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24 March 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2293

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KREISKY MEETING WITH QADDUMI REPORTED

TA081406 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Mar 81 p 2

[Text] "Faruq Qaddumi has reiterated to me that the PLO's firm position is that it will be willing to negotiate with Israel provided that the latter recognizes the Palestinians' right to self-determination and the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people." This is what Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky has told MA'ARIV correspondent Ben Segenreich, following Kreisky's second meeting with the PLO "foreign minister."

The Kreisky-Qaddumi meeting took place on the evening of 5 March in Kreisky's office. Afterwards Qaddumi met Austrian Foreign Minister Dr Willibald Pahr and then flew back to Beirut on Friday.

According to Chancellor Kreisky, the reason for the PLO's refusal to set up a Palestinian government in exile, in the spirit of President al-Sadat's proposal, is the PLO's unwillingness to place Palestinians residing in Arab countries in a dilemma. According to Qaddumi, the Palestinians who live in Jordan, for example, will encounter difficulties in adopting Palestinian citizenship. Kreisky added, however, that al-Sadat's idea could be realized at a later stage.

Kreisky admitted, contrary to his previous expectations, that he has not reached an understanding with Qaddumi over the cancellation of clauses calling for the destruction of Israel in the "Palestinian charter." According to the Austrian chancellor, the reason for the PLO objection to the cancellation is its reluctance to let go of its major negotiating asset before it has gained some kind of a concession from Israel.

CSO: 4820

CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AGREE ON ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 7 Feb 81 p 2

[Text]

CSO: 4820

PALESTINIAN GROUP CRITICIZES ITALIAN SECRET SERVICE

AU030856 Rome ANSA in English 0820 GMT 3 Mar 81

[Text] Beirut, 3 Mar (ANSA)--The Palestinian People's Liberation Front (PPLF) has levelled new charges against the Italian Secret Service "for cooperating with the United States intelligence service to discredit the Palestinians."

In a communique released to ANSA, the spokesman of the PPLF, whose leader is George Habash, said that "several Italian figures cooperate with the CIA and Mossad (the Israeli Secret Service, Ed.) to sabotage good relations between the Italian and Palestinian peoples."

Spokesman Mahmud (Suhuri) disclosed that his movement knows that "a colonel of the Italian Secret Service, accompanied by other officers, was in Lebanon a few weeks ago and made contact with Lebanese fascists linked to Mossad.

"We know all the details of this affair and will reveal them in due time."

A first round of charges against the Italian Secret Service was made Saturday by another PPLF spokesman.

Some reports which appeared recently in the Italian press linked the Palestinian People's Liberation Front with the Italian Red Brigades urban guerrilla organization.

The PPLF also made serious accusations against the Italian ambassador in Lebanon, who just recently completed his tour of duty here, charging that he is a "fascist."

The diplomat, Stefano d'Andrea, has declined to comment on the charges.

Monday's communique reiterated that the Habash-led Palestinian movement has "absolutely nothing to do with the Red Brigades."

"However, we will always be happy to say that we have excellent relations with all the democratic and progressive forces in Italy," (Suhuri) added.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

IRAQI LOAN TO MAURITANIA--Dr Louleid O. Weddad, minister of water resources and housing, arrived in Nouakchott Saturday evening after a working visit of several days to Iraq. While in Iraq the minister signed a $35 million (more than 1.5 billion Mauritanian ouguiyas) dollar loan agreement. The loan is being made to our country by Iraq. The loan will finance hospital, school and other educational-social institution types of construction. The minister also indicated that during the visit an agreement was struck with the Iraqi development fund to finalize the terms of carrying out programs in our country financed by Iraq within the framework of bilateral cooperation. The minister praised the cordial and fraternal atmosphere surrounding the activities of the Mauritanian-Iraqi mixed commission. He expressed his thankfulness for the warm welcome shown him during his visit by the Iraqi authorities. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 16 Feb 81 pp 1, 4]

KUWAITI LOAN TO MAURITANIA--The Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA) indicates in a dispatch datelined Kuwait that the Kuwaiti economic development fund has resolved to concede a 4.2 million Kuwaiti dinar loan to our country. The agency notes that the loan will be used to finance the highway from Espoir Nouakchott to Nema. It is repayable in 25 years. The loan falls under the excellent cooperation ties that link our country and the fraternal government of Kuwait. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 17-18 Feb 81 p 1]

CSO: 4400

ENERGY TALKS WITH ITALY PROMOTE ECONOMIC COOPERATION

Belkacem Nabi in Rome

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 6-7 Feb 81 p 1

[Text] Algeria and Italy are preparing to strengthen their cooperation in the energy field. Italy will receive 12 billion cubic meters of Algerian gas per year.

During a press conference held Friday in Rome Mr Belkacem Nabi, minister of energy and petrochemical industries, said Algeria would supply Italy with 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year and that this amount could be increased during current negotiations.

But Mr Nabi did make it clear that this quantity would only be reached according to transport capabilities and multilateral relations with other European countries.

Mr Nabi also said during the press conference that substitute sources of energy were discussed during the Algerian-Italian talks.

Finally the minister referred to the objectives of the quite exemplary cooperation between the two countries, the very heart of which is the energy field.

We note that Mr Balkacem Nabi will be received this morning by Mr Sandro Pertini, president of the Italian Republic, with Mr Omar Oussedik, Algerian Ambassador to Rome.

Mr Belkacem Nabi is also to meet the Italian prime minister Mr Forlani and the Italian minister of Foreign Affairs.

It may also be mentioned that the Algerian delegation will be invited today to a lunch given by the president of the Italian Republic.

Algerian-Italian Talks Begin

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 6-7 Feb 81 p 3

[Text] Algiers (APS) Mr Belkacem Nabi, member of the central committee, minister of energy and petrochemical industries, left Algiers Thursday morning for Rome

on an official visit to Italy from 5-7 February at the invitation of Mr Pandolfi, Italian minister of industry.

Mr Belkacem Nadi, who is leading a large delegation, will have talks in the Italian capital with a view to extending and strengthening cooperation between the two countries, particularly in the field of petrochemical industries, and will meet important personalities in the Italian government. This visit follows those made to Algeria in 1980 by the minister of industry and the president-general manager of ENI [National Fuel Agency].

Beginning of Algerian-Italian Talks

Rome (APS) The Algerian-Italian talks between Mr Belkacem Nabi, member of the central committee and minister of petrochemical industries, and Mr Piloppo Maria Pandolfi, Italian minister of industry, began last night in Rome.

Before taking up the key issue in the talks, the price of gas, the two ministers reviewed the cooperation between the two countries and expressed the hope of developing it further, in the interests of both countries, the more so since a solid political and economic basis already exists. In this connection Mr Balkacem Nabi said this meeting simply continues the dialogue which has already begun, and that the two countries have reason to be proud of the achievements each has attained. These include something quite unique in the world: the Algerian-Italian gas duct via Tunisia, which allows the two countries to best solidify the relations that can exist between Africa and Europe.

Mr Nabi said the gas duct, which extends nearly 2500 kilometers including an underwater section of 1588 km, is far from considered a traditional commercial operation. It allows the two countries to strengthen existing relations and direct their cooperation toward projects where the two countries can meet in both bilateral and multilateral contexts.

While during the talks the energy sector was considered as the fundamental element of Algerian-Italian relations, it is nonetheless true that the two parties have decided to direct their cooperation toward the future and to base it on and build it around these strong points of trade. Thus the two ministers decided on the principle of forming working groups to find ways to diversify trade, since Mr Pandolfi indicated during the talks that the plan for founding an Algerian-Italian bank is well under way and that Italy can offer financial and technical facilities in connection with developmental assistance.

Mr Pandolfi also recalled Italy's position concerning the north-south dialogue and said Algeria and Italy were an example which other countries could follow.

Taking up the question of the price of gas during the frank discussion, the two parties decided to seek formulas best adapted to their interests which reflect the facts of the international market. Thus the formula of requested prices [prix recherchee] should be a lever for the two national economies.

This formula ought to provide, on the one hand, a guarantee to preserve national wealth and an investment opportunity, and on the other hand it ought to ensure Italy secure consumption.

The two ministers in common agreement referred to the SONATRACH experts and to experts of the Italian company "ENI" [National Fuel Agency] the task of finding a balanced formula concerning the price of gas. The experts were to meet Friday (yesterday) in Rome.

Finally, it should be mentioned that Mr Omar Oussedik, Algerian ambassador accredited to Rome, attended the talks.

It is also to be noted that Mr Belkacem Rabi, accompanied by a ministry delegation, is also to have talks with several Italian authorities, in particular Mr Demitcheiis, minister of Italian state participation, and Mr Manoa, minister of foreign trade, and finally Mr Grandi, general manager of the Italian company "ENI."

This visit falls within the framework of the negotiations for setting up in early 1981 a large agreement for cooperation between the two countries.

9772
CSO: 4400

GULF INVESTMENT COMPANY PROFITS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Feb 81 p 12

[Text]

The Gulf Investment Company (GIC) has announced a profit of $44 million for the period from October 23, 1979, to the end of 1980. It was in October 1979 that GIC became Bahrain's most heavily over-subscribed company, when it put $4 million worth of shares on the market and attracted $8 billion worth of bids (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, January 12).

The company said in Bahrain last week that in lieu of paying cash dividends to its investors from the profits, it would give a bonus share for every ten held, and thus increase its paid-up capital from $125 million to $137.5 million. GIC directors said this had been decided in order to conserve the company's liquid assets for future investment.

Some of GIC's major investments since it started operations 14 months ago include real estate purchases in Paris, where GIC has a 30 per cent stake in a Kuwaiti holding in the Rhône-Poulenc complex on the Champs-Elysées (*An-Nahar Arabe Report & MEMO*, December 1, 1980). GIC has also bought a 10 per cent stake in United Gulf Bank, has set up an exempt company in Bahrain and has acquired 48 per cent of the Bahrain Light Industries Company.

GIC's total assets stand at $195 million, up $70 million from the original figure. These assets are reported to include $75 million in profits from trading in silver. About 2,000 investors from Kuwait own 70 per cent of the $100 million in privately-held capital, while 50 shareholders from Bahrain own another 20 per cent.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

GULF INTERNATIONAL BANK PROFITS--The Bahrain-based Gulf International Bank may announce profits of $20 million or more for 1980, its fourth year of operation. Last November GIB announced nine-months profits of $11.3 million, and the bank's general manager has been quoted as saying recently that the figure will be "almost double" for the whole year. Last month GIB called up additional investments to bring its paid-up capital to $180 million, as it seeks to consolidate its position as a leader in the syndicated loan market. Owned by the seven Gulf Arab states, the bank is managing loans worth a total of $11 billion, allowing GIB to claim that it ranks 37th in the world. At the end of 1980 the bank's position looked as follows: $1.58 billion in deposits at interest and certificates of deposit, compared to $807 million a year earlier; $90 million in the bond portfolio against $45 million in 1979; $1.32 billion in loans, up from $542 million the previous year; $2.64 billion in time deposits against $1.25 billion; subscribed capital of $265 million, compared to $106 million in 1979; paid-up capital was at $106 million, increasing to $180 million in January; total assets stood at $2.9 billion against $1.14 billion, the previous year. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 9 Feb 81 pp 11-12]

CSO: 4820

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR BUDGET DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM [Public Security] in Arabic No 90, Jul 80 pp 75-80

[Article by Maj Gen Muhammad Fawi 'Usr: "State's General Budget and Ministry of Interior's Budget"]

[Text] Definition: The state's general budget is the financial framework for a specific fiscal year—a framework including all the revenues expected to be collected and all the estimated expenditures. The fiscal year consists of 12 months, begins with the first day of July and ends with the last day of the following June.(1)

General Principles on Which General Budget Is Based:

In view of the importance of the general budget in the state system and activity and in implementing the state plans in such a manner as to give them an effective and positive role, it has been agreed that the budget should be based on four principles, namely:

1. Duration: A full year is the right duration for the budget. The start and end of the year differ from country to country, depending on the agricultural production conditions and the conditions involving other kinds of production. Therefore, it is wrong for the [general] budget to cover a half year or one quarter a year.

Comprehensiveness: Because the budget includes all the revenues expected to be collected and expenditures estimated to be spent, the state revenues list should include all the state revenues, regardless of how varied, and the expenditures list should include all kinds of expenditures. On the basis of this principle, it is not permissible to collect a certain revenue in order to meet a certain expense.

For example, the wages of workers in a certain department may not be disbursed from the revenues accruing from the sale of certain papers or applications which this department sells.

3. Clarity: It means that the budget must be clear and divided into accurate and regular units and charts so as to make it easy to find any figure in the budget and to learn the purpose for including the figure and the goal it seeks to realize.

4. Flexibility: This principle is intended for dealing with all circumstances and eventualities. This is why the budget includes appropriations through which sudden and unexpected expenses not taken into consideration at time of preparation of the budget can be dealt with.

(1) Law No 104 of 1980.

Phases of Preparation of State's General Budget

The constitution defines the powers exercised by the government, including the power of preparing the draft general budget.

This draft is presented to the legislative authority in the name of the government and is considered an embodiment of the government's policy and a declaration of the program that the government intends to carry out.

The financial regulations concerning the budget and its calculations have summed up the phases through which preparation of the state's general budget passes until it reaches its final legal form in the following:

First, the annual revenues and expenditures are estimated with the knowledge of the heads of the departments and of the ministries and are then presented to the Ministry of Finance to examine them and combine them in a single book.

Second, the general budget—the revenues and the expenditures—are divided into chapters approved by the legislative authority (the People's Assembly) and the chapters are then divided into provisions. This division is decided upon with the knowledge of the Ministry of Finance and no modification may be introduced to it without the permission of the Ministry of Finance.

The provisions are then divided into categories and shifts and modifications within these categories are within the power of the departments, ministries and the financial comptroller.

Third, estimates of the revenues are presented to the Ministry of Finance in statements outlining the kinds of revenue, the allocations tied to them in the current budget, the allocations required to be tied to them in the following year and the reasons for the difference, if such a difference exists.

It is to be noted that the estimates should be based on the value of the original revenues without subtracting the collection costs.

These estimates must also be coupled with a statement of the statistics on whose basis the estimate is made, with reference to the factors that may affect the estimates during the year.

Fourth, estimates of the expenditures are also presented to the Ministry of Finance in statements outlining the kinds of expenditures, the sums allocated for them in the current budget and the sums required to be allocated for the next year, the reasons for the job positions to be introduced or abolished and the reasons for increases or reductions in the allocations made for the expenditures.

Fifth, revenue estimates must reach the Ministry of Finance at the beginning of February and expenditure estimates at the beginning of March, keeping in mind that the Ministry of Finance may assess the expenditures received after the set date on the basis of the current year's budget and of the modifications introduced to it.

Sixth, the Ministry of Finance presents to the People's Assembly the final accounts of the state's general budget, including the revenues and the expenses, at least 2 months before the end of the fiscal year so that the Assembly may discuss and approve

them [1]. If the new budget is not approved before the end of the current fiscal year, the rules governing the old budget will continue to be observed until the new budget is approved.[2]

Seventh, after ratification by the People's Assembly and after the president issues a law binding the state's general budget, the Ministry of Finance sends each budget to the department concerned, outlining the expenditures in chapters, sections, provisions and so forth.

Budget of Ministry of Interior

After the preceding introduction, we will try in this part to present a simple review of the Ministry of Interior's budget insofar as only the expenditures are concerned.

This review will cover the powers of the Ministry of Finance, the common mistakes, the budget chapters, as well as a simplified review of the various provisions and categories.

By persuing the state's general budget book, we find that the budget is divided into several sectors, each of which consists of several sections covering similar activities.

The budget of the Ministry of the Interior is within the defense, security and justice sector and forms a part of their budget.

The ministry's budget is divided into three branches:

First branch: The General Bureau

Second Branch: Security and Police.

Third Branch: Prisons.

Each of the first two branches is divided into several chapters, as follows:

Branch 1, General Bureau:

This branch covers 10 chapters arranged as follows:

Chapter 1, the General Bureau (which includes the minister's office, the assistant ministers' offices, the inspection and planning offices, the officers' affairs, the personnel affairs, the general administrative affairs department and other agencies and departments not included in the following sections.

Chapter 2: The Police Academy.

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(1) Article 76 of the constitution.

(2) General circular by Ministry of Finance No 57/45/13M, Renewed and repeated on 28 December 1957.

Chapter 3: Civil Status Affairs.

Chapter 4: The Travel, Immigration, Passport and Citizenship Documents Agency.

Chapter 5: The Criminal Investigation Agency.

Chapter 6: The Civil Defense Agency.

Chapter 7: The State Security Agency.

Chapter 8: The Public Security Agency.

Chapter 9: The General Department for Police Supply.

Chapter 10: The Training Agency.

Branch 2: The Security and Police:

This branch includes the following three chapters:

Chapter 1: The Police [Department] which includes the security directorates.

Chapter 2: The Port Security Agency.

Chapter 3: The Central Security [Department].

Chapter 1 of Branch 1—the General Bureau—is divided into the following four sections:

Section One

This section includes two groups:

A. Group one which includes the cash wages and allowances.

B. Group two which includes the in-kind and cash benefits.

Section Two

This section includes three groups:

A. Group one which is concerned with commodity requirements.

B. Group two which is concerned with service requirements.

C. Group three which is concerned with current remittances (covering taxes, fees on goods and rent).

Section Three

This section is concerned with the investment allocations for the ministry's investment projects, including:

A. Armament.

B. Means of land transportation.

C. Means of water [presumably river and marine] transportation.

D. Equipment and furnishings.

E. Buildings.

F. Horses.

Section Four

This section concerns the capital remittances and is divided into two divisions, one concerned with repaying local loans and their interest and the second concerned with repaying foreign loans and their interest.

The remaining chapters of Branch 1 and all chapters of Branch 2 and Branch 3 include only two sections each, namely section one and section two, as already pointed out.

In view of the fact that each of the aforementioned groups contains several provisions and each provision several categories, we will cite them very briefly, coupling each group with its special budget number so that it may be found easily when necessary and may be used soundly:

First, Branch 1, Chapter 1:

Section One

A. Group One (cash wages and allowances) which includes the following provisions:

Provision 1: Permanent jobs.

Provision 2: Comprehensive remunerations.

Provision 3: Personnel on loan whose salaries are shouldered by the budget.

Provision 4: Costs of academic leaves of absence and of training grants.

Provision 5: Remunerations.

Provision 6: Salaries and allowances.

B. Group two (in-kind and cash benefits) which includes two provisions:

Provision 1: In-kind benefits.

Provision 2: Cash benefits.

Section Two

A. Group one-Commodity Requirements:

Provision 1: Raw materials, including:

Category 1: Main raw materials.

Category 2: Auxiliary raw materials.

Provision 2: Fuels, Oils and Motive Forces, including:

1. Engines. 2. Oil derivatives. 3. Lubrication and oiling materials.

Provision 3: Equipment spareparts, including:

Category 1: Spareparts and maintenance materials. Category 2: Various equipment and materials.

Provision 4: Packaging and wrapping materials (one category).

Provision 5: Stationary and books, including four categories: 1. Stationary, 2. Books, magazines and library documents. 3. Notebooks. 4. Other printed materials, such as file books and account books of small value.

Provision 6: Water, lighting, electricity and gas, including: Category 1: Water. Category 2: Lighting.

Provision 7. Small equipment and furnishings.

Because of the importance of this last provision and of its varied categories, we will mention in the following the categories of the provision concerning the ministry:

Category 1: Furniture.

Category 2: Office supplies.

Category 3: Iron safes and filing cabinets.

Category 4: Teaching equipment and audio-visual aids.

Category 5: Typewriters.

Category 7 [no 6]: Computers and statistical machines.

Category 8: Printing machinery.

Category 9: Scales.

Category 10: Heating and cooling equipment.

Category 11: Gardening tools.

Category 12: Photography equipment.

Category 13: Musical instruments.

Category 14: Athletic equipment.

Category 15: Fire control equipment.

Category 16: Tents and field equipment.

Category 18 [no 17]: (Food service utensils).

Category 20: Medical equipment.

Category 21: Animals and birds [livestock and poultry].

Category 22: Other furnishings.

B. Group 2 (service requirements) including:

Provision 1: Maintenance costs consisting of the following categories:

Category 2: Building and installation maintenance and repair work and minor works in government buildings.

Category 3: Maintenance of facilities and networks.

Category 5: Equipment and machinery maintenance.

Category 6: Maintenance of means of transportation.

Category 7: Maintenance of office equipment.

Provision 2: Research and experimental services.

Provision 3: Publication, advertising, propaganda and reception, including:

Category 1: Publication and advertising costs.

Category 2: Public affairs and public relations costs.

Provision 4: Printing costs, including:

Category 1: Printing costs.

Category 2: Subscriptions to magazines and newspapers.

Category 3: Purchases of copyrights.

Category 4: Encouraging writers and writing.

Category 5: Costs of publishing cultural magazines and publications.

Provision 5: Public transportation, transfers and communications, including:

Category 1: Transportation of equipment by railroad.

Category 2: Public transportation of personnel and others by railroad.

Category 3: Public transportation and transfers by other means.

Category 4: Transfer allowances.

Category 5: Telephones.

Category 6: Teleprinter.

Category 7: Ticker [sic].

Category 8: Mail.

Provision 6: Leasing equipment and transportation means including:

Category 1: Leasing statistical and computer equipment.

Category 2: Leasing tents and chairs.

Category 3: Leasing transportation means.

Provision 7: Costs of services of agencies and organizations.

Provision 8: Foreign subscriptions, taxes and fees.

Provision 9: Costs of cultural relations and foreign cooperation.

Provision 10: Service costs for non-personnel, including:

Category 2: Social and athletic activity for non-personnel.

Category 5: Awards and medals.

Provision 11: Costs of training programs.

Provision 12: Unexpected and confidential costs, including:

Category 1: Confidential costs.

Category 2: Unexpected costs.

Provision 13: Varied service costs, including:

Category 1: Insurance.

Category 2: Costs of holidays and celebrations.

Category 4: Costs of holding fairs, museums [sic] and conferences at home.

Category 6: Burial costs.

Category 7: Varied other service costs and illiterary eradication costs.

G. Group 3: Current remittances, including:

Provision 3: Rent (category 1 for land and category 3 for warehouses, garages and buildings).

Category 4: Local interest payments.

Provision 5: Foreign interest payments.

Section Three

Its projects have already been explained and they include no provisions or categories.

Section Four

This section concerns capital remittances and is divided into two divisions, one for repayment of local loans and one for repayment of foreign loans.

We also wish to remind that the other chapters of Branch 1 and all the chapters of Branch 2 and Branch 3 include only two sections, namely sections 1 and 2, as already explained. Each section includes groups, each group provisions and each provision categories, according to the above details.

Financial Authorities to Dispose of Budget Appropriations

First, Agency Heads:

A. The heads of agencies may dispose of the sums allocated for each provision without permit and in accordance with the agency needs, provided that the estimated total appropriation allocated for the provision involved is not exceeded.

B. Agency heads may be permitted to exceed the appropriation for a provision by one tenth the sum of the appropriation or 1,000 pounds, whichever is bigger, provided that the excess doesn't surpass 10,000 pounds and provided that the other provisions of the section contain a sufficient surplus.

Second, General Director of Financial Control:

(Shall have the power to spend whatever sums exceed the power of an agency head) up to one quarter a provision's allocations or 5,000 pounds, whichever is bigger, provided that the quarter does not exceed 25,000 pounds and with the same conditions [sic].

Third, the Ministry of Finance shall have the power to license spending whatever sums exceed this limit.

As for transfers from one section to another, the People's Assembly approval must be acquired for such transfers. The same applies to every expense not listed in the budget or exceeding its estimates.

General Restrictions

1. No additional appropriations may be made unless the need arises and only after the Financial Center examines the original allocations, finds it impossible to avoid the request and secures an equal surplus to cover the additional appropriations from the total appropriations and provided this is subject to the control of the Central Accounting Agency.

No commitment shall be made to an expenditure until the additional appropriation is approved by the legislative authority. Such a request [for additional appropriations] must be submitted 3 months before the end of the fiscal year.

2. Insofar as new activities are concerned, a permit may be given for exceeding the total estimate listed in the budget for a new activity in return for an equal reduction in the total estimate for other activities.

It is within the power of the general director of financial control to issue such a permit if the excess is no more than one tenth the estimate or 1,000 pounds, whichever is bigger, so that the tenth may not exceed 10,000 pounds [sic]. The Ministry of Finance shall issue the permits for any excess greater than this sum. As for new works listed in the budget and not handed over or completed in the year in which they are expected to be completed or handed over, the undersecretary concerned may deduct the estimated expenses of such activities in that particular year from the budget of the following year, even if no allocations are made for these activities in the new budget. However, it is conditional that the expenses permitted in this manner be within the limits of the costs previously approved for these activities in the preceding budget and provided that such a permit does not result in exceeding the total appropriation for the section concerned.

3. The government may not conclude a contract or make commitments to a project resulting in the spending of state treasury funds in a future year or years without the approval of the People's Assembly.

4. Regarding the employment, leasing, maintenance and supply contracts, they may be concluded for a period of no more than one year, provided that they do not result in increasing the appropriations of the provisions concerned in the subsequent fiscal years and provided that a contract's duration does not exceed 3 years, unless the prior permission of the Ministry of Finance is acquired.

5. Contracts extending beyond the fiscal year may be concluded for works whose implementation lasts more than one year when such works are indivisible, provided that the value of the contracts concerning them does not exceed the total expenditures listed in the budget and approved by the legislative authority and provided that the contracts are concluded with the approval of the Ministry of Finance.

6. Contracts for divisible works shall be confined to the part permitted by the appropriation in the budget of the year in which this part is carried out. Should the need arise for concluding a contract for a part of the work that lasts beyond the fiscal year and if the sum contracted exceeds the appropriation, then the contract shall not be concluded without the approval of the Ministry of Finance.

7. No request for additional appropriations shall be accepted in the last 3 months of the fiscal year. Therefore, the authorities concerned must examine what they need in advance and must take the necessary precautions to submit requests of the kind to the Ministry of Finance before this date.

8. Bonded appropriations in the budget and additional appropriations not spent by the end of the fiscal year shall become null and void.

Further Powers and Instructions

1. The state's general budget instructions concerning the Ministry of Interior permit the transfer of allocations from the provisions of section two to the three branches.

2. The same applies to the instructions pertaining to the recreation expenditures listed within category 17--varied other service expenditures--as follows:

The recreation spending for the second class forces shall be within the limits of the total revenues collected from (canteen) rents "after exclusion of (similar rents), the music band, the (food) sold and seven percent of the revenues collected from the use of the noncommissioned officers and second class soldiers in private parties for each unit separately [sic].

3. The seniority of officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers and civilian personnel shall be the same in the ministry's various branches.

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INTERIOR MINISTRY'S TRAINING FACILITIES, PROGRAMS EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 90, Jul 80 pp 100-103

[Article by Col Jamil Farajallah Khalil: "Futuristic View of Ministry of Interior's Training Organizations"]

[Text] Preface

On 28 November 1966, ministerial decree No 156 was issued, setting up and organizing the Central Training Department which was then raised to the level of agency by republican decree No 1287 of 1967 so as to combine the training organizations in a single central outfit. In the middle of 1975, law No 91 of 1975 on the Police Academy was issued, entrusting this academy with the powers of training the police officers while maintaining the quality of centralized training at the ministry. Will the future bring further development and in what direction?

Group Specialization:

What law No 91 of 1975 added insofar as the Police Academy is concerned is the entrenchment of group specialization, considering that it combined the police officers' educational and training activities in a complete organizational structure that guarantees greater coordination in the policies of educating and teaching police officers, provided that the training agency exercise the same powers insofar as the noncommissioned officers, policemen and civilian personnel of the police authority are concerned.

We are not about to evaluate here the role of each of the central agencies concerned with training affairs, meaning the Police Academy, the Training and Development College and the Training Agency. What we are concerned with in this regard is to underline the signs of an expected transformation in the organizational map of the ministry's training structure—a transformation resulting from the change in the general atmosphere which engulfed the creation of the Central Training Department in 1966. This transformation can be predicted and summed up in a single phrase, namely the "inclination toward localization" while preserving a limited degree of centralism in a manner different from what is prevalent at present.

Requirements of Transformation From Centralism:

In 1966, the material training resources, such as sites and equipment, were considered a nucleus capable of growth and expansion. The planners of training activity believed that this activity was destined to flourish at the central level whereas training at the local level was to continue to be embodied in some refresher

courses that would not go beyond the limit of short-term refresher programs. But the actual circumstances led the training systems to a path different from that estimated for them in the bureaucratic planning. This was due to the following reasons:

First, the conditions of the extensive construction development and of the housing crisis led to rising land prices in the capital and to obstructing the expansion of training sites, except in remote areas and only to a limited degree. The sites thus remained relatively unchanged and became inadequate for the growing training needs of the ministry's agencies.

Second, the change in the workforce structure after the October 1973 war and the accompanying manifestations embodied in the decreasing numbers of (cadets), the citizens' refrainment from taking up the jobs of noncommissioned officers and policemen, the acceptance of increased numbers of illiterates to the jobs of noncommissioned officers and policemen and the expanded use of recruits in activities other than those of guard duty and of breaking up demonstrations.

All the above needs training requirements. They also require greater technical, moral and material resources to meet them than is currently available at the central level.

Third, the scientific and technological development in the security utility's equipment has been accompanied by similar expansion in the purely technical and specialized training programs which are impossible to implement except on the work site. The use of the same modern equipment and apparatuses far from the work site would be futile even if the latest training means and aides are used to simulate such equipment.

Fourth, the ministry's tendency in the early 1970's to implement the policy of resettlement for the officers and policemen of the police agency in the security directorates. This approach contributed to the emergence of increased numbers of students [in the police force] who declined to come to the capital to receive training. This manifestation was further compounded by the existing problems of residence, transportation and communication, not to forget the travel expenses shouldered by the student—expenses that have multiplied in recent years.

Fifth, the state's tendency to apply the system of decentralization and the accompanying executive decrees issued by the Ministry of Interior, of which the most outstanding is perhaps the decree dividing the security directorates into geographic districts, each headed by an assistant minister of interior.

Sixth, the country's march toward the phase of peace after suffering from a series of wars requires, as a consequence, developing the training policies in a manner that is concerned with studying the geographic districts, especially the liberated parts of the homeland, with finding the indicators of the needs of each district separately and with establishing and carrying out training courses compatible with the social and criminal manifestations in each district.

Seventh, taking into consideration the group denied training, especially civilian female workers whose family circumstances prevent them from moving from the remote security directorates to the capital to receive training.

Because of all of these reasons and of other considerations which cannot be reviewed here, the futuristic view of the training activity should require this training to be compatible organizationally with the expected changes.

Available Alternatives and Solutions:

The Ministry of Interior's training plan is faced with the presence of the following alternatives:

1. Determining the training priorities in light of the available resources and in a manner that responds to the urgent training requirements while postponing the other requirements until the resources become bigger. This is a hope whose realization may take long.

2. Shorten the duration of the training programs being implemented in order to make the opportunity available for conducting the largest number possible of training courses.

The obstacle facing this alternative is one connected with the fear of undermining the training efficiency and of increasing the number of officers and personnel members withdrawn for training purposes, thus placing a heavy burden on the shoulders of the agencies concerned with operational affairs.

3. Resorting to firmness in dealing with the manifestation of students declining to attend training courses.

This course is flawed by its incompatibility with the scientific rules of education which dictate that the student have the desire and the motive to learn and to be trained. However, what we are facing at present is a humanitarian problem primarily and it is better to deal with it objectively.

4. Turning toward localization and conducting specialization training courses in the local training agencies.

But it is impossible scientifically to implement this alternative in an absolute manner. Transferring the entire burden to the local training agencies means nothing other than saddling these agencies with a heavier burden than they can shoulder and without realizing any progress in training at that.

Proposed Alternative:

In view of all of the above considerations which are becoming increasingly acute with time and to avoid the undesirable consequences resulting from these considerations--consequences that may not be possible to obviate in the future--we will present in the following our futuristic view of the organizational conditions of the training agencies of the Ministry of Interior:

Local Agencies:

The local training agencies include a training center, a section for the security forces and a training department, section or unit. Therefore, it is better to unite the efforts of adjacent directorates and to combine their resources so that they may undertake implementing the specialization training programs in which students can enroll from among the personnel of these directorates. The resources for conducting these programs can be made available at the level of the district and not the directorate and the human expertise for conducting them can be secured, especially since regional universities have spread throughout the republic and since it has become relatively easy to enlist the help of university professors. The help of expert veteran officers, personnel and commanders in each district can also be enlisted

The matter will require no more than preparing and developing a training center in every district, building a number of suitable lecture halls and securing the financial appropriations needed for paying instructions and spending on training activities.

The higher administration of the training complex will be entrusted to a board of directors including the directors of security in each district and headed by the district's assistant minister of interior.

The progress of work in the training complex will be supervised by a director with the right rank and aided by a number of qualified training officers, provided that they follow administratively the technical office of the assistant minister of interior in the district. This realizes the following:

Deeper study of the manifestations of each province.

Realizing the meeting of students [trainees] with the security and local government leaders, thus making the training realistic and strengthening the various forms of cooperation between the police and the local government.

Making residence and transportation easier for the students as a result of the short distance between the training complex and the security directorates from which they come.

Spreading and entrenching training awareness as a result of participation by the leaders in formulating the executive policies for the training activity in each district.

Proceeding to conduct specialization training courses in the manner compatible with the needs of each district.

Lifting the burden from the shoulders of the central training agencies whose role must be developed in the following manner:

Central Training Agencies:

A. Educational Installations:

It is more appropriate for the development to include:

A change in the quality of the training courses so that they may complement those conducted at the regional level and so that they may become more specialized.

Conduct the training courses that require material and technical resources exceeding the equipment, facilities and technical expertise available at the local level.

Gather trainees from the various districts for the training courses that cannot be held at the training complex due to the small number of trainees in each district.

B. Central Agencies:

In light of the above visualization, the logic of affairs requires combining and integration of the central agencies in charge of planning and designing programs

and formulating training policies for the various groups. This logic also requires the presence of technical supervision over the progress of central and local training, securing training assistance, preparing the references necessary for training, reviewing the reports of instructors and providing guidance and control, provided that the powers of the agencies in charge are purely technical. As for administrative supervision over the training installations, it should be as limited as possible and should exist only to the degree that guarantees sound implementation and coordination of the training programs of the various groups in the different districts.

It is worth noting that the concept of training complexes is in force in the United Kingdom where more than one county [muqata'ah] participate in building a modern complex for training police members. I had the opportunity to stay in one of these complexes and to familiarize myself with its various sections throughout an entire week when I was sent to this complex on a training scholarship at the beginning of 1972. It was an experience worth studying and researching.

To conclude, the futuristic view of the training organization in the Ministry of Interior reflects an objective view in this regard. I have dealt with some broad lines and main ideas of a proposed general framework that can later dwell on numerous details.

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DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT TRACED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 89, Apr 80 pp 43-50

[Article by Brig Gen Fakh-al-Din Khalid 'Abduh, director of Public Relations Department; "Creation and Development of Organizational Structure of Public Relations Department"]

[Text] What is meant by organization of the Public Relations Department is to combine the responsibilities within the public relations jurisdiction and of the same nature in one of the Public Relations Department's sections or units.

There are three main methods to organize the Public Relations Department:

First Method:

The method of the means of communication or the functional method: What is meant here is to distribute the responsibilities and the work among the various sections and units of the Public Relations Department according to the kind of work or function with which each section or unit is concerned.

There is the press section, the radio section, the cinema and television section, the symposiums section, the fairs section, the protocol section and so forth.

Second Method:

Method of Mass Groups:

What is meant here is the distribution of responsibilities among the public relations sections and departments on the basis of communication or relations with the various groups of the masses who have relations with the organization within which the public relations outfit operates. There is the internal relations section which is concerned with the organization's personnel, the consumer relations section which is concerned with the public that consumes the commodity produced by the organization, the suppliers relations section, the press relations section and other sections, each of which is concerned with a certain public connected with the organization.

Third Method:

This is what we may call the combined method. What is meant here is that kind of method of organization which combines the two aforementioned methods and that distributes the work between sections that are concerned with a certain function, such

as information, and other sections that vary with the various relations with different kinds of public, such as the internal public section and the external public section.

These are the methods on whose basis a public relations department can be organized. It remains for us to review the creation and development of the organizational structure of the Public Relations Department of the Ministry of Interior.

Creation of Public Relations [Department] in Ministry of Interior:

On 28 January 1953, the Council of Ministers issued a decree setting up public relations offices in the various ministries on the strength of a memorandum submitted to the council by the Ministry of National Culture and Guidance.

On February 1953, the then minister of interior issued a decree setting up a public relations office at the Ministry of Interior with the responsibility of contacting the papers and supplying them with the ministry's news and of facilitating the task of journalists in getting the data and information they wanted.

This office acted as a liaison between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of National Culture and Guidance, represented in the Public Information Authority.

It is evident that these offices were not public relations offices in the currently acknowledged technical and scientific sense of the word. Rather, they were more of press offices in each ministry. The most important responsibilities actually carried out by those offices were:

Disseminate news pleasing to the public.

Receive journalists and try to contain their activities in the ministries so that they may not get hold of any news or reports which a ministry was eager not to make known.

Carry out some protocol activities, such as receptions, parties and so forth.

It is evident from the above that there was no sound understanding of the public relations message and that the wrong practices underlined the wrong understanding of the role of public relations. This is still one of the major problems being experienced by public relations in our society.

On 11 January 1962, a ministerial decree was issued raising the office to the level of a department. The Public Affairs Department was thus set up and its components were defined as follows:

The planning and followup section.

The information and moral guidance section.

The foreign relations section.

The management and secretariat section.

On 11 October 1962, another ministerial decree was issued annexing the complaints office to the Public Affairs Department and considering that office one of the department's sections.

A ministerial decree was then issued on 20 April 1964 annexing the People's Assembly Affairs Office to the Public Affairs Department. Even though the public relations outfit is eager to have constant contact with the tendencies and opinions developing among the people's representatives and with the discussions in the parliamentary council concerning the Ministry of Interior, yet the function of the People's Assembly Affairs Office is of a particular nature that is outside the interests of the Public Relations Department.

Though annexation of the complaints office to the Public Relations Department has a definite practical benefit—namely that through analyzing these complaints, the Public Relations Department can be in touch with some of the masses' inclinations and can put its finger on some of the public opinion pulses—the nature of this office's work falls primarily within the core of the jurisdiction of the control agencies from which the public relations can get indicators of the public opinion.

Practically, the protocol functions, embodied in receptions, parties and in arranging the minister's movements and appointments, continued to predominate the activity of the Public Affairs Department in its new form of organization.

However, right signs did appear on the path and the scientific and technical concept of public relations began to get gradually clear to the minds of those in charge of the work. A somewhat sound exercise of public relations emerged, considering that public relations are a common language between an organization, those working in it and those dealing with it. Through this common language, public relations have to create a state of social adaptation between the organization and its workers and then between the organization and those dealing with it—adaptation based on mutual understanding and trust to insure the organization's success and progress.

Interest in studying and analyzing the public opinion then started and this interest urged the organization to find out the rational public opinion tendencies, considering that this is the cornerstone in building sound relations between the organization and society and between the organization and its workers.

However, we can now say that the action was [not] based on the planned and well-studied scientific method but relied on the personal capabilities and opinions of those in charge of the work and on their certain desire to develop and enhance the work.

Reorganization of Public Affairs Department in 1965:

As a result of the good efforts exerted by the Public Affairs Department personnel, the Ministry of Interior generally and the police agency in particular began to feel the importance of the public relations and of the work they carry out. Moreover, action and the desire to learn and to develop gave the department personnel extensive experience and created in them the desire to organize the department on a sound basis. This wish received the support of the ministry leaderships and ministerial decree No 969 of 1965 was issued to reorganize the Public Affairs Department in the following manner:

First, the Director.

Second, sections and units:

1. Information Section:

The radio, cinema and television unit.

The press and publication unit.

2. The Internal Relations Section:

The social relations unit.

The cultural relations unit.

3. The Foreign Relations Section:

Society's Relations unit.

The Foreign Relations unit.

4. The Financial and Administrative Affairs Section:

The administrative affairs unit.

The financial affairs unit.

The secretariat unit.

5. The Complaints Section. 6. The People's Assembly Affairs Unit. 7. The Technical Research Unit.

Establishment of Moral Guidance Section at Department:

On 23 December 1966, ministerial decree No 168 was issued establishing a new section in the department, namely the Moral Guidance Section.

Change of Department's Name to Public Relations Department:

On 23 July 1971 and in the wake of the correction revolution, ministerial decree No 1219 was issued to organize the Human Relations Department of the Ministry of Interior. Some of the functions of the Public Affairs Department were transferred to this department. In accordance with the decree, the name of the Public Affairs Department was also changed to that of the Public Relations Department.

Organization of Department in 1971:

On 5 August 1971, the Public Relations Department was reorganized in accordance with ministerial decree No 1398 which set up the department's organizational structure as follows:

First, Department Chairmanship.

Second: Administrative divisions:

1. The Information Section:

The radio, cinema and television unit.

The press and publication unit.

2. The Internal Relations Section: This section's functions are restricted to implementing the department's plan in the sphere of the activities connected with the cultural relations concerning officers, policemen and (civilian) personnel of the police agency and to proposing the development and strengthening of this plan whenever the need arises.

As for the social relations activities, they were transferred to the Human Relations Department.

3. The Foreign Relations Section:

Society's relations unit.

The foreign relations unit.

4. The Administrative and Financial Affairs Section:

The administrative affairs unit.

The financial affairs unit.

The secretariat unit.

5. Technical Research Unit:

It is noticed that the Complaints Section and the People's Assembly Affairs Unit are excluded from the organizational structure of the Public Relations Department and that the first has been annexed to the Public Inspection Department and the second to the control of the minister's office.

Thus, the public relations began to exercise their scientifically acknowledged functions.

However, it later became evident from action that there was an urgent need to reorganize the Public Relations Department once again for the following reasons:

1. When the department was organized, decree No 1398 of 1971 forgot to set up the second supervisory level of the department chairmanship and thus the department lacked an agency to manage the public relations.

2. Insofar as the Internal Relations Section is concerned, its activity became restricted to the department's cultural relations plan, dropping the department's moral guidance activity whereas this activity is closely connected with the department's work in the sphere of educating the police members.

It is needless to say that what is meant by the department's activity for the cultural welfare of the police agency members is that activity that seeks to enlighten

them as to the ideal means of dealing with the citizens, to make them aware of the positive and negative factors that affect this relationship with the citizens either positively or negatively and to stress the concept of public relations in their minds.

3. Insofar as the protocol activities are concerned, they were not entrusted under the aforementioned organization to a particular section or unit and this caused this function to spread in all the administrative sections. This approach caused the protocol activities at times to predominate the department's other activities because the protocol activities are most often connected with the ministry's leadership.

Insofar as the foreign relations section is concerned, it has been noted that it included a unit for society's relations and another unit for foreign relations whereas the acknowledged tradition, insofar as the expression foreign relations is concerned, is that these relations always mean those relations that extend beyond the homeland.

Moreover, society's relations are of major significance insofar as relations generally are concerned and insofar as the policeman in particular is concerned. This is why these relations should be elevated to the level of a section.

5. It has also been noted that the attention given to the Information Section led to ignoring the other means of communication with society—means that are beyond the mass communication means. Therefore, an urgent need developed to set up a section for society's relations to undertake this task.

For all these reasons, it was deemed necessary to reorganize the Public Relations Department. So, decree No 2412 of 1976 was issued, taking into consideration most of the previous observations. Following are the articles of this decree:

Article 1. The Public Relations Department is one of the agencies under the control of the minister and is concerned with exerting efforts to strengthen the good relations between the police agency and the masses and to gain the masses' confidence so that it may attain stronger cooperation between these two sides. The department shall also exert efforts to develop police awareness among the citizens so as to guarantee the curbing of crime and the apprehension of crime perpetrators.

The department is also concerned with taking care of the cultural and recreational affairs of the police officers and members by developing the bonds of friendship and cooperation among them in a manner that guarantees the good progress of work within a framework of cooperation and amity.

Article 2. The organizational structure of the Public Relations shall be formed, its work shall be carried out and its jurisdiction shall be divided as follows:

First, Department Chairmanship:

The department shall be chaired by a director who will have the power to supervise the department's various administrative sections. The director shall also supervise technically the public relations units in the ministry's agencies, its general administration and in the security directorates and shall coordinate their efforts in this sphere. The director shall also supervise directly the planning and follow-up unit.

Second, Department's Deputy Chairman:

The second level supervision shall be entrusted to a deputy director who shall assist the director in supervising the department's sections and who shall deputize for the director when the former is absent.

Third, Administrative Divisions:

The Department shall include five sections and a major unit, namely:

1. The Information Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's information plan, with the help of all the available information means, the radio, the television, the press, the cinema, fairs and publications.

This section shall include the following subsidiary units:

The radio unit:

This unit shall be concerned with whatever pertains to the radio activities connected with the police, including:

Preparing radio recordings concerned with highlighting the police efforts and with familiarizing the citizens with the police services.

Offering technical advice on radio programs connected with or affecting the Ministry of Interior.

Preparing the programs connected with developing police awareness among the masses and exerting efforts to broadcast such programs on various occasions.

Supervising the special radio programs concerned with serving the police goals.

Strengthening the relations with those in charge of the radio agencies and gaining their confidence and cooperation.

Cinema and television unit:

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's plans through the cinema and television, including:

Producing the cinema and television films necessary to bolster the relations between the police and the masses, to familiarize the masses with the services offered them by the ministry and to strengthen police awareness among the masses to fight crime.

Producing training and educational films that seek to raise the efficiency of the police officers and policemen and the ministry personnel.

Encouraging organizations and firms to produce propaganda films that highlight the police message and that strengthen awareness of the police services.

Offering advice on the script of television programs and cinema films that deal with the police so as to make sure that whatever undermines the police and police workers is avoided.

Discussing participation by the police forces and agencies in cinema and television scenes that enhance the prestige of the police and highlight the police development, all in accordance with the instructions regulating such activity.

Organizing recreational and educational movie shows for the police forces.

Exchanging movie films with other countries in order to enhance the benefit and to familiarize these countries with the modern development of the police agency.

Developing the relations and ties with those in charge of the cinema and television agencies in order to gain their confidence and cooperation.

Proposing purchase of the projection equipment, laboratories and instruments necessary for implementing the department's plan in this sphere.

Filing and preserving the books, recordings and movie films which the department deems fit to be preserved in order to be used when the need arises.

The press and publication unit:

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's information plan, with the help of the press and the various means of publication. This activity includes:

Preparing a daily summary of what the papers and magazines publish on the activities of the ministry and its branches.

Preparing replies to the articles, complaints or commentaries published by the press.

Organizing conferences and press interviews to highlight the police efforts and the police services to the masses.

Bolstering the relations with those working in the press in order to contribute to their understanding of the police message and to enhance their contact with those working in the various police magazines so as to increase the topics of publication.

Preparing informational, scientific and literary materials and publishing them in the form of pamphlets or of wall posters that are beneficial to spreading information on the police.

Exchanging printed materials and educational books concerned with the police activities with the internal and foreign sides concerned.

Designing and producing guidance posters concerned with the police message so as to facilitate offering police services to the masses.

Preparing and carrying out propaganda campaigns that strengthen police awareness among the masses.

Recording important occasions in photographs and providing such photographs to the information media.

2. The Internal Relations Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan for the cultural and recreational welfare of the ministry's personnel, including officers, policemen and civilians, and shall exert efforts to bolster the ties of amity and friendship among them in order to raise their morale.

This section shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The cultural welfare unit:

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan to develop cultural awareness among the officers, policemen, and civilian personnel. This includes:

Exerting efforts to establish libraries in the ministry and its branches and to supply them with cultural and scientific books so that they may be available to all the agency's personnel.

Following up the intellectual movement and keeping up with what the various information media say about the state's domestic and foreign policy so as to include this material in the police agency's national education plan.

Preparing cultural and religious symposiums for the police agency on the various national and religious occasions.

Organizing meetings between the ministry's leaderships and workers through which the police leaderships can understand the problems of the broad base and its proposals for developing the methods of work and also can formulate solutions for the police personnel.

Preparing public opinion reports for the ministry's internal public.

Caring for officers and troops sent abroad on scholarships, supplying them with whatever binds them to their homeland and exerting efforts to solve their problems.

Exchanging cultural books and publications with libraries in and outside the Arab Republic of Egypt and with the various ministries and authorities.

The recreational affairs unit:

Prepare for and organize camps and tourist trips.

This unit shall be concerned with implementing the department's recreation plan for the officers, policemen and workers and for bolstering amity and friendship among them. This activity includes:

Organizing the showing of recreational movie films in the gathering places, such as the officers, noncommissioned officers and policemen's clubs and the stations of the security forces.

Preparing the proper programs for entertaining the forces on the religious, political and social occasions and taking whatever measures are necessary in this regard.

Keeping up with the living and working conditions of the police agency personnel and exerting efforts to solve the problems they encounter and to improve their living conditions.

3. The Foreign Relations Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan for foreign relations between the police agency of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the foreign police agencies. This section shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The foreign affairs unit:

This unit shall be concerned with bolstering the relations with the foreign police agencies and with looking after the welfare of visiting delegations. This activity includes:

Implementing the ministry's plan for communication with the Arab and foreign police agencies and exchanging the training programs which the ministry prepares at the Police Academy and at the various training institutes.

Exchanging the pamphlets and publications published by the department with the police agencies of the various countries so as to familiarize them with the development realized by the Egyptian police.

Following up the results of the training of visitors and notifying their countries of these results.

Preparing the proper plans for establishing permanent relations with the visitors after they conclude their training and return to their countries.

Translating from and to Arabic and arranging and organizing meetings with the foreign delegations required for the department's activities.

Protocol unit:

This unit shall be concerned with the following:

Preparing the itineraries of the Arab and foreign police delegations invited by the ministry.

Receiving the police delegations invited by the ministry, supervising their stay and preparing all the means for making their visits successful.

Contacting the ministry's various agencies to coordinate itineraries with them with the aim of presenting the agency in an eminent manner and confirming with these agencies the dates of visits and whatever changes may occur in them.

Supervising the protocol procedures in the celebrations and occasions held by the ministry.

4. Society's Relations Section:

This section shall be concerned with implementing the department's plan for the development of the police agency's relations with society's various sectors, with the armed forces, with the judiciary, prosecution, lawyers, press and information people, with the student, worker and peasant sectors, with the women's sector and with others.

This section shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The unit for developing relations with the society:

This unit shall be concerned with bolstering the ties between the police and society's various sectors. This activity includes:

Preparing and organizing the ministry's participation in the special occasions of the various sectors, such as the armed forces day, the teachers day, the peasants day, the workers Mayday and other occasions.

Inviting society's various sectors to visit the police utilities to familiarize themselves with the police activities and services to the masses.

Organizing sports rallies and competition days between the police and these sectors.

Exchanging membership between the police agencies and clubs and the sectors whose regulations permit such an exchange.

Organizing film shows at clubs and unions to explain the police message and its role in serving society.

Holding symposiums and organizing lectures in the various schools with the aim of gaining confidence in the police work among the future generations.

Preparing the proper programs for the police's annual celebration of 25 January so as to bolster the police relations with the society and to have the masses participate in this occasions.

Taking part in the national holidays which the country celebrates.

Police friends unit:

This unit shall be concerned with developing the ties of friendship and cooperation between society's various sectors and the police agency members. This activity includes:

Exerting efforts to spread the system of the police friend groups in the schools and universities and to form student groups that participate with the policemen in performing some services, such as traffic control, carrying out civil defense plans, plans to guard against fires and so forth.

Organizing symposiums and meetings in clubs, unions and public places with the aim of developing among the masses elements that take part in disseminating police awareness among the citizens.

Exerting efforts to apply the voluntary police system by developing among the masses elements that contribute to realizing the police message by taking part in police activities in the cities and villages, in the tournaments held between athletic clubs and in the national and public celebrations, thus contributing to the control of security.

Exerting efforts to develop among the rural population elements that contribute by helping the police control the phenomenon of revenge and of village fires and that also contribute in reconciling disputants and foes, thus bolstering security and curbing crime.

Following up implementation of the volunteer preparation and training programs and volunteer utilization methods in cooperation with the various agencies of the security directorates.

5. The Administrative and Financial Affairs Section:

This section shall be concerned with the department's administrative and financial activities and shall include the following two subsidiary units:

The administrative affairs unit:

This unit shall be concerned with:

Preparing the services for the members of the police agency and for the department personnel and with supervising the implementation of these services.

Organizing the movement of vehicles and of the information means according to the daily program of the department and of its various sections, making sure that the vehicles and information means are adequate and carrying out maintenance work on them.

Organizing service affairs for members of the police agency and of the department personnel in accordance with the laws and instructions regulating this aspect.

Carrying out clerical work.

Recording and distributing the department's incoming and outgoing mail.

Organizing the general instructions unit and the periodic circulars and publications.

The financial affairs unit:

This unit shall be concerned with the following:

Preparing the department's draft budget, supervising the spending from this budget's allocations during the fiscal year and dealing with the ministry's central agency regarding the procedures to permit extra spending and to acquire additional allocations when necessary.

Writing disbursement forms.

Controlling spending from the financial resources given to the Public Relations Department for spending on various purposes.

Preparing lists of the department's (requirements) and contacting the various agencies to carry out the contracting and purchase procedures.

Engaging in purchases within the limits of the powers of the department director and taking part with committees in [purchases] exceeding this power.

Carrying out warehousing works, examining the trusts in the warehouses, working to complete their salaries of the various types [sic] and keeping account and warehousing books in accordance with the regulations organizing this aspect.

Contacting the ministry's central agency in regard to the questions of the Accounting Office and to answering these questions.

Keeping account of the paper money and stamps trust and making lists of them.

Supervising the fuel disbursements for the department's vehicles.

Establishing, organizing and keeping the cards, books and records necessary for these activities.

6. The Planning and Followup Unit:

This unit shall be under the direct supervision of the department director and shall be concerned with the following:

Preparing technical studies connected with developing the department's work.

Studying the annual plan of the specialized sections and proposed amendments to it in preparation for its approval at the ministry's higher levels.

Following up implementation of the different phases of the plan in the various specialized sections and presenting periodic reports on the outcome of the followup.

Writing and publishing the department's orders, instructions and periodic circulars and taking the necessary measures to gather and preserve them.

Following up the security situation and the criminal manifestations with the various means and proposing the propaganda plans to confront these manifestations and to enlighten the citizens as to the means to which criminals resort.

Establishing Relations Department and Putting Public and Human Relations Under Its Control:

When the Ministry of Interior was reorganized in July 1979, ministerial decree No 1460 of 1979 was issued amending the organizational structure of the Ministry of Interior and redistributing supervision among the ministry's various specialized sectors and geographic districts. The decree states that the minister's office shall be headed by an assistant minister and shall control the following agencies:

The Officers Affairs Public Department.

The Relations Department which branches into the following departments:

The Public Relations Department.

The Human Relations Department.

The Medical Services Department.

It is noticed that this decree has subjected the abovementioned three departments to single administrative supervision headed by the director of the Relations Department. The decree has thus codified the actual practice which was in force before its issuance, considering that when personnel transfers were made in August 1978, the minister of interior issued Decree No 653 of 1978 appointing a director for the Relations Department to supervise the Public Relations Department and the Human Relations Department. It is evident that ministerial decree No 460 of 1979 added to them the Medical Services Department.

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CENTRALIZED, DECENTRALIZED POLICE TRAINING SYSTEMS DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 90, Jul 80 pp 111-114

[Article by Maj Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasabu: "General Training of Police Members Between Centralism and Decentralization in Third Training Conference"]

[Text] For several years now, training has been gaining increased attention and has been preoccupying the minds of reformers who believe in the worth of the Egyptian man and in his ability to accomplish and to improve the level of performance in all spheres of work when prepared and trainined by faithful hands.

The importance of training escalates if today's society in which we live has decided to develop its means and methods, to adopt everything new and to march forward to a future filled with hopes, stability and prosperity.

The policeman is a part of this developing society. Rather, he is a symbol and a manifestation of this society. If society has adopted learning as a means of progress and of realizing what it aspires for, then it is our duty to continue to develop the method of preparing the policeman who represents the broad police base and to train this policeman to face his responsibilities and duties in a manner compatible with his society's requirements and development.

The Ministry of Interior has devoted attention to training and has set up training colleges, institutes and centers at both the central level and the local level in the various security directorates. The ministry has also allocated the funds necessary for training in its capacity as an investment that yields to society the stability and security which enhance work and production in an atmosphere of reassurance.

In view of the fact that the members of the broad police base--represented by the first class policeman who join the police agency service in the various sites and specializations and by the recruits who spend the military training period in the police agency--reflect the basic front of relations between the police and the public, the police agency has begun to rely on these members for many of its activities and services, such as the public security, traffic control and riot control patrols, skilled work, such as driving vehicles and motorcycles and other skills needed by the police agency, in addition to the numerous other spheres of security to which their help is employed or in which it is deemed necessary to use their help. This is why it has been inevitable but to devote all attention to these members and to focus our studies and research on the means capable of enhancing their educational standard, especially since most of them are illiterate, and to training and preparing them to confront whatever security services are entrusted to them--services that

accompany the age of science and the society of prosperity and progress. This is what our study—The General Training of Policemen Between Centralism and Decentralization, presented to the third training conference—focused on.

The study covered the following aspects:

First, studying the concept and goals of the basic training of new policemen and the development that this training has undergone, discussing the comparative virtues of carrying out this training at the central level in Cairo, in training complexes located in the republic's geographic districts or at the local level in the security directorates, underlining the benefits and drawbacks of each system and ending with the ideal visualization for such training.

Second, discussing and evaluating the proposal to set up centers in the geographic districts to receive new recruits and to provide them with basic training.

Third, evaluating local training in its present form and the means to develop this training.

The study concluded with a number of recommendations that may light the way toward introducing the development necessary to prepare the members of the broad police base and develop in them the efficiency, ability and preparedness to face the requirements of the age.

First: Training New Policemen

Considering that the policeman is the trustee of the country's and the citizen's security and the refuge and the aide to anybody with an honest need and in view of this policeman's standard when he joins the service currently—especially his inability to read and write and his low educational standard—and in light of the conclusions reached by the study concerning the basic preparation and training of this policeman, of the current and desired goals of this training, of the advantages and drawbacks of carrying out this training centrally or of decentralizing it and in light of the ideal visualization of this training, it may be more beneficial to:

1. Set up a central policemen's training center in Cairo as one of the educational outfits controlled by the Training Agency in accordance with the decree governing the agency's current organizational structure and in a manner similar to what is followed in training the police officers and noncommissioned officers. This center should be able to absorb those who join the service every year and should have the necessary buildings and training resources until training complexes are set up in the republic's geographic districts to undertake this task.

2. Develop the method and means of training the new policemen so as to provide for:

Eradicating their illiteracy and enhancing their cultural standard.

Familiarizing them with the concept of political and criminal security and with the method of dealing with the masses.

Focusing on the proper use of the weapons in their hands and providing them with actual training on target shooting, including fixed, moving, fleeting and night targets.

Bolstering their spiritual, ethical and disciplinary values and familiarizing them with the patterns of sound conduct that must be followed and with the consequences of the failure to abide by such conduct.

Training them to read maps, how to recognize the sphere of their work accurately and easily and how to direct the citizens or tourists to the places that they want.

Providing them with practical training on how to approach a crime scene, on how to assist the specialized agencies, such as the traffic police, the firemen and rescue squads, the criminal investigation police and the ambulances, and on how to recognize explosives and render them safe and harmless to people.

Training them to write simple reports on information connected with their work and to conduct an initial examination of the scene of an accident.

Training numbers of them to drive vehicles and others to ride motorcycles and to make any simple repairs they may need.

Teaching them the elementaries of English and some phrases used to help the foreign tourists who come to the country in response to the open-door policy and investment in all spheres of this policy.

Giving them systematic military training, developing their physical ability to endure the hardships of a policeman's work and putting stress on their ability to confront outlaws.

Providing them with cultural training on the legal, police and national aspects.

3. The duration of this kind of training should not be less than 6 months for every batch. This is the minimum time required to train the modern policeman who can realize the desired goals.

4. Lay stress on the types of general training that the policeman receives periodically at the work site in order to continue to enhance the policeman's cultural, disciplinary and police level. This is in addition to laying stress on the courses qualifying policemen for promotion and specialization courses in the various spheres of work.

Second: Receiving, Preparing and Training Recruits:

In view of the increased numbers of recruits joining the police and of the inability of Cairo Security Forces Training Center to accommodate, prepare and train the current numbers--a fact which forces the center to assign most of the recruits to the security directorates to provide them with the basic training as soon as the enrollment procedures are completed--in view of the evident inadequacies and drawbacks in the resources and training standards of the security forces sections in the security directorates, not to mention the fact that the commands of the directorates resort to using the recruits in various public security services before their training is completed, and in view of the ministry's inclination to use and employ the recruits in various public security operations, it is urgently required that the attention be focused on preparing and training the recruits in a manner that makes it possible to raise their performance level and to utilize them to the degree possible. This should be done in addition to preparing the recruits to return to the various production and service sectors at the end of their service as citizens with a degree

of education and ability that guarantees their taking part in shouldering their responsibilities and duties toward the progress, prosperity and welfare of society.

The factors that help realize all this are focused in the following:

1. Set up centers to receive and train security forces in the geographic districts by selecting sites for these centers in the republic's conscription districts—Cairo, Alexandria, Ismailia or al-Sharqiyah and Asyut.

2. Provide the resources necessary to receive, accommodate and train recruits in each center in a manner that permits preparing them to perform their role in the fields in which they work or in which they will be assigned to work immediately upon the conclusion of their training.

3. Each center should undertake the following tasks:

Receive recruits from the conscription district and do the necessary to give them the various medical tests, to check their criminal records and to register them.

Feed the recruits and provide them with medical and social care throughout the period of their training at the center.

Provide basic training to the forces of the security directorates and of the police units within the district's jurisdiction. This is followed by higher or vocational training for groups designated to perform the following tasks:

A. Demonstration and riot control groups.

B. Platoons for the pursuit of gangs.

C. Public security patrols, guard duty, traffic police, criminal investigation police and other specializations for which the resources are available at the center.

D. Skilled work: Car driver, motorcyclist, mechanic, mason, painter, carpenter, plumber and so forth.

Eradicate the illiterary of the illiterate recruits during the period of basic, advanced or vocational training which the recruit spends at the center.

It is worth noting that to realize the benefit desired from training these recruits, the training centers or the commands in charge should not employ the recruits throughout the aforementioned training period in anything other than the center's internal services.

Tasks of Security Forces Sections in Directorates

There is no doubt that every policeman, especially the recruit, needs to continue his training throughout the period of his service in the agency so as to guarantee his fitness and his ability to face and shoulder the requirements of the work entrusted to him.

Here emerges the role of the current security forces sections in the directorates. After training the recruit and preparing him to carry out the tasks of the work

to be assigned to him, the forces are distributed to the security directorates and units in light of the specialized or vocational training they have received at the training centers in accordance with a plan drawn up for the purpose and taking into consideration the advanced training or [sentence incomplete].

Accordingly, the role of the security forces sections is confined to:

A. Feeding the recruits and providing them with health, social and cultural welfare.

B. Providing the recruits with periodic training and with constant daily training for those [word indistinct] from the service.

C. Prepare the forces necessary for the various security services and regulate their departure from and return to the sections.

D. Use the skilled workers and set up the workshops necessary to benefit from their skills.

There are numerous views and opinions developed as a result of experience and of actual training action and these views and opinions have resulted in measuring the yield of training. There are also the experiences gained as a result of the actual application of all kinds of training at the central and local levels. There is also what on-the-spot followup has revealed in regard to the condition and capabilities of the local training agencies and in regard to the drawbacks and inadequacies resulting either from the lack of training requirements, which the ministry is sparing no efforts or funds to meet, or from the lack of training awareness among some local commands. This is what we seek and hope to eliminate through constant inspection and through spreading awareness of the importance of training and of its effect on the level and accuracy of performance.

I have seen it fit to confine myself here to what we aspire for in terms of preparing the members of the broad police base to meet the requirements of the age, exploiting in this regard the sincere desire of our leadership to elevate the police agency to the level to which every sincere member of this agency aspires and which is sure to realize security for whoever lives on the soil of the beloved Egypt and for every grain of sand in our immortal land.

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CENTRAL PRISONS SYSTEM LABELED FAILURE

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 91, Oct 80 pp 81-85

[Article by Edward Jaras Bishay, first inspector in Prisons Administration and Secretary of Higher Advisory Council for Prison Affairs; "Central Prisons in Scale"]

[Text] Introduction:

In accordance with the provisions of law No 396 of 1956 regulating prison affairs, prisons are divided into four kinds:

A. Penitentiaries [liman] which currently include the Abu Za'bal Penitentiary, the Turrah Penitentiary and Turrah Farm and the Desert Road Penitentiary between Cairo and Alexandria.

B. General prisons which exist wherever there is a court of first instance.

C. Central prisons which exist wherever there is a district court.

D. Special prisons which are established by presidential decrees defining the types of prisoners to be detained in them, the method of treating them and the conditions for their release.

In accordance with the above law No 396 of 1956, the central prisons remain under the management and supervision of district officers until they are annexed to the Prisons Administration. This is why central prisons are attached to the buildings of police stations and precincts and why their management is entrusted to their officers. It is evident that even though nearly a quarter century has passed since the promulgation of law No 396 of 1956, the Prisons Administration has not yet exercised its natural jurisdiction over the central prisons because they have not been annexed to this administration.

However, we are interested in drawing attention to the fact that a central prison consists in fact and practice of a room in police station premises in which convicts sentenced to a short prison term (3 months or less), prisoners kept under precautionary custody and at times convicts sentenced to more than 3 months, when the remaining period of the sentence they are serving is 3 months or less, are jailed. People being interrogated by the district prosecution or due to appear before the district court are also jailed in these prisons at times.

As a result, a strange mixture of people are gathered in a central prison despite the age differences, criminality, type of crime committed and the environmental, cultural or social circumstances of the jailed because the nature of the place does not permit separating those incarcerated in it. Moreover, a central prison lacks all the basic elements required for a proper human dwelling, considering that this prison is always crowded to the degree where the required degree of ventilation and the living facilities, such as sleeping, eating and even relieving natural functions (whether standing or squatting) are affected.

It is natural, therefore, that such a prison can serve no penal or social purpose and cannot be hoped to reform anybody. This being its condition, it is rather impossible to adopt it in any modern means of penal reform. I should also not forget to note that a prison of the kind represents an additional burden to the police stations officers despite the heavy burdens they shoulder in fighting crime and maintaining public security, not to mention the annually increasing sums allocated to meet the expenses of the (growing numbers) of central prisons. Moreover, there is the almost daily work on the requests submitted to the Prisons Administration director to approve transfers from the central prisons to the general prisons in implementation of the provisions of article 6 of the bylaws of the prison law, considering that the [central] prisons can absorb no more.

In view of the fact that the administrative revolution means that no failing system should remain as it is and that it should be torpedoed and eliminated immediately and in view of the fact that the central prisons system is, in our opinion, a penal system that realizes no sound penal purpose on the one hand and is, on the other hand, a center for hatching crime and criminals because of the tight space and of the presence of a various mixture of human beings that facilitates criminal contacts and agreements, it is necessary to reconsider the presence of the central prisons in their present state.

Essence of Problem:

The essence of the problem is embodied in the short-term imprisonment and this motivates us to define this kind of imprisonment.

Meaning of Short-Term Imprisonment: There is no set criterion defining the period to which the phrase "short-term" applies.

This is why the opinions vary in this regard. There are those who say that this term doesn't exceed one year whereas others stress that it should not exceed 6 months. A third group restricts this period to one month and a fourth believes that it shouldn't exceed 3 months.

None of these opinions has been backed up by a legal or realistic support.

It is our opinion that we should always go back to the origins because this is the scientific way that always gives correct and decisive results.

If we go back to the prison regulations issued on implementation of the provisions of article of the bylaws of law No (396) of 1956 on prison organization, we find that these regulations state that a prison term of up to 3 months is considered a short jail term.

Therefore, we believe that a short jail term is a term that doesn't exceed 3 months.

The said article also stipulates that short jail terms be served in central prisons. However, this article takes precautions in this regard and states that convicts serving short jail terms "may, with the approval of the general director of prisons, be placed in a general prison if it is closer to the prosecution or if the central prison runs out of space to accommodate them."

Thus, the talk about carrying our short-term imprisonment and about the penal suitability of central prisons for this kind of imprisonment becomes compatible.

Nature of Short-Term Imprisonment:

It is acknowledged that what the legislator means fundamentally by imprisonment is isolating the convict from society for a certain period of time so as to avert his danger on the one hand and to reform the convict on the other. This mainstay must be always present when a convict is jailed, otherwise the imprisonment becomes some kind of nonsense and of torture.

The legislator is above both nonsense and torture and the era when the prisons were a place for torture and oppression and a means to merely hurt the convict without any reformatory or social purpose has gone. This being the case, all prison term penalties must be based on the purposeful mainstay of reforming the convict and of releasing him a corrected element that contributes to building society and enhancing production.

But action and practice have revealed that this mainstay is lagging behind the rules of short-term imprisonment.

Because the prison term is short, it doesn't enable the officials to confront it with any reformatory or curative programs that rehabilitate the convict in any way.

Also because the term is short, it creates indifference toward the criminal penalty. It is very easy for the beginner criminal to withstand this penalty which passes quickly and ends with his release. As for the veteran criminal, the short prison term represents to him a recreational penalty and, at times, even an opportunity to be exploited. Under the prison term, the convict enjoys the rights of a prisoner and the food, clothing and healthcare which the prison administration offers him. On the other hand, the convict may exploit the prison term as a golden opportunity to meet with beginners in jail life and select from among them a fat catch which this veteran criminal embraces upon his imminent release and which he enlists in the criminal organizations or in the smuggling, robbery, prostitution and drug gangs.

To put it briefly, in addition to proving futile, short-term imprisonment has also prove to be very dangerous and to form an extremely important factor in hatching crime and criminals in the accursed crucible of the central prison.

Solutions to Problem

Now that the present state of the central prisons has become very clear, consideration must be given to a modern penal system that leads us away from the dilemma of clinging to the central prisons which have proven to be a definite and absolute failure in the penal sphere.

Salvation from this condition can be realized only through doing away with short-term imprisonment.

If we consider carefully, we will find that rescue will come to us from one of two sources:

A. The fine Penalty.

B. Protective Custody.

First Source-Fine Penalty:

In addition to lifting from the shoulders of the public treasury all the costs and expenses spent on the central prisons, this penalty yields at the same time a profitable revenue to the state. What is more, the state profits even more by overcoming the drawbacks of short-term imprisonment and by preserving the dignity of those sentenced to short-term imprisonment. This kind of penalty may even constitute for the convict a starting point for a decent life and honorable work.

Forms of Fine:

Basically, a fine is tantamount to payment by the convict of a sum of money to the state treasury.

This is the traditional form of the fine. A fine is considered a flexible means which the judge or the executive authorities, led by the public prosecution, adapt to realize the goal behind a criminal penalty.

To put it in detail, this means that the judge is always able to discern the ability of the convict standing before him. If the convict can pay the fine in a lump sum, then the judge rules accordingly. But if the judge finds that it is impossible for the convict to pay the fine in such a manner or if he realizes that such a sentence would create problems in the convict's life, especially if the convict is a small vendor or a poor worker, then the judge can divide the fine into installments easy for the convict to pay.

Perhaps the continued implementation of this fine would constitute a constant reminder to the convict of the crime he has committed and would urge him not to repeat his crime.

Moreover, there may be destitute and sick convicts at times. In accordance with the provisions of the law and of the principle of equality among citizens before the law, such a convict cannot but be fined. However, in view of the convict's financial and health circumstances, the judge may rule that terms of the fine be made easy, in the sense that the fine is kept hanging over convict's head through the legal period and that he is made to pay it when he becomes capable of doing so, for instance in case he gets an inheritance, a gift or a grant during the legal period. In any case, the fine is dropped with the termination of the period set for dropping the penalty. In this regard, a fine is different from debts owed to the state which drop only when the legal period set for the right [to collect] in the civil law ends.

One of the modern and beneficial methods of collecting the fine is to make the convict work for it in a work camp. We urge the state in the era of the revolution of

building and construction to expand this form of penalty implementation because it yields profitable wages to the convict and gets him used to honorable and productive work which helps him to earn an honest living at the end of his compulsory employment which may turn into optimal employment if the convict wishes to continue his work.

Moreover, this form also supplies the building and construction circles with enormous and constant manpower that helps to complete the tasks undertaken by the state.

We would like to stress here our refutation of the statement that this system of penalty implementation may create the feeling that it is system of "forced labor. There is a big difference between the two systems. The proposed system adapts the individual and society to engage in productive work, regardless of how unskilled, and gives the convict wages equal to those of similar unconvicted workers. All the state does in this regard is to collect the fine levied on the convict by deducting a small and convenient part of the wages he collects.

Meanwhile, forced labor is not concerned with the wish of the prisoner to do the work compatible with his abilities and is carried out in return for no wages and without any consideration for the simplest duties of human or hmanitarian decency toward the person pressed into forced labor.

Therefore, there is no place here for bringing up the question of forced labor.

It is our opinion that the opportunity should be made available [to the convict] in any honorable site acknowledged by the state, be it a work camp, a state workshop, a public sector enterprise or even a private sector enterprise because what is important is to get the convict used to honest work at proper wages and to have the state collect its rightful fine.

Second Source-Protective Custody [al-tadbir]:

The present prisons suffer from the oldness of the buildings in which they are housed and even from the collapse of parts of these buildings in some areas, not to mention the fact that they are crowded with their inmates whose numbers are almost double the numbers determined to be healthy when the prisons were first built.

All this has spread a network of difficulties and complications that cause the immediate waste of most of the efforts exerted to realize the real goals of punishment which are embodied in reform and correction.

Perhaps the most evident example in this regard is the impossibility of separating the prisoners in order to implement the principle of punishment separation which is the mainstay and one of the elemtary principles of modern [criminal] reform. Here is where the idea of resorting to protective custody instead of punishment for certain crimes emerged.

It can be said here that a complete and integrated penal policy is applied, especially since protective custody provides flexibility of application which doesn't exist in the sphere of applying penalties. This kind of custody is not tied to the guarantees involving penalties, such as termination of the penalty through amnesty, lapse of time or the need for a final sentence to carry it out.

This protective custody is based on the policy of defending society against those who have actually committed crimes and those expected to commit crimes at any moment, such as instinctive and habitual criminals (as in the case of drug crimes). Protective custody is established for anybody whose conditionwarns of criminal danger, i.e. for anybody who is in a psychological condition that makes him likely to commit a future crime. In criminal law, this state is reflected in the phrase "readiness to commit crime."

This criminal state is discerned from the character of the criminal, his criminal record, his life and behavior and his family and social conditions.

The law has its means of taking precautionary measures, of which the most well-known are:

1. Foiling the criminal's perpetration of a crime by seizing his weapon or by preventing him from residing in a certain place, such as preventing a person apprehended for drunkenness from frequenting drinking places and preventing a person apprehended for gambling from frequenting gambling clubs, and so on.

2. Preventing the criminal from engaging in a certain profession or vocation, such as preventing a rash driver apprehended for speeding from working as a driver.

3. Limiting residency to a certain area.

4. Deportation to the place of origin.

5. Exerting efforts to prepare the criminal for an honest and normal life in society and getting him used to the love of work and to interest in work to earn a living by enrolling him in a work organization.

It is also acknowledged that as a penal institution, a prison represents an indivisible whole. According to the law and to the administrative and social concepts, a prison is a place to serve a penalty. Therefore, no part of a prison can be set aside for protective custody. Any statement to the contrary means collapse of the legal controls and watering down the penal policy, thus putting distance between this policy and the goals that the legislator seeks by establishing the precautionary measures. To make the matter clear, it must be pointed out that protective custody is not a penalty imposed in return for a crime committed by a person but rather consits of a number of measures that are not intended for punishment but to prevent the continued presence of the danger of the [potential] criminal to society. Protective custody is not a punishment that requires depriving this individual of (his rights), which is something by which a penalty is characterized.

Accordingly, many minor crimes which are dealt with at present by meting out short-term jail sentences can be dealt with by applying the system of protective custody.

It is fortunate that the application of protective custody is easy due to the presence of reform establishments and institutes controlled by the Ministry of Social Affairs. These can be exploited ideally by being set aside for implementation of protective custody against criminals committing such crimes.

Conclusion:

The preceding review underlines the following facts:

1. The central prisons were set up to accommodate convicts sentenced to short jail terms.

2. Short-term imprisonment is a penalty that realizes no reformatory goal.

3. Short-term imprisonment is costly to the state.

4. Short-term imprisonment is a seed of crime and criminality.

5. In their current state, the central prisons can realize no sound penal goal.

6. A fine to be paid in a lump sum, in installments or on easy terms is a proper alternative to short-term imprisonment.

7. Employment [of convicts] in work camps, in state workshops, in the public sector or even in the private sector yields numerous benefits to the state and to the person employed.

8. Protective custody is a better punishment in dealing with crimes for which short-term jail sentences are meted out and the application of protective custody is easy in the reform establishments controlled by the Ministry of Social Affairs.

With this quick discussion, I have perhaps focused the light on actual and scientific facts which we hope will be beneficial.

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NEW, OLD LAWS GOVERNING VILLAGE MAYORS, CHIEFS COMPARED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 89, Apr 80 pp 34-38

[Article by Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Latif Siddiq: "New Law on Village Mayors and Chiefs"]

[Text] Introduction:

Article 34 of law No 58 of 1978 concerning village mayors and chiefs stipulates abolition of law No 59 of 1964 concerning village mayors and chiefs. We will review generally in the following what the new law has introduced in comparison to the old law, according to the arrangement of the law's articles and sections.

Section One

General Rules

Article one stipulates that each village shall have a mayor and that the post of mayor shall be abolished in any village having a police post.

In implementation of this article, it is compulsory to abolish the post of mayor in a village containing a police post whereas this abolition was optional in accordance with article one of the abolished law which stated that the minister of interior had the power to abolish the post of mayor in any village containing a police post and had the power to issue a decree reinstating such a post. This is understood from the phrasing of the article because in the new law, the phrase "shall be abolished" is used in a manner that makes the abolition mandatory whereas the article in the abolished law used the phrase "the minister of interior shall have the power to abolish," thus restricting the right to abolition or lack of thereof [to the minister of interior].

Section Two

Conditions To Be Met by Whomever Is Appointed Mayor Or Village Chief

Article 3 defines these conditions and we will point out here the amendments introduced to the conditions in comparison to the abolished law:

1. Age: It is no less than 30 years in the new law whereas it was no less than 25 years in the abolished law.

2. The director of security may relieve the candidate for the post of village chief from the condition of literacy if he is an only candidate. To make it possible to permit this exception, the abolished law required the presence of at least one candidate meeting the condition of literacy.

3. Insofar as the condition of ownership of cultivable land or of having a monthly pension is concerned, the new law makes conditional that whoever is nominated for the post of mayor own 5 feddans within the jurisdiction of the village or of neighboring villages or have a steady monthly income of no less than 20 pounds monthly from landed property. The minister of interior may disregard this condition if all the candidates, when there is more than one, cannot meet this condition. The abolished law made it conditional that whoever was appointed to the post of mayor or village chief had to have land holdings in the village, regardless of the area and of whether the holdings are in the form of owned or leased land, or be entitled to a monthly pension of no less than 20 pounds from a public treasury insofar as the mayor is concerned and no less than 5 pounds insofar as the shayk (village chief) is concerned.

It is concluded from the above that the new law requires the candidate to the post of village mayor to own land in the village and that his ownership be no less than 5 acres. The land holdings may not be in the form of leased lands. The new law has also added an alternative to the condition of land ownership, namely a fixed monthly income of no less than 20 pounds from landed property. This is in addition to the other conditional alternative of a monthly pension of no less than 20 pounds.

The law does not stipulate this condition for a candidate to the post of village chief. Consequently, such a candidate is not required to own cultivable land or to have a pension salary or income. The law also empowers the minister of interior to disregard this condition for the post of mayor when all candidates, if there is more than one, fail to meet it or when they are running for the post in non-agricultural areas.

4. The new law does not stipulate that whoever is appointed village chief must not be a marriage or four-times-removed blood relative of the village mayor. This condition was stipulated in the abolished law.

Section Three

On Appointment of Mayor or Village Chief

Date to Present Candidacy Applications:

Article 4 of the new law stipulates that candidacy applications for the post of village mayor shall be presented to the security director and candidacy applications for the post of village security chief shall be presented to the district officer until the end of the 20th day following the opening of the door of candidacy. This means that this law permits the submission of candidacy applications during the period in which the decision to open the door of candidacy is under review, namely the period of 10 days following the issuance of this decision and the next 10 days. The abolished law permitted the submission of these applications in the 10 days following the period in which the decision to open the door of candidacy was under review and did not permit their submission during this period.

Appeals Against Candidate Lists:

Article 5 of the new law stipulates that the requests for registration in and omission from the candidates list shall be submitted to the security director. The abolished law stipulated that they be submitted to the security director insofar as the post of mayor is concerned and to the district officer insofar as the post of village chief is concerned. The new law has thus unified the authority to which these requests are submitted insofar as both posts are concerned.

The new law has also unified the committee to examine the requests submitted for both posts under the chairmanship of the security director whereas in accordance with the abolished law, there was one committee headed by the security director for the post of mayor and another headed by the district officer for the post of village chief.

Article 6 of the new law stipulates that the decision on the candidacy applications for both the posts of mayor and village chief shall be made by a committee comprised of the security director or his deputy, in case of the director's absence, as chairman, and a judge appointed by the general assembly of the court within whose jurisdiction the village concerned is located, a prosecution attorney appointed by the head of the prosecution office concerned and two members of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee, one of them representing the district, as members. The committee meeting shall lack quorum unless four members, including the chairman, attend. The committee decisions shall be issued by vote majority and the party concerned shall be notified of them. Any applicant whose name is excluded may appeal the committee's decision to the minister of interior within 15 days of receiving or being notified in writing of the committee's decision. The minister of interior may issue within one month as of the date of his being notified of the appeal the decision he deems fit. The directorate shall be notified of this decision in order that it may in turn notify the person concerned. Otherwise, the committee's decision in this regard shall be considered null and void and the name of the applicant concerned shall be included in the list of candidates.

It is evident from this article that in addition to unifying the committee for reviewing the candidacy appeals for both the posts of mayor and village chief, this article has also introduced the right to appeal against this committee's decisions and has set a date for issuance of the minister of interior's decision on such an appeal. Should this date pass without the issuance of this decision, then the appeals committee's decision is considered void and the name of the plaintiff is included in the candidates list. Article 6 of the abolished law stipulated that the decisions of this committee were final and were to be conveyed to the district for implementation.

Formation of Election Committee:

Article 8 of the new law stipulates that the voters shall express their opinion on the election of a mayor before one or more committees comprised of a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class two as chairman, of a representative selected from the village voter lists for each of the candidates and a civil servant with job grade of no less than class four as secretary. A general committee shall also be formed to supervise the election and shall be comprised of an officer with the rank of no less than a colonel and of two members of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee. Insofar as the election of a village chief is concerned, this committee shall be formed of a police officer with a rank of no less than major, of a representative for each of the candidates selected from the village voter lists and of a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class four as committee secretary.

A change has been introduced to the committee supervising the election of a mayor, considering that such a committee is now headed by a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class two whereas in accordance with the abolished law, such a committee was headed by a police officer with a rank of no less than lieutenant colonel, its membership excluded any member of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee and the most senior village chief. The new law has also included in the membership of this committee a representative for each of the candidates selected from the village voter lists instead of the 3 voters registered in the village voter lists who were included as members of this committee in accordance with the abolished law.

A change has also been introduced to the committee supervising the election of village chiefs by excluding from its membership the most senior village chief and the 3 voters registered in the village voter lists who were included in this committee in accordance with the abolished law. The new law adds to this committee's membership a representative for each of the candidates selected from the village voter lists.

The new law has also introduced a general committee to supervise the election and to be formed of an officer with a rank of no less than colonel and of 2 members of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee. Article 15 of the executive regulations of this law state that this committee will supervise the process of election for the post of mayor or village chief and that the security director will issue a decision forming the committee and designating its headquarters. The regulations also state that the duties and powers of this committee include the following:

1. Notify immediately the district or subdistrict officer and the security director of the start and end of the election process.

2. Secure order within the election committees.

3. Answer the committees' queries during the progress of the election process.

4. Guarantee neutrality in all the election committees.

Formation of Vote Counting Committee:

Article 9 of the new law stipulates that the vote counting committee shall be formed of the head of the election supervision committee as chairman and of the 2 members of the supervision committee, of the chairmen of the elections committees and of the candidates or of their representatives as members. Article 16 of the executive regulations on this law stipulates that the secretary of the First Election Committee shall be the secretary of the vote counting committee.

This law includes in the membership of the vote counting committee the candidates or their representatives and excludes from it the senior village chief who was included as a member of this committee in accordance with the abolished law. The new law also includes in its membership two members of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee (who are also members of the committee supervising the elections) whereas the abolished law included in the vote counting committee one member of the district's Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee.

Date of Appointment of Village Mayor or Chief:

Article 11 of the new law stipulates that the mayor or the chief must be appointed within a period of 3 months of the election, else the mayor or chief shall be considered legally appointed by the end of the said 3 months. This provision has no equal in the abolished law and it requires that the appeals against the election be examined quickly and that the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee convene quickly to issue its decision appointing the mayor or the chief. The provision also requires the Ministry of Interior to issue its decision in this regard quickly and before the lapse of 3 months on the election date, else the mayor or chief will be considered legally appointed by the end of this period.

Appeals Against Election:

Article 12 of the new law stipulates that whoever has applied to the candidacy of the post of mayor or chief and has had his application accepted shall have the right to appeal against [the results of] the mayor's or chief's election and shall do so in writing to the security director within one week of the date of election. The appeal must explain all the reasons on which it is based and no complaint or appeal against the correctness of the election will be accepted by the administrative authorities after the lapse of this date.

This article amends the date for submitting the appeals, considering that it has become one week from the day of election whereas it was 15 days from the day of election in accordance with the abolished law. This article has also introduced a new stipulation, namely that no complaint or appeal regarding the correctness of the election will be accepted by the administrative authorities after the lapse of the date for submitting the appeals.

Renewing Term of Mayor or Village Chief:

Article 13 of the new law stipulates a village mayor or chief shall continue to hold his post for a period of 5 years after the approval of his appointment to this post and that the post shall be considered vacant as of the first day following this period unless a decision is issued by the minister of interior renewing this term for 5 more years beginning with the first day following the end of the preceding term.

A bill has been prepared to add a new paragraph to this article stating that the minister of interior may renew the term of a village mayor or chief more than once.

The abolished law did not permit renewal of the mayor's term more than once whereas it did permit repeated renewal for the post of village chief.

Section Four

Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee

Formation of Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Article 14 of the new law states that the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee shall be formed of the security director or of his deputy, in case of the director's absence, as chairman and of the Ministry of Interior inspector, the prosecution director or his deputy in case of his absence and the two members from the district within

whose jurisdiction falls the village whose problems are presented to the committee. Should one of these two members be absent, the security director shall appoint his replacement from among the members elected in the other districts of the governorate.

The new law has added to the membership of this committee the two members elected from the district within which falls the village whose problems are presented to the committee—two members who are from among the current mayors. In accordance with the abolished law, the committee membership included two members appointed according to seniority and in turn, with one of them coming from the district within which falls the village whose problems are presented to the committee. The abolished law provided for the appointment of the two most senior mayors in each district to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee for a period of 2 years beginning with the first of January, taking into consideration turns in appointing the district's mayors.

Election of Two Members of Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Article 16 of the new law states that two current village mayors from each district shall be elected to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee in the first half of the month of October on the date and in the place set by the security director and that their membership shall be for a period of 2 years beginning with the first of January. Should a member's seat become vacant before the end of the term, the security director shall hold a complementary election and the membership elected shall end with the end of the term of the member he has replaced.

The election committee shall be comprised of the district officer or his deputy as chairman and of two non-candidate mayors selected in the manner set by the executive bylaws as members.

Article 24 of the executive bylaws states that these two mayors shall be selected by the security director and adds that this committee's secretary shall be a civil servant with a job grade of no less than class four.

Article 33 of the executive regulations states that the election shall be held at the district's or subdistrict's headquarters by secret poll, in accordance with what is followed in the election of a village mayor or chief and by relative majority.

Appeals Against Election of Two Members of Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Article 16 of the new law states the candidates [sic] and mayors elected in due process may appeal to the Ministry of Interior against those elected [to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee] or against the election process within 15 days of the election. The signature of the plaintiff shall be authenticated by the documentation authorities. The minister of interior shall issue his decision regarding the members elected to the membership of the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee within 60 days of the end of the period of appealing, else the passage of this date shall be considered a decision approving the election results. The suspended mayor [presumably the mayor against whom the appeal is submitted] shall not exercise his membership in the committee throughout the period of his suspension.

Article 35 of the executive regulations states that a special book shall be prepared at the Public Administrative Affairs Department to record in it the appeals submitted by the candidate's and the country's mayors who have taken part in the election. As

soon as they are received, these appeals shall be referred to the Public Inspection Department for examination and the outcome shall be presented to the minister of interior to issue a decision on the appeals within 60 days of the end of the period of appealing, else lapse of this date shall be considered a decision approving the outcome of the election.

Section Five

On-Task and Powers of Village Mayor's or Chief's Job:

Article 19 of the new law states that should any cause prevent the village mayor or chief from performing his job, the security director shall delegate the oldest village chief to do so. Should the village chiefs be equal in age, then the security director shall delegate the most senior chief to perform the task temporarily.

It is obvious from this article that the deputy mayor who performs the mayor's task in case of the latter's absence is the oldest village chief. Should the village chiefs be of the same age, then the most senior in the service will be the deputy mayor and the security director issues a decision delegating him to carry out the mayor's duty temporarily. The abolished law stated that a village chief, without any age or seniority restriction, be delegated.

Mayor's Retention of His Original Job:

Article 22 of the new law states that should any civil servant be elected or appointed village mayor, he shall be entitled to retain his job throughout his term as mayor, shall be considered a full-time mayor and shall enjoy all the benefits of his original job.

This provision has been introduced to the new law and has no equal in the abolished law. The goal of this provision, as pointed out by the explanatory memorandum on the law, is to encourage qualified civil servants to run for the post of mayor so as to raise standard of those holding this post. Should a civil servant be appointed to this post, then he will retain his original job and will collect all his dues from this job while devoting full time to the mayor's functions.

Section Six

On Dismissing Village Mayors and Chiefs Administratively and Bringing Them To Trial Before Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee:

Power to Impose Penalties:

Article 23 of the new law states that the security director may penalize, either by warning or by a fine not exceeding the sum of 10 pounds, a village mayor or chief if he neglects or fails to perform the duties and requirements of his job or should he debase himself. The Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee may penalize him by warning, by levying a fine of no more than 100 pounds or by dismissal from his post.

It is evident from this that the new law has doubled the maximum fine that the security director and the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee may impose on the mayor or chief, considering that the abolished law empowered the security director to levy a fine of 5 pounds and the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee to levy a fine of 50 pounds. Moreover, the new law does not permit combining dismissal from the post with a fine whereas the abolished law did permit this.

Article 26 of the new law states that the disciplinary decisions issued by the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee shall be conveyed to the minister of interior within 15 days of their issuance so that he may consider them for approval. This article also states that the minister shall have the right to cancel or reduce the fine. This article does not make the stipulation made in the abolished law, namely that these disciplinary decisions be approved within 60 days of the date on which they are brought to the minister's notice or else be considered final.

Defense in Disciplinary Court:

Article 28 of the new law states that the village mayor or chief shall have the right to appoint an attorney to defend him if he is brought before a disciplinary court.

This provision is tantamount to codifying the practice under the abolished law which lacked such a provision.

Section Seven

Final and Transitional Provisions

Mayor's Recompense:

Article 29 of the new law states that a village mayor shall be awarded an annual recompense of 120 pounds. In the abolished law, this recompense amounted to 60 pounds. The explanatory memorandum on the new law has pointed out that increasing this recompense has been in line with the current economic conditions and is meant to make the recompense adequate for the expenses that a village mayor shoulders by virtue of his job.

Validity of Law Regulating Exercise of Political Powers:

Article 30 of the new law states that the provisions of law No 73 of 1956 regulating the exercise of political rights shall continue to be in force whenever they are not in conflict with the provisions of this law whereas the abolished law confined this validity to the provisions of section 4 of the law regulating the exercise of political rights--provisions concerning the crime of (truancy) or other crimes committed upon or because of the election of village mayors and chiefs.

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PROCEDURES GOVERNING ELECTION OF VILLAGE MAYORS, CHIEFS EXPLAINED

Cairo AL-AMN AL-'AMM in Arabic No 91, Oct 80 pp 75-76

[Article by Maj Gen 'Abd-al-Latif Siddiq: "New Village Mayors and Chiefs Law"]

[Text] Introduction:

We presented in a previous edition(1) a general report on the provisions introduced by law No 58 of 1978 in comparison to the provisions of abolished law No 59 of 1964 concerning village mayors and chiefs. We will deal here in detail with the provisions of three sections of the new law:

Section one: Procedures for Nomination to Posts of Village Mayor and Chief.

Section Two: Procedures for Election of Village Mayor and Chief.

Section Three: Procedural Steps Taken After Appointment of Village Mayor and Chief.

Section One

Procedures for Nomination to Posts of Village Mayor and Chief

Nomination Conditions:

Article 3 of the law states that whoever is appointed to the post of village mayor or chief must meet the following conditions:

1. Be a male Egyptian registered in the village voter lists.

2. Be of good reputation, not be deprived of the exercise of his political rights or have these rights suspended. If he has been previously dismissed on disciplinary action, then a period of 5 years should have passed on the date of approval of the dismissal decision.

3. Be no less than 30 years old.

4. Be able to read and write. The security director may exempt the candidate for the post of village chief from this condition if he is an only candidate.

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(1) See #89 of AL-AMN AL-'AMM, April 1980, page 34 and beyond.

5. The ownership of a candidate for the post of village mayor may not be less than 5 feddans within the village jurisdiction or in neighboring villages or he should have a fixed monthly pension of no less than 40 pounds monthly from landed property, not including the cultivable land, or have an income of no less than 40 pounds from all the above vessels.

Insofar as the candidate for the post of village chief is concerned, he is required to have cultivable land, regardless of its area and regardless of whether owned or leased, within the village or in neighboring villages or have a monthly pension or fixed income from landed property of no less than 15 pounds.

The minister of interior may disregard the conditions stipulated in this provision if all the candidates, when there is more than one candidate, fail to meet these conditions, if the post is in a non-agricultural area, if the door of nomination is reopened and if one candidate or more apply.

Article 2 of the law underlines another condition to be met by whoever is appointed village chief, namely that his name be registered in the village segments [qa'imat al-hissah] list. This article stipulates that the village be divided into segments and that each segment have its own chief and a list in which it registers annually the name of its inhabitants who are included in the village voter lists.

If the candidate cannot meet all or some of these conditions on the day in which the door of nomination is opened, then his candidacy will not be accepted. An example is the candidate who hasn't reached the age of 30 on the day the door of nomination is opened but who does so afterwards. The nomination of this candidate is not accepted because he fails to meet one of the nomination conditions on the day in which the door of nomination is opened, namely the condition of being at least 30 years old.

We will point out in the following some observations regarding each of the nomination conditions separately.

1. Condition of Citizenship, Sex and Registration in Village Voter Lists:

It is required that the candidate be Egyptian and male. Therefore, females may not be nominated. The candidate must also be registered in the voter lists of the village for whose post of mayor or chief he is nominated. In implementation of this condition, article 7 of the executive regulations requires that a birth certificate or an official copy of this certificate and a voter certificate or an official certificate issued by the district officer stating that the candidate's name is included in the village voters list be presented.

2. Condition of Good Reputation, of non-denial and non-suspension of exercise of political rights and of passage of 5 years since approval of disciplinary dismissal decision:

The law has set no controls and has defined no reasons for loss of good reputation but has left this up to the administration within the limits of responsibility for public security and order, as long as its assessment is not tarnished with the flaw of the abuse of power.

We will note in the following the most important criteria that can be employed to make sure of the presence of the condition of good reputation?

Characterizing a person as a person of good reputation or of bad reputation is the result of such a person's behavior and actions in society. If it becomes evident from the totality of these actions that they are compatible with his society's traditions and conditions, then the person concerned cannot be described as being of bad reputation. But if the person's actions are incompatible with what people acknowledge as the right conduct, then it can be said that this person is of bad reputation. The criterion in both cases is the conduct of the person himself because the basis of good reputation is the behavior and conduct of the person himself and the good or bad qualities that he displays. Therefore, a person cannot be censured for his brother's crime and cannot be blamed for what others have committed (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 23 October 1976, Dossier No 42/5/20 and 24 November 1976, Dossier No 42/19/41).

It is not essential that a criminal or disciplinary conviction be issued to prove the quality of bad reputation. A person's reputation may be affected by his personal or ethical conduct or by a serious charge, even though no legal or disciplinary action may have been taken due to the lack of sufficient evidence (Administrative Judiciary Court ruling on 6 April 1970 and 15 February 1971).

The law does not define what crimes it considers as crimes violating honor or trust and, consequently, crimes causing the loss of good reputation. The important thing in this regard is society's view of the crime. If under the circumstances in which it is committed, a crime betrays moral weakness, deliquency of character, whims or desires, then it is a crime violating honor or trust and its perpetrator loses his good reputation (Legal opinion of General Assembly of Legal Opinion and Legislative Sections of State Council on 20 February 1968).

As for the crime of a custodian's embezzlement of (impounded property belonging to him), this crime is tantamount to no more than violating the impoundment procedures defined in the civil and commercial litigation law or in the administrative impoundment law, depending on the circumstances. This means that this crime is a violation against the public authoritys' procedures which are established in the interest of the impounding party. These procedures require observation of the terms and conditions set by such impoundment. Thus, this crime does not cause its perpetrator to lose his good reputation (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 26 September 1972, Dossier No 45/18/20).

An embezzlement crime perpetrated by a custodian against his wife's property is not considered a crime violating honor and is not proof of bad reputation. Though described by the law as an embezzlement crime, it is not considered adequate on its own to be counted as a crime violating honor (Supreme Administrative Court ruling in case No 492 of 15 January 1972).

What is meant by a suspended sentence is to empower the judge to order suspension of a penalty on which a sentence is issued for a set period (3 years). This period is considered a probation period during which the convicted is instructed not to commit another crime if he wants to escape finally the sentence issued against him and to consider this sentence as if it were nonexistent, else the sentence will be carried out against him, in addition to whatever sentence may be issued for the new crime.

Accordingly, the temporary effect of the suspension order means in fact nothing more than a suspension, in the sense that the sentence issued for the crime continues to be present and to produce all its incriminating consequences, including the branding of the convict of the characteristic of bad reputation if the sentence is issued for a crime violating honor. If the suspension period ends without a sentence being issued meanwhile abolishing the suspension and if, consequently, the sentence is not carried out during this period and is considered as if it were nonexistent, then the precedent of this sentence may not be used to characterize the convicted as being a person of bad reputation (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 16 August 1977, Dossier No 42/14/69).

To guarantee the accuracy and soundness of the investigation concerning the presence of the condition of good reputation in the candidates for the post of village mayor or chief, the Ministry of Interior issued circular No 5 of 1977 instructing that this investigation be conducted by a committee formed of the district officer, the directorate's chief of the criminal investigation section and the district's intelligence officer and that the committee use the information of the state security intelligence branch.

In addition to meeting the condition of good reputation, the candidate for the post of village mayor or chief may not be a person denied the exercise of his political rights or whose political rights have been suspended. To explain this condition, it is necessary to point out the cases of denial and suspension of the exercise of political rights.

Article 2 of law No 73 of 1956 concerning regulation of the exercise of political rights states that the following shall be denied the exercise of their political rights:

1. A person convicted of a felony, unless rehabilitated.

2. A person whose property is placed under custodianship by court order and in accordance with the law throughout the period during which this custodianship is valid. In case of confiscation, the denial of rights shall be valid for 5 years as of the date of the sentence.

3. A person convicted for one of the crimes stipulated in the agrarian reform laws or the supply and pricing laws, a person convicted of the crime of charging a sum of money beyond that set by a lease contract, a person convicted of the crime of smuggling currency or funds or of the crime of customs tax evasion, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.

4. A person convicted of stealing or concealing stolen property, of swindling, of issuing a bouncing check, of betraying a trust, of treachery, graft, fraudulent bankruptcy, forgery, use of forged papers, of perjury, of tempting witnesses, of violating honor, corrupting youth, violating public morals, vagrancy or of a crime committed to evade military or national service, as well as a person convicted of any crime stipulated in the provisions covering the above crimes, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.

5. A person sentenced to a prison term for one of the election crimes stipulated in articles 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49 of this law, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.

6. A civil servant or a public sector worker dismissed from service for reasons of violating honor, unless 5 years have passed since the date of dismissal and unless a final decision has been issued abolishing the dismissal decision and compensating the person concerned.

7. A custodian or a guardian relieved of his duty due to misconduct or of betrayal, unless a period of 5 years has passed since the date of the sentence relieving from custodianship or guardianship.

Article 3 stipulates the political rights of the following persons be also suspended:

1. Persons placed in custody throughout the period of custody.

2. Detained persons with mental disorders throughout the period of detention.

3. Persons who have declared their bankruptcy for a period of 5 years of such declaration, unless rehabilitated before the end of this period.

It is noticed that a person convicted of a felony of any type is denied the exercise of his political rights, unless rehabilitated, i.e. regardless of whether the felony violates or doesn't violate honor. The text is general and, therefore, includes every felony. As for a person sentenced to a prison term, it is required to deprive him of the exercise of his political right that the sentence be issued for one of the crimes listed specifically in provisions 3, 4 and 5 of article 2 of the law regulating the exercise of political rights, unless the sentence is suspended or the convicted is rehabilitated.

We must note that the period for judiciary rehabilitation is 3 years for a misdemeanor and 6 years for a felony, beginning as of the date of implementation of the sentence or of amnesty. This period is doubled in case of (repeat offenders and of termination of the penalty due to the lapse of time).

As for the period of rehabilitation by the force of law, it is 12 years for a felony sentence, 6 years for a misdemeanor sentence and 12 years for a misdemeanor violating honor (and in the case of repeated conviction and termination of the penalty due to the lapse of time).

The period of (the invalidation of a sentence due to the lapse of time) is 20 years for a felony, 30 years for a death sentence and 5 years for a misdemeanor, beginning as of the date when the sentence becomes final, unless the sentence issued by the criminal court is in absentia. In this case, the period starts as of the date of the sentence.

Article 7 of the executive regulations of the law on village mayors and chiefs makes it a must that the candidate submit his criminal status record to make sure that he meets the condition concerning non-denial of the exercise of political rights.

3. Condition on Age:

The age of a candidate for the post of village mayor or chief must not be less than 30 years on the day the door is opened for nomination. The document proving the presence of this condition is the birth certificate or an official copy thereof.

There is no maximum age for the candidate. A candidate's old age is no proof of his inability to perform the duties of his post. The law's stipulation regarding dismissal of the mayor or chief when he becomes obviously inf rm or when the medical commission decides that he is not fit is a procedure for ending the service and not for appointment. To perform the duties of his post, a village mayor or chief doesn't need so much muscle power as he needs experience, awareness of the village problems and a moral influence among the village inhabitants that enables him to solve these problems. Should it become evident from his delivery of his duties that he is obviously infirm or if the security directorate refers him to the governorate's medical commission and this commission decides that he is physically unfit, the security director may issue a decision referring him to the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee to consider his dismissal (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 23 May 1977, Dossier No 42/6/46).

4. Condition of Ability to Read and Write:

A candidate for the post of village mayor or chief is required to be able to read and write. The Ministry of Interior has issued instructions to make sure that this condition is met. The instructions stipulate that an officer (the assistant security director for the post of mayor and the district deputy officer for the post of chief) test the candidate in reading and writing, provided that the dictation piece used in the test consist of no less than 40 words that are free of dictation complexity, that the reading test be on ordinary subjects written clearly and that the test evaluation be either passing or failing.

The law empowers the security director to exempt a candidate for the post of village chief from the requirement of reading and writing if he is a sole candidate.

Exemption from the requirement of the ability to read and write is tied to the following restrictions:

1. This exemption is restricted to the post of village chief and excludes that of mayor.

2. The candidate to the post of chief should be a sole candidate.

3. This exemption is optional and not mandatory.

4. The security director is the authority with the power to grant this exemption.

5. The security director must issue the exemption decision during the period in which the candidacy applications are under review, i.e. during the 10 days following the end of the period of nomination. The exemption decision becomes void after this period because the security director will have then lost his authority to use this power.

It is to be noted that in case an appeal is made concerning the presence of the requirement of reading and writing, the committee reviewing the nomination appeals must re-test the candidate in reading and writing. If the committee decides to reject the appeal without re-testing the candidate, being content with the precedent of his failure in both reading and writing, then the committee's decision will be incorrect because it diminishes what is required [procedurally]. The committee is

required to verify the soundness of the appeal by re-testing the candidate in reading and writing, and this is something which it hasn't done. This requires that the papers be referred to the Village Mayors and Chiefs Committee to correct the procedures by re-testing the candidate in reading and writing and by then proceeding with the measures stipulated by the law (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 29 January 1977, Dossier 42/9/18).

5. Condition of Cultivable Land Holding, Pension or Fixed Income From Landed Property:

The law makes several stipulations which have been explained at the outset of this article.

Insofar as this condition of candidacy is concerned, we underline the following observations:

A. The candidate to the post of mayor must hold at least 5 feddans in ownership i.e. he must be in control and the owner of this area of land. Control without ownership is not enough. The law permits that this land be within the jurisdiction of the village for whose mayoralty he is a candidate or in the neighboring villages.

B. To make sure that the condition of cultivable land ownership is met, article 7 of the executive regulations concerning the village mayors and chiefs law requires that the certificate of cultivable land ownership or an official copy thereof be presented to prove that the candidate for mayor owns at least 5 feddans, in addition to an official certificate of (actual expenses), i.e. another official document proving that he owns such land in the village or in the neighboring villages.

G. The law provides an alternative to the condition of the candidate's cultivable land ownership, namely that the candidate have a monthly pension or a fixed income of no less than 40 pounds from landed property. To make sure that this condition is met, article 7 of the executive regulations requires the submission of an official certificate proving that the candidate is entitled to a monthly pension from a public treasury or has a steady income of no less than 40 pounds from landed property. Insofar as the landed property is concerned, the law stipulates that it must be something other than cultivable land and must be owned by the candidate.

The law provides an alternative to the condition of cultivable land ownership for the candidate for the post of village chief, namely that he earn a monthly pension or a fixed income from landed property of no less than 15 pounds monthly.

Some people are mistaken when they think that a still active civil servant at the time the door of nominations for the post of mayor is opened meets the condition of being entitled to a monthly pension, considering that he will be entitled to this pension when he is retired. Being potentially entitled to a pension at the time when the door of nomination is opened is not enough. This means that it is not enough for a candidate to complete the period of service that entitles him to a pension after the door of nomination is opened and without having actually completed the service and already earned the right to a pension. The legislator demands that the candidate be actually entitled to the pension at the time when the door of nomination is opened. Being potentially entitled is not enough. Actual entitlement does not arise until the service is completed (Legal Opinions Department of Ministry of Interior, 24 August 1968, Dossier 42/11/34).

6. Condition of Registration in Segment List [qa'imat al-hissah]:

Article 2 of the village mayors and chiefs law underlines another condition that must be met by the candidate to the post of village chief, namely that such a candidate's name be registered in the segment list, considering that the article divides the village into segments, each with its chief and with its list in which it registers annually the names of its inhabitants who are registered in the village voters list. This means that a candidate to the post of the chief of a vacant village segment must be from this segment and his name must be registered in this segment's list.

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the executive regulations concerning the village mayors and chiefs law state the procedures for preparing and amending the segment lists, summed up in the following:

A. Each segment shall have a list in which it registers the names of its inhabitants who are included in the village voters list. This segment list shall be prepared in two copies, one kept by the mayor and the other by the [district] officer.

B. The committee for preparing the segment lists shall be formed under the chairmanship of the village mayor and with the membership of the segment chief, the (village marriage clerk) and whichever literate village voters selected by the officer.

C. The segment lists shall be amended annually in the 2 weeks following the conclusion of the annual review of the voter lists, ending on 31 December. The amendment shall be made in accordance with the village voter list by adding to or omitting from the segment list the names added to or omitted from the village voter list.

D. No amendment shall be introduced to the segment lists during the year, except within the limits set by article 11 of the executive regulations concerning law No 73 of 1956 on regulating the exercise of political rights. Such amendments concern the change of voting place, correction of the voter lists in implementation of the decisions and rulings on appeals pertaining to registration in the voter lists or changes made in accordance with notifications on final rulings or decisions leading to the denial or suspension of the exercise of political rights.

It is to be noted that article 10 of the law regulating the exercise of political rights states that no change may be made in the voter lists after the voters are summoned to an election or a referendum. In implementation of this provision, no changes may be introduced to the village segment lists when the voters are already invited to vote in an election or a referendum because these changes are made in accordance with the contents of the village voter list. Thus, it is not permissible in this case--i.e. after issuance of the decision inviting the voters to take part in the election or referendum--to amend the voter lists.(1)

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(1) The remaining part of the topic, pertaining to the nomination procedures for the posts of village mayor and chief, will be completed later.

8494
CSO: 4802

UNIVERSITIES MUST FULFILL SOCIAL NEEDS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Feb 81 p 8

[Interview with Dr Ali Shariatmadari]

[Text]

A thorough and complete revolution is one that brings about a transformation in all aspects of the society. The culture and value system of a society are the determining factors in the line and policies of that society. The Islamic Revolution was a revolution of values, this movement introduced new criteria in all dimensions. Beginning from within man and reaching all organs of the society, the cultural revolution has proven to play a sensitive and noteworthy role. In the educational dimension schools have undergone vast cultural developments and transformations still continue. The universities have been closed for this cause. Several months ago Imam Khomeini appointed a committee to formulate and coordinate the matters of the cultural revolution.

To clarify the viewpoints of this committee and their goal, Pars News Agency has interviewed Dr. Ali Shariatmadari a member of the Cultural Revolution Committee which follows:

Q: What is the overall objective of this committee and what responsibilities do you feel?

A: This point must be clarified that the cultural Revolution is not limited to an educational revolution. The changing of educational aims, the contents of education, educational programs and training of teachers and professors are only a part of the overall goal of the cultural revolution. However, the staff, due to the priority of university matters and educational centers and in accordance with Imam Khomeini's decree, has concentrated a large part of its activities to bring about fundamental transformation in education at all levels.

In due time, the staff can, with the support of other social organs, bring about a complete transformation in all aspects of life. I must also state that the problems facing our universities are very complicated.

The problem does not consist in holding classes, or the professors and the students. Such problems could be solved at any time and our universities would reopen. The question of university existence must be defined and the responsibilities of universities must be determined.

The curriculum must be based on scientific principles and in line with the country's needs. The role of the university with regard to the government and the people must be determined. The universities must be in the service of the people and this matter cannot be regarded in an uncertain manner. Rather, the daily activities of our universities must be productive in answering the needs of our society. The society needs medical doctors and the universities must train these doctors.

But an increase in the number of physicians will not have any value for the society if their attitude is the same as that of our present doctors. If instead of eight medical universities, we have twenty, but the graduates are not willing to serve in rural areas and all of them want to become specialists and reside in foreign countries or only in our large cities, these universities will not benefit 70 to 80 percent of our people and the fact that these universities are open or closed, will not make any difference for the people.

Medical universities are valuable for the society when the students, from the start of their medical training, are willing to travel to villages and concentrate their training in these regions. In this case, the process of education directly benefits the society.

This also holds true for other universities. Our university specialists must venture into the poorer regions of the country and deal with these great problems. If all these graduates wanted to live in the bigger cities and be employed by this or that ministry, then the universities would have no value for the society.

In the past, the objective was to increase the number of students and higher training centers and the programming was not based on scientific principles. Education facilities were not provided to all

universities and the students, were not accepted on educational criteria. In summary, the results of the activities of the universities, students and the professors, were not given to the society.

The graduates did not work in their own fields of expertise. For this reason, the formation of universities, the programming, the appointment of professors and students, must be carefully studied and before this aim is realized, the opening of the universities has no meaning.

Q: A need is felt for a new set of classification in regards to the cultural revolution. What is the position of the cultural revolution staff concerning this phenomenon?

A: The phrase "cultural revolution" has two meanings, one is "revolution" and the other "cultural." Revolution means that a fundamental transformation in all aspects of life must occur. The political, economic and educational systems must change and relationships between the people and the government must be changed.

There must occur a transformation in our relations with other countries and the role of our people must be different from what it was in the past. In such conditions, we can declare that a revolution has occurred.

But when we speak of culture, we must understand what is meant by culture. Of course, sociologists and anthropologists speak about the meaning of culture and present different views on it.

Sometimes it is said that culture is the life-style of a society, its cooking, clothing, etc., the manner of dealing with nature which encompasses science, or the manner of dealing with beauty which relates to arts and the manner of thought which considers philosophy and ideology. Therefore, we see that culture takes into account all materialistic and intellectual aspects of life and determines the life style of an individual in a society. Then, when considering a cultural revolution, the meaning must include all these different aspects.

Q: Considering the fact that in the cultural revolution of Iran, the universities have been closed for an indefinite period of time, do you consider the society, or the university, as the determining factor of our cultural revolution?

A: Universities, as a sector of the society, are affected by the society and also have an affect on society. In reality, there exists an organic relationship between universities and the society. When we discuss society, we are in fact discussing the existing system of values in that society.

Due to the fact that, since the advent of Islam, Islamic culture has influenced us in all aspects of life, all social organs must be under this same influence. Universities, as a social organ, obey society and must comprehend the society's culture. In the Islamic Revolution of Iran, the cultural revolution went beyond the philosophical, ethical and artistic boundaries and encompassed the political and economical dimensions of the society.

Taking notice of this fact, universities must also be under the influence of an Islamic culture. And because in such a culture, intellectual incentives are the basis for all activities, the universities must comprehend the values of this culture and their responsibility towards it. In summary, in light of Islamic culture, universities must carry out a complete transformation in their affairs.

Q: What is the view of the cultural revolution staff in regards to political activities in universities?

A. We must first determine the meaning of political activity. We believe that universities are centers for discussion and review of different affairs, which includes politics. In accordance with this belief, freedom must prevail in the university environment. What is meant by discussions is a scientific approach in identifying problems, formulating answers, and forwarding the results to the society. If such is the nature of political activity, then the universities are an important center for such matters.

However, if political activity is to include opposition to the people's ideals and attacking the leaders of the country, then we can no longer consider this political activity and will not allow it. Nowhere in the world is any social organ allowed to conduct such activities. We believe that students should study political matters and discuss such issues. But as I have said, the nature of "discussions" is important.

Q: In response to the country's vital needs in the fields of science and agriculture, decisions have been made to reopen Technical and Medical Schools. But there is little or no talk about Humanities and Arts. Don't you think that after a while, the prevalence of a sort of technocracy will entangle all levels of our universities, giving no importance to Humanities?

A: The staff has not been idle regarding this matter. We have formed groups of experts and professors of Humanities and have chosen 15 essential fields of Humanities and have merged them with other subjects. We have weekly discussions with professors of Humanities. Our aim is to determine to what extent Humanities has been influenced by Western or Eastern system of values. We must determined the role of Humanities in the present world.

What is Islam's view towards Humanities? How can we employ Islamic doctrine in examining and putting forward new ideas in certain fields of Humanities? Besides, we want to include Humanities in our university curriculum, so that a trained engineer or physician can understand and be familiar with the society's system of values. Therefore, you see that we have been active in this regard and are continuing our research and work in Humanities. We hope that Humanities like other subjects, will be able to meet its responsibilities to the society.

CSO: 4920

ADOBE CONSTRUCTION INDICATES RETURN TO SIMPLER LIFESTYLE

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Feb 81 p 8

[Excerpts]

I hear the hope that, with knowledge and action, with knowledge and purity of soul, with knowledge and pious deed, you will overcome your difficulties.

— "Imam Khomeini"

I wake up thinking about clay.

Why is it that we still know so little about this simple material?

Humans have been with it since the dawn of civilization and even earlier than that.

... The coming of industrialism with its spangles has thoroughly blinded the human creature to the soul that is alive in clay. The protective layer industrialized man has developed, has numbed his senses.

Concrete and steel, tools of lazy minds, have stopped the progress of clay which can so beautifully mold imagination into form and space. Vaults and domes, children of clay, are but imitated in concrete and steel, while the opportunity to create new forms with clay has been stopped somewhere in history.

... How is it that the human creature had created the most beautiful structures and spaces out of clay units before the technology of today stopped him at the elastic limit of this material? How is it that since strength of materials have been known and sophisticated calculations have been developed, no architect or engineer dares to build a mud vault of more than three-meter span? And yet, far bigger spans were built hundreds of years ago and still stand.

... If I can successfully bake a glaze into my house, then after 6,000 years of ceramics sized for the mantlepiece, I will make the revolution of living in ceramic spaces. It will be a true integration of ceramic art into architecture...

In our visits to contemporary art museums and the numerous exhibitions held there, on the occasioon of the 2nd anniversary of the victory of the revolution, gallery number 5 attracted our attention very much. Because, in the majority of museums and exhibitions, located in the northern part of the city, we saw a kind of art which is alien to the majority of our masses and has so far failed to attain their recognition.

Maybe they thought that if some villager or worker from the south of the city, set foot upon the elegant halls of the museum, they would somehow take away from the artistic value of the paintings and other items. And this was the kind of "arts" that the taghoot culture introduced into our society, arts alien to the people. But no, we do longer want this sort of art, because we have had a revolution and if we claim that our revolution touches all dimensions of life, then this revolution must also encompass our arts.

Today, in our visits to one of the most exciting museums in Iran, we saw signs indicating the start of a revolution in our arts. We can claim our arts to be popular when the museums and exhibitions attract and entertain all the different strata of our people.

The art that is presented, must tell of the pains and needs of our own society. The reason gallery No. 5 attracted our attention was because the art presented offered a cure for one of the biggest pains suffered by a hardworking stratum of our people, which for years had suffered the lashes of different dictators ruling Iran.

Yes, this time, the pains of the mostaz'afin have been taken to the museums in the upper part of town. Together we shall take a look at the museum and then speak to one of the officials of the exhibition. The exhibition is called Geltaftan.

Geltaftan is the name of a new system of architecture, which is very new in Iran and the world and the system was introduced by an Iranian engineer.

This system strengthens the resistance of mud houses and this system can be employed for strengthening old houses in rural areas and prevent their devastation due to natural disasters like floods and earthquakes. One of the qualities of this system is the low economic cost. The process has no need for factories, machinery and skilled labor. The exhibition views a number of pictures showing the different stages of the process and the work done on some rural houses. Also a torch is seen, that is simple enough, is the only needed too for the process.

Nader Khalili, who has innovated and constructed the Geltaftan system, was born in Tehran in 1937. He has gained his education and experience in Iran, Turkey and the United States.

For the past six years, riding a motorcycle, he has been doing research and studies in villages of Iran. A summary of his impressions has been written in his book called "Racing Alone".

He has delivered lectures and published articles around the world about habitations for poor people and the transfer of traditional crafts into the modern technology. Another system he has designed is called "Sardgah", by which architecture of traditional ice-reserves can be utilized to create modern cold store and cooling systems. A prototype of this work is presently being developed.

Geltaftan (literally "clay-firing") is an expression made up of the words "Gel" ("g" pronounced like in "get"), meaning clay-mud, and "Taftan", meaning to fire or bake.

Geltaftan is a method of increasing the resistance of existing buildings, especially clay and adobe rural dwellings. It is also a system of constructing new buildings to become traditional, beautiful and low-cost; which are resistant to natural elements, floods and earthquakes.

The design is based on the utilization of the four universal elements of water, earth, air and fire. By this method, existing sun-dried bricks and clay houses are fired and baked in place to become a monolithic brick structure.

The penetrating effect of fire fuses the walls, floors, the roofs and different parts of the building as much as possible. New buildings too can be made of such materials as adobe and clay earth, and then baked into an integral, jointless unit. The interior areas of houses can also be lined with a layer of ceramic glaze, baked together with the structure, creating tilework-like even surfaces.

Geltaftan is a simple, elementary method by which the art of traditional architecture and traditional crafts such as brick baking, pottery and ceramic work are linked and put to use.

The applications of Geltaftan are numerous. Among the primary and secondary possible applications relevant to the rehabilitation and new construction of the villages in Iran, particularly from the housing viewpoint, three may be envisaged:

1) Increasing the stability of existing houses made of adobe and clay.

2) Building new houses with adobe and clay as its principal construction materials.

3) Prefabrication system.

Secondary applications of Geltaftan such as stabilizing "qanats" (underground irrigation system), producing construction materials, pottery, enamel, etc., are also possible.

After repairing a number of old and worn-out houses of a village, the process of firing and baking was carried out, with the following results, which may speak of a significant development in the future of rural architecture:

a) The existing vault or dome covered houses made of adobe and clay were cheaply ($52.- of fuel for a house with two rooms) transformed into brick houses. Not only were the old adobes changed into solid baked bricks, but also the mortar between them acquired the solidity of bricks, adding to the rigidity of the structures.

b) With the radical change of properties occuring in the firing process, the weak points of adobe and clay — their solubility in water and low resistance to crushing forces — were turned into strong ones. This natural alteration of the material through the action of fire gives it added resistance to rain, snow, floods or earthquakes.

c) Using a primitive method, with the sole help of home-made torches and local fuel, it was shown that reconstruction and restoration can be achieved in the remotest regions of the country. With a minimal investment in buying the necessary equipment ($450.- for a torch, a hand pump and some piping), it is possible to bake a whole village.

d) Once the houses are solidified, they may be finished with any traditional materials such as mudstraw or stucco, without any need for major alterations in the suitable living space of villagers.

e) Some areas of a building, such as the bathroom, the toilet room, the kitchen, etc., may be lined with a layer of traditional ceramic enamel. Surfaces treated in this manner will be similar to a uniform tileworks all at once solid, hygienic and attractive. Thus, the success gained in glazing of the experimental rooms has brought forth a turning point in the integration of the architecture and ceramic arts.

f) With the use of the amount of heat required for baking the materials of the structures, the pest-ridden living areas are thoroughly wiped-out of mice and troublesome insects, and ample obstacles are created against their return.

g) By erecting temporary thin walls at the door and window openings, every room may be used as a brick kiln, where sun-dried bricks can be baked for use in making walls, landscape, etc. In this way, not only a building will require no manufactured construction materials, but will act as a profitable productive unit itself.

h) Among the most important results of the implementation of this project in the reconstruction of villages is the "self-help" factor. The "brick-backing" restoration method not only gains spontaneous acceptance by villagers, but, as soon as the first house is baked, it is learnt by them, and put to use by their own hands, since they are naturally and traditionally acquainted with every stage of it. Even in winter, when no agricultural work takes place, the restoration can easily go on. The tests made by the experts of the Building and Housing Research Center of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development — regarding resistance to moisture, pressure and loadbearing — points to the success of Geltaftan.

i) A proof of this success may be observed in the old kilns of the villages. These kilns were made of adobe and clay, and by the action of fire they have withstood centuries of rain and snow and floods

and earthquakes, unaltered as one-piece bricks.

With the Geltaftan method, every new rural building, whether a mosque, a school, a private house a public bath or a stable, can be made of adobe and clay as its only construction materials, and then baked into a one-piece brick. The finish works of these buildings may be done in the traditional manner, and areas such as bathrooms and toilets can be ceramic enameled and fired.

In almost every region of Iran, the clay earth required for building can be found. In cases where it may not be available, its transportation is feasible and economic, because it is the only material to be transported. Also the cost of this transportation will be considerably less than that of steel, cement or other manufactured materials, all the way from countries who export them.

The results obtained from the application of Geltaftan in the new construction of buildings which are underway are as follows:

a) All the needed buildings are made in the village by the local "memar" (builder), often in an indigenous manner.

b) Importing construction materials such as steel, cement, bricks, tiles, etc., is absolutely unnecessary (this can mean severing every dependence of the village upon manufactured, non-local products).

c) The cost involved is considerably lower than that of buildings commonly using bricks and steel beams, it is more in line with the low-cost adobe construction. Thus, with the amount of money required for one modern steel and concrete building, it is possible to build a few houses by Geltaftan. The effects of such a dive in prices at the national level can mean a huge difference in total figures.

d) By using the Geltaftan method, original, traditional architecture, together with its innumerable desirable features, can be revived, and our villages can retain their own architectural identities.

e) By making use of local materials and manpower, work is provided in the village, and all the money allocated for construction is spent in the village.

f) Similar to rehabilitation work, in this case also rooms can be used as kilns to produce bricks.

g) In the Geltaftan method, there can never be a shortage of materials, (as it is common in the conventional systems). Clay is abundant, and every kind of fuel can be used. In the extreme case of a temporary shortage of fuel, the building can still be erected and used in the traditional manner, until fuel is once again available.

h) Geltaftan is a combination of rural, traditional arts and crafts, which naturally gains the immediate acceptance of villagers, who learn it rapidly.

With existing plans and designs, it is possible to prefabricate rural houses, which are then transported to their sites. In this way, the Geltaftan factory (which operates just like a brick factory) produces units which are used in the assembly of a house.

Each of these elements is a complete brick room (integrating the walls, the roof and the floor) produced in one piece. The combination of these allows a house, a school or a public building complex to be easily created.

One of the greatest advantages of this method is that such buildings are resistant to earthquakes, because the one-piece rooms, resting on a layer of sand, actually float over the tremor waves. Eventually, this may lead to a new method whereby it can be possible to set new standards of strength of materials in combination with the geometric forms of buildings, in view of better protection against earthquakes.

Another advantage of the prefabrication method is the rapidity of its production of housing modules. In this way villages can be restored and new villages can be built within a short period of time.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

TECHNICAL COOPERATION MINUTES--Baghdad, 5 Mar (INA)--Iraq and Bulgaria signed here today joint minutes for scientific, technical and economic cooperation in the field of construction and building. The joint minutes was signed by Iraqi Housing and Reconstruction Minister Muhammad Fadil and visiting Bulgarian Minister of Construction and Constructional Materials Ivan Sakarev. It covers cooperation in the field of practical research and exchange of expertise in the field of laboratory research and testing of construction materials. The Bulgarian side expressed preparedness to delegate experts and engineers to Iraq where they will work in the construction of roads and bridges, and share in laying blueprints for housing schemes in Iraq. [Text] [JN051927 Baghdad INA in English 1900 GMT 5 Mar 81]

SAUDIS REPORTEDLY HELP IRAQ--Iraq has recently completed several large arms deals, with Saudi help, in order to overcome the Soviet embargo on Iraq. Our Arab affairs correspondent Ehud Ya'ari says that the new deals are based on the supply of Saudi oil in return for the weapons. From Brazil, Iraq is purchasing about 2,000 armored personnel carriers, and from Spain it will purchase transport planes and bombers as well as large quantities of ammunition and light arms. Iraq is seeking to purchase 200 tank transporters from Britain, aid in the overhaul of chieftain tanks that were captured from Iran, and Rapier antiaircraft missiles. From Italy, Iraq is purchasing naval vessels. Our correspondent notes that this effort reflects an Iraq desire to free itself from dependence on the Soviet and to ready itself for the continuation of the war against Iran. [Text] [TA082019 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 8 Mar 81]

CSO: 4820

RAFI LEADER ASSESSES DAYAN'S POSITION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Feb 81 p 6

[Text] IN THIS ancient land of miracles, where political corpses have a knack of coming back to life to heckle their delegators, Moshe Dayan may be getting ready for his third coming. This is unprecedented, even in Israeli politics. Dayan has known how to preserve his legend of being above the rules that bind other men. He has demonstrated that Humpty Dumpty can put himself together again and lead the king's men back to the castle.

Speculation about the state of his health notwithstanding, Dayan is his mid-60s still basks in the aura of the eternally youthful rebel. No other Israeli politician has been described as "a sex symbol for an American" — as actor Peter Strauss referred to him some time ago. And now it appears that Dayan is all set to embark on a new adventure.

His ex-Labour comrades, outraged by what they consider his effrontery in seeking to take votes away from them, maintain that Dayan sees himself as a star-fick. They argue that he is behaving in character and is determined to punish our their run. Has a cunning predator invading a hard-working farmer's pasture.

The priests of Dayan's personality cult, on the other hand, expect to benefit from the tendency to amnesia among the voters. But they will face droves of disenchanted devotees for whom Dayan is the Great Betrayer who turned their idolem of faith into shopping shows for his career.

For them, Dayan is the one who made inconsistency an exact science. For his supporters, his qualities of inscrutability and unpredictability make up for what the critics see as opportunistic opportunism and double-talk for the suffering of ordinary people. One Dayan-minister speaks of his "three-phased decisions."

THE DAYAN camp is banking on Labour sliding the Yom Kippur War guilt here (because a number of its front-benchers were in power at the time), and on the Likud being hard to Dayan (in the expectation that he will deprive Labour of many votes).

Yet Dayan will not be able to escape criticism that his ministerial record in both defence and foreign affairs was not as glowing as his public relations efforts would have us believe. His importance with [illegible] in a [illegible] for the [illegible] in 1973, and when he resigned from the foreign ministry he left many great unsolved foreign-connected problems in a state of neglect.

Dayan could in effect be asking the voters for votes of his "right, wrong, nothing to explain" as the crisis of faith in the credibility of politics.

But at this election, everything proceeds. Dayan will have to face two symbols of his inconsistency which have cost millions of shekels of public money — Yamit and Ophira.

More than any other public figure, it was Dayan who inspired the creation of these two outmoded entities, only to abandon them as a Likud minister.

Although his political record is strewn with the wreckage of other people's careers, Dayan takes it for granted that those he has let down will still come running to him when he calls. The most outstanding case is the ever-loyal Moshe-dad Ben-Porat, who took Dayan at his word in 1977 and soon found that he had been abandoned to fend for himself.

Ben-Porat's experience will not, apparently, stop him from joining Dayan's list if asked, because he believes that Dayan knows what's good for this country.

Zalman Shoval has also managed to remain a loyal supporter of Dayan. He was part of the original band that formed Rafi — even before Dayan left Labour in 1967. He is about while when Rafi formed a union with Mapai and Ahdut Ha'avoda. He broke with Dayan over his fence-sitting, and in 1973 chose to follow Ben-Gurion and Dayan's cousin Yiftach Hurvitz in forming the State List. In 1973 they joined with Eliezer Shostak and Eliad Ofaim in the Li'ma party, which was a founding group of the Likud.

In this framework they achieved power in 1977 as part of Begin's Likud, finding themselves in happy partnership with Dayan, who, having been elected on the Labour ticket, hardly hesitated to cross the political divide and join the Begin cabinet.

AT 52, SHOVAL, who is a banker, has taken on the onerous duty of assembling the vehicle for Dayan's

third coming. Apparently, Hurvitz and Shoval will bring Rafi's assets, and its access to public funding both in the Knesset and the Histadrut, while Dayan will bring his glamour and popularity.

"Moshe says the 10th Knesset will have to cope with some of our most fateful problems, particularly the follow-up of the autonomy scheme and the relationship with Jordan under the Camp David agreement," notes Shoval. "At present neither the Likud nor Labour is offering their answers on this subject."

Dayan fears Labour could make a deal with Jordan short of peace and thinks Begin has missed the big chance created by the peace treaty to defuse the Palestinian issue.

Shoval speaks of Rafi as providing the organizational basis.

"We know that our electoral potential if we stand alone is 6-8 seats, while polls indicate that a Dayan list could net 'at least' 20 seats."

The new party's social and economic programme would reflect Yigael Hurvitz's thinking, Shoval suggests, adding "the public knows that Yigael was right."

In his forthcoming book Dayan reiterates that he is finished with politics, which leaves another question mark over his credibility.

Would the party simply serve as a one-time vehicle of convenience for Moshe Dayan, turning into a wrecking machine or a constructive mechanism at its master's will?

"Dayan says that we are in a state of national emergency, so there is room for a list based on agreed positions composed of men capable of implementing them," he replied.

"It is possible that some of its members might not wish to serve more than one term in the Knesset. No, it's not simply a vehicle for Dayan, rather it's aimed at being a conveyance of declared positions. It is coming into being in response to Dayan's confession that he did not want to lose sleep over the fact that if he stayed out of politics bad things might happen in Judea and Samaria that would endanger our country."

If the new list wins enough seats to play a real role in the next Knesset, it will choose between the two big parties, depending on where it can have more influence. "We might even opt for the Opposition benches," declares Shoval. "It will be a list advocating a programme on pragmatic lines in the best Ben-Gurionist tradition.

"Moshe once told Begin that if Jordan should offer a peace treaty based on territorial compromise, Israel should *not* say there is nothing to talk about."

At the same time Shoval attacks Labour's "readiness for unilateral concessions," adding that "even the Allon plan has been abandoned by them."

He then reminds me that Dayan only stepped into the Likud ministerial limousine after Begin promised not to annex the West Bank.

AS TO THE list's composition, Shoval at this stage is ready to say only that there will be 39 candidates, including Moshe Dayan, Yigael Hurvitz, Zalman Shoval, Yitzhak Peretz and Israel Katz — and probably Mordechai Ben-Porat. Among the others there would be two prominent economists, three senior business executives, a noted political scientist, three women, two generals, a well-known author-historian, representatives of development towns and an Arab.

Wouldn't this be the Democratic Movement for Change in different clothing? "No resemblance whatsoever, apart from the justified disappointment with the Likud and the lack of enthusiasm for Labour. From the start the DMC was a chance collection of people lacking any common ideological background, who got together to pull in the votes. We know that anyone joining us does so on an accepted programme. Most of our candidates were at one time or other part of Rafi, or supported Ben-Gurion."

Also the leadership issue would be clear-cut from the outset. "Yadin is a decent and honest man, but he lacks the kind of personal authority that Dayan enjoys. The list will certainly reflect Dayan's thinking."

DAYAN GAVE some insight into his thinking in a newspaper article last week; in which he clarified what he meant when he called for "a government with a strong hand." He explained: "We aren't doing enough to fight crime. If the police lacks the necessary force, I would recommend using army units." He also wanted "a clear-cut and tough policy on economic matters involving radical measures" — like the closure of El Al.

Dayan was quite revealing when asked whether he thought some people were tired of democracy. He said: "While I am no barometer of the public mood, I think that it's not a matter of tiredness with democracy as a concept but with the lack of effectiveness of Israeli democracy. Under this system there can also emerge highly effective leadership. One cannot say that the U.S. does not have democracy because it has a presidency. There, a small group of people manage matters quite efficiently.

"Nor do I think there are any complaints about the working of executive policy-making in Britain. One may disagree with Mrs. Thatcher's policies but one cannot ignore that she governs with a clearly-defined policy. I do think it's highly exaggerated to translate the general mood of dissatisfaction in [Israel] as a total negation of the democratic system. Recent governments did not — in the public mind — function effectively and failed to cope with the country's problems."

After explaining that his final decision to run would hinge on who would go along with his platform, Dayan revealed that he would unveil his programme on March 6 at a "forum for political and economic discussions."

He also intimated that he would announce his decision to form his own slate in the first week of April, just before the 9th Knesset dissolves.

Dayan stressed that his "reservations about Labour's platform does not mean support of the Likud." The Likud's problem, according to Dayan, "is not only programmatic but one of performance and implementation of policy."

(Dayan dropped a bombshell at the Tel Aviv Labour Council forum recently when he said "I will not crawl back to Labour," apparently expecting the party he had so publicly abandoned to be beset enough to crawl back to him. Labour supporters see this declaration as yet another indication of how slippery a customer Dayan can be — taking his battle for votes into the heart of its Tel Aviv stronghold.)

Dayan is against Labour's platform because he considers it to be against Israel's interests, "although of course I do not question the good intentions and constructive approach of Shimon Peres, Israel Galili and Haim Bar-Lev." His main objection is to Labour's proposal to reach an accommodation with Jordan in stages; his greatest fear is that the mountain slopes along the West Bank will be handed back to Jordan. This is the fulcrum of Israel's eastern defence line, Dayan argues, which under any agreement must remain under IDF control.

He also takes issue with the Labour plank to pursue negotiations with Jordan without resorting to new elections (as had been the Labour commitment under Golda Meir to the NRP).

Dayan envisages that the main burden of his election campaign clash with Labour will be on this issue. "I would not propose that anyone vote for them on such a platform. I doubt very the Likud argument that they want to roll me out as the PM. But I do contend that their practical politics would be our country's ruin. I will fight that with all my verbal powers. If as a result they will be denied their mandate to govern, I won't regret it. On the contrary, I will be very happy indeed." □

CSO: 4820

THIRD MAJOR PARTY SEEN AS MISGUIDED ALTERNATIVE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 13

[Article by Yoel Marcus: "Without Dreams of Princes"]

[Text] Something strange is happening to the country on the way to the tenth Knesset: It is left without De Gaulles. The nation, not unlike a magician who is left without rabbits, pidgeons, and other creatures to pull out of his hat, stands with open mouth and scratches its head: What to do when Menahem Begin has let you down and the alternative is not so appealing? Who is one going to vote for? Who shall be made leader and guide when the hat is completely empty of tricks? The fact that so many people have not yet decided who to vote for is living proof that there are no more magic leaders left, and that in effect we are on the threshold of a new era.

The yearning for a charismatic-authoritarian leader began in the public consciousness when David Ben Gurion's decline started at the end of the first decade of the state. Since then, for almost two decades, we have nurtured in our consciousness a sort of a succession of idols who at a given time were expected to step into Ben Gurion's shoes and lead with a sure hand and a clear knowledge of goals to be met. But the disappointments were as great as the expectations. Somehow those whom the public imagination considered touched by the divine spirit and capable of bringing salvation, were burned the moment they took hold of the reins, like meteors entering the atmosphere.

The first to be burned was the late Yigal Alon, considered superstar by many, at a time when Moshe Dayan was an unknown general in the early days of the state. Next to be burned like meteors were Pinhas Lavon and Yitzhak Ben Aharon, both because of their questionable character, their sharp tongue and their temper. The idolized Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, who many believed would bring salvation, were burned together. Golda, because there was no political wisdom behind her strength and determination. Dayan, because behind his political conception (or conceptions) there was no determination and consistency. After them and between them a whole generation of generals who were dropped into political life were burned. In many instances their contribution to our political life was insignificant or nil. Yitzhak Rabin, while no one's idol, was handed the party and the state on a silver platter after the Yom Kippur War fiasco in a way no one ever received it, certainly not with as much credit as he was given. He did not know what to do with the assets he inherited, and paved the way for his party first historical defeat in the elections. After him Ezer Weizman crossed our sky, was

given praise, credit, and hopes. The disappointments he gave his supporters equal their dreams. Having reached the bottom of the magician's hat, the country even tried Begin, who, while not exactly everyone's dream, enjoyed the aura of the founders of the state. Begin, mainly disappointing his own friends, proved himself devoid of leadership, and to this day it is a mystery to me how he commanded, if indeed he did, the Irgun underground. Each disappointment gives rise to a new dream. Thus the Yitzhak Navon dream was born, but Navon himself, visible as he is, made it clear he was not made of the same stuff dreams are made of. Every Erlich had his Hurvitz. And every Hurvitz turned out to be a god who failed. Who for example is going to dream about "men like Buma Shavit," after we saw what he did running El Al?

The greatest public dream was smashed by Yigael Yadin. It is strange, for 20 years Yadin was on the periphery of our political life like a potential De Gaulle. Which commentator or journalist did not sin in making the prophecy that some day we would have to call Yadin to the rescue? He finally came, and brought down the Alignment, whereupon he sank into the quagmire of total inaction, with all the privileges of office.

And now, despite the Yadin and the Begin disappointments, 9 out of every 20 potential voters are still not convinced the Alignment is the best alternative for the present government. This vacuum of undecidedness is giving rise to the assumption that there is room for a "middle party," which, with the right candidates, will accomodate all those who are fed up with the Likud but dislike the Alignment. A similar, though opposite task, was undertaken by the Democratic Movement for Change in the last elections. But this time this new party cannot find a new De Gaulle for good measure. Yigael Yadin can indeed be sorry (personally, at least) he did not stay out of the race as a potential De Gaulle to this day, when we no longer have dreams of princes. At least we would have had someone in whose hands we could entrust the "center party" we hear so much about. It might have gotten the 20 plus seats which such list is now expected to get, but it is doubtful whether its fate would have been different from that of the DMC. I am afraid this is what awaits any "middle party" which might come into existence in the next few months.

The reason is, you cannot rely on an ad hoc party, without a past or an ideology, without a solid base, a patchwork party with only one goal--to seize as many seats as possible from the large parties. Yet there are signs some past "saviors,"--Dyan, Weizman, Hurvitz and others are busy creating a center party. What will be the ideological base of these people in the future, considering the fact they did not get along while serving in the same government? Even if such a party comes into being, it is safe to assume it will crumble soon after the elections, once it has blocked the winning party from having the necessary majority or forced it into the bear hug of the religious parties. After the DMC experience and without dreams of princes, the center party is discredited by definition. It will not be a party and it will not be central, only a mirage, our last one, and a stumbling block on the road of orderly government.

Having no choice next June except to vote for either Begin or Peres, the future battles of the 80s will take place between Dov Ben Meir, Eliyahu Shpeiser, Miqi

Bar Zohar, and Aharon Harel on one hand, and Tosef Rom, David Levi, Yoram Aridor, Gid'on Pat and their likes, on the other. The public has to get used to the idea that we are left without De Gaulles and without magic leaders to dream of, and we have to learn how to live and get along without them. Who knows, such acceptance of simple reality without grandiose dreams may indeed be our salvation.

9565
CSO: 4805

FORMER DMC ACTIVISTS ASSESS POSITION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 20 Feb 81 p 7

[Article by Robert Rosenberg]

[Text] THEY WERE THE BEST and the brightest in those days of despair and scandal. They promised a return to an atmosphere like that of the earliest days of the state, when nobody was apathetic, nobody was corrupt, nobody was uninvolved.

Some joined on the ground floor, before there was even a name for the phenomenon. Others joined later, when the issue of names sometimes appeared more important than the ideology itself. When the second group joined, some say, the fall began. However, members of the second group now claim that they were the original nucleus.

And when the death was finally announced this week of the Democratic Movement for Change — or shall we call it Dash, or Shinui, or the Democrats or the Free Centre — it evoked few outbursts of emotion.

Who still remembers the DMC's Seven Principles? Or the reasons why Shulamit Aloni never joined? And who cares? One more-or-less serious question remains: Was it murder, manslaughter, or suicide?

"It was as if somebody impregnated 200,000 people, and then forced a abortion that ended up as a hysterectomy. It was a crime," says Asher Tarmon. He is usually a calm man who runs an important, but not huge, Jewish organization that specializes in American Jewry's relations with Israel.

From his office not far from Jerusalem's King David Hotel he can see the American flag atop the U.S. consulate on Rehov Agron. But his concerns are not American; he has been an Israeli for more than 30 years, and when he joined Shinui, he says, it was the first time he "became involved."

He mentions his early enthusiasm and the bitterness he now feels about all politics.

"If only we had pushed through electoral reform. I felt about that issue, that principle, the way a soldier feels about his first combat. 'If I can only get through this, then everything will be all right,' says the soldier, and that's how we felt, how I felt about electoral reform."

Who will Tarmon vote for now? He doesn't know.

PERRY RODED, a successful Jerusalem businessman, knows who he would like to vote for; he also knows that he'll have to vote for somebody else.

A few weeks ago Roded wrote a letter to a certain Mr. Allen, in the U.S., urging him to stand for the next Knesset.

"This electoral system," he wrote, "has produced some pretty strange results, the most grotesque being the election of (Flatto-Sharon)... the chances of legislation for electoral reform are practically nonexistent as it would put the majority of the current Knesset members out of a job.

"This is where you come in. If you agreed to run for the Knesset, your name at the head of the list would be such a drawing card that your election would be a virtual certainty...

"The presence of the leading professional humorist of our generation alongside 119 amateur jokers... the realization that the time has come for electoral reform," wrote the Jerusalem businessman.

Roded ended his letter — to Woody Allen — by saying that he was being absolutely serious.

But Roded will vote for Shinui in the coming elections; he stresses that he was always a member of Shinui, and didn't fall for Yadin as a knight in shining armour.

"Shinui lives on, returned to its original self," says Roded, describing the various splits that plagued the party as "purges."

ONE OF THE words that kept popping up this week in conversations about the DMC was "enthusiasm." People described how they had organized neighbours, relatives and colleagues.

They talked about their enthusiasm the way lapsed Catholics or former Mea She'arim residents speak of God. They felt conned, somehow resentful that they had allowed themselves to be sullied by their naivety, innocence and enthusiasm.

Tarmon throws away the brochures that still regularly arrive from both Shinui and Yadin's par-

ple. Roded, wary of charisma, doesn't read the Shinui brochures but still allows the movement to collect IS3 a month from his bank account. It's not much money, and maybe it would cost more to cancel the standing order. But Roded knows that unless Woody Allen shows up by March (it would take him three months to become a citizen), he'll be voting for Shinui.

WE EXPLAINED to Roded that there was a mystery attached to this story. We weren't sure of the scene of the crime, or what instrument was used, or even what the motives were.

Roded sent us to Mr. Hepner, the owner of a Jerusalem institution where American-style deli is served. Hefner, said Roded, was a Shmuel Tamir man.

Tamir's reputation had us searching at first for his people as the possible perpetrators of the crime. So we eagerly hunted down Hefner behind his counter.

He didn't really want to talk about it all, and forcefully denied he was part of what Roded had called "the well-oiled, politically sophisticated Free Centre people who took over the party."

But Hepner did drop a clue.

"We saw the party as a *tabula rasa*. It was the Shinui people who ruined it. We saw it as an opportunity to preserve Eretz Yisrael. Yes, when they joined it ruined the party."

Even the chronology is blurred. Shinui existed long before the DMC.

Everybody had told us that the DMC was all about domestic issues. Hepner had given us a clue, but he refused to talk about it.

THERE WERE other people we spoke to, people we remembered as eager followers of Yadin. They refused to be mentioned by name and refused to acknowledge that Yadin had brought them into the affair. But then a chance conversation led us to Ruth Borman, well groomed, fortyish, married to a well-known Hadassah University Hospital professor.

She sat in her Abu-Tor living-room and told us she joined when Yadin initiated the movement. She couldn't remember exactly when she first became disappointed — it must have been when she realized that the DMC had begun to give up its principles so that it could keep its seats in the government. She is still full of praise and respect for *some* of the leaders of the party. She will vote for Labour in the coming elections — "not for love of Mordechai but hatred of Haman."

She remembers the enthusiasm, but says that her entire lifestyle is one of civic involvement.

For her, the DMC was all about a kind of civic "purity." Hepner's words about Eretz Yisrael reverberate silently when she says that the leadership's power struggles over foreign and defence issues were the virus that ate away at the movement.

As the only person we spoke to who said she was ready to vote — "if the opportunity arises" — for a new party if one appears on the scene, Ruth Borman seemed to confound the theories of the cynics who are disappointed by the DMC story.

Asked about the "abortionist" theory of the DMC, she said that she was ready to be persuaded again, and offered another image. "Yadin had a sapling to plant in fertile ground," she said, reminding us of the public malaise of 1976-1977, when Labour was in ruins and Menahem Begin was still a pariah in the political wilderness, trying one last time to win an election.

ALL THOSE questioned talked about the same process. Immediate, undreamt of success (one even compared it to the establishment of the State, something nobody believed would happen and is now sometimes so disappointing), and just as sudden failure.

Success went to the head of the movement, said one. Another said the movement never really had a head which could be affected by success.

Nobody ever approached Yadin during the last four years to tell him what they thought. The irony of an electorate favouring constituency politics but refraining from contacting its elected representatives is only a minor theme in the affair.

The ultimate irony was expressed by Yadin himself, about six months ago, during one of the periodical splits in his now non-existent party. He was being interviewed by television at the Knesset and was asked whether he felt he had disappointed the 200,000 people who had voted for him.

He puffed twice on his pipe. He was the one who made constituency politics his major goal.

"How am I supposed to know who those 200,000 people are?" he replied.

CSO: 4820

NEW PARTY TAKES CENTRIST RELIGIOUS POSITION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Mar 81 p 3

[Text]

Not since the period when David Ben-Gurion was prime minister has there been a real effort to reach a consensus on the role of Judaism in the Jewish state — and even Ben-Gurion was ambivalent on the subject — Prof. Ze'ev Falk said yesterday.

He was speaking at a press conference in Jerusalem called by Shorashim (roots), the new political party that sees itself as "a bridge between the religious and non-religious."

Dr. Michael Corinaldi, a practising lawyer and lecturer on family law at Tel Aviv University, is chairman of the movement and No. one on its projected Knesset list. Falk, professor of law at the Hebrew University, is No. two and Dr. Pinhas Rosenbluth, veteran educator and National Religious Party godfly, is No. three.

Corinaldi said that newspaper descriptions of Shorashim as "an alternative to the National Religious Party" were misleading. It was not a religious party but "a general Jewish movement" appealing to all voters who wanted to break down the wall between "religious" and "non-religious" ("a false dichotomy") and to base the life of the nation on "the elements of Jewish tradition."

Both Corinaldi and Falk complained of the obstacles for new lists being set by members of "the closed club" (i.e., parties represented in the present Knesset). They attacked the mooted raising of the minimum number of votes required for Knesset representation to 2.5 per cent (from the present 1 per cent) shortly before election day as "undemocratic" and bordering on retroactive legislation.

Corinaldi called it a desperate measure engineered by the NRP in an attempt to prevent its own disintegration (because of Rabbi Haim Druckman's intention of running a separate list).

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LIFE IN GUSH EMUNIM SETTLEMENTS ANALYZED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 30 Jan, 13 Feb 81

[Article by Yosef Goell]

[30 Jan 81, pp 4-5]

[Text] The prospect of a new government sometime this summer is the overriding fact of life in the settlements of Judea and Samaria, where Gush Emunim is the largest single political force. The [author] toured the area last week, to check with Gush supporters and others on efforts to get as much done as possible before the forthcoming elections.

LAST APRIL, when I first visited the new Gush Emunim settlement at Eilon Moreh, the approach to the isolated outpost was over a potholed road-cum-track that wound through the Arab village of Deir el-Hatab. Earlier this month, when I had occasion again to visit the place, the approach started out from Nablus over the same potholed road but ended in a broad, newly-asphalted highway that swept up through the pine-covered mountainside, by-passing the Arab village entirely.

The road to Eilon Moreh is symbolic of the changes and the tempo that have characterized Israel's settlement efforts in the West Bank in the past three years.

In Eilon Moreh itself the original 40 prefab homes are now occupied (in April there were only 20 families on the site), and the shells of another 36 permanent concrete homes are taking shape on the hilltop above the present temporary site. In Ofra, the oldest of the Gush Emunim settlements, set up under the Likkud government and located on the Ramallah-Jericho road, settlers are preparing to move into the 30 new 70 sq.m. permanent homes nearing completion alongside the present prefab site.

The rise of new permanent homes at various stages of construction was also evident in all the other settlements of the cross-section we chose to visit earlier this month: Gush Emunim's Kedumim in Samaria, and Migdal Oz and Tekoa in Judea, the Herut-affiliated community of Ha'aleh Shomron, halfway from Kfar Saba to Kedumim; and the growing township of Ariel (which is not named after Ariel Sharon, the driving force behind settlement in Samaria and Judea).

Development of the building, occupational and industrial infrastructure to provide on-site jobs for most of the settlers is less impressive. There is a small silk-screen printing plant in Ofra employing about a dozen people, and a metal working plant connected with Delaware Industries; the beginnings of electronics and metal working plants at Eilon Moreh, and some talk of a still secret patent for producing electric batteries with a fantastically long life; a computer software plant in Kedumim and a smattering of smaller workshops; a plant making spare parts for the world's leading computer manufacturer at Ariel. But the vast majority of the breadwinners among the settlers still work in their original jobs on the Coastal Plain or in Jerusalem.

MAJOR SOURCES of employment are the yeshivot, religious seminaries and more study schools in such places as Ofra, Beit El and Kedumim. The new local authorities that have sprung up for the settlements in Judea, Samaria and the "Land of Benjamin" (around Jerusalem) also provide clerical jobs, mostly for women from the member settlements.

Most settlements have by now been linked to the national

electricity grid, with some in the eastern sections of Judea and Samaria receiving their power from the Jerusalem Electric Corporation (at present under Arab control but threatened with take-over by the Israeli Ministry of Energy). Water is piped mainly from across the "Green Line" which marked Israel's former armistice lines with Jordan.

There is a new breathtaking road nearing completion between Tekoa, just at the foot of Mount Herodion in the uplands of the Judean Desert, and Mitzpe Shalem on the shores of the Dead Sea. A small section of Arik Sharon's pet project — the Cross-Samaria Defence Highway — has been completed west of the main Jerusalem-Nablus road, linking up with the narrow winding roads leading down to Kalkilya and Kfar Sava. Huge earthmoving machines are working on the last link in this road, east of the Jerusalem-Nablus highway, that will connect the coast with the settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley via Majdal Bani Fadil and Ma'aleh Ephraim, although the chairman of the Council of Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, Israel (Yesha) Harel, pooh-poohs the pace of work on this latter project.

The most impressive change of all is in population. Exact figures are hard to come by; the closest approximation I could get, from Harel and partly corrected by an on-the-spot check in a cross section of settlements, is 5,000 adults and 10,000 children in about 36 settlements.

NOT ALL the settlers are members of Gush Emunim and its periphery. Ariel, one of the largest settlements, was created mainly by secular, Labour-oriented (but hawkish) employees of the Defence Industries and the Israel Aircraft Industries. Nearby Ma'aleh Shomron is formally affiliated to the Herut settlement movement, although settlers there told me that few among them were indeed members of Herut. "We learned that you can't settle without some strong movement to represent you when they give out the goodies, so we settled for Herut, because it's the party in power."

Israel Harel volunteers that in Kiryat Arba (the largest of the settlements and established under the [illegible] aegis of Labour's ostensibly "dovish" minister, the late Yigal Allon) there are many settlers "who came just for the subsidized housing and there are others who are simply rabble."

It would be a fair estimate, however, that at least one-half of the total population identifies with Gush Emunim, which amounts to an appreciably larger number than the Gush spoke of three-and-a-half years ago.

Also impressive is the fact that there have been hardly any defectors from the Gush vanguard of settlers, despite the difficult physical conditions of the early days. "In Ofra, only three families have left over the years, one of them to a 'more pioneering' settlement at Shilo, and two for personal reasons," Harel told us.

And finally, it should be noted that the total number of settlers in the Judea and Samaria areas is significantly larger than the total in the Labour-government-sponsored areas of the Golan, the Rafiah Salient and the Jordan Rift Valley, although the difference in the number of adults is not that large.

THE BIG TEST of Gush Emunim's potential will come in the next few months as the first permanent homes in the various settlements are occupied and the prefabs now inhabited by the original settlers are vacated for new occupancy.

There is reason to believe that the Gush has used up nearly all its manpower reserves except for the relatively small number of Bnei Akiva graduates in the *hesder yeshivot*, whence its original supporters came.

Thus, the 15,000 population may with considerable effort be increased to 20,000 or so by mid-year, the cut-off date in everyone's mind in the territories, at which time a Labour government is expected to replace the Likud and the settlement "godfather" Arik Sharon.

But if the comparison with Labour's previous settlement efforts, in terms of numbers, is flattering to Sharon and the Gush, seeing the results against the figures of the surrounding Arab population would seem to be an exercise in futility. Whether the election day number stands at 15,000 or 20,000 or even 25,000, it would represent several years of supreme ideological, political, budgetary, technological, bureaucratic and human effort and still constitute only about one-third to one-half of the annual natural increase of the Arab population in the areas.

AT THE TIME of writing there are plans calling for the establishment of 10 additional settlements, which should be in place by the summer elections. (The need to complete this phase of Sharon's original master-plan is the main reason why he has been the outstanding opponent of early elections.) Included in this number are: Yakir (1 & 2) near Karnei Shomron on the Nablus-Kfar Sava road; Reihan (4 & 5) in the northwestern corner of Samaria; Mikmash, east of Ramallah; Nili, northwest of Ramallah; Tekoa 2, south of Bethlehem; Mitzpe Govrin, south of Hebron; and Shavei Shomron-2, northwest of Nablus.

It is somewhat doubtful whether there are enough ideologically-motivated people waiting to establish these settlements and flesh out the existing ones. So the main settlement strategy seems to be to attract less idealistic settlers by promises of impressively subsidized housing in surroundings that offer a quality of life hard to find in the overcrowded Coastal Plain.

The standard new homes being built in the existing settlements vary in size from 78 to 90-odd sq.m. Na'aman (Sheldon) Lurie, an immigrant from Newton, Mass., who has been a member of Ofra for the past two years, has been living in one of the original 42 sq.m. two-bedroom prefabs which he rents for IS650 a month, including utilities

and local taxes. He is preparing to move into a 78 sq.m. permanent single-family home for which he is paying IS130,000.

In Tekoa, Eli Bask, a member of the Russian *gar'in* (nucleus group) which founded the settlement together with an American *gar'in*, told me that the 15 permanent homes that are to be built (Tekoa is much younger than Ofra; lots are just being measured, and there isn't yet any sign of building), will cost about IS200,000 each. I heard similar figures in Ariel and in Ma'ale Shomron.

IN ADDITION there are plans to allocate plots for "Build Your Own Home" schemes in nearly all the settlements. The fact that most of them are considered "community settlements" rather than kibbutzim or moshavim means that requirements for equality in housing can be waived.

The recent reports of large-scale deals which Sharon and Housing Minister David Levy are negotiating with private contractors, whereby easy government loans and state-owned lands in urban sites within Israel proper will be allocated in exchange for an undertaking to build thousands of homes in sites in Samaria, refer mostly to the "Build Your Own Home" schemes.

Reports speak of negotiations for the construction of 1,800 single family homes in Karnei Shomron at a cost of about IS300,000. This location is considered especially attractive since it is only 15 km. from Kfar Sava.

Settlers there and in neighbouring Ma'ale Shomron told me that it took them 30-45 minutes to get to work to their old jobs in the Coastal Plain. Settlers in Ofra and Beit El and Tekoa need about the same amount of time to get to work in Jerusalem. This means that a large proportion of their income is spent on transportation.

Negotiations with contractors for the building of 500 homes in Elkana, 500 in Shavei Shomron and several hundred in Givon, near Jerusalem, have also been reported.

WHAT HAS been done and what is planned for the next few months obviously costs large sums of money. It is difficult to fix the exact amounts, since Sharon funnels money to his projects much as the National Religious Party uses the ministries, and Jewish Agency bodies under its control to distribute funds to its religious and economic institutions. Formal budgetary frameworks are only the tip of the iceberg.

A study by Zvi Schuldinger published in *Ha'aretz* last fall concluded that funds channelled to the settlements in Judea and Samaria in a year from the budgets of the Ministries of Housing, Agriculture, Defence, Finance, Education, Interior, Religious Affairs, and Industry, Trade and Tourism, as well as from the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department, totalled IS15 billion.

It seems clear, however, that the haggling with private contractors over a barter agreement indicates that even sums like the above estimate are far from sufficient for the plans already afoot to flesh out the 40-50 settlements with housing for an additional 10,000 or so settlers.

The overriding consideration in all the settlements is the likelihood that the Likud will be replaced by a Labour government in the summer. "Pessimists" among the settlers, usually among the more far-out Gush Emunim ideologues, mumble under their breath about the need to organize resistance to Labour attempts to remove the settlements physically. "Optimists" speak of a more indirect Labour approach that would dry up their funds.

A report from London last week, however, quoted Labour Party chairman Shimon Peres as denying any intention to dismantle or "dry up" the existing settlements in Judea and Samaria. But Peres said that no further settlements would be established by any Labour government in heavily populated Arab areas, and that major Labour support would go to the neglected settlements in the Jordan Rift Valley.

ISRAEL HAREL of Ofra notes that the Council of Jewish Settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which he chairs, was established as a political body specifically to defend the political interests of the settlements — not only those established by Gush Emunim but those in non-Gush localities, too.

At present the council's purpose is to apply pressure on Sharon to get things done as quickly as possible. Harel, formerly a newspaperman on *Yediot Aharonot*, also edits the council's spirited weekly, *Nekuda*. He does not excessively admire the Likud government or Sharon. "The council was established specifically because of the terrible weakness of the government, which is noted primarily for having two left hands. Even Sharon, who has been the prime mover and pusher of settlement, has the terrible habit of not finishing things. If it were not for us many of his initiatives would never have got off the ground.

"They're not serious," he says of the Likud. "They work as if they have a world of time, or at least another four full years, to finish what they've undertaken to do."

Harel is optimistic about the fate of the territories and of the new settlements, regardless of the government in power. "Paradoxically, it may even be better under an Alignment government. Since Sadat is opposed to the 'Jordanian option' of bringing Hussein into any talks and Labour is opposed to the autonomy, there is a good chance that the *status quo* will continue under a Labour government.

"But even if there is real movement on the 'Jordanian option,' I am convinced that we can mobilize sufficient support from the public to prevent the adoption of any decision to relinquish any part of the territories to foreign sovereignty."

The need to mobilize such support, from as broad a popular base as possible, was the rationale for the establishment of the council. It was intended to be the political arm of the settlers. The regional councils are in charge of municipal government and services, and Gush Emunim will continue as an ideological educational movement and the official settlement movement represent its outlook [illegible] in

the relevant institutions.

There is more to it than that, however. Harel admits that Gush Emunim "has had an organizational accident. Hanan Porat and others from among its central activists have gone over to the newly formed Tehiya Party, and that party has so far proven a failure."

This sentiment is an echo of the debate which raged in the Gush over whether to organize directly as a party or to concentrate on serving as a pressure group in a larger arc of the political spectrum. Harel and the council clearly represent those who have opted for a broader political strategy.

"There are a number of parties in our periphery which we can help or harm. And we're obviously working on them. Hitherto very little was done in Labour itself but we are beginning to have meetings with their people, too."

An inkling of the sort of contacts that are being made is provided by Dov Keren, the chairman of the Labour Party branch in Ariel.

Keren told me that the branch numbered 105 of the 360 adults in Ariel and that 85 per cent of the population belonged to the Histadrut. "Ariel was planned by Labour governments and most of us from the Defence Industries and from the Israel Aircraft Industries first organized to come here in the early '70s, encouraged by then-defence minister Moshe Dayan."

Keren said that in addition to obtaining the support of the Labour Party leadership bureau for recognition of the Ariel branch, he has also been in contact with Yisrael Galili, the head of the party's settlement committee, on the inclusion of Ariel in Labour's official settlement map.

"If Ariel is included, why not neighbouring Karnei Shomron and even Elkana, which is much closer to the Green Line?" I asked.

"That's just the point," he answered.

HIS NEIGHBOUR in Ariel, Dr. Aharon Ben-Ami, a lecturer in Middle East politics at Bar-Ilan University, expressed confidence that it would never come to a Labour government seeking to dismantle the settlements in Judea and Samaria.

"I am convinced that no agreement to relinquish the territories either to Jordan's King Hussein or to the Palestinians will be acceptable to either of them without Israel also giving up Jerusalem and going back to the 1967 lines. I don't see the Americans forcing Israel to such a total retreat, and I don't see the Arabs agreeing to anything less.

"If there is any attempt to dismantle the settlements," he added as an afterthought and very gently, "I think there will be much more than mere passive resistance on the part of the settlers."

In this connection, opponents of Gush Emunim and of the entire settlement effort on the West Bank are known to be concerned about the presence of large arsenals in the hands of the settlers. Every settlement has such an arsenal for security purposes, and nearly all settlers are armed.

One of the nightmare possibilities often raised in the endless debates over the question of the settlements is that extremists among the settlers will resort to arms to resist any attempts to dislodge them.

It is difficult to express a balanced opinion on what is the hottest issue in Israel. I would guess that some of the most extreme Gush settlers would use arms against Israel army units sent to carry out government policy. But it is difficult for me to accept such an argument in regard to most of the settlers I have met, incuding some of the true believers in the Greater Land of Israel philosophy.

There is always the possibility, however, that the "crazies" might drag the others into a confrontation with the authorities. My impression is that the mainstream among the settlers as represented by Harel's council and the mainstream in Labour as represented by Peres are aware of the dangers and are adopting stances to guard against them.

"We must prepare ourselves psychologically and practically for harder days under a Labour government," Harel says.

And Peres, as noted above, is busy denying that he has any intention to provoke a direct confrontation by dismantling the Judean and Samarian "empires." □

[13 Feb 81, pp 8-9]

[Text] Gush Emunim's combination of religion and nationalism is clearly the dominant element in Judea and Samaria, but there are many people who have settled there for other reasons.

THE LAST TIME I saw Benny Katzover, he was the object of adulation by a group of Herutniks from Netanya who had come on a Pessah pilgrimage to Eilon Moreh.

This was shortly after Eilon Moreh was established at its latest site Jebel Kebir, some kilometres east of the Palestinian stronghold of Nablus. The Jebel Kebir site was chosen after the High Court of Justice had disallowed settlement at Rujeib, several kilometres to the south, because it found no legal basis for the Gush-initiated expropriation of private Arab lands there.

Katzover, a founding member of Gush Emunim and the secretary of Eilon Moreh at the time, was holding forth to busloads of admiring supporters on the heroism of the Gush settlers, the perfidy of the Begin government, and the eventual need to remove the Arabs from Judea and Galilee.

In his presentation, Katzover was the epitome of the Gush Emunim true believer; the sort who had stood up to both the Rabin and

Begin governments and pushed ahead with the establishment of close to two score new settlements in Judea and Samaria, in response to a "higher call" than that of cool political calculation.

This time, I met Benny Katzover in the offices of the Shomron (Samaria) Regional Council, of which he is chairman, and which are located at the original Eilon Morek site at Kedumim.

Katzover is still very much the true believer; but he is also the routinized bureaucrat. The office in which we met was hung with charts of population rosters of the nine settlements in his bailiwick, and with detailed maps of land use and allocation. He himself is today concerned with such mundane problems as the building of schools and kindergartens, municipal budgets, negotiating with the Public Works Department over the posting of road signs, and the filling in of potholes on those roads, which lead from the narrow waist of the heartland of the "old" Israel several kilometres to the west.

What has happened to Benny Katzover is fairly representative of what has happened to Gush Emunim, the group of graduates of the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement and of Jerusalem's Mercaz Harav Yeshiva who took it upon themselves to compel the governments of Israel to support and provide the wherewithal for their determined settlement of Judea and Samaria.

THERE ARE THOSE, like the spokesmen for Kiryat Arba's Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who insist that the Gush no longer exists and that anyone purporting to speak in its name is misleading the public. Others, like the chairman of the Yesha Council (the body representing the settlements in Judea, Samaria and Gaza) Israel Harel, insist that the Gush does still exist in the shape of the settlement movement Amana, and that its political functions have largely devolved on the Yesha council. It still remains as an ideological movement, says Harel.

The truth is that of the original firebrands of the Gush, Haim Porat of Kibbutz Kfar Etzion is working on the kibbutz and in his spare time is engaged in negotiating the complex issue of land ownership in and around the Etzion bloc; Gershon Shafat is active in the Tehiya Party; Katzover is busy with his regional council; and Rabbi Levinger, voted out of office in the Kiryat Arba he helped to found, is devoting himself to serving as the religious leader of the offshoot of the Kiryat Arba settlers in the heart of neighbouring Hebron.

The metamorphosis of the Gush seems to have resulted from its twin reverses: the High Court decision over Rujeib and the failure of its leaders' hunger strike last year to impel the government to take action on other land expropriations. Some would say that the spirit had departed from the movement. Harel claims that part of the change was due to the "tactical error" of such leaders as Porat and Shafat in shifting their energies to the narrow confines of Tehiya party politics from the broader concerns confronting the settlements in the territories.

SO MUCH media attention has been focused on Gush Emunim that it may well be that the fact of its virtual demise, of its being swallowed up by Yesha, the regional councils and Amana, has gone unnoticed.

My own assessment is that this is very much what has happened and that the Gush has just about used up all its reserves. Further settlement in Judea and Samaria depends largely on the ability of the existing frameworks to mobilize reinforcements very different from the original Gush prototype of a young graduate of Bnei Akiva, or the *hesder* and Mercaz Harav yeshivas.

This type is still in evidence in such Gush strongholds as Ofra, the first of the Samarian settlements, and neighbouring Beit El. It is even more apparent in Beit El Bet, which revolves around its yeshiva. To the outsider, the atmosphere in these mainline Gush settlements seems distinctly inbred. Each of them is very much an old boys' club, reminiscent of the kibbutzim that were established around nuclei from inbred Labour Zionist youth movements.

This early Gush prototype includes an emphasis on the trappings of deeper personal religiosity than that which characterized their National Religious Party parents and their Bnei Akiva contemporaries who did not make the crucial move into the Gush and into the settlements. A somewhat incongruous sight is the combination of chest-length, Agudat Yisrael-style beards — unlike the clean-shaven or short-bearded Bnei Akiva graduate — with the regulation knitted *kippa* and short pants in the summer and army fatigues and battle dress in the rugged Samarian winter.

Orit Ori, the young secretary of the Etzion Bloc kibbutz, Migdal Oz, is typical of the feminine side of this shift to greater religiosity. When I interviewed her she was dressed in a long Mother Hubbard and had her hair covered. She told me she was a daughter of one of the earliest of the Kibbutz Hadati foundations, Sa'ad, where such dress would have been frowned upon by a more revolutionary generation of religious pioneering women.

THESE DEVELOPMENTS among some of the elite elements of the NRP younger generation — the change from unhappiness over the reality of a secular, "goyish" Israel to super-patriotic pioneering, and from relatively easy-going Orthodoxy to greater personal religiosity, have been matched in the U.S. The result has been an impressive mixture of new American Orthodox olim in many of the Gush settlements.

Na'aman Lourie of Ofra, formerly Sheldon Lourie of Newton, Mass, is representative of this stream in the human melange in the Gush settlements. The son of a synagogue beadle, he came on aliya in 1967 at

the age of 19 in response to the trauma of the waiting period that preceded the outbreak of the Six Day War. He went through the succeeding 10 years touching many of the typical bases of olim of this period: ulpan, kibbutz, Bar-Ilan University, and management of a wholehome food emporium in Jerusalem's Ramat Eshkol.

The last of these experiences qualified him to manage Ofra's kitchen, which serves 80-120 diners daily from the Nature Protection Society's field school, the Judaic Studies Institute and the weekend seminars the settlement runs for supporters from town.

Lourie would seem to be a typical low-key member of the Gush Emunim periphery. He enjoys being at Ofra, partly because he feels he is participating in the "holy task" of settling Samaria, but even more because of the unique quality of life it affords him. Quality of life for Lourie means "none of the city's hustle and bustle, a slower pace of living, safety and the good life for my wife and my three children, and membership in a like-minded religious community which permits me to relax in the evenings by studying Tora."

Many of these sentiments were echoed by Moshe Schneider, an erstwhile Jerusalem painter, and much older than the average settler. Schneider moved to Ofra with his wife and six children a year-and-a-half ago.

YET ANOTHER shape in the human pattern of the Gush settlements is provided by David Kapah, son of a noted Jerusalem Yemenite rabbi, who himself was a religious educator for many years in the capital. In Ofra he has established a silk-screen printing plant which employs 12 workers.

"I knew absolutely nothing about silk-screen printing when I came here, and I'm still learning. But we're already making a go of it," Rapah told us on a tour of the plant.

The large number of observant olim among the Gush settlers, especially from the U.S., would seem to bear out the impression gleaned in conversations with local Gush spokesmen that hopes for further expansion of the settlements are based more on expectations of tapping this reservoir abroad than on attracting many more such reinforcements from Bnei Akiva and yeshiva graduates from Israel itself.

The expectation of financial help from American Orthodox sources and from South African Jewry is also central to the planning now going on in Yesha circles to enable the settlements to weather the "ice age" of the coming Labour government.

There are recent reports of emissaries being sent to raise money from hawkish elements in the affluent South African Jewish community. As for manpower, plans for establishing the "city" of Efrat, across the road from the Etzion bloc, are based entirely on the mobilization of American immigrant settlers.

The old boys' club scent that exudes from Gush settlements bothers some of its more sensitive supporters. In a recent issue of Yesha's impressively well-edited weekly, *Nekuda*, one sympathetic adherent warns against the emphasis placed on the symbols, philosophy and teachings of the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva. The fostering of such an inbred atmosphere, he warns, could turn off large numbers of potential adherents among Israel's secular majority.

The Yesha Council, or at least some of its cooler and more pragmatic heads, like Israel Harel, are aware of this problem. In the Council's activities and in the columns of *Nekuda* there are persistent attempts to harness the Labour-oriented settlements in the Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift Valley to a common effort to protect all the over-the-Green-Line settlements against possible attempts by a future Labour government to have them removed.

WHILE GUSH EMUNIM and its latter-day form of religiously-inspired, super-patriotic pioneering is certainly the dominant element in the Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria, it is not the whole story. In Ariel, one of the largest of the settlements in western Samaria, I spoke with two couples who would seem to be representative of the different motivations that have attracted very definitely non-Gush types to the settlements.

Dr. Aharon Ben-Ami and his wife Zivia, he a sociologist of Bar-Ilan University and she an editor and writer for *Ma'ariv*, are long-time members of the secular wing of the Greater Land of Israel movement.

"The fact that we came to Ariel only two years ago," Zivia told me, "was not a matter of a late conversion to the cause, but of the need to solve a host of personal problems before we could move out here. Now that we're here, we see that it was a very wise move. Some things are difficult, like the time involved in commuting to town. What is worse for me is the sneering I come up against from some of my colleagues when they hear I live in Samaria. And *Ma'ariv* is said to be to be hawkishly nationalistic.

Ben-Ami counts himself and Zivia among those who have come to Ariel for ideological reasons. "There are others, however, who have come for the better quality of life up here in the mountains. Then there are those who have found it a solution to their housing problems."

As old-timers in Ariel, the Ben-Amis are among those slated to move into the first 60 cottages, to be completed in a few months time. Roads and earthmoving for an additional 110 homes in the "Build Your Home" programme have already been completed.

"Aren't you rather leery of spending your own money on a home in an area that may be abandoned under a Labour government?" I ask.

Ben-Ami is the one to reply:

"There will never be a situation in which a partial Israeli withdrawal will be accepted by the Arabs. 'Partial' means getting out of Ariel but not out of Jerusalem. I believe that a Labour government will never be confronted with a realistic option of having to withdraw from only part of the territories and I don't believe

the U.S. will really pressure Israel for a total withdrawal. I feel secure here."

THE EVENING that I visited Ariel, the town secretariat was crowded with representatives of families qualifying to move into permanent homes, waiting to notarize their applications for allocation, by lottery, of the first cottages. It was a scene typical of the early stages of many a development town, although here, it appeared to me, the population was almost entirely veteran Israeli, much of it also ex-kibbutz, rather than new immigrant.

I was "privileged" to witness an example of a typical Israeli rip-off associated with such occasions. The notary public who had come from town for the purpose of conducting the bureaucratic rite was charging each family a "cut rate" of "only IS100" for his assembly-line services. Not bad for an evening's work.

While the Ben-Amis may be characteristic of the convinced Greater Land of Israel movement people among the secular settlers, Dov and Zilla Keren, who were the first settlers in Ariel, are more representative of those old-time Israelis, many of them employees of the defence industries and of the Israel Aircraft Industries, who responded to the call of former Defence Minister Moshe Dayan for the settlement at selected sites in Samaria.

Dov himself works for Mekorot, formerly in Haifa now in Tel Aviv, and is part of that second-and third-generation Israel that is so heavily represented at Ariel. He is chairman of the local Labour Party branch and a candidate for the party's central committee.

He and his wife agree that she was the major factor pushing for the family's settling in a place like Ariel. In the event, they were the first family there, living in pristine isolation for a week before other settlers joined them. Zilla speaks of her own motivation as being primarily the desire to emulate the "real Zionism" of her parents, one of the founding families of the Emek Hefer moshav of Even Yehuda.

"It seemed to me that my parents had been among those who built this country. I was always proud of them but also jealous, because when I grew up and set up my own family everything seemed to have been done already. Ariel is a chance for me and my family to continue that tradition of being profoundly involved in building and settling the country."

I HEARD similar sentiments from nearly all the settlers I spoke to, with Dov and Dalia Warman of the relatively new settlement of Ma'ale Shomron perhaps being the most characteristic.

I came to Ma'ale Shomron on a particularly rainy day. In between the drops I tried to find someone to talk to. The first four doors of the settlement's 40 prefabricated houses I knocked on produced only children to stare at me. I later discovered that in many families, both husband and wife worked in their former jobs on the Israel side of the Green Line, 15 km. distant, and the children were either in a day-long kindergarten or "key kids."

Dov and Dalia, who are in their early thirties, declare that Ma'ale Shomron, even in its raw state, is a paradise for children. Dalia also says she feels much safer in Ma'ale Shomron than she did in Petah Tikva "where I always locked the door day and night against robbers."

Dov drives back and forth to his job in Bnei Brak every day, about 35-45 minutes each way depending on the weather and the traffic. (Israel Harel estimated that many families like the Warmans spend more than one third of their income on commuting).

"We lived in a typical apartment in Petah Tikva and I felt as if I weren't alive," Dov recalls. "I had the nagging feeling that something was very definitely lacking in my life. I wanted to create something new."

Echoing the Kerens of Ariel, Dov says, "My parents, who immigrated after independence and lived under terrible conditions in the early years, felt that they personally had built this country. I felt nothing. People my age have by and large attained their initial material goals. We all have our apartments, furnishings, fridges, TVs and cars. But leaving it at just that gives a flat feeling that there must be more to life. What I wanted was a challenge.

"Without sounding about it, I can honestly claim that in the past two years, Dalia and I have done something fantastic. Together with the other families here we have built a new community in Israel. What we have accomplished in this short time is nothing short of remarkable. And there is much more to come.

"The last time I was on reserve duty, some of my mates said *'Kol hakavod* Warman. You've really brought it off. When they pull you down you'll be a millionaire from the compensation you'll get.'

"Now, that's nasty. It's a terrible thought to believe that anyone could come to live here with compensation in mind. But I must say there are only a few cynics like that. The other fellows and my old friends in Petah Tikva are generally admiring of what we did. Many of them say that they'd like to do it too, but I doubt that more than a few will actually have the gumption to do it. But it's the biggest thing that ever happened to us and neither of us regrets having made the decision."

Dalia agrees enthusiastically, and so do their two children.

Comments like these, which I also heard in many settlements in the Golan, in the Jordan Rift and in Rafiah and Yamit are, I believe, an indication of the yearning of many younger Israelis to return to a less cynical, less material and more spiritually satisfying existence than that offered by the urban Israel of today.

MA'ALE SHOMRON is also interesting as an experiment in which a conscious decision has been taken to accept both religious and non-religious families. About one third of the families there are observant, but Dov notes that "a thing like this can't work if you have extremists on either side."

The main potential problems are public behaviour on Shabbat and

the question of schooling. In regard to the former, the arrangement is that people are free to do as they like in their homes, but there is an attempt to prevent any "desecration" of the sabbath in public. Members who intend using their cars on a particular Shabbat park them outside the perimeter fence.

The local kindergarten and school belong to the State-Religious trend, but boys from secular homes are not required to wear *tzitzit* and need only put on a *kipa* for Bible and Mishna classes.

So far, Dov and Dalia say, the system has worked without any trouble, mainly because there has been a lot of good will on both sides. Also, Dov adds, "most of the secular families are from observant homes and they all share a desire to give their own children a greater exposure to Jewish traditions."

There is a similar arrangement in force in the Judean Desert settlement of Tekoa, whose 22 families are equally divided between observant and secular, the founders being two immigrant groups, one religious Americans, the other Russians.

Binyamin Ricardo of Beit Horon, which is also a "mixed" settlement (Kfar Edumim is the fourth one), wrote in a recent issue of *Nekuda* that the whole point of such arrangements is to bring around the "less religious" partners gradually and without undue pressure to the religious point of view. He studiously refrains from speaking of "religious and secular" and prefers "religious and less religious" as a basis for the "proselytizing" potential he sees in such mixing. He writes:

"The reasons that justified the self-isolation of religious communities in the big cities and other areas of Israel do not exist in the new settlements of Judea and Samaria. Here, the religious population is not a minority. It constitutes a majority, even in the mixed settlements, and thus has no need to protect itself. It should instead radiate out to the others." □

CSO: 4820

UMM AL-FAHM RESIDENTS VIEW RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Feb 81 p 3

[Text]



CSO: 4820

LEVINSON'S ECONOMIC PLANS VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 13

[Article by A. Schweitzer: "Sapir with a Calculator"]

[Text] Mr Shim'on Peres, chairman of the Labor Party and its candidate for prime minister if it wins the election, refused to conform in a televized interview he would appoint Mr Ya'aqov Levinson as his finance minister. But in fact, it seems, the decision has been made: The second session of the party conference which took place this week in Tel Aviv has confirmed it. His place among the speakers and the attention he was given by the listeners showed that both those on the dais and in the audience locked upon Levinson as one of the stars of the show, who deserves a major role in the Alignment government, if and when it is formed.

Mr Levinson did not let us down. Anyone who weighed his words could tell that he gave us clear indications regarding his basic economic philosophy, which would guide him as finance minister, that is, as the head of the economic policy. What was interesting in this expose of principles of faith was the absence of macro-economic terms. It was a lecture about the basic values of the labor movement, the centrality of the human factor, the justification for economic incentives etc. Even the inflation was mentioned as tied to such economic terms as stability and trust. But from this exclusion one may derive the inclusion: Levinson did not deal in macro-economics, since he is not at home with it. If he is appointed to head the economic team of an Alignment government, he will try to proceed according to a model dating back to the 50s and associated with the late Pinhas Sapir.

Mr Levinson will bring to the job the experience of an unusually successful banker, who turned Bank Hapoalim, a dormant sectarian institution, into a financial giant in both Israeli and international terms. Besides his personal skill and uncommon energy, he was helped by following and getting involved in the affairs of his clients. A long time before the Mizrahi Bank invented the slogan saying that it stands with its clients 24 hours a day, the presence of Bank Hapoalim in its clients' affairs was routine.

This applies to the so-called labor economy, namely, Tnuvah, Hamashbir, Kur, Solel Boneh, and what not, where Levinson became an institution, as well as the private sector which turned to Bank Hapoalim for credit or other assistance, and found out the lenders were interested in its clients' affairs, and whenever necessary even

became involved in them. It is only natural for people to try to repeat their successes, and so Mr Levinson as finance minister is likely to try to implement the system which made him so incredibly successful (not an exaggerated term in this tontext) as head of Bank Hapoalim.

In broad terms, one may regard the future of the Israeli economy as based upon the success of, say, 1000 companies which will export an average of 10 million dollars a year. The heads of these companies will supply ideas, knowhow, organization and marketing, while the Israeli public, represented by the treasury, will take care of the material resources--incentives in Mr Levinson's words--and the person-power. The treasury will also supply guidance, auxiliary services, will stand by the client, and probably also inside its business, and will monitor the operation. Thus, in broad terms of course, one may expect the economic policy to unfold.

The concept, again, is not new, though the goals have changed. The late Sapir looked for jobs for mass immigration, while Levinson is looking for an improved economical existence in a competitive world. More than Sapir, and in accordance with the experience gained after 20 years of working in the labor movement and in Bank Hapoalim, Levinson is aware of the instability of the Israeli market. It is no accident he has spent most of his energy in recent year to internationalize the bank. Israel will find its economic growth in foreign markets, or will see its economy stagnate, and the breaking into those markets and becoming entrenched in them is the task of the above mentioned 1000 companies.

It was said about the late Sapir, that he knew every industrialist. His admirers said he knew every cog in every machine, and whatever was not stored in his phenomenal memory was written down in a small book he carried in his pocket. If Sapir only had 100 companies while Levinson has 1000, Levinson also has a calculator, which extends the reach of the national manager, the director general of Israel Ltd., ad infinitum. A clear goal, a philosophy of involvement, a focusing of the national economic effort on a relatively small number of realizable objectives--this, it seems, is Levinson's doctrine in a nutshell.

This is a highly abbitious doctrine. The late Sapir found it very difficult to steer a relatively primitive economy with his 100 firms, which worked mostly for an unpretentious domestic market. Anyone who tries to run, even with a calculator, an economy of 1000 companies which market their best products in highly demanding foreign markets, will find out his problems are multiplied not ten fold, but rather to the tenth degree. Levinson must be aware of this, as he is aware of the need to impose taxes, to negotiate with Mr Meshel, and even with Etan Rosenman, to take care of housing for young couples, and to feed the military moloch. It seems that in regard to these matters Levinson expects to act according to circumstances. It is anyone's guess how he is going to accomplish his goals in our economic and social turmoil.

The liberal economic theory is the result of conscious acceptance of the principle of reaching economic decisions in countless foci. In the meantime the opposite theories have been put into effect, those which are based on various degrees of centralization. The liberalism of our time is the result of doubt: The planned economies are a resounding failure, and the return to decentralization of economic

decision making is not so much an approval of the 200 year old theory, but rather a disillusionment with economic centralism.

But reality raises questions about what can actually be achieved in terms of national economic steering, through the liberal approach. The last 3 years in Israel are not exactly an economic success story. The timing of the Levinson message is propitious, and it is safe to assume it will be accepted by his party, and if it wins it will become the base for its economic policy. We will then find out if it is possible to run a national economy of 3.5 million people as if Israel were one large conglomerate.

9565
CSO: 4805

LAVI' ENGINE CONTRACT TO GO TO BEIT SHEMESH ENGINES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Feb 81 p 2

[Text]

If the government decides to build the Lavie fighter, the engines for the planes will be produced at Beit Shemesh Engines, and not the Israel Aircraft Industries, it was confirmed yesterday.

This decision was taken by Defence Minister Menachem Begin at a meeting with Defence Ministry heads on Friday.

For the past two months the government has deliberated about granting Beit Shemesh the contract. Former Defence Minister Ezer Weizman had favoured the idea, but after his resignation the IAI argued that only it had the infrastructure and technology to undertake the project. To give the contract to Beit [redacted] ment unnecessary duplication, IAI said.

However, on Friday Begin adopted the recommendations of a special Defence Ministry committee chaired by Director-General Yoav Ma'oz which supported Weizman's earlier recommendation.

At this stage, the decision will not lead to increased or new direct government investment in Beit Shemesh. Both because the future of the Lavie is far from certain, and because of a proviso that before government money is pumped into the company the government should acquire a majority of its shares.

CSO: 4820

DEPLOYMENT OF NEUTRAL SINAI FORCE VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 14

[Article by Uzi Benziman: "American Force in Sinai? Israel Begins to Negotiate with New Government in Washington Re-Implementation of Clause Mandated by Peace Treaty with Egypt to Determine Stationing of Neutral Force in the Peninsula; Reagan Declared Policy Seeks Military Presence in the Area, Which is Sure to Displease Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] We shall find out in a few weeks whether U.S. President Ronald Reagan is seriously planning to station American troops in the Middle East. Israel is about to start talks with the new government to test the degree of readiness to keep the American commitment attached to the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty to establish a multi-national force to oversee the limitation of forces in the Sinai. When Israel withdrew to the El Arish-Ras Muhammad line, the UN Security Council did not fulfil its assigned role of overseeing the military arrangements in the Sinai. The U.S. did not honor its commitment either, as understood by Israel, which was expressed by President Carter in a letter to the prime minister dated 26 March 1979, according to which the U.S. was going to establish a multi-national force in lieu of the UN force which failed to materialize.

At the time the U.S. excused its failure to keep its commitment by arguing that it referred to the final rather than the partial withdrawal. Washington recognized its obligation to establish some sort of a military force to oversee Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai, and after much bargaining it formed the "Sinai Support Mission", a force of several dozens of American observers to whom Israel and Egypt can turn for mediation.

But even according to the evasive American interpretation, there is no doubt that in anticipation of the completion of the IDF withdrawal from the eastern section of the Sinai, scheduled for April 1982, there is a need to establish a neutral military force to oversee the military arrangements which will be put into effect upon the completion of the evacuation of the peninsula. This need arises out of Section 6 of the military enclosure to the peace treaty which mandates a role of policing and supervision to the force and to UN observers. In President Carter's letter to Mr Begin, which was based on the assumption that the UN was not going to cooperate with Israel and Egypt in implementing the treaty, it was stated in this regard: "The United States believes that the principle in the treaty which deals

with the stationing of permanent UN personnel in this area of the forces limitation can and should be done by the UN Security Council. The U.S. will make its best effort to obtain the necessary action from the Security Council. If the Security Council does not make the arrangements stipulated in the treaty, the President will be ready to take the necessary steps to insure the establishment and maintaining of a multi-national force which is suitable and acceptable." (translator's note: check original letter).

Determent Policy

Last year, during the talks regarding stationing of neutral forces at the El Arish-Ras Muhammad line, the American Government announced that if it cannot establish a multi-national force (as substitute for a UN supervisory force), a strictly American force will be stationed in the Sinai to fulfil the role assigned to UN forces in the treaty. Since Carter and his advisers argued that this commitment does not refer to interim withdrawal but only to the final one, the Reagan administration will have to face the challenge of establishing a supervisory American force which will fulfil the commitments of the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty.

Experienced diplomats in Jerusalem are careful in referring to the challenge the treaty presents Ronald Reagan with. There is no enthusiasm shown regarding this question, and its implications as a touchstone for the credibility of the new administration. The Jerusalem diplomats prefer not to draw public attention to the Israeli probes taking place in Washington at the moment (it is to be assumed that the question of establishing an American supervisory force in the Sinai occupied an important place in the talks between Ambassador Efraim Evron and Alexander Haig two days ago).

Even without going into the details of the talks concerning this question, it is safe to assume that Reagan will have to decide whether to take the bull by the horns and establish the American supervisory force in the Sinai as a way of implementing his statements about stationing American troops in the Middle East. Washington's obligation to "deliver the goods" by stationing a military supervisory force in the Sinai appears to fit in President Reagan's policy, which seeks station American military units in the area for deterring the Soviet Union as well, and also to demonstrate American concern and control of vital interests around the globe and to intimidate demented regimes like Khomeyni so as to avoid another hostages incident.

Establishing American bases in the Middle East is part of a long range military plan, initiated by the Carter administration, to introduce rapid deployment units which can go into action at a short notice far away from home. The American supervisory force in the Sinai gives Reagan a good apportunity to begin realizing his intention. The stationing of the force is mandated in the treaty signed by the President of the United States. Honoring this commitment is an official action on the part of the U.S. in keeping with its own obligation, and at the same time it serves the purpose of Reagan's international policy.

Taking Saudi Feelings into Account

Circumstances seem to be suitable for the American Government when it comes to a decision whether to respond to Israeli expectations to establish an American super-

visory force. Both interested countries--Israel and Egypt--are in favor of such American action. Israel for its part has taken some kind of American presence for granted from the beginning as a vital support for making the treaty credible. Egypt, on the other hand, has realized that the withdrawal of the IDF from the Sinai is predicated on the clause concerning a neutral force, and since it has its own plans of military cooperation with the U.S. The events in Chad, and Kaddafi's expansionist plans which may threaten the Sudan, give Egypt and the U.S. added reason for U.S. military presence in the Middle East.

Against such considerations stand American interests in Saudi Arabia. As in the past, so in the Reagan administration, Israeli-American relations vie with U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia. Reagan's early days in office demonstrated this conflict of interests. While Reagan and his people, even after their election, keep making pro-Israeli statements, there is a tendency to accept the Saudi request to fit the F-15 planes with offense equipment (for bombs and additional fuel); While the Reagan people talk about Israel as a strategic asset, Washington signals West Germany to sell advanced tanks to Riyadh. To remove any doubt, the new administration makes clear statements about the desert oil country. Alexander Haig says that if he were in office in 1968 he would have sold advanced planes to Saudi Arabia, and that the U.S.'s desire to increase its presence in the Persian Gulf should take into account the sensitivity of Saudi Arabia.

The new administration's relationship to Riyadh is influenced by a group of people who surround Reagan, several of whom are businessmen who have done business with Saudi Arabia for years. This group may be more sensitive that its predecessors to the dependency of the American economy on Saudi oil money. In addition to this consideration there are other considerations which also affected President Carter: The pressure of European countries and of Japan on the U.S. not to spoil its relations with the Saudi court, as well as the clear recognition on part of the U.S. that it had to take into account the whims of the Saudi oil princes regarding rise in prices, reduced production, or a major financial maneuver, which could cause tremors in the economies of the West.

As in the past, so under the new administration, the traditional commitment of the U.S. toward Israel and its real interest in the existence of a stable and secure Israel in the Middle East clashes with its dependency on Saudi oil and money. A veteran diplomat said this week in Jerusalem that it is in Israel's interest not to bring about a confrontation of these two parallel interests, and to continue to isolate any question in Israel-U.S. relations from the essential confrontation which may result from Washington's special relations with Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia's negative attitude toward the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty, its central position in the Arab Rejectionist Front (witness Islamic Conference last week calling for holy war against Israel), its geographical proximity to the Sinai, will in a few weeks confront the U.S. commitment to establish a neutral force to oversee the military arrangements in the Sinai, as well as Israel's and Egypt's interest that this commitment is carried out, and the opportunity such a force will give the Reagan administration to lend credibility to its statements about a firm international policy.

9565
CSO: 4805

SOVIET IMMIGRANTS FACE STRESS, INSECURITY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 20 Feb 81 pp 6,7

[Article by Yakov M. Rabkin: "Double Standards"]

[Text]

on aliya or to settle in the free lands of the Diaspora. The choice is made in long, agonizing discussions at the dinner table; its implementation awaits the moment when the Jew actually leaves the Soviet Union.

HAVING ESTABLISHED that emigration for the Soviet Jew is a matter of choice rather than of escaping danger, let us look at the conditions the Soviet Jew faces if he decides to leave his country and settle in Israel.

Whereas his motives for aliya may not be entirely different from those of a Jew from the free world, the circumstances of his aliya differ quite a bit. After the difficulties involved in leaving the USSR, and the accompanying anxiety and uncertainty, the émigré arrives in Israel. This is where the differences begin.

The Soviet Jew has never seen the country. He has not visited it either as a private tourist or on one of the promotional tours sponsored by the Jewish Agency. He has never seen a *shaliah* (though the usefulness of these emissaries is far from obvious), nor talked with Israelis or with compatriots who have tried Israel and returned to their Diaspora homes. He is also aware that, having left his country, there is no way back. Soviet exit visas are one-way.

How many Western Jews would have opted for aliya under these initial conditions?

BUT RATHER than answer rhetorical questions, let us see what the Israeli reality means for the Soviet oleh and for his Western counterpart.

The security of knowing that he can always return to his native land is perhaps the most important psychological factor that differentiates the experience of the Western from that of the Soviet oleh. And it is largely responsible for the way they react to the problem of integrating into Israeli society.

Western olim often find the new country more abrasive than do the Soviet immigrants. It is the latter, however, who get the feeling of being trapped in Israel. It is no accident that it was a Soviet and not a Western oleh who jumped to his death at a Haifa absorption centre.

The Soviet's perception of the difficulties of absorption is incomparably more acute, and rightly so, since the very fact of coming to Israel curtailed his chances of going anywhere else in the free world.

Once in Israel he is no longer considered a refugee by Western countries where he might eventually wish to settle should his experience in Israel prove too discouraging. Conversely, once admitted to a Western country, he acquires freedom of choice, and can give Israel a try, like any Western Jew.

Defining one's official status in Israel is an important consideration. While, by virtue of the Law of Return, the Soviet Jew, stripped of his Soviet citizenship, automatically becomes an Israeli citizen on arrival here, the Western Jew can take his time and test the ground as a tourist, a student or a temporary resident.

Besides providing a sense of security, the fact that one can always return to one's home base has many other advantages. For most Western olim, the umbilical cord to the Diaspora is never severed. American olim, for example, rarely use the Israeli mail to send letters "home" but get friends going to the States to mail their letters there. The Association of Americans and Canadians in Israel provides a similar mail service for its members.

I mention this apparently trivial detail because it underlines a significant difference in the meaning of aliya for the Western and the Soviet Jew. The latter, once having left his country, is cut off from it forever. He has to rely on the slow and unpredictably censored postal flow between Israel and the Soviet Union, where he has left relatives and friends. For all practical purposes, his link with the old country is severed brutally and irreversibly.

THE AMERICAN JEW comes from a land which commands respect and envy in Israeli society, exercises an inordinate influence and remains Israel's last ally in an increasingly hostile world. The widespread adulation of everything American stands out in sharp contrast to the denigration of and condescension towards everything Soviet. The Israelis' urge to affirm themselves as "Westerners" in the midst of "Orientals" has many adverse repercussions. One is that we regard the Soviet Union as a desperately backward country, an attitude one would be hard put to find in the U.S. and, *a fortiori*, in Western Europe.

This spills over not only into the average Israeli's underestimation of Soviet technological and military capabilities, but into disdain for the training and experience the 150,000 Soviet olim have brought with them during the past decade.

The American is also less linguistically isolated than the Soviet Jew, whose language is rarely understood and even more rarely used in Israel. Not only is English widely used here; he has been absolutely free to learn Hebrew before coming on aliya.

While Soviet, mostly Russian-speaking, Jews constituted no less than 45 per cent of olim to Israel during the 1970s, little Russian is to be found on the signboards either in the ostensibly international Jewish Agency or in the Ministry of Absorption.

ONE MAY also wonder why the Russian instructions on the Hebrew examination paper for newcomers at the Hebrew University differ so drastically in quality and clarity from the corresponding English, French and Spanish versions.

All this clearly complicates the Soviet oleh's life. Moreover, Israel's English-language media, both printed and electronic, are of incomparably better quality than their Russian counterparts. Kol Israel's Russian-language broadcasts project a much more idealized image of Israel than do the broadcasts in English or French, and certainly than those in Hebrew.

This further emphasizes the need for the Soviet oleh to detach himself from his linguistic milieu, which

cannot but increase his sense of insecurity in the new country.

On the positive side, however, the same insecurity makes Soviet olim conspicuously better students at ulpanim than their Western classmates, though his comparative excellence involves much stress and psychological discomfort.

ANOTHER FACTOR contributing to stress and insecurity is money. It is reasonable to assume that few Western Jews come on aliya with less than $150, which is the total amount in liquid assets the Soviet Jew is allowed to take with him from his native land. This, incidentally, explains why the Soviet delegrie are involved in the unedifying petty trade in Rome which was so picturesquely exposed on these pages several months ago. It also makes the Soviet olah totally dependent on the bureaucratically-dispensed loans of the Jewish Agency and the Ministry of Absorption.

Let me expand my earlier question: How many Western Jews would have opted for aliya under these conditions?

Much has gone wrong during the 10 years of Soviet aliya. The cardinal mistake of both Israelis and the Soviet Jews was that they expected too much of each other.

Israelis expected the Soviet Jews to become loyal and grateful citizens after decades of anti-Jewish repression in the USSR. On their side, Israel-bound Soviet Jews thought they would feel needed and wanted in the new country.

In planning to come to Israel, the Soviet Jew was not thinking of customs and absorption privileges, about which little was known in the Soviet Union when the emigration movement was gathering momentum there.

I personally doubt whether these very relative economic advantages ever accounted for much in any Jew's decision to make aliya. But they have inconsiderably spoiled the attitude of Israelis towards new immigrants.

ONCE IN Israel, Soviet olim discovered a very different land from what they had imagined (the Russian-language broadcasts of Kol Israel had contributed to their over-expectations). Insecurity breeds aggressiveness, and the Soviet olim's behaviour patterns did not differ substantially from that of other uprooted populations determined to make it in the new land. After all, today every fourth physician and every fifth scientist in Israel is a graduate of a Soviet university.

The roots of the two kinds of over-expectations are different, and what concerns me most are the expectations Israeli and many Western Jews have had of their Soviet brothers.

In the West, the heroic image of Soviet Jews has helped to mobilize world public opinion around the emigration issue. The effect has been the release of a quarter of a million Jews from the USSR. In Israel, as the post-Six Day War society was plunged into its new self-oriented materialistic future, a need for an ideal, a continuation of the old romantic Zionism, was felt, and Soviet Jewish activists came at the right time.

Those refuseniks who chained themselves at public places in Moscow and staged hunger strikes in the obscurity of the Ural prisons were heroes indeed. So are those who have to resort to similar forms of protest today in order to obtain their exit visas. But these heroes lose a good deal of their Zionist fervour in the merciless clash with Israeli life. Idealism and romantic images of Israel are somewhat easier to hold on to in the Diaspora, particularly when actively defying the hated Soviet regime.

THIS HAS BEEN forgotten by the leaders of all the political parties in this country, as well as by the media. Just as Zionism usually flourishes better prior to aliya, the Soviet Jew is much more attractive while he is still fighting to get his exit visa.

An article in *The Jerusalem Post* by Hanna Zemer, the editor of *Davar*, illustrated this point very well. She admitted quite openly how badly Israelis feel about the Soviet Jews and how her own opinion was changed for the better when she met them... in Moscow.

The kind of people Zemer met and described in her article were heroes. Crammed into a small room, they studied Hebrew, constantly watched and harassed by the authorities, they met foreigners, complained about their fate and showed a strong will to achieve their goal.

These are the people whose very defiance of the regime crucially depends on what is said about them in the free world. But if the media build the image of the average Soviet Jew around these heroes, the public is bound to be disappointed, for they are hardly representative of the rank and file of the Soviet Jewish population.

The rank and file are afraid to meet foreigners, let alone an Israeli journalist. They do not study Hebrew, and even if they dream about learning it and leaving the country, it often takes them years to summon up the courage to apply for an exit visa.

Zemer concludes: "...these Jews come to Jerusalem, or to Kfar Sava or to Kiryat Yam, not to New York, not to Montreal, not to Sydney. I wish they were here already. I wish I could hear them complaining. I wish they could already say this place is a disappointment."

The Jews she is writing about, a minority within a minority of those who dare to leave the USSR, are likely to come to Israel and to experience the disappointment she predicts. But, as I have already pointed out, while disappointed American or Swiss olim can probably return to their native countries, disappointed Soviet Jews are pretty well trapped here. Even if they succeed in obtaining a visa for another country, there is the problem of repayment of the government loan on which their initial absorption depended. Some even perceive themselves as little more than colonist fodder, "Israelis in spite of themselves."

This situation certainly contributes to the fact (of which Zionist leaders are so proud) that the retention rate among Soviet olim is so much higher than among immigrant

Western Jews. And yet, there is widespread concern about the dropout, or nesher, phenomenon.

ON FEW OTHER issues do the Labour opposition and the Likud government agree as they do on the question of the nesher in Vienna. Rather than working on the drastic improvement of absorption, the government has resorted to attempts at symptomatic treatment. This usually consists of demands on the Diaspora communities to curtail their assistance to Jews who decide to settle in the West or pressure on Western governments not to regard Soviet emigrants as refugees. There have also been suggestions that direct flights from the USSR to Israel should be organised, so that there is no longer any opportunity of choosing the country of settlement.

In an attempt to curb the growth in the number of neshrim, the Israeli government wants to make it clear to Soviet Jewish émigrés that it will not allow the Israeli visa to be changed for a "visa of convenience" in Vienna. So far, the united efforts of the Diaspora Jews have succeeded in blocking this policy, which raises serious humanitarian questions.

The over-dramatisation of nesher points at the existence of a double standard being applied to Diaspora Jews. Somehow, the fact that in 1979 only 40 per cent of Soviet Jewish émigrés settled in Israel seems to provoke more anxiety than the substantially lower figures of the Israel-bound among, say, South African, or Argentinian Jewish emigrants. Let us also recall how, only two years ago, half-empty El Al planes were taking off from Teheran flying behind Jews who preferred the uncertainties of "fundamentalist" Iran to the outstretched hand of the Jewish state.

The attraction of Israel for Diaspora Jewry (as well as for Israeli-born Jews) is apparently the issue. The recently rediscovered parallels may have some of the same roots as the neshim of the Soviet and other Jewish emigrant groups: the challenge of establishing the Israeli experience in its present form is less attractive than the old challenge of building the state.

Immigration from all over the world has plummeted in recent years. While the neshim of Soviet Jews increased in the years 1976-1980 from 20 to almost 80 per cent of all émigrés, their percentage of the total aliya fluctuated in the same years only between 37 and 47 per cent. This means that Soviet Jews continue to supply the bulk of aliya, and that the dramatic rise in neshim is only a reflection of the aliya trend worldwide. Should it, then, be decried as "ingratitude" on the part of the Soviet Jews? Does the bare fact that the Soviet government would not allow Jews to emigrate unless they declared Israel as their destination justify this indignation?

THE TIME HAS COME to face reality without ideological blinkers. The Soviet aliya, aliya from the largest Jewish Diaspora outside the U.S., has been a very limited success. It is a sad fact of the last decade of Jewish history that petty political rivalries and the deterioration of the social fabric within Israel have crushed the aliya expectations in Soviet Jewry. The jealousy of ordinary Israelis, the cruel indifference of the political leadership of this country, and the deplorable impotence of the Diaspora leaders have been the main factors in frustrating the promised aliya from the USSR.

These factors have been particularly harmful in view of the shallow and naive character of Soviet Zionism, a Zionism without Zionist organisations.

The former Prisoners of Zion who so patiently thrust open the gates of the Soviet Union for other Jews 10 years ago did not suffer in vain. But it hurts to see what has become of the image of the Soviet Jew in Israel. □

CSO: 4820

HEBRON JEWS DISCUSS RELATIONS WITH ARABS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 27 Feb 81 p 6

[Article by Uosef Goell: "Hebron's Faithful"]

[Text]



haven't I?' I asked him after the third pressure, and he admitted it. But we took off along another tack, and I think I got through to him."

What Miriam Levinger is trying to get through is two messages. One is that of "the legitimate and inalienable rights" of the Jewish people to settle and live throughout the Promised Land. (The slogans and phraseology in the literature put out by the supporters of the Beit Hadassah group are vapidly but embarrassingly reminiscent of PLO propaganda. Hebron is referred to as "the second holiest city of the Jewish people," paralleling the Arab claim to Jerusalem as "the third holiest city in Islam.")

IN ADDITION to the [illegible] cum-religious point as to the right and mitzva of settling throughout the length and breadth of the land, Miriam Levinger is also trying to make a personal point about Jewish fear and courage.

She speaks of her girlhood in the south Bronx, already notorious as one of New York's terror areas.

"My father was a well-known cantor and composer of cantorial music, and we lived at Southern Boulevard and 163rd Street," says the former Miriam Bendheim, who came to Israel at the age of 19 in 1956, "and we children were taught to be afraid.

"Forcing people to do something. And this is one of the messages I'm trying to get across here. There are those among us who can't help being afraid, have lost. I don't push them. But I push and help those who would like to overcome their fears.

"I admit that at times I've even caught myself acting otherwise, but I corrected it. When my son was 16 years old, he came home by a late bus and walked across several kilometres of open fields through a solidly Arab area to our home in Kiryat Arba. I started to scold him, but then I realized that that would be galut, a continuation of our Diaspora conditioning to fear."

Miriam Levinger says she walks through the Arab souk unarmed and unafraid. Friends and relatives say she is afraid, with a pistol in her bag, and that the Arabs know it and are scared to death of making any trouble for her. She claims that ever since she and her women occupied Beit Hadassah, the number of Arab nationalist demonstrations and attacks on Jews in Hebron has diminished, and that their incidence is much lower than in other towns, despite the reputation Hebron's Arabs have for extremism.

It is not clear whether this reputation is deserved. The fear which Hebron traditionally imparts in the hearts of Jews, and which Miriam Levinger is trying to overcome, stems less from the nationalist nature of the town's Arab population than from the large "wild" Bedouin component in that population. Arab Hebron is not noted for nationalist intellectual rabble-rousers, as are more modern Nablus or Ramallah; because of its proximity to the desert it is more of a wild frontier town. It would certainly qualify as the least modern and most fundamentalist Muslims of the West Bank's Arab cities.

WHAT IS CLEAR is that two years after penetrating into the heart of Arab Hebron, the women of Beit Hadassah continue to live behind a barricade of army gun-emplacements and reinforced panels.

Meir Indor, who holds the "Hebron portfolio" in Kiryat Arba's Gush Emunim settlement, and who accompanied us on the visit to Beit Hadassah, feels that this is as it should be. One of the points he is trying to get across is that Gush Emunim settlers should not be expected to defend themselves, but that Israel's commitment to the possession of all of Judea and Samaria should express itself in the granting of sufficient military strength to fully all the settlers' defence needs.

"I am opposed to the Yesha Council maintaining its own defence committee," he says, referring to the new political group the Gush settlements have set up to coordinate lobbying for the settlements' interests. "Security is something the army should take care of and we should be very careful not to let the army and the military government off the hook on that."

Indor, who has been in Kiryat Arba with his wife and two small daughters for the past four-and-a-half years, is in charge of the "Hebron Committee's" public relations, both in Israel and abroad. He recently took the message of the need for Jewish settlement in Hebron to the U.S., where he was active in setting up the Hebron Council, a fund to finance the cause of Jewish Hebron, and in enlisting the aid of the Bnei Akiva religious youth movement there.

Indor says there are now about 600 families in Kiryat Arba and no empty apartments. Driving through Kiryat Arba is a very different experience from driving in [illegible]. If one ignores the continuous security fence around it, it is possible to imagine that it is one of the new suburbs of Jerusalem.

A few years ago many of the apartments in Kiryat Arba were empty, but this is no longer true. The apartments have either three or four rooms and most, Indor says, are owned rather than rented. He rents his own three-room, [illegible] flat for IS110 a month. The problem of apartments was discussed by the Housing Ministry. Indor states that many settlers were originally attracted by the inexpensive housing but said "anyone who came here just for that wouldn't last long."

He is especially proud of the mixed nature of the population.

"Fifty-five per cent are Sephardim and 100 of the 600 families are new olim, mostly from the U.S. [illegible] also from the Soviet Union. About 80 per cent are religious and the rest are secular."

[illegible] Lar and there is [illegible] boys and girls, and [illegible] in the centre are [illegible]

The general atmosphere [illegible]



CSO: 4820

HAIFA AVOIDS COAL UNLOADING

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Mar 81 p 6

[Text]

HAIFA. — The National Planning Commission's decision on Tuesday to veto any coal unloading in Haifa — even on a temporary basis, as requested by the Electric Corporation, has stirred up heated public controversy here.

The corporation's new managing director, Eytan Jacobson, who until now has tried to keep a low profile, has taken a strong stand against the ruling, which he called "hasty" and "appallingly wrong." It is only the result of misinformation and bad calculations, he claimed.

"Not only that, but this will cost the country over $40 million. For the sake of such a sum the government once wanted to close down El Al. How come it is willing to open its purse wide now?" he said in an interview with Kol Yisrael.

Mayor Arye Gurel, on the other hand, greeted the commission's decision as "a definite proof of public responsibility and concern for the health of our 400,000 citizens." In a cable to commission chairman and Interior Ministry director-general Haim Kubersky, Gurel expressed his satisfaction for his strong stand against the proposal.

The Electric Corporation had originally asked to have all coal for its new power station being completed in Hadera unloaded at Haifa port. Three years ago, however, the commission ruled against the proposal and ordered the corporation to seek alternative solutions.

Last July construction was started of an off-shore pier in Hadera large enough to allow the easy unloading of over three million tons of coal a year. All work on this project, however, was stopped four months ago, when a violent storm almost sank the two barges doing the work off shore, with all 85 on board.

The Hadera pier will now not be ready until April 1982, but the power station's first unit is scheduled to be put into operation this July. Consequently the Electric Corporation again asked to use Haifa port facilities for unloading its coal, at least until the pier is completed. The eight-month temporary agreement would also show local and government authorities that the entire operation was safe and did not endanger anyone's health or worsen local pollution, corporation experts explained.

If no alternative place is found until July to unload the coal, the power station will start burning oil. The difference in the price of oil over coal, Jacobson stressed, will add up to over $40m.

"It is deplorable that the commission ruled the way it did. We never thought it would decide on the whole issue on Tuesday. We thought only the temporary unloading in Haifa was at stake. That is why we did not prepare our case as well as we could have done — because if we had, the outcome would have been different," he claimed

CSO: 4820

THOUSAND OF DUNAMS SEIZED ON WEST BANK

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Feb 81 pp 1, 9

[Article by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — A total of 24,000 dunams have been seized in the past four months for the establishment and consolidation of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, a senior source in the defence establishment said yesterday.

The Knesset Finance Committee earlier this week allocated IS50 million for the establishment of six new settlements and for building 400 additional homes in existing West Bank localities. They will be ready for occupation by June 30, Knesset election day.

The moves are part of a drive to increase the West Bank's Jewish population by 8,000, which would bring the total to 25,000 by the end of 1981, authoritative sources said.

The source maintained that more than 20,000 of the 24,000 dunams are state owned, and the government merely exercised its right to use them. Another 4,000 dunams at Gush Etzion were Jewish-owned before 1948. Senior sources in the World Zionist Organization's Settlement Department said only small, isolated tracts were Arab-owned. They will be used for roads and public utilities.

The seizures reported were: 5,000 dunams at Yakir B (previously called Elkana B), 4,480 at Gush Etzion, 4,000 at Gittit, another 4,000 at Ma'on and Carmel, 2,350 at Tekoa B, 2,000 for Mizpe Guvrin, 600 for Nili, 450 at Nebi Samwil, another 450 at Kedumim, 180 at Giva Harasha, 150 for Givon, 100 at Migdal Oz, 100 for Michmash and 35 for Efrat.

Arabs have already contested the government's claim to ownership of lands for the settlement expected to rise at Mizpe Guvrin (northwest of Hebron). Other village mukhtars were recently shown the lands the government plans to use for Yakir B (between Elkana and Ariel) and for Nili (southeast of Ben-Gurion Airport), but no protests have been registered, a defence establishment source reported.

Nor have protests been registered against the land seizures for Tekoa B (in the Judean Desert) or Michmash (in the upper ridge of the Jordan Valley east of Ramallah).

Speaking to reporters yesterday, WZO Settlement Department head Mattityahu Drobless maintained that the authorities should concentrate on consolidating existing settlements rather than building new ones. He explained that the latest allocation will be used to enlarge isolated settlements such as Eilon Moreh, Shilo and Neveh Tsuf to 100 units each, and other small settlements from 30 or 40 to 60 families each.

The houses will be ready by election day, although most of the 3,000 people expected to move there will arrive after the school term, in July and August, he predicted.

The WZO will improve the infrastructure at each settlement, and by the end of the year all will be connected to the electric grid, he continued. It also wants to increase job openings at each site because at present 70 per cent of the settlers commute to work, he said.

Meanwhile, he reported, the Housing Ministry is building 1,200 to 1,500 housing units to increase the urban Jewish population in the West Bank by 5,000.

Drobless, a member of Prime Minister Menahem Begin's Herut Party, said that 18,500 Jews now live in the West Bank, compared with some 5,000 when the Likud came to power in 1977.

He added that from 1967 to 1977, the Alignment established only 72 settlements throughout the country, an average of 7.2 settlements a year. The Likud has established 165 settlements, averaging about 40 a year, he said, adding that 35 of the new Galilee settlements are only small "lookouts."

CSO: 4820

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT PERSONNEL SEEN IN SHORT SUPPLY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Feb 81 p 6

[Text] TEL AVIV. — There is a dire shortage of scientific personnel willing to go into industry, Gustav Meltzer, head of the electric and electronics group of Koor, said yesterday. "In my group alone, it was possible employment for 100 competent persons with top scientific skills."

Meltzer was speaking at a press conference called by the Israel Industry Center for R. & D., which with other bodies, such as the Industry Ministry, is sponsoring a meeting of those active in the field of R. & D. in Jerusalem.

Meltzer noted that although it was difficult to determine exact figures, "the salary of an engineer with an academic degree ranges from IS6,000 to IS13,000 gross; for a technician from IS5,000 to IS12,000 gross; while ordinary workers earn from IS1,200 to IS4,000."

(These figures are before taxes, they also do not include all the fringe benefits.)

"It is only by keeping one year ahead of the rest of the world in R & D," Meltzer said, "that we can expect to keep our present markets and to conquer new ones."

This viewpoint was echoed by Eli Hurvitz, general manager of Teva Pharmaceuticals, who pointed out that "our only chance to expand exports is to develop new formulas — which cost enormous sums."

Prof. Arieh Levie, chief scientist in the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism, said that the solution to providing the country with the [illegible] industrial [illegible] is [illegible] by [illegible] a long [illegible] program in this field, which would come [illegible] by [illegible] Minister Gideon Patt, he said.

Levie pointed out that the proposed new [illegible] [illegible] The [illegible] R & D [illegible] that other [illegible] from time to time [illegible] at present [illegible] other on an annual basis [illegible] [illegible] to [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

ALTERNATIVE SITE PLANNED FOR ELAT AIRPORT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Feb 81 p 6

[Text] TEL AVIV. — Government officials have begun a detailed examination of two alternative sites for Elat's airport. The examination follows a directed to the Israeli air force base cerned not to enlarge the present airfield, which cuts through the town.

The present airport is too small for planes carrying 150 passengers, for example. These aircraft are directed to the Israeli air force base in the nearby Moon Valley in Sinai. However, Israel will have to vacate the base by April 1982 in accordance with the peace treaty with Egypt. The Egyptians had agreed that Israel be [illegible] flights, but a spokesman for the Ministry of [illegible] Tourism [illegible] government [illegible] suitable airport of its own.

Two alternatives are under consideration, one four kilometres north of Elat, and the other 11 kilometres from town.

Teams of experts will now examine the soil and consider how the runways should be built. They will also plan the airlanes which would lead to them.

Officials said they expected the reports by April, when the Ministerial Economic Committee will decide between the alternatives.

It will take eight to ten months to build the airport, so that it would be ready by the time the Israel Defence Forces withdraw from Sinai, the officials said.

The new project will cost $30m. to $50m., depending on its size and the facilities it will provide, under government control said. Part of the cost will be covered by selling the land on which Elat's present airport is situated. That airport will not be enlarged because the planes [illegible] and vibration affect the nearby hotel area.

Meanwhile, the government has found a way to enable the British government Dan Air to fly passengers to Elat.

Dan Air wanted to fly through [illegible] 727-200s there, with 180 passengers. The Israeli authorities [illegible] [illegible] at Ben-Gurion Airport, the British government [illegible] the plan because Britain is in [illegible] that will revert to the Egyptians.

According to the new arrangement, the Boeing 727-200s could land and take off at Elat with all the seats taken, but to reduce the load at take-off the planes will not carry enough fuel for a non-stop flight to Europe. They will land at Ben-Gurion Airport for refuelling, a government source told *The Post*.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS VERSUS RAKAH--Rakah, the New Communist Party, has charged fundamentalist Moslems with violent attempts to halt its political activity. Il-Ittihad, the Rakah magazine, reported yesterday that in the past year Moslem fundamentalists burned the communist club here, set fire to a vehicle owned by the party, attacked a family because of its identification with the party and beat members of the party's youth movement who used to sell the party papers. The newspaper also charged the fundamentalists with opening fire on a vehicle carrying a dance troupe to protest its appearance at a wedding in the Triangle. Several troupe members were wounded, the newspaper said. Il-Ittihad also reported that a cache of arms was uncovered in a deserted house in Umm el-Fahm by local youths who informed the police. Several members of the fundamentalist movement were arrested by security forces recently. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Mar 81 p 3]

ADVANCED MERKAVA TO BE PRODUCED--The second model of the Merkava tank will soon be in production, and the third model, now in the advanced experimental stage, will be ready around 1985. Tat-Aluf Ben-Zion Ben-Bassat, head of the IDF Ordnance Corps, gave this progress report in an interview with Kol Yisrael's "Weekly Column" programme Friday evening. The second model will have better fire control to increase chances of hitting the target on the first shot. There will be further improvements in the third model, and both second and third models will have better equipment for night fighting. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Feb 81 p 2]

CSO: 4820

'DIWANIYAH' PRAISED AS NATIVE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTION

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 21-27 Feb 81 p 29

[Article: "The 'Diwaniyah,' that Kuwaiti Institution"]

[Excerpt] The "diwaniyah" [reception hall], as the word is used in Kuwait, is the room in a house, or attached to it, in which the man of the house receives his male visitors in the evening, where they discuss events of the day. Most of the time the diwaniyah is handed down from father to son among people who are financially able to keep it going.

The meaning of diwaniyah, in the strictly social sense, has expanded during the parliamentary election campaign in Kuwait, to include a big, beautiful, luxurious tent where the candidate, sitting on the floor with his shoes off, receives the voters of his district, who question him and debate with him. Usually the session is not to the candidate's advantage.

According to its meaning outside the election environment, the diwaniyah constitutes an institution through which people form bonds with each other, during which friendships are formed all the time and political and economic alliances are formed sometimes. Interestingly enough, the young Kuwaiti man has not abandoned this firmly established Kuwaiti institution. For him it is a part of his family inheritance, which must remain intact. Through it, as for his father and grandfather before him, he carries out all his interpersonal relationships with neighbors, friends, and countrymen.

Like everything that has been revived or renewed in Kuwait, the diwaniyah after having been [merely] a unique meeting place, is now agreed to be the best place for friends to meet and for constructive dialogue. It has been the focal point of social life and now is tantamount to an ancient forum which is supported [by all].

In the past, the diwaniyah played a leading role in building the concept of democracy as a native practice fostered by the family sessions. This could be the reason behind the Kuwaiti's unreserved way of expressing his frank opinion, which is marvelled at by citizens of other Arab countries.

The government in Kuwait is comfortable with the diwaniyah, because in its opinion it is a political focal point through which the political and intellectual climate of Kuwait can be gauged, in this tiny country where most people know each other.

The current "election diwaniyah," which has been dubbed the "democracy tent" by the Kuwaiti newspaper, AL-QABAS, is now found in all the electoral districts. Outside are the shoes of the voters who have removed them to go in and debate with the persistent candidates each night during specific hours. Usually dinner is served, and sometimes there are music and dancing.

CSO: 4802

SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN FOOD PLANNED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Feb 81 p 2

[Text] Kuwait's United Company for Agricultural Production (UCAP) has set a target of covering domestic needs of foodstuff in the near future. From a very modest starting output of 352 tonnes of vegetables, clover and fodder in 1977, the company managed to put on the market 13,307 tonnes in 1980.

"We have an arable area of land about 10 million square metres in Salibiyah of which 37 per cent could be cultivated last season," said Mohammed Al-Roumi, the chairman of UCAP which incorporates four agricultural and livestock subsidiaries in addition to the Credit and Savings Bank.

Honey

"The company has the potentialities of cultivating the whole area as soon as the 22 million gallons of water necessary for irrigation are available," he added.

Another experimental field of production explored by UCAP is honey. A piece of land has been planted with flowers and surrounded by a large number of beehives. "The preliminary output of 99 kilograms of honey has encouraged us to expand the baby project," Al-Roumi said.

Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Al-Khalifa attended the opening session yesterday of "Isma" regional raw materials meeting.

The three-day panel opened here under the chairmanship of Abdul Baqi Al-Nouri managing director of the Petrol-Chemical Industries Company, who is also vice chairman of the Middle East Executive Committee of "Isma."

The panel is the first to be held in the Middle East or outside Europe, the report added.

"Fertilisers are very different from most other chemicals. They play a crucial role in food production," Al-Khalifa told the opening session.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

FRENCH LOAN--Kuwait Interantional Investment Cpmpany will co-lead with Banque De Lindochine Et Che Suez and Banque Nationale De Paris in a 600 million French francs loan issued in favour of Caisse Des Depot Et Consignatious, a KIIC press release said yesterday.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Feb 81 p 2]

GABON PRESIDENT--President of Gabon, Omar Bongo, currently in Kuwait, visited the Amir yesterday and held a round of official negotiations. Minister of Amiri Diwan affairs said that the negotiations between the Amir and President Bongo centred on bilateral relations and methods of consolidating them in various fields. The discussions further dealt with Arab-African relctions in an atmosphere of understanding and friendship. [Excerpt] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Feb 81 p 2]

BRITISH INSURANCE SHARES--The Kuwait Investment Office in London has purchased 525,000 shares of the British General Accident Fire and Life Insurance Company, raising its stake to 14.7 million shares or 10 per cent of the ordinary equity, it was disclosed last week. General Accident's shares were quoted at the end of the week at 302 pence ($7.03), 11 pence above the midway point between the 1980-81 high of 370 pence and the low of 212 pence. The Kuwait Investment Office, acting for the Kuwaiti government, holds about 5 per cent of the shares of Britain's major insurance companies, according to sources in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance quoted by the ASSOCIATED PRESS. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 16 Feb 81 p 13]

KFAED LOANS--In 1979-80 the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development KFAED concluded 20 loan agreements totalling 71.93 million Kuwaiti Dinars, a press report released recently in Kuwait said. Four loan agreements amounting to $7.2 million are in final stages, the report said, adding that the fund is also studying 22 projects in 21 states. During the same period, KFAED processed 24 projects for developing countries. The fund's loans are repayable within periods ranging between 9 and a half years and 36 years. Loans extended to Arab states constituted 41.5 per cent of the fund's total lending during the same year and interest rates ranged between 1.5 and 5.5 per cent with varying periods of grace. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 7 Feb 81 p 12]

SOLAR ENERGY EXPERIMENTS--Solar energy is expected to be put to practical use in Kuwait this year. The two fields most likely to be the starting point are government housing and agriculture. The Ardiyah housing project will soon be equipped with solar energy to be used in providing the residents with hot and cold water, according to Public Housing Authority sources. The layout of the Ardiyah residential area providing for open spaces in the midst of each group of houses will allow the solar energy equipment to be installed in these spaces. In the field of agriculture experiments are still being jointly conducted by the Agriculture Administration and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR) for using the solar energy in cooling the greenhouses of the protected plantation. A source at the Agricultural Administration said that this step is part of a major plan worked out by the ministry to develop agricultural production in Kuwait by overcoming environmental obstacles. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Feb 81 p 2]

KIIC GOLD BOND DEAL--Kuwait International Investment Co. (KIIC) announced today that the firm is co-managing a bond issue on behalf of Refinemet International N.V. indexed to 100,000 ounces of gold. The issue is lead managed by Drexel Burnham Lambert and Co-managed by Credit Commercial De France, Banque De L'Union Europeenne and Kuwait International Investment Co. The bonds are indexed to the market price of gold and offer investors the advantage of gold without actually possessing non interest bearing bullion which would cost money in terms of storage, insurance and assay. Interest will be payable annually in February and the coupon is expected to be in the 3 to 4 per cent range. Both principal and interest will be denominated and payable in gold at the option of the investor to the extent such payments are in multiples of one hundred ounces. The bonds will be listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. The pricing formula will be determined on Feb 9 and pricing will take place on Feb 11. The price of the bonds will not be in excess of 103 percent of the market price prevailing on Feb 11, 1981. Refinemet International N.V. is a US based Metals Company 61 percent owned by Empain-Schneider group. The gold-indexed bonds are guaranteed by Refinemet International Co. and R.M.I. Refinery Inc., and will be secured at all times by gold or gold denominated collateral in excess of the gold obligation of the issuer.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 6 Feb 81 p 2]

FUND FOR TANZANIA PROJECT--Dar Es Salaam: The Kuwait Fund has reported to have agreed to help finance a gigantic transport project in Tanzania which is considered to be an essential infrastructure for the implementation of the Mufindi Pulp and the Stiegler Gorge hydro-electric power project. An accord has reached here between the government of Tanzania and the visiting five-man delegation of Kuwait Fund led by its Director General Abdulatif Yussuf Al-Hamad. [as published] Hamad later called on Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and assured him of all possible financial assistance from Kuwait Fund for Tanzanian projects. The aid offered by Kuwait fund would be spent on a large railways and port communication network together with the purchase of urgently-needed spare parts, essential equipment and rolling stock. A spokesman for Tanzanian Ministry of Industries said that the Kuwait Fund authorities have also agreed to provide more funds for Mwanza Textile Mill. Kuwait has already provided financial assistance amounting to shs. 280 million for Mwanza Textile Mill and the Mufindi Pulp project.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 11 Feb 81 p 3]

CSO: 4820

AL-HUMAYDI ADDRESSES SCHOOL GROUP

Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 7 Feb 81 pp 1, 13

[Text]

[redacted]

CSO: 4820

MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADE GROWS WITH TURKEY

London 8 DAYS in English 14 Feb 81 p 48

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] TURKEY'S State Planning Organisation forecasts that the 1981 trade deficit will increase to $5.5bn, 25 per cent over 1980 figures, according to a report published in January. However, the organisation also announced that Turkey hopes to bridge part of the trade gap with a 20 per cent increase in expatriate remittances, and in view of the gloom the projections generated, news of Turkish companies winning contracts in Libya have come as a great relief.

Libya is an important trading partner for Turkey because of the large contracts Turkish companies are winning there, and also as a reserve source of oil. Turkey currently imports 3-4m tonnes of Libyan oil a year, but at times of crisis, such as the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, Libya would have been the one country Turkey could have approached for an increase in supplies.

In the event, Turkey did not need to approach Libya as Iranian and Iraqi supplies were resumed after a few weeks. But in 1974, during Turkey's invasion of Cyprus, Libya came up with the extra oil needed to keep the Turkish army in occupation.

At the moment, Libya is of paramount importance as a source of foreign currency earnings for Turkey's ailing economy. In 1980 Turkish companies won $1.6bn worth of contracts in Libya. The latest of these was won by Tokas, an affiliate of Saracoglu Holdings, is worth $68m and is for building 848 homes and 11 clinics in various Libyan towns.

The other large contract was awarded to Sezai Turkes Feyzi Akkaya, for building the first phase of Misurata port. This Turkish company, which built the first phase of Tripoli port, won the contract in the face of strong competition from Japanese, South Korean and West German companies.

'The reason we win contracts in Libya is because we are also a Muslim country, which works to our advantage,' said one Turkish businessman. 'But our workmanship is also good and we finish contracts on time. This is just as important. The other important reason is that we are cheaper than other companies because our labour force is cheap.'

There are about 14,000 Turkish workers in Libya, employed by 26 Turkish firms. To attract remittances from these workers and others in Europe, Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Turgut Ozal introduced a scheme in January under which workers abroad can bring their foreign currency savings into Turkey and keep them in foreign currency deposit accounts for six months to two years.

The latest protocol, signed in December by the Turkish-Libyan joint economic committee which was set up in 1978, shows that links between Turkey and Libya are getting increasingly strong. This protocol seeks to improve communications between the two countries by increasing Turkish Airline flights to Libya and by establishing direct telephone links.

These clauses were in addition to the normal trade agreements covering exports from Turkey such as grain, olive oil and other agricultural products, as well as manufactured goods produced by state-run economic enterprises. In 1980 Turkish exports to Libya reached the $500m mark: in 1979 the figure was $130m and in 1978, $80m.

Besides the widely publicised trade relations, there are also the less publicised military agreements between the two countries. General Evran, Turkish head of state since the military takeover in September 1980, visited Libya in September 1978 while he was chief of staff, and signed a military and defence cooperation agreement, under which Libyan airforce cadets are trained in Ankara.

Political problems in Turkey meant that an agreement to set up a joint light arms industry, dating from the same time, was shelved: but according to Turkish military sources there is now no reason this industry should not be set up soon.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

WAREHOUSE CONTRACTS--The Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy has signed a contract with an international specialist firm to establish general warehouses in Tripoli, Tajoura, Al-Aziziyah, Bani Walid, Tarhouna, Marzek and Obari. The total area of these warehouses is estimated at 176425 square metres, represents the first stage of a project covering the various parts of the Jamahiriya with general warehouses. The contract is given according to the recommendations and resolutions of the Basic People's Congresses. [Text] [Valletta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 14 Feb 81 p 5]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

KUWAITI LOAN TO OMAN--A loan agreement was signed yesterday between the Sultanate of Oman and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). According to the agreement, the fund will make a loan of KD 4 million to help finance Sohar gas line project. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Sultanate by Salim Mohamed Al-Kusaibe, ambassador of Oman in Kuwait, and on behalf of KFAED by Abdul Rahman Salem Al-Ateeq, chairman of the Fund's Board of Directors and minister of finance. The aim of the project is to supply natural gas for the copper smelter in Russeil, power generating units and other consumers on the Omani Batinah coast. The project consists of a steel pipe having a nominal diameter of 16 inches connecting the Yibai gas pipeline at Mrerat to Sohar for a distance of approximately 227 kilometres and other necessary facilities and services. Total cost of the project is estimated at KD 11 million of which 35 per cent is covered by the Fund. Execution has commenced in 1979 and is expected to be completed next year. The loan will be for a period of 16 years including a two-year period of grace, amortised in 28 semi-annual instalments, the first of which will be due in June 1983 and the last in December 1996. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Feb 81 p 2]

CSO: 4820

CENTRAL REGION ANNOUNCES MINISTRY SETUP

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 p 1

[Article: "Ministries Proposed for Central Region; Health, Education, Finance, Agriculture, and Regional Affairs"]

[Text] It has been decided to propose the creation of five regional ministries in the Central Region, by adding a new ministry to the number of ministries proposed in the regional government organization. That will be done by splitting the Ministry of Public Services into two ministries, the first for educational and guidance affairs, and the second for health and social welfare. This was in view of the enormity of educational and health services in the Central Region.

This was done in a meeting that Mr 'Abd al-Rahim Mahmud, governor of the Central Region, held the day before yesterday in Wad Madani, with the heads of the technical committees, which carried out the studies pertaining to structuring the regional government in the Central Region. The meeting replaced the regional ministries, by proposing the creation of five ministries: Ministry of Regional and Administrative Affairs, Finance and Economy, Agriculture, Education and Guidance, and the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. This change abolished the ministry proposed for housing, water and public utilities. This will become a major bureau, under the supervision of the minister of regional affairs, who, according to the proposed structure, will hold the rank of central minister and deputy to the governor. A deputy minister will assist him in running ministry affairs.

The structure proposed for the regional ministry includes establishing two organizations, one called the Council of Regional Planning, and the second for legal advice. Both will be directly under the governor of the region.

On the other hand, 'Abd al-Rahim Mahmud will chair a broader meeting next Saturday, in his office in Wad Madani, which will include the acting provincial governors, the executive directors, and the first assistant governors of al-Jazirah, Blue Nile and White Nile provinces. The purpose is to consider the structure of the regional government and the local popular government.

The governor of the Central Region, the day before yesterday, directed the acting provincial governors that they must begin at once to close the accounts of their provinces, preparatory to the start of the new stage.

7005
CSO: 4802

OIL PIPELINE DEVELOPMENT REPORTED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 p 1

[Article: "Program to Develop Oil Pipeline To Be Completed in February"]

[Text] 'Abd al-Rahman al-Talab, technical director for the oil pipeline, told AL-SAHAFAH that the project to develop the line would reach final completion the end of next February. This development will make possible the shipment of all petroleum derivatives through the line, including gasoline, benzine, white gas and naptha fuels. Capacity will reach 100 cubic meters per hour (about 80 tons per hour). His Excellency said that the development project might include technical and engineering changes in the design of some machinery and requirements pertaining to the line.

On the other hand, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Talab explained to AL-SAHAFAH that the pipeline had successfully completed pumping benzine. So far, it has been possible to ship about 12,500,000 gallons, through the pipeline, by means of the pumping test, which ran between 28 November and 17 December 1980.

It is worth pointing out that the project to develop the pipeline has been under way since July 1980, through several Austrian and West German firms, under the supervision of a French company.

7005
CSO: 4802

PROGRESS OF AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN AL-JAZIRAH REVIEWED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 10 Jan 81 pp 6-7

[Interview with Minister of Agriculture, Dr 'Umar al-Amin, by Muhammad Ahmad Mabruk: "Minister of Agriculture Explains to AL-SAHAFAH Reasons for Decline in Al-Jazirah Productivity. Minister Draws Up Comprehensive Program for Implementation; Ministry to Solve Project Problems. New Production Relations; Radical Solutions for Farmers' Problems"]

[Text] The effects of "old age" have begun to appear in the huge al-Jazirah project. Its yield has fallen off considerably, which necessitates a pause to carry out numerous studies and search for the project's revitalization, so that it can take its place in driving our national economy as one of the important mainstays, and as one of the larger projects in the world.

We published a comprehensive field report before, in which we met with the project's administration, farmers and their federation. There was a consensus about a number of causes for the decline of project productivity. Today, we meet the minister of agriculture, Dr 'Umar al-Amin, with whom we discuss project problems, and the solutions which have been and will be taken for these problems.

[Question] We asked the minister of agriculture about the causes of the project's declining productivity.

[Answer] Project productivity has fallen off, especially last season, to a degree that has not been seen since 1957, a year of world economic conditions, which led to a poor return from foreign currency. This has caused the state to suffer financial losses, due to the decline in its share of production profit, from direct and indirect taxes. There was also a decline in the farmers' profit, which caused the farmers to accumulate debts. Production in the project has declined in proportion to the deterioration of production factors, such as poor means of irrigation, and unavailability of machinery. What we have is old and has not been reconditioned for a long time. There are also problems stemming from agricultural changes, represented by increasing crops and their acreage, without proportionally increasing production factors, in addition to escalating production costs, with the rising costs of imports, rising administration costs and the project's inflated management. The farmers' issues are represented by poor production returns, the profit-sharing system, and the system of mutual accounting.

[Question] The minister of agriculture explained the solutions that the ministry will implement to solve the project's problems.

[Answer] There have been several studies made and conferences held about the project's problems, and how to solve them, in which numerous foreign consulting firms participated. However, the situation continued as it was, until June of this year, when work to solve the project's production issues began in earnest. The president issued several decrees to the People's Assembly. The president stated that the project's problems were becoming increasingly critical, to such a degree that partial solutions were of no use. The president pointed out the state's policy toward rebuilding the project and the production infrastructure, by implementing an integrated program to refurbish the project.

This would involve two programs: the first, to expedite renewal and maintenance of equipment and machinery, means of transportation, shipping and communications, building storage facilities, improving irrigation networks. This would be done through a loan from the World Bank and the European Common Market, amounting to $33,500,000. In fact, it has been credited, and work began in June 1980, and will be completed in December 1981. The second program is to fully rejuvenate the project, through a program costing $200 million, by means of a similar loan. Foreign consulting firms are currently drawing up a study for this project.

[Question] We asked the minister about the stages required to implement the first urgent program.

[Answer] The immediate program includes the procurement of 163 tractors of different kinds for the project. Equipment for the Ministry of Irrigation includes 20 motorized graders, 14 heavy caterpillar tractors, 30 light-weight locomotives for al-Jazirah's railroad, 23 fuel tankers, 72 trucks, 75 "pickup" trucks, 138 fuel storage-tanks, and 119 warehouses, in addition to workshop equipment and spare parts. The immediate program is aimed at rectifying the project to meet current production demands.

[Question] Before the minister of agriculture clarifies the steps taken concerning production relationships, we should say that the method adhered to was the method that the colonialists laid down, and which has continued up to now. The profit was divided among the farmers with no concern for the gap between the producer and the weakness of production, with respect to the farmers, which generated a condition of indifference among the farmers. They greatly neglected the cotton crop, and concentrated their efforts on other crops, from which the farmer's return was commensurate with his actual production. This was one of the basic reasons leading to the decline of the project's cotton productivity. This non-system of joint accountability was greatly prejudicial to the farmers' rights.

[Answer] Perhaps the subject of production relationships and the decrees which the president issued concerning them, was a very important factor in raising the project's productivity. That was done by abolishing the system of sharing, and joint accounting, and substituting a system of individual accounting, as was done in the revolutionary al-Rahad pilot project, which returns net production profit to the farmer. The new system of production relationships requires that a fee for

water and land is deducted, and paid to the state, to cover the irrigation and administrative costs, and the ground rent. The state offers agricultural services, such as preparing the land and other agricultural operations, fertilizers and insecticides of various types, provided that the cost is deducted from each farmer individually, so that a farmer is not hurt by circumstances surrounding some other farmer.

A change has been made in the cotton marketing system, by purchasing the cotton from the farmer when it is delivered to the gin. This ensures that the farmer gets rapid receipt of his profit from cotton, after the production costs have been deducted. To solve the current financial problems, the farmers' debts were suspended by a presidential decree, and a 10-year schedule of payments set up, so that the debt payments will not swallow up these profits, which the farmers will realize from the new system of production relationships, and the improvement in project performance.

In order to achieve stability for the farmer, a new system of agricultural credit and insurance has been established, to guarantee financing of agricultural processes for all crops. Implementation of that will be in the mid-term program to rejuvenate the project.

[Question] We asked the minister about solutions which will be adopted to solve the project's administrative issues, which have caused very large deficits in the budget, and hamper the performance of its mission.

[Answer] The rate of inflation, with respect to the project's management structure, and the rise of administrative expenses, are developing in a way that ensures the work's efficient progress. At the same time, we are limiting the administrative costs, by rebuilding the project's management structure.

[Question] Concerning the agricultural cycle, we asked the minister about the "composition" of the crops planted in the project, and whether they were the most suitable?

[Answer] The present agricultural cycle came about as a result of research and studies, which established that no more than one million of its total two million feddans could be planted, because the irrigation system could not serve more than this amount at any one time. Three summer crops and one winter crop, wheat, are planted, but after the project has been rebuilt, the present agricultural cycle will be reviewed, so as to introduce livestock into the marginal lands, on which fodder will be planted for the farmers' livestock. In some areas, there will be concentration on livestock, by allocating more acreage for fodder for the farmers' animals. There is a program to introduce livestock into the agricultural cycle of all the projects. That will be implemented gradually.

[Question] We asked the minister about solutions to the problems of insufficient labor required to harvest the cotton.

[Answer] This is a problem which will be dealt with through mechanization. That will be implemented in a 3-year program to mechanize the harvesting of medium-staple

cotton in al-Rahad, al-Suki and New Halfa, and short-staple in al-Qadharif, the Blue Nile projects and the Nuba hills. Experiments in harvesting by machines have been successful. Fifty harvesters have been acquired for the al-Rahad project, which is sufficient to harvest a third of its acreage, as well as 27 machines for the Blue Nile project as a first stage. In fact, their work will begin in January, and it will relieve the cotton picking problems. In the next 2 years, harvesters will be introduced into the New Halfa and al-Suki projects. As for long-staple cotton, it has been proven that it cannot be picked by machine, but must be done manually. There is a project to harvest sugar cane mechanically, as is the case in Kinanah. Harvesters will be used for sorghum and sesame. We hope to obtain a great deal of benefit from machinery in agricultural operations, within 3 years time, as a solution to the problem of labor shortfalls.

We note from talking with the minister of agriculture, officials responsible for the project's management, and the Farmers' Federation, that in fact the soil suffers from exhaustion and poor fertility, despite the extensive use of fertilizers. The latter is considered a danger to the soil's composition and its profitability, due to the earth's loss of organic material. We should mention that certain excellent types of sorghum have become extinct. "May" sorghum, for example, is no longer grown, after having been planted for scores of years. "Fatritah" sorghum and other types, more usable in poor soil land, have been substituted.

These are some prominent examples of how the project's crops have been affected by soil exhaustion, the effects of which began to appear since the beginning of the 60's, when cotton productivity began to continuously decline. This was when the project was under the Ministry of Finance.

Cotton Plant Diseases

Cotton diseases have developed and increase year after year, having found a suitable environment, until they can withstand countermeasures. These disease countermeasures were increased, including the use of chemicals, until the diseases developed an immunity against them, because of their repeated use. The experience of last season is a good example. The use of these chemicals produce harmful effects on the environment, soil, water, and consequently, on animals and man. The minister of agriculture comments:

"It is well known that the use of chemicals, especially weed and disease killers, has an effect on polluting the environment, because these chemicals are toxic. However, this is not a big effect. The use of insecticides is a practice followed the world over."

It is well known also that the cost of fighting these diseases is rising rapidly, due to world market conditions. It goes up side by side with the price of oil, which is the basic element used for these chemicals. That has a direct effect on the cost of production; the costs increase, but cotton is unable to fetch a price commensurate with the rise in these costs. Expanding the disease countermeasures is followed by huge costs, since it necessitates more equipment and manpower, because the project is so large.

Fighting Nature

Constant irrigation, and the loss of organic matter in the soil causes it to become hard. As the plowing becomes deeper, the hardness increases, choking off the plants' growth, and causing irrigation to become difficult and superficial. This is the case in the Jazirah project. Plant cycles suffer, especially cotton. This is frequently accompanied by chemicals, represented by fertilizers, insecticides and herbicides. Since 1944, the land has been plowed deeper and deeper, to attempt to overcome the soil's hardness. This attempt to "conquer" the soil occurs when it loses some of its basic elements. The project management has continued, since that time, to make every conceivable effort in heavy plowing, without giving the land an opportunity to rest from this effort. This is one agricultural method in the developed world; another is to plant crops which are abundantly fertile, such as legumes, so as not to "fight nature," but rather, to benefit from its basic elements. Its balance should not be upset, in order to ensure a large return, with less expenditure to overcome the land. There is no better evidence for that than the great success achieved in the United States, in terms of "natural agriculture," and in China, where they abandoned the use of fertilizers for a system of interval cultivation. The land is planted in adjoining rows of two plants that differ in kind of nourishment required. This is just one aspect of important agricultural developments, through which the farmer is bound more closely to the land.

Previously, the Clothing King

Cotton is no longer "clothing king" in the world. Man-made fibers and petrochemical fabrics have dominated the world market, and have considerably lessened the demand for cotton, due to the excellence and inexpensiveness of its competing commodities. On the other hand, cotton's productivity has directly expanded in producing countries. One feddan produces eight kantaras in Egypt, and more than that in the United States and other areas of the world. Sudan is no longer dominant in producing cotton in the world. It enters the market with less production each year. With regard to that, Dr 'Umar al-Amin says:

"Concerning long-staple cotton, Sudan and Egypt are still prime-movers in the world market, and world prices for it are influenced by production in Egypt and Sudan. As for medium and short-staple cotton, we have no influence there."

The last few years have seen a sudden, abrupt upturn in a number of areas that have a direct effect on the Jazirah project. Undertaking huge growth projects attracted manpower, and achieved settlement for the citizens in these areas. The inhabitants, either within or outside of cheap labor areas, no longer needed al-Jazirah, after the Khashm al-Qirbah project was established. Then came the growth projects: al-Rahad, Kinanah, 'Aslayyah and other large agricultural projects and industries. The Jazirah project began to suffer from a lapse of effort; every year, there was a labor shortfall. If workers were found, their wages went sky-high. Each season saw a repeated inability to harvest the crops. The cotton bolls gradually fall under animals' hooves early in the season. Police and army patrols are useless against them; this is an area of two million feddans.

Regarding the big change that took place in the whole country, the Jazirah citizens especially benefited, more than others. The project did not benefit from the spread of education among farmers' sons, who were assumed to be the farmers of the future. They got out of agriculture, even those who had not been educated, and went to another more profitable and less arduous trade. Then came the wave of emigration to the oil nations; unfortunately, no farmers will return.

Education has not been directed toward the service of agriculture, so that it follows the progress happening in the world, except in a serious experiment on a few feddans, called the sons of the farmers' projects. The experiment died in its infance, without showing any yield.

Machines are being developed in the project, and their use is increasing, without the farmer being a part of this development. When the need to use machines increased more and more, due to the labor shortage, the project went in the direction of expanding its workshops and management and technical structure, instead of distributing the machines to the farmers, so that they could operate them, bear the cost of operating them and be in charge of them. That way, the farmers could run the agricultural operations themselves, instead of other workers running the operations for them. The Farmers' Federation started limited attempts to have the farmers own the machines, on a very narrow scope. It began with some of the more capable farmers and ended with them. A group of machine owners has appeared, which has become a new factor in putting pressure on the farmer, through their bad service and the rising cost of renting their equipment, thus exploiting the pressing need for them.

The project's policy to maintain specific agricultural "traditions" has continued. This was done by successful experiments to grow vegetables for export, but they became limited, because of the rising cost of production and fluctuating quality. Efforts were discontinued, in order to reduce the cost. Later, results in marketing our crops proved the success of groundnuts, which have achieved high productivity and a superior price on the world market. However, in addition to the groundnut crop's ability to fertilize the land, all that did not help to expand its cultivation, in the sense that cotton was, despite the fact it does not require the fertilizer, chemicals or manual labor for harvesting that cotton does.

Livestock, Rejected Wealth

Expanding cultivation of crops, and adding new crops, at the expense of the remaining grazing land for animals, has restricted their movement and has put a heavy burden on the livestock owner, who is a farmer at the same time. Numbers have declined considerably. It is well known that the Jazirah area, once rich in vast animal resources, is changing with settlement, because their owners are settled and not nomadic. However, this distinction has dealt a heavy blow to the livestock, because of their restricted movement, on the one hand, and the cultivation of grazing land on the other. All that remains is left over after cultivation, and is only sufficient for limited numbers.

The owners, who are the farmers, are forced to graze them in the cotton, and the animals attack it. However, to feed them in any other way would cost the farmers

more than their profit from cotton. Instead of a logical solution to this problem, the project management resorts to calling the police, and the people's armed forces, to protect the cotton crop from the animals' attack. They chase them, and the owners pay a fine for what they eat. Then the animals reenter the cotton fields once more.

With regard to not settling the animals and difficulties with breeding them, it has become burdensome to the farmers to maintain large herds, because the cost of feed has become very high. There is no longer enough sorghum for humans, and it has disappeared as an important part of animal feed. The price of birdseed has risen, while quantities have decreased, due to its small production as an adjunct to cotton productivity, and the rise in cost of producing it. That is reflected in the prices for livestock and their by-products. It has become a source of new concern for farmers; there are, therefore, losses concerned with animals, due to their poor production, small numbers and the damage they do to agriculture.

There is another problem. There are seasonal workers who pick the cotton. They come from vast grazing areas, and own huge herds of animals. They cross the two Niles every season, outnumber the local Jazirah animals, and must be fed until the picking season ends. There is nothing but the cotton itself. They attack it at night, and it only takes a few nights until all the year's efforts to grow cotton are gone. Perhaps this is more like a waterwheel, giving and taking from the lake.

Perhaps we should mention that this project, despite its vast size, only has a single poultry farm, with only 6000 chickens. There are one or two poultry specialists, for artificial insemination. The farm is under the supervision of the project's department of social welfare. This is all that is devoted to animal husbandry, even though a tiny percentage of the project's land could meet the needs of the local market for chicken, eggs and meat.

It should be clearly noted that the people "despise" breeding animals, and the new generations of citizens are no longer interested in the Jazirah land. They have lost their enthusiasm for breeding animals and have lost confidence in it as an abundant source of wealth.

Instead of looking at animals as parasites of agriculture, logic demands that we should derive benefit from livestock as an aid to agriculture, something that returns the organic elements of fertilization to the soil. We should consider them as a valuable source of wealth, whose offspring could be improved and whose by-products could be developed. We would benefit from settlement, which is preferrable. Not having settlement was a factor in the failure of the milk and meat projects, which were established in the western part of the country. Settlement should not become a confinement for animals, and a cause of their becoming extinct, because like agriculture, livestock is a rich source of production, with guaranteed profit, for at least two reasons.

We import their by-products from countries similar to ours, such as Kenya, or we give the citizens of al-Jazirah dried milk and other by-products that we import from Western Europe, while we take over grazing lands and chase out the animals.

The question of managing the project needs to be comprehensively dealt with, as the minister of agriculture said. Perhaps this treatment should take into consideration that managing this project from one center makes the centralized management of the project a bloated, inflated body, remote from most of the project lands. This causes most of this management to be confined inside their offices. There is little overseeing, which causes the problems to get out of hand and become difficult to resolve. The management does not recognize the factors and problems until after they have spread and become bigger, because oversight of the fine details is impossible for the centralized project. Without this overseeing of small details, there will be no success, no matter what marvelous and large production inputs there may be. This is because they--and this has been proven--are being wasted every season.

Without the effective participation of the farmers in project management, their understanding of and experience with management will be superficial. Meaningful participation is not just farmers' "representation" on the board of directors and the committees, because true participation is in management of the fields, inspection, and in every department, right on up to the top of the project.

True participation is not even the farmers themselves carrying out the work of cultivation, whether by machine or manual efforts. Farmers should not be turned into "contractors," with agricultural machinery owners, the project management and the workshops carrying out the agricultural processes in lieu of them. Even though cultivation is being done by machines in most of its stages, has the farmer's role become to watch the machine, while it does the work?

There is certainly a bigger role for farmers' organizations, and the republican, revolutionary and popular organizations in the project, sharing in running the cultivation operations, effectively supervising them, and making the farmers and workers aware of the most modern means of agriculture, so that farmers' organizations do not become just a liability.

It should be made clear that it is necessary to have reliable, easy communication between project areas, especially after the telephone system, which had been doing this important job, became defunct. Scores of kilometers of wire and poles have vanished, converted into house roofs. The authorities responsible for protecting it were unable to--to say nothing of the bahavior of those who have stolen the equipment. Is the costly wireless communications system, which the project management procured, going to be used as a substitute for the telephone system?

What if the Jazirah project management were to reduce the cotton acreage to one-quarter the size, for example, confine it to areas capable of producing it, saved three-fourths of the costs expended for cotton, and concentrated efforts on the areas planted. Productivity would rise, to yield the same production that the entire presently-cultivated areas yield, or perhaps increase. A feddan, last season, produced one and one-half kantaras, despite the fact that it could yield eight kantaras, if its cultivation was improved, as is the case in Egypt for example. Consequently, we could do away with much of the labor now required for the very complex cotton operations.

Moreover, benefit could be derived from the remaining acreage to grow other crops, such as groundnuts, whose great worth and guaranteed profit have been proved, especially since world markets today need all kinds of food. Most of the need for cotton cloth has been replaced, causing great unprofitability and stripping the land of its fertility and wealth of natural fertilizers that the groundnut plant restores to the soil. But, the groundnut does not require the labor, whether by the farmer's hand or by machine, nor does it need what cotton does, in terms of fertilizers and chemicals that harm the soil and the natural environment.

It would also be possible to use vast areas, which are now planted in cotton, to expand the livestock areas, to exploit animals commercially, improve their breed and their by-products, so as to satisfy the market's needs and to truly compete in world markets, as another "crop" added to the project's crops.

After having proven the success of growing vegetables for export, what if the project management were to improve their quality and increase their quantity, in order to compete with others in world markets, and to satisfy domestic market demands. What if it were to allocate areas to grow different types of fruit in gardens, which could be the largest gardens in the world, because the project does not lack any essential element. It could be an important part of the world's fruit markets. The project does not lack anything, and these things only cost a small fraction of the cost of cotton, and could be twice as profitable.

This is the fruit of field investigations, which AL-SAHAFAH tasked us to do. They included the project management, the Ministry of Agriculture, the farmers and their federation. We considered that the project's problems were not born today, but are the product of a series of accumulated matters, which began with the very start of the project, and whose effects have surfaced during the last 15 years.

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ARAB EXPECTATIONS OF NEW FRENCH PRESIDENT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 May 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "Arabs and Francois Mitterand's Republic"]

[Text] It may be said that the Arabs, both rulers and peoples, have followed the French presidential elections with extreme interest and as if some aspects of these elections were an Arab issue. Are they so?

The following observations may, in their entirety, constitute an answer which may clarify some features. These are the observations:

First, a large number of Arab kings and presidents have been surprised with Valery Giscard d'Estaing's loss and Mitterand's victory because they had not taken some axiomatic facts into consideration. These include the fact that the French citizen has a temperament different from that of the Arab citizen; he cannot withstand having one person rule him for 14 successive years and the freedom available to him, and not to the Arab, makes him express his rejection of anyone who fails to take this axiomatic fact into consideration.

Second, it is surprising that the Arab kings and presidents had not opened channels of communication with Mitterand's France earlier even though the man has not secretly engaged in political action and even though he has been a permanent candidate for the presidency. The secret behind the failure to open such channels may lie in the fact that the political position taken by General de Gaulle after the Arab-Israeli war of 5 June 1967 is the position that the Arabs want France constantly to adopt and whoever aspires to the French presidency is required [by the Arabs] to follow this position.

But Mitterand is not the candidate of circumstances or of chance. He is a man with political ideas which, most of the Arab rulers know, are somewhat in conflict with the position with which they feel reassured. These rulers also know that Mitterand's chances of success were not so minute as to make them indifferent to opening channels of communication with him.

Until the few hours preceding election day, most of the Arab kings and presidents seemed extremely assured that the result [of the election] would be to their satisfaction. Perhaps it is even reasonable to say that most of them were only waiting for Valery Giscard d'Estain to be announced the winner. This was also

the condition of most of them during the U.S. presidential election campaign a few months ago.

Third, the failure of the Arabs to open communication channels with Mitterand several years or at least months ago doesn't necessarily mean that the Sixth Republic will have unfriendly relations with the Arab world. But Mitterand's previous positions, positions that have been relatively sharply opposed to Arab causes, make an unfriendly state of relations likely if Mitterand the president does not reconsider some of the positions of Mitterand the candidate, and if he fails to take into consideration the fact that the Arab world has a fundamental role, now and for years [to come], in France's ability to play an independent and strong role at the same time.

Will Francois Mitterand the president reconsider the positions of Francois Mitterand the candidate?

It is wrong to assume that the reconsideration we mean constitutes a dilemma to President Mitterand because his Republic will last 7 years, barring a surprise similar to the misfortune that happened to Reagan [shooting incident]. Though the 7 years of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's presidency abounded with stumbles, thus precluding the possibility of a renewed 7-year term, the 7 years of the sixth republic will abound with numerous transformations which will make it impossible to renew President Mitterand's term or even to renew the experiment of leftist rule.

This means that President Mitterand is not the captive of complications and he has ahead of him a broad sphere to work with, a flexibility that minimizes the perils for him. This is why his previous positions and numerous promises to Israel, positions and promises that are mostly at the expense of the Arabs and against their hopes and aspirations, require deep reconsideration.

But what may preclude such reconsideration is the fact that these positions and promises are bound to clear-cut convictions and ideology. This is where the danger lies, especially if President Mitterand rules within the framework of these convictions and this ideology.

Fourth, the formula of the French role, whose foundations were laid down by General de Gaulle and which became well developed in the last 5 years of President Giscard d'Estaing's term, is the formula in which the capable Arab countries, or some of them, have found solutions to numerous problems and dilemmas and in which France has found a solution for the economic prosperity to which it aspires and which prevents bankruptcy, unemployment and a decline in the military and civilian production. These Arab countries hope that President Mitterand will continue to work within this formula, thus responding to the weapon demands of some of these countries and sparing them the need to turn to the Soviet Union for weapons or to completely capitulate to the U.S. will. They also hope that he will respond to the demand for technological know-how and for the requirements of their development plans--requirements which are asked for only when those needing them secure their weapon demands.

This response has been beneficial to France, enabling it to further develop its war and civilian industries, keeping the franc strong up to the moment when the public opinion polls began to turn in Mitterand's favor. The franc has since been shaken in a manner unprecedented before Mitterand's assumption of power.

Though the cables of congratulation sent by the Arab kings and presidents to President Mitterand have not stated clearly what they want from him, most of these kings and presidents are worried that President Mitterand will embark on steps in keeping with his convictions and his ideology and with the promises that he has made to Israel.

It may be said that the Arab ambassadors in Paris had never been as active as they have been since Mitterand's victory and Giscard d'Estaing's fall. These ambassadors have exerted much effort and have tried hard to deduct correctly the line that President Francois Mitterand will follow. What is more, some of these ambassadors have informed him in one way or another (and this information is attributed to well-informed sources in Paris) about some of the [Arab] wishes and hopes on the basis that the issue is extremely important to some kings and presidents.

It is worth noting here that President Saddam Hussein, the Arab leader who has been the target of the strongest attacks of Francois Mitterand the candidate, has deliberately overlooked the protocol side in his cable of congratulations to Francois Mitterand on his presidential victory, and has conveyed to Mitterand two fundamental points: The first stresses "Iraq's wish to continue and to develop the relations of friendship and cooperation with France," and emphasizes that these relations "have very definitely served in the preceding years the essential and legitimate interests of the Iraqi and French peoples." The second point is embodied in President Saddam Hussein's statement in his cable of congratulations that "we are eager to develop the relations of understanding and cooperation between the Arab nation and France in a manner that serves their common interests, that contributes to eliminating the aggression and the tension in our Arab area, that helps the Arab Palestinian people regain their legitimate rights which have been acknowledged and supported by the international community which believes in freedom and justice and that contributes seriously to achieving peace and stability in the world."

Fifth, President Giscard d'Estaing has not given [the Arabs] the maximum that France can give but has given to a reasonalbe limit in return for which the Arabs have not been reluctant to give France the maximum.

For the situation to continue as it has been, President Francois Mitterand must not implement the ideas and pledges of Francois Mitterand the candidate.

As an initial step, the Arabs look forward to statements from President Mitterand to dispel some of the concern, or rather some of the apprehensions generated by Mi-terand the candidate--statements coming in reply to the Arab cables of congratulations, most of which have contained indications that there are numerous Arab apprehensions.

Will President Mitterand do so or will he not be able to overlook the fact that most of the Arabs wished, up to the moment of his winning the presidency, that he would not win? Will he, therefore, feel that he must treat them in a reciprocal manner that will not reassure them?

If Mitterand embarks on the first step we have referred to [make statements reassuring the Arabs], he will not only reassure most of the Arab rulers and peoples regarding France's continued compliance with its positions vis-a-vis the Arabs--positions that are minimal--but he will also foil the hopes of certain international parties, such as West Germany which aspires to form, along with Britain, the Western alternative for the Arabs, such as the United States which hopes that the eruption of a sharp conflict in the Arab-French relations under Mitterand's presidency will make the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia cling to the U.S. weapons and U.S. technology and not attach big hopes to the French alternative; and such as the Soviet Union which has lost heavily throughout the number of years since France came to constitute the alternative at the armament level--an alternative which has seemed important and constantly liable to rapid development.

There remains a fact--namely that until the latest elections it wasn't evident that the French situation constituted an issue or a semi-issue for most of the Arabs, both rulers and peoples. Perhaps President Francois Mitterand will take this into consideration and will strengthen the relationship instead of contributing to the creation of conditions of disengagement which well result in the Arabs losing a little and France a lot.

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SOVIET OCCUPATION OF KANDAHAR SEEN AS WARNING TO PAKISTAN

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1280, 15 May 81 p 35

[Article by Huda al-Husayni: "The Mujahidin Are Waiting for Arms...but the Arms Roads Are Blocked. Pakistan Signed the American Assistance Agreement, and Then the Soviets Devastated Afghan Kandahar"]

[Text] The 27th of last month was the anniversary of the communist coup which took place in Afghanistan in 1977 and which led to the killing of President Muhammad Da'ud and members of his family and to Muhammad Nur Taraki's taking power with the support of the Soviets. Afghanistan gives this coup the title: "The Great Sawr Revolution" [Sawr is the name of the month corresponding to April].

The Soviets began their celebration of this anniversary in their own special way and before the date of its occurrence.....And, in the middle of last month, there was an increase in Western reports to the effect that the Afghan mujahidin controlled the majority of the 29 provinces and that they also gained complete control over the provinces of Kandahar and Herat, in which the second and third largest Afghan cities are located.

At the time when the West's applause of the rumors increased--it often wished for their existence, while Western correspondents continue to say that the narcotics of Afghanistan have spread in the Soviet army and that the Russian situation in Afghanistan is on the verge of strangulation; and while the voices of mujahidin officials exclaim that the weapons have run out and that no one is guaranteeing to them the arms which they need, especially anti-armor and anti-aircraft missiles.... at the same time, the leaders of the Kremlin were adding to the 85,000 soldiers in Afghanistan 5,000 other soldiers whose mission was to make rapid raids.

On the 22nd of last month, two things happened. The first was in Peshawar, Pakistan, where the formation of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan from 4 groups was announced anew. The 4 groups are: the National Liberation Front (Sayyid Gailani), the Afghanistan Liberation Front (Sibghatullah Mujaddidi), the Islamic Revolution Movement (Muhammadi), and the Hizb-i Islami Movement (Yunus Khalis). The fundamental task of the alliance is the formation of a committee to ensure arms for the mujahidin. The second was in Kandahar, Afghanistan near the Pakistani border where, while the alliance was announcing its second birth, Soviet forces were emerging from their military bases located near the airport, at a distance of 10 miles from the city, to undertake a comprehensive sweep operation

in which they would stress to the West that supremacy in Afghanistan belongs to the Soviets and not to the mujahidin.

During the attack on Kandahar, Soviet military helicopters were also undertaking operations in the fields around Kandahar, shooting at the villagers, causing them to flee, and spreading terror among them; and they were thereby accomplishing their mission, alleviating the possibility of the exertion of any pressure on the infantry division which was trying to gain control over the province.

The flight began, and then, 4 days after the attack, Habibullah Garzay, the official of the Islamic Front for National Unity, arrived at Quetta, the capital of Afghan Baluchistan. He described the battle as follows: "Fighting is taking place in Kandahar, even within the walls of the old city."

The leaders of the Kremlin were looking forward with delight to the completion of the operation to gain control over Kandahar because it would place them very close to Pakistan which was, on that day, receiving its foreign minister Agha Shahi who was returning from the United States with agreements: one guaranteeing financial support, and another, military support for a period of 5 years as a reward to Pakistan which, in the words of American Secretary of State Gen. Alexander Haig, "stood up against the confrontation of the Soviets."

Therefore, some military observers say that the Kandahar operation was no more than a warning which the Soviets directed at Pakistan.

A Pakistani source says that Agha Shahi rejected, or rather, avoided obligating [Pakistan] [to carry out] America's wishes regarding assistance to the Afghan mujahidin, especially with regard to announcing officially the guaranteeing of assistance to them over the Pakistani borders, because the infiltration of arms over the borders of Pakistan to the mujahidin would arouse Pakistani fears of a Soviet reaction. Then, American strategists themselves were asking to what extent Moscow would accept the policy of fait accompli. Washington was anxious that Moscow would try to get closer to the Pakistani border.

Now, after the gaining of total control over Kandahar [by the Soviets], American observers are expecting the beginning of Soviet military operations against Pakistan on the pretext of striking at Afghan mujahidin bases inside of it.

Agha Shahi was wary of the Soviet approach. Therefore, the Government of Pakistan refused permission to the Afghan mujahidin to announce a government in exile in Peshawar; and during the American-Pakistani talks, the Pakistani refusal with regard to arms passing over to the mujahidin in an official manner was categorical as long as the United States did not offer to Pakistan all guarantees that they [the U.S.] would guarantee its security.

Thus, after the signing of the contracts and agreements with Pakistan, the Reagan administration, in order not to arouse the anger of the Soviets, the U.S. president himself announced the lifting of the embargo on the sale of American wheat to the Soviet Union; and France followed him. However, as it seems, the Soviets were expecting this operation, not for the sake of saving Pakistan, but as the TASS news agency mentioned, for the sake of the American farmers themselves.

Hence, there emerges the remark that the solution of the Afghan problem depends in part on the international situation and in part on talks between the East and the West. However, it does not at all depend on the "struggle" of the mujahidin or on the wishes of the Western press.

Regarding Pakistan, this warning, the occupation of Kandahar, will not be followed by another military warning inside Pakistan, as one military analyst says, because the Soviets will continue to practice the policy of encouraging the emigration of civilians in order to engulf Pakistan with Afghan refugees; and then, it will be compelled to sit at the same table with Afghan President Babrak Karmal and Soviet officials to discuss a political solution to this problem.

The military analyst adds that what contributes to the pressure on Pakistan is the claim by India that the American arming of Pakistan constitutes a danger to it; and so, it will, in the end, rush to throw itself into the arms of the Soviets. Consequently, Pakistan will be surrounded by Soviet pincers which will not hesitate to take the next step, to surround Pakistani Baluchistan and to swallow it up, especially since the Americans would continue to repeat that the concerns of the Reagan administration are primarily about the removal of the danger of Soviet communist expansion so that it does not get close to the oil wells.

In any case, after 18 months of the occupation of Afghanistan, the clamor of the world, especially the Western world, which is demanding Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, has lessened considerably.

Some sources finally think that it is farfetched that this withdrawal will take place because it is tied to numerous factors, among them, the religious expansionism which Khomeyni was brandishing when the Soviets reacted to it with the occupation of Afghanistan and with many economic resources.

One Western economist says that the Russian connection with the Afghans is very old and goes back to 1952 when the Soviets began to offer financial and military aid to Afghan governments. Some of this assistance provided for special studies for the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Soviet geologists found huge quantities of natural gas in wells located in the North of Afghanistan. Likewise, they found large quantities of iron ore located north of the city of Kabul.

In 1968, the Soviets completed the construction of a pipeline linking the natural gas wells in the North of Afghanistan and Soviet territory. Also, huge quantities of bituminous coal were extracted, and up to 1978, the quantity of Afghan bituminous coal which was sent to the Soviet Union reached 200,000 tons per year. The average amount of Afghan natural gas imported by the Soviet Union has reached 3 billion square meters per year. For every 1,000 square meters, the Soviets pay 37 dollars (the world price is 160 dollars). Therefore the economist asks at the end of his discussion what will induce the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan? Observers say that the next step which will be taken by the Soviet army is a sweep operation of the province of Herat on the Iranian border, leaving its main force in Kandahar. It will constitute a continuous warning to Pakistan.

CSO: 4604/4

FLN SUSPENDS FOUR MEMBERS

LD302346 Algiers Domestic Service in French 2200 GMT 30 Jun 81

[Text] In the fifth session of the FLN Central Committee this afternoon's work ended at 2030. The members of the session's bureau immediately processed with the installation of the commissions, and it is at the level of commissions that work will continue tomorrow morning. At the fifth ordinary session whose theme, I remind you, is cultural policy today's work was marked by President Chadli Benjedid, head of state and secretary general of the FLN.

And in the afternoon the Central Committee decided on the suspension of Ahmed Bencherif, Mohamed Tayebi Larbi, Mahmoud Guennes and Moustapha Bousfra.

It was after hearing the report of the disciplinary committee that the members of the Central Committee decided by vote the [words indistinct] the suspensions. The central disciplinary commission had previously, under Article (?115) on the [words indistinct] of the party called the members concerned to question them on the contents [words indistinct] presented by the law and this in conformity with Article (?62) of the party's statutes.

In his speech, of course, President Chadli Bendjedid expressed his satisfaction at the considerable progress being made by the country in its mastery of management and in the increase in production.

After mentioning the great efforts made in the reconstruction of the disaster areas [words indistinct] the president pointed out that the country's financial position is excellent in comparison with previous years while [word indistinct] is continued improvement thanks to a general effort.

Speaking about relations with friendly and fraternal countries, particularly following his Arab and African tour and his visits to the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, the president informed the members of the Central Committee in detail of the results achieved, as he also gave an account of the different resolutions of the 18th African Summit and informed them of the talks which he had with the leaders of friendly and fraternal countries.

President Chadli Bendjedid also stressed the total cohesion in the thought and action which characterizes the political leadership which after the fourth party congress has undertaken collective action organized to assist the construction of socialist society, whose values are founded on the principles of the National Charter.

CSO: 4519/15

PUBLIC SECTOR COMPANY BOARDS TO GET BROADER POWERS

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 1 Jul 81 p 1

[Article by Nadiyah Sultan]

[Text] The Labor Secretariat of the National Party has approved a 5-pound increase in the wages of the private sector workers to be disbursed as of the beginning of July along the line followed with the government and public sector workers.

The secretariat has also called for advancing the payment of periodic increases to the private sector workers to the month of May instead of the month of January, the same as in the case of the government and public sector workers.

This materialized in last Monday's meeting of the General Labor Secretariat of the National Party under the chairmanship of Ahmad al-'Amawi, the party's labor secretary.

The Democratic National Party's Labor Secretariat has stressed the need to strengthen and develop the public sector so as to enhance the national economy.

The Labor Secretariat has also agreed to amend the law governing the public sector workers with the aim of releasing the boards of directors of the sector's companies to be free to appoint workers, to give them incentives and allowances and to evaluate and grade jobs while abiding by the set wage rates.

The amendment provides for: The right of a board of directors to establish regulations concerning the selection and appointment of workers, provided that job seniority be considered as of the date of the start of work according to the appointment decision. The board of directors may establish the regulations concerning the appointment of workers to jobs at wages exceeding the starting wages on condition that the appointee possess experience exceeding that required for the grade to which he is appointed so that he may be entitled to the wages stipulated for the job in accordance with the job grading list. This is to be established instead of a uniform wage list. The amendment also provides for empowering the chairman of a general assembly to issue, on the recommendation of the board of directors, decisions on promotions to higher jobs, beginning with the job of general manager. As for the other jobs, the promotion decision is to

be issued by the chairman of the board of directors after consultation with the Workers Affairs Committee.

The meeting of the National Party's Labor Secretariat was attended by Mustafa Munji, the Cairo workers secretary and the economic affairs secretary of the Workers Federation; Sa'id Jum'ah, the chairman of the General Union of the Engineering Industries; Muhammad 'Ali al-Faqi, the chairman of the General Press and Printing Union; Abu Bakr Jad al-Mawla, the federation treasurer; 'Abd-al-Fattah Badr, the federation secretary for labor and wage affairs; Khayri Hashim, the chairman of the General Post and Telegraph Union; and Mahmud al-'Askari, the first deputy chairman of the Food Industries Union.

8494
CSO: 4504/7

PROPERTY OF EX-GENERAL AL-SHADHILI, OTHERS IMPOUNDED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Jun 81 p 1

[Article: "Properties of Sa'd al-Shadhili, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid and Hikmat Abu Zayd Impounded on Decision by Socialist Prosecutor; They, Along With 16 Others, Including 6 Journalists, Have Been Referred to State Security Prosecution for Founding Underground Organization Financed by Libya To Overthrow Regime in Egypt"]

[Text] Counselor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad, the socialist public prosecutor, yesterday issued a decision impounding the monies and properties of retired Lt Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili who lives in Algeria at present. The decision also bans Al-Shadhili's wife and children from disposing of these monies. This action is in preparation to refer Al-Shadhili and five others, including an ex-minister and a woman ex-minister to the Values Court.

In addition to these 6 persons, the decision also provides for referring 13 others, including 6 journalists, to the higher state security prosecution to take investigative measures and determine the criminal responsibility of each of them for their participation in an underground organization, called the National Front, operating in the rejectionist countries, led by retired Lt Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili and financed by Libya to overthrow the regime and to harm the country's national interests and its domestic security through acts of sabotage and terror.

Investigations have revealed that Libya has given the organization 3 million pounds and that retired Lt Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili has met with the Palestinian resistance leaderships for the purpose of coordination.

The investigation initiated by the socialist public prosecutor's office under the supervision of Counselor Yusuf Qazzaz, the director of the prosecutor's office, has revealed that the members of the underground organization are:

Retired Lt Gen Sa'd Muhammad al-Shadhili, known as Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili, an ex-ambassador who lives in Algeria at present; 'Abd-al-Majid Muhammad Farid, an ex-minister at the presidential office previously convicted in the case of the centers of power; Hikmat Abu Zayd Muhammadayn, (an ex-minister known for her leftist inclinations); Michel Kamil Mikha'il, (a communist journalist and

member of the Political Bureau and of the Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party abroad); Mahmud Amin al-'Alim (a communist journalist and one of the leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party); Muhammad Fahmi Husayn, alias Fahmi Husayn (a communist); Ghali Shukri Ghali (a communist journalist and one of the leaders of the Egyptian Workers Communist Party abroad); Adib Dimitri Bulus, (a communist); Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hakim Diyab, (a member of the previous Vanguard Organization); Ahmad 'Abbas Salih, (a communist journalist); Muhammad Abu al-Futuh 'Abd-al-Rahman, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Ghazali al-Jubayli (a leading communist previously charged in cases of communist organizations and a member of the Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party); Samir Fahmi Karam, (a communist journalist); 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Malik al-Khamisi, (a communist writer); Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Al al-Saqat (a lawyer who worked previously in the offices of a communist attorney); Ahmad Fu'ad Muhammad al-Tuhami, (a communist producer and one of the leaders of the Egyptian Communist Party who lives in Iraq at present); Muhammad Mamduh 'Izzat Hasan, (a communist who teaches in Libya); 'Abd-al-Mun'im Ibrahim Wahdan, (a former administrative official of al-Nasr Car Company and a member of the Vanguard Organization who currently works in Libya) and Sami Mahmud Muhammad Hajji, the front's secretary general who lives in Beirut.

It has become evident from the investigation that they have set up, organized and managed outside the country an organization under the name of the Egyptian National Front that seeks to overthrow through illegal means the regime in Egypt. The prime defendant [al-Shadhili] has announced in the papers and magazines of the rejectionist Arab states the organization's need for 4 million dollars to implement the front's plan. Through Ahmad Iskandar, the Syrian minister of information, the organization has received 3 million pounds from Libya to help it bolster its activities. The ICATU [International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions] has also contributed $10,000 to this organization.

The investigations have also shown that the front has set up offices in a number of Arab countries, namely Syria, Algeria, Libya and Lebanon. It has been uncovered that the prime defendant met on 2 April 1980 with the Palestinian resistance and Lebanese National Movement leaderships to coordinate their efforts and to study what they have called the method of armed struggle against the Egyptian regime; that he is trying to purchase weapons at home and to store them in safe caches and that he has been trying ceaselessly to unite the opposition forces abroad in order to set up an effective military wing for the front. In this regard, the front has been trying to acquire Syrian passports to send to the Egyptian elements that can be recruited abroad so that they may enter Syria and receive military training there. It has also become evident that the front members and leadership are in contact with some of the leaders and officials of the Arab rejectionist states. Defendants Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili and Mahmud Amin al-'Alim have met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad. Within the framework of strengthening the front's military and terrorist organization, the former has also met with some elements and members of the Lebanese National Movement and of the Palestinian resistance, including Yasir 'Arafat, Abu Jihad, the commander of al-Sa'iqah forces, and Walid Musa, the head of Fatah operations in Beirut. An office has also been set aside for retired Lt Gen Sa'd-al-Din al-Shadhili at the headquarters of the general command of the Syrian al-Sa'iqah forces in Beirut.

The investigations have further shown that this organization has published from its headquarters in Algiers a periodic publication known by the name of AL-JABHAH [THE FRONT] and that the organization members have been persistently publishing [articles against Egyptian regime] in a number of Arab and foreign newspapers and magazines, including the Syrian AL-BA'TH, TISHRIN and AL-THAWRAH, the Iraqi AL-THAWRAH and AL-JUMHURIYAH, the Libyan AL-'USBU' AL-SIYASI, the Algerian AL-SHA'B, the Lebanese AL-ANWAR, AL-SAFIR, AL-NAHAR and AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI, the German DER SPEIGEL, Paris ALMUSTAQBAL, London 23 JULY and others.

To realize the above-mentioned goals, the members of this organization have also broadcast from the radios of Damascus and Libya statements and articles disseminating false and tendentious rumors and reports and inflammatory propaganda liable to harm the national interests and the country's domestic and external security--statements and articles urging the Egyptian masses to rebel and to overthrown the regime. The articles and statements have also attacked all the country's various domestic and foreign policies with the aim of undermining social peace and national unity, of spreading the spirit of defeat and shaking confidence in Egypt's political and military position.

8494
CSO: 4504/7

GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP'S 'POLITICAL MANEUVERS' VIEWED

GF011651 Paris AFP in English 1615 GMT 1 Jul 81

[Text] Tehran, 1 July (AFP)--In a new political offensive, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni today called on the nearly 200,000 Shi'ite Muslim clergy to prepare for the presidential election on 24 July so that the president will not be "imposed by the United States or the Soviet Union."

Meanwhile, parliament speaker Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani warned the parliamentary opposition against ill-considered public statements and complicity with violent groups.

"You can even say what you want on television, but do not become diabolical," he said. "Do not fool the children. Do not give them bombs.

"If there is a chance that you might live, it is in the shadow of the Imam (Ayatollah Khomeyni) and under the Islamic government," he told opposition legislators.

The statements appeared to be a part of a political maneuver to help fill the power vacuum created by the sacking of Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, still in hiding, and the killing of 74 persons in the bombing of the ruling Islamic Republican Party (IRP) headquarters last Sunday. Leftists and the United States have been accused here.

Ayatollah Khomeyni said the clergy, in effect the country's political ruling class, and even theology students should head out into the countryside in advance of the presidential elections on 24 July. There are as yet no official candidates.

IRP leader and chief justice Mohammad Beheshti, 4 ministers and 27 parliament members were killed. Security forces have since discovered a "clandestine center," where 50 persons were meeting, the new IRP leader, Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Javad Bahonar said.

He said they planned to destroy parliament. The newspaper KEYHAN said that the suspects were leftist Mojahedin, and one was killed and three wounded in the gunfire before the arrests.

Three members injured in the blast Sunday were present in parliament today to make a quorum, and speaker Rafsanjani cried as he mentioned the deaths of their 27 colleagues. Their seats were adorned with their photographs.

IRP Secretary Bahonar charged that the bombing had "roots in the United States."

In a press conference, he suggested that Iranian Muslim leftists were at least partly responsible for the bombing, and were in the pay of the United States, known frequently in Iranian (?slogans as the) great Satan."

The masterminds of the bombing were "those mercenaries of the great satan, the Mojahedin," he said, adding that the exact degree of responsibility of the Mojahedin was not known.

Mr Bahonar said he himself narrowly escaped death in the bombing when a colleague persuaded him not to go there, saying he looked tired.

He also said that he was only elected as party leader for 40 or 50 days, until the next party congress.

He added that the partial legislative elections to fill the seats of the dead deputies would be (?held the) same day as the presidential elections.

CSO: 4600/46

POSSIBLE CIVIL WAR IN COUNTRY DISCUSSED

NC011323 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 30 Jun 81

[Text] One of our correspondents reports from Tehran that the fanatical dictator of the clerical regime, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, has ordered his illiterate Prime Minister Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, to take the necessary steps to sever all telephone and telex links with abroad. The order was given after the bomb explosion that killed Mohammad Beheshti and 71 other members of the fundamentalists and (?inhuman) clerical regime. Our correspondent adds that foreign media reported the news on the explosion before the lie-disseminating radio of Khomeyni's regime. As a result the deprived people in our country were enraged over the strict censorship of facts and they listen constantly to foreign radios for the latest reports and facts.

Quoting political sources, our correspondent says: the recent explosions in Iran, and especially in Tehran, manifest the homeland's patriots' rage and disgust over Ruhollah Khomeyni's bigoted and despotic policy. The regime of the executioners has started the executions of patriots in order to stifle the loud voice of the deprived people of our country. It has banned demonstrations, it encourages attacks by Hezbollah hooligans and it issues orders to its bloodthirsty revolution guards to fire on the people. Fearing its downfall, the savage and murderous regime arrests innocent and deprived people, and sends them in the most savage way at dawn the next day, without any reason, to Sheikh Sadeq Khalkhali's firing squads. In the opinion of political observers the people's rage over the executions led them to seek a solution. Last week with the death of the famous spy, Mostafa Chamran, the assassination attempt against Khamene'i, the (?deceitful) [word indistinct] and the dispersed explosions in Tehran and in the provinces, and finally the explosion at the Islamic Republican Party's headquarters, inflicted harsh blows to the half-dead and shaky regime of the traitorous clergy. Therefore, political observers believe that a full-fledged civil war throughout Iran and especially in Tehran is inevitable.

CSO: 4640/24

IMPACT OF TEHRAN BOMBING ASSESSED

PM011418 Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Jul 81 p 3

[Dispatch by Eric Rouleau: "Defending the Islamic Revolution at Any Cost"]

[Text] Tehran--Will the violent attack which decimated the ranks of the Iranian ruling elite ultimately serve to breathe new life into the Islamic regime? Everything has been done to attain that objective. Television is devoting all its evening programs to footage of the attack, of mutilated or decapitated bodies, filmed when the emergency service teams were extricating them from the ruins. The radio is giving horrifying descriptions, broadcasting poignant statements punctuated with sobs from the victims' close relatives. The press is publishing their pictures, tracing their careers as resistance fighters against imperial autocracy and their achievements since the republic was established.

A fringe section of the population, whom there is no hope of "winning back" because they have been ideologically hostile to the regime ever since it was formed, probably remained unmoved by the sight of this horror. It is not uncommon here to meet with "taqutis" (the forementioned fringe section) who are rejoicing over it, convinced that the success of the attack and those which will follow will certainly bring about the Islamic Republic's collapse.

However, judging from the many reactions observed in various sections of society, it would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that most of the population, whatever their criticisms of and grievances against government policy, were deeply shocked by the massacre, by the tragic deaths of leaders some of whom were known for their honesty and devotion.

Joffat ol-Eslam Mohammad Montazeri was among those. Ayatollah Hoseyn Montazeri, his father and presumed successor to Imam Khomeyni, was discreet enough not to mention his personal tragedy even indirectly in a long statement he made. It was the imam himself who paid emotional tribute to the action of "our son Mohammad." "One of our revolution's great minds."

While Ayatollah Montazeri proclaimed that "Islam is in danger," Imam Khomeyni sought to demonstrate in his speech the criminal nature of the "leaders of the counterrevolution," calling on the population to denounce to the authorities

those people, including neighbors, whom they might suspect of seditious activities. But, above all, he adopted a paternal tone in his appeal to "young people who have allowed themselves to be deceived by the fallacious arguments of those who serve the great satan" (the United States). Since he cannot denounce the local perpetrators of the attack by name until the inquiry has been completed, the "leader of the revolution," followed by the press, is directing the people's condemnation against U.S. imperialism alone.

KEYHAN, although one of the most "moderate" of the daily newspapers, entitles its editorial: "Death to the United States!"; ETTELA'AT devotes its banner headline to "Savage Crime by American Mercenaries."

Against all expectations, the repression is marking time. It was expected that there would be a flood of executions after the attack but none has been announced since the night of Sunday/Monday. Have instructions gone out to moderate the repression? Nobody knows, but some "hints" from Khomeyni attracted attention. He expressed the view that the revolutionary courts should not function under the influence of emotion or out of a "desire for vengeance." Take your time, he stated in substance, and only pronounce the death sentence after serious consideration. The "leader of the revolution's" advice has not always been followed in the past and experience will show whether he is heeded this time by courts which are still doing what they like, particularly in the provinces.

Generally speaking the authorities' main concern--judging from their many statements--is to ensure the stability and continuity of institutions. A series of measures has been taken to this end with surprising speed. As early as Monday morning, Ayatollah Ardabili, a co-founder of the Islamic Republican Party [IRP] and the republic's prosecutor, was appointed president of the Supreme Court and member of the presidential council, replacing Ayatollah Beheshti, the IRP's strongman, who was killed the previous day. Education Bahonar has been appointed IRP secretary general. [sentence as printed] [Words indistinct] Prime Minister Raja'i began to distribute the posts of around 10 ministers and under secretaries of state who died amid the ruins.

The date of the election to choose Mr Bani-Sadr's successor as president of the republic has been kept as 24 July.

Foreign Agents?

"The action of a bunch of murderers will not change the course of our revolution in the least," the country's main leaders reiterate in various tones. It is precisely this stress on playing down the political significance of the attack, this determination to exploit it to mobilize the population, which suggests that the confidence being displayed is not complete. You only have to look at the extraordinary security network being set up to be convinced of that. Of course terrorist actions per se will not endanger the regime. But they are likely to constitute a constant challenge to Imam Khomeyni's authority and, above all, to maintain disturbing uncertainties which would be bond to adversely affect all spheres of public life from the war effort to the economy.

The most worrying fact for the authorities is that the inquiry is making scarcely any progress. Mr Bani-Sadr has officially been excluded from the list of suspects, since, according to government spokesman Behzad Nabavi, the former president of the republic "does not have the means of launching such an attack."

Suspicion is naturally falling on the Mojahedin-e Khalq—the best organized opposition movement. But do they have the capacity to successfully carry out such a complex operation? The power of the explosives, the sophisticated mechanisms used and many other technical details point clearly to professionals. Therefore, some circles think that the perpetrators of the attack could only be agents of foreign services or, more probably, former Savak members now serving royalist groups which have taken refuge in Europe and the United States.

All the indications--including the government spokesman's statements Monday—are that the attacks will continue. The important question is how the authorities can end them.

CSO: 4619/7

BRIEFS

REVOLUTION GUARDS IN TEHRAN--Following Sunday night's explosion 2,000 mercenary revolution guards, who attacked Kurdish women and children in Kordestan, were called to Tehran. These men surrounded Jamaran, Ruhollah Khomeyni's residence, in order to prevent possible danger. [Text] [NC011333 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 30 Jun 81]

CSO: 4640/24

MINISTRY CITES INCREASE IN ROAD, BRIDGE, HOUSING PROJECTS

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 May 81 p 3

[Article: "Total of 3.4 Million Housing Units Within New Plan of Ministry of Housing and Public Works; 1981 Plan Constitutes Qualitative Leap in Ministry's Work; 2,400 Kilometers of Roads Paved in Territories Controlled by Our Valiant Forces"]

[Text] It was announced at the Ministry of Housing and Public Works yesterday that a housing program comprising 3.4 million housing units will be implemented within the framework of the ministry's new and ambitious plan to eliminate the housing crisis.

Shakir Mahmud Ahmad, the ministry undersecretary, asserted in a press conference held yesterday and attended by representatives of the Western and international wire services, the Iraqi News Agency and foreign, Arab and local papers and magazines that the new 1981 plan is tantamount to a qualititive leap in the ministry's work because the appropriations allocated for the projects amount to a twofold increase over last year's appropriations, especially for road, bridge and housing projects which represent the backbone of the country's development.

The undersecretary pointed out the effective role performed by the ministry and its various agencies to support the tasks of our valiant armed forces in their just battle against the Persians and the racists by making available all the roads and bridges required for the forces' movements. The undersecretary said that during the 8 months of the war, roads with a total length of 2,400 kms have been paved within the territories controlled by our valiant forces and that 40 million cubic meters of soil and bridge works have been covered by the effort. The undersecretary asserted that this figure is equal to all the road works existing in Iraq before the glorious 17 July revolution.

He added that the total length of the roads currently being paved by the ministry in the northern areas amounts to 11,000 kms and that the accomplishments realized during the past few months of the war prove to the entire world that the country's capabilities have not been affected by the war. We have also concluded contracts with several international firms to build various roads at a cost of 600 million dinars, thus realizing a fivefold increase over last year.

The undersecretary also noted that Iraq is the first country in the area to enter the era of rapidly built roads, since Iraq has concluded agreements for the construction of a modern road network with a total length of 1,200 kms. The agreements include 5 major contracts, each committed to the construction of 120 [sic] kms of roads. These roads will link the Iraqi borders with Syria, Jordan and Kuwait at an estimated cost of (1 billion) dinars. When completed in 2 1/2 years, these roads will cover the major cities in the central Euphrates region, in addition to a 650-km long express highway linking Kirkuk, Irbil and Mosul with the Syrian-Turkish borders. It is expected that work on this highway will begin next year. When this road is completed, Iraq will be linked with the neighboring countries.

Within the ministry's plan in the buildings and housing sphere, the undersecretary pointed out that there has been a qualitative [sic] leap in bridge building exceeding by 80 percent last year's accomplishments. The plan has also focused on modern and advanced health projects in all of the country's areas and cities so that all the ministries and institutions will have modern buildings with all the facilities. The same applies to public and cultural buildings.

The undersecretary also announced that the ministry is currently building more than 110 various industrial institutes and preparatory schools, and pointed out that the cost of these institutes alone amounts to more than 300 million dinars. This is in addition to the conclusion of new contracts for hundreds of millions of dinars to complete the final phases of the Baghdad University project in al-Jadiriyah, a new project for al-Basrah University, a university in the autonomous rule region and buildings for the new al-Rashid University in Baghdad.

He also pointed out that the ministry has also focused its efforts on completing the installations for the medical city in the next 2 years. A contract has been concluded for the completion of this project at a cost of 150 million dinars. Meanwhile, the number of projects in the ministry's plan for the current year amount to 841 projects with a total cost of 2 billion dinars.

The plan also provides for an increase of more than 100 percent in the housing projects. The ministry is also building water and sewage projects at a cost of 680 million dinars, in addition to the infrastructure projects of the Baghdad International Airport which will cost 240 million dinars and will be completed by the end of 1982. These projects are designed to meet the country's needs until the year 2000, considering that the airport will be able to accommodate 10-12 million passengers annually and will be a modern airport in terms of its structure and equipment and in terms of the services it offers the citizens.

The plan also provides for the final blueprinting phases of the Mosul International Airport which will be similar to al-Basrah Airport and for the construction of three plants to produce prefabricated buildings.

Within the national direction, Shakir Mahmud Ahmad, the ministry undersecretary, pointed out that an Iraqi engineering office has been opened in Djibouti for housing cooperation projects, in addition to the Iraqi engineering offices in San'a' [yemen] and Mauritania which carry out housing projects with the material

aid advanced by the revolutionary government to the fraternal Arab countries through the grants and loans given the brothers on soft terms. This is in addition to other projects in Jordan and Somalia and to the efforts currently underway to conclude an agreement with Morocco in this sphere.

8494
CSO: 4304/11

JOINT COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON UGANDAN VICE PRESIDENT'S VISIT

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 May 81 p 6

[Article: "Joint Iraqi-Ugandan Communique Lauds Iraq's Response to Islamic and International Initiatives To Settle Conflict With Iran"]

[Text] Uganda has lauded Iraq's response to the initiatives made by the Islamic Conference, the nonaligned countries and the United Nations to settle the conflict with Iran through negotiations guaranteeing security and stability in the area.

In a joint communique issued in Baghdad and Kampala yesterday afternoon on the 3-day visit made to Iraq by Paulo Muwanga, the vice president of Uganda [title as published], the two sides have asserted that peace and stability and normal relations of cooperation, especially among neighboring countries, require mutual respect of the firm rights of each of the two countries.

The two sides have strongly condemned the racist Zionist aggression against the Arab people and have stressed that no just and lasting peace can be realized without the full and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist forces from all the occupied Arab territories and without the full restoration of the Palestinian people's rights to their homeland and to setting up their independent state under the leadership of the PLO.

Following is the text of the communique:

At the invitation of Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf, the vice president of Iraq, Uganda Vice President Paulo Muwanga, accompanied by a high-level delegation, visited Iraq in the period from 17-19 May 1981.

Leader and President Saddam Hussein has received the Uganda Vice President who delivered to him a written message from Uganda President Milton Obote [sic]. The delegation chairman has also been received by Vice President Taha Muhyi-al-Din Ma'ruf and the two have discussed the bilateral relations and the international issues of common interest.

The Ugandan delegation chairman has also met with Taha Yasin Ramadan, the first deputy prime minister.

The two sides have noted with satisfaction the development in the two countries' relations and have underlined their resolution to expand the sphere of their cooperation.

The two sides have also reviewed the current international issues and have underlined their belief in the principles of the United Nations, of the Nonaligned Movement and of the Islamic Conference Organization and have expressed the conviction that observing these principles is essential to safeguarding world peace and security and the welfare of peoples.

Regarding the situation in the Arab area, the two sides have strongly condemned the racist Zionist aggression against the Arab people and have asserted that no just and lasting peace can be realized without the full and unconditional withdrawal of the Zionist forces from all the occupied Arab territories and without the restoration of the Palestinian people's full rights to their homeland and to setting up the independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative.

The two sides have also condemned the ceaseless Zionist aggression against southern Lebanon--an aggression constituting a part of the imperialist maneuvers seeking to liquidate the Palestinian revolution and forming a violation against Lebanon's sovereignty, the safety of its territories and its territorial integrity.

The Iraqi side has familiarized the Ugandan side with the situation on the eastern borders and with the regrettable developments leading to this situation. The two sides have asserted that peace, stability and relations of normal cooperation, especially between neighboring countries, require mutual observation of the firm rights of each of the two countries.

The Ugandan side has lauded Iraq's response to the initiatives taken by the Islamic Conference, the nonaligned countries and the United Nations to settle the conflict through negotiations guaranteeing security and stability in the area.

The Ugandan side has familiarized the Iraqi side with the current hardships experienced by Uganda. The Iraqi side has lauded the Ugandan Government's efforts to rebuild and rehabilitate the country.

The two sides have expressed their concern over the tension prevailing in many parts of the world. They have especially condemned the apartheid regime in South Africa for its flagrant human rights violations and for its occupation of Namibia without any consideration for the world public opinion. The two sides have underlined the determination of their governments to work hand-in-hand with the international organizations to eliminate all forms of racism and to liberate all illegally occupied territories.

The two sides have stressed the need to strengthen the Afro-Arab cooperation, underlining the historical ties binding the Arab and African peoples.

The vice president of Uganda has expressed his profound appreciation for the warm welcome and for the hospitality accorded him and his delegation during their stay in the Republic of Iraq.

Baghdad, 19 May 1981.

Taha Muhy-al-Din Ma'ruf
The Vice President of Iraq

Paulo Muwanga
The Vice President of Uganda

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CSO: 4304/11

KARBALA' DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DETAILED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 22 May 81 p 3

[Article: "Interview With Karbala' Governor: Implementation of Development Projects Costing 350 Million Dinars; Projects To Maintain, Expand and Develop Holy Places Have Taken Priority in Implementation"]

[Text] Since the inception of the glorious 17 July revolution, Karbala' Governorate has undergone major developments in all aspects of its life. Last year and the first half of this year a qualitative step in the rate of development project implementation has been experienced, amounting to 350 million dinars [sic], i.e., the equivalent of Iraq's general budget before 1968.

Speaking to an INA [Iraqi News Agency] mission on the occasion of the birthday of Imam 'Ali, the foster son of the prophet's house, may God's peace be upon him, 'Adnan Dawud Salman, the governor of Karbala', has said that the projects to maintain, expand and develop the holy places have, on the direct instructions of the leader and president, Saddam Hussein, taken priority because of their great and distinguished position in the hearts of the Arabs and the Muslims. His excellency the president has advanced for this year alone a grant of 5.75 million dinars to be added to the annual appropriations allocated for the projects concerning the holy places.

The governor pointed out that Al-Husayniyah rabin [shrine] has been recently covered with gold-filigreed (velvet) and that central air conditioning and precious crystal chandeliers have been installed in the two pure (rawdahs).

The walls of al-Husayni and al-'Abbasi courtyards and the floors of their two pure (rawdahs) have been covered with marble. Meanwhile, work is in progress to expand them by expropriating the houses and shops surrounding them and by building their outer walls in the Arab Islamic style.

The governor of Karbala' further added that work is proceeding actively to gild the facade of al-'Abbas tomb with gold and to build the new tomb of Habib ibn Muzahir al-Usari. Meanwhile, work will begin in a few days to rebuild and to gild with gold the two minarets of the tomb of al-'Abbas, in addition to making comprehensive expansions in all the holy tombs in the governorate.

As for the implementation of industrial projects in the governorate, 'Adnan Dawud Salman said that construction of the new Karbala' dairy plant will be completed in the next 2 months, that the plant has cost 2.25 million dinars and that it has a daily production capacity of 75 tons of various dairy products to meet the needs of the governorates of Karbala', al-Najaf, Babil, al-Qadisiyah and al-Muthanna. Construction of the liquid sugar [glucose] plant will also be completed this year.

Moreover, ceaseless and concerted efforts are being made to complete the Thermoston No 1 and Thermoston No 2 projects, al-Nawrah project, the cement plants, the stone-cutting plant, the ceramics plant, the gypsum plant and the concrete blocks plant. The canning factories have witnessed the installation of new production lines to develop this industry.

As for agriculture, the governor of Karbala' has pointed out that 41 percent of the agricultural plan for the current summer season has been implemented, that 8,774 donums, out of a total of 21,043 donums, have been cultivated with various crops and that work continues to implement the remaining part of the plan on schedule.

The governorate is also witnessing at present implementation of the biggest poultry-breeding project, in addition to 38 chicken farms, each with a capacity of 4,000 chickens, and a modern slaughterhouse with a capacity of 6,000 chickens per hour.

To facilitate cultivation and agricultural marketing operations in the governorate, an important 12-km country road linking al-Hindiyah district with al-Jadwal, al-Gharbi and al-Khayrat subdistricts was completed this year. Meanwhile, efforts continue to be exerted to complete a number of country roads with a total length of 146 kms.

In the sphere of education, 'Adnan Dawud has said that the construction of 53 elementary, junior high and high schools in the governorate has been completed, in addition to a preparatory school of agriculture in Al-Hindiyah District and a school of commerce in the city of Karbala'. Moreover, a number of boarding sections have been added to the governorate's preparatory schools of agriculture and industry.

Work is also in progress to complete the construction of 150 elementary and junior high schools and kindergartens, in addition to a number of scientific and vocational halls, boarding sections and preparatory schools of industry, agriculture and commerce.

The governor has also pointed out that all elementary school students and kindergarten children in the governorate, totaling more than 67,000 students and children divided among 218 schools and kindergartens, have been included in the school meal system.

As for the health services offered the citizens of the governorate, a large number of main and subsidiary health centers have been built in the governorate's districts and subdistricts. This is in addition to the major expansion undergone

by al-Husayni Hospital in Karbala' where a new branch for heart revival, emergencies and an artificial kidney has been opened and supplied with the latest medical equipment.

In regard to the implementation of service projects, the governor has pointed out that the governorate is currently witnessing the biggest campaign for paving roads and sidewalks, for building public parks, children's parks, modern markets and for extending drinking water and electricity networks to rural villages and to new residential quarters. Meanwhile, a number of roads with a total of 295 kms are under construction, including the pilgrimage road, the strategic service road, the second lane of the Karbala'-al-Najaf road and the access to the Karbala'-Babil road.

As for providing the citizens with proper housing, the governor said that efforts are intensifying noticeably to complete the 1st phase of the biggest prefabricated housing project in the city of Karbala'--a project providing for 710 housing units. This is in addition to more than 1,000 housing units distributed over the governorate's districts and subdistricts. Meanwhile, more than 3,000 housing plots have been distributed to citizens with limited income in the various parts of the governorate.

Concluding his statements, 'Adnan Dawud Salman said that the holy Karbala' Governorate, with its various social segments that have found in the 17 July revolution and in its leading party, the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, the true representative of the governorate's hopes and aspirations for free and honorable life--this governorate pledges to the party and revolution command, led by leader and president, Saddam Hussein, to remain loyal to the noble principles and values in which the great party and the gigantic revolution believe, to make greater sacrifices and to uphold the country's dignity and honor.

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WESTERN PRESS TREATMENT OF WAR DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 16 May 81 pp 3, 11

[Article by Hamid Ja'id: "Regarding Western Media's Position Toward Our Just War Against Racist Persian Enemy"]

[Text] In following the press, radio and television reports circulated about the war and its results and about the facts this war has produced on the international and regional arenas we do not find the objective reality insofar as transmission of the real daily events or of the causes and continuation of the war are concerned. There is an information blackout, there is a distortion of the facts and there is disregard for the events and for what they generate.

The conventional question raised here is: Why this position and in whose interest is it taken? The answer is, undoubtedly, completely evident. The world, despite its vastness and despite the spread of varied information media in it, is still controlled by the Western information monopoly. The report circulated is also still controlled by a small number of wire services despite the presence of more than 100 national news agencies spread in all parts of the world. Even though the source of more than 75 percent of the news reports circulated is the Third World, the four wire services, known as the "big four," [control the transmission of these news reports]. These wire services are embodied in the ASSOCIATED PRESS which controls the transmission of 17 million words daily and the UNITED PRESS which controls the transmission of 14 million words daily--both are U.S. founded and owned--in the British founded and owned REUTER which controls the transmission of no less than 2.5 million words daily and in the AFP which controls the transmission of 3 million words daily. This means that the four wire services control the transmission of nearly 36 million words daily. This figure is enough to cover or fill 13,320 newspaper pages and nearly 53,280 magazine pages. It also covers 250 days of transmission on the air arond the clock.

Out of such stunning figures on the volume of the news reports circulated and transmitted by the four wire services and by other national news agencies, the share of the Third World and its problems is at times negligible. At best, the number of the news reports circulated about this world doesn't exceed the number of a man's fingers. This is not surprising, especially when we learn that two-thirds of the news reports produced by the world pass directly through New York and that the reports are no longer free of distortion but rather they are tarnished with views, opinions and data hostile to the peoples and future

aspirations of this [Third] World and are subjected to inflammatory propaganda formulas conflicting with the existing reality, with the nature of the struggle for survival and with the evident facts--formulas utilized under the shadow of unequal relations between an exploiting world and an exploited world, whether in the sphere of economy, of politics or of the exchange of information, especially in the sphere of the circulation of news reports. These reports have not swerved from the framework of distorting the facts, corrupting the tastes, disseminating incentives for deviation from the fundamental national values and foiling the development plans and the cultural accomplishments, as well as the values bolstered by struggle actions in the sphere of the social and economic building and development in the developing countries that seek to rise with their citizens to the level of the age.

This is why the answer regarding the information blockade set up by the Western information monopolies around our just war with Iran and regarding the blackout as to the causes and continuation of the war is obvious. The blackout concerning the war is not an exception. It is, from a Western viewpoint, the rule. This blackout is a constant condition insofar as the major problems of development and progress in the Third World countries are concerned.

One observation may suffice to prove the soundness of our assumption. This observation is that a war has been going on for 9 successive months in the most important, strategic and hottest part of the world where the two superpowers are facing each other, yet this war gets little attention from the media and has failed to occupy in the circulated reports of the wire services the position that it merits or a position compatible with its dimensions, significance and impact on the level of the international struggle.

What the Western information monopolies want to tell us is neither new nor unknown to us nor unexpected by us. What they want to tell us has been obvious through their constant behavior which is built on withholding the facts and on establishing a blackout around whatever is accomplished or is about to be accomplished intellectually, actually or in terms of political, economic or military information and action. Even when compelled to say something, these monopolies express it from a purely Western viewpoint because the Western media's theoreticians and monopolists do not acknowledge the rights or viewpoints of the others. They fail to acknowledge the actions and accomplishments of the others independent of the West's action and accomplishment and of its industrial and war machine. The objective information logic dictates fundamentally that accomplishments be evaluated on the basis of whatever new they add to humanity and that events be evaluated and dealt with on the basis of their impact on mankind's future and on the accomplishments of the age. It is true that our just war is a regional war but it has a direct impact on the interests of mankind by virtue of its distinguished position as a site of confrontation between the East and the West, as one of the richest oil stores and oilfields, as [the site of] intricate international relations, as an Arab and Mideastern area and as the center of the Nonalignment Movement and of an effective pan-Arab movement for sovereignty and national rights. An area like this in which fires have been raging for 9 months doesn't merit enough interest in the sphere of information! Yet, they are ignoring the war. But regardless of how hard they try to ignore

the war or the causes of its continuation, they will be forced ultimately to evaluate the facts of the war, at least at the military level. Consequently, they will be compelled to evaluate the action and the accomplishment realized in this regard and the impact of this action and accomplishment on the future colonialist plans designed to undermine our people's and nation's freedom and independence.

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BRIEFS

NEXT YEAR'S INVESTMENT PLAN--Dr Taha Ibrahim al-'Abdallah, the minister of planning, yesterday morning headed a symposium of the ministry's central planning agencies to discuss preparation of next year's investment plan. The minister pointed out at the symposium that next year's plan will derive its strategy from the party's and revolution's general strategy in the sphere of national development--a strategy which seeks to realize economic, social and educational welfare and to increase the citizen's income. The minister asserted that the goals of the development plan will not be affected despite the conditions of the just war being waged by our struggling country under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, the nation's knight, against the racist Persian enemy. Dr Sabri Zayir, the chairman of the ministry's Economic Planning Agency, reviewed the indicators for preparing the plan and the citizen's role in socialist building and in implementing the development programs. He also reviewed the socialist sector's role in development and in the process of distributing incomes in a manner leading to social welfare, to building the national economy, to expanding and developing the production capacities, to an increased utilization of the available capacity and to focusing on the food, building and construction industries. The indicators have underlined the pan-Arab dimensions in the Arab economic integration and in the projects implemented by Iraq in a number of fraternal Arab countries. The Central Followup Report on the 1980 development plan's projects and the proposals to tackle the obstacles that may lead to delaying the implementation of some of the development plan's projects were then reviewed. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 22 May 81 p 3] 8494

LABOR AGREEMENT WITH NICARAGUA--The workers of Iraq and Nicaragua have stressed their common wish to bolster the relations existing among them through fraternal cooperation and through the exchange of labor and struggle experiences between their organization in Iraq under the leadership of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party and in Nicaragua under the leadership of the Sandanist Popular [sic] Liberation Front in order to entrench their common struggle against imperialism, Zionism, reaction and racism. This is stated in the joint cooperation protocol concluded between the Iraqi General Federation of Labor Unions and the Central Council of the Nicaraguan Labor Unions. The protocol calls for the exchange of pamphlets, cultural studies and delegations between the two organizations for the purpose of familiarization with the accomplishments realized in each of the two countries. The two sides have also agreed to coordinate their work and to program their activities within the framework of the International Federation of Labor Unions in a manner compatible with their cooperation, their common struggle and their similar positions toward the various labor issues. This coordination will also apply to the work of the member [labor] organizations in the two countries. The protocol also calls for strengthening the structure and the procession of struggle of the International Federation so that it may serve workers all over the world and may support and aid the peoples struggling for liberation and independence. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 May 81 p 6] 8494

CSO: 4304/11

COMMENTS ON FRENCH MIDEAST POLICY

GF261750 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL'AMM in Arabic 25 Jun 81 pp 1, 23

[Editorial: "Before France Slips Far Away..."]

[Excerpts] Last month's French elections that led to the "coup" that brought the socialists to power has created an imbalance in Arab-French relations--relations that had existed since the time of General De Gaulle.

Now that the socialists have achieved absolute control as a result of the parliamentary elections, it is clear that this imbalance is increasing and that socialist Paris intends to follow its president's pro-Israel inclinations. The socialists exploited the French Communist Party's strong desire to join the government in order to pull it far from its previously declared policy of support for the Arab and Palestinian stand.

It could be that our relations with the United States and our failure to confront it have encouraged or are now encouraging the new French rulers not to pay much attention to Arab opinion and not to fear its consequences;

The French know that the Arabs exerted great effort in both the oil and investment fields to prevent the communists in either France or Italy from gaining power. After assuming power, they opened their arms to Israel and adopted measures in its support. An example of this is France's stand following the Israeli raid against Iraq and its submissive reaction despite the death of a French citizen in this raid. Another example is Mitterrand's initiative to free French companies from abiding by the Arab boycott of Israel and the companies that deal with it. In addition to this are the continuing statements that guaranteeing Israel's security must be the basis of resolving the Middle East crisis and that the Palestinians have a right to a homeland. These are vague words that could be similar to President Carter's ideas on a Palestinian "home."

What is important is that we do not adopt an idle stand on this French change, and the faster (?we act) the better. We must not wait too long before making it clear to Mitterrand's France that the whole matter is not so simple. If we are unable or unwilling to impose a form of government or policies on the French, then we certainly can impose on ourselves the position we must adopt toward a state that avoids a balanced position in order to support Israel against us.

If we have a certain interest in maintaining the French position on the side of reason, balance and French interests themselves, it is necessary that we make Paris realize the heavy price it must pay in return for shifting toward our Israeli enemy.

CSO: 4304/38

RECENT EXPLOSIONS, RELATIONS WITH IRAQ DISCUSSED

GF011924 Kuwait AS-SIYASAH in Arabic 1 Jul 81 p 1

[Editorial by editor in chief Ahmad al-Jarallah: "What the People Have Built Cannot Be Easily Undermined"]

[Excerpts] Many elements, parties and quarters are known to be looking for a gap to drive a wedge in relations between Iraq and Kuwait, and indeed, between Iraq and all the Gulf countries. Perhaps these elements were very happy when they heard that last Thursday's childish acts of sabotage took place with Iraqi sympathy--whether with the Iraqi president's knowledge or with the knowledge of others.

In the course of the past 5 years Iraq has succeeded in removing the cautious attitudes and apprehensions that existed toward Baghdad. Iraq had to exert intensive efforts and be very patient to mollify feelings and clear the air. The Iraqi-Iranian war showed that the ties between Iraq and the countries of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula are too strong to be shaken by transient events or whispers by elements that do not wish to see the region's interests bound together and its people prepared for the inevitable gathering.

Last Thursday's incidents have caused many--who whenever Iraq is mentioned agree to everything that is being said but qualify their agreement with the word "if" that is dipped into a big pot of doubts and suspicion--to rub their hands in glee.

The Kuwaiti Government has done well to send the Interior Ministry under secretary to Baghdad. And Saddam Husayn did well when he declared that Kuwait's security is indivisible from Iraq's security. The most serious act that could harm relations is to shock the people's sensibilities regarding security and stability.

Kuwait, which has matured and is experienced in the affairs and problems of state, will not be frightened by acts of this kind, particularly when the issue is the enforcement of law and order and the establishment of security and stability.

Many elements believed that last Thursday's incident might have been the gap through which it would have been easy to sever those relations established by the people of the area before they were established by its rulers. Concern

for these relations was demonstrated by the visit of the Kuwaiti Interior Ministry under secretary to Baghdad on one hand, and by the Iraqi leader's affirmation that Iraq has no aims against Kuwait's security and stability, on the other.

This is certainly what the people want and is compatible with their extreme sensitivity toward anything that undermines security in a manner advantageous to the powers looking at this area with hostility and envy.

One important thing should be realized: Kuwait today is different from what it was 20 or 30 years ago. Events and the facing of regional and world problems have made it more resilient. It is no longer frightened by any incident that is intended to be an early warning--that is, if such calculations are relevant to those who planned the sabotage and who, as the Iraqi president has affirmed, have no connections with Baghdad whatsoever.

CSO: 4304/38

BRIEFS

1981 STATE BUDGET--Kuwait, 1 Jul (KUNA)--The Kuwaiti Government today began to implement the biggest state budget in the country's history: almost $11 billion [currency and figure as received]. The budget, approved last night by the Kuwaiti National Assembly, estimates total revenue at 5,279 billion dinars--equivalent to $19,268 billion--of which oil revenue amounts to 5,097 dinars--equivalent to $18,604 billion. Thus, revenue from oil has increased by 13 percent compared with last year, despite the fact Kuwait has cut its production from 1.5 million barrels a day to 1.25 million, as from the beginning of last April. Expenditure under the budget has been estimated at 3,008 billion dinars, equivalent to $10,979 billion--an increase of 3.6 percent compared with last year's budget, which in itself was a record in Kuwait's history. The government decided to transfer 2.196 billion dinars, equivalent to $8.015 billion, to their reserves. Of this, 696 million dinars--equivalent to $2.54 billion--will go to the general state reserves and the rest for the reserves of future Kuwaiti generations. [Text] [LD011026 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0713 GMT 1 Jul 81]

EXPLOSIONS REPORTED--In its 28 June issue, the Lebanese newspaper ASH-SHARQ, citing informed Arab sources, reported that an organization called "The Revolutionary Retribution Organization" [Munazzamat al'Iqab ath-Thawri] was responsible for the five explosions that took place in various parts of Kuwait last Thursday. These sources said that [passage indistinct] warned Kuwaiti officials that it will continue to carry out such actions in Kuwait and in other Gulf countries if these countries continue to throw themselves in the lap of the United States. [Text] [GF011908 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Islamic Revolution in Arabic 1730 GMT 1 Jul 81]

CSO: 4304/38

STATEMENT BY AGRICULTURE MINISTER ABDELLATIF GHISSASSI

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 25 May 81 pp 1, 4

[Article: "Help For Farmers Raising Crops and Farmers Raising Livestock Who Have Been Affected By the Adverse Climatic Conditions--Harvest Is Between 25 and 29 Million Quintals of Grain; Government Action Has Made It Possible to Limit the Drought's Consequences"]

[Text] Rabat, May (MAP[MAGHREB-ARAB PRESS AGENCY])--Abdellatif Ghissassi, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, held a press conference at his ministry's offices during which he gave specific information about the agricultural situation.

After a preliminary statement, Ghissassi responded to questions from representatives of the national press. The questions dealt with preparation for the next agricultural season, price policy and improving production, agricultural credit facilities and the training of cadres.

On this occasion the minister of agriculture and agrarian reform stressed that His Majesty the King's Government attentively follows the changing situation in the agricultural sector and engages in great efforts to improve production and achieve economic and social development in the country.

Here is the text of Ghissassi's statement:

"I am pleased to be explaining to you today the conditions which have characterized the current agricultural season, the estimated production results with regard to the principal agricultural crops, and the measures which have been taken so that the marketing of crops can be carried out in optimum conditions.

First of all I would like to mention that the Council of Ministers--which was chaired yesterday morning by His Majesty the King, Hassan II, may God grant him glory--examined this subject and made effective decisions regarding in particular grain prices, the details of which I will give subsequently.

The current agricultural season was marked by two important positive events whose consequences will make themselves felt in the future, in the agricultural sector in particular and in the national economy in general.

The first of these events, the National Days of Agricultural Economy, was held in Marrakesh at the end of February on the invitation of His Majesty the King who very much wanted to draw the attention of all of his subjects to the fact that the destiny of our country and of future generations depends on the agrarian question. Those National Days gave all of the kingdom's active forces the chance to reflect on all aspects of this issue and made it possible for them to start up determined stimulatory activity capable of facing up to the challenge confronting the country in the food area.

We hope that the members of the National Agriculture Commission, which was an upshot of the Marrakesh conference and is currently carrying on its work, succeed in developing a basis for work which will gain unanimous approval from the entire group of participants with a view to promoting rural development.

The second important event which marked this season was the presentation to Parliament of the draft 5-year plan by the government of His Majesty the King, Hassan II. The draft plan gives an obvious priority to agriculture which is shown particularly by the size of the credits allocated for this sector.

An Obvious Priority to Agricultural Sector

With regard to the general directions and programs of the draft 5-year plan, the lessons drawn from the previous plan made possible an effort, on the one hand, to increase the resources to be allocated to the agricultural sector generally. On the other hand, it made possible an effort to reconsider the distributional breakdown of investments and human and material resources within the agricultural sector, so as to insure a balance between rain-fed agricultural zones and irrigated perimeters, as well as among the different activities connected with crop production, livestock raising, and the forestry division according to the contributions made by these different sectors of production towards agricultural value added.

The Adverse Consequences of the Drought

In the area of the methodological approach to intervention, the action program of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform will include carrying out the implementation of integrated development projects and doing a national food strategy study.

Ladies and gentlemen,

You are well aware that the current season has experienced something with adverse consequences for Moroccan agriculture, namely the drought.

During my last discussion with you I already had occasion to bring to your awareness the measures which have been taken by the government and are likely to mitigate the effects of the drought, both on the national level and on the level of the distressed farmers.

Today I would like to be more specific about the climatic conditions which have characterized this season, the measures of a technical and organizational nature which have been taken to accomplish the different tasks, this season's results, and the financial aspects of production and marketing, before finally dealing with price policy.

The Physical Conditions of the Current Season

Grain production is directly linked to conditions in nature regarding both rainfall, its amount and distribution, and land use.

Rainfall:

The 1980-1981 season was characterized by the following conditions:

- Low rainfall during the months of September and October (32 mm);

- Practically universal drought, apart from the East, which prevailed from mid-November to the beginning of the second week of January;

- Low rainfall from 9 January to 18 February 1981, which affected the whole country but to varying degrees depending on the zone in question (15 to 42 mm); and

- Low levels of precipitation from 20 February to 10 March which did not go above 5 mm.

This season's rainfall through the end of March 1981 compared to the average rainfall of the last 4 years is given in the following listing:

- Unfavorable Rain-fed Agriculture Land in the South
  Current season: 133
  Average of the last four seasons: 227
  Deficit or surplus: -41 percent

- Unfavorable Rain-fed Agriculture Land in the East
  Current season: 213
  Average of the last four seasons: 181
  Deficit or surplus: +18 percent

- Settat Transition Zone
  Current season: 131
  Average of the last four seasons: nothing to report
  Deficit or surplus: -66 percent [sic]

- Favorable Rain-fed Agriculture Land
  Current season: 220
  Average of the last four seasons: 451
  Deficit or surplus: -51 percent

This listing brings out the fact that the hardest hit zones are the unfavorable rain-fed agriculture land in the south (-41 percent) and the Settat transition zone (-66 percent).

On the other hand, the period from the beginning of April to 13 May saw additional precipitation which had a beneficial effect particularly for the East and the favorable rain-fed agriculture land (including Fez and Meknes):

- Unfavorable Rain-fed Agriculture Land in the South
  1980-1981 season: 151
  Average of the last four seasons: 255
  Deficit or surplus: -41 percent
  Additional precipitation since 25 March: +18 mm

- Unfavorable Rain-fed Agriculture Land in the East
  1980-1981 season: 281
  Average of the last four seasons: 210
  Deficit or surplus: +34 percent
  Additional precipitation since 25 March: +68 mm

- Chaoui
  1980-1981 season: 172
  Average of the last four seasons: 428
  Deficit or surplus: -60 percent
  Additional precipitation since 25 March: +41 mm

- Favorable Rain-fed Agriculture Land
  1980-1981 season: 338
  Average of the last four seasons: 524
  Deficit or surplus: -36 percent
  Additional precipitation since 25 March: +117 mm

These additional amounts of rainfall are certainly going to improve conditions for pasturage and crops.

Grain-growing Area and Breakdown by Type

The amount of land sown with grain reached 4,270,000 hectares this season and is divided up as follows:

- Barley: 2,237,000 hectares, or 52.5 percent
- Durum wheat: 1,193,000 hectares, or 28 percent
- Soft wheat: 481,000 hectares, or 11 percent
- Corn: 361,000 hectares, or 8.5 percent

Total: 4,272,000 hectares

The Agricultural Season's Organization

A comparison of the above data with those pertaining to the 1979-1980 season shows that the amount of land allocated for the four principal cereal grains remained at the same level as the previous season.

The current agricultural season was marked by meticulous preparation in which all government departments concerned with the agriculture sector participated.

This preparation was aimed at:

- Insuring favorable conditions for getting the season going and for providing farmers with production inputs in sufficient quantity, at reasonable prices, and in timely fashion; and

- Taking best advantage of agricultural potential by working the soil early and sowing in timely fashion.

These goals were met thanks to the collaboration of elected authorities who played a part in prodding along the season's unfolding activities and of the provincial agricultural development committees, chaired by the governors, which kept track of completing those operations at the regional level.

At the national level, a ministerial commission periodically took care to analyze the information concerning the season's progression and to organize the distribution of production inputs while trying, with the participation of representatives from the occupational groups concerned, to resolve problems which could not be solved at the local or provincial levels.

1) Fertilizer

The plan for supplying the country with fertilizer established by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform reckoned on an availability of 705,000 tons, which is 40 percent greater than the previous season's consumption, in order to avoid any shortage of fertilizer. This ambitious non-mandatory plan was aimed at breaking out of the pace of changing fertilizer consumption set during the 1975-1979 period, which did not increase more than 6 percent.

At the same time, the fertilizer sector benefited from price stabilization and simplification of the procedure for granting aid for fertilizer usage.

On 15 May 1981 actual fertilizer stocks reached 665,000 tons, which is 96 percent of the amount set by the program, while sales reached 483,000 tons, remaining at the same level where they were at the same point during the previous year.

However, basic fertilizer recorded an 8 percent increase, while purchases of spreading devices experienced a drop of 30 percent because of the drought which characterized this season.

A goal of the aforementioned activities undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform was to correct a situation of low fertilizer usage, given the role that that input has in improving productivity and consequently increasing production.

2) Seeds

The measures taken concerning seeds aimed to:

- Improve availability of seed varieties in comparison with last year;

- Lower the prices of choice seed varieties by reducing the disparity between their prices and those of ordinary seeds;

- Simplify the procedure for granting subsidies by making their level uniform and extending them to all farmers;

- Let the farmers get choice seeds back at subsidy prices, the amount of the subsidy being paid directly to SONACOS [National Company for the Marketing of Seeds];

- Revise the subsidy levels for fodder crop seeds for both individual producers and cooperatives; and

- Extend the distribution network for choice seed varieties, which network went from 200 sales outlets in 1979-1980 to 260 in 1980-1981.

These measures made it possible to raise the utilization level of choice seed varieties, as is shown by the following:

A) Choice Seed Varieties of Cereal Grains

Seed availability in this area reached 717,000 quintals as against 520,000 quintals for the previous season, which is an increase of 38 percent.

Overall sales hit 541,000 quintals, 502,000 slated for growing regular grain crops and 39,000 for seed crops.

Thus, the measures taken for this season bore fruit since there was an 80 percent increase in the number of seeds allowed back to farmers for growing regular crops as compared with last year.

This increase in seed distributions is due in part to the increase recorded for sales of soft wheat seeds which were twice the number of those distributed the previous season.

B) Choice Seed Varieties of Legumes

There were 1,000 quintals available in this seed category.

This amount of course remains low; although these seeds make it possible to increase yields by 25 percent, they are nonetheless not sought after by farmers.

C) Fodder Crop Seeds

The amounts of fodder crop seeds made available to farmers got up to 15,000 quintals, 8,500 of them certified.

D) Potato Seeds

- For the early harvest sector: 8,000 tons of seeds were imported, 1,400 for growing seed potatoes. These amounts when added to (local) grenadine seed availability, which was up to 8,000 tons, made it possible to satisfy producer demand.

- For the regular harvest sector: seed availability reached 12,550 tons, about 10,000 tons of which were sold commercially and the rest stored in refrigerated facilities.

We would point out that national potato seed production has progressed as follows:

- 1977-1978: 180 tons
- 1978-1979: 757 tons
- 1979-1980: 2,000 tons
- 1980-1981: 12,000 tons

E) Choice Beet Seeds

The beet production program for the current season was carried out on the basis of what amounted to 10,480 quintals of imported seeds. We would point out that 140 hectares have been laid out for beet seed crop cultivation.

F) Oil-producing Plant Seeds

- Sunflower seed availability for Moroccan cultivation amounts to 6,000 quintals and will make a 40,000-hectare program possible.

- Cotton seed availability for Moroccan cultivation was 8,800 quintals while needs only amounted to 7,600 quintals.

- Needs for soybean seeds will be met by importing 400 quintals.

Thus we can say that thanks to the programs which have been carried out we have been able to meet all of our seed needs for the current season.

3) Agricultural Equipment and Fuel

In the area of agricultural equipment, the main provisions have consisted of:

- Reducing tractor prices as of the beginning of 1981 by exempting them from TPS [expansion unknown];

- Granting farmers a subsidy for tractor acquisition at a level of 30 percent of price for cooperatives and 10 percent for individuals.

In addition to these two measures, provision is made for:

- Acquisition of more than 200 tractors per year starting in 1981 by the technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The necessary credits for this undertaking have been provided for in the appropriations bill.

Regarding fuel, the most important decision made during this season was for the diesel price increase not to apply to diesel used for agricultural purposes.

The procedure relating to this decision's implementation is already in place and is presently in the process of being jointly administered by offices of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Finance.

4) Agricultural Credit

The current season was marked by a revision of the system of loans in order to adapt it to what was required for improving agricultural production.

This revision was evidenced in increases in financing limits:

- Seed production in cereal grains: 20 percent
- Regular cereal grain crops: 15-20 percent
- Legume production: 20-30 percent
- Fodder crop production: 10-20 percent
- Industrial market-gardening and oil-producing plant crops: 10 percent
- Local market-gardening: 10 percent
- Upkeep of olive trees, vineyards, and other plantation agriculture: 30 percent
- Acquisition of draft animals: 17 percent

- An increase of 20 percent in authorization ceilings for Regional Agricultural Credit Banks—ceilings went from 150,000 dirhams to 180,000 dirhams for certain banks and from 200,000 dirhams to 240,000 dirhams for others

- Endowment of Regional Agricultural Credit Banks with resources for financing agrarian reform cooperatives when urgent cases are involved or when thorough study is not needed

- A 20 percent increase in the financing levels of Local Agricultural Credit Banks

These provisions have made possible a 5 percent growth in the level of credits granted by the National Agricultural Credit Bank: those credits went from 750 million between September 1979 and April 1980 to 785 million during the same period of the current season.

This increase is the result of an increase in short-term credits which are meant to finance work relating to the growing season. These short-term credits went from 431,000,000 to 475,000,000, which is up 10 percent, while a drop of 2.5 percent in medium-term credits was recorded since they went from 319 million to 311 million dirhams.

Production Estimates

It should be emphasized that production estimates are based on methodology set out long ago by the State Secretariat for Planning and Regional Development and by FAO and is part of the framework of the system of statistical surveys undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. This method calls for choosing a sample, the results from which are subsequently extrapolated to the total land area in order to estimate the level of production.

To this end a study of the agricultural situation was done during the months of March and April. It focused on 969 douars [village-size administrative units] and involved 50,000 farmers.

This process allowed the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform to collect initial harvest estimates. Though the methods used were not rigorous and were subject to certain uncertainties which are characteristic of any statistical survey, they made it possible to make approximate estimates of the volume of production, while results are being awaited from the agricultural survey's second stage which will be available in September after the harvests.

This survey's initial stage is primarily aimed at estimating the areas sown with the major cereal crops--they have grown to 4,272,000 hectares this year (as I have already had occasion to point out).

Thus, the production forecast for the 4 principal cereal crops is 21,000,000 quintals according to the statistical survey indicated above, which comes up with:

- A sown area of 4,274,000 hectares; and
- An average yield of 5 hectares [as published; "quintals per hectare"?]

This season's level of production is only about 50 percent of last season's, a marked decline. Moreover, this season's level constitutes the lowest level of production recorded in the last 20 years except for the 1965-1966 season (14,700,000 quintals). This drop is attributable to the decrease in yields (there has been no decrease in land areas).

However, the amount of precipitation recorded after the end of the statistical survey, particularly in eastern Morocco and the zones favoring rain-fed agriculture, will allow for improvement in yields in all categories of cereal grains and their production might reach between 25,000,000 and 29,000,000 quintals.

Early Harvest Fruits and Vegetables, and Citrus Fruits

During this season production of early harvest fruits and vegetables hit 300,000 tons, including 230,000 tons of tomatoes, 52,000 tons of potatoes, and 18,000 tons of various vegetables.

Exports amounted to 125,000 tons compared to the previous season's 150,000 tons, which was a drop of 17 percent.

This drop in exports resulted from the effects of the frost on tomatoes and the effects of the drought and the lack of water for irrigation on potatoes. It was also caused by the increase in domestic demand for these items of produce along with remunerative prices.

In spite of the drop in the quantities of early harvest fruits and vegetables exported, the value of those exports reached the same level as it did last year thanks to improvements in world prices.

It is estimated that the production of citrus fruits this season will reach 972,000 tons as against 1,037,000 tons last season, which is a 7 percent drop.

Exports will probably amount to 680,000 tons compared with 768,000 tons last season, which is an 11.5 percent decline.

In spite of this drop in the amounts exported, receipts from exports will reach 160 billion centimes, which is the same level as last year's receipts.

Sugar Crops

Regarding sugar crops, I would like to emphasize that sugarbeet production will reach 2 million tons this season instead of last season's 2.2 million tons.

On the other hand, sugarcane production has experienced a marked rise during this season, reaching 510,000 tons compared to 376,000 tons last season, which shows an advance of 26 percent.

These quantities will make it possible to carry out a sizable amount of sugar production which should, in spite of this season's bad climatic conditions, reach 320,000 tons compared with 335,000 tons last season.

Livestock Output

The livestock sector was affected this season by the drought situation experienced by our country, which had disastrous repercussions on cattlemen and sheep-raisers, as well as by the increase in costs experienced by agriculture in general, which was itself similarly affected.

In spite of this situation, livestock output made advances as the following indicators show:

Red Meat

Red meat and variety meat output went from 215,000 tons in 1979 to 230,000 tons in 1980. Although this level of increase, which was estimated at 7 percent, could be considered a normal one, taking into account changes in this sector and efforts exerted to expand it, the recorded rise this season is not normal since it was caused by the increase in the supply of livestock butchered because of the drought.

This abnormal increase is evidenced particularly by the increase of amounts of butchered lamb and mutton, an increase estimated at 41 percent over the previous year. This had direct repercussions on the selling prices of these meat products which declined from 18 to 15 dirhams in comparison with April 1980.

Beef experienced a similar situation though it was less pronounced since the price went from 14.5 dirhams to 13 dirhams.

Poultry Meat

Poultry meat output was recorded at 104,000 tons in 1980 as against 100,000 tons in 1979, which is an increase of only 4 percent compared to an increase of 10 percent in 1979. This decline is the result of the substantial increases in costs of poultry production, particularly in feed prices, and all the more because the increased supply of red meat led to a drop in demand for poultry meat.

For these reasons poultry meat output should decline 25 percent in comparison with the same period last year.

Eggs

Egg production reached the 615 million mark in 1980 as against 6 million in 1979, which is an increase of 2.5 percent.

Milk

Milk production went up to 780 million liters in 1980 compared to 730 million liters in 1979, thus recording a 7 percent increase. On the other hand, processed milk went up 1.7 percent.

This slowdown in the production expansion of processed milk stems from problems which certain operations are having on the marketing level.

Production Costs for Cereal Grains

The costs of certain production inputs have risen appreciably during the current season.

Thus:

- The price of diesel fuel has increased by 50 percent, from 1.40 dirhams to 2.40 dirhams a liter.

- The agricultural guaranteed minimum wage has been raised by 20 percent as of May 1981 from 10.15 dirhams to 12.18 dirhams per day.

These two increases have led to a rise in grain production costs. With respect to farming in which the land is worked with machinery, the effects of the diesel price increase range between 6.5 dirhams a quintal for corn to 11 dirhams a quintal for durum wheat. As for the effects caused by the increase as of May 1981 in the agricultural guaranteed minimum wage, they vary between 4 dirhams a quintal for corn, cultivation being mechanized, and 8 dirhams a quintal for barley, the cultivation of which is carried out with traditional methods.

These expense increases have required revision of the prices paid to grain producers in order to allow the latter to receive income likely to cover actual farming costs and to take out enough profit to meet their needs.

The Council of Ministers, regally presided over by His Majesty the King--may God grant him glory--met (Thursday 21 May) and set new grain prices as follows: (in dirhams per quintal)

Durum wheat and soft wheat:
New price is 135
Old price was 125
Barley and corn:
New price is 96
Old price was 92

Financing for Marketing

It was decided to earmark overall budgetary limitations of 1.2 billion dirhams for financing purchases by SCAM [expansion unknown], CMA [expansion unknown], SONACOS (which benefits from a government guarantee in its dealings with banking institutions), and the SCAM Association.

Gentlemen,

From this account it emerges that the agricultural sector has been affected by the adverse climatic conditions which have prevailed during this growing season. Since grain production and livestock were the hardest hit by the drought, it was decided to develop a specific program for these two sectors with a view to helping crop-raising and livestock-raising farmers to withstand the adverse effects of this situation and to get prepared to start the next season in better circumstances.

Two months ago I already had the occasion to lay out the broad outlines of this program for you.

With regard to other areas of agricultural activity: in spite of their vulnerability to adverse climatic conditions, the drop in production was less than forecast.

His Majesty the King's Government is carefully following developments in the agricultural sector and is currently turning its attention to preparation for the next season, hoping that it will have better climatic conditions so that efforts undertaken in this sector will be profitable and agricultural development will be promoted, which development is constantly urged on us by His Majesty the King, Hassan II, may God grant him glory."

9631
CSO: 4800/80

BRIEFS

TERRORIST'S MOVEMENTS NOTED--According to some [unnamed] Syrian political refugees, the terrorist Ramirez Sanchez, aka Carlos, is said to have been in recent contact with certain hardline Syrian secret services. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 29 Jun 81 p 31]

CSO: 4319/7

PAPER URGES IRANIAN NATION TO UNITE

GF011338 Ash-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 30 Jun 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Iran's Ordeal and the Need for Unity"]

[Excerpts] What is now happening in Iran is worrisome. We are not only worried about a national revolution that shook the oppression of the greatest superpower, but also about the fact that the weakening of the national Iranian revolution may encourage the imperialists to once again do what they please in the entire Gulf region.

In view of our Islamic affiliation, our good neighborly relations and our common desire for security and stability, we sincerely state that Iran could have protected its march against unrest and could have prevented the shedding of blood, which recently flowed both in the prisons as a result of numerous executions and in the streets as a result of clashes and blood fighting, however great the necessity for an anti-imperialist march to consolidate the national unity begun by the revolution.

Despite what happened, and the horrifying number of people who have been killed either by quick executions or by terrible explosions, revolutionary Iran can heal its wounds and compensate for its losses if, through real conviction, a single dominating trend could emerge and if dialogue between the authorities in power and the national opposition could be resumed.

The superpowers, whether Eastern or Western, will undoubtedly take advantage of the current Iranian crisis of national unity to achieve their own goals, threatening not only Iran but all of its neighbors in the Gulf region as well. It is hoped that this threat from the superpowers will urge the Iranians, who are faithful to their revolution, to put aside their hatred and join ranks to confront the superpowers waiting for the time of intervention.

CSO: 4304/38

BRIEFS

AMBASSADORS' APPOINTMENTS--Abu Shabi, 29 Jun (GNA)--The UAE has decided to open an embassy in Rome next month. The Italian Government has agreed to the nomination of Nasir al-'Abudi as UAE Ambassador to Italy. Al-'Abudi recently visited Rome to discuss necessary preparations for the opening of the embassy. The UAE Government also welcomed the nomination of Muhammad Mansur al-Hajiri as Qatar's ambassador to the UAE and the nomination of Amir Gulistan Janjua as Pakistan's ambassador to the UAE. [Text] [JN291016 Doha GNA in Arabic 0955 GMT 29 Jun 81 JN]

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END

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10 August 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2378

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BRIEFS

EGYPT REDUCES FUEL PRICES--The government of Egypt informed Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i at noon today that it decided to reduce by 3 dollars per barrel the price of all sorts of fuel being sold to Israel. Our correspondent Gadi Sukenik reports that the reduction will be retroactive to 1 July. This is the third reduction in the Egyptian oil price within 3 months. Israel recently approached the Egyptians, noting it was their biggest client and explained that in view of the surplus situation in the world market and the reduction of prices, the Egyptian oil should be again made cheaper. Energy Ministry sources praised to our correspondent the positive response and the constant Egyptian readiness in reaction to Israel's demands. Israel is purchasing from Egypt about one quarter of its fuel consumption, 2 million tons annually. [Text] [TA171526 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 17 Jul 81]

CSO: 4323/28

ANALYSIS OF FRENCH ATTITUDES ON ARAB ISSUES

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 28, 18 Jul 81 pp 16-17

[Text] IT LOOKS as if the umbilical cord between France and Tunisia won't be severed as a result of the coming to power of the new socialist government in France. French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson chose Tunisia for his first visit to an Arab country, and sought to dispel whatever doubts Tunisia might have about the future of its privileged relations with France. 'France is Tunisia's first client and supplier,' he insisted.

Cheysson can claim links with Tunisia which go back further than those of any other serving diplomat. In July 1954, with Mendès-France, he participated in the negotiations which led to Tunisia's independence. Twenty-seven years later, in July 1981, Tunisian President Bourguiba decorated Claude Cheysson with the Grand Sash of the Order of the Republic, putting a seal on the continuation of the special Tunisian-French relationship.

Cheysson, in Tunis at the invitation of Foreign Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, visited Bourguiba's home town and summer retreat of Monastir, where Economy Minister Abdelaziz Lasram and Planning and Finance Minister Mansour Moalla complained of the direct threat to Tunisian exporters posed by the enlargement of the EEC. Talks with Premier Mohamed Mzali indicated that Tunisia will remain one of France's favourites. The press communiqué spoke of a common desire 'for close cooperation in all domains' as well as 'the intensification of the financial and industrial cooperation'. French Minister of Defence Hernu is due in Tunis at the end of August and the Tunisian-French mixed commission will sit in October. President Bourguiba also invited President Mitterrand to Tunis.

Unlike those of many diplomats, Cheysson's statements come across as clear and direct. He told journalists that France is ready to supply its nuclear power knowhow to any country of the Third World, on condition that guarantees of peaceful usage are made. He gave the socialists' view that the Middle East crisis could not be solved without Egypt, and that Camp David was 'a step towards peace'. He said Jerusalem's international status, where three cultures and three civilisations converge, 'cannot be modified unilaterally but only in the global settlement of the Middle East problem.' He also mentioned that France was happy with King Hassan's initiative of a referendum on the Western Sahara.

The PLO, however, remains unhappy about France's Middle East policy. An interview with Claude Cheysson published last weekend in the Lebanese newspaper *Al Nahar* has met a gloomy response from Palestinian officials in Beirut.

The head of the PLO's political department, Farouk Kaddoumi, remained in Paris after talks with Cheysson last Saturday, but there have as yet been no signs that his arguments have had any impact on the new socialist government's Middle East policy.

In the interview, Cheysson elaborated on recent statements by President Mitterrand indicating a preference for a 'step by step' approach to settling the Middle East crisis. The new French position involves acceptance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace, demands for guarantees of Israel's security, and the creation of a Palestinian 'homeland'. Cheysson said he understood the Palestinian people, 'who see their right to existence and a state as a natural, basic and recognised right which must be realised before anything else.'

However, he added that many similar issues remain to be decided, such as an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, guarantees for Israel, and Jerusalem's status, and it was not possible to determine yet in what order they should be approached. He said the term 'step by step' should not be dismissed just because of its associations with former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

More controversial still is the notion advanced by President Mitterrand, that issues such as the status and location of the Palestinian 'homeland' should be worked out in direct negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Asked who was meant by 'the Palestinians', Cheysson said that the issue was blurred. The PLO was a representative of the Palestinian people, he said, but there were also other such representatives, such as the West Bank mayors. He denied that the mayors' proclaimed choice of the PLO as their sole legitimate representative affected his assessment. He felt that these questions would be the focus of his discussions with Kaddoumi. (The interview was conducted before the PLO official's arrival.)

Before leaving Beirut, Kaddoumi announced that he was hopeful the PLO representative in Paris would secure full diplomatic status as a result of his talks, and that France would recognise the Palestinians' right to an independent state. Neither of these goals now seems likely in the light of Mitterrand's position at the recent European summit in Luxembourg. The French president showed himself to be concerned above all to steer the European states on a course more in keeping with the American Camp David policy. Palestinian officials see this as particularly ominous, coming as it does after separate discussions between Mitterrand and King Khaled of Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan — both Arab states ostensibly are opposed to Camp David.

Those talks, however, occurred before the Israeli elections. Both Cheysson and the French president had indicated that Jordan and Saudi Arabia would be more accommodating to a Camp David-style settlement if Israel could make some small concessions on the status of Jerusalem. While Mitterrand may have felt that he had a good chance of influencing his fellow Socialist International member Shimon Peres on this point, there seems little hope of making any impact on Menachem Begin.

CSO: 4500/25

JAPANESE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN NORTH AFRICA, EGYPT

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 28, 18 Jul 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text] JAPANESE industrialists, with strong government backing, are stepping up efforts to expand their activities in the growing North African markets. Over the past decade, the Japanese have made a lot of headway in state-controlled economies such as Algeria and Libya, but the going has been tougher in more liberally-oriented economies such as Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt. The Arab states that make up Africa's northern fringe still represent only a relatively small proportion of Japan's overseas commerce, accounting for 1.3 per cent of total exports and a mere 0.7 per cent of imports.

Hydrocarbons, as could be expected, are the premier Japanese import from this region. But because of the great distances involved, Japanese purchases of sweet North African crude are very low when compared with oil imports from the Gulf. Saudi Arabia now supplies Japan with over 25 per cent of its oil.

The profile of Japanese exports to North Africa has altered considerably in the past 10 years. They have branched out from consumer goods to heavy capital equipment and the provision of expertise. Food and textile products have diminished in importance, while sales of transport equipment, telecommunications gear, electrical equipment and motor vehicles have grown significantly.

Following last spring's visit to Algiers of a high-powered delegation from the Japanese employers' association, the Keideren, Tokyo was able to supply more than $2bn in soft loans to help finance Japanese ventures during Algeria's current Five Year Plan (1980-1984). Since 1974, trade between Japan and Algeria has taken a great leap forward, increasing fifteen-fold.

In 1980, bilateral trade reached almost $1bn for the first time, with Japan importing $451m worth of products, 80 per cent of which were condensates. The Algerians, for their part, bought $452m worth of goods made in Japan, notably chemicals, machine tools, steel, synthetic fibres and turnkey plants. More than 2,000 Japanese technicians currently live and work in Algeria.

The Japanese have benefited in their rapid penetration of the Algerian market from their government's firm desire to diversify its range of economic partners. Japanese firms have played an important role in Algeria's rapid drive to build up a heavy industrial sector. Nippon Steel, for example, has been providing technical assistance and expertise for the el Hadjar steelworks at Annaba since 1977, and Japanese firms are expected to win the contract for the 2m-tonne-yearly integrated steelworks to be built at Jejel.

Algeria's hydrocarbon sector has also provided Japanese business with considerable opportunities. C. Itoh and the Japanese Gasoline Corporation were responsible for the Hassi Rmel gas liquefaction plant, and Kobe Steel and Marubeni carried off a $272m liquefied petroleum gas complex, also at Hassi Rmel.

Libya has been another successful area for Japanese business in recent years. In 1980 Tokyo outstripped Paris to become Tripoli's third largest commercial partner. Japan's strategy, again, has been to obtain a foothold and a good reputation on the local

market by selling high-quality consumer goods and then moving into industry to supply capital equipment.

Libya is considered by most Japanese firms as their most promising market in North Africa. Like Algeria, the Libyans desire to diversify their trading partners, and the Japanese can furnish, at competitive prices, the materials to build their heavy industrial base. Kawasaki Heavy Industries, for instance, recently won a $181m deal to build a cement works at Zlitan, following in the steps of Mitsubishi, which is working on a similar project at Darnah.

The Egyptian market has proved a much tougher nut to crack for the Japanese. They have come up against the well-entrenched interests of Egypt's traditional economic partners like Britain and the US, as well as the recent commercial pushes of West Germany and France. A prime example of Tokyo's difficulties is the fact that exports of Japanese consumer goods to Egypt have hardly risen over the 1977-1980 period. One possible reason is the cautious credit policy applied to the Egyptian market by private and public Japanese financial institutions. Japan ranks third, behind the US and West Germany, as an official aid contributor.

By far Japan's greatest participation in the modernisation of Egypt's infrastructure has been the dredging and widening of the Suez Canal. This is a logical move, as it affects not only Japan's relations with Cairo, but also its trade lifeline with southern Europe and the rest of North Africa. Japan's economic presence in Egypt is boosted by its regional economic interests; many firms, including Mitsui, Sumitomo and C. Itoh, have established regional headquarters in Cairo.

Morocco has posed an even more intractable problem for Japan's usually ingenious corporations. Among the main reasons why the Japanese showing in the kingdom has been so meagre are the continuing close ties between Paris and Rabat and the way that French firms have entrenched themselves solidly. What is more, the current doldrums in the Moroccan economy and stiff import regulations hardly encourage market penetration by a newcomer.

Tokyo's principal imports from Morocco are fish, fish meal and rock phosphate to supply its fertiliser industry. The lack of an oil industry in Morocco has deprived the Japanese of one of their favourite conduits into new markets. Nonetheless, Japanese firms are usually present when large contracts are tendered, bidding for industrial projects, especially railway modernisation, telecommunications, motor vehicles and metallurgy. The Tokyo government has backed up these efforts by offering attractive soft loan packages. So far, however, the results have not lived up to expectations.

The Tunisian market is very restricted in comparison with those of the large North African nations, and French commercial dominance again presents a stern bulwark against the ambitions of Japanese companies.

CSO: 4500/25

LONDON MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS FATAH'S ABU IYAD

FM301344 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 24 Jul 81 pp 14-18

Interview granted by Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, Fatah movement central committee member, to Rarid al-Khatib--date and place not specified.)

[Excerpts] AL-HAWADITH: Lebanon has submitted to the Arab followup committee a working paper which according to the official text released recently calls for the implementation of the agreements concluded with the resistance regarding southern Lebanon. How far are you ready to implement these agreements?

Abu Iyad: Since 1975, the year of the civil war, the implementation of the agreements concluded with the PLO has been no problem despite all the attempts by the media to portray it as such even under the worst circumstances. Several parties that have nothing to do with the Cairo agreement have entered the battlefield in London including the "National Movement," the "Amal" organization and other small organizations which all carry arms because the war affects them all.

With regard to the Cairo agreement and the other agreements between us and the Lebanese state, the Lebanese state has shown that it is unable to implement many matters concerning the Lebanese themselves. For example, the question of controlling the city of Juniyah and its port and all the public utilities in the eastern sector of Beirut. The same can be said of the western sector. There are vast areas in the south where the Lebanese authorities have no control. The reason being the question of the Lebanese army on which the Lebanese still disagree. They disagree over its structure and command. Some of its officers who took part in the war were promoted instead of punished.

Therefore, it is inappropriate and illogical to talk about implementing the agreements at this time.

We have told official Lebanese and Syrian circles that we are prepared to implement the agreements when there is a national accord at all political levels and when an "effective government" comes to power. A government that is capable and firm with all parties.

We have never interfered in the question of Lebanese accord, and all we hope is that the question of implementing the agreements [between the resistance and the

government] is not be given priority over the question of achieving Lebanese national accord, for that would be asking for the impossible. But when accord is achieved and an "effective government" representing all those who took part in the war is formed, we will be willing to implement the agreements.

AL-HAWADITH: [Former Lebanese prime minister] Sa'ib Salam called for a new agreement to be concluded with the resistance in lieu of the Cairo agreement. How far are you ready to do this:

Abu Iyad: The issue in my view is not one of new or old agreements. The Cairo agreement is an agreement on generalities. For this reason we later concluded the well-known "Melkart" agreement, which dealt with details. A new agreement on generalities could be concluded that would give the resistance 100 points and take away 50. But such an agreement would still need another detailed agreement. Let us conclude a new agreement laying down details for the original one.

It is not a matter of agreements but of confidence between the government and the resistance, which on our part is based on one essential thing. There is no room for compromise on or discussion of our carrying of arms to protect our camps in southern Lebanon.

AL-HAWADITH: The Arab followup committee proposed stopping relations between the Phalangist Party and Israel. What are in your view the practical conditions for carrying out this proposal?

Abu Iyad: The followup committee should have a long discussion on the question of the Phalangists and Israel with a view to issuing a statement breaking relations between them. The Phalangist Party might issue such a statement signed by Bahir al-Jumayyil and the Phalangist War Council. But it would not be an important statement.

Solving this problem demands that the Phalangist Party adopt a decision to break relations with Israel based on a real and firm belief declared in a public statement which should contain some sort of self-criticism as wll as resolutions confirming that Lebanon is a natural extension of the Arab world and that Lebanon should side with the Arabs, not with anybody else. Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil expressed such a view in many statements and during personal meetings with me. Many other Phalangists believe in this stand.

This should be followed by practical steps to enable the government to control the ports in conjunction with the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) while it is stationed in Lebanon, or with other Arab forces as they have been demanding so as to ensure that relations [with Israel] are broken.

AL-HAWADITH: A U.S. State Department spokesman recently expressed his government's satisfaction with the break of relations between the Phalangist Party and Israel. How do you explain this statement?

Abu Iyad: It is a strange thing, and one possible explanation is that the United States intends to make the solution of the Lebanese problem in some way a prelude to solving the Middle East problem in 1982 after the third and final stage of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai is completed under the Camp David agreements.

The Americans have told the Arab countries that they will not be ready to discuss any solution other than Camp David or any changes to Camp David before the third stage withdrawal from Sinai. For this reason they want the area to be calm during this period.

The idea behind Philip Habib's first visit to the area was to "defuse" the danger of war between Israel and Syria so that the "Soviet danger" which the Americans allege is the number one danger in the area would not drop to third, fourth, or fifth place or become marginal while the Israeli danger rose higher. This was the aim of Philip Habib's first move. It was not in the interest of Syria or the Arabs but of the U.S.-Israeli plan.

AL-HAWADITH: Are you prepared to open a dialogue with the "Lebanese front" once agreement is reached on the question of relations [with Israel]?

Abu Iyad: That is the only problem between us. Another point is that they should recognise that we really want to return to our country. And for us to return to our country and not to settle here, they must encourage us to carry arms.

When we are unarmed it will be easy to herd the Palestinians like sheep. One group will be told to go to Jordan to settle there. Another will be told to go to Syria, and yet another to go to Egypt, and a large section of the Palestinians will be settled in Lebanon.

If they are really against settlement by Palestinians they must help us to continue fighting so no international decision can distribute us among the Arab countries like sheep.

AL-HAWADITH: Diplomatic options for the PLO seem to be narrowing at present because of the attitude of the new U.S. administration and the faltering of the European initiative. In the meantime its military operations are hampered by many stumbling blocks. Do you consider that the PLO is in an impasse and what should it do in the coming stage?

Abu Iyad: The principal factor making for success in our diplomatic moves is our military activity inside the occupied territories. The second factor is the strength of the Arab countries in the balance of power with Israel. When the Arab situation is balanced with Israel it will be a factor making for our political and diplomatic success. And when it is not, it will be the opposite.

With regard to military action in the occupied territories there are no stumbling blocks but there are great difficulties. Nevertheless, it is continuing. Despite the extent of our activities, which might be lessening, they are continuing.

What is beyond our control is the question of Arab solidarity and, consequently, of the Arab-Israeli balance. When Iraq and Syria disagree this means a weakened Arab-Israeli balance, and when Egypt withdraws from the battle the Arab weight in the balance is reduced.

The present Arab situation is very bad. We have lost one of the two bulwarks of our political activity and we are left with our own bulwark which exists and is holding firm, though it is definitely affected by the Arab situation. In the

absence of an Egyptian front and Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese fronts the fighter inside the country suffers from the Arab situation which affects his morale because of the smaller amount of military material he will receive. We must note that our territory is small and the Israelis have divided it into squares in order to combat fedayeen action. Nevertheless, there are arrests and clashes every day and Israeli jails are full of thousands of Palestinians. This shows that our people are resisting with every means at their disposal despite all the corrective measure, including the attempts to expropriate lands and build settlements.

In the diplomatic arena the effect of the Arab situation is reflected in the attitude of the European countries. President Francois Mitterrand says that the Camp David accords are a reality, yet he supports the establishment of a Palestinian state. How can these stances be reconciled when the Camp David accords kill the Palestinian state and "autonomous rule" means that the Palestinians must remain directly under occupation? The head of the biggest European state has by his recent statement undermined the European initiatives for the Camp David accords are of no benefit whatsoever to the Palestinian side.

Suppose the ruler of an oil country stands up and tells Mitterrand, either you support the Palestinian cause and the establishment of a Palestinian state and recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people or else all your country's interests in the Arab countries will cease. The French ruler cannot afford to do other than take the matter into consideration. If the Algerian Government tells Mitterrand "Your visit to Israel means that you cannot visit us," many things will change. The French president is preparing to visit Israel. How can he proceed from Israel to Algeria or vice versa? It will be an embarrassment for the Algerian Government, but if it makes it a condition that we cannot visit Algeria if he visits Israel, I believe he will reconsider his political attitudes.

AL-HAWADITH: American statements have played down the importance of the recent Syrian-Soviet maneuvers. How do you explain this?

Abu Iyad: These statements were intended for domestic public opinion, not for Israel, and were aimed at reassuring people that the maneuvers are something normal.

Nevertheless, the maneuvers that took place were something new because this was the first time that the Soviet Union had held maneuvers with a country outside the Warsaw Pact. This has many implications, the most significant of which is that the Soviet Union cares for Syria as a place and as a country and is anxious not to allow anyone to attack it. This is a signal to Israel which in essence says, we are here and capable of giving Syria all types of aid.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned the maneuvers have shown that it is actually determined to play a role in the Middle East and in solving its problems. It wants to maintain this role and preserve it. Thus, it wanted to tell the Americans, you may have concluded the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel but you have not achieved a comprehensive peace or established peace in the area.

AL-HAWADITH: Israel has begun improving its relations with the Soviet Union and it claims that at a later stage it will ask it to allow a general emigration of Soviet Jews and that it will also ask to be allowed to keep the occupied Arab

territories in order to settle millions of Soviet Jewish immigrants. Where will the Soviet Union stand in the future between the PLO and Israel?

Abu Iyad: The Soviet Union is our friend but every friend has its own considerations. The question of emigration has always been a matter of contention between us and the Soviet Union, but I do not think that it will allow large-scale emigration to Israel, particularly in view of the fact that the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel has not succeeded since 60 percent of them after a short while in transit have gone to Italy and other places.

However, the matter will be the subject of discussion between us and the Soviet Union. I believe that the Soviet Union will certainly not give up its relations with the PLO and the Arab countries for the sake of Israel.

CSO:4304/83

PLO'S QADDUMI DISCUSSES FRENCH, U.S. MIDEAST POLICIES

PM200926 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 14 Jul 81 p 8

[Interview granted by head of PLO Political Department Faruq Qaddumi to 'Ali al-Shubashi in Paris--date not given]

[Text] [Question] You are the third Arab official to visit France, after King Khalid and Jordanian Crown Prince Amir Hasan. What is your impression of the new French Government and the statements by French officials, and what is your view on the inclusion of communists in the government?

[Answer] We expect France in its new era to take progressive steps in its stand on the question of the Palestinian problem and the Middle East crisis, particularly since it has previously taken such steps and has made a substantial contribution to consolidating the European stand within the EEC. With regard to statements by French officials, particularly President Francois Mitterrand's statement about the inevitability of the establishment of a Palestinian state, there is no doubt that such statements give rise to optimism that in the future France will play an important role in realizing the Palestinian people's right to establish an independent state of their own. We hope that this view will develop into France's official stand in the near future.

With regard to the inclusion of communists in the French Government, I do not imagine that this will change that government's course and policy. In fact, this is the first time in a long while that communists have taken part in the government of a West European country, and therefore we believe that this trend will strengthen international detente and ease tension, particularly between the two superpowers and in Europe's internal situation.

We also believe that NATO is in itself a real aggression against the world's peoples. Therefore, if the government of a European state that is a member of this alliance is penetrated by other elements, the aggressive alliance will lose its effectiveness and the world will renounce alliances and will pursue coordination and cooperation instead of entering into aggressive armed alliances.

[Question] You have often said that the European initiative is finished and that there is a Soviet initiative that you accept. Is it true that there is a Soviet initiative, or are your statements aimed at pressuing the United States and the West so that they will move toward a solution?

[Answer] We have said that we welcome the Soviet initiative but we have not said that we accept it. In other words, we have accepted it as a positive move by the friendly Soviet Union, aimed at serving our just cause and the cause of peace in the area. But while we support the principles included in the initiative with regard to the achievement of the Palestinian people's national rights, including their right to establish an independent state and to UN participation in the convening of an international conference on the Middle East, we have also underlined that we categorically refuse to recognize Israel. This is our attitude toward the Soviet initiative. As for the European initiative, there is no such initiative.

We do not think that the principles that Europe has suggested regarding the Middle East problem will lead to such an initiative in the near future. We are now concentrating on the individual attitudes of each European state so we can find out its stand and, as Arabs, modify our stand toward it accordingly. Experience proves that efforts to prompt the adoption of a joint European stand have hindered our efforts to develop the stand of each European country separately, since the non-progressive stands of countries like Denmark and Norway influence the European Community and have an adverse effect on progressive stands.

[Question] Washington is said to have told some Arab countries that it was awaiting the results of the Israeli elections before moving toward a solution, but these elections seemingly have not encouraged the United States to make such a move. What do you think?

[Answer] It is thought that following the outcome of the Israeli elections, Begin, the well-known terrorist, will reform the Israeli Government. This in itself is grounds for concern by everybody that the possibility of war in the area will increase.

On the other hand, the whole world realizes that we do not trust the United States or its aggressive policy, since it is the primary supporter and encourager of Israel's aggression against the Palestinian people. We have no doubt that U.S. imperialism is working against peace and for a new war, particularly under the new U.S. administration.

The bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor is yet further evidence of the aggressive Israeli policy, which has the new U.S. administration's blessing. Added to this is Richard Allen's public statement that "Israel has the right to hot pursuit of Palestinian fedayeen in southern Lebanon." Do we need more evidence to prove that U.S. policy is prepared to sacrifice all its interests in the Arab world for the sake of preserving Israel's safety and security?

As for the Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, it is known beyond all question. Israel was established on the principle of usurping the Palestinian people's rights, expelling that people, seizing their lands and persecuting them through aggressive attacks on their camps, wherever they are. There is no indication in the outcome of the Israeli elections that the Israeli policy will change toward peace, and I would reiterate that the return of Begin to power will increase the possibility of war in the area.

[Question] The Americans see the Soviet threat as the real danger to the area. What is your opinion regarding this, and is there any truth in this view?

[Answer] We do not see the real danger to the Middle East as the Soviet presence. The Soviet Union has always been a neighboring state to the area and has no colonialist history, unlike other states. Also, it was the Soviet Union that revealed the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which divided the Arab east between certain Western states, to the Arabs. It was the first to give them arms back during the era of late President Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir and side with them during the tripartite aggression against Egypt. It is now siding with us and supports our causes everywhere and it recently sided with sisterly Syria and strengthened its steadfastness against the Zionist threats during the alleged missile crisis.

So what danger does the Soviet Union pose to us or to our interests? The danger is an illusion.

I discussed this question frankly with some Arab ministers at the recent meeting in Baghdad and cited illustrations of the stands of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

[Question] What about Afghanistan?

[Answer] With regard to the question of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union has often declared that it is ready to withdraw its forces from there if neighboring countries give the necessary guarantees that they will not attack or provoke Afghanistan.

[Question] The PLO has mediated between Arab countries that disagree with one another, such as Morocco and Libya and Iraq and Syria. Do you expect to succeed in removing the causes of disagreement so that the Arabs can stand united in the face of their principal enemy?

[Answer] We have indeed carried out such attempts, and brother Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] made several tours of these countries, most of which were successful. We hope that in the near future the efforts will lead to an Arab summit which would settle these differences once and for all.

CSO: 4304/79

PLO OFFICIAL BEMOANS LACK OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS

LD241440 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1255 GMT 24 Jul 81

[Text] Beirut, 24 Jul (KUNA) -- A leftist Palestinian official said today that the "big powers" re use to provide the PLO with sophisticated weapons to match the military arsenal which the United States provides to Israel.

The Palestinian official, who asked not to be named, declined to explain to whom he was referring by the words "big powers." He added, "We have asked for several batteries of sophisticated ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles, naval boats and ground-to-sea torpedo launchers (qadhifat torpero al-bahr) to enable us to least to defend our civilian population in Lebanon."

"Such demands," the official said, "have been made since Israel's invasion of southern Lebanon in March 1978. But the only response we received every time is a postponement. We are not given a clear rejection or acceptance. By saying this we do not mean to expose our allies, only to remind them that we are in a race against time, against the enemy and against the ally of our enemy who is our ally's number one enemy."

PLO spokesmen and information officials have declined to comment on these remarks.

The Leftist official added, "The Arab countries which possess such weapons cannot hand them over to a third party as they are barred from this by a clear rovision in the purchase contracts concluded with the arms manufacturing quarter."

The Palestinian official said that "the PLO has units of pilots residing in a number of Arab countries but we have no planes. We are like a taxi driver who has no taxicab to drive."

On the other hand, the Lebanese newspaper AL-LIWA', which has close connections with the Palestinian resistance, has quoted Arab diplomatic sources as saying that "the PLO has for some time been asking the USSR to supply it with anti-aircraft Sam-6 and Frog missiles." The paper adds that "the USSR has so far not responded to these demands, as the USSR believes that supplying such sophisticated weapons to the PLO would be tantamount to a declaration of war against Israel at a time when Arab and international conditions are not appropriate for such a stop."

CSO:4304/83

JORDAN REPORTEDLY PLEASED WITH BAN IMPOSED ON WEST BANKERS

TA221125 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Jul 81 p 2

[Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Text] The Jordanian authorities do not conceal their content with the military authorities' decision to forbid Judaea and Samaria Arab personages from holding any contact with PLO members. The Jordanians hope to be aided by this decision to strengthen their status in the region.

It was reported from Arab sources that the Israeli Government's decision did not give rise to indignation among the Jordanian leadership and that in talks recently conducted between Judaea and Samaria notables and the Amman authorities the decision was not condemned. In contrast, there was talk with the Jordanian prime minister and interior minister about the need to increase the financial aid to the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria and East Jerusalem. Both said that the aid will indeed increase and will not be given through the joint PLO-Jordanian Committee which has been paralyzed for some months already due to differences among its members.

Security elements said that this Jordanian reaction was expected when the decision on forbidding Judaea and Samaria Arabs to hold contacts with the PLO was formulated. According to these security elements the village mukhtars have not yet developed dependence on the PLO and they are still accustomed to the Jordanian regime's rules and regulations. The heads of small towns so far have behaved as though the relation with the PLO has been imposed on them and from now on it will be then easier for them to link up with Jordan. As for the mayors, they are bound to behave according to the degree of risk they may face. Mayors such as Karim Khalaf and Bassam al-Shak'ah who have all along detested the Jordanian regime will now have to maneuver themselves in a manner which will not burn the bridges with the PLO but yet reach peaceful coexistence with King Husayn as well.

CSO: 4323/27

KUWAITI INVESTMENTS IN MOROCCO

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 28, 18 Jul 81 pp 36-37

[Text] A $60m TOURIST complex in the Erraha district of Marrakesh, which is now almost certain to go ahead, is the latest in a series of projects undertaken in the country by the Moroccan-Kuwaiti Development Consortium (MKDC) in the field of tourism and hotel construction.

The Erraha project, which covers an area of 26,000 sq m in the centre of Marrakesh, includes a leisure centre, a commercial section and parking space, as well as a number of apartment blocks. According to MKDC's managing director, Sein al Abdein al Alawi, most of the finance is expected to come from various Kuwaiti companies — but the contracts will go largely to local firms.

'So far we have not decided who will get the contracts,' said al Alawi. 'The study is completed and we are waiting for the financial side of things to be finalised. We might use some foreign companies, but we hope to use mainly local ones.'

The consortium was set up at the end of 1976 with a capital of $70m, and has made total investments to date of around $650m. It is 66 per cent owned by Kuwaitis, who are represented in the company by the Kuwait Real Estate Investment Corporation. The other 34 per cent is owned by Moroccan private and semi-public enterprises.

The consortium has concentrated its activities in three major fields. In the industrial sector, it runs two sugar refining factories (in Doukkala and Zemamara) and owns cement factories and plants producing mechanical equipment and metal products.

In hotel management and construction, another area of involvement, a subsidiary company, Farah, has a chain of six hotels in Rabat, Marrakesh, Tatwan, Casablanca, Safi and Khouribya. During the next two years Farah hopes to add another four. The consortium's third field of activity is housing construction, mainly cheap housing. It has a subsidiary company which specialises in the building of prefabricated dwellings.

Besides its investments through MKDC, the Kuwait Real Estate Investment Corporation is also involved in Moroccan projects on its own. On the Corniche of Casablanca, for instance, it has acquired a site of 70,000 sq m on which it intends to build a tourist complex and a number of villas. It is also seeking investment finance in Kuwait for various housing complexes in Casablanca and Temara, near Rabat. The former comprises 107 villas and 530 apartments, while the Temara project involves building a large low-cost estate on 13 hectares.

However, even these levels of investment and activity do not seem to satisfy Moroccan businessmen, whose expectations are much higher. As al Alawi said: 'The scale of investments by the Kuwaitis, and by the Gulf states on the whole, are rather timid in comparison with the possibilities that our country offers.'

Moroccan businessmen are also complaining that Moroccan goods are being re-exported to the Gulf market from European countries — under different brand names, and without a made-in-Morocco tag.

The team from the centre was anxious both to arrange meetings between Kuwaiti and Moroccan businessmen and to introduce Moroccan products to the Gulf. As one businessman from Rabat said: 'We have enormous difficulties nowadays in penetrating the EEC market, so the best thing for us is to use the Gulf markets and hope that Gulf investors will come to our country. I am sure that returns on investments in tourism will be worthwhile.'

CSO: 4500/25

BRIEFS

APPROVAL FOR ARAB AID SOUGHT--Gaza Mayor al-Shawwa has asked the military government in the area to allow him to receive the equivalent of 40 million Israeli shekels as aid from the Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee. This is reported by our correspondent Bassam Ja'bar. The military government says that it asked al-Shawwa to specify the destination of these funds but the mayor has not yet complied with this request. Therefore, he has not yet been issued a reply. [Text] [TA221641 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 22 Jul 81]

CSO: 4323/27

SOVIET POSITION CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE

Mutiny at Air Base

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 9 Jul 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] Peshawar, July 8: Reports reaching here from across the border now confirm the mutiny at the Bagram air base near Kabul.

The details reveal that a group of 13 Air Force officers, led by Major Mohammad Asghar Safi, revolted and blew up ammunition dumps, destroyed 17 aircraft and damaged another 18. The leader later on took off in an aircraft bombed the base and was either hit or crashed somewhere.

It is said the action coincided with the first anniversary of the execution of Abdul Majeed Kalkani, an insurgent leader by the Afghan Government. At that time, in retaliation, the authorities in Kabul had carried out indiscriminate air attack killing relatives of the officers who had revolted.

In Kandhar area the Mujahideen have also been active. They attacked the Kandhar air base, destroying 10 aircraft and four helicopters. At the same time conscription has been intensified since all peasants who were issued arms to protect themselves, have been ordered to report for military duty at Kabul. It is reported that through such coercive means the authorities have been able to forcibly recruit about 1,000 people.

The state of discipline and morale in the Armed Forces remains very poor. It is reported that about 50 officers and other ranks were arrested on the charge of anti-Government activities. Two ring leaders in a battalion were arrested while others managed to escape allegedly for a plan to kill their officers and join the Mujahideen.

It is also reported that the Soviets are further augmenting their strength in Afghanistan. Not only a large number of military transport vehicles was reported to have arrived in Afghanistan last month but the frequency of transport flights has increased considerably. It may, however, be possible that these supplies have been sent to replace those damaged as a result of action by Mujahideen.

The Afghan authorities, in order to improve the situation have raised the period for conscription service from two to three years.

Meanwhile, the congress of National Fatherland Front, which was summoned by the regime in Kabul, was a total flop. It was a State-managed affair attended by party functionaries and low-grade Government employees. All they did was to sign on the dotted line. The Kabul regime is playing it up as a great achievement, but the public response remains very poor.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting continued in Afghanistan's capital of Kabul and Parwan Province and the Mujahideen were apparently in control of much of the countryside, Western diplomatic sources said today.

The fighting in Parwan Province, north of the Afghan capital, was also reported here yesterday by other diplomatic sources. They said the important town of Gulbahar was reported to have been wrested from Government control last week. Western sources said Gulhabad's bazaar area was completely destroyed in the fighting and there were many casualties.

Parwan's capital of Charikar appeared to be in the hands of the Mujahideen in the afternoon.

In Kabul, the sources said sporadic artillery and machine-gun fire was heard at night this week. The sources said at least four Afghan soldiers were killed last Wednesday in a Mujahideen raid near Karga Dam west of Kabul.

They said a restaurant overlooking the Karga Lake was destroyed. The sources quoted a note left by the Mujahideen as saying that the restaurant was burned down because officials of the ruling People's Democratic Party and Soviet troops were corrupting the place.--PPI/Reuter.

Battle at Baghlan

Karachi DAWN in English 17 Jul 81 p 6

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 16: Afghan guerillas fought a pitched battle with Kabul Government troops in Baghlan industrial area, north of Kabul last week and inflicted damages on Government properties, reports reaching here today from the Afghan capital said.

Trouble began when Government soldiers spotted a dozen armed Afghans moving in the area on Saturday and challenged them. In the exchange that followed at least seven Government soldiers and five guerillas were killed. The insurgents set fire to Government properties.

The following day the Government forces aided by tanks and armoured personnel carriers conducted a search and destroy operation in the area, the reports reaching Afghan dissidents here said.

The incident was confirmed by the State-owned Kabul Radio yesterday when it claimed that a group of "bandits" which was active in the industrial Baghlan area was liquidated by Security forces.

According to an Azkana report official Iranian news agency 'Pars' said today Soviet helicopters bombed several houses and killed two children in the village of Abdullah in Herat province of Afghanistan.

'Pars' said the Soviet helicopter attack on the village was retaliatory after Afghan Mujahideen thwarted a planned Soviet ambush on the village which is in extreme Western Afghanistan.

In other fighting near the Iranian border, 'Pars' said Islamic guerillas blew up a Soviet tank and killed the soldiers inside.—APA.

Hundreds of Troops Killed

Karachi DAWN in English 23 Jul 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] NEW DELHI, July 22: Several hundred Soviet and Afghan Government troops as well as civilians were believed killed or wounded last week near Kabul in the heaviest fighting against freedom fighters, in the area for 19 months, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

They said the fighting in the Paghman foothills, 20 kilometres (12 miles) northwest of Kabul began as a clearing operation against a nationalist controlled area on July 13 and was spread over three days.

The sources said they estimated at least 70 young Afghan military cadets were among those killed in what they described as the heaviest fighting close to the capital since Soviet troops arrived in Afghanistan in December 1979.

Other diplomatic sources gave a less dramatic account of the fighting, saying there appeared to have been a clearing-up operation in Paghman in which the Soviets and Afghans used artillery rocket-launchers and helicopter gunships, although the freedom fighters had largely left the area after hearing of the impending attack.

But these sources who said they believed cadets from the Military Academy in Kabul were killed in the operation and reported that Kabul Television last Sunday showed the bodies of 80 cadets killed while fighting "traitors and enemies" in Paghman.

The Western sources said the action in Paghman started when guerillas fired on a group of about 300 cadets moving into the hills. The guerilla surrounded the cadets and shouted over megaphones urging them to surrender. The sources said about 200 cadets surrendered and others were believed killed.

On July 14, apparently to avenge the attack on the cadets, a strong Soviet and Afghan armoured force supported by helicopter gunships moved into the area "shelling, strafing and bombing" villages and individual houses, the sources said.

Villagers trying to flee the area were gunned down and those found taking shelter in the houses and cellars were killed, they added.

But on at least one occasion when Soviet troops, landed by helicopter to reinforce the ground troops, were virtually wiped out by guerillas, the sources said.

They said some Soviet troops were also reportedly strafed and bombed by their own helicopter gunships by mistake.

The fighting continued throughout the day on July 14 and at night the guerillas made an unsuccessful attempt to overrun a heavily fortified army camp near Paghman.

Sporadic fighting also continued the next day and the sources which had been attached for burial.

The Western diplomatic sources said that totalling up the casualties was difficult but they estimated several hundreds Soviet and Afghan troops were killed or wounded, apart from the civilians and 50 to 100 Mujahideen.

Commenting on the operation, the sources said it may not have achieved the objective of clearing Paghman of guerillas because several hundred more had arrived from other provinces by the time the fighting ended.

But they said the action may have made it harder for them to operate from there.

The sources said the residents of Paghman had been warned of the action before it was mounted and many civilians had left by July 13. The Government troops had been increasingly frustrated by control of the area by guerillas.

They said the situation in Kabul last week had remained largely peaceful probably because the guerillas and the Government troops were engaged in Paghman.

But killings of some individuals and members of the ruling People' Democratic Party (PDP) continued. A popular singer and Government supporter was killed recently at her home and an Afghan soldier guarding a diplomat's house was shot by gunmen who also snatched away his rifle.

Soviet forces in Afghanistan control only five to 10 per cent of the country, according to a report in the "Toronto Globe" and "Mail".

The Toronto paper carried a report from David Van Praagh, who teaches journalism at Ottawa's Carleton University, and is currently visiting Pakistan, that described the dilemma faced by the Soviet Union.

Eighteen months after invading Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is faced with the fact that it controls only a small part of the country and its hold even on the capital "is tenuous", says the report. At the same time, the Soviet forces in Afghanistan are suffering high casualties and their morale is "sagging".

While the war has pushed two million Afghan refugees into Pakistan, the report continues, the 85,000-man Soviet force in Afghanistan is also "beleguered", and the Russians may be looking for a way out of Afghanistan.

It quotes Afghan leader Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani as saying in Peshawar that the Russians would like to leave Afghanistan "but they don't know how".

The report credits the Afghan Mujahideen with "scoring stunning victories with often obsolescent weapons", but falls short of predicting a Soviet pullout. It recalls that during the 1920s and 1930s the Russians had brutally subjugated tribal peoples on the northern side of the Oxus river when their military means were more limited than they are now.

An American anthropologist who spent 30 years doing research in Afghanistan says that Soviet tactics are unifying the Afghan people as no previous government was able to do.

In an interview with "Science" magazine, Louis Dupree said that this unity, and the supply of weapons to the freedom fighters, "could force the Russians, who already know they can't conquer Afghanistan only destroy it, to settle the matter peacefully at the negotiating table".—APP.

Fifth of Population Flees

Karachi DAWN in English 23 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] Bonn, July 22: Nearly 20 per cent of Afghanistan's 17 million population have fled the country since the Soviet invasion of December 1979, a member of the West German Parliament said today.

Mr Volker Neumann said that 2.2 million Afghans were currently in refugee camps in Pakistan and one million had fled to Iran.

About 2,000 refugees continued to leave Afghanistan daily.

Mr Neumann, who belongs to the Social Democratic party (SPD) of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, is Chairman of an SPD working group on refugee affairs.

He has just returned from a visit to refugee camps along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.--DPA.

Call for More Soviet Troops

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 25 Jul 81 pp 1, 8

[Text] London, July 24: Mr Babrak Karmal has requested the Soviet Union to send more troops to deal with the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, reliable sources from Afghan capital said.

The sources reported that Mr Babrak Karmal who had proceeded to Moscow last week on a secret mission is still there. He had been summoned by the Soviet authorities for consulting on the proposal put forth by the European Economic Community (EEC) relating to calling a global conference on the Afghan issue and on the widening gulf between Parcham and Khalq factions of the ruling Communist party in Afghanistan.

It is reported that Mr Babrak Karmal is extremely worried over the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan. The emergency arrangement made to overcome the situation in the country has not produced encouraging results. The urban guerillas have rather stepped up their activities. To control the worsening situation, the Soviet forces had recently been called back from a number of subdivisions of Kandahar province and stationed in Kabul. Similarly, the Afghan militia has been withdrawn from Kabul-Jalabad Road and replaced by the Soviet forces.

It is further reported that Soviet authorities had talked to Mr Babrak Karmal on the rifts between Parcham and Khalq factions. It is to be mentioned that Khalqis had adopted stiff attitude after Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshatmand was inducted into office and they had been demanding equal share in the key governmental posts. The ratio at present between Parcham and Khalq is 60:40, but the most important posts are occupied by Parchamis.

Convoy Attacked

During an encounter between Mujahideen and an Afghan army convoy in Sangeen area of Kajki subdivision of Helmand province on July 6 two tanks were destroyed and the crew was killed.

The government force fled away with a tank. Two Mujahid drivers Pir Jan and Sardar Mohammad were martyred. The fighting took place suddenly between the places Grishik and Farah.

According to the details, the Mujahideen were going to their places in a truck when an accident took place at a dangerous turning and the truck was left at the place with drivers Pir Jan and Sardar Mohammad to look after and they proceeded on to their places on foot. Meanwhile a government convoy appeared in the area. The truck in which the Mujahideen were carrying arms and ammunition was seized by the force. On their return, the Mujahideen encircled the convoy and after three hours of tough fighting the government force fled away with one tank while two tanks were destroyed by rocket launchers. The Mujahid drivers Pir Jan and Sardar Mohammad were martyred. The number of casualties of the government force could not be ascertained.

Radar Stations

More details have come to light about the losses occurring as a result of Mujahideen's raid on Spin Buldak area close to Pakistan border on July 11.

One of the three Afghanistan's major radar stations had been totally destroyed in the attack. According to the latest information the cost of the radar station was 70 million dollars.

According to the information received by Agency Afghan Press, Quetta office, three high Soviet army officers visited Spin Buldak last week to review the situation. The helicoper carrying the officers were protected by three gunship helicopters. The officers had an aerial survey of Spin Buldak and the border area.

During their stay in the border town, a number of people were arrested including three Afghan intelligence officers. An ugly scene of clash took place between the Soviet officers visiting the area and the Afghan army officers. Hezb-i-Islami sources have reported that security measures have been tightened at the radar stations at Mahal Chinar in the suburbs of Kabul and in Helmand province.

It is also reported that 200 soldiers and 6 tanks, have been sent to Spin Buldak following the Soviet officers' visit to the area.

Failure of Soviet Propaganda

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 25 Jul 81 p 3

[Text] Islamabad July 24: Eyewitnesses to Soviet human right violation in Afghanistan told a congressional hearing on Wednesday that the Soviet Union faces a growing Afghan resistance and has failed in propaganda efforts to win over the Afghan mind, a Press release of U. S. International Communication Agency said here yesterday.

A tribal leader from Central Afghanistan, who travelled on foot for three weeks in order exit his country and testidy at the hearing, said that the Afghan Freedom

Fighters have increased in numbers and are experiencing a greater power than they had five months ago. Testifying in Dari dialect, Malik Mohammad Hussain Wardak said that Soviet soldiers do not dare "step 10 feet outside" a large number of Afghan cities because they fear being killed by the Mujahideen or freedom fighters. Wardak remarks were translated by Thomas Gouttierre, Director of the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska at Omaha.

Soviet failure to influence Afghan thinking was underscored by Mohammad Seddiq Farhang, formerly economic adviser to Afghan President Babrak Karmal. Farhang, who recently fled Afghanistan to seek asylum in the West said that the Soviets main propaganda thrust within Afghanistan has been an attempt to convince the people that the present Government is not under the control of the Soviet Union and that the Russian army is in position to defend Afghanistan against other countries.

This propaganda has failed, Farhang said, the the Soviets have had no influence on the Afghan mind.

Farhang said the Soviets want to convince the rest of the world that they are attempting to bring about a change that is necessary to bring a backward society into modern life and that the Mujahideen are acting "to prevent these necessary reforms.

He also pointed out that one of the most significant consequences of the Russian invasion and occupation of Afghanistan has been that the fact of the invincibility of the red army has been shattered.

Wardak also noted that "not all of the occupation troops are Soviet," Wardak said, not noting that Cubans, Czechoslovakians, Bulgarians, and other members of Warsaw Pact countries are fighting in Afghanistan. Asked what evidence he could recount substanting the involvement of these troops, Wardak said that markings on captured weapons indicate that they are from countries other than the Soviet Union. He added that some wounded and captured soldiers also indicated to his men that they are not from the Soviet Union.

Devastating Weapons

Wardak spoke in detail regarding the various types of devastating weaponry utilized by the Soviets. He said they include reconnaissance planes, MI-24 Helicopters, deep penetrating bombs that enter the ground, explode, and spray rubble over a large expanse of terrain, incendiary bombs that can inflict wounds that take six months to heal, gas bombs that immobilize victims for 40 minutes and impair hearing ability for several days, bombs that leave a residue of long gelatinous-type strings which explode when touched, and camouflaged bombs in the form of toys and pens capable of blowing off limbs.

"Not only are freedom fighters being killed," Wardak stressed, but so are our women and children. No life remains in those areas bombed by the Soviet warships."

Wardak also pointed out that we inside Afghanistan obtain almost all of our weapons from captured Soviet convoys, defecting Afghan troops, and purchases made in the border areas."

Push Back One Generation

Documenting the effects of Soviet control over the day-to-day operations of the Afghan Government, Farhang said that as a result of more than three years of Communist rule and Soviet occupation, Afghanistan has been pushed back at least one generation on its path to progress.

"This is based only on the losses inflicted until now, Farhang continued. What the future has in store for my unfortunate country is beyond anybody's calculation or estimate.

Perhaps the most moving testimony of the hearing was given by an 18-year-old Afghan woman named Nahid who led a demonstration on April 29, 1980, against Soviet domination of her country.

Relating the sequence of events which resulted in the shooting of at least 70 of her school friends by Russian soldiers Nahid appealed for U. S. aid in regaining her homeland.

We urgently call on the American Government to take decisive action, she said.

Congressman Dante Fascell stressed that the Soviet Union has clearly undermined the spirit and intention embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, severely damaged the international climate and done great harm to East-West relations.

He challenged the Soviet Union to account for their religious violations of the Helsinki accords and expressed the hope that the hearing would be a vehicle to serve notice to the Soviet Union that the United States Congress remains concerned about what is happening in Afghanistan.--APP

CSO: 4600/94

KHALKIS SEEN LOSING IN FEUD WITH PARCHAMIS

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 25 Jun 81 p 5

[Article by A.H.: "Continuing Fights Between Factions in Kabul"]

[Text] Consolidation of Power by Parchamis Group

During the meeting at the end of May of the Central Committee of the Afghan state party--officially called the Afghan People's Democratic Party--a reorganization within the state leadership took place; however, no far-reaching changes are expected. As had been announced earlier, the offices of head of state and prime minister, both of which had been held by Babrak Karmal, were to be separated. Apparently, original plans were to lend a more important role in the leadership of the state to the Khalki faction. Although it had a larger membership, it had more or less been eliminated from the government since the overthrow of Hafizullah Amin. One of its members is supposed to be named prime minister. It appears that the Soviets were behind it; for a long time one of the biggest worries for the Soviets has been how to stop the continuous and often bloody factional fights within the state party between Khalkis and Parchamis and how to reconcile the two factions.

The Parchamis are a small group of parlor-communists from the cities. Most of them come from well-to-do families and they always speak Farsi--also called Dari--the Iranian dialect of Afghan city dwellers. The Khalkis are composed almost exclusively of Afghans speaking the Pushtu language. They are descendants of nomadic tribes, although the majority of them hold lower level state jobs, teachers, functionaries, corporals and officers who had graduated from state schools and joined the civil service. The most violent flare-up of this enmity between the two factions which to date has been inextinguishable occurred under Hafez Amin, when many Parchami party members were arrested, tortured and cruelly executed, many of them with their families. Since then a number of bloody feuds have been in existence between the two wings of the party.

Rumors Surrounding Sarwari

Following the plenary session of the Central Committee, several imprisoned Khalkis were brought from the Pul-e-Sharki prison to talk to Babrak Karmal. Even Azadullah Sarwari, Karmal's former vice-president who had been appointed ambassador to Mongolia, briefly turned up in Kabul, which led to speculations that

the Russians wanted to make him prime minister. Sarwari was the head of the Secret Service while Amin was in power and he was considered one of the main torturers during that bloody period. The saying goes in Kabul that he had personally participated in the tortures of his fellow ministers and party brothers of the Parchami faction. For that reason he could not retain his position as vice-president when Karmal took over after the invasion and the liquidation of Amin by the Russians, although he allegedly had the support of the Soviet Union.

During the first few months of the Soviet invasion, many Parchami ministers refused to participate in government sessions which were attended by Sarwari, and several gunfights took place between supporters and bodyguards of both factions and apparently even between the ministers themselves. Finally Sarwari was dispatched to Mongolia.

No Reconciliation as Yet

The reappearance in the capital of Sarwari in conjunction with rumors about an impending reinstatement of the Khalki faction in the government seems to have intensified the continuing feuds between the two factions. In May there were reports that 21 Parchamis had been shot and killed by Khalkis during the course of 1 month. According to Indian conjectures, Karmal outwardly (and toward the Russians) appeared to support the inclusion of Khalkis in the government, but inwardly he simultaneously conducted a "secret purge" in the army and in the administration, and the primary victims were Khalkis. During the second week in May all these tensions and intrigues seemed to have led to a gunfight in the presidential palace, during which one of Karmal's bodyguards was killed.

Continuing Repression of Khalki Faction

In the end, Karmal avoided having to put Khalkis in leading government positions. Soltan Ali Keshtmand, a Parchami and a Karmal supporter, became Deputy Prime Minister. He was among those people who had been tortured by the Khalkis under Amin. Keshtmand comes from a minority group, the Hazaras; they are the mongoloid inhabitants of the central valleys of the Hindu Kush. They had always been considered especially inferior and hence they had suffered brutal treatment by the traditional master race, the Pushtus. The fact that a Hazare could become a prime minister is considered more or less a sensation by Afghans, even those who are living in exile in Europe. Most of them, however, assume that this development might even intensify the fighting with Khalkis of Pushtu origin.

Abdorrashid Arian, a Khalki who had replaced Sarwari--who had been sent to Mongolia--11 months ago as deputy prime minister and minister of justice, was sent "upstairs" to the presidium of the Revolutionary Council and was thus eliminated. The office of the chief of the Secret Service, which continues to be a very important post, also remained in the hands of a Parchami, Najibullah, who became a member of the politburo as well. Two Parchamis, Abdul Kader--a former pilot who later became head of the Air Force and who was the main organizer of the two coups d'etat in 1973 and 1978--and Gul Aqa became vice-presidents. Watangar, the other important officer in the uprising, is closer to the Khalki faction. He remained minister of communications but at the same time he was moved to the politburo. The presidium was expanded and now consists of 11 members, 2 of them Khalkis. The general impression is that Karmal succeeded in sidestepping the

plan supported by his Russian mentors, the intention of which was to create a balance between Parchamis and Khalkis, and in the end he was able to continue strengthening the preponderance of his own faction in the government.

Brisk Activity by Freedom Fighters

Nevertheless, all these power struggles within the government of Kabul are only of secondary importance, because the government together with the protective Soviet occupation troops only controls major road systems and the more important cities. But even in those locations they are increasingly challenged by freedom fighters. During the week between 8 and 14 June the military airport of Baghram was attacked by partisans. Next to Kabul it is the most important airport in the country, and many Soviet fighter planes and helicopters are stationed there. Apparently they filled drainage ditches leading to the airport with gasoline and set them on fire. It caused enormous fires and explosions of stored ammunition. According to eyewitnesses, endangered planes left the airport immediately. The road from Kabul to Baghram was closed after the attack and again 4 days later. The attack occurred on the anniversary of the execution of Majid Khlakhani, a well-known leader of the partisans. In Parwan, his home province, there were many other raids, among them the shelling of the house of the governor of the province. There were also reports of two major attacks on the main road over the Salang Pass to the Soviet Union, and, furthermore, of the desertion of 200 men from the Afghan troops in Jevel Sarraj located on the same main road and of fierce fighting in the area that occurred on Friday and Saturday last week.

In Kandahar the rebels still seem to stay in the suburbs and the surrounding areas. The government paper of Kabul reports that party workers in that city had transported the city's grain supplies from the interior of the city to the airport; apparently it was feared that inside the city they would fall into the hands of the rebels. Kabul's state television reported that religious leaders of the city of Kandahar had talked to the governor and complained about the steadily deteriorating living conditions and continuous raids by rebels.

Extended Compulsory Military Service

According to Radio Kabul, gatherings are currently taking place within the army, during which the soldiers are declaring their willingness to extend their military service voluntarily "until the rebels are defeated." But background reports show that the government has extended compulsory military service in certain cases by 6 months, in others by 12 months. Last December police units in Kabul mutinied because the government had unilaterally extended their years of service. According to the same sources, young people are frequently stopped in the streets and forced into military service although they have not even reached the age for the military draft. They also reported that a 15-year-old had been shot to death during such a military barricade in the capital when he tried to flee; his name had been Abdurrahim.

It was said that fierce fighting had also broken out in the former summer residence of the Afghan kings, located in the immediate vicinity of the capital, and at a dam near Kabul. Reports by journalists who had accompanied the rebels as they were moving through the country indicated that in many cases weapons were now available that could destroy tanks. But the number of civilians leaving the

country is also rising constantly; it appears that the number of refugees has now surpassed 2 million people. The refuge movement presents a severe danger for the rebel groups because they depend for food and support on the farmers who are gradually depopulating the mountain valleys. Their obvious attempt of recent months to move the fighting into the vicinity of the cities and suburbs might in part be linked with the necessity of protecting the population in the open country as far as possible from counterstrikes and annihilating attacks by Soviet airplanes and tanks.

8991
CSO: 4620/1

EX-CHIEF OF NIOC SEES KHOMEYNI SLIPPING FAST

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Jul 81 pp 92-93

[SPIEGEL interview with Hasan Nazih, former head of the Iranian Oil Company: "Khomeyni Has Lied to the People and Cheated Them"]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Nazih, the bomb attack on the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party has deprived the party of its most important people. What does the future hold?

Nazih: The present situation is the result of the utter abuse of power by the reactionary mullahs. Things have reached a point where Khomeyni is calling on parents to denounce their children and vice versa.

SPIEGEL: You yourself were a member of Khomeyni's leadership team. Has the regime really come to be that far removed from its original ideals?

Nazih: What do you mean, "member of Khomeyni's leadership team"? I had been chairman of the Iranian Bar Association and wanted to remain such. During the time of the shah I had publicly defended the strikes of the petroleum workers. Therefore, at the request of the petroleum workers, I was asked by Prime Minister Bazargan to assume the post of general manager of the National Iranian Oil Company, with Khomeyni reluctantly putting up with it.

SPIEGEL: But once you were part of it, you went along?

Nazih: I was merely general manager of the petroleum industry. I was never on Khomeyni's leadership team. I saw through Khomeyni's plans from the start and at Neauphle-le-Chateau drew his attention to his promises to the Iranian people. I repeatedly criticized the mullahs' machinations. And I was definitely aware of what the consequences of such criticism would be.

SPIEGEL: So why did you go along in the first place? Was it your hope that through a detour via Khomeyni the Iranian people might find their way to true democracy?

Nazih: At Neuphle-le-Chateau, Khomeyni had given assurances both publicly and to me personally that he had no intention whatsoever of assuming governmental powers but that he considered himself merely a spiritual leader.

SPIEGEL: Did Khomeyni purposely deceive you about his true intentions, or do you think that events got the better of him and that he spontaneously placed himself at the head of the nation?

Nazih: He abused the wave of support by the masses, which hailed him as a symbol of the revolution, to establish a so-called Islamic republic. The Iranian people had fought for freedom, independence and profound social reforms. In other words, he ignored the aims of the revolution contrary to his previous intentions.

SPIEGEL: In his writings he had never left the slightest doubt about the nature of his political philosophy.

Nazih: During his time in Paris, Khomeyni never publicly advocated his political philosophy or his intentions. Nor did we believe then that he would take brutal steps to realize his political philosophy. He simply lied to the people and cheated them. He tried to turn back the clock by 1,400 years, and in fact he almost managed to do so by varied manipulation of the masses and by abusing their religious feelings.

SPIEGEL: How about the civilian politicians? Did they perhaps intend to use Khomeyni only as a tool in order to assume power themselves later?

Nazih: We did in fact think that we need not fear the mullahs because 1) only a small part of the mullahs had any political ambitions (which, incidentally, is true to this day) and 2) we were sure of the liberal and moderate ayatollahs.

SPIEGEL: Such as Ayatollah Shariat Madari...

Nazih: Not only him but Ayatollahs Taleghani and Rafsandsharni and others.

SPIEGEL: Taleghani died before he could stay Khomeyni's hand. Was he Khomeyni's great antagonist?

Nazih: He was the ayatollah who was also accepted by the broad masses of the people. But he was systematically isolated. Later he even had to hide and sleep at a different place every night. In order to defame him with the masses, Khomeyni even charged that he was trying to show off as an idol. He wanted to prevent that, he said.

SPIEGEL: How was it possible for the mullahs, who really had hardly any political experience, to get rid of experienced politicians?

Nazih: Beheshti was so clever as to form conspiratorial cells, everywhere at an early stage, from which later to found his IRP. His people had the mission to hinder the technocrats in their work and to paralyze the government apparatus and systematically to seize power.

SPIEGEL: They were mullahs and functionaries of the Islamic Republican Party?

Nazih: Predominantly so, but also people of the Tudeh Party, which from the start pulled on the same rope as Beheshti in the hope that they themselves would come to power after the mullahs had destroyed the old structures but then proved incapable of exercising government power. The mullahs have achieved their aim, the Tudeh Party not as yet.

SPIEGEL: And then you yourself fell victim to Beheshti's conspirators.

Nazih: I was a thorn in the mullahs' side. They, therefore, constantly looked for a reason to remove me from the petroleum industry in order to bring it under their influence.

SPIEGEL: You never had any direct access to the top political leadership?

Nazih: No, I never wanted to.

SPIEGEL: Who then was part of it?

Nazih: The top leadership consisted of Rafsandshani, Beheshti and Muzawi Ardebeli. Bazargan never played a big role; he prepared the way for the mullahs to assume power. He was merely kept informed--if that. He was constantly reprimanded by Khomeyni. When he went to Qum to see Khomeyni and requested that the so-called Council of Experts be dissolved (which was meeting under Beheshti's chairmanship) Khomeyni chewed him out like a schoolboy. According to reliable reports, he shouted at him: "Put your request back in your pocket and scram, or I will bash your face in." Intimidated, the prime minister went back to Tehran with his request.

SPIEGEL: The so-called Employees Association of the Iranian central bank accused the country's religious leaders of extensive embezzlement and massive corruption. Did that in fact happen already during your time?

Nazih: I can give an accurate answer only as far as my area is concerned. On several occasions, clerics came to see me asking for one to three tanks of oil for European friends of Beheshti's or Rafsandshani's. They made no secret of the fact that they had been bribed and asked me what kind of cut I wanted.

SPIEGEL: What did the go-between in fact rake in on the average?

Nazih: I never permitted such deals and did everything I could to nip such things in the bud. Of course, I thus incurred the enmity of Messrs Beheshti and Rafsandshani.

SPIEGEL: And how were things under your successor, Ali Akbar Moinfar?

Nazih: It went ahead on a large scale. Only, I think, Moinfar can hardly be held responsible, for Beheshti had got hold of the entire oil sphere and, therefore, of course was also the main person to benefit.

SPIEGEL: How many millions did you turn over per day on the average?

Nazih: In my time--1979--the turnover was about 75 million dollars a day. I had proposed that one daily intake each be provided for individual provinces in order to promote their development. Ayatollah Rafsandshani, acting speaker of parliament at the time, demanded the authority to dispose of the amounts provided for the Provinces of Khuzistan and Kurdistan, to a value of 150 million dollars. Since I suspected that this sum might be used for another purpose and misappropriated, I, of course, refused his request. He never forgave me for that.

SPIEGEL: So, in your opinion, the mullah regime is virtually already at an end?

Nazih: I think the mullahs are through in Iran. The mass arrests and execution even of minors are a clear indication of their weakness. I think they no longer have any chance to continue ruling in Iran.

SPIEGEL: And who will follow the mullahs?

Nazih: Certainly not those who collaborated with the shah. It can only be forces that persistently pursue the aims of the revolution, that fight for a democratic republic in Iran and that are known for sure to have the masses of the Iranian people behind them and aside them and not against them.

8790
CSO: 4620/4

MONTAZERI ADVOCATES EXPORT OF ISLAM 'BUT NOT TO GRAB LAND'

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Jul 81 p 8

[Text] Tehran (Pars)--Ayatollah Montazeri in an interview with Arabic magazine Al-Azmane Arabiyah published in Sharjah said, "We will export Islam to all countries, but it does not mean that we have any designs upon other territories.

Our aim is Islam not land."

In another part of his interview Ayatollah Montazeri, about the separation of politics and religion, said that since the first days of Islam religion was not separate from politics. The matter was brought up for the first time by non-Moslems and imperialists and that was in order to dominate the Islamic countries.

Ayatollah Montazeri, regarding the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic, said that Iran would be the friend of those who did not want to impose anything upon us or to make us its colony. "We do not want to put a wall around ourselves but would struggle against those who plot against us," he said.

He then concerning the countries of the region said that Iran would not interfere in the affairs of the countries of the region at all. We are interested to have relations with these countries based on friendship and cooperation, he added.

"We are not at war with the countries of the region but we are aware that some of these countries gave a lot of aid to Iraq."

He stated that our position with due regard to the other countries stance before us:

Except Iraq and countries waging war upon us--is open to review. He then stressed, "there would be no peace with Iraq and countries waging war on us. We have no hostility with the Iraqi Moslem nation--rather it was the Iraqi regime which started the war.

He concluded that unlike other revolutions that were followed by martial law, arrests, suppression of the press censorship, after the achievement of revolution all political groups, even the Communists, benefitted from freedom, of activities, demonstrations, and other legal freedoms.

Only groups who plot against the Islamic Republic and have connection with foreigners are not allowed to have activities. The borders of freedom in Islam limited once this freedom is used to conspire against Islam.

CSO: 4600/92

UAE BLASTED FOR DEMANDING THREE IRANIAN GULF ISLANDS

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in English 16 Jul 81 pp 1, 3

[Text] Under immense pressure from Saddam, Sadat and King Khalid, who are associated with the supreme influence of the U. S.-Israel policy, the United Arab Emirates (U. A. E.) was politically obliged to get involved in a dangerous, critical catastrophe, by recently assuming an antagonistic attitude towards the Islamic Republic of Iran and claiming possession of three Iranian islands.

Within the historical perspective, the authenticity of the political status of the U. A. E. would be justified amidst the historical domination of imperialism over the world. It is quite evident that the U. A. E. as well as Israel, are countries which have been newly imposed upon the Middle East region. After all, Iran, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Iraq and Egypt are the genuine nations in the Middle East, endowed with countries of historical inheritance.

As a matter of fact, the treacherous policies of the infidel belligerent Superpowers have made indispensable contribution to the advent of a new country, namely, the U. A. E. The expansionist colonizers should be questioned as to the origins of this newly-founded country.

On the other hand, we are aware of the fact that the U. A. E. has been dragged towards such a calamity, despite her reluctance, because a simple deduction will tell us that the declaration of war against the Islamic Republic of Iran will certainly jeopardize the socio-political security of the U. A. E. After all, the adaption of such a belligerent policy foreshadows the assailant attitude of the U. A. E. towards the other Arab nations in their aspiration towards the independent righteous path of Islam.

In the long run, the Arab nations are justified in being emancipated from the domination of the East and the West. In fact, the Iraqi imposed war has been a dastardly conspiracy contrived, in the guise of preserving the interests of the U. A. E. through the restoration of the three Iranian islands. Still, Saddam had the misconceived belief that, by a surprise attack upon Iran, he would be regarded in the Arab world as a heroic conqueror.

Furthermore, the avaricious temperment of Saddam would prevent him from sharing his phoney privilege with a trivial country such as the U. A. E. Moreover, Saddam is aware of the fact that the U. A. E. is not endowed with such an

overwhelming military potential as to pose a serious threat to the consolidation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, the autocratic ruler, Saddam, justifies his belligerent nature in terms of his military aggression against Iran.

Nowadays, Saddam's Ba'athist regime is doomed to ultimate collapse, the mightly fortress of his Government has been shattered. Consequently, the imperialistic countries are determined to substitute Iraqi military aggression with the political assailancy of the U. A. E. Thus, Saddam will be accomodated with the precious opportunity of withdrawing the Iraqi mercenaries from the war scene.

In this respect, the expansionist imperialists will be provided with a flimsy excuse to launch attacks upon Khuzistan in the guise of defending the U. A. E. along with the interests of the other Arab nations. Despite such a foxy policy though, the imperialist U. S. has never posed a serious threat to the security of Israel. It is no wonder that the occupying regime of Qods is metaphorically defined as a "dagger in the heart of the Arab nations."

Two years ago we predicted that the antagonistic policy of the U. S. toward the impoverished nations, especially the oppressed nations in the Middle East region, would ultimately metamorphosize the Persian Gulf in to the cemetery of the American mercenaries. We declare though that the devout Moslems are quite determined to safeguard the territorial integrity of Iran along with Islamic values. In quest of such sacred objectives, we are decisive in resisting to the last drop of blood.

Still, the U. A. E. should be aware that her new efforts are thoroughly futile, since they are in contrast with the pragmatic measures that the U. A. E. rulers, like the Iraqi authorities have adopted so as to substantiate their decrepit regimes with the assistance of the Egyptian and Jordanian soldiers. Consequently, it is more advisable for the U. A. E. authorities to concern themselves with social welfare and peaceful measures rather than with the instigation of a war.

It is an undeniable conviction that any military maneuver in the Middle East will coincide with the ultimate triumph of the suppressed nations over the imperialist politicians. Thus, the preservation of peace is quite indispensable to the survival of the U. A. E. whereby the U. A. E. will be able to maintain her political status with supreme honor.

The U. A. E. will only be able to achieve a peaceful, compatible existence by the adoption of a righteous, independent policy, whereby the opportunist U. S. and Zionist Israel would not be able to abuse the U. A. E. as a scape goat in quest of their expansionist objectives.

CSO: 4600/92

'TAGHOOT'--A QURANIC TERM DEFINED

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Jul 81 p 8

[Text] Every revolution has a specific culture and language according to which the nature and basis of that revolution can be understood, and its opposite trends can be identified and frustrated. It is, in fact, on the basis of such a culture that the criteria for revolutionary values and standards would become evident, and thus evaluations would remain immune from any deviations.

Among the terms employed during the Iranian Islamic Revolution, was "Taghoot". However, care should be taken in understanding the meaning of this word, its repercussions and those whom it includes. In the light of the fact that the nature of the Iranian Revolution is Islamic, therefore, revolutionary terms, expressions and slogans should be naturally studied from the ideological point of view. For this reason and in an attempt to recognize the meaning of Taghoot and its dimensions we get inspirations from the Holy Quran. Of course, in so doing, we try to make very short analysis derived from the Holy Quran, otherwise a complete survey of the matter would need long discussions and debates, which could not be included in this essay.

Taghoot

The terms is derived from the word "Toghian" which means the highest level of disobedience and violation. Therefore, Taghoot is referred to as a violator who rejects all the genuine traditions of life, that exist in connection with human perfection.

The Holy Quran has explained the term "Taghoot", and its dimensions and characteristics in eight instances. Here we briefly refer to them:

1. Taghoot, a Symbol of Mental Slavery:

"And (as for) those who keep off from the worship of the Taghoots and turn to Allah, they shall have good news, therefore give good news to my servants. Those who listen to the word, then follow the best of it; those are they whom Allah has guided, and those it is who are the men of understanding. (Sura Zumar, Verses 17, 18)."

In this verse, the worship of God and worship of Taghoot have been expressed and the most significant privilege of these two kinds of worship has been interpreted in mental "freedom" and "slavery". The Quran has reminded us that the rejection of Taghoot and the inclination to worship God, depend on contemplation, insight and the power of recognition. Meanwhile, in other verses, the Quran says that the worship of Taghoot, Satan and idols, is due to the lack of insight and meditation. In conclusion, we can say that Taghoot, in an attempt to preserve power for exploitation would also try to keep people removed from realities and truth, so that 'it' could impose on them 'its' words and thoughts. In this connection, to foil this ominous objective, a comparison between words and conceptions would be valuable.

2. Taghoot, an Agent of Reaction:

"Have you not seen those who assert that they believe in what has been revealed before you? They desire to summon one another to the judgement of the Taghoot, though they were commanded to deny him, and the Satan desires to lead them astray into a remote error. (Sura Nisa, Verse 60)."

This verse clearly describes the process

of breaking down ideological revolutions and the regresson to Taghooti procedures and sovereignty. In other verses, a thorough description has been given on the role of hypocrites who are symbols of reaction and who always try to prevent the progress of ideological measures through their reactionary tactics. It has further referred to the rule of justice and equity, which owes its power to obedience to the leader and the preservation of unity. To get an overall view, we can say that hypocrites (hidden taghoots) intend through spending money and by resorting to instigating acts, to break down the leadership and introduce self serving changes in policy and stands, to violate the divine systems and turn the "revolution" to "reaction." By so doing, they would lay the grounds for reinstating the great taghoots into power.

In defining "reaction", we can say that reaction is the revival of false traditions of exploitation, dictatorship, and colonialism, in any form and appearance they might be. Inversely, the revival and return of pure traditions and the hidden realities of life which exist in the statements of the Prophets, not only is not a reaction but is, in itself, a source of progress. However, the revival of the policies of colonialism and dictatorship, which are based on lies, tyrannies, crimes and provocations, is considered a reactionary and taghooti maneuver whether in Eastern or Western form, and whether it is rightist or leftist.

3. Taghoot, a Manifestation of Eclecticism:

"Have you not seen those to whom a portion of the Book has been given? They believe in idols and false deities and say of those who disbelieve. These are better guided in the path than those who believe. (Sura Nisa, Verse 51)."

In this verse, eclectic programs have been considered a factor in assuming Taghoot. There are people who implement some ideological knowledge, on the basis of idolatry. They are neither familiar nor unfamiliar with all the ideological realities; and these hybrid thoughts pave the way for the sovereignty of Taghoot and its worship. First, they believe in different idols and then in Taghoot. It is for this same reason that taghoots in history have never opposed the various kinds of idolatries, because the latter is an introduction for the worship of the former.

In conclusion, it could be said that Taghoot, with its multicolored countenance, that is, a partially religious partly atheistic view and by taking advantage of eclectic thoughts and programs, would lay the ground for the establishment of its sovereignty, assisted by the society's "small taghoots."

4. Taghoot, Origin of Compulsion, Source of Fraud:

"There is no compulsion in religion; truly the right way has become distinct from error; therefore, whoever disbelieves in Allah, he indeed has laid hold on the firmest handle, which shall not break off, and Allah is Hearing, Knowing. (Sura Baqara, Verse 256)."

In this verse, the basis for the worship of God and Taghoot has been described in connection with three things, namely compulsion, deception and weakness. In worshipping God, there is no sign of any of these qualities. There is no compulsion in religion and there is no deceit in actions, and no infirmity and weakness in effects.

5. Taghoot, Cause of Darkness and Gloom:

"Allah is the guardian of those who believe. He brings them out of the darkness into the light, and (as to) those who disbelieve, their guardians are satans who take them out of the light into the darkness; they are the inmates of the fire, in it they shall abide. (Sura Baqara, Verse 257)."

This verse refers to gloom and the spread of darkness in the society, as one of the characteristics of Taghoot. By spreading darkness and obscurity in human minds, Taghoot promulgates wretchedness in an attempt to hide its own ugly face.

6. Taghoot, an Agent to Metamorphose Human Beings:

"Say: Shall I inform you of (him who is) worse than this in retribution from Allah (worse is he) whom Allah has cursed and brought His wrath upon, and of whom He made apes and swine, and he who served the satan, these are worse in place and more erring from the straight path. (Sura Maida, Verse 60)."

Taghoot tries to destroy man's independence by inspiring decadent ideology in his mind, infecting him, and thus forcing him to give up unconditionally.

7. Taghoot, Conspirational and Deceitful:

"Those who believe fight in the way of Allah, and those who disbelieve fight in the way of Satan. Fight therefore against the friends of Satan surely the strategy of the satan is weak. (Sura Nisa, Verse 76)."

Satan has taken form in the body of Taghoot, whose whole being is complete devilishness and full of conspiracy. However, Taghooti conspiracies, even though inspired by suitable expertise, are weak and infirm, because they misinterpret the realities of life.

8. Taghoot, Liar and Deceiver:

"And certainly, We raised in every nation an apostle saying: Serve Allah and shun the Satan. So there were some of them whom Allah guided and there were others against whom error was due, therefore travel in the land, then see what was the end of the rejectors. (Sura Nahl, Verse 16)."

This verse refers to Taghoot as an origin of perversion. Therefore, in an attempt to cause confusion and utmost perversion, Taghoot endeavors to denigrate religious beliefs and thus quell the religions ideas of the people.

By utilizing these eight verses on "Taghoot" from the Holy Quran, it is now understood that Taghoot, contrary to the imagination of some people is not restricted to dictators and butchers like pharaohs, Caesars, kings, Hitlers, and so on. Rather, Taghoot is any filthy element, who, by resorting to conspiracies, deception, provocation and taking advantage of myriad ideologies tends to break down the pure cultural, military, political and social foundations and cause sedition, discord, confusion, panic and constraining of righteous action in the society.

Therefore, the Muslims are duty-bound, according to their ideological mission, to keep away from such elements, and eventually to fight against them, regardless of their being rightist, leftist, Western, Eastern, internal or foreign, so that crimes and disturbances would be eliminated and that all the programs would become divine.

CSO: 4600/93

RAMADAN DISCUSSES EFFECTS OF WAR

London 8 DAYS in English No 28, 18 Jul 81 pp 13-15

[Interview with Taha Yassin Ramadan, first deputy premier, member of the Baath national and regional leadership, and C-in-C of the Iraqi Popular Army]

[Text]

Question: Two years ago, when I last spoke to you, Iraq was in privileged position. The Baghdad summit had given it the leadership of Gulf and anti-Camp David Arab countries, while the non-aligned summit scheduled for 1982 in Baghdad was to grant it a prominent position in that movement too. Then came the war with Iran and a certain degree of isolation. How do you assess the situation now?

Answer: I do not think that the situation you describe suffered major changes, however much our enemies would like to believe it. On the contrary, developments such as the war have consolidated it by confirming — in trying circumstances — the firmness and coherence of our policies. The non-aligned movement welcomed evidence that we are not subject to any superpower. The Arab nation had its faith in us confirmed by the ways we were prepared to defend it against all aggressions.

In front of the Arab masses, and I deliberately say masses and not governments, our role has been vindicated. We do not seek any leadership. It is a matter of polarising Arab expectations and will, and this stems from our political line, not from any quest for leadership. We have never been isolated. The war has made us stronger both among the Arabs and the non-aligned.

There has certainly been an improvement in inter-Arab relations, manifested particularly by the apparent thaw between Iraq and Syria, and by the visit of Libyan number two, Major Jalloud. Can you comment on the latter?

It has been a preliminary contact and not much can be said about it yet. Libya might have realised that Iraq does not only fight for itself, but for the entire Arab nation. But practical effects of this have not materialised yet. Should they take place, we shall appreciate and applaud.

Foreign commentators are often confused over your international alignments. You, on the other hand, always insist on your absolute independence from both superpowers. How have recent events, such as your own visit to Moscow and Iraq's call for a general Arab boycott of the US, affected this stand?

In Moscow we have indeed found a positive atmosphere and a genuine desire to maintain friendly relations. We discussed the cooling of our relations in recent months, we told them what we thought of their attitude on the Iraqi-Iranian war, and we exchanged points of view on other matters.

I can say that all this has really been very fruitful. The result was a much better understanding of our respective positions in the framework of a renewed spirit of trust and confidence. Final results may not have been at the level of our expectations, but they certainly represent a great step forward.

And does your call for a boycott indicate a worsening of relations with Washington? Is it realistic?

We certainly want the call to have practical repercussions. So far, however, nothing has been done in this respect — and on the basis of what we understand of the

Arab world, we do not expect much to happen.

It is the overall Arab position that needs correcting. Had there been a firm and united Arab position from the start, Iran would not have waged war against Iraq, the Israeli raid would not have taken place, and the US would not have been able to adopt its present policies on the Arabs, nor to support Israel unconditionally.

Such a firm position demands an overall economic and political boycott of the US. The US had long built up Iran as an American base against the Arabs, and Iran has now tried to carry out its US-assigned mission.

What do you find more worrying, the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, or of US troops in Oman, Diego Garcia and on the Awacs overflying Saudi territory and possibly guiding Israeli aircraft against Arab targets?

Our policy is constant and clear. Iraq is against any interference from outside powers into the affairs of the Arab nation. We expressed our condemnation of the Afghanistan intervention and have always been against US bases.

This policy is not going to change. Our president made as much clear in his eight-point Arab charter of last February. Any foreign presence in a country threatens war and destabilises the area. It does not protect anybody, but rather calls for more foreign intervention.

Do you think that world reactions to the Tammuz bombing represent a shift in international attitudes on Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict?

We have greatly appreciated these reactions supporting Iraq and condemning Israel. Our policy on scientific and technological development will remain exactly the same — if anything, the bombing has strengthened our determination. Our traditional friends have confirmed their support and aid for our plans.

We have also learned a lesson. Our partners in this process will be more diverse and numerous. The weaknesses that permitted the raid will be removed.

The bombing proved two points worldwide. For one, that Israel is not a peaceful country seeking secure borders, but expansionist and aggressive, an entity implanted in the Middle East to carry out aggressions against the Arab nation. Secondly, it showed that Israel, a minority in the area, could impose itself on the majority, the Arabs, because of its control of science and technology. Now everybody knows that only science and technology can redress the balance between the Arabs and Israel; and the Arabs have learned that only Iraq is serious in its determination to do something about this. There is no gap between slogans and o[illegible]s here.

Saddam Hussein has just called for the industrialised world to help the Arabs acquire the bomb. Do you not think that such a call may justify zionist charges that Iraq was always after nuclear weapons, and may thus embarrass your suppliers of nuclear technology?

In fact the president did not precisely make such a call. He merely stressed that Israel has always lived by blackmail. There is a balance between the two blocs, and the Arabs' friends should help us to put an end to Israel's blackmail. The Arabs want to discourage Israel, not to destroy it. As to Iraq, we stick to our loyal commitment to IAAE rules and controls.

What is the outlook for the war with Iran? Is an end in sight?

The end or continuation of the war does not depend on one single will, but on both sides in the conflict.

Do you think that the ousting of Bani Sadr and the subsequent turmoil in Iran are going to affect the war?

The events involving Bani Sadr and Beheshti are only a beginning. Given that Iran is losing the war, Bani Sadr's successors will be held equally responsible as he. In our view, this is the start of a civil war in that country. It shows that those who wanted the war against Iraq acted against the will of the Iranian peoples. All we hope for is that Iran may find a reasonable and wise ruling group, capable of governing, restoring the economy, and promoting development in the service of the people. In this case, dialogue would become possible and a solution easily be found.

A new US Arab strategy seems to be taking shape. It consists of the establishment of a belt of pro-western regimes through North Africa down to the Gulf. What is Iraq's response to this?

The US presence in this belt is not new. Recent events have only emphasised it. Our position is not new either. It has been repeated from the Baghdad summit to the president's statement of 8 February, calling for a ban on all foreign military presence and for a minimum common Arab stand on this.

There is a big difference between friendship and accepting a foreign presence on your soil. The only solution is the Arabs' solidarity among themselves.

In rejecting superpower tutelage, Iraq has long been seeking privileged relations with Europe. In the light of recent developments, including the strengthening in Europe of forces friendly to Israel and Camp David, how does this policy fare?

Arab policies towards any country cannot be dictated by reactions to this or that event, but must be constant and based on overall factors. The change that has taken place in France is a deep one. Yet our relations are not affected, for they are between countries and not between factions.

CSO: 4300/64

DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED IN LIGHT OF WAR

London 8 DAYS in English No 28, 18 Jul 81 pp 10-13

[Article by Fulvio Grimaldi]

[Text]

IRAQ'S PAPERS and television news bulletins are crammed with reports from the war, battle scenes, the departures of army or militia contingents to the front, and images of Saddam Hussein decorating soldiers. Dispatches from the battlegrounds offer little variation from one day to the next: Iranian losses usually range between 200 and 300, with the occasional jump to 600, while 'Iraqi martyrs' rarely exceed 20 or 30.

However, since the figures given for destroyed Iraqi equipment have more than once exceeded that lost by Iran, these bulletins are considered basically trustworthy by foreign correspondents. The higher kill rate given for one side is explained away through the different interpretations of military matters.

Iraqis follow the news from Abadan, Kasr Elshrin, Ahwaz or Dezful with evident interest. In the national conscience, the identification with the war and its problems is deep and widespread. But the ten-month old conflict does not affect the average Iraqi's life strongly, either psychologically or materially, and foreign visitors have difficulty in detecting any manifest sign of it in Baghdad or elsewhere. The decreasing number of Persian pilots, and the many aircraft lost so far in the conflict, have made air raids a distant memory for most citizens — except those in Basra, which is within range of Iran's 205mm artillery at Abadan.

The rubble from earlier bombing strikes has been removed, and today the only signs of air activity over the capital are the red balloons put up to trap attacking planes.

Life goes on as usual in all respects and Iraqis have, to all intents, learned to live with the war. The price of basic commodities has risen only slightly and consumer goods are generally available. In the splendid holiday cottages of Habenieh, one of the Baghdadis' favoured weekend resorts, weddings are still celebrated, and nothing seems to be bothering the large — and proud — families visiting the exhibition of captured war material at Zawra Park.

Within Baghdad itself, preparations for next year's eagerly awaited non-aligned summit, which will hand over the chairmanship of the movement to President Saddam Hussein, are to be seen in new bridges, roads, subways, and huge public buildings in attractive Arab style. Journeys into the countryside offer similar impressive vistas of activity, possibly even more hectic than before.

Indeed, the whole country seems to be one huge building site. New farming villages, industrial plants, and residential districts — all with the inevitable children's playgrounds — line the highways, manned by the same Finnish, Italian, French or Yugoslav teams. Several of them went home at the outbreak of the war, but have now returned.

The scenery is occasionally blocked by long queues of trucks carrying equipment or consumer goods all the way from Romania, East and West Germany, and Scandinavia. With the war virtually at a halt, attention has returned to the business of development. On the other hand, the widely reported breakdown of Iran's

economic, social and political structure fosters a general mood of calm and confidence — however much it is the 'Persian priests' that are singled out for contempt and resentment, as opposed to the 'Iranian peoples', who are basically pitied.

Such a mood is spiced with the unavoidable flow of jokes and anecdotes. Have you heard the one about that recently captured medical officer who was travelling along the road from Ahwaz to Abadan, and confidently told a baffled Iraqi patrol that his three million dinars were to pay the wages of the Iranian troops in . . . Basra?

Another, less amusing yarn, concerns a Phantom shot down over Baghdad, from which only one of the two pilots ejected. Asked where his comrade was, the surviving pilot explained that, being a *pasdaran* (Khomeini guard), he had preferred to fly on to heaven.

It is the secular outlook of the Iraqis, after 13 years of Baath rule, and the priority they consequently give to present life and deeds, which lies at the bottom of this serenity and determination. Outside observers have often announced Saddam Hussein's imminent downfall as a consequence of this or that setback, such as the war's endless grinding on or the humiliation of the Tammuz bombing. Why this did not occur was explained to *8 Days* by Tariq Aziz, the regime's number three, with the customary description of a people which, after the years of progress and renewed dignity, greatly identifies with its leadership.

'But there is more to this,' he told *8 Days*. 'It is a characteristic of ours to forget individual misfortunes in the moment of crisis. Furthermore, by beating the Iranians from the first week, Iraq attained the first-ever victory of the Arabs in modern times. This has given all Arabs self confidence.'

The rising rates of investment, production and productivity support such an assessment. The country's trade, as the minister in charge of it, Hassan Ali, told *8 Days*, has never suffered from the negative effects of the war. Allocations for the import programme have risen this year by 25.6 per cent, 20.5 per cent of it going on consumer goods and 44.5 per cent on capital goods. The war has allowed for a further extension of the public sector (32 per cent trade, 40 per cent industry) to the detriment of the private sector (2 and 5 per cent respectively).

Leaving aside oil, the minister added, exports of fertilisers, blankets, tractors and cigarettes have decreased — in favour mainly of dates, where an excellent crop is expected this year too — but will still generate some $40m in revenues. The Baghdad international fair, slated for October, will be bigger and more diversified than ever, he concluded, and has had its site expanded.

This optimism is shared at the planning ministry, where Sabah Kachachi, former director-general and now adviser to the minister, proudly points to the investment figures. The 1981 development programme was allocated $2.5bn, which is 30 per cent more than in 1980. 'If it surprises people that we manage to invest more in war than in peace,' he comments, 'it is because they do not realise that not all developing and oil-producing countries put all their eggs into one basket.'

Kachachi continued: 'I would not claim that the war had no effect on the economy. But after many months of war the effect, particularly on development projects, has been minimal. The reason for this is that both our development programmes and capabilities have a much deeper dimension than is usually thought. Indeed, certain aspects of the war were even positive, inasmuch as it made us pull out a bigger effort to prove ourselves.'

Adjustments in development priorities have naturally had to be adopted, but not to the extent generally anticipated. Some less crucial sectors — infrastructure, for instance — had to suffer delays. 'The reason we manage to hold out,' said Kachachi, 'is the flexibility of programmes which has always marked our planning. Re-adjustments may have put back this or that project, but they did not affect either overall targets or the intensity of development.'

Israel's bombing of the Tammuz nuclear reactor has produced a unanimous reaction: Iraq has a perfect right to develop its nuclear technology and catch up with Israel 'on behalf of the entire Arab nation'. Kachachi concluded: 'Nobody will ever draw the line for our development, whether at plastics, blood plasma research or nuclear technology. Never.'

CSO: 4300/64

FUND ESTABLISHED TO AID WAR VICTIMS

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 13 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Akram Dhannoun]

[Text] **A special fund was recently established to the benefit of victims of the Persian aggression on Iraq in response to country-wide requests to regulate the flow of donations from Iraqi and Arab citizens.**

Mr. Husham Hassan Tawfiq, under-secretary of the ministry of finance said that popular demand to donate funds in support of war victims and the necessity of regulating receipt and channelling such funds had provided reason for the creation of the fund.

He said that thousands of applications and letters were sent directly to the President of the Republic and to the Diwan of the Presidency of the Republic urging that a specific body be named to which such funds could be addressed.

Many applicants were from among citizens of other Arab countries asking to be permitted to make their own contributions to families of the martyrs and the fighters and in order to assist in the war effort against the racist Persian enemy. They reiterated that such contributions would only be a humble gesture to appreciate the role of the victims and the fighters in defence of the homeland.

The under-secretary, who was speaking to the Baghdad Observer, added that a decision was, therefore, made to create the fund. A high committee was formed and provincial committees went into operation for the purpose of collecting contributions offered by Iraqis and Arabs inside the country.

"No sooner than the committees started work, thousands of Iraqis and Arabs resident in Iraq began to hand in their financial contributions. There have been contributions represented even the savings of children", he said. Committees were then set up in all Iraqi embassies and reports from these committees speak of extremely positive results with contributions coming from Iraqis and Arabs abroad.

The under-secretary said that contributed money were being remitted systematically to the special fund which now has its headquarters in Baghdad. These money are channelled in the form of financial grants to families of the martyrs and to those affected in any way by the Persian aggression.

"The contributions thus made are in fact more of a social assistance rendered by citizens in expression of their sharing in the sufferings of families of the martyrs and appreciation of those soldiers injured in the fighting whilst repulsing the persian aggression and to help those whose property was damaged by the aggressors", said Mr. Tawfiq.

He indicated that the revolution by its laws had already secured full material and financial redress to those families and to injured soldiers. The full financial compensation provided by laws has already fully covered all affected families and persons.

"The fund is only created in response to the massive popular demands. It will now provide additional financial support to repair whatever material damage caused and to reward families of the martyrs and wounded soldiers", he said.

"The fund's regulations ensure compensation for damaged property with effect from the date the damage was inflicted beginning from 4th September 1980, the date on which the racist Persian aggression started against Iraqi border towns"

According to the ministry under-secretary, compensation is paid in proportion to the amount of damage caused to persons or property. Compensation committees of the fund are now investigating and assessing damage caused to citizens. Their reports are sent to the fund higher committee and the latter recommend provincial committee assessment for approval by the first deputy prime minister. With regards to compensation in cases of martyrdom or physical injuries, the related family or person is compensated directly by the provincial committees without needing to obtain further approvals. The fund has no timelimit and will continue operational as long as the Persian aggression countinued.

CSO: 4300/66

IRRIGATION EXPERIMENTS DISCUSSED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 11 Jul 81 p 4

[Text] Agricultural authorities in the autonomy region have been actively seeking the most advanced and scientific methods of agriculture and irrigation in a massive drive to effect an gricultural take-off in the northern provinces.

There, it was soon discovered, that drip and spray methods of irrigation could be instrumental in achieving such an agricultural revolution. This method of irrigation, it was realized, provided the most efficient and productive method of exploiting the water supplies. The sparing use of water meant that wide areas of arable land could be irrigated.

A pilot project utilizing this method of irrigation is already underway in Zakho, Duhouk Province. This project is made of two adjacent units, the first covering 1560 donums (1 donum-2500 sq.m.) to be irrigated by spray methods while the second, covering 200 donums, is to rely on drip irrigation.

The project is fully supplied with spray equipments, as well as other machinary for different stages of the agricultural process. Already, 1000 doums out of the 1560 donums of the spray project has been tilled with various seed crops, including beens, peas and melons.

The drip method is used to irrigate 200 donums of orchards. According to this method each tree will receive no more water than what it actually needs. This of course will vary according to the tree's age. alredy 100 donums to be irrigated this way have been planted with peach seeds.

An ambitious wide-scale application of this method of irrigation in Duhouk is planned, which is to cover 15 thousand donums in Slivani Plain and another 15 thousand donums in Sumail plain. Other studies are looking into the efficacy of applying this method of irrigation to a big irrigation project in Zakho which could cover 43 thousand donums.

CSO: 4300/66

ROAD, HOUSING PROJECTS COMPLETED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 6 Jul 81 p 4

[Text] The Ministry of Housing and Construction will complete this year 1300 km-long network of roads at a cost of over 101 million Iraqi Dinars, Mr. Mohammed Fadhl Hussein, Minister of Housing and Reconstruction said on July 4.

Mr. Hussein told Iraqi News Agency that the Ministry had earlier embarked on constuction of nearly 9000 km long network of roads spread all over the country at a total cost of 640 million dinars.

He added that work was underway to build 20 bridges costing 171 million dinars, 12 of which would be complete this year. Work was also underway on 6 large road junction projects in Baghdad and other provinces at a cost of 75 million dinars.

As regards to the 1300 km long eastern express way, stretching up to the Syrian, Jordanian borders, to be built at cost of 120 million dinars, the Minister said that work was already underway in 8 stages out of the project's 10 stages. The remaining 2 stages will be soon awarded to international specialist companies, he said.

The Minister announced that the first stage of a second express way, which begins from Baghdad and stretches northwards up to the Turkish border, will soon be put to tender and so will the tender for the first stage of the 60 million dinars road of Baghdad-Abu Ghraib.

(Housing)

With respest to housing the Ministry had completed the construction of over 7 thousand housing units spread over 16 provinces at a cost of over 72 million dinars and there are another 9 thousand units costing 26 million dinars still under construction, he explained.

He also noted that the Ministry was expanding its capacity in the field of prefabricated housing plants. Presently three new such plants are being built, which will enhance the speed of house construction as well as improve their quality and effect saving in construction labour and materials.

On the same level, the Ministry had built a number of mobile and fixed intermmediate construction material plants.

CSO: 4300/66

REVOLUTION ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY NEW PROJECT ANNOUNCEMENTS

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 8 Jul 81 p 4

[Text] Unions and state departments all over the country continue their preparations to celebrate the 13th anniversary of the July 17 Revolution.

The Ministry of Endowments and religious affairs will celebrate the occasion by opening a number of projects built at a total cost of ID. 8.5 million. These include a number of residential multi-storey buildings and a rest house in Baghdad and another in Nineveh province, a hotel in Kerbala province, in addition to 20 mosques in the Northern provinces of Sulimaniyah and Arbil.

In the Northern province of Dohouk, 4 million dinars projects will be opened, and the foundation stone for others costing ID. 5 million will be laid down. Among the projects to be opened are a marketing centre, a textile factory and numerous service projects. Moreover, the province is preparing a number of sport and art programmes and other social activities on the occasion.

The Agriculture and agrarian reform board in Arbil province submitted a number of projects for tender, at a cost of ID. 300 thousand.

These projects, which should be completed within a year, include two veterinary hospitals with houses, two marketing centres, a warehouse of 500 tonnes capacity, and a stable.

More projects costing 1.5 million dinars will be opened in Babylon province including among others, a tourist hotel and service projects. The celebrations will include laying the foundation-stone for schools and village electrification projects. On the other hand youth and students of Babylon are preparing art and culture festivals and other activities on the occasion.

Similar activities and programmes, will take place in other provinces to mark the occasion.

Meanwhile, the Irrigation Ministry inagurates a number of projects and starts work on several others in commemoration of the July Revolution. These include seven pedestrian bridges at Hindiya district and nearby regions; eight houses for irrigation employees in Kerbala, and two others in Mahaweel. The Projects on which work will begin, include coating Sardawe canal, regulating the second stage of the Shaqlawa drainage canals; the Salameyah irrigation project and six dams in Qadissiya province.

Foundation stones will also be laid for a rest-house for Irrigation employees in Shaqlawa; a house and office building for Irrigation units in Kerbala Province.

CSO: 4300/66

'HA'ARETZ' EXAMINES BEGIN 'DOCTRINE'

TA191238 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 9

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Begin Doctrine"]

[Text] After the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the prime minister and minister of defense, in his statements, set a new and unambiguous rule in Israel's security policy. Mr Menahem Begin repeated that Israel would not permit the Arabs to equip themselves with weapons intended for mass destruction. It was clear that he was not only referring to his period in office as prime minister. On one occasion he sand that, by destroying the Iraqi reactor he had set a precedent for any future prime minister of Israel. This is a new doctrine. It means that Israel will regard an Arab attempt to produce nuclear arms as an act of war. It is worth noting that Begin, in his remarks, did not restrict himself only to nuclear weapons. He spoke about weapons intended for mass destruction, and this makes matters far more difficult for Israel. From this it follows that he was obviously also referring to lethal biological weapons capable of hitting a large population and lethal gases that could also be used as weapons for mass destruction. In the nuclear field, it was Iraq that took the first steps, but, in the field of chemical weapons, the Arabs have already taken various actions. Egypt was not content with the use of gas in the Yemen war, but got down to the manufacture of certain types of gases. Before the Yom Kippur war, it took the trouble to transfer quantities of gas to the Syrians.

The question is whether Begin's doctrine can be put into effect, especially as it covers such a broad field. Following the daring and "clean" air force operation against the Iraqi reactor, Israel's deterrent power against the Arabs has increased. That operation will leave a deeply etched impression on the Arabs for a long time. Israel's image of being capable of being "unbalanced" and taking the most drastic steps will increase in Arab eyes. For some time various experts have been claiming that over the last few years Israel has begun to seem to the Arabs--particularly after the peace with Egypt--as too cautious, giving too much consideration to the risks it takes. The overexposure to the Egyptians, in both the social and security fields, also cut down on the size of Israel's deterrence. The destruction of the Iraqi reactor will block this trend. The Arabs and their supporters will again draw the conclusion that there is also an unexpected element in Israel's reactions and that it is sometimes capable of acting as an unbalanced country when it is a matter of existence, the physical security of the country and the people.

This is one of the positive results of the bombing of the reactor especially when it is clear that, because of the new U.S. strategy, Washington will flow enormous quantities of modern arms to Arabs and in a few years the qualitative gap will decrease from 1:3 to 1:5 or more to Israel's disadvantage. The danger also springs from the fact that, parallel to the massive supplies of arms, Saudi Arabia will succeed in influencing the United States not to incorporate Israel in the regional arrangements and to leave it "outside." Therefore, it is for all sides--including Saudi Arabia, which declared a jihad against Israel, adding that it would finance the establishment of a new nuclear reactor in Iraq--to know that Israel is capable of an unexpected move if it is pushed into a corner and its calm is undermined. The Arabs describe such moves as unbalanced (inter alia, they recall threats by Israelis to bomb oil wells in Saudi Arabia), but, in reality, it is not unbalanced if it is a question of a comprehensive strategy, of unbalance committed with wisdom.

Whatever Israel's deterrent power, it is clear that it cannot solve all the security problems confronting it. This is only a partial answer to the doctrine defined by Begin. Even if we were a superpower, it is doubtful if this doctrine could be used. The process of producing weapons of mass destruction can be held up, disrupted and a very high price can be demanded from those who involve themselves in it, but it cannot be entirely prevented. How can we know if Arab countries will not try in the future to make bad use of the reactors they establish? And how can a secret process of producing nuclear weapons, far from the reactors, be prevented? It is certainly even more difficult to prevent the maintenance and storage of poisonous gases or biological arms. Even from the geographical viewpoint, it is hard for Israel to actualize such a doctrine when there is the possibility of Arab cooperation with a country as far away as Pakistan. And what will we do if the Soviet Union positions nuclear arms in an Arab country, as it has done in Europe? An excellent air force is a long-range strategic arm, but even the best air force cannot give the answer to every problem arising in this field, particularly in view of the technological developments expected in the next few years. It is worth assuming that after the destruction of the reactor, everything will be done in Iraq to close the gaps in the field of aerial defense, and the same applies to Saudi Arabia (which will in the future be equipped with AWACS aircraft) in whose airspace the Israeli planes have been flying.

The reference, then, is to a doctrine of suspension and from this it follows that we must assume that some time in the future the Arabs will succeed in obtaining nuclear weapons. In the meantime we have certain advantages, but it is clear that the ideal solution to this is not fighting, but a stable peace and regional settlements.

The struggle does not only take the form of fighting. We will also be forced to face difficult political and publicity competition. The Israeli weakness in this field is, to no small extent, caused by its refusal to sign the nuclear nonproliferation agreement. It is difficult to explain why the country that has not signed the agreement has destroyed another country's nuclear reactor, a country that allowed supervision by the International Atomic Energy Commission. Here we have a contradiction. We claim that it is possible to get out of the agreement by an announcement made several months in advance. If this is so, many are asking, why is Israel refusing to sign it? The trouble is that our publicity in this field is too slow, too academic in its approach and too often handed over to people who have an

inclination toward exaggerated underground tendencies creating an impression in advance that our whole intention is to conceal something.

Almost the only positive step taken in this field is the proposal put forward by Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir at the previous UN General Assembly in September 1980 for nuclear disarmament in the area. The intention was a regional disarmament, modeled on that in Latin America, in which countries that did not sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty are also partners, and this also includes a guarantee by the two superpowers not to position nuclear weapons in the area. Shamir proposed the convening of a regional conference on this topic, but the Arab countries did not give any reply to the proposal. Iraq turned it down outright.

Before Israel destroyed the Iraqi reactor, almost no serious debate was held about Israel's existing possibilities in the nuclear sphere. The argument, if one can call it an argument, has mainly been held between professors. Apart from Moshe Dayan, there has been nobody in the government who has been prepared to say a word on the issue. It is clear that, on this issue, there is an unnatural repression: it would be a mistake to think that this ignoring [of the matter] conceals behind it an Israeli nuclear strategy. Israel has no nuclear strategy. It has a political-nuclear view expressed in its decision not to sign the treaty and to persist in its policy of not being the first to introduce nuclear arms into the area. But this is not a strategy, or even the beginnings of a strategy. It is sufficient to compare Israel with a country such as Sweden, for example, in the sphere of atomic diversity and the plans for national stability. In this sphere we are not even in grade one. An underground store of gas in large caves, as recently presented in the center of the country, is only a first step, and a small one, in this sphere. Plans are lacking and the absence of an argument is tangible, particularly toward a period in which the issue will be raised, either as a part of the new doctrine laid down by Menahem Begin, or as an essential issue in any regional settelment and peace agreement.

CSO: 4323/28

TZIPORI, GUR INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON RAIDS

TA172018 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 17 Jul 81

[Interview with Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori and Reserves Lt Gen Mordekhay Gur by military correspondent Dan Semama in the television studio--17 July, videotaped]

[Text] [Semama] Mr Tzipori, this afternoon the air force attacked the terrorist organizations' command headquarters in Beirut for the first time. What has happened now, that a decision was made to attack the command headquarters inside Beirut, inside a populated area?

[Tzipori] First, we had already attacked the command headquarters some years ago; it is true that it was with an infantry force that reached there somehow. The decision to attack the command headquarters was made in view of the fact that those command headquarters are the operational center for all the terrorist bodies, both as concerns the state of Israel and its inhabitants and as concerns Jewish institutions throughout the world or, other elements in the world, not only Jews. And then, as it were, a situation was created that within Beirut which, as it were--Beirut should be ruled by the Lebanese authorities--murderous people are sitting, with complete security, sending murderers against the state of Israel and others in the world, taking upon themselves the responsibility for the acts of murder and they are, as it were, defended and we, because of our great sensitivity to the issue that, heaven forbid, civilians should not be harmed, were very cautious and we reached the conclusion that we must hit the heads, altogether in the places which give the terrorists the cover and give cover to their command headquarters; they take the responsibility upon themselves. And, in view of their great strengthening and the power of the indiscriminating actions, including today's hit at the Nahariyya hospital too, at the maternity ward; it was decided to deal with the heads and that is what happened.

[Semama] That is, this means a change in Israeli policy and attacking terrorists even if they are located in populated areas?

[Tzipori] This is not a change in policy. We will try, as far as possible, to avoid hitting civilians, but if they want to receive the cover of the civilians for acts of murdering Jews, we will have to act against them, and we hope that those civilians within whom they are trying to mix in will condemn them.

[Semama] Yesterday the chief of staff said: We will hit the terrorists even if they settle in civilian centers, and there was indeed today's action. Do you not fear, or think, that there may be a very severe diplomatic, political reaction after this attack?

[Gur] In the past, too, we were sometimes forced to hit terrorists when they settled in population centers. On almost all the borders. From now on, the question really is one of both the quantity of casualties and the political howl various countries in the world want to set up. For example, Carter's administration, for much smaller things than that, would send up shrieks to the high heavens. Reagan's administration understands us much better and it understands Israel's compulsions much more fully, but I assess that, if there are many casualties, a political question of first degree will arise. Undoubtedly it will also arise with us, in its moral aspects which have always been our guiding light, but each time that this returns again it again brings this question up in a sharp form. I would propose that we prepare for a political situation that could be a completely new one.

[Tzipori] Recently, over the last few months, there has been an enormous strengthening there. Libya, the Eastern Bloc countries, Syria, have armed these terrorists with more sophisticated weapons--for example, Katyusha launchers carried on vehicles, with 40 launchers, 21 launchers; they have received heavy artillery such as that artillery which has shelled Nahariyya over the last few days, 130 mm artillery; they have received tanks. A great strengthening. We have seen how a greater danger has been building up and do not need this danger to be inside our homes before we deal with it. Therefore we have begun more massive actions in order to prevent in advance the possibility that all this strength should be thrown against the citizens of the state of Israel and we would have to deal with this, how can I put it, post factum.

[Semama] But are you convinced of the efficacy of those actions, after, in fact, we have seen the script? We act and they attack and we act again and they attack again.

[Tzipori] I am not convinced of the results of the actions there have been to date, but I am convinced that we have several other solutions in our pocket and if this message we are giving them is insufficient for them to stop their attempts to murder the citizens of Israel, we will have another message.

[Gur] To reach a situation in which no katyushs will fall on the Galilee panhandle or on Qiryat Shemona or on settlements, moshavim, kibbutzim along the border--this requires action on a much broader scale. I am not sure that this is the intention, but, as I said earlier, if the speed and strength of the operations, from both sides, goes on like this, there may very well be developments which nobody wants today.

[Semama] Mr Gur, do you think that the government of Israel, after the recent IDF actions, has adopted a certain policy? Are we moving in the direction of total, physical extermination of the terrorists, if this is at all possible, or, perhaps, is there more long-term thinking, that is, some sort of a political settlement which would solve the problem?

[Gur] Let us begin with the fact that I hope that the intention is to reach a political settlement, because to reach a total extermination of terrorists is impossible unless we really conquer the whole of Lebanon, or bomb on a scale beyond what is reasonable for the state of Israel and the IDF. It is impossible to solve the Palestinian problem only by using force. It is impossible to solve the problem of the Syrian presence in Lebanon only by using force, because then it will be a question of war on a much wider scale. So, I believe and hope that Israel's aim today is to explain to both the Syrians and the terrorists that we will not accept the situation that has been prevalent over the last few weeks and they must take their fate into their own hands and they must put things in order. If this does not happen, again, not in the form of a threat and not in the form of a guess--to my great regret, relying on past experience, matters certainly may deteriorate to a much wider scale and I repeat: to the best of my knowledge, nobody wants this; people in Israel certainly do not want it.

[Semama--repeating the question for Tzipori] Are we moving toward physical, total extermination of all the terrorists or, perhaps, if at all possible, toward thinking about a political solution for a longer term?

[Tzipori] We are moving, and I hope that this message will be sufficient both for the world's countries and for the Arab world, that a regime of law in Lebanon must be implemented and the government of Lebanon must be given sifficient power to enable it to disarm the terrorists and know that its border is a quiet one. Jordan was able to do this; Syria--Syria is pushing the terrorists into acting against the state of Israel, there are no actions against the state of Israel from the Syrian border. [Sentence as heard] There are almost no actions against the state of Israel from the Jordanian border. Even from the Egyptian border, before there was peace, there were no terrorist actions. This means that the solution must be a solution under the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities or anyone who stands behind them, a solution that the issue of a free country as a center of international terror or as a center for a war against the state of Israel will cease and that they should impose a rule of law and there should be no command headquarters of murderers sitting in the capital city of Lebanon, murderers who boast of the murders of children, babies, women or old people. The solution must--I hope that it will be in that direction--be that the government of Lebanon, with everyone who should help them, will overcome that problem and again turn that border into a peaceful one.

CSO: 4323/28

DISMAY VOICED IN JERUSALEM AT U.S. STANCE

TA231147 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jul 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by 'Uzi Benziman]

[Text] Acrid criticism is being voiced in Jerusalem at the measure of trustworthiness displayed by the United States, at its capability of conducting itself like an ally at its capacity to meet its commitments arising out of the Camp David accords.

In the past 24 hours, government circles in Jerusalem have been complaining about the American approach as manifest in the decision to maintain the suspension of F-16 deliveries to Israel and in the angry note addressed by Alexander Haig to the prime minister, demanding that Israel "immediately" cease its attacks on the terrorists in Lebanon. Among the complaints heard:

Unlike the Soviet Union, which affords constant support to its proteges and does not expose them to public criticism, the United States is all too ready to attack publicly its ally (Israel), to issue warnings and to impose penalties (suspension of the planes).

Washington indulges in double-talk with Israel: the secretary of state himself has in the space of a week addressed two contradictory notes to the prime minister. Whereas in the first Alexander Haig praised the ties between Israel and the United States, in the second letter he was not loath to cast blame on Israel (it is embarrassing President Reagan) and gave backing to the administration's decision to strike at the relations between the two countries.

The United States is not a dependable patron: it submits to pressures from the European countries and Saudi Arabia and strikes at Israel, which it calls its ally and friend.

Washington harms the Camp David accords and undermines the political reality created in the Middle East. Israel has given up Sinai and the peninsula's strategic assets, doing so inter alia in return for U.S. readiness to make compensation through the supply of sophisticated weaponry. Now Washington breaks its commitments in this respect, thereby imperiling the peace process set up at Camp David, which to a large extent is based on the assumption that Israel is assured of firm support from the United States.

The cabinet will today renew its deliberations on the situation in Lebanon.

CSO: 4323/28

U.S. POLICY, WEINBERGER CRITICISM ATTACKED

TA261013 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Jul 81 p 7

[Commentary by Eliyahu Salpeter: "They Are Trying to Confuse the Truth"]

[Text] Stinging comments by a U.S. minister do not have to anger us more--or concern us less--even if his name is Weinberger and he claims that he is not of Jewish origin. The circumcision ceremony is less important in this case than his rich past at the top of the (Bechtel) Corporation which has contract and construction ties worth $10 billion (!) in Saudi Arabia.

The trouble with Mr Weinberger's criticism is that he is first and foremost one of President Reagan's closest friends; and, secondly, that the Saudi Arabian interests which brought him into the innermost sanctum are indeed genuine U.S. interests which work, influence and convert people in the business world that so richly influences Washington.

In contrast to this, the advantage of Weinberger's remarks is that this is Weinberger and that is his way and that is very convenient. The man is well known as someone who is not sympathetic to Israel, as one who leans toward exaggerating in his criticism of us and heaping praise on the Saudi Arabian monarchy's democracies. With such a man, on the surface, it is not necessary to seriously argue because, after all, he hates Israel and everything about it, and what can be done? In fact, the devil is not so terrible! There is a little criticism, but the president will not personally join in the attacks on Begin.

This is not the first time such a thing has happened say authoritative sources in the prime minister's office, and we should not exaggerate the gravity of the tension in the relations between Israel and the United States. It is true that this contradicts what was said 2 days earlier about the fact that the prime minister was angry, saying that it had never happened to Israel that Washington should violate a signed agreement about weapons supplies; but the katyushas that fell on Qiryat Shemona also contradicted remarks made by Mr Begin and, altogether, a man should not be judged when he is angry. And Mr Begin, as we said, is very angry with Washington.

And why is the prime minister angry?

After all, the chairman of the Knesset defense and foreign affairs committee explained very well the petty considerations guiding Washington in its damaging criticism of Israel: the United States is scared of being identified with us, it is even trying to defend its interests in the Arab world. Apparently there is no limit to the selfishness of the non-Jews.

What does it matter what is said in Washington, anyway? People in Qiryat Shemona are still crying "Begin, king of Israel"--at least, those who have not yet left the place. What a good thing that they added color television to the list of appliances for the purpose of compensation; color television is not only important before the elections, but after them, too....

And in the prime minister's office, as Qol Yisra'el announces, they have at last found the genuine culprit guilty of all the troubles: the communications media are guilty of a "short" created between Jerusalem and Washington. Very simple. And, as for the descriptions of the horrors of hundreds of civilian casualties in the Beirut bombing, the same report by "prime minister's office sources" has a completely simple explanation: "correspondents who are influenced and incited by the PLO' are responsible for the reports from Beirut. Not pictures in the international press, not pictures seen on television screens all over the world, but several incited correspondents....

The prime minister has also rejected the criticism of Jewish leaders ("not everyone who contributes to the bonds is a leader") and was going to write some harsh words to Secretary of State Haig, because the Americans "kept quiet when the Syrians slaughtered Christians" (the person in charge of Israeli publicity in the United States may even again remind the Americans of the massacre they made of the Indians in the 19th century....)

Getting down to it, there is something very dangerous when a government tries to convince the public that black is not black and a blow is a friendly pat; this might not only convince Greenspan from Nahariyya and Abut-ul from Qiryat Shemona, but--and perhaps, first and foremost--Menahem Begin in Jerusalem. We have never had such a hostile public opinion and press in the United States as we have now; it has never happened that the administration, congress and the U.S. press--all three of them!--set up such a critical tone against us as has happened this time. However, instead of stopping and examining what, in fact, happened (and how matters may, perhaps, be corrected), the government rushes to scatter headlines saying that all this is, in fact, only bad old Weinberger and not good Reagan.

A well known and recognized method. And, after all, Mr Begin never received anything from the U.S. president except for the "friendliest letter of his life." The U.S. president, whether Republican or Democrat, is a courteous man who is scrupulous about the rules of protocol. He couches even the harshest words in diplomatic language. Therefore, the prime minister can always quote "my very dear friend" in the last sentence and forget everything that was said in the middle.

The question, of course, is how long can the method of announcements compete with the reality in the field.

--During the months preceding the elections, it was explained to the Israeli people (and, finally, to the non-Jews, as well) that the policy of initiated attacks [as opposed to actions taken in retaliation] against terrorist concentrations was gaining enormous success and that there were no longer any attacks, infiltrations and firing. After the elections the government suddenly disclosed (at least, to the public) that there were most dangerous concentrations of terrorists across the border and so they would have to be hit with full force in order to destroy the infrastructure and disrupt their attempts to organize themselves.

The question arises whether the great attempts at getting organized only began on 1 July 1981, or had they been going on even before that (as Ze'ev Schiff published in HA'ARETZ back in May). And if the organization already started several months previously, was the absence of terrorist actions really entirely the fruit of the Israeli attacks, or did the terrorists simply refrain from constant activity during the time they were reorganizing? And if there was reorganization--why did it not elicit any reaction before the elections?

--How many "command headquarters" do the PLO and the other terrorist organizations have? Not a day passes without an announcement about "precise hits" and this or that command headquarters, for some reason, are not in the command headquarters. What is the definition of a "command headquarters" for the needs of the Israeli public? Is there anything in the comments by foreign correspondents in Beirut who jeer at the terrorists' tendency to call any desk with a telephone and a man in uniform a "headquarters?"

--Mr Reagan and Mr Haig always repeat that Israel is a friend and ally of the United States. This is pleasant and important. But, perhaps, there is more than one interpretation of this term, particularly if it does not prevent leveling damaging criticism at the ally, does not prevent support for votes condemning Israel in the United Nations and does not prevent the freezing of the arms shipments intended for Israel, so that perhaps the interpretations of Messrs Reagan and Haig is not the same as that of the prime minister of Israel?

If there was an active opposition in Israel, it might have raised these questions for public argument. But the Labor Party is still in a state of shock resulting from the election results and its leader declares that this is not the time for him to get into arguments with the prime minister. Perhaps this is an understandable approach on the part of someone who was deluged with salvos of tomatoes at the Maymuna celebrations, but it is not a wise approach on the part of someone who wants to educate the Israeli public to see reality and cope with it without illusions.

CSO: 4323/28

'MA'ARIV' DISCUSSES U.S. CONTACTS WITH PLO, ISRAELI REACTION

TA281049 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] Reports received in Jerusalem on an improvement in the PLO's image and standing in the eyes of the American public and about pressure exerted by several congressmen and by low-level administration officials to reexamine American policy regarding the terrorist organization have aroused concern among senior political circles in the Israeli capital.

At a Foreign Ministry meeting it was decided to immediately intensify diplomatic and information activities in an effort to undermine initiatives for a direct dialogue between Washington and the PLO. The most striking indication of the change of approach to the PLO was an editorial published by the influential WASHINGTON POST newspaper which called on the administration to hold direct contacts with the PLO.

According to the information received in Jerusalem, Saudi Arabia is putting heavy pressure on the American administration to begin a direct dialogue with the PLO, which is presented by Saudi as a moderate organization. Further reports were received in Jerusalem that Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat is planning to put forward a proposal to President Reagan during their forthcoming meeting in Washington to include the PLO in the next phases of the autonomy negotiations.

It was also learned in Jerusalem that the belief is gaining in the U.S. Administration that a way should be found to conduct a dialogue with the PLO in order to make progress in the autonomy talks and on other issues pertaining to the Middle East dispute, particularly the Lebanon crisis.

State department officials were reported as having said recently in off-the-record briefings that the United States will eventually have to find some way of conducting a dialogue with the PLO since without a green light from this organization there is no hope of promoting a Middle East settlement.

According to evaluations made in Israel, the U.S. Administration is encouraged by the results obtained through the indirect contacts with the PLO concerning the Lebanon crisis and might therefore expand these contacts.

CSO:4323/29

PAPER SEES PLO STATUS STRENGTHENING

TA231108 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 23 Jul 81 p 3

[Commentary by Banko Adar: "Cease-Fire Negotiations--With Whom?"]

[Excerpt] No wonder 'Arafat sent Waldheim his conditions for agreeing to a cease-fire on the Lebanon-Israeli border in a hurry. In the 6 days since the incidents started, the status of the PLO improved enormously, to the point where that organization became in the world's eyes the chief factor on which peace in the Middle East depends. The hopes that extremist Palestinian leaders invested in Menahem Begin's rule have indeed materialized in the wake of recent incidents on the northern border.

On the eve of the elections in Israel, 'Arafat declared that "Begin is the greatest ally of the Palestinian movement," and PLO sympathizers in the territories openly told Israeli reporters that they were interested in the "Herut" leader's victory, as his aggressive policy against the Palestinians and his opposition to any political solution of their problem would unite the Palestinians and the world against Israel, and strengthen the status of the PLO. It is reasonable to assume therefore, that since Begin's declaration of 10 May that "katyushas will no longer fall on Qiryat Shemona" and until after the elections in Israel, the PLO refrained meticulosuly from firing katyushas on Qiryat Shemona or other settlements in the north, so as not to endanger the prospects of Menahem Begin's reelection.

Last week's incidents showed clearly that the timing of the resumption of the katyusha fire on northern settlements was by no means incidental. 'Arafat could have fired rockets also before the elections, had he wished to do so, but he decided to fulfill Menahem Begin's pledge of "no more katyushas' up to the elections, a period in which the PLO meticulously abstained from any exchanges of fire in the northern sector.

Israel's reaction to the terrorists' provocation only strengthened their status. Hopes that the bombing of the bridges would cause a serious lack of military hardware in southern Lebanon proved to have been futile, and the attack on the terrorist headquarters in Beirut, in which 80 percent of the casualties (according to none other than Israeli sources) were civilians, strengthened the PLO status in Lebanon and caused Israeli immeasurable political harm. The fact that Israel is compelled to enlist in its war against the terrorists major components of its

military power and the prime minister's statements describing the PLO as "an army equipped from head to toe, threatening to liquidate us," transformed the terrorist organization into a factor without whose participation in a dialogue (direct or indirect) a peace-making would be impossible.

The partial acquiescence of the prime minister to the U.S. demand for a cease-fire constitutes a withdrawal from his basic position, according to which terrorists should continue to be fought until they are liquidated. The government postulated at the same time, however, that it would not agree to direct or indirect negotiations with the terrorist organizations, a decision in which it turns a blind eye to a political reality of its own making. Not only the United Nations, but also the Americans are conducting negotiations with the PLO, even if for diplomatic reasons the contacts are secret or via a third party. Israel's consent to submit to U.S. pressure and agree to a cease-fire constitutes—even if it claims the opposite—an impressive and important political victory for the PLO.

CSO: 4323/28

MAPAM, HADASH ON CEASE-FIRE IN NORTH

TA251751 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1713 GMT 25 Jul 81

[Text] Tel Aviv, 25 Jul--MAPAM secretary-general, Victor Shem-tov, has reacted to the cease-fire, saying that the agreement on the cease-fire is the only correct step Mr Begin has made since the beginning of the Lebanese missile crisis. Israel has made every conceivable mistake in that crisis. Mr Begin now owes the Israeli people an answer to two questions: first, whether the purpose of the massive attack by the air force was to destroy the terrorist organizations' military infrastructure. If so, it is clear to all that the cease-fire will be taken advantage of by the terrorists to rehabilitate that infrastructure. So, were the destruction in the north and the victims of the bloodshed--the dead and the wounded--all in vain? The second question addressed to Mr Begin is why he does not have the public courage to admit that the cease-fire in Lebanon was obtained through an indirect dialogue with the PLO. Why was it necessary to promote Yasir 'Arafat to the rank of president of Lebanon--as he was presented? It was not Mr Sarkis who shot the katyushas at Qiryat Shemona and Nahariyya. It was 'Arafat. Without the consent of the head of the terrorists, the fire would not have ceased.

Knesset member Me'ir Wilner has said: It is a good thing to have a cease-fire between Israel and, in fact, the PLO. But it is a bad thing that the Begin government had not agreed to it earlier; in contrast, Yasir 'Arafat had accepted the UN Security Council resolution on the cease-fire at once. The bloodshed in the last 2 weeks has come out of the government's initiative and culminated in a political failure for the Begin government on the one hand; and it has strengthened the PLO on the other. The situation that has been created reinforces the urgent need to establish a just peace by setting up a Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel.

CSO: 4323/28

'HA'ARETZ' CRITICIZES ISRAELI ACTION IN LEBANON

TA281345 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Jul 81 P 11

[Text] The recent military confrontation between Israel and the terrorist organizations in Lebanon is an event with clear-cut time limits. The start and finish of which are well known and the developments of which are clear to one and all. It would therefore be fitting for the government and the prime minister to give an accounting to the nation of their considerations in initiating the confrontation of the expectations guiding them during its course and of the motives that inspired them to conclude that confrontation. The recent war against the terrorists enables every Israeli citizen to test the government's handling of this vital and sensitive issue that involves not only the security of the state but also the loss of lives.

Mr Begin and his 15 cabinet members owe us an explanation as to what inspired them to order the air force on Friday, 10 July, to resume attacking the terrorists in Lebanon after long weeks of calm. Why were pilots on that day sent to bomb terrorist positions in the al-Zaharani area, while negotiations were under way between the government and the U.S. Administration on canceling the suspension of the four F-16 planes whose shipment from the United States had been delayed in the wake of the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq?

We want to know, Mr Begin and members of the cabinet, why the air force held its fire for 3 months preceding 10 July, if indeed it was necessary to employ the air arm to disrupt the new military deployment of the terrorists in Lebanon? Was it really absolutely necessary to dispatch the fliers that day and shatter the tranquility that prevailed in Galilee? And, if that was indeed the case, why did nobody prepare residents in the north for the ensuing difficult period? Was there a special reason for disrupting the tourist season in the region? Why were no preparations made to organize the life of residents in shelters? Was the terrorist reaction to the air force attack properly foreseen?

As a rank-and-file citizen, I tried to get answers to these questions. All I could find out was that some time after the elections the prime minister recommended to his colleagues, the ministers, that the air force be put into action. The ministers accepted the recommendation. They do not know why the initiative was not made before 10 July. Was it due to the elections, or perhaps because of Philip Habib's mediations? If indeed the latter consideration guided the prime minister's approach--it is not clear why it had not been taken into account also around 10 July, as Mr. Habib was at that time also endeavoring to

bring about a withdrawal of the Syrian missiles from Lebanon. In any event, the ministers were told that detailed information exists facilitating to attack and disrupt the terrorist military deployment, and that Habib's mission need not interfere with this, as it was taking too long and must not make us submit to the danger of the strengthened terrorist deployment in Lebanon. It also transpires that the ministers were told that the terrorists might react to the air force raids by Latyusha fire on settlements in the north, but nobody foresaw at that stage a massive terrorist reaction of the kind witnessed on 15 July, when the whole northern sector from Nahariyya to the Galilee panhandle was shelled, an attack resulting in 3 dead and 25 wounded.

Respected cabinet members, we want to know what considerations guided you in adopting the decision to bomb the terrorist headquarters in Beirut on Friday, 17 July. Was such a large number of civilian losses taken into account? Was there reliable information on hand indicating that there were good prospects of hitting terrorist leaders in their headquarters or disrupting their control over units in the field? Did anyone mention to you the fact that on that day heads of the Western countries were meeting in Ottawa? What did you want to accomplish in that attack? What U.S. reaction did you foresee and how did you prepare for it? What actions did you take to cope with the waves of anti-Israeli publicity? In what way did you prepare for the expected military reaction of the terrorist organizations (whose capabilities you were able to judge as early as on 15 July)?

As a rank-and-file Israeli looking for answers to these questions I find that the government itself was stunned by the huge proportions of the blow inflicted on the Beirut population as a result of the air force attack. As no such far-reaching blow to Lebanon's citizens had been foreseen, the ministers failed to anticipate the U.S. reaction, or President Reagan's embarrassment in his talks with Western leaders at Montebello Castle, as well as the bad impression the attack had on U.S. public opinion. Because of the surprise that the results of the air force attack inflicted on the ministers themselves, no suitable Israeli information campaign could have been prepared. For the same reason--but also due to organizational deficiencies--residents in the north, and particularly those in Qiryat Shemona, were not prepared to withstand the massive terrorist shellings that came in the wake of the air force operation in Beirut. At that stage the defense establishment was already aware of the terrorists' ability to harrass settlements in the north most painfully, but by then it was too late to create conditions in the north, and especially in Qiryat Shemona, which would make life under fire sufferable.

We would also like to know why the government did not continue with its method and failed in winding up its all-out war against the terrorists which it started on 10 July? Why did it submit to an American dictate, accepting without demur conditions for a cease-fire which Philip Habib imposed on behalf of President Reagan (a cessation of hostile activities, without any guarantees insuring a prevention of terrorist redeployment in southern Lebanon--even though, it will be recalled, this had been the reason for the Israeli attack on 10 July). Why, Mr Begin, did you make such high-handed statements to the cabinet and public (in the course of your last visit at Qiryat Shemona) about an early solution to the Katyusha problem, and why did you renege as soon as you felt the pressure of the U.S. Administration? You, who believed in the efficacy of an armed confrontation with the PLO--why did you check it before completion? After such heavy losses to

life, property and morale have been inflicted in the settlements of the north. After relations with the United States have been reduced to an all-time low--why did you not, at least, exhaust the profit you hoped to achieve from the attack against the terrorists?

We are directing the same question to the cabinet. How is it possible that 15 men of authority and the highest responsibility say yes to the will and views of one man, Mr Begin? When he urges a military offensive, he is given full support by most of his colleagues in the cabinet, except for Yiga'el Yadin, and when he recommends the holding of fire, he again has full backing (except for Ari'el Sharon). Has none of the ministers an independent stand, his own sense of judgment? Did you not ask yourselves any of the aforesaid layman's questions when adopting the string of decisions that resulted in the confrontation with the terrorists between the 10 and 24 July? How can a rank-and-file citizen rely on you when he sees the results of your considerations?

Can anyone up there at the seat of government in Jerusalem face the nation and point out the state of Israel's accomplishments following the armed confrontation in Lebanon? What has, in fact, changed between 9 and 25 July in terms of the terrorist deployment and their ability to harrass northern settlements? What did the Israeli nation profit from its government's policy that resulted in seven dead, dozens of wounded, vast damage to property, immeasurable harm to the northern settlers' morale in a grave erosion of Israel's status in the world, in a most serious disruption in U.S.-Israeli relations, in betraying our weakness to withstand U.S. pressures, in granting a new status to the PLO, in harming the IDF's deterrence capability, in the demeaning of the state of Israel, in arousing internal strife in Israel?

There is still the possibility that the incident is not over yet. There may be more to come and, in view of future developments, the incidents between 10 and 24 July may appear in a different light.

This is the hope with which Mr Begin's aides and cabinet ministers are flirting. Political activity is expected which would remove the PLO from Lebanon (or, at least, from the south of that country). An alternative option is also being discussed, mainly that the PLO will violate the cease-fire and provide the IDF with an excuse for completing the job the air force started on 10 July.

To judge by the wisdom the government showed in the last 2 weeks, the rank and file citizen may well have doubts about the credibility of such predictions and considerations. The layman who, unlike a minister who has access to intelligence assessments and IDF evaluations, is asking himself, will the same compulsions (internal or outside ones) which forced Mr Begin and his ministers to unconditionally surrender to U.S. demands and agree to a cease-fire not be reflected again, and with a vengeance, if the IDF sets out to finish the job in Lebanon in the future? The rank-and-file citizen will also be asking whether a military operation, no matter how extensive, will remove the Katyushas from the border (see the results of the Litani operation), and whether this will solve the Palestinian problem.

CSO: 4323/29

TZIPORI ON SITUATION ALONG NORTHERN BORDER

TA241528 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 24 Jul 81 pp 5, 26 Weekly Supplement

[Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori interviewed by Refa'el Bashan--time and place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] One gains the impression that on the northern border, the State of Israel has entered a vicious circle and a deadening from which there is no exit. We bomb the infrastructure of the terrorist concentrations almost on a daily basis and a few hours later they fire Katyushas at the settlements in the Galilee panhandle; the IDF again drops bombs on them and they again open fire with long-range artillery--and this has been going on for 8 days. Is this campaign going to evolve into "a war of attrition" or into some sort of Middle Eastern Vietnam war?

[Answer] There are several answers to the complex issue. One of them is to make the terrorists pay such a price that they would be forced to think 77 times before they plan any move. Past experience as well as what is now happening in the field show us that the terrorist leadership is not at all moved by the number of casualties we inflict on them and their collaborators. Therefore, in my opinion, a solution to this problem could be found on two planes: the first one--which we have already implemented in the past and which proved effective--is to "charge" the cost of the attacks against us on the Lebanese Government which allows the terrorists to operate from Lebanese territory. The second is that the Lebanese Government must be held responsible for preventing terrorist activities; for instance, as the case with Jordan. Even militant Syria hardly allows the terrorists to operate from its territory.

It is true that these examples cannot be implemented in Lebanon because, in fact, it does not have a central government capable of installing order in the country. Therefore, if there is no other choice, the second solution can only be implemented through military measures which would once and for all remove the threat posed to Israel by the terrorist bases, even on the assumption that following such an operation the State of Israel would be faced with difficult international problems. On the other hand, a new situation of this sort may force the international community to show more invlvement in what is happening in Lebanon and to try to assist the Lebanese Government, with the aid of multinational forces, to maintain its control and order over its territory. The State of Israel has now been through 8 days in which the inhabitants in the north, in the Galilee panhandle and the western Galilee, have been forced to spend days

on end in the air raid shelters and we have suffered casualties and our property has been damaged. No government in the world can allow such a situation to go on; we are approaching the decisive moment of truth. I must unambiguously state that there is no military problem that the IDF cannot cope with.

[Question] Could there be a situation in which the IDF, forced by the circumstances, would be forced to launch a second "Litani Operation," in another form, in which it will cross the border and it will attack and clean the terrorists bases in Lebanon?

[Answer] If circumstances so require, we will be forced to clean the area beyond the border of artillery, missiles and terrorist bases, to systematically and thoroughly destroy their bases and to ascertain that they cannot organize in those areas or reduce their activities to the minimum possible. On the other hand, whoever thinks that the problem of Arab terror can be totally liquidated is deluding himself. We have known this phenomenon since the late 1920's and its subsequent evolution during dozens of years. Our problem has always been--and continues to be--how to reduce to the minimum the damage that the terrorists might inflict to the normal life of the citizens of the State of Israel.

[Question] What about my question regarding the development of "a war of attrition" on the northern border?

[Answer] The present government has very well learned the lessons of the past and under no circumstances will we allow a war of attrition to erupt in the north. Under no circumstances should the State of Israel be involved in a war of attrition. We remember very well the days of the "war of attrition" in the 1970's, the Bar-Lev Line, and its consequences and we will not let it recur.

[Question] Since the massive bombings against the terrorists began on the northern border we have seen that, in spite of all our explanations that the PLO intentionally establishes headquarters sites amid the civilian population and that Israel does not want to hurt civilians, the world is not ready to listen to us and we hear ceaseless and sharp condemnations from statesmen and media throughout the world. Maybe it would be better, and possible, to find other alternatives to hit the terrorist targets and headquarters other than through our massive bombings and thus keep in mind world public opinion which has consequently become more hostile toward Israel?

[Answer] I would like to refer to this issue from two aspects: a) Horrifying international hypocrisy which has made us the culprits because we want one and only one thing--to protect the life of our families! Has the world forgotten the bombing conducted by thousands of the allies' planes during World War II or, for example, the thorough destruction of Dresden? And what did the German planes do to Britain and the Japanese planes to the United States?! Has the world already forgotten what happened a few years ago in Vietnam?! Even in Beirut itself--which we only attacked once--thousands of innocent citizens were killed in the fighting between the Christians, the Syrians and the terrorists--and nobody is saying one word about it?! The same holds true regarding "Black September," the massacre of the terrorists in Jordan by King Husayn. Why are international media not telling about what is happening within Syria itself, where people opposed to the regime, men, women and children are being slaughtered?! Neither do they report on the

intermittent massacres in Afghanistan and the Sahara. These issues are clouded by a screen of silence. Only when the State of Israel sets out to protect the life of its citizens from murderers who do not have the guts to fight the security forces and who aim all their bombs at civilian targets, only then do all the "beautiful people" in the world--and to my regret, also in Israel--wake up to denounce the legitimate acts of the government to protect its citizens.

b) The second aspect--and I am saying this with full responsibility as a man who has been with the security forces since before the establishment of the state and until this very day: I have never seen more sensibility in choosing targets with the aim to minimize hitting civilians in the course of a military operation; it is not us who have established terrorist bases and headquarters within and near civilian settlements. On the other hand, under no circumstances can we allow their location to provide them shelter, an excuse and the possibility to act freely against the State of Israel; as said, we are forced to act against these bases but we certainly take maximum precautions not to hit civilians. However, beyond all this I want to say the following: the civilian population which allows terrorist bases to be established in their midst--and most of them collaborate with the terrorists--can obviously not expect to be absolutely immune! They are left with the choice; either drive them away--or move away themselves--or undertake risks inherent in the establishment of terrorist headquarters in their buildings.

All of the terrorist headquarters controlling the murderous and terrorist attacks on Israel and other countries in the world are concentrated in Beirut, the Lebanese capital. Not only are all the orders to carry out attacks issued from there but, also, following one of their "successes," which included the killing of babies, women and old people, the official radio stations of the terrorist organizations proudly assume resonsibility for these crimes and boast about their deeds. The Lebanese Government is aware of all this but it keeps silent because it is weak and cannot handle the situation. However, we can not sit still and as a government responsible for the life and well-being of its citizens we must cut the heads of these strikes. Maybe this will be a clear-cut message to every decent Arab citizen living in their midst to move away from them and leave them as isolated as lepers.

[Question] In your estimate, how many civilians were killed in the bombing on Beirut?

[Answer] Some 100 to 140 civilians were killed and several hundred were injured. However, Arab propaganda--which immediately realized the effect this would have on world media--blew up the number far beyond its true proportions. On the other hand, dozens of terrorists were killed in our bombings, including the one on Beirut. Thus, we achieved a very important goal we had set for ourselves, namely, that the time has come when Israel is sufficiently strong to cope with all the Arab countries hostile to us. Thus, in addition to our recent war against the terrorists in the air, on land and in the sea we can solve the problem of the terrorists in a most thorough manner. Our military history attests to the IDF's capability--beginning with the 6-day war through the Entebbe operation and the destruction of the reactor in Iraq--and proves that the State of Israel, is capable of finding the appropriate answer to fluid situations in the field.

[Question] So, what are we waiting for?

[Answer] One does not pound with a heavy hammer before one has checked other alternatives. In principle, we are trying to confine our operations to the smallest and most logical dimensions. As said, the problem is not a question of our militry operational capability but a question of timing and weighing of the international situation. Before we carry out more decisive moves we try to exhaust other means. However, if this were to fail the problem of the terrorists would be solved in an entirely different way. This opinion is also seconded by the prime minister and the chief of staff.

[Question] Mr Deputy Defense Minister, what is our "red line" beyond which we would be left with no other choice but to adopt measures which you described, in a radio interview, as "cleaning the field"?

[Answer] We do not have any "red line". We will analyze the situation in the field and the government will act accordingly while taking into account the international political situation.

CSO: 4323/29

U.S. FIRMS LAGGING ON NEGEV BASE CONSTRUCTION

TA301410 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 81 p 2

[Text] Falling behind schedule has been recorded in the construction timetable of the new air force bases that the Americans are building in the Negev. Those delays cause difficulties to the functioning of the air force during the transition period. It is hoped in the IAF that those delays will not affect the evacuation set for April 1982.

Correspondents were told during a tour yesterday that this falling behind by the Americans is only one of the numerous problems the IAF has to cope with in view of the upcoming evacuation of the two large air bases in Sinai. It is already becoming clear that the reduced air space is liable to engender friction between military flights and civilian aviation. In comparison to the vast training space that was available to the IAF in Sinai, the firing ranges it has at its disposal this side of the green line are very limited. In addition to the logistic problems, the density of aviation traffic will also result in harm to the environment. As the IAF will not forego supersonic flights, residents will have to get used to sonic booms.

The governing IAF guideline is that every installation that can be dismantled is to be transferred to the new bases. Whereas all other operational installations that cannot be dismantled are to be destroyed. The destruction is scheduled to take place in October. In the framework of the present dismantling operation (Ramon B) large quantities of equipment were stored in containers for future transportation to the new bases on semitrailers. The cost of evacuating the air bases will amount to 233 million shekels (calculated 2 months ago).

Keeping the reduced air space in mind, the air force is planning changes in training that would nonetheless maintain at all times the IAF's operational capability. It was also reported that the construction of housing units at the new airfields is lagging considerably behind schedule.

CSO: 4323/29

NEW REGIONAL COUNCIL IN DEAD SEA AREA

TA301743 Tel Aviv ITEM in Hebrew 1710 GMT 30 Jul 81

[Text] Qalya, 30 Jul -- Upon the establishment of the "Megilot" regional council in the northern part of the Dead Sea, the founding of local authorities in Judaea and Samaria--currently including 10 local authorities overseeing 84 settlements inhabited by 20,000 inhabitants--has been completed. The director general of the Interior Ministry, Mr. Hayim Kubersky, stated this today at Kibbutz Qalya during the founding ceremony of the new "Megilot" Regional Council.

The new council extends to an area of 700,000 dunam and it includes five [existing] settlements and two new settlements in process. The regional council also includes seven tourist resorts which will become a tourism center. Mr. Shay Releg of Kibbutz Qalya was elected head of the council which is formed by the representatives of six settlements.

The director general of the Interior Ministry added that the budget of the Jewish local authorities beyond the green line is 250 million Israeli shekels, including the interior ministry's allocations of 150 million shekels. Mr. Kubersky emphasized that henceforth these authorities will be governed by the same regulations applying to the local authorities within the green line. Mr. Kubersky added that the heads of the Jewish local authorities in Judaea and Samaria would together constitute the regional planning and construction committee that is authorized to approve local and regional infrastructure plans.

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PLANS FOR GAZA POPULATION DISCUSSED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 7-13 Jun 81 pp 13, 14

[Text]

Translated from al-Istitaan (Settlement) by Abed Abdul Rahman al-Arafa (Jerusalem: Abu Arafa Publishing House).

Gaza (Strip) is considered a problem for Zionist settlement planners. Though its strategic position and its fertile agricultural land make Gaza an enticing area for settlement, the human population density (Palestinian) in the limited land area makes Zionist settlement process very complicated. Despite the establishment of several Israeli settlements between the towns of Gaza (Strip), the aspirations of the settlement officials have not as yet been met.

The possibility of executing effective Jewish settlement cannot be implemented unless a way is found to deport the local population, or at least part of it, and to settle Israelis in its place. The Israeli authorities have stepped up attempts in this field, but until now have not concretely changed the situation because of a second limitation: that of water-resources.

The military authorities have restricted water pumping for Palestinians. The possibility of (agricultural) expansion for the settlers is still very limited, however, because most of the area of cultivatable agricultural land is already in use by Arab farmers, while the unused lands, of which a large percentage are *miri*-sandy- until now are uncultivated. Studies and financial outlays need to be directed to develop these lands.

The Israeli occupation authorities have already fenced off thousands of dunams of lands on the pretext of 'security' and in 1971, started to set up settlements on these lands. The areas fenced off in Gaza (Strip) for settlement purposes are several times the actual needs of these settlements.

Population Density

The population density in Gaza Strip is one of the highest in the world. Thousands of Palestinian refugees, forced to leave their towns and villages in the Southern area of Palestine in 1948, have lived since in camps set up in the suburbs of Gaza Strip towns under very difficult conditions. This has caused serious drain in the limited production resources in Gaza, and after 1967, the huge numbers of refugees constituted a constant source of security concern for the Israeli authorities.

The leaders of the Zionist settlement movement found themselves countering the inevitability of deporting the refugees (until the execution of their expansionist settlement policies became possible). But a step like mass deportations could arouse strong international reaction. Therefore, the authorities had to find a different way to execute their plan— to show the world that what is happening is "only for the improvement of the living conditions of the refugees" and o give them employment opportunities inside Israel. The Israeli authorities prepared a set of plans to solve this problem.

Rehovot Plan

A plan, drawn up in the Rehovot Agricultural Institution by a special committee headed by Professor 'De Shallet' in 19[illegible], stipulated that the refugees should be integrated in the framework of a comprehensive plan for the occupied territories. The plan called for a study of the specific conditions of each area.

For the area of Gaza (Strip), this plan proposes the transfer of the refugees to the West Bank and the imposition of conditions that would push the workers into Israel.

Weitz Plan

A scheme was also prepared in 1969 by Ra'anan Weitz, head of the Jewish Agency settlement department. The scheme proposes the transfer of 50,000 refugees from Gaza to Al-Arish, to lessen crowding in the camps and to solve employment problems without restricting the workers to the camps or even inside Israel.

This plan was initially rejected because it required the transfer of large numbers of refugees, which in turn would induce strong world reactions against Israel. There was a tendency to accept the Rehovot programme, therefore, though it would pose several difficulties for the Israeli planners.

The success of the Rehovot scheme depends on the execution of the plan throughout the occupied territories. The subordination of the Gaza economy to that of Israel would create links between the Israeli employers and Arab works, and the reduction of the Israeli economic activity would lead to a decline in the economy of the occupied territories. In spite of the fact that these difficulties were good reason for dismissing this programme, they typify relations between the occupied territories and the occupying authority.

The Alternative

The problems of the "Weitz scheme" are still there in the "alternative" scheme now in force. This plan aims to change the existing camps by constructing housing units outside them. Some stages of this project have been implemented in Beach camps: al-Burzj, al-Nusseirat, Khan Yunis and others. Many refugees were pressured to transfer to these ready-built units. Others were moved to houses vacated by their owners after the 1967 war.

Israelis consider the plan to be partly successful. It did not, however, meet their wider aspirations. They had to implement the project in the camps by military force.

After meetings with UNRWA employees and camp notables where they were informed of the military's measures, destruction orders were issued and preparations were made to 'settle' those who lost their homes in Gaza and the area of Al-Arish. Several families were also forced to move to the West Bank. This plan continues. Latest announcements reveal that the authorities plan to set up four new housing quarters where 2,750 families could be concentrated.

CSO: 4300/62

RESTRICTIONS ON WEST BANK DIGNITARIES, REMARKS

TA282110 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 28 Jul 81

[Excerpts] The military government in Judaea and Samaria has decided to ban dignitaries and mayors from making political declarations which somehow imply identification with the PLO. The coordinator of activities in the territories, Maj Gen Dani Mat, today said there is no difference between the military and political struggle waged by the PLO against Israel. Major General Mat today toured in Bethlehem and Ramallah. Our correspondent Rafiq Halabi also joined the tour.

[Begin videotype] [Halabi] Ilyas Frayj arrived at the military government building in Bethlehem today to lay out to the coordinator of activities in the territories the moods prevailing in Judaea and Samaria. Public figures in the territories have recently been banned from dealing with political issues and meet with PLO officials in the Arab world.

Ilyas Frayj claims that the military government encourages villagers in the area to organize so as to push them away from the influence of the municipality and thus decrease his authority. Major General Mat said that the military government would not adversely affect the status of the moderate Frayj.

Seen in this picture while touring the souk of Bethelhem, Major General Mat ordered the tightening of screws on the mayors identified with the PLO.

This is a new policy. Major General Mat sees a direct connection between the tuning down of the political tones in the territories and the decline in the number of terrorist gangs and acts of sabotage.

[Mat] Israel has been struggling against all the components of the PLO, both military and political. I think that there is no distinction between the military and political PLO. Ideology and philosophy also conducts to action. Therefore, I do not think there is a difference between both these factors.

[Halabi] Major General Mat, when it is said that the mayors should not deal with political issues--we are talking about an autonomy process and these are public dignitaries. How can this issue be dealt with when the representatives of the territories are the mayors?

[Mat] I think there are no special problems regarding the mayors. A mayor enjoys a vast area of action within the sphere he is in charge of. That is, the

municipal sphere. There is nothing to prevent a mayor from expressing his opinion according to the spirit of the peace agreement, coexistence, the Camp David accords and so on. Certainly, what a mayor cannot say is, the PLO represents me. If he says that the PLO represents him, this is tantamount to giving actual legitimization to the declarations made in the last conference in Damascus. This is actually a paradox which, in my opinion, cannot be reconciled. [End of videotape]

CSO: 4323/29

GOVERNMENT WANTS CIVILIAN GUARD IN WEST BANK

TA171303 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Jul 81 p 2

[Report by Yehuda Litani]

[Text] For the first time since 1967, the military government wishes to set up a kind of "civil guard" for the inhabitants of the West Bank to prevent cases of stone-throwing on Israeli cars. In the last few days the military government has been trying to activate some such guard in portions of roads in the town of al-Birah, where Israeli cars have recently been stoned. It was reported from al-Birah yesterday that residents who had been asked to join that force have refused.

Al-Birah Mayor Ibrahim Sulayman al-Tawil yesterday issued an announcement strongly condemning this last move. He stated, among other things, that it is unheard that inhabitants be called upon to guard the army, whereas in fact it is the army that is responsible for guarding the citizens. It was further reported from al-Birah that identity cards of those inhabitants who refused to participate in the new guard have been taken away from them by the military government.

On the other hand, it was reported yesterday that the new steps are aimed at preventing the inhabitants from suffering, because each time stones are thrown at Israeli cars the military government closes parts of the roads and imposes curfews for hours or days. If the inhabitants guard themselves and prevent such instances, IDF elements reported yesterday, the inhabitants will not suffer extra hardships.

CSO: 4323/27

AIR FORCE COMMANDER INTERVIEWED

TA181756 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 18 Jul 81

[Interview with Israel Air Force Commander Maj Gen David 'Ivri by Pinhas 'Idan "a few days ago"--place not stated--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] Maj Gen David 'Ivri, Commander of the Air Force: The missile crisis in Lebanon: in your view, is this a repeat of the missile affair in the [Suez] Canal?

[Answer] Not in the missiles, although there are some nuances that may be similar, but there is a completely different situation between us and Lebanon and Syria in comparison with the situation that there was with the Egyptians. The threat of missiles by its nature is different, it is more strategic, the first was more tactical because of its nature in its implications as to what the air force was or was not capable of doing. Here, in my opinion, the strategic-political nature is more dominant than it was then. The problem of the missiles in Lebanon is, first of all, the introduction of missiles by another country into Lebanese territory, in order to defend its own forces there, to defend the Syrians, that is definitely a political-strategic problem. What it means is that it also restricts our military capability, our air capability. For the moment, at least, it is partially restricting, but the very fact of the introduction [of the missiles] is a sort of precedent meaning that, tomorrow they can say, we are also introducing them into other areas. There are Syrians in other regions of Lebanon and, to give them an air defense, all of Lebanon can be covered with ground-to-air missiles and the crisis afterward could be, possibly, similar to that missile crisis with Egypt, where there could even be an effect on flights in the north of Israel. The military aspect that exists is that they are certainly providing indirect defense not only to the Syrians, but also to the terrorists. We can see less of what is happening down below, we can attack less areas than those we were able to attack before. Thus, we are stopping some of the defense, or deterrence of terrorist activity here.

[Question] As a result of this, have the terrorists, under this or another umbrella of Syrian missiles, increased their air power?

[Answer] They are constantly developing air power. I believe that this is not connected with the missile crisis. It cannot be directly connected with it. The terrorists' interests, again, are also strategic-political ones. If it was easy

for them to attack, they would attack and it would make no difference if there was an umbrella or not. It appears to me that, in the situation that has developed here, it would have been worthwhile for the terrorists to be somewhat relaxed, perhaps to gather strength, to begin to develop a deployment and begin to advance with it. It seems to me that this is what they did, under the missile umbrella and not necessarily to be active or aggressive. When they are going to be aggressive is when it will be worthwhile for them, strategically and politically. This could be tomorrow. We simply have a time gap which did not sufficiently prevent the terrorists from advancing and reinforcing.

[Question] Yes. Maj Gen David 'Ivri, has what is called the status quo ante, from the military aspect, in Lebanon, changed, following the missile crisis?

[Answer] Of course it has changed. With the missiles in their current sites, they are controlling areas of Lebanon they did not control before and they are preventing us from flying freely. They have downed our drones, pilotless planes, with missiles fired from Syrian territory, when the drones were flying over Lebanon.

[Question] Is there greater Syrian reinforcement than there was in the months before the missile crisis, on the Lebanese-Syrian border?

[Answer] Definitely. There are reinforcements, mainly in the field of air defense. A great deal of anti-aircraft weapons, many deterrent and detection systems, there are the main things.

[Question] Air Force Commander, has the Syrians' air activity increased in Lebanon over the last few months, following what is called the missile crisis?

[Answer] On the contrary, the air activity itself, using planes, when they are deliberately firing ground-to-air missiles at planes, has decreased. It seems to me that the battle, or the area in which they are interested in fighting, is in the field of the missiles. Therefore it is in it that they have certainly established a significant deployment.

[Question] Maj Gen David 'Ivri, has the conflict between the superpowers in the Middle East become more tangilbe over the last few months, following the missile crisis?

[Answer] Definitely. The involvement...the very fact, for example, that Philip Habib came to the Middle East and went to Syria...the United States entered with a certain hold that it did not have in the past. The Russians; the naval exercise held recently; there is competition here over which of the superpowers is getting a greater position of power and we, of course, play the pawns. The policy the pan-Arab blocs have had to take, the different situation that has certainly been created since the missile crisis, in the relations between the Arab countries--these are matters which, in my opinion, are today in existence by the very fact of their [presumably the superpowers] involvement. In my view, this is a process the results of which, for the moment, are still difficult to predict, as is who will in the end be in a better position and which power will overcome. The process is at its peak. What will happen later will depend on whether we attack or are attacked.

[Question] Yes. The Soviet's proximity to our border, does this restrict our ability to fly?

[Answer] For the moment, there is no indication that this has to restrict us in our missions, the ones we have been accustomed to. It is clear that we have no trend toward presenting a challenge to the Russians.

[Question] Major General 'Ivri, a very large question is, of course, Jordan, which is standing aside, but I understand that it is building up its strength, from the air aspect, no less than is Syria.

[Answer] Jordan certainly is building up its strength and I would not say that it is standing aside when they are building so many airfields and acquiring such equipment--that is not called standing aside. I would say they have given a certain encouragement to the Syrians, over the last few weeks, a certain encouragement to the Iraqis, full cooperation with the Iraqis, partial cooperation with the Syrians, so this cannot be called standing aside. The Jordanian threat is definitely becoming stronger every month.

[Question] In your estimation, is there any trend toward forging a link between the two air forces, the Syrian and the Jordanian?

[Answer] Apparently the potential for such a link exists. It is a fuction [last word in English] of the tension. When the enemy is Israel, this link tightens at once, and of course there is no possible problem of language and communications. When Israel is not the common enemy, the conflict between them is such that they quarrel. The possibility of a link exists.

[Question] Maj Gen David 'Ivri, in fact, we began with the crisis, the missile crisis in Lebanon. Is there, in fact, a real war going on in Lebanon?

[Answer] In my view, this is a war that has been continuing for a long time and we do not always know who is the enemy of whom--that is one of the problems of the Lebanese. First with the Syrians, then against them, the Christians and so on, this is a very complicated business of conflicts where the interests of one do not always fit in with those of the other and this can occur [even] within a single town.

[Question] As the air force sees it, will there be war?

[Answer] This is not a war, it is small campaigns; it is a collection of, every now and then, operations, with ups and downs. I will explain myself on this point. War has--it should have--an effect on the process of the army's, the air force training and education, to interfere with it or create special efforts which say: now you are entering into a training-educational effort suitable to that conflict. We are continuing to develop in the field of training and education as we should, without any interference to the normal processes and so I would not call it a full war, but a series of small campaigns which we have to deal with every now and then.

[Question] In your assessment, Air Force Commander, will we be able, in the coming decade, to prevent the advance of a balance of threat [as heard] in the Middle East?

[Answer] A balance of threat is something psychological. We speak about a balance of forces or a balance in military ability to stand firm. In the ability to stand firm, militarily, in my opinion, we--if we continue in accordance with the plans we are demanding now, whether these involve the lavi or procurements we think we can make--I think we will be able to maintain the gap, at least we will not decrease it, because we are constantly pressing for qualitative, not just quantitative, solutions.

['Idan] Maj Gen David 'Ivri, commander of the air force, thank you very much.

CSO: 4323/28

WEST BANK LAND OWNERS APPEAL ON LAND ISSUE

TA212016 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1845 GMT 21 Jul 81

[Excerpt] Jerusalem, 21 Jul--Twelve Arab landowners from villages in the Ramallah and Hebron districts who complain that their lands had been declared state lands for the purpose of setting up the Neve Zuf and Mizpe Guvrin settlements today attained an order nisi from the High Court of Justice against the Judaea and Samaria commander and the trustee of abstentee and governmental property.

The order that was issued by Justice Moshe Kohen instructs them to show cause within 45 days why they should not cancel their declaration of the land as governmental property. An interim order was also issued banning the authorities from carrying out work on the lands until the ruling of the High Court of Justice on the appeal is given.

The appelants from the villages of Umm Safa', 'Ajul and Tarqumiyah, claim via attorney Felicia Langer that their lands were declared by the military authorities as state land in June and preparation work on them has begun without allowing the Arab owners to have the transitional 21-day period during which the owners are entitled to appeal the decision.

The appeal states that when the land owners turned to the Ramallah Appeals Committee they were asked to deposit a 1,000-shekel collateral each for the covering of possible damages the state may incur if it is ruled that the lands belong to it. They complain that this is a change of policy intended to prevent the issuance of preventive orders which delay the pace of settlements desired by the authorities.

It is further claimed in the appeal that the military authorities' acts run counter to Jordanian law, Israeli law and international law.

CSO: 4323/28

SETTLERS DEMAND REVOCATION OF CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

TA220703 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 22 Jul 81

[Text] The more complex the political situation becomes and the more the security tension in the north increases, the more the Jewish settlers beyond the Green Line step up their political activity, demanding stopping the withdrawal from the Sinai, severance of any connection with the Camp David accords, and applying Israeli law over the Golan Heights. Here is our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh on this:

[Begin recording] The conditions have now ripened for dramatic decisions to be made, the settlers in Judaea, Samaria, the Gaza district and the Golan Heights say. The Council of Jewish Settlements in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza demands that the government declare that it is immediately retreating from the Camp David accords. The council says that the stoppage of aircraft deliveries to Israel are tantamount to an arms embargo on Israel. This is a violation of the Camp David accords. The United States had promised Israel modern arms in return for the strategic depth it has become deprived of [in the Sinai], but now it is taking back its readiness to do so. The members of the Judaea and Samaria settlements also pointed to the aid Egypt wants to extend to Lebanon as proof that Egypt has no intention of pursuing the peace treaty. The recent Egyptian verbal aggression also supports this approach, according to the settlers.

In the Yamit district, the local settlers repeat their demand that the pullback from the Sinai be stopped. Members of the Ma'oz movement from Yamit repeated their demand that the pullback be stopped, and they sent sand from the Sinai to members of the 10th Knesset. They called on the Knesset members not to lend a hand to carrying out the withdrawal and the uprooting decided upon by their predecessors.

In the north, the Golan settlers have recently increased their activity toward annexing the Golan Heights to Israel. They explain that what is currently happening in Lebanon again illustrates the significance of the Golan Heights and makes poignant the need for Israel to keep it forever. They say that anyway the whole world is angry with Israel, so that a decision to annex the Golan would not cause serious political damage.

In all the Jewish settlements beyond the Green Line, the settlers talk against the United States and Egypt. They are convinced that after the withdrawal is completed, no one will any longer take account of Israel. Then, they say, the United States will be able to impose an embargo, Egypt will be able to revoke peace, and Israel will have nothing to fight with. The conclusion, therefore, they say, is that now is the time to take action to turn the wheel back. [End recording]

CSO: 4323/28

WEST BANK MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S ANNUAL REPORT RELEASED

TA230643 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 23 Jul 81

[Text] It has been many months now that the hostile political activity in Judaea and Samaria has ceased said Judaea and Samaria Commander Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, in a preamble to the military authorities' report on the 14th year of the military authorities. Our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria Arye Gus looks at the report.

[Begin recording] In the 14th year of the military authorities Ben-Eli'ezer writes, significant developments have occurred in the political-terrorist sphere and in the military authorities' fight against this. The period began with an uprise in the nationalistic activity and reached its peak in May 1980 when a terrorist squad attacked the Hadassah building in Hebron. The military authorities' policy which Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer terms a policy of consistent curbing of hostile activity had its immediate effect in the area and it has been for months now, he notes that the hostile political activity has ceased almost completely. Furthermore, the wave of violence in the region has been stemmed and the region enjoys total calm. Later the Judaea and Samaria commander pays tribute to the achievements of the security services in preventing hostile terrorist activity. In the civilian sphere the regional commander notes the military government's achievements in developing agriculture and the individual's standards of living continued to rise as a result of the significant growth in the agricultural product. This year the military authorities laid emphasis on the handling of rural population and the infrastructure for the consolidation of moderate elements has been extended. During the year the building of major electricity lines in the region has been completed, land surveys have been conducted to determine ownership of the land, tax collection has been increased and about 1.15 million people crossed the Jordan bridges. [End recording]

CSO: 4323/28

BRIEFS

LABOR, CITIZENS RIGHTS MOVEMENT TIES--The Labor Party Bureau and Faction in the Knesset this afternoon agreed that the Citizens Rights Movement [CRM] join the labor-alignment. The decision was taken by a small majority of four votes after a stormy debate. Rabbi Manehem Hakohen said the religious workers' faction would demand the same conditions as Shulamit Aloni [of the CRM]. The Labor Party decided to propose Shlomo Hilel as its candidate for the post of Knesset speaker. [Text] [TA191827 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 19 Jul 81]

IDF HARASSMENT CHARGED--The joint government-zionist federation settlement committee yesterday approved the idea of putting up a settlement called Pesagot on Jabal at-Tawil near al-Birah north of Jerusalem. Some 60 families, mostly from the Bayyit Vagan neighborhood of Jerusalem, hope to start a civilian settlement which will eventually house 200 families. Several months ago plans were approved to set up a regional council on the mountain. Residents of the Jabal at-Tawil neighborhood in al-Birah have complained that the military government is trying to force them to do guard duty on the road to an Israeli outpost in the area to prevent youths from stoning Israeli vehicles. The residents say they have refused to sign such an obligation and the municipality has put out a statement claiming that citizens under occupation cannot be obligated to guard. Military government sources told the ITIM news agency that for several weeks youths have been stoning Israeli cars in the area daily, causing injury and damage. Therefore the government decided to force the residents to guard. [Text] [TA270705 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 27 Jul 81]

IMMIGRATION IN JUNE--Only 817 immigrants arrived here in June, compared with 1,700 in June 1980 and only 325 Israeli emigrants have returned during the first half of 1981. Immigration statistics for June provided by the Absorption Ministry reflect a continuing slump in immigration. The drop is partly due to the severe reduction in the number of emigrants from the Soviet Union and to the increasingly high dropout rate, over 80 percent, among Soviet Jews that do leave Russia. [Text] [TA291825 Jerusalem POST in English 29 Jul 81]

MUSLIMS ALLOTTED FUNDS--Nazareth--A 4 million shekel budget for improving religious, educational and social services in the Arab sector was approved yesterday by the Muslim Trust Committee, headed by the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, Binyamin Gur-arye. For the first time the committee, which is in charge of Muslim property in Israel, allocated funds for the renovation of the hilly site of Sidna 'Ali, near Nerzliyya, and for the construction of new mosques in Bedouin villages. The committee also allocated IS180,000 for scholarships and IS900,000 for research on Islam and Muslims in Israel. The committee consists of the representatives of several government offices and four Muslim dignitaries. [Text] [TA270949 Jerusalem POST in English 27 Jul 81 p 3]

HEBRON STUDENTS ARRESTED--The military government today arrested some 20 students from the technical college in Hebron who had invaded a building owned by the city's education office and had refused to evacuate it. Our correspondent, Arye Gus, reports that the Hebron municipality had leased a school building to the technical college in contradiction of the military government's orders. The military government evacuated the building on Monday. However, the students invaded it again. The military government today demanded that they evacuate the building and when the students refused, it detained about 20 of them for interrogation. Our correspondent notes that the technical college in Hebron is suffering a serious shortage of classrooms. Public figures and institutions in Hebron have protested against the move of the military government. [Text] [TA221637 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 22 Jul 81]

HEBRON HOSPITAL ESTABLISHMENT DISALLOWED--The military administration has not permitted the establishment of a private hospital in Hebron, to be financed by the joint PLO-Jordan Committee. A public body in Hebron wanted to set up the hospital and numerous physicians in the town signed a petition supporting its establishment. The military administration told our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari, that it has no objection to an additional hospital in Hebron, provided it will operate within the framework of the government health-care system. The military administration has also rejected a request by the largest building association in Judaea and Samaria to build a new township near 'Anabta in Samaria. The plan projected the building of some 360 housing units, a mosque, a school and a kindergarten. [Text] [TA190632 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 19 Jul 81]

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES BRANCH--The management of the aircraft industries this morning acceded to an appeal by the government and decided to establish a branch in Qiryat Shemona. Also this morning, the Ministry of Housing authorized the construction in Qiryat Shemona of shelters larger than the usual standard. This refers to public shelters and shelters for educational institutions and the aim is to permit those staying in them to receive more services than they can in simple shelters. For this purpose the minister of finance authorized another budgetary allowance. [Text] [TA201232 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 20 Jul 81]

WEST BANK SETTLEMENT WORK--Ramallah, 23 Jul--The establishment of the Nili and the Mikhmash settlements in the Ramallah area will soon be completed. Gush Emunim's Mikhmash nucleus has already moved to its settlement site while the Nili nucleus is going to move to its settlement site soon. At the same time it was reported that a religious nucleus that was located for some years in the former Sanur Jordanian police station on the Nabulus-Janin Road moved to its permanent site nearby. The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria reports that extensive development works are currently underway on the Tulkarm-Nabulus Road for the establishment of the new settlement of Shave Shomron 8 (Siftan). The settlement will be populated by a religious communal nucleus of Gush Emunim. [Text] [TA230931 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 0915 GMT 23 Jul 81]

NEW INDUSTRIAL ZONES--The industry and defense ministries are setting up three new industrial zones in the Galilee as part of the plan to Judaize it. According to this plan the three zones will be filled with tens of industrial plants, especially in the metal and electronics fields, and will employ thousands of workers most of whom will live near the plants. The implementation of the program was assigned to

the Mivney Ta'asiya Company, a governmental company subordinate to the industry minister. [Excerpt] [Report by El'Azar Levin] [TA220957 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jul 81 pp 1, 2]

TERRORISTS DAMAGE NAHARIYYA INDUSTRY--The direct and indirect damage caused to Nahariyya industry by the shellings is so far estimated to be running into tens of thousands of millions shekels, and it may be running even higher in the long range, due to an inherent loss of markets here and abroad. One plant suffered a direct hit, incurring serious damage. Thus was the effect of recent incidents on the Nahariyya industry summed up yesterday by Michael Strauss, spokesman for the Nahariyya industrialists. Mr Strauss stressed that the Nahariyya industry--relatively to the town's population--is the largest exporter in Israel, with also the highest per capita productivity. The average decrease in productivity in the 22 Nahariyya plants employing together some 4,000 workers reached approximately 50 percent last week. [Excerpt] [TA231309 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jul 81 p 3]

WEST BANK SETTLEMENT APPROVED--The Committee for Settlement Affairs, which acts under the joint auspices of the government and the Zionist organization, approved today the setting up of a new urban settlement on Mt Tawil near the towns of Ramallah and al-Birah. Our correspondent, Avraham Ben-Melekh, reports that 2 months ago, approval was issued to set up on the mountain buildings of the Mate Binyamin Regional Council. About 60 families, most of them from the Jerusalem Bayit Vagan quarter, hope to settle on the site in the near future. They intend to build there a settlement with more than 200 families. [Text] [TA262039 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2000 GMT 26 Jul 81]

SETTLEMENTS BUDGET FROZEN--Judaea and Samaria, 21 Jul--The freezing of governmental budgets following the Finance Ministry's instruction has for the time being also frozen the plans for expanding existing Judaea and Samaria settlements. The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria has learned that many families who wound up their businesses in their towns of residence and were going to settle in the region remained with no answer. This caused problems to these families who had been promised to settle in Judaea and Samaria shortly. The families expressed the hope that the special committee which deals with deviations [where budget can be released] approve the continued expansion of these settlements and will allocate the necessary funds for this need. It was reported from the Zionist organization's settlement department that there is no talk of establishing new settlements in Judaea and Samaria in the near future but only expanding existing settlements. [Text] [TA212113 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2055 GMT 21 Jul 81]

DISCUSSIONS ON SPAIN JOINING EEC--Tomorrow France and Israel will conduct official talks on the results of the incorporation of Spain into the EEC. A delegation of senior officials from the Agriculture Ministry and the Industry, Commerce and Tourism Ministry--headed by the director of the Foreign Ministry's Economic Department Elyashiv Ben-Horin--will present to France Israel's arguments [against the move]. They state that the cooption of Spain into the EEC may seriously harm Israeli exports to Europe. Our Paris correspondent, Freddie Eytan, noted that this is the first time since 1970 that such a meeting will take place between Israeli and French officials. To date the government of France has refused to accept Israel's arguments. [Text] [TA211030 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 21 Jul 81]

CSO: 4323/28

FRENCH BIDDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURAL PROJECTS INCREASES

London 8 DAYS in English No 28, 18 Jul 81 p 41

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

FRANCE is hoping that its economic relations with Qatar will improve, after a poor year in 1980. French exports to Qatar dropped from French francs 681m ($122m) in 1979, to Ffr400m ($71m) last year, mainly because of the paucity of major new infrastructural schemes after the completion of the Qatar Petrochemical Company (QAPCO) complex at Umm Said.

The value of French purchases of Qatari crude increased during 1979-1980 from Ffr2.2bn ($395m) to Ffr2.86bn ($514m), leaving Qatar with a substantial trade balance surplus. France remains, after Japan, Qatar's largest oil customer. On the other hand, Qatar ranks tenth on the list of French oil suppliers, far behind the leader, Saudi Arabia, which now provides more than 50 per cent of Paris's oil requirements.

Franco-Qatari economic relations have centred on two joint-venture petrochemical companies. The state-controlled Charbonnages de France (CDF)-Chimie has a 16 per cent holding in QAPCO, while the Qatar General Petroleum Company (QGPC) has taken a 40 per cent equity participation in the $300m ethylene plant at Dunkerque in northern France, operated by the Compagnie Pétrochimique du Nord (Copenor).

The French engineering firm Technip won the $200m turnkey contract to build the centrepiece of the Umm Said complex — an ethylene steam cracker. Satisfied with the French firm's performance, the Qataris recently signed a Ffr600m ($107m) deal for the construction of a 50,000-barrels-a-day refinery at Umm Said. This was viewed as a major victory in French industrial circles, as Technip edged out two tough Japanese contenders, Japan Gasoline Corporation (JGC) and Chiyoda.

The eventual development of Qatar's Northwest Dome gas field is also a project which Technip would like to undertake. Moreover, the French firm is anxiously awaiting QAPCO's decision on a second polyethylene plant.

Altogether, French companies acquired new contracts totalling some Ffr800m ($143m) in Qatar last year, though most of the deals were in the small-to-medium range. For example, Novotel is to build a new luxury hotel in Doha, Cogelex will supply electrical equipment, Enertec-Schlumberger is furnishing radio equipment, and Bermaho-Robert was tipped to build an indoor sports complex.

Qatar is a traditional customer of the French arms industry. At the end of 1979, it ordered six twin-engine Alpha jet trainer/tactical fighter aircraft, the first time these have been seen in the Arab world east of Suez. Last September, Qatar purchased three missile-equipped rapid patrol vessels

and a mobile coastal defence system worth Ffr1.5bn ($269m). A few months later, Qatar signed a deal for 14 twin-engine Mirage F1 interceptors.

Along with Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan and Morocco, Qatar may be interested in acquiring the new-generation Mirage 2000 fighters. The Qataris, however, will certainly take into consideration the attitude of President Mitterrand's government concerning Middle Eastern affairs.

This means that France will probably no longer benefit from political dividends in its economic dealings with Qatar, as well as other Middle Eastern states. Under Giscard d'Estaing, French corporations carried off some important contracts as a result of Paris's solidarity with the Arab world. Now they will have to compete on the merits of price and quality alone. 'The going will be tougher, but we reckon that we have made, in recent years, enough inroads into the Gulf to keep our steam going,' a French businessman.

Qatar will be an important testing ground for French companies in the coming year, as several are bidding for lucrative infrastructural projects. Alsthom-Atlantique hopes to furnish gas turbines for an electricity generating plant worth Qatari riyals 450m ($123m). Cogelex is in line for a QR120m ($32m) contract for electrical sub-stations and CIT-Alcatel hopes to clinch a new telephone line deal. The state utility, Electricité de France (EDF), hopes to win a contract to build a new power [illegible]nt near Doha.

CSO: 4300/64

INVESTORS DISCOURAGED BY NORTH WEST DOME PROJECT

London 8 DAYS in English No 28, 19 Jul 81 pp 44, 45

[Article by Graham Benton]

[Text]

US OIL ANALYSTS predict tough negotiations ahead for the companies interested in developing Qatar's huge Northwest Dome offshore gas field. Even though the field's full extent is as yet unknown, it is already being described as one of the world's largest. Its total development, including onshore facilities for liquefaction and the purchase of a fleet of LNG tankers, has been costed at around $20bn by some observers. This would put it in the same league as Saudi Arabia's huge onshore gas-gathering scheme.

However, foreign oil companies are not falling over themselves to take a slice of the project. Last month Sheikh Rashid al Thani, deputy managing director of Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC), announced that both Exxon and Mobil had dropped out of international competition for a 20 per cent partnership in the gas field's development.

While a Mobil spokesman said that he had 'no reason to challenge' the Qatari statement, Exxon officials told *8 Days* that the company had not as yet actually submitted any proposals. Exxon was approached by the Qataris last August and, although it is technically still in the running, it is in no hurry to make a firm offer. Royal Dutch Shell, British Petroleum, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles and the US-West German-Canadian Consortium, Wintershall, are among the other groups Qatar has sought to interest.

Why the lack of urgency? Spokesmen for the two US companies would not commit themselves, but independent American analysts point to the scheme's massive cost, the uncertainty over future gas price levels, and the considerable doubts about the likely US market for Qatari gas.

Ali Jaidah, QGPC's managing director, last year suggested that investment of at least $4bn would be required to develop the Northwest Dome and build the pipelines and onshore liquefaction plant.

Understandably, Qatar has been one of the strongest advocates of a coordinated system of worldwide gas prices linked to oil's. In the case of Algeria, however, these attempts to boost what is seen as an undervalued gas price to a target figure of $6 per thousand cubic feet (the notional equivalent in thermal value of the high $40 it charges for a barrel of its light crude) have not been entirely successful. The best they have managed is around $5 from Distrigaz of Belgium.

El Paso of Houston, Texas, suspended its gas contract with Algeria last year because of the pricing dispute. Although the Algerians have tried to get the US firm to reopen talks, El Paso officials are still not interested in the terms being offered.

This, naturally, bodes ill for Qatar's hopes of finding a market for high-priced gas exports in the US, where transport costs and falling imported energy needs already militate against contracts for Gulf gas.

Japan looks a far better prospect, as it is now willing to pay much higher prices.

While all this may tend to dampen the US oil companies' enthusiasm for Northwest Dome participation, it certainly does not rule them out. Wherever the gas might finally go, the Qataris are definitely interested in using American technology, both for field development and liquefaction plant construction — over which Bechtel, Fluor, Ralph M. Parsons and M. W. Kellogg, all US firms, have been approached.

Moreover, despite the scheme's gigantic size, the Qataris have little choice but to press ahead after years of indecision. Oil reserves are unlikely to last beyond 2010, and as oil output declines so will production of associated gas.

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END

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GULF STATES APPROACHED ON AUSTRALIAN MINING VENTURE

London 8 DAYS in English No 26, 4 Jul 81 p 42

[Article by Colin Chapman: "Australian Iron Plans for Gulf"]

[Text] AUSTRALIAN IRON ore millionaire Lang Hancock and chiefs of the resources company Conzinc Riotinto of Australia Limited (CRA) have had talks in Bahrain with Arab steel and investment interests, with a view to the joint development of high-quality ore deposits in the Pilbara region of Western Australia.

Under the scheme, Gulf interests would provide much of the finance for the Australian $600m ($690m) Marandoo scheme, which involves a new railway and deepwater port in Western Australia. In return they would obtain a substantial stake in the project and a guaranteed supply of high-grade ore suitable for the modern direct reduction steelmaking process.

Hancock claims that the project will enable the operation to sell iron ore on the world markets at 40 per cent less than any other new mining venture. The scheme would also involve a new pellet plant in the Gulf, developed by the Arab Iron and Steel Consortium. At present, the only exporters of high-grade pellets, needed for direct reduction steelmaking, are LKAB of Sweden and CVRD of Brazil. Arab Iron and Steel has signed a letter of intent agreeing to take 2m tonnes of ore a year from the Marandoo scheme.

Marandoo, just one of many deposits in Hancock's oil fiefdom, has proven and provable reserves of 490m tonnes, with total inferred reserves put at over 1bn tonnes. In contrast with other deposits in the Pilbara region, it is of high quality.

The ore prospect used to be controlled by Hancock and Wright and Texas Gulf, but CRA bought out the American company's $70m stake after Hancock opposed blending the Marandoo ore with poorer quality product from other mines.

The new port is crucial because it would take ships of up to 400,000 dwt, whereas the other Pilbara ports of Port Headland, Dampier and Cape Lambert can only accommodate around 110,000 dwt. Hancock has already had a $20m feasibility study carried out by a leading firm of consulting engineers, who maintain that the new port and railway could be built for $600m.

'Then,' said Hancock, 'big ships could load up to 100,000 tonnes at the other ports, and top up with 250,000 at Ronsard. A big ship would save the Japanese about 40 per cent of the freight from Pilbara to Japan. But I don't want just to help the Japanese. The real market we can conquer, with Arab help and backing, is in Europe, where we will be highly competitive, and Southeast Asia.'

With the world moving towards a shortage of high-grade ore — Amax Iron estimated a shortfall of 41m tonnes by 1985 at a recent Frankfurt conference — the project is beginning to get a higher priority in Australia, whose iron ore industry has been in the doldrums for some years.

CSO: 4300/57

PDRY, OMAN PEACE EFFORT FALTERS

London 8 DAYS in English No 26, 4 Jul 81 pp 16, 17

[Article by John Dimsdale: "Muscat and Aden Peace Bid Falters"]

[Text]

THE UAE and Kuwait have had little success in their mediation efforts this month in the continuing estrangement between Muscat and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Both Aden and Muscat have filed official complaints with the Arab League accusing the other of armed aggression and border incursions.

The foreign ministers of the Gulf Cooperation Council decided in April that a prime duty was to 'clear the atmosphere between Muscat and Aden'. A joint paper pronounced normal neighbourly relations and a respect for territorial sovereignty as prerequisites of long-term stability, and stated the need to stop 'lurking ambitious elements' from entering the region. Foreign ministers of the Gulf states cited the accommodation and border agreement between the UAE and Oman as a precedent and example.

Although it will be some time before the governments of Muscat and the PDRY can be expected to sit at the conference table, Kuwait and the UAE have successfully established indirect tripartite talks. On his way to the Baghdad summit at the beginning of June, the UAE's foreign minister, Rashid Abdullah, was quoted as saying that both Aden and Muscat had responded 'positively'.

But two recent developments have caused at least a temporary setback to any peace moves. The first is an outbreak of border skirmishes resulting in alleged kidnapping and loss of life, the second the launching of a propaganda campaign by PDRY exiles aimed at the Aden government.

In mid-June the PDRY telexed the permanent secretariat of the Arab League, alleging that an Omani airborne landing had been made at Wadi Dighan, some 40km south of Habrut, and that the Omani forces had captured three members of the PDRY people's police. Four other incursions on successive days were complained of, and it was alleged that Oman used 16 helicopters and two troop carriers on each occasion.

Two days earlier, the Arab League had received a note from Muscat accusing the PDRY of blatant aggression in a series of armed attacks on Oman. The Muscat message claimed that its armed forces had detected a six-man group of the people's army, armed with Soviet rifles, 35km south of Habrut. Three men were taken prisoner and three escaped.

Although the details do not coincide exactly, it is clear from the dates given — 12-13 June — and the location of the alleged clashes, that both sides are referring to the same incidents. What is not certain is whether the moves were orchestrated by the PDRY for home and overseas propaganda purposes. When Aden filed its complaint, PLO leader Yasser Arafat had just arrived on a visit seeking PDRY support for the Palestinian cause and joint Arab condemnation of the Israeli attack on Baghdad. The Palestinian party was immediately told of the border incident. It is highly unlikely, however, that Arafat will take sides, as he is keenly aware of the UAE and Kuwaiti efforts to mediate.

It is also worth noting that less than three days later — on 20-22 June — the PDRY

went to the polls in a general election for the country's local people's councils.

Overseas, the exiled 'Patriotic Forces (PF) in Southern Yemen' have been building up their propaganda efforts. In February, Abdul Qawi al Makkawi, secretary general of a national rally of the PF held in Cairo, forecast increased criticism of the PDRY government. Claiming that 'more than half the population has left Southern Yemen in search of peace and security and a decent living,' the exiled leader alleged that 13 years of Soviet domination in the PDRY had turned the country into 'an anti-Islamic centre for the spread of atheistic communist ideas and for the training of agents to carry out sabotage in neighbouring Arab states.'

The anti-Soviet line taken by PDRY exiles is hardening. A reputable East African publication quotes South Yemeni refugees as saying that mosques in the PDRY are being turned into militia training centres, that Lenin's birthday has become a holiday on a par with holy feast days, and that daily prayers are discouraged by the authorities. Yemeni sources further claim that to confuse the Arab world, a delegation of Soviet Muslims actually visited Aden at a time when the Muslim religion was being described in South Yemeni schools as a 'flaw in the human spirit'.

Whatever response the Arab League may make to the complaints lodged with it, the careful diplomacy of the UAE and Kuwait is going to have to take account of exiles who seem bent on further destabilisation.

CSO: 4300/57

BRIEFS

CLAIM MOROCCAN TROOPS TO GULF--The Egyptian periodical AL-MUSAWWAR announced that an agreement has been concluded between the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Morocco whereby the latter is to provide 15,000 soldiers for a joint force to defend the security of the [Persian] Gulf. The periodical explained that the first contingent of the Moroccan force which will be the nucleus for the joint force will arrive in the gulf area on the first of September [1981]. AL-MUSAWWAR mentioned that the ministers of the gulf states will meet this November to discuss how to create a joint force and to discuss the question of protecting the Straits of Hormuz. [Text] [Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 25 Jul 81 p 1]

CSO: 4504/49

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC BANK LOAN TO TURKEY--The head of the Islamic Development Bank in Jidda signed an agreement with the representative of the Turkish Industrial Development Bank. The Islamic Development Bank will participate in raising the capital of (Trapzan) Company in the Republic of Turkey by $650,000. [GF230956 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 22 Jul 81 GF]

BANK LOAN TO GAMBIA--An agreement between the Islamic Development Bank and the Republi of the Gambia was signed today in Jidda to finance its imports of cement and natural gas from Algeria and Morocco. The value of the agreement is $440,000. The agreement was signed on the bank's behalf by Dr Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali, director general of the Islamic Development Bank and on Gambia's behalf by its ambassador to the Kingdom, the representative of the Central Bank in Gambia. By signing this agreement, the Islamic Development Bank has presented $7.07 million for financing Gambia's foreign commercial operations and technical assistance. [Text] [GF220823 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in English 1930 GMT 21 Jul 81 GF]

CSO: 4300/71

BRIEFS

BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, SAUDI ARABIA REFINERY--Development and Industry Minister Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi has announced that an agreement has been reached among the Saudi petroleum and mineral affairs establishment, the Kuwaiti oil establishment and the Bahraini Development and Industry Ministry to study and establish a refinery to change heavy oil into light oil. This project will have profitable returns in the international market. The minister added that he signed a protocol in al-Ta'if last night with Saudi Petroleum and Mineral Affairs Minister Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Kuwaiti Oil Minister Shaykh 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah to establish the conpany and its founding laws. He said the Kuwaiti and Saudi ministers charged him with completing the legal measures being taken to register the company, which will be situated in Bahrain. He said a sum of $2 million has been allocated for the project's economic and technical studies, in view of which the project's volume and capital will be determined. In conclusion, the minister said this project has an advantage. It will deal with heavy fuel oil and perhaps with heavy crudes in the future, unlike refineries in the region that were constructed to refine heavy and medium fuel. [Excerpt] [GF191620 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 17 Jul 81 pp 1, 3]

CSO: 4304/78

AUTHORITIES STRESS CLOSE TIES WITH ISLAM

Praise From Tajik Dignitary

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 8 Jul 81 p 3

[Text]

"It is only the permanent interference from the outside into the destiny of the Afghan people, only the dangerous actions, which have been named the "undeclared war" against Afghanistan, which prevent our brothers in the friendly country from living peacefully and building their economy", Kazi Abdullah Kalon-Zade told a Tass correspondent.

The Tajik religious figure was among a delegation of Soviet Muslims, who visited the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at the invitation of Chairman of the Council for Islamic Affairs Dr Sayeed Afghani.

Abdulla Kalon-Zade specially noted that most Muslims, leaders in common with the country's people, understand and value the Soviet Union's policy vis-a-vis Afghanistan. The members of the delegation had occasion to hear about it from the people they talked to.

The Tajik leader quoted the Minister for the Affairs of Nationalities and Tribes and President of the Academy of Sciences of the DRA Mohammad Sulaiman Laiq as saying at a reception in honour of the Soviet delegation: "Had it not been for the disinterested and timely assistance of the Soviet Union, there would be no free Afghanistan."

"We saw that all sober-minded and patriotic people think so. Everyone can convince himself there that the new system, which was established as a result of the April revolution ensures for Afghanistan's population confidence of the future, civil rights and freedom of religion. The poor, who were enslaves for centuries, received land and homes. A camaign for the elimination of illiteracy is underway in the country, the construction of medical institutions has got underway. Refugees, who crossed the border once under the imact of hostile propaganda are learning about the transformations and many are returning home. Their number would be even larger had the enemies of the eople not intimidated them."

Ramadan Celebration in Kabul

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Jul 81 p 4

[Text]

KABUL, July 11 (Bakhtar).— To distribute the prizes to 'qariyan' and 'fatehan' (Koran reciters) of 90 mosques in Kabul, where recitation of the entire holy Koran and 'taraweh' prayer took place in the first 10 days of the holy month of Ramadan, a grand function was held at the Preventive Medicines Department auditorium on Thursday.

Following recitation of a few verses from the holy Koran, Dr Sayeed Afghani, President of the Islamic Affairs Department and Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Ulema and Clergymen of Afghanistan, spoke on the "duties and responsibilities of the true Muslims in their religious affairs and progress of the country".

Kabul Mayor Eng Sangin also spoke on the virtues of fasting and said: "Millions of our working Muslim masses have practically realized the good wishes of the PDPA and the DRA Government and are day by day mobilised for implementation of the useful and progressive plans in the National Fatherland Front."

He added: "On behalf of the Kabul citizens, especially those who participated in the recitation of the entire holy Koran in the 90 mosques of Kabul in the first 10 days of the holy month of Ramadan, I express thanks to the esteemed 'qariyan' and 'fatehan' by whose recitation of the holy Koran our people receive spiritual rewards."

Others attending the function were Kabul Governor, a number of party cadres and some employees of the Islamic Affairs Department and the Supreme Council of the DRA Ulema and Clergymen.

Qari Abdul Ghafar Furqani, on behalf of other 'qarian' said: "The party and the DRA Government in pursuance of the Fundamental Principles have taken valuable measures in support of the holy religion of Islam and the freedom of religious rites of the religious people of Afghanistan, therefore, we 'garian' and 'hafezan' express our resolute support from all lofty objectives of the party and Government, wishing them further successes."

At the end, Abdul Aziz Qaisari, a member of the Islamic Affairs Department, read the text of a prayer and the prizes were distributed.

Qoran Recitation in Mazar-e Sharif

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Jul 81 p 4

[Text]

MAZARE SHARIF, July 14 (Bakhtar).— Recitation of the entire holy Koran, started with the "Tarawi" prayer on the second day of Ramazan in the shrine of Hazrate Ali (the fourth caliph of Islam) was ended on Saturday. night.

The recitation was joined by besides ulema, clergymen and a large number of the religious residents of Mazare Sharif— by Sayed Ekram paigir alternate member of the PDPA CC, the provincial secretary, the Governor, the police commander and some heads and employees of Government departments, who prayed the for progress of dear Afghanistan, peace and tranquility of the toiling people.".

The recitation of the holy Koran, started with the 'tarawih' prayer at the first 10 days of Ramadan in some mosques of Mazare Sharif and the woleswalis of the Balkh province, ended on Saturday night

CSO: 4600/101

AFGHAN REFUGEES BECOMING PERSISTENT PROBLEM

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by Patrick Frances]

[Text] Today more than 2 million Afghan refugees have arrived in Pakistan since the communists took power in Kabul on 27 April 1978 and Soviet forces entered Afghanistan on 27 December 1979.

Following the failure of the alliance formed at the prompting of the Islamic Conference, the groups of Afghan underground fighters based in Peshawar in Pakistan, who represent only a part, and not the most progressive part, of the résistance movement--which incidentally is very fragmented in the field--are currently trying to unite in their efforts to drive out the Soviet "invader." There are still great differences between the two main lines of thought currently prevailing among the leaders in exile--the moderates and the Moslem fundamentalists--and they concern in particular the issue of American aid.

Our special correspondent in Pakistan, Patrick Frances, presents in a series of three articles the problems raised by the arrival of such a high number of displaced persons and the organization of the resistance movement.

Peshawar--On 31 May 1981, a census showed nearly 1.7 million Afghan refugees officially registered by Pakistani authorities in North West Frontier Province. On that same date, there were about 400,000 in neighboring Baluchistan Province. Those figures back up Pakistan's claim to have the heaviest concentration of officially registered refugees anywhere in the world, and the situation represents an increasingly heavy financial burden for Pakistan.

F.R. Safi, assistant commissioner for Afghan refugees, says: "It's a race in which we are always behind." The day before in Islamabad, Brigadier General Azhar, the chief commissioner, had been commenting to us concerning the graphs and statistics decorating the walls of his office. From November 1979 to November 1980, the number of Afghan refugees rose from 314,600 to 1,309,500--an increase of nearly 1 million in 1 year. On an average, the monthly increase at the time was 83,660. During the first 2 weeks of January 1981, the figure was over 72,000 for the two provinces taking in the most refugees.

There is no better illustration of the extent of the problem than those graphs we saw in an office of the UNHCR (UN Office of High Commissioner for Refugees) in Peshawar. Those for the districts of Peshawar and North Waziristan, for example, are literally "exploding."

In the field--in the district of Peshawar, for example, which is sheltering the largest number of refugees (more than 300,000) and where Pakistani authorities have decided to suspend registrations in order to encourage new arrivals to settle elsewhere--the runaway tide is generating discouragement but also a certain amount of pride.

Safi said: "Elsewhere in the world it may be possible to cope, but here the situation is uncontrollable." He admits: "Our plans are constantly out of date, and due to the lack of personnel and administrative sluggishness, the number of refugees has already doubled before those plans go into effect. But even so"--and here visible pride shows through--"foreign visitors generally acknowledge that, given the means at our disposal, we are working miracles."

Fraud and Corruption

Fraud? Corruption? "There is no country without such unfortunate occurrences when aid as sizable as this is involved," noted Roman C. Kohaut, head of mission, but he immediately deplored the fact that such an issue was being made of facts that could just as well be true of Thailand or Somalia.

People at the Peshawar office of the UNHCR are both more annoyed and even more pragmatic: "The words 'fraud' and 'corruption' are totally inadequate for describing a situation in which underadministration and tribal hierarchy explain and excuse many things." That is the substance of what they say.

The same realism exists on the Pakistani side. Brigadier General Azhar admits: "It would be dishonest of me to tell you that such schemes are not going on." But he denies that there is fraud or corruption "on a large scale."

Asking the same question of Safi in Peshawar brought a long silence and an icy look. Was it an embarrassing question? No, an insulting one, because let us not forget that here we are among Pathans, whether they be Pakistanis or Afghans. His answer had two parts. First the thunder: "With respect to those found guilty of fraudulent activities, we will make no compromise. They will be answerable to military justice--to courts-martial--and they deserve to go to jail and to receive a few blows with the whip."

Then came the speech for the defense and the mitigating circumstances. "Don't forget that at the beginning, we had to cope with this sizable influx with just a handful of government officials who were already overburdened with the tasks assigned to them." There was the case, for example, of a single official, helped by two assistants, who was put in charge of from 30,000 to 40,000 refugees. "In those conditions, how can you expect to exercise effective control over registration and detect double registrations?" Safi went on: "So we decided last September to reorganize the refugee administration completely so as to have the situation totally under control within 6 months--including both registration and the distribution of Pakistani and international aid."

It was decided, first of all, to beef up the staff considerably: from 5,000 to 6,000 people were specially recruited. The second decision was to set up smaller basic units--that is, villages or tent cities with a maximum of 5,000 people or 1,000 families, each of which will be administered by about 30 people. The objective: to know each refugee personally within those units.

Parallel with that important administrative reform, there will be a policy aimed at preventing the establishment of refugee camps less than 10 kilometers from the Afghan border. It is recognized, of course, that refugees have settled in tribal areas where the Pakistani central government cannot intervene, but it is asserted that in such cases, they receive no aid. Spokesmen for the UNHCR are more moderate in their remarks. While they understand the Pakistani concerns (to prevent the refugees from being the victims of reprisals), they say they are incapable of simply cutting off food supplies for the women and children living in those areas. The United Nations has decided, however, to give the Pakistani Government financial assistance to help it enforce that policy. A subsidiary problem, but one which is nevertheless a matter of growing concern to Pakistani authorities, is the presence of some 3 million animals belonging to the refugees. The damage they do constitutes a serious threat to a natural environment that is already very fragile. The UNHCR acknowledges the gravity of the problem but admits that it is powerless on that particular point.

The same powerlessness, or something close to it, exists with respect to another problem that Afghan adults[1] are becoming more aware of every day: that of employment. One official at the UNHCR observed: "As time passes, they realize that they are not going to go home tomorrow and that they will consequently have to find work. It is up to us to support all their efforts, but we must also take local Pakistani unemployment into account and avoid creating problems. This considerably limits our action." He explained that generally speaking, "whatever we offer to the refugees, we must also offer to the local population. That is what we are doing, for example, in the health field."

Since the number of Afghan refugees is increasing constantly (and it is emphasized that "it is one-way traffic"), the financial burden being imposed on the Pakistani Government is growing steadily greater. The average monthly cost of a family of refugees (about 10 persons) amounts to $150. In 1980, an overall sum of $200 million was spent, half of it provided by contributions from the international community--that is, the UNHCR, the World Food Program, and national and private humanitarian organizations.

Of the approximately $100 million thus expended by Pakistan, the lion's share consisted of the payment to each officially registered refugee of a monthly allowance of 50 rupees.[2] That allowance cannot exceed 500 rupees per family. It was reduced from an initial amount of 120 rupees after the World Food Program went into operation, since that program now provides each refugee with a monthly ration of food.

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1. According to official statistics, 28.3 percent of the Afghan refugees registered as of 15 January 1981 were men, 28 percent were women, and 43.7 percent were children under 12 years of age.

2. One Pakistan rupee = 0.45 French franc.

While those rations seem to be distributed quite regularly, especially in the case of wheat and sugar, the same is apparently not true of the Pakistani monthly allowance. The latter had not been paid for several months at the Kacka Garhi camp on the northern outskirts of Peshawar (18,000 persons) when we visited there. But it is true that while the Pakistani Government intends to respect its generous commitments, doing so is going to cost it a cool $90 million in 1981. So it is easy to understand the urgent appeals being made by Pakistan to the Islamic community.

In addition to the payment of that allowance, the Pakistani Government is also in charge of forwarding international aid, most of which arrives at Karachi: some 500,000 tons of miscellaneous products in 1980. That represents a sizable expenditure, since Quetta and Peshawar, the two main distribution centers, are located 500 and 1,000 kilometers respectively from that port.

Lastly, Pakistani authorities are thinking of paying financial compensation to the owners of land occupied by the Afghan refugees.

Some people say that such a measure is indispensable if the government does not want a feeling of hostility toward the refugees to develop among the local inhabitants.

In one office, some of the figures posted on a board--the highest--show the percentage of refugees in relation to the total population of the receiving districts. In some cases--Kurram and North Waziristan, for example--it is on the order of one-third. In Baluchistan, in the district of Chapai, it exceeds 40 percent.

When one examines the figures, confides one UNHCR official, one always expects problems to appear at some point, but what is thought to be the "critical threshold" is passed every time. One is forced to note that so far, Islamic hospitality and Pathan fraternity ("they have never stopped fighting among themselves, but they form a common front in adversity") have been more than words.

11798
CSO: 4619/12

GROUP OF NURISTANI MARAUDERS CAPTURED

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 9 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] A dangerous Nuristani terrorist group which had engaged in terror, robbery, banditry and plundering people was recently captured by the security alert force in Kabul. This group of marauders, killers and terrorizers--armed with various kinds of weapons and ammunition--who were captured a little while before they were to carry out an act of inhuman terrorism were ringleaders and perpetrators of robberies and night raids on innocent families of the city of Kabul and had been committing these acts under orders from their foreign bosses and employers.

During the investigation, seven members of this band confessed to their inhuman acts which proves their ties with one of the mercenary groups abroad with the so-called name of "Jam'iyat-e Islami."

Various kinds of weapons and ammunition were seized from this terrorist group as well as foreign arms, military uniforms, and a quantity of strong, dangerous chemical poisons--which could kill a person in a few moments--together with several motor vehicles which were used in carrying out their atrocious activities. And further investigation of this matter is continuing.

CSO: 4665/6

TEACHER TRAINING EXCHANGE AGREEMENT WITH TASHKENT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 9 Jul 81 p 2

[Text]

An exchange agreement on scientific and methodological cooperation was concluded recently between the Kabul Teachers' Training Academy and the Tashkent State Institute of Pedagogy in Kabul. Kabul New Times had a brief interview on the agreement with Pohanmal Dr Dost Mohammad Parwani, Principal of the Kabul Teachers' Training Academy.

Dr Parwani said: "The major task of the party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is building a democratic and progressive society, wellbeing, prosperity and promoting the moral and material living standard of the working people for building a new society and for a revolutionary leap, educating the people, blossoming of knowledge, growth of the national and progressive culture. The DRA Government, under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, renders persistent, expanded and indefatigueable efforts for popularisation of education. However, putting into practice such plans is impossible without experienced teachers."

Exchange of documents were on organising teaching, cooperation on completion of the educational programmes of the courses, popularisation of the methodic training experiences, the import of experienced professors and teachers from Tashkent, exchange of information on scientific research of the departments concerned, exchange of the scientific work for the general public, training of the Academy's teachers in Tashkent, in the fields of history and pedagogy, teaching methods of mathematics, physics and other social and economic subjects.

"As part of its assistance", he added, "the Tashkent Institute will help our institute in organising the libraries, in sending laboratory equipment, technical teaching materials, scientific and methodological educational facilities, political and literary books, scien-

tific and research work and scientific works in pedagogy."

PROGRAMMES

Parwani went on: "The one-year post graduate courses' programmes were promoted to master's degree programmes in 1979 with the UNESCO financial assistance and a sub-contract with the Soviet techno-export. It was felt that the teachers who are teaching in the masters' degree courses should be doctorate (sprantors) degree holders".

"Candidates for sprantory", he added, "whose age do not exceed 35 ought to hold a MA or MS, teaching at the Teachers' Training Academy, schools or other educational institutions engaged in scientific, teaching or research work.

Parwani said that at present 140 people have joined the master's degree course of the Academy in the first and second terms. They will continue their education in seven fields of psychology, science (chemistry and biology), mathematics, physics with foreign language and social sciences for two years in four departments.

Candidates for sprantory, after examinations in a limited number of subjects ought to publish a 200 page thesis. It should be a creative work and should be defended. The candidate should have published three scientific article in the leading domestic or foreign newspapers.

"Since the party and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are willing to implement the mass education reform in Afghanistan, the need for training academic cadres is felt greatly. Based on the national and revolutionary policy, envisaged plans and realisation of the lofty objectives of the Saur Revolution, urgent needs was felt for training of the sprants in the country so that they should train national vocational academic cadres in various field to serve the homeland", Parwani added.

CSO: 4600/102

SURPLUS OF SUGAR IMPORTS REPORTED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Jul 81 p 3

[Text] "With the procurement of not less than 100,000 tons of sugar from abroad, not only will the people's needs be totally fulfilled, but a considerable amount of it can be stored for future use," said Sayed Azeem, Hussain, commercial vice-president of the general fuel and sugar procurement department in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

It is intended that during the current Afghan year, 100,000 tons of sugar will be purchased and imported to the country and put at the disposal of the people. The contract for the purchase of 40,000 tons of sugar has already been signed by the Afghan authorities and the contract for the delivery of another 60,000 tons of sugar has been signed by the general department for procurement of sugar and fuel and the Vestog-Intorg Company of the Soviet Union.

The vice-president of the department further said, since sugar is one of the most important consumer items in Afghanistan, on the basis of the revolutionary government's economic policy, special emphasis has been laid on its procurement transportation, and timely distribution to the people. To realise this objective and in an effort to maintain uninterrupted supply, necessary and all-sided efforts have been made by this department so that under an organised programme sufficient amount of sugar is procured, distributed and stored for the timely supply to people throughout the country.

As a part of the department's current year's development plan, the contract for the delivery of another 60,000 tons of sugar, in continuation of previous contracts, has been signed recently by this department and the suppliers.

In accordance with this contract, the Government of the Soviet Union, in addition to the 40,000 tons of sugar supplied to Afghanistan on commercial basis, has agreed to provide Afghanistan another 15,000 tons of sugar as grant-in-aid, and another 5,000 tons of sugar on the basis of easy consumer credit. These will be delivered to Afghanistan when necessary.

On the basis of these contracts, the delivery of the sugar will take place through the Afghan ports. Delivery of previously signed contracts has already begun and delivery continue in full swing.

Answering a question about the supply procedure, the vice-president of the department said the department in an effort to properly supply sugar to the people, at present has around 1,500 commission outlets for distribution of sugar in strategic places of the capital, and an additional number of such outlets in the provinces in proportion to the population of each provincial city. The inhabitants of the capital and the provinces receive their sugar through these outlets uninterruptedly. The existing distribution outlets can fully meet the needs of the people throughout the country and naturally, if we feel the need, of course the department will consider more distribution centres.

Since 1357, considerable increase has occurred in the prices of sugar in the world markets, and this trend is on the increase. At the end of the year 1359, the price of sugar has considerably gone up. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in order to help the compatriots and maintain stable supply of sugar in the markets, decided to purchase notwithstanding the prevailing prices and its scarcity in the world markets, sufficient amounts of sugar from abroad and supply them to the people at reasonable prices.

On the basis of this decision of the people's Government, the department of fuel and sugar procurement, through various contracts, was able to supply the needs of the public. No profit has been earned from the sale proceed. The sugar is being sold at a loss.

As part of the current year's plan of the department, this department intends to sign further contracts for purchase of sugar from abroad and put at the disposal of the people, Hussaini added.

CSO: 4600/102

BRIEFS

USSR BULLET-PROOF UNIFORMS--London, July 20--The mujahideen snatched 200 bullet-proof uniforms from Soviet forces in Kunar Valley. They are using the uniforms in guerilla operations. These uniforms were snatched from the Soviet forces from the fronts of Asmar, Bari Kot and Ghugha Serai over the last two months.--AAP [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 21 Jul 81 p 5]

CSO: 4600/102

BRIEFS

TRADE AGREEMENT--Tirana--A long-term trade agreement and a financial convention between Algeria and Albania have been signed in Tirana by FLN Politburo member and Finance Minister M'hamed Yala, who has been visiting Tirana since 10 July at the head of an Algerian delegation. The Algerian delegation, accompanied by Algeria's ambassador to Albania, was received by Mr Adil Carcani, member of the Politburo of the Albanian Workers' Party and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, and had talks with various officials in Tirana, including Foreign Minister Nesti Nase and Foreign Trade Minister Nedin Hoxha. The financial convention and the new trade agreement which have just been drawn up will make it possible to further develop bilateral economic and commercial relations.

AGREEMENT WITH USSR--The Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industries has announced that recent talks took place between a Soviet oil company and Sonatrach. An agreement was reached to complete the part between (?Tin Touri) and Hassi-Mas'ud of the gas pipeline that links (?Lorral) with Hassi-Rmel. In accordance with the agreement which was signed on 7 July by the representatives of the two companies, the Soviet company will complete a 421 km section of the gas pipeline--(?Lloral)--Hassi-Remel which is an important element of the development resources of the national economy. [Text] [LD110503 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 10 Jul 81]

CSO: 4504/42

BRIEFS

MUNICIPAL COUNCILS ESTABLISHED--AL-ADWA' has learned that there is a strong inclination in the government toward studying the issue of reviving the formation of municipal councils following their long absence. The government has decided to implement this following the completion of the preparatory arrangements for these councils. Bahrain is to be divided into five regions, each of which will have its own local municipal council. It has also been decided that these councils will be represented in the central municipal council, which will be located in Manama, the capital. The number of members will vary depending on the importance and size of the region. Two-thirds of the councils' members will be elected and the remainder will be appointed, in order to guarantee the participation of the good and capable elements who decline to enter the elections and who consider election campaigns unpleasant. [Text] [GF181853 Manama AL-ADWA' in Arabic 18 Jul 81 p 1]

CSO: 4304/78

ECONOMIC-INDUSTRIAL PROSPECTS OF IRAN SAID TO BE 'GRIM'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 24 Jul 81 pp 11-12

[Text] The prospects of Iran ever becoming a leading industrial power as envisaged by the late Shah are now almost nil, according to a confidential report prepared by experts for a leading Western financial firm.

An Iranian economist who has seen the report says the experts point out that in addition to the breakdown of economic activity, the suspension of all major development products for a considerable period and the halt in training of skilled and unskilled manpower, the achievements of industrial countries in cutting down their oil consumption and the glut now accumulating on the market means the chances of huge oil revenues are unlikely for future administrations in Iran.

The loss to Iran as a result of the chaos that has followed the revolution cannot even be estimated, the experts say. Unlike in wartime Europe, when factories produced armaments and training continued, Iran has virtually stopped functioning, and the lack of industrial and technical tradition means getting things moving again will be much harder than in Europe. In addition, even if a fairly stable regime replaces the present one, large numbers of technocrats and professional people will not return to Iran, it is thought.

As far as agriculture is concerned a shortage of engineers and others who can provide the expertise necessary to a revival will be acute. The effect of the religious "nightmare" on the still turgid social life in the rural areas will also lead to yet more young people leaving the countryside than in the Shah's days, it is forecast.

Added to the social discontent will be the political unrest that will inevitably follow the heady times of the revolution. People will prove undisciplined and in all walks of life it is unlikely that there will be willing cooperation and a general working for the same ends and the common good, the experts said.

The result, it is felt, is that the military will have to exercise effective control. If that is not possible then a long period of semi-anarchy, unrest and nil economic growth can only follow. Either a Khaddafi or some similar military leader will be

thrown up who can appeal to the young and exercise some control, or Soviet forces will have to move in on a compassionate mission to force submission to discipline, the forecasters feel.

"The report suggests to the intelligent observer that the idea that ethnic minorities will prove the main obstacle to peace in Iran after any counter-revolution is wrong," IPS' informant pointed out. "It will be the urban masses, and the young people in general, who will be the threat to the continuance of a rational society. The tribal people, in fact, will have their traditions and their long-standing social set-up to help keep them in line, but the rest of the people, who had begun to taste the benefits of a modern society without concerning themselves with how they were achieved, will have no such protective mechanism against their ushering in anarchy."

Only if the present regime survives and manages to achieve a society based on Islam's tenets and the people accept it can religion hope to have more than a minimal influence in the future Iran. Thus, the inability or unwillingness of Western democracies to take an active role in the development or corrective processes in societies like that of Iran means that the Soviet Union is likely to become the lover who takes over the household in time, is the consensus of the experts' views.

CSO: 4600/106

TEXT OF BUDGET FOR CURRENT YEAR PUBLISHED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 81 pp 14, 3

[Text] The Islamic Consultative Assembly, yesterday, after 5 consecutive days of deliberation, ratified the items of the bill for the budget for 1360 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82] with 66 legislative notes. The budget bill was studied for more than 100 hours by the Cabinet ministers and more than 150 hours by the Commission of Planning and Budget. According to the spokesman of the Commission of Planning and Budget, no budget bill has ever, in the history of Iranian Parliaments, been studied so carefully. And most of the criticism concerning this bill has occurred in the mass media. Because of the importance of this bill, KEYHAN is providing the complete text for its readers. It must be mentioned that this bill must still be approved by the Council of Guardians before the government is notified.

Single Article. The government budget for 1360, from the standpoint of revenues and other funding sources and from the standpoint of expenses and other payments amounts to 3,165,981,700,000 rials as follows:

A. The general revenues and other funds amount to 3,037 billion rials and the expenditures and other payments from this fund amount to 3,037 billion rials.

The government has been authorized to present to the Majles a bill for abolishing interests in the banking system.

The Ministry of Education has been authorized to put at the disposal of the Literacy Movement [Nehzat-e Savadamuzi] funds amounting to 3 per 1000.

B. The allocated revenues of ministries and government institutions amount to 128,981,700,000 rials and the expenditures and other payments from this fund amount to 128,981,700,000 rials. The general revenue and other funds referred to in Paragraph A of this Article have been approved and the government has been authorized to collect the revenues and other funds referred to in Part 3 of this law in 1360 and to pay the expenses of the ministries and government institutions as well as the aid and other funds referred to in the charts of Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this law, within the limits of the collected revenues and other funds in 1360, on the basis of the allocated funds and in accordance with related laws and regulations and the Legislative Notes of this law.

The budget of that group of profit-making establishments dependent on the government which have become government establishments in 1360 may be implemented upon approval by the Cabinet.

Legislative Note 1. The revolving fund of the treasury in 1360 consists of 150 billion rials.

Legislative Note 2. A. In order to make up the deficit in the revolving fund necessary for the implementation of the ratified programs for purchasing and selling essential materials, products, and goods needed by companies and establishments affiliated with the Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, Commerce, and Industries and Mines, and the National Iranian Steel Company, in accordance with the proposal of the respective ministers and the approval of the Organization of Planning and Budget [OPB], the Central Bank of Iran has been authorized to gradually provide the companies and establishments affiliated with the above-mentioned ministries with the necessary funds to be used exclusively as specified, under the supervision and responsibility of those ministers.

B. The Ministries of Agriculture and Rural Development, Industries and Mines, and Commerce and the National Iranian Steel Company shall be charged with supervising the correct use of the respective revolving funds, with regard to purchases and sales, in accordance with the program cited in Paragraph A, and the direct deposit of said funds acquired from sales in the respective accounts in the Central Bank of Iran, and for providing the means for the review of their own revolving fund accounts.

C. All funds obtained from the sale of goods purchased with the above mentioned revolving funds (with the exception of the difference between the cost and sale price in the case of the National Iranian Steel Company) shall be deposited directly in the Central Bank of Iran and credited to the account of the respective revolving funds. Violations of this decree or the decree of the last part of Paragraph

A of this Legislative Note shall be considered illegal use of government properties and funds.

D. The re-acquisition of money from the revolving funds for the purchase of any one of the items, products, or materials shall be restricted and shall depend upon the deposits having been made in the previously acquired revolving fund, in accordance with the program of purchases and sales approved by the OPB and the Central Bank of Iran. In implementing this Paragraph, should the necessary coordination between the acquisitions and deposits of the revolving fund not exist, the Central Bank of Iran shall inform the proper executive organizations in order that steps be taken to change the program of purchases and sales to correspond with the regulations of Paragraph A of this Legislative Note.

E. The Central Bank of Iran shall be charged with preparing and sending to the OPB a complete monthly report concerning the amounts paid in revolving funds cited in Paragraph A as well as collected funds from the sale of goods purchased with the revolving funds cited in Paragraph C of this Legislative Note, which are deposited in that bank, separated according to company and establishment.

F. Companies and establishments affiliated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development shall deposit in the proper account at the Central Bank of Iran, at most by the end of 1360 [20 Mar 82], the amount of the revolving funds put at their disposal which have not been deposited (except for the service charges) in accordance with Legislative Note 2 of the Budget Laws of 1358 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 80] and 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81] and its amendment.

G. The Ministries of Economic Affairs and Finance and of Agriculture and Rural Development shall be charged with investigating, at most to the end of Azar 1361 [21 Dec 82], the accounts of the revolving funds which have been paid in accordance with the related Legislative Notes of the Budget Laws of the years before 1358 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 80] in regards to the kind, amount, and manner of purchase of goods and for determining the reasons for the failures to deposit in the revolving funds and the delays in payments to the funds obtained through the sale of the goods purchased with related accounts in the Central Bank of Iran. Appropriate legal action shall be taken regarding individuals who have not adhered to or have not tried to adhere to the principles of the related Legislative Notes as far as spending procedures, deposits on time in the revolving funds, or supervision according to contracts signed with the Central Bank of Iran, or regarding those who have made illegal use of the revolving funds, purchased goods with those funds or funds obtained from the sale of the above-mentioned goods. The report of the actions taken shall be given to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Office of the State Prosecutor General before the end of Dey 1361 [20 Jan 83]. The

Office of the State Prosecutor General shall take rapid action in the legal pursuit of violators.

H. Revolving funds used in 1360 in the implementation of this Legislative Note shall not exceed a total of 350 billion rials.

Legislative Note 3. A. To help in the operation and expansion of factories and agricultural production centers, to increase national production activities, the Central Bank of Iran, with consideration for the monetary policies of the country, shall, itself or through other banks, from its own resources or the resources of other banks, provide specialized or provincial banks with the necessary credit for production, industrial, mining, or agricultural purposes, for the creation of housing and buildings, and for carrying out investment projects in the above-mentioned areas. In accordance with a proposal of the Central Bank of Iran, within a maximum period of five years, the OPB shall include in the government budget the remainder of the claims resulting from the implementation of that group of projects for which the granting of credit has been deemed necessary and has been approved by the Economic Council for every year after the necessary investigations.

B. The OPB shall be authorized to secure from the following year's government budget, in accordance with its needs, all or part of the service charges of the credits granted for the projects proposed in the latter part of Paragraph A of this Legislative Note.

C. The operational guidelines of this Legislative Note concerning the amount and limit of credits for every section, the time period, and other conditions of the credits mentioned above in this Legislative Note shall be prepared within one month of the date of the announcement of this law by the Central Bank of Iran and the OPB and shall be approved by the Monetary and Credit Council.

Legislative Note 4. The due date for the implementation of Legislative Note 32 of the Budget Law of 1359 shall be extended to the end 1360.

Legislative Note 5. A. The government shall be authorized to allocate the amount of 35 billion rials of the fixed investment credit of item 503001 of this law for the implementation of emergency projects in connection with the forced war and other necessary projects for which no funds have been allocated in this law or which are unable to be implemented in accordance with the general regulations, despite the allocation of funds.

B. The credit or funds allocated to every organization in implementing Paragraph A of this Legislative Note shall be used at the discretion of the minister of that organization and shall not be subject to the General Accounting Law or other general regulations of

the government. Expense documents shall be taken into consideration in the final account with the joint signatures of the minister and the accountant of the improvement projects of the concerned executive organization.

C. The credit funds cited in this Legislative Note for every executive organization shall be kept in a separate account in the Central Bank or the Melli Bank of Iran and their use permissible in accordance with the regulations in this Legislative Note and with the joint signatures of the minister and the respective accountant of the developmental budget.

D. The ministers shall be charged with sending to the prime minister detailed reports of every expenditure subject to this Legislative Note within a maximum period of one month after its completion. The government shall be charged with presenting to the Islamic Consultative Assembly a detailed report of the expenditures subject to this Legislative Note within a maximum period of two months.

Legislative Note 6. A. The governor general of each province shall be authorized to allocate a maximum of 10 percent of the total funds for development of the province, as cited in Section 6 of this law, for emergency development operations and shall inform the provincial planning committee of the procedure. A minimum of two-thirds of the above funds shall be used for villages.

B. This fund may be used with the proposal of the organization carrying out the emergency operations and the agreement of the governor general and its use shall not be restricted to the General Accounting Law or other general regulations of the government. Expenditure documents shall be taken into consideration in the final account of the development projects of the province.

C. The credit funds referred to in this Legislative Note shall be kept at the local Melli Bank in a separate account as needed and use of this account, in accordance with the regulations of this Legislative Note, shall be permitted with the joint signatures of the governor general and the accountant of the development projects of the province.

D. The governor general shall not be authorized to give any sort of operational or personnel commitment through the use of this fund for the following years.

E. The governors general shall be charged with sending a detailed report of each expenditure referred to in this Legislative Note within one month of its completion through the minister of interior to the prime minister.

F. The governors general shall be charged with raising the issue of the budget of their province with the representatives of the province and shall give priority to vital needs.

Legislative Note 7

A. Permission shall be granted for the allocation of funds in the amount of 350 billion rials, as cited in item 503041 of this law and as proposed by the OPB, with the approval of the Cabinet, dividing the expenses incurred because of the forced war as follows:

1. To provide for the needs of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

2. To purchase oil products,

3. To provide for the expenses of the war victims,

4. To reconstruct war zones.

B. The use of any amount of funds referred to in this Legislative Note which shall be allocated for the operation of the contracts of the Ministry of National Defense and other commitments in accordance with the law ratified on 29/8/58 [20 Nov 79] by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its operational guidelines are hereby authorized.

C. The completed expenditures from the funds cited in Legislative Note 1 of the law, "Permission to Implement the National Expenditures of the First Two Months of 1360" [21 Mar-21 May 81], and Legislative Note 5 of the law, "Permission for the Implementation of the National Expenditures of the First Four Months of 1360" [21 Mar-22 Jul 81], shall be counted in the account of item 503041.

The government shall be charged with presenting to the Islamic Consultative Assembly every six months a report of the operations cited in this Legislative Note.

Legislative Note 8. The government shall be authorized to put at the disposal of the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Interior the necessary sums credited in items 143503 and 503010 of this law, on a case by case basis, to make up for the exemptions from paying the price of water and electricity of low-consuming customers, in accordance with the legislative amendment bill of the law of exemption from paying the price of water and electricity ratified on 18/6/58 [9 Sep 79] of the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran by providing the proper organizations and establishments with the necessary funds based on documents presented to the above-mentioned ministries by said organizations and establishments as follows:

A. To companies affiliated with the Ministry of Energy (water and electricity, regional electricity, and city drinking water companies) up to 5,500 million rials.

B. To companies and establishments affiliated with the municipal offices, up to 1,800 million rials.

Legislative Note 9. The government shall be authorized to make necessary expenditures up to 500 million rials from the amount credited to item 501001 of this law, with the approval of the Cabinet ministers and without consideration for the General Accounting Law or other general regulations. The documents for this type of expenditure shall be signed by the prime minister (or the proper minister) and the proper accountant. And those expenditures will be taken into account in the final expenditure.

Legislative Note 10. The OPB shall be authorized, whenever necessary, to allocate funds credited to item 281001 (the Consumer and Producer Protection Organization for the differences between the price of food items and basic goods and commitments) of this law and shall be required to inform the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of the allocation of the necessary funds in order that they be put at the disposal of the Consumer and Producer Protection Organization in partial payment to be used in accordance with the proper regulations.

Funds paid for this purpose, with regard to Legislative Note 60 of the Amendment to the National Budget Law of 1353 [21 Mar 74-20 Mar 75] and the Budget of 1354 [21 Mar 75-20 Mar 76], shall be taken into account in the final expenditure upon review.

Legislative Note 11. The government shall be authorized in 1360, on the basis of revenues obtained from the increase in the price of gasoline, a maximum amount of 21,500 million rials from the government funds of item 501001 of this law for each needy villager above the age of 60 years up to the amount of 3,000 rials per month and shall be paid in order of priority through investment, production, goods, or cash services by the National Welfare Organization.

The eligibility guidelines and also the implementation procedures of this Legislative Note shall be approved by the Cabinet within one month of the date of the ratification of this law with a proposal by the National Welfare Organization and the approval of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the OPB.

Legislative Note 12. The ministers and governors general shall be charged with sending to the Islamic Consultative Assembly once every three months a list of the expenditures of those ministries and government institutions under their supervision in accordance with special legislation not subject to the regulations of the General

Accounting Law or which have been provided from the funds cited in Article 17.

Legislative Note 13. The Iranian Government Railroad shall be authorized to spend the amount of 800 million rials from the proper funds ratified for development projects in the current year, to continue and complete the plan for self-sufficiency (studying the structures, repairing spare parts, and producing needed equipment).

Use of the above funds shall be independent of the General Accounting Law and other general government regulations. The related documents shall be included in the final expenditure with the joint signatures of the director of the executive organization and the proper accountant.

Legislative Note 14.

A. Ministries, government institutions, and other executive organizations shall be charged with preparing, within a maximum of one month after the notification of the passage of this law, an agreement, which includes a list of expenditures itemized according to program, concerning their current funds, as provided in Section 4 of this law, and for exchanging it with the OPB.

B. Executive organizations shall adhere to the agreements concerning the current funds referred to in Paragraph A of this Legislative Note in paying expenditures and keeping proper accounts.

C. Until the agreements concerning the current funds referred to in Paragraph A of this Legislative Note have been exchanged, expenditures from the current funds of the executive organizations may be made on a scale determined by the committee for the allocation of funds referred to in Article 30 of the National Planning and Budget Law. Executive organizations and the OPB shall take into consideration the funds referred to in this Paragraph as they are allocated in the agreements.

D. The allocation of funds from those referred to in Article 8 of the budgets of executive organizations shall be forbidden except for the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The funds referred to in Article 8 for the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran may be used with the approval of the Supreme Council of Defense and the report of the expenditures from the above funds shall be sent to the above Supreme Council once every three months.

E. An increase in the current funds of each of the programs and items of expenditure of the executive organizations included in the agreements referred to in Paragraph A of this Legislative Note, except for those of Articles 1, 2, 8, and 7, which cannot be increased, subject to decreases in the funds of other programs in the

respective organizations up to a maximum of 25 percent, provided that no change occurs in the sum total of the current funds of the executive organization, shall be authorized as follows:

1. Up to 10 percent, only once a year with the approval of the highest authority of the executive organization and the knowledge of the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance;

2. Over 10 percent and up to 25 percent only once, on the suggestion of the highest authority of the executive organization, with the approval of the Cabinet, and the knowledge of the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance;

3. Increases in the funds mentioned in Article 19 in necessary and unavoidable cases, authorized without consideration for the restrictions of Items 1 and 2 and with the approval of the highest executive organization and the knowledge of the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.

F. In the case of executive organizations whose current funds have been included in this law as aid, determination and notification of the articles of expenditure shall not be required.

Legislative Note 15

The following shall be authorized:

A. Allocation according to projects and notification of the proper executive organizations, the OPB, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance about the fixed investment funds of national development projects which have been provided in Section 4 of this law, within a maximum period of one month after the ratification of this law, upon the suggestion of the proper ministers and the approval of the Cabinet.

B. Concerning the continuation of those projects which were being implemented at the end of 1359, on the basis of the instructions which shall be prepared by the OPB and approval by the Cabinet, and upon notification of the passage of this law, the executive organiaztions shall prepare the details of the project operations, within the confines of the funds of the notified projects referred to in Paragraph A of this Legislative Note, and shall implement them with the approval of the proper minister. Copies shall be sent to the OPB, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, and the proper accounting office of development projects.

Under an emergency plan, the government shall build flood controls along flood routes near villages.

C. The implementation of new projects as well as new projects in connection with old projects, which have been unprecedented, shall be subject to the approval of the operational details of said projects by the OPB, in accordance with the instructions referred to in Paragraph B of this Legislative Note.

The OPB, in implementing this Paragraph, shall be charged with the approving and notifying the project within a maximum of 10 days after having received the operational details. If the OPB should not agree with the proper executive organization on the operational details, the issue shall be studied by the Economic Council and the decision of said Council shall be implemented.

D. Necessary changes in the operational details of the 1360 projects shall be allowed in accordance with the instructions referred to in Paragraph B of this Legislative Note.

E. Any necessary change in the names of projects that are announced in implementing Paragraph A of this Legislative Note or the separate allocation of funds of the approved project into two or several projects shall be authorized with the approval of the Economic Council.

F. The administrators shall be authorized, if necessary, upon the suggestion of the proper executive organizations, to make changes in the executive organizations of the national development projects. They shall also be authorized, according to case and need, to allocate to private projects the funds of item 503002 (miscellaneous expenditures and new development projects) of Section 4 of this law to be implemented according to Paragraphs B and C of this Legislative Note.

G. The operational details of each national development project whose operations organizations are other than their executive organizations shall be approved by the authorities mentioned in Paragraphs B and C of this Legislative Note on the basis of joint proposals by the executive and operations organizations within the bounds of the funds approved for each case. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall directly provide the executive organization of each project with the proper funds.

Legislative Note 16

The following shall be authorized:

A. The development funds for provinces included in Section 6 of this law shall be allocated separately according to chapter and plan, on the basis of the instructions referred to in Paragraph B of Legislative Note 16 of this law, within a maximum of one month after the ratification of this law, with a proposal of the local executive organization by the planning committee of the province. Upon the

approval of the operational details of each project by the above committee, the OPB of the province shall notify the local executive organizations and shall send copies to the accounting office of the development projects of the province, the OPB, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.

B. Necessary changes in the operational details or the title of the provincial development projects which are announced in accordance with Paragraph B of this Legislative Note are authorized on the basis of the instructions cited in Paragraph B of Legislative Note 16, and with the approval of the Planning Committee of the province.

The operational details concerning the provincial development projects whose operational organizations are other than the executive organization shall be approved by the Planning Committee of the province with the joint proposal of the executive organization and the operational organization within the limits of the approved funds. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall directly provide the operations organization of the project with the proper project funds.

Legislative Note 17

A. An increase in the funds of the national development projects announced according to Paragraph A of Legislative Note 16 of this law shall be authorized to be taken from the decrease in the funds of other above-mentioned projects within each of the programs of the executive organization up to 25 percent, with the approval of the highest authority of the executive organization and the knowledge of the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, and between 25 percent and 50 percent with the approval of the Economic Council, provided no changes occur in the total sum of the development funds of each program in each executive organization.

B. The increase of development funds of each program and executive organization within every chapter shall be authorized from the decrease of funds in other programs and executive organizations, from 10 percent to 25 percent, with the approval of the proper minister and the notification of the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and over 25 percent with the approval of the Economic Council, provided no changes occur in the sum total of the development funds of that chapter.

Legislative Note 18. A. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall be authorized to allocate a revolving fund amounting to 10 percent of the funds approved for fixed investment in 1360 to each one of the executive organizations and provinces in order to facilitate payments for development projects. Later Payments from the treasury shall be exclusively authorized in exchange for positive documents or lists of expenditures catagorized by proper projects and

approved by the director of the executive organizations and the proper accountant.

B. In cases where the above-mentioned revolving funds are insufficient for pre-payments as regards signed contracts or for opening documented funds and completed commitments on the basis of positive documents, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall put at the disposal of the accountant the extra revolving funds as needed.

C. The funds for development projects in the amount of the revolving funds which have been put at the disposal of the executive organizations in the implementation of Paragraphs A and B of this Legislative Note shall be considered allocated.

D. Executive organizations shall be charged with regularly reporting to the OPB on the operations referred to in this Legislative Note and other information concerning the implementation of development projects based on Article 35 of the National Planning and Budget Law.

Legislative Note 19. Authorization shall be given for that group of programs or development projects which can feasibly be implemented provincially to be categorized as provincial projects according to a proposal by the OPB and the approval of the Cabinet and to be announced to the local executive organizations by the OPB.

Legislative Note 20. The Planning Committee of each province shall be formed under the chairmanship of the governor general and with the membership of the director of the OPB and the directors general and authorities of the executive organizations of the province, the representatives of provincial city councils, a representative of the Construction Crusade, and a representative of the Chamber of Commerce and Industries and Mines of the province at the invitation of the governor general. Before the representatives of city councils are elected, a representative or representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly of the province shall take their place on the above committees as observers.

The OPB of each province shall be charged with the duties of the administrative office of the Planning Committee of that province.

Legislative Note 21. A. The current funds of the local executive organizations subject to the provincial budgetary system, which have been established in accordance with the program cited in Section 5 of this law, with the proposal of the executive organization and the endorsement of the OPB, shall be divided among the articles of expenditure and ratified by the Planning Committee of the province within a maximum of one month from the ratification of this law.

B. The inclusion of funds in Article 8 of the current budget of local executive organizations shall not be authorized.

C. Before the notification of the current budget of the local executive organization referred to in Paragraph A of this Legislative Note, the articles of expenditure of the current funds of the local executive organizations shall be implemented as determined by the committee for the allocation of funds of the province.

Legislative Note 22. A. The transfer or exchange of current funds between local executive organizations referred to in Section 5 of this law shall be authorized with the proposal of the executive organizations, the endorsement of Planning Committees of the provinces, and the notification of the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance in one lump sum for every province, up to 25 percent only once every year, provided no changes occur in the sum total of the current funds of the province.

B. The increase of current funds in every one of the programs and articles of expenditure of the local executive organizations ratified by the Planning Committee of the province shall be authorized from the decrease of funds in other programs and articles, except Articles 1, 2, 8, and 17, which cannot be increased, at a maximum of 25 percent annually, with the proposal of the local executive organization and the endorsement of the Planning Committee of the province, provided no changes occur in the sum total of the funds of the local executive organization. The OPB of provinces shall be charged with immediately informing the OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance of the changes resulting from the implementation of this Paragraph.

Legislative Note 23. Should the governor general determine that the local executive organization is incapable of implementing a project, another local executive organization proposed by the Technical Council of the province shall be appointed by the governor general.

Legislative Note 24. The central executive organizations shall be permitted, if able, to allocate a portion of their own funds to the provincial affiliated offices which are subject to the provincial budgetary system and shall notify the OPB, the OPB of the province, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.

Legislative Note 25. A. The decrease or increase of funds for the provincial development projects (fixed investments) of each province in each of the programs shall be authorized up to 20 percent once every year only, upon the approval of the highest authority of the local executive organization and the notification of the OPB of the province, the General Office of Economic Affairs and Finance of the province, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, and up to 25 percent with the endorsement of the Planning Committee of the province, provided no change occurs in the sum total of the development funds of each chapter.

B. The increase or decrease of funds for development projects of each province, among the programs of each local executive organization within the chapter shall be authorized up to 10 percent with the approval of the highest authority of the local executive organization and the notification of the OPB of the province, the General Office of Economic Affairs and Finance of the province, and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and up to 25 percent with the endorsement of the Planning Committee of the province, provided no change occurs in the sum total of the development funds of the local executive organization of that chapter.

C. The increase of funds for the development projects (fixed investment) of each province, between Chapters, up to 10 percent, and to any amount if the funds are transferred to the chapters of Agriculture and Rural Development, industry, and water, shall be authorized with the approval of the Planning Committee of the province, provided no change occurs in the sum total of the development fund (fixed investment) of the province.

Legislative Note 26. The funds for aid to the service units of the National Welfare Organization, except for Personnel and administerial expenditures, with regards to Legislative Note 6 of the law establishing the National Welfare Organization and Legislative Note 2 of Article 1 of the financial charter of the above-mentioned organization, shall be included exclusively in Article 17 and shall be used with consideration for the above-mentioned charter and Article 60 of the General Accounting Law.

Legislative Note 27. The OPB shall be authorized, by the end of Mordad 1360 [22 Aug 81] at the latest, with the cooperation of the National Welfare Organization and with regard to the priority of the regions, to take rapid steps to distribute funds amounting to 7,500 million rials, cited in item 503013 of this law, among the dependent units of the National Welfare Organization in the provinces, to add to the funds of the above-mentioned units in the provinces.

Legislative Note 28. The OPB shall be authorized, with the cooperation of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health, to distribute, before the end of Mordad 1360 at the latest, the funds in items 503011, 503014, and 503012 of this law among the general Offices of Education of the provinces in accordance with the program and the articles of expenditure and to be added to the proper budgets.

Legislative Note 29. The use of funds of item 111506 of this law shall be subject to the regulations of the Single Article ratified on 29/8/58 [20 Nov 79] by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran and subject to its operational guidelines.

Legislative Note 30. The Ministry of National Defense shall be authorized to pay the wages of divers and personnel of stationary and floating drydocks of the Air Force who work above and beyond the call of duty to repair commercial ships and oil pipes, in accordance with the charter proposed by the above-mentioned Ministry and approved by the Cabinet, from funds included in its own ratified budget.

Legislative Note 31. Authoization shall be given for the remainder of the monetary funds referred to in Paragraph B of Legislative Note 10 of the law amending some of the regulations of the Budget Law of 1359 which have remained unused during that year to be used for related cases in 1360, keeping in consideration the law concerning the funds of the contracts of the Ministry of National Defense ratified on 29/8/58 by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its operational guidelines.

Legislative Note 32. The purchase of major defense items from the funds referred to in Legislative Note 47 of the Budget Law of 1359 shall be subject to the regulations of the Legislative bill concerning the funds of the contracts of the Ministry of National Defense ratified on 29/8/58 by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its operational guidelines and shall be exempted from other regulations. The operational guidelines of this Legislative Note and Legislative Note 47 of the Budget Law of 1359 shall be proposed by the Supreme Council of Defense and approved by the Cabinet.

Legislative Note 33. The procedure for the use of the funds of item 111507 of Section 4 of this law, under the heading of "Ministry of National Defense--Research Expenditures," shall be proposed by the Ministry of National Defense, endorsed by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance and the OPB, and approved by the Cabinet, until the ratification of the proper guidelines.

Legislative Note 34. The content of the Single Article concerning the increase of the above amount, in the law allocating 500 million rials from the funds for the project for the "Commitments Concerning the Completion of Air Force Buildings," ratified on 10/10/59 [31 Dec 80] by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, shall remain in effect until the end of 1360 to partially pay for the emergency and necessary expenditures. The required funds may be provided from the 1360 funds for the project for the "Commitments Concerning the Completion of Air Force Buildings."

Legislative Note 35. The contents of Legislative Note 3 of the Budget Law of 1358 shall be renewed until the end of 1360 and in implementing this Legislative Note, authorization shall be given to provide the Agricultural Bank with the necessary funds from those provided for in item 503008, Section 4, of this law and the final payments shall be included in the expenditure.

Legislative Note 36. Authorization shall be given:

A. For the payment of all unpaid commitments of the development projects of Plan 5 and of 1357 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79], 1358, and 1359, which have been created in accordance with the regulations within the limits of the ratified funds from the funds of 1360 of that project;

B. For the payment of the commitments of the years mentioned in Paragraph A above of projects created in accordance with this Legislative Note and whose operation has been completed or completely stopped either from the funds of the related program or those of item 503002 of this law, under the supervision of the OPB.

Legislative Note 37. The government shall be authorized in 1360 to make, if necessary, any omission, inclusion, or change in the legal form or content of the charters or guidelines of executive organizations, both central and local, and the OPB shall be charged with transferring and moving the proper approved funds in accordance with the above-mentioned actions and changes.

Legislative Note 38. The payment of any sort of bonus in 1360 to working or retired employees or workers of ministries or government or government affiliated establishments and companies, including military, state, and insurance companies, shall be forbidden. Government companies and organizations which are not subject to general regulations by name shall also be subject to this Legislative Note. The end-of-the-year bonus shall be exempt from the above legislation and shall be subject to a single system which will be proposed jointly by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, the OPB, and the Organization of State Administration and Employment and shall be approved by the Cabinet.

Legislative Note 39. Authorization shall be granted for the wages of physicians and other employees who, beyond their regular working hours, undertake the physical examinations of the applicants for driver's licenses and perform other services at the driver's license bureaus of Tehran and other cities, to be provided and paid in accordance with guidelines which shall be proposed by the Ministry of Interior and approved by the Cabinet, from the current funds of Articles concerning the budget of the police of the Islamic Republic or Iran.

Legislative Note 40. A. The legislative bill concerning the maximum and minimum salaries of working, retired, and prospective employees ratified in Ordibehesht 1358 [22 Apr-21 May 79] and later amendments shall remain in effect in 1360.

B. There is no obligatory minimum salary in connection with those employees who have been suspended in the course of the implementation of the law purging and cleansing the government offices.

C. By payable maximum and minimum salaries and benefits, concerning the above-mentioned legislative bill, is meant the total of the salaries and benefits of the employees before legal deductions.

Legislative Note 41. The commitments of the end of 1358 in items 502007, 502010, 502011, and 502012 of the Budget of that year, regardless of whether they have been created within the limits or above the funds approved in the above items, may be paid from funds provided for in item 702101 (the payment of commitments concerning the budgets ratified in 1350 [21 Mar 71-20 Mar 72] and beyond) of this law with consideration for the proper regulations.

Legislative Note 42. The funding share of each university and institution of higher education shall be determined by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the OPB in accordance with the programs and set articles of expenditure from the funds provided in item 113543, Section 4, of the law entitled "Ministry of Culture and Higher Education--Expenditures for Reopening the Universities and Institutions of Higher Education" and shall be added to the approved funds of the proper executive organizations.

Legislative Note 43. The Cabinet shall be authorized to take steps by the end of 1360 at the latest in regards to the implementation of Legislative Notes 1 and 3 (concerning funds in 1360) and 14 of the law concerning the establishment of the National Welfare Organization ratified on 24/3/59 [14 Jun 80] by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its amendment proposed by the National Welfare Organization and the OPB.

Legislative Note 44. The Central Organization of Rural Cooperatives of Iran, with the cooperation of the Organization of State Administrative Affairs and Employment, shall be charged with adjusting the situation of its employees who are subject to the State Employment Law within the operational guidelines of the classification of jobs project of the above law by the end of 1360 at the latest. These changes may be implemented from the beginning of 1360 and the reimbursement adjustments for employees from 14/1/57 [3 Apr 78] to 29/12/59 [20 Mar 81] in the implementation of the State Employment Law shall be paid within three years.

Legislative Note 45. The OPB shall be authorized to allocate the share of each Vahed Bus Company of Tehran and other cities from the funds provided in items 503006 and 503007 of Section 4 of this law in accordance with their needs.

Legislative Note 46. Authorization is given for the distribution among the municipal offices of the country of the funds provided in item 105004 of Section 4 of this law, entitled "Ministry of Interior --Aid to the Municipal Offices of the Country," with a proposal of the Ministry of Interior, the agreement of the OPB, and the approval

of the Cabinet. Funds from item 501002 entitled "Special Expenditures of Executive Organizations" which have been put at the disposal of the municipal offices of the country before the ratification of this law, with the approval of the Cabinet, shall be taken into consideration in the accounting for the funds of item 105004 mentioned above.

Legislative Note 47. The cases and procedure for the use of funds referred to in item 144503 of the law entitled "Preparing Industrial Projects for Light Industries" shall be subject to guidelines approved by the ministers of industries and mines and economic affairs and finance and the deputy and director of the OPB and shall be exempt from other regulations. The Ministry [of Industries] and Mines shall be charged with sending once every six months to the Committee of Industries and Mines of the Islamic Consultative Assembly a progress report on projects referred to in this Legislative Note.

Legislative Note 48. In the implementation of the legislation of 21/4/59 [12 Jul 80] of the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, authorization shall be given to put at the disposal of the supervisory council of the Iranian Organization of Scientific and Industrial Research from funds provided in item 501002 (special expenditures of executive organizations) of Section 4 of this law, up to the amount of 800 million rials with the approval of the Cabinet, to be allocated for the support of innovators, inventors, and researchers of scientific and industrial problems in accordance with a proposal by the above Council and the ratification of a commission made up of the ministers of culture and higher education, industries and mines, economic affairs and finance, and the OPB, and one other minister chosen by the prime minister.

The use of funds cited in this Legislative Note, carried out under the supervision of the minister of industries and mines, shall adhere to the guidelines proposed by the supervisory council of the Iranian Organization of Scientific and Industrial Research, and shall be approved by the above-mentioned commission, and shall be exempt from other regulations.

Legislative Note 49. The 1360 fund for the Central Committee of the Islamic Revolution, the Organization of Islamic Propaganda, and the Martyr Foundation [Bonyad-e Shahid], provided for in items 105005, 114006, and 131600 of Section 4 of this law, may be paid gradually as needed on the basis of allocation and request for funds by the proper authorities of the above institutions, and their use shall follow the guidelines proposed in each case by the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, and the Martyr Foundation and shall be approved by the Cabinet. The Martyr Foundation shall continue its work under the supervision of the deputy minister of executive affairs until its charter is ratified on 10 Dey 1359 [30 Jan 81; as published].

Legislative Note 50. A. The contents of Legislative Notes 14 and 34 of the Budget Law of 1359 shall remain in effect in 1360. In cases where the execution of the project of this Legislative Note or of Legislative Note 23 has been transferred Construction Crusade, the executive organization shall be transferred to the Construction Crusade. Cases in which the operation of the projects and plans is contractually referred to the Construction Crusades shall be exempt from this decree. Funds for new projects cited in this Legislative Note can be paid through [revenues from] oil production, upon approval by the Cabinet.

B. The OPB and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall be authorized to transfer to the Construction Crusade with the agreement of the proper executive organization the executive organization of the development projects whose 1359 funds are subject to Legislative Notes 14 and 34 of the Budget Law of the above-mentioned year, which shall be put at the disposal of the Construction Crusade, except for cases in which the Construction Crusade has acted as a contractor.

Legislative Note 51. A. The 1360 funds of the Construction Crusade, referred to in Section 6 of this law, shall be payable gradually and as needed on the basis of requests for funds by the Central Committee of the Construction Crusade or authorized individuals of the above-mentioned Committee and their use under the supervision of the deputy minister for executive affairs shall only be subject to the regulations of the Construction Crusade.

B. A minimum of 30 percent of the above funds shall be payable exclusively in monetary form.

C. The funds referred to in this Legislative Note shall be deposited in accounts which have been opened or will be opened in the capital, upon the suggestion of the Central Committee of the Construction Crusade and the recommendation of the treasury, in the Central Bank or one of the branches of the Melli Bank of Iran, and in other cities, upon the suggestion of the director of the local Construction Crusade and the recommendation of the director of the local Office of Economic Affairs and Finance in the branches of the Melli Bank of Iran or other government banks acting as agents of the treasury. The above accounts may be used with at least two authorized signatures of the Construction Crusade introduced to the bank following the above guidelines.

D. The Department of Accounts, in accordance with Principle 55 of the Constitution, shall review the financial affairs of the Construction Crusade and shall be charged with providing the necessary facilities and resources for this review of the account.

Legislative Note 52. A. The amount of 20 billion rials of the funds provided in item 129003 of this law shall be gradually put at the

disposal of the regional organizations mentioned above to implement Article 9 of the law concerning the administrative procedures of the health, treatment, and educational units of the Ministry of Health and Welfare with regards to the needs and operational resources of each regional organization of the Health Department of the provinces under the supervision of the minister of health and the deputy minister and director of the OPB, to be used independently of the budget approved for these organizations, on the basis of financial and transactional regulations followed by the Social Security Organization.

B. Another 15 billion rials from the funds in the items mentioned above, which shall be deposited in the general treasury after being collected, shall be distributed and used as special revenues according to the regulations of Paragraph A by each of the regional organizations of the Health Departments of the provinces in connection with the implementation of the above-mentioned law.

C. The use of the remainder of the funds of the budget of regional organizations of the Health Departments of the provinces shall be subject to the General Accounting Law and other general government regulations.

D. The procedural instructions for regulating and keeping the accounts of the funds cited in this Legislative Note shall be prepared and announced by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance.

Legislative Note 53. Authorization is given for the use of the funds in item 107004, Section 4, of the Budget Law of 1359--concerning the shares, membership dues, and aid of the Iranian government for the expenses of the United Nations, other international organizations, and other commitments--to pay the costs of such expenses as were not payable that year in 1360, from item 702101 of Section 4 of this law, taking into consideration the proper regulations.

Legislative Note 54. The law of authorization of the state expenditures for the first four months of 1360 (except for Legislative Notes 2 and 3, until the notification of these projects and of the details of the projects referred to in Paragraphs A and B of Article 16 of this law) shall be abolished on 1/5/60 [23 Jul 81].

Legislative Notes that are valid until abolished [as published].

Legislative Note 55. The Accounting Offices and the directors of all executive organizations shall be charged with depositing into the treasury by the end of Farvardin [21 Apr] of every year at the latest the remaining unused funds of the previous year, including current, fixed investments and aid.

Violations of this legislation shall be considered unauthorized use of government properties and funds.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, at the end of the above due date, shall provide the OPB with a list of the unused funds referred to in this Legislative Note.

Legislative Note 56. Local executive organizations shall be authorized, with the approval of the Planning Committee of the province, in cases in which the time period for the implementation of provincial development projects exceeds one year, to sign contracts amounting to a maximum of 50 percent of the funds approved for that year for the projects of the following year, taking into consideration the necessary funds for the project of the following year before all other funds.

Legislative Note 57. From the date of the ratification of this law, the figures referred to in Article 1 of the charter of government transactions shall be amended as follows:

Petty transactions are those which do not exceed 200,000 rials. Moderate transactions are those which do not exceed 2 million rials. The Legislative Note following the above-mentioned Article shall remain in effect.

Legislative Note 58. In order to provide the necessary facilities to create more activity and motivation in the technical and craft units and institutions in the country which are affiliated with the ministries and government organizations as well as encourage the students and trainees of these institutions to bring out their talents, the government shall be authorized to take steps in the following manner.

A. Special revenues from technical and craft training in the ministries and government organizations and institutions, including the sale of products or rendering of industrial, agricultural, medical, and paramedical services, shall all be collected in the account of the general treasury. The general treasury shall provide a report once every three months concerning revenues received in this way, separated by the executive organization, to be presented to the Supreme Council for the coordination of technical and vocational training.

B. The government shall be charged with providing the Supreme Council for the Coordination of Technical and Vocational Training, with funds matching the amount of income made in this way, up to a maximum of ( ) rials [as published] from the funds of item 501002 of the special expenditure of executive organizations, which shall be distributed among the proper executive organizations based on the

revenues received. The procedure for the use of these funds shall be based on Paragraph C of this Legislative Note.

C. The procedure for the use of these funds shall be based on operational, financial, and transactional guidelines which shall be prepared by the Supreme Council for the Coordination of Technical and Vocational Training and approved by the minister of sciences and higher education. The above-mentioned guidelines shall be prepared in such a way as to not create personnel commitments or long term funding on the part of the government.

Legislative Note 59. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance shall be authorized to include in the special account of the treasury one-half percent of the funds from taxes and fines received in 1360 and beyond, referred to in the Direct Taxes Law ratified in Esfand 1345 [20 Feb-20 Mar 77] and the later amendments (except for income taxes of banks and government institutions and companies) and to spend on employee education and training in taxation affairs and accounting, encouraging the employees and those who have been or are being effectively active in tax collecting. Funds paid in accordance with this Legislative Note are exempt from all other regulations. The Ministry of Economic [Affairs] and Finance shall be charged with presenting to the Islamic Consultative Assembly a biannual report of the taxes collected and the distribution of the taxes collected among various income levels.

Legislative Note 60. The contents of Paragraphs 27 and 29 of the operational guidelines of the 1359 budget law, ratified on 30/2/59 [20 May 80] in the extra session of the Cabinet and the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the later amendments shall remain in effect until they are abolished.

Legislative Notes of the Representatives

The following Legislative Notes were proposed by the representatives and were ratified.

Legislative Note 61. The government shall be charged with conducting the necessary studies to abolish the banking interest system and to reform the banking system in the shortest possible time after the ratification of this law; and it shall present a bill in this regard to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. In any case, these studies shall not exceed six months in duration.

Legislative Note 62. The government shall be charged with the complete supervision of the Mostaz'afan Foundation and, at the latest date of four months after the ratification of this law, shall report to the Islamic Consultative Assembly the inventory of moveable and immovable property, credits, debts, expenditures, and the two-year revenues of this Foundation.

Legislative Note 63. In an emergency plan, the government shall be charged with building flood controls along flood routes near villages. The funds will be provided from the account for the payment of damages.

Legislative Note 64. The Ministry of Education shall be charged with putting at the disposal of the Literacy Movement the 3-per-1,000 funds donated by contractors to the National Committee for the International Fight against Illiteracy and the former National Organization of Literacy, which are available at the time of the ratification of this law in the proper checking account, in order to assist the programs of the Literacy Movement. The use of these funds shall be subject to the guidelines which shall be proposed by the Literacy Movement and approved by the minister of education and shall be exempt from other regulations.

Legislative Note 65. The government shall be charged with making arrangements to put at the disposal of the treasury, to be deposited in the account of public revenues, all the funds and properties obtained as fines or from the confiscation of properties by the revolutionary, regular, or guild-related courts, within four months of the ratification of this law. The funds and properties obtained by the above-mentioned courts after the ratification of this law shall be deposited in the treasury account. Violations of this Legislative Note shall be considered illegal use of government property.

Legislative Note 66. The Ministry of Energy shall be charged with preparing, within a maximum of three months, the graduated rate of water and electricity towards balancing the subsidy and shall present it to the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

Numerical Text of Government Budget for 1360 [21 Mar 81-20Mar82]

The General Government Budget of 1360 shown in figures. The aim of printing this balance sheet of the budget is to clarify the general lines in numbers. Note that the figures are in billions of rials.

General Government Budget of 1360

A. Revenues	Figures in Billions of Rials
1. Taxes	544.4
2. Other Revenues	157.3
3. Revenues from Foreign Trade	100
4. Revenues from the Sale of Oil	1,523
Total	2,324.7

B. Expenditures

Current government funds (including the funds for the repayment of the principal and interest of foreign loans)	1,847
Development Funds	850
War Funds	350
Total	3,047

[Remainder illegible]

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CSO: 4640/51

CONDITIONS PREVAILING ON EVE OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS DESCRIBED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 24 Jul 81 pp 1-8

[Text] Iranians of 15 years and over go to the polls today to elect a new president in an atmosphere of growing despair among a big section of the populace. Already one of the candidates, Habibollah Asghar Owladi, has only narrowly escaped an assassination attempt, when would-be killers shot at him from the boot of a car.

Afterwards the prosecutor said one of his captured attackers had swallowed a cyanide pill to avoid his inevitable fate, giving rise to fears in Tehran that suicide squads were a new phase of the rising violence now confronting the authorities.

Ayatollah Nateq Noori, one of the more radical mullahs who has been busy in the campaigns for the presidential and Majlis elections which also take place today, also narrowly escaped a bomb explosion obviously directed against him.

Tehran was full of reports that the Mojahedin and some allies were promising a coup d'etat in the capital today. The reports also swept the exile communities in the West, but nobody seemed to know how it was to be effected.

The presidential election seemed set to be a virtual walkover for the favoured nominee of Khomeyni and the Islamic Republican Party, present premier Mohammad Ali Rajai. One of his four rivals had also nominated himself for the parliamentary elections so was obviously foreseeing defeat, and observers said yesterday they would not be surprised to see two if not all of Rajai's opponents withdraw.

Rajai himself was also confident of winning, judging by his replies to questions at a press conference. He said he foresaw no further disputes between the president and the premier, because the latter would be "chosen from people of our line," and then went on to say his own programme when elected president would be to avoid becoming like Bani-Sadr, who was starting to become a new Shah, try to establish Islamic government and to speed up parliamentary processes to that end.

But it became quite clear by the beginning of the week that in addition to trying to influence the public to support Rajai the main campaign by the authorities was to try to ensure a bigger vote for him than that for Bani-Sadr two years ago. Then the former president polled more than 11 million votes, 76 per cent of those cast.

Besides reducing the qualifying age of voters to 15 the government has made a huge effort to facilitate casting of votes, providing hundreds of new polling stations, and even mobile centres to tour the war fronts to get the soldiers' votes.

Two factors which aided Bani-Sadr last time were the fact that the fundamentalists put their resources behind him to defeat secular candidate Admiral Madani, who in spite of this received 3 million votes, and he was also seen as one of the less radical candidates.

All the pro-Khomeyni ayatollahs have been busy in the past two weeks urging people that voting was their Islamic duty, and people have been assured they can vote anywhere and at any time, and that they only have to produce an identity document, even if it does not bear a photograph.

A leading preacher on Tehran radio has told the public that any vote of more than 11 million for the winning candidate will be "a slap in the face for the United States," while anything less than that would be a stab in the back for Islam. If it was less than 11 million then the people at the White House, in France and Britain and all the counter-revolutionaries "would dance all night."

Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani also told radio listeners that the counter-revolutionaries, through the bombings and other attacks, were doing their best to keep the vote as low as possible. The people must answer this by expressing their will.

Khomeyni's ruling that voting is compulsory for all citizens of the Islamic republic is also seen as part of the bid to ensure a vote of more than 11 million. "The authorities will trumpet around the world that the Iranian people have voted for Islam and the revolution," one cynical Tehran resident commented to an IPS contact.

Stories in the Western media that Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, who has criticised Khomeyni in the past, and some others of the Great Ayatollahs have told their supporters that voting is not an Islamic duty, have not been confirmed by any Iranian sources. They are largely discounted.

But one of the leading religious figures in Ayatollah Reza Zanjani, a longtime associate of former anti-Shah premier Mohammad Mossadeq who has steadfastly refused cooperation with Khomeyni, has circulated a statement in Iran and outside accusing the country's present leaders of political incompetence, of neglecting Islam and making their own constitution, and causing great harm to the country. The country was now facing possible defeat by the Iraqis, he said, and faced "an explosion of the nation."

The ayatollah, who is in his 80s, echoed attacks several months ago by two other senior clergymen on authorities who approved confiscation and looting, which he said were among many other inhuman acts. Zanjani's own son is a long-time member of the Tudeh (pro-Moscow) party who is being held in Evin prison at the present time.

The Tudeh party, along with another leftist ally of the ruling IRP party in Iran, has called on its supporters to vote for the IRP candidates in both the presidential and parliamentary elections.

Iran watchers generally do not attach any great importance to the result of the elections, except insofar as they can result in a slap in the face for Bani-Sadr, who is presented as an American puppet, and proving the insignificance of the Mojahedin movement, they said.

"It will change nothing and the scenario of killings and violence will continue," one observer told IPS. "Meanwhile the takeover by the pro-Soviet wing of the IRP will steadily continue."

Violence in Iran over the past week has taken a clear anti-clerical and anti-religious turn. Attacks on clergymen have been followed by fire-bomb and other raids on mosques and particularly on libraries where often centuries-old volumes of the Muslim holy book, the Qoran, are kept.

Hundreds of volumes of the Qoran have been destroyed in raids on bookshops, along with other religious material, as it seemed the so-called Islamic leftists, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and the Fedayeen, began to drop the religious veil that has balanced their admittedly leftist tendencies.

If "Lenin wearing a turban," as one commentator had put it, had been the picture they presented until now Lenin appeared to be coming to the fore as hate for the clergy, who have been responsible for the slaughter of so many young men and women since the departure of former president Bani-Sadr from office, grew.

Speeding motor cyclists in Tehran and many provincial towns hurled fire and explosives into libraries and mosques as well as offices of the ruling political party, the Islamic Republican party, and of the revolutionary guards and hezbollahis who are their strongmen.

The Tehran press reported scores of these outrages, but sources in Iran said there were countless other attacks. In the midst of all the violence, however, the revolutionary courts continued their summary trials and scores continued to be executed for offences ranging from being members of the now-proscribed Mojahedin and Fedayeen minority organisations to adultery and homosexuality.

At the same time photographs and reports revealed the fact that the Iraqis had carried out new bombardments of Ahvaz, Dezful, and other southern cities, causing heavy damage and loss of life. With lists of martyrs also reflecting the fact that fighting was still going on at the front, and accounts of new refugees arriving from the south-west of the country, outside observers wondered just how long the Iranians would go on taking the medicine.

Reports said that leaders of the Mojahedin and Fedayeen minority organisations had been talking with either Bani-Sadr or his aides over the past two weeks to discuss cooperation between their supporters where possible. While Mehdi Bazargan and some other prominent figures had taken a conspicuously neutral stance and expressed their loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeyni to save their skins, other more active members of National Front and related bodies have been more in action along with the Mojahedin, sources say.

Other young activists with either attachments to the monarchy or other exile groups as well as others who are simply against the regime because of its oppression have joined in opposition activities.

The Mojahedin themselves have openly insulted Khomeyni and called on the people to support them against his brutality and dictatorship. They accused him of pressuring other respected religious leaders to endorse his regime, and of the killings of young people. They roundly condemned Khomeyni's appeal to people to spy on each other, turning the public into his spies.

An open letter circulated in Tehran recalled that Khomeyni wrote a letter to the late Shah in 1973 saying he must not give election rights to women. Yet after the revolution Khomeyni changed his tune, it said, and said they must now vote as a religious duty. Khomeyni had made a great error in undermining the Iranian people, who had overthrown Savak and the Shah, and he was going to regret it. He would come to a bitter end.

The tone of Mojahedin statements now has turned aggressively and openly against Khomeyni, whereas only a few weeks ago they still paid respect to him and insisted he was mistaken in his view of them.

The Mojahedin's open letter said they did not accept Khomeyni as an Imam and would never accept a man whose hands were stained with the blood of Iranians. He was responsible for the chaos, divisions, war, torture and killing since the revolution.

"We are asking the real clergy what we should do with such a person," the Mojahedin said. "We are waiting for a fatwa (a religious declaration) from the clergy and if they issue this we will throw Khomeyni and his "hezbolshaitan" (Party of the Devil) into the dustbin of history." Meanwhile demonstrations by both leftists and monarchists have taken place all over Europe and the United States. In Paris groups of Mojahedin supporters have demonstrated almost daily in front of the embassy, which is now run by Khomeyni supporters who are suspected by some people as being Savama (security) agents. Nobody is allowed inside the building.

In Cologne a crowd estimated at 1,000 marched in protest against the Khomeyni regime and its violence. While in Hamburg the Shi'ite mosque, largely built with funds supplied by the late Shah, and where the late Ayatollah Beheshti was in charge for some years, was attacked and ransacked. Several Qorans were destroyed there by the attackers.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent a strong protest to the West German government over the incident, saying it could not have been made without the prior authority of the West German authorities.

"Unless West Germany takes action to find those responsible for this hideous act Iran will hit hard at all West German interests in the Muslim world," the statement said. "For one must understand that the Qoran cannot be trifled with."

Observers point out this is the first time the Iranian foreign ministry has spoken out in such harsh tones, and it perhaps reflects the hard line which will be taken under the new minister Hussain Mussavi. This is the third time the mosque has been

the centre of violence, the last occasion being the visit there of former Khomeyni education minister and now Behesthi's successor as secretary general of the IRP Hojatoleslam Bahonar. He had to be taken out by a side entrance after he was shouted down.

In Genoa, in northern Italy, 100 Iranian students began a hunger strike to protest against the Khomeyni regime. In Sweden Kurds made a demonstration.

Meanwhile back in Tehran executions of a number of people, including Bahais and Jews not connected with the radical movements, have again been reported in the last two weeks. Prominent people arrested include former Minister of Justice in the Bazargan government Mobasheri and a former professor of ex-president Bani-Sadr in sociologist Ehsan Naraghi. Bani-Sadr has twice before obtained the release of Naraghi when guards took him into custody.

Signs that the regime is still concerned over the influence of deposed president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr are obvious in the Tehran press. In one edition of ETTELAAT daily alone two feature articles criticised the former head of state and reiterated his mistakes and faults.

Well-known commentator Hossain Abutorabian went over old ground by stating that arrogance and pride were two of the main reasons for Bani-Sadr's downfall. The president had been interested in building himself up regardless of the republic's interests. His other weakness had been listening to the wrong advice.

One of his former advisers Ahmad Alaghmand, in another long article, said the fact that there were different groups, some religious, some leftists, in the president's office led to disagreements. His work was disturbed as a result, and the religious people all left. The president thus became more under the influence of organisations like the Mojahedin-e-Khalq. This was particularly so at his ENGHELAB-E-ESLAMI newspaper, where the leftists changed the policy.

Sources in Europe who claim to be close to the former president now say that he is hiding in Tehran and not in Kurdestan, as reports have suggested. There it is not only easier for him to remain out of sight but he can also keep closer to what is happening on the political scene, they say. Other reports have this week hinted that the president was with Kurds inside the Turkish border.

Yet another of his former supporters in well-known writer Haj Sayed Javadi demonstrated the tortuous thinking and inconsistencies of thought of Iranian intellectuals in an attack he made on Bani-Sadr in an article in the Paris paper NOUVELLE LITERAIRE not long ago.

Javadi first attacked his fellow intellectuals for not providing an alternative to the regime Iran has and pointed out that Bani-Sadr, who was one of them, had been in on the foundation of the Islamic republic and had gone along with all its stages, acting as chairman of the revolutionary council even though its constitution was baseless. Bani-Sadr wanted to become a power in the state so he collaborated with its founders. Javadi claimed that even Bani-Sadr's newspaper ENGHELBAD-E-ESLAMI had refused to print his article on torture being practiced in Iran.

An Iran-watcher in London, commenting on the Javadi interview, said the writer seemed to have forgotten that he (Javadi) was very anxious after the revolution to get a seat in the Islamic Majlis and that even in an article in ENGHELAB-E-ESLAMI at that time he was a keen supporter of Bani-Sadr and gave him plenty of backing. Javadi's allegation that intellectuals did not really take part in the uprising against the Shah was untrue, even though he may have been correct in saying they were not organised.

"But the preposterous thing about Javadi's remarks is his allegation that the American Republican Party was behind the hostage-taking in Iran as part of a plan to bring to power people like Kissinger, Haig and others with 'imperialistic' views," the Iran watcher said.

"How sad it is to think that a member of the intellectual elite of Iran like Javadi says things like that. It reflects the unfortunate psychology of Iranians who are both projective and histrionic. They used to say Carter organised it to win the election. Now they say the other side planned it. They refuse to blame themselves for what is their fault, but scream at Western and Eastern imperialism instead. If they don't face up to their own responsibility for what happened there will be no chance of righting things."

One Iranian general in exile announced he was returning to Iran and apparently left Paris this week, another claimed an organisation with which he was connected planted the bomb which wrecked the IRP headquarters in Tehran, and Admiral Ahmad Madani wrote a fourth letter full of dire warnings but gave no clue as to any action he or his friends might be planning to help his compatriots.

"It is a typical programme of action from our great fighting men," commented an exile politician in Paris. "They usually mount their campaigns from behind their writing desks and the engagements take place in the salons of first-class London or Paris restaurants.

"People will believe the two generals' claims when they see them back on Iranian soil. As for the Admiral he continues to float on a sea of verbiage--and the current seems to take him further every time from the rough waters around Iran!"

It was General Bahram Ariana, a genial admirer of Napoleon who came to live in Paris several years before the revolution after he had completed his term as military chief of staff, who, close aides revealed, had returned to Iran. He intended to be there on his native soil when the anniversary of the death of the late Shah came round next weekend, they said.

Sources said a number of other officers who have been living in Europe or the United States planned to join him somewhere near the Turkish border.

Ariana issued a message expressing his condolences to the new Shah and the Empress Farah on the anniversary of the death of the Shah, who he said was "a great Iranian patriot who had died for his country because of the ingratitude and pettiness of many of his people."

Observers conceded that if Ariana did turn up on Iranian soil this could lead to other generals and politicians having to reconsider their own positions in the comfort of exile in the West.

General Parviz Khosrovani, a former chief of the Shah's gendarmerie, told interviewers from magazines in Britain, Spain and West Germany that it was two members of a pro-monarchist group called resoundingly "The Military Organisation for National Equality," who had planted the bombs in the IRP headquarters which killed 74 top political girues. The bombs were radio-detonated. Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, premier Rajai and Ayatollah Khamenei were on the group's hit list, Khosrovani said.

One periodical quoted the general, according to Paris sources, as saying that Bakhtiar and Oveissi, the two best known opposition leaders, had lost their positions now and his organisation would take the lead in future.

So many individuals and small organisations in exile have claimed some part in the IRP bombing that observers were sceptical of the Khosrovani claim until further proof had been adduced.

Madani, whose three previous open letters, which are so far the only signs of what he was reported to have claimed would be an opposition movement against the Tehran regime, were addressed to Khomeyni himself, addressed his latest one to "the struggling, rights-seeking people of Iran." He warned the present rulers of the country to change their anti- and un-Islamic attitude or face the wrath of the people.

He did not attack Khomeyni personally but condemned the regime for its sadism and killing. "The hand of revenge is waiting in its lair and will deal with your bloodsucking and plundering in the same way it has dealt with other bloodsuckers and plunderers in history," the admiral said.

The large mass of monarchist supporters in Europe and the United States has become critical in recent weeks of the failure of those around the new Shah Reza in Cairo to project both him and the symbol of monarchy more powerfully to the exiles in particular and to the world in general.

Though reports are common that the young king is enthusiastic in trying to find out the ways he and the monarchy can play a role in resolving the hideous situation of his people they point out that little or nothing of this is projected publicly. Yet those who see themselves as rivals to the monarchy, not only leftists but so-called social democrats who have ambitions to be president of a secular Iran, are constantly in the limelight.

"It almost seems as if monarchy is ashamed of itself, instead of its holders being the proud protectors of an office which, whatever its shortcomings, has served the Iranian people and melded together what was heading to become one of the most powerful states in the world," a prominent exile in Europe told IPS.

"The Pahlavis themselves, even if some members of the family by their irresponsibility are open to criticism, have a great deal to be proud of in the progress they brought to Iran. The late Shah and his father both made mistakes, but in the circumstances in which they found themselves--and the behaviour of the Iranians in exile has reflected their capricious and naive attitude to the modern world--they both achieved virtual miracles in that country which history seemed to have passed by in the early part of this century.

"Of course their faults have been criticised. But the Shah's advisers seem to have sat back and allowed the criticism to mount without answering them in the simplest manner possible--by showing the proof that the positive side far outweighed any harm done to Iran."

The result of the absence of a positive campaign to rehabilitate the monarchy in the eyes not only of Iranians, who so badly need reassurance that they belong to a proud nation and tradition after the horrors of the last two years, has been a gradual eroding of hope in its future among its most enthusiastic supporters, observers say. This at a time when the British monarchy is most effectively demonstrating its crucial importance to the country, and when even left wing newspapers concede the key roles being played in much more socially advanced countries than Iran like Belgium and Spain by their monarchs.

Visitors to the Imperial family in Cairo say that the inactivity springs from several causes. Firstly, the new king is young and inexperienced and his mother Empress Farah, wishes to play a subtle, careful role in the light of her knowledge of her compatriots' sensitivities, by ensuring the monarchy is centred upon him. Thus, in spite of the fact that she has been constantly informed of the respect in which she is personally and widely held in many parts of the world as a social and cultural benefactor to her society--and that in Iran there is plenty of evidence that intellectuals still inside the country, and especially the general mass of womenfolk, frequently express the loss her departure has been for the country--she is not anxious to project herself through press and other interviews.

Another important reason for the low profile policy is believed to be a division of opinion among those in the Shah's entourage who believe he should keep a very discreet role and those who favour a more bold policy. So far those who prefer the quiet role have swayed opinion.

"But many of us now feel the Shah's aides must reconsider and regain their open patriotism," a London-based exile who has been working for the monarchist cause told IPS. "There is nothing wrong at a time when young Iranians are dying for their principles in joining vociferously in the attack on those who are killing them.

"In a way the present attitude is similar to that displayed by people who say we shouldn't hope for the murder or natural death of Khomeyni now because that would leave him a martyr. How stupid! Do people who say this think Khomeyni would hesitate for one moment to kill them, no matter how insignificant they might be? If he felt they were against him and his concept of Islam, as he and his aides so often say, he would want only their slaughter and burial in the nearest ditch.

"We Iranians are living in cloud cuckoo land over these things. We have to fight to get the world's support for us against the butchers who rule our land; we need all that sympathy. We have to stop tearing ourselves apart by a form of criticism that is pure self-destruction. We had a lot to be proud of when you compare Iran's record over the 15 years before the revolution with that of many other countries with big incomes. We were freer, had more hope for the future, had begun to demonstrate our real abilities and own special potential to contribute to the world.

We had our problems, unique problems, yes...But we were doing magnificently in basic terms, and we shouldn't let the bigoted Western press, with its inexplicable hate of all successful non-Western countries, fool us..."

The reason many exile political figures were equivocal in their attitude to the monarchy now was directly linked to the failure of those around it to project proudly and fearlessly its achievements in the face of the criticisms raised by leftists and others all over the world. Many of these people were instinctively anti-institutional people, while all were utterly ignorant about the true facts of the situation inside Iran and what life was like for its people under the late Shah, the exile said.

CSO: 4600/104

MOJAHEDIN, 'HYPOCRITES' BEING LIQUIDATED IN REVENGE

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 12/13 Jul 81 p 5

[Text] The campaign for the suppression and destruction of the peoples' Mojahedin and related groups was officially sanctioned in Iran on 30 June, when Khomeyni mentioned the "misled group who call themselves Mojahedin of the People" by name and blamed them for the assassination attempt on the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party, which had cost 74 people their lives. Even the authorities have mentioned the man who is supposed to have planted the bomb. He seems like the archetype of a typical member of the Mojahedin. According to official records, his name is Ali Riza Kolahi, he is 23 years old and is studying electronics. He "infiltrated" the Islamic Republican Party, had worked as an electrician at party headquarters and thus had the opportunity to plant the two bombs. One of them apparently exploded in the council chamber where a party meeting was being held; the other exploded outside of the building next to a supporting wall, the collapse of which in turn caused the ceiling to collapse.

The picture of the fugitive Kolahi was put up in all the provinces. He seems, however, like ex-president Bani-Sadr, to have escaped to the area which is in the hands of the Kurdish Peshmerga, which remains largely inaccessible to government officials. A Kurdish radio station in Baneh confirmed that Bani-Sadr is in the Kurdish border area.

Call for Denunciation

Khomeyni called upon the Iranians indirectly to conduct a manhunt, urging them to become "members of the secret service," and to watch their fellow citizens. The newspaper of the Islamic Republican Party then published a series of tips on how the amateur secret service agents are to act. It was recommended to overhear all conversations--"in the clinics, on the streets, in offices and in theaters"--and to inform the authorities immediately about anything suspicious. They also reminded that "the CIA pays more than 1,000 journalists who obtain information for it," and in general it was stressed that journalists represent a "dangerous source of information for the espionage of the superpowers."

Numerous Mojahedin and members of other leftist groups were arrested. Seizures of apartments were repeatedly reported, in which the urban guerrillas supposedly established themselves in secret strongholds. This happened shortly after the attack of 28 June, when 50 activists were captured, who--according to official

representations--had planned to blow up water mains in Tehran as well as the parliament building. Later there were reports of an apartment in the vicinity of the presidential buildings on Palestine Street, in which the guerrillas who were present are said to have defended themselves for 6 hours on the night of 4 July; finally, three died, three fled, and two were captured.

Over 100 Executions in 2 Weeks

Executions are numerous throughout the country. On 6 July, 23 members of the opposition were shot at Elvin Prison. According to official reports, these people belonged to a group of 90 Mojahedin, which were taken prisoner on 17 June, that is, before the bloody demonstrations of 20 June in support of the ousted president Bani-Sadr.

The total number of executions in the first 2 weeks after the ousting of Bani Sadr was estimated by Reuters at 130. Government officials have raised bitter accusations against Amnesty International because this organization, which is in the habit of keeping exact records in such cases, has estimated the total number of executions since the downfall of the shah at 1,500, while the government maintains it was not more than 350. On this occasion Iranian newspapers declared that Amnesty International is "also in the service of the superpowers."

Enemies of Islam

The authorities are attempting to leave the grounds for execution uncertain in order to blot out the distinction between political and criminal charges. The formula, "because of corruption on earth," comprises the three causes--distinct in Western eyes--for offenses against the political Islamic order, against the Islamic penal code, and against the strictly religious rules of Islam. Also formulas such as "armed rebellion against the Islamic Republic," or simply "agitation against the Islamic order" are being used. A more specific report from recent days read for example: execution of four young people between the ages of 19 and 22 because of "burning of an Islamic propaganda tent in the northern city of Sari."

Together with the Mojahedin, who are usually described as "munafiquin" (hypocrites) because it is found that they don't deserve the honorable title of Mojahedin (fighter in the holy war), militants of the Komala are also often mentioned, a leftist group of Marxist-Leninists that works closely with the Kurdish insurgents. Also mentioned is a group called Peikar, likewise a Marxist-Leninist underground organization, which many members of the Fedayeen have joined, after their leaders had decided to support the Islamic government and to use the same political tactics as the Tudeh Party.

The actions of government security troops--committee members who are active as Islamic police, and guards of the revolution--apparently have primarily the goal to search houses for weapons and propaganda material of the Mojahedin and related groups. Thousands of houses in Tehran are said to have been searched, leading to hundreds of arrests.

Since the bomb attack of 28 June and the murder of the head of Evin Prison shortly after that, no major Mojahedin activities have been reported, except for the assassination of Mohammed Ansari, governor of Gilan Province, and of his coworker Nurani, by two motorcyclists in the city of Resht. Both of them died of their injuries. The assassins got away; it is not certain whether they belong to the Mojahedin or not.

Up until the big bomb assassination, there was apparently a certain mingling among the militants; some of the younger ones were close to the Mojahedin, but also associated with members of the Islamic Republican Party. This is likely to have come to an end, and officials do all they can to single out and isolate those belonging to the Islamic left. This purpose is served further by continuous accusations that the Islamic left in reality works "for the Americans," for "the superpowers," or else for the Iraqui enemy. It is the opinion of the Moslem activists--as formulated by Tehran's public prosecutor--that corruption must be driven from the earth so that the other Moslems may live in peace.

9328
CSO: 4620/3

REUTER BLASTED FOR 'BIASED' REPORTING

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Jul 81 p 8

[Text] The research group of the international unit of PARS NEWS AGENCY has made a statistical evaluation of one month's operations of REUTER NEWS AGENCY in order to show the true face of foreign international news agencies, how they report the news of Iran, and to what extent they try to reflect the realities and facts. The sum of the news items cabled by REUTER concerning Iranian issues in Khordad 1360 [22 May-21 Jun 81] consists of 220 news items, a total of 5,300 lines, of which 3,261 lines, 81 news items (67 percent), are concerned with internal disturbances and conflicts, skirmishes, and the statements of Bani-Sadr. Whereas only 877 lines (16.5 percent) of the news covers the forced war of Iraq on Iran.

The results of the investigation of REUTER in Khordad 1360 are as follows:

Subject	Total Lines of News	Percentage	No of News Items
1. Disturbances and Bani-Sadr	3,161	67 percent	81
2. Revolutionary Courts	190	4 percent	12
3. Earthquakes	150	3 percent	8
4. Anti-Revolutionary Subjects Other Than Nos 1 and 2	154	3 percent	6
5. War	877	16.5 percent	66
6. Miscellaneous	767	6.5 percent	47

Now some samples of the REUTER news distortions in Khordad 1360.

1. On 8 Khordad [29 May] REUTER quotes the imam: "Anyone who ridicules the clergy or weakens the law shall be punished by execution."

In the original, the imam: "If anyone ridicules a follower of the ideology [maktabi] or of Islam, he is an apostate by nature; his wife is forbidden to him; and he must be killed."

The original of the second part of the news item: "Anyone who intends to discredit the Constitution is a corruptor."

2. On 9 Khordad [30 May], REUTER quotes the imam as follows: "Everyone must respect the Islamic institutions and spiritual leadership; otherwise, he will be tried as one of the corrupt of the earth, which is punishable by execution."

In the original, the imam: "All of you are bound to accept the law. When something has become law, [anyone] complaining about it in order to incite the people is one of the corrupt of the earth.

3. On 9 Khordad, REUTER quotes Bani-Sadr: "The Constitution has given me the authority to call for a referendum. And should I be answered with threats and insults when I ask for a referendum on the basis of my rights according to the Constitution?" This news item also quotes from Bani-Sadr: "If a republic falls because its president is punished for defending the Constitution, another revolution is called for.

In the original, Bani-Sadr: Should this happen, another revolution has occurred.

4. On 14 Khordad [4 Jun], REUTER quotes Bani-Sadr: "I consider the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces my most essential duty."

In the original: "I consider the position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces my most essential duty as a Moslem responsible before God and the people."

5. On 15 Khordad [5 Jun], REUTER: "Only one country opposed the U.S. plan to create understanding among the countries in the region, that is Iran. The Iranian leaders want to export the reactionary Islamic revolution."

6. On 21 Khordad [11 Jun], REUTER: "If Bani-Sadr resigns, he can dissolve the Majles and request new elections."

Explanation: According to the Constitution, the president can by no means dissolve the Majles and request new elections.

7. On 26 Khordad [16 Jun], REUTER: "Bazargan's family has reported that the prosecutor's office has issued an order for Bazargan's arrest."

It must be explained that if such an order had been issued by the prosecutor's office, it would have been put directly at the disposal of the mass media. On the other hand, if a news agency should receive such a news item, it should check with the prosecutor's office, as is customary, to make certain of its validity.

It would not be out of place to refer briefly to the way the news concerning the recent crime of the bombing at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party has been published by REUTER NEWS AGENCY.

REUTER reports on Monday, 8 Tir [29 Jun] about the martyrdom of Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Montazeri: Sheykh Mohammad Montazeri was merely 1 of the 69 people who was killed in the explosion. For Iranians, however, he was part of their folk culture, famous for being a revolutionary, an airplane hijacker, etc. In a series of unsuccessful involvements in which he and his armed guards broke the law, he was given the nickname of Mohammad Ringo.

This British news agency also writes on 6 Tir [16 Jun]: If Raja'i becomes a presidential candidate, the elections will merely be brief and somewhat unceremonial [as published].

On 8 Tir [Jun 18], REUTER reports from Tehran: "Although Ayatollah Beheshti, the founder and general secretary of the Islamic Republican Party, who was an influential person, was killed, two other members of the Presidential Council who had taken over the duties of the president after his dismissal are still alive," and this will implicitly set the stage for counterrevolution.

This same news item reports: "The skill with which last night's bombing was done set off the rumor that the military had had a hand in these events." And so simply these Zionist news agencies prepare the ground for the destruction of the morale of the military brothers.

In fact, no such rumor existed at all and British REUTER has indulged in self-made rumors instead of reporting the news.

This news agency, in continuing its report, adds: "Although today several thousands of the supporters of the clergy marched on Tehran, the majority of the Iranians interviewed emphasized that the issue is not merely mourning the death of these personalities, but the events that are likely to occur in Iran from now on, which is the cause of their worries."

In this manner, the demonstrations of millions of the Moslem people of Tehran and other cities are reported by REUTER as demonstrations of a few thousand people. They also want to instill the uncertainty that the demonstrations of the Moslem, martyr-nurturing people are merely due to their worries concerning future events in Iran. On the other hand, it is unclear who this majority of Iranians is with

whom the REUTER correspondent has spoken. Hence, by clarifying a segment of the activities of one news agency affiliated with imperialism and the manner in which the news of Iran is reported by this British news establishment, we call to the attention of the committed Moslem people of Iran as well as the authorities [the necessity of] controlling the activities of foreign correspondents. It would be appropriate to point out that a large number of the agents of the intelligence agencies and the spies of imperialist countries, including the CIA, consist of foreign correspondents.

In conclusion, PARS NEWS AGENCY, in light of the above, once again asks our committed revolutionary people to be alert in their contacts with foreign correspondents--the majority of whom undoubtedly do not wish our Islamic revolution well--and to avoid disclosing any information which might be useful to the enemies of the revolution. It also emphatically requests the cooperation of the people with the people's news collecting unit of PARS NEWS AGENCY and requests our Moslem nation to contact us through telephone nos 898057 and 898058 if necessary; and, if they have interesting news, in order to close the way to the lies and incorrect and unfactual reports of foreign correspondents, to report the news and complete reports of some of the events not witnessed by PARS correspondents, in order to perform their religious and revolutionary mission correctly and responsibly.

9593
CSO: 4640/35

NOTABLES STATE POSITIONS ON CURRENT ISSUES

Ex-Cultural Adviser on Ties with Bani-Sadr

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Jul 81 p 14

[Interview with 'Ali Musavi Garmarudi]

[Text] I had no role in the continuation and propagation of the deposed president's culture.

Garmarudi considers not resigning his position of cooperation with Bani-Sadr as the mandate of religious guardian jurisprudence.

Yazd, KEYHAN correspondent--'Ali Musavi Garmarudi, the former cultural adviser to Bani-Sadr, the deposed president, participated in a television interview in Yazd and explained the negative role and activities of the Office of Coordination.

Concerning his role in propagating the culture of the former president, he said: I had no role in the continuation and propagation of the culture of the deposed president. No evidence exists that I have strengthened his culture. I have only written two introductions to his books; there is no third occasion on which I have approved of him in any newspaper or interview.

'Ali Musavi Garmarudi cited as his reason for not having resigned from the post of cultural adviser to Bani-Sadr his not having permission from religious guardian jurisprudence in this case, saying: Since the religious guardian jurist had instructed me not to resign, I did not resign. He then announced the names of the main operators of the Office of Coordination of the deposed president as follows: Taqavi, director of the Office; Mas'udi, the legal adviser; Salamatiyan, the director of the Office of Coordination, and Ghazanfarpur.

Garmarudi then explained his own role in cooperating and his relationship with the Office of Coordination saying: ETTELA'AT interviewed me last fall or winter. I was asked about my relationship

to the Office of Coordination. At that time, I said that I had no relationship with and would not recognize the individuals of this Office if I saw them on the street. The former adviser to the deposed president, in regards to the roles of Salamatiyan and Ghazanfarpur in the programs of Bani-Sadr said: In my opinion, Salamatiyan and Ghazanfarpur determined the policies of Bani-Sadr and controlled the Office of Coordination, which was under the general direction of Salamatiyan. He added that Sadifi and Pirhoseyni were among the other members of the Office of Coordination. I think Pirhoseyni had the most responsibilities and more recently he became Bani-Sadr's son-in-law- and married his brother's offspring [as published]. I have not forgotten that when I had gone to England to speak to the students, on my way back to Iran in Paris, Mr Pirhoseyni was in the Iranian embassy in Paris where, with the charge d'affaires--I hope this charge d'affaires bears witness--I asked this person, who had just come from Iran, about the situation with the forced war. He said: I think that we have been defeated and we must give some of the Iranian territory to Iraq and sit down and negotiate with Iraq. As God is my witness, I became so upset and angry that I could not contain myself and left. I told the charge d'affaires not to allow these individuals to go on foreign television or to other places and say such things. It is documented that together with the charge d'affaires on Television 2 of France, in answer to the impertinent statements of the ambassador of Iraq in responding to the television announcer, I said: We have an expression in Persian which says: "The chickens are counted at the end of autumn." This was said by Mr Rafsanjani later on, and, as God is my witness, I said exactly this. He asked: Considering that you do not have much arms or ammunition, since they have been destroyed and your army is in disarray, how are you going to fight? I told them: Are you spying on Iran to know that our arms and ammunition have been destroyed? Never; this is not so. Thank God everything is in its proper place. Furthermore, we fight relying on our faith. From the first day of the revolution, we put on our shrouds. I told them: Neither is Iraq stronger than the United States nor are we smaller than Viet Nam.

At the conclusion of this television interview, 'Ali Musavi Garmarudi recited a poem of his own composition on the occasion of the birthday of his holiness Hasan (Peace be upon him).

Orumiyeh Imam on Denouncing Relatives

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Jul 81 p 8

[Sermon by Hojjatoleslam Hasani]

[Text] Hojjatoleslam Hasani: The "Jumjum" region in Qasemlu Valley was purged of counterrevolutionaries.

The Friday imam of Orumiyeh: I handed over my two sons who were not in line with the revolution to prison and I handed over my other son to the revolutionary court in Tehran last Thursday.

Orumiyeh, KEYHAN correspondent--The Friday worship-political [siyasi-ebadi] prayers in Orumiyeh, led by Hojjatoleslam Hasani, were performed with the participation of thousands of the faithful, fasting inhabitants in the Jame' mosque of this city.

Before the sermons, "Hojjatoleslam Mowludi," the supervisor of Orumiyeh's Central Committee, spoke to the participants in the prayers. Inviting the people to take part in the presidential elections, he asked them to vote for brother Raja'i.

Then, Ebrahimi, the governor general of western Azarbayejan, praised the martyrs of Islam and the recent martyrs of the region and spoke about the current problems of the province and the changes during the past months. Then, in regards to the issue of providing security in western Azarbayejan Province, he declared: Thank God we were able to establish security in most of the regions of the province, with the help of our military and law enforcement brothers, and we hope the situation will be still better soon.

The governor general of Azarbayejan said in another part of his speech: Certain changes have been made and will be made in the Office of the Governor General and those who are not in line with the imam will rapidly be dismissed.

The governor general then pointed out the round-the-clock activities of the personnel of the gendarmerie and police and said: In the course of the past month, they have been able to do positive work throughout the province.

He added: In meetings we have had in recent days with the authorities of the province, we have had positive results in various areas. We hope to investigate, as soon as possible, the problems of the province and eliminate them.

Hojjatoleslam Hasani quoted Colonel Kiyani, the commander of the 64th Dividion of Orumiyeh: Today (yesterday) at noon, the "Jumjum" region in Qasemlu Valley was cleansed of the filth of counterrevolutionaries by the army brothers and the Islamic forces were positioned there.

He then started the sermons by expressing appreciation for the support of the people of Orumiyeh for the armed forces of the Islamic Republic saying: Last year, the people of Orumiyeh on one occasion

alone donated fruits and food items valued at 15 million rials to the 64th Division. I ask the self-sacrificing faithful Moslem population of our city not to hesitate in their overall support of the brothers who give their lives for Islam and to be more steadfast than ever before in this regard.

Hojjatoleslam Hasani, then speaking on the issue of the closeness of the presidential elections, asked the people of Orumiyeh to actively participate in the elections.

He added: The Hezbollah and the clergy of the city must go to the farthest parts of the province and familiarize the people with the importance of participating in the elections.

The Friday imam of Orumiyeh also announced: The people of Azarbayejan will vote for brother Raja'i because he is a follower of the ideology and 100 percent in line with the imam.

The Friday imam of Orumiyeh added: For the preservation and survival of the Islamic revolution and Republic, we must give up everything in our possession. We must think and act only for the good of Islam and our Islamic revolution. To carry out the law and the judgment of Islam, if necessary, we must even give up the light of our [eyes; our children]. Of course, I myself, gave over two of my sons who were not in line with the revolution to the prison here in Orumiyeh and took my other son, Rashid, to the Revolutionary Court in Tehran yesterday (Thursday). Every faithful person who is committed to our Islamic revolution, if he finds a member of his family to be a counterrevolutionary, must hand him over to the Revolutionary Court. There are only two choices for a Moslem. He can either choose the Koran and Islam and hand over the deviant member of his family and society to the Revolutionary Court and an Islamic verdict or, on the contrary, ignore his own commitment.

The Friday imam of Orumiyeh continued the second sermon of the prayer session with statements about the Bill of Retaliation. He said: People who have no faith and do not heed the laws of the Koran and do not believe in the government of Islam say that the Bill of Retaliation is inhumane. If two faithful persons bear witness that a person has made such a statement, the accused must be executed.

Hojjatoleslam Hasani, referring to the actions of some of the leaders of the country in the past, said: Two persons have committed a great treason against this country. One is Mehdi Bazargan and the other is Bani-Sadr. At the present time, too, their path is continued by the supporters of Nehzat-e Azadi [The Freedom Front] and Jonbesh-e Azadi [The Freedom Movement].

The Friday imam of Orumiyeh also condemned the actions of counter-revolutionary mini-groups. Referring to some of their anti-people, inhumane actions such as terrorism and capturing people in Orumiyeh, he warned that if they continue these actions, the Revolutionary Court will take the most decisive actions and determine their fate.

In concluding the sermons of the prayer session, the Friday imam of Orumiyeh condemned the alliance of Israel and Egypt against the brother country of Libya declaring: The Moslem nation of Iran stands for Islam in every way against the conspiracies of the United States and its servants and will support Libya against these two countries which are dependent on the United States.

Hojjatoleslam Hasani asked of the Almighty a long life for the imam of the people and the final victory of the revolution and stood up for prayers.

Rasht Imam on Fifth Column Activities

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Jul 81 p 8

[Interview with Hojjatoleslam Ehsanbakhsh]

Rasht, KEYHAN correspondent--Hojjatoreslam Ehsanbakhsh, the representative of the imam in Gilan Province and the Friday imam of Rasht, in connection with the recent counterrevolutionary actions on the national level and especially in Gilan and the problem that occurred in this province some time ago, took part in an exclusive interview with the KEYHAN correspondent and responded to his questions. The representative of the imam, in response to the first question of our correspondent concerning the present atmosphere of Gilan, stated: The superpowers do not easily give up the countries that make a revolution. They try to weaken revolutionary societies in various ways. Placing bombs, assassinations of known figures, counterrevolutionary operations, and coup d'etats are among the actions instigated in revolutionary countries by the dominating countries. Our country has left behind some stages in the revolution, the first of which was the events of Kurdestan; then came pan-Arabism in Ahvaz; then the issue of Tabas occurred; later, there was the unsuccessful coup d'etat attempt; and then the forced war of Iraq against Iran was put into action. Since the world-devourers have become disappointed in carrying out such actions, they have now created the Fifth Column. This Column has appeared in different guises, in various forms, and with deceptive tongues; but they all have a common objective. This opportunist Column has declared armed war against the Islamic revolution some time ago. This action is beneficial in several ways to the subjugating countries. First of all, they can create fear and terror within the country with the above-mentioned Column. Second, they benefit in showing their counterrevolutionary actions to the world, suggesting that there is no stability or

security in the revolutionary Islamic country of Iran. On the whole, the intention of this Column is to achieve its Satanic goals through the recent terrorist actions in Iran and also in Gilan; and in this way, they want to disturb the minds of the people. The Friday imam of Rasht continued his statement on this very issue saying: The decisive leadership of the imam neutralizes all the actions of the counterrevolutionaries. For instance, we have seen that the recent assassinations drew the people more united with the revolutionary scene. In my more than 35 years of residence in this region, I have never seen such a funeral procession as the one for our 2 martyred brothers, Engineer 'Ali Ansari, the governor general of Gilan, and his deputy, Nurani, by the ever alert people of Rasht. In the memorial ceremonies for these two martyrs, in which I also took part, the Moslem people displayed their unity once again with their presence.

The Friday imam of Rasht, responding to a question by the KEYHAN correspondent about the steps taken to solve the problems of the people said: Every war creates difficulties. I remember that during World War II, in 1320 [21 Mar 41-20 Mar 42], I saw in Rasht how the price of groceries and general necessities of the people increased tremendously. Naturally, the present war has caused a number of opportunists and speculators to sell the goods and other necessities of the people at high prices. These actions are taking place under conditions of war not only with Iraq, but also with the world-devouring superpowers, such as the United States. On the other hand, these superpowers support and strengthen Iraq. But the government of Iran, despite the war with the superpowers, provides for the needs of the people. For instance, 50 trucks of groceries enter Iran through the Gilan region alone and are distributed every day. But our nation that has risen up must display more unity to solve their difficulties and they must be the partners and supporters of the revolutionary Islamic government. In this way, we will solve the particular legitimate difficulties of the people and we ask the revolutionary institutions and offices to do their duties.

Hojjatoleslam Ehsanbakhsh, the Friday imam of Rasht, responding to the last question of our correspondent concerning the Islamic atmosphere of Gilan, said: In comparison with the past, Gilan has assumed an Islamic face. If during the month of Ramazan in the past years you had entered the city of Rasht, you would have seen that some of the people violated the fast by eating out in the open; but at the present time, this problem does not exist. There is hope that we will witness more Islamic growth day by day in this region. In conclusion, my message to the alert and martyr-giving people of this province is that the honor of the revolution rests with them in the presidential elections that will take place on 2 Mordad [24 Jul] of this year, because there are political wolves who evaluate these elections and the revolution and as soon as they see problems, they will take political advantage of the situation. Therefore, to prevent this group from achieving their anti-Islamic goals, I ask all the brothers and sisters of Gilan to participate in these elections and by displaying such a revolutionary act, to strike at the mouth of the world-devourers with a strong fist.

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CSO: 4640/54

BAKHTIAR: 'NO QUESTION' OF ACCORD WITH BANI-SADR

PM311333 Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jul 81 p 4

[Report by Jean Gueyras: "Mr Bakhtiar: The Former President Was One of the Pillars of the Islamic Regime"]

[Text] "The Islamic Republic's disintegration is continuing." Former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, receiving a few journalists at his residence in Suresnes, was beaming with satisfaction and said he is "proud" to have been the first to announce this disintegration. He was hard on Mr Bani-Sadr who, he recalled, advised Imam Khomeyni to show intransigence at Neuphle-le-Chateau "when I was planning to visit Paris in early 1979 to try to find a formula for a peaceful transition between the revolution and the monarchy."

In Mr Bakhtiar's view, Mr Bani-Sadr was one of the pillars of the Islamic regime. "He played a major role in drafting the Islamic constitution and in setting up the revolutionary courts. You must not forget that he was chairman of the Revolution Council before becoming head of state. It was he who gave full powers to Ayatollah Khalkhali for eliminating drug addicts. It is true that he tried to salvage something from the wreck, like Goebbels who allowed four Jews to leave Nazi Germany: the least that can be said is that he was involved in rather unpleasant affairs not only in Tehran but also in Kordestan and Turkmenistan."

Might you forget the past and establish cooperation with the former head of state? Mr Bakhtiar was asked.

[Answer] That is out of the question. There is no possibility of a political agreement between us. We cannot agree on principles and what would I gain from concluding a tactical agreement with him? It was he who said that Iran has no existence without Islam. It is true that since then he has corrected himself and spoken of Iranian nationalism. But that about-face is essentially opportunist. Because he felt the Imam was abandoning him he suddenly became the champion of democracy and nationalism.

[Question] But does he not have popular backing and support in the army?

[Answer] That is all an illusion; indeed he has fallen back onto all kinds of discontented people. In addition he thought that the army was behind him. However the army was ridiculed and humiliated by people like Bani-Sadr, who strengthened

all the forces hostile to the military in Iran, including the Pasdaran. It is true that Mr Bani-Sadr might reply that he was not involved in the Islamic Republic's extortions and that even as president of the republic he had no real power. That is exactly what Hoveyda (the shah's prime minister--LE MONDE note) said. You have to know how to say no at times. However Mr Bani-Sadr remained president of the republic for 18 months and never considered resigning. [Answer ends]

Mr Bakhtiar had much less to say when questioned on his own activities. He stated that he has had no relations with Baghdad since the Gulf war started, but he added, without further explanation, "I do have two radio transmitters somewhere in the region." "Moreover I maintain my views on this war. It was provoked by Khomeyni, who is the aggressor and who, contrary to what is generally accepted, was the first to denounce the Algiers agreement."

"My options are clear. I have never accepted the Islamic Republic and I remain faithful to Mossadeq's line. In my view the 1906 constitution is still in force but, in view of the changes which have come about since them, a constituent assembly should decide on the country's constitutional future."

CSO: 4619/23

ROULEAU ON IMPLICATIONS OF BANI-SADR EXILE

PM031009 Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Jul 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by Eric Rouleau: "A Hunted Man"]

[Text] "I will never leave Iran," Mr Bani-Sadr confided to us shortly before going into hiding 12 June. Two days before that he had been sacked as commander in chief of the armed forces, and he was expecting to be sacked from his post as president.

At that time the situation seemed so favorable to him that he was convinced that "if the people's will were to be flouted in that way," Iran would experience "a second revolution" and the "military front would quickly collapse." Against all expectation the army immediately paid allegiance to Imam Khomeyni; the clerics who supported him [Bani-Sadr] changed sides or kept quiet; the attempts to demonstrate in his support were repressed, often violently.

In theory, Mr Bani-Sadr could count on the active support of a broad group of political parties starting from the extreme left. But although most of them were small groups, the Mojahedin-e Khalq was thought to have the means of mobilizing broad sections of the population. Mr Rajavi's party above all had members experienced in the urban guerrilla warfare waged in the shah's day, and considerable arsenals. But the repression was so brutal--thousands of arrests and dozens of executions--that the Mojahedin recently seemed incapable of ensuring the deposed head of state's security.

Therefore Mr Bani-Sadr could no longer afford the luxury of leading "the resistance against the dictatorship" from the national territory. If he had been arrested he would have been tried for "high treason" and probably executed. Ayatollah Gilani, the judge in the Evin Prison Revolutionary Court, had said at a press conference: "Bani-Sadr deserves death on three counts!"

The Islamic courts do not usually publish the charges in advance. But the press was full of accusations each of which was virtually enough to lead the former head of state to the gallows. According to official statements he was the "leader of the counterrevolutionary conspiracy," carrying out frontal attacks on the state's institutions and its elected representatives, and indulging in subversive activities within the army. He was suspected of "Bonapartist" designs. Care was taken not

to denounce him as an "American agent," but his relations with the United States were considered "suspect" in more than one respect. He had opposed taking the American diplomats hostage; he had announced when finance minister his intention to withdraw Iranian funds from American banks, which had enabled President Carter to "freeze" all the Islamic Republic's assets in the United States the very next day; he "exaggerated" the Soviet threat, the better to justify a rapprochement with the United States.

More seriously still, at the beginning of July, the press printed texts "demonstrating the relations which Bani-Sadr had with the CIA." The documents, found in the archives of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, are probably authentic. They reported conversations between a U.S. intelligence service representative and Mr Bani-Sadr, first in Neauphle-le-Chateuau and then in Tehran. However, the agent, who posed as an important businessman, explained in a report that he tried to guarantee the "cooperation" of the future president of the republic by offering him the job of "technical adviser" with a salary of $1,000 per month. That did not prove anything because no document printed in the press showed that Mr Bani-Sadr knew his interlocutor's real identity or that he even accepted this modest offer of money. But the aim had been achieved: doubt was maintained in order to sully the reputation of the deposed president before possibly charging him officially with collaboration with the enemy.

Mr Cheysson's Statements

Mr Bani-Sadr has, therefore, chosen to take refuge in France, the country where he had lived in exile between 1964 and 1978 to escape the shah's police. He did not need to consult the French Government first since External Relations Minister Cheysson had stated on 19 June: "The homeland of human rights will not hand over any political refugee whatever happens, be he Bani-Sadr or anybody else..."

Nonetheless the French authorities have required the former Iranian president to sign the traditional pledge not to indulge in any political activity as long as he lives in our country. According to well-informed sources, it goes without saying that he will have to refrain from any statement to the press.

This instruction will apparently be applied all the more strictly since the French Government hopes to maintain "normal" relations with the Tehran government despite considerable points of contention between the two countries. The Islamic authorities were already criticizing Paris for its "unfriendly" attitude. According to them, France had become the "main center for counterrevolutionary movements," enabling leaders of the former imperial regime to hold public meetings and give press conferences, among other things. In addition the Iranian authorities were complaining that France was refusing to negotiate possible arms sales while supplying the Iraqi enemy with substantial military equipment.

The French Government's grievances are equally serious. The financial demands resulting from various nationalizations and from the unilateral cancellation of business contracts already under way amount to at least Fr15 billion. A large part of the unpaid bills would be likely to fall on the French taxpayer since the capital involved was insured by the French Foreign Trade Insurance Company.

The multiplicity of decisionmaking centers in the Islamic Republic, the lack of foreign policy and the internal struggles had hitherto prevented the Tehran government from obeying any negotiations to settle outstanding problems. The problem posed by Mr Bani-Sadr's arrival in Paris may make it possible to outline if not an agreement then at least a dialogue which would have the value of specifying the two governments' respective positions.

CSO: 4619/23

CLANDESTINE 'VOI' SCORES BANI-SADR, SUPPORTS BAKHTIAR

NC011330 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 31 Jul 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Summary from poor reception] "A Voice of Iran correspondent reports that so far all national groups and leaders of Iranian resistance movements abroad have declared Bani-Sadr persona non grata. All of them, including Shapur Bakhtiar, have said that Bani-Sadr participated in all the regime's crimes, that his hands are stained with the patriots' blood and that he was a partner to the plundering of the nation's wealth."

Bani-Sadr failed in the struggle for more power and is now trying to pretend to be a nationalist. The same sources say that with his "ridiculous" policies, Bani-Sadr turned the country's banking, financial and economic sectors into a shambles. But he was able to gain some popularity among "naive" people through his speeches and indications of opposition with some of the clergy.

"Bani-Sadr is not a trustworthy person" and his "opportunism" was clearly apparent from the time he was in Paris with Khomeyni.

"From the very start of our activities we, the Voice of Iran, have always unveiled Bani-Sadr's nature, as we did that of the other leaders of the regime of usurpers. Bani-Sadr is a person far more sly than the rest of Khomeyni's associates," and his facade fooled the world, who thought of him as a moderate.

Bani-Sadr did his best for a rapprochement with the army. He used the country's mass media and participated in debates and discussions to present himself as a nationalist and to thus gain more power. "Bani-Sadr was one of the drafters of the antinational and irreligious regime of Ayatollah Khomeyni. He was responsible for and a partner to all the crimes committed by the non-Muslim clergy and the despots of Tehran." His talent was that he knew French and had contacts with the French press. "The foundation of Bani-Sadr's thought is completely communist," and this can be clearly seen in his thesis, research and (?speeches).

If "noble bazaaris and other ranks of people organized pro-Bani-Sadr demonstrations, these were intended as an expression of opposition against the rule of the tyrants and to express dissatisfaction with Khomeyni and the other non-Muslim clergy." These demonstrations were not for the sake of Bani-Sadr, but to express dissatisfaction with the regime.

"Despite that which has been said about him and which will be said in the future and even though he enjoys the support of some of the powers of the world," it is not believed he can form a group in Paris and--as he himself puts it--to struggle against Khomeyni. "The Iranian nation should be careful of Bani-Sadr's future intrigues and games" and should remember that all the chaos and anarchy on the domestic scene and the loss of respect on the international scene are results of the "sinister acts of Bani-Sadr and his associates."

Perhaps from all the opinions expressed during the past couple of days concerning Bani-Sadr's escape the most correct of all is that of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, who has said: "Bani-Sadr's hands are stained with the blood of the Iranian nation," and he should be publicly tried in a national court for all the crimes he has committed.

CSO: 4640/60

BRIEFS

ARMED FORCES ARRESTS--[Passage indistinct] these reports state that the clergy are greatly terrified with an inevitable insurrection by the armed forces and have started fresh arrests of officers and NCO's of the joint staff of the Iranian armed forces. According to these reports the ruling clergy have arrested and imprisoned hundreds of officers and NCO's during the past 2 weeks. The reliable WASHINGTON POST reports that a few days before Bani-Sadr's escape to Paris three brave pilots of the Iranian air force who were under arrest were executed. [Text] [NC311501 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 31 Jul 81]

KHALKHALI THREATS TO FRENCH--Reports from Tehran state that Sadeq Khalkhali has announced that if the French Government does not extradite Bani-Sadr to Iran, the demonstrators in front of the embassy will do exactly what they did with the U.S. Embassy. However, reports from Paris indicate that despite the empty threats by Sadeq Khalkhali and by other clergymen of the clerical regime, the French Government [words indistinct] and will not change its decision. [Passage indistinct] [Text] [NC311503 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 31 Jul 81]

IRAN-ISRAEL-PLO RELATIONS--Yasir 'Arafat has sent a special representative to Iran to ask the Islamic Republic to explain the arms' purchases from Israel and the crash of the Argentinian plane carrying the Israeli arms. World agencies have reported that Yasir 'Arafat has warned the Raja'i government that if this report is true and the Islamic Republic's objective is against the Palestinians, he will order his men to leave Iran and return to Lebanon. Meanwhile, it is said that in a meeting with Yasir 'Arafat's representative, Hashemi Rafsanjani tried to conciliate the Palestinian leader. International agencies report that following the crash of the Argentinian plane Israel is trying to soothe the PLO, whose relations with the Islamic Republic are extremely aggravated, and that Israeli opposition leader Shimon Perez for the first time indirectly recognized the PLO in a television speech when he said: It should not be forgotten that PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat signed the Lebanon cease-fire agreement on Friday. Meanwhile, it is said in Arab circles that following the commotion after the crash of the Argentinian plane carrying Israeli arms to Iran and Yasir 'Arafat's protest to the regime's officials, the Islamic Republic has assigned Hashemi Rafsanjani to head a conciliatory mission and has sent a representative to Israel asking the Israeli Government to review its relations with the Palestinians. These sources say that Menachem Begin charged Shimon Perez with this duty so that cooperation with and the sale of arms to the Islamic Republic will continue. [Text] [NC311632 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 31 Jul 81]

BAHA'IS EXECUTED IN TABRIZ--A Free Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that the nine people who were executed in Tabriz on Thursday were Baha'is. Khomeyni's regime said that they were zionists and had condemned them for spying for Israel. In Germany the Baha'i society announced that the nine people executed in Tabriz were Baha'is. Some time ago the FRG Parliament had protested such executions. Agencies report that nine more people were executed in four Iranian cities yesterday. This brings the number of the people executed during the month of Ramadan to more than 300. [Text] [NC311629 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 31 Jul 81]

ENVOY ON PLANE CRASH--Mohammad Mokri, the Islamic Republic of Iran's ambassador in the Soviet Union said in a news conference in Moscow that the Argentine aircraft which crashed in Soviet Armenia carried commercial commodities. Mohammad Mokri added that, contrary to reports disseminated in the West, the plane which crashed on 11 July did not carry military equipment. At the news conference Mohammad Mokri also said that if necessary, Iran is ready to help the people of Palestine by placing arms and volunteer forces at the Palestinians' disposal. Mohammad Mokri added that Iran has helped the Palestinians in the struggle against the zionist regime as much as possible to date, but is ready to help the Palestinian people even more. [Text] [LD311831 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 31 Jul 81]

BAKHTIAR AID TO REFUGEES--Our correspondent has reported from Paris that leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran [NRMI], Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, in addition to attending meetings of political discussions with representatives of combatant Iranian groups and with foreign and Iranian (?officers) and politicians, spends many hours each day with Iranian refugees. At present, more than 400 Iranian families are being aided by the NRMI secretariat in Paris. Many Iranians who live in France have been allocated credits to put into order the lives of the families of armed forces martyrs, retired people and students. These credits are being used under the supervision of the financial committee of the NRMI. Last week Dr Shapur Bakhtiar started talks with French officials so that (?arrangements can be made) for Iranians who cannot return to Iran from fear of Khomeyni's killings and (?executions). [Text] [NC011637 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 1 Aug 81]

PLOTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT--Tehran--The deposed shah's general, his dreaded secret service organization SAVAK's agents who fled out of the country are now planning a coup d'etat against the Islamic Regime, it was disclosed by Soviet Union official news agency TASS reported recently. TASS in is dispatch from Washington quoted American journalist Clark Kissinger as saying that some of the top American officials are also involved in the plots being hatched against the present regime of Iran. The TASS dispatch identified a US official who once posed in the so-called US Embassy in Tehran as John Mamdord and said that he is now acting as a middleman for US President Ronald Reagan and Iran's anti-revolutionary forces. Kissinger also disclosed that some European countries such as UK, West Germany and France are also involved in certain anti-Islamic activities. Kissinger said that despite the fact the US had vowed not to interfere into the internal matters of Iran, it (The US) will continue to do so, TASS reported. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 20 Jul 81 p 2]

CIVIL WAR PREDICTED--Iraqi deputy premier Taha Yassin Ramadan told the London-based 8 DAYS magazine that the turmoil in Iran after the deposing of former president Bani-Sadr was the start of civil war in the country. "It shows that those who wanted war against Iraq acted against the will of the Iranian peoples," he said. "All we hope for is that Iran may find a reasonable and wise ruling group, capable of governing, restoring the economy and promoting development in the service of the people. In this case, dialogue would become possible and a solution easily found." [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 24 Jul 81 p 12]

PREMIER IN EXILE--Reports from Tehran Wednesday claimed former president Bani-Sadr had issued a proclamation naming Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Mas'ud Rajavi as his premier of Iran. The Mojahedin organisation would cooperate with him, he announced. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 24 Jul 81 p 12]

THEOLOGIANS ON OIL EXPORTS--Qom (PARS)--"If the reactionary Arab rulers are genuine in their exclamations, they should boycott the huge oil exports to the imperialist U.S. and the criminal Regime of Israel." The Instructors at the Theological School of Qom made the above comment Wednesday in a cable to the Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Islamic Assembly of Lebanon, following the hostile Israeli air-raids on Southern Lebanon. In the telegram, the Instructors denounced the savage crimes committed by the Occupying Regime of Qods and emphasized, "The heroic militants of Lebanon should take no heed of the phony support offered by the belligerent U.S., the "capitalist" Soviet Union and the reactionary Arab rulers in the Middle East." The Theological instructors also assured the sacrificial combatants of Lebanon that they can count upon the infinite Grace of God Almighty and the profound assistance of the righteous Moslem nations in the Middle East, in their confrontation with the dastardly conspiracies of Zionist Israel. [Text] Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Jul 81 p 1]

ANNUAL BUDGET, OIL EXPORTS--After a four months' delay the Majlis has approved the budget for 1360 (Mar 21, 1981-Mar 21 1982), and the original figure of 3,300 billion rials (about 20 billion pounds) is slightly reduced to 3,166 billion rials. Increased sales of oil are scheduled to make up the deficit of 702.3 billion rials in the budget. But observers already forecast that not only will it not be made up but it will prove to be much larger a deficit. Oil sources estimate present exports of oil at 800,000 barrels a day (the government claims they are over a million a day) but to balance the budget it is thought exports will have to go up to 2.2 million barrels a day. The deficit on the last budget was 878 billion rials. The war allocations in the budget are among those reduced. They total 350 billion rials instead of the 550 billion originally allotted. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 24 Jul 81 p 12]

CSO: 4600

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY FUNCTIONS DISCUSSED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 1 Jul 81 p 2

[Article by Clela Khoshaba]

[Text] On June 20th 1980, following a general election in which Iraqi people freely elected their representatives, the national assembly was convened for the first time in Iraq; thus materializing the masses' true will, interests and hopes.

The election was an expression of our people's faith in the revolution, its principles and the just leadership of the party headed by President Saddam Hussein.

The National Assembly, is representative of all social stratas and national groups which make up the Iraqi community. Its membership of 250 contains members of the Revolutionary Command Council, lawyers, doctors, workers, engineers, government officials and farmers.

As a result of the democratic procedure that was followed in the elections, it was assured that Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens would be included.

The Assembly also has 16 female representatives, which is considered a high percentage compared with other Arab and international parliaments.

On June 30th 1980, President Saddam Hussein inaugurated the first session of the National Assembly, with a comprehensive and historic speech in which he stressed the importance of strengthening and developing the democratic experience which the assembly represents. President Saddam Hussein called upon the assembly to reflect the will of the people and to spread democracy in the country.

The Assembly celebrates today its first anniversary; and on this occasion the Baghdad Observer prints this interview with Mr. Zaid al-Falahi, Director of Information of the National Assembly.

"During the first year of its life, the Assembly consolidated parliamentary procedures and established links with various parliaments and National councils throughout the world.

The tasks of the Assembly could be summarized as follows:

— Enactment of laws
— Questions and answers (to and from ministers)
— Follow up of the State's general policy.
— Approval of treaties.
— Declaration of war and peace.
— Censuring and questioning of ministers.

On the approval of its statute, the Assembly started to implement its basic objectives. Accordingly eight committees were set up. They are:

1. A committee on legal and administrative affairs, which deals with draft laws, treaties, international agreements, other legal affairs in addition to administrative subjects related to

council.

2. A committee on Arab and international relations whose competence centres around the studying of bilateral and multi-lateral external relationships with Arab and foreign countries, as well as overseeing international treaties and agreements.

3. Committe on financial and planning affairs, which reviews the budget, economic development plans and other financial matters.

4. Committee on education, information, culture and youth.

5. A committee on agricultural and commercial affairs.

6. A committee on citizens affairs and public utilities, which examines matters related to housing; surface, maritime and air transport; postal services; in addition to looking into citizens' complaints which are filed in the Assembly.

7. A committee on social, health and religious affairs, specializing in studying matters related to mosques, holy sites, shrines, family security, maternal and child care, the handicapped as well as matters concerned with the various health services.

8. A committee on oil, energy, industry and mineral affairs.

These committees which consist of 7 to 15 members ballot at the assembly's first session after its election. Membership in the committee is for two years and renewable.

Each committee elects its chairman, vice chairman and a rapparteur.

The eight committees mentioned above are regarded as the back bone of the assembly for they not only frame the bills but they are responsible for the implementation of the work specified in the bills.

The speaker undertakes the preparation of the assembly's agenda for each of its sessions, the drafting of its work plan, the approval of the assembly's draft budget and its organisational structure prior to its presentation to the assembly for final verification.

Two sessions are held annually by the assembly, the first commences on the 1st Saturday in April and lasts to the end of May and the second takes place between the first Saturday in November and the end of December on the condition that the general budget has been approved.

By a presidential decree, the President of the republic may prolong the Assembly's session or call for an extraordinary session if necessary. The Assembly is also authorized, by a majority decision, to prolong its session for a maximum period of one month.

How the Assembly implements its legislative functions.

At the start of each session, the Speaker prepares a draft agenda which is submitted to the assembly for approval. The agenda consists of projects, draft laws, and memorandum received by the Assembly.

Draft laws are presented to the Speaker's office which is obliged to transfer it within forty eight hours to the relevent committee and the committee on legal and administrative affairs.

The respective committee, on discussing the draft law, and in co-ordination with the legal and administrative committee, will present a joint report containing their recommendations to the assembly's Speaker.

The draft law, together with the two Committee's joint report, will then be distributed among members of the assembly and the subject will be scheduled for discussion at the next meeting.

Should the draft law be approved by the Assembly, the Speaker will dispatch the law to the Secretariat General of the Revolutionary Command Council in the case of the draft being originally submitted by the President of the Republic, or the dispatch will be to the President if the draft had originated from the Revolutionary Command Council.

In the event of the draft law deing rejected by the assembly, it will be returned to the Presidency stating reasons for rejection.

Should the National Assembly reject a draft law submitted by the RCC the draft would be balloted and passed by a majority of two thirds in a joint meeting between the Assembly and the Council.

The Assembly is empowered to debate draft laws presented by not less than one quarter of its members, provided that these laws will not be of military or national security nature.

The Assembly started its legislative functions last April, and has already approved a number of laws among which are; a law on regulating Iraqis working abroad, one concerning tourists car hire offices, a public health law, a pharmacists promotion law; a law of the Iraqi Co. for land reclamation: A law of the Ministry of Culture and Information, an Iraqi scientific societies law, a financial center and accountants law, the general establishment for social reform law.

Among draft laws which the assembly rejected was the government officials evaluation draft law.

As to the assembly's external relations, an extensive set of relationships was established between our National Assembly and a large number of Arab and foreign parliaments. The Iraqi National Assembly is a member of the World Federation of Parliaments, as well as a member of the Arab Federation of Parliaments and has actively participated in a large number of parliamentary meetings in various parts of the World.

The Speaker of the Assembly, Mr. Naeem Haddad, has vigorously contacted parliaments of the world to explain the true dimensions of the Palestinian issue and the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, the latest message dispatched by Mr. Haddad concerned the zionist aggression on our nuclear installations".

CSO: 4300/60

JAPANESE COMPANY SUES FOR WAR DAMAGES

London 8 DAYS in English No 26, 4 Jul 81 pp 34, 35

[Article by Koji Nakamura: "Iraq Is Sued for War Damages"]

[Text] THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT'S favourable attitude towards a Japanese firm which demanded compensation for damage caused by the Iran-Iraq war may set an important precedent and encourage other firms to follow suit.

In what was the first Japanese — perhaps the first foreign — move to demand such compensation, Kawasaki Heavy Industries asked the Iraqi government to pay Japanese yen 5bn ($22.5m) for losses sustained by the war. The Iraqi government is reportedly ready to meet the demand.

Kawasaki Heavy Industries is constructing two cement plants for Yen 90bn ($408m), one at Hit, 200km west of Baghdad, and the other at Altamin, in the Kirkuk oilfield area. Construction work was started in 1980; on completion, they will each produce one million tonnes of cement a year.

Construction work had to be suspended in September, 1980, as the outbreak of war made it impossible to use Basra port for unloading construction materials. They had to be re-routed to Aqaba and then transported overland to the sites. Though construction work in Hit was resumed in May, work at Altamin remains suspended.

It is for the additional expenses incurred as the result of re-routing the materials that Kawasaki has demanded extra payments. These break down into demurrage at Basra, re-routing expenses, truck transportation expenses and labour.

In meeting this demand, Kawasaki sources said, the Iraqi government has urged Kawasaki to expedite the construction of a civic hall in Baghdad, work on which has also remained suspended because of the war. Industrial sources feel this shows an Iraqi desire to speed up the various construction projects, particularly social facilities such as hospitals, schools, roads and harbour facilities, that have been awarded to Japanese and other foreign firms.

Construction orders awarded to Japanese firms amount to an estimated Yen 1,000 bn ($4.5bn). Iraq is understood to have awarded Japan some 30 per cent of construction orders issued to foreign sources in 1980, and accounted for more than 40 per cent of overseas building contracts awarded to Japanese firms.

The issue of such orders was suspended on the outbreak of war, but Iraq has issued fresh orders to Japanese firms since April for what are believed to be post-war rehabilitation programmes. Of these, the most noteworthy is a Yen 80bn ($362m) contract awarded to Marubeni Corporation, a major Japanese trading firm, to build seven general hospitals. This is the biggest construction contract awarded to a Japanese firm with the exception of industrial plant facilities.

The hospitals are to be built in Mosul, Dihok, Kirkuk, Ar Ramadi, Ad Diwaniyah, Al Kut and As Samawah, and follow an earlier Yen 42bn ($190m) order to Marubeni in 1979 for five general hospitals, construction of which is now in progress. Total construction orders awarded to Marubeni alone amount to an estimated Yen 500bn ($2.2bn) and cover 22 projects such as hospitals, schools, bridges and harbour facilities. The number of Japanese workers engaged on these has gone back to the pre-war level of 6,000; some 50 per cent

had been evacuated due to the war with Iran. Work even at such 'dangerous areas' as the Basra harbour has been resumed.

Major construction orders awarded by Iraq to other Japanese firms amount to more than Yen 200bn ($907m), and include a Yen 80bn ($362m) award to Mitsubishi Corporation for the redevelopment of Baghdad city. The estimated total of construction projects undertaken by Japanese interests is close to Yen 1,000bn ($4.5bn).

Behind the steady emergence of Iraq as one of the biggest outlets in the Middle East for Japanese hardware, technology and manpower, is a reported Iraqi decision to reciprocate Japan's heavy purchase of crude. While Iraq accounted for 5.4 per cent of total Japanese crude imports in 1979, its share is now estimated at more than 9 per cent. This is more than Iran's share, and is close to the UAE's 10 per cent — the biggest volume available to Japan from Middle Eastern suppliers after Saudi Arabia's 30 per cent.

On the other hand, Japan's relations with Iran have worsened with the disgrace of President Bani Sadr. At stake is the Yen 750bn ($3.4bn) Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company (IJPC).

Bani Sadr promoted the project in spite of negative feelings on the part of the Japanese, particularly since the construction site at Bandar Khomeini, 100km from the border, was bombed five times by Iraq, causing 'repairable but considerable' damage. The virtual dismissal of Eimei Yamashita, president of the Iran Chemical Development Company (ICDC) — the Japanese investing firm of the IJPC comprising five companies affiliated with Mitsui and Company — who had been the driving force behind Japan's efforts to complete the project, bears testimony to the discouraging position the Mitsui consortium now finds itself in.

The Mitsui consortium, which foresees a delayed decision on whether or not the company will continue construction work because of the developing Iranian situation, may demand compensation from Iran for damage to the IJPC facilities caused by Iraqi aerial bombings.

Before the revolution, Iran was Japan's closest partner in the Middle East, and at one time provided more than 40 per cent of Japan's oil imports. A variety of industrial programmes had been under study, a result of the Shah's campaign to emulate Japan. After the revolution, Japan was heavily dependent on Bani Sadr's moderate position on external affairs. Now that he has disappeared from the scene, both government and industrial sources fear the relationship with Iran — which in April decided to export 230,000 b/d of crude — will deteriorate again.

CSO: 4300/59

UK FIRMS CAUTIOUSLY INCREASE BUSINESS TIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 26, 4 Jul 81 pp 35, 36

[Text] IRAQ is the Middle East's fastest developing market for exports. British exports there this year are likely to be worth $1bn, making it the third largest Arab purchaser of UK goods, behind Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

The war with Iran has not impeded the growth of Iraq's imports. The government is eager to prove it can provide both guns and butter. Transport difficulties, which created serious problems for exporters in the first three months of the conflict, have largely ended.

The Iraqis are particularly eager to see more British companies working in Iraq. A sign of this is the technical and economic cooperation agreement signed by Hassan Ali, trade minister and a member of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council, in London last week.

With Iraqi state companies sensitive to the way the political wind is blowing, this will ease the path of British businessmen on the way to Baghdad. The private sector is negligible. The improvement in relations contrasts with the boycott on contracts for UK companies imposed by Baghdad in 1978 in retaliation for the expulsion of 11 Iraqi officials from London.

Fear of a hostile political climate and difficulty in acquiring visas dissuaded British businessmen from trying to enter the Iraqi market during the 1970s. There were easier markets further south in the Gulf. The jailing of two businessmen in Baghdad also cooled UK enthusiasm. As a result, British contractors have had few successes in Iraq. The market has come to be dominated by the West Germans and Japanese.

At a conference of the Council of British Manufacturers of Petroleum Equipment (CBMPE) the previous week, following a mission to Iraq, a supplier described how he tried to find a bidder for two oil treatment plans for which his company had been invited to bid. As he explained to the Iraqis, his company did not carry out turnkey construction. He found subsequently that not one of the five British contractors he contacted showed any interest. Most cited political instability in the region as the reason.

Contractors have reason for caution as long as the war continues. Some Iraqi state organisations are prepared to take the exigencies of war into account and be flexible in contract conditions. Others refuse to admit that conditions have changed since a year ago. Even before the war there were difficulties getting equipment to Baghdad on time, with ships waiting at Basra port for up to 60 days.

The Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) told the CBMPE that British companies had failed in the past to supply sufficient technical data on products, react quickly to inquiries, emphasise after-sales service, or control prices.

Many companies, however, have been unable to do business in Iraq because of the difficulty in acquiring visas. Nonetheless, in the last four or five months, the number of UK companies with offices in Iraq has doubled.

Contractors are beginning to have some success. The largest single contract for many years, a $130m road project in Baghdad, was won recently by John Laing International. This may prove to be a portent for the future of British trade.

Once the war with Iran is over, the Iraqis will need to return rapidly to their old level of oil production, which touched 3.7m b/d last year. They also have ambitious plans to utilise more associated gas: the government needs to prove to the people that the war is not setting back national economic development.

NATION FINANCES PROJECTS IN YAR, MAURITANIA, DJIBOUTI

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 20 Jun 81 p 5

[Text]

As part of Iraq's national policy, the Housing and Reconstruction Ministry's planning committee, is building in the Yemen and Mauritania, a number of service educational, and health projects.

In Yemen Arab Republic, a hospital and three health centres are being built at a cost of ID. 3 million. A 50-bed hospital will be built in Sanaa.

On the other hand, work has begun on the technical training institute in Nouackchott, Mauritania, as well as installing electric street lights in the city's popular quarters.

An Iraqi bureau for carrying out constructional, housing and service projects has been set up in Djibouti. The staff are due to leave for that country shortly.

The projects to be built in Djibouti include a town, to be called "Iraqi Brotherhood City", with 150 houses with services, such as a mosque, a health clinic and a school.

Two other schools will be built in other parts of the Djibouti.

Similar projects will be awarded to local countractors.

CSO: 4300/60

HEALTH SECTOR BUDGET CITED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 24 Jun 81 p 4

[Text] Dr Riyadh Ibrahim Hussein Minister of Health, said new health laws will be enacted shortly.

Opening the fourth Health Ministry's general congress in Mosul, he added that the Ministry's budget climbed to over 12% of the total government budget, a record for developing countries.

Within nine months 100% of the Ministry's plan has been implemented," he said. He added that many hospitals were being built all over the country.

He emphasised that the purpose of the plan was to implement the first stages of socialized medical practice ensuring preventive services for every citizen and introducing the health-card system as in all advanced countries.

He called on health workers to increase their sense of responsibility, so that "we can occupy our rightful place among advanced nations as desired by Ba'thist thought and the teachings of President Saddam Hussein." He praised President Saddam's unlimited support for the health sector.

The opening of the congress was attended by Mr Subhy Ali Khalaf Governor of Nineveh, and Mr Sa'dy Saleh, Secretary of the Nineveh Ba'th Party Branch Secretariat and other officials.

The congress will discuss reports and studies on the new health law, health insurance, rural health education and training, medicine, human ecology, in addition to methods of developing health services in liberated regions.

The Secretary General of social affairs (Kurdistan Autonomy Region), Directors of Hospitals and health Institutes from all over Iraq are participating in the congress.

CSO: 4300/60

BRIEFS

HOSPITAL PROJECTS CITED--Three new hospitals, each with 100 beds, are to be built in the districts of Baiji, Dour and Tuz in Saladdin Province. The decision to build the new hospitals was taken in a meeting yesterday at Tikrit attended by Health Minister Dr Riadh Ibrahim Hussein and Mr Ja'far Qassim Hamoudi, member of the Regional Command of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. It was also decided to build 270 flats and 165 houses to accommodate physicians and other medical staff in the Province. The meeting also decided to provide the Province with 10 more ambulance vehicles. Earlier, Dr Hussein, visited the State Establishment for Drugs in Samarra and reviewed to its staff Iraq's policies in manufacturing and importing drugs. A new administrative board was formed for the enterprise during the Minister's visit. Mr Ibrahim, also inspected other medical institutions and centers in the districts of the Province and was briefed about the standards of medical services offered and of their needs. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 23 Jun 81 p 4]

DANISH BUILD BATTERY FACTORY--The Copenhagen-based firm, Hellesens, has been awarded the contract to build a $3m dry-cell battery factory in Iraq. Hellesens will provide the machinery and technical expertise; a provision also exists for Hellesens to supply $4.3m worth of raw materials within a year. The factory will be managed by the Iraqis themselves. Hellesens, a relatively small company with only 750 employees, managed to win the contract against stiff competition from the Japanese giant Hitachi, which supplied Iraq with a similar factory three years ago. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 26, 4 Jul 81 p 43]

CEMENT PLANT OPERATIONS RESUME--The Japanese firm Kawasaki Heavy Industries Ltd has resumed construction work on two cement plants in Iraq worth an estimated Y 90 billion ($400 million). Work was halted at the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war last September, and damage suffered through suspension was estimated to be Y 5 billion ($22 million) at the end of March. Announcing that work had resumed, Kawasaki President Kenji Hasegawa said last week that this followed an agreement with the Iraqi government on increased pay for local workers. Mr Hasegawa added that negotiations would continue on compensation for the damage. He gave no further details of the agreement reached with the Iraqi authorities. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 13 Jul 81 p 4]

CSO: 4300/67

U.S. REACTION TO INVESTMENT POLICY CRITICIZED

London 8 DAYS in English No 26, 4 Jul 81 p 36

[Article by David Butter: "Kuwaiti Investment Smear"]

[Text] RECENT disclosures of a confidential portfolio on $7bn Kuwaiti investment holdings in the US were designed by pro-zionist quarters to smear Citibank in the Arab world and raise American public resentment against Arab holdings generally, leading businessmen in Beirut are claiming.

The leak to the *Chicago Tribune* of the Citibank portfolio on Kuwaiti investments led the chairman of the Senate commerce, consumer and monetary affairs subcommittee, Benjamin Rosenthal, to express 'deep concern' over Opec investments in the US. He once more raised the spectre of 'Opec countries buying up huge pieces of America without anyone knowing it.'

Rosenthal failed to point out, however, that under existing US law, it is impossible to acquire large holdings there 'without anyone knowing it.' Like most of the US media, Rosenthal dwelt on the 'secrecy' of Kuwaiti investment in public corporations. Under US legislation, however, if any investor acquires five per cent or more of a publicly-owned American corporation, the investor must make a public file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Kuwaiti investments were 'secret' because none of the holdings exceed this five per cent ceiling.

The revelation of the Kuwaiti investments and the stir it has caused follow a pattern similar to the campaign by pro-zionist US groups to counter any shift in public opinion toward sympathy with a Palestinian or wider Arab point of view.

According to a report published in May by the Kuwaiti government — another detail which suggests the investments were far from 'secret' — the emirates' current oil revenue surplus is $65.1bn. Some 66 per cent of this has been invested in the US and Europe, 27.6 per cent in Kuwait, 4.8 per cent in Arab countries, and 1 per cent in Japan and Africa.

Kuwait is expected to move steadily away from investing in the US and towards Europe, Japan and the rapidly developing Far Eastern markets of Korea, Malaysia and eventually China. The recent appointment of Abdel Latif al Hamad as finance minister suggests Kuwait may become more actively involved in Third World development aid.

CSO: 4300/58

DEFENSE SPENDING TO INCREASE

London 8 DAYS in English No 27, 11 Jul 81 pp 38, 39

[Text] KUWAIT's recently elected national assembly last week approved a KD5.3bn ($18.8bn) budget for 1981-82, for the year starting 1 July. The parliament interrupted its ten-hour economic public session to discuss in secret the defence allocations, which accounted for 10 per cent of last year's $17.4bn budget.

Among the recommendations published by the assembly's finance committee were demands for tighter control of government capital expenditure, and more supervision of military spending. This is an area where regional developments have forced a Kuwaiti reassessment: reflecting the tensions in Afghanistan and Iran, and the Gulf war, the five-year plan published last March devoted 19 per cent more to defence than the previous national blueprint.

The $18.8bn government revenues called for by the budget will come almost entirely from crude oil sales, and represent an increase of 14 per cent over last year. Although Kuwait cut ouput from 1.5m to 1.25m b/d last April, the $18.1bn estimated oil revenue is seen as a very conservative figure — but in line with its normally cautious budgetary policies.

Actual government expenditure will rise by around 3 per cent to nearly $11bn. The budget surplus will go into state reserves, which will be increased by $7.8bn this year, 30 per cent more than last year. The government has assigned $5.3bn of this for the Reserve for Future Generations, $2.5bn for the General Reserve Fund and around $250m to cover a capital increase in the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED).

The finance committee had cut nearly $80m from the budget's first draft, as part of its brief to control spending. Major expenditure areas include salaries (allocated $22m), approved construction projects, and $4.5bn for revolving payments and unforeseen expenses.

The discussions about the budget, which is the first to be submitted to the parliament since it was elected in February after a four-year suspension, and the finance committee's recommendations reflect the even more cautious approach which Kuwait is showing on expenditure as a whole this year. Debates in the parliament also showed the growing feeling among some members that more government money should go to spreading religious awareness.

Kuwait's new finance minister, Abdul Latif al Hamad, said on a recent visit to London that a semi-autonomous investment authority is to be established to manage the country's long-term reserves. These are believed to be worth in the region of $50bn, and at the moment are under the direct control of the finance ministry and its agent in London, the Kuwait Investment Office.

●Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council will launch a joint investment fund, with capital of between $3bn and $6bn. Its headquarters will be in Kuwait, where there is considerable financial expertise. Its head is to be Abdul Rahman al Attiqui.

Al Hamad also said that the Gulf Investment Fund also intends to assist with the development of countries in which the money is invested, but clarified that these investments would be on a commercial basis and will not amount to aid.

CSO: 4300/58

BUDGET ASSUMES OIL REVENUE INCREASE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 27, 6 Jul 81 pp 3-4

[Text]

The Kuwaiti parliament has approved a budget for the fiscal year which began on July 1, following a government draft proposal based on increased oil revenue estimates in the next 12 months. The new budget – the first submitted for parliamentary approval since 1977 when the National Assembly was suspended – projects revenues of KD 5.3 billion ($18.92 billion), an increase of 37 per cent over last year's figure. Expenditures are budgeted at about KD 3 billion ($10.7 billion), a mere 2.56 per cent more than the comparative amount during the previous fiscal year.

The forecast surplus of KD 2.3 billion ($8.21 billion) will go mainly to increasing the country's reserves. KD 1.5 billion ($5.35 billion) has been set aside for the Reserve for Future Generations and KD 696 million ($2.5 billion) is to be paid into the General Reserve Fund. The total surplus this year is 34 per cent higher than during 1980-81.

According to unofficial reports, Kuwait has earmarked KD 1.278 billion ($4.56 billion) for defence and international financial commitments, with these two sectors accounting for 42.6 per cent of total expenditure. Development projects have been allocated KD 587 million ($2.1 billion), representing 19.5 per cent of overall outlay. This compares with KD 444 million ($1.7 billion) or 15.2 per cant in the last fiscal year. Some KD 590 million ($2.1 billion) have been allocated for wages and salaries, making up 19.6 per cent of total expenditure. The similar figures last year were KD 499 million ($1.87 billion), or 17 per cent.

The government estimates that oil revenues in the new fiscal year will amount to KD 5.1 billion ($18.2 billion), equivalent to 96.22 per cent of total income. The Central Bank earlier stated that oil revenues in 1980 came to $17.2 billion and contributed to a trade surplus of $14.2 billion.

In an official report, the Bank said that the oil sector contributed to about 70 per cent of the growth in GNP last year, and added a warning that other sectors of the economy needed to be developed. Last year, GNP stood at $26.8 billion, an increase of 14.7 per cent on the previous year; the trade surplus was up 7.2 per cent while the cost of living index rose by 7.7 per cent.

The estimate for the current fiscal year's oil revenues is based on the assumption that oil prices will continue to rise, which at the moment seems far from certain. The price of Kuwaiti oil was recently around $35 per barrel, compared to an average of $29.50 in the last 12 months. However, as the likelihood is remote that the present oil glut will be absorbed before the middle of next year, there is no guarantee that Kuwait's real oil revenues will match the estimated figure, notwithstanding Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa's recent forecast that the glut will be over by the end of 1981 (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, June 22).

The only indication of parliament's reaction filtered through in the form of 24 recommendations by the Finance Committee, which included a call for closer supervision of military spending and tighter control of the government's capital expenditure policies.

In an interview earlier this year, the newly-appointed Finance Minister, Abdel Latif al-Hamad, told this newsletter that the government was considering demands for a new and autonomous investment agency to manage Kuwait's investment programme (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 18). The Minister gave no details of what would be involved nor what was meant by autonomous. At present, all Kuwaiti financial and investment institutions have a large if not overwhelming government majority shareholding.

Reports from Kuwait last week also said that there were calls for government-backed programmes to spread Islam and an end to Ministry of Education subsidies of girls' dancing classes. Observers have suggested that these recommendations reflect a new wave of Islamic fundamentalism among some of the recently-elected members of parliament.

CSO: 4300/56

INVESTMENT IN LOCAL MARKET ENCOURAGED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 13 Jul 81 p 4

[Text]

The Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC) is to co-manage a $500 million bond issue for the World Bank, it was announced in Kuwait last week. The issue, which is being registered on the Luxembourge stock exchange, is being made at 98.5 per cent of par value and carries 14 3/8 per cent interest and a maturity of five years.

The announcement of the loan coincided with a declaration by Finance Minister Minister Abdel-Latif al-Hamad that Kuwait is planning to reactivate its Dinar capital market for foreign borrowers. Mr Hamad's declaration, made in London, was also underlined by a statement by Commerce and Industry Minister Jassem al-Marzouk cautioning Kuwaiti businessmen against investing in companies outside the Arab world.

Mr Hamad was quoted as saying at the beginning of this month that "medium- and long-term lending on the Kuwaiti market for foreign borrowers is now being resumed on an active basis." He said this would "be applicable to Kuwaiti Dinars as long-term credits." An example of this, he pointed out, is the recent facility arranged for the National Bank of Yugoslavia, which was partly drawn up in Kuwaiti Dinars.

Mr Marzouk's statement was more puzzling however. While selective restrictions on the formation of new companies in Kuwait have been enforced until now to avert liquidity difficulties, Mr Marzouk said "Kuwaiti capital owners are strongly cautioned against dealing in shares of (foreign) companies if they wish to ensure the safety of their investment." Mr Marzouk was reported to be commenting on news that Kuwaiti businessmen were in the process of setting up firms in Luxembourg and the Bahamas.

Government sources in Kuwait have been quoted as saying that the flight of potential investors to foreign markets, because of the restrictions, has caused sharp fluctuations in interbank interest rates which have had an adverse impact on Kuwait's stock exchange.

In its annual report, the Kuwait-based Arab Company for Trading Securities, notes that "the restrictive measures imposed during 1979 and 1980 to reduce liquidity crisis have now been formally removed," singling out the Kuwaiti Dinar bond market as the most important beneficiary of such a move. The outlook for 1981 remains unclear, the report goes on to say, as "rising inflation levels and the concomitant rise in interest rates continue to be the biggest enemy of the bond markets, and conditions in the local money markets will be the determining factor as to the future course of the Kuwaiti Dinar bond market in 1981."

According to the report, the Kuwaiti Dinar market has passed through the most difficult period of its existence since it was created in 1974 owing to the adverse effects of unprecedented high rates of interest, large fluctuations in foreign exchange markets and political tensions. But it was to the credit of the Kuwaiti bond market that price levels remained relatively stable despite erratic movements in domestic interest rates.

Nevertheless, the turnover on the market in 1980 was particularly poor. From $327 million in 1979, the level of trading fell by more than half to $157.5 million last year, the report states. The consequence of this was the growth of investment in floating rate certificates of deposit which has been strongly supported by Kuwaiti institutions such as the KIIC.

CSO: 4300/67

BRIEFS

KUWAITI PERIODICAL SUSPENSION--Kuwait, 22 Jul (KUNA)--It was announced here today that the Kuwaiti authorities have suspended the Islamic-oriented periodical AL-MUJTAM'A AL-ISLAMI for 2 weeks for publishing an article "harmful" to Kuwait-Syria relations. The suspension order was issued by Minister of Information Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad as-Sabah in accordance with provisions of the printing and publication law. The periodical, the organ of the Religious Social Reform Society, had published an article by a Syrian religious shaykh whom it described as the general secretary of the Islamic committee. It identified him as Shaykh Muhammad abu al-Nasir al-Bayanuni. The article vehemently criticized the Syrian regime. The social reform society is sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, which is opposed to the ruling Syrian regime. The periodical has been suspended a number of times for publishing articles which the government considered to be harmful to its relations with Syria. [Text] [LD230234 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0823 GMT 22 Jul 81 LD]

CSO: 4304/93

LONGER SENTENCES FOR RIOTERS

Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2812, 21 Jul 81 p 10

[Text] Rabat, July 19--An appeal court has increased the prison sentences meted out to 11 of the opposition party and trade union members arrested after the cost-of-living riots in Morocco June 20, a Communist newspaper reported today.

The paper, AL-BAYANE, said the court in Meknes had extended to two and three years the 18-month terms originally imposed on the 11, members of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces and of the Democratic Labor Confederation (CDT).

One of the 11 is the party's regional secretary at Meknes, Mohamed El-Jabiri, the newspaper said.

It also reported that a Casablanca trial court yesterday handed down sentences ranging from two months in prison to six months suspended against four party and union leaders. One of them was a Mr Moustaghfir, Secretary-General of the National Union of Small Businessmen, the paper said.

Eighty-two other people, many of them members of the Socialist Party or of the Labor Confederation, have appeared since July 13 before a Rabat court on charges arising from the CDT's general strike call and the riots that followed.

The Rabat court's verdict is expected by the end of the month.

The Government says 66 people were killed in the riots, which were most intense in Casablanca, and that none died by gunfire. The opposition and overseas human rights groups have charged that security forces opened fire on crowds and that several hundred people died. (AFP)

CSO: 4500/23

MINISTER REPORTS ON AGRICULTURAL SECTOR

Casablanca VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 29 May 81 pp 1, 3, 5

[Article on Minister of Agriculture Abdelattif Ghissassi's assessment of 1980-1981 agricultural campaign, 22 May 1981, place not specified: "Harvest: 25 to 29 Quintals: Late Rainfall Beneficial"]

[Text] Mr Ghissassi assessed the 1980-1981 agricultural campaign last Friday evening.

It is far less catastrophic than might have been feared as little as 2 months ago; output certainly did suffer significant damage, due as much to frosts as to drought, but the late rainfall at the end of March and in April made it possible to reduce the seriousness of the situation.

In March, Mr Ghissassi estimated the harvest at between 20 and 25 quintals, and lack of precipitation was expected to further reduce these figures.

But the rainfall recorded made it possible to get clearly improved results, particularly in the northern part of the country. It should also be pointed out that in the East the campaign got excellent results, as has already been pointed out in any case [as published].

In addition, the measures taken by the government, especially those for cattle, have had beneficial results.

Lastly, one other element of the situation made it possible to attenuate the consequences of the disasters: the prices received for exports by the OCE [Marketing and Export Office] were on the whole higher than in the previous year, which made it possible to maintain income figures despite lower tonnage.

Mr Ghissassi's account of the campaign is given on pages 3 and 4.

The main points of Minister of Agriculture Abdellatif Ghissassi's account of the results of the agricultural campaign follow.

Plantings

	1979-80	1980-81	Percentage
Barley	2,150,000	2,237,000	52.5
Hard wheat	1,255,000	1,193,000	28
Soft wheat	440,000	481,000	11
Corn	415,000	361,000	8.5
Total	4,260,000	4,272,000	

Overall Results of 1980-81 Harvest

	1980-81	1979-80
Cereals (4)	21 to 29 million quintals	44 million quintals
Early vegetables	300,000 tons	
Export portion of above	125,000 tons	148,900 tons
In tomatoes	230,000 tons	
In potatoes	52,000 tons	
Citrus fruits	972,000 tons	1,037,000 tons
Export portion of above	680,000 tons	768,000 tons
Beetroot	2,000,000 tons	2,200,000 tons
Sugar cane	510,000 tons	376,000 tons
Sugar	320,000 tons	365,000 tons
Peanuts	202,500 quintals	119,700 quintals
Milk	780 million liters	730 million liters

Cereal Prices

	Current	Previous
Hard wheat	135	125
Soft wheat	135	125
Barley	96	92
Corn	96	96

Rainfall

The 1980-81 campaign was characterized by the following conditions:

Light rainfall during the months of September and October (32 mm)

Practically generalized drought prevailing from mid-November to the beginning of the second week in January, except in the East.

Slight rainfall occurring from 9 January to 18 February 1981, affecting the country as a whole but with varying intensity depending on the areas considered (15 to 42 mm)

Light rainfall from 20 February to 10 March, not over 5 mm

At the end of March 1981, rainfall measurements for this campaign are compared to the average rainfall for the 4 preceding years in the following table:

Situation End March

	1980-81	1977-80 Average	Difference (Percent)
Unfavorable southern arid land	133	277	-41
Unfavorable eastern arid land	213	181	+18
Settat transitional zone	131	385	-66
Favorable arid land	220	451	-51

Situation on 13 May

Unfavorable southern arid land	151	255	-40.8
Unfavorable eastern arid land	281	210	+33.8
Chaouia	172	428	-59.8
Favorable arid land	338	624	-36

These tables show that the zones most affected are the unfavorable southern arid land (-41 percent) and the transitional zone around Settat (-66 percent).

In addition, the supplementary rainfall occurring in the period between the beginning of April and 13 May had a beneficial effect, especially in the eastern regions and the favorable arid area (which includes Fez and Meknes).

Since 25 March, supplemental rainfall was as follows: Unfavorable southern arid land: + 18 mm; Unfavorable eastern arid land: + 68 mm; Chaouia: + 41 mm; Favorable arid land: + 117 mm.

Plantings

Areas sown with cereals during this campaign reached 4.272 million hectares divided as follows:

Barley:	2.237 million hectares, or 52.5 percent
Hard wheat:	1.193 million hectares, or 28 percent
Soft wheat:	481,000 hectares, or 11 percent
Corn:	361,000 hectares, or 8.5 percent.

Comparison of these data with those of the 1979-80 campaign shows that the areas used for the four main cereals have remained the same as in that one.

Organization of the Campaign

The current agricultural campaign has been characterized by painstaking preparation in which all government departments concerned with agriculture took part.

The objectives of preparation were:

to assure favorable conditions for the start of the campaign and for supplying farmers with the necessary items for production, in large enough quantities, at reasonable prices, and in good time;

to derive the greatest possible advantage from agricultural potential by early soil preparation and timely seeding.

These objectives have been reached, thanks to the collaboration of government officials who participated in starting the campaign process, and provincial agricultural development committees which under the chairmanship of the governors supervised the completion of the operations regionally.

At the central level, a ministerial board made sure that periodic analyses were made of information concerning the progress of the campaign, and that distribution of production needs was organized, while trying to solve problems for which no solutions had been found at the local or provincial level, with the participation of representatives of the professions involved.

Fertilizers

The national fertilizer supply plan, established by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, planned availability of 705,000 tons, or 40 percent more than consumption in the previous campaign, so that any fertilizer shortage would be avoided. This ambitious, strong-minded plan was meant to break the evolution pattern recorded during the 1975-79 period, which remained below 6 percent.

In parallel, the fertilizer sector benefited from price stabilization and simplification of the procedure for obtaining aid in the use of fertilizers.

Actual supplies of fertilizer by 15 May 1981 had reached 665,000 tons, or 96 percent of the planned program, while sales reached 483,000 tons and remained at the same level as last year's at the same time.

Meantime, basic fertilizers recorded an 8 percent increase, while surface spreading machines showed 30 percent reduction in consumption because of the drought characterizing this campaign.

The above-mentioned actions undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform were intended to correct the under-use of fertilizers in view of the latters' role in improving productivity, hence enhancing output.

Seeds

Provisions concerning seeds were made for the purpose of:

Improving the supply of seeds, compared to last year

Lowering the cost of choice seeds by decreasing the difference between their price and that of standard seeds

Simplifying the process for granting subsidies by unifying the rates and extending them to all farmers

Resale to farmers of choice seeds at subsidized prices, with the amount of the subsidy being paid directly to SONACOS [National Company for the Marketing of Seeds]

Revision of subsidy rates for fodder seeds, for individual producers as well as cooperatives

Extension of the distribution network for choice seeds, of which sales points have increased from 200 in 1979-80 to 260 in 1980-81.

These measures have made it possible to raise the use level of choice seeds, as the following shows:

A: Choice Cereal Seeds

Available supplies of these seeds have reached 717,000 quintals as compared to 520,000 quintals for the previous campaign, which is an increase of 38 percent

Overall sales for their part have reached 541,000 quintals, of which 502,000 for standard cereal production and 39,000 for propagation.

Thus the measures taken for this campaign have borne fruit, since the rate of increase in resales of seeds for standard production was 80 percent in comparison with last year's.

The increase in distribution is due to a large extent to the increase recorded for sales of soft wheat, which amounts to twice the distribution in the previous campaign.

B: Choice Leguminous Plant Seeds

Available supplies of these seeds: 1,000 quintals.

Of course these quantities are still small, but they are not much in demand among farmers, though they can increase yields by 25 percent.

C: Fodder Crop Seeds

Quantities of fodder seeds made available to farmers reached 15,000 quintals, including 8,500 certified quintals.

D: Seed Potatoes

For the early vegetables sector: 8,000 tons of seed potatoes were imported, of which 5,000 tons for propagation. These quantities, added to supplies of red potatoes (local), which reached 8,000 tons, made it possible to meet producer demand.

For the seasonal sector, seed potato availability amounted to 12,550 tons, of which 10,000 tons were marketed, and the rest deposited in cold storage.

It is pointed out that national seed potato production has developed as follows:

1977-78: 180 tons
1978-79: 757 tons
1979-80: 2,000 tons
1980-81: 12,000 tons

E: Choice Beetroot Seeds

The beetroot production program for the current campaign was achieved with imported seeds amounting to 10,480 quintals; we point out that 140 hectares for beet seed propagation have been established.

F: Oil Seeds

For sunflower, available supplies of nationally produced seeds, amounting to 6,000 quintals, are enough to achieve a 40,000 hectare program.

With regard to cotton, available supplies of nationally produced seeds amounted to 8,800 quintals, whereas needs amount to only 7,600 quintals.

Soybean needs for their part will be met by importing 400 quintals.

Thus we can say that as a result of the programs completed, we have been able to meet all needs for the current campaign.

Agricultural Equipment and Fuel

As regards agricultural equipment, the main provisions consisted of:

Tractor price reduction, as of the start of 1981, through exemption from purchase taxes.

The granting to farmers of a subsidy for tractor purchase up to 30 percent of the price for cooperatives and 10 percent for individuals.

In addition to these two provisions, there is a plan for the acquisition by the technical services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform of over 200 tractors a year starting in 1981. The funds necessary for this operation have been provided in the finance law.

As regards fuel, the most important decision made during this campaign was non-repercussion of price increases of diesel fuel used for agricultural purposes.

The process of applying this decision has already been established and is now being carried out jointly by the services of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Finances.

Agricultural Credit

The present campaign has recorded the revision of the loan schedule to adapt to the needs of improving agricultural production.

The revision has resulted in increases in loan standards in the following areas:

Cereal seed production: 20 percent

Standard cereal production: 15 to 20 percent

Pulse production: 20 to 30 percent

Fodder production: 10 to 20 percent

Large-scale truck farming and oilseed production: 10 percent

Local truck farming: 10 percent

Upkeep of olive groves, vineyards, and other orchards: 30 percent

Acquisition of draft animals: 17 percent

Increase of 20 percent in the limits of regional agricultural loan banks, which have risen from 150,000 to 180,000 dirhams for some banks and from 200,000 to 240,000 dirhams for others;

Granting of loan powers to regional agricultural loan banks for agrarian reform cooperatives in cases of urgency or cases not requiring extensive review;

Increase of 20 percent in the loan levels of local agricultural loan banks.

These measures have made it possible to increase the level of loans granted by the National Agricultural Credit Bank by 5 percent, since the latter have risen from 750 million between September 1979 and April 1980 to 785 million during the same period in the present campaign.

This increase is a result of the increase in short term credits earmarked for the financing of work in the agricultural campaign, which have risen from 431 million to 475 million, or 10 percent more, while medium term loans recorded a decrease of 2.5 percent, falling from 319 million to 311 million dirhams.

Production

It should be stressed that production estimates are based on a method evolved long since by the State Planning and Regional Development Office and the FAO and is related to the statistical survey system undertaken by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. This method uses a sample, of which the results are extrapolated later to include the whole area to estimate the level of production.

To this end a study of the agricultural situation is completed during March and April, concerns 969 douars [villages] and affects 50,000 farm workers.

The procedure enables the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform to assemble the first harvest results. The methods used, while they are not absolutely strict, being subject to some uncertainty, characteristic of all statistical surveys, still does make it possible to reach an approximate estimate of production volume,pending the results of the second stage of the agricultural survey available in September after the harvests.

The first stage of the survey is aimed primarily at evaluating the areas sown with the main cereals, which this year (as I have already indicated) amounted to 4.272 million hectares.

Thus, the production forecasts for the four principal cereals are for 21 million quintals, acccording to the statistical survey previously mentioned, which makes a sown area of 4.274 million hectares, and an average yield for 5 hectares.

This level of production is distinctly lower than the previous year's, since it amounts to only about 50 percent of it. Incidentally, it constitutes the lowest level of production recorded over the past 20 years, with the exception of the 1965-66 campaign (14.7 million quintals). The decrease can be attributed to lower yields (and not to smaller areas planted).

However, the rainfall recorded after the end of the statistical survey, especially in eastern Morocco and the favorable rainfall areas will make it possible to improve cereal yields as a whole; production could reach 25 to 29 million quintals.

Early Vegetables and Pulses

During this campaign, early vegetable production reached 300,000 tons, including 230,000 tons of tomatoes, 52,000 tons of potatoes, and 18,000 tons of assorted vegetables.

Exports came to 125,000 tons, compared to 150,000 tons the previous campaign, which is a drop of 17 percent.

The decline in exports is a result of frost damage to tomatoes, drought and inadequate irrigation water supplies on potatoes. It is also a result of growing domestic demand for these items, with profitable prices.

Despite the decrease in quantities of early vegetable exports, the value of exports reached the same level as the previous year, and this was a result of improvement in world prices.

Pulses

Pulse production is expected to reach 972,000 tons this campaign, compared to 1.037 million tons the previous campaign, or a decline of 7 percent.

Exports will amount probably to 680,000 tons compared to 768,000 tons last campaign, or a decrease of 11.5 percent.

Despite the regression in quantities exported, revenues derived from exports will amount to 160 billion centimes, which is the same level as earned last year.

Sugar Cultivation

With regard to sugar cultivation, I stress that beet production is expected to reach 2 million tons during this campaign, instead of 2.2 million tons as in the previous campaign.

Sugar cane production, on the other hand, experienced a notable increase during this campaign, reaching 510,000 tons, compared to 376,000 tons in the preceding campaign, indicating an increase of 26 percent.

These quantities will make it possible to reach a high level of sugar production, reaching, despite bad climatic conditions, 320,000 tons against 335,000 tons during the preceding campaign.

Livestock Production

This sector was influenced this campaign by the drought situation our country experienced, which had some very bad consequences for cattle and sheep farmers, in addition to the increase in agricultural prices, also affected.

Despite the circumstances, livestock production experienced a gain, as the following indicators show.

Red Meats

Production of red meats and offal increased from 215,000 tons in 1980 to 230,000 tons in 1980 [as published], and even though this rise, which reached a rate estimated at 7 percent, is considered normal, in view of the development of this sector and the efforts made for that purpose, the rise recorded this campaign is in fact above normal, since it resulted from a larger supply of slaughtered animals because of the drought.

The abnormal increase is reflected particularly in the increase in quantities of sheep slaughtered, estimated at 41 percent approximately, in comparison with last year's, which has had direct influence on the market prices of these meats. They have declined from 18 to 15 dirhams by comparison with April 1980.

Beef experienced a similar situation, though less marked, since prices fell from 14.5 to 13 dirhams.

White Meats

Poultry production recorded 104,000 tons in 1980, against 100,000 tons in 1979, or an increase of only 4 percent compared to 10 percent in 1979. The regression is a result of large increases in poultry production costs, especially in feed prices.

Especially since larger meat supplies have led to a decline in demand for white meat..

For these reasons, the production of white meat is expected to experience a reduction of 25 percent compared to performance in the same period the previous year.

Eggs

Egg production reached 615 million units in 1980, compared to 600 million in 1979, or a gain of 2.5 percent.

Milk

Milk production rose to 780 million liters in 1980 compared to 730 million in 1979, thus recording an increase of 7 percent. The gain in milk processed, however, was only 1.7 percent.

The slowdown in the development of milk processing results from the problems encountered in marketing by certain units.

Cost Price of Cereals

The cost of some production factors recorded large increases during the present campaign. For example:

The price of diesel has risen 50 percent, from 1.40 dirhams to 2.40 dirhams per liter.

The SMAG [agricultural guaranteed minimum wage] was increased by 20 percent effective May 1961, rising from 10.15 dirhams to 12.18 dirhams per day.

These two increases led to a rise in the costs of cereal production. As concerns mechanically worked fields, the results of increased diesel prices vary between 6.5 dirhams per quintal for corn and 11 dirhams per quintal of hard wheat. Those caused by the increase in the SMAG since May vary between 4 dirhams the quintal for corn, which is mechanically grown, and 8 dirhams the quintal for barley, which is farmed by traditional methods.

Increased expenses have necessitated a revision of the prices paid to cereal producers to allow them to make an income sufficient to cover the actual costs of farming and generate enough profits to meet their own needs.

Cereal Prices

The cabinet, meeting on Thursday, 21 May under the distinguished chairmanship of his majesty the king, God crown him with glory, set the new prices for cereals as follows (in dirhams per quintal):

Hard wheat and soft wheat: new price: 135; old price 125

Barley and corn: new price: 96; old price: 92

For Marketing: 1.2 Billion dirhams

Concerning the financing of purchases and of the SCAM, CMA [expansions unknown] and SONACOS (which are under state guarantees in connection with banking institutions), and the union of SCAM, it was decided to earmark an overall budgetary envelope of 1.2 billion dirhams.

From this account, it can be seen that the agricultural sector has been affected by the bad climatic conditions raging throughout the country during this campaign. Cereal production and livestock raising having been the most affected by drought, it has been decided to work out a special program for these two sectors, with a view to helping farmers as well as stockmen to bear the negative effects of the situation and prepare to begin the next campaign in better conditions.

I have already had the opportunity of meeting you, 2 months ago, and outlining

the program to you.

So far as the other ventures are concerned, despite their sensitivity to bad climatic conditions, the drop in production has been less than expected.

His majesty's government is vigilantly watching the evolution of the agricultural sector, and is now engaged in preparation of the next campaign, hoping that it will take place in better climatic conditions and succeed in deriving profit from the efforts undertaken in the sector, and to promote agricultural development, to which his majesty King Hassan II, may God glorify his name, constantly exhorts us."

12149
CSO: 4519/2

BRIEFS

NEW POLITICAL PARTY--Rabat, 15 Jul (MAP)--The creation of a new Moroccan political party "The Party of Democratic Independents" was announced officially in Rabat on Tuesday. An official of this organization said that a committee was set up to look after the affairs of the party and to prepare its constituent congress. It should be recalled that at the opening of the spring parliamentary session the formation of a new parliamentary group called "The Group of Democratic Independents" was announced. This group publishes a weekly magazine. The new party, which includes several members of the present government, is the result of a split within the National Rally of Independents, headed by Ahmed Osman, (which holds the majority in Parliament). [Text] [LD180448 Rabat MAP in French 1000 GMT 15 Jul 81]

DISSIDENT LAWYER ARRESTED--Rabat, 24 Jul (AFP)--The president of the bar in Agadir, Taeib Sassi, has been arrested for distributing leaflets and disrupting public order, it was learned here today. Mr Sassi was arrested after defending several people pulled in by the security authorities in Morocco during the bloody repression of a general strike and riots in protest against major food price increases last month. About 600 people are believed to have died in the unrest, according to unofficial sources. The lawyer is being defended by the president of the Moroccan lawyers' association, all of the lawyers of Agadir and several of the bar chiefs in other Moroccan towns. Meanwhile, the prosecution has demanded harsh penalties against 82 defendants on trial in Rabat in connection with the unrest, including the former president of the bar in Rabat, Abderrahman Benameur. Mr Benameur is a member of the National Committee of the Opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), many of whose members were arrested in the crackdown. He has denied accusations that he incited people to strike or was involved in armed gatherings. [Text] [NC241850 Paris AFP in English 1819 GMT 24 Jul 81]

CSO: 4500/24

JAPANESE TO PARTICIPATE IN OIL EXPLORATION

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 13 Jul 81 p 11

[Text]

The Japanese Sumitomo Petroleum Development company announced last week that an international consortium has won a contract from the Omani government to explore for oil in the eastern part of the country. The oil produced will be shared by the two sides, Sumitomo said, but did not specify on what basis the venture was set up.

The consortium, which is made up of the Japanese firm as well as Elf-Aquitaine Oman, International Energy Development Corporation of the Netherlands and the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, is to start prospecting later this year.

Meanwhile, the Omani government issued a statement earlier saying that the Japan Oil Exploration Company and Elf-Aquitaine Oman would be spending a total of $130 million on oil exploration in the Sultanate, under concessions awarded by Muscat at the beginning of this month. The official statement gave no details of the concession agreements, which will last between six and seven years, according to reports from Muscat. It was not clear whether the official announcement referred to the same contract as the one reported by Sumitomo.

Last April, the Amoco Oman Oil Company won a seven-year oil concession covering an area of 49,000 square kilometres from the Omani border with the UAE.

At around 325,000 b/d, Oman's oil output is one of the lowest in the Gulf, though it is higher than that of two OPEC members, Ecuador and Gabon.

CSO: 4300/67

BRIEFS

DELEGATION IN BULGARIA—Yemen Socialist Party (YSP) delegation led by brother 'Abd al-Hamid Ahmad Sa'id, member of the Central Committee and deputy secretary of the Central Committee, returned to Aden this morning from the People's Republic of Bulgaria after a visit which lasted several days. In a statement to the Aden News Agency, brother 'Abd al-Hamid said the delegation acquainted itself with the technical experience of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) in the field of party construction. He said they held a number of meetings in the secretariat of the BCP Central Committee to discuss ways of expanding and developing party relations between the two friendly countries. The delegation also made a field study of the activities of province committees and their offices and party leaderships in some factories and agricultural societies with a view to appreciating the experience and activities of the BCP and Bulgaria's achievements. It is worth mentioning that the YSP delegation's visit to Bulgaria came within the framework of the protocol signed between the YSP and the BCP. [Text] [EA181630 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 18 Jul 81]

CSO: 4304/78

FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT TO INCREASE

Doha GULF TIMES in English 30 Jun 81 p 9

[Article by T. M. Anantharaman: "French Strengthen Qatar Connection"]

[Text]

Doha: France is likely to play a bigger role in the overall development of Qatar following a three-day meeting of the Qatar and French Cooperation Committee in Paris.

It was agreed that French cooperation would be extended to agriculture in Qatar.

The French will provide expertise to develop the Wadi-al-Araig region into a huge farming area.

In July last year two French agricultural experts visited Qatar and told *Gulf Times* in an interview that the Wadi-al-Araig area could be developed into a 300-hectare farm, using mechanised farming techniques.

Cooperation will be extended to cover other agricultural projects in Qatar, said Mr Ali H Khalaf, a member of the Qatar-French Cooperation Committee and Director of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, who has just returned from the Paris meeting.

Mr Khalaf said the French side showed a keen interest to participate in Qatar's major industrial schemes, including the North-West Dome gas project.

Qatar's light and medium industry sector may be thrown open for private sector participation from French firms.

Mr Khalaf said both sides were satisfied with the talks.

He added: "We hope our relationship and cooperation will develop further in future. We also hope that the French side will take an even more interest and strengthen the relationships further."

The Paris talks were the second meeting of the Qatari-French Cooperation Committee.

The first meeting of the panel was held in Doha in October last year.

Mr Khalaf said the talks also covered the economic and trade relations. The two sides hoped to increase trade, he said.

A review of trade relations in 1980 was held at the meeting and both sides were satisfied with them.

The French wanted to increase their trade with Qatar. Qatar hoped that Qatari products would find an easy way into French markets and that French firms would take more interest in Qatar's industrial ventures.

France ranked fifth in Qatari imports for 1980, with French exports to Qatar totalling QR283.34m — some 5.38pc of Qatar's total imports.

Major French exports to Qatar in 1980 included industrial machinery (QR32m), machinery spares (QR29.7m), oilwell equipment (QR17m), auto spares (QR22.15m), gas manufacture (QR18.4m) and perfumes (QR7.45m).

Qatar's team at the talks was led by the country's ambassador to France, Mr Hamad Abdulaziz al-Kuwari. Other team members included representatives from the ministries of Economy and Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Agriculture and Industry, the IDTC and the Chamber of Commerce.

The next meeting of the Qatar-French Cooperation Committee will be held in Doha.

CSO: 4300/56

BRIEFS

CEMENT PRODUCTION--Qatar has signed a contract with the Belgian company IRI for the construction of a cement works with a capacity of 2,000 tons a day, the OPEC News Agency reports. This would take the country's cement-producing capacity to 3,000 tons a day. The report gave no other details. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 27, 6 Jul 81 p 9]

CSO: 4300/56

BRIEFS

STAND ON PALESTINE PRAISED--Head of the Islamic Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Damascus, Ihsan Tawfiq Salih--alias Abu Tawfiq--described the Kingdom's movement at both the Arab-Islamic and the international level as a responsible movement which deserves the appreciation and praise by every Palestinian who is sincere and loyal to his cause. The Palestinian official said that it is not in the interest of the PLO or any of its formations to attack the Kingdom, which adopts a responsible pan-Arab stand toward the question of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian official was commenting on recently reported attacks by certain Palestinian parties on the stand of the Kingdom toward the Palestinian question. [Text] [LD032030 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 3 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/93

BOYCOTT OF ELECTION THREATENED

Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2812, 21 Jul 81 p 11

[Text] At the end of last month the MTI said it was boycotting next November's general elections because of conditions set by President Habib Bourguiba and his ruling Destour Socialist Party. The party objected to the ruling that a political group must win five per cent of votes cast to become eligible for recognition under the President's plan to return Tunisia to a multi-party system.

The Communist Party also warned it would not take part in the poll if it was not allowed to have its own media vehicle to express its views. Shortly afterwards President Bourguiba gave permission for a Communist paper to be published.

Two other Islamic radicals, members of the Progressive Islamic Movement, were also arrested, it was learned later, while the source close to the MTI said 12 of its 25 founder members were among those held.

The arrests were said to have followed incidents in a Tunis mosque on Saturday night as Mr Muru was preaching to a large congregation during the fasting month of Ramadan. Sympathisers of the movement said the incidents, including brawls between different groups in the mosque, were sparked off by provocateurs.

The MTI has been particularly active in the mosques for the past few years. Its militants attract large crowds with their combination of theological argument and criticisms of the Government's policies.

The movement is also active in schools and universities, and was accused by the authorities of being behind disturbances in schools earlier this year.

The authorities brand MTI militants "fanatics and extremists" while expressing confidence that the Tunisian people's characteristic "spirit of tolerance and moderation" will mean the end of the movement.

Usual tactics are to arrest leaders of groups like the MTI from time to time, then release them after a few days without bringing them to trial, observers said. (AFP)

[MTI: Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique]

CSO: 4500/23

'LE CONTINENT' INTERVIEWS ISLAMIC MOVEMENT LEADER

PM241430 Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Progressive Islamic Movement leader Hmida Enneifer in Tunis by Lucien Ahonto: "Voyage Inside the Tunisian Opposition"--date not specified]

[Text] LE CONTINENT: What is the difference between the Progressive Islamic Movement [MIP] and the other Islamic movements?

Hmida Enneifer: First, we are not really a political movement, at least not for the time being. We are more a group of intellectuals trying to explain Islam in the modern world. The aim is to redefine contemporary Islam because there have been too many errors of interpretation since Islam appeared. Therefore, we play primarily a cultural and social role. The reason we formed a group was that we noticed that no political party adheres to this cultural revolution which we envisage. Of course we are concerned in politics. But at present we do not plan to form a political party. That will come in the second phase of our action.

We are primarily progressive Muslims. This is what distinguishes us from Rached Ghannouchi's Pro-Islamic Movement [MTI]. The instigators and members of the MTI have good intentions but they are not realistic, they will not accept any evolution and their program is vague. We want nothing to do with addiction to the past. The world is evolving and progressing, and we must follow that progression.

LE CONTINENT: To what party on the Tunisian political chessboard do you feel closest?

Hmida Enneifer: It would be going too far to say that we feel closer to one party than to another. All I can say is that in Tunisia only the Communist Party in my view has a clear and well-defined program.

LE CONTINENT: Does that mean you would call on your movement's members to vote communist?

Hmida Enneifer: If we have to vote, we will vote for those who want change and progress. If the communists want change with dignity, order and progress, we will vote for them.

LE CONTINENT: How do you view the future of the multiparty system in Tunisia?

Hmida Enneifer: It is still rather difficult to see how things will develop, since the country has been living under a strong and authoritarian regime for 25 years. Nonetheless, I think the prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, is sincere. But the question which must be answered now is whether he has a team determined to work in the same direction as him. That is not clear. Moreover, the situation must be taken into account. The authorities in countries like Algeria or Libya are not likely to view this experiment favorably. They must fear some contagion because this open approach has been adopted under pressure from the population.

Nonetheless, the Tunisian experiment is still at the stage of an adventure. We must wait and see. What is certain is that the government now has its back to the wall. It has no alternative. The Destourian Socialist Party supporters are no longer represented even in the university. This is a sign of change.

CSO: 4519/34

TUNISIAN 'PRO-ISLAMIC' LEADER INTERVIEWED

PM270904 Paris LE CONTINENT in French 21 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Tunisian Pro-Islamic Movement (MTI) Chairman Rached Ghannouchi by Lucien Ahonto: "Journey Inside Tunisian Opposition"]

[Text] LE CONTINENT: How did the MTI originate and what are its aims?

Rached Ghannouchi: The MTI did not orginate from nothing. It is the outcome of a situation which Tunisia experienced at a particular moment, of an evolution in this society, which has always been governed by a regime that has never represented the Tunisian people's fundamental interests or the country's will and attitudes.

The MTI has existed for over a decade and takes an active part in the country's political life through its stances. Our demand for authorization to exist is in no way a response to the openings granted by the government, but the expression of an internal evolution of the movement's structures and opinions and of its determination to take a more democratic and public part in political life.

LE CONTINENT: Is there not a contradiction between your political commitment and what you are, namely primarily religious men?

Rached Ghannouchi: The MTI is not a political movement in the narrow politicking sense of the term, but an all-embracing kind of movement, that is, religious and concerned with daily life. In Islam there is no dichotomy between belief, religious worship, and the practice of social, political and economic life. We express ourselves through worship: politics is also a form of worship. I repeat that this stems from our overall view of Islam and religion.

LE CONTINENT: There is increasing talk of a resurgence of Islam. Is there any connection between your movement and this resurgence?

Rached Ghannouchi: We make our decisions not in relation to foreign movements but in relation to the Tunisian people, on the basis of the specific characteristics of Tunisian society.

Our essential foundation is Islam, from which we draw the ideological basis for our decisions, our stances and our policies, but we are closely in touch with the real situation in Tunisia. In this connection, we can state that the MTI is totally autonomous both in its structures, organization and regular statements and in its strategic approaches.

Of course we maintain fraternal ties with Muslims throughout the world, because Islam is an internationalist-type movement. But, I stress, we are Tunisians above all.

LE CONTINENT: How do you stand with respect to the country's other Islamic movements?

Rached Ghannouchi: We do not claim exclusive rights over the Islamic movement. The other currents also have their own place. Indeed, we believe that this diversity of approaches is a promise of wealth for the Islamic movement as a whole and for Tunisia in particular. Nevertheless, I would point out that our movement represents the underprivileged members of Tunisian society, all those who need freedom and democracy.

There are only two classes in Tunisia: the rulers and the ruled. We are on the side of the latter, that is, those who have always been deprived of the means of expression, whether in the context of the people as a whole or in the context of political or mass organizations.

LE CONTINENT: It is said that the MTI is one of the groups with the largest audience in the country.

Rached Ghannouchi: Yes, indeed. And this audience needs to be channeled, led, made aware and guided progressively so that it is not won over by the existing regime or by other movements. It is to gain the means to participate fully in the evolution of Tunisian society that we have applied for authorization.

LE CONTINENT: The government has established as a precondition for the recognition of opposition movements participation in the elections and the winning of over 5 percent of the votes. What do you think of that?

Rached Ghannouchi: We will not participate in the elections under the conditions laid down by the government. They constitute antidemocratic practices. We are categorical on this point. In any case, our application for authorization is simply a legalization formality. Whether or not we are refused this authorization, we exist and will continue to exist. In any case, we have no illusions, because the democratization of the political institutions backed by the government is merely a facade.

This became apparent in June, when the president of the republic backtracked somewhat on his statements in April at the Destourian Socialist Party [PSD] congress, that democratization existed in the country and he did not see why people were so excited about something that already existed.

Now there is no more talk about accepting the parties, but simply about a few open lists [of candidates in the coming general election]. This is an indication that the government is insincere. One thing is certain, however: the people are already convinced of the need for this democratization and it is impossible to see how the government could halt this movement, which is a popular thrust.

The pressures will continue because the PSD embraces all the foundations of despotism and tyranny.

As far as we are concerned, we will continue the struggle, because the meaning of democracy is not the granting of authorization to various groups, but the expression of the people's will.

LE CONTINENT: What are your priorities?

Rached Ghannouchi: We are demanding that the government abandon the tutelage that it exercises over the Tunisian people, not so as to replace it with an Islamic tutelage, but to permit the people to decide once and for all to express themselves freely and democratically.

We are demanding truly democratic institutions for Tunisia, the Arab countries and the African continent as a whole.

Our heads of state never relinquish power unless they are in their coffins or in their tanks. Even when they are spent, they cling to power, to the people's detriment. We are waiting for the day when they will at last realize that it is not they, but the people, who govern.

CSO: 4519/34

PARIS MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS TUNISIAN SOCIALIST

PM281033 Paris LE CONTINENT in French 22 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Tunisian Arab Socialist Party [PSA] leader Brahim Bouderidela by Lucien Ahonto: "For an Arab But Socialist World"--date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] LE CONTINENT: There are already movements of socialist persuasion in Tunisia. What is special about the PSA and what are its features?

Brahim Bouderidela: The fact that its options are definitely of an economic nature distinguishes our movement from other socialist trends. We attach most importance to the economic aspect of politics and support very actively the idea of Arab unity because Arab countries will emerge from underdevelopment only if they are united...

LE CONTINENT: But there is already another party on the Tunisian political chessboard which also advocates the unification of the Arab world.

Brahim Bouderidela: Yes, and we are aware of this. But there is a difference between our two movements--we strive for an Arab socialist society.

To go back to your first question, I will tell you--and this is no revelation--that the Arab world has at its disposal many resources and clever people who can help it to achieve a level of development equal or even superior to the present level. Provided they are united and have clear-cut political orientations, Arab countries can achieve a level of development similar to that of industrialized countries.

LE CONTINENT: Do any points of convergence exist between your party and the Tunisian Communist Party [PCT], for instance?

Brahim Bouderidela: At present we have no formal contacts with the PCT. I cannot tell you whether or not we have any points of convergence with that party. What is certain is that we all strive for democracy, and this also applies to some other movements.

LE CONTINENT: How can your--definitely economic--options be concretized?

Brahim Bouderidela: Many experiments have already taken place in the Arab world, but they have frequently failed to take into account an essential factor--the psychological factor. Differences among classes must be eliminated. To achieve this it is necessary to nationalize all means of production. This is the only way to ensure that the means of production are not concentrated in the hands of only a few people who derive big profits from them whereas the remainder of the population--the majority--struggle against poverty.

Nonetheless we are not communists, as some people may think, even though we believe that this is the only way to control production and development and achieve a fairer and more equal society. This is not the situation at present either in Tunisia or in most other Arab countries.

LE CONTINENT: What was your reaction to the democratic open-door policy announced by the government?

Brahim Bouderidela: Obviously we were very pleased. However, not only words but concrete deeds are called for, measures which would make this opening toward a multiparty system effective. We will certainly submit a dossier containing applications for visas. However, our main objective is to become known and acquire a solid base in the country. Our task will be difficult but we believe that, provided the present government keeps its promises, we will soon have a base in the country supported by all strata of the population.

LE CONTINENT: How do you assess the future of your movement, Tunisia and, finally, the Arab world?

Brahim Bouderidela: With optimism.

CSO: 4519/34

PAPER INTERVIEWS TUNISIAN ARAB PARTY LEADER

PM281332 Paris LE CONTINENT in French 22 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Bechir Essid, secretary general of the Tunisian Arab Nationalist Rally [RNA] by Lucien Ahonto: "Arabism Is a Political and Socioeconomic Reality"--date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] LE CONTINENT: What new element has your movement brought to the Tunisian political chessboard?

Bechir Essid: The RNA differs from other Tunisian political organizations insofar as it has some quite clear objectives. What many political parties frequently forget is that above all Tunisia belongs to a specific world--the Arab world--and that this must be taken into account. Arabism is a political, social, economic and historical reality. What we are bringing is a new stimulus.

LE CONTINENT: Have you got any idea of what support you have in the country?

Bechir Essid: We made our public appearance in May. This has prompted many people to say that a new party has just been formed. In fact we are no "novices," as people may believe. We have existed for a number of years but not as a political party.

As for the number of our supporters among the population, I cannot give you any figures but one thing is certain--we are a people's party and we have support in all circles. Our movement is of interest to all nationists in the country and is open to everybody. Nationalism is the cornerstone of our movement and once you realize that Tunisia is above all an Arab country, you have an idea of the support we command.

LE CONTINENT: Your movement made its appearance in public only as recently as a month ago. And yet one of your closest colleagues--Mohamed Ssaleh Oueslati--has already resigned. Has this not jeopardized the very existence of the RNA?

Bechir Essid: Mr Oueslati's resignation has in no way jeopardized the movement's existence. There has been no serious disagreement between us...

LE CONTINENT: Yet you have relieved him of all his responsibilities in the Politburo.

Bechir Essid: He has excluded himself from the movement. However, as far as we are concerned, what counts is the future of the movement, not personal quarrels. The RNA will continue to operate, always in a democratic manner, despite certain attacks, showing respect for everybody's ideas and any trends which may appear one day within it.

LE CONTINENT: Would you be prepared to participate in a national opposition front, as certain parties have suggested?

Bechir Essid: A priori, there is no reason why we should not, nor can we see any disadvantage in participating in a national opposition front. Provided an agreement can be reached on a certain number of issues. We are open to everybody, to all trends, and are willing to engage in dialogue with anyone. But, let me emphasize, on a clearly defined basis determined in advance.

LE CONTINENT: What are your chances of obtaining authorization and participating in the coming parliamentary elections?

Bechir Essid: Like many other parties, we have applied for authorization. It is now for the government to decide. In any case, our movement will pursue its struggle with or without authorization. We are a workers party which has existed for a number of years. What is new is that we have asked to be legalized.

As far as elections are concerned, we will start talking about them at an opportune moment since many matters still need to be clarified both on the part of the government and by our side.

LE CONTINENT: Do you maintain relations with other foreign Arab nationalist movements?

Bechir Essid: The RNA is above all an independent movement formed in Tunisia. It is possible to pursue an open-door policy toward other foreign nationalist movements without either repudiating or jeopardizing one's identity.

We are seeking to achieve Arab unity because we deem this of vital importance for the Arab world. The map of the Arab world shows that many countries have regrouped. We are convinced that only unity can help Arab countries to develop and to wage a struggle against domination and imperialism.

A federal union of the Arab world must be achieved...

LE CONTINENT: And what about a greater Maghreb?

Bechir Essid: We do not believe in it because it excludes many other Arab countries and would be a handicap for Arab unity.

CSO: 4519/34

MINISTER ON FUNDAMENTALISTS' ARRESTS

NC302033 Paris AFP in English 2001 GMT 30 Jul 81

[Text] Tunis, 30 Jul (AFP)--Sixty-one leaders and activists of Islamic fundamentalist groups, mostly from the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), have been arrested in Tunisia since July 18, Interior Minister Driss Guiga said here today.

He told a news conference on the recent crackdown by the authorities against militant Islamic activists in the country that another 20 of these "extremist organisations having political aims" were currently being sought by police.

Investigations were underway to establish the role of people arrested "in violent acts and attitudes tending to sow disorder and to strike at public order," the minister said.

Those detained were also accused of attacking individual liberties, religious freedom, and incitement to rebellion, Mr Guiga said.

The minister said that the MTI could have links with foreign organisations or countries "having expansionist aims in the field of religious revolution" but declined to give any further indications of the authorities' suspicions.

The arrests began after Islamic militants entered a mosque at Msaken 160 kms (about 100 miles) south of Tunis on July 17 by force, he said.

They intended to oust the government-appointed imam (religious leader) and replace him by another chosen "by a sort of people's committee."

The minister said that the extremist religious movements were contrary to "the spirit of tolerance which characterises Tunisian society," which he said was "attached to the true principles of Islam."

He blamed the extremist movements for being behind numerous "acts of violence and demonstrations," particularly in schools earlier this year.

Mr Guiga said they had used mosques for political activity and had attempted to recruit young children.

The Tunisian authorities had until now shown patience towards the extremists who had since 1979, he said, set up "a veritable secret political organisation" with a national and regional leadership and local cells.

CSO: 4500/26

BRIEFS

TUNISIA, DPRK AGREEMENT--Tunis, 8 Jul (TAP)--Two cooperation agreements have been signed this morning in Tunis between Tunisia and People's Democratic Republic of Korea. These agreements which include exchanges of news, programmes and journalists between the two countries are part of the strengthening of cooperation relations between Tunisia and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. The first agreement was concluded between Tunisia's and Korea's radio and TV departments and the second between the Tunis Afrique Presse news agency (TAP) and the Korean news agency. [Text] [LD090552 Tunis TAP in English 1400 GMT 8 Jul 81]

CSO: 4500/26

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT URGED

London 8 DAYS in English No 27, 4 Jul 81 pp 38, 39

[Article by Annie King-Underwood: "Infrastructure 'Is Vital'"]

[Text] THE PRESIDENT of Mitsui Ocean Development and Engineering of Japan, Jiro Nozu, visited the UAE in June and urged Arab states, and more specifically Gulf states, to take a greater interest in developing their industrial infrastructure. 'They can import high technology and master it, but this achievement is only possible if supporting industries are established,' said Nozu.

Mitsui Ocean Development manages the Arab Heavy Industries (AHI) project in the emirate of Ajman. The general manager there, R. Arichi, elaborated to *8 Days* on Nozu's theme, claiming that industrial infrastructure should be a priority for Gulf states, otherwise their efforts would be like building 'castles on sand'. Arichi added that industrial projects and infrastructure were currently developing along parallel lines. In his opinion, more emphasis should be put on the latter.

For Nozu, industrial infrastructure meant the development of roads, ports and transportation facilities, and the maintenance of vehicles, power plants and various workshops. He added that 'the UAE has the right climate to achieve industrial self-sufficiency'.

Arab Heavy Industries was founded in 1975 as a joint venture between the government of Ajman, which has 25 per cent ownership, UAE citizens (50 per cent) and a group of Japanese companies headed by Mitsui Ocean Development and Engineering (25 per cent).

AHI's main activities are in ship repair, heavy machinery, construction of facilities for the repair of rigs and supply boats, fabrication of both offshore and onshore equipment and facilities, steel fabrication and oil-related equipment.

The Japanese company is keen on getting the Gulf states, and oil companies based there, interested in a new oil boom and skimmer which they will introduce to the world market in September. Nozu said: 'This will be useful in the Gulf, as the conventional oil fencing fails in its purpose when there is a strong water current as the oil spillage spreads beneath the fence.'

The new oil boom is patented in the UK and, as Arichi explained: 'It contains the water, which means that there is no way the oil spillage can escape. In other words, it positively collects the oil at the point of spillage. The new boom does not have any moving parts, which means that it is not affected by the movements of the water.'

Arab Heavy Industries decided to increase its authorised capital by $817,439 to $13.89m, at the extraordinary general meeting of its shareholders at the beginning of June. It was also resolved that authority be granted to the board to issue additional shares in excess of $13.89m if the initial increase sanctioned is fully subscribed by present shareholders within 21 days. If all the shares are not taken after 21 days they will be offered to new subscribers, and the board may increase the capital.

About a year ago the National Bank of Abu Dhabi provided a UAE dir10m ($2.7m) medium-term secured loan for AHI, the proceeds of which were used to refinance in part a US dollar loan secured by means of an irrevocable and unconditional guarantee from Mitsui Bank Limited.

BRIEFS

ADFAED LOAN TO SENEGAL--The Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED) is to grant Senegal a $70 million loan to help finance the development of the Senegal River basin. An announcement made in Abu Dhabi said an agreement on the terms of assistance would be signed shortly between the fund and the Senegal River Investment Organisation. The project, at a total cost of $800 million, includes the construction of two dams, scheduled for completion in 1986 and 1988. According to Mukhtar Ben Hayba, the head of a Senegalese delegation touring a number of Arab countries, railway tracks and a road network necessary for the execution of the project are already under construction. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 28, 13 Jul 81 pp 11, 12]

ELECTRIFICATION PROJECT--General Enterprises Company of the UAE has won a $12.26 million contract to design, supply and install four 33-kilovolt electricity substations to Umm al-Quwain. In a report last week, the UAE's official WAM News agency said that the contract, the largest ever won by a locally owned firm, called for work on the scheme to be complete by September next year; the network will ultimately be connected to the UAE's national grid, which, WAM said, should be finished around 1990. GECO has also won a $3.8 million contract for installations to link the emirate of Fujairah to the eastern coastal regions; this scheme, also due for completion by September 1982, will bring electricity to a number of mountain villages which at present rely on generators, the report said. In a run-down of electricity projects currently underway in the UAE, the agency said the Federal government has allocated 100 million Dirhams ($27 million) to improve services to Ras-al-Khaymah and had ordered a feasibility study into a 50 MW steam power station serving Umm al-Quwain and Ajman. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 27, 6 Jul 81 p 4]

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END

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12 August 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

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12 August 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2380

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WRITER CALLS FOR ARAB WITHDRAWAL FROM ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 60, 20 Jun 81 pp 16-17

/Article by Ahmad Baha' al-Din: "Why Don't All Arabs Withdraw From Atomic Energy Agency?"/

/Text/ I truly pity the Arab ministers of foreign affairs, especially the veterans among them.

They live aboard planes more than they live in their homes and stand on rostrums more than they sit behind their desks. At times, one imagines that the Arab ministers of foreign affairs are the only fighters in the Arab world or that we have come to believe that the division of Arab ministers of foreign affairs eliminates the need for 100 armored divisions.

What is more, they have carried year after year the futility of all the disputes that have erupted between their governments and their leaders.

What is the end of these meetings, resolutions and calls?

What is the end of these resolutions that we have gotten the UN, the Islamic countries, the nonaligned countries and even Europe and America to issue?

I don't think there is a cause in the world that has gotten such a number of unimplemented resolutions and /of resolutions/ to fly the Palestinian flag in dozens of world capitals without flying it over a single inch of Palestine's soil?

What Then?

I know an Arab minister of foreign affairs who almost lost his position years after the 1967 war because he told the head of his state: "We have done all that diplomacy can realize and we have had all kinds of possible and impossible resolutions issued. Now, it is either the force which both the enemy and the friend take into account or else there is no meaning in persisting in a toothless diplomacy and in an acknowledged right that has no talons."

By this I am not calling for sounding the bugle for general attack against the enemy tomorrow. Moreover, I am not calling for abandoning the political struggle in all spheres.

But there has to be a strategy which encompasses both war and peace and contains both the sword of al-Mu'izz and his black gold.

We use the word "strategy" in place and out of place because everything turns into a word with us.

But in the political dictionary, there is a word above the word strategy, namely the supreme strategy.

What exactly is this supreme strategy to us so that each action may complement it and may be in harmony with it?

What do we want in the long run and what do we want in the short run, with the ability to realize what we want?

Peace with conditions? Use of the peace weapon with utter seriousness?

War, whatever its date? Then, we want to see our societies prepare seriously for this likelihood.

Is it to contain Israel with something like a new long truce until the balances of power change?

These are the supreme strategic decisions that require courage and strength, that require us to "work for this world as if we are going to live forever and to work for the hereafter as if we are going to die tomorrow" and that require us not to be content with one half the venerable Hadith without the other half.

As for dancing on stairs, it can only lead to catastrophe.

Even if our negative option is the state of no peace, no war, which is the existing state, then it also requires a study, a plan translated into specific positions and into certain options, all of which are directed to serve this position /presumably meaning option/ and to develop it with the change of circumstances.

But the presence of the state of no peace, no war just because this is what actually exists and because we cannot or do not want to change this state is something that allows Israel to take advantage of the benefits of both war and peace simultaneously.

Most of the Arab countries are, legally and officially, in a state of war with Israel. Consequently, they should expect military operations by the enemy whenever he gets the opportunity or finds the right atmosphere, regardless of whether he is treacherous or not, because this is war.

The greatest cause for surprise is the surprise over the Arab surprise generated by the Israeli raid against the nuclear reactor in Baghdad.

I don't know how long we will continue to have a totally unjustifiable surprise every season or how long we will continue to call for war every day, and then when a military action occurs we will continue to go screaming to the world and asking others to inflict the punishment for us!

All that can be said in writing, in speeches and in analysis about the Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor has been said.

But there remain, in my estimate, several points that need to be emphasized because they may be the most important conclusions:

The first point: It has been expressed well by James Reston, a well-informed American writer, who has tactfully said something to the effect that the "United States is partly responsible, not in the sense of instigating Israel but in the sense that the general logic of the Reagan administration's foreign policy facilitates such actions and creates the right atmosphere for them." These are extremely serious words.

James Reston has drawn his government's attention to the fact that keeping silent over what has happened will open the door to enormous dangers.

To accept that it is Israel's right to carry out this raid under the pretext of self-defense means accepting the same action if carried out by any nuclear power against any potential enemy.

Each of India and Pakistan, for example, have the capability to manufacture an atomic bomb and each of them suspects the intentions of the other. Consequently, and according to this logic, it is the right of India to raid and destroy the nuclear reactors in Pakistan and it is the right of Pakistan to do the same thing against India.

Another possibility is still more serious than this one: The hostility between Russia and China is well known. China has managed to manufacture the atomic bomb and the hydrogen bomb but it hasn't yet been able to manufacture the means to transport these bombs to their targets. Here also it becomes the right of Russia to raid and destroy China's nuclear installations under the pretext of self-defense. The argument is more acceptable here than in the case of Israel and Iraq. What makes Russia wait until China becomes capable of retaliating and why shouldn't Russia delay with such a raid the Chinese nuclear power for dozens of years?

Therefore, the entire world will become a more dangerous place and will progress toward more perils if the precedent of the Israeli attack is allowed to pass without adequate reaction from the world generally and from the United States in particular.

The second point is that the number of nuclear reactors already constructed or that are under construction in the Third World to which we belong has exceeded 70 nuclear reactors. Some of them are in dangerous countries isolated from the international community, such as South Africa, and others are in countries that are behind us in resources and civilization, such as the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Columbia, Chile and Argentina.

The principle of setting up nuclear reactors is no longer a privilege of the advanced countries.

But the principle which Begin wants to underscore with his raid against the Baghdad reactor is that all countries of the world, excluding the Arab countries, are permitted to build nuclear reactors. As long as the Arabs have not yet accepted Israel, its conquests and its usurpation, then they have no right to build a single nuclear reactor!

I don't know by what logic the world will condone this new principle. Will the Arabs accept it or will it be allowed to go unpunished? I don't know to what extent the Arabs will accept from all those who are their "friends" conciliatory words and harsh facts!

The third point is that all the Arab countries have signed the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty. Thus, they are members of the International Atomic Energy Agency and accept periodic inspection of any nuclear reactor they have. The agency inspected the Baghdad reactor itself only a few months ago.

The only countries in the world that have refused to sign the treaty are France, because of its Gaullist policy which has been rebellious against the domination of the superpowers, India and Pakistan, because of the deep suspicions and the bloody history between them, and Israel and South Africa which cooperate with each other in making atomic bombs.

Signing this treaty and joining this agency was supposed to have provided protection for the participant. This signing and joining is also a pledge on the part of the participant not to use the reactors for military purposes.

But if a country refusing to sign the treaty, such as Israel, attacks a signatory of the treaty, such as Iraq, then what is the use of the treaty and what is the value of the international agency? Why don't all the Arab countries declare their withdrawal from the agency and nullify their signatures on this treaty, unless Israel is punished properly and unless it is compelled to sign the treaty? Israel will not agree to sign it because it is manufacturing atomic bombs, as the entire world knows.

In the 1950's, 'Abd-al-Nasir refused to sign the treaty unless Israel signed it when Israel had started at the time building its famous Dimona reactor.

At the same time, 'Abd-al-Nasir was building a training reactor in Inshas. He did expect the countries which possessed the experience at the time--United States, Russia and Britain only--to refrain from helping him in realizing nuclear progress because of his failure to sign the treaty.

Perhaps few know that this was the direct cause of 'Abd-al-Nasir's recognition of the PRC at a time when such recognition was considered a major crime. His recognition was actually considered so. The world clamored vociferously against Egypt and the United States intensified its intransigence and its fight against Egypt because 'Abd-al-Nasir estimated that China, which was not a member of the UN and which was not committed to international resolutions, was the country which could help Egypt in the nuclear field. This cooperation did actually start secretly at the time.

But even Egypt signed the treaty finally and is in the process of building reactors which it has bought from western companies. Despite this, Israel has refused to respond by signing the treaty even though the United States has asked it to do so.

Why, once again, don't the Arab countries withdraw their signatures and urge other Third World countries to do the same, considering that we are tying ourselves to a bond to which the enemy doesn't tie himself and that it will always be possible to acquire nuclear experience, even if from the devil himself?

The international community must protect the laws it promulgates or accept that these laws be torn to pieces everywhere.

The extremely important fourth point is that the Israeli raid on Baghdad has proven decisively that there is no Arab country which is far from the danger because it has no borders with Israel or because it has no territories occupied by Israel. Israel settled this matter when it extended its aggression to a country with which it has no common borders because this country is in a state of war with it and because it is preparing for scientific progress in the future.

Israel is thus declaring that it is her right to strike Saudi Arabia, Libya or Algeria. With the modern arms, it is no longer impossible to reach the farthest point in the Arab world.

This is a totally new position which Israel has declared with its staging of this raid and with its right to use the pretext of self-defense to strike a target that is 1,000 kilometers away from it.

It is the duty of the Arabs to prepare for this possibility in both the near future and the distant future.

Perhaps this raid will teach the Arabs to take integration seriously and to eliminate the conflict in their broad political lines.

The chaos in the Arab weapon deals is no longer acceptable.

The absence /presumably meaning presence/ of strong and effective defense networks has become a must, before we speak about offensive weapons.

We don't want to reiterate the talk about the Arab money wasted in superficial projects nor about the excessive spending on these superficialities. It is like a man dressed in the richest clothes while his underwear is torn. All this is nothing new to the reader.

Nor do we want to talk about the thousands of Arab minds scattered in all parts of the world.

As usual, we will experience a temporary shock and tell them: Come, we will pay you the highest wages.

O people, it is not at all a matter of wages. It is a matter of well-studied and integrated projects which have a future. It is a matter of guaranteed scientific (freedom) and a matter of a social environment in which science can flourish and becomes possible to apply. It is not enough to have the best seeds in order for these seeds to grow and bear fruit. These seeds have to be planted in the right soil.

A plane is built at present by having Britain produce the engines, Germany the wings, France the fuselage and the United States the precise control instruments.

Despite our limited capabilities, which we need to begin to build up, our political disputes stand between us and this thing /integration/ which is the only hope for progress.

8494
CSO: 4304/44

CURRENT UNIVERSITY ISSUES REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Jul 81 pp 30, 31

/Article by Labib al-Siba'i: "Young People and the Universities: Determining Rules To Let Faculty Members out on Loan Abroad"/

/Text/ Rules are to be organized for loaning members of faculties in Egyptian universities out to Arab and foreign universities. According to these, the ratio of members out on loan is not to exceed 25 percent of the members of each faculty, faculty members cannot go out on loan if they are supervising master's or doctoral theses (unless these are completed or on the verge of completion), and the faculty members are not to be connected to participation in scientific research for which contract has been made with research centers inside or outside the university.

Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, president of Cairo University, stated that another condition for loaning out faculty members is that they not have written textbooks for distribution to students which have been in continous use for a period of 3 years, lest loaning these members out compel students to change the university textbooks required.

Dr Talba 'Uwaydah, president of the University of al-Zaqaziq, declared that a comprehensive survey is to be made of all faculty members who have completed a loan period of 4 years in Arab universities, so that other members besides them in the same fields of specialization, may go out on loan to preserve the Egyptian presence in Arab universities; if it is not feasible to find replacements for them, their loan period can be extended for a fifth or sixth year.

Reneweal of loanouts of faculty members is also not to be permitted unless the members spend a period in Egypt equivalent to the period of their previous loanouts, and university instructors are not to be permitted to go out on loan before 3 years have elapsed since their appointment — on condition that the total periods of absence on loan, scholarly missions, and special leaves to accompany a spouse not exceed 10 years during the period of the faculty member's service.

Dr Hasan Hamdi added that it has been decided to consider that faculty members have resigned if they refrain from returning within 1 month of completing their loan periods, on condition that their resignations be withdrawn if they return within a maximum of 6 months.

He stated that it has been decided to treat members on a sabbatical who have been sent on foreign scholarships the same as members on study missions abroad as regards payment of their salary at home and to set out rules on sending faculty members abroad on scholarly missions so that they may be sent out for a period of 1 year which may be renewed once if necessary. People sent on such missions will receive their salary in full at home during the period of the mission provided that upon completion of their mission they present a report on the activities and research they performed abroad.

University faculties have almost completed the process of correcting students' examination papers, and the results of examinations in the faculties will be announced the first week of July. The activities of investigating the grades, for which four committees have been formed in each faculty, have started this week.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University, has stated that it has been decided to set out specific procedures for the investigation committee's activity, covering a review of all levels of questions and the extent to which they are relevant to the faculty's degrees, evaluations set down on the covers of the examination notebooks, /imposition of the condition/ individual committee members not monopolize investigations or activities related to them, the condition that grades and evaluations in subjects the students previously passed and evaluations in subjects in which they failed be set down, and the condition that reports be prepared which include a statistical analysis of the general results of the examinations, the results of the examinations in each subject, and application of the stipulated rules for clemency.

Dr al-'Adawi added that Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, president of the university, has decided to establish an office in each faculty to receive students' complaints following declaration of the results and review them at once to correct them.

Dr Hasan Hamdi described how students could present grievances or context examination results. He stated that students had the right to present their grievances on examination results as soon as they were announced, in which case a review would be made of their examination papers. If the students felt that the results of the examination were severely contrary to their expectations, review of their examination papers would take place only to investigate the possibility that material errors were made in the examination booklets or investigation lists, such as discrepancies between the grades listed in the investigation lists and the grades in examination booklets or between the total grades to the questions and the total grades the students acquired, in which case the results would be corrected immediately.

With regard to evaluations, the university president said that cases where for instance a student assumed, on his own, that he would obtain a specific grade, then got a grade below that, were a purely discretionary process on the part of the professor and could not be reviewed under any conditions. The university president added that it had been decided to apply a number of general rules to guarantee that justice would be done in making corrections among students, guaranteeing the fact that faculty members would refrain from correcting examination

papers if any of the students presenting themselves for the examination were their spouse or a second cousin or closer relative, that faculty members in every subject would take part in correcting examination papers on those subjects, and that assistant instructors and lecturers would be prohibited from performing correction work on any type of examination.

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BENEFITS, FAVORABLE POINTS OF HIGH DAM REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Jul 81 pp 12-15

/Article by Usamah Mihran: "The Case for the Maligned High Dam!"/

/Text/ After the conclusion of the symposium of the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Culture, it was apparent that Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata's output in defense of the High Dam has not yet been exhausted and that his arguments in replying to the statements made on "the seven errors of the High Dam" will require many more symposia. Thus it has become necessary to renew the discussion with one of the most important people in charge of the construction of the High Dam, who was a minister of agriculture, irrigation and land reclamation for more than 4 years. The discussion began with a statement by Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata.

"Discussion has previously been held on the side effects of the High Dam in the People's Assembly, the Ministry of Irrigation and the national councils concerned. This has all been raised once, twice, a hundred times. Although the matter was settled in the technical sense, each time it is nonetheless being raised again, in the same manner, at the same rate and with the same shallow understanding. None of the forecasts which pessimists raised before or after construction of the High Dam have been realized. Come along with me so we can discuss the truth and ask whether the dam has benefited Egypt or brought it disaster, whether it has wrecked it, as some people say, or built it up, as the evidence and figures say.

The Silt, or Mistake Number One

"People say that the dam is the main reason the land is being deprived of silt and that this has resulted in deterioration of the fertility of the soil and a decline in per-feddan productivity. I have no answer to that more eloquent than these figures:

"Our overall plant production has risen several times over since start of the construction of the High Dam, through an increase in the average per-feddan productivity of wheat from 6.75 ardebbs before construction of the High Dam to 9.01 ardebbs after it.

"Likewise, per-feddan productivity of Syrian corn has risen from 9.11 to 12 ardebbs and cotton from 4.61 to 6.25 kantars. This has been due to a number of reasons.

"The first reason: as the Egyptian soil scientist Dr Mustafa al-Jabali says, the soft grains of silt in the past blocked off the interstices in the soil, resulting in a weakening of soil characteristics and a decline in soil productivity as a consequence of poor ventilation and low permeability of the fine organisms which functioned to create the nutritional compounds necessary for the growth of the plant.

"The second reason: the silt caused a number of problems every year when the channels and waterways filled up. This had an exceptional effect in obstructing all agricultural development projects.

"The third reason: It has been possible to replace the nutritional elements present in the silt following construction of the High Dam by adding 13,000 tons of nitrate lime fertilizer to compensate for the 4 million tons of Nile silt that have been blocked up behind the High Dam and contain the 1,800 tons of nitrogen the land requires."

At this point I asked the former minister of agriculture and irrigation:

"If this is the situation, why do some people say that the shortage of silt following the High Dam is to be considered a major reason for the scraping activities taking place on Egyptian land and the elimination of extensive areas of farmland for the sake of manufacturing red brick to replace brick made out of Nile silt?"

/He replied/ "The scraping activities taking place on the soil in Egypt through the establishment of red brick plants are basically in violation of the law. It is not true that the absence of silt has prevented Egypt from manufacturing brick, which is to be considered a basis for construction and building activity. To the contrary: the silt of the Nile was a burden on the brick industry in Egypt, especially when we realize that the bearing capacity of brick made out of silt ranges from 5 to 10 kilograms per square centimeter, placing a great load on foundations and obstructing the development taking place in the construction brick industry now. The whole world is using clay and sand brick for modern dwelling construction and Egypt, after construction of the High Dam, also began to develop the brick industry by constructing factories for these types."

Water Quality Has Not Changed

With these words, the former minister of agriculture and irrigation concluded his statement on the problem of silt and moved over to another of the seven errors Dr 'Ali Fathi had listed. This error is related to the nature of the water in Lake Nasir. In this area, Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata went on, there is a new fact, to wit:

"Control of the river water and retention of the river's input have led to the emergence of a number of phenomena:

"First, the entire annual input is now retained in Lake Nasir.

"Second, the High Dam itself has become the sole force controlling this input.

"Third, 97 percent of the materials suspended in the water are now retained behind the dam.

"The fourth phenomenon is that permanent irrigation has become a distinctive feature of the Egyptian land; continuous inundation of the land is the method that has come to be followed, and, as a result of that and the spread of building and industry, the rate of water pollution has risen. In spite of these facts, the ratio of the salts dissolved in the Nile water retained in the lake before the flood in 1974, 1975 and 1976 did not exceed 75, 151 and 146 parts per million, respectively, whereas, before construction of the dam, the salt ratio was about 200 parts per million before and 138 parts per million during the flood period. Through studies prepared by the Ministry of Irrigation and Asyut University, it has become possible to reach the following conclusions:

"First, the quality of water in Cairo, calculating the existing ratio of salts, was 170 parts per million in 1976; this ratio has not risen since.

"Second, the Nile water is in a state of equilibrium in terms of alkalinity, salinity and hardness.

"Third, the average salt concentration in Lake Nasir now is lower than it was before the construction of the High Dam.

"Fourth, the salinity in the dam reservoir is increasing in concentration gradually, at a rate ranging from 1 to 3 parts per million per year, no change has occured in the quality of the Nile water, and no toxicity has occurred, as some people have rumored."

Increase in Soil Salinity and Rise in Groundwater Levels

On the problem of increased soil salinity and the rise in groundwater levels in Egyptian soil, Eng Abu-al-'Ata said:

"It is not true that the High Dam is the cause for the rise in the salt ratio in the ground. The appearance of salt in the soil throughout Egypt preceded construction of the dam. Much of the land in the Governorate of al-Minufiyah especially suffered from a high rate of soil salinity in the forties, compelling us to construct a system of tile drains there then. However, following construction of the High Dam, irrigation water is being provided throughout the year and the dam has become a permanent source of water at all times. Perhaps this temptation has been the main reason why peasants and engineers have been profligate with irrigation water. Even some water quotas for certain crops in some areas have exceeded 300 percent of actual requirements, as a consequence of which the level of water in the ground has gruadually risen in some areas. Remedying this phenomenon through irrigation water consumption guidance and the construction of concentrated general and tile drainage systems is the simplest thing possible and the Ministry of Irrigation is about to do it now. The program is about to cover all the land in Egypt; it will do this by the end of 1985 specifically."

The Lie about Scouring and the Collapse of Barrages and Levees

After that, let us move to the problem of scouring in the Nile channel. Is that reality or just an accusation? Is the collapse of barrages and levees as a result of construction of the dam to be expected, or is it all the problem of allegations and the casting of doubt? Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata answered these queries as well, stating,

"One of the most important subjects dealt with by people who talk about the side effects of the dam is that of comprehensive scouring. Many questions have arisen on this subject, on the amount of scouring, the rates of scouring and the speed of its occurrence in the Nile channel.

"The opposition people said in 1956, before the construction of the dam, that scouring in the bottom of the channel would come to 54 meters, that that would occur on four occasions, in each of which there would be soucring to a depth of 14 meters, that most of the scouring would occur in the first 2 years after the construction of the dam, and that comprehensive scouring behind the barrages at Isna would occur in 9 years and behind the barrages at Naj' Hammadi in 12 years. Then it was said that a new delta would emerge at the northern end of the reservoir and that a new channel would be created downstream from Aswan.

"The Nile was diverted in 1964, retention behind the dam started that year, 5 years passed, and none of what the opposition people said happened. However, they did not desist from making accusations and casting doubt. They proceeded once again to voice accusations against the dam on this matter, stating that the river float would be lowered by at least 2 meters after 5 years of operation and by 3 meters after 10 years. The years have passed, but this has not happened. They proceeded to state, in 1976, that 83 percent of the comprehensive scouring would occur 17 years after operation began, that is, by 1985 specifically. They stressed that the depth of the river between Isna and Naj' Hammadi would come to 6.65 /meters/ that below the Naj' Hammadi barrages would come to 8.4 meters, and that below the Asyut barrages would come to 6.4 meters. Responding to these inaccuracies, Dr Yusuf Hammad, professor at Alexandria University, made basic studies in 1977 and presented us with a memorandum containing the following conclusion:

"After /the dam went into/ operation, the Nile channel floor reached a state of equilibrium; its composition is 20 percent soft sand and 80 percent coarse sand. This gives a wholly reassuring indication that no scouring has occurred to a degree that should cause one to be afraid.

"In addition, the Institute for the Study of Side Effects of the High Dam has underlined this fact.

"Another professor, an Egyptian-American, Dr Jamal Mustafa, also presented a detailed study on the problem, and the Soviets and the Swedish consulting firm VPP have offered studies on this subject. The studies all contradicted the pessimists' statements. The most eloquent response was made by the Ministry of Irrigation in 1976, after 12 years had elapsed since the dam began operating; on this problem of scouring the ministry's studies stated that the drop in the Nile floor below the Isna

barrages was no greater than 30 centimeters and that the annual rates of scour which occurred did not exceed the following:

"Between Aswan and Isna, 2.2 centimeters per year.

"Between Isna and Naj' Hammadi, 3 centimeters per year.

"Between Naj' Hammadi and Asyut, 2.5 centimeters per year.

"Between Asyut and Cairo, 0.4 centimeters per year.

"As a result of these facts, the forecasts made on this phenomenon were no greater than those that had been anticipated before the dam was built, which in any event did not reach the danger point.

"In spite of that, the ministry has considered it appropriate to carry out the Tushki Depression Project to eliminate all possibilities, no matter how slight. Proceeding from this premise, we have actually started to construct this depression in the Western Desert and it is now on the verge of completion. It provides the greatest guarantee for eliminating all dangers of scour, since all the drainage from Lake Nasir above the 175 meter /level/ on 1 August will go into this depression."

With these facts, Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata ended his counterattack against the people who are opposed to and cast doubts on the soundness of constructing the dam. However, the issue has not yet been resolved.

The Egyptian Academy of Scientific Culture in conjunction with the Ministry of Irrigation and the Egyptian Society of Enginners has decided to devote a whole week to a re-evaluation of the High Dam.

No one knows when the issue will be resolved, even though it has, from the technical standpoint, been resolved, dozens of times already.

A Heated Symposium

AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI opened the file on the High Dam the week before last. No sooner had some of its side effects been broached than the Egyptian Academy of Scientific Culture held an urgent symposium to re-evaluate the dam, nothwithstanding the report by the competent national councils on the soundness of the dam's construction from the technical standpoint and Ministry of Irrigation studies and reports on the soundness of and accuracy of the project from the economic and technical standpoints as well.

A large number of prominent Egyptian engineers and experts in the fields of engineering, agriculture, construction and dams /were in the symposium/.

Heading up the gathering were Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata, former minister of agriculture, irrigation and land reclamation, and Eng Ahmad 'Ali Kamal, former minister of irrigation and secretary of the committee which set out the fundamental studies on construction of the dam.

Also attending the symposium were Dr 'Ali Fathi, former professor at the University of Alexandria, Dr Mustafa Sulayman, professor of engineering at 'Ayn Shams, and other university professors specializing in the field of dams.

The symposium began with a statement by Mr 'Abd-al-Ghani Sa'id, former deputy minister of manpower and head of the symposium, who said:

"The High Dam has been one of a number of projects which have had positive and negative features. In spite of the dam's immense achievements, it did not receive a sufficient amount of study before construction on it started, as a result of the impetuosity of officials at that time and their insistence on completing construction of the dam as soon as possible, considering that it was a national political duty before an economic and technical one.

"Therefore some side effects have appeared which provoke the fears of many scientists now."

At this point Dr Mustafa Sulayman, professor of engineering at 'Ayn Shams, took the floor, saying:

"The High Dam has beneficial points and detrimental ones. I do not deny that. However, truth to tell, the cause of the problem of groundwater and rise in the water table does not lie in the High Dam, as Dr 'Ali Fathi has stated. Rather, the main reason here may be attributed to our misuse of water for irrigation, household uses and industry. Greatest proof of this is the fact that the groundwater level all over the map of Egypt is at levels much higher than that of the Nile itself. How can the High Dam be a danger to Egypt's homes and villages, as some people are bruiting it about?

Eng Ahmad 'Ali Kamal, former minister of irrigation, added another item of fact when he took the floor, saying:

"There was no impetuousity of execution in construction of the High Dam, but there was haste, based on fear of a repetition of what happened in 1913, when the total Nile discharge was 42 billion cubic meters while the actual requirements of both Egypt and the Sudan come to 52 billion. Had that occurrence been repreated in the sixties, there would without question have been a drought, and no one could have predicted the consequences of it."

Then came Eng 'Abd-al-'Azim Abu-al-'Ata's turn. He took the floor and began a counterattack against Dr 'Ali Fathi's statement, saying:

"The time has come for us to ask ourselves what the dam has given us and what it has taken away from us. This project has given us a great deal. It was not started impetuously, as the lecturer has said, because, according to the facts which are available, I say that there is not a single engineering project which received the study, the time and the research the High Dam received. In addition, this project was the offspring of Western and Eastern thinking both. Swedish, German, American and Italian experts helped set out the studies for it, in addition to the Russian experts who later took charge of carrying the project out. In

addition, when we review the side effects of the dam, we will find that they are like the shade of a building -- we cannot say that they are negative features detracting from the project, as some people rumor. Everything said about these side effects has been answered realistically and through figures, from the first problem, scouring, to the flight of fish because of a paucity of silt.

"In summary, I would like to say that the High Dam is to be considered the greatest achievement in the history of the Egyptian people, in spite of the empty talk and allegations."

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EXPERT OFFERS INDEPENDENT JUDGMENT ON HIGH DAM CONTROVERSY

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Jul 81 pp 16, 17

/Article by Muhammad Nu'man: "The High Dam Case: The Problem Is Unbalanced Growth"/

/Text/ It is not possible to ignore the damage which has befallen the High Dam, as Eng 'Ali Fathi has depicted it; however, attributing this damage to the very existence of the High Dam in reality means offering an explanation that is limited to surface features.

While this limited explanation proceeds from the nature of the country's economic and technological circumstances, imparting a practical character to it, this practical character is also its basic flaw. No one disputes the fact that the High Dam is a massive engineering work, the product of a technology which is very advanced when compared with the irrigation and farming technology that prevails in the country.

For example, to talk about the electric power generated by the High Dam, the current operating revenues from this power are very modest when compared with the costs of the generating plant, and also when compared with the technical level — not to mention the hopes which had been placed on the construction of great electric power sources. This may fundamentally be attributed to the purposes for which the electric power generated is used: it was expected that the industrial sector in the country would expand thanks to the use of electricity, whereas what has happened is that the electric power has been dissipated in other service purposes, and the returns from the use of this power have been very modest. At the same time, the conversion of basin lands to permanent irrigation without the performance of any serious work of the same caliber as the technological achievement which marked the construction of the High Dam to build an extensive system of drains in Upper Egypt and develop those in Lower Egypt has had extensive effects on the rise in the level of water in the ground, above and beyond delays in projects to improve and maintain the soil with the purpose of retaining its fertility.

However, the basic point is that construction of the High Dam, with the resources it has offered to change the irrigation system in Upper Egypt and increase irrigation capacity in Lower Egypt, was not linked to a new agricultural production strategy which would deal with the variables that had arisen in the irrigation system. Indeed, matters became worse when purposeful approaches were actively made

toward the cultivation of more crops that imposed strain on the farmland in Egypt; it is from this that the bad consequences for agricultural production have arisen.

One of the most important elements in the new situation has been the absence of silt and the increased hydraulic capability of the Egyptian irrigation system. Greater emphasis ought to have been placed on farming leguminous crops which are noted for their lower consumption of water and their added ability to concentrate nitrogen in the air in the soil, thanks to the chains of parasitic bacteria on their roots, to make up for some of the deterioration in fertility resulting from the disappearance of the silt.

However, what has happened has been an expansion in cotton farming, which is one of the crops that imposes the greatest load on Egyptian soil and is an important host for a number of insects, as well as having a relatively high consumption of water. In accordance with the estimated increase in water in the irrigation system, expansion in rice growing took place but that happened in the absence of projects to build and develop the drainage system.

The tile drainage project was started after the dam was completed, in 1970, and it is now proceeding at a snail's pace.

Constructing a dam with great capabilities is not an easy matter, especially when the mechanism of agricultural modernization is almost nonexistent. This unbalanced situation is primarily what is responsible for the current disturbances, in the sense that the current damage from the High Dam is the result only of disruption in the existing structure of our economy, which is to be characterized as backward. It was presumed that development in one of its support sectors would lead to an upsurge of activity in other sectors, as one development theory (the theory of unbalanced growth) holds. However, the result was further disruption, which led to a deterioration in the rates of growth of the target support sector (agriculture).

This may be atrributed to:

1. The survival of obsolete land tenure relationships in the agricultural sector.

2. Industry's failure to play its part in providing advanced agricultural machinery to raise the technological level of agriculture.

3. The failure to choose a new crop structure which will guarantee flexibility in foreign trade and provide local food and agricultural raw material requirements.

4. The orientation of all economic activity toward services, which has led to a deterioration in the national economy's capacity to function and has contributed to continued obsoleteness in scientific research.

Thus the concept of creating development on a well known principle, "creating unbalanced grwoth," has failed, because the options of economic growth are organically and historically linked to the country's modern economic growth

experiences. To subject the High Dam to an inquisition in the absence of these variables is unjust, as it neglects to take stock of the basic mechanisms of growth in our country. What happened with the High Dam, and what will happen with other projects, is governed by this mechanism.

Eng 'Ali Fathi's Objections

Although Eng 'Ali Fathi builds his objections to the High Dam on the project itself and on the manner in which it was constructed, remedying certain of the side effects which have arisen from it is not an impossibility. Furthermore, predictions of danger from certain other side effects have in some cases been marked by a spirit of exaggeration.

The decline in the fertility of agricultural soil in Egypt is a process that has been going on since the start of cotton cultivation, and we cannot imagine that cotton farming will keep up, at its current broad scale, at the expense of other basic crops, without adding further to the deterioration of the agricultural soil. The side effects of the High Dam alone are not responsible for this, although we do not concede that the absence of silt has had an effect on soil fertility.

It is from this problem that the processes of comprehensive scouring in the river channel as well as on the shores have resulted, although the establishment of a number of barrages, as recommended by the experts who took part in building the dam, will reduce these effects, which are in reality wholly different from those in the Sudd region to which Eng 'Ali Fathi compared them: the latter consists of rocks and cataracts obstructing the course of the river which are not subject to human control. In addition, the construction of such barrages would, in the time of floods, permit greater volumes of water to flow, making partial use of the silt brought with the water and pursing the system of construction through numerous barriers without disturbing the basic function of storage behind the High Dam.

In another area -- the points raised concerning exposure to poisoning by water through the effects of chemical fertilizers and pesticides -- the use of fertilizers and pesticides in this constant fashion would still be wholly present even if there were no High Dam, in view of the crop sequence followed.

In addition, Eng 'Ali Fathi has raised objections to the fact that peasants are compelled to scrape /soil off/ the land. This in reality is a confused notion of the scraping issue, because peasants in Egypt now acquire the soil needed for common fertilizer only from the large clods left over from plowing. In some areas of the Governorate of al-Buhayrah the concern has reached the point where landowners deprive peasant tenants from collecting anything but large clods in order to make fertilizer, and even if scraping to make ordinary fertilizer take place, that does not go beyond the legal limit for scraping, which is 25 centimeters -- and ultimately this returns to the land on which the scraping took place and contains garbage materials.

However, the issue which is really the most serious, and is expressive of disequilibrium in the country, in the technical balance, is that of scraping off land and selling it to brick plants, which are constantly increasing in size and number in

spite of the legal prohibitions. The continuous expansion in the number of such plants bespeaks a backwardness in construction technology in the country and a failure to develop other alternatives to use as building materials. This is a most serious issue, since it threatens the entire surface layer of the farmland. As regards the spread of plants and algae in the river channel, the metal systems installed above barrages and bridges for security purposes in the past have been unsuccessful in retaining many of these and have helped the performance of periodic cleansing operations (although a long time passed between each period). Once these metal systems were removed, the plants and algae in the river proceeded to proliferate. Is there anything to prevent them from being restored? We do not believe so. This will solve a problem which is most critical.

The objection bearing on the deposition of a new delta by the dam (after hundreds of years) is realistic, in the light of current circumstances of scientific development, but not inevitable in terms of future possibilities. In addition, the danger that new river channels will be created under the influence of this delta is to be doubted, in view of man's increasing capacity to control rivers; the Nile created its current delta and chose and modified its channels in the context of the hydraulic freedom guaranteed it by the fact of the development of human society following man's appearance on earth, not to mention the river's choices in far distant geological epochs when all natural changes occurred in total freedom. Time has shown the possibility of controlling the course of the river. Hasn't the river ceased moving to the east, as it did before, thanks to the levees built on both its sides?

Looking to the future from a premise of permanency is very harmful, but looking with sincerity with something akin to a serious fear for the future of the country and the generations to come is truly noble.

The deeply-versed Egyptian irrigation engineer 'Ali Fathi has taught us a lesson, which is how one can be sincere in his thinking and continue to propound it, that is, how one can have a cause. It is a lesson of which our generation — which is totally preoccupied by opportunities to look for work in some oil countries above all else — should be conscious.

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BACKGROUND OF 'BLOODBATH' STUDIED

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 9 Jul 81 p 8

[Commentary: "Iran's Blood-bath"]

[Text] Iran seems to be indulging in a masochistic orgy of blood-letting. State terror and terrorism, in the background of political feuds and a mad struggle for power, have culminated in the massacre of June 28, followed by more street riots, more killing and more executions.

The latest round started when, after President Banisadr's impeachment and dismissal --from an office to which he had been elected with a massive 75 per cent vote--, his opponents clashed with protestors who objected to the hurried and, they felt, unjustified verdict given by the Majlis. The issue was sought to be settled with the bullet and baton, with the knife and the knout. With street battles raging in many towns, hundreds of the ex-President's supporters were rounded up and more than one hundred were summarily executed. The charge invariably was defiance of the Constitution; but charges did not matter, apparently no trials were held, no evidence taken, and no judicial verdicts given. Defiance of the ruling party's diktat was considered crime enough, and the sentence usually awarded was death. Not unexpectedly, counter-terrorism escalated, and seemingly the main target was Ayatollah Beheshti--recognised as No. 2 in the clerical hierarchy--, the presiding eminence of the revolutionary tribunals and later Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who had supervised the campaign of severely punishing all manner of dissent with ruthless single-mindedness. Along with him, 73 prominent IRP leaders were killed when the party's headquarters was blown up, and the Governor of the local jail where most executions took place was also gunned down.

Whose hand?

It was a carefully-planned plot, a well-timed operation. In the country's prevailing maelstrom, and our dependence on the Western media for news, it is not easy to decide which minds plotted the plot and which hands pressed the switch to further spread violence and bloodshed. Some IRP leaders have blamed 'the great Satan' and American or Iraqi agents. That foreign hands are active in Iran is most probably true, and their aim can only be the country's destabilisation. But not much foreign aid has been required to create conditions of chaos and instability, and the in-fighting which has been intensified over recent months seems to be independent of foreign guidance.

Certain factors are plain. The loose united front which fought and toppled the Shah's regime crumbled soon after the final victory. Then, the country's voters were and remain ambivalent about the direction which Iran should follow. What is more, having acquired control of the Majlis, the IRP sought to establish a monopoly of power. For a time, the tandem government was kept in balance by the mediation of Ayatollah Khomeini, who until recently was accepted as the supreme arbiter; but when he abandoned this role, it was open war. Another factor that made for internecine conflicts is that increasingly the IRP leaders became intolerant of disagreement or dissent. While castigating American agents or remnants of the Shah's regime, they engaged in battle against elements that had played a major role in the struggle for liberation. Blame has been thrown on various factions--Mujahideen-i-Khalq, Banisadr's men, minority groups--for the Tehran blast, without an iota of evidence to substantiate the grave charge. And the IRP's intolerance seems to be based on an arrogant assumption of the right to dictate to the others. Many an Ayatollah claims that he speaks with the voice of God; therefore, any opposition to his injunctions is opposition to Islam and the Creator.

The future

Not even the war imposed on Iran by Iraq or the deteriorating economic situation helped to bring about a reconciliation between the warring groups. When, on the one hand, volunteers were being recruited by different groups to buttress the army in the country's defence, on the other hand, these same groups were found engaged in mini-battles among themselves. An irrational attitude to politics, the absence of civil liberties, a blind lust for power, and the capacity to kill all opponents, have made a mockery of Iran's democracy and added to the turmoil and chaos. Whether Ayatollah Khomeini can deal with the existing situation has become uncertain. And if, in the coming days and weeks, Prime Minister Rajai's appeal for calm is ignored and the blood-bath continues, the portents are ominous and even Iran's survival as a nation State may be at stake.

It must therefore, be realised by all political parties that unless they can work out a sensible path to rapprochement among themselves, Iran's Islamic revolution and the country itself can be placed in grave jeopardy.

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GOVERNMENT GRANTS SUBSIDY TO INVENTORS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Jul 81 p 16

[Text] The cabinet of the Iranian Islamic Republic met yesterday morning under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i and opened the meeting with readings from the glorious Koran.

During this meeting, which lasted more than three and one-half hours, Prime Minister Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i and Minister of Executive Affairs Nabavi presented reports on the political matters of the day, on the presidential election, on the mid-term parliamentary elections and on the positions and circumstances of seditious and belligerent groups in relation to their background, their way of thinking and their armed anti-national acts. Later, Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the minister of foreign affairs, referred to the treacherous conspiracy of the imperialist and Zionist news agencies that have related the crash of the Argentine plane to the transfer of arms from the Zionist regime to Iran and in this respect, he enumerated the fabrications and lies of these news agencies and circles. He also recalled the ever-increasing influence of the Islamic revolution among the various segments of the Muslem people throughout the world and stressed the magnificent celebration of the Jerusalem day that can lay the foundation for a genuine and decisive start of Muslem unity and the reconquest of the Holy Land from its Zionist occupiers.

During this meeting, the issue pertaining to the contracts on atomic energy and IBM computers was submitted. It was discussed and reviewed and a decision was reached. Subsequently, the proposal by the Ministry of Industry pertaining to the payment of 50 million rials to the National Organization for Scientific and Industrial Research was approved as a subsidy to inventors and discoverers and in order to carry out industrial research on the basis of the 1981 budget act.

CSO: 4640/66

BACKGROUND OF NEWSPAPER CLOSURES REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 6-7

[Article by Phil Davison]

[Text]

IRAN'S MUSLIM fundamentalists, in control of the government, judiciary and legislature, have silenced domestic press opposition and restricted freedom of speech. In the past year, the clergy-backed government has closed down more than 20 opposition newspapers and driven critical political pamphleteers back underground, where they once operated against the Shah's regime. More recently, Ayatollah Khomeini has asked Iranians to watch one another and report any 'counter-revolutionary' gossip.

In the euphoric first few months of the Islamic revolution, when soldiers and revolutionaries paraded with red carnations in their rifle barrels, the streets of Tehran hummed with political and religious discussions, publications, posters and tape recordings. The freedom of expression was stunning: while the Iranian army was busy cruising ethnic Kurdish rebels in the west, one could buy Kurdish guerrilla posters or cassettes of their music in Tehran.

Despite the Islamic nature of the revolution, communist literature and portraits of Marx and Lenin were on sale everywhere. As far as Ayatollah Khomeini, spearhead of the revolution, was concerned, Iranians could criticise him or his followers at the risk of nothing more than a fist fight.

The gradual erosion of freedom of expression began a year ago when the independent daily newspaper *Bamdad* was forced to close down after crowds of Islamic fundamentalists had occupied its offices on several occasions. The popular daily *Ayandegan* was shut down by the authorities, as were the organ of the communist Tudeh party, *Mardom*, and some 20 smaller publications.

Even with those papers gone, opposition to the clergy's overwhelming role in the post-revolutionary establishment was still expressed in the dailies *Mizan*, which supported the bourgeois policies of former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and *Islamic Revolution*, published by then President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. The offices of *Mizan* (which means 'scales of justice') were vandalised last November and slogans such as 'death to liberals' were painted on its walls.

Mizan's closure was ordered following an editorial last April, when it questioned whether Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti had the right to hold the position of leader of the dominant Islamic Republican Party (IRP) at the same time as that of Iran's chief justice. The closure brought a strong reaction from Bani Sadr, whose *Islamic Revolution* was then left as the only publication critical of the fundamentalists.

'We must defend freedom at any price, and especially freedom of the press,' the president said. 'If a newspaper insults me, I do not want it prosecuted because I know, and past experience makes it clear, that tryanny over the press is the beginning of complete tyranny.' After a brief reappearance at the end of April, *Mizan* was closed down again but this time it was not alone. *Islamic Revolution* was also

banned, effectively silencing opposition.

Bani Sadr's paper had annoyed the authorities for many months through its forthright criticism, particularly because of the regular 'President's Diary' column, in which Bani Sadr attacked the direction of the revolution and often even Khomeini.

Politically, however, his presidency gave him little more power than a veto over the appointment of cabinet ministers and the newspaper column was his strongest influence over the Iranian people. In the column, he had attacked all strata of post-revolutionary Iran, including the clergy-backed government's long refusal to negotiate the release of the American hostages.

The press closures leave two major morning and two evening newspapers in Iran, all four supporting the line of the fundamentalists and the government. The morning papers are *Azadegan* and *Islamic Republic*, the latter the organ of the Islamic Republican Party which is the country's major power bloc. One of its founders was Ayatollah Beheshti, the IRP leader who was among more than 70 religious and political figures killed by a huge bomb at the party's Tehran headquarters last month.

The evening papers are *Kayhan* and *Ettelaat*, both of which describe themselves as independent but support the line of the present government. The state radio and television, officially known as 'the voice and vision of the Islamic republic', are directly under the control of the IRP. They reflect no opposition and often broadcast the speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini or other religious leaders in full, sometimes several times a day. The long-standing official Pars news agency functioned under the Shah's regime but its executives were largely purged after the revolution.

Having tightened the screws on the domestic press, Khomeini has now called on Iranians to watch one another and report anything suspicious to the authorities. 'From now on, you are all members of the intelligence organisation,' he said. In an article along the same lines, the IRP's paper *Islamic Republic* told Iranians: 'You may hear lots of things on a bus, in a taxi, in a doctor's office and public places about political issues. Inform the officials of every bit of information you may come across and they will investigate and identify the counter-revolutionaries.'

CSO: 4600/113

MINISTRY ANNOUNCES UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PLAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Jul 81 p 2

> [Text] The Unemployment Compensation Plan will go to the Islamic Consultative Assembly after reviewal by workers and those involved in labor and workers' problems. With this Plan, unemployed persons will receive up to 75 percent of their net pay.

The deputy minister of labor and social affairs announced that in regards to the issue of unemployment compensation, which has been an objective of workers from the beginning of the revolution, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has prepared the Unemployment Compensation Plan. According to the Plan, the aim of implementing unemployment compensation is to support the labor force at times of involuntary unemployment, to protect the relative purchasing power and standard of living of unemployed workers and to prepare grounds properly for the implementation of the government policy of employment and effective utilization of human resources, to achieve the goals of economic and social development in the country. The basic principles of the Plan are as follows:

1. With consideration for Principle 24 and Paragraph 12 of Principle 3 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, unemployment compensation shall be considered as a protective institution for the labor force, which, on the one hand, shall provide resources to protect the relative purchasing power of workers who are willing to work but who, involuntarily, have lost their jobs and, on the other, shall provide the opportunity for the implementation of an employment policy within the framework of a labor economy by preparing for a national culture of employment; providing educational standards and vocational, directional, and professional training; transferring workers; providing workers with identification cards; making the law of supply and demand in the job market understood; regulating supply and demand in the job market; and putting people to work.

2. In connection with Principle 28 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the implementation of the Unemployment Compensation Law, on the one hand, shall deal with the right of the individual to be properly employed and to enjoy social security and, on the other, shall emphasize the duty of the government to create jobs.

3. In accordance with Principle 29 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the expenses for the implementation of the Unemployment Compensation Plan shall be provided from general revenues and from those from the participation of the people. Hence, the tripartite partnership of workers, employers, and the government has been accepted in principle. On this basis, with consideration for the results obtained from previous studies which estimate the rate of compensation should be between 3 and 5 percent of the wages paid, and with consideration for the economic situation and conditions, . . . to work, the pay of the worker during his unemployment shall be less than his pay at the time of employment. But to ensure a minimal livelihood, this amount shall not be less than the legal minimum wage.

7. [as published] In order to ensure employment incentives, payment of dues, the procedure for implementing the program, the participation of the government in the program, the time period for the payments, and other protective measures at this stage, unemployment compensation dues shall be set at 3 percent. With consideration for experience gained through the implementation of the program, steps shall be taken to increase or decrease the level of participation of each of the above-mentioned groups.

4. In connection with Principle 29 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, unemployment compensation is a right of everyone. On this basis, all employees of all economic sectors are covered by unemployment compensation. But, considering the fact that the fund requires time to consolidate its financial situation, action should be taken to determine the eligible units and regions in a way that would provide this stability to a certain extent. Therefore, in the beginning, those units and regions will be selected which enjoy more economic stability.

5. Considering the responsibilities of the government for welfare support and other applications of social security, unemployment compensation shall be compulsory.

6. Unemployment compensation protects those workers who have lost their jobs under involuntary conditions and whose income has been cut off. This compensation shall be provided from the beginning of unemployment to the time of re-employment, based on the length of time unemployment compensation dues have been paid.

8. The rate of compensation to unemployed workers shall be determined by the number of dependents.

9. The determination of fines and control of workers and employers shall be based on justifications and guidance. And procedures shall be followed which shall compensate for the losses and damages to the fund without seriously endagering the livelihood of the worker or the economic organization of the employer.

10. The fund shall consist of an organization under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and shall have separate financial and administrative guidelines in accordance with national administrative, political, social, and economic exigencies.

11. The Unemployment Compensation Fund shall be a government organization managed on the basis of the tripartite partnership of workers, employers, and the government. The above-mentioned groups shall enact their partnership through the Council of the fund, which shall be the highest decision-making authority to determine the policies and management of the fund.

12. In order to prevent the multiplicity of arbitrative authorities, to ensure a united policy, as well as to avoid organizational expansion, arbitration of the differences resulting from the implementation of the law shall be conferred, as far as possible, upon the arbitration authorities cited in the Labor Law. In this manner, the arbitration of differences between the worker-employer, fund-employer, and fund-worker, in their primary stages shall be the responsibility of the workshop committees and in the investigation stage will be the responsibility of the arbitration commission. Only in the event of differences between the employer and the fund, when the subject of the arbitration exceeds 200,000 rials, shall the case be referred to the overseeing committee, upon the request of one of the parties.

13. In regulating labor relations and adherence to the accepted principles, the Unemployment Compensation Fund shall avoid interference in the issues and disputes concerning labor relations and the decision of the arbitrating authorities shall determine dismissals from or leaving employment and guilt or innocence.

14. The Unemployment Compensation Fund may establish an independent organization for the collection of unemployment compensation dues. In addition, the Fund shall be authorized, if necessary, to confer this duty upon another government organization.

15. The total wages paid to workers are subject to unemployment compensation dues; however, with consideration for social security and the necessity of a just distribution of income, a ceiling shall be determined for unemployment compensation payments.

16. In connection with the goals of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and in order to coordinate the national economic goals with those of social security, the government must devise a proper plan to assist those who are not included in the Unemployment Compensation Law, to be implemented by the welfare organization.

In this interview, the deputy minister of labor and social affairs said: Later studies have predicted that the implementation of unemployment compensation would be a step towards the abolition of Article 33 of the Labor Law. He expressed hope that with this plan, unemployed individuals will be able to receive maximum of 75 percent of their net pay. If these unemployed individuals serve in the Labor Army [Sepah-e Kar] under the supervision of the government in public-related affairs and in villages, they will receive their full salary. In conclusion, he asked all the workers, those involved in worker and labor issues, and the experts on social and human problems to send their views and suggestions to the Office of Projects and Plans of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs as soon as possible, to complete the Unemployment Compensation Plan to be sent to the Cabinet and the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

9593
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RADIO-MOSCOW BROADCASTS CRITICIZED BY SPOKESMAN NABAVI

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Jul 81 p 9

[Text] Yesterday, before noon, brother Engineer Behzad Nabavi, the deputy minister of executive affairs and spokesman for the government, took part in a press and radio-television interview responding to the various questions of correspondents concerning the issues of the day:

The War Issue

As an introduction, he first said: In the name of God the Compassionate and the Merciful.

Regarding the war, as before, we must pay attention to it. All the efforts of the enemy are directed towards diverting our attention to other issues. The Islamic army has been victorious and nothing of significance has been accomplished by the other side. The latest victory was yesterday (the day before yesterday), which is clearly evident in the attacks on the electrical facilities of Iraq, which has lost its aggressive power; and its reaction has been either retreat or immobility. For this very reason, it has begun activities on the political scene and has made a proposal which includes the following:

1. No use of force in resolving the differences between the countries;

2. No interference in the affairs of countries; 3. Open shipping through the Straits of Hormoz. The goal of Saddam in proposing these issues is to prove that the Persian Gulf is not open to shipping. However, everyone knows that open shipping is assured and even our armed forces are protecting safe shipping in the Persian Gulf.

Furthermore, it is Saddam who has resorted to the use of force and has interfered in the internal affairs of other countries. Naturally, when he stops this, the conditions for a cease-fire will have been met. It is he who must stop the use of force. Nabavi added: The

enemy, through its vast propaganda, wants to defile the face of our revolution. And, therefore, it pretends that Iran's position is in support of the West. Mr Nabavi added: It is interesting that Radio Israel broadcasts that Iran has purchased arms from Israel. But they have been unskillful in the broadcast of this report. Israeli radio has announced that Iran purchased arms and ammunition from Israel [as published].

Engineer Nabavi added: On the battlefronts, the war is progressing to the benefit of the Islamic army. God willing, we will hear even better news in the future. I must thank our combatant brothers who have become more steadfast in their objectives despite the internal events and the Zionist and imperialist propaganda. Every day their blows are harsher on the enemy.

The Bombing of Southern Lebanon

Brother Nabavi then referred to the bombing of southern Lebanon and said: The tragedies created by Israel in southern Lebanon are similar to those created by Saddam in southern Iran. Nabavi added that the government of Iran declares its sympathies with the Lebnese and Palestinian people and, moreover, it offers to send them any of its material or spiritual resources possible. The government of Iran is sorry /that a U.S. conspiracy has involved the most powerful forces of the region (Iran and Iraq) in a war, in order that Israel can massacre our defenseless brothers/ [in boldface]. Israel, who knows how Iran and the brother nation of Iraq could help, has taken the maximum advantage of this issue to put pressure on Lebanon and Syria. Egypt, too, makes the best of it to put pressure on Libya.

Nabavi added: Islamic countries must put pressure on Iraq to stop its aggression, so that Iran can go to the aid of the Lebanese and Palestinian brothers.

Elections

The government spokesman then referred to the escalation of the activities of the people for the elections and said: While the presidential candidates are all within the forces in line with the imam, the elections are becoming more expansive. For this reason, the positions of the opponents have also expanded. This shows how important the elections are from their points of view.

Engineer Nabavi then spoke on the boycott of the elections by opposing groups, referring to the recent communique issued by the National Front to boycott the elections, and said: The National Front never issued a harsh communique in the entire course of its history during the shah's regime. At least now it has issued such a harsh communique. Put this communique alongside the propaganda of the foreign radios. Brother Nabavi added: The Western press propagandizes that

the people will not participate in the elections so that the former president, elected with 11 million votes, would remain legitimate.

And the Hezb-e Demokrat [Democrat Party] has declared 2 Mordad [24 Jul] a day of unity. Also, HURRIYET newspaper, published in Turkey, has quoted the Mojahedin announcing that 2 Mordad will be the first day of an uprising.

But the reason for their efforts to meet this day in such a manner is hidden in the nature of the elections. Since no good has come to them from the shah, Reza Pahlavi, or Bakhtiyar, they now want a president instead. And the foreign press says that the people will not participate in the elections. And Radio Israel, endorsing the communique of the Monfeqin [Hypocrites] (Mojahedin-e Khalq), has announced that on 2 Mordad, Iran will become a blood bath, in order to discourage the people from coming out of their houses.

Engineer Nabavi added regarding this issue: Those people who hurried with open arms to meet bullets and threw themselves in front of tanks in order to prevent the influence of the foreigners in the country are not afraid of such poisonous propaganda. They will participate in the elections more united and consolidated, because the counterrevolution will not stop its counterrevolutionary propaganda and activities. For instance, this morning, our brother 'Askar Owladi, who was a presidential candidate, was attacked by counterrevolutionary elements and was taken to a hospital. One of the attackers was killed and another captured. /It is quite clear why people such as 'Askar Owladi are assassinated and who assassinates them. They intend to prevent the presidential elections/ [in boldface].

People, Our Intelligence Organization

Brother Nabavi added: Another issue is the capture of a large segment of the members of the Peykar group. The operations were so vast that the group could not believe it. Of course, it must be pointed out that our intelligence organization has been and is the people. The people do these services which have, fortunately, included an important segment of the Peykar organization. In these captures, many of their operations and group policies have been exposed. Mr Nabavi said in this connection: For a while, we were even suspecting some of he authorities and we were asking why these coupons were being sold on the streets and where so many coupons had come from. /After taking over the Peykar group house, hundreds of gasoline coupons and coupons for the people's necessities were found in this house/ [in boldface]. It became clear that these so-called pro-people and pro-working-class groups had been forging coupons, which shows the nature of these groups. It becomes clear how these groups made their living. /In the internal analytical assessment of the group obtained from this organization, there is reference to the

internal organizational crisis from which they suffer very much, and they have finally connected it with the universal crisis of communism/ [in boldface]. Of course, they did not put this analysis at everyone's disposal. It was only available to their leaders, who were shocked after being captured and who confessed immediately to all the facts. Another issue is the operation of the group. Nowadays, they have resorted to explosions, bombings, and throwing Molotov coctails which, from a military standpoint, are worthless. /I am wondering how these groups have sunken to such depths/ [in boldface].

Nabavi added: In the past, when they wanted to assassinate someone, they would try not to even harm the driver. But these gentlemen go to mosques and place bombs. They take their instructions line by line from their leaders. /This action is similar to those of the Mafia, which are carried out according to a plan/ [in boldface]. They want to demonstrate that they still exist. /They suppose the more they do this, the more the people will leave the scene [in boldface], whereas, after the explosion at the central office of the Islamic Republican Party, we saw that the Friday prayers of that week were performed more gloriously than ever.

The Soviet Government Must Explain

Engineer Nabavi added: Another issue is the position of Radio Moscow, which must be discussed. Nabavi said: The position of the Soviet Union is clear in regards to the revolution. Both at the time of Mirza Kuchek Khan and before the revolution, the Soviet Union had declared many times that they supported the Iranian revolution. But the statement of last week from Radio Moscow does not show this and it is even worse than those by the B.B.C. and the Voice of America. For instance, on 24 Tir [15 Jul], in a report from Tehran, it said that the pasdaran and the police of Tehran used tear gas and fire arms to disperse the supporters of Bani-Sadr. They must explain this to us. Or, it has announced that in Kurdistan, eight soldiers who wanted to join the opponents were executed by the Tehran government. Or, it has announced that Iran summoned several military units from the front in order to put down the increasing demonstrations in Tehran. Unfortunately, /these kinds of actions can have unpleasant effects on the relations between the two countries/ [in boldface]. The government spokesman continued and in regards to lowering inflation, said: The decrease in the inflation rate compared to the previous months can be good news. The Central Bank has announced that the prices of several items which had been priced by the government have decreased and this shows that the government serves the people.

Brother Nabavi, in responding to a question by one of the correspondents concerning the silence of human rights organizations about the bombing of Lebanon, said: When Elqaniyan and Khorram were executed in Iran, they (the human rights people and the United Nations)

started to make noises and the transitional government went to the imam to stop the executions. Mr Nabavi added: But, concerning the bombing of southern Lebanon, it (the Security Council) only reprimanded that the disturbances are to be prevented and it should be important to them that all these defenseless people are rolling in blood.

Nabavi added: See how the Western press reflected the riots of the Mojahedin-e Khalq on 30 Khordad [20 Jun] while they did not report this horrible and awful bombing. Also, see how the Western press wanted to stack the deck and force on the revolution people such as Nazih, Matindaftari and Lahiji, who were all either Freemasons or functionaries of the West.

Aid to Southern Lebanon

In regards to the aid of the government to Southern Lebanon, Engineer Nabavi said: The issue was raised in the Cabinet that we might send health and medical aid, but we might not be able to send very much in military aid. They will forgive us for this. They even know of our resources regarding health and medical aid. Brother Nabavi, in regards to the rumor of a decrease in the price of oil, said: This is the kind of atmosphere created by the Western press. They suggest to an oil producing country that another country had reduced its price and wonder why we do not do the same. These suggestions which create uncertainty continue as far as forcing the OPEC member countries to reduce their oil prices, in order to destabilize oil prices. But the source of all these actions are the oil cartels.

9593
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STUDENTS CONDUCT POLITICAL AGITATION IN INDIA

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 28

[Article by Sumanta Banerjee]

[Text]

IRAN'S POLITICAL conflict has spilled over to India. The 10,000 or so Iranians studying in engineering colleges, medical institutions and universities in a number of Indian cities have split into two opposing groups — one supporting Ayatollah Khomeini, the other giving allegiance to the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq and the Fedayeen-e-Khalq.

The leftwingers, who support Bani Sadr, appear to be in a minority. A small pro-Moscow section — the Tudeh party members and sympathisers — are behind Khomeini.

The Tehran government has approached the Indian external affairs ministry to screen the admission of Iranian students to Indian universities, so that those belonging to groups opposing it can be excluded. Apart from some Iranians studying in India on government scholarships, or who are sponsored by Iran as part of the India-Iran cultural exchange programme, most Iranian students in Indian universities are there off their own bat. Tehran's request, conveyed through an official delegation from Iran has not yet received an official response from the Indian government.

Divisions among Iranian students in India became apparent soon after Khomeini came to power. Most of these students — who before the revolution held frequent demonstrations in Delhi, Bombay and other Indian cities — opposed Khomeini's concept of the Islamic state. They objected to the imposition of some Islamic customs, like the veiling of women and the ban on music, and eventually banded together into an organisation called the All-India Students Association (AIISA).

Tehran watched these developments closely. It sent a representative, Hojatoleslam Emadi, to Poona where there are about 3,000 Iranian students. Emadi addressed groups of Iranians asking them to oppose those who were 'anti-Islam'. Not long after the speech a group of pro-Khomeini Iranian students attacked the Poona office of the AIISA.

Ironically, the anti-Khomeini students had to face similar harassment during the Shah's reign when agents of Savak, Iran's secret police monitored Iranian student activity in India and sometimes assaulted them if they took part in anti-Shah demonstrations. In those days Iranian students protesting in Indian cities wore masks. One Iranian student now at Delhi university said: 'We may have to go back to those days, since Khomeini is using the same methods as the Shah did.'

According to the AIISA: 'Our activities in the past included the exposing of the authoritarian Shah, and later of his so-called democratic government under Shahpour Bakhtiar. We have always stood for a democratic and secular Iran, where the people will be ruled in a truly democratic atmosphere.

'We will stand up for those causes, which are cherished by the Indians also. It is unfortunate that the people of Iran who, after years of long drawn-out struggle succeeded in throwing out the Shah, are today faced with a situation where democratic rights are suppressed and have to wage another battle to combat the reactionary and anti-secular policies of the ruling clergy.'

The anti-Khomeini sentiments of these Iranian students have not yet taken the form of open demonstrations. When anti-Shah protests were organised in the past, the Indian government used to round up some of the leaders and extradite them to Iran — presumably in deference to Tehran, on which India depended for oil.

Following the attack in Poona, the AIISA appealed to the Indian government to protect Iranian students from further assaults. So far, the Indian authorities have maintained a non-committal stance — there has not been any case of extradition recently — and are probably awaiting the emergence of a more orderly state of affairs in Iran before they take any decision on their Iranian 'guests'.

CSO: 4600/113

JERUSALEM EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM SEEKS ETHNIC INTEGRATION

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Jan 81 p 3

[Article by Yitzhak Shor: "Accelerated Integration"]

[Text] Tensions in Jerusalem revolve around three conflicting groups: Jews and Arabs, secular Jews and religious Jews, Sefardi and Ashkenazi Jews. The educational system is the only social system which succeeds in blunting at least one glaring contrast--the ethnic one. It works persistently and systematically to accelerate the integration process, especially in the public schools.

Jerusalem has five main types of schools: public, public-religious, independent, special, Arab.

The public schools enroll 56 percent of the Jewish children in the city, compared to 74 percent nation-wide. They are the most integrated, dealing with educational needs of students of different socio-economic backgrounds. Interestingly, they include one religious (Conservative) school, as well as two experimental schools. In 1982 a new public school with a Labor orientation will open its doors.

Religious Schools--42 Percent

The public-religious schools enroll 28 percent of the city's Jewish children, compared to 20 percent nation-wide. Despite the religious education, groups of parents have taken their children out of those schools and established separate schools which they consider more religious and more nationalistic. Those are the Noam and Horev schools. The public-religious system also includes three HABAD (Lubavitz hasidim) schools, which are independent yet do not belong to Agudat Yisrael's independent system. The public-religious schools also include integrated as well as sectarian schools. Some are co-ed, while others are either boys' or girls' schools.

Agudat Yisrael's independent schools enroll 14 percent Jewish children in the city, compared to 5.7 percent in the rest of the country. Alongside, though not part of it, are state subsidized Talmud Torah (religious academy) schools which reflect the philosophy of various hasidic groups.

Separate special education schools only account for 2 percent of Jewish students, but many regular schools have special ed classes which encompass 7 percent of all Jewish students.

Jordanian Curriculum in Arab Schools

Arab education is divided into at least two systems--a city system, in which Hebrew and civics are taught, and a private system, which uses a Jordanian curriculum. Next year the city system will start using the Jordanian curriculum, beginning in first through sixth grade. The reason for this decision, reached by the city schools division and the Arab education and culture department of the Ministry of Education, is the refusal of Arab institutions of higher learning to accept Arab high school graduates who do not have an Arab diploma. Most of the graduates turn to Jordan, while a few study at the West Bank, Damascus, Egypt, or Europe and America.

One of the weaknesses of Arab education in Jerusalem is the lack of willingness of the parents to send their children to pre-mandatory schools. According to Member of Knesset Tamar Eshel, who is in charge of education in the Jerusalem municipality, parents are not willing to pay even 15 shekels per month to educate their children at age 3 or 4. Most public pre-mandatory schools charge 280 shekels per month.

Compulsory Kindergartens Swallow up Pre-Schools

Of 450 classes missing now in Jerusalem, at least 100 are pre-school classes. Knesset Member Tamar Eshel said that, especially in new neighborhoods, the compulsory kindergartens swallow up the pre-schools. The government is not willing to give one shekel to the building of schools for ages 3-4. For older children the government must allocate funds, and even there the money is late. The city has great difficulty getting funds for schools for 4-year-olds in new neighborhoods.

Another problem is the extremely high tuition. This year's pre-school tuition is 28,000 pounds per year. Next year, according to Tamar Eshel, it is expected to rise to 70,000 pounds (7,000 shekels) per year. This year some 1,000 children out of 5,000 were taken out, namely, 20 percent. Next year will be worse.

The new neighborhoods are populated with young couples. All of them are up to their neck in mortgage payments, and depend on the paycheck of both spouses. Without proper solution for the schooling of the young, the mother cannot go to work. The Ministry of Housing builds schools in the new neighborhoods with first through sixth grades, but no pre-schools. The education department officials in the city of Jerusalem are openly worried that it is precisely in the new neighborhoods the schools will have to go into a second shift in 1982.

Integrated Enrollment Zones for First Grade

Yoel Shiftan, director of the city's education department, is a great believer in integration as a means for building a more cohesive society in the next generation. In order for school integration to succeed, those kindergarten children which need special attention have to be brought up to grade level. Kindergartens in poor neighborhoods in the city are 2 to 3 year schools. The teachers work on language skills and cultural enrichment.

In the second educational phase, namely, the elementary level, the city has introduced integrated enrollment zones for first grade. Children from different neighborhoods are enrolled in first grade without specifying a school. The city, aided by principals and teachers of the lower grades, assigns students to various schools of the same type from different areas in a balanced manner. Each year the number of parents who give inaccurate information about their place of residence in order to have their child sent to a better school decreases.

The third phase of integration takes place in the intermediate grades. The educational reform has affected four public schools--Beit Hinuh, Denmark, Rene Cassin, and Ziff. Next year the intermediate grades will be integrated in Rehavia. Parents who originally opposed integration, have now accepted the policy of the city and the Ministry of Education.

Public-religious schools are yet to integrate their intermediate grades.

9565
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NEW INDUSTRIAL MATERIALS DEVELOPED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 May 81 p 8

[Article by Mordkhay Artzieli: "Industrial Application for Inventions Developed at Negev University"]

[Text] Two revolutionary inventions in the area of plastics and ceramics, the result of research by two scientists recently arrived from the Soviet Union and Romania which was done at the Institute of Applied Research at Ben-Gurion University in the Negev, are being used industrially.

The first invention, credited to Dr Yuli Lieberman, who came 5 years ago from the Soviet Union, is a material stronger than steel and resistant to corrosion. This new material is made of 90 percent sand, 3 percent glass fiber, and the rest special adhesive materials derived from plastic.

This material can be used for making floor tiles for chemical plants, fireproof bricks, decorative coating, and even construction frames usually made of iron. Dr Yoel Schechter, director of the Institute of Applied Research at Ben-Gurion University, says there is no reason why future building may not be made of this material which can replace steel beams.

The industrial application of the invention is done by the Dan-Con Company which was recently established. More than $1 million were invested in the company by Israeli, Canadian, and American investors. The company will soon build a semi-industrial plant and then a large plant which will employ hundreds of workers. It was disclosed that a large West German company has shown interest in the new material and may enter into partnership.

The second invention is credited to Dr Dov Yoashko who came from Romania 4 years ago, and has since worked for the same institute as Dr Lieberman. He has developed a new method of making small complex ceramic items for use in electronic and chemical industries. These items have been made until now from iron, yet ceramics are more resistant to heat, corrosion, and abrasion.

The raw material for this invention is aluminium which is imported from abroad, but the added value of the product is high.

Both inventions have been patented in Israel and abroad.

The investors who work on using the first invention have already established a new company to make use of the second. Their representative is now in Germany, ordering equipment for the new enterprise.

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MILITARY INDUSTRY DISPLAYS NEW WEAPONS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 May 81 p 3

[Article by Tzvi Harel: "Three Military Industry 'Hits'--Mini-Uzi, MAG, Arrow Shell"]

[Text] IDF tank crews will soon receive a new type of personal weapon: Mini-Uzi sub-machinegun, recently developed by the weapons' developing enterprises (MPLN) of the Military Industry. The miniature version of the Uzi was displayed yesterday in public for the first time along with three other new weapons, at the Industry's exhibition in Tel Aviv, attended by 12,000 people.

The push for developing the mini-Uzi came because of IDF tank crew rescue problems, exacerbated by heavy weapons. Despite its reduced size, the new Uzi's characteristics are not compromised. On the contrary: its rate of fire is 1200 rounds per minute as compared to 850 in a regular Uzi.

The length of the mini-Uzi with its butt folded is 35 centimeters. A regular Uzi is 44 centimeters long. Total length of mini-Uzi with butt is 60 centimeters, or 6 centimeters less than the regular model.

It was made known that the demand for this new weapon went up when it was recently seen in pictures showing it used by President Reagan's body guards. Potential buyers are police departments around the world.

The mini-Uzi is equipped with a "deviation compensator" installed at the opening of the barrel. Its purpose is to push the barrel down, since it was found out that a short barrel tends to go up when fired.

Israeli MAG

Another weapon which was displayed at the exhibition, the second ever put on by the Military Industry, is a MAG medium machinegun. The Israeli MAG, developed by the Military Industry, is a copy of the Belgian MAG which has been used by the IDF for years. It can be carried by hand and can be mounted on a tripod in a vehicle.

Galil Sniper's Rifle



Mini-Uzi sub-machinegun

"Arrow" Shell

The MAG, known for its reliability, is used by the armed forces of the United States. "The MAG production," Mr Tzvi Yarom, director of the MPLN said yesterday, "has enabled us to contend with highly reliable technologies."

"Arrow" Shell Shown to the Public

A new exhibit shown to thousands of visitors was the "Arrow" shell, which was shown for the first time to military correspondents a week ago. The shell intended for tank guns (105 millimeter) is stabilized by fins.

Since it was first produced in 1977, the shell has been purchased from the Military Industry for over half a billion pounds. Among the buyers were NATO countries which bought 300,000 rounds. The shell does not spin in flight but is stabilized by its fins. It can penetrate steel.

Galil Sniper's Rifle

The fourth new exhibit is a sniper's rifle made by the Military Industry's "Blue and White" division. It is a new model of the Galil rifle.

In addition to the above, additional weapons which were made by the Military Industry when it was run by the Haganah were shown. One such weapon, a 52 millimeter mortar, is still manufactured by the Industry.

MPLN enterprises employ thousands of people (the Military Industry employs a total of 15,000 people). MPLN Director Tzvi Yarom maintains that the plant at Kiriat Shmoneh which employs hundreds of workers, is one of the most important. Most of our employees in Kiriat Shmoneh, Yarom says with satisfaction, are under 30. They provide an important economic base for both the Military Industry and Kiriat Shmoneh.

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BRIEFS

NEW SNIPER TELESCOPE--A new sniper aiming telescope named Nimrod was recently developed in Israel. It will be attached to the new Galil sniper's rifle which was displayed in public for the first time during Independence Day. This was reported by IDF weekly BAMAHANEH this week. The Nimrod telescope is the "last word" in telescopic sights for military use. Its durability and low price have caused interest in many countries, which would like to buy it for military or police use. The instrument was developed by Alex Eliraz of Kur in cooperation with the Military Industry. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 May 81 p 6] 9565

CSO: 4323/17

JUMAYYIL'S CONTACTS WITH FOLLOWUP COMMITTEE DETAILED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 60, 20 Jun 81 pp 26-27

/Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Lebanon: AL-MUSTAQBAL Carries Details of Dialogue Between Followup Committee and Bashir al-Jumayyil; Phalangist Official: 'Statement of Severance of Relationship With Israel Is With Sarkis and Will Be Broadcast by Palace as Soon as Agreement on Arab Guarantees Is Reached'"/

/Excerpt/ Beirut--Informed Phalangist sources have revealed that Envoy Philip Habib reviewed in detail with Bashir al-Jumayyil the dialogue he had with the Arab Followup Committee throughout two meetings: The first at the level of ministers of foreign affairs and the second at the level of ambassadors. After the meeting, the U.S. envoy emerged with several impressions, including the impression that even though the committee has not reached full understanding with the Christian side represented by the Phalanges, it has been able to establish basic principles in accordance with which to work in order to reach an understanding. The Followup Committee members have left Beirut but the door to their return is open, with big hope of achieving positive results. It has also been said that Habib has started efforts in Beirut to create a positive atmosphere for the second stage of the Arab Followup Committee's work so as to contribute to bringing success to its mission. He has worked in this regard with the Maronite leaderships, particularly with Bashir al-Jumayyil, the commander of the Lebanese Forces, who has seemed to be the man with the final say on anything projected by the Arab Followup Committee.

Official sources say that Bashir al-Jumayyil's position is what has delayed announcement by the Arab Followup Committee of a number of security measures and political steps to put the Lebanese crisis on the path to a sound solution after approval of a permanent cease-fire, and what has made the committee content itself with the statement which it has issued and which is confined to underlining the commitment of the various parties to the cease-fire.

One of the official reports on the meetings and contacts of the Arab Followup Committee in Bayt al-Din and Beirut notes that the issue of the relationship with Israel was the basis of every discussion with the Lebanese Front leaderships, especially with Bashir al-Jumayyil.

The Arab Committee has notified the Phalangist leadership that the relationship with Israel is rejected by the Arabs and that continuing this relationship means the creation of an Arab position against the front dealing with Israel and putting this front in the enemy camp.

The Saudi and Kuwaiti ministers of foreign affairs have stressed to Bashir al-Jumayyil the need to adopt positions that put an end to any existing relationship with Israel and that restore cooperation with the Arab countries because this is the only way to bring Lebanon out of its tribulation, to find solutions for its problem and to restore it to normalcy. Ministers Sa'ud al-Faysal and Sabah al-Ahmad have asked the Lebanese Forces commander to issue a statement ending any involvement or relationship with Israel and underlining abidance by the Arab solution and the adoption of Arab initiatives confirming the credibility of this position.

In principle, Bashir al-Jumayyil has agreed to respond after stressing that the Arab countries, or at least some of them, shoulder the responsibility for the relationship with Israel because the right to self-defense is legitimate and dictates cooperating with anybody when necessary. He has also assured the Saudi and Kuwaiti ministers that the Phalange Party and its allies are fully ready to sever the relationship not only with Israel but with any other side with whom the Arab countries ban dealings. He has also made known the party's readiness to declare this position and to abide by it in return for having the Arab countries shoulder their responsibility toward Lebanon and its Christians and for having these countries give the Christians the guarantees that reassure them about their future.

This position has been considered a good basis for drawing up a work plan that begins with the announcement of a cease-fire to be followed by the implementation of measures that abolish the armed manifestations and put an end to the propaganda campaigns. A political dialogue is then to follow in order to solve the disagreement over the Lebanese army's role and then to embark on a search for a detente formula.

When the ambassadors committee conveyed to Bashir al-Jumayyil at B'abda Palace these results which were reached by the Arab Followup Committee, this committee asked him for the statement he had promised to issue on ending the relationship with Israel.

Bashir al-Jumayyil's reply was: "We have put the statement you are asking us for at the disposal of the president of the republic and he now has it. But before this, we want the Arab guarantees that must be given to us. We want these guarantees to come through the legitimate authority and to be presented to it."

An argument then took place over the role of the legitimate authority and of the guarantees. The Arab Committee asserted that there is no such thing as guarantees because "to us, the guarantee lies in an understanding over a comprehensive projection and an executive plan to solve the Lebanese crisis. This projection is to be approved and agreed upon with the legitimate authority and not with any other faction."

Bashir al-Jumayyil replied: "We also want everything to be done through the legitimate authority. When the Arab Followup Committee presents to us the solution plan, we will discuss it. If we find it acceptable, you can then ask for the statement ending the relationship with Israel from the president of the republic."

Upon returning to Bayt al-Din Palace and reviewing the outcome of this meeting with Bashir al-Jumayyil, President Ilyas Sarkis said that he has the statement but that its announcement is tied to the guarantees about which the Phalange talk.

Consequently, the committee delayed the adoption of any measures and contented itself with the statement it had issued. Agreement was then reached to hold a meeting at the level of ministers of foreign affairs in Riyadh on the 23rd of this month to discuss the work plan and the executive program to solve the Lebanese crisis, to determine the committee's projections in this regard and to hold another meeting at Bayt al-Din Palace on 4 July 1981 and declare this plan after its approval by the main parties.

Last week, there were active contacts along several Lebanese-Syrian axes and Saudi-Syrian-Lebanese axes, in addition to the series of contacts which President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Wazzan held with the various Lebanese sides and which led to formulating a final draft of a Lebanese working paper to be presented to the Riyadh meeting.

But Slowly

The calm that has prevailed on the frontlines in the Lebanese capital as a result of the various parties' abidance by the cease-fire has been a positive indicator which has strengthened the hope in the possibility that the Arab Followup Committee will reach positive results and solutions in the second phase of its mission. But the situation in Lebanon and the area generally does not call for excessive optimism because the path to establishing solutions that secure the required stability is still mined, especially since the outcome of the Israeli elections will inevitably have a role in full success or failure or partial success or failure.

It must be pointed out here that 4 July has been set as the date for the return of the Arab Followup Committee to meet here in Lebanon so that the Israeli elections may be over and the results announced. Many fear a win by Menachem Begin's bloc in these elections because Begin's return to power will undoubtedly make the Arab Committee's task more difficult.

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CSO: 4304/44

REPORT ON DOMESTIC ISSUES, WESTERN SAHARA REFERENDUM

Immediate Action Urged

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 29, 25 Jul p 1

[Editorial]

[Text]

IF HE is serious, King Hassan's proposal for a 'controlled referendum' to solve the Western Sahara conflict must be acted upon immediately, both by the African states who have agreed to arbitrate in the dispute and by the Polisario Front guerrillas who for years have been fighting for the former Spanish colony.

We will know that King Hassan is serious when he agrees to enter into direct negotiations with the Polisario. As a staunch defender of the Palestinian struggle against Israel, King Hassan must find an uncomfortable parallel between the PLO's quest for international legitimacy and that of the Polisario, whose state-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, has been recognised by over half the Organisation for African Unity's members, despite Morocco's loud protests.

A referendum, overseen by 'impartial' African countries and the United Nations, would probably show that most Western Saharans prefer independence to their present status as a Moroccan province. But this would not be the blow for King Hassan that it seems. First, Morocco has no need for Western Sahara phosphates: it already owns 50bn tonnes, three quarters of the world's known reserves.

Second, Spain left little to the Saharans following its hasty departure from the colony; a Polisario republic could only survive by keeping close economic ties with Morocco and neighbouring Algeria, which along with Libya, has backed the guerrillas, against the king. And with a ceasefire struck, Morocco and Algeria could once again restore mutual trade links.

But as King Hassan well knows, life is not quite that simple. A withdrawal now might be turned against him; he has enemies in the army and opposition, and their numbers have grown after his handling of the food riots in Casablanca. Hassan is a skilled statesman, however, and could weather such attacks.

A long-standing popular joke in the kingdom aptly illustrates this: Hassan is sitting at a cabinet meeting in Rabat with the country's top politicians, generals and technocrats when suddenly in bursts the king's most faithful servant, Colonel Dlimi. 'Sire,' whispers Dlimi in his ear, 'bad news from Skhirat. Robbers and thieves are looting your palace there.' The king quickly surveys his assembled cabinet, then replies: 'Impossible, Dlimi, all the robbers and thieves of the kingdom are here in this room with me.'

'Controlled Referendum'

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 10-17

[Article by Stephen Hughes and Tim McGirk]

[Text] King Hassan's unexpected proposal of a 'controlled referendum' on the Western Sahara issue, which astounded delegates at the OAU summit in Narobi, was made after a series of behind-the-scenes Moroccan diplomatic initiatives, notably with Libya. The suggestion was surprising, partly because the Moroccan army seems to be containing the Polisario rather well at present, and partly because Moroccan national unity could be weakened by the disappearance of a common enemy. Financial imperatives may hold the answer — the war, now in its sixth year, has been costly, and Morocco's income has been hit by the decline in the phosphate market. Removal of food subsidies in May led to serious rioting in several towns, causing the government to about-turn swiftly. On pages 10-17, Stephen Hughes and Tim McGirk analyse the economic and political state of the nation.

There are prospects of peace in the Western Sahara conflict for the first time in over five years, but a great deal of wrangling lies ahead before any form of political settlement can be achieved.

King Hassan's surprise proposal of a 'controlled referendum,' a suggestion adopted by the OAU summit in Nairobi, appears to be the only way out of a political and military deadlock. But there is no guarantee that it would defuse the conflict completely. Hevertheless, the OAU has set up an 'implementation committee' to carry out a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire and the organisation of a referendum for the 'general and regular self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara.'

Composed of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania, the committee has full powers to settle the details 'in collaboration with the parties to the conflict,' and is due to meet before the end of August.

The main problems it faces are the presence of Moroccan administration and some 30,000 troops in the Western Sahara, deciding who and how many people will be eligible to vote, and what role if any will be played by the Polisario Front,' whose guerrillas have been fighting for independence in the disputed territory.

King Hassan's view, expressed unequivocally at a news conference in Rabat after the Nairobi meeting, is that on no account will his army or administration be withdrawn. To support this attitude he cited the cases of Algeria, Djibouti and Zimbabwe, where troops stayed put during similar consultations. Hassan also said that only people registered in the 1974 Spanish census, irrespective of their present whereabouts, can vote in the referendum. The Spanish census counted 73,497 Saharans, which means that the area's present population is probably around 100,000.

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The monarch added that there could be no 'secessionist campaign', meaning he would not tolerate any 'foreigners' calling for independence in the region. He thereby practically eliminated any potential choice for voters.

The Polisario's view — shared by its main backer, Algeria — is that the king's conception of the referendum is merely as a plebiscite to rubber-stamp the accomplished fact of the Moroccan takeover. In communiques and comments in the official press, the Polisario and Algeria have made it clear that there will be no ceasefire unless Morocco accepts direct negotiations with the Polisario, a suggestion flatly refused so far by Hassan.

The Polisario's 'indispensable conditions' for a self-determination referendum are the withdrawal of the Moroccan army and administration, the return of all Saharan refugees, and the installation of a provisional international administration which includes representatives of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

The Moroccan and Polisario positions are therefore irreconcilable and the outcome depends on what the seven-nation implementation committee decides, with the assistance of the UN and the OAU, in consultation with the belligerents.

Of the committee members, Mali, Sierra Leone and Tanzania are considered pro-Polisario, since they are among the 26 African states to have officially recognised the SADR, while the Sudan, Guinea and Kenya tend to favour Morocco. This leaves Nigeria as a 'neutral' with the determining vote.

A bitter polemic is bound to rage over the question of the number of estimated eligible voters. In the meantime, although the Polisario says it will continue to wage its guerrilla war, its ability to do so has been considerably limited by a number of significant new factors.

To begin with, the Moroccan army has mastery of the terrain, or at least of what is called the 'useful Sahara' — the main towns and mines — around which an extensive defence network running to about 450km has been built.

Western military experts who have seen them say the defences are very effective, and it would take the firepower of a Panzer tank division to smash through them. They are composed of 'berms', or three-metre-high ridges, barbed-wire entanglements, minefields and electronic sensors that can detect the slightest movement. At intervals they are backed up by fixed positions housing small garrisons and, at wider intervals, by mobile intervention forces and aircraft within a few minutes' striking distance.

The success of these defences is indicated by the fact that there have been no big Polisario attacks for months; when the guerrillas tried to prove they were still a force to be reckoned with after Nairobi, the best they could manage was the shelling of two Moroccan positions from a distance of 20km.

Another constraint for the Polisario is the sudden reconciliation between Morocco and Mauritania, brought about at the behest of King Khaled of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis supply both countries with substantial financial aid and were in a position to force the Mauritanian president, Colonel Mohammed Khouna Ould Haydalla, to make peace with King Hassan in the interests of Arab unity.

Although President Haydalla is an ardent Polisario supporter, he was obliged to sign an accord agreeing to ban the use of his territory for attacks on Morocco by the Polisario, whose last major offensive last March on Guelta Zemmour was launched from the Mauritanian side of the froniter. The loss of Mauritanian sanctuary means the Polisario is in theory confined to Algerian territory for its rear bases: this area is opposite the apparently-impenetrable new Moroccan defences.

A third factor is Libya's offer to restore normal relations with Morocco, again in the interests of Arab unity. This implies that Colonel Qaddafi is prepared radically to change his attitude to the Polisario. King Hassan said recently that he has yet to obtain any formal undertaking from Libya that it will modify its support for the Polisario. Relations between the two countries have not been restored.

The prospect of peace in the western Sahara is already having an effect in Morocco. The King managed to forge national unity over the issue in the past, but

with a settlement in sight there are signs that this unity is breaking up.

The Casablanca riots, in which between 66 (the official figure) and 637 (the opposition figure), are said to have died, were the result of widespread discontent over higher prices for basic foods introduced by the government at a time when the country is suffering from one of the worst droughts in decades.

The violence was touched off by clashes between rival trade unions, when the Union Marocaine du Travail (UMT) refused to join a nationwide general strike called by the Confederation Democratique du Travail (CDT), which is allied to the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), the main opposition party. The UMT drivers wanted to keep the city buses running, so CDT militants smashed or set fire to fifty of them, sparking a wave of violence such as Casablanca had not seen in 16 years.

In the aftermath of the riots, 2,000 are to stand trial, the opposition press is suspended indefinitely, and what is called by the opposition 'the most brutal repression' on the part of the authorities strengthened the USFP in its determination to pull its 16 representatives out of parliament.

This would leave the king with a rubber-stamp assembly and the opposition free to agitate for economic and social reforms just when an end to the Sahara war is likely to encourage dissent at home.

For the moment, King Hassan is keeping his counsel. He expressed no anger about the violence, just regretted that it had coincided with a crucial moment for Morocco at Nairobi. He even said Casablanca had a 'good record' in the past, adding that justice would take its course, and implied that he could later exercise royal clemency and thereby patch up his relations with the opposition.

DEVASTATED by a terrible drought, many farmers in Morocco abandoned their parched acres on the edge of the desert and headed for the dirty, tin-shack shantytowns surrounding Casablanca. Bread was cheap, but the new arrivals found little else: there were no jobs, and few schools and hospitals. Only violent crime seemed plentiful.

Then they could no longer afford the bread: following strict budgetary advice from International Monetary Fund experts, the impoverished Moroccan government last May slashed subsidies on flour, sugar, oil and other commodities. Soon afterwards, on 20 June, rioting spread through Casablanca's slums like an uncontrollable brushfire. When armed security forces finally quelled the disturbances, at least 66 people (the government figure) had been killed, hundreds injured and 2,000 demonstrators, mainly trade unionists and members of the opposition Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), jailed. Opposition sources claim the death toll was much higher, and eyewitnesses say that as a way of hiding the high casualty rate, the police made house-to-house searches for corpses and quietly dragged them off to the city morgue.

After the riots, which also broke out in the capital, Rabat, Fez and Marrakesh, King Hassan wasted no time in restoring at least partial commodity subsidies. But the damage was done. In the aftermath of the disturbances, many bankers wondered if the IMF demands — both on Morocco and other struggling low-income countries — had been unreasonable to begin with. After all, they said, the point of the IMF is to prop up governments, especially those of pro-American allies like King Hassan, not hasten their downfall.

As one US banker in London remarked: 'Morocco has one of the biggest financial imbalances in the Middle East. In these cases any readjustment over a short period of time is extremely painful. There's always a danger that the government gets hurt.' This banker added that the IMF policy, in fact, is more lenient to relative paupers like Morocco today than it was in the early 1970s, when the lending institution demanded 'impossible' results within 12 months.

At stake is a $1bn credit for Morocco, arranged by the IMF last October. The money comes in instalments over the next three years, and if the IMF thinks Morocco isn't tightening its belt fast enough it can — and may — cancel the credit facility. When asked if the demands on Morocco might have been too harsh, an IMF official in Washington retored: 'If a country's in a mess, a remedy has to be found whether there's an IMF or not. We don't impose measures, only suggest them. So it's up to the Moroccan government to decide how the measures are implemented.'

However, in the case of Morocco, the IMF's prescriptions were quite specific: reform taxes, shape up the export industries — phosphates, fisheries and agriculture — and take an axe to government spending, including subsidies on consumer goods. Yet King Hassan could not have picked a worse time for unpopular cutbacks. The Western Sahara war between the king's armies and the Polisario Front Saharan tribesmen has dragged into its sixth year, and only through massive loans from Saudi Arabia can Morocco cover its war costs. Even so, its ill-equipped navy can do nothing to stop foreign vessels from poaching fish along Morocco's 1,200km coastline. In addition, drought has killed off nearly one third of Morocco's livestock and withered most of this year's grain crop.

To make matters worse, sales of Morocco's main export, phosphate — an essential fertiliser ingredient — have fallen off drastically. *Green Markets*, the authoritative fertiliser periodical based in Washington, US, claims that the price for Moroccan triplesuperphosphate, a type of phosphoric acid, has tumbled from $210 a tonne in February 1980 to a present $145. Phosphate rock, of which Morocco has the world's largest reserves, also fell in price.

Phosphate sellers around the world were hurt by Washington's decision to halt Occidental Petroleum Corporation sales of 700,000 tonnes of enriched phosphate to the Soviet Union. 'When Oxy couldn't sell it to the Russians, they put it on the American market,' observed one fertiliser expert. This dumping occurred at a time when poor crops and high interest rates in the US — by far the largest single market for phosphate — forced the price down further still. 'There are companies in Florida and Louisiana (the main phosphate mining belt in the US) who aren't even recovering their production costs,' said a *Green Markets* analyst.

Another snag for Morocco is the appearance of new competitors in an already-overcrowded market. South Africa, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Mexico and Australia will begin exporting significant quantities of rock and phosphoric acids within the next three years, according to experts. Although still the biggest exporter of phosphate rock in the world, Moroccan sales dwindled by 8.6 per cent last year, while US producers saw their share of the market leap by 27 per cent. Faced with low demand and persistent attacks on their open mine at Bu Graa by Polisario guerrillas, the Moroccans suspended their controversial sales of phosphates from Western Sahara, a territory Morocco annexed from Spain, in a somewhat debatable manoeuvre, in February 1976.

The phosphate market is expected to remain slack through 1981 according to industry analysts, so Morocco cannot count on a sudden boost in sales to replenish its empty treasuries. As it stands, all of Morocco's phosphate revenues go to cover oil imports, with no cash left over for improving other key economic sectors that might provide more jobs. Recent findings by the World Bank — which Morocco angrily disputes — report that nearly one third of the country's 20m population fall below the bank's absolute poverty line.

However. King Hassan has friends in high places. American banking sources in London doubted that the IMF would withhold the remaining instalments of the credit should King Hassan decide that to comply with the IMF measures would lead to more rioting. 'The biggest noise in the IMF is still the US,' said one banker. 'You can expect the Americans and the Saudis to back any Moroccan demand for financial aid.'

Still, even with emergency cash infusions from its powerful allies, the problems that led to the Casablanca riots will remain. Although Premier Maati Bouabid's government swiftly rescinded its decision to cut food subsidies by 40 per cent, there is still an average 20 per cent increase on sugar, oil, milk, butter and flour. It is estimated that Moroccans spend most of their earnings on these five staples.

Like most agricultural people, bread for the Moroccans holds a religious--and highly political--significance. Every household, even in the tin shantytowns of Casablanca, makes its own 'hobbes' a flat, platter-shaped loaf that is often decorated with a small crescent or star so that a family can tell their bread apart from other loaves at the public ovens. The three basic ingredients for bread--flour, water and salt--are represented one every mosque in the kingdom by three metal spheres mounted on top of each minaret. For most Moroccans bread is an alienable right. And unless Hassan can guarantee them bread, and cheap bread at that, his kingdom is in trouble.

KING HASSAN of Morocco, had he not inherited a poor but durable monarchy from his father, Mohammed V, would have made a great escape artist. By his own account, the 52-year-old king has survived 16 assassination attempts and held onto his throne while wars, military coups and rebellions raged in the desert states around him. It came as no surprise, then, that Hassan slipped nimbly away from the box of swords that awaited him at the Organisation of African Unity summit in Nairobi.

Backed into a corner over his Western Sahara policy — over half the OAU states recognise the claims of the tribesmen fighting for the independence of the Western Sahara — King Hassan stunned the Nairobi summit. He made the unexpected, and seemingly conciliatory, announcement that Morocco would agree to a 'controlled referendum' as a means of ending the costly six-year war.

The first stage would be a ceasefire with the Polisario Front guerrillas. Armed by Algeria and Libya, the guerrillas use a base in Tindouf, Algeria, from which to launch their hit-and-run raids on Moroccan outposts in the Western Sahara. Step number two calls for a referendum — supervised by OAU and UN observers — of all true 'Saharans' both inside the Moroccan-occupied territory and in the Tindouf refugee camps.

Political observers are divided as to the intentions behind Hassan's sleight of hand in Nairobi. Some say he is only stalling for time, that given the riots in Casablanca, the military and the opposition parties would seize on the pretext of an unpopular Saharan withdrawal to oust him. Other observers claim Hassan realises that a settlement to the war, and renewed economic ties with Algeria, would give the Rabat government a chance to repair Morocco's social and economic damage.

The king himself has been predictably vague. Western diplomats in Washington and Europe following the desert conflict say that Hassan will stop short of direct negotiations with the Polisario Front — one of the guerrillas' conditions for a ceasefire. The king constantly refers to the Polisario and their Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as 'a gang of mercenaries.' And at Nairobi, Moroccan delegates brawled with the Saharans.

However, Hassan found himself a surprise ally in Libya's Colonel Moammar Qaddafi. Once bitter enemies, Qaddafi and Hassan found it politic to mend their old quarrels. Libya wanted to rally all Arab countries against Israel's air raid on the Baghdad nuclear reactor.

On the African side, Qaddafi wanted at the very least to fend off OAU criticism of Libyan intervention in Chad. At the most he wanted African leaders gathered in Nairobi to agree that the next OAU summit be held in Tripoli. Qaddafi achieved both goals, and his jubilant secretary for external affairs, Ali Abdel Salem Tariki, called a press conference in Nairobi where he boasted that Libya had been 'the star of the show'.

Morocco certainly provided backstage assistance: had he wished, King Hassan could have mustered enough African allies to give the Libyan delegates an angry reception. However, several weeks before the OAU summit, Hassan had dispatched a squadron of diplomats to 90 countries, in a bid to explain Libya's actions in North Africa.

Shortly before the summit, Qaddafi asked Palestinian Chief Yasser Arafat, one of the few Arab leaders able to travel between Tripoli and Rabat with impunity, to intercede with Hassan. Reliable diplomatic sources in London told *8 Days* that Hassan had agreed to keep quiet at the OAU summit about Libyan troops in Chad in exchange for a withdrawal of Qaddafi's support for the Polisario. Reports of this arrangement, however, were brushed aside by King Hassan at a press conference in Rabat and also by the Polisario Front representative in London, who said that Libya was still supporting the guerrillas.

Hassan's other unfinished business at the African summit was with Mauritania. When President Mohammed Ould Haydalla accused Hassan of plotting to overthrow him in an attempted military coup earlier this year, the Moroccan king stormed out of the Nairobi conference hall. Morocco's diplomatic ties with Mauritania frayed soon after the desperately poor Nouakchott government walked out of the Western Sahara agreement, effectively abandoning its share of the former Spanish colony to the Polisario guerrillas. It was left to the Saudis, who provide both countries with sizeable financial assistance, to insist that Morocco and Mauritania end their bickering.

CSO: 4500/27

BRIEFS

ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION OF CASABLANCA--On 22 July, Prime Minister Maati Bouabid announced the decision to divide Casablanca into five prefectures. They are Casablanca-Anfa, 1,600,000 inhabitants; Hay Mohamedi-Ain Sebaa, 600,000 inhabitants; Ain Chock-Hay Hassani, 500,000 inhabitants; Ben Msik-Sidi Othmane, 800,000 inhabitants; and Mohamedia, formerly called Fedalah, 250,000 inhabitants. [Excerpts] [Paris LE MONDE in French 31 Jul 81 p 3]

APPOINTMENT OF PREFECTS--On 28 July 1981, His Majesty the King appointed the following prefects for the five newly created prefectures: Ahmad al-Fizazi, Casablanca-Anfa; Ahmad Shawqi, al-Mohamadi-Ain al-Sebaa; Mustafa al-'Alami, Ben Msik-Sidi Othmane; Larbi Ouezzani, Hay al-Hassani-Ain al-Chok; and 'Abdallah Ouezzani, al-Mohamadia-Zenata. [Excerpt] [Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 30 Jul 81 pp 1, 5]

CSO: 4504/50

POTENTIAL OF NEW ANTIGOVERNMENT ALLIANCE REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 22-28 Jun, 29 Jun-5 Jul 81

/Article by Muhammad al-Hasan Khalil: "Studies on the Progressive National and Domestic Alliance"/

/22-28 Jun 81 pp 35-37/

/Text/ The phenomenon of alliances among political forces which are agreed on the goals they are trying to achieve is not a new one, and it did not begin with the emergence of parties and political movements in the modern era. However, points of congruence of concurrence between different approaches can be strategic, tactical or both together. What distinguishes one alliance from another? The model to which the writer is referring in this study is that of the alliance between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (Sudanese region).

Strategic alliances are combative forms of action which become crystallized through the powers of persons with specific expertise in struggling in the context of a common notion in order to provide the forms of political, movemental and organizational interaction which are best able to achieve a long-range goal.

All political alliances are broad consensuses regarding numerous points through which the organization of various aspects of common political experience is attained and the alliances are transformed into a guide to action dealing with issues on which a unified vision is formed.

Alliances, on this level, evolve from a common vision to a common formula. While every alliance is the result of a political consensus, every alliance contains specific combative duties; that is, it requires that missions be performed, some of which are direct and and concern every party to the alliance individually, some of which are common. Thus alliances are a vision on the one hand and an activity on the other.

Political alliances do not exist in a vacuum, because they are the product of sufferings and needs which respond to the goals of those in the alliance, be these goals tentative or not. Alliances take place among parties, and each party to an alliance has his specific vision in the context of his special objectives; alliances embody the most advanced form of consensus, and in themselves are a summary of positions expressive of common elements in combative relations and political

visions, as proof of a rapprochement which has a background and dimensions that elevate it above the level of random activities of the moment.

/Two lines missing/ the necessity to create an integrated platform for what is actually being established, such as higher tentative goals for the alliance lying within a conception of the parties connected to it. Thus every alliance has a specific context that brings the forces in the alliance together, but they do not merge totally. Alliances are a process of filling the gap in political rapprochement and creating commong ground for establishing goals and slogans which will deal with issues in a stage of struggle.

/Two lines missing/ forms of political action observing the aspects of differences and concurrence in positions.

Every process of consensus must have a purpose in order to attain some objective. Here it is worth distinguishing between tactical and strategic alliances.

Tactical alliances are marked by the particular nature of common goals, in isolation from estimates of political gains that may concern them; therefore they have a higher character of /two lines missing/, in fact do not commit themselves to provide them or to provide the means to lead to them.

Strategic alliances, to the contrary, are distinguished by embodying the general interest of the people, with a clear line defining commitments, providing a view of a historic reality covering an entire stage.

Alliances concentrate on these objectives, on the one hand. They also create the formulas which will make it possible to attain these goals and in their circumstances they are conditioned by means which offer the greatest potential, through organized joint effort. On this basis, it is necessary that every alliance be based on an integrated conception of each party's role and at the same time on each party's position. Through this preliminary glance, we can state that alliances are the totality of specific circumstances that is imparted to joint political action. Every joint activity in a political alliance is founded on an objective vision of the nature of the political and social struggle and battle which is endorsed by the principle of organizational independence; that is, the parties to every alliance preserve organizational independence and this constitutes the objective based that provides the potential for combative struggle and places that at the service of the goals which produces the alliance. Here is where we find the practical importance of interaction among forces and formulations in the alliance, to enable the alliance to evolve from its lower forms and patterns to higher forms, in accordance with the higher demands which the alliance has taken part in creating.

Alliances express an advanced state, and the pursuit of alliances develops until /two lines missing/ the conditions of the alliances. Thus every alliance is founded on the endorsement of a political entity composed of various parties. In another area, these different parties have specific positions and visions which they believe are the higher goals for which they are fighting; consequently, the alliance is based on a reality which justifies its existence as the joint action of independent parties.

Thus every alliance arises from the given facts of the actual situation in the popular arena, and this popular arena, and the way it is viewed in the light of the existence of the political forces, either partially or totally expresses specific mass aspirations.

What justifies any alliance is the existence of numerous forces which have their various roles, histories and circumstances of growth in terms of their premises and their orientations. The mere existence of an alliance means the absence of a political force which is equal or by nature possesses an equivalence to the arena of mass struggle and combat. Political alliance means adhering to a notion contrary to that of the monopolization of political action.

Thus we find that alliances are a product of the objective circumstances and actual demands and problems that face the process of mass struggle, unititing numerous parties while at the same time providing them with the wherewithal for launching unified joint action. Every alliance is engendered by needs, and the premises of every alliance become the equivalent of a general forward thrust which turns the alliance into something which is possible and which actually exists. Specific circumstances, sometimes temporary, occur and become the equivalent of political motives for the establishment of an alliance, but political motives for the establishing an alliance are not enough to establish an alliance.

Political alliances are founded on principles and bases, foremost of which must be the positive nature of the esteem each party has among the others, each party's political and historic course, and efforts exerted to unify the mass struggle, in addition to the strategic and theorectical aspect of the establishment of the alliance or the maximum objectives of the alliance. At this point we can concentrate on the subject of the alliance between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

The alliance between the Democractic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party was not established or born in a haphazard manner; rather, it emerged as the result of objective causes which made this alliance a necessity and an urgent act in order to establish optimum conditions for combative relations between the two parties. It is not the offspring of political happenstance, for instance the political quest of general popular demands for the unity of nationalist forces, nor it is an elitist consensus isolated from the progressive nationalist struggle. Rather it is, in essence, a defense of broad mass goals, and it casts the most concentrated light on issues on the domestic stage as well as the causes of the Arab nation.

It did not constitute a transitory conviction abstracted from its combative context from the beginning. It is the causes which produced this alliance that make us reach this conviction. Our national combative legacy causes us to dispense with any concern to arrive at this abstract truth in order to absorb the alliance, create a true front culture and be aware of the conceptions of this alliance, because there are many forms of temporary, haphazard political consensus which to a large degree have distorted the notions of organized political relations among the parties involved in national action. Therefore, if we are to grasp the alliance in an objective manner we must, at the outset, ascertain the initial developments which produced this alliance. The natioanlist arena in the nation of the Sudan witnessed

many struggles, before and after independence, and many shifts which have underlined the need for mass struggle in order to continue the national democratic liberation struggle which the national movement has embodied in its struggle against the old colonialism and for which our masses have struggled since independence.

The Sudan has also always been aspiring toward the future. Saving the country from a state of vacillation and building a road to the future in the face of the national struggle became the only route that would put an end to the state of fragmentation of national action, assuming the importance of creating an alliance which was able to inspire the masses and open the pathways to progress up before them — the pathways to real loyalty to the national legacy and the rising road to our people's long-range objectives of independence, sovereignty and progress.

Therefore the course of national development shows us how much more important strategic alliances are than tentative temporary ones.

What was the nature of alliances in the past?

In the past, alliances were connected to issues of power and were dependent on the forces which had the greatest power and resources for taking over the leadership of government in the Sudan. It was natural that many flaws should dominate such political relations. Basically they were beset by a state of a lack of vision of the problems of national development; in another area, their interrelations vacillated and were unstable.

Thus it is necessary to differentiate between obsolete tactical alliances which are characterized by the broad political coalition activity aimed at power, and political alliances with a strategic depth which keeps their sole concern from being one of transforming their strength into a mere ladder for rising to positions of power. In the context of the opposition, the former alliances were not organized, and they lacked the inspiration of mass struggle and the organization of such struggle about specific goals. They often took form on bases which were sometimes purely elitist and sometimes lay within sterile frameworks that did not have the strength to endure and did not reach a level of formulation and effectiveness that was worth mentioning. Therefore, these relations were formalistic and did not even cover an organizational dimension which could organize the masses' ranks in a fashion enabling them to take off and confront all circumstances obstructing national development. Perhaps the circumstances of military rule and the alliances which occurred in the context of military rule gave us forewarning of this fact — of the extent the popular Sudanese stage had reached in direct action at a time when active political forces were absent, indeed were surprised by the popular October revolution. This is one example which provides us guidance on the nature of relations among national action forces in a previous stage.

This issue created many interconnected situations, shuffled the cards and wasted opportunities for making a decisive distinction between fighting forces and reactionary forces, between forces which had stopped functioning and were paralyzing the country's development and the popular vanguard. The country of the Sudan continued to experience many spontaneous objective conditions but the forces of progressive national struggle were not united within the context of suitable mass training and

mass advancement toward the unification of their movement and consequently mass advanement toward confrontation of the challenges facing them. Thus the alliances in the previous stage were elitist in the sense that they did not touch upon the true nature of the people's struggle and movement proceeding from a base of mass struggle; thus these relations were not continuous but were dictated by transitory circumstances which the circumstances themselves invalidated. Therefore we can observe the degree of apathy that characterized these alliances: they were distinguished by maneuvering and all the means of distortion which weakened organized political relationships and kept them from exerting influence on the masses.

Consequently, a hastily-arranged context at the upper levels resulted in consensus, then dissension, among numerous political parties, imparting to them negative features and accumulated burdens, which consequently did not help create a natural atmosphere for rectifying the course of the national experiment. However, does that mean that the problem lay just in the form by which consensus was reached, or did the problem arise from the contradictory nature and internal tensions of this consensus, making the question legitimate and relevant?

Were the alliances created in a truly complete fashion? What are the features of the deficiencies which dominated these political links?

By the start of the era of independence, the parties had embarked on their first experiment following a number of schisms which arose from the links specific forces had with colonialism that placed them at the service of colonialism. Then occurred the process whereby the Sudan got its independence, and the actual situation in the country became subject to an alliance among those in power which produced many complications. It was under these conditions that the National Movement Party embarked upon the experience of governing. The party was divided within itself and this enabled reactionary forces to stalk their prey, lay bare their intentions and turn power into an instrument for imposing their tutelage upon the post-independence Sudan. At that stage, the National Movement Party did not possess a program which spelled out its positions on questions involving the national struggle, as a consequence of the rift within itself and its participation in power; it was experiencing subjective contradictions onthe one hand and contradictions with other parties on the other. This enabled the National Party, specifically, to hand power over, as it was unable to push through plans for a shift to neocolonialism in the Sudan in the framework of the first Sudanese parties that held power following independence.

By viture of the fact that it had come into being as the product of a national struggle of liberation, the National Action Party remained able to respond to an awareness of colonialsm's schemes on the popular scene at a time when the National Party, as was always the case with it, was trying to reap the benefit. The rift in the National Unionist Party in this early stage came about within a political and social context which was the expression of new elements that had started to be influenced at an early point in the post-independence stage; the National Party benefited from that, since it shifted from its status as a minority in the first parliament to real leadership of the first government in power in the post-independence stage. This constituted a gain for the National Party, in spite of its obsolete structure which was linked to colonialsm and to the exploitation of contradictions on behalf of the quasi-feudalist and bourgeois forces.

Dealing with this issue is not a technical matter of determining the extent of damage inflicted upon the democratic national movement in general; dealing with it, rather, is the product of the results derived from the experiment which ended with the betrayal of liberalism and the institutions of liberalism the movement had been claming to preserve. Thus the process of a shift in power from one characteristic to another was not a gradual one -- rather, it was a process of real transformation which occurred to the benefit of obsolete and reactionary forces and forces opposed to the development of the country. The debacle which befell the liberal experiment proved, in a manner that left no room for doubt, that the Sudan's shift from liberalism to military dictatorship just 2 years after independence was not a chance occurrence but rather was the result of mistakes in the experiment and the composition of the regime, which was contradictory in its own right, having a nationalist pole on the one hand and a subordinate pole on the other -- a joint experiment which could not ultimately succeed. Under military rule, once the forces which had handed power over to the military rule had proved that the new team would never hand power back as it had promised, the National Party in particular hastened to make a review of its own existence without meeting with the other parties; therefore that stage required that the National Party seek recourse in a new maneuver in order to benefit from the conditions of military rule.

However, the National Movement Party did not in turn benefit from these circumstances to unite its rank and weaken National Party influence in the context of the military regime. That was one aspect of the situation. Another was the meeting of the National Unionist Party, the National Party, the Communist Party and others in a manner which was governed by no conditions, in order to exploit the contradiction between the People's Democratic Party and the National Unionist Party in this vortex which the National Party strove to turn to its advantage in order to regain its credit after it had handed power over (a matter which is no secret).

The National Party's attempts were aimed at turning the front of parties within the framework of the regime into a National Party facade and thus this front quickly became a formal one which contented itself with memoranda, everything reverted to the way it was, and the front broke up of its own accord. This sort of wretched end was just the natural result of the preliminaries, which lacked sound features. This induced the Sudanese Communist Party to agree to become a party to the regime's institutions, and it entered the Central Council. In addition, sectors of this party entered the Central Council as a result, and this situation continued until the October revolution and the entry of the Sudan into a new stage.

Following the October revolution, the parties became accustomed to resuming their former relationships and the same rules, which had been retained, governed these relations. The situation following the October revolution bears witness to the establishment of successive governments, agreed to by various means, while the National Party, and the reactionary circles attached to the National Party, were scheming to establish a civilian dictatorship under the cover of the Islamic constitution (in hopes of retaining the balance in the national arena, which had been changed) and were continuing to advance new and modern forces and clear goals which the October revolution had presented and whose slogans it had emphasized. The Natonal Party brandished a serious weapon by dominating the national scene and hinting at the use of arms and the use of traditional powers to

terrorize the Sudanese national movement. However, the National Party was not itself able to remain united, as a result of numerous factors, and broke up internally. This was not, however, a qualitative rift and did not in reality bring about distinctive forces which would represent an advance over the traditional composition of this party. In the light of these circumstances, the National Movement Party reunited itself but it was the basic force for disruption in retaining the balance, in retaining the alliance with the National Party, in spite of its numerous attempts to put the ball into the National Party court and benefit from its contradictions. However, the character of the alliance remained largely intact and the political role of the National Party remained largely intact and the political role of the National Party remained as it was without any changes. Therefore, the domestic state of affairs experienced a deterioration on the political level, corruption on the economic level, and a readiness to suppress the national progressive struggle under the slogan of the suspect Islamic constitution, which was hostile to democratic freedoms, and a forcible transition occurred from which the second liberal experiment could not escape once it had broken apart.

In this stage, the National Party and the Moslem Brothers started to cope with the political situation through the regime for the sake of their own designs. Thus, by the time Democratic Unionist Party regained its unity, conditions had not corrected themselves, because to correct this situation would mean splitting off from the National Party and setting the National Movement Party off in a permanent fashion by alienating it from the positions of the National Party. After the 25 May coup, the political situation changed and the new regime in turn rapidly started to fall apart, take a hostile attitude toward democracy and the popular movement, stir up a thick cloud of slogans, and indeed present itself as an heir to the national struggle and an agent of the masses of our people; it began to set forth a fascistic platform a short time after it took over power.

In this stage, on the one hand the struggle between the forces of national struggle and the authorities became intensified and the opposition started to become organized, on the level of the Democratic Unionist Party and the masses of the al-Ansaw, and in the context of other parties and opposition political forces. Although the national front emerged in these circumstances, we find that new factors were added to the opposition process that actually furnished the National Movement Party with an opposition center after the political leadership which had been guiding the National Party had almost disappeared and consensus was achieved between the Democratic Unionist Party and the masses of the al-Ansar (but excluding the National Party). However, the opportunistic leadership of the National Party came back again and turned the national front into a vessel of which it became a part, in addition to the other remaining struggling forces, so that al-Sadiq al-Mahdi specifically could be a party to the national front and try to exploit the legacy of confrontation which had accumulated between the masses of the al-Ansar and the reactionary authorities. In this situation, which functioned within the new capabilities and resources to create an effective opposition led by the National Movement Party, an attempt was made to have the National Party recover its position and lead the national front — if not become an actual leader of it. This created a new condition which lay within the spirit of

vacillation and sometimes conflict over the essence of the propositions the national front was raising at that time, and reached the point where we found that the national front's program was self-contradictory and revealed nothing new. This to a large degree reflected the National Party's attempts to fragment the nationalist opposition which had started to organize itself between the Democratic Unionist Party and the masses of the al-Ansar. Thus the National Party and the Moslem Brothers worked to weaken this front, bargain with it and turn it into a formal opposition which contented itself with reaching a political settlement with the regime.

Thus the National Party remained true to its destructive role and pursued it inside the national front, in the company of the Moslem Brothers. The consequences of this development are well known to us, since these parties again adopted the same conspiratorial role they had been playing, detached themselves from the national front, and settled on the reconciliation as their political strategy. Here we find that the basic forces in the national front had rid themselves of these people and had assumed a natural position which would enable them to perform their role effectively and with distinction, following the withdrawal of those marginal forces which had attempted to turn the national front into an instrument for achieving their narrow ends and their craving for power.

/29 Jun-5 July 81 pp 35-37/

/Text/ AL-DUSTUR has published the first part of an important study on the progressive domestic national alliance among political forces which have reached consensus on the goals they are trying to realize. In his study, the writer has referred to the example of the alliance between the Democratic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (Sudanese region), based on agreement on strategic and tactical points.

This is the second and final section of the study.

Why are we reviewing this history?

We are reviewing this history in order to get an overview of the political range and horizon of the alliance between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Democratic Unionist Party.

The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party closely observed the development of the national movement in its diverse phases and made an objective evaluation of this development through an analytical and at the same time a critical view of the situation. All the analyses the party issued many years before the alliance prior to the circumstances in which the alliance arose, held that the relationship between the National Movement Party and the National Party was ultimately harmful to the tasks of national development, and indeed created many difficulties in organizing the movement of national struggle. Thus the state of affairs which we are experiencing in the form of complicated circumstances enables us to have a pure, long-range view of qualitiative nonobjective evaluations, indeed causes us to advance on a footing of clarity and an interchange of issues of struggle in the context of proper, concentrated dialogue. This has resulted in making the issues of an alliance between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Democratic Unionist Party a basis for the

discussions which actually took place under the circumstances and in the context in which they took place. This issue was not isolated or remote from the realities and details of the common view that it was necessary to establish an alliance between the two parties.

Our people had been facing numerous challenges, sometimes decisive ones, on subjects which infringed upon national sovereignty and the Sudan's orientation after independence. The National Movement Party, with its people and mass support, committed itself to a nationalist position which it expressed at the outset when it called for a unity of the struggle in Egypt and the Sudan, taking a longer view and also seeking out its positions through its commitment to the sovereignty of the country and its independence, as well as to the elimination of colonialist plots from the area and from the Sudan. After independence, it did not use fascistic methods to weaken the mass struggle. Indeed, it contented itself with struggling in the context of its political experiment and did not betray it, regardless of our view of this liberal political experiment. When it was hoped that the Sudan would join the Baghdad Pact and the suspect colonialist plans in the fifties, the unionists adopted clear positions against these schemes; in fact, when the National Movement Party proceeded to unite itself and bring down the National Party government, power was handed over to the generals in 1958 and thus its positions remained ones of commitment to the national and domestic interest. Likewise the National Movement Party was distinguished by openness and responsiveness toward all national issues.

It managed to evolve its experiment by itself in the context of opposition to the existing regime and it was present in all the positions which reflected the nature of our masses' struggle against this regime and commitment to the causes of the Arab nation.

Thus we look upon the Democratic Unionist Party and evaluate its experiment in accordance with basic indestructible dimensions, and therefore the groundwork of the common struggle has made it obligatory for us to investigate the legacy and positions of the national struggle. Currently the Democratic Unionist Party is taking a firm stand on all the authorities' maneuvers to expand their base under the cover of what is called reconciliation. Therefore the alliance between the two parties is one based on proper foundations of vision on the one hand and is constructed within the context of the circumstances of secret struggle which we are engaged in in the country and in the context of broad popular opposition. Therefore the emergence of the consensus has been a way of specifying long-range strategic missions which will not just open up horizons for the resurgence of the Sudan but will be missions more long-range than these, on the national level. At the same time, emergence of the alliance has rid a basic segment of the arena of national struggle of obstacles to proper interlocking relationships from which only the forces of backwardness and subservience have benefited.

The consensus calls for the adoption of a national line which will preserve the country's independence and prevent subordination to centers of foreign influence as a faithful response to the struggle for independence which began at an earlier stage.

In another area, this alliance is committed to our masses' struggle to rid the Arab nation of Zionism and neocolonialism, beginning with the establishment of an economic system which rejects the capitalist road to development and is based on a form of development which will achieve the missions and duties of the stage to uplift the public sector, turn it into a leading sector, program the domestic economy, develop it with reliance on planning, weaken all the foundations on which the parasitic bourgeoisie in the country has grown, and extirpate the manifestations of political, economic and moral corruption. In another area, the alliance has dealt with direct important issues on the organization of the political arena, starting with the organization of the democratic movement in general in its areas and fields with complete coordination between the two parties and the transfer of the alliance from formal formulas to practical everyday combative formulas through consensus between the bases of the two parties and the acquisition of mutual expertise through the greatest degrees of common action and interaction, so that this alliance may be built on firm foundations. Thus the alliance between the two parties will be a comprehensive one covering the needs of the entire stage in the political and economic context in order to return domestic development to its proper course.

Thus the struggle of the two parties is a comprehensive one which assures a scope that goes beyond all the alliances the local stage has witnessed and deepens the joint notion of transforming the country in a revolutionary manner and a progressive manner toward more distant objectives of liberation and social development. This requires a political struggle so that the aspects of this experiment may be underlined in the bases of the two parties and on the mass level in general. For this reason, in terms of its type and nature, the alliances is of a strategic type, since it deals with the issues in the long range stage of the battle masses to break up the domestic contradiction between the forces of the masses, which are struggling for the sake of progress and all the fraudulent alternatives now existing or working to impose a fait accompli upon our people. Thus the strategic alliance which we are talking about is a necessity, not a political measure or just the arrangement of a process of political change, in spite of the importance of change as a basic link in the process of inaugurating political, economic and social transformations.

There remains an important issue, that of the points of consensus and difference between the two parties. First:

This issue does not concern the alliance directly, because the alliance is founded on agreement, which, naturally, means that the alliance has been agreed upon and that, by the nature of the situation, there is no dispute over it. While there are details which are unclear or need deeper study, review or completion, the staffs concerned will be responsible for creating the wherewithal for realizing suitable formulas regarding these details within the general principles of the alliance and for satisfying these details for the sake of the alliance.

However, if what is meant are the distinguishing features of both parties which constitute the real state, nature and goals of the parties, this, to a large degree will depend on the composition of each party on the one hand and the level of the forces which make them up. In the context of internal bases, there

remains a difference of identity between the parties, when one understands their party structure and rules. Each party possesses its internal identity and matters regulating this identity. This dimension is an organizational one and therefore it is natural for us to note, on the one hand, the structure and national organization of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and, on the other, the structure and organizational scope of the Democratic Unionist Party. In the context of goals, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party is a nationwide revolutionary party believing in the unity of the Arab nation and combining the class struggle and the national struggle. It considers that the Arab nation is a single unit socially, politically, culturally and economically, and that therefore the fragmentation existing in the Arab nation is a state which will disappear through revolution, because it is an anomalous state. Therefore this party is fighting in the nationwide context in its organization, proceeding from the close-knit nature of the unity of Arab struggle and the struggle for Arab unity. In the domestic context, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party gives special importance to the domestic struggle and is fighting to strengthen the domestic situation and to link it to the nationwide one.

On this basis, its strategy is founded on two struggles at the same time, the national struggle and the domestic one. The domestic struggle takes note of particular characteristics and diversity in the national experience through the medium of total solidarity, which cannot be separated from a unified struggle for unity, freedom and socialism.

The Democratic Unionist Party arose during one of the decisive stages of the national struggle within a general current which expressed broad popular aspirations through the process of Arab upsurge and the struggle against colonialism. Therefore we do not consider that the locale of the origin is distinct from the nature of the united struggle against colonialism, since the national struggle is a united one. Circumstances of fragmentation and colonialism made it mandatory that the movement of national liberationist resurgence in the Arab world take numerous paths in the struggle against backwardness and colonialism, in the light of the lack of an administration which could pave a single path for this movement when the modern battle of the Arab people against colonialism began.

For this reason, an overall view of the struggle of the Democratic Unionist Party which understands the particular qualities of the national struggle will cause us to view this party within the framework of a period when the national socialist movement had not grown in our country; therefore the emphases which the unionist movement in general made in its slogans were, in their dimensions, congruent with the movement of national struggle. However, the clarity or obscurity of goals is not a final fact; rather, it is a fact subject to numerous elements among them the circumstances of the national struggle in general and the domestic challenges which have arisen from the colonial reality. Thus we find that the notions of struggle are what brings a given party in the Arab nation closer, or distances it, from the issue of domestic struggle. Therefore we find that it is most difficult for us to demand that an experiment such as that be transformed under these exceptional circumstances by setting forth all the national goals in full in their contexts at one stroke. For this reason, as

well, one can grasp why the birth and appearance of the national socialist movement occurred in the Arab east but did not appear in the Maghreb: a group of historic factors led to that. However, in the context of the domestic state of affairs, the National Movement Party, as a broad current joined by numerous social currents to which belonged social groups and classes, some of which were revolutionary, some of which belonged to new classes, and some of which belonged to the traditional situation, is precisely what caused the Democratic Unionist Party to turn into a party with mass origins and a party with a mass nature. Thus the issue of organizational and intellectual identity must not be subject to mere theoretical distinctions; it must be viewed in a true historic fashion lest we pause at length to discuss the components which cause each party to stand in its own right.

The Arab Socialst Ba'th Party's position on the nature of social forces arises from the fact that the forces which have real interests in change are the revolutionary classes -- the classes of workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and soldiers. Thus it is the group of toiling people which is the most revolutionary of classes, since they have been affected by a state of exploitation as a result of the fact that they have been ground down by class oppression and exploitation and on this basis they are one ones who will benefit from the process of change, because this change sets forth essentially from the premise of the interests of these classes -- through struggle, however. There are other forces which play a fighting role and become part of the movement of social, economic, political and cultural change, that is, that have an interest in change, that is, in revolution. There are the petty bourgeois groups which when connected to the issue of change assume the character of revolutionary intellectuals and tilt toward the masses, and consequently constitute an inseparable part of the popular alliance fighting against oppression and exploitation.

There remain groups and classes which, through their interests, their mentality and their productive and political status, tend not to be part of these revolutionary forces which are struggling for their interests in accordance with the goals which this struggle expresses. Therefore, quasi-feudalist forces and bourgeois forces are not included in this alliance and are not part of the popular masses in the revolutionary notion which is naturally different from the concept of citizenship. Therefore, even when we talk about the people, we mean that portion of the people which has a real interest in struggle and change. This does not mean that there are no perverse circumstances. Specific groups exist which are not revolutionary in their structure but, at one stage, play a role in the general national struggle against colonialism; however, the fact of their contradiction with the masses starts with the withdrawal of direct colonialism. Consequently, their resurgence is the process of struggle against the masses and they assume this role in the absence of colonialism.

Thus we find that the bourgeoisie in the Arab nation is not in reality the bourgeois class which was once upon a time a revolutionary one. The bourgeoisie in Europe came about as the offspring of a specific historic stage and circumstances, bore slogans of change, and in reality did manage to cover an entire stage and prove that it was a revolutionary class, before it became transformed into a reactionary class later, hostile, through its exploitation, to the workers.

Therefore, the bourgeoisie in Europe played revolutionary roles; we find that this role in the post-feudal stage, in the struggle against the remnants of feudalism, in the struggle for democracy, and in the general upsurge in society, culture and the arts which the bourgeoisie in Europe led.

Thus we reveal the class and the political nature of these groups, which are constantly playing a parasitic role. They do not occupy a basic position in production and do not play any true positive political role on behalf of the masses. However, this does not mean that the stage is of necessity one of eliminating the local bourgeoisies. There is still broad scope for them to play some part in private activity in the context of their material being and their participation, albeit partial, in development. This is because these private sectors will paly a limited role in the development process, especially in the areas of services and construction, domestic trade and the production of certain commodities. Thus, transcending their role will in reality not occur until the progressive transformations reach a higher stage by virtue of which society will advance to the stage of radical socialist transformation. However, what is important, as far as we are concerned, is these groups' future presence in the alliance and in political representation. In this context they are to be excluded and are not part of a true mass alliance. They can play their role within a central economic planning which clearly sets out the limits of their role in the development process and their contribution to the private sector in matters which concern the government sector in development and the provision of certain requirements during the transitional stage. According to the foregoing, one must draw a distinction between these classes' economic and political role: economically they will be guided and their fields of activity will be spelled out, while politically society will be liberated from their influence by placing the maximum guarantees that they will not resume playing their political role and by restricting their movement and their tendency toward hostility toward progress.

Therefore, in this stage, there will be no embarrassment over their role, since they will not pose an obstacle to development plans and will participate in certain development activities in a manner planned by the state. However, this role can never be a basic one, since the shift of this role to a basic one would mean the sovereignty of the bourgeoisie and its guidance of development, that is, the shift of the entire economic state of affairs to a subordinate, subservient one which we cannot suppose could be divorced from the capitalist market and capitalist development. Thus, our statement that it is necessary to set forth a progressive, non-capitalist form of development ultimately means turning the public sector into the truly leading one, not just in the context of industry or agriculture but even in the context of trade and all other sectors. Thus the bourgeoisie must retreat, must be guided, and must reach some stage in which state ownership of production will take over and consequently its role in the whole productive and economic process in general will be dispensed with. Only within these conditions will it be possible to seek a national role for the bourgeoisie; outside these conditions, the bourgeoisie cannot be a national force. If we are talking about social groups which belong to the middle class and are active in the field of commerce, the road is open to these classes within these conditions, and consequently the means will be provided for them, on condition that they content themselves with their situation within this economic developmental orientation.

Otherwise, all variables will be theatened because setting forth an economic strategy which is in keeping with the real state of the current world economy can be attained at the outset only through a political liberation which makes the national interest the criterion of every activity in the development process; failing to endorse a platform of independent political and economic independence will expose the country, or any Arab country, to an onslaught by the capitalist market and the tremendous resources of foreign companies and advanced production, and will consequently make the local market on the one hand, as well as the entire economic structure, weak and incapable of protecting industry, any gains in the context of agriculture, or planning in any field of production and development. Thus thwarting the role of the local bourgeoisie begins with the sovereignty of the state and its political liberation and the establishment of a progressive economic development program which will in economic terms distance the national state of affairs from the dangers of the world capitalist market and also dangers that the country may be linked to foreign economic circles. In the context of development under backward circumstances, the beginning lies with the political, with planning by specifying the features of the economic program and with recognition of the status the state, public ownership of production and private ownership have in production. In spite of our insistence on the nature of the mass alliance, and the need for it to be distinguished by this nature by preserving the purity of the identity of the struggle for change, struggle for change means revolution, revolution has its enemies and its intrinsic forces, and therefore, within this evaluation, it is necessary to understand who are the people who have a real interest in revolution and who are the people who will be damaged by revolutionary activity. We must not be imprecise when we talk about this change. There are social classes which have no interests but themselves. Discovering social contradictions, with all their severity, ascertaining the nature of the exploitation process, categorizing society, and distinguishing exploited forces from exploitative ones and independent ones is the true first beginning of the process of change. Society in reality is not a unified whole; rather, it is governed by numerous struggles, contradictions and interests; this is a fact which is independent of our own consciousness, a fact which exists in society, so why should we be terrified of it? These are the facts of life in society. There are people who steal the people's livelihood and live in a state of affluence to the point of indigestion, while others cannot find their daily bread. We must distinguish carefully when we talk about social forces and not deal naively with these formations and social groups. Thus, in the process of struggle, it is necessary that we resolve this issue not according to the amount of damage that will afflict a small part of the people but in terms of the interests which will accrue to the entire people, in the theorectical context, whether on the economic status of the bourgeoisie, through its history and nature, or through its role in the political alliance in general. We must understand the status of the bourgeoisie through its social function and its position in the struggle for change. If there are specific forces organically linked to the political alliance (when we say organically we mean organizationally), this does not mean that political alliance is an expression of these forces; even if political alliance is planned in a manner which will guarantee these forces' position within a greater process, this does not mean that the alliance is an expression of the interests of these forces. Alliance expresses the interests of a broad segment of masses which are organizationally merged on the one hand, albeit in the context of the masses,

and alliance expresses the reality of mass struggle at a certain stage and expresses the interests of the masses at a certain stage. To take a position on that does not lie within a mere scheduled agenda. The nature of your accomplishments, and what you offer the people, are what determine the level of the struggle with classes that have no interest in revolution and consequently they are what reveal and provoke hostility; when you feel that you have been harmed you will not content yourself with settlements; rather, you will start with sabotage, and consequently the suitable procedure is to trim their nails further, and trimming their nails does not just mean restricting their freedoms -- it means striking out at the heart of their interests. This is a matter of life or death as far as serious forces fighting for the same of the masses go.

The accomplishment of these missions, turning the alliance into the throbbing heart of the movement of the masses and strengthening their confidence in it, is the necessary prelude to shifting the alliance to an advanced level, which means establishment of a progressive national domestic front.

/Note/ The expression "local bourgeoise" is more suitable than the expression "national bourgeoisie."

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2381

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13 August 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2381

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OPEC ACQUIRING U.S. REFINERIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 44-45

[Article by Graham Benton]

[Text] AS MAJOR US OIL firms cut back on refining capacity, and smaller refiners face bankruptcy, Opec investors are moving in to pick up some of the choicer pieces.

Rising oil prices, domestic energy conservation and a worldwide crude supply glut have combined to cut total US imports of refined products and crude oil by a third since 1977. Then they averaged 8.8m b/d, while in the first five months of this year they were down to 5.5m b/d. As a result, only 65.9 per cent of US refining capacity was being used in June, and companies with a major proportion of their operations in refining activities have felt the pinch badly.

Worst affected are the small refiners which lack the major assets base to cushion them against the trade recession. For many, the situation has become perilous since President Reagan deregulated the oil industry in January, simultaneously depriving them of equalisation entitlements (which obliged crude importers to make oil available to the small refiners at the same price paid by the oil majors' own refineries) and the so-called 'small-refiner bias' (which gave firms with less than 50,000 b/d capacity subsidies on crude purchases of up to 16 per cent). As product prices decline faster in the continental US than crude prices, independent refiners are in trouble, and the bankruptcies have already begun.

This is where the Opec investors have begun to make an appearance. In May, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation bought a 50 per cent stake in Hawaii's largest refinery owned by Pacific Resources of Honolulu. American Petrofina of Dallas, Texas, sold its 90,000 b/d refinery at Port Arthur to Venezuelan interests for $75m and US businessmen representing private Kuwait and Saudi investors have purchased four more small Texan refineries (with capacities reportedly varying between 45,000 b/d and 75,000 b/d).

The cost of the four refineries has not been officially revealed, but an executive of one of them, UNI oil of Ingelside, has said that his refinery was purchased for a 'low price'. The 52,600 b/d plant sold by Houston's independent Refining Corporation reportedly went to $75m.

The private investors, organised by the Kuwait-based Gulf International Bank and other Arab financial institutions, are reported to have paid no more than $250m for the lot. But why are Opec buyers so interested in refining operations which US oil firms currently find so unattractive?

One theory prevalent among US businessmen is that the Gulf investors want to acquire some secure investments in politically stable areas. But since the likely financial returns could be bettered in other areas of investment, this is scarcely a major factor. Much more important is the greater flexibility provided by a stake in both downstream and upstream oil operations. Most Opec countries are keen to diversify away from being mere suppliers of raw materials.

Only last month, Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa told the national assembly in Kuwait that his country was embarking on a major expansion of refining capacity because selling refined products was more profitable in the long term. Kuwait plans to increase the capacity of its existing domestic refineries from 600,000 b/d to 750,000 b/d (out of total current crude production of

around 1.25m b/d.) Its newly-bought interests in Texas and Hawaii could add another 180,000 b/d of capacity. Other instances of KPC's interest in refining and marketing rather than crude sales to foreign oil companies include plans to start a joint venture 200,000 b/d refinery outside Kuala Lumpur with Petronas of Malaysia, and a $50m exploration and production partnership with AZL Resources of Arizona (in which Saudi Arabia's Adnan Kashoggi has a 50 per cent interest).

Kuwaiti and Venezuelan investors in particular have another inducement to set up their own refining operations. Both have extensive reserves of heavy crudes which sell at a discount against the higher grade crudes exported by Saudi Arabia and the North African producers. The Ex-IRP refinery in Texas is capable of processing the heavier crudes, and private Arab investors are understood to be contemplating a further $250m investment.

With 16 US refineries shut down and several more up for sale (and the possibility that 20 per cent of the country's 300-odd plants could be closed by the year-end), many more refiners are expected to seek foreign purchasers or find themselves vulnerable to takeovers from government firms or private investors abroad.

Some US refiners are far from keen about the prospect because they suspect that plants with Opec links will have favoured access to Opec oil supplies. Already, smaller US refining companies are preparing to fight back by banding together in consortia which can take on the relatively large volume oil contractos which Middle East exporters tend to prefer.

More sanguine oil analysts welcome Opec investment in US refining plan however. They feel that purchase o refineries in the US by the oil exporters enable the US to continue consuming products refined on the spot rather than being obliged to import petrol from the Middle East. That is a prospect which already faces Western Europe, where Texaco Chairman William Barrack this month claimed that a third of existing capacity may never be used again as Opec shifts gradually to refining its own crude for export to the market. If Opec can be enticed into taking a greater stake in US refining capacity, the US will be all the better placed to avoid its own refining recession.

CSO: 4300/70

INSURANCE PAID ON SHIPS TRAPPED BY GULF WAR

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 20 Jul 81 p 11

[Text]

A Bermuda insurance group has agreed to pay about $36 million to the owners of 10 merchant ships trapped in the Shatt al-Arab since last September by the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran. The move is bound to have an impact on Lloyd's of London, the world's premier maritime insurance market, which has so far refrained from paying out on any vessel trapped in the waterway. The directors of the Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) decided that the 10 vessels should be regarded as total losses because their owners had been deprived of prossession and it was unlikely they would recover the vessels within a reasonable time.

In coming to this conclusion, the insurance group noted that the dangers of attempting to sail out of the Shatt al-Arab under present circumstances would be extreme.

On 23 September 1980, the Iraqi government banned merchant vessels from entering or leaving the country's ports – a decree which is still in force.

Since the outbreak of war on that date, no dredging has been carried out, although the Shatt al-Arab is prone to silting. The presence of the ships has, in itself, contributed to the clogging of the waterway. The ships involved in the pay-out are nine Greek vessels and one Cypriot ship.

At Lloyd's, underwriters are taking the first anniversary of the start of the war as the key date in their deliberations. If the vessels are not free by then, insurance claims will start to be met. Few people, however, expect the Shatt al-Arab to be free for navigation by then. Even if the war were to have ended, minesweeping would probably be necessary.

The Institute of London Underwriters, which handles about half the marine business placed in London, noted earlier this year that 1981 looked like being a bleak year. The institute's Chairman Geoffrey Merriman, drew particular attention to the 72 vessels trapped in the Shatt al-Arab and to the amount of cargo off-loaded in the Gulf short of its destination.

CSO: 4300/68

'BBC' REPORTS ON FIGHTING AT PAGHMAN

Rebel Resistance

TA281616 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 28 Jul 81

[From "Radio Newsreel"]

[Text] We begin this newsreel with Afghanistan and the first eyewitness account for some time of the continuing efforts to quell resistance by the Afghan rebels. Our correspondent, Arnow Van Lindon, has for the past few weeks been observing guerrilla resistance in the area known as Paghman just northwest of Kabul. There have been indications recently of increased rebel activity in the area near the capital. Van Lindon now describes an action which took place earlier this month in this dispatch which has just reached us:

[Begin recording] The combined Soviet-Afghan army operation lasted more than 2 and 1/2 days and involved well over 1,000 troops, backed up by scores of tanks, armoured patrol cars, helicopter gunships and MiG fighter jets.

But although Mojahedin casualties were high—40 were killed and twice as many wounded—the Russians did not succeed in their objective, which was clearly to surround the area and root out the Mojahedin once and for all. Insurgents managed to stave off the attack, at numerous points, and when the offensive force finally retreated, were left as much in control as ever. To assess how high the cost of the offensive was to the Soviets, is hard to say. But at least 2 tanks, 1 armoured patrol car, 3 military trucks and a jeep were destroyed, and more than 40 weapons were in Mojahedin hands.

The devastation caused by the tank was maybe most profound for the civilian population in the villages. In what had the air of indiscriminate bombing and rocketing, 25 villagers were killed—most of them women and children—and many more wounded. Houses and the surrounding farm and fruit gardens were destroyed. The attack, although far more concerted on this occasion, was the fourth since I arrived in Paghman a month ago and is a sign of the increasing Soviet discomfort and irritation of Mojahedin control of the area. The cause of that discomfort becomes plain in the evenings. Nearly no night passes without one or more of the Pasman groups launching an attack on Afghan or Soviet army posts just outside Kabul, concentrating particularly on those units guarding the

Qarghah dam, just north of the capital. Those attacks which take the form of short engagements and a hasty retreat have had some success, maybe most of all in dispelling Soviet claims of complete control of the city and its surrounding area. Arnow Van Lindon, BBC Paghman. [end recording]

Cadet Protest

TA291532 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 29 Jul 81

[Text] More information has been coming out of Afghanistan about a battle earlier this month between government forces and Afghan rebels at Paghman west of the capital Kabul. Although exact details are unclear, it is reported that military cadets were forced to play a prominent role in the fighting. Now according to Western diplomatic sources in neighboring Pakistan, some of these cadets have held a protest demonstration at their military academy. Alexander Thompson in Islamabad has been piecing together the reports:

[Begin recording] The cadets, it is said, were put in the front line in front of Afghan and Soviet troops to make sure they did not run away. If they did, they were shot. Apparently the cadets had been told that they were going to the area to conduct house searches. They had not expected to end up in the middle of a bloody battle. Reports reaching diplomats here say they were demoralized by their first combat experience and on their return to Kabul they staged a demonstration at their academy to protest that they were called on to fight before they had become fully fledged members of the armed forces. It is said that there has also been discontent among students from the air force and signals schools, who were taken to Paghman where they proved to be ineffective and reluctant fighters. Western diplomats here can see that it is difficult to assess the significance of the Paghman battle. They say the insurgents were driven back into the hills and arms caches were destroyed. But these sources say insurgents have now reoccupied most of the region and they are said to have reestablished check points on the road to Kabul. [end recording]

CSO: 4600/95

BRIEFS

LEBANESE DELEGATION LEAVES--The Lebanese Independent Nasirite Movement high-ranking delegation, led by Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir Qulaysat, secretary general of the movement, left Kabul after a friendly visit to Afghanistan. Niaz Mohammad Mohmand, secretary of the PDPA Central Committee, the assistant to the party Central Committee International Relations Department and some members of the department bade farewell to the delegation at Kabul Airport. Before the delegation left Niaz Mohammad Mohmand praised its visit as further strengthening relations between the people of both countries. Reciprocally, the leader of the Lebanese delegation expressed gratitude at the warm welcome of the Afghan authorities and said that the friendship and revolution of the people of Afghanistan have gained a place in our hearts. [Text] [LD270838 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 26 Jul 81]

YOUTH GROUP MEMBERS JOIN DEFENSE UNIT--A number of members of the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan of the school of Bagram Airport [as heard] have volunteered to join the ranks of the Bagrami Sarondoy unit in order to defend the honor, freedom, territorial integrity and national sovereignty of the country and to annihilate the enemies of the country and the revolution. The meeting was held in the grounds of the school and further successes for the youth were hoped for. [Text] [LD282104 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 28 Jul 81]

TV AGREEMENT WITH GDR--A cooperation agreement between DRA Television and the State Television Committee in the GDR Council of Ministers was signed this morning in the DRA Ministry of Information and Culture. The agreement was signed from the DRA side by the director of broadcasting of DRA Television; and from the GDR side, the ambassador of that country in Kabul, Kraft Bumbel. Under the contract cooperation will be undertaken on television programs and technical personnel and experts will be exchanged between the two countries for a period of 2 years. [Text] [LD290110 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1230 GMT 28 Jul 81]

COAL PROTOCOL WITH USSR--After an official and friendly visit to the USSR, Eng Mohammad Esma'il Danesh, minister of mines and industry, returned to Kabul this morning. At Kabul International Airport, members of the Council of Ministers, personnel of the Ministry of Mines and Industry and members of the USSR Embassy in Kabul were present to welcome the Afghan delegation. The minister of

mines and industry said on arrival in Kabul that the Afghan delegation had visited research plants and coal mines and had held fruitful discussions with the USSR authorities about the extension of economic and technical aid in the field of coal extraction. A protocol was signed on the start and development of cooperation in the field of coal extraction, the training of skilled cadres and the exchange of delegates between the two countries. Esma'il Danesh expressed appreciation for the warm welcome that was extended to the Afghan delegation during its stay in the USSR. [Text] [LD291812 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 29 Jul 81]

TURKISH ENVOY DEPARTS--The Turkish Ambassador to Afghanistan Ilham Bakay whose term of office has ended, left for home today. Deputy to the Foreign Affairs Ministry's Department of Protocol and a number of the friendly countries' ambassadors and charge d'affaires said farewell to him at the Kabul International Airport. [Text] [LD300708 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1730 GMT 29 Jul 81]

AFGHAN RADIO 'JAMMING' BBC BROADCASTS--New Delhi, 30 Jul (AFP)--The Soviet-backed Afghan Government has started systematically jamming radio programmes of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) beamed towards Afghanistan, reports reaching here from Kabul said today. The organised jamming started on July 17 and was still continuing, the reports reaching Afghan dissidents here said. Afghan radio listeners in Kabul said that BBC's evening Persian programme on the medium waves was heavily disturbed on July 17 by loud Afghan music. Some of them tried other shortwave bands, but the result was the same. The reports quoting rebel sympathisers in the Afghan radio said that the Soviets had installed a jamming device in Kabul. There was, however, no independent confirmation. A BBC official here, when contacted, said that he had also received similar reports of jamming. "We are trying to ascertain the facts", Satish Jacob said. The BBC plans to start a 15 minute Pushtu language service soon specially to cater to the Afghan listeners. [Text] [BK300656 Hong Kong AFP in English 0642 GMT 30 Jul 81]

SPINBULDAK RADAR STATION DESTROYED--London, 24 July (AGENCE AFGHAN)--One of Afghanistan's biggest radar stations located at Spinbuldak near the Pakistan border has been destroyed in an attack by Mojahedin. Its cost was estimated at 70 million rupees. According to the agency's Quetta office, three high-ranking Soviet officers toured Spinbuldak last week. The helicopter in which they arrived from Qandahar was escorted by three helicopter gunships. They conducted an aerial inspection of Spinbuldak and border areas. [Excerpt] [GF281920 Karachi JANG in Urdu 25 Jul 81 p 12]

CSO: 4656/1

CAUSEWAY PLANS UNDERWAY

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 36-37

[Text]

BUILDING FEVER has broken out in Bahrain since the dramatically sudden go-ahead for constructing the long-awaited Bahrain Causeway, the 25km road link across the sea between the Bahraini archipelago and Saudi Arabia on the mainland. Link roads to the causeway's starting points had already been started, and it is now clear that local firms involved in road building, providing labour, importing plant and catering are only at the start of a boom that should take them profitably into the second half of the 1980s.

Estate agents expect rents to start rising again and hoteliers are looking forward to letting more rooms. The economic impact of the project on Bahrain and its relations with Saudi Arabia, which is footing the $564m bill, is already being felt.

All this is in sharp contrast to the years of delays and doubts that have characterised the history of the causeway until now. No sooner had the Saudi finance minister, Mohammed Abalkhail, signed the contract with the winning Saudi-Dutch joint venture, Bandar Ballast International, than the signal for the project to begin was given. The Bahraini development and industry minister, Youssef Shirawi, told reporters after the signing ceremony that work on the causeway itself would start immediately.

The rapid start-up was made possible by an unusual reversal of normal procedures — both the Bahraini and Saudi governments endorsed the contract with Bandar Ballast International before it was signed. It was also helped by the fact that the Dutch partner in the consortium, Ballast Nedam, appears to have had enough warning of its success in the lengthy bidding process to have prearranged the necessary syndicated guarantees to cover $140m in advance payments and performance bonds.

Urgency now is understandable. The $564m asking price of Bandar Ballast International is almost half the general cost estimates for the causeway made over a year ago. With obvious tight margins on profitability, the consortium will be anxious to safeguard itself against delays and the risk of raw-material price inflation. For both governments, too, speedy completion of the causeway would give a concrete symbol of the new spirit of cooperation in the region fostered by the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Specific firms that will benefit from the causeway construction are the Building Raw Materials Company (Bramco), which manages the local rock quarry, and, over in Saudi Arabia, the newly-onstream Saudi Bahrain Cement Company. But some dislocations are inevitable. The link roads are being blasted through outlying villages near Manama, and families will have to be relocated. The causeway will also plough through the world's largest prehistoric graveyard of 100,000 tumuli, and archaeologists reckon that only about a fifth of the burial chambers can be excavated and preserved in time. Furthermore, the prospect of more large-scale dredging is bad news for the local shrimp fishing industry, which is only just beginning to recover from earlier disturbances of breeding grounds.

For the consortia that failed to land this prestige contract, the new determination with which the contract is being executed will be like rubbing salt in a still-open wound. Talk of a physical link between the two countries has been going around for at least 20 years, but things started getting serious in 1975, when the first design specifications were drawn up by the Danish

architects Christiani and Nielsen, who subsequently became partners in Saudi-Dutch Consultants and have advised the Saudi government on the causeway project from the beginning.

By 1978 prequalification documents were available, although no official date for prequalification was given. No fewer than 213 firms from 26 countries collected the prequalification forms, which consisted of a two-page project description and four pages of diagrams. At that stage companies were told that the entire project would be let in one contract, and that the 25km distance would be made up of a 3km road across the Bahraini island of Umm Nasan, 10km of embankments, and five steel box-girder bridges, totalling 12km. Then 125 of the companies, grouped into 39 consortia, sought prequalification.

The scene then switched to Washington and the World Bank headquarters. A working team of nine World Bank experts, two Saudis, two Bahrainis, and three representatives of Saudi-Dutch Consultants was set up to make recommendations to the Joint Technical Committee. The team met in April, May and June of 1979, at a time when many thought that the causeway project was dying a slow death; the Saudis were feeling particularly cost-conscious at the end of their second Five-Year Plan, and the cost of the project was being put at more than $1bn.

Suddenly the mood changed. The second big boost in oil prices had made the cost constraints less pressing, but more importantly perhaps, the World Bank experts as well as interested contractors had persuaded the committee to consider using cheap reinforced concrete rather than steel for the bridge work, and in November 1979 tender documents were issued asking for alternative designs as well as a 'conforming' bid that included steel structures.

Of the 39 consortia which had sought prequalification, 18 were originally selected to tender, but with the agreement to allow alternative reinforced concrete designs, another four were added. Then the highly-successful South Korean firm, Hyundai, fell foul of the Saudi authorities after an alleged bribing incident and its name was struck off. Although nobody could still be sure that the causeway would go ahead, the competition among bidders began to hot up.

Because of the heavy dredging component it was considered that Dutch companies always stood a good chance. But the fancied French consortium led by Spie Batignolles had enlisted the services of the Japanese dredging experts, Penta Ocean Construction, which had been working on the Suez Canal widening project. The other Japanese companies were dealt something of a body blow by the decision to allow concrete rather than steel designs. The deadline was 30 June, 1980, and 16 consortia of the 21 that had prequalified submitted bids, many of them inflating the size of their bid bond to hide the actual size of their bid.

As the adjudication process dragged on into 1981, the rumours grew. One factor became clear: local participation or partnership was going to be looked on favourably, and this was confirmed when only a handful of competitors were asked to extend their bid bonds in January. Three favourites emerged: Bandar Ballast International, the Bin Laden Consortium, which included West German, Japanese, Saudi and Bahraini interests, and the Franco-Japanese-Saudi Group led by Spie Batignolles. By April it was clear that the Saudi-Dutch team, with Mitsubishi in harness, had won the coveted prize.

But suspense and protocol continued to the last, and nobody would confirm the contract until the Saudis made the official announcement after their new budget in May.

The long-term prospects are hard to guage, and depend to a large extent on the degree to which Saudi Arabia's relatively

austere lifestyle influences that of Bahrain. For if Bahrain remains the more congenial place, for foreigners to live in, then with the causeway easing communication between the two countries, more firms from abroad, including the West, might be expected to establish Bahrain as their base for Saudi operations. A spokesman for Prince Bandar, who owns a majority stake in the Bandar Ballast International consortium, has said that the causeway is likely to confirm Bahrain as an offshore commercial and financial centre for the Saudi Arabian kingdom.

What is not yet clear is whether the Saudi authorities might put pressure on Bahrain to provide worker dormitories for Asian labourers employed on Eastern Province projects; if this happened it would of course provide a bonanza for local importers but might seriously strain some of Bahrain's other social services, notably water supply.

CSO: 4300/70

COMMENTARY ON KHOMEYNI 'COLLUSION' WITH ISRAEL

NC301629 Free Voice of Iran [Clandestine] in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 29 Jul 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots! When, on the day after the revolution started, no one yet knew what plans Khomeyni and his coterie had for the Iranian nation, suddenly people started zealously chanting the slogan of "Today Iran, tomorrow Palestine." This raised the question among many of those who were observers of the events on what relationship there was between the developments in Iran and Palestine. The Palestinian problem is a world problem while the incidents in Iran are domestic events, and the first has turned into a labyrinth in which the world has been lost, while the second is a knot that can be opened only by prudent hands.

A relationship could not be found between the Iranian revolution and Jerusalem's freedom and we therefore came to the conclusion that Tehran's street demonstrations which made the shah leave the country would be followed by the sequence of Palestine's freedom and that the formidability of these newly arrived men making such claims would shock the Jews who would free the occupied territories and flee. But suddenly one day the world became aware of Khomeyni's secret collaboration with the Israelis, and suddenly everyone realized that all those inflammatory slogans which were put into the people's mouths, written on walls and continuously repeated were only used to mislead the people.

The Israelis planned to keep the Palestinians busy with Iran, to stir the Palestinians' interest in Khuzestan--which can have similarities with the lost territories--to fill the Palestinians' pockets with the great oil incomes [of Iran] and, in short, to open a new front for the Palestinians and to thus reduce the great congestion of Palestinians in countries around Israel and, by dispersing them, to boost the security in Israel's border areas, to reduce subversive activities and to at least alter the Palestinians' offensive positions to defensive ones. This was a sly and deceitful plan to which the Palestinians were attracted in the start. But this zeal was not longlasting, and the Palestinians came to their senses very soon, realized that they are being kept at a distance from their main objectives for the sake of (?deceitful things). [They realized] that Khuzestan will not be a Palestine for them and that if they stop thinking about Palestine, they will be Palestinians no longer and the rights for which they have struggled so much will be taken away from them.

When this plan failed, the Israelis then discussed their plan for the war with Iraq with Khomeyni's regime. The Israelis feared no Arab country as much as they feared Iraq. Iraq was a staunch enemy whose unharmed armed forces could be a great danger for Israel at any given opportunity. By sparking off the flame of war with Iraq, Khomeyni could give Israel its peace of mind. Khomeyni accepted this plan and in return Israel promised not to deprive him of assistance.

The Argentinian plane that crashed in Soviet territory last week and which was carrying a large quantity of arms and spare parts for Khomeyni's "victorious Islamic army" was one of the hundreds of aircraft carrying arms for Khomeyni from Israel. Foodstuffs have been brought, medicine has been brought, spare parts have been brought, and experts and engineers were also brought so that Khomeyni could prepare himself to deceive a nation and to start a war in the name of Islam, to send the country's youths to meet their death and to kill these youths by the thousands. But Israel's assistance to Khomeyni's regime is not limited to these only. Israeli planes, bearing emblems of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic, are bombing Iraqi positions, and Khomeyni is ticking these off as his own conquests. Israeli agents carry out extensive propaganda in all the mass media for Khomeyni's self-invented regime and to crush opponents of his regime. And the London BBC commentator and Khomeyni's friend and helper, John Turner, in his commentary last night built a national and popular figure out of the coolie Raja'i and called the Islamic regime a "popular" regime. Khomeyni continues the same (?intrigues in Iran and tries to deceive the people).

Israel has even become more Catholic than the pope. It encourages the Americans not to stop their (?moderate) and conservative policy toward Khomeyni and his regime and not to think that Khomeyni's regime will make a mistake and harm U.S. policy in the Middle East.

If these unsaid secrets were (?well kept) until last week, they have now been revealed with the crash of the Argentinian plane that was carrying Israeli arms and spare parts to Iran, and the world press is dauntlessly pushing aside the curtains and opening the hand of Khomeyni and his likes in front of the world public opinion. The world now knows what the slogan of "Neither East nor West" means, because a regime that is "Neither East nor West" is (?actually a deceitful middleman) which makes a deal with the West against the East and vice versa and uses all the (?possibilities) in order to keep upright some way or other. And its most disgraceful act is that it colluded with Israel against Iraq, against the Palestinians and against all the Muslims who have been striving for the salvation of Jerusalem for 40 years now.

CSO: 4640/58

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON BANI-SADR ESCAPE, BAKHTIAR COMMENT

NC301613 Voice of Iran [Clandestine] in Persian 1805 GMT 29 Jul 81

[Text] The voice of the republic announced today that Abolhasan Bani-Sadr has fled Iran for France together with Mas'ud Rajavi in a military aircraft piloted by the late shah's special pilot and that he has joined Bakhtiar and the monarchists in Paris. In its midday newscast the Voice of the Islamic Republic added that Bani-Sadr and Rajavi arrived in Paris military airport in a military Boeing 707 piloted by Colonel Mo'ezzi, the same pilot who took the shah of Iran and entourage from Iran to Morocco. The Iranian Government has requested Bani-Sadr's extradition. The request has been handed by the Foreign Ministry to the French ambassador in Tehran. Khomeyni's radio added that Bani-Sadr and Rajavi fled Iran on the anniversary of the late shah's death and went to Paris, using Turkish and Greek airspace.

A Voice of Iran correspondent reports from Paris that the plane carrying Bani-Sadr arrived in a military airport near Paris at 0400 Paris time. Five other people were with Bani-Sadr in the aircraft, and one of them was Mas'ud Rajavi. The Paris radio briefly interviewed Bani-Sadr at the airport. He said that he will go to his residence and join his daughters who are there. Our correspondent reported from Paris that at 1330 Paris time the French television interviewed Bani-Sadr. In this interview Bani-Sadr called himself Iran's legitimate president and said that the recent elections were (?rigged). He said that only 15 percent of the Iranian people participated in the recent elections, while during the elections held during his time more than 90 percent of the people participated.

Our correspondent reported from Paris that Dr Bakhtiar was interviewed immediately after the interview with Bani-Sadr. Mr Shapur Bakhtiar said that Bani-Sadr is guilty, because he is among the engineers of the illegitimate regime in Iran today. Shapur Bakhtiar added that the bloodthirsty Eichmann, Khalkhali, was brought to power by Bani-Sadr, and Bani-Sadr is a partner in all the crimes committed by the present Iranian regime.

CSO: 4640/58

CLANDESTINE RADIO CARRIES EMPRESS FARAH'S MESSAGE

GF291940 Voice of Iran [Clandestine] in Persian 0330 GMT 29 Jul 81

[Recorded message issued by Empress Farah Pahlavi on anniversary of death of late shah of Iran--no date given]

[Excerpts] On 28 July 1980, our dear king (?departed) this world. For us as Iranians this would be a [words indistinct].

Your Majesty, today is exactly 1 year from that hot midsummer day when I last kissed your cold forehead. On that sad day you left us forever and went to an eternal place where there is no sign of the hurt, misery, sadness and [words indistinct].

You expended all your efforts for the benefit of a nation that has enjoyed a very rich and historical culture and with its immense intelligent and hard-working human wealth and the God-given natural wealth [words indistinct] possibility of all forms of progress. [passage indistinct]

[Words indistinct] such sacrifices will not be without results. It will be the basis of new efforts and [words indistinct] every time. It is with reliance on such a fact that all those whose heart beats for Iran are putting up with the (?terrifying fire started) by Khomeyni. There is no need for me to explain this [word indistinct] for you or say what is happening in your [words indistinct] land now, since I know that you [words indistinct].

I am sure that none of these facts are hidden to you, since no father can ignore his children's pain, and you now--just as when you were in this world--are deeply (?aware) of all the suffering and [word indistinct] of all Iranian people, whom you considered your children. [passage indistinct]

The happiness is becoming less and less and the sadness greater and greater in present-day Iran. However, in (?all of this death and cruelty), they [the people of Iran] have faith. This is the faith for which you set the example. The God of Iran will not leave this land of (?culture) to the hands of faith and will not leave its oppressed people to their misery and hopelessness. I know that their faith and vigil will be a flame that will finally result in the victory of light over darkness. I am certain that the Almighty will grant you your last prayer

and will again lead the Iranian nation to their salvation. The way to salvation is appearing on the horizon of history. The various strata of the Iranian people are getting more organized every day and are becoming more combative against this cruel, inhuman and antinationalist regime. The patriotic soldiers of the armed forces, the zealous and brave tribes, the threatened women of Iran, the [word indistinct] clergy, religious minorities, [words indistinct] office workers and Iranians abroad and [words indistinct].

Reza Shah II, who according to the constitution is our shah and the guarantor of our national unity, is feeling the heavy weight of his responsibilities more and more every day and is preparing more and more to carry them out. Naturally, I, as an Iranian, as your wife and as the mother of your children, will do all that is in my power to [words indistinct].

CSO: 4640/58

LOCAL OPPOSITION PRESS SILENCED, FOREIGN REPORTERS EXPELLED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 11 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by Phil Davison]

[Text] Istanbul, July 10.

IRAN's Moslem fundamentalists, who control government, judiciary and legislatuure, have silenced domestic press opposition, restricted freedom of speech and most recently launched a campaign against the foreign press.

In the past year, the clergy-backed government has closed down more than 20 opposition newspapers and driven critical political pamphleteers back underground, where they once operated against the Shah's regime.

More recently, the fundamentalists have launched a campaign of intimidation against foreign reporters and religious leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini has asked Iranians to watch one another and report any «counter-revolutionary» gossip.

In the euphoric first few months of the Islamic revolution, when soldiers and revolutionaries paraded with red carnations in their rifle barrels, the streets of Teheran were a babel of political and religious discussions ,publications, posters and tape-recordings.

The freedom of expression was stunning: while the Iranian army was busy crushing ethnic Kurdish rebels in the West, you could buy Kurdish guerrilla posters or their music in central Teheran.

Despite the Islamic nature of the revolution, communist literature and portraits of Marx and Lenin were on sale everywhere

In s of the popularity of Ayatollan Khomeini, spearhead of the revolution, Iranians could criticise him or his followers at the risk of nothing more than a fist fight.

The gradual erosion of freedom of expression began a year ago when the independent daily newspaper Bamdad was forced to close down after crowds of Islamic fundamentalists had occupied its offices on several occasions.

The popular daily Ayandegan was shut down by the authorities, as were the organ of the Communist Tudeh Party, Mardom, and some 20 smaller publications.

Paint

Even with those papers, gone, opposition to the clergy's overwhelming role in the post-revolutionary establishment was still expressed in the daihes Mizan, which supported the bourgeois policies of former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, and Islamic Revolution, published by then President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.

The offices of Mizan (which means «scales of justice») were vandalised last November and slogans such as «death to liberals» were painted on its walls.

When Mizan, in an editorial last April, questioned whether Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti had the right to be at one time the leader of the dominant Islamic Republican Party (IRP) and also Iran's chief justice, it was ordered to close.

The closure brought a strong reaction from President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, whose newspaper Islamic Revolution was then left as the only publication critical of the fundamentalists.

«We must defend freedom at any price, and especially freedom of the press», the President said. «If a newspaper insults me, I do not want it prosecuted because I know, and past experience makes it clear, that tyranny over the press is the beginning of complete tyranny».

Mizan re-appeared and was shut down again but this time it was not alone. President Bani-Sadr's own paper, Islamic Revoluiton, was also banned, effectively silencing opposition to the fundamentalist regime.

Mr Bani-Sadr's paper had irked the authorities for many months through its forthright criticism but particularly because of the regular «President's diary» column, in which Mr Bani-Sadr attacked the direction of the revolution and often even Ayatollah Khomeini himself.

Mr Bani-Sadr was also commander-in-chief of Iran's armed forces and was believed to

have gained the support of significant sections of the military.

Attacked

Politically, however, his Presidency gave him little more power than a veto over appointment of cabinet ministers and the newspaper column was his strongest influence over the Iranian people.

In the column, he had attacked all strata of post-revolutionary Iran, including the clergy-backed government's long refusal to negotiate the release of the American hostages.

With the ban on the President's newspaper, the Moslem fundamentalists eliminated domestic press criticism and effectively added the Iranian media to their sphere of control along with the cabinet, the revolutionary judicial system and the Majlis (parliament).

The press closures leave two major morning and two evening newspapers in Iran, all four supporting the line of the fundamentalists and the government.

The morning papers are Azadegan and Islamic Republic, the latter the organ of the Islamic Republican Party which is the country's major power bloc.

Ayatollah Beheshti, the IRP leader and one of its founders, was among more than 70 religious and political figures killed by a huge bomb at the party's Teheran heaquarters last month.

The evening papers are Kayhan and Ettela'at, both of which describe themselves as independent but say they support the line of the present government.

The state radio and television, officially known as «The voice and vision of the Islamic Republic,» are directly under the control of the IRP.

They reflect no opposition and often broadcast the speeches of Ayatollah Khomeini or other religious leaders at full length or even several times in one day.

The long-standing official Pars news agency functioned under the Shah's régime but its executive positions were largely purged after the revolution and it now reflects the line of the IRP-backed gocernment.

Having tightened the screws on the domestic press, Ayatollah Khomeini last week called on Iranians to watch one another and report anything suspicious to the authorities. «From now on, you are all members of the intelligence organisations», he said.

In an article along the same lines, the IRP's paper Islamic Republic told Iranians last week: «You may hear lots of things on a bus, in a taxi, in a doctor's office, and public places about political issues».

The paper said in an editorial: «Inform the officials of every bit of information you may come across and they will investigate and identify the counter-revolutionaries».

«The C.I.A. alone has over 1,000 reporters for gathering intelligences», the paper wrote.

«... news of the June 28 disaster (the bomb blast at the I.R.P. headquarters) reached the BBC in less than five minutes.

Expelled

The speed with which the two foreign news agencies in Teheran at the time, Reuters and Agence France Presse reported the bomb blast apparently annoyed the Iranian media and sparked the latest campaign against the foreign press.

The reports bounced back into Iran on the Farsi language service of the BBC, to which many Iranians tune in as a result of the lack of Iranian media.

Reuters reported the death of Ayatollah Beheshti, from its own sources, hours before the official Iranian media.

When a Reuter reporter in Teheran telephoned the official Pars news agency to ask for its version, he was told: «Yes, we know he is dead but we cannot punish it».

In the past week, the campaign against the foreign press built up. The Islamic Republic newspaper described David Hirst, Middle East correspondent of the Guardian, as «The famous British spy».

The government ordered Reuters to close its bureau in Teheran and gave myself and two other correspondents, Barry May and Alan Philips, 48 hours to leave the country.

CSO: 4600/105

ARMED ATTACK NETS BANDITS FOUR MILLION TOMANS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Jul 81 p 2

[Text] Karaj--KEYHAN--In an armed attack against a car carrying money belonging to the Sepah Bank in Karaj one person was killed, three others were wounded and more than 4 million tomans in bank funds were stolen.

At 1415 yesterday three armed men riding a Peugeot car with a temporary license blocked the path of a car at the intersection of Kemali and Barghan Streets carrying money collected from the branches of the Sepah Bank to be delivered to the main branch. They opened fire from both sides and as a result a bank watchman by the name of Haj 'Ali Agheshteh was hit by the bullets and killed. Bahman Ruzban, another bank watchman, was hit by bullets in the stomach and a bank clerk by the name of Mehdi Diniar was wounded in the shoulder. Meanwhile, a woman passerby by the name of Huriyeh Kalbasi, who was hit in the head by bullets, was taken to the Kasra hospital by a group of people. All of the wounded are being treated. Huriyeh Kalbasi and the bank clerk were taken to Tehran for operation because of the seriousness of their wounds.

During this attack, the armed men succeeded in escaping with a Peykan car carrying more than 4 million tomans.

This case of theft is being prosecuted by the Karaj police. Meanwhile, last night the police received a phone call that a Peugeot car with a temporary license and a Peykan car had been abandoned behind the Morad-e Ab hills on a dirt road. There is no trace of the cars' occupants. Following investigation, it was discovered that the cars found in that locality are the Peugeot used by the armed bandits who had stolen it, and the Peykan bank car containing the money.

The last report filed by the KEYHAN reporter from Karaj indicated also that this morning Haj 'Ali Agheshteh, the Sepah Bank watchman killed during the attack by the armed robbers against the car carrying the bank money, was taken from the Sepah Bank in Karaj by the people to the city's cemetery where he was buried.

CSO: 4640/59

IRAQI CEASE-FIRE CONDITIONS LABELLED 'USELESS EFFORTS'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Jul 81 pp 1, 3

[Text] Today, Iraqi foreign policy suffers from much ambiguity and confusion. The Iraqi regime suffers from unbearable, deadly difficulties resulting from its Zionist aggression on the sanctuary of the Islamic homeland of Iran.

Recently, Tareq 'Aziz, in connection with the military aggression on Iran, had made certain statements that on the one hand bespeak the extremely weak morale of the leaders of the Iraqi regime, and on the other, show the complete political bankruptcy of this regime.

Tareq 'Aziz, the deputy prime minister of the Ba'th government of Iraq, said in a speech in Baghdad that the government of Iraq is prepared for a "just" and "honorable" solution for both sides.

While Tareq 'Aziz was making these statements, justice was saying, an eye for an eye; "honor" has dictated and dictates the crushing of the aggressor to its unquestionable annihilation. It is ridiculous; more than 10 months have passed since the aggression of Saddam's army on Iran; the Ba'thist army has made ruins of several of our valuable provinces; it has inflicted tens of millions of dollars of damages on this nation; and most important of all, it has massacred thousands of the best children of this land. And now it is looking with trembling steps for a "just" solution. It is really ridiculous.

It is ridiculous; but even more ridiculous is that Tareq 'Aziz has so unabashedly said that any solution to end the war must be based on the three principles of (1) no force or threats in resolving the differences, (2) mutual consideration for the sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of the countries in the region, and (3) open shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormoz.

Why does the deputy prime minister of the Ba'thist government of Iraq bring up these three principles to "solve the disputes"? Perhaps it can be safely said that Tareq 'Aziz did not mean to arrive at a just solution. With this speech, he only wants to accuse the

Islamic Republic of violating the above-mentioned principles. Whereas, the Islamic Republic of Iran has never tried and will never try to resolve its deep rooted differences with dependent governments and reactionary leaders such as Saddam through violence. Essentially, it does not find it necessary to resolve its differences with the likes of Saddam. We have always preferred to pave the way for the growth in awareness of all downtrodden nations, especially the Moslem people of Iraq, and we believe that with the awakening of the Iraqi nation, there will remain no trace of Saddam for us to try to resolve our differences with, whether through peaceful or violent means. From our point of view, this is the only way that the government of Iraq will be recognized. We consider those who give financial, military or political aid to the Ba'thist government and who try to delay its downfall as servants of imperialistic policies and we believe that such forces cannot be friends of the Arab people.

And we emphatically ask them to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of their brother nation. If Tareq 'Aziz declares the principles accepted by his own government, as it was mentioned, he must justify the presence of the aggressive army of the Ba'ths on Iranian territory as a violation of the above principles. And if he considers the violation of those principles a sufficient excuse for aggression against the sanctuary of an Islamic country, he surely will find it justifiable that when his own government violates those principles, the neighboring countries of Iraq should also attack its borders and occupy some of its territories.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, in the course of its life of two years and a few months, has proved by its various positions and actions that it does not believe in violating any of the above-mentioned principles. The world witnesses that Iran has been fighting Iraqi aggression for 10 months, under the harshest conditions, in the most serious manner and it must bear witness that (while other countries only claim to support non-aggression and avoiding threats in resolving the differences between the countries in the world) the Islamic Republic, by sacrificing its best children, has entered, in practice, into a battle with those who behave contrary to all humane principles and internationally accepted bases and contrary to all of their own claims, who believe in force and the use of military violence to attain their defiled objectives. The truth is that no nation or government believes more than our nation and government in the principle of non-violence in resolving its differences with neighbors. Our combative forces are fighting with astonishing perseverence on the bloody and dangerous front in the west and south in order that no dictator or roughneck imagines that he can achieve his unjust intentions through the force of bullets.

this is at a time when the Iraqi government continues to act with the unjustifiable presence of its soldiers, openly and actively, contrary to the first principle of what Tareq 'Aziz says. And this

is at a time when the political circles in the world have not forgotten that the Ba'thists used threats and fear tactics against their Arab neighbors to force their wishes and resorted to sabotage and bombing within the borders of Kuwait in order to occupy Bubiyan Island.

The second principle that the deputy prime minister of Iraq offers as the foundation of any sort of peace is more ridiculous than the first principle. While thousands of Iraqi soldiers have occupied part of the Islamic land of Iran, he speaks of respecting the sovereignty of the countries in the region. By bringing up this principle, he tries to imply uncertainty about whether Iran is trying to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. It is really strange! If Radio Iran speaks of the Koranic law for the people and arouses them to protect the hero of Islam, this is considered interference in the internal affairs of another country, but when Saddam demands, in an interview with AL-ANBA', the deportation of the Iranians residing in that country, this is not interference in the internal affairs of another country. It is not clear why the broadcast of a few hours of Koranic interpretation, discussion of religious problems, and offering a few correct analyses of international issues is called interference in the internal affairs of another country while Iraq's adventurism before the war, instigating disturbances in Iran, escalating racial war, and numerous bombings, which according to documented evidence clearly demonstrate the direct interference of the Ba'thist regime, is not called interference in the internal affairs of the Iranian nation.

It is said that the thief always shouts "thief, thief" louder than everyone else. It is clear from the statements of Tareq 'Aziz that Iran's silence about the intrigues of Iraq in the Persian Gulf has upset the Ba'thists. For some time now, this country has been pressuring the government of the Emirates against its will. Of course, we hope that the United Arab Emirates resists the blackmail and threats as before. But what is the intention of the Ba'thists in putting the Emirates under pressure? All political circles in the world know that the Ba'thists, in order to invite the United States into the Persian Gulf, want to set fire to this oil-producing region; and the starting point of this conspiracy are the three strategic Iranian islands. And all the political circles of the world know that if Baghdad succeeds in its plans, for a while, open shipping in the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormoz will be disrupted due to the war conditions which will ensue, and this is exactly the excuse that the United States needs to occupy the region. The United States has long realized that none of its dependents and pupets have the ability to protect its filthy colonialist interests in the Middle East. And it has known that sooner or later, if the nations of this oil-producing region do not determine their own destinies, the wheels of history will turn back and the old era of colonialism will be revised in the Persian Gulf; this would mean

that the United States would have an open military presence in the region.

Such a dangerous move would undoubtedly not take place without the preparations of the United States. Now it has been more than a year since Carter, the former president of the United States, made his declaration concerning the vital interests of the Western superpower in the Persian Gulf. In his noisy declaration, he had given himself the right to send the American army into the Middle East should those interests be threatened. Since that time, the propaganda loudspeakers of the West have tried to incline the minds of the people the world towards accepting the American claim.

In order to attack the Persian Gulf, the United States would have to present their important oil passage as a barrel of dynamite about to explode. No one has yet asked himself why the Western press has constantly mentioned the forced war of Iraq on Iran in the last 10 months as the "Gulf war" (although it has had no direct effect on the Persian Gulf and open shipping in it, aside from a few unsuccessful attacks by Iraqi airplanes on Kharg Island). Is their goal anything but the use of this open aggression as propaganda to prepare the grounds for the military occupation of the region by the United States?

In order to attack the Persian Gulf, the United States needs a spark which will set the whole of it on fire and the Iraqi government, if even for the sake of pleasing them, is trying hard to light a flame in the Persian Gulf. It is really shameful that a government--after its conspiracies to invite the American executioners into the Persian Gulf and to destroy the security of the whole region have been exposed to the political observers--considers one of the main conditions for resolving its disputes with Islamic Iran as open shipping in this Gulf and the Straits of Hormoz.

We warn our southern neighbors that the government of Iraq has become the fire carrier for a show which will result, more than everything else, in damaging the independent character and, essentially, the existence of the smaller countries in the region.

The Ba'thists of Baghdad will not derive advantage with trapeze acts such as the speech of Tareq 'Aziz. Instead of issuing new conditions for peace every now and then, they had better prepare themselves for a history-making defeat.

The Iraqi regime will not derive advantage from these desperate efforts.

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CSO: 4640/62

BRIEFS

PAKISTANIS CONDEMN ARTICLE ON IRAN--Our correspondent in Karachi has reported that the Pakistani paper JANG has published an insulting article about Imam Khomeyni, over which the people of Karachi have expressed strong grief and anger. Yesterday evening at a great gathering in a Karachi mosque, Maulana 'Abbas Haidar 'Abidi [not further identified] strongly condemned this article and strongly assailed this criminal paper. All of the Karachi organizations as well as the All-Pakistan Shi'ite Council in a published statement have protested against the paper's impudence and have condemned the criminal paper. Members of the general public in Pakistan are condemning the impudence of this paper through the agency of the Iranian consulate at Karachi. [Text] [GF261751 Zahedan International Service in Urdu 1530 GMT 25 Jul 81]

IRANAIR RESUMPTION OF KARACHI FLIGHT--Iranair has announced that effective 4 August, the airline will resume its flight to Karachi. A plane will fly to Karachi every Tuesday and will return to Tehran the same day. [Text] [GF291616 Tehran International Service in Urdu 1315 GMT 29 Jul 81]

FORMER GENERAL'S PLOTTING REPORTED--World news agencies have reported that General Aryana, a reputable officer and commander, is trying to inflict the last blow to Khomeyni's regime. General Aryana, who is said to have established himself in a point in Iran and on the Iranian-Turkish border, has formed an organization within Iran consisting of reputable officers who support Iran's freedom. General Aryana has said that at present he is preparing, with the help of freedom fighters, to inflict the last blow on Khomeyni's regime in order to save Iran from the bunch of ruling terrorists and criminals. Opposition groups, too, have expressed their support for General Aryana and have intensified their activities in order to enter the scene at the opportune moment to support the general, who is one of Iran's experienced commanders. General Aryana has also called on all domestic forces to support him. The liberation forces of Iran, under the command of General Aryana, will commence their activities too. They have called on the residents of Iran's northern towns not to leave their houses at night and on the armed forces to join the liberation forces, with all their materiel, upon the call to action. The moment for the armed forces' officers and NCO's to join the liberation forces will be announced later. [Text] [NC281756 Free Voice of Iran [Clandestine] in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 28 Jul 81]

CP LEADER'S INTERVIEW REPORTED--In an interview with the AFP, Secretary General of the Iranian Tudeh Party Kianuri endorsed the suppressive policy of Khomeyni's regime and stated that the patriotic youths being sent to the gallows in groups are worthy of death. According to him, the punishing of freedom fighters who do not succumb to the disgrace of supporting the clergy and have risen to save the homeland by execution is entirely correct. Nureddin Kianuri added that as long as the regime continues its anti-imperialist policy, the Tudeh Party will support it. However, he made no reference to what he means by anti-imperialism and did not mention anything about Soviet imperialism, toward which Khomeyni is approaching more and more each day. Mr Kianuri also made no mention of the direct affiliation of the Tudeh Party with Moscow or of his servant-master relationship with Leonid Brezhnev. One concludes from Mr Kianuri's remarks that the Tudeh Party, on the orders of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, has been charged with the duty of continuing to support the Islamic Republic's leaders until the rotten fruit of the Islamic Republic is fully swallowed by Soviet imperialism and [words indistinct]. [Text] [NC291914 Radio Iran [Clandestine] in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 29 Jul 81]

CLERGYMAN KIDNAPPED--Kurdish Peshmerga have kidnapped Ayatollah Mostafa Moradi, Khomeyni's representative in Baneh. Reports from Kordestan state that the night before last a number of Kurdish combatants attacked Sheykh Moradi's residence and after killing the Revolution Guards protecting him, took him captive. In a statement left at Sheykh Moradi's house, the Kurdish combatants condemned the sheykh for close cooperation with Khomeyni. It is said that Moradi has played a major role in crushing the freedom fighters and the mass murder of Kurdish brothers. [Text] [NC291828 Radio Iran [Clandestine] in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 29 Jul 81]

CSO: 4656/1

SAMET COMMENTARY ON REAGAN MIDEAST POLICY

TA291603 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jul 81 p 9

[Commentary by U.S. correspondent Gid'on Samet: "Reagan's Reeducation"]

[Text] The cease-fire in Lebanon is a good opportunity to reexamine what happened in the last few weeks. However, this pondering—even if no longer as angry and temperamental as in the middle of this month—does not restore any previous situation, but rather opens a new chapter in the relations between Washington and Jerusalem.

Beyond the criticism of Israel's policy in the last few months--which was sometimes more and sometimes less justified--the U.S. administration has no other choice but to thank Israel for a service rendered. Israel forced the administration to reconsider its Middle East policy. This reconsideration gradually made the administration reach some unpleasant conclusions which will certainly not please Israel either. The U.S. policy in our area had been covered with myth, phraseology and generalizations, but Israel lifted one after the other the veils of "make believe."

From the beginning of this administration the United States thought the Middle East would be the proper arena for implementing its political and global philosophy regarding the East-West confrontation. U.S. policy enthusiastically believed that it would be able to translate its aspiration to push the Soviet Union away from any site into the geopolitical and diplomatic terms of the eastern Mediterranean Sea basin and the Persian Gulf. [as published] Then Israel came along and showed it--beginning with the AWACS, through the Iraqi reactor and concluding with Beirut--that the real truth is that of the Israeli-Arab conflict. Jerusalem did not do so in order to prove its justness in the strategic argument. Through the offices of Mr Begin, Israel acted only according to its own considerations and timetable. However, this was enough to show the hollowness of the strategic consensus of its friend.

So long as America is embarrassed only by the opposition to the supply of sophisticated equipment to Riyadh or the destruction of the nuclear reactor, Israel has and will continue to have its advocates. The dangerous limit was the bombing on Beirut. The great difference between the dispute over the AWACS in Baghdad [as published] on the one hand and the bombing on Beirut on the other stemmed

not only from the scope, the sensitivity of the moral aspect and the especially infuriating timing, and not only from the fact that it was a question of a load reaching a critical level or that it was a straw that broke the camel's back. A second and more sober look must show that because of Beirut the United States was forced to become finally persuaded that it has taken the wrong route in the Middle East.

This is a painful lesson to the largest superpower. The United States has not yet reached the conclusion that it must change direction in its bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and its failing policy in Central America, yet it is about to reach such a conclusion concerning our area. The change is that, against its will and conception, the United States has been dragged into reaching the conclusion that it must initially deal with an in-depth solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict. The current strategy has proved to be very harmful for the administration. Because of it the U.S. administration paid a dear price in the Muslim world even before it had time to hope that this strategy would produce some benefits.

Israel was the first to implement this policy. Syria, Iraq and the PLO--Moscow's clients according to the U.S. conception--were an easy target for Israel. Israel's free translation of the U.S. conception soon showed Washington what it could not have known in theory: the anti-Soviet strategy in the Middle East is full of contradictions and obstacles.

Soon afterward, the Muslim world accused the United States of cooperating with the Israelis--which, on the surface, seemed to be dancing to the U.S. tune--or, at least, the United States was unable to restrain them. The United States made the worst of two worlds: Muslim reticence, a dispute with Israel, a strengthening of Soviet penetration instead of the opposition and it gained the reputation of someone who does not exactly know what it wants in the most sensitive area in the world.

The lesson in the last few months was so blunt and convincing that there is no need today for a complicated and thorough look deep into the heart of the decision-makers in the U.S. administration. The change seemed inevitable and it was made all the more easy by the fact that it did not have to face an established policy which had to initially be proven wrong.

The implications of the change are more serious since it was not by accident that the administration set its priorities regarding the Middle East upon taking office. The implications are very serious as far as the administration is concerned but they may be chiefly painful to the Israeli friend which had unintentionally shown it the way. This change will, first and foremost, call for a significant acceleration of the debates on the future of the West Bank and for striving toward a "comprehensive and thorough solution" of the Palestinian problem. The special status of the U.S. presidency, mainly during the term of such a popular president, has caused Mr Reagan's approach to infiltrate the ranks below him. It will not be simple (the bombing on Beirut has made it much easier) to provide an elementary justification to something which has thus far been regarded as undesired or not urgent.

It is not simple because this issue is vital to a friendly state such as is Israel. To make such a move--there have been increasing calls to this effect in influential papers (the WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES), by former administration officials (Vance, Brzezinski) as well as by the Arabists who have again come to the forefront in the State Department and the Pentagon--would mean to get embroiled in a complicated and perhaps insoluble situation. The situation is complicated because the President regards the PLO as a despicable organization and there is so far no indication that the PLO will give the President and his staff as much as the end of a thread to hang on to.

The tactical and fundamental questions stemming from the process of reformulation of the U.S. conception are no less painful. The administration knew what it had spared itself of when it decided to delay this process as much as possible: in spite of all the foreseeable complications, is it possible to tackle the Palestinian problem in depth without even conducting indirect contacts with the PLO? Without the PLO, is there any chance of co-opting the Palestinians in the autonomy talks which President al-Sadat is expected to start encouraging as of the beginning of next week? What practical (territorial) interpretation will the United States ultimately be forced to give to UN Resolution 242 when this stops being a coined term and requires a specific interpretation? Will the U.S. merely declarative approach regarding the settlements not be forced to grow teeth and claws?

These are very unpleasant questions for the administration, which was not prepared for them and is now confronted with them to no small degree because of Israel and because of the opportunity it provided to those advocating the political option in the Middle East to resume their offensive here on all levels. President Reagan is currently at a decisive stage of the struggle on his economic policy. If, according to prevailing estimates, he wins the struggle Reagan will be free to make the difficult political decisions due at the end of his "budget round." Reagan's position is, perhaps, the largest unknown factor. Very little has been learned to date on his role in foreign policy and on issues on which he is not so much knowledgeable as he is fervently committed. Not enough is known on the President's decisionmaking process since he is subject to the pressure of experts on world policy and he is aware of his own limitations.

The reeducation of Ronald Reagan--a true supporter of Israel, a leader who speaks very strongly to the heart of the American nation and its leaders--may become an important chapter in the history of the relations between the two countries. As trite as this sentence may sound, it would not harm to mention again the need for the Israeli Government to organize its thoughts and be well prepared for the upcoming difficult debate.

CSO: 4323/30

'MA'ARIV' ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH U.S.

TA311108 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 31 Jul 81 p 13

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "Haig Is Hoping That 'Minor Things' Would Not Resume the Fire; Habib Demanded That Begin Personally Watch the Local Command"]

[Excerpts] It appears as though someone in the U.S. administration is too nervous, fearing that any small incident might lead to a huge conflagration the U.S. "firemen" would no longer be able to extinguish. But if this is so, it seems that the U.S. administration is again repeating its traditional errors: lack of consideration for Israel's security sensitivities and irrational condemnation of even a just and logical act. All these lead to the opposite results than the administration had hoped to achieve.

However, the U.S. nervousness, dictating not-thoroughly-thought-out reactions to certain administration personalities, must most likely have a deeper cause, but this can be found in the realm of the conscious: Washington knows full well that the U.S.--as well as Israeli--media comment and interpretation saying that Israel had, so to speak, "recognized" the PLO, even indirectly, are not worth anything. It is true that the government of Israel has recognized the PLO, but not as partner to any kind of negotiation, but as an object one should wage a war against. There is nothing in common between the agreement to reach a "cease-fire" with it and this declared objective.

"If the terrorists force a new war on Israel, we will have to invade southern Lebanon," said Knesset member Yitzhaq Rabin, former prime minister and chief of staff, who had reservations about the IDF operation against the terrorists headquarters in Beirut. Namely, despite the "recognition" of the PLO and the "indirect negotiations" with it, in effect nothing has changed.

All this criticism on the government's agreeing to conduct negotiations on "peaceful relations with the president of Lebanon," while everyone knows that what it had in mind was actually the PLO can perhaps serve well the continued strife between the opposition to the government in the inertia of the election campaign, but it cannot change the reality which the United States fears so much: that of a total war against terrorist bases in Lebanon, according to Yitzhaq Rabin's formula. U.S. administration figures may assume that if Rabin thinks out loud about such an option, neither is it a stranger to Menahem Begin's train of thought.

This is Washington's great fear. People there know that Begin does not regard the cease-fire as an ideal as long as the terrorists base themselves deeper and improve the cannon positions directed at Nahariyya, Qiryat Shemona, the Galilee panhandle, Kefar Gil'adi or any other Galilee settlement within the firing range of the katyushas and the cannons. The truth is that no government would have tolerated such a state of affairs as the remarks of the Alignment's defense minister-designate would approve.

One could also sense the U.S. sensitivity from the statements made by President Reagan's emissary, Philip Habib, in a conversation with Prime Minister Menahem Begin just before the Lebanon cease-fire came into effect. Habib and Begin convened in camera and as far as is known, the former pleaded that Israel not react "to every operation" by the terrorists, and that it would act with utmost restraint. Habib also asked the prime minister to ascertain that if a reaction was called for this would not be carried out by the local command in the field or by its superiors without prior examination by Begin in person.

Secretary of State Alexander Haig's message to the prime minister on the cease-fire was written in a similar spirit. Haig praised Begin for the wise and courageous decision, acknowledging the risks Israel had undertaken, but along with the praises, he also laid a modest request and a hope: He hoped, so he wrote, that "minor things" would not lead to the resumption of fire....

It is not clear what are the means by which one measures "minor" terrorist violations, but one thing Haig knew without a shadow of doubt: that "minor" violations can soon lead to a big conflagration. Haig's assumption was, indeed, reinforced in Begin's reply message. Among other things, the prime minister wrote to him that he had already managed to hear that one of the organizations--meaning Jibril's--was not accepting the cease-fire (meanwhile, Yasir 'Arafat has succeeded in forcing him to accept the cease-fire). However, that was not the main point in Begin's message. The main point was the emphasis that it should be clear to the United States that in the event that the terrorists violate the cease-fire, Israel would not be able to keep still for long. Haig could gather that if the silence is broken this time, the Israeli reaction might be irregular.

The desire not to underline the points of friction with the U.S. administration also explains the Israeli silence over the "very grave thing"--as the prime minister put it--committed by the United States: holding up the F-16 aircraft it would have supplied to Israel in accordance with a signed deal. This is a breach of a contract, Begin states. Can we not rely on the United States even?

One cannot nevertheless ignore the fact that the United States has turned the F-16's into a lever with which to pressure Israel. The question the prime minister raised--on whether or not one could rely on the United States--cannot remain hanging in mid-air without an answer from the highest echelons in the United States. Other questions stem from this basic one: What value have U.S. promises resulting from the peace treaty with Egypt, to which the United States is party and on which the U.S. President is a witnessing signatory? What power, then, has the President's view that the PLO has never been chosen as the

representative of the Palestinians...and that it is nothing but a terrorist organization? Moreover, what is the significance of Reagan's declaration about the Middle East: "We should not dictate an arrangement" (and, furthermore, "I would like to make this clear both to al-Sadat and to Begin")? And would Saudi Arabia have the "final word" in shaping U.S. policy in terms of calculations where Israel is concerned?

At present Israel has no problems with the secretary of state, even though it looks as though on the levels under him nothing has changed. What about Caspar Weinberger's Department of Defense? Does the President have faith in it in regard to Israel?

And, in general, what is the "presidential policy" Reagan meant to put into effect and submit his subordinates to?

Do the evolutionary phases of handling the F-16's harmonize with an attitude toward the "natural ally"--Israel--which is "the last deterring element"?

CSO: 4323/30

CHIEF OF STAFF EXPLAINS CEASEFIRE, LEBANON SITUATION

TA241637 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1505 GMT 24 Jul 81

[Interview with Israeli Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan by IDF Radio correspondent Tzvi Shapira--24 July, place not given--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan: Today the prime minister announced agreement on a cease-fire. What is the significance of the announcement?

[Answer] The significance is that nobody is firing from both sides of the border, including the Christians in southern Lebanon.

[Question] Is this an agreement between the State of Israel and a second party?

[Answer] No, it is not an agreement. In legal terms, agreement means, I assume, that this is when several parties or two parties sign a document. This is not the situation.

[Question] With whom did we conduct the negotiations?

[Answer] Habib--Philip Habib--mediated. I do not know exactly with whom he mediated on the other side. Here I know that he spoke with us, because there are not several sides here. On the other side, I do not know. The State of Israel asked him to tell the government of Lebanon of what it had to say.

[Question] In your estimation, what led to the cease-fire?

[Answer] In my view, the terrorist establishment in Lebanon was either broken or was about to break. But that does not mean that, in such a situation, they cannot use weapons, a cannon or a Katyusha--this is not what I mean. What I mean is that their entire establishment in southern Lebanon was seriously damaged by us. They suffered at least 100 killed. If we include Beirut, it may come close to 200 terrorists killed. We hit their transportation, we hit their bases, weapons, command headquarters, supply depots, infrastructure and units and, in my opinion, they found themselves in a situation in which their operational framework was almost broken. I would once more remind you that you should not treat what I am saying with skepticism. One can see that the volume

of fire, from last week until today, sharply declined. We can see what this means. We can see what they suffered during the days of our operations. In my opinion, when they realized that as time went on, the more they were hit and hit again they then looked for a way to accept the truce in order to be able to reorganize. In my view, they will try to reorganize with the aid of the Syrians, the Russians and the Libyans in order to stand on their feet again. Then there may be a sign that the cease-fire will end.

[Question] What led Israel to accept the agreement for a cease-fire?

[Answer] Israel is not interested in firing. Israel is interested in peace. Israel wants life to be normal along the border, on both sides, and our military activity was carried out to lead to a situation in which there will be no firing. We acted against terror along the borders. We succeeded. A new problem sprang up, one of terror by means of a modern weapon, a long-range one, the Katyushas and cannons, and our activity restricted their ability to strike. If the firing had continued, in my view, we would have reached a situation in which the terrorists would not have been able to use those weapons. We have not yet said the last word about the methods of our operation. We have not yet said it and we still have many things in our pockets that we can use and, I can say, they are more or less drastic, but they are an additional weight on the terrorists' backs.

[Question] I would like you to return to the entire issue of the fight against the terrorists over the last few days. With regard to the agreement, I wanted to ask what guarantees Israel was given by Philip Habib, who conducted the negotiations, in order that the terrorists' activity should not be resumed?

[Answer] I do not think that anyone can give guarantees that the terrorists' activity will not be resumed. I do not think that Philip Habib gave any guarantees that this activity will not be resumed. This is not an agreement between countries, or between governments. A mediator went to several parties and moved between several parties. He brought what he had to say from one to the other, because they cannot speak directly to each other. Here the spoken word is apparently what is relied upon.

[Question] I ask you, Chief of Staff, how will the IDF work now, in this cease-fire situation?

[Answer] When there is a cease-fire, the IDF does not fire.

[Question] Will Israel, or the IDF, continue to fight the terrorists wherever they are, as we announced? Or will we now halt our fire?

[Answer] Israel has not said that it is abandoning the method of working, the methods of working against the terrorists as it has declared in the past and carried out in the past. If the current situation leads to a stop to terror altogether, then we may have to think about a change in policy.

[Question] Have we not tied ourselves, to a certain extent, with regard to our future ability to act, through this arrangement?

[Answer] I do not think that we have tied ourselves.

[Question] This arrangement commits us to nonaction and if it appears, for example, that the terrorists are reorganizing themselves in the field, building command headquarters, building--bringing in weapons...

[Answer--interrupts] Then we will decide. We have not said that we are putting ourselves in a straitjacket, tying our hands behind our backs and what occurs in the field, we do not see, do not hear, do not react to. We have not said that. Now there is a halt to the terror of all kinds. If we find out that that terror has not halted, or there are preparations to resume it, we will be confronted with a decision and I assume that we will make the correct decision.

[Question] That is, you do not regard this as a change in Israel's policy on the terrorists?

[Answer] The government of Israel has not changed the policy.

[Question] Do you see no fear that this arrangement, or agreement, will be received by the world, or the terrorists, as a precedent for a settlement, or what would be interpreted as a settlement with the terrorist organizations?

[Answer] No. Not necessarily, this should not be the case, we have not spoken with the terrorists nor have we come to any agreement with them. However, there were contacts with the terrorists in the past, there were agreements with the terrorists, there were negotiations with terrorists, with terrorist organizations, on the release of the plane and the crew from Algeria. There were indirect contacts on the release of 'Amram from imprisonment in Lebanon in return for prisoners, terrorist prisoners in Israel, and there were indirect negotiations with terrorist organizations for the release of the Entebbe hostages. It is not important that it was through a third party, but the State of Israel conducted negotiations, and rightly, for a certain purpose. That does not mean that it recognized the organizations, nor does it mean that, by this, it set a precedent it must repeat.

[Question] Yes. Do you think the terrorists regard this as an achievement for themselves?

[Answer] That depends on whether the terrorists try to present everything in their relations with us as an achievement, even if it is a failure. Last night there was a raid by our forces along the coastal axis. We hit vehicles, several terrorists were killed, our forces returned safely. What did the terrorists announce? It appears the BBC heard this from the terrorists--an IDF force was repelled from the coast of Lebanon, it suffered heavy losses; there are no reports about the terrorists' casualties. So, what the BBC says is heard by the whole world and the world knows that there was an Israeli attempt at a raid in Lebanon, it was repelled. We suffered very many losses and the terrorists came out the victors because nobody knows about their losses. This is the way the terrorists present a picture.

We can remember clashes with squads. A sqaud tried to infiltrate, they were all killed. Nothing was left of it. The terrorists' announcement: Four heroes stopped a military convoy. They destroyed 100 soldiers, they set six trucks on fire. Nobody fell. So, this makes a great, strong impression on the terrorists, it gives them a feeling of victory and this is the way they present themselves in propaganda. We speak about information, we do not propagandize, we are ashamed to speak about propaganda, it reminds us of the time of the Nazis. We speak about information. The information is not taken in by the world. We explain that we attacked the command headquarters in Beirut, because up to now they were immune. From them, orders went out to all quarters of the world for terror. It was there that they planned, organized, absorbed, gave orders. The Arab propaganda says there were 700 casualties--civilians, all civilians. Of course, that is a lie bigger than any ever heard before. We are trying to explain why we went to Beirut, why we attacked and how many civilians were killed compared with how many terrorists. However, our explanation was not accepted.

[Question] What are the facts as the IDF knows them?

[Answer] We know that the command headquarters were destroyed and what was hit, too, when one or two bombs went astray. What was hit were terrorist buildings, that we know from the Lebanese press and, according to the Lebanese press, at that place terrorist installations, equipment, cannons, command headquarters and people were hit. I have a document under my eyes which bases itself on data published in the Lebanese press and I will read it, what is written in it: In the Israeli aircraft's bombing of Beirut on 17 July, heavy damage was caused and several Palestinian centers were destroyed.

The main positions destroyed by the Israeli aircraft are as follows: The destruction of an ammunition dump in (al-Faqwahini). The sports stadium, that is in Beirut. A hit on a PLO command headquarters, the main operational office. The destruction of a position of the Lebanese Arab Army near (al-Sabinas). The collapse of three buildings, one of them a nine-story building, in (Sabra) and (al-Faqwahini). The destruction of Palestinian bases recently established in the (al-Janah) area. A hit on the home of Khalaf Salah (Abu-Iyad). Minor damage was caused to a house in (al-Faqwahini). The three buildings that collapsed belonged to the command headquarters that was bombed. The destruction of a battery of field artillery, 155-mm and 130-mm, six of them, cannons, near the center of the council of the south [as heard]. That is something in the suburbs of Beirut. The destruction of eight trucks carrying rocket-launchers artillery batteries at the entrance to the (Shapila) and (Sabra) camps. The destruction of 80 military vehicles and civilian vehicles near the (al-Dana) station and the outskirts of (Sabra). These are apparently vehicles that were parked in the region of the command headquarters that was attacked. A hit at the position of the deterrent force facing the (Shapila) camp. Three soldiers were killed and 18 injured there. They are apparently Syrians. The destruction of a position of the Arab Liberation Front. The destruction of a position of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. In one of the buildings that was hit in (al-Faqwahini) there was the headquarters of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and in another building, the headquarters of the Arab Liberation Front. These are the buildings that were hit. The building in which there was the main PLO operations room was also damaged.

[Question] Do we know the number of civilians who were hit in those buildings?

[Answer] No, not from this document.

[Question] And over and above that?

[Answer] The spokesman for the Democratic Front said that the missiles, or our bombs, hit the administrative headquarters of the Democratic Front where a large number of the people in the building were killed and wounded. Another source--a responsible source--from the Democratic Front said that the bombing hit the front's centers, where many people were killed and wounded and there was also damage. There is no reference here, even in one word, to the number of civilians hit. I would remind you that what I have just read is a quote from Lebanese papers which reported on the results of the bombing.

[Question] Today, in retrospect, knowing the implication of this operation on the U.S. administration and European governments, do you still think the operation was correct, or should we have avoided it?

[Answer] I think the operation was right and timely. I do not think we would have enjoyed world sympathy under any other circumstances. We did not gain sympathy when the incidents in Ma'alot or Qiryat Shemona occurred, or when events occurred in Nahariyya or the coastal road. No one applauded us. They scolded us less when we went out on the Litani operation or when we carried out some operation, but we have never been pitied and never has the UN Security Council been convened when we, in our midst, were severely attacked. Not even once was the Security Council convened for such an event. So these condemnations and the cries of alarm, which are largely for specific reasons rather than for reasons of justice, will pass. We are well experienced in this. In my opinion we would not be able to change this conduct and this norm as long as the West is dependent on Arab oil, and when billions of dollars are deposited in European and U.S. banks, and when the Arabs purchase property and assets throughout Europe and in the United States too. Who there would come out against the Arabs? It is not a matter of justice. Saudi Arabia is considered a moderate country and a democratic one--not simply moderate, but also democratic--but there people are beheaded in the market place as punishment. Supposing capital punishment had been given on a terrorist who killed children, what commotion there would be in the world! In the Belfast prison, five or six Irishmen have already died of hunger. In other words, they conduct a hunger strike until they perish. Yet the noble prime minister of Britain did not even blink. She just said: Let them die. What does she care? Do they try to force-feed them? Here if a terrorist-murderer goes on a 24-hour hunger strike, he is already being injected shots and infusions and food and I do not know what else--God forbid that he should feel bad.

I am not against his feeling well, but I am merely comparing the norm of behavior toward us to that toward themselves and others.

So I do not think we should get excited about it. The State of Israel thought that this is what should be done, and it did it. Now that it is done, let them shout.

[Question] But did we take into account, or did we know that so many civilians would be hit? Did we take into account these world reactions, or were we surprised by them?

[Answer] What does the world do when civilians are hit here? We did not set out to hit civilians with malice. All the terrorist targets in the State of Israel are civilian. They have not attacked an army camp even once, either with Katyushas, or with cannons, or by taking hostages or carrying out a sabotage act. Only civilians [are their goals]. And what has the world to say about this? I am not saying we should adopt the same standard; on the contrary, we act differently. The targets we attack are only terrorist targets. In Beirut, the commands were situated inside the city, surrounded by civilians. It is from there that all the murder directives are issued. Why should they be immune? Only by virtue of being situated among civilians? Our air force is an excellent air force with an extraordinary level of performance of which many throughout the world are envious, even after the [attack on the] Iraqi nuclear reactor [although they do not admit it]. We could have acted under the justifiable assumption that the surroundings would not be hit. Indeed, it was not hit. I think the information on the number of civilian casualties was a lie. It was a lie with the objective of propagandizing, because the Arabs know to what extent the world is sensitive, or sensitive about us when it happens there, and they have exploited this. I am not sure if and when the dimensions of this lie would emerge, but I am sure the figures and the data that have been reported are exaggerated and stem from propaganda. We aimed at commands in other areas, too, and so far we have refrained from attacking them because they were in the (?safety) of civilian installations or buildings--not in Beirut. Despite military pressure, or what I would say was a military necessity, to hit those commands, we nevertheless avoided hitting them only because of the fear that civilian lives might be jeopardized.

Many of our methods of operation--of carrying out raids and commando operations--are rendered more difficult by ourselves and tie down the force of our operation for fear of hitting civilians. We did this to maintain our moral standing, to preserve our norms of conduct. We do not expect to be patted on the shoulder. One can see what other countries have done to civilian populations, how they behaved in times of war, and then see those very same people come and preach to us. In my opinion, we may be the only ones in the world who behave in this manner toward a civilian population. Whenever the civilian population is hit, it is by chance and not intentional and we regret every such incident. But we will not change our ways. However, this is a matter of life or death. In other words, they want to liquidate the State of Israel and we are fighting for our existence. It is inconceivable that they be immune because of a geographical location in a certain place. I am calm about this, and anyone who is familiar with how we operate and our methods knows that this is the way things are.

[Question] With your permission, I would like to go back to the arrangement [hesder] or agreement [haskama] reached between the Israeli Government and Philip Habib today. Does this arrangement or this agreement apply in full to southern Lebanon as well? How? Does it obligate Haddad's forces also?

[Answer] It clearly mentions this issue.

[Question] What role did the Syrians play in reaching this agreement? Does the cease-fire pertain to them, too, or are they not party to the matter?

[Answer] Officially, the Syrians took no part in the firing incidents, as far as we know. To the best of my knowledge, they are not party to this matter. A cease-fire exists with Syria since the Yom Kippur War.

[Question] Were the Syrians involved all along with the negotiations of Philip Habib?

[Answer] Only insofar as the missile crisis is concerned.

[Question] Will the supply of F-16 aircraft from the United States resume as part of this agreement?

[Answer] I do not know about this. I am not aware of any reference to this issue in the context of the cease-fire.

[Question] To sum up the subject, how do you regard the U.S. role, or that of Philip Habib, in obtaining the agreement [haskama]?

[Answer] Philip Habib is an emissary on behalf of the U.S. President. He went from one country to another in the Middle East. What has been agreed upon was agreed upon through his mediation.

[Question] Have the recent expressions in the United States, the suspension of the supply of the F-16 aircraft and the verbal statements that constitute, so to speak, or perhaps do not constitute, pressure on Israel, played a part in obtaining this agreement? Do you not see it this way?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Mr Chief of Staff, do you regard this agreement to be the end of a process, a recess, a time-out, or a beginning of a process?

[Answer] I think this war with the terrorists is the longest in Eretz Yisra'el--in fact, in any country; in our case, in Eretz Yisra'el--between the Palestinians and the Jews. [sentence as heard] I think that now the stage has changed. The fighting in the last 2 weeks had a certain form, and if the fire resumes, it will certainly resume in a different form, or it may resume in the same form, but other moves will be taken. In these wars, no period resembles its predecessor exactly, and this is true throughout the years.

[Question] What do you expect the terrorists to do now in southern Lebanon? Earlier you mentioned the many hits we scored there, the fact that we destroyed their infrastructure and the organization in the terrorist organizations' ranks. What do you think will now happen in southern Lebanon?

[Answer] I assume they will try to organize and repair things, replenish stocks they have lost or that have been burned or destroyed. This is what I assume. I

do not know exactly what their organizational capability is or how long it will take. I presume Libya and Syria and the Eastern bloc will supply them with what they need, perhaps even increase the flow of weaponry to the terrorists. I presume they will use this period for reorganizing.

[Question] Let us return to what preceded the cease-fire. In your estimation, did the terrorists start firing because of [Israeli] bombings, or did the bombings, as far as they [the terrorists] were concerned merely serve as a pretext or a reason for the firing?

[Answer] We witnessed a swift, massive improvement in the terrorists' organization and the using of modern weapons. This process included the absorption of equipment, training and its deployment in the area. We had much proof of this, a lot of evidence and a close follow-up. Our initiated activity stopped because of the elections, the missile crisis, Philip Habib. In my opinion, had our initiative not been resumed, the terrorists--who had amassed all that materiel and positioned it in the area--would have launched a war on us--as they admit, saying they are at war which they have declared--in a manner we had known before. In my opinion, we caught them in the middle of, or toward the end of, their process of organizing for the resumption of war using a new means of warfare. These would not have been terrorist acts through squads or penetration attempts to take hostages, or through using a rubber boat or a glider. It would have been Katyusha launchers and 130-mm cannons and tanks used from fortifications with coordinated orders. The targets would have been our settlements within that range and also the Christians in southern Lebanon. We studied the beginnings of the resumption of activity of this type and its significance: What it means when a 40-barrel launcher fires on a settlement, or when cannon fire is directed--such as with 130-mm cannons--on a particular site. If we had resumed our activity 1 month from now, perhaps our predicament would have been a lot more difficult. By our predicament, I mean the condition of the border settlements. It would have been much worse.

[Question] The government's policy of hitting the terrorists wherever they are without waiting for them to carry out actions was criticized because it was said the policy was speeding up the terrorists' reinforcing and organizing. What do you think about this criticism?

[Answer] In my view, what prompted the terrorists' becoming a force that uses such means of warfare is precisely our success in preventing other terror acts, terror acts in different methods. I do not know why this criticism is being voiced, or what the alternative could have been: Maintain a system in which they kill 22 children in Ma'alot and then we go out and react? Is this the right way? For the last 14 or 15 months we have acted in such a way that they have not been able to have one squad penetrate into Israel. Contrast that to the method of retaliation previously used. Did it ever prevent a terrorist act? Not even once, not even one time. It was just an act of revenge when, after they went to Yehud and killed a mother and her six children [as heard] we went to Qibya in retaliation. There are also other examples from the period in which we engaged in retaliatory operations. Did we once prevent any kind of act? Negative, the answer is no. However, since May 1980 not even one squad has

penetrated Israel to carry out an action, and even terror acts within the country have been on a steep decline in both number and quality and outcome. In a steep decline. So, to what should this be attributed?

Now, they--so I believe--have said to themselves: We cannot penetrate and carry out terror acts either in the air, in the sea or on the land. We tried a hot-air balloon, they burned it; a glider, they captured it; in the sea, they sank our boats; and on land, they kill us all. This is impossible. So what, then? We should remain at a distance and fire a Katyusha, or fire a cannon--at civilians, the very same civilians we--the terrorists--wanted to reach in their kibbutz so we could kill their children. So now we will do it with a cannon from a distance. The same terrorist acts, the same targets, but through other means, where they do not take any risks.

[Question] Is the IDF prepared to handle this type of terrorism?

[Answer] Yes, you can see for yourself that in the last few days we have destroyed cannons, reduced the volume of fire, and had this continued we would have brought them to such a situation that their capability would have been nearly nil.

[Question] What are the difficulties in this type of action against terrorism using artillery?

[Answer] Difficulties in the terrain, as well as the need to have excellent intelligence. We have very good intelligence, and we have overcome the difficulties in the field as we have good means to activate and cancel out this advantage of deploying weapons from afar.

[Question] Can you envision a way or possibility of countering this terrorism with artillery--if it may be called this--by static artillery firing and by using aircraft?

[Answer] Using aircraft is not static warfare, it is dynamic. I said earlier that we have many methods we have not used in this struggle. There are ways of acting that make possible solving this problem, too.

[Question] Are you prepared to elaborate on those methods?

[Answer] No.

[Question] This period in which the terrorists fired at a civilian population in the north was difficult for the population--in the towns, in the Kibbutzim and in the Moshavim. On the basis of what you have seen, and according to your impression, how did that population react?

[Answer] The civilian population is a problem because it, in fact, serves as the terrorists' target. Now, it would be worthwhile to refresh our memory a bit. When the terrorist activity reached its peak--when they sent squads that penetrated, held hostages, went on ambushes and entered into settlements--the problems

were much greater both in terms of the investment in forces and in terms of the behavior of the civilians along the border. The tension, the fear and anxiety, the reactions were all much graver. The efforts the IDF invested were also much greater. However, all this is forgotten. Even then it was accompanied by firing--albeit not massive--on settlements.

This continues to be a problem for the State of Israel, when the civilian population constitutes a target in war, and only this civilian population is the target: The bus on the coastal road, the Savoy Hotel, the bomb at the university cafeteria or in the Karmel market or in Netanya or anywhere else are directed only at the civilian population. Since this terrorism has been checked, what remains for the terrorists to do is to act in the way they have recently demonstrated: to shoot from a distance, from deep inside their territory. They hit the civilian population along the border. I think the conduct of our population is more than acceptable; it is good. The moment the IDF took Qiryat Shemona into its hands there, too, the atmosphere took a 180-degree turn. And even though the social condition and the background in Qiryat Shemona and Nahariyya are different, still the situation in Qiryat Shemona is greatly improving. I can remember what happened in Bet She'an when shelling took place and there were Katyushas every day. The situation was very difficult. So, by good management, by explaining things and through treatment it is possible to give the populace an ability to withstand. And this is what we have been doing now.

[Question] What has the IDF done during this period in Qiryat Shemona to help the population?

[Answer] The IDF has become the central factor in restoring normal life in Qiryat Shemona in all spheres: It took care of the shelters and the electricity there as well as in distributing food and in cleaning and painting and in treating the population directly and in organizing the civilian life. This had an immediate impact.

[Question] Do you, as chief of staff, think that the preparedness for this was sufficient? Was the town prepared in a manner that would satisfy you as chief of staff?

[Answer] What do you mean was the town prepared?

[Question] In terms of shelters and how they are readied.

[Answer] In Qiryat Shemona there are shelters, some of them in a bad condition. But there are many shelters--in terms of the population there are enough. But they are in a different condition than shelters in other places for many reasons, both because of the age of the shelters and because of the population's attitude toward these installations. Wherever the population treats them well and with understanding, the condition of the shelters is better, and where there is neglect, in times of need people find out that it is difficult to function or make sure that the shelters are fulfilling their purpose properly. This is a subject that has to be worked at throughout the year, every day, in all the sectors of the population. It is not the IDF's job, but the IDF has been dealing

with this indirectly, albeit insufficiently. If this job is given to the IDF, then it will deal with it and do its best. In the 2, 3 or 4 days that we have been in Qiryat Shemona, this is what we have been doing, and it has an outstanding effect on the populace and on the general feeling when tested, namely when one has to go down into the shelters and sit there for a long while.

[Question] Let us get back to the terrorists and the Syrians. The terrorists in some regions operate under the Syrian missile umbrella. Does it not create a situation in which the Syrians, too, can be held responsible for the situation?

[Answer] I think the Syrians should be held responsible for every terrorist activity. And we know that this is so, that the Syrians are responsible and urge them to operate against us from Jordan and have been helping them cross the border into Jordan. I know that the Syrians have been equipping them with means of warfare and ammunition, and have been training them. I also know that there are many operations that are coordinated with or conducted with the knowledge of the Syrians. Some of the terrorist bases are under the umbrella of the Syrian ground-to-air missiles, but this will not immunize them at all.

[Question] How much has the fact that the Syrian missiles are still in the Lebanese al-Biqa' area constituted a military threat to us, beyond the political threat?

[Answer] It is damaging from the point of view of intelligence as well as from the point of view of having changed the status quo in Lebanon because these missiles cannot be ignored, despite what I said that the terrorists would not be immune even if they are under such an umbrella. It has created a new situation for us with other difficulties involved.

[Question] Has the IDF limited its overflights of these areas?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Further on the recent days' events: What are the budgetary results and implications of our actions in the north?

[Answer] I did not go deeply into the details, but next week we will sum up the lessons and then I will know.

[Question] Has it hampered certain things the IDF had planned to do?

[Answer] No.

[Question] In other words, everything is normal, business as usual in the IDF throughout this period?

[Answer] Absolutely.

[Question] Mr Chief of Staff Refa'el Eytan: Now that this stage is over and we are on the brink of a cease-fire, how do you see the IDF's priorities in the near future?

[Answer] They have not changed. They are still what had been determined for this year, and this is what will be implemented.

[Question] What about the north?

[Answer] The same.

[Question] Would you like to say something to the soldiers who participated in all those operations in the north and all those civilians who had experienced this entire difficult period of shelling?

[Answer] I must address myself to the capability the IDF has demonstrated in all its branches during this period: The artillery units, the artillery corps, paratroopers, Golani commando units, armored corps units, the air force and the navy--as usual, they all demonstrated a superb level of performance, showed resourcefulness and ability, and provided an example of what the IDF can do, an example of the army's standards. The soldiers have been working very hard, but the training and preparatory stages they undergo have proved themselves worthy now that one has to stand the test.

One must also devote some words to the civilian population, which is--in this case--passive. In other words, war is being forced on it and yet it is devoid of any capability of replying or responding. It is the army that reacts, whereas the population feels somehow hit without being able to take other measures. This is the nature of a civilian population along the firing line. I must note that our civilian population's standard is high both relative to other periods and perhaps compared to other nations that were in a similar situation. I am convinced our population has been showing a much higher standard, much more tolerance and understanding, as well as courage. I wish them good luck in continuing to do so.

CSO: 4323/30

'HA'ARETZ' EXPECTS SOVIET-JORDANIAN ARMS DEAL

TA311031 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Jul 81 p 13

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Soviet Offensive in Jordan"]

[Text] While the ships of the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and seaplanes carried out a joint landing exercise with the Syrian army on the Syrian coast, several suspicious Soviet moves are being made behind the scenes in the Middle East. The Kremlin does not remain static and it is noticeable that we can expect moves of political and military significance in the area.

The demonstration of Russian military presence in Syria came to an end with the conclusion of the maneuvers and the departure of the heavy aircraft (the TU-16's and IL-38's that accompanied the maneuver). However, it is clear that the military move has not ended with this. Too many Russian military delegations have been arriving in Damascus recently. The visits began back in May, when the deputy commander of the Soviet Air Force, Marshal (Vapimov), came on a supervisory tour of Syria. The Syrian army is still on high alert, but the "missile crisis" has died down. Israel is not pressing, as it did at first, and the U.S. mediator is also showing no signs that he intends to return to the area soon to deal with the missile problem. Therefore, the question is: What is the purpose of the visits to Damascus of the Russian military delegations, which, according to one report, again included the deputy commander of the Soviet Air Force? The answer to this can be found in Damascus and Moscow.

But if the Russian activity in Damascus is also still unclear, it is now becoming apparent that the main Russian effort today is directed at Jordan. They want to penetrate this new position at almost any cost. If the other activity is concentrated around countries in which Moscow already has a foothold, Jordan is a new, most important target.

The reference is to an arms deal between the Soviet Union and Jordan, which will represent a foothold for Moscow in this pro-Western country. In the past possible arms deals between Jordan and the Soviet Union were mentioned more than once, but they were always turned down. This was either because King Husayn drew back at the last moment, or because of Saudi Arabian pressure and U.S. temptations. According to all the signs, this time we have reached the crossroads. In my evaluation, this time the results will be different and Jordan will sign its first Russian arms deal, despite all the counterpressures.

We should not understand from this that from now on Jordan will cut itself off from the Western sources of supply. It will try to enjoy the best of both worlds and threaten Washington with Russian deals (right now deals are being conducted with the United States). There is no doubt that this is a dangerous game from Husayn's viewpoint, particularly if he is confronted with a firm U.S. administration. An increase in the Russian presence in Jordan will also be a danger to his regime. It is natural that Husayn should try to procure the Russian weapons without their being accompanied by Russian experts, or only a few of them. But matters are not simple when it is a question of arms deals, especially with the Soviet Union.

One way or another, an arms deal between Jordan and the Soviet Union, if it does indeed come off, is a change in the deployment of the superpowers in the Middle East. It would be an impressive Russian achievement after Moscow's retreat from several places in the area. This would be penetration of an Arab country with a pro-Western tradition since its foundation. If the move succeeds, it is clear that the important objective is not Amman itself, but the neighboring capital to its southeast: Riyadh. There is no doubt that Moscow wants not only a penetration of Jordan, but mainly a springboard, using Jordanian mediation, to Saudi Arabia.

If this deal comes off, it will also have an immediate effect on Israel and its security. This will mean that there will again be Russian experts in close proximity to two of its borders. The danger to Israel will also be directly military. According to what has been published, the deal in question is one of antiaircraft weapons systems. After Jordan received improved Hawk batteries from the United States, which Jordan considers (because of the restrictions laid down by Washington) to be an immobile weapons system, it may be assumed that it will now try to get the mobile weapons systems from the Russians. These are known for their quality.

First of all, this involves SAM-6 batteries, models of which were introduced into the al-Biqa' region of Lebanon by the Syrians. The Jordanians may very well also try to procure the more modern and smaller missiles (against low-flying aircraft) of the SAM-8 and SAM-9 models. Another good mobile antiaircraft system the Russians have is the SU-23 radar-guided cannon. It is true that the Jordanians have Vulcan multibarrel cannon (like the IDF), but they may be interested in also fleshing out their military establishment with the Russian cannons (with four barrels and on armored halftrack vehicles). Such a deal has an appreciable military significance from Israel's point of view. It would add superior antiaircraft defense to the Jordanian armored formations (now being improved with the aid of the United States and Britain).

The political moral is that promises made to Israel at the same time as modern weapons are being sold to Arabs have no value. This is what happened when the F-15's were sold to Saudi Arabia and it was promised that the additional fuel containers and bomb carriers would not be sold to it; and also when we were told that the Hawk missile batteries for Jordan were providing that country with all it needed. Every such promise holds good only at the time and we should always assume that it will be broken. This time the one who violated the "arrangement" is not Washington, but Amman.

However, it is worth noting that such a deal between Amman and Moscow could be carried out at a time when Washington has laid an embargo on Israel on the issue of the F-16's.

It may not be assumed that the Russian military effort in the Middle East has come to an end. At the two extreme ends of the area--Iraq and Libya--the Soviet Union is making efforts to enhance its ties. In Iraq it intends to return to the old positions and melt the freeze that began with the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran. For the moment it is not known whether a Russian-Iraqi arms deal is in question. The Iraqis need a great many new weapons systems and they are appealing to any possible element. The possibilities are that a large new deal will be implemented with the Soviet Union, or that Moscow will implement the deal via another Eastern country, as it already did during the war (it sold arms to Iraq via Poland, and to Iran via Libya, Syria and North Korea).

At the other end of the area Moscow will certainly take advantage of al-Qadhdhafi's concern about the renewed rapprochement between Egypt and Sudan. Al-Qadhdhafi is convinced that it is only a matter of time before Egypt again attacks him. It was reported quite a long time ago that the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean is to make a first official visit to Libyan ports. It is more reasonable to assume that Moscow will also suggest that Libya sign a friendship and cooperation pact with it (as it signed with Damascus last year) and perhaps even hold a joint naval maneuver with the developing Libyan fleet as it did recently with the Syrian fleet. However, all these are moves of secondary importance compared with the expected arms deal between Jordan and the Soviet Union.

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RAMALLAH MAYOR HAILS PLO 'VICTORY ON NORTHERN FRONT'

TA300814 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2230 GMT 29 Jul 81

[Text] Jerusalem, 29 Jul--Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf is claiming in the East Jerusalem paper of AL-FAJR that "the Palestinian people under the PLO's leadership scored a big victory on the northern front."

Khalaf's remarks were published despite the ban imposed by the military authorities on Judaea and Samaria public figures publicly declaring their identification with the PLO. Khalaf claims that "the war proved that the Palestinian people are a difficult factor in the regional conflict and that no solution will be possible without the PLO's agreement."

Ramallah's mayor added that "the Washington administration and the Tel Aviv government will have to recognize the PLO's exclusive leadership." Later the mayor praised the Palestinian-Lebanese cooperation recently manifested in the steadfast stand against hostile forces. He congratulated Yasir 'Arafat, saying that all Palestinians stand behind him.

Khalaf rejected Israeli declarations that the PLO consented to a cease-fire in light of the blows it absorbed, claiming that "the joint PLO-Lebanese forces emerged stronger from this war than from past wars and it was the Palestinian resistance which compelled the others [Israel, the United States] to recognize its power and ask for a cease-fire.

CSO: 4323/30

BRIEFS

BUDGET FOR TERRITORIES--The budget of the local authorities beyond the green line will amount to 250 million Israeli shekels this year. This was reported yesterday by the coordinator of internal affairs in the Interior Ministry, Dr Me'ir Shaham, at a convention of 12 heads of the Jewish local authorities beyond the green line. Dr Shaham said that the development budget would be finalized in the next few days after the Interior Ministry and the Finance Ministry had completed their discussions. According to Dr Shaham, the heads of the local authorities would also serve as the regional committee for urban planning, parallel to the regional planning committee of the Arab settlements. The committee will be empowered to approve regional infrastructure plans. The regional committee will be headed by Shlomo 'Amar, the staff officer for internal affairs at the military government of Judaea and Samaria. Dr Shaham explained that the local councils would be able to enact various auxiliary laws on issues of local government after a special court for the implementation of auxiliary laws has been established in the territories. [By 'Aqiva Eldar] [Excerpt] [TA291328 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Jul 81 p 18]

CSO: 4323/30

'ABD-AL-'ATI AL-'UBAYDI DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 27 Jul 81 pp 3-4

[Text]

Libya's Secretary General for the Office of External Communications Abdel Ati al-Obeidi made a two-day official visit to France last week, underlining closer relations between the two countries since President François Mitterrand took office. Just how delicate the question of Franco-Libyan ties is felt to be in Paris was illustrated by the secrecy which surrounded Mr Obeidi's visit. Mr Obeidi has a rank roughly equivalent to Minister of State.

No announcement of his presence in France was made by the authorities and no word appeared in the French press; officials at the Quai d'Orsay and in the Ministry of Cooperation and Development who met Mr Obeidi at first denied to this newsletter that he was there; later, however, Ministry of Cooperation officials did confirm his presence in Paris, where he gave an interview to *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*'s Randa Takieddine.

The interview follows:

Q: Following your visit to France and your meeting with Jean-Pierre Cot, the Minister of Cooperation, can you say whether there is an improvement in Libya's relations with the new Socialist government in France?
A: I must say that we are satisfied with the new policies of the French government concerning Libya and particularly because they have managed to bring relations out of the freezer, where they had been during the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing.

Q: Was your visit the result of a French invitation or was it due to a Libyan initiative?
A: It was the result of common contacts which started with the Libyan statement expressing satisfaction over the victory of François Mitterrand and his Socialist Party and the congratulatory telegramme sent by Col Qadhafi to the new Socialist President. This encouraged contacts between the two countries. A further contribution was made by the French government's announcement of its will to initiate a new policy of economic cooperation and trade and, of course, by the lifting of the freeze on existing contracts between Libya and France imposed by President Giscard d'Estaing.

Q: What do these contracts deal with?
A: Purchases of arms and oil contracts, notably the contract between Libya and Elf-Aquitaine over exploration for oil in our country. France has now lifted the ban.

Q: Has there been an effective start to resumed supply of French military equipment?
A: There are routine measure which are being undertaken. The French have told us these will not take a long time.

Q: Did you meet only Mr Cot? Are you planning to meet other French officials and how would you describe the atomosphere during your talks here?
A: Up until today, I have met only Mr Cot. I may meet some other French officials tomorrow. I can say that the atmosphere during our talks with Mr Cot was one of understanding and that on many topics there is a common conviction that we can together find a way to clear up problems.

Q: Is it true that the French government has inserted conditions into new contracts for military equipment and other contracts?
A: The official French communique said that all previous contracts would be implemented but that new contracts would depend on new positive steps to solve the problem in Chad.

Today, we made it clear to the French that the problem in Chad concerns first and foremost the government of Chad. This is because Chad is an independent country and we have a common agreement with the government of that country. So it is a Chadian problem. The French government has shown understanding for this view.

We have made it clear to the French that the Organisation for African Unity discussed this matter in Nairobi and took a decision with which we agreed. We are certainly cooperating with the government of Chad and the OAU to implement this agreement. Moreover, military cooperation between Chad and Libya should not be viewed as a military invasion by Libya because of the common agreement between the two countries. The French have understood our point of view and have expressed thier will to help the government of Chad rebuild its economy after the war.

I think this policy of dialogue will contribute to more understanding on both sides. This sort of policy was absent when Mr Giscard d'Estaing was President.

Q: The French have placed conditions on a resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Libya and France. Among them is the rebuilding of the French Embassy in Tripoli (which was badly damaged by mob violence) and the withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad. Did you discuss these points?

A: They have made it clear to us that there are no conditions for the resumption of normal relations. There are, however, some problems to be solved and among them is indeed the question of the French Embassy in Tripoli.

As for the question of Chad, they did not discuss it in terms of a military withdrawal but insisted that the Chadian problem should be treated in accordance with the Nairobi agreement of the OAU. The French have made it clear to us that they do not consider our presence in Chad is illegal. Rather, they expressed their respect for our cooperation with the government of Chad.

To return to the question of the French Embassy in Tripoli, we do not consider this a difficult problem. We will definitely help to solve it and re-establish normal relations between France and Libya. This is because we are convinced that there are interests linking France and the Arab nation which are much more important than these problems.

Q: Did you talk with the French about Lebanon and the Israeli raids there?

A: Yes we did, and the French expressed their worries over the deteriorating situation and over a global confrontation in the Arab region. But I must admit that the French position was not the one we would wish them to adopt in that there was no frank and clear condemnation of Zionist aggression against Lebanon and the Palestinian Resistance.

Q: Do you mean that there has been a shift away from France's traditional pro-Arab policy?

A: I do not mean that. But we expected France to have a clearer and more frank attitude in its condemnation of Israel.

Q: Can we return to your remark about France not considering Libya's military presence in Chad to be illegal?

A: They told us this and they made it clear that this question is none of their business but rather one which concerns mainly the government of President Goukkoune Oueddé in Chad, Libya and the OAU. But they said that France can contribute in assisting the government of Chad and made it clear that they do not consider this as interference or that it is a French problem.

Q: Did you discuss military cooperation between France and Libya?

A: This subject was considered, but we did not go into details. These are being left to experts in both Libya and France.

Q: How do you view economic cooperation between Libya and France?

A: In the past, France contributed to our National Development Plan through French enterprises, through technical assistance and through cooperation in exploring for oil and exporting oil. This cooperation can be resumed and increased.

Q: Is there any intention to invite Col Qadhafi to visit France?

A: We did not speak about this. But we did speak about how to maintain our contacts and there will be possibilities for more contacts and visits by officials of both countries.

Q: Col Qadhafi has spoken of the need to use oil as a weapon against the West after Israel's aggression in Lebanon. Did you discuss this with the French?

A: We did not discuss the oil embargo as such. But we did speak about mutual interests and the need for a clear stand on major issues in Europe in general and in France in particular.

Q: The US has threatened to arm and strengthen Libya's neighbours to counter your policies in Africa. Did this initiative encourage the French to improve relations

with Libya in an attempt to halt the spread of American influence in Africa?

There is also a belief that the Socialist government in France would like to improve relations with Libya to obtain an alternative Arab market to Iraq, which is showing its dissatisfaction over French policy following the Israeli raid on the Osirak reactor. Is this so?

A: The US is trying to play a dangerous role in Africa and is threatening the security and stability of the continent, especially in Egypt and Sudan. We talked about this with French officials and we gathered that the French do not agree with American policy in Africa.

France wants security and stability in Africa and they want Africa to remain outside the orbit of the super-powers. France is trying to take an independent stand in its African policy ...

As for the second part of your question, we do not intend to compete against any of our Arab brothers. It is irrelevant to talk of an alternative to Iraq. France has huge interests throughout the Arab nation.

Q: Libya's relations with the US are bad and recently President Reagan closed down your diplomatic mission in the US and expelled your diplomats. Yet the majority of the oil companies operating in Libya and dealing with you are American. How do you explain your non-retaliation to US policy?

A: We wanted initially to maintain good relations with America. Unfortunately, their attitude was irresponsible and strange. We did not retaliate because we did not want to adopt the same irresponsible and strange attitude. The American oil companies still operate and deal with Libya and they were not harmed.

Each country has its right to defend itself. But we are convinced that the US is following a policy of harming the whole Arab nation and of enmity to the Arabs.

CSO: 4500/28

TAKEOVER OF OIL SERVICES EXPECTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 20 Jul 81 p 9

[Text]

Qatar wants to take a bigger role in operating its oilfields when the service contracts of two foreign oil companies expire next year, according to a report from Doha.

The two companies, Dukhan and Shell, have five-year service contracts to operate Qatar's onshore fields. The companies at present have a fixed fee agreement, set at 1.266 per cent of the selling price of a barrel of oil.

According to Director of Petroleum Affairs Abdullah Sallat, Qatar plans to develop sufficient local expertise and technical know-how to run its own oil facilities without outside help. However, Mr Sallat, has conceded that a complete takeover of operational and production facilities may not be possible before the expiry of the present service contract.

In such a case, Mr Sallat stated, a revised contract would be drawn up "promoting Qatar's national interests." This would mean that the fee rates would be reviewed to take greater account of the increasingly large role being taken by the country's state-owned oil company, the Qatar Petroleum and Gas Corporation (QPGC). At present, QPGC is training personnel in all areas of the oil industry, including management, operations, exploration and drilling.

CSO: 4300/68

AIR FRANCE HOSTS SAUDI VENTURES IN PORTUGAL

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 p 41

[Text]

AIR FRANCE has just arranged an unusual partnership, whereby Saudi money will pay for the construction of two luxury hotels on land owned by the Portuguese state oil company Petrogal. The intermediary's reward is that both will be operated by the French airline's hotel subsidiary Meridien.

The details were discreetly published in the Portuguese Official Gazette on 7 July, with the ministry of finance's all-important seal of approval. The $30m deal is the largest Saudi investment in Portugal to date and will be Meridien's first venture in the Iberian Peninsula. For Petrogal, the move to take a share in the hotels rather than sell the land outright reflects a decision to diversify.

One of the hotels will be built next door to the Lisbon Ritz, which was taken over by the Intercontinental chain last year. Perched on a hillside, it will have a view over Lisbon's main park. The other is to be built in the northern city of Oporto, where it will overlook the Atlantic Ocean on the road to the port of Leixoes.

Air France persuaded the Geneva-based Saudi investment company Ditco to put up the money for the project. Petrogal is being mysterious about Ditco's board of directors, but reassuring whispers from the French suggest that it is suitably close to the Saudi royal family.

The Portuguese government, meanwhile, seems resigned to the fact that the only things the Arabs find attractive in Portugal are the sun and the sea. For years, the Foreign Investment Institute, which acts as a regulatory board, has been complaining that the only petrodollars coming to Portugal were being invested in tourism.

For Portugal — so heavily dependent on Arab oil — it would have been much more satisfactory if Middle East money was used to buy up some of the lame ducks in the public sector, which are being offered at bargain prices seven years after the revolution. It would have meant that the Arabs were in some way committed to supplying the oil needed to maintain Portuguese industry.

Nevertheless, at the moment it is hotel development that is attracting Arab money. For example, the state-owned airline TAP has been involved in protracted negotiations to sell its share in the Lisbon Penta Hotel to a group of Arab investors.

An Arab consortium, led by a Saudi Arabian financier, is planning ambitious tourist developments in northern and central Portugal. The consortium has been negotiating with two small towns near the 'Portuguese Venice', Aveiro, to build two Club Méditerranée-type tourist villages. Further north, near Viena do Castelo on the northern border with Spain, the same consortium is involved in discussions to build two country clubs. According to press reports, the estimated investment in the two projects will be $30m.

The Arabs' pioneering investment in Portuguese tourism came in 1973.

CSO: 4300/69

DILEMMA FOR SAUDI BANKS

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 42-43

[Article by Robert Pouliot]

[Text] WESTERN banking institutions are keeping a close watch on the implications and likely effects of an exceptional series of fatwas, or religious decrees, issued in Saudi Arabia, condemning the use of riba, the western system of interest.

At least 10 leading banks and corporations have asked high-ranking managers, some at vice presidential level, to look into what a new trend towards interest-free Islamic banking could mean for them and for the management of the kingdom's estimated $130bn gross of foreign investment.

They include big names such as La Société Générale (one of France's Big Three nationalised banks), Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner, and Smith (the top US brokers), the First National Bank of Chicago, Kleinwort Benson (Britain), Chase Manhattan in New York, the Deutsche Bank, the Middle East group of Brown Brothers Harriman (NY) and multinationals such as Lockheed Aircraft and Lafarge (France).

The fatwas have condemned interest as usury, have forbidden Muslims to work for, or even help, riba banks and have called on Saudi authorities to do their utmost to stimulate the establishment of banks that operate within the rule of Sharia, or Islamic law.

A few of the western institutions are already dealing under the rules of Sharia and have helped some new Islamic investment companies in their quest to create new types of interest-free financial instruments to manage short-term liquidity through commodity trading, foreign exchange and futures market dealings.

But despite the issues raised by the fatwas, there is evidence that the western system is holding strong. In Riyadh, a senior official from a large Saudiised concern commented: 'If there is any trend at all, it is in the opposite direction, away from Islam.' He pointed to a massive conversion over the past year of accounts that did not bear interest into time deposits. The high interest rates in America drove thousands of Saudi businessmen and savers, who used to forego interest on their accounts for religious reasons, to insist on cashing in the highest going rates for their time deposits in Saudi Riyals. Thanks to a yield three times higher than that for regular accounts earning 4 to 5 per cent interest (or 'commission' as it is known in the kingdom), saving and time deposits have soared by 128 per cent over the last year, according to the latest report of the Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA). Borrowers, mostly companies, at present have to pay a record 16 to 17 per cent interest to banks such as the National Commercial Bank or the Riyad Bank.

The bank official even referred to two cases in which sheikhs recently got private fatwas issued in favour of interest. 'Surprisingly enough, one said that he was allowed to get interest if the income was immediately ploughed back into productive projects while another insisted that as long as the bank invested in risky projects, he could earn interest. On the other hand, adds the source, a majority of members of the royal family would still keep their Saudi deposits in interest-free instruments.

As Sheikh Mohammed Ali al Harkan, one of the greatest callers of Islam and general secretary of the Jeddah-based

World Muslim League, spread over 52 countries, told *8 Days* from his summer home in Taif: 'All the ulemas of the kingdom are against riba and are working hard to change the system, but the implementation of the fatwas depends on the political authorities, not on us.'

A recent fatwa, number 3.620, issued in late April, answered a bank employee, Mahmoud Hussein Hammed, who had asked whether work in a riba bank was permissible and, if not, whether he had to resign. Signed by Sheikh Abdelaziz bin Abdallah bin Baz, president of the Permanent Supreme Council of Religious Scholars, the decree left no compromise: 'Work in the banks as they are today, using interest, is prohibited and you are therefore forbidden to work in this bank.' The fatwa then referred to a previous decree released in 1976 (number 1.338), dealing at length with the issue.

In the long term, mounting pressure both inside and outside the kingdom could speed up the process of change in the banking system and cause initially dramatic bottlenecks in handling large portfolios. 'There is considerable pressure building up inside Saudi Arabia to Islamicise the system and it would be a mistake on the part of western bankers to overlook such a phenomenon,' insisted a top Swiss banker who is closely associated with a number of Saudi businessmen. 'What I am afraid of is that one day Saudi Arabia may legislate in favour of Islamic banking, thereby causing big changes, with most western bankers caught off guard.'

Another financier, formerly connected to a large US bank, says the transition should not be too brutal. 'It wouldn't be in our interest nor in the interest of the West,' says the source, who is now committed to establish new instruments under the rules of the Sharia.

Authoritative sources, who prefer to remain anonymous, already envisage a transition period of three to five years during which no new banking or operating licence would be issued to institutions based on riba. Simultaneously, a large number of institutions operating under Sharia would be encouraged. After this, all institutions would either have to abide by a new Islamic banking code, yet to be adopted or enforced, or close down. Such a transition might be along the same lines as the Saudiisation of the kingdom's banking network, successfully achieved last year.

But SAMA sources, on the other hand, told *8 Days* that it has no such plans. The banking question is a continuing debate within the Saudi government and no decisions have been taken so far which would indicate such a conversion. The SAMA sources added that the most important consideration is that if the country's banks stopped giving interest, investors would send their money abroad. Another source, heavily involved with Saudi bankers and acting as a financial adviser to Crown Prince Fahd, does not believe that the thrust of the fatwas will be effective. 'It won't be enforced. Everyone in banking circles is confident that all will continue as before.'

"One day Saudi Arabia may legislate in favour of Islamic banking, thereby causing big changes"

Diplomatic sources in Jeddah admit that there is a hardline Islamic fundamentalist camp, headed by Prince Abdullah, within the royal family. With Prince Majed, the minister of municipal and rural affairs, he has joined Prince Mohammed al Faisal in setting up the latest Islamic institution, Dar al Maal al Islami — the Islamic House of Funds — in June. But any friction between them and the pro-American lobby headed by Crown Prince Fahd has been reduced lately. Diplomats believe that nobody in the royal family is going to push for such a big economic change when Saudi Arabia is heading the new Gulf Cooperation Council and helping to resolve the Lebanese crisis and the Gulf war. At the same time, they add, the Saudis are anxious to preserve American and European support, especially while Israel is on the offensive.

Yet voices of dissent are being heard more and more often. For instance, Dr Mustapha Mahmoud Nour, vice president of the Islamic Investment Company IIC, says he does not understand why there still has been no answer from the Saudi finance minister, Sheikh Mohammed Abalkhail, to a licence request put more than 18 months ago by his group to operate in the kingdom. Compelled to work out of private offices set up by Prince Mohammed (a major shareholder of IIC and the prime mover behind Dar al Maal al Islami) in seven areas

throughout the kingdom. 'We were instructed in late June by the ministry of information not to use our name any more when advertising our investment certificates (known as modarabas). The irony of it all is that more than half our 14,000 or so investors in the Middle East are from Saudi Arabia, followed by Egyptians.'

Prince Mohammed was at a press conference in mid-June to launch Dar al Maal al Islami, geared to take over from IIC. Asked why the cradle of Islam had not allowed any Islamic commercial bank to operate, in contrast to Kuwait, Dubai, Egypt, Sudan, Jordan and Bahrain, he commented: 'It could be a shock if Saudi Arabia opened an Islamic bank, as many others would need to be created. It is a big dilemma, a big problem.'

The only Islamic institution based in Saudi Arabia at present is the Islamic Development Bank, a multi-billion dollar multilateral aid organisation which Prince Mohammed helped to create. Sources there say that IDB has never taken interest on any loans it has given but charges instead a service charge of between 2.5 and 3 per cent to meet administrative costs. Yet, asked whether reports alleging that IDB had earned 'by mistake' interest on some of its idle cash (reckoned to reach $200m to $300m), a senior official, who insisted on remaining anonymous, said that a fatwa, issued during last year's hajj period by IDB's religious supervisory board, instructed the bank to hand over any interest earned to calamity-stricken states. 'And we did, to countries such as Sudan and Algeria, and elsewhere in Africa.'

The crucial test will come within a few years, depending on the performance of such new institutions as Dar al Maal al Islami — if it succeeds in getting a licence from Saudi Arabia — or through a new investment company set up by the powerful Rajhi currency-changing family. If these two vehicles succeed in offering investment outlets as competitive under Islamic rules as the existing riba institutions, 'the transition could accelerate significantly,' said the IDB official.

CSO: 4300/69

COMPETITION GROWS IN FOOD MARKET

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 29, 20 Jul 81 pp 7-8

[Text]

Competition has brought down retailers' profit margins on food in Dubai with a thump, according to a survey by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry which was published last week. The survey showed that margins on some foodstuffs had been slashed to as low as 5.5 per cent, a far cry from the mark-ups of as much as 300 per cent which the Emirate's Ministry of Economy and Commerce found being charged by profiteering shopkeepers early last year.

The ministry had found mark-ups of 166 per cent on coffee in its study of prices last year; the latest survey shows a margin on coffee of 8.6 per cent. Milk powder had been marked up by 82 per cent last year; the figure given by the Chamber of Commerce for this commodity was 6.25 per cent. The survey, covering the first quarter of 1981, showed that none of the major items of food carried profit margins of more than 28 per cent. "Retailers are making only marginal profits on a wide variety of popular items like milk and milk products, tea and coffee, frozen chicken, butter and sugar," the general manager of one Dubai supermarket chain told *WAM*, the official UAE news agency. "Even on other items, the retail business no longer fetches more than 20 per cent profits."

Lal Ganwani, who heads another supermarket chain, cited changing buying habits in Dubai for lower prices. "More and more people who used to shop from the *souk* (market) are now buying from supermarkets," he told *WAM*. "To retain this clientèle, stores are having to come to terms with *souk* prices, which used to be about 10 per cent lower than supermarket prices." Mr Gawani added that Dubai shippers were showing a greater awareness of prices. "It is no longer possible for any store to charge prices that are unfair to the consumer," he said.

Another supermarket owner complained to *WAM* that an over-supply of goods was bringing down prices. "The supermarket business itself has become saturated," he told the news agency. "There is competition among stores as never before." *WAM* also quoted traders in food as saying that the supermarkets were employing staff to monitor the prices charged by rival chains. "Any change in prices in one chain leads to a quick reaction in others," a trader commented. "Competition has become so stiff that this is the only way one can stay in business."

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ARAB STATES 'BOYCOTT' OF JERICHO--Arab countries are boycotting Jericho Municipality because the [Israeli] military government has appointed a mayor without the agreement of groups from the National Guidance Committee. The (Sharja) Emirate in the Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia have frozen allocations totalling 8,000 dinars which had been promised to the municipality and the military government cannot compensate it with similar sums. [Text] [TA061443 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 6 Aug 81]

CSO: 4323/36

IRAQI, ALGERIAN, VENEZUELAN OIL MINISTERS INTERVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 71, 20 Jun 81 pp 38-41

/Interviews with Iraqi, Algerian and Venezuelan Ministers of Oil by Rabah Munir Shaykh al-Ard; "Three Ministers of Oil Talk to AL-MAJALLAH"/

/Text/ Geneva--Less than 2 weeks after the end of the 60th OPEC conference, held in Geneva from 25 to 26 May 1981, the oil market has experienced important developments reflected in the decisions of a number of oil producing countries to reduce their production, even to reduce their prices below the price of $36.41 per barrel set by the conference. The current oil surplus in the world markets ranges from 1.5 million to 3 million barrels. Moreover, some of the producing countries are thinking of raising their production to maintain the volume of the revenues which they need for their development plans. The presence of this surplus in the market, in addition to the plans of a large number of consumer countries to abandon oil as a sole source of energy, has led to an automatic drop of the prices in the free market. This "shock" which the oil market experienced in the wake of the latest OPEC conference has had its impact on the currency market. The price of the pound sterling dropped in the wake of Britain's decision to reduce its oil prices and the price of the dollar in the currency exchange markets has risen due to the flow of deposits, especially from petrodollars, to the U.S. banks as a result of the high interest rates paid by these banks.

AL-MAJALLAH deals here with the oil dossier after the latest OPEC conference through three interviews: The first with Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, the Iraqi minister of oil; the second with Belkacem Nabi, the Algerian minister of energy and mineral resources; and the third with Dr Humberto Calderon Berti, the Venezuelan minister of oil.

Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, Iraqi minister of oil: We Use Atom Within Peaceful Framework and Will Fight with Syria if it is Attacked

All the delegations and the organization /OPEC/ secretariat have asserted that the relationship between Iraq and Iran inside the Geneva conference sessions and outside them has been normal and calm and that it hasn't reflected what happened at the previous meeting in Bali and what is currently happening on the borders between the two countries. The energy issues with which the organization is concerned have been so critical and important that they excluded all other external issues from its discussions.

But in one of the closed sessions, an interesting thing happened, confirming that the delegations clung to maximum objectivity. Some political analysts may detect a deeper meaning in the incident and may tie it to the latest Tunis conference.

During the first day's sessions, while discussing the issue of setting up an oil studies institute to be attached to Oxford University, Engineer Hasan (Sadah), the Iranian minister of oil, objected and proposed that the institute be set up in a Third World country, such as India, Pakistan or Venezuela, as long as its financing comes from the organization. Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, the Iraqi minister of oil and member of the Revolution Command Council, supported the Iranian minister. The heads of other delegations to the conference also supported him. It was decided to refer the issue to further discussion only after some of the other delegations expressed an opposite view.

Iraq is of decisive importance in all oil conferences. Its production amounts usually to 2-3 million barrels daily. But the war has destroyed many of the oil installations and the production has dropped to a level estimated by the world oil companies at 600,000 barrels daily. Moreover, Iraq has oil reserves that put it in fifth place among the oil exporting countries. These reserves amount to 30 billion barrels and will take 31.2 years to deplete. This depletion period puts Iraq in sixth place behind Iran, Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Libya. Moreover, Iraq has a role of major significance in the Gulf policies, in the development of the Gulf's economy and in the Arabs' military and general relationship with the resistance front against Israel. AL-MAJALLAH met Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, the Iraqi minister of oil, and had the following interview with him:

/Question/ Mr Minister, how would you describe Iraq's position toward the OPEC meetings?

/Answer/ Our position is that we want OPEC's unity and solidarity and want it to deal with the issue of the surplus primarily and to establish a balance between the two ends of the equation in the market.

/Question/ Are you for reducing the production?

/Answer/ It is necessary.

/Question/ What is the percentage which you view as necessary?

/Answer/ The percentage compatible with the actual consumption.

/Question/ Ten percent, for example?

/Answer/ This is determined by statistics.

/Question/ What about the prices?

/Answer/ The prices are subject to a number of factors, including the inflation factor. We do not raise or drop the prices in a haphazard manner but in a manner that is tied to preserving the purchasing power of the oil revenues.

/Question/ Is it likely that the prices will rise, considering that the inflation factor is present?

/Answer/ There is an inflation rate. Therefore, the prices must be tied to this inflation rate so as to control inflation.

/Question/ In the wake of the OPEC conference results, which have been somewhat disarrayed, do you think that it is still possible to use the oil weapon in the battle?

/Answer/ On the basis of my belief and confidence in it as an effective weapon, oil can still play the same role entrusted to it at present and in the future if the Arabs can employ all their resources in this sphere in a sound scientific manner.

/Question/ Is the "sound manner" meant to be in terms of industrialization?

/Answer/ In terms of industrialization, of production, of price policy or of marketing. What concerns us is to use chemistry or the atom in the peaceful sphere. In the field of petrochemicals, we are about to complete the first complex which operates on gas and the second complex which operates on oil. What concerns us is not just to get naphtha from oil but to acquire all the complex industries in this field, be they refining industries or conversion industries.

/Question/ OPEC, in whose foundation you played a major role, is accused of having created monetary inflation in the western world in particular and of having led to the decline of the standard of living of the workers and of the lower classes in Europe and the United States generally. What is your reply to this?

/Answer/ Regrettably, the western media have tried to distort the facts. These media have great capability of movement in the information field. But the truth is that the OPEC member countries have done no more than to defend themselves in order to make up for a minimal part of the losses which they have incurred and which they continue to incur as a result of the change in the value of the dollar and of the inflation exported to them by the industrial countries.

/Question/ Does OPEC perform any role to protect the Third World?

/Answer/ Certainly. We consider the OPEC the vanguard of the Third World's struggle to change the existing economic relations and the structure of the world economy with the aim of establishing equal relations and a fair economic system.

/Question/ Studies say that the Arab area generally has benefited from the availability of large amounts of oil money but that this money has led to inflation in the Arab countries which has hurt those with fixed income and those with no income at all and that unemployment has also increased?

/Answer/ Unemployment has not increased.

/Question/ It has increased in some Arab countries. All this has created a general social crisis. To what degree can the OPEC (say that it isn't actually the club of the monopolist rich in the Arab countries)?

/Answer/ The OPEC is supposed to carry out the development plans and the national and international commitments required by these countries. Otherwise, production at more than what is actually needed intensifies the effect of inflation. Moreover, production at a bigger rate than actually needed leads to wasting this depletable resource. Regrettably, investments by the surplus monies in the Arab area are not enough to create a state of development, to employ labor, to eliminate unemployment and to develop the Third World also. What is important is that the surplus funds of the oil countries which possess a so-called petrodollar surplus, which is now invested in other countries, are supposed to invest this surplus in the Arab countries and in the Third World to aid their development process.

/Question/ Then you believe that the OPEC has a role in enhancing Arab unity?

/Answer/ Certainly. It has a role in enhancing all aspects of Arab unity and in establishing an alliance with the Third World countries.

/Question/ Then, to what extent do you believe that the Gulf Council constitutes a step in this direction?

/Answer/ We sanction any meetings between any two fraternal Arab countries, and we sanction any formula for unity. We in Iraq have approved this step.

/Question/ There is a scientific study which says that Morocco possesses nearly 20 percent of the world's reserves of shale oil, amounting to 1,000 times the liquid oil reserves, and that this shale oil can rival the liquid oil and ultimately lead to "breaking OPEC's back," as they say. What is your opinion of this?

/Answer/ I don't know whether the amount in Morocco is 20 percent or less. This kind of oil does exist in the world. We hope that it will contribute to meeting the world's needs of this substance. But extracting this oil requires enormous costs and a complex technology. This is why it cannot compete with liquid oil and cannot be a substitute to it.

/Question/ Mitterrand has won the French presidency. Do you think that Iraq's relationship with France will improve during his regime?

/Answer/ We hope that it will be so. This will appear through Mitterrand's positions toward inter-Arab relations, toward Iraqi-French relations and toward Arab-French relations on a global scale because France has large interests in the Arab area dating to more than 20 years ago. We hope that the position of the socialist Mitterrand will be compatible with Iraq's socialist line and we hope that the relations between Iraq and France will develop and will be fruitful.

/Question/ And what about your relationship with the Soviet Union?

/Answer/ It is a good relationship.

/Question/ U.S. intelligence has issued a second report denying their first report in which they said that the Soviet Union wants to attack the area because it needs oil. They now say that the Soviet Union doesn't need to import and that it will continue exporting oil. What is your opinion on this issue?

/Answer/ We hope that our relations with the major powers will be like our relations with any small country. We view the Soviet Union, the United States and China with the same looking glass with which we view ourselves, regardless of their size and strength. We hope that the relations between the Arabs generally and the superpowers, and especially between Iraq and the two superpowers, will be equal relations based on mutual respect, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs.

/Question/ Do you believe that the Soviet Union poses a danger to the Gulf?

/Answer/ If any country acts outside this framework (equal relations), we consider it a danger to the area. When such a country acts in disregard of mutual interests or in such a way as to realize its expansionist ambitions, then we consider it an aggressor and a covetous country, regardless of whether it is the Soviet Union, the United States or any other western country. We want the Gulf's defense, survival and interests to belong to the Gulf people and to be free of any foreign participation.

/Question/ The Iraq-Iran war has entered its 10th month. Do you have figures on Iraq's losses?

/Answer/ The war is still going on and it is difficult to make a count of the losses, both on the Iraqi side and the Iranian side. It is certain that a war in which advanced weapons are used is no military picnic, especially since the first target of the Iranian side was the civilian and economic installations primarily. This was an endeavor on the Iranian side to cover up its failure in the military arena after the victories scored by the Iraqi army. We hope that the losses are not big.

/Question/ Do you expect the war with Iran to be ended?

/Answer/ This question must be addressed to the Iranian side. We have made our position clear. We have welcomed all the initiatives. The Iraqi initiative to put an end to the fighting is on conditions that guarantee our rights to our territories and our territorial waters, no more and no less. We have no ambitions and nothing like that.

/Question/ Is it possible that Iraq will join the Gulf Council?

/Answer/ This is a premature question. But we are considered a Gulf country.

/Question/ What is Iraq's position toward the war in Lebanon?

/Answer/ Lebanon's problem lies in uniting the Lebanese forces internally and in freedom from any external Arab or foreign intervention.

/Question/ If Syria is subjected to war, will Iraq defend it?

/Answer/ Iraq considers any aggression against any Arab country an aggression against Iraq itself.

Belkacem Nabi, Algerian minister of energy and mineral resources: OPEC Is Not Responsible for West's Crises

Algeria occupies 10th place among the oil producing countries. Last year, its production reached 950,000 barrels daily. The reduction /in production/ introduced by Algeria the year before last was the second highest in the organization after Kuwait,

amounting to 21.9 percent. Algeria also produces large quantities of natural gas (43.5 million cubic meters /daily/). This puts it in third place /in OPEC/ behind Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and in fifth place in the world. Behind them, the Soviet Union and the United States. Because of all of this, Algeria is most enthusiastic to discuss the issue of production. In the latest OPEC conference, which for the first time in the organization's history moved from regulating its prices to regulating its production, Algeria has played a serious role in developing the organization's short-range and long-range policies.

AL-MAJALLAH met with Belkacem Nabi, the Algerian minister of energy and mineral resources and one of the Algerian revolution's veterans, and had this interview with him:

/Question/ What was your feeling at the end of the OPEC meeting?

/Answer/ The meeting has realized the minimum results, namely: Preserving the prices, reducing production and harmony among the overwhelming majority of the member countries.

/Question/ Are you satisfied with these results or do you think that some countries will modify their positions gradually?

/Answer/ We could have gotten better results than we have.

/Question/ What is the Algerian Government's position toward the accusation that the organization has created the general capitalist crisis in the western industrial countries and that it should exert efforts to rescue the world from this crisis?

/Answer/ All the studies carried out by the western countries themselves prove the opposite.

/Question/ Do you mean that the oil exporting countries are the victim and that the western industrial countries are the ones on trial?

/Answer/ Yes.

/Question/ Algeria's oil reserves are enough to last 23.5 years. But Algeria is trying to industrialize itself and to create other sources of wealth. What are the accomplishments which you think the Algerian oil can play a role in realizing?

/Answer/ Algeria's reserves are considerable. Algeria has made plans for the appropriate use of these reserves. However, our policy is to preserve this depletable resource and to use it as a starting point for creating lasting economic growth. This is why our policy is not geared toward limitless exportation, regardless of the price. Exportation is planned according to the country's needs and according to the lasting contribution it makes to building the national economy.

/Question/ Do you feel that the Gulf is threatened by the Soviet Union, as it is said?

/Answer/ I don't know. But I have no such feeling.

Dr Humberto Calderon Berti, Venezuelan minister of oil: Rising Oil Prices Will Force Consuming Countries to Abandon Oil

Venezuela recently announced the discovery of vast quantities of oil that have put it in an international position rivalling in importance the top producers of the "black gold." Until recently, Venezuela had reserves of 17.95 billion barrels which are enough to last it for 23 years at the 1980 production level of 2,159,000 barrels daily. It has been seventh among the OPEC members in reserves and third in production. Therefore, it was logical for it to reduce production /last year/ by 8.4 percent below the year before last and to be a strong voice in calling for continuing and generalizing such reduction. In OPEC, Dr Humberto Calderon Berti, the Venezuelan minister of oil, has an important role because of his strong interest in the future of oil in the world of energy. AL-MAJALLAH met with the Venezuelan minister and conducted with him an evaluation of the latest OPEC meeting:

/Question/ The price freeze decided upon by the Geneva conference reduces the revenues by nearly the inflation rate. What do you propose?

/Answer/ We must apply the "formula" agreed upon to prevent this.

/Question/ How large has the impact of inflation been on the oil revenues?

/Answer/ The inflation exported from the member countries of the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization to the OPEC has amounted to 7 percent. Meanwhile, the value of the dollar has risen 3 percent. Thus, the net drop in the revenues has been 4 percent.

/Question/ Dr Berti, do you feel that Saudi Arabia will raise its price between this time and the next OPEC conference in Abu Dhabi at the end of the year?

/Answer/ It may raise it by $2 to $34. It is my belief that as long as the other members have committed themselves to reducing their production levels, Saudi Arabia will also reduce its production. It is my feeling that it will reduce it by 10 percent, i.e., by 1-2 million barrels daily.

/Question/ Do you think that the Saudi officials will make their decisions in stages or in one go to reunite the OPEC ranks?

/Answer/ I believe that the Saudis will make all their decisions in one go before the convocation of the next meeting. They have not wished to discuss the production levels. This has been their traditional position and we respect this position. They may be planning to raise their prices later on. In the conference, I proposed freezing all the prices whereas they insisted on reducing them.

/Question/ The conference ended with the adoption of the proposals you submitted to it on the eve of its convocation. Were there other proposals?

/Answer/ The submission of various proposals was inevitable. One of the proposals urged that we all go to the limit whereby the Saudi oil is priced at $34, the other prices are reduced and the entire price system is frozen for 18 months. The proposal I submitted called for freezing the prices at approximately $36-41 until the end of the year and reducing production for 6 months only to see what will happen as a result.

/Question/ Was there another proposal to freeze the prices at $36-41 and to raise the price of Saudi oil to $34?

/Answer/ No. There was a proposal to unify the prices at $34. But for some of us, it is difficult to lower the prices. I believe that the resolution we have adopted is a good step toward unifying the prices at the end of this year. It is my personal feeling that as long as we have kept the effective price of crude oil somewhat open to rising, Saudi Arabia will raise its price to $34. This price may even reach $36 in December 1981. We may not be content with unifying the prices at the end of the year. We will also resort to applying the "formula" as of January 1982.

/Question/ Is this what was reached in the meeting which you have held to discuss the organization's long-range policy?

/Answer/ We have studied this aspect in the meeting of the Long-Range Policy Committee. We will form a committee of experts headed by Shaykh Yamani. This committee will review the "formula" which we have all proposed. In addition to all this, we need to conduct a study to predict future energy consumption. We produced 31 million barrels daily in 1969 whereas we produce 24-25 million barrels at present. Our share of the market has dropped and this drop has aroused the concern of some member countries. In our estimate, oil has been an important factor in the revenues of most of our countries in the past 50 years and, for Venezuela, will continue to be an important factor for long years to come. We all need the oil revenues. But we also need to use the oil within a comprehensive view of the energy sources. Therefore, the situation is not the same for all the member countries. There is a difference between the countries whose resources are enough for 5-10 years and those whose resources are enough for 50 or 100 years. The view toward the issues and the policy which must be followed varies between the two groups. The only way to reach an agreement among all of us is to begin forming some sort of a pioneer policy emanating from the understanding of each of the member countries of the circumstances of the other member.

/Question/ Doesn't the matter rely on accurate estimates?

/Answer/ We have no problem in this regard. We are very conservative in making our estimates of what will happen in the future. In Venezuela, for example, we present the budget to the parliament. Last time, the budget was presented on the basis of $27 per barrel of Venezuelan oil. At present, the average price of Venezuelan crude is $30.5. Even though we have decided to freeze the prices, we still have extra revenues. However, we will also reduce production and the revenues will amount to $2 billion. The figures have been calculated conservatively. We always prefer the calculations to be conservative.

/Question/ What do you imagine the role of the oil alternatives to be in the future of energy?

/Answer/ We must always view this issue in a frank and open-minded manner. We must consider the real contribution that coal and the atom can make. At present, nuclear and coal energy is cheaper than oil in the wake of the 1979 price hikes. What is the position of Venezuela and of similar OPEC members? We expect and hope that we will be the oil exporters for long years to come. We have vast reserves to realize this goal. At the same time, we want the prices to be convenient. Therefore, we need a price policy that supplies us with more money and at the same time preserves for us

an important energy source which we do not /want to/ squander. This explains the difference in viewpoints, not only toward the existing situation but also toward the future, that is found inside the organization at times. The decisive question is this one: What will happen 10 years from now? Some OPEC members will not be exporters and may even become importers.

/Question/ Which are the organization members which you expect to become importers?

/Answer/ I don't know what will happen. But this is nothing new and has happened frequently in the past. Take Columbia for example. Before 1974, it exported 1.2-1.5 barrels daily, and so did the Ecuador and Gabon. At present, Columbia purchases 60,000 barrels daily from abroad. We must therefore, prepare for this destiny.

/Question/ When you say that of the various energy sources coal is cheaper than oil, does this mean that the others will be urged to shift to coal?

/Answer/ I pointed this out at the meeting of the Vanguard Long-Range Policy Committee. We are in a phase that requires us to think what the future conditions will be. If you possess a quantity of oil enough to last a long time, you must still preserve oil as an energy source. If you raise your prices steeply, you encourage others to go to excess in preserving energy and diversifying its sources. The matter concerns establishing a balance. But if oil is the only resource you possess--this, by the way, is not Venezuela's situation but that of some OPEC members--then you must consider carefully the period in which this resource will be depleted. Does it exceed 5 or 10 years? Does it reach 100 years? If you understand this, you will be able to analyze our internal differences /within OPEC/ over matters dealing with the diversification of resources.

/Question/ But don't you think that diversification is connected with the relatively different energy prices?

/Answer/ I believe that in the future we will need a more profound analysis to know what must be done at the level of prices. We are about to reach a pricing system that encompasses oil, nuclear energy and coal. Remember that nuclear energy needs 12-14 years to be developed. Economically, nuclear energy cannot compete with oil. As for coal, some U.S. refineries have begun to shift from oil fuels to coal in their private internal consumption. The industries are following suit. Do you know how much the share of the oil fuels in the energy market rose in the first quarter of 1981 compared to the first quarter of 1980? Thirty percent.

/Question/ In the West?

/Answer/ It rose 30 percent in the West. One can thus understand our need to watch these developments very carefully.

/Question/ Can you say that the OPEC countries have been surprised by the success of the consuming countries in making this shift from the use of oil to the use of other energy sources and that the shift has come faster than expected?

/Answer/ You undoubtedly know that we have exerted efforts to persuade the consuming countries to preserve energy and to diversify its sources. Why? If the train maintains its current speed on this railroad, we, the exporters, will find ourselves in a very bad situation insofar as the requirements for high production capacity are concerned. But if we compel the others to develop new sources of energy, and there is a big need for such development at present, we can preserve our share of the energy market. Thus, you see that we have to watch the developments with great honesty, with ourselves and with the others.

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HEAD OF ARMY ENGINEER CORPS DESCRIBES ACTIVITIES

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 3 Jul 81 pp 30, 31

/Article: "Head of the Armed Forces Engineering Authority Speaks for the First Time: A Modern Military Agency Joins the Egyptian Military Authorities"/

/Excerpt from text/ President Anwar al-Sadat will be meeting with them in the coming days to observe their fine military accomplishments on behalf of mankind and the future in the field and will spend some time with these fighting men, who have turned barrenness into fertility and have given a new birth to life.

They are the cream of our armed forces fighting men. They have a prominent role in war, and in peace they enter into various struggles remote from battle which have an ongoing character; when they end one battle they start another one, without catching their breath, in a silence which knows no limelight. Indeed, they take part in a group of battles on a number of various fields at the same time. These are battles in which there is no fire and where defeat is absolutely unknown!

Come let us meet with these proud men, the most skilled of performers on the strings of life, who are playing the most pleasant of songs and the greatest of symphonies, those which address themselves to the intelligence, the heart and the eye together--symphonies of the requirements of man and the age, and the establishment of a modern civilization--the engineers of our Armed Forces Engineering Authority, the most recent military authority, which was established last March and consists of five military engineering departments, all of which take part in reconstructing the Egyptian environment with the most modern arts and techniques.

Last March, the Supreme Armed Forces Command approved the establishment of the Armed Forces Engineering Authority and the reorganization of the departments belonging to it, including the Armed Forces Major Projects Department. The department was established in 1976 to perform an important, major role in the cultural context in the first 5 years of its existence, and this role led to a practical, positive contribution in solving Egypt's major problems.

What is this role?

What is the job of the Armed Forces Engineering Authority?

Who are the leaders who run this massive volume of cultural, construction, engineering and industrial labor?

What accomplishments have they achieved in the past 5 years, which is the age of the Armed Forces Major Projects Department?

These are the details.

Our Armed Forces Engineering Organization was formed last March, as I pointed out in the introduction. Its chairmanship was assigned to Staff Maj Eng Muhsin Sidqi, who had been occupying the position of director of the Department of Engineers. Management of the Major Projects Department was assigned to Maj Gen Eng Ahmad Lutfi Taha, who now occupies the position of authority vice chairman for projects.

I went to them, and, before we listen to them, come let us learn about them first.

Staff Maj Gen Eng Muhsin 'Abd-al-Fattah Sidqi was born in al-Mansurah in July 1930.

He graduated in engineering from Cairo University in 1952, specializing in force mechanics, and graduated from the War College in the same year, starting his military career as an instructor in the Military Engineers' School.

From 1954 to the end of 1956 he was engaged in training National Guard personnel. In 1959-60 he pursued studies at the Staff War College and worked in the Eastern Military Region Command until December 1966.

In the 1967 round, Col Eng Muhsin Sidqi was head of operations and planning in the Corps of Engineers; this corps exerted great effort and expended many men in the 1967 round, though that was hidden by the results of the ill-omened round.

Then came1971, and the man joined the Higher War College in Nasir Military Academy, matriculating in the 1972 round and then assuming command of the Engineers' School.

From mid-1972 to the glorious October-Ramadan war, he assumed responsibility for providing the engineering equipment for the war operations theater in preparation for war.

In 1974 he was assigned chairmanship of the engineers of the Third Field Army.

When 1977 occurred Maj Gen Eng Muhsin Sidqi returned to the Major Projects Agency as head of the Prefabricated Building Section there.

In January 1981 he assumed chairmanship of the agency and, with the establishment of our armed forces' Engineering Authority last March, Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, minister of defense and commander general of the armed forces, assigned him the chairmanship of the new authority.

We find that Maj Gen Eng Ahmad Lutfi Taha, vice chairman of the engineering authority for major project affairs in our armed forces, graduated in engineering at Cairo in 1953, specializing in architecture.

He was born in Cairo in October 1931.

He joined the War College and graduated from it in 1954, contributing through his efforts to the execution of the project to build the Egyptian War College in 1956

in a modern style, making it one of the proud engineering works in the capital in which the Military Works Department took part.

He was transferred to the theater of operations in Sinai before the 1956 round and was active in war engineering projects there between al-'Arish and Abu 'Uwayjilah.

He then assumed chairmanship of the Projects and Planning Branch in the Military Works Department, and, when the executive agency for housing projects, subsequently an executive wing of the Major Projects Agency, was set up in 1976, he assumed chairmanship of it.

In July 1980 he returned as director of the Military Works Department, then became deputy chief of the Central Major Projects Agency, which he then chaired last March. The agency changed its name to "Armed Forces Major Projects Department," and became one of the departments of the Military Engineering Authority.

He acquired a scholarship for training and study in France in 1968-69 and has diploma of higher studies in construction science and design in engineering at Cairo in 1972.

Two Combat and Construction Engineering Elements

Staff Maj Gen Eng Muhsin Sidqi, chairman of the Military Engineering Authority in our armed forces, told me:

"After the 1956 and 1967 rounds, a pressing need arose to have a scientific plan set out focusing all military engineering personnel, but this plan did not come into being until last March, when the engineering command of the engineering departments spread about within our armed forces was unified with the objective of enabling people to exert themselves to their utmost power and resources. The Military Engineering Authority now contains these departments:

"The Engineers' Department.

"The Military Works Department.

"The Water Department.

"The Military Survey Department.

"The Armed Forces Major Projects Department.

"Thus engineering combat personnel are working in the authority and engineering construction personnel are working in our forces. In the past, the activity of construction personnel in the Engineers' Department was oriented toward the construction of military installations, airports, bridges, and military bases. Then a study was made on having the authority, with its tasks, components and formation, cover all the military forces, and the Egyptian Supreme Armed Forces Council at the end of last year issued the decree establishing it and the authority began to carry out its activities, starting in May 1981, applying massive development work to its program which arose from the government's strategy."

/Question/ A question: allow me to go back to 1967, to the beginning. What was the nature of the beginning? What was the background of it, or the considerations which made it mandatory that our armed forces establish the Major Projects Agency?

/Answer/ The great development which our armed forces embarked on in 1974-75 made radical modernization and development mandatory and made it necessary that permanent camps for the forces be established in the form of military towns which could respond to their housing, training and technical supply needs, in addition to the proper necessary administrative services for concentrating these forces within the new towns in a permanent capacity. We also found that establishment of these military towns and other housing installations, which are mostly to be built outside the main cities of the republic, would result in 'evacuation' of the armed forces from the areas they occupy inside these towns. This would give scope for plans for construction expansion projects on behalf of the mass of the population and for greater, deeper freedom in execution of the projects.

Consequently, we found that the projects required for developing military dwellings entailed a great amount of labor, and this made it mandatory to establish the Armed Forces Major Projects Department, which would assume charge of the 5-year plan housing tasks and those of following future plans.

In the first half of 1976, the agency established what is now the Major Projects Department. In carrying out its projects, it relied on the following major elements:

An executive agency for the construction of prefabricated buildings. This would build complete military towns and use three of the most modern international-class prefabricated building plants.

An executive agency for other projects, such as hospitals, factories, major workshops, military faculties, command and administration buildings, main administrative bases, housing structures for armed forces personnel and all other major new installations.

A joint executive agency working in conjunction with the Ministry of Reconstruction which would be active in completing military towns that might be greater than the operating capacity of the prefabricated building construction system in the authority.

With the new form of application of our plans, we find that the Military Works, Survey, Engineers' and Water Departments participate in the military housing plan, in addition to the Major Projects Department. Each department performs a large share of the work in order to accelerate execution of the plan and rehousing of the military combat units which had been fighting and living in trenches and field fortifications and eating sand every day since before 1948. Residing in modern camps will guarantee a proper life for personnel, as soldiers or officers, and will guarantee that they are given sustenance, training and recreation in the most dignified fashion while at the same time optimum resources are provided to maintain and keep up military equipment. In carrying out these projects we have also relied upon the benfit we have derived from advanced countries which have preceded us in this context, such as England, West Germany and France. We have visited them, have visited modern European camps and have made plans for our camps while devoting attention to our system and life.

Naturally these camps will require electric, water, telephone, sanitary drainage, road and communications systems and will also include schools, markets, movie houses and hospitals. We have always been most anxious not to impose these burdens on the government and we have worked at maximum strength through the armed forces in our plants.

/Question/ How many new camps will you establish? Which of them have you completed? Is the civilian sector cooperating with you in constructing them?

/Answer/ At present we are establishing a group of camps. Completed furnishings for two in June 1981, in the areas of al-'Amiriyah and al-Malak in al-Isma'iliyah. By the end of this year, God willing, we will have completed four similar camps. The civilian sector, is providing optimum cooperation at a high level of discipline.

Here I would like to refer to the building industry, which is a new one with international specifications. Our armed forces have taken the first step in operating plants to construct buildings and to complete plants which are not operating. Today our forces are using five prefabricated building plants which we have obtained from West Germany. Each plant has built one modern camp and is now busy building a second one. The beginning occurred in 1978. Although the people in these plants were recruits and it was necessary to train and prepare them firstly as troops, they quickly, through their distinctive qualities, acquired the ability to operate the equipment in these advanced plants at the highest level of technical competence.

We have imported a plant to produce reinforcement iron screens. This is to be considered the most advanced method for saving such materials as iron and steel, saving manpower and shortening building and construction time. This plant has started operating at night now that some organizations constructing ordinary housing have applied for part of its output and it has been established that it saves 30 percent of the price of raw materials and that just 48 workers can produce 6,000 tons of iron screens possessing a special distinctive rigidity. The plant paid off its cost in just 1 year of operation.

Skilled Worker Soldiers

We have started manufacturing insulation materials used in building walls and roofs. Our new plant is operating at a capacity of 500,000 square meters per year and we can supply our output to such Egyptian companies as refrigeration firms. Since we produce insulation materials at one third the price we used to pay for it, the factory has managed to cover all its costs in 6 or 8 months.

This plant is engaged in producing light metal insulating installations, supplying 300,000 meters of corrugated tin roofs, workshops and warehouses with Egyptian materials while procuring the chemicals it requires from abroad. The soldiers working in the new plant, which is based on a modern technology similar to European ones, have intermediate industrial skills and represent successful Egyptian personnel in the development of the new industries which are being added to those in the country for the first time. In view of the technical background these soldiers had before they were recruited, we now possess a working class of skilled people and technicians.

Previously the European countries did not allow such plants to be sold; they just sold the products. We obtained the plants from West Germany.

/Question/ Allow me a question on the problem of suitable housing required by the officers of today and tomorrow and noncommissioned officers. This problem began to appear on the military stage in the mid-seventies. What about it, and what about your efforts to cope with it or solve it?

/Answer/ We are well aware that the armed forces' effort in solving the problem of housing its personnel is a practical effort, a contribution to coping with the problem of housing throughout the country, because the people in our forces form part of the masses of the people themselves. It is in our plan to complete 3,500 units for officers and noncommissioned officers in the first stage. Of these units, we have delivered 1,000, another 1,000 will be ready for delivery in June and July 1981, 700 will be ready by the end of this year and the rest will be ready in the first half of next year, God willing.

I would like to point out that the armed forces are planning for a very ambitious housing project which the government will support, to build 100,000 housing units for officers and noncommissioned officers, with priority to go to newlyweds and people who do not have housing. These units will be erected in Cairo, Alexandria, the canal towns and the towns in Uppe Egypt, in order to respond to the désire of each officer or noncommissioned officer, and we will start putting this ambitious plan into effect before 3 months have elapsed so that it can be completed in 5 years. These dwellings will be apportioned through the system of granting deeds for up to one-quarter of salary in instalments over a period of 30 years, in keeping with the government statute, and the resources of the Military Engineering Authority and its plants along with the government's organizations will be used to this end. Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense, has expressed great interest in ways of carrying out this ambitious housing project without obstruction or procrastination.

During the conversation sessions, the two engineers Maj Gen Muhsin Sidqi and Maj Gen Ahmad Lutfi Taha, told me:

"There are other projects that have some importance, such as renovation of the military hospitals and medical clinics to serve civilians, and we are the ones who built the Egyptian Military Medical Academy in accordance with the most modern construction and equipment technology. Then there is the Alexandria Outpatient Clinic, with its great size, in addition to a new burn hospital, which is the first hospital in our country to be devoted to burns, and a new hospital for Alexandria with a capacity of 600 beds which can be increased by 200 additional beds. This will be one of the most modern hospitals in the Middle East.

"There are other activities we are performing, such as construction of new military clubs in al-'Asafirah, al-Ma'murah and Port Said and the expansion of various clubs that exist now."

Another question: what about the military engineers' efforts to reclaim land and to support self-sufficiency in food in Egypt?

/Answer/ We are applying President al-Sadat's directives with total commitment, especially as regards the need for the armed forces to rely on their own resources to provide their food and farm requirements. In this respect, the Armed Forces Supply and Provisions Authority and the Self-Sufficiency in Food Department are establishing cattle and dairy product farms which we are building, which provide meat, milk, cheese and butter, as well as new poultry and egg farms and fish farms and new bakeries.

In land reclamation, the Departments of Engineers, Survey, Military Works and Water are taking part in collective activities to prepare land for farming. We have actually established the Shubra Shihab farm in al-Qalyubiyah to raise and fatten cattle; this is considered to be one of the most modern of Egyptian farms and has a milk plant. We are also preparing a second plant to raise cattle in al-Tall al-Kabir.

We have succeeded in reclaiming 150 feddans of land a week and around that have drilled wells to provide the land with irrigation water.

Our armed forces engineers deal with the land, while hydraulic engineers drill the wells and military works engineers build centers to house livestock for the land which has recently been reclaimed.

Maj Gen Eng Muhsin Sidqi asked me:

"Do you know how much land we have reclaimed and how many wells we have drilled?"

The chief of the Armed Forces Engineering Authority responded to his question with a smile of hope on his face:

"As of end-June 1981, we have managed to reclaim 2,000 feddans and /drill/ 50 water wells.

"There is another great effort which the fighting men of our armed forces' engineering authority are carrying out in civilian sector projects to respond to the needs of the masses of our people:

"They have made a practical contribution to the new industrial, electrical, agricultural and petroleum projects in the Western Desert. They have removed the old mines that had been scattered about in the various areas of this desert since World War Two.

"The Engineers' Department has been removing the Shubra al-Khaymah electric plant in record time so that we can start erecting the new plant which will be the greatest thermal plant in Egypt with the cooperation of /text ends at this point/.



/caption/ Staff Maj Gen Eng Muhsin Sidqi, head of the Armed Forces Engineering Authority.

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RAJA'I'S ELECTION CONSIDERED 'TRIUMPH OF REVOLUTION'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 pp 1, 3

[Text] The 2nd Mordad 1360, 22nd Ramadan 1401, 24th July 1981, is honored as a memorable day. The historical, noteworthy day signifies the triumphant stride of the Moslems towards ultimate victory. Even the phony Superpowers realized the historical significance of this auspicious day. In consequence, they treacherously conspired to instigate fatal clashes in Islamic Iran on such a monumental day. However, the threats and futile exclamations of the exploitative Colonizers were thoroughly null and void, since on this sanctified day, falling within the Holy period of Qadr, the fresh fragrance of liberty once again revived the resolute spirit of Moslems in Iran. Presumably, this historical promise of freedom foreshadows the spiritual enlightenment of other Islamic nations in the region.

When the Western expansionist countries were confronted with the inevitable downfall of Bani-sadr as their last hope, they were politically motivated to consolidate an unsubstantial opposition front through their domestic deviationist elements such as the National Front, the Mujahedin Khalq and the Communist Factions. In the course of the so-called anti government demonstrations on 25th Khordad (June 15, 1981), the belligerent Superpowers suffered an overwhelming shock for among the infinite flood of devout Moslems, there was no trace of the seditionist members of the National Front, the Mujahedin Khalq, and the pro-Bani-sadr demonstrators. Directly after such profound humiliation, inflicted upon the Superpowers, a sudden wave of terrorism and sabotage vibrated throughout Iran. However, all the efforts of the counter-revolutionaries have been quite futile. In the meantime, the unified Moslem nation has submitted itself to the inspiring decrees of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution and has renewed its pledge with the committed theologians. The Moslem people have maintained their active presence on the political scene and on the historical day of 2nd Mordad, July 24th 1981, the qualified Iranians cast their numerous votes in favor of Rajai, as a trustworthy, committed President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this respect, the Iranian nation also dedicated martyrs to justify the presidential status of Rajai in the heart of history. After all, Rajai is honored as an independent president bending neither to the East nor West. So far the total number of votes in favor of Rajai has exceeded 11 million. A few points require our urgent attention in this respect:

1--The downfall of Banisadr and the election of Rajai, as a promising president, has made an indispensable contribution to the overall consistency throughout the authoritative institutions of the Islamic Republic regime, and the initial desire of the nation has at last been fulfilled in this respect. Furthermore, the deviationist elements of imperialism such as: Amir Entezam, Hassan Nazih, Madani and Banisadr have been eradicated from the political scene. Thus, the expansionist U.S. and other belligerent Colonizers will not be able to contrive dastardly conspiracies and impose their destructive interference upon Iran.

Still, it is quite evident that the avaracious Superpowers will challenge our victorious Revolution with new treacherous conspiracies and extensive sabotage.

Despite such baseless threats, we are endowed with an overwhelming potential to annihilate the inevitable plots.

2--We, hereby, declare that the decrepit policy of Imperialism to segregate the unified masses is now thoroughly absurd, since the enlightened people, along with their revolutionary leaders, aspire towards the sacred status of Martyrdom. As a matter of fact, the sacrificial endeavors of our committed people will neutralize the collusions of the Superpowers. The election procedures have been accomplished in the districts inhabited by the Sunni sect. The overwhelming enthusiasm of Sunni Moslems for the presidential elections and their active participation in the elections finally subdued all the international conspirators who administered the U.S. oriented conference of Taef, Nowadays, the frustrated U.S. is obliged to seek refuge in the foxy plots adopted by the CIA, Pentagon and her deviationist elements, to contrive clandestine conspiracies against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3--The political splinter groups, affiliated with the East and West, had made futile efforts to intensify the social turmoil during the hectic moments of the presidential elections. However, they were disenchanted at encountering the diligent participation of the qualified Iranians in the polling. Still, the counter-revolutionaries in collaboration with their imperialist authorities will make futile efforts to jeopardize the territorial integrity and the national solidarity of our revolutionized country. However, the resolute spirit of the Moslem nation is never vulnerable to such phony threats. After all, we are determined to achieve triumph over the belligerent Iraqi regime and bring about the liberation of the Holy City of Qods.

4--All the infidel opponents of the Islamic Republic regime are quite disillusioned with the unexpected results of the elections. Thus, they will spread around baseless rumors that the presidential poll has been an evil trick or a nasty fraud. In fact, the Western mass media and the mischievous voices of America, Britain, Israel, West Germany and France disseminated provocative, unsubstantial propaganda, concerning the new round of presidential elections in Iran. Radio Israel has exclaimed that the club-wielders have cast votes in the polling. We hereby declare that "yes," the club-wielders did participate in the polls and we warn you that the same club-wielders will ultimately emancipate Qods from the billegerent domination of the owners of the Phantom and AWACS and those destructive bombs.

CSO: 4600/114

EX-TEHRAN UNIVERSITY GOVERNMENT PROFESSOR ANALYZES TRENDS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 9 Jul 81 p 8

[Report of interview with Mehdi Mozaffari by Birgit Rasmussen]

> [Text] Mehdi Mozaffari, doctor of political science, formerly a professor at Tehran University and now assistant professor at Aarhus, was for many years close to the chief figures of the Iranian revolution, including Beheshti, the next strongest man in the country, who was among those killed in the bomb attack Sunday [5 July].

The eyes of the world are again directed toward Iran after the powerful bomb explosion in Islamic Republican Party headquarters in Tehran which wiped out a large part of the party leadership Sunday, including Beheshti, the party leader, who was considered the most powerful man after Khomeyni.

The 41-year-old Mehdi Mozaffari, formerly professor at Tehran University and since 1979 living with his Danish wife and two sons in Denmark, where he teaches at the Institute of Political Science, Aarhus University, has good qualifications to appraise developments in Iran and the significance of what has just happened. Since his early youth he has been among the leaders in progressive religious and political movements in Iran, has been close to and worked with the later holders of power like Beheshti and also with political personalities like former president Bani-Sadr, who has been out of sight for 3 weeks, and with Bazargan. Together with them he has often fled from the Shah's police, the Savak, and later it has been the Islamic authorities, his former comrades in arms, that he has had to fear.

"Bani-Sadr and others encouraged me to support Khomeyni, and I went with them to his residence outside Paris--that was in the time when posts and responsibilities were being handed out--but when it came to the point, I *could not*, and turned back a few meters from the residence. I left Tehran shortly before Khomeyni returned, for I knew that I would be one of the first to be put in prison or executed. My name was mentioned on the radio--and not favorably. It is dangerous to be *known* to the authorities--and an 'apostate.'"

Such a Man Was Beheshti

What has happened in Iran since, with the many executions and the putting into practice of the frightful Islamic criminal law, did not take Dr Mozaffari by

surprise. "I am no prophet, but I was able to foresee how it would be. My doctoral dissertation in 1970 dealt with "The Shiite Concept of Power," and during the work of analyzing the Islamic precepts and later Khomeyni's works, I saw the horror that has now materialized more and more clearly. It was a long time before Hitler's "Mein Kampf" was taken seriously, and it is the same with Khomeyni's writings... And make no mistake, there are grounds in the Koran for the way Beheshti and the priesthood have proceeded, if you take it literally."

Dr Mehdi Mozaffari met Beheshti for the first time in Rome in 1960 in his capacity as representative of the Moslem student organization, often saw him later in Tehran, and has several letters from him. While Beheshti was imam in Hamburg, Mozaffari visited him frequently. "At that time I was among the leaders of 'the National Front' and of the 'Movement for the Liberation of Iran,' which Beheshti had founded. I remember that Beheshti said to me that 'we shall not have modest visions; everything is possible, even the impossible, even an Islamic government.' He also had good relations with the Shah and members of the government. A great political talent, and in spite of my strong opposition to him, I must say that in his way he was a valuable man. 'Better Beheshti as a negotiating partner than a fool,' his opponents often said. In his place we now have ayatollahs who do not have his quality and political sense, but are *at least* equally cruel. *He* knew how far he could go.

"Perhaps he could--if not before, at least when it fitted in with his ambitions--have broken the chain of terrorism, summary executions, etc., for in spite of everything he was open to the world, spoke and read four foreign languages, and was sensitive to opinion, even though he said the opposite."

Who Set the Bomb?

Concerning Bani-Sadr, whom he has known from student days, and who, by the way, strongly advised him 11 months ago not to return to Iran, Dr Mozaffari says that he knows him as an honest, patriotic man--and kind by nature. He could hardly bear to see the violent demonstrations--even on TV--and yet he was commander in chief of army, but did not know how to handle a weapon. Nobody has connected *him* with the bombing incident, because it is well known that that is not his style. Mozaffari does not think he has left Iran--for it would not be in keeping with his ambitions to take himself out of play that way.

"Bani-Sadr wants to mix one part Islam with one part nationalism and one part socialism, and that is perhaps both his strength and his weakness. His strength, because it can combine many forces; his weakness, because the forces are not homogeneous, and his message is ambiguous, unclear."

One of the big, important questions now is who set the 30 kilo bomb in place near him and in his IRP [Islamic Republican Party] headquarters. "The mojahedin, the socialist Muslims, who have great success among the young, are one possibility," says Dr Mozaffari. "But it is also conceivable that it was a faction of the army. Putting 30 kilograms of dynamite in a well-guarded place is professional work, indeed almost military, one might say. But the Iranian army has no tradition of *coups d'état;* it is mostly foreigners that have pulled off *ours;* we import them. But who knows, perhaps a surprise by the army *can* be expected, maybe in connection with Khomeyni's death, and possibly it is being held back now only by fear of Khomeyni's power over the masses. It is always what the 81-year-old wants that happens...

"Whoever is behind the bombs, they must have infiltrated the IRP party, and why not TUDEH, the pro-Soviet party? In spite of everything, the situation will be less stable for a time; the priesthood is losing control a little, and after the violent slaughter will be short more qualified people for important posts than before it. That gives TUDEH more chance to get influence."

Islamic-Pro-Soviet Alliance

And paradoxical as it may sound, that party, which has always been financially, politically, and ideologically supported by the Soviet Union, *is* already in, Mehdi Mozaffari says. "It is no longer a secret that there is a tacit alliance between the priesthood and TUDEH. A tactical alliance. The Islamic régime promotes anti-western tendencies, and the Soviet Union is highly satisfied with that. And through TUDEH the Soviet Union takes care of its interests in Iran, where the party's members are quietly and calmly infiltrating by degrees at all levels where the priesthood cannot entirely control the situation. They have not got enough administrators, officials, etc. And the ayatollahs for their part make use of TUDEH as a means of neutralizing the autonomous forces that are working for a nationalistic, independent, secular state of Iran--people like Bani-Sadr and Bazargan, all who are neither for the Soviet Union nor for the Americans, but want to remain Iranians. They are attacked incessantly in TUDEH's newspapers and on Radio Moscow...

"And the priesthood assumes that TUDEH still cannot in a given case overthrow it and seize power, because the people are so deeply rooted in Islam. But the alliance has really been established. And it is also known that some of the information that lands on Khomeyni's desk comes to him from the KGB [Committee for State Security] by way of TUDEH.

"History shows that the Soviet Union never allows forces that are working for autonomy a completely independent policy in a country with which the Soviet Union has common boundaries. If we study the Iranian revolution we find a systematic outmaneuvering of those forces. The Russians do not need to invade Iran. They can simply 'work' quietly and wait for the situation to become ripe, and the West has been kind enough to commit errors in the region that the Russians can take advantage of."

To the question of whether he predicts a long life for the strict Islamic régime in Iran, Dr Mozaffari answers: "We have seen many governments that, to put it mildly, were not democratic or liberal, maintain power. Unless something extraordinary happens, I believe the situation will stabilize. This is merely a hypothesis, but if a stability is achieved based on the tactical alliance we have been discussing between the ayatollahs and the pro-Soviet party, that alliance may perhaps come to form the basis for a consensus between the United States and the Soviet Union. Trade will perhaps again be oriented largely toward the United States, for the country, the army, etc. must be built up, and for the Soviet Union stability, no threat on the border, and non-intervention in Afghanistan will be an acceptable situation.

"And if we take the war with Iraq, which will soon have been going on for a year, and which the ayatollahs naturally use to eliminate opponents and to justify the economic situation and unemployment, etc., it is conceivable that if the régime really becomes stabilized, it may perhaps have no further use for that factor. And at that time I believe Iran will accept negotiations," says Dr Mehdi Mozaffari.

8815
CSO: 3106/145

FOREIGN MINISTRY REACTION TO BEN-ME'IR REPORTED

TA061049 Jerusalem POST in English 6 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by diplomatic correspondent David Landau]

[Text] The advent of Yehuda Ben-Me'ir (NRP) to the Foreign Ministry as its first-ever deputy minister is awaited by ministry men with trepidation and some misgivings.

A closed coterie which never welcomed newcomers and outsiders, the ministry staff seems all the more dubious about Ben-Me'ir because it has developed such a warm regard for the present minister, Yitzhaq Shamir (Likud-Herut).

Top-ranking ministry staffers are aware that Shamir was not at all enthusiastic about the idea of having a deputy--and his awareness adds to their doubts about Deputy Minister Ben-Me'ir.

They wonder how the two men will hit it off together: Shamir, the taciturn, reticent and entirely unglamorous older man, and Ben-Me'ir, extroverted, undisguisedly ambitious, with a flair for public relations and a penchant for headline-catching pronouncements.

Ben-Me'ir himself told the JERUSALEM POST last night that "as a psychologist (he lectures to post-graduate students at Bar-Ilan University), I know from various studies that husbands and wives who have opposite characteristics succeed best in marriage."

"After talking with Shamir, I have no doubt that we will work well together. I have known him for many years, and share the universal admiration for him," Ben-Me'ir said.

The ministry men wonder too, as do outside political observers, what Ben-Me'ir's appointment signals for Shamir's own political future only a few months ago, Shamir was widely regarded as Premier Menahem Begin's heir-apparent in the Likud leadership.

Since then, he has suffered two setbacks: first, Begin's old Irgun comrade-in-arms, Ya'aqov Meridor, returned to politics--and now to a prime post in the new Begin government; and second, Ari'el Sharon was promoted to defence minister, and thus joined the frontrunners in the succession stakes.

The foisting of a deputy foreign minister upon the reluctant Shamir has been a third blow to his perceived power and prestige within his party--especially since Sharon quickly and firmly slapped down the idea that Ben-Me'ir be named his deputy at defence.

Ministry insiders said yesterday that Ben-Me'ir had already indicated that he proposes to be an active deputy minister. They said he wants responsibility for hasbara (information) policy and wants to be involved in Israel-U.S. relations.

But the prospective deputy minister last night denied any particular preferences. "I will do whatever the minister asks me to do," he said.

The insiders added that Ben-Me'ir intends to bring with him his own secretary and assistant. "Shamir brought no one," one ministry man noted wistfully. "He relied on us."

Ben-Me'ir said that he would be bringing "only technical assistance. There is no need for any other aids--the Foreign Ministry has excellent people."

He noted that as a long-serving member of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, and of its subcommittee on the Foreign Ministry, he is well-acquainted with the ministry.

The appointment of a deputy minister, and his direct involvement in U.S.-Israel affairs, are likely to hasten the departure from the ministry of its second-ranking civil servant, Deputy Director-General Hanan Bar'on.

Bar'on has been considering leaving for some time, and has been offered the post of director of the Israel Museum by Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Ko-lek. A veteran diplomat and one of the ministry's ablest senior staffers, he is under heavy pressure from his colleagues--and from the minister--to reconsider.

CSO: 4300/76

BETHLEHEM MAYOR DISCUSSES NEW CABINET

TA051907 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 5 Aug 81

[Text] In the territories, most political figures would not react publicly to the new government, but privately in conversation with reporter Jerry Cheslow they expressed apprehension over Ari'el Sharon's appointment as defense minister. They noted Sharon's record as a tough military commander of Gaza and the fact that he was chairman of the Ministerial Settlement Committee in the previous Begin government. The only West Bank leader willing to express his views to our reporter was Bethlehem's mayor, Ilyas Frayj:

[Begin recording] The general feeling in the West Bank among the population is that they are really very scared about the extremism of the newly-formed government in Israel because they have been reading the newspapers on how extreme it is. So I hope that the actions of the new government will prove the contrary and that the new government--especially the new defense minister--will initiate a new policy in the West Bank and Gaza, whereby the treatment of the people will be different from what it is now and that the defense minister will pay more attention to the needs of the municipalities and will deal with the municipalities as the elected institutions in the West Bank, and that we sincerely expect the prime minister to initiate a new bold and courageous gesture that might help to bring peace in the holy land where the Arabs and the Jews could live together in peace as good neighbors and as equal neighbors with each party recognizing the legitimate rights of the others. [End recording]

CSO: 4300/76

IMPROVEMENT NOTED IN ISRAEL'S STANDING IN SOME AFRICAN COUNTRIES

TA070959 Jerusalem POST in English 7 Aug 81 p 9

[Article by Murray Gordon]

[Excerpts] There are small but tangible signs of an improvement in Israel's standing in a number of black African countries. Evidence of this may be found in growing political and economic ties between Jerusalem and several states, particularly West Africa.

The explanation for this warming trend appears to be rooted in a combination of factors having to do with growing African disenchantment with Arab policies and Israeli activities within West Africa.

African unhappiness with the Arabs surfaced at the recent Organization of African Unity summit that was held in Nairobi. President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya, current chairman of the OAU, expressed a commonly shared African view when he rebuked the Arabs for their preoccupation with Middle East issues. This obsession, Moi warned, could cause the organization to lose sight of the problems that are of most direct concern to African states, which include the high cost of oil, economic assistance for the hard-pressed African economies and political developments in South Africa.

The recent decision by Gabon and Zaire to allow Israel to open interests sections has strengthened Jerusalem's hand in these francophone countries. With diplomats of its own in these poor, but resource-rich countries, Israel has a chance of developing a wider range of economic, trade and diplomatic activities.

This brings to five the number of African countries in which Israel has interests sections--the other three being Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Kenya. To round out the picture, Jerusalem maintains full diplomatic relations with four other countries on the continent--not counting South Africa. These are Egypt, Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland.

According to reliable sources, there is growing contact between Israeli business and diplomatic officials and high-level political figures in these and other West African countries. There is considerable public support, particularly among the educated elite, for Israel, most of whom would welcome a restoration of diplomatic ties.

A recent meeting in Accra of the Ghana-Israel Friendship League, which was organized in 1979, was devoted to the question of recognition of Israel. Approximately 200 people attended the meeting, which was addressed by a member of parliament, a prominent Baptist leader and businessmen.

Trade and economic activity have, in the past few years, bounded ahead. Between 1979 and 1980, the volume of trade with Gabon rose from $12 million to $14 million. Trade with Nigeria in the same period doubled, from $20 million to $40 million. Much of this trade is in key areas such as agriculture and communication, where Israeli products and expertise are rated highly. This expertise is much in demand in Nigeria, a country with which Jerusalem has no diplomatic ties. There are about 2,000 Israelis working on a wide range of construction projects in this oil-rich state.

A project of no small economic importance was the construction in 1980 in Togo of a multi-million dollar factory for the production of cement clinker. Solel Boneh, together with the government of Ivory Coast, built this first major regional project in West Africa that is jointly owned by Togo, the Ivory Coast and Ghana. This was the first Israeli venture in Togo since ties were severed in 1973.

Another sign of improved relations with Africa is the growing stream of young Africans coming to Israel to complete their studies. Although the number of students falls far short of the total who flocked to Israeli institutions during the Halcyon days of the 1960s, there are indications that more may be on the way. These students, whose travel and stay in Israel are often financed by international organizations, are enrolled in a wide variety of courses including agriculture, port management, adult education and trade unionism. Ironically, they make their way to Israel via Cairo, where they complete the last leg of the journey on a Nefertiti or El Al flight.

Apart from the oil issue, there is growing West African concern of Libyan political ambitions in the region. Recently, the government in Accra severed diplomatic relations with Tripoli, accusing Colonel Mua'mmar al-Qadhdhafi's government of meddling in Ghana's internal affairs.

At the diplomatic level, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty weakens the Arab rationale for withholding recognition from Israel. Africans, when discussing the matter, often point out that it was the Egyptians who had pressed them the hardest to break with Jerusalem in 1973. With an Egyptian ambassador residing in Tel Aviv, and Israeli occupation of the Sinai coming to an end, many black Africans no longer believe it is logical to hold back on formal recognition of the Jewish state. They recognize, of course, that the threat of sanctions, or worse, is what keeps their governments in line.

Israel, for its part, is not simply waiting for the Africans to come knocking on the door. There was a time when Israelis, after the shock of the break had worn off, reacted by arguing that Israel should write off Africa. These attitudes have changed. Israelis have a better and more realistic appreciation of the constraints--political and economic--under which African governments operate.

Jerusalem has been using quiet diplomacy, along with trade, in an effort to nudge the African states towards closer relations. This policy, it can be noted, has begun to yield diplomatic and economic results.

CSO: 4300/76

BRIEFS

MINISTRIES TO TRANSFER--A number of government ministries will be transferred during the rule of the present government to East Jerusalem. The first ministry on which it was already decided that it will be transferred to the east of the city will be the Tourism Ministry. An agreement on this was reached between Tourism Minister Avraham Sharir and the prime minister. This is reported by our political correspondent Shim'on Schiffer. Minister Sharir is about to examine today a number of buildings in East Jerusalem, one of which will house the Tourism Ministry. The tourism minister has already notified senior officials in his ministry of the decision. Our correspondent remarks that in the Ash Shaykh Jarrah area in East Jerusalem a new quarter for government ministries is nearing final stages of construction. [Text] [TA080528 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 8 Aug 81]

MEXICO LOWERS PRICE OF OIL--Following heated negotiations Israel recently conducted with Mexico, the latter has lowered the price of oil it is selling Israel by approximately $2 a barrel. This will save Israel millions of dollars. An official announcement to this effect was given to the Energy Ministry yesterday. Our correspondent says that a few months ago Mexico lowered the price of oil it was selling by $4 a barrel in view of the world oil market slump, but suddenly raised the price by $2 a few weeks ago. Experts believed the hike lacked economic logic because of the glut in the world market and therefore the present reduction does not come as a surprise. Oil experts have told our correspondent that Mexico will probably lower the price of oil it is selling its other consumers as well, and noted that Israel is not one of the largest consumers. Yesterday a report emanated from Mexico City about a slight decrease in the price of oil for all consumers. [Text] [TA051811 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 5 Aug 81]

NEW IDF ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENTS--The chief engineering officer has disclosed that the engineering corps has developed and is using new bulldozer tanks modeled on the Patton and Centurion tanks. These tanks are replacing the old Sherman ones. The engineering corps has also developed a small bridge for use over antiaircraft ditches and an assault raft that can be towed easily. This raft is entirely produced in Israel. The engineering corps is also using new mine systems. Brig Gen Avishay Katz told our correspondent Shalom Oren that the engineering corps is also prepared for fighting against gases and chemical materials. The construction system has been transferred to the maintenance corps from the engineering corps and the engineering corps is now entirely a combat corps. [Text] [TA041114 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 4 Aug 81]

NEW MILITARY SECRETARY--Our political correspondent Shim'on Schiffer has learned that the prime minister decided to appoint Col 'Azri'el Nevo as his military secretary. Colonel Nevo is now serving as assistant to the outgoing military secretary, Brig Gen Efrayim Poran. [Text] [TA050521 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 5 Jul 81]

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DATA RELEASED--During the first third of 1981 (January to April) industrial production rose. At constant prices, in industrial plants employing salaried workers (apart from the diamond industry) it rose by 1.5 percent compared with the last third of 1980 (September to December). This increase came as a continuation of the recovery in industrial production that began in the second third of 1980, which was about 4 percent higher than the first third of 1980. A similar increase in production was noted in the last third of 1980, compared with the second third. This was reported in Jerusalem by the spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics, who relied on data computed after adjusting for the normal seasonal fluctuations. The spokesman also added that the standard of industrial production in the first third of 1981, compared with the first third of 1980, was not the same in all fields. Striking increases in production were noted in the following fields. Printing and publishing (10 percent); mining and quarrying and rubber and plastic products (4 percent each). There were decreases of 3-4 percent in the fields of: food, drinks and tobacco, basic metals and metal and leather products. There were only small fluctuations in the other fields. During the first third of 1981 daily work wages for industrial workers rose (this did not include one-time payments and differentials in salaries for previous periods) by 42 percent in comparison with the same period last year (January-April 1980). It will be noted that the consumers' price index rose during the first third of 1981 in comparison with 31 percent of the last third of 1980, by 134 percent in comparison with the same period last year. [Text] [TA041101 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Aug 81 p 5]

CSO: 4323/36

BEIRUT PAPER ON COUP ATTEMPT, UNREST

PM030818 Beirut AS-SAFIR in Arabic 29 Jul 81 pp 1, 14

[Unattributed report: "Discovery of Coup Attempt in Jordan; 25 Officers and 150 Soldiers Arrested"]

[Text] According to reports from Amman the Jordanian regime recently discovered an organization within the Jordanian Army, including several officers of different ranks, which was preparing to state a military coup against the regime.

The reports add that Jordanian intelligence discovered the organization and arrested 25 officers, including one with the rank of colonel. Intelligence organs are now carrying out a large-scale purge of the army ranks which has so far involved more than 150 soldiers and warrant officers.

Well-informed sources said that some sort of house arrest has been imposed on the families of the arrested officers and their telephones have been disconnected. This situation, the sources added, was clearly reflected in Amman and Irbid, where army and military police patrols are patrolling the streets day and night and guards have been reinforced on official premises, the general staff building and the radio and television building.

In the meantime arrivals from Amman say that students of al-Yarmuk University in Irbid, 80 kilometers north of Amman, have been staging a sit-in strike since 19 July in protest against the campaign of arrests and persecution by the Jordanian authorities to suppress the displays of support for the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national movement.

The arrivals said that the students of al-Yarmuk University staged a demonstration on 19 July and organized rallies and the donation of blood for the resistance and the Lebanese national movement.

They said that the Jordanian authorities immediately dispatched large forces which cordoned off the university and arrested 12 students. The university administration expelled 50 students accused of causing riots on the campus.

The arrivals say that intelligence organs are now hunting 20 students who allegedly incited the demonstration. Among those known to be arrested are: Jawdat Yusuf (administrative science), Nadir at-Tall (economics), Jamal Mahmud (administrative science), Riyad al-'Attar (physics), and 'Ahid 'Abd al-Bari (mathematics).

The sit-in strike, the arrivals state, is still in progress and the students have issued a statement demanding the following:

That blood donations be delivered to the resistance and the Lebanese national movement.

That U.S. policy in the area be condemned and practical measures be taken against U.S. interests in Jordan.

That the detained students be released and those who have been expelled from the university be reinstated.

CSO: 4304/102

PAPER ON BOYCOTT OF U.S. GOODS

JN011008

[Editorial report] Amman AR-RA'Y in Arabic publishes on page 6 of its 1 August 1981 issue reportage by Samihah 'Ali on Jordan's "popular boycott" of U.S. products. The report is carried under the banner headline "As of Today Do Not Buy Anything That is American" and the subheads "Woe Unto the Nation That Eats What it Does Not Grow and Wears What it Does Not Manufacture" and "Call to Every Free Citizen: Do Not Turn Your Piaster Into a Bullet in the Chest of Your Son."

Cited in the report on the boycott of U.S. products, Nizar Jardanah, doyen of the pharmacists, says: "This idea originated in the pharmacists' association when we met to send a medical team to Lebanon. We were pained by our situation, realizing that our children are being killed in southern Lebanon by U.S. weapons. Hence, there came the idea, to which the unions reacted excellently by adopting a unanimous decision to boycott all U.S. goods for which there is a local, Arab or foreign substitute or those that can be dispensed with. According to statistics, in 1979 Jordan imported 7 million ounces of medicines, about 25 percent of which was imported directly from the United States or indirectly from U.S. firms in Europe. The association will seek to stop the importation of all these medicines, except those that cannot be substituted, such as cancer and anesthetic drugs. All unions will do this because we want to expand the boycott to include the labor unions as well as the popular social bodies, expanding it until the idea reaches the Chamber of Commerce. We will also spread this call through the Arab world by means of the Arab unions' continuous contacts. The idea will then be raised before governments to get them to take part in its implementation."

Talking about the people's response to the idea, Jardanah says: "I think that the people's positive response will be high and will not be less than 75 percent. In order to achieve this, there should be an information campaign to place the individual face to face with this problem. It has been proven that the individual can do something as this is an embodiment of the nation's will, especially in the absence of other means, and as the weapon of boycott is considered an appropriate one. The call for this boycott has the specific aim of protesting against the daily killing of our children and men by Israel with U.S. weapons. We have to convey this stand of ours to the United States. We have to make people move and feel that Israel is America and vice versa. Despite all Arab concessions, the U.S. officials' statements still stress that Israel is their primary ally."

Six citizens, representing importers and consumers, are interviewed. One of them says: "Although I know that this boycott will not affect America a great deal, I will comply with the people's will and refrain from dealing with U.S. goods." Another says: "I think that this talk is for local consumption because the action must be taken on an official level. Otherwise, it will be useless as there are 1,000 ways for American goods to reach our markets." A third says: "The implementation of this decision in Jordan is something beautiful, but the boycott which shakes America is that of oil." A fourth says that the boycott should be "on a general Arab level." The last two call for undertaking the boycott on an official level and for stopping U.S. commercials on television and in other media.

The report ends by appealing to merchants and consumers to boycott U.S. goods.

CSO: 4304/102

BRIEFS

AID INSTALLMENT FROM KUWAIT--The economic editor writes: Yesterday, the Ministry of Finance received a $65-million transfer from the Kuwaiti Government representing the first installment of the Kuwaiti financial aid to Jordan. This installment was due on 1 January. Kuwait's commitment to Jordan amounts to $195 million for 1981. This will be paid in three equal installments of $65 million on the first of January, May and September. [Excerpt] [JN280957 Amman AR-RA'Y in Arabic 28 Jul 81 p 1]

CSO: 4304/102

DARFUR FINANCE MINISTER OUTLINES ADVANTAGES OF REGIONAL RULE

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 29 May 81 pp 8-9

[Article: "Darfur Government Speaks; Minister of Finance: Regional Rule Means More Services and Production"]

[Excerpt] Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Tijani, the minister of finance and economy, remained stationed in Khartoum in recent weeks to follow up ceaselessly and with strong determination the issue of food supplies and of petroleum. He considers the issue of securing these supplies in the province his first and biggest challenge. This is why success is inevitable. I stayed throughout April and the first week of May in the office of the Darfur Province governor at the Socialist Union and experienced closely the hardships which Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid and Arbab encountered to acquire materials and spareparts and, ultimately, to ship them, which is the worst of all problems. They arrived in their office at 0800 and continued to work ceaselessly inside and outside the office, with or without a car or with a taxicab. They worked in the ministries, organizations, the industrial zone and, the al-Sijanah market. They contacted Port Sudan or al-Abyad and at times traveled to them when necessary. Their work continued in this manner until 1600 or 1630 in Khartoum's stifling and poisonous atmosphere. A man who experiences this situation closely will never wish to become minister.

Under these circumstances, and out of appreciation for them, I handed him [presumably Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Tijani] my questions so that he could answer them in writing at home because he had no time for a (recorded interview). I chased him daily, reminding and reproving. He wasn't harsh but he promised a lot and broke his promises to the point where I thought he did not attach any importance to the media, like all financial experts and economists. I tried to persuade him of the importance of information on the political, development and modernization issues but to no avail. A week passed and then another half a week with no answer. The time had come and it was putting pressure on me; Hasan Sati was pursuing me by telephone, asking me to fulfill my promise on time. I express here my regret for the unintentional delay for which, of course, Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid is not responsible. I despaired of him and returned to al-Fashir to try my luck with other ministers. The interviews started and I was drowned in them, sorting, rephrasing and summarizing. While in the midst of all this, I received an envelope from Khartoum. I was surprised. I then proceeded to open it and found that it contained the doctor's answers, typed neatly. Even the questions which I had handed him in hand writing were typed. Here I am sending them to Sati to enter the dossier as received.

[Answer to first question] Yes, Sudan is considered a developing country and not a backward country because the latter word, i.e. backward, is no longer used in the development literature in view of the fact that nearly all the countries of the world have started forward on the path of development. The phrase "less developed" may be used. Inevitably, the developing countries will reach the phase of development in the near future.

Now let us return to the essence of the question, namely that the limited resources from which Sudan, like the other developing countries, suffers constitute an obstacle on the path of implementing regional rule at a fast pace. In other words, will the regional rule constitute an additional burden to Sudan's financial resources?

The answer is yes. The regional rule system will constitute an additional financial burden. But the other part of the answer is: Will the gains that we will reap from the regional rule be equal to these costs or not? Here we say that the gains from regional rule surpass the costs because the yield is represented in care for the citizen who is the goal and objective of development. In other words, this system concerns itself with the Sudanese citizen, with the standard of his prosperity and with his participation in managing his political and economic affairs. We know that the goal of development is not only to increase the individual's share of the national income, i.e. enhance his income standard, but also to enhance the individual's participation in managing his affairs, forming his future and adapting his presence in a manner compatible with his aspirations. All this comes through regional rule because every province has the right to manage its economic and political affairs within the framework of the state's general policies and under the canopy of the united Sudan with all the factions in its alliance.

The regional rule system is capable of helping effectively an increase in production and productivity and, consequently, in helping economic and social development. If there are financial burdens, they are temporary and will disappear in the near future. It is hoped that the provinces which rely mainly on the central government for financing will become in the future a source of revenue and of financial resources for the state. I do not find it at all unlikely when I say that the central budget will be financed by the surpluses of the regional budgets by the end of one or two decades, thus making these supluses the main sources of the state's general budget. Let us start with the local and regional resources to meet the expenses at the local, regional and central level. We will thus reach the stage of self-reliance in development financing. This is an advanced stage of development.

On this premise, I urge the Arab and international financing organizations and the fraternal and friendly countries to extend a helping hand to Sudan in this phase so as to enable it to overcome the current phase because Sudan, with its material and human resources, can reach the phase of self-reliance shortly, and very shortly, when compared to the other developing countries which lack many of the resources with which Sudan is blessed. This means that Sudan's problem lies in securing the financial sources to exploit these resources in the required speed and manner. On this basis, I want to assure the citizens in the province that regional rule doesn't mean saddling the citizen of the province with additional financial burdens but means more services and more production and development. Even if there are new taxes, which are not at all foreseeable at present, then these taxes will undoubtedly be much smaller than the yield which the citizen will reap.

Fundamental Problem Is Providing Water

[Answer to second question] Yes, God be thanked, Darfur Province is very rich in resources, especially regarding the agricultural and livestock wealth. But the main problem is the problem of supplying water to man and beast. If we manage to supply the water, we will be able to exploit these resources and the yield will be abundant, God willing. I will not be exaggerating if I say that Darfur Province can contribute effectively to supplying the Arab world and the neighboring countries with a large portion of the meats which they import from Europe at present. The other provinces can produce the remaining meat and food supply needs. We will thus realize what the world is urging, namely that Sudan become the food basket of the Arab world.
On this basis, the aspects of investment in Darfur Province are embodied in the spheres of livestock and agricultural wealth, transportation, communications and the small industries which rely on the livestock and agricultural wealth. As for the facilities which the Darfur regional government can offer, they are the same as the facilities stipulated by the state's investment law and announced by Badr-al-Din Sulayman, the minister of finance and national economy. These facilities are summed up in giving land to an industrial installation at base price and tax and customs exemptions for a set period of time, in addition to the investment incentives needed in this regard. As for the obstacles in the face of an upsurge in investment, there are no noteworthy obstacles. The basic requirements are to train the skilled cadres and to supply the electricity and the water needed for an installation.

Purpose of Development Is to Make Man Happy

[Answer to third question] As you have pointed out, development begins and ends with man, meaning that man is the one who makes development and that the purpose of development is to make man happy and to realize prosperity for him. Man is man, be he in Darfur, in northern, eastern, central or southern Sudan. I cannot say that a citizen in a certain area has qualities distinguishing him from a citizen in another area. What is required of the citizens in all the provinces and in Sudan generally is to raise the slogan of enhancing production and productivity and of developing the spirit of responsibility and loyalty. God willing, we will attain what we aspire for in the near future. This is not much for God.

I cannot Wade

[Answer to fourth question] As for the fundamental features and characteristics of both the current and the development parts of the general budget, I cannot wade into this subject because the budget is still in the phase of discussion. But what I can say is that we here in the province and the central government have given the projects to provide water top priority and that these projects are followed by the agricultural projects and the projects to strengthen the health and educational services.

State Has Supplied All Needed Funds

[Answer to fifth question] Of course there is a number of development projects which have not been implemented in Darfur Province. This manifestation applies to all of Sudan's provinces because by its nature, implementation is tied to time and to numerous technical, financial and administrative factors. Therefore, the projects that have not been implemented in Darfur will be implemented in the coming years. There is no obvious problem that can obstruct the implementation of these projects. God be thanked, the state has provided all the funds needed for the implementation of these projects and we are currently in the process of studying the best means for implementation, taking into consideration the province's executive and absorption capacity.

Coordination Among Provinces

[Answer to sixth question] Yes, Sudan's provinces differ as to the degree of backwardness, population density and availability of the infrastructures. Consequently, the level of progress and the ideal method for narrowing the gap between the provinces lie in a regional coordination based on mutual benefit under the canopy of the united Sudan so as to enhance growth and prosperity for the provinces and for Sudan generally.

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AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN DARFUR DISCUSSED

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 29 May 81 pp 8-9

[Article: "Darfur Government Speaks; Minister of Agriculture: Darfur Is One of the Country's Richest Provinces With Natural Resources"]

[Excerpts] We met with Yusuf Sulayman Takinah, the minister of agriculture and natural resources in Darfur Province, so that he could tell us about the province's natural resources. He said: "The province is rich with natural resources." I became aware of this fact as a result of the field trips that I have recently made to many parts of the province.

"I have formed the conviction that this province is almost the richest in natural resources, whether in terms of livestock, in terms of fertile land which hasn't been exploited yet or in terms of its moderate climate which is convenient for the production of many kinds of vegetables and fruits, such as the area of Jabal Murrah and the savannah area which is rich with its resources. There are also the soft wood forests which are found in abundance in the western and southern parts of the province. As for wildlife, Darfur is nearly the richest of the country's provinces in this respect. This fact creates very good potentials for tourism, especially in the areas of Wadi Salih, Jabal Murrah and al-Rudum. As for livestock potentials, one can talk about them at length and without restraint. However, there are some problems due to the density of the livestock population which has created pressure on pasture lands. There is also the problem of decertification in the northern part of the province. But it is my evaluation that these two problems are not that serious if people confront them with action and with programs that curtail decertification in the north and enhance the grazing capacity of the pasture lands in the south."

Resources Are not Exploited

Takinah went on to say: "The fact is that these resources have not been exploited. One regrets to see the deterioration in the services, especially in the sector of agricultural services, in recent years. This deterioration is due to the fact that many top-level officials give agricultural services a low priority that may rank fourth or fifth, even though this is a sphere of production that may increase the service (components) if we give it special attention. As a result, the financial appropriations, the work capabilities and the production revenues of this sector suffer from heavy negligence that has obstructed the capabilities of this sector's

workers to a large degree, even though the sector contains a large number of qualified youth. But the lack of the necessary appropriations, of the means of movement and transportation and of other components has obstructed the capability of these young men and has even made them feel insignificant as people who can perform a service for this country. As a result of this situation, there has been a clear drop in the production of both the conventional and the modern sector. If we take corn production in the conventional sphere, we find that the recent years have witnessed starvation in many parts of the province."

Sack of Corn for 100 Pounds

In some parts of Buram and Dain, the price of a sack of corn reached nearly 100 pounds last fall. Nobody could imagine such a thing happening at all, especially when we learn that Nyala, Dain and Buram are rich savannah areas where the average annual rainfall is more than 500 millimeters. For a sack of corn to reach such a terrible price in such areas is tantamount to a tremendous decline. As for livestock, veterinary services have relied in the past 5 years on the aid received from the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. The vehicles received as part of this aid have broken down, keeping in mind that they were the only means for the transportation of the veterinarians and the technicians. With the breakdown of these vehicles, the services dropped by 55 percent in comparison with what they had been before the past 5 years. This in turn has led to a drop in livestock production. Moreover, large numbers of livestock have perished due to the lack of the necessary veterinary care.

Service Rate in Sphere of Livestock Is 20 Percent

Takinah added that the sector of agricultural services for livestock currently performs services within the limits of only 20 percent of its total capacity. If this situation persists, in addition to the poor pasture lands, we will be exposed in the next 10 years to a total annihilation of the livestock wealth in this province. Therefore, the people in this sector need serious and speedy action to save what can be saved.

Forests

As for forests, a 6-year plan was drawn up in the late 1960's to attain self-sufficiency in soft wood for all of Sudan from the area of Jabal Murrah. Very regrettably, only 30 percent of the plan was implemented and the trees planted within the framework of this plan developed the yellow-leaf disease and almost perished due to the lack of followup and care. Moreover, there have been two fires, one of which occurred this year and the other earlier, which destroyed an area of 4,000 feddans of soft wood trees in the area of Qulul in Jabal Murrah--an area subjected to total negligence. At present, many of these trees are not subjected to (thinning) [al-tabtir] process which is extremely important for their growth. If no immediate plan is formulated to save the situation, this project will disappear completely in one or two seasons. Takinah then resumes his talk about the animal wealth in this provice, asserting that it is the richest province with wildlife and that it contains all the kinds of animals existing in Africa. From the northern semi-desert part to the southern, southwestern and eastern parts of the province which are in the rich savannah area, there are all kinds of animals and rare wildlife. What is regrettable is that this sector, like the other sectors in this sphere, has been subjected to negligence. Some species of wildlife have begun to be exposed to extinction, especially with the presence of modern arms in the hands of many of the nomadic tribes.

Elephants Emigrate

In al-Rum area, elephants have begun to emigrate to central Africa. If the destruction of elephants and of leopards continues in the present manner, we will not find any of these species of wildlife within 5 years.

Insofar as cultivable lands are concerned, we have vast areas in southern Darfur, along the banks of Bahr al-'Arab in particular and in some parts of the north. If these lands are exploited, food security can be realized not only for the province or for the country's other provinces but also for the neighboring countries. It is regrettable that no efforts have yet been made to utilize these lands. As for oil seeds, this province alone has produced peanuts which have yielded a revenue of 60 million pounds. This is a conventional crop into which only a very small degree of modernization has been introduced. It is evident from this that if only a little effort is exerted to modernize this kind of crop, its revenues will multiply several times, thus enhancing the farmer's income and encouraging him to produce more. This province can thus become one of the country's, even of Africa's, most prosperous provinces.

Food Security

Securing food for man is an obsession with the minister of agriculture and natural resources. In this regard, his excellency the minister said: "When I entered the cabinet, I drew up my strategy on the basis of securing food for the citizen of this province this season, despite the difficult circumstances under which I came. The conditions require us to start our first season with the rains. Consequently, we have not had enough time to draw up long-range plans. Therefore, I and the leaders of the agricultural sector in the northern and southern parts of the province have focused on preparations to insure food security in the mechanized and conventional agriculture areas and on increasing the cash crop, namely peanuts, to raise its revenues next season. Our policy seeks to strike a balance between the food crop and the cash crop so that neither may overwhelm the other. In the southern part of the province, 80 percent of the preparations have been completed to deal with the current season, but without expansion and with emphasis on the already existing projects so as to enhance their productivity. This includes the Habila project which covers 1,500 feddans, the Quraydah project which will expand to 10,000 feddans next season compared to 5,000 feddans last season, the Khawr Ramlah project in Jabal Murrah and the Hajlijah project in Dain. The acreage of this project will also be doubled. There is also the runoff water project in Malamm al-Widyan area, Qubbat Musaddaq area and Abu Dulayq area. We believe that if rainfall is moderate this year we will be able to secure 70-80 percent of the province's food needs."

I Wish Everybody Could See Umm 'Ajajah

Takinah then spoke about Umm 'Ajajah from the depths of his soul and with a fire that consumes all his emotions and is reflected in the muscles of his expressive face, saying:

"I wish everybody in this province could see the area of Umm 'Ajajah with its vast, fertile and flat lands which require no noteworthy efforts from heavy machinery. Nomadic bedouins used to rely for their corn needs on what was planted in this area.

Yet, the project was shut down for reasons unknown to us or to the province authorities so far. All the machinery was transferred to Tuzi project in the Central Province." Takinah then stated that he met twice with his colleague the minister of agriculture, food and natural resources in Khartoum earlier this year and with the general director of the Public Organization for Mechanized Agriculture and that agreement was reached to resume work in this project, provided that the Mechanized Agriculture Organization secure the machinery and a maintenance workshop so that an already prepared area of 10,000 feddans may be cultivated and so that new areas may be cleared as of the new season. Regrettably, I went to the project on the set date and found no trace of officials of the Mechanized Agriculture Organization. I was compelled to appoint a director for the project from among the brother agronomists in Nyala and asked the governor to appoint an assistant medical officer for the project. I then met with the farmers in Dain area and we reached agreement that they will provide two tractors for the project. Moreover, his excellency the president has presented the province with a gift of five tractors which are on their way to us. I have given instructions that three of the tractors be shipped to the project after they are assembled in Nyala. Takinah said that he expects 7,000 feddans of Umm 'Ajajah project to be cultivated this year. This will meet the corn needs of the eastern and southeastern parts of the province.

European Market Project Creates Scare

Speaking about Jabal Murrah project, Takinah said that the project proposed by the EEC group has created a scare among the farmers because they don't understand it. This is due to the lack of adequate information. I visited the project and agreed with those in charge of it that it is an experimental project and that the farmers here cannot wait for its results to appear and then start their cultivation. Consequently, I have instructed the farmers to plough their lands this year and to cultivate them in their old methods. Meanwhile, the project's experiments will continue until their results appear. I will return to the project later this month to familiarize myself with the progress of its work, as already agreed.

Tobacco

As for tobacco, Takinah said, that 50,000 pounds have been approved as a first installment [to aid tobacco cultivation]. We have received the sum and a new manager has been appointed for the project and will arrive from Khartoum shortly. We will begin tobacco cultivation this season. I have instructed the people concerned to prepare the seedlings so that we may start actual cultivation at the end of June and the beginning of July. We have had a problem in shipping cement and zinc sheets for the project's wells and furnaces. I have asked the Coordination Office in Khartoum to supply one or two vehicles to ship these materials.

New Direction in Savannah

Takinah went on to discuss the project to develop the western savannah, saying that the project has been reevaluated and redirected in order to supply the area within its borders with water, road and veterinary services, in addition to the experimental farms that are being currently set up in it. The is a financing problem with the World Bank. The project director has gone to the United States to conclude the financing agreement. Therefore, I expect that the project will begin as of next October, implementing its programs in a practical manner. On our part as a

provincial government, we have pledged to the World Bank that the funds received for the project will not be transferred to the services from now on but will be spent on the immediate purposes of the project. Moreover, we have pledged that the brothers performing the veterinary and other services will operate from within the provincial government and according to the project's program. These were the only reservations expressed by the World Bank officials and we have given them our pledges in writing. Therefore, there is no financing problem any longer.

Neglected Area

Takinah then declared that there has been an area whose agricultural services have been neglected, namely the southwestern area of Darfur or the area of al-Ta'ayishah and al-Bani Halabah [tribes]. This is due to the security conditions. The area is not included in the savannah project. Takinah added: "I have instructed the brother agronomists to conduct an immediate study in order to set up agricultural and development projects in this area and to form a team for this purpose. I expect this team to present the outcome of its study within 1 or 2 months."

Fearful Laxity

We then asked him to tell us, by virtue of his experiences in the past few months, about the hindrances obstructing the path. He says that he will speak frankly and that he is always frank, adding: "The resources and the human cadre are available but there is fearful laxity in the civil service. With this laxity, there has been a lack of leadership. To a large extent, people have begun to deal with issues bureaucratically inside their offices and by way of reports, without paying any attention to problems in the field. Naturally, this laxity can be dealt with through the presence of a responsible leadership, through making decisions on the issues and through adopting the new values."

He continued with emotion: "The other painful thing is that people, especially people in the civil service, do not fully understand the phase of regional government. Their understanding of this experience is still vague. Takinah then urged the civil service leaderships to understand clearly the new relations created by the regional government and said that this will help solve many of the problems of laxity and of misunderstanding." Takinah added: "Our good people still believe in forgiving. If an official in charge brings a delinquent civil servant to account they intercede on his behalf for forgiveness and for overlooking the offense, even if this is done at the expense of the public good. Takinah urged that this phenomenon be brought to an end for the sake of public interest. He then asserted that the central Ministry of Agriculture fully understands the relationship between the two [central and regional] ministries and praised Dr 'Umar al-Amin, the minister of agriculture, and Dr al-Jak, the minister of state for agriculture, saying: "They cooperate with us to the furthest degree and fully understand the nature of agricultural work in this province. They have fully empowered me to take charge of all aspects of the agricultural activity."

Field Visits

Yusuf Takinah is a young minister. I believe he is the youngest of the province's ministers. This youth helps him to move about freely and to work hard in all parts of the province. However, he is not unique in this quality of mobility because all the ministers in this province are wanderers and travelers. From March until now, Takinah has made numerous on-the-spot visits that have covered most parts of the province and he is still ready to travel.

We asked him to tell us about the outcome of these visits and he said: "The first visit I made was to Jabal Murrah where I familiarized myself with the progress of the project's work and with the problems of this area on the spot. This area has been subjected to numerous experiments from the 1950's until the present. These experiments have not served their purpose and this has aroused doubt in the minds of the farmers who have not felt the benefits of these experiments. This is what motivated me to start my field visits in the area of Jabal Murrah. I, along with the brother agronomists, have been able to solve the immediate problems on the spot and I have instructed that the project serve the people's interest. In my evaluation, the trip was important because it helped me familiarize myself with the laxity existing in the agricultural services, whether for the forests, the orchards, the tobacco fields or the other activities. The trip also helped me form a clear picture as to how to deal with the remaining problems upon my next visit. The second area I visited was Malamm al-Widyan and Abu Dulayq where I found the problems to be simpler, but on a smaller scale and requiring less effort."

Collapsed Project

"The visit also included Saq al-Na'amah project which I found to be a collapsed project. Not a single feddan of the project was cultivated last year. I also found the brother official in charge of the cultivation of the jojoba, a desert crop with a high yield, and his team with nothing to do because they had no fuel and no work resources. The jojoba plants were also thirsty because they had not been irrigated in 4 months. The officials needed 20 barrels of gas monthly whereas the governorate was not able to supply them with one-tenth this quantity. Therefore, I have given my instructions that the same acreage of this project which was cultivated in the past be cultivated again. I also instructed the supply officials to secure the required quantities of gas. They also have a small problem of liquidity within the limits of 5,000-6,000 pounds. We will cover this sum from the budget of the Regional Ministry. Thus, I believe that they can supply al-Fashir's vegetable and corn requirements in the coming season. I will visit them again before I visit Jabal Murrah to see how the preparations for the season are coming along and to solve some simple and temporary problems. The other area that I have visited is the area of Umm 'Ajaj. As I have already said, this area has all the natural resources for agriculture. During this visit, I, along with the Southern Darfur Security Committee, the Dain District Security Committee, brother Yusuf Bakhit, the cabinet secretary general, and a number of notables of al-Ruzayqat and al-Masiriyah al-Humr tribes near this area. We took several measures and resolutions to prevent the recurrence of such clashes. So far, the security situation there is very reassuring. The incidents will not recur if our brothers in Kordofan take the same precautionary measures that have been taken here."

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BIOGRAPHICAL DATA ON DARFUR REGIONAL LEADERS PUBLISHED

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 29 May 81 pp 8-9

[Text] Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid: Full name: 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Tijani 'Abd-al-Majid.

Birth date and place: 18 October 1943 in the town of al-Fashir.

Social status: Married and has 3 children.

Academic data: 1. BA in economics with honors from Khartoum University in 1967. 2. PhD in economics from Liverpool University in England, 1974. 3. Assistant professor in Kuwait in 1978. 4. Chair professor in Kuwait in 1980. 5. Studies in economy and planning.

Work data: 1. Assistant financial inspector at the Ministry of Finance and Economy in 1967. 2. Financial inspector in 1968. 3. Planning inspector in 1969. 4. Chief planning inspector in 1972. 5. Professor at Khartoum University from 1974-77. 6. Regional expert in Khartoum for the OAU from 1974-77. 7. Adviser for the Ford Office in Khartoum. 8. Consultant and member of the Board of Directors of the Economic and Social Research Council of the National Research Council. 9. Planning expert in the Arab Planning Institute of Kuwait from October 1977 to February 1981.

Adviser for the ministries of finance in each of Abu Dhabi and Qatar during employment in the Arab Planning Institute.

He trained the technical cadres which prepared the five-year plan of the UAE Government during my employment in the Arab Planning Institute.

He studied modernizing and implementing the general budget of the Gulf states during my service in the Arab Planning Institute.

Yusuf Sulayman Takinah, the minister of agriculture and natural resources: Born in Buram, Darfur, in 1946. Graduated from the Khartoum University School of Arts in 1970. Worked as an administrative officer in the regional government. Earned his diploma in public administration in 1971. Got an MA in political science from the University of Khartoum in 1978. Social status: Married and has one child.

Retired Staff Brig Gen 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Rahman Shuqayri, governor of Northern Darfur: Born in Umm Kaddadah in March 1937 and grew up there. Completed his higher secondary education. Joined the Sudanese Military College in 1956. Graduated as second lieutenant in 1958. Acquired his MA in military sciences from the Commanders and Staff Officers College.

Areas in which he has worked: The Central Command, The Western Command. The Southern Command. The General Command of the People's Armed Forces. The Eastern Command.

Positions he held before: He rose gradually in various command positions during his service in the armed forces. The last of those positions was commander of the Eastern Command.

Ibrahim 'Umar Muhammad, governor of Southern Darfur: Born in 1943.
Education: Elementary and general secondary education in Nyala. Studied economics and social sciences at Khartoum University. He has an MA in public administration from the United States. Social status: Bachelor. Experience: Worked in the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform-the Service Affairs Bureau. He was also delegated to work in the following ministries: 1. The previous Ministry of Local Government. 2. The Ministry of Youth and Sports. 3. The Ministry of Education-the Higher Education Department. 4. The Sports Betting Authority. 5. The Ministry of Irrigation. 6. The previous Ministry of Cooperation as ministry adviser for administrative affairs. 7. The Industrial Cooperative Organization as acting deputy director general and as director of financial and administrative affairs.

Dr Muhammad Husayn Abu-Summ, the secretary general of the Darfur Province People's Council: He was born in al-Fashir in 1939, graduated from the Omdurman Islamic University in 1963, acquired his diploma in education and psychology from 'Ayn Shams University in the Arab Republic of Egypt in 1965, acquired an MA in Arab Literature from al-Azhar University in 1967, and a PhD in Arab Literature from the same university in 1976.

He worked for a long time at the Curricula Section of the Saudi Ministry of Education and as associate lecturer at the Education College of Riyadh University. He returned to Sudan at the end of 1976 where he worked as lecturer at the Omdurman Islamic University and then as dean of the Women's College of the same university.

Dr 'Ali al-Hajj Muhammad, the minister of public services: Born in Nyala in 1939.

Education: Elementary and intermediate education in Nyala and secondary education in Khawr Taqqat. He entered al-Mu'tamar Secondary School in 1959 and then the Khartoum University School of Medicine in 1966.

He was a member of the University Students Union for 5 years. In 1963, he was dismissed from the university for a period of one year, along with the members of the Executive Committee of the Khartoum University Students Union, during the military rule. He had also been dismissed from Khawr Taqqat because of his political activity and completed his secondary education at al-Mu'tamar School.

He is one of the founders of the Darfur Renaissance Front and was the front vice chairman as of the time of its foundation.

He was chairman of the Darfur deputies conference which was held in al-Fahsir on 25 May 1965 and called for regional rule at the time.

He worked as a physician in al-Junaynah, Zalingei, Nyala, Sannar, Halfa al-Jadidah and Karkuj.

He specialized in obstetrics and gynecology in London. He returned to the country in response to the initiative of the brother president and leader and to his call for reconciliation. He has been a member of the Central Committee as of 1978.

Ahmad 'Abd-al-Qadir Arbab, the minister of housing, water and public utilities: He was born in Buram District. Education: Elementary in Nyala. Intermediate in al-Fashir Intermediate National School. Higher secondary education: The Higher Secondary School of Commerce in Omdurman. The Sudanese Military College from 1956-58. The Yugoslav Air Aviation and Control College from 1959 to 1961. The Air Force Command in Khartoum from 1962-66. Northern Command [dates jumbled]. Western Command from 1969-72. [Phrase dropped] 1974-75. Southern Command-the Upper Nile from 1967-69.

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DAMASCUS DAILY QUESTIONS ARAB STANDS

JN310825 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0430 GMT 31 Jul 81

[From the press review]

[Text] In a commentary entitled "The Cease-Fire and the Arab Stands," TISHRIN says: The Palestinian fedayeen inside the occupied territory attacked a bus carrying a group of the Zionist occupation forces. This is common in any region under occupation and is similar to any of the operations carried out against the Naxi occupation forces in the European states that fell victim to Hitler's policy of expansion and domination.

However, what is considered common by all the world's peoples is considered extraordinary by the racist Israeli rulers, who want to impose new rules for international law so that they can do what others cannot do and be given what others cannot be given while denying to others the rights to which they are entitled in accordance with the laws and charters laid down by the international community.

Following Begin's statement in which he expressed determination to kill the innocent civilians in Lebanon during his savage war against Lebanon and the Palestinian people, the terrorist executioner made a new statement in which he said that Israel views with great seriousness the fedayeen's attack on the bus, adding that Israel will retaliate for this attack at the place and time it deems suitable.

Actually, there was no need for such a statement, since Israel--which is occupying all the Palestinian territories as well as the territories of three Arab states, is launching a war of attrition against the Arab Palestinian people while denying this people's right to determine their own fate and is contravening the principles of the UN Charter--need not reaffirm its determination to continue the war of attrition against the Palestinian people both inside and outside the occupied territories.

TISHRIN states that the reference in Begin's statement to ceasing fire on Lebanon--whether this was in the part which considered the attack on the bus as a grave violation of the cease-fire or in the part saying that the incident has no relation to the cease-fire agreement--constitutes an attempt to make Israel appear to be concerned over the cease-fire, although the cease-fire declaration was actually an Israeli declaration stopping a barbaric and savage 14-day war which achieved none of the goals laid down by Israel and the United States.

The cease-fire declaration came about in an attempt to cover the dismal failure of the Israeli war, to give the United States the opportunity to again propose the U.S. settlement to the concerned parties in the region and to encourage those whose hearts throb for Washington to move and assist the U.S. efforts.

TISHRIN adds: All this shows that the cease-fire does not mean that Israel has decided to stop its war against the Arab Palestinian people and Lebanon. Indeed, two Israeli generals stated in a press conference at the Israeli Embassy in Washington yesterday that Israel does not rule out the possibility of launching a similar raid on Beirut in order to reach the heart of the fedayeen organizations. It also seems that the United States wants to use the Israeli military hammer to impose its will on the Arabs.

TISHRIN asks: Will some Arabs be content with merely making and issuing statements and expressing satisfaction over the Israeli-U.S. statement on temporarily stopping the war? Will participation in the Pan-Arab battle merely amount to applause for the splendid heroism of the Syrian eagles and the courageous Syrian stands while keeping the Arab human, military, economic and oil potentials away from the battle?

Words, sentiments and statements do not deter aggression, punish an aggressor, liberate a territory or wrest a right. The true yardstick for testing the Pan-Arab stand is working in all fields in order to withdraw the card of force from Israel's hands and the card of applying pressure through the Israeli military hammer from the U.S. hands.

CSO: 4304/103

DAMASCUS COMMENTS ON PHALANGIST ACTIVITIES

JN311424 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1215 GMT 31 Jul 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] The phalangist gangs continue their frenzied attempts to explode the security situation in Lebanon. They began their plan yesterday and continued it today by setting all the axes in the capital ablaze and continuously firing at the so-called contact lines, which symbolize the phalangist-isolationist design to divide Lebanon. Thus the phalangists returned a feverish atmosphere to the capital and once again created an atmosphere of anxiety and terror similar to the situation that reigned during the first days of the acute Lebanese crisis.

It is no secret whatsoever that certain political quarters were surprised by this terrorist phalangist escalation at a time when a belief had begun to prevail that the crisis would soon end and that serious efforts would get underway to deal with its causes, particularly since the Arab followup committee had achieved results at its last meeting that were considered by observers to call for optimism--that is, results indicating the consolidation of security as a prelude for discussions to achieve detente and return things to normal within the framework of national accord and its requirements.

The events of yesterday and today once again emphasize that the phalangists and the isolationist forces connected with them are currently using the tactics of maneuver and deception in the hope of insuring implementation of the conspiratorial isolationist design against Lebanon. It now seems that the phalangists urgently needed to catch their breath and reorganize their forces following the severe blows they received from the Lebanese nationalist forces and the stand taken by the Syrian forces operating within the framework of the Arab deterrent forces. This stand foiled the attempt to successfully peddle the plan of isolation and Zionization.

The most prominent point that draws attention in the current isolationist-phalangist explosion plan is that it is taking place within the framework of the following circumstances:

First, the antagonistic attempts of the Zionist enemy air force against certain Lebanese areas failed. It has become clear that Syria, due to the confrontation of enemy attempts by its brave air force, was able to prevent and foil the Zionist attempts. This prompted the internal agent forces to complement the Zionist design to make the internal situation explode.

Second, the Lebanese nationalist forces and the brave Palestinian revolution exerted great efforts to correct the internal situation in Lebanon and provide a suitable atmosphere for bringing Lebanon back to normal. As is well known, this situation does not serve the isolation and Zionization plan that Israel and the agent forces linked with it are trying to peddle in Lebanon.

Third, the so-called statement of good intentions issued by the phalangist gangs decrees an end to dealings with the Zionist enemy. It seems that the phalangists want to use this statement as a smokescreen for their criminal design. They openly declared this a few days ago by saying that the other side--that is, the forces of the Lebanese nationalist movement and Palestinian revolution--should affirm their good intentions as well. It was very clear that what was meant by good intentions in this instance amounts to a decision not to confront the Zionist enemy or to confront its designs against Lebanon and the Arab region. To put it in a nutshell, the phalangists wanted their statement to be a document of surrender by the Lebanese nationalist and Palestinian forces to the designs of the Zionist enemy. This is completely unacceptable because achieving security in Lebanon is inseparable from the necessity of confronting the criminal Zionist attack. Israel is the one that threatened and is threatening Lebanon. It is the one that is plotting to entrap Lebanon in the treasonous conspiracy and subjugate it to its influence. This must be confronted by all the forces concerned with the security, unity, independence and Arabism of Lebanon.

In the light of all this, it is not strange or surprising that the Zionist isolationist-phalangist forces should attempt to make the security situation in Lebanon explode every time a glimmer of hope appears for the return of things to normal.

However, Syria, which has always proved that it can never relinquish any effort that will result in correcting the situation in Lebanon, reiterates that those who are playing with fire, as far as security in Lebanon is concerned, will burn their fingers, whatever the size of the forces that are supporting them and their conspiracies.

All criminal attempts against the unity, independence and Arabism of Lebanon will be broken by the equation of Pan-Arab, Syrian, Lebanese nationalist and Palestinian security. This fact must be grasped by Washington before anyone else. All conspiratorial plans are formulated in Washington. The role of sabotage played by the CIA, not only in our region, but throughout the world, is no longer a secret.

However, Washington's luck with its conspiratorial designs will be no better this time than it has been every time it wanted to strike at the will of our Arab people and its legitimate, Pan-Arab, nationalist aspirations.

CSO: 4304/103

MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE ECONOMY

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 22 Jun 81 p 9

[Article by 'Abdallah Khalid: "A Propos of Measures To Set the Right Course for Consumption, Imports, Exports; Increasing, Improving Quality of Local Production Is First Step To Build Sound Economy; Anti-Smuggling Efforts Would Bring About Success of Recent Government Measures; Citizen's Cooperation with Authorities Would Eliminate All Gaps, Expedite Development Process"]

[Text] One of the fundamental concerns of the state--any state--is the realization through its executive and legislative agencies of what is in the interests of the homeland and the citizen. This would stem from the economic and social policy that is pursued by the state on all levels. Since the Syrian Arab state had chosen the road of progress and socialism ever since the 8 March 1963 Revolution, which was consolidated by the 1970 Corrective Movement, it was inevitable that all the resolutions and measures taken by the government be in agreement with this course which has realized the interest of the broadest bases of the toiling masses.

Inasmuch as the Corrective Movement was a qualitative shift towards firmly establishing the foundations of the revolution, the Seventh Regional Conference of the Socialist Arab Ba'th party was tantamount to a firm establishment of and a reinforcement for this revolution at a stage in which our country was facing the most vicious imperialist, Zionist campaign that had targeted our nation and was trying to establish the Zionist occupation and restore imperialist hegemony over our Arab area.

In this context it is possible to understand the dimensions of the recent measures taken by the government towards setting the right course for consumption and keeping it within bounds so as to serve the interests of our country and our masses and strengthen our course whose objective is to liberate the land and the citizen.

New Resolutions

To carry out the government's directives, the Ministry of Economy issued a resolution banning the importation of a group of products mentioned in the

report of the Import Guidance Committee. These products include decorative plants; flowers; budding flower plants; sprouting twigs; decorative leaves; Indian cashew nuts; unshelled almonds; unshelled walnuts; unshelled hazelnuts; unshelled pistachios; watermelon and melon seeds not prepared for cultivation; squash, zucchini and pumpkin seeds not prepared for cultivation; marble; various kinds of marble ore or industrialized marble, as well as blankets, clothing, flowers, synthetic papers and their parts and the ready varieties of those papers. A few days ago the Ministry of Economy did issue a decree prohibiting the importation of perfumes and foreign cigarettes.

The question that is being asked now is this: What is the significance of these measures, and what are the positive consequences that these measures have on the course of the national economy?

It is evident that the Syrian Arab country has realized numerous accomplishments on all levels. This has led to the achievement of suitable rates of growth in income and national production.

Suffice it to mention that during 1980 and in the context of achieving an integrated program for internal construction, the country did achieve an estimated 34 percent increase in production in the field of industrial work and a 21 percent increase in production in agricultural work over 1979.

These figures, however, do not signify the absence of a few gaps which are undesirable from an economic standpoint or from a positive standpoint.

Perhaps foremost among these gaps are the growth in the volume of consumption and the change in its composition and makeup.

Increased Consumption

In the television debate which he conducted last week, the minister of planning affirmed that total consumption in the country during the fourth 5-Year Plan grew at an average rate of 16.01 percent annually. In 1980 this growth in consumption constitutes 85 percent of the national product. This figure is high not only for developing countries, but also for advanced countries as well. This is because it signifies a reduction in the rate of savings necessary to finance investment and expedite the development process.

Were we to add to this the fact that this growth in consumption has occurred in the consumption of non-essential and recreational goods and goods that are not produced locally, we would be able to see the effects that passive consumption has on the production process itself.

Hence came the idea for the need to set the right course for consumption. This does not necessarily mean reducing the volume of consumption as much as it means directing the resources that are available for consumption towards satisfying essential goods and needs which are consumed by the

largest segment of the population and eliminating gradually the consumption of recreational and imported goods in an earnest attempt to make foreign currency available. This foreign currency must be utilized according to economic priorities and according to the development plan that has been set.

The Purpose of Setting a Right Course

It is natural that in addition to all this, setting the right course for consumption seeks to steer the modes of consumption towards locally produced goods or towards goods which may be produced locally.

The implications of the recent measures whose objective is to achieve greater production in the public and private sectors may be understood in this context. The recent measures also seek to form what is called prudent consumption which would make essential goods available and provide the necessary materials for investment, capital formation and greater production in the future. This essentially means steering the economic resources that are available in the national economy towards satisfying collective needs which satisfy the desires of the greatest segment of citizens and keeping those resources away from luxury individual needs that satisfy only the needs of a few citizens of our country. The consequences of the measures that have been taken by the government are positive, and they are most certainly in the interests of the citizen. It is obvious that a considerable amount of currency which used to be spent on these goods would be saved, and the government will be able to direct this currency so it can be utilized in other fields and sectors that have greater priority and more benefits.

In addition, prohibiting the importation of the materials mentioned in the decree of the Ministry of Economy will push towards the development of local industries in two directions: increasing quantity and improving quality. This is a great service for the course of the national economy and, accordingly, for the development of the country. The fact is that protecting national production is one of the state's fundamental functions, whether that state is socialist or capitalist. Therefore, the protection, the encouragement and the improvement of national production are among the chief functions of the state in our country so that national production can become self-sufficient.

The Urgent Function

Limiting imports for non-essential consumption will free a portion of our foreign currency resources to ensure the importation of more essential materials. In addition, limiting imports would bring about an improvement in the balance of payments as far as imports are concerned, and this would be reflected in an improvement in the rate of exchange of our currency. This is beginning to become clearly evident, especially since the recent measures were accompanied by the establishment of the parallel market for foreign currencies.

If these measures reflect the state's genuine desire to correct courses and paths, to improve performance and production and to build a solid, sound economy that would stay in step with the country's course of struggle and lay down the foundations for the continuation, the nourishment and the reinforcement of the struggle, and if setting the right course for consumption, imports and exports has become an urgent function required by the current facts of our economy, these measures that have been taken by the government will fall short of achieving their desired objective unless they are accompanied by three matters:

--Speed in increasing the quantity and improving the quality of local products. This is not only the responsibility of the state, in the sense that it is not the responsibility of the public sector alone, but it is also a national responsibility that falls [also] on the shoulders of the private sector for which the government has guaranteed protection and backing.

National Compliance

Industrialists in our country showed their interest in these measures by expressing their gratitude and appreciation for the firm resolutions that were issued by the Import, Export and Consumption Guidance Committee. These resolutions caused a significant step to be taken towards the encouragement of national industry; they made it prosper and released its national constructive abilities in the fields determined for them by the economic and social development plan. The fact is that the integration of objective measures in import and export areas will have broad, positive consequences on the public and private sectors. The integration of those measures will strengthen the foundation of the national industry and will satisfy the needs of local consumption with local products, and this will strengthen the standing of exported goods in foreign markets.

--The measures of the Import, Export and Consumption Guidance Committee cannot possibly have the effectiveness that is being sought from them if the smuggling market becomes stronger and if smuggled goods become as widespread in the markets as they are today. Therefore, the government's principal task must proceed in two directions: it must stabilize the prices of goods found in the market by imposing deterrent penalties on supply violations so as to make a merchant think many times before committing a violation; and it must provide at the same time alternative products in quantity and quality for the banned products.

Measures to check smuggling must be strengthened by means of watching the outlets for smuggling and the intermediaries and brokers who facilitate the smuggling process. Smuggling has considerable negative effects on the national economy. I believe that this is not an easy matter, but [I also believe that] when necessary it is not difficult if the will and the ability to take these measures are there.

The Citizen's Role

--None of these measures can achieve the objective that is being sought unless the citizen is convinced that what is taking place is happening

in his interests and that his national responsibility demands that he protect, support and strengthen these measures. This can come about through an authorized agreement with the authority; [this agreement can be achieved] by various means. Among these means are notifying officials of any violation that takes place; refusing to pay any sum of money over the price set by the government; and giving information about smuggled goods and smugglers. It is the creative interaction between the political leadership and its masses that is the first step to the success of any measure. A passive attitude is the first step to the failure of any measure. If our country is engaged today in a battle of honor, the citizen, through his awareness, is to wage his battle against all those who try to impede his economic course, the course of development, the course of progress and socialism.

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CSO: 4304/50

STEPS TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN SYRIAN POUND

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23 Jun 81 p 11

[Article from SANA: "Foreign Currency Rates of Exchange Decline as a Result of Our Economic Measures"]

[Text] Rates of exchange for foreign currencies in the country have undergone a substantial decline that varied from 10 to 15 percent.

The Syrian Commercial Bank has set the rate of exchange for the dollar in the parallel market at 570 piasters. Two days ago the rate of exchange was 635 piasters.

Large groups of citizens have been seen standing in long lines in front of the window of the Syrian Commercial Bank to sell the foreign currencies they have in their possession.

Observers expect the rate of exchange for the dollar to drop today to 550 piasters. The remaining rates of exchange for foreign currencies have dropped as a result of the economic measures that the government has put into practice recently.

In the context of the radical and integrated economic measures that the government has been taking successively along with its inclination to develop the national economy, strengthen its foundations, prevent the importation of a few products that are considered non-essential for citizens, and shift a number of products and commodities from the national industries to the parallel market [thereby] encouraging their export to foreign markets; and because of the economic benefits of preparing standard specifications for locally produced products, benefits which have a positive effect on private consumption and which strengthen the standing of [our] exports in world markets; and so as to achieve the greatest benefits from the activity that is being carried out by the Syrian Arab Specifications and Measurements Agency; and to make the economic guidance steps in this area exhaustive, Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasim, the prime minister, issued a communique ordering the authorized agencies to cooperate with the Syrian Arab Specifications and Measurements Agency in

studying the internal specifications projects in the context of those agencies' specializations. The prime minister also enjoined that specialists and professionals in these agencies be sent to attend the meetings of the Syrian Arab Specifications and Measurements Agency to discuss the aforementioned projects and to take part in raising the standard of specifications and measurements in all the areas of production in the country.

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END

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BRITISH MIDEAST EXPORTS INCREASE

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 34-35

[Article by Michel Szwed-Cousins]

[Text] Britain's export trade to the Middle East is set to take off dramatically, overtaking both France and Italy to become the fourth largest exporter to the region after Japan, the US and West Germany. The rise in orders could be as high as 50 per cent, between $4bn and $5bn (depending on the dollar rate against sterling) over the 1980 export total of $9.7bn.

This impending boom in business with the Middle East is a reflection of Britain's new-found favour generally in the Arab world. The upturn in good will has plainly excited British trade officials. The British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington--now president of the EEC's Council of Ministers--has become the Middle East's most favoured westerner, having shown what is regarded as progress towards understanding the region's political problems.

Carrington has inherited this position from Giscard d'Estaing, who was popular, particularly in the Gulf, because of his apparent sympathy with the Palestinians. At the time French officials were happy to admit that there was a link between this political favour their then president had accrued and the growth in export orders from Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf. In the UAE market, for example, France--along with the US--made noticeable gains at Britain's expense.

Now British industry hopes that the so-called 'politically motivated contracts' that used to find their way to France will travel a few kilometres further west and cross the English Channel into Britain. These contracts are usually package deals connected either with defence or with turnkey construction projects, such as a sewerage scheme or an industrial site. They are usually worth $100m or more.

Until now, British firms seeking this type of valuable contract have been beaten to it by Japan, West Germany, France or the US. OECD figures show the Arab market grew by 36 per cent last year. The British share of this has generally been in 'administratively ordered' contracts to do with supplies, equipment and consultancy.

Last year, Britain's share of the total international trade with the Middle East was 8 per cent. Among OECD countries, which between them exported 80 per cent

of goods and services paid for by the region, Britain ranked fifth, accounting for 10.3 per cent of OECD countries' share of the market, compared with Japan's 15.5 per cent, the Americans' 14.3 per cent, West Germany's 13 per cent and France's 12.8 per cent. In sterling, the value of Britain's exports was 4.2bn pounds sterling.

The Middle East market is expected to grow by 30 per cent this year, but Britain's share of it is confidently expected to be much greater. Exporters and officials alike have little doubt that by the end of this year the 5bn pounds sterling mark will have been topped.

Confirmation of the expected trend is hampered by an industrial dispute in the British civil service, which has meant that no trade figures have been issued since January. The growth has also been masked by the rise in the dollar and the comparative fall of the pound sterling. When the pound was high last year, Britain's Middle East exports were worth $9.7bn. But with the pound now down around the $1.90 mark, the anticipated growth in sterling to more than 5bn pounds sterling translates as only $9bn--an apparent but illusory fall of $700m.

It is the added extra of the 'politically motivated' contracts that interests Britain's exporters to the Middle East. Consultants believe the process has already begun. In May a British consortium was awarded a 150m pounds sterling ($285m) contract by Saudi Arabia for a 500-bed hospital. It is the sort of contract that usually goes to US, German or French groups, and there has been some speculation that it went to Britain because of political good will.

Hopes are equally high for large contracts from Iraq and Algeria, particularly in housing construction and water supply. Nevertheless, there are also strong fears in Britain that British industry is simply not up to dealing with the $100m-plus contracts that may now come its way. One trade adviser commented: 'I don't think, from the evidence of the past two or three years, that British industry is up to taking advantage of this situation.'

The problems are partly financial and partly because so many Arab governments prefer working on a state-to-state basis, a notion very out of favour with the present British government, but one that the French and Japanese are only too happy to comply with. Many British companies are finding it difficult to put up the necessary finance for both bid and performance bonds. Unlike West Germany, where banks are often involved with consortia bidding for projects and deal with the financial side, in Britain the banks' only involvement is to lend the companies the money they need and then charge interest on it. There are now moves in Britain to get the banks more involved in bids, but progress is slow and is not likely to ease matters in the near future.

Political favour towards Britain is most noticeable in Iraq (partly because it contrasts so vividly with the 1978 Iraqi trade embargo on British goods). In 1980 British exports there were up 75 per cent, compared to Japan's 35 per cent. In the view of one highly-placed business adviser in London, there was 'no question whatsoever' as to why a British consortium won the $126m contract for the Baghdad metro. It was 'purely because of political favouritism,' he said.

Iraqi ministerial visits to London are becoming regular events. Foreign Minister Saddoun Hammadi was in the British capital in March, and Oil Minister Taha Abdul Karim is expected soon.

However, Iraq's interest in Britain is not based only on the changed British image in the Middle East. The Iraqis have made it clear that one motivating factor in the decision to increase trade with Britain was the attitude of British companies working in the country last September at the beginning of the Gulf war. While most British firms stayed, others, notably the Japanese, suspended operations, albeit temporarily. At the time, the Iraqis announced that the actions of foreign companies would be noted and those countries whose companies stayed on would find in future that the contracts were coming their way.

However, this reward factor in Britain's growing trade with Iraq, though important, is primarily for publicity. What Iraq particularly wants is a defence package from Britain. Already a team of 30 Iraqi technicians is reported to have visited Britain to discuss a $2bn deal with British Aerospace to establish an indigenous aircraft industry in Iraq. The idea is that the Iraqis should build 300 British Hawks fighter-trainers under license.

CSO: 4300/72

ARAB BANK LATIN AMERICAN INVESTMENT ON RISE

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 p 41

[Text] The Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) and the National Bank of Bahrain have recently become shareholders in the Arab Latin American Bank (Arlabank). This move brings the number of Arab partners in the Lima-based consortium to 12.

While Arlabank's authorised capital has been raised to $200m (62.5 per cent paid up), the increase in the number of Arab partners will not alter shareholding composition among the Latin Americans. This means that the 17 Latin American shareholders will continue to hold 40 per cent of Arlabank's equity.

Two of the Arab shareholders, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB) and Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company (KFTCIC) played a key role in setting up ABC last year. The association of LAFB and KFTCIC in the Spanish-speaking world goes back to 1975 when both banks participated in the establishment of the Madrid-based Banco Arabe Espanol (Arlesbank), which later became an Arlabank shareholder.

During the past three years Arlabank's record does not suggest that it assumed the prominent role in economic cooperation between Latin American and Arab countries' anticipated when it started operations in 1978. Instead it has concentrated on safe and profitable euroloan issues, and as a result a prominent euromarket customer Brazil, has become a favourite among Arlabank's Latin American clients. Thus, in the course of his October 1980 visit to Brazil, former Kuwaiti Finance Minister Abdulrahman Atiqi announced the opening of an Arlabank branch in Rio de Janeiro.

Earlier this year Arlabank participated in a $260m loan to Brazil's huge development bank, Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Economico (BNDE). The loan, undertaken by an Arab syndicate, was led-managed by KFTCIC. In 1980, KFTCIC led-managed a $60m loan for BNDE which involved six other Arab banks including Arlabank. This year BNDE intends to borrow abroad a total of $700m, and its president, Luiz Antonio Sande de Oliveira, has mentioned that another $200m will be arranged by the Kuwaitis.

Continued Arab interest in Brazil is also expected to result in the opening of a Brazilian-Iraqi bank. Formal negotiations to establish the Banco Binacional

Iraquiano-Brasileiro began in late 1979 during Brazilian Planning Minister Antonio Delfim Neto's visit to Baghdad, and late last year Iraq's deputy Finance Minister Hashem Tewfiq al Yawar went to Brasilia for further discussions. In view of this administrative activity, it has been suggested that the reason for the slow pace in Brazilian-Iraqi negotiations is Baghdad's financial difficulties as a result of the Gulf war which have so far led to a $14bn loan package, pledged by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, to help the country repair the damage caused by the conflict.

According to Iraqi Finance Minister Tamer Razooki, however, the major hurdle in the negotiations with Brazil is Baghdad's interest in a 50-50 partnership, while existing legislation specifies that majority share control must be Brazilian. A possible way to overcome this obstacle would be to draw on the 1975 precedent laid by the Arab-Brazilian Investment Company (ABICO): Kuwait's 50 per cent stake in ABICO is distributed among three shareholders while Brazil's is solely held by BNDE.

CSO: 4300/72

REPORT ON CHEYSSON NORTH AFRICAN TOUR

XC091701 Paris AFP in English 1552 GMT 9 Aug 81

[Text] Rabat, 9 Aug (AFP)--As French Government officials continue to criss-cross Africa, Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson arrived here today from Algeria for a 24-hour working visit to Morocco.

Meanwhile, Pierre Beregovoy, general secretary of the French presidential Elysee Palace, left Casablanca this morning for Tunis following a 3-day private visit that included a 90-minute meeting with King Hassan II. There were no reports about those talks.

Before leaving Rabat, Mr Cheysson announced that Presidents Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria and Francois Mitterrand of France will meet in November.

It will be up to Colonel Bendjedid to decide whether the meeting will occur in Algeria or France, Mr Cheysson said. If Paris is chosen, it would be the first official visit to France by an Algerian president.

Speaking to reporters after talks with Col Bendjedid, Mr Cheysson also said that people living in the war-plagued Western Sahara had a "fundamental" right to self-determination.

He declined further commentary about the issue, saying any comments that would jeopardize first steps in this direction would be "irresponsible."

In Rabat, Mr Cheysson said that Paris would remain "totally neutral" on the Western Sahara issue.

But in an earlier interview in Paris, Mr Cheysson had indicated that France favoured a referendum for self-determination in the Western Sahara.

French Foreign Ministry officials had also met with a delegation from the Polisario Frotn, fighting in the disputed area, in Paris shortly before Mr Cheysson left for Algiers.

At his news conference there, Mr Cheysson also announced that new negotiating procedures would be set up in an attempt to break the current impasse over the price of French imports of Algerian liquified natural gas.

"The path will have to be completely cleared before the two presidents meet," he said.

Mr Cheysson also promised that his government would not tolerate any discriminatory measures against immigrant workers in France. Many of France's four million immigrant workers are from North Africa.

In a commentary about Mr Cheysson's visit, the Algerian daily newspaper AL-SHA'B said today that France's new left-wing government spelled the way for better bilateral relations.

The right, which had governed France for 23 years, was incapable of understanding the revolutionary programme of an independent Algeria, the newspaper said.

While in Rabat, Mr Cheysson is to meet with King Hassan II and Prime Minister Maatibouabid before returning to Paris late tomorrow.

CSO: 4500/31

PLO REPRESENTATIVE TO LEBANON EXPLAINS POLICIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 28, 18 Jul 81 pp 21-22

[Interview with Shafiq al-Hout, PLO representative in Lebanon and member of its United Nations delegation, by Earleen Tatro; date and place not given]

[Text] Question: What effect do you think the current efforts to solve the problems of Lebanon will have on the Palestinians?

Answer: What has happened in Lebanon and has been described as a civil war has been from the very beginning against the interests of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause. We have described what has happened as a plot by the zionists and by some reactionary Lebanese forces--with the blessing of the United States of America--in the hope of diverting international attention from the basic and fundamental question of the Middle East crisis: the Palestinian question. If this problem is solved and a new Lebanon emerges with an Arab identity, I think then our turn will come in the negotiations.

[Question] Many people in Lebanon say the problems of their country cannot be solved until the Palestinian problem is solved.

[Answer] This is true in a way, because the consequences that resulted from the creation of the zionist entity--basically the presence of millions of Palestinian refugees--have influenced all Arab political life. As long as the question of Palestine is not solved, I think it is impossible to predict about security and settlement in the area. But as we can all see the complications of the Palestinian question, we should be ambitious enough to solve minor issues like the Lebanese issue.

[Question] You consider the Lebanese problem a minor issue?

[Answer] Compared to the major issue, the mother of all issues, which I think is the issue of Palestine, the Lebanese question in one of its aspects is a result of the Palestinian question. For instance, some Lebanese say: 'We cannot afford to have a million Palestinians in the country.' Okay, I see their point. But what can we do with these Palestinians? The Phalangists' option is to deport them or to throw them into the sea. It's obvious the Palestinians will resist such an attempt.

But does Lebanon really have to live with this crisis as it is today until the question of Palestine is solved? Those who thought so have in my view committed a very dangerous mistake... What stops the Lebanese from having a unified government? Concerning the issues they are in conflict about, I think political dialogue is capable of solving such problems. They don't have to carry arms against each other, and it's fatal and useless and stupid to carry them against the Palestinians.

[Question] To some extent, hasn't the absence of a strong central government been an advantage for the Palestinians here?

[Answer] No. No. This again is one of the misunderstandings of the Palestinian position. On the contrary, we have always asked the Lebanese--as we have asked all the Arab countries--to head toward two objectives: first, strengthening of resources, strengthening of armies; and second, strengthening of unity or cooperation among different Arab states. Because we know that we alone as Palestinians, without the support of the Arab people, the Arab states...I wouldn't want to say it would be useless to struggle, but it would be very, very expensive.

[Question] Can we expect the Arab League mediators really to accomplish anything? The last session seemed to create a defeatist attitude in some quarters.

[Answer] The demands of the Arab League are a matter of principle--basically, they are to cut off relationships and cooperation with Israel. I would say a portion of the Phalangists--maybe Bashir Gemayel in particular, who has been taking all the blame for committing a portion of the Lebanese with the Israelis--is debating the issue very hard. Which is safer? To carry on the collaboration with Israel or to return to the Arab family? It's Gemayel's neck at stake, no doubt, more than anybody else in the Phalangist Party or even in the Gemayel family.

[Question] You mean Pierre? Or Amin? (Pierre Gemayel, founder of the Phalange and father of both Bashir, the militia commander, and Amin, a member of parliament).

[Answer] Amin. Amin doesn't, in my opinion, have the worries that Bashir has, because Amin has been smarter from the very beginning. He kept his tongue under control, and his declared positions more than once indicated a kind of moderate attitude.

[Question] Last autumn Amin told me: 'We can offer the only example of peace or coexistence with Israel in the Arab world.'

[Answer] We are ready to offer peace with Israel. We of the PLO are ready to offer peace with Israel.

[Question] You are?

[Answer] Yes, if they yield to the UN resolutions and recognise the national rights of the Palestinian people.

[Question] Is that a tacit recognition of the state of Israel?

[Answer] What has the resolution to do with that? I mean, you can have the Soviet Union and the United States of America not recognising Red China for 25 years, but they did not wage war against it. Ideological differences have to coexist.

I mean, the struggle goes on, but not necessarily an armed struggle. We are ready to participate in any political effort that may lead to a just, comprehensive, peaceful settlement in the area.

[Question] What effect do you see the Israeli elections having on the Palestinians?

[Answer] There wouldn't be a bit of difference.

[Question] But are there any implications in the fragmented election results, which give the small, ultra-religious parties disproportionate power in the formation of a government?

[Answer] It shows first of all that the Israelis don't see much difference in the political parties...Peres is just as much a zionist as Begin (but) he is much closer to the language of today. I mean, he can express himself in a language that might have more popularity in the western world than that of Menachem Begin, who insists on his biblical language and arrogant way of putting things.

So there isn't much difference, but it might have one result: I think political life in Israel itself will be rather difficult for the coming four years.

CSO: 4300/72

PLO CONNECTIONS WITH EUROPEAN TERRORISTS EXPLORED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Jun 81 p 19

[Article by 'Avi'ezer Golan: "Palestinian Saboteurs Aid European Terrorist Organizations"]

[Text] West German police forces and intelligence agencies have concluded that Palestinian groups and radical Arab nations have been directly aiding and encouraging European terrorist groups. On the other hand, they are divided in their opinions on the question of the Soviet Union's role in supporting terrorism. There are those who believe that Soviet aid to terrorism has been mainly indirect--this as summarized by a team of NEW YORK TIMES correspondents who conducted a 2 month investigation in Israel and Europe.

The TIMES writes that the dispute over who is behind world terrorist activities has recently come to the forefront, raising the issue, in the United States, of whether there is any point at all in pursuing detente with Moscow. Therefore, the controversy has affected the international position of the PLO.

The study addressed the following points:

Palestinian groups, which in the past cooperated with various European terrorist organizations in open terrorist activities, continue to provide refuge for European terrorists on the run and aid to terrorist organizations, left and rightwing alike.

For more than 10 years now, various terrorist groups have been training in camps located in South Yemen, Libya, Lebanon and other Arab countries. Some of these camps were established by extremist Arab organizations such as Dr George Habash's Popular Front. Technical and political aides from East Germany and other Soviet bloc countries were also involved. Thus, for example, individuals in the Spanish government claimed that the Basque terrorist movement was supported and encouraged by the Russians, in an effort to prevent Spain from joining NATO.

Aid to the neo-Nazis

Conservative journalists, commentators and politicians in the United States and Britain claimed that European governments as well as the Carter administration ignored diplomatic and political factors and proof indicating Russia's involvement in terrorism. But, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, opinions are divided over the

definition of what constitutes proof. Although several West German terrorists confessed that they used "safe houses" in East Berlin and received aid from East Germany, the West German Government tends not to lend credence to these claims and does not see this as proof of Soviet intervention.

A Czech deserter who escaped to the West recently told of the existence of a training camp for Italian terrorists in Czechoslovakia. An Italian police source, however, said that these camps served for ideological guidance and that although they were important in the past, he did not believe that they exist today.

At the beginning of the year, a senior security staff person in West Germany feared that Arab organizations connected with the PLO had aided in training a neo-Nazi terrorist group. A PLO representative in Germany denied this. The security officer also discovered that leftist German terrorists were hiding in areas of Lebanon controlled by the PLO.

Israeli intelligence files are bursting with all the claims of connections between Palestinian organizations and both leftwing and neo-fascist terrorists alike. This does not necessarily mean, however, that PLO aid to international terrorism has increased.

The annual CIA report published on 15 June, claimed that Arab terrorist activity in 1980 did not reach the level of the 1970's and that most of the incidents were confined within Lebanon. "The Popular Front" was actually paralyzed since they had been cut off from Dr Habash in September.

The opinion of European security officers on Soviet involvement in terrorism was less adamant than that of certain journalists. A West German security officer announced in May that "the facts do not justify the claim that the Soviets are directly involved in terrorist action--and this is also true with regards to the Soviet satellites."

However, as noted above, the Spaniards claim that as long as 2 years ago, Gromyko warned that if Spain moved in the direction of joining NATO, it would be faced with the problem of increased terrorism.

Training in Lebanon

In Italy, although it is assumed that terrorism is "homemade," the feeling still prevails that Italian terrorists cross borders with great ease and receive protection, arms and other forms of aid from non-Italian terrorist groups. The same officials who appeared unwilling to point an accusing finger at Russia, pointed out that terrorism cannot be separated from the overall effort to stir up western societies. There were those who claimed that Italian terrorists received protection across the border, from countries friendly with Moscow.

British security forces claim that members of the army of the Republic of Ireland (IRA) were trained in Palestinian camps in Lebanon during the 1970's, but they believe that these relations did not continue. On the other hand, most of Ireland's arms are made in Russia and purchased in the Middle East--although the identity of the vendor has not been proven.

The British point in anger to the fact that Americans of Irish descent (who are the principal supporters of the Republican army) collect funds in the United States to purchase Soviet arms.

The CIA report reveals that the Russians also sent large quantities of weapons to Libya, who directly aids the Palestinian terrorist organizations. THE NEW YORK TIMES replied: "The money with which Libya buys arms from Russia is acquired from the United States in payment for oil..."

9811
CSO: 4323/21

PLO SAID MAINTAINING CONTACTS WITH GERMAN NAZIS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jun 81 p 18

[Article by Daniel Dagan: "The PLO's Nazi Connection"]

[Text] A little while ago, high-level negotiations failed to achieve their objective of bringing a halt to the operational cooperation between the neo-Nazis in Germany and the PLO. An official in one of the intelligence branches of the Federal Republic said: "The other side set up political conditions which we could not accept. We will have to continue to act at the police level." According to one news source, the negotiations were conducted via the Minister of the Interior of the district of Bavaria, George Tandler, among others. However, a spokesman in Munich denied Tandler's involvement in the negotiations saying that the whole story "sounds imaginary." Unofficially, sources within the Bavarian police said that talks have always been held through the intermediation of various parties. They added, however, that the results thus far have been negative and that there is no point in stirring up the issue.

Bonn's probes within the PLO on the issue of cooperation with the neo-Nazis were made in conjunction with arrests intended to bring an end to the ties between the Palestinian terrorist organizations and the West German urban guerrillas. About a year ago, a group of foreign journalists had the opportunity to discuss the subject with a top official in the Federal Criminal Investigation Agency (the West German FBI). The official said that two activists from the leftwing urban guerrillas who were wanted this month in Germany for their participation in terrorist activities, were engaged by the terrorist headquarters in Beirut. As for the possibility of extradition, the official said that the PLO had demanded in return full and unconditional diplomatic recognition, as well as a long list of other political demands.

The feeling among experts in Bonn is that the PLO is interested in continued cooperation with German radical groups in order to retain a potential weapon for political extortion. But, the umbrella organization of the PLO carefully keeps these ties discreet, even at times under cover. This allows West Germany to officially ignore the phenomenon, which, under normal circumstances would certainly arouse strong public protest.

Extraordinary events which require police intervention can be considered unpleasant incidents both by Bonn and by the PLO. Such was the case with the neo-Nazi

activist Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, who was arrested last week at Frankfurt Airport. Hoffmann is the leader of the illegal "Defense Sports Group" which bears his name. At the time of his arrest he was on his way to another visit to Lebanon. According to information from German police sources, he was to meet again with Palestinian terrorists in charge of the training program for members of the group. In the last 2 years, Hoffmann has made several trips to Syria and Lebanon, where he established close ties with PLO agents. According to German police estimates, 20 members of the neo-Nazi "Sports Group" have undergone military training at PLO bases in Lebanon to date. Furthermore, Hoffmann acted in West Germany as an "agent" for other neo-Nazi groups whose members were also interested in the military training courses offered by the Palestinian terrorists. Thus, for example, the young Gottfried Hap, leader of the group known as "The Black Forest Combat Unit," was sent to Lebanon via Hoffmann. Hap was arrested a short time after his return from Lebanon. His confessions to the police are considered very valuable and paved the way for the arrest of Hoffmann himself.

International Security Measures

Another spectacular episode came to light back in November 1976, when the German police arrested in Hamburg a young neo-Nazi named Udo Albrecht. Albrecht had met earlier, in Zurich, with one of 'Arafat's representatives, who had given him a large sum of money to buy arms for the PLO. At the time of his arrest, Albrecht was carrying 80,000 Swiss francs.

As in the case of Hoffmann, Albrecht was responsible for recruiting Germans to be trained by the PLO. According to the police account, he recruited several hundred individuals, some of who were sent to Lebanon. Albrecht, a member of the "Adolf Hitler Volunteer Section," hired as his attorney a man who holds the title of honorary president of the Arab-German Friendship Society. Details of his activities were brought to light at the time by three of his men who were arrested in Yugoslavia.

9811
CSO: 4323/21

BRIEFS

PERES IN MOROCCO--During the meeting between Yasir 'Arafat and King Hassan II, which was attended by Abu Ayad, the conversation touched upon the visit to Morocco by Shimon Peres, the leader of the Israeli Labor Party. The King said inter alia that Peres had entered Morocco on an American passport at the invitation from the head of the Moroccan Jewish colony in connection with a certain occasion. King Hassan II had met with him and had had a long conversation with him "in the interests" of the Palestinian cause. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 218, 6-12 Jul 81 p 17] 8389

LIBYAN AID TO FATAH--The first payment of Libyan aid to the FATAH movement, $20 million, has arrived. Informed Arab sources state that the total aid which has been received during the past 3 months from certain Arab countries is more than $100 million. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 217, 29 Jun-5 Jul 81 p 17] 8389

CSO: 4304/74

BRIEFS

SAUDI ARABIA'S DONATION TO GAMBIA--King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz has ordered that $10 million be donated to the Republic of the Gambia to help it obtain necessary foodstuffs and medicine. [Text] [GF061935 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 6 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/106

BISHARAH INTERVIEWED ON GCC ISSUES

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English No 474, 20-26 Jul 81 pp 20-26

[Article by Mona es-Said]

[Text] The secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abdallah Beshara, has described Washington's treatment of the Arab world as "humiliating and insulting" and called for Arab solidarity as "the best answer" to America's anti-Arab policies.

"We don't see any real hope of an improvement in the relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world," Beshara said in a long-distance telephone interview with MONDAY MORNING last Thursday.

Arab solidarity, he said, would be the best response to the behavior of both Israel and the United States, which were "enjoying a Roman holiday" in Lebanon and the Arab world because of Arab disunity.

Beshara was commenting on the sharp escalation of Israeli attacks on Lebanon last week and the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor last month.

In the absence of Arab solidarity, he said, "any talk about oil as a political weapon is totally meaningless."

Beshara, who was Kuwait's chief delegate at the U.N. before he was named secretary general of the newly created GCC in May, said that the Gulf countries had "no misgivings" about increased Soviet involvement in Syria because "we know that the Soviet Union supports the Syrians and the Palestinians to the hilt, actively and constructively."

He added: "On the contrary, we have misgivings about the support of the United States for Israel."

The Gulf leader said he did not rule out the establishment of diplomatic relations some time in the future between the Soviet Union and the other five members of the GCC—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain. Kuwait already has diplomatic relations with Moscow, and Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah said last week that his

government would have no inhibitions about requesting the assistance of Soviet military experts should the need arise.

Beshara, while stressing that there were no anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet blocs in the GCC and that no GCC member could impose policy on the other members, said, "It would be foolhardy to say that relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states will remain as they are now... What I can say, and I think I am truthfully reflecting the views of all members, is that we should not rule out any possibility for the future."

On the escalating Israeli attacks on Lebanon, Beshara said: "We have been saying for a long time that the best weapon Israel has is Arab disunity. We have been telling the Arabs in their various meetings that without Arab solidarity, Israel will rain death and destruction all over Lebanon and on other Arab countries. We have been saying that Arab unity is of overriding importance to contain the Israeli raids.

"We have said, and we will say, that Arab unity is the best way to deal not only with Israel, but also with the United States, which is enjoying a Roman holiday because of Arab disunity."

He added: "The way the United States has treated the Arabs is insulting. We are being taken for a ride, and we believe that the best answer to this American policy would be a common Arab policy based on solidarity. It is we, the Arabs, who deserve the blame for our setbacks, because of our continued bickering."

WASHINGTON

The Gulf states were not frightened by the Israeli air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor last month, he added, "but we are humiliated, insulted. We and the other Arabs have been treated as nonexistent human beings. We don't feel that the reaction of the U.S. (to the Israeli attack on the reactor) was satisfactory. I personally believe that Washington's behavior was not in line with its own interests. We don't believe that Washington's reaction to the raid is excusable or that Washington followed a policy of reason. We believe that Washington's behavior was insulting, humiliating to the Arabs. The statement which was read to the Security Council by the U.S. representative after the vote (on the resolution condemning Israel) was a total apology to the Israeli authorities. We believe this policy of the U.S. is adverse and damaging to Arab interests.

"We do not see any real hope of an improvement in the relationship between the U.S. and the Arab world."

The U.S. and Western offers of military protection for the Gulf states were totally unacceptable, Beshara said.

"We don't believe that Western security assistance would be the best way to ensure the outflow of oil from the Gulf," he said.

Commenting on reports in the Western press that the Gulf states approved of the American-European "rapid deployment force" (RDF) for the protection of the Gulf but would not say so in public for fear of radical Arab reaction, Beshara said: "These are stupid reports which are unworthy of any answer. The GCC has never discussed the Western protection proposals or the RDF or the so-called 'Carter Doctrine' with

anyone, and no one has approached us about this.

"Who threatens the Gulf? We don't think that the Gulf is being threatened by a specific powerful force from the outside. We believe that the Gulf has become an international arena simply because of the rivalry, the competition, the race for spheres of influence in our area. We believe that once this race disappears the security of the Gulf will be assured by the people of the region themselves.

"It is not out of shyness that we have not publicly stated that we are in favor of the rapid deployment force of the U.S. We believe that the rapid deployment force of the U.S. would directly or indirectly invite the intervention of the Soviet Union to find footholds in the area. We don't want anyone — neither the Americans nor the British nor the Soviets — to have footholds in our area. We want the Gulf to be free...

"We want no military offers from the Western bloc or from the Eastern bloc, because if we accept an offer from either side, we will be portrayed as subservient to that side or collaborators with it."

The GCC, Beshara said, was in favor of the "Gulfanization" of Gulf security.

"In other words, the security of the Gulf should be left to the people of the Gulf alone. We are totally independent and we adhere to the policy of nonalignment. We are relying totally on ourselves for the ensurance of stability in our region."

The GCC, Beshara said, will consider any threat to the stability and internal security of any of its members a threat to the stability and internal security of all its members. "The Gulf has left the period of individual approach. Our approach now is one of collectivism, and we will not accept the weakening or the undermining of the security of any member, but will consider it the weakening and undermining of the stability of all members."

OMAN

In the first GCC summit some two months ago, Oman appeared to differ with other Council members on the need for Western military protection. It submitted a working paper which reportedly advocated acceptance of Western protection offers.

"The paper submitted by Oman, as well as other papers, is still under study, and the question of security will be extensively discussed at the meeting of GCC foreign ministers in Taef on August 31," Beshara said. "The foreign ministers will then submit a report on the question of security to the GCC summit meeting in Riyadh in early November."

On the question of security, Beshara said, "Oman is part of our group. Like all other GCC members, it abides by the provisions of our charter. But the Omanis have a viewpoint which we should understand and respect. They have a problem with South Yemen. They are not in favor of the military presence of the Americans or any other power just for the sake of their presence. If the problem with South Yemen is resolved, there will be no need for Oman or any other GCC member to favor the support of either the Western bloc or the Eastern bloc. The Omanis are doing their best to comply with the good offices being undertaken by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to resolve this problem, which was discussed with the Omanis very recently by a Kuwaiti envoy who was dispatched to Oman for that purpose. The Omanis have problems,

and these problems – all the issues relating to their security – will be discussed in the framework of the GCC."

SOVIET

While rejecting the Western offer of military protection, the GCC considered the Soviet proposal of an international conference to neutralize the Gulf equally unacceptable, Beshara said.

"The neutrality of the Gulf cannot be separated from the neutrality of the adjacent areas – the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea," he said. "It would be futile to neutralize the Gulf while the Soviet troops are in Afghanistan and Soviet naval forces cruise the Indian Ocean or the Arabian Sea or maintain facilities in various Red Sea and Arabian Sea ports."

He added: "Had the Soviet Union's proposal covered the neutrality of the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea as well as the neutrality of the Arabian Gulf, and had the proposal involved the withdrawal of Soviet troops from adjacent areas, including Afghanistan, then it would have been sound and attractive. But so far, the proposal confines itself to the Gulf, and it is useless to talk about Gulf neutrality in a vacuum, without considering the neutrality of the adjacent areas."

Although the Gulf states did not favor Soviet presence in or around the Gulf, Beshara said, they had no misgivings about the increased Soviet presence in Syria.

"The two areas should not be linked," he explained. "When it comes to the Gulf, we know that the intention of the Soviet Union is to reduce, if not totally eliminate, the influence of others. But when it comes to the problem of the Middle East, we know that the Soviet Union supports the Syrians and the Palestinians to the hilt, actively and constructively.

"It is unfair to say that we are apprehensive or that we have misgivings (about Soviet presence in Syria). We don't. On the contrary, we have misgivings about the support of the United States for Israel."

Relations between Kuwait and Moscow are "correct and friendly," Beshara said. He noted that in April, just before his appointment as secretary general of the GCC, he accompanied Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah on an official visit to Moscow, "and I know that they had extensive constructive discussions on how to strengthen the bilateral relationship between the two countries."

Asked to comment on speculation that Kuwait might try to influence the other five members of the GCC to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviets, Beshara said: "It is not true that there is within the GCC a bloc which is in favor of consolidating the relationship between the Council and the Soviet Union and another bloc that does not. We don't have blocs in our family – in our club, if you will. There is one bloc, the GCC, and it adheres to the policy of nonalignment, and the policy of nonalignment is to have balanced, constructive policies toward all countries."

As to whether Kuwait would favor the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviets and the other members of the GCC, Beshara said, "I don't think that we are in a position to impose a policy on any GCC member. The GCC is an association of sovereign states which coordinate, harmonize, exchange

ideas, consult each other and so on, but the final decision still lies with each sovereign state. The GCC is not a supranational organization that can impose anything on its members or dictate to them. We are still in the process of consultation and consolidation. The collective approach is still new to us. We have lived all our lives in an individualistic, almost tribal way. Even the concept of statehood, of organization and discipline, is new to us. We must absorb the concept of modern diplomacy, and that takes time.

"I believe that with the passage of time, we will be able to have one common foreign policy. We are still in the process of developing a foreign policy consensus."

Asked whether he visualized the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states in the foreseeable future, he said: "I don't rule it out. I don't say it will happen tomorrow, but I don't say it is impossible either.

"It would be foolhardy to say that the relations between the Soviet Union and the Gulf states will remain as they are now. They may develop, they may differ, but I definitely don't rule out any possibility... What I can say, and I think I am truthfully reflecting the views of all members, is that we should not rule out any possibility for the future."

CHANGE

The Gulf is approaching a major transformation, Beshara said.

The change will occur if an economic agreement which has already been drafted is approved by the GCC leaders.

"The first draft of the agreement was worked out by the GCC finance ministers when they met in Riyadh on June 8. They will meet again in nine or 10 days to finalize the draft, which will then be referred to the August 31 meeting of the GCC foreign ministers in Taef, and then to the GCC's November summit in Riyadh for final approval."

The new agreement "replaces all past bilateral economic agreements between GCC members and meets the demands of the people of the Gulf," Beshara said. "All obstacles and barriers among the Gulf states will be removed, and the people of the Gulf will be able to move freely among the six countries and enjoy the right of ownership in each of them, regardless of their place of birth.

"If this agreement is implemented, it will change the Gulf from different entities into one huge entity."

In addition to this landmark agreement, the working paper accepted by the Gulf leaders in the first GCC summit included a provision for the coordination of oil policy, including exploration, production, pricing and marketing.

"We have been instructed by the heads of state to hold a joint meeting of foreign and oil ministers to develop a common oil strategy," Beshara said. "If you ask me when this will happen, my answer is: not tomorrow or next week. We will discuss it during the foreign ministers' meeting in Taef at the end of August and decide on the steps that should be taken for the joint meeting."

WEAPON

As to whether the GCC has discussed the possible use of its massive oil resources as a political weapon, Beshara said: "We believe that the best weapon the Arabs can have is Arab solidarity. In the absence of solidarity, all other weapons are meaningless. To say that

oil is a political weapon when Arab strength is being drained by Arab divisions, Arab intrigues and Arab infighting is to put the cart before the horse; it is a policy of escapism. We cannot buy the concept of oil as a political weapon in the absence of Arab solidarity."

In an interview with *Monday Morning* (published in last week's issue), Hani al-Hassan, political advisor to Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yaser Arafat, said that if French President François Mitterrand's positions on the Middle East fell short of his predecessor's, the PLO would ask Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq to take firm economic measures against France.

In response to this statement, Beshara reiterated that "in the absence of Arab unity, any weapon, be it oil or petrodollars, becomes meaningless."

He added: "We don't believe it is feasible or practicable for the oil-producing countries to have a policy of confrontation with the French government. What we believe in is Arab unity, Arab solidarity, a well-coordinated common Arab policy. As long as Arab divisions persist, it is meaningless — and I think counterproductive — to talk about oil as a political weapon."

Beshara said he was not fully acquainted with Mitterrand's Middle Eastern policy yet, "but you have to bear in mind that His Majesty King Khaled Bin Abdulaziz, King of Saudi Arabia, visited France recently, had talks in Paris which I am sure were in line with Saudi Arabia's well-known Middle Eastern policy. The Saudi government later let it be known that it was happy with the outcome of the talks. We cannot imagine any GCC member being pleased with discussions with the French government if those discussions did not provide assurances that French policy would be favorable to the Arabs."

Furthermore, Beshara said, a French envoy recently held talks on economic affairs with a GCC member, and those talks "reassured us, dispelling any apprehensions regarding possible drastic changes in the foreign policy of the French government."

On the basis of those two GCC-French encounters, "I believe we can say that the policy of this French government will not be dissimilar from the policy of the previous French government. The French government is a pragmatic, realistic government, and it is aware that its interests lie in the consolidation of its relationship with the Arab world."

IRAQ

Commenting on Saudi Arabia's announced intention to cover the cost of a new nuclear reactor for Iraq to replace the French-built reactor destroyed by Israel, Beshara said: "This shows how powerful the GCC is in implementing what the Arabs want, how responsive the GCC is to the Arab League, how aware the GCC is of the need for Arab solidarity."

As to why Iraq, an Arab Gulf state, was not invited into the GCC, Beshara said: "It is not enough to be an Arab country or a Gulf country to be in the GCC. The members of the GCC have certain characteristics and peculiarities which dictated the formation of the Council. GCC members are countries that, by and large, have identical political systems, identical internal and foreign policies, identical ideologies, identical aspirations and identical human, social and political problems."

CSO: 4300/74

FRENCH-ALGERIAN SUMMIT SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER

LD091458 Algiers Domestic Service in French 1200 GMT 9 Aug 81

[Excerpts] Here are our correspondents on the line from Houari Boumediene Airport and they are ready to report:

We have just left the official airport where we have seen the departure of Mr Claude Cheysson, French minister of foreign affairs, who was bid farewell at the aircraft's steps by Mr Boualem Bessaiah, minister of information and culture. Immediately before his departure at 1205 the French minister of foreign affairs gave a press conference and we have put some questions to him.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] For Algerian radio and television, Mr Minister, on leaving after your meeting with President Chadli Bendjedid, you expressed satisfaction. Have you had any special reason for this?

[Cheysson] Yes, there are so many reasons that all of this press conference could be devoted to them. I was received by the head of state under exceptional conditions yesterday. I am only a minister of foreign affairs, nevertheless the president of the republic was good enough to spare a good part of his afternoon for me. He allowed me to have a very full exchange of views with him, after the one I had with my Algerian colleague, for as you know I began my visit to Algeria by calling on Mr Ben Yahia at his bedside.

In my conversation with President Chadli Bendjedid every subject was tackled including bilateral subjects, of course, but also many international subjects over which Algeria and France have positions which are share positions or similar positions or again sometimes positions which slightly differ. What has, above all, impressed me in this conversation, and which I have immediately reported to President Mitterrand, is to have seen that Algeria has, just as France has, the will to underline the very special, very privileged character of our relations.

As it is now in France, under very spectacular conditions, as you will agree, a socialist majority has arrived which finds itself from the point of view of political concepts very close to socialist Algeria. And so we have the somewhat heady feeling that between Algerians and the French an extraordinarily rich period can open with joint consultations, joint undertakings and discussions on nearly every subject.

This will be illustrated in a most spectacular manner on the occasion of the meeting of our two presidents. The president of the Algerian Republic has authorized me to reveal before the Algerian press the acceptance he has given to a meeting with President Mitterrand in November. In fact, he had invited President Mitterrand and I have brought the very satisfied and grateful reply of President Mitterrand that he would be very happy to come to Algiers as he was invited to do by his Algerian colleagues. However, he also offered to the Algerian president, should he prefer this, to come to Paris on an official visit. This would be the first visit by an Algerian head of state to France. The Algerian president will decide himself in which direction the visit will be paid. In any case, it is scheduled for November, the two heads of state have agreed on this, and this will be a particularly exciting moment in French-Algerian relations. This was the cause of my satisfaction yesterday. [End recording]

CSO: 4519/37

EVENTUAL IMPACT OF TUDEH, MOJAHEDIN ON REGIME ANALYZED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 76 25-31 Jul 81 pp 27-29

[Article: "Can Leftist Organizations Change the Present System in Iran?"]

[Text] Mojahedin-e Khalq prevented by Khomeyni from carrying arms and declaring their candidacy for the presidency.

While Iran is preparing itself to elect a new president to succeed deposed president Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, attention to the role that leftist forces and organizations are playing inside the Iranian Revolution continues to grow. The most prominent of these organizations and forces are the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the communist Tudeh party. AL-MAJALLAH has obtained from a number of experts on Iranian affairs and from other sources, who stay in touch with the developments of events in Iran, a full background of the activities of the Mojahedin-e Khalq and a measure of the strength of the Iranian left.

The accusations that are being made in Iran these days against the Mojahedin-e Khalq group remind one of many of the charges that were being made on the street in Iran against the Shah's group in the last months of 1978. The Mojahedin-e Khalq group has shifted from being an ally to the revolution against the previous regime to [involvement in] secret activity and violent actions against the men of the present regime. The fact that Ayatollah Khomeyni accused this group directly of responsibility for the explosion that destroyed the building of the Islamic Republican party and caused the death of Ayatollah Mohamed Beheshti, the leader of that party, and a large number of ministers, members of parliament and party officials was the principal motive behind the process of prosecution and the executions that the Mojahedin-e Khalq group are being subjected to now in Iran. Khomeyni described the Mojahedin-e Khalq as a counter-revolutionary group. He said they were "a group of agents hired by the superpowers to execute this operation." Khomeyni called the Mojahedin "a group of blind people calling for a holy war for the sake of the people." The Iranian government also announced that 23-year old Mohammad Reza Kolahi, one of the members of the Mojahedin, was the one who had placed the bomb in the offices of the Islamic Republican party.

Ever since former Iranian president Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr was removed from office, the Mojahedin have been the target of a wave of prosecutions that is being carried out by the Revolutionary Guard and by the hard-liners of the Islamic Republican party. According to official reports, about 200 members of the Mojahedin have so far been executed. Iranian authorities have also announced recently that Fath-ollah Bani-Sadr, the former president's brother and two of his aides have been arrested.

The Mojahedin had supported Bani Sadr in his long struggle with the Islamic Republican party. Government sources in the Iranian Revolution have affirmed that it was the Mojahedin "who had smuggled Bani Sadr out of the reach of Islamic justice." All recent developments in the relationship between this group and the hard-line Islamic faction, which now controls matters in Iran, indicate that an open and a long war between the two parties has begun. Such a war could lead to several possibilities. Most prominent is the possibility that the Soviet Union and its allies may intervene on the Iranian scene to take advantage of this struggle. This is what the Soviets have been counting on for more than 2 years.

Who are the Mojahedin-e Khalq, and what do they seek from their present struggle with the Islamic Republican party?

The Mojahedin-e Khalq are the third leftist group in Iran; in addition, there are the Tudeh communist party and the Feda'iye Khalq party which is a Marxist group most of whose members had split from the Tudeh party and established this extremist group. These two groups, however, are now pursuing a peaceful and a silent policy. Sometimes they form alliances with Khomeyni. But the Mojahedin-e Khalq insist on the armed struggle and the guerilla war against the regime. The Mojahedin differ also from the two other organizations by pursuing a course that is closer to Islam and, accordingly, closer to the notions of the revolution. The other leftists, however, are secular or Marxist. For that reason the foundation of support for the Mojahedin has been broader than that for the other two leftist organizations, considering the fact that a religious atmosphere does control Iran. Furthermore, the slogans that are being articulated by the Mojahedin are Islamic slogans and, as such, they generate some enthusiasm among the masses.

The Origins of the Mojahedin

The origins of the Mojahedin go back to the National Front which represented a coalition of the Iranian opposition in the late fifties and early sixties. Evidence and information indicate that the Mojahedin acquired weapons in 1969 and were trained by some Palestinian organizations.

This information also states that a few of the Mojahedin took part alongside the Palestinians in the Black September battles in Jordan in 1970. The Mojahedin began their operations inside Iran in 1971 alongside the Feda'iye Khalq movement. These operations were executed with top-level professionalism and precision, such as the assassination operation of a number of U.S. officers in 1973 and 1975 and the assassination of other Americans who were working in Iranian military establishments in 1976.

The logo of the Mojahedin-e Khalq shows a hand holding a rifle. The principal thinker among the Mojahedin is 'Ali Shari'ati who advocates a radical and a progressive ideology. Shari'ati sees no conflict between the Islamic faith and establishing a classless society on the one hand and armed struggle against imperialism on the other. The Mojahedin had reservations about the stipulations in the constitution of the Iranian Revolution regarding the full centralization of authority, the method of forming the Constituent Assembly and the clergy's full control of political affairs. They also had supporters in the government during the first phase of the life of the revolution. They had supporters like Mehdi Bazargan, Ibrahim Yazdi, Sadeq Qotbzadeh and the deposed president Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr. But the Mojahedin, nevertheless, failed to create a broad national base of support. Estimates indicate that the number of [active] members in the Mojahedin does not exceed a few hundred. However, they can mobilize several thousands of supporters. Members and supporters of the Mojahedin are intellectuals and belong to the middle class; they are university students, engineers and physicians. In any case it cannot be said that the Mojahedin make up one group since there are different movements within the party and these run the gamut from the right to the far left. The Islamic group among the Mojahedin still maintains close ties with merchants who are called "the bazaari" in Iran. Those merchants played a prominent role in all the movements that appeared in the Iranian mainstream during the early stages of the revoluion. The Mojahedin also have support among the young clergy who received their education in the religious institutes of Qom. During the days of the Shah those clergymen used to meet with the members of the Mojahedin in the prisons. It was Ayatollah Mahmud Taleqani, who enjoyed wide popularity in Tehran and who also had leftist tendencies, who was the chief liaison between the Mojahedin and the clergy. Taleqani died in September 1979. At the present time it is Ayatollah al-Shaykh 'Ali Tehrani who represents progressive Islamic thought among the clergy. He too supports the Mojahedin. Former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan joins the Mojahedin in their support for the idea of reviving activism in Islam, and he shares their dislike for religious government. Bazargan is still an important liaison between the Mojahedin and the clergy.

The Mojahedin have not had good relations with Khomeyni's regime and with the radical faction in the revolution which has considered the clergy the only authority in political affairs since the beginning of the revolution. As the dispute between former Iranian president Abol Hasan Bani Sadr and the clergy around this problem developed, the Mojahedin found themselves, because of their position on this question, on the side of Bani-Sadr. Khomeyni had kept the Mojahedin away from power from the beginning because of the fear that they might stage a struggle for power in the future.

The question of military training and mobilization was the most prominent point of contention between Khomeyni and the Mojahedin. After the U.S. embassy in Tehran was occupied, the Iranian mainstream was swept by a call to arm young people and give them combat training out of fear of the possibility of a U.S. invasion. The Mojahedin tried to take advantage of this atmosphere to have their members trained and to obtain weapons for them. But Khomeyni prevented them from doing so. He armed the Revolutionary Guard

who support him, and they became a real power under the control of the Iranian authorities. During the presidential elections in January 1980 Khomeyni prevented the representative of the Mojahedin, Mas'ud Rajafi from declaring his candidacy because of his group's opposition to the constitution. Observers think that had Rajafi been allowed to declare his candidacy, he would have received several million votes, especially among the young, women and religious minorities. After that the Mojahedin were subjected to harrassment, and they were accused of treason during the two parliamentary elections in March and May 1980. Bani-Sadr supported the criticisms that were made by Rajafi on the "excesses" that had occurred in the elections. He also supported Bazargan's mysterious statements which advocated "the election of people who were loyal to the revolution." Bazargan was of course referring to the Mojahedin. Khomeyni, however, rejected these criticisms and called for the election of persons who were "100 percent Muslims." Khomeyni considers the Mojahedin to be anti-Islamic, and he thinks that it is necessary to curb their political activity in Iran once and for all.

Observers note that the position of the Mojahedin vis a vis Khomeyni's rule was distinctive. Whereas communists of the Tudeh party chose to rally round Khomeyni to ensure their security and protection and whereas Feda'iye Khalq resorted to undercover activity, it was the Mojahedin alone who were prepared to confront the Iranian regime.

Moscow's Bet

What is the relationship between the Mojahedin and the other leftist forces in Iran, especially the Tudeh party and the Feda'iye Khalq group? Accordingly, how close are their ties with the Soviet Union?

This question is extremely important because it is the relationship between leftist Iranians and the Soviet Union that Moscow is counting on so it can play a certain role in the future of the struggle for power in Iran. As far as relations between leftist groups are concerned, there is from a practical standpoint tacit cooperation between the Feda'iye Khalq and the Tudeh party. The Feda'iye consider working with the Mojahedin in an unofficial manner necessary during the period of Iran's transition from a religious socialist society, which the Mojahedin want, to the secular socialist society, which the Feda'iye want. A few members of the Feda'iye group have joined the Mojahedin in the opposition movement alongside the Kurds in the province of Kurdistan.

The three groups worked together spontaneously on a number of other matters. They continued, for example, to demand the establishment of an army that represented all trends, and they exerted considerable pressure to achieve that. This led Khomeyni to adopt a cautious position regarding the army and its loyalty to the Islamic Republic. The cooperation was also evident during the parliamentary elections last year. The three groups supported the nomination of Mas'ud Rajafi , and the Tudeh party also called for the formation of a joint elections front for the three parties.

The struggle for power at the present time is considered a threat to the Iranian regime, which finds itself with no other alternative but that of repressing leftist organizations. The most prominent of these organizations, of course, is that of the Mojahedin. The left has become a significant contender for power, while the Soviet Union stands close to Iranian events, following them with interest and anticipation. Although Moscow's position on the Iranian Revolution is largely a positive one, there is growing doubt in the Soviet Union about the stability of Khomeyni's regime over the long range. There is evidence, however, that there is large-scale undercover Soviet activity along the open borders between the two countries, a border that is about 1,500 kilometers long. It was Moscow, for example, that helped revive the Azerbaijan Democratic party, which has close ties with the communist Tudeh party. The Soviet Union provides weapons and funds to all the dissident groups in the Iranian provinces, such as the Kurds. And it is known that the Mojahedin, with the cooperation of the Kurds hid Bani-Sadr in the Kurdish area which is located for all practical purposes outside the control of the central government. What helps the Soviet Union in its contacts with the Iranian minorities is the fact that it has population groups that share the same heritage with those minority groups. The Soviet Union also has other basic factors in Iran, among which are its relations with the PLO. But the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is worrisome to Iranians.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union will play the greater role in the future of the Iranian Revolution, considering first its geographic proximity and its strategic interest in the situation there. However, the Soviet Union cannot play a direct role, that is, through the factions that support it inside Iran, such as the Tudeh party, for example. This is due to the resentment Iranians feel for all communications between Moscow and these groups inside Iran. Experience has confirmed that the ties of the Tudeh party with the Soviet Union were burdensome to the party, limiting its effectiveness and political capability. But its relationship with the Soviet Union has also helped the party, especially with regard to funding and the use of the Soviet presses to print communist publications for distribution to Iranians. Following the victory of the revolution, the Soviet Union, with the Tudeh party behind it, adopted a course of support for Khomeyni. It was the opinion of Kianuri, the leader of that party, that "The Ayatollah's program is consistent with that of the Tudeh party. There are no major differences between socialism and social notions in Islam." In the referendum that was held in March 1979 the Tudeh party supported the Islamic Republic. It was the only leftist organization to do so. The party also praised the publications of Khomeyni's party and of the religious movement, considering them "revolutionary" and "friendly to those suffering from privation." The party attributed its decision to support Khomeyni to the threat from counter-revolutionary forces.

Among the most prominent objectives of the Soviet Union and the Tudeh party was that of aggravating hostilities and pushing the conflict of interests between the Iranian Revolution and the United States to the point of no return. Iranian communists were among the strongest supporters of the occupation of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. In return, they were calling

for Iran's increased dependence on the Soviet Union. This is a matter about which Iran's clergy have reservations. The Tudeh party used all its pressure tactics to have all existing treaties with the United States repealed, especially in the area of providing weapons to the army and obtaining spare parts.

Recently, the Tudeh party has increased its interest in the conditions of Iranian minorities, such as the Kurds, the Baluch--from the province of Baluchistan--the Turks and the Arabs. The number of minorities in Iran is about 14 million persons out of a total population of 35 million people. For this reason the party's chances for success are considerable, considering the negative relationship between the minorities and the present regime. The Iranian communist party is advocating the right of minorities to autonomy, a peaceful solution to the disputes with the central authority in Tehran and [an end] to Iranian boycotts.

Tudeh's Strategy

The strategy of the Tudeh party began to appear clearly ever since the middle of last year. In a statement issued at that time, the party considered the Iranian Revolution to be going through its "second phase" whose trends are marked by radicalism. The party said that it was supporting Khomeyni during that phase because their objectives coincided together. The following step would be that of "creating a broad popular front of the forces that support Khomeyni. This would lead to a struggle between the hostile classes, and then the principal objectives of the revolution would be determined. The result will come out in the interests of the people." The third phase of the revolution would bring "a change in social conditions in favor of the working people"--that is, the rule of the communist party.

Conditions which Iran is experiencing today are considered fertile ground for creating threats to the existing regime. In this situation observers view the power of the Iranian left, with its various factions, and they consider the left a serious contending power to the regime of Ayatollah Khomeyni. The middle ground policy has disappeared from Iranian society, and the extremist policy of the clergy has helped foster the radical trend within the ranks of the intellectual Iranian class. Ultimately, this serves the interests of leftists. The unproclaimed alliance between young people, minorities, workers and intellectuals constitutes the possible alternative under the conditions of the existing regime's weakness. The left stands behind this alliance so as to appear to be the only beneficiary of Iran's current problems.

What makes these possibilities more significant is the fact that the religious forces in Iran, which had rallied behind Khomeyni, are not necessarily and inevitably prepared to stand behind his successor. It is the opinion of experts in Iranian affairs that if loyalty to Khomeyni is not transferred to loyalty to clear regulations and rules--and this has not happened so far--the disputes between the ayatollahs will be reflected in the Iranian mainstream, and the clergymen will lose their power to other forces.

Iranian experts also think that the continuation of current political conditions will suffice, in the course of 5 years, to bring about the collapse of the authority, as a result of its internal weakness, without the need for a direct outside attack. Reference is made here to the growing popular discontent with the economic problems, with the force used by the regime to deal with the conditions of minorities and with the development and expansion of the political opposition. In this regard the left is enjoying the strained positions with the minorities. For example, the left pursues a policy of tolerance towards the minorities and has a more precise idea about the economic program.

Within the left the Mojahedin are considered the strongest of the opposition groups. They adopt principles such as those of advocating revolution and adherence to Islam. Although the Mojahedin have no ties with the Soviet Union, as the Tudeh party has, or with Marxist ideology, as the Feda'iye Khalq have, they will undoubtedly face a number of problems. The most prominent of these problems comes from the Soviet Union itself. Moscow would not be comfortable with the establishment of an Islamic regime that applies socialist principles successfully because the effects of that regime would become evident inside the Soviet republics and in another number of countries that revolve in the Soviet orbit.

The question that remains [to be asked] after all these expectations and analyses have been made pertains directly to the future of the Mojahedin and to the future of the ongoing open battle between them and Ayatollah Khomeyni. It is on the answer to this question that many developments regarding the future of the Iranian Revolution depend.

8592
CSO: 4604/6

MINISTER OF ECONOMY DISCUSSES VARIOUS ECONOMIC ISSUES

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 18 Jul 81 p 11

[Text] The Economic Service--Dr Hoseyn Namazi, the minister of economic affairs and finance, participated in a press and radio-television interview and explained the economic policies of the government and then, responded to the questions of the correspondents on this subject:

First, concerning the economic policies of the government, he said: I need to explain that although before the victory of our revolution, we had the economic policies devised for us and immediately after the revolution, we began to implement them, given the war conditions, we had to stop the previous programs and implement a program in keeping with the war conditions. Another point that I must mention is that the program of economic policies must completely correspond to the basic Islamic principles. Since these principles have not been implemented in practice, they cannot be devised by one person or even one ministry and they require time. Of course, the economic policies of the government are discussed in the Cabinet meetings and the ministers and other experts offer their views. These meetings have been successful. In these meetings, the Cabinet members review the parts of the Constitution which concern the economic policies of the government. We have reached agreements in many cases where the possibility of differeces of opinions existed. We hope our future steps will enable us to offer programs, taking into consideration the war conditions and priorities.

Then, Dr Namazi, concerning the changes in the taxing system, said: The change of the taxing system requires Islamic experts in this area. Certainly, those who are scholarly and eligible must express their views. Although I cannot have the appropriately necessary knowledge in all Islamic areas, I can say that a system in which the tax burden is on the shoulders of the low-income and salaried people cannot be an Islamic system. These people are those from whose salaries the taxes are deducted before they receive them. On the other hand, there are individuals with large incomes who, for certain reasons, including the fact that their real income is not known or because of

the low percentage rate of taxes on the incomes of these individuals, do not feel much pressure. It does not take someone who has studied for years in the theological schools in order to express his views to understand this issue. The fact is that this corresponds with true Islamic justice. We can simply say that the tax burden must be proportionate to the income of the individuals.

Therefore, we are trying to take the tax burden off the shoulders of the poor and place it on the shoulders of upper and high income people. I am very sorry that in the first four months of this year, the ratio of taxes received from the private sector to the taxes on salaries may be one to six and a half. We know what sorts of incomes exist in this country and we confess that a taxing system must be devised based on the financial resources. It should be mentioned that some of the people who know little about the delicate points of the taxing system demand an immediate change. But the problem is not that simple. It must be done with sufficient care to anticipate what kinds of problems the decrease and increase of taxes will create in the next 20 year .

Mr Namazi, then, in regards to freeing the hands of the authorities in connection with the budget, said: The problem is that the executive authorities wanted to have a free hand in their activities, and they insisted that the budget be provided for from the sale of oil. But given the war conditions, this was not practical and they had to revise their expectations concerning developmental activities.

Dr Namazi, concerning cooperation with other countries, said: In devising contracts, we keep in mind the general principles and we pay little attention to what category the country that we are in contact with belongs. Our principles are that in these contracts, the principle of fairness must rule the transactions; and if a contract is contrary to the interests of our nation, we never agree to sign it.

On the subject of the closure of the assembly industries, he said: In my opinion, closing factories whose raw material and spare parts come from abroad is not right. But, as regards the change in production policies, it is a problem that the Ministry of Industries and Mines is studying.

Concerning ownership and the role of the private sector, Mr Namazi said: Private ownership must by no means be a means for the accumulation of wealth or a means to polarize the society into rich and poor. Under the present circumstances, we must give the highest priority to cooperatives. With the exception of heavy industry, which must be in the domain of the government, we must move towards creating cooperatives.

Then, in regards to signing contracts with the Eastern bloc, he said: As you know, before the revolution, the economic resources of the

government were taken advantage of by Western countries. After the revolution, since certain principles have been governing our economic policies, we pay no attention to what country we have relations with. Instead, we pay attention to which countries can sign fairer contracts with us.

Then, concerning the expenditures and revenues of the government, the minister of economic affairs and finance said: Despite what has been said about oil exports, perhaps the best solution under the present circumstances is conservation. Naturally, in developmental operations, priorities must be considered. Also, the unfreezing of Iranian assets will help significantly.

About the bill to abolish interests, Mr Namazi said: The real issue is the survival of the banks, which is not in harmony with the abolition of interest. Essentially, banks will survive differently with the abolition of interest. Many studies have been done in this connection and a group of experts are studying the issue. They are trying to involve the banks in the gains and losses of economic activities by using interest-free loans and the principle of limited partnership.

In conclusion, the minister of finance said about the damages to nationalized foreign banks: I must point out that having had no minister of finance during the first six months of the formation of the Cabinet caused certain disruptions. For instance, the General Assembly of Banks was not formed and no decision could be made. And later, there were so many vital problems that took the time of the General Assembly of Banks until recently. Of course, this issue was briefly mentioned in the last meeting of the General Assembly of Banks and will be on the agenda of future meetings of the General Assembly of Banks.

9593
CSO: 4640/63

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES, CALL-GIRL NETWORK DISCOVERED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Jul 81 p 2

[Text] Two houses of joy, 25 musical instruments and many sex magazines and films were discovered by the strike force of officials fighting proscribed things, and a number of men and women were also arrested and jailed. Mohammad Taghi Sajjadi, director of the bureau fighting proscribed things, stated in a special interview with the ETTELA'AT reporter: "Some days ago this bureau was informed that alcoholic beverages and sex magazines were stored in the Saman buildings at the end of Keshavarz Boulevard. Having identified it, the brothers of this strike force went to this locale. The owners of some of these houses became aware of the presence of these strike force brothers and threw from the windows into the street many of the sex magazines and porno films. During the search that was carried out in some of the houses that had been previously identified, a great deal of bottles of both foreign and domestic alcoholic beverages, sexy pictures, porno tapes, musical instruments, sets of playing cards and other items were discovered."

He added: "A few days ago, counterrevolutionary and hypocritical elements twice, using hand grenades, attacked the building housing the bureau of the fight against proscribed things. Fortunately, bodily injury was avoided both times; only during the second attack two cars caught fire and suffered damages as a result of a grenade explosion." He then continued: "For the last time, a warning is issued to the drivers of all vehicles to refrain from playing undesirable music in their vehicles. In this respect, we have received a number of complaints from passengers, and should these acts be repeated, drivers will be severely punished."

Brother 'Abbas Kamali, the representative of the central committee of the bureau fighting proscribed things, stated in relation to the activities of this strike force: "We have attempted to prevent any activity against the dignity of a Muslim. We strongly confront anyone who indulges in drinking alcoholic beverages. We have succeeded so far in putting a stop to the activities of porno tape sellers who were displaying their wares in the streets of Tehran. There are also some others who have a hand in it, and we shall soon put a stop to that as well."

He added: "Unfortunately some non-Muslims manufacture alcoholic beverages and sell them to the people at exorbitant prices. These persons are arrested when

they are discovered, just as some Christians and Jews have been arrested and jailed for the crime of selling alcoholic beverages." Brother Kamali continued: "Unfortunately some prostitutes are living in this big and ungovernable city of Tehran; they have established a telephone network, through which they make unfortunate innocent girls available to pleasure-seeking men. Last week we arrested a large network of this kind, and after an investigation, some of its elements led us to the discovery of another network. The women who had established them are now in jail and there is a strong likelihood that they will be executed, to serve as a lesson for those who indulge in these lowly acts."

CSO: 4640/69

MORALITY OF BEIRUT RAID QUESTIONED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 24 Jul 81 p 6

[Article by Yosef Goell]

[Text]

LABOUR PARTY leader Shimon Peres was instrumental this week in muting his party's criticism of the bombing of the PLO headquarters in Beirut in which several hundred civilians were killed and many more wounded. A week in which thousands of Israelis were forced to huddle in air raid shelters in Nahariya, Kiryat Shmona and elsewhere in West and Upper Galilee was, Peres reportedly insisted, no time for divisive politics.

To my mind, he was as wrong as he had been, contrariwise, in picking a fight with Begin over the Air Force strike against the Baghdad nuclear reactor at a time when such a stand could only lose him votes.

The elections are over. It is essential, for our own self-respect and for our image in the eyes of our friends abroad that as many Israelis as possible dissociate themselves from the outrage of the consciously planned killing of civilians, which was perpetrated in their name.

Israel has been engaged in a 33-year-long war with the surrounding Arab world. Odds are that the war will continue, in both cold and hot fashion, for at least that long in future. Because I believe this is so — because I do not buy the delusion that peace is just around the corner or the fatuous talk of "a peace process" that ostensibly began with the Sadat initiative four years ago — I believe it so crucial to condemn the Beirut bombing and the mode of thought that made it possible.

Specifically because moral authority is crucial to Israel's war against the PLO and other enemies in the Arab world, Israelis must castigate that outrage, admit that a mistake was made in our name and work to prevent its repetition.

I would go so far as to express the hope that some voices of outrage would be heard not only from the kibbutzim being subjected to the PLO's Katyusha and shelling attacks, but also from Nahariya and Kiryat Shmona residents themselves.

In 1948, in the midst of a life-and-death struggle, which we were clearly losing, the mainstream of the *Yishuv* found the moral courage to condemn the outrage of Deir Yassin in which a large number of Palestinian Arab villagers were killed during an attack on that village, which was part of the Arab siege against Jewish Jerusalem. The entire Jewish press with the exception of the Revisionist paper castigated the perpetrators of that attack, the Irgun Zvai Leumi, then commanded by Menachem Begin.

In fact, one of the issues which figured centrally in the split between the IZL underground and the Haganah controlled by the Jewish Agency, was the former's in-

sistence on a policy of "eye-for-an-eye" retaliatory attacks against Arab civilian targets, as against the official policy of *havlaga*, near superhuman self-restraint, even in the midst of war, with our own dead still at our feet.

THERE HAVE always been those among us who have counselled the eye-for-an-eye approach. But they were always a small minority. The main argument against our assimilation into the dominant regional Arab concept of blood vengeance was that such a position was basically foreign to the most profound Jewish concepts, including concepts on how one conducts a war for survival.

I am not a "bleeding heart" oblivious to the wrongs perpetrated against us and sensitive only to the hurts caused to our enemies. Nor am I addressing myself to professional hand wringers who choose to disregard the cynicism of a West that cares little for Jewish blood, or indeed for the blood of the fellow Christians of southern Lebanon.

Like a dwindling number of us, I fought as a foot soldier in nearly all of Israel's wars and have killed Arab soldiers. I am not proud of that latter fact; but I do not hesitate to say that I would do it again and insist that my son does it to defend our people and land against our real, not imagined, enemies.

Does that give me or anyone else the right to condone, or pass over in silence, the killing of noncombatant men, women and children living in the area commandeered by the PLO murderers for their headquarters?

In his rhetoric, Mr. Begin has shown himself a specialist on the outrages perpetrated and threatened against our own innocent children. Children are chosen for such rhetorical purposes for their innocence. By definition, Arab children are no less innocent than are our own. Can it really be that Mr. Begin's cabinet secretary dared express himself, in reaction to the first shock in Israel over the killing of those hapless children, by charging that that very criticism was "monstrous"?

The attack was carried out by the Israel Air Force, for obvious reasons. The alternative, a commando raid on the ground, might have avoided a high rate of civilian casualties, but it would have been much more dangerous for the men involved.

Another important reason is that aerial bombing involves a certain detachment. As the Americans learned in Vietnam, pilots and bombardiers do not see the human suffering their deadly cargo almost unavoidably inflicts.

But if statistics are correct, one must assume that most of those pilots are children of kibbutzim. What do they feel? What do their kibbutz elders feel? What will their elder brothers, who wrote *The Seventh Day*, baring their tortured souls in the aftermath of the Six Day War, say when their younger brothers come home on leave?

REINFORCING these moral considerations is the reality that apparently nothing was gained militarily by Israel from the bombing of the Beirut headquarters. Much was lost in international support. It seemed to have been in the best traditions of an emotionally triggered act of vengeance, rather than a calculated act taking into account Israel's best interests.

The PLO headquarters have been in the same location for the better part of a decade, during which the PLO has loosed its reign of terror over Lebanon and sought to use the territory of that hapless country as a springboard for attacks against Israel. Other targets were consistently attacked by Israel during this entire period. But previous governments, including Mr. Begin's own for four years, correctly refrained from attacking those headquarters, because of the surrounding civilian population. Nothing has really happened in the interim that could in any way have justified such a change in policy.

And what of our own rabbis, those who would set themselves up as our moral guides; why are their voices muted?

One of the heights of Jewish heritage is contained in the talmudic criticism of the Song of Miriam, that exultant tribal victory song in the Book of Exodus marking the drowning of the Egyptian hosts in the sea through which the Children of Israel had just passed safely. The rabbis have God himself expressing his chagrin and saying: "The fruit of my hands are drowning in the sea and you choose to sing songs of praise?"

It will be a long war. But what will it avail us if we find that in winning we have lost our Jewish souls and turned into the image of the most bestial of enemies?

CSO: 4300/73

NEW HERUT MKS DISCUSS POLICIES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 24 Jul 81 pp 6-7

[Article by Mark Segal]

[Text]

TWO AUTHENTIC voices from southern development towns will now be given a national hearing with the election to the 10th Knesset of Yavne Council Chairman Meir Shitrit, 32, and Kiryat Gat Mayor David Magen, 36. They represent Herut in the Likud, but they might well have been spokesmen of the Labour movement had they not been rejected as "young Turks" by the Mapai establishments in their towns when they first groped their way into politics.

Shitrit and Magen have much in common, personifying the emergence on the national level of a growing number of grass-roots representatives on both sides of the political spectrum. They are both under 40; moulded by their years as army officers, they are both sons of Moroccan immigrants and they experienced the *ma'abarot* as children. Moreover, they are intelligent articulate and self-confident. Both men are living proof that the pressure cooker *has* worked, and their success stories refute the dire predictions and idle chatter about the failure of integrating the immigrant communities into one nation. They got where they are by merit. They are the first to oppose the validity of a separate communal party, and heartily condemn the patronage of absentee Sephardi notables like Nessim Gaon.

Meir Shitrit's family reached the desolate collection of abandoned Arab buildings that was Yavne in 1957 after a spell in a *ma'abara*. Although his parents could neither read nor write, they encouraged their bright son's hunger for learning, and he started paying for his schooling by working in nearby citrus groves from the age of 12.

A scholarship was arranged for him at the Kfar Batya youth village where he pursued his secondary schooling, continuing to work in the groves on his days at home. This intensive pursuit of education finally brought him to Bar-Ilan University, from which he graduated with a BSc in microbiology. His initial desire to study medicine could not be pursued because of financial reasons, but it brought him into the medical corps during his army service and in the regular army where he rose to the rank of captain. In the Yom Kippur War he was medical corps operations officer with Aluf Kalman Magen, organizing medical aid for the troops engaged in the bitterest fighting on the southern front.

His talent for leadership and devotion to his community were called on in 1968, when, on vacation from university, he organized a "youth revolt" against the local elders' opposition to a sports centre. Their demonstration made headlines at the time. He found a

vehicle to get things done in the apolitical framework of the Jaycees, of which he became local president.

Encouraged by his brother-in-law, who is still Yavne Council treasurer, Shitrit agreed to the local youngsters' appeal that he run for the council chairmanship in the 1974 local elections. The local Mapai bigwigs turned his group down, while Herut welcomed the crusading youths with open arms. He won five of the 11 seats on the council and at 24 became the country's youngest municipal leader. Proof of his success and popularity came with his triumph at the 1978 local elections, when he won 85 per cent of the total vote. The number of his constituents nearly doubled in the intervening years, from 8,000 to 15,000

His first aim was "to improve the self-image" of the local residents. I was duly impressed during a short tour of Yavne to see the neat rows of homes, each with its own little garden, and the many trees and lawns around the older housing estates. He had used Project Renewal as best he could, arguing "we have to adapt the means to the residents, criteria."

From a hilltop overlooking the swimming pool and sports centre donated by the Kay family of London, he showed me the "villas" which came into being with the "Build Your Own Home" scheme. This was part of his design to attract a better-educated population to his town.

"I don't want to compete with the cities, but to offer a more attractive place to live," he said, noting Yavne's proximity to Tel Aviv, Rishon Lezion, Rehovot and Ashdod.

He had set aside part of the new quarter for regular army officers wishing to build their own homes, and got five times as many applications as there were plots. This housing scheme had cost the government nothing and enhanced real estate values in the entire township.

His aim being social and educational integration, he had briefed all applicants for the "villa quarter beforehand." "I did not accept any applications before we had raised educational levels and other amenities," he stressed.

AS WE APPROACHED the functional council offices, I noticed numerous posters bearing Mayor Shitrit's face on the election hoardings. Sitting in his office, near a huge photograph of Premier Begin, I wondered whether the local vote (Likud-58 per cent; Labour-14 per cent; NRP-7 per cent; Tami-6 per cent, etc.) was more for Begin or for Shitrit.

He conceded that his having been a candidate had played a role in the campaign. He said that local government is the best training-ground for parliamentary work, because of the direct contact with the public. This led him to expound his support of electoral reform, which he averred would help solve the problem of the gap between the communities. He was persuaded that the best men would be chosen to the Knesset. "Mind you, I have no illusions about the difficulty of getting such legislation through. After all, how many MKs do you know who would be re-elected in a constituency system?" he asked sharply.

Shitrit intends setting up a parliamentary lobby for development towns and he is pleased at the number of members returned this time from these areas, starting with his own party; he has already had talks on future common action with Moshe Katzav (of Kiryat Malachi) and David Magen.

Before travelling to Yavne I had heard of friction between Shitrit and Magen during the Herut internal election process; however, that is now behind them, and each speaks of the other with respect.

Inside Herut it is said that their ascendancy was regarded as a threat to the current primacy of Housing Minister David Levy as "*the* ethnic spokesman," and that their army experience might give them the edge.

Not unexpectedly neither of them rose to my probing on their rivalry to Levy, shrugging off such talk with a laugh.

SHITRIT intends focusing his activity in two Knesset committees — finance and education (or interior). The former because he believes he can use his experience as chairman of the finance committees of the Broadcasting Authority and the government tourist corporation. He wants to help local government, and reform outdated legislation governing its relationship with the central administration, especially to avoid "the unhealthy site where elected heads of towns have to go begging cap in hand to the central bureaucracy."

His priorities are to reform National Insurance arrangements, on top of improving educational facilities in development towns, holding that universal subsidies should be abolished, with only the needy getting state aid — be it in foodstuffs, transport, housing or family allowances. Much of the money now going to better-off families could be better utilized in extending the school day until 6 p.m. in many areas.

When we talked of the elections, Shitrit waxed wrathful over the "artificial representatives of the communities who owe more to the party machine than to the public. I always said I don't want to be chosen for my background but whether I'm good at my job or not. The division of the country along ethnic lines is extremely dangerous and the leaders of all parties must now endeavour to cool partisan tempers and strive for national unity." He considers Tami's lack of success a most encouraging sign for the future. No, he does not think that his party's advocacy of massive funding for settlement activity across the "green line" is at the expense of the Katamonim or development towns, emphasizing that "it was Herut that raised the banner of Project Renewal."

WHILE SHITRIT would like a national unity coalition if it is possible, Magen is more emphatic about his party's Land of Israel ideology.

Magen (like Shitrit) has rabbinical antecedents. He claims to be descended from Maimonides on his father's side. His uncle is the chief rabbi of Casablanca, Yedidya Monsonego, who reportedly handled the first communication between King Hassan and Premier Begin which laid the ground for President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem.

Magen Hebraicized his name in the late '60s when he served as an armoured corps officer on the Suez Canal front during the War of Attrition; his commander was Aluf Kalman Magen (another element in

common with Shitrit), and he took that name.

His kibbutz-born wife is a Pinto, from the ancient Spanish and Portuguese community of Amsterdam; their marriage represents the rounding of a circle, because according to their family lore their forebears were neighbours before the Expulsion from the Iberian Peninsula.

His family came on aliya from Fez in 1949, and lived at first in the Talpiot *ma'abara* in Jerusalem, and later in Bak'a. David was the youngest of nine sons and daughters and he attended primary and secondary schools in Jerusalem. After matriculating, he was called up and chose the armoured corps, signing on for the regular army and serving until 1972. He still has something military in his bearing. When he settled in Kiryat Gat on demobilization and was appointed director of municipal administration, he had difficulties adjusting to the complexities of civilian life. "You know, the first time the staff committee and I disagreed, I thought I was being threatened with rebellion," he said, adding, "but I learned quickly."

THE LOCAL Herut branch made him their mayoral candidate in the 1973 municipal elections. His party did well enough for him to become deputy mayor; in 1976, a shift in coalition politics propelled him to the mayoralty.

In the 1978 municipal elections Magen won 69 per cent of the 15,000-plus votes, a convincing recognition of his leadership by any criteria.

His personal popularity served his party well on June 30, when the Likud netted about 50 per cent of the vote, Labour getting 32 per cent, and Tami only six per cent.

Discussing his mayoral record, Magen dwells on his efforts to raise educational standards and improve community services by opening modern schools and encouraging popular sports. One thing he is particularly proud of — mosquitoes no longer bother Kiryat Gat's 26,000 residents. He recently allocated 2,000 dunams for a new industrial park, where he hopes to diversify sources of employment for returning soldiers.

"We are 50 minutes from Jerusalem and Tel Aviv and half an hour from Beersheba," he said, explaining his town's advantages. The average age is 22, with 9,000 youngsters under 18. Hence 50 per cent of his budget goes on education. His constituents derive from 42 countries — 60 per cent are from North Africa and Asia, 48 per cent were born in Israel. The average family has four members and there is no housing shortage.

Magen speaks admiringly of Israel Pollack, whose Polgat concern employs 28 per cent of Kiryat Gat's labour force (and who publicly urged Begin to ensure that Magen be elected to the Knesset). "He is first a good Zionist and then an industrialist," Magen declared to me.

In the Knesset, Magen would like to concentrate on education and social services. He intends making tough demands for development towns, and looks forward to cooperating with other civic leaders to further local government's case. "I see myself as an emissary of local government in the Knesset," was how he put it.

He hopes to be able to function properly both as mayor and MK, saying his original decision to run for parliament was motivated by a wish to serve Kiryat Gat and the surrounding area. "I consider myself as MK for the entire Lachish region, irrespective of party affiliation or settlement trend," Magen said. "I trust I won't have to choose between the two functions, but if I have to — which I hope I won't — I will leave the Knesset."

THE NEW Likud MK is hopeful that electoral reform will be legislated by the 10th Knesset; he believes that the necessary laws could have been enacted by the 8th Knesset if the procedure had been properly handled, and is convinced that there is sufficient support amoung younger Herut MKs from the smaller towns, plus Liberal and Labour MKs to find the right kind of formula to bring in constituency elections in time for the next elections. What matters for him is the accountability of the elected to the electorate.

Magen would urge the leaders of the main parties to get together and "pursue a vigorous campaign to uproot the dangerous phenomenon" of erecting communal banners. He sees no real reason why the issue should have burst as it did onto the national agenda: "After all, no one was talking about it six months ago." Noting that the Likud and Labour had about an equal number of MKs from the oriental communities, he argued that the actual debate over whether Tami had succeeded in its aim was in itself an indication of its success.

Talking of the Likud's future, Magen spoke fervently of the need to revise the Gahal agreement with the Liberal Party so as to merge the constituent parties into one political organization. If that is not possible, "I will fight with all my power for Herut to run alone in the 11th Knesset elections," he said.

THE POPULIST leader from Kiryat Gat wants to make the Israeli educational structure more rational — "And I expect I will stir up a hornet's nest" — by integrating the school systems of kibbutzim and moshavim, the Agudat Israel Independent school trend, the state religious and the general state schools.

"So many financial and manpower resources are wasted by the school divisions, preventing the proper integration of Israel's children into one nation," he declared.

Magen would begin by integrating children from moshav and kibbutz schools with children from nearby towns. "Every morning one sees a fleet of school buses converging at the crossroads. There is the bus taking youngsters from three kibbutzim, Beit-Nir, Gal-On and Gat 40 kilometres away, to the Kibbutz Artzi regional school at Kfar Menahem. The youngsters from Hashomer Hatzair encounter buses carrying youngsters to the Aguda school centre at Hazon Yehezkel. Soon afterwards, you see the school buses of the Lachish Regional Council — some head for Kiryat Gat, others to the moshav movement school at the Ne'ora rural

centre, some to Ashkelon, and others to the school at the Kfar Silver youth village. Or there are buses conveying youngsters to the yeshiva high school of the NRP's Shapiro Centre, which is on a higher level than the state religious school in Kiryat Gat where we have the three school trends — general state, state religious and ultra-orthodox independent."

Magen intends changing all this. It will be interesting to see how far he gets.

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BACKGROUND OF NEW MKS DISCUSSED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 10 Jul 81 pp 5, 6

[Text]

YA'ACOV GIL, the Alignment's 36th man, will reach the Tenth Knesset as a professional with 28 years of youth counselling and social work behind him.

Gil, 49, is one of a family of 10 children from Jerusalem's Nahlaot quarter; his mother was a third-generation Jerusalemite; his father, a stonemason, walked here from Syria just after the turn of the century.

Married, with three children, the eldest of whom is 16, Gil has just resigned as the head of the Jerusalem Municipality's Youth, Sports and Social Affairs Department.

He is proud of belonging to the first graduating class of the Baerwald School of Social Work at the Hebrew University, where he took his BA.

"I don't see politics as an end in itself," he told *The Post*. "Politics for me is no more than a means of realizing the true aims of social work: namely, closing the social gap, and combating alienation between the income groups and the communities.

"The disadvantaged can be helped to improve their conditions, if we find leader-elements among them who can be motivated and whose creativity can be developed," Gil argued. "The most effective leaders of the Second Israel spring from Second Israel itself."

He has warm words for Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek, who helped put social work in the city on a new and more professional track when he entered city hall. "Teddy did not mind that I joined Mapai in 1965, while he was Rafi, and it did not prevent our working together. He showed us, in the municipal employees' staff committee, that such factional calculations did not concern him."

GIL BECAME increasingly active on behalf of the Labour Party in the Jerusalem District, and in the 1977 elections was assigned the 52nd place on the Alignment list (but only 32 MKs were elected). Subsequently, he was appointed to the party's elite leadership bureau, and his place on the 1981 list, representing the district alongside Uzzi Baram, was virtually clinched. On June 30 he was made head of the Alignment's election day operational headquarters in the city.

I asked him how he — as a Sephardi in the Alignment — fared in his campaign confrontations with Oriental voters in Jerusalem.

"It was rough, you bet. The alienation between the communities and Labour was immense. They talked about Shimon Peres's plan to give up Eretz Yisrael to the PLO. They were trotting out the Likud's bombast and its half-truths. They had been conditioned to distrust

automatically everything Labour said and did," he said.

Gil said he was pleased that he managed in the election campaign to generate doubts among traditional Likud supporters about the Likud programme, even though he had won few people back to Labour.

"In 1981 we got twice as many votes in Jerusalem as in 1977, and it wasn't just the intellectuals who came back home from the DMC. We improved our showing in Bak'a, Katamon and Neve Ya'acov too, thanks to painstaking grassroots work.

"We didn't make any impression on Mahane Yehuda, however, because Labour simply doesn't speak their language. They don't care about the trade gap, or about inflation, since Aridor put all that cash into their pockets. If we want to get into that sector, we have to make use of all the time we have between now and the next election. Above all, we have to work with the teenagers."

He agreed that if Yitzhak Navon returned to Labour politics, after completing his term as President, he could give a valuable push to the party's prospects in the next election. "But the long-term solution is to get back to the grassroots and open the eyes of the young so that they see where Menahem Begin and his Likud are leading our nation," Gil concluded. □

ASHER WALLFISH

A STRONGER dose of Zionism and Jewish tradition would do the Israeli educational system a world of good, says Miriam Glazer, 52, who will soon be sworn in as a first-term Likud member of the Knesset.

"There are schoolchildren here who don't know the words of 'Hatikva,'" the Yemen-born former Irgun Leumi fighter says sadly.

Glazer came to this country in 1934; her grandfather was here from 1880. She has been the principal of the Joanna Jabotinsky Youth Village in Be'er Ya'acov since 1951.

Educating youth, Glazer says, has given her "pure, natural experience" which she wants to put to use in parliament. "I want to contribute, along with my colleagues, towards strengthening people's love of Israel. What we have to give our children is a solid view of our right to the Land of Israel."

This, she says, should include history lessons on "how we got here and why," coupled with greater emphasis on the Jewish aspect of national holidays.

Israel, she contends, would do well to emulate the example of the U.S., where the American flag is hoisted over schools daily and children know the words of the national anthem.

GLAZER is a relative newcomer to politics. Not wanting to disrupt her family life, she turned down a party overture to stand for the Seventh Knesset. But now that her three boys have grown up, she's ready to represent the Herut. She was elected to the 35th place on the Likud list.

Glazer commanded an IZL fighting unit made up of women soldiers at Kfar Vitkin and worked in a Jerusalem hospital during the War of Independence.

She recalls that it was the Hagana which first claimed her loyalty.

"It was almost automatic — whoever went to high school was in the Hagana," she says. But she left that organization after her commander asked her to name friends in the Irgun and to paint slogans saying that Begin's group represented a "knife in the back of the Yishuv."

She joined the IZL and was subsequently expelled from her teacher-training college in Tel Aviv in the aftermath of the blowing up of the Altalena. The college principal, she says, took exception to her Irgun activities. That was in 1948. By 1950, thanks to a sympathetic Education Ministry supervisor, Glazer managed to find a teaching job — although she didn't have a diploma.

TODAY she holds a BA from the Hebrew University and an M.A. in Bible studies from the Jewish Theological Seminary in the U.S.

She cannot forget the difficulties she had teaching illiterate immigrant teenagers from Morocco in the early 1950s at the Jabotinsky Youth Village.

Low-level bureaucrats at the transit camps, she says, assigned the "worst cases" to the school. And it took sweat and ideological conviction to keep the village running, and the kids in class.

"We don't want a woman teaching us," was the prevalent sentiment among her charges -- some of whom came to class with knives strapped to their legs.

Interviewed in her pleasant Holon apartment, Glazer noted with satisfaction that, after her candidacy was announced, many of her former pupils lobbied on her behalf at the Herut convention. □

JEFFREY HELLER

BENNY SHALITA, 45, whose No.44 spot on the Likud list turned out to be absolutely safe, came into politics — and the Liberal Party — via the Local Council of Menahemiya, a small village between Tiberias and Beit Shean.

Known in the region as a dynamic and hard-working character, he has without doubt been the key figure in turning a neglected and run-down settlement into a highly desirable residential area, complete with swimming pool, sports facilities, and cultural activities. "Quality of Life" is the right phrase for Menahemiya today. It retains its rural character — about 80 of its 300 families continue to work in agriculture — but in recent years has attracted engineers, teachers, medical workers, and others in the professions.

A wiry, energetic man who exudes an air of being in charge, Shalita has learned well the techniques of getting things done in contemporary style. A few years ago, his municipal council produced a glossy 24-page full colour brochure, in Hebrew and English, telling the world about Menahemiya. "It's our calling card," he explains, "useful for raising funds and attracting new people." And in the regional telephone directory, the Menahemiya Local Council's telephone listings take up more than half as much space as the entry for the Lower Galilee Regional Council, which includes no less than 17 settlements.

Shalita took on the job of heading the local council 24 years ago, at the ripe age of 21, making him the youngest municipal head in business at the time. "It all happened by accident, and my job was supposed to be temporary," he told *The Jerusalem Post* in his office at the handsome municipality building, surrounded by flowers and with a fountain playing at the entrance.

"I came home from the army, and I simply was ashamed at the condition of the village. So we received authority from the Ministry of Interior to set up a council to improve matters. I wasn't planning to stay on. But as you see, I did."

His is a farming family; his brother now manages his farm; his father was born in the Ukraine and came to Menahemiya from Sejera in 1930; his mother was born in Kfar Tabor; his wife is a Tel Aviv girl, and the couple have three children.

LIFE in peaceful and crime-free moshava Mazkeret Batya has not left new Alignment MK Rafael Suissa, 45, blind to the plight of prisoners in Israel, and he has pledged his Knesset career to improving conditions in jails and to rehabilitating released convicts.

Head of the local council of the veteran moshava for the past 13 years, Suissa has been an active member of the Labour Party for 26 years. He was brought to Israel from Morocco by the Poalei Agudat Yisrael youth immigration movement and was educated at a yeshiva.

"I appreciate being chosen for the Knesset," he says, "But I am still an ordinary person who lives in a rented flat and remembers the suffering of being a new immigrant here."

"Suissa and his family live in a 48 square metre apartment. Two of his children have recently completed their army service and his youngest daughter will go into the army in two months.

Many of Mazkeret Batya's 3,800 residents are new immigrants who have settled down happily. Unfortunately, the small moshava cannot accommodate all those who would like to live there, due to lack of housing.

FOR SUISSA, the Knesset is not a goal but a means to an end. He is already involved in establishing a parliamentary bureau in his region to help residents who have problems with the authorities. Volunteer lawyers will give people free legal advice, and the bureau will try to speed up responses from the appropriate authorities and initiate parliamentary questions.

In addition to prison reform, Suissa will concentrate on problems of education and absorption, and try to help released soldiers and elderly citizens.

He points out that no party has said anything about the rehabilitation of prisoners or about improving appalling prison conditions.

Suissa elaborates: the national crime rates is rising. Ninety-two per cent of the convicts are Sephardim, whose problems can be traced to their social, economic and educational plight as children.

When a judge sentences someone to prison, he should not be condemning him to sub-human conditions in an over-crowded cage; he should not be sentencing the prisoner to sleep on the floor because there are no beds, or to abuse from other prisoners. Nor does the judge rule that the human image God stamped on the prisoner's face should be wiped out during his prison term. But that is the lot of the Israeli convict. And that is what Suissa will fight to change.

"They always say there are no funds; let them cut other budgets down. I am sure that money can be found, and that education and work for convicts can be established. And what later, when the prisoner is released? Society doesn't want to know him, nobody wants to employ him or to rent him an apartment. From this situation, the road back to prison is short."

After serving as a civil servant for 28 years, Suissa believes that he can do his job as a Knesset member in addition to fulfilling his duties as local council head. Of course, he says, he will have to put in more hours of work, but that's okay with him. *MICHAL YUDELMAN* □

SHALITA is proud of the fact that his village, with a population of around 1,800, provides an excellent example of families whose ethnic origins are a very comprehensive mix, living on the best of terms as next-door neighbours. The majority are from North Africa, with others from Eastern and Central Europe and South America; there are also native-born Israelis and immigrants from English-speaking countries.

This successful integration runs counter to much of what was emphasized in the recent election campaign. "There was absolutely no unpleasantness in the campaign here; everything was very quiet," Shalita assures the visitor to the village, which compared to the old days is now decorated with flowers in containers along the streets, parks, and private gardens, and has an excellent system of night illumination — important for a border settlement.

Local election results were 50 per cent for the Likud, 24 per cent for the Aligament, and a healthy 17 per cent for Tami, with all the other parties dividing up the remaining 9 per cent. Shalita is fond of saying that "some of my friends actually voted against the Likud, because they didn't want to lose me to the Knesset." He plans to retain both jobs, spending three days in Jerusalem and four (counting Saturday) in Galilee. Responding to the criticism that both of these are really full-time jobs, he points out the precedents now in the Knesset, "and Dimona is certainly bigger than Menahemiya."

He hopes to be appointed to the Finance or Interior Committee in the Knesset, "the latter because I have very wide experience in municipal problems." He also plans to set up a "Galilee bloc" within the Liberal Party to further the

development of the north. He insists that he is on equally good terms with all the power brokers in his party, and that "the internal elections for the Liberals' Knesset seats were far and away the most democratic of all.

"There are, those who accuse Begin of 'permitting too much democracy,' and the Likud of not functioning with sufficient power. But in fact Begin believes in democracy with his entire soul."

IT IS APPARENT that there exists a strong undercurrent of anger against the Alignment in Galilee settlements outside of the kibbutz framework. In the case of Menahemiya, this may range from resentment at having been neglected during the Deganya birthday celebrations (Menahemiya was actually the first Jewish settlement in the Jordan Valley, founded in 1901 with the help of Baron Rothschild; its first name was Melahamva, after the Arab village, and in 1921 this was changed to honour the father of Sir Herbert Samuel, Menahem), to a feeling of economic deprivation, in the light of financial aid and industrial projects set up for the surrounding kibbutzim.

Shalita on the recent elections: "Do you know why people in places like Savyon, Herzliya Pituah, North Tel Aviv and the best neighbourhoods in Jerusalem voted for the Alignment? That's where the rich contractors live, people with black money, people who built the Bar-Lev Line and didn't pay taxes. They always have it good; but they know that with the Alignment they have it better yet."

To those who do not yet know him, "Benny" extends an invitation to come to him with any problems they may have, "especially the little man, with no contacts," and promises that the door will always be open, both in Jerusalem and in Menahemya. □

Helga Dudman

CSO: 4300/73

BRIEFS

DEAD SEA WORKS PRODUCTION--Sdom--The latest plant addition to the Dead Sea Works, which will increase output of potash by 470,000 tons a year, is now being run-in and should go into full production soon. Another additional complex, now being finished and to be run-in within a few months, will bring the total output of both new plants to 1,300,000 tons a year. Present production of the existing plant is only 1,200,000 tons. Production will total 2.5m. tons a year when the entire complex is operating at full capacity. The project which has just been completed should have taken 26 to 30 months to finish, but a stepped-up drive to build it as fast as possible--and thus earn an additional $4m. a month--led to its completion within 19 months. Israel Chemicals, the parent firm which owns the Dead Sea Works, believes this is a record for finishing such a complicated project in this country. Some $94m. was allocated to the project, and evidently not only have costs remained within this budget, but there is a feeling that when all the contractors' bills are paid, the total cost may be somewhat lower. About 90 percent of the equipment that has gone into the plant was purchased in Israel. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 8 Jul 81 p 9]

SOLAR ELECTRICITY PROJECT--A new system of converting solar energy to electricity is being developed commercially by a team of scientists and engineers under the leadership of Prof. Yirmiyahu Branover, a Soviet immigrant to Israel, Solmecs, a Dutch-based company, is investing $2.5 million to finance the program. Prof. Branover's invention is based on the application of magneto-hydrodynamics (the science dealing with the motion of fluids through magnetic fields) to solar energy conversion. The new system uses a liquid metal, which is heated up by passing through a solar collector. Droplets of a volatile liquid, injected into the metal, heat up, vaporize and expand, driving the metal through a strong magnetic field. The current generated is picked up by electrodes and the vapour is condensed in a tank and can be used to produce hot water. The price of a 100-kilowatt unit is expected to be about $70,000 and the device is reckoned will operate for as long as 30 years without requiring repair, supplying all of the electrical needs of a large apartment block. [Text] [Tel Aviv BUSINESS REVIEW & ECONOMIC NEWS FROM ISRAEL in English No 80, 1981/II p 4]

CSO: 4300/73

'AQABA TOURIST PROJECTS UNDERWAY

London 8 DAYS in English No 27, 11 Jul 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Poul Roberts]

[Text]

JORDAN harbours ambitions of developing its substantial Gulf of Aqaba coastline into a major near-term tourist attraction, utilising parts of the 26km of scenic shoreline donated by Saudi Arabia in the 1970s. Aqaba has attracted international attention of late more as a bustling seaport supplying Iraq's war effort than as a blossoming tourist town.

The Gulf of Aqaba's location on the Red Sea, and its natural beauty, make it an obvious tourist attraction. 'The drama of bare ridges leading the eye to a rugged mountain backdrop, and the contrast between brown rock and intensely blue sea,' as one London consulting firm noted in its 1980 assessment to Jordan's ministry of tourism, encapsulates Aqaba's scenic potential.

The key to the development plan, which will push the project's total cost to nearly $3bn, is a giant resort complex ringing a manmade lagoon along the northern shore — the 'lagoon project'.

Jordanian planners are proceeding with these lavish designs on the strength of a 40 per cent jump in Aqaba's visitors in the last two years. Europeans (mostly Scandinavians, who comprise 30 per cent of all Aqaba's patrons) and regional Arabs lead the build-up.

Aqaba's new popularity parallels a surge in Jordanian tourism that last year injected nearly Jordanian dinars 160m ($480m) into the economy, almost doubling in five years. Travellers to Aqaba are expected to double the 1980 figure of 75,000 again by 1990.

'We are firmly convinced that now is the time to make Aqaba a major tourism facility, particularly for the Arab world,' says Zahdi al Wawi of the ministry of tourism.

However, it appears that this theory hasn't been subscribed to by the ministry's marketing department as yet. A spokesman said his department planned no new advertising campaigns in Asia. Jordanian tourism is promoted only very generally in North America, Europe, the Far East and some Middle Eastern countries. About JD150,000 ($450,000) will be spent on advertising in 1981.

Since Aqaba's first hotel was built in 1961, the gulf's fabulous tropical temperatures and arresting landscape have drawn good crowds. As more hotels and facilities sprang up, tourist numbers peaked at about 45,000 in 1973, and then levelled off through 1978. There are now eight hotels.

European visitors dropped to 8.4 per cent of the total in 1977, after reaching 27 per cent in 1974. Aqaba's primary bait for Europeans has always been winter scuba diving but, largely due to industrial development around the gulf, an estimated one third of the Jordanian coastline's splendid coral reef has been destroyed. Since the decline of the reef, a brilliant green against the deep blue gulf water, many exotic marine specimens have become less common. Word travelled fast around Europe — but in 1978 the Danish tour company Tjaereborg began arranging massive charters to Aqaba.

Now the current fighting in Lebanon and on the Iraq-Iran front has renewed suspicions about the region's stability, according to tourism observers in Jordan, and European numbers are again on the decline at Aqaba. On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in the number of Arab and Jordanian visitors to Aqaba.

Average hotel occupancy has jumped from only 30 per cent in the mid-1970s to 57 per cent in 1980. Furthermore, hotels exhibit an impressive 95 per cent occupancy rate in winter. To lure new customers, Aqaba's establishments have begun offering discounts as high as 50 per cent in summer.

Aqaba's resort area offers one luxury five-star hotel — the Holiday Inn — but there are four other top-quality hotels. Government planners want an increase in beds to about 7,000 by 1990, from the current 1,400.

The aim of the lagoon project is to improve the quality of Aqaba's accommodation and entertainment facilities — after persistent complaints from visitors — while catering to both the requirements of more affluent customers and the 'sun, sea and sand' preferences of mass tourism.

Circling the lagoon will be a bevy of luxury and medium-priced hotels, and attractive chalets. Water-sport amenities, numerous restaurants, nightclubs and grocers will make the vacation complex entirely self-sufficient. In addition, the government appears inclined to respond to market surveys indicating that a casino could pay for the programme in as little as ten years.

Bids for the first stage of construction on the lagoon project will be invited by late summer according to al Wawi. Expenditures have been included in Jordan's 1981-1985 Five Year Plan. The second phase of the Aqaba development programme, the 'south coast' plan, aims to attract those tourists lured by sun, sea and sand.

Designs for a 7km public beach, complete with picnic and camping areas, toilets and snack bars are now being concluded, says al Wawi. Portions of the beach will also be set aside for the development of hotels, bungalows and luxury apartments. Four international hotel chains have already expressed interest. The tract is being planned in detail by Jordan's many planning agencies.

Though al Wawi admits that planning on this scale has never been undertaken by the more than 30 offices participating, he is confident the bureaucracies can pull it off. To encourage private investment, government lending institutions will offer long-term financing of 65 per cent of capital requirements, at interest rates at least one point below commercial rates.

CSO: 4300/77

ARAB MISUSE OF OIL WEAPON DISCUSSED

GF060921 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 5 Aug 81 p 1

[From the "Opinion" column by editor in chief Jasim Ahmad al-Nisf: "Oil Players"]

[Text] Those who believe that Arabs will have an oil weapon for the rest of this century, are wrong. Those who believe that Arab investments abroad, whether in the United States or Europe, can play any role or can be withdrawn whenever these countries pose a threat to investors, are wrong.

We, as Arabs, have destroyed one of the strongest weapons in our hands--oil and its derivatives--because we have glutted the international market with large quantities of oil so that now the United States has an oil reserve to meet its needs for more than 3 years even if production of Arab oil is completely halted. Even the world's poorest country, Bangladesh, has an oil reserve to meet its needs for more than 9 months. This is an enormous reserve. As for European countries, their reserves of Arab oil will meet their needs for 2 to 2 1/2 years, taking into consideration that these countries purchased oil at relatively low prices compared with its current prices, and that the purchasing unit--the U.S. dollar--was cheaper than its current rate.

We do not expect oil to be our weapon in the near future because we have not used it properly, keeping in mind that there are two main oil-exporting countries--Iraq and Iran--whose oil exports have been almost suspended for a year because of the war between them. However, with regard to this basic strategic material, the international market is self-sufficient. Perhaps this is the reason why oil-importing countries are trying to impose conditions on oil purchases and prices set by oil-producing countries. Even Japanese industries have begun to impose conditions. They have rejected the prices of the oil-producing countries and have threatened to stop their dealings with them if their demand on reducing prices is not met. They have not even made the effort to compare prices of industrial products being exported to us--whether these products are U.S., European or Japanese--for the past 10 years so that the very high prices of their products will go unnoticed.

Therefore, we, as Arabs, must make proper use of this gift, which is dear to us and is vital to the future of our Arab nation, in order to lay the foundation for our scientific progress and enable us to use this weapon confidently instead of letting days, indeed years, pass by and finally regretting not having used this gift at the appropriate time.

From this time on, we must reduce our oil exports and thus plan for our coming generations by not exhausting our oil wells.

CSO: 4304/107

INDUSTRIAL BANK GRANTS $25 MILLION IN LOANS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 27 Jul 81 p 2

[Text]

The Industrial Bank of Kuwait has approved loans totalling $25 million to six industrial establishments, it was announced last week and the Industrial Promotion Committee approved applications for grants to expand 23 existing industries.

The loans are all on soft terms, the announcement said without giving details.

The Kuwait Company for the Manufacturing and Trading of Furniture has been granted a $4.9 million credit to expand its plant and introduce a new production line for wooden doors, kitchen utilities and special ceilings.

Kuwait's Industrial Gas Corporation will obtain $3.26 million to finance the expansion of its Shuaiba project, which produces oxygen and nitrogen.

The Khamees Plastic Factory is to benefit from a $470,000 loan to purchase equipment and expand production of plastic packaging materials.

Another $1.08 million have been earmarked for an unspecified factory's expansion programme, while the Kuwait Company for Chemical Manufacturing will receive $10.89 million to construct a new plant. The project is to produce chemicals used by local textile industries.

A loan of $4.71 million has been granted to the Kuwait-Sharjah Company for production of cooling and refrigeration equipment.

According to the reports from Kuwait, the Industrial Promotion Committee approved the creation of 25 new local industries last year, involving investments worth $143.86 million.

The reports also announced a two-year ban on imports of black steel pipe in order to protect local industry.

CSO: 4300/75

RESOLUTION ON ISRAELI AGGRESSION PASSED

NC231938 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 23 Jul 81

[Text] The Chamber of Deputies today unanimously approved the recommendation adopted by the joint subcommittees at their meeting last Monday after making some amendments that were also unanimously approved by the Chamber of Deputies.

The following is the text of the recommendation:

1. In view of the increasing Israeli aggression on Lebanon that is currently threatening the implementation of a new stage in Israel's expansionist plan at the expense of southern Lebanon, the joint Chamber of Deputies subcommittees of foreign affairs, national defense, administration and justice which met on 20 July 1981 decide the following:

Proceeding from the fact that this aggression and the recent grave escalation is an axiomatic result of the previous stages of the tragic crisis emerging from the situation in southern Lebanon and represented in the continued policy of refraining from adopting a stand that can confront the crisis according to a clear and specific visualization of a plan of action that takes into consideration all eventualities; proceeding from the premise that the Arab countries must adopt a responsible stand confronting the Israeli scheme according to the following option--either to embark on a military confrontation or draw up a unified political and economic plan that can foil the enemy's plan in keeping with the provisions of the Arab League Charter and the joint Arab defense treaty; and proceeding from the proven impotence of the UNIFIL forces to perform their tasks and because extension of the UNIFIL mandate to date takes place automatically regardless of how well they perform their tasks and the results they achieve--a matter that has made their presence imposed on them and on the UN General Secretariat and so useless that it practically leads only to an international coverup and perpetuation of the status quo in the south, the Chamber of Deputies at its session on 23 July decides to recommend to the government the following:

1. To call on the members of the Arab League and the Joint Defense Arab Council to put the Arab responsibilities before the Arab and to make an urgent resolution on this opinion by drawing up a military, political and economic plan, including

the oil weapon, to face the challenge. The Chamber of Deputies emphasizes its previous resolutions and recommendations. It asks the Arab countries to chart a joint Arab strategy to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and of the Arab League, including the summit conferences and the concluded agreements.

2. To call on the United Nations to put the responsibilities of the international community members before them and to adopt resolutions and measures that can practically deter Israeli aggression and put an end to its disdain of the spirit and provisions of the United Nations. The Arabs are called upon to adopt a unified stand on this issue toward the United Nations that may lead, if necessary, to taking decisive and firm measures at the political and economic levels toward the international powers supporting Israel and consequently responsible for failure to implement the Security Council resolution on the south, a resolution that provides for removing the occupation and extending legitimacy through the area.

3. The Lebanese Government must adopt a frank and suitable stand in light of the extent of Arab and international response toward its current tragedy.

CSO: 4304/110

PHALANGIST STATEMENT AT CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES DISCUSSED

NC231558 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1240 GMT 23 Jul 81

[Deputy Edmund Rizq's statement on behalf of the Lebanese Phalangist Party at the Chamber of Deputies session on 23 July--recorded]

[Text] We want to adopt a gallant stand on the Arab and humanitarian levels. We support the liberation of the usurped land in Palestine, but we are against endangering Lebanon vainly and uselessly, making it a tender morsel for aggression, because the results of these operations are only further ruination, destitution, desplacement, devastation, exhaustion and killing Lebanon and the Lebanese people.

When Israel poured its bombs out, it hit Lebanese utilities and shed Lebanese blood. Whether the dead in Lebanon are Lebanese or resident guests, the tragedy is Lebanese. Certainly, we cannot persist in this superciliousness, ignorance and (?partial confrontation). We say that Israel is aggressive, but it justifies its aggression and uses pretexts in international forums, saying it is defending its security. As I have said, we support fighting if there are genuine fighters and not advocates of fighting and are hiding. We support war if there are warriors and not only advocates of war. They are only using the word 'war' on the radio as a false slogan, and then throw the burden on those poor steadfast people in the south, who are bleeding daily, and on this homeland, which was a source of pride for the Arabs and Arabism and gem in the Arab East. This homeland is now disintegrating and suffering the pains of death. The slogan now is to watch Lebanon and instead of solidarity they now offer it alms. We are sick of alms and begging at doors. We must stand in unified firm, unpenetrable and closed ranks. No one can accuse us of not being in solidarity with the Palestinian cause. We are the ones who accuse the others that they are abandoning the Palestinian cause and Lebanon and are enjoying seeing the pressure concentrate on Lebanon and becoming the abscess. If we really want to tackle the issue of southern Lebanon, which is at the root of the Lebanese question, we must tackle all the aspects of the question and not only part of it. We must say all the truth and nothing but the truth to all the people and it must be said by all. There is no forum like this Chamber of Deputies for the truth to be said. There are no other people like this audience who represent Lebanon, the Lebanese people, fact and solidarity and not sectarianism, parties, domination or anything alien to our originality.

The recommendation adopted by the joint subcommittees is right, but it is not sufficient to rally around it a Lebanese unanimity because it did not tell the whole truth. The truth is that we are the masters of our decision and its timing and assess any issue according to its suitability to our supreme national (wataniyah) interests and our Pan-Arab [Qawmiyah] interests which do not shirk our national interests. Lebanon is being grievously wronged by its Arab brothers. This fraudulence is represented in the Arabs' overlooking the contraventions, evil practices and excesses that are embroiling Lebanon and not benefitting the Palestinian question. We want to be on good terms with all the Arabs, particularly the Palestinians, the Syrians, the Arab detterent forces and all, but on scientific and objective bases.

Lebanon is fragmented, the Lebanese people are in a state of destitution and the Lebanese institutions are dismembered. All the Lebanese institutions and their competence, safety and patriotism are being discredited and slandered--because we have not yet announced a unified stand on the reality of the situation we have been living through for well over 12 years. This situation has exacerbated since 1975 as a result of disregard and negligence. If we really want to save Lebanon, we must be frank.

Thus, we say frankly, if we want to fight Israel, let us fight it as Arabs from the ocean to the Gulf and according to a unified strategy. If we want to make peace with Israel, let us do that with honor and dignity and not by sneaking through the Camp David agreements or some such agreements. We do not want sneaking around, but direct, honest and courageous confrontation through Arab solidarity.

All accusations now fall before the accusations we are leveling at those who relinquished the substance of the Palestinian cause and Lebanon, leaving it an unprotected morsel for the open Isaeli (?fangs). From now on, no one can accuse us--we are the ones who level accusations. No one can classify us from now on--because we are more entitled to classify. We have drenched our soil with our blood and the blood of our youths from all sects and areas. We reject any division and segration among the Lebanese people. We want the Muslim before the Christian to bear the Cedar Banner, and we want the Christian before the Muslim to defend the Arab right in every Arab land and everywhere. However, we want both the Muslim and the Christian together on the road to reality, confrontation and frankness.

In the face of the Israeli aggression, Lebanon is today weak and being taken unilaterally. The Lebanese people must be unified by reality and see it, so as to tell anyone, whether Syrians, Palestinians or Arabs, from the East or the West, that this is our homeland and (?yours) and this is our land and your guest country. Come all of you and let us reach an understanding on how to coexist and live and really repulse the aggression, and not by giving us the crumbs and leftovers of your oil. Anyway, we thank you for the alms, but we want genuine Pan-Arab solidarity. We do not want anyone to set examples for us, because Lebanon is now giving the example for everyone--how men and people die when they believe in their cause and defend their right.

CSO: 4304/110

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY FLOURISHING

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 13 Jul 81 pp 4-6

[Text]

It would be a bitter irony if the current negotiations to bring peace to Lebanon produced a political settlement, but with it, economic collapse.

Distorted almost beyond recognition by six years of civil strife, the Lebanese economy resembles that of no other economically advanced nation. And yet, it not only functions, it is thriving.

In all logic, the economy should have vanished long ago, for there exist only the vestiges of a state structure. The vast amounts of money which trickle down to citizens mostly come from the large inflows of foreign funds channelled through political and paramilitary organisations; some of these are richer than the government itself.

It is precisely the disappearance of these channels, implied by a political settlement, which could wreak economic havoc, for there are virtually no other structures on which to base national reconstruction. It is almost a truism that Lebanon today is a nation without a state; as the following analysis shows, a major task facing the peacemakers is to avoid creating a state without a nation.

After lengthy negotiations with warring factions on both sides of the divided capital, Parliament was finally able recently to meet to vote on the government's 1981 budget proposals. The legislature brought in only minor amendments to the LL 5.2 billion ($1.22 billion) budget, details of which appeared in this newsletter's January 12 issue, and approved a deficit of LL 1.5 billion ($351 million).

Although it constitutes a full third of the budget, the deficit in itself is not particularly alarming. However, taken in the context of a public debt of LL 2.2 billion ($515 million) and an admission by Finance Minister Ali al-Khalil that the Treasury's health is poor, there is cause for concern. The shortfall is due, not to spectacular deficit financing of public sector projects, but to a mounting public debt and the inability to tap the country's economic resources.

There is a paradox here, for there is no shortage of money in Lebanon. On the contrary, liquidity levels in private banks are very high, while the performance of the national currency, though weakened by the rise in value of the dollar, is generally regarded as reasonable. All forms of commerce are flourishing, from conventional trading to the peddling on street corners of every commodity imaginable.

In many parts of the country, real estate is booming and land prices in Beirut are astronomical, with pavement shacks reportedly commanding key money running into millions of pounds. Construction is visible everywhere, much of it in the traditionally poorest areas such as the south. There is no shortage of any type of consumer goods, from basic necessities to ostentatious luxury items, and although the cost of living is prohibitively high for low- and middle-income earners, hunger does not exist, despite the destitution of thousands as a result of the fighting.

A further sign of some form of economic dynamism is provided by balance of payments figures. Last year, Lebanon had an estimated balance of payments surplus of LL 3 billion ($810 million, at year-end exchange rates). Such a favourable position was also enjoyed before the 1975-76 war.

However, the raw figure conceals the all important fact that the state no longer benefits from the side-effects of such favourable trade surpluses. Most trade is entirely in private hands; but while in the past the state reaped some of its benefits through customs duties, that is no longer true. Revenue from duties is continually falling at a time when it is virtually the only form of income

left to the state, given the impossibility of collecting direct tax.

According to figures recently released by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI), customs receipts fell by 32 per cent, from LL 360 million in the first half of last year to a miserable LL 212 million ($48.75 million at current exchange rates) in the comparable period of this year.

Such a drop is significant in itself, but it takes no account of inflation, nor of increased trading. The BCCI has projected, on the basis of trading patterns, that the government ought to have collected LL 500 million ($115 million) in the first half of this year, while other estimates have put lost customs revenue at closer to LL 2 billion ($540 million).

Customs receipts have been dwindling visibly since the 1975-76 war, but they have never hit the record lows registered today. From 1968 to 1974, receipts were usually at around 11 per cent of the value of imports. This dropped to 9 per cent in 1979, to only 6.8 per cent last year and will probably be markedly lower this year. Whereas customs recipts represented 49 per cent of total state revenue and 80 per cent of indirect taxes and duties previously, they provided only 27 per cent of total revenue and 95 per cent of indirect duties last year, and are projected to fall to 14 per cent of total public income this year.

New forms of smuggling have appeared

As the BCCI report points out, this drastic fall has been accompanied by peak performance levels at the country's many illegal ports in the period spanning the end of last year and the first few months of 1981. Known for what is often described as their resourcefulness, the Lebanese have developed new and more sophisticated forms of customs duty evasion, such as underbilling.

Ships docking in at legal entry points draw up manifestos quite at variance with the actual volume and value of goods abroad: minimal duty is thus paid on what is declared while the largest part of the merchandise goes untaxed by the state – though not entirely tax-free, since militias on both sides of the Beirut port, for example, collect their own special due.

The loss is becoming serious as the government is increasingly under pressure to meet higher and higher current expenditure, carry out its ambitious and socially desirable reconstruction and development programme and continue subsidising some essential commodities such as wheat and fuel. That pressure on the one hand, and the state's increasing inability to meet these demands is eroding the economy in a way that is not immediately obvious when one walks down the busy commercial streets of most Lebanese towns.

Unable to pay a $ 45 million fuel bill due in April, the government was recently threatened and then faced with a crude oil cut-off from its supplier, Trans-Arabian Pipelines (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, June 1). After a month-long interruption, when the country's oil reserves were adequate to cover local refining and consumption needs, Tapline resumed pumping this month subject to the government settling its now $90 million bill within a fortnight. It is probable that Saudi Arabia will step in and settle the amount outstanding to the Saudi-based Tapline, as it did in 1977, when Lebanon had an unpaid fuel bill going back to 1973.

This threat to Lebanon's energy supplies has also reinforced its dependence on Syria. The Ministry of Petroleum and Industry has signed an agreement with Syria's Banias refinery authorities for the supply of 10,000 tonnes of refined petrol with an option for a further 20,000 tonnes.

The Ministry, which also subsidises butane gas production by one-third, has been forced to make another agreement with Syria on the supply of anything between 30 and 100 tonnes of gas a day, owing to a dispute with local gas distribution companies. Panic at the news of an impending shortage has sent butane gas prices in the last six weeks by 50 to 80 per cent above normal levels.

Apart from the *ad hoc* nature of all these measures, the exact terms of the agreements for renewed or increased supplies have not been publicised and there is thus no way of ascertaining their long-term implications. The situation could also worsen as extra supplies from Syria would not meet the shortfall from an eventual cut-off by Tapline. Current reserves of gas oil, diesel and fuel oil are estimated to be sufficient for local consumption until the last week of August, while refined petrol exists in quantities to last until the third week of this month.

The government has also announced an increase in public and private sector wages and salaries. There was nothing unusual in that, since every year the trades union confederation negotiates new wage settlements in the spring. However, the vicious circle of inflation from higher costs of living and consequently increased salaries and wages goes unbroken. The cost of living indices established by the government and by the confederation were predictably very far apart, and the maximum increases of 15 per cent conceded by the government were well below the confederation's demands; in addition to the LL 1 billion ($230 million) in fuel and wheat subsidies, the burden on the state has become almost intolerable.

The picture is even gloomier when one considers that the five-year $2 billion aid package promised by the oil-rich Arab countries for reconstruction and development projects is way behind schedule. Only $200 million has been received so far when it should have been $600 million by the end of June.

Furthermore, industrialists whose enterprises account for a significant economic return, both in terms of job opportunities and revenue generated, are threatening unspecified reprisals if the state continues to turn a deaf ear to their calls for help. They are seeking a rescheduling of some LL 600 million ($138 million) of debt and need an executive order to obtain satisfaction. Moreover, they have appealed for various state-backed facilities and incentives so that what industry exists can go on. Their losses are reflected in social hardships for workers, who in turn are unwilling to make further sacrifies for the survival of the industrial sector.

The problem is apparently intractable, as industrialists and government alike both depend on the state of security for their growth – unlike all the beneficiaries of trade, whether legal or illicit, who continue to flourish in the most atrocious security conditions. As all else, these are intimately linked to the political conflict in the country, and though some form of normalisation has been set in motion in the last two weeks, a real cure to the country's economic ills will not be forthcoming short of a total political solution – hardly a likelihood at present.

The head of the BCCI, Adnan Kassar, has warned that the economy is on the brink of collapse. In a totally laissez-faire economy, the state's capabilities before the outbreak of the war in 1975 were already minimal; and though there has been some change in economic philosophy towards more control of socially essential aspects of the economy, these capabilities are now almost totally eroded, at a time when they have become more necessary than ever before.

CSO: 4300/77

BRIEFS

DEFENSE TREATY WITH SYRIA--Beirut--In'am Ra'd, leader of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, has affirmed that the struggle against the Zionist enemy is a Pan-Arab struggle dictating cohesion and the drafting of frameworks and forms necessary for forming a unified Pan-Arab front. In a statement today, Ra'd called for concluding a joint security and defense treaty with Syria. He asserted that at this time of struggle against the Zionist entity, we must adopt the Pan-Arab security equation, namely the Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese national alliance. Ra'd explained that the political aim behind the escalation of the Zionist military acts is to dismember the Pan-Arab front of steadfastness and to dissociate the Lebanese masses from the Pan-Arab issue by inflicting on them grave losses. [Text] [JN202136 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 2115 GMT 20 Jul 81]

CSO: 4304/110

FIVE-YEAR PLAN DISCUSSED, DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL FORMED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 218, 6-12 Jul 81 p 41

[Article: "The Second Five-Year Plan--Ambitions and Objectives"]

[Text] During the second half of 1981, work began officially on implementing the second phase of the comprehensive economic plan with the implementation of the second five-year plan (1981-1985) which is not much different from the first five-year plan (1976-1980) inasmuch as the objectives of both plans were delineated within a comprehensive development framework which was defined by the 1975 development law and which covered both plans.

Ambitions

The second development plan earmarked about 2.152 million Omani riyals (double the costs of the first plan) for expenditure on development projects while general expenses for the 5 years were estimated at 7.364 million riyals with incoming not exceeding 6.947 million. Important policies involved in the second plan are:

Proceeding with an expanded program of providing services and extending the network of facilities to various areas of the country, giving particular importance to the areas with particular geographic characteristics, such as the Musandam area, the southern area, the interior of Oman and the remote areas.

Giving particular priority to the irrigation, agricultural and fishing sectors, for which 157 million Omani riyals were allocated, including 22 million for repairing and maintaining wells and canals, 43.5 million for promoting the agricultural and fishing sector and 19 million for establishing an agricultural and fishing loan bank.

Appropriating 135 million riyals to support the private sector.

Authorizing 344 million for the communications sector, roads, ports and radio and landline communications.

Forty million Omani riyals for building 4,278 homes for persons of low income.

Providing all areas of the Sultanate with electricity and water services.

Objectives of the Plan

There is another aspect to the economic plan in the Sultanate, that is, the full interest in having it be comprehensive and integrated. Therefore, a development council has been set up, headed by the sultan himself, to be the central machinery for planning with the following fundamental foci.

Increasing investments in production projects in the industrial, mining, agricultural and fishing sectors.

Developing new sources of national income to stand along side it and to replace it in the future.

Making a geographical distribution of investments to cover all areas of the Sultanate.

Taking an interest in all sources of water as a vital compnent necessary for continued development of economic activity.

Promoting local commercial activity, increasing competitive activity and ensuring a reasonable level of prices.

Rounding out the essential elements of a free national economy centered on the activity of the private sector based on free competition with no monopolies.

Raising the skill level of the state's administrative machinery.

Years of Challenge

The first phase of the life of economic development in the Sultanate (1970-1975) was characterized by an emphasis on providing a foundation for infrastructure projects necessary for economic and social development in particular, and for modernization and development in general, in order to bring about rapid economic and social development which would make up for the earlier years of isolation.

In studying conditions in the Sultanate before Sultan Qabus assumed the tasks of governing, it emerges that national income was 81 million riyals while government expenses were 21 million, investments in the private sector were 1.1 million and the country had no more than 10 kilometers of paved roads, 12 beds in hospitals and lacked modern ports and airports. After 5 years had passed since the start of the first development plan, national income had risen to 590 million, an increase of 445 percent, the government's share of investments had risen 82 percent and those of the private sector 50 percent, 176 schools had been built, there was a total of 708 kilometers of paved roads and hospital beds had risen to 1,000.

Statistics changed with implementation of the first 5-year plan: national income rose in 1979 to 1.032 million riyals, investments to 318 million and net exports of commodities and services to 262.1 million.

There was a surplus of 124.2 million riyals in the balance of payments in 1979 compared with a 12.8 deficit in 1975. Net loans and subsidies sank in 1979 to about 58 million compared with 124 million in 1975.

The 5-year plan accomplished 85 percent of its objectives. The question remains: Will the new plan have this degree of success?

Omani officials are optimistic. Will this optimism be justified?

8389
CSO: 4304/74

PROGRESS CITED IN CEMENT INDUSTRY

Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 23 Jul 81 p 17

[Text]

The final seal was put on the building of a RO50 million cement factory at Rusail with the signing on Saturday morning of a Letter of Credit between the Oman Cement Company and the Arab Bank Limited.

Work on the project has already started on the site and is expected to be completed before the end of 1983, when it will produce some 624,000 tons of cement a year. A smaller plant is also under construction in Salalah, and the two will effectively combine to provide ready cement for building projects throughout the Sultanate.

The Letter of Credit was signed by the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Oman Cement Company and under-secretary of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Ali Dawood, and the Executive Manager of the Arab Bank Limited, Mr Abdulkader Askalan. The Arab Bank Limited heads a consortium of banks all based or operating in Oman.

From the end of this year, some 20,000 tons of plant equipment will be shipped mainly from Europe to Oman, and will be transported from Mina Qaboos to Rusail for assembly by specialists. The main contractors are The West German firm Krupp Polysius, one of the world's major suppliers for cement-making factories and with a 200-year history of building successful plants throughout the world.

The project is under the care of Basse Sambre-ERI of Brussels, specialist cement project consultants, who are at the moment busy vetting all the designs from suppliers. The company's consultants will supervise the work of the various contractors on site in association with the Oman Cement Company's technical department.

The completed plant site will be served by a 10km road running from the main Seeb/Nizwa road, designed by Turner Wright and Partners and constructed by Wimpey Alawi LLC.

A housing complex, designed by Huckle and Partners and complete with pool, clubhouse, clinic and shops, is also being built to cater for the 300 staff who will eventually run the factory.

The entire project will result in the production of high standards of cement which will serve the building requirements of the Capital Area, northern Oman and the interior.

Key members of staff from Krupp Polysius are to help run the plant for the first three years, after which the Oman Cement Company will take over completely on its own.

A contract signed between the Oman Cement Company, which is wholly owned by the Government of the Sultanate of Oman, and Krupp Polysius in February this year also made provision for the training of Omani staff who will keep the plant running 24-hours a day on a three-shift basis.

A considerable degree of planning has gone into the design of the works to ensure that the plant will be the most successful in the Middle East. The layout and provision of the major machinery units have been designed so that an extension to double the plant's

capacity could be easily and economically arranged. Automated controls and careful design of each section should provide Oman with home-produced cement of a very high quality.

The cement which is to be produced is known as Ordinary Portland Cement and Sulphate Resisting Cement - dry cement. The company has chosen to produce cement by the dry process to save energy, for wet cement would mean an additional outlay for water and heating.

The raw materials needed for production are available near the site, and include limestone, sillica and a small quantity of iron-ore from Ibra. Apart from a minimal amount of bauxite being imported from Australia, the production of cement at the factory begins and ends in Oman, with the finished product being sent to existing cement merchants for delivery to customers. **CM - S**

CSO: 4300/79

BRIEFS

U.S. ACTIONS CONDEMNED--SAWT AL-THAWRAH, the organ of the PFLO, has called on the Arabs to boycott the United States economically and diplomatically until it realizes the gravity of the game it and its godchild, Israel, are playing. In its editorial this morning the paper said that the encouragement, support and backing given to Israel by Washington is known to all. The United States stresses and ("flaunts") its support for the Zionist enemy. This support makes Israel commit crimes against the Arabs. That support had emboldened the enemy to bomb the Iraqi nuclear plant and launch a large-scale attack against Lebanon in addition to threatening Syria with aggression. All this would not have happened if it had not been for the American support of the state of the Zionist gangsters. [Excerpt] [EA092042 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 9 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/107

$3.5 MILLION PER DAY LOST DUE TO OIL PRODUCTION CUT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 30, 27 Jul 81 pp 10, 11

[Text]

The state of Qatar is losing $3.5 million a day following a 16.5 per cent cut in oil production which went into effect on June 1. Authoritative sources in Doha are quoted as saying that daily output of oil had dropped by 80.000 b/d to 400.000 b/d, after the decision taken at the May meeting of OPEC oil ministers in Geneva to reduce production by 10 per cent.

Daily revenue from oil sales were estimated at $18 million before the production cut in Qatar. And present levels will be maintained, the sources said, until the world oil glut estimated at around 2 million b/d is resorbed.

Qatar has been finding it increasingly difficult to sell its oil in recent months, and had already been forced to cancel a premium of $6.50 it tried to charge from its Japanese customers in the spring (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, April 13).

The sources in Doha said Qatar had renewed existing contracts with international companies, but they declined to give the terms of these agreements, the OPEC news agency reported. "We have resolutely resisted cutting the price," was the only comment cited in the report. The sources indicated that Qatar would not necessarily increase production once the glut eases, probably some time next winter.

CSO: 4300/75

PAPER LINKS USSR-SYRIAN MANEUVERS TO U.S. POLICY

PM101555 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 8 Jul 81 p 9

[Editorial: "The Joint Maneuvers"]

[Text] What exists between Syria and the Soviet Union is a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in October 1980; what is now taking place between Syria and the Soviet Union is joint military maneuvers close to the Syrian coast in the vicinity of Latakia and Banyas.

These are the first joint maneuvers ever staged by the Syrian and Soviet armed forces and the first Soviet military maneuvers ever staged on any Arab territory.

The opponents of this military cooperation are very disturbed, and the alarm is being sounded, warning of a Soviet military presence in the Arab East close to the oil sources and refineries.

Those who are in favor of this military cooperation say that the aim is to show the United States and Israel that their attempt to harm Syria is not easy, for if Begin continues to hold to his professed aim of attacking the Syrian missiles on Lebanese territory and of opening a new front in the Golan area, Hafiz al-Asad would like to make him and others understand that he is prepared to go all the way in challenging him and Washington.

That view requires some corrobaration, but this can be provided by simple dedication.

At all events these Syrian-Soviet maneuvers constitute a precedent and contain many lessons for those who look forward to the American plans related to the rapid deployment forces earmarked for the Middle East region, contrary to the political wishes of the Arab states directly concerned.

The fact is that Israel and the United States are behaving as if they are one state. Since this is the case, especially as Damascus understands it, Syria is venturing to do everything to safeguard its interests, entity, position and national aims.

To both opponents and those in favor: Good wishes.

CSO: 4304/110

SYRIAN-SOVIET ALLIANCE VIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 29, 25 Jul 81 pp 20-21

[Article by Dilip Hiro]

[Text]

THE JOINT Syrian-Soviet naval exercises, two weeks ago, involving Soviet landing craft and warships deployed along the beaches between Baniyas and Tartus, marked a new stage in the growing polarisation in the Middle East.

It was the first military manoeuvre of its kind. Although far less ambitious than last November's Egyptian-American naval exercises in the Mediterranean, codenamed 'Bright Star' which involved more than 100 warplanes, it was meant to warn Israel against attacking Syrian territory or Syrian missiles in Lebanon.

By refusing to confirm the event, Syrian officials got the best of both worlds. While Syria's adversaries were warned that the USSR was ready to help it with ground troops if Syria wre attacked by Israel, its well-wishers in the region were denied firm news and thus denied a chance to criticise Damascus for getting too close to Moscow.

What brought about the joint Soviet-Syrian manoeuvres were the belligerent actions and words, in late April, of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin directed against the Syrian deployment of missiles in Lebanon to protect its peacekeeping force there. To meet the threat, Syrian President Hafez Assad, and his defence minister, Mustapha Tlas, reportedly paid a secret visit to Moscow in May.

Within weeks, Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean increased, with some of the ships carrying troops. In order to let America and Israel know the extent to which it was committed to aiding Damascus militarily, the Kremlin ordered its soldiers to board ships at the Black Sea port of Odessa in broad daylight.

This was reminiscent of the time, in early 1970, when the Kremlin conceded Egyptian President Nasser's request for appropriate defensive weapons against Israel's deep penetration bombing of Egypt. On Moscow's insistence, advance Soviet surface-to-air missiles were driven through Egyptian cities in daylight, so as to caution both the Americans and the Israelis. Later, Soviet pilots intercepting Israeli fighter-bombers violating Egyptian airspace, freely conversed in Russian on their intercoms. These tactics, coupled with the shooting down of some Israeli jets, halted the Israeli deep penetration bombing of Egypt in mid-April 1970.

Deployment of ground troops in a foreign country is a complex operation, and requires much advance planning. Moscow has reportedly stockpiled weapons at Syrian ports and airfields. These stocks include 1,000 tanks: enough to arm 75,000 combat troops. (Syria's 200,000-strong army possesses 2,700 Soviet-made tanks.) Since Syria's weapons are almost exclusively Soviet-made, the two forces would have little difficulty in coordinating their operations on the battlefield.

Military cooperation between the two states increased after Assad and President Leonid Brezhnev signed a 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in Moscow last October. The treaty stipulates mutual

consultations 'in the event of a situation jeopardising the peace and security of either party.'

But even when there was no formal treaty between Syria and the USSR, Moscow offered its troops to aid the Syrians in their fight against Israel. This happened during the 1973 war. On 27 October, two days after the ceasefire, Defence Minister Tlas told a correspondent of the Kuwait-based *Al Rai al Aam* that the Kremlin had been prepared to send 55,000 Soviet soldiers to fight alongside the Syrians during the war.

In fact Moscow had put on alert a force of 165,000, composed of 55,000 combat troops and 110,000 support troops. It was determined to frustrate the Israeli forces' plan to march on to Damascus after they had captured Quneitra, and it succeeded in this by bringing about a ceasefire. Earlier, within three days of the outbreak of war, the USSR had started airlifting arms to Syria as well as Egypt. And, before that, it had been swift in replenishing Syria's considerable military losses in the June 1967 war.

Following the conclusion of a friendship treaty with Moscow, President Assad has been behaving with growing confidence: this has been apparent in the way he handled King Hussein's sheltering of Syria's Muslim Brotherhood activists in Jordan last November, the Lebanese Phalangists in Zahle, and Begin in the Syrian missile crisis. By staging joint naval manoeuvres with the USSR he was telling Israel attack, and that Moscow would help his country.

CSO: 4300/78

TIGHT CONTROLS ON ECONOMY SEEN

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 5, 20 Jul 81 pp 6-7

[Article by Elias Baroudi]

[Text]

Recent news and indicators about the Syrian economy paint a somewhat mixed picture, but highlight a clear trend towards more belt-tightening, and increasing government control of the economy.

In a statement made during a cabinet meeting on June 8, Syrian Prime Minister Abdel Rauf al-Kasm revealed that Gross Domestic Product grew by 9 per cent in real terms in 1980, or by around twice the rate of growth achieved in 1979. Mr Kasm also indicated that the highest rates of growth were achieved in the agricultural and industrial sectors – 26 per cent and 17 per cent respectively. The growth in per capita income in 1980 was put at 17.8 per cent though it is not clear whether this is in real or current terms.

Early in July, the Syrian Prime Minister reaffirmed his satisfaction with the performance of the economy, and indicated that, as a result of the creation of a two-tier exchange rate system, the Syrian Pound was appreciating rapidly against the dollar and Syria's foreign exchange reserves were rising. Syria's currency exchange regulations were eased on April 22, through the introduction of a parallel exchange rate determined by supply and demand, and thus comparable to the black market rate (*An Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 18).

The parallel rate was to apply to all private sector exports, remittances from Syrians working abroad, and public sector exports with the exception of oil, cotton, and phosphates; the Syrian Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade indicated that the main objective behind the new two-tier system was to encourage private and public sector exports as well as tourism and the inflow of remittances.

The new system has undoubtedly had its desired effect, with the Syrian Pound rising gradually against the dollar, other major currencies and the Lebanese Pound during May and June. By the end of June, the parallel rate against the US Dollar was $1 = SL 5.00 against around $1 = SL 6.30 in April, a rise of around 25 per cent. One factor which is reported to have contributed to the improving position of the Syrian Pound was an inflow of Arab aid to Syria to the tune of $1 billion in recent months, but it is difficult at this stage to gauge the accuracy of this figure or to determine the extent of its effect.

In any case, and in a further move to limit black market dealings, the Syrian government announced on June 29 that currency allowances for Syrian nationals travelling abroad would be doubled so that they would not have to resort to the black market to obtain foreign exchange. Thus the currency allowance for Syrians travelling to Arab states was increased to SL 2,500 and that for travellers to non-Arab states to SL 5,000. While this move is not in itself very significant in the over-all scheme of things, it is nevertheless indicative of an increasing confidence in the Syrian Pound and the position of Syria's foreign currency reserves.

On an equally optimistic note, Syrian Minister of Finance Dr Hamdi Al-Saka announced earlier this month that total state revenues in the first five months of 1981 were up by 81 per cent over the same period in 1980. The Minister also indicated that current expenditures in that period were up by 15 per cent compared to the similar period of 1980, and that capital expenditures increased by 41 per cent or by more than three times the increase in current expenditures.

Against this backdrop of encouraging statements and signs of healthy growth of the economy and the improvement of the exchange value of the Syrian Pound, the government has nevertheless called for a cutback in household consumption and for the "streamlining" of consumption habits by a move away from "unnecessary luxury goods." Such calls were supplemented early last June by a strict ban on imports of a number of luxury goods, and by reported restrictions on the number of import licenses granted to the private sector since April 22. Under the terms of the April 22 decree, all private sector imports are subject to an official license and only the Commercial Bank of Syria is allowed to arrange letters of credit. The restrictions placed on the import of luxury goods have been justified both by the need to protect national industries and by the argument that such imports have in the past drained a large proportion of the foreign exchange reserves which could have otherwise been put to more productive uses. Indeed, it is argued that the cutback in luxury goods imports has already helped to improve the exchange value of the Syrian Pound.

In addition, and as if to mirror the austerity measures imposed on the private sector, the Syrian Prime Minister issued a directive on July 4 to all ministries, government agencies and other public bodies requesting that they make all necessary efforts to save 10 per cent of budgeted expenditure allocations for the fiscal year 1981.

In conclusion, it may be argued that if the various positive indicators quoted above reflect an accurate picture of the overall performance and situation of the Syrian economy, and in the light of the various policy measures which have been instituted in recent months, then the next period may be characterised by a trend towards the building up on advances made in the economy during 1980 and the first half of 1981, at a time when state planning authorities are still working on the delayed 1981-85 five-year plan, which would tie in with a 10-year plan for the period up to 1990, also under preparation.

The basic factor to watch for in current efforts to consolidate and "rationalise" economic activity, is the extent of the squeeze on the private sector, a trend which may have adverse economic consequences if carried to an extreme.

In the final analysis, however, the Syrian economy's prospects over the short and medium term depend to a large extent on how the political situation in the Middle East develops, on the size and regularity of the future inflow of Arab aid, and on whether the inflow of remittances from Syrians working abroad will attain the hoped for figure of $1 billion a year as a result of the introduction of the two-tier exchange rate system.

UAE

COMPETITION NARROWS FOOD RETAILERS' PROFIT

Competition has brought down retailers' profit margins on food in Dubai with a thump, according to a survey by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry which was published last week. The survey showed that margins on some foodstuffs had been slashed to as low as 5.5 per cent, a far cry from the mark-ups of as much as 300 per cent which the Emirate's Ministry of Economy and Commerce found being charged by profiteering shopkeepers early last year.

The ministry had found mark-ups of 166 per cent on coffee in its study of prices last year; the latest survey shows a margin on coffee of 8.6 per cent. Milk powder had been marked up by 82 per cent last year; the figure given by the Chamber of Commerce for this commodity was 6.25 per cent. The survey, covering the first quarter of 1981, showed that none of the major items of food carried profit margins of more than 28 per cent. "Retailers are making only marginal profits on a wide variety of popular items like milk and milk products, tea and coffee, frozen chicken, butter and sugar," the general manager of one Dubai supermarket chain told *WAM*, the official UAE news agency. "Even on other items, the retail business no longer fetches more than 20 per cent profits."

Lal Ganwani, who heads another supermarket chain, cited changing buying habits in Dubai for lower prices. "More and more people who used to shop from the *souk* (market) are now buying from supermarkets," he told *WAM*. "To retain this clientèle, stores are having

CSO: 4300/78

MEASURES TAKEN TO CONTROL CASH

London 8 DAYS in English No 27, 11 Jul 81 p 37

[Text]

SYRIANS are now limited as to the amount of money they can take out of their country. In this latest in a series of draconian financial measures instituted by the government, individuals travelling to other Arab countries are allowed to take only $500 (Syrian £2,500) with them. Those travelling to non-Arab countries are restricted to $1,000 (S£5,000).

The moves, intended to control imports and financial transactions, began three months ago. On 22 April, Minister of Commerce and Trade Dr Mohammed Atrash introduced a system of two parallel exchange rates for the currency. This was designed to encourage tourism and suppress the black market, and was followed by restrictions on letters of credit, confining them to the state-run Syrian commercial banks. Credit arranged through non-Syrian banks was no longer recognised by the government. As of the beginning of May, importers were to obtain Syrian government authorisation.

More recently, the government officially announced a total ban on certain commodities such as cigarettes, air-conditioners, perfumes, cosmetics, marble, paints, flowering plants, pistachio nuts, peanuts, almonds and melon seeds.

But what has come as a surprise to bankers in Beirut, and to Syrian officials in the banking sector, is that the new tourist rate — or as the government prefers to call it, the 'balance' rate — for the Syrian pound has made sharp gains against the dollar and other foreign currencies during the past two weeks. The new rate has also been rising on Beirut exchanges.

Official Syrian sources attribute this improvement to the government's restrictive measures — adopted mainly to protect the currency — as well as to the increased dollar inflow from several Arab states. One Syrian diplomat said: 'Every time there is an Arab foreign minister's meeting, Syria is allocated a new parcel of dollars,' but it is not possible to quantify this parcel.

The Commercial Bank of Syria, which fixes the tourist rate daily, announced that the dollar had fallen to around S£5.20, and during the past few weeks it reached S£4.85. On the open Beirut exchanges, the Syrian pound rose against the freely convertible Lebanese currency from 70.25 piastres to 84.50. This sudden rise in the Syrian pound against the dollar caused a certain amount of panic on the black market, which began to sell the dollar and other foreign currencies at prices even lower than the balance rate. The official rate, used for all official transactions and for valuing imports, remains at S£3.95.

Lebanese banking circles were extremely put out by the Syrian's government's new measures, especially the one stipulating that all private sector importers — with the exception of those fulfilling government contracts — must place funds in escrow or open letters of credit with Syrian banks, as this represents a threat to Lebanese banking interests.

For the first time in decades, Syria's currency will be able to respond to market forces, albeit partially, reflecting a new, more realistic, trend. Earlier in the year, the

government increased interest rates. Even though this increase did not approach western ones, it showed a new governmental concern about the rigid banking and financial structure.

At the same time, special measures were introduced to ensure that the agricultural sector did not suffer from these high interest rates.

The currency reforms are an indication that the Syrian government is resorting to financial, rather than social, changes in its attempt to improve the economy. But it remains to be seen how effective these reforms will prove, considering Syria's difficulties with foreign exchange reserves and meeting import payments.

The new two-tier exchange rate is intended to attract remittances from Syrian expatriates, ensuring that the sums sent into the country go through the official banking system and not through the black market via Beirut. Under the new system, all expatriate remittances, all earnings from tourism and private sector invisibles, can be converted into Syrian pounds at the freely floating balance rate.

CSO: 4300/78

BRIEFS

SYRIA, USSR ECONOMIC COOPERATION--Moscow--A protocol for economic, scientific and technical cooperation has been signed between Syria and the Soviet Union. The protocol was signed for Syria by Dr Salim Yasin, minister of state for planning affairs, and for the Soviet Union by (Misko Tchikov), chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. (Tchikov) expressed confidence that this agreement will strengthen relations of friendship and cooperation and the fateful struggle against imperialism and Zionism. He said that the directives of His Excellency President Hafiz al-Asad and President Leonid Brezhnev will help us achieve more success. Dr Salim Yasin stressed that this agreement will contribute to the consolidation of friendship between the two countries. He stated that Syria, under President Hafiz al-Asad's leadership, has overcome all obstacles and will continue its confrontation of the fierce colonialist aggression which has our steadfastness and struggle as its target, seeking to remove us from the world of progress and liberation. The SANA correspondent in Moscow reports that the agreement covers many economic, technical and scientific fields between Syria and the Soviet Union and that it comes within the framework of the meetings of the joint Syrian-Soviet committee which ended this morning. [Text] [JN211611 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1515 GMT 21 Jul 81]

FIGHTING IN ALEPPO--Scores of people were killed or injured in Syria when a number of buildings were demolished on top of them as a result of clashes between Syrian special forces and Muslim Brotherhood members in the Aleppo area. The Voice of Lebanon has received the following information: Last Monday at dawn, Syrian special forces encircled the Bab al-Hadid locality, using tanks and heavy machineguns, in the search for weapons and Muslim Brotherhood members. A clash ensued in which a Syrian officer was killed and a large number of soldiers and civilians injured. In a locality known as the Central Bus Station, Syrian intelligence arrested three persons; they were immediately executed by firing squads. In the al-Yannu suburb, the special forces, aided by intelligence elements, encircled a number of buildings on the pretext of looking for Muslim Brotherhood members. They demolished a number of houses on top of their occupants with tank fire. Nine Muslim Brotherhood members were killed and other residents were injured in the attack. Yesterday, Wednesday, Syrian intelligence arrested the prayer leader Shaykh of the al-Rahman Mosque on charges of assisting and guiding the Muslim Brotherhood. It has been noted that Syrian security organs are tightening security measures in the Palestinian camps and preventing the inhabitants from traveling unless they have a license from the Interior Ministry. [Text] [NC231346 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 23 Jul 81]

CSO: 4304/110

BRIEFS

SECURITY MEASURES--I would like to announce to the Tunisian people some of the measures which I have decided to implement, most important of which is the decision concerning the basic organization of security personnel, a matter which has concerned workers in this sector for several years. I wish to tell those responsible for security that the basic reorganization privileges that I have approved. The measures will come into effect on 1 January 1982. We have decided on that date so that we do not place too heavy a burden on the 1981 budget, which has just been approved by the National Assembly. The second measure concerns Mr Habib Achour, whom I have decided to transfer temporarily to Qurous, where the mineral waters will be good for his health. After a while we will consider transferring him again, if he so wishes. [Excerpt] [Speech by President Habib Bourguiba, on measures to mark his 78th birthday; delivered at al-Munastir Conference Hall, 3 August] [LD051352 Tunis TAP in Arabic 1000 GMT 4 Aug 81]

CSO: 4504/55

FAILING SOVIET SALES DRIVE REVIVED

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 p 3

[Article by K.P. Nayar]

[Text]

THE Soviet Union's first major effort to penetrate the UAE market has collapsed, but efforts are under way to revive the commercial venture which brought about a three-fold increase in Russian exports to Dubai in just one year.

Avtoexport, the Moscow-based company which began exporting Lada cars to the UAE exactly two years ago, has located new agents who are at present taking possession of the unsold stock of 160 cars and a large pile of spare parts and other equipment.

The collapse of the first venture comes in the wake of futile efforts by the Moscow Chamber of Commerce early this year to participate in a trade exhibition in the UAE for the first time.

One hundred and ninety Russian cars were sold in the UAE during the two-year-period when Dubai's Mohamed Omer bin Haider Establishment acted as agents for the Soviet automobile manufacturers.

The sales boosted Russian imports into the UAE by more than Dh. 4 million taking the annual total to a little over Dh. 15 million last year against Dh. 5.3 million in 1978, a year before the introduction of Soviet automobiles into the local market.

A spokesman for Lada said the two-year-old agency was terminated at the request of the local parties. No reason was given for the action, but it is learnt that at least one consignment from Moscow arrived in Dubai after an unusual delay.

The new agents, A.W. Galadari Motors, have launched an aggressive sales drive for Niva, claimed to be the "cheapest four-wheel drive now available in the local market." Their marketing campaign is soon expected to cover the entire Lada range.

Mr Ahmed Hasan, service manager for Lada, said yesterday that the first five Nivas under the new arrangement were sold to Iraq. The firm has a stock of 100 more vehicles of the same kind.

The disruption in the agency agreement is certain to have an adverse impact on Russia's position in Dubai's trade chart this year.

Other items imported by Dubai from the Soviet Union include timber, alcoholic beverages, chemicals and rubber products.

Russian timber is already facing stiff competition from South-East Asia and with the introduction of a direct shipping link between Dubai and Indonesia this competition is expected to become stiffer this year.

Other Russian imports listed in the trade chart are so insignificant in value that even a reasonable increase in their exports is unlikely to help Moscow to hold on to its present place in the trade chart.

However, the Moscow Chamber of Commerce is understood to be reviving its efforts to participate in some future exhibitions in the UAE in a bid to gain a firm foothold on the local market.

CSO: 4300/79

IMPROVED ECONOMIC SITUATION

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 22 Jul 81 p 14

[Text]

THE UAE's economy saw a sharp reduction in the level of inflation in 1980 to 15 per cent from an average of 25 per cent in the 1974—77 period.

The National Bank of Abu Dhabi, in its annual report which was released yesterday in Abu Dhabi, said the dramatic fall has been brought by the general improvement in trading activities and also in the construction sector which attained greater momentum in the second half of the year.

But the evident improvement was not without its negative effects the report adds.

"Towards the year-end it became apparent that price responses to improving economic climate was again having an adverse effect upon attempts to control inflation at the level reached for 1980 as a whole."

According to the report, federal revenues have increased "continuously" over the past five years with expenditure budget at Dhs 26.2 billion for 1981 "showing corresponding rises largely reflecting increased outlays for industrial and strategic infrastructural purposes."

In the banking sector, the report emphasises, the growth of resident deposits were "erratic" in the early part of 1980 reflecting to some degree outflows of funds seeking higher interest rates abroad especially in the United States dollar.

DEPOSITS

"However, in the second half of the year a substantial improvement was seen with deposits from residents registering an average increase of 24 per cent over corresponding figure in 1979," the report notes.

NBAD's operations improved in 1980 over 1979.

The annual report says: "Despite the difficulties prevailing in the money and capital markets, profits achieved by all divisions for 1980 were greater than in the previous year."

The report underlines that deposits of domestic branches from all sources increasaed by Dh 400 million a major share of which was granted to construction and industrial sectors.

The report goes on "Net profit and profit available for appreciation increased by 45 per cent over the 1979 level despite several factors, such as the doubling of taxation on the profits of overseas branches and fluctuations of foreign currency interest rates."

The report highlights that the "significant" increase in profits enabled "our" bank to strengthen its general reserves by Dh 43 million, as opposed to Dh 22 million for the previous year.

NEW SUBSIDIARY

The bank report points out that the "most" prominent achievement in its overseas activities during 1980 was the opening of its new wholly-owned subsidiary, Abu Dhabi International

Bank, N.V. (ADIB) with a cpital of 10 million dollars. "The establishment of this subsidiary represents a most important expansion of our international operations and aims at developing NBAD's activities within the Americas," the report commented.

ADIB commenced its operation in Washington D.C. in January, 1980.

The report points out that the foregoing improvement reflected "the twin steps taken by the Currency Board to curb capital outflows" by raising the maximum levels of interest rates of 10.5 per cent per year; and by a series of five progressive upward revaluations of the dirham against the US dollar. "Over the course of the year these revaluations totalled 2.52 per cent from a middle rate of Dh 3.766 to Dh 3.671. Along with these measures an improvement in the overall maturity profile of time-deposits was discernable," the report notes.

The report stresses that liquidity showed significant improvement during the year given the fact that in the final quarter of 1980 there was—for the first time in four years—no net foreign liabilities position in the banking sector.

"This was reflected in a decline in the overall advances/deposits ratio from an average of 142 per cent in September, 1979, to 111 per cent at the end of 1980. Disbursements by the federal real estate committee applied towards the liquidation of bank advances to the property sector played an important role in this improvement," the report says.

The report expounds that monetary supply (M1) in the UAE increased by 17.5 per cent in 1980 although currency in circulation increased only by 9 per cent. It is added that bank credit jumped by 13.5 per cent and M2 (private domestic liquidity consisting of M1 plus quasi-monetary deposits) rose by 29 per cent with M3 (M2 plus government deposits in local and foreign currencies) rising by 30 per cent.

It is noted that the UAE balance of payments surplus doubled during 1980 to Dh 18.4 billion from its 1979 level.

OIL REVENUES

"This was mainly caused by increased oil export revenues which amounted to Dh 67.9 billion, an increase of Dh 22 billion and also reflected an improvement in the export performance of the non-oil hydrocarbons and reexports sectors," the report says.

The report continues that imports estimated at Dh 31.2 billion continued their "historical" pattern of rapid growth rising by 20 per cent over the 1979 levels.

"That increase was a function, first, of increased imports of capital goods necessary for the development of the country's industrial infrastructure, secondly, of increased demand for consumer goods reflecting higher standards of living and disposable incomes and, thirdly, the impact which world-wide inflation rates have upon the ever increasing cost prices of the nation's imports. That latter consideration is believed to be the main consitutent element of domestic inflation," the report elaborates.

On the progress of the bank, the report says that the year 1980 was one of "consolidation with emphasis upon increasing the profitable deployment of the resources at the bank's disposal."

The report explains that the foregoing effort followed an increase in total footings of 32 per cent in 1979 alone and a compound growth rate of 143 per cent during the preceeding three-year period.

"In the course of 1980, total footings fell marginally by 2 per cent to a year-end level of Dh 17.5 billion which reflected the diminution in the dirham equivalent of the United States dollar, the currency in which a very substantial proportion of the bank's investment resources is denominated," the report underlines.

It is explained that domestic lending/deposits ratio at the year end was 43 per cent in contrast to the overall rate of 110 per cent applying to all locally incorporated banks at the time.

INVESTMENTS

It concluded that the bank's investment portfolio increased by 29 per cent during the year and although both total deposits and total advances and loans showed a marginal reduction, this "camouflaged" increases, first, in dirham deposits segment (which is said to have reflected a 28 per cent increase over that of 1979) and, secondly, in the domestic lending segment where notable progress was being made in achieving greater penetration of the offshore oil support industries, manufacturing and trading.

CSO: 4300/79

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ISSUES FUNDING STATISTICS

GF041700 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 4 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] The general economic development plan of the UAE aims at creating economic equilibrium among the seven member amirates of the federation to achieve a uniformity of the standard of urban development among them.

This is reflected in the annual report of the Planning Ministry on federal government projects in each of the amirates.

It says the federal projects in the past year in Abu Dhabi cost DH1.203 billion, Dubai DH536 million, Ash-Shariqah DH798 million, Ajman DH403 million, Umm al-Qaywayn DH510 million, R'as al-Khaymah DH1.077 billion and Fujayrah DH1.422 billion.

Work on all these projects started during the 1980 budget period.

Fujayrah Amirate occupies the first position in terms of allocation, reflecting a greater attention paid by the federal government to the development of the eastern coast.

The figures indicate that the allocations for Abu Dhabi and Dubai amirates are relatively small because more attention was paid to the other amirates and because most of the other developmental projects were carried out by the local governments of the two amirates.

Under the plan, the federal ministries carry out various projects in all the amirates.

In Fujayrah, the projects of the Ministry of Electricity and Water cost DH359 million, of the Ministry of Health DH190 million, of the Ministry of Communications DH652 million, of the Ministry of Education and Youth DH53 million, of the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and AWQAF DH23 million, of the Ministry of Information and Culture DH15 million, of the Ministry of Labor DH3 million and of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing DH116 million.

In R'as al-Khaymah Amirate, low-cost houses are being built at a cost of DH30 million, while the projects of the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and AWQAF cost DH23 million, of the Ministry of Information and Culture DH10 million, of the Ministry of Electricity and Water DH707 million, and of the Ministry of Communications DH420 million.

In Ash-Shariqah Amirate, the Ministry of Education and Youth is carrying out projects costing DH265 million, the Ministry of Health DH171 million, the Ministry of Electricity and Water DH176 million, the Ministry of Communications DH268 million, the Ministry of Information and Culture DH22 million, the Ministry of Justice DH3 million and the Ministry of Agriculture DH8 million.

In Ajman Amirate, the projects of the Ministry of Communications cost DH 112 million, of the Ministry of Electricity and Water DH195 million, of the Ministry of Education and Youth DH37 million, of the Ministry of Health DH14 million, of the Ministry of Public Works DH18 million and of the Ministry of Justice DH15 million.

In Umm al-Qaywayn Amirate, the Ministry of Communications has undertaken projects costing DH168 million, the Ministry of Electricity and Water DH212 million, the Ministry of Health DH50 million, the Ministry of Education and Youth DH49 million, the Ministry of Justice DH6 million, the Ministry of Information and Culture DH8 million and the Ministry of Agriculture DH1 million.

In Abu Dhabi Amirate, the projects of the Ministry of Education cost DH445 million, of the Ministry of Information and Culture DH138 million, of the Ministry of Health DH9 million, of the Ministry of Justice, Islamic Affairs and AWQAF DH77 million, of the Ministry of Agriculture DH23 million and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing DH20 million.

All these projects are for serving federal organizations. The executive council of Abu Dhabi Amirate carries out projects concerning public services and municipalities, in addition to investment projects.

In Dubai Amirate, the cost of federal projects--DH536 million--is 7 percent of the total cost of federal government development schemes.

The cost of the projects of the Ministry of Education and Youth in Dubai Amirate was DH301 million, of the Ministry of Health DH156 million, of the Ministry of Information and Culture DH14 million, of the Ministry of Agriculture DH6 million, of the Ministry of Communications DH23 million and of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing DH16 million.--WAM

CSO: 4300/81

WATER, POWER PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 23 Jul 81 p 23

[Article by Raman Kapoor]

[Text]

A Dh 893.47 million budgetary allocation has been made to the ministry of electricity and water for 1981 for executing numerous power generation, electrification and water work programmes in the federation.

This was stated in an interview by the Minister for water and Electricity, Humaid Nasser Al Oweis, yesterday. Stressing that power and water must reach even the remotest areas in the federation no matter what the cost, he said the total power generation in the northern emirates this year would be stepped up to 593,000 mwh, compared to 321,000 mwh in 1980.

The on-going power projects are to cost Dh 239.4 million, and those ready for execution will cost Dh 161.7 million. The on-going water schemes are to cost Dh 65 million and those ready for execution have been completed at a cost of Dh 44 million.

Work has been undertaken for strengthening power distribution systems in Ajman, Umm Al Quwain and Fujeirah towns with 33-kv lines. In Ajman work has almost been completed. At Umm Al Quwain it has just started and the feasibility studies have been initiated at Fujeirah.

The 33-kv transmission lines are being executed on the following routes: Umm Al Quwain-Falaj Al Moalla, a 60-km link; Umm Al Quwain-Rafa, a 33-km link; Fujeirah-Munnay, a 45-km link; Fujeirah-Kalba, a 8-km link; and, Manama-Idhn, a 21-km line.

A 33-kv line has been energised on the Fujeirah-Qidfa-Dibba 67-km link. In due course, this route would be on a 132-kv line.

A scheme to interconnect the isolated power system on east and west coasts and in central segment is under perusal of the ministry.

So far the ministry has electrified 99 villages, and another 55 villages would be reached shortly. An additional 60 villages would be electrified in the northern emirates, under a new scheme. The exact number of villages in the UAE is not knwon, but may be in the region of 400.

Questioned whether the UAE has any programme to tap nuclear energy, Mr Oweis stated that the UAE, being a member of the UN atomic energy agency, had requested the body for conducting a feasibility study. A United Nations professor of nuclear technology had visited the country and submitted a report. The expert also saw the use of radioistope in the hospitals. The expert report is now under the government scrutiny.

The UAE government has set up a national committee, chaired by Dr Mana Saeed Al Oteiba, minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources to delineate thinking on the alternative resources of energy, including from atom. The UAE is in specially advantageous position with regard to solar energy, which is still to be tapped.

The UAE, being a relatively new state, studies are still to be done on how much electricity is being used in the household and industrial sectors. Consultants are seized of making estimates as to how abundant are the water resources of the emirates, and to work out the possible demand parameters of the developing needs of water for agriculture and industry.

The Gulf countries are collaborating increasingly on the electricity generation programmes, and periodic meetings are held on exchange of technical data on comparability of different equipment used and manufactured in the respective regions.

Power generation and water works are being run under the total supervision of the ministry, and no foreign companies are engaged in the field.

The ministry is presently employing 1,734 personnel, and it has introduced two training programmes in order to bolster the national capability. First one is that for each contract of power plant installation and transmission distribution system, a six-week training programme is to be incorporated as a part of the contract for the nationals to be trained at manufacturers' works.

CSO: 4300/79

BRIEFS

MINERAL SURVEY--The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources has allocated Dh 3 million in its budget for this year to carry out part of the third stage of the mineral survey in the country. The third stage of the survey is to assess the feasibility of commercial exploitation of the minerals discovered in the northern emirates during the second stage of the survey which ended last year. Copper discovered in the Madb region of Fujeirah and chromite discovered in Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khaimah and Fujeirah will receive special attention. The Cabinet has already approved carrying out of the third stage of the survey. Mr Salih Al Mahmoudi, director of the mineral resources department at the ministry had recently, while in London, discussed with officials from the Hantic Geology and Geophysies Company the basic steps for carrying out the project. This company had executed the first and second stages of the project. The second stage of the survey, which took 20 months, also discovered copper in Ras Al Khaimah, talc in Fujeirah, manganese in all the northern emirates and other raw materials.
tion aims at improving the performance of the Arab League offices and establishing new offices. [as published] It has accomplished a study on setting up a unit for publishing and distributing Arab League news and to supply the publicity offices with all the information they require. The plan includes publications of booklets on the Palestinian issue and the Middle East struggle, holding of symposia and organisation of cinema shows and art exhibitions about the Arab nation. [Text] [Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 25 Jul 81 p 3]

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END

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No. 2384

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20 August 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2384

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GERMAN COMPANY SEEKS TO SELL ROCKETS TO ARAB COUNTRIES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Jun 81 p 2

/Article by Yossi Melman: "German Rocket Company Negotiating With Muslim Countries"/

/Text/ The German Rocket Company, OTRAG, is trying to arrange giant transactions for the sale of rockets of Muslim countries including Pakistan, Syria, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, according to a special interview which will be broadcast tomorrow (today) on the BBC program "Panorama."

OTRAG's involvement in the region began after its plan to establish a rocket site in Zaire in Africa failed after a mysterious explosion in which six German technicians were killed. Because of pressure from company investors, its president, Lutz Kaiser, was forced to seek new locations for test sites. In May 1979 Kaiser proposed, through a German businessman, Klaus Nickel, that the President of Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq, purchase information from OTRAG despite his knowledge of Pakistan's intentions to procure nuclear weapons. However, because of financial problems, the president of Pakistan did not agree to this.

Afterwards, OTRAG proposed to the Syrians to set up a rocket launching site in their country and to build for them, according to the text of the contract which became available to the producers of the program, 2-stage tactical rockets with a range of 300 km and 5-stage rockets with a range of 2000 km, however these contacts also were fruitless.

An approach to the Saudis

The German company then approached Saudi Arabia. Through the German General (Retired) Harold Wust, contact has been established between OTRAG and Saudi military personnel. It is evident from documents that on 20 Jun 1980 a meeting took place in the offices of the German company Miflan in Frankfurt at which OTRAG people were present. It was proposed at the meeting that the company establish a rocket launching site in Saudi Arabia and manufacture hundreds of rockets in a deal valued at about $4 billion. Other companies such as Telefunken and AEG were also to have been involved.

When the plan failed, the Germans approached Libya. At the conclusion of the negotiations, an agreement worth $100 million was signed. Qaddhafi granted OTRAG a test site about 800 km south of Tripoli, and the Germans will soon present him with the first rocket.

"Only for Peaceful Purposes"

The German company maintains that some of the documents presented are spurious and that it is involved only in building rockets for peaceful purposes such as the launching of communications and weather satellites. However, Fred Weimer, an international businessman who has served as an intermediary between OTRAG and Zairian President Mobutu, said on the program: "We are not children. These toys can be easily converted to weapons."

The program also points out the fact that the distance from the test site in Libya to Tel Aviv is exactly 2000 km, the range of the rockets which OTRAG offered to the Syrians.

Prime Minister Menahem Begin says in an interview for the program: "Every supply of weapons to countries like Libya is a crime against humanity."

The producers of the program worked on its production about 1 year and were assisted by tens of interviews, some of which were conducted also by HA'ARETZ reporters in Germany and Britain.

The producer of the program, Christopher Olgietti, told HA'ARETZ that while collecting the material, he obtained information also on attempts by OTRAG to offer deals to Jordan and Iraq, however, he was unable to validate this information and therefore it was decided not to include it in the program.

5830
CSO: 4323/18

BRIEFS

SAUDI LOAN TO SOMALIA--The Saudi Fund for Development has granted Somalia a soft-term loan of Riyals 33.3 million ($10 million), the Somali news agency reported last week. At 2 per cent interest, the 15-year loan is to finance the completion of the Juba sugar project at Marerey, in the south of the country, the report said. The third from the Saudi Fund, the latest loan brings the fund's total lending to Somalia to SR332.6 million ($100 million). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 8]

AMF LOAN TO SOUTH YEMEN--The Arab Monetary Fund has announced a loan of $30 million to South Yemen in balance of payments support. In an announcement from its headquarters in Abu Dhabi last week, the AMF said the five-year loan would carry annual interest varying between 5.2 and 6.4 per cent. South Yemen has previously borrowed $11 million from the AMF, the announcement said, without giving details. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 8]

IDB LOAN TO GAMBIA--The Islamic Development Bank last week extended a $3.4 million loan to Gambia to finance purchases of cement and natural gas from Algeria, according to a report from the bank's headquarters in Jeddah. The gas imports are valued at $2.6 million, the report said. With the latest credit, Gambia has benefited from a total of $7 million in interest-free loans from the IDB. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 8]

CSO: 4300/86

OPEC LOANS TO THIRD WORLD ANNOUNCED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

The OPEC Fund for International Development has announced eight loan agreements worth a total of $59.45 million, to finance development projects and balance of payments deficits in a number of Third World countries.

The largest loan of $25 million is for balance of payments support to Bangladesh. This is the eighth OPEC Fund loan to Bangladesh, which now has borrowed a total of $99 million from the aid organisation.

Senegal has been allocated $14 million to finance a chemicals project, which is co-sponsored by the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA). The project involves the construction of production units to manufacture sulphuric and phosphoric acid as well as fertilisers. The latest is Senegal's fifth loan from the OPEC Fund, which has so far disbursed $31 million to the African country.

The Dominican Republic is to receive $10 million, for an unspecified purpose, in the fourth OPEC Fund loan to that Carribean country. Total borrowing by the Dominican Republic from the OPEC Fund stands at $17.93 million.

Mali, which has also been granted $1.04 million towards its contribution to the UN Common Fund (See following article), is to benefit from a loan of $6.45 million which will finance a biomass power scheme. The project includes the construction of a thermal power plant which will use rice husks as fuel. This is Mali's sixth loan from the OPEC Fund, which has so far disbursed $36.5 million, most of it to help meet the country's balance of payments deficit.

Sao Tome and Principe, the Seychelles, Dominica and Djibouti have each been allocated $1 million as balance of payments support. Each of these countries' borrowing from OPEC is extremely low, varying between a total of $1.3 million and $2.5 million.

CSO: 4300/86

PRE-ELECTION COMMENTS ON RAJA'I'S NOMINATION

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 21 Jul 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] In the Islamic Republic, the Friday [24 July] prayer is one of the means of mass communication used regardless of the conventional media such as the press, radio and television. It allows conveying the orders of the revolutionary clergy in record time from the top to the base of the social pyramid. This is no longer a gathering of the faithful but rather a political meeting. The authorities use that ceremony to broadcast their instructions explaining to their audience that should they ignore them, they will be failing in their religious duty.

This is how a week ago, the electoral campaign for the post of president of the republic was simultaneously launched in several towns during the Friday prayer. The watchword is the same everywhere: everybody has the religious duty of going to the polls and casting a vote for the candidate whom Khomeyni wants to put in the post of president of the Islamic Republic.

But the Tudeh Party (Iranian Communist Party), always ready to pretend to be following the "road indicated by the Imam" had just announced that it would support the candidature of Raja'i, the current prime minister. The Tudeh Party has ordered its militants and supporters to vote for him.

Simultaneously, all the Islamic organizations and associations in the country have issued communiques announcing their decision to vote for Rajai'.

As for the government, it has just published a list with the names of four candidates accepted in the presidential race:

1. Mohammad-Ali Raja'i: the present prime minister. Non-commissioned officer in the Air Force under the old regime, he was discharged then sent to prison on a sex charge--he was caught in the act of committing sodomy with a soldier. After being released, he became involved in subversive underground activities while it seems that his profession was teaching. During the first weeks of Khomeyni's stay in Teheran, he was serving tea to the "Imam's" visitors. Raised to the rank of prime minister through the intrigues of the diabolical Beheshti, and while he had no idea of what a government was, he fulfilled his mission: his role was to oppose Bani-Sadr, then president. This he did. A zealous flunkey, he got to like the power game. Today, he is the appointed candidate of the Islamic Republic Party, the ranks of which have been decimated by the assassination attempt of 28 June.

2. Habib-Ollah Asgar-Oladi: now deputy to the Islamic Parliament. Terrorist, active member of the Islam Fedayeen group (the Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), he was directly implicated in the assassination of Prime Minister Hassan-Ali Mansour in 1965. That is the reason why he spent several years in prison under the old regime.

3. Abbas Shebani: physician and pro-Khomeyni militant of long standing, he was minister of agriculture during the brief period between the fall of Bargazan's provisional government and the time when Bani-Sadr became president.

4. 'Ali-Akbar Parvaresh: a man who has always been pro-Khomeyni and is now vice president of the Islamic Parliament.

In fact, although they are all faithful to Khomeyni's bloodthirsty doctrine, Raja'i's three competitors stand a very poor chance of being elected and they are nothing but a "guard of honor" for Raja'i who, thanks to their candidature, will give the impression of having been properly elected and appointed while he will have had the advantage of a rigged election.

This is the week when the Islamic Republic will hold the first ballot in the presidential election. The outcome is known in advance. In the same way as Bani-Sadr won in the past only because that is what the "Imam" wanted, Raja'i will be the winner because that is what Khomeyni has decided. And Iran will get another puppet.

But this time and in order to make people forget the discredit brought upon the Islamic Republic by Bani-Sadr's betrayal, they want at all cost for Raja'i to get more than 11 million votes. Bani-Sadr in fact got that many votes.

For that purpose, a draft bill has been introduced in Parliament reducing the voting age to 15.

Undoubtedly, ballot boxes will be placed in the many overpopulated prisons as it has been done in all the elections held over the last two and one-half years. These ballot boxes, as usual, will only produce votes for the official candidate since the victims have no other choice but to vote for their torturers. The mental patients from the psychiatric hospital of the town of Mashad will probably be required to vote once more with the tragedy turning into a farce.

Yes, Raja'i, who is already beaming at the thought of his incoming victory and who suddenly has learned again how to shave, will certainly get more than 11 million votes. But our readers will not be impressed by the figures announced. They are too well aware of the nature of Khomeyni's dictatorship to be deceived by the actors of a farce.

8796
CSO: 4619/19

BAHA'IS ARE LEAVING IRAN TO 'ESCAPE GENOCIDE'

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 20 Jul 81 p 3

[Text] Last week, the BBC special correspondent did a reportage in Pakistan dealing with the Baha'is refugees from Iran.

Due to the persecutions suffered by followers of that sect in the Islamic Republic, the Baha'is are leaving Iran en masse in an attempt to escape genocide. Those whom the BBC correspondent was able to meet numbered about 100 and they were all cadres belonging to the intellectual elite: teachers, physicians and civil servants. They received anonymous letters. To survive, they joined the exodus.

It should be pointed out that Baha'ism bars its followers from taking part in political life and even advises them not to defend themselves if they are attacked. This explains how Khomeyni's "justice" is having such an easy time in wiping out that religious community which, with 500,000 followers, was the largest religious minority in Iran in the past.

The Baha'i oral tradition has been saying for a long time that an inescapable disaster will shake Iran down to its foundations around 1976. Since 1973, the sect leadership has been advising their fellow-Baha'is whose moral fiber was considered to be weaker to expatriate themselves. This is why thousands of Baha'is left Iran between 1973 and 1978. Those who remained behind to face developments, did so fully conscious of what would happen and for the purpose of keeping the fervor of their religion alive.

Today, the repression has become so savage that even the most courageous have had to become resigned to go into exile. At the same time, others have ended by converting to Islam to escape unavoidable death.

Some Baha'is were among the most brilliant members of the Iranian society. It is a shame that they chose to suffer when on the grounds of their ability alone they could have prevented what happened. At least, let us hope that now they will join those who are fighting.

IRAN LIBRE deeply deplores the crimes committed against the Bah'i community and assures that community of its unfailing support.

8796
CSO: 4619/19

NUMERICAL DETAILS ON IRANIANS EXECUTED IN ONE MONTH

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 20 Jul 81 pp 3, 4

[Text] The vicious circle of violence whirls faster and faster in the Islamic Republic where the principle of an eye for an eye takes the place of justice. The government counters the assassination attempts carried out by its opponents with mass executions which are immediately followed by more attempts leading to further reprisals and this goes on and on. During the past week, assassination attempts and executions have followed one another at a diabolical rate and it is hard to imagine what the ultimate result of this will be. The 20 attempts which the press reported to have taken place in just two days, 12 and 13 July, were retaliated with many executions. The death toll for last week was as follows:

Thursday, 9 July	5 Majahedin	in Amol and Bershahr
	1 ordinary soldier	in Ispahan
	1 trafficker	in Tabriz
	2 counterrevolutionaries	in Sari
Friday, 10 July	4 Mojahedin	in Lahidjan
	2 Mojahedin	in Shiraz
Saturday, 11 July	2 leftists	in Masdjede-Soleyman
	2 traffickers	in Gorgan
	1 trafficker	in Hamadan
	1 counterrevolutionary	in Lahidjan
	1 leftist trafficker	in Kurdistan
Sunday, 12 July	5 Mojahedin	in Behshahr
	4 counterrevolutionaries	in Sanandadj
Monday, 13 July	12 persons (political)	in Teheran
	11 persons (various)	in the provinces (Gorgan, Ghaem-Shal, Lahidjan, Rezayeh, Langaroud)
Wednesday, 15 July	4 leftists	in Amol and Ispahan
	3 Mojahedin	in Behshahr

Thursday, 16 July	3 Majahedin	in Teheran
	1 counterrevolutionary	in Tabriz
	3 traffickers	in Hamadan
	4 drug traffickers	in Tabriz
	1 counterrevolutionary	in Astara

A total of 73 persons were executed in just one week.

The total number of executions for the period starting on Saturday, 20 June and ending on Friday, 17 July is 214 persons as officially reported by the Islamic authorities.

8796
CSO: 4619/19

NEGOTIATIONS RENEWED TO OBTAIN IRON ORE FROM INDIA

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] Tehran (Pars)--In an exclusive interview with Hejazi Deputy Manager of the Iranian National Steel Company, in charge of mining, the controversial agreement signed between Iran and India five years ago was discussed.

He said that according to a contract signed between the two governments over five years ago, the ex-regime had agreed to grant a loan worth dollars 630 million to be used for expansion of an iron ore mine in that country through an Indian company called Kodormokh.

In return the company had agreed to supply the Iranian Steel Manufacturing Company with the needed iron ore. The sum of dollars 255 million of the said load was paid to the Indian government before the end of the old regime. However, due to one-sided nature of the contract, the Islamic Revolutionary government of Iran refused to pay the balance.

The repayment of the loan was for Iran to receive a total of 150 million tons of iron ore from the said company over 20 years.

While the price was calculated to make Iran pay more than dollar 25 per ton, whereas the 1981 price of iron ore is less than that. Another article of the contract forbade Iran to sell the product to any third party in case Iran was not able to consume it while the Indian company reserved the right to sell the product to any other and charge Iran for any difference in the price obtained.

Hejazi added that a few meetings had been held between the representatives of the Indian company and Iran and the outstanding issues have been reviewed.

Some changes in the contract have been agreed upon and more negotiations are underway to amend other one-sided articles.

Among the items agreed was to oblige the company to deliver to Iran iron ore with 66.5 purity instead of just the 40 per cent originally specified in the contract. It has been agreed that Iran will take delivery of 2.5 million tons of iron ore per year in the current year which will be increased to 5 million tons in about 3 years.

CSO: 4600/115

BRIEFS

GOVERNOR GENERAL ESCAPES ASSASSINATION--Tehran (Pars)--The newly appointed acting governor general of the province of Gilan on the Caspian Sea and his deputy escaped an assassination attempt on their lives in the city of Rasht on Saturday evening. Nassrollah Shadnoosh and his deputy were riding in a car along with their bodyguards when their car was stopped by occupants of two other cars in front of Rasht National Park in central part of the city. The assailants opened fire from two sides and the body guards fired back. Although all the windows of the governor's car were shattered, nobody was seriously hit. Shadnoosh received minor injury in the left hand and one of the guards was also slightly wounded in the head. The report indicates that both the governor and his deputy resumed their daily work yesterday and the guard was released from hospital. It is recalled that the previous governor general of Gilan and his deputy were both martyred by gunmen in the city of Rasht last month. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 p 1]

FORMER GOVERNOR SEEN IN PARIS--Paris (Pars)--Pars correspondent from Paris reported that in the clashes organized by counter-revolutionaries to disturb the Friday prayers in the French capital the former military governor of Najafabad who is wanted by the Iranian government, was recognized and temporarily detained by Moslem students. Captain Zolfaghari was responsible for ordering the killing of many civilians in Najafabad during mass demonstrations against the ex-shah 3 years ago. The same source indicated that various elements against the Islamic government of Iran had collaborated in Paris to ensure that the weekly Friday prayers of the Iranian Moslem students would not take place. They occupied the usual place for prayers in the university and did not hesitate to shower the students with all kinds of obscenities. Among those actively participating in the abuse was Captain Zolfaghari, who was recognized and arrested by the Moslem students, but later freed by the police. This incident was reported to the French media by Pars and was mentioned by two television stations the same night. The fugitive ex-military governor is reported to be living in Paris on an Iraqi passport. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 p 1]

NEW PUBLICATIONS--Tehran--Following the efforts of the Deputy Minister of Islamic Guidance for International Affairs, the Ministry of Guidance is publishing magazines, by the names of 'Iraq the Aggressor', "Imam and the Ummat", 'The Hostage Taking', 'The Voice of Islam', 'Mahjuba', 'Letter of the Islamic Revolution', and 'Jang' in English. Also the books entitled; 'Coming to One's Senses', 'Capitalism',

'Martyrdom', 'The Visage of Mohammed (SAW)', 'Hajj', 'If the Pope and Marx did not Exist', all by martyred Dr. Ali Shariati, the great Moslem sociologist, have been published. In addition the following books were also published. 'The Important Duty of the Iranian People', by Leila Kashani; 'Islam's Cadre', by Engineer Mehdi Bazargan; 'Imam Ali's (AS) Letter to Malek-el-Ashtar', translated by Allameh Rashid Torabi; and the letters and sermons of Imam Ali (AS) from 'Nahjul Balagha', translated by Seyyed Mahmud Asghar Hosseini. People who are interested in these books, can buy them from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance office located in Keshavarz Boulevard. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 p 2]

CSO: 4600/115

MINISTER GIVES OVERVIEW OF TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 17 Jul 81 p 6

[Text] During the last few years large scale transport and communications projects have been carried out; extensive services have been developed on up-to-date scientific bases to meet the growing public demand and facilitate the implementation of national development plans.

A comprehensive picture on the significant role undertaken by the Ministry of Transport and Communications has been expressed by Mr. Sa'doun Ghaidan, Revolution Command Council member and Minister of Transport and Communications, in an interview with the Baghdad Observer.

Beginning and future

The transport and communications sector can be viewed through the perspectives of two phases, pre-revolution and post-revolution the Minister said.

Proceeding from the principles and objectives highlighted by the Political Report of the 8th Regional Conference of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and in line with the objectives of the National Development Plan to accomplish a comprehsnsive socio-economic development, the transport and communications sector has had to be so developed as to provide every ancillary facility to render the implementation of development plans feasible and effective, he added.

Before July 17 Revolution of 1968, this vital sector failed to attract due attention; it was in no way considered a vital prerequisite for a far-reaching countrywide development in various walks of life.

Following the Revolution, the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party devoted considerable attention to the development of transport and communications to help carry out the ambitious development plans. In 1970, a State Organisation for Land Transport was established (initially an affiliate of the Ministry of Economic). In 1976 the Organisation was so expanded as to embrace five specialised transport establishments with a countrywide coverage.

Meanwhile, railway networks which had been totally neglected before the Revolution have now become of a country-wide coverage, serving the major objective of transporting capital goods, spare parts and various other types of essential commodities both for public and private consumption. Alongside this development in the railway services, up-to-date facilities have been introduced to help develop traffic control in line with international standards.

Following July 17 Revolution, a major line connecting Baghdad with Hosaiba, en route Falloja, Ramadi and Ana, throgh the Iraqi-Syrian borders was commenced with in 1978; it is to be completed in 1982.

The Minister disclosed that a plan was drawn up by the Ministry for the development of this sector. The plan envisaged raising railway line capacities and expanding railway networks; modern wagons and locomotives have been supplied whereas up-to-date maintenance facilities are being provided.

Water transport

This sector, the Minister added, had been totally discredited before the Revolution, with the marine transport being confined to two vessels, namely July 14 and Ramadhan 14, with a loading capacity of 6000 tons each.

After the Revolution, 12 new vessels were purchased with an overall tonnage having increased to 114,000. Navigation lines have expanded in such a way as to cover a broad spector. River navigation has also been subject to intensive attention to have it developed in line with the upsurge in the field

of transportation.

A number of committees have been formed to conduct economic and technical feasibility studies to develop river transportation. The Baghdad-Basrah line is considered the nucleaus of prospectively extensive network. In the meantime, 100 boats of a total loading capacity of 500 tons have been purchased to serve as the initial fleet on the Baghdad-Basrah line.

Iraqi ports

In 1967, Iraq had 12 docks in all its ports, three in Um Qasir and nine in Margil, with a total capacity of 1.5 million tons.

After the Revolution, the capacity was raised to 14 million tons in 1980, with the number of docks having increased to 28. Ten other docks are being built and 13 others are to be added to raise the total capacity to 27 million tons per annum.

Telecommunications

Upto 1968, telecommunications were confined to telephone lines connected to out-dated exchanges with a total capacity of 60,000 lines, added to carrier waves for inter-city telecommunications. As for communications with the outside world, a few limited capacity systems were used.

Following the Revolution, considerable atention was devoted to this vital sector. Up-to-date facilities have been established for inter-city and international communication. Among the major achievements in this field are the highly sophisticated telephone, telex and microwave networks which facilitate swift connections with even the remotest parts of the world. Fully automatic exchanges have been installed for this purpose.

Postal services

Although postal services had been traditionally old in Iraq, they only received little attention before the revolution. The situation has totally changed since the Revolution. Postal services are currently being considered within the context of overall national development plans to help promote their services to cope with the growing demand for this vital activity. Modern buildings, up-to date facilities and newly developed techniques are being introduced. Training centres are now providing efficient and trained personnel to run this vital activity.

Civil aviation

The old Baghdad Airport, which was the only civil aviation facility in Iraq before the Revolution, was soon found to be of no avail in the rapidly-growing international relations of post-Revolution Iraq.

The Baghdad International Airport, which was opened on January 8, 1970, provided landing and take-off facilities for modern aircraft.

The National Development Plan envisaged the necessary studies for the construction of a new huge airport in Baghdad to meet international standards of technical and scientific development, with a modern airports to be built in Basrah, Mosul and Arbil to serve local routes.

The new "Saddam Hussein Airport" is to be completed by the end of 1982 to rank airports in the world in terms among the most sophisticated of technological equipment and control facilities.

Iraqi Airways

Air transport services began in Iraq in 1946, when chartered planes were used for the transportation of passengers and goods. In 1955, the Iraqi Airways purchased four Viscount aircraft which continued in service until 1964, when three Trident aircrafts were purchased.

The Iraqi Airways had had to encounter a large number of difficulties until July 17 Revolution, when a new phase of development began. By the year 1974, a contract was concluded for the purchase of five modern Boeing aircrafts to be added to the Iraqi fleet. In 1976 another six Boeing aircrafts, including two Jumbo type, were received to provide a facility consisting of eleven aircrafts operative on an extensive network of airlines.

A recent contract was concluded for the purchase of another five Boeing aircrafts, including two Jumbos, to be added to the ever-growing fleet of Iraqi Airways planes.

CSO: 4300/80

IRRIGATION MINISTER CITES PROJECTS

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 17 Jul 81 p 12

[Text]

Within the intensive attention devoted by the Iraqi Government, irrigation is considered among the major infrastructures which are bound to accomplish far-reaching foundations for agricultural development.

A large number of dams and irrigation projects have been carried out to provide irrigation water to vast areas of land over the last 13 years, with a view to reaching a standard of ample bases for subLsequent agricultural development.

In a statement on the activities of the Ministry of Irrigation, Mr. Abdul Wahab Mahmoud, the minister said, "The Ministry of Irrigation undertakes, among other basic tasks, the responsibility of developing water resources in the country; hence it has to shoulder the following tasks:

"1 — Preserving water resources and developing new and growing sources of water supply to help develop the agricultural sector to the levels sought by the leadership and bring about the necessary conditions for establishing agro-industrial projects.

"2 — Building dams, reservoirs and other irrigation projects whic are required for the organisation of irrigation networks and distribution of water in the most possible rational way to even the remotest parts of the country.

"3 — Reclaiming, refertilising and desalinating the soil in the areas where the agricultural sector had suffered from neglegence in the past.

"4 — Maintaining irrigation and drainage networks and administering irrigation canals."

In his account of the irrigation projects carried out since July 17, 1968, the Minister said, "Right from the beginning of the current upsurge in agricultural development, i.e. thirteen years ago, a large number of irrigation projects have been put into effect. These have significantly replaced a number of projects which had been established since 1950, being of no avail in the course of attempts to develop the agricultural sector. In fact, agricultural projects had been carried out without premeditaed developmental planning, hence their exclusive benefit to the feudalists and other narrow interested circles. This had also applied to the pattern along which drainage projects' were undertaken.

"Proceeding from the principles of July 17 Revolution, five-year plans were drawn up to incompass a large number of integrated irrigation and land reclamation projects, based on the following prerequisites which may be termed as a cornerstone for a far-reaching agricultural development:

"1 — The water balance study, involving a study of the comprehensive plan for the development of land and water resources in Iraq. So far, the first and second stages of this study have been concluded.

"2 — Commencement of the general mainstream project, involving the construction of a 156 km.-long canal for irrigation and drainage purposes. The first stage of this project has already been completed and the second commenced with; it aims at draining water out to the sea to avoid polluting river water.

3 — Improving of Lower Diyala Area, through the execution of Khalis, Miqdadiya, Duz and Upper Euphrates, irrigation and drainage projects,

the latter of which is to provide irrigation water to 250,000 Donums on both banks of the Euphrates River. Aski Kalak Irrigation Project in Arbil, covering an area of 53,000 Donums, is also considered in this respect. Its first stage has already been completed.

"4 — Saqlawiya, Yousifiya and Latifiy irrigation and drainage projects, covering an area exceeding millions of donums of arable land.

"5 — Husseiniya Irrigation and Drainage Project, added to Dalmaj Irrigation and Drainage Project, which cover an area of 448,000 Donums, part of which, i.e. al-Mazar Project, has been completed, whereas the other parts, i.e., Husseiniya and Hiwar, covering an area of 210,000 donums, are being carried out.

"6 — Salman Pak Drainage Project covering an area of 250,000 donums, in which the major part of earth-moving and excavation works has been completed.

"7 — Kirkuk Irrigation Project covering an area of one million Donums where oleagenous seed cultivation is to be enhanced to met industrial demand."

Other irrigation and drainage projects are in the process of designing; they include Al-Jazira Irrigation Project, covering an area of one million donums, which is considered a major contribution to the food security programme. It is bound to provide an export-oriented surplus of food supplies.

A major project is the Mosul Dam, which is bound to provide irrigation water to about one million donums of arable land. The project envisages a storage capacity of 12 billion cu.m. of flood water, besides generating 1034 Megawatts of power to be utilised in industry and other purposes.

The Mosul Dam which was commenced with in 1981 will be completed in 1986, with the storage facilities to be completed by the end of 1984.

Another major project is the Haditha Dam on the Euphrates River, which was commenced with in 1978 and will be completed in 1984-1985. This will provide a power generating capacity of about 600 megawatts.

Bakhma Dam project, also currently under consideration, is another major irrigation project. It is bound to provide a storage capacity of 13 billion cu.m. and generate 2000 megawatts of electric power.

Meanwhile, a number of small dams have been built in the Western Desert area, e.g. Rutba Dam in which water is being stored for irrigation and nomad settlement purposes. Other projects in this category are Ogila and Shabaka Dams which serve sheep-keepers in the Western Desert.

A multi-purpose project is being carried out in Tharthar area to connect the Tigers with the Euphrates; this project which is expected to be completed in 1984 will provide flexibility in the utilisation of water in the Tigris and Euphrates, including the elevation of water level for feasible navigation.

Speaking of the scientific techniques introduced to the irrigation sector, the Minister pointed out that proceeding from the directives of President Saddam Hussein, universities and institutes of technology are being approached with a view to having most up-to-date scientific research and techniques applied to irrigation and drainage projects so as to accelerate the pace of development.

A comprehensive programme has been drawn up by the Ministry of Irrigation to utilize science and technology in the execution of irrigation, drainage and dam building projects.

For instance, the main and sub-canals are being coated with concrete or similar alternatives to save large quantities of water, prevent pollution, avoid sedimentation and preclude seepage.

The computer is being used in drawing up designs for a number of irrigation and drainage projects with a view to securing fast and accurate results. In all these projects, the universities and institutes of technology are contributing to help carry out and devlop irrigation projects, dam construction, canal coating and other relative undertakings.

To keep up with scientific and technological development, the Ministry of Irrigation has established a centre for water research at a cost of ID. 7 million to concentrate on the design; and construction of canals and dams, the analysis of soil and construction materials, the compilation of data, etc.

The State Organisation for Land Reclamation is undertaking a large number of research works related to drainage construction and specifications; the most appropriate means of coating canal networks are being considered within the context of an extensive scientific research undertaken by the Organisation.

Another major aspect of the Ministry of Irrigation's activity is the development and utilisation of subterranean water; artesian wells are been dug in various parts of the desert land. So far, 4500 wells have been developed during the last 13 years in the villages and countryside in the desert areas, to be utilized for human consumption and agriculture. No doubt, underground water is considered a national resource which should be duly preserved. This is the subject of a study on the storage and preservation of subterranean water.

It is to be noted that the Ministry of Irrigation commands a highly developed apparatus for artesean well-drilling, maintenance and operation. A large number of hydrological maps have been prepared to help develop this essential national resource.

Regarding future plans of the Ministry, the Minister said, "A working paper has been prepared envisaging prospects for the development of water resources and arable land for the years 1980-1985. The paper will be discussed by various other relative sectors, e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of ndustry and the Ministry of Municipalities. It was considered and approved by the Cabinet in July 1980, and is to be put into effect for the development of this major sector."

CSO: 4300/80

RAMADAN LAUDS POPULAR ARMY WAR EFFORTS

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 17 Jul 81 pp 4, 5

[Text]

The Commander in Chief of the Popular Army has announced that the power of the Popular Army reached a level which is by far higher than that of the pre-war period as regards manpower strength, armament and training.

Mr. Thah Yassin Ramadhan, who was speaking in an exclusive interview with the Baghdad Observer on occasion of the 13th anniversary of the 17—30 July Revolution of 1968, declared that the Popular Army admitted volunteers from the Arab countries and would continue to do so "not out of the need for more fighters but in order to build more bridges of understanding among Arabs" for their common cause.

In the interview, Mr. Ramadhan spoke extensively about the evolution of the Popular Army as a special experiment that has contributed to the cohesion of the people and the large-scale role undertaken in the current battle against the Persian aggressors. He disclosed that Popular Army members from the Autonomous Region exceeded 30,000 and the number would top 35,000 by the end of the year.

The Commander in Cheif said that it would be impossible in a brief session to talk about the Popular Army and cover the entire experiment, that produced this force — to talk about the beginning of this force as an idea and its crystalisation into a major formula and as an instrument of revolutionary building within the context of the new progressive pattern created in Iraq. "But on the anniversary of the glorious 17—30 July Revolution, which has come about whilst our country is fighting a large scale national battle over the past 11 months, it behoves us to cite with high commendation the role undertaken by the various contingents of the Popular Army right from the first days of the battle".

A special experiment

Mr. Ramadhan said that the Popular Army "is an experiment which drew great attention of writers and commentators and therefore the Army's splendid role in the battle against the Persian has not been a surprise to us. The background and the method of action that gave rise to this formidable force some 11 years ago served a reason for its present stand towards the crucial circumstances through which Iraq is passing".

The achievements of this Army in the battlefield furnished further evidence to the farsightedness and sound calculations involving its inception, he said. Counting on similar experiments in other countries and with acknowledgement of quarters who are close to such experiments, the Iraqi Popular Army is a special experiment in its own right.

"It is a special experiment in its formations, in its armament and in the enormous confidence that is implanted among its members. The type of weapons in the hands of its members, the high standard of its military training and the characteristically different organisation and management of its training camps have given this army the quality of a special experiment which is superlative to those of other militias in the world", he said.

"The kind of supplies and provisions and its self-administration, also its special relationship with the regular armed

forces are all factors for the special experiment of the Popular Army. We have often said that the Popular Army is not an alternative or a parallel formation in relation to the armed forces. It is a formation which is complementary and subsequently a standing reserve force closely linked to the armed forces".

"Hence, there is nothing called applied coordination with the armed forces as is existing in other militias of the world. This is because coordination problems inevitably occur in other experiments and is confirmed by lessons derived from the war period. Contingents of the Popular Army are in constant touch with the armed forces and all through there has been no problem nor has been any suggesion called coordination' with the armed forces".

"This is a proof of the clarity of vision and soundness of the edifice from the outset. Combatants and ranks of these formations had fully absorbed their role and known how to deal with the armed forces in their capacity as integral part thereof. The formula of buildup had not been isolated from the armed forces because the Popular Army was only set up in the full knowledge of the regular armed forces and with their participation, beginning with armament, training and ending with how to perform assignments in the context of integration with them."

"The war rendered the absolute proof of the fact that it is the nature of building that provides the criterion and not subsequent procedures and measures taken to tackle problems. The general command, with President Saddam Hussein in the forefront, on many occasions expressed its confidence in the Popular Army and its role in rebuilding our people according to the new revolutionary pattern".

"The Popular Army's contribution in this respect became abundantly clear to the masses of our Iraqi people and the entire people across the Arab arena. The phenomenon of the Popular Army is among outstanding features of the 17—30 July Revolution and one of its first experiments. It is well known that the raison d'etre for the creation of the Popular Army was in order for this forces to shoulder internal assignments within boundaries of the country, largely related to protecting vital installations and security of citizens. It is to substitute the armed forces on some internal positions to the extent if basic contribution in anti-aircraft combat".

"This role of the Popular Army was well manifested from the first moments of the Persian aggression on our country. Combatants of the Popular Army gave a vivid example in performance of duties and in rallying the people around them and stretching firm bridges of confidence and cooperation with members of the pulic. I believe that this is one of the most important aspects achieved by contingents of the Popular Army whereas similar formations had failed to do so whether in previous experiments in our country such as the Popular Resistance and the National Guards or elsewhere".

"Both latter experiments — Popular Resistance and National Guards — fell short of creating the confidence and understanding that are shared with the people. The experiment of the Popular Army achieved a great deal in this direction. We are now in the 11th month of continual contact between Popular Army contingents and citizens. We find mutual confidence with members of the public gaining constant momentus and we see tranquility prevalent in all areas where Popular Army contingents are present".

Repulsing outside aggression

Asked how the decision was made to commit Popular Army contingents for full-scale participation in the current war, Mr. Ramadhan said that the decision was made upon the desire of President Saddam Husein to give Popular Army contingents an additional role relating to repulsing outside aggression. "The move was not aimed to test the power of the Popular Army but was emanated from a great confidence that this additional role shall be performed with excellence", he said.

Mr. Ramadhan said that the decision was based on the President's foreknowledge of the background of this great organisation. The participation of the Popular Army in the battle outside the borders that is beyond their own basic assignments as a militia was regarded as a secondary role. But with the passage of time, Popular Army contingents proved their combat ability and opted for full-scale involvement without encountering any genuine problem.

"The great confidence that is built between the Popular Army and our combatants of the armed forces led to the proposition of giving the Popular Army a new role represented in the occupation of principal positions previously held by regular military combat forces. After thorough assessments of the new assignments it became possible for our combatants to perform this new role on a large scale in all fronts including the northern region".

"Observation and reports of military commanders continued to testify to the growing capabilities of Popular Army combatants which have given us additional pride. I believe that what made the Popular Army contingents assume such a standard of assignments is not only their military training and the special care given to them in their campings as much as their full faith and devotion to the objectives of their Revolution and Party and their determination for sacrifice until victory is achieved".

"Nor is the Autonomous Region faraway from the presence of Popular Army contingents. Although the growth of these contingents in the autonomous region was relatively slow owing to the conditions prevailed at the time, they were there from the first years of the revolution in accordance with the programme drawn for their organisation in the region. The Autonomous Region was by no means the latest areas for the presence of the contingents. Provinces in the central area and in the south had the presence of Popular Army contingents much later in the Autonomous Region.

"Despite all conditions and attempts made in the darkness against the presence of these formations, the Popular Army grew and expanded rapidly in response to great willingness and even pride among the sons of the Autonomous Region to become Popular Army members. As a result we now have the rate of Popular Army combatants in the Autonomous Region not lower than that of other provinces. In fact, the number of combatants of Popular Army in the Autonomous Region alone is expected to reach 34,000 by the end of current 1981. We now have over 30,000 combatants with a large proportion of them assuming assignments in the region. The rate of combatants undertaking direct assignments is higher than that of combatants in other provinces".

"Many combatants of the Autonomous Region repeatedly asked to be given a role in the central and southern areas which are beyond their own respective areas and assignments. Actually a formation is regularly dispatched in alternate order to participate in Popular Army duties in the other areas".

Patriotic organisations

Asked what political shades and affiliations were held by volunteers in the Autonomous Region, the Commander in Chief said those included people from patriotic organisations and independent elements. "All have contributed effectively to the Popular Army in the region. The contribution is wider than that given by such people in other provinces which is a positive indication to adherence and support of all sons of the region to the Popular Army. Non-bathists are more than half and such a phenomenon is not existing in other provinces".

He continued: "In the war period a new phenomenon surfaced for the Popular Army that is unknown to other militias: the exceptional task of retraining and developing combat capability of fighters which entail a great deal of effort and exertion and which is coupled with the training of new members. Added to this is the number of new members receiving training having exceeded the number of trainees in the pre-war period. It is another added quality to the preparedness of the Popular Army and its efficient management".

"The training plan for 1980 was in the neighbourhood of 26—28 percent more than prescribed. This percentage was not accomplished in 1979 and 1978. The same standard of recruitment will be kept for 1981 inspite of the gigantic tasks shouldered by the Popular Army."

Students and the Popular Army

Referring to the enlistment of students to membership of the Popular Army, he said that "for the first time, the Popular Army is including students within its formations and undertaking their training, on a large scale, in numerous provinces. This task will be accomplished 100 percent. The enlisting of more combatants is not dictated by the need for more fighters to serve in the front nor can this be regarded as to elevate and bolster their self condfidence. But in the long run such is required. This war is a wide one which means that the people ought to have wider role side by side with the armed forces as necessitated in the presence of the Popular Army. This is instrumental in increasing the cohesion between the sons of the people in all their social groups. By this way we can achieve the great objective which we aspire to".

Arab volunteers

Asked about the number of Arab volunteers within the Popular Army, Mr. Ramadhan said that Arab volunteers came from most of the Arab countries, They were mostly enabled by their own political conditions, some came from outside their own countries, others came direct from their own countries where political conditions permitted them.

"Palestinians had greater share particularly those resid-

ent in Iraq. But there is a large-scale voluntary movement among our Egyptian brethren. Arab volunteers will continue to be accepted not out of the need to numbers of combatants but in order to deepen the nationalist outlook of the war and to give Arab brethren an opportunity to contribute to the war in order to lay bridges of confidence and understanding among all Arabs. Over 5000 Arabs have participated in the front and the number will increase in the future", he said.

The Commander in Chief stressed that the present power of the Popular Army reached a level which is by far higher than before the war. Most modern techniques of training are applied and new elements are assigned to tackle whatever impediments and shortcomings experienced at the beginning of the war and in the transition of the Popular Army to its new role. All such conditions have now been tackled with the result that Popular Army's capabilities are much greater and superlative in quality compared with the pre-war conditions.

He also said: "We are confident that the Popular Army is capable of continuing the march forward with better effort, better power, and better organisation. It has invested to the best the rich experience in the war. We now study phenomena produced by the battle in order to invest them to the benefit of the Popular Army's power and the development of its level as a pioneering experiment".

In conclusion, the Commander in Chief spoke about the recruitment of women to the Popular Army confirming that there existed strong membership of women within the army. The women shouldered duties of civil defence and care, he said. "Acceptance of women in the Popular Army will continue. We have introduced improvements on the programmes of first aid and civil defence benefiting from war experiences. Enlistment of women within the formations of the Popular Army is a healthy sign".

CSO: 4300/80

CONSTRUCTION, ROAD PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 17 Jul 81 p 21

[Article by Abed-Noor Abboud]

[Text]

There is an unprecedented boom going on in the building and construction sector in Iraq with hundreds of Dinars being invested in construction of new motor-roads, bridges, housing schemes, dams, etc. side by side with other development work in health, education, culture, scientific research and land reclamation.

The main target in the Five Year Plan, launched this year, provides for the transfer of "our country to an advanced stage in the fields of science and technology, in construction, general progress and economic development". Tremendous emphasis continues to be placed on the building programme which received 28 percent of the total investment programme of ID. 1.9 bn.

ID. 133 M. has been expended on building and road projects due for completion in current 1981. Further contracts recently signed bring the total sum for such projects to over ID. 2.732 bn. These include a 1,300-km long section of the international expressway, 12,308 kms-long roads, a number of civil airports, bridges, traffic junctions and 38,770 housing units.

A recent statistical release from the State Establishment for Roads and Bridges said that ID. 999.275M are being invested to build 12,308 km of roads including 2,554 kms in the Southern area at ID. 254.750M; 3,865 kms in the Central area at ID. 318.873 M and 5,889 kms in the Northern area at ID. 425.652 M. ID. 1.250 bn was allocated to cover the 1,300-km section of the international expressway, a major road building project now under construction to link the Kuwaiti borders with the Syrian borders across the country.

ID. 339 M. was allocated to build 100 major and minor bridges and ID. 445M. to build three airports in Baghdad and the Provinces. There are 110 more building projects under construction costing ID. 61 M.

According to Mr. Mohammad al-Mufti, Director-General of the State Establishment for Roads and Bridges, more than 12,000 kms of roads were now under construction in the country at an annual completion rate of 2500-3000 kms. There are 21 major and 75 minor bridges under actual construction and work will soon begin on 18 other major bridges.

He said that over 2400 km long roads and 17 brid-

ges were built in Iraqi-held Iranian territory. The work done under difficult war conditions was regarded a feat for Iraqi engineers and workers.

There is an unprecedented brisk activity in the building of new housing units and residential complexes with new housing schemes worth ID. 98 M which are due to be inaugurated, or foundation stones laid, during this week's celebrations marking the 13th anniversary of the 17th July Revolution of 1968. 7,355 other housing units are due for distribution to new owners in 16 Provinces by the end 1981. They have cost ID. 72.511 m. Further 42,000 housing units, costing well over ID. 1.250 bn, are now under construction.

Among the most important contracts awarded this year was the ID. 1.410 bn contract of the Mosul Dam which is expected, after completion, to change the agricultural situation in a large part of Iraqi arable areas. It will reclaim more than one million donums of land and will have a large electricity generation plant built over it. It is also expected to improve river transportation between Baghdad and Mosul.

Another ambitious project getting underway is the Baghdad metro, the first stage, a 32 kms line, should be completed by 1990. The project with consulting engineering contract already awarded to a British firm, is expected to cost more than ID. 1 bn.

The problem that emerged through, under such a development boom, is that supply and demand cannot meet in the production of several items of the construction materials. A case in point is that of the cement production, an item which has become increasingly scarce in spite of recorded increase in production rates. With ever-increasing demands to feed development projects, Iraq reacted to the problem with a new chain of cement production factories springing in different parts of the country. With contracts recently signed for cement works being built in Kerbala, Nineveh, Anbar and other places, production in 1984 will be more than 23 M tons.

This year, the first year of the Five-Year Plan, has coincided with the war of aggression started by the Persians. One of the established objectives of the war has been to delay and disrupt Iraq's construction and development programmes. But to the dismay of the Persian enemy and their backers, Iraq's budget came out with 38 percent increase on the 1980 budget at ID. 5.025 bn.

Exceptionally high development rates are being achieved in all sectors and countrymen are now fully mobilised to increase the country's real material possibilities side by side with repulsing the aggressors.

CSO: 4300/80

AIR FORCE COMMANDER INTERVIEWED ON REACTOR RAID

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew No 22, Jun 81 Insert pp 1-4

[Article: "The Nuclear Reactor--'Bull's Eye'; Special Interview with Air Force Commander, Major General David Ivri"]

[Text] After the commotion caused by the destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq quieted down somewhat, Major General David Ivri, the Air Force commander, found a few minutes to talk about some points of the operation especially for the readers of the Air Force newsletter.

"First," the commander said, "the execution was perfect. Only the intended targets were hit. Not a single bomb hit an unintended target, such as another reactor or another installation. We made sure we did not cause casualties or nuclear radiation.

"Second, one of the cornerstones of the operation, besides the planning and performance level, was the reliability of the equipment. Such a dangerous long-range mission cannot be undertaken unless we fully trust our equipment. Indeed, the latest Air Force equipment turned out to be most reliable. We may add that special installations were made for this operation in a short time and with minimal warning. In light of the results, we cannot help but congratulate the personnel of the maintenance system--the planners, the engineers, and the aircraft technicians. This was also pointed out by the pilots who returned from the mission.

"Another accomplishment was the full secrecy surrounding the operation. Despite its complexity and the large number of participants, the secrecy was total, without any leakage. Such secrecy made the hair's breadth difference between total surprise and exposure, the cancellation of the operation, or even worse.

"In sum," Major General Ivri said, "the Air Force has shown capability and a new dimension in its high planning and performance level while using new sophisticated equipment in every possible operational way."

The Air Force commander saved the most newsworthy item till the end: "Some say we have worked in cooperation with Iran. Well, they are right!" He hastened to add with a smile: "Because of the Khomeyni revolution we got the F-16 planes sooner than expected and we were able to use them in this operation...."

The Leader: Only After Landing I Realized What We Have Done

"As we approached our target we locked down and saw a complex surrounded by a thick cement wall," the leader of the formation which attacked the Osirak nuclear reactor near Bagdad relates. "The complex covered several hundred square meters, surrounded by a wall. The target itself was one building with a silver dome. The perimeter was less than 100 meters."

The formation leader said little. The daring mission is only two days behind him, but there is no sign of it. His voice does not reveal the magnitude of the responsibility he was given only 48 hours ago.

He continued on: "We have known about the operation several months ahead of time. We kept practicing the smallest details. Even the chief of staff flew with us in one of the rehearsals. When we finished there was no doubt in anyone's mind we were fully prepared."

Total Secrecy

"I was not given the date of the operation until the day before, when the base commander came back from seeing the Air Force commander. Everything was kept top secret. Not only did the women not know anything about what was going to take place but also the officers and the technicians were kept in the dark.

On Sunday (7 June 1981) we had our last briefing and we took off. The fast briefing proved one more time how well oiled we were for the mission."

The planes took off with maximum fuel and bombs. The bombs were the usual ones, which had been tried in various operations. The attacking planes were escorted by planes ready for potential interception by enemy planes. "We took off in the afternoon and we flew until we reached the target."

This is long flying time for a combat pilot. Even when the flight takes place in enemy airspace, there is time to think and wonder about the meaning of the operation. What did the leader think about on the way to Iraq?

Total Surprise

"Flying time may seem short, depending, of course, on the circumstances," the leader smiles. "I was busy all the time navigating. As the leader of the formation I had to direct all the aircraft with total precision to the target. When you know several planes depend on you, follow you, and, above all, rely on you, you have no time for the problems of the world.

"I was busy all the time with the operation. I kept looking at the fuel gauge, the formation behind me, all the airplane systems. The most potentially frustrating thing is a technical problem in one of the aircraft. This worried me more than anything else. Everything else we had taken care of beforehand."

The planes did not encounter any resistance on the way to the target. No enemy planes, no anti-aircraft fire, no missiles.

Total Precision

"Our surprise attack caught the enemy napping," the leader speculates. He was the first to bomb the reactor. "But when we reached the Osirak reactor, also called Tamuz by the Iraqis, we were greeted with strong anti-aircraft fire. The lack of alertness of the planes and missiles surprised us. The enemy could have done a lot better.

"At that moment I didn't think about anything. I reached a point where I intended to release the bombs, I pushed the button, and another plane moved in after me. Everything worked like clockwork, exactly on schedule and at record speed."

The flight back took less time than the flight to the target. "The tension was not nearly as great, although there were problems on the way back. We faced the danger of interception. The enemy planes had had enough time to intercept us. We kept looking at the radar, searching for enemy planes.

"When we approached our base the others came up to me and prepared for the landing in a close formation. One of the tricks in such a mission is not to lose one's control even on the way back. You should return in the most orderly manner, taking the quickest route, without showing off."

"I Heaved A Sigh of Relief"

The leader is careful not to become emotional. He speaks fluently, yet without sentimentality. Only this once he deviates from his factual account: "When we landed at the base I realized what we had done. I was apprehensive before we left. I am not a pessimist, but we were going hundreds of miles through enemy territory to a well guarded target. There were many critical risks. Only when I saw everyone get off the aircraft and assemble did I heave a sigh of relief."

The Planner: "The Motto was Simplicity and Common Sense"

The planner of the Air Force operation to destroy the Iraqi nuclear reactor--an operation of far-reaching strategic consequences--is younger than the state, having been drafted after the Six-Day War.

The 32-year-old planner is a seasoned pilot who has flown Skyhawks, Phantoms, and Mirages, with combat experience as a Phantom pilot in the Yom Kippur War. In recent years he has worked as an operation planner, of which the most spectacular operation is this perfectly planned and executed destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Months of planning and precise coordination, risking the unknown, went into this longest bombing mission in the history of the Air Force, in which the reactor was destroyed with exemplary precision and in record time.

While the impact of the operation reverberated throughout the world, we met the pilot relaxing at home with his family in shorts and barefoot, like after an ordinary workday. This might have been the result of the motto which had guided him throughout the operation--be simple.

The pilot says: "I was chosen to head the team which was directed to offer suggestions and present a plan for hitting the reactor. After weighing all the other alternatives, it was decided to use airplanes.

[Question] What changes took place in the plan before its final draft?

[Answer] "In the first stage we tried out different aircraft. We wanted to have the shortest possible attack while keeping a margin of safety. This is how we decided what airplane to use. That is, we wanted to make sure that even if some airplaces were knocked out, the rest could carry out the mission. Such a long range operation over foreign territories forced us to think of solutions to make sure our men did not fall into enemy hands and remain helpless so far from our borders.

Not to Endanger the Frenchmen's Lives

As for ammunition, we decided to use the usual bombs, large size, but not too sophisticated or more than necessary. We wanted to keep it simple in order not to create too many risks and complications.

Besides the target and the distance, we took into account the air threat. We were concerned about being discovered by the Jordanians, and later by the Saudis and the Iraqis. The target itself was protected by ground-to-air missiles. The Iraqis, of course, are at war with Iran. So we figured they would be at full alert. Hence the element of surprise was of the utmost importance. If they were forewarned about our arrival, the operation would have ended differently. The enemy planes could have engaged us on the way there. So our first concern was to arrive at the target secretly. This presented us with another challenge to insure the success of the operation. We had to find a course which would enable the planes to get there and back, do the bombing in different climactic conditions, and be able to maneuver in case of being discovered by the enemy. Many things were unpredictable, and we had to take them into consideration.

[Question] How do you decide when to attack?

[Answer] "We were not particularly concerned about the exact time of the attack. It was important to fly the right way and get there at the right time. But no special problems had emerged, and we were able to attack at the exact moment.

"We set the time so as not to endanger the lives of the French scientists and technicians, who at that time were off from work. This is also why we picked Sunday, which is the Sabbath for Frenchmen and Catholics."

Only Scattered Anti-Aircraft Fire

[Question] What were the unknowns during the planning? What was the extent of the risk for the pilots?

[Answer] "There were many unknowns. For instance, we did not know if we would be discovered by the enemy, when, and how the enemy would react.

"We also didn't know which enemy would discover us. In all of this there was a need for a great deal of resourcefulness on the part of the pilots.

"The risk for the pilots was not small. The risk begins with any problems with the equipment. You are far from home and it would take a long time to be rescued. It is difficult to find a pilot in the desert, so far from home. There is a danger of landing in such territory, far away, where your life is in danger, and this concern accompanied the pilots.

"The pilots were picked by the commanders according to their experience, and the plan was worked out before the operation, but the pilots were notified officially the first time we wanted to go into action only a couple of months ago."

Flight Profile Training

[Question] How did you train for such long range mission?

[Answer] "We constructed a flight profile and kept practicing it, calculating the course, the range, the timing, and other details. The planes flew over our territory, in the same formation as the attack. We tried to make it as close to the actual attack as possible."

[Question] How in your opinion was the operation conducted to its conclusion?

[Answer] "We tried to put the plan into effect several times and each time we had to call it off for another reason.

"The operation of destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor was an exclusive operation of the Air Force. It was the longest bombing mission the force ever flew. Many people worked on it, many professionals who worked on all the details. My job was to check options, ideas, and consequences, put them together for a detailed plan which would answer the demands of the commanders, the immediate ones on up to the chief of staff. I became familiar with the smallest details of the operation, and I had to present it properly. I had to keep reexamining every idea, consider its worth, and decide whether to adopt it or not. There were discussions up to the last moment. So I don't see myself as the only planner of the operation, but rather as the director, or the one who put it together.

"The operation was carried out better than any training flight which I had participated in until now, and there was perfect coordination between the plan and the execution. It was almost like a movie. Such perfect performance and planning is only possible, of course, when the pilots and the planes are of a given quality. All one has to do is put them together with the other factors which make the operation successful.

Common Sense of Creative Thinking

[Question] Would the plan have looked differently if someone else had planned it?

[Answer] "Another person might have given the Air Force commander other suggestions. We certainly could have done it differently, yet with the same degree of success."

[Question] What qualifications do you need to plan this operation?

[Answer] "First of all, I have experience as a combat pilot, and a great deal of experience as a Phantom pilot in the Yom Kippur War. My special background is due mainly to flying Phantoms, which necessitated input in planning and attack. A good planner needs to know all the methods of attack, all the kinds of weapons, and creative thinking.

"Creative thinking means common sense. To know what I want to do, what the enemy will think, and what will I do then. We do not know this enemy, so we had to figure out how smart and alert he was. There is also room for intuition. In every operational planning, intuition is an excellent substitute to logical-mathematical thinking. This is why another kind of plan could also have succeeded. In such plarning you cannot prove anything regarding the behavior of the enemy in a mathematical way.

"One of the problems of this operation is facing so many unknowns. But the way to do is to simplify matters. Do things the simplest way. We worked on this operation one and one-half years, and we faced many problems and questions. Anyone familiar with the operation knows it is very complex, and, in the end, very simple."

[Question] Are you good at chess?

[Answer] "No. I have always lost at chess, even at checkers. If the operation were as complicated as a chess game, it would have failed. It would not have been simple enough.

9565
CSO: 4323/26

EXPORT OF SUBSIDIZED FOOD PRODUCTS INCREASES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 29 May 81 p 12

/Article by Gabi Kessler: "West Bank Merchants Export Subsidized Food Products"/

/Text/ In recent weeks the export of subsidized food products from Israel to western countries has increased. The movement of capital from Israel to other countries has also increased, according to a statement made yesterday by the Alignment Coordinator on the Finance Committee, MK 'Adi 'Amora'i.

According to him, in May there was an increase in the purchase of subsidized food products by Arab merchants from the West Bank who transported them to Jordan and Kuwait while exploiting their low price in Israel and their higher price in the Arab countries.

The sale of foreign currency in the banks increased fourfold. For the first time in a long while, dealers and speculators in foreign currency have again appeared on Lillienblum Street in Tel Aviv. According to MK 'Amora'i, the rapid decline of the shekel in May is the result of the increased demand for foreign currency by Israelis, some of whom have tried to smuggle it out of the country.

The Knesset Finance Committee yesterday authorized an increase of 210 million shekels for the subsidies appropriation after it was disclosed that the annual appropriation for subsidizing milk, eggs, and frozen poultry was already exhausted after 2 months. Finance Ministry personnel reported that the subsidy rate of bread has now reached 110 percent of its cost to the consumer. The subsidization of public transportation and frozen poultry is at 80 percent, and the subsidization of milk is at 65 percent. It was only 5 months ago that the government was subsidizing only four products.

The governor of the Bank of Israel, Arnon Gafni, told the Finance Committee that in the first months of 1981, the improvement in the balance of payments which characterized the same period last year came to an end. Inflation has also not been stopped despite the fact that the subsidies have increased threefold over that which was planned in the budget.

5830
CSO: 4323/18

UNREST AMONG ARAB UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Jun 81 p 4

/Article by Yosef Tzuriel and Amos Lavov: "Students Riot in Bi'r Zayt and Na'jah University in Shekhem"/

/Text/ Security authorities in Judea and Samaria are preparing today for the possibility of disturbances commemorating the anniversary of the wounding of the mayors of Ram Allah and Shekhem. Karim Khalaf and Bassam Shaq'a were asked to avoid instigating any disturbances to mark the event or participating in events which others initiate in their cities. Other mayors have also been asked not to visit Ram Allah and Shekhem today lest their presence be inflammatory or provide a pretext for demonstrations.

Yesterday there were disturbances at Bi'r Zayt University. Students gathered in the morning in the university yard and on the adjoining road. A little later they began to throw stones at Israeli vehicles. A military patrol which arrived on the scene ordered the students to enter their classes or return to their homes. They refused, and even increased the throwing of stones, and they burned tires. An order was given to clear them out by force, and tear gas grenades were also fired toward them. One student was held for interrogation. There were no injuries.

At the al-Na'jah University in Shekhem students also created a disturbance yesterday. The security forces surrounded the university and acted with restraint. There were no injuries. The disturbances in the university began after a week of futile attempts on the part of the communist and religious students to incite the campus after their failure in the recent elections to the students association. As was reported in MA'ARIV 2 days ago, all 11 positions in the students committee were won by the moderate students in the elections which were held last week. The chairman of the board of trustees of the university, Hikmat al-Masri, told MA'ARIV that the results of the elections reflect the moderate tendency which is appearing in Judea and Samaria in general.

At al-Na'jah University, a "Palestine" flag was waved at 11 am. The students also erected barricades at the entrances to the university and burned tires. The security forces blocked traffic on the nearby roads to the campus. The soldiers and the police did not attempt to approach or enter the university.

The students threw stones at the security forces, however there were no casualties and no damage. The disturbances on the campus continued until the late afternoon hours, and the students did not go home until darkness. At the end of the day, the security forces permitted the students to leave the university and go home quietly.

5830
CSO: 4323/18

MEASURES TAKEN TO COPE WITH DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 30 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by David Bernstein]

[Text] THE PALESTINIANS today constitute more than 50 per cent of the population of Jordan, according to figures released recently by the Palestine Bureau of Statistics in Beirut.

Jordan, acutely aware of this demographic problem that threatens the very foundations of the Hashemite Kingdom, has insisted for some years now that the Palestinians form about 40 per cent of the population, an estimate based on UN figures that are now well out of date.

Sources in the West Bank assert that the proportion of Palestinians in Jordan is even higher than the 50 per cent-plus cited by the PBS, putting the figure at about 65 per cent — with fully 75 per cent of the population in the capital, Amman, said to be of Palestinian origin.

With an annual birth-rate of some 4 per cent, compared with 2 per cent for Jordan's non-Palestinian population, it has long been clear that the Palestinians would eventually form a majority in the kingdom.

Accordingly, the Hashemite regime has taken a number of steps over the years to prevent the Palestinians from ever seizing power in Jordan:

- Undercover security servicemen have been planted in all refugee camps, giving the Jordanian authorities almost total control of all aspects of life there;
- Palestinian army officers and MPs are under constant surveillance;
- There is a ban on all forms of Palestinian particularist party activity;
- In times of tension, the refugee camps and other Palestinian populated centers are placed under curfew as a matter of course and electricity supplies are cut off;
- Palestinians in the armed services are particularly suspect, and elaborate measures have been adopted to prevent them from advancing to positions of power;
- There are very few Palestinians in the upper echelons of the army, and even those few are restricted to administrative posts — logistics, supply, medical, maintenance, etc.;
- Palestinian officers in front-line battle units are regularly rotated to prevent them from building up a potential power base in the army;
- Officers of Palestinian origin are strictly blocked in their advancement, with many encouraged to retire early once it is made clear to them that there are no promotion prospects for them in the Jordanian armed forces;

□ Palestinians are being recruited more selectively, and even though there is general conscription in Jordan, Palestinians today make up no more than one-third of all army personnel, compared with more than half a few years ago (however, Palestinian soldiers still form a majority in most battle units, and are often referred to contemptuously by their Beduin officers as "cannon fodder").

ALTHOUGH THERE has been growing resentment among Palestinians at their treatment, especially in the army, openly expressed discontent has been relatively muted.

The PLO has clearly decided, for the time being at least, to play down the problem for fear of disturbing the delicate state of its relations with Jordan, which are in the process of reconciliation following the showdown of September 1970.

Relations between the two sides are conducted through a joint PLO-Jordanian committee, which meets regularly in Jordan. One of the main functions of this committee is to maintain contacts with the population in the West Bank, a channel which the PLO would be loathe to close.

Of even more importance to the PLO is the opportunity presented by the regular meetings of the committee to secretly rebuild its infrastructure in Jordan, almost completely obliterated in the confrontation with King Hussein in 1970.

So, while the PLO is careful not to goad Jordan at present, a leading member of the organization's central committee was recently quoted in the Beirut daily *as-Safir* as saying that Jordan has "legitimate" reason to fear that the Palestinian national solution "will be at the expense of the Hashemite Kingdom."

CSO: 4300/85

SOCIAL SECURITY CORPORATION ACTIVITIES OUTLINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 30, 1 Aug 81 p 37

[Text]

'WE WILL be the biggest investment corporation in Jordan within two or three years — except for the government, of course,' claims Farhi Ubeid, director general of Jordan's Social Security Corporation (SSC). After getting off to a good start 18 months ago, Jordan's social security scheme is continuing to attract funds — it now has financing to the tune of Jordanian dinars 11.5m (JD1m = $2.9m).

The SSC, instituted under Jordan's provisional law number 30 of 1978, first extended occupational health, disability and pension coverage to 7,000 Jordanian employees on 1 January 1980. Another 56,000 employees have been added to the scheme in two stages since, and 60,000 civil servants and other employees from contracting and construction firms are due to join this summer and autumn.

Ubeid, who took over the SSC directorship in February 1980 from Jawad Anani, now labour minister, told *8 Days* that the corporation expects to have accumulated $26.8m more from employer and employee payments by the end of the year. By 1985 it anticipates an accumulated balance of $596m.

'Our top investment priority is housing,' Ubeid said. But while the SSC investment programme envisages that 25 per cent of available funds will go to housing schemes, the current breakdown of investments shows the major share to be in industry, primarily cement factories.

The Jordan Cement Factories Company is allotted $4m, the new factory at Rashadiya in the south, which will produce cement for export, $13.4m while the Syrian-Jordanian Company for Industry will get $2.9m for its white cement plant.

Another $5.9m is allocated to a range of industries, including the Jordan National Maritime Lines, the Refineries Company and Jordan television. Alia — the royal Jordanian Airline — and the Jordan Hotels and Resthouses Corporation will each get $1.5m in loans, while development bonds and securities will get $.7m and $1m is in real estate.

As well as SSC funds for housing, feasibility studies are underway for the establishment of an investment bank. This would provide loans to those insured for housing, education and equipment for the self employed, at low interest rates.

The programme envisages 7.5 per cent of funds going to agriculture. The SSC is also studying the possibility of initiating or participating in other schemes, such as baby food production, pharmaceutical products and educational toys.

The SSC's insurance scheme, set up with advice from Britain and aid from Kuwait, will eventually cover all employees working in Jordan.

CSO: 4300/85

INTERIOR MINISTER ANNOUNCES IMPROVED SECURITY MEASURES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Jul 81 p 3

[Article: "Minister of the Interior: Preventing Organized Crimes Calls For the Cooperation Of the Sister States; Visitor Permits Will Be Issued In Cases Of Clear Necessity"]

> [Text] A unified plan by the Interior and Defense ministries to protect the borders.
>
> Expulsion will be limited to those who violate security or who are illegal aliens.
>
> We hope Iraq will extradite the two suspects in the bombing incidents.
>
> Redistribution of security personnel along the border outposts.
>
> There have so far been 100,000 applications for Kuwaiti citizenship.

The minister of the interior, Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad, said that contacts with Iraq were continuing to secure the extradition of the two suspects accused of planting explosive devices in five separate areas of Kuwait last month. He emphasized that preventing such organized crimes from being repeated in the future requires cooperation and coordination with the sister states.

Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad emphasized that there is abundant security and stability in Kuwait at various levels. He warned that the security authorities would not allow those who commit security or law violations to continue to reside in Kuwait, which welcomes all honorable and sincere visitors.

The minister disclosed a plan by the Ministry of the Interior for improving the work of its personnel and for a carefully planned redistribution of security personnel along the border outposts in accordance with the latest developments in the country and in the Gulf region.

He noted that another project was being studied jointly by the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defense to devise a unified plan for protecting Kuwait's borders against any acts of infiltration or aggression.

No Expulsion Campaigns

Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad denied that there was any campaign to expel foreigners. He said that there was no basis in truth to such rumors. He emphasized that Kuwait welcomes all sincere individuals who come to Kuwait to engage in business honorably, respect Kuwait's laws and customs, and who do not behave toward their hosts with impertinence.

The minister continued: "However, we will not allow those who violate Kuwait's security or who have suspicious connections to remain among us in Kuwait." He emphasized that any expulsions at the present time would apply only to those living in the country illegally or who have shown a lack of respect for Kuwait's laws.

Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad spoke about the recommendations of the parliamentary committee on interior and defense matters concerned with the subject of Kuwait's internal security, which were published yesterday by AL-QABAS. He described these recommendations as excellent and positive, and said that they were now being studied by Interior Ministry officials. He said, "We welcome any cooperation with the National Assembly which will in any way help to promote stability and security in Kuwait." He said that this was made quite clear throughout the past session of the National Assembly when everyone stressed that security and freedom are inseparable.

A Security Plan

On the subject of strengthening the country's security methods Shaykh Nawaf said that several measures had been taken to that end and are being applied on both sea and land. On sea, the coast guard is being strengthened with modern advanced equipment and trained personnel. In addition, continuous naval patrols are being instituted to protect the local waters from infiltrators and violators as well as from any hostile activities which might pose a threat to Kuwait's security and stability.

With regard to steps being taken to implement security measures on land the minister said that a plan had been prepared by the ministry and would be implemented. Its object will be to reorganize the structure of the ministry so as also to reorganize the stationing of security forces along the border guardposts and distribute the personnel along these posts in a manner appropriate to the current situation and to the demands of protecting Kuwait's borders, removed from any interferences which might affect the maintenance of the country's security.

The minister stressed that the capabilities necessary for accomplishing this improvement had been taken into consideration while the plan was being devised, particularly in view of the fact that the border posts have taken on considerable importance under the critical circumstances in the Arab Gulf region.

Cooperation Between the Interior and Defense Ministries

The minister called attention to another plan for improving coordination between the ministries of the Interior and Defense. This involves developing a unified

plan for protecting the border with army personnel stationed in the front ranks and policemen performing the duty of a second line of border defense.

On the matter of Kuwaiti contacts with officials in Baghdad relating to the requested extradition of two suspects accused of planting 5 explosive devices in separate locations in Kuwait last month, the minister said that the contacts were continuing. He expressed the hope that Iraq would extradite the two suspects to Kuwait at the earliest opportunity so that they can be brought to trial in Kuwaiti courts and justice can take its course with them.

Arab Cooperation In Security Matters

On the subject of the Arab security plan produced by the conferences of Arab interior ministers Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad said that its purpose was to coordinate and improve cooperation in security matters and the exchange of intelligence and data in security matters. It also affirms the mutual extradition of criminals among these sister states because such criminals pose a danger not only to a single country but have a harmful effect on all.

Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad stated that if the recommendations of the conferences on Arab security were not implemented it would be impossible to speak of cooperation in security matters--which everyone wants--and that this subject would remain merely empty words, particularly while we are discussing the establishment of a higher committee of Arab ministers of the interior to coordinate, monitor and implement our ambitions for strengthening Arab security apparatuses capable of protecting the security of the Arab states from any external or internal aggression, in addition to combatting crime.

With regard to the committee on cooperation among the Arab Gulf states Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad said that there were no contacts or discussions within the framework of this committee on the subject of security. He continued, "We welcome any cooperation among the Gulf states and any coordination in various spheres. This subject, however, has so far not been raised for discussion. But if it is raised, we will have a plan and fully thought-out ideas on the subject of security."

100,000 Applications For Citizenship

The minister of the interior also spoke about naturalization and efforts being made to study the cases which satisfy the criteria for granting citizenship. He said that the number of applications for Kuwaiti citizenship received at all the centers authorized to accept them amounted to about 100,000. He said that when the deadline for the applications--as determined by a cabinet decision--had been reached at the end of this year special committees would be formed to study these applications and make a decision on them in accordance with the criteria for granting Kuwaiti citizenship.

He said that the rate of applications currently being submitted had dropped off greatly because most of those who realized that they met the criteria for naturalization submitted their applications during the first 3 months when the centers first opened.

With regard to the naturalization of police and army personnel the minister said there is a law which governs such cases. Anyone who serves for 15 years can obtain Kuwaiti citizenship, and citizenship acquired in this way becomes permanent after the completion of 20 years of military service.

Visitor Permits

Shaykh Nawaf also spoke about suspending the issuance of visitor permits. He said that this had been done as an emergency measure which became necessary after the bombing incidents had disturbed security. This measure has been eased in keeping with current circumstances, and visitor permits are being issued in cases of clear necessity. He said that the Government of Kuwait always takes the human and social aspects into consideration and bears them in mind in any decision of this sort.

9123
CSO: 4304/82

ALIEN LABOR STATISTICS ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Jul 81 p 2

[Article: "15,000 Workers From India, Pakistan and Bangladesh Entered Kuwait's Labor Market Last Year"]

[Text] According to the annual report on employment activity and basic information about workers who arrived in 1980 published by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor the number of Iranians who entered the labor market rose, returning to the level of 1978, but still below 1977 levels.

One established feature is still the continued influx of workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In 1980 a total of 14,960 new workers from these 3 countries entered the labor market. This represents 26.6 percent, or more than one-quarter, of all newly arriving workers.

There was also a high demand for other Asian workers, particularly those from Thailand and Sri Lanka.

On the other hand, there is also a large number of new Arab workers in certain economic areas. But the continued increase in the number of new Asian workers in other economic activities cannot be ignored.

Arab Workers

The report presents statistics on work permit renewals according to economic activity and nationality, with comparative figures from the previous year. An examination of the origins of newly arriving workers reveals the scope of the change which these origins have undergone when compared with workers who arrived a year or more ago. This may be seen in the statistics on work permit renewals. The following are the most important indications in this connection:

Arab workers account for 57.1 percent of the total number of work permit renewals, while Asian workers account for 41.3 percent. It is very easy to see the difference between these two figures, as well as the equivalent statistics for new arrivals, which confirm the changing origins of workers in 1980, as a result of the huge number of new workers arriving from Asian countries.

An examination of these figures from 1977 to 1980 shows that this change in the origins of workers is occurring very rapidly. Instances of work permit renewal show a high proportion of Arab workers which increases from year to year. The opposite is true for new arrivals, inasmuch as the figures show a high proportion of Asian workers which is increasing from one year to the next.

The following question presents itself: Why is there a discrepancy between the figures on new workers and renewals when one would expect the two figures to be closer when the current demand continues as it has been for about 4 years in a row?

Analysis Of the Indications

The answer to this question must take into account the following points:

The large number of people of Arab origin accepted in the past to supply the labor market developed into a pool of Arab workers which still comprises the majority of alien workers.

Increasing the residency period for non-Arab workers to 5 years has caused Asian workers not to show up in the statistics on work permit renewal, with the huge number of them currently in Kuwait's labor market. It is necessary to wait a year or two for the expected radical change to occur.

A portion of the Asian workers are temporary workers who will leave the labor market when their job is over. These individuals are employed through foreign contractors. Therefore they do not appear in the renewal figures, and will only show up in the figures on termination and departure. They will have no effect on the figures given in the tables. Korean workers are the best example of this.

Arab Nationalities

With regard to individual nationalities certain important indications can be discerned in the work permit renewal figures. Among these indications are the following:

Among all the Arabs, Egyptians, followed by Jordanians, Syrians and Lebanese, figure most prominently. These figures are much higher than those for new arrivals. Renewal figures have been this way in past years also.

Among all the Asian nationalities there has been nothing like the current level of new arrivals, as the statistics for 1978, 1979 and 1980 show. The reverse is true for Iranian workers, who show a higher number of renewals than new arrivals.

In their renewals, workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh are maintaining the high numbers reflected in the figures on new arrivals during the years under comparison.

There are many more workers from Western Europe than from Eastern Europe for both renewals and new arrivals.

The figures indicate that the general situation for renewals has not changed during the past 4 years included in the comparison. It can thus be said that there were more Arab workers than others, both in the three primary economic areas of construction work, trade, restaurants and hotels, and manufacturing, as well as in the other areas of economic activity.

9123
CSO: 4304/82

STEPS TAKEN TO EASE CRISIS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 214, 8-14 Jun 81 pp 12-14

[Article by Rafiq Shalala: "The Crisis of the Follow-up Crisis Committee"]

[Text] Will the Arab follow-up committee, which was summoned into meeting on Saturday, chaired by President Ilyas Sarkis, produce practical results to achieve peace in Lebanon, even though temporary or relative, or will its fate be like the fate of preceding Arab committees?

This question has occupied political circles in Lebanon since the recent conference of Arab foreign ministers in Tunis announced the "activation" of the Arab oversight committee, which was born in 1978 and then revived in 1979. Previous Arab experiments have not been encouraging, or rather, have increased the agonies of the Lebanese, who have preferred more than once that their problem remain in Arab hands, instead of being snatched up by international hands and tossed about, like a wretched ball in a game in which only "foul" shots count.

Unfortunately, the preliminary signs that preceded the committee's meeting did not inspire reassurance, since a dispute arose over where it should be held, from proponents of Ba'bada or Bayt al-Din, to demands that it be held in Shtawrah...or in Riyadh. Lebanese officials faced difficulty in deciding this matter, which almost led to postponing the meeting.

Despite this negative start, Lebanese officials hoped that they could transcend it, since the formalities, although they did stem from basic fundamentals, would not influence the committee's work, and the atmosphere which must accompany its meetings.

Lessons of the Past

The committee members are invited this time to learn a serious lesson from what occurred in the past, especially since some of them took part in the meetings of previous Arab committees, and came to know the true difficulties which the Lebanese state faced in implementing the decisions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits. They must start from previous efforts, not return to point zero.

The follow-up committee which meets today, is the fourth since three committees were afflicted by failure after failure.

The first Arab committee was quadripartite, and was called a supreme committee. It was formed, after the Riyadh and Cairo summits, from representatives of Egypt, Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, in addition to Lebanon. Its mission was to oversee implementation of the two summits' resolutions. This committee succeeded in gathering up the heavy weapons, and relocating the regular Palestinian forces which had entered Lebanon during the war of the Sixties. It then turned to dealing with the most delicate issue, applying the Cairo agreement. It was confronted by the problem of collecting the medium weapons. However, it was able to bypass it, to look into a more delicate problem. When the question of the Cairo agreement was broached, the situation began to become different. Security developments occurred in the country, the most important of which was the assassination of Kamal Jumblatt, which caused the security situation to escalate. Members of the committee became preoccupied with taking measures to prevent the situation from deteriorating and more assassinations from occurring.

After the end of the security "hullabaloo", it renewed the debate over the Cairo agreement. Differences of opinion among the committee members arose over means of implementing the agreement, which put their activities on ice, especially after a Lebanese interpretation of the agreement appeared, which was incompatible with the Palestinian interpretation. The Lebanese side insisted on using their interpretation, because it was meaningful and had direct relationship. Attempts made on other levels did not succeed in producing an Arab interpretation.

After the committee's activities ceased, contacts were initiated on an individual level. Attempts surfaced to revive a Lebanese--Syrian--Palestinian committee to study the best ways to deal with the Cairo agreement issue. Meetings were held in Shtawrah for this purpose, but were not fruitful.

The events of the summer of 1978 occurred between the Syrian forces operating in the "deterrent" and the "Lebanese forces." President Ilyas Sarkis made a quick trip to a number of Arab states, which concluded with a meeting of the foreign ministers of Arab states participating in or financing the "deterrent force." After the meeting, which was held at Bayt al-Din palace, a follow-up committee was formed to attempt to implement the previous resolutions. It was composed of representatives from Syria, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; Egypt which had been expelled from the Arab ranks was missing.

The committee held its first meeting on 5 December 1978, and drew up its program of action, after the way had been prepared for it by security arrangements which required units from the Saudi army, then active in the deterrent force, to take up positions from the Syrian forces in the Eastern zone, especially al-Ashrafiyah, the entrance to eastern Beirut, and al-Karantina.

The committee decided to undertake initiatives and contacts with the parties concerned. The ambassadors distributed the roles among themselves. Disarmament was the first matter that their initiative faced. One faction demanded that the Cairo agreement be applied first. Views diverged, and the result this time was not positive. Members of the committee, along with the Lebanese regime, did not give up hope regarding the possibility of reaching a solution. On that day, the Saudi ambassador, Lt Gen 'Ali al-Sha'ir, and the Kuwaiti ambassador, 'Abd al-Hamid al-By'ayjan, were returning from Zgharta by helicopter, following their meeting with

President Sulaiman Franjiyah. Passing over the area of Sarba, where clashes were going on between the army and the Phalange over the barracks, their helicopter was hit by shells, wounding the Saudi ambassador and causing an emergency landing. From that moment, the situation became tense. Developments occurred which led to al-Sha'ir's departure, followed by the withdrawal of the Saudi forces operating in the deterrent, as well as the United Arab Emirates' forces.

The committee's activities were suspended again, and its members scattered, after gossip about the difficulties that one of the quarters put in their way, in order to prevent them from completing their mission.

The country continued to fluctuate between clam and tension. The danger in the south grew worse, despite the introduction of international forces there, apart from the occurrence of internal incidents, which made the Lebanese picture even darker.

In this atmosphere, the Arab summit met in Tunis. President Sarkis brought up the true facts of the Lebanese situation, and called on the Arab states to adopt a unified position to save Lebanon, defend its territory and preserve its independence. The conferees decided, in addition to financial support, which has not yet been paid in full, to revive the follow-up committee, with its four members, on condition that a representative from the Arab League's secretary general join with them. This was Mr Hamadi al-Sayd.

The committee held its first meeting, chaired by Sarkis, on 7 December 1979, amidst an atmosphere which boded well, in view of the Arab states' solidarity with Lebanon. However, this atmosphere was not enough to translate the solidarity into practical matters. Several committee members held successive meetings, someof them with the Palestinian side, some others with the leaders of the "Lebanese Front." The basic subject for discussion at that time was sending the army to the south, and then taking similar steps in Beirut and the sectors, in order to achieve increased Lebanese self-security.

The days passed quickly, and the committee held its final meeting on 21 January 1980, in which its failure was confirmed. Informed sources at the time attributed this failure to three reasons:

1. The fundamental change in the Palestinian position, without altering the form.

2. The withdrawal of the Syrian forces, operating in the deterrent, from the southern littoral to the Biqa', to deal with an Israeli strike that the Syrian officials were expecting.

3. Disputes within the regime over the priority for action. Should it only be in the south, or the north and south together, as well as other areas?

However, other sources said in regard to this that the committee had lost its credibility of action, and that local, Arab, regional and international developments had blocked its initiative, aside from intentional maneuvers to paralize its work and retain freedom of action in Lebanon for the concerned parties only.

Throughout 1980, security incidents in Lebanon accelerated. Fruitless efforts were made to achieve Lebanese conciliation. During the first part of 1981, developments appeared on the Lebanese scene, which spread the violence and led to the outbreak of the April war, which extended on into May, and probably would have lasted even longer.

The meeting of the Arab foreign ministers was held in Tunis, to deal with the situation arising from the Syrian-Israeli crisis. Lebanon saw an opportunity to raise its problem, demanding this time that final solutions be made for this very difficult problem.

New decisions were generated, which were no different in scope from the previous Arab decisions which had not been implemented. The most important was, "the need to apply the decisions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits, and activate the follow-up committee, specified in those decisions, provided that it convene on the foreign minister level, whenever the need requires."

Based on this, the fourth Arab follow-up committee begins its work with the hope that it will produce more than its predecessors did. An informed source says that Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butros, during the Tunis conference, rejected the demand to broaden this committee, as some suggested, to include another country, such as Algeria. Note that Algeria was active in participating with the Lebanese government in calming down the situation and searching for solutions which would restore security and tranquility to the country. This rejection of his was interpreted as a Lebanese wish not to clear the way for another Arab state to demand membership on the committee, lest that lead to transferring the Arab disputes to the heart of the committee, and thus losing the needed homogeneity at this delicate stage.

This source added that President Sarkis, before and during the Tunis conference, was making calls to Prince Fahd, the Saudi crown prince, who supported the revival of the follow-up committee, and expressed concern that the Arab role not be considered as final in Lebanon, along with his registering his regret at the lack of success of this role so far.

The same source believes that the rebirth of the committee, in the midst of the American initiative, represented by the trip of Mr Phillip Habib, President Ronald Reagan's envoy, and Soviet Chairman Leonid Brezhnev's call for an international conference to study the Lebanese crisis, would cause the Arab step to close the file on Lebanon, since opening it before the Great Powers would only open their appetites for demands and conditions, whose positive results for Lebanon and the Arabs would not have a relatively high guarantee.

The question being broached today, and which the Arab ministers will face, is where should the committee begin? Should it begin with the Riyadh and Cairo decisions, the most important of which is to implement the Cairo agreement, or the Bayt al-Din decisions, which included basic and executive matters on both the security and political levels, or the decisions of the Tunis summit, particularly the split relating to the introduction of the Lebanese army into the south?

As a digression, did not the new situation, after the events of last April and May, create new and complex issues, such as the Syrian presence in some areas, the Palestinian presence, the legal government's presence, not to mention the Israeli presence?

These questions, despite their importance, find those in government circles who say that there are answers for them, if there are good intentions and sincere wishes among the members of the committee, and among those who represent a solution to the complex Lebanese crisis. However, its complexity should be resolved step by step.

The Need

Accordingly, government circles say that, in the present stage, the need is for the Arab follow-up committee to look at the problems, some of which are very pressing, others merely urgent, and to decide them. Perhaps the most important thing required by Lebanon in the first stage is a set of priorities, in order to achieve a complete cease-fire, open the corridors between the two halves of Beirut, break the blockade of Zahlah, search for security measures that would consolidate the cease-fire, and achieve a firm and lasting truce, including along the confrontation lines, provided that commensurate political steps be taken to achieve the conciliation, which is the last and most difficult quest.

The Army and Arabization of the Deterrent

However, informed sources say that the committee will be confronted by a very delicate question, support of a new role for the Lebanese army. Some members of the committee think that the time has come to give Lebanese units the task of maintaining security in several areas, after achieving the army's presence in the south in suitable numbers, as worded in the armistice agreement. This group believes that deploying the army in certain disturbed sectors would restore tranquility, and constitute a dividing point between the legal government's positions, in which it was present, and the positions in the hands of the armed parties, whether rightist or leftist. If it succeeds in its mission, the experiment can be extended to other areas. If it is unsuccessful, the situation will be no worse than it is now. Why shouldn't the Arabs try to give this opportunity to the army? Note that the government has pledged, on more than one occasion, that the army would be committed to neutrality, as has occurred in several areas, except where its positions have been exposed to repeated attacks, forcing it to respond.

In this group's opinion, giving the army security missions in several areas (such as Zahlah), would be in harmony with the Arab summits' decisions, which affirmed their support for the legal government gradually expanding its authority over several areas, and building the army on sound bases.

However, this viewpoint is countered by the reservation of some parties who feel that the time has not yet come to give the army security duties, before the national conciliation is achieved. Some circles interpreted the recent statement of Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, to the effect that he cannot accept giving the army security duties, other than in the south, until after a Lebanese consensus is available on its role, as being part of a campaign to keep the army out of activity at the present stage. Therefore, the position of the Lebanese Front, calling for the army's withdrawal from the confrontation lines, could also be interpreted this way.

A faction supporting the army's deployment in Zahlah, for example, goes even farther when it says that the regular Lebanese forces presence in the Biqa' capital, and in the hills surrounding it, would curb the use of the question of the presence of Syrian missiles in the Biqa', or Israel's pretext of protecting the Christians, as an excuse to move against the Syrian forces.

The second point, to which the committee will be exposed, is the matter of reconstituting the "Arab deterrent force," in such a way as to restore its Arabization. Informed sources have discussed the possibility of adding Tunisian units, and possibly Saudi units, to these forces, so that the Arab cover to deal with the Lebanese crisis would be both political and military, and to block the way to any unilaterialism.

In this regard, ministerial sources are saying that Syria is anxious that any arrangements or solutions for the Lebanese crisis not lead to a "lessening" of its role, lest this matter be taken on as someone else's burden. These sources cite two recent items from Damascus, to the effect that affront to the Syrian role, although it came in an indirect form, is causing Damascus to consider itself absolved of any obligation, and might force it to reconsider its forces' presence in Lebanon. Accordingly, Damascus also raised two conditions for the success of Phillip Habib's mission, one of which was confirmation of the "legality" of the deterrent forces.

A prominent governmental source replied to those who say there is a need to sign security agreements between Lebanon and any Arab quarter, that that should not occur before achieving Lebanese conciliation, so that it would be assured of full Lebanese approval. Moreoever, the committee, in the event of the success of certain security preparations, which could produce outbursts, will find itself faced with studying the accord through searching for a way to apply the conciliatory principles. Informed sources thought it likely that the committee members would carry out consultations with the Lebanese parties in order to achieve this result.

Will the Committee Succeed?

Right now, it is impossible to prophesize either the success or failure of the committee, because of the very intricate questions involved. However, government circles are as optimistic as possible about reaching a "minimum" with respect to measures, because present circumstances are compelling the Arabs to deal with the Lebanese crisis in a much more serious way this time, especially since they know that this opportunity is the final one, or else the superpowers will seize the problem, and impose solutions upon it.

Government officials seriously believe that the American and Soviet positions, to achieve a quick solution to some of the pending problems, are for the purpose of preparing the climate for comprehensive and final solutions, since it is inconceivable for Lebanon to remain immersed in a sea of blood, while awaiting final solutions to the Middle East crisis, for which an adequate opportunity has not yet appeared.

I would like to add to that that the peril, to which the recent developments have subjected the Lebanese crisis, and the explosive fuses which the situation's

deterioration carries, have compelled those concerned, whether Arab or foreign, to expedite putting out the fire, lest it spread outside of the Lebanese borders.

In any event, the government, as its sources say, is determined to make the atmosphere as suitable as possible for success, as are the parties active on the Lebanese scene. In the event of failure, the government will discover the true positions and hidden reasons behind the obstacles. It will not remain unwillingly silent, as happened in the past, because the damage resulting from silence would not be any worse than Lebanon's damage so far. Who would be a candidate for its political, security and economic loss.

7005
CSO: 4304/71

UTILIZATION OF FOREIGN LOANS REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1287, 3 Jul 81 p 35

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "Arab Capital Awaits Arab Security; Before Leaving the World Bank, McNamara Urged Attention to Lebanon's Needs"]

[Text] On 1 July, the term of Robert McNamara as head of the World Bank ended and the term of Clausen, formerly president of the Bank of America, began. The ceremony marking the change of office is expected to include discussions of the major problems handled by the World Bank and the need for continued attention to these problems on the part of the new president within the framework of his implementation of loan programs for fiscal years 1981 through 1985.

In view of McNamara's respect for Lebanon and his admiration for the implementation of Lebanese projects despite unstable security conditions, he promised that the issue of Lebanese reconstruction and Lebanon's applications for additional loans would be among the issues addressed in the discussions he will conduct with his successor, Clausen . He pledged to recommend that the bank be prepared to go to the maximum limit in granting loans to Lebanon short of fear for the safety of its investments.

McNamara made these remarks to Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, president of the Reconstruction and Development Council in Lebanon, in a recent meeting in New York. The two men discussed the Lebanese Government's application for a new loan to finance a number of construction projects, including certain additional works at the port of Beirut, expansion of the port of Tripoli, and participation in a project to recondition the country's highways which will cost an estimated total of 1.5 billion Lebanese liras.

The World Bank was surprised by the completion of the works financed by the previous loan of $50 million. These works included the project to renovate the port of Beirut which was completed during the war years amid falling shells and DShK (heavy machine gun) fire and despite the violence of the battles that took place in the area.

The notable fact is that Dr 'Atallah was making a tour to enlist the financial resources of international institutions during the months of April and May while Lebanon was witnessing its most violent security disruptions, which reminded the

Lebanese of the 1975-76 war. Nonetheless, the president of the Reconstruction and Development Council assured the international experts and officials he met of the Lebanese' ability to live with the disturbances and carry out the urgent projects demanded by the forward pace of life. This view reflects the principle established by the government in 1978, which held that: "Whatever projects can be accomplished in the midst of the unstable security conditions must be accomplished!"

Dr 'Atallah said: "The latest disturbances had an impact on the projects currently being implemented in Lebanon but they did not stop the work on any of them. Some of the foreign experts working on a number of these projects even left Lebanon for a period of rest and relaxation and then came back and continued carrying out their assigned duties!"

He added: "It can be said that work in most fields included in the reconstruction project has already begun, and some projects have made tremendous progress with the exception of the project to restore the commercial climate, which has not made much progress due to security reasons familiar to everyone."

With the implementation of the projects, the loan funds obtained by Lebanon during the past years have inevitably been used up. Consequently, new loans must be obtained in order to implement new projects included in the reconstruction plan. But how have these funds been spent?

The major loans and aid funds obtained by the Lebanese state can be summarized as follows:

--A loan for $50 million from the World Bank, more than half of which was spent on the renovation of the port of Beirut. The remainder was spent on other projects.

--A loan of 5 million Kuwaiti dinars from the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and a loan of 3 million Kuwaiti dinars from the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development. These two loans were also spent on the renovation of the port of Beirut.

--A loan for approximately $70 million from the European Common Market, most of which (some $60 million) was spent on the implementation of electric power projects in the areas of al-Jiyyah near Sidon and al-Dhawq near Juniyah.

--A $150-million loan from private banks in the international market. Part of this loan was spent on water projects and the remainder was spent on electric power projects.

--A soft loan for 240 million francs in accordance with a financial protocol signed with the French Government to finance deals won by French companies in bidding competitions for Lebanese projects. Almost the entire amount of this loan has been spent.

--The sum of $200 million which the state obtained as part of the Arab aid approved for Lebanon by the Tunis summit. This aid was set at $1 billion to be paid over 5 years at a rate of $400 million per year. The sum received by the state so far amounts to one-half of its entitlement for 1980. These funds have been allocated for various projects dealing with housing, water, hospitals and roads, divided equally between south Lebanon and the remainder of the country in accordance with the resolutions of the Tunis summit.

In addition to these funds, a loan of 400 million Lebanese liras made up of 100 million liras secured from the commercial banks along with 300 million liras from the Reconstruction Development Council has been spent. This money was allocated for loans to private sector firms hurt by the disturbances--including both industrial and tourist firms--in order to help them rebuild their productive capacity. Some 200 firms have taken advantage of these funds.

Nevertheless, the projects included in the reconstruction plan are in need of additional loans and aid grants for completion since the cost of projects entrusted to the public sector alone totals no less than 15 billion Lebanese liras. This was the reason for Dr Muhammad 'Atallah's trip to enlist aid from resources available among international institutions.

After ascertaining the World Bank's readiness to grant Lebanon additional loans, the president of the Reconstruction and Development Council asked officials in charge of the United Nations' development program to raise Lebanon's established quota for the next 5 years (1982-86) from $10 million to $22 million. The Lebanese Government also hopes to obtain financial aid from AID, while recognizing that the lion's share of this aid has gone to Egypt and Israel since the Camp David agreement. During his recent visit to Brussels, Dr 'Atallah held negotiations with EEC officials, in particular Mr Claude Cheysson, who is now French foreign minister but formerly held the post of EEC minister of development. The purpose of these negotiations was to conclude a new financial protocol to provide Lebanon with a loan at least equal to the previous loan. In addition, contacts are currently being made between the Lebanese and French Governments pertaining to the signing of another financial protocol, from which Lebanon is seeking in the neighborhood of 500 million francs.

Lebanon views all these loans and foreign aid grants as complementary to Arab financial support, because Lebanese officials--chief among them President Elias Sarkis--are convinced that the Arab states will carry through their commitments to Lebanon completely in accordance with the resolutions of the Tunis summit. However, it appears that the flow of Arab aid is awaiting the provision of Arab security in Lebanon. While security is conditional on developments abroad, Arab funds would provide Lebanon with moral backing enabling it to obtain additional foreign international and governmental loans.

8591
CSO: 4304/69

ENERGY CRISIS DISRUPTS ECONOMY

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 pp 5-6

[Text]

A severe fuel crisis has developed in Lebanon in the last 10 days as a result of Israeli attacks on the country's second largest refinery at Zahrani in the South. Israel's air raids and artillery fire in the second half of July have caused millions of dollars worth of damage at the refinery's oil installations, including the pipeline which brings the crude in from Ras-Tannura in Saudi Arabia, and main oil storage tanks.

There have been long queues at petrol stations even during the middle of the night and until dawn, and a thriving black market in all sorts of refined products. These, however, are only the visible and initial signs of the latest crisis, which threatens to deepen and put in jeopardy basic necessities such as bread production, transport of agricultural produce and other foods as well as threaten essential services such as water supplies, electric power and telecommunications.

Sources at the Mediterranean Refining Company (MEDRECO), which runs the Zahrani refinery, estimate that deliveries of gasolene, fuel oil and diesel could be resumed within a week from existing stocks in the undamaged storage tanks. However, refining operations are not expected to resume for another two months because of extensive damage to the main pipeline and to ancilliary pipe networks.

Three pipes carrying the Saudi crude were hit by Israeli air raids two weeks ago on a makeshift bridge. This had been erected to replace the Zahrani bridge destroyed earlier by Israel's air force. Five storage tanks with a capacity of almost 150,000 barrels of oil were also hit, causing serious losses and an oil slick.

Moreover a 300-metre stretch of the main pipeline from Ras Tannura has been destroyed.

To meet acute shortages, the Ministry of Petroleum and Industry has been looking to foreign sources for additional supplies, mainly Rumania and Syria. As a first step, 19,500 tonnes of refined petrol were imported by tanker and unloaded in almost equal amounts at the Tripoli refinery terminal in northern Lebanon and at the Dora storage area just north of Beirut. An additional 1.2 million litres were to be supplied under an agreement with Syria from the Syrian Banias refinery and a further 60,000 tonnes of gasolene were expected to reach Tripoli after this newsletter went to press.

However, in spite of these abundant supplies, consumers are finding it extremely hard if not impossible to buy petrol. Other than consumer panic which led to an uneven spread of sales from petrol stations in the first few days of the shortage, emergency supplies from Tripoli destined to all areas in Lebanon have been halted by militiamen of former President Suleiman Franjieh. Mr Franjieh has demanded that priority should be given to northern Lebanon in the distribution of petrol, and thus the crisis has now taken on an overthy political dimension. Furthermore, Mr Franjieh's militiamen have diverted fuel oil destined for Lebanon's electricity authority, arguing that industrial plants in the north were suffering from shortages. As a result, the whole of the country is now on an electricity rationing programme.

Negotiations with Syria for the supply of 25,000 tonnes of fuel oil for the electricity authority are reported to have resulted in an agreement between the Lebanese Petroleum Ministry and the Banias refinery. However, as the country experienced its fourth day of seven-hour power cuts, there was as yet no sign of new supplies.

Meanwhile, repair teams in the South started work on the narrow gauge railway connecting the Zahraini refinery with the power-generating station at Jiyyeh, south of Beirut. The fuel from Tripoli was destined to the power-generating plant in Zouk, north of Beirut, and if the southern plant can resume normal capacity through deliveries from the Zahrani refinery, there is hope that electricity rationing can be alleviated. It is due to be stepped up if fuel shortages continue.

Scarcely veiled charges

Lebanon's Minister of Petroleum and Industry, Mohammed Beydoun last week made scarcely veiled accusations against various military organisations, following a personal visit to former President Franjieh at the week-end. Speaking to reporters, the minister pointed out that the shortage of gasolene was running at between 1.2 million and 1.5 million litres daily, approximately half of estimated demand of between 2.7 million and 3 million litres. Mr Beydoun indicated, however, that stocks at Tripoli, Dora and Zahrani stood at 30 million litres. The fact that the shortage is being so cruelly felt by all sectors of the population is therefore to be explained in some other way.

Trucks carrying supplies from Tripoli and Banias in Syria are being stopped by gunmen and rerouted to service stations in areas under their own control. Parties in East and West Beirut as well as in the provinces have been giving coupons to their supporters and long queues are being kept waiting while militia vehicles fill their own tanks. Last but not least, consumers have shown the notorious absence of civic spirit for which the Lebanese are reknowned by queuing to top up almost full petrol tanks, when others have run completely dry, or by buying plastic containers of gasolene which they store at home or sell at three times the normal price to those who have not been able to get within even driving distance of a pump.

Shortages of diesel fuel used by bakers have meanwhile triggered fears of shortfalls of bread, and panic buying has already started, further aggravating an already tight supply situation on the eve of the Moslem feast of *Eid-el-Fitr*, which marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan. Farmers in the south have also been affected as their irrigation pumps lie idle and their transport vehicles are empty. Industrialists complain that the shortage of fuel oil, in addition to the electricity rationing, mean that they have to shut down their plants or enforce a go-slow.

In the capital, crowds have been queuing at any gas station vaguely rumoured to have received petrol in the dead of night. Heat, frustration and fasting in this last week of Ramadan has made tempers rise and there have been gunfights over petrol in which at least five people are so far reported to have died. Black marketeering has brought the price of a 20-litre container of petrol to LL 100 (about $23), while in some parts of Beirut gasolene was alleged to have been sold at $100 for 20 litres on the 10th day of the crisis. In normal conditions, the selling price of 20 litres is between LL 22 and LL 24.

CSO: 4300/85

INTERNATIONAL MAPPING PROJECT PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 24, 20 Jun 81 p 21

[Text] THE LIBYAN planning secretariat has launched an ambitious $120m project to map out the entire country. Contracts in the offing will cover aerial photography by Finnmap of Finland, cartography by Polservice, the overseas arm of the Polish national cartographic organisation Geokart, and field and geodetic surveys by an unnamed American firm.

For political reasons, a question mark still hangs over the American side of the partnership, but Finnmap is confident that its own surveyors will be airborne next December or January. The Poles are expected to scoop up 60 per cent of the $120m, the Americans 25-30 per cent, and the Finns 10-15 per cent.

The success of the venture will hinge largely on Finnmap's aerial skills. The company is to charter twin-engined Piper Cheyennes, fitted with pressurised cabins for aeriel surveys at a height of 9,000 metres. Finnmap will consign 10-15 of its 150 personnel to the Libyan operation. Most of the work will be carried out in the October-May period, because the summer months are not clear enough for good photography.

This is the biggest contract to date for Finnmap (80 per cent of its $5.5m earned, in 1980 came from abroad), which has already carried out surveys in East Africa, Zambia, Nigeria, Iraq and Libya itself. Sven Wik, the company's export manager, believes that Finnmap's presence in Tripoli is a crucial factor in a highly competitive market: 'The Libyans have found that we are serious, that we don't dodge our responsibilities, and that they can trust us,' he said.

Should political events in Eastern Europe hamper the Poles' cartographic commitments, Finnmap still expects its own work to go ahead. In these circumstances the complete project could be taken over by one large consultant, with the others working as sub-contractors.

Covering 1.76m square kilometres, Libya, the largest Arab country after Algeria and Saudi Arabia, will provide the mappers with a formidable challenge.

CSO: 4500/30

BRIEFS

LOAN TO YUGOSLAVIA--The Libyan National Bank has granted Yugoslavia a $150m financial credit, repayable over seven years. The loan, which follows the visit to Belgrade, earlier this month, by Libya's second-in-command, Major Abdelsalam Jalloud, will help finance Yugoslavia's balance of payments deficit, anticipated this year to be $1.8bn. Yugoslavia wants to borrow just over $2bn this year to finance its deficit and top up its foreign currency reserves. Deputy Prime Minister Zvone Dragan announced last month that Kuwaiti-based banks would lend the country $250m. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 28, 18 Jul 81 p 39]

CSO: 4500/30

OPPOSITIONIST MOHAMED BENSAID DETAINED

Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2816, 4 Aug 81 p 11

[Text] Rabat, August 2--Mohamed Bensaid, a long-time Moroccan opposition figure who recently returned from 18 years' exile in France, has been detained for 24 hours and had his passport seized, sources close to him said today.

Mr. Bensaid, a former leader of the pre-independence Moroccan Liberation Army, was held by police in Casablanca from Friday until yesterday, the sources said.

They said Mr. Bensaid had just come back from Iraq, where he attended celebrations of the 13th anniversary of the accession to power of the Baath Party.

The police questioned him about his activities while in Baghdad, the sources said, and "temporarily confiscated" his passport.

Mr. Bensaid lived in France from 1963 until last March 8, when he returned to Morocco after an amnesty was decreed by King Hussan II.

The opposition leader had been sentenced to death in absentia in November 1963, simultaneously with Mehdi Ben Barka, who was later kidnapped in Paris and disappeared, for plotting against state security. (A.F.P.)

CSO: 4500/32

VIEWS OF CHIEF JUSTICE ON INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY EXAMINED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 522,15-21 Jun 81 pp 16-17

[Article: "The Appellate Courts Do Not Violate Independence of the Judiciary!"]

[Text] The Lawyers' Guild has witnessed a new chapter of the comedy, through which the Sudan lives today. The facts of this comic chapter emerged during the specialized legal forum, held on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Sudanese independence. More than 30 senior legists participated, and submitted learned studies and papers about the constitutional and legal situation now being violated in more than one area of state affairs in the Sudan.

At the same time in which observers were in unanimous agreement that the forum was a fierce, political demonstration against the regime, those observers expressed their condemnation, because the only one, who stood apart from the others at this forum, was Khalafallah al-Rashid, the chief justice who, in the midst of everyone's astonishment, defended the special courts and the state security courts, and asserted that they did not violate the principle of judicial independence!

Mr Khalafallah was not content with twisting the truth, but rather, he justified the government's interference--through enacting legislation to limit the powers of the judicial system--by establishing the special courts and restrictive laws for the courts in regard to claimants.

The chief justice evaded the true definition of the principle of judicial independence, and defined it as the independence of the judge in rendering his judgment, thereby ignoring the general principle, which is independence of the judiciary as a power.

In the introduction to his study, which was submitted along with two different studies by Professors 'Ali Mahmud Husanain and Muhammad 'Abdullah Mushawi, both lawyers, Khalafallah al-Rashid dealt with the principle of judicial independence from the historical aspect, and its development from the inception of Islam to the 18th Century, referring to the views of the Islamic legists regarding the development of this principle, saying, and we quote:

"Judicial independence means that the justice makes his decision in accordance with his conscience, and does not permit anyone to give him direction in that

regard ... and that the judge is secure in his position, so that he cannot be injured because of his judgments."

He made it clear that the consequence of this definition was that the judge could only be removed from his position because of misconduct, and that judges' salaries should be suitable to meet the costs of living, so that they could maintain a standard of living commensurate with the gravity of the duties thrust upon their shoulders.

The chief justice reached the crux of the matter, when he clarified the relationship between judicial independence and the modern constitution.

It is well known that the chief justice, who at the same time is head of the Supreme Court, is a member of the Central Committee of the Sudanese Socialist Union, by virtue of his position. Moreover, all the members of the Supreme Court, by law, are members of the Socialist Union's National Council. The present constitution of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, dating from 1973, stipulates in Article 185 that: The judicial system is responsible directly to the president of the republic for the performance of its duties. He explained this article by pointing out that there was no intermediary between the judicial system and the president, and therefore, the judicial system was equal to the legislative and the executive powers.

He then turned to the text of Article 187 of the constitution, which says: The justices are independent in the performance of their judicial duties, and the only authority over them is the rule of law. They are responsible to the president of the republic for their good performance in accordance with the laws.

The chief justice referred to the law of the judicial system for 1973, which abolished the judicial system's subordination to the minister of justice, and created the Supreme Judicial Council, which is composed of the president of the republic as chairman, the chief justice and his three deputies, the high justice, as well as the minister of finance, the minister of public service, the public prosecutor, and the dean of the college of law in Khartoum University.

It is worth noting that the chief of justice, in a meeting of the Supreme Judicial Council, on 1 February 1981, with a majority of its members from outside of the judicial system, rejected the well-versed cadre submitted by the judicial system, which led to complete condemnation by the members of the judicial system for its decision, starting with a memorandum submitted by the justices of the Supreme Court, and then another memorandum from the justices of the Appellate Court, and a third from the judges of the first and second degree district courts, as well as judicial workers. This was followed by the judiciary's heroic stand; 370 judges submitted their collective resignation, out of 450 total judges working in Sudan in both the civil and shari'a departments. This continued for 2 weeks, after the president accepted the resignations, since it had become a battle between the regime and the judges, in which the ruling regime was finally forced to give in and back down regarding the decree accepting the resignations. The ruling authorities pledged to resolve all the judicial system's problems, and created a committee called the Committee to Re-examine

the Judicial Structure. It was chaired by the vice president, and has four other members, none of whom are from the judicial system or work in the legal profession.

Generally speaking, we should ask the chief justice about his position, and that of his deputies, and some of the Supreme Court justices, including justices of the Appellate Court, and what did Shedwa the lawyer, Turabi and his supporters among the Muslim Brotherhood lawyers do to damage the heroic position of the judges, with their farcical statements, which later caused the chief justice to understand that he would be the loser in that battle, after he clearly understood what the Muslim Brotherhood was trying to do to him, in terms of striking at him and replacing him with Justice 'Umar Bakhait, a member of the supreme court, which made him understand the error of his position not to defend the judges' cases or to support their demands.

As we previously indicated, the chief justice evades the true definition of the principle of judicial independence, defining it as the judge's independence only to render his judgment, avoiding the general definition, which is the judiciary's independence as an authority, which is the judiciary's independence as an authority, in the full meaning of that word. The provisional constitution of 1956, as amended in 1964, was zealous about that, as were the numerous guarantees, which that constitution gave the justices, in terms of their appointment, promotion, accountability and dismissal. The glorious October revolution in 1964 confirmed the principle of judicial independence.

Indirectly, the chief justice has tried to protect the supreme court from the continuous attacks against its judgments in all the constitutional cases submitted to it since 1973, up to the present time, all of which were thrown out. He referred to the statement of the famous Lord Cook, some 40 years ago, to the effect that common law can overrule any legislation issued by parliament, if that legislation is contrary to right and reason. The chief justice concludes that that is untrue, by virtue of the fact that the courts cannot oppose any dispute, no matter what variety, because of the presence of other organizations, better able to carry out the activities, not related to traditional controversies. Therefore, the role of the judicial system was limited in traditional disputes brought before it, disqualifying it, accordingly, from considering any dispute between a citizen and the state, with respect to any effort regarding his basic and constitutional rights. Therefore, the chief justice has defended the special courts and the state security courts, and has affirmed that they have not violated judicial independence. With regard to that, he referred to the old Islamic legal principle, rejected by all the Islamic law schools, to the effect that the ruler can restrict the authority of the judge. It is well known that the special courts, the state security courts, the military courts, and other judges have, during the past 5 years, become the courts of first instance.

Judicial authority is the exception, since because of numerous emergency laws, headed by the state security law, those courts mentioned above have been put on a level with the judiciary, and infringe upon many of the courts' prerogatives.

It is most unfortunate that they are formed, in a majority of cases, by judges appointed by the chief justice himself. However, they are governed in their judgments by emergency measures and special articles, damaging to all the guarantees granted to citizens by modern legislation, for the purpose of defending them. This is headed by the citizen's right to appeal at all stages. They restrict many of the legal provisions and measures, which were granted to protect the rights of the citizen.

It is worth noting that the chief justice has tried, as best he can, to distort the truth. Sometimes he stresses that the judicial system is independent, and that its independence means that it is free of the ruler's control. At other times, he justifies the government's interference by enacting legislation to curb the powers of the judicial system, by establishing special courts and enacting restrictive laws. The best example of that is the public buildings' evacuation law of 1969, as amended in 1978. This prohibits the courts from considering any order or judgment coming under the purview of that law. Appeal as to constitutionality of that amendment came in a number of cases before the supreme court, the constitutional department. As usual, the ruling was that the law was constitutional, despite the fact that it deprives the citizen of his right of litigation. This is a natural right, confirmed by all the divine laws, and both ancient and modern legislation.

Regarding protection for justices, referred to by the chief justice, that they would only be dismissed because of misconduct, in reality it has been the reverse of that. How many have been dismissed, without any accounting or question, even if the most honorable of men and standing in the judicial establishment. We can mention Supreme Court justices Hasan 'Alub and Hasan Mahmud, judge 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Mubarek, a member of the Appellate Court, and many others who have emigrated, after having the doors slammed shut in the face. They have battled for their positions, such as justices al-Tayyab 'Abbas al-Judayri, al-Tajani al-Zubayr, and several other judges, who went abroad to open the doors of progress for others, who are fuming at the courts, on the one hand, and at the chief justice, and his supporters inside the judicial system, on the other. We shall mention the lawyer Sadiq 'Abd al-Halim, and others who are trying to follow in his path. However, they have not yet achieved what Sadiq 'Abd al-Halim achieved, who has become a distinguished member in the Appellate Court, stimulating everything and anything within the judicial system, by virtue of his distinguished position.

All of this is happening within the judicial system, without any protection or law, since the judicial system, after having protected rights, now has begun to seek protection for itself, even from the police. The police's battle with the judicial system requires considerable clarification from us. It began when pressure was put on the chief justice to issue an ordinance to protect the police from citizens' complaints.

The chief justice instructed his judges, in an ordinance, to not open charges against the police, until after the documents had been submitted to him, a matter which shackled a clear legal provision, and a constitutional principle of the equality of citizens. With the exercise of this ordinance, the policeman

began to dominate the citizen, in matters of arrest and investigation, and in many cases, using harsh measures against the citizen which, in many cases, could reach the level of torture. This caused some judges to refuse to implement that ordinance, in their commitment to the legal provision, so that a clash occurred in many court jurisdictions, between judges and police officials. This was reported to the highest authorities, which led to a complete breach between the judicial system's leadership and judges, and the police on all levels, reflected in a lack of cooperation at work, and the generating of many memoranda in that regard from both sides. It was discussed several times in the National Security Council, without a solution being found.

Some of the speakers at the lawyers' forum dealt with that, and with what the matter had done to the judicial system, and reference was made to the aforementioned ordinance. A week after it was raised in the forum, the chief justice found sufficient courage to abrogate that ordinance.

We are absolutely convinced that the chief justice, as a Sudanese citizen, knows very well what his position is and what his responsibility is. Either he is a citizen, zealous on behalf of his country's best interests, protecting his fellow citizens from the one-man rule that holds sway over the citizens' necks, which is a clear path and an easy, not impossible, matter, or he will continue on the path he is following today, with hostility for his nation and his fellow citizens. He is with the number one enemy in the same trench. He has the option to correct his course; the day of reckoning is not far off.

7005
CSO: 4504/35

DOMESTIC CONDITIONS SAID WORSE THAN GOVERNMENT ADMITS

Egyptian Troops

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 524,29 Jun-5 Jul 81 pp 8-10

[Article: "The 7 June Uprising: Sadat Sent His Troops; Frank Carlucci, American Deputy Defense Secretary, Hastily Came to Khartoum to Supervise Their Deployment"]

[Text] Was it merely a coincidence that the British radio correspondent, who flew to Khartoum to cover the news of the enormous popular uprising against Marshal Numayri's regime, had a meeting with a person alleged to be the head of the railroad workers' union, so that he could announce the end of the uprising? Was it just a coincidence that 'Abbas Khadhr, the real leader of the railroad workers' union, was absent when it was announced that the regime had regained control, over the rebellious Sudanese civilians?

The British radio correspondent was unable to conceal his astonishment at the threats made by the Marshal to execute the striking workers, at the same time that the regime was announcing the end of the strike. The correspondent asked: "If normal life had been restored to the status quo, why threaten executions?"

Obviously, Numayri's calculations were different in the beginning. He dealt with the popular uprising on the basis that it was merely [illegible]kers making demands. He decided to dissolve the railroad workers' union, and banned its president, 'Abbas Khadhr, from pursuing any union or political activities. That was in the aftermath of the strike, which the union, numbering some 43,000 workers, declared, and is the strike later joined by workers from the land and river transport unions, and the hotel and beverage [illegible]rkers.

However, as the extent of the uprising esculated, the calculations changed. The field marshal was later forced to describe the strikers as "saboteurs", and ordered the army to run the trains, after the security forces had arrested some of the striking workers' leaders. He issued a republican decree, stopping all mediation efforts aimed at ending the strike.

Why did Numayri cease these suspicious "mediation efforts?"

Diplomatic observers in Khartoum confirm that the field marshal realized that the uprising was a long way from just a labor strike, and consequently, he tried a

show of force at first. He then instructed Mustafa Jaysh, the minister of transport, to announce that the threat contained in his statement did not mean expulsion of the workers.

Therefore Numayri, after having arrested 64 unionist leaders, after violent resistance which felled scores of martyrs, wanted to signal to the workers, who had become leaderless, that he did not mean his threats literally. In the minister of transport's statement, he said that the measures taken, such as moving the headquarters of the Railroad Board from 'Atabarah, meant nothing more than applying decentralized organization.

These statements came at a time when an airlift was starting between Cairo and the "Wadi Sayyadna" airfield, which used to be called the Nasser base, but the name was changed to flatter Sadat. It is located north of Khartoum; the purpose of the airlift was to transport Egyptian military troops to Sudan to defend the regime.

This action was taken by the two "Camp David" regimes in Cairo and Khartoum, together with the arrival in the Sudanese capital of Frank Carlucci, the American deputy secretary of defense, on a brief visit lasting 2 days, during which he supervised the deployment of the forces and equipment, which would defend the regime the moment the backbone of Numayri's regime within the armed forces collapsed.

The first thing that caught the attention of observers in Khartoum was the claims of the minister of transport that most of the railroad workers had returned to their jobs. News from different sources stressed that those who had been forced to return to their jobs were very few in number, terrorized by the threat of death and expulsion, after they were driven from their homes by army forces loyal to the government. The rest of the workers were still continuing their uprising.

Lest there be any action to storm the prison, in which the uprising's leaders were being detained, the Numayri regime moved the detaineees to one of the remote prisons in southern Sudan, after the field marshal's advisors suggested that the prisoners' presence in "Kubr" prison would only constitute a danger that he would have to face. The strikers would certainly consider "Kubr" prison in the capital to be a heroic symbol, from which they would derive fuel for their resistance. Those workers might also consider attacking the prison to release the detainees by force.

As for the rest of the minister of transport's statements, in which he alleges that the field marshal had no intention of expelling the workers, they provoked a great deal of merriment in local, Arab and international circles. Is it possible that the field marshal's orders to arrest, expel and torture were merely an action to make life comfortable, intended to pamper the workers and to respond to their demands?

In this context, what does the republican decree mean, which Numayri issued through Hassan al-Turabi, the public prosecutor, who turned it into law, which

stipulates that anyone who strikes, or refuses to work, or incites to strike will be punished by execution?

This law, by any measurement and by any consideration, has no equivalent in all the world. It is incompatible with the most primitive principle of human freedoms. Even in the nations of the Eastern camp, which forbid strikes, they do not make execution the punishment for strikers. On the contrary, what has happened in Poland is one of the examples that provides the best evidence of this.

In the face of this fascism, a parallel for which can scarcely be found, the minister of transport tried to justify the field marshal's behavior. He said that moving the headquarters of the Railroad Board from 'Atabarah was just an organizational step in the direction of decentralization. Moreover the military battalion, which Numayri ordered formed to administer the railroad, was merely a means to support production and not to run the utility.

Is this a surrender to the people's will?

Those who know the facts confirm, without blinking an eye, that what has occurred is sort of a tactical retreat, which permitted some breathing room, during which Sadat's military aid arrived in Khartoum.

Numayri realized that the strike was no longer merely a demand, but was a violent national uprising, which was trying to uproot the regime.

His greatest fear now is that the hostility will shift to the rest of the unions.

What about the military aid that is now being implemented, in accordance with the Khartoum summit, between the two Camp David allies?

The airlift, which we mentioned a little while ago, went between one of the Cairo airfields and the Wadi Sayyidna airport in Khartoum.

Observers estimate the size of the airlift as comprising 50 aircraft loaded with troops, equipment, ammunition and arms. A group of huge American Hercules aircraft took part in the operation, staged out of Luxor airfield, carrying troops and tons of arms, ammunition and equipment.

Added to that were all the Egyptian forces, stationed in Sudan since the mutual defense pact between the two countries was signed. No one knows precisely the number of these troops, but some observers confirm that they number in the thousands.

Translated to the practical level, that means the regime's reduced trust in its armed forces, and that it relies, more and more, on Sadatist and American support.

It is known that some recently demobilized, and highly trained, Egyptian troops have been loaned to the Khartoum regime during the past few months, in the guise of workers and officials. Jobs were immediately found for them, despite the

unemployment about which the Sudanese people complain. Housing was also found for them, and they were supplied with weapons for street fighting and to oppose any popular movement. Some circles say that their number will reach 3000 by the end of August.

On the other hand, reports arriving from Khartoum state that an Egyptian military aircraft arrived at Wadi Sayyidna airport, on 17 July. It was met by a car belonging to the office of the presidency. The car took two passengers from the aircraft to Numayri's home, where a closed meeting was held, lasting three hours. Some security sources indicate that these two dawn visitors were Muhammad Sa'id al-Mahi, Sadat's director of intelligence, and 'Ali Zaki, his deputy for Arab affairs.

In the latest development of events, observers read with interest the item, slipped by the Sudanese security organization to one of the Arab newspapers, which said that an Israeli aircraft was forced to land at Khartoum airport. It was explained that it was carrying experts, arms and ammunition enroute to Zaire.

The fact is that the air route between Israel and Zaire does not pass over Khartoum airspace.

There is nothing more to this matter than the fact that a shipment of Israeli arms, supported by a number of Zionist experts, has arrived in the Sudanese capital. It was an operation, about which the Sudanese people became aware by surreptitious means, to attempt to make it appear that the regime, reconciled with the Sadatist normalization regime, which is reconciled with the Israelis, was still in a state of war with the enemy.

However, the odd thing, as reported in the news, was that the Israeli airplane vanished completely from the Khartoum airport, and instead of being displayed to newspaper correspondents, it was sent to one of the military bases, from where it was returned with its crew to Israel.

Behind these grave incidents, and undoubtedly making up the most dangerous of all, is the state of bankruptcy and the collapsing economy, which has led to factory shutdowns, due to a lack of oil. One of the British FINANCIAL TIMES correspondents in Khartoum commented on that, by saying: "The workers' strike has shut down the railroads, but they would have shut themselves down without a need for a strike, so long as the crops, that they are supposed to carry, such as cotton, are by no means available!"

He added that methodical plundering has destroyed the rest of the economy; the regime has begun to search for kinds of trade especially for that, which can be added to its robbing of Arab and foreign assistance.

This trade has gotten out of control to such an extent that American authorities in Houston have recently uncovered a trafficking in arms smuggled to South Africa, in which the Khartoum regime is involved. It was clear from investigations, which were leaked to the British newspaper THE OBSERVER, that illicit

weapons were purchased from the United States for the Government of South Africa, using an official certificate from the Sudanese government, attesting that the arms were for export to Sudan. This was done because the international boycott law prohibits the exporting of arms to the racist South African government. It was also made clear that the value of the shipment was approximately $1.5 million, and that the import license, issued by the Sudanese military attache in London, was the legal cover for that.

Here is just one small example of this methodical plundering. In a country, whose foreign debts amount to more than $2 billion, the foreign banks rescheduled these debts, in exchange for direct supervision over the country, which could shed light on yet another reason for the popular uprising, whose factors are violently interacting now.

No matter what the reason for this 8 June uprising, those who are following what is happening in the country, which should have been supplying the Arabs with food, according to the propagandistic cosmetic projects that the Khartoum regime is promoting, know that the regime has begun to search for food from the Arabs. Those who are following events in Sudan know for a certainty that the recent uprising will not be the last. Our evidence for that, for those who still need evidence, is the total strike announced by the doctors, and which in fact began on 30 June.

On the contrary, there is popular solidarity in 'Atabarah, where the merchants and livestock owners gave their goods to the workers without compensation. This was where the workers, whose expulsion was announced, and who were forced to give up their homes and live in tents, marched with the masses to the Armored Corps headquarters, and surrounded it. From there they went to the Railroad Board, safeguarded by the military battalion, formed by the field marshal.

This popular solidarity is the thing that will have the final word in the battles going on these days.

Armed Forces Affirm Stand

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 524, 29 Jun-5 Jul 81 pp 8-10

[Text] In the midst of the violent popular uprising, which Sudan needs, the establishment was announced in Khartoum of the "People's Armed Forces Officers' Committee to Save the Nation". The communique, which was distributed in Khartoum, addressed to the masses of the Sudanese people, stated that this organization is the true embodiment of the will of the nationalist officers, ncos and soldiers.

It stated that its first and last goal was to rescue the country from blind subservience to the Egyptian-American regime, and to resist the danger destroying Sudan. The statement called on the Sudanese masses, workers, tradesmen, farmers, intellectuals and studnets, to be fully vigilant, and to reject the shame that is the Numayri regime. The communique said that Sudan was and still is capable of crushing on its breast an agent regime, which has become isolated from the masses, and which has thrown itself into the arms of the Egyptian regime, the legal, authorized agent of American imperialism and world Zionism in the Arab and African region, scornful of the country's higher interests.

The communique of the People's Armed Forces Officers' Committee emphasized that this course upon which the Numayri regime has embarked has led to the collapse of the Sudanese economy, has made it dependent on crumbs from the masters' tables, and has led to forsaking national independence, transforming Sudan into a base for the Egyptian and American armies of occupation.

The communique also stated that the heroic battles would continue in combat against the Numayri regime. Join ranks as the day of deliverance and sweeping away of this regime draws near.

Position of Alliance

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 524, 29 Jun-5 Jul 81 pp 8-10

[Text] In its statement to the Sudanese people, the alliance of the Democratic Unionist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, Sudanese Region, affirmed that its program, as announced in the alliance's first statement, is represented by:

Persistence in achieving the masses' goals of restoring democratic rights to the struggling masses, and maintaining the honor of the country and its citizens, under the aegis of national authority and progressive pan-Arabism.

The struggle for a unified and flourishing Sudan, in which there is opportunity for social and economic advancement, and the development of regional self-determination in southern Sudan, extricating it from the formal framework, in which the Numayri regime has confined it, in order to make a real accomplishment in the areas of development and services, and to increase interaction and solidarity between the two halves of the country, based on democratic principles of mutual respect and trust.

Modernization of the economic sector in the countryside and the cities of Sudan, to mobilize its resources, and to employ growth plans based on planning for sufficiency with balanced sector and regional development.

Rejection of the capitalistic method of development, and adherence to the socialist option, stemming from the traditions of our civilized people, especially their human and material experience, in order to achieve the broadest gains for the overwhelming majority of our people.

Accomplishment of the national alternative, for which the masses are fighting, based on civilized principles, embodied in independence, and rejection of all forms of foreign hegemony and political and economic subservience, and domination tied to the centers of foreign direction.

Complete elimination of the supports of the present rightist, fascist regime, and full political liberation for the country, to put an end to the spurious organizations and the tyrannical legislation, to uproot the parasitical forces tied to the regime, and to unleash the people's energies, under the aegis of legality, national sovereignty, pan-Arabism, and the integrity of the rule of laws.

To erradicate the traces of the regime's political deviation, which has isolated our country from its pan-Arab role, and has shackled it with bonds of treachery, subservience and the machinations of world Zionism and imperialism, aimed at eliminating our goals, the struggles of our Arab Nation, and our central issues, led by the battle to liberate all Palestinian soil, and to reject all humiliating settlements.

The statement stressed that the two allied parties affirmed the need to esculate the popular and trade-unionist movement, in order to achieve this program, which for its part, emphasizes that the sole qualified alternative to the regime is the progressive, pan-Arab, national alternative, stemming from unlimited faith in the masses and their fighting abilities, since they are the purpose of change and its means.

The statement said: "Signs of victory are engraved in the skies over Sudan, after the Sudanese people made great strides, which have brought them to an important crossroads in their history, to rally their forces and to let loose the winds of change.

7005
CSO: 4504/35

SUCCESS SEEN FOR ECONOMIC MEASURES

London 8 DAYS in English No 24, 20 Jun 81 p 21

[Text]

SUDAN'S EFFORTS to bring order to its fraught economy, in line with demands made by the International Monetary Fund and the world's bankers, look like paying dividends. The country anticipates a $326m budget surplus for the 1981-1982 financial year.

The draft budget presented last month to the country's council of ministers by Finance Minister Badreddin Suleiman anticipated a total revenue of $3.462bn, with a total expenditure of $3.136bn. This includes $1.058bn for development projects (30 per cent up on 1980-1981 allocations) and $736m for local government (a 20 per cent increase). The extra revenue will come from increased taxes as well as a greater share of the profits made by state companies.

The budget makes no mention, however, of loan and interest repayments, a continuing headache for Sudan. Financiers in London estimate that Sudan will have to find $80m for interest repayments during 1981-1982. Sudan has borrowed $1.1bn on the international markets, much of it to help meet its severe balance of payments deficit, running at about $1bn a year.

A total of $400m is owed by the government-controlled commercial banks to five major banks, plus $43m in interest back-payments, and late last year the creditors rescheduled the debt at 1¾ per cent above Libor.

There is little doubt, however, that the IMF and the bankers are pleased with Sudan's stringent economic regime. As well as granting a fresh $100m loan to finance essential imports, Sudan's creditors at the same time agreed to reschedule a $400m debt, without upping the rates. In addition, last November the IMF extended a further $289m in credits. Earlier this month IMF financiers paid another visit to Khartoum to discuss a further tranche.

Increased remittances from workers abroad, encouraged by preferential rates of exchange, should go some way towards dealing with the country's shortage of foreign exchange to pay for imports. The 30 per cent rise in development expenditure under the budget is a result of the emphasis on improving export performance. Top priority has been given to oil and agriculture, particularly cotton and groundnuts, the two principal exports. This year the price of cotton is expected to rise significantly as, for the first time, world cotton demand outstrips supply.

With an oil imports bill last year of about $400m, Sudan, must invest in its nascent oil sector if it is ever to solve its balance of payments difficulties. Chevron, one of the major companies prospecting in Sudan, beheves that by 1983 Sudanese production will reach 30,000 b/d. This exceeds the country's current consumption and underpins the claims made by the energy and mining minister, Sharif al Tuhami, that the country will be oil self-sufficient in two years' time. A new refinery is to be built, with World Bank support, at Kosti, 275km south of Khartoum on the White Nile; by 1983 it should be producing 15,000 b/d. Tenders are to go out this year. In addition Sudan has a 26,000 b/d refinery at Port Sudan.

However, as part of the new economic regime, local currency expenditure on development projects has been cut to $240m a year, about 20 per cent of the amount planned for development during the coming financial year, and so the Sudanese will have to rely just as heavily as

ever on outside support.

Though Arab funding continues to pour in — $100m on projects in Southern Sudan alone in the next three years, starting during the new budget period — the country is becoming increasingly dependent on the West and on Egypt. US assistance to Sudan earlier this year was put at $104m — half of it to pay for American imports -- but another $100m in the form of a military aid package was announced shortly after President Numeiri offered military facilities to the US in March.

Economic dependence on Egypt has usually been seen as the prime cause for Sudan's support for its northern neighbour, and the new budget gives every indication that it will continue to grow. There are reports that Egyptian funding will play an important part in the new budget, though Egyptian officials at the ministry of Sudanese affairs refuse to comment. Nevertheless, the draft clearly states that the budget 'will strengthen integrated Egyptian-Sudanese companies and enable them to progress in their specific fields'.

The Egyptian link, highlighted by President Sadat's visit to Khartoum last month, led to a $125m trade agreement in April, under which Egypt will supply machinery in return for Sudanese agricultural produce.

At the moment, however, the government has sufficient problems of its own over transport. The 43,000-strong railway union, the largest in Sudan, was outlawed on 30 May when workers began a five-day strike to protest against the dismissal of several colleagues and to draw attention to the escalation in the cost of living. The government declared the strike illegal, but in view of the union's power this is hardly likely to be the last it has heard from the railway workers.

CSO: 4500/30

BRIEFS

SHADY ARMS DEAL ALLEGED--The French commercial attache, in the French Embassy in Khartoum, wasted no time when he was in his post. He was not content with his friendships with "senior" officers in the Sudanese army, but rather, after he resigned and took up residence in the Sudanese capital, he concluded business and commercial contracts with them for deals involving "obsolete" arms. He persuaded them that he could be useful, and he shared in their commissions and profits. Monsieur Courfin sold the Sudanese army some French Panhard armored cars, which were seen in the military parade on 25 May. They were of the type produced before further development. Third World nations refused to purchase them; however, Lt Gen Fathi 'Umar Abu al-Hasan, deputy minister of defense, and Maj Gen 'Abd al-Rahman Sayyid Ahmad Berbera, CO of the armored corps, were "persuaded" that they were of good quality, after having received a 30 percent commission of the total deal, which amounted to $30 million. However, Brigadier Ziyadah Saleh al-Shaykh, CO of the training and armaments department in the Sudanese army, objected to the deal, before purchase was made, due to his experience and knowledge of them, when he worked in the UAE as CO of the Panhard armored car force. The ruling regime rewarding him by retiring him, after giving him a smaller stipend than his colleagues. [Text] [London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 524 20 Jun-5 Jul p 5] 7005

CSO: 4504/35

SYRIAN JEWS VICTIMS OF OPPRESSION

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Jun 81 p 9

/Article by George E. Green, Director of the Middle East Department of the American Jewish Committee: "Five Thousand Syrian Jews Between the Hammer of 'Asad and the Anvil of the Muslim Brotherhood"/

/Text/ With the continuing internal unrest in Syria, there is a growing feeling of uncertainty among the 5,000 Jews of the country. They continue to suffer severe discrimination and they have been deprived of the right to leave Syria. Seven Jews are now in prison after having been convicted of an illegal attempt to flee. Other Jews, men and women, have been killed or seriously wounded during previous attempts at flight. The Jews are also subject to the arbitrariness of government decrees which impose limitations on their rights to sell or inherit property.

The Jews are also suffering from the campaign which the government is waging against the Muslim Brotherhood underground which has murdered several government figures and last summer made an attempt on the life of President Hafiz al-'Asad. In order to eliminate the Brotherhood, 'Asad has given a free hand to his "defense brigades" and also to the agents of the Mukhabarat (Secret Security Policy) who violate without blinking an eye the most basic human rights including searches without warrants, torture, imprisonment without trial, and arbitrary executions.

In a search which security agents conducted last July, the agents also visited the home of a Jewish smith. They took him along with them so that he would lead them to other Jewish homes in the area. One guard was posted at the door, and a captain remained inside the house ostensibly in order to conduct a search. When the search revealed nothing, the officer turned to the smith's young wife and ordered her to undress--apparently to prove that she was not carrying propaganda material of the Muslim Brotherhood on her person--and raped her.

The smith protested to the authorites and received assurance that there would be an investigation. However, nothing was done to the officer-rapist. It appears that two other Jewish women in the northern city of Aleppo were also raped, but they preferred to keep silent because of the shame. The absurdity involved in searching for propaganda material of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jewish homes is conspicuous. The Jews of Syria have no part in the political life of the country. They are exempt from military service, and they are not permitted to hold government positions. They would surely not gain anything from the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in that the brotherhood is striving to establish an "Islamic state" on the ruins of the present regime.

To Be a "Musawi"

A clear case of discrimination which the Jews suffer in contrast to the non-Jewish citizens of Syria is the explicit prohibition against emigration. The violence, breakdown of law and order, and economic instability have impelled a substantial number of Muslims and Christians to leave Syria. According to statistics of the American Department of State, about 2,500 Syrians are now studying in the United States. According to other sources, 400-500,000 Syrians are working outside of their country, primarily in the oil states of the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf.

Not so the Jews. Their identification cards are stamped with the word "Musawi" (a follower of the religion of Moses, that is a Jew), and they are not permitted to leave the country, even for neighboring Arab countries. In March 1974, four Jewish women were raped and murdered when they tried to cross the border into Lebanon. A protest funeral which Jewish women conducted on the streets of Damascus turned the world's attention to their Tragic fate.

After numerous reactions from international entities and after a personal appeal from President Jimmy Carter in May 1977, 14 Jewish women were permitted in July 1977 to leave for New York in order to marry. Hopes were raised that President 'Asad would keep his promise to Carter and permit additional Jews to leave for humanitarian reasons, "on the basis of considering each case on its own merits." However, in the 4 years that have passed since that time, only a few Jews, mostly elderly and sick, have been permitted to leave Syria.

The Damascus authorities have closed their ears to the repeated appeals for the reuniting of families. Today, 400 single Jewish women are having difficulty finding suitable husbands, both because many Jewish young men have previously fled Syria and because there are those among the remaining ones who refuse to marry under the present circumstances as long as they have no assurance that their children "would be able to grow up in an atmosphere of freedom," as one of those who fled recently explained. A Swiss tourist who returned from Syria recently reported that the social pressure is intensifying on the Jewish women to convert and marry Moslems.

Other Jews have jeopardized their lives in attempts to flee. Mrs Badriyah Akiva Baraqat, a young mother of four children, was seriously injured and paralyzed in parts of her body after she was shot by Syrian border guards in August 1976. She was hospitalized in Aleppo, and it was only after long months of appeals that she was permitted to go abroad for an operation. She was compelled to post a bond of $10,000 to guarantee her return. Moreover, her husband and four small children were not permitted to accompany her.

The husband, Baraqat Baraqat, together with four other family members, were among 24 Jews who were arrested on 10 October 1980 on the charge of attempting to flee. Despite an order from a judge in Damascus to free them, the Security Police, the Mukhabarat, insisted on continuing the detention of seven of the Jews, including the husband and his 14-year old cousin, so that "others will see and be afraid."

Mrs Akiva Baraqat is now recuperating from an operation in a hospital in Brooklyn.

"Illegal" flight has recently become more and more dangerous as the hand of the security agents becomes heavier along the Syrian borders and in the major population centers. The Mukhabarat insist that the Jews who are brought to trial on attempts to flee be sentenced to at least 6 months in prison, and if possible to 5 years. All of this has stopped in recent months the"illegal" attempts to emigrate.

Family Members' Obligation to Denounce

In recent years several Jews have managed to obtain passports and exit visas for the purpose of business trips or convalescence. However, they had to deposit enormous sums of money, at times as much as $6,000 cash, with the authorities and leave behind several members of their families as an "alternate guarantee." Since the annual per capita income in Syria does not exceed $800, only very few members of the community have been able to take advantage of the exit right. If a Jew does not abide by the schedule and does not return in the time allotted him, the deposit which he left with the government is automatically forfeited. Three months ago the authorities suddenly canceled even the few exit visas which several fortunate Jews had in their possession.

The government has also confiscated the property of Jews who left the country "illegally." Recently in Aleppo, Jewish property was seized even in cases of Jews who were abroad with official exit permits. Their relatives were compelled to pay rent to the government in order for them to continue to live in their own homes.

The Jews must report to the Security Police even when they travel within Syria, from one city to another. If one family member is absent from his home without an explanation, his relatives must immediately notify the Security Police. If they do not do this, they can expect a cruel interrogation and arrest. Because of the enormous difficulties involved in any attempt to flee the capital city, Damascus, virtually no escape incidents of Damascus Jews have been recorded. Therefore, the Damascus community has grown because of the natural increase, and it now numbers 4,000 people.

In contrast, the number of Jews in Aleppo has declined to only 750. In Qamishli, the number has declined to 150 or 200 Jews. Since the Qamishli community does not have the services of a rabbi, and there has been no Jewish school there for several years, there has been a gradual shift of Jews to Aleppo.

In Damascus 19 synagogues are now functioning, and in Aleppo, 3. The Jewish schools in these two communities continue to function under the close scrutiny of the Secret Police. Several Jewish students are permitted to attend the universities.

"The Blackest Day"

In Damascus 20 Jewish doctors, 20 pharmacists, 5 dentists, and 2 lawyers are registered. Other Jews work in business and are involved in the traditional Jewish craft, metalworking. The economic distress of the Jews stems primarily from the general economic distress. However, to this must be added limitations on the transfer of property and a recent attempt by the Security Police to reimpose a prohibition (which was first issued in 1966) against the ownership of private vehicles by Jews.

Two ancient synagogues in Aleppo, Bet Nasi and Midrash Senor Moshe, were completely destroyed during urban renewal work. The government offered an insignificant compensation to the local community. The community council appealed the sum to a court in Damascus but lost.

The Jewish dilemma is very difficult: As much as the Syrian Jews are disturbed by the brutal conduct of the agents of 'Asad, they are much more afraid of the possible results of a rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. "This would be the blackest day in our lives," a Syrian Jew recently said in a private conversation. He expressed a fear that the fanatical and anti-Israeli brotherhood would impose prohibitions and limitations even more severe than those in existence today.

5830
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REPORT ON OPPOSITION GROUP

Schism Within MUP

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 17 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by Lucien Ahonto: "Voyage To the Interior of the Tunisian Opposition Movements. The MUP or the Inevitable Split"]

> [Text] After the PCT [Tunisian Communist Party] another leftist group: the MUP [Popular Unity Movement]. The Popular Unity Movement created by Mr Ahmed ben Salah, former Tunisian minister of economy, after his dismissal in 1969, now has two factions: the followers of Ben Salah who remained faithful to their leader and the MUP-Popular Unity faction whose promoters not only "set about murdering the spiritual father" but still pose as trustees of the authentic spirit of the original MUP.
>
> Since we were unable to reach the Ben Salah faction representatives in time, we are forced to hear only from Mr Mohamed Belhadj Amor, the general secretary of the MUP-UP. Established in Tunis where its leaders were received by the chief of state early in the new year, the MUP-UP has its own headquarters and firmly considers itself one of the progressive parties.

LE CONTINENT: You reject the label of secessionist since you consider yourselves as the true expression of the MUP. However, the faction using Mr Ben Salah's name also declares it holds the authentic MUP tradition. This does not help matters when it comes to granting the MUP a visa.

Mohamed Belhadj Amor: The Popular Unity faction corrected the situation. We proved that we had a broad majority but the minority categorically refused to discuss it. It also refused to listen to the base and allow it to decide, in the last instance. That is why things are clear for us: the faction close to Mr Ben Salah adopted the deviationist positions and abandoned the inviolable principles on which we were in agreement in the beginning and on the basis of which the organization was formed.

The First To Have Asked

So far as the visa is concerned, we were the first to have applied for it. Moreover, if the government decided to grant the MUP a visa I do not believe it would make the mistake of letting the Ben Salah faction obtain it.

LE CONTINENT: If the authorities granted you a visa would you undertake to resume, or at least try to resume, a dialog with the followers of Ben Salah? For example, go to elections together?

Mohamed Belhadj Amor: We consider that the followers of Ben Salah have followed deviationist positions and furthermore are only made up of a number of individuals. The day they become a real group and agree to discuss matters with the base, then we can think of trying to do something jointly.

We are setting up our organization and are ready to negotiate with them but only if it be on well-established terms at the outset.

That being said, it is becoming increasingly clear that it is a case of persons who no longer believe very much in pluralism. Apparently these are people who only want to return to power under a single party system. That is a basic difference, without taking into consideration those bureaucratic and antidemocratic methods, and the personality cult.

LE CONTINENT: Do you not believe that in the last analysis these disagreements play into the hands of the existing authorities?

Mohamed Belhadj Amor: In fact, it can be feared that the government does play on this and seeks to profit from these disagreements. But we are convinced that the blame lies on those forces or movements who ought, it should be said, to think through their actions.

We Have Taken The President's Statements Seriously

In my opinion it is a question of policy orientation within the same movement. However, we are convinced that the truly progressive forces will end by creating a common front and taking the lead.

The existing authorities are right to try to exploit these differences: that is to be expected, in order for them to continue to exist, to continue to defend themselves against certain practices they have been blamed for.

LE CONTINENT: Do you really believe in the opening up of the political spectrum announced by the chief of state?

Mohamed Belhadj Amor: We have taken serioulsy Mr Habib Bourguiba's statements announcing his intention of instituting a multiparty system in Tunisia. For us, this was a solemn affirmation of the right of political groups to a legal existence. It constituted an important step in the evolution of our country's political traditions. That measure will allow us as well as other political

groups to participate effectively in the realization of our program of action through a representation at the national level. It is with this in mind that we applied for a visa well before the chief of state's declarations, which, it must be stated, are the consequence of the struggles we are carrying on. If the opening up of the political spectrum is not achieved now we shall carry on our struggles in the hope that some day our dreams will be realized.

LE CONTINENT: Are you considering making a common front with other opposition groups?

Mohamed Belhadj Amor: I am quite firm on that point. There is no question of our constituting any kind of a front with any one whatsoever. Recently there was a meeting about this attended by the Tunisian Communist Party, the Democratic Socialist Movement, fundamentalists, and representatives of the Ben Salah MUP faction. We have seen the results that brought. No one agreed with anyone else. To tell the truth the people who attended the meeting did so with hidden motives in mind: in particular to take the lead in the opposition, and assume some sort of leadership over the other groups.

For ourselves, we have always denied anyone the right to pose as leader of the opposition. Those who attended the meeting know this very well. Moreover, that is why the promoters did not invite us to participate, even if they denied it after the event.

LE CONTINENT: What have your relations been with the existing authorities since you were received by President Habib Bourguiba?

Mohamed Belhadj Amor: We have no relations with the government. We accepted the chief of state's invitation in order to convey our grievances to him and not to try to influence his decisions regarding the granting of visas. We already have a certain legitimacy. It is up to the government to judge the extent of each movement, each faction, and to grant visas.

We are the party that has demonstrated its political maturity and which also has the courage to begin and carry out a dialog.

MUP-Popular Unity's Positions

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 17 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by Lucien Ahonto]

[Text] Was there a split within the MUP? Why? Each of the factions claiming the heritage of the original MUP has its own version of the facts and obviously accuses the other of every crime. Here is what Mr Mohamed Belhadj Amor has to say.

"First I want to make it clear that there has been no split within the movement. There has only been a rectification as a result of the disagreements between a large part of the MUP membership and the 'Ben Salah' wing. Since its formation

the MUP has been a grouping of militants belonging to different generations, who have followed different political or activist paths. As a result there have always been two factions which have never stopped confronting each other over political orientation or over methods of action. But that is to be expected in a political movement. Things went bad when the Ben Salah faction began to want to reduce the movement to a pressure group on the watch for crises or false steps by the regime. It could not last. The Popular Unity faction therefore began a restructuration of the movement throughout the country. The authorities in power (the Destourien Party) reacted and began to make arrests. That was when the schism between the two factions came out in the open.

"However, we still tried to preserve the unity of the movement, beginning on new, clearly defined bases. Unity was once again preserved, thanks to a compromise. But that understanding, too, lasted only a few months since the followers of Ben Salah again fell back into their antidemocratic practices and wanted to reduce the movement to the dimensions of only one man, with all the consequences that can be foreseen in that kind of situation: in particular, the personality cult and the tendency to personal power. It is noteworthy that the followers of Ben Salah refused to apply for a visa for the movement.

"The minority (the followers of Ben Salah) moreover refused to enter into a discussion proposed by the majority (MUP-Popular Unity). People who call us dissidents do so because they are unaware of what has taken place within the party since its formation.

"We have called for a profound and serious internal discussion. Mr Ben Salah and those close to him have rejected this. It was only then, and with a view to preserving the movement's unity and combatting the antidemocratic practices of Ben Salah's followers that we set about straightening out our faction, which is in the majority, let it not be forgotten, and we undertook the necessary steps to apply for the visa required by the regulations."

9772
CSO: 4519/28

FUTURE IMPORTANCE OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

Paris LE MONDE in French 14 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by Michel Deure: "Henceforth the Fundamentalist Faction Will Play an Important Part in Political and Social Activities"]

[Text] Tunis. On 4 July, the first day of the month of Ramadan, when the local press announced that restaurants, cafes and cake-shops would be closed during the hours of fasting, it could have been feared that the spirit of toleration which had always prevailed in Tunisia, and which made its reputation, had just disappeared. And then gradually in 3 or 4 days the regulations which had been in force for several years came back into effect. These regulations reconciled individual freedom with the concern of not offending anyone's convictions and principles: it forbade the sale of alcoholic drinks to Tunisians, eliminated open-air service of cafes (but the interior rooms remained open to patrons regardless of nationality), and maintained all restaurant services.

What happened during that period of hesitation? Did the authorities want to give themselves some time for observation before relaxing the rules they had just promulgated because they were anxious to avoid incidents that the violence-prone partisans of strict observation of the Koran might provoke?

Government departments categorically deny this interpretation and offer the unconvincing explanation that a ministry of interior circular was misinterpreted. It is a fact that certain regional authorities and some part of the police have on these occasions shown excessive zeal and this has, according to reliable testimony, given rise to downright abuse of authority.

Obviously such a situation was to fill the newspapers and divide public opinion, contrary to the country's traditions of moderation. Those who consider themselves the sole repositories of truth and defenders of the Koran claimed a victory and the others, more numerous and including many of the faithful, made no secret of their concern over such budding sectarianism and over what they considered at the same time a retreat by government authorities in the face of fundamentalists' demands.

The hubbub reached right up to President Bourguiba. Since independence he has struggled to harmonize Islam and modernism, tradition and progress. It is said that he was much displeased and gave orders at once to countermand these measures,

which violated his conviction that each Tunisian is free to practice his religion, or not, as he wishes. To make it clear that his attitude was based on no other consideration he donated 25,000 copies of the Koran to the mosques.

This incident, which ought to have been forgotten, continues to be the topic of all conversations because the fundamentalist faction, which has just formed a "Moslem Movement" and which has asked for recognition, nowadays occupies an important place in Tunisian political and social activities.

In the beginning it was encouraged by the government, which saw in it the best means of countering Marxist influences, mainly among the students. Its activity has increased over the years, now without inspiring the interest, if not the sympathy, of an increasing number of Tunisians.

President Bourguiba's Irritation

Their leaders and front-line activists are everywhere: in mosques overflowing with the faithful, who listen to preachers unsparing in their criticisms of the regime; in universities; in high schools and colleges, the scenes of violent confrontations this spring; in the countryside, where more and more they are coming to the aid of the needy; in firms. It is certainly not by chance that a few weeks ago the funeral services for two workers killed in an accident at the naval works at Menzel-Bourguiba almost degenerated into an uprising following a demonstration over some religious slogans.

Every moment, in streets, and now even at the counters of certain government offices, bearded young men and stern-faced young women garbed in the traditional veil and long dress remind one of the existence of the movement. If these exterior signs are the object of mockery, true, increasingly unobtrusive mockery, they irritate the chief of state to the highest degree. A few days ago during an awards ceremony, he pointed out, more serious than joking, to a young prize-winner who was sporting a beard: "That's not the way to be a good Moslem. Besides, Charlemagne had a beard and to my knowledge he was no Moslem."

Obviously, this situation does not fail to attract the watchful attention of government authorities who for the time being are following a wait-and-see policy. Repressing the fundamentalists might make "martyrs" out of them and thus increase the number of their sympathizers. Even the other opposition factions, which now privately express the greatest reserves about them, would be obliged to support them, as they did, most unwillingly, in the past. Moreover, to exclude them in advance from the beginnings of the democratic process would be tantamount to casting them into a semi-clandestine status, thus making them probably more difficult to keep track of.

In political circles it is hoped that a sense of moderation, which the great majority of Tunisians have always shown, will prevail and that this religious flare-up will decline by itself.

Is that excessive optimism? Perhaps. Yet a recent incident which took place in the very center of Tunis confirms this analysis. It was 10 o'clock when a bearded man about 40 years old wearing the white robe of the fundamentalists placed himself on the threshold of a small bar and began shouting at the customers, insulting and cursing them. The latter, mostly workers, let him talk, exchanged a few ironic smiles and then returned to drinking their coffee, without any apparent remorse.

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ELECTION, BACKGROUND ACTIVITIES OF NEW PRESIDENT REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81 pp 1-3

[Text] The "landslide" victory of premier Mohammad Ali Rajai in the elections for the presidency of the Islamic republic represented a decisive new blow to its opposition on the part of the ruling extremists.

Though some observers dismiss the voting figures as "entirely fraudulent" and "grotesque exaggerations" of the true poll, the way the republic's officials handled the exercise and contrived to avoid any impression that its opponents could disrupt the voting demonstrates that the mullahs and their friends are still ahead of the late Shah's men in putting on a show of mass public support.

One or two Iran watchers, indeed, went so far as to describe Rajai's win as "a remarkable victory over the united opposition." But a "progressive" clergyman in Paris who is close to the Islamic-leftist Mojahedin-e-Khalq contended that many observers had believed the Tehran government's allegations that the group's supporters were planning a coup d'etat, but in fact the Mojahedin, a well disciplined force, had instructed its supporters to avoid any possible threat to lives on the polling day itself, so it had not suffered any "defeat."

Others refused to believe the Mojahedin had taken no part in the violence which latest reports now reveal was far more widespread than was originally reported throughout Iran on polling day. The government announced 11 revolutionary guards had died in hit and run attacks, but the toll is said to have risen considerably as reports reached Tehran from more distant parts of the country.

In many parts of the world the republic's embassies were also under attack from opposition groups. In Ankara the ballot box was seized and destroyed. In Vienna several people were hurt in a shoot-out and there were a number of arrests. In New York a group of 15 Iranians chained themselves to the Statue of Liberty as a protest against the excesses of the regime at home, the second time this has been done. In Copenhagen students attacked the embassy and disfigured photographs of Khomeini.

Rajai was credited with having gained just short of 13 million of the 14,652,440 votes cast, with Abbas Sheibani, a longtime National Front stalwart second with 666,650, and the other two candidates, Parvaresh with just over 400,000 and Asghar-Awladi 252,349. The 461,948 votes declared void, Tehran radio said, were for Khomeini, Bani-Sadr, "Mahin and Shahin."

Controversy over the validity of the figures was fueled by numerous expressions of scepticism over the facilities being available for so many people to reach a polling station. Although these were much more widely available than when the first referendum on the Islamic republic was held in 1979 an article published in a Tehran newspaper at that time estimated that the figures of votes in favour were inflated many times over and cited obvious logistical obstacles to anything like the published number of votes being cast.

Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, who represented the small town of Karaj in the last parliament under the Shah, and who now heads a nationalist, anti-monarchy opposition group in the south of France, pointed out this week that "even if all the babies in the area had voted it would be impossible to find the 300,000 whom the government claimed voted there in the presidential election." Other former officials pointed out other discrepancies. The figures for voting in London, 902 only for a community of scores of thousands of eligible voters, showed a marked contrast to figures of voting inside Iran.

Bani-Ahmad also contended that Islamic associations which are now the powers in numerous offices and factories had begun to examine the identity cards of employees to confirm that they had marks showing they had voted, a threat which was unofficially publicised before the presidential poll. It was feared that those who had not voted could face dismissal from their jobs.

Observers said there was no doubt, in fact, that the intensive campaign waged by the regime, ranging from Khomeini's announcement that failure to vote was an anti-Islamic act to pressures of all kinds on the public to make them feel they would be found out if they didn't, did send many people to the polls who may not have gone.

Tehran radio, in a commentary after the results were announced, said the landslide win could be considered as a complete defeat for the united counter-revolutionary movements. The win reflected true Islam in confirming that the people were not separate from the clergy (a part of Islamic doctrine). It also showed that former president Bani-Sadr's victory was owed to the fact that he was seen as a candidate of the Imam's line but when he departed from it he was thrown into the dustbin of history.

Behzad Nabavi, the official who is tipped to succeed Rajai as premier, said the poll victory marked the end of the power struggle and the time for planning had now come.

But Iran watchers said two other things had to be achieved before the country could settle down to real planning and steady development again.

The first was a decisive victory over the "monafeqs" (false devotees), as the groups like the Mojahedin and their allies are now labelled. Without this, security could not be restored and real progress would be virtually impossible without reestablishment of security and law and order.

The Mojahedin is already prepared, sources say, for a new onslaught from the regime's forces. The execution on Monday of Reza Saadati, the former Majahedin leader who was serving a long sentence for allegedly spying for the Soviet Union, is seen as one of the opening moves of the new campaign against the Mojahedin. Simultaneously, announcements were made of the executions of many more members of the movement.

The other area which had to be tackled was the economy, which is in a more chaotic state than ever. The threats by the public prosecutor of Islamic retribution for those who on strike or indulge in go-slows, now common in the state offices and industries like oil, are signs of the regime's realisation of this problem.

Iran's second president in less than three years of the Islamic republic, Mohammad Ali Rajai, had been a Muslim activist since he was a young air forceman who met the late Ayatollah Taleghani in his late teens, Tehran radio said in a biography of the new head of state broadcast on Monday.

He then established contact with the Feda'iyan-e-Eslam organisation (the then Egyptian-based Muslim Brotherhood branch in Iran) and began his doctrinal struggle.

A native of Qazvin, a small city west of Tehran, he had been brought up largely by a brother after his father died when he was three. After he completed elementary school he came to Tehran at the age of 14 and worked for some years in the bazaar before becoming attached to the air force.

He left the air force in 1953 and, obtaining his secondary school diploma the same year, he got a job as a teacher at Bijar in Kurdestan. He continued working as a teacher until the revolution, except for several spells in prison. After a period at a teachers' college he moved to a secondary school in Khonsar, later moving to Tehran to teach statistics in a secondary school there. He had moved to his native Qazvin when he was arrested and jailed for the first time. When freed, he began to collaborate with Jalaleddin Farsi, a founding member of the Islamic Republican Party and Hojatoleslam Javad Bahonar, who has succeeded Mohammad Beheshti as secretary-general of that party.

They founded an Islamic association which started an Islamic school for girls and the Rejah Foundation and Kamal Society, which became centres for those who supported the movement responsible for the rioting in Tehran led by Khomeini in 1963, the radio said. In 1970, when Farsi left Iran to form a guerrilla group, Rajai continued as his liaison man in Iran, and once paid a visit to Damascus to discuss plans with him.

While acting as a school principal Rajai met Hanif Nejad, one of the Mojahedin founders, when the latter's wife was a teacher at his school. After being again arrested and jailed in 1973 Rajai, the radio said, cogitated long on how the Mojahedin movement could equate Islam with Marxism "and failed to understand." After completing his sentence he was rearrested after only a short period of freedom and was only released again at the time of the revolution in 1978.

Rajai quickly became active again, forming a secret Islamic organisation called the Teachers' Islamic Association, in which he cooperated with the Rafsanjani brothers, one of whom is now Majlis Speaker and the other a deputy premier, Bahonar and Beheshti. He visited France, Turkey and Syria on short trips during this period, but was later appointed Minister of Education in Mehdi Bazargan's provisional government. He soon nationalised all educational centres and schools. He became an M.P. for Tehran and was appointed Prime Minister in 1980 on the recommendation of the Majlis.

Married with one son and two daughters, the radio said, Rajai has always observes strict Islamic discipline in his behavior.

CSO: 4600/118

ARIANA SETS UP HEADQUARTERS AT IRAN-TURKISH BORDER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81 p 7

[Text] Former chief of the Shah's joint staff General Bahram Ariana is now established in a full-time headquarters on the Turkish-Iran border, honouring a pledge he made when he left Paris last week, according to informed sources in Ankara.

He is reported by aides to have already made contact with military groups inside Iran who oppose the present regime. But they added he is trying to avoid embarrassing Turkish officials, who enjoy good commercial relations with Tehran, by making propaganda.

IPS' Paris correspondent also reports that a considerable number of former officers in exile have contacted Iriana's office in Paris and say they plan to join him. They hope to travel in small groups in the near future. Some are already prepared to leave. Ariana says he believes that any coup d'etat must come from Tehran and it is there that he plans to direct his efforts.

Many opposition groups have expressed their support for Ariana's action. "It's a very laudable idea and I'm all for it," said Ali Amini, a former Iranian premier who heads a movement for national reconciliation which tries to bring opposition elements together. "It is far better to do that than to sit in Paris publishing communiques about freeing the country.

"As far as I am concerned I am ready to do what I can for Ariana's success."

Ariana believes the monarchy should be restored to Iran and security then provided for Iranians of all ideologies in the country.

CSO: 4600/120

INTELLECTUALS REPORTED TAKING REFUGE IN FRANCE

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by J. -M. Durand-Souffland--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] It was in late August 1978, when they became convinced that the shah's regime could not survive much longer in the face of a cold wind that would soon change into a revolutionary tornado, that a large number of families belonging to the Iranian /"gentry"/ began to think of going into exile. Moreover, the court itself was the first to set the example: Hercules C-130's from the air force were leaving Tehran twice a week for destinations in Spain, for Paris and the Cote d'Azur, New York, and Los Angeles, carrying on board precious furnishings, tapestries, art objects.

But the big exodus of intellectuals--doctors, lawyers, architects, engineers, professors, etc.--whose wives and children spent the summer in Europe as they did every year, and already chose to stay there--began to get organized in mid-September and continued to the end of 1978. Starting in March of the following year, 5,000 to 6,000 political refugees were fleeing the country every day by any means possible. Estimates of the total number of Iranians who thus left their country before, during, and after the advent of the Khomeyni regime range from 700,000 to nearly 1 million.

In France, a country which in the past was always enthusiastic about the Iranian intelligentsia, the number of Iranian refugees claiming to be in opposition to the /"mullah republic"/ is estimated at about 40,000. Monarchists, republicans who are fundamentally democratic, supporters of a /"strong"/ rightist regime, such are the three broad tendencies represented in France by a number of individuals.

Princess Azadeh Chafik, the shah's niece through her mother (Princess Achraf, the monarch's twin sister), whose brother, naval captain Chahryar Chafik, was assassinated in Paris on 7 December 1979, embodies the monarchist and legitimist tradition. Her movement, "Free Iran," which publishes, under that same name, two weekly news bulletins, one in French and the other in Farsi, stays in continual contact with Iran, from which it receives a great deal of intelligence on a daily basis.

Mr Nahavandi--former chief of staff for the empress Farah Diba, former rector of the Universities of Tehran and Tabriz--calls for national unity, which in his view is the only way to put an end to the present regime. Later, once Iran is freed from the grip of the religious fundamentalists, he would be prepared to see the country choose for itself a new regime--either a monarchy or a republic--through a national referendum. Though he was once a personal friend of the shah, Mr Nahavandi, considered by the monarchist cliques /to be on a separate track/ in the struggle to liberate Iran, is nonetheless an /"ally"/ of the cause.

General Bahram Ariana--former chief of staff of the imperial army, a brilliant officer out of St-Cyr, grand officier [rank above commander] of the Legion of Honor, the man who commanded the shah's troops in fighting with the Iraqis at the time of the border incidents in 1972--is a firm monarchist, in whose eyes the country's real destiny can only be achieved under Pahlavi rule. General Ariana, who has been in Paris since the Iranian revolution, left the capital on 25 July for a country /"neighboring"/ Iran, with the aim of personally fighting--probably in Baluchistan--alongside the tribes opposed to the Khomeyni regime.

The former prime minister, Shapour Bakhtiar, who is the best known of the exiles in France because of his many television appearances and because he was the object of an attempted assassination in July 1980, at Neuilly, continues to fight for the cause. The existence, on Iraqi soil, of a transmitter which continually broadcasts under the name Radio Iran to Iranians who have stayed in the country, providing news bulletins and making appeals to the resistance, contributes to giving his activities special "force." And on the other hand it would seem that he has at his disposal substantial financial resources, which is not the case with the other movements.

General Gholam-Ali Ovelssi, while he has remained very close to traditional monarchist circles, seems nevertheless to have retired now from any active political role. At about this time last year he did not hesitate to tell the weekly VSD that he would make himself /"master of Tehran"/ before the end of the following August. Similarly, Mr Ali Amini, a former prime minister, has apparently now abandoned any activity leading to the overthrow of the imam. But it is also true that Mr Amini is 77 years old.

Mr Hassan Nazih--describing himself as a partisan of a liberal republic, willingly using all those who resisted authority in the time of the shah--last year established the National Movement for the Liberation of Iran, which since that time has not received much attention. He is certainly more frequently criticized by his peers than any other exile. Even if he was, in the Pahlavi years, the president of the Iranian Human Rights League, Mr Nazih is criticized for having also been at the same time the president of the Iranian bar association and a personage with high rank at court, a status deemed incompatible with his "self-proclaimed" role of opponent to the throne.

9516
CSO: 4619/24

EXILED IRANIAN PRESIDENT DEFENDS HIS RECORD

PM041219 Paris LE MONDE in French 2-3 Aug 81 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Mr Bani-Sadr's Explanations on His Contacts With a CIA Agent"]

[Text] Following the publication of our journalist Eric Rouleau's article entitled "A Hunted Man" (LE MONDE 30 July), [former Iranian President] Mr Bani-Sadr sent us the following letter:

The documents seized in the American Embassy in Tehran to which your journalist refers were either wrongly translated into Persian or were mutilated. I did have a conversation with an American who was posing as a businessman, but I did so in the presence of several of my advisers. It is also true that he offered me the job of technical adviser to his firm. However the monthly salary he offered me was not $1,000--as moreover was stated in one of the documents not printed by the Iranian press--but $5,000. Obviously I was not taken in by this unusual and highly suspicious proposal. I therefore showed my American interlocutor the door.

If the Iranian Government had published all the documents in its possession, I am convinced that they would have reported my categorical refusal. However, one of the two documents published speaks for itself. This is what it states: 'Mr Bani-Sadr and his advisers are intransigent, and we would not be able to trust them. Mr Bani-Sadr is very intelligent, responsible and perspicacious, and the experience of recent years suggests that he will not align with our positions.' That is what the CIA agent thought of me.

Allow me also to give an additional detail about the Iranian people's reaction to the underhand coup d'etat which I have just suffered. The executions, murders and attacks and the high level of abstentions in last week's elections all reflect the people's resistance. With all due respect to skeptical observers, the second revolution which I have predicted has certainly started--a revolution which will sooner or later be crowned with success.

Moreover, my attitude to the United States has always been very clear. The attacks to which I have been subjected on this subject are unfounded. I have already stated that, in view of the Tudeh Communist Party's weakness and the political situation, the USSR does not seem to pose a serious threat to Iran. I have always upheld and implemented a policy of national independence. Today, as before, I think it is necessary to block the path of both the United States and the Soviet Union and of the political parties in our country favorable to them, which are now trying to seize power by every possible means.

CSO: 4619/29

PLAN ORGANIZATION TO UNDERGO RESTRUCTURING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Aug 81 p 14

[Text] The restructuring of the Budget and Plan Organization will be carried out by joint councils on planning and expertise; the objective of this restructuring will be to make maximum use of employees' productivity. This was announced by engineer Musa Khayyer, minister of executive affairs and chairman of the Budget and Plan Organization during a press conference.

Engineer Khayyer started out by saying: "The work of becoming acquainted with an Islamic type of planning started 10 months ago—that is, from the time I came to the Budget and Plan Organization; considering the fact that a great deal of our time was spent on affairs of the day, the review of this organization's structure has taken until today."

He added: "We noticed that because of the special nature of the organization and the way it was structured, the affairs of the nation were being reviewed diojointedly and in isolated fashion, and the network that could provide full guidance to the performance of technology, of the economy, production, distribution and consumption was non-existent."

Engineer Khayyer continued by saying: "The structuring of this organization will be carried out by joint councils on planning and expertise, and its objective is to make maximum use of employees' productivity."

Regarding the manpower restructure of the organization, the chairman of the Budget and Plan Organization stated: "A committee has been formed in this organization consisting of deputies and advisors, and they have been revieweing this subject. If, in the course of personnel restructuring we find out about a surplus of employees, we shall transfer them to other sections where their talents could be used more appropriately."

He elaborated: "In the restructuring, we shall use the service of experts, who may occasionally lack the necessary (religious) commitment and faith, as working elements, but we shall not give them leading positions."

Continuing his remarks, Musa Khayyer said: "The employees will be ready to assume their positions after 10 days, in accordance with the restructuring and the duties newly assigned to them. The closing of this organization will not financially harm them." In conclusion, he said: "During the time the organization is closed down, some of the employees will be present at their jobs at the discretion of the organization's deputies so as not to stop the current work of the organization, such as the publication of the budget.

CSO: 4640/79

RELATIONS BETWEEN SOVIETS, KHOMEYNI REGIME DISCUSSED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81 pp 5-6

[Text] The luring into Soviet airspace and shooting down of an Argentinian cargo plane could well be a new Soviet demonstration to Iran and the rest of the world that they are masters of the situation along their southern borders, an Iranian former official of the late Shah who played a top role in relations between Tehran and Moscow for many years commented to IPS this week.

"Two flights went by and then the Russians showed their hand as if to say, 'Look, we're in control here--why don't you turn to us?'" the official said.

"Soviet ambassador Vinogradov told a very shaken Khomeini after the blowing up of the IRP headquarters that he could rely on every possible support from the Russians," the former official said. "He had only to ask and it was his. We have heard this from Tehran, where the present officials are far too naive to keep such secrets for long."

The IPS informant said westeners would be equally naive if they thought the Soviet Union had ever relaxed in its determination to consolidate its influence over Iran. "Every dealing I had with them over those years demonstrated clearly their plans and their determination in that respect, and since the revolution they have steadily pursued a policy which would make their role a dominant one in any eventuality there."

Arrivals in Europe from Iran in recent months have provided evidence of the steadily expanding grip on much of the bureaucracy and industry of Tudeh party members and their supporters. "They have implanted themselves everywhere and it really doesn't matter if it were true that they are not popular with the mass of Iranians," the former official said. "Since the party had demonstrated its support for the Imam and the Islamic republic it can hardly have been said to have made itself unpopular."

"It is perfectly clear that Moscow is determined to ensure no repetition of the error of 1953, when the party was well organised and strong and by its failure to back the Mossadeq government put the ball back in the Shah's court," another commentator told IPS. "This time the organisation will help keep the mullah's regime working and will be intact when the regime goes the inevitable way of all such unwordly administrations. The fact that the Soviets are aware of this fact was demonstrated by the cooling of their relations with Tehran over recent months. This incident was obviously designed to embarrass the Iranians.

"Although one cannot go along with the appallingly stupid ideas that people have that pro-Moscow IRP people blew up Beheshti and his 'moderate' colleagues--if they were moderate then Hitler's SS men were, too--it has left the mullahs much weaker and thus played into the hands of Moscow to a great extent. And Moscow, with a far better understanding of oriental thinking, thanks largely to its own oriental populations, knows better than the West exactly how to exploit the situation."

Some Iranian observers of the scene in their country are especially concerned about the advantage of the Soviet now enjoys over the West in the level and competence of its oriental specialists. The departure from diplomatic services of the older brigade of experts who had much more power of decision and knew their areas more deeply than do the more regularly switched modern diplomats in the West, is one factor that has worked adversely for the West. Another has been the change in western societies which has produced a new race of "liberal-minded" younger diplomats who see the problems of the world almost purely from the point of view of their own societies, and have less understanding and certainly less sympathy for the conservative elements trying to halt anarchy in the East and the Third World in general, they say.

Even in London and other western capitals where there are large Iranian student communities the Russians are able to call on Persian-speaking Soviet nationals from the southern republics who can quickly and ably build up relations with young Iranians. The Mojahedin and other leftist groups outside are much more directly in contact with Soviet agents than are their compatriots at home, where the Soviet Union is seen as just another imperialistic nation.

At Speakers Corners in Hyde Park on Sundays, for example, a Persian-speaking journalist from Baku, in Soviet Azarbaijan, is on first name terms with dozens of leftist youngsters who make this a regular meeting place. He takes a leading role in trying to shout down Iranians who try to express purely nationalistic as distinct from commonplace leftist views on Iran. The fact that he retains such friendly relations with Mojahedin-e-Khalq and Fedayeen minority students who profess to be anti-Soviet reflects perhaps as much on the sincerity of their anti-Moscow stand as on his and his colleagues' perspicacity in obtaining their confidence.

Indeed, when pressed by questioners about their attitudes to the western powers the Mojahedin and other "nationalist" leftists quickly begin to take a pro-Eastern block stance, and when really pushed will openly defend the Soviet Union. At worst, they say, the Soviet Union is revisionist, but where Lenin's ideas have remained honoured it is a desirable system.

That the military inside Iran still keeps a wary eye open for Soviet moves is exemplified by reports received by IPS from Tehran sources that at least one high-ranking army officer has been arrested in a newly exposed pro-Soviet or directly inspired Soviet plot. The Tehran announcements of discovery of arms bases belonging to Marxist groups may be linked with this plot, the sources said. Reports said the plot was discovered by military sources.

"The Soviets have always been able to find a few people in the military who are ready to serve their purpose," one Iran watcher told IPS. "In the Shah's days they managed to keep well informed and there was, of course, one celebrated case where a general, who had been spying for many years, was caught red-handed giving documents to a Soviet agent. There is obviously the possibility that young officers fed up with the present situation in Iran might look at the Soviet Union as a possible saviour now that the West has firmly demonstrated it is looking after its own ends and not those of the Iranian people."

CSO: 4600/119

MAGAZINE REPORTS BEHESHTI'S SHADY DEALINGS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81 pp 7-8

[Text] The West German magazine DER SPIEGEL has described the late Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, head of the Islamic Republican Party, who was killed in the recent bombing of its headquarters in Tehran, as a 'machiavellian character.'

It alleged that when the Shah visited Hamburg in 1976 he contrived to be away on a trip to avoid meeting him, and later flew to East Berlin to renew acquaintance and have meetings with the former Soviet consul in Hamburg and chief KGB organiser in northern Europe Vladimirov.

After his return to Tehran, the magazine article alleged, Beheshti turned to some plundering. He sold several very expensive carpets, including two pieces from one of the royal palaces, each of which had 1.2 million knots to a square metre and which had taken craftsmen 15 years to make.

It was also alleged that, as head of the Supreme Court Beheshti had taken big sums from families of political prisoners in Iran to spare their relatives' lives, but had not troubled to save them from execution.

The magazine also quoted dates and amounts which it said German banks had received transfers of money from Beheshti in Tehran. On 21 Aug 1979 he had sent 6,240,000 marks, on 30 Oct 1979, 305,000 marks; and on 19 Dec 1979 and 7 Apr 1980 on each occasion sums of 8 million marks. All the sums were sent to the Bank Melli Iran branch in Hamburg, but were afterwards transferred to Beheshti's accounts in other German banks by a close aide, the magazine said.

CSO: 4600/120

EXILES MOURN SHAH ON ANNIVERSARY

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81 p 8

[Text] Ceremonies to mark the first anniversary of the late Shah's death were held on Sunday and Monday almost everywhere in the world where Iranians are gathered in good numbers. London, Paris, Los Angeles, Bonn, Munich and many other cities saw crowds of up to more than a thousand people collected to recall the dead sovereign and put flowers around his photograph and that of his son, who has succeeded him.

They were sad ceremonies, with black-clad women often crying inconsolably and the air full of bitterness and a sense of despair. They were larger than many of the monarchist gatherings of the last couple of years because many Iranians who had previously remained aloof from them felt the need to come and try to identify with their compatriots once more, and at the same time air the sense of bitterness towards the western countries which is now almost the strongest single emotion among the exiles everywhere.

They feel betrayed and abandoned by the West, to which they always looked and with whom they enjoyed special relations under the Shah. The residence and visa problems they face, particularly in Britain, which pursues a not uncharitable but seemingly an unnecessarily officious and thus unnerving policy towards the Iranians who live here, have added to the anger the exiles feel over the failure of those erstwhile friends to foresee the effects of their abandonment of such a staunch ally as the late Shah.

One old man, in apparent anguish, told a British bystander in London, "No, we hope Khomeini doesn't go for a little while yet for we want every Iranian to rediscover his patriotism first so they will never rely for the tiniest thing on foreigners any more!"

The bitterness towards Britain was not only because people like him, who have adequate means but have to use them to help out less fortunate friends and relatives, are never allowed to feel they have secure residence here until it is safe to go home again; it is also due to the fact that Britain was always seen as the country which understood Iran and Iranians better than any other nation, he explained.

"When are all those British ambassadors, and scholars who were always our most honoured guests in Iran going to put in a word for us in the fact of all the libels and slanders printed and mouthed in the West which they know not to be true?" he demanded of the Briton. "Don't they have any principles at all, or is it they are busy currying favours elsewhere?"

As the crowd of several hundreds wound round the Mayfair street in front of the Egyptian embassy in London, waiting to lay their flowers at the foot of the Shah's picture, an IPS correspondent said one could also hear complaints against the seeming inactivity of those around the new Shah and of his father's former chief officials and business beneficiaries who also leave the publicising of the monarchist cause to stronger patriots of more modest status. There is now a real need of a new monarchist lead to boost the spirits of the exiles.

Many of those, too, who gathered now to take part in or watch from afar the ceremony were also moved enough to admit their own fickleness in not supporting the Shah more fervently when he was still in Iran. Although they prefer to publicly put most of the blame for their fate on the Carter administration in the U.S. in particular, and on other Western countries, more and more of the exiles--together with rising numbers in Iran itself--are bitterly regretting their mistake in not realising their advantages under the late Shah's rule.

The new Shah, in a message referred to on Israel radio, said the terror and the chaos and the suffering in Iran were tragic evidence of the fact that his father had, in fact, been a progressive politician.

CSO: 4600/120

RAFSANJANI LINKS BANI-SADR TO BOMBINGS IN IRAN

NC041212 Paris AFP in English 1203 GMT 4 Aug 81

[Text] Tehran, 4 Aug (AFP)--Iranian parliament speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani charged today that former President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr was linked to two bomb explosions yesterday that killed 14 people and injured 40.

In the first, a booby-trapped car blew up in Tehran, 200 meters (650 feet) from the offices of newly-elected President Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, and not far from the Parliament building where Mr Raja'i was being sworn in.

That blast killed one person and injured 15, according to official figures. Among the injured were young children who were going for vaccinations at the Pasteur Institute.

In the second, in Kermanshah, capital of the western province of Kermanshahan, 13 people were killed and 25 injured when a bomb exploded near a telephone headquarters.

Mr Bani-Sadr and other "groups" in Paris who said they wanted "to expel the companions of the Imam (Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni) from the scene" were doubtless responsible for this "blind terrorism unprecedented in Iran," Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani said.

The parliament speaker also lashed out at the French Government for granting political asylum for the ousted former president, who arrived in Paris last Wednesday.

"No logic can justify, not even that of the mafia and gangsters...the allegedly socialist and human rights-defending French Government which grants political asylum to those people," Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani said.

He was apparently referring both to Mr Bani-Sadr and to Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the outlawed people's Mojaheddin, who helped the ex-president escape from Tehran aboard an Iranian air force jet.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Rafsanjani's criticism was the latest in a series of condemnations of France.

The daily Islamic Republic newspaper, the organ of the ruling Islamic Republic party, reported a demonstration Sunday in front of the French consulate in Isfahan, central Iran, in which several thousand protesters shouted "death to the fascist French Government."

The newspaper added that the national head of a committee for the disinherited, identified only as Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek, "enumerated crimes committed in Algeria, the massacre of Armenians and other disinherited in countries dominated by France."

The newspaper also printed an editorial denouncing "the growth of French arms sales to anti-popular regimes, vassals of the West."

CSO: 4600/122

LEBANESE WEEKLY INTERVIEWS BANI-SADR ON SITUATION

NC081130 Paris AFP in English 1118 GMT 8 Aug 81

[Text] Beirut 8 Aug (AFP)--Deposed Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr said today he asked Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni to stop a massive tide of executions in exchange for a halt to "sabotage by opposition forces" and dialogue between the two sides.

In an interview published today by the Lebanese weekly AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI, he added that Ayatollah Khomeyni did not reply to the suggestion, made at an undisclosed date.

The former president, sacked by the Iranian fundamentalist regime for "political incompetence," described the executions of dissidents as a "massacre" and accused the Islamic tribunals of "disfiguring Islam."

He added that he had also asked Ayatollah Khomeyni to halt the executions in recognition of his 20 years' service to the Iranian spiritual leader.

Mas'ud Rajavi, head of the people's Mojahedin, the Moslem-leftist movement hardest hit by the executions, arrived in Paris on July 29 with Mr Bani-Sadr.

The former president told the magazine the ayatollah had created the revolution guards and the tribunals, and it was now up to him to "restructure the army, the police and other institutions."

On Iraq, at war with Iran for a year, the ousted president said that in the first months after the Iranian revolution two years ago Iraqi President Saddam Husayn sent an envoy to express solidarity with the new regime.

But Ayatollah Khomeyni rejected the advance, saying that to accept friendship from President Husayn would be to "deceive the hopes of the Iraqi people" of overthrowing him.

Mr Bani-Sadr accused Iraq of arming Kurdish insurgents and sending terrorist commandos into Iran. He also accused the United States of encouraging Iraq to attack Iran, "in the hope that it would all be over in a couple of days."

CSO: 4600/122

CLANDESTINE RADIO SCORES BANI-SADR; WARNS IRANIANS

NC051200 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Aug 81

[Station talk]

[Text] Compatriots! By confessing that he was deceived by Khomeyni, that his assessment of Khomeyni was completely wrong and that he was wrong in seeing Khomeyni as a savior, Bani-Sadr shows that neither did he have the power of political foresight nor can he be trusted as a politician.

With his recent interviews which have been tantamount to a penitence, Bani-Sadr shows his great lack of political dignity and the mistakes he makes in his political assessments. With his flagrant (?change) of policy Bani-Sadr shows that he lacked political (?foresight) both in Neuphle-le-Chateau and in Tehran. These great political (?mistakes), which were paid for in the chaos and the unsettling of the Iranian society, show that today too Bani-Sadr's assessments are not free of mistakes and that tomorrow he may seek justice and apologize for mistakes he commits today.

Bani-Sadr's mistakes are not such as can be forgiven by saying "sorry, I won't do it again." Bani-Sadr's mistake was that he played with the destiny of a nation. Bani-Sadr's sins are not personal sins of which he himself will bear the consequences. With his wrong (?calculations) that involved the life and (?destiny) of a nation, Bani-Sadr became an element in an unending (?range) of crimes and calamities. He played the major role in destroying Iran's economy and his biggest sin--if we accept the fact that he made a mistake merely in his assessment of Khomeyni--was his political shortsightedness.

Today Bani-Sadr is committing another mistake. He is trying to return to a position for the undertaking of which he lacks all merit and competence. Who of the vigilant Iranian people will trust Bani-Sadr's political (?knowledge)? Bani-Sadr's blunders (?started a bloodbath) in Iran. Who would want a repeat of this deadly mistake?

By confessing to his big political (mistake now) Bani-Sadr clearly shows that he is 2 and 1/2 years behind time. When 2 and 1/2 years ago, Shapur Bakhtiar warned in a hundred (?ways that tyrannical) dictatorship is coming, couldn't Bani-Sadr hear the shout of danger and warning? But at that time (?he could not) hear these shouts. He was too carried away by his imam's promises and he could not use his logic.

The truth is that Bani-Sadr did not commit a mistake. He has only turned from Khomeyni or, in other words, Khomeyni has turned from him and this because Khomeyni was not prepared to place the whole morsel of power in Bani-Sadr's mouth. If Khomeyni had fulfilled Bani-Sadr's opportunistic requests, today Bani-Sadr would have still been in Tehran and would have been saying "oh imam, imam" and he would have been issuing the execution orders for persons who had in the slightest insulted the imam.

CSO: 4640/80

FRG MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS BANI-SADR

DW040906 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 3 Aug 81 pp 90-93

[Interview with former Iranian President Bani-Sadr in his Paris apartment by editor Renate Possarnig, date not given]

[Text] SPIEGEL: Mr Bani-Sadr, almost 3 years ago you and Ayatollah Khomeyni prepared the overthrow of the shah from Paris. Now you are here again—without Khomeyni. What are your feelings?

Bani-Sadr: I am very sad, and I am still dreaming of it. Khomeyni will see that he made a mistake at the time. True, what we did in Paris at the time, the program we made was revolutionary. It envisaged the unity of religious and intellectual ideas and was to initiate an integration of all sections of the people. But in the last analysis all these ideas have not been implemented.

SPIEGEL: But as president you were very much responsible for this.

Bani-Sadr: As president I was powerless. But as the representative of a strong movement of the intellectuals and the people I was influential. Today I feel stronger, and this must be assessed positively, because I have managed to awaken the national awareness. The people today are no longer what they were 2 years ago.

SPIEGEL: But in Iran itself things look very miserable today. What has become of the strong man Khomeyni?

Bani-Sadr: He is a weak man. He changes his mind very often, depending on what movement is exerting pressure on him. It was only because of this weakness that the catastrophe was possible. But he is not responsible for everything.

I believed in him 20 years. Together we returned to Iran, both having the same ideas. But gradually his ideas changed, because the ratio of forces in Iran has changed. On the one hand, there were the progressive Iranians who gradually lost influence, and on the other hand, there were the reactionary forces.

SPIEGEL: Do you mean to say that Khomeyni is not a wise man?

Bani-Sadr: If you don't criticize yourself you will become the slave of your demands and wishes. Khomeyni in power has become the slave of power. There is

a power which is constructive, and there is a power which is destructive. An alcoholic, for instance, becomes the prisoner of wine. He drinks and drinks and drinks, and nothing is left in the end.

SPIEGEL: You are talking about a power-greedy Khomeyni...

Bani-Sadr: There is another type of power who is enslaved as well, true, but who also is an organizer to strengthen his power, like Hitler in Germany. Hitler had an organizational talent which enabled him to stay in power. Khomeyni, however, is sick; he is not well.

SPIEGEL: You don't talk very friendly about a man who said you were his spiritual son.

Bani-Sadr: But the father has lost his mind and thus also his son.

SPIEGEL: How did this breach happen?

Bani-Sadr: One year ago we discovered the plan of a coup d'etat which in my view came from the Americans as well as people who were very close to power and wanted to conquer absolute power at any price. It was a slow and lingering process. These people planned to make the people and Khomeyni oppose me. They didn't succeed, because the people had confidence in me, but they did succeed in dividing Khomeyni and me.

SPIEGEL: When did you realize this?

Bani-Sadr: Two and a half months ago, events followed in a rapid succession. I suggested a referendum. This shocked Khomeyni very much. He feared the people would possibly vote for me and against him. That would have been his end and the end of the Islamic Republican Party.

SPIEGEL: The people sided with you?

Bani-Sadr: At the time Khomeyni made his first public speech against me. Then I went to Shiraz where the people received me with extraordinary enthusiasm. They encouraged me and asked me indirectly to criticize Khomeyni. Earlier, when I took the floor, the slogan was: "Long live Bani-Sadr! Long live Khomeyni." This time people only shouted: "Long live Bani-Sadr," and they also shouted "Bani-Sadr, fight against whomever..." This infuriated Khomeyni even more.

SPIEGEL: Then you saw that a confrontation was inevitable?

Bani-Sadr: In my home city of Hamadan I learned at a large rally that Khomeybi had prohibited my newspaper. One day later Khomeyni delivered a very touch speech against me. When I subsequently gave a speech in another city the population welcomed its president very cordially and demonstrated against Khomeyni. That was for me the beginning of the end. I then received an ultimatum from Khomeyni saying that I could remain president and supreme commander if I collaborated with Beheshti and his clique.

SPIEGEL: Beheshti was the head of the Islamic Republican Party and, as supreme judge, a sort of grey eminence. You didn't want to cooperate with him?

Bani-Sadr: I refused. I don't find titles like president and supreme commander and the like important. What mattered to me was to govern and to fight for freedom and independence. What is left today of Iran's independence: we are waging a war, our economy is much more dependent than at the time of the shah, and in the technical field we are also more dependent than we were previously. Our freedom, too, is in a worse state than under the shah. There is no freedom of the press and of opinion, arbitrary executions, imprisonment and tortures have become a daily routine.

SPIEGEL: All this happened while you were president of Iran.

Bani-Sadr: I didn't want a presidency under such conditions. Then one day I learned that Khomeyni had ousted me as president and supreme commander.

SPIEGEL: But you didn't want to simply accept this?

Bani-Sadr: I decided to do nothing. I went home to my wife--I, the innocent victim. There she and my friends asked me: What are you going to do? I said, I am going to resign myself to my fate, because I knew this was a coup d'etat which would be followed by Parliament giving its blessing and then by my execution. But my wife said, you must offer resistance. She insisted. I followed her advice. To that moment I had not thought about resistance at all. I went underground without having prepared myself at all for it.

SPIEGEL: Did you have anything to do with the bomb attempt in which 72 people were killed, including 21 parliamentarians and your deadly enemy Beheshti?

Bani-Sadr: On the day of the explosion I happened to be close by and I heard the detonation. Somebody phoned me and reported that there had been an explosion at the Islamic Republican Party's headquarters. I still don't know who is responsible. I can only imagine that it was Beheshti himself.

SPIEGEL: The mullah committed suicide?

Bani-Sadr: You can hardly express it like that. The matter is quite simple: When you keep suppressing other people and abolish all rights, this is bound to have consequences in the end. When you oust a president who was elected by the people you shouldn't be surprised that the response is an explosion. Three or 4 days before Parliament met I said in a communique that the rulers in Iran were striving for an absolute power monopoly.

SPIEGEL: But who is responsible for the attempt, do you think?

Bani-Sadr: The rulers themselves, because they have betrayed the revolution. This revolution was symbolized by three values: the Islamic Republic, independence and freedom. This means, a people who consider Islam as being in line with their free and independent development.

SPIEGEL: In what way was the revolution betrayed?

Bani-Sadr: My opponents betrayed Islam, because the Islam they represented was no longer compatible with freedom. Thus they have also betrayed freedom. We are more dependent today than we were previously and we have civil war in our country.

SPIEGEL: But you yourself not only watched these developments over a long time but also caused them. Why didn't you evade this responsibility earlier by resigning?

Bani-Sadr: If I had resigned I would have lost every influence. After all, as president I could speak, I had an own newspaper, I gave interviews...

SPIEGEL: What did you change?

Bani-Sadr: I struggled within the system and in doing so was successful. After all, the despotic dictatorship of the monarchy lasted 2,500 years, the dictatorship of the religious people only 2 years.

SPIEGEL: Will this dictatorship come to an end soon?

Bani-Sadr: I don't really see a change of survival for them. They are incapable of any organization.

SPIEGEL: But who can organize the country today?

Bani-Sadr: I can.

SPIEGEL: From Paris?

Bani-Sadr: No, no, I am going to return to Iran in a few months. The citizens who abstained from voting in the recent presidential elections are my people. The armed forces side with me and most intellectuals are my followers. What must be prevented is the transformation from being connected with bloodshed.

SPIEGEL: So you want to bring Khomeyni's end?

Bani-Sadr: He is supported by 15 percent of the people, and this is enough to remain in power, if you use repressive methods. If he had the support of the masses he would not have to resort to repressive methods.

SPIEGEL: You said that you are backed by the army. Why didn't you use the military for yourself?

Bani-Sadr: This was repeatedly offered to me, but I think you stage a coup d'etat only if you don't believe in the power of the people. In addition, I don't want to replace one dictatorship with another one.

SPIEGEL: What possibilities are left for you? Do you want to open resistance in Iran by channelling cassettes with your recorded speeches into the country, as Khomeyni did 3 years ago?

Bani-Sadr: I can do that, but it is not enough. When I was underground in Tehran, I did precisely that. I also used cassettes in my political struggle. It is very important to inform and activate public opinion.

SPIEGEL: But now you are sitting in an apartment in Paris and must allow people to ask you whether the revolution was worthwhile, whether it was worthwhile to eliminate the shah regime.

Bani-Sadr: The people are awake. They have become aware of their situation. This was not so under the shah regime. The revolution was no mistake.

SPIEGEL: What sort of person is your successor, President Raja'i?

Bani-Sadr: A weak man who is happy to have the title of a president. Khomeyni characterized him correctly: he is an illiterate wise man.

SPIEGEL: How do you assess his political chances of survival?

Bani-Sadr: There is civil war everywhere in Iran, and this civil war will aggravate. On the eve of the presidential elections the Mojahedin-e Khalq undertook 120 military actions against the government.

SPIEGEL: Will Khomeyni with his charisma be able to halt these developments?

Bani-Sadr: No.

SPIEGEL: How is it possible at all for a country which is at war with another country, Iraq, to simultaneously afford civil war, for the president to be informed by the press about his removal? What is still functioning in this country where the economy and trade practically have collapsed?

Bani-Sadr: How did the Germans stand the war? At any rate, it is hell.

SPIEGEL: When you escaped from hell Wednesday evening and left the plane in Paris people noted only one change about you, your moustache was gone. Is it true that you left your homeland disguised as a woman?

Bani-Sadr: No, I left my country like a soldier--in a uniform.

SPIEGEL: Mr Bani-Sadr, we thank you for this talk.

CSO: 4620/8

CLANDESTINE RADIO HITS BANI-SADR RESPONSE TO BAKHTIAR

NC071636 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Aug 81

[Text] In a letter to the French publication LE MONDE, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr has stated a few points in reply to Shapur Bakhtiar. In his letter Bani-Sadr replies to Bakhtiar's accusations as follows:

1. I was in no way involved in the formation of the revolutionary courts and the revolution guards corps, and I always opposed the methods of trials and the executions. I even succeeded in saving several from certain death. I announced several times that the trial of officials of the former regime should be open trials;

2. It is true that I opposed the possible meeting and agreement between Bakhtiar and Khomeyni in 1979. The reason for my opposition was that I wanted to cut short from Iran the hand of the Americans with the approval of whom Shapur Bakhtiar had become prime minister. On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that Bakhtiar (?played a large part in removing pro-Mosaddeq intellectuals).

3. [Words indistinct] Ayatollah Khalkhali, and I had not appointed him to this post. According to the Islamic laws he was a shar' magistrate and could act as he deemed suitable. I repeatedly informed Khomeyni in letters about Khalkhali and even once showed a film on one of his trials to officials in order to inform them of his (?summary) trials. The only job I gave Khalkhali was to put him in charge of the antidrug campaign and in the orders I gave him I reminded him to avoid rashness.

4. As I have repeatedly stated, we left Tehran with the help of the armed forces and in a military aircraft. Doesn't this prove the armed forces' support for me and the weakness of the officials in charge?

5. It would have been easy for me to neglect and ignore the government's policy and executions and the violation of the law and to keep my post as commander in chief and president.

6. I have said many times and repeat that Iran without Islam does not exist. Islam is the main pillar of our national identity, but, if responsible officials, be they civilian or religious, want to establish dictatorship in the country, they are not Muslims.

After replying to each one of Shapur Bakhtiar's condemnations, Bani-Sadr writes: By accepting to compromise with the shah's regime Bakhtiar committed treason to the nation.

The Free Voice of Iran wishes to recall one point as far as Mr Bani-Sadr's opinions as stated in his reply to Dr Shapur Bakhtiar is concerned and that is that as confessed by Khomeyni's regime and officials, it was Bani-Sadr who (?colluded) with the Americans and took Mr Khomeyni's hand and took the exiled mullah from al-Najaf to Paris. It was the United States that forced its spies Yazdi and Qotbzadeh to become Khomeyni's tongue and arm and to overthrow the regime of the late shah which had been trapped in America's trap. Therefore, Mr Bani-Sadr's claim is an empty claim and Mr Shapur Bakhtiar is a true patriot who, if he had yielded to the Americans, would have become president of Khomeyni's regime as did Mr Bani-Sadr and would have kissed Mr Khomeyni's hand. The meeting of Ramsey Clark with Khomeyni and of (Catton) with Yazdi and Qotbzadeh and the confidential documents on the talks between Beheshti and U.S. officials especially Huyser have ruled out any acquittal of Khomeyni's U.S.-Israeli officials, including Bani-Sadr himself.

CSO: 4619/29

BANI-SADR: 'WE WERE DECEIVED AT NEAUPHLE'

PM041156 Paris LE MATIN in French 1-2 Aug 81 p 8

[Interview with former Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr by Marie-Claude Decamps: "Bani-Sadr: I Overestimated Khomeyni"--date not given]

[Text] "In the aircraft which was taking us toward Tehran I said to myself with emotion that Khomeyni's return to Iran was rather like the light finally returning to the earth.... On Tuesday evening, hiding in the Boeing which was fleeing to Paris, I felt that I had been completely taken in...."

February 1979, July 1981: From Cachan to Cachan, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr's strange epic has just ended. Nothing has changed in his apartment in Rue Du Pont-Royal, guarded by the police. The only difference is that in the gloom behind the half-closed curtains, the walls are covered with photographs showing Bani-Sadr on a motorbike, a helmeted Bani-Sadr on the Iraqi front, Bani-Sadr in Parliament and so forth--in a word, Bani-Sadr in power. This makes it rather like a museum already.

Just as in the good days, his friends are there too, waiting in this rather stifling intimacy, surrounding this deposed president who intends to remain president despite his exile, and who seems anxious to justify himself in their eyes.

"On what do I base my legitimacy? I was elected, the people are with me. If I had been allowed to hold the referendum I had asked for against Parliament, I would have won. If...." Sitting on his sofa Bani-Sadr wearily argued his case.

He is probably bitter. Is he lucid? Bani-Sadr, almost rejuvenated by his trials, dwelt on the story of "his" revolution, which is primarily his personal story. Firuzeh, his daughter, was sitting beside him and nodding to encourage him: "I have never doubted my father, he does not lose heart."

Bani-Sadr sees no sign of weakness in this escape at night, in a borrowed uniform, after months in hiding and this very symbolic return to Cachan where he had already spent 15 years in exile. "Leaving a country by taking off from the most heavily guarded international airport in the world under the authorities' nose proves just how inconsistent the authorities are. If this shows up anybody's weakness, it is theirs."

[Question] Why leave?

[Answer] Precisely to demonstrate their weakness. And also because it was becoming increasingly difficult to ensure my safety in Tehran. Too many people were mobilized solely to ensure that. People had to keep watch all round the block of houses where I was hiding. They reported every Pasdaran (Revolution Guards) automobile.... I had to move four times in 2 months. On 28 June when the Islamic Republican Party headquarters was blown up I was nearby. I even felt the explosion.... [Answer ends]

I Said to Myself: It's Over

Moreover Bani-Sadr had not wanted to go into hiding. It was his friends and his wife Ozra who urged him to do so. "It was the evening when, on my return from Khorramshahr, I discovered that Khomenyi had dismissed me from my post as commander in chief of the armed forces," he explained. "I said to myself: It's over now. The next stage will be my dismissal from political office and, finally, my execution. Like a rebellious son who knows that resisting serves no purpose, I was resigned to playing in full the role of 'siavosh.' In the Iranian tradition he is the innocent, sacrificial victim. Then I reacted and decided to fight. I went into hiding."

Bani-Sadr looked at his friends and nodded at the giant photograph of Imam Khomeyni holding out his arms over the head of his former adviser. At the time it was a gesture of protection. "In the final analysis, my only mistake was that I overestimated him. In Neauphle everybody believed that he had adopted the Iranian intelligentsia's new ideas. After all it was the intelligentsia who made him, not the religious hierarchy. The imam used to say: 'Power is a scale with two pans, the clerics in one and the intellectuals in the other.' His pan of intellectuals was soon emptied: the scale is now tipping in one direction. It is as if he were now the prisoner of the Islamic institutions which he himself created. He no longer has any areas of support. He has alienated the moderate clerics. He has even alienated the nationalists." "I told him," Bani-Sadr recalled, looking round for signs of approval, "not to touch Mossadeq's memory. He made that mistake too. The nationalist leaders supported me. It was even one of them who was first to help me and hold out his hand to me when the fundamentalists succeeded in ousting me. Khomeyni is decimating the Mojahedin, who have had a real popular structure for the past 17 years. Since he is cut off from everything, even from the army, all he can do is use force. Like the shah after all...."

What about the stifled press, the massacre of the Kurds, the execution of students, the economic chaos? Is Bani-Sadr denying his responsibility for them all the more so because he feels responsible for having backed these actions? "I was opposed to it all," he shouted, "the emergency courts, the militia, the seizure of the American Embassy. From my first day as president of the republic I was, paradoxically, a 'president in opposition.' I will say so, I will even write a book about it."

[Question] Why has Khomeyni changed?

"Power corrupts!" the former president said bitterly. "In the first few days after his return to Tehran the imam wanted to abandon everything. I had to persuade him to stay. Now it's different!"

An Old Man To Be Pitied

Bani-Sadr once again looked inquiringly at the faces surrounding him: "How could it have been predicted at Neauphle that one day he would have 5-year-old children shot? We wanted to keep a certain aura of 'greatness' about him but in the end that was more than he could take.... I regarded him as a 'savior.' Now I see him merely as an old man to be pitied."

[Question] Is the return to Cachan ultimately the acknowledgement of total defeat?

[Answer] Yes, in a way, because we were deceived at Neauphle. But in the space of 2 years we have awakened Iranian awareness, and it has developed more than it had in 100 years. That is the most important thing.

[Question] Are these the words of an exiled man trying to console himself?

[Answer] It is true that leaving your country and joining the tide of other refugees can be seen as a kind of failure. It means doing the same as all those who arrive saying that they are going to 'return' home in force and who never go back.... At the same time there are positive aspects; the opposition, especially since my agreement with the Mojahedin, will be able to organize outside the country and create a front in which all the groups supporting our ideas will be united. This is also one of the essential reasons why I have returned to Paris: It was necessary to justify Iran on the international stage. In this connection I am counting on Europe a great deal.

[Question] Is France not making you pay too dearly for Khomeyni's precedent?

[Answer] I was expecting this reception; it is only natural after the Khomeyni experience. But I also think that, in a way, a socialist government should be more aware of our position....

You will see, Cachan will be a second Neauphle, to save the country from civil war just as the first (at least in its intentions) cut the ground from under the Americans' feet by installing Khomeyni in power. In any case I can assure you that it will not be a suresnes (residence of Shapur Bakhtiar, the shah's last prime minister). [Answer ends]

The former president smiled for the first time: "When you have been to the Iraqi front amid the shelling and have been chased by Iranian aircraft, which, by the way, are less dangerous than the Iraqi aircraft, you are not quick to give in."

CSO: 4619/29

CLANDESTINE RADIO COMMENTS ON BAKHTIAR'S NRMI PROGRAM

NC061550 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 6 Aug 81

[Unattributed talk: "Bakhtiar and the National Resistance Movement of Iran"]

[Text] Last week, when replying to a correspondent's question on the possibility of his uniting with people like Bani-Sadr, the leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran [NRMI] Dr Shapur Bakhtiar referred to the part played by Bani-Sadr and his likes in establishing Ruhollah Khomeyni's antipopular regime and his participation in all the regime's crimes, pointing out something very noteworthy. Dr Bakhtiar said: The difference between us and Bani-Sadr's group is a fundamental one which stems from the fact that we believe in the establishment of a social-democratic system based on the nation's sovereignty, while Bani-Sadr and his associates are speaking about changing the policy of the clerical dictatorship into, what they say, is a true Islamic republic.

This single sentence by Dr Shapur Bakhtiar shows that in a government envisaged by the NRMI strugglers, the rule will be lawful and the law will be voted by the nation, which will have freedom of expression. Under Iran's future government the press will freely and uncensored inform the nation of all political, economic, social and cultural issues as was the case during the short premiership of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar.

We will sacrifice our lives in the struggle for freedom so that each and every one of the Iranian people can be free in expressing their view and opinion, even if this view and opinion differs from ours. In the Iran that we want to build, all political parties and groups will be free and able to propagate their views, unthreatened and without pressure. In that case the Parliament--as the true elected representative of the nation and the strongest ruling organ--will supervise the correct management of the nation's rightful needs in all fields and the country's affairs. Freedom of press will be the guarantor for honest elections and the true representatives of the nation will be the guarantors for freedom of the press.

In the social and economic field the NRMI wants to ensure social justice through the correct implementation of socialism. Therefore health care, housing, education, employment and the insurance for the future will be offered to all people of Iran. In Iran's future system material shortage will in no way mar the Iranian citizen's human dignity. On the other hand, with the change in the taxation system, measures will be taken to prevent the accumulation of wealth by specific people or groups and, especially, the exploitation of humans by humans will cease.

As for relations with other countries of the world, the NRMI believes that while respecting the principles of peaceful coexistence with all countries of the world, and establishing friendly relations with all nations, Iran should grant priority to the preservation of independence, territorial integrity and national interests and consider these as basic principles in its political economic and cultural relations with other nations.

What we discussed in short is a summary of NRMI views as far as management of the country's affairs is concerned. Our fundamental difference with groups like the Bani-Sadr clique--irrespective of their participation in all the crimes of the present regime--stems from the fact that they do not accept [words indistinct]. Under no condition can we unite with individuals or groups that (?do not) [word indistinct] national sovereignty; therefore it is natural (?for us to disagree) with those who want the continuation of dictatorship of the vice regency of the supreme jurisconsult with (?slight) differences in this system. Also groups that do not respect the wishes and views of the nation and want to impose on our nation communist economic systems with an Islamic facade are at great variance with us. These are the fundamental differences to which Dr Shapur Bakhtiar refers in his interviews.

CSO: 4640/80

BRIEFS

RESISTANCE HEADQUARTERS ESTABLISHED--In order to safeguard our Islamic revolution, which has cost us the blood of 60,000 martyrs and more than 100,000 disabled, the Aghajari Revolution Guards Corps Mobilization Department has founded a resistance headquarters to guard and protect the city. All Muslim and devoted brothers interested in joining this headquarters are asked to contact the mobilization central headquarters in Omidiyeh, the Revolution Guard Corps office in Ja'far Square and Revolution Guard Corps headquarters in Miyanpur for registration. [Text] [GF041425 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 4 Aug 81]

CLAIMS OF REVOLUTION GUARDS DESERTING--Fear of the nation's wrath cast its shadow on the session of the mullahs' majlis yesterday. Sheykh Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the chief mullah of the majlis, called on the regime's security forces to crush opponents. Sheykh Montazeri requested the security forces of Khomeyni's regime to "guide" the deputies so that they will not be targets of assassination attempts. We wish to recall that the revolution guards themselves are not safe from the wrath of the nation and according to information we receive each day several revolution guards leave this antipopular corps and join the combatant forces. [Text] [NC061440 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 6 Aug 81]

TERRORISTS RECRUITING IN BELFAST CLAIMED--Recently, Hadi Ghaffari, leader of the clubwielders who are on the paylist of the Islamic Republic Party, came to PARIS and attended meetings in the embassy of Khomeyni's regime together with 12 Revolution guards. Even though Hadi Ghaffari did not give any details of the reason behind his trip, Iranian freedom-seekers in Paris have found out what his mission was. Without being able to leave his hotel very often he left Paris for Belfast, Ireland. Some political observers say that Hadi Ghaffari intends to recruit northern Ireland terrorists for terrorist activities abroad and the assassination of opponents of Khomeyni's regime. Opponents of Khomeyni's regime are also investigating the details of Ghaffari's mission to Belfast. [Text] [NC071700 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Aug 81]

GUARDS REFUSING EXECUTION ORDERS--The wave of the killing and massacre of the people of Iran and of the nation's combatant youths by the bloodthirsty executioner of the Islamic regime continues. Yesterday, 38 Iranian nationalists were killed by the firing squad of Ruhollah Khomeyni's hireling revolution guards. Our correspondents have reported from various Iranian cities that the clerical regime has formed new execution groups, because many of the revolution guard youths refuse to murder their compatriots. It is said that the new execution squads are formed of religious

students of Qom's Feyziyeh School. Our correspondent reports from Tehran that a revolution guard who refused to shoot young girls in Evin Prison was sentenced to death and executed. Another report states that combatant national organizations have warned officials of the regime by various means that they will avenge the blood of their martyred brothers and sisters. [Text] [NC081641 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 8 Aug 81]

RESIGNATION OF GENDARMERIE CHIEF--As you know, each and every one of the officials in Khomeyni's regime who are not prepared to serve a fascist and dictatorial regime are either being dismissed or are resigning. The resignation of the commander of Khomeyni's gendarmerie is also connected with this, since the freedom-seekers of Iran will not forgive anyone who cooperates with this regime and who participates in the crimes committed by Khomeyni's anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian regime and who will have to testify to their crimes in national courts. [Text] [NC081736 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Aug 81]

TUDEH MEMBERS IN RADIO-TELEVISION--According to well informed sources in Tehran, the mullahs regime controls only the newcasts on radio and television. The rest of the programs are completely under the influence of Tudeh members. This party, which is still faithful to the imam, in order to be in a position to carry its treacherous operations--just like the mullahs--has long had its claws on the radio and television and all the important positions of production and program preparation. A number of Tudeh members in charge of program production operate in the guise of mullahs and are working in the radio and television with clerical beards and attire. [Text] [GF111356 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 11 Aug 81]

KHOMEYNI'S REMARKS REPORTED--Ruhollah Khomeyni, following weeks of silence, gave a sermon yesterday in which he again said: All people have the religious duty to keep their neighbors under surveillance and take note of their actions. He openly said: Everyone must control everyone else, this being a decree of Islam. The imam of Jamaran added: Anyone who cannot stop his child from opposition by advice has the religious duty to inform the local committee or revolution guards about him. If he does not do that, he will also be a party to the crime. Referring to the assassination of heads of the regime and various bombings, Khomeyni said: Such things are unimportant since we have revolted, and the explosion of several bombs has no importance. [Text] [GF111557 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 11 Aug 81]

ARREST OF FAKURI RUMORED--It is being rumored in Tehran that Colonel Fakuri has been dismissed from his position and has been arrested. This rumor strengthened following today's meeting between armed forces commanders and the leader of the executioners, Khomeyni. Fakuri, the air force commander, did not attend this meeting. Colonel Fakuri has not participated in (?recent) meetings either. [Text] [GF121614 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 12 Aug 81]

AID FOR KHOMEYNI'S OVERTHROW--Cairo, 6 Aug (AFP)--Reza Pahlavi, who declared himself shah of Iran in succession to his father in October, revealed today he was in contact with top Iranian opposition figures with the aim of overthrowing the government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni. Reza, 20, who has lived here with his mother the empress Farah since the shah's death in July 1980, mentioned a concerted plan among opposition leaders but stressed he had not revealed the contacts earlier to avoid "putting in danger the lives of those who are the best hope for the people." Reza Shah called on the Iranian people to "prepare themselves to participate in the uprising" against the rule of the ayatollahs. His appeal would be recorded and sent of [as received] 50,000 cassettes to Iran, he added. [Text] [NC060957 Paris AFP in English 0952 GMT 6 Aug 81]

CSO: 4600/122

OIL EXPLORATION UNDERWAY; AGREEMENT WITH YUGOSLAV FIRM

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 11 Jun 81 p 2

[Article from PETRA: "Local News: Implementation of Oil Exploration Program in Kingdom Begins; Agreement Signed with Yugoslav Firm To Provide Drill and Its Crew; Dakhqan Says, 'We Will Begin Digging the First Well in al-Azraq Area in 2 Months' "]

[Text] An agreement between the Natural Resources Authority and the Yugoslav Naphtha Gas Company was signed yesterday at the [offices of the] authority. According to the agreement the Yugoslav firm is to provide a drill and its crew for oil exploration purposes in the kingdom's territories.

The agreement was signed for the authority by Engineer Ahmad Dakhqan, deputy director of the Natural Resources Authority; and it was signed for the firm by the vice president of the board of directors of the Yugoslav company.

The signing [ceremony] was attended by Engineer Yusuf al-Nimri, general manager of the authority; the Yugoslav ambassador to Amman; a number of officials in the authority; and members of the Yugoslav Embassy in Amman.

Engineer Dakhqan stated that the conclusion of this agreement comes in the context of the authority's efforts to implement the oil exploration porgram in the kingdom. "In the past we had made seismic surveying agreements with international companies for surveying 6,000 longitudinal miles in various areas of the kingdom."

He indicated that there were three seismic surveying teams that had begun working since early last April.

He said, "We are hoping that drilling in the first well in the area of al-Azraq will begin in 2 and a half months. This [well] falls under the group of wells that will be drilled in the same area in the light of the results that will be achieved from the drilling."

He added, "The authority has made the necessary arrangements to enter into

agreements with specialized companies to complement the drilling operations. [Such suplementary activities include] azimuth surveying, photographing the wells and analyzing the data. These are services that are closely associated with deep drilling. A professional organization from the authority and a number of advisers will supervise the implementation of the drilling operations."

Dakhqan said that drilling costs per year are estimated to be 2 million dinars and that a drill can dig about 10,000 meters a year.

Engineer Yusuf al-Nimri, general manager of the authority discussed seismic survey operations with the correspondent of the Jordanian News Agency. He said that the surveying process is considered one of the most important oil exploration activities and one of the most critical in regulating and programming exploratory drilling operations. In addition, surveying operations are pursued because of geological, geo-chemical and geo-physical studies [they provide]. These are useful not only in determining drilling sites, but they also help in controlling expenditures in general.

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CSO: 4304/52

RURAL ELECTRIFICATION PROJECTS REPORT

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 14 Jun 81 p 5

[Article by Hamid al-Sa'aydah: "Local News: 26.8 Million Dinars for Furnishing Lights to 284 Villages in the Kingdom; Names of Villages That Will Be Furnished with Lights during the 5-Year Plan"]

[Text] A Jordanian Power Authority report on rural electrification projects in Jordan stated that the number of villages in the kingdom, according to 1979 statistics, was about 980. These villages are inhabited by close to 723,000 persons. This is equal to 38.5 percent of the total population of the kingdom.

The report made it clear that the Jordanian Power Authority was devoting much attention to supplying electricity to the largest number possible of the residents of these villages in accordance with the technical and material capabilities that are available.

On the basis of this principle the authority did complete a number of rural electrification projects in the Jordan Valley and in the governorate of al-Karak during the 1976-1980 5-Year plan. It has also begun the implementation of another number of projects in other areas. These projects come under the new 5-Year plan and will be completed in 1982-1983.

The report stated that in extending the interest in supplying electricity to the remaining villages in the various areas, the Jordanian Power Authority and the power companies have committed themselves to new programs that are currently being implemented. These will be completed during the present 1981-1985 5-Year plan. These projects are:

--The rural electrification project in the governorates of Amman and al-Balqa'.

The Jordanian Power Company is supplying electricity to 82 new villages in the area under its jurisdiction. This area is inhabited by about 89,000 persons. The project will be completed between 1981 and 1984 so that a number of the villages would be furnished with lights every year. Project costs are about 9.5 million dinars. The project is being financed by foreign loans, local loans from the government and by the company's resources.

--The rural electrification project in the governorate of Irbid. The Irbid Power Company is presently trying to supply electricity to about 108 villages in the various parts of the governorate. About 138,000 persons live in those villages. The project will be completed between 1981 and 1984, and its costs amount to 9 million dinars. Foreign costs of the project are being financed by foreign loans, and local costs are financed by government loans and by the company's resources.

--The al-Karak and southern Jordan Valley electrification project. The Jordanian Power Authority is supplying electricity to 42 villages in the area of al-Karak and in the southern Jordan Valley. This project will be completed during 1982. These villages are inhabited by 30,000 persons.

The costs of this project amount to 2.3 million dinars.

--The al-Tufaylah and al-Shubak area electrification project. The authority is now supplying electricity to 21 villages in those two areas which are inhabited by 11,000 persons. This project will be completed in 1982-1983. Costs of this project amount to about 2 million dinars.

--The Remote Villages Electrification Project:

The authority has begun supplying electricity to 13 scattered villages by means of diesel units and distribution systems for each village. So far, six villages have been furnished with electricity, and the remaining villages will be furnished with electricity by the end of this year. Costs of this project amount to 2 million dinars.

--The Ma'an and al-Rashadiyah Electrification Project:

Plans to supply electricity to 18 villages where 17,000 persons reside in the area of Ma'an, Wadi Musa and al-Rashadiyah under the project for supplying electricity to 33 villages in the southern area of the kingdom have presently been completed.

Work on that project will begin this year, and it will be completed in 1983. Costs for this project amount to 2 million dinars.

We may summarize the rural electrification projects that are currently being implemented and that have been obligated during the present 5-Year plan [as follows]: furnishing lights to 82 villages in the governorates of Amman and al-Balqa'; to 108 villages in the governorate of Irbid; to 21 villages in the district of al-Tufaylah and the subdistrict of al-Shubak; to 13 remote villages; and to 18 villages in the governorate of Amman and the area of al-Rashadiyah.

Regarding future projects, the Jordanian Power Authority is considering and making plans to electrify the largest number possible of villages in the kingdom. This comes under various projects whose implementation will begin as soon as current projects are completed.

By the end of 1982 the following villages in the governorate of Irbid will have been furnished with lights: Maruw, Harima, al-Qasfah, al-Kharibah, Kafr Jabir, Sama al-Rawsan, Habras, Haratha, 'Aqrabah, Samar, Hatim, Malaka, Umm Qays, 'Al'al, Abu al-Lawqas, Sayalah, Kharaja, Taqbal, 'Izrit, Yabla, al-Rafid, Kafr Sum, Saham Ibdar and al-Mansurah.

By the end of 1983 the following villages in the governorate of Irbid will have been furnished with electrical lights:

Nadirah, Hamamah al-'Alamat, al-Dajaniyah, Rahab, al-Kittah Sakib, Dibbin, Barama, al-Ashrafiyah, Bayt Iydis, Kafr Abil, Awsarah, 'Arjan, Faw'arah, Dawqarah, Jajin, Zubiya, Shatnah, Mukhayyam Ghazzah, Hamamah al-'Umush, al-Madwar, Umm al-Na'am, Dayr al-Liyat, Raymun, Nahlah, al-Jazazah, Jafin, Kafr Rakib, Kafr 'Awan, Jadita, Ba'un, Rasun, Hur, Kafr Rahta, Jamhah, Fa', Rahaba.

By the end of 1984 the following villages in the governorate of Irbid will have been furnished with electrical lights:

Hayan al-Gharbi, Marsa', 'Amrah wa 'Amirah, al-Husayniyah, Janin al-Safa, Dayr al-Si'nah, Tabanah, Ham, al-Kharaj, 'Anabah, Muqbilah, al-Mushayrifah, Sama al-Sirhan, al-Harash, Mabrukah, al-Wahadinah, Hayan al-Mashraf, Bala'ma, Umm al-Jamal, Sabhah, al-Dafyanah, Zabadah, Saydur, Jahfiyah, Qafqafa, 'Amrawah, al-Hara, Sumayya, al-Mansurah, Zaniyyah, Hayan al-Sharqi, Mastabah, Jibbah, al-Hashimiyah, Kharbah al-Ba'ij, Subhiyah, Bayt Yafa, Hufa, Kafr 'An, Habaka, Jaba, Dhunaybah, Raba', Thaghrah al-Jib, Umm al-Qatin.

Between 1983 and 1985 the following villages, which are also in the governorate of Irbid, will be electrified:

Mandah, Dar al-Basha, Qal'ah al-Ruzz, Balas, al-Kafir, Umm al-Sarab, al-Gharbiyah, Dayr al-Kahf, Sab' Sayr, Khushaybah, Salhuf, 'Afana, al-Hidadah, 'Ayn, al-Makiftah, al-Shubaykah, Khusha', al-Kawm al-Ahmar, Dhahr al-Sarw, Makharba, Mahanah, al-Rashayidah, Jabir, al-Rayshah, al-Mazra'ah, Salyatayn, Dahal.

As far as the governorates of Amman and al-Balqa' are concerned, the villages that will be furnished with lights by the end of 1982 are [as follows]:

Ma'in, Manja, Umm Qasir wa al-Muqabilin, Umm al-'Umad wa 'Alan, Ziy, al-Taybah, Manshiyah Hasaban, 'Iraq al-Amir, al-Bassah, Ramimayn, al-Nuzhah, Umm Jawzah, al-Matallah, al-Buwaydah, al-'Adasiyah, al-Mawqar, al-Faysaliyah, Hasaban, Abu Nasir, Umm 'Abharah, 'Ayra, Yaraqa, Kharaybah al-Suq, Subayhi, Rajam al-Shami.

There are also villages that will be furnished with electricity between 1981 and 1983. These villages are:

The villages that will be completed between 1981 and 1983:

Malih, al-Nuqayrah, Dhayban, Hanina, Lab, Umm al-Basatin, al-'Aliyah, Sarwat, Baraza, Mawbas, al-Shaqiq, Tab Kara', Harayah, Shafa Badran, Gharnatah, Mushayrafah, Kafir al-Wakhyan, al-Khushafiyah, Umm Rummanah. Dhayban wa Umm al-'Asakir, Umm al-Salih, Umm Rummanah (Madba), al-Jayza, Natal, Kamashah, Bilal, Bayrayn, al-Rawdah wa Mansurah, al-'Aluk wa al-Ma'rah.

There are villages in the governorate of al-Balqa' and [in the governorate of] Amman that will be furnished with lights between 1984 and 1986. These are:

Rajam al-Kharabishah, Kharabah Sarah, al-Husayniyah, al-'Ush, Umm al-Walid, Maghabir, Mahana, al-Qarayat, al-Dhuhaybah al-Gharbiyah, Qaryah Zaki, al-Marahah, Dhuhaybah al-Daham, al-Jadidah, al-Jadidah, Umm al-Qatin, al-Gharus, Abu 'Alaya, al-Maslubah, Sayl Hasaban.

As far as rural electrification in the south is concerned, the following villages will be furnished with lights by the end of 1982:

Batir, Rakin, Amra' Sarafa, Jada'a al-Sayaydah, al-Maghir, Abu Turabah, Madin, Marud, Sawal, al-'Iraq, al-Taybah, al-Hashimiyah, al-Juwaydah, Jericho, al-Zubaydiyah, 'Aymah, Dimnah, Jad'a al-Jabur, Badhan, Umm Hamat, Ma'muniyah, Mushayrafah, al-Rawdah, Majrah, Jahrah, al-Qatranah, Umm al-Hashim, al-Jur, al-Naqa', Ghawr Hadithah, Ghawr al-Mazra'ah, Ghawr Fifya, Saka, Samarah, 'Abdaliyah, Mawmiya, al-Baqi', 'Aynun, al-Duwaykhilah, al-Sila', Abu Makhtub, 'Ayn al-Bayda', al-Jayah, al-Jahir, 'Aymah, al-Maqar'iyah, al-Hasa, al-Sala', Abu Makhtub, 'Ayn al-Bayda', al-Jayah, al-Rawim, al-Mansurah, Sunayfahah, Hawalah, al-Nimtah.

By the end of 1983 the following villages will also be electrified:

Wadi Musa, al-'Ays, Jalwakh, Bayr al-Dabaghat, Nawafilah, Bayr Khadad, Qa', Abu Dinnah, al-Manshiyah, Basatah, Rahab, Ayil, 'Abil, Fardhakh, 'Arafah, Sadaqah, Marayghah, Baradi, Qarin, Zahrah, Suwaymarah, Talsan, Dala'ah, Gharandal, Dasira, Dana.

Between 1982 and 1984 the following villages in the Jordan Valley will be electrified:

Al-Baqurah, al-Madrasah, Abu Saydu, al-'Ajajirah, al-Marayihah, Sabira, al-Faqir, al-Mushahirah, Busaylah, Abu Habil, Maysar al-Hadidah.

By the end of the present year the following villages, which are remote villages, will have been electrified:

Dhayban, al-Husayniyah, Bayr 'Ata'atah, al-Azraq al-Janubi, Mahi, al-Ajfayif and Gharandal.

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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION LABOR MIGRATION POLICY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 4 Jun 81 p 6

[Article: "Local News: Principles of Assigning Male, Female Teachers, Guidance Counselors on Loan to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Yemen, Oman and the Arab Emirates"]

[Text] We received the following from the Ministry of Education:

To meet the needs which fraternal Arab countries have for male and female teachers by means of sending them teachers on loan assignments, this ministry wishes to open the doors to male and female teachers who wish to go on such loan assignments to those countries and who meet the conditions with regard to specialization and seniority, as indicated in the attached schedule, and to the principles of lending teachers which are indicated below. Teachers are to apply at the education offices/colleges with which they are affiliated for filling out the application forms for loan assignments from Sunday, 7 June 1981 to Wednesday evening, 10 June 1981. The application of anyone who does not come [to the education offices] during the set time will not be accepted.

The Principles of Loan Assignments

--Teachers may receive loan assignments according to seniority in graduation for graduates of institutes and universities so that every 2 years of service prior to [their acquisition] of a degree is counted as 1 year seniority.

--A teacher who has a bachelor's degree in addition to a diploma from the Teachers' Institute may submit an application for a loan assignment on the basis of the diploma only or on the basis of the university degree only, whichever he wishes. Accordingly, he is obligated to accept the loan assignment appointment on the basis of the qualifications he chose, and he has no right to demand from any agency that his salary be changed on the basis of the other degree he has.

--A person may receive a loan assignment the second time in the following manner:

A. Anyone who had been on a loan assignment in the past for 3 years or less and who has been back [in the country] for 5 years or more so that the total loan assignment years the first and second times would be 5 years only.

B. Anyone who had been on a loan assignment in the past for 4 to 5 years and who has been back [in the country] for 10 years or more, provided that the new loan assignment be for a period that does not exceed 3 years.

C. Those who had been on loan assignments in the past in Libya or Algeria for 1 year or less and who have been back [in the country] from the loan assignments for 3 years.

D. Groups of people mentioned in paragraphs A, B and C may not receive loan assignments a second time if the agencies to which they were assigned terminated their loan assignments for behavioral or professional reasons.

E. Candidates for loan assignments to whom Paragraph B of Article Three applies may not exceed 10 percent for each country, provided that the specializations requested are taken into consideration.

--Loan assignments are authorized (according to the principles) to those who served in the past outside Jordan or in Jordan before joining this ministry.

--The wife of a teacher who is on a loan assignment or whose loan assignment is being renewed may get a loan assignment with her husband in the country where her husband has his loan assignment, provided she meets the conditions of the agency that is borrowing her services with regard to experience, educational qualifications and specialization.

--A person who had resigned or lost his job in this ministry to work abroad and who has been back [in the country] for 10 years, if he had resigned from service, and for 12 years, if he had lost his job, may be given a loan assignment for 3 years or less.

--A person on a loan assignment may not end his loan assignment during the academic year unless he does so for health and social reasons that are acceptable to the ministry.

--Anyone who becomes a candidate for a loan assignment according to his application and who is selected for such an assignment by the committees for work contracts in fraternal Arab countries and who turns down such a loan assignment may not be allowed to have [another] loan assignment until 2 years after his rejection of said assignment, unless his rejection of the assignment was due to overpowering reasons.

--Anyone who returns from a loan assignment is obligated to accept the job and the position determined for him by the ministry.

--Anyone whose resignation has been accepted will not be considered for a loan assignment.

University Graduates

Areas of Specialization and Seniorities Eligible for Filing Loan Assignment Applications

Area of Specialization	Arab Emirates Specialization		Qatar Specialization		North Yemen Specialization		Saudi Arabia Specialization		Sultanate of Oman Specialization		Kuwait Specialization	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Arabic language	72	77	--	--	71	71	76	78	77	--	77	78
Law of Islam (Shari'ah)	72	77	--	73	--	--	76	78	--	--	77	78
English language	74	77	75	--	71	--	76	78	77	77		
Mathematics	74	77	--	--	71	--	76	78	77	77		
Physics	74	--	--	--	71	--	76	--	77	77		
Chemistry	74	--	73	--	--	--	76	78	77	77		
History	--	--	--	--	71	71	76	78	77	77		
Geography	72	77	73	--	--	--	76	78	77	77		
Education and Psychology	--	--	--	--	--	--	76	78				
Biology	73	--	--	--	--	--	76	78				
Vocational Education	--	--	75	--								
School principal	Secondary school principal								Elementary school principal			
Librarian									Librarian			

Teachers' Institutes

Religion	--	77								
Arabic	73	77								
English	73	77	73	--	--	--	--	--	77	77
Modern Mathematics	73	77	73	--						
Classroom Teacher	--	--	--	--	71	--	76	79	77	77
Vocational Education	--	--	73	--	--	--	--	--	77	--
Agriculture	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	77	--
General Science	73	--								
Laboratory Lecturer	--	--	--	--	--	--	Laboratory Lecturer		Laboratory Lecturer	

Observations

The agencies that are borrowing the teachers are stipulating the following post-qualification services:

--The United Arab Emirates: 3 years for university graduates and graduates of institutes.

--Qatar: 8 years for university graduates, except for graduates in the English language and vocational education (3 to 6 years); and 3 years for graduates of institutes.

--Yemen Arab Republic: at least 10 years for university graduates and for graduates of teachers' institutes.

--Kuwait: 3 years for university graduates.

--Saudi Arabia: 2 years for male university graduates; 3 years for female university graduates and 2 years for graduates of teachers' institutes.

--The Sultanate of Oman: 4 years for university graduates and 2 years for graduates of teachers' institutes.

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MAJOR HADDAD SPEAKS TO NATION 9 AUGUST

NC091310 Marj 'Uyun Lebanon Voice of Hope in Arabic 1000 GMT 9 Aug 81

[Speech by Free Lebanon Commander Maj Sa'd Haddad to the Lebanese people on 9 August--live or recorded]

[Text] Brother Lebanese: I have not spoken to you for a long time because the situation has been relatively calm. There have been several attempts made here and there to reach a sort of solution. Today I want to tell you briefly about a number of things. The first of these is that I felt very sorry when I heard the news of the murder of Capt (Habib Zraydih). He was a friend of ours and served with us for a long time. Not only was he a friend of ours but also of every sincere Lebanese. He was one of the officers on which Lebanon relied and the people had hopes in him that he would work for Lebanon. He did work for Lebanon and was enthusiastic and proud of being Lebanese. May God have mercy on his soul.

Anyway, 2 days after he was killed I read that he committed suicide. I personally do not believe that he committed suicide. It is certain that he was assassinated, because I cannot imagine that a bullet could be shot in his room without it being heard by someone in his house. When people opened his room in the morning, or found it open and the man killed, they said he killed himself with a pistol. His fate is the same as every sincere Lebanese. I know that most officers and military personnel who are enthusiastic about their nationality will meet the same fate, either on this or some other way. There are people and trends that do not want Lebanon to have sincere Lebanese. May God have mercy on the late (Habib Zraydih), but we want to caution those who are enthusiastic about Lebanon to take care of themselves wherever they are, even if they are in the eastern part of Beirut, because the enemy has agents everywhere and can use them to achieve his purposes. I tell you frankly that anyone who is not 100-percent sure about his security is welcome here and we are ready to receive him. God willing, the late (Habib Zraydih) will be the redeemer of all of Lebanon and his assassination will not go in vain.

Anyway, there have been many crimes in Lebanon and so far no one has uncovered any perpetrators. Thus, we do not expect the perpetrators of this crime to be uncovered. In the same vein, we read in the newspapers every day reports honoring the late Riyad Taha. I tell you that the best way to honor the memory of Riyad Taha is for the Syrian occupiers to hand over the killers to justice. It is time that they stopped their method of killing a person and walking in his funeral.

Do not honor him, because in this method of honoring I believe that his soul will suffer more. [Passage indistinct] The best way to honor him is to uncover the killers and hand them over to justice. However, who will uncover them amid this state of affairs in which the protector is the thief?

The next subject is one that I do not like to talk about, but it pains my heart. About a week or more ago I wanted to talk about it, but I hesitated. I am a person who does not like to keep anything to myself. [Words indistinct] The week before the last, the boys were coincidently watching a series entitled Islamic Conquests on Jordanian television. The portion that I saw showed how the Christian copts in Egypt were still following pagan customs and wanted to throw a virgin girl into the Nile. The Arab Muslim governor with his sagacity, love and I don't know what came and prevented this. The girl was shown in a convent full of priests and bishops who were walking in a procession to offer the girl as a sacrifice to the Nile. The film then showed how with love Islam persuaded a large number of the Christian Egyptians to convert to Islam.

First of all, I regret that such a series has been screened in Jordan because up to now we had believed that Jordan was a bit more advanced than other countries and that King Husayn was more open to the civilized world than the other Arab leaders. He knows well the history of the Islamic and Christian religions.

Everyone knows that if there had been no Christianity, there would not have been a television. If there had been no Christianity, there would not have been petroleum. If there had been no Christianity, there would not have been progress. If there had been no Christianity, it would not have been possible for Egypt to produce such a film, nor for Jordan to screen it.

I want to explain things more simply. According to the laws and rules of commercail advertisement, you have the right to exhibit and praise the quality of your merchandise but you have no right to say that this merchandise is better than the other trademark. This is because the holders of the other trademark will sue you. In any case, you can enumerate the good characteristics of the Islamic religion as you like. You can say that the Islamic religion was copied from the Christian and Jewish religions. You can say that the Islamic religion promises you that if you are good on earth, then you will go to heaven. God has opened for you a prostitution market up there where you can enjoy yourselves because the virgins and nymphs are all there. [Words indistinct] But you cannot pinpoint the bad aspects of the Christian religion.

It is a shame that such a defamation is taking place in the 20th century. We all know that the Islamic religion spread through the use of the sword, whether in Egypt or elsewhere. Remember that he who kills by the sword will die by the sword. However, we will not abandon our tolerance and love because the Christian religion teaches us love and tolerance.

On this occasion, I wish to remind his excellency President Anwar al-Sadat, in whom we have full confidence and to whom we harbor every appreciation for his heroic stands toward peace--we ask him to heroically prevent sectarian sensitivities within Egypt just as he heroically made peace. We ask him to give the necessary protection to the copts, particularly since his excellency President Anwar al-Sadat

was brought up in a coptic school. We also say that pharaonic Egypt has no more than 7 percent Arab blood. Whether they are Muslims or Christians, they are all from the same pharaonic origin. The present Egyptian Muslims were Christians and the present Christians are relatives and brothers of the Muslims.

As we said, we have a special affection for his excellency President Anwar al-Sadat and the Egyptian people. We hope that love will prevail among all the sons of Egypt and that religious persecution will stop. The Egyptian people must rise above all this, focus on what is in Egypt's interest and work together for the sake of Egypt's interest. They must avoid repugnant religious fanaticism. [Passage indistinct]

Anyway, we on our part, as we have said, respect all religions. However, we demand the others, whose religions, beliefs and thinking we respect, to reciprocate with us. I again tell you that it is more honorable that I have said this (?openly). I hide nothing and I have accustomed you to frankness. I am not used to hiding anything lest others hide something and wait to retaliate. We say things in order to put matters right and not to retaliate.

Furthermore, what we want to call back to memory is the question of Zahlah. It is true that there has been a cease-fire in Zahlah. It is equally true that internal security forces have entered Zahlah. However, you know that the sons of Zahlah are farmers who live by agriculture. Zahlah (?cannot survive) without agricultural production. Therefore, we demand that the officials tackle the situation and exert pressure on the Syrians to lift the blockade on Zahlah indeed and permit the sons of Zahlah to exercise all their agricultural, industrial and social activities as before. The sons of Zahlah do not intend any harm to anybody. We know them. Keep them from harm. Does Syria, which has been unable to kill them through the war, want to starve them to death? Therefore, the officials must act toward the actual lifting of the blockade on Zahlah.

Today, we have the problem of Tripoli, which is dear to our hearts. It is a Lebanese city and its inhabitants are Lebanese. [Words indistinct] the hired forces that call themselves the legitimate forces. [Words indistinct] Approximately, a year ago, things began moving in Tripoli. [Words indistinct] We warned in the past that the Syrians who came to Lebanon did not come to help any Lebanese or anybody on the land of Lebanon. They came to help themselves only, no more and no less. I tell you [words indistinct] that they primarily planned to annex all Lebanon. [Passage indistinct]

Let the occupants know that no matter how long it takes and regardless of how strong the occupant is, we will expel them not from the south of Beirut only but from all of Lebanon--from the al-Biqa' and the north also.

Furthermore, we are very happy about the U.S. role in the area. It has been recently found out that the United States is the main factor in the Middle East. We are sure that the United States can restore sovereignty, independence and peace to Lebanon if it decides to do so.

Today, whatever saboteur 'Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] says and does and whatever he and Hafiz al-Asad say against the United States and against Reagan, Philip Habib and others, the fact remains that they obey the orders of the United States.

I will give you an example. Long ago [words indistinct] we had a soldier in the company from the Jean Bey family. When watned people were detained, he used to act overenthusiastically and beat the detained persons. He was often asked: Why do you act this way? Take it easy man, it is a pity. His other military comrades and officers used to say that he was a patriot because he was harsh with the detainees.

Anyhow, a short period afterwards members of the Dexieume came around and arrested him, saying that he was a member of the Syrian National Party. They beat him the way he used to beat others.

Why do I say this? A person must not be deceived by appearances. Yasir 'Arafat and Hafiz al-Asad curse the Americans. But, if you look a little deeper in matters, you would find out that both obey the orders of the Americans. Anyhow, we do not feel angry but rather happy because we know that the United States actually works for the sake of peace and the rights of Lebanon. It will exploit 'Arafat and Hafiz al-Asad's subservience to it to impose a solution that will be in the interests of Lebanon. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and others are now helping the United States, and we wish them success in their good efforts. Anyhow, the required solution for Lebanon is that which provides for the departure of the saboteurs and all the alien occupying forces from the land of Lebanon. We hope that the United States will help us attain this goal.

We have forgotten to say that the cease-fire is somehow holding. This is something encouraging. We hope that President Sarkis and Saudi Arabia have restrained the saboteurs and forced them to pass through two stages. Today, we see the saboteurs sitting in the south drinking and eating and doing no work. The checks continue to come to them from the Arab states. Why are they doing no work? What benefit are they to us? Let them get out of the south and let the Lebanese legitimacy, Lebanese Army and UN emergency forces come, but let the saboteurs leave the south and let the southerners live somehow happily in security and comfort. If Yasif 'Arafat wants then to go to Saudi Arabia and Jordan to speak, let him go and speak wherever he wants. If the question is one of speaking, let him speak from anywhere other than Beirut. Let him speak and may God be with him. No tax is paid on speaking.

Therefore, I ask Sarkis and Saudi Arabia to demand that the saboteurs withdraw from the south to Beirut as a preliminary step and then withdraw from all Lebanon. We are [words indistinct] because they are in a weak position now. Their back has been broken by the recent Israeli operations. This situation must be exploited. When they leave, they will ease the burden of the Arab states. They will not be receiving money from them any more. They will be looking for jobs to earn a living. The Arab states will no longer have to pay them. Saudi Arabia gave them $20 million recently and is still giving them money. Libya and Kuwait and others pay them. They can use this money to implement development, construction and humanitarian projects instead of giving it to the devil's agents to spend on devilish work.

[Words indistinct] I am answering them now and I ask: Lebanon has asked that the quadripartite committee's meeting be advanced by 1 week. I ask why? Why ask this when the meetings have previously been postponed for 1, 2, 3 and 4 months. I

want to understand what the purpose of the summit meeting is. They claimed that the purpose is to formulate a unified strategy for the south. A little later, when one of them [word indistinct], they said that this strategy does not mean war but could mean a peace strategy. But the word strategy is a military term. Today, when the Arab states and the Arabic-speaking states hear anything which could mean a war, they [words indistinct]. They will not respond, because nobody has any interest in participating in any fighting. Neither Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Syria or any other has any interest in participating in the fighting. Why should they fight? Is the south their cause? The question of the south can be settled when the alien saboteurs withdraw from the south. This is how the problem will be solved. They do not have to look for the sun after midnight. Why don't we be frank and tell them: come here, brothers, and take the saboteurs away from here. Why give them money [words indistinct]? I suggest that the best place to take them to is Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is a rich and big country. Its population is sparse. It can accommodate all these refugees. They can take them to Saudi Arabia. They would become rich there, and, if they want to establish a state for them, then let the Saudis give them a piece of land to establish a state. The refugees will be happy there. This would be the greatest service to Lebanon and to the entire world.

Therefore, I hope that those who claim to be responsible will stop deceiving the Lebanese people. They are always coming up with something new. They raise the people's hopes through the quadripartite committee at times and through a five-member committee and meetings at ambasadorial, ministerial and summit levels at others. We have seen many summit meetings and what they said about Lebanon and did for Lebanon. Could the purpose of the entire exercise be extortion, a habit which those who claim to be responsible, have learned from the saboteurs and the Syrians? The saboteurs and the Syrians have always followed the method of extorting money from the Arab states and the rich Arab [word indistinct]. Lebanon, or those who claim to be responsible in Lebanon, have, perhaps, learned from them to extort money. [Words indistinct] We do not want and the Lebanese citizen does not want money, anything or soldiers from anybody. The only thing that the Lebanese citizen wants is that Lebanon return to the Lebanese. [Words indistinct] If the aliens leave Lebanon, there would be no problems among the Lebanese. The best proof is [words indistinct]. Is there anybody in the occupied south, whether in al-Nabatiyah, Tyre or elsewhere who wants the saboteurs? Does anybody in Ba'Labakk want the saboteurs? Does anybody in Zahlah want the Syrians and the saboteurs? Does anybody in Tripoli want the saboteurs and the Syrians? Tell me what faction in Lebanon has not fought the occupiers? What does this mean? This means that all the Lebanese have one demand. They want the occupiers to leave Lebanon so that they may reunite and live together.

We hope that anybody who wants to serve Lebanon will work in this direction--the expulsion of the alien occupiers from the land of Lebanon. May you live long and long live Free Lebanon.

CSO: 4304/114

PEACE TENUOUS WITHOUT OVERALL MIDEAST SETTLEMENT

PM101118 Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 4 Aug 81 p 1

[Article by Michel Abu Jawdah: "The 'Lebanese Peace'--Is It Comprehensive?"]

[Excerpts] The "U.S. peace plan for Lebanon" that came to light on the eve of President al-Sadat's [Washington] visit consists of three points: first, to strengthen the UNIFIL and increase its powers; second, to strengthen the lawful authorities throughout Lebanon financially, politically, and militarily; and third, to cut off Syrian, Libyan and Soviet arms supplies to the Palestinians. The plan is backed by France, Britain and West Germany.

The first step will encounter the Soviet veto in the Security Council; the second will encounter the local, Palestinian and Arab "veto"; and the third will, of course, encounter the Syrian, Libyan and Soviet veto. This has always been the case in the past. But has anything changed to overcome the three vetoes?

Yes and no. Yes, if Palestinian, Syrian and international peace in the area come through the "Lebanese peace." Therefore, if the answer is yes, it must be said that the plan for Lebanon conceals a bigger and more comprehensive plan which was born in Mexico by arrangement between the major industrial powers and the developing countries, notably between the United States and Saudi Arabia, since the report on the plan originated from there. But if the answer is no, then it means that Lebanon will face further difficulties, that is, unless what is known as Philip Habib's "miracle" is followed by a bigger miracle which will be Ronald Reagan's miracle and the first of its kind in 33 years.

Nevertheless, caution remains necessary, because what has happened and is happening in Israel since the election with regard to forming a government there requires Lebanon as well as other Arab countries to be alert and vigilant. Menahem Begin's extremist and violent rule, which expressed itself in the raid on Beirut and previously on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, is likely to become even more extremist and violent as a result of its increasing reliance on its religious wing.

The need for alertness [illegible] ance by Lebanon becomes more acute--even more than for the Arab countr[illegible] a [illegible]me when Egypt, through talks between its president and President Reagan a[illegible] eviously with British officials, is trying to revive the Camp David policy as [illegible] the autonomy talks were going to lead to self-determination and later to a state for the Palestinians.

In his talks in Washington the Egyptian president will find himself facing a new U.S. administration which is in turn facing a new Israeli administration. The two administrations vie with one another in their extremism. The new U.S. administration, even more loyal to Israel, is trying through the cease-fire in Lebanon to avoid recognition of the PLO, while the Israeli administration behaves as if it did not recognize even the minimum in the Camp Davic accords, which is autonomy, and acts on the contrary, as if the accords were the official instruments for the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza.

The United States is now in the course of practically--though not publicly--abolishing or, rather, "annexing" the European initiative. It continues to welcome the European efforts, yet it declares that it has obtained the approval of Britain, France and West Germany for its initiative in Lebanon without making any reference to developing U.S. contacts with the PLO.

This "U.S. initiative" calls on Lebanon to be more alert and vigilant, more so than the Arab countries, because the "annexation" of the West Bank and Gaza by a "religious colonialist" Israeli Government will, if the Lebanese crisis remains unresolved, lead to further exacerbation of the problem of the Palestinians in Lebanon, much more than the problem of the Palestinians in other Arab countries.

CSO: 4304/114

WORKERS, OFFICIALS DESCRIBE DEVELOPMENTS IN LIGHT INDUSTRY

Tripoli AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 1 Jun 81 p 7

[Article by Mukhtar Suwaysi and Daww al-Shaybani: "Individual Is Primary Goal of Development; Door Is Open for Producing Masses; Raising Production to Bolster Freedom and Independence; Masses Are Invited to Enter All Spheres of Production"]

[Text] "Meeting the needs must be realized without expoliting or enslaving the others, else it is in conflict with the goal of the new socialist society." The Green Book, Chapter Two.

In a previous issue of AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR, we touched, [in an article entitled:] "The Path to the Age of the Masses," in our diccussion concerning the light industries on some points stipulated by the decree of the General People's Committee for Light Industries and on the bylaws of this decree. Through our interviews with the officials and with a number of producers in their production installations, we have discussed the advantage and economic benefits of these installations that seek to realize the highest production rates so as to build a prosperous national economy leading to the goal of the socialist society of the masses, namely the goal of bolstering and underlining independence and freedom on the soil of the first jamahiriyah in history. We also pointed out in detail the organizational measures and the extent of the subsidy and exemptions enjoyed by the producers in accordance with the decree of the General People's Committee for Light Industries and with the bylaws emanating from this decree.

The Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Light Industries provides the opportunity for the producing masses to take the initiative and enter the broad productive fields and spheres of the light industries to enhance progress at the various production levels in order to build a strong economy whose foundation is the man capable of producing--man who is the primary goal of development according to the new socialist projection brought into existence by the third international theory which has come to establish the mainstays of justice and equality, to lift injustice from man and to rescue him from the talons of the relations of oppression, exploitation and of all forms of suppression and slavery that shackle his freedom.

In this report, we will shed more light on production in the numerous light industry fields where the individual can prove his worth and his ability to produce, innovate and invent as long as he has the genuine desire and the readiness.

At the outset, we interviewed brother Dr 'Amr al-Maqsi, the secretary of the General People's Committee for Light Industries, who said to us:

"In the field of the light industry, production depends on production activity carried out by the individual's work and his private efforts of by the members of a number of families combined by a contract called the founding contract. In this case also, the production is based on the efforts of the individuals without exploitation by anybody and production belongs to society and is divided among society's main elements according to the dictates of Chapter Two (Socialism) of the Green Book."

Brother al-Maqsi added: "By his ability, readiness and what his efforts produce for him, a man can engage in any production activity, particularly in the field of the light industries which are founded on countless vocational and craft skills.

[Question] Is there a limit as to the number of individuals who want to engage in a certain production activity?

[Answer] As I have already pointed out, there are controls or limits concerning the number of individuals. The decree of the General People's Committee for Light Industries and the bylaws emanating from it have renewed the organizational measures governing the production projects in which the individual or a group of individuals want to exercise their production activity.

Invitation Addressed to Producing Masses

The masses are urged to produce, give and sacrifice in the various fields of production and to invest monies in the production projects that are of common benefit and through which the society of the age of the masses can underline its independence and freedom. The door is open to the masses to embark on the various production activities that rely primarily on the producing industrial mentality and not on the commercial mentality which relied before the age of the masses on exploitation and blackmail and which sought comfort and profit.

To These We Address Question

In the wake of society's decision to transfer money to the banks, some people still have their money in the banks and have not used it in productive development projects that bring society abundance and prosperity, even though the opportunity is available for production, innovation and invention in all the productive spheres and activities. The Light Industry Secretariat opens the door, welcomes initiatives and gives the applicant [investor] all the guarantees, whether in terms of subsidies or in terms of other measures.

The installations of numerous models of creative productivity in the various municipalities have entered the phase of actual production and have started their work with firm and advanced steps at all levels of light production.

The question addressed to those whose monies are still idle in the banks and who have not yet employed them in the various and broad fields of production so as to

serve society--the urgent question addressed to these people is: Why haven't they followed the example of the early initiatives that have entered the production stages?

I want to assert here that all the guarantees are insured and available in accordance with the industrial organization law. All that a man with an idea has to do is to apply to his municipality to transform the idea into productive work programs.

The invitation is addressed to a large number of merchants and to other groups which had engaged in the past in crafts that have now come to represent an exploitative manifestation in the wake of the new socialist projection.

These merchants and others, who are fundamentally craftsmen and skilled people and none of whom is without a craft or a skill, are supposed to apply, each within the jurisdiction of his municipality, to the secretariats of the special people's committees for light industry so that they may get permits that entitle them to engage in a productive and creative activity that depends on their own effort, without the exploitation of anybody.

In any case, we hope that there will be in the various municipalities of the Jamahiriyah cells that work hard and earn their profit with the sweat of their own brow.

[Question] What are the steps which the applicant has to carry out?

[Answer] The steps required of the applicant are summed up in his skill, his technical and administrative capability and his readiness to engage in the production activity in which he wants to specialize. This comes as a result of the decree of the General People's Committee for Light Industry, as a result of the slogan of "partners not hirelings" and as a result of the dictates of the bylaws of the General People's Committee for Light Industry.

With Producers and Their Production

We have had more than one interview with the producers and we have been able through these interviews to familiarize ourselves with their production and with their technical and administrative abilities. Our first interview was with a producer in the field of light industry:

Name: Mansur Muhammad al-Mushaklat.

Name of installation [business]: Al-Mushaklat Family Installation for Plastic, Household and Electrical Products.

[Question] When did you get the license and the operation permit?

[Answer] I got the license on 2 November 1975 and was given the operation permit on 6 November 1975.

[Question] What is the number of your family members?

[Answer] In fact, those engaged in the management and operation are the members of my family and of my brother's family, totaling 19 persons who engage in their production activity in the installation.

[Question] What is the average daily production of plastics?

[Answer] The average daily production is tied to two main elements:

First, the availability of production and the availability of marketing opportunities.

Second, the field of plastic products is a broad field that relies primarily on the availability of machines. As for operating the machines, it poses no difficulty. A small number of individuals can operate a large number of machines easily.

[Question] When did the al-Mushaklat family begin actual production?

[Answer] At the outset, the production went through initial stages that are considered mere tests. The actual production started in 1976 and now this production is improving and increasing noticeably, both qualitatively and quantitatively.

[Question] What are the types of products?

[Answer] Our production is embodied in various kinds of plastic products, including:

Various types of electricity boxes, of which we produce 400 pieces daily.

Spiral electricity piping, of which we produce 500 meters daily.

Various kinds of household plastic utensils, of which we produce 2,000 pieces daily.

Dishes: 200 daily

Drinking cups: 1,000 daily.

[Question] Do you encounter any difficulties posing an obstacle in the path of production?

[Answer] As far as production is concerned, there is no noteworthy difficulty, except for the small capacity of the business because we want to expand in the sphere of the plastic products. To be specific, we need a plot of land with an area of 600 meters to install the machines in the right places and to use part of the land as a store.

[Question] What is the motive behind the foundation of this project?

[Answer] Basically, the motive was determined by experience, considering that I have considerable experience in the field of plastic products. I have been able to polish this experience with a two-year training course in Italy. The fact is that increasing the production rates in the field of plastic products will lead to the phase of self-sufficiency.

[Question] What is the extent of the cooperation and coordination between you and the secretariat of light industry?

[Answer] The cooperation and coordination exist to a large degree, whether in terms of guidance, in terms of technical assistance or otherwise.

At the conclusion of the interview, brother al-Mushaklat said:

"My ambitions in the field of my specialization are boundless. I can expand in the sphere of plastic industries and can diversify the production, producing such items as ballpoint pens, boxes for [soft] drinks and telephones. I must express an opinion or a piece of advice in this regard so as to strengthen productive industrial awareness based on the purely industrial mentality. Regarding those who were engaged in the past in commercial or other activity, they must turn to the various fields of production so that we may, and with a collective spirit, realize self-sufficiency."

We have also interview brother Ahmad Muhammad al-Shuwayhidi who manages with his family a textile plant in the new al-Thalatha' Market in Wadi al-Ajal Street.

[Question] Brother al-Shuwayhidi, when did you get your license?

[Answer] I got the license and the operation permit in 1972.

[Question] What is the goal from your setting up this project?

[Answer] The fundamental goal is to raise the production rates in the textile industry and to achieve self-sufficiency. Moreover, I have nearly 50 years experience in this field. I have accompanied this industry from the time when I depended on manual work. Now, it is operated by machines and by sophisticated equipment.

[Question] What is your average daily production?

[Answer] I run the plant with my family and the maximum daily production is 80 silk dresses of the Sada brand.

We also interviewed in Tajara' brother 'Amir 'Abdallah Husayn who runs with his family a business for the production of perfumes. At the outset, brother Hasan's eldest son said: "The perfume industry in which we have been engaged for years depends on importing the raw materials and mixing them in certain proportions and according to extremely precise scientific specifications and measures.

"As for the production, it is improving noticeably. We currently produce 1,920 small-size bottles and nearly 1,400 large-size bottles. With time and with increased experience in the field of the perfume industry, the production will increase and will be of high quality."

In the society of the age of the masses--the productive society that is free of political, economic and social maladies--every man has the right to engage in his

production activity as long as he has the ability, the creativity and the inventiveness. The new socialist project brought about by the third international theory has defined the main characteristics of the man capable of giving and sacrificing in the various fields of production, without any exploitation.

The invitation is addressed to the productive masses and the opportunity is open to all to enter the fields of production. Let all roll up their sleeves to produce, innovate and invent so that prosperity may be realized and development enhanced in order to bolster independence and freedom.

8494
CSO: 4504/21

ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF DISCUSSES MILITARY TRAINING, WORK OF DEVELOPMENT

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 10 Jul 81 p 15

[Interview with Lt Col Yall Abdoulaye, National Army Chief of Staff and CMSN Member, on the occasion of the third anniversary of 10 July 1978; place not specified]

> [Text] In an exclusive interview, Lt Col Yall Abdoulaye, National Army chief of staff and a member of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation], told our reporter that the third anniversary of 10 July "is a time to look back over the long and difficult road already traveled." Lt Col Abdoulaye also mentioned the substantial, effective participation of our army in the work of development. As examples, he cited the large amount of rice harvested by the Kaedi military sector and construction of the Tiguint-Mederdra highway. In reply to a question about military training, Lt Col Abdoulaye stressed the necessarily diversified nature of instruction for officers and noncommissioned officers. He also noted the good qualities of the Mauritanian soldier prior to comparing a year of peace and a year of war. In conclusion, Lt Col Abdoulaye made a stirring appeal to all soldiers of our valiant army.

CHAAB: What does the third anniversary of the movement of 10 July mean to you?

Answer: The third anniversary of 10 July is a stage in the process which the armed forces began in 1978 to bring our country to an abrupt halt in its race toward total collapse.

The vigorous spirit to save our country, which motivated the armed forces 3 years ago, derives new strength and even more resolute determination on the occasion of this third anniversary of 10 July.

It is also a time to look back over the long and difficult road already traveled.

And at this point, it should be said that the overall result of the program laid out by the CMSN is positive.

However, much remains to be done and this third anniversary will thus enable us to determine the total effort which must still be put forth to properly carry out all the tasks which the CMSN has set for itself.

CHAAB: The question of the armed forces' participation in the fight against underdevelopment has recently been raised, especially since the end of the war in the Sahara. To what extent has this idea taken concrete shape over the last 3 years?

Answer: By definition, the army's main job is to defend the country. And it cannot be assigned another mission if latent dangers exist. But if minimal security conditions are established, it is the duty of any underdeveloped country's army to devote part of its activities to the work of national development. Such is the case of Mauritania. Our armed forces have therefore definitely felt this need and this duty.

Thus despite its deep involvement with the job of national defense, the armed forces have been able to make room, however modest it may be, for the work of development. For example, I would like to mention the large amount of rice harvested this year by the Kaedi military sector.

With winter just around the corner, we are encouraging all military units stationed in agricultural areas to cultivate a field or to lay out an area for growing vegetables or rice.

CHAAB: Military engineers participated in building roads this year for the first time. Is there a plan for their participation in other similar projects (roads, dams, etc.)?

Answer: In the context of volunteer operations, military engineers have actually participated to a very broad extent. For example, I can mention the construction of the Mederdra-Tiguint highway, a section of road that mobilized a great deal of military, human and material resources.

The work of military engineers must therefore be part of a national program and their participation, depending on the possibilities, will be assured every time that it is needed.

CHAAB: Training is essential, especially for developing armies. Is the Atar Inter-Services School capable of handling our army's officer needs?

Answer: You are quite right in saying that "training is essential, especially for developing armies."

To stress the importance of this aspect, I will add that the worth of an army can be measured by the extent of its instruction.

This instruction is diverse and varied. It requires a continued, sustained and constantly better effort. This means that such instruction must be dispensed by a sufficient number of competent cadres who are aware of their country's specific realities.

That is one of the basic reasons which led to the establishment of the Atar Inter-Services School. The school trains officers and noncommissioned officers for the regular army and provides instruction for reserve officers to become part of the regular army.

It conducts its classes in Arabic and French in two different brigades and thus makes inter-services training possible.

Only specialized training is provided abroad, due to the lack of certain very special and very expensive infrastructures.

CHAAB: The essence of the Mauritanian soldier's instruction should come from the traditions and values of our people. Can you tell us what has been done in this regard?

Answer: The Mauritanian soldier is a descendant of a Moslem people who are intelligent, proud, honest and courageous.

All of these qualities are maintained and cultivated in the army, for they are fully in keeping with the warrior traditions of the Mauritanian people.

The physical and moral values of these warrior traditions are part of the Mauritanian soldier's program of instruction.

Moreover, through the talks and conferences held regularly by officers and during personal visits by National Defense officials and the president of the CMSN, the chief of state, these qualities are recalled and illustrated with actual examples drawn from both our war experience and lessons of daily life.

CHAAB: Our country has spend enormous amounts of money in a war that was forced on it. Three years after our withdrawal from the Saharan conflict, can you provide us with a comparison between a year of war and a year of peace?

Answer: A year of peace and a year of war are fundamentally opposites from the standpoint of both human and material repercussions.

The gap to be filled in both cases is considerable, especially for an underdeveloped country.

Our country's experience has been bitter. Under the former government, it was almost swept away, wiped off the map.

Without giving you a comparison using figures, I will say merely that war causes all sorts of hardships and its disastrous effects are even more pronounced when it strikes an underdeveloped country.

War causes poverty, sickness, economic and social paralysis. It creates widows, orphans and physical casualties forever.

That is why, as long as a country is not attacked, it should avoid war.

CHAAB: Do you have an appeal to make to the national armed forces on this occasion?

Answer: The appeal that I would like to make to the armed forces, on the occasion of this third anniversary, is that they should always bear in mind the serious responsibilities which they have had since 10 July 1978.

The Mauritanian people are watching them; that is why every member of the armed forces should set an example and be a model for emulation by demonstrating his good citizenship and professional qualities.

In particular, the soldier should be aware of his duties, eager to learn them and to train himself to carry out his mission as well as possible.

Concerned with preserving equipment, disciplined and always available, he must accept the job's hardships and obligations selflessly.

Proud of his country, he rejects all subservience other than national duty, including the ultimate sacrifice: giving up his life.

11915
CSO: 4519/30

DIRECTOR DISCUSSES SITUATION OF SUGAR INDUSTRY

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 17 Jun 81 No 1749 pp 3, 8, and 18 Jun 81 No 1750 pp 3, 7

/Interview with Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna, director of the sugar project, by reporter Sidi Mohamed Ould Babana, date and place not specified/

/17 Jun 81 pp 3, 8/

> /Text/Sugar is one of the staple foodstuffs in our country's diet. That is why our country had decided to set up a sugar refinery at Nouakchott to supply the domestic market at reasonable cost. But unfortunately the project failed dismally under the former government. Since 10 July, great efforts have been made to get the sugar plant started again.
>
> The director of this enterprise has been kind enough to review, in the first part of this exclusive interview, his company's present situation. He also spoke about former SOSUMA /Mauritanian Sugar Company/ employees and the supply of raw materials for the sugar plant.

CHAAB: In connection with establishing the sugar plant, the Mauritanian state had signed with an American company some contracts that turned out badly for our country. We are aware that since the 10 July movement great efforts have been started to get the plant going and reap some profit from the monies already sunk into it. Director, can you review the situation for us?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: First of all, I want to thank your newspaper for giving me this opportunity to talk about the sugar project, about which the public has such strong feelings.

As you probably know, sugar is one of the staple products in our country's diet. Moreover, it is a first line strategic product for our country's leaders. This said, I note at once that your question revives some gloomy

memories for people who know, from personal experience or otherwise, the project's eventful history.

Aside from the disappointing and painful aspects of the situation you recall, and that we have unfortunately inherited, I note that this project, which is important for our economic health, has not come to anything despite the considerable funds allotted to it.

The major difficulties underlying the plant's being idle reside essentially in the fact that production was suspended as a result of certain technical flaws recorded on the sugar loaf production lines, that the subcontractor Lang Engineering refused to correct.

Since establishment of project management, serious efforts have been made at all levels to put the project on its feet again.

Thus, our nation's leaders have succeeded in obtaining from a brother country the funds needed to start up the project again.

These funds have been made available to us in the form of a 10 million US dollar loan under particularly favorable conditions. This, too, is how we put an end to the dispute with the American company Lang Engineering, which is the dispute you referred to a moment ago, by signing the protocol of an agreement for transfer of the title-deed of the plant and its facilities to our country. Since then, other appropriate actions have been taken to prepare for start-up. Just to give a few examples, recruitment, the selection and training of upper echelon cadre and supervisory personnel, the gradual installation of a management structure, finding possible partners, writing and signing certain technical aid agreements with our partners for adjustments and technical modification of the plant, services, etc.

CHAAB: Among the problems you inherited from the previous sugar project, there is the matter of the workers who served on that project and whose wages have been held up for nearly 2 years now. What solutions do you foresee for dealing with this problem?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: The situation of the former SOSUMA employees is well on its way to being corrected. Freezing the company automatically involved dismissal of just about all expatriate and local personnel, except for a small administrative nucleus which was kept on to finish the liquidation and take care of plant security and that of the annexes. Up to 98 percent of these workers have been rehired by the sugar project, and their earlier wages will be paid to them in their entirety out of SOSUMA assets. As to those affected by staff reduction, their wages were paid them at the time, out of loans advanced by the treasury.

An interministerial sub-committee of which I am a member is now assessing SOSUMA's liabilities and assets with a view to finding ways and means of paying off its creditors.

CHAAB: How is the plant to be supplied with raw materials?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: For the sake of clarity in what follows, let me first point out that only the compacting operation (loaf sugar) will be started up. The sugar refinery itself will remain frozen for some time. This is an economy choice, decided upon the basis of a technical, economic, and financial feasibility study by our office of engineering.

To return to your question, supplying the plant will therefore only involve the loaf sugar manufacturing part.

The quantities of refined white sugar neeeded for home consumption will be imported from Europe, Latin America,or elsewhere, depending on world market availability.

In addition to refined sugar, we shall have to import packaging materials, chemical products, and so on.

Importation of refined white sugar will be carried out either through SONIMEX [Mauritanian National Import-Export Company], which has the monopoly at the moment, or, as an exceptional measure, by the sugar project itself if necessary, and that will be as soon as the trade relations between these two state institutions have been defined.

[16 Jun 61 pp 3, 7]

> [Text] The output of the Nouakchott sugar compacting plant will amply cover the domestic need for this commodity and the surplus (about 2,000 tons is to be exported; at any rate, this is the assurance given us by the director of the sugar project, Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna, an an exclusive interview.
>
> In the second part of this talk, published today in this paper, Mr M'Bareck Ould Bouna speaks about the size of the investment, the problem of training cadre (all native-born) except for two Algerian technicians....
>
> When will this unit be operational? The director of the project, of which the importance in our economic life needs no justification, says March 1982.

CHAAB: What is the unit's production capacity? Can it meet SONIMEX demand?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: The compactor has a capacity of 40,000 tons of sugar a year, of which 30,000 tons are in sugar loaf and 10,000 tons in cubes.

For the sake of information, the sugar refinery and compacting plant was planned for a nominal capacity of 160 tons of refined sugar every 24 hours.

Since, as we mentioned before, only the compacting plant will be working, the total plant output will be:

for the sugar loaf production lines, unit capacity will be 50 tons every 24 hours, which amounts to an annual output of 37,500 tons for 250 days' running time;

for the two sugar cube production lines, unit capacity will be 5 tons every 24 hours, which amounts to an annual output of 2,500 tons for 250 days' running time.

As can be seen from reading these performance figures, the Nouakchott plant will amply cover the domestic consumption of loaf sugar, which is on the order of 38,000 tons a year.

To make allowances even for future growth of the domestic market, we are planning to acquire in the fairly near future an additional compacting line for cube sugar, with a capacity of 50 tons per 24 hours, which amounts to a yearly output of 12,000 tons for an estimated running time of 250 days.

CHAAB: An industrial complex of this sort, Director, requires large investments. Where do you expect to find the necessary financing?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: Priority investments, such as getting the machinery ready, acquiring spare parts, repairing the plating in the plant, buying raw materials, etc...will be borne by the loan of 10 million US dollars that has been made available to us. As concerns the start-up expenditures and the first few months of operation, plant activity should make it self-supporting without any trouble.

As for the second part of your question, I think I have already answered it.

CHAAB: Do you think this plant can enable the country to become self-sufficient so far as sugar is concerned, and if so, when?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: I think I have already answered that question. But to round out my answer, I will add that our output will even exceed the self sufficiency level, since a quantity amounting to about 2,000 tons, intended for export, is expected.

CHAAB: Will neighboring countries' experience in this field be useful to you?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: Among our neighbors, only Algeria and Senegal have the same type of installation as we do. The first country is helping us technically and financially with realization of the project, and I am quite sure that the second country is ready to make its experience in the field available to us if necessary.

In passing, I would like to take advantage of your paper to express, on behalf of the leadership of this nation, as of my own, our warmest thanks to these two brother states: one for its generous assistance, and the other for its availability.

CHAAB: Starting this plant surely requires a large number of qualified personnel. So what are your plans for recruiting and training personnel?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: I know that I am going to surprise you when I tell you that besides domestic cadre and laborers, the sugar plant will employ only two Algerian technicians: an engineer and a financial expert.

Nearly all the personnel we shall need is now either finishing up its training in Algeria, or is already available on site at the plant.

CHAAB: Can you give us a date for the actual start of production of the plant?

Col M'Bareck Ould Bouna: Actual start of production is planned for the beginning of March 1982, which is the date at which the involvement of the Italian construction company, which happens to be the Reggiane company, will cease.

In concluding this interview, which I personally would have liked to be more detailed, it must be remembered that the profitability of this project needs no further proof; even though it has experienced several unfortunate episodes in planning as well as in management, the project is worth saving for many reasons, otherwise all the sacrifices made for it will have been in vain.

12149
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PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES SOCIAL MEASURES, ECONOMIC RECOVERY

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 10 Jul 81 pp 14, 23

[Interview with Lt Col Maouiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, on the occasion of the anniversary of 10 July 1978; place not specified]

> [Text] "With regard to what has been achieved, there is an open and indomitable will to restore our people's self-confidence, for moral and psychological depression was becoming established in people's minds before 10 July ...." This is what Lt Col Maouiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, prime minister and minister of defense, told us during an exclusive interview on the occasion of the third anniversary of the glorious movement of 10 July. In this interview, the prime minister made an extremely positive, exhaustive assessment of its results. He spoke about the reestablishment of peace, the reorganization of public finances, economic recovery and the implementation of major projects, the resumption of projects which had been suspended as well as starting other major projects which had been jeopardized for a long time. Lt Col Taya also talked about the social measures taken on behalf of our people, the government, etc.

CHAAB: Today our country celebrates the third anniversary of our national armed forces' acquisition of power. What significance does this event have for you?

Answer: On 10 July 1981, we celebrate the third anniversary of the seizure of power by the armed forces, the ultimate guardians of national legitimacy. The army actually had to intervene on that day to put an end to the dangers of dismemberment and bankruptcy threatening the country and to end a pointless, fratricidal war.

Thus 10 July is a great day for the armed forces, for patriotic forces and for all of the Mauritanian people.

It symbolizes the verdict of a people who could no longer endure being trampled.

CHAAB: When the armed forces seized power on 10 July 1978, they laid out an ambitious program for themselves. Can you tell us what has been accomplished and what remains to be done?

Answer: With regard to what has been achieved, there is an open and indomitable will to restore our people's self-confidence, for moral and psychological depression was becoming established in the minds of the people before 10 July; it was therefore necessary to foster self-confidence and faith in the country.

From a practical standpoint, you are no doubt familiar with what has been accomplished; first of all, peace was reestablished with the signing of the agreement with the POLISARIO Front on 5 August 1979, followed by economic and financial recovery through gradual reduction of the budget deficit, an austerity policy for government spending and readjustment of foreign indebtedness. We have also gone ahead with major projects (the Highway of Hope, Nouakchott's Port of Friendship, the Gorgol Noir project, Boghe Plain, the Guelbs Project) and resumed other projects which had been suspended: an oil refinery, sugar refinery and the Inchiri copper mines.

Other projects such as the Omnisports stadium, television and social services are underway, thanks to our domestic effort and the effort of brother and friendly countries and international institutions. However, much remains to be done in this regard and will be done with determination, for those who hesitate and waver in the fight against underdevelopment will be excluded.

CHAAB: Eighty percent of the population lives in the Rif and the armed forces, aware of this, have given the rural sector priority. Mr Prime Minister, can you identify the obstacles to implementing this decision?

Answer: The majority of our population are in fact rural residents, but the main base of our economy can also only be the primary sector, and that is why the CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] and the government have given this sector priority.

This priority is illustrated by the achievements mentioned previously: the Gorgol pilot project, Gorgol Noir, Boghe Plain, the Hodh-Aftout Saheli dams: by following the OMVS program but also through the public's conscientious participation in the work of this sector.

I should also mention: the establishment of the National Development Fund (FND) and the establishment of the regional development fund by the government. But there are real limitations which must be overcome through the determination of the government and operators.

Such limitations include persistent drought, the heavy financing to be obtained for such investments, the mentality of operators, the property system and the level of technology. Finally, there is the problem of water control.

CHAAB: Our people's purchasing power continues to decline at a time when the labor market's possibilities remain limited despite the launching of several economic projects. What measures have been considered for remedying this situation?

Answer: The economic conditions of the mass of our people have always been our major concern. And based on our country's economic situation, the austerity policy for reviving our economy and our public finances, and the necessary effort for sacrifice at all levels, the actual measures which have currently been taken in this connection

are: on one hand, raising wages in the case of all monthly incomes of less than 10,000 UM [Mauritanian ouguiya]; eliminating the contribution to the RN [National Recovery] effort in the case of incomes of less than 12,000 UM; on the other hand, setting the lowest possible prices for staple commodities (sugar, rice, tea).

These products will therefore continue to be subsidized, to be sold at very low prices in comparison to those charged in neighboring countries. We are also suffering from the adverse effects of price increases in industrialized countries, the oil bill, the deterioration of trade conditions and inflation. So that the results of this effort do not end up in the pockets of speculators, we recently established a distribution system for SONIMEX [expansion unknown] products by eliminating middlemen.

Moreover, the absorption capacity of the labor market is certainly limited, but as projects get underway, a sharp improvement will start to be felt and will continue.

Finally, in this regard, I would like to say that there is underdevelopment on all levels and I urge my fellow citizens to persevere in their efforts and spirit of sacrifice so that together we will gradually put in place an economic system providing the best conditions for our people.

CHAAB: The efforts made to reorganize the government have had only limited success; the government is still in a state of disorder. Mr Prime Minister, can you tell us why? What measures have been considered in this connection?

Answer: Our government is still ineffectual, like that of any underdeveloped country. Government officials propose interesting concepts and views, in theory, but do not make the connection between such theories and practical application. Thus the important thing is practical application and that is why there must be a radical change in our government to combine reason and reality in a pragmatic approach with the aim of considering the interests of our people.

This is the orientation that must be given to the sectoral objectives set by the CMSN and also to the plan for government action, which has just been made public.

Our government, a descendant of the former colonial government, is slow to change, but will be induced to do so through observance of work schedules; the required presence of all government officials and civil servants at their posts; a sense of responsibility and respect for the public welfare.

Through the application of coherent programs, stability in operations and strict management, everyone should realize that the contaminated environment of selfish, biased interests is forever a thing of the past and that this government will be an instrument for achieving our people's legitimate aspirations.

Three processes must govern this reorganization of the government: 1. political determination at the government level; 2. changing the mentality of government officials and civil servants and their motivation; 3. active participation of the public, which must no longer endure in silence the abuses or demands of this government, which they must now view as their own and no longer tolerate such major evils as nepotism, interventionism and bribery.

CHAAB: Can you tell us our country's position on the latest developments in the Western Sahara conflict?

Answer: Our position on this conflict has always been neutral, but at the same time we are keenly interested in any permanent, comprehensive solution which could be reached in the interests of those peoples.

We have no position on this issue and hope very much that peace can be restored in that area, whose peoples need to devote their efforts to something other than war; thus the recent development in the situation can only be viewed favorably.

CHAAB: Mr Prime Minister, do you have an appeal to make on the occasion of this anniversary?

Answer: The fight against underdevelopment and the march of history beseech us to firmly establish our national unity, without which nothing lasting can be achieved: our national unity must be firmly fixed in the collective consciousness, just like the deep feeling about the concept of government and public affairs. We must identify with our past and rediscover ourselves in the present to build the future, a future which I urge the Mauritanian people to contemplate, as it will require new behavior based on objectivity, reason and freedom from many hindrances.

From this standpoint, it is our duty to listen to the mass of the people but also to mobilize them in the right direction, in particular by shaking off fatalism. This is what is required to build our country in peace and friendship with all our partners. Every citizen shares responsibility for this joint undertaking and I therefore urge everyone to take part in building a radiant future.

11915
CSO: 4519/30

STUDY QUESTIONS ROLE OF FOREIGN BANKS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 521, 8-14 Jun 81 pp 19-20

[Article: "On Silver Jubilee of Independence, Governor of Bank of Sudan Opens Fire on Foreign Banks; Competitive Position of Foreign Banks and National Banks in Sudan Is not Equal; Former Attract Cadres Trained on Banking Operations, Using for This End All Kinds of Incentives and Inducements Which National Banks Cannot Offer Because of Redtape Which Paralyzes Their Movement"]

[Text] Khartoum--Exclusive AL-DUSTUR Dispatch--The Sudanese lawyers Union has sounded the alarm and more than 30 prominent Sudanese law professors have pointed the fingers of accusation, warning of the violation of constitutional legitimacy that is occurring in more than one sphere of state affairs.

The warning came from the special legal symposium held by the union on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of Sudan's independence.

In this symposium, numerous scientific research studies were presented on more than one vital issue, including: Condition of legal education in Sudan, the causes, traces and means of dealing with the delay in deciding [legal] cases, the role and problems of the law profession, the judiciary's independence, the special laws, the labor laws and the laws to encourage economic investment.

Regarding the last issue, namely the "laws to encourage economic investment," Sudanese Economic Expert 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid presented a study in the second part of which he discussed attracting local and foreign capital for investment in opening new banks.

In his study, the Sudanese economic expert opened fire on the foreign banks, urging the legists and the Lawyers Union to discuss the legality of the decisions approving the establishment of these banks in light of the dangers emanating from them and in light of the country's constitution which calls for "socialism of the state," of the 1970 law nationalizing the banks and in light of all the other penal laws capable of putting an end to this activity which harms the country's interests and sabotages its institutions.

'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid who has held several important positions, including member of the Ministerial Economic Council, chairman of the Technical Advisory Committee of

the Banking Apparatus and Governor of the Bank of Sudan, said that commercial banks have never constituted a field of investment for which the state exerts efforts to attract and to which it opens the door wide, encouraging this investment in the manner it is currently doing.

He said that the banks used to perform serious tasks in guiding the national economy in their capacity as the vessels for collecting the national savings and channelling them toward the economic activities.

The former governor of the Bank of Sudan pointed out that the nature of these [commercial] banks has compelled the Third World and socialist countries to nationalize them because of their dangerous impact on the state utilities. The man who had headed the Sudanese banking apparatus said: "The law issued in 1970 nationalizing the Arab, foreign and Sudanese banks is still in force and no action has been taken to repeal it." Drawing attention to legislative fallacies, he added: "The state has begun to encourage the establishment of local and foreign commercial banks within the framework of the 1980 economic investment law. The establishment of these banks, done by decrees and not by law, is capable of burying the investment law while still in the womb."

In this regard, 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid wondered if any investor, be he foreign or Sudanese, will choose a more profitable sphere than commercial banks?

He said that such banks yield on annual profit reaching 700 percent of the capital, On the other hand, the important industrial and agricultural activities in Sudan, activities which require manyfold the capital required by the commercial banks, yearn to move from loss to a profit within the limits of 10-30 percent. None of these activities can even contemplate realizing profits similar to those realized by the commercial banks.

The former member of the Ministerial Economic Council then returned to the 1980 investment encouragement law, saying that one of its most important benefits is the exemption from the business tax. 'Awad stressed that all or some of the new commercial banks are exempted from taxes. The Sudanese economic expert also said that there is a new policy acting outside the framework of the said investment law, that this policy is based on no other law and that it is geared toward attracting local and foreign capital to set up commercial banks. This policy has led to the creation of a large number of these banks and there are still many requests under discussion.

'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid cited as proof the Sudanese press which emerges daily with reports on permits to numbers of new banks to operate in Sudan.

Last August, AL-SAHAFAH reported that the Ministry of Finance and National Economy had approved the establishment of five Arab and foreign banks in Sudan and had received requests for opening five more commercial banks.

Earlier, in January 1980, the Bank of Sudan granted its approval for the establishment of a number of Islamic, foreign, Pakistani and American banks. Another number of banking establishments had also applied to be permitted to operate in Sudan.

'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid then listed the controls laid down by the Bank of Sudan to regulate the operations of these banks, including the regulation that the capital of any such bank not be less than $10 million, the regulation that they advance medium and long-range credit facilities to the production sectors, such as agriculture and industry, and the regulation that no deposit [savings] accounts in local currencies be opened to other than exporters and importers. The main source of the commercial banks' profits is not their capital but the deposits of the public which are put as a trust with the banks and which amount to 22 times their capital. Here the Sudanese legist and economist wondered if the required capital--$10 million --can be a guarantee for the deposits of the public which exceed this capital by more than 22 times.

'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid said that these banks are companies with a limited responsibility, meaning that their responsibility doesn't exceed their capital, and that this poses a danger to the popular savings and to the fate of the Sudanese banking system as a whole should any of these banks fail or declare its bankruptcy intentionally or unintentionally!

Regarding the effect of the establishment of these new commercial banks on the national state-owned banks, 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid asserted that the establishment of these banks will not only bury the new embryo--the 1980 investment encouragement law--but will also kill with premeditation state-owned establishments which yielded last year a profit amounting to 52 million pounds.

The Sudanese economic expert said that the competitive position between the foreign banks and the national banks is not equal. The former attract the cadres trained in banking operations, using for this end all kinds of material incentives and inducements which the national banks cannot offer because of the redtape that paralyzes their movement.

Regarding the role of the banks in advancing credit facilities and in making decisions with a speed that doesn't obstruct the commercial and economic activity of the clients, the Sudanese economic expert said that a decree by the minister of finance demands that the national banks refer any requests for more than 100,000 pounds to the Bank of Sudan, then to an advisory committee and then to the minister himself to make his decision on them whereas the foreign banks are not subject to the power or authority of the minister and can decide on the clients' requests quickly and in a manner which cannot be rivalled by the national banks.

'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid pointed out that this decree was abolished in 1970 and was then reinstated when the door was opened wide for the foreign banks.

The inevitable consequence of this unequal competitive situation is that the new foreign or local banks will replace the state-owned banks. The inevitable consequence of all this will be the collapse of the national banks because the clients will flee them and their cadres to the foreign banks. The expected ultimate outcome of this is that the national banks will die and the arena will become free for the foreign banks.

At the conclusion of his study, 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid turned to a main point of major importance which may shed light on many issues and on the goal of the policy

followed by the state. The rules regulating the work of the foreign banks prohibit them from opening all kinds of deposit [savings] accounts in local currencies, except for exporters and importers dealing with them. If the primary and most important role of banks is to gather the national savings, then this restriction imposed on the foreign banks will cause their resources to consist entirely of on-demand current accounts.

The practical outcome of this imaginary "restriction" is that the foreign banks will not be able or, to put it more accurately, will be exempted from advancing long-term credit facilities for the industrial and agricultural activities because how can they perform this role when their resources consist of on-demand current accounts?

Thus, the "restriction" turns into another advantage improving the competitive position of the foreign banks. It is a restriction intended for local consumption and to mislead the people into believing that many restrictions are imposed on these banks and that these banks perform a role which our national banks cannot perform.

Here, 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid pointed out that the total investments from the national savings in the Sudanese banks amounted to 146 million pounds at the end of 1970 while the banks retained surpluses of 229 million pounds for which they earned no profits.

'Abd-al-Majid also pointed out that the national banks earned no profits from the surplus sums and that they didn't need deposit [savings] accounts but opened such accounts out of their sense of their national responsibility to gather the national savings. Moreover, the total medium and long-range loans advanced by the Sudanese national banks in the said year amounted to 95 million pounds.

The gist of the study presented by 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid to the Sudanese Lawyers Union symposium on the silver jubilee of Sudan's independence says:

The state is hiding behind the economic investment encouragement law to open the door wide for the foreign banks.

The foreign banks are exempted from taxes, do not finance the industrial and agricultural activities and their profits are astronomical.

The foreign banks are established by illegal decrees that are capable of killing the state-owned national establishments because these banks enjoy a good competitive position whereas restrictions are imposed on the national banks.

The summary of the study says:

The national banks and the state-owned banks are the backbone of the economic life. The industrial, commercial and agricultural activities are in danger and Sudan's economy is in danger.

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INTEGRATION OF ISLAM, TECHNOLOGY DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-'ARABI in Arabic No 271, Jun 81 pp 21-25

[Article by Dr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Kamil: "Dialogue about Islam and Progress"]

> [Text] "The most charitable among you are my contemporaries, then those who came after them and those who came after those." How?
>
> What is the truth in Islam's position on the question of progress?

Kuwait was the scene of the Intellectual Creativity Symposium in the Arab world between 8 and 12 March 1981. The University of Kuwait; the United Nations Organization; the National Council for Culture, the Arts and Letters; and the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research worked together on this symposium.

The guest of honor at the symposium was Dr 'Abd-al-Salam, the first Muslim scientist to receive the Nobel prize in physics in 1979. His talk was about the advancement of the sciences in Arab and Islamic countries.

Dr 'Abd-al-Salam began his lecture by saying, "In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. I have the honor of addressing you, and what I have to say applies to a number of developing countries, including my own country, Pakistan. I feel that I can say what is on my mind without running the risk of being misunderstood.

"My observations today will revolve around the subject of the abstract sciences. I join you in advocating that the greatest priority be given to the creation of knowledge within a scientific league for the Arab and Islamic countries. I am advocating that plans be made for the essential stages, if we want to occupy among the nations the respectable position that we deserve in this field."

Dr 'Abd-al-Salam spoke after that about modern developments in physics, especially with regard to the principal forms of energy and natural forces. This is the field that Dr 'Abd-al-Salam has been working in for years.

Before the last two decades physicists used to believe that energy had four basic forms: gravity, electro-magnetic energy and two kinds of nuclear energy identified

as the weak form and the strong form. It is now self-evident that one of these forces is changed into another as is the case when the force of gravity is changed into an electrical force and electricity is generated from waterfalls. There is also the transformation of strong nuclear energy produced inside the sun into electro-magnetic energy due to the heat of the sun's rays. The fusion of electro-magnetic force and weak nuclear force has been possible.

Physicists are now entertaining the hope of proving that the strong nuclear energy form is also a part of this fusion.

The ultimate target remains that of fusing together the force of gravity and the new electro-nuclear force. The essence of this process is that the force which causes the apple to fall or fixes the moon in its orbit--that is the force of gravity--is a manifestation of the same fusion which electrical force or nuclear force are considered a part of.

Professor 'Abd-al-Salam sums up the efforts of scientists, disregarding the boundaries of time and place, in an attempt to link the past grandeur of Islam with the steady stream of contemporary life and the hope for a sunny future as he says:

"Although this idea which was first suggested by Einstein may appear today to be mere fantasy, it is our hope that it will become an established truth. It may also require 50 years before it can be stated precisely and proven properly. I pray to God that a physicist from one of the Islamic countries will find a decisive solution to this problem."

Between Science and Faith

Then Professor 'Abd-al-Salam combines this great hope with Islamic faith and says, "Our purpose in fusing the natural forces that are isolated on the surface is only part of our faith as physicists and part of my faith as a Muslim. I am grateful and thankful to God for honoring us by giving us opportunities to probe deeply into one of the manifestations of His creation. This favor is bestowed by God on whomever He wishes, and God's grace is great."

Then he stated that in December 1979 when he spoke on behalf of physicists who had won the Nobel prize in response to the speech that was made by the King of Sweden during the dinner banquet that was held in Stockholm's Great Celebration Hall, he had said:

"The discovery of physics is a heritage in which all of humanity takes part. People in the East, in the West, in the North and in the South have contributed equally to this doscovery. God Almighty says in the Holy Koran:

"'God's work is flawless. Turn up your eyes: can you detect a single flaw? Then look once more and yet again: your eyes will in the end grow dim and weary' [al-Mulk: Verses 3-4]. God Almighty the truth.

"This is exactly what we physicists believe. This is the faith we cherish and by whose light we are guided. The more we wish to probe, the more does our admiration and our happiness increase. And the love of inquiry--the love of more knowledge--grew in our hearts."

Professor 'Abd-al-Salam reviews the history of science and George Sarton's opinion [on the subject] in his large five-volume work which divides the history of science into epochs each of which is half a century and associated with a principal figure. The vigorous ages were those from 750 A.D. to 1100 A.D.--a period of 3 and one-half centuries. They were the ages of Jabir ibn Hayan, al-Khawarizmi, al-Razi, al-Mas'udi, al-Farabi, al-Bayruni, Avicenna, Ibn al-Haytham and 'Umar al-Khayyam. These are Arab, Turkish, Afghan and Persian men who belong to the Islamic nation.

In Sarton's history of science western names do not show up for the first time until after 1100 A.D. This is apart from those that did show up in the Greek and Roman civilizations which for practical purposes were Mediterranean civilizations.

After reviewing the decline that befell the Islamic world, Professor 'Abd-al-Salam called for a scientific awakening under the umbrella of Islam. He reviewed examples of the scientific progress plans in Japan, China and the Soviet Union and [referred to] the fact that the west was attracting Third World scientists. He proposed a "Nation of Science" plan inside Islamic and Arab countries. "This would be a system or organization which would have the necessary funding and the world's guarantee for its own security and the security of its research. It would have intense immunity at least for the next 25 years. Those scientists would have nothing to do with internal or sectarian political disputes as was the case with the Islamic nation of science in the past.

"This nation of science can make plans for the Islamic scientific revival and can interact with the world scientific movement. Isolation in science is a loss." Professor 'Abd-al-Salam conluded his talk by making two appeals. The first one [was directed] to the scientists so they can work together to establish the nation of science, and the other was to the rulers to sponsor this project.

Progress and Hope

The discussion about the future was linked with hope. It was a discussion in which faith and science converged and determined a project about which more than one speaker made a comment. We are in fact suffering from the fact that scientific activity is affected by the shifting tides of domestic politics and we do need a scientific Arab and Islamic body that has immunity similar to that of the courts. [We need a body] that can establish the foundations of our scientific revival as we usher in the years of the 15th century of the Hegira calendar.

A long stream of events that have been taking place in the Far East where I have been visiting recently went through my mind.

In countries of the Far East that have a small population, such as Singapore with 3.5 million persons, the people were able to persuade the companies of Japan, Western Europe and the United States to establish assembly plants in those countries, and the names of Taiwan, Korea and Singapore began to conquer world markets.

At the same time Japan made intense efforts to upgrade its industries, especially its motor vehicles and electronics industries. These industries are now threatening U.S. and European production on their own turf. Germans now refer to the Japanese as the "yellow Prussians" as though they were the Germans of Asia. Joint Japanese and European companies and joint Japanese and U.S. companies began to emerge; these [joint ventures] are transferring Japanese technology to the West.

The discussion [in Japan] now revolves around the conquest of European and U.S. industry by means of the robot.

The Japanese revolutionized education radically for the purpose of making the greatest possible use of human abilities. This revolution in education depends primarily on superior training whose standards continue to improve. Computers perform secretarial tasks; robots stand in front of production machinery; innovation, training; new innovation; and new training in a continuous escalating movement.

Then This Human Influx

One can look at people's faces in a number of oil proudcing countries in the Arab world and see the large numbers of people from the nations of the Far East who are working in the various areas of life, and especially in the area of major construction. They come from a front that begins in Korea in the north and [extends] southward to Singapore. Sundry nations, religious and cultures are coming to terms with the land, the road, with construction, electronic devices and with automobiles. Technology is now a universal language which a worker can use anywhere on the surface of the earth.

If [workers from the Far East] were to add to technology administrative organization, production speed and production precision, they would be able to conquer many of the markets of the world; and they have conquered many of them.

In brief, we are now facing an influx of industry and humanity, even though Europe is facing an industrial influx only.

In some quarters of the cities of the Gulf an Arab would feel separated from his native country. The people are not his people, and the language that is being spoken is not his language. People from the Far East are everywhere, and their products are filling the exhibition halls.

Their success is indisputable; we face it with a determination to work and to pursue an uphill course regardless of the obstacles.

This is an inescapable race which requires us to reconsider the investment of our capital and the preparation of our young people.

One can draw a line from Mauritania in the farthest western point of the Arab world to the Gulf in the eastern part of the Arab world; one can continue walking to the shores of east Africa, visit the non-Arab Islamic world in Asia and try to look for the calm areas of production and technology which direct not all of their

energies to production, but at least more than 50 percent of their energies to it; one can try to write in a list in front of one an account of the bilateral and regional struggles, the civil wars and their local and foreign resources; one can try--merely try--to consider the bloodshed, the destruction and the verbal war and to compare what is happening in the Arab and Islamic world with what is happening around one in any group of countries in the world one chooses. The conclusion one comes to is evident: we are destroying ourselves, and the world around us is progressing and building.

Maligned Islam

In the midst of this we find ourselves not lacking in those who are trying to lay all or part of the blame on Islam. It is as though Islam were responsible for what is happening to the Islamic world.

Something of this nature took place in the Intellectual Creativity Symposium.

Some people spent their efforts "coming up with accusations against Islam." Some people went so far as to say that if we were free from all or part of Islam, we would be able to go foreward.

Let us cite examples of these statements which are not new. Such statements have been made by a few orientalists and by those who profess to be Muslims. Among the statements they made was, "Islam advocates advancement to what is worse."

How?

They said so on the strength of a statement made by the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation:

"The most charitable among you are my contemporaries; they are followed by those who come after them and by those who come after those."

The statement is authentic, and it is related by Muslim and attributed to 'Umran Ibn Hasin.

Before I turn to an analysis of this statement, I would like to say that the point of the dialogue is not to suppress the other opinion. It is the right of every lecturer, commentator or writer to express his point of view. A dialogue is a cooperative effort. It is not like bees in a beehive that we come to symposiums, with all of us building unalterable and unchangeable hexagonal cells. We are not in a position to dictate an opinion or to accept an opinion without proof.

May God have mercy on the soul of al-Kindi, Islam's philosopher, when he said, "We ought to be ashamed of preferring the truth and acquiring it, even if it were to come from races that are remote from us and nations that oppose us. No one is more worthy of the truth than the truth seeker. The truth ought not to be disregarded or belittled by the one who speaks it or the one who brings it. No one's worth is diminished by the truth; the truth rather confers distinction on everybody."

Perhaps the end of the age of the orthodox caliphs and the fact that power was transferred to the Umayyads may have increased people's sense of injustice and pessimism. We read something to that effect in the treatise of al-Jahiz, "Al-Nabitah." Al-Jahiz thinks that Islam went through a monotheistic period, a period of dissolution, and then a period of godlessness.

Al-Jahiz was a follower of the theological school, al-Mu'tazilah, which introduced speculative dogmatism into Islam, and he has 'Abbasid inclinations. What he has in mind by the three stages are the age of the Prophet and the period of the orthodox caliphate until the death of 'Uthman, which marks the beginning of the dissolution. Godlessness comes with the advent of the Umayyads."

Imam 'Ali, may God honor him, resisted this dissolution, and the matter ended with his death and the demise of the orthodox caliphate. Abu Bakr al-Tartushi writes in "Saraj al-Muluk" [the Light of Kings] (540 Hegira-520 Hegira), "Today, the best of times is gone forever, and what remains is the worst. Death today is a boon for every Muslim."

Among recent orientalists we read [accounts] about this by Massignon and Louis Gardet. A summary of this opinion was mentioned in the book by Dr Fahmi Jad'an, "The Principles of Progress as Seen by Islamic Thinkers in the Modern Arab World" (Beirut, 1979); and in the book, "Studies in Islam" (Dar al-Farabi, 1980). [The latter] has a study by Professor Mahmud Amin al-'Alim on the notion of time as perceived by Islamic thinkers. Appended to the study is a bibliography on the same subject.

"The Most Charitable among You Are My Contemporaries"

Let us mention the statement in full.

"The most charitable among you are my contemporaries; they are followed by those who come after them and by those who come after those. After them will come people who profess to be Muslims but who will not die for Islam; people who betray and who cannot be trusted; people who make solemn pledges and do not fulfill them. It is in those that surfeit appears."

Let us begin by defining the notion of "qirn" [translated] "contemporaries."

In the Arabic language dictionary the term, "al-qirn al-ummah," [translated] "nation of contemporaries," comes after "al-ummah" [translated] "nation." It's been said that a [qarn] lasts 10 years, and it's been said that it lasts from 20 to 100 years. The term, "al-qirn," is derived from al-iqtiran. The dictionary's editor quotes al-Azhari, whose importance to our subject is considerable, as saying, "What is recorded here, and God is all-knowing, is that the term, "al-qirn," refers to the people of every period during which there was a prophet or a class of scientists, regardless of the number of years of that period. The evidence for this lies in the statement by the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, 'The most charitable among you are my contemporaries'—he means my disciples; 'they are followed by those who come after them'—he means the followers—'and then by those who come after those'—he means those who learned about Islam from the followers."

If we are seeking a current term that is close to the notion conveyed by the term, "al-qirn" in that statement, that term would be "generation." Not the whole generation, but only those who learned about the religion directly from the prophet and who formed with him the first community in al-Madinah. What is being referred to is a group of people who live together and whose actions are similar in a given period of time.

In this light the notion of "al-qarn" as a term denoting 100 years is refuted completely, and so is the [notion of] population inclusiveness which divides the world of Islam in its entirety and keeps nothing but the faithful community of al-Madinah.

Let us take another step so we can see the relationship between this statement which is attributed to the Prophet and legislation. Imam Ibn Taymiyah says in his study, "The Authenticity of the Faith of the People of al-Madinah" (Collection of Legal Opinions 20: 294-305):

"Al-Madinah is the place to which the chosen prophet immigrated. In it God set down for His Prophet the canons and laws of Islam. The faith of its people during the time of the disciples, the followers and their followers (3 centuries) is the soundest faith of all the people of Islamic cities in the East and the West in its principal and secondary tenets. These three ages are the ages of the three preferred generations which the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was referring to when he said, 'The most charitable among you are my contemporaries.'"

The criticism in the statement was directed at the qualities of dissemblers and at the affluence evident in the Prophet's statement, "It is in those that surfeit appears."

Ibn Taymiyah says, "None of the Muslim scholars concluded that the consensus of the people of any city justifed the fact that what they had agreed to was to be followed by people in another city either in those ages or the ages that followed them. The discussion is about their consensus in those preferred ages. After that the people agreed that the consensus of the people of a city was no justification." He ended there.

The question for Ibn Taymiyah in this statement is a legislative one. It is linked with a specific area in a distant time. This legislative perspective on the statement follows the linguistic one that has already been reviewed.

Other Standards for Progress

Other standards for progress become evident if we were to consider the following three statements by the Prophet.

1. "Among my fears for you after my time is fear of the one who will show you the prosperity and splendor of the world. He will not bring goodness to you by evil. What causes things to grow also kills by surfeit or consumes [one]--"al-habat" is surfeit of food which is a sensation of sickness from overeating, and

"yalim" means approaches death. This wealth is like beautiful foliage. Anyone who takes what is rightfully his and uses it rightfully is the best of helpers; and anyone who takes of this wealth without being rightfully entitled to it is like one who eats and is never satisfied. He will have witnesses to testify against him on the Day of Resurrection." This is narrated by al-Bukhari and by Muslim who attributed it to Abu Sa'id al-Khadari.

2. "What I wish is that the [land of the] Persians and the Romans be conquered for you and that the world would flow to you. May you receive so much bread and so much meat that the name of God would not be mentioned over much of it." [As published] This was narrated by al-Tabarani and attributed to 'Abdallah ibn Yusr.

3. "How are you faring if one of you leaves with one suit of clothing and comes back in another? How would you be faring if one sheet were to be placed in his hands and another taken away? How would you be faring if you were to cover your homes as you do the Kaaba [in Mecca]? You are better off today than you were then." This was narrated by al-Tirmidhi and attributed to 'Ali.

The three statements indicate growth in the following areas: the broadening of Islam's territory; the increase in general revenue and in per capita income; the availability of plant and animal foods--and this is reflected in people's weight; and the spread of luxury in food, clothing and shelter.

All or most of these factors are considered indications of a prosperous society. This is what all contemporary societies are seeking.

Let us ponder the statement about wealth that the Prophet made, may God bless him and grant him salvation: "Anyone who takes what is rightfully his and uses it rightfully is the best of helpers." The Prophet described wealth in terms of beautiful foliage.

Does Islam Advocate Progress?

What is important in the Prophetic Tradition is self-control in front of money, food and one's craving for clothing, shelter and appearances. It is important that what one earns is earned legitimately and that one spends it legitimately as well.

Can we say that the area of the Islamic world in the age of the chosen prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was more charitable than the area of the Islamic world after the conquests in 'Umar's age? Can we say that the area of the Islamic world in the age of the orthodox caliphs was more charitable than that in another age?

Charity here is qualitative. It pertains to legislation once; to area one time; to the number of Muslims one time; and to general income [another] time with a word of caution against the dangers of affluence. This is not absolute charity. If it were that it would disown scientific and cultural progress and the Islamic efforts that were made following the age of the prophets.

What remains in people's hearts is a feeling of gratitude for the Prophet's generation which had among its first responsibilities those tremendous responsibilities of spreading Islam. The hope still remains that there will be new horizons of "charity" in subsequent generations, and we see that in the meaning of the Prophet's statement, may God bless him and grant him salvation:

"My people are like the rain. One does not know whether the goodness comes at the outset or in the end." This was narrated by al-Tirmidhi and attributed to Uns.

This meaning used to rage in the hearts of the disciples, and the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation speaks about it. Let us read together this dialogue that is narrated by Imam Ahmad in his account of Abu Jum'ah, one of the disciples: "We ate with the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and Abu 'Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah was with us. He said, 'O Messenger of God, is there one among us who is better than the rest? We all adopted Islam with you, and we all fought with you.' He said, 'Yes, those people who will come after you and who will believe in me even though they have not seen me.'"

Charity here is caused by faith--despite the gap in time and place. The first Muslims have the charity of being the prophet's associates and of paving the way for all those who came after them.

This is sufficient for discussing the matter of "progressing towards the worse" and analyzying the statement that "the most charitable among you are my contemporaries." From the perspective of one of the other statements by the Prophet progress can be made on many horizons for which we have to make an effort. "Their Lord answers them, saying: 'I will deny no man or woman among you the reward of their labors. You are the offspring of one another' (The Imrans: 195). There were other questions that were discussed in the symposium. I hope there will be an opportunity in the future to consider them.

8592
CSO: 4304/80

'AFP' REPORTS ARREST OF AFGHAN EXTREME LEFTISTS

BK121611 Hong Kong AFP in English 1519 GMT 12 Aug 81

[Text] Islamabad, 12 Aug (AFP)--Afghan authorities have arrested 275 people over the last two weeks in a crackdown aimed principally at extreme leftist elements, Western diplomats said here today.

The start of the drive coincided with the return of Afghan President Babrak Karmal from a 5-week trip to the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, where he mixed official business with medical checkups.

The diplomats said that Afghan security forces had made massive arrests of militants of the Maoist group Chalai-i-Jawi (eternal flame) including its leader Osman Landai.

Official Afghan media also announced the execution of six prisoners who the diplomats say may have been extreme leftist militants already in custody when Moscow sent its troops into the country in December of 1979.

Seventeen other people were sentenced to 1 to 16 years in prison last week, sources in Kabul reported. But they were unable to provide any details of the mass arrests in the Afghan capital.

Meanwhile, diplomatic sources in Islamabad reported intense military activity north of Kabul, mostly in the Parwan region.

They said Afghan rebels have evacuated families from the Paghman area 20 km from the capital in anticipation of a government attack. But Afghan-Soviet troops appear to have moved further north, ignoring the Mujahedeen positions around Paghman for the moment.

The government forces have pounded towns and villages in the provinces around Kabul with shellfire since Friday, presumably in reprisal for residents' support of the rebels, the diplomats said.

CSO: 4600/127

PREDICAMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION ANALYZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 81 pp 1, 5

[Review by Andre Fontaine of book "Rapport sur la resistance afghane" [Report on the Afghan Resistance] by Gerard Chaliand, Editions Berger-Levrault, 163 pages, approximately 29.90 Fr.]

[Text] On 27 December 1979, crossing for the first time since the Second World War the boundaries of the sphere of influence then recognized as belonging to the USSR, the Red Army invaded Afghanistan. Since then it has come up against a resistance the size and effectiveness of which are the cause in the West of the most contradictory news reports. Gerard Chaliand, who since 1964 has scarcely stopped crisscrossing guerrilla zones, from Vietnam to Colombia by way of the Near East and Africa, has twice gone to investigate on the spot on behalf of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London.

With him the word "investigate" takes on all its true meaning. For, unlike so many others who in their "investigations" only seek confirmation of their Manichean biases, Chaliand forms his conclusions only after he has seen and understood. It is this that provides the exceptional interest of this "Rapport sur la resistance afghane," in which everything is said in 157 pages, not only about the resistance, but about Afghanistan and the invader's strategy.

As the author reminds us, since the middle of the 19th century Afghanistan has been a "buffer state;" the Soviet intervention those broke up a de facto situation. This is enough to enable one to believe with him that it constitutes not only "a step in the slow erosion of the adversary positions every time circumstances lend themselves to it," but also "the catalyst for the end of an epoch, the epoch of detente."

The existence of the buffer state in question was the result of a compromise between two empires, the Czarist and the British, which were determined to have no contact at any point. It did not correspond to any geopolitical reality, each of the various ethnic groups living on both sides of the borders and the countries being cut down the middle by the high Indu-Kuch barrier.

The main problem in this arid land has always been water. Because it had not been solved, the agrarian reform decided upon in 1978 by the Stalinists of the Khalq was doomed to failure. Conducted with clumsiness and brutality, it made no small contribution to the popular uprising. The socialist regime in Kabul would have been overthrown, there is no doubt about it, if the USSR had not come to its aid, getting

away to begin with, with liquidating its head, Hafizullah Amin, Kabul's Pol Pot. And there is a similarity between the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Vietnamese intervention in Kampuchea, and it is rather too bad that Chaliand did not show this.

As in so many other circumstances, the law of entropy, as defined by Francois Jacob in "The Logic of the Living" as it concerns the molecule, fully applies here: "The change from order to disorder under the influence of a calculable chance." The monarchical regime had put the fox in the chicken coop by giving the USSR a primary role in foreign trade, drawing up the five-year plan and training officers. After its fall in 1973, following a famine that was itself due to the drought, Prince Daoud, who had become president of the Republic, is first supported on the left and then seeks to get rid of it, going as far as to have some of its leaders arrested, at a time when the economic situation was again deteriorating. The result is the coup d'etat mounted by the communists--the "hard-line" communists of the Khalq and the more "moderate" communists of the Parcham, who were temporarily reconciled with each other. But the former quickly brought about the elimination of the latter, who will only return to power, with Babrak Karmal, in the wagons of the Soviet invader. Meanwhile Afghanistan will have experienced general insurrection and ferocious repression.

Eighteen months after the invasion began, the Soviets are controlling, with no great difficulty, the cities and the large major highways. Their formidable armored helicopters have played a part in depopulating the border regions, hundreds of thousands of peasants having fled to Pakistan. Thus there has been created, all around the country, a no man's land that is not easily crossed by the members of the underground.

The social base from which the occupiers and the regime get their support is weak, despite indisputable social, economic and cultural efforts. But, although the resistance is "massively supported" by the population, it is terribly broken up, and lacks nearly everything: masterminds, weapons, strategy, middle-level cadres. The losses being sustained by the invader are far less than the fantastic estimates that are periodically echoed by the dispatches, particularly those coming from Delhi, would lead us to believe.

Taking into the feebleness of the Western reactions, the causes of which Chaliand analyzes with perspicacity, the USSR can estimate that it has time on its side and that one day it will succeed in making Afghanistan a new Mongolia: a protectorate closely integrated with its empire. The strategic advantage it draws from this is considerable here and now, to the extent that it is getting closer to the Gulf, and is "in an ideal position to exert an influence on the regional equilibrium of the forefront of Asia."

Must we give up and let the inevitable happen? This is not Chaliand's opinion. The "reformist policy in the Third World," whose necessity he affirms, only has a chance, in his opinion, if "the Soviet Union and its strategy are vigorously countered." Hence his conclusion that what is required if the Afghan resisters are not to be helped, is "a great deal of pusillanimity or more or less voluntary blindness." It is in the general interest that the boa [constrictor] not be able to believe it is assured, in any location whatsoever, of a tranquil digestion.

8946
CSO: 4619/26

SOVIETS BOMB OWN, AFGHAN TROOPS AT DEH BALA

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 26 Jul 81 p 3

[Text] Russian bombers have killed about 60 Afghan militia at Deh Baala, 40 Km south of Jalalabad headquarter of Nangarhar province. These bombers had come for the protection of this very Afghan militia and Russian soldiers. According to the delayed reports received by the Agency Afghan Press, Russian and Afghan troops had camped at Deh Baala in the hills. At night Syed Muneer Baacha Ulaswal (sub-divisional administrator) who had earlier crossed over to the Mujahideen, along with some freedom-fighters, went for a survey of Russian troops position and reached near a tank. He peeped into the tank and found no soldier in it. He took out two Clashen Kov, four light machine-guns and bullets magazine from the tank.

The next night, a group led by Muneer Baacha on one side, a group led by Farooq Jan on another side and the third group led by a religious leader, headed towards the Russian camps. Muneer Baacha, also a rocket launcher expert, attacked the same tank from which he had seized arms. Later, the tank was destroyed. Muneer Baacha then destroyed another tank. The sound and fury of firing awakened the Russian soldiers asleep in their barbed-wire protected tents. In a huff, they started firing on all sides. But the Mujahideen, who already lay in wait did not allow the invaders to take positions and attacked them with their home-made guns and the weapons snatched from the Russians. The unnerved Russian soldiers took to their heels. On the other side, Farooq Jan had also destroyed one tank. In the morning, when the Mujahideen surveyed the Russian tents, they counted 35 dead bodies left behind by the fleeing soldiers. But at midday, the Russian planes bombed villages, resulting in the death of about 15 women, children and old men besides a large number of cattle. The village folk had taken refuge in a nearby fortress.

On the third day, the Mujahideen attacked the same place where the Russians had camped again. Exchange of firing continued for the whole night. Russian planes bombed again at 10 a.m. the next day. This firing was far more intense. There was dust all around. The bombing gave rise to a blinding dust-storm in which the Russians and the Mujahideen could not see each other. But Russian planes continued indiscriminately. The Mujahideen, with great difficulty, took shelter at different places. In the morning, when they came out of their shelters, they saw Russian and Afghan soldiers' bodies strewn all over the place. They were victims of the bombing of their own planes and stray dogs were feasting over their bodies.

CSO: 4600/128

'BBC' CORRESPONDENT ON AFGHANISTAN FIGHTING

TA121533 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 12 Aug 81

[From "Radio Newsreel"]

[Text] Reports continue to filter from Afghanistan of the Soviet Union difficulties in pacifying the Afghan resistance. Sources across the border in Pakistan speak of further Soviet military moves against the rebels and there are more indications of the extent of territory said to be under guerrilla control. Reporting from Islamabad with the latest details, here is Alexander Thompson:

[Begin recording] According to sources used by Western diplomats reprisals against guerrillas and guerrilla supporters north of Kabul are continuing. Yesterday and the day before, Soviet armored column was seen moving north of Kabul and there was speculation that the objective was the Panjshir Valley which remains under guerrilla control. Diplomats in Islamabad say the size of the column would indicate that a major military operation was underway. There has also been increased military activity in Kabul itself with more Soviet and government troops on the streets backed up by tanks and armoured cars. A diplomat here said it seems the army was put on the alert but it is not clear exactly why. In the past week firing heard on the outskirts of Kabul is reported to have increased. Assassinations in the capital have also continued. A few days ago the director of personnel in the Political Directorate of the Ministry of National Defense is said to have been killed as he was leaving his house in the suburbs. Other reports reaching Islamabad quote a particularly well placed source as saying that, to all intents and purposes, the government has lost control of the three northeastern provinces of Nangarhar, Laghman and Konar. It said they only have a certain hold on the three provincial capitals where the government's presence is largely symbolic. The day-to-day running of the area is firmly in the hands of the resistance. Meanwhile, the government is continuing to have difficulties in recruiting men for its armed forces. They are said now to be concentrating on members of the ruling People's Democratic Party who belong to the Khalq faction. [End recording]

CSO: 4600/127

'BBC' REPORTS INTENSE FIGHTING

TA120640 London BBC World Service in English 0600 GMT 12 Aug 81

[From "Radio Newsdesk"]

[Text] More reports have been filtering through to Pakistan on clashes between the Soviet and Afghan Government troops on the one side and the Afghan rebels on the other. They speak of reprisal raids by the forces backing President Babrak Karmal against rebel positions in towns and villages near Kabul. Alexander Thomson has been listening to the latest reports to reach Islamabad:

[Begin Thomson recording] Resistance activity in the area around Kabul is reported to have been particularly intense over the past few weeks with attacks on the Salang highway, which links Kabul with the Soviet Union. According to reports, the Russians decided that guerrillas and guerrilla supporters in the area should be punished. Western diplomats say the reprisals began last Thursday with an attack on the town of (Kolatan), about 25 km north of the capital, by armored units supported by helicopter gunships and MiG-21's. On Friday, the towns of (Siraye Kuaja) and Jabal os Saraj are said to have been hit and a number of houses in the two towns were destroyed by tanks and, according to reports, the tanks sent ploughed up orchards and wheat fields to deprive local guerrillas of their source of food and to punish their supporters. Casualties in the attacks are not specified, but they are reported to have been high. Reports seem to be backed up by eyewitnesses at Kabul airport, who say they saw a steady stream of helicopter gunships heading north during the period involved returning frequently to be rearmed. [End recording]

CSO: 4600/127

'BBC' REPORTS REBEL ACTIVITIES IN KABUL

TA061548 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 6 Aug 81

[From "Radio Newsreel"]

[Text] In the year and a half since Soviet troops moved into Afghanistan, there have been frequent reports of sustained resistance to their presence and the Afghan Government they are supporting. Attacks on Soviet troops and Afghan Government soldiers have been reported both from the provinces and the Afghan capital, Kabul. The Dutch journalist, Arnow van Lindon, has just spent 10 weeks inside Afghanistan with the Mojahedin guerrillas and his report indicates extensive resistance inside Kabul itself. Van Lindon has now crossed into Pakistan, from where he sent this account:

[Begin Van Lindon recording] It has been on the third morning after my arrival in the Paghman region just north of the Afghan capital, Kabul, that I had woken to find the room filled by what turned out to be officers of the Afghan regular army. It was a Friday, their day off, and dressed in civilian clothes they had made the 10-mile journey to see the rebel commander, whom I was accompanying, and pledge their allegience to him and his cause.

Almost immediately, they had offered to do what I had discounted as the impossible journalist's dream--to take me into the capital, into the nerve center of Soviet control in Afghanistan and put me up there for a number of days. My instant enthusiasm had however faded as more than 4 weeks passed without the visit becoming a reality. Then, now 2 weeks ago, I was finally told that everything was in order. That night a group of eight Mojahedin took me to the house of one of the officers--a captain--on the outskirts of the city: nervous 3-hour walk, in which we repeatedly had to dodge Russian units guarding various roads and paths leading into the capital. The next morning with a captain hardly recognizable in his dirt-green uniform and peaked cap and sitting in the back of an Afghan army jeep, I was driven into Kabul, stopping on the way only to pick up a full colonel also in on the plot. We drove right across to the spread-out city--a drive some 20 minutes. The officers were tense to say the least, but their presence and the fact that we were in an army vehicle meant we were waved straight through at three mixed Russian and Afghan checkpoints we encountered. The tension, which was matched by that of the civilians in whose house I spent the next 6 days, was understandable, for if at any moment anyone had guessed our real identity, these men would without a shadow of doubt been sentenced to death. The civilians with whom I sayed were all government officials--men working at one or other of the ministries during the day that engaged in

what can only be described as urban guerrilla warfare during the evenings. Like their army counterparts, they were all members of one of the four major Afghan rebel parties, the [word indistinct] faction of Hezb-e Eslami, all under stringent orders from the commander in Paghman not to leave their posts to openly join the insurgents but rather to further weaken the Marxist regime from within. Although only allowed out on the streets in the comparative safety of the army chief, the visit did give me a clear view of antigovernment activity in the one place where it is considered to be almost impossible. Maximum secrecy and care are taken at all times, but I was shown significant arms caches mainly of small arms and primitive explosives, and told that most of the actions were done by two-man assassination teams using pistols. How effective the groups are it is hard to say. Certainly there are confirmed reports of several assassinations of Communist Party members each week, but above all they give the Mojahedin a well organized and a widespread armed web of supporters within the apparatus of the government they are fighting against.

Arnow van Lindon, BBC, on his return in Islamabad. [End recording]

CSO: 4600/127

PLANS FOR AFGHAN MOBILE RADIO NETWORK REVEALED

AU071534 Rome ANSA in English 1507 GMT 7 Aug 81

[Excerpt] Rome, 7 Aug (ANSA)--A group of Italian and French intellectuals rounded out by Soviet dissidents are preparing to leave Rome to begin a mission of setting up a mobile radio network in the service of Afghan rebel forces battling the Soviet troops of occupation.

The idea of a free radio network for the Afghan rebels originates with Henri Bernard Levy, one of the major figures among the new French philosophers, and was enthusiastically received by members of the human rights committee, one of whom is Renzo Rossellini, president of the Italian movie studio Gaumount Italia and managing director of Citta Futura. Citta Futura was one of the first privately-owned radio stations to begin broadcasting in Rome.

Also Rossellini is getting ready to go to Afghanistan.

He said here that he intends to make the trip "to set up the first transmitters and get into contact with the rebel forces.

"We became aware that one of the first effects of the Soviet military invasion," of December 1979, "was the takeover of the information media. The only source is Soviet military information, which is devious, and has the single goal of disseminating propaganda," he said.

"The blocks outside connections and information on what is happening in the country. That is, every force fighting in a valley in the patriotic struggle thinks it is the only rebel force and is unaware that there is another fight in the next valley, that there is an insurrection," the young filmmaker, son of late Italian director Roberto Rossellini, said.

Rossellini confidently predicted that, "Afghanistan Free Radio will be a reality with a month."

CSO: 4600/127

TENSION 'RISING' BETWEEN SOVIET, AFGHAN TROOPS

BK051240 Hong Kong AFP in English 1213 GMT 5 Aug 81

[Text] Islamabad, 5 Aug (AFP)--Tension and bad feeling is rising between Soviet and Afghan troops fighting the Muslim resistance in Afghanistan, Western diplomats (?here) said today.

Quoting reliable sources in Kabul, diplomats said that the chief of an Afghan army unit posted near the Pakistani border in Konarha Province recently went to the capital to complain to his seniors about an uncooperative attitude shown by the Soviet command.

Relations worsened during the Soviet-Afghan operation launched three weeks ago with the aim of winning back areas seized from the Afghan army by insurgents over previous months, the sources said.

A Soviet unit which confronted rebel forces was granted Soviet air back-up but the same aid was refused to Afghan Government troops, who consequently suffered heavy losses, the sources said.

Another diplomatic source in Islamabad last week reported the "loss" in Konarha of two Afghan battalions, but was unable to establish the circumstances.

The malaise within the Afghan army had reached the Puli Sharki Military Academy in Kabul, diplomats said.

Some cadets were boycotting courses at the academy since 70 comrades were killed on July 14 when cadets were placed in the front line of a major offensive in the rebel-held Paghman region, diplomats said.

At the time, 200 cadets were said by diplomats here to have deserted and relatives of the victims invaded the military hospital to protest that "inexperienced youths were sent to their deaths".

Some of those still attending courses given by Soviet instructors could be "crypto-Muhajideen" learning military techniques before joining the resistance, according to one source described by the diplomats as excellent.

The situation in Kabul was reported calmer than usual over the past week because of ceremonies marking the end of the Islamic fasting period.
CSO: 4600/127

REBELS REPORTEDLY CONTROL PANJSHIR VALLEY

TA030719 London BBC World Service in English 0600 GMT 3 Aug 81

[From radio newsdesk]

[Text] Two French doctors who have been working in Afghanistan say one of the rebel groups opposing the government has complete control in the Panjshir Valley region about 40 miles north of Kabul. They said the rebels, members of the Jami'at-e Eslami, are making frequent attacks on Soviet troops. The doctors have now returned to Peshawar in Pakistan, from where Alexander Thomson sent this report:

[Begin Thomson recording] The doctors, who are members of the Paris-based "Aide Medicale Internationale," went to the Panjshir Valley with a mule train carrying medical supplies some 2 months ago. They say the Jami'at-e Eslami is fully entrenched and supported by virtually the entire population of the valley. They run military, educational and Islamic training centers and the French doctors were able to establish a hospital in the Mojahedin stronghold. There had been no doctors in the area for some 3 years and they had to train medical assistants from among the Mojahedin. They said that the Jami'at-e Eslami organized almost daily attacks against Soviet forces using trained guerrillas augmented by armed villagers. Their arms range from World War II Enfield rifles to rocket-launchers, bazookas and machine guns. They seldom seem short of ammunition or supplies. Much of these came from Soviet convoys, which had been ambushed and destroyed. The doctors said that during their stay, the Russians launched two major attacks at the mouth of the Panjshir Valley, but they were unable to penetrate Mojahedin-held territory. [end recording]

CSO: 4600/127

KARMAL REPORTEDLY CEDES WAKHAM PROVINCE TO USSR

Karachi DAWN in English 27 Jul 81 p 1

[Text]

LONDON, July 26: Mr Babrak Karmal has formally handed over documents on the annexation of the Wakhan area on the north-east of Afghanistan to Soviet President Brezhnev, it was authoritatively learnt by the Agency Afghan Press in Kabul.

Mr Karmal is presently on a visit to the Soviet Union and he presented the documents to the Soviet President at his holiday resort.

On June 28, an Afghan-Soviet delegation for the borders completed it project and the documents were recently delivered to both the administrations for signing. It is learnt that the recent unofficial visit of Mr Karmal to the Soviet Union was aimed at signing the agreement with the Kremlin as well as to ask for more military forces for protection of his faltering regime.

The sources told 'AAP' that they have learnt through the messages exchanged between Kabul and Moscow that the unofficial visit of Karmal was meant to hand over the affidavit on Wakhan stating it to be a part of the Soviet Union. The document was signed by Mr Brezhnev and Mr Karmal.

The agreement was signed with an objective to annex the most strategic area of Wakhan to the Soviet Union to cut off Afghanistan from China and to have direct borders with Pakistan.

Kabul Radio described the document as a "historic gift of Karmal". It was the second such historic incident" as on July 24, Mr Karmal presented a copy of the Wakhan affidavit to the Lenin Central Museum in Moscow as a meritorious service for October Revolution. The sources said that during his visit to the Museum he was shown the primary progress documents about Wakhan during Taraki and Amin regimes by the General Incharge of the Museum.

The sources believed that such agreement will not be acceptable to the followers of Khyber, an executed leader of the Parcham Faction. Khyber's faction is now led by Suleyman Laiaq, Bariq Shafiai and Nematuddin Tahseeb alongwith the army section of Khalq party such as Aslam Watanjar, Assadullah Sarwari, Syed Mohammad Gulabzoy and Shirjan Mazdooryar.

Kabul Radio announced yesterday that the Karmal administration has released 79 prisoners in Herat province who were opposed to the Karmal regime.

It was learnt that they belonged to the Khalq wing of the ruling party in Kabul.

The release followed their acceptance of the Soviet invasion as a "suitable action" due to historic needs of the communist regime of Kabul. Meanwhile, they will also obey the Karmal administration. Then they were released on the promise that they will now support the Soviets stay in Afghanistan.

CSO: 4600/128

BRIEFS

CUBAN AMBASSADOR ARRIVAL--Kabul, 10 Aug (BAKHTAR)--Manuel Pinadu Kazanova, the newly appointed ambassador of Cuba in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan arrived here for his new post today. He was received at the Kabul international airport by deputy for protocol department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and members of the Cuban Embassy in Kabul. [Text] [LD120420 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0415 GMT 11 Aug 81]

USSR TAKES OVER N.E. SALIENT--Srinagar--Soviet troops have completely taken over the wild and mountainous Wakham salient of northeastern Afghanistan bordered by the Soviet Union in the north, by Xinjiang China, in the east, and by the Gilgit area of Pakistani Kashmir in the south, according to reports reaching Srinagar. This follows an agreement between Moscow and Kabul transferring the salient, which is 10 to 25 miles wide, to the Soviet Union. Inhabitants of the Wakham salient are reported to have been sent into the interior of Pakistan. The area has apparently been turned into amilitary encampment with a string of emergency air-landing bases, Soviet troops and armour. The Afghan-Pakistani border is reported to have been sealed with mainly Russian-officered cantonments now being established all along it. China has strongly protested against the Wakhan take-over. [Text] [LD101450 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 10 Aug 81 p 4]

PHOSPHATE FERTILIZER--An agreement was concluded here today for the purchase of 20,000 tons of phosphate fertilizers between the Afghan Fertilizer Company and "Solyzpromexport" of the Soviet Union. On the basis of this agreement, the delivery of this triple super phosphate fertilizer will be completed in the third and fourth quarters of the current year. [Text] [LD130342 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0415 GMT 13 Aug 81]

CSO: 4600/127

CAPABILITIES OF PRESIDENT RAJA'I EVALUATED

London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 pp 2-3

[Article by Tim McGirk]

[Text]

THERE WAS never any question that fundamentalist Premier Mohammed Ali Rajai would become Iran's next president. Just before last Friday's general elections, marred by assassination attempts on the clergy and a wave of bombings throughout the country, all three other candidates announced that they would cast their ballot for Rajai. Soon 12.6m Iranians — more than 90 per cent of the voters — followed suit, sweeping the one-time country school teacher into the highest elected office of the land.

Rajai steps up to replace ex-President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, who was impeached six weeks ago for being politically 'incompetent' and driven into hiding with the Kurdish rebels. The fundamentalists, through their political apparatus, the Islamic Republican Party, now control the Majlis and the legislative, judicial and executive branches of the government, even though a bomb explosion at their Tehran party headquarters last June killed off 74 leading IRP members.

Although Rajai's victory was never in doubt, the actual voting count was surprisingly high. The centrist party of former Premier Mehdi Bazargan, along with several senior ayatollahs who deplore the violent reign of the fundamentalist government, urged followers to boycott the elections. In a message smuggled down from his hideout in the Kurdish mountains and circulated widely throughout Tehran, Tabriz, Ashad and Isfahan, Bani Sadr condemned the elections, as 'nothing but the continuation of a regime of terror, suffocation and killings. It has no prospects other than civil war.'

The Revolutionary Prosecutor's warning that anyone caught disrupting the election would be 'corrupt on earth' — a Quranic charge that carries the death penalty — failed to deter election day terrorism. Islamic-marxist guerrillas of the Mujaheddin killed 11 Revolutionary Guards stationed around Tehran's many polling booths. In Gilan province, two gunmen on a motorcycle pulled up to the governor-general's limousine and fired, wounding both the top provincial official and his bodyguard.

The fundamentalist authorities have executed more than 200 opponents in a government crackdown that has been going on since Bani Sadr was ousted. During the Friday elections, another 120 people were arrested in Tehran alone. Most of them are suspected Mujaheddin guerrillas, whose leader, Masoud Rajavi, has set up a 'National Council of Resistance' allied with the fugitive ex-President Bani Sadr.

In addition, at least 50 top Iranian military officers who served under the Shah

have set up headquarters in northeast Turkey, not far from the Iranian border. The pro-monarchists led by the former chief of staff, General Bahram Aryana, are reported to be fighting for the return to power of the Shah's son, Mohammed Reza, and aim to organise a series of armed uprisings against the fundamentalist government. It is doubtful whether the exiles command much following inside Iran today. Their opposition could only be effective, say observers, if they were to link up with Bani Sadr and the Mujaheddin. This possibility is remote.

Even within the fundamentalist party, not all clergymen and their ideas are cut from the same mullah's cloth. Known more for his devotion — Rajai often boasts that he has never read a book written by a non-Muslim — than for his administrative skill, the new president faces the difficult task of uniting the radical, pro-Moscow, wing of the IRP with the moderates who are pushing for a gradual increase in trade with the West.

CSO: 4600/130

NEW CENTRAL BANK CHIEF EXPLAINS HIS POSITION

London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 pp 38-39

[Text]

MOHSEN NOURBAKSH, the new governor of Iran's central bank, looks more like an earnest young technocrat than a member of the fundamentalist camp that dominates Iranian political life. Yet his revolutionary credentials must have been impeccable for him to take over what is arguably the most important single institution dealing with the economy. He replaced Alireza Nobari, who was appointed by Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, the former president.

Born in Tsfahan, a city whose businessmen and traders are legendary in Iran, Nourbaksh, at 33, is probably the youngest central banker in the world. He is a professional economist having studied first at Tehran University, and then in the US, where he gained his doctorate. The new governor is credited with research work on Islamic economics, inflation and the problems of unemployment.

'I am not an out-and-out monetarist,' he says. 'Money has its role, but it does not rule in the economy of a Third World country such as Iran.'

Nourbaksh said he could not give an exact figure for Iran's current oil exports, claiming that it varied from week to week, 'sometimes 700,000 b/d and sometimes over 1m b/d.' He was confident, however, that the target on which the budget is computed — an average of just above 1.3m b/d for this present year — would be met.

He believed there will be a general improvement in the oil market later in the year and that production cuts by the oil exporting countries will help 'normalise the market.' He was adamant that Iran would not cut prices to attract new customers as other producers have done.

Nourbaksh said that Iran's foreign exchange reserves had risen above $4bn but he would not say by how much. Some $1.5bn from the US Federal Reserve will be added to this figure 'within this week.'

Looking to the future, the governor agreed that one effect of reducing the money supply would be further to cut private sector activity. This would not, however, put up the rate of unemployment for there would be a compensating increase in state economic activity, he claimed. 'Our economic policy is in the direction of giving government the major role in the economy,' he said. The governor denied that any plans existed for a major devaluation of the currency.

Inflation, along with unemployment were two major concerns for the central bank, said Nourbaksh. Limiting the money supply was aimed at remedying the first of these. For the past two months, inflation has been rising at the rate of 2 per cent a month, and he said that a figure of some 30 per cent for the current year was being predicted.

●Six leading West German pharmaceutical companies, including Hoechst and Bayer the world's biggest drugs groups, are seeking compensation totalling DM 100m ($41m) from the Iranian government, which last year nationalised their local subsidiaries.

The companies and the West German Pharmaceuticals Industry Federation are now seeking help from Bonn in negotiating compensation.

CSO: 4600/130

VOLVO CONSIDERING NEW OPERATION IN IRAN

London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 p 38

[Text]

VOLVO may be about to resume operations in Iran, according to a report in the Stockholm daily, *Svenska Dagbladet*. Quoting Tehran sources, the paper said that the Swedish bus, truck and car company was negotiating with the National Iranian Industrial Organisation (NIIO) to renew its contract — broken off when the Shah was deposed — with the state-owned Zamyad Company, formerly an assembler of Volvo light trucks and Japanese Nissan pick-ups.

While the company has refused to comment on the newspaper report, a Volvo International spokesman told *8 Days*: 'There have been contacts with Iran since 1978 because we do have interests to watch there.'

According to the newspaper, Volvo personnel have inspected Zamyad's factory to assess the feasibility of a fresh start-up. Another company with similar aims in Iran is Talbot of the UK.

However, a Volvo manager visiting Tehran told *Svenska Dagbladet* that his team — allegedly the fourth to visit Iran since the revolution — was not there to talk about a contract, but to make 'technical controls' and see how intact the factory was. He added that any decision on eventual talks would be taken by Volvo International in Gothenburg.

Zamyad started assembling Volvo trucks in 1971. From 260 in the first year, output peaked at 1,800 in 1976. In the last year of operations, 1978, it touched 1,540. Multinational Volvo's lastest annual report shows that the Swedish group still has a 30 per cent stake in Dorman Diesel Iran, and an 8 per cent holding in the Rena Industrial Group Investment Company of Tehran. These are the only Middle East names on its list of manufacturing companies, subsidiaries and associated companies. Iran is not covered by the almost ubiquitous Volvo sales companies, and no longer appears in the table of direct exports from Volvo's Swedish factories.

Iran grew more than any other Swedish export market in 1980, with a 173 per cent leap over the previous year. The figure primarily reflects the volatile state of Iran: Sweden's exports to the country, around $202m in 1978, plummeted to $58m in 1979. Last year's figure, approaching $160m, represented only 0.6 per cent of total export revenue.

In the last three years Iran has been successively 19th, 44th and 24th in Sweden's export table, in marked contrast with the stability of the leading Middle East outlet, Saudi Arabia, which was 14th, 12th and again 12th.

CSO: 4600/130

CRISES DEPLORED BY MUSLIM WEEKLY

Draconian Methods

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 30 Jul 81 p 6

[Text]

AS IRAN moves from crisis to crisis, the threat to its viability and integrity grows more serious. The mini general election following the ouster of President Banisadr and the ghastly bomb blast that destroyed the IRP headquarters, necessitating more than fifty bye-elections for vacant Majlis seats, has not brought, nor was it expected to, any hope of reconciliation among the country's squabbling armed factions. Although the ruling party has, according to the results declared, won hands down in the polls, with the voting age reduced to 15 years in order to provide the new President Ali Rajai evidence of greater numerical support, its satisfaction over the electoral victory is mitigated by a number of unhappy developments. Banisadr, having joined hands with the Mujahideen, issued an appeal that not only asked the Iranian people to boycott the official elections but suggested that they prepare themselves for electing a parallel Majlis which would be the real repository of the people's power and genuine protector of the Islamic Revolution. As a result, throughout the election campaign violent clashes took place and a few dozen partisans, including at least one authorised presidential candidate, were killed. Following the polls, Banisadr has described the election as a part of the ruling party's campaign of terror and has given a call for setting up a Council of Resistance which sounds ominously like an invitation to civil war.

Whether or not the ex-President's appeal for an all-out struggle against the regime meets with the response he expects, it is clear that Iran has lost a great deal of the unity and cohesion it had acquired during the struggle against the Shah's regime. It is certainly not enough for the country's present rulers to declare from time to time that any one who opposes their policies is either a foreign agent or a stooge of the royal family. It is probably true that agents of all sorts are functioning in the country, and that they are taking full advantage of Iran's many unsolved problems to foster chaos and anarchy. But what is far more relevant is that the unity forged during the struggle for liberation has

been frittered away by the failure to weld together the various groups that formed the broad national front that made the people's victory possible. Lack of tolerance, the ease with which political fatwas were declared on sectarian bases, the lack of civil liberties and use of draconian methods to suppress dissent, and the revolutionary regime's inability to cope with growing economic problems, have all added to the prevailing confusion and discontent. Similarly, the failure of Iran's rulers to deal on a rational basis with the problem of Iran's ethnic minorities has not only brought the country to the verge of civil war on many occasions, but has provided the ruling party's opponents with safe havens from where they can plan and launch their political—and not only political—attacks against the Tehran Government.

Although the latest crisis brings to Iran its most critical year, it should still be possible to save the country from the danger of destabilisation. To achieve this, Ayatollah Khomeini who, despite the events of recent months, enjoys a great deal of power and influence, must emerge as a national leader who is above partisan factions. He must provide firm guidelines to prevent the implementation of policies that have caused deep rifts not only among the ruling elite but among various sections of the people. State institutions must be made to work and the ad hocism of the last two years must be overcome. Then, all institutions must be democratised and the ruling party circumscribed by laws and rules. Above all else, the Imam must guarantee the rule of law and curb the activities of armed groups which seem to have acquired the right to arrest, detain or even execute people without proper charge or trial. Such methods of State-patronised terror can only encourage further strife and violence. It seems dangerously plain that, unless Iran's present rulers can acquire the vision needed to evolve plans that will allow for national reconciliation among the country's political factions and its various nationality groups, friends of Iran will have good grounds for feeling deep concern for the country's future.

Plight of Mujahedin

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 30 Jul 81 pp 15, 16

[Article by Suroosh Irfani: "Slaying the Blossoms of the Revolution"]

[Text]

"THE MOTHERS of the Mujahideen have taught their children to destroy the palaces of despotism, the slavery of imperialism, to declare the dawn of Touhid in human society"—Mrs Rezai, the mother, four of whose children, members of the Mujahideen-i-Khalq, were executed.

Their crime was that they had demonstrated against the dismissal of Banisadr from his post as President of the nation. The Islamic judge who sentenced them—Ayatullah Muhammadi Gilani—did not even know who they were. The twelve girls, the oldest 18, the others under 16, refused to identify themselves in court. When Gilani asked their names, each in turn replied 'Mujahid'. To the question 'child of?' each replied 'the people of Iran'. Gilani solved the problem of identifying the girls by having them photographed. Then he consigned them to the firing squad.

Islamic Guards led the dozen girls to the court- yard of Evin Prison in Tehran. The oldest was clad in a black flowing chadar, the traditional Muslim veil. The others wore dark scarves. As the Guards began to blindfold them, the girls started chanting, "Death to fascism! !"

Three days later, the clergy controlled *Ettela'at* printed the girls' pictures with a terse message asking the parents to call for the bodies. The parents should bring, the Paper said, "a birth certificate bearing their (the girls') pictures." At a Press conference, Gilani defended the trials and executions of the girls. "By the Islamic canon," he said, " a nine-year old girl is mature. So there is no difference for us between a nine-year-old girl and a 40 year-old man."

The above account, describing the execution of 12 female members of the Mujahideen-i-Khalq, the progressive Islamic organisation leading the current wave of opposition against the fundamentalist clergy, was printed in the July 6 edition of *Time*. What the American magazine did not report was the fact that among the last words the Mujahideen girls shouted before they were silenced by the firing squad, were "Allah-o-Akbar! Down with Imperialism! Down with Reaction!"—slogans which were a living echo of the words every Mujahid urban guerilla had shouted when brought for execution before the firing squads of the Pahlavi dictatorship during 1968-1977.

No reason why

The girls executed three weeks ago in Tehran prison saw no reason for revealing their personal identities. Each of them was a Mujahid. God's guerilla, who had totally devoted herself in sacred striving for the cause of God, the absolute idea of freedom and perfection. On the social plane, their jehad "represents the struggle against all those forces obstructing the evolutionary flow of man and society". For the Mujahideen, these counter-evolutionary forces which must be effaced from society are dictatorship, imperialism, reaction, and exploitation. Without the elimination of these evils, the social conditions for unfolding man's spiritual side will not arise. Only in a classless society based on Divine Unity would mankind attain its mission of divine vicegerency.

A 'Muttaqi'

The Mujahid-i-Khalq is a 'muttaqi', one who practices 'taqwa' through a revolutionary renunciation of all material and self-centred attachments, including the love for one's life: "You will not attain unto taqwa until you forego that for which you love" (Al-Imran; 92). Thus he guards the trust given to man by God by remaining free from his own selfish desires and persevering in the fight for justice. According to Ali Shariati, the Mujahideen's teacher, a 'muttaqi' is a responsible rebel. "He is a *rebel* because he has ceased to be a passive recipient of all the values, standards, norms, thought system, mode of life, and morals that society feeds the individual with. He is *responsible* because he feels that many customs, norms, modes of thought and values of his society are redundant, yet they are being perpetuated in the form of dogma and for the sake of preserving the *status quo*. Knowing fully well the falsity of many of the values and standards prevailing in his society, often disguised under the banner of Truth, he decides to do something about breaking the chains of force which are binding the minds and souls of the people. Like Ibrahim, the Mujahid rises to break the idols of dogma, fossils of the past which have blocked the way for the emergence of Truth and the unfolding of the creative impulse of life." Because the Mujahid fears God alone, he is free of all fears, such as fear of demigods and dictators.

A reminder

This feal is a reminder to the Mujahid of his responsibility for changing unjust and anti-evolutionary social conditions in a progressive direction. In this battle, victory belongs to those who show initiative, who gain maturity through hardship and suffering. Like Iqbal, the Mujahideen believe that "the essence of *Touhid* as a working principle" in human organisation is "equality, brotherhood and solidarity". The object of the Islamic State is to transform the ethical and spiritual content of Islam into working principles in society, to reflect "the unity of God in the unity of mankind". The issue of private property from the point of view of Touhid becomes irrelevant because ownership in its absolute sense belongs to God alone—every capacity and aptitude in man, all material wealth and spiritual strength, are a trust which God has given man to be employed for social evolution and growth. One could compare the Touhidi classless society of the Mujahid to the human body in which each of its billions of cells is engaged in its characteristic work, taking neither more nor less than its needs (for that would lead to disease and destroy the body) from the distribution system (which is blood in this case), circulated equally throughout the body by the heart.

The Mujahideen's ideology did not develop in the leisurely retreat of secure libraries and dogmatic discourses. It evolved through a dialectical interplay of their social and spiritual struggle against dictatorship, imperialism, reaction, and exploitation, on the battlefield of life. Because of the attraction of the young generation of Muslims to the Mujahideen's revolutionary Islamic ideology, the fundamentalist professional clergy branded the Mujahideen as "worse than kafirs (infidels) worse than Marxists". However, for progressive Ayatollahs like Taleqani, the Mujahideen are 'devout pupils of the Quran' who opened the way for the Islamic Revolution. Jean Paul Sartre once remarked that were he ever to choose a religion, it would be the faith of Dr. Ali Shariati, the French-educated revolutionary Islamic thinker, who provided much of the ideological context for the Mujahideen's revolutionary redefinition of Islamic thought.

Personality models

One reason for the attraction of socially-aware young Iranians to progressive Islam could be attributed to the fact that the revolutionary struggle and commitment unto martyrdom of the Mujahideen pioneers at a time when no one dared oppose the Pahlavi

regime made these pioneers 'personality models'. Thus, thousands of young boys, including even those of primary school age, aspired to become a Mehdi Rezai – the 19-year old Mujahid executed by the Pahlavi dictatorship in 1972 for his armed struggle against the regime. Mehdi's defence speech in the Shah's military court became an irresistible call for commitment to social struggle. "Let them torture on, let our flesh and blood be consecrated to the cause of the people. As long as there is oppression and injustice, there will be struggle, and as long as there is struggle, there will be victory and defeat. But the final victory will be that of the masses. It is not for me to make this claim. History is a witness to it."

And thousands of young girls aspired to become a Fatima in the tradition of Fatima Amini–the young school-teacher whose trail-blazing martyrdom under Savak's torture in 1975 became a beacon of inspiration for thousands of young women, making them participants in the field of social struggle and drawing them into the folds of Mujahideen. Documents retrieved from Savak archives after the Islamic Revolution confirm Fatima Amini as a fighter with an almost invincible faith and ideological commitment.

Child of the people

These documents, published by the Mujahideen in 1979, reveal that the twelve Mujahideen who were recently executed had answered the questions of the Islamic judge exactly in the same manner as Fatima, the first female member of the Mujahideen to be executed by the Shah's regime, had answered in 1975. When the Pahlavi judge had asked Fatima her name, she had simply said, 'Mujahid'. And in response to the query about her parents, she had replied, 'I am the child of the people'. Like Fatima Amini, who recited verses from the Quran to boost her morale and spirit under Savak's lethal tortures, the twelve Mujahid girls had shouted before their execution "Allah-o-Akbar".

The pressing question which arises is BY what criteria had Ayatollah Gilani, the Islamic judge, concluded that the unknown girls presented before him in the Islamic court were kafirs, 'waging warfare against God', and merited the death sentence? In what manner could the girls have demonstrated the inner essence of their belief and God-consciousness, so as to prove to the likes of Judge Gilani that they were Muslims?

In this tragedy, who is to decide about who is a Muslim and who is a kafir? Those executed or their executioners who turned a blind eye and a hard heart to the Quranic warning, "It is for Allah to judge between those who differ. Only your Lord knows who is the best guided on the path". (The Holy Quran, XVII: 22 and XXII: 17).

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Against stupidity the gods themselves struggle in vain. – Friedrich von Schiller.

CSO: 4600/129

PRO-KHOMEYNI FOUNDATION SET UP IN INDIA

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 3 Aug 81 p 3

[Letter from N.V.M. Fasalullah]

[Text]

Dear Brother,

The Islamic Foundation was established on the 1st of Ramadan 1400 thus fulfilling a great need in our area. This is not just an addition to many such ventures. Our foundation is born from a realisation that other groupings do not serve the end we aim at.

By the Grace of Allah we have entered the era of Islamic revival and the first Islamic state in the world has come into being. As you know this is only a part of the picture. However the sense of inferiority is still the greatest malady that plagues a large part of the Ummah. Muslims by in large have lost the sense of greatness 'the Quran created among the believers. A distorted religious concept, a leadership that flaunts westernized intellect and selfishness, and a set of followers who deanean themselves in blind surrender to such leaders - this is the present state of the community. The identity and existence of the ummah remains at stake as long as this condition continues. That this identity can be recovered only by following an independent, unaligned and revolutionary path is borne out by contemporary events. Our activities are characterized by a comprehensive presentation of Islamic ideals working hard for their triumph, having hope in divine assistance and boldly facing world issues.

We have no perticular alliance with any organization, at the same time we are committed to the Islamic Movements throughout the world. We do not claim that Islamic Movements are beyond criticism. An atmosphere of free criticism is above all necessary for facing the challenges. "Official Islam' is posing great hurdles before the Movement. The Islamic Movement should be independent of it and the Movement should become operational and not only a preaching of an ideology.

Along with Da'wa and welfare activities we are running a small library and reading room in our office, which we want to develop into one with reserch facilities.

During last November 1980 we brought out a pamphlet titled 'A GRAND ALLIANCE AGAINST ISLAMIC REVOLUTION' in Malayalam, in support of Iran, and distributed it throughout Kerala State of India. In it we clarified that Iraq's invasion of Iran is a war against Islam in the tradition of Abu Jahal. Muslims should be aware of the tactics of Muslim rulers and their umbrella organizations like Rabita ul Islam to defame the Revolution and its Leader Imam Khomeini. The defense of Islamic State is the duty of the ummah and not only of the Iranian brothers.

At present, we are working on the following publications:

* Iran's Revolution.
* Islam - a Movement for the Liberation of the Oppressed
* Action Agenda for Islamic Movements.

(We shall soon publish a booklet introducing our proposed projects and programme and it will be sent to you)

We wish to have close contact with brothers all over the world. Please introduce us to all the Islamic Organizations and institutions and furnish their addresses. Kindly publish the news of the formation of ISLAMIC FOUNDATION through your press.

Send us information regarding your activities and other publications and periodicals. We hope to share your experiences and feelings. We look forward to frequent communication.

May Allah, Almighty bless us all and lead us in the right path!

Yours in Islam,

N.V. Mohammed Fazalullah.

PUBLICATION OF A BOOK ON IRAN'S REVOLUTION

The Islamic Revolution in Iran established the World's first Islamic Republic. Islam and the Islamic Movement, especially due to the revolution in Iran, have become the world's most discussed topic. The media is giving a very distorted and biased picture of the developments in the Islamic world.

The Islamic Foundation has decided to conduct a study of the subject and publish a book. The following are some of the topics we propose to discuss.

We pray to Allah, the Almighty for the successful completion of the project.

1. A short history of Iran from the earliest to the present including the various people and geography of Iran.
2. The Pahlavi Dynasty and Reza Shah's Rule.
3. The Islamic Movement in Iran from the advent of Islam to the present.
4. The Islamic Revolution and overthrow of dynastic rule.
   — Islam as a revolutionary force.
   —Roots of the Revolution
   — Role of the masses.
   — Islamic awareness among the masses.
   — Leaders of the Revolution.
   — Role of Ulema.
   — Imam Khomeini the man and his leadership.
   — Revolutionary Guards.
   — Secularists, Communists and others in the revolution.
   — Factors behind the success.
5. Iran after the Revolution.
   — Referendum, constitution and elections
   — Programme for the cultural revolution and social change
   — Economic Programme and Planning.
   — Administrative Reforms.
   — Foreign Policy.
   — Relations with other Muslim countries
   — Revolutionary Courts
   — Hostage issue
   — Foreign attack
   — Shi'ite-Sunni issue and the Revolution.
   — Minorities and other groups and parties in present day Iran.
   — Nature of differences of opinion among the Iranian Islamic Leaders.
   — Propaganda war waged by imperialists and Muslim rulers.
   — Two years of Islamic government - an assessment. (achievements, obstacles and drawbacks)
6. Identity of the Revolution - A comparison with other revolutions of the world
7. Global Islamic Movement and the Iranian Revolution.
8. The Revolution and the World.
   - Impact of the Revolution on the world and attitude of the world towards it.
9. A call to the oppressed.
   - Islamic Movement for the liberation of the oppressed
10. Islamic Republic - the Future.

The completion of the project is a very difficult task with our limited resources and materials. We need all kinds of assistance from Islam loving brothers. Send all relevant materials and books for the study of the subject. Back issues of various periodicals will also be very useful. Your kind suggestions and comments are most welcome.

May Allah bless us all and help us in our endeavours!

Yours in Islam,

N.V. Mohammed Fazalullah.

Director

Islamic Foundation.

Note: Books and other materials preferably in English, Arabic and Urdu.

Dear Brother,

Send us KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL regularly. Its back issues will be very useful to follow Iranian developments closely. Send us all and help make our research project a success.

Thanking You

CSO: 4600/131

SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF ARAB COMMUNITY DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Jul 81 p 10

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "The Hardships of the Arab Citizen; Limited Professional Training; Conservatism Preventing Women from Working; Large Families Depending on One Breadearner; Aforementioned Problems Placing Arabs at Bottom of Economic Ladder; Gap in Social Services Offered by Authorities to Jewish and Arab Communities"]

[Text] Israel's Arab citizens are hardly represented in the top 30 percent of Israeli households in terms of their net income per family. Yet, they count for three times as many in the bottom 10 percent and two times in the next 10 percent. Their ratio begins to fall--in proportion to their number in the population in the 60-70 bracket, and in the 70-80 only one-tenth. The data is not taken from hostile sources. The figures appear in the 1979 Israel Statistics Annual. Other figures: more than one-third of Israeli Arabs suffered in 1978 from severe housing problems. Compared to 0.5 percent Jews living four or more in one room, the rate among Arabs is 18.2 percent, while 1.7 percent Jews live three in one room compared to 18.9 percent Arabs.

There are undoubtedly many reasons for the hardships of Arabs in Israel. Some are objective. For instance, limited education and professional training, which make it hard for the single bread earner to support a family. The size of the Arab family adds to the problem--in 1978 the birth rate for Jewish women was (percent) 2.8, Christian was 3, Muslim was 6.3, and Druse was 6.9. In other words, the average Arab had to support a twice as large family, often as a single supporter, making less money, and working in a less advanced economy.

In order to clarify the issue of the provider and his dependents, the research department of the Labor and Welfare Ministry has published a detailed pamphlet on urban areas, Jewish and Arab. The pamphlet, titled "Social Profile of Communities in Israel," points out that the number of workers and dependents is nearly equal. Potential workers are people between the ages of 19 and 65. The ratio between dependents and providers in 1973 was 1 to 0.92. In Nazareth, for example, 1.33 depend on each working person. In Um al Fahm the ratio is two to one. In Kafr Manda it reaches a record 1:2.39. Add to this the absence of industry and real employment in Arab communities, besides the limitations of conservatism and the need to raise children which prevent Arab women from working, and the picture becomes quite grim--the Arabs are at the bottom of the economic ladder in Israel, and they seem to have little change to advance all by themselves, even if they enjoyed equal opportunity in employment and professional advancement, which is not the case (I do not know anyone who seriously maintains that the government treats all citizens as equals).

No Equality

This is not to say that there has not been progress made in the Arab community, both economically and culturally. Anyone who visits an Arab village can see that a considerable change has taken place since the Sixties. Communal and public services has improved immeasurably. But the gap between the Arab community and the general community has not been narrowed. Government services are not provided equally.

In Araba, for example, there is one-half social worker per 8,000 inhabitants, while in Yeruham there are nine. In Kafr Kana there is one social worker per 7,000 people, while in Migdal Ha'emeq 22.5 social workers serve 13,000 inhabitants. The greatest injustice seems to be committed against families with many children. Those children constitute more than 40 percent of the children in Israel (three or more children per family), and they number more than 200,000. Of those, 190,000 children were born in families without veterans, and so they are punished by the authorities. They do not receive any national insurance.

This "fine" reached last year 360 million shekels which were withheld from those large families (according to the law in effect until this month). It should be pointed out there are one and one-half million children in Israel. Of those, one million is treated as equals by the National Insurance Institute, since they are the first and second born in their families. The ones who are discriminated against are the other one-half million, who are third (or more) born. In this group the number of Arab children is 40 percent. After allowing for the Druse families, a large portion of the Bedouins, policemen's families, and Arab families with one son who enlisted in the army, there are still 190,000 children who are discriminated against.

To Strengthen Welfare Services

In short, not only objective factors make things hard for the Arab citizens. Also prejudices and suspicions due to security make things difficult. The change process is accelerating and needs the improving of welfare services, to prevent abnormal phenomena, the study of the research department of the Labor and Welfare Ministry points out. The study was conducted by the Sociological Service company in Ramat Gan. The authors of the study interviewed people in various communities, both prominent citizens and those on welfare. They classified Arab communities as the "small homogeneous" ones, where traditional local institutions take care of the elderly and the needy, and where there is no need for government services. In middle size villages, on the other hand, like M'ilia and Daliyat el Karmil, the family structure has weakened and a greater need for welfare services has arisen.

In Arab cities like Nazareth or Acre, as well as in the large village of Um al Fahm the urbanization process is quite advanced. The process of the young leaving their families and the community control has begun to show its effect.

The method of research and the sampling of interviewees raise questions. Why did they interview in one place welfare recipients, and in another a random sampling of voters? Yet the findings reveal the growing complexity of the problems, which threaten the relative calm in Arab villages. The crime rate in Nazareth, for example, was 37 for every 1,000 residents only in 1978. In Nazerat 'Illit it was 50, and in Migdal Ha'emeq 110. In 'Afula and Tiberias the annual rate of crime was twice as high as Nazareth (in Um al Fahm, Taiyiba and Tira, on the other hand, the rate was only 15 per thousand).

Yet the study authors warn that the weakening of the social structure in places like Acre is beginning to result in the smoking of hashish, runaway adolescents, and crime. Even in Um al Fahm there are signs of trouble. In Nazareth, the study points out, the society is healthier. This, according to the study, is due to a more solid social structure than in Acre, where most of the residents are refugees from the slums of Haifa. The Arabs of Acre are suffering from a negative balance of immigration, since affluent residents move elsewhere.

But even in "healthy" Nazareth there are signs of weakness, which call for the expansion of social services.

9565
CSO: 4323/34

SINAI FORCE AGREEMENT PRAISED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 13 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by Moshe Zaq: "Sinai Agreement"]

[Text] The Knesset in Jerusalem, the Congress in Washington, and the People's Assembly in Cairo will be called upon soon to ratify the agreement on the establishment of a multi-national force in the Sinai. The agreement will be initialed this week by representatives of Israel, Egypt, and the U.S.

The government yesterday heard a report on the agreement from the prime minister. As long as it looked like there were differences of opinion among Israel, Egypt and the U.S., the differences were played up in Israel. But as soon as the agreement was reached no one is interested in the agreement any longer, despite the fact that it marks a turning point in the history of the Middle East: A fully equipped U.S. military force will be stationed in the Sinai and will be directly involved in keeping the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. This is a major breakthrough from an American standpoint, in addition to the American warning stations established in the Sinai in 1975.

The Egyptians, who conducted joint military maneuvers with American forces, and who are willing to render unlimited services to the American Armed Forces so they can "defend Arab countries when the need arises," were very concerned about the deployment of American forces in the Sinai, lest it might be construed that the American forces are taking the place of the IDF in the Sinai. The Egyptians were willing to give the Americans bases west of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, like the base at Ras Banas. But they were afraid of what other Arab states might say if they allowed the U.S. to use the bases and the air fields in the Sinai. The unnecessary statements in Israel about turning the Etzion air field over to the U.S. for its strategic needs made things harder for Egypt and did not help the negotiations.

The American mediators tried to present the Israeli-Egyptian discussion as a bargaining over the size of the international force--and so it was presented in the Israeli media. But when Israeli representatives started direct negotiations with Egypt on this subject, it became clear that the Egyptian reluctance was not over the size of the force but rather the reactions of other Arab states to the placing of a large American force in the Sinai.

There was a need for a great deal of patience and diplomatic savvy in order to overcome the Egyptian reluctance as well as the American reluctance over direct military involvement in the Sinai. The agreement which will be initialed this week will bear witness to the fact that these difficulties have been overcome, and will make the American commitment to keep the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt a practical reality.

One of the difficulties of reaching an Israeli-Egyptian agreement for establishing a multi-national force was a result of the growing pains of the Camp David negotiations--in the old drafts dating back to the Fifties and Sixties regarding peace accords which were found in the files of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, a place was accorded to the UN for keeping the peace.

Despite the fact that the UN in its present hostile composition has opposed direct Israeli-Arab negotiations, the UN clause remained in the Camp David accords, regarding a UN force which would guard the buffer zones in the Sinai. The Soviet threat to veto the decision to establish a multi-national force in the Sinai when this decision came up at the Security Council spared us this problem, and made it possible to establish a multi-national force without the UN. Yet the Americans and the Egyptians, each for their own reasons, tried to include a section in the agreement which would revert back to a UN force. That is, when the UN agreed to it, it would be possible to turn the authority over the multi-national force to the UN.

Israel could not object to this on principle, but made a condition: only when the UN accepts the Camp David accords will it become the peacekeeper in the Sinai.

The bargaining between us and Egypt and the U.S. went on for weeks. The Americans offered a compromise, namely, that the agreement will state that it will be contingent upon the UN approving the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, yet Israel insisted that it should state explicitly that the UN has to approve the Camp David accords.

The debate went on without publicity, until the saving formula was found. The UN will not be mentioned at all. Instead, it will state that the two parties agree that the powers of the multi-national force can be transferred to another force.

It may appear to be a matter of semantics, but there is a lesson to be learned from this debate and this agreement: diplomatic negotiations should be conducted without publicity concerning every detail, and, furthermore, when Israel knows what it wants and what is the limit of its concessions, it can withstand joint American-Egyptian pressures.

These lessons should be applied to the forthcoming negotiations on autonomy.

9565
CSO: 4323/34

POSITIONS OF ALIGNMENT KNESSET MEMBERS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Jul 81 p 21

[Article by Moshe Mazels]

[Text] Eighteen hawks, 17 doves and 13 dove-hawks in the Alignment faction.

What is changed, they ask in the new Alignment faction that was elected this week to the tenth Knesset? The supposition is that the 25 "new faces" in the faction will give it a more hawkish coloration and therefore a different tone will be heard in the future from what has been heard in the past.

The Labor party platform clings to the principle of territorial compromise, negotiations with the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria, and the cessation of settlement in areas crowded with an Arab population such as Samaria, but there is no doubt that the faction's line on these questions in the future will be harder. The traditional conflict between the divisions of "hawk" and "dove" will continue and there will be a need to find concensus and compromise.

An "ornithological" breakdown of the composition of the faction shows 19 hawks, 17 doves and 13 "dove-hawks" like Shimon Peres, Yitzhaq Rabin, Haim Barlev, Mordekai Gur and others. The "hawk" group is more diverse. One can find in it the three moshav people Aryeh Nehemkin, Yehezq'el Zak'ai and Na'im Ra'anan, kibbutz people like Dani Rozolin and Ya'aqov Tzur, two representatives of the "weaker sex" Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino and Tamar 'Eshel, as well as 'Eliahu Shpeiser, Gad Ya'aqov, Shlomo Hillel, etc. In the "dove" group we find seven Mapam people, Abba Eban, Naftali Blumental, Yeruham Meshel, 'Uzi Bar'am, Rabbi Menahem Hacohen, Yosi Sarid and Michael Harish. Also included in it are two Arabs, Muhamad Watad and Hamad Hal'ilah, and one woman--'Orah Namir.

In the new 49-member faction, which approaches that which was elected in 1973 (51 members) a number of changes have occurred: there are 20 representatives of districts, 12 representatives of the oriental communities, 6 female members, 5 kibbutz members, 3 moshav members, and, for the first time, 2 Arabs. The weight of the districts in conspicuous this time, in contrast to the central list, which finds expression the "new faces" from the local scene like the secretary of the workers' council of Beersheba 'Uri Svag, the secretary of the workers' council of Mazkeret Batyah Rafi Svisa, the mayor of Safed Aharon Nahmi'as and the representatives of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Dov ben Me'ir, Michael bar Zohar and Ya'aqov Gil.

Strengthening of the Districts

The strengthening of the districts at the expense of earlier factions reflected a shift to territorial representatives in place of some of the stars of the central list, which is determined by the organizing committee. The absence of representatives of the younger generation is conspicuous (the secretary of the young guard Haim Ramon appears only in the 50th place on the Alignment list) as is that of the heads of professional and academic federations. There is a kind of perversity in this absence in view of the great backing that the Alignment enjoyed in the election campaign from academics, the younger generation and the professional federations.

The "dove" faction of the party will receive additional strengthening this time from the seven Mapam representatives with the "new faces" Victor Shemtov, Ya'ir Tzeven (a Maki man, from the former party of Moshe Sneh and Shelli), 'El'azar Granot and Muhamad Watad. This composition is likely to intensify the political and settlement debate between the representatives of the labor party and Mapam on political questions in the Knesset.

This time the Alignment faction will face maximal polarization. If it should be decreed to remain in the opposition, it would be the Knesset's strongest opposition faction ever. In its struggle against an opposition with a very compressed majority, it will require precisely maximal unity and the ability to overcome centrifugal tendencies on social, economic and political questions.

The new faction will lack members with parliamentary experience from the ninth Knesset like Esther Harlitz, Me'ir 'Amit, Dov Golomb and Ze'ev Katz, and in particular the chairman of the Mapam bloc in the past Knesset Heike Grosman, who preferred this time not to be included on the list of candidates for the Knesset and to be chosen as a candidate for minister in an Alignment government--something which now seems dubious.

Invigorating the list

When the revolution occurred in the public mind towards the election and the Likud rose in the polls until it was even with the Alignment and even surpassed it, they said in the labor party that one of the reasons for this unexpected phenomenon was the party's unsuccessful list of Knesset candidates. There were those who claimed that it lacked sufficient attractive innovations, especially among the first ten; there were those that spoke against the placing of Shoshana Arbeli-'Almozlino in second place on the list after Shim'on Peres and thundered about too little invigoration. But there is no avoiding the fact that no list could be blessed with 50 percent new faces up to the fiftieth position and with such strong representation of oriental communities, women and districts.

This list was the fruit of the labor of difficult struggles and crises which accompanied long vigils and interaction between experienced parliamentary veterans and new faces from among the communities, districts, cities, labor settlements, women and development towns. If the party should be fated to remain in the opposition, it will at least be able to be blessed with the fact that it will be a strong aggressive opposition that will breathe forcefully down the back of the coalition.

9794
CSO: 4323/24

TREND TOWARD LIKUD SEEN AMONG YOUTH

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by Shevah Weiss]

[Text] Since 1973 the youth have tended to identify with hawkish, activist, nationalist-chauvinist parties. The positions of the Alignment on foreign and security issues are seen, for some reason, as a readiness to "fold"--despite the strong principles of its components from a Zionist and ethical point of view.

The elections in the IDF serve as a clear indication of the current political scene among the younger generation. Already in 1973 after and in the wake of the Yom Kippur War signs began to appear of the increasing prestige of the Likud among the younger generation. At that time the Likud won a 2 percent advantage among the voters of the "double envelope" in the IDF.

This phenomenon continued on an even larger scale in the elections for the ninth Knesset in May, 1977. The Likud won 44 percent of the votes of the IDF soldiers, the Democrats for Change about 26 percent, and the Alignment 22 percent.

In the elections for the tenth Knesset as they have been published, still unofficially, the success of the Likud in the IDF, which won about 45 percent, still stands out. Tehiya got about 7 percent, and together with the NRP, Tami and Telem, the "not one inch group" won about 60 percent of the voters of the "double envelope."

The Alignment also increased its strength

Indeed the Alignment also achieved something of significance. According to the results available, the Alignment increased its support even among the younger generation by about 50 percent. This fact is expressed as well in the IDF elections in which the Alignment won about 36 percent this time.

We have available the results of "elections" which were held in more than 30 high schools as a kind of simulation which was initiated by educators and administrators on the eve of the elections to the tenth Knesset. When we tabulated these totals we arrived at a picture like this: support for Likud was around 45 percent, for Tehiya around 16 percent. These schools do not include the federal religious education system or the Yeshivot. Indeed this is a rather unscientific collection of results but on such a large scale it is not without significance.

A few weeks ago we published in YEDI'OT AHARONOT the essence of a survey which we took among three groups of students, from the University of Haifa, the Technion and from the law department of the University of Tel Aviv. Among these students too a trend was noted to support the big parties, and a certain preference was also noted for Likud and Tehiya. It therefore turns out that the younger generation is inclined to support parties and movements that are nationalist, "not one inch-ist," at times chauvinist, and generally very activist and hawkish.

A blurring of positions

We will try briefly to account for this political reality. The activist policy of the Likud, Tehiya and the NRP appeared in the expressions of the leaders and the media in a rather sophisticated mantle, as a kind of categorical imperative. The more dovish alternatives, which in our opinion are no less categorical in their makeup, did not succeed in making a sufficient impression upon the conscience of the younger generation. The Alignment, which is trapped by a kind of blurring of positions in the area of foreign and defence policy, has not been successful in persuading the younger generation of the justice of the Alon program. This program, which has strong Zionist and ethical security principles, is depicted, for some reason, as a kind of readiness to "fold."

A large portion of the younger generation belongs to what is called in sociological jargon the "oriental communities." The communal schism, which so deeply influenced this election campaign, found a particularly radical expression among the younger generation. It thus turns out that the anti-Ashkenazi phenomenon, which homes in precisely on the Alignment, is even more a factor among the younger voters than among the older ones.

These elections, from the psychological-political viewpoint, turned out to be a kind of presidential election. The entire interest revolved around "this one versus that one." It would seem that the leadership of the Likud and Tehiya is more acceptable to the younger generation.

Political reality

In our view this is a result of the fact that the last few years have been characterized by the sticking of a depressing prototype on the Alignment leadership. There is no difficulty in proving, in a factual way, that this tag which has been stuck on the leaders of the labor movement lacks all foundation. But these facts had relatively little weight in creating the motivations of the voters in general and of the younger generation in particular. If we add together the political reality of the younger generation and the political reality of the "tribes of Israel" and its communities, the demography is against the Alignment. An important matter which will guide the Alignment leadership toward the future.

9794
CSO: 4323/24

LIKUD KNESSET DELEGATION DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Jul 81 p 21

[Article by Avi Bettelheim]

[Text] "We have no Weizmans in the new faction," said one of the Herut MK's. What will be the face of Likud in the tenth Knesset? More hawks among the liberals. The new MK's will busy themselves with economics—and leave the political sphere to the experts.

MK's in the Herut movement and the Liberal party see a more homogeneous Likud faction in the tenth Knesset, one which will "get along" with the government politically and which will be characterized by much more discipline than that of the faction in the ninth Knesset. "We don't have any Weizmans in the new faction"—averred one of the Herut MK's.

The division of forces in the Likud faction if it should enjoy 49 Knesset seats will be as follows: 25 MK's from the Herut movement (seven new ones); 18 MK's from the Liberal party (nine new ones); 4 from La'am as well as Yitzhaq Peretz (formerly of Rafi) and 'Aqiba Nof (formerly: the Free Center, Democrats for Change, the Democratic Movement, and the Fraternity faction).

Particularly conspicuous is the invigoration in ranks among the bloc of Liberals: nine new MK's out of 18 representatives. Also conspicuous is the integration of new MK's into the Knesset. Joining Roni Milo', Moshe Ketzev and Ehud Ullmart are David Magen, Me'ir Shitrit, Micah Reiser and Michael Kleiner from Herut, Dror Zeigerman and 'Eli Qols from the Liberals.

Five weeks ago, shortly after the completion of the internal elections of the Liberal party for determining the Knesset candidates, the presidium chairman of the party Yitzhaq Moda'i said: "there is no doubt that the hawkish line has gained the ascendancy in the Liberal party." New faces like David Shifman, the deputy mayor of Tel Aviv, and Pinhas Goldstein have a hawkish outlook of long-standing and will constitute strong support for the prime minister and his friends in the Herut movement.

Nevertheless they say in the Liberal party that the Knesset "team" expresses the traditional pluralistic line of the party inasmuch as "doves" such as the young Dror-Zeigerman are also integrated into it. And yet lately within this party the suspicion has been voiced that the ascendancy of the hawkish line and the

completion of the processes of "unifying the Likud" will bring about the assimilation of the party within the Herut movement and a weakening of the liberal wing in Likud to the point of its complete disappearance.

Liberals Assuage

The Liberal heads are trying to calm people down and say that the party will not be wiped out and that its influence as a moderating factor with different views from those of the Herut movement will continue, especially in the economic sphere. As proof they relate that when the members of the two blocs struggled over the preparation of Likud's economic platform and substantial differences of opinion broke out between Yoram 'Aridor and Yitzhaq Moda'i--Menehem Begin decided on certain points in favor of the Liberal line that Moda'i took.

Thus far in the Liberal party the internal squabbling has not yet begun which so characterized this party in the last 4 years and which sullied the internal relationships among its members. And yet below the surface there is already some ferment, the source of which lies in two directions: the appointment of ministers to the new government on the one hand and feelers about establishing a new internal coalition on the other.

For the ministerial positions (the Liberals expect five portfolios) there are many takers, beyond the four present ministers (Ehrlich, Moda'i, Patt and Nissim).

The new internal coalition in the Liberal party is these days in the first stages of formation, and an effort is discernible towards cooperation among the factions of Yitzhaq Moda'i and Avraham Sharir--factions which were set up on opposite sides of the barricade in the last 4 years, which have struggled with one another and which have caused total confusion to the point of paralysis of institutions and the lack of coherent party activity in the branches.

If however an understanding should be reached between these two personages--most of the party forces would be united it is possible that at least for the time being the unending internal wars would be done away with. "We hope that we have learned from experience and that we will be able to function properly in the tenth Knesset. We now have a fresher more vibrant faction. If we don't learn how to stop behaving like 'private grocery stores' within the party, it will destroy us," said MK Sarah Doron.

The experts

It is thought within the Herut movement that the Likud faction will be monolithic in comparision with the faction of the ninth Knesset. Indeed two new MK's were added to the Herut movement from among 'Ezer Weizmann's loyalists--Micah Reiser, head of the organizational branch in the movement (the only one who voted against the removal of Weizmann from Herut in the celebrated vote at the movement's secretariat) and Me'ir Shitrit--head of the Yavneh local council--and yet it seems that there will be no significance at all to this fact as long as Ezer himself remains outside.

In addition the lack of a partner like the Democrats for Change will, in the opinion of some in Herut, prevent many of the problems that characterized the previous government.

It appears that a majority of the new faces in the Likud faction will invest their time in economic and social spheres and leave foreign and security matters to the ministers and a small number of MK's who are considered experts in these areas like the former ambassador to Egypt Dr 'Eliahu 'Elissar, who is considered a candidate for an operational function connected with foreign policy matters.

Thus for example the new MK's Dan Tikhon, Yitzhaq Zeigel, Tzvi Renner and Pinhas Goldstein promise to occupy themselves with economic matters related to their private businesses; Miriam Gelzer-Ta'aseh, David Magen and Me'ir Shitrit will deal with social and welfare matters; Dr Yehuda Perah will contribute to the educational sphere and Beni Shalita' will deal with agricultural affairs.

9794
CSO: 4323/24

CAUSES BEHIND POLITICAL CRIMES DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 703, 22 Jul 81 p 18

[Article: "The Whys and Wherefores of Political Crime"]

[Text] In a recent issue of AL-TALI'AH we dealt with the subject of political crime, a subject which Kuwait has begun to experience in recent years. We said that this kind of crime was to be expected under the geographical and political circumstances that are surrounding the area, [and we said that] this was the result of several reasons. Foremost among these reasons is the struggle of Arab intelligence [agencies]. Amidst the multiplicity of Arab alliances and the polarization attempts that each alliance makes to exert pressure on the Arab parties in question, [these intelligence agencies] do not care about where they can settle their disputes.

Second, this struggle is superimposed on the ambitions of the foreign powers, and especially the United States and Britain, who are turning the Gulf area into an arena for centralized activity to sidetrack the course of development which those nations are pursuing and to make those nations live under a state of permanent threat.

But the principal matter in all this is the fact that the only thing that is new about political crime is its increase and its intensity. In the past political crimes used to take place under the cover of secrecy, and it was difficult to discover their significance.

What is important in this regard in our opinion is [having] a clear insight into this kind of crime, whether it manifests itself in throwing explosives or assassinating people, and determining its principal targets as well as those agencies that back up such crime. The anxiety and confusion generated amidst people by political crime and the fact that it sidetracks the course of democratic development by placing obstacles in front of public liberties legislation and by creating the justification for emergency measures would appear to be one of the objectives for turning Kuwait into a place where disputes between intelligence agencies can be settled and for exerting pressure on Kuwait so it can proceed on the course which this or the other party may want.

What is important is that the names of the agencies or interests that are behind such actions, which are destroying Kuwait's stability and security, be proclaimed clearly. Keeping these cases, which have increased in recent years, under a cloud of secrecy and conjecture and a target of rumors and idle talk is not useful at all. We have noticed that some people are spreading such rumors against some national and Arab forces. In an atmosphere of secrecy agencies that back such crimes increase their activities so they can utilize the effect of those crimes against national agencies. We can refer here to the fact that it was probably a coincidence that revealed the hand that was behind the recent campaign of explosives. Had it not been for this coincidence, those who have their own ulterior objectives would not have stopped taking advantage of the mystery that enveloped these incidents and would not have stopped making accusations against national figures and forces.

Being fully convinced of the serious consequences that this destructive activity will have on the course of Kuwait's government and its people and condemning the agencies and the parties that are standing behind these activities, it is our view that the elimination of these crimes and their effects on our local conditions requires that a clear announcement be made to the citizens about the secrets of these operations and the mystery that surrounds them be exposed. There is nothing more dangerous to the security of a people than hiding the truth from them and allowing those with ulterior motives to make conjectures in the press and to engage in personal conjecture. Such operations can thus be foiled, and they can always be turned against those who had planned them.

We believe that every time a crime of this kind took place, government agencies did have enough information about their circumstances and the people who carried them out as well as their objectives. But what we find curious is the fact that an atmosphere of mystery and secrecy is maintained. [We find it curious that] a few voices have emerged calling for measures that infringe upon public liberties. They are calling for retention of the emergency laws, such as the Assembly Law and the Publications Law. These demands are being made despite the fact that those who are making them are quite aware of the fact that impeding the course of democracy in Kuwait and spreading an atmosphere of anxiety and terror is the objective of political and non-political sabotage activities. Are we then to deal with political crimes by restricting liberties and turning Kuwait into a prison? Or do we deal with these crimes by aborting these plans and spreading the truth about them and showing respect for the citizen's intelligence, his good judgment and his understanding of matters? It is difficult in today's world, and especially in Kuwait, to deal with matters by means of emergency measures, not only because these measures are nonproductive, but rather because preserving the safety of the [country's] course and the relationship between the agencies of government and the citizens requires a relationship of another kind--a full partnership. It is not just a handful of individuals who are responsible for the security and the future of the country; everybody is. That is, all the people are responsible.

This responsibility requires that the citizen be made fully aware of the events that are taking place around his country as well as the dangers to which it is exposed. This is the proper way to eliminate any effect which crimes that destroy peace and stability may have.

8592
CSO: 4304/80

VARIOUS POLITICAL FORCES COMMENT ON LIBERALIZATION

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 Jul 81

/Article by Rashid Khashnah: "Tunisia: When Will There Be Pluralism, and What Form Will It Take?"/

/13-19 Jul 81 pp 21, 22/

/Text/ The draft national charter which the Tunisian cabinet has ratified, in which the Detourian Party set forth its conditions for agreeing to the emergence of opposition currents, has raised objections from the parties.

In the previous issue of AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI, the Popular Unity Movement's Political Bureau, the Tunisian Communist Party and the Islamic Orientation Party expressed their observations.

Here are the observations of the Movement of Social Democrats and the Tunisian Worker's Organization.

At the Destour Party conference held in 1971, an obvious rift appeared between two currents, the first calling for liberalization and expansion in the scope of freedoms, the second calling for toughness and a restriction of democratic practices. The struggle between the two approaches ended with the victory of the latter and the removal of the former from the Central Committee and the ministries they had been occupying. The rift was consecrated with the expulsion of such liberalization leaders as Ahmed Mestiri, El Baji Kaid El Sebsi and Hassib ben Ammar from the Destour Party in the 1974 conference.

At the start of 1977 this group started to move and be active in the area of the defense of freedom under the title of Social Democrats. It participated in the establishment of the Tunisian League for the Defense of Human Rights in June 1977 and at the end of the same year obtained a permit to issue a political paper titled AL-RA'Y, which started to appear in December 1977.

The movement then announced the formation of a political party in June 1978 under the name of the Movement of Social Democrats. It presented an official request to the authorities on this, announced the names of its temporary board, which consisted of nine members, and proceeded to publish its political and economic program on the pages of AL-RA'Y. However, the announcement of the formation of the party provoked an internal struggle in the heart of the movement between the temporary board and people who refused to turn the movement into an opposition party, and

the dispute ended when the former current took over the newspaper and drove the board off it. The group which insisted on forming an opposition party was compelled to apply to issue a paper speaking in its name and in 1980 it did obtain a permit to issue AL-MUSTAQBAL, the first issue of which appeared on 1 November 1980.

The Democratic Socialist Movement has good relations with such Arab parties as the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers in Morocco and the Egyptian Grouping Party, and with European socialist parties.

In past weeks, when the ruling Destour Party declared that it would allow the existance of opposition movements on certain conditions, the democratic Socialist Movement called for the convening of a national symposium of political leaders to formulate a joint groundwork for action and a preparatory meeting was held in which the Communist Party, the Islamic Orientation, the Popular Unity Movement (Political Bureau) and the Movement of Social Democrats participated.

When some pressure was put on the authorities to prompt them to retreat from the liberalization decision, Ahmed Mestiri wrote a lead editorial in AL-MUSTAQBAL in which he said "About 2 months ago the president declared the endorsement of political pluralism at the Destourian Socialist Party conference. This declaration was a political event and had a deep, beneficial impact domestically and abroad. Then the days and weeks passed, and it began to seem to people as if the matter had not yet 'ripened' but was still the subject of discussion among people in positions of power. Then the issue started to be subject to psychological vacillations, whims and outbursts of temper, although there were preconditions and various obstacles to pluralism, including the fears and reservations which some of our brothers and friends abroad have been expressing as if they were more worried about Tunisia and its stability than the Tunisians themselves were." Mestiri concluded his editorial by stating "To whomever it may concern: the single-party system, as has been proved by the experience of the past 10 years, has not protected Tunisia from various unsettling moves, tensions and severe crises, and the approval of pluralism and the concentration of the ruling regime on the basis of true popular support that requires will alone guarantee that the wherewithal for the real protection of Tunisia and strengthening of the domestic front will be provided." AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI asked Mestiri about his conception of pluralism and the formulas for attaining it, and he answered.

/Question/ Does your movement intend to take part in the coming parliamentary elections? On what terms?

/Answer/ Our movement actually is thinking of participating in the coming parliamentary elections, but it has not yet taken its decision in this regard, because the conditions under which it will take place have not yet become clearly crystallized. There is a climate which must exist and guarantees which must be provided in order for the elections to be free and unblemished so that it will be possible to conduct an election campaign and participate equally with the ruling party in overseeing the voting process. This certainly makes it mandatory that we have a system which is autonomous and structures and branches which the authorities recognize legally.

We will not, as some bodies in the regime believe agree to link the elections to the issue of the legal recognition of opposition parties, unless the Destourian

Socialist Party agrees to withdraw from power, dissolve itself and let its members come forward as independent candidates for election on an equal footing with the other candidates, while subjecting itself to the same rules which it wants to impose on other political currents. In this case alone will we agree to go through the test of the elections before obtaining legal recognition.

/Question/ What is your position on the draft national charter the Destourian Party presented at its latest conference?

/Answer/ We do not reject the notion of the "national charter," in principle, especially since our movement previously presented a similar recommendation in October 1977, although the ruling party categorically rejected it.

Regarding the contents and conditions of this charter, we do not agree that this charter should be a one-way obligation. We demand that it be the subject of consultation, then agreement, among all the parties concerned.

/Question/ How do you view the possibility of coordination among opposition positions in the current stage?

/Answer/ In the most recent period, bilateral and group contacts have been made among representatives of the most important detachments of the opposition and discussion has taken place within these detachments on the subject of applying pluralism, which the regime has promised and the issue of elections. Naturally different developments, points of dispute and points of agreement exist. Although the time has not yet come for joint action and full coordination, this will not prevent concentrated contacts and continued consultations in order gradually to eliminate points of dispute and differences in position, and it will become possible to create common ground to specify the ways of exercising democracy. This is the goal of the recommendation which we presented recently on holding a national symposium of political leaders.

/13-19 Jul 81 pp 22, 23/

/Text/ At the end of the sixties and the start of the seventies, a Marxist-Leninist movement which was distinguished by its broad and concentrated activity, especially in circles of intellectuals and young people became prominent on the political stage. This movement was fused into an organization bearing the name of the Socialist Study and Action Grouping which issued a theoretical and political journal titled AFAQ. Then issuance of the magazine stopped and in 1971 it was replaced by a newspaper bearing the title AL-'AMIL AL-TUNISI, in which news was conveyed on labor strikes and political articles, as well as ideological analyses and discussions.

In 1974, the organization shifted from appealing for socialist revolution to giving democratic and nationalistic missions priority over socialist goals. That was also the year in which the organization changed its name and became the Tunisian Worker's Organization.

In two consecutive years, this organization was subjected to two major trials, the first involving 201 accused persons, the second 101, in the summers of 1974 and 1975.

Internally, in its notions the Tunisian Worker called for radical change and opposed the policy of cooperatives which Ahmed Ben Salih led, as well as the policies of the seventies which Nouira led. In the foreign field, it was hostile to the great powers and put the United States and the Soviet Union on an equal basis, proceeding from the assertion that the Soviet Union had degenerated and had become a domineering power internationally and a capitalistic on domestically.

This current was congruent ideologically with China, but it was not proved, in the successive trials that followed one another, that there was any direct relationship between it and China. With the latest changes which suffused the great Asian nation with an atmosphere of rapprochement with the west, and the United States specifically, the Tunisian Worker's Organization condemned the Chinese leaders and considered them neodeviationists proceeding along the road of evolution to an imperialist power. The Tunisian Worker Leaders consider that these positions are proof that their line is independent of all foreign powers and their control over their political decisions is absolute.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI met with one of the organization's leaders, and here is his view of the current stage:

/Question/ Toward the end of the sixties and in the first half of the seventies your movement stood out as the most important opposition force on the domestic stage. How did this organization arise? What stages did it go through?

/Answer/ After the coup attempt of 1962 was dispelled, a decree was issued proscribing the sole opposition party at that time and confiscating its newspapers. It was then officially decided to codify the single party system at the Destour Party conference in Bizerte, which was called the Conference of Destiny. In this atmosphere, a group of combative young people emerged within the group of people studying in France and made a stand against the policy of individual rule and the blows against freedom. Their goal was to unify the forces of the left. In 1964 the fighters started returning to the homeland to work domestically.

This group composed of students, professors and researchers followed a policy different from that of others. It did not submit to the will of the regime but rather took the initiative of exercising the right of expression and organization and in 1963 founded an organization to arrange its activities under the name of the Socialist Study and Action Grouping in Tunisia, which was better known by the name of its magazine, AFAQ. The organization began to establish branches throughout the country and started taking part in student union boards and intellectual symposia. In 1967, it was invited to take part in a conference held in Algeria on Socialism in the Arab world. It also took part in the great debate which was organized in the Labor Exchange in the capital on the policy of cooperatives. We were almost the only ones to create an opposition press at that time and we afforded it a broad distribution in circles of intellectuals and young people. It is true that the Communist Party issued the publication AMAL in French and started distributing it domestically, but we were the ones who took the initiative of creating and stimulating a good intellectual climate and developing the ideological struggle for the sake of a scientific discussion of the issues in our society. For example, when Mohammed Harmal issued a brochure on classes in Tunisia, we published a reply to it.

In the realm of political democracy, we took clear positions and recorded our differences with others frankly. When a minister resigned in the sixties in the name of democracy, we explained the difference between two types of democracy--popular democracy and bourgeois democracy.

In addition, in the context of foreign policy, we took part in the 5 June 1967 protest demonstration against the United States and Britain and some members of our organization were tried as a consequence of that demonstration. We also supported the Vietnamese cause by participating in the emergence of the secret Vietnam Committee, in which democratic and peace-loving elements took part. To consecrate this sympathy, we organized a demonstration against the foreign minister of South Vietnam, who visited Tunisia at that time.

Parallel to and as a result of this broad activity, an intellectual evolution occurred within the organization, when it was transformed from one which was not ideologically homogeneous but contained Trotskyists, nationalists and liberals to a unified one embracing Marxist-Leninism, in interaction with the political practice of the organization first of all and the development of the world struggle between deviationism and Marxist-Leninism.

In 1968 the policy of repression escalated, all scope for freedom was blocked off, the policy of promoting cooperatives by force and compulsion was applied, and that was accompanied by the elimination of every opposition voice and the suppression of every form of expression. Blows were concentrated against our organization and a trial was staged against us, after the State Security Court was established specifically to try us. Sentences of 16 years' imprisonment were issued against us. Naturally this was a tax we paid for explaining the basis of our thinking, which brought about a radical difference between the reformist political thinking which prevailed and the promotion of a revolutionary conception of change.

After these two stages, the stage of growth and the stage of broad practice, the organization, in the first half of the seventies, passed through a third stage, the most conspicuous feature of which was an actual, not rhetorical, orientation toward the working class and the propagation of new thinking in labor circles. This meant that repression did not dampen our exercise of our political and intellectual plan. Indeed, we developed it, since, in addition to our continued presence in young intellectual circles, we started to give concrete form to the slogan of solidarity with the working class.

This radicalization and practical progressive orientation was accompanied by the approval of our view on the political and ideological level, especially our strategic orientation on major issues, especially the two issues which in the past had been marred by negative features, first the issue of the unity of the Arab peoples in the context of their affiliation to a single nation, and second the nature of the historic stage Tunisian society is going through, which is one of a national liberation that has not yet been consummated. Consequently it is mandatory, as a strategic goal during this stage, that national and democratic missions be carried out as a step toward socialism and that a society be created in which man's exploitation by man will be eradicated. These new positions during the 1973-75 period were a rectification of the positions which had prevailed previously, and this made it possible to go beyond the notion of bypassing stages and shortcutting the

natural development of society. In this period the name of the organization changed and it acquired the name of the Tunisian Worker's Organization, in embodiment of our labor orientation. That is the name of the paper we started issuing in 1971.

This new intellectual and labor orientation sharply increased the organization's spread and influence and spurred on its fighting members. In spite of the errors which were made we believe that we alongside other parties have contributed to developing and radicalizing democratic thinking which is opposed to tyranny and to deepening a national consciousness which is opposed to foreign hegemony. This orientation has had a repercussion in the popular movement, specifically the trade union movement, which began to embrace it, and it had a reverberation, for example, in the National Council of the Trade Union Federation shortly before the 26 January 1978 events.

Naturally that was no secret to the authorities, and repressive campaigns were repeated against our movement, most important of were the trials of 1974 and 1975. Until recently our staffs and fighting members were in prison and they were not released until August 1980. Naturally they were not the only ones in prison.

/Question/ What is your appraisal of the current stage and your position on democracy and the proliferation of parties?

/Answer/ In the current stage, the situation has experienced tangible progress whose roots go back to 1977, when the working class appeared on the stage as the most prominent social force in opposing its basic freedoms,trade union traditions were firmly implanted which the country had not known since colonialism, and other groups of people came running after them.

A disruption in the balance of forces resulted from this tide, especially in the social context. The structured framework of this tide was the trade union movement. In this atmosphere, the working class became the main social class and the consensus which had been built up about the regime started to shrink and break up and isolation increased. This social disruption created further disruption in the domestic balance in general and in the isolation of the regime abroad. At first, the regime tried, through a violent bloody confrontation which was aimed at the Union Federation, the center of gravity of the labor movement, to restore its lost balance, but it did not succeed in this, because of two important factors, first the working class' and labor movement's rejection of this dominance by the regime, their refusal to break under the blows, and their resistance to them, and second the worsening economic crisis of the regime, which could not control it as it had hoped through this blow.

Against the background of this deteriorating situation, the roots and the fuse of the Gafsa operation grew. This was tantamount to a warning signal which awakened the regime and made it clear to it that the horizon did not inspire confidence. Therefore, by pursuing a new policy, it is now trying to regain its balance under the title of liberalization.

The best indication of the development of the balance of power and the growth of the popular movement is the fact that it has succeeded in imposing a new areas of

confrontation. Previously, the regime had restricted demands to the economic context alone, that is, to organizing relations among "social parties." Today, however, the arena has become political as well, that is, one of struggle for democracy and freedoms.

In this context, the regime is acting on the basis of a modified policy, but the essence of its policy still is based on the spirit of exception and repression. Bearing obvious witness to that is the "national charter" it is propounding as a framework for organizing political life in the country.

/Question/ What is your position on the draft national charter?

/Answer/ Our view is clear: it proceeds from the position of protecting, unifying and developing the radical and democratic tendency which has appeared in Tunisian society. As far as we are concerned, there is no room to play the role of supporting the claim that democracy exists on the surface or of being a facade for this process, which an effort is being made to promote in the name of liberalization.

Our position may be summarized by the contention that the exercise of freedoms can be conditioned only by the protection they have against fascists and the enemies of freedom. Therefore we reject the ideological and political conditions which are aimed at putting pressure on political movements and defending the regime.

/Question/ Do you intend to present an official application to obtain a permit to issue a newspaper?

/Answer/ We have devoted all our powers to placing the struggle in the context of democratic combat because democracy offers better circumstances for developing political action.

Regardless of our intellectual democratic convictions, our practice itself has been based on adherence to freedoms, especially the freedom of the press and of organization. The most obvious proof of that is the fact that we have actually exercised our basic democratic rights, have not waited for permits from anyone, and have made every possible sacrifice.

However, we stress that when we resorted to secret activity that was not so much a choice of free will as one imposed upon us by non-democratic circumstances and by the absence of freedoms which prevailed and still is prevalent up to now. However, in spite of that, we do not today ignore the developments the democratic and mass movement has imposed, and we are determined to launch the struggle for the legitimacy of our organizational and journalistic activity and existence as a contribution on our part to the struggle for real freedoms, not in the context of an erroneous democratic game--regardless of the regime's readiness to grant us legitimacy by law--because legitimacy is won, not given, and we will, as we did in the past, continue the struggle for our freedom and right of expression and open political action.

/Question/ What in your view are the conditions which must be provided in order for the elections to be free?

/Answer/ In our opinion it is not possible for free elections to take place unless the following minimum conditions exist: issuance of a general parliamentary amnesty and improvement upon the partial measures which have been taken up to now, which remain a sword hanging over fighting political and trade union members; second, abrogation of unconstitutional laws, especially the Law Associations and the Press Law, which prevent political currents from exercising their rights; and third, review of the election law and provision of material and media resources to all political currents.

11887
CSO: 4504/40

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION IN ELECTIONS--The Tunisian presidential decree on the coming parliamentary elections (to take place in Tunisia 1 November 1981) is still the subject of debate among opposition political currents. The Tunisian Communist Party and the Social Democrats' Movement had previously recorded their reservations on this decree, which calls for legal permits to be granted to opposition movement only after they obtain a minimum of 5 percent of the votes. In the statement by the Islamic Movement of Tunisia, the leaders of that movement in turn expressed their reservations and their abstention from participation in the elections. In another area, the Popular Unity Movement /MUP/ (wing of Ahmed Ben Saleh, resident abroad) declared its rejection of this measure and renewed its application to obtain a legal permit, while the Popular Unity Movement (wing of El Hadj Ben Omar in Tunisia) expressed its readiness to embark on these elections, which it considers a suitable opportunity to assert itself domestically. The leaders of this wing declared their intention to issue a daily newspaper (AL-WAHDAH) as of next 1 September, that is, 2 months before the date of the special parliamentary elections. While the Social Democrats' Movement is the only one now permitted to issue a newspaper, the weekly AL-MUSTAQBAL, it is likely that the Popular Unity Movement (domestic wing) will receive a permit to issue a newspaper at least to sanctify the presidential decree through the movement's newspaper and restore a balance with AL-MUSTAQBAL, which rejects this decree. /Text/ /Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 11 Jul 81 pp 12, 13/11887

CSO: 4504/40 END

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No. 2387

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26 August 1981

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MOROCCAN ENVOY TO LIBYA PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

LD070447 Tripoli JANA in English 1716 GMT 6 Aug 81

[Text] Tripoli, 6 Aug (JANA)--'Abd al-Ati al-Ubaydi, secretary of the People's Committee of the Foreign Liaison Bureau, this morning received Maati Jorio who presented his credentials as Morocco's new ambassador to Jamahiriyah.

Mr Jorio delivered a speech expressing Morocco's sincere desire in working to consolidate relations between the two brotherly peoples in the Arab nation's interests and to develop ideal relations which would realize our nation's aims to thwart the conspiracies facing it.

He stressed, "the marginal differences between Arab countries disappear in the face of the blatant challenges confronting the Arab nation and its existence and civilization."

He stressed the necessity "for unifying Arab endeavours and energies in deploying them against the Arab nation's common enemy."

Referring to the mutual and sincere desire to consolidate bilateral relations, he said, "this will give us powerful impetus to deploy all our abilities in implementing this nationalist aim."

Al-Ubaydi responded by stressing the Libyan Arab people's readiness to strengthen relations with its brotherly Moroccan people. He said, "the leader's nationalist proposals, during the celebrations of the 11th anniversary of the American forces' evacuation, affirms this orientation."

He added "the Libyan Arab Brotherhood Bureau in Rabat will concentrate its efforts to consolidate these relations, develop them and advance them to realize the two brotherly people's ambitions. The Moroccan Embassy in Jamahiriyah will find all support and assistance to fulfill its role in strengthening bilateral relations."

He then provided the Moroccan ambassador with detailed explanations about direct democracy practiced in Jamahiriyah and the new organization of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and its role in strengthening the Libyan Arab people's relations with other peoples.

CSO: 4500/33

ORGANIZATION, ADMINISTRATION OF POLICE WARRANT OFFICERS INSTITUTE

Cairo AL-WAQA'I AL-MISRIYAH [THE EGYPTIAN MINUTES: SUPPLEMENT OF THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 125, 28 May 81 pp 3-27

[Ministry of Interior Decree Organizing Police Warrant Officers Institute]

[Text] Ministry of Interior Decree No 534 of 1981 Concerning Bylaws of Police Warrant Officers Institute:

The minister of interior,

After perusing law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority;

Ministerial decree No 196 of 1967 organizing the Training Agency;

Ministerial decree No 133 of 1968 on the regulations of the educational institutes of the Training Agency;

Ministerial decree No 1925 of 1969 establishing and organizing the Police Warrant Officers Institute;

Ministerial decree No 1527 of 1971 establishing and organizing the General and Specialized Training Center, of the Warrant Police Officers;

Ministerial decree No 1477 of 1980 reorganizing the General Personnel Affairs Department;

The memorandum of the first assistant minister of planning, followup and control, approved on 16 October 1980, on studying the issue of personnel and drawing practical solutions for it;

The memorandum of the General Organization and Administration Department, dated 8 March 1981;

And the approval of the Higher Police Council;

And in accordance with the State Council's opinion,

Has decreed:

Article 1: The General and Specialized Training Center of the Police Warrant Officers shall be merged with the Police Warrant Officers Institute and shall come under the direct control of the Training Agency director.

Article 2: The Police Warrant Officers Institute shall be headed by a commander who shall be in charge of managing and disposing of the institute's affairs in the various educational, military, disciplinary, athletic and administrative spheres in the manner outlined in detail in the attached bylaws.

Article 3: The rules contained in the attached bylaws shall apply to the Police Warrant Officers Institute.

In matters for which no rule is found in the attached bylaws, the regulations of the Training Agency Educational Institutes shall be applied.

Article 4: This decree shall be published in AL-WAQA'I AL-MISRIYAH and shall go into force on the day following its publication.

Issued on 16 March 1981.

Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il

Bylaws of Police Warrant Officers Institute

Article 1: The Police Warrant Officers Institute shall provide the police warrant officers with theoretical and applied education and training so that they may work in the various police agencies and shall prepare them for promotion to higher ranks.

The institute shall consist of the two following sections:

1. The general section which shall include the initial educational phase and the phase of specialized training.

2. The section providing training for promotion.

Article 2: The institute shall be headed by a commander with the proper rank who will be under the direct authority of the Training Agency director. He shall be assisted by a second commander with a lower rank for each of the two sections. Upon the commander's absence, the more senior of the two second commanders shall replace him.

The commander shall also be assisted by aides for the following tasks:

A. Educational affairs.

B. Training affairs.

C. Student affairs.

D. Administrative and financial affairs.

Chapter One

Rules Governing Acceptance, Enrollment and Registration at Institute

Article 3: The minister of interior, or whomever he delegates, shall set the number of students to be accepted at the institute each year in accordance with a recommendation submitted by the General Personnel Affairs Department at an adequate time before the date set for the start of studies and after consultation with the Higher Police Council.

The Training Agency director shall set the acceptance, enrollment and registration regulations, shall determine their dates and conditions and shall advertise them at least two weeks before the date set for the acceptance of enrollment applications.

Article 4: An applicant wishing to enroll in the initial phase [general section] of the institute shall be required to meet the following conditions:

1. Be an Egyptian citizen. Should he lose his citizenship while studying at the institute, he shall be dismissed.

2. Be of good conduct and reputation.

3. Not sentenced previously to a criminal penalty or to a penalty restricting freedom as a result of a crime violating honor or a trust.

4. Not dismissed previously from government service by a sentence or by a final disciplinary decision, unless at least four years have passed since issuance of the sentence.

5. Not dismissed previously on a disciplinary measure from any other institute or school because of misconduct.

6. Have a general secondary education certificate or its equivalent in the skilled specializations determined by the minister of interior on the recommendation of the Training Agency director.

7. Be physically fit to receive education and training. Should the student become physically unfit while studying, he shall be considered dismissed from the institute. Loss of physical fitness shall be determined by the medical authority concerned.

8. His age upon the start of studies shall not exceed 26 years.

9. He shall not be shorter than 167 centimeters, with a chest span of 84 centimeters at least.

10. Shall not be conscripted in the armed forces, unless he acquires their approval to enroll in the institute.

11. The student and his guardian or guarantor shall undertake in writing a consolidated commitment to repay the total sum of monies spent on the student and monies he collects [in salary] during his studies in case he resigns.

Article 5: The applicant must pass the physical and health fitness test in accordance with the conditions set by the Training Agency director.

Article 6: A committee to select new students in the institute shall be formed of:

The assistant minister of interior concerned as chairman.

The Training Agency director as member.

The director of the General Personnel Affairs Department as member.

The institute commander as member.

The second commander of the institute's general section as member.

Upon the absence of the committee chairman or one of its members, whoever performs the work duties of the absentee shall replace him [on the committee].

The selection committee shall issue its decisions by absolute majority. The decisions shall not be final until approved by the minister of interior.

Article 7: This committee shall select the students from among those who have acquired certificates meeting the needs of the authorities concerned in accordance with the plan drawn up for the academic year in which the students are accepted. In making its selection, the committee shall take into consideration:

The grade total, the newness of the educational qualification and the right age.

Article 8: No more than 15 percent of the total number of those whom it is decided to accept at the institute shall be exempted from the conditions stated in provisions 8 and 9 of article 4 and from the physical fitness condition referred to in article 5, provided that their age not exceed 28 years at the start of schooling. The exempted shall be from among the following categories:

1. The sons or brothers of persons martyred in defense of the country or the sons or brothers of policemen who have died during or because of the service.

2. The sons and brothers of persons lost in military operations

3. The sons of present and former police and armed forces officers.

4. The sons of present and former civil servants in the Ministry of Interior.

5. The sons of present and former members of the police organization.

6. Persons excelling athletically, provided that they submit certificates authenticated by the sports unions concerned.

Article 9: The Selection Committee's decision shall be published at the institute premises, at the Training Agency and at the Security Directorates Bureau.

An applicant whom it has been decided to accept at the institute shall present himself for enrollment within three weeks of the announcement of the committee decision.

Should the applicant fail to present himself on time, he shall be considered dismissed, unless he presents an excuse which the institute administration finds acceptable.

Article 10: The new students shall spend a three-month probation period to make sure of their moral, educational and disciplinary fitness to join the police corps.

If the student completes the probation period successfully, his name shall be registered as one of the institute's students. Any student who fails to complete the probation period successfully shall be dismissed from the institute on a decision by the Selection Committee explaining the reasons. This decision shall not become final until approved by the minister of interior.

Chapter Two

System of Study and Training at Institute

Article 11: The state shall shoulder the expenses of education, training, residence, food and the cost of training and (holiday) clothes for the students during their period of study at the institute's sections.

Article 12: A monthly recompense of 10 pounds shall be disbursed to the students during the period of their education in the first phase and during their vacation between the two phases.

Article 13: Studies in all sections of the institute shall be conducted in Arabic, in addition to teaching one or more foreign languages in accordance with the curricula on which a decision shall be issued by the Training Agency director.

The Training Agency director shall set the dates for the start and finish of the studies and the dates for the institute's annual examinations.

Article 14: Studies and training in the institute's general section shall consist of two stages:

First stage: Its duration shall be one academic year during which the students study the program prepared by the Training Agency. At the end of the year, a graduation examination shall be held and shall be followed by a vacation, with paid recompence, of no more than two months.

Second stage: Its duration shall be one academic year. At the beginning of this stage, students who complete the first stage successfully shall be appointed with the rank of warrant police officer, third class, on probation. In light of an ability test prepared for the graduates by the Training Agency in coordination with the ministry's authorities concerned, the graduates shall be distributed among the specializing groups [courses] in which the students receive disciplinary, police and specialized training.

Studies in this phase shall include:

First, General Training:

This includes general lectures for all students in various specializations in the following branches:

1. The police studies group [course]:

Police management and organization.

Police operations, advanced program.

Personnel and documentary security.

2. Criminal and social sciences group [course]:

The art of dealing with the masses.

Criminology.

Sociology.

Psychology.

3. The assisting studies group [course]:

A foreign language.

Spiritual and religious values.

Public symposiums.

4. Practical training, such as military and athletic training, advanced target shooting and typing--all in accordance with a program that is compatible with the students and that realizes the desired goal of training.

Other studies may be added, should the need arise, on a decision by the Training Agency director upon the recommendation of the institute administration or upon a request by one of the authorities concerned.

Second, Specialization Groups [courses]:

These include:

A. The secretarial specialization group which includes the police warrant officers who will specialize in office, administrative and financial activities, in filing, listing and other secretarial arts, in addition to typing.

B. The technical specializations group which includes warrant officers specializing in works requiring technical or scientific skills, such as radios, computers, vehicles, criminal evidence, firefighting and other specializations.

C. The public security specializations group which includes the warrant officers who will specialize in the various spheres of police action, such as (assistant duty officers) and patrol, traffic, port security officers and other duties.

D. The investigation specializations group which includes the warrant officers who are trained to work in the various fields of investigation.

Article 15: The police warrant officers may not assume their duties or be dispatched to the authorities in whose fields they have specialized before passing the examination of the second phase successfully.

Article 16: The warrant police officers nominated for promotion to higher ranks shall join the institute's section for promotion training to take training courses that seek to raise their capability and their awareness of their duties and to enhance their military discipline.

The active veteran warrant officers nominated to work in the ministry's various specialized fields may also join the specialized groups to enhance their ability in these fields.

In coordination with the:

The General Personnel Affairs Department,

And the General Organization and Administration Department,

The Training Agency director shall set the number of students in each course, the number and duration of the courses, the dates of their convocation and the subjects to be taught in them.

Article 17: The resignation of a student in the initial phase shall not be considered final without the approval of his guardian or guarantor and the ratification of the Training Agency director. In case the resignation is accepted, the student shall be made to repay the total sum spent on him and the recompense he collected during his period of study at the institute jointly with his guardian or guarantor and without undermining any administrative penalty imposed on him. The provisions of law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority shall be applied to students of the second phase or students in the section for promotion training [in case they submit their resignation].

Article 18: In case the student's resignation is accepted, the institute administration shall notify the conscription zone within whose jurisdiction the institute falls to deal with the resignee insofar as his conscription is concerned while taking into consideration the stipulations of the police authority law in this regard.

Article 19: A student may not absent himself from the institute, unless for a compulsory reason. Should he absent himself, he or his guardian shall notify the institute of the reasons compelling him to be absent. The institute administration shall assess the reasons. If the excuse is sickness, then the student must proceed to the institute for treatment. If this is impossible, then he must proceed to the nearest public hospital. The student or his guardian shall notify the institute of his admission to the said hospital. Else, the student shall be considered

unjustifiably absent and the institute shall take the necessary measures against him, unless the reasons for his absence are approved by the medical authority concerned and by the institute administration.

Article 20: If the total number of days in which the student is absent from his studies for any reasons exceeds 20 percent of the total actual school days, then he shall be denied participation in the first examination of the phase during which he has been absent. If his absence exceeds 50 percent of the actual school days, he shall be considered a repeater and shall be required to repeat the studies of that phase. His repeating shall be considered tantamount to wasting a chance for passing, unless the absence is due to sickness.

Article 21: The institute administration may grant the student, in emergency situations, a leave of no more than 72 hours at one time for the central area [meaning the area in which the institute is located]. Travel leave may be added to this period, depending on the circumstances of each case separately.

Article 22: A student at the institute shall pay a sum of 150 piasters monthly in return for the health insurance and the social, cultural and athletic activities at the institute.

The sum paid for a student's treatment outside the institute hospital may not exceed 20 pounds for each phase. Should the cost of the treatment exceed this sum, the student shall be treated in public hospitals or at his own expense.

A committee headed by the institute commander shall be formed to adopt the measures and to set the rules governing disbursements for such activities [treatment costs] and the justifications for these disbursements.

Chapter Three

Examination System

Article 23: An examination shall be held at the conclusion of the first phase in accordance with the conditions set by the Training Agency director in coordination with the institute director. The minister of interior shall approve the outcome of the examination and students passing the examination shall be awarded the Police Warrant Officers Institute's diploma.

Article 24: The institute commander shall approve the result of the specialized second phase examination and shall award the students completing this phase successfully a certificate attesting to their completion of the specialized studies.

Article 25: If a student fails to perform all or part of the examination for the two phases for a reason which the institute administration decides to accept, then he may take the second [make-up] examination only in the subjects which he had failed to take.

If the student passes the second [make-up] examination, he shall be credited with the grades he has scored for every subject.

The institute commander shall set the date and rules for the second [make-up] examination so that it may be held no more than one month after announcement of the results of the first examination.

Article 26: Should a student fail one or more subjects in the first phase, he shall be given a second examination only in the subjects he has failed. Should he pass the second [make-up] examination, he shall only be granted the lower end of the grades he scores.

Article 27: If a student in the first phase fails the make-up examination or fails to take this examination for any reason, he shall be considered a repeated and shall be denied one-half his monthly recompense, unless his failure to take the examination is due to a reason acceptable to the administration, in which case he shall not be denied one-half the recompense. If he repeats a second time, he may be dismissed from the institute or given a chance for a third time, but only on a decision by the assistant minister concerned and he shall be denied all or part of the monthly recompense.

Article 28: If a student fails one or more subjects in the second phase examination, he shall be given a make-up examination. If he fails in the make-up examination, he shall be referred to the military court for consideration.

Article 29: Any institute student who cheats or initiates an act of cheating in the examination shall be referred to the military court for consideration.

If the student is caught red-handed, he shall be expelled from the examination hall and shall be prohibited from sitting for the examination for the remaining subjects. This shall be done without violating the possibility of submitting the case for disciplinary action.

Article 30: The top students in the various specializations shall be awarded material and moral incentives on the recommendation of the commander of the Warrant Officers Institute.

Chapter Four

Student Discipline

Article 31: In addition to the rules spelled out in these bylaws, the institute students shall be subject to the directives and instructions issued by the institute administration, without violating the provisions of law No 109 of 1971 concerning the police authority.

The institute commander shall send an efficiency report on each second-phase student to the authority which the student will join after graduation.

Article 32: The disciplinary penalties that may be imposed on the students are:

1. Reprimand in private or in front of the students.

2. Additional services [chores], provided that they do not exceed five services monthly.

3. Additional exercises [al-tawabir], provided that they do not exceed three exercises at one time.

4. Delaying departure from the institute until the morning of official vacations and holidays.

5. Detention at institute during official vacations and holidays. One-fourth a grade shall be deducted for every week of this kind of penalty, beginning with the second week.

6. Deduction from the attendance and conduct grades to a maximum of two grades at one time.

7. Deduction from the recompense, not to exceed the recompense of two days at one time and provided that the total deduction from first-phase students doesn't exceed the recompense of 15 days per entire academic year.

8. Stripping away honor ranks given to veteran students or students excelling in any field or demotion to a lower rank.

9. Solitary confinement for a period of no more than 14 consecutive days.

One-half a conduct grade shall be deducted for each day of this kind of penalty.

10. Cancellation of a student's examination in one or more subjects.

11. Denial of one of the two [first and make-up] examinations or both examinations and considering this denial the using of a chance to pass.

12. Final dismissal from the institute for first-phase students.

Article 33: The following authorities shall be empowered to impose the penalties:

Platoon commanders and officers up to the rank of captain: [Empowered to impose] the penalties stipulated in provisions 1-4.

Company commanders and officers up to the rank of lieutenant colonel: Penalties stipulated in provisions 1-5, provided that the detention does not exceed one week at a time.

Battalion commanders and officers up to the rank of colonel: The penalties stipulated in provisions 1-5, provided that the detention doesn't exceed two weeks at a time.

Commander's aides: The penalties stipulated in provisions 1-6, provided that the detention doesn't exceed two weeks at a time.

Institute's second commander: The penalties stipulated in provisions 1-8. As for the penalty stipulated in provision 9, namely the penalty of solitary confinement, the second commander may impose it for a period of no more than 196 hours at a time.

Institute commander: Provisions 1-9.

Military court: All provisions.

A high-ranking officer (delegated to work at the institute) may impose the penalty of solitary confinement for a period of no more than 24 hours, in addition to the other penalties to which he is empowered by his rank or his original duty.

Article 34: Any first-phase student who stays away from studies at the institute without permission or legal justification shall not be entitled to the recompense for the days he misses.

Article 35: The decisions on disciplinary penalties shall be final. The sentences issued by the military court shall not become final unless approved by the Training Agency director within 15 days of the date on which the papers are presented to him. If this period passes without ratification, cancellation or mitigation of the sentence, then the sentence shall be considered final.

The Training Agency director shall be entitled to mitigate or abolish the penalty and his decision in this regard shall be final.

The minister of interior shall be empowered to mitigate or abolish the disciplinary penalties and the penalties imposed by a sentence from the military court after they are ratified [by the Training Agency director].

Article 36: The order issued for a disciplinary penalty or the sentence of the military court may be suspended if justification for such a suspension is found in the student's conduct, his past or in the circumstances under which he committed the offense for which he is punished.

The suspension may also include the subsequent measures.

The order to suspend implementation of the disciplinary penalty shall be abolished if the student is punished with a similar or a lesser penalty before the lapse of one full month on the imposition of the suspended disciplinary penalty.

Article 37: The institute's military court shall be formed:

Under the chairmanship of the institute's second commander;

And with the institute's two most senior officers, appointed by the institute commander annually, as original members and the two second most senior officers as reserve members.

The court secretary shall be an officer appointed by the institute commander.

If there is any reason to prevent the institute's second commander from heading the court, he shall be replaced by the second most senior officer in the institute.

Referral to the military court shall be on a decision by the institute commander and the trial procedures shall be subject to the provisions of the martial rules law.

Article 38: The student must be notified of the decision to refer him to the military court and of the date of the trial at least 48 hours before it starts.

The student shall be notified in writing at the institute or at his actual place of residence of the trial decision and of the charges against him.

Should the student fail to appear before the court without excuse despite being notified of the referral decision or if he produces an excuse unacceptable to the court, then the court may try him in absentia.

But if the student fails to appear for an excuse acceptable to the court, the trial shall be postponed to another date of which the student is notified in the manner described in the first paragraph of this article.

Article 39: If the student commits an act necessitating his punishment after taking the examination or during the holiday between the two phases conduct marks shall be deducted, regardless of whether the penalty is original or subsequent, from the total grades of the first school phase. His position shall then be determined in light of the subsequent results.

Article 40: If a student absents himself from the institute without permission, one mark shall be conducted from the attendance grades for each of the first 10 days and one-quarter mark for each subsequent day, unless another penalty is imposed on him for this absence.

Chapter Five

Institute's Sections and Administration

Article 41: The institute shall consist of the following sections and units:

A. The educational affairs section.

B. The training section.

C. The students affairs section.

D. The administrative and financial affairs section.

E. The technical research unit.

F. The [public] relations unit.

Article 42: The institute commander, with the aid of the Education Council, shall supervise all sections of the institute and shall supervise directly the technical research unit and the relations unit.

Article 43: The institute commander shall have the following powers:

Draw up the institute's work policy and coordinate its various sections and units.

Nominate teachers and instructors, draw up a plan to train them and observe the implementation of this plan, set the rules for evaluating them and follow up on the evaluation results.

Observe the holding of examinations and follow their procedures through the final phases.

Establish permanent directives to organize the institute's work.

Review the inspection reports concerning the institute to remedy any shortcomings revealed by the inspection and implement any recommendations approved by the Training Agency.

Prepare proposals to reorganize the institute, to modify the tasks of its various sections and units and to develop its curricula and its training methods.

Prepare the annual report on the institute's work and present it to the Training Agency.

Article 44: The educational affairs section shall be in charge of supervising the following aspects of activity:

Prepare, coordinate and issue the teaching programs.

Plan the curricula, have them approved by the Education Council and follow up on their implementation.

Secure educational aid and organize its distribution and use.

Organize the holding of examinations, prepare their results and present them for approval and announcement.

Prepare the progress reports for the various groups.

It shall be in direct supervision of the study plan and the educational and examination affairs unit.

Article 45: The study plan unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the study plan, present it to the Education Council and follow up its implementation after it is approved.

Prepare the study programs and announce them to the sections concerned after it presents them to the Education Council and after they are approved.

Nominate the teachers necessary to implement the study plan and present the nominations to the Education Council and the Training Agency.

Notify the agencies and authorities to which the teachers delegated to instruct at the institute belong so that they may approve the delegation.

Prepare the study lists and notify the teachers whose delegation is approved of the academic programs and dates.

Issue instructions organizing the course of work in the unit and announce these instructions to the various sections and units after they are presented to the Education Council and approved.

Prepare the statements of teaching recompense, record them and deliver them after consultation with the financial affairs.

Make a count of the textbooks for the various courses and secure them before the start of each course.

Collect the notifications concerning the institute teachers, whether the notifications to attend meetings or the notifications summoning them to the administration.

Prepare the records on the various necessary data concerning the teachers.

Article 46:

A. The educational affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Implement the study plan and notify the plan unit of the parts of the plan completed as soon as they are completed.

Make a daily check of teachers' presence and absence and present the result to the commander.

Observe regular holding of studies in all classes and prepare the daily reports on the teachers' presence.

Plan to keep classes from which teachers are absent occupied through cooperation with the study plan unit and within the limits of the program prepared for these classes.

Prepare a daily list of the names of the teachers and of the hours each of them has taught and deliver it, along with the daily attendance sheets, to the study plan unit.

Prepare a report before the conclusion of [the studies of] each group evaluating the educational situation concerning all the subjects taught and present it to the institute commander so that the teachers of the classes lagging behind may be notified to complete teaching the subject before the end of the group [course period].

Contact the teachers and discuss with them the memoranda [study materials] prepared according to the program of each subject and present them to the institute commander after they are approved by the Education Council so that he may take the necessary measures to have them printed before the start of the new study groups [course].

Submit the proposals made by any of the teachers and implement whatever decisions are made on these proposals.

B. The unit shall also prepare the following records:

A record of the minutes of the meetings of the teachers, including the date of meeting, the names of those present, the issues raised, a summary of the discussions in the meetings and the recommendations resulting from these meetings.

A record for each student group containing a daily count of the hours taught by each teacher according to the daily attendance sheets.

A daily record book on the presence, absence and tardiness of teachers.

Article 47: The examinations unit shall have the following tasks:

Make preparations for holding the examinations on the dates set by the study plan.

Prepare the seating numbers for the students in cooperation with the student affairs section.

Supervise implementation of the instructions issued on the holding of examinations and present the outcome of the committees' implementation of these instructions.

Prepare a list of the examination committees for each subject and present this list for approval.

Contact the committees that prepare the examinations with enough time before the examinations to obtain from them the questions for each examination and the ideal answers to the questions.

Take the necessary measures to print the examinations, taking into consideration the required confidentiality.

Prepare the answer papers and have them sealed with the seal of the institute commander.

Make a count of the truant and sick students staying at outside hospitals in cooperation with the student affairs section and do the necessary insofar as these students are concerned.

Continue the control procedures, distribute the examination papers, along with the ideal answers, for the purpose of correction, re-collect the papers and enter the grades in the cards and record books prepared for the purpose, taking the required confidentiality into consideration.

Prepare lists of the results, present them and announce them in cooperation with the student affairs section after these results are approved.

Study and analyze the results of the examinations and present the outcome of the study [to institute commander].

Prepare the graduation certificates, have them approved and send them to the authorities concerned.

Prepare the records, files and cards concerning examination affairs and prepare the instructions pertaining to them.

Article 48: The training section shall have the following tasks:

Draw up the annual training plan for the institute's officers, personnel and students.

Draw up the plan to prepare the teachers and assistant teachers by holding local courses and by nominating them for training courses abroad in accordance with the Training Agency's annual training plan.

Provide the officers and the teachers with the (instruction materials) for the various training branches.

Supervise supplying the unit with the training aids necessary for the various training branches.

Draw up the plan (to procure various items), such as instruments, equipment and clothing, in participation and coordination with the institute's officers.

Prepare records--cards--containing all the training data pertaining to all the institute workers.

Supervise the target shooting exercises [tawabir darb al-nar] and take part in giving lectures on weapons.

Record the activity of the institute's assistant instructors and make an evaluation of each of them.

The training section shall also be in direct control of training, target shooting, athletic and military training and library aid materials.

Article 49: The training aid materials unit shall have the following tasks:

Secure the training aid materials for the institute according to the actual needs.

Exert efforts to develop the training aid materials in a manner compatible with the development of education.

Keep a record of the training aid materials in the institute and preserve and maintain them.

Print and publish the references, memoranda and other educational and training documents belonging to the institute.

The shooting unit shall have the following tasks:

Train weapon instructors and supply them with equipment constantly and according to the program and exert efforts to unify their performance method.

Follow up implementation of the weapon training programs according to the curriculum and familiarize itself with the standard of absorption and performance.

Prepare and supply the firearms--submachineguns, handguns and rifles--and take the necessary measures to repair damaged weapons.

Supervise directly the shooting exercises and the disbursement of ammunition.

Collect the empty shells found in the firing range, along with ammunition consumption statements, and return the empty shells and the statements to the warehouse units.

Prepare, supply and maintain (shooting mats and targets).

Record the results of the examinations of students in the study groups and make an evaluation of their shooting standard.

Prepare the books, files and cards necessary for these activities.

Article 51: The physical education unit shall have the following tasks:

Supervise the institute's athletic games hall and fields, supply them with the necessary equipment and instruments and maintain them.

Train the institute students and workers in accordance with the athletic education programs and the self-defense methods.

Form athletic teams at the institute and supervise their training.

Supervise the dispensation and retrieval of sports clothes and instruments.

Make proposals to develop the athletic programs and self-defense.

Record the athletic results of the training courses and evaluate the level of the students.

Organize and keep the necessary files and records.

Article 52: The military training unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the military training programs for the various courses according to the approved curricula.

Supervise implementation by the instructors of the programs drawn up for each course.

Exert efforts to enhance the standard of the instructors and to continue development of the military training programs.

Organize and keep the necessary files and records.

Article 53: The library unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the library budget in cooperation with the publication section of the Training Agency.

Keep up with scientific writings so as to procure the latest books and references needed for teaching and training at the institute.

Organize internal and external [book] loans.

Record, classify, maintain and keep the books and references in the library.

Establish, organize and keep files, records and cards concerning the library.

Article 54: The student affairs section shall consist of battalions and companies, depending on the number of students, and shall have the following tasks:

Receive the students, familiarize them with the institute's work and study procedures, watch their attendance of classes and training on the scheduled dates and record their absence from and their discontinuance of their studies.

Care for the students' cultural, health, living and social affairs and help them solve the problems and overcome the difficulties that face them.

Investigate issues affecting the students' morale and present them, with recommendations, to the institute commander and the institute's second commander.

Conduct the investigations which the institute decides to conduct with the students and complete the investigations received by the institute in this regard.

Express its opinion on the leave permits that the student ask for, observe their use of the leave, their return from it and record the leave in their files.

Observe the students' performance of the tasks which the institute permits them to perform and observe their return from such tasks.

Coordinate visits and contacts and organize the delivery of mail belonging to the students.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for performing the abovementioned tasks.

Article 55: The administrative and financial affairs section shall take charge of the institute's administrative and financial affairs in a manner that guarantees that such services are performed properly at the institute.

The section shall consist of the personnel affairs unit, the administrative affairs unit, the secretarial unit, the supply unit and the financial affairs unit.

Article 56: The personnel affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Organize the service affairs of the institute's regular and civilian workers--affairs such as appointment, promotion, termination of service, transfer, delegation, leaves, penalties and so forth.

Record, issue and announce the institute's daily directives.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for the above-mentioned activities.

Article 57: The administrative affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Coordinate the services of the institute's regular and civilian workers and observe their arrival and departure.

Organize vehicle services and control the use, (fuelling) and maintenance of vehicles.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for the said activities.

Article 58: The secretarial unit shall have the following tasks:

Collect, sort out and distribute the institute's incoming and outgoing mail.

Organize the writing, copying, recording and filing operations.

Establish, organize and keep the files, records and cards necessary for these activities.

Article 59: The supply unit shall have the following tasks:

Organize the process of providing the institute with supplies and follow up the implementation of this process.

Coordinate the kitchen, restaurant and laundromat services and the other utilities required for institute's students and workers.

Manage and control the help serving in the said utilities.

Article 60: The financial affairs unit shall have the following tasks:

Prepare the institute's draft budget and propose the new financial plans.

Carry out the measures pertaining to contracts, purchases and supplies.

Organize the process of expense accounting, auditing and control.

Organize the warehouses and supervise the institute [premises].

Article 61: the technical research unit shall have the following tasks:

Sum up the experience gained from teaching and training and make proposals to develop the programs in cooperation and coordination with the various sections and units concerned.

Conduct studies connected with the institute's message, mission and teaching and training policy, organize the teachers' and instructors' participation in these studies, examine their recommendations and make conclusions on their outcome.

Keep up with the constant development in the crime and police sciences and in the methods, means and instruments of training and make it easy for the teachers and the instructors to familiarize themselves with this development.

Article 62: The relations unit shall have the following tasks:

Disseminate awareness of the institute's message, goals, tasks and accomplishments in cooperation with the various sections and units concerned.

Organize celebrations, visits and trips in cooperation and coordination with the authorities concerned.

Spend from the institute personnel recreation fund on the purposes for which the fund is allocated.

Coordinate the information operation.

Article 63: The institute's Education Council shall be comprised of:

The institute commander as chairman;

The second commander of each section, the commander's aides and the head of the technical research unit as members.

The Training Agency director may add to the Education Council members any experienced people he deems fit to add, to the limit of three members.

The technical research unit chief or his deputy shall carry out the duties of council secretary and shall supervise the council's permanent secretariat.

Article 64: The Education Council shall draw up the institute's work policy, shall follow up its implementation, shall evaluate its results, shall investigate the shortcomings or drawbacks in the spheres of teaching and training and shall propose the proper solutions for them.

The council shall also have the following tasks:

Draw up the institute's teaching and training plan, follow up its implementation and evaluate its results.

Set the institute's teaching and training methods, evaluate the curricula and the programs and propose their modification and development.

Approve the plan for training the teachers and the instructors.

Follow up the holding of examinations and tests, evaluate their results and discuss and assess the success reports.

Review the reports on inspections of the institute, study their results and recommendations and propose the means to deal with the shortcomings and drawbacks revealed by the inspection.

Discuss the institute's teaching and training problems, make proposals and recommendations on them and follow up the outcome of these proposals and recommendations.

Draw up the plan for spending from the appropriations allocated for the institute's training aid materials.

Approve the permanent directives concerning the institute's system issued by the institute director.

The council's decisions shall not become effective until approved by the Training Agency director.

Article 65: The council shall meet according to the institute commander's decision and its decisions shall be issued by absolute majority.

The minutes and decisions of the council meetings shall be recorded in a special file. The issues on which the council makes proposals or recommendations shall be referred to the Training Agency for consideration.

General Rules

Article 66: In exception from articles 4 and 11 of these bylaws, the minister of interior may approve the enrollment of students from the Arab or friendly countries. In this case, the students may be exempted from one or more of the acceptance conditions stipulated in article 4, provided that their state shoulder all the expenses in free currency, unless the minister decides to exempt them from all or part of these expenses.

Article 67: Supervision and observance of the first-phase students shall be performed by second-phase students selected from among those excelling educationally and militarily and given the following honorary ranks:

X First Sergeant X Sergeant X Corporal

Interim Rules

Article 68: Police warrant officers may be enrolled in the institute for training or for specialized studies when there is a need for such enrollment and only in accordance with a decision by the minister of interior.

8494
CSO: 4504/18

'OPEN WAR' HAS SUCCEEDED 'CONFLICT OF TENDENCIES'

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French No. 329 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by Ahmad Faroughy--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] As predicted, on 24 July the Iranians elected Mr Ali Raja'i, the current prime minister, as president of the republic. He thus succeeds Mr Bani Sadr, whose removal was officially announced by Parliament on 21 June.

The four candidates who entered the lists in the presidential election had the endorsement of the Islamic Republic Party. But while the number of individuals allowed to participate in the political arena was thus reduced, divergences within the Shiite movement have become exacerbated to such a point that one must now describe it in terms of open warfare.

The victory won by Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr in the presidential elections of January 1980 over the religious candidates; the clergy's success as a bloc within the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) in the legislative elections of May 1980; the IRP's effort to limit the prerogatives of the chief of state; and finally the process unleashed by the party that led to the dismissal of Bani Sadr in June, have brought out into the open the merciless struggle between factions which has always divided the political wing of Iranian Shiism.

In effect, the various groups which carry the banner of Islam today in Iran have been in continual conflict over the political interpretation to be given to that religion, particularly with respect to the organization of the state. Two broad tendencies can be seen, however: one tendency preaches an Islamic state without the government being in the grip of the clerical apparatus; the other aspires to a theocratic state. Among the various groups favoring the first tendency, the strongest organization at present is that of the mojahedin of the people; as for the theocrats, they have coalesced within the IRP, which enjoys the unconditional support of Imam Khomeyni.

This split was revealed for the first time in the early 1960's. Some adherents of the (Mossadeghist) National Front--at that time the principal force in opposition to the shah's dictatorship--were dissatisfied with the secular and socialistic orientation of the front, and decided to leave it in order to found the Iran

Liberation Movement (MLI). Among its leaders were Mehdi Bazargan, who was later to become the first head of government of the Islamic republic. In addition to the nationalist, constitutionalist, and anti-imperialist positions of the Front, the MLI added the political dimension of Islam, saying that in a Moslem nation /"religion cannot be separate from political affairs."/ Unlike the National Front, which became increasingly secular, the MLI wanted to be the political expression of Iranian Shiism; it tried to build a bridge between the leftist intellectuals and the Muslim faithful. However, the religious insurrection of June 1963, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeyni, and the repression which followed it spurred the left wing of the MLI to break away from that movement, which was condemned as too tepid in terms of Islamic militancy and too legalistic in its tactics vis-a-vis the shah. The MLI dissidents decided therefore to go to armed struggle against the Pahlavi regime. In 1965, three of them--Mohammad Hanifnedjad, Ali Asghar Badizadegan and Said Mohsen--formed the Organization of Combatants for the People of Iran, popularly known as the mojahedin. Over the years, the central core expanded, and a goodly number of new recruits were sent to be trained in Palestinian camps.

In August 1971, SAVAK (the political police) arrested Said Mohsen. In his pleadings before the military tribunal of Tehran[1] he briefly described the economic ideology which inspired the mojahedin and which, in substance, contradicted those of the theocrats, who were now under the undisputed leadership of Ayatollah Khomeyni.

/"In economic terms,"/ said Said Mohsen to the military court, /"we think that increasing production can only be made possible by mobilization of the people... This movement can only succeed if it takes account of two factors. First, the need for a profound change in attitudes and an elevation in the level of revolutionary awareness... The result of this will be to change people's thinking. Everyone feels himself responsible to others and toward the generations to come, thereby increasing solidarity between people, which is the will of the Creator. Individualism and private interest will disappear... Secondly, mobilization of the masses should be carried out in their interests, and not in the interests of those in a privileged class of capitalists and exploiters. If not, that same mobilization would become a means to perpetuate and accentuate the exploitation of man by man... If man can do what he wishes with himself, he should also have the possibility of controlling what he produces... It is for this reason that we do not accept the principle that anyone other than the producers have the right to make use of the fruits of their work."/ "That which the people harvest should not feed other mouths." /"This principle summarizes our economic conception of the future society: it results from our faith in Islam."/

The Mojahedin Against the Theologians

To this anticapitalist economic conception, which would later become even more resolutely collectivist, basing itself on a "socialist" interpretation of the Koran--the mojahedin add a vision of an organic organization of political life in the Islamic community. In short, this community should become its own "imam," guiding itself along the path to God, leaning toward a classless society without hierarchies and in oneness (/towhid/) with Him. The leadership of this community would emerge spontaneous from the base, so the theological class could not claim to exercise power. The refusal to yield leadership of the community to a class of theologian

savants arises thus from the fact that, for the mojahedin, Islam is opposed to classes, to social divisions, and above all does not recognize the clergy. It is on these basic points that the ideology preached by the mojahedin is categorically opposed to that of the Ayatollah Khomeyni.

In fact, to the thinking of the future imam of the Islamic republic[2], /"Islamic government is the government of Divine law over the people. This is what constitutes the fundamental difference between Islamic government and other constitutional governments, both monarchic and republican. Another fact of capital importance is that in these regimes the elected representatives of the people or the monarch make the laws, while in Islam the only lawmaker is God, the Holy Legislator."/

For the Ayatollah Khomeyni, the Islamic community should be governed in accordance with Koranic law and the /hadiths/ handed-down(stories which are the most important reference source outside the Koran). But who is in a better position to interpret them than the /faqih/ (the jurist specializing in the /feqh/, the theological sciences as a whole)/ Thus, /"Islamic government being the government of the Law, the doctors of Law and the theologians or faqihs must therefore be its guardians. It is they who watch over all executive, administrative, and planning affairs."/ In short, the administration of the state must be in the hands of the clerical apparatus: in the eyes of Ayatollah Khomeyni, only a theocracy can guarantee the strict application of the laws revealed by God and transmitted by the Prophet and his companions. So the idea of a "spontaneous," organic, classless society, and above all a society without clergy, is set against the mojahedin's idea of a society subject to divine immutable laws of which the mullahs are the interpreters: the Moslem secularism of the mohahedin against the Islamic theory of Imam Khomeyni[3].

In the economic domain, the founder of the Islamic republic shows himself just as hostile to the mojahedin ideology as he is in the political domain. Conservative, a defender of capitalist enterprise and private property, Ayatollah Khomeyni asks only that the fiscal system called for by Islam--/djazie, kharadj, khoms and zakat/--be well administered. /"It is the responsibility of officials of the Islamic government to determine and then collect the taxes correctly and in a manner proportional to incomes, and finally to spend them for the good of the Moslems."/ Beyond that, the ayatollah confines himself to stating that it is the duty of the governing clerical apparatus to /"struggle against illegal profits, illicit gains,"/ without ever throwing into question the existing economic system[4]. These two tendencies were to coexist as long as the shah remained in power, the militants on either side preferring to work together to defeat the common enemy. By contrast, as soon as the regime fell, their alliance made no more sense.

Thus, the mojahedin are not represented on the Revolutionary Council, the supreme decision-making body which replaced the monarchic institutions--nor are they in Mr Bazargan's provisional government. The subsequent ostracism of the mojahedin by the imam is not limited to their exclusion from decision-making at the national level; it was also expressed, starting in spring 1979, by implacable criticism on radio and television of their activities and statements. Harassments and provocations, intimidation and brutality on the part of the pasdarans (Islamic militia) obliged the mojahedin to work semi-clandestinely, starting only a few months after

the fall of the Pahlavi regime. Two factors, finally, were to exacerbate the division in the Islamic movement, and would result in the violent conditions--verging on civil war--in which Iran today finds itself engulfed: the activities of the IRP and the establishment of the new state institutions.

Founded in March 1979 under the direction of Imam Khomeyni, the IRP immediately set itself the goal of monopolizing the key positions of power. But it had to eliminate liberals and secular nationalists who, under Bazargan's provisional government, had set themselves to opposing the arbitrary controls the clerical apparatus had clamped on the wheels of state. The prime minister and his MLI-National Front coalition cabinet showed themselves, however, to be incapable of stopping the irresistible rise of the PRI: the party enjoyed the support of the imam while they themselves were barely supported by the mojahedin, who never had confidence in the MLI and the National Front, preferring henceforth to see themselves excluded from the government rather than to sustain their struggle against the rising theocracy.

Thus, after the resignation of the Bazargan cabinet in November 1979, and following the purges within the state apparatus, the arbitrary imprisonments and the summary executions, the PRI finally found itself fully in control of Iranian political power. In order to govern, it nevertheless had to transform this /de facto/ power into /de jure/ power, as in the imam's view the supreme authority within the Islamic republic resided in the Parliament, which is responsible for ensuring that the administration of the state is being carried out in accordance with divine law. By giving primacy to parliamentary authority, this institutional structure enabled the theocrats who sat in it to paralyze, then to dismiss Abol-Hassan Bani Sadr--the first president of the republic--when he tried, like Bazargan, to oppose the hegemony of the IRP.

In effect, the constitution elaborated by the experts--including Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the IPR--and approved by a referendum in December 1979--allows Parliament at any time to control, censure, or countermand the actions of the president of the republic. The latter is quite limited in other respects too: according to Article 113 of the constitution, the role of the head of state is confined to /"coordination of relations among the three branches of government."/ According to articles 123 and 124, /"the president is obliged to sign the decrees of parliament"/ and can only /"propose a candidate for prime minister,"/ the latter's appointment depending on a vote of acceptance by Parliament. The executive power is held by a government that is constantly subject to draconian Parliamentary control.

Bani Sadr's election as president of the republic in January 1980 over the candidates of the IPR was a Pyrrhic victory: in May, the theocratic party won the legislative elections, obtaining an overwhelming majority of seats in the Parliament. Hoping to be the leader of a third force, situated between the mojahedin and the IPR, Bani Sadr was in fact crushed between the two rival movements. His presidential duties prevented him from moving closer to the mojahedin--described by the imam as /"traitors to Islam"/--while his constant criticism of the IRP's actions alienated the supporters of theocracy. The undeniable popularity of the chief of state with all classes of the population were nevertheless of little help in the face of the omnipotence of the clerical apparatus: the prisoner of a constitution which limited his jurisdiction, he refused to choose between

submission to the diktats of the IRP or resignation, opting instead for passive resistance. Thus, laborious negotiations between the chief of state and the IRP on the subject of the composition of the government began in summer 1980 and continued for more than 4 months. Nevertheless, in late September Bani Sadr saw Mohammad-Ali Raja'i, a confidant of Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the IRP, imposed as his prime minister. Immediately upon his appointment, the latter did everything possible in an effort to wrest away what little authority the secularists--thanks to Bani Sadr's presidency--still retained within the state apparatus.

Kept out of governmental decisions, the Iranian president played no role in the final resolution of the affair of the American hostages, which was entrusted by the imam to Parliament, while the prime minister was given the responsibility to implement its decisions. The Iraqi attack against Iran in late September 1980, and the war which followed, nevertheless enabled the chief of state to exercise the only authority he still unquestionably possessed, that of commander in chief of the armed forces. All the same, even on the front lines, the pasdarans (Islamic militia are also found to be the military wing of the IRP) participated in the fighting in an autonomous manner, beyond the control of the army, and thus of the president.

Increasingly stripped of the means to take any action, boycotted by radio and television, which did not report anything except the activities of the government and the Parliament, Bani Sadr launched a campaign through his newspaper REVOLUTION ISLAMIQUE against the decisions of the Raja'i cabinet and the monopolization of power by the clergy. The increasingly critical tone of REVOLUTION ISLAMIQUE--the newspaper at that time had the largest circulation of any Iranian publication--incited Ayatollah Beheshti, who, in addition to being the head of the IRP was also president of the Supreme Court, to launch a major offensive against the president.

The Final Enemies

In the first months of 1981, the leaders of the PRI perceived, in effect, the danger of a possible tactical alliance between the partisans of the chief of state and the mojahedin against the theocratic power. Their fears were reinforced in early March, when violent confrontations on the campus of the University of Tehran pitted supporters of Bani Sadr--for the first time joined by mojahedin--against the men of the IRP.

The conflict between the president and the theocratic party became more bitter after these events. The chief of state thenceforth refused to ratify a goodly number of governmental and parliamentary decisions, and in particular the one which made Prime Minister Raja'i the interim minister of foreign affairs. In order to resolve this conflict, the imam appointed an arbitration commission composed of three members of the clergy who were notorious for their pro-IRP bias, who found against Bani Sadr, and called for the shutting down of his newspaper, which was accused of /"sowing discord"/: this was carried out in early June. More and more convinced by Ayatollah Beheshti that the chief of state was an obstacle to theocratic power, the imam ended by setting himself openly on the IRP's side: on 10 June, the "guide of the revolution" relieved Bani Sadr of his responsibilities as commander in chief of the armed forces, while Ayatollah Beheshti implicitly

confirmed that the president would be prosecuted for having violated the constitution by refusing to ratify decisions of the government. On 13 June, fearing for his life, the president fled into hiding: so the machinery that would inevitably lead to his dismissal was set in motion. In effect, on 20 June, under constitutional procedures, the IRP members of parliament voted to delcare the head of state /"politically imcompetent"/ and the same night an arrest warrant was issued for him. However, according to article 110 of the constitution it is Imam Khomeyni who has, in the last resort, /"the power to discharge the president of the republic in the interests of the country, after the Supreme Court has decreed that the chief of state failed to perform his legal responsibilities or after the Parliament has noted to declare him lacking in political competence"/: the "guide of the revolution" made use of this right the next day after the parliamentary vote.

Having thus swept aside the only obstacle to their total domination of the apparatus of the state, are the theocrats now going to hurl themselves against the only enemies who may still be capable of challenging their leadership of the country: the mojahedin? The dismissal of Bani Sadr marked an important turning point in the implacable factional struggle the mojahedin and the IRP are waging for leadership of the Iranian Shiite political movement. The bloody confrontations between the mojahedin and the pasdarans on the eve of the fall of the chief of state, the summary executions the following day, the attack on 28 June which decimated the leadership of the IRP--killing Ayatollah Beheshti, four ministers, six deputy ministers and one-fourth of the PRI parliamentary group--the wave of arrests, the dozens of executions of leftist militants--including a number of mojahedin--as well as the many armed attacks against the regime which have taken place since then, lead one to think that the conflict of tendencies within the Islamic movement has now been transformed into open war.

FOOTNOTES

1. Documents of the Iranian Revolutionary Movement, "Organization of the Moudjahiddin of the Iranian People" (Volume I), ed. Abu-Dhar in Farsi, 1977 (published clandestinely).

2. Cf. Houkoumate-Eslami, Nadjaf (Iraq), 1971. Transcription of the political reflections of Imam Khomeyni. French translation, "Toward an Islamic Government," Paris, Fayolle, 1979.

3. We note here that Iran is a special case, for the secular-clerical conflict is played out within the Islamic movement and not outside of it, as in the case of other Muslim countries. Cf. Ahmad Faroughy, "Secularism and Theocracy in the Near East," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, November 1980.

4. Cf. "Toward an Islamic Government," pp 37 and 103.

9516
CSO: 4619/25

PAPER QUESTIONS U.S. MIDEAST NUCLEAR PLAN

JN150744 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 15 Aug 81 pp 1, 18

[Editorial: "The Nuclear Weapons in the Middle East and the U.S. Efforts To Restrict Their Proliferation"]

[Text] The news published yesterday on U.S. efforts to conclude a charter banning the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East means that Washington is seeking through all possible means to prevent any of the region's states from obtaining nuclear weapons in order to guarantee that only the Zionist entity could possess these weapons and to eventually guarantee a continued Israeli military supremacy and a continued U.S.-Zionist hegemony over the region's peoples and destinies.

Washington knows better than others that Israel is the only party among the Middle East states which possesses nuclear weaons and that it is also the only party which has not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. It has rejected any surveillance over the Dimona reactor despite its allegation that this reactor is used for peaceful purposes.

It is obvious that the U.S. choice of this particular time to start its efforts is linked with the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and with the Iraqi Government's serious efforts to rebuild this reactor, which will, of course, be subjected to international surveillance. Hence, one understands that the U.S. efforts in this regard will include negotiations with the big powers, something which means that Washington will try to exert pressure on the French and other governments which may cooperate with Iraq in rebuilding its peaceful nuclear reactor in order to make them stop this cooperation.

Consequently, the question Washington has to answer is: Will Israel abide by the abovementioned agreement? Will this abidance mean the removal of the nuclear weapons Israel currently possesses, or will Israel, at least, agree to subject its nuclear installations to international surveillance? If the answer is positive, the Arab states will certainly be the first to welcome the efforts the United States is talking about and all the efforts aimed at keeping nucelar threat away from the region.

CSO: 4804/115

SHARON'S NEW POLICY TRIES TO DECEIVE ARABS

JN151818 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 15 Aug 81

[Station commentary: "The Israeli Policy of Leniency Is an old Policy in a new Form"]

[Text] Israeli Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon stressed that Israeli soldiers will not behave like masters of an invaded land. They will behave as guards of peace whose task is to keep order and to secure the citizens' security and welfare. In other words, Israeli soldiers will deal with the people of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as guards of security and not as invading soldiers.

What Sharon stressed is not the result of a new philosophy but of a new method of dealing with the people of the Bank and Strip after all other methods of oppression, displacement, evacuation, arrest, allurement, subservience and attempts at containment have failed.

It is necessary for the observer to look behind the smooth words. It is a must that one should not be bewildered by the luster of slogans without trying to reach reality of the intentions behind them. What Sharon stressed necessitates a lengthy study to expose what is behind the words and prove that there is no change in Israeli intentions and plans.

When Sharon declares that his soldiers will not be invaders but guards of security, he stresses that the role of these soldiers as occupiers has ended and that it is time they acted as owners of the land after 14 years of occupation. He stresses that the Palestinians are just a minority living on Israel's land whose links will be with the police like any other minority in any other country. This means denying the Arabs their citizenship in the occupied land and dealing with them as members of a minority who must not violate the status of being guests on Israel's land. He stresses that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are part of Israel, the removal of the large barrier at the (Erta) point near the Gaza Stip is the first step in Israel's policy of annexing all the occupied Arab lands. The removal of the barrier was coupled with the establishment of movable barriers and sudden searches between the Bank and the Strip as a security measure adopted by any state on its lands.

What seems an attempt to break the ice between the Arabs in occupation is but an attempt to extinguish the flame of Arab rejection and to besiege it with a policy which appears to be less harsh, but which has in reality graver results and

consequences. Occupation remains to be occupation. The attempt to turn the soldiers of the invasion into guards of peace and security does not change the established facts and does not cover the fact that the Israelis occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and that their people are citizens and owners of land who reject and resist occupation. These people have the right to live on their own land. The attempt to limit this issue to the Israeli police and security organs is a frank denial, though implicit, of the Arabs' citizenship and all their legitimate rights as citizens in their lands which are dominated by occupation.

It is certain that the near future will witness a lot of Israeli measures, resolutions and statements which fall within this new policy and which might seem to be an interpretation of the policy of leniency, as it is termed by the Israelis, in dealing with the people of the bank and the strip. This policy might appear to be a positive Israeli change in the interest of the Arabs in the occupied lands. To realize the grave goals of Sharon's declaration is enough to put us all face to face with the new methods of Begin's government, whose existence depends on the support of the extremist religious parties. These parties refuse to withdraw from any occupied land and insist on more expansion and the establishment of occupation.

When we couple Begin's and Sharon's extremist stands with those of the religious parties, we are able to understand the new Israeli policy of leniency and its dangerous goals. We will be able to alert all those who might be deceived by the appearances of this policy based on dealing with the Palestinian in the Bank and the Strip as guards of security and not as soldiers of invasion and occupation. In other words, this means dealing with the Palestinians as a minority through the police and security organs. It means depriving them of their citizenship, land and all their rights which the world community has recognized and called for their practice of these rights on their own soil.

CSO: 4304/115

COMMENTARY CONDEMNS DECISION ON FUNDS TO WEST BANK

JN051851 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 5 Aug 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] The Israeli occupation authorities' decision banning the delivery of the Arab aid funds to the municipalities of the occupied Arab cities through the channel of the joint Jorandian-Palestinian committee is just another step that comes within the framework of the policy of suppression which is practiced against the residents of the occupied Arab land in order to deprive them of hope, further entrench Israeli occupation of Arab land and spread more Jewish settlements over Arab soil. This decision cannot be separated from the other maneuvers and movements that are taking place in southern Lebanon or those that are being prepared by the U.S. and Egyptian presidents.

As for what happened and is still happening in Lebanon in light of the fragile truce which was agreed upon by the Begin-led Israeli Government--for Begin's government was forced to accept this truce for different temporary considerations such as: devoting all efforts to form a new Israeli Government under the Likud, securing a period of calm necessary for restoring self-assurance and high morale to the Jewish settlers in northern Israel and attempting to stop the unprecedented campaigns of criticism and condemnation of the Israeli rulers which came from all over the world and from the United States--we say that all this is just another link in the chain of measures that are intended to contain increasing understanding of and support for the Arab stand and for the PLO in particular.

As it was expected, Israel is now violating the cease-fire agreement and is sending warships to shell Palestinian resistance positions on the Lebanese coast. Also the Egyptian president is in Washington trying to revive the talks of the self-rule for the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

It is certain, therefore, that there is a logical and organic connection among all these events and developments that aim at imposing a fate accompli on the residents of the occupied Arab territories, a step that is in line with the Camp David process which has failed to bring about a just and comprehensive peace simply because it has ignored, and is still ignoring, the crux of the problem as well as the most important side in it, namely, the Palestinian people represented by the PLO.

Yesterday, a Jordanian official's statement reiterated Jordan's firm and clear stand on the ongoing attempts to bring about a settlement that will satisfy no one but Israel, the United States and Egypt. Such a settlement will naturally be blessed by Egypt which is still risking its fate as well as that of the entire Arab region through insisting on the Camp David march and attempting to impose the self-rule plan as engineered by Israel under the leadership of Begin.

The Jordanian official reconfirmed Jordan's stand which says that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Hence, Jordan announces its rejection of the Camp David agreements which ignore the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights in their own soil and national homeland.

In light of the new Israeli Government's statements and intentions to annex the entire Palestinian land to the State of Israel, the Egyptian-U.S. talk about self-rule is considered a cover which attempts to give Zionism enough time to swallow up the Palestinian land, to force a fate accompli in the area and to strike at the Palestinian cause inside and outside the Palestinian land.

Hence, the decision to ban the Arab aid fund for the West Bank and Gaza Strip is another link in the chain of policies that intend to destroy Arab life inside the occupied territories. By adopting these policies, Israel hopes to separate the Arab land from its residents, to swallow it up and to bring about the objectives of the Zionist extremists and the fanatic members of the Torah parties represented in Begin's government, which itself stems from extreme Zionist principles.

CSO: 4304/115

BOOK BY CROWN PRINCE REVIEWED

JN160821 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 16 Aug 81 p 3

[Review by Tawfiq Ahmad al-Khalil of the book "Palestinian Self-Determination: A Study of the West Bank and Gaza Strip" written by "Hasan ibn Talal, Crown Prince of Jordan. Published in London by Quartet Books: 138 pages, with illustrations"]

[Text] His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hasan's latest book on Palestine contains 138 pages of well-documented material divided into five sections, with a foreword and maps.

The sections include an introduction, historical background, legal issues, an appraisal of the legal claims, proposed solutions and finally a perspective for peace.

The foreword and introduction place the Palestine problem in its correct setting, preparatory to the historical background, which gives the reader a clear view of the injustice that has befallen the Palestinian Arabs, and the deprivation they have suffered for over 60 years. This is presented in an intelligent, lucid and scholarly fashion.

Perhaps one of the better statements characterising the Palestine issue is that which comes at the beginning of the foreword: "Historically," the author states, "seldom have unity, self-determination, statehood and security been so bedeviled as in the case of Palestine."

The third section shows us the legal basis of the Palestinian claim to self-determination and the establishment of an autonomous state in the West Bank of Jordan and in the Gaza Strip. These claims and their bases are explained in detail. At the risk of being repetitous, the writer has had to go back in time to emphasise the legality of such claims, bringing them up to date; and to enumerate them more than once, possibly in order to enable these facts to penetrate--especially into the Western mind, which until very recently has been unable or unwilling to grasp them, and also to refute Israel's illegal counterclaims.

It is made clear in this part of the book that whereas the Palestinians have until now been denied any opportunity to achieve statehood, massive illegal Jewish and [as published] immigration into Palestine has very seriously upset the demographic, social and economic balance in the country, and allowed the Zionists to usurp a state by force as early as 1948. And the process of "elbowing out" the indigenous Arab Palestinian continues until the present day.

It is high time that the legal claims of the Palestinians to their territory were put forward in such a manner, and it is high time that the unjustifiable Israeli claims be contested. This is done successfully in the largest section of the book. Put quite simply, the author confronts Israeli legal and political apologists on their doorstep, and defeats them at their own game.

It is in the chapters on the appraisal of legal claims and proposed solutions that the writer comes into his own, when he states that Israel knows that there will be no peace as long as Israelis deny the Palestinians their homeland. "A proud and ancient people such as the Palestinians cannot be kept out of their lands or in subjection to Israeli military power in the West Bank and Gaza forever," he writes.

So, as he concludes perhaps the solution lies in Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, reaffirmed in resolution 338, delineating the requirements for peace between Arab and Israeli, whose implementation may result in "a little bit of territory against a little bit of peace."

Israel's present posture in the West Bank and Gaza and its decision to remain there for "security" reasons may be very convenient, but it is illegal, and is detrimental to world peace.

A just and comprehensive settlement based upon the "reinstatement of the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, and to determine their future and to establish an independent Palestinian state on their national soil" is what is required to put an end to their long years of suffering, and is the only way in which peace and stability are going to reign in this region.

Finally, the author concludes, there is no other option for the Israelis but to deal directly with the Palestinians "in a general conference of settlement," and Israel has "to be prepared to live with a new Arab state of Palestine."

CSO: 4300/87

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON, GULF AFFAIRS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 17 Jul 81 p 3

[Interview with al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad: "Lebanon Will Continue to be Arab; They are Optimistic About Solving the Problem; Events in Iran Will Reflect on the Region as a Whole"]

[Text] Al-Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, deputy prime minister, foreign minister and minister of information, said that the Arab follow-up committee to bring peace to Lebanon will continue its efforts, so long as there are hopes for a solution to the issue in Lebanon.

Shaykd Sabah al-Ahmad, in an interview with the newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, which is published in Arabic in both London and Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, expressed his optimism at recent developments in Lebanon, with regard to solving the Lebanese problem, and he said that Lebanon will continue to be Arab.

The foreign minister praised what he called the promise of the Phalangists to sever relations with Israel. He said that the remaining points of dispute between the Lebanese contending parties have reached the point of each solutions, by means of holding a round table for these parties.

He stressed that legitimacy in Lebanon would only be achieved when every Lebanese citizen respected the authority of his country, and his loyalty was to it and not to any quarter or organization.

On the other hand, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad stated that his recent visit to Moscow was none of the other Gulf states' business.

Regarding Kuwait's determination to obtain Soviet arms, he said: "We do not fear Soviet experts, but we have not yet asked for any Soviet expert to assist in training the army on Soviet weapons."

Concerning the Gulf Cooperation Council, the foreign minister said that Iraq had not been disqualified from the council, but the nations of the council were similar, and were able to have a kind of agreement and cooperation, without the need for unity or a federation.

Shaykh Sabah commented on the recent explosions that occurred in scattered areas of Kuwait, and said that the Kuwaiti government did not think that some sabotage

activities were unusual, because the area was volatile, and he underscored that Kuwait would not change its policy, no matter what the circumstances.

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad called for an end to the bloodshed between Iraq and Iran, and indicated that events in Iran would reflect on the region as a whole.

Text of the Interview

The following is the text of the interview:

[Question] To what extent will the Arab follow-up committee's efforts continue in order to bring peace to Lebanon?

[Answer] So long as there are hopes for a solution to the issue in Lebanon, the committee's efforts will continue. Praise God, I now have a feeling that there are signs of hope, especially concerning the main issue, which the committee is facing, and I mean by that the question of cooperation with Israel, which was always an obstacle to the committee's work, in its capacity as a representative of the Arab nations, present in Lebanon under Arab auspices. We have heard about the Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis confirmation that relations between the Phalangists and Israel have been severed.

In fact, this matter will cause the committee to continue, if this is true. It will help it to find Lebanon in a state of serenity, to find it united and independent under the legal authority. Seven long years of killing and hatred among brothers is enough.

Lebanon Will Continue to be Arab

[Question] What is your view concerning the nature of the pledge, accepted by the committee, regarding the severing of relations between the Phalange and Israel?

[Answer] The truth is that I have not read the statement submitted to President Sarkis, and my knowledge of that is confined to what I have heard on the news. We have tried to obtain a copy of the statement, but we have been unable, because it was handed to the president in trust. Despite that, if this gratifying statement was issued, measures will follow, first of all, to open up all of Beirut, and to hand public property over to the state. There are other measures which would come later. However, we should say that the best thing is the severing of relations with Israel, because this concerns us very greatly, since we do not want a faction of the Lebanese dealing with Israel. We want Lebanon to continue to be Arab. It will remain Arab, God willing.

Arab Guarantees to the Lebanese Front

[Question] Lebanese Front leaders, on various occasions, have expressed their willingness to sever relations with Israel, in exchange for Arab guarantees. It is well known that Syria rejects the offering of such guarantees. Is there a formula for another solution? And does the committee reject offering such guarantees as these?

[Answer] First of all, I want to make it clear that after offering the Lebanese Front the desired guarantees, I believe that Syria would not think a single day about remaining in Lebanon. This is something that is well known to the Lebanese themselves, because Syria's remaining in Lebanon is not because it wants to remain, so much as it is to protect Lebanon and the Lebanese. Therefore, when we have obtained a pledge to sever relations with Israel, and we have been convinced of it, we shall ensure with our Syrian brothers that we shall give guarantees to those bretheren who fear the presence of Syrians or Arabs in Lebanon, because this entire army would not be against them for one day, as much as they would be with them and with Lebanon as a whole, in order to maintain it and to preserve its security.

The Lebanese Paper

[Question] With regard to the Lebanese document, submitted to the committee, it has been mentioned that it contained several Lebanese proposals and concepts in order to try to bring peace to Lebanon, and solve its problems. As a member of the committee, do you believe that this document will achieve the Lebanese dreams?

[Answer] There is a proverb that says: Whatever man desires, he gets. The document submitted to the committee contains several ideas regarding the political and security areas, including the army. However, the most important thing in this paper is the article on severing relations with Israel, which is considered to be at the forefront of the articles. Then there are other articles concerning conciliation and dialogue.

We hoped to conclude the primary problem, which is severing relations with Israel, by virtue of the fact that it was the primary obstacle before any action. Consequently, the rest of the points will be easy, whether pertaining to accord, or the army, or constitutional amendments. They can be solved at the round table, which will be agreed to. We must not rush matters to a solution in one day or night.

The Lebanese Army

[Question] Some Syrian quarters consider the Lebanese army to have Phalangist loyalties. Based on this, how can the army be reorganized to enable the legal authorities to deploy it in sensitive spots, without difficulties?

[Answer] With respect to this matter, I believe that the army is Lebanese, not Arab or Syrian. The people of Lebanon themselves know a way to deal with this problem. In the world of today, it is not easy to find anything pure, because you will find both good and evil.

It is possible that a kind of agreement could be reached, to eliminate everything that is bad, retain some of the army, and then build a new army based on service to the flag. This will require a long time, but help can be had from the loyal part of the Lebanese army.

[Question] Therefore, based on that, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia submitted some ideas to the Lebanese president, concerning reorganization of the Lebanese army. Was this rejected by President Sarkis?

[Answer] There was neither rejection nor acceptance, as much as there was consultation regarding this matter, because the army was split, whether with those group or that. However, some of the army was not divided. There are some officers who might have been displeased with the Lebanese legal government. It is assumed that they will not remain in authority. Nevertheless, all this has not been thoroughly discussed.

Legality and Lebanese Accord

[Question] When do you think legality will be achieved in Lebanon, after this tragedy in which it has been living?

[Answer] This will be achieved, when each individual respects the sovereign power in Lebanon. This is legality and will continue to be, because if matters continue in this fashion, man will begin to only respect the rifle, and his loyalty will be to a specific region or to a specific town.

[Question] Let us go back to the promise requested from the Phalangists. Do you think that submitting it will give impetus to the theory of national accord, so that that can be achieved easily?

[Answer] National accord is mentioned in the Lebanese paper, and will be discussed at the next meeting. Since I have not received a copy of the pledge, I cannot give an opinion. In any case, I welcome the matter in principle. I am also pleased by this initiative by some of the factions in Lebanon, which possibly have been mistaken or in error, and now have returned to reason.

[Question] However, the problem of Lebanon is not just with the Lebanese Front. There is South Lebanon, and there are situations in other areas. When will the legal government be extended to these areas?

[Answer] In fact, the problem of South Lebanon is different from the rest of the other problems. In Lebanon, one can negotiate with Arabs, and the negotiations can be between Arabs and other Arabs. In the South, there is Israel. We are not authorized to negotiate with it. On the contrary, we would never accept that. Despite this, the problem of the South is considered to be one of the items of the Lebanese concept submitted to the committee. We would be happy to find, with our brothers in Lebanon, any solution that will assist them, so that there would be Lebanese army authority in the South, in addition to the UN authority. It has been decided to keep the emergency forces in the South.

We Paid Our Commitments to the Deterrent

[Question] Why did you refuse to pay the financial obligations to the deterrent forces, and have you had reservations about them?

[Answer] In fact, Kuwait did not refuse to pay the obligations, but only had reservations. The reason for this reservation was that it had been agreed that a report would be submitted about these forces' missions. We asked once, and then again, but no report was submitted to us. Finally, we reserved the matter of payment. However, in light of the present circumstances, which Syria is experiencing, we decided to pay the obligations.

[Question] Do you support other Arab forces joining with the Syrian forces in their mission in Lebanon, and is it considered a joint Syrian-Lebanese request?

[Answer] This proves that the Syrian brothers are not desperate to stay in Lebanon, as we believe. Others have welcomed an Arab army from the Arab states, to assist in maintaining security in Lebanon. This matter has been proposed, but so far, considerations of Arab accord have not helped that.

Arab Summit in November

[Question] Let us leave Lebanon for now, and deal with Arab accord in the light of present circumstances. Have you called for an urgent Arab summit?

[Answer] First, there has been some confusion regarding what has been said about my calling for an Arab Summit. I have not issued an invitation as such, because this is within the purview of the Arab states. However, all I said was that there should be a conference held soon, and that I wanted all matters to be discussed, because, as is known, the summit will be held in November. That is not very far away. This summit must seriously discuss all matters, especially after the events that have recently occurred, such as the strike against the Iraqi reactor, and so forth.

[Question] However, don't you think it unlikely that positive decisions will come out of the summit, in light of the present Arab circumstances?

[Answer] With respect to the Arab disputes, I think that this is not the first time, nor will it be the last, that there have been differences. However, when bad times come, you find agreement on the basis of the proverb which says: "Me and my brother against my cousin; me and my cousin against the stranger."

We have a precedent in the past that supports that. That is 1973, when we were able to gain the respect of the world. However, unfortunately, after the present fragmentation, we have lost even that respect. We must regain our respect, and this is what we will be working for in our next meeting.

[Question] Regarding the European initiative, French President Mitterand has a negative attitude toward it. Do you have a comment?

[Answer] Some of what he said was unfortunately true, but President Mitterand sent an envoy to His Highness the Amir, with a letter. They are constantly affirming that they have not changed their policies toward the Arab nations.

Gulf Military Cooperation

[Question] Let us talk frankly about the Gulf Cooperation Council. Is cooperation in military matters unlikely, and has it been confined to just economic, social and cultural affairs?

[Answer] It is correct that the Cooperation Council, in its articles or basic laws, has not made any mention of matters relating to military or security affairs. This is a point. As to why it was confined to other areas, that stems from our

feeling that this was the object of concern to the peoples of our countries. Therefore, based on that, the Arab peoples must be bound together. We should not initially raise military or security matters. Binding our peoples together was our initial concept; later, we can pursue the matters that must be attended to.

[Question] Why postpone military cooperation, when the region, as is being said, faces various threats?

[Answer] The fact is that I differ with you, in the way that you put your question about this point concerning threats to the region. The question is from whom is this danger, and why? Because those who want to think something, must ask themselves about the benefit from that. Is it for oil? I think oil is still open. Then, why?

Therefore, we do not want to think that there are dangers, or that we are threatened, or that there is any quarter that wishes to attack our country. Despite that, I agree with you that there must indeed be security cooperation among ourselves, because unfortunately, our region is a plaything regarding matters not in the region's best interests. There must be a shield for security cooperation in this regard.

As regards the military sphere, you can standardize your weapons and training, but until the arms factories are in your region, that is all. This will come to pass in the future, when these matters are discussed.

[Question] Therefore, as concerns this matter, you do not share the point of view of the Sultanate of Oman regarding the threats that confront it?

[Answer] Here I speak in my country's name. I might not share in some of its observations relating to security in the region, but that does not mean that we differ with it. Oman has in fact submitted a working paper in this regard, but my view is that it should be discussed in the next meeting of the council's foreign ministers. This is natural, and in truth, the leadership has not studied the Omani paper, sufficiently, so as to be able to make a judgment on it. Therefore, they have asked that the next meeting of the ministers be postponed, along with submitting a report regarding it to the summit.

Mediation Between Aden and Muscat

[Question] In this context, why did the mediation efforts, which you began, along with the UAE foreign minister, between Aden and Oman cease?

[Answer] Mediation has not ceased. It may have stopped publically, but we are in touch with the brothers in South Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman. We hope that we shall reach an agreement.

[Question] But do you think that it will be easy to achieve reconciliation between two countries, after a separation of 10 years? And what about the conditions posed by Oman, regarding restoration of relations?

[Answer] The fact is that the question of setting conditions is the reverse of what you said. The truth is that Aden submitted certain specific points. I don't say conditions. Those points have been studied by the brothers in Oman, and some of them in Aden. I have sent the director of my office to Oman, and I shall be in touch with South Yemen. I have considerable hope that all problems will be resolved. I would not say that the problems of the past 10 years would prevent restoration of relations, because there were problems, for many long years, between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Despite that, things calmed down, and now there are good relations, and the two countries have ambassadors. This would not prevent relations from deteriorating, and then improving back to good relations.

The Moscow Visit

[Question] There have been several interpretations about your recent visit to Moscow. Would you give us the true version of the purpose for the visit, and the subjects discussed?

[Answer] First to counter what has been said. My visit to Moscow does not pertain to any of the Gulf states. We are the only state in the region that has good relations, tying us to Moscow, and we are proud of these relations. I went there, and this is not the first time that I have officially visited Moscow, to discuss many matters that interest the two countries, and concern the region and the world as a whole. We might not agree on many points. For example, I would not agree with the Soviet Union regarding Afghanistan. However, that does not mean that I am its enemy. From its viewpoint, it feels that what has happened there is a matter of maintaining its security. As for my point of view, it is different. It is a military occupation. Many matters could not be agreed upon, but that does not prevent there being mutual respect and mutual friendship between Kuwait and the Soviet Union.

[Question] In light of what has been said about Kuwait urging the other Gulf states to establish relations with Moscow, are you undertaking such a role? What would the reflections of that be on the balance in the region?

[Answer] It is not my business to advise these states, but I would like someday to find that they have good relations with the Soviet Union, as does the United States, and as does France or England. As regards reflections of that, I believe that it is natural to exchange diplomatic relations with any state, especially a major power. What is the matter with that; what are we condemning? If you are convinced that this is in your best interests, there is nothing wrong with it.

Soviet Experts

[Question] You are following a course of diversifying armaments. Based on that, you have bought arms from Moscow and from some other Western nations. With regard to arms from Moscow, will you be asking for assistance from Soviet experts to train the Kuwaiti army, or from Arab experts? And if you seek Soviet expert help, aren't you afraid of the repercussions of that on your security, in light of other nations' experience in that regard?

[Answer] I would be concerned about the presence of Soviet experts in my country, since when they came, they would be under a kind of surveillance. The agreement between us and their government would be that this is their limit and this is my limits.

This is not the first time that we have bought arms from Eastern nations. We have always sought help from Arab states, to train our men on these weapons. In this context, we have sought help from Syria and Egypt, before we broke off relations with it, since both use Russian weapons. In fact, I have not requested any Russian expert, but were I to ask for any someday, it would not frighten me, because, before I ask for them, they would have to know their limitations.

What Happens in Iran Reflects on the Region

[Question] How do you view developments of the situation in Iran, and repercussions of the Iraqi-Iranian war on the region's security?

[Answer] We must not forget that Iran is in the region, and not far away. Everything that happens there reflects on the region as a whole. I can only say that we do not want our region turned into a conflagration. We want our brothers in Iran to understand that they must stop the bloodshed currently going on between Iraq and Iran, for the good of Iran and the entire region.

Iraq Has Not Been Excluded From the Cooperation Council

[Question] What is your comment on the Iraqi president's recent statements, in which he made it clear that he wanted [to join], even if not publically, the Gulf Cooperation Council, at the present time? And why has Iraq been excluded from the council, since it is a Gulf nation, facing upon it?

[Answer] The answer to this question, in light of present circumstances, is difficult. Despite that, I would like to stress that Iraq has not been excluded. Every Iraqi individual must understand, to the extent possible, that these states are all similar, and are capable of having a kind of agreement and cooperation among themselves, without the need for unity or federation. This is well known. I don't think that I can comment further on this matter.

[Question] Kuwait has been threatened recently by several security incidents. It was said that they were aimed at dissuading Kuwait from its public positions, regarding certain issues. Do you believe that such actions as these would cause you to change your positions?

[Answer] We should not think it unlikely that incidents will happen here and there. We are in a volatile region. At the present time, Kuwait is different from what it used to be in the past. Kuwait now has a population of one and one-half million persons, who are a mixture of different nationalities. Therefore, we do not consider such incidents as these to be unusual. Regarding what was said about their being aimed at changing Kuwait's policy, Kuwait's policy stems from its beliefs. Its policy will not change, no matter what the circumstances. This will continue to be our policy, and nothing that happens will dissuade us.

As for certain subjects, located in Kuwait, carrying out acts of sabotage, this is not unusual, because you can find deviants even in one family. Based on this, we do not think it strange to find three or four deviants, out of 250,000. On the contrary, in my opinion, the Arab brothers living here were more upset over this than were the people of Kuwait ourselves, because they live with us. In any event, there are deviants, and we must not think about them.

Syrian-Soviet Maneuvers

[Question] What is your opinion regarding the joint Syrian-Soviet maneuvers, currently being held off the coast of Syria, to confront the threat of the Israeli enemy?

[Answer] I have not received anything official concerning it. Everything I have seen about it has come from the American news agencies. As regards the so-called missile crisis, the Arab world has shown its support for Syria, and Kuwait was among those nations that supported it. The Amir of our country has been in touch with the Syrian president, expressing that support. In the Arab world, we shall continue to support Syria in its ordeal with Israel.

[Question] To what extent to you support the British initiative relative to Afghanistan?

[Answer] We are with, and support, any initiative that removes foreign forces from Afghanistan. This is not just a matter of only Soviet forces, but rather, I mean that any country occupied by foreigners must be freed from that occupation.

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CSO: 4304/86

BEIRUT PUBLICATION RIDICULES SHARON'S POLICY

JN151849 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1545 GMT 15 Aug 81

[From "With the Events" program: Article published in Beirut AL-NIDA' of 15 August entitled "Strong Men Who Make Concessions or a Liberal Cover for the Zionist Grip?"]

[Excerpts] It is said that a strong ruler is the most capable of making concessions. It is also said that the most extremist (?force) is the one most capable of showing flexibility, at least proceeding from the premise of (?pardoning) or proceeding from the theory which says that the one who wants to make concessions should have something to offer and be strong enough to do so.

Al-Sadat's visit to Israel was made within this context. He believed himself strong enough to make concessions and relinquish everything while remaining strong. He never thought that the road of the U.S. peace process would end up with a stalemate. The same thing is being said of Menahem Begin.

The same thing can be said of the new defense minister, the known terrorist Ari'el Sharon, who is considered a special figure in Begin's second term of office. This minister, who is known for his direct confiscation of Palestinian and other Arab land, [words indistinct] announcing the application of a new policy for the Palestinian inhabitants, the sons of the occupied land. Our doors are open to you, Sharon told public figures in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Knock and all doors will be oepend to you. Ask and you will be given. No mass punishment as of today. I, Sharon, will visit the territories, leaders and villages.

However, this liberal openness which the terrorist minister is (?proposing) is conditional, as the military command in [words indistinct] to two matters: the first is the continuation of Israeli occupation without opposition and without disturbing the occupiers. The second matter is creating an amenable climate for the application of Palestinian self-rule and encouraging the emergence of political negotiators in the occupied land, other than those who have proclaimed allegiance to the PLO.

By temptations on one hand and threats on the other, Sharon is hoping to isolate the PLO and lessen its influence in the occupied land while the aggression against the Palestinian resistance and its allies in Lebanon continues. The search for alternatives to the PLO is an old trend. Sharon's predecessors tried to find such alternatives and failed. Some Arabs tried, Al-Sadat did later, and failed too. All

signs indicate that neither Sharon nor those who are stronger and fiercer than he can create any alternative to the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. As for trying to (?separate) the people from the PLO, Sharon will live and die before achieving this illusion. Our kinfolk know what the intentions of Begin's defense minister are by making these proposals. They know that the Zionist leader put forth these ideas to alleviate the feeling of political loss in Israel resulting from the cease-fire, which constitutes a recognition of the existence, role and strength of the PLO.

CSO: 4304/115

BRIEFS

VEHICLE ATTACKED IN BEIRUT--While the security situation has registered noticeable progress in most areas, a shooting incident took place before noon today in the al-Rawshah area of Beirut. Armed men attacked a vehicle carrying Ilyas Hannush, alias al-Hanash; inconclusive reports say that Ilyas Hannush, his two sons and two of his companions were killed in this incident while other reports say that Ilyas Hannush was killed together with two of his companions. [Text] [NC161013 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 16 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/115

BRIEFS

DEFENSE CHIEF MEETS FOREIGN OFFICIALS--Commander in chief of the Libyan Armed Forces, Brig Abd Bakr Jabir Yunis, this morning held a working session with Chadian Defense Minister Adoum Togoi, who is now on a visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. A number of Libyan Armed Forces officers participated in the meeting together with members of the delegation accompanying the Chadian defense minister. Brigadier Yunis met at noon today with Col Gen Antanas Semer-Dzhiev, first deputy minister of defense and chief of the general staff of the Bulgarian Socialist Republic, who is on a visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah at present. [Text] [LD121346 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 12 Aug 81]

CSO: 4504/56

PREMIER OUTLINES GOALS OF DEVELOPMENT PLAN

JN152111 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 15 Aug 81

[Excerpts] Damascus--The people's assembly held a meeting at 1800 this evening under speaker Mahmud Hadid in the presence of Prime Minister Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm; Walid Hamdun, deputy prime minister for services affairs; and the ministers.

Dr 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm delivered a speech on the state's 5-year development plan, its aspects and objectives. He stressed that development requires great efforts, characterized by firm will, scientific research, patience, accuracy of administration and proper implementation of all its aspects. The prime minister added that the limited sources should be wisely used and that both public and private expenditure should be economically justified.

Dr al-Kasm summarized the objectives of economic and social development as: increasing domestic production by 8.5 percent per year; increasing the GNP by 7.6 percent per year; increasing the employment by 4.2 percent per year; raising rates of investment by 6.7 percent; increasing total consumption; and increasing imports, exports and savings.

He also summarized the objectives of the state budget as: balancing domestic resources with expenditures in the general budget; balancing the general budget itself and the GDP; increasing current resources and revenues; limiting general administrative expenditures; reducing the deficit in the general state budget; and reducing the domestic resources deficit in the balance of payments.

In conclusion, Prime Minister Dr al-Kasm extended thanks to all those who had participated in preparing the draft of the development plan. He expressed his faith and truth that everyone would exert increasing efforts to overcome any difficulty in order to ensure the success of the fifth development plan and, accordingly, the success of economic and social development which is a great national task.

CSO: 4304/115

UGTT LEADER DISCUSSES FUTURE PLANS, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 23 Jul 81 p 5

[Interview with Taieb Baccouche, UGTT Executive Committee Member, by Lucien Ahonto and Mireille Lemaresquier; date and place not given]

[Text] It may seem somewhat surprising initially that we are including the Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT), the only (at least for the time being) Tunisian trade union, in this survey of political movements in opposition to the sole political party. But it is much less surprising after learning the role which this federation has played in the long process of liberalization. In the opinion of many observers, the events that followed the strike order issued in January 1978 by the UGTT, led by Mr Habib Achour at that time, were a decisive factor in convincing the authorities that democratization was necessary. More generally, it is a certainty that as a result of learning to retain a certain part of its individuality despite its structural ties with the sole party, the UGTT today appears to be the only mass organization capable of mobilizing a good percentage of Tunisian workers. The trade union federation founded by Ferhat Hached could therefore logically be tempted to participate in the current political debate more explicitly, but perhaps not directly--that seems difficult--but more securely through an alliance with one of the parties (leftist, no doubt) that have applied for recognition. That would be the only thing that could change the present situation, which seems to favor reactionary movements.

LE CONTINENT: What are the UGTT's current relations with the Destourian Socialist Party?

Taieb Baccouche: Our relations with the party in power are based on the government's respect for the UGTT's independence. Past experience has clearly shown that any interference with the federation's internal affairs can have serious consequences for the country.

We also believe that dialogue with the government, a candid and responsible dialogue, remains the basis for solving the various problems facing the country.

For the time being, our relations are therefore normal relations between a trade union and a government trying to find a basis of understanding within the context of dialogue.

LE CONTINENT: Is this the result of the Gafsa congress?

Taieb Baccouche: The last UGTT congress can rightly be considered a turning point. In fact, if we disregard the congresses that were held from 1946 to 1956, when independence was declared, it can be said that UGTT congresses have most often been characterized by some form of government intervention since independence. For almost a quarter-century, therefore, the UGTT has always been faced with the problem of trade union autonomy and problems resulting from a certain amount of intervention in union affairs by the government in general and by certain factions within the government in particular. Most of the UGTT's crises since that time have mainly been due to such problems.

LE CONTINENT: Will the UGTT take part in the next parliamentary elections?

Taieb Baccouche: With regard to the UGTT's possible participation in the parliamentary elections, the new Executive Committee has been ordered to study the matter in depth and to present its findings at the next meeting of the federation's National Council in November.* It is therefore too early to decide on a position.

Participation Procedures

LE CONTINENT: Is it one of the functions of a trade union to submit lists of candidates for election and, furthermore, is it desirable for the UGTT to engage in political activity?

Taieb Baccouche: The UGTT cannot be expected to behave like a political party. But that does not mean that it must remain indifferent to what is happening in the national political arena. On the contrary, it plays an active part in national political life. Methods and procedures must now be defined. For the present, it is still too early to provide any specific information about all that, in view of the change in relations between the UGTT and the government.

One thing is certain, however: we have no intention of setting the UGTT up as a political party or of forming a party. As for the possible participation of UGTT members in the next elections, I cannot tell you the party tickets on which they would run. That is also part of what I call the "participation procedures," which must be defined by the National Council.

LE CONTINENT: Concerning the UGTT itself, what impact could its greater independence have on national political life?

Taieb Baccouche: Establishing trade union independence and the exercise of democracy within the federation is likely to also favor the development of a more democratic national life, since the problems are related. The UGTT is not acting like a political party and I don't believe that it will behave as such; but it is obvious that as an important union organization, the UGTT takes part in national political life, also participates in working out development plans, in defining social and economic choices and, by that very fact, thus participates in political life in

*Since this interview took place before the date of the elections was set, for 1 November, the National Council could meet before November.

the broadest sense of the term. Considering all of this, the UGTT can effectively contribute to the development of a more democratic national life, which can be given concrete form through the establishment of political pluralism.

LE CONTINENT: Isn't there the risk of a split within the UGTT? There was much talk of this at the time of the Gafsa congress, because there was definitely a split over the approach to be adopted concerning the case of Mr Habib Achour. Are these unfounded rumors?

Taieb Baccouche: I believe that there is no risk of a split. These are unfounded rumors. The withdrawal of about 23 percent of our comrades, or 127 delegates, was a withdrawal of principle for some, since they believed that the issue would be sidestepped at the congress. It they had participated in discussing this issue, they would not have withdrawn. That is why most of those comrades, after seeing the results of the congress both in terms of resolutions and the new Executive Committee's composition, regretted their withdrawal and would have liked to have had the honor of participating in making such resolutions.

One Stage in the Struggle

LE CONTINENT: Then this was a misunderstanding?

Taieb Baccouche: Essentially a misunderstanding, since there is no difference in principles; of course, there are differences in working methods. For most congress participants, the congress was just one stage in the struggle.

LE CONTINENT: What are the priorities of action which you are setting for your union, now that you have returned to normal union life?

Taieb Baccouche: First of all, this year is an extremely important year for us, since every deadline is coming up at the same time, political, social and economic deadlines.

Priority is being given to reviving all collective negotiations and bylaws this year; that is a huge undertaking. It therefore requires effective preparation. Secondly, the Sixth 5-Year Plan must be prepared. It is the UGTT's duty to issue opinions on such projects, so that this plan will be in the interest of the working class and underprivileged classes. We also plan to take vigorous action to limit social and regional disparities as much as possible while fighting for greater social justice.

The wage-price spiral must be broken. Thus the rise of wages between March and April did not cause prices to flare up. Dialogue with the government may lead to positive results. In fact, it is basically a question of improving the standard of living without causing an increase in the cost of living. We will thus make progress toward social justice.

A Maghrebian Dimension

The political and trade union situation in Tunisia is not developing in an isolated environment, but in a natural regional context whose penetrability has often been demonstrated by history.

Under these circumstances, we might wonder whether the changes in the UGTT's bylaws will affect other trade unions in the Maghreb.

Although still exercising discretion, the general secretary of the Tunisian trade union federation recalled that the UGTT's founder, Mr Ferhat Hasched, always gave a Maghrebian dimension to his actions: "It is very difficult to talk about trade union life in other countries, but I believe that one effect of the historic ties which have existed between the UGTT since its inception and Maghrebian trade union movements, in particular in Algeria and Morocco, but also Libya and Mauritania, is that what happens in one Maghreb country does not go unnoticed and most often has a definite impact on the trade union situation in other countries, in view of such historic ties. As for us, we intend to revive a certain kind of union unity on a Maghrebian scale and to return more or less to the sources of Maghrebian trade unionism, because Tunisian trade unionism, since the birth of the UGTT in 1946, actually had a Maghrebian orientation. The UGTT's founder, in everything he did, always gave a Maghrebian dimension to his union activity. And we are also determined to give this Maghrebian dimension to our actions."

Achour to Be Pardoned Soon?

"President Bourguiba gave me to understand that on 3 August, on the occasion of the birthday of the chief of state, Mr Habib Achour could be released. His problem should no longer be stated in political terms, but in human terms," Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed M'Zali said on 14 July during a long interview grated to UPI.

If Mr Achour's release should actually take place, Mr Baccouche believes that it would undoubtedly be the result of various action taken since the Gafsa congress by the UGTT on behalf of Mr Achour. "The congress unanimously passed a motion on the 'ostracism' of Comrade Habib Achour. This motion states in particular that we attach a great deal of importance to a general pardon and to measures to expunge the offense, not merely its consequences.

"We are determined to continue the fight so that measures to 'ostracize' Comrade Achour--he is the only one left--will be suspended. We took advantage of the first meeting with the president of the republic to raise the issue, but since we saw him on the day after the congress, we did not yet have all our motions ready and we therefore did not discuss the matter in depth. We raised the issue with the prime minister during the first official interview which he granted us and discussed the matter. We hope that through persuasion and dialogue, we will manage to give concrete form to the recommendations of the congress and the special motion on the 'ostracism.'"

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POLITICAL OPPOSITION LEADERS DISCUSS MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 220, 20-26 Jul 81

[20-26 Jul 81 pp 24-25]

> [Text] The Temporary Committee of the People's Unity Movement [MUP] maintains that the legitimate existence of any movement is not contingent on the number of votes it gets.

The draft National Charter which has been approved by the Tunisian government--that charter in which the Destourian party set forth its conditions for accepting the appearance of opposition movements--has stirred the objections of the parties. In the past two issues of AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI the Political Bureau of the People's Unity Movement, the Tunisian Communist party, the Islamic Movement [also known as Movement Tendence Islamique MTI, the Movement of Socialist Democrats and the Tunisian General Union of Labor [UGTT] made their observations. The observations of the temporary committee of the People's Unity Movement and the Progressive Muslims are here [in this issue].

Early this year observers in Tunisia were taken by surprise when a news report issued by the official news agency announced that President Bourguiba had met with four figures who were known for their affiliation with the People's Unity Movement. The four figures had been placed on trial along with the members of the movement in June 1977. At that time Mohamed Belhadj Omar had called a press conference on behalf of the group to announce a split within the People's Unity Movement and the fact that a few of the well-known inner [circle of] leaders would have nothing to do with the movement's secretary general, Ahmed Ben Salah.

This new movement then filed an application for a permit so it can exist as a public political party and publish a newspaper that would speak for it. A short time afterwards the minister of the interior summoned two members of this movement and informed them that the government had decided to permit their party to publish a political newspaper. The temporary committee of the People's Unity Movement thus becomes the second movement after the Democrats' Movement to be allowed to publish a newspaper.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI met with Mohamed Belhadj Omar and asked him about the questions of the conflict his group has with the Political Bureau of the People's Unity Movement. We asked him about where the movement he represents stood on the current situation.

[Question] Why was there a split in the People's Unity Movement?

[Answer] What did in fact happen was not a split in the heart of the movement, but it was a correction of a deviation and a return to the original principles on whose bases the movement had been created. This happened after those whom we call the "Ben Salahite" faction moved away from the movement. Those people are personally loyal to Ahmed Ben Salah, and they wanted to turn the movement into a mere pressure group whose only objective was to return to power opposite a second movement which we represent. This is the People's Unity Movement which wanted to make the movement an independent popular movement that would interact with the toiling masses and whose purpose was to build a socialist society. This fundamental difference between the two movements became evident, especially since the trial to which the movement was subjected in June 1977. This difference manifested itself in the disparate sentences that were rendered against the individuals of both movements. Then the conflicts and the mutual contradictions became sharper while the First National Conference was in session in July 1980 and afterwards. This forced some of the fighters, despite their unceasing efforts to safeguard the movement's unity, to submit their resignations from [their positions of] responsibility and call for starting a serious and profound dialogue around some of the actions and positions of individuals.

It was natural for this difference to show up one day in the life of the movement because ever since it was formed, this movement had included in its ranks groups of fighters who belong to various social and professional circles and generations who were joined together by an agreement in principle that is based on what was mentioned in the statement that was published by the movement in 1975, and especially the following principles:

A. Practicing genuine democratic action in the innermost circles of the movement by relying on continuous and comprehensive self-criticism for every action; repudiating unilateral action; and rejecting the narrow notion of leadership so we can spare our movement [the danger] of making serious mistakes.

B. Working to ensure the independence of the movement in all the choices and decisions it makes and establishing the principle of non-affiliation with any movement inside or outside the country.

C. Staying in step with the people's struggles and with their legitimate aspirations for freedom, democracy and social justice; and strengthening the popular organizations, especially labor and student organizations.

Despite the fact that everybody endorsed these basic principles, the second movement has been trying to violate them ever since the recent National Conference was convened.

[Question] What is the program that your movement is defending?

[Answer] We believe that the liberal policy which has been followed for the past years has led to the creation of a new bourgeois class on the economic and social scenes. This class tied its interests closely with those of foreign monopolistic capital, and this established subordination and strengthened the hegemony of the new colonialism over the country. It sharpened the differences between a fortunate minority, which is protected by the regime, and the vast majority of the people who continue to suffer from high prices, from increasingly serious speculations and from the spread of unemployment.

This policy has also aggravated the imbalance between agencies on the one hand and cities and villages on the other. This imbalance exists equally in the distribution of basic furnishings and in industrial or agricultural projects as well.

In the educational and cultural field the liberal choices that were based on class and selectivity aggravated [the problem of] the disruption of education and expulsion from school among the ranks of the people. This made them victims of illiteracy and vagrancy. It dimmed their prospects and caused uncertainty about the future in the ranks of young people. [It also caused] a blatant incongruity between educational programs and employment requirements, and this further aggravated unemployment and migration from rural areas.

Furthermore, the prevailing fluctuation in the cultural policy which is being followed by the regime has distorted authentic Islamic Arab values by adopting imported educational and cultural models.

[Question] What is your alternative?

[Answer] The People's Unity Movement which has not stopped criticizing the danger of this policy is proposing an alternative that is based on a socialist choice made in the context of honoring socialist and public liberties. Our view of the road that must be followed to build a socialist society can only stem from the popular masses. This means that our view stipulates the actual participation of the forces of production in the decision making [process] and in supervision on all levels. Because we set out from a profound and an objective analysis of the contradictions that our society is experiencing, all our energies are being directed towards overcoming these contradictions for the purpose of creating new economic and social relations that would ensure the establishment of geunine social justice.

The achievement of these objectives can only be realized--and we have not stopped affirming this--by honoring socialist and public liberties which are not only confined to traditional liberties such as the freedom of speech, the freedom to organize and to assemble and the freedom of religion. In fact, we have not stopped affirming that these liberties will

remain superficial unless they gain not only legislative guarantees but also economic guarantees as well.

It is the view of the People's Unity Movement that these liberties will not become truly democratic until all citizens, especially the toiling classes, can practice them. This requires that new choices be available to guarantee that these liberties will be practiced in economic, social, educational and cultural areas on the basis of the right to establish alternatives, the right to make a decision and the right to supervise and to monitor.

On the basis of these principles our 1975 statement set forth our general trends and the program of our activities in all the sectors. We are pointing out that this program--since we asked for a legal permit--is now under consideration by committees which we formed from among our fighters so as to keep the program in step with events.

[Question] Will your movement take part in the coming parliamentary elections?

[Answer] It is premature to raise the question of our movement's participation in the coming elections which are being proposed by the regime as a new stage in the context of the open-door policy. However, the movement is urgently affirming that there are basic conditions for organizing a truly democratic elections campaign. Among those conditions we mention the need to clear the political climate by issuing a general legislative amnesty and repealing all unconstitutional laws and decrees.

We do not consider legislative elections an end in themselves or a blessing from the regime. These elections rather constitute a serious and a responsible political action, considering the fact that the elections make it possible to mobilize all the political movements equally so as to conduct a popular referendum on specific political and economic programs.

Until today, however, consultations with the political movements on this objective have not taken place. The People's Unity Movement does not think that the legitimate existence of any political movement should be contingent on the number of votes it gets in elections that are held under mysterious circumstances.

[Question] What is your position on the draft National Charter?

[Answer] Our movement has always called for a comprehensive national dialogue in which all political movements and popular organizations that are represented would take part. This dialogue must deal with the conditions that would push our country on to the road of democratic and socialist change, and especially those conditions of honoring the constitution and the republican regime, safeguarding national independence and the gains of the people, honoring public liberties, repudiating all forms of violence regardless of their origin, achieving social justice and affirming the Islamic Arab personality.

[Question] Will you participate in the proposed "National Conference" of political leaders if such a conference is convened?

[Answer] We believe that an opposition front has to be built on a progressive basis and, above all else, on the basis of programs. It is not to be an opposition front merely for the sake of opposition. All opposition movements must commit themselves to struggle for the purpose of adopting a policy whose substance is socialist and whose methods are democratic. Nationalist and progressive forces are to work together for the purpose of confronting every danger that would result from the pursuit of a non-popular policy; they must continue to be vigilant and commit themselves totally to respond to the masses' real preoccupations.

[20-26 July 81 pp 25-26]

[Text] Progressive Muslims: multiple parties are and objective fact, and the regime's recognition of that fact is an observation of reality.

The great expansion that the Islamic movement has experienced in Tunisia attracted supporters with various affiliations. This led to the appearance of differences within the movement that in many instances ended in the occurrence of divisions. Among these divisions was the split effected by the group of Attorney Hasan al-Ghadbani. That group established a party which they called the Consultative Islamic party.

Among the groups that grew out of the original Islamic faction also was the movement of Progressive Muslims. One of its prominent figures is Hamidah al-Nayfar , editor in chief of the magazine, AL-MA'RIFAH, the faction's magazine, which he had left in 1978. Another one of the faction's known figures is Salah al-Jurshi who was one of the magazine's chief editors.

The correspondent of AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI met with al-Nayfar and with al-Jurshi and asked them about the underlying assumptions of their faction and its ideological and political goals.

[Question] How did your dispute with the other Islamic faction evolve into a breach in relations?

[Answer] Some of us were active within the other faction, and we became convinced that a cultural revolution in the Islamic world would have to be effected because a large measure of our inferiority and our backwardness is attributable to the fact that we do not understand our history and we do not understand the Koran and the developments that took place in recent times. Unless this objective analysis takes place, the Islamic world will continue to flounder in backwardness. Hence, one of our first objectives is to rebuild religious thought.

One may ask why this question is urgent, and the answer would be that in our view the experiences of the 100 or 50 years of resurgence have proven that religion cannot be ignored and left for public consumption while

political matters are taken over by people with a capitalist, western background. As a result of this fact the religious social structure continued to function despite the official [line of] talk which stated that it had to be left alone. This structure continued to function on the social and cultural level, and many of the movements that have been hoping for change paid no attention to it despite the fact that it affects people's beliefs, such as their belief in miracles, and endorses an inferior notion of society.

Opposite those people others emerged calling for the reformulation of cultural structures in the old style of the al-Salafiyah [an Islamic reform movement] school. This attitude is represented by Islamic religious factions in the Arab and Islamic world which believe that the best way for restoring Islamic cultural structures is to reformulate them in the old style. For this reason we unabashedly call them proponents of the past.

It is our view that there is a significant factor manifesting itself in the cultural structure which is still influential. What is happening in Iran, Algeria and Tunisia confirms its existence. This is what we call the Islamic pulse which cannot be ignored nor restored by the method of the al-Salafiyah school. We think that in order to formulate a new and a revolutionary society, the underlying assumptions [of the situation] we find ourselves in must be considered as well as what humanity has added to them over these centuries. We can thus restore our pulse to suit the times in which we are living and not some other time. It is therefore not possible to talk about Islamic action in Tunisia without taking into consideration the developments that are taking place in Tunisia itself. We are not in Egypt; we are not in Iran; nor are we in 1981. We are in Tunisia today, Tunisia which has experienced resistance to colonialism and the emergence of new aspirations. From this perspective we consider ourselves progressive. We also understand the influences that are coming to us from east and west Europe. This is because the geo-political situation has an effect which must be taken into consideration. One of the meanings of progressiveness also is that modern conviction in Islam today can only come about by taking into consideration the period that extends from 1956 until today.

There is also another difference that may draw the line between our ideas and those of others. This difference lies in our view that Islam does not color the understanding with one hue only. Islam comprises the uncontested portions of the Koran, that is, [those verses] that are clear and specific; and it also comprises verses that are obscure and not clearly intelligible. These may be interpreted variously. Therefore, there is no dogmatism in Islam. Islam has a philosophic immutable view of a person because that view is one of its fundamental questions. That is, it comes from the uncontested portions of the Koran.

There is also the relationship between one person and another or what is called public morality. It [too] is constant and immutable. Other than these two aspects, the philosophical aspect and that of worship and morality, the remaining questions, such as those of the regime, of social functions, and of the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the

governed, are questions that do not have the quality of constancy. Accordingly, the social and political aspect is determined by every society according to its conditions and in the light of Islam's public laws. In the context of defining this mutable and developing aspect of Islam, one may take advantage of what other human societies have achieved, even those that are not Islamic.

There is another point of dispute, which is the position on the Muslims' heritage. Although the works of our scholars have produced a plentiful heritage, not all of this heritage is necessarily true. Inasmuch as we maintain an open mind towards the outside world, we maintain an open mind also towards our heritage by abandoning [our tendency to] view it in glorified terms. Hence we are proposing the need to renew religious thought in the light of major Islamic principles and over-all human production, whether that production comes from the east or from the west.

[Question] How did your movement evolve into an independent movement?

[Answer] We have had Islamic activity in Tunisia since 1970. This activity manifested itself in giving lessons and publishing the magazine, AL-MA'RIFAH. But this Islamic activity was didactic, and its political background consisted of considering the existing regime responsible for the looseness of morals. Therefore, Islamic action was very traditional, especially since the Islamic movement itself considered itself at that time a means for salvation and sensed that it had a heroic role in saving society. Hence developed one of the points of the dispute between us.

The dispute was set off ever since 1975, and the first problem was what we called "the Tunisization of Islamic action." We had not been looking at the experience of Egypt, Sudan or any of the other countries; but we were rather looking at our own situation, and we were emphasizing the need to analyze it and to proceed from it. This led to the existence of two different views on whose bases the dispute widened until it ended with my departure from the magazine, AL-MA'RIFAH, where I was editor in chief. I left the magazine because of the dispute we had around these questions and around the position on human thought. The dispute began when our work developed in the seventies, and the nucleus [of our movement] was expanded with a gathering of support among students, professors, physicians and others. These groups had had social experiences that we ought to have understood and gone along with. We may hence summarize the questions of the dispute in three points: first, the attempt to free ourselves from the "moral" view of people and society, [an approach] that explains everything in moral terms; second, the departure from simplification and generalization, especially the position on the questions regarding which we used to express public positions such as those of social justice and the freedom of women in Islam; and third, the establishment of interaction between us and the society from which we had been semi-alienated. The truth is that it was the thinking of al-Sayyid Qutb which crystallized this alienation. Qutb articulated his thoughts in three statements. They are: the ignorance of the society in which we live; looking down on that society under the pretext that it was not ours; and dissociation, that is, there had to be total

alienation from the society. Qutb offered no solution to the proposed problems because he considered them to be the result of ignorance. These three components make up one of the aspects of the al-Salafiyah mentality. Then the dispute developed after we had made significant progress in our attempt to read the heritage and evaluate the reality that we were experiencing. It became evident to us that the moral factor was merely the outcome and not the source of all of society's problems. We also considered popularization to be the bane of various societies because it legitimized everything. A discussion about social justice, for example, is quite meaningless unless we tie it with the question of ownership and changing production relationships.

The case is the same in the question of the political regime. We are not calling for absolute democracy; we rather define democracy in terms of establishing and honoring constitutional institutions, preserving the separation of the powers and making the public participate so they can become spokesmen for these institutions and can speak on their behalf.

[Question] Where do you stand on the multi-party political system?

[Answer] The multi-party system is an objective fact, and the regime did no more than recognize this fact. The university, for example, which graduates most of the generations and cadres of the future have students who rally around factions and movements that aspire for change. This phenomenon is growing and is influencing other sectors because those people graduate and become influential members of society. The university is graduating new generations and groups whose aspirations and positions cannot be ignored. The multi-party system then has forced itself on reality because Tunisia in 1981 is not the same as Tunisia in 1956 or in 1934. Consequently, the regime's recognition of the multi-party system is a mere observation of reality.

The question that is being raised now is a question on the nature of the step that is to follow this recognition. This is a more difficult step because it sets problems in front of the regime which the regime cannot solve, such as the problem of developing the country's institutions, the agencies of the media and the ministries that formulate the major choices. These institutions are not the property of a group, but they rather belong to all the people, and, accordingly, the matter requires total reconstruction.

The average citizen finds strange contradictions in the stage through which we are now passing. There is, for example, the discussion about multiple parties which is taking place at a time when illegal practices are continuing, such as sudden arrest, the closing down of some newspapers and the refusal to grant legal permits to other newspapers. In view of this situation we want popular resolutions not resolutions that come from above, because true democracy does not wait for resolutions that come from above.

[Question] Did you ask for permission to publish a newspaper that would speak for you, or did you ask for a permit for a political party?

[Answer] We think there is a primary need which manifests itself in crystallizing our own inner thoughts, that is, among ourselves and also with others at the same time. Therefore, we feel the need for establishing a dialogue and the need for having a public bulletin that would articulate our convictions. To hear the opinions of others and to give shape to this inclination we filed an application in the summer of 1980 to publish an intellectual monthly magazine that would deal with social issues in a scholarly analytic fashion. At the outset the authorities appeared prepared to approve our request, but they did not follow through with any practical measure. Likewise, we will soon submit an application to obtain a permit to establish a cultural society that would hold lectures and seminars and publish a cultural publication about them.

[Question] Don't you think that this concentration on cultural activity makes you merely an intellectual movement and keeps you from appearing to be a political movement?

[Answer] Every political movement has an intellectual starting point and an ideological background. This is what is fundamental in our view. We have general principles which we want to crystallize. Therefore, the existence of a cultural society is necessary. Let us take, for example, the French socialist party which did not represent anything major 2 decades ago. But because of the struggle upon which its fighters and leaders embarked, it has come to represent a force whose intellectual and political proportions are rooted in French society. Hence emerges the need to base every serious movement on an intellectual foundation and on profound programs so that these can give the movement's politics an integrated cultural and ideological dimension that develops with reality. What is being proposed to the progressive Muslims, therefore, is the establishment of a distinctive ideology. We believe that entering the political arena is not difficult, but staying in it is difficult indeed because that requires strong underlying principles.

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28 August 1981

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CURRENT IDF, AMF TRANSACTIONS DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 p 57

[Text] THE ISLAMIC development bank, a branch of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, is to grant more than $95.2m in credits to various Islamic countries.

The Jeddah-based bank gave Algeria $18m in credit to purchase industrial goods, while Pakistan received $16m to buy vessels for its new state tanker company. Other credits included $15m to Bangladesh for cotton imports and a similar sum to Senegal to buy sunflower seeds. North Yemen received $10m towards the purchase of petroleum products. Syria, the Maldives, Niger and Cameroon also received credits from the IDB.

The bank's council, chaired by the president, Dr. Ahmed Mohammed Ali, also agreed to increase the bank's financial contribution to the Jordanian Fertiliser Company. The bank is speeding up the programme to fund a research and training institute which will foster the principles of Islamic banking throughout the Muslim world. It was also announced that the bank's foreign trade financing would be opened up to large private placements.

By the end of last year the IDB had committed $347.1m in financing foreign trade operations, $49.4m in loans and technical assistance and a further $651m in miscellaneous investment.

Meanwhile, the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) expects to come close to doubling its capital within the next six months to about $900m, AMF officials have announced. The fund, the Arab world's equivalent of the Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF), exists mainly to help Arab countries with balance of payment difficulties.

Officials say that the amount the fund has committed in loans is expected to reach half its resources in the next two to three weeks and trigger an automatic call on member states to pay up all their capital. The fund's authorised capital is 263m Arab Accounting Dinars ($890m) but only 52 per cent of that has been paid up. One dinar equals three IMF Special Drawing Rights.

Officials at the fund's headquarters in Abu Dhabi said that a board decision taken last April meant that member states would have six months to pay up after the call for capital. Loans committed at the end of last year were about $120m, but the loans expected to be approved in the next few weeks would almost double this. The fund, founded by an agency of the Arab League, began in 1977 when the aim of fostering closer economic and monetary cooperation between Arab countries. Its president is Iraq's former planning minister, Jawad Hashim.

Bankers said the increase in the fund's capital would allow it substantially to increase its lending and become more of a force in the Arab world. 'The fund does not directly finance development programmes but tries through lending to correct imbalances in a country's economy.

An important project now being considered is a clearing system for payments between member countries to pass through a central system, perhaps at the AMF headquarters. The fund is also preparing studies on ways to use the Arab dinar, at present a notional currency used by the AMF, in transactions between Arab countries. Officials are looking at ways of revaluing the dinar by using a basket of currencies rather than the SDR as at present.

CSO: 4300/84

ISRAEL COMPLAINS ABOUT EEC LOANS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 3 Aug 81 pp 7, 8

[Text]

The European Economic Community agreed last week to disburse $1.05 billion in loans and grants to seven Arab countries and Israel over the next five years. Almost $430 million of this has been earmarked for direct grants to the Arab states, and the remaining $620 million is in loans to be shared between these countries and Israel. Israeli officials in Brussels have charged the EEC with discrimination against their country, but community sources have retorted that Israel is not a developing country, as are the seven other recipients, and that it has the highest per capita income of the group.

The aid is being granted under current financial protocols linking the EEC with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Israel.

Egypt gets the lion's share of the latest package with $133 million in direct grants and $156 million in loans; Morocco follows next with $114 million of grants and $94 million in credits; Algeria receives $45.6 million of direct aid and $112 million in loans; Tunisia's share is $62.7 million and $81.7 million respectively. In the Mashrek, the biggest recipient is Syria with $34.2 million worth of grants and $66.5 million of loans; Jordan follows with $27.2 million in grants and loans of $38 million, while Lebanon gets $16.7 million in direct aid and $35.5 million in credits; Israel receives $41.8 million worth of loans.

The Israeli ambassador to Brussels protested at a news conference that his country was being discriminated against by not receiving any direct grants from the EEC, while countries rich in resources such as Algeria were getting substantially larger loans as well as straight grants. Although there were reports that some EEC governments were sympathetic to the ambassador's arguments, precedent in EEC assistance opposed these because Israel has not been receiving direct grants under the current protocol which expires in December.

CSO: 4300/84

BRIEFS

EUROPEAN LOANS TO ARAB STATES--European Community aid to its major trading partners in the Maghreb and Mashreq will total about EUA 1bn (EUA 1 = $1.04) over the coming five years. This represents a 40 per cent increase compared with European aid to the seven Arab countries and Israel from 1977 to 1981, but still falls far short of the aid request put in by the recipients, or even the aid figure suggested by the EEC executive commission. The aid will include EUA 600m in loans from the European Investment Bank, the EEC's main lending institution. The interest rate on the loans, estimated at between 13 to 15 per cent per year, is considered much too high even by European experts. Some EUA 415m will be given in the form of grants, with Algeria receiving EUA 44m, Morocco EUA 107m, Tunisia EUA 59m, Egypt EUA 126m, Jordan EUA 27m, Lebanon EUA 15m and Syria EUA 34m. European Commission experts who recommended that grants to the EEC's so-called 'preferential' partners should total about EUA 489m, stress that the final aid figure agreed by European foreign ministers in Brussels recently is 'disappointingly low'. They point out that EEC aid for the next five years barely takes account of inflation. While Italy and France were willing to increase European aid to the Maghreb and Mashreq states, both Germany and the UK are believed to have opposed such moves. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English 1 Aug 81 p 33]

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HARDSHIPS OF SOVIET SOLDIERS DESCRIBED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Jul 81 pp 90-91

[Text] The Soviet citizen can now learn from his newspaper that Moscow is having difficulties in occupied Afghanistan.

The Afghan driver Jalaleddin does not have much sympathy with his compatriots' resistance struggle against the Soviet invasion: "We all hate the bandits," he admitted to the correspondent from the Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, "we are glad that the troops came."

Similar confessions are quite familiar to the readers of Soviet newspapers since their army occupied the neighboring country in December 1979.

However, reading on reveals something unusual: "Earlier, many people thought that the bandits were really fighting for the people." Jalaleddin's opinion apparently changed after the rebels--dismissed in the Soviet Union for a whole year as insignificant individual fighters--attacked his bus.

As the Soviet press reports them, the operations of the rebel groups are hitting the population in the mountains along the Afghan-Pakistani border especially hard: The resistance fighters are blocking the few traffic arteries in the remote parts of the country, they are blowing up bridges and throwing up barricades to hamper the provisioning of the border area with water, gasoline and provisions.

Burning schools and mosques, mined roads, burned out vehicles everywhere, numerous dead and wounded: "We are having difficulties, and not just minor ones," complains Division Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Said Chan of the Afghan army.

Soviet newspapers have recently been painting this gloomy picture in documentaries and reports from the scene in Afghanistan--suddenly the Soviet reader learns that the intervention is meeting with mass resistance. He no longer has to make do with radio reports from the West, with rumors or news about the dead from his circle of acquaintances.

For a year the Soviet press had printed exclusively good news about the occupied country. The army newspaper RED STAR had lost its patience last October with the "desire of the hirelings of imperialism and reaction to intimidate the population by terrorism and to disrupt the economic situation," from which the attentive reader could draw his own conclusions about the seriousness of the situation. But the RED STAR was optimistic: "The enemies have no future."

One and 1/2 years after the Soviet strike on Kabul, the enemies have still not been vanquished: Foreign centers of sabotage, bluster PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA and LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, are turning criminals into freedom fighters, training them, delivering weapons and arms to them and directing their sabotage from Pakistan. Those pulling the strings are in the United States, China, Pakistan and Egypt.

Theories about international conspiracies against the progress of socialism have a long tradition in the Moscow agitprop head office. The admission--even if indirect--that Soviet policy somewhere in the world is meeting bitter resistance is, on the other hand, new for the Soviet citizen.

Soviet documentaries on Afghanistan avoid mentioning their own troops, who are described at most once, cleaning their barracks or reading their mail. The heavy fighting around Kabul in mid-July, in which the Soviets also suffered losses, are passed over in silence in the Soviet press. Soviet observers always accompany only Afghan army units on a "bandit hunt."

According to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, the war reports are intended to refute the claim of Western "liars" that the Afghan army is crumbling and is on the side of the rebels, just like the majority of the population.

As proof to the contrary, courageous Afghan soldiers, as well as rural inhabitants, tested by suffering but full of hope (friendly to the government), are praised in the style of the Old Slavic heroic epics. In this way, the backdrop needed for bravery and tears reveals something of the hard everyday life of the occupying forces.

For the first time since the fighting with China in 1969 decorations are again being awarded in the Soviet army to bolster the morale of the troops. The eulogies for fallen Soviet officers, which had been suspended since last summer, were resumed again recently--a sign of increasing military difficulties.

Members of the civil defense and the paramilitary organization DOSAAF can read in their monthly magazine KNOWLEDGE OF WAR how comrades in the colonial service are carrying out their "responsible mission."

Their "international duty on the territory of the Afghanistan Democratic Republic" is restricted, according to the military paper, to freight transportation, road construction and educational journeys, during which the Afghans are enlightened about the building up of socialism and are entertained with Soviet folklore.

The Soviets still live in encampments outside the settled areas, "in the midst of deserts and stony gorges." They drill for their own water, generate their own electricity: food and necessary goods are brought in from the Soviet Union. "Conditions are hard," the correspondent from KNOWLEDGE OF WAR concedes, "everything here costs maximum exertion."

Communications rely almost exclusively on helicopters because of the constant threat of attacks, and even this is an "extremely difficult and dangerous way," since the resistance fighters are now shooting down helicopters.

The reporter betrays one secret of war: The limited contingent of the Soviet army in Afghanistan consists in large part of 18-year olds, who "were still in school a short time ago," the army is apparently being filled by recruits who have to go into the Afghan desert immediately after basic training.

There the inexperienced soldiers have to pass a hard test straight away: Even the peaceful cultural campaigns, the military correspondent complains, are "by no means without danger"--everywhere rebels lie in wait.

PRAVDA reported the "assassination" of an Afghan political general and his escort--a "villainous crime" right in the center of Kabul.

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA reported: "Outwardly the enemy cannot be distinguished from a peasant," but "no sooner has the soldier turned round than he has a bullet in his back."

Moscow has never written so openly about dealing with guerillas: The Afghans feel revulsion at the "bestial brutality" of the rebels and had "now turned away from the terrorists."

The Soviets are forcing themselves to be calm: When they conquered Central Asia at the beginning of the 1920s, native resistance lasted for a decade--then the intruders had won. So, today, Soviet propaganda is utilizing familiar images of the enemy:

The dreaded "gang leaders" of Afghanistan appear either as dispossessed large-estate owners, who were stigmatized in the Soviet Union as "kulaks" and liquidated, or as "dushmans" and "bashmachs": These were the names given to the Moslem partisan groups in the Asian Soviet republics who vainly fought against communism.

Just like them, the "counterrevolution" is bound to fail: "The plans of the enemies of Afghanistan are doomed to failure," prophesies the NOVOYE VREMYA, the organ of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Perhaps the more realistic campaign is intended to prepare the Soviet citizen that the judgment cannot be carried out quite so soon.

The conservative SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA is less optimistic in its judgment about the guerilla war: "It is a bitter struggle," writes the correspondent, "a struggle for life and death."

Deep Gratitude

In order to polish up the self-image cultivated by propaganda of the peace-loving Soviet army, which is received as a friend and protector even in occupied countries, the Soviet news agency Tass is mailing out photographs from occupied Afghanistan.

There is little evidence of confrontations with Afghan resistance fighters, the motifs are rather emphatically civilian in nature: a rich display of goods in the poor country, scenes of fraternization between Soviet soldiers and natives.

The official caption: "All honest Afghans cherish feelings of deep gratitude to the Soviet soldiers who are temporarily stationed in this friendly country at the request of the government."

Apparently the propaganda officials in Moscow accept the fact that the recipients of their PR photographs might notice the discrepancy between the illusion of harmony and reports of Western news agencies about bitter rebel actions.

9581
CSO: 4620/5

GOVERNMENT BUYS OUT COMMUNICATIONS FIRM

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 17, 7 Aug 81 pp 25-26

[Article by Louise Denver]

[Text]

ONE OF THE MOST advanced telecommunications industries in the Arab world has just been bought out by the Bahrain government. A memo of agreement was signed and the sale of purchase completed for the government of Bahrain to take over 60 per cent of Cable and Wireless in Bahrain.

The authorized capital of Bahrain Telecommunications, the name of the new company, is 80 million Bahraini dinars corresponding to the net book value of Cable and Wireless assets in Bahrain on July 1.

Although Bahrain Telecommunications (BTC) is now majority Bahrain-owned, operations will continue to be run by Cable and Wireless until the formalities of registration as a Bahraini shareholding company are completed and the deal is made official by Emiri decree.

John Munday, the chief executive of the Bahrain subsidary of Cable and Wireless, Bahrain International Communications (BIC) said the new company is expected to become official within the next couple months — he anticipates by *Eid al Adha* in October. Until then he will continue to direct operations with an expected BD30 million local turnover this year before becoming responsible to the board of directors of Bahrain Telecommunications (BTC).

The new board is to be formed but the Minister of Transport and Communications for Bahrain, Ibrahim Humaidan, is being widely tipped to lead the new company. U.K.'s state-owned Cable and Wireless will keep 40 per cent of the shares and the Bahrain government and government nominees, such as pension funds and national institutions, will own the rest. The unusual feature of the preliminary negotiations is that the government has already underwritten BD6 million of the issued BD60 million shares and is offering them to the public. So the Bahrain people can have a 10 per cent equity stake in BTC themselves.

The move had been under discussion for some years "because it is always advisable that the government has an interest in her communications network," said BIC chief Munday. Minister of Transport and Communications Humaidan said, "Majority ownership of the national telecommunications network is important for security, social and political reasons."

The United Arab Emirates announced its intention of taking control of all local subsidaries of both C&W and International Aeradio on September 1, 1976. Emirates Telecommunications Corp. (EMIRTEL) came into being in which C & W and International Aeradio together had a 40 per cent holding and the UAE 60 per cent. They took over the

standard earth station at Dubai and the one 120 miles away at Abu Dhabi. This was the forerunner of the Bahrain move — tried and tested on exactly the same basis as the new Bahrain company BTC is being set up.

The takeover brought forward from 1982 when the concession granted to C & W was due to expire is in line with the whole Gulf policy to become owners of all natural resources, which of course includes the all important communications industries. The move had been under discussion for some years and the decision to go ahead now is a measure of the smooth and amicable transition that was always anticipated.

The takeover coincided with the opening of the new BD20 million telephone house in Bahrain and the new record services building adjacent to it. The seven-story block, the tallest in Bahrain, was built to house the two companies — BIC, the subsidary of Cable and Wireless, responsible for the international side of C & W, and Bahrain Telephones, which runs the local services. In anticipation of the government takeover the two companies merged last month so that the chief executive of BIC became responsible for four divisions — engineering, administration, finance and communications.

The new building was just one more milestone in Bahrain's Communication history and symbolic of the crucial role the industry plays in the island's economy. Tenders for the next major project under way are expected to be received by mid-September. Four firms have been invited to construct the $60 million submarine cable linking Bahrain with Qatar and the UAE. Work on the joint venture between the three governments is expected to start by mid-1982 and the completion date is set for the end of 1983. The cable will offer 1400 voice channels and as a measure of its importance, chief executive Munday sees its logical extension south into the Indian Ocean and north to Kuwait.

Ultimately the submarine cable will be owned 40 per cent each by Bahrain and the UAE and 20 per cent by Qatar. The project consultant is a Swedish firm SWEDTEL and the invitees for tender are Standard Telephones and Cables, the U.K. subsidary of ITC; the French firm Submaroom; Nippon Electric; Fujitsu Ltd.; and the U.S. firm Western Electric International. The cable will keep pace with the tremendous growth rate in the demand for telephone and telex services in Bahrain, estimated at around 20 per cent annually, and should be sufficient to last the next 25 years' requirements.

From March 31, 1975 to January 31, 1980 the total telephones in Bahrain increased by a phenomenal 215 per cent to 72,564. And over the three years from 1977 to 1980 the number of international message minutes (overseas) increased from 10.0 million to 27.7 million.

In addition to the giant strides Bahrain has made in its domestic services with the introduction of digital exchanges shooting her communications industry into the forefront of the latest in technological development, the island provides direct international dialing to Europe, North America, Africa, Asia and other world points by the two earth stations in Bahrain via satellite. The short-haul traffic to the neighboring Gulf states currently provided by microwave and trophosperic scatter will soon be replaced by the submarine cable and the development of Arabsat.

The latter is a stationary satellite that will be suspended above the Arab world to bounce instant communications from all the subscribing countries' earth stations. The agreement was signed in early 1981 in Jordan to place the satellite in the air by 1983. The French firm Aerospatiale, partners with a U.S. firm, will be responsible for controlling the project. And the individual countries participating will be responsible for the construction of their own earth stations.

Bahrain is already way ahead of the rest of the Gulf in this field and its first station, which started up in 1969, paved the way for her present economic and commercial growth. The station was constructed at that time at a cost of BD 5.5 million to give Bahrain diversity of

routing and to meet the enormous demand for international communications services. The fully automatic telex services to most countries in the world is now used by 1460 subscribers and has capacity for 2500 machines, enough to cope with anticipated demand until 1985.

A spinoff to Bahrain's communication policy has been the setting up of a financial center that has attracted worldwide attention. National and international financial institutions found the readymade communications network a boon for the transmission of financial intelligence that keyed them in to the world wide money markets.

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PCI ORGAN EXAMINES CAUSES OF BANI-SADR'S FALL

Neutralization of Supporters

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 26 Jun 81 pp 19, 20

[Article by Massimo Boffa: "The Fall of Bani-Sadr"]

> [Text] The recent events in Iran are not ascribable so much to the manipulation of the Islamic masses as to the political neutralization of the ousted president's adherents. Bani Sadr had not one ally he could count on. Is this a repression without anything to stop it, or is it the beginning of a bloody civil war?

The curtain has risen once again on the drama of the Iranian revolution, and the scene this time portends an inauspicious future. Decisive events are still in the making, but the direction they are taking, while still inconclusive, is clear. What is not clear, however, is how this development will end up and when. Khomeyni has given the Islamic movement's extreme right a free hand to favor itself by disrupting the fragile equilibrium that has balanced the rapports between the powerful factions within the revolution. Until yesterday the idol of the Iranian masses but then abandoned to his fate by Khomeyni, Bani Sadr has fled into hiding; and while the extremists are trying to find him, they are arresting numbers of his collaborators. The roads are under surveillance by pasdaran and squads of hezbollahi. In their first sporadic attempts at armed resistance, the mojahedin and fedayin have been intimidated and driven back with bloodshed by firing squads and judiciary terror. The various forces of opposition, both religious and laic, appear to be disoriented and poorly prepared to fight the Islamic extremists.

In a dispatch from Tehran several months ago, RINASCITA warned its readers not to swallow oversimplified rumors about the Iranian revolution which were then circulating; we pointed out that its enemies were not confronting a well ordered totalitarian regime, with its law and rituals, but rather an extremely open political situation that must logically lead to civil war, motivated by an accumulation of resentments. Iranian society, in fact, had been polarizing more and more radically: on the one hand, the extremists' structures and practices in the government, in parliament, in the judiciary, in the mass media, and in parallel organisms created by the revolution; on the other hand, the "veto power" held by ex-president Bani Sadr, surrounded by a rising number of committed activists, particularly among the Shiite clergy, and various factions of the opposition in the battle to preserve a "pluralist" situation. Both sides claimed popular support and the strength of the armed forces.

Under these circumstances, the possibility of a catastrophic clash could not be deemed a remote eventuality; in fact, it was explicitly called for by the nation's political leaders if and when Khomeyni should disappear from the scene, since apparently his primary role had become that of guarantor of political equilibrium. Instead, the Imam decided to anticipate the moment for settling accounts. In the coming weeks we shall know whether he has provoked a civil war or avoided it through preventative repression. Without Khomeyni it would be fought in his name by both sides, and the outcome would be highly uncertain. But now that he has chosen to side with the Islamic revolution, Bani Sadr's party has been outlawed, and the clash can be contained, at least for the moment, through the initiative of God's party.

The determinant factor in the positions held by the opposing forces, Khomeyni's change of mind, introduced something totally new into the internal situation, and whoever undervalues it in the belief that the Imam has always been opposed to the president simply does not know the most elementary facts about the Iranian revolution. Indeed, it was Khomeyni who delegated to Bani Sadr the command of the armed forces although, according to the Constitution, he should have been in command himself. Furthermore, he was one of the most active contributors to the president's popularity. During the early months of the war, the Imam even endorsed Bani Sadr's program in defense of the specialists, subsequently mortified by the Islamic and populist "cultural revolution." At the time, many in Tehran were willing to bet on--or hope for--a more decisive distancing from the Islamic Republican Party.

Then matters moved ahead with precipitous speed. The national government found itself increasingly paralyzed by internal conflicts, which allowed [Khomeyni] little time to make a choice; and since he felt a closer affinity with the party of God's extremists, he chose it over the movement headed by Bani Sadr.

As happens after every defeat, the errors committed by the president are now under review--and not without a dose of malice. Undoubtedly Bani Sadr overestimated his strength and carried out various incautious measures. Not that he lacked a considerable following among the people--to the contrary. Paradoxically, his fall occurred not in a moment of weakness but rather when his actions were undermining his political adversaries. He was the only Iranian leader who had a real charismatic rapport with the masses. But his charisma rested not only on his personal resources: to a great extent, it reflected the legitimacy granted him by Khomeyni. Consequently, the enormous influence he exerted over the people abruptly vanished when the Imam turned against him, which happened as soon as Khomeyni realized that the president was leading an opposition, speaking more and more openly in behalf of the laic, nationalist, and leftist factions. Bani Sadr's power of attraction appeared irresistible until he bagan to penetrate the heart of the Khomeyni revolution. The legal system was no help to him; the Constitution, in fact, denied him the trappings of power it conceded instead to his adversaries. To be effective, therefore, his actions could only be illegal to some degree, a condition his enemies eagerly exploited.

At the crucial moment, Bani Sadr could not count on a single ally of any weight. Even the army, to which he had dedicated considerable care, hastened to declare its loyalty to Khomeyni and its "neutrality" in the political battle. Certainly, it would have been ingenuous to expect it to behave otherwise. The charismatic rapport between the Imam and the people, the one truly stable factor in the ongoing Iranian revolution,

has automatically stripped every institution acting against his authority of its power. This is true also of the army and its officers. In any event, as always the armed forces express their loyalty with prudent reserve. Their leaders have never been partisans of the Islamic republic. It has been, and continues to be, their policy to gain time, awaiting the most propitious moment to achieve an autonomous role. Today the armed forces are still not subjected to politics, nor have they been integrated in any way into the mechanism of consolidating the new power. They are deployed on the frontiers, not in the cities. Yet, it is clear that in the long run, their political role is destined to increase in proportion to the uncertainty of the outcome of the domestic strife.

Here we come to the core of the question: what will happen, what is happening in Iran? Are we observing a repression without anything to stop it or the beginning of a bloody civil war? For the present, the prospects seem to be in no way definitive, nor are they as unilaterally favorable as the victors' propaganda would like us to believe. Despite all appearances, the fall of Bani Sadr is a serious trauma for the Iranian revolution which cannot easily be cured. This time we must not allow ourselves to be duped by the television camera showing vast crowds jamming the streets of Tehran and calling for the president's head. They are not the same throng of millions who hitherto turned up for every momentous development in the revolution. The kindest estimates cite only a few tens of thousands of demonstrators. The main factor in the fall of Bani Sadr has not been so much a manipulation of the masses by the Islamic extremists as the political neutralization of his huge following. This new act of the drama is being played with a relative passivity of the masses.

For the present, the opposition headed by Bani Sadr appears to be disoriented, without a voice, uncertain of its own identity. Accustomed to express its views in terms of the revolution as a wing of Khomeyni's political array, today it is immobilized by the Imam's actions. It is not by chance that the first to make a counter move have been the extreme left groups, the "mojahedin" and "fedayin," long consigned to oblivion and fought by Islamic power. Nevertheless, the executions in the past several days betray the evident fear of a much stronger resistance. From some Iranian cities, chiefly Mashad, come reports of extremely violent uprisings, their outcome taken less for granted than in the capital. The country's opposition to the extremist policies of the Belai government is far more widespread than it seems to be on the surface. Thus, much can still depend on the fate of the opposition leaders, primarily Bani Sadr who, in all probability, has never moved beyond Tehran's city limits.

The Islamic Republican Party has sought to seize uncontested power in order to realize finally its social goal: to outlaw the other parties so that it can establish a one-party regime based on a sort of popular democracy; to introduce the Islamic model into the nation's juridical legislation; and to substitute the structures of social radicalism with a state apparatus. But now that all institutional power rests in its hands, never has the Islamic republic seemed as feeble, as exposed to attack from the growing numbers of its enemies.

Shapur Bakhtiar, formerly prime minister under the Shah and now living in exile in Paris, takes no pains to conceal his satisfaction with the party's weakness. And what about the West, what about Europe? It appears that millions of people feel deep sympathy for the unfortunate Bani Sadr. But who has stepped forward to help him?

He tried until the last to communicate with Europe, to explain to the nations of Europe the motives for his own revolution. But who listened to him? Who responded when, he appealed, in the name of those international laws of which the European nations declared themselves to be so proud, for denunciation of Iraq's aggression, which was left to him alone to resist? What did Europe do to counter that hostile, demoniacal image the Islamic extremists attributed to Bani Sadr's "illusions?" What did Europe do to show the Iranians that it was different from the Europe they had known, that it was worth the trouble to make the effort to establish a mutual relationship?

Islamic Jacobinism

Rome RINASCITA in Italian 20 Jun 81 p 20

[Article by Leonardo Paggi: "Islamic Intolerance"]

[Text] They cashiered Bani Sadr and shot down his closest political colleagues. In a climate still apparently marked by an intense mobilization of the masses, the new Iranian Islamic republic is slipping steadily and openly toward authoritarianism, thereby indicating that it is incapable of undertaking the costs and benefits of a political dialectic which everyone considered not only fully compatible with the new regulations adopted by the popular rebellion aganst the shah's dictatorship but also respectful of them. Whatever may be the complexity and specific nature (both beyond discussion) of Iranian reality and its improbable identification with Eurocentric categories, the new political turning poses basic questions again on how to decipher and read the contradictory forms that liberating processes everywhere seem to pose.

Once again we find ourselves facing a drastic inconsistency between a social content of emancipation, characterized by a popular revolt against the most brutal and immediately visible forms of imperialistic oppression and the entrenchment of a power which patently wants to seal off hermetically every ulterior avenue of expansion. This contradiction is nothing new to the Italian and European left. Perhaps for this reason it seems more than ever urgent to go beyond summary, elusive judgments and, particularly, to avoid stopping short once again at an overly passive acceptance of the diverse results between the "social" and "political," but to turn back and reflect on the structural limitations of a political model, the classical type of social revolution repeatedly hampered by obstacles; in other words, to review the model that prevailed between 1789 and 1917, subsequently from the Chinese revolution to the anticolonial movements of the 1960s and 1970s.

Certainly it is not a problem of latching on tardily to the assumptions characteristic of the whole liberal political tradition, which identify with democracy and its principles of a competitive ethos--the market society, which finds its fullest expression in the various "economic" theories of democracy. Instead, it is a matter of understanding more clearly that even intense mobilizations of the masses do not by themselves automatically guarantee that they will be granted a greater participation in the process of political decision making. The history of the Jacobin model and the wide range of forms it has taken bears ample witness to the opportunities within reach of popular uprisings to overthrow existing state and bureaucratic orders, paralyzing their capacity to respond and react (in this sense, the Iranian revolution has been surprising in its ability to propose a victorious outcome of

mass movements against the power of a highly modern and efficient war machine). At the same time, it shows its enormous power to encompass popular energy in the new state's legitimacy, but it hinders every facile equation between a developing representation and the growth and consolidation of political democracy.

The question is not without implications in the matter of recognizing theoretically and politically the development processes of democracy, inherent to a great extent in the socialist tradition of the Western workers' movement. The liquidation of Bani Sadr points out the Islamic party's intolerance of every limitation imposed on its own power that can come from expounding real interests, hence also from inevitably distorting them. Whatever the facts of Islam may be, even in its violent verbal rejection of the Soviet model, the Iranian victors seem to be more and more tempted to repeat the one-party experiment (difficult now to say with how much possibility of success), which has dominated an entire phase in the history of the national liberation movement. In other words, the experiment of an authoritarian or plebiscitarian democracy which, beginning with the classical postulate of "popular sovereignty" or "general will," ends up by giving a good example of the historical and political mechanisms which can turn a process of democratic development into a kind of "tyranny of the majority."

Today perhaps more than ever, the European socialist movement must continue to uphold the democratic participation of the masses, it must clarify its own independence (theoretical, not only political) from that primordial political model which, in its own infancy, manifested an explicit distrust in principle of every form of private and group social organizations. "The sovereign body, being constituted only by the individuals who comprise it, does not have, and cannot have, any interests contrary to their interests, therefore it has no need to give guarantees to its subjects because it is impossible that such a body would wish to harm all its members. The sovereign body, for the very fact that it is such, is always what it must be" (Rousseau).

At the same time, moreover, the Iranian experiment poses another question of primary importance: the forms its own development is taking--that is, given the integration levels of the world market and the very technological complexities of that development, whether the Jacobin formula can continue to be (as it has been all during its glorious past) the authoritarian political instrument that can guarantee a strong, secure direction in an accelerated process of modernization. The Shah's failed policy of integrating [Iran's economy] on a subordinate level with the great American multinationals is not in itself enough to hope for the eventual success of a political model inevitably induced to interpret the problems of national autonomy in terms of self sufficiency.

We must not forget that the crisis of nonalignment is also, to a large extent, the crisis of a hypothetical economic development based on relative national autonomy (example: the shipwreck of the Indian experiment). But the way self-criticism developed on the Maoist model or the evolution of the Soviet's single party toward a neocorporative kind of system, which entrusts main choices to negotiations between the centers of power--don't these factors demonstrate the indisputable justification for social complexity, even where we find the maximum expansion of Jacobinism?

We have listed some of the most disparate problems and questions for one reason only: to call attention to the fact that Iran's woes will contribute to the rising need to analyze more precisely and dispassionately those concepts and key words such as "reevaluation" and "democracy," which have played such a major role in the whole history of the European socialist movement.

9653
CSO: 4628/3

INTERDEPENDENCE OF RELIGION, POLITICS ANALYZED

Shi'ism in Islamic Republic

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Mehdi Mozzafari, Iranian professor residing abroad]

[Text] The arrival of Mr Bani-Sadr and Mr Mas'ud Rajavi in France in exile has again called attention to the Iranian revolution which, like so many others, is devouring its children and even its fathers. Whereas Mr Rezvanian, in response to Daniel Ribant, stresses the legality of the election of the deposed president, Nuri Albala questions whether the people's Mojahedin is not making a fatal mistake by banking on Bani-Sadr and the conviction that Imam Khomeyni will lose all popular support. Mr Mozzafari hardly believes in the Islamic Republic's compliance with the principles of Shi'ism and P. Hartmann denounces the complicity which, according to him, exists between the Toudeh communist party and the leaders of the Islamic Republic.

Is the republican government Shi'ite? Was it Islamic? The answer obviously depends on what is meant by a republic. If we accept, along with J.-J. Rousseau, that "a republic is any state governed by laws; monarchy itself is a republic," the question is irrelevant. But if we want to attribute particular features to a republic and define it as a nonhereditary political system that is essentially based on the predominance of the will of the people, then the issue of its compliance with Koranic precepts may be raised.

In reality, Islam does not mean a great deal by itself. Of course, as everyone knows, there is a book, the Koran; a messenger, Mohammed; and a long, 14-century history. But what gives concrete shape to all of these components is clearly the way in which they are examined, interpreted and put into practice. Above all, that depends on the areligious and material interests in question.

The Koran makes no definitive reference to either government or the state. In this connection, it simply orders the faithful to obey God, his prophet and rulers (Sourate IV, verse 62/63), just as it requires them to resolve their problems through negotiation (principle of chura).

Apparently aware of the nonexistence of Koranic texts concerning this matter, the Iranian leaders have attempted to solve the problem by referring exclusively to the governments of Mohammed and Ali in the seventh century,* which Moslem historiography is generally inclined to submit as the most perfect, the most just and the most original that mankind has ever known.

From the standpoint of legality, the status of chief of the Medinan community, over which Mohammed presided, by no means derived from the will of the faithful and even less from that of non-Moslem Medinans but rather, like his gift of prophecy, from the will of God. Thus this is a fundamentally theocratic system which it would be pointless to try to compare to a republican government.

Ali's government is less removed from this idea, insofar as Ali was the only one of the four "well-guided" caliphs whose access to power derived neither from an appointment by his predecessor nor from a designated assembly nor from a limited assembly. He attained power following a riot which culminated with the assassination of the ruling caliph. Shi'ism has always stressed the spontaneous character of Ali's rise to power. However, it has always, and this is the most important point, refused to attribute Ali's legitimacy to a popular vote. Much to the contrary, the Shi'ite argument is that Ali was regularly appointed to his position by the prophet. And subsequent events, which really brought him to power, are far from constituting the legal basis for his appointment.

The type of theoretical contradiction with which Shi'ism is struggling is thus apparent. On one hand, Khomeyni has proclaimed a republic in the name of Shi'ism while, on the other, the models invoked have nothing to do with such a government.

By theoretically comparing the imamate with the caliphate, the Shi'ites have practically, much more than the Sunnites, abandoned the principle of a republic. Judge for yourself:

1) Shi'ism believes in the nominal and express appointment of Mohammed's successor by God. It rejects the popular vote process.

2) None of the 12 Shi'ite imams has been "elected" to the imamate. This status is bestowed by heritage.

3) In the Shi'ite literature, there is not the slightest positive reference to the republic (Djumhur-i). This word has been used in a pejorative sense every time, to denounce the opposite school: Sunnism.

4) The Shi'ite prince is appointed by divine grace (lotf ilahi) or, in other words, providence. The consent and vote of the people are consequently excluded as a basis of legitimacy.

5) The expression "Islamic Republic" in Iran dates back only to late 1978 and early 1979. Khomeyni apparently did not have a clear idea of a republican government. The idea probably became established as the shah's position deteriorated.

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*Mr Mehdi Bazargan's statement in LE MONDE of 26 January 1979.

6) In Khomeyni's statements prior to his arrival in France in October 1978, there is no trace, at least no explicit trace, or the republican idea. Of course, Khomeyni sharply criticized and challenged the government of the shah. He certainly accused the Pahlavis of being usurpers, but not because they were kings, rather because they had seized power by violating the constitution, which was also monarchical.

7) It was only in his statement of 1 November 1978 that Khomeyni publicly referred to the republican alternative.

As already stated, Islam provides no exact information about the form of government. Shi'ism is no exception to this rule. It is Moslem historiographers, jurists and theologians who have attempted to give shape to their speculations and thus to submit, in the name of Islam, "Islamic" forms of government, whether monarchical or republican. They "have put together an account of historical events, aimed at accrediting the idea of a legitimate successor of the prophet while designating his responsibilities as such. This is the conviction which has taken root."*

The Islamic Republic was established in Iran not because of its compliance with Koranic or Shi'ite standards, but for a simpler reason. Republican government was the antithesis of a monarchical government personnified by a king who was especially hated by the people. But since this government is actually republican only in name, the president of the republic--under the 1979 constitution--is generally considered to be merely the ceremonial head of government. Thus he cannot invoke the will of the people as the source of his legitimacy and investiture.

Ayatollah, Tudeh 'Hand in Glove'

Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Patrick Hartmann]

[Text] The ayatollah and the commissar, or if you prefer, the Islamic Republican Party (PRI) and the Toudeh, the Iranian communist party, go hand in glove together. They go hand in glove insofar as censorship, harassment, imprisonment, torture and execution are concerned.

For the (pro-Soviet) Iranian communist party is also pursuing the opponents of the government. Discreetly, of course, remaining in the wings and thus attracting international public opinion little when it denounces acts of despotism.

Actually, the Toudeh acts as a spy, denouncing anyone who complains and pointing a gun at anything that moves. For the religious fundamentalists to be able to take better aim, the target is brought out into the open. The evidence of such a fine symbiotic relationship is not lacking:

Regularly from January to April, the communist daily MARDOM has reported in its columns every strike, every occupied plant and every social conflict, but not to support the strikers, rather to call for repressive measures.

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*M. Arkoun, "l'Islam et la laicite" [Islam and Secularity], Centre Thomas-More, p 11.

During the same period, the (banned) newspaper MOUDJAHED (organ of the Khalq Mojahedin, Moslem leftists opposed to the PRI and Imam Khomeyni) provided proof on several occasions that the repression being carried out against the Islamic left was facilitated by the "reports" which the Toudeh had submitted to authorities. The communists denied this up until the time that MARDOM began to wonder how the aforementioned "reports," including records, were falling into the hands of the Mojahedin.

We are also amazed that a Marxist-Leninist newspaper like MARDOM was tolerated by the authorities until June 1981. The repression against the non-Islamic and insufficiently Islamic press dates back to August 1979. Even the newspaper of the Islamic Fedayin (religious radicals closely associated with the Moslem Brothers) was banned in March 1981, 2 months before MARDOM.

There is no question that the government's anticommunist propaganda is false. It enables the PRI to keep its reputation and that of Imam Khomeyni untarnished in the eyes of the (profoundly anticommunist) Iranian people. In reality, for example, it does not prevent Toudeh militants from participating--discreetly, of course--in mosque assemblies in which problems concerning neighborhoods, food supplies, etc., are discussed.

The PRI actually needs the Toudeh (the oldest PC [communist party] in the Middle East, with branches extending into all Arab capitals), its network, its establishment and the discipline of its cadres. Only the Toudeh can enable the religious radicals to stamp out leftist groups such as the Khalq Fedayin and the Khalq Mojahedin, which today constitute the only organized and truly popular opposition to the Islamic dictatorship. Moreover, the Iranian leaders periodically need the Soviet Union. According to one source at the Soviet Embassy in Tehran, 80 percent of Iranian trade was routed through Soviet republics during the economic blockade of Iran.

The Toudeh in turn needs this alliance with the religious radicals to be able, thanks to them, to eliminate everything connected with the left and regain its strength. The PC has emerged very weakened from the Pahlavi period and its fanatical allegiance to Moscow has caused it to lose a great deal of popularity.

In the same way that the PRI is sounding the death knell for true Shi'ite Moslems,* the Toudeh is settling its scores with authentic leftist militants while being careful not to strike itself. Assuming that the PRI should remain in power, the opposition will at least be left with a poor consolation: that of witnessing, sooner or later, the ayatollah devour the commissar or vice-versa.

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*I will take this opportunity to point out the assassination, which went unnoticed, of Abdel Al-Reza Ebrahimi, the spiritual leader of the Shi'ite community of the Sheykhis, a marvelous "school" concerned only with spirituality and whose research aroused the enthusiasm of the orientalist philosopher Henri Corbin. Al-Reza Ebrahimi was killed in Kerman last year. His disciples have accused the authorities. The latter have refused to open an inquiry into this matter.

11915
CSO: 4619/28

BANI-SADR ACCUSED OF HYPOCRISY, 'MISDEEDS'

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 31 Jul 81 pp 1-4

[Text] On Tuesday, 28 July 1981, Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr, the deposed president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, arrived in France on board a military plane. The right to political asylum, which he had already been granted in advance since 20 June, when he went into hiding, was generously confirmed at the Evreux airport. The fact that this aircraft left Iranian airspace under completely illegal circumstances was apparently not considered a usual case of air piracy.

Upon his arrival, Bani-Sadr was flanked by a strange pair. On his right stood Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the people's Mojahedin, an urban guerrilla group of Islamic Marxist sympathies, notorious for more than a decade for their acts of terrorism. During his presidency, Bani-Sadr strongly opposed this group, condemning to death several hundred adolescents who claimed to be associated with the Mojahedin. Since being deposed, the former president has made peace with his former enemies and Mr Rajavi (their supreme leader) has taken refuge at his side in France at the very time that his followers, who include 12- and 13-year-old adolescents, are being massacred in the Islamic Republic. On Bani-Sadr's left was Colonel Moezi, the shah's former and last pilot, still proudly wearing the blue silk scarf of Imperial Army officers about his neck on that Tuesday morning.

What a strange escape, a strange honeymoon, and a strange asylum which has been granted to Bani-Sadr.

Several tens of thousands of Iranians have taken refuge in France since the revolution. Ingratitude is not one of their characteristic traits. But they fear for their lives and for those of their children. For if the Bani-Sadr-Rajavi alliance does not manage to unify those refugees, it will pose a constant threat to them. The consequences of this incident are foreseeable:

1) From a diplomatic standpoint, the freedom and undoubtedly the lives of French nationals in Iran are seriously threatened. If it is true that the mullahs control the crowds which they are manipulating, it has also been demonstrated that at the right time, they know how to throw them into a state of collective hysteria.

2) In France, the safety of Iranian nationals is seriously jeopardized. For example, there has been an assassination attempt against Shahpur Bakhtiar, which caused the death of a French policeman; the assassination of Prince Shafik at Villa-Dupont; the

regular attacks carried out on public thoroughfares against anti-Khomeyni demonstrators, and the recent criminal abduction of Colonel Zolfaghari at the university residence halls in Paris provide us with proof, if there is any need for it, of the methods used by the friends of Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr, at odds today but who were long allies. The appearance of two kinds of terrorism on French soil can now be feared: a) acts of retribution between Khomeyni supporters and Mojahedin, who are now in armed conflict, and b) assassination attempts against any Iranian national opposed to either of these groups. Everyone is threatened: monarchists, republicans, nationalists, even moderate and those following a wait-and-see policy, who do not dare take a stand.

The Free Iran Movement solemnly cautions French authorities against the consequences of the asylum granted to Bani-Sadr and the hospitality provided for the terrorist Rajavi. Mr Bani-Sadr and Mr Rajavi are not just political refugees. They have too much innocent blood on their hands to now be considered victims. There are distinctions required by the most basic morals. Nothing would be more ridiculous than to systematically applaud the positions taken by all of Khomeyni's enemies without considering their responsibilities or their pasts. Bani-Sadr is the very one who, in response to the Americans' refusal to extradite the shah, did not hesitate to coordinate an international kidnapping operation.

In 1978, President Giscard d'Estaing granted Khomeyni permission to reside at Neauphle-le-Chateau, enabling him to orchestrate his propaganda of hatred from France. But the president had an excuse: at the time, no one was really familiar with the false imam's doctrine and no one in the West could anticipate his crimes. But President Mitterand's position is very different in 1981. He cannot ignore the a abominable crimes perpetrated in Iran while Bani-Sadr was president of the Revolutionary Council and later president of the republic, heinous crimes which he allowed to take place. Everyone can understand France permitting him to escape the gallows, but no one will condone France allowing him to pursue a plan of action which formerly led to so many acts of torture, assassination and abuse of human dignity and rights.

Too much has been said and written. The political thoughts of Bani-Sadr and Rajavi have been written down; their misdeeds to date are numerous enough to permit an appraisal of their future actions.

History could not forgive such a mistake.

Abol-Hassan Bani-Sadr is well known to the world: every fact and action in his life during the last 3 years have been reported by all international publications.

But an appraisal of him is needed. This man, although he resided in France for 15 years, speaks French very poorly. That is why he has always made very vague statements to the mass media in that language, gladly willing to be considered a just man by his Western listeners. He has an especially large audience, since no one would assume, just by looking at him, that he is insincere. The myth of a liberal, socialistic and leftist Bani-Sadr has thus emerged. His best friends, so-called progressive Westerners, think that they have heard the echo of their own thoughts in his remarks, thus considering him to be one of them. Some of them have even gone so far as to write doctrinal works in his name.

But for us Iranians who have heard him speak and who have read his countless papers and reports (for his verbosity is unparalleled), it is clear that Bani-Sadr is neither a liberal nor a leftist. In reality, he is only an ambitious opportunist who is determined to succeed by any means.

At the very time that France was asking him not to make political statements, Bani-Sadr granted the London TIMES an interview in which he condemned, without any qualms, the man whose hand he had openly and publicly kissed on the day that he became president. He also said that Khomeyni alone was responsible for the atrocities committed in Iran.

He who has betrayed, will betray. If given the opportunity, Bani-Sadr will treat France the same way that he has treated Khomeyni. He also did not hesitate, when he was all-powerful, to violently attack France, that place of refuge which had accepted him for so many years.

But let us review his duties within the Islamic Republic:

According to his own statements, he was the theoretician of Islamic subversion. As early as February 1979, he became one of the members of the Revolutionary Council, endorsing the assassinations, disguised as political executions, of the old regime's representatives--the very ones who had simultaneously granted him four scholarships, which he used to reside in France for 15 years.

After becoming president of the Revolutionary Council, he was directly responsible for the thousands of other assassinations ordered following so-called Islamic "trials," which were only mascarades that arbitrarily sentenced to death anyone who did not conform to the Islamic Republic. It was for this same purpose that he ordered the organization of bloody expeditions against the provinces that revolted: Kurdistan, Azerbaijan, Gorgan and Fars.

As a member of the High Economic Council, it was he who, after becoming "father of the Islamic economy," established the bases for a ridiculous, destructive system. That is true to such an extent that Iran today has nearly 5 million jobless (who do not receive any compensation) and the country has been plunged into an unprecedented depression, making it unable to satisfy its most basic needs.

As minister of economy and finance, it was he who dismantled Iran's banking system.

Briefly minister of foreign affairs and interim director of seven other ministries, he got rid of all of the government's valuable people, on the pretext of a purge, replacing them with people whose incompetence and negligence were notorious.

Bani-Sadr was also the one who advised women to adopt Islamic dress, enjoining them to cover their hair, since the light shining off it could disturb men at their work.

During the last 2 and ½ years, we have not found any social class in Iran that has been shielded from the "Bani-Sadr effect." We should also recall that he was the one who appointed the bloodthirsty Khalkhali in April 1980, who was responsible for the "fight against drugs." All during this period, in which he was triumphant, Bani-Sadr never stopped writing. All of his works and statements enable us to define

the man: he is a demagogue and an ambitious opportunist who has never failed to flow with the tide. Let us recall the following few facts:

In April 1980, Iranian leftist militants were demonstrating on the campus of the University of Tehran. The Mojahedin among them had already expressed their opposition to the Khomeyni regime.

On 21 April, Bank-Sadr, then president of the Revolutionary Council, ordered them to disperse within 3 days under penalty of the worst sanctions (Iranian press, 22 April 1980).

On the following day at 0730, he repeated that order. Then serious confrontations during the day set the leftist opponents and Moslem reactionaries against each other. Hezbollahis (religious fanatics) armed with clubs were dispatched to the site, wounding and killing those who were not their own. That same evening, addressing those gloomy henchmen, Bani-Sadr thanked them for the job done as follows: "Good Moslem people! The determination which you have shown during these few days has made it possible to rescue the country from a very grave danger. Now that the Islamic Government has been established, all of you must known that the essential condition for the survival of the revolution and the safety of the country is your obedience." (Iranian press: 22 and 23 April 1980).

One month earlier on 19 May 1980, Bani-Sadr had ordered the Mojahedin to put down their arms, proclaiming publicly: "We will certainly never negotiate with you. That would amount to recognizing your power, when you have risen up against the will of the people. A government chosen by the people cannot allow itself to surrender to bandits like you ...." The leader of the same Mojahedin was none other than Mas'ud Rajavi, at whose side Bani-Sadr recently arrived in France. Hypocrisy cannot be carried any further.

To complete this sketch of the man, a final quotation should be enough to make it clear: On 26 April 1980, during a radio-television interview in Iran, Bani-Sadr said: "From the time that we decided to accept the authority of a guide, we must obey him, even if we do not believe in him. That is what we call the cultural revolution." (Keyhan, 26 April 1980)

11915
CSO: 4619/27

FRANCE ATTACKED FOR GRANTING ASYLUM TO DISSIDENTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 5 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] ONCE AGAIN, the anti-human origin of the U.S. mercenaries has come to full manifestation, once again the treacherous advocates of imperialism and their belligerent affiliates, such as the Administrative Officials of the French Government, revealed their opportunistic tendencies to the impoverished masses all over the world. France, the so-called Land of Liberty, takes pride in its theoretical, superficial support for non-provocative political activities. However, the antagonistic policies adopted by the vicious authorities, disguised in deceptive propaganda, has been divulged to the oppressed nations throughout the world. All the Moslems still recall the brutal crimes, committed by expansionist France in Algeria. The Islamic nations also remember that, after numerous cruel crimes, the exploitative government of France left Lebanon quite defenseless to fall victim to the assailancy of the Occupying regime of Qods, inspired by the notorious terrorist, Menachem Begin. Moreover, in the guise of supporting the Lebanese nation, the French government has assumed a nonchalant policy in confrontation with the extensive massacres of Zionist elements.

Far from preserving loyalty to her committments, the French government further sustained the Zionist regime of Israel by sending its Mirage Fighters, whereby, thousands of innocent Lebanese were brutally massacred in successive air raids inflicted upon South Lebanon. Such is the phoney definition of the humanitarian support for Lebanon, within the cultural context of the assailant Colonizers. Upon the arrival in France of the ousted president Banisadr, along with the notorious terrorist Masud Rajavi, the Moslem Iranian students in France staged a peaceful demonstration in opposition to the criminal policy of France in granting political asylum to Banisadr.

Although the so-called democratic regime of France made efforts to prevent the demonstrations of the Iranian Moslems in Paris, the authoritative agents of the Great Satan enticed the fugitive counter-revolutionaries, the disenchanted SAVAK agents and the political splinter groups to launch severe attacks upon the Islamic Students' Council in Paris. During the hostile attacks at the Islamic Council, the Fascist Police Force of France also sustained the counter-revolutionaries. Subsequently, the assailants inflicted extensive damage and severe injuries upon the Moslem demonstrators.

In pursuit of its interests, the imperialist U.S. has imposed the Zionist supporters of Bakhtiar and Banisadr upon the independent French nation. Thus, we hereby express our profound sorrow on account of such a calamity, since the opportunist elements of the U.S. dictate their explosive policies to the conscientious French people. We fervently hope that the French nation will not permit the Mitterrand Administration to abuse the revolutionary potential of the emancipated Iranian nation. Still, we are aware of the fact that the French people are subject to the anti-philanthropic policies of their administrative officials. Likewise the American nation shares the same catastrophic plight with the French people. Furthermore, the government authorities of France and the U.S. are also influenced by the Zionist, Imperialist Colonizers.

We severely denounce this assailancy against the Islamic Students' Council in Paris. In the meantime we warn the French government of the disastrous consequences of such an antagonistic attitude towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Islamic Government of Iran urgently demands severe penalty for the saboteurs involved in the attacks launched on the Iranian Moslem demonstrators against Banisadr. We officially ask for the restoration of the fugitive traitors, Banisadr and Rajavi, who are conspiring dastardly conspiracies in France in collaboration with the Zionist imperialist agents in order to destroy the Islamic Revolution. We fervently beseech God Almighty to emancipate all the impoverished peoples, suppressed by the belligerent Superpo

wers. We are looking forward to the day, when Divine Justice will be further consolidated throughout the world.

We are looking forward to the inevitable political doom of the Occupying regime of Qods and her allies, along with the expansionist U.S.

Hail to all the noble revolutionary militants in South Lebanon, Eritrea, South Africa, and Northern Ireland who have made sacrificial contributions to the ultimate emancipation of all the exploited suppressed peoples of the world.

CSO: 4600/136

PALESTINIAN STATE SEEN AS INEVITABLE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 29 Jul 81 p 10

[Article by Ya'acov Friedler]

[Text] IN 1897, at the conclusion of the first Zionist Congress, Theodor Herzl wrote in his diary that in Basle he had laid the foundations of a Jewish state.

His contemporaries would no doubt have expressed their disbelief if he had made his thoughts public. But after 51 years, he was proved to be right.

On July 17, 1981, with the Air Force raid on Beirut, Prime Minister Menachem Begin started the count-down for a Palestinian state. It will, I venture to estimate, take less than 51 months for history to confirm this.

Mr. Begin, unlike Dr. Herzl, was not aiming for a new state. He probably intended quite the opposite, but history will show that *nolens volens* — to use one of those Latin expressions our premier favours — he put the finishing touches to Palestine with that unfortunate raid. History does not measure intentions, it merely records events as they happen.

In fact, history has been moving towards a Palestinian state, and a sizeable school of thought in its favour has been building up in Israel as well. All of us who do not want to impose our rule on a million unwilling Arabs have indeed been seeking the best way of letting them manage their own affairs for ths sake of both peoples.

THE RAID on Beirut turned world opinion overwhelmingly in favour of a Palestinian state, giving explosive momentum to a process that had long since taken root — if only because the world hopes in this way to remove the Palestinian problem from the oil routes once and for all.

It is ironic that Begin of all people should have been the person to put the state on its feet with the ill-considered raid.

The cease-fire that has now brought the fighting on our northern border to a stop resulted partly from that raid, and no amount of verbal athletics can hide the fact that the agreement was made with the "so-called" PLO. We did not agree on a cease-fire with "the lawful government of Lebanon," as the Israel Government would have us believe, because the lawful government of Lebanon exercises no law in the area.

Every schoolboy knows that if you persuade a gang of hooligans to stop pelting you with stones from the backyard of a dear old lady's cottage, it is not the dear old lady who puts down the stones.

But unlike Begin, not every Israeli — and possibly not even a majority of Israelis — will regret the establishment of a Palestinian state. Some of us, indeed, have long believed that the sooner we reach agreement on a state with the Palestinians, the less dangerous that state will be for our own future.

I WAS AMONG those who voted for Begin in 1977 precisely because I believed that he would hand over some parts of Judea, Samaria and Gaza to the Palestinians — or for the Palestinians — with dignity, honour and possibly magnanimity. I believed the Alignment then was incapable of displaying such qualities.

As it transpired, Begin did display all these graces in handing over Sinai to the Egyptians. I am still sad that he did not do the same on our eastern side, too.

There may still be time left to hand over the eastern territory in a way which ensures that the new Palestinian state will not be a threat to Israel, or to the many Israelis who will live on its border. To promote fears of what such a state would do to the citizens of the coastal plain sounds somewhat hollow after what those in the Galilee have just undergone at the hands of the PLO, which Begin had publicly promised before his election would not occur.

No doubt, the Palestinians will take their Katyushas and 130 mm guns into their new state, but they will then be putting their own country on the line if they pull the trigger; they will be responsible for the safety of their own people; they will not be able to simply disregard the lives of the poor Lebanese.

If they fire on Israel, the world will not be "aghast" if Israel then silences their guns.

THE JORDANIANS stopped the PLO and the Syrians have not allowed them to shoot from Syrian

territory, precisely because the price is too high.

Moreover, the PLO will find that the Palestinians they come to "liberate" in Judea and Samaria will not allow them to provoke Israel into retaliatory action against them. They will in any case be so preoccupied simply keeping their state viable that they will have little spare time for shooting at Israel, even if the security arrangements we make in return for giving up the territory make effective shooting possible.

Nor should we forget that if the PLO thinks it is getting a bargain in Judea and Samaria, it is in for a surprise. And if it imagines that all the bleeding hearts of Europe, who so vigorously extol the rights of the Palestinians to a state of their own, will care two hoots once they have it, it's wrong.

One can envision even the Arab states, who are now such zealous backers of Palestinian statehood, washing their hands of the whole business once the state is established and letting the Palestinians stew in their own juice.

The PLO may also find that the oil which lubricates its cause so well now will wear off as the interest of the oil sheikhs wanes, and Europe's moralists will find a more convenient cause to bleed for.

THE PLO may just find, one suspects, that the only reliable party it will be able to look to will be its Israeli neighbours. We, at least, have had some success in turning this barren land into something better than a desert. In time, the PLO might even find that it can benefit from our experience.

Not a few Israelis object to the Beirut raid on purely moral grounds. Not a few may also acquiesce in a Palestinian state on moral grounds, believing that, like it or not, we must make room for them.

Would it be too much to hope that Begin, after he has taken so decisive a step towards Palestinian statehood, will still display grace and magnanimity in the face of the inevitable?

It would be nice to think he will do so, because that is the Jewish and the humane way to act.

CSO: 4300/83

COUNCIL IN GALILLEE ARAB VILLAGE DISSOLVED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 12-18 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by Daoud Kuttab]

[Text] The Israeli Ministry of Interior dissolved the local council at Mughar village in the Galilee, June 25, one day prior to the scheduled High Court hearings regarding confiscated Mughar land. No official reason has been given.

The dissolution marks another turning point in the progressive council's battle with the authorities since their election in 1978. In the past three years the Rakah-led municipality has had its budget slashed, hundreds of dunams of land confiscated, and a series of problems with grants from government ministries.

In the last elections,Mughar, a village with a majority of Arab Druze, voted in a Rakah head of council and a majority for the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality list. Since that time this Galilee village of 16,000 has been plagued with a cash flow problem.

"We teachers of the village have suffered the most," said Salman Dagesh, a teacher at the local secondary school. Our salaries have been delayed almost every month since the council elections."

Other services and projects have also been affected. Amin Asakle, the head of the municipal council, explained to *Al-Fajr*, "Debts had been piling up against the council since 1973. When we took over, we discovered that many projects had been started and we had to foot the bill. But we haven't been able to get our regular annual budgets from the government." In 1980 the local council submitted an IS 10 million budget; only IS 3.8 million was approved.

The budgets for housing and education were delayed by administrative "red tape." Teachers and municipal employees got advances on their salaries until the government checks arrived.

When a Mughar resident, working in the housing ministry, inquired about the delays, he was told: "It is because the Mughar council considers the village Arab."

Mughar: An Arab Village

The change of council brought a change in official attitude to political/communal questions. When the present council took over, they discovered that the former council had taken a decision declaring Mughar, a village with 52 percent Arab Druze population, a "Druze" village. "This was part of the attempt by the Israelis to brainwash the Druze into thinking that Druze is not only a religion but a nationality," said one municipal employee. "The first act of the new council was to unanimously reverse the previous decision, declare Mughar an Arab village and announce official opposition to mandatory conscription of Druze young people. In explaining its principled stand the council declared the Druze are an inseparable part of the Palestinian Arab people. "The Israeli government considers Mughar as a breeding ground for Zionism," Amin Askale states. "We consider it a farm for resistance. When we won, they hit the roof."

Councillors point out that "Druze" villages receive slightly better treatment from the Israeli authorities. "[illegible] Mughar council opted for in[illegible]grity," said one.

Land Confiscation

Things came to a head in Mughar over the issue of land

confiscation. When a 620 dunam plot of land was slated for confiscation under the Judaisation of the Galilee plan, the council decided to fight. The strip of land known as Dabet el Za'ter has been registered in the name of the village since Ottoman times. In the past most of such "common" land has been re-registered by the Israelis as "state land." After six inconclusive sessions with the state of Israel land committee, the council decided to circumvent the problem by giving the land to individual villagers. Within days the council gave plots in the strip to people wishing to build homes. Sixty building maps were approved altogether. The area was thus re-reigtered in the names of individuals.

Force

On the eve of the April Histadrut elections the road leading to Mamle and Musha, where 3,000 dunams of village is situated, was closed off. After complaints from farmers, Amin Asakle took the local council's bulldozer and re-opened the road. "The authorities thought we would go to court to fight it out," Asakle said. "We force them to take us to court if they want to take our land."

Locals noted that the Israelis often use the time it takes for cases to come to court to finish their land grabs. At the time of its dissolution, the council was also fighting another 700 dunam grab attempt through the courts.

Special Committee

The Israelis hit back by appointing an investigative committee to look into the affairs of the elected council.

The Interior Minister authorized the committee to examine the grievances of residents complaining of "inefficiency of the council and lack of needed services." The committee was appointed by Israel Koenig, District Commissioner of the Northern District. It consisted of Heads of Local Councils at Daboriah and Abu Sran (both sponsored by the NRP) and an employee of the Interior Ministry and the Head of the Land Ownership Office (*tabu*). The four came to the village and discussed the problems with residents, bank managers and clan heads. The contents of their report, which was delivered to the Minister of Interior, have not been made public. Lawyers for the council are at present appealing to the courts for a copy. As a result of this recent report the council was dissolved by order of the Minister on June 25.

Mixed Reaction

Some villagers raised legitimate questions with *Al-Fajr* on the running of the council. "The council has made many promises which it did not carry out," said Yousef Dagesh. "The council showed that it could not manage well. For example, excavation for the sewers was done twice and the council had to pay IS 400,000 in compensation to an engineer." Dagesh also questioned why personal checks were used to pay teachers.

Asakle Responds

Asakle defended the council's actions and explained some of the council's misunderstandings. "First of all," he said, "the sewers were only dug once. Secondly, work was properly advertised," he went on, "and the tender accepted. It doesn't cost the council anything extra. The problem was a throwback to the time of the last council, when an engineer was commissioned to draw up maps for the school," said Asakle. "Then the Education and Housing Ministries insisted on following set maps. The engineer sued and won, and we had to pay for the previous council's mistakes."

Teachers are paid by personal check, the council accountant explained, because, "We were overdrawn in the bank. The government transfers the teachers' pay directly to our account in the local bank. Since we were overdrawn we would not be able to draw checks on the account for the teachers' pay. We decided to open a separate account for teachers' salaries. All this was done with the knowledge of all concerned parties."

List of Services

To combat the dissolution the council issued a leaflet detailing the services they provided during their tenure. Among other things the list included: a diesel roller which has paved 18,000 cubic meters of road, a building for mother and child care, new furniture for all the schools, a 12 dunam strip purchased for a future school, as well as the protection of land from expropriation. Local social workers and council employees are afraid that these services will be curtailed under the new regime.

Asakle told *Al-Fajr* that the council is particularly proud of its record on water supply. "In the two years and seven months (of the council) no house was without water, an everyday occurance

in the past," he said. Asakle predicted that within months water would be cut off by the appointed committee.

Residents had mixed feelings about events of the past week. Some told *Al-Fajr* that they hoped that the committee would solve the financial problems of the village. All look forward to new elections. The date of the coming council elections is, as yet, unknown. "It depends on the Interior Minister and the mood of the village," said one resident. "If it looks like the Rakah supported Front can be defeated we will have elections. If not, no one knows."

Appointed Heads Declare Ignorance

In the place of the dissolved council a committee was appointed to carry out the work of the council. The committee is headed by Jamil Jadoon, retired head of the Immigration and Naturalization offices in Nazareth, and includes Judge Abdel Halem Thakho and Fouad Zu'be, an education inspector.

In his first day at the council Jamil Jadoon told *Al-Fajr*, "I have no experience in local councils but I will be given guidance by the Judge." When asked if he knew of the problems of the village he responded, "I am ignorant of the problems here but I will learn them." Jadoon said that he knows nothing about the results of the investigation. He does know that his appointment came according to Law 38/3 of the Local Council Orders. Jadoon has no specific plans for the village but he vowed that he would not stay on if he did not get financial backing by the government.

Regarding the future, Ahmad Asakle, a former councillor, said, "Winning the council is only a means to an end. We are concerned in raising the awareness of the residents." Amin Asakle added, "I will continue to work through the Druze Initiative Committee to make our people aware. These decisions will not affect our enthusiasm. On the contrary, we will work harder now."

CSO: 4300/83

COMMENTARY ON U.S. AS TARGET FOR SAUDI OFFENSIVE IN PEACE PLAN

TA101108 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Aug 81 p 5

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "The Saudis Assault the U.S. Target"]

[Text] The Saudis have learned from the Egyptians to assault the U.S. target--both the administration and public opinion--in an effort to weaken Israel's standing and gain more support for the Arabs' demands. Fahd is both imitating al-Sadat and competing with him. One would even conceivably trace a certain division of labor between President al-Sadat and Amir Fahd in trying to win over the heart of the United States. This conquest is both personal and political, set up one against the other: two Arab peace seekers versus the Israeli wormonger (as evidenced by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the PLO command headquarters in the heart of Beirut).

Al-Sadat's and Fahd's common goal is to obtain U.S. support for the Palestinians' demands of Israel. The one favors these demands in terms of the representation (the PLO); the other backs their actual demands (total Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of a Palestinian state and the declaration of partitioned Jerusalem as its capital). The method they employ is to try to win by points, not with a knockout; to continue to erode Israel's status slowly, systematically.

Al-Sadat can afford to support the idea of incorporating the PLO into the peace process. He is already known to be a man of peaceful aspirations and one not suspect of supporting terrorism or extending aid to the Soviets in their maneuvers toward affecting Syrian military expansionism in Lebanon. Al-Sadat's moderation needs no proof.

Amir Fahd, on the other hand, is a newcomer to the peace game. He still cannot grant the PLO citations of honesty or capability, and any Saudi attempt to purge the PLO would besmirch Saudi Arabia rather than achieve its purpose. This is the objective division of labor between President al-Sadat and Amir Fahd, even if the details of the scheme have not been scrupulously coordinated. This is the method and this is the goal: to present peace plans that would appear to be more moderate than earlier ones; to drag Israel into issuing hasty negative reactions that would present it in a more extremist and belligerent light than ever before and would force it later to withdraw from its earlier positions

so as not to lose more points in the battle for the support of the U.S. administration and public. Al-Sadat's and Fahd's moves are well calculated and planned; the reactions in Israel--by both the government and the opposition spokesmen--hasty, surprised, not well thought out.

Neither the government nor the opposition can avoid reacting to the Saudi move. Both have different roles to play and each should fulfill it properly and be able to "hold back the fire" of political and propaganda reactions, and shoot only "directed fire." But the traditional division of roles between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East has been reversed, and now they are firing in an organized and well-calculated fashion in accordance with a predetermined plan, whereas here everyone grabs a gun and shoots in the air to boost his spirits and hear the sound of his own gun, smell the smoke and see the fire. In the distant past we used to deride the Arabs for doing what they did.

Prime Minister Menahem Begin will soon go to the United States. He will be asked to present to the U.S. administration a policy of peace and the resumption of the political process in the Middle East. Such a process will have to include Saudi Arabia and Jordan as well, so that the United States can continue to avoid incorporating the PLO into that process until it changes its positions and is prepared to recognize Israel. President Reagan is interested in incorporating the Saudis in the peace process in order to erect a basic anti-Soviet edifice in the Middle East and to be able to supply Saudi Arabia with all the sophisticated arms they are interested in without congress (and Israel) interfering in this. President Reagan will expect Menahem Begin to present him with an Israeli peace plan that would allow him to satisfy this prime U.S. interest in the Middle East, not a peace plan that would hamper it (even if it is equipped with the best of legal and moral reasons). Begin's visit to Washington will be tested primarily for whether it jeopardizes President Reagan's Saudi policy or helps it, even at the cost of a reasonable price to be paid to Israel for it. Will Begin demand a price or set up an obstacle? This is the crucial question Amir Fahd's peace plan presents to Israel.

During the election campaign, Menahem Begin derided the "Jordanian option" and the "Saudi option" raised by Shim'on Peres. One should hope that he only did so for election reasons and not because he did not fathom the real political content of these foreign terms. What they mean, in practical terms, is an Israeli plan that would allow the United States to bring the Saudis and the Jordanians closer to it and to guarantee their stability and reliance on the United States, as well as to permit it to continue to object to the incorporation of the PLO and the Soviets into the next stage of the peace process without torpedoing this process from its foundations. It means that this should be made possible, not sabotaged. If Menahem Begin now decides to cease being the prime minister of "Herut" and begins functioning as prime minister of Israel, he ought to invite Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres and consult him on the "Saudi option" and the "Jordanian option" that could, perhaps, be submitted by Israel in Washington.

The opposition, for its part, should also begin functioning like an opposition following the election campaign and after a government enjoying parliamentary confidence has been set up in Israel. This is a fact and there are conclusions to be drawn from this reality. It is not the opposition's job to

try to foil Menahem Begin's imminent visit to Washington, or supply him and his supporters with pretexts and excuses for claiming that the opposition made him fail. If he does fail, this unfortumately will be the failure of the entire State of Israel and we will all share the brunt of the outcome; so that if he fails, let him fail on his own accord only, and let it be clear that he failed because of his policy or lack thereof, despite the good will of the opposition and its readiness to help him succeed. In order for the Labor Party (and, indeed, the entire alignment) to function as an opposition, it must complete its internal organizing and put an end to the domestic strife within its ranks over the composition of the Knesset defense and foreign affairs committee and the other supreme state bodies.

Why should we deny it: this domestic elections campaign is one of the causes of the raging competition of "shooting from the hip" by various opposition spokesmen. Both the government and the opposition should organize quickly to carry out their civic duties, which are so different in nature. Menahem Begin should do his homework before his fateful visit to Washington, and the opposition should be prepared to help him do it if he wants and is able to operate as a prime minister and not as the leader of the opposition who happens to be in the rule.

CSO: 4323/40

RABIN DEMANDS CHANGES IN LABOR PARTY

TA071256 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 pp 1, 7

[Report by Shlomo Naqdimon]

[Text] In talks he held last week, MK Yitzhaq Rabin has raised the demand for internal "democratization" in the Labor Party. He thinks that the Labor Party is not functioning properly and that there is need to execute immediate moves in it to change this situation.

Among other things, Rabin raised the following demands:

--that the Alef [citizens for Peres] circle be abolished.

--that the plan (recently in the works) to forthwith set up an election headquarters headed by MK Mordekhay Gur, to prepare for the next Knesset election be frozen.

--Rabin explained that the two above-mentioned institutions existed in the party a long time before the last Knesset election and said he believed they "neutralized" the party's work.

Rabin further demanded that:

--new party institutions be elected immediately. These are: an executive; an executive secretariat; an economic committee; a political committee; a legal committee and their respective secretariats. Rabin demands proper representation of all party factions in these institutions.

--the party's functioning be improved by establishing procedures and working regulations, and by holding executive meetings at set dates.

--deliberations on the next Knesset elections be held and that lessons be learned toward future public campaigns.

In his talks, Rabin has been explaining that the party is now crying o for an overhaul and real rehabilitation. He repeatedly argues that the intern l elections held toward the party conference in 1980 were mishandled and that to a certain extent things had been distorted then. In his opinion, the necessary remodeling will also lead to changes in the wrongs in this sphere.

Rabin has hardly referred to party chairman Shim'on Peres in these talks. He has primarily spoken about content, but indirectly one can hear an overtone of criticism of the party chairman. The estimate in the Labor Party is that a possibility of a renewed Peres-Rabin feud is not to be ruled out. When asked whether the demands he had raised point to the revival of the option of a contest, Rabin replied: "There is no talk about a personal struggle, rather of a change in the party's everyday affairs."

Last week a closed meeting was held between the leaders of the various kibbutz movements in the Labor Party and the heads of the Rabin camp. The leaders of the kibbutz movements suggested not holding elections for the post of party secretary and to enable Hayim Bar-Lev to continue holding the job.

Rabin and his colleagues rejected the proposal outright, describing it as anti-democratic. They insisted that elections for the post of party secretary be held, as promised. Rabin again said that his camp is guided by the first-order principle that there is a right to compete for every post.

Yesterday Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres held intensive--but separate--talks with MK's Eliyahu Speiser, 'Uzi Bar'am and Moshe Harif, and discussed the situation in the party and the prospects of a contest for the post of party secretary in September. It should be noted that Hayim Bar-Lev has said that if the party does not unite in backing his candidacy, he will not present himself as such.

Speiser and Bar'am announced already several months ago that they intend to compete for the post, whereas Peres has a written statement to Speiser saying he would support his candidacy.

CSO: 4323/40

BRIEFS

ECONOMIC POLL--Unlike their personal economic conditions, the economic condition of the State of Israel seems grim to the majority of the public. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll of the Pori Institute commissioned by HA'ARETZ. Of all polled 56.3 percent believe that the rate of inflation will now increase, in contrast with 11.8 percent who believe it will decrease. Of all polled 49.3 percent fear economic decrees in the near future and 37.3 percent believe that a negative change will now occur in Israel's economic situation whereas 20.9 percent believe a change for the better is in the offing. Nevertheless, 41.5 percent believe no change will take place in their personal economic state. These views are prevalent among all public strata but the more advanced socioeconomic sectors are more pessimistic regarding Israel's economic condition in the near future. The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people personally interviewed in their homes throughout the country. [Text] [TA091135 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Aug 81 p 6]

ARAB FUNDS BAN--Ramallah, 9 Aug--The mayors of Judaea and Samaria predict a collapse of the municipal and services networks in view of the recent ban issued by the military government on bringing in Arab support funds from the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee. They claim that the municipalities were able to provide the local inhabitants with services due to the committee's funds only, as the military government granted the municipalities only small sums of money. The mayors, and particularly the moderate ones, expressed the hope that the military government would revoke this decision and would permit the municipalities to introduce the support funds into the area. A senior military government officer told the ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria today that the decision to ban contact with the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee will remain firm in the future as well. The military government will not allow PLO support funds into the area, "but this does not mean all Arab aid." The military government is now examining the issue from all its aspects. Other Arab personalities, mainly from the agricultural sector, argue that since the Baghdad conference, where a decision was made to set up a support fund for "the steadfastness of the inhabitants of the territories," the farmers have not enjoyed any aid from the support fund. They said that although the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee, which handles the fund, has sent some money to certain elements in the region, these did not reach the farmers. They claim that these elements took the money for themselves. [Text] [TA091402 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1345 GMT 9 Aug 81]

CSO: 4323/40

BRIEFS

THREATS AGAINST TRANSPORT BUREAUS--Libyan Arab maritime transport bureaus in certain countries of Europe have received terrorist threats from heinous Zionist elements wishing to carry out, through fascist methods, terrorist actions against the Jamahiriyah bureaus, in particular in large European capitals. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRYA-PRESS in French 4 Aug 81 p 1]

NEW YUGOSLAV CONTRACT--Libya has granted the Yugoslav firm Energoinvest a contract to found a joint company producing aluminium and petrol-coke. Reports from London did not disclose the value of the contract. This is the third Libyan-Yugoslav deal in a month. In July, Energoproject of Belgrade signed a $220 million contract for a naval academy in Tripoli and the Libyan National Bank granted Yugoslavia a $150 million loan as balance of payments support (An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO, July 13). Earlier this year the two countries signed a trade protocol, pledging to double trade between them. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 12]

CSO: 4500/34

KINGDOM EXPANDING FLOUR MILLS

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 17, 7 Aug 81 p 9

[Article by Javid Hasaan]

[Text]

THE KINGDOM will soon be self-sufficient in indigenous flour production with the opening of a third mill in Riyadh next month and planned increase in production capacity at Qassim, Khamis Mushayat and Jizan, said Ahmed Shinawi, director general of the Grain Silos and Floor Mills Organization.

Shinawi told *Saudi Business* last week that Riyadh, which caters to the central region, had been unable to meet the demand for flour supply. But now it will be self-sufficient with the commissioning of the third mill there with a capacity of 420 metric ton per 24 hours and another at Qassim with a capacity of 270 tons. "With these we shall be more than self-sufficient," the director general said.

The present flour supply position, according to Shinawi, is that the Eastern Province is self-sufficient in this respect, while the western and central region are lagging behind. When all the projects are completed, the total production capacity in the Kingdom will shoot up to 855,000 tons as against a demand of 650,000 tons in the net two years. (The present demand is for 600,000 tons.)

"This capacity is flexible. It can always be raised if we make it a six-day or seven-day week, depending on the demand," Shinawi said. Giving a low-down on the expansion program, he pointed out that Jeddah now requires 330,000 tons of flour while its present milling capacity is limited to 259,000 tons. However, with the addition of the flour mills at Khamis Mushayat and Jizan, the total capacity for the western region will go up to 425,000 tons.

Similarly, Riyadh at present produces less than the demand for 210,000 tons per year, a demand which has been increasing by 3.5 per cent annually. With the addition of the mills at Riyadh and Qassim, the production capacity in the Central Province will rise to 300,000 tons, based on a five-day week. Dammam, which produces 130,000 tons per year, is self-sufficient. Even so, a building is being installed for a third mill in case the production capacity has to be augmented.

The whole strategy is to build up a buffer stock of flour for six months. Toward this end the storage capacity is also being stepped up with additional 40,000-ton silos for Qassim and more grain silos at Khamis Mushayatt, Riyadh and Jizan. The indigenous floor, Shinawi said, is superior to the imported, as it is enriched with iron, niacin, thiamin and riboflavin. The imported variety is not, as a laboratory test has revealed, he pointed out.

Referring to the sale of flour packets he said the organization has introduced into the market family flour packets by installing three small bag packing machines at

Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah. Riyadh and Dammam lines have already started production and marketing of family flour. The step is a sequel to the earlier 45-kg bag flour for the bakeries, a size which was too large for housewives and resulted in substantial wastage as the flour became infested because of prolonged storage. Other include patent flour enriched in two-and-five-kg packages and whole wheat flour in two-and-five-kg packages.

"The flour in these packages is specially produced for all house baking and cooking requirements. It is of medium strength and is good for making bread, cookies and pastries," Shinawi pointed out.

The organization also meets the requirements of farmers and helps cattle and livestock development by expanding feed production for the dairy and poultry farms. Billed for commissioning next year is a feed mill with a capacity of 25 metric tons per eight hours and a seed cleaning plant with a capacity of nine tons per hour. When completed, they will provide a fillip to the growth of the farm sector which gets priority in the Kingdom's third five-year plan.

Shinawi explained all silos are "slip formed concrete" except 20,000-ton silos which are made of steel and imported from Italy. The following is a breakdown of the distribution of silos in the Kingdom:

	Steel	Concrete
Riyadh	20,000	60,000
Dammam	20,000	60,000
Jeddah	—	120,000
Qassim	20,000	40,000
Khamis Mushayat	—	40,000
Total	60,000	300,000

The marketing of flour and feed is done either through direct sale from mills to customers or through the existing channels of distributors and importers. "We are also delivering our products in bulk to customers who have bins and bulk intake facilities. Besides, we use our bulk flour and feed trucks," Shinawi added.

Asked whether the storage system was plagued by any rat menace, the director general said: "Rats are not a problem in the silos as it is a complete rat proof system. Each plant has its own pest control section to check infestation and rodents in the warehouses. I would say the main problem is manpower development." This problem is being handled through the various training programs.

CSO: 4300/88

BRIEFS

DUTCH POULTRY PLANS--Khartoum, July 17 (SUNA)--In the domain of the Sudanese-Dutch cooperation, a number of poultry farm officials are due here this year to discuss the promotion of poultry farms in the country. The Chairman of the Sudanese-Dutch Friendship Society Baha 'al-Din Muhammad Munawar said they had prepared an integrated programme to be implemented within this year. The programme includes the invitation to hold a meeting here next December to discuss means of boosting the cultural exchange between the two friendly countries, he concluded. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 17 Jul 81 p 2]

CZECH FLOUR MILL PROJECT--Madani, July 17 (SUNA)--Central Region Governor 'Abd-al-Rahim Mahmud and the Deputy President of the Czechoslovak Technopole Firm signed here yesterday a contract to erect Rufa'ah Flour Mills project. The foreign component of the project is $ 3,156,000 and the local component is Ls. 200,000, said Director of Mills Ahmad Hasan. According to the contract, the construction works will be finalized within a maximum period of 18 months. The daily productivity is targeted at 120 tons of flour per day. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 17 Jul 81 pp 2-3]

'ATBARAH CEMENT FACTORY--Khartoum, July 17 (SUNA)--The extension of 'Atbarah Cement Factory will begin production by the second half of 1982 with a maximum productivity of 236,000 tonns per year thus bringing the overall productivity of the factory and its extension to 450,000 tonns. Together with Rabak Cement Factory the two factories will cover 2/3 of the country's needs of cement until 1985. Work on the Ls. 24 million extension began May 1976. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 17 Jul 81 p 3]

NUBA FISH PRODUCTION--Fish production at the Nuba Lake was estimated at 700 tons for the 80/1981 season. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 18 Jul 81 p 3]

FODDER PLANT--Construction work on a fodder factory near the central region town of El Hasahiessa will be completed next September. The project is being executed by a Czech company at the cost of Ls 600,000. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 18 Jul 81 p 4]

NEW JOB CLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE ANNOUNCED--Khartoum, July 20 (SUNA)--The Director of the Establishment issued circulars on the application of the second phase of the Job Evaluation and Classification Scheme (JECS). The circulars revised the items of increments and allowances with the effect of abolishing some and introducing new ones. The third phase of the Scheme will begin very soon, a reliable source said. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 20 Jul 81 pp 2-4]

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BRIEFS

KUWAIT OIL EXPLORATION IN ECUADOR--The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) is to set up a joint oil exploration venture in Ecuador later this year in a further move to diversify its activities abroad. Reports from Quito indicate that plans for the project will not be implemented until the legislature in Ecuador approves new regulations on operations by foreign companies. The regulations are to be agreed by the Ecuadorian Congress by the end of this year. The joint venture will be among the first undertaken by an Arab oil state in Latin America. Earlier this year, KPC set up two similar joint ventures with Pacific Resources of Hawaii and AZL Resources of the US (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, June 22 and May 4). According to Ecuadorian Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Cesar Robalino, the plans for the joint venture were examined earlier this year during discussions with Kuwait's Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabbah. One of the smaller members of OPEC, Ecuador averaged a daily outputof 220,000 b/d last year, but with local consumption rising at a faster rate than production, the country must step up exploration if it is to remain an oil exporter. According to Mr Robalino, drilling by the Ecuador state oil company, CEPE, has been held up by a shortage of drilling rigs. CEPE has announced that during the first six months of this year nine wells have been drilled with 16 more scheduled for drilling by the end of 1981. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 10]

CSO: 4300

AMF TO DOUBLE CAPITAL BY THE END OF 1981

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 7

[Text]

The Abu-Dhabi based Arab Monetary Fund is to almost double its capital to $900 million within the next six months, officials of the Fund were quoted as saying last week. The AMF is the Arab equivalent of the International Monetary Fund, and lends mainly to countries with balance of payments problems.

The Fund's authorised capital is now Arab Accounting Dinars 263 million ($890 million), but only 52 per cent of this amount has been paid up. One AAD is equivalent to about three IMF Special Drawing Rights, the IMF's currency, which is worth approximately $1.33.

According to officials of the Fund, loans committed by the AMF are expected to amount to its paid-up capital in about two weeks' time. This will trigger an automatic call on member-states to pay in the remainder of their contributions to the authorised capital. Under a board decision taken in April, member-states have six months to pay up the remainder of their contribution after the call on capital is made.

By the middle of this month, loans approved by the AMF, one of the smaller Arab-dominated funds, are expected to reach about AAD 70 million ($237 million). Loans committed last year amounted to AAD $35 million ($118.5 million).

However, AMF officials expect the Fund to play a much larger role in the Arab world in the future, as the AMF's capital increase takes effect in the next six months. The Fund does not directly finance development programmes, as do the major Arab-dominated lenders such as the Islamic Development Bank and the OPEC Fund for International Development.

Nonetheless, as an Arab League institution, created in 1977, the AMF seeks to promote closer economic and monetary ties in the Arab world, mainly through lending to correct economic imbalances such as deficits of trade.

Among projects now being considered by the AMF is a basket of currencies akin to the one used by the IMF to calculate the value of the SDR. So far, the AAD is not a real currency of exchange and its value is based on that of the IMF's currency.

Also under consideration, AMF officials said recently, are a central system for clearing payments between member-states and ways to make the AAD an effective monetary instrument in transactions between Arab countries.

CSO: 4300

BRIEFS

KUWAIT FARM WINS IRAQI CONTRACT--The Fiafi Trading and Contracting Company of Kuwait has secured the biggest foreign contract ever to be won by a Kuwaiti company, with a $210 million order from the Iraqi Defence Ministry. The contract is for the construction of a group of buildings for the ministry of Baghdad. At about the same time as the deal was announced, Fiafi and the Kuwait-based Indian construction IOCC were reported to have signed an agreement directly related to the Iraqi contract. The agreement is understood to cover the provision of management services, technical cooperation and help with construction by the IOCC to Fiafi. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT AND MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 11]

CSO: 4300

GULF INVESTMENT AGENCY WOULD BRING BENEFITS TO AREA COUNTRIES

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 23 June 81 p 7

[Article by D. Ahmad al-Bar: "Gulf Investment Agency: A Step To Steer Arab Funds Toward Productivity and Foster Growth in Developing Countries"]

[Text] A meeting of Gulf countries' finance ministers may soon take place in Kuwait to debate the issue of setting up a Gulf investment agency. The Gulf Cooperation Council gave preliminary approval to the proposed project during its last meeting in Abu Dhabi.

An organization such as this may be looked upon as a serious venture toward attaining economic unity in the Gulf region. It may also serve to crystallize the region's unitary investment policy which, as is known, is one of the structural pillars of a comprehensive economy. The Gulf countries are seeking not only a unitary investment policy; their goal is to earn greater profits from cash assets and increasing oil revenues than otherwise earned by each country individually.

Because of the banking system in the Gulf countries specifically, and in the Arab world generally, and because of the almost absent financial markets and Arab expertise, a large part of cash assets and oil revenues have been placed in short-term deposits in the United States, Europe and Japan.

In the past few years, the Gulf countries have been diversifying their foreign investments. Some of their assets have been invested in the purchase of real estate, others have been placed in corporate stock ownership and in co-sponsoring projects with advanced capitalist and developing countries. To sink their funds, they have also set up interbanking systems such as--and we mention just a few--EUPAF, the Arab European Bank, the Arab French Bank, etc. Besides commercial investments, the Gulf countries have subsidized funds designated for national and regional grwoth to encourage their participation in Arab and simultaneously in Third World development projects.

Investments such as these absorb only a small portion of Arab Gulf funds. The larger portion, estimated at $80 billion, are deposited in American and European banks which in turn invest them in developing countries at exorbitant interest rates and on specified terms. As a matter of fact, Arab assets have played a major role in financing foreign trade and other ventures for the developing countries. In 1970, Arab loans totaled $3 billion; in 1979 they reached approximately $17

billion. Due to high interest rates, developing countries have been forced, year after year, into the European and American financial markets to defray the cost of increased debts resulting from high interest and to finance a part of their projects. This situation had led the developing countries to be heavily indebted to financial institutions around the world.

A report on growth and cooperatives published in 1980 by the agency on cooperatives and economic development indicated that debt obligations owed to Western financial institutions by developing countries had risen from $16 billion in 1970 to $175 billion in 1980. The report also indicated that future debt obligations resulting from mounting interest rates would soon exceed their loan entitlements from Western financial markets.

Establishing a Gulf investment agency has been a logical step toward productively investing Arab funds in Arab countries and in developing countries that maintain strong ties with the region, rather than resorting to intermediaries whose sole aim is to reap unjustifiably high interest rates. In accordance with a studied plan, a part of the Gulf investment agency's funds will be placed in the agricultural sector, thus securing food supplies for Third World countries. Other investments will be steered toward certain industries that have thus far been unable to attract funding from banks that tend to seek possibilities for short-term gains regardless of the extreme importance these projects represent for the economy of these countries. It has been proven that Western commercial banks rarely invest in long-term productive ventures; rather, they concentrate on short-term, high-interest gains.

Such an agency for international growth will lead to the creation of a nucleus of financial experts complementing the already existing cadres now prominent in world finance.

This agency will gradually receive funding allocations from the various Gulf countries. In addition, finance ministers will soon set forth the regulations and procedures necessary to set up specialized investment firms to lure individual investments away from foreign banks and to attract those individuals who abstain from dealing with high interest rate banks. Thus, they will channel investments into Gulf resources and subsequently reinforce agricultural and industrial growth in the area. Far greater profits will be earned than otherwise obtained through deposits at foreign banks.

9770
CSO: 4303/58

TUDEH OPPONENTS WANT PARTY LEADER TRIED

Tehran JAVANAN-E EMRUZ in Persian No 753 20 Jul 81 pp 10, 12

[Report on Tudeh Party First Secretary Nureddin Kianuri]

Reminder

[Excerpt] Following the open debate between JAVANAN and Kianuri of the Tudeh Party of Iran, a representative of an opposing faction, called "Nobakht", called at the office of this magazine and offered some explanation on the issue.

He said the monthly, the proletarian MARDOM was the mouthpiece of his faction and put forth certain statements in connection with the core and the secretary-general of the Party which, in summation, pointed to the incompetence and even treason of Kianuri vis-a-vis the Marxist Tudeh Party. Moreover, he called for the purge of Kianuri's gang from the Party.

The Party and Kianuri responded to this view by decrying Nobakht as a renegade and an undesirable person to the Party.

As we said earlier, the faction opposing Kianuri have sent in certain remarks as the continuation of their earlier remarks and in connection with the response by the Tudeh Party. We bring the first part of these remarks to the attention of our dear readers in this issue, but before doing so, the mention of a number of points is in order here:

1. The faction opposing Kianuri has called for the formation of an open court in order to illumine and prove the charges brought against him in relation to the murder of his party comrades. JAVANAN, also, announces that it is ready to print the evidences and arguments of both sides if such a trial takes place. Thus, the two parties come face to face and we shall remain a neutral observer on behalf of our readers until such a time when the truth of the matter is made evident.

2. The faction opposing Kianuri has, inter alia, brought up the issue of the government's compromise with Kianuri several

times during the course of its arguments. With a view to the background of the Tudeh Party in Iran and in its political currents, we believe this to be a controversy. The Iranian nation knows best who stands to gain from this controversy. As the responsible officials of the country have announced on several occasions, they are in no mood to compromise with the Tudeh Party. On the contrary, they have many times tried to avoid the attitude which might induce a repetition of past incidents. Any clearer evidence of this fact than the statement of Mr Jannati, member of the Guardian Council, in connection with the presidential elections, to the effect that being a member of the Tudeh Party is a negative point and a libility?

3. To prove its points and point out the observation of the rule of courtesy on the part of the leadership of the Party, the opposition faction has sometimes employed words which we quote ipso facto so that there may not be any censorship at work--just as it has never been. We apologize to our dear readers on this score.

We hope that these series of debates and the advancement of new issues may prove a positive step in the direction of revealing the facts and illuminating the c ntrast between the profiles of righteousness and falsehood, and of sincerity and duplicity. We look forward to receiving your suggestions.

We already knew that Kianuri has engaged in a conspiracy of silence in the monthly, proletarian MARDOM. Therefore, it seemed likely to us that he would continue this conspiracy and sidestep the issues brought up in the interview. However, we had forseen in that introduction that Kianuri could not carry on like this forever. We did not expect our forecast to come true so quickly. Now that this prophecy has been realized like the other prophecies made in the monthly, proletarian MARDOM, we leave behind, untouched, the passages about this prophecy in the already published introduction as well as the other parts of the article as we move on to conclude with a response to the "replies" by Kianuri.

But, now long can Kianuri and his gang continue their conspiracy of silence depends to a considerable extent on the support given us by the truth-seeking and right-minded compatriots and also on the re-echoing of our words by the truly (not speciously) progressive and revolutionary publications, press and mass media that want the facts to come to light. In our opinion, all the members of the press that have refrained from reaching our righteous voice to the ears of the honorable and revolutionary people of Iran (particularly the publications of the "leftist" groups who we are sure are invariably aware of the existence of the monthly proletarian MARDOM, but out of political envy keep silent for fear of our gaining "strength") are colluding with Kianuri in his conspiracy of silence against us. Likewise, the government and the ministry who, despite a lapse of two years, have not responded positively to our legitimate request for securing a license to freely publish the monthly, proletarian MARDOM, are in fact abetting Kianuri and aiding the

broadening of his treachery. The Iranian nation is right in viewing their attacks on Kianuri as sham quarrel.

The foregoing notwithstanding, we firmly believe that Kianuri cannot keep up his conspiracy of silence for more than one or two more years—assuming that he still remains in his position. Because the blows of the hammer af time and the hardheaded facts will either force him to adopt a definite stance or will crush his stony skull --in which no thought other than skullduggery, conspiracy and treachery transpires-- so smashingly that he will not even have a change to give a cry of "ouch"!

What picture takes shape now before our eyes is that of Kianuri and his associates who have risen to the apex of power and position (and we promise the Iranian nation that their rise will be arrested at this level) and at the same time plummeted into the bottom of the trashbin of history. Any patriotic Iranian who is alert and able to see the truth and penetrate into the core of the phenomena can easily see the rascalities of Kianouri and his gang and at the same time sound the depths of their abjectness, wretchedness and meanness. He can see well that anywhere they turn they get a smack on the head. May these sobering lessons of history sober our revolutionary and evolutionary generation into wide awakening and bring to self-consciousness those who simple-mindedly and in futility are sinking to the bottom in their scramble for achieving a rapid grip at the levers of power.

Is Kianuri Sincere In His Patronage of the Islamic Republic?

In his interview with JAVANAN-E EMRUZ, Kianuri says that if the Party Congress is not disrupted by an attack by club-wielders he calls it to convene within 24 hours. Elsewhere (in his recent TV debate) he said that his Party is open to Moslems and that many Moslems are its members and that this does not give rise to any problem.

There are, of course, ample evidence to prove the duplicity and falsity of his and that of his gang's advocacy of the Islamic Republic regime. But we suffice our argument to the examination and analysis of his two recent statements which are known to all and sundry.

As far as the convening of the Congress is concerned, Kianuri has for the first time shown his hand and revealed that he is strongly against the holding of the Congress. The more or less old members of the Party are well aware, of course in private, that Kianuri has never been in favor of the holding of the Congress and he is not for it now, either. This is because the convening of the Congress would spell the death of Kianuri and his associates (if not physically, at least politically, for sure). We think one example would be sufficient to prove this point.

About two years before the Bahman [February] Revolution, Kiumars Zarshenas (the dubious member of the Central Committee of the Party and the Secretary-General of the Youths Organization of the Party), visited the writer's house along with another responsible officer of the Party. We had some limited discussion about party matters. After the departure of that comrade, the discussion between Zarshenas and the writer expanded and covered the more important party matters. During the discussion he explained the reason for the non-convention of the congress (which, in accordance with the decision of the Fourth Plenum—the extensive plenary session

--of the Party had to be held even in clandestine conditions). He said that the members of the Central Committee prevented the holding of the congress as a result of internal differences among themselves.

Let us now revert to Kianuri's claim which was quoted above.

Firstly, any party member or any person for that matter, who had read the complete proceedings of the Fourth Plenum and the draft of the Constitution (of the Party) before it was forged (by Kianuri), knows that in accordance with the contents of these document the Central Committee of the Party is duty-bound to hold the congress (or at least its extraordinary session) even in clandestine conditions. This has been done by other communist parties (including Lenin's party before the October Revolution) in conditions by far more stringent than those experienced by our party, and they have always been successful. So, if the gentlemen who are our leaders are not up to this task, it should frankly be said that they are very incompetent and inadequate. Therefore, they should shut up and refrain from boasting right and left about having "adequate experience" and "a background of forty years of revolutionary struggle".

Secondly, when Kianuri claims that he will hold the Party Congress inside 24 hours if only the club-wielders do not stop him, it must be said that it can firstly be assumed that we are still (or again) in conditions of underground struggle and that according to the decisions adopted by the Fourth Plenum and in accordance with the tradition of all the communist and workers' parties in the world we can and should form the congress so that the party does not become stagnant like a quagmire (as it has).

Thirdly, if it is true that the congress can be called within 24 hours, why Kianuri did not call the congress to convene sometime during the first three months of the revolution--the period which was 90 times the length of 24 hours!--when there was no trace of any club-wielders and ond dare say that the said period was the freest days of our history up to the time of this writing? If the claim of a 24-hour call was a bluff, then it is yet another proof of Kienuri's mendacity and charlatanism. If his claim is true, then the person who has missed 90 golden chances of 24-hours calls for the convention of the Congress cannot be called anything but a traitor. And this negligence has taken place in circumstances in which the holding of the congress has become one of the most crucial and imperative necessities for our party--a matter of prime importance.

Fourthly, the question we pose is if the repetitious claim by Kinauri and his associates is out of sincerity--which implies that they consider the present government one of the "revolutionary democrats", then what is the meaning of this excuse about the fear of club-wielders preventing the holding of the congress? It is here that the falsity of the pretense of Kinauri's outward advocacy of the Islamic Republic is exposed. This indicates that despite his foxiness, Kianuri has failed to conceal his faithlesnness and disbelief in this government, because it is quite clear that if he considers club-wielding as a characteristic of this regime, then it means he does not believe in its being neither a revolutionary nor a democratic regime. If he associates this regime with the club-wielders, he is at least questioning the revolutionary quality of the regime, because a characteristic of a

revolutionary regime it is to confront decisively and in a revolutionary manner the undealthy phenomena (such as club-wielding) and remove them immediately. Therefore, if a regime is a democratic one but remains silent in the face of violent phenomena, then it is not a regime of "revolutionary democrats" but in that case an attribute such as "pacifist democrats" would be more befitting it. These are not the kind of matters which are unknown to anybody. Therefore, if there is somebody who does not know these, then he cannot be accepted as a "leader".

9695
CSO: 4640/65

BRIEFS

TRAINING FOR AFGHANS--More than 10,000 Afghans have been trained to serve with the revolutionary guards in Iran, according to reports from Tehran. They have been trained by Iranian and Pakistanian experts. Some have been serving at the crucial northern end of the war front, but others are being sent to areas where ethnic minorities are active. Around 4,000, it is said, are being sent to Baluchestan, where daylight attacks on revolutionary guards and other installations in recent weeks have reflected the defensive stance of the government forces. The training of the Afghans is said to have been carried out with their traditional brutality in mind and it is feared they will give no quarter when in action, dissident sources say. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

WIDESPREAD POWER, WATER CUTS--The Tehran government has announced a 56 billion rial fund to provide loans for tribal groups in Iran as an apparent move to try to redue the unrest in the tribal areas. The money will be paid through agricultural cooperatives. As water and electricity cuts become more widespread the Ministry of Energy in Tehran has announced it intends to call in private contractors to help improve supplies. It announced new projects to this end while appealing to the public to restrict its use of water to the minimum to help the situation. Tehran radio announced water supplies would be cut off for a period of eight hours the following day in four areas of the capital. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

AMINI URGES OPPOSITION--Veteran former statesman Ali Amini in Paris, commenting on the presidential elections in Iran, said the boycott of the polls by nationalist and patriotic statesman had shown the ballot boxes were in fact only "conjuror's boxes." He called on Iranians to continue their struggle against Khomeini saying the world was now watching the situation in Iran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

ASKS FOR OIL REVENUE PAYMENT--Writing in the Paris-based Iran-va-Jahan newspaper economist Reza Alavi said each Iranian should have received around $125 dollars annually, based on the oil revenues under the previous regime, but this had been "stolen" by former governments who were not true representatives of the people. He urged that the first task of any new government should be ensure every Iranian received around that sum, based on oil revenues of ₤12.5 billion a year. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

TERRORIST ATTACKS--Intelligence sources say Madrid, the Spanish capital, is now the pivotal centre for organisation of terrorist attacks by Libyan, Iranian and Syrian government-backed groups. The good relations Spain has cultivated with the Arab world have made this feasible, they say. The recent murder of PLO representative in Brussels Naim Khader, considered a "moderate," was carried out by Libyan agents based in Madrid, the sources added. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

SPECULATION OVER SE'ADATI--Iran watchers were divided over the significance of the execution of Reza Se'adati, the Mojahedin leader who was killed in Evin prison. Some thought this marked the opening of a new campaign against the leftist groups. Others, however, said it could have been a response to the Soviet shooting down of an aircraft leaving Iran. A renewed anti-Soviet campaign by the Iranian regime, if launched, could confirm the latter view, they said. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Jul 81]

CSO: 4600

KURDISH LEADER TALABANI INTERVIEWED

Stockholm RIZGARIYA KURDISTAN in Turkish Jun 81 pp 14-18, 30

[Interview with Kurdish Patriotic Union Secretary General Jalal Talabani; place and date of interview not given.]

[Text] [Question] As known, organization is of great importance in national liberation movements and in political struggle in general. Organizations appeared in various places in the Kurdish national resistance which lasted from the 1920's until 1938, that is, until it was crushed in the Dersim uprising. The most important of these organizations was the Kurdistan Emancipation Organization, which was of note especially in the Sheikh Sait resistance. We know that this organization, known to have been founded under the leadership of Jibranli Halit, was the first serious Kurdish organization. It is also necessary to mention the HOYBUN [expansion unknown] organization. We know that it was organized through the efforts of Jaladet Bedirkhan and was active in the Agri uprising.

What was the role of these political organizations, usually founded by Kurdish intellectuals, in the resistance movements? Were they effective?

[Answer] Concretely, we do not see that these organizations were all that effective in the Kurdish movements. These organizations tended to be a collection of intellectuals, who came from the nobility and prominent families, and of the aghas and chieftains themselves. The founders of these organizations usually came from the prominent families. They usually tried to combine the situation existing in Kurdistan at that time with the new thoughts which were developing. The innovative aspects did not carry much weight because they were defending their own status in Kurdistan as a class. The class configurations of that time were already outmoded. And certainly there were men from among the people within these organizations and they were effective to an extent. For example, Menduh Mithat, Kadri Jan and Jigherkhwin were among the men in this category.

However, the policies they followed and their class status prevented these organizations from being representative of the masses. They could not lead the masses. They could not organize the masses according to the needs of their own organizations. Therefore, their effectiveness was limited.

Their most important aspect was that they brought the concept of political organization to the Kurdish movements. They demonstrated the need for organization. As I pointed out, however, it cannot be said that these organizations were successful because of their class status and their inability to become a mass party.

[Question] What were these organizations' demands? What did they want? Did they have political programs? What was the framework of these programs?

[Answer] As far as I can tell, they did have programs.

HOYBUN especially had a defined program. It was published in a book entitled "The Kurdish Problem." The program called for the liberation of Kurdistan. It called for language and cultural freedom. However, this program and its demands had no special aspects. It did not include such matters as what the social order in Kurdistan should be, equality for women, what kind of course to set the social structure in Kurdistan on as a class matter and so forth. Only the liberation of Kurdistan (rather abstractly) was shown (demanded).

[Question] Okay, what lessons should be learned from these Kurdish national movements? What lessons do these movements contain for the armed struggles of today and the future?

[Answer] What we get from these movements, briefly, is this:

1. Kurdish aghas and chieftains cannot provide leadership for Kurdish national liberation movements. The Kurdish movement cannot succeed under the leadership of individuals and strata which attempt to lead, being content with only a few advantages which the social structure provides.

2. Imperialism and the states which divided Kurdistan up among themselves cannot be the friend of the Kurdish people. The history of Kurdistan shows us this in a very concrete way. They are the enemies of the Kurdish people.

3. Kurdish aghas, chieftains and rulers who are linked to the outside and are in the service of foreign enemies must be considered enemies. They have no connection at all with the Kurdish people and the struggle in Kurdistan, because they are committed to the enemy and serve the plans of the enemy. They are traitors to the Kurdish people and take their place in opposition to the struggle.

4. We have to recognize our friends and enemies well. It is very important from the standpoint of the fate of the struggle to be able to see concretely who is our friend and who is our enemy. Strong friendly relations must be developed with friends. Strong boundaries must be drawn between friends and enemies.

5. We must distinguish carefully between the states which divided Kurdistan among themselves (such as Turkey, Iran and Iraq) and the people of those nations. A state and the people of that nation are not the same thing. The states are our enemies and the people are our friends.

6. The leadership of a progressive, revolutionary party is necessary for the success of the Kurdish people's struggle. It becomes very difficult without such leadership. Old mistakes are repeated. Unity of the patriotic, progressive forces of Kurdistan is also necessary. Unity of the "peshmerge" which are equipped with new methods of people's warfare and conduct partisan warfare is necessary, too.

It is very important to be alert to imperialism, especially U.S. imperialism. Imperialism and imperialists are definitely enemies of the Kurdish people. It is

necessary not to be deceived by them. Now as before, we must not give them the chance to deceive us. We must be able to see through their ploys.

The lessons we must learn are briefly these. I discussed all of them at length in the book I wrote. If you ever have a chance to read the book, you will see all of them taken up in greater depth.

[Question] Let us ask a question also about the Mahabad Kurdish Republic. What has the Mahabad Kurdish Republic done for the Kurdish movement? What has the Kurdish movement gained by the Mahabad Kurdish Republic?

[Answer] In discussing this topic, it is necessary to mention KOMELA, the Komela Jinawey Kurd (Kurdish Renaissance Organization). This organization constitutes the first example of a serious organization in the history of Kurdistan. It is the first organization composed of Kurdish petite bourgeoisie. Until the founding of this organization, as I said before, it was the Kurdish elite which led the movements and organizing in Kurdistan. There was also a similar organization founded in Iraqi Kurdistan named HEWA (Hope). HEWA was made up of the same class levels, but it was rather reactionary. It was too nationalistic. Komela, however, was both nationalistic and leftist. Most of its founders and members were students. It was the representative of the petite bourgeoisie and its programs were national and democratic.

The second thing about KOMELA was that it took concrete steps against the Kurdish aghas and chieftains. Articles were written, poems were recited and efforts were made to act sensibly in practice. A third feature was that for the first time in the history of Kurdistan an organization established a trend toward the friends of Kurdistan. It established relations with the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the world. It established relations with other progressive powers. Alone of all the Kurdish organizations, including HEWA, up to that time, it was able to see the Western world for what it is, an imperialist camp. The dominant trend was to establish relations with them. KOMELA was the first Kurdish organization to break this trend. KOMELA also carried the struggle of the Kurdish people to the villages. It organized in the villages and enlightened the villagers. Another important feature of KOMELA bearing attention is that it was for Kurdistan. That is, one of KOMELA's most important features was that it worked to bring about an organization and to organize the struggle in all parts for all of Kurdistan, not just for Iranian Kurdistan. KOMELA had a section in Iraqi Kurdistan and worked to organize in Turkish Kurdistan through Ali Ghazi. It had relations with Syrian Kurdistan, mostly with Kadri Jan. It is rather necessary to see the problem as a whole and act accordingly, and KOMELA did this.

These things are the most important legacy and therefore lessons that KOMELA left to the Kurdish movement.

[Question] This information about KOMELA is important. This information is needed in order to understand the Mahabad Kurdish Republic in the course of history? So, was the Mahabad Kurdish Republic founded by KOMELA? How much was the Soviet Union influential in the formation of the Republic? What was the effect of the Azerbaijan People's Republic? What is the Republic's contribution to Kurdish history and the struggle?

[Answer] My approach to this period of the history of Kurdistan is somewhat different from my approach up to this time. What I say and write on this topic, as I see it, is different from the others.

In my opinion, KOMELA's failure to preserve the structure we just discussed and bringing in Ghazi Muhammed to head it had a negative effect on development. This incident was the beginning of a period of regression. KOMELA was an organization of the petite bourgeoisie, as I said. It had a rather radical and political stance. The Soviet Union intended to help it develop, to bring it to a more advanced position and give it a revolutionary structure. Relations were close for this reason. Bringing in Ghazi Muhammed at the head, however, did not go along with this line. Certainly Ghazi Muhammed was a valuable person, but he was a person of social stature. He was a religious man, a landowner. Ghazi Muhammed was brought in to head KOMELA in order to convert it into a party (the Kurdistan Democratic Party), but instead of establishing strong and continuous dialogues with the cadres, his headquarters adopted an attitude downplaying their importance.

The aghas and the sheikhs, with whom there had been no organized relations to that date, were brought to the head of the party and it was they who formed the government.

I published in my book the lists of the central committees in the periods when KOMELA and Ghazi Muhammed were dominant. Looking at the class and social structures of these two central committees, one immediately notices great differences. KOMELA's central committee was made up largely of tradesmen, peasants, students and intellectuals, that is, people rooted in the petite bourgeoisie. In contrast, the people on the central committee in Ghazi Muhammed's time were the rulers of that time. They were many aghas, sheiks and mullahs. This situation showed that the Kurdish movement had again come under the monopoly of the ruling classes. This monopoly of the elite had been broken in the KOMELA period. The monopoly of the Kurdish rulers in Iraqi Kurdistan had also been broken. The movement there was under the leadership of RIZGARI [Kurdish Liberation Party] and the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party. This had been an important development for the movement in Kurdistan, but it did not last. The Kurdish movement again came under the control of the Kurdish elite. The formation of the Kurdish Democratic Party in the way I explained and the Republic's having almost the same character must be interpreted as a return to the old line from the standpoint of the Kurdish movement. And this situation had a direct effect on the other parts of Kurdistan.

The effect on Iraqi Kurdistan, in particular, was immediate. The party removed its leaders, and when Mullah Mustafa Barzani returned, control of the movement passed to him. He lost no time in surrounding himself with the elite of Iraqi Kurdistan. Shiekh Latif, who was elected vice president, was the biggest land holder in the Suleymaniyah region. Another was Shiekh Ziyad Muhammed, who was the biggest landlord in Erbil. So once more the Kurdish movement came under the leadership of the aghas and shiekhs. And this was a step backwards.

Besides this, the Mahabad Kurdish Republic and the events which followed it certainly had a lot of positive effects also. It is necessary for us to see these positive aspects as well as the negative aspects. For one, the Mahabad Kurdish Republic was the first republic in Kurdish history. This is very important. Also

for the first time in the history of Kurdistan a political party gained ascendency. The model of the Kurdistan Democratic Party was a first. It is even more important that it was democratic (within the confines I explained). The emergency of democracy next to nationalism is not something to be belittled. Again for the first time the movement in Kurdistan attracted the interest of a Socialist state. Friendly relations were established between the Kurds and the Soviet Union. Launching a campaign for Kurdish-language literacy, publication of the KURDISTAN newspaper and the rise of intensive awareness throughout Kurdistan, all such things had advantages.

However, the situation would most likely have been quite different if the Kurdish Republic had been formed under KOMELA's leadership, because the Kurds were defenseless when the Iranian state attacked. Ghazi Muhammed did not opt for resistance. He was just as guileless as Mullah Mustafa in 1975. But with this difference: he stayed in his country among his people, defending his ideas to the end, not quailing in the face of death. These are not little things.

[Question] What caused the fall of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic? Was it the effect of the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences which were taking place at that time? What was imperialism's place? What was the Soviet Union's attitude?

[Answer] In my view, what was most important in the fall of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic, along with the class and social positions of the forces at its head, was the social structure of that day. History has proved to us many times that backward and outmoded ruling classes can never succeed. We were just discussing the position of the forces which led the Republic. In this situation, it was rather difficult for the Republic to survive those hardships. The forces we discussed were not leaders for hard times. To see difficult times and hardships through was like something impossible from their standpoint. These were the reasons for the surrender to the Iranian army. The possibility of any other alternative was not even considered.

It is especially necessary not to forget the social structure of that time. [Political] awareness in the structure of that time was inadequate. Modern classes had not yet been formed, intellectuals were extremely few. The social conditions to support a republic did not exist.

On the other hand, world conditions were also against the Kurds. American and British imperialism helped Iran against the republic in Kurdistan. The Soviet Union also pursued an erroenous policy. Instead of helping the Kurdish and Azerbaijani republics, it reduced relations with them to a minimum. It ignored the destruction of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic and the Azerbaijani People's Republic by the Iranian state.

There is an important lesson that we must learn here: not to rely on the outside. Not even to rely on an outside socialist nation. It is extremely important for the Kurdish movement to be independent. The Soviet example shows this concretely. The Soviet Union was the only bastion of world socialism under the circumstances of that time. It represented world socialism. It had a tremendous opportunity. It had great influence in the world. Despite this, when it changes its policy for

various reasons, it went back on helping the Kurds and the Azerbaijanis. This is why it is important to be able to be independent.

Second, there is a need for the leadership of a progressive, revolutionary organization. Our leaders must not be individuals, our leaders must be organizations. The influence of individuals persists even today. Unfortunately, this situation reflects on our organization. The Yekitiye Nistimane Kurdistan (Kurdistan Patriotic Union) must supercede all. It is very important to establish the supremacy of organizations. The Kurdish movement needs this.

Another important lesson for us to learn is that American imperialism is our enemy. Up to that time, only British and French imperialism were on the scene. After that, America also joined the enemy camp. It was seen clearly in the experiment of the Mahabad Kurdish Republic that the imperialist camp is the enemy of the Kurdish movement.

His utter defeat in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1975 showed us that Mullah Mustafa Barzani failed to learn anything about this stern lesson. He saw American imperialism as a friend instead of an enemy. And we all saw the painful result.

The interests of American imperialism required the absolute destruction of the Republic of Kurdistan. And they ultimately encouraged the shah in this regard. Otherwise, the shah could not have taken on such a risky business as destroying the Kurdish and Azerbaijani republics by himself.

Iraqi Kurdistan

[Question] Now let us get to Iraqi Kurdistan. We see that a party was also formed in Iraqi Kurdistan when the Mahabad Kurdish Republic was at its height. Would you explain briefly the developments from the formation of the party until the Kasim revolution in 1958 and the history of the party? In particular:

First, what was its policy?

Second, what kind of program did it have?

Third, what was the class and social status of the leadership cadres of the party?

Fourth, what classes supported the party, what classes had relations with it and what classes formed the party base?

Fifth, how were the party's relations with the Iraqi people, the Arabs and other minorities and their revolutionaries?

[Answer] I answered all these questions, or wrote about them, in my book. But there are two things I did not discuss at the time I was writing the book. Let me discuss them now. Let me discuss them first and then answer your questions briefly.

The first point is that the way the party formed, that is, the way the Kurdistan Democratic Party [KDP] was formed was a step backwards in my view. A party had

been formed in Iraqi Kurdistan named the Iraqi Kurdistan Communist Party. This party led to the formation of another party, named Parti Rizgari Kurd (Kurdish Liberation Party), in order to have social effectiveness. Kurdish intellectual, youth, nationalists and patriots gathered under the banner of this party. The communists, however, took the communist party directly.

With the formation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, the work of these two parties became confused. Everything was mixed up between them and, of course, this hurt the Kurdish Marxist-Leninists. Let me put it this way, if you pour a little acid into a bucket of water, it is the acid that will lose its punch. It becomes the same as water. The KDP-Iraq took the punch out of the Marxists by mixing everything up together.

We are not making this mistake today. The Kurdish Marxists establish and work through their own organizations. And they work in cooperation with the patriotic, revolutionary Kurdish forces.

Second, the KDP rebuilt the leadership of the Kurdish aghas and chieftains. This was a significant blow to the Kurdish movement. The roots of the heavy defeat in 1975 go back to them. That is, we experienced heavy losses in 1975 as the result of a mistake made back in 1946.

When the KDP was formed in Iraq in 1946, Mustafa Barzani was in Iran and did not even know about the organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan. The organizations we are talking about had been organized by Hamza Abdullah and some other people. Hamza Abdullah was the greatest Kurdish Marxist of the time. He was widely respected among the people. But he had conflicts with Ghazi Muhammed and this is why he wanted to strengthen Mullah Mustafa against Ghazi Muhammed.

[Question] What were the conflicts?

[Answer] I do not know exactly, but Ghazi Muhammed was said to have accused Hamza Abdullah of being a British agent. And Hamza Abdullah strengthened Mullah Mustafa because of the conflicts. He brought him in and made him chairman of the party. Until that time, Mullah Mustafa had not even been a member of either of the parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. After that, Mullah Mustafa controlled the party without too much difficulty and was himself the chairman. Shiekh Latif was deputy chairman and Sheikh Ziyad Muhammed was assistant deputy chairman. Another group of aghas came to the party and stuck like a burr. After these developments, straight Kurdish Marxists and revolutionaries deserted the party en masse and joined the Iraqi Communist Party. The Kurdish aghas and sheikhs began to control the movement. And the source of all this misfortune which our people suffered for 30 years, from 1946 to 1976, began there. The source of the mistakes began with restoring the aghas, mullahs, sheikhs and chieftains to leadership.

Barzani should have been seen as a national Kurdish personality. He should have been kept outside the party. Still, he should have been respected. But should a person have been brought to the head of the party who had no idea of what organization meant, who had never even once in his life been interested in these things or understood them?

After these things came to a head, the party lost its effectiveness. It existed in name only. In practice, it could do nothing. Party functionaries in all the places where the party was effective were relieved of their duties. The leading aghas of the regions were brought into replace them. In this way, the party was alienated from the political scene and a mechanism emerged to replace it in which the aghas were influential and made the decisions. The plan was clear--to render the party inoperable and ensure control of the Kurdish aghas. On the other hand, the party wanted the revolution under its own control. To do this, it established committees in the regions where there were independent peshmerge units composed of tribal forces and made an intensive effort to control the movement. But it was ineffectual despite this. Mullah Mustafa had been organizing the tribal forces, and he was opposed to the party. Not just to the party, but to the party idea. In his view, the party effort had been sowing seeds of discord among the Kurdish nation. Naturally such an understanding would be opposed to the party. For this reason, he formed tribal units outside the party and tried to run the movement with them. His opposition to the party reached the limit after 1962. That year Mullah Mustafa and his friends established relations with the United States. In these relations, established through the journalist Danna Adam Smiht [as published], America made it clear that it was not happy with the party, and especially the party's central committee and politburo, that they were Marxists. For this reason, the Kurdish movement was "suspect" and they could not aid it, they said. This was when Mullah Mustafa's hostility toward the party reached the limit. At first, Mullah Mustafa wanted to get rid of the party but, heeding someone's advice, he decided to put up with it. Someone told him, "If you get rid of the party, Ibrahim Ahmet, Jalal Talabani and Dr Shemzini will use it against you to bring the party ranks over to their side."

In short, the party existed, giving struggle, continuously.

[Question] Now we come to an important problem--the dimensions and causes of the conflict between you and Mustafa Barzani and the forms they took. Would you explain briefly the conflicts, especially up to 1966, and the forms they took?

[Answer] As I said, there was a concrete conflict between Barzani and the party. The party wanted the revolution under its own control, to direct it; Barzani wanted to take leadership of the revolution with the tribal forces. The party wanted the revolution to be a revolution of the workers, the peasants and the poor people and to assign them basic functions; Barzani wanted the tribal forces to be the basic force, especially the Barzani tribe, and wanted them to occupy the basic positions. We had a lot of similar conflicts.

After the coup against Kerim Kasim in 1963, Barzani openly took the front against the party, because war was close at that time and Barzani did not have the strength for it. Barzani reached agreement with Salam Arif in 1964. There was nothing to benefit the Kurds in the agreement. It was even worse than the announcements made in connection with the Kurds by the Iraqi state during the Baath period. The Baathists had used the term "Our brothers the Kurdish people" in their statements, but even this was not done in the new agreement. Barzani released a bulletin after the agreement was reached (his bulletin was published in the newspapers and broadcase on official radio), saying that the peshmerge must return to their homes.

After this happened, the units attached to Barzani attacked the headquarters where the party politburo was located. The politburo did not fight back. Instead of fighting, they fled to Iran and were arrested by the shah's troops in Iranian Kurdistan.

[Question] Would you expand a little, especially, on your flight to Iran and subsequent developments (and of course your reasons for going)? As you are one of the most important surviving witnesses of this incident, it would be useful to hear about it from you.

[Answer] Of course. I was going to explain it anyway.

The date was 1964. Barzani and his tribal forces made an all-out attack on the politburo headquarters. Ibrahim Ahmet was not there at the time. I was there with the late martyr Ali Askeri and the others. We realized that we could not repulse this attack, that it would be disastrous, and we decided that the best alternative was to go to Iran.

[Question] Where was Ibrahim Ahmed at that time?

[Answer] He had gone to Europe. When we went to Iran, the Iranian authorities came and said, "Either surrender your arms immediately or go back." So we crossed the Iranian border, but we only went a kilometer or two to the village of Betush. We were of two opinions at that time. One view was to go back to Iraq, establish a headquarters there and fight if Barzani units attacked. The other view was mine. I said, "Mullah Mustafa is not in the Barzan region himself at the moment. Let's go directly to the Barzan region to Sheikh Ahmet Barzani and then Mullah Mustafa cannot get at us." That was my view. But my colleagues did not accept it. So we went back to Iraq.

[Question] Who were the ones who did not accept your proposal?

[Answer] The late Ali Askeri, Hilmi Sherif, Omer Debabe and the others. So we went back to Iraq. We settled in the Sulkiye region, but Barzani sent his units after us. With Iraq's help, of course, Iraq was helping them, providing vehicles and sending supplies from the cities. Barzani had reached agreement with the government, deciding that the party should be abolished and the Kurds should stop fighting. The Iraqi government's greatest fear at that time was of the party itself.

When Barzani's units came after us, we had to fight back, but we were defeated. There was nothing for us to do but go back to Iran. We settled in a place close to the border. The Iranian authorities came to us and said that they would harbor us there on one condition. Their condition was that we not return to Iraq. They did not want us to go back to Iraq. We accepted this proposal.

This is where we came to Iran's plan. After a while, they came and said that the place where we were staying was not good and that we had to go to a better place. The place we went was a plain. They gave us tents and such and made sure we settled there. So they moved us some distance from the border and away from the mountains.

One night they came and said that we could not remain armed on Iranian territory and that we could either give up our arms and stay as political refugees or go back to Iraq. They also said that they had established relations with Barzani and that Barzani would permit us to return.

We said, "Okay, then we will establish relations with Barzani and if he gives us assurances that he will not attack us, we will return to Iraq."

[Question] We want to ask something here: Who were the Iranians who established and maintained contact with you? Were they direct spokesmen for the government, army spokesmen or SAVAK?

[Answer] It was Iranian officers who established and maintained contact with us. Their spokesman was a Kurd named Ferruh Niyar. So they told us through this officer that they had established relations with Barzani, that Barzani was in the Gilala region, that they would take us as far as Haci Omran by car and that we could sit down and talk with Barzani there. We agreed to this. But they also said that we could not go anywhere within the borders of Iran as long as we were armed, that we could place our weapons in one or two large trucks, that our peshmerge would guard these weapons and that the rest of us (400 to 500 at that time) could take military vehicles and go to Haci Omran quietly at night.

We got in the military vehicles and set out one night. They took us to the military garrison at Sakiz. They said that we would eat there and then leave for Mahabad and go from there to Haci Omran. They took us inside the military garrison. We were surrounded by thousands of armed soldiers. We did not have our weapons with us. They said we would spend the night there.

The next morning, they told us that we were going to stay there now, that we could not go anywhere. They also seized our weapons.

After a while, they established contact with Barzani. When Barzani said that we could not stay in Iranian Kurdistan, they took us to Hamedan, a city near Tehran.

When we found out that Iran was going to hold us there, we objected. We went and talked to the authorities. We said that we wanted to go back to Iraq, that we were going back at any cost, that we would go to the Iraqi embassy and surrender if necessary and that Iraq could kill us if it wanted to, but it would be better than staying here. They did not agree. We started a hunger strike. After two or three days, they came and saw that it was serious. They said that they definitely would not permit me to return to Iraq, but I could go to Europe if I wanted to. I had my passport and I went to Europe, to West Germany.

I stayed there for about a year. The other colleagues stayed on for a year in Iran. When war began again in Iraqi Kurdistan, when Iraq attacked Kurdistan again, we returned to Kurdistan. We went to Barzani and told him that his policy was wrong, that Iraq had given up no rights at all and it had done no good to stop the struggle. We made an alliance with Barzani. But he scattered our units. We agreed to this.

He put me, Nuri Shawez, Nuri Taha, Ali Askeri, Omer Debabe and Hilmi Sherif in a region at the back. We said "Okay" to this also. One of our colleagues, a member of the central committed named Ali Hamdi, had been captured by Barzani's troops. We requested that he be released. They were always saying, "Today," "Tomorrow." After a while, they told us that our friend had died. Also, according to information conveyed to us by some of our friends, plans were being made to kill us too.

According to the agreement we had reached with Barzani, we were supposed to be able to work actively politically after three months. We were to operate as a party and establish an alliance with Barzani's party. We were to work as two parties. Three months, six months passed and the decision still had not been made so that we could begin our work. On the contrary, plans had been made to get rid of us. The decision for our death had been made. A decision was issued, signed by Barzani himself, which said, "Everyone found and proved to belong to Ibrahim Ahmet and Jalal Talabani's party should be put to death." Not just captured, but killed. I still have this document. They killed our colleague Ali Hamdi. They murdered another group of our colleagues. We remained. Reports were coming to us every day. One day, three of Barzani's men brought us a written report. The report said that "idris Barzani" wanted to see me and Hilmi Sherif. A person who had worked in the party before and was a regional commander at that time had told Ali Askeri that a death decision lay behind the report and that we would be killed if we went.

[Question] Do you remember this person's name?

[Answer] No, I do not remember. Ali Askeri had known him well. We decided not to go. Six of us decided among ourselves not to go, but to escape. Four of us, Hilmi Sherif, Ali Askeri, Omer Debabe and myself escaped. Ali Askeri went to Kirkuk, Omer Debabe and I went to Suleymaniyah and Hilmi Sherif went to Baghdad to begin operating underground. Our goal was to conduct political activity, to protect and develop our force. After a while, we learned that Barzani was again about to make a pact with the Iraqi government. His purpose was again to make an agreement directed against us. Exactly as in 1964.

At that time (1966), Abdulsellam Arif was in power in Iraq. And he was a friend of Nasser. We sent one of our colleagues (Hilmi Sherif) to Egypt to see Nasser. We had friendly relations with Nasser. We were thinking that he could be helpful in resolving the Kurdistan problems in Iraq. We explained our situation to him. Nasser did not want war in Iraq. It was his view that the war should be ended with the Kurds getting their due. He pointed out that it was necessary for us to try to end the war and get the Kurds together with the Iraqi government. In this way, he said we would be able to create the conditions for a change of power in Iraq. The purpose was understood to be realization of a change of power in Iraq through a junta. He also had many men in the army. He said that when the administration changed, the Kurds would have full rights. This was a proposal which we also found appropriate.

Abdurrahman Bazzaz was prime minister in Iraq at that time. Abdurrahman Bazzaz established relations both with Barzani and with us and advanced the need for us to agree with the Iraqi government. We agreed to this.

We made a big mistake here. We should not have accepted the Iraqi government's request for talks. We should have rejected this request. We should have let Barzani talk with them and, if he had obtained partial rights, we would have come into those rights, too. But, as I said, we made an important mistake and established relations with the Iraqi government.

We had only one fear, that Barzani would reach agreement with Iraq, catching us in the crossfire, totally annihilating us. This was what influenced us to enter relations with Iraq. We should have been content just to strengthen our own political efforts after all. We were holding a few regions. We should have tried to create conditions for a broader struggle there. We should have done this instead of establishing relations with Iraq.

8349
CSO: 4654/66

EMPHASIS GIVEN TO EDUCATION

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

Two Iraqi ministers were relieved of their portfolios last week and appointed to posts as advisers to the country's Revolutionary Command Council, the highest authority in Iraq. Hazem Mohammed Khalaf was replaced as Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research by Abdel Razzak Kasem al-Hashemi and Abdel Jabbar Abdel Majid gave up his post as Minister of Education to Abdel Kader Ezzidin as the result of two decrees issued on July 26 by President Saddam Hussein.

No reason was given for the minor reshuffle. It could, however, signal greater emphasis on education in Iraq. The budgets for these two ministries have risen steadily in recent years, but the proportion of the overall budget allocated to them has decreased slightly between 1979 and 1981. The latest moves could mean that this trend will be reversed in line with the government's avowed policy of pushing ahead vigorously with development projects despite the 10-month-old war with Iran.

Budgetary allocations for education and research (1979-81)
(in millions of Iraqi Dinars*)

	1979		1980		1981	
	ID	% of total budget	ID	% of total budget	ID	% of total budget
Ministry of Education	75.4	2.9	108.8	2.9	140.3	2.8
Ministry of Higher Education	70.8	2.6	102.0	2.8	123.9	2.47

* ID 1 = $3.88 at the current exchange rate.

CSO: 4300

CABINET MEMBER MERIDOR'S BACKGROUND DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Aug 81 p 4

[Article by F.C.: "M Ya'agov Meridor: A Flamboyant Capitalist"]

[Text] What a strange fellow is this man, suddenly called back less than 6 months ago to the political scene by Mr Begin, to be named, to everyone's surprise, his right arm in the immediate future and his eventual successor. Why such an unexpected choice, when Ya'agov Meridor, after a cautious career in Parliament, had retired 12 years ago in order to devote himself entirely to his increasingly lucrative business affairs?

One can judge how limited were the choices from the fact that he is a man who is really a little old for an heir apparent. Meridor is 68 years old, like the prime minister, to whom he has endeared himself by proven loyalty since 1943, when he turned over to him his functions as commander of the Irgun, the clandestine extremist organization which had declared war on the British occupying power.

Meridor today has one of the largest fortunes in Israel. Among other things he heads a maritime transport company specializing in refrigerated shipments, one of the biggest in the world, and a fleet of tankers that have led Begin to call him affectionately "my Onassis." The arrival of this flamboyant capitalist is obviously worrisome to the laborites, who fear the second Begin government will seek the development of a "privatization" of statal and para-statal enterprises.

Meridor has already set the example by recently buying back--in company with some South African investors--a big construction company belonging to the Jewish Agency. Meridor the businessman is also a patriot. He showed it during the 1973 war by putting his ships at the disposal of the state for the emergency transport of 28,000 tons of arms and mutions supplied by the United States, and, previously, by allowing some of his companies to serve occasionally as a cover for activities of the secret services.

Though a shrewd financier, he has also had several grandiose projects go down to resounding defeat, which led some to doubt his capability and judgment, and somewhat embarrassed his friends. When he was established in Ethiopia, did he not suggest the idea of "drying up" Nasser's Egypt and forcing it to make peace by diverting the waters of the Blue Nile? Quite recently, just before the elections,

Mr Meridor announced with great hub-bub that some of his scientists had just discovered a new and very mysterious method of producing energy from plant-based gases, which, he said, "will force the Arabs to drink their oil and give Chancellor Schmidt, Mrs Thatcher and President Mitterrand the chance to quit their bootlicking." To hear him talk, it is "the greatest invention since the wheel," said the Laborites with some amusement. It is a fact that for more than a month now since the elections, Meridor has not spoken any more about his revolutionary invention. He lost a good deal of his reputation as a young innocent in that venture.

9516
CSO: 4319/6

NEW KFAED LOANS CITED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 31, 3 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has announced new loans worth a total of $142.3 million to six Asian and African countries, including Zimbabwe for the first time. The loans are for between 20 to 40 years and carry interest varying from 1.5 to 4 per cent annually.

Zimbabwe received the first $29 million tranche from a total credit of $54 million to finance improvement work for its railways (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, March 30). According to the loan announcement in Kuwait, the 17-year loan will cover 96 per cent of the scheme's total cost.

The loan has a three-year grace period and is at 3.5 per cent annual interest, plus a 0.5 per cent service charge.

About $3.5 million has been earmarked for one of the poorest Islamic states, the Comoro Islands, to finance a telecommunications project. The loan is for 40 years, carries 1 per cent interest and an administrative fee of 0.5 per cent. It has a 10-year grace period.

This is the first KFAED loan to the Comoros, which has so far this year benefited from $5.5 million in aid, through two credits from the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) to finance oil purchases from Kuwait (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 4 and January 19).

Bangladesh gets one of the largest of the KFAED loans, with $28.44 million to finance the drilling of Artesian wells, which will irrigate 150,000 acres of agricultural land. The project is expected to relieve the country's acute food shortage, the loan announcement said, and lessen its dependence on food imports.

Somalia receives a comparable amount, $28.77 million, for an irrigation project in Mogambo. When completed in 1986, the project will irrigate an area of 2,200 hectares on the west bank of the Juba river around Mogambo. The total cost of the project is estimated at $42.2 million.

Indonesia has been allocated $37.8 million to finance the country's Greater Bandung Power Distribution Project. Construction of the $65.8 million project is to start next year and is scheduled for completion in 1984.

Finally, KFAED has also granted Pakistan $14.68 million to finance a rural electrification project in the province of Baluchistan. The scheme is to provide power to 300 villages for domestic use and for small development projects such as water pumping and light industries.

CSO: 4300

QADHDHAFI'S GREEN BOOK ANALYZED

Paris ESPRIT in French Apr 81 pp 42-51

[Article by Jean-Paul Charnay: "Qadhdhafism"]

[Text] Muammar Qadhdhafi has tried to go beyond traditionally structured fundamentalist doctrines and articulate both the religious absolute and the laws of history. Without going over his ultimate geopolitical and geostrategic aims, we will try here to identify the concepts of religion and of human and social nature elaborated in the "Green Book" and several other texts.

Many thinkers in all civilizations have considered the world and history as intellectually and morally shameful subjects: "In practice, it is always the strong who rule." ("Green Book," I concl.) Agonizing over injustice leads one to search for a remedy, but also to ask oneself whether it was always this way. Like many other minds, Muammar Qadhdhafi has thus embarked on this quest, for his people and for humanity, in a universe which oscillates between the harshness of the anti-imperialist struggle and the ambivalences of economic development which threatens to erode the moral and social equilibrium without which, he says, man could not retain his dignity as a creation of God. For unlike many Islamic leaders who keep the faith in their hearts, yet also unlike the fundamentalists who only offer the literal application of the canonical institutions in a world where it would be difficult to apply them, he is trying, from canonical and anthropological basis provided by the Koran, to construct a moral, social, political, and economic architecture which answers to the needs not only of Muslim societies but of our time.

As a believing Muslim, he cannot accept that the creation was "evil" from the start; in and for Evil in its full human, ethical, and theological meaning. This produces a dialectic rather unusual in Arab-Muslim thought, which tries to blend a religious orientation with a certain concept of the "state of nature." This category which is simultaneously anthropological, moral, and political, intended to account for the evolution, organization, and operation of social groups--the "state of nature" has in the West served as the starting point for many constructions of rights and theology, social criticism and political philosophy: this state of nature varying from a totally pessimistic one (for Hobbes man is his own predator) to the idyllic conception of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

The predominant Arab-Muslin theological tradition was to the contrary obliged, by the historic event of the Koranic Revelation, to another duality, that between the pagan era, the jahiliya, pejoratively viewed, and the Moslem era of restored innocence. The reference to a "state of nature" was therefore often hidden by the normative description resulting from the law delivered by means of the latest and greatest of the prophets, Muhammad. There remained only the problem of determining whether good and evil were good and evil by themselves, in themselves, "by nature," or because God had decided so. Those who adhered to the first opinion were accused by those who adhered to the second of denying the omnipotence of God. And, in fact, Arab philosophers who used the term "state of nature" presented it as a rather pessimistic conception. Not as pessimistic as that of Hobbes, for whom that state is one of an absolute war of all against all, but a state which social organization and community life must inevitably corrupt, rigidify by formalistic rules (Ibn Tofail) or turn into a state that is the opposite of a refined civilization (Ibn Khaldun).

For Ibn Tofail (Abubacer, 12th century) Hayy ben Yaqdhan (the Living Person: created man, child of the Vigilant One: God), left as a babe on a desert island, reaches the highest philosophical and moral concepts, through the interaction of the natural predilections of his soul and the world which surrounds him (experience), but once having discovered life in society falls away from it. For Ibn Khaldun (14th century) the cyclical rhythm of human societies is marked by the apogees of dynasties which subdue tribes and build a civilizing empire, but the refinement of the latter leads to degradation, corruption, and the fall of the civilization to an inferior level, to a state of nature, or anxious struggle for survival inhibits the development of security and thought.

This is a contradiction from which Muammar Qadhdhafi is trying to escape. The creation, emanating from God, must be good, as must also be the manner in which it has been regulated by successive Revelations: this is a traditional finding of all Muslim theology. The problem for Muammar Qadhdhafi is thus to find those factors destructive of the original harmony. Far from contrasting the impurity of the jahiliya with the purity of the Muslim era, as most theologians do, he looks in the Koran for the explanation of the course of civilization and its deviations from it. According to the Koran, in effect, humanity was created divided into two ethnocultural groups: "We made you as peoples and tribes in order that you should understand each other. Not for you to kill each other." The state of nature consists of one difference: "Nationalism thus existed before the appearance of religion." ("Discourse on Religion and Nationalism," 5, moharram 1398, 8 February 1973, French publication: "General Information Administration," p 18.). But conversely, at the beginning, religion was in a primordial, universal, and undifferentiated stage: "The great principles of humanity were born before any theories." ("Opening Speech at the International Congress of European and Arab Youth," 11 rabi II, 1393 [Muslim Era], 14 May 1973, published in French: "General Information Board, Ministry of Information and Culture," p 5.). Thus, Islam "in its divine conception" signifies the "true" religion. It is larger than the Islamic religion in the historical sense of the term; it not only concerns the "Muslims" who, strictly speaking, have only existed since the Hegira ("Religion and Nationalism," p 11) but all men who since the creation of Adam (and "all human beings are descendents of Adam," "Youth," p 6) have believed in one God; and particularly the great prophets from Ibrahim (Abraham) to Muhammad, including Jesus-Issa, to whom God expressly said" "Be Muslim" and who was not at all a polytheist but adhered strictly to hanifism, the original, primordial, natural religion.

Thus Jews and Christians were originally only Muslims ("Religion and Nationalism," p 17). And even today, "what does it matter if one is Muslim or not, the important thing is that you believe in God and that you believe in all the prophets from first to last," ("Youth," p 25.). However, this presupposes that one accepts the prophetic mission of Mahomet.

This concept thus implicitly incorporates one of the great notions of Muslim theology, the notion of fit'ra, a sort of innate disposition of the human being to perceive the essential truths of divinity and creation, particularly the worship of one God. "The most pious among you is in God's eyes the best," ("Youth," p 57): the most honorable.

From the state of nature of humanity (divided into peoples) and that of religion (pre-existing the Koranic Revelation and belief in God) thus emerges the ethical and individual state of nature, a state consisting in a balanced life in the bosom of one's own people, respectful of other peoples.

But "Adam is of the earth," ("Youth," p 6) and his passions, his instincts, become the institutions which constitute the natural order: nationalism and religion. And their deviations, like their reappropriation to struggle aganst those deviations, will be precisely what drives "the engines of history"--will constitute the "movement of history," made up of advance and recession, of a perpetual struggle between good and evil, of a permanent straining not to return to their original form but to achieve their legitimate functioning in the world of today.

This structure of ideas thus integrates psychological, political, and economic factors. Laterally to the famous definitions of the nation by Renan (collective will to live) or Stalin (a historically constituted community of people having the same language, territory, economic life, and psychological and cultural formation), Qadhdhafi asserts: "Setting aside blood ties, the nation is in a word a feeling of belongingness and a communal destiny" ("Green Book," III). A very interesting proposition, for it does not refer to either of the two traditionally fundamental ties: Arab genealogy (so powerful in the family, the tribe, the glorification of common ancestors) and religious cohesion. By contrast, it emphasizes a historic and voluntarist teleology: the communal destiny.

But how do deviations and debasements appear? For God permitted and intended the harmonious differentiation of humanity into nations. But within each nation, other oppositions have come to light: each tribe, sect, group, party, and class pursuing its own particular interests to the detriment of the others, and aiming at absolute domination over the whole of society. This leads to the creation and expansion of an institution, the "apparatus of government," to the advantage of only a part of that society. This seizing of absolute power first destabilizes internal relationships, then international relationships: for the class or faction in power is going to increase its exploitative activity against the others: from a unifying force, nationalism becomes an aggressive force ("Youth," p 11). It also produces a debasement of the law, by enacting purely human and partisan constitutions and statutes to provide ideological justification for and to maintain its power. The law is in turn warped, like the nation, out of the state of nature ("Green Book," I, p 66).

Thus, both prior to and beyond the universalism of religion, the differentiation of nations is recognized, and thus the necessity of an international order to regulate their relations. But the nation is of a social nature, immediate and natural like the family, while international institutions are of a political nature, and thus subject to the phenomena of conflict and destruction. Thus Qadhdhafi's ideological critique emerges to demystify the modification of the natural order, both from the political and economic point of view.

From the political standpoint, he denounces representative elections and referenda validating the insidious dictatorship of parties ("the tribes and sects of the contemporary wold", "Green Book," I, p 33). From the economic point of view, he denounces the profit motive, which going beyond the legitimate satisfaction of needs entails a private accumulation of capital.

Now the brutal or insidious dictatorship of parties, just like slavery to money, is contrary to the state of nature and to natural law. Qadhdhafi's theory at this point intermixes anthropological and tneological elements.

"As man is everywhere the same, so his morphology and instincts are everywhere the same...natural law (natural order) has become the logical law of man," (ibid., p 69) and religious law, "religion, absorbs custom (tradition, the natural order), which is the expression of the natural life of the people. So then religion is the confirmation of natural law" (Ibid., p 74) and reflects the natural state of primordial religion.

Now in this state of nature, every man is both free and aware of his responsibilities to himself (his own welfare) and to others. Neither encroaches on the other. This is why Muslim religious law (the Koranic revelation), sure of the dignity of man, of his capacity for managing his own affairs, decrees so few material penalties (only those indispensable to the protection of life in society; the others postponed to the day of the Last Judgment) and provides so many recommendations and guidelines intended to guide man toward the good. "The law is the criterion for distinguishing the just from the unjust, the true from the false, as well as the rights of individuals and their duties," ("Green Book," I, p 71-73). And this is because the law refers back to and confirms that state of nature in which humanity lived in the first days of creation, which explains why unlike other religions Islam is much less a coercive normative system than a "system of definitions and purification." In any case, the relationships between natural law and religious law are very different from those offered by Christianity. According to Saint Thomas Aquinas who provided one of the most complete eleborations, it is quite the opposite: it is divine law from which, by rigorous deduction, natural law is derived; and then the laws effectively applicable in and between human societies are in turn derived, by induction and accommodation with the practical law decreed by sovereigns, from natural law.

Such a theory would doubtless seem dangerous to Qadhdhafi, for the exacerbation of the phenomenon of nationalism could exploit and degrade formulations of religious law. Thus the system undoes itself. Thus Jews and Christians at various times have distorted the Scriptures ("Youth," p 39) and have used them to pursue an aggressive nationalism. Thus new "ideologues" such as Mao or Lenin ("Religion and Nationalism," p 21) or technology ("Youth," p 31) can arise which, if not kept in bounds, lead to the work of Satan: atomic weapons, intercontinental missiles (ibid, p 15). The works of Satan culminate in the usurpation and exploitation of the wealth of other peoples: it is the ultimate negation of human dignity and equality.

From this conception of the state of nature, Qadhdhafi rigorously deduces the strategic consequences. The struggle against dictatorial government should not be carried out on a class against class basis. For if it were victorious, it would inherit the contradictions of the society, would fragment and reproduce the same class oppositions ("Green Book," I, p 41).

There remains then propulsion of the whole of society by means of violence and legitimate revolution, but this cannot be carried out without running the risk that the active individuals and minorities involved in the struggle may in turn fall into despotism and bureaucracy. Similarly, in foreign policy, positive neutralism must be respected by all nations, but it must also maintain special vigilance toward those which appear to give signs of aggressive nationalism: in other words signs of a tendency to imperialism and exploitation of others.

These strategic principles do not bar condemnation of any Realpolitick, whether it derive from the unbridled natural order or from religious law. For the believer, fear of God obliges respect of others, and respect for promises made. For other policies, this respect only derives from fear of reprisals, which entails the concept of a policy motivated solely by the play of antagonistic social forces, a game which can only favor the success of the great imperialistic powers ("Youth," p 37-38).

Consequently, for and by virtue of Islam, of course, but also out of concern for "natural" humanity, between men and peoples, Qadhdhafi reacts against what he believes he sees in worlds external to him, and which appear to him to be contrary to human nature and to the social state of nature: the hedonistic materialism of western capitalism leading the lost soul from solitude to moral disorder, to the taking of narcotics, to suicide, and which forces him to break the law to achieve safety in numbers (labor organizations); the brutal idolatry of the state found in communism, which reduces man, the slave of the governmental apparatus, to violating the law to survive ("Youth," p 48 and 53-54).

So, as between capitalism and communism, while humanity undergoes "the passage from the era of republics to the era of the masses," (Green Book," I, 22), and while John Paul II--though reaffirming dogma--preaches a Christian humanism that goes beyond Catholicism, Muammar Qadhdhafi offers a "third international path," which calls for the formation of a society of affiliated socialist producers, organized in economic terms on the basis of limiting private property to the enjoyment of only those goods that are indispensable to human life; replacement of wage-earning, the sale of manpower (which remains a form of slavery in spite of all social measures) by participation in the fruits of production in proportion to his contribution to one of the three major factors of production (raw materials, means of production-energy, labor); reduction of savings to individual nonconsumption; and rejection of money as an instrument of capitalization and exploitation. In political terms, it would be organzied on the basis of a combination of congresses (to deliberate) and people's committees (to implement) in neighborhoods and industries, eliminating the apparatus of government and administrative fortresses; unique occupational problems being resolved by specialized trade unions. For real democracy consists not in some particular governmental or electoral procedure but in the fact that the entire group is responsible for itself and has become its own proctor. ("Green Book," I, pp 75-76). The press, the mass media, must therefore remain the general expression of the people's will, and the media in turn must make the society transparent to itself, must be the instruments for the conscious autonomy of the masses (Jamahiriya).

This economic and political theory, perhaps more communitarian, interdependence-oriented and populist than socialistic in the strict sense, coexists with the determination to secure autonomy and the personalization of daily life. Every family should own its own house, a means of transportation: the accumulation, thus the concentration, of its wealth would establish dominance relationship between individuals, which would be contrary to human freedom. Similarly, natural dignity demands the end of the status of "domestic help" and its replacement by that of a wage-earner specializing in the general chores of maintenance and cleaning.

Carried to its logical conclusion, beyond the collectivist system of production which produces a surplus of wealth, a system of self-sufficient farms should be superposed, permitting the family to live, not in strict autarky, but out of range of the sudden surges and abatements in the supply system that is more or less connected with the international market. The structure induced by this system no longer presupposes the big patriarchal family, but a sort of paternal nuclear family.

Thus we see the concerns which are also coming to light in a number of Arab countries: the determination, by means of family cells intermediate between the traditional family and the conjugal family of the West, to stabilize on the land a demographic fabric that will not ineluctably drain off toward the urban coastal areas, one which is capable of resisting the avatars of industrial development and the vagaries of world prices.

For a population such as Libya's, the major part of which lived in a nomadic state, such prospects refer less to the idea of a "return to the land" than to the transposition of the old natural order: human nature in the family context, physical nature still close to the rhythms of the seasons and the crops which, beyond the banks of the Syrtes, were still confined to oases. The development of the land beyond Benghazi is significant in that regard.

In this theory, various elements appear. Some arise from the Arab-Muslim formulations of socialism and neutralism, and from the concern of rulers to channel the demographic growth perceived as an expansion of the Muslim community and as strategic offensive factor in the re-establishment of global economic balance, in a new distribution of wealth. Others arise from the traditional sociopolitical ethos of the Muslim city: the regulation of community life by all of its members, evoking the theory of the hisba by virtue of which order and morality rest on the every individual's vigilance. Affirmation of its oneness and rejection or elision of divisions into classes and sects, an affirmation which even penetrates into economic specialization: the division of labor being recognized as indispensable but of only technical significance, secondary to the participation of each individual in production, and its permeation of the two ultimate "natural"institutions: the family, where the duties of each member are traditionally ascribed, and the nation. Nostalgia for a better past where a society in equilibrium remained true to itself, in a state of cultural and historic splendor, while at the same time attending to individual needs, but also the determination through collective effort to transpose that splendor and equilibrium to the modern world.

To do this, Qadhdhafi sketches out a philosophy of history and a dialectic of good and evil and bases his pragmatic revolutionary struggle against any abuses of power on concepts he derives from Koranic anthropology: a natural differentiation not

by class but by peoples, a differentiation harmonized by a guiding, natural and universal law which was formalized by the Revelation of the Hegira. The religious reference reveals his intent to build a theory adapted to our times, not as a new humanistic philosophy--thus a changeable one, subject to national contingencies--but on a permanent, unique, and eternal truth: that natural law which Islam has embraced, which the Revelation has confirmed and certified for the faithful, but which in its origins transcends the historically Islamized peoples and has value for all humanity divided into its various peoples.

Thus one can see the originality of Qadhdhafi's intellectual journey. Far from re-creating by logic a state of nature from which the existing social order would derive through improvement or deterioration, he searches within law which appeared subsequently, at a historically known and definite moment, the elements of that state of nature, and tries to offer a transposition adapted to our time.

By his religious orientation Qadhdhafi wants to re-establish the primal innocence of human realtions, a conscious society where relations will be determined not by constraint but by self-regulation of behavior and harmonious satisfaction of needs, a society in which man, happy in the bosom of his family, his country, and his culture, having an internalized ethos and his external needs satisfied, will finally attain happiness. In this attempt perhaps lies the most original contribution of his thought; in any case it is the most respectable.

Of course, methodologically and philosophically, many questions arise.

From the theological point of view, it would be necessary to explore more deeply the previous theories relative to the realtionships between natural law and religion and to examine them in light of current historical, exegetical and ethnological knowledge.

From a historical standpoint, it would be necessary to diversify interpretive systems: to assimilate the conflict between North and South Yemen to a religious conflict between Zeidites and Chafeites; to portray the conflict between Syria, which still bears the imprint of the Ommeyyades, and Iraq, which still bears that of the Abbassides, as essentially a national one; or even to describe as religious in nature India's partition in 1947 and as national that of Pakistan from Bangladesh in 1971, is too schematic to be credible.

From the anthropological point of view, it would be necessary to try to determine whether social frameworks other than the people or the tribe--tribe currently suffering from a pejorative connotation and being transposed into the notion of nation, a modern meliorative notion: the danger of anachronism is great. And it would also be necessary to see whether anthropologies arising from other systems of civilization--by the differentiated status of the productive forces, and by contemporary social and cultural stratifications--could easily be correlated with the natural state-primordial religion which is supposed to be transposed into its own society under existing conditions.

From a comparative point of view, it can be noted that the manner in which the "Green Book" perceives the values and structures of the West is the way in which they are represented by the media, with no profound vision of their revolution. It would also

be necessary to try to determine to what degree contemporary examples have influenced the doctrines of the "Green Book," validated at the same time by efforts to correlate them with other Islamic parallels. From the political point of view, still others are posed:

1. the problem of knowing whether the nation, the people, constitute a relevant structure in relation to the predictable evolution of the international community, which is increasingly hemmed in by economic interdependence and by the aspirations of the masses for higher standards of living;

2. the problem of the relationships, in ideology, in culture, and in international law, between the Arab nation as an entity and the various Arab states and regions. From a doctrinal point of view, the "third international path" postulates the withering away of the "apparatus of government"--but history continues to confirm the tendency for bureaucracy to be re-established. Especially since (this is corollary to the withering away of the state) the withering away of the law cannot be applied to religious law itself. Here we are enmeshed in complex theological, juridical, ethical, and psychological problems.

From the sociological and cultural point of view, it would be necessary to determine the consequences of expanded education and the psychological and economic changes produced in feminine psychology by the expansion of the female work force in the production system and women's possession of independent incomes, in order better to estimate the relevance of the proposed family structure.

From the economic point of view, finally, it would be necessary to determine the conditions for participation described as "natural" but which in practice runs up against the complexities of technological, financial, banking, and fiscal systems, against fluctuations and dominating positions in international trade, etc.

But basically questions of method and erudition remain peripheral to the grand design--to Qadhdhafi's great religious, political, and strategic challenge to imperialism and materialism: his formulation--and carrying into action by his faith--of a theory which legitimates his actions and can be a model, hope, and inspiration for all peoples ("Presentation at the De-Gaulle-Nasser Colloquium," Benghazi, 1975). Right from the start, the anthropological assertion of the preexistence (historically, not spiritually of course) of the nation before religion enables him to justify the fact that all Arabs, whether Muslim or Christian, "are putting their effort into Arab nationalist movements," ("Religion and Nationalism," p 19) and his passionate desire to create a nation that would transcend Libya, a nation with a coherent and complete social structure, through his unions with Tunisia, Egypt, and now Syria, in order to marshal against petro-dollars the historical alliance of the middle class and intellectuals in those countries which alone could make possible the organizing of a political structure (the neo-Hegelian dream) worthy of the name...We know what that was.

This similarly explains that push toward sub-Sahara, toward that Sahelian zone where once extended great black Muslim warrior empires, where today deposits of uranium are beginning to be exploited, and behind which both Algeria and Egypt are also hovering. This also explains the missionary assistance and cultural bureaus, the efforts at political action in Uganda, in Central Africa, the recognition of the POLISARIO and the successful establishment in Chad, a step by step advance into the

center of Africa. This also explains why this Islamic-Christian dialogue may be in part intended to counter-balance Soviet support. This also explains his reinterpretation of Islam in a simple style and on the basis of a few simple notions, doubtless sincere but also having geopolitical implications, an interpretation which sometimes puts him at odds with traditional theologians, with the aim of capturing the support of the Arab and African masses, and to catch the over-westernized intellectuals and the middle classes that are overly concerned with their standard of living.

This explains this short "Green Book' which is intended to play the role of those short and forceful texts which made their influence felt over more than half of humanity: the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" and the little "Red Book"...And this explains what he has done over the last few months, at Benghazi, Madrid, Paris,... mixing faith and propaganda, Macchiavellian strategy and the hope--perhaps utopian--of a new humanity, and along with practical politics*, those many meetings with intellectuals from East and West to consolidate the conceptual eleboration and the international endorsement of the "Green Book."

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*On the geopolitical and geostrategic implications, cf. our studies: "The Islamic-Christian Dialogue: An Essay in Psycho-Strategic Interpretation: in POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, 1976, No 3, p 219; and "Geopolitical Dreams and Realities in Middle Africa," STRATEGIQUE, Third Quarter, 1980, No 7, p 7.

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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FOREIGN MINISTER DETAILS AFGHAN FOREIGN POLICY

Moscow INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS in English No 7, Jul 81 pp 13-19

[Article by Shah Mohammad Dost, Member of the PDPA Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs]

[Text]

The April National Democratic Revolution of 1978 ushered in a new and fundamentally important era in the history of Afghanistan, in its domestic policy, primarily in the socio-economic sphere. It also constituted an extremely important shift in the country's foreign policy. In terms of its class and social orientation, this policy has become an instrument for attaining the lofty goals of the revolution. It has truly become a policy reflecting the people's vital interests on the international scene. Democratic Afghanistan's foreign policy is a consistent policy of peace and resolute defence of the people's national interests.

In steering the government's foreign policy, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) is guided by the well-known principles formulated by Lenin who said that the policies of any state, including its foreign policy, of course, are determined by the socio-economic nature of that state and reflect its class interests. This approach to our foreign policy clarifies the difference between current activities and the policies pursued by the anti-popular regimes of the past. The semi-feudal economy which prevailed in Afghanistan is being replaced by the economy of a national democratic state, which is called upon to serve the interests of the broad working masses. It should be emphasized that this greatly expands and consolidates the socio-class basis of our foreign policy and ensures massive popular support.

Another important feature of our foreign policy is that it has added a new dimension to our relations with the countries of the socialist community, the Soviet Union in particular. We regard the continued consolidation and development of these relations as a major political objective, realizing that it meets the national interests of the people and helps consolidate their independence, and the sovereignty and international positions of the republic.

The qualitatively new features of the country's foreign policy have organic ties with the general democratic principles which it upheld in the past: its commitment to active struggle against imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, and consistent and unreserved support for the struggle of peoples for their freedom and independence. Lastly, they

concern the republic's profound commitment to the policy of non-alignment which plays a vital role in the struggle against the aggressive designs of imperialist and hegemonistic forces. Our country has supported and continues to support the non-alignment movement for its anti-imperialist nature and believes this to be its major source of strength.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan regards the principle of peaceful coexistence and the policy based on this principle as vital not only for the country but for mankind as a whole. Nobody will deny that there is no reasonable alternative to peaceful coexistence. It is on the basis of this principle that the country endeavours to develop its ties with all other nations.

The April Revolution has done much to help translate these general democratic principles into action, in other words, Afghanistan's foreign policy now meets the interests of the workers and retains the most democratic traditions of the past policies of our state. By this we mean our unflagging determination to maintain and develop our ties with adjacent states in the spirit of good-neighbourliness. These traditions can doubtlessly play a beneficial role in this respect.

This is an outline of the fundamental principles which determine the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan born of the April Revolution.

History shows, and Afghanistan is yet another illustration of this, that every revolution which is truly popular and affects the social foundations of the state generates opposition among reactionaries. This also applies to our country, where reactionary forces have tried and are still trying to hamper the development of the April Revolution. However, this is only one side of the coin, the other being that external reactionary, imperialist and hegemonistic forces have joined the fight against the revolution and seek, in alliance with internal reaction, to turn the clock back and destroy our revolutionary gains.

This has created a special situation characterized by a state of actual, though undeclared, war against the Afghan revolution, which was unleashed by external imperialist quarters, in violation of the generally recognized norms of international law and in tacit agreement with the Peking hegemonists. At the same time, an anti-Afghan campaign, unprecedented in scale and mendacity, has been launched, whose architects and instigators attempted to undermine the revolution. There is irrefutable evidence that the "Afghan issue" was created not by the popular revolution, but by the attempts of external imperialist forces to strangle the revolution through overt interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign Afghan state. This fundamental fact is indispensable for an objective explanation of international developments that centre around our country.

For almost three years Afghanistan has been in the epicentre of world politics, if such a term can be considered appropriate. Imperialist statesmen and politicians and the bourgeois press are making the most of the "Afghan problem", trying to turn it into a regional as well as an international crisis. But anyone with a modicum of objectivity will realize that our revolution did not and could not cause any international problems because it was a revolution by the Afghan people, in the interests of the Afghan people. This revolution did not and could not affect the interests of our neighbours, nor of any other states, no matter how close to us.

Therefore, the absurd attempts to connect in any way the popular revolution in our country with the worsening of the international situation in our region are completely unfounded.

But for the undisguised attempts, in flagrant violation of international law, to deprive the Afghan people of their right to be the masters of their own country, no "Afghan issue" would have emerged. It was devised by the forces of reaction, imperialism and hegemonism who considered the sovereign choice of the people a menace to their mercenary interests.

That is why they have formed a united front against our revolution, their major objectives being interference in our internal affairs, the organizing the dispatching of armed bands to the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afganistan, and the arming and training of various counterrevolutionary forces in a futile attempt to check the natural course of events in Afghanistan.

One of the principal aims of these forces has been to undermine our republic's international positions and to discredit it internationally. That is the reason why the "Afghan issue" has been repeatedly and artificially inflated at various international forums, including the United Nations. The initiators of those notorious campaigns failed to attain their goals; they could not check the profound revolutionary and democratic transformation, nor could they undermine the republic's international prestige.

However, the nature of imperialism and reaction is such that they are unable to draw the right conclusions from their failures. On the contrary, they persist in their attitude, thereby worsening their own positions. That is why we still have to constantly confront their plans to destabilize the situation in Afghanistan, to expand the scale and diversify the forms of their interference in our internal affairs. At the same time, Afghanistan's enemies are trying to discredit the peaceful and independent foreign policy of the DRA, which has been and is today deeply rooted in the principles of non-alignment.

The enemies of the Afghan revolution and of the people of Afghanistan resort to various devious ruses, a major one being their attempts to completely distort the essence of our relations with the socialist countries, the Soviet Union in particular. No one in our country has tried to conceal the fact that we regard the relations with the Soviet Union, which are based on the principles of the respect for equality, independence and national sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, on the principles of comradely mutual aid and international solidarity, as a major precondition for the successful development of our independence and the consolidation of our state's international positions. Our history has convinced us that the Soviet Union is not only a good neighbour but also a true and reliable friend. Our countries are linked by long-standing ties of friendship, initiated by the great Lenin. And it was only natural that after the April Revolution these relations should continue to develop fruitfully and acquire a new and more profound dimension, thus meeting the interests of the two peoples and logically and historically reflecting the natural course of events.

In March 1981, Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of the DRA, stressed that "the great friendship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan has deep and traditional roots.... At present, this traditional friendship has been elevated to a higher qualitative level, to fraternal relations, revolutionary solidarity and comprehensive cooperation".

Political, economic, scientific and technical, commercial, cultural and other ties between our states have been successfully developing over a long period of time. The Soviet Union continues to render all-round support and assistance to our country in various fields, doing this without any ulterior motives and on a just and mutually acceptable basis.

The legal basis of these relations is the Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighbourliness and Cooperation of December 5, 1978, which has become an important milestone in Afghanistan's history. The Treaty is of special significance to us because it reliably serves the national interests. It is on the basis of this treaty that the Soviet Union renders extensive economic, and moral and political support to the just cause of our popular and democratic revolution. When the internal and external reactionaries became especially active and began resorting to direct armed intervention to overthrow the people's democratic regime, the Soviet Union sent a limited military contingent to Afghanistan at the request of our government, with the sole objective of helping the Afghan people and their armed forces repulse the external armed aggression and defend the country's independence and sovereignty.

The legitimacy of this act arises not only from the sovereign rights of Afghanistan and the treaty between our two countries, but from the generally recognized norms of international law, the UN Charter in particular. The right to self-defence, the right to appeal to friendly countries for help, is a self-evident right, and is recognized by all nations. However, in our case the imperialist and reactionary press, the Peking hegemonists and certain other quarters, who are either badly informed or completely ignorant of the situation in our country, have launched a strident campaign against both Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. They employed the so-called Afghan issue as a convenient pretext for aggravating the international situation and undermining detente.

However, as is well known, the heart of the matter is not the presence of the limited contingent of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but continuing acts of aggression and subversion against the people and government of our country. As was emphasized in the statement by the DRA and the USSR, signed in Moscow on October 16, 1980, the dates of the withdrawal of the limited Soviet military contingent from Afghanistan "can be considered in the context of a political settlement and not before the aggression against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has completely ceased and guarantees have been given that subversive activities from abroad against the Afghan people and their government will not be resumed".

At the 26th Congress of the CPSU, the Soviet Union once again unambiguously explained its stand on the issue. "As for the Soviet military contingent," said Leonid Brezhnev, "we will be prepared to withdraw it with the agreement of the Afghan government. Before this is done, the infiltration of counter-revolutionary gangs into Afghanistan must be completely stopped. This must be secured in accords between Afghanistan and its neighbours. Dependable guarantees are required that there will be no new intervention. Such is the fundamental position of the Soviet Union, and we adhere to it firmly."

The Soviet proposals concerning the normalization of the situation in the Persian Gulf area have generated interest all over the world. It is no secret, however, that the West has given a negative response to the Soviet proposals aimed at normalizing the situation which has emerged and become explosive due to the direct US interference and the military presence of the USA and its allies in the Persian Gulf. They are trying to link their naval build-up to the presence of the Soviet military con-

tingent in Afghanistan, though no such link does or can exist, in view of the fact that the US military build-up in the region started long before the limited contingent of Soviet troops was sent into Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union, in accordance with its consistent and constructive policy, stated that it was prepared to conduct talks on the Persian Gulf as a separate problem and that it was ready to participate in a separate settlement of the situation that had developed around Afghanistan. At the same time the Soviet government also confirmed that it did not object to discussing the problems related to Afghanistan together with the problems of security in the Persian Gulf, emphasizing that only the international aspects of the problem, and no internal affairs of Afghanistan, could be discussed. Afghanistan's sovereignty as well as its status as a non-aligned country must be fully protected.

The Afghan people and their government fully share this approach, believing it to be principled, just and realistic and in tune with the interests of universal peace and security in the Persian Gulf area. Such an approach is entirely in the national interests of the Afghan people, as it protects their sovereignty unreservedly.

The Afghan government is of the opinion that the withdrawal of the US naval force from the Persian Gulf and the dismantling of the US military bases in the region, as well as the cessation of intensified foreign military penetration of the Middle East will result in a radically improved situation in the region and will have a beneficial effect on the international situation in general.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan attaches special significance to the non-alignment movement to which it belongs. Pursuing its policy of non-alignment, our country, together with the other progressive members of the movement, is taking consistent and vigorous efforts to consolidate international peace and security, to solve the problem of disarmament so vital for the whole of mankind, to establish zones of peace and to dismantle foreign military bases and to put an end to various attempts at interference in the internal affairs of other states, and to establish a new economic order based on just and democratic principles. We have always backed every new step taken to solve these problems and, are doing everything in our power for their solutions.

Nevertheless, although we regard the non-alignment movement as a powerful and positive factor in current international relations capable of exerting considerable influence on the development of world politics, we are aware of its heterogeneity and of the frequent and significant differences of approaches of its members to specific problems. We also have to take into account the fact that individual member-countries of the movement fall, wittingly or unwittingly, under the influence of certain Western powers.

Our country advocates broad unity within the non-alignment movement on the basis of unremitting struggle against imperialism. It was this basis which became the starting point for the movement, and adherence to it has made the movement strong and effective. The movement has acquired great international prestige because of its anti-imperialist nature, and it can maintain and consolidate this prestige only through a consistent anti-imperialist policy. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been pursuing this course within the movement and is proud of its contribution to the development of the movement's anti-imperialist nature.

Our country, which gained its freedom and independence after a hard and protracted struggle against colonialism, has always taken the side of peoples fighting for their national liberation. The victories of the national liberation movement strengthen the foundations of international peace and security by eradicating sources of potential conflicts. Life has shown that imperialists and reactionaries have used and continue to use the struggle of the peoples for their freedom as a pretext for fanning up the flames of international conflicts. Moreover, a concept has been advanced in the USA recently which essentially outlaws the national liberation movement and equates it with international terrorism.

We are resolutely opposed to such a concept and express our complete solidarity with and support for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America who are fighting against imperialist, colonialist and neocolonialist exploitation. The Afghan people and their government resolutely support the struggle of the fraternal Arab peoples against Israeli aggression and occupation. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan unreservedly advocates the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from all occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine, their right to national statehood in particular. We denounce in no uncertain terms the separate Camp David deals and the Egyptian-Israeli "treaty", which is essentially a betrayal of the interests of the Arab peoples and is impeding the peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem. We also express our solidarity with the people of South Africa who are opposing the inhuman regime of apartheid, and with the people of Namibia struggling against the occupation of their country by the Pretoria regime and demanding independence. Out country supports the valiant struggle of the peoples of El Salvador, Chile and Bolivia suffering under the domination of reactionary fascist and militarist cliques. Both in the UN and at other international forums, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan strictly adheres to its fundamental policy of support for the struggle of peoples for their liberation.

In conducting its foreign policy, our country attaches great importance to the gamut of problems related to our ties with the neighbouring countries, Pakistan and Iran in particular. For many centuries, the peoples of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan have maintained traditional economic and cultural ties and their histories have much in common. In point of fact, there did not and do not exist any objective reasons dividing them, let alone provoking any hostility among them. They have every reason to live in peace, friendship and harmony. It is only the imperialist circles, guided by the old imperial precept of "divide and rule", that are interested in creating friction and conflicts among them.

Our country expresses its solidarity with the fraternal people of Pakistan who are fighting for democracy and social progress, and with the people of Iran defending their independence and sovereignty against the assaults of American imperialism which has still not abandoned its attempts to bring the Iranians to their knees. We advocate the development of our relations with these countries on the basis of the generally recognized norms of international law.

However, it is no secret that after the April Revolution the forces of international imperialism and reaction and the Peking hegemonists started to use the territories of these countries as their base for subversive activities against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This of course seriously impaired relations between Afghanistan and these countries. In fact, no sovereign state will tolerate the infiltration from the territory of its neighbours of gangs of murderers that terrorize, kill, set

fire to schools and hospitals, and destroy the property of citizens, their principal objective being the overthrow of a regime installed by a popular revolution. The world is well aware of these subversive activities. The relevant facts were published by our government and brought to the knowledge of the United Nations.

Nevertheless, these activities still continue. Moreover, President Reagan stated officially that his administration will render military assistance to these bandits by supplying arms and helping train them, etc. This statement can only be viewed as another manifestation of flagrant US interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. The USA had earlier been the principal instigator of subversive activities against our country. It used every means possible and impossible to aggravate the situation which had developed around Afghanistan. The facts show that the new administration is no less active in this regard. Such a policy is fraught with grave consequences.

The military regime in Pakistan will not shirk its responsibility for acting against the wishes of the people and providing the country's territory for the organization of such acts of subversion perpetrated by mercenaries and counter-revolutionaries.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has repeatedly stated its readiness and sincere desire to maintain normal and friendly relations with its neighbours. On May 14, 1980, it put forth wide-ranging constructive proposals on a political settlement of the situation centering around Afghanistan and the normalization of its relations with Pakistan and Iran. Those proposals, as is known, have generated wide international interest. The world regarded them as a reasonable and acceptable basis for the solution of the existing problems. Regrettably, the other parties failed to respond. Subsequent developments showed that our proposals retained their topicality. It follows that, as in the past, it is up to the other parties to respond.

The processes taking place in Afghanistan, particularly after the new stage of the April Revolution, are convincing proof of the growing support for the understanding that the popular power enjoys among the broad working masses and the country's population in general. A most telling example is the creation of a national patriotic front which will represent all strata of the population: trade-union members, democratic youth and women, and patriotic employees. The bodies of people's power are growing stronger, the economy is developing, the agrarian reforms and law and order are making headway, great progress has been made in the field of education, etc. This is irrefutable testimony to the irreversible nature of the revolutionary transformations in Afghanistan. This should be realized by the enemies of our revolution. The April Revolution, designed to build a new society, liquidate all vestiges of feudalism, carry out radical transformations in the interests of the workers and develop the national economy and culture and raise the people's well-being, is advancing successfully, despite the incessant attacks by its foes—imperialism, hegemonism and international reaction.

In his telegram addressed to the leaders of the Soviet Union on the occasion of the April Revolution's third anniversary, Babrak Karmal pointed out that "the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Revolutionary Council and the government of the Democratic Republic of

Afghanistan are pursuing and are determined in the future to firmly pursue in the international arena the positive policy of a peaceful non-aligned state, and resolutely come out for a political solution of the situation which has developed around Afghanistan as a result of conspiracies by the enemies of the April Revolution and the acts of aggression and overt interference by imperialism, hegemonism and reaction and their lackeys, and for a lasting peace and security in our region, in Asia and throughout the world".

At a time when our people were fighting for their freedom and independence, against British colonizers, Engels wrote that the Afghans were a brave, energetic and freedom-loving people. Today, when the Afghan people have become free—free to build their lives on a truly democratic basis, having obliterated the grim age-old legacy of the past, there must be no doubt that they will be capable of defending their freedom. And our foreign policy serves this noble goal.

CSO: 4600/135

WAR SEEN BLOCKING SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Havana VERDE OLIVO in Spanish 5 Jul 81 p 19

[Report on interview with Afghan Minister of Mines and Industries Esma'il Danesh by Armando Lopez Rivera: "Afghanistan Moves Forward"; date and place not specified]

[Text] "Agrarian reform, the struggle against illiteracy, and an increase in the living level of the people are some of the most important aspects of the revolutionary process in Afghanistan," stated Esma'il Danesh, minister of mines and industries, member of the Central Committee of the PDPA [Afghanistan People's Democratic Party] and of the Revolutionary Council of the Afghanistan Democratic Republic.

The Afghani official explained that the movement begun in his country on 27 April 1978 is a national-democratic, anti-imperialist, and antifeudal revolution which is advancing toward the building of socialism. He stated, "It is true that we do not have the material and technical bases for such a construction effort, but we will create them. It is also necessary to take into account the concrete conditions in our country, its history, the people's traditions, their beliefs and habits."

In answering a question on the prospects for his country and internationalist solidarity with the Afghan people he said: "Our country is rich in natural resources, and the people (there are almost 20 million inhabitants) are very hard-working and talented. We receive the support of all of the revolutionary forces of the world, especially that of the Soviet Union. Help from the USSR is fundamental for the success of the Afghan revolution. Without it we could not have safeguarded and maintained the territorial independence of the country and frustrated the aims of imperialism and other reactionary forces.

"The United States and China," he added, "are trying to halt the progress of the Afghan revolution. Both want to make the revolutionary government disappear and install a feudal regime once again. However, thanks to the solidarity displayed by the USSR and other socialist countries, the moral and political support of the revolutionary forces of the world, and thanks to the heroic Afghan people, the plans of the counterrevolutionaries have not succeeded. The revolutionary government remains in power and has complete control of the country. Of course, our enemies continue working on their plans to frustrate the process, but final victory will be ours."

Danesh referred to the aggressiveness of the Reagan administration against Afghanistan and described how "the undeclared war has been turned into a declaration of war." He pointed out that, "from its beginnings the Afghani revolution has been confronted with the hatred of international reaction and of Chinese hegemonism. Before the accession of Ronald Reagan to power the United States was hiding its intrigues against our country and the help which it was providing to seditious groups. It tried to do this in secret. It did not announce its military and economic help to the counterrevolutionary bands. Nor did it say that it had established training camps in Pakistan and Iran from which it infiltrated the enemies of the revolution.

"However, Reagan has openly admitted that he is helping and will continue providing military and financial assistance to the counterrevolutionaries," he said. He affirmed that with Reagan in office world imperialism and Chinese hegemonism are more aggressive than ever, not only in Afghanistan but also in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. They are promoting the arms race and create obstacles to detente.

The Afghan minister of mines discussed some aspects of the socioeconomic changes which are being carried out in his country and stated that his government is giving special attention to the final stage of the agrarian reform, through the establishment of cooperatives, state farms, and the gradual mechanization of agriculture. The state sector of the economy is being strengthened, and an effort is being made to attract the middle class and domestic capitalists not connected with imperialism to participate in the industrialization of the country. A struggle is also being waged against the remnants of feudalism and for the liquidation of illiteracy, in order to create a new, revolutionary culture.

Finally, Danesh emphasized the importance of Soviet assistance in all sectors of national life: economic, military, technical, cultural, and social. "With Soviet aid," he said, "we have built factories, cattle farms, schools, and hospitals. Soviet doctors and nurses are taking care of the health of the Afghan people, and other specialists are contributing to the training of personnel in various technical areas."

5170
CSO: 4748/6

AFGHAN COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY BANDITS OPERATING IN IRAN

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in English 30 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] A great number of Afghan immigrants are living in Iran. Most of these immigrants are laborers who have been deceived by propaganda against the Afghan revolution and came to Iran, or who simply came to Iran in the past looking for work. Among them there are three counterrevolutionary groups operating at full force which were organized by imperialist spy organizations and international bands of smugglers and thieves.

Group One: These are counterrevolutionaries which play the role of imperialism's fifth column in Iran, and practically all of them "are active" under the cover of parties and "organizations that fugitive Afghan feudalists created on the orders of the CIA."

Group Two: These are smugglers who cooperate with the international smuggling network. This group, most of whom are nothing more than dupes, use the cover of so-called Afghan "rebel" parties. By the wide distribution of drugs in Iran they benefit the counterrevolution from the practical political standpoint, and also pour billions of dollars of profit into the pockets of international smuggling bands. These smugglers are involved in contraband ranging from cigarettes to drugs and weapons, and in reality they made up the main force of the smuggling bands.

Nowadays it is rare for news of the arrest of smugglers to be printed in the press and for those captured not to be Afghans.

According to a KEYHAN report, counterrevolutionary bands active among Afghan immigrants "stop at nothing, buying and selling drugs, smuggling various goods, committing theft, felony and rape, and in this way have created enormous difficulties for the people and officials." 12 April 1981

However, their basic activities fall into three categories: Carrying out the role of a fifth column for imperialism, various kinds of smuggling, the most important of which is drug smuggling, and large and small-scale theft. Each one of these activities often culminates in murder. A glance at the news of the past two months shows the extent of the activity of Afghan smugglers.

The KEYHAN newspaper reported on 1 March 1981 that a twelve-man band of Afghan smugglers, along with their leader, were arrested by the Revolution Guards in Esfahan. They had used a house in an area of Najafabad near Esfahan for their activities, operating under cover of a tailor shop. One kilogram of marijuana juice, several radios, a number of cassettes, cartridges, mens and womens wristwatches, and 355 grams of heroin which had been hidden underground, were discovered and confiscated.

Several days later: "Following all-out unremitting efforts by the Strike Force Guards of the Mashad Central Komiteh of the Islamic Revolution during the past several days, and after an armed clash with three professional Afghan smugglers with long records which took place in the border strip near Torbat-e Jam, the Guards succeeded in seizing the quantity of 11 kilograms of pure heroin and in arresting the smugglers and turning them over to the Revolution Headquarters in Mashad." KEYHAN 4 April 1981.

This news had not yet been completely broadcast when another Afghan smuggling band was trapped: "In a violent armed clash between officials of units Four and Eight of the Municipal Bureau of the Anti-Drug Crusade and a group of smugglers which took place on the Tayebad border, two of the smugglers were wounded and 14.52 kilograms of heroin were seized by officials. Six heroin smugglers with long records who were Afghans were also arrested."

Then it was the turn of an Afghan smuggling band in Kerman to be arrested: "Kerman - Officials of the Anti-Drug Crusade of the Kerman Municipal Police confiscated 11 kilograms of opium residue and 1.15 kilograms of hashish from seven Afghan smugglers." ETTELA'AT 13 April 1981

Then again a band of Afghan smugglers was arrested a few days later [sic] in Mashad: Mashad - According to the report of the News Section of the Mashad Revolution Guards, on the morning of 1 April 1981, 56.3 kilograms of opium was confiscated from several Afghan smugglers by the brother Guards of Tayebad with the cooperation of officials from the Gendarmarie Guardstation of Qare-ye Neh.

Furthermore the Khorasan Municipality Public Relations Office announced that 1,726.5 grams of hashish and heroin were seized from two smugglers in Mashad. One of the smugglers was an Afghan. ETTELA'AT 13 April 1981

Ultimately the extent of the activities of Afghan smugglers reached such a height that three Afghan smugglers were executed by firing squad in Esfahan.

Group Three: Most of them are Afghans who have come to Iran under the cover of being "Afghan rebels," and while spreading propaganda that they came to Iran in order to "Struggle" against the revolutionary government of Afghanistan, they are busy with highway robbery, theft and murder! These "strugglers" in reality are struggling against the people and revolution of Iran.

9557
CSO: 4665/7

MUJAHEDIN REGISTER MORE SUCCESSES AGAINST INVADERS

French, Italian Support

Karachi DAWN in English 9 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] WASHINGTON, Aug 9: Afghan guerillas have recently begun to "eliminate" supporters of the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal regime and have distributed a list of 30 such "targets", according to a US State Department report released here yesterday.

The report, entitled "Afghanistan: 18 Months of Occupation," said that "these assassinations of supporters of the Afghan regime starkly underline the danger of collaboration" with the Soviet-backed Government.

"Although the Mujahedeen (guerillas) cannot take and hold a major city, they have made life dangerous for Government supporters in all urban centres," the report said, noting that a religious leader and an Afghan General were killed by guerillas in Kabul last month.

The guerillas recently scored "important achievements" in their fight against "Soviet forces of occupation" and the Afghan Army, the report said, adding that Soviet forces had notably suffered a "serious defeat" last month in the Paghman mountains, just 15 km. (nine miles) northwest of Kabul.

"The Soviet authorities did not succeed in covering it up due to the heavy losses they sustained," the report added.

FREE RADIO

In Rome, a group of Italian and French intellectuals are preparing to leave Rome to begin a mission of setting up a mobile radio network in the service of Afghan guerilla forces battling the Soviet troops of occupation.

The idea of a Free Radio network for the Afghan guerillas originated with Henri Bernard Levy, one of the major figures among the new French philosophers, and was enthusiastically received by members of the Human Rights Committee, one of whom is Renzo Roccellini, President of the Italian movie studio Gaumont Itlia and Managing Director of Citta Futura. Citta Futura was one of the first privately-owned radio stations to begin broadcasting in Rome.

Also Rossellini is getting ready to go to Afghanistan. He said here, according to Italian news agency 'ANSA', that he intends to make the trip" to set up the first transmitters and get into contact with thier guerilla forces".

Rossellini confidently predicted that "Afghanistan Free Radio will be a reality within a month".

On another topic, the Italian filmaker said that "Soviet interference has been developed over the years at the political level and now military interference is being developed.

"One of these military instruments is provocation, association and infiltration and for this reason I am convinced that behind the terrorist phenomena in Italy there is the direct involvement of the Soviet Union", he said.

FIGHTING IN HERAT

Meanwhile, fierce fighting has been continuing in Herat Province for the last 20 days and the contending forces have suffered heavy losses.

In the bloody encounters the known commander of Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan, Abdul Aziz Khan, along with other 10 Mujahids was martyred. The losses caused to the other side could not be ascertained. According to latest reports, the freedom fighters conducted raids on Government

installations and points of strategic importance in Herat city and other places in the province even on the day of Eid-ul-Fitr.

According to the details of the encounters taking place in the second fortnight of July, the Mujahideen killed 10 rival soldiers and wounded another 20 in the fighting in Injeel sub-division on July 18 continuing for 12 long hours. One Mujahid was martyred and 6 others were injured.

The Jamiat-e-Islami guerillas were encircled at Aab-e-Sultan near Herat city The Mujahideen succeeded in breaking the siege and they escaped before reinforcement by a helicopter. Aab-e-Sultan was besieged and attempt was made to loot the wheat stores there which were set on fire by the residents. The locality was then shelled by helicopters and tanks as a result of which two girls were killed and a large number of people were wounded.

On July 21, Jamiat freedom-fighters launched a night attack on the police station of rani Gate in Herat and killed two persons including an officer. A soldier joined the Mujahideen and brought his Kalashinkov and a wireless set with him. The same day a nearby village of Herat Rabanandgan was attacked by the Government forces killing six people. The Mujahideen made a counter-attack and killed 21 persons and destroyed an armoured vehicle.

The Mujahideen waylaid a convoy moving on the Kabul-Herat road and captured a Soviet and Afghan officer who were later sentenced to death by an Islamic court.

On July 26, the Mujahideen's position in Sub-division Bakwah in Herat Province were shelled through helicopters. Six Mujahids were martyred. The Mujahideen shot down a helicopter at the place. On July 28, the Mujahideen destroyed a truck in the Lash Jeween sub-division of the province. Thirty people aboard were killed In the fire exchange, six Mujahids were wounded, who later expired.

On July 29, the police post of Kandahar Darwaza in Herat city was destroyed in an operation led by commander Fazal Ahmad. Three Afghan soldiers escaped while 18 were killed. A Parchami was captured and awarded the death sentence.—AFP/AAP.

Soviets Admit Losses

Karachi DAWN in English 10 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Aug 8: The Kabul correspondent of the leading Soviet daily 'Pravda' has admitted that Afghan Mujahideen have lately stepped up their "terrorist" activities in the south-west of the country. A prominent local politician Huja Malik was shot dead in Kindagon.

The daily claimed that several 'terrorist' groups have been surrounded and wiped out in the area.

Meanwhile, the Afghan Mujahideen are reported to have intensified their resistance against Russian and Karmal forces in Nangarhar, Badakhshan and Faryab provinces in spite of the fact that they are in combat with sophisticated weaponary their traditional bravery and courage are their best arms in the battle fields.

According to sources close to a prominent Afghan religious leader, Pir Syed Aale Muqtadir Gilani, the Mujahideen have inflicted heavy loss and casualties on the Russian invading forces and Karmal regime agents during different operations in Paktia, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces on Eid and the day after Eid.

In these ambush attacks the number in Paktia, Nangarhar and Kunar provinces on Eid and the day after Eid.

In these ambush attacks the number of casualties in these three places was estimated at over 150 troops which also included between twentyfive to thirty Russians, four heavy tanks and even number of mortars and thirty military transport vehicles. Russian made automatic rifles and sub-machine guns seized by the Mujahideen were numbered over a hundred.

The Mujahideen also attacked a military hospital established for the Russians in Badakhshan and at an armoury and ammunition centre in Ghazni.

The hospital and a power house were blown up while a major portion of the arms depot was destroyed. The Mujahideen also captured two military jeeps loaded with dozens of rifles highly powerful hand-grenades and weapons that are used in guerilla operations. The Mujahideen also seized alive fifty of the Russian advisers and Afghan soldiers.

Prominent Afghan leaders entering D. I. Khan through North and South Waziristan told 'PPI' that the intensified activities of the Mujahideen have caused further shrinkage of Karmal's administrative control over the urban areas of the country. They said that Mr Karmal's military convoy could not move in the night although they were using brutal tactics to crush guerilla activities.

Hill track residents in Afghanistan are bombarded by air and shelled by helicopters indiscriminately wherever they see guerilla activity.

They also use of gas bombs similar to napalm bombs and massacre of children and women in ambiguity it may be recalled that the Afghan refugees concentrations in D. I. Khan is highest after Peshawar.

CSO: 4600/144

PAPER COMMENTS ON OTTAWA SUMMIT'S INTERFERENCE

BK171631 Kabul NEW TIMES in English 30 Jul 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Attempts to Meddle in DRA's Internal Affairs Doomed to Failure"]

[Text] The statement issued the other day by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan denouncing the bid of the "seven" Western capitalist countries to interfere in the DRA's affairs was the expression of the right and firm stand and will of the party, government and people of Afghanistan to forge ahead with the progressive policy adopted for the good of the Afghan people.

The attempt of the imperialist countries headed by the United States of America to interfere in the internal affairs of the free and revolutionary Afghanistan is fanning up the intensity of the tension of the situation in our region.

The head of the seven Western states and governments which met in Ottawa some time ago made another attempt to exploit the world situation in their imperialist interest and thus get their political and economic designs implemented in different parts of the world.

In discussing world problems they expressed concern over the situation developing around Afghanistan and showed "sympathy" with the Afghans. This is in fact part of the scheming plot of the imperialists to prepare further ground for their intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan described the declaration of the seven capitalist Western countries to "support the international effort to restore to the Afghan people their rights to determine their own future" as an open and crude violation of the elementary norms of international law and the UN charter's basic principles.

The reference made in the final declaration of the summit of seven major Western countries was in effect the continuation of the policy of imperialist states adopted against the party, the government and people of Afghanistan ever since the victory of SAWR revolution staged by the majority of the toiling and industrious people of Afghanistan. Since then imperialists have made many attempts to flagrantly interfere in the internal affairs of the free and independent Afghanistan. These attempts are clearly aimed at toppling the rule of working class in Afghanistan and bringing back into power the feudal lords and exploitative elements to directly serve the interests of imperialists and colonialists.

It is almost 3 years that the imperialists, hegemonists and reactionary forces have been carrying out subversive activities and terroristic acts within the land of free Afghanistan killing the innocent people including children, women and old people. They want to sow discord among the people and create a gap between the party, government and the people of Afghanistan.

Upon assuming power President Ronald Reagan of the United States openly announced that his government would deliver arms and ammunition to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries contrary to the principles of the United Nations charter. Now the whole world fully realises that a large quantity of arms and deadly weapons are supplied to the Afghan counterrevolutionaries who make every effort to disrupt normal life inside the country and create panic among the people. A large quantity of these arms which have the markings of the manufacturing of U.S., Britain, Egypt, China and Pakistan have been captured now and then from the terrorists and bandits sent into Afghanistan and put on display for public attention.

These and many others are the clear manifestation of the attempts of the imperialist countries and world reaction to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. It was the flagrant violation of the principle of "noninterference in the internal affairs of other states" as guaranteed by charter of the United Nations, and the armed aggression from outside which made the legal government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan request its great northern neighbour, the Soviet Union, to send its limited military contingents to Afghanistan to safeguard the national independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the basis of the friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation treaty signed between the DRA and USSR.

The government of Afghanistan has been pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence with all countries especially its neighbours. To normalise its relations with Iran and Pakistan the DRA Government took peace initiatives more than 1 year ago on 14 May 1980 and invited the governments of Iran and Pakistan to have talks separately with DRA Government in a bid to solve and iron out their differences and lead a peaceful life side by side with one another. No positive response has been received to the proposal made by the DRA Government. On the contrary Pakistan is enormously arming itself with the U.S. weapons and continuing its efforts to send armed bandits and mercenaries into Afghanistan.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan still adheres to its peace initiatives and proposals to normalise relations with Iran and Pakistan but will never allow any other country to interfere in DRA's internal affairs and serve the interest of imperialism and colonialism in this part of the world.

CSO: 4600/140

NEW WAVE OF VIOLENCE IN KABUL

TA141548 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 14 Aug 81

[From: "Radio Newsreel"]

[Text] There are reports from Afghanistan which suggest a new wave of violence in the capital Kabul in the past few days. The reports from sources in Kabul which have proved reliable in the past say there has been a sudden rise in guerrilla activity resulting in a number of deaths. Satish Jacob in Delhi has been studying these latest accounts from Kabul:

[Begin Jacob recording] In the past 4 days as many as 20 people including an army brigadier and a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior has been assassinated. The brigadier was gunned down near his residence in the heart of the city on Sunday by two assailants who escaped in a taxi. The official who was in charge of political affairs in the Ministry of the Interior was shot and killed while driving home after work at a busy intersection. His assailants, too, escaped in a taxi. The sources said that Kabul had been more or less incident free, probably because both the opponents and supporters of the Soviet backed regime of President Babrak Karmal was busy with 'Id celebrations, the 'Id celebrations at the end of the holy month of Ramadan. But violence suddenly erupted after the Friday prayers last week. That evening, Muslim rebels attacked a party center in the army [word indistinct] of Khayrkhana, killing at least seven members of the party militia. Following these attacks, security in Kabul has been tightened and for the first time day patroling (?has been) introduced. There are guards posted everywhere who also carry out house searches. The sources said that guards were stopping especially young people in the street to check their identity cards. [End recording]

CSO: 4600/140

EX-OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON GOVERNORS COMPLAINTS

BK160956 Hong Kong AFP in English 0935 GMT 16 Aug 81

[Text] Islamabad, 16 Aug (AFP)--The majority of Afghanistan's 29 provincial governors admit that Muslim rebels predominate in their regions, according to a senior civil servant who has fled here.

Gulam Hussain Safi, the Western-educated 49-year-old director of the "Central Guiding Office for Local Government Authorities" was still at his post on 1 July.

He told how in June he attended a meeting of governors in Kabul and they complained bitterly of the feeble power given to them by the government.

Several of them told Mr Safi: "We have no money, and our budget allowances are on paper only and we never get anything. We cannot even pay the salaries of our police."

Mr Safi recalled that the governor of Parwan (northern Afghanistan) told the meeting, attended by three ministers and Soviet advisers, that "he could not contact Kabul even though he is only 63 kms (37 miles) away because the telephone had been cut by the rebels and he did not have a radio transmitter in working condition."

"He could not even visit local authorities in his province because the rebels held all the roads leading from his capital, Sharikar."

The governor of Baghlan Province also admitted that most of his roads were held by rebels, while the governor of Nimroz regretted that the one source of pure drinking water for his capital, Zaraj, was held by rebels.

Mr Safi said that the ministers replied: "All you have to do is to dig a new well."

The governor of Nimroz also compalined that the "ashrar" (rebels) were able to decode messages sent to him by the Kabul government.

The governor of Takar said that he had received permission to launch a mopping-up operation "but 5 days after our troops had left the region, the rebels had returned."

Salahuddin Otak, governor of the province of Konar which borders on Pakistan, was the most critical of the central government while at the same time requesting more Soviet troops.

"We have nothing--no arms, ammunition, money or personnel. Even for one pound of tea we have to get from Asadabad, capital of Konar, to the neighbouring capital of Jalalabad."

At the end of the meeting Colonel Sher Jan Mazduryar, transport minister, admitted there was insecurity on many roads.

But another minister told the governors that "revolutions always have these kinds of problems, which the imperialists try to exploit. We have only a limited budget and we can do nothing to help you. You ought to share some of our problems."

Mr Safi said that his office, which came directly under the prime minister, was created in June 1980 to reduce the powers of Interior Minister Sayyed Golabzoy, a member of the Khalq (people) faction of the Communist Party which is a rival of the Parcham (flag) faction led by President Babrak Karmal.

Mr Safi, a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley, said he would have been able to go on working under a Marxist regime but he could not stand for the "increasing domination of Soviet advisers."

He said: "Recently the deputy attorney-general of Kabul, Abdul Bashiq Wasiq, who is also head of the ruling Revolutionary Council's secretariat, threw a Soviet adviser out of his office because he had entered without knocking.

Two hours later Mr Wasiq was dismissed from both his posts."

CSO: 4600/140

KABUL SECURITY DISTRICTS ESTABLISHED AFTER ALERT

BK191245 Hong Kong AFP in English 0956 GMT 19 Aug 81

[Text] New Delhi, 19 Aug (AFP)--The Afghan capital has been divided into 11 distinct districts to effectively counter the increasing activities of Moslem rebels fighting the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal regime, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

Better municipal work was given as an official explanation for the division by the Kabul mayor, Adina Sangeen.

Each of the districts will have a security chief with an unspecified but substantial number of soldiers under his command. All but one district touches the center of the city which would make security measures easier, the sources here said.

The city witnessed a 5-day security alert beginning 11 August during which Afghan troops aided by ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) members searched houses, stopped vehicles and arrested a number of suspected rebels.

The arrest claim was prominently published in the state-owned NEW KABUL TIMES on 15 August. The newspaper said that the security forces had unearthed and neutralised a ring of antinational forces in the city. Observers here said that most of the arrested rebels belonged to the pro-Beijing Sama rebel group. City residents woke up on 11 August to see soldiers swarming over the streets, stopping vehicles and issuing commands through wireless fitted jeeps.

There were systematic searches of suspected neighbourhoods. The following day Kabul International Airport was closed for several hours.

The sources here, quoting diplomatic observers in Kabul said that the airport was closed as the authorities wanted no foreign overflight during the period.

The security alert gave rise to several rumours, one of which was that Afghan soldiers in a nearby army garrison had clashed with Soviet troops.

In spite of the security alert, the city continued to witness killings of pro-regime people. Eight members of the Kabul public prosecutors offices were shot dead during the period, and one or two known party members were also killed daily for three successive days beginning 11 August.

CSO: 4600/140

BRIEFS

TELEGRAMS FROM CASTRO, REDDY--Kabul, 19 Aug (BAKHTAR)--A congratulatory telegram on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of regaining of Afghanistan's independence by Fidel Castro, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, chairman of the State Council and head of the Cuban Government, addressed to Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of Revolutionary Council of the DRA, was received here. Expressing solidarity with the people of Afghanistan in their struggle in defence of their real reaction the telegram wishes further development of friendly relations between the DRA and the Republic of Cuba. A similar telegram has been received from Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, president of the Republic of India, in which hope is expressed for the continuation and development of existing relations between the peoples of our countries. [Text] [LD202150 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0418 GMT 20 Aug 81]

CSO: 4600/140

RAJAVI DISCUSSES SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN BBC INTERVIEW

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Aug 81 p 16

[Interview with Mas'ud Rajavi]

[Text] Question: Mr Rajavi, would you tell us at the suggestion of who or which organization did you leave Iran?

Answer: In the name of God and the heroic people of Iran, I submit that after it established widespread terror, Khomeyni's regime proved over the last two years that it cannot tolerate any opposition. The chimera has gone to his head that he is possibly God's chosen one. His far-reaching rule of terror could not as much as tolerate the distribution of leaflets and would not even relent in the case of 12-year-old children and pregnant women who had undemonstrated feelings against the regime. As we know President Bani-Sadr has issued me an order of appointment under which I have been given two responsibilities. One to organize the National Resistance Council, and second, as a next step, to set up a committee for administering the country. Particularly after the execution of our brother, Mohammad Reza Se'adati--who had been convicted to imprisonment but even that did not appease Khomeyni--the conclusion reached by the Resistance Council and the Mojahedin Organization was that they should get us temporarily out of the country for the sake of the security of the Resistance Council and of the two of us and also for the purpose of having the message of the oppression and rightfulness of the people of Iran heard by the world.

Question: Would your exit from the country not undermine your personal leadership and diminish the impact of the Mojahedin on the political events?

Answer: As we have no ambitious motives nor a claim to leadership, we believe that whatever is done in the service of the revolution and the movement would in fact make all our people happy and drive them forward. As you know our revolutionary bretheren and the populist personnel of the army, too, gave very valuable assistance in this respect. One of our secret members in the Army is Colonel Behzad Mo'ezi who is the most senior and outstanding Iranian pilot. According to a plan that we had prepared in advance, we arranged to bring Mr Bani-Sadr along, also, with Mo'ezi's own plane.

Question: The Iranian government charges that your organization has been responsible for the explosion at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party? What is your response?

Answer: I should say that the Iranian government is usually given to leveling various accusations against us. Khomeyni, like the Shah, calls us Islamic Marxists, spies, terrorists, anarchists, and the like. Recently, the Khomeyni government has even been mindless of the fact that one cannot be accused of spying for America and the Soviet Union at the same time. Perhaps tomorrow he will accuse us of being mercenaries for the French. These do not matter. What matters is the Iranian Revolution and our ideology which is Islam and which shall move on.

Question: Then, you deny that in connection with the said explosion you had.....

Answer: I must say that resistance is very widespread in Iran. As security considerations were prohibitive and as I was not in one place to be able to receive regular information, I have not had a report on this matter from my brothers. But I can tell you this much that all the acts of resistance are deeply rooted in popular support.

Question: Do you believe that Iran's political problems and difficulties could be solved by violence and explosions?

Answer: They cannot be solved in this way. In fact these are imposed on our people by Khomeyni's terrorism. It is the expression of our people's resistance to it..... Khomeyni has left no other outlet for this expression. As you know, the newspapers have been shut down and no parties except the government-appointed ones have the right to be active.

Question: Do you think that you can run the country better than the Islamic Republican Party does?

Answer: I have no such illusion. Since we do not wish to use dictatorial and anti-popular policies with the force of clubs and bullet rounds, we could at least perceive the problems of the people and try to work for their solutions, with the participation of the people themselves. I am sure our response would not include the use of clubs.

Question: Generally speaking, how would the government you have in mind be evaluated from the viewpoints of individual freedoms and economic policies?

Answer: Well, before Dr Bani-Sadr, the President, issued this order to me--as you know he stayed in my house in the heart of Tehran all the time--we had a long talk about what our desired government should be like. The sum total of these discussions and their conclusions have been expressed in the Covenant of Iran's Freedom and Independence which has been composed by himself and sponsored by us.

Question: Would you please tell us what role will the other parties have in Iran once you gain power?

Answer: We shall not have any political prisoners nor shall we execute anybody on political charges under any circumstances. As is called for in the spirit of Islam and as you have certainly heard and seen in the words of Ayatollah Taleqani, we shall aspire to the spirit of liberalism, brotherhood and goodness and work against all practices of censorship, oppression and unjust encounters.

Question: Would you please tell us what is your view of the religious leaders in general?

Answer: I must say that the Khomeyni regime tries, by willful misrepresentation, to pass as the exponent of the Iranian clergy. To us, this is not so at all. The gang of criminals whose hands are smeared with blood up to their elbow and who abet Khomeyni, is a very small minority among the majority of the clergy of Iran. The Iranian clergy have all been on the side of the disinherited and struggling people of Iran throughout the clerical history. The Iranian clerics have never brandished their clubs and knives on the people. That is why our relationships with the clergy is not all-embracing [sic]. Many of them are now in jail. Master 'Ali Tehrani, too, is now in prison. I have also heard it said that Hojjatoleslam Ashvari is in Evin Prison and his execution has reportedly been ordered. You know well the story of the late Father Ayatollah Taleqani. You know better than I do that Ayatollah 'Alami is in hiding. I am glad that the regime has not yet managed to catch these people. Like the question of the revolution and what Islam is, the question of the clergy is separate from Khomeyni's regime.

Question: Would you please state your view of the army and the revolutionary guards corps?

Answer: As our brother, Col Mo'ezi, one of the prominent examples of the military, showed, the army is full of populist and revolutionary persons. With a democratic spirit the military would really like to move toward liberty and independence. I am very happy about this. I must congratulate the Iranian people that many of their children in the army are capable of utmost valor. As regards the revolutionary guards corps, I am afraid it is composed of misled, uninformed and very low-level elements who have been deceived by Khomeyni and whose leadership is totally reactionary an anti-popular. As you know, this corps bears the responsibility of most of the tortures in prisons. I take this opportunity to warn them, particularly the administrators of the tortures, that the Iranian nation will settle with them unless they desist from their doings.

Question: You sound to be highly optimistic about the future. Would you please tell us the reason for your optimism?

Answer: The reason is that Dr Bani-Sadr and we and, basically speaking the progressive, democratic and truly devout and committed forces in Iran, collectively, form the near-majority, what seems to be over 80 percent of the population. You will see that Khomeyni's regime will not manage to continue its evil and anti-Islamic life for more than a while or at most a few months. Our people will certainly attain independence and freedom soon.

Question: One of the vague aspects of the Mojahedin's policy concerns the Soviet Union and the issue of the occupation of Afghanistan. The Mojahedin have never presented a clear and stable view so that many of your critics accuse you of being affiliated with the Soviets. What is your opinion about this?

Answer: This is another of those dubious charges. We only seek independence. Independence is not a mono-facted problem. I regret that our viewpoints on Afghanistan have not been made known to you. That has been printed in our publication in detail. No, we were against that kind of interference with the problem

of Afghanistan, despite the fact that there are reactionary instigations in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, there is no opportunity now to expound our views in detail. However, you can refer to our last year's publication. At any rate, I would tell you that it is not so at all. We are strugglers in the cause of the independence and freedom of our country. I believe that no campaign can be meaningful if independence is excluded from it. Independence is our prime objective.

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CSO: 4640/75

TUDEH OFFICIAL CLAIMS BANI-SADR, RAJAVI 'DOOMED TO FAILURE'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 3 Aug 81 p 2

[Article: "Banisadr, Rajavi Should Be Locked in Psychiatric Hospital"]

[Text]

TEHRAN (AFP) – Ousted president Abolhassan Banisadr and People's Mujahedin chief Masoud Rajavi should be "locked up together in a psychiatric hospital," according to Nureddin Kianouri, general secretary of Iran's Tudeh Communist Party.

The Banisadr-Rajavi alliance – aimed at forming a national resistance council against the Islamic government is "doomed to failure," Kianouri said recently in an exclusive interview.

"Banisadr is a traitor, with a mental illness that is politically very dangerous," Kianouri asserted. "He is incredibly egocentric and believes he is the greatest thinker of the century."

The Communist leader claimed fidelity to the line of Imam Khomeini. "Revolutionaries of the entire world do not care what the bourgeois world thinks" about the 250 executions of the internal imperialist agents since June 20, Kianouri said.

"The leaders of the counter-revolutionary groups are murderers and they deserve the death penalty," he said. But Iranian young people "disturbed by the Mujahedins' propaganda" should be allowed to "correct themselves."

"These youths have committed social crimes in supporting imperialism," he said, and " they should be re-educated in work camps."

The Iranian Communists have strongly supported the religious regime despite measures putting them in the political opposition and banning their newspaper, Mardom (The People).

"We supported Prime Minister (Mohammad) Ali Rajai in the presidential election because he was the universal candidate of all Iranian anti-imperialist forces," Kianouri said. "The orientations of revolutionary Islam coincide with the Communist program."

Questioned about the unlikely agreement of a Communist Party with a religious group, Kianouri said: "In the Shi'ite (Moslem) religion, it is very difficult to envisage despotism through personal power or fascism."

"We will support the Islamic Republic, as long as it follows its present orientation as anti-imperialist, anti-despotic, in favor of the oppressed masses," he said.

Kianouri said he did not know how many people were members in the Tudeh, but, he said, it has "political influence that is growing every day."

The group should soon be given the right to hold meetings, he added.

Kianouri acknowledged that one faction of the Islamic Republic Party wanted to ban the Communists, but added that many other clergy agreed that non-violent left-wing groups could participate actively in politics, "according to the line defined by Imam Khomeini."

The Communist Leader showed similar optimism about Iran's foreign policies, saying he was happy to note "the progress of a tendency to normalize relations with Socialist countries."

He said that tendency illustrated the "neither East nor West" policies of the Islamic Revolution, which led authorities to "limit outside trade with the West to develop it with Socialist and Third-World countries."

But the Tudeh still is a semi-clandestine party, which was able to surface publicly only once when Kianouri participated in a televised debate more than a month ago.

Even the AFP interview had to be conducted secretly, at an address that was divulged at the last minute. Kianouri said this was because of death threats received from the People's Mujahedin.

CSO: 4600/137

IRAN NATIONAL STEEL CO. SHIFTS TO ISFAHAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 Aug 81 pp 2, 3

[Text]

ISFAHAN (Fars) – "The central office of the Iran National Steel Company will be shifted to Isfahan in a near future," revealed the Governor-General of the province of Isfahan, Esmail Davoudi in a press conference yesterday.

According to a circular, announced in the concerned offices in Tehran, the Governor-General declared the employees of the Iran National Steel Company are obliged to report to the Central Office in Isfahan within a period of one month.

He said that Dr. Sadr was introduced as the Managing Director of the company during visit of the State Minister and the supervisor of the INSC to this province."

Davoudi pointed out the transfer of the Central Office to Isfahan according to the approval of the Revolutionary Council, adding that "the employees were being transferred to this province due to the vast activities of the steel mill and transfer of the Steel Mill of Bandarabbas to this region and establishment of the gas steel mill complexes in the Mobarakeh region of Isfahan, so that the shifting of the employees will remove half the problems in this important issue.

The transfer of the employees to Isfahan was supposed to be carried out to the end of the Shahrivar of 1359 but some of the problems, comprising the war issue, economical sanction resulted in delay on this important affair.

Talking about the accomodation facility, he said that measures were taken to provide the indigent facilities for the employees in the area but the Fulad Hotel would temporarily extend its accommodation facilities for settlement of the workers.

To achieve the goal of self-sufficiency, Davoudi stated that "the establishment of the steel complexes in the Mobarakeh region of this province which a gas-burn steel mill system, will provide the necessary background for self-sufficiency in the steel industry."

He disclosed the expenditure of the project as a sum of Rls. 400 billion with an annual production of 2.5 million tons of various iron products," estimating the feasibility of the steel mill for the next three or four years.

The Mathalogy Academy has been busy training apprentices for the steel industry and the related measures."

During the press conference, the Governor-General also talked about the shortage of schools in the area, saying that "procurement of the schools for 60,000 school children in this province should be executed only by accelerating the completion of those schools for which the construction measures are in progress. To carry out this vital issue we will allocate all the completion materials throughout the city of Isfahan for completion of semi-built schools for a week."

Indicating to the recent political currents in the country such as assassination attempts on the life of the top-ranking personalities throughout the country said that "during a series of sessions with the cooperation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Mobilization and the disciplinary forces, we decided in creating some special headquarters in Isfahan, so the training of some of personnel was started who will be take their responsibility in Isfahan in a near future."

He concluded by saying that "we hope the Revolutionary Courts and the judiciary officials will carry out their responsibility with more decisiveness."

CSO: 4600/137

PAPER DEMANDS 'MORE DECISIVE MEASURES' AGAINST TERRORISM

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 6 Aug 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by Seyyed Husen Musavian]

[Text] In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

The abortive assassination attempts on the lives of Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, the Minister of Interior, and brother Zavvarei, the Deputy Minister of Interior on 13th Mordad (August 4th, 1981), and the unjustifiable assassination (martyrdom) of Dr Hassan Ayat, the Majlis deputy of Tehran, along with the disastrous bomb blast in Azadi Square in Kermanshah, followed by the martyrdom of 15 innocent Moslems and the recent explosion in front of the Pasteur Hospital in Tehran, resulting in the martyrdom of some other innocent individuals, testify to the fact that an extensive wave of terror and explosions has vibrated throughout Iran.

After the dismissal of the fugitive, Banisadr from the post of presidency, drastic alterations which occurred in the Middle East region were quite evident and surprising to the researchers of the current issues of this region. The critical condition of the Middle East region which was further intensified by the imminent Syrian-Israeli war and the successive air raids upon the South of Lebanon, had attracted the attention of the nations all over the world. Though, all of a sudden, the hectic preoccupation with the Middle East, critical issues was no longer a matter of serious concern. However, the alarming wave of recurrent bomb blasts and assassination bids vibrated all over Iran. Still, such an expansive boom of Terrorism had been already anticipated by the provocative Western mass media as well as the notorious CIA mercenaries, Rajavi and Banisadr. Still, the abrupt wave of terroristic activities has been further aggravated after the triumphant election of Mohammadali Rajai as the President of the Islamic regime on account of 13 million votes.

Right after the consolidation of a consistent Islamic government, the expansionist U.S. became purely apprehensive of its inevitable political doom. In consequence, the imperialist U.S. victimized Iran with an abrupt wave of terrorism and extensive sabotage. In terms of a letter, published in "TEHRAN TIMES" (Vol. III, No. 22) on July 8, 1981, we divulged a clandestine conspiracy, betrayed by an unanimous reliable source as the committed supporter of the Islamic Revolution who has penetrated through the CIA. In one part of the aforementioned letter, it was

confirmed that the American officials had trained various saboteurs in Egypt, West Germany and China and later dispatched them to Iran to instigate the reign of terror. It is significant to note that Iran has been free from sporadic explosions and frequent assassination attempts during the presidential term of ousted Banisadr.

In pursuit of its clandestine plots for a coup d'etat, the belligerent U.S. adopts the treacherous policy of savage terrorism associated with sporadic bomb blasts and frequent assassination attempts whereby the intimidated, disenchanged nations would be obliged to surrender to the dominations of terrorists. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran is an exception to this treacherous rule, since the U.S. has misconceived the unique cultural values of the Islamic Revolution and the Moslem Iranian nation. The successive defeats of the U.S. in contriving collusions against Iran, further substantiates this conviction. Still, we are not motivated to address the American elements and the Zionist terrorists. After all, they will just accelerate their political doom through criminal actions and anti-human policies.

However, we are determined to warn the authorities of the Islamic government to adopt more decisive measures in preserving their security. Why do you not grant top priority to the security measures? Why do you not consider your security more seriously? Why do you not grant any value for your life as an indispensable asset to the prosperity of Islam? You should be alarmed that international Terrorism has launched hostile attacks on the Islamic Republic regime so as to annihilate Islamic values. Still, the U.S. cherishes the misconception that widespread assailancy, along with brutal crimes, will accomplish its avaricious objectives. You will be held responsible if you fail to employ decisive precautionary measures for the consolidation of security and the detection of the criminal agents of the U.S. Likewise, you will be held responsible in the eyes of the impoverished nations dominated by the East and the West.

The crucial issue is not focused on the preservation of my life or yours, since the prosperity of Islam takes precedence over such trivial concerns. If you just call for further assistance in this respect, millions of committed Moslems will diligently volunteer to safeguard the lives of the devout Moslem authorities of the Islamic Government, along with the administrative officials of the Revolutionary Institutions. You should be aware of the fact that the public is looking forward to your urgent demand for an antagonistic confrontation with the saboteurs and terrorists. The closure of Tehran's Bazaar signifies the public protest to the lack of determination for a hostile opposition to the Zionist elements. Once again, we warn you against neglecting the profound potential of the nation to overcome any considerable obstruction.

CSO: 4600/138

BIOGRAPHY OF NEW WIR CHIEF MOHAMMED HASHEMI

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 Aug 81 pp 2, 3

[Text] Tehran, (Pars)--Mohammad Hashemi Rafsanjani was born into a religious family in 1942 in Behouman village of Rafsanjan. He finished his elementary school in the same village, and left for Qom in 1957, where he started to study religious sciences in the Feiziyeh Theological School, while going to high school at nights. It was in that period that he went to meetings organized by his brother Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the present Majlis Speaker) and Dr Bahonar (new prime minister) where he got to know the ruling system and decided to oppose it.

He later went to Tehran, and while pursuing his nightly studies, he started his political activities by distributing political papers in the year 1962, when Imam Khomeini started his political struggle against the regime. This caused him to be arrested and shortly imprisoned by the regime in 1963.

In 1966 he received his high school diploma in mathematics and was employed as a simple clerk in the Sharif Industrial College. In 1969 he left for the United States to continue his education where he received his M.A. degree in economical management. While residing in the U.S. and acquainting with active Moslem students he attended the lecture sessions of martyred Dr Mostafa Chamran. He became a member of the Islamic Association, established by Dr Chamran and other brothers, and published the paper "The Clergy and 15th of Khordad" with the cooperation of other members of the Association.

Meanwhile, he was in contact with martyred Dr Beheshti. With the cooperation of other brothers he also organized the first seminar of Islamic Societies under the name of "Islamic Economic." As one of the members he took a trip around the U.S. spotting dedicated and interested volunteers for publicity works inside Iran. He returned to Iran in 1974, going back to the United States after meeting many people and consulting with friends.

When the Imam went to Paris, he joined him, later came to Tehran, along with Imam.

In November 1979 he became a member of the managing board of the Central Organization for Rural Cooperation and later became the administrative and financial deputy of the Ministry of Agriculture. In 1980 he became deputy prime minister and political advisor in the cabinet of brother Rajai. He held this post until he was given the new post. He became a member of IRP's central cadre from the first days that the party was established. He is also in charge of the Party's Foreign Affairs Relations. He married after the Revolution and now has a child.

CSO: 4600/137

BRIEFS

RAJA'I THANKS BREZHNEV--According to the Central News Unit, the following telegram was sent by President Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Moscow: In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. Your Excellency Leonid Brezhnev, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. I wish to thank you for your message of congratulations on my election as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In turn, I hope relations between all the governments of the world will be based on complete and actual respect for each other's sovereignty, and that all the deprived nations of the world will be able to freely practice their right to sovereignty over their destinies free from the domination and influence of foreign powers. [Signed] Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. [Text] [LD131302 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 13 Aug 81]

CALLS TO FIGHT KHOMEYNI--Dear compatriots and military brothers, Khomeyni's regime has decided to liquidate you. Do not follow these criminal executioners--the criminal mullahs who have driven the army into destruction. They have sent the dear ones, officers, NCO's and soldiers to firing squads. Do not obey these criminal mullahs. Through every means possible fight against this bloodsucker and criminal regime--that has turned our Iran into a graveyard--and keep your unity. Do not stand against the nation. Aim your guns and machineguns at the criminal rulers and those who have deceived Iran's liberty. The Liberation Army of Iran, navy commandos and courageous Iranian pilots are ready to help you. [Text] [GF152003 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 15 Aug 81]

AZADEGAN WARNING TO OMAN--The Azadegan Organization has warned the Omani regime that if the two Iranian pilots--who landed at Muscat Airport in an Iranian F-27 and who are being questioned by Omani authorities--are tried or returned to Khomeyni's Islamic regime, the members of Azadegan Organization will take action against the regime of Oman. [Text] [GF161545 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 16 Aug 81]

PEOPLE ADVISED TO REPORT--The Jahrom governorate in a communique makes it the official duty of law enforcement organizations in the area to confront hypocrites and plotters decisively, with complete attention, all power and necessary effort, and to discover plotters and reveal their (?identity) to the people. In the same communique faithful Muslim brothers and sisters are asked to follow up matters with complete awareness and, while chasing and recognizing counterrevolutionary elements, to report those responsible for assassinations or terror and fright to the governor's office, Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, police or gendarmerie. In the Jahrom

governorate communique the sad events of recent days in the area--which resulted in murders of two youth and mourning by their families--are strongly condemned. According to a report by our correspondent from Jahrom's learning [as heard] center, on Thursday and Saturday evenings two youths, Javad Qana'Atiyan, aged 20, and Samad Payebaz, aged 22, were killed in Jahrom. This is the third murder in Jahrom for which a group by the name of Towhid has taken responsibility in its night pamphlet. [Text] [GF171910 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1430 GMT 17 Aug 81]

KHUZESTAN ACTING GOVERNOR GENERAL--According to the Khuzestan governorate public relations lffice, Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the acting interior minister, has appointed Mohammad Hasan Tavalla'i, the deputy director of construction department of Khuzestan governorate, as Khuzestan's acting governor general. [Text] [GF171611 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 17 Aug 81]

CABINET APPOINTEE APPROVED--Tehran, 17 Aug (AFP)--The Iranian Parliament today approved all but one of the 22 cabinet members nominated last Thursday by Prime Minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar. The nominee who did not make it through the vote of confidence was Hoseyn Tajgardan, the proposed transportation minister. His candidacy was refused after he carried only 70 of the 182 votes cast. A majority of the 201 members of Parliament decided on the vote of confidence procedure after debate ended earlier today on the cabinet's composition. Twenty-two ballot boxes, each bearing the name of a minister, were put in front of the lectern. Each Parliament member was given ballots with his own name on them. Hojjat ol-Eslam Sadeq Khalkhali, known for his fierce repression of drug offenses, earlier today questioned the competence of five of Hojjat ol-Eslam Bahonar's choices. [Excerpt] [NC171401 Paris AFP in English 1351 GMT 17 Aug 81]

DELIVERY OF U.S., UK ARMS--With the coming to light of the secret arms' transactions between Khomeyni's Islamic Republic and the United States and the fact that these arms were being delivered through Israel, it has been revealed that from now on and by virtue of a new agreement the middleman's role will be played by the terrorist government of Libya. On the basis of an agreement, U.S. and British arms will first be transferred to Libya from where they will be sent to Khomeyni's regime. Reports received state that the first consignment, consisting of 200 tanks, 200 (?artillery pieces) and a large amount of bombs and ammunition, will be delivered to Khomeyni's republic in the near future. [Text] [NC181509 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 18 Aug 81]

RETURN OF IRANIAN ASSETS--The United States, the friend and supporter of the criminal Khomeyni regime, returned about $2 billion of Iranian assets that had been frozen following the capture of American diplomats. Out of this amount $1 billion will be handed over to the court that is studying financial claims by U.S. companies against Khomeyni's regime. The remaining $1.5 billion will be paid directly to Khomeyni's government. [As heard] [Text] [NC191618 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 19 Aug 81]

IRANIAN-UAE OILFIELD SUCCESS--The newspaper ETTELA'AT has cited a PARS report on the success of Iranian experts who are drilling an oil well in a joint oilfield located between Iran and Dubai. The oilfield is known as the Fatah field. Quoting an Iranian Petroleum Ministry spokesman, the agency reports that Dubai struck oil in this field a few months ago. However, up until now, Iran had not struck oil in its section of the field. The new well is 25 km south of the Iranian island of Siri and is in 60 meters of water. It has been drilled to a depth of 8.970 /word indistinct/. Oil was first struck at 1100 on 7 August. /Text/ /GF131120 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1815 GMT 12 Aug 81/

ITALIAN ENVOY 16 AUG MEETING--The Italian ambassador to Tehran met today with Ahmad ('Ameri), the director of the Roads and Transport Ministry. During the meeting, they discussed means of cooperation between Iran and Italy. [Text] [GF161909 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1430 GMT 16 Aug 81]

CABLE FROM MRS GANDHI--Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi has sent a congratulatory cable to Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar on his selection as prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In her cable Mrs Gandhi notes the old amicable relations between India and Iran during several historical stages and expresses hope that these relations will improve and expand further in the future. Dr Bahonar has also received congratulatory cables from the Bulgarian premier and the ROK prime minister. [Text] [GF171229 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1100 GMT 17 Aug 81]

MEETING WITH DPRK AMBASSADOR--The DPRK ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran met with agriculture and rural development minister, Mohammad Salamati today. During the meeting the DPRK ambassador repeated his country's invitation to the agriculture and rural development minister to participate in the session of Nonaligned and Developing Countries to be held in DPRK 26-31 August. The DPRK ambassador also affirmed the necessity of cooperation between the Islamic revolution of Iran and DPRK. [Text] [GF181650 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1430 GMT 18 Aug 81]

YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL CONGRATULATES BAHONAR--The president of the Yugoslav Federal Executive Council has expressed his country's interest in bolstering cooperation and friendship between the Iranian and Yugoslav people. This came in a congratulatory cable that he sent to Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar on his appointment as prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. [Text] [GF190555 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 19 Aug 81]

MESSAGES TO PRESIDENT--Tehran (Pars)--President Chadli Ben Jadid of Algeria yesterday congratulated Rajai for his new post of presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Algerian president expressed his happiness on Rajai's ascension to the post of president and wished him success in shouldering the burden of the presidency. The Algerian president hoped that changes in the Islamic Republic would be in conformity to what the Imam of the people Imam Khomeini has outlined and would continue to follow the line of the Imam. The Algerian message in conclusion said that the government of Algeria looks forward to develop Iran-Algerian ties at every opportunity. The Heads of the following countries and organizations also sent similar messages. The President of East Germany, President of Italy, President of Tunisia, President of Rumania, President of North Korea, President of Lebanon, the President of West Germany, Secretary General of Polisario Front, President of Guinea, and Secretary General of the Organization of the Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC). [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 3 Aug 81 p 1]

PAKISTAN NATIONAL DAY MESSAGE--The Pakistani ambassador in Tehran has addressed a speech to the Iranian people on the occasion of his country's independence day today. In his speech the ambassador referred to the longstanding relations of fraternity and cooperation between the Iranian and Pakistani peoples. He also expressed hope that bilateral cultural, historic, political and economic relations will be strengthened and that cooperation between the two countries in all fields and scopes will be enhanced. He went on to say that the brotherly and Islamic ties between our two peoples will be further enhanced and consolidated in conformity with our countries' bilateral cultural and commercial relations. [Text] [GF150500 Tehran International Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 14 Aug 81]

CEASE FIRE TERMS--Qom (Pars)--"Withdrawal of the Baathist Forces from Iranian territory, termination of Iraqi military aggression and Saddam's trial in an international court are the three crucial proposals of Iran for bringing to an end the current war between Iran and Iraq," Friday Prayers Imam of Qom Ayatollah Meshkini commented yesterday during the Friday prayer gathering. Meshkini stated, "the three proposals by Iran for the termination of the Iraqi imposed war should be given top priority. He then pointed out that it is no use the Non-Aligned Peace Commission coming to Iran, if these proposals are not accepted. In his first sermon, Ayatollah Meshkini declared, excessive ambition and arrogance will be to the detriment of man. Later, Meshkini recalled the recent comments made by the ousted president Banisadr, confirming, "the successive assassination attempts and the frequent bomb blasts can be attributed to the evil conspiracies contrived by Banisadr and his treacherous counterparts. They wrongly believe that by carrying out extensive sabotage they will be able to return to Iran. Meshkini then added, "Even if you kill one million people, the nation will never allow you to come back to Iran." In the course of his second sermon, Ayatollah Meshkini extended his sincere condolences to Imam Khomeini and the Iranian nation upon the martyrdom of Dr Hassan Ayat which coincided with the 40th day of martyrdom of Ayatollah Dr Beheshti and 72 devout companions of the Imam. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 Aug 81 p 1]

CSO: 4600/137

RASHID KARAMI INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1289, 17 Jul 81 pp 14-15

[Interview with Prime Minister Rashid Karami by Amin al-Siba'i; in Beirut; date not specified: "Rashid Karami Tells AL-HAWADITH, 'The Presidential Palace No Longer Represents the Lawful Government, and the President Has Given Up His Role as Ruler' "]

> [Excerpts] "Stopping at the statements of Pierre al-Jumayyil is not possible as long as dealings with Israel continue."
> "I see no conflict between the positions of the Lebanese state and those of the Palestinian Revolution."

At the beginning of the interview we told Prime Minister Karami, "Despite all appearances it seems that the average citizen has resigned himself to the permanent danger and the continuing despair [that exist] despite all the measures that were being carried out while preparations for the Bayt-al-Din Conference were underway. These measures had shown some features that encouraged optimism. The general feeling is that under the best of conditions a truce will be established and will be followed in the future by military expeditions. This is because the measures that have been approved so far have not constituted a radical political solution as much as they've been sporadic security operations whose purpose was cosmetic, as much as that is possible. What is your position which will be announced in case the proposed political solution fails?"

[Answer] What is striking in our crisis, which has lasted 7 years, is that no party has been able to achieve victory over the other. This is because of those agencies that interfere whenever matters become tough to prevent any movement from imposing its will [on the people] or gaining control by force. This is part of the course [of action] that has been characterized by rigidity and hardness. It is in any case the policy of President Sarkis who is backed by the forces that advocate this slogan. We have thus seen how in every battle that takes place--whether that battle takes place on the contact lines, in Jurd al-'Aqurah , in Zahle or elsewhere--these forces help each other, come to action to propose solutions, find ways [out of the crisis] and accordingly, bring the parties to discuss

[matters]. Eventually they arrive at arrangements which begin with limited steps and partial solutions, but they never enter into a discussion of comprehensive solutions to rescue [the situation]. Therefore, it became evident from the meetings with Mr Philip Habib that his discussions with everyone he met were confined to Sania Heights and to the subject of the missiles. Everyone who tried to take the discussion out of this framework was met in the best of cases with silence. It is also being declared that what is required is that matters remain as they are until the investigation of the situation is completed. When a decision on the policy that will be pursued is made, a discussion of our questions and the solutions to them can then be undertaken. This means that so far and until further notice we are to stay as we are. We are being asked to be accommodating and to accept a cease fire or a truce. This would be followed later by an investigation into fundamental matters. Hence it becomes evident that the choice is confined to one of two roads: a political solution or a military solution. Our experiences indicate that these two choices are being investigated but that no one is able to launch the rescue [operation] by resorting to either one of them. Today, with the Arab Follow-Up Committee we are awaiting the results regarding the political solution. I find clear indications in the statements that President Hafiz al-Asad made to Hungarian television that [the Syrians] will try to use political and diplomatic means to get Lebanon out of its predicament. If they do not succeed, they will resort to other methods.

You can thus see what could happen if the Arab Follow-Up Committee is unable to bring about the hoped for rescue with which it has been charged.

[Question] One can thus conclude that the military solution which had been unlikely has managed to thrust itself at this stage as a likely solution. Who in your opinion is responsible for this? Are all the Lebanese responsible or only a certain group?

[Answer] I think that it is one group that is responsible, and I am referring to the Phalangists, who are still relying on the Israeli enemy.

[Correspondent's remark] This interview took place before Bashir al-Jumayyil submitted his memorandum to President Sarkis.

No one can come to an agreement with the Phalangists on this position and on their method which would move Lebanon away from its pan-Arab course and its national interests and keep it from preserving its unity, its democracy and its Arab character. Therefore, since the struggle revolves around this destiny, this history and this heritage by accepting coöperation with the enemy, I do not believe that a solution can be reached with the situation being as it is. Therefore, the decisive solution will be one [imposed] by force, and this will happen if those who deal with [the enemy] and those who have deviated from the proper course adhere to their positions.

[Question] There is information that when you, as a delegation representing the Islamic Grouping, met with the foreign ministers of the Arab

Follow-Up Committee at B'abda Palace, statements were made during the discussion that boycotting those who deal with Israel should be confined to those who deal with Israel only and that the dialogue must be expanded and must continue with those inside the Lebanese Front and with the Maronites who do not deal with Israel.

[Answer] The Arab ministers did not suggest this to us.

[Question] The suggestion was Lebanese!

[Answer] I think this opinion has to take shape through practice. What is required then of those to whom you are referring is that they proclaim a position opposing that of those who deal with Israel and support the other forces for the purpose of saving Lebanon from what it is being exposed to because reliance on Israel is the principal threat to all of us. Therefore, all the people have to join forces to foil this conspiracy. Afterwards everything can be settled in light of the higher interests of the homeland. There would be no restrictions on such cooperation; in fact, it would become a national duty.

[Question] Then you do not consider what al-Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil said in the statements he made, criticizing the idea of cooperation with Israel to be adequate to close the chapter on dealing with Israel?

[Answer] Neither I nor anyone else can consider such statements that are followed by [other] statements [adequate]. Altogether these statements mean nothing. They are, however, domestic barriers [set up by al-Jumayyil] according to his mood and what [he thinks] the market will bear. Therefore, one cannot stop at these statements as long as the dealings with Israel continue and as long as all the forces are still calling for a candid position that would be followed by congruent positions and practices so that everyone would be assured that this matter has come to an end, and Lebanon has returned with all its citizens to the course of unity, Arabism and lawfulness.

[Question] What is the specific formula that would be good enough to give shape to this return?

[Answer] There is no doubt that an official, unequivocal announcement by those who deal with Israel is what must determine the course they must take. Accordingly, the state has to play its role and undertake its responsibilities so it can extend its authority all over Lebanon and bring an end to the unlawful presence, especially of those who deal with Israel.

[Question] Some time ago you had proposed that a national conference be convened in the presidential palace so that a dialogue can take place. It seems that this dialogue is no longer possible even if the Presidential Palace were to call for it, since the question of dealing with Israel has created all these obstacles. Is there another way out?

[Answer] We regret to say that the presidential palace in all its practices and positions no longer represents the Lebanese lawful [government]

that would pull together all those around it. Since the presidential palace does deal with those who deal with Israel; since it places everyone on the same level; and since it has abandoned its role as ruler, I believe the correction must begin with the government itself. Unless this takes place, I believe that nothing else can be achieved.

[Question] Is this position final? Will it not be changed even if the state were to achieve a suitable formula for a political solution with the Follow-Up Committee?

[Answer] Everything depends on the lawful government's commitment to its constitutional oath and its national responsibilities. When the Arab Follow-Up Committee determines the steps that would lead to the correction of this situation, new climates will have been created, and we can then proceed towards taking the required steps.

[Question] To correct the situation in the government legal steps must be taken such as drafting legislation that would be approved by two thirds of the Chamber of Deputies to re-schedule the date for electing a new president sooner. Are you thinking of leading the parliamentary campaign to amend the constitution so that what you are referring to can be achieved?

[Answer] There is no doubt that I did propose this solution because I know that after 5 years in office President Sarkis is in a psychological condition that has created problems which he would find difficult to depart from. This is because it is his erroneous equation that caused him to lose his leadership role and the possibilities he had for saving the country from [the problems] in which it is floundering. We also see that what is left of his term is in fact not enough for him to stay with the course of rescue until it runs its course and achieves its objectives. The current president also may not commit the future president to agreements and arrangements that would differ considerably from his ways of thinking and his inclinations. President Sarkis himself approves of this. It is also the right of the future president to be informed of what is happening because most of what is happening will apply to his term. For all these reasons I proposed that a new president be elected before the expiration of the term of the current president.

[Question] How many months before?

[Answer] I do not think the question is one of time. This is a question that is rather subject to this stage during which the Arab Follow-Up Committee is undertaking its efforts. I think it would be beneficial for the election of the new president to take place as soon as possible.

[Question] Do you think that the political climate is suitable for obtaining the support of two thirds of the members of the Chamber of Deputies to amend the constitution and set a closer date for electing the new president?

[Answer] I think that when it becomes clear who is behind all these considerations that have been mentioned, it is inevitable then that everybody

will perceive his responsibility and will join forces with others to find the most suitable and the best ways out [of this predicament]. I believe that then everyone will agree with me that what I proposed was right.

[Question] There is a solution which some people think is more likely than a military solution and more likely than setting a closer date for the presidential elections. This solution is for you to head a six-party government of activists that would include leaders representing the Lebanese Front who do not deal with Israel. You would undertake the task of correcting the situation during the remaining term of President Sarkis. What do you think about that, and are you prepared to do so?

[Answer] With President Sarkis present, with his way of thinking and acting, and considering what he has been able to achieve throughout these 5 years, foiling every attempt and wasting every opportunity that became available because of his erroneous equations and his direct relations and dealings with those who deal with Israel, I wonder how a harmonious government of adversaries can be established in view of these mutual contradictions. [I wonder] how such a government can put an end to all these obstacles and how it can remove the difficulties from the course of rescue. I think that this process requires, first, that everyone have one choice and that choice would be to endorse the unity, the Arab character and the democracy of Lebanon. Second, a reform program that consists of the 14 principles and the constitutional document is to be drawn up, and there is to be agreement on this program. Afterwards a task force can be formed to implement what has been agreed to, not its opposite. This is because what I fear most if such a government is set up is that there be strife within the government over everything that is proposed or every question that arises. After that this government would fail and the country would continue to flounder in its crisis, and this in my view cannot be allowed to happen.

[Question] Some time ago you proposed that Lebanon sign a cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union. A few politicians found this suggestion to be a violation of Lebanon's neutrality between the two camps and a violation of the National Charter. They asked If you would sign such a treaty if you were prime minister.

[Answer] I think there was some confusion about that statement which I made. The statement I made was said in the context of a statement which Mr Dory Sham'un had made in Europe. He had said that if conditions remained as they are, those who represented them were prepared to undertake the measure of investigating with the Soviet Union [the possibility of] achieving a treaty according to which the Soviet Union would be given a naval base in Juniyah. When the crisis of Zahle evolved and the Soviet fleet came into the Mediterranean Sea, I said that the question had become rife for them since Juniyah was all ready and the Soviet fleet was nearby for the operation which Mr Dory Sham'un had suggested should take place. Hence we said we were not among those who opposed such a course of action if they are the ones to undertake it.

[Question] Contradictions have appeared recently in your ranks towards

some positions. While you have affirmed your insistence on the constitutional document, Mr Walid Junblat has called for staying away from it and adopting secularism. This has raised questions about the future of your project which seeks to unify and coordinate positions among leaders of the same party?

[Answer] I do not think that there is any conflict in the proposals that have been made by some or by others. I will present our views again, and I think they will meet with everyone's approval. The constitutional document is considered a whole that cannot be broken into parts because it established a balanced solution to the various political questions that are being raised. When an endorsement of the sectarian nature of the three leadership positions is sought, such an endorsement depends on the implementation of the articles of the constitutional document so that the authority of each one of these positions can be preserved and, accordingly, the responsibilities determined in a manner that would preclude conflict and confusion. What is more important in this regard is the selection of the prime minister by the Chamber of Deputies. If they were to go back for discussions, considering that the endorsement of the leadership positions has been settled once and for all and if they were to get rid of the other conditions that were mentioned to correct the reality of endorsing and controlling the leadership positions so as to achieve balance, we would then reject all these proposals and insist on abolishing political sectarianism absolutely, beginning with the presidency and down to the last position in this state. The subject of secularization is another matter because it has to do with religious beliefs. We said, and our position is still the same, that we support secularization in everything that does not conflict with religion. Accordingly, we approve within these boundaries of what the religious authorities approve of.

[Question] In the context of looking for a radical solution, calls are being made to encourage dealing with the heart of the problem in the south and drawing up a new agreement between the state and the Palestinian Resistance. This new agreement would replace the Cairo Agreement and build on the situation that exists at the present time. Given your experience in government and the 1969 conditions, do you think that this suggestion could hold a solution?

[Answer] I would like to present that question to the Lebanese people from another perspective. Given everything that has happened and taken place and given the state of chaos and the absence and decline [of authority] that we are facing today in every area, and especially the weakness, the inertia and the disintegration of the state, [I would ask the Lebanese people about] our situation prior to the events and under the agreements that the authorities tried to use to set limits for what the Palestinian Revolution can do. These extraordinary practices by the Palestinian Revolution sometimes led to a clash between the forces of the government and the forces of the Resistance, and these occasionally ended in settlements and bittersweet solutions. The question is this: despite all these excesses, deplorable practices and occasional clashes, were we better off then or are we better off now with no agreements being adhered to, no authority to

monitor [affairs], and no forces able to impose what is in the interests of Lebanon and its sovereignty? What was the outcome of the policy, the ideas and the conduct of those who formed militias and opposed the Palestinian Resistance under the pretext that they wanted to defend the state and the lawful government? Merely raising that question would give one the answer.

We support the agreements. We support the sovereignty of the state, and we support the legitimate Palestinian struggle to achieve the legitimate national Palestinian rights which the whole world has acknowledged. I find no conflict between the state and the revolution. In fact both of them have to cooperate with national and pan-Arab interests to foil the partition and settlement [plans] because the weakness of one would weaken the other.

8592
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STATE REVENUES, DEBTS, FOREIGN AID DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1289, 17 Jul 81 pp 45-46

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "Profits of Central Bank Are Most Significant Revenues; Customs Revenues Are Least Significant; Lebanon Lost, but Lebanese People Gained; Public Debt Rose to 7 Billion; Lebanon's Situation Continues To Be Better than That of Jordan, Belgium"]

[Text] Minister of Finance Dr 'Ali al-Khalil issued an official statement announcing a 16 percent increase in the state's revenues from 3.869 billion pounds in 1980 to 4.489 billion pounds in 1981.

Although these are the bookkeeping figures and are traceable to budget estimates, they did surprise a few businessmen who naturally had doubts about the possibility of realizing such an increase. Those businessmen even estimated that real revenues may be a little over 1 billion pounds. That is only about 22 percent of the estimated revenues.

There is no doubt that the state has suffered the greatest losses from the war that has been going on for about 7 years. It is true that the Lebanese people lost their property and their institutions and that some of them lost their lives, but most of them benefited economically and managed to coexist with the war. Those people are divided into two groups:

A group left Lebanon and worked abroad, achieving spectacular success that increased their financial resources. This is evident and reflected in the funds the Lebanese people transfer to their families in the homeland. These funds contributed to the formation of a surplus in the balance of payments that amounted to 475 million dollars in 1980. In addition, the volume of Lebanese investments abroad increased.

The other group, which remained in Lebanon despite the losses they suffered [in their property] and annual incomes--that is, in the balance of profits and losses--were able to coexist with the events and to adjust all aspects of their commercial, industrial or investment operations. In the area of expenditures, for example, a few organizations reduced the number of employees. Others came to an agreement with workers to reduce wages. [Such measures] led these organizations to realize concrete profits and

enabled them to stay in business. In addition, the value of their assets multiplied many times because of inflation and high prices.

Figures of the deposits made in Lebanon's commercial banks may provide clear evidence of the Lebanese people's financial and economic activity. These deposits rose from 9.651 billion pounds in 1975 to 24.575 billion pounds in September 1980. This is an increase of over 154 percent.

The state was in a different position. The war prevented it from sharing the profits of the Lebanese citizens, and it lost most of its income resources without being able to lay off any employees or reduce their salaries. Quite the contrary it raised employees' salaries at a rate that some experts say exceeded wage increases in the private sector. The number of civil servants also rose. Therefore, expenses under the first section of the budget, that is, salaries and wages, rose from 1.149 billion pounds in 1975 to 3.392 billion pounds in 1981. This is approximately a 200 percent increase. These expenses used up 75 percent of the state's general budget which amounts to 4.489 billion pounds for the current year.

It seems that the activity of Lebanese citizens in the private sector did not encourage civil servants to become active themselves, fulfill their civil service duties and collect the state's shares of those profits. Using the excuse of overpowering security conditions, most of them stayed away from their posts except at the end of each month to get their salaries.

However, some of those who come to the official agencies of the state to do their work are energetic, honest, content and satisfied with their work and loyal to it. Another group, however, is quite different. [People who are in the latter group] rejected the notion that their fellow citizens in the private sector should become active and increase their investments and profits without their having a share of those profits in return for certain services, even if those services were done at the expense of the state. It is known that this kind of civil servants, in the eyes of some people and under those conditions, may be regarded as better than the other kind who refuse to report to their jobs. That preference is based on the fact that the former group contribute to ensuring the income of the state whereas the second group receive salaries without doing any work in return.

There is more than one administrative agency in the state in which employees work with brokers to execute the business of their clients. This activity is especially prominent in customs agencies and real estate agencies where each group of businessmen now has a group of brokers who specialize in the prompt execution of business at the least possible cost.

Customs revenues are usually considered one of the indicators of a country's economic activity. But in Lebanon and under the conditions of the war, this is not the case. In 1974, that is, before the war, customs fees constituted 47 percent of the state's total revenues. This declined to 27 per ent in 1980. It is estimated that customs fees will make up about 14 percent of the state's revenues this year. Customs revenues during the last 6 months amounted to about 212 million pounds. Observers expect these revenues will not go below 500 million pounds in 1981.

The reason for this, as is well-known, is due to the prevalence of smuggling and the failure of all the anti-smuggling attempts considered by the state. Minister of Finance Dr 'Ali al-Khalil admits this is a natural result of the lack of security and the fact that the state is not in control of all the facilities and the localities where the various goods come into the country.

Smuggling in Lebanon under the conditions of the war passes through two routes: The first goes through through the illegal ports where parties collect the fees and deprive the state of these revenues.

The second route goes through the brokers and their partners among whom are some civil servants who offer services to importers by charging them reduced fees for their goods which enter Lebanon from the legal ports.

"Had it not been for smuggling," as the minister of finance says, "customs revenues would have reached 1.5 billion pounds annually." But the chairman of the Development and Construction Council, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah raises this figure to 2.5 billion on the basis of the activity of the private sector and the increase of imports from abroad.

At any rate customs revenues remain one of the three most important sources of state revenues despite the smuggling activity that is protected by the war and the disturbances in security. There are automobile fees and registration fees, such as real estate registration from which total actual revenues this year will amount to about 250 million pounds. But the source of revenue that is more important than the first two sources is that of the state's share of the profits of the Bank of Lebanon. These profits come from the bank's currency operations and deposits abroad. The ministry has estimated [its share of the bank's profits] for the present year to be 725 million pounds. This figure is the only one mentioned in the estimated revenues for the 1981 budget because it is close to being actually collected.

The state then finds itself in the red when it comes to computing profit and loss. It spends 3.392 billion pounds for employees' wages and salaries, but its revenues do not come to even half this sum. [Therefore], the state borrows from the Central Bank and from commercial banks to pay the rest.

According to the information of the minister of finance the state's public debt amounted to 4.539 billion pounds distributed as follows:

--Abour 725 million pounds in foreign debts until the end of 1980.

--3.815 billion pounds in domestic debts. About 2.787 billion pounds of that sum are debts to commercial banks, to the Deposit Insurance Organization and to the Social Security Fund. The debts arose from the sale of treasury certificates, and the rest are debts to the Central Bank.

If the unstable security conditions continue, observers expect the public debt of the Lebanese state to exceed 7 billion pounds by the end of this year.

The question that is being raised here is this:

What is the role of Arab aid funds in alleviating the burden of debt from the Lebanese state?

One and a half years have gone by since implementation of the Tunisia Summit resolutions began, giving Lebanon 2 billion dollars over a 5-year period at a rate of 400 million dollars a year. Of the 600 million dollars that were due by the end of last June, only 206 million dollars have been received. It seems that receipt of the rest awaits the stabilization of the security situation, as some Arab diplomatic sources in Beirut said.

But these funds are earmarked for Lebanon's reconstruction projects. Half of them are to be implemented in the south and the other half in the remaining areas of Lebanon. They reduce the state's need to borrow from abroad to finance projects. But the urgent spending which the treasury faces every month is that of [paying] the wages and salaries of civil servants. This requires continuous borrowing from the Central Bank and from commercial banks so these expenses can be met. This is because Arab aid funds cannot be re-allocated so the money can be spent on salaries and wages.

Regardless of the matter it seems that Lebanon's public debt has not yet reached the stage that worries officials. At the present time that debt constitutes about 30 percent of the national product which is estimated to be about 15 million pounds. Lebanon is thus on an equal footing with the United States whose public debt is equal to 30 percent of its national product. Lebanon's debt is greater than Venezuela's (23 percent), Australia's (25 percent), and Canada's and Japan's (26 percent). By comparison Lebanon's situation is better than that of Belgium, whose debts constitute 50 percent of its national product; Italy, whose debts are 62 percent of its national product, and Jordan, whose debts are 72 percent of its national product.

Since reserves are usually formed during times of good fortune so they can be used during times of bad fortune, Lebanon can continue to borrow against the state's currency reserves at the Bank of Lebanon. The Ministry of Finance has estimated this reserve in the draft [faslakah] 1981 budget to be about 25 billion pounds; that is equal to six times the currency in circulation.

In addition, there are debts to the treasury from the taxes that are due from companies and organizations for previous years. These taxes exceed 1 billion pounds. There are also treasury loans that amount to about 4 billion pounds and are traceable to a number of organizations and agencies, the most prominent of which is the Lebanon Electricity Organization and the municipalities. The state must get back these loans after these organizations collect the fees and subscriptions. This has not been possible because of security conditions.

Lebanon then has a debt of 4.5 billion pounds and a financial claim for about 5 billion pounds.

There is no doubt that the minister of finance relied on all these factors when he recently reassured the Lebanese people and those who are concerned about the soundness of the Lebanese economy. He said, "I am announcing from a position of responsibility that our economic and financial situation is still sound despite the difficulties we are facing which several countries would not have borne had they been hit by the same misfortune that befell us. This is because we did not resort to any emergency measure, nor did we touch the gold reserve. The treasury deficit is not the result of a weakness in the economic structure or an imbalance in the financial structure. It is an unexpected deficit that has resulted from the events which caused treasury revenues to decline. These will recover as soon as we have even a relative relaxation of the political and security situation."

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END

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2391

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No. 2391

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JORDANIAN-IRAQI ECONOMIC TIES STRENGTHENED

London 8 DAYS in English No 32, 15 Aug 81 pp 36, 37

[Article by Steve Ross]

[Text]

IRAQ's first deputy premier, Taha Yassin Ramadan, is expected to finalise several agreements on trade and economic cooperation when he visits Jordan later this month, adding still more momentum to Jordanian-Iraqi economic integration.

The shape of things to come was indicated during the April visit to Baghdad of a committee headed by the Jordanian minister of industry and trade, Walid Asfour. At the end of the visit a trade protocol was signed specifying an increase in the import quota for Jordanian goods, organised via the Jordanian trade centre in Baghdad, from Jordanian dinars 4m to JD11m (1JD = $3). Also specified were a further Iraqi loan of JD30m for Jordanian road construction — bringing the total of recent Iraqi road loans to JD45m — and an agreement on the investment of JD11m in Jordanian industries and joint ventures.

Asfour's team also submitted, and Iraq welcomed in principle, the outline of a proposed Iraq-Jordan joint company for industry, and Iraq was receptive to Jordanian proposals that it put up 15-20 per cent of the JD45m capital for a cement factory at Rashadiya to be built by the Mitsubishi Corporation, and JD1.9m of the JD4m capital required for a new textile venture. Iraq was also reportedly very interested in a proposal for a food packaging industry, currently the subject of a feasibility study.

Other possible joint enterprises — the details of which may become clearer after Ramadan's visit — are wood processing ventures, a car, bus and truck assembly plant and the manufacture of agricultural equipment, refrigerators and air conditioners.

The private sector has also been active in bringing Jordan and Iraq closer: Amman chamber of industry director Ali Dajani told *8 Days* that trade relations were 'actually developing into wider integration of economic interest', although Jordanian commercial banks were not yet operating in Iraq. He emphasised that Jordan's Aqaba port, which rapidly became more important to Baghdad after the start of the war with Iran, would remain a 'permanent backbone port' for the Iraqis; Iraq's own Basra port will be highly congested, Beirut is crippled, and Latakia is too small, he said, 'so they have to depend on Aqaba'.

Among the factors making Aqaba attractive, Dajani added, are the 'shortcut route' to Iraq which will be provided when new roads are built with the help of the Iraqi loans, and the new $50m joint transport company, set up last year, which is buying 700 heavy trucks from the West German firm M.A.N. and plans to open a string of garages and repair shops along the Jordan-Iraq route.

'We expect some joint ventures in the importation of certain goods needed by

both countries,' Dajani also noted. As an example, he cited the possibility of jointly importing edible oils from southeast Asia — 'I imagine in the future a plant at Aqaba with storage tanks' — to take oil from ships for distribution to Iraq, Jordan and possibly other Middle East countries.

Dajani mentioned the contrast between the new JD11m import quota for the trade centre at Baghdad and the original figure on its establishment in 1970: JD250,000. The quota is an important factor in faciliating trade between Jordan's free enterprise economy and Iraq's socialist economy. 'Public sector establishments in Iraq should import JD11m worth of goods from Jordan a year,' Dajani said. 'If they don't, we are free to sell on the open market.'

Iraqi private companies have been authorised to import certain kinds of commodities, mostly consumer goods; the balance of trade was in Jordan's favour for the first time last year, and during the first six months of 1981 the Amman chamber of industry certified JD26m worth of exports to Iraq. Dajani estimated that exports through other bodies would be worth around 20 per cent of that figure. Jordanian exports include processed foods, prefabricated houses, refrigerators, cookers, ceramics, handbags, pharmaceuticals, furniture, clothing, plastics and cigarettes.

During a nine-day visit in May, a three-man Iraqi delegation visited 40 factories and met representatives of 150 firms to investigate the export potential of Jordanian industry. They were impressed both with the quality and the potential quantity of what they saw. Jordanian industry has a great deal of dormant capacity, Dajani told *8 Days*, and given a buoyant market — which it seems to have in Iraq — many factories could easily gear up to two shifts, whereas at present they are operating on one.

CSO: 4300/89

IRAQ TALKING TO SAUDI ARABIA ON OIL PIPELINE

NC091555 Paris AFP in English 1524 GMT 9 Aug 81

[Text] Nicosia, 8 Aug (AFP)--The Iraqi Government is in the process of negotiating the construction of a pipeline between its oil fields south of Bassorah through Saudi Arabia to a terminal on the Red Sea, according to Middle East Economic Survey published in Cyprus.

The Saudi Government, according to the publication, has already given its agreement to installation of the pipeline on its territory, but has informed the Iraqis that they will have to build their own terminal.

Saudi Arabia recently opened a new Red Sea terminal at Yenbo, but told Baghdad that Yenbo was available only for Saudi oil, the magazine added.

It recalled that Baghdad was seeking to open an alternative route for its oil because the war with Iran has rendered the two Iraqi terminals at the mouth of the Gulf impracticable.

These terminals, at Khor-al-Amaya and Muna-al-Bakr, used to receive 3.5 to 3 billion barrels a day. The current Iraqi production of 1 million barrels is mainly funnelled through Syria and Turkey.

For political as well as technical reasons, the magazine said, Iraqi oil exports via Syria have been limited to 300,000 barrels a day, while the Iraqi petroleum company's pipelines through Syrian would have a capacity of 1.2 million barrels.

CSO: 4300/90

KUWAITI-IRAQI RELATIONS--Reliable sources in Kuwait have stated that Kuwaiti relations with the bedouin Saddamist regime are currently strained. Observers believe that this change in relations has come about as a result of the interference of Saddam's mercenaries in Kuwait's internal affairs, through their acts of sabotage and detonating bombs in public places and governmental establishments. Reports from Kuwait quoting these diplomatic sources reveal that the Kuwaiti Government intended to blame the Iranian Muslim strugglers for these acts. However, following the arrest of some Ba'thist mercenaries and the flight of some others to Baghdad, the situation became clear and Saddam's conspiracy was uncovered--the expansionist goal of Saddam's regime was made clear to Muslim public opinion in Kuwait. Observers add that through these operations, Saddam Husayn wanted to link Kuwait and the rest of the Gulf regimes to his imperialistic war against the Islamic Republic of Iran and its revolution, after it became clear to all that he had failed to achieve the goals for which he waged this war. [Text] [GF200941 (Clandestine) Voice of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution in Arabic 1740 GMT 19 Aug 81]

KFAED LOAN TO YAR--The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has extended a KD 400,000 ($1.4 million) loan to North Yemen to finance its share of a pan-Arab telecommunications project. The loan, announced in Kuwait, will go towards the pan-Arab network linking Djibouti, Somalia and North Yemen to the rest of the Arabian peninsula and the Horn of Africa (See an-Nahar Arab Report & Memo, July 6). The terms of the latest KFAED loan were not disclosed. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 8]

CSO: 4300/91

KARACHI PAPER REPORTS HEAVY FIGHTING IN AFGHANISTAN

Golbahar District

GF151656 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 10 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] Peshawar, 9 Aug (PPI, AAP)--Bloody conflicts have been reported from the Golbahar District in Parvan Province between Mojahedin and Soviet forces. According to these reports, the Soviet troops attacked with the latest arms and ammunition and with the help of their air force, but the Mojahedin displayed their usual courage and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy and at least 300 Russians and Afghans were killed and a large arsenal of equipment fell into the hands of the Mojahedin. A large quantity of armored vehicles and tanks were destroyed in the clash.

According to a report, the Mojahedin seized an army truck loaded with military equipment and large quantitites of rifles, 5 mortar guns, 1 machinegun, 40 Kalashnikovs and 15 handgrenades. Three Mojaheds drank from the goblet of martyrdom. A Hezb-e-Eslami source from Samangan Province says that Mojahedin attacked Soviet forces in Morghab District and killed 22 Russians and government forces who belonged to the Parcham faction and destroyed 2 tanks on the Morghab highway. Continuing their assaults, the Mojahedin killed six members of the militia, one of whom was a clerk. The Russians forced the Mojahedin to retreat by using tanks. Heavy fighting has been raging in Herat for 20 days and both sides have suffered heavy losses in men and materiel.

In these clashes, Jami'at-e Eslami-ye Afghanistan Commander 'Abdol 'Aziz Khan and 10 others were martyred. According to latest reports, the Afghan freedom fighters attacked Herat and government and military installations in the province.

On 18 July, in a 12-hour long clash, in the Enjil subdivision, 10 enemy soldiers were killed and more than 20 wounded. On 21 July, freedom fighters of the Jami'at ambushed the Iraqi Darwaza police station and killed an officer and another person. One officer joined the Mojahedin and brought his Kalashnikov and two radios along with him. On the same day, government forces attacked (Rayanandgan) village in Herat District and killed three persons. The Mojahedin retaliated and killed 21 persons and destroyed an armored vehicle. The enemy was forced to retreat after a furious 3-hour long battle. The Mojahedin then attacked a military convoy on the Kabul-Herat highway and captured a Russian and an Afghan Government soldier, who were sentenced to execution by an Islamic court.

On 26 July, in Balva in Herat subdivision, Mojahedin camps were shelled by helicopters and six Mojaheds were martyred, but the Mojaheds managed to shoot down one helicopter.

On 29 July, a police post at Qandahar Darwaza in Herat District was destroyed under the command of Commander Fazal Ahmad. Three Afghan officers fled while thirteen were killed. A member of the Parcham faction was captured and later executed.

Balkh-Jowzjan Convoy

GF161638 Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 12 Aug 81 p 12

[Excerpt] Peshawar, 11 Aug (PPI/AAP)—Mojahedin operations against Soviet and Karmal forces continue. The Mojahedin attacked a Soviet convoy enroute to Balkh from Jowzjan killing a large number of Russians. Two tanks and three armored vehicles were set on fire.

In an attack on Soviet forces in Short Tappeh, the Mojaheds killed 35 Russian and Karmal forces and destroyed 2 tanks and an armored vehicle. Seven Russians were killed in Ghazni and an enemy tank was blown up. According to informed sources from Paktia, the Mojahedin ambushed a military vehicle on the (Garmgrevel) highway and destroyed it with rocket launchers, as a result of which 43 Babrak soldiers were immediately killed.

Government installations in Takhteh Pol area in Qandahar subdivision were attacked and two tanks and a truck were destroyed. Four persons were killed.

In Arghandab division in (Gali Manadi), a mosque was desecrated in an air attack by enemy forces. Two women became victims of enemy firing.

CSO: 4656/2

CABINET DECISIONS ON INFRASTRUCTURE, EDUCATION REVIEWED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 15 Jun 81 p 1

/Text/ Algiers (APS)--The cabinet met yesterday, 14 June 1981, at the residence of President Chadli Bendjedid, secretary general of the FLN Party, who also presided over the meeting.

The cabinet heard a statement by the prime minister on government activities during the past week.

Regarding the report of the minister of transportation and fisheries, after an examination of the general situation affecting the ports of the country the cabinet adopted a series of measures aimed at improving the situation affecting port installations, their functioning, and aimed at increasing their profitability. These measures essentially involve the following:

I. Use of the Ports

--The reactivation of the permanent programming and coordinating committee established by Decree No 75-72 of 17 June 1975, whose composition will be modified, taking into account the important ship operators directly concerned;

--The acceleration of port restructuring;

--The improvement in the storage of merchandise and particularly the encouragement of containerization;

--A study for the establishment of a system for the accelerated removal of strategic products from the ports;

--Improvement in the speed of unloading operations and the removal of merchandise from the ports;

--The recourse to combined transportation operations with the establishment of a specialized transportation company whose essential mission would be the removal of merchandise from the ports to company storage areas;

--The specialization of specific piers or even of ports and the construction there of appropriate equipment.

II. Regarding Equipment and Construction

1) Acceleration of planned operations and particularly:

--Equipping docks with engines to move ships;

--Reconstruction of the Annaba and Wahran storage silos;

--Electrification of the ports;

--Development of the open storage areas;

--Construction and conversion of warehouses, storerooms, and marine reception stations /gares maritimes/.

2) Improvement in the road and railroad networks as provided in the 5-year plan and more specifically these facilities in the port of Algiers.

3) Acceleration in the implementation of the different programs for the development of fishing ports.

III. Regarding Infrastructure

--Speeding up measures to protect and maintain existing infrastructure (jetties, docks);

--The need for continuous dredging of the ports;

--Modernization of mooring facilities;

--Study and implementation of the programs to extend commercial ports (Delles, Annaba, Mestghanem, Beni-Saf);

--Pursuing and accelerating the implementation of the different programs for the development of fishing ports;

--Construction of new ports and shelters for fishing by the national maritime construction companies;

--Establishment of container terminals.

The cabinet, after examination of the operation of the education and training institutions, and on the basis of a report by the minister of planning and national development, has ordered a series of measures aimed at contributing to better coordination of the education and training system, in the framework of the application of the resolutions of the Central Committee of the party.

These measures have been decided on particularly as they concern;

--Student health;

--Considerable reductions in school losses through the opening of new training systems and by the qualitative and quantitative improvement of already existing systems;

--School and university orientation programs;

--Intensification in the use of existing educational and training institutions, at all levels and in all sectors, and more particularly those for technical and professional training;

--Meeting the need for teachers and improvement in the quality of teaching by the application of a substantial program of permanent training;

--Assigning qualified personnel in the productive sectors;

--Planning for the Arabization of scientific and technological instruction, taking into account at the same time our progressive, real needs and our capacity to carry out these programs.

These measures, which are in the framework of coordination of the system of education and training, will be put into concrete form by announcements having a legislative and regulatory character, in accordance with a schedule to be applied in 1981 and 1982. A permanent national committee has been charged with supervising and implementing these activities.

In accordance with the instructions of the president, the prime minister has presented a report on the measures of assistance taken on behalf of the victims of the earthquake which affected the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard the prime minister read a report on the operations already carried out and those under way. Further, the minister of health, accompanied by the president of the Algerian Red Crescent, surgeons, specialists in epidemics, and specialists in civil defense, was sent to Tehran bearing a check for $1 million which will be turned over to the Iranian authorities.

The cabinet heard a communication from the minister of light industry on the most recent meeting of the Group of 77, which was held not long ago in Caracas.

The cabinet heard a communication from the minister of higher education and scientific research on the official visit which he has just made to Tunisia.

The cabinet heard a communication from the minister of housing and urban planning on the Algerian-Yugoslav agreement recently reached, bearing on the construction of 35,000 housing units.

Finally, the cabinet heard a communication from the minister of commerce on the official visit which he recently made to Portugal.

5170
CSO: 4519/21

PLANS FOR ALGIERS METRO TO BE UPDATED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 3

[Text]

Successive plans to build a Métro (underground rapid public transport system) are to be re-assessed and brought up to date under the terms of a contract signed recently between the Algerian government and SOFRETU, a subsidiary of the Paris RATP public transport authority. A report from Paris did not disclose the amount of money involved, but the comparatively modest sums earned by SOFRETU are only the tip of the iceberg for French exporters. SOFRETU had a turnover in 1980 of about FF 150 million (about $26 million at today's exchange rate) but its work led to exports by French manufacturers of more than FF 1 billion (about $175 million) in a sector in which there is stiff international competition, notably from Japan.

There is no shortage of plans for an Algiers Métro, but they date back many years and the latest was undertaken by the RATP in 1955. Under the terms of the new contract, SOFRETU will study traffic flows in Algiers and advise the authorities there on routes and on the most suitable form of public transport to cope with demand. The RATP operates both the Métro and bus services in Paris and the French are also well-placed to advise on tramways because an up-to-date network of tramways is to go into service in the French city of Nantes in 1983. SOFRETU is also able to advise on fares for the proposed public transport system.

SOFRETU was the company chosen to draw up plans for a Métro in Cairo, where work costing more than FF 1 billion is due to begin shortly, to be completed by 1985. It is also involved in construction of a 63-kilometre Métro system in Tehran. Work on this underground rail network was begun shortly before the fall of the late Shah but it has since been suspended by Iran's Islamic revolutionary authorities.

SOFRETU has carried out studies similar to those being undertaken for Algiers in Casablanca, where trams are being used, and in Tunis.

CSO: 4500/35

RESTRUCTURING OF THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR OUTLINED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 19-25 Jun 81 No. 904

/Article: "To Increase Profitability"/

/Text/ The evolution of our food needs, determined on the basis of a balanced, average food ration, and of the foreseeable population increase shows in the short and medium term that food dependence will continue to have a very heavy, specific impact on our national development. It is therefore vital, as the constitution states, to make every effort possible to achieve maximum self-sufficiency for our needs by our national productive apparatus. The restructuring of the enterprises of the agricultural sector falls into this category.

On the initiative of the minister of planning and national development, who is also president of the National Committee for the Restructuring of Enterprises, on 10 May 1981 the cabinet considered the project for the restructuring of enterprises depending on the MARA /Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform/. The cabinet adopted a program which, based on the need for a rationalization of activity and an increase in the profitability of new enterprises, will move in certain basic directions, such as specialization of new structures, decentralization, and the participation of producers in management.

In the framework of this reorganization, measures to accompany it have been prepared which tend in particular to improve the functioning of the various offices involved.

The establishment of these offices was based on an agricultural development policy aimed at providing the farm workers with a variety of specialized services. However, under the term "offices" are included organizations which are very different regarding their activities and their importance in the national economy.

The principal difference is based in theory between the offices taking action at the level of one enterprise or of several, similar enterprises, whose principal activity is the sale of the product or products concerned, either in the form of raw material or after providing them with a more or less hasty kind of processing, and the offices providing services to the whole of the agricultural sector (animal husbandry included), furnishing raw materials and factors of production.

In the first category of cffices may be included in particular the ONALAIT /National Milk Office/, the ONAPO /Algerian National Olive Products Office/, the ONCV /National Office for Marketing Wine and Wine Products/, and OAIC /Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office/, and the OFLA /Fruit and Vegetable Office/. In the second category are the ONAB /National Poultry and Meat Office/, the supervisory office of the SAP /Agricultural Provident Societies/, the ONAMA /National Agricultural Equipment Office/, the CPRA /People's Construction Projects of the Agrarian Revolution/, and the National Studies Bureau for Rural Development. However, in reality this distinction is not so precise. Certain offices even play a considerable role in production itself, such as the ONAB, which has its own centers for the production of chickens for meat and eggs for consumption.

Whatever the function of these offices, their role in fundamental in the framework of the steadily growing integration of the agricultural sector into the modern economic sector. It is therefore necessary for the objectives established for the various offices to be defined clearly and for their rapid growth to be accompanied more and more by very strict rules of management, both for the implementation of their investments as well as for their functioning.

The measures adopted concerning the various offices at the cabinet meeting of 10 May 1981 more specifically concerned the second category of offices: those which function principally to provide services. These are the ONAB, the supervisory office of the SAP, and the ONAMA. At the cabinet meeting of 24 May 1981 a program was adopted for the restructuring of two other offices: the ONALAIT and the ONAPO.

ONAB: Specialization and Decentralization

The restructuring of the ONAB will involve greater specialization and decentralization of its activities. It is essential to move toward a kind of industrial specialization which involves dimensions likely to ensure a maximum of efficiency in organization and in management.

In its basic statute the ONAB has the role of promoting the development of production of animal products; producing and selling food products derived from livestock; organizing and increasing poultry production; and rationalizing the production and distribution of red meat.

The ONAB will continue with its first mission concerned with animal nutrition, but new structures have been established for the opening of:

--three regional offices for poultry production

--three regional offices for the production of red meat

The coordination of all of these offices will be provided by a coordination and promotion committee at the level of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

The regional poultry offices have the function of producing and selling the items for further production: chicks, hatching eggs, etc; furnishing the producers with equipment, material, and products specifically needed for their activity; and helping in the establishment of specialized cooperatives.

The regional red meat offices, for their part, must: promote and develop production, processing, and distribution of red meat; fix the prices and sell the various meat by-products; and assist the producers on the technical level.

The official figures set out the framework of the productive activities of the ONAB for 1979 and 1980, as follows, in terms of its 2 principal activities: poultry production and livestock foods.

(Figures in Tons and Units)	1979		1980	
	Productive Capacity	Production	Productive Capacity	Production
Eggs for consumption	80 million	60 million	100 million	52 million
Eggs for hatching	15 million	13 million	16.5 million	15.1 million
Chickens for meat	3.9 million	2.09 million	3.9 million	2.24 million
By-products	90 tons per hour	297,900	120 tons per hour	268,896
C.M.C.			6 tons per hour	11,147
Capons /poulets demarres/	260,000	234,360	260,000	267,600
Chicks	26.9 million	18 million	99.9 million	17.9 million

According to this table, one can easily note that 1980 was principally characterized by:

--stagnation and even regression in production in the poultry and animal feed sectors;

--a still relatively low rate of use of capacity, compared with the existing production potential.

In 1969-70 the original facilities provided to the ONAB (established by law in 1969) were limited to six animal feed production units with an annual capacity of 45,000 tons and to two poultry centers. There was a rapid expansion from this starting point in the course of the 2 four-year plans for all three sectors of activity of the office. At present its facilities include: 15 animal feed production units already functioning, 2 units under construction, 28 poultry production units with other units under construction, and 19 animal fattening centers.

Nevertheless, if we compare the figures to the overall program of activity and to the level of imports, it is necessary to note that the indicated increase of 15 percent in the level of activity in 1980, together with the constant sales prices as compared to 1979, is certainly due to the sale of imported products, principally as far as meat and poultry products are concerned.

Satisfying Domestic Requirements

It must still be noted that estimates concerning imports seem to have considerable variations. Thus, in an article about the ONAB dated 12 May EL MOUDJAHID reported imports in the order of 500 million eggs for the first 4 months of 1981 (out of an overall annual target of about 1.5 million eggs) and of 800 million eggs in 1980.

ONAB: Comparison Between Its Level of Activity and Level of Imports

		1979		1980		1981 (Estimated)	
	Unit	Production	Imports	Production	Imports	Production	Imports
Poultry							
--Eggs for Consumption	1,000	53,017	527,700	51,971	64,900	98,000	1,382,000
--Eggs for Hatching		13,050	73,900	15,119	66,207	35,900	160,000
--Day-old Chicks/Meat		18,155	1,399	17,896	2,024	63,730	4,000
--2-Year Old Hens		234	110	268	404	1,030	424
--Chickens for Meat		2,094		2,204		3,384	
Lamb and Mutton	Ton	770	1,941 (frozen)	800	2,730 (frozen) 1,000 (fresh)	2,100	5,700 (frozen) 2,250 (fresh)
Beef	Ton	1,400	3,500 (fresh) 1,600 (frozen)	1,000	5,350 (fresh) 2,675 (frozen)	2,670	13,420 (fresh) 6,900 (frozen)
Animal Feed	Ton	308,245	89,362	268,896	82,356	804,000	175,400

In the coming decade the activity of the ONAB must be concentrated, as a matter of priority, on poultry production and the production of animal feed which, moreover, is closely linked to poultry production. The objective in mind is to satisfy nearly all national requirements for day-old chicks/meat and both egg-laying and sterile chickens by the end of the 5-year plan in 1984.

That presupposes a considerable increase in productive capacity:

--For egg-laying hens: more than 5 million female, day-old chicks by 1990; the requirements for 1984 will be met by present, installed capacity or capacity presently under development;

--For sterile hens: more than 5 million by 1990 and 1.6 million by 1984;

--For production of chicken meat: more than 106 million chickens by 1990 and 36 million chickens by 1984.

In principle the ONAB has no plans to take part in the production stage of chickens and eggs directly sold to the public. However, the development of consumption, particularly in urban areas, requires some regulation by the ONAB. That is why it has been decided that in 1984 the ONAB will produce about 20 percent of the national production of chickens and eggs, as compared to 15 percent in 1990.

This objective will require increasing the productive capacity of the ONAB itself, which in 1981 totals 14,000 tons of chicken meat and 20 million eggs for consumption. From now to 1984 the ONAB will also have to develop the capacity to produce 400 million eggs, which will then be turned over to cooperatives in the provinces.

Elsewhere, in terms of slaughtering facilities, the objective set for the ONAB, as a matter of priority, is to slaughter its own production. However, by 1984 the available capacity should be slightly greater than the strict needs of the Office (10,000 chickens per hour).

In all, the new equipment program for the ONAB for poultry production has been extimated as costing about 1.567 billion Algerian dinars.

Regarding animal feed, the objective is also to meet almost all requirements for concentrated feeds, which are estimated at about 1 million tons in 1984 and 2.2 million tons in 1990.

The development of red meat production (ONAB production only represents about 10 percent of national production) should take place in the framework of a project costing some 421 million Algerian dinars /DA/, of which 161 million will be provided under a loan from the World Bank. The component elements of this project are the establishment of three integrated slaughtering complexes in Annaba, Algiers, and Oran; the establishment of 12 centers for the purchase of sheep; the purchase of 30 trucks; the cultivation of 60,000 hectares of grazing plants /medicago/; the construction of sheepfolds in 120 self-managing farms; technical assistance and the training of personnel to go with it.

The draft 5-year plan prepared by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform pointed out that it was useful to recall that the ONAB, which because of its activities, is a very large organism, should study every possibility of improving its management. It is to meet this requirement that the recently envisaged new structures have been adopted: establishment of three regional offices for poultry production activity and three regional offices for production of red meat, as well as the institution of a coordination and promotion committee at the level of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform to ensure the coordination of all of these offices. Since the beginning of 1980 there has already been a headquarters organization encompassing the three sectors of specialized activity: one for production of red meat, a second for animal feed, and the third for poultry production.

However, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform itself has stated that since the new organizational structure has not yet been put in place, a certain kind of skepticism has been evident among some headquarters officials, involving a certain relaxation of effort which has been transformed with time into opposition to the restructuring process. It remains to be hoped that the measures recently adopted by the cabinet will take effect as quickly as possible so that "the confusing context of disorder and improvisation in which the varied activities of the Office have taken place up to the present" may disappear.

ONAPSA: Provisioning and Distribution

The legal existence of the supervisory office of the SAP [Agricultural Provident Societies] was recognized by a decision of the minister in October 1978. Its role then was to coordinate the activity of the local SAP's in the following areas: supplying the producers (fertilizer, herbicides, seeds, and plants in particular); supervising the CAPCS organizations [Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperatives] at the level of each region by the Ministry of Agriculture by means of the SAP groups; the work of clearing and preparing the land for planting (removal of roots and stones); the organization and development of rural artisan functions and construction of rural housing. The restructuring measures adopted by the cabinet on 10 May 1981 notably confirm the existence of a "National Office for Provident Societies and for Agricultural Service" (ONAPSA) and henceforth make a distinction between its principal activities and other activities. Its principal activities are providing and distributing elements essential in production (fertilizers and other chemical products, seeds and plants, animals needed for reproduction, and other products intended for agricultural production). Stocking and air conditioning, providing the areas of the Sahara with food, and production of packing materials constitute its other activities.

The development of agricultural production planned for 1984 will become apparent in a strong increase in the demand for products distributed through the SAP. The SAP organizations presently existing (98 in all, of which 7 are located in port areas) do not provide for adequate coverage of the country. Therefore the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform has provided for the development of 20 new SAP organizations in the course of the 5-year plan. Their location should be determined later, as a function of the programs of regional agricultural development.

The program for equipment of the supervisory office for the SAP as set out in the 5-year plan has been valued at about 1.223 billion DA (including activity concerning rural artisan activity: these total 31.5 million DA which are no longer included among the activities of ONAPSA), of which 136 million DA are allocated for the completion of activities already authorized.

Programs	In Millions of Algerian Dinars
Remaining to be Completed	136
New Programs	
Development of New SAP Organizations	16
Stocking of Non-Perishable Products	45
Stocking of Perishable Products	720
Transportation Facilities	175
Materials Required	100
	1,056

For 1984 requirements for non-perishable products are estimated at 1 million tons for fertilizers and 60,000 tons for herbicides. Installed capacity and that under construction are clearly insufficient in this regard.

It was furthermore decided to increase capacity for stockpiling these products up to 400,000 tons between now and 1984, which implies the construction of about 180 warehouses of 1,000 tons capacity each (thus involving an effective doubling of present capacity).

The consumption of fertilizers went from 332,000 tons in 1978 to 425,000 tons in 1980 (an increase of 25 percent), and the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform has calculated that the amount of fertilizer used in 1980 per hectare is 95 kg for the self-managing sector, 43 kg for the Agrarian Revolution sector, and 28 kg for the private sector.

With 30 percent of the useful agricultural surface (SAU) the self-managing sector is presently consuming nearly 56 percent of the total quantity of fertilizer delivered to the agricultural economy. The private sector is only consuming 22 percent of the fertilizer total; however, it is using this amount on 60 percent of the useful agricultural surface.

In addition to the marginal character of the use of fertilizer over the largest proportion of our agricultural land, we should also underline the problem of delay in making deliveries in timely fashion for the needs of the countryside.

The most important activity provided for in the 5-year plan concerns the creation of an infrastructure for stocking seed potatoes. The lack of a stocking infrastructure adapted to proper provisions for keeping the potatoes is a powerful brake on the development of domestic production and makes recourse to costly imports necessary.

At the end of 1978 the SAP organizations had a stock of 710 trucks, most of them very old and largely worn out, either in the normal activities of the SAP organizations or in seasonal activity, particularly in the plains areas (delivery of animal feed, for example). The SAP organizations are presently using other sources of transportation for about one-quarter of their total activity. The program set out in the 5-year plan envisages the purchase of 194 trucks, of which 120 will go for replacement purposes, bringing the total stock of trucks to about 800.

Land clearance activity has been carried on with equipment consisting of 163 bulldozers and accessories (rooters, trailers, tractors). This stock of equipment is also very old and needs to be added to and brought up to date. (100 million DA are provided for this purpose in the 5-year equipment program.)

For its part the National Agricultural Equipment Office (ONAMA) has the objective of supporting the development of agricultural mechanization by ensuring the distribution of agricultural equipment both imported and locally produced; the availability of replacement parts; and major repairs (lesser repairs are seen to by the CAPCS organizations). The ONAMA also distributes small-scale irrigation equipment and related replacement parts. Finally, since 1976 the Office has produced prime movers, disk harrows, and vats. Three of its units are presently functioning: at Hammon Bou-Hadjar, Mostefa Ben Brahim (Sidi-Bel-Abbes), and Guelma. Another unit is on the way to beginning production at Bou Saada.

The sale of agricultural equipment remains the principal activity (60 percent of the total) of the Office. It is accomplished through 29 shops (only the provinces of Adrar and Tamanrasset have not been provided with a shop) and an equal number of replacement parts stores. This basic infrastructure is supported by four regional directorates (in Algiers, Oran, Constantine, and Bou Saada) and by a central warehouse at the headquarters of the Office.

The ONAMA also has 78 vehicle shops which operate at the individual farm level, particularly during campaigns of national interest. They serve essentially to make up for the shortage of CAPCS organizations. Out of 690 CAPCS organizations only 387 have minor repair shops whose facilities are in general unsuitable, the equipment inadequate, and the personnel assigned not qualified. The extent of the problem of repairs and spare parts evidently depends on the condition of the stock of agricultural vehicles (transport and other equipment which is old and badly utilized). Hence there is a high ratio of equipment which is broken down, there is a substantial need for repairs, and there is excessive consumption of spare parts.

Level of Imports - Value in Thousands of Algerian Dinars

Products	1979	1980	1981 (Estimated)
--Spare Parts	77,538	138,221	-----
--Towing Accessories	7,913	21,065	-----
--Hydraulic Accessories	5,774	178,486	-----
--Processing Equipment	-----	18,056	-----
Total	91,225	355,828	375,000

These problems have been accentuated, both at the level of ONAMA as well as the CAPCS organizations by the lack of qualified workers (mechanics, electricians, welders), due to difficulties of recruitment and above all to the lack of stability of personnel already trained, who are attracted by more lucrative activities outside this sector.

In the course of the 5-year plan the extent of the activity of the Office will naturally be a function of the need for agricultural equipment which, at the national level has been calculated on the basis of the 1984 agricultural plan.

Regarding small-scale irrigation works, the objectives approved for 1984 cover 15,000 hectares and concern above all the renovation of already existing irrigated areas.

Equipment	Vehicle Stock, End of 1979	Purchases, 1980-84	Vehicle Stock, End of 1984	Increase, 1980-84
Tractors	37,900	36,400	51,830	36.6%
Mini-Tractors	550	3,720	3,630	560.0%
Combines	4,330	4,660	6,140	41.8%
Reapers	13,066	15,184	23,250	77.9%
Rakes	9,250	5,995	11,620	25.6%
Harvest Presses	6,000	9,670	12,670	111.2%
Miscellaneous Agricultural Equipment	80,623	87,187	137,810	70.9%
Prime Movers	14,640	13,010	22,150	51.3%
Seed-Drills	7,100	17,880	22,230	213.1%
Fertilizer Spreaders	6,270	15,650	15,650	149.6%
Processing Equipment	12,270	11,320	13,590	10.8%

The draft 5-year plan provides simultaneously for a strengthening of existing structures and their redeployment throughout the whole country. This naturally implies that their operational activities in support of agriculture should be decentralized to the provincial level. Therefore, there should no longer be a central warehouse of spare parts, nor areas for stocks, nor repair shops at the headquarters of the Office.

The changes that have taken place in the organization of the ONAMA and adopted by the cabinet on 10 May 1981 concern simultaneously the general functioning of the structure and the manner in which it functions. A distinction has been made among the various kinds of activity: distribution of agricultural equipment, management of spare parts, service after sales and repair of equipment and other activities; and technical testing of machinery with a view to standardization.

ONALAIT: Massive Imports

Two weeks after having adopted the scheme for restructuring three offices (ONAB, ONAPSA, ONAMA), on 24 May 1981 the cabinet also approved restructuring of two other offices (ONALAIT and ONAPO) which, contrary to those in the first group, can be directly attached to that first group, namely offices which operate at the level of a single farm or of several, similar farms, whose principal activity is the sale of the product or products concerned, either in an unprocessed state or after they have undergone a more or less hasty kind of processing.

The fundamental element in the application of national policy with respect to milk, ONALAIT operates at the level of collecting, treating, processing, and sales. Now, despite rapid development of its activity, presently the Office is far from performing the role which it should have.

At the end of 1980 the ONALAIT had produced 422 million liters of milk, about 74 percent of its real capacity (the 8 units belonging to ONALAIT then represented an effective daily production capacity of 1,635,000 liters). About 11 percent of the product consisted of locally produced milk and 89 percent consisted of recombined milk. The rate of use of local milk in ONALAIT production has recorded, moreover, a more and more evident decline (18 percent in 1977, 14 percent in 1978).

The Office reportedly does not even collect 50 percent of the quantity of milk produced by the socialist sector, estimated at some 90 million liters. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform explains this inadequacy in the collection by reasons which pertain to production (irregular production, absence of planning in the dairies, a lack of refrigeration equipment) and by reasons which pertain to ONALAIT: collection is certain only from treatment units from which the collection circuits are too long and the coverage of the production zones is incomplete; inadequate number of vehicles, many in bad condition, resulting in delays in collection schedules, irregular hours, and frequent cancellations. This is a situation which also results in deterioration in the quality of the milk (a large percentage of sour milk) and weighs heavily on the cost price.

Whatever the case, the present tendency threatens to end over the long term in production entirely dependent on foreign countries, unless a vigorous policy is adopted of stimulation of production and of improved collection.

Milk Production

TUC: Rate of Use of Installed Capacity
TAP: Rate of Increase of Production

Product	Unit	1979 Production	TUC 1979	1980 Production	TUC 1980	TAP 1980/1979	1981 Forecast
Processed Milk	Thousand Liters	371,684	73%	422,116	74%	14%	663,900
Of Which Local Production	"	48,400		43,500		-11%	81,000
Milk Products							
Yogurt	Thousand Pots	44,928	44%	68,552	67%	52%	117,500
Cheese	Tons	2,732	43%	5,072	81%	86%	8,206

Imports of powdered milk and of MGLA (fatty matter from anhydrous milk) increased in value by 68 percent in 1980, compared to 1979, although the quantities involved were almost the same: 43,000 tons for milk powder and 12,000 tons for MGLA.

We are therefore observing a very substantial increase in the price of these products on the international market, which threatens to increase even further our dependence on foreign countries. It therefore becomes more and more necessary to use the Algerian milk production potential rationally.

Elsewhere, as a result of a quantitatively inadequate system of distribution and particularly in the transport area, ONALAIT is not distributing its products to the retail level very well (poor coverage of the territory, substantial losses).

According to the program adopted on 24 May 1981 by the cabinet, the Office has been restructured into three regional offices provided with real autonomy of operation. They should become efficient through the reorganization of two distinct functions: collection and distribution.

Other measures have been approved, among which we should note the following: the prompt establishment of new offices within the country and the balanced division among the new offices of the officials and personnel presently working at the level of central headquarters.

The principal objective of the restructuring that has been approved evidently is to permit application of the policy adopted in terms of the development of milk production in the framework of the 5-year plan, which provides for a considerable increase in national production (estimated at some 930 million liters in 1984) and a slower development of imports. As a function of the approved consumption objectives, imports should total about 710 million liters of fresh milk equivalent in 1984.

This table makes it possible to note that:

--For milk, 1980 production showed a noticeable increase by comparison with production in 1979;

--For milk products an important increase in production was also noted, which probably means a greater skill in using installed capacities and a diversification of the products which ONALAIT sells on the domestic market. However, these products are far from satisfying the consumption needs of the people.

The equipment program for ONALAIT (1980-84), costing 2.121 billion DA (of which 1.44 billion DA are for the new program), places the principal accent on investments concerning the collection and distribution system, which represents 45.1 percent of the new program. The new program provides in particular for:

--the establishment of milk collection centers (400 million DA);

--additional credits to reach the capacity initially approved for the various production units (100 million DA);

--extension of existing production units(208 million DA);

--improvement of the distribution network (250 million DA);

--replacement and expansion of transport facilities (100 million DA);

--establishment of three units for stocking and maintenance (150 million DA);

--establishment of a packing unit (70 million DA);

--establishment of a central laboratory and equipment of a training center (20 million DA);

--social infrastructure (construction of about 300 housing units and employees' cantines (100 million DA).

The annual collection of more than 200 million liters of locally-produced milk presupposes the existence of a collection network throughout the production zones, with a daily capacity of about 1 million liters per day. About 50 collection centers, including the transport equipment necessary and refrigeration equipment should be built between now and 1984.

In addition, the improvement in the quality of milk and of milk products requires the establishment of a central laboratory for control of milk quality and technology, which will be built near a training center. The availability of qualified personnel is a prior condition for success in the development of the activity of ONALAIT.

ONALAIT only provides about one-quarter of the national consumption needs for milk and milk products and about one-third of the production sold commercially. By 1984, and if the production goals are achieved, a substantial portion of national production available for sale (about 240 million liters according to the provisions of the five-year plan) would be sold outside the framework of ONALAIT, in a distribution system in which fresh milk constitutes almost all of the sales. The draft 5-year plan in this regard provides for a type of organization of this distribution system which, in the present state of the pricing system, may have problems in surviving.

This system is presently characterized by a difference between the price of milk at the point of production, estimated at 1.50 DM /sic; probably should read DA, Algerian dinars/ per liter, and the sales price of pasteurized milk (1.20 DA per liter). The sales price of pasteurized milk, in the case of ONALAIT, is partially compensated for by the cost price of reconstituted milk.

ONAPO: Over-Equipped and Weakness in Production

After having examined the present situation regarding olive production and the difficulties met in this sector, the cabinet also adopted on 24 May 1981 a restructuring scheme for ONAPO /Algerian National Olive Products Office/, which is based on the following principles:

--development of activity to support production;

--modernization of processing units;

--organization of the collection and sale of olive oil.

Certain complementary measures were also adopted, including: taking in charge support and maintenance of the olive orchards before their entry into production. The cabinet also decided on the need to develop an overall policy concerning fats and oils.

ONAPO has the mission under law of directing the production of olives, of preserving and selling preserved olives, of pressing the olives for oil and of selling the oil resulting therefrom.

Its activity is dependent on the production of olives which, during the past few years, has shown a very clear declining tendency (aging of the trees, poor maintenance, lack of manpower, with the latter factor presently the most fundamental). However, the weakness in olive production is not the principal cause for the decline in ONAPO activities, which is not even succeeding in accepting a large proportion of the production of the socialist sector, its principal supplier. The following table, comparing olive production for each harvest of the past few years and the proportion of the production handled by ONAPO, is considered very significant in this regard.

	1975/76	1976/77	1977/78	1978/79	1979/80
Olive Production (Quintals)	2,200,000	1,160,000	890,000	1,500,000	900,000 (est)
Production Handled by ONAPO	397,170	271,354	64,928	254,288	99,000
Percentage	18%	23%	7%	17%	11%

ONAPO production (table olives and olive oil) is carried on by a network of oil pressing and canning centers. The Office presently has a network of nearly 40 production units, with a total capacity of about 730,000 quintals of olives, including 147,000 quintals of table olives and 670,000 quintals of olives for oil. Its production capacity is more than 9 million liters on the basis of an average return from the pressing of oil of 15 percent.

For the 1979/80 harvest ONAPO handled 99,000 quintals of olives /sic; in the chart above, as printed, production handled by ONAPO is given as 9800 quintals/ which represents a very low rate of utilization of installed capacity: about 14 percent. Olives handled by ONAPO, in turn, only represent 11 percent of the harvest.

Table olives handled in 1980 (18,000 quintals)--down by nearly 50 percent, compared to 1979--were clearly insufficient to keep the units working. Some 37,000 quintals coming from oil olives were therefore added to the total, which resulted in a use rate of nearly 35 percent of installed capacity for table olives!

Regarding the oil pressing capacity, only 11 percent of it was used. ONAPO sales on the domestic market last year were about 40,000 quintals at an average price of about 6.88 DA per kg and 1,364,000 liters of oil at an average price of 10.98 DA per liter. These quantities, which represented an increase compared to 1979, were nevertheless unexpected in terms of production, which led to the accumulation of substantial stocks that had been estimated at the end of 1979 to consist of 46,800 quintals.

Exports rose to 17,650 quintals for preserved olives, but the average export price was only 3.84 DA per kg in 1980, compared to 4.28 DA per kg in 1979.

In the framework of the 5-year plan it is planned to stimulate production of olives by replacing existing orchards and by planting new orchards. These programs should lead to a production of raw olives of 1,820,000 quintals by 1984. The objectives approved aim at having ONAPO process 690,000 quintals, of which 80,000 quintals will consist of table olives and 610,000 quintals will be olives for pressing; that is, 40 percent of total production and 66 percent of the production to be sold. This quantity will make it possible to utilize installed capacity at a rate of 54 percent for table olives and 91 percent for olive oil.

The investment program approved for ONAPO for the period 1980/84 amounts to 98 million DA, of which 7 million DA will come from funds left over at the end of 1979. The two most important categories in the investment program concern the acquisition of mechanical harvesters (31 million DA) and machinery for the further treatment of olive oil cake (26 million DA).

Faced with the difficulty of finding manpower to harvest the olives, a minimum program has been approved in the framework of the 5-year plan for the purchase of about 100 harvesters. The program also envisages the establishment of two repair centers, as well as the training of drivers and of repairmen and the provision of technical assistance (provided by the manufacture of the equipment).

As we have already pointed out, the restructuring programs adopted for the offices concerned (ONAB, ONAPSA, ONAMA, ONALAIT, ONAPO) aim principally at a rationalization of their activities in order to ensure an increase in their profitability. The measures adopted, particularly concerning specialization, decentralization, participation of the workers in management, certainly fit into this perspective. However, considerable problems remain, such as those affecting price.

To acquire the raw material indispensable for the operation of the already existing production units, the offices concerned find themselves pressed up against the constraint of prices which are fixed for them in the framework of the various harvests. They are thus in a position of weakness as against private buyers who can offer higher prices for speculative ends. And when they produce the products themselves, which they process or sell, the offices are also faced with a considerable dilemma. The cost price of their production or of domestic products such as fertilizer, milk, and eggs (whose production is insufficient to meet domestic needs) is always much higher than that of similar, imported products.

To ensure their financial stability, a process of equalization is considered essential. With a legitimate concern for profitability, since the results of their activity is judged on the basis of this criterion, how then can the offices concerned give priority to the primordial objective of the development of domestic production?

5170
CSO: 4519/21

BRIEFS

OIL EXPLORATION IN TANZANIA--Algeria's state-owned hydrocarbons group, Sonatrach, is to start drilling for oil in Tanzania later this month under an exploration scheme estimated to cost $7 million. The scheme provides for three months of exploration, including drilling a 4,000 metre-deep well on the Tanzanian coast. Sonatrach's contract is part of an agreement signed recently between the Algerian company and the state-owned Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation. Under the agreement, Sonatrach will also carry out a seismic survey. Both projects are being financed by a $10 million loan granted by Algeria to Tanzania last month. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 4]

CSO: 4300/35

DEFENSE MINISTRY BANS AREAS TO FOREIGNERS

PM071046 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Aug 81 p 8

[Report by Ahmad Husayn: "Defense Ministry Preparing Draft Decision Banning Presence of Foreigners in Some Egyptian Border Areas"]

[Text] The Ministry of Defense has prepared a draft decision banning the presence of foreigners in certain towns and military zones without a permit from the ministry and without being accompanied by a representative of border guard intelligence. These areas include the Canal provinces, with the exception of the towns of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez, which are to be entered from specific areas, and the provinces of Sinai, with the exception of the towns of Al-'Arish and Al-Qantarah and the tourist areas of the Gulf of Suez and St Catherine Monastery. The decision also bans diversions from the main roads between Alexandria and Matruh, Cairo and Rashid.

The draft also bans the presence of foreigners without a permit and without being accompanied by a representative of the border guard intelligence in the desert areas south of the line between Barnis and Abu Sinbil and the desert areas south and west of the line between Abu Sinbil, Wahat Baris Al-Dakhila, Al-Farafirah, Al-Bahriyah, Siwah and the Ra's al-Barr-Rashid road.

With regard to the Canal provinces the approach to Port Said is to be via Dumiyat or Ismailia which is to be reached via the Cairo agricultural and desert road, and the approach to Suez is to be via the desert road providing that the Al-Mu'ahadah road is used for movement between the three towns without deviating from this road.

With regard to the Sinai provinces the presence of foreigners here is banned with the exception of the towns of Al-Qantarah, Al-'Arish and Rafah, which are to be approached via the town of Al-Qantarah Gharb and the coastal road to Al-'Arish and Rapah. The tourist areas on the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba are to be reached via the Sadr coast road, Ra's Muhammad, Sharm Al-Shaykh, Dahab, Nuwaybi' and Taba. The St Catherine Monastery tourist area is to be reached via the Sadr-Wadi Firan road, the Catherine-Wadi al-Dahab road or the At-Tur-Catherine road.

With regard to Matruh Province, the presence of foreigners here is allowed with the exception of Egypt's western political borders and an imaginary line from the point north of Al-Qasabah on the northern coast east of Marsa Matruh and southward past the towns of Al-Qasabah and Siwah and along the western edge of the Al-Qattarah

depression to Qarrat Abu Shahin, south of the northern coast in the east and the Mediterranean coastal area in the north. [sentence as published] Also an imaginary line from Qarrat Abu Shahin southwest of the Al-Qattarah depression westward along the Al-Ahdathiyat line up to the western political borders with Libya in the south.

The draft allows the presence of foreigners in all the areas of the republic and their movement on all roads with the exception of the roads and areas specified above. The presence of foreigners is allowed in the desert spots between the Red Sea and the Nile valley and the Abu Sinbil-Aswan road in the company of a representative of border guard intelligence. Foreigners are also allowed to spend the night on the Mediterranean and Red Sea coasts in places to be defined by the Ministry of Tourism in coordination with the Ministry of Defense.

Owners and skippers of tourist yachts and boats engaged in tourism and other vessels are allowed to enter and leave ports considered legal ports of entry to the country. They can also dock their vessels in ports, harbors and islands on the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of Suez that have been approved by the Ministry of Tourism after consultation with the Ministry of Defense. When dropping anchor at sea, owners of these vessels should keep 1 km away from the coast by day and 2 km by night.

Those who violate these regulations will be punished by a maximum sentence of 3 months and a maximum fine of 100 pounds or one of the two penalties. Anybody helping a foreigner in violating this regulation will receive the same punishment.

CSO: 4504/57

MINISTRY STUDYING WORKERS' TRANSPORT TO LIBYA

NC061713 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1425 GMT 6 Aug 81

[Excerpt] Cairo, 6 Aug (MENA)—The Foreign Ministry and the authorities concerned are busy preparing a study containing several proposals for regulating the travel of the Egyptian workers to Libya via Malta and resolving the problems and the obstacles facing the workers and putting an end to the attempts that are being made to exploit them, according to Foreign Ministry Consular Department Director Ambassador Kamal 'Abd al-Rahman in an exclusive statement to MENA.

Ambassador 'Abd al-Rahman added that the problem arose because the Egyptian workers destined for Libya are concentrated in Malta awaiting visas to enter Libya.

He said that the Egyptian authorities have taken urgent measures to resolve the problem of the workers' concentration by suspending additional flights [to Malta] and making the resumption of these flights conditional upon the flow of the workers from Malta to Libya.

Ambassador Kamal 'Abd al-Sama [as published] pointed out that the Egyptian Foreign Ministry had sent a committee to Malta under the chairmanship of Consular Department Deputy Director Ambassador 'Abd al-Mu'im 'Atiq to study the problem. In the light of the committee's report, several measures have been taken to resolve the problem, including a request to the interior and tourism ministries to contact the travel and tourist companies which have been transporting the workers to prevent any exploitation [of the workers]. Another measure is to follow up the efforts of the Egyptian Embassy in Malta to provide suitable accommodation for the workers during their waiting period, which could be as long as 1 month because of the delay in granting them entry visas to Libya, and to agree on reasonable charges for the accommodation of the Egyptian workers in special places allocated for them.

Ambassador Kamal 'Abd al-Rahman said that the (Halfar) area, which is close to the airport and which is a former British forces camp in Malta, has been prepared [for the Egyptian workers]. It can accommodate 750 persons.

He pointed out that during the Foreign Ministry Committee's presence in Malta on 14 July, the number of Egyptian workers there reached 1,300.

CSO: 4504/57

DECREE NAMES HIGHER PRESS COUNCIL MEMBERS

NC042226 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1310 GMT 4 Aug 81

[Text] Cairo, 4 Aug (MENA)—A republican decree was issued today forming the Higher Press Council was follows:

The Higher Press Council will be formed under the chairmanship of consultative council chairman Dr Muhammad Subhi al-Hakim. The council will include as members:

The AL-AHRAM establishment board of directors chairman, 'Abdallah 'Abd al-Muttalib 'Abd al-Bari;

The AL-AKHBAR establishment board of directors chairman, Musa Sabri Kamil;

The DAR AL-TAHRIR establishment board of directors chairman, Abd al-Muhsin Muhammad 'Abd al-Muhsin "Muhsin Muhammad";

The ROSE AL-YUSUF board of directors chairman, Abd al-'Aziz Khamis;

The DAR AL-HILAL establishment board of directors chairman, Makran Muhammad Ahmad;

The AL-TA'AWUN board of directors chairman, Mamduh Rida;

The OCTOBER magazine board of directors chairman, Anis Muhammad Mansur;

The AL-AHRAM chief editor—the AL-AHRAM establishment, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Fattah Nafi';

The AKHIR SA'AH chief editor--the AL-AKHBAR establishment, Muhammad Wajdi Qandil;

The AL-MASA' chief editor—the DAR AL-TAHIR establishment, Samir Rajab 'Ali Sharaf;

The SABAH AL-KHAYR chief editor--the ROSE AL-YUSUF establishment, Louis Jiryis;

The HAWWA' chief editor--the DAR AL-HILAL establishment, Su'ad Ahmad Hilmi;

The agricultural magazine chief editor--the DAR AT-TA'AWUN establishment, Muhammad Basyuni 'Amirah;

The MAY chief editor, Ibrahim 'Ali Sa'dah;

AL-AHRAR chief editor, Wahid Ghazi;

AL-SHA'B chief editor, Hamid Zaydan;

The jouranlists' DOYEN, Salah al-Din Muhammad Jalal;

The Information General establishment director, Muhammad al-Shafi'i 'Abd al-Hamid;

The MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY board of directors chairman, Muhammad 'Abd al-Jawad Mansur;

The Radio and Television Union board of secretaries chairman, Muhammad Safwat al-Sharif;

The chairman of the Trade Union of Publication, Printing and Press Workers, Muhammad 'Ali al-Faqi;

The National Distribution Company board of directors chairman, Dr Husayn al-'Amri;

The Writers Union chairman, Tawfiq al-Hakim.

The council also includes the following public figures: 'Abd al-Mun'im Mahmud al-Sawi, Dr Jamal al-Din al-'Utayfi, Dr 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Nimr, Dr Muhammad Kamil Laylah, Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, Dr Husayn Muhammad Nassar, Dr Khalil Sabat, Dr Yahya abu Bakr, Dr Husayn Mu'nis, Muhammad Tharwat Abaza, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, Ihsan 'Abd al-Qaddus, Salah'Abd al-Sabur, Amin Muhammad 'Adli, 'Abd al-Hamid Ahmad Ibrahim Hamrusy, Hafiz Mahmud, Mahmud Zaki 'Abd al-Qadir, Aminah Ahmad al-Sa'id, Sabri Abu al-Majd, 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abdallah, Jalal Mustafa 'Isa, Ahmad Zayn al-'Abidin Mahmud "Ahmad Zayn," and Muhammad Salah al-Din Muntasir.

The council also includes two legal members: 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali Mansur and Dr Ahmad Salamah Muhammad Salamah.

This decree shall be published in the Official Gazette.

Issued at the Presidency on 24 Ramadan, 1401, corresponding to 25 July 1981.

CSO: 4504/57

BRIEFS

SABOTAGE ORGANIZATION TO HIGHER COURT--Cairo, 13 Aug (MENA)--The higher state security prosecution today referred another sabotage organization, the Misr al-'Urubah organization, to the High State Security Court. The organization includes three accused persons, two of whom are unemployed and currently fugitives while the third is a student who has been placed in custody after his arrest at Cairo airport. This student had been sent by the organization to detonate the explosives he had hidden in a recorder set in some public places with a view to terrorizing people and shaking confidence in the regime. The organization operates for the rejectionist states--namely, Syria, Algeria and Libya. These states have financed the organization and enabled its members to pursue its antagonistic activities. Moreover, they had entrusted the third accused person with transporting the explosives, after having trained him on how to detonate the explosives, and had given him $100 to pay the customs fees for the recorder set in which the explosives had been hidden. [Text] [NC130704 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2258 GMT 13 Aug 81]

CSO: 4504/57

INTERNATIONAL WEEKLY INTERPRETS POLITICAL HIGHLIGHTS

Bahonar's Problems, Priorities

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 33, 14 Aug 81 pp 1-4

[Text] Iran's first clerical prime minister, Hojatoleslam Mohammad Javad Bahonar, formed his cabinet this week against a background of growing signs that the consolidating of the IRP's grip on all sections of the administration could yet have arrived too late.

As Bahonar appointed his ministers and outlined his plans, among which reestablishment of security was one of the priorities, more prominent regime figures were attacked by gunmen and bombing and shooting continued unabated in Tehran and up and down the country.

As other victims, this time of the revolutionary guards who make up the firing squads for the revolutionary courts, succumbed to the guns in scores, public unease at the steadily rising slaughter became more and more widespread. People were heard asking if there was no-one who could bring back the country to sanity.

More ominously the picture of the stresses which are responsible for the unrest became a little clearer as Tehran sources reported the first signs of a possible split among the fundamentalists.

Clergy associated with the Fedayeen-e-Eslam (the Iranian Moslem Brotherhood) were said becoming increasingly angry over the predominantly lay IRP's increasing moves to eliminate the merchant community, which has traditionally supplied them with their financial needs. And as the IRP continued to promise a Marxist-type economy and the elimination of all middlemen, so there were signs that some of the fundamentalist clergy might be prepared to do battle with the IRP.

In addition the admissions of now exiled Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi that his organization could not be responsible for all the bombings going on in Iran backed up the opinion of many other observers that other forces are involved in them. There were even suspicions that sections of the armed forces could be involved as part of a campaign to eliminate prominent figures before a possible military move to take over the country.

Leftist sources have begun to voice fears (echoed in Paris in clandestine interviews by former president Bani-Sadr this week) that the bulk of the army still retains

loyalties to the Shah and the old order. Bani-Sadr told the Paris daily Liberation that "the biggest danger to Iran is the re-Americanization of the country." He said one of the main reasons for his flight to Paris was to "prevent pro-U.S. tendencies among the opposition to Khomeini filling the vacuum created by the clerical despots."

Some observers saw this as a tacit admission by Bani-Sadr that the military in Iran had refused to follow him and that they shared the opinion of most Iranian politicians and observers that Bani-Sadr had proved a failure and had no future. Though Bani-Sadr himself continued to argue that he has great support among the armed forces and cited his method of escape as evidence, it did not escape notice, too, that he said he had not asked the military to make a coup because he objected to their playing a dominant role--another suggestion that he knew they didn't really want him.

The Arab Report and Memo, a Paris-based Lebanese owned publication, quoted an observer this week as saying that "the Shah's army—and there is still a lot of the Shah's army left--hates the Mojahedin as much as the IRP does," and suggested the Mojahedin were also aware that the army would move to take power swiftly from them if the Mojahedin did overthrow the government.

The stories of defections by rank and file soldiers during the last months of the Shah's reign were much exaggerated in the Western and Iranian press, according to most people in Iran at that time. Right up until the final surrender of the generals to Khomeini the vast majority of the forces maintained their loyalty to the Shah and the war with Iraq is said to have brought back much of the old esprit de corps. If the old commanders are gone the new ones are frequently men in their image, just as Beheshti, Bahonar and other of the new rulers of Iran are in the image of their mentors like Khomeini. It would be naive to imagine that two years of revolution have transformed the thinking and political outlook of a part of the officer corps, never mind the whole of it, most experts feel.

If any group of officers is planning to move, however, it is felt there is no great urgency from their point of view. This is not simply because of the need to carry on the war, but the plans of the new premier, even if they can be implemented, threaten to alienate still larger sections of the public than previous changes, while those involving the indoctrination of the armed forces, now admitted to be an urgent task, by the Bahonar government, will take a long time to formulate or being to take effect.

In the meantime more of the Mojahedin will be killed, along with more regime figures and revolutionary guards. Any coup will thus be a matter of good timing.

The rift between sections of the more radical mullahs, too, will play into the hands of opponents of the IRP. Past experience has shown that the secular as well as the clerical radicals have little capacity for temperate action and the likelihood is that any conflict will become bitter and divisive. This again can only strengthen the more moderate clergy. Indeed, many observers estimate that the regime cannot claim the complete loyalty of more than 10 percent of Iran's estimated clergy corps of 150,000.

There are also suspicions among the clergy that Bahonar and the IRP contemplate a shaking up and restructuring of the religious set-up in Iran sometime in the future. Many mullahs would be reduced to lay status and an entirely new radical and clerical nucleus would dominate the scene.

Before that Bahonar has made it clear he intends to introduce young revolutionary elements into the administration. Observers interpret this as portending the likelihood of his introducing a bill which would disband the present civil service and allow him to introduce his younger radical elements in its place.

"Bahonar contemplates something similar to the plan implemented by Khaddafi in Libya," one Iran watcher told IPS. "The difference is that Iran already has institutions, unlike Libya when Khaddafi took over, that stand in his way. There's the bureaucracy and there are many other areas of society where Bahonar must face obstacles which Khaddafi did not have to fear.

"It should also be remembered that Pahonar served for some time as liaison man between the Fedayeen-e-Eslam and the pro-Moscow Communist Tudeh party, and it is generally suspected that he developed considerable interest in Marxist and Leninist ideas during that time. Although his comparative sophistication makes him seem a moderate at times, people who know him better say he is a leftist of deep convictions who will prove to be just as ruthless as Beheshti."

Security, inflation and unemployment top the list of problems to be tackled by new premier Bahonar's government, according to an outline he gave after his appointment had been approved by the Majlis.

Restarting industry and providing proper facilities for production, purges of the bureaucracy, a cultural revolution with employment of young and revolutionary forces, strengthening and stabilizing the policy of the government, embracing neither East nor West, fighting against consumer or luxurious living, reducing wealth, producing an administrative and employment system that would annihilate the bureaucratic system, bringing civil service salaries into line with the cost of living, strengthening the cultural and ideological beliefs of the people, and strengthening the armed forces and producing a revolutionary and doctrinaire atmosphere among them were other items he listed.

Bahonar said he was choosing his ministers from among doctrinaire officials who were politically on the line of the Imam. They must be revolutionaries with administrative abilities, and, "where possible, we must find people who are experts in their fields."

His foreign policy would be built on relations with liberation movements. "Our overall policy will be to protect the oppresses masses of the world," Bahonar said, "and to annihilate the superpowers and cut off their domination of the Islamic world."

Bahonar promised he would put an end to the terrorism that is taking a daily toll of both prominent figures and opponents of the regime. He would also aim to eliminate the misunderstandings and discord planted by American agents, an apparent reference to former president Bani-Sadr.

Bahonar said the society, which had suffered so badly from internal divisions because of the "liberals," now needed harmony and homogeneity.

Observers do see the possibility of harmony at the top of the IRP now, with Rajai as president, Hahsemi Rafsanjani as Majlis Speaker and Bahonar, all these former comrades in arms over many years. This providing they all survive the wave of killings sparked off in recent weeks.

Aged 47 Bahonar was a pupil and disciple of Khomeini and a member of the clerical school of Khordad 15 (June 6), known by the date of Khomeini's first unsuccessful attack against the Shah's White Revolution and its reforms in 1963.

Later, along with the late Ayatollah Beheshti, the assassinated Hassan Ayat, Rajai and Jalaleddin Farsi he was involved in setting up the Rifah religious school, which became the secret centre for the radical section of the clergy. It was no coincidence that Khomeini set up his headquarters there when he first came back to Tehran.

Raja'i-Mitterand Fracas

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 33, 14 Aug 81 pp 3-4

[Text] Many French and foreign observers were left mystified by what appeared to be amazingly clumsy handling of the crisis with Iran by the government of French president Francois Mitterrand. It was generally conceded that they had made "a very poor diplomatic show."

On Tuesday Iran's president Mohammad Ali Rajai metaphorically flung a congratulatory telegram, sent to him by Mitterrand as a palliative, back into the French president's face.

"You are giving armaments and Mirage aircraft to Iraq, and at the same time you wish me success," Rajai said in a reply to Mitterrand. "Certainly one of these is untrue and the vigilant peoples of Iran and France know full well which one is a lie." Rajai added that it was an historical disgrace that Mitterrand had turned France into a refuge for criminals, murderers and terrorists, an obvious reference to the granting of political asylum to his predecessor Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi.

"That was really rubbing Mitterrand's nose in the dirt, for he had done everything to abase himself publicly to the Iranians since the tension broke, including freeing the blocked gunboats bought by the previous regime. Why ever the crisis was allowed to blow up to the proportions it did--seemingly a calculated move by Mitterrand's administration--if there was no plan to deal adequately with any consequences, is beyond imagination," said one French commentator.

The French press was sore at the harm to their country's prestige, even though the taking of any hostages was avoided and the majority of the French community in Iran was safely out of the country by midweek.

The socialist daily Le Matin, observing Mitterrand's diplomatic defeat, regretted that Bani-Sadr had not conformed to French instructions to remain silent so as not

to interfere with the political dealings and asked, "Did he not contribute in some way to increasing tension between Paris and Tehran?"

In Tehran itself the controlled handling of the crisis by the administration enabled its forthright comments on French actions to have their maximum effect. Crowds demonstrating in front of the French embassy were disciplined and in addition to the humiliations heaped on the French verbally the success of the Iranians in forcing the French to travel home on Iran Air flights instead of on a special aircraft sent for them brought in about $70,000 of extra revenue for Iran!

As the French government cut off Bani-Sadr's telephone and barred nearly all visitors some French commentators as well as Iranian exiles could hardly help comparing his treatment with that given to Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris in 1958. At that time Khomeini and his henchmen were allowed to talk to the press from the whole world, as well as receive countless visitors.

In addition, some asked if the isolating of Bani-Sadr might not be extended to other exile opposition leaders like Bakhtiar. "We could all become scapegoats or even hostages in the hands of a left-wing French government," one exile commented.

Also angering the exiles is the fact that Bani-Sadr and Rajavi, if allowed to talk freely, could well have been able to project a much truer image of the vicious character of the clerical regime than has yet been possible. This could have brought new pressures onto the Iranian regime from the outside world, they say.

Refutation of Bani-Sadr Denials

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 33, 14 Aug 81 pp 4-6

[Text] A claim by former president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, in a letter to the left-wing French daily Le Monde, that he had opposed post-revolutionary executions in Iran and advocated public trials of leading personalities of the Shah's regime so the people could see the truth, was refuted by a former revolutionary colleague in Hassan Nazih this week.

Nazih, who ran the National Iranian Oil Company immediately after the revolution, told IPS he was witness to the "complaisant silence" of Bani-Sadr when he and others were protesting about the executions at meetings of the revolutionary council.

"He never opened his mouth to back us or condemn any of the reported executions of innocent people," Nazih said.

Bani-Sadr claimed in his letter that he had no responsibility for the formation or functions of the revolutionary courts, which were independent from the revolutionary council.

The former Iranian president was replying to criticism of him by Shahpour Bakhtiar, the main exile opposition leader in two television interviews. Bani-Sadr confirmed in his letter that he created obstacles between Bakhtiar, when he was premier, and Khomeini because, he said, "Iranians wanted to liberate themselves from U.S. domination and Bakhtiar had compromised himself in campaigning against Mossadeq intellectuals after 1953.

Bani-Sadr also denied any responsibility for the excesses of "hanging judge" Khalkhali, who he said was a religious judge appointed by others, not him. In several letters to Khomeini, Bani-Sadr said, he had complained about Khalkhali's excesses. (Bani-Sadr, however, did appoint Khalkhali as head of the anti-narcotics squad and it is widely believed that many political opponents of the regime were executed by him on the false grounds of their being drug-traffickers.)

Bani-Sadr also contended that his successful escape in a military aircraft was evidence that he enjoyed considerable support from the military in Iran.

Finally he reaffirmed that he considered the independence of Iran could not be maintained outside Islam. Islam and autocracy were incompatible, he said, and he again accused Bakhtiar of compromising with the Shah and "presiding over the slaughter of Iranians when he was Prime Minister.

In an interview with IPS' Paris correspondent Nazih, forced out of office and then out of the country by the fundamentalists several months after the revolution, said that Bani-Sadr was "totally involved" in the hostage-taking, bloodshed, despotism and other tragedies which had overtaken Iran, and he dismissed Bani-Sadr's attempts to absolve himself.

It was Bani-Sadr, he said, who climbed onto the U.S. embassy wall in Tehran after the hostage taking and declared, "If there is a way to declare war on America then this is it, the way shown by the students of the Imam's line." Nazih accused Bani-Sadr of being one of the instigators of the hostage-taking.

Nazih, himself a lawyer, also ridiculed Bani-Sadr's claim that his dismissal from the presidency was unconstitutional. He said Bani-Sadr voted for the constitution, and under it his dismissal as absolutely legal.

And, finally, Nazih said, Bani-Sadr had during his presidence blamed Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Beheshti and others for what was wrong, while it was Khomeini himself who was the "mother of corruption." Yet Bani-Sadr had declared his acceptance of Khomeini's Imamate.

Nazih added that he felt the Mojahedin had made a great mistake in joining with Bani-Sadr, who represented nothing and had no power or popular base. This demonstrated that the Mojahedin were young and still very inexperienced, he said.

In an interview he gave to the French daily Liberation which startled many readers with its misture of vanity and naivete, Bani-Sadr later described Khomeini as "my greatest error." He said it was he who wrote Khomeini's speeches while he was in France, and if Khomeini had become leader of the clergy "it was because of us revolutionaries, the intellectuals whose weight has been brought down to zero in the last two and a half years."

Imputing to himself the characteristics and qualifies of famous figures in Iranian literature (incidentally in a work banned by the Islamic regime he helped to set up) Bani-Sadr said it was his wife who had urged him to resist Khomeini and had given him courage. (Some confusion seemed to exist during the week over the whereabouts of his wife; Ayatollah Reyshahri, the military revolutionary prosecutor, was quoted

in the Tehran press as saying she left with her husband, but there was no trace of her on the plane which brought Bani-Sadr out of Iran).

According to Bani-Sadr the war against the Kurds was part of a plot to topple him. (Observers were quick to point out that Bani-Sadr himself rejected a six-point proposal from Kurdish leader Democratic Party leader Qassemloo to solve the crisis, and that afterwards the former president told the troops not to take their boots off until "the counter-revolutionary armed gangs" had been cleared from Kurdestan.

Qassemloo, however, did not let this stop him offering Bani-Sadr a haven with his forces. "You have passed your examination brilliantly," Qassemloo told me," Bani-Sadr said.

The former president went on to describe the present regime in Iran as the most tyrannical in Iran's entire history. He accused bazaaris who supported Khomeini of having been allowed to make gigantic profits (the equivalent of 30 billion francs was a figure for this quoted recently for last year alone).

"I tried to make of Khomeini a revolutionary eternal spirit, but his brain cannot reflect such grandeur," Bani-Sadr was quoted as saying.

He also claimed that "for the first time in the history of mankind," as commander of the army, he succeeded in dividing up the powers of the commanders with the ordinary soldiers. "I promoted many ordinary soldiers to the rank of officer," he said.

The former president rejected any attempt on the life of Khomeini or a military coup, giving as his reasons his objection to any more bloodshed or civil war, and also to the army occupying a dominant role in the country.

Asked what remained of the revolution in Iran, Bani-Sadr replied, "Nothing—just nothing."

New Hope for Monarchists

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 33, 14 Aug 81 pp 6-8

[Text] Whether it was merely the fact that Iran was in the news again, or simply because those looking after the new Shah's public relations took the trouble to circulate copies and tapes of his speech in good time for once, there was no doubting the renewed interest in Reza Shah the Second by the western media last week.

With Abolhassan Bani-Sadr on the run and seemingly heading for limbo perhaps the pressmen were looking for a new anti-Khomeini figure to restore the familiar tyrant-opposition set-up they appear to see everywhere but in their own countries, some Iranians observed.

Surprisingly it was the Guardian in Britain which chose the bold headline "Shah calls for national revolt" and gave it two-column prominence. Some readers thought that this paper, which seemed to relish the Islamic revolution so much in its early stages and whose staff have been bitterly disappointed that their former friends, with their brutality, have made the Shah look like a kindergarten mother in comparison, had been sold to a Repert Murdoch or a Tiny Rowlands.

The speech, which suggested the monarchist cause was by no means as lost as many of its opponents had hoped, was given prominence around the world, particularly in Persian language broadcasts into Iran. Some Iranians gleefully seized on this as evidence that Western governments were suddenly on their side and against Khomeini (a speaker in Hyde Park solemnly announced that he had evidence that the British government had "withdrawn its support for Khomeini"). But it appeared more likely that some unexpected efficiency from the public relations people in Cairo was the prime cause.

There was no doubt of the boost the new statement by the Shah provided for the majority of exiles, who had become critical recently of the monarchist lobby's seeming inactivity. In London it was promptly announced that a march to support the monarchy and mark an important day in Iran's post-war history, the 28th of Mordad, when the coup d'etat which returned the Shah to power took place in 1953, would be held on August 19. It will start at the Albert Hall at three in the afternoon, and march through kensington High Street.

The London community also became noticedly more vehement in its cries of "Long Live the Shah" at a charity concert which brought a packed audience to Kensington Town Hall last Saturday night. Many people seemed to have found renewed hope of returning home following the flight of Bani-Sadr and the reports of widespread violence inside Iran.

The concert, the third organised by a body called the Institute of Concerned Iranians which has distributed many thousands of pounds to really needy Iranian exiles, again raised a large sum of money. One woman alone purchased £2,400 worth of raffle tickets for prizes of small value.

Although the institute's workers are solidly pro-monarchist it gets the support of many exiles who have an open mind on the subject, since no-one else has got down to the job of helping the less fortunate section of the community. Latent feelings for such an ancient monarchy among average Iranians are being brought out again as the exiles become more nostalgic for home but ardently hope for a more civilized regime to live under than the present one.

Some observers of the Iranian scene have expressed firm opinions that the reason the armed forces did not move to support Bani-Sadr on the Mojahedin is that there is little sympathy for them among the soldiers and airmen, who still retain old allegiances to the monarchy.

A number of publications recently have commented on signs that support for the Shah remains high in Iran, especially in the armed forces. The Arab Report and Memo (See 1) contended the military still contained "many of the Shah's men" according to its sources.

The publication makes the same cardinal error, however, as have most foreign observers of the Iranian scene in the last couple of years, in saying that the mullahs can hold onto their power "like the late Shah...through a combination of repression and the fact that those who hate the regime do so for many different reasons and they are unlikely to come together."

The late Shah did not in fact need the limited repression he employed to stay in power, for until the mullahs were able to whip up an incredible frenzy against him in 1978 the vast majority of Iranians supported him either enthusiastically or because they saw no reasonable alternative to his rule. Leftist intellectuals and extremist mullahs, in combination, failed to erode that support until the Shah himself and his advisers demonstrated the most startling political naivete and loss of nerve that caused even many of his stoutest backers to look for security somewhere else. Even then it was a firm belief that the Americans and other westerners had decided the Shah's time was up that convinced so many who abandoned their monarch.

A realization that whatever the shortcomings of the late Shah's reign, and the excesses of both some of his Savak agents and money-seeking friends, life was far happier and hopeful than it is today is now widespread among even ordinary people in Iran. They frequently express this view to people they trust but are kept mute publicly only by the atmosphere of terror that the regime has managed to induce, Iranians who have been at home recently say.

"Indeed, it would be astonishing if they didn't think that way, for life is fast becoming thoroughly miserable for nearly everyone," one businessman with British residence who returned to Tehran to try to get his business moving again, told IPS. "The death lists at the prisons and the war front, the fear that it could be your relatives next, the complete absence of any feeling of stability, are creating a dangerous mood that could unleash much worse bloodshed than we have so far seen.

"I honestly believe that anybody who turns up in Tehran and says he's the Shah will get himself a huge following. They'd take anybody if it meant a return to some sane way of living again. The world just doesn't appreciate this--everything has changed in the past few months. Even the Mojahedin have lost their following except among the adventurous young. People are already pointing to the fact that the Mojahedin behaved as badly as anyone else in grabbing jobs, causing trouble in offices and being completely impervious to argument after the revolution."

The fear that the Mojahedin, along with all the other political ideologues, would impose the same oppression as the present regime is yet another reason for people feeling nostalgia for the Shah's regime, he said..."even if there is an element of 'the devil you know'...in their reaction."

CSO: 4600/145

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ SAID TO BE 'ON VERGE OF FATAL SPLIT'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 8 Aug 81 pp 6-8

[Text] Some Iran watchers feel the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, until now the biggest and best disciplined and armed force in opposition to the mullah's regime, may be on the verge of a fatal split.

They point to an alleged "final testament" of Mohammad Reza Saadati, the Mojahedin leader executed in Evin prison last week, which appeared in the Ettela'at daily in Tehran after his death. In it he expressed his view that the Mojahedin organisation had taken a wrong step in backing Bani-Sadr and the other so-called liberals, and they must change their policy and support Khomeini, who was "the symbol of the masses' anger."

Ettela'at said it knew that many people would be sceptical about the authenticity of the alleged statement left by Saadati, but it could be seen to be in his genuine handwriting.

Saadati, one of the Mojahedin leaders, was arrested some months after the revolution when he was in the process of handing documents to a Soviet agent. He was later charged with spying for the Soviet Union and faced the death penalty. But pressure from leftist groups in Europe helped to earn him better treatment, and he was finally sentenced a few months ago to 10 years' imprisonment on the spying charge.

The fact that Saadati was known to be close to the Soviets suggests that others like him in the Mojahedin movement might follow the example of the majority of the Marxist Fedayeen movement which split into pro- and anti-fundamentalist groups some time ago. The pro-regime group have been actively working with the pro-Moscow Tudeh (Communist) party and with the regime in Iran. Some observers now see the possibility of a big section of the Mojahedin, certainly of the leadership, joining up with the Tudeh, leaving the remainder of the movement to continue their opposition stance.

"This would be fatal to the movement and would neutralise it as a powerful force against the regime," one observer said. "There could even be further splintering which could reduce it to minimal importance."

The flight to Europe of the best-known Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi is seen as another indication that there are divergences of views among the leadership. The periodical Moghavamat (Resistance), published by a group of leftist intellectuals, posed the questions this raised.

At a time when Iran was in such chaos Rajavi, as a known fighter, should surely have remained in the country, it said. His departure was undoubtedly a blow to the Mojahedin morale. What everyone would like to know, in these circumstances, was whether he left the country of his own accord or was it a decision of the organisation's central council that he should leave?

"If we knew the answer to that, we could get a better idea of what is happening behind the scenes with the organisation's leadership," a London observer told IPS. "We don't even know how the leadership works, whether it is a loose organisation with various better known people working on a freelance basis, or whether it has a close liaison body at its head. Rajavi may just have made his own decision to quit and try a new tack from outside, or he may have been sent to ensure the Mojahedin has a place in a leftist opposition set-up working abroad."

Rajavi's statement to reporters that "Khomeini is worse than Hitler" was bitter music to many of the exiles who heard it, for they were quick to point out that Rajavi was among the early supporters of the Ayatollah and continued his support long after the course of the Islamic republic was clear.

As for the alleged Saadati statement observers said there was no proof that it was a genuine document in spite of Ettela'at's claims and the idea that he would sit down and make such a long document just before his death, or would confess to any part in the killing of the Evin prison governor did not fit in either with his earlier conduct or his character.

Iranians who talked to Mojahedin demonstrators in Europe in recent days said there was no doubt, however, that they were in doubt as to what was happening with their leadership. They continued to demonstrate round the world against the regime in Tehran and its killing of their colleagues, but one interested observer said they were concerned as to the meaning of Rajavi's flight and the future policy of the movement.

Some people saw the reported allegation by Bani-Sadr that elements in the regime were preparing the way for a takeover by the Soviets as a sign that the Russians were trying to break up the Mojahedin movement and draw a segment of it to their side. Saadati, they pointed out, was definitely the Russians' man. This could explain Rajavi's decision to quit along with Bani-Sadr, they said. If some of his colleagues were already heading in the Soviet direction he may have felt his own fate would be sealed if he remained.

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SITUATION ANALYZED AFTER BANI-SADR'S FLIGHT TO PARIS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 8 Aug 81 pp 4, 5

[Text] An Iranian journalist gives his assessment of his country's first ever president.

"Bani-Sadr--joins others in elegant exile in Paris" said the caption under the newspaper photograph showing the former president, smiling smugly just below photographs of himself on the walls of a typically smark Iranian home-from-home in Paris.

It said so much about Iranians, about their pre-revolutionary foolhardiness, their post-revolutionary mindlessness, and the feeling each and everyone shares that he is an innocent, well-meaning, even admirable person who has absolutely no responsibility for the bloodletting and othersavagery that have inundated what in the last decade of the Shah's rule became a society in the modern sense for the first time.

Bani-Sadr is credited with fighting tooth and nail against any move by moderate colleagues to stop the anarchy that was inevitably taking over Iran in the last weeks before the Shah left. Even Mehdi Bazargan, whose own ambitions were merely to be prime minister and not to slaughter all those who served the Shah, and Ibrahim Yazdi, who felt God had given him a special responsibility through years of devoted prayer in the alien western world, felt there could be some use in dealing with then premier Shahpour Bakhtiar; but Bani-Sadr, the mullah's son who at that time was driven by the same fanatical drive for revenge of his father's colleagues, in addition to a driving ambition to be Iran's first president, would have none of it.

For him saving Iranians' lives was less important than ensuring he achieved his ambitions. Later as chairman of the revolutionary council he shrugged his shoulders and said, "What can I do?" as many innocent people were dragged before the firing squads. He was quite happy to remain head of state for a regime which countenanced even the stoning of women on occasions, saw nothing incongruous in claiming "liberal" and advanced socialistic ideas while fellow socialists were imprisoned and ill-treated and even executed.

And when he felt his powers decreasing, he saw nothing incongruous, either, in trying to paint himself as a knight in shining armour trying to save the damsel in distress. He started attacking those he had appointed, like the crude Ayatollah

Khalkhali, for their excesses, he refused to cooperate with those who refused to concede him the almighty stature of a president of a country like the United States.

And as he saw the blood spill again as he pushed his campaign against the fundamentalists to absurdly imprudent lengths it seemed he gloried once more in the spilling of blood for Islam, a favourite delight of fanatical Iranian Muslims. It seems never to have occurred to him to temper his extremism to help save the lives of more courageous supporters. "You see, they die for me," he seemed to be gloating.

Once in Paris he was happy to claim the young Mojahedin girls and boys whose blood was spilled so freely by the mullahs had died in his cause. And he promised they would give more of their blood for his and spill more of the blood of other Iranians to give him, Bani-Sadr, the seat on the revolutionary Peacock Throne once more.

The reason why the Bani-Sadr sitting there, beneath his own portrait in a comfortable pad acquired miraculously without his having gone through the greater part of his life without doing a day's work, is such a sinister figure is that he combines the passionate ruthlessness of the leftist revolutionary with the fanaticism of the extremist Muslim.

Khomeini and his Shi-ite henchmen kill with the finality of men who believe that those who are against them are against humanity in general. They say "God" but, in fact, they believe they are the guardians of all decent humanity. Like all of their kind they are nearly all the sons of mullahs, steeped in a medieval, anachronistic fundamentalism that western societies still pride themselves, throughout their literature and art in having virtually obliterated from societies.

Look at their family histories and you will see that they and, as often as not, their fathers, uncles, brothers and cousins have spent their whole lives writing, preaching and meditating in a prescribed prison of thought, closed to that of other faiths and philosophies in most cases, through several generations.

See the archives in Lucknow library in northern India which detail the works written by the antecedents and relatives of Khomeini himself, whose grandfather left Lucknow for Iraq in the mid-19th century and never returned. Khomeini's family mausoleum is still there in a village 60 kilometres from Lucknow, along with the ruins of a religious school which they endowed and staffed. Islam was their life and the subject of their lives' studies. Khomeini's distant relatives still staff the Shi'ite library and the college in Lucknow, along with the descendants of other fundamentalist families who until recently never thought about anything except Islam.

They and so many other of their Shi'ite conferees in Iran have masticated and churned Islam into an imbroglio of tortuous thinking that allows no escape. From being an appeal to the better instincts of man and a code for his living in a way that will please a deity, Islam has been turned into a tyrannical barrier against progressive thinking and liberation from medieval prejudices and super-

stitions. It says little for a people with such a long history of culture and original thought as the Iranians that they should become the most bloodied victims of fanatical religious prejudice since the days of the Spanish Inquisition. It suggests a frightening degeneration.

Herein lies the tragedy of the situation in which Iranians find themselves today, one which turns up people like Bani-Sadr who confuse the media treatment of freakish revolutionaries with adulation and admiration, the relish of journalists for other people's distress with feelings of genuine concern, the fanaticism and brutality of the modern left with something less ignoble than the imperialism of the past.

While Bani-Sadr remained in Iran, trying to cope spontaneously with a human situation, perhaps he had some hope of helping settle his society onto some reasonable course. Back in the West, where his religious background and mental limitations always made him a misfit, seeking reassurance with other oriental misfits like Le Monde writer Eric Rouleau and intellectual luxuriates who despise ordinary humans with ordinary tastes, he can only revert to the insignificance that frustrated him for so long.

Insignificant, that is, to Western society. With both Khomeini's supporters and the majority of the exile communities seeking his blood he must stand a fair chance of winding up in Paris' Muslim cemetery. He'll soon be forgotten, for just as Muslims happily obliterate their cemeteries after a few years, so they accept the temporality of life and the causes of it. Non-Muslims, contemplating the phenomenon of the Islamic revival, could well cogitate on that.

CSO: 4600/141

'DEVIATED' BANI-SADR CONTRASTED TO 'LOYAL SON OF KHOMEYNI'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Aug 81 pp 1, 3

[Article by Ahmad Fargah]

[Text]

'ID' CAN be defined as 'Return'. Within the Islamic perspective, 'Id Al-Fitr signifies the blessed occasion for the reunion with the authentic 'Self' of the Moslems. It also commemorates a triumphant day - the graceful day following the ultimate victories achieved in one month of committed resistance to the inner desires. This is because, after the triumphant sanctifications in the sacred aspiration towards a divine temperament, the purified individual will be blessed with the holy potential for an antagonistic confrontation with the satanic adversaries. The Moslem nations celebrate the auspicious occasion of 'Id Al-Fitr. The Moslem Iranians also cherish the sacred memories of the historical revolutionary incident of the Prayer Congregation of 'Id Al-Fitr,' held in 1979 under the leadership of martyr, Ayatollah Mofatteh on the Qeitarieh hills. This sacred ritual made a decisive contribution to the inevitable downfall of the Royal Autocrat, the Shah.

'Id Al-Fitr of the current year is also historically significant since, on such a graceful occasion, the leader of the Islamic Revolution officially consigned the presidential authorities on the second President of the Islamic Republican regime. According to the Islamic Constitution, the consignment of the presidential authorities is the exclusive commission of the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Imam Khomeini, in accordance with Velayat-eFaqih. Still, we should expound on the motivating factors behind the downfall of ex-President Banisadr. It must be noted that the ousted President Banisadr had a dreadful temperament and had no faith whatsoever in Islamic Jurisprudence.

Despite the initial warnings of Imam Khomeini against any alterations in behavior after being elected President, the ousted president made considerable changes in his ideas and behavior. Consequently, he severely denounced the occupation of the U.S. 'Spy Den' by the Moslem followers of the Imam's line (this unprecedented incident has come to be recognized as the second Revolution). Banisadr also granted full freedom to the anti-humanitarian splinter-groups for their out-lawed political activities and armed oppositions. He even issued a certificate for arms possession to the deviationist members of the Mujahedin Khalq. In short, Banisadr assumed a hostile attitude to the Imam and the Moslem nation.

The faithful Moslem nation could no longer endure the antagonistic attitude of the ex-President Banisadr. Thus, they flooded the streets to stage demonstrations against him. The 17 million people who cast their votes in favor of Banisadr thus withdrew their votes of confidence. Moreover, 30 million demonstrators shouted, 'Down with Banisadr' and demanded that the Islamic Consultative Assembly legislate a Bill, advocating the political incompetency of President Banisadr. Subsequently, the Islamic Majlis ratified the aforementioned Bill and Imam Khomeini issued a decree to remove the deviated President.

Afterwards, Banisadr, who failed to bring about severe clashes on July 24th (the second round of the Presidential Poll) escaped from Iran, disguised in women's clothes and accompanied by the notorious saboteur, Masoud Rajavi.

We, hereby, present you with some questions and the replies which one would expect from the dishonest news correspondents of the Western media who disseminate provocative propaganda against the Islamic Republican Regime. However, these news media have been completely and utterly disappointed in their futile attempts to soil the prestige of the Islamic Revolution.

The crucial questions are as follows:

1) Why did Banisadr finally escape, despite all his exclamations concerning fortified resistance to the Imam and the Moslem nation.

2) What is the relationship between the ousted Banisadr, the fugitive terrorist Rajavi, and the private pilot of the deceased shah, Colonel Moezi. After all, the toppled President Banisadr in his interview with the BBC the facist voice of England, has assumed full responsibility for the planting of the bombs and it was the counter-revolutionary saboteur, Rajavi, is the instigator of the fatal armed oppositions on June 20, 1981.

3) What is the relationship between the fugitive Banisadr and Kazem Rajavi, the former representative of the deceased shah to the U.N.? After all, in the course of his robbery of the classified documents from the Foreign Ministry, Fazli Nezhad, the former representative of the Office of the ousted Banisadr also made efforts to steal the papers concerned with the salary of Kazem Rajavi who had been employed with SAVAK. It is significant to note that Kazem Rajavi has been assigned as the official interpretor for the negotiations between the French government and the Iranian crew of the plane which took Banisadr and Rajavi to France, since the Iranian crew have requested to return to Iran.

4) Finally, what is the relationship between the U.S. and the toppled Banisadr? After all, the documents in the U.S. 'Spy Den' have certified that Banisadr, was the economic adviser of a trade company in the U.S. Does it mean that the aforementioned trade company had to employ Banisadr as the only qualified economic adviser?

We fervently hope that the naive supporters of Banisadr and Rajavi will not be further deceived by the treacherous frauds of these fugitive counter-revolutionaries. The alert Iranian nation will no longer be enchanted by Western ideology of 'Nationalism' which annihilates human values. In this respect, the Iranian Moslems cast 13 million votes in favor of Rajai as the pious, devout believer in the Islamic School of Thought. Moreover, President Rajai, the genuine manifestation of Islamic values, has permanent scars due to tortures inflicted during the tyrannical reign of the shah.

President Rajai is also honored as the loyal son of Imam Khomeini, as well as his faithful follower. President Rajai also cherishes the conviction that even the slightest deviation from the righteous path of Islam will motivate the nation to withdraw the 13 million votes of confidence. In the event of such a calamity, the Imam's conviction will be substantiated for the Imam, warned President Rajai, in case of violation of Islamic Jurisprudence, the 13 million voters would shout, "Down with you." This is the genuine origin of the Revolution. Such is the Islamic Revolution.

CSO: 4600/146

NEW SHAH TELLS SUPPORTERS: BE PREPARED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 8 Aug 81 pp 9, 10

[Text] Reza Shah the Second, in a message to mark the 75th anniversary of Iran's 1906 constitution, has told his supporters and opponents of the Khomeini regime they should be ready to rise against the present Tehran regime.

"Prepare yourselves," he said. "Many things are going on behind the scenes both in and outside the country...Things will happen very shortly...groups are well organised and will soon be showing themselves."

He also warned his compatriots against thinking it was in the hands of foreign governments to take action to change things in Iran. "That is wrong," he said. "It is in our own hands, and we must show the foreign governments we mean business."

The new Shah said action must be taken soon, for the present regime was not capable of doing anything but kill. If it continued with the slaughter, the country would inevitably disintegrate, and foreign governments would intervene.

Saying the so-called revolution was a true one, he said it was the duty of all Iranians, including he himself, to fight for the constitution of 1906. He pointed out that leading religious figures had a hand in making that constitution, the best Iran had ever had and which had been torn up in 1979.

Since then the Iranian people had learned an expensive lesson, which was that without a proper constitution a government could not govern.

CSO: 4600/143

PRINCESS ASHRAF 'WILL FIGHT ON'

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 8 Aug 81 p 10

[Text] Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, twin sister of the late Shah, told a French television interviewer this week that it saddened her to think of the readiness of the French government to give asylum to president Bani-Sadr when they were not prepared to offer the same facility to her late brother.

But she said she was not going to retain much rancour about things like that now.

The Princess said she would continue her political struggle against the regime in Tehran and would not give it up until the new Shah (her nephew) was on the throne.

She added that she was not afraid of terrorists, for attempts had been made on her life before and she was used to living with security.

Meanwhile monarchist groups, mostly young people, have continued their demonstrations outside Iran against the regime in Tehran. At the Iran Air office in London on Tuesday they tore down photographs of Ayatollah Khomeini and distributed photographs of the new Shah.

CSO: 4600/143

PERSECUTION OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 8 Aug 81 p 9

[Text] Fears that a systematic eradication of all Bahais left in Iran is being planned by the mullahs regime there is being voiced by foreign Bahai sources as news seeps out of Iran of more and more executions of members of the Bahai community in the past couple of weeks.

There are also renewed reports of Jews being arrested in greater numbers and more executions threatened. The numbers held are said to be much higher than has been publicised in the West, but fears that any new protests could lead to the killing of many of those held have muted complaints, according to some Jews in Europe.

"The problem of Iranian Jews in exile is the same as that of Bahais and, of course, Muslims whose relatives are left in their home country at the mercy of thugs," one former Tehran Jew told IPS. "If we open our mouths the mentality of those mullahs is to slaughter a bunch of our people to demonstrate their implacability.

"What do we feel when we read that Israeli suppliers have been sending arms and spare parts to Iran, presumably with the open consent of the government, and then Israeli planes go and bomb the nuclear reactor of the opponents of the Jew-baiters in Iran?" he asked. "We wonder what marks out us Iranian Jews an unworthy of the support and protection of our brethren."

The main complaint of Iranians--Muslims, Jews, Bahais and the so-far reprieved Christians--is that international organisations and governments who pay lip service to human rights have failed to voice their opposition and condemnation of what is happening in Iran.

"The reason we can be singled out for revenge so easily by the murderous mullahs is that others not involved in the slaughter hardly say a word for us," one Bahai told IPS. "Amnesty tells us they can only make representations on our behalf if we give them names and details, but if we do those people back in Iran will surely slaughter another group of our relatives. While there's life there's hope."

Certain aspects of Bahai religious beliefs also tend to discourage them from making complaints that sound like calls for revenge. When asking sympathisers outside Iran to speak up for them they have also encouraged them to refer to attacks on Bahais in Iran during the time of the late Shah, imagining they will

gather further sympathy from this. Instead many of their Muslim compatriots have been angered by what they see as gratuitous attacks on the late Shah, who has himself been strongly criticised by many fanatical Muslims for allowing Bahais to take prominent positions during his regime. The Shah deliberately protected the Bahais in the last years of his reign and favoured prominent members of the faith over Muslims for a number of key positions.

This is not to say that prejudice against Bahais during the Shah's regime was not widespread. The followers of the faith have always been seen as heretics by devout Muslims. But violence against the Bahais in Iran has always occrred at the instigation of the Muslim clergy, never as a voluntary action by a government until the past two years when the clergy became the government, it is pointed out. Ordinary Iranians have contained their prejudices over the centuries to demonstrate a tolerance of other races and beliefs second to none.

CSO: 4600/143

FUTURE OF IRANIAN KRUPP HOLDINGS DISCUSSED

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 1 Jul 81 p 170

[Interview with Minister of Industries Herawi]

[Text] No indiscriminate layoffs

The Iranian state, which owns 25 percent of the shares of the German steel enterprise Krupp, prevented the firing of 5,000 steel workers. Iranian Minister of Industries Herawi, who is a member of the Board of Directors, explains why.

Question: Your vote in Krupp's board of directors did away with a plan of reorganization which would have eliminated 5,000 jobs. Why?

Herawi: Indiscriminate layoffs are not in accordance with our Islamic ideology.

Question: Is your veto really based on purely religious principles?

Herawi: The fate of people in the production process is more important to us than economic considerations. We feel that we are doing the right thing when people get what they are entitled to, including their right to work. In this respect we met with success at Krupp; the spontaneous approval of the members of the enterprise council and of a great number of steel workers confirms this.

Question: A shareholder is usually concerned about profits. What is your role in Krupp? As member of the board of directors do you consider yourselves as representative of the interests of the employer or of the employees?

Herawi: According to our principles there ought not to be any contrasts. Islam is opposed to any kind of power structure in factories.

Question: How do you put that into actual practice?

Herawi: The leaders and the workers of an enterprise are all members of the same community which produces to benefit everybody.

Question: The European steel industry is struggling with overproduction. Did you realize that your opposition against the reorganization plan will make the perilous condition of the Krupp factory even worse?

Herawi: We do not reject every reorganization plan in advance.

However, we are primarily concerned that the workers will not become the only victims. Indeed, our philosophy of life is not based on materialism. This distinguishes us from the actions of Western capitalism and the materialistic point of view of Eastern socialism.

Question: How can you reconcile your ideology with the chance that if Krupp's rationalization plan is deferred more than 5,000 jobs could be lost in the future?

Herawi: Your argument that by terminating thousands of jobs other jobs can be saved is actually absurd. In a famine-stricken country it would be tantamount to demanding that 300,000 persons be killed to allow the rest of the people to have something to eat. At Krupp we stuck to our ideas. After our action the management presented a new plan. And behold, suddenly another solution is found.

Question: Why do you approve of the new plan? Krupp's leadership says that 4,000 jobs are yet to be eliminated.

Herawi: To us it is important that nobody gets fired. The plan to mothball steel foundries in Hagen which would make 2,000 workers jobless is definitely out. The elimination of jobs at Krupp will exclusively be achieved through accelerated pensioning and leaving vacancies open. The members of the enterprise council agree to this.

Question: From now on will Krupp's management policies be decided by Tehran and your ambassy in the Godesberg Allee?

Herawi: Not at all. That role was only forced upon us because the labor union apparently neglected to protect the interests of the workers.

Question: The labor union, in particular its member of the board of IG Metall Rudolf Judith, who is sitting beside you in Krupp's board of directors, as deputy chairman, is probably not in agreement.

Herawi: That is most likely. Based on my knowledge of the situation I am not surprised that Judith would have agreed to the plan of mass layoffs if we had not been against it.

Question: Is this your answer to Judith's attack on Iran accusing it of flagrant disregard of the rights of its workers?

Herawi: I do not feel at all that I am under attack. That man does not know what he is talking about. Mr Judith is upset that he was outperformed on the left by the Islamic Republic. Some labor leaders are therefore now diverting public attention away from their own shortcomings. Did IG Metall show concern with the fate of Iranian workers when they were oppressed and exploited under the regimen of the Shah?

Question: How are workers treated differently under Khomeyni?

Herawi: Iranian workers are now actually in charge of their factories. They have a voice in all problems of management policies and should in the future (we are working on this) help to decide what should be produced and for what reasons. For instance, everybody should then be involved in a decision on sales to South Africa. That is our form of participation in management.

10319
CSO: 3105/156

USE OF CHEMICALS IN IRAN WAR DENIED

JN121828 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1750 GMT 12 Aug 81

[Text] Baghdad, 12 Aug (INA)--A military spokesman has denied the news reiterated recently by the Persian information organs in which they claimed that the Iraqi forces had used chemical substances in the (Tamarshin) mountain area west of the Iranian town of Piranshahr.

In a statement to INA, the military spokesman said that this claim is baseless and is part of the campaign of lies and falsehoods launched by the Iranian regime.

The military source regretted that an international agency like REUTER, citing the Persian PARS NEWS AGENCY, carried these lies without scrutinizing them or linking them with the background of this regime, which is based on lies and fabrications.

He stressed that victorious Iraq, which derived its victories from its sound human and national position, does not need to resort to such an act. He added that if Iraq had been in need of such action and if it had approved it, it would have used it earlier and against more important military positions than those referred to. He pointed out that the Iranian enemy is engrossed in the course of lies and falsehoods with the aim of covering its repeated defeats before our valiant army.

He said that by such claims the enemy may have also meant to prepare for the employment of internationally banned weapons which its ally Israel may be trying to get it to use, as it previously used napalm and phosphor bombs against our valiant army, which was not shaken by them.

Concluding, the military spokesman warned the Iranian regime against falling in the trap of Zionism by using internationally banned weapons. He said that this regime should always remember the consequences of its previous wicked acts.

CSO: 4304/119

'BAGHDAD RADIO' ATTACKS SYRIAN FOREIGN, DOMESTIC POLICIES

JN181855 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1615 GMT 18 Aug 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Upon reviewing the course taken by the Syrian regime since assuming power, we find it abounding with political, security, economic and national crises as well as with acts contrary to international norms and charters.

A few days after the hostile war imposed on Iraq by the Persian enemy began, the Syrian regime tried to pretend to be neutral. However, when it learned of Iraq's victory and of the defeat of its allies, the Persian aggressors, it quickly unveiled its real face and began to offer the Tehran rulers various forms of military, economic and political aid, the last of which was placing Syrian airspace and land at the disposal of the Persian enemy, knowing that this enemy not only threaten Iraq's security, sovereignty and territory, but also publicly threatens the entire Arab Gulf region's security, sovereignty and independence.

By so doing, the Syrian regime sought to alleviate the impact of the Persian regime's defeat. Nevertheless, the Persian enemy continued and is still continuing to receive painful blows by our armed forces' heroes. Moreover, the impact of the Iranian internal crisis and internecine fighting among the regime's leaders has escalated. The Syrian regime considers those leaders its allies, portraying each of them as a legendary hero of revolution, progressiveness and leftism.

After the Syrian regime failed to solve its exacerbating domestic problems and crises, it began to look across its border, searching for a certain role that could justify its evasion of confronting one of the Syrian Arab people's national struggle issues, that is, the issue of the occupied Golan Heights. Due to geographic, political and security considerations, the Syrian regime found in Lebanon the opportunity to play the role it wants as well as the role drawn up for it. As it has interfered in Lebanon in vain for 5 successive years, it moved and in so doing moved the situation toward an explosion as well as toward the worse. The Syrian regime practiced all forms of intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs. It drew the sword of its terrorism against the national forces and the independent press; it abducted free writers for expressing their objection to this regime's heinous role.

The Syrian regime's objective in Lebanon was and is still that of consecrating the abnormal situation there and keeping Lebanon a weak follower subjugated to its will.

Therefore, when there were signs of the victory of the Lebanese nationalist movement and the Palestinian resistance over the rightist forces and when Lebanon got very close to an end to the bloodbaths, thereby beginning an epoch of stability, the Syrian regime, with a green light from the United States and the Zionist entity, sent its troops to Lebanon in order to occupy it, strike at the Lebanese nationalist movement in favor of the rightists and consecrate the bleeding and disruption in Lebanon, thus serving the capitulatory settlement plans in the region.

When the Arabs try to help Lebanon solve its political, security and other problems and when they try to boost all accord proposals made by the official Lebanese authority or by other local national quarters, the Syrian regime immediately foils these Arab and local efforts. For instance, the Syrian regime has deliberately foiled all Arab initiatives and solutions beginning with the Riyady summit resolutions in 1976 and ending up with the ninth Arab summit conference in Baghdad as well as the Tunis and Amman summits. It has also deliberately and out of evil intent foiled all national initiatives and national accord proposals, beginning with the round table, the broad front and the program of the nationalist movement for national accord, and ending with the Lebanese Government's 14-point national accord plan and the attempts to form a national accord government comprising all disputing forces on the basis of faith in Lebanon's unity, Arabism and independence.

Internally, the Syrian regime is suffering from several crisis, most prominent of which might be the growing opposition which expresses itself daily through various militant forms. Hence, in an attempt to abort the role of this opposition, the Syrian regime spends large sums on its intelligence organs in order to carry out acts of terror and suppression against citizens both inside and outside Syria.

CSO: 4304/119

INCREASED OIL OUTPUT PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 32, 15 Aug 81 pp 44, 45

[Article by Michel Szwed-Cousins]

[Text]

IRAQ PLANS to build new pipelines within the next two years to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This was revealed in London on 31 July by the Iraqi oil minister, Abdel Karim Tayeh. He said the decision was prompted by the difficulties caused by the war with Iran, which he believed could carry on for some while yet.

Compared to the 3.5m b/d Iraq exported before the war, mainly through the Gulf, exports are now down to just under 1m b/d, passing through the two Mediterranean pipelines to Syria and Turkey. The lines, however, are running under capacity and the branch from the Syrian line into Lebanon is not used, says the minister, because of difficulties with Damascus.

Both the Saudis and the Kuwaitis have agreed to the two new pipelines. The Saudi line, about 1,400km long and with a capacity of around 1m b/d, will have its outlet on the Red Sea. Abdel Karim Tayeh did not mention where, but it is expected to be Yanbu, the terminal of Saudi Arabia's own new 1,215km trans-Arabian pipeline which cost $1.6bn. Shipment from Yanbu started last month.

The pipeline through Kuwait will be 400km long and carry slightly less than the Saudi one. This means that when both are complete, Iraq should have an export capacity not much less than pre-war.

Proposals to build a pipeline to Aqaba in Jordan were not considered feasible because of its proximity to Israel. However, Abdel Karim Tayeh announced that Iraq was thinking of building a refinery in Jordan and supplying the country with oil. This is because of Amman's support for Baghdad against the Iranians. Until now Jordan has taken most of its oil from Saudi Arabia. This latest idea, it is thought, will entail building a third pipeline to a point other than Aqaba to fuel the proposed refinery.

Abdel Karim Tayeh was in London (the third Iraqi minister in recent months to visit the British capital) to discuss Anglo-Iraqi cooperation in oil development. Among those companies he is hoping to bring to Iraq are BP and Shell. Iraq wants to 'set up new relationships' with the two, which would include allowing them to lift Iraqi oil once more.

On pricing, the minister said that Iraq would revise its prices if there was a corresponding repricing of goods the country imported. Inflation would also have to be taken into account. However, he believed that Opec would shortly act to coordinate both pricing and production policies amongst member states. African members of Opec — Libya, Algeria, Nigeria and Gabon — recently met in Tripoli and called for such a summit.

At the meeting, the question of Saudi production will predominate. The Saudis, said the minister, 'expressed readiness to reduce production' when oil ministers from Islamic countries met informally in Taif in Saudi Arabia on 15 July. He believes the Saudis will start cutting production by about half-a-million barrels a day this month. But, whatever way it is done, it will be gradual. The Saudis are producing 10.3m b/d at the moment, but they are believed to be willing to cut back if others agree to a basic reference price of $34 a barrel.

A call for moderation in pricing and production policies has also come from another quarter in the Iraqi oil ministry. Its head of research, Muhammad Ali Zainy, writing in the *Opec Review* last month, called for production to be determined by the development requirements of each country concerned. Rejecting both consumption-linked production policies or those wedded to conservation as harmful to the interests of present and future generations, he called for production to be related to internal investment.

CSO: 4300/89

BRIEFS

FRG WINS TRAIN CONTRACT--Thyssen Henschel of West Germany have won a DM 250 million (about $101 million) contract to build 82 locomotives for the Iraqi government. Deliveries are due to start at the end of next year, according to reports from London. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 9]

CSO: 4300/91

ISRAELI AIR FORCE SEEN MAINTAINING QUALITATIVE SUPERIORITY

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Apr 81 pp 10-13

[Interview with David 'Ivri, Air Force Commander, by Aharon Lapidot; date and place not given]

[Text] Recently events involving the air force directly or indirectly have become the center of public attention. Subjects such as air battles in the skies of Lebanon and the downing of Syrian MiG's, terrorist attacks, the integration of modern aircraft by countries of the region, development of the Lavi aircraft, and so forth are making headlines.

The commander of the air force, Maj Gen David 'Ivri, consented to give a special interview to BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in which he commented on the above subjects.

[Question] General 'Ivri, the past few months have been marked by intensive activity especially in southern Lebanon. Can you summarize the activity of the air force in the north recently?

[Answer] The air force's activity in southern Lebanon is intensive and is carried out in accordance with the government's policy of Israeli initiative against the terrorists. When a target is clearly and precisely identified, the air force goes into action and attacks--understandably, through the selection and determination of target priorities. One of the most important criteria for a target selected for attack is the certainty that it is not a civilian target but a terrorist target.

We have had very good success to date in the precision of the attacks and the reliability of carrying out the missions. Recent events have been especially marked by frequent use of helicopters. The helicopters have been operated in coordination with the ground forces and have taken part in many ground operations.

The Syrians are finding themselves between the hammer and the anvil. The Israeli attacks are causing the terrorists to put pressure on the Syrians to intervene. The Syrians, who feel committed to the terrorists, react and attempt to prevent the air force from carrying out its missions. Their objective is not only the attacks but also our reconnaissance flights.

[Question] Was this the reason for the air battle of 13 February?

[Answer] Yes. Already in January we detected a Syrian tendency to disrupt our reconnaissance flights. The disruptions continued into February and we were alert to it. We sensed a tendency to provoke a clash on certain reconnaissance flights, and on these flights we reinforced ourselves with an escort. The flight of 13 February was escorted by an F-15.

The Syrian aircraft came towards our aircraft with the clear intention of interception. It was moving at a very high rate of speed and with great acceleration. This data can easily be identified on the radar--the space between the blips on the radar screen was considerable, and it was apparent that the Syrian fighter was moving at a high rate of speed.

At that time the reconnaissance aircraft had to suspend its photography, and in order to protect itself, the F-15 was forced to move immediately to intercept. The pilot fired at the Syrian aircraft and saw it explode, but he was unable to identify the type with certainty. However, it is clear to us that according to the speed and performance of the aircraft as viewed on the radar screens that the Syrian aircraft had to be a MiG-23 or MiG-25. According to foreign sources, it is highly probable that it was a MiG-25.

The battle was very short. Our aircraft returned safely to their bases, and we continued our missions as usual.

The tension in Lebanon has not eased, and I have no doubt that we must expect actions in the future both against attacks and reconnaissance flights. We will continue to carry out our policy with due consideration and caution so as not to be forced into retaliation.

[Question] Does the terrorists' operations of gliders have any implications for the air force?

[Answer] The gliders are weapons which come from the air and are hostile. As such, they are an air force concern. The air force is ready for them, and I will not elaborate on that. However one thing is clear:

Combatting gliders which come in the night is completely different from intercepting an attacking MiG. Nevertheless, we must be careful and not get carried away, for example, by diverting all our combat resources against the gliders and forgetting the real target of the air force. Combatting the gliders is in no way the most important function of the air force.

[Question] It is apparent from what you are saying that you do not consider the gliders a one-time occurrence.

[Answer] Absolutely not. I believe that a terrorist organization will aspire to do everything it can to cause damage and in every area, even the air, and not only with gliders. We know that the terrorists have pilots who are training on fighter aircraft and helicopters, and it is apparent that they are trying to build an air force. An air force, which has no national responsibility, can do things which a state cannot do. This is a constant threat in the area, but it must be dealt with in the proper proportion. They will not conquer the State of Israel, however they can cause us damage in materiel and morale.

[Question] Permit me to move to a different subject. How have the F-16 aircraft been integrated in the air force?

[Answer] I can say that in regard to the F-16, we have experienced a sad and happy occurrence in Iran. I am referring to the Khomeni revolution. This revolution preceded our receiving the aircraft by about 1 and one-half years, and we were forced to prepare the groundwork for integration on very short notice. I owe a pat on the back to those who did the staff work, the field work, and the integration groundwork for the aircraft. This was a complex and difficult organizational and procedural operation which was done under the pressure of time and on an unprecedented scope. It was carried out in an outstanding manner. We have been flying the F-16 since July 1980, and we have quickly reached a state of operational readiness. In comparison to other countries which received the F-16, we completed the integration in one-third of the time.

[Question] The air force also improvised several original solutions for the F-16....

[Answer] Yes, that is correct. One of the interesting improvisations is the vertical ejection rack, a bomb rack which was developed here in Israel for the F-16. Actually, the vertical ejection rack was developed on the basis of the bomb rack in the Skyhawk and Phantom. In the development of the F-16, the Americans have not yet reached the stage of developing a bomb rack while we have achieved a double advantage, of time and cost. It is clear that the new system will be more complex, more complicated, and inestimably more expensive. We used equipment available to us with an extremely significant savings of cost, and we adapted it to the F-16. In other matters we learned very much from the integration of the F-15. As is known, the engines in these two fighter aircraft are the same, and there is considerable similarity in the technology and avionics of the F-15 and F-16. Similarly, we transferred the technicians from the F-15 to help in the integration of the F-16. I regard the integration of the F-16, considering the pressures of time, as one of the most successful aircraft integrations in the air force that I can remember.

[Question] How do you feel the air force will continue to maintain the quality gap between it and the other air forces in the region in light of the appearance of advanced aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16, and perhaps even the AWACS and Tornado among our neighbors?

[Answers] Maintaining the quality gap is a fundamental problem of the State of Israel--and of the air force. It is a continuous battle, and there are peaks from time to time. When we integrated the F-15, we reached a peak and the gap between them and us seemed to grow. When they integrate the F-15, this peak will close. However, the gap is not only a function of a certain type of aircraft. The qualitative gap between air forces is measured by the output of your entire system, beginning from the Piper, the technician, the battalion guard, and the quartermaster, and ending with the one who presses the button to launch a missile or release a bomb. Even the BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR is a component in this system....

The entrance of the F-15 or F-16 into a hostile country does not mean a simultaneous change in the gap between a technician here and a technician there. If we are successful in deriving more sorties from our F-15, more missiles, and better hits, we will maintain the qualitative gap.

The time factor is also significant. We have been flying the F-15 since 1976, and a gap of skill and combat doctrine developed over the years has already been created. Therefore, such a type of airplane or another does not necessarily mean a closing of the gap. Nonetheless, the Tornado aircraft, for example, definitely constitutes a threat. It is a deep penetration and attack aircraft, high speed, modern, and precise in terms of the positioning of its armament, and we have to know how to operate our F-15 and F-16 better.

[Question] What if we have to deal with their F-15 aircraft and their AWACS?

[Answer] We will deal with them if we have to.

[Question] What about quantities? What role does the quantity of aircraft in the hands of one side play?

[Answer] I have no doubt that quantity has an effect. However, quantity can be overcome by means of multiplications of power. Already there is a ratio between us of about 3 to 1 in their favor. We can already say today that we cannot cope with such quantities. Rather, the true question is not the number of aircraft you have or the number of bombs which you can carry but how many sorties you can carry out and how many of your bombs actually hit the target. Did you select the correct traget, one which if you hit it will have a maximum effect on the course of events? These are the true criteria. In these matters we have demonstrated to date our superiority, and there is a good prospect that the air force will demonstrate this also in the future.

[Question] What stage is the Lavi project in now?

[Answer] I can say that we have completed the basic work in determining the operational requirement or the characterization of the aircraft. The Lavi project team, now located in the air force, will have to concern itself with the refinement and detail of the requirement, together with similar teams of the Aircraft Industries and the Ministry of Defense. We can demand superior performance from the aircraft, however ultimately we must consider the limitations of technology, time, and budget. And the trade-off between requirements and limitations is a difficult and complex task. In reality, the Lavi is our first attempt at building an aircraft from the actual foundation and not from a stage of modification. The Kfir, for example, was built on the basis of the Mirage. It underwent many changes--engine, systems, wings, winglets--however, despite all the changes, it still can be seen as the grandson of the Mirage. As for the Lavi, however, we are planning and building it from the first stage.

[Question] What about the budget for the project?

[Answer] The budget crunch is already affecting us. This year we will receive less than what is desirable and what was planned. If we do not have enough money for the development process, and as a result the development takes much longer than was planned, the aircraft will become expensive. I hope that this will not happen and that along the way those who cut for us our slices from the budget cake will understand the importance of the subject and treat the project accordingly.

[Question] What kind of aircraft will the Lavi eventually be?

[Answer] Essentially, we are interested in an inexpensive and small aircraft, one which in about 10 years will be able to replace the Skyhawk and the Kfir in the air force's disposition of forces. Therefore, it will be a one-engine aircraft but both a one-seater and a two-seater. We are planning a relatively large series of the two-seater version because we consider the Lavi also as an aircraft for instruction and advanced training.

[Question] You recently visited the United States and the American Air Force. What is your impression from the visit?

[Answer] The feeling that I had throughout the visit was one of esteem and admiration for the Israeli Air Force. I felt at time that the esteem was even somewhat exaggerated. They give you credit and expect more from you.

The reception was outstanding. I was met with a sympathetic and open attitude, an actual feeling of personal intimacy, both from those whom I had met on their visits to Israel and those whom I had met for the first time. It was difficult for me to become accustomed to the fact that the strongest power in the world was expressing such esteem for a representative of a small country. I encountered several such displays, including those from ordinary airmen whom I met at the American Air Force bases. They knew, and inquired, about the air force more than I had imagined. On another occasion, when our air force attache held a cocktail party, all the prominent people who were invited came without exception. This was an unusual phenomenon, and I felt that it was improtant to them to meet me and to express their esteem and respect which they feel toward the air force and that the professional connections with us were important to them.

During your visit you flew an F-18....

[Answer] I flew the F-18 at the American Navy's test center at Patuxent River on the Atlantic coast. The flight was in a two-seat F-18. Although I sat in the rear seat, I did most of the flying. The flight lasted about 1 and one-half hours and included refueling in the air. A Phantom escorted us, as is customary for every aircraft in its test stages. The flight itself was very intensive and included virtually the entire flight spectrum: air-to-air, air-to-ground, maneuvers, comparison of performance with the Phantom, operation of the engines at low and high altitudes, and so forth. The aircraft, despite its being the most advanced one in the F-15 and F-16 family, is impressive in the facility of flying it. It is easy to taxi and the take-off is short. Especially impressive are the operation of the engines, the transition from non-ignition to full burn, and the electronic guidance.

The flight instruments of the F-18 are mostly concentrated on television screens. Most of the buttons and switches are concentrated on the two grips: the stick and the throttles. You can actually receive all the information you require without moving your hands. It is more like "playing music" than flying. In sum, it was a very delightful flight.

[Question] Is there any significance to your flight in the F-18? Or was it in the category of a courtest flight only?

[Answer] No. I wanted to get a feel for the aircraft and impressions from it. The American Navy considers the F-18 as its primary aircraft of the future. It is a

expensive aircraft, and it is in one of our plans. Therefore, we are following the aircraft's development and performance continuously and are evaluating it in order to make a decision regarding it in the future. Naturally, my flight did not determine if we will procure it or not. The flight was part of our following the progress of the aircraft, and when the time comes, we will combine all the impressions and make a decision.

[Question] What is behind the reports that the Etziyon and 'Eitam airfields will be turned over to the Americans?

[Answer] I do not assume that they would be opposed to receiving them.... Will this actually take place in the current political alignment? I do not know. It is a political problem. Nevertheless, we are evacuating the fields as planned in April 1982, and it seems that this date is indeed coming. The planning for the transfer has been completed, and the evacuation and the entry into the new fields will soon begin. We had hoped that we would be able to provide additional manpower to the new bases so that they would make the absorption easier. However, unfortunately, the situation at the moment is just the opposite. They are even cutting our current manpower. There is no doubt that the air force will have to place a strong emphasis on the evacuation and the transfer to the new bases, and the other bases will have to suffer somewhat.

On this occasion, I call on all the air force personnel to mobilize for the transfer operation. Even psychological support alone will facilitate the implementation of the task, and I hope that when we look back on the transfer, we will be able to consider it a success.

[Question] It finally appears that the air force personnel will soon have new uniforms.

[Answer] Correct. On the next Air Force Day, the regular air force personnel will get with points one replacement set of sky-blue uniforms. The planning for the replacement of the uniforms began 2 years ago. The entire operation does not involve a waste of money for the air force. The uniforms will be acquired through the allocation of the points for each regular air force person. Were we to compromise today on the exchange, we would be forced to pay for all the exchanges which have already been prepared.

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VARIOUS MINING, WATER PROJECTS IN NATION REVIEWED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 31 May, 1, 8, 23 Jun 81

/Article by Ahmad Shakir and Ziyad Farhan: "Domestic Income To Increase from 90 to 200 Million Dinars through the Industrial Sector"/

/31 May 81 p 5/

/Text/ Development plans in the industrial sector will help raise domestic income from 90 million dinars at the end of last year to 200 million dinars by the end of the 5-year plan in 1985.

Among the most prominent goals of the plan is to create a suitable and encouraging investment climate to attract investors to put money into establishing modern industrial projects or to take part in existing ones, as well as to introduce industrial technology which is compatible with Jordan by developing and building food and export industries and industries with a high level of technology which do not depend on manpower so much as on capital and machinery and by bringing about a higher degree of integration and interconnection among domestic industries within the industry and mining sector itself and between this and other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, construction and transportation.

The plan also aims to continue performing geological studies on local ores in order to evaluate the feasibility of exploiting them, as well as intensifying efforts to explore for oil and alternate forms of energy in various areas of the country; realizing greater Arab industrial coordination in cooperation with other Arab countries; attaining a better geographical distribution in locations of new industries and provision of basic facilities for these locations; and combining existing industries and professions in industrial towns and areas distributed among various areas of the kingdom. The proposed organizational procedures of the 5-year plan for the industry and mining sector contain a series of points:

Studying, planning and constructing industrial towns in the kingdom instead of constructing numerous factories within population centers, enticing existing and new industries to situate themselves in these industrial towns while concentrating on the town and industrial zone projects included in the regional plans which are being approved.

Encouraging Jordanian industrial exports, particularly by exempting some of their profits derived from export from the taxes and levies in effect.

Offering aid of 100,000 dinars per year to the Professionals' Fund of the Industrial Development Bank over the coming 5-year period, extending the loan granted to the Development Bank for that purpose from the Central Bank without interest for 1983 and raising the maximum value of loans granted to professionals from 4,000 to 5,000 dinars.

Pursuing a system for regulating banking complexes which is aimed at mobilizing local financial sources to help support industrial development in Jordan.

Setting forth a program to guarantee the guidance of imports by reducing imports and increasing willingness to buy local products for consumption and industrial purposes.

Setting forth the necessary legislation to amend instructions on granting permits for and overseeing industry, in order to keep abreast of changes which have occurred in recent years.

Setting forth the necessary legislation to organize the commercial register, so that registration will be compulsory for all local factories.

Continuing to study customs tariffs to make them more encouraging in terms of the establishment of local industry and reviewing exemptions for primary and raw materials required for industry.

Establishing a center for information of interest to industry.

Reviewing laws on concessions for local companies with the goal of developing and amending them to keep up with economic developments.

Increasing the annual rate of issuance of standard specifications and the application of standards, intensifying surveillance over the application of standards, establishing quality control centers in major plants and centers to train people working in these plants, and completing the outfitting of the necessary laboratories and accelerating application of the system of quality seals and establishment of a special staff of technicians to work in laboratories.

Devoting attention to unifying standards and introducing them as courses of instruction in preparatory, secondary, intermediate university and university educational levels.

Amending Investment Encouragement Law 53 for 1972 to contain more exemptions, facilities and incentives than it and the amendments already made to it do, at present, especially as regards development projects established in less developed areas and projects using advanced technology or aimed at exports or the provision of necessary commodities, especially foodstuffs.

Issuing investment brochures which will contain preliminary studies of specific industries, dealing with the economic, technical and marketing features of these industries, so that they may be placed at the disposal of investors to make use of them in investing their funds.

Encouraging the use of industrial accounting systems in approved economic projects and creating a section to follow up on and closely investigate the execution of this law and projects benefiting from the Investment Encouragement Law.

Authorizing qualified consulting firms to make economic feasibility studies of all new industrial projects in which investment is greater than 25,000 dinars, as an essential basis for giving Ministry of Industry permits to these industries.

Conducting an industrial survey aimed at setting forth a list of intermediate commodities to be produced to respond to the requirements of the local market and markets in adjacent Arab countries, as well as raw materials used in industry which may be replaced by local raw materials.

Concluding the necessary agreements with other countries to prevent double taxation with them.

Future Projects

Herewith is a list of some projects which it is proposed to carry out in the years 1981-85:

Projects under construction: There are a number of projects on which certain measures have been adopted that are necessary if they are to be completed during the 1981-86 5-year plan; it is expected that construction on these projects will continue in the coming plan.

Among the most important of these projects are:

The southern cement plant: This is to be built in the al-Rashidiyah area near al-Tufaylah and will have a productive capacity of 1 million tons per year; investment in this plant is estimated at 50 million dinars and the value of annual output is estimated at 25 million dinars. It will create an estimated 1,200 job opportunities.

The al-Abyad cement plant: It is intended to build this in the al-Dalil area, in view of the fact that suitable raw materials are present there in adequate volumes and good quality. This project will be carried out in participation with the fraternal nation of Syria, through the Syrian-Jordanian Company, the productive capacity of the plant will total 100,000 tons per year, and the necessary investments are estimated at about 18 million dinars. Annual production is valued at 4.5 million dinars.

The lumber complex project: It is intended to build this in al-'Aqabah in cooperation with a Malaysian company which has the raw materials the project needs. Its costs are estimated at about 10 million dinars, broken down among the years of the plan, as shown below, and its productive capacity is estimated at about 142,000 cubic meters. It is anticipated that construction on it will begin in 1981 after the investors finish preparing the designs and bid documents related to it.

The industrial city project in Sahab: To provide the land which has been set aside, prepared for the construction of factories and supplied with all the services needed for industry, it has been decided to set up an industrial city in Sahab. The

land area appropriated for this purpose is 2,530 donums, all preliminary study work and designs related to the first stage of the project have been completed, and the cost of it as of the end of 1980, came to about 225,000 dinars. The award for grading the site and constructing the retaining wall for the first stage of 750 donums has been assigned and it is expected that that will be completed by the end of March 1981 /sic/. It is expected that execution of the general bid, which accounts for the next stage of construction (consisting of the construction of plants, the administrative complex and all services) will be completed in the month of April 1981. About 30 model plants will be constructed in the first part of this stage. It will be possible to increase this to 60 or 108 plants and it is expected that the costs of this first stage of the project, which will be completed in 1984 and comprises the development of an area of 750 donums of land, the linkup of services, construction of the administrative area and the construction of buildings for 96 model factories, will come to 17.03 million Jordanian dinars.

New Projects

The industrial city project in Irbid: The northern region in particular, and the town of Irbid in particular, suffer from the fact that industries are situated in their center. They also suffer from the fact that inhabitants are migrating from these regions to more developed ones, such as the Amman regional area. To cope with these problems and to accelerate industrial development of the northern region, it is necessary to establish an industrial city in the town of Irbid. This will lie northeast of the town, on an area of 26.6 hectares. It is anticipated that this project will create about 2,000 job opportunities and its costs are estimated at 3.8 million dinars.

/1 Jun 81 p 7/

/Text/ Yesterday AL-DUSTUR published news of some of the industrial projects which are to be built during the next 5-year plan.

Herewith is the remainder of these projects. They include projects to explore for oil and natural gas, copper and phosphate.

Second Stage of the Project To Explore for Oil and Natural Gas

In the first 5-year plan, the first stage of this project, which was aimed at evaluating old information bearing on oil exploration in Jordan and at reoutfitting and stabilizing tapes on the seismic surveys previously carried out in the al-Azraq and al-Sirhan areas, as well as covering these two areas and the al-Rishah areas with additional aerial reconnaissance, geochemical, magnetic and seismic surveys, preparatory to entering into detailed exploration and deep drilling stages in these areas, was completed. All these activities were financed by the treasury.

Alongside this activity, a foreign company conducted some geological and geophysical studies in the northwestern area of the east bank, as a result of which an exploratory well was drilled to a depth of 2,754 meters close to the permanent site of al-Yarmuk University. It was dry.

In light of the results obtained following completion of the first phase of the project, which ended with the end of the first 5-year plan, the territories of the kingdom where it is hoped oil will be discovered were divided into four zones and the necessary allocations were set aside to continue the search for oil in Jordan.

The Oil Shale Study Project

There are large quantities of oil shale in Jordan containing a good percentage of hydrocarbons and organic materials which can be refined or used by the direct retorting of rock to generate electric power after it is crushed.

These rocks are situated in the northern, northeastern and central sections of the territory of the kingdom. The authorities have finished making a detailed geological study of the oil rocks present in the al-Lajun area, where the existence of close to 1.3 billion tons of good quality has been established at a depth very close to the surface of the earth, in a manner that will allow it to be strip-mined.

In order to determine the technical and economic feasibility of these rocks, a list has been made of tenders from a number of companies so that agreement may be reached with one of them to carry out the following economic feasibility studies and industrial experiments:

The performance of industrial experiments on representative samples of the al-Lajun rocks to determine how fit they are for retorting on the one hand, or for direct retorting, preparatory to the performance of an engineering and economic study on the manner by which these rocks will be produced.

Selection of the best technical methods by which it will be possible to exploit the oil shale.

Performance of a preparatory economic feasibility study of the project.

Continued detailed economic and technical feasibility study of the project in order to proceed with it and carry it out, in the event encouraging conclusions are obtained by the preparatory study.

In addition to the study the consulting firms will carry out, the authorities will, through the medium of their special agency, conduct geological studies of and detailed drilling into the oil shale existing in the region which extends from al-Qatranah to al-Husayniyah in order to determine the volumes and quality of the reserves in this area so they can constitute a backup for the proved reserves in the al-Lajun area. The costs of the consulting services and exploration activities have been estimated at about 1.5 million dinars.

The Project To Explore for Geothermal Energy Sources (Phase Two)

Phase one of the project was completed during the first 5-year plan, with the cooperation of the United Nations development program. This consisted of a geological, geophysical and hydrochemical survey of the Zarqa' Ma'in and al-Zara areas. Studies were made on the conclusions of these studies, from which it became apparent that it would be necessary to drill some stratigraphic wells before issuing a final verdict on the feasibility of the area.

The project which it is intended to carry out during phase two consists of the drilling of four test wells in the Zarqa' Ma'in and al-Zara areas, at depths ranging from 100 to 300 meters, and the performance of geophysical and geothermal studies on the wells, in addition to a study of rock and water samples extracted from the wells.

In the light of the conclusions of these programs, it will be possible to discuss whether or not to proceed with the execution of the third stage of the project (the retorting phase).

Costs of Phase two are estimated at about 400,000 dinars.

The Copper Project

This project had previously been in the first 5-year plan, 1976-1980, but was not carried out, because of the severe drop that copper prices faced on the world market; this made the project unfeasible from the economic standpoint during this period.

In view of the perceptible improvement in copper prices which is occurring at present and in view of the results of the studies the Seltrust consulting firm made at the authority's expense, which were completed in early 1980, it has been recommended that a 3,000-ton-year pilot copper mill be erected. Its production will be based on the ore which it has been proved can be mined by the strip mining system and is estimated at about 5 million tons, on condition that establishment of the project be preceded by erection of a test plant with a capacity of 25 tons of ore per day and that a detailed economic and technical feasibility study be made of the project to select the most appropriate means for separating and extracting the copper from its ore.

The costs of erecting the project, in 1980 prices, are estimated at about 8 million dinars, including the costs of the test plant and the technical and economic feasibility study of the project, provided that it is supplied with electricity from the general high voltage line and that it is guaranteed sulphuric acid from the phosphatic fertilizer plant in al-'Aqabah as well as all necessary infrastructure requirements such as roads and housing.

Expansion of Phosphate Production

The project may be summarized as the extraction of phosphate from the phosphatic clay produced at a rate of 300,000 tons per year by the upgrading equipment as well as the extraction of phosphate at a rate of 100,000 tons per year from the tailings produced by the crushers. The increased output is estimated at 400,000 tons of phosphate per year and the value of the required investments in 1980 prices is estimated at 3,652,000 dinars.

The al-Wadi al-Abyad Mine

The project may be summarized as:

The construction of a new washed phosphate production line with a capacity of half a million tons a year and the opening of a new mine to produce the phosphate required to operate it.

The extraction of phosphate at a rate of 200,000 tons a year from phosphatic clay produced by the upgrading equipment.

The extraction of phosphate at a rate of 50,000 tons per year from the tailings produced by crushers. The value of the investments required for the Wadi al-Abyad project is estimated at about 3,261,000 dinars, distributed among the years of the plan.

Other Phosphate Support Projects

In order for the company to be able to continue its current and proposed phosphate production projects, it will require the performance of the following support projects which will serve production operations in the various mines:

The purchase of three drilling rigs to accelerate exploration activities between al-Hasa and al-Qatranah and increase the phosphate reserves around the two areas of al-Hasa and al-Wadi al-Abyad so that these may be adequate for a period of no less than 25 years.

The construction of depots to store aluminum and explosives at the al-Rusayfah and al-Hasa mines, to meet the needs of the company and current contractors.

Expansion of the residential town at al-Hasa and the construction of new housing units for married people to attract good technicians and keep present ones, in addition to expansion of housing units at al-'Aqabah and completion of the outfitting of the main administration building in Amman.

Construction of a 2.5-kilometer pipeline to transport and pump phosphate from the crusher site at Ore Nine to the site of the phosphate washing units. The value of the investments required for these support projects is estimated at 13,846,000 dinars.

/8 Jun 81 p 4/

/Text/ The industrial sector's development plans will contribute effectively in increasing national income from 90 million dinars at the end of last year to 200 million dinars at the end of the 5-year plan.

Among the plan's objectives is the continued performance of geological studies on local ores to determine their economic feasibility. Among the new projects and programs are:

The General Geological Survey of the Kingdom

Regional geological maps of Jordan were prepared at various scales, including one to 1 million, one to 750,000, one to 500,000, one to 250,000 and one to 100,000, in the period 1960-1980, and a survey was made of small areas of the kingdom for specific objectives at scales of one to 50,000 and one to 25,000. In spite of their abundance, the regional geological maps were all general in format and one of them could be relied upon as background for specific specialized studies or planning activities in developing such specific economic sectors as water, for example, mining, industrial stones or the like. In order to fill the gap and respond to specialized, sectoral requirements, it has been necessary to venture upon a purposeful specific geological, strategic and mineralogical survey of the entire

territory of the kingdom at a scale of one to 50,000 which will be oriented toward development and economic and industrial planning purposes. The execution of this project will result in the preparation of an atlas of maps for all the base plates of the kingdom at a scale of one to 50,000, which will be 150 in number. As an example, but not exclusively, the atlas will represent the following coverage on a topographic base plate, with a plate at the same scale: general geological, structural, seismic, gravimetric, magnetic, mineralogical, hydrogeological, geochemical and others, along with an explanatory text.

If all requirements are made available to this project, it will take close to 10 years' time to carry it out. During the period of the plan, 1981-85, it will cost about 750,000 dinars.

The Project To Establish a New Phosphate Mine and Mill in the al-Zarqa'B Area

The project may be summarized as the opening of a new mine to produce the phosphate ore required by the new plant in the al-Zarqa'B area, which consists of a crusher, phosphate-treating equipment, a phosphate washing unit, a cooker, water and electricity supply and so forth. It will be built in two stages, the first of which will produce ordinary unwashed phosphate, the second washed phosphate. The total productive capacity of the two stages will be 800,000 tons a year and the investments required are estimated at 5.62 million dinars in 1980 prices.

The al-Shayidiyah Phosphate Project

The goal of the project is to open a new mine and the requisite plants for it in the al-Shayidiyah area so that production may commence in late 1986 at a productive capacity of half a million tons; this will gradually increase to about 3 million tons a year in 1990 and 10 million tons a year before the end of this century. The project will consist of mining machinery, phosphate treatment equipment, coarse sifting and crushing machinery, phosphate washing units and phosphate drying, treatment and storage equipment, along with the construction of a complete residential city, inner roads, water, electricity and other services. The investments required are estimated at 57,730 dinars, above and beyond those needed to provide the necessary means of transport from the mine to al-'Aqabah, storage depots, equipment for ships and other diverse services. Total investments will come to about 52 million dinars.

The Bromide and Bromide Products Project

The American Great Lakes Corporation has made a final economic feasibility study on the production of bromide and bromide products from Dead Sea waters. It is expected that a decision to start construction of the project will be taken in 1981.

Production will be about 3,000 tons of bromide and bromide products per year; therefore, quantities of chlorine and caustic soda will be produced. Costs of the project will come to 15 million dinars, broken down into 8.25 million dinars in capital and 6.75 million dinars in foreign loans.

Magnesium and Porcelain Clay

The Austrian firm Rottner has finished carrying out a study on the extraction of magnesium oxide from the Dead Sea. This study deals with the production of porcelain clay.

Production will total 10,000 tons of magnesium oxide and 50,000 tons of porcelain clay.

Costs of the project will total 50 million dinars, 20 million dinars of which will be capital and 30 million dinars in foreign loans.

The Animal Fodder Project

In the course of producing magnesium oxide, hydrochloric acid will be obtained as a byproduct; this acid will be used to produce animal fodder.

Costs of this project will total 5 million dinars, broken down into 2 million dinars in capital and 3 million dinars in loans.

The Potassium Sulphate Project

The company is now making a study on the production of potassium sulphate. The costs of this project will come to about 11 million dinars, broken down into 6 million dinars in capital and 5 million dinars in loans.

The Pure Table Salt Project

The Potash Company will benefit from the increased demand for rise in prices of potash by doubling its output. Costs will come to 71.5 million dinars, of which:

39 million dinars will be in capital
32.5 million dinars will be in loans.

The Feldspar Project

The project aims at extracting feldspar of both types, sodium and potassium, from its granitic ores, which are present in the al-'Aqabah area. Anticipated productive capacity of the project will come to about 20,000 tons a year. In addition, the anticipated project costs will be about 1.5 million dinars.

These costs will include performance of the necessary economic feasibility studies, performance of designs and construction of the plant.

Fifty percent of the costs will be financed by company sources; the remainder will be financed by public subscriptions and loans.

/23 Jun 81 p 7/

/Text/ The Potable Water Organization's 5-year plan includes efforts to determine the resources and sites of water sources, classification of these sources and the economic use of water sources to cover various requirements within the context of a comprehensive plan, as well as transmission of the water to population concentrations and mining and industry projects which have not yet been supplied with water.

This will be done by drilling additional wells, improving and expanding water production methods and saving capital and operating expenditures on water supply projects by improving management competence, improving the quality of construction and maintenance and creating less costly alternative energy sources in special cases.

The plan also stipulates that studies and laboratory analyses are to be made on water sources which might be used for household purposes in order to protect basins where water sources are located, in addition to a study on the technical and economic feasibility of increasing water sources by bringing water from outside Jordan or desalinating seawater.

In addition, construction designs and bid documents will be drawn up for public sewer projects in Ma'dabba, al-Rusayfah, Wadi al-Sir, Suwaylih, al-Mafraq and al-Ramtha.

Studies and designs will also be prepared for sewer projects in al-Zarqa', Irbid and al-'Aqabah, with consideration given to methods for processing water in a fashion facilitating its use in agricultural and other activities.

Among the organizational measures which will achieve these goals are the codification of a comprehensive national water plan, including the formulation of a fiscal budget based on resources and needs and the evolution of these resources and needs, the establishment of a higher water council whose task will be to provide coordination among various sectors and bodies using water for their purposes, and the codification of a policy for distributing the water balance in Jordan in a fashion which will guarantee that various water sources are properly used in the framework of needs and priorities.

The organizational measures also stipulate that a review is to be made of statutes and instructions bearing on groundwater and groundwater replenishment and use surveillance in a manner guaranteeing the regulation and control of this process in order to maintain and develop this important course and complete hydrological studies covering areas which have not been studied or on which studies have not yet been completed.

Costs of the organization's projects in the plan years are estimated at about 27.25 million dinars, including 5,935,000 dinars for projects in the Governorate of Irbid, 8,608,000 dinars for projects in the central area, 2.69 million dinars for projects in the al-Karak Governorate, 1,175,000 dinars for projects in Ma'an Governorate, and 6,557,000 dinars for al-'Aqabah region projects.

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PAPER CRITICIZES U.S. PEACE PLANS

GF161203 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Aug 81 p 1

[Editorial: "God Is With the Patient"]

[Text] Every now and then, and with the election of every new U.S. President, talks on MIddle East settlement projects increase in the United States. Each president sends delegations to the region to uncover "secrets" and to listen "sincerely" to the views of the region's leaders. The U.S. President, sitting in his rocking chair in the White House, awaits visits from Arab leaders and Israeli friends, who will "entertain him." They discuss "the region's vital importance" with respect to U.S. and Western interests and Israel's security which, as Washington claims, is the basis of the "Free World's" security. Washington's "peace projects" have not changed since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the president's concern over the Middle East.

Between what Washington calls "initiatives," various U.S. administrations leak news about U.S. attitudes and proposals. The U.S. President assumes "dramatic" attitudes toward Israel, as in the case of the F-16 jet fighters. Along with such actions, which U.S. propaganda describes as punishment for Israel, the U.S. President "bestows" some economic aid upon allied countries in the region after having tested them in operations that will eventually serve U.S. interests.

Yesterday, President Reagan renewed restrictions on delivering more F-16's to Israel. In exchange, he promised to arm President al-Sadat's government with these jet fighters for the next 5 years as a reward for its commitment to U.S. policy and its "good intentions" toward Israel.

Reagan's United States lost nothing in the arms deal with Egypt. Rather, it gained a written pledge from President al-Sadat during his recent visit. He pledged to give the U.S. a piece of Arab land to use in its military strategy in the Middle East and Gulf region.

All signs so far indicate that the Reagan Administration will not reach a Middle East settlement unless all Arabs consent to the Israeli peace plan. It also appears that the Reagan Administration will lift restrictions on selling planes to Israel in due time.

There are indications that a Republican United States during the Reagan Administration will not be any better than former Republican or Democratic administrations as far as the Arabs and the Arab cause are concerned. As usual, the United States will not be fair in its dealings with the Palestinians or even acknowledge the fairness of the Palestinian cause if U.S. interests in the Middle East are not affected. U.S. interests throughout the world are great and many, and so are the Arabs. Nevertheless, who among the Arabs will step forward in the confrontation with the United States? Let us wait--God is with the patient.

CSO: 4304/119

FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE DEALS WITH SITUATION IN ZAHLAH

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 218, 6-12 Jul 81 pp 12-14

[Article by R. Sh.: "Zahlah Conquers Beirut"]

[Text] The Solution Arose Out of the Conditions, Counter-conditions, and Guarantees.

The Solution Is Being Achieved Because the Follow-Up Committee Has Adopted Lebanon's [Working] Paper and Damascus Has Responded Favorably.

The entry of internal security forces into Zahlah last Tuesday represented the basic turning point in the course of the crisis which has been raging since last 1 April in Lebanon generally and in Zahlah in particular. This step is important because of its timing. It was carried out a few days before the date set for holding the third session of the Arab Follow-Up Committee, chaired by President Elias Sarkis, in Bayt al-Din for the purpose of searching for solutions to the Lebanese issue.

The entry of 500 internal security troops into the city, and their taking over of the international route and some of the other vital locations, will pave the way for breaking the siege of Zahlah. In spite of the fact that some difficulties have emerged with regard to carrying out these steps, political contacts will be enough to overcome them because most important is that the steps be carried out, even though to a relatively incomplete degree.

The fact is that settling the Zahlah issue was not something that was easily achieved. The difficulties which confronted the solving of this issue made those responsible for doing so consider success in solving this problem to be a positive indication which would perhaps leave its imprint on the overall security situation in this country. This is especially true since local, Arab, regional, and international developments have contributed, to a large degree, toward making the impossible possible. There is no doubt that dealing with the crisis in Zahlah brings one into direct contact with the question of the Syrian missiles which were introduced into the Biqa' Valley because of the war fought over the city and after Israel had shot down two Syrian helicopters near the hills which surround the capital city of al-Biqa'. The Zahlah crisis was the most important of the issues which the American envoy, Mr Philip Habib, brought up during his shuttle trips

between Beirut, Damascus, Riyadh, and Tel Aviv. For this reason, a number of observers in Beirut considered success in solving the Zahlah question to have been still another success achieved by Philip Habib's mission after the success which he achieved concerning the missile crisis--which Tel Aviv is still exploting daily as it did previously.

The settlement also means success for the role of the Arabs in dealing with the Lebanese crisis, and this is particularly true with regard to the role of the Saudis who returned to the Lebanese arena after a forced absence which events had forced upon them during the last 2 years. When dealing with the Zahlah issue, Saudi Arabia played a very effective role in quickly bringing about a solution which would satisfy the Lebanese official authorities who were working hard to end the city's tragedy after it had been going on for so long. With this purpose in mind, Saudi Arabia, with the approval of Damascus, set up a plan for deployment of security troops in the city after it had become apparent that deployment of the army, which was what the [Lebanese] government had hoped to do, appeared to be difficult at the present stage. The Arabs in the Follow-Up Committee, especially the Saudis and Kuwaitis, became convinced that the correct Lebanese solution was one which had the approval of Damascus. They then worked toward achieving this by consecutively contacting the interested parties, that is, Syria, the Phalangists, and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the "Lebanese Forces."

If we take for granted international backing, especially the backing which America has given Saudi Arabia in its efforts to solve the Zahlah crisis, then it becomes clear what role has been played by large nations such as France and America, in addition to the countries of the European Common Market, in overcoming some of the obstacles and in putting pressure on the interested parties, both directly and indirectly, in order that the Zahlah crisis experience a happy ending.

At this point we should stress the importance of the role played by the Vatican through the contacts made by Pope John Paul II and by the offices of the Apostolic See with nations which are friendly to the Papal State, at the forefront of which are the U.S. and France. Mention should also be made of the fundamental role played by the archbishop of New York, Cardinal Terrence Cook, who called upon President Ronald Reagan to work toward the achievement of a solution of the Zahlah crisis. He promised him that he would do the best he could, in view of the widespread influence which Cardinal Cook has in the U.S.

All of these efforts--local, Arab, and international efforts--became woven together in order to create an appropriate solution, suitable plans were made, and then the various roles to be played by the parties involved in creating the solution were distributed well and successfully.

Although the beginning of the end of the Zahlah tragedy has clearly emerged recently, negotiations, which have been carried on on more than one level, have concentrated on the necessity of removing the problems--and how many of them there are--which have been emerging from time to time and representing an obstruction to the solution. Dreams [of a solution] would be destroyed and the shelling would start up again, then things would get better and there would be less shelling.

At this point it would be well to mention the stages passed through by efforts to deal with the Zahlah crisis since the suggestion was made, about a month ago, to deploy the security forces. This plan was countered by conditions, the most important of which was that which stipulated that armed Phalangists from outside Zahlah should leave the city and should hand over the international route to the Deterrent Forces. At that time, it proved impossible to arrive at a solution, shelling of the city started up again, and the various areas of the city went through a terrifying period. After the latest meeting in Bayt al-Din, the suggestion was made once again, using the first solution as a basis, and then the conditions emerged again and efforts were made to overcome the problems. Initially the most important obstacles to carrying out the plan were [the inability to achieve] an agreement concerning how the armed Phalangists--who turned out not to number more than 95 young people--were to leave the city and the fate of the heavy weapons in the city--since Damascus refused to allow these weapons to remain in the hands of any Zahlah group for fear that this would cause hostilities to break out again.

The "Lebanese Forces," in turn, set their conditions, the most important of which was that armed outsiders, who had stationed themselves around Zahlah, had to leave the area. This especially referred to those who had joined the ranks of the "Arab Army of Lebanon" and some of the parties of the "Lebanese Front." They demanded guarantees which would assure that the city would not be shelled or that the people of the city would not be attacked if the Phalangist "outsiders" left it.

The conditions and counterconditions were discussed at length, and they were debated between the negotiators--the most prominent of whom were the Saudi ambassador, Lt Gen 'Ali al-Sha'ir, and the minister from Zahlah, Ilyas al-Hirawi--and the parties concerned. Concerning the matter of the guarantees, it was finally decided that the bishops of the city should commit themselves to supervise the new agreement and to make sure that it is not violated, and it was decided that Saudi Arabia and the Arab Follow-Up Committee would guarantee that the Syrian forces would not violate the agreement.

Informed sources say that Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil informed the bishops and ministers of the city that he was prepared to order the Phalangists who were not from Zahlah to "immediately leave the city, on the condition that they be the ones who commit themselves to history and to the people of Zahlah to bear responsibility for any violation of the agreement and promises. The bishops and ministers then made contacts [with those concerned] and then came back with the guarantees demanded and conveyed them to Shaykh Bashir [al-Jumayyil] and to the government leaders. The fact is that it took time and entailed other "costs" to obtain these guarantees which were presented by Saudi Arabia in coordination with Kuwait and with the knowledge of the Lebanese authorities. Consecutive meetings for this purpose were held in both Damascus and Beirut.

The Solution

What emerged was the solution which it was decided to use in order to deal with the crisis. The solution stipulates the following:

1. Entry of the internal security forces into Zahlah, handing over of the international route, and opening up the other roads to the people of Zahlah.

2. Withdrawal of all non-Phalangist armed personnel from the city by means of utilizing two buses, with these people being accompanied by Minister al-Hirawi, the chief of the intelligence apparatus in the Syrian Deterrent Forces, Col Muhammad Ghanim, and one of the bishops of the city. (The withdrawal has actually already taken place.)

3. Collection of all the heavy weapons in the headquarters of the Greek Catholic archbishop in Zahlah.

4. Lifting of the military siege of Zahlah, allowing supplies to reach the city, and opening up the city to all the people of the region.

5. Replacement of the type of Syrian troops who are stationed in the hills surrounding the city. What this means is withdrawing the special troops and replacing them with other Syrian regular troops in order to pave the way for handing over some of these hills to the security forces at a future date. However, the Syrians are to retain observation posts there. These hills are of strategic importance since they overlook the mountainous areas in Kasrawan and al-Matn, and they also play a strategic role in terms of serving as a spot from which to observe movements taking place outside of Lebanon. The implementation of this clause of the agreement was delayed because of problems which emerged at the last moment. It is feared that if these problems are not dealt with, then there is the possibility that the situation will deteriorate. But since these clauses began to be implemented last Tuesday morning, this has reassured those responsible that the first stage of the agreement will be successful. However, one should bear in mind that a settlement of the Zahlah situation will remain apart from the solution required for the overall Lebanese situation both on the political level and in terms of security. However, this is an indication of the readiness of the parties concerned to be responsive concerning all of the issues which will be discussed in Bayt al-Din. In particular, the success of the step taken in Zahlah will have a positive influence on the third meeting of the Follow-Up Committee.

The Beginning of [Lebanon's] Salvation?

Does the success attained concerning the settlement of the Zahlah situation mean the beginning of [Lebanon's] salvation?

It is still premature to answer "yes" to this question. This is because the particular situation with regard to the Zahlah question, from the human, military, and political points of view, demanded that a separate solution for this problem quickly be found--although this solution cost the city more than 500 dead, thousands of wounded, and material losses amounting to more than 7 billion Lebanese pounds as a result of the destruction of Zahlah's factories, establishments, and vital utilities. Added to this there was the international clamor which accompanied the events concerning this city, the intervention of the great powers, and the emergence of the missile crisis and the threat of this crisis to cause the outbreak of a large-scale war--a crisis which caused everybody to move to try to avoid such a

war, especially the U.S. This international clamor contributed toward the creation of solutions, albeit temporary solutions; we must all await comprehensive solutions for the Lebanese crisis which appears to be more and more linked to the crisis which afflicts the region as a whole.

Dealing with the Zahlah situation, even if done only partially, has closed the curtain on one of the most painful chapters of the Lebanese war. It has also opened up the door to gradual solutions for security crises, whether in Beirut or in other turbulent areas. It is expected that the Arab Follow-Up Committee, at its next meeting, will study such solutions--using as a basis the Lebanese working paper which was adopted at the meeting in Jiddah and which gives priority to particular security-related solutions which will provide a quiet atmosphere appropriate for discussing the political solutions which, it is hoped, will lead to the achievement of an accord.

It would be an exaggeration to suppose that dealing with the Zahlah crisis will be followed by comprehensive dealing with the other crises. The reason for this is that some of these crises are apparently very difficult to solve, especially if the solutions designed for them involve a role for the Lebanese army at this present stage because this army is still greeted with reservations by many parties and this prevents it from assuming its security duties. For this reason, the [Lebanese] government hopes that the settlement of the Zahlah situation will be a forerunner for partial security solutions which will have the approval of Damascus and which, in the short run, will have the objective of opening up transit points in Beirut and creating an atmosphere conducive to implementing a cease-fire, and this would pave the way for the proposal of political solutions. This is the essence of the work of the Follow-Up Committee. If it succeeds in this, it will have carried out, to a relative degree, the mission which was entrusted to it. This is because the Lebanese people have come to hope for even a minimum of real peace and quiet and no longer listen to promises concerning comprehensive steps to be taken because they know full well, just as the Arab countries and the other countries of the world know, that the time for this has not yet come.

If it is necessary to have an official assessment of the Zahlah operation, then the person who has summed it up best has been President Sarkis. After he received a report from Maj Gen Ahmad al-Hajj, of the General Staff, who is the commander-in-chief of the internal security forces, concerning the entry of the police [into Zahlah] and the exit of non-Zahlah armed personnel [from Zahlah], he said: "This action confirms the existence of legitimacy and the fact that legimitacy is able to play its role. It is also a confirmation of the good intentions and the success of the Follow-Up Committee which will be achieved in the future if its decisions are carried out."

9468
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MOROCCAN 1981 BUDGET OUTLINED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Jun 81 pp 8, 9, 16

/Text/ Following is the statement of Minister of Finance Reghai on the budget bill voted for 1981.

The development recorded by the economic and financial indexes indicates that the policy of financial and economic recovery followed during the 3-year plan (1978-80) made it possible to achieve positive results, both in terms of the recovery of internal and external equilibrium as well as in terms of economic development. This result is of such nature as to encourage us to begin a new stage of economic and social development, in the course of which a rate of growth will be achieved which responds to our desire to satisfy the needs of our citizens and to ensure the improvement of our productive apparatus.

Thus, on the basis of these considerations, financial policy for 1981 has been determined, setting out the essential priorities in the next economic and social development plan, which is in the last stages of preparation. In any case, the last word will evidently depend on the definitive choices which will be made by the next 5-year plan. In the light of these choices, and if the need should arise, an amended draft budget law, bringing the necessary changes, will be submitted to the National Assembly at an appropriate time.

This financial policy clearly reflects the determination of His Majesty's government to pursue the course of economic and social development and to provide the means to permit resolution of the fundamental problems of our national economy. This is a matter, in particular, of reducing social disparities, of fighting against unemployment, of promoting the creation of jobs, and of improving the living level of the majority of citizens.

Clearly, this presupposes the strengthening of the policy of production and the grant of a major place in the strategy of economic growth to the development of productive capacity, since this is the only way likely to guarantee the independence of our economy and balance in our financial situation.

Achievement of these objectives rests on the efforts which will be made at the same time by the public and private sectors. For its part the state has not ceased playing its role as the motive force of the economy, through the development of infrastructure equipment and the establishment of financial structures worthy of a modern country and by the extension of the necessary encouragement to private investment.

No doubt, the private sector will know how to live up to the level of the hopes based on it in an economic system characterized by liberalism and individual initiative and will provide further proof of dynamism and increased activity in order to draw more profit from the important encouragement provided it and thus contribute to putting to use the enormous potential of our national economy.

The government will spare no effort leading to the consolidation and broadening of our economic foundations, without neglecting the strengthening of the fundamental economic balance considered to be a necessary precondition for any healthy and harmonious recovery program.

In this regard I would like to mention the agreement which I concluded recently with the International Monetary Fund, by virtue of which this institution agreed to grant us substantial assistance in the framework of the "broadened facility" and the "complementary facility." At the same time negotiations are presently under way with a view to obtaining a loan from the new facilities of the World Bank under the program called "Structural Adjustments Program."

No doubt these various forms of help will assist you in undertaking the projects necessary to achieve the fundamental objectives which we are pursuing and which consist of the defense of our territorial integrity, the correction of the imbalances still affecting our economy, and the guarantee of a rate of growth suitable to our ambitions.

Those are the objectives which we have sought in the past and which we were seeking to achieve by mobilizing our means and our potential. This tendency appears in the budget law for 1981 in its 2 main aspects: the operating budget and the investment budget.

The Major Feature of the Budget
(Figures in Millions of DH--Moroccan Dirhams)

I - General State Budget

	1979	1980	1981
Receipts	19,564.3	21,666.2	25,698
Expenditures	21,558.1	23,562.5	28.174.2
Of which:			
Operating Expenditures	10,622.2	12,634.5	15,356.6
Investment Expenditures	8,735.9	8,428	9,996.6
Debt	2,200	2,500	2,820.9

II - Budget Annexes	1979	1980	1981
Receipts	1,104.6	1,153.9	1,220.5
Expenditures	1,104.6	1,153.9	1,220.5
III - Special Treasury Accounts			
Receipts	3,411.8	4,167.8	4,920.7
Expenditures	3,817.7	5,037.7	5,383.7
IV - Total			
Receipts	24,110.3	26,987.9	31,839
Expenditures	26,480.4	29,754.1	34,778.4
Excess of Expenditures	2,369.6	2,766.2	2,939.4

Investment Expenditures			
Ministry of Finance	3,130.9	2,599.1	1,367.3
Ministry of Equipment and National Development	1,145.7	1,678.9	2,505
Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform	943.5	777.2	1,503
Ministry of National Education and Cadre Training	796	526	842.7
Ministry of Energy and Mining Research	326	240.2	373.1
Ministry of Transportation	261	391.7	500
Ministry of Housing and Territorial Management	132.6	124.6	205.4
Ministry of Health	119.2	129.3	710
Ministry of Justice	61.2	28.5	43.3
Ministry of Information	57	33.2	243.2
Ministry of the Interior	45.3	59.3	81.2
Ministry of Tourism	45	26.2	15.2
Planning and Regional Development	38.4	31.6	20.2

Payment and Obligational Credits

Obligation Credits, 1980	8,428	(Millions of Dirhams)
" " , 1981	8,732.8	" "
" " , 1982	14,003.9	" "

Financing the State Budget

	1979	
Equipment Expenditures	-9,016	-7,843
Special Accounts - Budget Annexes	+1,018	+1,099
Balance from the Ordinary Budget	+ 802	-1,075
Treasury Deficit	-7,196	-7,828
Financing Arrangements:		
Domestic Loans	1,190	1,555
Foreign Assistance	4,795	5,666
Treasury Resources	1,211	607
(Of Which from the Bank of Morocco)	(715)	(1,221)

The Operating Budget

For 1981 ordinary receipts are estimated at 18.5 billion DH, compared to 15.2 billion DH in 1980, or an increase of 21.38 percent. This increase also concerns the fiscal receipts which are made up of the operations of the state monopolies, the financial participation of the state in business enterprise, and miscellaneous receipts.

In this rega d it is important to note that the draft budget bill for 1981 involves no legislative change of such nature as to increase the fiscal burden. This is by reason of the government's desire to pursue the objective of relative stability in our fiscal system. Moreover, the government will soon present to the National Assembly a draft bill on fiscal reform whose features have been established, following a distillation of views on the subject of local and agricultural taxation.

On the subject of credits opened for ongoing expenses for 1981, these amount to 18.1 billion dirhams, as against 15.1 billion dirhams in 1980, showing an increase of 20.1 percent.

The characteristic features of this evolution of the operating budget may be summed up in the following principal points:

First, continued strengthening of the ministries charged with security and the defense of the country by satisfying their needs for positions and credits necessary for the functioning of their services and their equipment, as well as the coverage of their activities. These ministries have benefited from about 40 percent of the credits made available to all of the ministries under the heading of personnel and equipment expenditures.

Secondly, a continuation of the efforts aimed at strengthening decentralization by placing increased financial means at the disposition of the local administration. The state subsidies to these administrative units will go up from 270 million DH in 1980 to 345 million DH in 1981.

Thirdly, paying the necessary attention to the social sphere, as various measures have been taken in favor of citizens with limited incomes and as the means available to the ministries concerned with the social sector have been further developed. Thus, compensation expenditures will increase by 188 percent, because the subsidies to the compensation fund and to the National Interprofessional Office for Cereals and Vegetables will increase to 1.4 billion DH, as against 486 million DH in 1980.

To these subsidies should be added a contribution of 80 million DH earmarked to compensate persons owning rental property who have an overall income not exceeding 1,500 CH per month and whose rental income has been reduced by one-third.

Payments by employers, estimated at 65 million DH, will be continued for the validation of prior service of temporary employees eligible for the system of retirement allowances.

Elsewhere, we have raised the credits provided to the Ministries of Health and National Education as well as to the ministries charged with professional training, including the Ministry of Equipment and National Development, the minister of state charged with tourism, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Handicraft, and the Ministry of Housing and Territorial Management.

Fourthly, the creation of almost 37,000 new positions to respond to the need for cadres in the defense and administrative sectors. This particularly concerns the sectors of national education (13,400 positions) and public health (2,539 positions) and also permits giving permanent status to 3,120 temporary employees and 1,781 Moroccan citizens expelled from Algeria.

These creations of new positions, on the other hand, constitute one aspect of the government measures aimed at promoting employment and at fighting against unemployment.

Fifthly, there is the increase in salaries of government employees in two stages during 1981. This increase in large part will benefit low-level officials and will consist of raising by 10 percent the value of the index point to 150, in stages of 5 percent as of 1 January 1981 and 5 percent more as of 1 July 1981.

Despite the growing needs expressed by the different administrative entities for the completion of their missions and which have required a considerable increase in ordinary expenditures, the operating budget for 1981 will be characterized by a surplus of 377 million dirhams, as compared to 150 million dirhams in 1980, as a result of the parallel increase recorded in ordinary receipts.

The Investment Budget

Investment does not have for its only objective the satisfaction of immediate needs in the different areas of national activity but rather tends toward the creation of broad economic activity which implies the achievement of approved projects and the laying of foundations essential to balanced economic, social, and cultural development. Thus, it is true that the equipment available to the country is the necessary instrument for development and the guarantee of the future at the same time.

In his speech opening the present session of the National Assembly the King asked us to be ambitious in the matter of investments so that we can exploit all of the national wealth, whether in the soil, under the ground, or in the sea. Thus, the draft investment budget for 1981 has applied this royal directive.

This budget has three characteristics which may be summarized as follows:

1) The size of the credits allocated;

2) The manner of dividing these credits among the various social and economic sectors;

3) The scale of certain new projects contained in it.

Before going into the contents of the draft investment budget in detail, it would be useful to review, even if only briefly, these three characteristics.

Regarding the size of the credits made available, the size of the new credits is practically 10 billion DH, whereas the annual average credit opened under the three-year plan (1978-80) was less than 8.47 billion DH.

If the comparison of the overall figures is intended to show the importance of the leap forward achieved by the present draft budget, compared to preceding budgets, a detailed examination of the different sectors makes it appear clearly that the draft which has been submitted to us responds to the directives of the King.

In effect, and although the first priority remains the military equipment effort aimed at providing the courageous Royal Armed Forces with the means of accomplishing their mission under the best conditions, the other sectors have also benefited from substantial credits so that they could face up, as far as possible, to the needs they had expressed.

Regarding the division of credits among the various social and economic sectors, this proceeds from the wish to reduce disparities, both at the social as well as regional level, and to exploit national resources.

It is appropriate to note in this connection the beginning of a large program of constructing housing for the families of those who have died on the battlefield in defense of the territorial integrity of the country, as well as the implementation of a program of constructing housing for lower-ranking government officials, and the adoption of measures favoring our workers abroad. The latter notably include the opening of specific credits aimed at covering the refund of interest on the loans extended to this category of citizens for the purchase of housing for themselves or their families.

In this same framework it is right to note the increase the resources placed at the disposition of the national development program in order to extract the greatest benefit from the existing human potential and to lessen the consequences of unemployment. In this respect work projects will be opened for the attention of young people, known for their dynamism within political, trade union, and social institutions. This will be done so that they can contribute their part to the work of building the country.

Regarding the diminution of regional disparities, the program that has been approved is characterized by effective intervention in favor of the development of the Sahara provinces, the expansion of investments in the arid zones, the areas that specialize in animal husbandry, as well as forest areas and regions threatened by erosion.

This program is also characterized by the size of the credits allocated to the Regional Special Development Fund and the maintenance at a high level of the activity of the development funds of local government bodies. This provides real content to the policy of decentralization that has been followed for several years.

In the area of the exploitation of national resources, it is important to point out particularly the qualitative change that has occurred in the level of investment in the fields of oil research and the possibility of exploitation of oil shale, as well as in the area of marine fisheries and deep water research.

Finally, the Investment Budget for 1981 is characterized by the beginning of certain operations whose scale requires that they be mentioned. These concern principally the construction of the new building for the Chamber of Representatives, the new University Hospital Center in Casablanca, the port at Laayoune, the Ait Chouarit dam, and the Rabat sports complex.

Thus, one may consider that 1981 will be marked by the resumption of investments and of the economic activity which accompanies it, after a period of 3 years of pause and reflection whose results have been the re-establishment of a fundamental balance and the creation of favorable conditions for a new resumption of growth on healthy economic and social bases.

The total credits provided in the Equipment Budget amount to 24 billion DH, of which 9.9 billion DH are provided out of current income for 1981, as opposed to 8.4 billion DH for 1980. An additional amount of 14 billion DH in obligation credits is provided for 1982 and following years.

To these totals should be added credits from the present fiscal year which are estimated at 12 billion DH, which brings the overall budgetary package at the disposition of the different ministries to 36 billion DH.

5170
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'PFLO RADIO' ON FOREIGN INFLUENCE IN OMAN'S ARMED FORCES

EA152050 Aden Voice of PFLO in Arabic 1545 GMT 15 Aug 81

[Excerpts] Brothers, when we talk about British domination of Oman we find a great deal of material evidence for the process of domination which Britain has been pursuing since the beginning of the 19th century.

A regime that lacks trust in its own people cannot stay in a position of leadership for a long time. This is the course of the Qabus regime in Oman. His policy will inevitably fail and consequently the treacherous regime will be removed from Oman. The Qabus regime in Muscat lacks all pretense to independence apart from the name and [word indistinct]. It is thus qualified to play any part assigned to it by the imperialist powers without any conditions or limits.

Now the era of military pacts with Britain and the U.S. is ushered in with the granting of military facilities on Omani territory.

In a report prepared by a U.S. military mission which toured Oman for months and studied the situation in the country, there was a paragraph which said: "The British presence in Oman is an obstacle to the transformation of the Omani armed forces into a national Omani force. In every military sector there are many British officers and many of the Sultan's military advisers are British.

This report went on to say: There is dismay in Omani circles about foreign domination over the armed forces and about the fact that Omanis are not given the opportunity to advance. These things constitute factors threatening stability in Oman.

What has been said in the report only touches on the painful reality experienced by the citizens under the regime of a gentry in Muscat. Let the forces of our people unite to rid themselves of the yoke of shame brought in by Qabus and his fellow travellers under the guidance of their masters in our country.

CSO: 4304/119

LNG VENTURE WITH JAPAN

London 8 DAYS in English No 32, 15 Aug 81 p 45

[Text]

FIVE MAJOR Japanese trading firms have agreed to form a negotiating group as a positive response to a recent invitation from the Qatari government to participate in its plan to export LNG resources amounting to six million tonnes a year from 1987. The five companies, who received separate invitations from the Qatari government, are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, C. Itoh, Marubeni and Nissho-Iwai.

Qatar's huge Northwest Dome offshore gas field is thought to be one of the world's largest, although its full extent . as yet unknown. The massive costs involved in extraction, plus uncertainty over future gas price levels, have made many western companies cautious about committing themselves to large-scale involvement.

According to the invitation received from the Qatari government — which set the deadline for acceptance at the end of August — the development of LNG will be carried out under a service contract between the Qatari government and international majors, and the project will be structured under a joint venture formula. The Qatari government invited the Japanese companies to participate in the joint venture and its marketing.

The invitations further said that the Qatari government would retain an 80 per cent share in the joint venture, and that international majors would hold 10–15 per cent, the rest to be held by the Japanese participants. The Japanese firms are reported to have notified the Qatari government already of their 'interest' in the project, including participation in the construction of development facilities to be established in Qatar.

The Qatari move is reportedly based on statement, made by Governor Jeida of the National Petroleum Corporation of Qatar at the sixth international conference on LNG held in Japan in April 1980. That a 'vast natural gas field with 2.8bn tonnes of LNG has been discovered in Qatar.' This would represent 5–6 per cent of the worldwide confirmed total natural gas deposits.

The current talks follow the recent contracts Japanese electricity and gas companies have concluded with Western Australia for annual purchase of six million tonnes of LNG and the basic agreement reached between Japan and the Soviet Union for development and purchase by the Japanese of six million tonnes of LNG from the continental shelf off Sakhalin Island.

The joint five-company invitation is an innovation — until now, there has been two set formats to LNG import negotiations. One is that a specific company has been approached to implement a specific project, as in the cases of Alaska, Brunei, Das Island, Sarawak and Canada. The other is that two or three more firms have submitted bids, and only one company has been chosen to enter into final negotiation, as in the cases of Indonesia and Western Australia.

In order to avoid any possible confusion or 'divide and rule' dangers the companies have agreed to take a unified position.

The Japanese are fully committed to securing LNG resources as a replacement for oil, which now accounts for 75 per cent of primary energy requirements. The government plan is to reduce the level to 50 per cent by 1990.

CSO: 4300/89

BRIEFS

FLOUR MILL STUDY--The Qatari government's Industrial Technical Development Centre is studying plans for a new high-capacity flour mill to meet the state's needs until the turn of the century, the OPEC news agency reported last week from Doha. OPECNA said a study was also underway to choose a suitable site for the new mill and that an existing mill at Umm Said might have to be moved because of the risk of industrial pollution. Much of Qatar's new heavy industry is located at Umm Said. The flour mill at Umm Said was set up in 1972 at a cost of $32.9 million and can grind 100 tonnes of wheat each day; the mill also has storage capacity for 16,800 tonnes of wheat; an extension to the plant was added in 1978 at a cost of $54.8 million. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 5]

CSO: 4300/91

POLITICAL FIGURES RUMINATE ON MOVE TO PARTY PLURALISM

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 13 Jul 81 pp 28-31

/Article by al-Salami al-Husni: "Following Bourguiba's New Democratic Initiative, Discussions with AL-DUSTUR; Muhammad al-Shabi: 'The Call for Party Pluralism Is an Important Turning Point'; Hasan al-Ghadban: 'We Bless This Step and Hope It Bears Fruit'"/

/Text/ In 1975, that is, 6 years ago, Tunisia's president, Habib Bourguiba, hinted in a press conference that Tunisia might embark on a course of political pluralism. However, the prime minister at that time, Hedi Nouira, told the Egyptian magazine AL-MUSAWWAR that party pluralism, even in Europe, had become a facade for chaos.

Since that date, Tunisia has gone through important events, from the Tunisian General Federation of Labor crisis and strikes to the events in the city of Gafsa. Tunisia, as it embarked on the decade of the eighties, seemed to be gathering its wounds and preparing to enter a new turning point which it had not seen in the past. Mr Mohamed M'zali who is well known for his intellectual liberalism and his Arab orientation, was given responsibility for supervising this turn, which actually appeared a year ago. Since then a number of steps have been carried out, characterized at the beginning by political liberalization and the clearing of political air. Then, some months ago, the stamp of recognition was granted to a number of parties and ideas, along with freedom of the press. Thus Tunisia began, sometimes hesitantly and sometimes bravely, to progress toward a kind of democracy and recognition of various political currents in the country.

Pluralism of Ideas

Bourguiba, in his capacity as chairman of the ruling Destour Party, declared at that party's conference that he saw no obstacle to letting political movements take part in public life and that the time had come to recognize a pluralism of ideas. This declaration was the consecration of a state of affairs that actually already existed, since all currents had started to express themselves, through the press, publications, or open activity; however, at the same time that the regime was seeking gradual ways of applying these orientations, the opposition demanded that it be officially recognized and that it be permitted to issue its own press.

While this searching and demanding was going on, the real problems of the shift from the single-party system to the multiparty system became apparent. The government has stated that if it permitted everyone who wanted to form a party to declare that and proceed with his activity, Tunisia would turn into a mosaic of parties

and organizations, while what was intended by letting currents proliferate was the broadening of scope of action of major intellectual forces. The leaders of the ruling Destour Party do not hesitate to say that the opposition which demands to be given official permission for party activity is unaware that the Destour Party itself does not have an official permit and that the only party with a permit in Tunisia is the Communist Party (whose permit has been withdrawn). Indeed, the ruling Destour Party has not received permits from the Ministry of the Interior since the French colonial authorities proscribed it after World War II. Therefore, to prevent that sort of political fragmentation, the Council of Ministers recently announced that official recognition of the parties would be conditional on each party's getting 5 percent in the parliamentary elections to take place next 1 November. These elections will be taking place ahead of schedule, so that the way may be paved for the opposition to take part in them, with full financial and media guarantees for the candidates. In the wake of the declaration on these measures, the various political currents, especially the Communist Party, the Social Democrats and the Islamic Orientation, declared that they were awaiting more suitable conditions for participating in the elections. These conditions may be summarized as prior official recognition of political organizations, permission for every party to issue its publications speaking in its name, and the guarantee of justice in the conduct of the electoral campaign.

The Solution Is in Bourguiba's Hands

In fact, as events have proved, the solution and resolution are still in Bourguiba's hands. Everyone is still waiting for the president to take another step in the direction not of encumbering the opposition with conditions which are difficult to meet but of granting them a greater opportunity to show what they can do. It is he who appointed Mohamed M'zali to guide the country toward democracy, and it is he who declared /the policy of/ pluralism. Why shouldn't he also signal the Ministry of the Interior and the government to apply the law and the letter of the nation's constitution? Bourguiba might be waiting for the appropriate time, but continuing in a state of searching and hesitation which the opposition describes as a retreat might be very harmful to the steps that have been taken so far along the road toward recognizing the opposition's right to exist and to express itself. However, what political circles in Tunisia do stress is that the slow progress Mzali's cabinet is making on the issue of democracy might result from pressures some rigid forces domestically and abroad that are opposed to an opening toward the opposition are exerting, and perhaps might result from the government's fear that haste in applying the decisions which have been made will deliver a blow against the democratic orientation itself through unexpected social or political convulsions and that it is reasonable to think and draw attention to dangers before moving forward with a new policy and to impose coordination between this liberalization and the social situation, which has become less tense following the election of new Labor Federation leaders.

In any event, these fears today all constitute a psychological factor, as far as both the government and the opposition are concerned, through which each party tries to come up with a missing compromise solution which will satisfy everyone, that is, a compromise between the way the opposition characterizes the regime, stating that it is not serious in its appeal for political pluralism but is using it for local consumption to create a suitable atmosphere to regain its breath, and

the statement the regime makes, to the effect that it does not want to implicate the country in political fragmentation or grant permits to organizations (some of which have ties with the outer world and some of which still believe in violence) and that what is needed is that objective rules be set forth which will apply to everyone.

In another area, although attention in Tunisia has come to be concentrated on the issue of democracy, the regime has made another substantial issue part of the priorities and reforms it intends to carry out. Bourguiba made the announcement "Tunisia is an Islamic Arab country with African and Mediterranean dimensions, and this affiliation imposes a group of duties upon it. We believe that it is inevitable, sooner or later, that we will merge with our brothers in organizing our common affairs in a formula which we will choose, lest each country remain alone, isolated, limited in power and low in influence." In Tunisia, this declaration is considered an important turning point, not less than the turn toward democracy. By virtue of this, the name of the National Assembly has been changed to the Chamber of Deputies--it was stated in the particulars of the constitutional reorganization that the word "nation" cannot be applied to Tunisia because it is part of a greater and broader nation, the Arab nation. In the conditions of Tunisia, as part of the low status an important part of the influential elite is suffering from (as contrasted with the circumstances which prevailed, in which Arab nationalism was considered to be a serious charge for which a person could be brought to trial), this decree is considered a revolution which has definitively and constitutionally established Tunisia's Arabism, crushing tendencies opposed to Arabism on the left and right alike and consecrating the Arab orientation through a historic triumph which will have results, if it is accompanied by serious application of the decrees bearing on the democratic orientation, for the future of Tunisia, which, by virtue of this turn, will begin to have influence abroad and in the Arab environment, while for a long time it was just influenced by it.

The Historic Turning Point

In another area, proceeding from Tunisia's preparations to enter onto these new democratic horizons, AL-DUSTUR held two conversations--with Prof Muhammad Mas'ud al-Shabi, a prominent leader of the Arab Nationalist Trend in Tunisia and the number one opposition member in the new left movement, and Shaykh Hasan al-Ghadban, who speaks for the Tunisian Islamic Consultative Trend-- in an effort to ascertain the reaction of Tunisian opposition political bodies to the new democratic step Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba has taken.

Herewith is the text of the first conversation:

/Question/ Prof Shabi, observers consider that President Habib Bourguiba's declaration on political pluralism and the results of the exceptional conference of the Destourian Socialist Party and the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] are among the most significant events which have occurred recently in Tunisia. How do you view this new situation in the country?

/Answer/ Without a doubt, the latest Destour Party conference should be considered one of the most prominent events Tunisia has gone through in the recent period, or in a number of years, at least from the theoretical standpoint, because two issues to which the country's present and future are related were resolved in it.

The first issue is the Destour Party's endorsement of political pluralism, that is, a proliferation of political currents in the country, by making it legitimate for these various currents to express themselves independently of the Destour Party and the regime. Assuredly, such a decision must be considered an important turning point in the history of the regime, because it will shift the country from a single-party system to a system in which political currents proliferate and in which they express themselves in legitimate form.

The second point which was raised in this conference is the issue which was resolved when the conference applauded enthusiastically as the party chairman declared it. This is the issue of Tunisia's national identity. The issue of Tunisia's Arab affiliations resolved, and reference was made to the need to try to merge it into an Arab nation through which Tunisia, and all parts of the Arab nation, will be able to defend themselves against the forces threatening them on the international stage.

We certainly believe that the Destour Party, after 20 years of ruling the country, has shortened the distance between itself and the popular democratic opposition, in particular the democratic progressive Arab current, by resolving these two issues. For this reason we consider that if these resolutions are carried out a new stage will have begun in the country in order to build its present and prepare to build its future.

/Question/ When we address ourselves to the major issues in the country, we do not view them from a party perspective, we view them from the perspective of the country's interests, and those of the Tunisian people. What is important is that the people benefit from these decisions. Through whom is not the important issue; whether that takes place through the Destour Party or through others is something which will be resolved not be argument but by history, especially if the country actually does move over to a democratic situation where other currents can express themselves freely through freedom of expression and freedom of the press. We concentrate specifically on freedom of the press because one cannot establish a real natural democratic life without accepting freedom of the press and expression, and freedoms such as that of assembly, without question, because political pluralism in truth has no meaning if it is not given an opportunity to define its concepts. It is not important how many parties there will be in the country; what is important, rather, is that the various currents in the country find an opportunity to express themselves as the Destour Party has found an opportunity to express itself. Naturally, we have never said that the Destour Party must be expelled from the country; rather, we say that every Tunisian has a right to the country. Our problem with the ruling party lay in its considering that whoever was outside it ought to be outside the country. This arose from the fact that this party did not acknowledge the need for a multiplicity of ideas. It is impossible that the country could evolve in a natural manner if there is no struggle and dialogue between long-term and short-term interests, the interests of the present generation and the generation of the future, within the important thing is that we be able to reduce the contradiction in this struggle, the contradiction between these interests, so that the transition from the present to the future will take a form more peaceful and beneficial for the country, in a conscious manner which has been determined in advance. Such a conscious manner cannot exist if the country does not enjoy a democratic climate in which every current and every idea on the country's present

or future will be permitted to be expressed. Therefore the issue at hand now is whether the opposition (which for the most part expresses the country's aspirations for the future) can exist alongside the present, and whether the country can live in its present and its future at the same time.

/Question/ Do I understand from this that M'zali's government enjoys your trust and that you consequently believe that it is able to apply this transition toward democracy?

/Answer/ I believe that no judgment on any government can be made through statements or through the program which it declares it intends to apply, although the program and the intentions are taken into consideration in the evaluation. Mohamed M'zali is a personality who has been known for years for his commitment to specific ideas. Through the cultural field, Mohamed M'zali propounded Tunisia's affiliation with the Arab world and with Islamic Arab civilization. On this point we are in sympathy with him, are in agreement over it, and we can participate together in applying it and consequently take part in a democratic Arab nation. For this reason we consider that if M'zali's government can grasp the general picture of the overall forces in the country, it can apply a significant portion of the slogans it has propounded. This does not mean that hard-line forces connected to the Western and capitalist world will refrain from exerting pressure, but we believe that Mohamed M'zali will be able to rely on influential popular forces to frustrate the effect of these burdensome elements that oppose and obstruct Tunisia's progress toward democracy and toward incorporation into a democratic Arab nation.

/Question/ Could the conclusion of this analysis be that the progressive Arab current will advance hand in hand with M'zali's government if the latter takes steps to carry out its democratic program?

/Answer/ Certainly the progressive Arab current does not take a negative position on the country or events. It extends its welcome to every step that is taken as part of the convictions on whose behalf it is striving. It is anxious that there be a great power in the country which believes that Tunisia's future interests are contingent on this matter and on the greater Arab movement. We are claiming to represent the whole Arab current, because that exists in all the political blocs in the country. We consider that the Arab tendencies within each bloc can cooperate with one another in carrying out the common tasks which the country's present and future lay on our shoulders.

Power in Arabism and Islam

AL-DUSTUR to Shaykh al-Ghadban: Does the Islamic Consultative Trend have any particular opinion on the democratic developments taking place in Tunisia?

/Answer/ The announcement the Destour Party made at its latest conference was not new from the constitutional standpoint; what it announced is written down in the constitution, which was codified in the first days of independence. Consequently the Destourian Socialist Party has responded to constitutional legitimacy. It is true that there are people who say that pressure was applied until the regime responded to this demand, which was made by the opposition and by all popular powers in Tunisia, but the truth of the matter is that the council which drew up the

constitution in the first days of independence considered salvation and success could be realized only through pluralism. We are sorry that what the constitution contained previously has been announced after such a long period. It is not bad for us not to say a great deal over the past, now that it has been declared that what the constitution declared legitimate has been declared legitimate in law. We bless this step although we follow it with this: The Tunisian people are capable of exercising democratic life and it is not right that guardianship be imposed on it from one direction, because our people belong to a nation whose history is replete with the virtues of pluralism, even on the ideological and religious levels! I believe that the forces which have appeared on the Tunisian stage have enough maturity and consciousness to enter into the adventure of political pluralism without having the interests of the country and the religious institutions. However, the danger threatening this declaration is that a sort of regression from the announcement that has been wisely made, might occur if the burden on the opposition movements is increased through conditions which the opposition did not endorse but which the ruling regime has stipulated. It is logical that the only condition without which no movement can play a role in Tunisia is that it not betray the conscience of Tunisia, is that it not be non-Arab, and Islamic--that is, that it not be unpatriotic. The regime ought to have asked the opposition who was outside this framework, that is, outside the framework of Arabism, Islam and nationalism.

/Question/ Will the Islamic Consultative Trend take part whenever an opportunity is granted it in the parliamentary elections or other things?

/Answer/ We are not waiting for an opportunity to participate--we began participating 10 years ago. As far as parliamentary elections are concerned, we have issued a declaration (we do not know why AL-MUSTAQBAL did not publish it, as that is an opposition paper) in which we stated our position, which is that we believe that if the coming elections were to take place in a framework of political justice, that is, if there were to be political equality among all, including the ruling party, and the resources available were to be distributed to all movements, because the resources of the Destourian Socialist Party are those of the Tunisian people--and also if there were to be justice on the level of the media and also on the security level, whereby security agencies would protect the meetings the various political currents held, and there were no guardianship on the part of the government in terms of supervision or dectation of conditions, and that anyone who wanted to come forward to be elected could do so, we would in this situation, be prepared to enter the coming parliamentary election contest. However, if there is guardianship over the process of venturing into the elections and if there are conditions for entering these elections, we will not enter them, because we see no justification for doing so--indeed, more than that, we will condemn opposition people who do enter them because that is to be considered a conspiracy against true democracy. This is the position which we have declared in our statement and publication and which we are repeating for AL-DUSTUR magazine.

The Regime Knows

/Question/ However, the political justice you are demanding clashes with a situation which you acknowledge, which is that political movements in Tunisia do not have equal weight, and that consequently the Destourian Party, which still constitutes a force in the country, might not agree to be the equal of a weak movement which is not even able to express itself.

/Answer/ It is true that political movements in Tunisia are unequal, even in their background and their mass appeal, but we demand that every movement be given what it represents. How can we ascertain this constituency? There is no doubt that the regime knows the true nature of every movement in the country and the extent of its constituency. What is important is that we honor /the principle of/ having these people choose who they want and the trends in the country that they wish. There one must state that we are not leary of political fragmentation--what we are afraid of is that the regime fears certain tendencies that have real weight, as a result of the slogans they raise and the ideas and hypothesis they present, which the Tunisian people respond to in a spontaneous fashion. In my opinion, these tendencies focus on one fact, which is Arabism and Islam, which are deepreeted in the conscience of the Tunisian people, and no other fact or idea has the presence in the hearts of the Tunisian people that Arabism and Islam do. We are afraid that the government may try to slam the door in the face of people raising the banner of Arabism and Islam.

/Question/ However, the government says that the danger lies not in Arabism or Islam but in violence and secret activities aimed at overthrowing and bringing down the regime.

/Answer/ Naturally when lawful activity is not allowed, recourse is taken to secret action, which was never an acceptable choice, even in the days of the prophet of God. Secret action is compulsory when one is faced with nonrecognition. The option which exists is that between democracy and violence. If the government is afraid of violence, it must eliminate the causes of it, which are embodied in a refusal to recognize other tendencies. We are now faced with two options--open democratic activity governed by the law, or unlawful activity which will bring sin upon the country, in view of the violence and chaos that will produce. These phenomenon no one is content with, but what recourse is there for anyone compelled to pursue them in the face of prohibitions?

The Iraq-Iran War

/Question/ Today the Arabs and Moslems face a war between Iraq and Iran. How do you as an Islamic Consultative Trend view this war?

/Answer/ It is necessary to go back to the beginning of the story if one wants to understand the end of it, because the talk about the Iraq-Iran war is the end of the story. Whether the authorities which were established in Iran after Khomeyni's return to Iran are authorities which have committed themselves to Islam is the basic point.

When the revolution in Iran began, we were in sympathy with it, up to the day Khomeyni returned. I do not believe that the Iraqi people were against it--rather, they were against the corrupt regime of the Shah. Once matters were in Khomeyni's hands, did the Iranian people get what they had been expecting? Did oppression and terror really end and did the era of freedom start? I believe that what is known as the Islamic revolution in Iran has become greatly confused in a manner detrimental not just to Khomeyni as a person but also to Islam and the Moslems. Ultimately it is Islam that is injured and hurt by the behavior of two people in power in Iran. I believe that the fact that some Islamic movements became implicated

with Khomeyni was a mistake from the standpoint of Islamic law because it imparted a character of sanctity to every action that took place in the name of Islam. While we do not intend to look at the acts of the prophet of God, there are mistakes and good deeds in the acts of man. The mistakes by the people who are in charge of affairs in Iran are plain to see and the practices that are far-removed from Islam are plain to see. They are all a facade for the defects in the way the institutions of government were established. It would have been more fitting had the Iranian government, rather than getting into a war, which has brought Iran nothing but calamity and destruction, established the foundations of the state first. However, the tragedy is that the Iranian leaders became implicated in marginal problems, in a war in which there is no benefit for the region, the Arabs or the Moslems. This failure, power struggle, killing and liquidation is proof that what has taken place in Iran is not an Islamic revolution. When we say this, we believe that we are being sincere before God in what we say. We, as an Islamic Consultative Orientation, are the first to raise the banner of criticism against the Iranian leadership, which is not committed to Islamic morality.

Who Is al-Shabi?

al-Shabi is considered a major fighting member of the Arab Nationalist Trend in Tunisia. He has in the practical sense devoted a number of articles and books to this orientation that were issued over a period of time, most prominently "The Strategy of Arab Revolution," "A Step Forward, Not a Retreat" and "The Maghreb at the Crossroads." A single thread links all these books--the relationship between the issue of democracy and Arab unity and the forces which are active in the negative and positive senses in Arab society governing this issue specifically.

Who Is al-Ghadban?

al-Ghadban is considered the Islamic Consultative Trend leader in Tunisia who has the greatest influence on the Tunisian man in the street. That may be attributed to his connection with Arabism and Islam, and the postulation that Arab unity is an inevitable necessity. Above and beyond that, he has given more than 200 lectures which have been sold in the form of type cassettes in Tunisia in ordinary marketplaces. The Islamic Consultative Orientation is considered a tributary of the Islamic Orientation led by Rashad al-Ghannushi and 'Abd-al-Fattah Maru.

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CSO: 4504/41

PAPER COMMENTS ON U.S.-ISRAELI DIFFERENCES

GF161952 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 13 Aug 81 p 1

[Editorial: "The Essence of the Differences"]

[Text] The news that the United States has postponed the delivery of sophisticated arms to Israel, and the annoyance of the Israeli enemy, who went as far as to protest this action by the U.S. Government, pose a question to which we must seek an answer: How far can these differences go?

This in turn requires us to seek the answer to another question: To what extent can the Arab exploit these differences and turn them to their favor? And how?

The differences between the United States and Israel spring from a basic fact, namely, that each side gives priority to its own strategic interests. The strategic interests of the United States in this region is to ensure the flow of oil to the West without impediment or threats and to prepare the entire area for a positive role--from the U.S. viewpoint--to confront the Soviet danger that has begun to emerge particularly following Afghanistan. In this regard it should be noted that the Reagan Administration gives priority in its strategy to this last aspect.

However, the continuation of the Israeli conflict is a constant obstacle to stability in the region, while the U.S. commitment to Israel continues to be an obstacle to the Arabs' acceptance of an alliance with the United States in the conflict against the Soviet Union. Thus an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict is a necessary condition for implementing U.S. strategy in the area. This is what the United States is seeking to achieve by various means, without of course neglecting the so-called "moral" commitment to the Zionist state.

Matters could have gone Washington's way if the Arabs had accepted the fait accompli and accepted Israel's conditions to end the conflict. However, what happened is that the capitulation process stopped at Camp David and went no further. Consequently, the United States had no alternative but to exert pressure on the other side--Israel--to achieve its objectives. And as much as the Arabs insist on their rights the United States will equally exert pressure on Israel. Israeli leaders are ultimately not interested in the implementation of U.S. strategy as much as they are interested in realizing the dream of a greater Israel.

This is the essence of the contradiction between what Washington wants and what Tel Aviv wants. In the past Israel's policy was based on the U.S. belief that Israel is the area gendarme that is capable of being compelled with the use of a stick to follow the path drawn up by Washington. Recent development, however, have removed this illusion and persuaded the United States that the "use of the stick" is bound to alienate the Arabs more and more from Washington.

Let us hold on further to our rights. This is the only way to make the United States believe in the justice of these rights.

CSO: 4304/119

UAE PAPER ON U.S. DECISION ON AIRCRAFT DELIVERY

GF2010 : Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 19 Aug 81 p 1

[Unattributed editorial]

[Text] Reagan's decision to lift the ban on delivery of F15's and F16's to Israel was not dangerous in itself. The Arabs know the "depth" of linkage and the "strength" of the relationship between Washington and Tel-Aviv--to quote Evron, the enemy's ambassador to the United States, who was the only Israeli to laud the decision as his personal accomplishment.

However, the significance of the decision stems from the fact that it is the final act of a U.S. maneuver aimed at assuring Arabs that they are being considered by U.S. decisionmakers. Nevertheless, Arabs knew beforehand the "insipidness" of this maneuver and the naivete of the plot.

The U.S. decision aimed "tactically" at absorbing the indignation that spread throughout the Middle East, indeed, throughout the world, at Israel's brutal attack of Iraq's nuclear reactor near Baghdad, which employed the same kind of aircraft. It is certain that Israel was informed of decision in advance and that the United States did not stipulate not to show some resentment. Thus, Israel protested as best it could. This was the situation at the first stage of the ban.

The ban had to hold for a few more weeks to tactically absorb the effect of the barbaric raids on Beirut, in which the same kind of aircraft was also used. Realistically, Israel was not in need of them.

Meanwhile, the United States did not forget to present one of its projects and papers on the Middle East, and what emerged was the cease-fire in Lebanon, which succeeded "temporarily." Thus, the Israeli-Palestinian war stopped, perhaps for reasons determined by the two parties at that time. Then came the more dangerous paper, which called for turning the cease-fire into a de facto situation, in other words, into a "settlement." The latter paper was rejected because it was more vile, because it aimed at turning the cease-fire into an annihilation of the Palestinian revolution. The U.S. conspiracy had to be uncovered and condemned. Therefore, hopes evaporated and its was decided to remove the thin mask made of the threads of the cease-fire and the ban of aircraft delivery to Israel in order to reveal the U.S. face as it is.

In short, the decision means freeing Israel's hand once again to carry out its aggressive acts. How soon Israel will take action!

However, from an analytical point of view, the decision can be considered a "positive one" because every tactical deceptive step has a negative effect on friends and every open confrontation unifies them against enemies.

CSO: 4304/119

UAE OIL MINISTER ON OPEC EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT

JN202001 Manama GULF NEWS AGENCY in Arabic 1915 GMT 20 Aug 81

[Text] Geneva, 20 Aug (GNA)--UAE President His Highness Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al Nuhayyan has instructed the UAE delegation at the OPEC conference in Geneva, to work for reaching some sort of agreement that protects OPEC unity and the member states' interests and serves the entire world. This came in a statement by Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, UAE minister of petroleum and natural resources, to the Emirates News Agency here today. He added that tremendous efforts are now being exerted by the OPEC heads of state to reach a compromise solution among the OPEC's 13 member states.

The minister pointed out that OPEC heads of state will appeal to Saudi King Khalid to raise the Saudi oil price to $35 per barrel in accordance with a proposal supported by the majority of member states. He warned that the states that sell their oil at high prices will very soon be forced to lower their prices due to market influences. He also warned that if the current conference fails to reach an agreement, Saudi Arabia will find it hard to raise its oil prices even to the level of [figure indistinct] per barrel, which is the price of its light oil.

Dr al-'Utaybah added that the African states, which demand prices up to $40 per barrel for their excellent light oil, will not be able to sell it at the present prices. He expected these states to announce large reductions in their prices if they do not take advantage of Saudi Arabian willingness to raise its prices. This, he said, is due to the influences of the confused market.

He said that the ministers are unanimous on freezing prices until the end of 1982 and that there is no disagreement on the levels of the prices at which the freezing will be implemented. He added that this freezing will create a suitable atmosphere and stability in the world markets until demand for oil returns. [words indistinct] once again.

CSO: 4304/119

MINISTER OF PETROLEUM DISCUSSES OIL PRICES

JN161217 Manama GULF NEWS AGENCY in Arabic 1145 GMT 16 Aug 81

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 16 Aug (GNA)--Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, UAE minister of petroleum and natural resources, has called on OPEC countries which are selling their crude oil at high prices to reduce these prices. He called on the countries [words indistinct] their prices [words indistinct] raise their prices to seek a compromise solution among the various trends, thus leading to the unification of the oil pricing systems in the region.

In a statement today, Dr Al-'Utaybah said that the price of $34 a barrel is a good basis for such a compromise solution, one which the oil market can automatically accommodate through supply and demand and which will enable balance to return to this market once again.

He stressed that his country will exert all its effots to consolidate OPEC's unity and protect the interests of member states.

Dr al-'Utaybah pointed out that the reasons for the oil crisis are due to the large increase in crude oil prices and not to the increase of production. He went on to say: The increase in Saudi production is not the reason for the surplus in the market because this increase compensated for only part of the reduction of oil production by Iraq and Iran.

He stressed that the OPEC states should reconsider their long-term pricing policy in a new spirit in light of the new factors brought about by the market.

Concluding his statement, which he made before his departure for Geneva today, Dr. al-'Utaybah stressed that his country is not at present facing any difficulties in marketing its oil and said: The UAE is always eager to find the suitable healthy market for its oil and gas for several coming years. Therefore, he said, it will not take any steps which might lead to the loss of its markets and clients.

CSO: 4304/119

DEVELOPMENT PLAN SEEKS BALANCED GROWTH

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 pp 5, 6

[Text]

The Federal Ministry of Planning in the UAE has unveiled the federation's next five-year plan (1981-85), estimated to cost a total of around $3.67 billion. It is understood that $2.27 billion of this will go towards development projects already under way, while the rest will be used on schemes undertaken during the new plan period.

At the same time, the Ministry of Planning released figures on the last calendar year's achievements under the previous general economic development plan. According to the Ministry's report, the authorities' concern is to balance out the standard of living in various parts of the country, and provide greater economic equality among the seven member-states of the federation.

The figures released by the Planning Ministry are a good indication of the imbalances which existed and the way the authorities are now seeking to redress them. The largest development project funds allocated last year, the ministry's report says, went to Fujeirah, which received Dirhams 1.422 billion ($386.8 million). Abu Dhabi came only second with Dirhams 1.203 billion ($327.2 million), while another traditionally poor Emirate, Ras al-Khaimah, got Dirhams 1.077 billion ($292.9 million).

Ajman, which has also long been neglected received Dirhams 403 million, Sharjah was allocated Dirhams 798 million ($217 million) while richer Dubai got Dirhams 536 million ($145.8 million) and Umm al-Quwain received Dirhams 510 million ($138.7 million).

But it must be borne in mind that these figures are not a totally accurate reflection of the level of development spending in the UAE. The relatively small sums allocated to the two richest Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, also reflect the wealth of these states' local governments, which have undertaken much of the development effort there.

Fujeirah got $104 million for power and water

According to reports in the UAE's official new agency, the Federal Ministry of Planning spent on Fujeirah Dirhams 395 million ($107.44 million) for electricity and water projects, another Dirhams 190 million ($51.7 million) on health development, Dirhams 652 million ($177.3 million) on education and youth projects, Dirhams 53 million ($14.4 million) on the Emirate's local Ministry of Justice, Dirhams 23 million ($6.25 million) on Islamic affairs, Dirhams 116 million ($31.5 million) on housing and public works, Dirhams 15 million ($4 million) on cultural and information projects and Dirhams 3 million on labour affairs.

In Ras al-Khaimah, the Planning Ministry reported that low cost houses are being built at a price of Dirhams 30 million ($8.2 million), while Dirhams 23 million ($6.25 million) has been allocated to Justice and Islamic affairs, Dirhams 10 million ($2.7 million) was spent on cultural and information projects, Dirhams 707 million ($192.3 million) financed electricity and water projects and Dirhams 420 million ($114.2 million) went to communications schemes.

Another relatively poor Emirate, Sharjah, received Dirhams 265 million ($72.1 million) for education, Dirhams 176 million ($46.5 million) for electricity and water development, Dirhams 268 million ($72.9 million) for telecommunications, Dirhams 22 million ($5.9 million) for information and cultural projects, Dirhams 8 million ($2.2 million) for agriculture and Dirhams 3 million ($816,000) for the local justice department

In Ajman, the local Ministry of Communications was allocated Dirhams 112 million ($30.5 million), the Ministry of Electricity and Water received Dirhams 195 million ($53 million), the Ministry of Education Dirhams 37 million ($10 million), the Ministry of Health Dirhams 14 million ($3.8 million), the Ministry of Public Works Dirhams 18 million ($4.9 million) and the Ministry of Justice Dirhams 15 million ($4.1 million).

In the Emirate of Dubai, the local Ministry of Education and Youth Affairs received the lion's share of allocations with Dirhams 301 million ($81.9 million) for the largest single education development project after that of Fujeirah. The Ministry of Health came second with Dirhams 156 million ($42.4 million), followed by the Ministry of Communications with Dirhams 23 million ($6.25 million), the Ministry of Public Works and Housing with Dirhams 16 million ($4.35 million), the Ministry of Information and Culture with Dirhams 14 million ($3.8 million) and the Ministry of Agriculture with Dirhams 6 million ($1.6 million).

In Abu Dhabi, 37 per cent or Dirhams 445 million ($121 million) of the emirate's total share of Dirhams 1.203 billion ($327.2 million) went to education projects. Dirhams 138 million ($37.5 million) was spent on informational and cultural schemes, Dirhams 77 million ($20.9 million) went to the local Ministry of Justice, Dirhams 23 million ($6.25 million) was allocated to agriculture, Dirhams 20 million ($5.4 million) financed public works and housing projects and Dirhams 9 million ($2.4 million) went to the Health Ministry.

One of the poorest emirates, Umm al-Quwain received Dirhams 212 million ($57.6 million) for water and electricity development, Dirhams 168 million ($45.7 million) for communications projects, Dirhams 50 million ($13.6 million) for health schemes, almost the same amount ($13.3 million) for education and youth affairs, and Dirhams 8 million ($2.2 million) for information, Dirhams 6 million ($1.6 million) for justice and Dirhams 1 million ($272,000) for agriculture.

These figures give a clear indication not only of the UAE government's aim to create greater balance between one Emirate and another but also of the particular needs of each one. The poorest states, Ajman, Fujeirah, Sharjah and Umm al-Quwain received the largest amounts for infrastructural development such as communications, water, electricity and health projects, while the richest got the biggest sums for educational, informational and cultural schemes.

CSO: 4300/91

BRIEFS

CONTRACT REGULATIONS ISSUED--Contracts with the government of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi from the beginning of next year will go only to companies which have registered with the Emirate's Controller of Companies, Mohammed Mousa al-Gamzi, Under-Secretary of the Department of Planning, announced last week. He said the deadline for applications for registration is August 31. Mr Gamzi said the new rules would encompass about 1,000 contracting firms in Abu Dhabi and that companies would be divided into five categories. The aim of the measure which resembles one adopted by Kuwait, is to enable local contractors to play a more effective role in obtaining contracts for development projects in the Emirate. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 6]

U.S. FIRM WINS CONTRACT--The Abu Dhabi Gas Liquefaction Company (ADGLCO), a subsidiary of ADNOC, has granted a $320 million contract to Chicago Bridge and Iron (CBI) of Illinois to build seven gas storage tanks for the ambitious Das Island gas terminal project in the Gulf. The American manufacturers are to provide three storage tanks of 80,000 cubic metres capacity for LNG and four of 50,000 cubic metres capacity for LPG. Ancillary plant and services are also included in the contract, which is being undertaken by the firm's London-based subsidiary, CBI Constructors. Work on the order is due to start later this year and is scheduled for completion in 1985. The nature of the soil on Das Island explains the high cost of the storage tanks, which have to be built along precise specifications, including that of being blast-proof. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 8]

ABU DHABI OIL OUTPUT--(WAM)--The oil production of the Amirate of Abu Dhabi now is 1.5 million barrels a day. Of this 1 million BPD is produced on-shore and the rest off-shore. A number of petroleum projects are being implemented. One of them is the construction of a large refinery in the al-Ruways area. Work has almost been completed and the refinery will start production before the end of thisyear. Its capacity is 120,000 barrels daily, which is more than enough to meet the total consumption needs of the UAE. The surplus will be exported. Also under construction is liquefaction plant for gas produced on-shore. The plant, the first such for on-shore gas in the Gulf, is on Das Island. It will treat 550 million cubic feet of gas daily, and Japan will import the entire production for 20 years. [Excerpt] [GF071109 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 7 Aug 81 p 3]

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ARAB STATES PURCHASE EUROPEAN GLIDERS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 Jul 81 p 3

/Article by Shlomo Shamgar: "Arabs Purchase 150 Gliders in Germany"/

/Text/ Syria has recently purchased 50 motorized gliders of the type which the terrorists have used to penetrate into Israel, and a shipment of 100 additional gliders will soon leave for Arab countries. This was reported in the German weekly DER SPIEGEL.

According to the weekly, these gliders are being produced in the town of Zieg in southern Germany by the technician Fritz Schweiger and the industrialist Eberhardt Jahle. The two have been involved in the production and export of gliders for 6 years.

The German weekly reports: "In 1979 six Syrians were trained for the first time in the glider school attached to the enterprise. Afterwards, the Syrians invited the two Germans to Syria, and there they trained additional Syrians in the Hermon area. One of the outstanding trainees at the time was the son of President Hafiz 'Asad.

"The Syrians wanted to add a small engine to the original model. Their request was fulfilled and after the modification was successfully tested in Germany, the Syrians ordered 50 such gliders."

Now the enterprise is preparing a shipment of 100 additional such gliders for other Arab countries--Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq.

The cost of each such glider is 12,000 marks (almost 60,000 shekels). It is noteworthy that when the pilot of one of the terrorists' gliders was recently captured in Israel, it was found that he was trained in Syria for this attack.

According to the German weekly, the two Germans who are producing the motorized glider are aware that it has military use, and they are cooperating secretly with the West German military authorities. The two of them, incidentally, served in the West German Army.

However, in spite of this, the two maintained to the DER SPIEGEL reporter that they were "very surprised" when they found out that their product is likely to be used for an attack on Israel. According to them, there were no Palestinians among the Arab "sportsmen" who had trained with them. They also contend that they cannot track every glider which they sell and they do not consider themselves guilty of exporting weapons to the terrorists "just as the Daimler Benz enterprises are not guilty if someone uses a Mercedes to rob a bank."

5830
CSO: 4323/25

ARAB INVESTORS VIEW MITTERAND POLICIES

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 31, 8 Aug 81 pp 34-35

[Article by Alan Tillier]

[Text]

DESPITE REASSURANCES from French officials and bankers, Arab investors are worried about President Mitterrand's nationalisation policies, and some private financiers have already pulled out.

Arab mistrust, according to investors in Paris, centres mainly on the Communist presence in Mitterrand's cabinet and French attitudes towards Israel. There are Arab sources who still maintain that the president gave King Khaled assurances on the first point, amounting to the statement: 'I am as anti-communist as you are.'

French envoys continue to circulate in the Gulf with soothing words about the continuation of arms sales, and the safety of Arab government and private deposits in France. Leading Saudi investors have been reassured about their stake in the arms manufacturer, Thomson CSF.

The most recent envoy was Claude de Kemoularia, adviser on international affairs at the Banque de Paris et du Pays Bas (Paribas), the major French merchant bank which holds stakes or represents those of private clients (including Arab investors) in hundreds of French companies.

Kemoularia is not a banker by training but he straddles the financial and political worlds with great ease. On a visit to Abu Dhabi, he announced: 'There will be no change in France's economic policy towards foreign and Arab investment. As a banker with responsibilities, I can state that the free movement of goods and investments will be maintained in France without conditions or shackles.' Unfortunately, Kemoularia's own bank is up for nationalisation.

'Arabs are postponing investment decisions,' said Roger Azar, one of Paris's leading advisers to Saudi investors. 'On the other hand, it is hardly the moment to sell assets here', he added.

The Bourse is down 20 per cent, and sizeable Arab stakes in some companies — such as Creusot-Loire (steel), banking groups like Suez and Credit Commercial de France (Abu Dhabi interests) and the arms manufacturer Matra — could well be affected as they are all due for nationalisation.

The French guarantee of free flow of capital calmed the fears of many Arab investors. Shortly after Mitterrand's victory, some private Gulf investors left, but the governments have stayed. Commenting on the anxieties of private investors, one Paris-based Arab banker said: 'It is not necessarily a political problem. These are people who seek maximum security, and they just don't know this government.'

Before the elections, some Arab investors who were misled by the polls into expecting a Giscard victory bought prestigious buildings on the Champs Elysees, like Fouquet's restaurant. There has been no Arab investment since the results were announced.

As far as foreign governments are concerned, the French are hoping for Saudi participation in a $5bn public loan scheduled for launching after the summer holidays. In the opinion of one Arab banker, France would have to pay ½ per cent over Libor to attract Arab funds.

On a more optimistic note, Paris has recently patched up relations with Tripoli and resumed arms sales to Libya — which has between $1bn and $2bn in Paris banks like the Algerian-Libyan Banque Intercontinentale Arabe.

But Arab suspicions remain, given the pro-Israeli lobby inside the French Socialist Party. The recent decision by Paris to withdraw support for the Arab boycott has already brought a warning from Kuwait about the future of Arab investment in France.

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PLO GAINS SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 81, 8 Aug 81 pp 16-17

[Text]

THE PLO has succeeded in winning diplomatic recognition in four Latin American countries — Brazil, Cuba, Mexico and Nicaragua —and it continues through official and unofficial missions to press its case in the continent. A measure of its success is the fact that since 1974 all but three Latin American countries have, at some point, expressed support for the Palestinians at the United Nations.

Latin America will host the forthcoming UN seminar on Palestinian rights, to be held on 31 August-4 September at Havana's Palacio de Convenciones. This regional seminar, one of four, was mandated by the General Assembly in 1979 and included 21 Latin American states among its proponents.

The UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People had hoped to find a suitable venue for the seminar in a non-member country (Cuba is vice-chairman of the committee). Panama was to be the venue initially but the government declared that the dates put forward by the committee were unsuitable. Guyana (a committee member) declined to host the seminar for similar reasons.

In 1974, six Latin American states were among those which voted in the UN General Assembly for recognition for the PLO and the affirmation of Palestinian rights. At the end of last year's emergency debate on Palestine the number had reached 22. Though most Latin American states could not be accused of consistency in their UN voting only three — Guatemala, Honduras and Paraguay — have never expressed recognition of Palestinian rights.

Recently PLO diplomatic activity at the UN has been accompanied by a drive to strengthen links with political parties and opposition groups in Latin America. PLO headquarters in Beirut has hosted a stream of Latin American visitors and numerous Palestinian delegations have toured the continent. While some elements of the PLO, most notably the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, continue to cultivate contacts with Latin American guerrilla groups, such as Chile's Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) and the scattered remnants of Argentina's Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRT), mainstream PLO efforts have been concentrated on finding friends in ruling and opposition parties, popular organisations and the church hierarchy.

Palestinian publications have highlighted the visits to Beirut of such Latin American personalities as former Bolivian president Luis Adolfo Siles Salinas, a presidential candidate in last year's elections, who was a guest of the PLO after a delegation of Bolivia's Popular and Democratic Union (UDP) coalition visited PLO headquarters. Other visitors have included Brazilian parliamentarians Joao Hercolino and Airton Soares; a multi-party parliamentary delegation from Peru; Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSP) deputy secretary general Lucia Romero Santiago; the leader (since assassinated) of El Salvador's Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), Manuel Franco, and the leader of El Salvador's Farabundo Marti Front (FMLN), Shafiq Jorge Handal.

One of the regular Palestinian visitors to Latin America is Ibrahim Ayyad, a Catholic priest and member of the Palestine National Council. Ayyad's contacts with Latin American ecclesiastical have proved valuable. In 1978 he was received by Chilean Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez who affirmed his support 'for the rights and just cause of the Palestinian people'.

Palestinian contacts with opposition circles in Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador and Guatemala have probably been facilitated by Israel's aggressive military sales in the

CSO: 4300/93

TURKISH JOURNALIST INTERVIEWS YASIR 'ARAFAT

NC141051 Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 11 Aug 81 p 3

[Interview granted by PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat to CUMHURIYET correspondent Cengiz Candar in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] The Turkish Government has adopted an energetic stand following the latest Israeli attacks. It has issued a stern communique denouncing Israel. What is more, for the first time it has extended medical aid. Has the attitude adopted by Turkey this time satisfied you?

[Answer] (Butting in before the question ended) We had expected more than that, particularly after the barbaric attack on the Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. We must not forget that Turkey is a member of the Islamic conference which has adopted various resolutions. That is why I believe that the Turkish Government should have taken a step further. It should take a concrete step and sever all its relations with the Israeli military junta, which has murdered women and children.

The Israelis do not confine their attacks to military targets. They have proved this during the Palestine-Israeli fighting which lasted for 15 days during the month of Ramadan. However, all their attempts have met with failure. We have shown that we can resist. We have proved that not only can we resist, but that we can also act resolutely and take some advanced steps and thus achieve victory over this Israeli military junta.

[Question] If we take into consideration that Turkey, in its capacity as a member of NATO, is in close touch with the Americans, don't you think that it can play a role in persuading the United States to recognize the PLO?

[Answer] I doubt it; I do not think so. The Americans insist on maintaining their present attitude. Even the Europeans have been unable to change the U.S. attitude. However, supporting the Palestinian cause is a moral and historic responsibility of Turkey, because the Palestinian people who are under occupation are subjected to constant attacks by Israel, which enjoys unlimited American support. Against this, the Turkish Government should use every possible influence in supporting its Palestinian brothers in any other way.

[Question] After the latest war, there is a general conviction that the United States may change its attitude toward the PLO. The U.S. officials in general,

and Alexander Haig in particular, have stated that the Camp David Accord should be subjected to radical changes.

[Answer] I do not build castles in the air. This is a plot against the Palestinians, against our future, and against our women and children. I am sorry to say that I am not optimistic. They do not seem to be altering their attitude in any way. They insist on the Camp David Accord.

[Question] Do you think that the cease-fire can be lasting and steady?

[Answer] Begin was very specific. He has arrogantly stated that this cease-fire would be temporary. And now they are preparing for a new military expedition, a very extensive operation. Begin's words during those days when he had formed his government was an open warning to us. He said: Watch your step. But we are prepared for him. We are determined and we know what we are doing. We will achieve victory sooner or later. No one should doubt this. We are marching in the direction which history flows. They are opposing it.

[Question] Under the circumstances, in what direction is the Palestinian diplomacy heading in the period ahead?

[Answer] We have many plans but we prefer not to talk about them. Let militant acts speak for itself, not words. (After a short pause he went on.) Nevertheless, let me give you some clues. We are determined to increase our activities in all fields, for we have to turn the victory we have achieved in the 15-day war with Israel into a political victory. We are going to observe an international solidarity day next month with the peoples of Palestine and Lebanon. An Arab summit may convene this year. We have asked the nonaligned countries to form a support committee which will remain in action permanently. On the other hand, we have many other arenas of struggle.

[Question] Now I wish to ask you a non-political question. This is a journalist's question. Had you ever thought that al-Fakhani, (the part of Beirut which is inhabited by Palestinian civilians, one of the PLO centers) would have been attacked by the Israeli air force?

[Answer] Yes, 48 hours earlier. Here is the AS-SIYASAH, a Kuwaiti newspaper which carries an interview with me. This is what I had said: "The next 48 hours will be hell let loose. Wait and see." Yes, I was expecting it; in fact, I was expecting more. But I assure you, the Israelis must expect far more from us. It is true they possess considerable military strength. But this strength is not theirs. It is American strength; it is American technology, American weapons, and American planes. It is the American bombs that rain over our people every day. We cannot, by any means, compare our military strength with theirs. But there is only one thing they will never achieve: That is our resoluteness, our faith, our strong will and our lofty spirit. We are marching in the direction which history flows.

CSO: 4654/137

'ARAFAT VIEWS PLO POLICIES

London 8 DAYS in English Vol 3 No 31, 8 Aug 81 pp 14-15

[Interview with Yasser 'Arafat by Patrice Barrab]

[Text]

Question: Are you not tired of having to answer the same questions without any change in the situation through the years?

Answer: Well, it is all part of our struggle. We know that our adversary uses every available means to combat us, including the information networks and the media. For this reason, given my position as commander in chief of the Palestinian revolution and president of the PLO, it is my duty to keep world opinion informed about our side of the story.

Has your analysis changed?

We are each day confronted by new developments, but our adversary has not changed positions and has even increased aggression.

What has been the most important development in recent years on the path to peace?

First of all, there has been no step towards peace. On the contrary, aggression and the escalation of hostilities against the Palestinian people have intensified, along with those against the Arab nation, as the Israeli air attack on the Osirak reactor in Tammuz has shown. The Israelis do not care about international guarantees.

Second, there is this hell in which the Palestinian and Lebanese people live in the South Lebanon, with the Israeli military junta using the area to test its latest weaponry. Most of the casualties are civilians and women and children. And the US administration continues to abet Israel with funds and arms. No, in the past few years tension and a state of war have predominated.

And we continue our struggle, which is to be able to live in peace one day, Muslims, Christians and Jews, in liberty, equality and in fraternity, in peace, on the land of peace.

In 1974, when you addressed the UN, you said that you held in the one hand an olive branch and in the other the gun of a freedom fighter. What is the situation now?

My dual position has not changed. I believe in a just peace. Not in a peace of the weak, of slaves. I will continue to fight those who wish to force the olive branch away from me, including the Israeli military junta of racist and nazi outlaws. Indeed, the prime minister and the foreign minister of Israel are wanted by British justice. There is even an Interpol warrant out against them.

Do you consider Europe to be sufficiently strong to initiate an independent peace effort?

I regret to have to say no! It is sad to see to what American influence is a determinant in the formulation of European foreign policy. In accordance, one must ask several questions regarding the viability of European technology and economic assistance. After the Israeli raid on Tammuz, it is essential to know whether the Europeans are willing to shoulder their responsibilities and honour their commitments. To what point is European assistance vulnerable to international banditry? We must be given an answer.

Do you think Giscard d'Estaing might eventually have recognised the PLO? And what do you expect of Mitterrand?

I cannot indulge in political fiction. Mr Giscard d'Estaing is no longer in power in

France. It is true that much was achieved in his presidency regarding the rights of the Palestinian people. Farouk Kaddoumi, the PLO representative in Paris, was recently received by different officials of the new administration in France, and has undertaken important discussions. However, it seems that the French position has not yet crystallised.

Whatever the case, Claude Cheysson, the French foreign minister, has said that France did not intend recognising the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

It is important that he remember the facts: over 115 countries have recognised the PLO as the unique voice and representation of the Palestinian people — almost twice the number which has recognised Israel. The Arab League has recognised us. We are a fully-fledged member of the Islamic Conference, of the non-aligned movement and we have been given observer status in the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and in the United Nations. The PLO is a democracy in its own right. Its members are freely elected. There are no rival factions. And I am its elected representative. Recently the French people were aggravated by American reaction to the appointment of communists to the French cabinet. Likewise, we will not tolerate foreign intervention in our internal affairs. Are the French people of courage and resistance, or are they lackeys of a Vichy-style representation? All our people accept us, whether in exile or in occupied territory.

Would you prefer Begin or Shimon Peres to head an Israeli government?

It makes no difference to us. Both are alike in deed although may differ in appearance.

What could you do to help the forces of peace in Israel itself?

Actually it's the other way round. The progressives in Israel must themselves realise the tragedy and the unique situation of our people, where 60 per cent live in a diaspora while 40 per cent live under occupation of their land. Our own political programme stipulates a peaceful situation of coexistence on equal terms, well beyond current antagonisms. We do not hate the Jews. We believe that Judaism is part of our civilisation, of our cultural heritage.

We are with the tide of history, while the clique in power in Israel is not. They will sooner or later realise their error and we will be victorious. One cannot go against the course of history.

Does this mean that you are willing to talk to Israeli progressives?

We have already had discussions with Israeli progressives! We have met them in Paris, in Rome, in Prague, in Sofia. I myself met a progressive member of the Israeli parliament, Charly Bitton, during the international peace conference in Sofia in September 1980. And I did so publicly.

Imagine that Menachem Begin turned up to see you in such a meeting, unannounced?

I do not like to ask for the moon. Besides, Menachem Begin is not the moon. He is a terrorist at large.

Don't you sometimes want to leave all this, at least your position as leader of the Palestinian people? Don't you lose hope?

To go where? To do what? I am a refugee — without a home, without a nationality. I have no passport. We do not have the choice. The fascist and racist policies of the Israeli government have isolated us. We would like to live in freedom, in dignity, as equals of the other peoples in this world. My only choice is to continue my struggle. Regarding my tenure as president of the Executive Committee of the PLO, only the Palestinian National Council can decide. And who am I to abandon my responsibilities? I owe allegiance to my people.

Finally, whoever told you that I had lost hope? Each time that I see a Palestinian child I am fired by its determination and hope and will continue to free my people from the torment inflicted by history and upheld continually by the Israeli government.

CSO: 4300/93

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST PARTIES PLOT AGAINST IRAQ--The Foreign Ministry has received detailed accounts of acts of terrorism carried out by some groups in a number of Middle East countries--groups that are prompted by international communism. One of the reports says that 15 days ago Arab communist parties held a meeting in Prague in which they adopted a decision to wage a propaganda war and carry out instigations against the Iraqi regime, which was described in the unpublished decisions of these parties as practicing terrorism and suppression against communists in Iraq. The report adds that the Syrian and Iraqi communist parties played a prominent role in making these parties adopt this decision. [Text] [NC201252 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 20 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/118

TRAVELER DESCRIBES HIZB-E ESLAMI TACTICS, SUCCESSES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Aug 81 pp 110-123

[Report by Peter Scholl-Latour about his time with the partisans in the "forgotten war in Afghanistan:" "'Grab Your Machinegun!'"]

[Text] The operation began as a masquerade. In the bazaar in Peshawar we had had some Afghan clothes made for us and were trying on the unshapely wide trousers with amazement. A flappy shirt down to the knees and a vest were part of our outfit.

When we looked at ourselves in the mirror on the eve of our departure, wearing a huge Pushtun turban or the round cap of the Nuristani, we thought we looked quite grotesque, particularly with our stubble a la Yasir Arafat.

But the mujahedin of the Afghan resistance organization Hizb-e Eslami with whom we wanted to cross the border into Afghanistan had insisted absolutely on our masquerading that way. Else we would not have a chance to pass through the Pakistani checks, and in Afghanistan itself we would expose ourselves to extreme danger wearing European clothes.

We had been asked to report to the Hizb-e Eslami headquarters in the town's Fairabad district at 0600 hours.

There 3 brightly painted Afghan buses were waiting already, with about 180 mujahedin crammed inside. In that crowd we would submerge without drawing attention, if need be pretending to be Turkmens or Uzbeks in case Pakistani police should ask.

The atmosphere on the buses was one of joyful excitement. Most of the young men, as yet unarmed and returning to the fighting area after a period of recuperation in the rear as part of a carefully scheduled system of rotation, could not wait to return to the "holy war."

At the entrance of the Hizb-e Eslam headquarters, laid out like a fortress around an improvised mosque, there stood heavily armed guards with rapid-fire Kalashnikovs who bodily checked every visitor for arms or explosives.

The day before, inside the interlocking premises, we had interviewed the leader of this fundamentalist Islamic party. Gulbuddin Hekmatiar, a lean man of about 30 years, made no secret of his convictions.

His movement was in the forefront of the fight against the Soviet invasion, but unlike other Afghan resistance groups, he rejected any cooperation with the West and particularly with the United States. "We do not need any help from abroad," Hekmatiar assured us; "if need be we will procure our arms on the battlefield itself."

The leader of the Hizb-e Eslami had resisted the state power for as long as 7 years. In 1974, on behalf of militant Islam, his friends--young military men and students--had staged a coup against President Dawud and had almost been executed.

His gaze somewhat veiled and turned inward, as is often true of devout and very deeply committed Muslims, Hekmatiar spoke to us in a low, controlled voice. In regard to the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, he made a bold, downright arrogant statement, saying that it was the aim of the Hizb-e Eslami to liberate not only Afghanistan but all coreligionists exposed to the yoke of alien domination and godlessness on the other side of the Amu Darya.

In Peshawar we had been asked frequently why of all people we had chosen the Hizb-e Eslami to accompany us on our trip.

I had quite consciously turned to that extreme Islamic group. Apart from its fight against the Russian invaders, it wants to subject its own feudal lords to the egalitarianism of early Islam but, on the other hand, distrusts the obscure or at least naive religious concepts of the rural mullahs. It had been my experience that in the partisans' war the future belonged to the radical, the intransigeant organizations.

Basically the founders of the Hizb-e Eslami and also its present leaders came from the Afghan intelligentsia and a wing of the petite bourgeoisie seeking a religious and, above all, also social renewal by returning to the fundamental principles of early Islam.

It appears to turn out that these Muslim revolutionaries, who in some ways are related to the Muslim Brotherhood, have conspiratorial and organizational abilities lacking in the other fighting groups.

There is no doubt that the pro-Soviet propaganda of the Babrak Karmal regime in Kabul has made the Hizb-e Eslam its primary target. Invariably it portrays Hekmatiar with blood streaming down his face. Apparently the ruling Marxists also want to include the Afghan oligarchies and the mullahs in a broad defensive front against this trend of radical Islamic renewal.

When the buses finally got moving after quite a long wait, the subaltern officers jumped up from their seats shouting, "Nara-i-takbir"--meaning something like "invocation and glorification."

The mujahedin replied in unison, "Allahu akbar" (God is great), and this shout was repeated three times, with their index fingers pointed heavenward.

It turned out to be an endless journey. When we reached the tribal area of the Pushtuns, Pakistani soldiers and police, still guarding the forts from the Kipling era, frequently stopped out transport.

But the rousing shout of "Allahu akbar" and the assurances of our fellow travelers that they were Afghan mujahedin returning to the front protected us from a more detailed identity check which might have put a sudden end to our journey.

The road was winding through rocky terrain toward Parakhinar. While the rice and wheat fields became more scarce, there was an increase in makeshift housing of Afghan refugees and black goatskin tents of namads in checkered clothing.

The laborious journey took 10 hours. We had climbed above an altitude of 2,000 meters, the air becoming thinner and cooler. Over a crushed-stone road, as the sun was setting, we finally reached the border village of Teremangal, at the end of a tip of Pakistani country digging deep into Afghan territory.

Teremangal looks like a big transit point for caravans from Marco Polo's times. Long rows of two-hump camels arrive with their loads. The Pushtun women, dressed in bright red, stay in the background, away from the strange men. The steep height, where one could already see the Afghan border, is guarded by a Pakistani fort. A mysterious busy atmosphere rules in Teremangal--the atmosphere of big adventure.

We were quickly accommodated in a teahouse in order that the spies of all conceivable organizations might not notice prematurely that a German television crew was trying to make its way here to Afghanistan. The leader of our operation, a bearded Pushtun with a lambskin cap, called "Shahid" (one who professes), told us that we would leave in the middle of the night, that 30 armed mujahedin would stay with us for our immediate protection and that a further group of 150 men at some distance would insure additional security.

We had already bought four donkeys and six horses in Peshawar to transport our cumbersome TV equipment. The night in Teremangal was taken up primarily by packing and briefings, with green and black tea keeping us awake and making us nervous. We hardly got any sleep.

The departure in the dark and mud (it had rained the day before) took place in great disarray. As we hurried to the border across a steep slope that seemed to go on forever, the early sun was spreading its first light, and we were lucky not to be detained at the last minute by Pakistani border soldiers.

The Afghan border post on the other side had been devastated and burned. Next to it we discovered a destroyed Soviet armored personnel carrier. Shahid, riding aside me, explained that this area had been liberated from Russians and communists as long as 2 years before.

We descended into the valley along tall green pinewoods. We were in an area where before the outbreak of hostilities German development aid personnel had promoted a big forest project. But all foreigners had long since vanished from this territory, and of the lumber mill only the outer walls were still standing.

Commander Shahid, who knew only Pushtu and Dari (the Persian spoken primarily in central and northern Afghanistan), told me through our two interpreters, Afghan engineering student Wali from Hildesheim and social science student Amin from Strasbourg, that we now should proceed in small groups of two or three men.

At a distance of about 6 kilometers, he pointed out to us a fortified military camp which was still in the hands of pro-Soviet government forces and from where the mujahedin passing through were fired on from time to time.

"On the whole," Shahid explained, "they behave peaceably, expecting us too to leave them in peace; anyway, they are only being supplied by helicopters and are largely isolated."

We went through a number of villages which were partly still inhabited even though occasionally rocket attacks had torn holes in the loam walls. The wheat was tall. The apricot trees were bearing their first fruit.

The men accompanying us were not particularly well armed. They carried British Enfield rifles from World War II and occasionally betrayed some nervousness because it was said that the Jerji tribe of the Pushtuns was not a reliable partner in the fight against the Russians and occasionally could even be bought. Possibly here for the first time the rivalry between Afghan resistance groups was manifesting itself, for by no means all mujahedin sympathize with the zealots of the Hibz-e Eslami.

In the course of that day we realized what strain we were facing. One steep slope followed another. We stumbled through rocky riverbeds and with great effort worked our way upward on the mountain trails. When we had reached the first big pass at an altitude of 4,300 meters, where the snow-white sugarloaf mountain of the Safed Koh seemed close enough to touch, our confidence waned, and we wondered if we would weather our operation.

All mujahedin who-coming from Pakistan--were moving into the interior of Afghanistan were equipped with infantry arms, but those who--coming from the interior--were moving in the direction of Teremangal were unarmed.

It was plausible that there were sizable arsenals and arms caches near the border.

We were particularly impressed with a troop of slit-eyed Mongols who hurried up a steep slope on the run. They belonged to the people of the Hazarah settled in the inaccessible nuclear area of Afghanistan around Barmiyan and its glorious remnants of Buddhist culture.

Adherents of the Shiite branch of Islam, the Hazarah are among the bravest fighters of the holy war and in their rocky redoubts are hardly bothered by the pro-Soviet armed forces. These descendants of Genghis Khan spirited past us like an apparition, greeted us with "salaam aleikum" and vanished behind the nearest height.

Toward evening we reached a rocky mountain valley and another "samovar." The place was called Laredar. Armed groups were already camped around the tea hunt.

The time had come to conduct a talk on basic points with Commander Shahid, it having been the original plan of the Hizb-e Eslami to escort our camera crew far into the interior of the country, into the Province of Parwan north of Kabul.

The distance we would have had to cover on the way there and back was 600 kilometers as the crow flies but in reality probably double that. On this very first day we had come to realize that the mujahedin's ideas of time and distance far overtaxed our abilities.

Among Afghans it apparently was part of manly competition--a bit of boasting included--to cope with an extended difficult high-mountain area in a minimum of time. Only this almost incredible mobility and stamina explain the fact that resistance against the Soviet expansion of power is holding its own throughout the country.

The Russian infantrymen, of course, are no more able than a German camera crew to advance at a comparable speed or to find their way in this wilderness.

It was to turn out later that the Hizb-e Eslami combined a quite definite plan with our expedition: strong mujahedin forces that had been concentrated near the former excursion spot of Paghman about 20 kilometers from Kabul were to do open battle there with the Soviets and their Afghan allies.

It was a difficult talk with Shahid when I had to explain to him that we could not go along with the speed of the march and the destination prescribed to us by the mujahedin. Our tour would have extended to at least 2 months, and after 2 weeks we would probably have reached such a state of exhaustion as to make any further camera work impossible.

Before the commander then finally continued by forced march with his partisans on his way to the locality of Asrow 10 hours away (which had been bombarded by the Russians on the previous days) we took leave of one another with the threefold fraternal kiss customary among the Afghan mountain peoples.

Two armed mujahedin were left behind for our protection--no idle precaution considering that the equipment and also the cash which we were transporting represented unimaginable riches in this wilderness.

This stay in Laredar turned out to be something extraordinary. Apparently we were on one of the big routes of infiltration of the resistance fighters leading into the surroundings of Kabul and into the extreme north of Afghanistan.

Without letup there arrived new squads of mujahedin of the most varied racial and political character, resting briefly next to our samovar for some tea and a little cooked rice.

Then they devoutly performed their prayers, with their guns within reach. The respective commander also acted as prayer leader or "imam." The fatiha, the opening sura of the Koran, resounded solemnly through the rocky mountain valley.

Two old men with white beards addressed us in a joyous and happy manner. Pointing heavenward and outlining helicopters, they cursed the "shurawi" (Soviets) and imitated the bark of a machinegun. Even for those old men, who moved around in the precipitous terrain with amazing agility, the holy war apparently was great fun.

Whenever an armed group turned up we asked about its political affiliation. If they were Hizb-e Eslami men they would embrace our two bodyguards, and we would join them around the fire. But when partisans of the Harakat Inkelab-e Eslami showed up and stuck a poster bearing the picture of their leader Mohammadi on the stone wall of our tearoon, the atmosphere became tense, almost hostile.

The very first day we had been struck by the fact that the Afghans never moved around without a gun. To have a firearm was an indispensable confirmation of their virility for them. I had to think of Montherlant's statement that the gun is "a second male member."

Until late into the night I discussed with our interpreter Amin, the social science student, the political orientation of his party and the troublesome fraternal strife between the various partisan groups.

For these simple and devout men, Islam is an obsessive religion which pervades every sphere of their daily life. The Hizb-e Eslami rejects outright the National Islamic Front of the feudal lord and descendant of the Prophet, Gailani, well known and frequently supported in the West.

According to Amin, this movement is too pro-American and not apt to do justice to the social revolutionary aims the Islamic fundamentalists have set themselves. It is with profound anger that he mentions the tiny but probably quite effective Maoist action group which manages to engage in acts of sabotage under the name of "Sama."

The trouble was that the West tended to support Westernized grand bourgeois and tribal emirs who used to move around the environs of the Kabul court. On the other hand, there was a tendency among leftist intellectuals in France and Germany to overvalue Marxist splinter groups and to follow their struggle with committed support.

Before our departure I had listened carefully to what foreign, including U.S., observers had to say and found out about the opinions of Pakistani special services.

All were agreed that the tightly organized movement of "engineer" Gulbuddin Hekmatiar had the best chance to prevail in the end. Occasionally its conspiratorial experience and its uncompromising discipline were compared to Tito's communist partisan movement in Yugoslavia during World War II, whereas Gailani and other pro-Western figures are seen as Afghan parallels to the unfortunate Serbian Colonel Mihalovic.

In Laredar we spent the night on the bare floor of the smoke-filled "samovar." During the first night the camera crew became the victims of innumerable fleabites, and fleas were also to be our constant companions in the days to follow.

As a first meal we were offered some rice and a few potatoes and some sugared green tea. We did not get any rest, what with the "host" of our establishment constantly stumbling over the sleeping people to fetch sparse supplies for new groups of mujahedin from his cases and boxes.

After sitting around the camp fire for a few hours to warm themselves, these warriors resumed their march into the mountains undaunted. There also arrived a caravan with wounded men, and then was shown on its way to Pakistan. The Russians had bombarded the Tessin Pass leading to the Kabul-Jalalabad road, with 17 people killed and a large number wounded.

Early in the morning already, there approached some camel from the direction of the Pakistani border loaded with bazooka projectiles. There was now no end to the stream of mujahedin. Our cameraman Baldur Freek spoke of a "Mujahedin Highway."

A comparison with Vietnam was quite inappropriate, because U.S. air reconnaissance would long since have smashed such concentrations of partisans, and we would have had to expect B-52 area bombing.

To our great surprise the arsenal of the mujahedin was also far better than expected. Hunting rifles and antiquated shotguns have long since disappeared.

In addition to the Enfield rifle, the Russian Kalashnikov--also called AK 47--increasingly is the basic equipment. Added to this are light submachineguns of Soviet and British manufacture and a fairly big caliber antiaircraft gun the Russians called "dashka."

Time and again we noted that there was no lack of armor-piercing weapons and that barrels of the RPG-7, plus projectiles, were among the most frequent freight.

We took a careful look at the marks of origin of these bazookas. Apparently it is part of a tacitly agreed policy to supply the Afghan partisans with equipment of Soviet manufacture or at least Soviet type.

A bearded Pushtun warrior, a giant of a man, explained to us quite credibly, with his followers agreeing, that the mujahedin had long since overcome their initial fear of tanks, that they would often dance for joy when Russian tanks were reported to be approaching, with the fighters of the holy war then vying for the honor of firing the bazookas from the greatest distance.

Having lost much of their effect, the Soviet fighter planes, mostly MIG-21's, are considered primarily a means of psychological warfare.

On the other hand, the Soviet MI-24 helicopters remain lethal and almost invulnerable; owning to their titanium armor they cannot be shot down even by 12.7-mm heavy machineguns, such as reportedly have been delivered lately in a roundabout way by the Chinese.

What the Afghan resistance lacks without a doubt is surface-to-air missiles. The mountain warriors are helpless in the face of the missiles and armament of the MI-24's. The troop movements of the Russians on the roads controlled by them during the day take place under the indispensable protection of the invulnerable helicopters.

So it does not take much imagination to figure out how fundamentally the overall strategic situation would change if the Afghans one day were actually equipped even to a modest extent with SA-7 surface-to-air missiles. It would lead to a decisive turn in the war.

The Russians would be pushed into the defensive and presumably would not even be able to hold the most indispensable transit routes leading from the Amu Darya via the Salang Pass to Kabul and from there via the big circular road to Kandahar and Herat.

In the succeeding days, as we continued our march, I realized that a comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam was fairly misleading. While later, on our way toward Asrow, we encountered mountain villages which from time to time had been attacked from the air, there is no systematic action of annihilation by the Soviet Air Force in Afghanistan such as was practiced in the "free fire zones" by the U.S. Air Force in Indochina.

Nor had the wheat fields, about to be harvested, been destroyed by chemicals. A continuous air force presence such as the Americans could afford even in the most remote corners of Indochina does not exist here. Apparently the Russian helicopters and MIG's are needed in their entirety for protecting the most important towns and keeping the big strategic roads under surveillance.

The numerical ratio is also likely to develop increasingly to the disadvantage of the Red Army. According to experts, a 10:1 ratio is needed to fight partisans with a chance of success. In Afghanistan the ratio is nowhere near that.

Even if the Russians had 100,000 men stationed in Afghanistan rather than the 85,000 constantly mentioned officially--with at most 20,000 being actual combat forces--it would be a wholly inadequate number.

The Afghan government army fighting on the Russian side has shrunk like goat leather in the past few months, and its combat readiness leaves a lot to be desired. Massive desertions occur time and again, and the present number is estimated at 35,000 at most.

Confronting these forces, according to conservative estimates, are about 100,000 well-armed, highly motivated mujahedin, experienced in mountain warfare, and in addition there are at least 100,000 partisans who are peasants and traders during the day but are available to the various resistance movements as armed auxiliary forces at any time.

Toward noon Amin told me that an about 300 men strong Hizb-e Eslami unit had arrived. These men, who had split up into groups of 20 to 30 men to camouflage themselves against air attacks, were well armed and were under a tight command.

Amin introduced himself to the commander, a bearded Tajik with a black turban, about 30 years old, by the name of Abdul-Wadud, who enjoyed special prestige.

His elder brother Mohammad Omar had been a leader in 1974, when he was a medical student, in the Islamic coup against President Dawud and had been executed when the putsch failed. Regarded as a martyr ("shahid"), he was always referred to as "Dr Shahid" in the conversation.

After a brief talk Abdul-Wadud said he was prepared to escort us a further stretch into the interior of the country in the direction of the Kabul-Jalalabad road, which I had chosen as our destination. Unlike our first escort, he displayed complete understanding for the demands of our television work and our slow rate of advance.

His men constituted a fierce, bold and likable crowd. They included not only Pushtuns but Tajiks and Uzbeks from northern Afghanistan. Though Persian by language and strain, the Tajiks predominantly are adherents of the Sunni branch of Islam.

The majority of their fellow tribesmen live on the other side of the border, in Soviet Tajikestan. The Uzbeks, on the other hand, considered Turkic, are related to the Mongols.

I could not help but again and again compare the Afghan mujahedin with their likeminded Palestinian or Iranian comrades. Among these Afghans one could notice great relaxation and self-assurance coupled with devout readiness to sacrifice one's self. There was not a trace here of the hysteria of so many of the Palestinian fedayeen or the hectic neurotic behavior of so many of the Iranian Pasdaran.

Abdul-Wadud comes from the Province of Takhar in the extreme northeast of Afghanistan. The village he comes from lies on the Amu Darya only 50 kilometers from the Soviet border. In 1979 he had fooled the government of President Hafizullah Amin, who was assassinated later, into believing that along with 300 followers he intended to join the fight of the Marxist government against the rebels.

He received 300 guns, went into resistance with them and led the first attack against the provincial capital Faizabad in Badakhshan.

Though originally a teacher, Abdul-Wadud had now turned into a model leader in the holy war. He gathers his people under a picture of Hekmatiar, and the student Kais from Kabul with a megaphone leads their chanting, with a mujahedin hailing their party, the Hizb-e Eslami, their leader Hekmatiar and the independence of Afghanistan. But the shout that recurs constantly is "Allahu akbar."

Abuse of the Soviet Union, communism and the red "quislings" of Kabul is followed by the shout of "margbar America"--"death to the Americans."

The confrontation with Moscow has not by any means led to a conciliatory attitude toward the West, even though we learned in later conversations that the Iranian revolution of Khomeyni was not quite to the liking of most Afghan resistance fighters. An important difference, according to Amin's translations, was the fact that the strict structures of the Shiite clerics had a disconcerting effect on Afghanistan's Sunnite majority.

From now on we continued on our way--partly on foot and partly on horseback, together with Abdul-Wadud's force. We crossed wild mountain terrain, which we found very difficult. The horses moved with extreme agility along the steep slopes and in the rocky riverbed which we reached toward evening. When we arrived at the next but one "tshaykhana," which was far more spacious though not any more hygienic than our last "samovar" in Laredar, the main body of Abdul-Wadud Uzbek-Tajik force had already reached the riverbed.

With their camp fires, their horses and donkeys, their fur caps and arms, they presented an extremely warlike picture. Amin explained to me that the atmosphere of the army camp already was typical of northern Afghanistan and its nomads. As for us, we felt a little like being guests at Genghis Khan's.

Abdul-Wadud told us that he too was taking part in the great race toward the Province of Parwan, to where the Pushtun leader Shahid was supposed to have escorted us. But his real final destination was his home Province of Takhar and the immediate proximity of Soviet Tajikestan.

The simple mujahedin who had crowded around us, demonstrating their friendship in every way, assured us at the camp fire that it was their intention not only to liberate Afghanistan from the godless "shurawi"--the Soviets--but to bring their Muslim brothers in Soviet Tajikestan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan their independence from the Russians and restoration of the true faith. They share the bold dreams of their chairman Hekmatiar.

Meanwhile our television crew of five men integrated smoothly into Abdul-Wadud's warlike force. In the camp at Aserre (the name of the small resting place) the conversation of the mujahedin constantly centered round the military situation. For these simple men from the mountains, who normally earn a hard living as tenant farmers or day laborers, the holy war constitutes a great adventure, a manly fulfillment.

We learned that the most important towns of Afghanistan, such as Kandahar and Herat, were only sporadically under the complete control of the Soviet Army. Though the war conditions on the whole seemed chaotic to a western observer, there apparently existed a comparatively well functioning system of rotation between the resistance fighters and all the various provinces.

The Hizb-e Eslami, which doubtless has the most solid organization, has established a so-called shura, an elected assembly, as a local body in each province.

Of course the Afghans try to play down the rivalries existing between the various organizations. Nevertheless there is great distrust, even enmity, among the various groupings. There are even said to be armed conflicts and raids against armed caravans.

There are numerous tribal organizations in the interior of the country which are hardly known in Pakistani Peshawar of Quetta and are conducting their "jihad" entirely autonomously. But this variety can also prove to be an advantage for the partisans. The Soviet military machine does not have the slightest chance to smash the front of its adversaries once and for all in a well-aimed operation. The Afghan resistance is a kind of Hydra which is constantly growing new heads.

The eastern mentality of these warriors is bound to drive any European strategist to despair anyway. In our excursion to Afghanistan we were able to establish that the so-called free territories were expanding and were being bothered less and less by the Soviet invaders.

It was an evening full of atmosphere in Aserre. The bold figures of the mujahedin could be seen in their evening prayers against the background of the sulfur-yellow sky. The rocky valley reverberated with the neighing of the horses and the braying of the donkey, of which the Prophet Muhammad, according to a "hadith," is supposed to have said that it was the ugliest sound in all creation.

Before we fell asleep amid the smoke of our tea hut, surrounded by swarms of fleas, Amin translated for us the song which we could hear from the camp fire:

"Grab your machinegun, thus worshipping the blood of our martyrs. Destroy the palaces of the oppressors, for you will win with Allah's help. Annihilate the party of the devil."

From Aserre we went downhill through deep gorges in the direction of the locality of Asrow. Here the land was more densely populated. The loam castles erected by the Pushtun tribe of the Mangal with their cold architecture recalled the "Ksur" of the Grand Atlas of Morocco. A strange uniformity of the Islamic world from the extreme Maghrib to the extreme Mashriq [east] revealed itself here.

Multicolored flags were fluttering above individual graves, indicating that "shuhada," fallen warriors of the holy war, had been buried here. Next to every new group of mujahedin moving in both directions, northwest and southeast, we encountered refugees seeking asylum in Pakistan from the Russian bombings.

They were carrying only sparse possessions. "These are the alleged feudal lords Radio Kabul keeps reporting on in its propaganda broadcasts," Wali said.

The sun was at its height when we reached the Valley of Janohel. Compared with our previous accommodation, this resting place made an almost delightful impression, recalling the description of paradise in the Koran--"gardens crossed by rushing brooks."

Our standards had also become quite modest, and the mulberries, called "tut" by the Afghans, seemed delicious to us despite the fact that they were still yellow and unripe. Abdul-Wadud had had some tea, a little mutton and flat bread called "nan" prepared for us.

We were camping right next to a simple whitewashed mosque built of loam. It was Friday, and Abdul-Wadud's warriors were preparing for the big prayers and the sermon--the "khutba."

Previously some children of the village, which too had been bombed, had led us to a couple of duds--powerful Russian bombs whose steel casings stuck in the loam. The village youngsters had fun throwing rocks at these highly explosive monsters.

At 1300 hours the mujahedin gathered for prayers. The prayer leader and preacher was Abdul-Wadud. He was embodying the ideal Islamic warrior's image, the "amir al-muminim." He was spiritual leader, military commander and the supreme political authority.

During his prayers, instead of the traditional "sword of Islam" ("sayf al-islam") he was holding a Kalashnikov--the way it had first been demonstrated in Tehran by Ayatollah Taleghani.

The fierce Uzbeks and Tajiks were immersed in devout prayers. Abdul-Wadud addressed his sermon to his followers in Dari:

"You are the most fortunate men on earth. There are only two glorious roads open to you: either you survive as victors and will be highly honored as "ghazi," or you die as martyrs of the faith, as "shuhada," and will be admitted to a place of honor in paradise."

He then expounded on how only a belief in Allah enabled one to wage this fight, because only a devout Muslim could dare challenge the immense power of the Soviet Union.

During the "khutba" the Uzbek subaltern leader, whom we called Genghis Khan because of his wild exterior, rose to quote aloud a verse of the Koran:

"If anyone says that the dead who die on the road of Allah are dead, he is mistaken. They are alive; only you do not know that they are."

After these pious proceedings we lay down for siesta. Sound engineer Helmut Walter had lent me his "Walkman" with cassette. It was an indescribable experience suddenly and unexpectedly to hear the solemn sounds of the Tannhaeuser overture in this wilderness. When the trombones made their powerful entrance, I caught myself singing at full voice, "Im Kreuz ist Heil" [our salvation lies in the cross]--which fortunately none of our Afghan friends understood.

In the afternoon the mujahedin staged a combat exercise for our cameras. In actual combat we would not have been able to film anything anyway but would have had to seek cover from the Soviet helicopters. But even this demonstration was impressive.

Despite the fact that we knew that the partisans were lying in wait for an attack, it took us quite a while to discover them behind the rocks.

Measured by Vietnamese conditions, which are used so often for comparison, the mountain world of the Hindu Kush with its incredible crevasses and its proliferating system of caves provides even better hiding places than the Indochinese jungle, where living conditions were fairly intolerable even for the North Vietnamese--as we knew from first-hand experience--and where the malaria rate among the "Bodoi" often was about 30 percent.

What surprised us was the firing descipline of the checkered Afghan force. Abdul-Wadud had given strict instructions that there should be no waste of ammunition. If there was some frequent and enthusiastic firing nevertheless, it was an indication that there no longer were any acute supply problems as far as ammunition was concerned.

The partisans moved along the rocky slope with the agility of mountain goats despite the fact that most of them wore only ordinary torn and utterly worn out shoes without socks. Even in the winter, they told us, they had no better shoes in which to move around in the snow; all this did was to increase their speed, they said.

In reply to a question of mine Abdul-Wadud said that the military training of his men was, relatively speaking, so satisfactory because a great number of officers of the former Afghan Army had joined the mujahedin and saw to it that there was systematic instruction.

By way of a festive high point we were treated to a performance of an equestrian game called "Buskashi." This crude event is extremely popular, particularly in northern Afghanistan. In it, the riders of the steppe fight for a dead goat, often suffering serious falls and accidents because everyone of these daring nomads would like to be the best "khapandots" (the most daring rider).

At our game things proceeded relatively harmlessly. The packhorses were ill suited to wild tests of strength. Nevertheless we felt a whiff of the reckless abandonment of this central Asian men's world constantly directed toward tests of strength. Our Commander Abdul-Wadud turned out to be an excellent rider and born "khapandots."

At night we slept in the mosque at the foot of the prayer niche of the "mihrab," which probably represented a special honor for us nonbelievers.

Abdul-Wadud had advised us against continuing on our way northwest with his force. We would find it difficult to get food for our animals. After the bombing of the Tesin Pass we would probably have to cross completely impassable terrain, and above all there would be no opportunity to take pictures of the Kabul-Jalalabad road during daylight since we would have to cross it in great haste at night.

The departure of the mujahedin originally had been set for 0430 hours, the time of the morning prayer. Suddenly instructions were changed however, with the departure taking place at 0200 hours. It took this force of about 300 men only a quarter of an hour to be completely ready to move on.

It took us much longer to load our packhorses and start on our return trip, with a small escort, in the opposite direction. I did not want to await the dawn in Janoshel. The day before there had been so much noise and shooting that we seriously had to expect Soviet helicopters to turn up. The dark was our best protection.

On the way back I now looked so derelict that I often was stopped by elderly men who wanted to converse with me in Pushtu of Dari. In a laborious climb we again reached the resting place of Aserre, camped around the obligatory "samovar" and with the help of our interpreter Amin talked about the problems of Islam.

Even the quite simple mujahedin turned out to be amazingly well informed about events in neighboring Iran and in the Arab world. Our most reliable bodyguard was a small but robust Hazarah, a Mongol from near Kabul named Dawud.

Because of my Koran sayings, he had become particularly fond of me. We discussed the reasons why the Hizb-e Eslami fundamentalists were refusing to seek effective assistance against the Russians from the Americans.

This is, however, a question of principle, almost a theological question. The statement of those professing Islam, "la ilaha illa allah" (there is no god except God), is applied consistently to politics. Any in any way different sort of subordination or even merely leaning on a superpower would, as it were, look like treason against the principle according to which God is greater than anything else—"allahu akbar."

There is great support among the Afghan mujahedin for the movement of the Muslim brothers in the Arab area. On the other hand, the Syrian Ba'th regime of President Hafiz al-Asad is described as godless, as a satellite of the Soviet Union, even as an actual accomplice of Israel.

Above all, I was impressed by the basic egalitarian attitude of this movement, even though it rejects the term "socialist." Amin quoted a verse of the Prophet Muhammad according to which "all people are equal like the teeth of a comb."

On that day we were on the move for 15 hours, by foot or on horseback. One can imagine the extent of our exhaustion when we arrived in Laredar again. From now on we were only guarded in a minor way, and the risk of a clash or plunder increased.

Nevertheless we did not feel threatened for a second, for our bodyguards, particularly the student Kais and the Mongol Dawud, considered it a matter of honor to get us back safe and sound. In the tribal area of the Jerji there were tensions vis-a-vis the population below the surface, which our escort tried to keep secret from us, without our failing to notice their nervousness.

After some difficult stages we finally reached the destroyed Afghan border fort again. On the pass leading to the Pakistani locality of Teremengal stood a single Pakistani soldier. We had separated into small groups of two or three men, and the guard scrutinized with amazement and distrust the strange figures approaching him.

In Teremangal we were lodged again, as discreetly as possible, in the local tshaykhana. There dubious figures gathered around us, scrutinizing us suspiciously. As we learned later, they also included a couple of Pakistani secret policemen. Understandably Amin's statement that we were travelers from Nuristan met with skepticism.

We were in a hurry to get away from Teremangal, for the mood among the local Pushtuns was unpleasant. Under a poster honoring Khomeyni, it came to violent political confrontations. When things were got ready for the overnight accommodations, we sensed that we were in a highly homosexual environment. Suddenly the lofty atmosphere of holy war had turned into a "Midnight Express" climate.

With their usual efficiency Amin and Wali had come up with a bus full of mujahedin among whom we submerged. Owing to our stubble and our dirty clothing we now looked far more credible. Like a tabernacle, the vehicle had been lined with silver foil on the inside.

The Pakistani checks were stricter than they had been in the other direction because the Islamabad security authorities were afraid lest the armed opposition against the regime of President Zia-ul-Haq--particularly supporters of the executed former head of state Zulfiqar 'Ali Bhutto--infiltrate agents and saboteurs of the dissolved Pakistan People's Party from Afghanistan.

At the Hizb-e Eslami headquarters in Fakirabad, we finally parted with our faithful Afghan guardian angels and friends with the traditional kisses and genuine emotion.

In the immediate proximity of Teremangel, the Hizb-e Eslami presented us with a special surprise. Dr Karim, an Afghan doctor practicing in Osnabrueck, who had organized our expedition from the start, arranged for a couple of members of the Soviet Armed Forces taken prisoner by the mujahedin to come before us.

One was a Russian sergeant from near Perm in the Urals, who reportedly had left his outfit near Bagram and in the first few days had been afraid of being killed by his Afghan guards. Now he made quite a confident impression again. His name was Yuriy Grigoryevich Povarnizin. His statements were not very revealing, probably because of a lack of knowledge of the language on the part of our interpreter.

The gray-haired bearded editor-in-chief of the journal SHAHADA named Sediki, despite the fatherly way he handled the two prisoners, was unable to produce a clear statement. But Povarnizin did compare the Societ action in Afghanistan to the facist agression against the Soviet Union in World War II.

The second Soviet Army man was a Turkman named Yaskuliyev, whose first name--Muhammadgul--showed hin to be a Muslim. He described himself as a deserter.

Whereas Povarnizin had fallen into the mujahedin's hands near Bagram, Yaskuliyev had changed sides near Sharikar along the road leading to the Salang Pass.

This presented additonal proof that in that area too, considered a nuclear area of the spread of Soviet power in Afghanistan, the mujahedin are moving around without being bothered much and are rendering sizable stretches of land insecure.

The Turkman Yaskuliyev complained about having been maltreated by the Russian superiors in his unit. "I was beaten frequently," he said, "as happens with wives in our country." He now wanted to take part in the holy war and, after some hesitation, said that the Islamic revolution would also spread to the Muslim peoples in Soviet Central Asia.

Both Soviet prisoners refused my offer--agreed to by the Afghans--to transmit letters to their families through the Soviet Red Cross.

The first evening after our arrival in Peshawar we spent in a hospitable house of this capital of the Pakistan Northwest Region, with honorary German Consul Rudolf von Przyborowski. He was a "Colonel Blimp" type. The most interesting guest was a high Pakistani security representative in charge of surveillance over the entire border, from the Chinese Sinkiang to Baluchestan.

"We are faced with an amazing and shocking fact," said the border commissioner. "The Russians are losing their partisan war in Afghanistan, because if one does not suppress such a guerrilla force through total military and political superiority, one loses in the end."

He asserted that "world public opinion and the Western media, however, are not taking cognizance of this development. Perhaps there is a tacit winking agreement between the two superpowers in the East and West to keep the Islamic revolution under control and deny it the publicity it deserves."

8790
CSO: 4620/10

GULBUDDIN'S BAND TO BE TRIED FOR TERRORISM

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 27 Jul 81 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, July 27 (Bakhtar)—More facts have been brought to light by the security authorities regarding the interrogation of terrorists of counter-revolutionary ringleader Gulbuddin's band, who were arrested recently.

In a statement, the security authorities said:

As our compatriots know,some time ago a large number terrorists and assassins connected with Gulbuddin's band were captured together with important documents connected undeniably with spying and counter-revolution organisation in Kabul city and the provinces in operations launched by security forces.

They have been under interrogation, in accordance with the Fundamental Principles of the DRA and revolutionary legality.

In the course of interrogation, in consonance with tenets of the law, a number of them were detained.

The leader of the group was Hamidullah, who, with false and counterfeit identity cards, under false names and in different disguise, secretly carried on his counter-revolutionary and terroristic activities. Earlier he had fled to Pakistan and had spent some time with Gulbuddin to avoid the attention of the security authorities.

Later, however, he returned to Afghanistan to resume his subversive and criminal activities against the people, under the instruction of his masters-the blackest reactionary circles in Pakistan and the US—the CIA.

He was unware that, since the moment he returned to this country, he had been under surveillance of the patriots and alert security forces for further information on his links with other terrorist and killer circles. This professional killer, unaware of the fact that he was under surveillance, made an attempt a few nights ago on the life of a 'soldier of revolution' and opened fire on him. The incident occurred on Taimani-Khairkhana road. However, he was surrounded by security forces and during an armed encounter with the security forces, he was shot and killed.

A search of the body revealed a pistol, important organisational and other documents which disclosed some of the links of Gulbuddin's band, led by this reactionary

element within the country, as well as the imperialist espionage network and the crimes organised and committed against the patriotic religious leaders, social and national figures and innocent people.

The terrorist groups, led by this professional killer, have been organising, for some time, subversive and terrorist acts in Kabul against innocent people. All terrorist groups, connected with acts of terror mentioned have been arrested and soon they will go on trial.

The confessions of those responsible for these acts of terror led the security forces to arrest this element. These merciless terrorists and professional killers have terrorised innocent people, leaving sons fatherless and women widows.

Some of their victims are as follows:

— Zamiruddin, a police officer.

— Wali Yusufi, Deputy Minister for Higher and Vocational Education.

— Khan Qarabaghi, a Radio-TV singer.

—Shohor, head of the Parwan Secondary School.

— Habibullah, son of Ghulam Haider, principal of the Shwaki School.

— Abdul Mateen, son of Ghausuddin, Alaqadar of Ramak, Gahzni.

— Adel Zurmati, Head of the Municipality Directorate.

— Maj Sher Aqa.

—Mohammad, son of Safdar.

— Dr Akrma Osman, who was wounded and survived.

Investigation and stern surveillance are continuing in full swing in relation to the documents and evidences found with this element in order to foil the black designs of these circles related to these killer and criminal bands.

CSO: 4600/150

GUERRILLAS ATTEMPT TO UNITE

TA230649 London BBC World Service in English 0600 GMT 23 Aug 81

[Report from: "Radio Newsdesk"]

[Text] Attempts to unite the various guerrilla groups opposed to the Soviet backed government in Afghanistan are gathering momentum. The first meeting of a new organization, which it is hoped will bring together the guerrillas, has been held in Peshawar, in Pakistan's northwest frontier. Alexander Thompson sent his report from Islamabad:

[Begin Thompson recording] The latest attempt to unite the various guerrilla organizations, which use Peshawar as their headquarters, comes after some 5 months of efforts by a group of concerned religious leaders and scholars who came to the city from several parts of Afghanistan. The differences between the main six organizations have, at times, affected the operations in the fields and at the first meeting of the Supreme Council of the new union a statement was issued by the senior religious scholar, (Mian Gu Sabzara), calling on the guerrillas to come together under one leadership and one flag to wage a more effective struggle. He told the various groups that they would no longer have a say in Afghanistan if they did not unite now. A temporary chairman was appointed, Professor (Rabanai) of the Jami'at-e Eslami Party. A president is expected to be chosen within the next few days. A spokesman for the Jami'at-e Eslami has said the Supreme Council also criticized attempts currently underway to form the united front of guerrillas in Quetta, the capital of Pakistan's Baluchistan Province. The spokesman said these are plots against the struggle inside Afghanistan. He said that this latest attempt to bring together the guerrilla organizations in Peshawar will be more successful than previous ones because it was supervised by respected religious scholars and the more time passed without unit the stronger the pressure from the people. [End recording]

CSO: 4600/151

BATTLE NEAR GULBAHAR REPORTED

PM271124 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 27 Aug 81 p 4

[Dispatch by Balram Tandon: "Afghans in Vie-Day Battle"]

[Text] New Delhi--The Afghan Army, reinforced by elements from Soviet occupation troops, suffered substantial casualties in a recent battle round the town of Gulbahar, according to diplomatic sources in New Delhi yesterday.

The battle began when Afghan Army detachments tried to force their way out of Gulbahar into the Panjshir Valley, which is intermittently a stronghold of the Mojahedin guerrillas who oppose Soviet domination of their country.

The battle is said to have lasted from 15 to 20 August. It is not clear whether the Afghan and Soviet troops gained their objectives.

No details of casualties were available, but according to one unconfirmed report 300 Afghan troops sent out from the Kabul garrison defected to the guerrillas.

Gulbahar commands the entrance to the Panjshir Valley. Control of this strategic valley has changed hands several times in a series of battles.

The latest of these is the first since the Soviet-installed Afghan leader, Mr Babrak Karmal, announced that the Afghan Army would take the offensive.

According to reports from Kabul fighting between the ruling Parcham (Flag) and Khalq (People's) factions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan has meanwhile become so intense that Mr Babrak Karmal broadcast as president a special appeal for unity.

The Khalq faction, which was dominant from April 1979, is said to have launched an assassination campaign against Parcham supporters.

At least 30 people in various official capacities are reported to have been shot down in the party feud.

According to some accounts from Kabul seven court officials who had led prosecution proceedings against Pathan guerrillas or Khalq Party workers, were shot down between the end of July and last week.

CSO: 4600/151

NEW AFGHAN DAILY CARRIES KARMAL MESSAGE

LD192110 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1530 GMT 19 Aug 81

[Text] In accordance with the decision of the PDPA Central Committee Politburo, the national daily ANIS began publication today, 19 August, the anniversary of the restoration of our beloved country's independence as the publicity organ of the national committee of the National Fatherland Front [NFF].

Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the Revolutionary Council, sent a message to mark the beginning of publication of the ANIS daily as the publicity organ of the NFF National Committee, which was published on the first page of the first issue of this daily. The message says, among other things, that today, the first issue of ANIS as the publicity organ of the NFF--this great social fulcrum of the DRA and (?charter) of the unity of action--is being published by the will of the million masses of our people. The publicity organ of the NFF has great and responsible duties in defense of the people's vital interests and the Sawr Liberating Revolution, particularly its new development stage.

The message also says: the publicity organ of the NFF, representing the views and beliefs of broad sections of the people of the country, is commissioned to publish matters relevant to the situation in the country, and the history of our people's courageous struggles for justice, right and awareness.

Having stated valuable facts about the freedom-loving and anticolonial struggle of the heroic and toiling people of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal added: the publicity organ of the NFF must be able not only to indicate the goals, interests and demands of the masses, but to play a suitable role in coordinating the masses, and equipping them with faith and belief in independence, right, justice and freedom. The publicity organ of the NFF should accomplish its great role in the daily increasing (?trend) toward the unity of national and patriotic forces in defense of the irreversible revolutionary gains of our people, which are a vital historical necessity.

The message also adds: the publicity organ of the NFF does not have only the heavy task of enlightening the views of the masses of people and of publicizing revolutionary and humane thinking, it should also create an organized [word indistinct] system for presenting the facts of our society and revolution, and rejecting the fabrications of our enemies. Every reader and every toiling compatriot with feeling and a conscience will not only find a clear reflection of his interests in the issues of ANIS, but by studying the ANIS publication, will be equipped with logical reasoning for defending facts.

Babrak Karmal added: In the present situation and circumstances, when the pledged and conscientious thinkers and preachers of our homeland have great tasks to accomplish, the liberating Sawr revolution in its new development stage has provided extensive opportunities for implementing their patriotic and responsible duties. I hope the ANIS workers will be able, by providing these extensive and various opportunities--the pillars of which rest on the unbreakable will of the people--to fulfill their duties with creativeness.

The first issue of ANIS, which was published today in honor of the country's independence anniversary, and other dailies of the country, prints on page 1 a photograph of His Excellency Ghazi Amanollah Khan, in whose reign the heroic and courageous people of Afghanistan gained their independence. Alongside the news and information, the daily prints a number of photographs of our country's leaders.

The editorial of the first issue of the publicity organ of the NFF is devoted to the transformation of the daily as the publicity organ of the NFF. The article notes the importance and role of the NFF in coordinating the patriotic and national forces for building a new and prosperous society. It adds: the ANIS daily, which from now on has a heavy task as the publicity organ of the NFF National Committee in enlightening the views of the broad masses and creating a sincere atmosphere among them, will take part in further enlightening the views of our people with the help and support of our toiling people.

The daily will expose the crimes of regional and domestic reaction who collaborate with world-devouring American imperialism against our people, homeland and revolution.

The editorial concludes: The daily will endeavour to further strengthen the spirit of brotherhood and equality between all the people of Afghanistan. This spirit fortunately exists at the moment, too.

CSO: 4665/8

BRIEFS

REBELS REPORT ARMY OFFENSIVE--Islamabad, 26 Aug (AFP)--The Afghan Army, backed by Soviet artillery and air cover, has launched an offensive in three northern provinces to flush out guerrillas from areas close to the Soviet Union, rebel sources said today. The assault, which began last Thursday, was aimed at rebel concentrations in Takhar, Baghlan and Parwan Provinces, Hezbe Islami leader Younis Khalis said. It was supported by at least 21 Soviet aircraft and helicopters, he added. The assault on rebel positions in Baghlan was among the heaviest during the past several months, the rebels said. Some 1,000 regular Afghan Army paratroopers tried to encircle rebel positions around Baghlan mountainsides, they added, but one unit was under siege by guerrillas in the Daman Ghori area north of Kabul. The rebel sources also claimed to have damaged 11 Soviet tanks with plastic explosives, and to have shot down one low-flying helicopter during the offensive. Meanwhile, the Afghan Army has increased its propaganda offensive by dropping leaflets in Farsi promising that "enemies of the revolution" will be crushed. [Text] [BK261657 Hong Kong AFP in English 1647 GMT 26 Aug 81]

MINORITY LANGUAGE BOOKS, PROGRAMMING--Kabul, 27 Aug (BAKHTAR)--The victory of the National Democratic April Revolution and its new evolutionary phase provided vast grounds for the deep socioeconomic and political changes in our country. Among other things work is being done for the language, literature, art and culture of all nationalities to develop and flourish and wide strikes is taken in this aspect on the basis of revolutionary guidelines of the DRA. The establishment of the departments of Uzbeky, Turkmen and Baluch languages in the framework of the department of the compilation and translation of the Ministry of Education for the compiling of textbooks in these languages was the very basic work which began with the completion of textbooks for the first and second grade students. This for the first time enabled the children of these nationalities to study in their mother tongues. Programmes were made in radio and television for those nationalities and the cultural side was brought about more effectively to meet the peoples needs. YOLDOZE, GORASH and SOB are the weeklies which are published respectively in Uzbek, Turkmen and Baluch languages. [Text] [LD280610 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0434 GMT 28 Aug 81]

CSO: 4600/151

MAS'UD RAJAVI ON ALLIANCE WITH BANI-SADR

LD150153 London BBC Television Network in English 2200 GMT 14 Aug 81

["Exclusive interview" with Mas'ud Rajavi, Mojahedin-e Khalq leader, conducted by Sally Hardcastle on 14 August near Paris--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Why did you leave Iran?

[Answer] If you know, our people in Iran are under the dictatorship of Khomeyni regime, a very reactionary bloodthirsty and deceiver regime. For instance, within the past 45 days more than 400 of my brothers and sisters have been executed and this figure is the figure declared formally by the regime. Between these brothers and sisters, you can find young girls between 9 and 12 years, some women with babies in their stomach.

[Question] But if this is all happening, surely it would be better for you to stay in there and continue to lead the resistance.

[Answer] Of course. We could stay there. But I will tell why now I am here. After Khomeyni shut all the newspapers and made a very hard dictatorship, the world was not informed exactly what is happening inside Iran. Then, after he deposed President Bani-Sadr, the president wrote a letter for me for organizing the national resistance movement.

[Question] But why did you join Bani-Sadr? Because after all, it is said that he is as responsible as Khomeyni for what is happening Iran?

[Answer] I am not the special advocate for all the life and all the motions of President Bani-Sadr, but let me tell you that the plan we reached together is just a plan. The president is not ready to be before Khomeyni. It means that he could be a president just now and have the best possibilities. But he protested the dictatorship, and we are very glad just now that he is with us and we are with him--both against dictatorship--for making an independent and free Iran.

[Question] We had news today that General Ariana, leading some ex-soldiers from the Iranian army, has taken a gunboat and is preparing perhaps to go into Iran and perhaps to join up with the army. Now how would your movement react to that? I mean, would they support him in any way? How would they react to it?

[Answer] No. These are originally and basically different lines. Our people, and of course we, do not want to come back to the past times. We are forces for future.

[Question] But I know that both you and Bani-Sadr are very religious and Islamic, and many of the criticisms of the current regime is that it is Islam that has caused many of the problems, why should you be any different?

[Answer] Of course we are Muslims and we demand that he is Muslim! But the content of our Islam is absolutely different with him because we believe in democracy; we believe in real independence; we believe in the rights of the different strata of the people. Let me tell you an example. For example, you know when we came here they were telling on the radio and TV that we have come by wearing the clothes of women. You know why they tell this? Because in their reactionary ideology, the clothes of women is a bad thing, not respectful. But for me, even if it was necessary, I was very proud to wear the clothes of women. So I think it is [word indistinct] made especially for you.

[Question] You are now with Bani-Sadr. Are you partners, or when you get to Iran will he be president and you will be second in command? Or, will you be president and he be second in command? How does it work?

[Answer] He is the president and as he wrote to me, just now I am responsible for organizing the resistance and in future making a committee for governing the affairs of the country, for administrating the affairs of the country.

[Question] And you are part of that?

[Answer] Yes.

CSO: 4600/148

KPD ORGAN DEFENDS TUDEH STAND, CRITICIZES BANI-SADR

Duesseldorf UNSERE ZEITUNG in German 29 Jun 81 p 4

[What Is Behind the Disputes in Iran? Latest Declarations of the Communist Tudeh Party; Answer to a Reader's Question]

> [Text] Question: "We read daily about the vehement disputes in Iran. What is involved? Why was President Bani-Sadr deposed?" asks our reader Martina Lehmann from Gelsenkirchen.

Answer: Our paper has continuously presented brief reports by news agencies about the developments in Tehran. Now it is in possession of statements by the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh Party. A declaration of the central committee of this party, dated early June 1981, describes the current dangerous conflict that is becoming more severe due to the Iraqi war against Iran: "The forces of large capital, or large landholding, and of all circles hit by the revolution are busily steering the popular masses away from the basic aims of the revolution, defined by the overthrow of the life-threatening rule of universal imperialism led by U.S. imperialism, to pave the way for a return of imperialist rule through a civil strife within Iranian society. They exploit all faults, deficiencies, weaknesses and errors."

"With joint and united efforts we must overcome this conspiracy just like the last one," the Tudeh central committee continues, at the same time criticizing the government and the parliamentary majority who are opposed to a decisive struggle and the unit of the revolutionary forces. The hampering of the Tudeh Party is also attacked. "Our party strongly protests the unjust and illegal prohibition of the NAMEH MARDOM, the main organ of the Iranian Tudeh Party, simultaneously with the prohibiting of newspapers dependent on conciliatory organizations of liberal capitalism that have consciously embarked on a line aimed at weakening the revolution and the Islamic republic." This ban, however, will not sway Tudeh from its principled and revolutionary position.

Maintain the Imam's Line

The Tudeh Party also warns of serious mistakes by forces who claim to defend the revolution and its institutions, declaring in a proclamation dated 12 June 1981: Such groups may be able "to achieve a brief victory over their opponents, but over the long run they themselves will become a great danger to the basic laws of the

society, since the enemy can achieve its treacherous plan with exactly the same methods." In its proclamation the Tudeh Party advocates the maintenance of "the determining anti-imperialist and popular line of Imam Khomeyni. This line, being the expression of the most important demands of the millions of underprivileged of our society, is completely supported by all revolutionary forces, from the true fighters of Islam to the true adherents of scientific socialism." This line led to the victory of the Iranian revolution and shook the foundations of the rule of world imperialism in the Gulf region. The latter is now busy "helping the revolutionary countries of Iran and Afghanistan to achieve an imperialist stability."

With this aim in mind imperialism is attempting to "achieve the destruction of the Islamic republican system from inside," splintering the popular forces up to fratricidal strife by exploiting conspiracies in distant areas of the country (Kurdistan, etc.).

Willingly or unwillingly, the proclamation of the Tudeh Party states, this splintering is fostered by forces such as: the "American-Chinese groupings," "Maoists converted to Islam," the "compromising front of the capitulationists of liberal capitalism" (such as the National Front and the "Liberation movements" celebrated by Western bourgeois media, as well as the "coordination bureau" of the now deposed President Bani-Sadr) as well as left extremist adventurists such as the "Mojahedin Khalq" and dominant forces within the mass media. Lastly, "dubious groups and persons are pressing the people under the title of 'Hezbollah' (Party of God), claiming to defend the historical decisions of Imam Khomeyni."

Such groups and their activities foster the attempts of the enemies of the revolution. For that reason the Tudeh Party urges especially the youth of the country not to let itself be drawn into the adventures of these forces. The "guideposts" for a determination of one's own position should always be: Every position and action applauded by imperialist circles, capitalists dependent on foreign countries, large landholders, the "compromising liberals" and "American Maoists" is contrary to the interests of the people and the revolution. As far as the function of the state president is concerned, the Tudeh Party draws attention to its criticism of the draft constitution that provided for too much power to the directly elected president. The opinion that "the best form for the institution of popular rule is the transfer of all authority to the representatives of the people" has been proven.

Bani-Sadr Torpedoes Necessary Legislation

It is appropriate for parliament to appoint and, if necessary, to dismiss the president, to proclaim and enforce legislation. It is recalled that President Bani-Sadr rejected ministers proposed by parliament, did not sign legislation, thus preventing their implementation, even though they were of vital importance to the people. It is also recalled that the president and his circle participated since March 1981 in the exacerbation of the differences between various popular forces. Such a "diversion of the public consciousness" from important tasks helped the aggressors. Bani-Sadr, "in spite of warnings by all revolutionary forces, was unable to draw a line between himself and that front," consisting of "compromisers and capitulators to imperialism."

The Tudeh Party describes the class-conscious essence of the disputes--aside from disputes about personalities--thusly: "The main roots of the disputes are to be found among the foreign-dependent and exploiting capitalists, and the suppressing large landholders; the main initiators of these provocative disputes are the political handmaidens of one mind with these capitalists and large landholders." This "poisonous spring" would continue to be a threat as long as government and parliament leave the interests of these classes untouched.

The party calls for unity: "The interests of the revolution demand always, and especially in the current difficult situation, that each revolutionary be aimed at uniting as many forces as possible who are interested in working sincerely to further the revolution." The revolutionary forces should also not allow themselves to be separated from their friends and supporters on the international level. Finally, the Iranian communists urge: "Let us carefully examine the facts of the history of our country and the world, and let us learn from the experiences of successful and unsuccessful revolutions in other countries."

9240
CSO: 4620/7

TEHRAN RADIO ASSAILS COMPROMISING ARAB LEADERS

GF171347 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 16 Aug 81

[Unattributed commentary: "The Compromising Arab States And The Regime Occupying Jerusalem"]

[Text] According to reports issued by foreign agencies on 22 July, the Iraqi Ba'thist regime, in cooperation with the imperialists, paid $200,000 to (Alfred Proggi) in Zurich through an Iraqi known as S'adi Hamdun to draw up and publish a number of false certificates and documents. These false documents were to claim that the Iranian government had purchased arms from the Zionist regime and transferred them to Tehran. (Proggi) complied with the wish of his patrons and prepared the documents alleging that Iran had purchased military equipment and spare parts from Tel Aviv totaling 17 million pounds sterling and transferred them from Tel Aviv to Tehran in an Iranian military Boeing transport aircraft in the course of three flights. (Proggi) was told to publish the said documents through the sold-out West European press and broadcasting media which are bribed by Baghdad. Meanwhile, hearing about the crash of an Argentinian aircraft in the Soviet Union, the said individual hastened to allege that the aircraft was ferrying arms between Tel Aviv and Tehran.

According to authentic documents, the Argentinian plane was transferring cargo from Cyprus to Tehran--cargo that was purchased by Iran from three Eueopean countries and shipped to Cyprus via Scotland.

The compromising Arab states in general and the Iraqi Ba'thist regime in particular have moved in cooperation with the imperialists to exploit this state of affairs through misleading and false propaganda with a view to disrupting the unity and cohesion between Iranian Muslims and the Arabs, particularly between the Iranian Muslims and their Muslim brethern living in the occupied land of Palestine. The move was also aimed at encouraging Muslims to adopt a negative stand against the Iranian Islamic Republic.

Taking this stand of the Iraqi Ba'thist regime into consideration, can one describe it as an enemy of Zionism? Our listeners will recall that foreign news agencies reported on 1 July that a ship carrying arms to Iraq ran aground off the Strait of Tiran. The ship was rescued with the help of the Zionist Regime and seen off to the Port of Aqaba where it was to unload the arms it carried. The arms were bound for Iraq via Jordan. The transport of those arms has probably been completed by now.

Is it possible for any honorable and reputable Muslim Arab to state that he has no knowledge about the arms Egypt has delivered to Iraq, the effective role Cairo plays in the betrayal of the objectives of the Palestinians and the anti-Islamic policies of Saddam and al-Sadat? Following al-Sadat's statement on 31 March that he had sold arms to Iraq worth $35 million, it became obvious that the arms in question were those captured by the Zionists during the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1974. Israel gave the arms to al-Sadat as a present and he later handed them over to Iraq to be used against Iranian Muslims and the region.

What is more interesting in the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear installations by Israel. This incident strengthened Iraq's position within Arab nationalism against the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It was actually a cause for widespread propaganda for securing the support of the Arab states and other Muslim countries for the Iraqi Ba'thist regime.

The compromising leaders of the Arab states--that is to say, the leaders of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt--and those of France and the United States were well informed of the exact date and time of the raid on the Baghdad nuclear installations. According to reports from Japan, on the day of the bombing of the Baghdad nuclear installations, Saddam al-Tikriti issued an order to the Iraqi antiaircraft command not to open fire on any aircraft that day. The order said Saudi and Jordanian aircraft would be carrying out joint exercises in Iraqi airspace.

It will be recalled that after the bombing of the installations, Western news agencies reported that the 16 Israeli military aircraft that attacked Baghdad reached their target by crossing Saudi and Jordanian airspace.

An interesting point is that the U.S. AWACS, which are at the disposal of the Saudi Sultanate, established the flight and the target of the Israeli aircraft at the time of the attack and reported the incident. The Iraqi Ba'thist regime has not reacted to this report in any way.

CSO: 4654/139

BRIEFS

BAHONAR RECEIVES TURKISH AMBASSADOR--16 August--The Turkish ambassador to Tehran was received by Prime Minister Doctor Bahonar yesterday. At this meeting Doctor Bahonar said the following in reply to the congratulatory message delivered by the ambassador on the occasion of his election as the prime minister: We expect our revolution to be respected as one that is authentic and based on the people, and not on either the East or the West, and that it is composed of Islamic [as heard]. While insisting on maintaining the policy of neither East nor West, we uphold the view that the ties between the people of the region and the superpowers be severed, that these peoples progress within the framework of close relations on the basis of full independence, and that the economic needs of the Islamic states should be met by Islamic countries. [Text] [GF171357 Tehran International Service in Turkish 1830 GMT 17 Aug 81]

CSO: 4654/139

WEST BANK ARABS REPORT ON SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 15, 18 Jun 81

[15 Jun 81 p 23]

[Text] Settlement, and the Israeli Theory of Security. What Is the Secure Border for the Settlements in the Ghawr Area of the Jordan Valley As Defined by Israel's New Plan?

The Zionist Settlement Offices have published the latest map of their settlement plans for the West Bank during the next 5 years in accordance with that is in the settlement development plan for the occupied West Bank which has been prepared by Matityahu Drobles, the head of the Settlement Office in the government of the Zionist enemy.

In a special report which AL-DUSTUR has obtained from the occupied territories it is said the Drobles's plan has the objective of relocating at least one-third of the Arab inhabitants during the next 5 years, that is, by 1985. According to the plan it will also be attempted to bring in new Jewish immigrants whom the Jewish Agency and Zionist organizations intend to entice and invite to what they call the "promised land."

The report, which was prepared by a group of Arab engineers in the occupied territories, also said that the policy of establishing Zionist settlements has the objective of geographically encircling Arab population centers and then beginning to economically close them off in addition to curtaining their defense capabilities in the future in case the Arab inhabitants mount any rebellion against Zionist occupation. The enemy is selecting locations which overlook the cities and large villages as places to set up his settlements. Concerning the type of settlements being set up in the occupied city of Jerusalem, the report says that the enemy has resorted to the method of encircling the Holy City with Jewish residential areas which will serve as fortresses and [centers of] war materiel. The report says that the enemy right now is hard at work trying to induce Jewish immigrants to settle in these residential areas and is offering them considerable incentives in an attempt to increase the number of Jewish inhabitants in the Holy City--especially in the part populated by the Arabs.

The report also mentions the fact that the Zionist enemy is not publishing the actual figures concerning the number of settlements being set up in the occupied

Arab territories because the Zionists want to minimize Arab and international anxiety concerning their settlement policy. For example, the total number of Zionists settlements which had been established in the occupied West Bank by the end of 1980 was about 102. This figure is much larger than the one published by the the official Israeli government offices. Furthermore, more than 20,000 settlers live in the settlements.

The report also brings out the fact that the settlement process is linked to what is called "Israeli security." From the Zionist point of view, any line of settlements which is erected requires another line of settlements to the east of it in order to protect it. Thus the settlements which have been established in the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley require, from the Israeli point of view, another line of settlements to be established to the east of it. Perhaps this latter line of settlements will be to the east of the Jordan River in order to protect the line of settlements which have been set up in the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley, in an area close to the river.

The report also warned of the consequences of underestimating the importance of this settlement process of the Drobles's plan which aims at establishing hundreds of settlements by the end of 1985 and which has the objective of clearing the occupied territories of their legitimate Arab inhabitants.

In addition to this, information which has come to us from the office of the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee in Amman tells us that the total area of Arab land which had been confiscated by the end of 1980 was 1,736,913 dunams, in addition to 150,000 dunams which were seized, at the end of 1980, from lands belonging to the town of Abu Dis, east of Jerusalem.

Mr Najib al-Ahmad, chief of the office of the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee in Amman, has translated into Arabic the information on the map prepared by Matityaho Drobles, the head of the Settlement Office in the government of the Zionist enemy. This map shows the density of settlements which the enemy intends to set up during the next 5 years. It also shows proposed roads, residential areas, and areas and locations for settlements--and thus makes it clear that this is intended to be a process of total take-over of the land in the West Bank. This confirms the information which came in the report from the occupied territories concerning the enemy's plan to move the Arab inhabitants out of their cities and villages and to install Jewish settlers in their place.

AL-DUSTUR has also learned that this map, accompanied by a report concerning the operations of erecting Zionist settlements, will be distributed to all interested Arab government bodies and to all the Arab ambassadors in Jord n.

[18 Jun 81 p 16]

[Text] In His Report About Settlement in the Occupied Territories, the Head of the Settlement Division Says: "We Will Never Give Up the West Bank."

There Is Insufficient Israeli Military Presence West of the Jordan River.

The Settlements Are Vital for Israel's Security!

The Report Emphasizes Israel's Permanent Objective of Maintaining Borders Far Away From Its Population and Economic Centers.

Last Monday AL-DUSTUR already published the latest Israeli settlement map which was prepared by Matityaho Drobles, the head of the Jewish Agency, the head of the Settlement Division, and member of the Likud party. This map showed that the Zionists have expansionist intentions and have in mind to seize Arab lands, cities, and villages in the occupied teriitories.

Along with the map we published the cautionary report which was prepared by a group of Arab engineers in occupied Palestine and which concerned the settlement process. Recently AL-DUSTUR obtained the report which Matityaho Drobles himself prepared. In this report he emphasizes that there is not the lightest doubt that Israel fully intends to take over the territories where the map shows that settlements will be established. Drobles says: "We have no intention of ever giving up control over the West Bank." Mr Najib al-Ahmad, head of the office of the chairman of the PLO's Executive Committee in Amman, has prepared a report about Drobles and his ideas concerning the settlements which have been published by the Zionist media. This report is being distributed to interested Arab circles. The following is some of what is contained in the report: The Present Status Concerning Settlements in the West Bank From what Zionist government offices have published concerning Drobles' settlement plan we have learned that as of the date that this plan was made public, that is, in September of 1980, 44 settlements had either been established in the West Bank or were in the process of being established. A total of 21 of these settlements are collective settlements, 12 of them are municipal settlements, 3 are agricultural villages, 3 are kibbutzes, 3 are industrial villages, and there is 1 district center and 1 industrial center. Of the settlements, 35 have already been established and [the others] have been in the process of being established in the West Bank during the last 3 years, that is, since 1977. The number of Jewish inhabitants in these settlement areas is now about 10,000.

Most of the settlements in the West Bank are of the village-collective type. Collective settlements are a relatively new type of settlement. Settlements such as these are geared to absorbing about 300 families in order to make it possible to develop a type of life which intensely religious, productive, and of a village nature to accommodate a closed society. This will enable the creation of an exceptionally good type of life, with a very high level of services--to a greater degree than what is found in broader and more open societies in municipal settlements which are similar as far as their economic level is concerned. In this closed society there emerge aspects of mutual cooperation and the ability to make the fundamental decisions which are necessary for the small closed society, which is found in a collective settlement, in order to put forth greater efforts and in order to preserve the particular nature of the settlemtnt. All of the members of every collective settlement are organized in a cooperative union. Joining the union requires the approval of the village settlement absorption organizations, and this includes approval by the Absorption Committee which is composed of representatives from the Settlement Office and the settlement movement which the nucleus belongs to as well as a representative from the settlement. Each candidate is evaluated

in accordance with the conditions which have been set in accordance with the nature of the settlement, the union organization, and the type of nucleus which establishes the settlement. All of this done in order to guarantee coordination among the members of the settlement, and this is the first necessary condition for the effective work which is to be done by a small settlement. Ths union is responsible for municipal services such as establishing parks, building roads, collecting garbage setting up the water supply system, etc., as well as social services such as education, health, and social affairs, and also cultural, social, and recreational activities. The union also provides aid to the members of the settlement in the economic and production realm by providing them with financing and by marketing their products. The union also preserves the distinctive nature of its settlement.

The Settlement Office provides aid by means of financing general and fundamental investments in collective settlements and also provides aid such as long-term loans in accordance with the teachings and bylaws followed in the village settlements. Production activities in a settlement are carried on by the members or by groups of members, and they are responsible for them. The Settlement Office, from its own supply of capital, provides the necessary financing for investments for production plants which are set up by the members or by groups of members, in accordance with the settlement's system. This aid is given only to union members who are permanent residents in the settlement and who work in the same plant, and only after the feasibility of their project has been studied and the authorities in the [Settlement] Office have approved it.

It should be mentioned that in spite of the fact that the settlement's means of production are still based on a relatively small [production] capacity, the settlers do earn their living from this and the social situation in most of the settlements is a good one. Furthermore, the atmosphere is friendly, warm, and full of intensive cultural and social activities. This means then that most of the settlements which have been established in the West Bank are strong settlements which are active and hard at work.

"At first we had to overcome numerous problems, but it was not long at all before the settlements were able to stand on their own feet, with the help of relatively small-scale investments. At first we had to bring water to the settlements only by means of water tanks at a time when almost all of the settlemnnts were getting their water by means of a system of water pipes. And in some places, such as Qadumim and Shilo, wells had to be dug. The appropriate operations for founding the settlements were carried out, and soon all of the settlements in the West Bank will be linked by a regional electric power network. In many settlements they have already begun to lay the foundations for putting up permanent structures which will then be built on the basis of the approach 'Build your own house yourself.'"

Details Concerning Four Settlements

Below are the details concerning four collective settlements in the occupied West Bank, and they serve to illustrate the pattern of the rest of the settlements:

1. Ofra.

This was the first settlement in the West Bank. It was established 5 years ago on

a high hill near the old town of ('Ufrah). The road to Elon and the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley runs by the foot of this hill. It also is close to the road which runs across the tops of the mountains in the southern part of the West Bank. Right now 72 families, with 300 children, live in the settlement, and together they constitute a population of 500 persons. The settlement jointly administers all of the activities which take place in it. So far 72 housing units have been set up in the settlement, and this year 10 more housing units will be put up. In addition to this, work has begun on the establishment of 50 permanent housing units. This means that, by the end of this year, about 80 families will be able to live in Ofra.

Drinking and watering places have been set up in Ofra. The Settlement Office has also planted a forest for this settlement which covers an area of 90 dunams and which, this year, will be expanded to cover between 150 and 200 dunams. This year industrial buildings were put up which cover an area of 2,100 square meters, and their purpose is to expand and provide support for currently existing factories and workshops which are housed in temporary buildings. The Settlement Office is also planning to set up four chicken farms there.

2. Beit El.

This settlement is located near the historic spot callet Bet El, next to an army camp to the right of the Ramallah-Nablus road, about 2 kilometers north of the road junction from which a road leads to the Ofra settlement, and about 20 kilometers north of Jerusalem. The Bet El settlers established their settlement in this location about 2.5 years ago, that is, in November of 1977. At the present time 65 families, with 17 children, live in this settlement, and the total population of the settlement is 300 persons. A total of 74 housing units have been set up, and approval has been obtained to set up about 50 permanent housing units in the settlement. This settlement has a grocery store, clinic, and a doctor, and soon a maternity and child care center will be opened there. It also has a library both for young people and for adults as well as a youth club and religious and cultural centers. The people in the settlement earn their living from their local jobs, district jobs, and outside jobs. The Settlement Office has put up industrial buildings in the settlement which cover an area of 660 square meters—buildings which are intended to house from three to six factories and workshops. The settlement will also soon have a filling station.

3. Qadumim.

This settlement was established 4.5 years ago, and is located next to the village of Kafr Qaddum, about 7 kilometers west of Nablus. Today there are 120 families, 360 children, 10 single people, and 60 students of religion living in this settlement. The total population is about 700 persons. The settlement has 130 housing units and 10 mobile homes. In addition to this, work has begun on the laying of the foundations for a "build your own house yourself" project in the settlement. The settlement has a central building for its synagogue, dining hall, orphanage, administrative offices, school which teaches 9 grades, and other public services. The settlement also has three chicken farms, a metal works, an insecticide factory, a jewelry workshop, a garment-making and tailoring shop, a comptroller's office, a copying office, and a paper factory.

4. Elon Moreh.

This settlement was established in January of 1980 at its present location next to the al-Kabir mountain which is located 4 kilometers east of Nablus. There are 35 families that live there, and the settlement's total population is about 200 persons. So far 41 prefabricated housing units have been set up there, in addition to 7 public buildings, a synagogue, a kindergarten, an orphanage, a school, a clinic, administrative offices, and a grocery store. The settlement has been linked to a major road, and now they are finishing the building of a road which passes by the town of Dayr al-Hatab. Factories and workshops have been set up in the settlement which cover an area of 1,200 square meters, and a blacksmith's workshop will also be set up. By the end of this year there will be about 40 families living in this area.

The West Bank Settlement Strategy

Drobles says: "Today we face a larger eastern front which includes Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. These countries, which possess tremendous resources and are united in their hatred for Israel, today constitute a dangerous and continuous threat to our eastern borders. The lessons which we have learned from our recent wars have taught us that we must guarantee, for ourselves, borders which are as far away as possible from our heavily-populated industrial and economic centers which are concentrated in the coastal plain. This is so that we would have sufficient breathing space in order to be able to mobilize the reserve forces which we depend on in view of the tremendous numerical superiority which the Arab armies have. For this reason, separation of our eastern border, which extends along the Jordan River, from our population centers will contribute a great deal toward providing for all of Israel's security. But it is not enough merely to have a military presence in the areas located to the west of the Jordan River in order to guarantee the security of this sensitive area. A civilian presence, embodied in the Jewish settlements, is very vital to the 'country's security.' This is because all of the settlements in the West Bank have been established on the tops of high mountains which dominate the main artiries where it would be difficult for armored vehicles, in particular, and for vehicles, in general, to pass through. Due to the lessons learned from past wars, we have taken all the necessary steps to guarantee that the settlers in the West Bank will be well trained and well armed in order to 'defend' themselves against sudden attacks."

In his report, Drobles goes on to say:

"Thus we are now forced to run a race with time in view of the talks currently going on concerning the future of the West Bank. At that time, all the agreements will be signed in accordance with the status quo as we present it in these areas, however one assesses it. So now is a very appropriate time to begin a large-scale comprehensive settlement program, especially at the tops of the mountains of the West Bank--an area which is characterized by its uneven terrain and which controls the Ghawr area of the Jordan Valley in the east and the coastal plain in the west. At this point I would like to say that there should be no doubt about the fact that our intention is to remain forever in control of the areas in the West Bank."

The West Bank Settlement Policy

Drobles elucidates his ideas by saying:

"Our experience with settlements has taught us that we should avoid creating a situation where a particular settlment is isolated in any given area. This is because of the necessity of depending on joint services with nearby settlements and because of security. For this reason, near each settlement in the West Bank there should be other settlements so that there will be groups of settlements in homogeneous settlement areas."

In order to spread the settlements out, as much as possible, and in order to establish settlements which are characterized by an outstanding quality of life, most of the settlements in the West Bank which have been established, or which are now in the process of being established, are first established as settlements of the village-collective type. In the initial stage, a single such settlement has from 50 to 300 families and the establishment of the settlement depends on industry, tourism, srrvices, and intensive agriculture."

"Detailed plans for the settlement are carried out by means of creating nucleuses which are prepared to immediately settle in the settlements as they are being established."

"During the next 5 years we should establish between 12 and 15 village and municipal settlements in the West Bank every year so that, by the end of this five-year period, we will have added between 60 and 75 settlements and the number of Jewish inhabitants there will be between 120,000 and 150,000 persons."

Settlements Which Have Been Established Or Are in the Stage of Being Established in the West Bank

Name of Settlement	Type of settlement	Year Established	Area
1. Qadumim	Collective	1975	Qadumim
2. Elon Moreh	Collective	1979	Elon Moreh
3. Bet Horon	collective	1977	Giv'on
4. Matityahu	collective	being established	(Mudi'in)
5. Mevo Horon	agricultural village	1970	(Mudi'in)
6. Halmish (Neve Zuf)	collective	1977	Halmish
7. Salit	industrial village	1978	Salit
8. Tyur	collective	1977	Shave Shomron
9. Dotan	collective	being established	Reyhan
10. Shave Shomron	collective	1977	Shave Shomron
11. Ma'ale Shomron	collective	1979	Qarne Shomron
12. Yaqir Qarne Shomron	collective	being established	Qarne Shomron

Settlements Which Have Been Established Or Are in the Stage of Being Established in the West Bank (contd)

	Name of Settlement	Type of settlement	Year Established	Area
13.	Bet El	collective	1977	Bet El
14.	Mitzpe Yeriho	collective	1977	Adumim
15.	Ofra	collective	1975	Bet El
16.	Shilo	collective	1977	Shilo
17.	Tapuah	collective	1978	Shilo
18.	Teqo'a	collective	1978	Etzion
19.	El'azar	industrial village	1977	Etzion
20.	Kefar Etzion	kibbutz	1963 [sic]	Etzion
21.	Migdal Oz	kibbutz	1977	Etzion
22.	Rosh Zurim	kibbutz	1975	Etzion
23.	Kochav Hashahar	collective (nahal)	1977	Bet El
24.	Mevo Shilo	collective (nahal)	1977	Shilo
25.	Rimonim	collective (nahal)	1977	Bet El
26.	Kefar Adumim	collective	1979	Adumim
27.	Reyhan	agricultural village	1979	Reyhan
28.	Bet Ariv (Levona) [illegible]	collective	being established	Halmish
29.	Ma'ale Nahal Mitzpe Giv'on	agricultural village (nahal)	1979	Shave Shomron
30.	Hadsha	collective	1980	Giv'on
31.	Hannanit (Reyhan B)	industrial village	1980	Reyhan

Total - 31 village settlements under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing.

Settlements Which Have Been Established Or Are in the Stage of Being Established in the West Bank (contd)

	Name of Settlement	Type of Settlement	Year Established	Area
32.	Qarne Shomron	municipal	1977	Qarne Shomron
33.	Qarne Shomron H	municipal (standing army)	being established	Qarne Shomron
34.	Bet El B	municipal	1977	Bet El
35.	Hargilo	municipal	1968	Etzion
36.	Efrat H	municipal	being established	Etzion

	Name of Settlement	Type of Settlement	Year Established	Area
37.	Givon	municipal	1977	Giv'on
38.	Ari'el/Haris	municipal	1977	Ariel
39.	Qiryat Arba'	municipal	1968	Hebron
40.	Elkana	municipal	1977	Ariel
41.	Mishor Adumim	industrial center	1975	Adumim
42.	Ma'ale Adumim	municipal	being established	Adumim
43.	Yitav	municipal	being established	Ariel
44.	Allon Shevut	district center	1970	Etzion

Total = 13 municipal settlements under the supervision of the Ministry of Housing.

Total number of settlements = 44.

Remark: According to statistics and what has been published concerning settlement in the occupied Arab lands, the number of settlements is much greater than the number officially published in Israel. Apparently this confusion is being created for a definite reason.

9468
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FEATURES OF WESTWIND PLANE DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Jun 81 pp 28-29

/Article by Aharon Lapidot: "The Scanners From the West"/

/Text/ There are people on whom fate has smiled: While enjoying themselves fully, they are carrying out an important security mission. The carrying out of the mission is extremely pleasant, both because of the company they are in and the aircraft they are operating. The name of the aircraft: Sea Scan or as it is known by its more familiar name, Westwind. The Westwind, originally an executive aircraft which is produced by the Israel Aircraft Industries, is a hit in the executive aircraft market. In the American market it is in first place in total sales, and when one considers the enormous size of this market, this is no small achievement. It is also in great demand outside the United States.

Naval people have concluded that this aircraft has no equal for maritime reconnaissance: Small, jet propelled, fast, high flying--it can be used to track the movement of suspicious vessels along the coast in order to prevent the infiltration of terrorists from the sea. Westwind aircraft to the Sea Scan type have been procured for the navy.

It is true that the naval personnel are great heroes at sea. They operate their missile boats with enviable skill. But wings? The air force operates them for them. Air force pilots fly the Westwind on maritime reconnaissance missions with naval personnel on its "deck." Between patrols, they carry out other missions with this aircraft such as "jumping" Ezer Weizman (when he was minister of defense) over to Egypt.

The aircraft itself is pleasing to the eye, quiet, and charming. It does not have the bold lines of the Phantom, the beauty of the F-15, or the sophistication of the F-16. It is not long, not high, and has broad wings. The most conspicuous part is its duck bill which contains the radar. On both sides of the fuselage there are bubble windows which permit outstanding observation below, even beneath the underside.

Without Fuss

It has a three-man crew: two pilots and a navigator. In addition, it has three navy people: two observers--the pleasant company--and an identification officer whose function is to supervise the observers and identify the vessels appearing on the screen and on the water.

The temperature is 20°C, and it is such a beautiful spring day that the visibility promises to be excellent. Major T, the pilot of the aircraft, points to my seat: a folding chair without support. "Sorry, the rest of the seats are taken," he smiles at me.

Without much fuss we are moving, and after a short take-off run, we are in the air. The aircraft has a self-propulsion system, and if it malfunctions, there is a small jet auxiliary engine which operates the systems and then the generator. The ignition is automatic, and the flow of fuel to the engines during the ignition is regulated without human intervention.

The two jet engines carry us in a few minutes westward toward the sea. For a minute or two I am enraptured by this blueness, and after we stabilize in the reconnaissance track, I turn to examine the wonders of the aircraft. And this is something to see.

Our host, Major T says, "This is a very advanced executive aircraft. It has dual, automatic navigation systems for all kinds of flying. The system, called very low frequency, is capable of flying the aircraft without human intervention. You feed it the reference point of your destination and the altitude at which you want to fly, and it does all the work itself: It maintains its course and altitude and executes turns. A similar system also exists in the Jumbo aircraft. Besides flying the aircraft, the system provides data such as ground speed and wind speed. "If you want to fly the aircraft yourself, you will also find out that the task is not a difficult one. The aircraft is equipped with a flight director which does not permit you to make a mistake. It alerts you to every deviation from altitude or course and provides you exactly the desired angles of turn. It also has dual communications systems, and actually almost every instrument appears twice on the control panel."

Closing a Gap

The navigator and the identification officer have discovered a vessel on the radar. The former calculates the shortest and most efficient course to it, and it appears to us in its full beauty: A large merchant ship which is moving toward the coast of Israel at a relatively high speed. We circle it. Everything is in order. We continue to fly and Major T continues: "The engines are really astounding. They are at a level which is not found in other aircraft. You can fly 10-20 sorties without the slightest problem. There has been only one case among all the Westwind aircraft which have been sold in the world in which an engine has malfunctioned in the air!

"The aircraft is pressurized (the air is at a constant pressure), and it can be flown even at the astounding altitude of 45,000 feet. The pressure of the cabin can be controlled by the pilot. The Westwind advances the naval requirements 100 years. The average speed of vessels is 15-20 knots, and we in the aircraft see a picture which for us is static. However, our very presence in the air closes a gap in the defense of our coasts. Our very reconnaissance patrol deters the terrorists, and we see everything which moves at sea."

We discover another vessel. This time a smaller one, about 2,000 tons. It is in the vicinity of Sur and is moving westward.

At this stage we have data on all the vessels in the patrol area. Major T suggests that I move to the co-pilot's seat and turns the wheel over to me. I am a pilot!

I cannot help remembering my friend, Uri 'Amit, who flies F-15's and F-16's and relates proudly about the stage when he went into a blackout and how quickly his stomach went up into his throat because of the high G force and the tight turns. Here, I am flying smoothly. The noise of the engines is virtually unheard in the cabin. As we have already said, one enjoys oneself completely.

Almost without sensing it, we have already completed the alloted time for the patrol. Major T signals me to vacate the seat for the co-pilot in preparation for the landing. Regretfully I leave the wheel and return to my seat. Who knows when I will have another opportunity to fly the Westwind?

5830
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COAL SEEN AS MAJOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCE

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 6 Jul 81 p 19

/Article by Avraham Dishon: "By the End of This Decade Coal Will Be the Primary Energy Source of Israel"/

/Text/ It seems that at least on one issue there are no differences of opinion among the various parties: the seriousness of Israel's energy problem. Although Ya'aqov Meridor recently publicized his sensational discovery, according to which all the world's energy problems will be solved, the experts still cast doubt on the effectiveness of this discovery. Oil as the primary component of the energy economy will continue to dominate at least until the end of this decade, they say.

Recently the Ministry of Energy published an internal document, "Israel's National Energy Policy." The author of the document, Dr Yona Bar-Gur, chief of the Planning and Policy Branch in the Ministry of Energy, conducted a thorough study in order to clearly indicate the trends of the energy economy in Israel until 2000. "For the first time we have a clear document according to which the economy can be planned in accordance with the requirements and the possibilities," said Director-General of the Ministry of Energy David Hago'el who coordinated the teams involved in the analysis of the policy.

Adverse Effect on the Balance of Payments

The State of Israel lacks primary sources of energy, and it now imports almost all of its energy requirements. About 98 percent of the consumption comes from imports. In spite of the fact that there are other oil importing countries, in none of the industrialized countries is the dependence on oil so complete.

Although Japan, for example, imports over 99 percent of its oil requirements, it has additional sources of energy, and so it actually imports only 75 percent of the energy which it consumes. Similarly, Denmark also imports 85 percent, Ireland 75 percent, and Greece 73 percent.

This extreme dependence of Israel on the importation of oil causes much more damage to the State of Israel in political, security, and economic terms.

The economic growth of the State of Israel is in danger because of the increase in the economic burden as a result of the import and supply of energy. Since the Iranian crisis in 1979, the State of Israel's expenditures for the importation of oil have almost doubled, from $1.3 billion in 1979 to $2.1 billion in 1980.

In no country in the western world have the expenditures for the importation of oil reached such a rate.

The increase in the expenditure of foreign currency for the importation of oil because of the worsening of business conditions has reached 5 percent ($900 million) of the gross national product in contrast to an increase of 3.9 percent which was paid during the previous oil crisis in 1974 ($410 million), according to a report of the Bank of Israel in 1980.

It is clear from this that if these conditions continue, and certainly if they worsen, the State of Israel will find it difficult to guarantee a reasonable annual growth rate which is vital to the economy, and the business conditions and the balance of payments will worsen in the future. In such conditions the Israeli economy must turn to other channels of supply and increase the efficiency of its use of energy.

Because of political compulsions, Israel is forced to depend upon contractual purchases from only two countries, which only amount to 60 percent of its consumption. This supply depends upon friendship or "political understandings" and not on bilateral interests. Israel is forced to obtain the remainder in the free market--the market of opportunities--the "spot market." The fact that in this market in recent years higher prices have been paid than in the contractual markets causes much more damage to Israel in terms of its capabilities of purchasing oil in a planned and systematic manner and in the quantity and quality appropriate for Israeli consumption. This is the reason for the importance of the tendency to call for the varying of the energy sources imported into Israel.

The Era of Coal in Industry

The virtually exclusive energy source of Israel today is the imported liquid fuel. In order to significantly reduce the State's dependence on imported liquid fuel, the Ministry of Energy is endeavoring to divert the use to the following additional kinds of fuel:

--Coal: The ministry's policy is based on the principle that in the coming decade coal will be the significant primary substitute for liquid fuel. 1981 is actually the year for the entry of the electric economy into the era of coal with the operation of the first unit of the power plant in Hadera by coal. In 1-2 years industry will also enter the era of coal with the conversion of the first cement factory to the use of coal.

Toward the end of this decade, according to the plans for development and conversion initiated by the Ministry of Energy, coal will represent 75-80 percent of the fuel input for the generation of electricity in the country or about 35-40 percent of all the energy inputs to the economy.

--Nuclear: The Ministry of Energy is examining the various possibilities for the construction of nuclear power plants for the generation of electricity in preparation for their actual operation in the next decade.

The preparation of a manpower basis and know-how by the use of existing structures such as the Electric Company and the Atomic Energy Commission and by the creation of joint or new structures.

The preparation of physical conditions for the introduction of power reactors by preparing locations for power reactors including the finding of solutions for suitable means of cooling and the study of the damage caused by unprotected power reactors and their effect on the population.

The preparation of a nuclear fuel basis--the extraction of uranium from phosphates, the production of fuel rods, and the guarantee of assured sources of supply for nuclear fuel.

The installation of the reactors within the framework of electricity generating systems will be based on the purchase or copying of existing plans with the hope for maximum involvement of Israeli planning in the production of components and systems.

--Solar Energy: Israel leads the world in the number of solar energy systems for the heating of water. The use of solar systems for the heating of water is likely to reach 2 percent of the total energy consumption in Israel (today it already constitutes 1.3 percent).

Solar pools, an original Israeli development likely to constitute an "energy breakthrough." To date a test facility has been successfully operated in 'En Boqeq. A plan has been worked out for accelerated development which includes the construction of a solar pool over an area of 250 dunams which will operate a five-megawatt turbine in 1983. If the development process is successful, it can be regarded as having the potential for supplying a significant part of the electricity requirement in Israel.

--Shale oil: With the recent discoveries of layers of shale in the southern Negev, known quantities of shale in Israel amounts to about 4 billion tons. The ministry estimates that this source can yield 20-30,000 barrels of oil a day.

--Hydroelectric energy: The "Seas Canal Project" is intended to exploit the height difference of 400 meters between the Mediterranean Sea and the Dead Sea, and it is likely to be integrated into the system for supplying electricity with a capacity of 600-800 megawatts for generating electricity.

--Geothermal energy: The Ministry of Energy included within the framework of the desalination project the drilling of test holes for the exploitation of geothermal energy sources which have been discovered in the Ashdod region. In this project the possibilities of exploiting the energy in the industrial enterprises in the region and in the desalination facility in Ashdod will be examined.

--Bio-gas: In the kibbutz of Kfar Giladi a project for the exploitation of agricultural waste, which produces 600 cubic meters of bio-gas a day, has already been applied. A part of the kibbutz's energy consumption is provided in the form of methane gas which is produced from the fermentation of animal waste. The Ministry of Energy hopes to bring the project to the commercial stage in order to disseminate it among the agricultural settlements in the country for self-supply of their energy needs.

--Wind energy: At this stage, the first tests are being conducted for the production of electricity from wind energy for local use by integrating it into the overall system. Concurrently, two pioneering facilities will be constructed in selected regions for local use.

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SINAI BEDOUINS COMPLAIN OF RETURN TO EGYPTIAN RULE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Jul 81 Weekend Supplement pp 22-23

/Article by Ya'aqov Havaquq: "Voice in the Wilderness; 'You Took Us Up to Heaven and Now You Are Casting Us Down,' Says a Young Bedouin in the Sinai After Having Tasted Life and Sin; Soon He and His Tribe Will Live Under Egyptian Rule; News From Egyptian Side Not Encouraging"/

/Text/ There is a somber mood in the Sinai these days, especially in the narrow eastern strip which is still under Israeli rule. The hopes and dreams which were nurtured for years have been smashed. The eventuality all the desert residents, both Israelis and Bedouins, have feared, became a reality. While the Israelis are arguing with the authorities about reperations, their Bedouin neighbors are doing some soul searching. No one visits them, no institution deals with them. The desert was and remains their home despite the change of rule.

On the eve of the total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, the Bedouins of south Sinai are looking back fondly upon the past, especially the recent past. Those who lived under Egyptian rule until 1967 know at least what is in store for them. The younger ones are gathering every bit of information to be prepared for the advent of the new-old regime. The Bedouins understand that the fat years are over, and the lean years are about to start. As children of the desert, unpampered by their environment, they must have attributes which will help them live under the new reality.

A deep change has taken place in the behavior of the 3500 Bedouins who have remained in the south of Sinai. Their openness is gone, replaced by long moments of silence. Their eyes are sad. They look betrayed, no longer showing that twinkle in their eyes of years past. On the eve of the total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai the Bedouins are especially careful in their dealings with the Israelis in general and with the military government in particular. They know that the Egyptian Big Brother is listening. They are afraid the eyes of the next ruler are watching and they are not taking any risks. Each Bedouin prepares his own alibi and makes sure he does not give the Egyptians any food for thought. When the men gather at night around the glowing coals to sip coffee, they analyze every shred of information from across the border. Every official statement issued by Egypt is analyzed ad infinitum. In their gatherings the Bedouins prefer to be alone with their problems. Israeli strangers, including those whom they welcomed in the past, are no longer welcomed. Their Bedouin tradition does not allow them to say so openly, but their cool attitude leaves no room for doubt.

Atawi Mahmud Sulayman of the 'Awalma branch of the Hamzayinah tribe, a tall lean man, symbolizes these days the realistic Bedouin type, who accepts the present as a divine decree and cautiously keeps a watchful eye on the place where the new masters of the desert are stationed. His 38-year experience of living in the Sinai doing various jobs shows clearly. He is bright and cunning and knows what is going on. In the presence of local guests he is doubly cautious. He chooses his words carefully, making sure not to say anything unwarranted. His statements are phrased in such a manner that he always leaves himself a way out. In private conversation when his words are not recorded he feels more at ease and his words are more blunt.

Atawi has two wives. One is about to give birth. She stayed in his house in Wadi Sa'al, not far from the Egyptian-Israeli border check post. The second, in whose house he is staying tonight in Nuwayba al-Mazayinah, is younger, and is also pregnant. This wife is busy preparing a drink for the guests who are sitting outside, under the acacia. When the tea is ready she puts down the blue kettle and disappears inside her house, according to the Bedouin custom. Her husband, the host, gets up and brings the kettle and the cups and serves his guests. While pouring he studies the blank faces of his guests, trying to find out what is going on inside their heads. He knows that they would like to loosen their tongues and release some of their tension and bitterness, but are afraid.

Atawi argues in front of his guests that there is no point for the Bedouins to harbor any illusions, they have to be honest and realistic. They have to accept the situation as it is, without embellishments. "Recent developments bother us considerably. No one took the time to tell us what has happened or what is going to happen. We are fed rumors and ambiguous statements." He says frankly: "We had it good when Israel was in charge here. We received better education than ever before. We had excellent health care. More than one was a sick person or a woman about to give birth picked up by a helicopter. We were shown that everyone, even a Bedouin in a remote wadi, is a human being. As for the Egyptians, in the areas which were returned to them, we haven't heard of anyone picked up by their helicopters. Nor do they have a doctor, like the Israelis. We get news from those areas. We know that it is difficult to find work there, which of course does not make us feel too happy. There is severe rationing of basic food items over there. Can we feel happy about those things? We all have relatives there and when you know your relatives are having work and food problems what are you supposed to do? How do you feel? Actually our hands are tied. There is not much we can do for them. We can only pray to Allah. Who can we trust if not Him?"

Silk Soft Hands

The men sitting around nod in agreement. He is the only one who dares to speak openly. The others only speak behind a mask of anonymity. One man, pot bellied, with a thick dark mustache and blue painted dark eyes, becomes bold and says: "We know very well what happens on the other side. To put it mildly, our brethren over there live under difficult conditions. Anyone who does not have a car does not find work. Nearly all the vendors in the territories which have been returned have been investigated. Those who had property or stalls until 1967 were allowed to go on selling; those who made their property during the Israeli rule were suspected of collaborating. No need to say too much about the fate of the collaborators. Someone mentioned the rationing of basic food items. Did you know that if they find a bag of sugar or rice in a Bedouin's house they investigate him, confiscate the bag and punish him? A few days ago someone came here from the Egyptian side and told us some very interesting stories."

The last sentence spoken by the unidentified speaker jolts nearly all those present. He might have said more than he should. Someone makes a vague remark to the effect that the person in question stayed at the house of the local shaykh. The latter, 'Abdallah Rabi' Darwish, who until now was half asleep, wakes up. "No, I heard someone came but I did not see him. He asked my wife about my whereabouts, and she told him I was not home and he went away."

After he finished his short personal apology he appeared relieved. He started sprucing himself up, straightening his rumpled robe, crossing his legs under himself and adding emphatically: "The men spoke about the situation as they see it. Let me tell you what I think. Until the 1967 War we were in the desert like our fathers and grandfathers. We did not see a car, we did not see an airplane, we were not picked up by a helicopter, but we managed to live. When we heard a war broke out we prayed to Allah as is our custom, and we said, Allah, make sure it all works out for the best! We did not say no to Egypt and no to Israel, rather we said, Allah, make sure it all works out for the best! Now too we turn to Allah and we say, Master of the World, make sure it all works out for the best!"

The diplomatic approach of 'Abdallah Rabi', the armless, bitter shaykh who leads the Hamzayinah tribe which dwells in Nuwayba, whose genteel words do not find any fault with the Egyptian rule, make those present shake their heads in derision. They realize, as we do, that his delicate position makes him say those things. A little later, in a private conversation, one of the Bedouins tells about the humiliating attitude of the Egyptians. A few weeks ago a group of Bedouins from the Israeli side wanted to pay a condolence visit to Shaykh 'Awda Salah Mubarakh, who lives in Wadi Fayran after he lost his father. The military government let them go through, but at the Egyptian check point near Shaykh Faranjah (not far from the St Catherine airfield) the Egyptians stopped the group and would not let it go through. "We told the Egyptians," he recalls, "the Jews let us through without any problems, while you who are Muslims like us won't let us go to Fayran to console the shaykh. The Egyptian officer was adamant. He told us haughtily to go back."

Since that disappointed group came back the story has been making the rounds of the Sinai among thousands of Bedouins along the eastern shore. This incident too leads the Bedouins to the same conclusion: One should be prepared for hard times under the Egyptian military rule. This preparation does not only mean less contact with the Israeli military government or caution with strangers. It also means quick stockpiling. The Bedouins are busy buying cars and trucks so they can make a living in the future. Those who lost their jobs, such as the ones who worked for the military or civilian government, are looking for other employment. Anyone who works saves his money. Atawi, like his friends, does not save Israeli money. Once or twice a week he travels to Elat or to the Gaza Strip and exchanged Israeli money for Egyptian pounds or dollars. Besides the cash he keeps in his coat pocket, he also carries a small calculator. "Last week," he recounts, "I went to exchange more than 200,000 Israeli pounds, mine and my friends," and without the calculator I would have gotten confused."

Bir Sal. A Bedouin concentration near the Israel-Egypt border check point. Dozens of shacks scattered about, some practically on the border. No men are seen early in the morning. Most of them must be working in Elat, in N'viot, or elsewhere.

Also the maq'ad, the gathering place of the men and the place of hospitality, is empty. We park the jeep near the stone built maq'ad, in order to prepare breakfast. LtCol Ran Peri, Governor of South Sinai, opens a can; another official unloads the jerrycan and the vegetable box. While we are opening the cans two Bedouin boys approach us. Their heads are shaven, except for a strip of hair in the middle of their head. They salute us like grownups, and without further ado turn to their work. One takes a rock and starts splitting a piece of wood. His friend collects kindling wood and paper. They start a fire in the maq'ad, and put on the kettle, which was kept in a concavity in the wall. A third boy, who came to see who the guests are, turns around and runs back in an unknown direction. The boy in the lined robe, who has split the wood, sees the fire subside. He takes some kindling wood and begins to revive the fire. Meanwhile the third boy returns with two adult men. One chubby man, wearing a dusty white robe, shakes our hands, and takes the place of the boy who made the fire. The latter starts rinsing the cups in the maq'ad. The adult takes an old tin can out of the concavity in the wall and puts it next to us. The governor hands him tea bags and sugar. The Bedouin at first refuses to take the offering. Only after several repeated offers does he accept. He pours the sugar out of the plastic bag into the kettle and adds a handful of sugar from the tin can. The tea bags he discards disdainfully, and prefers to throw in tea leaves from another tin can. When he notices our looks of surprise he waves the tea bags in our faces and says with an ironic wink, "This (the tea bags the governor gave him) is Jewish tea..."

While the man is preparing the tea the rest of the men who are around come over to the maq'ad. When the governor asks one of the men why so many men are around, he tells him: "Your honor, a Bedouin likes to work 1 week and then rest for 2 months." No one laughs. They all appear to agree with him. Some 50 years ago Maj C.S. Jarvis, who was the Governor of the Sinai from 1922 to 1936, became aware of this Bedouin trait. He described the Bedouins as parasites and hopeless bums. In one of his books, Jarvis writes: "The Bedouin is not a worker. He hates all menial labor. He considers it beneath a man's honor to dirty his hands with a spade or hoe. This becomes evident when one shakes the hand of one of the members of this noble race. Instead of shaking a rough hand, as can be expected of a someone who grew up in the desert, one touches a hand soft as silk."

The Price of Peace

Not far from the maq'ad is the border linking El Arish with Ras Muhammad. Until the final Israeli withdrawal in April 1982, this is the border. Except for some barriers along the border line, the border is open. This fact, it turns out, attracts the Bedouins. Tire tracks in the sand, off the main highway, reveal the activity on both sides of the border. In recent months the military government officials, who are in charge of security in the area, have caught several smugglers. The confiscated merchandise showed that the Bedouins on the Egyptian side need sugar, rice, tea, flour. From the Egyptian side they tried to smuggle fuel, clothes, shoes, cigarettes, and electronic products. The smuggling is not purely commercial. The Bedouin lives in the desert, under difficult conditions, and is raised on the principle of tribal solidarity. This solidarity is his socio-economic support in time of need. This desert principle does not recognize any international borders, permanent or temporary. Now too, the borderline between Israel and Egypt which divides tribes and families does not change this Bedouin principle. When a Bedouin on one side of the border hears that members of his family on the other side lack food he will do everything

within his powers to help them, even break the law. But there is no guarantee that this traditional custom may not be used to smuggle weapons or to engage in intelligence activities. In this regard neither the Bedouins nor the military government are, understandably, too keen.

The teacher Maslim Salim Maslim of the Tarabin tribe, a corpulent man, caresses the wounds inflicted on him by the Bedouin burn expert. The teacher, a resident of Nuwayba a-Tarbin, suffered lately from back aches and became bed-ridden. He went to see the doctor and was prescribed pills. He took the pills but nothing happened. He went to Jum'a, the food vendor next to the fort in Nuwayba a-Tarbin. The vendor told him to lie on his stomach and put an iron rod in the fire. He applied the rod to the patient's back until it resembled a chess board. Since then Maslim has felt well. The back aches disappeared, but the burns have not healed yet. He sits for hours on end in his yard, caresses his wounds and smokes. The sand next to his feet is strewn with cigarette butts.

The teacher keeps fidgeting. It is not clear whether his discomfort is due to pain or to being exposed to his guest, who happens to be a journalist. One of his neighbors comes to his aid. A tall man with stubble on his cheeks, forlorn clothes, and coarse bare feet. He says things which we have heard already in Bir Sal and Nuwayba al-Muzayinah, but as he goes on he becomes more interesting. "The Egyptian period was a dark age for us. Israel brought us up to the modern period, opened our eyes, and as we began to understand what was going on around us, we are back where we started. It's strange, we have always been ruled by military authorities, Turks, British, Egyptian, and now you. Yet, with the exception of Israel, all the rulers treated us with contempt. The Egyptians, for example, never treated us as human beings. They accorded us the kind of treatment they thought we deserved, the way they saw us. Few of us could read and write, so we were considered ignorant. The Egyptians treated us like boors. True, we are not experts on politics or the ways of the modern world. We live in the desert. Give us water, give us bread, give us pasture, and you won't find anyone happier than us. We are not concerned with educating our children, with reading and writing, or that distant future."

Similar words were written by Maj Jarvis, the British governor, more than 50 years ago. "The Sinai Bedouins are ignorant, but that does not mean they have no brains. I have always maintained that the average Bedouin is born with a very good mind. But it deteriorates for lack of use." Our interlocutor seems to read our thoughts and continues: "Our relations with the Egyptians," he explains, were complex and delicate. Since we were of no value to them, they did not bother to elevate us. They probably preferred to keep us ignorant. I think their negative attitude toward us stemmed from racial reasons. They saw themselves as descendants of the Pharaohs, sons of an ancient glorious culture, while we were backward people. Let me give you a good illustration. A Bedouin youth of the Daladla (a branch of the Tarbin tribe which lives in Jabal Ma'ara) went to Egypt in 1948 to study engineering. He then went to do graduate study in Germany. Since 1953 the Egyptians have prevented him from going back to his family in the Sinai. They were afraid he might put ideas in our heads."

He pauses, and then concludes: "The Egyptians saw us as uneducated and unimportant people, and the experience we have had with them in recent months shows that they have not changed their view of us."

Maslim Salim Maslim seems to enjoy the task of pouring. Instead of having to reveal his feelings on the eve of the Israeli withdrawal he lets his neighbor speak. Maslim does not stop his neighbor. He encourages him to talk by pouring him cup after cup. The neighbor is excited, he rolls a cigarette, fills his lungs with smoke and puffs leisurely. Moments later he continues in a low voice, as if sharing a secret: "A few years ago there was a wise Bedouin, who has since died, who came up with an interesting idea. He proposed sending a delegation of Bedouin dignitaries to Amman, who would meet with the British consul general, and would urge him to ask his government to separate the Sinai from Egypt and grant it autonomy."

The man died and the idea died with him. Even now there are not too many takers for this idea, perhaps because the Bedouins realize it is not feasible. The old Bedouins who still remember the British rule, know that the problem no longer concerns the British. One of them, who must have been brought up to date on the geopolitical changes since World War II, has seriously suggested organizing the delegation, but instead of sending it to the British consul general in Amman, he suggested that they go to see the American ambassador in the capital city of the Hashemite Kingdom.

The Bedouins in the Sinai feel betrayed. A young Bedouin who has "tasted of life and of sin" in recent years has put their feelings well: "You took us up to heaven and now you are throwing us away, just like that. When someone is blind he learns to live with his handicap. When you open his eyes he realizes what he missed when he was blind. When you cover his eyes again it will be hard for him to get used to it. The same is true with us. The Jews who have recently settled in the Sinai are receiving reparations, are told what is going on. No one cares about us, no one explains anything. Others negotiate and no one asks us. We pay the price of peace."

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GUSH EMUNIM PLANS SINAI EVACUATION PROTEST

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Jeffrey Heller]

[Text]

YAMIT. — Gush Emunim leader Rabbi Moshe Levinger will soon focus his activities on preventing the evacuation of settlements in Sinai, a close confidant said yesterday.

Rabbi Yosef Anteman, a veteran of Gush Emunim settlement attempts in Judea and Samaria, said that Levinger's exact plans cannot yet be disclosed. But he said the Kiryat Arba rabbi will definitely not be moving into Yamit, or try to set up new settlements in Sinai.

Anteman, together with his wife and five children, are among the 13 religious families who last month moved into Housing Ministry-owned flats in Yamit.

They may soon be followed by Tehiya MK Hanan Porat, he said.

The newcomers, Anteman said, will not resort to violence to prevent the pull-back, scheduled for April 1982. Levinger, he said, "is not violent, but calculating." Anteman added, "There are people in the region, however, who will take exceptional action."

A veteran Yamit resident, who identified himself only as Shlomo, said that the 13 families "want to put us in the category of extremists so that the government will have an excuse to evacuate us by force."

If violence erupts during the pull-back, he said, the Neot Sinai vegetable garden incident "will look like a joke."

The mood in Yamit is one of bitterness against a government that, as residents wryly note, has not even sent out letters officially informing them they will have to leave next April.

"They want to wear us down, so that we'll drop to our knees and beg for money," Shlomo said.

Business owners yesterday did receive letters from the government giving them until the end of the month to send in assessments for compensation, and advertisements tacked on the town centre's bulletin boards offer flats for sale in Beersheba, Kiryat Bialik, Ra'anana and elsewhere in Israel.

Anteman said that the flats which the 13 families obtained recently were arranged for legally with the Housing Ministry, but he declined to give any details. He said that the flats had never been occupied before.

The flats are situated next to an eerie-looking section of Yamit, in which completed air-raid shelters stand in sand dunes upon which houses will never be erected.

The families, most of whom left homes in Judea and Samaria they can presumably return to after April 1982, have found employment in Yamit and will send their children to the religious school in the city.

A belief that Yamit is situated inside the biblical Land of Israel was the underlying reason for setting up house there.

Anteman quoted Numbers 34:VI, in which Nahal Mitzraim — the Egyptian river — is listed as the Land of Israel's southern border. The river, he said, could be interpreted as meaning Wadi el-Arish, south of Yamit.

The move, at a time when most Yamit residents are thinking about compensation terms and starting anew elsewhere, was also meant to boost morale.

"Our coming here caused great waves of support in the region," Anteman said. "Everyone should know that the people who built this town won't give up easily."

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SABBATH BAN THREATENS OIL EXPLORATION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Aryeh Wolman]

[Text]

The coalition agreement proposing to ban oil drillings on the Sabbath will end oil exploration in Israel, senior engineers and managers in the industry told *The Jerusalem Post* yesterday.

A weekly interruption of the drillings — in which more than $30 million a year is invested — will cause the bore holes to collapse and play havoc with the methods of detecting the presence of oil, they claimed. Weekend breaks are not accepted by any oil-drilling firm in the world and their introduction in Israel would deter all further private investment, they added.

Physics Professor Ze'ev Lev, a member of the three-man committee which grants work permits for the Sabbath, claimed, however, that the technological means are available to prevent the collapse of the drilling holes. He argued further that the Sabbath work-force could be cut by at least 20 to 30 per cent, by introducing the technology and organizational methods already used in Japan and West Germany. These allow production lines and maintenance work to be stopped entirely at weekends.

Lev said that the walls of drilling holes are normally prevented from collapsing by circulating a fluid at high pressure inside the holes. But it is possible to cycle the fluid automatically in a closed system on a rest day, he said.

Because of this possibility, the committee does not permit Mekorot to drill for water on the Sabbath, said Lev, a member of the National Religious Party. U.S. firms have successfully used the technology in oil drillings, mainly in cases of emergency, he claimed.

But engineers in the government Oil Exploration Investment company said that such a system, even if workable in an emergency, is costly and risky. Furthermore, ceasing work on the Sabbath would damage rock formations, which in turn would affect the pressure of any oil catchments and make them difficult or impossible to detect, they said.

"All our contracts with investors stipulate that we must operate according to standard drilling procedures," one engineer said. "If we now have to change those procedures, all our private-finance will be withdrawn. No investor is going to take on an additional unknown risk because of horse-trading with the religious parties."

Lev said that factories in operation abroad are designed to allow the entire production line to be shut down at weekends. Also, sub-units could be shut down temporarily and by-passed during the week to allow maintenance work to be carried out then rather than on Saturday or Sunday. He gives as examples the car and glass industries.

"About 50 per cent of all the workers on the Sabbath do maintenance work," he said. "This figure could be cut by half or more."

Israel Meidan, director of the government's Productivity Institute, said that in theory Lev is correct. "But you can't bring about a managerial and technological revolution overnight because of a coalition agreement," he said. "Attitudes change slowly, and replacing old machinery takes even longer."

A similar view was voiced yesterday by Yossi Shalit, managing-director of the government-owned Negev Phosphates, which is also subject to pressure to cut its Sabbath work-force by the coalition agreement. Shalit said that fewer than 100 of the 1,700 work-force are employed on the Sabbath. Their main job is to keep the furnaces hot.

"It would be possible to replace nearly all of them by robots," he said. "But the investment required is too great to be justified on economic grounds. If the government is prepared to pay the price, however, then I'll go along with it."

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TAX REVENUES SURPASS PROJECTIONS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Aug 81 p 7

[Article by Slomo Maoz]

[Text]

Government tax revenue grew in real terms by 11 per cent in the first third of the current fiscal year as compared with the same period last year, despite the newly introduced tax cuts. Had taxes not been cut by Finance Minister Yoram Aridor, this revenue would have increased by 16 per cent.

In the past four months, government revenue from taxes reached IS24 billion, IS6.7b. of which was collected during July.

In nominal terms, tax revenue in the first third of this year grew by 146.6 per cent as compared with the same period last year. The major revenue increase stemmed from taxes on imports, which rose in nominal terms during the period by 222 per cent to reach IS3.2b.

Value added tax on locally produced goods accounted for nearly IS5b., representing a nominal ncrease of 190 per cent.

Income tax, amounting to some IS13.5 billion, increased by a nominal 129 per cent as compared with the same period last year.

State Revenue Administration director Uriel Linn told *The Jerusalem Post* yesterday that despite the tax officials' sanctions at the end of last month, the authorities in July collected more money than had been projected. He believes that tax collection will surpass projections fcr the entire year.

Linn estimates that government losses fron tax cuts will this year reach IS2.6 billion.

Linn said that while revenue from taxes on imports had stabilized, revenue from income tax was on the increase. He attributed this success to the innovations introduced by the authorities during the past two years, including increased fines on late tax payments.

In another area, government tax officials are scheduled to meet today to discuss whether they will go on strike in the coming days in pursuit of their pay claims.

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CANAL THREATENS LOSSES FOR DEAD SEA WORKS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 3 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by Macabee Dean]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — The Mediterranean-Dead Sea hydro-electric canal will cause the Dead Sea Works damages of about $100m. To offset this future incursion on profits, the company's board of directors has decided to earmark IS75m. this year, and a similar sum every year until the canal is completed in about a decade.

This was stated yesterday by Arie Shahar, general manager of the Dead Sea Works, who added that the undertaking had a "very good year," both in production and in profits, in 1980-81. "If every industrial enterprise in the country could reach the level of success we have, we would be well ahead on the road to economic independence," he said.

The figure of $100m. for damages is only an estimate, he said, noting that it had been made by a Knesset committee about a year ago. The damages would be due to the fact that the mineral concentration of the Dead Sea would be diluted by the incoming sea water. Retaining dykes would have to be strengthened and their height increased, and there would also be less evaporation, slowing down the production process.

The Dead Sea Works yesterday decided to set up a special committee to study the effects of these and other possible causes of damage.

Shahar noted that although $100m. seemed a large sum, it would only constitute one year's net profits of the Dead Sea Works, if these profits continued at their present rate. However, the $100m. would also have to be considered as part of the cost of building the canal, he said.

In 1980-81 the Dead Sea Works produced 1,344,000 tons of potash, "and this is 12 per cent, or 144,000 tons above the rated capacity of the plant," he said. He noted that "every ton over the rated capacity contributed greatly to the profits."

The high production was due to "intensive efforts to keep machinery in top shape, the presence of sufficient raw materials from the evaporation ponds, and especially outstanding efforts by the entire staff," Shahar said. Productivity rose by 3.5 per cent last year.

"We are giving our 1,300 workers a IS12.5m. bonus on account of 1980-81." In the previous year the bonus was only IS4.5m.

Exports dropped by 3.4 per cent, to 1,333,000 tons, in 1980-81, but the slight drop (due to bad economic conditions abroad) was offset by a 38 per cent increase in the price the potash fetched. Part of the increase in payments is due to the company's policy of cutting shipments to those places which pay in a weakening currency and stepping up deliveries to places where the currency is strengthening.

On the other hand, the company lost some of its profits (or potential profits) since income in foreign currency lagged 25 per cent behind the costs of production (based on the index).

However, the "bottom line" — net profits after all expenses and taxes, stood at IS589m., out of a total income of IS1,116m., Shahar said. The Dead Sea Works had two main sources of income: its operations, IS358m., plus another IS349m. from its investments (most of these are index-linked bonds, etc., which rose in price without rising in real value).

After taxes the net profit, as noted, was IS589m. This is a 59 per cent "real" (or 279 per cent unadjusted) increase over the profits of 1979-80, Shahar said. He believes that about a quarter of all the profits are inflationary, and not real. Just the same, he considers the results satisfactory.

The board has decided to pay a final cash dividend of 20 per cent in addition to the 25 per cent already paid (40 per cent last year), plus a 65 per cent bonus share dividend (125 per cent last year).

CSO: 4300/92

CONSTRUCTION ELEMENTS HIT SINAI CONTRACT METHODS

TA171416 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by economic affairs correspondent El'azar Levin]

[Text] The U.S. Corps of Engineers last week published a tender for the construction of two camps for the multinational policing force in Sinai. Clearly, the tender was "fixed" so that the U.S. firms would win it, and it was set up so that Israeli contractors would be unable to take part in it. This, despite the fact that, formally, a copy of the tender was sent to the Israeli Defense Ministry for it to invite Israeli firms to take part in it.

The tender, which is for the construction of camps and installations for the international force at Etam and Ofira, is estimated to be worth about $100 million. Published in the United States and in Israel last Thursday [13 August], the tender asserted that any contractor wishing to take part in it must appear the following Monday [17 August] in the offices of the Corps of Engineers in Alabama in order to submit his offers. Obviously, this proviso prevented any Israeli firm from taking part in the tender.

The publication of the fixed tender aroused considerable anger among construction elements in Israel, since the building will take place in an area that will be under Israeli sovereignty until April 1982, by which date the construction work itself is supposed to be completed. Israeli elements expressed criticism of the Defense Ministry in this affair, saying that it was a repeat of the affair of the construction of the Negev airfields by U.S. firms. In reaction, Defense Ministry sources said that since the U.S. Government was financing 60 percent of the investments in the camps, it could not be asked to have Israeli firms do the work.

Sources in the construction industry say that having U.S. firms build the airfields had turned out to be a dismal failure. The construction itself was costing $1 billion, whereas Israeli firms had at the time estimated that they could get the job done for $600 million at the outside. It was now emerging that the U.S. firms were behind schedule in the construction of the runways, the installations and the buildings. This was originally reported by HA'ARETZ on 30 July and it was confirmed yesterday by a senior IDF officer in an interview in the LOS ANGELES TIMES.

The heads of the coordinating institution in the construction industry--Solel Bone Director-General Shraga Rotman and the chairman of the Association for the Promotion

of Contractors, Avraham Goldstein--yesterday sent cables to the prime minister, the defense minister and the finance minister, protesting the fact that U.S. firms were getting the work and warning against a repeat of the Negev airfields affairs.

This reporter has learned that the contractors intend to demand firmly that if the U.S. tender cannot be annulled, the Defense Ministry must at least insist that the sub-contracting work be given to Israeli firms. Construction industry sources are apprehensive that the Corps of Engineers intends to have Egyptian firms do the sub-contracting work at both places as part of the political and economic tightening of relations between the United States and Egypt. These sources note that the Israeli firms have considerable international experience in the construction of all types of camps and installations and that it would be very strange if construction work in an area presently under Israeli sovereignty should go to Egyptian companies.

CSO: 4323/42

HA'ARETZ ASSESSES SHARON'S W. BANK POLICY

TA141227 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] What is new in Ari'el Sharon's remarks to the inhabitants of the territories?

It seems to me that the most essential point is the announcement that from now on the inhabitants of the territories and their leaders have a clearer address and that the meetings and talks with Palestinian notables in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be renewed.

Sharon wanted to say that from now on the responsibility for implementing the government's policy in the territories is transferred from the chief of staff to the new defense minister and that the vacuum existing on this issue on the political level has been filled. The new minister will speak with the leaders in the territories and will hear their opinions directly. It was not stated whether the talks will touch on political issues also and not on municipal affairs only. This is a novelty but only a prelude still.

What cannot be found in Ari'el Sharon's message to the residents of the territories? Sharon did not say a word about the government's previous decision according to which the leaders in the territories must not meet with PLO representatives abroad and must not make declarations of support for the PLO and its objectives, nor are PLO funds allowed into the territories. Hence, these instructions have remained unchanged. The talks Sharon will conduct will be with individual mayors and not with the National Guidance Committee it was decided to liquidate due to its representation of the PLO. The question then is whether Sharon's interlocutors will dare say more in their talks with him than with Moshe Dayan in the past, for example.

Minister Sharon's remarks indicate his readiness to change the atmosphere and this should not be belittled. This is important even if it is not intended to change the main tendencies of Israel in the territories. At stake is chiefly a change of atmosphere toward the population but not toward those leaders who overtly support the PLO or the rejectionist front's organizations.

As for the attitude of the IDF and the military government toward the population Sharon promised they will exercise respect and refrain from humiliating actions.

It should be remembered that such instructions have always existed but mishaps and humiliation did recur just as one finds harrassment in the IDF despite the prohibitions. Those standing at the roadblocks are not military government personnel but IDF soldiers and mainly reservists. The entry into schools which are not extraterritorial premises was forbidden in the past as well and an entrance permit is given in special cases only by the coordinator of activities in the territories. Senior commanders were even removed in the past due to irregularities on this issue. The problem facing the commanders was how to behave when students hurl stones from within their schoolyards at passing cars or hoist Falastin flags inside their schools. Collective punishments stopped a long time ago, except for curfews. The demolition of a house is a collective punishment also since this affects the family members of the accused as well but this punishment is still valid. However, if the intention is to put an end to harrassment during identification parades then the change is important.

For the time being there are no new regulations regarding conduct in the territories. In the first meeting of the defense minister with the executors of the policy in the territories--prior to the news conference [12 August]--such instructions were not given. Only time will prove whether the change in atmosphere will lead to a change in policy as well or whether this is mere fireworks.

CSO: 4323/42

BRIEFS

JULY UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS--The number of job seekers declined in June and about 32,500 people were registered in the employment service offices, about 2,500 less than in May. The number of unemployed also dropped in June to about 1,000 people. In the first quarter of this year, the number of workers from the territories employed in Israel grew by 10 percent. Most of them come from the Gaza Strip. On a weekly average, nearly 78,000 are employed in Israel. This emerges from a family survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics. [Text] [TA041451 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 4 Aug 81]

ARAB PROTEST LEAFLET--Chairman of the Students' Association in Israel Tzahi Hanegbi claims that the Arab students' committee distributed a leaflet today in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem campuses, saying, inter alia, that those students would fight for recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Arab Palestinian people. Hanagbi sent the leaflet to the minister of defense and called upon the minister to state that the new policy in the territories does not include permission for incitement in campuses. According to him, since the law to prevent terror was enacted about 1 year ago, no such leaflets have been distributed. [Text] [TA141359 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 14 Aug 81]

ANTI-ISRAELI SLOGANS, SONGS--Anti-Israeli slogans were drawn on Monday [17 August] on the car of the Golan Heights military governor. One of the slogans was "Syria--al-Ba'th," according to Druze residents on the Golan. The security forces have launched an investigation. In recent weeks, weddings in Druze settlements on the Golan have become focal points for incitement against Israel. It has been learned that during festivities that took place in the past few days the participants sang songs against the state of Israel and in favor of Syrian rule on the Golan. Meetings are also reported to have been held between Golan residents and Arabs from Judaea and Samaria, who are inciting the Golan Druze to act against Israel and against those Druze known for their identification with Israel. In the meantime, the security forces are continuing their comprehensive investigation to discover who raised a Syrian flag at the end of last week in the village of Majdal Shams, and who broke into the local school. [Excerpt] [TA191057 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Aug 81 p 2]

CSO: 4323/42

IMPORTANCE OF NATION'S ANIMAL RESOURCES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 20 Jul 81 p 2

[Text] Authorities in the Ministry of Public Works have prepared a report about animal resources in Kuwait that considers animal production one of the complementary branches of agricultural production. It considers it one of the staples providing people with food security, especially the animal protein that is supplied equally by red meat, poultry, eggs, or milk. The report said that people in Kuwait get most of their daily requirements from meat and animal protein since the individual's share of daily protein amounts to almost 33 grams, about half of which is from chicken and mutton. Furthermore, statistics show that local production provides about 12 percent of the total yearly consumption of animal products in Kuwait. Local production of mutton covers only 7.7 percent of local consumption (perhaps this may amount to 10 percent when sheep slaughtered in the home during holidays are included). The local production of beef covers only 6 percent, and milk and milk products amounts to only 5.8 percent of total consumption, while poultry is 31.7 percent and eggs cover 44.4 percent. It is clear from this report that it is necessary to develop local animal production on a level which can provide society with food security, particularly after the food-producing countries' threat to employ foodstuffs as a political and economic weapon. It recommends that a list of concerns be achieved, notably: 1) Establishing the aims of agriculture in general in Kuwait, and founding large companies for animal production. 2) Giving material and moral support to breeders of cattle, sheep, and poultry. 3) Training Kuwaiti youth for work in agricultural and animal husbandry fields. 4) Setting up a research center specially for animal production and poultry slaughterhouses. 5) Subsidize local poultry industry: Imported poultry gets two kinds of support, one from the producing country and one from the importing country whilst the local industry does not receive any kind of support.

9587
CSO: 4304/85

BRIEFS

RESTRICTING AUDITING FIRMS--AL-QABAS has learned that the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has decided to restrict auditing firms to only those Kuwaitis who hold licences. These are firms that handle millions yearly and are the same that essentially audit the accounts of Kuwaiti companies. As a result the ministry granted a 3-year grace period to firms that hold non-Kuwaiti licences. From now on it will resume its policy of restricting licences for non-Kuwaitis and will again resume its registration of them and limit them to the registers of the Ministry of Commerce until the accounting operation begins in 3 years (the grace period). An official source stated that the auditing firms owned by Kuwaitis have increased considerably and now exceed 100, and that they have also become very proficient in their operations while this trade used to be limited to firms that were owned by non-Kuwiatis. He added that the reputation of these Kuwaiti owned and managed firms has spread beyond Kuwait to neighboring countries to the point where it has become necessary to suspend the licencing of those non-Kuwaiti firms already licenced in the past. He said that the 3-year grace period was considered to be adequate for these firms to arrange for the closing down of their operations and earnings. This period is also beneficial to Kuwaiti owned firms to improve their practices and to solidify their position so that they can assume the responsibilities of the other firms. The source said: "It is possible that employees of the non-Kuwaiti owned firms could go to work for one of the Kuwaiti-owned auditing firms...However this point is subject to secondary factors and the law of supply and demand. There are no legal measures that can be taken, it can be determined only by the individual's work experience. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 18 Jul 81 p 15] 9587

AID TO PAKISTAN--Yesterday a spokesman on behalf of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said that Pakistan had directed Kuwait's participation last year toward its economic developmental programs, especially in the underdeveloped parts of Baluchistan. Local correspondents in Ismamabad reported that the unexpected increase in Kuwaiti aid came about as a result of the discussions that the Omir of Kuwait held during his visit to Pakistan last September. His Excellency expressed a concern for Pakistan's development especially in Baluchistan and promised to increase assistance funds. The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development has granted three loans to Pakistan this year and it is expected that a fourth one will be granted in September. The spokesman said that all three loans given this year by the Fund to Pakistan have amounted to $58.7 million. One of these will be used for a natural gas project; another for a rural electrification project which will benefit 180 villages; and the third loan will be used for a project to distribute drinking and irrigation waters in the Quetta-Gadani region as well as to build a fertilizer plant in the

Punjab. He said that Kuwaiti funds are also being spent on a number of developmental projects in Pakistan such as the project to install electric power between Karachi and Guddu. The spokesman added that Kuwait has also given some support for Pakistan's balance of payments to the amount of $130 million for this year and last. He said that a Kuwaiti-Pakistani Investment Company which was founded with initial capitalization of $25 million has recently received support that raised its paid capital up to $100 million. The spokesman expressed his belief that Kuwait will continue to manifest its concern for Pakistan's development especially in the poor sections of Baluchistan. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Jul 81 p 13] 9587

CSO: 4304/85

DEMOCRACY, LABOR UNIONS, ROLE OF COMMUNIST PARTY DISCUSSED

Tunis AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jul 81 pp 8-9

[Interview with Mohamed Harmel, Secretary General of the Tunisian Communist Party; in Tunis; date not specified: "Secretary General of Tunisian Communist Party Tells AL-SHA'B, 'We Will Make Every Effort To Bring about the Success of the Democratic Experiment so It Can Be an Effective Tool for Democracy' "]

> [Text] "Multiple labor unions weaken the labor union movement and violate labor union democracy."
> "A single party is harmful, but a single labor union is good."
> "The independence of the union guarantees that the interests of workers will be defended."
> "We support the independence of the labor union movement from all parties including ours."
> "We want a strong, united union."
> "We wish to join the remaining movements and come up with common lists [of candidates]."
> "Tyranny does not settle disputes or problems; dialogue is the solution."

Mohamed Harmel, whose name is often heard when communism in Tunisia is discussed, is a prominent figure in the Tunisian Communist party. He has been the secretary general of the party since February 1981, succeeding Mr Mohamed al-Nafi' . We met him only 3 days after the announcement that the ban on the party's activity would be lifted.

He greeted us in his home in the Bardu subdivision where we had a lengthy discussion that lasted 3 hours and touched upon various subjects. He was effusive as though the years of silence had created in him an unbridled desire to talk.

He spoke to us at first about the reasons for the ban that was imposed on the party's activity more than 18 years ago. He said, "They found fault with our speeches and our articles and considered our critical remarks 'an infringement on the dignity of the head of state and the members of

government.' In official speeches they used to say that we were materially involved in the conspiracy, but it later became evident that we were as far removed as possible from involvement in such a reactionary attempt to overthrow the government."

Then he spoke about the period that followed independence and preceded the resolution to ban the party, and he spoke about the role that Tunisian communists played during that period. He said, "At that time we were alone in the opposition." Then we found ourselves talking about the new conditions that the country is experiencing today, and we talked about the return of the Tunisian Communist party to the political arena. We tried to determine the impact of the resolution on him, and he said, "We had no choice in the matter of timing. That was due to considerations that concern the government only. I can say, however, that the president's decision took us somewhat by surprise inasmuch as we did not expect it these days."

He spoke to us about the willingness of the communist party to embark upon the new democratic experiment with a sense of resolve and responsibility, and he expressed the hope that this experiment would succeed with the participation of all the Tunisian political and intellectual movements. [He also hoped] that there would be intense concern with repudiating the methods of violence and terror, regardless of their source.

He mentioned that there were several factors behind the appearance of some extremist tendencies today. The most important of those were the policy which was pursued during the seventies and the turbulence, the void, the unemployment and the corruption that resulted therefrom.

He also informed us that the communist party has begun preparing [its] features for the new stage. It is getting ready to publish a weekly newspaper in Arabic called AL-TARIQ AL-JADID [The New Road]; Harmel was expecting it to be published next September. Later, the party also intends to publish a monthly, philosophical magazine that would concern itself with Marxist and progressive thought in general.

Mr Mohamed Harmel took part in the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist party where he delivered a speech. He also participated and was involved in several international seminars for communist parties and progressive movements. Our discussion touched upon other subjects and topics regarding the positions of the Tunisian Communist party on several questions. The full text of the interview follows.

[Question] The measures that were taken in January 1963 to ban the activity of the Tunisian Communist party were lifted recently. What is your evaluation of this event?

[Answer] We consider this a historical event regardless of the circumstances that surrounded it. It is a historical event for communists and for all the democratic forces in Tunisia. This is because the Communist party is the political party of the working class; it is the party of the toiling masses. The Tunisian Communist party is not a new party in Tunisia

for it has historical roots and ties with the labor movement. It has gone through various stages that included positive as well as negative [developments]. At the same time, the Tunisian Communist party is a party that has revived itself, using the experiences it has had and the lessons it has drawn to go forward and trying to stay as close as possible to Tunisian reality and to the aspirations of the popular masses and young people.

Everyone gains from this event which can be a reliable tool that can be used to continue working for the establishment of democratic liberties, for recognition of the various political parties without exception and for the confirmation of a general legislative amnesty.

The ban on the Communist party had sought to set the stage for a single party [system], and the stage was actually set for a single party. But today, our party has been able to regain its statutory legitimacy.

[Question] Recognition of your party constitutes the onset of legal multiple political parties. What is your view of this multiple party system?

[Answer] We see it as including political movements other than ours which must be recognized regardless of the results of the next legislative elections and whether or not they take part in those elections.

[Question] Will you take part in those elections?

[Answer] We have not yet decided what our position will be on those elections, but we will look into the subject, and we will make a decision in the coming weeks.

At any rate we proposed to the other movements the possibility of coming up with common lists [of candidates]. Discussions with others, and especially with the Socialist Democratic Movement, are still going on regarding this idea.

[Question] What role will the Tunisian Communist party play in the country?

[Answer] As the first party to have legal recognition, the entry of the Tunisian Communist party in the political arena marks the end of the period during which a single party, a single idea and a single view [prevailed]. This is in general. But its special contribution as a communist party will be uncommon because the party has positions, suggestions and studies on several economic, social, political and cultural questions that are of interest to the country. Not all of these positions and opinions are ready and definitive. These rather represent a continuous effort we pledge to undertake so we can benefit from others and try to be useful [at the same time]. We will be harshly critical of everything we see as negative and contrary to the interests of workers, the popular masses and the country. However, our criticisms as usual will always be responsible, well-considered, constructive and accompanied by support for all positive positions. We are determined to make our utmost efforts for the success of the democratic experiment which is still at the beginning of its course,

[beset by] conflicts and obstacles which are still delaying it. We will make every effort so that this experiment will become successful, surmount the conflicts, overcome all the obstacles and become an effective tool for economic and social development.

[Question] Tunisia experienced two kinds of development during the past two decades. How would you evaluate these two experiments?

[Answer] We consider the period of the sixties progressive in its goals. However, many errors were made, and these led to failure.

The second experiment during the seventies was capitalist in its goals and methods. It sharpened social and regional differences and set off a small number of fortunate people among the new bourgeoisie, most of whom were from the obsequious bourgeoisie. It too led to failure.

Therefore, a new, progressive and democratic alternative must be sought. This alternative must not repeat the previous experiment of the sixties. It must rather derive lessons from both experiments.

[Question] What are the general outlines of this alternative?

[Answer] First, true agrarian reform whose purpose is to limit large ownership of land is to be carried out.

Second, the present development model is to be replaced by another that is firmly based on the domestic market. The forces of production that are related to that market are to be encouraged, and all the vital forces and the nationalist social groups are to be invited to participate in the battle of development for which sacrifices can be made, provided its objectives are clear and serving the interests of all.

[Question] You have referred to workers more than once. What is the relationship between workers and the Communist party?

[Answer] The Tunisian Communist party considers itself part of the labor movement, and [as such], it expresses the political goals of labor. Sooner or later it wants to be serving the interests of labor at all times. Theoretically and historically it is closely tied to the future of the labor movement. The party and the labor movement are related in theory because the party's theory stems from the special role of the working class as a revolutionary force in the present and in the future. We cannot imagine the existence of a communist party without a working class. As the role of the working class grows, so should the role of the Communist party grow also.

The Tunisian Communist party is historically related to the labor movement in Tunisia, but it does not consider itself the only party that expresses the goals of the working class. It does not woo the working class or mislead it; nor does it advocate an immediate proletarian revolution. Instead, it calls for an alliance between the working class and the various other

nationalist groups. In this alliance the working class, with its various political and labor union bodies, would play a special role.

[Question] On the basis of everything that has already happened, how do you envision the relationship between the Tunisian Communist party and the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT].

[Answer] We believe strongly in the independence of labor union movements from all parties, including our own. At the same time, however, we can envision cooperation between the labor union movement and political movements.

[Question] What is your understanding of this independence?

[Answer] Because it includes workers with different opinions and tendencies who come together to defend their interests in accordance with the resolutions of a labor union organization, a labor union has its own identity. This identity requires that the resolutions and actions of a labor movement be independent of parties so that that labor union can maintain its unity and its identity. However, our absolute respect for labor union independence does not mean that we are not interested in labor union questions. We are rather extremely interested in them.

[Question] Is this an appeal against politicizing the labor unions?

[Answer] Independence does not mean a lack of interest in politics. Politics takes an interest in workers, and workers too as well as the labor union movement have an interest in politics. But workers' interest in politics assumes a special form: they do not form a political party, but rather a labor union. Political parties and labor unions do not necessarily share the same political inclination.

Independence guarantees that the interests of workers will be defended regardless of the parties that are in power.

[Question] Before 1956 you were relying on a labor union that was friendly with you. Is the Communist party thinking today of repeating this experiment?

[Answer] We fully support the UGTT, and we want it to be united and strong at all times. We do not approve of multiple labor unions because the working class needs one organization. Multiple labor unions weaken the labor union movement and violate labor union democracy.

Communists used to work in their own labor unions, and the time to evaluate that period will come. However, since independence we decided to support the UGTT as the only labor union organization for the working class.

Having one party is detrimental, but having one labor union is beneficial. [The principle of] multiplicity must be political and must not be transferred to the labor unions especially since the UGTT is an association of workers with different political views.

[Question] What do you think about the duplication of labor union and political responsibility?

[Answer] On the basis of our respect for the independence of labor unions we will honor the resolutions that the UGTT itself will make in this regard. If the labor union movement itself rejects the principle of dual responsibility, we will respect this.

[Question] How do you view Islam as a political phenomenon in Tunisia?

[Answer] We actually consider the Islamic faction to be a faction, and we deal with it on that basis. We support the progressive and democratic aspects, and we resist reactionary ones.

In a country whose people are Muslim, we do not consider Islam to be restricted to anyone. Nor do we consider the battle today to be one between Muslims on the one hand and non-Muslims on the other. This is an economic, social, philosophical and political battle. It is not a religious battle. We defend progressive gains, but we believe that defending such gains is not to be accomplished by tyranny, but rather by dialogue.

By the way, we are denouncing the recent campaign of arrests that is being carried out in the circles of the Islamic faction, and we are calling for the release of Abdelfattah Moro, Rached Ghanouch and others. Tunisia's experience has confirmed that tyranny does not resolve disputes or solve problems and that the solution lies in [establishing] dialogue and in providing the opportunity for every movement to express its point of view.

[Question] Young Tunisians have many problems. Do you have a special contribution in this area?

[Answer] The problem of young people is a fundamental one because it concerns the future of the country and pertains to the rising generation and the vital force of society. Solving problems such as those of unemployment, dropping out of school and delinquency is closely tied to the adoption of a progressive and a democratic alternative that would enable young people to take part consciously in the battle of development. It would offer them noble objectives that are worthy of sacrifices.

[Question] Since 1963 the political scene in the country has seen the emergence of groups proclaiming their acceptance of Marxism. What is your position on these groups?

[Answer] Universities in particular saw the emergence of these active groups which proclaimed their acceptance of Marxism. Unfortunately they took from Marxism hardened, obsolete models--and especially the Maoist-Chinese models of Marxism--and wanted to apply them to conditions in Tunisia. They called for an immediate revolution without conducting a scientific analysis of the facts about the revolution in Tunisia or the objectives and the forces that got it started.

These groups engaged in hostile actions against the Tunisian Communist party because they considered the party a distortion [of what they believed in] and inconsistent with Maoism. They also declared their hostility to the socialist countries with the exception of China. They thus rejected all forms of alliance because they did not believe in alliances. They turned every ideological difference into hostility, and this led to different divisions in their midst.

At the same time, however, these groups struggled against tyranny and defied it. As much as we have criticized their mistakes and as much as we want them to draw lessons from the current experience, we do appreciate the sacrifices they made in the struggle against tyranny. Today, we call upon all the leftist elements, regardless of their inclinations, to join us in a dialogue and to work with us, especially since there are those among them who are prepared to join our party. There are also those among them who prefer to work privately. We respect this; we appreciate it; and we encourage it.

What is important is that we derive all the lessons and use all [our] energies so that the Marxist movement can become a vital, creative and strong movement.

[Question] You spoke about the university. What do you think about the student crisis?

[Answer] This crisis is related to the tyrannical policy that was perpetrated against the students in the last decade. It is also related to the errors that the student movement committed under the influence of leftist groups.

The only solution [to this crisis] lies in the re-creation of a general union for the students of Tunisia by means of convening an emergency conference, in view of the fact that the student union is a democratic labor union for all students regardless of their schools of thought and their inclinations. This union would be re-created on the basis of a common program whose main component would be constructive and honorable cooperation among students and abandonment of violent and terrorist practices regardless of their source. The student movement then would not be monopolized by one tendency at the expense of another.

[Question] The Destourian Socialist party presented a national charter at its recent conference. What do you think about it?

[Answer] We said that we agreed in principle with what was stated in the charter, but we added that that charter had to be discussed by the various movements and that its final status would be determined as a result of that discussion.

[Question] A point that has to do with relations with the outside world was mentioned in the charter. Do you consider yourselves concerned with this matter?

[Answer] We have said since day one that we are not concerned with what was stated regarding material or ideological ties with the outside world. We are an independent national party whose roots lie in the history of Tunisian society and the Tunisian labor movement.

I want to emphasize that we are a party that believes in solidarity between the workers and nations of the world. It is worth noting that the idea of solidarity between workers and nations is no longer a communist idea only, but is now being adopted by other movements.

[Question] How then do you view your relations with the Soviet Communist party?

[Answer] The relationship that exists between us and the Soviet Communist party is one of solidarity with the party of Lenin which carried out the first successful labor revolution in the history of humanity and achieved major accomplishments that turned backward Russia into the industrially and culturally prosperous Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. But our relationship is based on full independence and non-intervention in domestic affairs. Every party makes decisions about its own directions according to the interests of its people and its special conditions. The people of Mecca know the parts of their town best.

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HAWATIMAH INTERVIEWED ON MIDEAST ISSUES

Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 30 Jun 81 p 9

[Interview with Nayif Hawatimah, Secretary General of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine by Ya'rib al-Sayyid; in Beirut; date not specified: "Brother Nayif Hawatimah Tells TISHRIN, 'Enemy's Threats to Syria Are Constant Part of Zionist State's Method; The Alliance between Numayri and Reactionary Regimes Fits the Mode of Conduct of U.S. Imperialism' "]

> [Text] "The policy of confrontation and opposition is the only language that Israel understands."
> "Syria, the Palestinian Revolution and the other opposition forces constitute a true and effective deterrent force."

TISHRIN met with Brother Nayif Hawatimah, the secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and conducted with him a candid interview about the most prominent questions and developments that are being experienced in the Arab area.

The opening remarks of the interview established the point of view of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and its evaluation of the events and complications that were taking place in the Arab homeland. These ranged from conspiracy against the nation and collusion with the Zionist imperialist attack that sought to break up the Arabs and crush their will to the refractory and defiant stance and the reinforcement of the Arab course of struggle.

It was inevitable that the following question be raised at the outset.

[Question] How does the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine view Syria's series of positions which sought to harden the Arab position in the face of the Zionist, imperialist attack?

Syria's Positions Are a Response to the Hostile Escalation

[Answer] Syria's recent nationalistic positions did not come out of a

vacuum. They were preceded by a U.S. supported series of escalating hostile Israeli positions that sought to intimidate, threaten and subdue the principal three forces of confrontation: Syria, the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement so as to extricate the capitulatory Camp David accords out of their predicament and break the ring of isolation around the client bourgeois regime in Egypt. The U.S. supported Israeli positions sought to bring in other Arab countries under the umbrella of these accords, thereby destroying the Arab nationalist forces in our area, and especially our Palestinian Revolution, and ensuring the required success for the plan to Zionize Lebanon. This is the plan that is being implemented by the Lebanese Fascist Separatist Front and the client Haddad. Accordingly, the escalating furor of Israeli expansionist aggression fits this mode. Reagan's policy and administration also fit in this mode, supporting this aggression and providing it with all the capabilities that are required while at the same time trying to promote [its view] that an alleged Soviet threat exists and distracting attention from the Israeli threat and the U.S. threat that do in fact exist.

It is the unyielding facts on the scene of struggle that once again determine the question of the Arab-Israeli national struggle as the most prominent and the sharpest problem in the area. Hence, the nationalist firm positions were the response for the U.S.-Israeli-separatist escalation in the area [in general] and in Lebanon in particular. Then Syria introduced its missiles into Lebanon to guarantee protection for its forces who were operating [there] under the auspices of the Arab deterrent forces. Before that Syria had reduced the gradual process of erosion which the separatist front had taken up and expanded during the past 4 years. The separatist front resumed that practice in Zahle and Sanin Heights so as to connect its spheres of influence in al-Jabal and al-Biqa' with the strip that is controlled by Haddad in preparation for completing the plan to Zionize Lebanon.

Serious Contribution To Stabilize the Peace

Those measures adopted by Syria which were a serious contribution to the stabilization of peace in Lebanon and the preservation of the unity of Lebanon's people and territory provoked Israel and its client allies. The hawks of Zionist war and aggression issued the most impudent and arrogant threats, and the same tune was loudly echoed by U.S. imperialists. None of this, however, diminished the defiance of Syria, the National Movement or the Palestinian Revolution. It became evident in concrete terms that the policy of confrontation and opposition was the only language that Israel and its allies understood. Hence, we in the Democratic Front in particular and in the Palestinian Revolution in general place a high value on the Syrian position, and we call for increased firmness in confronting the hostile alliance of imperialists, Zionists and Arab reactionaries. This can be done by preparing the domestic front and by striking at the reactionary class forces including the servile bourgeois lackeys, the corrupt bureaucrats and the major landowners so as to ensure all the essential components for steadfastness and resistance and guarantee that millions will rally behind the steadfastness plan and democratic openness for the masses. In this regard the steadfastness of the Arab Liberation Movement is

strengthened, and the international support of the socialist organization, and chiefly that of the Soviet Union, is firmly established, making that support for the nationalist position of Syria and for the other principal confrontation forces the firmest support there is.

Israeli Threats Are Part of the Zionist Course of the State

[Question] How would you comment on the series of Israeli threats against Syria, especially the declaration by the rulers of Tel Aviv that the second strike after the strike against the nuclear reactor in Iraq will be against the Syrian missiles in al-Biqa'?

[Answer] Israeli threats against Syria, against the Palestinian Revolution and against all the Arab nationalist forces are not new. They make up a constant part of the method pursued by the Zionist state and the basis for its practical conduct. The history of Israel is full of aggression and threats. This conduct receives full approval and protection from U.S. imperialism and its allies in the area. In this context we must affirm that Israeli aggression and the threatening policy that Israel is pursuing meets with success when it is neither confronted nor challenged. It has become evident that Zionist Israel began thinking seriously about the problem of attacking Syria when Syria assumed a firm position of resistance against the Israeli aggressive policy and when all the Arab forces of steadfastness, the socialist organization, and especially the Soviet Union, proclaimed their support for the Syrian nationalist position and joined in solidarity with it.

An Objective Deterrent Force

The Israeli raids on the Iraqi nuclear reactor confirmed the aggressive course of the Zionist state. Reagan, the leader of U.S. imperialism announced his full solidarity with this course and affirmed its legality. At the same time this U.S.-Israeli conduct was met by an official abject Arab position. It is also obvious that this operation was carried out in the general context of the Israeli conduct which seeks to bring about war in the area. Begin's provocative statements that the next Israeli strike will be against the Syrian missiles in al-Biqa' is no more than a confirmation of this. But this should not signify that Israeli aggression has a free hand in the area because the position of Syria, of the Palestinian Revolution and of all the Arab forces of steadfastness, who are sincerely supported by the socialist organization, and especially the Soviet Union, and by all the other friendly forces in the world, does in fact constitute a clear objective deterrent force for confronting the Israeli position. This affirms once again that nothing breaks the back of violence but violence.

Standing up to these threats and dangers requires first and foremost that the relationship of struggle between the foremost forces of confrontation: Syria, the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, be hardened and developed on all levels. It requires that all forms of concrete support for the forces of confrontation be guaranteed to the other

steadfastness and opposition countries. It requires expedition in convening the fifth conference of the confrontation countries so that the necessary and concrete measures can be taken to stand up to U.S. imperialism, which is backing and encouraging the escalation of Israeli aggression, and to stand up to Begin's plans and his piracy. This implies [certain] measures chief among which is a total boycott of the United States; the imposition of an oil embargo on it; measures to guarantee the implementation of the isolation measures against the regimes of al-Sadat, Numayri, Siad Barre and Qabus; and a guarantee that the other Arab countries will abide by the minimum resolutions that were adopted at the Baghdad Summit.

The fact that the Arab countries' response was reduced to a political protest reveals again the weak and abject nature of the position of Arab reactionaries. The situation now [is confined to] a practical step by the Steadfastness Front beyond which no practical step has yet been taken against the United States and Israel.

Numayri's Defection Is Not Surprising

[Question] What is required from the Arabs regarding the defection of Numayri's regime and the fact that he has shifted to the position of those who conspire against the Arabs and give in to the enemies of the Arabs?

[Answer] The defection of Numayri's regime and his shameful slide to the reactionary right toward national treason was not surprising to us in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. It was the product of the course that the regime has been pursuing since the 1971 setback. That course began with a strike against the democratic forces and the popular movement in Sudan and the repression of those forces. It was a [move] that was applauded by al-Sadat and by all the turncoats and Arab reactionaries. Accordingly, the hostilities that are being declared by Numayri's regime against Syria, Libya, Ethiopia and the Palestinian Revolution and the attempts to infringe upon the independence of Chad and everything that is progressive and patriotic in the area are only the products of that process in which the ranks of Numayri's regime find themselves falling into positions of national treason. Numayri's close alliances with al-Sadat, with the regime of Siad Barre in Somalia and with all the reactionary forces and regimes in Africa and in the area are part and parcel of the harmony that exists between him and the course and tactics of U.S. imperialism for the creation of regional, reactionary alliances that would become the tools for serving [the interests of] this policy in the area against its people first. This policy, which would operate under the despicable demagogic slogan of the alleged Soviet threat, would conceal the real daily and immediate threat of an attack by Israel and U.S. imperialism. Numayri's regime derived its insolence and its daring in going ahead with all this from its discovery that al-Sadat, who had committed the crime of concluding a peace with the Zionist enemy, was met with political apathy and the absence of a general deterrent on the part of the Arab reactionary regimes. Numayri found that the opposition policy for this regime was not up to the required standard on the part of the nationalist regimes and forces. What we conclude from this is that all the resolutions that were issued by the

Arab summits to oppose al-Sadat and to besiege him must deal with Numyari's regime [also]. The steadfastness and opposition regimes are being called upon to make the expulsion of this regime from the Arab League one of the objectives of their struggle in the context of opposing the alliance of imperialism, Zionism and Arab reactionaries.

In return different forms of support and assistance are to be offered to the national democratic forces that are struggling for the overthrow of Numayri's regime and the restoration of Sudan to its national position on the anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-reactionary front.

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AL-QADDUMI VISIT TO PARIS DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1289, 17 Jul 81 p 23

[Article: "Abu al-Lutf Discovers Political Romanticism in Paris While Waiting for Mitterand's Special Initiative"]

President Francois Mitterand is engaged in setting down the broad outlines of a new French initiative regarding the Middle East.

This is what senior French officials intimated to Mr Faruq al-Qaddumi during the visit that the director of the political office of the PLO made to Paris.

Abu al-Lutf tried to find out from French officials what the substance of this initiative was, but he was surprised with one answer: "We don't know!" He became convinced that the French leader was designing this policy by himself and that he had not yet told anyone about it, including senior government officials.

In view of conflicting statements that were issued by French officials, Abu al-Lutf concluded that the French socialists had not yet defined a clear position on the Middle East crisis. The contradictions in their statements were indications of the fact that the new leaders of France were searching for a policy that would "reconcile interests and principles," as one of the French ministers with whom Abu al-Lutf had met put it. Abu al-Lutf met that minister in the presence of Ibrahim al-Sus , the director of the organization's office in Paris.

One of the first people with whom Abu al-Lutf met was Mr Michel Rocard, minister of state [and] minister of planning. He preferred going to the luxurious Hotel Crillon where the Palestinian official was staying. If Mr Rocard enjoys a special standing with the Palestinians, he is also the leader of one of the most prominent wings of the French Socialist party. Therefore, al-Qaddumi met with representatives of the remaining wings: the leftist wing in the party, represented by the minister of state and minister of scientific and technological research, Mr Jean Pierre Chevenement; the new secretary general of the party, Mr Lionel Jospin, the historic socialist leader, Pierre Mendes-France, who is considered the spiritual father of the socialist group that is ruling France today; Mr Regis Debray,

an associate of the [late] revolutionary Guevara and current foreign relations adviser to the French president; Mr Michel Jobert, the minister of state and minister of foreign trade; and of course the minister of foreign affairs, Claude Cheysson.

Despite the brevity of the visit, these meetings are considered to be the most extensive contacts that have been made so far between the Arab side and French officials after King Khalid's visit [to the French capital] a few weeks ago. The French Socialist party consists of several wings, each of which has its own specific view on international crises, chief of which is the Middle East crisis. Zionism has had a long history within the French Socialist movement ever since its birth in 1920. It also holds sway within the present Socialist party which is an extension of the French branch of the International [Federation of] Labor. Despite that, the Socialist party was able to form what may be considered a position on the Middle East crisis. It is now advocating the right of Palestinians to have their own state. This recognition on the part of the Socialist [party], which is always preceded by an affirmation of Israel's security, safety and permanence, is the result of the conviction in those "principles" that call for the right of nations to determine their destiny and to live in peace and independence. Today, now that the socialists are in power, they have to adjust their position in accordance with [their] interests and not only [their] principles.

The insistence on these principles makes many French socialist leaders view the holocaust--that is, the extermination operations--from an emotional, romantic perspective. They also view the Palestinian tragedy from an emotional, romantic perspective as well. This is actually what distinguishes the socialist figures in France from the rightist or communist figures. With the socialists imagination plays a larger role than numbers do, whereas it is the numbers that determine the policy of rightists and even communists. Ultimately, President Mitterand's personality, saturated with political cunning, is also romantic to a large extent.

Abu al-Lutf observed and actually sensed how emotional considerations enter into the substance of the political dialogue with socialist officials regardless of their high rank. This was the case, for example, when they talked to him about the reason why they had welcomed the Camp David accords. These agreements which were welcomed by socialist leaders are still being welcomed by them even though most of them have not looked into those accords carefully. Minister Cheysson talked about al-Sadat's visit to Israel from the perspective of the emotional effect this visit had on the Israelis. The remaining socialist officials did the same thing. They were so spellbound by their romantic views that they were convinced that "the problem of the Middle East is in the final analysis a psychological problem." They considered al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem [an act that] tore down the psychological barrier that stood between the Egyptians and the Israelis. They all praised Camp David, but they all considered these accords inadequate.

Regis Debray explained to Mr Faruq al-Qaddumi that the French president viewed Camp David as "a symbol of peace between the two states of Israel and Egypt." And that is the "positive" side of these accords.

But the most prominent discussions that took place were those that revolved around comprehensive solutions and unilateral solutions. French officials, and especially Minister Jean Pierre Chevenement, the leader of the leftist wing in the Socialist party and the author of that party's program, considered the Geneva conference, which is the model for collective solutions, to have had no outcome. French officials also thought that there was no guarantee that that conference would be resumed in the future.

Opinions within the Socialist party are numerous. Jospin told al-Qaddumi, "There is a major trend [in favor of] achieving a unified position on the Middle East. President Mitterand is considering various opinions and ideas."

Minister Michel Rocard said that the position had not yet become clear for Mitterand. "The president is trying to find out who has been victimized more in the Middle East." Since the position had not yet become clear for Mitterand, Rocard could not have any knowledge of the initiative that the president was preparing.

Abu al-Lutf noticed that the socialists trust neither the United States' role in the Middle East nor that of the Soviets. When al-Qaddumi was explaining U.S. policy in the area, considering it a stumbling block to peace, Jospin responded by saying, "This may be true in many cases, since the United States may find peace to be a threat to its interests." At the same time he affirmed that "The Soviets too do not want peace because their interests require that disturbances persist in the area."

Officials agreed to say that the liberation organization was the representative of the Palestinian people, contrary to what was mentioned in the statement that Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson made to foreign correspondents. Cheysson told Abu al-Lutf that France sees no one now that can participate in talks on the Palestinian side but the liberation organization. French officials also agreed that the establishment of an independent Palestinian state was necessary.

When they touched upon domestic Israeli policy and its effect on the dispute in the Middle East, Minister Michel Jobert told Abu al-Lutf that Menahem Begin's policy will force France to assume a clearer position as far as the Middle East is concerned and that this position will be in the interests of the Arabs in general. Jobert praised the important role that Austrian Chancellor Bruno Kreisky played and the effect that role has had on the positions of Jewish communities in the United States. He made a reference to the French initiative that would come before the end of the year.

Every time Abu al-Lutf heard news of "the initiative," he would emphasize the fact that the liberation organization had decided to pay no attention to "collective" initiatives and that it was now hoping that every European country would define its positions separately on the subject of the Middle East and the Palestinian question. He said, "We want a French initiative, a British initiative or a German initiative, etc. We do not want a collective initiative." Relations will be bilateral, specific and direct.

At all the meetings Abu al-Lutf used to assume the burden of explaining the crisis and its effects on international scenes. The French officials listened, and in most cases they agreed.

Al-Qaddumi linked together the Middle East, Afghanistan, Poland, the question of weapons in Central Europe and oil, and French officials listened to him attentively. Palestinian demands on the French scene did not come till the end when Abu al-Lutf insisted that Mr Yasir 'Arafat be invited to visit Paris. Ibrahim al-Sus told me that inviting 'Arafat to Paris was essential especially if President Mitterand decided to visit Israel. Al-Qaddumi also asked Jospin that a [joint] French-Palestinian parliamentary bloc be formed. Jospin made note of the request and promised that it would be considered with the party leadership.

Abu al-Lutf, who was accompanied by al-Sus in his capacity as Palestine's ambassador in Paris, insisted that the organization's office in Paris be granted official diplomatic status and that all those working in the office be considered diplomats. He insisted that an agreement on a joint protocol be reached to define the bilateral relations that must go beyond the spheres of politics and include those of education, health and the social fields etc."

Al-Qaddumi thanked French officials for their devotion to the safety of the organization's representatives in Paris, especially since the new French government has doubled protection for the organization's offices. Minister Cheysson said, "We would not have anything bad happen to your people on our soil."

However, inviting 'Arafat to Paris remains the principal demand for the Palestinians.

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PLA CHIEF OF STAFF INTERVIEWED

Damascus SAWT FALASTIN in Arabic No 162 Jul 81 pp 16-19

[Interview with Chief of Staff Brig Gen Muhammad Tariq al-Khadra': "Military Unity and Elements of Escalating the Palestinian Struggle"--date and place not specified]

> [Text] In 1 year we removed all the cankerous sores, and the liberation army actually became the army of Palestinian national unity.
> The cohesion of the struggle between the liberation organization and Syria is a revolutionary mission to consolidate Palestinian victories.
> There are now no reasons for suspicion between the liberation army and PLO leadership.

In its issue No 543 dated 6/16/1981 the weekly magazine, AL-TALA'I', published an interview with Brig Gen Chief of Staff Muhammad Tariq al-Khadra' on the occasion of the first anniversary of his assuming his duties in the Palestine Liberation Army [PLA].

SAWT FALASTIN is publishing the text of this interview below.

When a military commander grasps the political implications [of a given situation], such knowledge signifies that he has an ability to analyze [situations] objectively and that he possesses a strategic view of all the political possibilities and developments that are inseparable from any military or other action.

In our interview with PLA chief of staff, Brig Gen Muhammad Tariq al-Khadra' we get a glimpse of this view when he shows us the objective analytical ability that is required. One year after Brig Gen al-Khadra' assumed his duties, AL-TALA'I' met with him in a candid interview that went beyond the year's experience of military and political responsibility and touched upon the experience of Palestinian national action and the nature of the present challenges.

[Question] Today marks the passage of 1 year since you assumed the staff command of the Palestine Liberation Army. How would you evaluate this responsibility, and what in your view are its implications?

[Answer] Actually, despite the enormous responsibility that was placed on my shoulders when I was given the honor of commanding this army on 10 June 1980, exactly 1 year ago; despite the unfavorable conditions within the army; and also despite the nature of the unobjective relationship between this army and all those who work on the Palestinian scene, even in popular Palestinian circles--despite all this--we managed to a large degree to achieve many positive things. We were able to mend many fences both domestically, between the ranks of the units of this army, and outside the army as well, in the relationship between the army and its fellow fighters on the Palestinian and Arab scene.

[Question] You said a year ago that we are military men as much as we are guerillas, and that we are guerillas as much as we are military men. How has this been reflected on the actual conditions of the Palestine Liberation Army?

[Answer] Actually I said we are guerillas as much as we are military men and we are military men as much as we are guerillas. I am still making that statement which we put into practice on the battlefield on the contact lines in Lebanon. We did so by building up the idea of Palestinian national unity within the ranks of this army regardless of the previous organizational affiliations of the military men who were joining this army. We still believe that guerillas play a distinctive role with special features just as the regular army staff play their own distinctive role with special features.

And here is what we affirmed in the past, are affirming now and will affirm in the future: the integration of the struggle for liberating the usurped land and regaining the national rights of the Palestinian Arab people must be accompanied by integrated armed action. This can be accomplished on all levels through coordination between the military command of the regular army, the guerilla command and the leaders of the armed popular organizations.

[Answer] This brings us to the problem of Palestinian military unity which was also emphasized in the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council at its last session in Damascus. Have specific steps or measures been taken in this regard with the army command or between the leadership of the liberation army and other Palestinian leaders?

[Answer] So far this has not happened. The resolutions that were adopted in that regard at the recent meeting of the Palestine National Council would undoubtedly constitute a major constructive positive step if they were to be implemented. If military unity is achieved, or as I say, if a major part of the armed integration on the Palestinian scene is achieved, even if the Palestine Liberation Army for whose command I am responsible were not in that context, I would consider the achievement of such armed integration a major positive step in the Palestinian struggle. I would hope

that this integration would assume its universal proportions for all the energies and capabilities of our fighting Palestinian people.

[Question] Everybody has acknowledged that the Palestine Liberation Army played a major role in the struggle on the Lebanese scene. Such a role requires support and capabilities that would help the army maintain its ability to fight and participate in combat. What are you asking for so this can be achieved?

[Answer] Despite the limited and ordinary capabilities that are available to the Palestine Liberation Army in weapons and combat materiel, our army is fighting with superior courage on the strength of two points:

--First, its full and deep faith in its cause, in its homeland and in the justifications for its struggle.

--Second, its high morale which comes out of the full and profound interaction between army leaders on all levels and those under their command who constitute a cooperative, cohesive fighting unit in the context of military notions of struggle and firmly established progressive notions of nationalism on whose strength each member of the army feels his responsibility fully. Accordingly, our heroes have stood up against the advanced weapons that are available in abundance to the Phalangist gangs and to the other separatist forces that deal with Israel.

The only thing I can do in this regard is to hold the Palestinian leaders responsible for completing the fundamentals of resistance and opposition by giving this army its legitimate rights to be furnished with the weapons and combat materiel that is commensurate with its responsibilities and with the materiel and weapons that are available to the other forces.

[Question] It was evident that since you were assigned the duties of the staff command, the people of Palestine found cause to be optimistic about the positive relationship between the liberation army and the leadership of the organization.

What about this relationship? How do you look upon it now, a year later?

[Answer] Actually, 1 year after taking over the duties of commanding this army I think that the reasons for suspicion that existed between the Palestine Liberation Army and the leadership of the PLO as well as those that existed between the army and all those who are working on the Palestinian scene are gone forever. On the basis of my perceptions of the reactions, either in popular Palestinian circles or in official circles within the PLO and other factions of the Resistance, I believe that in this year we have been able to get rid of all the cankerous sores and the reasons for suspicion. The Palestine Liberation Army has actually become the army of Palestinian national unity and the vanguard of the Palestinian Arab struggle.

[Question] The area is beset by numerous challenges. My question, Your Excellency, Brigadier General, is in two parts. How do you view these challenges, and what do you expect in the future? This is in the context of both the political and strategic perspectives. Let us begin with what is required first for confronting these challenges.

[Answer] It is actually very clear to all those who keep up with political and military actions in the Middle East in general and on the Lebanese scene in particular that the destruction of the Palestinian struggle, the Palestinian question and the Syrian-Palestinian cohesion is the goal of U.S. imperialism, Israel and their clients in the area. This leads us to a mode that confines our choices to two unavoidable specific points through which we can attain safety and continue the struggle. These points are:

1. Achieving integration, especially the armed integration of all Palestinian capabilities and energies that can bear arms in accordance with the following cadres:

A. Regular military cadres.

B. Guerilla cadres.

C. Armed popular cadres.

2. The full military and political cohesiveness in combat between revolutionary, defiant Syria and the PLO, the legitimate and the sole representative of the Palestinian Arab people, or rather, of all the Palestinian Arab people.

[Question] In this context you would have to refer in this regard to the nature of the challenges themselves. Don't these become evident in the congruence of imperialist strategy and Zionist tendencies against the Arab nation?

[Answer] The question is rather that of size being relative, i.e., large being small and small being large.

Israel is working in unison, at least in the Middle East area, with U.S. strategy. It is the United States which has the principal and the major interest in the oil resources and in the other resources in the Middle East area.

What does the United States want, and, accordingly, what does Israel want?

In order to guarantee that it will achieve its interests in the long range, the United States is trying to achieve two basic, important points:

1. It is trying to strengthen, reinforce and support Israel as a military, political and economic striking force so it can be used when necessary to control any area in the Middle East.

2. It is trying to weaken, partition and fragment the Arab homeland so that in case there are any fundamental changes in any Arab country, these changes become incapable of causing any damage to U.S. interests in the area.

On the strength of these two points we find that Israel's interests are identical to those of the United States. Consequently, Israel has a far-reaching green light that enables and empowers it to strike and to destroy any Arab or non-Arab establishment, organization or association in the Middle East that may damage the interests of U.S. or Zionist imperialism and Israel even over a long period of time.

For this reason the nuclear reactor in Iraq that was being used for peaceful purposes was destroyed. That nuclear reactor was to have begun operations sometime between next July and September. We must expect Israel to strike and destroy at any moment any civilian or military target that U.S. imperialism or Israel feels does not serve the two strategic points that I have already mentioned.

And here all the Arab forces must become aware--and that includes governments, people and fighting organizations--of the fact that the only solution and the certain, essential notion that will enable us to face the dangers that lie in store for us now and in the future lie only in a strong, genuine unity that is capable of putting up a military, political and economic opposition based on clear philosophical premises.

8592
CSO: 4304/100

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS PRAISED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 13 Jul 81 p 3

[Article by Ziyad Abu Ziyad: "A Small Word; We and the Soviet Union"]

[Text] No one can question or belittle the importance of Palestinian-Soviet relations because the Soviet Union, on the basis of its ideological position supporting liberation movements in the world and opposing imperialist influence and hegemony, has always been a courageous, friendly supporter of the Palestinian Revolution. The Soviet Union has expressed this friendship from the podia of international gatherings and conferences; it has practiced this friendship in the material support and backing it offers to the Palestinian Revolution.

The Palestinian people and their only legitimate leaders have always valued this support and this backing, and they have always looked forward to more of the same, considering the fact that the vicious attack to which the Palestinian Revolution is being subjected continues to grow in numbers and equipment and to receive absolute support and backing from the strongest imperialist power in the world, the United States of America. It is the United States that is contributing to this attack and offering support and assistance to those who take part in that attack with it.

The Palestinian Arab people have assumed a front-line position in defending Arab dignity and the question of liberation in the Arab world, which constitutes an inseparable part of the cause of liberation in the world. Through their legitimate and only leaders the Palestinian Arab people have turned down all attempts to negotiate, insisting that they will continue to defend their rights until they regain and seize those rights.

There is no doubt that the resistance and the victory of that nation is [tantamount to] resistance and victory for the cause of liberation in the world. Similarly, the defeat of that nation, God forbid, would be a defeat and a setback for the cause of liberation.

Hence comes the importance of that support which supporters of the liberation movement in the world must offer to the Palestinian people so as to enable them to realize their goals.

Hence also comes the determination of the Palestinian people and their urgent request to their friends that they not limit their assistance to them to a certain framework or a certain course.

The Palestinian people are looking to their friends, and chiefly the Soviet Union, in the hope that their assistance will not stop when it reaches a certain limit. They hope that that assistance will be commensurate with and as enthusiastic as that which U.S. imperialism offers to their enemies.

We have every hope that this will be the case.

8592
CSO: 4304/111

PROBLEMS OF LORD CARRINGTON'S INITIATIVE DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English 8 Aug 81 p 22

[Report by Jamal Rasheed]

[Excerpts]

THAT LORD CARRINGTON's Afghanistan peace initiative would fail was obvious, according to diplomats from Islamic countries in London. The British foreign minister's trip to Moscow, and the Kremlin's delayed rejection of his initiative, are seen as nothing more than propaganda exercises.

For the Europeans, something was needed to divert attention from its singularly unspectacular Middle East peace initiative. For the Russians, at a time of diplomatic confrontation with the US, there was a great deal to be gained internally from a visit by a European foreign minister.

According to the report, Egypt is supplying training and Russian-made weapons. China is sending caravans of arms into Pakistan including Sam7 missiles, and has opened up a direct route into Afghanistan along the difficult China-Afghan border, in case the Pakistan border ever closes. Bernstein suggests that President Zia has stipulated that participants must not publicly acknowledge their help.

In Jeddah recently, a SR50m ($14.6m) cheque was delivered by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to the Pakistan embassy — a gift from the people of Saudi Arabia to the Afghan refugees. Moreover the Saudi Red Crescent mission in Pakistan is providing medical facilities to the refugees. To date, the Saudis have handed over two sums of SR90m ($26m) and another SR50m ($14.6m) from public subscriptions for the refugees. A recent fatwa (religious ruling) by Sheikh Abdulaziz ibn Baz, president of the Institute of Scholarly Research in Riyadh, decrees that zakat (a voluntary alms tax on all wealth, set by the Quran at 2½ per cent) can be donated to the refugees and, for the first time, to the rebels. This means that arms can now be bought with money raised through religious channels.

Meanwhile, as the war in Afghanistan gets bloodier, especially along the Pakistan border. There have been recent guerrilla attacks on Afghan army units in both Jalalabad and Spin Baldak, which border on Pakistan's Peshawar ans Quetta. A major engagement took place at Paghman, the hillside resort of the former Afghan kings.

Following Lord Carrington's Moscow visit, Afghan President Babrak Karmal had a short meeting with president Brezhnev at a Black Sea resort. The Soviets are clearly concerned over the failure of Karmal's recent moves to set up a broad front organisation, termed the National Fatherland Front, after a number of prominent members were assassinated in Kabul. However, Karmal's regime is clearly attempting to improve its image — it recently allowed a British television crew into the country which not only interviewed government ministers but was also allowed inside the infamous Pul e Charke jail.

Meanwhile Moscow is campaigning against the recent arms deal with the US. Mrs Gandhi has hinted broadly that detente will be difficult between the two countries if Pakistan builds up its military capability. South Yemen's Ali Nasser Mohammed is also protesting against the deal. He alleges

that Pakistani troops are being stationed in the Gulf and that: 'The US is preparing Pakistan to succeed the late Shah of Iran in protecting American interests in the region.' He declared: 'We cannot be blackmailed by intimidation.'

CSO: 4600/153

ELECTION OF PRESIDENT REGARDED 'THIRD PHASE' OF REVOLUTION

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 26 Jul 81 p 1

[Text] After weeks, days and hours of worry, anxiety and expectation concerning the coming of the second of Mordad [24 July 1981], this destiny-making, historic day, which can be called the beginning of the third phase of our splendid revolution, finally arrived. The elections were held in unparalleled calm and were warmly received, contrary to all the absurd babblings of the minigroups, foreign radios and colonial loudspeakers (which had declared that they would make 2 Mordad a day of blood and tears). Since we are in a developing situation, these elections possess great importance from several aspects in relation to the determination of the future path of the Iranian Islamic revolution.

First of all, after the exposure of the U.S. line of the deposed president, and finally, after the imam's line came to govern the majority of the organs of this Islamic land, the enemy sat down to wait and see what the people's reaction to this development would be. Although the enemy committed all sorts of obscene and inhuman acts with the aid of the hypocritical and U.S. minigroups during recent days in order to turn the people away from voting, the fundamental objective of all these movements was to see what reaction the people would display vis-a-vis the genuine path of the revolution.

Yes, how beautiful was the perfumed and spiritual atmosphere of Iran's second of Mordad! From the very first instants of dawn, this aware and informed nation, young and old, large and small, men and women, moved in a state of complete readiness towards the voting boxes. In truth, how vigilantly they acted! They showed the world that only the line of Hosseyn's Islam is able to guide humanity to its goal.

Thus the analysts of East and West were once again bewildered by what had happened, and by what this people did and did not do.

Therefore, each day that passes brings another stage in the creation of this revolution, and our Muslim committed people, through their Islamic actions and behavior, give the world a new lesson in political and social life. The people, without any order or organization and solely under the aegis of the Hezbollah, entered the arena at any instant they were needed, and displayed their presence in a living and effective manner. We saw how they showed the world during the campaign for the presidency that the purpose of those events was not individual competition but was

service instead: that he whom the Muslims determined to be the better servant would gain their consent; and that everyone would move in the path of exercising this authority. Now, after this short introduction we come to the fundamental issue that concerns our revolutionary society today, which is: what is the duty and role of each one of these factors after passing through this revolutionary stage? What should the role of the people be as an ultimate determining factor, and how should the government and governmental and revolutionary organs behave?

Although this question possesses particular intricacy, it nonetheless holds significance from two aspects. In order that we be able to speak about this more, it is best that we go back a little ways and take a look at what the people's role was, at what sort of connection there was between the masses and the leader, at the leader's guidance of the nation, and the channels through which this guidance flowed during each one of the critical stages such as 22 Bahman [11 February] and 13 Aban [4 November] (the day of the hostage-taking and the revolutionary occupation of the spy nest), the removal of the president... and the second of Mordad [24 July]. For example, during the recent course of elections, despite all the obstacles that they wished to create in order to prevent the holding of elections, merely by one fatwa [decree] from the imam making voting a duty, all the tricks and ruses were defeated. The people wisely and lovingly responded to the leadership's call, and performed their lawful duty.

Therefore the dtermination of the future policy of the movement depends greatly on the positions taken by the leadership and the authoritative clergy. In the final analysis, the preservation of this connection, whether on the part of the people or the government--the Majles and the Supreme Judicial Council--will ensure and determine the path of the revolution's movement. Thus, since the people's presence on the scene is the guarantor of the revolution's survival, their supervision over the behavior of individuals and organs and their ensuring that elected officials do not violate the imam's line is a fundamental matter for the entire nation.

9557
CSO: 4640/71

NEW PRESIDENT'S LIFE HISTORY PRESENTED BY IRP ORGAN

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 15 Jul 81 p 4

/Text/ Mohmmad Ali Raja'i was born in 1312 /21 Mar 1933-20 Mar 1934/ in the city of Qazvin where he completed his primary education. He moved to Tehran in 1327 /21 Mar 1948-20 Mar 1949/ where he joined the Imperial Iranian Airforce, serving for 5 years during which time he completed his secondary school education by attending night classes. In 1334 /21 Mar 1955-20 Mar 1956/ he was a teacher in Bijar. He entered the teachers college the next year graduating in 1338 /21 Mar 1959-20 Mar 1960/ in mathematics and was hired by the Ministry of Education as a math teacher serving in the cities of Khansar, Qazvin and Tehran.

During his teaching career he proved to be a hard-working, worthy and competent instructor as well as a good teacher of morality and character.

In addition to having a command of modern sciences, Brother Raja'i also had a penchant for Islamic theology, and with his good knowledge of Arabic he studied Islamic philosophy and logic during his imprisonment and is well-versed in Islamic culture. Early in life he joined the political struggle against the hated imperial regime as an active and energetic member of the opposition group. With the establishment of the Freedom Movement in the year 1340 /21 Mar 1961-20 Mar 1962/ he became one of the movement's most effective members, working actively and truthfully alongside the late Ayatollah Taleqani. It was in connection with these activities that he was taken into custody in the month of Ordibehesht 1342 /21 April-21 May 1963/ and was imprisoned for 50 days by the hated Pahlavi regime.

With the start of the Islamic revolution, led by the Imam of the faithfuls, Raja'i widened his field of activities and began cooperating with the Islamic Coalition Organization on the level of a full member while, at the same time, he continued to have extensive relations with the Islamic martyrs. Iraq and Oman.

Following the revolutionary execution of Mansur by the armed faction of the Islamic Coalition Organization and the arrest of the leaders of the organization, Raja'i's cooperation with the militants continued until 1344 /21 Mar 1965-20 Mar 1966/ when, with the help of Brothers Hojjatoleslam Bahonar, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Jalaloddin Farsi and other brothers he began reorganizing the Islamic Coalition Organization, and in order to train individuals capable of engaging in an armed struggle, he began sending volunteers to the war fronts in Palestine. To complete his plans, Raja'i went to Europe in 1350 /21 Mar 1971-20 Mar 1972/ and after visiting France and Turkey he went to Syria where he got in touch with Brother Farsi.

All these activities were being carried out under the principle of dissimulation and it is interesting to note that one of the pseudonyms used by Mr Raja'i at the time in connection with these activities was that of "Omidvar" [hopeful or optimistic].

Another method of opposition was through cultural activities and the setting up of cultural institutions such as those of the Welfare Organization, the Welfare and Islamic Cooperation Foundation and various camps used as covers for political activities and the training of the revolutionary generation and talented individuals.

After the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization was first founded and after the arrest of the organization's leaders, Raja'i began cooperating seriously with the Mojahedins and was considered as one of the organization's most effective members. Later on, following the return to Iran of martyr Ayatollah Baheshti, a close relationship between him and Raja'i, who enjoyed Baheshti's full confidence, was established. Raja'i stepped up his activities and was finally arrested one evening in 1353 [21 Mar 74-20 Mar 75] as he was returning home after a secret meeting with Baheshti and his group. He courageously withstood two years of solitary confinement and torture in the antisubversive committee jailhouses of the oppressive Pahlavi regime. He did so without protesting and during his confinement Brother Raja'i created an epic of resistance, courage and steadfastness in the principles in which he believed. His legendary resistance even surprised officials of the former hated regime who, despite their daily torture, failed to make him confess. Once, these mercenaries were so exasperated, that they sent Raja'i to a damp cell for three nights and days during the cold of the winter hoping to make him confess. Yet, in spite of all these efforts, they failed to extract even one single confession from him.

It was as a result of such resistance that he was sent to Qasr and Evin prisons where he spent a total of four years in confinement. He was finally released at the height of the Islamic revolution in 1357 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79].

During their confinement Raja'i and those like him continued their fight against oppression, deviation, blasphemy and discord. Brother Raja'i was among the first people who became aware of ideological deviation by the Mojahedin-e Khalq. He broke away from them and in spite of their cowardly pressure against Raja'i and his sympathizers during their confinement their resistance continued. Following his release, Raja'i continued with his fight alongside martyrs Baheshti and Motahari, Dr Bahonar, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hojjatolesiam Khameneh'i, the late Taleqani and their fellow militants led by Imam Khomeyni. Assisted by a number of sympathizers, Raja'i began secretly mobilizing and organizing Moslem teachers in their fight against the former regime and was finally able to set up a secret organization called "Association of Moslem Teachers."

He took part in vast demonstrations in 1356 [21 Mar 77-20 Mar 78] and 1357 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79] and played an important and unforgettable part in the preparation of placards and propaganda publications during the big marches.

Following the victory of the Islamic revolution in 1979 Raja'i was put in charge of the Ministry of Education where he was able to finally fulfill one of the dreams of this oppressed nation, by equalizing the school system and stamping out discrimination in them by bringing them all under government control. He was later elected as Tehran representative in the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Following the suggestion of the Assembly to the President on 8/5/1359 [30 Jul 1980] he was presented to the Assembly as the first legal Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran and was confirmed by a decisive vote.

Only 8 days after he became Prime Minister, to the disappointment of the United States and its world-devouring allies, the war with the international criminals of Saddam began. He was able, despite the obstacles created by Bani Sadr and his supporters and the former SAVAK members, to run the country in the best way possible. This, in fact, is something no one else could have accomplished in this time period. Successive achievements of the Raja'i government under the leadership of the Imam and the sacrifices made by the heroic people provided the government such stability in international arena that the world-devouring United States could do nothing but accept the revolutionary views expressed by the Raja'i government representing a nation of 36 million people.

By steadfastness and obedience to the Imam, coupled with dedication to Islamic principles, Brother Raja'i was able to become an important instrument in scandalizing and bringing about the decline of those who deviated. His character and decisive approach with regard to both internal and foreign policy made him tremendously popular with the nation.

His behavior at the United Nations, the showing of his feet scarred by torture, his important and revealing speech at this influential world center, his confrontations with the world-devouring atheist Soviet Union and his method in dealing with the puppet governments in the region all pointed to his ability to run the country in accordance with the principle of "neither Eastern nor Western." His humility, simplicity, sincerity and deep love to serve the revolution and the oppressed need not be stressed.

His humble house and a wife who went along with him through all his efforts and struggle; and a shining record of a happy family life, which proves his management ability, have all helped disarm his enemies to the extent that no one has yet been able to find any fault with him. There have been rumors about him that have ended only in betraying the rumor-mongers. In short, the most important asset collected by Brother Raja'i at this stage is the full confidence of the Imam in him. He considers Raja'i a competent Islamic personality and says: "his wisdom outweighs his knowledge." When such feeling of confidence is coupled with that of the people and the grace of God all the hopes and aspirations of the supporters of the Islamic revolution gather such tremendous force that will enable them to go forward, hand in hand with their successful President, towards making the country more prosperous paving the way for the continuation of our glorious revolution until the day that the rule of the Twelfth Imam, God willing, is finally established.

9561
CSO: 4640/64

BIOGRAPHIES OF BAHONAR CABINET MINISTERS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 15 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] **TEHRAN, Aug. 14 (Pars) — In the following column our [illegible] have been provided with the biographies of some of the new ministers of Dr. Bahonar's Cabinet, who were introduced to the Majlis (Parliament) yesterday:**

ALI AKBAR PARVARESH: EDUCATION

Ali Akbar Parvaresh was born in the city of Isfahan in 1942. He has a Master's Degree in Education and was a teacher in the high schools in Isfahan till the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. He is familiar with the English and Arabic languages and has written or translated several works of Islamic literature. Parvaresh was first elected as a member of the Assembly of Experts for drafting the Islamic Constitution. After that, he was elected a Deputy to the Majlis from Isfahan. He is a Vice-Speaker of the Majlis and is also serving in the Majlis subcommittee on education.

AYATOLLAH MOHAMMAD REZA KANI: INTERIOR

Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Kani, was born in Kan village, north of Tehran in 1931. He studied Theology in Tehran and subsequently Qom for 14 years under Ayatollah Tabatabai Tabrizi, Ayatollah Borujerdi, and Imam Khomeini.

After the death of Ayatollah Borujerdi, he returned to Tehran and beside teaching Theology, he undertook the leadership of congregational prayers. Mahdavi Kani started his political activities at the age of 18 together with Navab Safavi, and Hussein Vahedi. Both members of Fedayeen-e-Islam, and Islamic Revolutionary Movement, under the Shah's dictatorship who executed them.

In the same year, he was arrested in Ardestan, a district of Isfahan, and was exiled. Inspired by Imam Khomeini, he increased his activities and as a result he was imprisoned several times.

In 1975, Kani was arrested for political activities together with late Ayatollah Taleqani, Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani and he was sentenced to 4 years in jail. Just before the Revolution, he was appointed by Imam Khomeini as a member of the Revolutionary Council and supervisor of Imam's Committees after the victory of the Revolution. Ayatollah Kani was appointed Acting Minister of Interior on February 26, 1980. He is also a Theologian member of the Council of Guardians of the Constitutional Law.

BEHZAD NABAVI: STATE FOR EXECUTIVE AFFAIRS

Mr. Behzad Nabavi was born in Tehran in 1942. He received his Bachelor's Degree of Electronics from Tehran Polytechnique University in 1964.

His political activities began in the University in 1959. A year later, he joined the "Second National Front" and in 1963, he participated in the University Committee of the National Front as the representative of the Polytechnique University.

Nabavi played an important role in the campaign along with the leadership of the National Front and also in the establishment of the "Third National Front"

In 1970, he found an armed group with the veteran members of the National Front. When his group was uncovered by the deposed regime, he escaped but after 3 months he was arrested in his own secret house and was sentenced to life imprisonment.

He cooperated with the People's Mujahideen Organization up to 1975, after leaving them he formed a clandestine group in prison in cooperation with a number of Islamic and militant prisoners. Nabavi was freed in 1978 when the jails were opened by the people. After the Islamic Revolution in 1979, he cooperated with the Central Committee of the Islamic Revolution and became a member of the First Council of the Central Committee.

By order of the Revolutionary Council, he was appointed a member of the Managing Council of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Finally, he was appointed as the State Minister and Spokesman of the Government from April 1980. Nabavi is married and has a child.

MOHAMMAD GHARAZI: OIL

Seyyed Mohammad Gharazi

was born in a religious family in 1941 and had his elementary and secondary education in Isfahan. He graduated in Electromechanics from Tehran University in 1961. The events of 1960-64 motivated him to begin his political activities. In 1971, he was arrested by the SAVAK and imprisoned for one year. In 1976, Gharazi secretly left Iran and joined other militant clergy in Najaf where he stayed for 6 months. Later, Martyred Mohammad Montazeri made arrangements for him to travel to Palestine and get acquainted with the revolutionary problems of the Muslim masses of Palestine, Eritrea, North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan. He accompanied Imam Khomeini in Paris and organized the struggles of the militant people while the Imam was there. He arrived in Iran along with the Imam and upon the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Gharazi joined the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps. At the time of Kurdistan disturbances, He was assigned to that province. Later in 1979, he was appointed the Governor General of Khuzistan Province.

DR. HUSSEIN NAMAZI: ECONOMICS AND FINANCIAL AFFAIRS

Dr. Hussein Namazi was born in 1944 in Shiraz (south of Iran). He pursued his university studies in Economics in Austria. After his Bachelor's and Master's Degrees, he got his Ph.D in French University of Austria in 1973. During his studies, he was a member of the Union of the European Students Islamic Association: On his return to Iran, he became a member of the Academic Board of Mottahedin University in 1975 and taught economics. He was also a member of the Board of the Academicians Islamic Society before the 1979 Revolution. After the victory of the Revolution, he was appointed as the supervisor of Mottahedin University and subsequently in Raja'i's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Finance.

MOHAMMAD SHAHAB GONABADI: HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Mohammad Shahab Gonabadi was born in Tehran in 1942. He completed his high-school Education in 1961 where he received his diploma from the Industrial Art School of Tehran. Mr. Gonabadi was employed by the Department of Education in the same year and 9 years later, graduated from the Industrial and Science College in the field of Civil Engineering. His next position was the Head of the Industrial Vocational School of Tehran for 4 years.

He was dismissed from his job for 2 years. He joined the Association of the Islamic Engineers of Iran from the time of graduation from the university of which he is still an active member.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, Mr. Gonabadi was appointed Head of Vocational Schools of the Ministry of Education. He was promoted to Technical Assistant of the Minister of Education later. He joined Prime Minister Raja'i's Cabinet as the Minister of Housing and Urban Development around end of September 1981.

SEYYED MOHAMMAD ASGHARI: JUSTICE

Seyyed Mohammad Asghari was born in 1948 in Hamadan, started his elementary education there and after getting his high-school diploma in literature and completion of his military service, he entered the Faculty of Law in 1972 and upon obtaining his B.S. in the branch of Judiciary Law in 1975, he succeeded to gain his M.S. in Private Law in 1977

From the very beginning he started his Islamic activities in the framework of the Islamic Association and cooperation with the Muslim scholars. During his high-school and university educations, he continued learning the Islamic Sciences and thus, named his book under the title of "An Analogy in the Rights of Islam and Iran" which attracted the experts.

Prior to the victory of the Revolution, he attempted to publicize the Islamic precepts through delivering speeches in the mosques. In the period of martial law under the ex-Shah, he had an eye-catching activity in the Assembly of the Muslim Lawyers through making speeches in highschools, mosques and ministries. He also assumed to mop-up the National Petro-Chemical Industries Company and then he was introduced as the Minister of Oil by the Union of the Islamic Associations of the Ministry of Oil.

He was elected in the trans-elections of the Islamic Consultative Assembly among 18 candidates but due to some impediments, the performance of election was postponed in that region. Later, he was appointed as the Justice Minister in Mr. Raja'i's Cabinet.

The awakening articles of Mr. Asghari have been widely read, some of them being: "A Word with the Revolutionary Guards"; "Faith and Speciality"; "Jihad, the Holy Combat"; "Sheikh Fazlollah, An Oppressed on the Scaffold"; "Imamat, Resolver of Difficulties"; have so far been published in the widely circulated papers. He is married and has two children.

SEYYED HUSSEIN MUSAVI KHAMENE'I: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Seyyed Hussein Musavi Khamene'i was born in 1942 in a district of Khamene near Tabriz, East Azarbaijan. He studied Architecture and Urban Planning at National University. He and a number of his friends founded the first Islamic Association of that university. After the victory of the Revolution, he became one of the members of the Leadership Council of the Islamic Republic Party and with the cooperation of some of his friends, established Jomhuriy-e-Eslami (Islamic Republic) newspaper, the official paper of the Islamic Republic Party. He is the publisher and

Editor-in-Chief of the paper. He was also a member of the dissolved Revolutionary Council. He knows the English language. He is married and has children.

MUSTAFA HASHEMI: INDUSTRIES AND MINES

Mr. Musatafa Hashemi was born in 1946 in Isfahan and received his M.A. Degree in Textile Engineering from the Polytechnic College. He was one of the founders of the Islamic Society at that College. After finishing his studies, he was active in the Arts Committee of the Husseinieh Ershad (Islamic Religious Institute) in 1971-74 . For 3 years, he worked in the Plan and Budget Organization. Then he served as Production Manager of a factory in Qazvin for 4 years. In 1977, he was arrested and detained in the deposed regime's prison for 2 months because of his political activities. At the time of the victory of the Revolution, he was the Press Officer of the Imam's Committee. He held various posts including, Production Manager of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Political Deputy of the Kermanshah Governor General, and the Head of the Technical Committee of the Construction Jihad and has held the same post until now.

HUSSEIN TAJGARDUN: ROADS AND TRANSPORT

Mr. Hussein Tajgardun was born in 1950 in Sirjan, Kerman, of a middleclass family. After finishing his elementary and secondary education in Kerman and Khorasan Province, he entered Tehran University, Faculty of Engineering. He graduated from the University in the field of Civil Engineering in 1972. During the years that Tajgardun was in University, as a result of local needs, he taught and was engaged in road construction works.

Tajgardun started his religious activities while he was in secondary school where he attended the weekly sessions of the students. In the University, he continued his activities by taking part in the demonstrations and strikes of the students. His last years in University coincided with the armed struggle of various groups and he continued his activities in one of the Islamic groups.

DR. HADI MANAFI: HEALTH

Mr. Hadi Manafi was born in 1941 in the city of Tabriz. His family moved to Tehran where he completed his primary and secondary schools. At the age of 20, he travelled to Turkey to enter Medical College, and seven years later, he graduated as a medical doctor. Dr. Manafi spent some time in Turkey working and studying in the field of surgery. He returned to Iran and was drafted to serve in the Health Corps for two years. After practicing in various departments of Health clinics, he was hired by the Social Insurance Organization of Iran. Following the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he was appointed as Head of the Tehran Emergency Clinic and was invited to join Prime Minister Raja'i's Cabinet later on. He served at the post of Health Ministry in the Cabinet of Mr. Raja'i.

ABDOLMAJID MA'ADIKHAH: ISLAMIC GUIDANCE

Mr. Abdolmajid Ma'adikhah was born in Qom in 1942, and graduated in Literature and Logic in 1961. He was a student of Ayatollah Montazeri and the Martyred Ayatollah Motahhari. He spent intermittent periods in prison subsequent to the June 1963 uprising, before being exiled to Gonbad Kavus. There he was again imprisoned and was finally transferred to Evin Prison where he was held without trial for two years.

In 1977, after delivering a speech on the 40th day of the martyrdom of Haj Aqa Mustafa Khomeini, he was arrested and sent to exile. After the victory of the Revolution, he was appointed as the Imam's representative for Kurdistan Development Affairs. He has also been Head of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. At the Majlis elections, Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah was elected as Tehran Deputy at the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

MANSOUR SHAHIDI: ENERGY

Engineer Mansour Shahidi was born in Isfahan in 1947 in a middle class religious family. In 1967, he entered Isfahan University from which he graduated in the Electronic Engineering field and then was assigned to work in the Steel Mill in that city while he was doing his military service. However, because of his political activities he was dispatched to Shahrud garrison (Semnan Province) to accomplish the rest of his military service period. Upon termination of his military service, Shahidi started to work as Supervisor in the Regional Electricity Department in Isfahan in 1973. He was jailed from 1976 to 1977 by SAVAK. Upon his release from prison, he started to work for a short time at the Industrial University of Isfahan as head of electricity installations but SAVAK would not allow him to work in sensitive posts in the Isfahan Regional Electricity Department.

After the victory of the Revolution, Shahidi was assigned to work as a member of the Board of Directors of the Electricity Department in Isfahan. He was also a member of the Engineering Society in his active city. Engineer Mansour Shahidi is married and has three children.

HABIBOLLAH ASGAR-OWLADI: COMMERCE

Habibollah Asgar-Owladi Moealman was born in 1932. He started his political activities at the age of 16 and took part in the uprising for the return of power to Dr. Mohammad Moeaddeq's government. He was arrested and sentenced to life-imprisonment in 1963 for being involved in the assassination of the Prime Minister Hasan-Ali Mansour.

He was released in 1977 and cooperated with the late Ayatollah Motahhari and other Muslim

clergy, to build-up new institutions for an Islamic struggle. After the victory of the Islamic Revolution, he was appointed the Head of the Endowment Organization. Later, he was elected Tehran Deputy to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and is now serving at the Commerce Endowment and regulation committee of the Majlis. In addition to Persian, Asgar-Owladi speaks Arabic.

MOHAMMAD SALAMATI: AGRICULTURE

He was born in 1946 in Kashmar, Khorasan Province. He migrated to Tehran in 1967 where he received his B.A. Degree in Economics. He was arrested and imprisoned by SAVAK for his political activities in 1974, was tried and sentenced to 3 years imprisonment in his first trial and 3.5 years of imprisonment in the second trial in 1975. Salamati was released from prison in 1979, after having passed three and a half years in confinment. Immediately after the revolution and upon the capture of the police college by the people. Salamati was appointed Minister of Agriculture in Mr. Raja'i's Cabinet in 1980.

MORTEZA NABAVI: PTT

Mr. Nabavi was born in 1947 to a religious, middle-class family in Qazvin. After obtaining his high-school diploma in that city, he came to Tehran and started to study in the Technical College of the University of Tehran, gaining his Master of Science in the Branch of Electronics. He performed his military service as a teacher in the Technical College and started to teach in the training center. He was politically active during his teaching period. As a result, he was arrested and was put in jail in 1973. Two years later, he was released. Upon the victory of the Revolution, he started to work in the Committee of the Refah School and after that worked in the Telecommunication Section of the Revolutionary Guards Corps. In mid-1980, he was appointed as the Financial and Administrative Deputy of the Telecommunication Company of Iran and before his appointment to this position, he was working as Deputy in the said company. Mr. Nabavi is married and has three children.

CSO: 4600/154

MORE DETAILS ON BANI-SADR FLIGHT REVEALED

London 8 DAYS in English 8 Aug 81 pp 2-3

[Article by Tim McGirk]

[Text] IT WAS A bad week for Ayatollah Khomeini, one in which Iran's 80-year-old revolutionary leader was stunned by a series of bad news bulletins — culminating in an earthquake which killed at least 8,000 in the southeastern province of Kerman.

The day before that disaster, Iran's most wanted man, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, had eluded his captors for the last time. Minus moustache, the fugitive ex-president slipped aboard a military aircraft at a heavily guarded airbase outside Tehran and was flown to Paris. To cap it all, the embarrassing claim of Tehran's secret arms trade with its sworn enemy, Israel, came to light, after a mysterious plane crash inside the Soviet Union. Iran denies any arms deal with the Israelis ever took place.

The plane, an old turbo-prop CL44 cargo aircraft owned by an obscure Argentinian company, had been chartered to run $30m worth of US-made tank spares and ammunition from Tel Aviv to Tehran. It had just delivered the third of its scheduled 12 planeloads when Turkish air-controllers saw it make a right angle turn on their radar screens and veer off into Soviet airspace, where it crashed.

According to Soviet authorities, the CL44 collided with one of two Soviet MiGs that scrambled to intercept it. Tass remarked cyptically that the CL44 had been performing 'dangerous manoeuvres' when it hit the Russian fighter. Then Moscow hushed up the affair.

Although Iran's clergy are fanatically opposed to Israel, they need spare arms and ammunition to continue the Gulf war with Iraq. Iran's military, like Israel's, relies heavily on US-manufactured weapons. As Washington has banned all arms sales to Tehran, the Iranians had nowhere to turn but Israel.

Tehran struck the deal with a Swiss arms merchant, Andreas Jenni. According to the London *Sunday Times*, Jenni received $600,000 cash in advance for the job. His partner was a Scot named Stuart McCafferty.

While Jenni handled the paperwork and the negotiations with Tel Aviv, it was up to McCafferty to charter an aircraft for the dangerous run. McCafferty first checked with cargo airline companies around Miami, where he lived, but all US companies he contacted were understandably wary about running the arms blockade on Iran.

His search took him to Buenos Aires, where he was finally able to lease the CL44 from Transportes Aereo Rioplatense. The twin-prop aircraft was then flown up to Miami and refitted with another engine. McCafferty checked out of his $400-a-month apartment at the Broadmoor Complex on 9 July and headed for Amsterdam — his last stop before Tel Aviv.

At Amsterdam's Schipol airport, police investigated the aircraft because of its strange Argentinian markings, but they found nothing. At that point, the CL44 contained only McCafferty's truck and the police let him go.

In an interview with the *Sunday Times*, Jenni revealed that the arms pickup in Israel was arranged through a British firm that represented both Tel Aviv and the Islamic regime in Tehran. It was through these middlemen that the tank spares were

loaded onto the CL44 in Israel and then flown to Larnaca airport in Cyprus. Because Larnaca's authorities seldom ask questions of arriving or departing cargo planes, the airport is often frequented by smugglers moving arms around the Middle East.

On one of the plane's shuttles through Larnaca, the pilot declared that the tank parts on board were 6,750 kilos of pipes. On the other two flights from Tel Aviv, McCafferty simply told the Cypriots that the cargo hold was empty and the matter was left at that. As Andrew Borowiec, *8 Days* special correspondent in Cyprus, writes: 'For a small island airport, Larnaca is exceptionally busy. In addition to some 220 scheduled "movements" a week, there are almost as many unscheduled cargo and passenger flights using the airport.'

All of this traffic passes under the watchful eye of the British and the CIA. The British still have two air bases on the island, with ultra-sensitive radar monitoring equipment, and recently they have paid close attention to the shipment of Israeli arms through Cyprus to the Christian militia in Lebanon. Island observers say, however, that this arms deal is the first indication that Cyprus has been used as a transit point for Israeli arms en route to Iran.

Although Israel and Iran broke relations after the Shah's fall, Tel Aviv wants to see Iran slug it out with neighbouring Iraq for as long as possible. 'Israel is perfectly happy to help Iran tear Iraq to pieces,' one diplomat said.

All went smoothly for McCafferty until the return flight from the third arms delivery in Tehran. Turkish military sources told *8 Days* that soon after the CL44 crossed from Iran into Turkish airspace, it suddenly turned sharply towards the Soviet Union. 'Twice we tried to alert the aircraft, but there was no answer. Finally it got beyond the range of our radar. We never heard from the plane again,' said one Turkish official.

Some aviation experts have dismissed press accounts that the plane's navigation system had been jammed by Soviet electrical devices. Said one London-based military expert: 'The Russians do have equipment that can do funny things to airplanes — but why would they want to waste it on a heap like a CL44?'

A more likely explanation would be that perhaps the ill-fated charter had an electronic short-circuit, which might have blacked out the navigation system and the angry radio warnings from the Soviet fighter planes.

'I'll bet the pilot never saw the two MiGs,' said one military expert. 'They probably came in on his tail, angry as hell that they couldn't get any response from him on the radio. When that didn't work, the Russians probably flew in closer to get the pilot's attention.'

At that moment, it is possible that one of the Russians misjudged the speed of the slow-moving cargo plane and they collided. 'Evidently,' the expert added, 'the Russians caught more than the pilot's attention.'

CSO: 4600/152

COOPERATION AMONG OPPOSITION GROUPS ASSERTED

Tehran PEYAM-E ENQELAB in Persian No 36, 11 Jul 81 pp 70-73

/Text/ In the name of God. For some time now certain developments have assumed a posture of confrontation with the rule of the "Imam's line" during which customary and practical means are used in order to seize power and remove from the scene the legal and legitimate rule of the Imam's line. These developments emanate merely from an alliance of rightist and leftist groups and factions--from the flashily dressed European types to leftists and opportunists--who have not refrained from resorting to trickery and deception to gain power. This situation is not like flowing water but a mirage which as other unholy conditions deserves the reward of hell to which our Imam says it will go. This chapter is an effort to study and understand this course of events.

We are now witnessing a major development on the Islamic Revolution's road toward the establishment and the strengthening of the pillars of the Islamic Republic on the basis of true Islam and under the leadership of the Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent, a development which can only result in the seclusion and elimination of all forces and trends opposed to the Islamic Revolution. This is at a time when the great leader of the revolution has left the road open for all these forces to return to the bosom of the people and the revolution, has given them the benefit of his guidance and leadership, and has spared no effort in carrying out his sacred and humanitarian duties in order that reason may prevail upon them, ourselves and the world, with no room left for excuse.

Unfortunately the guidance, advice and warnings of the Imam for a change in their antipopular position and policy were ineffective. They egotistically and arrogantly ignored the wise advice, believing they would be spared any reaction because of the war, the supremacy of law and the decisive struggle against world arrogance in which the Imam and the people are engaged. They became more determined each day in carrying out their devilish schemes. Their activities reached a point that forced the leader to choose either a continuation of the Islamic Revolution based on true and pure Islam or divergence from it. It is clear what the Imam's choice would be in this matter.

Counterrevolutionary Developments

The major and effective role in the developments under discussion belong to specific groups which, lacking popular base, owe their existence to the protection of Bani-Sadr as president of the republic and to their alliance with the Bureau of Coordination as the group operating under his leadership and other political prostitutes. Prior to the tragic events which occurred at the University on 14 Esfand /5 Mar/ and exposed their secret, they had had hands outstretched for such coordination and alliance. The unholy alliance of these groups, of which some move against the rotation of the president's axis, has not sought and does not seek a common goal nor does it operate from one motivation. Rather each, independent in thought and motivation, decided to cut himself a hat out of the felt of tactical alliance by studying and choosing, for example, the best method for overthrowing the Imam's line, preparing a "succession" plan, and finally drawing up and putting into action other devilish schemes.

These so-called harmonious yet disparate allies fall into two separate groups: the first group considers liberalism as its haven of hope and dominance over the Imam's rule its fond goal and desire. Since this group attaches special importance to its goal of liberal government, it sees its salvation from a rudderless existence of unconcern, pleasure and selfgratification in replacing the Khomeyni rule with a liberal government affiliated with the Western bloc. Finally, because they consider liberalism an ideal state, they concentrate in attaining such a form of government and are prepared to pay a high price in order to reach their objective.

The National Front and the Ranjbaran Party can be specifically mentioned as being in this group.

A. The National Front

From the start of the revolution, the National Front was among groups and organizations that separated themselves from the people and their revolutionary line, finding it difficult to tolerate the anti-American and general anti-affiliation character of the movement or to cooperate and keep in step with the Islamic nation. The discovery of documents in the U.S. spy den concerning the cooperation of some members of its leadership tore off from their soiled faces the false mask of "nationalist, revolutionary" and even further exposed their servile hands. We must not forget it is this revolutionary typhoon which exposes and disgraces all affiliated fronts, individuals and pawns standing in its antiimperialist path--rejecting and sending them into oblivion.

The "Nationalists" who are used to wearing suits made of foreign material adopted a more hostile attitude toward the revolution after the resignation of Karim Sanjabi from the provisional government, and decided to battle the Islamic Republic. Their vain efforts brought about their own seclusion and oblivion. These individuals, who usually wear cologne and are distinguishable by their ties, see the end of their goals and aspirations in an active and vigorous Islamic society which they of necessity must oppose. In continuing their vile political and social existence, they align themselves with trends of common interest and direction which, at the same time, allows them a base of operation and needed political standing and prestige to continue their treachery.

Liberal Rule a Strategy of the National Front

For this reason, the strategy of the National Front is to work for a liberal type of government under the leadership of Bani-Sadr. It feels it cannot find a better system in which it can attain untrammelled Western type freedom, coalition government, the enjoyment of Western culture, unlimited freedom of capital and struggle against "reaction" and other sacred and Islamic freedom-seeking concepts. The Nationalist, therefore, have not spared and do not spare any effort in supporting liberals and liberal rule. This was shown by their treacherous role in creating tumult and riot in recent days in the name of support for Bani-Sadr. The proof of this role was the arrest of a number of their participating and freedom seeking followers! We believe these are the last throes of the European style Nationalists who will soon fall in the garbage bin of history.

B. The Ranjbaran Party

The Maoist Ranjbaran Party has shown considerable fluctuation of attitude during the revolutionary period and has adopted differing stands vis-a-vis the Islamic Republic of Iran. In searching for the root causes of such stands, which are separate from its organizational character, 2 major factors present themselves:
1) the types of individuals who organize the group and those that support it;
2) its line, policy and strategy.

As can be gleamed from articles and writings carried by the Ranjbaran Party's official newspaper, the organizers of the group generally are intellectuals who lean toward the West and who consider specially Europe the cradle of civilization, freedom and independence and their house of hope. There appears to be no doubt about their spiritual and cultural attachment to the West. However, their political and organizational links are debatable. By expounding the slogan "Neither the United States nor Russia. Long live a free and self-reliant Iran," the Ranjbaran Party has tried to make society believe it favors the Islamic Republic's concept of "Neither East nor West." Yet their actions, coupled with a succession of attitudes adopted up to the present and specially in recent times, show clearly that its slogan is a deception intended to hoodwink and attract independence-seeking forces. The take-over of the Iranian mission at the UN carried out recently by elements affiliated with the party is proof enough of this because that action provided fresh material for foreign and Western sources by allowing them to give the impression that Iran is beset by chaos, confusion, unrest and discontent, a situation that spills over abroad. Also, they held meetings at which they commiserated with those disgruntled with the Islamic regime and agreed to rise against Imam Khomeyni by strengthening wellknown elements and trends outside the mainstream, to spray poison, and to create disorder by using propaganda facilities placed at their disposal by Washington. The effect of all this is submission to the tutelage and leadership of the world-devouring United States.

The Maoist line is the second factor used as intellectual justification for the flawed attitudes adopted by the Ranjbaran Party in the continuation of its political existence. This is because the Maoist political line which follows the Three-World thesis of Mao, works in practice and officially toward and to the benefit of imperialism. By adopting such a course and by coming up against the anti-imperialist nature of our Revolution, the Ranjbaran Party finds itself unable to adopt a pure party of unwavering hue.

The connection between this theory and the Ranjbaran Party comes into more clear focus when, despite millions of popular votes, they try to portray Khomeyni as a ruling despot! They go on to invite all so-called progressive elements as well as freedom-loving and revolutionary groups and organizations to continue their struggle for freedom and independence without heeding threats and frightening attitudes from Imam Khomeyni or any other authority of the Islamic Republic! Thus the Ranjbaran Party, unhappy over the Khomeyni regime, seeks to bring about its ideal society similar to those of Europe. With the close relationship between Bani-Sadr and these gentlemen in mind, we can say the situation tallies. By throwing their support behind him, these individuals want Bani-Sadr to become absolute ruler and their bridge to victory. It must be noted that the Ranjbaran Party's support for Bani-Sadr is not partial or a tactical one but is precedented. The presence of Maoist elements in the presidential offices as well as in the Bureau of Coordination is a further confirmation of this.

Ranjbaran Party and Recent Events

Relatively speaking, the Ranjbaran Party's role in recent events was no less than those of Mojahedin-e Khalq and the Bureau of Coordination. By actively participating in the clashes and supporting Bani-Sadr, they hoped to be able to put his views into action and give reality to his predictions. As we have said, this was the only road left for this bankrupt party to follow, because, after its quarrel with the Leader, it finds it difficult even to breathe in our revolutionary society. Naturally, its future cannot be any better than that of its co-traveller, the National Front.

We should remember that the events involving the National Front and the Ranjbaran Party will result in the seclusion of Bani-Sadr. To insure continuation of their treacherous existence, they will transfer their attention abroad to benefit from imperialist resources and to devote their endeavors to propaganda against the Islamic Revolution. Because of political workings and the lack of irregular forces, the notion of an armed struggle in this connection is not a correct one.

The second group considers liberalism as the means to its goals.

Although these persons have come under the protective umbrella of the liberals and have in turn risen to their support, they mentally oppose the liberals whose carcass they want to pass in attaining their ideal classless society. This group's alliance with the liberals is in reality a tactical one because these persons, contrary to the first group category, do not set much value on liberalism but have raised this as a banner against "reaction" and want to use it as a bridge across the waterway of reaction. Mojahedi-e Khalq is most distinguishable in this group's lineup.

Mojahedi-e Khalq

Following the Revolution, the Mojahedi-e Khalq Organization moved to the ranks of those opposed to the Revolution because of the attitudes and "radical" positions it adopted in order not to be outdone by the leftists. This opposition, with all its intensity and weaknesses, has come to a point of shamelessly accusing the Islamic Republic of identifying with Zionism. It also entertains the groundless idea that the Iraqi imposed war was triggered by the Islamic Republic for the purpose of exporting its revolution, and that this has brought revolutionary Iran closer to the United States! Even more shamelessly, they hint at absolving Iraq despite its open

aggressions, defamations and destructions! This comes as no surprise because the transgressions of the Mojahedi against the Imam's line in the name of opposition to "reaction" has its roots in the pick-and-choose nature of their ideology. (A study of this angle is not a part of this article.) The Mojahedi have pushed their hostility toward the Imam's line to a point that their opposition and goal of overthrowing the Islamic Republic have pulled them toward liberalism as a result of strong wishes within the organization. To us, the roots of this desire are caused by the following:

1. As the Mojahedi have themselves clearly indicated, they lack the resources needed to confront the "ruling reaction" or the Imam's line, and they feel that in present circumstances and with present forces they would be unable to act against the "reaction" which operates from a strong and extensive base.

2. Mojahedi's opposition to the Islamic Republic has crested to the point that it accuses the ruling establishment of identifying with Zionism and of leaning toward the United States. It considers its struggle against this a duty.

3. Liberalism under Bani-Sadr and his allies is the only movement which has relative capability and relative grassroots support to pit it against "reaction."

The Mojahedi thus felt they could, with their support, set up a wide and unified front aimed at destroying "reaction." They thus put their hearts into such support, hoping after victory over reaction they could accentuate liberal contradictions and weaknesses and assume the reins of power at last! In preparing the future ground and a plan of "succession; Mojahedi-e Khalq reached the stage of having to support the liberals and Bani-Sadr. At the same time they had a great fear of close relations between Bani-Sadr and the Imam's line and used every means to widen the gap between them. We may add that this very tactical and partial support for Bani-Sadr indicates that if the Mojahedi one day were to find it in their interest to oppose him, they would not hesitate to do so. Take heed people of vision.

Mojahedi's Role in Recent Clashes

The Mojahedi operated as the pivot of the opposition in the recent street clashes, disturbances and killings, specially those which occurred on 30 Khordad /20 Jun/. They had beforehand prepared the necessary ground as well as sufficient resources, including militia and other facilities. What factor or factors pulled the Mojahedi to such a stand! There is no doubt the Mojahedi themselves were not overly pleased by the turn of events, even though they had for some time before prepared for armed struggle and had entertained hopes that Iran would be "Lebanonized." Yet they did not allow notions to affect their practical assessment. They felt that because of certain reasons the time was not appropriate for such action. Inevitably they fell into such a position. The removal of Bani-Sadr as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and the debate concerning his political limitations took them, his allies, by complete surprise and put them into a state of amazement and stupor which eventually reflected the bloody evening of 30 Khordad. Fearing their political demise in the removal of Bani-Sadr, Mojahedi-e Khalq threw caution to the winds and entered the fray come what may, showing further their foul character by their savage killing of Hezbollah supporters.

Having entered the fray with all their forces and resources, Mojahedi-e Khalq know they will never have a more suitable opportunity than at present and are therefore intent in creating social apprehension, causing intrigue, and continuing sedition, unrest and killings to a point that would bring down the government. At the same time they are telling Bani-Sadr, who has boasted resistance and a firm stand, to resist and not to leave the field. This posture also helps to keep up the motivation of Mojahedi's supporters and sympathizers.

Bani-Sadr did not have the ability, however, to put up resistance, and his fall was the equivalent of sending liberalism into seclusion. This has caused the inflamed climate to subside and to stabilize the government more than before. This will cause Mojahedi's supporters to lose motivation and the organization itself to look for a newer stand.

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CSO: 4640/67

VITAL ISSUES DISCUSSED BY WEST AZARBAIJAN GOVERNOR-GENERAL

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Jul 81 p 4

[Text] Orumiyeh. Asghar Ebrahimi, the new governor-general of West Azarbaijan Province announced his own viewpoints in regard to various problems of the region in a radio-television and press conference.

The governor-general of West Azarbaijan delivered certain explanations concerning his own 1 month accomplishments in the province. Concerning the difficulties of the province he said: We have taken wide measures in the area of establishing security. In order to establish security, the government will carry out its goal with the use of its human resources. The occupation of the "Sardaghi" heights and the Qasemlu valley and the purification of a number of villages in this region, as well as the purification of the Seru road are among the tasks which have been accomplished in this area. The process of purification is being continued decisively and victoriously.

Favorable Groundwork for Purification

The governor-general continued: The basis of purification in these regions is that we believe that the deprived and oppressed Muslim Kurdish people, who like their compatriots were the objects of injustice and tyranny throughout history and during the previous regime, have to be looked upon differently from the counter-revolutionaries. The way we confront the counter-revolutionaries is completely different from the way we confront our deprived Muslim brothers.

The governor-general of West Azarbaijan also said: We are happy that after the decisiveness of the responsible officials in the area of establishing security, our Kurdish Muslim brothers have increased their cooperation and relations with us in various regions of the province. As a result, a very favorable groundwork for the purification of these regions has come about. What is interesting is that we entrust the purification to the people themselves so that they can continue their daily lives in the shade of the Islamic Republic far from any kind of intimidation, anxiety or pressure.

Alluding to his recent trip to Sardasht and the preparedness of local individuals to cooperate with the government and to establish security, Ebrahimi added: With the passage of time the ugly face of counter revolutionary elements--including the disbanded Democratic Party, Kumeleh and individuals like Qasemlu and Sheykh Ezzoddin, who from the beginning of the revolution were working for the benefit of Sadden and the Ba'th Party and for the super-criminals--had come to be revealed to the

Kurdish Muslim people and through employing military and law enforcement forces, we have recognized and neutralized many counter-revolutionary plans. In order to establish the authority of the government of the Islamic Republic in the regions under the influence of these political groups and the mercenaries of the super-criminals, we have harmonized, organized and arranged all of our forces under the provincial security council. Since we benefit from the total support of the Islamic Republic and the country's security council, and because of the experiences we have acquired in organized and unorganized warfare, with hope in God and with the resolution of the responsible and Muslim people of the region, we will soon reestablish security in the region.

Problem of High Prices

Concerning high prices in Orumiyeh the governor-general of West Azarbaijan said: Since up until now no decisive and serious activity has been carried out with regard to the problem of high prices, and taking into account the special circumstances of the region, the lack of correct display and requisition and other problems, the prices of goods in the bazaar have multiplied several times. Therefore we held a meeting with our pious brothers from the bazaar and it was decided first, that all of the shopkeepers will post the prices within eyesight of their customers, so that we will be able to stabilize prices to a certain degree; and second, that by assigning a large number of law enforcement agents to the roads, we will prevent the inordinate export of products and foodstuffs. At the same time we have begun a thorough battle against boarding and holding back goods. Through contacting the Army of Economic Mobilization in Tehran, we have attempted to increase our allotments of general foodstuffs, building materials, cooking oil, heating oil, etc. In order to battle against overpricing and hoarding we have attempted to display more goods, establish a system of just distribution and supervise prices, and we have also activated the guilds' court.

The governor-general added: From now on wheat will be given to bakeries at a price of 10 rials. We are aiming to keep the price of bread stable throughout the province and, by increasing the number of bakeries in the city, to solve the problem of bread which has caused certain difficulties for our fellow city-dwellers.

Contract With Turkey

In alluding to the problem of meat Mr Ebrahimi added: In this connection contracts have been signed with our neighboring country Turkey. Livestock will be delivered to the Iranian authorities at the price of $2 per kilo, and ritually slaughtered meat at an appropriate price.

Concerning unemployment the governor-general of West Azarbaijan said: In a country which has carried out a revolution the problem of unemployment is completely natural, particularly since in our country there has also been a war. Nevertheless, keeping in mind this province's large possibilities, suitable land, water and geographical conditions, we will attempt to increase the number of centers of production through investments by means of the provincial bank, the Center for the Expansion of Productive Services and Development and the provincial government, and in this way provide the unemployed with jobs.

He added: In addition to these programs, we will absorb a certain number of the unemployed in the establishment of security in insecure regions.

Then the governor-general of West Azarbaijan alluded to the activation of government departments and their combination with revolutionary organizations. He said: In this connection we have had numerous meetings with the responsible officials of the departments and the organizations. By integrating the government organizations with the departments and by utilizing the power of the youth, we will attempt to employ the organizations and the departmental budgets and their many resources for the benefit and welfare of the people of the region. It has even been decided to organize a number of commissions composed of the organizations and the departments in the domains of drinking water, agriculture, housing, construction, roads, hygiene and medical services, cultural affairs, and industrial and commercial occupations and services. Of course in this connection we have issued repeated warnings to the transgressing general directors and employees that they must bring themselves into line with the Islamic revolution.

We Are Ready for Martyrdom

Alluding to the recent conflicts in the city region (shahrestan) of Mahabad, he added: In an interview Reagan, the U.S. president, said that an opportunity would still remain until July. If they could break up the elections in Iran, their dominance in the Middle East could be preserved; otherwise, they would have to give up their hope for Iran. In this connection his foreign and domestic agents had mobilized themselves to upset the elections. In Kordestan also the band of Qasemlu, Ezzoddin, the Democrats and Kumeleh were carrying out their final useless efforts to establish an atmosphere of insecurity and upset the villages and roads in order to break up the elections in these regions. But fortunately, with the cooperative efforts of the military and others in the province we were able to capture many of them, including one of the Kumeleh leaders, who was carrying important information and documents. Moreover, the forces of Islam are ready to respond to any sort of counter-revolutionary activities will all their power and resources with the aim of putting the laws of Islam into effect in the region. In this path we also are ready for every kind of bravery and martyrdom, for such martyrdoms are necessary in order that the goals of the revolution may be realized.

Alluding to the allotments of heating oil in the province he then pointed out that the problem of oil had become a difficulty for the people because of a slow-down on the part of the responsible official of the provincial oil company, the weakness of the fuel committee in respect to an overall plan for the distribution of oil, and the limits on the agents of distribution. But fortunately, with the appointment of the new governor-general, this problem would soon be solved. If necessary, even forty liters of heating oil instead of thirty would be supplied to homes.

The governor-general of West Azarbaijan then gave the good news that, in regard to the recent repeated blackouts, which occurred either because of sabotage or insufficient power, two 22 megavolt powerhouses are under construction. God willing, one of them will begin functioning in the coming week and the second at the end of the month.

Then in the course of denying the existence of agents of Kahtiar, Palizban and Oveysi on the border of Iran and Turkey, Ebrahimi said concerning the construction of roads: God willing, the military roads necessary to move military forces to the regions on the border under the influence of counterrevolutionaries will soon be constructed.

PROBLEMS OF DAM BUILDING IN BALUCHESTAN REVIEWED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jul 81 p 10

[Excerpts] We have talked about Baluchestan, its riches, pains and bereavement. We discussed how the region's potentials had been ignored and that how it could be revived by just a little attention.

Such are the conditions of a region that if brought under cultivation could provide the nation with its needed grain, and if the construction work of the "Pishin" dam in the region were completed all the power needs of a vast area could be met and the living conditions of the inhabitants could be raised considerably from the present zero level. The new dam is being or will be built on the Sarbaz River in the "Pishin" region located at about 120 to 150 kilometers from Chah Bahar. Water of the Sarbaz River, and generally in all of the region, is plentiful only during the rainy season which often causes floods filling the reservoirs and, at the same time, prevent damages. Another dam was to be constructed in the Sarbaz region (on the same river) in an area approximately 200 kilometers south of Iran-shahr but its plans are not yet completed.

Another small dam was to be built on the same river in the Bahu Kalat region some 60 to 70 kilometers below the Pishin Dam. This was meant to collect the run-off waters from the Pishin Dam and prevent them from going to waste.

After the victory of the revolution, the Reconstruction Crusade, which had already built a number of dirt dams for the farmers in the area, decided to construct a dirt dam in the Bahu Kalat region before the Pishin Dam was built. This was to help speedily improve the sad conditions of the people in the region.

Construction work began last year. In building the dam, the Reconstruction Crusade depended on local inhabitants for the needed labor force bringing only the engineers and technicians from outside. This helped greatly in reducing, even though temporarily, unemployment. A large number of people of the Bahu Kalat village were also put to work and the construction work continued without interruption night and day. At the beginning, people could not believe their eyes and could not even imagine that water, the source of life, they had longed for for so many years, the lack of which had been the main cause of their pain, poverty and misery, would soon become available to them. They were soon asking themselves that if the dam was really going to be built and their barren land would come to life. They would be asking themselves if they could long for a better life as a

result of the project. At first, people were suspicious, but as the construction work continued and the dam began to rise the feeling of suspicion gave way to hope filling the people with excitement. After the level of water behind the dam began to rise following showers and a number of rainfalls people, filled with joy, began to congratulate one another and the Baluchis who had gone to the Persian Gulf sheikdoms to work, began sending congratulatory letters to their kin after they had learned about the events. Construction of the dam was finally completed with only the top layer still to be finished. Water collected behind the dam created a lake six kilometers long causing excitement among the people in the area. The prices of their barren land had increased and everybody was talking about the types of the crops they were going to raise. The beautiful sight of the water reflected in their eyes and the cool breeze coming from the waters in that burning hot weather soothed their ailing hearts....

Everybody was saying that Khomeyni had built them the dam and that the shah had done nothing for them. It was Khomeyni who had brought them water and had created the lake.

The Reconstruction Crusade had spent 6 million tumans to build the dam in 9 months time despite lack of many needed facilities and equipment.

But when the time came to lay down concrete on the top layer of the dam an untimely rain and the flash flood which followed suddenly raised the water level in the lake covering the unfinished dam, washing it down and with it the hopes of the people. With the dam gone the beautiful lake also disappeared.

What remained were the people and the burning hot sun and the dry land which was glowing more mercilessly at them. Bitterness and a feeling of total dispair was all that remained....In our visit to the area people were pleadingly telling us to ask Imam Khomeyni to rebuild their dam. They would say that they did not want anything from the government except that their dam be rebuilt again. They repeated this not ten but hundreds of times. They all asked that their message be conveyed to Imam Khomeyni. At the end of our visit, and as our car was moving away, we could still hear them saying: "We are not asking anything except for our dam to be constructed and water brought to us."

The building of dams has special importance for Baluchestan and they could perhaps be put in better use in that region as far as the taking care of the people's needs are concerned....The Baku Kalat Dam, located immediately above the Dashtiari region, will be capable of bringing under cultivation an area stretched 100 kilometers down to Chahbahar. It could also help irrigate a vast area of the nearby barren deserts.

It is reported that the Reconstruction Crusade is not keen about reappropriating further funds for the rebuilding of the broken dam because it feels that the 6 million tumans already spent had gone down the drain. The organization may be right to have expected a better construction job so that it would not have been so easily destroyed. Yet, and in spite of all that, the organization is one of the most active forces in the area and is capable of accomplishing things faster and cheaper by utilizing local forces. People are still pinning their hopes on the organization and we hope that it could, with the help of the government and

and similar facilities, rebuild the dam which so many thousands of our oppressed compatriots, who live under extremely poor conditions, are looking to.

Dashtiari is comprised of some 300 villages. Rainwaters provide the villagers with their drinking water. They have no deep wells. Whatever agriculture they have is by dry farming. Farmers are at the mercy of the Almighty. The construction of this dam and the Pishin Dam will bring life to this area. That is because at this post-revolutionary period, given the opportunity, people are prepared for self-improvement and if they desire, which they do, they can actively participate in various fields. It is quite different from the past in which any individual who wanted to develop a piece of land was usually faced with a khan or a chieftain who would claim the ownership of the land. If a farmer would dare to ask him why he thought that the piece of land that had remained barren and uncultivated for years belonged to him the chief would have answered that his forefathers had tilled the land some 100 or 200 years earlier. We are not concerned how he could have proved his claim of ownership. The fact is that people were enslaved and under pressure and did not have even the ability of developing a piece of barren and dry land.

In general, every part of the country was under the influence of a khan or a chieftain.

During my visit to Baluchestan in the early stage of the revolution I met a farmer who had been exiled to the village of Ziarat a few months earlier. He was very angry and was one of Sardar Sa'idi's slave-farmers. Sardar Sa'idi is a former representative in the shah's Majles and is now a fugitive in the mountains of Pakistan and Baluchestan. This man used to get million-tuman loans to develop Baluchestan but he spent his loans to develop, through the labor of his slaves, a large tract of land called "Garmbeyt," where he put to work various agricultural machinery and installed deep-well pumps. He did all this for himself and not for the people of Baluchestan whom he did not care for.

The exiled farmer had protested during the harvest time that his share of the crop was not enough to take care of his needs. This had infuriated Sardar and had brought about his exile.

People like Sardar, helped by their local gunmen, acted like Gods. As a result of the revolution their dirty hands were cut off and the freed slaves are now feeling free....

There is something else that I would like to recount....Two years later I went back to "Garmbeyt" and talked with the farmers, the same farmers who were once Sa'idi's slaves...I said well, you are no longer oppressed by him. He is a fugitive in the mountains and that everything that you grow is yours. One of the farmers answered that it was not so. He said that Sa'idi had told them in a message that he was going to give us half and take the other half for himself. I said that he was no longer there. He answered that in his message Sa'idi had said that in harvest time he would come with his armed men to take away his share.

I asked why they were not going to stand up against him. He said because he was going to kill them otherwise....

The oppressed who for long have felt the weight of the boots of the cruel and blood-thirsty local chiefs on their backs are not easily capable of throwing them off.

Despite the fact that these oppressors are now fugitives the intimidated farmers still tremble from the pressure of the past oppression and injustices. That is why when Sardar secretly slips into the village to claim his share of the crops the villagers, instead of rising against him and his men, surrender to his demands and give him what he is demanding.

Those who now and then cause disorder in Baluchestan are local chiefs and their agents. They do so because they have lost their personal interests and their control of the local people...The government is standing up against them. This government is for the oppressed and not for the local chief and whoever is in cohort with him, and will never come to terms with them.

The government must do everything to further establish its rules in the region. The more it can do so the better it will be able to rid the people from these bandits who have been trampling the rights of the toiling and oppressed people.

Unemployment is rampant in Baluchestan. Lack of opportunities and high prices are intolerable. There is a total shortage of yogurt, eggs, cheese, milk and meat. If eggs are found in certain centers such as Chahbahar, they are sold at 5 tumans apiece. One of the main reasons that some local people cooperate with the smugglers and engage in smuggling is unemployment. What can one expect from one who is hungry? When one looks at the hungry faces of his children he is ready to do anything to be able to save them from starvation. This is more true in a society where the level of education, culture and civilization is low.

By taking speedy action to create employment it could be said that, without exaggeration, some 90 percent of those who are now engaged in smuggling or are cooperating with the outlaws will quit and turn to honorable professions and join the revolution again.

Therefore, creating jobs in the region, which could be done in various fashions, is the key to the solution of the existing problems in that region.

9561
CSO: 4640/73

NEW AIRPORTS TO BE CONSTRUCTED IN TEN CITIES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Jul 81 p 12

[Text] With the aim of completing and expanding the country's airports, ninety projects and plans for programs of airport construction are in progress during the current year. All airports in the country are being improved and expanded. In Khorramabad, Sari, Ilam, Konarak, Saravan, Bandar Langeh, Yasuj, Ardabil, Shushtar and Tabas new airport facilities are being established.

In an exclusive interview with an ETTALA'AT reporter, Dr Baba'i, the deputy director for operational and technical affairs of the civil aviation agency announced programs for the establishment of new airports in provincial capitals and distant cities as follows:

In the Khorramabad city region (shahrestan) terminal facilities and appurtenances, police and fire stations nad new access roads for the airport are being prepared.

With the aim of establishing a terminal and its appurtenances in Sari, a police and fire station, parking lots for automobiles and airplanes, and airport facilities for Sari's Dasht-e Naz airport are being constructed.

For the Bushehr airport a terminal and access roads, a parking lot and a control tower will be built.

Dr Baba'i added: A terminal for the Ilam airport will also be established; a terminal for the new airport in Esfahan and an international terminal for the Shiraz airport will also be constructed; and basic changes in the terminal and airport of Zahedan will be carried out.

Concerning the expansion of the network of domestic flights to secondary cities and the establishment of new airports in these cities he said: One of the programs upon which the martyred engineer Musa Kalantari placed great emphasis was the establishment of airports for regions which are only accessible by land with difficulty. For this reason projects are being carried out which will enable the inhabitants of these regions to be linked by air routes. He added: In short, in order to expand the network of domestic flights, at the present moment construction activities are being carried out in the folowing locations: the establishment of a terminal and its appurtenances for the airports in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan, like the airports in Chahbahar (Konarak) and Saravan; establishment of a terminal and airport facilities in Yasuj, Ardabil and Nowshahr; the establishment of an emergency airport at Shushtar; the Tabas airport project; the project for expanding and improving the airport of Kermanshah.

The deputy director for operational and technical affairs was asked, "Considering the economic boycott, haven't there been any problems in relation to the electronic equipment for the airport traffic control and for guaranteeing the safety of flights?" He replied:

The economic blockade, or the disinclination to enter into contracts on the part of foreign companies in charge of selling electronic guidance and communication parts and equipment after the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, brought into existence certain strictures in regard to the import of aviation systems. But with the passage of a decree by the revolutionary council exempting the purchase of the necessary equipment and parts from the current rules of the country, a select committee of technical and financial experts of the agency went abroad. After having recourse to the companies and middlemen and assuring them that the purchases would be paid for in cash, they acquired a certain amount of the necessary equipment. After a time most of that was delivered, but the rest has still not been delivered.

It should also be pointed out that in such circumstances the middlemen will always be able to set the prices themselves, but, they could also create the possibility of breaking the economic blockade.

9831
CSO: 4640/68

WESTERN ARMS SUPPLIES SOUGHT

London 8 DAYS in English No 31, 8 Aug 81 p 20

[Text] AS THE GULF war grinds on, Iraq is increasingly likely to turn to the West for arms — and the market could be enormous.

Until now, Iraq has been mainly dependent on Eastern bloc arms: hence the surprise generated by a recent report in London's *Sunday Times* that the largely state-owned British Aerospace was considering a deal to establish an assembly plant in Iraq, for production of the light Hawk trainer aircraft.

Establishment of the assembly plant would be preceded by the sale to Iraq of an unknown number of assembled Hawks, the report said. Informed sources consider that this might constitute a sale of around 30 aircraft within two months of the deal being signed. Preliminary studies for starting up the assembly plant continue apace, with about 12 British engineers travelling to Baghdad each week to work out the details.

Military experts confirm that the Hawk has mainly a training function. But some models do provide an option for light air-to-air ground missiles, and could therefore be used in counter-insurgency operations in northern Iraq as well as along some of the Gulf war battlefronts. Speculation over the Hawk deal follows the agreement signed late last year under which France started shipment of Mirage fighters to Iraq. Those shipments continue.

As part of the long military shopping list they are now toteing around western markets, the Iraqis are reported to be particularly interested in the advanced Shir II battletanks especially developed for Gulf conditions under order from the Shah. With the revolution in Iran, that deal was suspended. With its heavy Chobham armour, the Shir would be a valuable assets for Iraqi armoured units now making do with diminishing numbers of Soviet T62s and T54/55s.

Replacement of its Soviet weaponry from the original suppliers now seems an increasingly remote possibility for Iraq. In 1972, already close Iraqi relations with the Soviets were formalised in a treaty of friendship and cooperation between the two states, but now that friendship seems to be waning fast.

Informed Arab sources report that when Iraqi deputy premier and leading ideologue, Tarik Aziz, made the most recent of his periodic visits to Moscow just a few weeks ago, he was told his government would have to end the war against Iran before the Soviets would ship any more arms. The Soviets had suspended new arms shipments to Iraq when the war started last September. But with most of their 250,000-man armed forces trained on Eastern bloc weaponry, the Iraqis clearly needed constant supplies to replace those expended in the war effort. They found much of what they needed in the more shadowy reaches of the vast Middle East arms market: some Soviet weaponry from North Yemen was shipped in through Saudi Arabia, and more reportedly came from Egypt.

But the Iraqis soon realised that such adhoc purchases could never keep them going. To think of turning West for arms technology was a natural progression for a government that had already developed a strong interest in western civil technology. Among the western arms-producing nations, Britain now seems well placed to take advantage of any spending money the Iraqis might have on offer. A previous Iraqi preference for France has cooled considerably since Giscard d'Estaing lost the presidential election and the

Americans, despite a growing trade interest, still have no diplomatic links with Iraq — their former embassy in Baghdad is still being used as a headquarters by the Iraqi foreign ministry.

There are certainly growing signs that the Iraqis have curbed their antipathy to all things American: the deal the two sides worked out in the UN Security Council in the wake of the Israeli bombing of Baghdad was firm evidence of this.

CSO: 4300/95

RAIL, ROAD LINK DEVELOPMENT GIVEN HIGH PRIORITY

London 8 DAYS in English No 31, 8 Aug 81 p 41

[Text] IRAQ has been almost entirely landlocked since the start of the war wiht Iran. Even when at peace, the country had only two ports — Basra and Umm Qasr — both in the south. Moreover Basra suffered from severe congestion.

Today Basra can no longer be used; it is intermittently bombarded from the other side of the Shatt al Arab by Iranian guns at Abadan. The Iraqis therefore have to use trade routes through Kuwait, Jordan, Turkey and Syria: between Aqaba and Baghdad, long lines of lorries trundle across the narrow but passable desert road.

Since the start of the war surface transport systems have worked well, though Iraq is not revealing the extra expense of the long haul involved. The only road to become impassable is that running north from Kuwait to the west of the Euphrates river, which last December developed ruts up to the hubcaps of cars.

Freight forwarders report no difficulties in acquiring trucks, and many of the initial problems caused by the war, when cargo had to be diverted from Basra, have been resolved. At that time, for instance, Marubeni had a shipload of cars dumped at Khorsakan in the UAE which was eventually brought round to Aqaba and then to Baghdad.

Nevertheless, there are still shortages of high-volume goods such as cement and bricks, and also of steel reinforcement bars. This is as much a result of greater project development as of the war — the 1981 development budget was increased by 28 per cent to $20.6bn. Even before the outbreak of war, the country was expecting to import some 4m tonnes of cement to augment its own nominal production capacity of 7m tonnes.

The government has always been nervous of the danger posed by Iraq's narrow outlet to the sea and its generally hostile relations with Syria. In the past, the Syrians have banned overland traffic to Iraq, closed down the oil pipeline to the Mediterranean and even cut the Istanbul-Baghdad railway, which runs through Syrian territory.

As a result, Iraq has looked for alternative shipping routes. Most of its 0.9m b/d oil exports now flow through the 1,000km-long pipeline through Turkey. The two oil terminals in the Gulf were severely damaged by the Iranians last December. Otherwise, the war has not seriously hindered road communications, though routes in the far north are now frequently impeded and sometimes temporarily cut by Kurdish guerrillas.

Elsewhere, the Iraqis are pushing ahead with better roads, the most important of which is a new motorway, which should eventually link the Jordanian border to Kuwait by way of Baghdad. The French are building a new airport at Baghdad at a cost of $750m, and another $37m is being spent on a new airport at Basra.

There is also a massive project to build railways between Baghdad and Hussaiba on the Syrian border, and a southern route linking the capital with the port of Umm Qasr. The first contract has already been awarded to Mendes Junior of Brazil. The aim is to build a railway network of 2,700km, of which 1,700km will be a double-track.

In Baghdad, a group of British consultants have started work on a design and supervision contract for the Baghdad urban transport system. One problem is that the Iraqi capital, with a rapidly

increasing population of 3.3m, is widely spread along the Tigris river. In the past, the high water table has prevented the construction of tall buildings and thus heavy concentration of people.

At the moment, public transport is inadequate, and many government offices have their own mini-buses and coaches to pick up their workforce. The number of private cars on the street is limited by government quota. There is often a waiting time of two years for the delivery of new cars, usually Toyotas and Datsuns, and the total number of private cars is probably less than 400,000.

Overall, Iraq wants not only to build up a modern transport system but also to ensure it has a number of alternative trade routes which will enable it, in the event of hostility from one or more of its neighbours, to keep its goods moving.

CSO: 4300/95

SHIPS TRAPPED BY GULF WAR TO BE WRITTEN OFF

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 33, 17 Aug 81 pp 2, 3

[Text]

The last hope has been lost of freeing 70 vessels trapped in the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq before major insurance claims fall due within the next month. An official of the UN, which is involved in negotiations to free the ships, made a statement last week effectively writing off any prospect for their release before some sort of comprehensive settlement of the Gulf war is reached.

London underwriters, who have insured the ships, introduced special blocking and trapping cover after ships were blocked in the Suez Canal as a result of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This form of insurance was offered separately from conventional war risk cover and was formulated to provide for vessels to be declared fully lost if held up for 12 months.

The 70 vessels in question have been trapped in the Shatt al-Arab since the outbreak of full-scale hostilities between Iran and Iraq on September 22 of last year. The London market exposure on vessels trapped in the waterway is estimated at tens of millions of sterling. Some of the trapped ships have already been the subject of insurance claims under physical damage cover (See *An Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, July 20), and several badly damaged vessels have been declared total losses, the London shipping daily *Lloyds List* reports.

The UN official was speaking after the failure of a fourth visit to the Gulf by UN Special Envoy, former Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme, to mediate in the dispute and, in particular, to secure an agreement from both sides to give priority to freeing the ships. Although agreement was reached on key issues for a ceasefire and the establishment of a 35-member UN monitoring team, arrangements for financing the ships' release could not be made to the satisfaction of all sides.

"Payment for the operation was perceived by both parties as an assertion of sovereignty," the UN official stated. This presented the UN negotiator with an apparently insurmountable obstacle, since the war began precisely because Iraq unilaterally abrogated the 1975 treaty with Iran which had made the Shatt al-Arab a jointly-owned waterway.

Speaking in New York, the UN official added: "What is quite clear is that it is no longer possible to undertake this operation as an emergency arrangement, and that it will have to be conducted in the context of what we hope will be a comprehensive settlement of the conflict."

CSO: 4300/95

BRITISH FIRM TO BUILD 70 POWER PLANTS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 pp 6, 7

[Text]

Ruston Diesels, a subsidiary of Britain's General Electric Company, has won a £ 70 million ($127.4 million). contract to build 70 power stations throughout Iraq. The stations are to be set up in a network of clusters over an 18-month period, with the first due for completion in 1983.

The Managing Director of Ruston, John Sword, told *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO* that the order had been won against fierce competition, especially from the West Germans. Among 10 rivals, from Japan, Scandinavia and West Germany, Mr Sword singled out Maschinenfabrik Augsburg Nuemberg (MAN) of West Germany and Denmark's Burmeister and Wain as the toughest (MAN has just won a $107 million trucking contract in Iraq, reported in this newsletter's August 17 issue).

Mr Sword emphasised that this contract should be the prelude to many more of the same magnitude. Although the latest one seems quite large, Mr Sword said, "we have to keep going on contracts like this." Ruston, which employs some 1,500 workers at its plant in Newton-le-Willows in Lancashire, exports roughly two-thirds of its production, and currently has a contract for power stations in Saudi Arabia.

The deal with the Iraqis will help boost British trade with Iraq in general, and with GEC in particular. GEC is one of several companies eyeing Baghdad's project for an underground rapid transport system, which is already being designed by Transmark, the British Rail subsidiary, and a specially constituted group British Metro Consultants (See *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 11). This contract is important as it will greatly increase opportunities for British firms as the project goes into implementation. Earlier this year GEC won a £ 40 million (about $80 million) Iraqi order for gas turbines, its biggest deal in Iraq so far.

Businessmen here believe that Britain is now reaping the rewards of comparatively good British attendance at last year's Baghdad Trade Fair, which was held despite the war with Iran; more than 50 of the 60 British companies invited turned up. British exports to Iraq were worth £ 322 million last year ($708 million at end-of-year rates), and this figure is expected to go up to at least £ 500 million in 1981. Marking the improvement of relations between the two countries, after several years of strain particularly following the jailing of three British businessmen in Iraq, bilateral ministerial visits are becoming increasingly frequent.

British Trade Secretary John Biffin is expected to lead the British delegation to this autumn's Baghdad Trade Fair, when he will lobby for British Aerospace to obtain the contract for an Iraqi air defence system, estimated to cost around £ 1 billion ($1,820 million at current rates).

CSO: 4300/96

BRIEFS

PHARMACEUTICAL PLANT--The Iraqi government has awarded an $8.4 million contract to an unnamed international company for the construction of pharmaceutical plant in Mosul, according to a report from Baghdad last week. The plant is to manufacture 3 million 500 cc syringes annually and produce high-quality distilled water and intra-veinous solutions, the report added. No completion date for the construction or other details were given. Special laboratories will be included in the plant to ensure quality and maintain surveillance, the report said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 33, 17 Aug 81 p 12]

PLOT AGAINST HUSSAYN--A plot against Saddam Hussayn was discovered and neutralized 2 months ago by the Iraqi counterintelligence and security forces. Some 10 high-ranking officers were jailed. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 24 Aug 81 p 24]

CSO: 4300/96

FINANCE MINISTRY OFFICIALS OBJECT TO CURRENT POLICY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Jul 81 p 12

[Article by Eitan Lipshitz: "The Isolated Minister in Finance"]

[Text] If Yoram Aridor remains in office, he will have to implement a personal revolution within the Finance Ministry. Virtually all of the senior staff in Finance, including those officials at the second and third levels, are hostile to both Yoram Aridor and the political system which he represents. This is a phenomenon which encompasses the senior secretaries and the assistants, as well as the atmosphere prevailing in the halls, rooms, and elevators, The impression is that this is also the case with respect to the junior secretaries the stenographers, and who knows?

Since the Likud came to power, the Finance Ministry apparatus has been waiting for the return of the Alignment. During the tenure of Simcha Ehrlich, it was said in the hallways that mysterious persons within the Alignment apparatus had "issued" instructions to senior officials to stay in place and keep an eye on matters. During the time that Yigal Horowitz served in office, his director general Ya'akov Ne'eman, could not conduct telephone conversations from his office because of the felling that he was being bugged and that his words would be passed on. In recent months, those of Yoram Aridor, people have not been cautious in what they say and have not used any cover. They have very openly waited for "them" to fly from power. The force and sharpness of criticism have been much greater than in the past in differences over the timing of a price rise in the cost of fuel, or the delay of payments.

I do not know even one official of seniority or semi-seniority who agrees with that which Yoram Aridor has done or will do. If Ezra Sadan, the director general, is pressed, he will say that if Yoram Aridor does something with which he cannot live, he will simply get up and leave. And he goes far. Others do not believe in even one principle established by Aridor in his "correct economics" and it does not matter what lines it will take.

One might get the impression that what is written here is too harsh. But no, If Yoram Aridor continues to serve as finance minister, or if another minister comes to the center from one of the economic offices, he will not be able to function, except alone. It is impossible for the finance minister to conduct an economic policy when the apparatus under him is waiting for the collapse when they will be able to say "we told you so, we warned you this would happen." This is simply impossible.

Yoram Aridor is a politician who know what he wants. In the few months in which he worked among the senior officials of finance, he did not consult with them very much. He "sent down" directives; he dictated courses according to his world view, and hardly sought support. More than once he has brutally cursed his senior officials because he has not obtained public support from them. From the four together and and from each separately he has in fact demanded that the officials stand by his side in the struggle against the Histadrut and in his political struggle. The senoir officialdom remained silent.

It is not necessary that Mr Aridor's conduct and methods of the past 4 months be indicative of his future conduct. But I think that I do not err in guessing that after the planning session of the upper echelon of Finance, at which the finance minister will present his principles of policy as he sees it and wants it, all those will leave saying that "this man is out of his mind."

Some of those who hold important positions in Finance, those with whom the finance minister must consult regarding the planning of economic policy and its implementation are the people who participated in discussions by Alignment staff for planning an alternative policy. There is no need to publicize names. Every one in Finance knows what I am talking about. Even the finance minister knows who they are. Others, no less senior, were physically prevented from participating in sessions, but consultation with them was almost daily.

The problem is not just with the finance minister. Perhaps even more severe is the personal problem of the officials and experts. I do not know whether it is possible to bridge the abyss between a great many of them and the finance minister, and I also do not know about intentions of resigning. Now in the press there are reports about the intention to "behead", and the coordinating committee of the Histadrut has announced that "it will not acquiesce to political dismissals."

It would be naive to expect now that those among the senior officials and economists of the Finance Ministry who differ with Mr Aridor will get up and leave their jobs. This is precisely the problem because in the present system of relations not one of them believes that it is possible to manage the Israeli economy. Not even the critical economists. There is no simple solution to the problem because in Israel it is impossible to order the deputy head of the fiscal branch or any other senior official to resign. But it seems clear to me that all those involved, including the finance minister, the officials, and the economists, that the Finance Ministry will not function. Too many "thinking people" in Finance will "take cover" in the fact that they are public servants.

Yet, the first word has not been spoken regarding economic policy for the coming year and future years.

7075
CSO: 4323/33

DEFENSE BUDGET LINKED TO GNP URGED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 14 Jul 81 p 17

[Article by DAVAR economic reporter: "To Link Defense Budget to GNP Growth"]

[Text] The increase of the defense budget, in recent years since 1973, has been accomplished at the expense of investment in the economy. Economic decision makers must now decide whether it is preferable to not increase the defense budget in the next few years, and instead to direct resources towards renewing investment and growth, so that in the future it will be possible to set aside a larger amount for defense. This is the thinking of the deputy governor of the Bank of Israel, Eliezer Shafar.

At an appearance yesterday at a forum of economists of the University-Kibbutz Center, Shafar described the basic problems of economic policies and the possibilities for their solution in the future. According to him, an examination of resources and uses available to the economy shows that the additional growth in the defense budget since 1973 was done at the expense of other investment. In that period, the proportion of defense spending to the GNP rose from 20.8 percent to 25 percent, with no real growth occurring in the investment budget.

Shafar claims that in the socio-economic structure of the country, there is no great prospect for reducing the level of private spending below the growth of the GNP scope. From this source, it is difficult to expect in the future a freeing of resources. Therefore, the only way to meet the means necessary for investment, so that it will be possible in the future to set aside more for defense, is not to increase the defense budget in the next few years. When in the future, investment bears fruit in a greater GNP, then it will be possible to renew growth in the defense budget.

The deputy governor of the Bank of Israel divides the history of Israel's economic development into two principal periods: until 1973, and from 1973 to today. What characterized the economy prior to 1973 was a high rate of annual growth of 9 percent while since then there has been a reduction in growth to a rate not exceeding 3 percent per year. This is contrasted to Western countries, in which the first period was characterized by a higher growth rate, while the slowdown in Israeli growth was much sharper.

The dramatic turnabout in the rate of development of the Israeli economy lowered its position in the world, even in relation to the hostile countries surrounding

it. In this connection, Shafar quoted data recently published in a survey by the World Bank. The survey includes economic data for 125 countries, and notes that while in terms of population Israel ranks 95, it ranks 55 in terms of product among all countries included in the survey, and 21 in terms of product per capita.

But since 1973, there has been a retreat in Israel's economic position. In that year, Israel's product was almost equal to that of Egypt, and double the product of Syria. In 1954, the total product of three enemy countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) was 3.2 times greater than that of Israel, while in 1972 it declined to 1.5 times that of Israel. In 1979, it returned to a level of almost twice that of Israel's product. Shafar said that today, we find ourselves in a situation in which the production gap between Israel and its enemies has grown.

The deputy governor of the Bank of Israel recently accepted a survey of the economic race between Israel and the Arab countries. One of the prominent discoveries of the survey was that at a certain level of defense expenditures, there is a substitution between defense expenditures and investment expenditures. The Israeli economy had already reached that level in 1973. This fact explains the virtual freeze in investment in the economy.

Indeed, between the years 1954 and 1972, the defense budget rose at a greater rate than the gross national product, but what enabled this was the excess of imports over exports. From the mid-1960's to 1972, there was a decline in private spending on account of a growth in savings, and this too released additional resources for defense.

The gap between imports and exports, which began in 1972, did not make possible a rise in the level of defense spending without affecting investment in the economy because of the energy crisis. From an annual expenditure of 100 million dollars for the import of oil in 1970, or about 700 million dollars at the beginning of the energy crisis, annual expenditures in this area rose to more than two billion dollars, which cut up any addition import of capital or increased aid from the U.S.

Under the present circumstances, the deputy governor of the Bank of Israel sees no possibility of renewing economic growth other than by freezing the defense budget for the next few years, at a level linked to the growth of the GNP. Policy makers are limited in setting up budgets for investment from the sphere of public consumption, which constitute about 12 percent of the uses in the economy. At the same time, the rules of the game do not enable the contraction of private consumption. Safar feels that if the strategic estimate is that war is unexpected in the next few years, and in light of the peace agreement with Egypt, it is preferable to consider such a freeze of the defense budget so that in the future it will be possible to expand it again.

Aharon Efrat, moderator of the economists' forum of the University-Kibbutz Center said in his opening comments that he does not feel that rumors of intentions to damage the workers' economy are serious. The central question, he noted, is to what extent the central production of the economy will be affected, where the workers' union is an important part of that economy.

7075
CSO: 4323/33

PURCHASE OF BRITISH VESSELS SAID UNDERWAY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1289, 17 Jul 81 p 29

[Article: "British Imperial Navy To Sail under Israeli Flag! Wealthy Jews To Buy One Third of the Royal Navy to Make Israel the Strongest Naval Power in the East Mediterranean"]

[Text] Israel has not been satisfied with the fact that it has the most potent air power in the Middle East and that it is the only country that has the nuclear bomb in the area. It is now trying to become the greatest naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean. Diplomatic circles in Washington are discussing serious information that was published last week by the newspaper, SPOTLINE [sic], adding to that information that is even more serious.

Israel is serious about purchasing the British navy!

Britain is in serious financial straits, and most of the units of its navy are up for sale. The only country that has made offers to purchase these units was Israel. But Israel too is "broke." However, major Zionist financiers have formed a financial consortium to turn Israel into "a strong naval power in the next 2 years by letting her acquire units of the British military fleet."

The government of Margaret Thatcher has decided to sell one-third of the royal navy. This move is unprecedented in the history of all the navies of the world. The British government has [also] decided to discharge from service 19,500 navy soldiers and officers in 1983.

Britain has begun deliberations with the United States regarding the sales process. British intelligence reports and diplomatic reports indicate that last 30 June John Nott, British secretary of state for defense made a second secret visit to Washington in only 10 days that lasted 24 hours. During that visit he met with U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig to discuss the "sad strategic consequences of the British government's decision to break up the British navy." The British minister gave his American colleagues preliminary information that included a "White Paper" which was to be published soon in London. That paper contained lists of the defense cuts, the

largest of which will be those in the navy. The White Paper explained the reasons that were compelling Thatcher's government to relinquish the British navy's historical role of being a first class naval power in the world.

The man who did not attend Minister Nott's meetings with U.S. officials was Admiral Sir Henry Leech, first lord of the British navy. He had refused to accompany the minister to Washington to protest the British government's decision and to announce that he intended to resign his position.

This is the gist of what the British minister presented to U.S. officials.

--The British government would put up for public auction one of three offensive missile carriers which are the pride of the British navy and among its most modern units. These carriers have the most modern nuclear strike technology. The missiles destroyer that will be auctioned is called the Ark Royal, and it weighs 16,000 tons. The carrier, Invisible, may also by put up for public auction; its capacity is 17,500 tons.

--Eleven other warships will be sold. These include two fast destroyers and nine missile carrying frigates. The destroyers are (Fotheringays) and the frigates are Leanders.

--Nineteen destroyers will be put up for sale, and some of them will be ready for sale as of 1982.

Minister Nott told the Americans that his country had found a customer for the carrier, Ark Royal, and for some of the other ships. The sale of parts of the British navy to that customer would not upset the strategic balance. That customer was Australia.

But the Australian prime minister's quick visit to Washington, coming after Nott's visit, ended in less than what Britian had hoped for. Sir Malcolm Frazier informed U.S. officials that the Australian press was mounting a violent opposition campaign against Australia's purchase of units of the British fleet.

Britain [then] began to look for another customer who can pay the price without creating an international uproar in the media.

Information indicates that Minister Nott informed U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger that if Australia were to withdraw its offer officially to purchase the vessels, the most likely purchaser will be a group of major investors and financiers in the world. This group had expressed its willingness to purchase one third of the British navy and offer it to Israel.

Israel has shown a strong desire for acquiring the missiles destroyer, the Royal Ark; two other destroyers; and two Leander frigates.

There is a training program that is part of the deal according to which each one of three groups made up of 400 Israeli navy officers would spend

12 weeks (3 months) in the training centers of the British navy in Portsmouth and Chatham.

[The names of members of] the Zionist consortium who have begun collecting the funds that are necessary for the deal from various financial and industrial sources in the world are still a secret. However, information obtained by SPOTLIGHT indicates that among those names are those of Edgar Bronfman, Harry Oppenheimer and his brother Sir Philip Oppenheimer. Bronfman is the president of the giant Seagram Corporation, which is the largest producer of alcoholic beverages in the world, and Oppenheimer is the president of two companies in South Africa that control the diamond trade in the world.

Negotiations for completing the deal are still underway, and Israel is pressing the financiers to pay a reasonable price. Its desire to own a strong naval fleet is greater than the dispute over a few million pounds with Britain.

8592
CSO: 4304/100

FUTURE MILITARY COLLEGE DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 31, 8 Aug 81 p 19

[Text]

JORDAN plans to build a new university at Muta in the south of the country to train students in military and police skills. The aim is to model the new institute on the world renowned military academies, such as Britain's Sandhurst. An annual intake of around 1,250 students is expected.

Jordan currently has two universities — the University of Jordan in Amman and Yarmouk University in Irbid — which are co-educational and teach a wide range of scientific, technical and liberal arts subjects. It also has several technical training colleges. The proposal for the new university came from a Royal Committee, chaired by chief of the royal court and former Prime Minister Ahmad al Lawzi, which was set up a year ago to assess the needs of the southern region and of Jordan as a whole. Though still very much in the planning stages, land for the university has already been purchased. Most of the money for the university will come from the Jordanian government though Iraq has pledged around $45m.

Setting up the institute at Muta will help the neglected southern region of Jordan. Yarmouk University and the University of Jordan are both in the north, making it difficult for students from the south to travel to and from their homes. Muta University will provide students from southern cities like Karak and Aqaba with the educational opportunities they have been missing. Muta will also act as a centre for technology and development.

Students will be instructed in the use of armaments and self-defence, the technology of modern warfare, and, for police students, law and administration. The university will grant bachelors' degrees at first, and possibly masters' and doctorates later.

Muta may begin classes in 1982 but they would have to take place in temporary quarters until the campus is ready. However, the university will have its first graduates this year — from the already operating Royal Police Academy in Amman, which has been made part of the new university. Fifty-six police students are expected to graduate this year.

There has been some scepticism about the establishment of this third Jordanian university. The country, critics point out, cannot always absorb the 3,000 graduates each year of the Yarmouk and Jordan universities. But backers insist that Muta graduates will be 'a different sort of person', and will all be able to find jobs somewhere.

CSO: 4300/94

NEW PHOSPHATE PROCESSING PLANT PLANNED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 32, 10 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

Plans for a new phosphate processing plant close to Amman were announced last week. Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, a state-owned enterprise, said it planned to spend almost Jordanian Dinars 6 million (about $18 million) on a new processing plant 6 kilometres from its mine at Ruseifa and 10 kilometres from the Jordanian capital. The processing plant is to have a capacity of between 800,000 and 1 million tons of phosphate rock a year. It is hoped that the plant will begin operations early in 1983.

The plant is part of a scheme to boost significantly Jordan's exports of phosphates. The mining company produced and exported 3.9 million tons of raw phosphate rock last year, mainly from mines at Hassa and Wadi al-Abyad in central Jordan.

Ruseifa produced less than 1 million tons and the processing plant is intended to maintain production at this level from the mine. In the meantime, output at Wadi al-Abyad and Hassa is to rise to 5 million tons a year during the next two years, using a walking dragline, the first in the Middle East. In the longer term, phosphate deposits at Shidiya, close to the border with Saudi Arabia, could be adding between 5 million and 6 million tons to Jordanian output, according to Walid Asfour, the Minister for Industry and Trade. Mr Asfour said last week that international consultants were bidding for a feasibility study for Shidiya, which is expected to go into production in the late 1980s. Mr Asfour said the study would be completed within the next 12 months. He hinted that the government was considering allowing private capital to participate in the Shidiya project.

A regional plan for fertiliser production in the Arab world is due to be discussed at a meeting of Arab industrial development experts in Baghdad on August 19 and 20, OPEC's news agency announced last week. The conference will bring together delegates from the Arab Organisation for Agricultural Investment and Promotion, the UN's Food and Agriculture Organisation and the UN Development Programme. Its aim, *OPECNA* said, was to lay down a plan for Arab chemical projects and to determine the role of the Union of Fertiliser Producers in training technicians for the industry.

CSO: 4300/94

BRIEFS

LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT--Kuwait is to establish commercial enterprises for animal breeding, meat industries and the processing of farm and poultry products, the department of agriculture said last week. The plan for livestock development, to be implemented soon, will aim at meeting at least 50 per cent of domestic needs. New agricultural sites are to be created, with the government providing essential services, cash incentives and part of the capital. Large fodder silos will be constructed to supply breeders' requirements at subsidised prices. Sewage water will be treated to irrigate large farms for cultivation of fodder. Research stations, slaughterhouses and new advisory units will be set up, while egg and chicken production will be subsidised to enable producers to compete with importers. Officials said the main problems confronting Kuwait and other Gulf states in promoting farming stemmed from poor returns from this sector. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 31, 8 Aug 81 p 20]

CSO: 4300/95

BRIEFS

JAPANESE DESALINATION CONTRACT--Qatar has awarded a contract worth $123 million to Japan's Sumitomo Heavy Industries to carry out the final expansion of Qatar's Ras Abu Fontas water desalination plant, it was announced last week. The contract covers the supply of four waste-heat boilers and desalination units; the plant has eight units at present with a maximum output of 32 million gallons of fresh water a day. The new units will increase production to 48 million gallons a day when they go on stream. Completion of the extension is scheduled for 1983 and the plant will then be able to meet Qatar's requirements for fresh water until 1987. Qatari officials said tenders were being invited for extensions to the reservoirs at Doha airport and that tenders had been received for construction of a reservoir with a capacity of 4 million gallons to supply water to Wakrah, 16 kilometres south of the capital. The capacity of the airport reservoirs is to be expanded from 15 million gallons to 25 million gallons. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 11]

CSO: 4300/96

ARABIZATION OF LABOR FORCE EXPECTED TO INCREASE

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 18 Aug 81 p 1

[Article by K. P. Nayar]

[Text]

ARAB countries are launching a concerted drive to export manpower to the UAE following its decision to Arabise the labour force. Tunisia is in the lead.

At the same time, local companies are making a major effort to absorb qualified nationals and other Arabs at various levels.

A new post of social counsellor has been created in the Tunisian embassy in Abu Dhabi and a senior government official from Tunis is expected to assume charge next month. He will contact ministries and government departments as well as employers in the public and private sectors throughout the UAE to seek placements for Tunisians.

A Tunisian Government body—the Agency for Technical Co-operation—has also decided to post a representative in the capital to tap employment opportunities here.

According to Tusisian embassy sources, these steps have been taken within the framework of the labour agreement signed between the UAE and Tunisia and approved by the UAE cabinet on March 23, this year.

These sources said that although Tunisia was prepared to supply all categories of employees, it was expected that the demand would initially be restricted to technical personnel.

Sundanese and Moroccan embassy officials said they were also preparing to ensure the smooth flow of labour from their countries to the UAE.

While Sudanese officials said they were already prepared to assist local employers in recruiting from Sudan under the new labour agreement with this country, Moroccan officials said they would finalise their plans only after the agreement was retified by the federal cabinet, possibly next month.

Commercial and industrial sources, meanwhile, expressed the view that changes in the pattern of expatriate employment as a result of the Arabisation drive would be steady but slow.

NO DISPLACEMENT

Several employers said the drive would not result in any immediate displacement of non-Arab expatriates.

"Employment opportunities in the UAE are set to expand as a result of the construction of several downstream units," said the director of a large industrial group in Dubai. Much of the additional labour that is likely to come in as a result of the new drive, he said, would be absorbed by the new units.

"Tunisians and people from other countries in the Maghreb are traditionally attracted by job opportunities in Europe, especially France," said one executive. It will take some time and a sustained drive to induce the type of employees needed here to come to the Gulf on a large scale, he said.

A spokesman of Dubai said the company already had a policy of encouraging the UAE nationals to join its staff. "From the beginning, we have given

opportunities to the UAE nationals who come forward to take up employment." As for expatriate recruitment, the spokesman said the only criterion for employment will be merit.

Trading houses in Dubai said they had taken national students for summer jobs for the first time this year. Until now, summer jobs for school students under a scheme drawn up by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs have been confined mainly to banks.

The general manager of one trading house said his firm's growth rate allowed for a 20 per cent increase in staff annually during the last few years. He said the firm welcomed the directive from the Dubai Chamber of Commerce to give preference to nationals and Arabs in employment. "It is in our interest as well. It will increase co-ordination with local bodies."

Many companies in Abu Dhabi are already giving preference to nationals and other Arabs while recruiting staff at all levels.

CSO: 4300/96

DESALINATION PLANT SATISFIES DUBAI'S WATER NEEDS

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 19 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

A full-scale test run of the desalination plant of the Dubai Aluminium Company at Jebel Ali has produced more than 25 million gallons of water a day—enough to meet the needs of Dubai city.

Dr B.F. Willetts, Dubai's deputy chief executive, told newsmen yesterday that this was being done using waste-heat from the smelter's gas turbines. Under this system, the energy conversion factor was 60 to 65 per cent, one of the highest in the world.

The two-day test-run began on Sunday. All the six evaporators of the desalination plant were run and the water was pumped into the pipeline system of the Dubai Water Department. The test-run was arranged to coincide with the high water demand in the city and at a time when high sea-water temperature adversely affects the performance of the evaporators.

POWER NEED

Each of the six Weir-Westgarth evaporators produces more than four million gallons of water daily and needs 3.5 MW of electricity. Steam used in the evaporation process is produced from the waste-heat of the smelter's turbine station, which has an installed capacity of 515 MW. The gas turbines use 30 per cent of the total energy to produce electricity and an additional 30 to 35 per cent of the total energy, which would otherwise have been wasted, is used to produce the water.

According to Mr Peter Simpkin, chairman, Weir-Westgarth Company, the cost of desalination units and associated water storage facilities (excluding costs of boiler and power stations), is about Dh 700 million. The water intake of four bouys daily is about 50 million gallons but about 50 per cent of the water is discharged into the sea as it cannot be used at the complex.

The quality of water is continually monitored, and it is produced to the specifications of the Dubai Water Department and the World Health Organisation, he said. The desalinated water is put through a blending process to give it a pleasant taste before it goes to the consumers.

A small quantity of filtered sea-water, after chlorination, is also added for taste.

It was revealed that the waste-heat collection system attached to each of the smelter's 13 turbines can generate sufficient steam for a 50 per cent expansion of the desalination complex. The government is considering plans for expansion to meet the future water needs. The three additional evaporators would have larger individual output. The complex then would be the largest single integrated unit in the world, producing more than 40 million gallons of water daily.

The two-day operation was headed by the smelter's power and desalination manager, Mr Reg Bailey, ex-deputy chief of the Hong Kong government's desalination unit, which was at one time termed as the world's largest. The construction director, Mr David Blanchard, represented British Smelter Constructions Limited, and representing Weir-Westgarth were Mr Simpkin, the operations director Mr John Davies, and the project manager, Mr John Laird, all of whom travelled to Dubai to be present during the test run. Dubai's team of engineering consultants, Kennedy and Donkin, was headed by the resident engineer, Mr Ron Hunt.

Mr Willetts, said "We had set a target of 25 million gallons a day, but in fact, at full capacity, we approached 30 million gallons a day."

After the first day of full output, production was gradually reduced to show that the Dubai could consistently produce 25 million gallons daily using five of the six evaporators, which would be the normal mode of operation, making allowance for routine servicing and maintenance, Mr Willetts said.

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END

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BRIEFS

NETHERLANDS WARNED ON BOYCOTT--Baghdad, 27 Aug (INA)--The Netherlands Government intends to prohibit all Netherlands companies and firms from abiding by the resolutions of the Arab boycott of Israel with the intention of breaking up the siege of Arab boycott imposed on all companies and firms cooperating with Israel. Under these measures, reportedly to be put into effect soon, the government of the Netherlands will no longer issue documents to these firms clearly indicating that goods being exported to Arab countries are not manufactured in Israel and will also ban them from stating that those who work with these firms have no cooperation links with Israel. Such measures contemplated by the Netherlands Government in fact will have adverse effects on its wide-ranging interests with the Arab countries particularly in economic and petroleum spheres. And thus, the Netherlands Government does not seriously take into consideration the interests of the Netherlands. [Excerpt] [JN271226 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1130 GMT 27 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/132

ISLAM IN MAGHREB DISCUSSED

Paris LE CONTINENT in French No 181 4 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Ait Mira: "Between Denominational Unity and Deviations"]

[Text] "One cannot understand the behavior of the Maghrebians without an approach to Islam which gave its coloration to the various forms of nationalism and the Arab World with which the Maghreb feels strongly linked." This comment, made by the French historian C.-A. Julien about 30 years ago, perhaps is no longer true regarding Pan-Arabism since movements came up in recent years in Algeria and Morocco which tend to reject this solidarity between North Africa and the Machrek. But it does still hold true for Islam. One might even say that, on the land of the "setting sun" denominational unity occupies a much more important place than in the Near East and Middle East.

This phenomenon has not been disproved since the Arab conquest although it has been interspersed with periods of relaxation of religious fervor and a return to local animist practices.

Between the arrival of the Arabs in North Africa around 647 and the emergence, during the 19th century, of the idea of Nahdah (rebirth), destined to extricate the Muslim world from the lethargy in which it had been slumbering under Turkish rule, one can distinguish five major periods.

The first one was characterized by bitter resistance against Arabic-Muslim penetration which took several decades. This was followed by enthusiastic acceptance of Islam which enabled the Maghrebians to conquer Andalusia in the name of the religion of the prophet Mohammed. During a third phase, the Maghrebians, tired of rule from Damascus or Baghdad in force and with the same fervor with which they had followed it, several centuries earlier, followed the Christian Donatist schism, called Kharejism, a schism which was born in Iran [sic].

Some historians interpreted that as the resurgence of the independent spirit of the Berbers. We note further that this schismatic drive somewhat came before the emergence of the big Berber dynasties (the Almoravides, Almohades, Merinides, etc.) who, while profoundly Islamized, in practice permitted the Maghreb to achieve its autonomy from the Machrek.

The fourth period coincides roughly with Turkish rule in North Africa. Oddly enough, the Turkish presence in the Maghreb, by progressively becoming a Muslim

domination, in the end reduced Islam to its simplest expression: the mysticism which found fertile soil in the "island of the setting sun." And so, this religion--which failed to achieve the unity dream of the Berber Agelid (king) Massinissa (2nd century B.C.)—under the dynasties of the Sanhadja found itself associated in religious practice with the old animist beliefs of the Berbers.

The last period was French colonization which played a role for which it was not prepared: "It was the intervention of the Christians in the Maghreb which aroused a reawakening of Islam to which the invaders fell victim."

Mystical Islam

The tremendous increase in movements today which follow fundamentalism cannot be separated from the impoverishment of Islam over these past two periods of time.

The 19th century in effect witnessed the development of a multitude of orders and sects which the Islamic movements of today still resemble considerably: Qadiriya, Shadhiliya, Djazoulia, Rahmania, Deqaoua, Senoussiya. Some of these brotherhoods, such as Tidjania, founded during the 18th century in the southern part of Algeria by Ahmed ben Mokhtar at-Tidjani, extended their influence all the way to Turkey and, in the south, over the entire Sahel.

This phenomenon had always been latent and, along with Sunnite Islam, there very quickly developed in the Maghreb a mystical Islam responding undoubtedly to the profound convictions of the people, which had been forgotten when Arab civilization experienced its high point. In comming to the surface again, these beliefs became intertwined with each other and were then superposed in chronological layers in the heart of the Maghrebian. In the same places we, prior to the arrival of the Arabs, received offerings during agricultural ceremonies, men would now gather who had come to call upon the magical powers of a saint in order to intercede in their favor with Allah.

This thaumaturgy as a matter of fact appeared as the representative of the God on earth and His miracles, in addition to his sacred gifts (baraka), were accomplished thanks to his profound knowledge of the Koran. The prophet Mohammed had been fighting against similar deviations in his time.

Berber Morocco rebelled against foreign influence, it remained roughly the same, as the Romans had known it during the time of Jugurtha. It resisted the penetration of Islam for a very long time" (C.-A. Julien, "L'Afrique du Nord en marche" [North Africa on the March], Rene Julliard Publishers, Paris). It is in this extreme region of the Maghreb that the brotherhoods experienced a very special upswing. To enjoy the greatest possible prestige, their chiefs said that they were "cherifs" (descendants of the prophet Mohammed). Certain disciples tended toward exhibitions. The Aissaouas of Meknes (Morocco) would eat fire.

Among this multitude of brotherhoods, those of Moulay Idriss in Morocco, Sidi Boumedienne in Tlemcen (Algeria), and Sidi Makhlas in Tunisia are undoubtedly the best-known.

The French conquest brought about an alliance among the brotherhoods and encouraged these deviations from Islam. This involved a by no means negligible degree of support when we remember that Tunisia, for example, consisted of about 300,000 khouanes.

Thus, the orders of the Tidjaniya facilitated French penetration in the southern part of Algeria. In Morocco, the head of the Tiattaniyin brotherhood did not conceal his intentions: "The Sultan is more dangerous to Morocco than any other tyrant we have had in our history." But this attitude only caused the progressive discrediting of the brotherhoods in the eyes of the people.

The Old Turbans

When Algeria was annexed in 1834 and during the development of the protectorate of Tunisia in 1884 and Morocco in 1912, a movement by the name of Nahdah (rebirth) sprang up in Egypt under the impetus of Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani (1837-1897).

With his disciple and successor Chaykh Muhammad 'Abduh (1949-1905), he developed the idea of an Arab nation which would take up the entire area covered by Muslim civilization at the time of the Omayyad and Abassid khalifs.

Nahdah produced a great echo in the Maghreb. The first half of this century brought a succession of Islamic congresses: the Fifth Congress which was held in Tlemcen (Algeria) in September 1935 and the Sixth Congress at Tetuan (Morocco) in October 1936, expressed demands which can still be found today in the speeches of Maghrebian politicians. Abd el-Khallek Torres, the nationalist leader of Spanish Morocco, demanded "the restoration of bonds between the three separate regions of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, and the restoration of bonds between these regions and the Arab and Muslim countries." Of course, some people think that "the tactic of the nationalists was more of a disadvantage than a service to Arabism which diverted them from the local realities and whose support turned out to be mediocre" (ibid.).

Be that as it may, on the eve of World War II, the nationalists felt that their territory belonged to a vaster grouping, that is, the Arab world. But above all, their membership in the Islamic community, like the independence of their countries, was a part of their demands.

5058
CSO:4519/42

GULF COUNTRIES DRAW ON KUWAITI SKILLED LABOR POOL

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 27, Jun 81 p 16

[Article by Muhammad al-Shiyati: "Gulf Countries 'Lure' Skilled Labor from Kuwait Labor Pool; Gulf Organizations Make Generous Offers; Kuwaiti Organizations Compelled To Double Salaries of Some Employees"]

[Text] For over 2 years Kuwait has been experiencing the migration of skilled labor to the Gulf states under the influence of many material and moral incentives. The Kuwaiti labor market is being drained, and this is arousing the concern of organizations and companies that were forced to raise wages and salaries in general to circumvent this migration, but [those efforts] were to no avail.

A Kuwaiti official said that those who are in charge of managing, implementing and operating any new company, organization or project in the neighboring Gulf countries look upon Kuwait as the market where they can obtain the labor, the skills and the rare specializations in return for financial incentives. Kuwait has become a center for skilled Arab workers who immigrated from their countries which no longer provide them permanent residence. Today Kuwait plays a role similar to that which Beirut played in the past.

However, Kuwait cannot withstand this situation as Beirut did. Signs of fatigue and exhaustion have begun to show on many organizations, especially those that spend large sums of money for training and specialization courses. Saying goodbye to the well-trained, experienced old faces and greeting the new faces that need knowledge and experience or adjustment to new working conditions not only renews the costs of training but also upsets the business cycle and causes it to regress.

The Gulf countries are benefiting from this situation. They need people who are experienced in managing projects, organizations and development agencies, and they find no other country but Kuwait in front of them, especially since Kuwait has been the precursor in the process of comprehensive development and the establishment of official and private organizations and agencies. Kuwait has the largest number of successful organizations and companies, not only locally, but also regionally and universally.

Moreover, it is best for the Arabian Gulf countries to seek assistance from people working in Kuwait since those people have already developed their experiences and their expertise to suit the work environment in Kuwait, which is similar if not exactly identical to the work environments in the other Gulf countries. It is inevitable that reliance on people outside Kuwait, regardless of their training and experience, will bring about a decline in the level of effectiveness [in Kuwait] for an undetermined period of time.

In addition, it is easy to make contact with the Kuwaiti labor market where what one is looking for is quickly found.

What helps Gulf investors "lure" people in the Kuwaiti market is the fact that they offer huge financial incentives at a time when the Kuwaiti market is suffering from economic stagnation, the high cost of housing and a relative lack of change in wages and salaries. All this has led to the creation of a favorable climate for "counter migration."

Such emigration often leads to invitations being extended to other groups of workers outside the country. Naturally, Kuwaiti organizations find themselves compelled to provide incentives to workers in countries--especially Arab countries--that export workers by paying higher salaries. If we were to take into account the fact that standard salaries and wages in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and even in Egypt rose considerably in the last 5 years, we would realize the exorbitant price tag of the entry of new generations of trained workers, technicians, administrators or others.

Many owners of companies and organizations have begun voicing their complaints, but these complaints, however, remain futile as long as political concerns in the Gulf override all other concerns. The strict security measures that are required by conditions preclude the required flow of labor and skills.

An official in an insurance company told AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL that he was forced to double the salary of one of his employees after that employee received a tempting offer along with some benefits such as housing and free travel tickets for him and his family. In order to justify to other employees granting this employee additional benefits, he created for that employee a high position and appointed him to it.

This is one of many examples that Kuwait continues to experience on various official and private levels.

People who move from Kuwait to other neighboring countries, however, often miss a number of benefits that Kuwait used to provide for them. Gas and electricity prices in Kuwait are very low, and there is an atmosphere of freedom and openness. There are social grants, paved and organized road systems and convenient public services.

Development in the Gulf countries requires more workers. Will the Kuwaiti

market be able to provide what the Gulf countries need? So far the more likely response is no.

Arab Outlets

Lebanon offered [the Gulf countries] those who were escaping from it. Syria somewhat prevents the export of skilled and qualified labor. It is known that mandatory military service places a basic limit on the exportation of people with skills and experience. Iraq, Jordan and even Egypt need experienced people, administrators and top-quality and mid-level skilled people. In this they are like all the countries of the Gulf, North and South Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman.

Countries in the Maghreb [Northwest Africa] pursue conservative policies regarding their highly qualified labor force. They are prepared to export trained workers only, but not their mid-level or upper-level capabilities.

It is most likely that the drain will continue and that the means for a solution will continue to be unavailable at present. The speed with which projects are being established exceeds the speed with which capabilities are formed and people trained. Therefore, eyes are being turned to the Far East where labor and experience are available at low cost. However, the solutions that are coming from the Far East come with a warning. [Labor from the Far East] will solve urgent problems, but it may in time create other demographic and social problems.

8592
CSO: 4304/120

'TEXT' OF 18 AUGUST KARMAL INDEPENDENCE DAY SPEECH

BK011653 Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Aug 81 pp 1, 4

[Text] Kabul, August 22 (BAKHTAR)--Following is the text of the telecast speech of Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and president of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, delivered on August 18, night on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the regaining of Afghanistan's independence.

"Noble compatriots, sisters and dear brothers:

"Tomorrow we are celebrating one of the biggest and the most exciting events of the history of our sacred homeland. Permit me to congratulate you on behalf of the Central Committee of the PDPA and the state of the DRA and on my own behalf, on the occasion of the 62nd anniversary of the great historical victory of the people of Afghanistan, the regaining of the independence of the country from the domination of the British colonial empire.

"We are marking the 62nd anniversary of the independence of our fatherland under conditions when our people once again are faced with new historical tests.

Model for Asia

"Today the free-born people of our revolutionary country have come out bravely and irreversibly to wage the final battle against the aggressions and shameless interventions of reaction, imperialism and hegemonism in order to defend the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity and emancipating revolutionary gains.

"The independence of Afghanistan was achieved in the condition when the Asian continent had just embarked on the path of awakening and anti-colonial struggle.

"The revolutionary changes in many of the Asian countries which took place under the direct impact of the Great October Revolution changed the balance of power in the interest of the liberation of people and the gradual weakening of the colonial imperialist system. Under these conditions, the patriots of Afghanistan inspired by the heroic struggle of participants of the first constitutional movement unfurled the banner of freedom in Asia for the first time and by this part in the struggle became a model and example for battle for freedom of the peoples of the Asian continent, especially the Muslim people.

"The independence of Afghanistan was not achieved easily. The best sons of the country imbued with a burning love and passion for freedom and with their hearts filled with the love of the country doomed the biggest colonial power of that time to ignominious defeat by laying down their precious lives and shedding their noble blood during the just and epic battle. They tolled the bells of freedom with mighty resonance. The heroic and free-born people of our ancient land played a befitting role in the battle for abolishing the system of colonial dominance in the Asian continent by defending their independent sovereignty and national honour against the imperialist aggressors.

"Noble and revolutionary compatriots:

"The militant and valorous people of Afghanistan throughout the ancient history of our country have always safeguarded the independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of their country like the pupil of their eyes and have not stopped short of any sacrifice for their holy objective.

"One of the traditions of the struggles for freedom of our people and the key to their victory in the struggle against colonialism of imperial Britain are the alliance and unity of action of all radical, freedom-loving revolutionary and patriotic forces of the country. The enemy in all conditions had attacked through diverse tricks and mischiefs the unity of acting of the patriots, that is, the reliable guarantee of their victory.

Amanullah

"The independence of Afghanistan which was achieved, under the leadership of the son of the country, Ghazi Amanullah, at the cost of holy blood of the son of the people was confronted with the threat of destruction as a result of the conspiracies, plots and interventions of British imperialism in the internal affairs of our country. The British imperialism with the help of its agents and servants and utilising the backwardness of the country and by spreading superstitions and prejudices, practising trickery and deceit, sowing disunity and deluding the people by its devilish plots organised chaos and disorder in our country and ultimately seated its own known servant, namely the tyrant Nadir, on the seat of kingship and practically confronted the independence of our country with the prospect of extinction.

"The black reactionary forces tied with Britain confused the minds of the masses of our people regarding the essence of the Amam state, making abusive use of the sacred religion of Islam, and consequently created an atmosphere of mistrust and hostility regarding that state. Our compatriots remember as to how the official of British imperialism like Lawrence resorted to treacherous provocations among our honest, truthful and noble people.

"Dear compatriots:

"Today also the reaction, imperialism and their shameless servants and agents are treacherously plotting against the independence, freedom, revolution, and the revolutionary gains of our people and, once again using those very well-known

weapons of theirs of yesterday, are spreading with the same devilish spirit false and ungrounded expectations for reversing the course of history of our country. But they are unaware that, as dictated by time and willed by our people, our revolution is irreversible.

"Today we are living in those conditions when the existence of the national liberation movement, the great world working class movement and the peace camp, being the indomitable and great bulwark of all revolutionary forces of the world, have brought an irreversible change in the world to the benefit of the forces of freedom, national independence and social progress. Today we live in a period when the progressive thoughts of our time penetrating deeply in the masses of the people, have been converted into a great material revolutionary forces.

"The gallant battle of our people did not cool down and did not end by any means during the years after the achievement of independence and during the rule of the monarchical and aristocratic oppressive dynasty linked with colonialism. It was during the continuation of this very difficult struggle of our people that the Sawr Revolution became victorious and the path of realisation of genuine independence of our country was opened.

"With the victory of the National Democratic Sawr Revolution, the progressive struggles of our people acquired new and wider dimensions and the broad masses of our people were drawn towards the revolution and the defence of its gains. Relying on these noble traditions of revolutionary struggle of our people, the ignominious deviation which had been forced in the course of the Sawr Revolution was done away with.

"The victory of the new evolutionary phase of revolution once again rescued the independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and our revolutionary gains from the threat of nillification and opened a new chapter for our people for consolidating national independence, and the construction of a new, blossoming and humane society.

"The old enemies of the prosperity and freedom of our people, taking refuge beneath the crime-stained and shame-polluted skirts of imperialism, want to drag our country into the bog of misery, destruction and attachment with colonialism and imperialism.

"The undeclared war against our people, which is being permanently fed through Pakistan by imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism and its Chinese collaborators, has no other objective except the destruction of independence and national sovereignty of our country, the disintegration of our glorious ancient land and the destruction of the revolutionary gains of our people. Our people have risen against this treacherous aggression of reaction, hegemonism and imperialism in a brotherly alliance and a revolutionary unity of action and are defending the country and the revolutionary gains.

"We are not alone in this just and difficult struggle. Just as the young Soviet republic led by V. I. Lenin, the great friend of the people of the East and the

toiling Muslims, was the first country which officially recognized the independence and sovereignty of our country immediately after its achievements and extended a hand of friendship and assistance to our people, today also the great Soviet Union is helping us in our just struggle against the interventions and aggressions of imperialism, regional reaction and hegemonism.

"The Soviet Union by providing timely assistance in response to the request made by the legal and authorized state and party authorities of the DRA during the most critical moments of the history of our country assisted our people in decisive defence of our independence, national sovereignty and rendered the greatest historical service for our people. Had there not been the timely and brotherly assistance of the Soviet Union, there would have definitely been left nothing of the independence of Afghanistan.

Historical Reality

"The enemies have portrayed this hard historical reality in a perverted form and are distorting the fact most shamelessly. However, history will bear witness that the independence of our country has been protected against the aggressions of aliens by the will of our people with the help of Soviet brothers.

Dear compatriots,

"Today in the new evolutionary phase of the Sawr Revolution, the banner of genuine independence, revolution and constructive and tumultous revolutionary constructive work and struggle is flying high in our beloved, proud and glorious, ancient country.

"The working people of Afghanistan are fighting for the defence of their revolutionary gains for preserving and strengthening the independence and national sovereignty of the country and for building a new society under the banner of the humane ideal and objective of the Sawr Revolution and united in the ranks of the national fatherland front and led by their vanguard and united party, the PDPA.

"In this life-generating and enemy-hitting battle, the heroism of people, the proud armed forces, the police, and security organs of the country led by the Central Committee of the party are the guarantee of our victory.

"In these moments when we celebrate the 62nd anniversary of the regaining of the independence of our sacred land, we pay glowing and fervent tributes to those valiant people who drank the wine of martyrdom on the way of achieving honour, freedom, and independence of the country.

"Long live the free born and noble people of Afghanistan.

"Long live our beloved country the free, independent, revolutionary proud and glorious Afghanistan.

"Long live peace and freedom of the people of the world."

CSO: 4600/158

CSSR SLATED FOR SPECIAL ROLE WITH KARMAL REGIME

Brussels SPECIAL L'EVENTAIL in French No 84, 14-20 Aug 81 p 11

[Article by C. Shaller]

[Text] Since it is being realized that the second year of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is closing slowly but surely, the Moscovite press does not cease painting a pretty picture of the rapid and positive social change in the country. Hasn't TASS published that: "The evolution of the Afghan revolution is obvious proof of the invincibility of the world revolutionary process of our era"? But they specify that certain Afghan leaders do not share this opinion...

So it is that Dr Anahita Ratebzad, a former member of the Politburo who had executive responsibilities under four different governments, recently stated that the Afghans were not "ready to try any socialism." And the validity of this testimony cannot be doubted since Dr Ratebzad is one of the notables with the closest ties to the party leader Babrak Karmal and enjoyed considerable prestige and influence after the Soviets put Babrak Karmal in power in 1979.

Since the Afghan economy has been put in complete disarray by the nationalist guerrillas--so much that the USSR is beginning to feel the need to support it in the same way it does its Cuban and Vietnamese allies. And it is probably in the process of studying ways to get its East European satellites to bear the burden. Besides, it would seem that COMECON which has just held its annual meeting in Sofia has decided to hold a special conference in September to study the case of Afghanistan, which would most likely take the form of financial commitments like those of the East European countries.

Moreover, the CSSR will probably be asked to play a leading role. Was not Babrak Karmal the ambassador to Prague during 1978 where he established special ties with the CSSR before he took power in 1979? So, it was after the visit to Prague of the Afghan foreign minister last April that Babrak Karmal made an official 4-day visit in June which was followed by a private stay. It was also used for signing a treaty of friendship with the CSSR. Subsequently, his finance minister, Abdol Wakil, made a trip to Prague in July to take part in talks about cooperation in the future.

It was on the occasion of these meetings that the Afghan leaders probably revealed their intentions of setting up a multi-part system which would permit

the existence of an Islamic party--in the hope of attracting wider support from the partisans of the Islamic resistance groups. Furthermore, two Czech experts have been sent to Kabul to formulate election laws. There is no doubt that the Afghan leaders have knocked on the right door: The CSSR which has six political parties is considered one of the most authoritarian governments in Eastern Europe.

CSO: 4619/32

PRESTIGE LOST IN CLOSURE OF OFFICER ACADEMY

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 5 Aut 81 p 4

[Article: "Kabul Officer Academy Closed--A Result of Fighting in Paghman"]

[Text] It was reported last Friday that Afghan authorities had found it necessary to close Kabul's Afghan Military Academy after it had been the scene of demonstrations resulting in some arrests. Kabul's officer academy had long been a renowned training institution in which cadets started their secondary education and graduated as officers. It used to have approximately 4,000 students. The academy was one of the most renowned "modern" achools in Afghanistan; many Afghan leaders of recent times were among its graduates. Under present circumstances, its closure signifies a considerable loss of prestige for President Karmal's government. It is tantamount to an admission that the government was unable to operate the school and to retain the loyalty of Afghan cadets.

An Offensive Against the Rebels

Simultaneously, the closure constitutes confirmation of fighting in Paghman which had started during the first half of July. Paghman is situated at the foot of the mountains only 20 kilometers northwest of Kabur; at one time, it was the summer residence of Afghan kings. The reports, which had reached the outside world via Delhi and Pakistan and which probably originated with diplomats in Kabul, stated that the combat directed against guerillas massed in Paghman had started when 300 cadets had been sent from Kabul to Paghman and were surrounded by the partisans. About 200 cadets were said to have defected to the partisans upon being invited to do so over public address systems. At least 70 of the remainder were said to have been killed.

Thereafter, the reports continue, Soviet troops were flown to Paghman in helicopters. One Soviet unit was said to have been ambushed and essentially destroyed; a second unit was reported to have been attacked by mistake by its own combat helicopters and decimated. The fighting in the Paghman area was said to have been the most severe since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and to have lasted 3 days.

It can be assumed that the desertion and death of older cadets had led to confrontations between the faculty and the younger students, finally forcing the government to close the school. It has been known for some time that young Afthans have been sent to the Soviet Union for military training and indoctrination. It is feared

that the balance of academy students are given the choice of either letting themselves be transferred to the Soviet Union or renouncing their officer careers.

Failed Mopping Up Operation

The objective of the offensive by government troops and Soviet units probably was to encircle and destroy the partisans around Paghman so as to eliminate the partisan presence in the valleys and mountains in the vicinity of the capital. This objective was obviously not attained. The guerrillas were apparently able to offer resistance, thereby delaying the encirclement maneuver. The bulk of their forces appear to have eluded the attackers in this manner. At the end of the offensive by government and Soviet troops they evidently returned to the mountains around Paghman. The rebels appear to have suffered fairly severe casualties, estimated to number about 80 killed. However, the attackers are said to have lost a considerably greater number of soldiers; the reports indicate about 300 government troops killed.

As usual, the civil population probably suffered the most. During the battle about 25 communities are said to have been bombed and attacked by tanks and helicopters. The inhabitants of the village of Paghman, having been warned by the partisans, are reported to have fled in time, but the village suffered severe damage.

Increased Unrest in the Capital

Since the fighting around Paghman there has been an increasing number of reports of shooting and explosions in Kabul, both at night and during the day. There were attacks also against Afghan troops guarding the Kargar Dam, which forms a reservoir between Kabul and Paghman. The most recent reports coming from Kabul also describe an increasing number of attacks against convoys traveling to Kabul from the north. These attacks are said to lead to occasional gasoline shortages in the capital.

All this indicates that the partisans located in the Paghman mountains northwest of the capital have not lost their operational bases.

9273
CSO: 4620/9

BRIEFS

KARMAL HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE--Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council, this afternoon received journalists from Japan, Sri Lanka, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Council headquarters and answered their questions in a free, democratic and friendly atmosphere. He spoke about the foreign policy of the DRA, emphasizing the recent DRA statement on the question of a political solution, and shed light in detail on the present stand of DRA foreign policy in favor of and the desire of our country for peace and detente in the region and in the world. He also discussed Afghanistan's desire to have good-neighborly relations and live with its neighbours in the atmosphere of peace and calm. Babrak Karmal also spoke about the country's internal situation and the victories and formidable achievements of the Sawr Revolution and its new development stage. [Text] [LD300535 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 29 Aug 81]

CSO: 4665/9

BENYAHIA'S POPULARITY ON THE RISE; BENJEDID TURNS TO ARRESTS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 12 Jun 81 p 32

[Article by Sulayman al-Furzuli: "In Anticipation of the Next Meeting of the Central Committee of the Party in Power, Bendjedid Returns the Algerian Scene to Autocratic Rather Than Democratic Policies"]

[Text] "Before the airplane crashed he was a minister, and after the crash he became a leader." This is what the Algerians are saying about their foreign minister, Benyahia, who was among three survivors on a plane which was hit by a windstorm while landing at Bamako airport in Ma'i. The Algerians, like all Easterners, believe in miracles. The survival of a minister from a burning plane was no small matter. When the plane carrying King Hassan II of Morocco was hit and downed by Oufkir's air forces, the king survived the accident, and his survival played a major role in strengthening his power to this day. It is said that the best thing that could happen to a politician or a leader in the Maghreb is to survive a murder attempt, for this will not only be considered a second chance to live but a rejuvenation of his political powers.

On hearing the news of the accident, Algerians thought that there was a plot to assassinate their minister of foreign affairs. Their belief was strengthened when the Algerian radio announced that all passengers on the plane, including Benyahia, had been killed. But when it was confirmed that he was alive and suffering only from minor fractures, his popularity in Algeria rose.

From the beginning of his political career as president of the Muslim Students Union, Benyahia was considered a technocrat. This has changed since he became foreign minister, as it is said: "wearing Abd-al-Aziz Bouteflika's shoes." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a different aura, which Benyahia, more than anyone else, knows well because although he assumed many important positions, he nevertheless remained unknown.

Benyahia is one of the self-made men in Algeria. This is reflected in his command of Arabic. In addition to being pragmatic in his approach to Arabic issues, Benyahia learned Arabic as an adult. His mastery of the language is so good that he can lecture in it. This challenges the old Arabic saying, "Learning in childhood is as permanent as engraving on stone." Few other than Algerians know that Benyahia wrote the National Charter that was put to a vote at the end of

Boumedienne's administration. This took place after he had learned Arabic. In addition, Benyahia was a negotiator in the Evian agreements which led to Algeria's independence. The French thought of him as an excellent negotiator and so did the Russians when Benyahia was Algerian ambassador to Moscow.

In his ministerial positions, Benyahia was an expert in problem solving. On several occasions, Boumedienne sought his assistance when the situation required a courageous rescuer. Despite the fact that Benyahia was an expert politician, he was not politicized until he joined the Ministry of Information. According to Algerians, the media entered their golden age when Benyahia was the minister of information.

His handling of student-related issues is the most important and truly appreciated achievement. These issues almost led to a political explosion during the Boumedienne administration and are still the most difficult problem in Algeria today. When relations became strained between Ahmed Talib al-Ibrahimi, then the minister of higher education, and the leftist and progressive students, Boumedienne entrusted Benyahia with the Ministry of Higher Education in order to solve the problem "in the field." Benyahia was successful in attracting student movements to Boumedienne's camp. Benyahia was able to do that by appearing to be the champion of the Students Development Movement and by advocating the need to improve higher education. The motto that was promoted them was "the democracy of education." Tackling these issues was, at the time, a very difficult matter.

The second task that Boumedienne assigned to Benyahia was at the Ministry of Finance at a time when the late president wanted to bring the national companies under government control These companies, and especially SONATRACH, the National Company for the Transport and Marketing of Hydrocarbons, were a state within a state, and at times were beyond the control of the state and its laws.

Benyahia differs from his predecessor Bouteflika by not being a part of the struggle for power. He is a man for all seasons. He proved to be more skillful than Bouteflika when he conducted the successful negotiations with France concerning emigrant workers, something Bouteflika failed to achieve despite his long friendship with France.

Benyahia knows that the struggle for power is a very complex matter. Entering this struggle poses requirements Benyahia lacks. He does not have a political base to use in his struggle and he is not useful to any particular constituency. But, as some observers say, he is indispensable for any government in Algeria. This indispensability might be the source of his strength and persistence.

The miracle that saved Benyahia from the plane wreck may not change the situation. Algeria today needs a miracle to solve its internal problems; at the end of last May, violent student clashes took place at the University of Algeria between Berber elements and the supporters of Arabization. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood led yet a different kind of demonstration at the University of Algeria and the University of Annaba where several people were killed and some were injured despite the presence of a great number of policemen inside and

around the university. Some believe that the number of policemen now stationed inside the university is equal to the number of students.

Student unrest went on continually during the school year, a problem that might lead Algeria to a dangerous situation. Student unrest will be the most important subject on the agenda when the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front meets next month. Some say that the Central Committee is preparing itself to support a new policy that will be presented by the president, Chadli Bendjedid, that engenders firmness instead of openness.

According to the government, Algeria needs firmness not only because of the student demonstrations, which were contained by stiff security measures, but also because of the regional demonstrations that took place in the city of Bejaia in eastern Algeria. The demonstrators in that town attacked and burned the city hall. As a result of their confrontation with the police, 3 were killed and at least 10 were wounded. Some accused foreign elements in the eastern region of Algeria of fabricating the incident to spread discord among the Kabyles. In its next meeting, the party Central Committee will deal with two delicate subjects: security at the universities and regional demonstrations. However, some believe that the scene has been prearranged to support President Bendjedid in the measures which he will take against many government officials who have been accused of stealing and illegal enrichment. Those who believe in the fabricated nature of the recent incidents are saying that the events are affecting the technocratic system, which is formed mainly of Kabyles as a result of their culture and French ties.

Others also believe that President Bendjedid has prepared the scene to get rid, gradually, of members of the previous administration, i.e., Boumedienne men. As a result, orders were issued to prevent a number of influential individuals from leaving the country, especially those enjoying immunity, due to their membership in the Revolutionary Council or the Central Committee, until the latter can lift their immunity in preparation for their trial. Most prominent of those are Col Ahmed Bencherif, the previous chief of the national police, and Tayebi Larbi, the former minister of agriculture.

When Bendjedid opened the investigations, he realized that it was more than he could handle. The investigation not only involves prominent names but also includes hundreds of merchants and small vendors who have been sent to prison. Their number is so high that there is no place for those who come from the universities, and that is why in Algeria today prisons are the largest institution.

Despite the fact that the measures undertaken against merchants and vendors were well received by the masses, especially since the economic difficulties resulting from inflation have affected the middle class as well as the workers, farmers and the poor, some fear that the arrest of the small violators constitutes the "guinea pig," while the big whales roam freely. Will Bendjedid pass his test with repression alone?

9786
CSO: 4504/26

BRITISH PAPER ATTACKED FOR ANTIREGIME ARTICLE

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 20 Aug 81 p 4

[Editorial by Mehdi Khandaqabadi: "Reply to DAILY EXPRESS"]

[Text]

LONDON (AP) - Extracts from British editorials yesterday Daily Express, conservative, on Iran.

"There is an increasing chaos parallel between the Iranian revolution and that in France nearly 200 years ago.

"The firing squad in each are claiming lives daily now, just as the Guilloine in Paris did then. Over 300 people have met their deaths in this way since President Banisadr was deposed in June....

"The only realistic hope of a quick collapse of the regime must lie with internal developments. The mullahs have the power, but not the experience or the Economic prosperity. If food shortages increase, they will soon discover that economics is a more powerful equation than religious fervor.

"It would be in a such self-made domestic chaos that a vacuum would be created for a strong man, ... to restore some semblance of law, order -- and humanity.

TEHRAN TIMES: Our reply to the American mercenaries is first that you have made claims of riots and instability in Iran for more than three years now. It is more than three years since your masters are attempting to overthrow this regime, and when they became disappointed they tried with their puppet hands like the deposed President Banisadr to cause a deviation for the Revolution and divert it towards American socialism. In order to achieve this objective they resorted to a number of conspiracies. But each time they became more desperate and more disappointed than before.

After the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeini, our enemies were resorting to all kinds of conspiracies to dam the huge wave of our revolution. But each time their calculations have turned out to be wrong and therefore, the conspiracies were all destined to failure.

According to the 4th Shi'ite Imam: "Praise be to God, who set our enemies among the foolish people."

If you have a profound knowledge of economics you had better help your own prime minister out of her desperate predicament of unemployment, one which has a higher rate of unemployment than is prevalent in our country.

The prices are high in comparison to prices in Iran but you persist in economic analyses gloomily for Iran. What you cannot find in Iran, but which exists in your country is racism.

You are the reactionaries like your ancestors of the middle ages believed in racism discriminating against Blacks, whites, Indians, Pakistanis and even Yorkshiremen and Londoners, and Scotsmen You will never give up your materialistic criteria which is destined to failure. You have not yet understood our progressive Islamic criteria. Of course, you are not at fault for this is only because you lack commonsense.

You have called our government radical but only recently in other contexts you have called it conservative. Isn't this an indication of your lack of judgement on world issues? It is now three years since you have been waiting for a collapse of the Iranian government from the inside. But this dream of yours has not been realized and will never be realized.

You believe that the religious people heading our country's affairs have a poor perception of economics and politics. Of course, this like your other calculations are belied, and you will find that these persons are on the contrary experts in these issues. Besides they are not without educated and competent advisers. But we ask if your politicians are educated? Why was it that your former Prime Minister James Callaghan a school leaver and your present Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is the daughter of a greengrocer? In which schools have they received their education in politics? You had better believe that Islamic Iran will never fall into your hands again, and that it will not be possible for you to rob its oil, gas and uranium freely once again and in return give us weapons and cosmetics.

You are so uninformed about the situation or conditions in Iran that you think there are riots all over the country. What you will see here, however, if you look clearly enough, the situation is so ordinary that it would seem as if there was no war at all.

Even in the cities close to the war fronts the situation is quite normal.

It is close upon a year that despite all these conspiracies, economic sanctions, air and ground raids we have been surviving and fighting for this ideology of neither West nor East. Meanwhile, we have been having all essential facilities and food products at our disposal. Yet you have always harbored the intention of converting the issues of the Islamic Revolution to suit your own thinking. You should know that Islamic Iran will continue on its way because it is God's Will, and God's promise is true. Death to imperialism! Hail to Islamic combatants and martyrs! Death to US!

CSO: 4600/160

U.S. ACCUSED OF PLANNING 'TO DIVIDE IRAN'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] Tehran (PARS)--Despite the conspiracies contrived by the foreign countries to intensify the political upheaval in Iran, the Islamic Revolution will ultimately be victorious, stated Andre Fontain, an official in the Foreign Ministry of France.

Fontain made the above statement in a recent article which appeared in the Arabic weekly magazine AL-KALA AL-ARAB, published on August 10, 1981, under the title "The Second Republic Regime." The post-revolutionary period of Iran and the views of the various personalities in support of the Islamic Revolution are projected in this article.

An excerpt from the article says, "Anyone who emerges victorious in the Islamic Revolution will eventually triumph over the Persian Gulf region."

Marvin Qaleb, an American political author, published a book on the recent events in Iran in which he stated the following: "In 1980, the United States requested the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, to play the intermediary role between the Soviet Union and the United States in the drawing-up of a plan for the division of Iran whereby the U.S.S.R. would acquire the northern part of Iran and the U.S., the southern part. The proposal was outrightly rejected by the Soviet Union."

This plan by the U.S. authorities signified the importance Iran plays in the prosperity of the United States. It also signified the apprehension of the United States, concerning the Islamic Revolution which would ultimately influence the Persian Gulf region.

Although the U.S. policy of intensifying the internal social and political tension of Iran has been regarded unfeasible by prominent political observers, the presence of the Moslem people of Iran has time and again proved that no such plot to dent the solidarity of the nation would be practical in Iran.

The White House officials are extremely unhappy that the Islamic Revolution of Iran has succeeded in eradicating all western influence from the country, for the evil dreams of the U.S. have been utterly thwarted.

Richard Pyber, a political advisor in the Reagan Administration, expressed his apprehension with regard to the chaotic political situation in Iran.

Pyber is reported to have said that the Islamic Revolution of Iran would eventually provoke the other regional countries to take more decisive action in managing their own affairs.

He is also reported to have alarmed the U.S. authorities about the lack of security on the frontiers of the Islamic Republic. He also declared that the current Iraq imposed war was enough proof of the fact that Iran lay open to foreign intervention.

In another part of the article, Pyber stated that even if the past 2 years had failed to see the accomplishment of the ideological goals of the Islamic Revolution, this does not mean that the revolution has been defeated.

"Every revolution has to weather its course to obtain its anticipated goals," Pyber was quoted as saying.

Michael Fuco, a French scientist and a prominent researcher of the Islamic Revolution, is reported to have claimed that each revolution has to encounter challenging ordeals in bringing to fruition its goals.

Fuco also stated that the present political upheaval in Iran is the inevitable consequence of the historical obligations that should be considered perfectly natural, since every revolution in the world has to pass through such alarming phases. The Iranian nation should aspire towards spiritual perfection, just in the same way as the determined French nation accomplished the French Revolution.

In this respect, the revolutionary Moslem people should be prepared to make many sacrifices in order to accomplish their revolutionary goals.

Fuco also stated that the Islamic Revolution had delineated the political identity of the Iranian nation.

In another part of this article, Fuco was quoted as saying that the provocative dubious broadcasts of the mass media of the Western world has always distorted the news emanating from Iran.

CSO: 4600/160

'RUMORS OF ARMS PURCHASE' ANALYZED BY FOREIGN MINISTRY

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Aug 81 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN (Pars) -- A top advisor to J.F. Kennedy, Piere Salinger recently alleged in a television interview that Iran has purchased arms from Israel and later, Iran's ousted President Banisadr in Paris confirmed the allegation.

The interview with the veteran U.S. advisor has coincided with fresh efforts of the United States for manipulating public opinion about the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Iranian government throughout the world.

The Iranian Foreign Minister referred to the fresh wave of efforts for disreputing the Islamic Revolution of Iran as an effort by the world imperialists for "severing the relations of the oppressed masses throughout the world with the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and making them pessimistic about it."

He said, "We have neither a vast resource of arms, nor a fully developed economy. We are bankrupt of all levers by which the Superpowers manipulate the people here and there for the purpose of attaining their ambitions. But we have a lever by far more powerful than what they have: It is the interest and sympathy of the oppressed masses of the world with the Iranian Revolution and the ever increasing spell of the message of Islam on the people throughout the world.

The Iranian foreign minister referred to the strafing of the Iraq's nuclear plant as a carefully studied plan carried out in collaboration with the reactionary regimes of the region in a bid to exploit it as a propaganda subject for himself throughout the world.

He said the interview on the American television had been a loophole in the chain of imperialistic plots against Iran which had gained impetus in the wake of the bombardment of Iraq's Osirak reactor. He said these plots against the Islamic Revolution have significant implications since they are being carried out in the wake of the positive response of the Palestinian ambassador to Iran to the proposal for the formation of a United Islamic Front against imperialism and Zionism. He also said that if the Iranian government had ever purchased any arms from Israel, such purchase must have been negotiated by the person of Iran's ousted President Banisadr, who was the commander in chief of the Armed Forces during his office in Iran.

Musavi said that the Iranian government and the Iranian people can not rival the world powermongers and the imperialists in any of their material capabilities, nor can they rival the Zionist in their broadcast and printed media, but that instead the Iranians can publish exposes in order to disillusion the minds of the less discerning public in and outside of the country.

The Iranian foreign minister challenged the U.S. broadcast and printed media for their reticence about the struggles of the people of Palestine for freedom and the frequent strafing of residential areas in Lebanon by the Zionists, and said the misrepresentation of facts about Iran by the U.S. media signifies desperate efforts for creating division between Iran and their brothers-in-faith in the Arab countries and Palestine.

He said the United States and the rest of the enemies of the Islamic Revolution of Iran have been apprehensive of the spread of the Islamic Revolution to other countries of the region and of its subsequent threatening of the interests of the United States and Israel in the region. "In the final analysis, their plots will avail them not, since we are in the right and since we have taken a decisive and tough stand in keeping with our religious faith. They are much more likely to suffer from the harmful consequences of their plots than are we," said the Iranian foreign minister.

CSO: 4600/159

EXPORT OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION ADVOCATED BY IRAQI MOJAHEDIN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Aug 81 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN (Pars) - The weekly magazine "Soroush" printed an interview done with the Secretary General of the Alliance of the Moslem Students, of Iraq. Brethren Yunis Bagher Mussavi. The subject is "The Islamic Revolution of Iran should be exported all over the world," excerpts of which follow:

Q: Would you express your background in struggling against the Ba'athist Regime?

A: Eleven years ago, I along with the other Iraqi Mujahedins took measures in forming an Islamic Movement in Iraq. In the beginning, we started to guide the oppressed nation of Iraq and inform them of the facts. In this connection, I was repeatedly arrested and imprisoned, till I decided to leave for Iran. Last year I was a pioneer in forming the first center of the Student movement in Iraq and therefore decided to organize the Alliance of the Islamic Students of Iraq. This Alliance has numerous branches in foreign countries, particularly in the European countries, which are busy with activities against the Ba'athist regime of Iraq.

Q: In the current conditions, how do you see the situation of the Iraqi Army, after several months of the imposed war?

A: The Iraqi forces are exhausting day by day are being annihilated. After any defeat they receive from the Islamic combatants, a large number of the Iraqi military and those responsible are being placed before the firing squads, due to non-participation in the war with the Islamic combatants. Also, the Iraqi Army has lost a great amount of its military hardware.

Q: A plot occured in the bombardment of the Nuclear Reactors by the Zionists, what was the aim of this plot in your opinion?

A: This plot which was conducted by the reactionary countries of the region and with the cooperation of imperialism and the international Zionism, was because they were all aware that Iraq is near destruction by the Moslem Ummat of Iran and believed that if the Moslem Iranians get access to these reactors they would certainly use them for annihilating the above said countries.

Q: How do you forsee the future of the war, after the dismissal of Banisadr by the Imam and the Majlis and removal of the compromizing path?

A: After Banisadr's dismissal, he was determined to create fear somehow, in order to return to his former power. In a statement, Banisadr has said that if he was put aside, Abadan would have been captured by Iraq, but during his days of dismissal, we witnessed the combatants of Islam freeing the Abadan-Mahshahr road. This shows that he was one of the factors of the war of attrition in Iran particularly in Abadan and Khorramshahr which had been in the hands of the mercenaries for a while. Dismissal of Banisadr, inflicted a heavy blow on the East and West superpowers and this has caused them to resort to other work like planting bombs, assassinating, and creating chaos through their domestic lackeys.

Q: Would you express your views on the recent incidents in Iran and the disasterous event of terrorists bombing the Islamic Republican Party headquarters.

A: Prior to anything, I see it appropriate to express my deepest sympathy to Imam Khomeini and the bereaved people of Iran on this occasion. When the U.S. and its lackeys understood that they could not do anything in the war, they exerted their utmost efforts to mobilize the attached groups and create chaos in the cities so that the combatants and the people be deviated from their main path. But they are making a big mistake because the more fierce actions they take the more vigilant the masses become and the more they abided by the rules of religion, and the Islamic Republic leadership. Regarding the bomb explosion in the IRP headquarters, I should say that the martyrdom of these great ones does not inflict any harm to the Islamic Republic.

CSO: 4600/159

TARIQ 'AZIZ ON RELATIONS WITH FRANCE

JN271726 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1640 GMT 27 Aug 81

[Text] Paris, 27 Aug (INA)--Tariq 'Aziz, Revolution Command Council [RCC] member and deputy prime minister, has described his recent visit to Paris and his talks with French officials as good and as constituting a new step toward bolstering the close relations between the two countries.

In an interview with the Paris-based Arab magazine AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI which will appear in tomorrow's issue, Tariq 'Aziz said that the French officials reiterated their readiness to continue cooperation in all domains in which it previously existed, including nuclear cooperation. They also expressed their desire to continue their relations with Iraq, 'Aziz added.

The RCC member explained that the French leadership has also asserted that its cooperation with Iraq is not subject to conditions, for Iraq is an independent state which does not accept any conditions for cooperation with any state and in any field.

The RCC member expressed Iraq's desire to have excellent relations with France, adding that this entails commitments to the two sides with regard to their friendship. He said that since the French officials have dealt with Iraq's needs with a positive and understanding spirit, Iraq will reciprocate and will deal with their needs in the field of oil and other fields with the same concept and spirit.

He added that his recent visit to France was made upon the desire of President Saddam Husayn and that of the Iraqi leadership to get acquainted with President Mitterrand and the new French leadership. This visit was also dictated by the important existing relations between the two countries in various vital sectors.

The deputy prime minister said: right from the beginning, we preferred to defer this meeting until after the new French leadership had acquainted itself with the true relations with other countries, including Iraq. He added: President Mitterrand and all the French officials with whom I met expressed a profound understanding of the existing relations between Iraq and France and their importance to the two countries' vital interests. He said: We have agreed that these relations should be in line with the ambitions of Iraq and the Arab nation on the one hand, and with France's on the other.

Continuing, Tariq 'Aziz said: I have told the French officials that the essence of Iraq's policy toward building international relations and toward building long-

range relations with France can be summed up with the word independence. Iraq is eager to preserve its independence and strongly supports Arab independence. Iraq, he added believes that its cooperation with France in all vital sectors will enhance this independence and France's independent line, for France's cooperation with Iraq and with those countries eager to preserve their independence will enable France to bolster its independent policy.

Touching on the U.S. call to proclaim the Middle East area a denuclearized zone, Tariq 'Aziz said: if the proposal is meant to destroy all of Israel's nuclear weapons and to prevent it from producing nuclear weapons in the future, we have no objection to end the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the area, for we are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in this area. That is why we signed the treaty prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, if the proposal is meant to cover up for the Zioist nuclear war program and to prevent the Arabs from possessing nuclear technology, we will resist it.

CSO: 4304/132

INDUSTRY MINISTER COMMENTS ON DEVELOPMENT PLAN

JN251225 Baghdad INA in English 1145 GMT 25 Aug 81

[Text] Baghdad, 25 Aug (INA)--Iraq has signed contracts on industrial projects during the period of war with Iran [which have--FBIS] reached an amount of a billion Iraqi dinar (more than U.S. dollars 3.5 billion), Iraqi revolution command council member and minister of industry and minerals Tahir Tawfiq said.

In a statement to INA, the Iraqi official said the process of industrial development in Iraq is going ahead according to its normal plan.

Iraq was anticipating an aggression since its efforts to achieve a solid economic base does not satisfy the super powers and the Zionist aggression on the Iraqi nuclear reactor was the second phase after the Persian aggression, Mr Tawifq pointed out.

The Iraqi minister said allocations of the industrial sector for the year 1980 reached 7 times more than the allocations of the 5-year plan of 1965-1969.

Iraq which is defending its territories and waters was expecting a 39 percent growth in Iraqi budget and investment programs and had proved high efficiency in implementing programmes of the socialist industrial sector the RCC member added.

On joint projects between Iraq and the Arab countries, Mr Tawfiq said Iraq is endeavoring to develop these projects in order to reach an Arab industrial integration through Arab specialized unions and organizations.

Speaking on Iraq's contribution in Arab organization, the Iraqi minister said Iraq is a member of several organizations such as the Arab Organization for Mineral Resource, the Arab Company for Mining, the Bahrain-based Arab Company for Steel and Iron and the Arab Company Minerals in Mauritania.

Iraq is seeking for an Arab developed industrial integration in order to consolidate the Arab nation's economic role, the Iraqi officials concluded.

CSO: 4300/97

STUDENTS OF NEAR-EASTERN ORIGIN DISCUSS ETHNIC DIVISIONS

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 26 Jun 81 p 9

[Opinion Poll by N. Golan: "Has the Integration of Exiles Failed?"]

[Text] The brandishing of political slogans such as "Integration of Exiles Has Failed" or "Ethnic Discrimination" will not advance their exploiters far, at least not among the circles of religiously observant, intellectual youth--as I discovered the day before yesterday (Wednesday evening) in my discussion with a group of students, most of them members of Near Eastern communities, at the University of Bar Ilan. It is possible that the fostering of feelings of frustration and deprivation "works" on "your people," but whoever is attempting to ride the ethnic crest on the backs of the religiously observant intellectuals as well will discover that he is riding the trough rather than the crest of the wave. "That's an ephemeral manifestation," my interviewees argued in one of the rooms of the student dormitory at the university.

A. Has the integration of exiles failed?

B. Has any one of you ever suffered personally from discrimination or deprivation because of your origin or seen others suffer for such reasons?

C. Is it possible to bridge the gaps or to attain the aims of exile integration in ethnic politics?

Uri Zahavi (A third-year accounting student, native of Kiryat Unu, graduate of the Itry Yeshiva in Jerusalem and the preacademic preparatory class at Bar Ilan):

In all of my experience--in the neighborhood, in the schools where I studied, in the local council of Kiryat Unu where I am active, as well as at the university--I never came up against anything that could have aroused in me any kind of bitterness because of my Near Eastern origin. I do, in fact, hear talk about deprivation, but the speakers belong to the adult generation, the parent generation, or those who were not born in this country and came here as children or adults. In my generation, among the fellows who are my contemporaries and who studied with me on the secondary level, went into military service and are at the University today, people are measured solely on the basis of intellectual capacity, initiative and personal capabilities, and I can testify from personal experience that origin

plays no role. In my opinion, if there is a social gap, if there is a sense of discrimination, it will pass away in another generation or two at most. If I am correct, even the discrimination that exists stems not from ethnic causes but from other factors. If my parents, when they arrived in this country, had been at the same intellectual level as those coming from Europe there would not have been created any kind of deprivation at all. Differences in culture and the intellectual gap are what created an attitude of arrogance on the one hand and feelings of inferiority on the other, and this phenomenon was erroneously attributed to ethnic origin. As the intellectual level of those who originated in Islamic countries becomes euual to that of people of European origin, the gap will disappear by itself.

Tzion Danino (of Shalomi, graduate of the Yeshiva in Kfar Haro'e, a first year economics student):

What is this integration of exiles? I don't understand who ever pushed this talk about integrating exiles anyhow. The Sephardis came to this country with an ancient culture and with a Mediterranean Jewish tradition that differs from that of the European, and the natives of Europe came with a technological and scientific culture, and no integration between two such different elements can be achieved. However, if by integration is meant the attitude of mutual respect or the level of education--it's true that in the early years of the state those with oriental origins suffered from an attitude of deprivation, from the well-known pejorative labelings ("Franks") and the like. Today, it appears to me that these manifestations are disappearing, not as a result of planned progress or a directed experiment, but rather as a result of the adaptation of those with Near Eastern origins to Western culture; and therefore, if I lived in situations that might have created in me feelings of bitterness because of my origin, I always knew that the biases stemmed from objective causes, from an objective intellectual gap, which is impossible to ignore among people of one origin compared with those of another. Even in the military, when they hear that you are from an absorption center or an immigrant village, some check you out more than others, and some investigate more carefully even if you are fully cleared. But then again I do not know if I have a legitimate complaint: an environment is an essential element in development and if you come from an environment that does not have the greatest reputation in society, it influences, in the beginning at least, the social attitude toward you...

We Always Studied Together, Sephardis and Ashkenazis

Yitzhak Weiss (graduate student in psychology, native of Natanya, graduate of the Midrashiya in Pardes Hana):

We give too much attention to the social gap and the efforts to narrow it, rather than focusing on the cooperative creativity and the fostering of a sense of unity. When I was a student at the Midrashiya and members of all ethnic groups studied with me, never once did I hear talk about origin, not once did I encounter difficulty in a relationship with anyone because of my origin. In the dorms and in social situations we lived and studied together, the weak and the strong, Ashkenazis and Sephardis, with no ethnic consciousness whatsoever. Perhaps during the days of Ben Gurion, when an attempt was made to "Ashkenazise" the Sephardis,

there was some kind of injustice perpetrated on those with origins in Islamic countries, but during my generation this has disappeared almost entirely.

Nor do I understand talk about integration. Why integrate? In a democratic society everyone can live with the tradition of his ancestors, to observe "listen my son to the teachings of your father," and need not give up his individuality in custom and life style. This is exactly as it should be.

On the other hand, if by integration is meant to close intellectual gaps, prodigious and successful efforts have been and are being made to close educational gaps in every system of Israeli education, including the university, and particularly in a place such as Bar Ilan where the percentage of students from Middle Eastern communities is greater than at any other university in the country (and in addition, observance of the Commandments and mutual religious tradition bridges gaps), so that any talk about integration of exiles that failed or succeeded is irrelevant.

Yitzhak Lichterman (third year student, international relations, native of Tiberias, graduate of the Secondary Yeshiva in Kiryat Shmuel):

The problem of the non-integration of exiles is no problem at all. I support the view that we did not come to this country to achieve the integration of exiles but rather an ingathering of exiles. Everyone should observe his traditions and his customs. What should be done is to increase, consciously, love and closeness among people. Nor do I understand the allegations of interethnic unfairness and alienation. I come from a family in which there are many mixed marriages and I have yet to see in my experience any difference at all in the educational achievements or in other achievements among the young of this or that ethnic group. It all depends on the individual, his capacility, his talents, his aspirations, and whoever chooses a liberal profession is not concerned about discrimination, deprivation. I'm convinced that all the recent attention to the issue is artificial, and is intended to achieve political goals and does not have behind it any factual basis.

Avraham Suleiman (second year student, Hebrew language and Israeli history, native of Natanya, graduate of the Secondary Yeshiva in Natanya):

Integration? No one wants integration or assimilation. Let each group preserve its uniqueness. The entire approach expressed in the slogan that you mentioned is a secular approach, the result of political disappointment, of operators who have established an ephemeral list to advance personal goals.

In reality, the percentage of intellectuals among the Middle Eastern communities is increasing yearly, so that the gap is narrowing of itself. When I studied at the Secondary Yeshiva, the number of those like myself was negligible, whereas today, as a teacher at the secondary level of the Yeshiva in Givat Shmuel, I have many students from Middle Eastern groups. Even at the Yishuv Hehadash Yeshiva in Tel Aviv, supposedly an exclusive Ashkenazi preserve, there are today students of Middle Eastern origin...

I Sensed No Ethnic Discrimination

Uzi Danino (first year student, economics, native of Ganey Tikva, graduate of the Himmelfarb Secondary School, fulfilled senior command responsibilities in the IDF, former secretary local Shlomi Council, coordinator of the Honhut Perah Project):

Let's start with me. I never personally encountered any attitude of discrimination because of my origin, in any of the schools where I studied, in the military, in society or at the university, and I have developed no sensitivity about my origin. At the same time, I am aware of the objective conditions that create feelings of inferiority among the Sephardic communities in the country. The predominant culture in Israel is Western and European, and whoever has not been acclimated to that since childhood senses an alienation or an inferiority. But this does not relate to the groups or to the ethnic tradition, and no one has ever claimed that the Romanian or the Polish tradition is superior to the tradition of the people of Morrocan origin. The question is, are equal opportunities afforded in this country to everyone, and apparently (among other reasons because in every acceptance committee and in every institution the people at the top are Ashkenazis) there is a preference in the choice of people for positions and assignments toward those of European origin, but that too is changing, and in the military and in educational circles it does not exist at all. On the contrary, in educational circles there is reverse discrimination and more funds, scholarships and other aid are allocated to people of the Middle Eastern communities to accelerate their progress.

Haim Nahshoni (fourth year student, psychology and educational guidance, native of Nes Tziona, graduate of the Yeshiva at Kerem Divnad and graduate of the Bar Ilan Kollel)

I can also testify, based on personal experience, that in all of the Mamad schools in which I studied they educated all of us to a unity and an understanding among groups and I can recall no instance of deprivation or a feeling of bitterness because of my origin. All of this ethnic talk is designed to make "political capital..."

Tzion Danino: Instead of discussing gaps or the closing of gaps, people should be told to start helping themselves. True reality should be accepted in a simple and straightforward manner. There is an intellecuual gap, its causes are historical, it was unavoidable and today it can be bridged and not through an operation of help on the part of the Ashkenazis or Sephardis, but rather by each individual, by his efforts and his personal means, and that's it...

Uri Zahavi: Talk about a gap and conscious attention to the gap will not only prevent people's progress, it will even bring about retrogression... On the whole issue of the gap, preconceived notions play a role as well as irrational emotions, and therefore we must strive for unity, toward mutual progress in a single party, so that the competent one, irrespective of his origin, will be able to move ahead. An ethnic party will perpetuate the gap and will not create a bridge between the people and the communities...

Yitzhak Weiss: I am particularly surprised that an ethnic party was created by a religiously observant man, a product of the national religious education system, who absorbed the ideology of the Land of Israel in accordance with the Torah of Israel for the people of Israel. If he had properly absorbed what he has been taught, he would be striving for the opposite goal of more unity, more cooperation. Inasmuch as he has been doing the reverse, it must be concluded that his motivations were personal and political and not social or ideological; he is exploiting the ethnic factor as a political base.

Tzion Danino: If there were to be 20 Sephardic Knesset members would that satisfy the people who feel inferior because of intellectual or economic lag? Even if there were to be 120 Sephardic members of the Knesset would that then guarantee that the entire nation would turn intellectual and progressive? In politics, gaps are not closed...

Uri Zahavi: A legislative body can certainly help, for example by allocating budgets for educational projects that are designed to close the educational gap...

Tzion Danino: If that is so, then even today such projects are given a maximum of resources although an ethnic list is still not operating in the Knesset. Incidentally, I'm even annoyed by the ethnic allocation in the lists for the Knesset. What's this sudden choice of two or three Sephardis only because of their origin, and their placement on the list? Let choices be made on the basic of qualifications and nothing else...

Ethnic List Not Solving Problems

Yitzhak Lichterman: An ethnic list will in fact not solve the problems of a gap, but what will it do? It will create antagonism toward the community which it represents, thereby intensifying instead of solving the problem. I agree with Tzion that even allocation of positions in accordance with ethnic groups in the various parties is an absurdity; it denigrates every ethnic group that is afforded a position and members of that ethnic group should deplore such an effort rather than fight for it...

Haim Nahshoni: Our age group, which knows how to live cooperatively with no ethnic consciousness, considers it weird that suddenly politicians appear to inform us: You're a Yemenite, you're a Moroccan, you're an Ashkenazi...

Yitzhak Weiss: In our age group there are no problems in any area, not even in food... We learned to eat gefilte fish with horseradish...

Avraham Seleiman: In theory, someone might have thought that an ethnic coalition in the Knesset would advance legislation desirable to his group and the like. But in effect, even if a thousand daws are passed for that group, the very fact that they were spread against an ethnic background would perpetuate the isolation, and therein lies the greatest sin with regard to the integration of exiles--the fact that in this way gaps are enlarged...I, too, oppose political-ethnic allocations in the lists for the Knesset; let only those capable be chosen, even if, at the moment, it would appear that there are no Sephardis politically capable...

Uzi Danino: I agree with my colleagues. The ethnic quotas should be thrown out in the Knesset lists. There is no need to worry. Time will take care of things, and the capable ones from all groups will rise and will progress...

Gonan Ginat (second year student, government and psychological sciences):

One comment: Anyone attempting to create a new gap, to say that now I am separating and dividing in order that later things will improve and there will be more integration, is only acting like a wise guy, or playing a cynical and interesting political game...

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CSO: 4323/22

INTEGRATION OF MIDEASTERN JEWS VIEWED AS SUCCESSFUL

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Jun 81 p 8

[Article by Kalir Yaniv: "Integration of Mideastern Ethnic Groups in the Country—A Success"]

[Text] I was shocked to hear the argument that the integration of Mideastern groups in the country has failed. It was particularly difficult to listen to this view from a veteran public figure such as Aharon Ozen. Our system makes possible a broad and varied spectrum of viewpoints, but he chose the unequivocal definition "failure." This is a difficult and painful definition to everyone involved in the matter of integration and to every citizen to whom the issue is close to the heart. More than that, it would appear to me that in a young and small country whose populace is so varied there are apt to be undesirable results from this kind of thinking.

Quite often I have heard from relatives, acquaintances and friends allegations that they suffered deprivation because of their ethnic background, Among these allegations were instances that touched the heart—temporarily. It is important, on this issue, to ask those making such accusations whether this deprivation against which they argue is anchored in law? And if it is not anchored in law, as we well know, every citizen is free and obliged to protest an injustice perpetrated on him until it is satisfactorily resolved and not to contribute to a clouded atmosphere of grumbling.

The allegations are, in principle, of a social or personal nature, arguments about the lack of proper representation, the lack of an approach to important issues, a lack of esteem and, in particular, disrespect.

Such allegations are by nature prevalent in so multifaceted a society to which immigrants have come in groups and whose process of stabilization has not yet been completed. To the extent that we deal with these allegations with patience and calmness, so much the better. Expressions such as antisemitism against Mideastern groups only inflame passions. It happens that a Jew whose origin is in Iraq is called an Iraqi and one from Morocco is called a Moroccan, just as they say Yekke, Polish or Romanian, and the exaggerated sensitivity is on the part of the protestor against that labeling.

There was a time, before the rise of the state, when the matter of the ethnic origin was not emphasized as strongly. Afterwards there was a period in which some of the members of the Mideastern communities were ashamed of their identity. Today, because of progress and a stand of unification on the part of the communities, there is a tendency to emphasize origin. I don't want to say with a knowing smile, this too shall pass--but clearly we are living in a situation that is not static and there should be no fear, in my view, for the perpetuation of the intercommunity situation now existing. That is why I am amazed at those alleging failure of intercommunal integration. I see success, albeit it not complete. Were it not for the problem of the distressed neighborhoods, it would be possible to argue that success was complete.

I see success in the integration of the Mideastern communities in the country both individually and in general. It is enough to look around you at the large number of intercommunal marriages at all levels of the population and the large crop of children of these marriages, from a number of generations, who no longer belong to any group except to the Israeli nation. In another few generations we will be totally incapable of determining the ethnic origin of most citizens of the state.

It is enough to listen to Israeli music and to the Mideastern bases of it, or to sample the Israeli kitchen, to become convinced that there is here an integration that speaks for itself, or to lend an ear to the language and to distinguish in all of the words and the expressions that have become part of the language the fact that their origin is in one ethnic jargon or another. It is worth remembering that we pronounce Hebrew in the Sephardic accent, while Ashkenazic has been almost forgotten. What is that, if not integration? I have noted but a few factors that come to mind while writing. Anyone doing a study on the matter would certainly find more. Every community contributed from what it possesses. The question of integration is too important for us to use as ammunition in an election.

I, too, am of the Mideastern communities. I came to the country with my parents from Iraq at a young age, a number of years before the establishment of the state. I grew up in the country and feel like the grass of the field in this land. Our viewpoint is dependent on and linked with our sensitivity toward this country. A large portion of members of the Mideastern groups has maintained a passive stance with respect to the country. While yearning for the land and coming to it, the group was not active in practical Zionism as a movement and came to the country through immigration projects. Perhaps in this too there is the root of its passive approach. At times, indeed, the question arises for me: What has the state done for me? Or I have this many children. What do I get? But there is insufficient inclination to do for ourselves. The Mideastern communities have their own rich. But no matter what they do for their community members of lesser means, they do not do enough. Here is a goal appropriate for the philanthropy of Nissim Ga'on. It requires internal initiative within the Mideastern communities to recruit the rich of the communities for their poor, and this will contribute to the raising of our self-respect. I am amazed at the content of the "concept of respect" that is still prevalent among us. What respect do we desire? What image do we want? Doing for the state is what brings about representation. Do we want a numerical representation merely for its own sake? Are we a coalition of communities?

I see an error in community representation not only because it is impractical and impossible, but because the community distinction has already become blurred. And in general, why do only the religiously observant circles speak for the Mideastern groups? Why don't other circles give expression to their opinions and thereby put a stop to the tangential manifestations in the Mideastern communities that certain newspaper people represent as though they were typical of Mideastern groups? Today, when the question of the trial of Minister of Abu Hatzeira comes up, immediately there are heard remarks about a conspiracy against the Mideastern communities; it is interesting that when Asher Yadlin was sentenced there was never any fear of a conspiracy Is not this situation a distortion to begin with? When Nissim Gaon (in an interview for YEDI'OT AHARONOT on 5 June 81) speaks of Abu Hatzeira, he doesn't praise the man, but rather says: "He represents one of the noble and religiously observant families in Israel that immigrated from Morocco and had many supporters." I hope that we are not returning to a period of condescension. Eastern communities, now more than ever, need idealistic leadership whose goal is unity. Leadership that will be prepared and be acceptable to members of the commuiity as well as to the nation as a whole.

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CSO: 4323/22

BRIEFS

LAV'I PLANE DETAILS--The projected Air Force fighter plane Lav'i will be somewhat smaller than the F-16 and will incorporate expanded utilization of micro-electronics in the fulfillment of its missions. The Lav'i will be so planned that it will be assigned missions whose cost is less than the missions of F-16 aircraft, which are exceedingly expensive to operate, AVIATION WEEK says in this week's issue. The weekly quotes the general manager of Aircraft Industries, Gavriel Gidor, who explained why a Pratt & Whitney 1120 engine has been chosen for the Lav'i: A stronger engine was selected so that it would have sufficient power to carry and activate the modern armaments that are to be developed for it within the next decade. Gidor explained that the arms and ammunition to be carried by the Lav'i, the electronic battle devices and the rest of the equipment of this fighter plane are yet to be developed, and since the Lav'i will be in production in the nineties and will serve the Air Force even after the year 2,000, an engine was chosen whose power would allow installation of all of this sophisticated equipment. Gidor added that the decision on armaments to be installed in the Lav'i is to be postponed to a later date, so that it will be possible to select from among the most modern devices available throughout the world during the coming years. The electronic antidetection devices, said Gidor, will be manufactured in Israel. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Jun 81 p 3]

GROUND-TO-GROUND MISSILE PRODUCTION--Israeli television announced on 9 August, for the first time, that the Israeli military industry would start production of a very powerful 290-mm caliber ground-to-ground missile. Very few details are known about these missiles, the development of which started shortly after the June 1967 war. According to Sunday's news-report concerning the project, the missiles are already operational. They are launched from a platform in a similar manner to the Stalin/ub utilized by the Palestinian forces for their Katyushas. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Aug 81 p 20]

CSO: 4319/9

MEMBER OF PAST REGIME CRITICIZED FOR COOPERATING WITH NUMAYRI

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 528, 27 Jul 81 pp 22, 23

[Article: "The Case Called the Servants of the Servant"]

[Text] In May, circles close to Ja'afar Numayri leaked a report, stating that he was determined to leave his post, and abandon political life. This report, in the view of those informed about the situation in Sudan, was a cause of alarm for every Sudanese citizen. However, the Sudanese paid no attention to this report, since they definitely believe that Numayri is resolved to continue his unique control over the people of Sudan. He will only accept the points of spears as a way to oust him. As for Numayri's statements, from time to time, that he wants to leave power, they are only the expression of a dictator's whims. They are whims that have specific goals and objectives.

The adulation that Numayri listens to night and day, from his supporters, might make him believe that he is the people's hero, and the inspired, sole leader. Consequently, he has become convinced that, as soon as the Sudanese people hear the report that their beloved leader (by 20 million citizens) has resolved to resign, they will rush into mourning clothes, and march in wailing processions, threatening to commit collective suicide, if Numayri carries out his intention.

Numayri might wish to delude his people by new means, since he fooled them for several days that what they long for had become a fact, and that Sudan was rid of Numayri. Then, the harsh truth became obvious; it was that he will remain! Numayri might have wanted to give his supporters the opportunity to vie in their adulation and praise for him, adding once more to the arts of hypocrisy, flattery and self-delusion.

Accordingly, the Sudanese ignored this report, which said that Numayri was leaving. However, they were astonished when they heard that the minister of communications, Dr Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad, said to Numayri.

What was said?

Did Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad say to Numayri: "You are a despot, a dictator, whose hands are stained with the blood of your people. Cooperation with you is a shame, which cannot be erased, and an irrevocable mistake"?

According to the information published by the Sudanese newspaper AL-AYYAM, Numayri was prepared to conclude a cabinet meeting, when Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad stood up, requesting permission to speak. He did not wait to hear a response, as the newspaper states, but rather, he began to speak at once, claiming that he spoke for himself, in the name of his ministerial colleagues, and in the name of all the Sudanese people.

He attacked the parties.

He attacked the sects.

He attacked the Sovereignty Council.

He attacked the constitution.

He attacked the Sudanese opposition.

He then praised Numayri, as if parents could not give birth to another quite like him. He said to him: "Only you can unite Sudan." "Sudan still needs you." "May you achieve what only you and no other can achieve." "You are the symbol of unity and progress." "Continue, so that Sudan will make progress."

Who is Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad?

How did he acquire his qualifications to become a spokesman of the man on the Sudanese street?

Those who know the ways of political life in Sudan confirm that the Sudanese interest in what Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad says is only the interest of contempt and scorn. What he says, in their view, is merely an opportunistic policy that is beneath contempt.

At the start of his working life, Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad was editor of the newspaper, SAWT AL-SUDAN, the spokesman of the National Unionist Movement. It was a successful paper, to the extent that the people swarmed around the vendors to buy it in a crowd, to avoid police interference.

He then became secretary of the Democratic Unionist Party and minister of commerce in the Mahghub government, which was toppled in the May revolution.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad was arrested and tried on a charge of corruption, and as a representative of the previous regime. He was sentenced to prison and in fact did go to jail. Note that Muhammad Ahmad Mahghub, who was the prime minister, was not tried and did not go to prison.

Before Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad completed his prison term in Kawbar prison, in North Khartoum, he was visited by Babakr 'Awdhullah, at that time the vice president. He met with him to conclude a secret deal and then Hamad was escorted to his home. Major Abu Qasim Hashim, secretary of the Revolutionary Command Council, announced that the trial of Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad had not been aimed at him personally but at the "previous" regime.

Then Babakr 'Awdhullah, in his capacity of minister of foreign affairs, issued a statement that the Sudanese Goverment had approved the appointment of Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad as one of the Arab League secretary general's assistants.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad continued in this post for some years, which was tantamount to probation and a test of his loyalty to his new masters.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad was successful in his test, since he did not take any position contrary to the Numayri regime. On the countrary, he volunteered to escort any Sudanese official who visited Egypt.

When the Baghdad summit conference issued its decree, requiring the transfer of the Arab League headquarters from Cairo to Tunis, Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad rejected this decree, and remained in Cairo, until Numayri recalled him and offered him the post of minister of communications and membership in the Political Bureau of the Socialist Union. He accepted at once, but later he claimed that he had only agreed under certain conditions. This was to achieve what he called national conciliation between the Numayri regime and the Sudanese opposition, which is led by al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, head of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). If he did not achieve this conciliation within 6 months, he would resign.

He repeated these words many times at functions, celebrations, and in statements. However, conciliation between Numayri and the Sudanese opposition was not achieved, and Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad did not submit his resignation as he had claimed. On the contrary he continued to cooperate with Numayri sincerely and with incomparable enthusiasm.

It is worth noting that last year Ahamad al-Sayyid Hamad led a delegation composed of religious and political dignitaries to represent Sudan in the so-called League of Islamic and Arab Peoples. Al-Sadat adopted the idea for this league in order to bolster, by popular support, his peace with Israel. It was an unsuccessful gathering of 'Ulama. That Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad was chosen to head the delegation was no coincidence. On the contrary it came about because of his old connections with the Egyptian security apparatus.

The Treachery Continues

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad is not the only one who has betrayed his principles and repudiated them. In the blackest of circumstances he abandoned his party and his leader, al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, head of the DUP. The Sudanese still remember another traitor, al-Rashid al-Tahir Bakr, the present president of what is called in Sudan, the People's Assembly. He also was one of the leaders of the DUP; then he surrendered to Numayri's enticements, who has done everything he could to fragment his party, using bribes, threats and promises as means of achieving his ends. He has not succeeded and the DUP remains united under the banner of its leader al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi.

Why Does Numayri Cooperate With Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad?

Numayri is very much aware that the real danger that threatenes his existence as ruler of Sudan, lurks in the political opposition groups. Therefore, he tries to sow the seeds of discord within the ranks of these groups whis is his basic objective.

When Numayri cooperated with Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad he thought that his cooperation would create a serious schism within the DUP resulting in weakening it and fragmenting its power. However, events came to prove that what Numaryi thought would be a victory for him turned into an ugly defeat, thanks to the consciousness of the Sudanese people. When Numaryi cooperated with Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad he imagined that he was dealing with a political leader supported by the masses of the Sudanese people. However, it later became clear to him that he was dealing with just one individual who only represented himself and who could not carry out any effective role in political life since he was held in public scorn. The Sudanese people are not ignorant, and when they give their affection and trust to some politician, the love and trust are not for the person. On the contrary, they are for the principles that he espouses and just as soon as he changes and betrays those principles he is immediately renounced and dealt with as an enemy.

It must be recognized that Numayri would not have dealt with Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad unless he was convinced that he was corrupt. It is well known about Numaryi that he prefers to deal with those who are corrupt like himself. He has confidence in their loyalty to him. Therefore talking about Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad is not because of any great importance that he has but rather his sole importance stems from his being a model for the opportunistic intellectual who uses principles, values and high standards as ways of ensuring himself of obtaining the highest posts. His importance also is that it is embodied in his betrayal of his past and his attempts to sell this past in the political marketplace for the purpose of personal gain.

What Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad told Numayri is proof of his isolation from the people and his attempt to maintain his political position through the use of flattery is one of the reasons for the misery and wretchedness of the people.

A Brief Mention Must Be Made

What Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad told Numayri in the recent cabinet meeting does require in the view of those who are concerned with Sudan the following mention:

How does Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad dare to claim to speak for all the Sudanese people?

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad may have the right to speak for himself and on behalf of his ministerial colleagues. But he and they are mercenaries whose ranks are united by just one goal--to continue to obtain more personal gain without regard for the daily tragedy in which the Sudanese people exist as a result of Numayri's despotic rule. As for his claiming to speak on behalf of the Sudanese people, his claim is an insult to that people. The people always hold up to harsh and severe accountability those who insult them.

Perhaps the only politician who has the right to speak for his people is that one who has dedicated his life to the service of his people and who has made vast sacrifices for them.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad attacked the parties, yet in the past he was a prominent partisan who believed in the parties and the sects despite the fact that his existence, as a politician, depended on the Khatmiyah sect which he still tries to exploit.

He attacked the Sovereignty Council but that is an institution trying to govern Sudan with a rule that can be described as a serious effort to give the Sudanese people the freedom, justice and well-being they aspire to. He attacked the constitution but the constitution was the sincere expression of the Sudanese people's beliefs. He attacked the Sudanese opposition and that front is what the Sudanese consider capable of liberating them from Numayri and his myrmidons.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad's entire statement was proof of the fact that he has benefited from his previous experience as minister of trade. He has become very good at trading in principles and values.

It is certain that what Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad said to Numayri at this particular stage in the history of the Sudan in which Numayri has turned into a shedder of his people's blood, exposes the decadence that could be used to describe someone who has betrayed his principles, his people and who cooperates with their enemies.

Numayri has the right to boast that he has achieved one thing during his regime and with out being aware of it. That accomplishment was his laying bare a group of intellectuals and exposing their misleading role. At a specific time in history they are trying to pretend that they are the well-known sword aimed against tyrannical despots. However, now it has become clear that they are a knife that cannot cut an onion.

If it is a tragedy that Numayri, while trying to maintain his power in Sudan, has turned into a servant of forces hostile to the Arab nation, it is an even blacker tragedy for the servants of the servant who are enduring the people's wrath and scorn. At the same time they are subjected to constant fear that they will lose their status with their master. Thus they become clowns who leap and jump around in a circus owned by Ja'afar Numayri.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad has proved himself an able clown who tries to fire at his master's foes but only succeeds in wounding himself.

7005
CSO: 4504/53

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GHANA--ABU Dhabi, 25 Aug (GNA)--The governments of the UAE and Ghana have decided to establish diplomatic relations on the ambassadorial level as of today, Tuesday 25 August 1981. A foreign ministry communique stated today that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries stems from their mutual desire to bolster friendship and to further cooperation between the two countries. [Text] [GF250733 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0602 GMT 25 Aug 81]

CSO: 4300/97

NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FRONT EXPRESSES INTEREST IN DIALOGUE

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 3 Jul 81 p 8

[Article: "Secretary General of the Yemeni 13 June Front Says, 'We Are Prepared To Cease Fire, Resume Responsible Dialogue; We Stand Alongside the Struggle of the National Movement' "]

[Text] Maj Mujahid al-Qahali secretary general of the 13 June Front for the Popular Forces and member of the secretariat of the National Democratic Front in the Yemen Arab Republic held a press conference in Beirut yesterday. Maj al-Qahali reviewed the current situation in North Yemen and the role which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is playing directly or through the Wahabi or Muslim Brothers it hires to prevent the restoration of stability to Yemen and to fan the fires of the war that is being waged by the San'a' authorities against the National Front and Yemeni cities and villages.

Comrade al-Qahali affirmed the solidarity of the Yemeni National Front and the Yemeni people with the struggle that the Lebanese people are fighting under the leadership of the National Movement. He said, "We are united in solidarity with the Lebanese National Movement, and we support it. We consider ourselves struggling together against a common enemy. As an expression of our solidarity our comrades are fighting in the ranks of the joint Lebanese-Palestinian forces." Al-Qahali saluted Syria's courageous decision to introduce defense missiles into al-Biqa', and he described that decision as "a reaction to Zionist aggression."

Al-Qahali indicated in his press conference that the National Democratic Front was founded on 11 February 1976. It was formed of seven political organizations and several popular organizations in addition to numerous national, independent gatherings and personalities. Early in 1979 the 13 June Front for Popular Forces joined the National Democratic Front."

Al-Qahali explained that the front "was fighting to establish a national democratic regime that would guarantee sovereignty for the homeland, democracy for the people and unity for Yemen."

He accused Saudi Arabia of interfering in Yemen's internal affairs and of conspiring against its sovereignty and independence. He revealed that

Saudi forces were making daily deeper incursions into Yemeni territory and said that the San'a' authorities, with support and encouragement from Saudi Arabia, have been waging an attack on democracy and the people for years. He said that scores of Yemeni citizens were suffering in prisons and detention camps and in the central prison in San'a' whose costs were paid by Saudi Arabia. That prison was built according to plans made by West Germans, and it holds numerous nationalists.

He said that the National Democratic Front "has always tried to establish peace and stability in North Yemen but that it has always been directly opposed by the vicious, armed means of the government. Sometimes our front has been confronted by the hired forces that are organized under the supervision of the authorities." He declared that the basic principle for the Saudis as far as Yemen was concerned was to keep the country in a state of chaos and to prevent the establishment of peace and stability in it." In this context Saudi Arabia occupied parts of Yemen, and the San'a' authorities did nothing to oppose that." He affirmed that "A regime that receives its orders from the Saudi government cannot work for the unity of the homeland."

Al-Qahali declared that the front "will continue its struggle for the unity of Yemen's soil and people [that is to be established] on democratic and sound principles."

He said that "During the past period of its political struggle the National Democratic Front has been intent on following the course of peaceful, democratic struggle as a means for achieving the goals of our Yemeni people in the Yemen Arab Republic. Our people want to preserve the national sovereignty and independence of our country. They want people to have political, democratic liberties, labor union liberties and real freedom of thought. They want the physical and emotional torture of political prisoners in the detention camps to come to an end, and they want those prisoners released. They want an end to the persecutions and the operations of driving people away from their homes. They want an end to the military campaigns that are waged against the masses of our people in the various areas of our country, and they want the formation of a national coalition government in which all national and democratic forces would take part. They want the restoration of the unity of our Yemeni homeland's soil and people by peaceful, democratic means."

He explained that the front "had pursued the method of peaceful, democratic dialogue with the government in San'a' as an alternative to dialogue with the gun since this was the way to guarantee that peace and stability would be achieved and the blood and property of our people protected from waste and destruction." He placed the responsibility for resorting to armed violence and violating the agreements that had been concluded with the' front on "circles that are more devoted clients, on those that are more deeply committed to their reactionary policies and on those who are more closely tied to the circles that oppose our Yemeni people." These circles, aided by gangs of Wahabis and Muslim Brothers, waged a war of annihilation against the Yemeni people. So far many citizens have been victims of that

war, and villages in their entirety have been destroyed and looted. Al-Qahali said that at the same time Saudi reactionaries pushed for the occupation of new areas of Yemeni territory in the governorates of Sa'dah and al-Jawf. Saudi patrols began penetrating these areas, and they kidnapped Yemeni citizens, such as First Lt Naji 'Abd-al-Hamid Sha'if, Muhammad 'Ubayd Sha'if, 'Ali Husayn 'Amir and Husayn Husayn 'Amir; their fate remains unknown.

Comrade al-Qahali revealed that last 28 June, following the failure of their military campaign, San'a' authorities resorted to a call for a cease fire and a resumption of the dialogue. Al-Qahali declared that the National Democratic Front, "as it responds to this call, is only proving once again its devotion to peace and stability. The National Democratic Front thinks that responsible national dialogue is the principal way for achieving the goals our people have for sovereignty, independence, democracy and unity. The Yemeni people will thus have an opportunity to participate actively in bringing about the victory of the crucial Arab cause of Palestine and the causes of liberation, progress and unity for which the Arab people have been struggling."

Responding to a question about the National Democratic Front al-Qahali said that a very small group [of people] had announced their dissent from the 13 June Front and had split from the National Movement. He said, "The front is prepared to conduct a dialogue with this group without any preconditions except that of a clear political view. The front is also prepared to work hand in hand with anyone who is struggling for the freedom and independence of Yemen."

Responding to another question al-Qahali said that relations between the National Front and liberation movements in the Arabian Peninsula and in the Gulf were "unshakable and strong, and that they covered numerous political, moral and military areas, when matters should make that necessary."

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END

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THE EGYPTIAN PRESS - 1981

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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NEW LINEUP IN PRESS MANAGEMENT REVIEWED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 24 Jun 81 p 1

/Article: "Newspaper Editors in Chief: No Change in the Editors in Chief of the Three Daily Papers"/

/Text/ Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly, has announced the names of the editors in chief of the nationwide newspapers and magazines which the assembly's general committee approved at its meeting yesterday and will present to the assembly next Monday.

This is the first time in Egypt that the names of candidates for positions of editor in chief of newspapers have been submitted to public opinion.

Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim said that that is taking place out of the premise that the press is one of the powers of the people stipulated by the constitution. Six new faces stand out: Makram Muhammad Ahmad, in the position of editor in chief of the magazine AL-MUSAWWAR; Su'ad Hilmi for the editorship of the magazine HAWA'; Samir Rajab for the editorship of the newspaper AL-MASA'; Shafiq Alfred Shammas for the position of editor in chief of the newspaper LE PROGRES; Sami Khalil al-Shahid for THE GAZETTE; and Muhammad Wajdi Qandil for AKHIR SA'AH.

All the other editors in chief remain in their positions. Retiring, because they have reached the legal age, are Aminah al-Sa'id and Sabri Abu-al-Majd from Dar al-Hilal, 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Ghani from AKHBAR AL-YAWM, and Najib Hanin from LE PROGRES.

Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim declared "The names express stability, because we are not striving for change just for the sake of change."

Herewith are the names of the editors in chief announced yesterday:

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad for MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY.
Ibrahim Nafi' for AL-AHRAM.
Musa Sabri for AL-AKHBAR.
Muhsin Muhammad for AL-JUMHURIYAH.
Samir Rajab for AL-MASA'.
Sami Khalil al-Shahid for THE GAZETTE.
Shafiq Alfred Shammas for LE PROGRES.
Ibrhaim Sa'dah for AKHBAR AL-YAWM.

Anis Mansur for the magazine OCTOBER.
'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis for ROSE AL-YUSUF.
Makram Muhammad Ahmad for AL-MUSAWWAR.
Wajdi Qandil for AKHIR SA'AH.
Louis Jurays for SABAH AL-KHAYR.
Mamduh Rida for the newspaper AL-SIYASI.
Dr Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Azim for AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI.
Su'ad Hilmi for HAWA'.
Natilah Rashid for the magazines SAMIR and MICKEY.
Muhammad Rashad 'Abdallah for AL-TA'AWUN.
Ahmad al-Manshalini for AL-RIYADI.
Khayriyah Husayn Darwish for AL-TALABAH.
Salah Jalal for AL-SHABAB WAL-MUSTAQBAL.
Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Nur-al-Din for TABIBAK AL-KHASS.
Mahmud Basyuni for the magazine AL-ZIRA'IYAH.

11887
CSO: 4504/37

CANDIDATES FOR EDITORIAL POSITIONS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Jun 81 p 12

/Article by Sharif al-'Abd: "Names of Candidates to the Editorship of Papers Announced to Public Opinion before Being Submitted to Consultative Assembly"/

/Excerpt/ Makram Muhammad Ahmad: editor in chief of AL-MUSAWWAR.

Born 25 July 1935.

He graduated from the Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophy, in 1958, and started his journalistic career as a reporter in the Accident Section of AL-AHRAM, then was head of the Press Investigation Section, then desk chief, then an editor.

Among his most prominent journalistic activities were the subjects he covered on the war in Yemen, the war in Aden, the war between Morocco and Algeria, the Eritrean revolution, in 1975, the war between Ethiopia and Somalia, in 1978, the union between Syria and Egypt in 1958, the 1967 war as AL-AHRAM's correspondent in Gaza, the Kurdish war in Iraq, 1958-59, the Lebanese civil war, in 1977, the American elections, and the latest Israeli elections. He wrote a weekly political column in AL-AHRAM and was one of the first Egyptian newsmen to visit Israel after the peace agreement, as well as Sinai after its liberation.

He held famous press interviews with Menachem Begin, Nahum Goldmann, Yitzhak Sapir, Moshe Dayan, Igal Alon, Shimon Peres, Ezer Weitzmann, King Husayn, Boumediene, Siad Barre, Hafiz al-Asad, Saddam Husayn, Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, al-Qadhdhafi, Ja'far Numayri, Ahmad Ahidju, the gang of four in China, Yasir 'Arafat, Abu Iyad, leaders in Lebanon, Muhammad 'Ali Nasir, Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, Raymond Barre (prime minister of France), Francois (Youche), minister of foreign affairs, and Lord Carrington.

He made visits to research centers in London and the Institute of Strategic Studies.

Muhammad Wajdi Qandil: editor in chief of AKHIR SA'AH.

He began as a university editor with the magazine AL-JIL in 1952, after enrolling in the Faculty of Law at 'Ayn Shams University. He then joined the AKHIR SA'AH editorial family in 1953.

He arose gradually in AKHIR SA'AH as a military editor, then became head of the Arab and Political Affairs Department, then was assistant editor in chief of AKHIR SA'AH in 1960.

He made journalistic tours of Africa, Asia, Europe and America to cover the revolution in Yemen, the revolution in Iraq, the war of liberation in Algeria, the Suez war of 1956, the June 1967 war and the October 1973 war.

He was appointed an AKHIR SA'AH editor in 1977.

He acquired pages from Husni Mubarak's journal on the October war which were published in AKHIR SA'AH, prepared Sayyid Mar'i's political memoirs, which were published in three parts, and is preparing a new book on witnesses to the October war.

He is married and has one son in the Faculty of Commerce (Cairo University).

He is 47 and comes from the Governorate of al-Minufiyah, al-Shuhada' District.

Samir Rajab: editor in chief of AL-MASA'.

He graduated from the Faculty of Letters in Cairo in 1959 and began his journalistic career as AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper's airport correspondent.

In 1967 he worked as a diplomatic editor with AL-JUMHURIYAH, then traveled on a fellowship to East Germany and obtained a degree in journalism. He returned in September 1968 and worked as aviation and tourist editor.

In 1976 he was appointed deputy editor in chief of AL-JUMHURIYAH for the weekly issue.

Louis Jurays: editor in chief of SABAH AL-KHAYR.

He obtained a bachelor's degree in literature and journalism at the American University in 1952, then a degree in higher studies in journalism and literature from the American University of Michigan in the period 1956-59.

In the period 1973-80 he held the position of appointed member to the ROSE AL-YUSUF organization.

Since 1980 he has been editor in chief of SABAH AL-KHAYR magazine.

Mamduh Rida: editor in chief of AL-SIYASI.

Born in 1933.

Graduated from the Faculty of Law.

Worked following his graduation with the magazine ROSE AL-YUSUF.

Was deputy editor in chief of ROSE AL-YUSUF, then member of the board of directors in 1964.

In May 1964 was member of the board of the Journalists' Union, then chairman of the board of the Dar al-Ta'awun Organization and general editor in chief of the AL-TA'AWUN papers in March 1976.

Dr Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Azim: editor in chief of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI.

He obtained a bachelor's degree in commerce in 1949 and immediately upon graduating worked in the Ministry of Supply, then traveled on scholarship to Germany, where he acquired a doctorate in economics in 1957.

He joined AL-AHRAM newspaper's general management in 1961.

He moved on to editorial work in 1965 as an editor with AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI.

In 1976 he was appointed editor in chief of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI.

Su'ad Hilmi: editor in chief of HAWA' magazine.

She received a bachelor's degree in law in 1952.

She started writing in the magazine AL-FUSUL, where she stayed until 1957.

Since 1957 she has been working as a writer with HAWA' magazine.

As a result of her writing on the October war, she received the gold medal, which is a supreme Press Council prize.

Natilah Rashid: editor in chief of the magazines SAMIR and MICKEY.

She graduated in 1957 from the Department of Psychological and Philosophical Studies of Cairo University.

She received the state prize for children's literature in 1979.

She has been active in children's writing with the magazine SAMIR since her graduation.

Her latest book was "Long Live Life," which has been translated into English.

Salah Jalal: editor in chief of the magazine AL-SHABAB WA-'ULUM AL-MUSTAQBAL.

He graduated from the Faculty of Science in 1952.

While he was a student, he headed the magazine published by the Science Faculty Federation.

Upon graduating he worked in the Egyptian press in the AKHBAR AL-YAWM organization and in AL-AHRAM.

He was the first scientific editor in the Egyptian press and is considered one of the few science editors of international class.

In 1967 he founded and headed the science clubs and headed the Arab Federation of Science Clubs.

He is the secretary general of the Society of Friends of Scientists abroad and the secretary general of the conferences on Egypt in 2000.

In 1971-73 he was secretary general of the Journalists' Union.

In 1977 he founded the magazine AL-SHABAB WA-'ULUM AL-MUSTAQBAL and has been its editor since then.

On 6 March 1981 he was elected to the position of head of the Journalists' Union.

'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis: editor in chief of ROSE AL-YUSUF.

Born in 1929 and graduated from the Faculty of Literature, Geography Department, in 1947.

He was a defendant in the Amin 'Uthman murder case.

He worked as press attache and counsellor in a number of foreign capitals in Africa and Latin America.

In August 1952 he joined the AKHBAR AL-YAWM family.

In the era of the power centers he was sentenced and imprisoned for 6 years, then released in the era of President al-Sadat.

He gradually advanced in journalistic work, working on AL-MISRI newspaper, then AKHBAR AL-YAWM and AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper. He was the deputy editor in chief of AL-JUMHURIYAH newspaper and editorial secretary of AL-MASA'.

In 1971, upon his release from prison, he was appointed political editor of AL-AKHBAR until 1977.

He was then appointed member of the board of directors and editor of ROSE AL-YUSUF and SABAH AL-KHAYR.

On 10 December 1979 he was appointed chairman of the board of the ROSE AL-YUSUF organization and editor in chief of ROSE AL-YUSUF.

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad: editor in chief of MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY.

He took part in the establishment of MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY and worked as head of its News Department.

In May 1966 he became editor in chief of MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY, then in 1969 chairman of the board of directors.

Shafiq Shammas: editor in chief of LE PROJET.

He was born in 1924 and acquired a bachelor's degree in law in Paris.

He worked in journalism as an art critic, then traveled to Paris for training on LE FIGARO newspaper in editorial secretary work.

He was the editorial secretary of the Liberation Rally's AL-MAJALLAH AL-MALIYAH WAL-IQTISADIYAH.

He was appointed to work with UNESCO in Cairo, then Paris, supervising the editing of some magazines and books and repairs of antiquities.

He returned to work on LE PROJET in 1976.

Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar: editor in chief of TABIBAK AL-KHASS.

Born 21 June 1934.

Obtained a bachelor's degree in medicine in December 1956 and a doctorate in internal medicine in 1975.

He has been editor in chief of TABIBAK AL-KHASS since January 1979.

He is a member of the Journalists' Union and is an elected member of the board for administration and editing in Dar al-Hilal.

Sami al-Shahid: editor in chief of THE GAZETTE.

Born in 1939 and obtained a bachelor's degree in literature in English in 1958, then a degree in higher studies in English literature from Dublin University, Ireland, in 1960.

He started journalistic work on THE GAZETTE in the local news section starting in January 1964.

He gradually advanced in journalistic activity until on 1 September 1980 he was appointed acting editor.

Khayriyah Darwish: editor in chief of AL-TALABAH newspaper.

She graduated in 1960 from the Faculty of Sociology in Cairo University, then worked as an editor of AL-TA'AWUN newspaper, editor of AL-HURRIYAH and editor of AL-SIYASI starting in 1965.

She started work as deputy editor in chief of the newspaper AL-TALABAH in 1976.

She was born in Cairo and is 42.

Ahmad al-Manshalini: editor in chief of AL-TA'AWUN AL-RIYADI.

He received a bachelor of arts degree from Cairo University in 1955, in the Sociology Department, and began his journalistic career as an editor with EGYPT NEWS AGENCY in February 1954.

He transferred to a job with AL-MASA' newspaper in August 1956 and in 1965 moved over to the AL-TA'AWUN organization as supervisor of youth and sports.

The newspaper AL RIYADI was issued on 6 October 1972. He is married and has a daughter who has a bachelor's degree in the Department of Society and a son, Hisam, who is in general secondary school at al-Urman School. He was born in August 1929.

He obtained the medal of sports for reviewers and sportsmen on the first Sports Day, in October 1978

Muhammad Rashad 'Abdallah: editor in chief of TA'AWUN AL-FALLAHIN.

Faculty of Literature, Philosophy Department, in 1959.

A degree in higher studies (cooperative society management) in 1968.

Member of the board of directors of the General Federation of Consumer Cooperatives.

Member of the board of directors of the Federation of Housing Cooperatives.

Born in Bilbays, al-Sharqiyah, 1936.

He has attended most cooperative and peasant conferences in most countries of the world.

He has been working as editor in chief of the newspaper AL-TA'AWUN since 1974.

Mahmud Basyuni Ibrahim: editor in chief of AL-ZIRA'IYAH magazine.

He has a bachelor of arts degree from Cairo in 1955 in geography.

He has a diploma in cooperative activity from the Horace (Elaskett) Institute in London, 1964.

He has a degree in higher studies in cooperative administration from 'Ayn Shams, Faculty of Commerce, 1970.

He has a degree in higher studies from the Media Institute, in journalism, with a rating of very good, 1972.

He has been a member of the Egyptian delegation representing the Egyptian agricultural cooperative movement in conferences and meetings of the International Cooperative Treaty since 1976. He represented Egypt in the 26th conference of the treaty in Paris in 1976, the 27th conference in Moscow last year, 1980, and in meetings of the central committee of the treaty in 1977 in Hamburg, 1978 in Copenhagen and 1979 in Manchester.

He is the sole permanent Egyptian and Arab member of the International Cooperative Press Group.

He has worked as a specialized journalist since 1960 in the Dar al-Ta'awun newspapers. Among the most important subjects in which he specializes are cooperative activity, cooperative theory, agricultural and rural development, projects in new lands, and desert development. He has a book on the New Valley which was issued in 1963.

He has worked as editor in chief of the magazine AL-ZIRA'IYAH since 1975 and prior to that he was a deputy editor in chief of the newspaper AL-TA'AWUN.

He was born in Tanta on 9 December 1974.

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SENIOR OFFICIALS OF VARIOUS PRESS ESTABLISHMENTS LISTED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 30 Jun 81 p 5

/Article: "Members of the Higher Councils, Boards of Directors and General Assemblies of Press Organizations"/

/Text/ Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly, has announced the new press organizations. The organizations include the names of members of the Supreme Press Council who are public personalities, the names of heads of press organizations, and the members of the boards of directors and members of the general assemblies of each organization. These are as follows:

The Supreme Press Council

Public personalities nominated for membership in the council: Dr Jamal-al-Din al-'Utayfi, 'Abd-al-Mun'im Mahmud al-Sawi, Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Nimr, Dr Muhammad Kamil Layla, Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, Dr Husayn Muhammad Nassar, Dr Khalil Sabat, Dr Yahya Abu Bakr, Dr Husayn Mu'nis, Muhammad Tharwat Abazah, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus, Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur, Amin Muhammad 'Adli, 'Abd-al-Hamid Ahmad Ibrahim Hamrush, Hafiz Mahmud, Muhammad Zaki 'Abd-al-Qadir, Mrs Aminah Ahmad al-Sa'id, Sabri Abu-al-Majd, 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah, Jalal Mustafa 'Isa, Ahmad Zayn-al-'Abidin Mahmud (Ahmad Zayn), and Muhammad Salah-al-Din Muntasir.

Two members from the legal profession: 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali Mansur and Dr Ahmad Salamah Muhammad Salamah.

The AKHBAR AL-YAWM Organization

Chairman of the board of directors: Musa Sabri.

Editors in chief: AL-AKHBAR, Musa Sabri; AKHBAR AL-YAWM, Ibrahim 'Ali Sa'dah; AKHIR SA'AH: Muhammad Wajdi Qandil.

Members of the board of directors: Ibrahim 'Ali Sa'dah, Ahmad Zayn-al-'Abidin Mahmud (Ahmad Zayn), Muhammad Wajdi Qandil, Kamal-al-Din Mahmud 'Izab, Sa'id Ibrahim Sunbul, Tal'at al-Zuhayri, 'Uthman Lutfi and Ahmad Ibrahim Rajab.

Members of the general assembly: Ahmad al-Jindi, Jalal al-Sayyid 'Ali, Isma'il Mansur al-Naqib, 'Abd-al-Mun'im Qandil, 'Ali al-Mughrabi, Ahmad Ibrahim 'Allam, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Dib, Muhammad Tabaruk 'Abd-al-Hasib, Muhammad Jalal Duwaydar, Jalal Mustafa 'Isa, Muhammad Samir Zaki 'Abd-al-Qadir, Sa'id Isma'il Muhammad 'Ali, Muhammad Kamal 'Abd-al-Ra'uf, Sa'id 'Abd-al-Hamid Ni'matullah,

'Ismat Shafiq, Sidqi 'Ashur, 'Abd-al-Fattah Ahmad 'Ali, Ahmad Riyad, Ni'am Ahmad Khalil al-Baz and Fayiz Buqtur.

AL-AHRAM Organization

Honorary chairman of the board of directors: Tawfiq al-Hakim.

Chairman of the board of directors: 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Muttalib 'Abd-al-Bari.

Editors: AL-AHRAM, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Nafi'; AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, Dr Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Azim; AL-SHABAB WAL-MUSTAQBAL, Salah-al-Din Muhammad Jalal.

Members of the board of directors: Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Nafi', Dr Jamal-al-Din al-'Utayfi, Sayyid 'Ali al-Sayyid al-Jabiri, Muhammad Salah-al-Din Muntasir, 'Ali 'Abd-al-Nabi Ibrahim, Salah-al-Din Muhammad Jalal, Salamah Ahmad Salamah and 'Ali Ghunaym.

Members of the general assembly: 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sharqawi, Tharwat Abazah, Najib al-Mistakawi, Kamal al-Mallakh, Muhammad Yusuf, Sami Mutawalli, Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Azim, Uzuris Fu'ad (Hamdi Fu'ad), Sayyid Mursi Muhammad, Fathi al-Sharqawi, Hasan Hilwa, Mustafa al-Burtuqali, Salah al-Ghamri, Sana' al-Bisi, Muhammad Muhammad Rabi' Muhammad, Muhammad 'Atiyah, Zakariya Nil, 'Abduh Mubashir, Mustafa al-Khatib and al-Sayyid Yasin.

The Dar al-Tahrir Organization

Chairman of the board of directors: 'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad al-Muhsin (Muhsin Muhammad).

Editors in chief: AL-JUMHURIYAH, 'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin; AL-MASA', Samir Rajab 'Ali Sharaf; THE GAZETTE, Sami Khalil Ibrahim al-Shahid; LE PROJET, Shafiq Alfred Shammas.

Members of the board of directors: 'Abd-al-Hamid Ahmad Ibrahim Hamrush, Samir Rajab 'Ali Sharaf, Sami Khalil Ibrahim al-Shahid, Shafiq Alfred Shammas, Ahmad Wajih 'Abd-al-Majid Qabil, Muhammad Hasan Sayyid al-Hayawan, 'Abd-al-Warith al-Dassuqi, and Naji Ahmad Muhammad Qamhah.

Members of the general assembly: Isma'il Muhammad Ahmad al-Shafi'i, Muhammad abu-al-Hadid 'Ali, Faruq Mustafa Fahmi, 'Ala' Muhammad Duwarah, 'Ismat Hamid Muhammad, Muhammad Khalid 'Abd-al-Hamid, Hamdi Sayyid Ahmad al-Nahhas, Samiyah Bulus 'Aziz, Muhammad Nur-al-Din Thabit al-Maliji, 'Abd-al-'Azim al-Babli, Yusuf Ahmad Farid, 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khidr, Mahmud Rashid Husayn, Thurayya Ahmad Fahmi al-Hakim, Sayyid 'Abbas Sayyid, Ratib Sadiq Sirhan, Sa'id Tantawi, Mustafa Tawfiq Shu'ayb, 'Ali Hasanayn Yusuf and 'Afifi Ahmad Da'ud.

The ROSE AL-YUSUF Organization

Chairman of the board of directors: 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis.

Editors in chief: ROSE AL-YUSUF, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis; SABAH AL-KHAYR, Louis Jurays.

Members of the board of directors: Louis Jurays, Muhammad Fathi Ghanim, Muhammad Salah-al-Din Hafiz, Mrs Su'ad Mahmud Rida, 'Atif al-Ghamri, Ahmad Ahmad 'Ali, 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Ali Ahmad al-Mughrabi and Jamal Kamil.

Members of the general assembly: 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Latif Hasan, Ruqayyah Riyad Isma'il, Fawzi Zuhayr, Muhammad 'Ali Rizq, Muhammad 'Ali al-Fiqi, Sabri Musa, 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Izzat, Layla 'Abd-al-Mun'im, Sana' al-Mughrabi, Mahmud Dhinni, Mahmud Sidqi al-Tuhami, Madihah 'Izzat, Fawziyah Mihran 'Isa, 'Adli Fahim 'Abd-al-Masih, Nihad Jad, Munir 'Amir, Fatimah al-'Attar, Zaynab Sadiq, 'Ali Muhammad al-Sayyid and 'Uthman Shawqi.

The Dar al-Hilal Organization

Chairman of the board of directors: Makram Muhammad Ahmad.

Editors in chief: AL-MUSAWWAR, Makram Muhammad Ahmad; HAWA', Mrs Su'ad Ahmad Hilmi; TABIBAK AL-KHASS, Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar Nur-al-Din; SAMIR, Mrs Natilah Ibrahim Rashid.

Members of the board of directors: Mustafa Kamal al-Munji, Basyuni Mustafa 'Isa, Mrs Su'ad Ahmad Hilmi, Fuil Labib Bisadah, Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Mukhtar Nur-al-Din, Khalil Ibrahim Hasan, al-Sayyid Fu'ad Husayn and Husayn Jabir 'Ali.

Members of the general assembly: Aminah Ahmad al-Sa'id, Sabri Abu-al-Majd, Zaynab Hasan Khalil, Salih Mursi Salih, Natilah Ibrahim Rashid, 'Iffat 'Abd-al-'Aziz Nasir, Muhammad Ahmad Sabri, Raja' 'Ali 'Abd-al-Nasir Fu'ad, Muhammad Faruq Muhammad 'Asim Abazah, Majid 'Atiyah Mu'awwad, Ahmad Sayyid Sayyid Abu Kaff, Sayyid Muhammad Farghali, Ahmad Sami al-Laythi, Taha Ibrahim Qabil, Jamal Zaki Hanna, Nazir Yusuf Kamil, Fawzi 'Abd-al-Latif, Faruq Muhammad Kamil, Husni Muhammad Amin and Sakinah Muhammad Muhammad al-Sadat.

OCTOBER Magazine

Chairman of the board of directors: Anis Muhammad Mansur.

Editor in chief: Anis Muhammad Mansur.

Members of the board of directors: Ibrahim Salih Muhammad Ibrahim, Hamid Ahmad Dunya, Husayn 'Ali Muhammad Abu-al-Khayr, Mahir Mahmud Fahmi, Mahmud Sami Ahmad, Mahmud Mahmud Mutawalli Ramadan, Mustafa Harit al-Jarihi and Wadi' Jamil ' Abdallah.

Members of the general assembly: Isma'il Muntasar, Ashraf 'Abd-al-Rahman, Aminah Murad, al-Sa'id Muhammad al-Qadi, Sayyid Fahmi Amin, Sultan Mahmud, Ibrahim al-Maliji, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Farid, 'Adil Hasan Ibrahim, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Abu-al-Layl, Faruq 'Abd-al-Latif, Fayiz Jirjis, Fathi al-Abyari, Maryam Rubin, Hatim Nasr Farid, Hamdi 'Abbas, Muhammad Qabil, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Afifi, Sa'd Yasin and Rashad al-Amir.

The Dar al-Ta'awun Organization

Chairman of the board of directors: Mamduh Rida.

Editors in chief: AL-SIYASI, Mamduh Rida; AL-TA'AWUN, Muhammad Rashad 'Abdallah; AL-RIYADI, Ahmad Muhammad al-Manshalini; AL-TALABAH, Khayriyah Husayn Darwish; AL-ZIRA'IYAH magazine, Mahmud Basyuni 'Amirah.

Members of the board of directors: Salamah 'Abd-al-Fattah Abu Zayd, Sa'd Mahmud Abu 'Imarah, Khayriyah 'Abd-al-Qadir Turk, Fathallah Rif'at, Muhammad Mahdi Shuman, Dr Salah al-'Abd, Muhammad Rashad 'Abdallah and Mahmud Basyuni 'Amirah.

Members of the general assembly: 'Atif Muhammad Basyuni, Khayriyah Husayn Darwish, Muhammad Kamil Muhammad Jabr, Faruq Ahmad Abu-al-'Ala, Ahmad al-Sayyid Ahmad Salim, Sa'd Sa'd Hasan, Muhammad Sha'rawi, Jamal 'Abd-al-Sadiq Abu-al-'Aynayn, Fawziyah Muhammad 'Ali, Yusuf Ahmad 'Ali, Nadir Muhammad Sa'id, Muhammad Qutb Ibrahim, 'Abd-al-Halim Muhammad, Muhammad Amin Sulayman, Sa'id Nur-al-Din, Faraj Hilmi al-Shinawi, Imam Muhammad Muhsin, 'Abdallah al-Hamati, Ibtisam al-Mistikawi, and Ahmad Muhammad al-Manshalini.

MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY

Chairman of the board of directors: Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jawad Mansur.

Members of the board of directors: Mahmud Muhammad Habib, 'Adil 'Abdallah al-Shafi'i, Rif'at 'Ali Mahmud al-Muhandis, Muhammad Najib 'Abd-al-'Alim al-Badri, Rushdi Muhammad 'Abdallah, Mrs Amal Hifni Mahmud, Ahmad Rida Khalifah, and Jawdat Muhammad Abu Zayd.

Members of the general assembly: Amal Muhammad Sayf-al-Din, Muhammad Samir Tawfiq al-'Ajuz, Sami Fudah Ahmad Fudah, Layla Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim, Fawzi al-Sayyid Ahmad Sa'd, Muhammad Fahmi Muhammad Hilmi, Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Azim Mujahid, 'Ali Ibrahim Shahatah Sultan, 'Ali Muhammad Sadiq, Isma'il Abu Zayd al-Hinnawi, Rif'at Tawfiq 'Awdah, 'Afaf Zaki al-Jubayli, Mahmud 'Ala-al-Din 'Abduh Qasim, Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Ati al-Shinawi, Suhayr Muhammad al-Subki, Shawqi Sayyid Ibrahim, Musa Sabri, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Nafi', Ibrahim 'Ali Sa'dah, and 'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin (Muhsin Muhammad).

The General Assembly

Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly, announced at the beginning of the session yesterday that Article 29 of the Press Powers Law, stipulates that the general assemblies of nationwide newspaper organizations are to be made up of 35 members, who will be selected in the following manner:

1. Fifteen members to represent journalists, managers and workers in the press organization, to be chosen by direct secret ballot. It is conditional that members have at least 5 years' experience in press activity. Each group will elect five representatives among its own members.

2. Twenty members to be chosen by the Consultative Assembly from writers or persons interested in intellectual, cultural, press and media affairs, provided that at least four of them be from the same press organization. Elections and selections will take place every 4 years. The Supreme Press Council will set out rules regulating the conduct of elections, conditions for the valid convening of the general assembly and the systems for taking decisions.

The Board of Directors

The Chairman of the Consultative Assembly said, and Article 31 Stipulates, that the boards of directors of nationwide newspaper organizations will consist of 15 members, as follows:

1. The chairman of the board of directors, to be chosen by the Consultative Assembly.

2. Six people working in the organization, to be chosen by direct secret ballot, provided that two be journalists, two be administrators and two be workers, and that each group elect its representatives.

3. Eight members to be chosen by the Consultative Assembly, provided that at least four of them be from the same press organization. The term for membership in the board of directors will be 4 years, which may be renewed. In order for a session of the board of directors to be valid, an absolute majority of the members must be present. Resolutions will be issued by a majority of the votes of the people present. In case of a tie vote preference will go to the side the chairman is on.

One may not combine memberships in the boards of directors of more than one press organization. Article 32 stipulates "the editorial board of each nationwide newspaper will consist of at least five members chaired by the editor in chief, who will be selected by the Consultative Assembly. The board of directors will choose the remaining four members, including one person who will be subordinate to the editor in chief in responsibility for press activity. The term for membership in the editorial board will be 3 years, which may be renewed." Article 33 stipulates "The executive bill for this law will organize the manner and measures for the selection of the chairman of the board of directors and editor in chief."

The Press Council

Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim then moved over to the formation of the Supreme Press Council, stating that Article 36 stipulates that "The president will issue a decree forming the Supreme Press Council, as follows:

"1. The chairman of the Consultative Assembly, who will be given chairmanship of the Supreme Press Council.

"2. The chairmen of boards of directors of nationwide newspaper organizations.

"3. The editors in chief of nationwide newspapers, provided that, in case they are more than one in number, one, chosen by the board of directors of the organization, will represent each organization.

"4. The editors in chief of party newspapers issued in accordance with the Party Law. If a single party has more than one paper, the party chief and an editor in chief will be chosen to represent them.

"5. The head of the Journalists' Union.

"6. The chairman of the General Information Authority.

"7. The chairman of the board of directors of MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY.

"8. Chairman of the board of trustees of the Radio and Television Federation.

"9. The head of the Press, Printing and Publishing Workers' Union.

"10. The chairman of the board of directors of the National Distribution Company, or an expert in newspaper distribution.

"11. The chairman of the Writers' Federation.

"12. A number of public personalities concerned with press affairs to be chosen by the Consultative Assembly, provided that they be no greater in number than the members noted in the paragraphs above.

"13. Two people engaged in the profession of law to be chosen by the Consultative Assembly." In addition, Article 37 stipulates, "The term of membership in the Supreme Press Council will be 4 years, which may be renewed."

Nomination Procedures

The chairman of the Consultative Assembly said that Article 148 of the executive bill to the Press Authorities Law stipulates "The General Committee of the Consultative Assembly will nominate the members selected for membership in the Supreme Press Council in a single list, will nominate all nominees at all levels and in all organizations for each newspaper organization separately in a single list as well and will submit these nominations in separate lists to the Consultative Assembly."

He added "The bylaws of the Consultative Assembly stipulate the nomination measures in Articles 101 through 104, and I would like, before reviewing the lists of nominees, to remind you that the executive bill to the Press Authorities Law which the council has issued shows the procedure for presenting lists of nominees and voting on them in the assembly."

Article 149 stipulates "The Consultative Assembly will conduct balloting on each list separately without debate. If the list wins a majority of the votes of the people present it will be considered definitively chosen. If it does not win such a majority the General Committee of the Consultative Assembly will prepare another list of all its candidates for presentation to the Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly will conduct the process of balloting on it in the same fashion until it wins a majority."

Article 150 of the executive bill stipulates "The chairman of the Consultative Assembly will convey the results of the assembly's balloting to the president and a copy of this balloting will be deposited with the Supreme Press Council."

In applying the provisions of the law regulating the authorities of the press, the executive bill and the provisions of the temporary Consultative Assembly bylaws, the board committee of the assembly held a meeting last Tuesday, which was then followed by a meeting of the General Committee, and the lists of nominations to the Supreme Press Council, board chairmen, editors in chief, and the members of the boards of directors and general assemblies were drawn up.

In applying the provisions of the law regarding the press powers and the executive bill, Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim, chairman of the Consultative Assembly, declared the lists bearing on the nominations for the Supreme Press Council and the nominations for the boards of directors of the press organizations and the general assemblies.

The assembly chairman reviewed every list separately and the assembly approved each of them.

Government Statement

Following the declaration of the lists, Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, the deputy prime minister for People's Assembly affairs, declared, "This is a day to be recorded in the history of true democratic practice in this nation--a democratic practice which is based on the presentation of opinions, guidance and consultation.

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EXECUTIVE BILL INTERPRETS NEW PRESS LAW

Cairo AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH /The Egyptian Minutes, Supplement to the Official Gazette/ in Arabic, No 35, 11 Feb 81, pp 2-15, 18-31, 33-51

/Excerpts/ Executive Bill to Law No 148 for the Year 1980 on the Powers of the Press, in the Form Approved by the Consultative Assembly at Its 26 January 1981 Session

Part One: Basic Principles

Article One. The Consultative Assembly expresses the will of the people in respect to the press in the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Article Two. The Supreme Press Council is responsible for the affairs of the press in the Arab Republic of Egypt and will venture on its areas of competence and responsibilities in this regard with the objective of supporting the freedom and independence of the press and guaranteeing that it performs its mission in the framework of the basic values of the society, preserving national unity, social peace, the democratic social system and the effectiveness of the press in guaranteeing the citizens' rights to enlightened knowledge of correct news and participating in the formation of public opinion on a basis of objectivity, truth, and concern for the higher interests of the society, in the manner stated in the constitution, the law and the provisions of this bill.

Article Three. This bill will guarantee the pursuit of freedom of expression of opinions and ideas by all people in the press in regard to everything connected to the affairs of the press, whatever their political or party affiliations or inclinations might be, in the framework of objectivity and constructive opinions.

Part Two: The Supreme Press Council

Chapter One: General Provisions

Article Four. The Supreme Press Council will assume its areas of competence as stipulated in the constitution and the law in accordance with the provisions of this bill. To this end, it may outline a policy which will guarantee the protection of the principles of 23 July 1952 and 15 May 1971, deepen their significance among the people and realize their goals by presenting clear enlightened thought and correct news.

Article Five. The Supreme Press Council will deepen its bonds with the Consultative Assembly.

It will strive to attain the firmest of bonds between itself and press organizations and installations, the Journalists' Union, the General Press, Printing and Publishing Workers' Union and other press, cultural and intellectual organizations in the country.

Article Six. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will inform the members of the council of the issuance of the republican decree bearing on the composition of the council or any modification which may occur in this composition. The measures stipulated in the law will be followed regarding the selection or appointment of anyone taking the place of any council member who has left his position within 15 days of the date the position is vacated.

Article Seven. The Supreme Press Council will meet in the city of Cairo.

It may hold sessions elsewhere, by decree of the council or in accordance with summons by the president.

Article Eight. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will head council meetings. He may delegate one of the two deputy chairmen of the Supreme Press Council to take his place. In the event they are absent chairmanship of the session will go to the oldest present member of the Supreme Press Council. In all cases the chairman of the session will have the same powers as those stipulated in this bill for the chairman of the council in regard to management of the session.

Article Nine. The Supreme Press Council may, through its chairman and its competent agencies, in accordance with the provisions included in this bill, demand any data from any official specialized body concerning any matter which lies within the council's field of competence.

These bodies must help the council and its agencies by responding to its request in a manner enabling it properly to exercise its areas of competence, and the chairman of the council may present cases of noncooperation to the Consultative Assembly.

Article 10. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will present the council's annual reports to the president after he has approved them, accompanied by the Consultative Assembly's observations and recommendations on the conditions of the press and conditions of the nationwide press organizations and other press installations in the Arab Republic of Egypt from the financial, economic and media standpoints. These reports will contain statements on the subjects the press has dealt with, the opinions it has reviewed concerning general subjects, the occurrences or conduct which may have occurred that infringe on its freedom and independence, and violations to the provisions of the constitution, the law or this bill which may have occurred in its activities.

This report will contain data bearing on the activities of the council and its various committees and the views and recommendations necessary to support the independence and freedom of the press and its proper performance of its mission in serving society.

The chairman of the Supreme Press Council may also at any time present the president with reports on specific subjects of a general nature related to press affairs.

Article 11. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council may, whenever the public interest requires, on the basis of a decree of the Council Board Authority, summon the chairman of the board of directors of a nationwide press organization, some members of its board of directors, the editor in chief of a nationwide publication, a member of the board of directors of other press institutions, their editors in chief, or responsible editors in them to attend certain Supreme Press Council meetings, or meetings of its specialized committees, in order to provide the necessary data and clarifications on the issues being discussed.

Article 12. The minister concerned with media and cultural affairs may attend Supreme Press Council meetings and chairman of the Central Accounting Agency may attend these meetings on the basis of summons by the chairman of the Supreme Press Council.

Chapter Two: Agencies of the Council

Article 13. The agencies of the council are:

1. The chairman of the council.
2. The council board committee.
3. The secretariat general.
4. Specific and special committees.

First: chairman of the council.

Article 14. The chairman of the council is the person who represents it, speaks in its name, maintains its order and dignity and the dignity of its members, and in general supervises the proper course of all the council's activities.

The chairman of the council will ensure that his activities are in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, the law and this bill.

To this end he may seek the aid of the council's board committee, the Trustee Council or a committee of some other council, or any of the members he chooses.

Article 15. The chairman of the council may summon any committee to convene to discuss an important or urgent matter, and the council chairman will head the meetings of the committees he attends.

With attention to the relevant stipulations governed by special provisions, correspondence between any of the council's committees and the Consultative Assembly, the People's Assembly, the executive authorities or other bodies outside the council will take place through the council chairman or in accordance with the system he sets out in this regard.

Article 16. The council chairman will have the power to review invitations sent to the council to visit higher councils or organizations specializing in press

affairs in other countries, or press or media installations in those countries, and invitations to these bodies will be issued by him, with the purpose of strengthening bonds and exchanging experts between the council and press and media councils and organizations throughout the world.

Second: the board committee

Article 17. At the first session of its meeting after its formation, the Supreme Press Council will elect board committee by an absolute majority of the valid votes granted in the elections.

The authority committee may always be re-elected one or more times.

Nominations for assuming membership in the board will be submitted in writing to the chairman of the council in the period he specifies at least 24 hours in advance of that meeting.

At the beginning of the session, the council chairman will announce the victory of the nominees by acclamation, if no more than the requisite number of people have come forward for nomination in the period specified.

If the number of nominees is greater than the requisite number, they will be elected by number of votes by secret ballot at an open session.

The council chairman will announce the results of the elections before conclusion of the session and will inform the president, the Consultative Assembly, the People's Assembly and the prime minister of them.

Article 18. The tenure of the council board committee will end with the end of the term of the Consultative Assembly during whose term it was elected or with the conclusion of 4 years following issuance of the republican decree forming the Supreme Press Council, whichever comes first.

Article 19. If the position of the council chairman is vacant, the more senior deputy, then the oldest member, will assume the tasks of the chairmanship in a temporary capacity until the Consultative Assembly elects a new council chairman.

If the position of a member of the board committee is vacated, someone will be elected to take his place until the end of his term.

Article 20. The council's board will at the start of every Christian year set out a plan of activity for the council and its members in a manner guaranteeing the organized course of its activities.

It may, in particular, do the following:

1. Cooperate in the pursuit of the activity of the council and its committees. In this it will be assisted by council members it chooses.

2. Cooperate with the council's various committees, set forth rules governing the administration of its activities, and coordinate the various aspects of its activity in accordance with the provisions of this bill.

3. Cooperate in organizing media, press, technical, legal, administrative and financial affairs in accordance with the general organizational rules the council sets forth, while observing the provisions of this bill.

Article 21. The council board may assign a committee to study a specific issue and present it along with a report, as a result of its study and recommendations regarding that, and the board may decide to present this report to the council.

Article 22. The Supreme Press Council board will set forth the agenda of its sessions in accordance with the stipulated plan of activity, while observing the priority in which the issues bearing on press, newspaper or journalists' affairs of a general nature are listed.

The secretary general of the council will prepare the draft agenda in accordance with the council chairman's directives.

The chairman will announce the agenda and convey it in writing to council members at least 24 hours before the date of the meeting, except in cases of urgency.

Article 23. The council board will take charge of the affairs of delegations it sends to other countries and attention will be given as far as possible to have these delegations include the various sections, classes and tendencies represented in the council.

The council board will choose chairmen for these delegations unless the chairman or one of the deputy chairmen of the council is included among their members, in which case he will have the chairmanship.

Article 24. The council board will set forth the general organizational rules related to honorariums and fees for attending sessions and the facilities the council will provide for its members to enable them to perform their responsibilities.

Article 25. The council chairman will summon the board committee to periodic meetings each month and can summon them to exceptional meetings.

The board committee will also be summoned to an exceptional meeting if that is requested of the council chairman in writing by three of its members. It will be a condition of acceptance of this request that the issues which it is proposed will be reviewed at this exceptional meeting be specified.

Article 26. The board will meet at the time its chairman specifies to review notices submitted on the issuance of new newspapers within 2 weeks of the date these notices are presented in writing to the council.

Third: Secretariat general of the council and its employees' bylaws.

Article 27. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council is the person who will in general supervise the secretariat general of the council and its administrative, financial, legal and technical affairs.

He may delegate some of his powers to the secretary general or to one or both deputychairmen.

Article 28. The council's secretariat general will be made up of the secretary general, the assistant secretary general and the legal, technical, administrative, and financial secretariats, departments and sections which lie within the organizational structure of the council. A decree will be issued by the council board specifying this. Positions in the organizational structure will be considered ones with influence on public opinion.

The council secretariat general will take charge of performing all the legal, technical, administrative and financial activities necessary to assist the council and all its agencies in engaging in its responsibilities, in accordance with the provisions of this bill, the general organizational rules issued concerning it by decree of the council board, and the orders the council chairman issues.

Article 29. The secretary general will attend council meetings and board committee meetings and will supervise all the departments and sections of the council secretariat general and all the people working in them.

The secretary general of the council will be responsible to the council chairman for the proper course of activity within the secretariat general, and the assistant secretary general will assist him in performance of his responsibilities and will take his place during his absence. The secretary general will have the powers stipulated for deputy ministers in the laws and bills, in terms of the council's financial and administrative affairs, and he may delegate some of his powers to the assistant secretary general or other senior employees of the council's secretariat general.

Article 30. It is a condition that anyone elected secretary or assistant secretary general devote himself full time to this job, and the Supreme Press Council will spell out the areas of competence of both jobs.

Article 31. It is a condition that anyone occupying any position lying within the organizational structure of the secretariat general of the Supreme Press Council not have been prohibited from occupying a position of influence on public opinion, in accordance with the provisions of the laws regulating that.

Article 32. The council, in accordance with a recommendation by its board, will set forth a bill to organize the affairs of people working in the secretariat general of the council.

The provisions applying to people working in the Consultative Assembly will apply to employees where no specific stipulation is included in this bill.

Article 33. The council board will issue the executive resolutions and general organizational rules bearing on the bill on people working in the council, with attention to the provisions stipulated in this bill. Interpretations of the provisions of this bill approved by the council, in accordance with submissions made by its committee board, following study by the Press Affairs Committee report, will be considered supplementary and complementary to the provisions of the bill on people working in the council.

Article 34. The bills bearing on people working in the council will be amended in accordance with recommendations by the board chairman or the board committee. The

recommendations will be submitted in the form of articles and will be accompanied by explanatory memorandums. The council will submit these recommendations to a joint committee of the Committee of Press and Journalists' Affairs and the Financial, Administrative and Economic Affairs Committee for study and preparation of a report on them to the council.

The council decree approving the bill on the people working in it and amendments to the bill will be issued following discussion of the report on the decree by the competent committee, by agreement of the majority of the council members.

Article 35. The secretary general will supervise the composition of the minutes of the council and board committee sessions, and the minutes of these meetings will upon review by the council board include subjects submitted to it in confidence. The council may permit other persons to compose these minutes. In all cases, these minutes will be signed by the council chairman and the secretary general and will be kept in a special ledger.

Article 36. The secretary general of the council must present a monthly report to the council chairman on the accomplishments that have taken place regarding the resolutions the council has adopted.

Fourth: Specific and special committees.

Article 37. The council will form a number of specific permanent committees, in accordance with the requirements of the conduct of its powers and duties as stated in the law and this bill. Among these will be:

1. The Press and Journalists' Affairs Committee
2. The Financial, Administrative and Economic Affairs Committee.
3. The Trustee Committee.

Article 38. The council, by its own decree, will spell out the manner in which these committees are to be formed and the manner in which their board committees are to be formed, in which work is to proceed in them and in which their activity is to be supervised. It will spell out the areas of competence of each and the minimum and maximum number of members in them.

Article 39. The council may, on recommendation by its board, form a special committee or committees for a specific mission or specific purposes. These committees will be terminated when they have finished preparing their reports and presenting the reports to the council and discussion of them has ended. It is also permissible, by decree of the chairman of the council, to submit specific issues to a joint committee made up of two or more council committees or their board committees to study and prepare reports on these issues for submission to the council's board committee or to the council.

The provisions bearing on specific committees will apply to these special and joint committees, with attention to the special provisions contained in the council chairman's decree forming them.

Article 40. These committees' reports will be presented to the Supreme Council so that it may take the measures it considers fit in regard to them.

Article 41. A branch committee may form a working group from among its members to study a specific issue which lies within its areas of competence, provided that it present the conclusions of its study to the committee.

Article 42. With the exception of the council chairman and the two deputy chairmen, it is not permissible to combine membership in more than two of the basic specific committees.

Article 43. Each of the specific committees will, within the scope of its area of competence, assume charge of following up on the articles, opinions, items of research or recommendations concerning press affairs involving the press and the media and lying within the area of competence of the committee, as well as the resolutions, recommendations and discussions conducted in this regard in the People's Assembly, the Consultative Assembly, the local committees or other organization councils, councils of legal public persons, or scientific and cultural societies concerned with opinions, ideas and the press.

The relevant committee will prepare a report for the council chairman regarding its study and the opinions it holds concerning those research items, articles, opinions and recommendations.

Article 44. The chairmen of the boards of nationwide press organizations may request the council chairman to seek the opinion of the relevant specific committees regarding matters related to these organizations' draft investment plans, development plans for their media, technical, administrative, financial or economic affairs, or any draft bill or organizational decree related to it.

Article 45. The council chairman may summon the relevant committee to a meeting in any of the abovementioned circumstances whenever he considers there is cause to do so, and the committee will provide the council chairman with a report of the proceedings of its meeting which it will devote to this purpose.

Article 46. Each committee may request the council chairman to meet with a relevant government member, with the chairman of the board of directors of a nationwide press organization, or with the relevant chief of any other public body to listen to the requisite explanations, information and data bearing on the subjects into which it has undertaken research or which lies within its field of specialization.

The committee will inform the council chairman of the proceedings in the meetings it holds, and the council chairman may at any time assign the committee to prepare a report on its proceedings for presentation to the council.

Article 47. The committee board will set out its agenda in accordance with the recommendation of its chairman, the committee will meet by his summons, and, in setting appointments for convening the committees, attention will be given to keep them from conflicting with the appointments for council sessions, except in urgent cases which make this mandatory, following the council chairman's agreement.

Article 48. Except for the stipulations made by the Supreme Press Council, the stipulated regulations regarding council meetings and decrees included in this bill will apply to the validity of committee meetings and decrees.

Article 49. Except for meetings of the Trustee Committee and the Branch Investigating Committee, each member of the council may by agreement of the committee chairman attend committee sessions, even if he is not a member of that committee, on condition that the subject not be related to him personally and that he not have a special personal interest in it.

Article 50. The minutes of the committees' sessions will be composed and the names of the people attending each session, the people absent, a summary of the discussions and the texts of the decrees adopted by the committee will be noted down in them. These minutes will be signed by the chairman and secretary of the committee.

A copy of these minutes will be deposited with the council chairman and the secretary general. These minutes may be printed at any time and published in the manner stipulated in the decree, by decree of the council board, in accordance with its chairman's recommendation.

Chapter Three: Sessions and Decrees of the Council

Article 61. The meetings of the Supreme Press Council will be valid only if a majority of its members is in attendance.

The council's decrees will be issued by approval by an absolute majority of the persons in attendance. If the vote is tied on a subject presented to the council, the side voting with the chairman will have preference.

Article 62. Within 15 days following the issuance of a decree forming it, hold a procedural session under the chairmanship of the council chairman, who will be assisted in the session's procedures by the youngest member and the oldest member, aside from the people nominated to membership in the board committee.

This inaugural session will be devoted to the giving of oaths and the election of candidates.

Article 63. At the inaugural session, the council members will give the following oath:

"I swear by almighty God to look after the interests of the nation, to perform the obligations of my membership in the council truthfully and sincerely, and to protect the freedom and independence of the press in its exercise of its powers and its mission in the context of the basic values of society and in accordance with the constitution, the law and the provisions of the bylaws of the Supreme Press Council."

Giving the oath will commence with the oldest and youngest members who will be assisting the council chairman.

Article 64. The Supreme Press Council's sessions will not be open unless the council decrees otherwise by a majority of members, in accordance with a recommendation by its chairman or at least 10 of its members. The council decree opening the sessions will be issued following a discussion in which two people in favor of and two opposed to holding them open will take part.

Representatives of the press and the other media and other people permitted to attend in accordance with the bylaws set out by the council chairman by his decree may attend the open sessions of the council.

Article 65. The council, in accordance with a decree by its chairman, may permit people who are not council members to attend its meetings when it deems that appropriate.

Article 66. The council chairman will organize procedures bearing on the followup of the publication and broadcast of the proceedings of the open sessions of the council and its committees through the various media in order to guarantee that the task of the representatives of these media in publishing or broadcasting the discussions which take place is facilitated.

The council chairman or whoever he delegates to do so will take charge of announcing the council's decisions and conveying them to the representatives of the press and the various media.

Article 67. No one may speak at council meetings until he requests the floor and the chairman gives it to him.

Nonetheless, it is not permissible to keep someone who requests the floor from having it, except for a reason justified by this bill.

The floor may not be granted for a subject submitted to a council committee for investigation except if that is to accelerate the committee's completion of its report or to request clarification on the accomplishments of the committee in this regard.

Article 68. Discussion will not be permitted on any subject not listed in the agenda except in accordance with a written request with cause submitted to the council chairman by at least 10 of its members 24 hours prior to the meeting, following the council's approval of that. The council will issue its decision in this regard without debate.

Article 69. If the council approves the discussion of a subject which is not included in its agenda, discussion will take place on it after a review of the agenda has taken place, unless the council agrees by a majority of its members to discuss it immediately.

Article 70. With attention to the provisions of a special stipulation on priority in the floor, the chairman, in giving the floor, will adhere to the order of the council members'requests for the floor, and the chairman must observe alternate turns for proponents and opponents of the issues presented for discussion on the floor.

Article 71. The council will specify a particular time to finish discussing general issues of an important character which by virtue of their nature need to be disposed of rapidly, especially media issues related to freedom and independence of the press, draft budgets, final accounts, bills and the like.

In these cases, the council will specify a maximum period which the members to which it gives the floor will observe, on the basis of a recommendation by the chairman or chairman of the competent committee or on the basis of a written request presented to the council chairman by at least 10 of its members.

Article 72. The chairman may direct the speaker's attention and warn him at any moment to observe the provisions of this bill and preserve order on the floor. If the member does not comply the chairman may direct a warning to him not to be out of order.

The chairman may order that any statement issued in violation of the provisions of this law be stricken from the minutes of the session.

In the event the speaker protests against this, the chairman will submit the matter to the council, which will issue its decision in this regard without debate.

Article 73. The chairman will recommend to the council that the discussion be closed if he considers that sufficient discussion of the issue has taken place or on the basis of a written request from at least five members that discussion of the subject be closed. Permission will be granted to discuss the closure of the discussion only to one person objecting to that and one person supporting it.

Article 74. Votes will be taken on a subject submitted as soon as the chairman announces the council's decision to close the discussion on it.

Article 75. The vote will be taken by roll call in the following cases:

First, as a condition for issuance of the council's decision on a subject presented by special majority.

Second, upon request by the council chairman or 10 members that the vote be taken by roll call.

Third, if the results are not clear, when the vote is taken by standing or staying seated. During the roll call, the member's vote will be taken by his stating "agreed" or "not agreed," without comment.

Article 76. The member may not abstain from voting on any subject submitted to his vote unless he presents the reasons for his abstention to the council after the vote has been taken on the subject and before the council chairman announces the results.

Article 77. People abstaining from voting will not be considered to be in agreement with the subject or in opposition to it.

If the number of people casting votes is less than the majority necessary for the council to issue its decision on the subject, it will be necessary to postpone the voting on it to another session. This session may be scheduled as soon as half an hour after the convening of the first session.

The issue submitted will be considered rejected if the necessary majority does not agree to it at the session to which voting on it was postponed.

Article 78. The chairman will announce the council's decree in accordance with the votes. Comment may not be made on it by anyone after the decree is announced, nor may the proceedings of the session be publicized by anyone present at these sessions except in open session of the council.

Article 79. The minutes of the council sessions will be composed and recorded and the secretariat will, at the end of each session, within 3 days of the date on which it is held, prepare the minutes on the meeting of this session and the draft of the recorded minutes in accordance with the rules and procedures issued by decree of the council chairman, with attention to the provisions of this bill. These minutes will set down in detail all the proceedings of the session, the subjects raised during it, the discussions which took place on them, the decrees issued, and the names of the members who cast votes on every recommdation on which a vote was taken by roll call, and the votes of each.

Article 80. The council will approve the draft minutes of its session at the following session, after the secretariat general of the council has drawn up these minutes and distributed them to members along with the agenda of the session in which the approval was presented.

Article 81. Each member of the council in attendance at the session whose draft minutes are submitted for ratification may request of the council chairman in writing that the corrections he deems appropriate be made to this draft before the convening of the session. The chairman will present the recommended corrections to the council to review approval of them. The chairman may permit the member requesting the corrections to present his view regarding them, and, if the council approves the requested corrections, they will be set down in the draft minutes of the session and the draft session minutes presented for correction will be corrected in accordance with that. No request will be accepted for the correction of minutes which the council has approved. The minutes the council has approved will be signed by the council chairman and the secretary general and will be kept in serial form in a special ledger in the council, and a copy of them will be sent to the board committee of the Consultative Assembly to read and keep in the assembly records.

Part Three: Journalists' Rights and Duties

Article 82. Journalists may not be subjected to any pressure from any authority, nor may they be compelled to disclose the sources of their information, even in the context of a criminal investigation.

Article 83. One may hold journalists to account for their actions only in the framework of their infringement of their national duties or the traditions of the profession, in the manner stated by law, in this bill and in the provisions of the Code of Press Honor.

Article 84. One may not hold journalists to account for an opinion they express or for correct information which they publish.

Article 85. Anyone opposing journalists because of their exercise of their job will be considered to be in infringement of their security as long as that is in the framework of the constitution, the law and the provisions of this bill.

Article 86. The following will in particular be considered to be in infringement of journalists' security:

1. Preventing journalists from writing and publishing the data, information or news they obtain or the investigations, comments or opinions they write without just cause, or failing to mention their name in accordance with the traditions that are observed, without infringing upon the powers the editor in chief has to avoid publishing the news, comments or opinions he seesit fit not to print.

2. Transferring journalists without justification from a nationwide press organization or from their position or job in that or in the newspaper institution they belong to to a lower job or position or one which is inferior in moral or material terms.

3. Directly or indirectly depriving journalists of any cash or material benefit if they obtain it by virtue of the law or the bills regulating the affairs of people working in the press.

4. Threatening or defrauding journalists by any method in order to make them publish or write subjects in conflict with their journalistic conscience and professional honor or principles of publishing and investigation or for personal interests or purposes of a specific body, person or persons.

5. Tempting or enticing journalists by offering them a cash or material benefit, service or gain or offering it to others linked to them by bonds of blood or marriage up to that of fourth cousin in exchange for employing them or exploiting their pen to write or publish material conflicting with their journalistic conscience and professional honor.

Article 87. Every journalist will have the right to complain and present grievances to the chairman of the Supreme Press Council regarding any act, conduct or decision which has the effect of threatening his journalistic security in violation of the provisions of the law or this bill. For this complaint or grievance to be accepted, the journalist must have previously informed the organization in which he works of his complaint or grievance.

The Supreme Press Council and the body concerned with investigating and examining these complaints and notifications will follow the measures stipulated in this bill.

Article 88. Journalists will have the right to attend the sessions and meetings at various levels, as long as they are not closed.

Article 89. Journalists will have the right to read all documents whose publication is not prohibited and they will also have the right to receive an answer to the information, news and statistics they ask for if that is all related to a public matter.

Article 90. The foundation of the freedom of journalists is commitment to the basic values of society and provision of a free climate for its growth, and it may not be adopted as an instrument for perverting or infringing upon these values.

Article 91. All people engaged in journalistic activity will be committed to observe the principles of honor, truthfulness, manners and traditions of the journalistic profession in their professional conduct.

Article 92. Newspapers or journalists will be prohibited from publishing or broadcasting material involving any of the following matters:

1. Propagating principles or opinions which contain a rejection of divine law or conflict with its provisions.

2. Inclining to or propagating liberation from religious values or loyalty to the nation.

3. Provoking young people and youths to social or moral deviation.

4. False or tendentious news, data, statistics or rumors or provocative propaganda infringing the country's national interests.

5. News, data or statistics infringing upon higher military secrets.

Article 93. Without prejudice to the right of journalists to comment and express opinions from the general standpoint, official data and communications issued by competent public authorities on any public matter which is to be published or is of interest to public opinion must be published, and data issued by the office of the public prosecutor and the texts of verdicts or decrees the competent judicial authorities issue on matters and cases which press publication has dealt with must be published during the investigation or trial, along with an adequate summary of the causes on which it was based, if a verdict of suspension or innocence is reached.

It is also necessary to adhere to a refusal to give prominence to the publication of news of a crime and the names and pictures of accused persons or convicted persons in a manner glorifying the crime or the criminals. The names and pictures of accused or convicted juveniles may not be published, in order to enable them to repent and regain respect for the order of society.

Article 94. The publication and writing of advertisements will be subject to the same rules which govern the editorial material published in newspapers without prejudice to the intrinsic and commerical nature of the advertising copy. The responsible editor will bear responsibility for all the advertising, informational or other material published in the paper.

Article 95. A complete, conspicuous distinction must be drawn between editorial and advertising materials. It is forbidden to publish any advertisement whose materials appear to contradict the values, bases and principles of society or the mission and goals of the press, entail the publication of fabulous material, deception, persuasiveness or temptation in order to exploit the needs of citizens, in particular juveniles and women, or are in any way in violation of public order or morality.

Article 96. The editor in charge of publishing advertisements presented to him by a foreign or private body or by individuals must confirm that these advertisements

are conforming to national policies and do not conflict with the stipulated principles on press publication in accordance with the foregoing provisions. The fees for these advertisements must not entail direct or indirect aid from a foreign country or body or a private body or person, and journalists may not acquire any sum of money or benefits of any character directly or indirectly for reviewing the writing or publication of this advertising.

Article 97. The Supreme Press Council will set forth the regulations organizing the direct or indirect acceptance by papers of special contributions, aid and benefits from any body, and it will specify the prices for space for government or public sector advertisement.

Article 98. Journalists are entirely responsible, along with the editor in chief, for respecting regulations directly governing press activity, in particular the rules of the Code of Press Honor and the basic principles of publication set forth in the previous articles.

Article 99. Without infringement of the provisions of Article 52 of the Press Powers Law, no journalists in a nationwide press organization or Egyptian press organization may work in any non-Egyptian newspaper, press agency or medium within or outside the republic or engage in any continuous or sporadic activity in them for or without compensation until he has obtained permission to do so from the Supreme Press Council in accordance with the procedures stipulated in this bill.

Article 100. Permission may not be granted if that conflicts with the national interest of the country, independence and freedom of the press or the proper course of activity in press organizations or without the agreement of the Egyptian press organization or institution.

Article 101. Journalists' request for permission will be submitted in writing to the chairman of the board of directors of the nationwide press organization, the person responsible for the Egyptian press installation or the Supreme Press Council, according to the case, so that he may express his opinion on it. The requests will show the name, surname, press organization or installation in which they work, their position in it, and the salary they receive from it, and it will specify the foreign media installation in which they are requesting permission to work, the nature of this work, its duration, the pay and benefits they will receive and the justifications they see fit for issuance of this permit. The requests must be accompanied by supporting documentation.

Article 102. The chairman of the board of directors of the nationwide press organization will submit the requests to the board of directors of the organization, and the person in charge of editorial work in other press installations will submit the requests to the person who assumes the responsibility for managing it so that he may express an opinion on them.

The requests will be presented together with the opinion of the body referred to in the previous paragraph to the chairman of the Supreme Press Council so that he may adopt the necessary measure regarding it.

Article 103. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will submit the requests for permission referred to in the previous article, and will submit the request coming to him directly, together with their attachments, to the Press and Journalists' Affairs Committee of the council to study them and prepare a report on them.

If the committee refuses a request, its refusal must be with cause and must be presented to the council board at the session directly following. In all cases, everything related to the permission will be presented to the Supreme Press Council so that it may adopt its final decision regarding it.

Article 104. The permit giving permission to work must be issued on the form prepared for this by decree of the chairman of the Supreme Press Council. This permission must include the specification of the body, duration and type of work, the value of the compensation the person receiving the permit is to obtain and other data that must be specified.

Article 105. Anyone to whom permission is granted in accordance with the above provisions must request its renewal at least 30 days before its term expires. The procedures bearing on the initial request will be followed in reviewing renewal requests.

Article 106. Without prejudice to the criminal penalties stipulated in the Press Powers Law, a Supreme Press Council chairman infringing on any of the duties stated in the law or in this bill will be subjected to investigation by the competent committee and a copy of the decree subjecting him to investigation will be conveyed to the Journalists' Union.

Article 107. The investigating committee stipulated in Article 46 of the law will consist of two members of the Supreme Press Council who are involved in the law and a journalist who is a council member to be selected by its chairman, when the submission to investigation is made. Chairmanship of the committee will go to the older of the two members of the legal profession.

Article 108. The chairman of the investigating committee must notify the journalist in writing of the occurrence of a violation and stipulate the date of the investgating session.

Article 109. The committee will conduct the investigation into the member handed over to it in person, and a lawyer or person delegated by the Council of the Journalists' Union or the branch union council may attend with him, according to his choice.

Article 110. If the person into whom the investigation is to take place does not appear at the specified time for the investigation and has no valid excuse, the committee will conduct the investigation in his absence.

Article 111. The comittee must complete its investigation within a maximum of 30 days of the date on which the investigation began. If the investigation is not finished by the time the period elapses, the subject must be presented to the Supreme Press Council to determine what it sees fit regarding it.

Article 112. The committee will inform the council chairman of the investigations in full, in the company of a thorough memorandum containing its opinion on the incident subject to investigation.

Part Five: The Grant of Permission to Issue New Newspapers and Lapses of Permission

Article 119. Notice to issue any newspaper will be conveyed to the Supreme Press Council with a notarization of the signature of the legal representative on it. This notice must be written out on the form set out by the Supreme Press Council.

Article 120. The secretariat of the Supreme Press Council will keep a ledger in which the date and hour of receipt of the notice are noted down. The data stipulated in Article 14 of the law will also be noted down in it, along with the changes which occur and the date of notification of the occurrence of the changes.

Article 121. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will present notification within the 3 days following his receipt of it to the council board so that he may investigate it and express an opinion regarding it. The council board may hand it over to the Press and Journalists' Affairs Committee so that it may express its view on the extent to which the legal conditions have been met by this notice. The competent committee may demand from any competent public body the data it considers appropriate regarding the notice, the persons submitting it and the people concerned with it, and the committee will present a report on its opinion to the chairman of the Supreme Council within a maximum of 20 days of the date on which the request is handed over to it.

Article 122. The opinion of the council board or the opinion of the committee to which the request is handed over, according to the case, will be presented to the Supreme Press Council so that it may issue its decree granting or refusing to grant the permit. In either case, the decree will be issued by the agreement of the majority of the council members present, and if it is a decree of refusal it must be with cause.

Article 123. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will inform the persons concerned of the decisions the council makes and the reasons on which it bases its decision in by return registered letter within 48 hours of the issuance of the decision and the secretariat general will commit itself to noting down the decision in the record prepared for that the day following its issuance at latest.

Article 124. Notices on the issuance of papers not owned by political parties or public legal personalities such as unions and federations will not be accepted in any of the following cases:

1. If they belong to private persons and have not assumed the form of a cooperative society or corporation in accordance with the founding agreement and the organization model issued by the Supreme Press Council in accordance with the presentation made by its board.

2. If the ownership of the capital of the company or society is not restricted to Egyptians according to the par shares.

3. If the paid up capital deposited in full in an Egyptian bank specified by the Supreme Press Council is less than the following amounts:

A. 250,000 pounds (if the paper is a daily).
B. 100,000 pounds (if the paper is a weekly).
C. 50,000 pounds (if the paper is monthly or issued at longer intervals).
D. If the property or stockholder, along with that of the members of his family, consisting of his wife and minor children, exceeds 500 Egyptian pounds.

Article 125. The Supreme Press Council may grant exceptions from some or all of the conditions stipulated in the preceding article in cases which it considers will enhance support and stimulation for the Egyptian press or support for its freedom and independence, in accordance with a review by the council board.

Article 126. Notices on the issuance of papers which do not present material on the forms prepared for this purpose, do not contain the essential information required by law for notification or the documentation proving any of the data, or whose owners do not present other data or documentation necessary for review and discussion of the notification within the period stipulated for them in writing in accordance with a return registered letter, will not be accepted.

Article 127. A decree rejecting the notice will be issued by the Supreme Press Council, the chairman of the Supreme Press Council will notify the people concerned by return registered letter that the notice has not been accepted, and notices which are not accepted will be considered as if they never existed.

Article 128. The period of 3 months referred to in Article 16 of the Press Powers Law will start on the day following receipt by the persons concerned of the notice of grant of permit.

Article 129. The issuance of a paper will be considered irregular in accordance with Article 16 of Law 148 for 1980 on the press powers if one of the two following matters occurs, except with an acceptable excuse:

1. The failure to issue half the issues that are essentially supposed to be issued in a 6-month period.

2. If the period in which it does not appear during a 6-month period is longer than that of its continuous issuance.

By issuance is meant offering the newspaper for distribution in the prescribed manner and depositing the requisite copies with the bodies stipulated by law, in addition to depositing a copy for the Supreme Press Council.

Article 130. If the legal personality which owns the paper is terminated for any reason whatever, the permit will automatically lapse.

Part Six: Nationwide Papers

Chapter One: General Provisions

Article 131. With attention to the contents of Article 22 of the Press Powers Law, national press organizations will be established by decree of the Consultative

Assembly after the opinion of the Supreme Press Council has been taken. This decree will be published in the Official Gazette.

Article 132. The decree establishing a national press organization will specify its name, its headquarters, the purposes for which it was established, the papers it issues, and the capital allocated to it. The decree will also include the selection of the president and members of the temporary board of directors, which will adopt the procedures and carry out the activities necessary for establishment of the new organization and its papers.

The headquarters of the organization may be in Cairo or a governorate capital.

Article 133. The Supreme Press Council will be in charge of setting out the special statute and temporary bylaws of the press organization, in the framework of the stipulation the Consultative Assembly made in the decree establishing the organizations in accordance with the recommendations of the temporary board of directors of the organization, while observing the provisions stipulated in this bill.

The press organization's statute and temporary bylaws will remain in effect until the competent authorities have set forth their statute and bylaws, following completion of the procedures for establishing the organization.

Article 134. The nationwide press organization will enjoy an independent legal personality and may embark upon all acts and activities necessary to achieve its objectives as soon as the decree bearing on its establishment is issued.

Article 135. With attention to the relevant contents of a particular stipulation in this bill, nationwide press organizations may have a connection with other nationwide press organizations and other press and media installations and news agencies which exercise activities similar to theirs or may help them achieve their objectives inside or outside the country. They may also take part in any manner with these bodies, buy them or be merged into them.

Article 136. The nationwide press organization's chairman of the board will represent it before the judiciary or in confrontations with others.

Article 137. The role the nationwide press organizations play, the equipment, machinery and accessories devoted to printing or distributing them, the nationwide printing, advertising and distribution organizations and installations connected to them, and, in general, all the installations attached to, complementing or supplementing their activities, will be considered part of their attachments.

Article 138. The fiscal year of the nationwide press organizations and the companies and installations belonging to them will begin with the fiscal year of the Supreme Press Council and end when that ends.

Article 139. The nationwide press organizations, the papers they issue and all the installations complementing and supplementing their activity will be considered a single unit when their draft budgets, plans, final accounts and profit and loss accounts are set out, and attention will be given to setting aside a special section for each in various chapters of these budgets, plans and accounts.

Article 140. It is a condition for occupying any position in the general assemblies, boards of directors or editorial boards of nationwide press organizations or papers they issue, or engaging in any function or activity in any of them or in the installations subsidiary to or complementing or supplementing them, that there be no legal obstacle to having the candidate or person occupying the position, job or activity assume these, on grounds that they are positions, functions and activities which are of influence in guiding public opinion.

The competent authorities must ascertain that such obstacles do not exist before issuing a decree or acting. Any decree, measure or action made in violation of the provisions of the first paragraph will become void.

Article 141. Nationwide press organizations will be considered tantamount to public legal personalities as regards cases involving criminal responsibility on the part of the chairman and members of its general assembly, members of its boards of directors, and the chairman and members of the editorial boards of the nationwide papers and the companies belonging to these organizations, and also as regards any people working in them or in companies and installations subsidiary to or complementing or supplementing their activity.

Article 142. The Consultative Assembly will specify the areas of activity of the commercial agencies the nationwide press organizations establish, and it must be informed of the companies and commercial agencies which these organizations establish.

Article 143. If it is apparent from the Central Accounting Agency report that there are financial discrepancies within the organization, the matter will be presented to the Consultative Assembly, accompanied by the finding of the organization's general assembly and that of the Supreme Press Council.

Chapter Two: Formation of the General Assemblies, Boards of Directors and Editorial Boards

First, elected members.

Article 144. A higher committee will be formed to supervise the elections of the members of the general assemblies and boards of directors of the nationwide press organizations which will consist of the chairman of the Consultative Assembly, the two council deputy chairmen, and two members from the legal profession whom the General Committee of the Consultative Assembly chooses from among its members.

This committee may, in particular, determine to open the rolls for election nominations in any organization and may have the power to discuss all contestations presented regarding these elections.

Article 145. The board committee of the Consultative Assembly will form committees from its members to hold elections within each organization.

Article 146. Elections will take place as follows:

Declaration of the opening of rolls for nomination.

Receipt of nomination applications in the 2 days following declaration of the opening of the nomination rolls.

Investigation by the branch committee as to whether candidates meet the conditions which must be met and declaration of the names of candidates in the 2 days following the closure of the nomination rolls. The committee will have the right to exclude names which do not meet all the stipulated conditions.

The names of persons whose nomination is accepted will remain posted in a visible place for a period of 1 week during which contestations presented by interested parties will be accepted.

Names will be reannounced following discussion of the contestations, provided that that be at least 3 days prior to the holding of elections.

The elections will be held on the stipulated date starting at 0900 hours in the morning, and ending at 1700 hours in the evening. The balloting will be on the form provided, which will bear the seal of the Supreme Press Council.

The branch committee concerned will be in charge of holding the elections. It will also be in charge of counting the votes and announcing the results of the selection of the people who obtained a majority and the proportion of the number of valid votes cast. The committee may in this regard seek the assistance of people working in bodies different from those within which the elections are held.

Article 147. Contestations related to election results will be presented to the higher committee, which will take charge of investigating them within a maximum of 1 week. In either case its decision will be final.

Second, chosen members.

Article 148. The General Committee of the Consultative Assembly will nominate the members chosen for membership in the Supreme Press Council in a single list, and it will nominate all candidates at all levels and formations to every press organization separately in a single list as well. These nominations will be presented to the Consultative Assembly in separate lists.

Article 149. The Consultative Assembly will conduct the balloting on each list separately without debate. If the list wins a majority of the votes of the people present, it will be considered definitively chosen; if it does not win such a majority the General Committee of the Consultative Assembly will prepare another list of all its candidates for presentation to the Consultative Assembly. The Consultative Assembly will carry out the process of voting on it in the same fashion until it wins a majority.

Article 150. The chairman of the Consultative Assembly will convey the results of the assembly's balloting to president and a copy of this balloting will be deposited with the Supreme Press Council.

Chapter Three: Meetings of the General Assembly and Boards of Directors and Their Areas of Competence

First, general assemblies.

Article 151. The chairman of the board of directors of the press organization will chair its general assembly.

Article 152. The necessary measures will be taken to elect and choose general assembly members within the 60 days preceding the termination of their membership term.

Article 153. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council may hand a specific matter over to the general assembly to take its opinion on it.

Article 154. Attending the meetings of press organization general assemblies will be the members of their boards of directors, except for members on whom a withdrawal of confidence has been presented. Also attending assembly meetings will be a representative of the Supreme Press Council, to be chosen by the council chairman, a representative of the Central Accounting Agency, to be chosen by the agency, and the organizations' accountant and legal advisor. None of them will have a counted vote in the general assembly proceedings but they will be permitted to speak whenever they so request on matters related to the field of specialization of the organization's board of directors, the Supreme Press Council or the Central Accounting Agency, according to the case.

Article 155. The organization's general assembly will meet at least twice a year.

The general assembly meeting will be held in the press organization's headquarters in accordance with a written summons from the chairman of the assembly, containing the agenda which the board of directors has set out.

Article 156. Nationwide press organization general assemblies will meet with a majority of its members in attendance.

The general assembly's decrees will be issued by an absolute majority of the people in attendance. In case of a tie vote, preference will go to the side of the chairman.

Meetings held, as well as decrees issued, in violation of the provisions of any of the two preceding paragraphs, will be void.

Article 157. The minutes of general assembly meetings will be written down and entered in a special ledger signed by the assembly chairman and secretary. The assembly chairman will convey its decrees to the chairman of the Supreme Press Council, and will provide him with a copy of the minutes of its meetings.

Second, boards of directors.

Article 158. Boards of directors of nationwide press organizations are the authorities dominating their affairs, disposing of their matters, and carrying out the activities and actions which they undertake. They may adopt the decisions necessary to achieve the organization's goals and purposes, in particular the following:

1. Setting out general regulations common to all components of the organization.

2. Engaging in all activities necessary to manage the funds of the organization and determine various aspects for investing it.

3. Setting forth the drafts of resolutions and bills related to the organization's advertising, financial, administrative and technical affairs.

4. Setting forth bills bearing on the journalists, administrators, and workers working in it and the rules bearing on their appointment, promotion, discipline, wages, bonuses, incentives, and raises, the material services provided for them and in general everything connected to the organization of their affairs.

5. Arranging the revenues necessary for financing the organization's investment projects and setting out the necessary policies on investing their funds.

6. Preparing a draft estimated budget for the organization, its draft final accounts and its draft profit and loss account.

7. Reviewing the issues the chairman of the board of directors sees fit to present to the board.

Article 159. The boards of directors of nationwide press organizations will meet at least once a month by summons of the chairman of the board or in accordance with a written request to the chairman from at least one-third their members, specifying the issues it is desired to review and discuss in the board meeting.

The board of the Supreme Press Council may decide to summon the board of directors of any nationwide press organization to meet, in accordance with a presentation made by the board chairman, whenever it sees a need for that, in order to review specific issues lying within the council's area of specialization.

The chairman of the Supreme Press Council may include an issue which lies within the council's area of competence in the agenda of the boards of directors of nationwide press organizations.

Article 160. Meetings of the boards of directors of nationwide press organizations will be valid only if an absolute majority of their members is present. The board's decrees will be issued by a majority of the votes of the persons present. In the event of a tie vote preference will go to the side the chairman is on.

Article 161. The chairman of the board of directors may summon anyone to whose information or expertise he may see fit to resort to attend the board's sessions, but he will not have a counted vote in the proceedings.

The minutes of the board of director's meetings will be recorded and entered in a special ledger which will be signed by the chairman of the board of directors and a person the board chooses from its members to supervise the secretaryship of the board.

Article 162. The chairman of the board of directors will convey the board's decrees to the chairman of the Supreme Press Council, and the chairman of the Supreme Press Council will present those abovementioned decrees which must be approved to the Supreme Press Council at the first session following the date of their conveyance to the council chairman.

Article 163. The chairmen of boards of directors of nationwide press organizations may summon the board of directors of any company belonging to the organization or the editorial board of any newspaper belonging to the organizations to meet whenever they consider that need so dictates. They may include an issue entering in its field of competence in the agenda of the board of directors or the editorial board.

Article 164. The chairmen of the boards of directors of nationwide press organizations' activities and the activities of the functions of the units and companies subordinate to them and attach to this report an auditor's report, if one exists, and a report by the Central Accounting Agency. These will all be presented to the press organizations' boards of directors so they may express the observations to the report they consider appropriate. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will be informed of these reports and the opinions the organization's board of directors considered appropriate in their regard.

Chapter Four: Editorial Boards

Article 165. The editorial board will take charge of setting out a plan for apportioning press work in the paper among the editors in it in accordance with proper work requirements, with attention to the competence, expertise and area of specialization of each, according to the submission made by the editor in chief to the board.

Article 166. The editor in chief will bear the responsibility for actual total supervision over all editorial and advertising material contained in the paper.

Article 167. Editorial boards will hold a periodic daily meeting in daily papers, weekly meetings in magazines and weekly papers and monthly meetings in magazines and papers issued every month, or on the date on which the paper is issued, in accordance with the editorial board's stipulations and a presentation made by the editor in chief.

Article 168. The editorial boards of daily newspapers will be in charge of studying the general policy and principles of the material published in the paper's issues and will determine the various responsibilities of the editors, department heads and the editorial secretariat of the paper related to the execution of that and the plan related to the completion of this execution. The editor in chief and his aides will follow up on the execution of the editorial board's decisions.

Chapter Five: Termination of Membership

Article 169. The positions of chairmanship or membership in the general assemblies or boards of directors of nationwide press organizations or the editorial boards of nationwide papers will be vacated in any of the following conditions:

First, termination of the fixed membership term or term for holding the position.

Second, attainment of legal retirement age.

Third, lapse of one of the necessary conditions for occupying the position, in accordance with a final ruling or decision by the competent authorities to that effect.

Fourth, termination of service by decree of the Consultative Assembly, in accordance with the recommendation of the Supreme Press Council, with respect to people the Consultative Assembly has appointed by its decree.

Fifth, resignation.

Sixth, death.

Article 170. The membership term in general assemblies and boards of directors of nationwide press organizations for people chosen by the Consultative Assembly will end with the termination of the assembly's term, even if that is before the termination of their membership. Nonetheless, these members will continue to perform their duties unless the Consultative Assembly chooses other people as members in these boards in the 30 days following its reorganization.

Article 171. Resignations from the board chairmanships of organizations will be presented to the chairman of the Supreme Press Council.

Resignations from membership in general assemblies and from membership in boards of directors will be presented to the chairman of that board and resignations from membership in editorial boards will be submitted to the editor in chief.

Chairman of boards of directors and editors in chief may present resignations to general assembly, board of directors or editorial board in order that it may present its view and discuss the reasons for tendering the resignation with the person submitting it.

Resignations submitted by editors in chief and editorial board members, and opinions concerning those, will be submitted to the board of directors of the press organization.

The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will be notified of the submission of resignations from positions on boards of directors or editorial boards and opinions that either have reached regarding them, within 30 days of their submission.

Article 172. The chairman of the Supreme Press Council may present resignations conveyed to him, in accordance with the provisions set down in the preceding article, to the board of the Supreme Press Council or one of the council's other committees in order to study its causes and to prepare a report regarding it for submission to the council.

The committee to which the resignation has been handed may summon the person submitting it to discuss the circumstances and reasons for its submission, and they

may request the board of directors of the press organization concerned to provide data related to the resignation they require.

The chairman of the Supreme Press Council will inform the Consultative Assembly of the recommendations the Supreme Press Council has reached concerning the above-mentioned resignations in order to take the measures it considers appropriate, within 8 days of the issuance of the decree by the council regarding them.

A resignation will be considered final only as of the date of issuance of the decree accepting it by the authority competent to do so, and the position will be vacated as of the date of issuance of this decree.

Article 173. The position of chairmen of boards of directors of nationwide press organizations, the boards themselves, the members of these boards, and the chairmen and the members of the editorial boards of nationwide papers will be vacated upon the attainment of 60 years of age according to the Christian calendar.

It will not be permitted to extend the terms of people occupying these positions after they reach this age in any of these positions.

Nonetheless, it is permitted to appoint them to other activities in nationwide press organizations or to choose them for membership in their general assemblies or for editorial work in nationwide papers for a period of 1 year which may be renewed until they reach 65 years of age.

Decrees on appointments to the Supreme Press Council will be issued in accordance with recommendations from the board of directors of the nationwide press organization concerned, with the agreement of the majority of its members. These decrees will contain a definition of the job of the person to be appointed, and the period, compensations and salaries he will obtain, on condition that that job exceed the total sum he had been receiving before retirement.

Article 174. People occupying positions of heads and members of general assemblies and boards of directors of nationwide press organizations and editorial boards of nationwide newspapers may be assigned to continue performing their duties in temporary fashion, by decree of the Supreme Press Council board, until people are elected or chosen to take their place in their jobs.

Article 175. The chairman of the board of directors will inform the chairman of the Supreme Press Council when the position of any member of the general assembly is vacated.

Article 176. Notification will be made within a maximum of 3 days following the vacating of the position, on the form prepared for that, and it will be approved by the chairman of the Supreme Press Council if the post is vacated, for a reason other than resignation or termination of the term.

If the position is vacated, because of the termination of the term or attainment of retirement age, notification must be given at least 60 days before the date specified for that.

Notification that the abovementioned positions have been vacated must include the reason why and the date on which it was vacated and other data, according to the measures stipulated by the chairman of the Supreme Press Council by his decree.

Article 177. The chairman of the board of the Supreme Press Council will, after taking the opinion of his board committee, submit to the Consultative Assembly the notifications he has received regarding the vacating of the position of members of the boards of directors or general assemblies in any nationwide press organization, be they elected or chosen, so that the necessary measures may be taken to issue the decrees bearing on selection or organization of an election of persons to take their place. The chairman of the Consultative Assembly will convey the decrees adopted in this regard by the assembly to the Supreme Press Council and the chairman of the board of directors of the press organization concerned.

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LISTS, PHOTOS OF PRESS COUNCIL, MAGAZINE BOARD MEMBERS RELEASED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 3 Jul 81 pp 8-10

[Article: "Consultative Assembly Chooses Supreme Press Council, Nationwide Press Organizations"]

[Excerpts]



مكرم محمد احمد

Makram Muhammad Ahmad, member Board of Directors of the Dar al-Hilal Organization

Board of Directors of the Dar al-Hilal Organization

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[Second row, left to right] Husayn Jabir 'Ali, al-Sayyid Fu'ad Husayn, Khalil Ibrahim Hasan, Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Nur-al-Din.

Members of the Supreme Press Council

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2396

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OAPEC TECHNICAL CONSULTING FIRM ESTABLISHED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 13 Jul 81 p 15

[Article: "Mutual Support of the Oil Producing Countries, the Sole Producer, to Counter the Maneuvers of the Monopolistic Western Oil Companies"]

[Text] The Arab Technical Consulting Company, which is an outgrowth of OAPEC, held its constituent meeting in Abu Dhabi yesterday.

The secretary general of the organization, Dr 'Ali 'Atiqah, stated that this company had capitalized $12 million, of which $3 million has been paid in expenditures and another $20 million has been authorized. He said that it was the first company in which there would be participation by the national oil companies of the OAPEC members, not the governments of these countries, and that the Arab Consulting Company, an OAPEC company, would also participate.

He stated that this company, which would be headquartered in Abu Dhabi, would be a center for acquiring, mastering and developing technology in the field of petroindustries and for directing this technology toward building consulting expertise capable of meeting the needs of the member countries in particular, as well as all Arab and developing countries in general that might seek it.

He went on to say, "We view the establishment of this company as a major challenge to the ability of Arab specialists and officials in the Arab countries for creating consulting firms to operate in an Arab climate."

Dr 'Atiqah called for mutual support among the oil producing countries, as a sole producer of oil,"to counter the maneuvers of the monopolistic Western oil companies."

He said: "The current situation will afford an opportunity to the companies and the big powers to manipulate the oil producing countries."

He expressed his belief that the current reduction in oil production is an opportunity, not a problem, stating that over the next 10 to 20 years oil will be worth more than it is now.

He added that whenever production is lowered, expenditures controlled and reserves increased, "we are insuring against the switch from the present oil era to the future post-oil era."

He indicated that the second Arab energy conference would be held in the capital of Qatar next March, given the success of the first Arab energy conference which was held in Abu Dhabi in 1979 and which he described as a historic step.

He stated that the coming conference would be much bigger because it would bring together and develop the issues that were dealt with in the first conference.

He went on to say that the OAPEC countries are very interested in the issue of establishing an oil prospecting company since there is a strong belief that there are great opportunities for major oil discoveries, particularly since there are still undiscovered oil areas in the Arab world.

8389
CSO: 4304/81

OWNERSHIP OF LONDON PUBLICATION REVEALED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 1 Jun 81 p 11

[Interview with Sudanese opposition representative Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, date and place not given; for additional excerpts of the interview see FBIS DAILY REPORT: MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA, Vol V, No 111, 10 June 1981 page Q4]

[Excerpt] [Question] What is your relationship with the Arabic magazine AL-DUSTUR which is published in London?

[Answer] Al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, as a representative of the Sudanese opposition, holds as public--not private--property 80 percent of the magazine AL-DUSTUR which is published in London. The remaining 20 percent is owned by the Ba'th Party regional leaders for the Sudan (Iraq). It is published jointly by the two parties. The journal is entirely public property. It does not belong exclusively to the Sudanese opposition. This journal is consistently and permanently opposed to the present regime in the Sudan. It has published several detailed exposés on this regime such as "The Black File," "The Perfidious Treaty" and "A Dossier Of Corruption." These articles together comprise a book of nearly 100 pages.

9123
CSO: 4304/109

BRIEFS

TUNISIA, OMAN TO JOIN OAPEC--The secretary general of OAPEC, Dr 'Ali 'Atiqah, stated that two other Arab countries, Tunisia and the Sultanate of Oman, would join the organization, which has its headquarters in Kuwait. He said that OAPEC, which comprises nine Arab countries, had received notification from Tunisia that it would submit a request for membership in the organization at its coming ministerial conference scheduled to be held in Abu Dhabi in December. Dr 'Atiqah added that there is a possibility that Oman might join OAPEC in the near future and said that he would be glad for any Arab oil-producing country to join the organization. Dr 'Atiqah had been speaking upon his departure from Abu Dhabi for Kuwait after attending the constituent meeting of the Arab Technical Consulting Company, the latest company established by OAPEC. OAPEC now comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE, Syria, Algeria and Libya. Egypt used to be a member but its membership was suspended after it signed the peace treaty with Israel. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Jul 81 p 13] 8389

ENGINEERING PRODUCTS COMPANY ESTABLISHED--At the beginning of July, the first Arab company specializing in the marketing of Arab engineering industrial products was established in the Jordanian capital. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Qadir, secretary general of the Arab Federation of Engineering Industries, which has its headquarters in Baghdad, told AL-QABAS that this company had been established on modern principals of marketing this type of goods with Arab capital and shares held by Arab companies specializing in this industry and by Arab citizens alike. He said that its headquarters would be in Amman and that it would open branches in other Arab countries. He indicated that another company would be set up for the production of copper rods for production of telephone and electric cables. It should be noted that the demand in the Arab East for copper rods for wire and cable projects at present totals 40,000 tons a year while in the Arab Maghreb it amounts to 35,000 tons a year. The federation has prepared a special study of this project and preparations are underway for holding a meeting of Arab companies that produce wire and telephone cable. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Jul 81 p 13] 8389

ARAB JOINT ECONOMIC PLAN--Dubayy, 2 Sep (QNA)--The national plan for joint Arab economic action currently being discussed by the Arab Economic and Social Council in Tunis will cost $62 billion. It will include a five-stage plan at a cost of $20 billion. AL-BAYAN said here today in a report from Tunis that the ministerial council will discuss a proposed specialized technical committee whose members--who are also delegates of the member states--will have the right to endorse the plan and a proposal on holding a meeting on 23 October in order to discuss the national plan. The paper added that the council is studying a suggestion to hold an extraordinary meeting of Arab foreign and economic ministers to discuss relations between the Arab states and the outside world, particularly between the north and the south. It was also suggested that planning ministers be called to join the meeting in order to discuss the five-stage plan. [Text] [GF021033 Doha QNA in Arabic 0835 GMT 2 Sep 81]

CSO: 4304/137

BRIEFS

OPEC LOANS--The OPEC Fund for International Development has announced two loans worth $17.4 million to Togo and Jamaica. These credits bring total lending by the Fund to $1.16 billion in 248 loans to 76 Third World countries. The $10 million loan to Togo will go towards the construction of the Lome-Nose-Tahoun road, which is considered a vital development project to improve the country's trade and agricultural activities. This is Togo's second credit from the OPEC Fund, which had previously given balance of payments support to that country. Jamaica is to receive $7.4 million in balance of payments supports, which has already been granted four times by the OPEC Fund. Only one of the Fund's total loans of $27.3 million to Jamaica was for a development project. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 33, 17 Aug 81 p 8]

CSO: 4300/98

STEPS UNDER WAY TO IMPLEMENT GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL PACT

Paris AN-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 216, 28 Jun 81 p 34

/Article: "After Coordination, Unity"/

/Text/ The six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council started on the path to economic unity when they approved a draft unified economic agreement during the meeting held last week in Riyadh by the ministers of finance of these states.

The agreement includes 25 articles aimed at "unifying and coordinating" the policies of the member states of the council in economic, oil, monetary, trade, customs and other areas, in addition to providing for freedom of travel, work and residence, freedom to pursue economic activity and transfer capital, and the right to ownership, inheritance and appointment of an executor within the states of the council.

This draft agreement will be submitted to the ministerial council when it meets in Riyadh in August and then to the Supreme Council for final approval, after which it would take effect.

Although the articles of the agreement are intended to "work toward coordination of projects of the basic structure with the aim of economic integration," it seems doubtful, at least at present, that it will be possible to achieve what 'Abdallah Bisharah, secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, referred to as a very important article. This calls for "drawing up a unified policy for the production of petroleum in the states of the Council."

It is well known that this point, in its practical aspects, was the subject of quiet dispute in recent months between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the other petroleum states within the Gulf Cooperation Council and outside it, because of Saudi Arabia's insistence on flooding markets with a huge production surplus while the other states (including Kuwait, the Emirates and Qatar from within the Council) insist on cutting back production. This is the question that could not be resolved during the recent meeting of the OPEC council. Observers see it as a political problem with various causes and dimensions rather than a purely economic problem.

In its basic articles, the agreement relies on the working paper drawn up by the leaders at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit meeting held in Abu Dhabi at the end of May, which some criticized for mixing fiscal, economic and commercial matters. It is interesting to note that this working paper asked the secretary general of the council to call on the ministers of finance and economy to draw up a unified economic

agreement within 2 months from the end of May. All of a sudden the agreement was ready in less than 2 weeks and was even approved during these 2 weeks, which means that it was as good as completed during the Gulf summit or that it was drawn up in haste along general lines on which there was no dispute.

In General, the working paper that was approved by the summit calls for fiscal and monetary cooperation through efforts to unify investment regulations and laws for the sake of "attaining a common investment policy aimed at directing domestic and foreign investments," with the provision that that would be done before the end of the 1981 calendar year.

The working paper also called for the creation of a standardized Gulf currency, which observers expect to be accomplished before November. Gulf experts say that studies of this new unified currency have been ready for some time and that the unified Gulf dinar is about to be born. All that remains is some more study of the dinar's value in gold or in special notes of withdrawal issued by the International Monetary Fund.

This is in addition to the working paper's insistence on "coordination of banking and monetary policy and increased coordination among monetary organizations and central banks of the states of the region to create a unified Gulf currency that will carry out the desired economic integration."

From another aspect, the paper calls for "coordinating fiscal and monetary policies of the member states on the external level in respect to offering international and regional aid for development."

If these are the bases on which unified economic agreement rests, no doubt there is great hope that there will be broad and rapid steps toward economic unity for the region. However, nothing will be done until there is implementation, which must be aimed at achieving independence of economic decisions. On this subject there is still more debate than agreement.

7587
CSO: 4304/55

PEACE OVERTURES ENCOUNTER PROBLEMS

Hong Kong FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW in English 28 Aug 81 p 31

[Article by Ted Morello]

[Text] **New York:** The first signs of a possible negotiated settlement on Afghanistan are receiving a frosty reception from a United States administration unreservedly dedicated to confrontational diplomacy. This emerged as United Nations Undersecretary-General for Special Political Affairs Javier Perez de Cuellar reported back after his recent mission to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Perez, a Peruvian diplomat who is also UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim's special representative on the Afghanistan issue, conferred with Afghan Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost in Kabul and Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi in Islamabad in early August. On returning here, he reported to Waldheim that the two governments had agreed tentatively on a four-point agenda but were deadlocked on priorities.

The agreed points for debate if face-to-face bilateral negotiations eventually get under way are: the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; pledges of non-interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs; international guarantees — presumably including the US, the Soviet Union and China — backing the non-interference pledges; and the return of Afghan refugees, most of whom are just across the border in Pakistan's North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces.

At the outset, Kabul and Islamabad disagreed on which item on the agenda should be taken up first. Afghanistan insists that the refugee issue should receive priority. Its rationale is that once the refugees — whom Kabul regards as active or potential guerilla raiders — return home, there will be no need for Soviet troops to remain in the country as a shield against rebel threats to the regime of President Babrak Karmal.

But Pakistan is holding out for Soviet troop withdrawal as the first order of business. Islamabad maintains that the refugees fled precisely because they were being massacred by the Soviets, and they have no intention of going back while Moscow's occupation force remains in their homeland. In fact, despite Kabul's repeated offers of amnesty, the displaced Afghans have not only refused to return, but are being joined by their countrymen arriving daily in a continuing exodus. In its most recent tally, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported that as of July 31 the number of Afghan refugees registered with the Pakistani authorities had swollen to 2.29 million. Therefore, Islamabad argues, troop withdrawal is a prerequisite to refugee repatriation.

However, even a Soviet withdrawal is unlikely to end an insurgency aimed at toppling Karmal, whose Marxist regime is deeply offensive to the devout majority of Muslim Afghans.

The first substantive follow-up to the Perez diplomatic mission will be proxy talks at UN headquarters in late September. With both Dost and Shahi here to attend the 36th General Assembly session, which opens on September 15, Waldheim will meet the rival foreign ministers separately — a scenario tailored to Pakistan's refusal to deal directly with a regime whose legitimacy it does not recognise.

Waldheim's shuttle diplomacy here will be staged against a background of Afghanistan-related contacts which in rapid succession follow Perez' recent return from the field. On August 21, Shahi flew to Washington to discuss the issue with US Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Three days later, Shahi's schedule called for a meeting on the same subject in

Islamabad with visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin.

On August 28, Shahi and US Permanent Representative at the UN Jeane Kirkpatrick are scheduled to confer in Islamabad. (Kirkpatrick is on a tour of Asia.) US State Department sources added that in Islamabad, the agenda was to focus on a joint strategy for handling the Afghanistan item when it comes up for assembly action. As the main frontline state, Pakistan can be expected to take the lead again in attempts to achieve a diplomatic settlement to the dispute.

However, these sources said, US President Ronald Reagan's administration is arguing for a tough UN condemnation of Moscow for its refusal to implement last November's assembly resolution calling, among other things, for the immediate withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan. They added that Washington is concerned that such manifestations as the Firyubin visit and Islamabad's agreement to the proxy talks will be interpreted internationally as substantive peace moves or, even worse, a soft-on-communism retreat, and make it harder to muster the assembly votes necessary to condemn Moscow.

Bilateral discussions in advance of the proximity talks will peak when Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, each heading his national delegation to the Assembly, meet here in mid-September in the first top-level US-Soviet contact since Reagan moved into the White House last January. While their agenda will cover the entire range of East-West relations, there is no doubt that a special place will be accorded to Afghanistan, which more than any other recent event has soured relations between the superpowers.

UN diplomats, aware that the Haig-Gromkyo meeting could have a powerful effect on the Shahi-Dost proxy talks, will be watching the big two foreign ministers' conference with more than a trace of apprehension. Already, there is a growing concern that the Reagan administration's "shotgun diplomacy" — and the Kremlin's possibly equally tough response to it — will jeopardise the delicate Afghanistan negotiations. ■

CSO: 4600/166

MEASURES UNDERTAKEN TO STRENGTHEN INTERNAL CONTROL

Closer Contact with People

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 8 Aug 81 pp 1, 4

[Speech by Babrak Karmal at seminar of Department of Documents and Liaison of the PDPA CC]

[Text] KABUL, Aug. 8 (Bakhtar).— Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and the President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, received the participants of the seminar, convened by the Documents and Liaison Department of the PDPA CC on organising documents and creation of a new administration at the Gul Khana Palace, the Revolutionary Council headquarters, and talked with them in a completely democratic and sincere atmosphere.

Upon his entering the Gul Khana Palace, Karmal was welcomed and greeted by the participants of the seminar with prolonged applause and revolutionary enthusiasm.

Dwelling upon the importance and nature of a healthy filing system of documents and the relation of party and Government authorities with vast masses of people, Karmal, in a part of his speech, said:

Comrades! In the two-day seminar you have become fully acquainted with all aspects of procedure and management, working procedure with documents procedure for reception of people, their petitions and letters and have exchanged your experiences.

The PDPA has attached great importance to the improvement and completion of party office procedures and management and will do so in the future. We believe that working with documents constitutes one of the major and important parts of party committees' activities.

The party has entrusted you with this important and responsible job. We expect that you utilise all your knowledge, experience, energy, steadiness, seriousness toward the creation of a really healthy order in office procedure and handling of documents in accordance with the requirements and instructions of the Central Committee.

In order to discharge your respective duties, it is necessary that you, incharges of documents and liaison offices of party committees, development and manifest qualities of orderliness, efficiency, seriousness, discipline and a sense of responsibility in yourelves. You must serve as excellent models for all party and Government employees in office procedure and management and handling documents because the major bulk of your work constitutes the establishment of liaison among party committees, leading body, secretariate, 'operate' and among all the branches of the Central Committee.

As I have been informed, participants in the seminar have paid ample attention to the completion, inspection and control of the execution of affairs in their speeches."

Karmal added: "I, in my turn, want to point out that inspection and control of the implementation of

resolutions, party and Government instructions is one of the important means of promoting demands and a forceful tool of managing affairs in party commitees.

"Inspection of the implementation of all resolutions and instructions must be conducted with seriousness and the utilisaion of all available forms of conrol. You must always keep in mind that only a careful study of matters, a careful and systematic forwarding of information, an objective(timely and profound analysis of the situation in localities and serious and documented proposals can bring success in the inspection and control of the implementation of resolution.

"In order to control the implementation of the resolutions, a creative, serious, attiude and a sense of pary responsibility must be mobilised considering the overall affairs of the Saur Revolution.

"If the affairs connected with control are left disorganised and without due attention, creative organisational work is unknowingly dragged to meetings. Thus living and important affairs are replaced by words and unnecessary paper work which will consume the valuable time of the party organisation."

In another part of his speech, Karmal said: "Our party always endeavours to expand and strengthen the relations of the vast masses of people. One of the living forms of these relations is the party committee working with the letters and complaints of people.

Letters make it possible to assess the effectiveness of the work of party comorgans and get information about the condition of the mittees and Government masses of people and find solutions to their problems and remove flaws.

"You, when attending to the letters, a source of information about the life, emotions and aspirations of the people, must seriously and incessantly attempt to have a benevolent attitude towards the written and oral demands of people.

"You must consider the handling of letters as a major portion of your organisational and political work.

"The proposals, published criticisms, consultations and complaints contained in letters must be immensely used. Serious work must be undertaken by party committees to remove the factors tha have caused disconent among people."

Karmal's speech was followed by questions raised by the seminar participants which were given satisfactory answers in a completely friendly and democratic atmosphere.

At the end of this meeting, one of the participans of he seminar, on behalf of the others, expressed gratitude for being received by Karmal and for his significant speech and pledged that, with sacrifice and selflessness and understanding the great mission with which the PDPA has entrusted them, will try hard to keep and guard party documents and relations df the party and Government authorities with masses in a healthy manner.
vened for the purpose of bet-
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ter management, documentation and creation of a new administrative system at the PDPA CC headquarters has ended.

Results of seminar were assessed as positive.

At the closing session, Aug 5, Sayed Taher Shah Paikargar, alternate member of PDPA CC and deputy chief of the organisational department of the CC, spoke on the importance of the seminar and assessed its outcome in promoting the educational level and better management of office procedures as 'fruitful and useful."

Also the incharge of the documents and liaison department of the Central Council of Trade Unions of Afghanistan, an instructor from the documents department of the party CC and a provincial representative, supporting HRDLU tative expressed readiness for the implementation of the resolutions of the seminar.

At the end the participants visited various branches of the CC and its archives.

Better Administrative System

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 9 Aug 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The holding of the first seminar on managing, organising and filing of documents and creation of a new administrative system was a right step taken towards the right direction at this time when the party and government have embarked on the road to progress and development of various aspects of the public life.

Convened by the Documents and Liaison Department of the central committee of the PDPA at the headquarters of PDPA CC, the seminar was addressed by prominent party members who drew the attention of the participants to the ordering and organising of documents in a proper and efficient way so it could help in implementing the programmes and plans undertaken by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and DRA government.

The main purpose of the seminar was to create a new progressive and productive system in office management and speedy handling administrative affairs.

The seminar was a very important move made by the Documents and Liaison Department of the PDPA CC towards introucing reforms in office management and creation of a system which would be inducive to the effective realisation of the lofty objectives and goals of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanisan and the DRA government. Instructions and orders cannot be properly put into effect if an effective and efficient administrative system is not developed within the government and the party as well.

The seminar which lasted two days not only discussed the duties and responsibilties of personnel and officials incharge of record keeping but also sought means and ways of improving office management and efficient performance of the tasks entrusted.

The seminar provided a good opportunity to the participants to exchange their experiences in handling records, keeping documents and maintaining good relations between the party organisations. No, doubt the seminar consolidated the ties existing between the Central Committee and the provincial committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

It is a clear and open fact today that the bigness and complexity of the party and goverment programmes and functions have given rise to the need for focusing attention on the improvement of administrative and managerial affairs in the interest of a growing Afghan society. The seminar was an attempt to systematically arrange and order the PDPA and DRA government affairs so far as to achieve the desired ends of the party and government in so far as this goal is humanly possible to reach. It is, in fact, an attempt to systematically work toward an honest integration of all points of view to the end that every individuality may be mobilised and made to count, both as a person and as an effective part of his group and of the society at large.

Reorganisation of administration and turning it into a dynamic and useful force to implement the party and government programmes has been the main concern of the domestic policy of the government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Last year for the first time in the history of Afghanistan a grand meeting was held to create an effective and efficient administrative system to be able to efficiently discharge government functions and do away with the old bonds of feudal and prefeudal orders. Since then in various ministries and public organisations efforts are directed towards the improvement of administrative system to execute the development plans rapidly and without any red tape and administrative bottlenecks.

In the past when the feudal order and monarchical regime were in power the government functions were characterised by red tape, bureaucracy and corruption including forgery, embezzlement, favouritism and nepotism. Individuals and clients used to go from one office to another and from person to another in order to get their work done. In every step he had to surmount an obstacle or bottleneck created not only by the bureaucrats but also by the outdated rules and regulations which could not meet the requirements of the time.

With the victory of the Saur Revolution and especially its new evolutionary phase the party and government leadership began to strive to do away with the bureaucratic way of handling administrative work of the government and the party and fulfilling the responsibility they are shouldered with.

It was because of this fact that Babrak Karmal General Secretary of PDPA CC and President of the Revolutionary Council while receiving the participants of the seminar in an address said: "in order to discharge your respective duties you should manifest in yourselves qualities of orderliness, discipline, efficiency, seriousness and a sense of responsibility'.

New ɔning System for Kabul

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 10 Aug 81 p 3

[Text] After the victory of Saur Revolution especially its new evolutionary phase under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan important and wide steps have been taken towards the safeguarding of the gains of Saur Revolution, development of national economy and improvement of the living conditions of the people of Afghanistan.

Making the above remarks in an interview with the reporter of the Kabul New Times the Kabul Mayor Engineer Adina Sangeen while commenting on the new administrative division of the Kabul city said that in accordance with the aims of the party and DRA government for the prosperity and welfare of the inhabitants of the Kabul city the Kabul city has newly been divided into 11 precincts through cooperation of Kabul City Party Committee and the Kabul Municipality.

The respective proposal for the new administrative division of the Kabul city was recently prepared by the Kabul City Party Committee and Kabul Municipality in an attempt to remove the problems and difficulties the Kabul citizens were faced with. The proposal was advanced to the party and state authorities and was recently approved by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan.

With the approval of the new administrative units of the Kabul city large facilities will surely be provided to the Kabul citizens. In the previous administrative division of the Kabul city basic norms were not taken into consideration equally as far as area, population, number of cultural institutions, recreational areas and other needed services and facilities are concerned.

ZONES

There were 11 party zones, 24 sarandoy (police) stations, and 24 municipality precincts and 6-8 traffic zones. Likewise social organisations such as women's organisation, youth organisation and trade unions were not organised and not established within the framework of the municipality units.

A sketch of the Kabul new administrative divisions.

As mentioned earlier, Eng. Sangeen added, the division of the Kabul city into 22 units was not based on the basic norms of modern cities and towns. There were many gaps and defects existing in the administrative division of the Kabul city. For instance, Paghman, located 15 kilometres from Kabul, a summer resort for the Kabul citizens had been turned into 14th precinct of Kabul city.

On the other hand, the areas close to the Kabul International Airport and other areas located 7-8 kilometres from the Kabul city which should have been part of the Kabul City precincts were connected with the woleswalis of Kabul province.

Dip Eng Sangeen said: In the previous administrative division the border lines of the precincts were not specified. Likewise, the customs, national, historical and religious traditions of the inhabitants of various areas of the Kabul city were not taken into account. All the Kabul citizens know that the capital of the Kabul city, the old city, has had special culture, customs and traditions. However, this part of the city was divided into 6th, 7th and 8th precincts regardless of taking this principle into consideration.

Therefore, the previous administrative division was not proper and, consequently, the different organs and institutions of the city were faced with many difficulties and problems in the daily life. Under the new administrative divisions eleven precincts have been created in the Kabul city.

Talking of the differences between the present and the past administrative divisions of the Kabul city the Mayor of Kabul said: Each of the present precinct of the Kabul city has party city committee, municipal council, social organisations, a police station, a municipality office and several other organs.

In the new administrative division of the Kabul city social, and economic conditions and national historical customs and religious traditions of the inhabitants of various precincts have been taken into consideration. The proportional division of population, areas, social and cultural organisations, cinemas and development possibilities of each precinct have been taken into account on the basis of the Kabul ciy master plan.

In making the boundary lines of the Kabul precincts use has been made of the fixed border lines such as mountains, roads and Kabul river. The new administrative division of the Kabul city will handle public affairs better and maintain public security in a more effective way in various parts of the city.

It should be mentioned, Eng Sangeen added, that the Kabul Municipality units or precincts will be entrusted with greater tasks and responsibility in handling municipality affairs.

The powerful delegation from the Central Office to several municipality units throughout the K abul City and the participation of the Kabul citizens in removing the municipality problems and difficulties and the better coordination between the functions and activities of various precincts and establishment of party city organs and government offices will help the Kabul citizens live a comfort and tranquil life.

In the new administrative division of the Kabul Municipality the population of each precinct will be a maximum of 70,000 and minimum of 10,000 people. This number has a complete logical ratio with the area of the respective precinct.

Likewise, Eng. Sangeen said, he shortcomings existed in the past administrative division of the Kabul City are fully removed now. Every precinct will be separated from others by fixed borders lines. Except for precinct 12th, all other precincts have a common border line with the centre of the city. The areas close to the border lines of Kabul city have been taken out of the Kabul woleswalis and connected with one of the 11 precincts of the Kabul city.

CSO: 4600/164

SECURITY CRACKDOWN IN KABUL, FIGHTING REPORTED

Heavy Security Crackdown

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 20 Aug 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] New Delhi, Aug. 19: The Soviet-backed Government in Afghanistan last week conducted one of the heaviest security crackdowns in Kabul in recent months, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

They said the operations included the searching of vehicles troops concentrations at key points, systematic searches of houses and the closing of Kabul airport for several hours.

Many people in the Afghan capital believed the crackdown was aimed at finding new recruits for the army, but the sources said the most logical reason seemed to be Government concern at the level of Mujahideen activity and infiltration into Kabul.

Despite the crackdown, the pace of Mujahideen attacks in Kabul remained at about the same level as in recent previous weeks, they said.

The sources also said that Soviet and Afghan troops fighting Mujahideen had been active in Parwan province, north of Kabul on the road to the Soviet Union. They quoted reliable sources as saying Kariz Amir about 40 kms north of Kabul was pounded from the air and by tanks last Thursday.

Another report adds: Seven teenagers were shot dead in Kabul recently while resisting or trying to escape forced induction into the desertion-ridden Afghans armed force, a report from Afghanistan said last night.

The seven deaths occurred within five days last week in the vicinity of Mikrorayan, a Soviet housing complex, and four in other parts of the capital. Two such killings were independently confirmed on Tuesday by a Western diplomat.

The Kabul report said the stepped-up programme involves spot identification checks of young men virtually every 100 yards along some Kabul streets and assembling those selected at the reshkhor military induction centre outside the city without informing their families.

Conscription squads have been authorised to fire on any youth resisting or trying to escape the checks causing grea. resentment in the Afghan capital, the report added.

According to a London report fighting raged between the Karmal forces and the Mujahideen at a place 15 kilometres off Darwazgai border post in Zabul Province, as a result of which eight Karmal soldiers were killed and three Mujahids were martyred.

Darwazgai is situated at a distance of 30 kilometre from the Pakistan border.

On August 13, the Mujahideen were going in a tractor trolley when over 30 soldiers coming in a truck from Darwazgai fort chased them. They fired at the

tractor and punctured its tyres. The Mujahideen exchanged fire with them taking the cover of trolley and killed the two soldiers sitting at the front seat alongwith the truck driver. The truck stopped and the Karmal force came out facing the Mujahideen. The hand-to-hand fight started as a result of which another five Karmal soldiers were killed. The Karmal force retreated and ran away towards the fort. Three Mujahids Karim Jan, Jumma Khan and Baz Muhammad succumbed to their injuries, while the injured tractor driver succeeded in reaching the destination. The driver's condition is stated to be out of danger.

In Darwazgai fort there are 250 men stationed alongwith artillery, 10 tanks and 10 armoured cars. Mines have been planted around the fort to the distance of five kilometre to the each side. The surrounding areas are under the control of the Mujahideen. The food supplies and other reinforcements are sent to the fort by helicopters. The Mujahideen had neglected this fort for sometimes. It is for the first time that a Government force came out of the fort and attacked the Mujahideen.—AAP.

Intelligence Service (KHAD) Buildup

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 21 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] RAWALPINDI, Aug. 20: The Soviets are bringing in advisers from other Warsaw Pact countries in Afghanistan and a number of high-ranking East German intelligence officials have been in Kabul for the past few months to impart specialised training of KHAD men and refurbish their intelligence gathering apparatus.

This was published by "India Today" in its latest issue of August 15 in an article captioned "Afghanistan tightening the screws".

According to the article, recently the Soviets have been working night and day to complete an oil pipeline from Hayration inside the Soviet Union, along the main Salan road linking Kabul with the Soviet border—another overt indication of their determination to make a permanent base in Afghanistan.

According to the article: "British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington's frantic dash to Moscow last month symbolised a depressingly familiar scenario. Ever since the Soviet military machine punched into Afghanistan in December 1979 frantic diplomatic efforts to carve out a compromise on the "Afghanistan problem" have come up against a blank wall of Russian obstinacy. Carrington's European Economic Community backed proposal for convening an international conference on Afghanistan merely represented the latest such attempt and predictably met with a firm rejections rom the Soviet side.

The Soviet rebuff to Carrington, however, has once again fuelled intense speculation on what is the most intriguing stir of the decade—what exactly are the Soviet plans for Afghanistan? With media coverage of that ill-starred country virtually non-existent since the clamp down on journalists' visas over a year ago, a possible answer has been shrouded in uninformed guesswork and often biased diplomatic reports. 'India Today' correspondent Asoka Raina, however, managed to obtain a visa for Afghanistan last month and spent ten days in Kabul and the major trouble spots to make an on-the-spot assessment of the Soviet strength and weaknesses, their current strategy in Afghanistan, the extent of resistance and what effect the Soviet presence has had on normal every day life in the country 19 months after the Soviets moved in.

Elsewhere, the Muslim world was withdrawing into a period of deep religious significance Ramazan, a month of abstinence and self-sacrifice. In Afghanistan, Ramazan merely ushered in unobstructive changes. The restaurants and souks were emptier than usual and though the curfew had been extended till midnight, Kabul is a ghost city, by early evening, just as it has been for the 19 months since the Soviets moved in. Soviet tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCS) still rumble through the streets at night, but in far greater numbers and their deep-throated nocturnal growls are now challenged by the high-pitched whine of 200 Soviet-made Niva jeeps that criss-cross the city on 24-hour patrols. The jeeps, painted a dazzling white, have been recently brought in from the Soviet Union for the exclusive use of the dreaded Afghan Secret police, Khadmita Idara Daulahi (KHAD).

Judging by the dramatic increase of activity, the Soviets are making plans for a permanent presence in Afghanistan. The jerry-built barracks and tents hastily erected to accommodate the massive influx of troops early last year, have been replaced by permanent structures in virtually every Soviet military base, with proper mess halls, dining rooms, bars and recreation facilities.

Kabul airport is a behive of activity with MIG-21s and MIG 23s in a constant state of combat alert while ponderous AN-12s and AN-24s land and take off at regular intervals, bringing in equipment and weaponry and taking out casualties from Mujahideen encounters.

Soviet movements: Last fortnight, the Soviets signed a yet unpublicised "agreement" with the Karmal government that gives them total control of the Wakhan bulge, a narrow strip jutting into the Pamir Plateau. The bulge, which is now out of bounds for the Afghans, offers the Soviets a strategic spring board into China's Sinkiang province. Military intelligence sources in Kabul say that the Soviets had moved two new infantry divisions and were building an airstrip.

The attack and its aftermath were both a measure of rebel conference and Soviet overkill. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets are paying a heavy price for their continuing presence in this embattled country. Intelligence sources estimate their losses in rebel skirmishes since December 1979, to be at least 6,000 men. Last May, a five-man high-powered military team led by General Okolosky arrived in Kabul to ascertain why Soviet casualties were abnormally high in what is a limited and localised flushing out operation.

Determination: Recently the Soviets have been working night and day to complete an oil pipe line from Hayration, inside the Soviet Union, along the main Salan road linking Kabul with the Soviet border another overt indication of their determination to make a permanent base in Afghanistan. Similarly, they have, over the past six months, started requisitioning houses for the treaty trickle of civilians, military and intelligences' advisers who flit in and out of Kabul. "They (the Russians) are throwing us out of our own houses till their accommodation is ready and we are forced to stay in rented houses", said a former Afghan diplomats in Kabul.

Intelligence sources also see as significant the fact that the Soviets are bringing in advisers from other Warsaw Pact countries. A number of high-ranking East German intelligence officials have been in Kabul for the past few months to impart specialised training of KHAD operatives and refurbish their intelligence-gathering apparatus. Retribution for aiding the Mujahideen is now done in far more subtle ways. Instead of bombing areas suspected of harbouring rebels, the Soviets are now employing indirect methods such as cutting of power and food supplies. Kandahar, an area of known rebel activity, has say these sources been without electricity for the past six months.—PPI.

Establishment of 'Recreation Clubs'

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 23 Aug 81 p 8

[Text] LONDON, Aug. 22: Karmal regime is trying hard to ruin the moral values of religious-minded Afghans by allowing establishment of brothels in Kabul. Opponents of the regime and unsatisfied members of Kahiq faction have strongly criticised the step.

Reports from Kabul say that some days ago two brothels were established in Kabul—one in Shahr-i-Nau and the other in Shah Shaheed. In these brothels prostitutes and abducted women are kept to please the sex-starved Russians and Karmalite soldiers.

At night, when Kabul is under strict curfew, these areas remain busy under the protection of security forces. Reports from other cities also reveal that such brothels have also been established with same purpose. In cantonments and small army bases "recreational clubs" fulfil the amorous desires of Russian and Karmalite soldiers. In these clubs" recreational facilities" are provided officially on a small scale.

Opponents of the puppet regime accuse that immoral values are wilfully encouraged by the authorities. They also quote an instruction to the Afghan police which restricts police to register a case against adultery. According to this instruction "amorous relations between men and women are their personal affair. Karmal regime is providing full protection to adultery for surreptitious reasons the opponents said.—AAP.

Conscription of Schoolboys

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 27 Aug 81 p 8

[Excerpt] A New Delhi report says: More than 300 Kabul schoolboys have been forced into the Afghan armed forces by conscription squads sent out to find replacements for military deserters, a report from Afghanistan said on Tuesday.

A Kabul source, who asked not to be identified but has been accurate in the past, reported that the draftees were immediately moved to remote provinces for rudimentary training before being thrown into battle with anti-communist guerillas, who control much of the Afghan countryside.

"The impressments reportedly followed the launching of a new conscription programme involving house-to-house searches and spot identification checks of young men every 100 yards (30 meters) along Kabul streets. Seven teenagers were reported shot to death recently in the Afghan capital while resisting or trying to escape forced enrolment in the military.

The source said the schoolboys were conscripted and sent outside Kabul without their families being informed. Relatives and friends have been visiting the homes of the draftees to express sorrow for the forced induction, he added.

The families of the impressed boys, having little hope of seeing their sons survive the fighting, appeared to be in mourning, the report continued.

Meanwhile, attendance in the 11th and 12th grades in Kabul high schools continued to be very low with thousands of boys having been sent by their families to the neighbouring guerilla controlled provinces of Logar and Parwan.

Although the official draft age in Afghanistan is 20, men much younger are being enrolled for compulsory service in the armed forces, according to reports from Kabul.

Committee

The Kabul administration has set up a committee under the chairmanship of Defence Minister Mohammad Rafi to review the constant increase in the strength of resistance movement, defeat of Government forces and growing incidence of Soviets casualties.

The branches of the committee would be established on the sub-divisional basis in the entire country to advise on devising a new war strategy.

The decision to the effect was made at a top level meeting last week attended by the Cabinet members, some of the Revolutionary Council members, Soviet Advisers, Soviet Ambassador in Kabul, Provincial Governors and some of the important office-bearers of the ruling party. During the meeting continuing for three hours, the demoralisation of the Afghan army growing incidence of desertions from the Afghan army and deteriorating morale of the party workers, were pinpointed as the fundamental causes for the reverses of the administration.--AFP/Reuter/APA/APP/AAP.

CSO: 4600/165

NEW LEADERSHIP'S POLICY DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 225, 13 Jun 81 pp 10-11

[Article by Ibrahim Salamah: "Policy of New Algerian Leadership: Continuity, Along With Avoiding Some Past Mistakes; Algeria Living in State of Psychological, Intellectual and Political Relaxation"]

[Text] Algiers--I haven't visited Algeria for 7 years, i.e., since the second press interview I had with the late President Houari Boumediene. In these 7 years, many things and many faces have changed. This is why Dr Mohieddine Amimour, the information adviser at the Presidential Office, advised me to meet with the largest number of new officials (excluding President Bendjedid). I have complied with his wish.

I have met with Abdelhamid Mehri, the party official in charge of cultural affairs, then with Minister of Information Boualem Bessaieh, with his colleague Minister of Tourism Abdelmadjid Allahoum, Minister of Commerce Abdelaziz Khellef, with legal adviser at the Presidential Office Ismail Hamdani and finally with the Director of Internal Security Hadi Khediri. This is in addition to some old friends, such as Deputy Saleh (Boujomah), former ambassador and current deputy Osman Saadi and, of course, veteran leader Ibrahim Touban.

I had two questions on my mind which I addressed to all those with whom I have met. The first is: What has changed in Algeria since Boumediene's death? The second is: Where is Algeria heading in its new era under the presidency of Chadli Bendjedid?

Regarding the first question, the modes of answering varied but the content has been nearly the same. One of them said: "There has been no fundamental change in the Algerian policy. But there have been some modifications imposed by the reality and dictated by the country's circumstances."

The minister of trade, who is a member of the Central Committee and a young man in his thirties, summed up the answer by stating: "It is a phase of reevaluating the structure of the state institutions in which bureaucracy has grown and thrived, turning the institutions into a burden to the citizen instead of being his servant."

Hadi Khediri, a former diplomat whose actions still display traces of his background, said: "There has been no change in the manner reported in the French press. I believe that France has not understood the Algerian people from the eruption of the liberation war in 1954 until the present. What happened has been simple and logical. President Boumediene died and fate didn't give him the chance to complete the constitutional institutions necessary for Algeria. Chadli Bendjedid was elected as his successor and he has completed the structure. The powers have been divided between the party's Central Committee and the ministers. Above the two institutions are the Political Bureau, which emanates from the Central Committee, and the president of the Republic who is the party secretary general and the president of the Republic, i.e., the commander in chief of the armed forces, at the same time.

"Naturally, the new Algerian officials have added their imprint; the late president had his personality and his style of work; and the new president has his own style and his approach. This is natural. However, the constant characteristics of the Algerian policy as defined by the National Charter, i.e., Algeria's Arabism and its Islamic dimension, its commitment to socialism as an economic system and its international affiliation with the nonaligned group, are things that have not been touched, and may not be touched by anyone; because they are fateful fundamental options reflecting Algeria's geographic, historical and cultural reality."

This is a summary of the answers of a number of Algerian officials to the first question. As for the second question--where is Algeria heading in its new era?--the answers have once again been close and similar. Khellef, the minister of foreign trade, said: "The socialism adopted by Algeria is not a ready-made mold imported from abroad. It is an intrinsic experience subjected to Algeria's circumstances. Therefore, through experience, we modify here or there according to the dictates of the public interest." Adnan [sic] Hamdani, the legal adviser at the Presidential Office, said: "Algeria has adopted and continues to adopt nonalignment in its international policy. It also believes in and defends the principle of self-determination for all peoples of the world. At the same time, Algeria is a socialist Arab Maghreb republic which moves along three axes:

"The Arab axis in its relations with the Arab Maghreb neighbors and with the Arabs of the East.

"The African axis where Algeria performs a vanguard role in assisting the developing African countries and in establishing sound economic and political relations with them.

"The Islamic axis which emanated from Algeria's historical and cultural reality, a reality which has made Algeria a prominent and active member in all the Islamic organizations and conferences."

Hamdani added: "I can assure you that the plots being hatched against Algeria, and with these plots all the military axes in the African continent nurtured and encouraged by Washington, only seek to drag Algeria to sidebattles after which Algeria would swerve from the firm bases of its domestic and external

policy. Despite all these attempts, Algeria still clings to the fundamental principles spelled out in the Charter and discussed in the special fourth congress."

The third question was: Algeria's relations with its sisters the Arab Maghreb countries are blemished by caution at times and by fear at others. What is the reason for this and what is the responsibility of the Algerians?

Most of the Algerian officials were initially surprised by this question but then their answers followed:

Dr Amimour explained the situation in the following manner:

"First, perhaps because only Algeria had a revolution and its people waged a valiant and ceaseless struggle to expel the colonialist. This condition has created in the Algerian citizen a kind of self-confidence which is at times too exuberant.

"Second, Algeria follows a realistic policy through which it doesn't seek to dominate its neighbors or even to gain spheres of influence, as some of the continent's countries do.

"Third, the system prevalent in Algeria inevitably forms, with its well-known intellectual and economic balance, a point of attraction for the peoples of the Arab Maghreb. This is something of which the neighboring Maghreb regimes are wary."

Dr Hamdani was more on the offensive in his answer, saying: I want to ask you the question in reverse: "What fraternal Maghreb country can say that Algeria has interfered in its domestic affairs or has tried to change its political system?" Relying on documents and history, he added: "Contrary to what you say, Algeria signed cooperation agreements with its sisters, the Maghreb countries. We signed trade agreements with Morocco in 1963 concerning the freedom of movement of individuals between and inside the two countries and an agreement on capital partnership, provided that our partnership does not include any foreign capital. The late President Boumediene visited Morocco for this purpose and this was the first agreement concluded by Algeria with its neighbors. The Moroccan side did not implement the agreement and the issue has been forgotten. The same thing happened with the Tunisian cabinet of Ahmed Ben Saleh. We concluded with Tunisia an agreement for partnership in the iron and steel industry and then discovered that the Tunisian government wanted to participate with French capital. It was then that the late President Boumediene uttered his famous phrase: "We expelled them through the door so that they may return through the window?"

What about Libya, Dr Adnan?

"Our relations with Libya are normal and we received a Libyan official yesterday. Consultations between the two countries are constant. We believe in unity among the Maghreb peoples first and then with the brothers in the Arab East, beginning from the base and not the top. The educational curricula must be first unified,

then the currencies, then the economic and agricultural programs, and then entry visas between the Maghreb countries must be abolished before the defense and foreign policies are unified. We have learned a lot from the experiences of the Arab East countries."

This is a summary of the opinions of a group of Algerian officials on the transformations experienced by Algeria in the past 5 years. A visitor to Algeria notices that there is actually a state of psychological, intellectual and political relaxation which expresses its opinion loudly, and seeks to continue the policy established by the late President Boumediene, while avoiding some of the mistakes committed in the past.

8494
CSO: 4504/14

MONARCHIST GENERAL REPORTED ACTIVE IN WEST AZARBAIJAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 35, 27 Aug 81 pp 4-5

[Text] Paris reports early this week said General Bahram Aryana, leader of the nationalist-monarchist group Azadegan which was responsible for the gunboat exploit and which is trying to unite the opposition to the Khomeyni regime, is now inside Iran.

He is said to be in the area near Shahpour, near Lake Rezaieh, in western Azarbaijan, in a region where pro-monarchist tribal leader Jahangir Khan Dari is said to have at least 20,000 men under arms.

Aryana has issued a new appeal to all Iranians to join together in saving Iran from those whom, he said, were now destroying it economically and culturally.

And he warmly praised exile opposition political leader Shahpour Bakhtiar for his prompt backing of the Tabarzin action. Aryana said he hoped that together they could save Iran from the "theocratic whirlpool."

Bakhtiar's call for support for Aryana after the gunboat incident was widely praised by centrist and rightist exile opposition groups, whose spokesmen said they saw it as the first really significant step by an exile leader to give a lead to uniting all nationalist opposition to the Tehran regime. Many people who had been critical of Bakhtiar in the past applauded his call.

"In conversations with Iranians in many different countries in the past week I have not spoken to a single one who was not thrilled with both the gunboat incident and Bakhtiar's call to rally for the cause," a former Iranian diplomat told IPS. "And those people told me that every Iranian they knew felt exactly the same way."

The support expressed for Azadegan by another veteran exile politician in Ali Amini also demonstrated the psychological boost "Operation Shahriar," as it was called in memory of the late Shahriar Shafik, the Shah's nephew and much respected captain in the former navy who was assassinated in Paris two years ago, gave to the exiles.

And it was felt by many independent observers that the establishment of a significant centrist and rightist nationalist bloc at the same time as former president Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi had set up their own leftist

nationalist front was a coincidence that would serve to clear many issues among the exiles, who have been constantly confused over their stands in the past year. The two groups, left and right, could at least square up to each other on equal terms having both "proved" themselves to the same extent," the observers said.

Surprisingly, there are even moderate observers who believe that as a result of these recent events there is an actual possibility that Bani-Sadr and Rajavi may yet come together with the centre and right-wing opposition groups to fight the Tehran regime. This is in spite of the fact that the two sides continue to reject each other in public.

Bani-Sadr has devoted much time in recent interviews to warning of the threat to the original revolution, which he still supports, from the monarchist opposition. Azadegan has expressed its rejection of any cooperation with Bani-Sadr, "whose hands are coloured by the blood of thousands of innocent Iranians."

But events could conspire to prove much of this rhetoric misleading, more than one nationalist source in Paris contended. For one thing the Mojahedin's power base in Iran was being rapidly eroded with the systematic winkling out of their centres and leaders and the putting to death of so many of the leadership and significant rank and file, he contended. There were obvious signs that the Mojahedin groups in Iran were now acting separately and ever more desperately in their battle with the fundamentalists.

The government's mercilessness and its threats to confiscate any property where the Mojahedin are found and to take the owners of the houses to the revolutionary courts where they may face the death penalty, are seen as steadily breaking the back of the Mojahedin resistance. Ayatollah Khalkhali himself has promised that executions will soon be reduced "because the Mojahedin face their end."

Because of this, some of the independent observers feel, the Bani-Sadr-Rajavi camp may see joining up with the rest of the opposition as a means of saving their own supporters. One monarchist source told IPS, "They may yet have to seek shelter under our banner for their own survival."

CSO: 4600/170

EX-TEACHERS' CHIEF DENOUNCES EXECUTION OF CHILDREN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 35, 27 Aug 81 p 9

[Text] The former head of the Iran Teachers' Association and a longtime opponent of the Shah's regime Mohammad Derakhshash has appealed to university professors, teachers, and all cultural and intellectual figures to express their concern over the slaughter of school children and other young people in Iran.

He pointed out that a nine-year-old girl was among those executed along with many children of high school age, and expressed his surprise that the world seemed so indifferent to the butchery. "Yet the hi-jacking of an aircraft gets so much publicity," Derakhshash commented.

"I want to call the world's attention to these executions," Derakhshash said in a statement published in the Paris exile weekly IRAN-VA-JAHAN, and which he is circulating to teachers and other organisations round the globe.

Derakhshash points out that he was jailed on many occasions under previous governments in Iran while standing up for the rights of teachers. He was also exiled on three occasions. In between these punishments he was a Minister of Education for a brief period, and in more recent years he represented Iran at many international education congresses. His association, whose membership takes in 600,000 people in the profession, is the only one in Iran recognised by the world conference of such bodies.

Derakhshash also protested over the closure of universities in Iran and the purging of so many teachers from their jobs on any flimsy and false grounds.

Since the fall of Hitler the world had not seen such a fascist regime as that now in power in Iran, he said. It was a curse upon humanity, and he was amazed that such a gang of terrorists was allowed to take its place at organisations like the United Nations.

CSO: 4600/170

RECENT ASSASSINATIONS, 'WIDESPREAD SLAUGHTER' DISCUSSED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 20 Aug 81 pp 5, 6

/Text/ Inside Iran there were more and more signs over the past week that regime figures were becoming obsessed by the murders and lack of security in Iran.

As rows and rows of young people were mown down by the revolutionary guards' guns all over the country, bringing the estimated toll of executions since Bani-Sadr left Iran to well over 500 and the figure climbing daily by scores, so the Majlis members ranted on and on about the assassinations of their colleagues and other clerics.

"Islam is in danger," Khomeyni again cried out to delegations he received, roaming on and on about Islamic duties and the need for people to "spy to save Islam."

And not only in the armed forces, but in the police and gendarmerie dozens of new officials were appointed to responsible posts.

Karaj, near Tehran, and eight areas in the capital got new police bosses in a bid to higher security. But police chief Colonel Vahid explained to reporters that with only 2,520 people on his staff trained as bodyguards, it was impossible to protect all the prominent personalities of the regime. Most of these, particularly the Majlis deputies, were protected by revolutionary corpsmen, he said.

"We are not equipped for this work and we are kept very active dealing with bank robbery and theft," he said.

Abroad, too, events were unnerving for the regime. It was announced darkly over Tehran radio that the leaders of the attacks on its diplomatic establishments in Washington, Berlin and other cities "have all been identified;" it accused the United States, France and Morocco of anti-Islamic acts. Khomeyni, according to the radio, said, "Everybody is against our country."

It was quite clear nobody knew how to explain away the hijacking of one of the Islamic republic's gunboats and the defection of air force personnel. Nor could the regime find any response, other than to blame the United States and other imperialists for the attacks on embassies and other Iranian institutions abroad.

Though it had tried hard to keep the news off Tehran radio it was obvious to the government that the news of the attacks on the republic's institutions abroad was reaching all sections of the public by other means, so it must produce some explanation.

The Tehran daily Kayhan announced that army commander General Falahi and a group of other senior military men had visited Khoy, in Azarbaijan, to "investigate the military, political and social problems and other difficulties there." Khoy is a strategic point for both west Azarbaijan, where there have recently been reports of activity by exiled former officers, and also for Kurdestan.

The government's anxiety about the continued unrest in the latter region was demonstrated by reports in the Tehran press that the Agricultural Bank was making a huge sum available to the Kermanshah region for farming development. Dairies, chicken farms, fruit orchards, irrigation projects and purchase of machinery, along with development of carpet weaving and new housing in villages, are envisaged. Not only were sceptics wondering where the money would come from, but they speculated on how, with the government often having little but nominal control in the area, officials would go about implementing the projects.

What has mystified many observers is the incredible meekness with which the general mass of the Iranian public has taken the widespread slaughter of their younger relatives and friends up and down Iran over the last few weeks. "The idea of a whole nation terrorised to a degree where it can stand by and watch its friends and neighbours, even members of its own family, dragged away and butchered, is startling in the 20th century," one said. "The cowardice of so many of our generals in running away and abandoning the Shah is equalled by that of those who run the armed forces today. If they demanded a stop be put to the slaughter the public would surely then feel safe to express their horror in turn over what is happening."

Some Iranian observers said it was the silence of foreign governments and the international organisations that contributed largely to the paralysis of those who could spark off some salutary response to the terror in the country.

"If the Iranians in exile, living in a rational world with access to newspaper and television comment on a reasonably well-informed and intelligent basis, are firmly convinced that their fate was the result of Western governments' plots, then how can you expect those inside Iran to believe that the West is concerned with anything but its own interests in dealing with Iran?" one asked. "While the West remains silent on the slaughter of innocent people and on contraventions of humane rules it has introduced in its own societies, then what hope do Iranians inside the country have that anyone supports them against this terror?"

CSO: 4600/162

SPOKESMAN SAYS AZADEGAN TRYING TO UNITE OPPOSITION GROUPS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 20 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

/Text/ "Our main aim is to save Iran and this task cannot be achieved except through a united front," said a spokesman for the nationalist-monarchist opposition group Azadegan in Paris, explaining why the group seized a French-built gunboat owned by the Iranian navy.

The boarding and capture of the gunboat Tabarzin by a group of 24 men and a lone woman off Cadiz last week was the first of what are planned as a series of moves to arouse world public opinion about the fate of Iran and to polarise the opposition forces to precipitate the downfall of the Khomeyni regime, he said.

As French officials and hijackers negotiated, the latter handing over the gunboat in Marseilles harbour to the French and in return receiving a guarantee of political asylum, first signs that the opposition group had achieved the aims of the operation were coming in.

Television screens and radio sets around the world put out reporters' latest looks at the opposition exile groups and demonstrated a growing realisation that the regime in Iran really wasn't as popular or entrenched as many of its apologists have been trying to make out. Opposition leaders got new airings; and even former president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr seemed to be let off the hook and allowed to say what he pleased without any French interference.

And a dramatic appeal by another prominent exile political leader in Shapour Bakhtiar to all officers of the armed forces and police and gendarmerie to report to the office of Azadegan's leader Bahran Aryana and place themselves under his command, showed the opposition groups were drawing closer. Until now Bakhtiar has avoided conceding authority to other organisations or their leaders.

A similar call to support Azadegan was made by veteran statesman Ali Amini, also based in Paris. He said he "totally and wholeheartedly" supported Aryana and his Azadegan organisation in their action. "This is every Iranian's success, not just that of General Aryana and Admiral Habibollahi (former head of the Imperial Iranian Navy) who commanded the operation," he said.

Bakhtiar, in his statement, also called on the Iranian tribes to join in the freeing of Iran from the "bloodthirsty mullah's regime" and appealed to them to contact Aryana's freedom forces representatives inside Iran to help them in their campaign to liberate the country. Amini joined him in calling on all Iranians to strengthen their fight for freedom.

The departure of Azadegan chief General Aryana from Paris to a headquarters near the Turkish-Irano border a few weeks ago can now be seen as part of a planned move to try to bring the main military opposition groups together under a non-controversial leader. The seizure of the gunboat certainly appealed to the imagination of not only former military men in exile, but other longtime Iranian activities in the West.

Aryana, a former armed forces chief of the late Shah, is a colourful character who has sometimes been mildly criticised for his individuality, unusual in a top military man; but he has always been a fervent nationalist and patriot who, unlike two other prominent military men whose names have been bandied about as opposition military chiefs in the past, General Gholamali Oveissi and Fereidun Jam, has not been accused of putting his own personal vanity before the interests of his country, according to Iran watchers.

Oveissi is reported to have told the Shah he would not serve under General Gharabaghi, the American nominee for commander-in-chief, in the final weeks of the Shah's regime, and so left the country "for a rest" instead; while Jam, in whom many people had great hopes to help support the last-ditch efforts of Bakhtiar to hold the nation together, is accused of preferring the comforts of life in London to the inconvenience of involvement in a complex political situation when he refused to join Bakhtiar's government in 1978. Gharabaghi himself did stay in Iran to try to keep the armed forces together but found the thankless task was impossible to carry out and finally fled into exile himself with nothing but opprobrium from former friends and new enemies alike.

Aryana and Azadegan would now seem to be established as the catalyst which could not only unite the real activists among the centrist and rightist exile opposition, but also prove the link between the exiles and the obviously discontented military men inside the country. Bani-Sadr himself on Tuesday launched a new appeal to the military inside Iran to act against the Khomeyni regime in what amounted to an open plea for armed resistance. If Bani-Sadr's estimate that only 15-20 percent of Iranians retain their loyalty to Khomeyni is correct, then there is plenty of encouragement for positive military action before long.

Evidence that Azadegan is trying to attract the participation of centrist and even leftist groups in a united front was evident from a statement by a spokesman for the group who stressed that even though it was essentially monarchist in outlook it believed that any future regime in Iran must be the choice of "every Iranian without exception." He also insisted that all opposition groups, from extreme left to extreme right, must join in the move to get rid of Khomeyni and then must be prepared to give each other the right to put their own policies to the Iranian nation. "Nobody, including us, has a mandate to choose or speak for the Iranian nation," he stressed.

And while religion must be respected along with the law, every Iranian, regardless of faith or ethnic origin, as long as they held an Iranian identity card, must be allowed to take the highest job in the land in the future, with absolute equal rights in everything," he said.

All this, observers said, could be seen as an effort by Aryana and Azadegan to leave the door open for as many ideological or diverse groups to link up in a united front and thus polarise efforts against the Khomeyni regime.

While leftist groups like the Mojahedin and Bani-Sadr's backers would obviously be suspicious of a movement including monarchists and other rightists who have not failed to disguise their animosity to Bani-Sadr and his new colleagues' marxist ideas, Aryana and his supporters can take comfort from Bani-Sadr's repeated warnings since he arrived in Paris that pro-American and pro-monarchist tendencies were slated to succeed in Iran if Khomeyni's regime is not removed quickly.

It is obvious from this, observers say, that Bani-Sadr is aware that more and more desperate Iranians, unable to reconstruct their lives and yet unable to leave Iran, are looking to any source to provide some succour in their distress. "Indeed, Bani-Sadr told Le Monde precisely that in Paris this week in warning of the fate in store for Iran," one Iran watcher told IPS.

CSO: 4600/161

EFFECTS OF 'MAKTABI' SOCIAL CUSTOMS, MORES DESCRIBED

Vienna PROFIL in German 10 Aug 81 pp 30-33

[Article by Renate Possarnig: "Maktabi--Everybody Suffers in Iran, Unless He Is a Hangman, Puppet, or Mindless Stooge of the Ayatollahs. The Women Suffer the Most"]

[Text] Some chest hair pushes through the open shirt collar. A wrinkled suit covers the bony frame. On the ascetic head, the hair is short, the stubble of beard long: the New Iranian is called Maktabi (rough translation: a 100-percent Islamic fundamentalist).

Almost every revolution attempts to create its own human image, be it only in general appearance. In Iran, the Shiite revolutionary ideal is best represented by the new president, Mohammed Ali Raja'i. But Mr Maktabi is to be seen also inside the ministries, offices and on the streets.

These unshaven gentlemen with their wrinkled suits have a message: neglect of appearance in favor of inner concentration on the faith and in favor of accomplishing the religious mission.

From dawn to dusk, Mr Maktabi worries whether inanimate objects or people whom he touches are clean or unclean. He will, as a matter of principle, open a door only with his elbow, since it might have previously been opened by a woman or a non-Maktabi man.

On the increasingly rare occasions when Mr Maktabi is forced to converse with a woman, he does not look her in the face. Should he encounter a woman dressed in Western garb on the street--that too is becoming increasingly rare--he will give her a wide berth. He will perhaps attempt to find out her name and address. But only for the purpose of denouncing her to the revolutionary guards, who solve style problems with the whip. Maktabi's own wife is of course required to wrap herself in a chador and wear a head scarf--the latter only to hide her hairline. If at all possible, she should never leave the house. And the Ayatollah Khomeyni has exactly prescribed the manner in which she is to fulfill her conjugal obligations: with the least possible enjoyment.

It goes without saying that Mr Maktabi observes Koranic law according to the interpretation of the head ayatollah. He prays five times daily. A particularly

zealous Maktabian, like President Raja'i, gets up in the middle of the night to pray some more. Mr Maktabi is horrified if he falls asleep during a Ramadan prayer lasting several hours and if a fly enters his half-open mouth and he swallows it, suddenly awakening from an unclean dream: he has eaten meat in daylight hours during the month of fasting! Mr Maktabi hastily consults the writings of Ayatollah Khomeyni and finds to his great relief that the wise man has foreseen this eventuality and has provided a generous means of atonement: repeated ritual ablutions.

Should Mr Maktabi, having completed these ablutions, return to his prayers and 2 hours later experience a call of nature, he must be certain to assume a position at right angles to the direction toward Mecca. Khomeyni has issued most detailed instructions concerning human excretions such as sweat, sperm, menstrual blood and saliva.

However, after 2 years of Iranian religious dictatorship there are still subjects which have not been designated Maktabi or non-Maktabi because the great imam has made no pronouncement about them; either he is not aware of them, or they do not interest him, or he is not clear about them in his own mind.

In the meantime it has become well known that neckties are not Maktabi. That is why there are no more necktie manufacturers or importers in Iran. But how about a pastry, a gold cigarette lighter or ping pong? Cigarettes appear to be Maktabi as long as they do not come from America--blue jeans and pop music decidedly are not. Is a bathtub Maktabi? Are sports Maktabi? The imam does not say. Thus it happens that parliament frequently argues about such questions for hours.

Apart from blind religious devotion Mr Maktabi is not expected to possess any inherent values such as truthfulness, love of liberty, loyalty and helpfulness. If Mr Maktabi moonlights in an occupation other than religious devotion, there is no requirement for special knowledge or expertise.

When for instance former gradeschool teacher and new president Mohammed Ali Raja'i became prime minister, his decisive attributes were his fanatical religious faith and his appearance of a Maktabian prototype. He did not have a clue about politics, but a great show was made of the fact that he had been in jail during the shah's regime. That however turned out to have been a silly chance occurrence: some time toward the end of the shah's regime Raja'i had been one of a group distributing handbills. The whole group was arrested and spent 1 night in jail. As usually happened in such harmless cases, the local SAVAK representative had the offenders brought to his office. "No big deal," he is said to have told them. "Sign this paper which states that you are all loyal to the shah anyway." According to several witnesses, Raja'i was the first to sign.

Since in the aftermath of all revolutions people do not generally undergo any changes, new types are created against a background of lies and a double standard of morality. Many are ostensibly Maktabi to further their careers. Once they have reached the top they restrict their Maktabiness to office hours. It was well known that the murdered Ayatollah Beheshti was anything but Maktabi during

the years he conducted Friday services for Hamburg's Shiite community. Even during the last year of his gradual assumption of power he was Maktabi only for public consumption. Many things can be said about the Ayatollah Beheshti, except that he was stupid. Thus he pushed Raja'i, who was practically bursting with religious devotion, into the foreground and, with a secret little smile, retired to a hidden apartment. No one knows what he was up to there.

Iran is not yet another Albania. Nor is Iran a completely closed and controlled society like North Korea. The shah's long reign left a deep imprint upon Iranian society. Not only that: some flotsam from the shah's times is still around. Not all Western books and not all locally produced pornographic movies have been burned. Not all whiskey bottles have been smashed. Not all cassettes of Western music have been destroyed.

Revolutions which prohibit a number of things are always confronted by a law of nature: everything that is prohibited continues to be available--it just costs more. Thus, there is still alcohol, prostitution and Western pop music.

Alcohol, as was known from the ayatollah's writings from the very beginning, is wicked--a Satan's brew. In his works one can read also that hashish and opium are not necessarily unclean. Thus Tehran's youth embraced this drug and smoked hashish during one whole summer. But then the regime's head executioner, Ayatollah Khalkali, appeared on the scene. He appears to hate the whole world because, being the class dunce in the Koran school of Qum, he was always made to clean the blackboard. Khalkali suddenly started executing hashish and opium dealers. He accepted $1 million from a Mafia agent who rushed to the scene to insure future opium deliveries from Iran; but to calm his conscience he had him executed anyway.

During the early months of the Islamic Republic it was occasionally possible to purchase a bottle of whiskey from militiamen and revolutionary guards who had "confiscated them for the state" in the villas of the rich. But one had to be very careful that it would not again be confiscated at the next, previously informed, roadblock. Then the highest ayatollah apparently got wind of the fact that in some places in his country fruit juices were still unpopular. Thereupon the ayatollahs decided to put some more urgency behind their prohibition. Alcohol stocks of the big Tehran luxury hotels were destroyed in front of foreign TV reporters and photographers; no doubt a few bottles filled with water were among those smashed.

While today only fruit juices are dispensed today in hotel bars and coffeehouses, where elderly gentlemen nostalgically listen to the ice cubes' clinking in the orange juice, alcohol is still available in Iran. The middle class fills bathtubs with grapes during the summer as in the past and lets them ferment. In the winter time they use raisins, resulting in a revolting, but still alcoholic beverage. Invitations to drink this raisin wine have all the air of a conspiracy against the state.

Today's prostitutes wear the chador, ply their trade in Mellat Park and are very expensive. One year ago near that park, peddlers offered, aside from cassettes

with recorded Khomeyni sermons, the last hits of the shah era, sung by public idols Gougoush and Shoreh.

No more. Today a peddler will pass a potential customer in a bazaar and whisper to him: "If you are interested in buying a Gougoush cassette, follow me without attracting attention. If you want to buy a Frank Sinatra, attract even less attention."

Tens of thousands of people who prior to the revolution had been selling such items as hit cassettes, cosmetics, jeans, dime novels and other items which today are considered non-Maktabi, have simply lost their livelihood.

Masons are faring relatively well; one of their jobs was to tumble shah statues wherever delirious mobs had failed to do so. In addition, they were needed to obliterate Reza Pahlevi's profile, coat of arms or other traces from all buildings. A few new jobs were created in the ministries too: the imperial insignia had to be cut out of official stationery. New banknotes were put into circulation--the shah's portrait has been replaced on the new bills by pictures of mosques. Anyone working on the eradication of the shah and all the traces of the former monarch has a relatively good job, since in his megalomania Reza Pahlevi tried to have himself immortalized on every street corner. Nor can poster artists or the makers of banners complain about lack of work, even though lately there has been less demand for Khomeyni portraits. But they have come up with a marketable idea: they pasted up a face, half of which consisted of a portrait of the shah, the other half of a likeness of toppled President Bani Sadr, and business is booming.

Professional demonstrators too can look back on 2 good years and may look forward to a secure future.

But none of this is any consolation to hundreds of thousands of people who have lost their livelihood through the dictates of the Maktabians. It is difficult to realize the kind of people who suddenly lost their jobs by virtue of the ayatollahs' series of prohibitions: the beach attendant and life guard on the Caspian Sea, the tennis pro and the hotel owner himself. The bathing beaches, separated by sex, where the women dip their chadors in the water behind a solid wooden fence and where the men enter the water some distance away, wearing voluminous Khomeyni garments, have hardly any visitors.

It is not known whether suntans and suntan oils are Maktabi.

While other revolutions have promoted sports and especially communist dictatorships have managed to dominate them through special training programs, the ayatollahs are apparently of the opinion that prostration and bowing in prayer are sport enough.

What good would sports do in this great epoch anyway? Mr Maktabi is so busy with his religious duties that he has no time to waste on them.

In former times people liked to play soccer in Iran. Now the mullahs have started to interfere in the soccer clubs also. Serious discussions were conducted

to determine whether kicking the ball is compatible with the Koran. A still more vehement discussion took place concerning tennis. It was obvious that the ayatollahs would forbid mixed doubles. Next there came the prohibition of tennis attire, which appeared sexually provocative to the guardians of the morals. That just about insured the demise of that particular sport. It is a rare occurrence to see a woman playing tennis wearing a chador, which is a considerable impediment to one's forehand.

Body building, otherwise the darling of rightwing as well as leftist dictatorships, is at best a stepchild in Iran. So is personal hygiene. The old law, freshly resurrected by Khomeyni, according to which no man must touch the hair of a strange woman, brought unemployment overnight to thousands of ladies' hairdressers. They protested mildly under the Bazargan regime. Later, they broke their combs and fell silent.

Should you try to engage Mr Maktabi in conversation on cultural matters, he will have none of it: religion and prayer are all the culture he needs. The mosque is equally a house of prayer and culture. In this aspect, too, the Iranian revolution is different from others: the Russian revolution sought to establish its own proletarian culture, Mao the Beijing opera. Cuba has cultural accomplishments to its credit, and Nicaragua's Sandinistas are promoting a colorful folk singing and dancing culture. But Khomeyni decrees that no "sensual music" must be performed anywhere in the country; it is not clear just what is meant by "sensual." Asked whether this includes Bach, Vivaldi and Mozart, the chief ayatollah said: "I have never heard of them."

If in Iran the state, culture and everything else are equated with religion, there is little else left. Possibly only the adoring hymns dedicated to the imam, set to Western melodies: "God is our only party. Ruhollah is our only leader. We are your soldiers. We obey your commands..." So much for poetry.

The last poem to come out of the land of the great poets last year started as follows: "My girl wears a chador over her jeans..."

Now there is no more poetry. The first entertainment movie since the ayatollahs came to power has yet to appear. One year ago Costa Gavras' anti-American film "State of Siege" was such a box office hit that scalpers bought up all the tickets and easily sold them for three times their regular price. There are a few movie theaters left. They show low-grade movies from the shah era and censored films from various countries other than the United States. There are TV broadcasts, since TV is an important propaganda medium. Even the ayatollahs recognize that. But the programs are even more soporific than those on Austrian television. It is hardly conceivable how a producer can put a program together. In any case, religion is broadcast in large doses: archive shots of ayatollahs and masses of people acclaiming them. Also some training films on how to use firearms. Hardly anything on international politics.

Iran is suffering under the ayatollahs' dictatorship. Everyone is suffering unless he is an opportunist, executioner, puppet or mindless stooge of the ayatollahs. The women suffer most of all. One day a courageous young man

appeared with his sister at the Hotel Intercontinental, where most foreign journalists live. He showed the foreigners welts on the body of the young woman, resulting from whiplashes administered by revolutionary guards. Their crime was to sit together, dance and talk. The regime's bullies considered this a wild orgy and took evident pleasure in whipping the women present.

Not only have the women all at once lost the rights they had laboriously attained under the shah's regime. They have in fact been deprived of their status as human beings. When banks suddenly demanded that unmarried female employees submit physicians' certificates as to their virginity, most of them quit their jobs. Mr Maktabi took their place. The fact that he knew nothing about banking, and in many cases did not even know how to read and write, mattered hardly at all. Mr Maktabi was unshaven, wore a wrinkled suit and a shirt open at the collar.

9273
CSO: 4620/11

RAJAVI GIVES VIEWS ON SITUATION UNDER CLERGY RULE

Paris AN NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 pp 4-6

[Interview with Massoud Rajavi, leader of Mujahideen, in France, date not given]

[Text]

As leader of the *Moudjahidin e Khalq* (Holy Fighters of the People), Massoud Rajavi is Ayatollah Khomeini's Public Enemy No 1. The Moudjahidin are blamed for bombings and assassinations in Iran and scores of them have been arrested and executed.

Mr Rajavi escaped recently from Iran to France together with deposed President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr. At first, they were cut off from virtually all contacts with the outside world by the French authorities, who feared reprisals against the French community in Iran for France's refusal to extradite the two exiled leaders. Later, this quarantine was relaxed after almost all of the French left Iran. Even so, as Mr Rajavi told *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*'s Randa Takieddine, he and Mr Bani-Sadr are still formally forbidden to speak out.

The two Iranian leaders are living in a villa in Auvers sur Oise, a tiny village surrounded by greenery about an hour's drive from Paris. Our correspondent was subjected to stringent security checks, first by French police and then by Iranian bodyguards. She found Mr Bani-Sadr relaxing in the garden, playing ping-pong. The interview follows:

Q: It is said that the best-organised opposition group in Iran is the Moudjahidin. How do you see your political action developing to get rid of the present regime? Do you believe the regime will be overthrown militarily?

A: Khomeini's regime is collapsing. It grows weaker day by day. After June 10 (when an opposition rally was attacked by the Ayatollah's supporters), he has been isolated politically from all democratic, progressive, nationalist and real Muslim forces inside Iran. Everybody knows that Khomeini is a deceiver and an impostor.

There is more and more resistance because everybody knows that, after the Shah, Khomeini has not given our people anything except more graves and more martyrs. We have more than 5 million unemployed and more than 2 million refugees from the war. Kurdistan is being bombed. Industries do not work at more than 30 per cent of capacity. Inflation is more than 100 per cent.

On the political scene, there have been more than 600 executions in about 40 days and you know from the history of countries like ours' that it is very rare that executions of young girls, pregnant women, soldiers, officers and merchants strengthen the regime. The only way that Khomeini has found to enforce his power is through killing, torture and other harsh methods.

Q: You say that the Khomeini regime is growing weaker because of his harsh methods. But the Shah also adopted harsh and unpopular methods and he managed to survive a long time. What makes you so sure that Khomeini's regime will collapse when he and the Islamic Republican Party control all of the institutions of the state?

A: The example of the Shah is not relevant. This is because the Shah was supported by the bourgeoisie. He had a strong army and he had Savak (the Shah's secret police). He had stability and international support. Although he was very cruel, he could solve some problems. Go and see now the state of our hospitals, which have deteriorated completely. Our factories as well.

I told you about inflation. Now, everything you buy has to be paid for with state coupons. All this proves that Khomeini's regime is relying basically on the general mentality of the people and not on physical factors that could improve the condition of the country. He is definitely falling down.

Of course, I cannot set the exact date. But I can assure you that it is not a matter of years.

Q: Does Khomeini have strength inside the army?
A: I don't think Khomeini is very strong inside the army. You know that I and President Bani-Sadr were flown out of Iran by two Moudjahidin army pilots. There is a big majority inside the army which opposes Khomeini because the essence of the army and its structure are not adapted to such reactionary people. We have a big anti-reactionary circle inside the army and inside that circle we have a rather smaller one which is progressive because of the revolution. But if Khomeini was strong inside the army, be sure that he would have used the army against the opposition like the Shah did. In the last part of his reign, the Shah was using the army against the opposition but Khomeini cannot use it in the same way.

Q: After President Bani-Sadr and you left Iran, there were some changes in the army command. Won't this affect the structure of the army?
A: I have the feeling that these changes will be to our benefit because they contribute to the increase in pressure within the army on those who understand the real face of Khomeini.

Q: How do you envisage getting rid of the regime. You say the Khomeini regime is weak, but he is still in power. So how will you get rid of him?
A: I do not think he is in control of things. For example, there were 120 acts of resistance in Tehran alone on the day of the elections. And you know that they are saying that they are arresting huge numbers of Moudjahidin every day.

As long as the number of executions increases, the opposition will increase the number of its operations. Perhaps you think that I am exaggerating. But if the situation was good, the regime would accept foreign journalists.

My second point is that we do not believe in a coup d'état and nobody, even among our opponents, thinks in terms of a coup the way the Royalists do. Building and attaining a real Islamic democratic state would come from the general resistance of the masses. It is growing every day towards this end.

Q: Why do you say you do not believe in a coup?
A: It is because of the special structure of the Iranian army and what happened during the revolution. All of the Shah's generals are finished, with the exception of one or two. Nowadays, a big majority of army officers are against reactionary regimes and specifically against Khomeini's reactionary Islamic Iran. If the Royalists want a coup like the one in Chile (in 1973), they should spend more than two years preparing the army for it. This is because a great part of the army is on our side. All the nation, including the army, does not want to go back to the past. They want a better future.

Q: The Moudjahidin have been described on many occasions as Marxist-Islamic, as a leftist Islamic group and as extremist revolutionaries. Could you clarify your position and what is the philosophy of your movement?
A: Khomeini, like the Shah, started right from the first calling the Moudjahidin Marxists, terorists, anarchists, spies, the works. The official media has three slogans: first, *Allah-o-Akbar* (God is greatest), second, *Khomeini al-Kaed* (Khomeini is the leader) and third, death to the *mounafiqin* (hypocrites). This is how Khomeini speaks of us.

This is how I would describe our movement: we are Muslims, but we believe in a real Islam and not in the one that Khomeini is applying. That is not Islam and we are against what he does in the name of Islam. Our Islam is democratic, civilised, humane and nationalist.

We are an Islamic democratic group and the name of our regime would be the democratic Islamic nationalist republic.

Q: How do you explain Khomeini's impact on the people of Iran?

A: Khomeini is the best Crown Prince of the Shah. I believe he is a heritage of the Shah's regime. This is because the only institution that was not destroyed during the 57 years of dictatorship in Iran was the clergy. At the beginning of the revolution there was an institutional vacuum which was filled by the clergy, headed by Khomeini.

Q: Some of your supporters have expressed disappointment that you have left Iran, claiming that your struggle will be less effective far from your country. You are both the political and military guide of the Moudjahidin. What is your answer to this?
A: You may have noticed that resistance is increasing every day. Secondly, right from the first day when we set up our organisation, we never believed in reliance on one individual. Now that I am here, I act as coordinator of the activities of our brothers in Iran. We all have different tasks.

Q: Do you have contacts with foreign governments to get help for your struggle?
A: The first thing that matters to us is public opinion in all nations. I am sure that the non-aligned countries will change their policy to be against Khomeini because until now they have not been well informed of what is happening in our country. Inside the non-aligned movement, the most important ones for us are the Muslim Arab countries. I hope that as soon as possible we will see some change from their side.

Still formally banned from talking

Q: The Palestinian resistance had good relations with you in the past. Do they still have good relations with Khomeini? Secondly, what has happened after the recent crash of an Argentinian aircraft loaded with spare parts from Israel for Iran?
A: I have documents proving that the regime is still cooperating with Israel. As for the Palestinians, they have let us know that they are with us strategically and that they do not have confidence in Khomeini.

Q: Do you mean that PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat told you this?
A: I cannot name names, but I am sure of what I told you.

Q: Have you met any Palestinians since you left Iran?
A: Don't forget that we have only been able to see people since yesterday. The French were very worried about the French community in Iran. You are one of the first journalists I have seen.

Q: Have you managed to convince the French that you should be able to start political activities?
A: Formally, we are still banned from talking. Of course, the situation is different now (following the departure of almost all French citizens from Iran). I am glad that the French Socialist Party condemned the torture and the methods of the present regime in Iran.

Q: Do you intend to return soon to Iran?

A: I wish to, of course, but I have some tasks to do before going back.

Q: The Tudeh (Communist) Party is allied to Khomeini and the IRP. Does this mean that the USSR is helping to support the IRP?
A: This question should be addressed to the USSR. Tudeh, this dirty party, is participating in all of the crimes of the present regime. They are acting as spies for the *Pasdarans* (Revolutionary Guards) against democratic and progressive groups. I don't know if the Soviets know this.

Q: Can you confirm that the bomb in the IRP headquarters in Tehran which killed Ayatollah Beheshti was planted by the Moudjahidin?
A: I am not informed about this. What I can tell you is that the IRP is responsible for all criminal acts in the country, executions and misdeeds of the *Hezbollahis* (Party of God). People want relief from the IRP. The resistance would do anything.

Shatt el-Arab issue can be negotiated

Q: Do you think that the regime in Iran is mishandling the Irano-Iraqi war?
A: I have heard that a memorandum was presented by the Iraqis to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim which quoted me as saying that Khomeini started the war. They were quoting me incompletely.

My complete statement was: we condemn Iraqi aggression against the rights of our people. We have taken part in this war and we lost many martyrs and our forces were stabbed in the back by Khomeini.

I said that what led up to the war was done by Khomeini and that if we had been in power instead of him there would not have been a war. But this does not mean that the Iraqis were not aggressors.

In April 1980 we were already expecting a war because Khomeini has reactionary ideas about exporting the revolution. He thinks revolution can be exported like machinery or other goods. This issue has been the source of one of the major quarrels between Khomeini and the Moudjahidin.

The war, like the problem of the American hostages, has been used by Khomeini as a cover for dismissing all of the socio-economic problems his regime is facing. We can prove that Khomeini is responsible for what led up to the war.

About five months after the war began, I and Hani Hassan, the PLO representative in Tehran, issued a joint declaration stating that the war was harmful to both countries and we suggested that Mr Arafat should act as a mediator. The next day, the IRP attacked me, saying I should not interfere. I can tell that Khomeini is responsible for more than 50,000 Iranian martyrs, for more than 2 million refugees and more than $1 billion of damage.

Q: What about the issue of the Shatt al-Arab waterway?
A: This can be negotiated. I do not want to go into detail, but this problem can be solved.

CSO: 4600/168

BANI-SADR PROCLAIMS 'NATIONAL COUNCIL OF RESISTANCE'

London 8 DAYS in English 15 Aug 81 pp 10, 13-15

[Interview with Abolhassan Bani-Sadr by Tim McGirk]

[Text] The irony of seeing himself chased back to France once again as a political exile has not escaped Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. It was as an economics student at the Sorbonne that Bani Sadr hid Ayatollah Khomeini in his small Paris flat when the clergyman first arrived in Paris to launch the Iranian Revolution against the Shah.

Now Bani Sadr himself, who escaped from Iran after two months in hiding, lives in danger of Ayatollah Khomeini's assassins. While he was underground, said the Iranian ex-president who was impeached by the fundamentalist-dominated government, 'Khomeini sent out orders that I was to be found and immediately executed.'

Both the former president and the French authorities are worried that the Ayatollah's wrath may not stop at borders. Three days after Bani Sadr, accompanied by the Mujaheddin guerrilla leader, Massoud Rajavi, flew out of Iran aboard a hijacked military aircraft, he was moved from a cramped flat in the Paris suburb of Cachan to a comfortable — and heavily guarded — house in the small village of Auvers-sur-Oise, 60km north of Paris. An advantage of Bani Sadr's new villa, which has a large garden and swimming pool, is its isolation. The French government, worried that the Iranians might retaliate for Bani Sadr's entry by taking French people hostage in Tehran, have blocked the media's access to the villa.

Before the French government cordoned off Bani Sadr's residence from the press, the former Iranian president spoke to *8 Days*. 'Iran is already torn between two armed forces — the opposition and the (paramilitary) Revolutionary Guards and the Komitehs (vigilante justice committees) loyal to Khomeini. What I'm trying to do is prevent the violence from escalating. This can only succeed if Khomeini allows political freedom. And he must do this quickly. If Khomeini were to die tomorrow, Iran would fragment. It would be the next Lebanon,' he said.

But Bani Sadr is in an extremely sensitive position. Although he would prefer to have Khomeini step aside for a freely-elected government, Bani Sadr, even in exile, is in the hands of the Mujaheddin organisation, which shows no signs of stopping its open guerrilla warfare against the ayatollah.

Bani Sadr faces the prickly task of restraining Rajavi, who shares the villa with him. The Mujaheddin leader has even declared: 'Mr Khomeini is worse than Hitler.'

With Khomeini unlikely to withdraw his support from the new fundamentalist president, Mohammed Ali Rajai, and as long as the Mujaheddin pursue their campaign of assassinations and bombings, Bani Sadr has no chance of averting an armed uprising in Iran, be it before or after Khomeini's death.

In the event of open civil war, the armed forces will side against the mullahs, Bani Sadr maintains. However, the ex-president is reported to have sent a message to the Iranian military urging them not to rebel until Iraqi troops are pushed from Iran. Once the Gulf war ends, said Bani Sadr, 'we can count on at least 90 per cent support inside the Iranian army and airforce.' Such a claim carries some weight, given the case of his escape from Tehran.

'It's nonsense that we were disguised as women,' said Bani Sadr. 'Rajavi and I walked on board the military aircraft wearing uniforms. I shaved off my moustache — that's all.' He now shows the faint stubble of a new moustache. Collapsed in an armchair throughout the interview, Bani Sadr looked haggard. Occasionally he stole nervous looks over his shoulder out into the garden where French gendarmes and his own Iranian bodyguards patrolled the hedgerows.

At the sound of a passing riverboat, an Iranian officer in a flightsuit glances towards the nearby Oise river from the garden terrace. He is Colonel Moezi, who stands out in the history of the Iranian revolution as a man of startlingly courageous convictions. The colonel, a Mujaheddin sympathiser, first made news by flying the Shah and his family out of Iran — and then returning the Boeing 707 to the mob gathered at the airport. 'The mullahs always held it against me that I flew that aeroplane,' declared Moezi. 'Nobody ever remembered that I got rid of the Shah, nobody ever thanked me for bringing back a $45m Boeing to the people of Iran.' The colonel logged 1,200 flying hours in the Gulf war against Iraq before his next historic mission: the dangerous task of smuggling Bani Sadr and Rajavi aboard a military tanker aircraft and flying them to France.

Rajavi's aides said that the top-secret escape plans were arranged only 24 hours before the aircraft left the runway at Tehran's military base. The only military officers involved were Moezi and his two crewmen, also Mujaheddin sympathisers, they said. This has not stopped the fundamentalist government from ordering a purge of the armed forces. Bani Sadr said 27airmen had been arrested after his escape.

The escape plan was to wait until late afternoon when the Revolutionary Guards at the base, who had been observing the Ramadan fast during the long daylight hours, were preparing for their evening meal. The plan worked without a hitch.

Like the other Mujaheddin operations, the sheltering of Bani Sadr, Iran's most wanted fugitive for the past two months, worked with military precision. Contrary to past remarks by Bani Sadr, Mujaheddin sources disclosed that the ex-president stayed at the guerrillas' Tehran hideout for only four weeks, not the full two months. Before that, Bani Sadr had been seen in southern Iran by an 8 DAYS special correspondent. At the time, it was believed that he then journeyed into North Kermanshahr province, where he was sheltered by Kurdish separatist rebels, though he has since denied this.

However, the Kurdish rebels fighting Tehran for regional autonomy were one of the first factions to join the 'National Council of Resistance,' formed in exile by Bani Sadr and organised by Rajavi, a crack administrator.

Bani Sadr has appealed to all Iranian political factions seeking 'independence, freedom and Islam' to join the council which, he says, has two aims. The first is to 'remove the forces of despotism that are operating in Iran'. Once the fundamentalist regime is toppled, said Bani Sadr, 'this coalition will then take the executive affairs of the country in hand.'

For Bani Sadr, planning the National Council of Resistance was a last resort. While hiding in Tehran, the fugitive leader made several attempts to contact Khomeini, urging him to halt the opposition crackdown. The Ayatollah rebuffed him. 'I sent him letters and cassettes. But one of the flaws in Khomeini's character — and the Americans quickly capitalised on this during the hostage crisis — is that if you tell him not to do something, he immediately

takes it as a sign of your weakness. Instead of ordering a halt to the violence, he intensified the purges, the executions.

'Khomeini and his collaborators must be made to accept that massacres, executions, torture and imprisonment cannot make people abandon their resistance to despotism. They have to accept this reality. You can't push people around by killings,' said Bani Sadr.

'If we don't succeed, then whether we like it or not, Iran's troubles can only be resolved by an escalation of this violence and counter-reaction to violence. At that point, it would be impossible to keep the army out of it.'

OUTSIDE Iran, few hard facts have emerged about the Mujaheddin guerrillas, other than the impressive hits they have scored lately against Ayatollah Khomeini's regime. Their leader, 37-year-old Massoud-Rajavi — branded by the fundamentalists as everything from an 'Islamic-marxist' to an 'American mercenary,' — commands one of the shadowiest, and most powerful, factions to emerge from the Iranian revolution.

When the fundamentalist-dominated government impeached President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr and called for his arrest, the well-organised Mujaheddin slipped him into hiding, moving him first down to Khuzestan, then back to a secret location in Tehran itself. Next, the organisation, which counts 70,000 armed sympathisers, planned the ex-president's escape.

Bani Sadr was accompanied aboard the Boeing 707 military tanker by Rajavi, and one of his first acts in exile was to form a coalition with the Mujaheddin with the aim of overthrowing the fundamentalist regime.

Mujaheddin sources concede that the two opposition figures also slipped out of Tehran on 29 July because the Iranian capital had become too dangerous for Bani Sadr. 'We were concerned about the president's security,' said one Mujaheddin. 'It got so bad that Khomeini's secret police were tailing anyone in Tehran buying a French newspaper.' Bani Sadr studied economics at the Sorbonne in Paris for several years.

Strategically, both the Mujaheddin and Bani Sadr stand to gain from the alliance. As the first elected president in Iran's long and bloody history, Bani Sadr can both legitimise the clandestine Mujaheddin and broaden their popular base. In exchange, the president, who made the serious error of never setting up his own political party inside Iran, can use the thousands of heavily-armed guerrilla cells, spread widely throughout the rural areas and cities, to engage the fundamentalists in armed struggle.

Although the Mujaheddin and their fundamentalist foes are both fervently Islamic, their break occured early in the Iranian revolution — on 1 February, 1979, to be precise, the very day Ayatollah Khomeini made his victory flight from Paris back to Iran. Massoud Rajavi explained to *8 Days*: 'The Mujaheddin were still hiding underground the night Khomeini got back from Paris. So he sent his son, Ahmad, round to see me. The message he brought from Khomeini was this: that we should accept the Ayatollah's enemies as our own enemies, and that the Mujaheddin accept Khomeini's divine nature. We sent Ahmad away.' 'Later,' added Rajavi, 'I met Khomeini. He held out his hand for me to kiss, and I refused. We've been enemies ever since.'

Massoud Rajavi is sharing the same villa as the exiled president at Auvers-sur-Oise. Though he laughs often and easily, Rajavi's naturally high-pitched voice turns razor-sharp when discussing Khomeini. 'Khomeini must execute — ten, twenty people a day — to rule. In the Shah's time there were 4,000 political prisoners in jail. Today, forget about the other opposition groups, the Mujaheddin alone have 7,000 people behind bars. Over the last three weeks, 300 Mujaheddin sympathisers, including girls aged 10, have been killed by firing squads. We never wanted an armed struggle, but Khomeini did,' the Mujaheddin leader claims.

In a murderous spiral, the Mujaheddin guerrillas hit back after every execution with bombings and assassinations. Most of the Mujaheddin's weapons came from the Shah's armouries, which were looted during the revolution. Lately, their tactic has been to gun down, such senior fundamentalist politicians as Islamic Republican Party founder Doctor Hassan Ayat and make their getaway on motorcycles through Tehran.

Even within the clergy, the Mujaheddin have powerful backers. Or had, rather. A highly respected theologian, Ayatollah Ali Tehrani, who is a Mujaheddin sympathiser, is now hunger-striking in Mashad jail according to Rajavi.

When asked if the Mujaheddin, like the present fundamentalist government, wanted to spread the Iranian revolution to nearby Gulf states, Rajavi's reply was emphatic: 'We don't believe in interfering in the affairs of other countries. Full stop. This business of exporting the revolution is one of Khomeini's reactionary views.'

As for the Mujaheddin philosophy, Rajavi said that it is based on the idea of 'towhid', which translates roughly as 'Muslim community'. Said the guerrilla leader: 'We go along with the three points on which Bani Sadr has based the National Council of Resistance: independence, freedom and Islam. Ideally, we'd prefer it if wealth was evenly distributed between the rich and the poor. But the Mujaheddin does accept the notion of a "national bourgeoisie" that is to say, one that isn't controlled by foriegn interests.'

Rajavi does not rule out the possibility that once the National Front of ex-Premier Mehdi Bazargan, which represents the upper and middle classes, withdrew from the Majlis it would be allowed inside the National Council of Resistance. Bazargan and the other National Front deputies have boycotted the Majlis since Bani Sadr's impeachement. Along with Bani Sadr and the Mujaheddin, it is thought that so far the other members of the resistance coalition include the autonomist Kurdish Democratic Party.

Bani Sadr's attempts to avert a head-on clash between the Ayatollah's men and the armed opposition have so far failed. And with Kurdish rebels and Mujaheddin guerrillas ranged on his side, the former president, like it or not, may soon find himself leading a council of war.

CSO: 4600/149

BAKHTIAR: BANI-SADR IS 'KHOMEYNI'S DISCARDED VALET'

London 8 DAYS in English 15 Aug 81 p 16

[Interview with Shahpour Bakhtiar by Tim McGirk]

[Text]

IF THE *Dallas* television series ever went international, even J.R. Ewing's crowd could never match the sheer nastiness and tangled intrigue of wealth, back-stabbing and power-grabbing that is currently going on inside the circle of exiled Iranians.

A cast of leading characters would include a young crown prince — honest, but who never uttered a word in his life until he was six years old. The tragic woman would be his mother, Empress Farah, the sensitive one, who is trying to escape politics altogether and recapture the personal life she never had with her autocratic husband.

The plot is further complicated by President Sadat, who gave the fleeing Pahlavis sanctuary and provided them with a cosy palace outside Cairo: he is now displeased with Farah's private pursuits and has shunned the former Iranian royal family, which was once a feature at every major Sadat reception.

Enemies, sinister figures and comic generals abound. First there is the late Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, a billionairess who is engaged in a bitter succession feud with the empress. Next comes Shahpour Bakhtiar, the last shah-appointed prime minister, who was once considered the only answer to Ayatollah Khomeini's regime. This leftist lost valuable support after allegations that he was receiving $12m from the Iraqi government, currently at war with Iran. The once-penniless Bakhtiar now owns three plush Paris residences.

Finally, there is a retired old Iranian chief of staff, General Ariana. He affects Napoleonic curls on his forehead, still sports a chest-full of medals, and is trying to organise an armed revolt in northwest Iran in September from a secret base somewhere just over the Turkish border.

No wonder then that — publicly, at least — neither Ayatollah Khomeini nor the two most recent Iranian exiles, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr and Mujaheddin leader Massoud Rajavi, aren't overly worried about the competition. Nevertheless, some of their attacks carry a sting.

In a telephone interview last week with *8 Days*, Bakhtiar ruled out any chance of his joining Bani Sadr's 'National Council of Resistance' and heaped abuse on the ex-president. 'He's nothing more than Khomeini's discarded valet,' he said.

When asked if the ex-president's sweeping election victory 18 months ago did not confer a legitimacy on Bani Sadr, he fumed: 'You European journalists don't understand Iran. Those weren't free elections. Khomeini dictated that Bani Sadr must be elected with over 70 per cent of the vote. And he was.'

Bakhtiar, like everybody else fighting Khomeini these days, says he commands the Iranian armed forces' support. This claim was dismissed by Bani Sadr, however, who told *8 Days* in Paris recently: 'These stories that Bakhtiar and the Shah's old generals still have loyal troops in Iran are nothing but daydreams.'

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NABAVI DISCUSSES BANI-SADR'S FLIGHT, MOJAHEDIN OPERATIONS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] Yesterday morning Engineer Behzad Nabavi, minister of state for executive affairs and the government's spokesman, took part in a radio and television press conference at the prime minister's office in which domestic and foreign reporters participated, and answered their questions concerning such issues as the presidential elections, relations with France, Bani-Sadr's and Rajavi's escape and the problem of factions. A summary of the conference was carried in the second edition of this newspaper yesterday. At the start of this interview, Engineer Nabavi noted that this would be the government spokesman's final press conference under the Raja'i administration.

Economic Mobilization Headquarters

He started by commenting on assumptions voiced in France by Bani-Sadr concerning the work of the Economic Mobilization Headquarters: We leave it to the people to judge the work of Economic Mobilization Headquarters, to see if there has been achievement or not. Economic experts believe that, given present conditions, the work of the Economic Mobilization Headquarters has been outstanding, that it would have been tragic if it did not exist.

Escape by a Military Plane

Nabavi had this to say about the escape of the accused by a military plane and changes in the air force: The matter of using the military aircraft for the escape is under investigation. A number of persons have been arrested in this connection.

Referring to the flight of the accused, Engineer Nabavi said all protests concerning the matter are being directed at the government. I would like to say that the government has not been involved in this because armed troops are responsible for the protection of airports and military installations. Commenting on Bani-Sadr's reference to Col Mo'ezzi as 'brother struggler,' the government spokesman said: Bani-Sadr had commendation and praise for Col Mo'ezzi during a conversation he had with Amir Taheri, the former chief

editor of KEYHAN who is now active in the SUNDAY TIMES of London and who is a well-known Freemason. He has remarked that although Col Mo'ezzi flew the shah from Tehran to his place of banishment in reality he carried out a revolutionary act. Is not this a disgraceful remark? He has given the impression that Mr Mo'ezzi has done a good act.

Presidential Elections

Speaking of the president and the choice of a new prime minister Mr Nabavi stated: Today swearing-in ceremonies will take place in the Majles to be followed immediately by Mr Raja'i's introduction of a prime minister. Mr Bahonar's premiership is a 99 percent possibility, and I hope that this will take place as early as possible. This is the first complete official cabinet after the constitution in which half of the ministers of the present administration will be changed.

Relations Between Iran and France

The minister of state for executive affairs then commented on future relations between Iran and France despite Bani-Sadr's refuge in that country, the present atmosphere of relations between the two countries as well as the detention by France of Iran's missile patrol boats: The unfriendly stands taken by the French government are very surprising and could leave a bad effect on relations between the two countries. As you know, 4 members of the crew of the aircraft which had gone to France have asked to be returned. In this connection the French government has made it difficult for members of the staff of the Iranian Embassy in France to meet with the accused, stating that such a meeting with Bani-Sadr and those accompanying him can take place only if they were to choose an interpreter for such a meeting. And eventually they introduced Kazem Rajavi to translate discussions of the proposed meeting for them. These are unfriendly acts of the French government. I must say that the question of the release of the missile patrol boats has nothing to do with relations between Iran and France. We must see what the future policy of France will be toward Iran before we make a decision. If France becomes the center for counterrevolutionary activities, Iran will show appropriate reaction.

Bani-Sadr's Extradition

Referring to the extradition of Bani-Sadr and those accompanying him, the government spokesman said: Legal documents in our possession obligate the French government to return them, but from the point of view of international law failure to do so would subject it to condemnation. However, the stolen aircraft are ready for return. For example the plane in Cairo awaits a pilot to fly it back while, according to French authorities, the one in Paris is ready to be flown back. Neither has come back yet.

The War and Government's Preoccupations

Engineer Nabavi then answered questions about the war and general matters occupying the government's attention: Military activities of recent days were highly

successful and were a telling answer to rumors such as those claiming a weakening of the air force. We would also like to commend the activities of martyred Major Shahramfar, a brave officer who did so much in Kordestan and other parts of the country.

Bani-Sadr's Interview

He also referred in his comments to the interview by Bani-Sadr by saying: He has said in the interview that a poor turnout in the presidential election of Mohammad Ali Raja'i was a demonstration of support for him! Of course the foreign press has had a field day in this matter. For example REUTER has said that the Iranian authorities resort to any means to insure that Raja'i gets a greater number of votes than Bani-Sadr did, such as lowering the voting age and extending the ballotting deadline. This same source has added that factory workers have been threatened with this or that consequence if they did not vote. This news agency then arrives at the conclusion that the election was a formality. Nabavi said: AP and the newspaper LIBERATION which is controlled by the rightists in France have ridiculed this matter and have spoken about the administrative system of the founders of the party--analyses which closely reflect views expressed by Bani-Sadr concerning Raja'i.

Counterrevolutionary Activities

The government spokesman then showed journalists a report on the activities of Mojahedin-e Khalq and other counterrevolutionary groups and gave details of activities of terrorism, bombings, destruction, shootings and the creation of fear by saying: Those who call the government Phalangist have really outdone the Phalangists of Lebanon, the German Gestapo, Palizban and Oveysi. Such acts cannot be justified under any formula such as for example who have been the targets of terrorism, what places have been bombed and what places have been destroyed--the important point being how these took place. These same people who call the government Phalangist have members of their family at the disposal of these same 'Phalangists' and we have information that they are in touch with their offspring.

He added: I am ashamed to repeat some of the names the Mojahedin have used in referring to the Imam. Referring to the discovery of Radio Peykar he said: In recent days about 60 persons have been arrested because of their part in commandeering cars and some 27 have been executed for various crimes. In another part of his comments he spoke about the flight of Bani-Sadr and Rajavi by saying their action showed on whose side they were: Bakhtiar and Oveysi. Bani-Sadr used to boast that since he was not afraid to die in the hot sands of Khuzestan he surely would not fear death in the cells of Evin prison. Of course those 'hot sands' of Khuzestan were really his luxurious palace in Dezful! He had asked us to place 5 hours of radio and television time at his disposal on the condition that we closed the borders. We of course told him the borders would also be closed to his supporters.

End of the Bani-Sadr Movement

Engineer Nabavi went on to say: The most important thing was the death of the Bani-Sadr movement. We no longer have a thing called the Bani-Sadr movement and, God willing, will be able to crush other diversionary moves. It can generally be said that the escape of these persons showed a weak point in the administration of the Islamic Republic. We must admit this and change this weak spot to a position of strength. An important point concerns rumors that the counterrevolution has used the matter to benefit from Bani-Sadr's strength. Such is not the case at all. When Bani-Sadr became commander in chief of the armed forces he adopted a special strategy aimed at positioning counterrevolutionary elements in the armed forces and shunting aside elements loyal to the revolution. His first move was the Tabas incident and the bombing of the helicopters which resulted in the martyrdom of a loyal son of the revolution (Mohammad Montazer Qaem). Those involved in those incidents should have been arrested and executed immediately. On the orders of Bani-Sadr, the then commander of the air force carried out the bombing to prevent documents of his connection with the United States from coming to light. Fearing that the air force commander, Bahman Baqeri might be arrested and cause his own exposure, Bani-Sadr assumed responsibility for that incident. And when they relieved Baqeri as acting air force commander, Bani-Sadr immediately appointed him head of the Civil Aviation Organization. At the start of the war for which he was totally unprepared, Bani-Sadr began moving 'chess pieces' in the armed forces. As we know, he issued an announcement to the effect that all retired generals must return to active duty. A repeat of the announcement was prevented. Immediately after this, Bani-Sadr expounded an analysis of the Nuzheh coup in order to divert public attention and put a question of doubt in their mind by saying the Nuzheh coup was engineered by the United States for the purpose of dislodging experts from within the armed forces. We know, however, it was a real coup that led to the arrest of a number of persons. He wanted to show that those who had uncovered the coup were Americans. In reality his purpose was to smooth the way for the return of the arrested military officers. By using his position as commander in chief, Bani-Sadr had created a climate of propaganda that misled air force pilots into false assumptions. One such issue was the "Arab vs Ajam" diversionary tactic.

Distribution of MIZAN and ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

The spokesman said: Copies of ISLAMIC REVOLUTION and MIZAN would be taken to military installations and centers at 2 o'clock in the morning whereas they would prevent newspapers of the Imam's line from reaching such places. The creation of such conditions by Bani-Sadr allowed him to remove officers of integrity from the ranks on the pretext of carelessness and negligence. In conclusion, the government spokesman addressed these words to the military brethren: I ask them to meet issues with full awareness and to remember that the gravest treason to the army was committed by Bani-Sadr. He used to refer to himself as 'I,' which meant the United States. These brothers must ask themselves where are these empty slogans of Bani-Sadr, why he took refuge in France and the types of people he imposed on the armed forces: Baqeri, Farivar (responsible for the 56-million-dollar blunder), Kheyrkhah, Mo'ezzi. These were disgraceful blots created within the armed forces by Bani-Sadr. Needless to say the government of the Islamic Republic will act decisively where wrongdoing is involved.

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DETERIORATION OF RELATIONS WITH PLO, ARAB STATES REPORTED

Media Rift Over PLO

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 35, 27 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] Top spokesmen of the Khomeyni regime have reacted angrily to a report in some Arab newspapers of the closure of the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran.

Tehran Radio ridiculed the report in two separate commentaries; then a Foreign Ministry spokesman took time off from a routine verbal attack on "American imperialism" to say that the Reagan camp had been as frightened by the alliance of Iranian and Palestinian revolutionaries that they had to fabricate false reports, such as the closing of the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran, "to create a rift between the two nations."

Subsequently the theme was picked up by the mullah-controlled press to reassert solidarity between the "great forces of Islam." One newspaper, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, organ of the Islamic Republican Party whose former editor, Hossain Moussavi, is now Minister of Foreign Affairs, suggested that Iran should take the lead in formation of a new front "to liberate the land of Palestine."

The suggestion was elaborated by Tehran Radio commentators, who said that while Khomeyni had already designated the last Friday of each Ramazan (Muslim fasting month) as Jerusalem Day, more concrete action was now needed. This came at a time when Libya, Ethiopia and the North Yemen were holding talks for a united front in the Persian Gulf against the Western presence there.

The whole affair underlines the embarrassment of the Iranian ruling clerics in having established trade ties with Israel, especially buying "Zionist-made" arms to kill Arabs in the war with Iraq. It also shows a rift between Bahonar's government on the one hand and the PLO on the other. To complicate things even further there are now signs of another rift between the Iranian theocrats and Colonel Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi of Libya. Informed sources in Tehran report that since the assassination of Ayatollah Beheshti, the founder of the Islamic Republican Party, relations between the Iranian mullahs and the Libyans have steadily deteriorated.

Restrictions on PLO Embassy

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 35, 27 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] Obviously the Palestinians and Syrians were unhappy when they heard of the shipment of Israeli arms to Iran. And they were not fooled by the stories which Iranians put out claiming a frame-up. While the mullahs were trying to make excuses to the Palestinians, a group of monarchist commandos in Tehran carried out a raid on the Palestinian Embassy. It is not known why they did it; nor is it known whether any Palestinians were killed in the raid. But reports indicate that the building, formerly the Israeli Legation office, was visibly damaged. Two Palestinians were attacked and badly injured in Tabriz, north Iran, by angry crowds.

The media in Tehran did not report these two incidents. And since Western media's correspondents in Iran are restricted in their movements, news of these two attacks did not filter out until the Iraqis learned of it and circulated it. It was at this time that reports of the closure of the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran appeared in sections of the Arab media. These reports came as further embarrassment to an already embarrassed regime in Tehran. During the past two weeks the media in Tehran, fully controlled by the ruling clerics, has tried to appear more anti-Israeli and even more pro-Palestinian.

Yet signs of strain between mullahs of the IRP and the various Palestinian groups are evident. For instance, Tehran Radio rarely uses news stories and comments put out by WAFA, the PLO news agency; it either uses dispatches sent from the Beirut office of PARS, the Iranian news agency or depends on news published by the Syrian-backed Al-Saiqa group. Movement of Palestinians not belonging to the Al-Saiqa group is tightly restricted for fears that Palestinian sympathisers with the Mojahedin-e-Khalq might try to smuggle arms to these anti-Khomeyni terrorists.

More specifically, new premier Bahonar is known to hold personal grudges against PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat. Given all these facts, especially links between the Mojahedin and some Palestinain elements, it is safe to assume that Bahonar has ordered some kind of restrictions be imposed on the Palestinian Embassy in Tehran, which explains why the regime was so jittery about reports of the embassy's closure.

Israeli Arms Deal

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 35, 27 Aug 81 pp 6, 7

[Text] Under the Pahlavi regime there were strong trading ties between Iran and Israel. The two countries had also established joint ventures in a host of agricultural and industrial fields. All these were no secret and all the Arab countries were aware of such ties. In fact, Iran was a channel through which in the past many Arab countries, including Iraq, used to receive Israeli goods or benefited from training in agricultural or animal breeding projects. Many Arab trainees received instruction from Arab-speaking Israeli experts on how to handle farm machinery or care for cattle and other stock. But all concerned would keep silent on this.

There was also cooperation between Iran and Israel on arms manufacturing and aircraft maintenance.

After the fall of the Shah's regime Iran on several occasions was forced to buy Israeli dairy products and meat to avert suddenly developing shortages. But the exchanges were kept to a minimum, especially because Iran had defaulted on payment of Israeli financial claims.

The war with Iraq, coming at the time of a Western trade and army embargo on Iran, forced the Islamic Republic to seek out international dealers to replenish its badly exhausted supplies of war materials. For a while supplies could be obtained from South Korea and a number of dealers capable of obtaining arms from German and British makers. But for as yet unexplained reasons relations between Iran and South Korea became badly strained, and Iran ordered expulsion of some South Korean diplomats and businessmen. Also, arms dealers in Europe were harrassed by British and other European authorities urging them not to supply the Iranians with arms.

The Tehran regime, after a time, learned that Israel was the best source for supplying the kind of arms the Iranian army and air force needed. But under the pressure from Palestinian and Syrian advisers within the Khomeyni regime, the Iranian army command resisted the temptation to try to buy from Israel.

The army chiefs were hoping Syria and Libya would supply them with sophisticated weapons as well as the sort of guns and ammunitions needed to keep up Iran's fire power in a war of attrition in which supplies are being wasted in a frightening manner. But the two brother Arab countries did not help.

To top it all, Arab (mainly Lebanese) dealers who were to get arms from international gun-runners appeared to be crooks. Reports of Arabs, in collusion with the mullahs, taking millions of dollars to buy arms but then making off with the money, circulated in Tehran.

Finally the National Defence Council in Tehran decided, in exasperation, to buy arms from Israel--a fact which Bani-Sadr has now admitted.

Several shipments of Israeli arms are said to have been flown to Tehran. Baghdad Radio has been accusing Iran of buying Israeli arms for the past six to seven months. Several front organisations were also involved and Cyprus was the key place. Unfortunately for the Iranians, the crash of an Argentinian freight craft in Soviet Armenia, still unexplained, exposed the whole deal.

In the meantime, at least one person who was opposed to the deal--Mostafa Chamran--was also mysteriously killed. Chamran was a leader of Al-Amal terrorist group in South Lebanon before returning to Iran to set up and command para-military forces.

The Tehran regime was understandably embarrassed when the secret deal was exposed because its main theme has all along been opposition to Israel. So, its official spokesmen had to over-react to suggestions of a link between the Khomeyni regime and Israel.

The Iraqis, for their part, are well aware of the Iranian regime's sensitivity over any links with Israel. Baghdad Radio has been blowing up the affair out of all proportion.

In reply Tehran Radio has said that the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear plant was planned as part of a secret deal between Saddam Hossein and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin to achieve two goals: firstly to provide material to the Iraqi propagandists, to say that while Iraq is fighting Iran, it is also being attacked by Israel, implying cooperation between Tehran and Tel Aviv; and, secondly, to enable Israel to destroy Arab nuclear capability.

Such allegations of a secret deal between Saddam and Begin, constantly broadcast by Tehran Radio, were so unbelievable that not even the most ardent and simple-minded supporters of Khomeyni believed them. Yet Tehran Radio has continued to claim that Israel's raid on the Iraqi plant was a kind of decoy to confuse "truly anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist forces."

Disagreements With Qadhdhafi

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 35, 27 Aug 81 pp 8, 9

[Text] It is known that Beheshti and his henchman Bahonar have always been close friends of Libya, while the family of Ahmad Khomeyni's wife, whose uncle Imam Mussa Sadr, the leader of the Lebanese Shi'ites who disappeared three years ago, holds Qadhdhafi responsible for his fate and is committed against the Libyan leader. Another of the clerical politicians, the assassinated son of Ayatollah Montazeri, Mohamad Montazeri, was known to be an agent and close friend of Rifat Assad, who was until recently head of the Syrian Intelligence.

At the beginning of the Irano-Iraqi war the Syrian and Libyan factions of Iranian mullahs came closer together, especially when Hafiz Assad of Syria and Qadhdhafi began to forge close links. But because of Syria's entanglement with Israel in Lebanon and Assad's refusal to give concrete help to Iran's war effort relations between the Khomeyni regime and Syria have inevitably cooled.

Iran hoped that Qadhdhafi would somehow be more positive in his support of Iran against Iraq. The dismissal of Bani-Sadr, who was despised by Qadhdhafi, could be calculated to please the Libyan president. But the IRP headquarters explosion which killed the pro-Libyan Beheshti as well as Mohammad Montazeri occurred almost immediately after Bani-Sadr's ouster. Meanwhile, the Libyan leader began paying more attention to his African role, including befriending the Marxist leader of Ethiopia; he told the Iranians to end the war with Iraq.

Bahonar is not very much inclined to end the war because it gives him a good pretext to continue his repressive tactics at home while keeping the army out of the way at the war front. He does not, therefore, appreciate Qadhdhafi's urgings that the war should be ended.

All these events have affected relations between Iran and Libya, especially now that Qadhdhafi appears to be trying to patch up ties with Baghdad and Rabat. There is no doubt that the Iranian rulers depend heavily on the support of Palestinian, Syrian and Libyan military and intelligence support at home to remain in power. Even today it is the Libyan intelligence and Algerian diplomatic support abroad which keeps the mullahs informed of the activities of monarchist and other opposition organisations abroad. The Khomeyni regime can, therefore, ill afford to lose Qadhdhafi's support.

But the regime is coming round to feel the drawbacks of leaning so heavily on volatile and unpredictable allies like Qadhdhafi. Indeed, they are probably well aware that their opponents at home are delighted to see Khomeyni and his aides lose face over the rebuffs they have received from Qadhdhafi, Assad and Arafat.

CSO: 4600/169

TUDEH PUBLICATIONS ACCUSED OF 'CREEPING PLOT'

Tehran AHZAB in Persian 14 Jul 81 pp 1-3

[Text] The subjugating and colonializing superpowers have experimented with various methods to attract the governments of the Third World. Their most important and best method is to plant affiliated political groups in the country of their choice or employ special groups or individuals who are able to work for their interests.

The methods and policies of the dependent parties, too, in the course of long years of being the mercenary servants of foreigners have reached perfection (!), since, as usual, those parties which are the "hopes" of the foreigners enjoy many propaganda resources. And the propaganda is carried out in the form of organizations as well as dependent publications.

The purpose of this brief introduction is to point out that a foreign nurtured party such as the Tudeh Party still continues its anti-Islamic activities through its many affiliated publications. And this is at a time when its central organ has been banned by the prosecutor of the Islamic Republic and accused of a "creeping plot" against the sacred principles of Islam and the foundation of the Islamic Republic.

Therefore, it is our duty to identify the affiliated publications, such as its central organ, of this atheistic group and neutralize the creeping plots which are being carried out by them.

One of these affiliated publications is ETTEHAD-E MARDOM, which has now replaced the banned newspaper, NAMEH-YE MARDOM. Below, we explain briefly about this publication and we hope to have the attention of the respected responsible authorities to eliminate the plots of the enemies of Islam and the Islamic Republic.

The weekly publication, ETTEHAD-E MARDOM, appears to be the paper of the Soviet-Tudeh minigroup, Ettehad-e Demokratik-e Mardom-e Iran, under the leadership of Mahmud E'temadzadeh "Behazin."

Concerning the minigroup Ettehad-e Demokratik-e Mardom-e Iran, it would be appropriate to explain that this minigroup at the height of the anti-subjugation, anti-atheistic Islamic movement of our Moslem nation, in 1357 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79], was founded by Behazin. From the very beginning, the charter of this minigroup was devised to conform to the charter of the Tudeh Party. Therefore, it is clear that it was functionally dependent on the hated Tudeh Party.... It seems that the Soviet political circles had thought that the Tudeh Party--given its absolutely treacherous past

regarding the Iranian people and its service to foreigners and given the fact that it played no role in the Islamic, anti-monarchical, and anti-colonialist struggles of the Iranian people--had and will have no chance for success in Iran and, therefore, it was necessary to create a minigroup with a new name and a new title, but with the same political line...which the Tudeh Party followed. Hence, they created the minigroup, Ettehad-e Demokratik-e Mardom-e Iran. In the beginning, this minigroup began its activities as the "new hope" of the Soviet Union.

But, after the victory of the magnificent Islamic revolution and after the foreigners heard the outcry of Islam and witnessed with astonishment and disbelief the immortal, movement-creating force of the cries of "God is great," they realized that "intellectualism" was of no use to them and they had to begin "deceptions." Hence, they gave the main mission to the old-hand trained group which was led by a loyal servant such as Kianuri. Consequently, the Tudeh Party entered the arena and did its best in the way of propaganda and public deception. And on this path it enjoyed the endless assistance of its "master."

In this manner, the role of Ettehad-e Demokratik-e Mardom-e Iran moved towards being a dependent group with pseudo-intellectual tendencies able to attract the East-struck pseudo-intellectuals who support the Soviet Union.

For this purpose, ETTEHAD-E MARDOM, a paper affiliated with the abovementioned group, dealt more with subjects of interest to the East-struck pseudo-intellectuals and its analyses of issues and events followed those of the Tudeh Party.

Presently, ETTEHAD-E MARDOM has replaced NAMEH-YE MARDOM. The Tudeh Party has many affiliated publications which it will use at times of vital importance.

There are also many organizations which are affiliated with this heretical, mercenary party, whether or not this dependence is official and open. And these affiliated organizations also have publications. Therefore, to fight the "creeping plot" of the Tudeh Party decisively and thoroughly, all of them must be identified and closed down.

Some of the publications of the organizations affiliated with the Tudeh Party which are presently being published and which freely continue their "creeping plot" against the sacred principles of Islam and the foundations of the Islamic Republic are listed below in hopes that the necessary legal actions will be taken against them.

The Official Publications of the Tudeh Party

1. NAMEH-YE MARDOM (Kurdish)

2. NAMEH-YE MARDOM (Turkish)

3. PAYAM-E MARDOM BARA-YE DANESHAMUZAN

The weekly student paper of the Tudeh Party

4. PAYAM-E MARDOM BARA-YE KARGARAN-E NOWJAVAN

The paper for the young workers

5. ETTEHAD

The workers' paper of the Tudeh Party

6. ETTEHAD-E MARDOM

The weekly publication for the so-called intellectuals of the Tudeh Party

7. JAHAN-E ZANAN

The publication of the Democratic Organization of Women, which is dependent on the Tudeh Party

8. SOLH

The paper of the pro-peace society, dependent on the Tudeh Party

9. BULTAN-E 'KANUN-E SENFI-YE FARHANGIYAN'

The cultural publication of the Tudeh Party

10. NASHRIYEH-YE SHOWRAY-E NEVISANDEGAN VA HONARMANDAN-E IRAN

The branched out group of Kanun-e Nevisandegan, affiliated with the Tudeh Party

11. NASHRIYEH-YE PAYAM-E HAMBASTEGI

Affiliated with the syndication society and the councils of Tehran and its suburbs

The following publications follow the affiliated line of the Tudeh Party:

FARDA-YE IRAN

VARZESH

HOD HOD

VARLIQ (Turkish)

PIRUZI

Also, it must not be forgotten that the Tudeh Patty also printed and distributed some publications without separate permits and as an addendum to the banned newspaper NAMEH-YE MARDOM and these publications have also been banned. Below, we also mention their names so that the respected authorities become aware and prevent their publication as well.

DONYA, the monthly theoretical paper of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party

JAVANAN-E TUDEH, the student publication of the Tudeh Party

DEHQANAN-E IRAN, the farmers' publication of the Tudeh Party

Little by little, in the future, we will provide evidence and reasons to show the dependence of the above publications on the Tudeh Party. In this issue, some of the evidence is provided which shows the affiliation of ETTEHAD-E MARDOM, which presently has taken over the role of NAMEH-YE MARDOM:

1. The first indication of the affiliation of ETTEHAD-E MARDOM with the Tudeh Party is that ETTEHAD-E MARDOM is affiliated with Ettehad-e Demokratik-e Mardom-e Iran. This minigroup follows precisely and is affiliated with the Tudeh Party. This is evident in the charter of this minigroup, the past record of its leadership, especially that of Behazin, and its line and policies.

2. Another sign that shows ETTEHAD-E MARDOM has replaced NAMEH-YE MARDOM of the Tudeh Party is the content of its recent issues, especially after NAMEH-YE MARDOM was banned.

The content of this publication before NAMEH-YE MARDOM was banned was mostly of the following nature:

Relatively theoretical and artistic subjects and articles for the so-called intelligentsia;

Political and social analyses which followed the line of the Tudeh Party;

Economic subjects;

Propaganda concerning the social conditions of the so-called socialist countries, such as Kampuchea, Laos, Cuba, Vietnam, North Korea, and Bulgaria.

On the whole, this paper did not report news, concerning itself mostly with subjects geared to East-struck pseudo-intellectuals. Its analyses were usually behind the times. Even its editorials, which by nature are supposed to be about current issues and events of the week, mostly dealt with the events of the previous weeks, for instance, 10-14 days before the article was written.

But after NAMEH-YE MARDOM was banned, this publication gradually lost the abovementioned characteristics and changed into a party paper, such as NAMEH-YE MARDOM. It increased its news reporting and now has much about current issues and events. It has relatively lost its special appeal to the pseudo-intellectuals. And in order to deceive the public even more, it has given up the propaganda of the social, political, economic, and other aspects of the socialist countries it used to deal with in such detail.

Apparently its sales have also relatively increased. Surely the Tudeh members are buying it instead of NAMEH-YE MARDOM.

These are all signs that show ETTEHAD-E MARDOM has replaced NAMEH-YE MARDOM. And, according to the honorable revolutionary prosecutor, the Tudeh Party is presently preparing and carrying out a "creeping plot" through this publication.

We will have more to say about the affiliated publications of the Tudeh Party. For now, suffice it to say that ETTEHAD-E MARDOM must be banned by the decree of the honorable responsible authorities the grounds that it is accused of waging a creeping plot against the sacred principles of Islam, so that the Moslem people of our country will be rid of this illegal publication and the dependent party of its affiliation.

In conclusion, we should point out the deceptive tricks of the Tudeh Party in 31'-'32 [21 Mar 52-20 Mar 53], when by using numerous titles but with one address, they obtained several publication permits from the government of the time and spread their party propaganda through them. This trickery and the deceptive policy are described in a bulletin that the Ministry of Islamic Guidance has published about the U.S. coup of 28 Mordad 32 [19 Aug 53]. We refer the interested readers to that source.

9593
CSO: 4640/83

OUTLAWING OF TUDEH PARTY ASKED

Tehran AHZAB in Persian 14 Jul 81 pp 1, 6

[Text] In the first part of this paper, concerning the public deception of the affiliated Tudeh Party and the pretention to Islam of these infidel functionaries, we said that the praise of Islam and the clergy by the Tudeh Party is nothing but a political game and an obvious public deception.

In stating our reasons in Part A, we said that the Tudeh Party is a communist party with a Marxist-Leninist world view, that is, with ideologies which are 100 percent atheistic and absolutely blasphemous.

In this regard, we quoted several instances of the writings of the treacherous Tudeh members which indicate that the Tudeh Party is Marxist-Leninist and is trying to drag out present Islamic society to Marxism and so-called "scientific socialism."

In the last issue, too, in Part B, after quoting samples of the writings of the Marxist-Leninists on religion, we explained in more detail that Marxism is the enemy of religion, that Marxism is precisely the same as materialism, and we concluded that:

1. According to Lenin, the leader of the Marxists, fighting religion is like the alphabet of Marxism.

2. Marxism is not the kind of materialism which would stop at the alphabet. In its fight against religion, it would go further, searching for a fundamental way to fight religion.

> It would not be inappropriate in order to show the vile objectives, which, according to the imam, are the destruction of the Koran and Nahj al-Balagheh, to review the works of the Tudeh Party, which make it clear that the Tudeh Party has already clarified the answer to this question and has openly said that in order to achieve power, it will deal with Islam hypocritically.

It expresses those views as follows:

"The philosophical and social views of Islam have been ingrained in the political life of the vast strata of cities and villages and no party will be able to ignore this reality."[15] [as published]

It is with consideration for such a phenomenon that it says:

"The propaganda organization of our party must work extensively in this area to find out methodically and in detail what can bring the supporters of Islam and the supporters of scientific socialism closer together on social issues. The party cadres must be completely mobilized in this regard. Little or no attention on this intellectual battlefield can cause irreparable damages."[16]

Also, Kianuri, in response to the question of why he quotes the verses of the Koran so much, said:

"We must, in our theoretical organization, deal with Islam, which is the ideology of the vast majority of our society, a society in which we want to bring about fundamental changes within the framework of our own ideas and world view. We cannot completely ignore the ideology and world view of 97-98 percent of the Iranian society . . . This is our best method . . . that is, to make use of one side which has progressive aspects . . . to suppress the other side which is reactionary."[17]

Kianuri, this great banner-carrier of Russian slavery who answers all questions easily and unabashedly, approves of being a functionary both for himself and his party. The Tudeh Party, to justify its hypocritical method, says:

1. Islam has deep roots in the lives of 97-98 percent of the Iranian people in the cities and villages.

2. The propaganda of the Tudeh Party must be based on showing Islam and socialism as close to one another.

3. Little attention to this issue will greatly and seriously damage the Tudeh Party.

4. To superficially defend Islam is the best way to impose our views and suppress the reactionary aspects of Islam!

This policy is not too unexpected since it is in accordance with the instructions of the great master, the mother party, that is, the Soviet Communist Party. The political secretary of that party, (Boris Punamarif), clarifies the duties of the Communist parties in the Middle East by quoting Lenin:

"V. I. Lenin emphasized many times that the Communist parties in the Middle Eastern countries must learn to conform to the special conditions of these continents in which farmers make up the largest group of the people, religion is a great force, and nationalism is often part of the prevailing ideology."[18]

This "instructional theory" from the secretary of the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and "forced obedience" by the central committee of the Tudeh Party, clarifies the dangerous and hypocritical nature of many of the articles published by the Tudeh Party introducing Islam and, for that matter, the true Islam of the imam's line. It clarifies that these articles reflect the implementation of this policy and follow a goal which is precisely connected with the propagation of Marxism and in its final stage, the establishment of a system based on blasphemous Russian thoughts and dependent on the Eastern colonialist system.

C. The Tudeh Party is an anti-Islamic party and must be abolished.

Our nation is a Moslem one. This is know to everyone. And, incidentally, the Tudeh members know this very well. Our being Islamic is our independence, it is our dignity and the foundation of the life of our nation. Because we were Moslems and considered the regime of the tyrant the manifestation of infidelity, we rose up and severed all its colonialist relations with Western imperialism headed by the United States. And now we continue on the same path with more valuable experiences. Imam Khomeyni, this guardian pillar of the revolution who is the helm of leadership for the whole nation, has pointed out frequently that the "nation made a revolution for Islam"; "we want Islam and none other than Islam"; etc. This special characteristic of our people, that is, having Islam and especially Shi'ism rooted in the depths of their lives, beliefs, and minds, has been the cause of all the present revolutionary changes. And that is why we have made the slogan of neither Western nor Eastern into a motto to fight against the Soviet, Chinese, American, and European colonialists. And we are irreconcilably at war with their domestic functionaries, such as the Ranjbaran Party, Jam'iyyat-e Edalat, Tufan, Razmandegan, etc. If we speak of imperialism it is not because it competes with the Soviet Union (as the Tudeh members say); we consider the United States imperialistic because it is one of the greatest obstructive forces to human development, obstructing the way to the Islamic and godly growth of human beings. The United States is our enemy because it prevents the establishment of an Islamic government and is the deadly enemy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, because it knows that through the establishment of such a government, its domination both in the region and in the world will be threatened. With this analysis, we have nothing in common with the loyal servants, such as the Tudeh Party, who consider themselves at war with imperialism only in words, according to the analysis dictated to them. The fact that we are the defenders of the working people in practice and not in

mere words can no longer be taken advantage of by the Tudeh Party and its cohorts who defend the working people with words alone, pretending to be close to Islam. Our nation knows you well. And it knows why you have become anti-imperialist. You move, work, and act in accordance with the instructions of the Soviet theoreticians, in the same way that Peykar, Tufan, and Ranjbaran are engaged in counter-revolutionary activities on signal by American or America-dependent politicians.

Concerning the anti-Islamicism of the Tudeh Party, it is sufficient to note that despite all their efforts to show themselves close to Islam, while carrying out the instructions of their master line by line, there still appear tell tale signs which betray the anti-Islamic nature of this party. For instance, Ehsan Tabari says:

"Religion is the offspring of witchcraft and has always preserved its internal ties with it, because religion is also based on dividing the world into natural and supernatural, considering the supernatural as authentic."[19]

Oh, you hypocrites and loyal mercenary servants, how could you still speak of the "imam's line"? The line of the imam, which is the line of God and religious rule, is based on faith, the unseen, and the supernatural. The imam, whom you unabashedly claim to follow, and on the basis of the verse, "Those who believe in the Unseen are steadfast in prayer," is the manifestation of piety, faith in the unseen and the practicioner of prayers. What would he possibly have to do with you atheistic, materialist blasphemers who oppose the "unseen"?

The world view of us Moslems is based on belief in "Allah" and faith in the unseen. And it is precisely the opposite of the materialistic world view of you Marxists. Since thought is the basis for action and we are in complete conflict in thought, so, too, in action we cannot have the least unity with you, even in so-called tactics, even for a short time. And on the basis of this principle, we declare that not only will we not give up our revolutionary actions which come from our exalted Islamic beliefs but also we will expose and reject the mercenary policies of the Tudeh Party, which tries to show its political line as close to the Islamic line of the imam. We seriously request of the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, especially the honored representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, that they materialize the public demand of the Moslem people of Iran and free the nation from the evil of these foreign-worshipping mercenaries and put an end to their official recognition in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

FOOTNOTES

15. Ratified in the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party.

16. The same document.

17. Kianuri, PROSESH VA PASOKH, No 8, pp 13, 14.

18. (Boris Punamarif), "Masayel-e Mobram-e Te'orik" [Vital Theoretical Issues], Translated by the Tudeh Party, p 86.

19. Ehsan Tabari, "Barkhi Barrasiha dar Bareh-ye Jahanbini va Jonbeshha-ye Ejtema'i-ye Iran" [Some Observations about Social World Views and Movements in Iran], New Edition, p 88.

20. The Koran, Sureh Baqarah, Vs 3.

9593
CSO: 4640/84

PENETRATION OF TUDEH PARTY IN KHOMEYNI REGIME DETAILED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 20 Aug 81 pp 8-11

/Text/ A formerly prominent Iranian official, who left Iran only a few months ago, contributed the following summary of the Tudeh's tactics in the Islamic Republic:

Iranian businessmen, civil servants, professional groups and the armed forces are alarmed at the mass infiltration of the administrative ranks by members of the Moscow-oriented Tudeh (communist) party.

Communists now occupy middle rank posts in most government offices. They are responsible for policy proposals and what they propose is often approved by the decision-makers, who are clerics of the Khomeyni school. Even the well-known Feizieh Theological School in Qom is heavily infiltrated by communists. Well-informed sources have identified as many as 60 trained communists among teachers of that theological school who wear turbans and mullah's garments but are, in fact, fully fledged communists.

The Tudeh party's infiltration of the theological schools is not new. As long ago as 1948 there were nearly 100 known communists among Qom's various schools of religious learning. In 1951 two religious figures were among the list of candidates put up by the Tudeh for the Majlis elections. These were Ayatollah Borghai and Shaikh Mostafa Lankarani, who did not make it to parliament then.

Subsequently, after the fall of the Mosadeq government in 1953, the regime which followed took up an anti-Soviet stance and closed down all the front organisations of the Tudeh Party.

The Tudeh leadership fled to Russia and other East European countries, leaving the rank and file to their fate. Many were tried and given prison terms but the majority abandoned political activity and settled down to ordinary life. The royalist regime's secret service, SAVAK, was efficient in keeping check on the clandestine operations of Tudeh Party and Soviet agents.

But they were not allowed to harass anti-regime elements in the religious schools and institutions. As a result, these theological institutions became a safe haven for communists. At the same time, the offspring of those Iranian communists who were in exile in Eastern Europe were being trained as administrators, doctors and agents by their host countries, ready to move into Iran when and if the conditions were ripe.

In the autumn of 1978, when Khomeyni was waging his Islamic war against the royalist regime, a top delegation from Moscow arrived in Budapest for secret contacts with Khomeyni aides. It is not known for sure who among the Khomeyni team met the Soviets in Hungary then, but it is certain that the since-assassinated leaders, Mohamuad Beheshti and Hasan Ayat, were making the final decisions on a deal which led to the legal presence of the Tudeh Party in post-revolutionary Iran.

Soon after the collapse of the royalist regime Tudeh activists all over the communist world were issued with Iranian passports and birth certificates and returned to Iran.

It is believed that several hundred Soviet citizens from the Azarbaijan, Tajikistan and Armenian republics who look Iranian and speak the Persian and Azari Turkish languages, were also sent to the northern provinces of Iran, with Iranian identity papers.

In the beginning the Tudeh Party kept a low profile and showed total obedience to Khomeyni. When former prime minister Bazargan decided, under pressure from intellectuals and the middle classes, to curb the Tudeh propaganda on the legal grounds that their actions were against several laws which were still binding in 1979, Khomeyni personally intervened to stop Bazargan.

It then became clear that the Tudeh was supported from very high up. In the summer of 1979, Tudeh activists were instrumental in pushing the Islamic Republican Party to adopt Marxist ideas on sections of the Islamic constitution which dealt with economic matters.

When the U.S. embassy was seized, the Tudeh gave full support to the move, and as a bargaining point it was allowed to defend Moscow's policies over Afghanistan, a concession which seems strange coming from a supposed Islamic regime.

The Tudeh has all along supported Khomeyni and the Islamic Republican Party, given them technical and intellectual assistance, and has slowly and quietly placed its own agents in the media, revolutionary courts and almost all the government offices.

Tudeh Benefits From Purge

In November 1979, following the taking of the U.S. embassy, Bazargan resigned as prime minister and Khomeyni decreed that the then-secret Revolutionary Council should begin direct rule.

The decree detailed four principal tasks for the direct rule by the council:

1. To hold a referendum to ratify the Islamic constitution
2. To hold presidential elections
3. To hold elections to the Majlis, and
4. To purge government offices of undesirable persons

One week later purging committees were formed in all government offices to dismiss everybody suspected of opposition to theocracy, sympathy for the West or having occupied a high position before the revolution. The purging committees consisted of two elected members from among the ranks of the employees, one representative of the management and two representatives from the Islamic organs.

It so happened that in nearly all purging committees the powerful members were all Tudeh party sympathisers, who used Khomeyni's directive on purges to selectively dismiss capable employees from important and key positions. Having thus created vacancies they systematically pushed their own trusted and loyal elements to fill them. In this way, without firing a shot, the Tudeh grabbed key seats in the administration.

Why Merchants Are Worried

The communist elements in the Khomeyni administration had planned gradual liquidation of the private sector as long ago as the spring of 1980. By creeping into the ranks of middle management they had convinced the Islamic Republican Party bosses that the mullahs could never hold power as long as the economy remained outside their total control.

Already the Islamic constitution had envisaged nationalisation of foreign trade and big business, as well as limitations on private land holdings. When the Iraqis invaded Iran, Tudeh elements in the administration saw their chance to bring all aspects of economic life under State control under the pretext of "a wartime economy."

Suddenly rationing was introduced for essential goods, coupons were printed and issued and an East European-type economy was imposed. The merchants are now afraid that before the war is over the private sector will be totally eliminated, except for a few enterprises owned by the new theocratic class. After the war it will be too late to change the situation, they fear.

For their part, the Tudeh Party believes that the more the country is shaped in a marxist mould, the easier will be their chances of a quiet takeover after the death of Khomeyni.

Tudeh Benefits From Splits and Executions

At the beginning of its second term in politics in 1979 the Tudeh was the weakest of all Iran's leftist parties. Moreover, it was hated by the majority of people because of its total and blind loyalty to Moscow. Clearly, Tudeh offices were regarded as branches of the Soviet embassy. Now, Tudeh is the only leftist party which operates freely and, thanks to vast financial resources, can expand its offices, publications and activities. It has benefited from splits in the ranks of other leftist parties and also from the slaughter of the members of other communist parties which are not loyal to Moscow.

How Does Tudeh View Khomeyni?

In an internal document circulated last year the Tudeh leadership praised Khomeyni as the most capable and far-sighted anti-imperialist leader the Iranian masses have ever produced.

"He penetrates the minds and hearts of the illiterate masses," the document said. He turns them against American and Western imperialism in a way no other person can. This is no small achievement. Because the Iranian masses have never had any hatred for the Americans or Europeans other than Tsarist Russia and Imperial England, the creation of hatred among them for the Americans could not have been achieved by anyone other than Khomeyni. Iranians had no natural reason to hate Americans, but thanks to Khomeyni they now feel it is their religious duty to do so."

The document further adds: "On the eve of the revolution, Iranians still had a strong nationalist feeling and a latent preference for monarchy. Both these elements could be played up against progressive change (i.e. takeover by communists) but Khomeyni used his influence and leadership to fight the Iranian sense of nationalism and its symbol, which is the monarchy."

Tudeh activists say that they can stage a creeping coup, or a palace coup, and live with Islam, but they could never live with Iranian nationalism; nor indeed they could never be so close to power had there been a monarchy in Iran. A monarch, no matter how weak or how much of a figure-head, could always be a rallying point or moral support for anti-communist forces.

"Khomeyni's work in ousting monarchy is his most important contribution to us," they say. "His anti-Americanism is his second biggest asset."

CSO: 4600/163

SWEDISH PAPER VIEWS IRANIAN EMBASSY SIT-IN

PM271358 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 25 Aug 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Lidingoe and Iran"]

[Text] The occupation of the Iranian ambassador's residence in Lidingoe, outside Stockholm, was terminated after only a few hours. The Swedish authorities acted with praiseworthy firmness. Even though the demands from the Iranian students who occupied the residence were modest--they wanted to hold a press conference in the house--every successful occupation of this type increases the temptation to undertake new blackmail attempts with diplomats as hostages.

The occupiers wanted to spotlight the reign of terror in their own country. This is very understandable. Over 600 people have been executed in Iran since President Bani-Sadr was toppled in June. On Sunday alone 23 opposition figures faced the execution squads. Simultaneously a further 500 were arrested. The clerical regime is running amok.

For several years now there have been thousands of Iranian students spread throughout the West, a reminder that the much-decried shah nevertheless pursued a generous education policy. Even as they demonstrate and attempt to occupy embassies, they cannot of course influence developments in Iran. They can only--like the chorus in a Greek drama--express horror at the bloody action.

Yesterday they condemned the shah. Today Khomeyni. And tomorrow?

It is difficult to prophesy what will happen in Iran. Behind the several outrages during the summer is the leftist Muslim movement Mojahedin, which has, however, suffered significant losses in the wave of arrests and executions in recent weeks. The students who occupied the residence in Lidingoe claim to represent two other leftist groups, which at least for the time being are playing subsidiary roles in the drama. The Moscow-oriented Tudeh Communist Party is of more interest for the future and it is biding its time in the shadow of Khomeyni. A long and bloody power struggle seems inevitable.

CSO: 3109/238

INITIATIVES UNDERTAKEN TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMY

Oil Exploration in Caspian

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 13 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN, August 12 (Pars) — As announced by the Ministry of Oil of the Islamic Republic of Iran Monday evening, following many months of exploration activities Well No. 1 near Seri Island, in the Persian Gulf halfway between Iran and Dubai a new source of oil for Iran has been struck. The location south of Seri Island is shared by Iran and the Sheikhdom of Dubai of the U.A.E. and the oil deposits are said to be quite large. The exploration began after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and was being carried out only by Iranian technicians all along. Dubai has been extracting oil from its side for the last few months.

In another development, the deputy Iranian Oil Minister, Dr. Ayatollahi along with other Oil Ministry officials paid a visit to the oil industry installations in the city of Isfahan. They inspected the oil depot project of Goldasht which is due to be completed after two months. A sum of four billion rials has been allocated for the project and one thousand workers are engaged in its construction.

Meanwhile, three oil fields in the southwest area of the Caspian Sea will be exploited according to a five-year program and the smallest field's estimatd reserves stand at 300 million barrels. By this project about 60,000 people will be employed, said the head of th Exploration and Production Department of the National Iranian Oil Company, Engineer Mehdi Parsi. Speaking in an interview with Pars, he also said that in their discovery projects in the Caspian Sea, they performed geological operations in 49 regions and selected three areas for initial drilling.

The research operations and the placement of orders of goods and equipment will commence from March 21, 1982 and the drilling operations will start in March 1983. He added that the maximum period considered for drilling each of the wells would be one year and in all three wells will be drilled. Research operations, implementation and drilling of the wells will be carried out over a five year period in the three oil fields

Increase in Merchant Marine

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, Aug. 16 (Pars) — "With the purchase of six cargo ships, the capacity of Iranian shipping will reach 3.5 million tons per year from 1.7 million tons," said Dr. Mohammad Taqi Banki the Undersecretary of the Plan and Budget Organization in an interview with Pars on Friday. Dr. Banki also explained the trip of the Iranian mission to Greece and the objective of the purchase of cargo ships. He said that the Economic Mobilization Headquarters that was established after the Iraqi-imposed war on Iran, in order to counteract the economic sanctions and shortcomings created by the war, decided to increase shipping capacity to meet annual import of 10 million tons of goods to Iranian ports.

"The Iranian mission to Greece purchased six cargo ships made by Hitachi Company of Japan belonging to a Greek company. By the purchase of these ships, the capacity of shipping of the Islamic Republic of Iran will increase 1.6 million tons to 3.5 million tons. The capacity of each cargo ship is 35,000 tons," Banki added. According to the international standards, every country should accept half of its capacity of imports.

The first cargo ship is due to be delivered to Iran within two and a half months. Iran has purchased these ships for 110 million dollars, and 10 percent of the price has been deposited in a bank as a guarantee of purchase. Mr. Banki added that the Iranian mission also talked with Greek officials about barter trade between the two countries. The Iranian mission in their meetings with Greek officials from the Commerce and Energy Ministries, said the Iranian government was interested in bartering oil with services and ships. Dr. Banki concluded that the decision would be made after necessary study in this field.

Measures Against Misappropriation

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, August 16 (Pars) — The Economic Mobilization Headquarters, in a statement released yesterday called on all production, trade and commercial services institutions to record all their business transactions and the relevant invoices in their journals to avoid any sort of misappropriation.

In fulfilling the aspirations of the great leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in connection with protecting the rights of the deprived and oppressed masses of society, and following the decision of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) to take measures for implementing Article 49 of the Constitutional Law which requires the government to confiscate wealth and income accumulated through bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation in government contracts and deals as well as all wealth accumulated through illegal activities, the Headquarters in an effort to protect the rights of the oppressed masses of Iran informs the production, trade and commercial services companies of the following points:

1. Failure to keep ledgers, to present invoices and to record business transactions in the ledger will be considered as an act of misappropriation and income gains through such ways is considered illegal.

2. Due to the fact that the official price of most of the goods has been announced by organizations, all production, trade, import companies as well as merchants services and distribution companies are obliged to record the prices, percentage of profit connected to production, import or sale as well as related invoices. The income gathered through ignoring the fixed prices will be considered illegal and those involved in such activities will be

dealt with according to the related regulations.

3. Any income secured through failure to pay the government the due sums, is considered misappropriation of public funds and wealth accumulated through such manners and will fall foul of the above mentioned article.

The statement concluded that the Headquarters will vigorously campaign against profiteering and while controlling the operation of production, trade and distribution units, it will take serious measures for controlling and stabilizing the prices as well as recovering the plundered rights of the Iranian people.

CSO: 4600/167

FRENCH FACE DILEMMA OVER NUCLEAR POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1285, 19 Jun 81 pp 21-22

/Article by Hasan Hamdah: "Israeli Operation in Baghdad Puts French Policy to Critical Test!"/

/Text/ In 1962 American intelligence agencies observed that something was happening at the "textile factory" in the Negev Desert near Dimona, and they began to investigate to find out what was going on. They were surprised to learn that what was produced at the "textile plant" had nothing to do with clothes but was a nuclear reactor capable of producing an atomic bomb comparable to the one dropped on Hiroshima!!!!!

What stirred up the Americans was the fact that French experts were in charge of training and helping the Israeli technicians to build this reactor and consequently to manufacture an atomic bomb.

At the height of work on the project General de Gaulle decided to terminate the aid and dissolve the contract, but it did not take long before he reversed his decision as a result of pressure from Ben Gurion, and he let things proceed in accordance with the secret agreement between the two governments. Thus Israel built its first nuclear reactor, and then its first atomic bomb, with the aid of France.

In the following year, 1963, violent debates raged among the Israeli leaders over the role of nuclear weapons in the defense of the state of Israel. Two views emerged. The first, under the leadership of Ben Gurion, felt that priority must be given to nuclear weapons in case there was a clash with the Arab states. The second was under the leadership of Levi Eshkol, who felt that nuclear weapons complemented conventional weapons but who gave preference to conventional weapons because they allow Israel to expand and occupy new land, an option that is not available with nuclear conflagration. At that time Eshkol made his famous remark: "We have not said that we will not use nuclear weapons; we have only given assurances that we will not be the first to use them."

Moshe Dayan repeated this remark on the occasion of the outcry that the Israelis stirred up against France last July concerning its programs of nuclear cooperation with Iraq. Dayan's statement came 5 weeks after Israeli intelligence, Mosad, assassinated Dr Yahya al-Mashad, the Egyptian nuclear expert who was directing the Iraqi nuclear program. Al-Mashad was in Paris when Mosad attacked him in his room at the Meridian Hotel and killed him. At the time, Israeli radio commented on the incident by saying: "The Iraqi program to obtain an atomic bomb will be set back by 2 years."

Al-Mashad's assassination in the heart of Paris is the second act undertaken by Mosad in France to delay the Iraqi nuclear program. At the beginning of 1979, a group of Israeli intelligence operatives launched an operation to blow up the core of the nuclear reactor prepared for Iraq near the French city of Toulon. On both occasions, French authorities kept silent.

Only days after the destruction of the reactor on French soil, one of the German magazines printed a front-page interview with one of the Israeli commandos who destroyed the reactor, including a detailed explanation of the operation, which was called ("Bar Levit"). At the same time, the Israeli press violently attacked former French President Giscard d'Estaing and the members of his government, accusing them of "helping Iraq produce an atomic bomb." Also, the major French newspapers, which are controlled by Zionism, then began to publish dossiers and analyses to the effect that Iraq would obtain nuclear weapons, with the aid of France, to destroy Israel. The press was then joined, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, by some groups of the French opposition, including the Socialist Party, which is now in power.

Here the basic question must be raised: Would the new government comply with Iraq's request if Baghdad decided to ask the French Government to repair the reactor and continue the same conditions that were in effect with respect to the percentage of the enrichment of uranium?

Since Mitterand first took over the presidency and formed the new government, statements have been issued by the ministers of foreign affairs and economy offering assurances that the government would be bound by commitments made by previous governments according to the principle of continuity of organizations. Ministers Claude Cheysson and Jacques Delors did not hesitate to confirm that France would adhere to the implementation of agreements of cooperation with Iraq in the field of nuclear energy. These agreements are actually under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, which is headed by Michel Jobert, who is known for his friendship with the Arab states. His inclusion in the government is considered doubly appeasing: internally to appease the moderate right and externally to reassure the Arab world first and then the rest of the Third World.

In an interview with one of the French newspapers, Jobert confirmed that "the word of France must be its continuity." All of this indicates that candidate Mitterand's reservations with regard to the atomic agreements with Iraq do not affect the cooperation between the two countries and the completion of the nuclear project, which began in 1975 when Jacques Chirac was head of state, in spite of insistence by the Israelis (Begin or Peres, President Mitterand's friend) that the project must be stopped.

However, the Israeli raid on the Tammuz installations, which was condemned by President Mitterand personally and also by the head of government, Mauroy, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced a new factor into the situation that may change the meaning of the continuity of which the French senior officials had previously given assurance.

This change in meaning may affect the degree of enrichment of the uranium (now a maximum of 93 percent), which can be altered in the reactor. The French authorities may resort to this, as can be seen in two statements, the first by Premier Pierre Mauroy and the second by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In his reply to a question from journalists during a press club interview on the "Europe 1" broadcast on the evening of Monday, 9 June, after Mauroy had condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear installations, he said: "We are determined to strengthen supervision of nuclear facilities, relying on a policy of pulling back in circumstances that might extend this type of competition in a difficult and explosive area such as this one."

A statement by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes a sentence of the utmost importance: "Since he took office, the president has hoped to confirm that it is necessary to take steps to assure that these facilities are used for peaceful purposes and to avoid any change in the direction of their use."

From these two statements, one notes a kind of lack of confidence in the nature of the supervision exercised by the experts by the International Atomic Energy Agency /IAEA/, although the substance of the Foreign Ministry's statement indicates that this agency is doing its duty in supervising the proper use of the reactor. This apparent contradiction can be attributed to the appearance of conflicting opinions among nuclear scientists over the capability of the Tammuz installations. The director of the IAEA, Mr Eklund, confirmed after the Israeli attack that the quantity of enriched uranium supplied to the Iraqi installations by France weighed 13 kilograms, not enough to build an atomic bomb, which requires 25 kilograms of 93 percent enriched uranium. Many scientists share Eklund's view. However, a number of other researchers and experts feels that this quantity (13 kilograms of 93 percent enriched uranium) is sufficient to build the bomb if combined with the quantities present at Tammuz 1 and Tammuz 2. This dispute became clear in the debates on French television among experts in the field of atomic energy. It appears that the French Government is inclined to take the second view, and this means that the French authorities may adhere to the idea that the percentage of enrichment of the uranium must be lowered so that it is impossible to modify use of the reactor to manufacture an atomic bomb. Note that the director of the IAEA confirmed reports indicating that Iraq will not be able to make a bomb for 10 years. However, will the Iraqis be content with that?

In 1979, when a group of Israeli commandos destroyed the heart of the reactor near Toulon, the government of President d'Estaing offered the Iraqis a modification in the contract, substituting a favorable conversion rate of a type of uranium weaker than that specified in the basic contract (93 percent). The Iraqis rejected the offer because they felt that it involved new delays at a time when the Israelis were trying to take advantage of the time factor. This is what the Jews said after they assassinated Dr Yahya al-Mashad, and this is what they said after the recent raid on the Tammuz installations. Professor Yuval Ne'emann, a top Israeli scientist in the nuclear field, commented on the recent operation by saying: "We have succeeded in delaying the Iraqi nuclear program for 3 years."

The government of former president d'Estaing had broached with Pakistan the subject of changing their contract and substituting weaker uranium, as a result of pressure applied by Henry Kissinger on the French president in 1976 to prevent Pakistan from producing the atomic bomb. However, the Pakistanis rejected the proposal and expressed indifference. They turned their backs on the French officials, placing their confidence in their senior scientist, Dr 'Abd-al-Qadir Khan, who had succeeded in learning how to enrich uranium by centrifugation. 'Abd-al-Qadir Khan, who studied at the German-Dutch-British Academy for Atomic Research (URENCO), was able to

build the unit necessary to permit enrichment of uranium to the degree necessary to build an atomic bomb. It should be noted that officials in the tripartite Academy for Atomic Research did not think at that time that 'Abd-al-Qadir Khan, who was married to a Dutch woman and wanted to obtain Dutch citizenship, would return to his country. They thought he would remain to work at the academy, and thus they made it easy for him to learn the secrets of the "centrifugation unit."

The Pakistanis succeeded in purchasing uranium from the Arlit mines in Niger, of which the French exploit 47 percent, the Nigeriens 35 percent and the Italians and Germans 12 percent. The Americans became furious when they learned of this because the (Kujima) organization, which represents the French in their uranium mine investments in Niger, is headed by Jacques Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president's cousin. The Kujima organization is a subsidiary of the French atomic energy organization, in which Jacques Giscard d'Estaing holds the position of fiscal director. This means that the sale of Nigerien uranium to the Pakistanis took place with the knowledge and approval of President d'Estaing!!!

In this way, the Pakistanis started their nuclear program, and it is no longer strange for General Zia-ul-Haq to say: "Our nuclear programs now are directed entirely toward nonmilitary purposes, but if circumstances forced us down the path of the atomic bomb then we would take it."

Could Iraq today follow in the track of Pakistan? It is difficult to answer that in view of the tight secrecy that surrounds this type of industry and in view of the absence of the French component that was available to the Pakistanis.

The French today are subject to direct pressure from the Israelis and from the Arabs at the same time. By virtue of the Israeli attack, the question of the Iraqi reactor entered the mainstream of France's relations with the Arab world as a whole and is no longer restricted to Iraq and France alone. The issue of the reactor has turned into a central issue in the Middle East struggle, and consequently it has become a test of French policy.

Here the French may ask that the door be reopened to negotiations on this central issue. Reopening negotiations requires a period that may be drawn out while the French negotiator tries as far as possible to satisfy both the Arabs and Israelis. The French have more than one weapon to ease their obligations. For example, they may try to make the Iraqi-Iranian war an obstacle to a quick solution to the issue of the reactor, as the former French authorities did in 1979 after the destruction of the core of the reactor near Toulon. The French may also stick to the argument that the state that is host to the nuclear reactor must guarantee the security of these installations to protect the safety of its citizens. This in fact is a general Arab responsibility transcending the responsibility of the Iraqi Government. What Israel fears is that the knowledge will spread among the Arabs, and they will enter the nuclear era.

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CSO: 4304/55

BRIEFS

IRANIANS RETREATING--Baghdad, 4 Sep (INA)--An Iraqi News Agency INA correspondent quoted a military commander as saying that his forces are chasing the remnants of the defeated Iranian troops at the northern sector of the war front. The commander, whose forces have repulsed a major Iranian offensive at Sar-e Pol-e Zahab area in which more than three thousand Iranians were killed, said that the Iraqi forces at this area are in complete control of the whole situation and the initiative is firmly in their hands. The INA correspondent said that he saw a number of Iranian soldiers who had fallen captive, while the AL-THAWRAH daily published photographs from the battlefield showing several of these captives. Yesterday, the high command of the Iraqi Armed Forces said that a large number of Iranian troops were taken captive after three days of fierce fighting at Sar-e Pol-e Zahab in Kermanshah Province. [Text] [JN041322 Baghdad INA in English 1250 GMT 4 Sep 81]

ARMY FIGHTERS--Baghdad 2 Sep (INA)--More than 40,000 fighters of the Iraqi Para-military Army, known here as the Popular Army, have been stationed along the battlefront over the past year of war action against Iran, the commander-in-chief of the Popular Army Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan said today. "The fighters, mainly engineers, employees, labourers and other administrative personnel, have been placed under arms at various sectors of the war front on shift basis so as to improve their combat preparedness and provide opportunities for all fighters to contribute into the war effort of this battle of honour," Mr Ramadan added. He explained that the front had always accommodated 40,000 fighters throughout the past 12 months on shift basis. Mr Ramadan, Revolution Command Council member and first deputy prime minister, was talking to the Iraqi News Agency (INA) marking a year of war operations for the Popular Army, against the Persian enemy. He said those fighters had played an active role on the battlefield and other areas of work and production which "make us more faithful and confident in the future and the potentiality of our people." The Popular Army has immensely benefited from the 12-month-old experience of war action and consequently will improve its capacity within soundly-safe scientific guidelines along with the principles of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, Mr Ramadan concluded. [Text] [JN021340 Baghdad INA in English 1320 GMT 2 Sep 81]

RAMADAN VISITS POPULAR ARMY Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council [RCC] member and commander of the popular army, visited the popular army training camp in Baghdad's al-Rasafah district today. During the visit, the popular army commander inspected the training exercises that are preparing the combatants to take part in Saddam's victorious al-Qadisiyah against the racist Persian enemy. The training develops their fighting capabilities and ensures their effective participation on the battlefield. During his meeting with the camp's commander, Taha Yasin Ramadan stressed the need for intensive efforts in training the combatants so they will be able to carry out their duties in the upcoming stage of our just battle against the regime of the imposter Khomeyni. They should also be prepared to serve with their comrades and brothers in the armed forces in preserving and reinforcing the victory and in achieving new victories in the second al-Qadisiyah of the Arabs, the al-Qadisiyah of Saddam. Taha Yasin Ramadan, RCC member and commander of the popular army, was accompanied by Comrade Samir Muhammad 'Abdal-Wahab, commander of the Baghdad district for the popular army, and a number of the officials of the popular army general command. [Text] [GF031344 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 3 Sep 81]

CSO: 4304/137

KNESSET MEMBERS DISCUSS POSITION OF MIDEASTERN JEWS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Jul 81 pp 15-23

[Pre-election interview with four Knesset members of Mideastern extraction, Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino (2nd on the party list), Rafi Adari (General Manager of "Shikun"), Shlomo Hilel (former Minister of Police) and Aharon Nahmi'as (Mayor of Tzefat), by DAVAR staff reporters Chana Zemer and Yoram Peri; date and place not specified: "The Alignment Is not Ashkenazi"]

[Text] On the eve of the Knesset elections and in the aftermath, the claim was often made that "the Labor Alignment is an Ashkenazi party." However, in this election as in the past, a significant proportion of Ashkenazi Jews voted for the Likud. It appears, however, that the ratio of Mideastern Jews supporting the Likud was double that of those supporting the Alignment. This disproportion stands out all the more in light of the fact that there were significantly more Mideastern Jews represented on the Alignment's list of Knesset candidates than on that of the Likud. The reasons for this phenomenon and other characteristics of the ethnic vote were the subject of an interview conducted by DAVAR staff reporters with four Knesset Members from the Alignment who are of Mideastern decent: Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino (2nd on the party list); Rafi Adari (General Manager of "Shikun"); Shlomo Hilel (former Minister of Police); and Aharon Nahmi'as (Mayor of Tzefat).

DAVAR: How do you explain the disproportion between the representation of Mideastern Jews within the Alignment and your support from within this sector? Perhaps it is true that this representation is not sufficiently "authentic." Perhaps you're not authentic...

Aharon Nahmi'as: I deny the labels that have been applied to the ethnic vote. I deny, too, the claim that the Alignment's list included ethnic representatives who are not accepted within their own communities. The issue is not one of setting someone up as an idol of the Mideastern population. And it's nonsense to think we have to line someone up against David Levi.

DAVAR: When the Likud was elected, it was not for Levi but for Begin that people voted.

Shlomo Hilel: True, so we must find an answer to Begin.

Nahmi'as: In the end, there are no set voting patterns attributable to the Mideastern Jews. We should examine the reasons why people voted as they did in this particular election. It is important to note that representatives of the Mideastern Jews from the Alignment were not intended to be contractors for that vote, just as Ashkenazi representatives did not act as contractors for the Ashkenazi vote. One must find the real reasons behind the vote.

DAVAR: Election studies show that since 1965 Mideastern Jews have voted in increasing numbers for the Likud. In 1969, for every two votes cast by the Mideastern population for the Alignment, one vote went to the Likud. In 1973, the ratio was 1:1, and in 1977, for each vote in favor of the Alignment two were cast for the Likud. This time, the gap may be even larger.

Rafi Adari: I don't accept the statistical analysis that has been performed here. We do not yet have the final results, so any analysis of the 1981 elections is premature. We must wait for the release of complete data in order to arrive at such conclusions. As for the question of whether we are representative or not--the labor movement gave better representation to the Mideastern Jews...

Shoshana Arbeli-Almozlino: Why do you say "gave"? They were voted in.

Adari: True, I prefer the word integrated. Shoshana was No 2 on the party list for the Knesset. I'm No 7 and Shahal is No 8. But the question is, were we allowed to make public appearances during the campaign?

DAVAR: Didn't you make public appearances?

Adari: Of course we traveled around the country making appearances, at assemblies and gatherings in private homes. But I mean appearances in behalf of the Alignment, in particular on television and radio. They made "shorts" about several of the people sitting here, but they were never shown. And when we toured the country the people asked: "Where have you been? Are they hiding you?"

Shoshana: My profile was shown once on television for 30 seconds.

Hilel: I wasn't interviewed either on television or on radio, and when they photographed the political leadership, you could see a big pipe and a big cigar, but all you could see of me was the top of my bald head.

Shoshana: When the Alignment put together the various election committees, there was a committee for neighborhoods and development towns. We decided that it was preferable to work together in the integrated framework of the party. But a separate committee was established and what happened? They neutralized it by not providing the apparatus and the means required.

Hilel: There is representation, but it is reminiscent of children in poor families who are shunted off into back rooms so as not to be seen when guests arrive. They're hidden under the table. They're an embarrassment. This was the reality of the election campaign.

Shoshana: It should, however, be clear that the Labor Party is not Ashkenazi. In the roll call preceding the last convention, Mideastern Jews accounted for 50

percent of the roll. Within the center of the party, they represent 38 percent, and they were elected by everyone.

Adari: When branch elections are held everything is fine. But the strength of the Mideastern Jews decreases at the level of the organizing committee. Only 7 of the 74 members of the chamber are Mideastern Jews.

Shoshana: Sixty percent of the secretaries of workers councils are Mideastern Jews, not only on new settlements but also in more established locations such as Bat-Yam, Hulon, Hertzeliya, Hedera, Tzefat, Tiberias and Netanya, The same is true for the mayors and local councils. We should not minimize the extent to which this leadership has grown. It therefore hurts to see that the Mideastern Jews have, in the main, given their votes precisely to an anti-workers party which will abuse them. The problem is not ethnic but class oriented. The further you descend into the lower economic brackets, the more Likud supporters you find, despite the fact that it is precisely for these groups that we, as a Zionist socialist party, are struggling. In this area our propaganda was seriously lacking.

DAVAR: Based on preliminary data, about one-third of the Mideastern Jews voted for the Alignment, but this third was neither seen nor heard. Is this because those who voted for the Alignment were embarrassed by their choice?

Hilel: No. The explanation has to do with style. Our public, both Mideastern and Ashkenazi, is not boisterous, brutal or crude, like the Likud supporters.

We must analyze what happened and why it happened, and from there seek answers to problems, the principal one being to promote a feeling of integration and belonging among Mideastern Jews. We don't always understand that this is a process which encompasses all facets of life. We dealt with each facet as it surfaced, and we thought that each solution would solve the whole problem. But a new problem would crop up immediately. First it was the problem of guaranteeing "bread and work" and we thought we solved that. Then the problem of housing came up. So we said we'd increase the area of each housing unit. But this was not sufficient. They wanted visibility within the party, too. So we promised them representation in the Knesset and we thought that this was the solution. But the process did not end there. Now there is a demand for integrity in the life of the country, the Histadrut and the party. The question of where we are in the party leadership is being raised. To this we did not respond.

DAVAR: But why did all this result in an ethnic vote for the Likud? Do they have better answers?

Hilel: Some were votes of protest against the Alignment. Some were taken in by the demagogic style of the Likud, as we have seen with other groups. And there are those who still see the Alignment as the source of all that was and is, because the Alignment brought them to Israel and took them in.

DAVAR: Are you saying that the Alignment is still seen as the "system" and the Likud as the opposition?

Hilel: Yes. The new immigrants related to the Alignment as home, and your expectations of your family are far greater than your expectations of strangers. Their attitude toward the Labor Party was stronger and less subject to change.

It was difficult for us to understand how people from Bet-Sh'an, Tiberias, Qiriyat Shemona, or workers in kibbutz-owned enterprises could vote for the Likud. But the reason is clear. Their expectations of the Alignment are completely different than those they have developed for Erlich and Mod'ai. We told them: The kibbutz members are your brothers. Erlich and Mod'ai are strangers. And a man feels more hurt when his brother doesn't treat him well.

Shoshana: In this regard, something terrible has happened. A while back, the settlement movement responded to a call to develop local enterprises and industry on the kibbutzim in order to create more jobs. Now they are being met with open displays of hatred. It is shocking to read the venomous manifestos posted in Qiriyat Shemona and other towns. This is the kind of agitation initiated by David Levi and successfully developed by the Likud on fertile ground. What is this fertile ground?

We cannot view the workers in such enterprises only at the level of the employer/employee relationship. The kibbutz movement should relate to them beyond this level. They should establish ties of a different nature throughout the year, not just on the eve of the elections. They should visit each other, celebrate events together and conduct joint study days.

Further, one must remember that salaried workers in the industrial enterprises of the settlements have no chance for advancement, because the management positions are reserved for kibbutz members. When I spoke with a project manager about this problem, he told me: I don't get involved in politics. And I say that it is up to the kibbutz movement to rethink its position on this issue, to change its policy or to turn the enterprises over to other hands.

Hilel: One evening I attended a meeting of a particular local enterprise. They had gathered all the workers, who lived in the development towns, into the kibbutz auditorium. When I entered the auditorium, one of the workers said to me: "This is the first time I've been in this building." I could have answered: "And have you been in Erlich's home?" But I knew that he had no such expectations from Erlich. On the other hand, we tell him: The kibbutz is your home. There are no differences between you, the worker, and the kibbutz member. Both of you are members of the same institution." We then feel the revenge of that which we ourselves have cultivated.

Adari: The economic situation was not at the heart of the debate during the election campaign. We allowed the Likud to go off in its own direction. The Likud tried to say that Begin represents the neighborhoods, the developing towns and the Mideastern Jews. They succeeded at this to no small degree--with our help. Over the last few months we came to see ourselves as the system. Some of us even had suits made to order. That's how what happened happened. We didn't try to understand that it was possible to convince part of the populace that shouted "Begin, Begin" to change their minds. We concentrated our efforts on supporters

of the Democratic Movement for Change. We could have made an effort to bring over to our camp those who had no ideological tie with the Likud, but rather with Begin. We didn't.

It is true that representatives of the Mideastern Jews appeared on the Knesset list. But was anything done beyond that? There was representation within the party leadership, with five ministers and one deputy minister...

Hilel: Seven people, because it was also announced that the deputy prime minister...

Nahmi'as: And two ministers from Mapam, which makes nine...

Adari: But did the Mideastern Jews have a voice in this cadre? When representatives of the Mideastern Jews ran in local elections they did very well. Nahmi'as received 62 percent in Tzefat and Jacques Amir did equally as well in Dimona. At home, Rafi Suisa received 48 percent of the vote, but what happened during the propaganda campaigns for the Knesset elections? These people were hidden. If the party had the sense to put them on the Knesset list, why weren't they given a forum. There was time for a broadcast about geese, but there was no time to let us present our economic plan. And later, at assemblies, they asked: Why don't we see you? It was a mistake not to provide a forum at which to present the representatives of the Mideastern Jews. And I don't accept the idea that only someone living in a large family in a one and one-half room apartment in a development town should represent the Mideastern Jews.

One other point: the Alignment, in directing its propaganda toward voters for the Democratic Movement for Change, did not have the wisdom to point out the government's oversights in terms that the whole population could understand.

Shoshana: I agree. The style was not popular. Sophisticated words are not always effective. And I agree with the claim that our propaganda was aimed at bringing supporters of the Democratic Movement for Change back to the Alignment, which it did. But there was no propaganda directed toward those social classes which are made up by Mideastern Jews, where social content has meaning. Twice I went to the public relations staff and said: I bring you a message from the field. You're heading in the wrong direction. I made several comments. Some they accepted, most they did not. They did not accept my claim that social issues, in those areas where our achievements were greatest, should be raised and contrasted with the lack of action on the part of the Likud. And they didn't answer me as to why they weren't giving exposure to Knesset members who dealt with those issues.

I would also like to respond to the question of whether we are "authentic" or not. There is no blow worse than to ask if we represent the Mideastern Jews. Are Knesset members from Poland asked if they represent Polish immigrants? We represent the population at large, not just ethnic groups, and the esteem we generate does not come from the Mideastern public alone.

DAVAR: Maybe your success in this area is the source of the problem. When you represent the whole, the Ashkenazi accepts you, too, causing others to reject you as their representative.

Shoshana: I don't accept that division. The Mideastern Jews accept us and vote for us, too. We don't need to analyze the election results. We should rather look for the source. The national counsciousness of the Mideastern Jews, for example, is well developed. Therefore, the Begin/Likud policy was close to their heart. As further proof, you may note that there are few Knesset members of Mideastern descent in Mapam, Sheli or the Communist Party, with all the differences among them. On the other hand, the Mideastern Jews did support Ben Gurion and Ahdut Ha'avoda, because they espoused an activist party line. Therefore, the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq, the downed helicopters in Lebanon, and Begin's warning to Assad to beware of Commander Y'anosh and Chief of Staff Raful were influential this time. His hard line position against the Arabs found favor in the eyes of a public which prefers strength to weakness.

Also, the Mideastern Jews as a people are traditional. They believe in religious values which cannot be changed. Therefore the anti-religious proclamations of some party members alienated us from this public. Our leadership must know that it can't form a government without the religious parties. And in general, the anti-religious stand is not that of the party. These were not decisions adopted at the convention. Many of our members are observant Jews, and the declarations of members who did not adhere to the party line did cause damage.

Nahmi'as: Shoshana and I were opposed to the party's decision to support the demands of reform and conservative Jewry. We felt that the reformed and conservative Jews vote abroad and that as a political party we must address our voters here. To them, tradition is important. Voters from the NRP switched to the Likud because of the skullcap on Begin's head and his use of the phrase "God willing."

Ben Gurion did not wear a skullcap. But he understood the importance of tradition. He frequently quoted the Prophets and the Bible. The expression "A guiding light for the goyim" was practically identified with him.

Shoshana: The Likud succeeded to imbue the Mideastern Jews with the idea that their difficult situation was the outcome of 29 years of Alignment rule, and that four years wasn't enough to change that situation. We weren't able to root out this feeling with our propaganda. Nor did we succeed at publicizing the enormous social gains accomplished from 1969-1977, during which time there was a dramatic reduction in the gaps between classes, and poverty was almost eliminated. On the other hand, during the Likud's rule, these gaps became broader and poverty increased. This is based on official data from the Social Security Administration.

DAVAR: Why has so much fuss been made over the use of derogatory expressions? After all, when we say things like "Polack" and "Kraut" in reference to Ashkenazi Jews it's far from earthshaking.

Nahmi'as: When I first heard the word "Chahchah" [derogatory slang for oriental Jews] I didn't know what it meant. I thought it was a word in a local Arab dialect, so I went and asked my mother, but she didn't know. Then I went to my "dictionary," my son who just finished the army half a year ago, and he explained it to me. There is some justification for wondering why it has taken on so much importance. But, it should be understood that the expression was brought to public consciousness by the prime minister's dramatization of it.
Making an issue of it at a national assembly, building an ideology around it,

therein lies the tale. The gravity of the issue comes from the fact that it became a tool in Begin's hand. He exploited it and is directly responsible for its interpretation.

One should remeber that the Mideastern Jews are very sensitive about the issue of pride, myself included. We should not make light of this. They are proud of being Jews and being Israelis. So their ego was strengthened by the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq and by the strong stand Begin took against the Arab nations. I'm sure the same was true for many people of European descent, the Holocaust survivors, regarding Begin's remarks to Schmidt.

Another factor which should be taken into account and which we have not yet mentioned is election bribery. The affluent were less influenced by this. They already had their color televisions. 'Aridor's election economics influenced precisely the weak sectors, i.e. the Mideastern Jews. In our propaganda, we did not have the good sense to talk about the closing of food programs in schools, the cutbacks in pensions to senior citizens, the tragedy wrought in 3 and one-half years upon those of limited means. We did not manage to draw out the Likud's vulnerable points. But they managed to capitalize on their strengths.

Now in the aftermath of the elections, we hear talk of the federal budget collapsing, and it is not the Labor Party who's talking about it but economists within the treasury department. Now, however, the ballots have already been counted.

Shoshana: Begin attacked me for not responding immediately to the statements made by Dudu Topaz when I was present at the general assembly. We only went up to the speaker's platform at 1900 and we hadn't even heard his remarks. The following day I went to Ofakim and still didn't know a thing about it. I was informed only after Begin exposed the issue at the Liduk's assembly. The fact that they had an entertainer at the Aligment's convention was a serious mistake. Had I heard his comments on "Chahchahim" I would have gone up to the stage, taken exception with his remarks, and asked him to leave the convention. But that is far from condoning the fact that the prime minister exploited such remarks for purposes of demagogic agitation. When I heard Begin, I was shaken. I would hope that this will not leave scars, that the public will analyze what was said and in what context, and that they will not feel that this was an insult to them.

Hilel: A word, like a blow, does not hurt in direct relation to its strength, but according to the sensitivity of the area that's wounded. If the nerves are not exposed, it's not so bad. But someone who strikes out without being aware of the sensitivity level of the target area is like a bull in a china closet. And I'm speaking of the various remarks that were made during the election campaign. Sensititivity demands that any intelligent man weigh his statements.

DAVAR: Do you consider three seats for TAMI to be a gain?

Nahmi'as: If there was an ethnic vote in this election, it should have gone to TAMI. The fact that TAMI captured only three seats indicates that the ethnic movement was not successful.

Adari: TAMI really failed.

Hilel: It's not a failure and not a success. TAMI worked on the periphery of the NRP, and succeeded within this periphery.

Nahmi'as: On the other hand, the labor movement deserves brownie points for its ability to castigate itself. To have grown from 32 to 47 seats is truly a victory.

DAVAR: The election results can be interpreted as a failure. Not only did the Alignment fail to form a government, it also failed to take voters from the Likud. The Alignment only managed to draw votes from those parties with whom it could have potentially formed a coalition.

Hilel: Our failure lies in the fact that we allowed false criticism to harm us relatively easily. If I had thought that the criticism was true, I would have said so: So be it. What happened, however, was that we were like plaster. Whatever you throw on it sticks. We are not an ethnically homogenous party, but due to a lack of sensitivity, due to derogatory remarks, because the party leadership appeared unresponsive, we allowed unjust claims to stick.

There is a very deep feeling of alienation from labor administration, the majority of which is "free" of Mideastern Jews. The worker's associations must be opened to Mideastern Jews. This is one area that David Levi can use to make stabs at the movement, because the feeling of the worker is not one of a man whose enterprise belongs to him.

But, most of the insinuations against us were unfounded. Such is the case, for example, in the political sphere. I'm convinced that the Labor Party's platform is accepted by the majority of the people, including the Mideastern Jews. It is not true that as a party we want to sell out the nation. But the way in which we presented our platform was conducive to having false ideas attributed to us.

DAVAR: Isn't there a need to establish understanding among the ethnic groups themselves? I've also heard that Labor is an "Iraqi party."

Adari: The Iraqis and Yemenites have had greater representation because they immigrated earlier to Israel. It is only natural for them to have secured leadership positions more rapidly.

DAVAR: It's like the imbalance experienced by the Russians with regard to the Ashkenazis. Because they settled earlier they secured the best positions.

Adari: Today's party is for everyone. It is true that the party did not have the sense to give representation to Mideastern Jews insofar as organizational-economic posts. I was the first member on the executive board of the worker's assoication, and for the sake of comparison, one should note that it has only been in the last few years that Mideastern Jews have been represented on the managerial board at Kur, Solel-Bone, Bank Hapo'alim, etc.

I remember the first election convention I attended. It was in Hatzor in 1959, 2 years after I immigrated to Israel. There was no electricity yet, no roads, and Begin appeared at the convention and talked about funds which Israel was receiving from abroad. As at other conventions, he turned and directed questions to people in the audience. "Did you receive $10,000 from America? And you, did you receive

your money yet?" And later he continued, "Dear public, my brothers and sisters," (of course everyone is his brother), "today there is no electricity. Tomorrow, when Herut is in the government, there will be great light in Hatzor."

Shoshana: It is interesting that I heard him say the same things at the time in Ramat-Gan...

Adari: In this year's elections, Begin continued to delude, brainwash and throw sand in the eyes of the people. He said, for example, that during the 4 years of Likud government 190,000 apartments were built. The truth is that in terms of public housing, 40,250 units were built and about the same number of private housing units. How did he arrive at the 190,000 figure?

Further, during the Likud's rule the price of apartments rose by 2,000 to 3,000 percent, compared with the overall inflation rate of "only" 1,198 percent. There are 38,500 young couples with certificates of eligibility still waiting for apartments. Those are the facts. Unfortunately we hired too many advisors on our election staff and not enough people to visit neighborhoods and development towns, people knowledgeable about the realities of the situation.

Shoshana: The Mideastern Jews have no commitment to the Likud. Half a year ago they wanted to change the government. Their vote was influenced by 'Aridor's tricks, by the bombing of the reactor and by other factors which have already been mentioned. As far as the future, the crucial question is whether we will do enough to promote integration. There has been economic progress. But, we have not gone far enough in the area of education. And another area where we lag is representation at the highest level. In the years to come, we must reexamine the means for advancing in these two areas. And if we do this, we will repatriate the Mideastern Jews to their natural home--the Alignment.

Finally, we come to the problem of political education. Those who came from Europe, from places where there were political parties, have developed political consciousness. They had received a political education. Such was not the case in Asia or Africa, where there was no democracy, no awareness of professional struggle. These immigrants are not immunized against the Likud's socialist demagoguery. For years this worked in our favor, but later it turned against us. When we neglected to teach values, when we stopped cultivating the cadres, it was the beginning of our troubles. Who sits in the government? Former members of youth movements and underground movements who were politically educated. A new generation of leaders has not been educated to replace them.

Adari: When we immigrated to Israel we sang, "We came to Israel to develop and to be developed." We came from 70 nations in the Diaspora to be one nation. This last election campaign turned the clocks years backward and I lay all the blame on the Likud.

Nahmi'as: When we went to the polls we each voted as individuals. Now we need to pray together for national solidarity, to heal the wounds left by the election campaign. We must accept the outcome of the democratic process as expressed at the polls, and we must preserve our unity, which is more important than anything else. The Alignment must forge a new apparatus for the future, because in the end, its ideology is the best for the Jewish people.

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VOTING PATTERN OF YOUTH DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by Professor Shevah Weis: "The Voting Populace, 1981; the Vote of the Younger Generation"]

[Text] In 1977, according to all available indications, the young voters preferred the Likud, the Democratic Movement for Change and the small radical movements to the Alignment. One indicator was the IDF vote: 44 percent of the voters in the IDF supported the Likud, around 26 percent supported the Democratic Movement for Change, and only about 22 percent supported the Alignment. In tens of secondary schools which conducted "mock elections," the Likud and the Democratic Movement for Change won impressive victories.

During the last few weeks there have been numerous indicators of a certain change in this trend. In most schools where mock elections were held, the gap between the Likud and the Alignment was significantly reduced. Similarly, Tehiya has found a significant position within the younger generation. Tehiya gained more support within this sector than the radical parties. The younger generation is now indicating a national-nationalistic wave, and as previously mentioned, the Alignment is more popular now than in 1977.

These trends within the younger generation significantly influenced the outcome of the elections. The Israeli electorate is especially young, with 29.5 percent between the ages of20 and 29 (!), and another 20.5 percent within the 30-39 year old bracket. If we add the 18-20 year olds, we would find that around 55 percent of the voters are young or very young. There was every likelihood that the improved status of the Alignment within the younger generation would show up in the results of the 30 June elections. We do not yet have a clear and unequivocal breakdown of the younger generation's vote. But there are nonetheless definitive signs indicating greater support for the Likud and Tehiya than for the Alignment.

In the past, it was possible to use information disseminated illegally about the IDF vote. This time, it was only possible to obtain such information indirectly. Without explaining the technique, I can determine that IDF soldiers again demonstrated a Zionist, national and nationalistic trend.

We have at our disposal the results of surveys conducted among many students at Haifa University, the Technion and Tel Aviv University's School of Law. These

surveys were conducted on the eve of the elections and indicate the following predilections:

- About half of the students intended to support the Likud or Tehiya
- A portion of the students had decided to switch their support from the NRP to the Likud
- A portion of the students who had in the past supported the Democratic Movement for Change decided to support the Alignment this time, but some were leaning toward the Likud

In addition, we have at our disposal the findings from simulated games conducted in 35 secondary schools throughout the country. More than half of the students supported the Likud, around 15 percent supported Tehiya, and only around 35 percent voted for other parties. If within the adult population the Alignment absorbed almost all of those voters who had previously voted for the Democratic Movement for Change, within the younger population the breakdown was quite different.

For both the adult and youthful voters, the breakdown between the Alignment and the Likud was according to these general lines:

- Among Jewish voters, support for the Likud rose above that for the Alignment;
- Among Mideastern Jews there was an absolute majority for the Likud;
- Among the young voters, support for the Likud and Tehiya was greater than that for the Alignment;
- Among senior citizens support for the Alignment surpassed that for the Likud;
- Among middle and upper class voters support for the Alignment rose decisively over that for the Likud;
- Among educated voters, support for the Alignment surpassed that for the Likud;
- Among all lines of the kibbutz movement support for the Alignment was absolute, reaching almost 90 percent;
- On the older, more established cooperatives support for the Alignment was very high;
- On new cooperative settlements, established after statehood by immigrants from Islamic countries, support for the Likud was high, occasionally above that for the Alignment;
- Among the minorities, support was divided between the Democratic Movement for Change and the Alignment, with a strong proclivity toward the Alignment.

A continuation of these trends will mean the demise of the labor movement, because the future hinges demographically on the youth and ethnic vote.

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CENTRAL BANK PUBLISHES ANNUAL REPORT

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 22 Jul 81 p 5

[Article: "In the Annual Report for the Jordanian Central Bank: Strengthening Confidence in the National Economy; Higher Production Rates; Bigger Surplus in the Balance of Payments; Increased Size of Foreign Trade"]

[Text] The Jordanian Central Bank issued the annual report for 1980. The report gave the economic situation through 1980, which was distinguished by increased activity in the growth planning field, by virtue of the fact it was the last year of the 5-year development plan, 1976-80. This activity was evident in the work of committees and forums, whose meetings were intensified during the year. They participated in evaluating the current plan's accomplishments, and in establishing the philosophies and goals of the next growth cycle (1981-85).

As regards the Jordanian economy's level of performance, during the year under study, it could be said that it was the continuation of the high production rates, for which the Jordanian economy has strived during its long development journey, and which is represented by the high growth rate in both the local and national production, the increase in the distribution of the production base, the expansion in financing by the banking system, the increase in governmental revenues from local sources, and the achievement of a surplus in the balance of payments.

Available information indicates that the averages of economic performance, achieved during the past 5 years, were comparable to the averages which the 5-year developmental plan (1976-80) were targeted against, since the annual growth rate in total local production, based on 1975 prices, amounted to about 10.5 percent, compared to a growth rate estimated by the plan at 11.9 percent. On the other hand, growth rates achieved in the gross national product, during the plan's period, amounted to approximately 13.4 percent, compared with the estimated rate of 11.5 percent, which the plan had targeted. This growth was reflected in all economic sectors in Jordan, which led to an increase in the individual's median income, in commercial prices, from 185 dinars in 1975, to 482 dinars in 1980.

Mention must be made here that the credit for higher levels of performance, which were achieved by the Jordanian economy, aside from efforts expended by the public and private sectors, should go to the factors of stability that Jordan bestowed in terms of confidence in the Jordanian economy, domestically and abroad, to the national work force, the security of the international reserves situation, which the kingdom owns, and which reflects the foreign financial influx, in terms of remittances from Jordanians working abroad and assistance from sister Arab nations.

From the study of available statistics, regarding the various trends for changes in the economy in 1980, it is possible to delineate the growth dimensions which were achieved, during the year, as follows:

1. Total domestic production, at the cost rate, registered a growth percentage of 21.7 percent. This was thereby increased to 762.4 million dinars by the end of the year. All economic sectors achieved this growth percentage, since growth rates fluctuated between 12.3 and 45.5 percent in the commodities production sectors, and between 4.7 and 5.0 percent in the services sectors. In view of the rapid rise of growth rates in the commodity production sectors, during the past 5 years, their participation in total local production rose from 34.1 percent in 1975 to 37.3 percent in 1980, whereas the service sectors' share declined from 65.9 percent to 62.7 percent, during the two comparable consecutive years.

On the sector level, the agricultural sector achieved a tangible improvement, since the income generated from it grew 34.2 percent, compared to a decline of 25.6 percent in 1979. This improvement in the agricultural sector was attributable to favorable climatic conditions, the introduction of modern methods of agriculture, and the provision of agricultural requirements. These factors produce a large increase in the production of some field crops, a slight increase in the production of vegetables, and an increase of 79.9 percent in the production of fruit and fruit-bearing trees.

In the field of industry and mining, which grew 39.9 percent, growth was concentrated in the processing industries, where income produced rose 45.5 percent, amounting to 108.4 million dinars, or 76 percent of the total income gained from the industrial and mining sector, which totaled 142.7 million dinars. Income generated from the extraction industries increased 24.7 percent.

Moreover, construction activity came alive, as evidenced by the great number of permits for many purposes in the major cities. That was aided by the continuation of efforts expended by the private sector, and the housing authority, to provide building for housing and other purposes, apart from the expansion in loans and easements, which the Housing Bank offered.

The growth achieved in the various economic sectors, in addition to the 24.8 percent increase in indirect taxes, and net income from investments abroad of 21.7 percent, led to a growth in the gross national product, at the market rate, of 22 percent, or 1073.8 million dinars in 1980, compared to 880.3 million dinars in 1979.

2. On the inflation-fighting level, a tangible, positive development was achieved, since the rate of increase, in a measureable number for costs of living, declined from 14.2 percent, during 1979, to 11.1 percent in 1980. That was attributable, in the first place, to the decline in increase rates in certain categories, which enter into making up the measureable figure. This decline in the inflation rate was achieved despite a slight increase in the costs of foodstuffs, and large increases in the costs of other commodity and service categories.

3. The Central Bank, during the year under review, assumed the performance of its main duties, represented by maintaining monetary stability and regulating the

amount, diversity and direction of credit, in addition to guiding and regulating the increase in the money supply. Therefore, the bank followed a monetary policy that can be described as flexible. At a time in which it called upon the commercial banks to not overstep the permissible direct credit percentage of 67.5 percent of their deposits, it also permitted them to increase this percentage to finance developmental projects, and encouraged them to make long-term loans, without expanding the current easements.

To encourage the banks to follow this policy, the bank took some steps, which would encourage them to attract deposits and absorb the liquidity in the hands of the people. It decided, on the one hand, to reduce the cash reserve percentage from 16 to 14 percent on deposits under demand, and from 13 to 11 percent on time savings deposits. It also authorized, on the other hand, a revision of the interest rate structure to encourage national savings. It raised the minimum interest rate on savings deposits to 5.5 percent, and on time deposits to 6.25 percent, on deposits subject to 1 month or more notification, and to 6.5 percent on deposits subject to 6 months notification or longer.

4. The activity of the Jordanian banking system in 1980, was reflected in the growth of domestic liquidity (cash supply plus quasi-money) of 26.7 percent. This rate, despite its increase, reflects a slight retardation, compared with the growth rate achieved during the previous year, which amounted to 27.9 percent. Moreover, it was the lowest rate of growth achieved since 1976. The retardation affected both the cash supply and the rate of quasi-money growth equally, since the former declined from 25.7 percent in 1979 to 24.7 percent in 1980, and the latter declined from 31.5 percent to 30.1 percent, during the 2 consecutive comparable years.

The increase in domestic liquidity, during the year under study, is attributable, in the first instance, to the net foreign capital, which rose 110.06 million dinars, to credit easements, offered to the private sector, which rose 96.65 million dinars, and lastly to the net governmental borrowing from the local market, which rose 12.13 million dinars.

5. Economic development, during 1980, was reflected in the Jordanian banking system's activities, since assets and liabilities of the Central Bank rose 26.7 percent, compared to 23.9 percent during the previous year, amounting to, by the end of the year, 578.54 million dinars, of which 429.48 million dinars represents reserves of gold and foreign currencies. Moreover, commercial banks' assets and liabilities registered a growth percentile of 28.7 percent, amounting, by the end of the year, to 916.69 million dinars.

The increase in commercial banks' assets was concentrated in liquid assets, especially foreign assets, which more than doubled, as a result of the rise in world interest rates. One of the results that stemmed from that was the rise in percentage of liquid assets to the banks' deposits, from 50.7 percent in 1979, to 54.5 percent in 1980.

Specialized lending institutions continued to broaden their activities, since their assets and liabilities, during the year under study, rose by 30 percent, compared to 27.1 percent, during 1979. By the end of the year, this amounted to 247.42 million dinars. The increase in their assets was concentrated loans granted

to the private sector, which rose by 27 percent, or a non-liquid balance by the end of the year of 129 million dinars. As for liabilities, the increase was concentrated in deposits, all belonging to the Housing Bank, since during the year, they rose by 42.2 percent, amounting to 122.58 million dinars, by the end of the year.

6. The size of foreign trade (exports plus imports) increased during 1980, reaching 887.45 million dinars, or a 24.7 percent growth, compared to 29.2 percent in 1979. The individual's share of foreign trade rose from 329 dinars in 1979 to 400 dinars in 1980.

Despite the slowdown in the rate of increase of volume of total foreign trade, the growth rate of national exports rose from 28.7 percent in 1979, to 45.5 percent in 1980, while the growth rate of imports fell 28.7 percent and 21.4 percent, during the 2 consecutive comparable years. Most of Jordan's exports were concentrated in agricultural products and raw phosphates, and certain manufactured commodities. Manufactured commodities (capital plus raw material) were the major part of imports, forming approximately 66 percent of total imports, while consumer commodities were about 34 percent of total imports.

8. [sic] On the public financial level, domestic revenues, during 1980, achieved a noticeable increase of 19.5 percent. Tax revenues grew by 14.6 percent, and non-tax revenues by 39.5 percent. As regards foreign revenues during 1980, it maintained the same approximate level as the preceding year, except for a slight increase of 1.4 percent.

Public expenditures, during 1980, maintained the same approximate level as the previous year. Its total increase was no more than .4 percent, and in general, current expenditures for 1980 increased by 1.4 percent over the preceding year. At the same time, capital expenditures fell 1.3 percent compared to the previous year.

In light of developments occurring in the public budget items, for the year 1980, the budget deficit declined from 79.8 million dinars in 1979, to 41.67 million dinars in 1980. Part of the budget deficit was covered by issues of the domestic public debt, which amounted to 18 million dinars. Moreover, the remainder was covered by the usual loan from the Central Bank.

Jordan also continued to follow its policy, aimed at strengthening economic cooperation with the Arab countries, within the framework of the Arab League and its existing organizations on the one hand, and bolstering its bilateral relations on the other. The importance of cooperation was expressed by the 11th Summit Conference held in Amman, and the extremely important economic and financial results achieved, represented by considering the decade of the 80's the decade of joint Arab economic effort on behalf of giving impetus to the wheel of development in the Arab countries, commensurate with the desired growth rates.

Gross National Product

First statistics available indicate that total local production, in cost price, rose from 626.6 million dinars in 1979, to 672.4 million dinars in 1980, an

increase of 21.7 percent. That is attributable to the increase of income generated by all the economic sectors, without exception. The production sectors achieved higher growth rates, represented by the rise of production value of the agricultural sector from 43.6 million dinars in 1979, to 58.5 million dinars in 1980, an increase of 34.2 percent. Moreover the additional value of the processing industry sector increased by 45.5 percent, and the strategic industry sector grew by 24.7 percent. Income derived from installations also increased 25 percent, and from the electricity and water sector by 12.3 percent. Moreover, the services sectors achieved differing growth rates, amounting to 38.4 percent and 50 percent, in the two sectors of non-profit institutions and domestic services respectively. The remainder of the services sectors varied between 4.7 and 20.7 percent.

As regards the relative importance of the economic sectors' share in total domestic production, the biggest was in the producers of governmental services sector, whose share was some 20.4 percent, followed by the industrial sector of extraction and processing industries, 18.7 percent, retail and wholesale trade, 17.4 percent, and in general, the total share of the material production sectors grew by 37.3 percent, compared to 62.7 percent for the services sectors.

Total local production, in market prices, amounted to 869.0 million dinars in 1980, an increase of 22 percent. The national product, in commercial prices, also increased, amounting to 1073.8 million dinars, or some 22 percent. That is attributable to achieving tangible growth in the various sectors, due to developmental projects, cooperation between the public and private sectors, and additionally, to the increase in indirect taxes by 24.8 percent, and a 21.7 percent increase in net income from investments abroad.

Monetary and Credit Developments

Summary of Monetary Developments

Monetary policy actions, during the past 5 years, have been marked by flexibility, aimed at safeguarding monetary stability and fighting inflation. These actions have been reflected on the total domestic liquidity, whose growth rate declined to 30.5 percent in 1976, to 27.9 percent in 1979, and 26.8 percent in 1980.

This slight slowdown in liquidity growth, during 1980, was reflected in both the money supply, in the narrowest sense, and in quasi-money, on an equal level. Although the largest part of the absolute increase occurred in the money supply, the relative increase for both of them was less than that achieved during 1979. The money supply, during 1980, registered a growth rate of 24.7 percent, compared to 25.7 percent during the previous year, while quasi-money registered a growth rate of 30.1 percent, compared to 31.5 percent, during the two consecutive comparable years. It is worthy of note also that the demand for money in circulation by the masses continued to rise, and during the year under study, recorded a growth rate of 27.7 percent, compared to 25.5 percent for the previous year, while the growth rate for deposits on demand declined from 25.9 percent in 1979, to 20.4 percent during 1980.

One of the most important factors, leading to the increase of liquidity, during 1980, was the net foreign balance, which had a 53.7 percent share of the total

increase. That was due to the increased influx of foreign currencies from abroad, especially the assistance granted by the sister Arab states, and the remittances from Jordanians working abroad. Credit easements granted to the private sector occupied second place, in terms of sharing in this increase, since by the end of the year, those easements totalled about 542 million dinars, i.e., an increase of 96.65 million dinars, or a share of 42.7 percent of the total increase. One should note that these easements occupied first place, in terms of sharing in the liquidity increase, during 1979, since its increase that year was 131.24 million dinars.

The third factor, sharing in the increase of domestic liquidity, was government borrowing from the local market, whose expansion during 1980, led to a rise in the net domestic public debt (i.e., loans granted to the government, and governmental paper and bonds, from which governmental deposits are subtracted). This increase was 12.13 million dinars, compared with the decrease of 16.32 million dinars during 1979. As for capital, reserves, and the net of other factors, they contributed to the lessening of the increase in liquidity, during the year, as a result of their rise in value of 8.85 and 14.30 million dinars respectively.

Monetary Policy

Despite this modest slowdown in the growth rates of monetary indicators, during 1980, these rates are still higher, when compared to the growth rates of the national product. Therefore, monetary policy has been continued in the direction of safeguarding monetary stability and fighting inflation, without stalling the work of economic development.

The Central Bank continued to encourage national savings, by altering the structure of interest rates on deposits, by raising them on long-term deposits. The minimum interest rate on savings deposits was raised to 5.5 percent, and on time deposits, those subject to 1 month or more notice became 6.25 percent, and deposits subject to 6 months or more notice became 6.5 percent. This rise has led to a comparable rise in the structure of lending rates, except that the percentage of interest return is still relatively close to true value, when inflation rates are taken into consideration.

On the other hand, during the month of November, 1980, the Central Bank authorized reducing the percentage of cash reserves from 16 to 14 percent for deposits on demand, and from 13 to 11 percent for savings and time deposits. This reduction was aimed at increasing the banks' liquidity to meet the demand for credit, and to enable the banking system to maintain a modest reduction in the cost of money, which helps them to keep lending rates within suitable limits.

In addition to that, the Central Bank has encouraged authorized banks to attract time deposits, by issuing certificates of deposit. The percentage of cash reserve required for this type of deposit was reduced to 8 percent, provided that the certificates of deposit are issued in differing denominations, that they are marketed through specialized financial firms and investment banks, that their term be for 6 months or longer, and that they not be redeemable before the date of maturity.

Regarding regulating the amount and diversity of credit, the Central Bank continued to apply the maximum percentage of credit to deposits, which is 67.5 percent. If that was exceeded, an additional, obligatory reserve amount can be imposed on any bank that exceeds this percentage, equivalent to the amount that exceeds the stipulated percentage. The additional, obligatory reserve is treated in the same way as the cash reserve, in terms of monetary penalty.

Banking System Activities

As a result of the economic development, which Jordan has achieved over the past years generally, and particularly the development in the structure of financial and banking systems and financial tools, banking system activities, during 1980, continued their steady growth, since its assets and liabilities recorded a growth rate of 30.8 percent, compared to 27.5 percent in 1979. The assets of the Jordanian banking system, by the end of 1980, amounted to 1387.49 million dinars.

Foreign assets form the largest part of the total banking system assets, since during the year under study, their growth rate was 38.1 percent, compared to 24.9 percent the previous year. Their relative importance, therefore, rose from 42.5 to 44.9 percent. It is worth mentioning that this increase, which was mainly reflected in Central Bank assets, was clearly evident in the assets of commercial banks as well, as a result of increase foreign commitments for those banks on the one hand, and of the application of more measures, freeing the income and outgo of foreign currencies, on the other. This led to a large increase in the commercial banks' foreign assets, and reflected, especially, in those banks' balances abroad.

The second factor, reflected in the banking system's activities during the year, is credit granted to the private sector and to public organizations, which rose by 105.74 million dinars, or a percentage of 21.6 percent. It is worth noting that the relative importance of domestic credit declined from 46.1 percent in 1979, to 42.9 percent in 1980. That is attributable, in the first place, to the slowdown in the rate of credit growth, since it declined from 37.5 percent in 1979, to 21.6 percent in 1980, on the one hand, and to the tendency of some commercial banks to increase the investment of their funds abroad, on the other.

Furthermore, credit advanced to the government grew by 41.1 percent over its level at the end of 1979, compared to a growth rate of 4.6 percent the previous year. It is worthy of note that this large increase in the amount of government credit was achieved at a time when the budget deficit was reduced by nearly half, since the total deficit was reduced from 79.85 million dinars in 1979, to 41.68 million dinars in 1980.

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SOURCES OF BANK FUNDS CITED, USE CRITICIZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 231, 25 Jun 81 p 44

[Article: "Source Of Bank Funds and Their Use In Jordan"]

[Text] At the end of 1980 the commercial banks as a whole controlled about 795 million dinars in assets, of which 82.8 percent came from depositors and 10.8 percent came from sureties, various appropriations and other obligations. The remaining 6.4 percent came from stockholders, or, in the case of non-Jordanian banks, from the home office, in the form of capital, voluntary general reserves and rotating or undistributed dividends.

This huge supply of money was used as follows: 32.6 percent as cash in the till and cash held by the Central Bank and the foreign banks, excluding funds deposited by the licensed banks among each other; 8.4 percent as financial paper, most of it government bonds and securities, and some corporate stocks; the remaining 3.5 percent [as published] as fixed assets and other debit funds.

These figures clearly illustrate the basis of the strength of the commercial banks in comparison with other companies. Their directors exercise control over assets amounting to approximately 16 times the stockholders' money, which is possible only in the case of banks.

But this fact has caused banks to be subject to strict laws which regulate the way they conduct business and set limits as to how far they can go. In other words, they are not dealing with their own money but with public funds.

In 1980 alone, 189.4 million dinars--excluding the amounts deposited by licensed banks in other licensed banks--flowed into the banks. Of these new funds 84.6 percent came from depositors, 7.2 percent came from sureties and appropriations, 3.8 percent came from reducing the banks' portfolios of government bonds and securities, and 4.4 percent came from increased stockholder fees.

With regard to the way these funds are used bank management used 61.6 percent to keep liquidity strong, and maintained a large amount of funds in the Central Bank and in foreign banks--particularly foreign banks. They loaned 35.3 percent in the form of bills of exchange, ongoing debts and loans. The remainder, 3.1 percent, went into fixed assets and other obligations.

A noteworthy phenomenon is the banks' increasing trend to invest a large portion of their resources abroad in foreign currencies, even if that should lead to their divestiture of Jordanian government bonds and securities. This is a negative and unfortunate trend because it is incumbent upon the banks to allocate a larger portion of their assets toward financing the government's development efforts. It is not permissible for them to invest excessively abroad in their desire for high interest and avoiding income tax, by exploiting the flexible rules governing them in this area.

9123
CSO: 4304/109

ECONOMY SPURRED BY REGIONAL FACTORS, INFLUX OF MONEY, INVESTMENT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 4 Jul 81 pp 51-52

[Article: "Jordan's Economic Take-Off Continues Despite Changes in Some Regional Factors; Additional Arab Companies and Money in the Jordanian Economy"]

[Text] The take-off that has been in progress for the past few years in the structure of the Jordanian economy and its various sectors is continuing. This is substantiated by a number of indications, three of which are interrelated, as follows:

The first is the continued influx of Arab money to take part in the establishment of new Jordanian investment corporations. Three such corporations are currently being established. These are:

--The Jordanian Rock Wool Industries Company, established with a capital of around 1.5 million Jordanian dinars for the purpose of operating in the sector of the trade, processing, and marketing of raw materials and products related to rock wool, a soundproofing and insulating material. The company is to begin operations with the establishment of an automated plant with an annual capacity of 5,000 tons. This plant will be capable of being converted automatically to the production of any type or form of rock wool.

The shareholders in this company consist of 22 parties who have subscribed to 50 percent of the company's 750,000 shares. The nominal value of each share is 1 Jordanian dinar. The Austrian company (Jisiba), which specializes in the new firm's product line, will provide the special technical prerequisites for the construction and operation of the plant. The Austrian company has subscribed to 150,000 shares in the firm (10 percent of the total capital) and the remaining shares (40 percent) have been subscribed to by 18 Jordanian engineers and businessmen, an insurance company, an engineering firm, and the pension fund of the engineers' union. The rest of the shares (50 percent) were offered for public subscription starting 28 June and will continue to be offered until 27 July. The results indicate that a number of Arabs have bought shares in the company on the existing terms, which state that each share has a face value of 1 dinar, of which the subscriber pays 25 percent.

--The Jordanian Finance Company for Development and Investment, established with a capital of 6 million Jordanian dinars ($18 million). A broad group of Jordanian individuals, companies, and institutions, along with a large group of Arab businessmen,

have subscribed to 75 percent of the shares of the company, which are considered founding shares. The remaining shares (25 percent) have been left for public subscription by Jordanian and Arab individuals and companies on terms to be set on announcement of the subscription, which will take place no later than July or August of this year.

--Islamic Investment House, Inc., established with a capital of 4 million Jordanian dinars ($12 million). A large number of institutions and economic agencies from Jordan, Kuwait, and other Arab countries joined in founding this institution as a specialized investment company operating according to the Islamic system based on profit sharing.

The Arab and Jordanian founders of the company subscribed to 60 percent of the shares, leaving the remaining shares to be offered for public subscription, which will take place according to the announced terms during July.

The second indication is the fact that a number of Jordanian and jointly owned contracting, construction and engineering companies have embarked on the development of modern multiunit housing projects to be offered through direct marketing to the public during the planning of the projects and before and during their actual construction.

While these projects meet some of Jordan's needs in eliminating what remains of the housing crisis and the problem of rising rents, the construction and development of projects of this nature reflect the progress that is being made in the housing construction sector and the methods employed to develop and market housing projects. Second, this phenomenon reflects the availability of income among Jordanian citizens, who are rushing to purchase coupons for housing units in these projects. Moreover, the availability of income is in itself an indication of the level of activity and growth in economic sectors and in the incomes of Jordanians.

Jordanian newspapers--and Gulf newspapers in general--have been filled in recent weeks with advertisements for such projects, inviting Jordanians working in the Gulf to reserve the housing units they desire; the latest major project of this type is "Internationality Suburbs," which has been constructed in Khalda through the enterprise of the International Contracting and Investments Company. This Jordanian corporation offered coupons for housing units in the 2,270-unit project, which includes detached villas, attached villas and apartments on different levels. The project is located on grounds interspersed with walkways, playgrounds, commercial markets, sports clubs, a kindergarten, public and private parking lots and a public library, with all buildings equipped with insulation systems.

The third indication of the continuing take-off in the Jordanian economy is the projects that are presently under study and formulation to stimulate investments in certain sectors, shift the momentum of investments from one region to another and develop the Jordanian capital of 'Amman.

The following measures can be included under this heading:

A. A study of the Ministry of Trade and Industry pertaining to proposed amendments to the law for the promotion of investment. The amendments include larger exemptions

for industrial and mining projects, tourist projects, land and marine transport projects and the education and instruction sector. The amendments also include broader exemptions for projects constructed outside the borders of the 'Amman region, the other governorates and the development areas.

B. A study by the National Planning Council pertaining to a project prepared by the 'Amman Regional Council calling for the relocation of all craft industries from the capital to the outlying suburbs, the designation of specified areas for mechanical industries and the distribution of these industries to facilitate the utilization of their services. Each industry would be provided with the services it required, including water, electricity, roads and industrial safety (first aid and firefighting), along with architectural planning of the workshops.

The aim of distributing vehicle repair shops and all their offshoots is to facilitate the use of their services in all areas (at a total cost of some $27 million for the project) rather than have them crowded into one area that is impossible to regulate. However, the primary purpose of the project aimed at changing the exemptions in the investment law to encourage investment in areas outside the capital--as well as the project to relocate nonmechanized industries outside the 'Amman region--is to prepare the Jordanian capital for eventual transformation into a modern city capable of providing major services rather than a city cramped by small, marginal institutions that are incapable of expanding because of high land prices in the city or because of a basic incompatibility with the development needs of a flourishing capital. At the same time, this will give the capital sufficient room for all the modern activities demanded by a state that is experiencing economic growth. Moreover, the other regions outside the capital will benefit from the return of some of the individuals who had migrated to the capital, and thus economic, commercial and building activity in the other governorates will pick up substantially and will counterbalance the activity of the capital in other fields.

C. These two projects are interrelated with a third project calling for the rejuvenation of the capital in several stages. The first stage would start with changes in the telephone, telex, electric power and water systems. The final stage would end with the establishment of a 1.8-hectare landscaped square along Al-Hashimi Street accompanied by the construction of new commercial centers, cafés and enclosed markets along some streets. Prior to these improvements, the project calls for the construction of a new building for the municipality itself, an antiquities center, a museum, parking lots, and malls for pedestrians along with the widening of paved streets, the modernization of the old markets, the development of communications services and so on. The total cost of the project including all stages will be over $30 million, which will be provided by the municipality itself, a number of public departments and merchants and storeowners in the areas that will benefit from the development.

At this time, operations pertaining to the construction and implementation of new projects in the public and private sector are continuing.

Thus, for example, an agreement has been signed for the implementation of the first part of stage one of the industrial city project in Sahhab at a cost of 8.5 million dinars ($25.5 million). According to this agreement, an international

organization will develop a 750-dunum area and furnish it with basic services and facilities (water, electricity, communications, sewers, roads, administrative installations, a vocational training center, a health clinic, an exhibition hall and buildings for 30 plants, including warehouses).

Another example is the signing of an agreement calling for the implementation of the civil, electric and mechanical facilities for a plant for the Jordanian Glass Industries Company along with facilities for a plant to process raw materials for plate glass production. The value of this contract is 5.6 million dinars ($16.8 million). The operation will be completed during the first half of 1983 so that the plant can begin production with an annual capacity of 27,000 tons of regular and colored plate glass. Part of the output will be sold within Jordan and the remainder will be exported abroad. The company that owns the plant is a mixed company with a capital of 2.5 million dinars ($7.5 million), 31 percent of which has been put up by government organizations. The project will cost 12.5 million dinars ($37.5 million), most of which will be financed through local loans.

This take-off in the Jordanian economy, which has really been in effect for several years, is attributable to a series of factors that Jordanian authorities have known how to exploit and keep effectively alive.

Fundamentally, the Jordanian economy initially benefited from economic coordination efforts between Jordan and Syria in a number of sectors. These efforts led to the establishment of a number of joint projects in the banking, land transport, industrial and various service sectors. These projects initially benefited from the mutual liberalization phase between the two countries, and they have not been affected too much by the recent tension that has developed in the two countries' political relations.

These coordination efforts and joint projects coincided with the Lebanese crisis, which led to the relocation of some activities of Lebanese businessmen and individuals residing in Lebanon (both Arabs and foreigners) from Lebanon to other centers, including Jordan. However, these efforts also coincided with the growth in the influx of money from Jordanians (and Palestinians residing in Jordan) working in the Gulf. The number of these individuals grew steadily along with the growth of their incomes and, consequently, the growth of their savings and remittances to their families, the banking system and the building and consumer sectors of the Jordanian economy.

Then came the improvement of Jordanian-Iraqi relations in two phases: first following Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and second after Jordan lent its support to Iraq in its war with Iran.

This improvement was reflected in construction and contracting deals won by Jordanian companies in Iraq, contracts for importation through Jordanian businessmen and Iraq's reliance on the port of 'Aqabah for imports of products and materials that could no longer be imported or stored in Iraqi ports due to the war with Iran. The improvement in Jordanian-Iraqi relations also led to a succession of aid grants and loans that strengthened the Jordanian balance of payments position and bolstered Jordan's ability to spend funds on supply and development projects.

Each day brings a new report of an instance in which Jordan has profited from Iraqi economic activities utilizing its facilities. The latest report of this type was an advertisement by a certain transport company (Maltrans) calling for 600 Arab drivers to drive its trucks from 'Aqabah to Iraq. The terms of the job offer were very good, including guaranteed housing for the workers (and possibly their families) in 'Aqabah.

As part of this high level of developmental activity that has been made possible by a series of regional factors, Jordan has completed many basic facilities in the financial, banking, industrial and commercial sectors as well as in the air and marine transport sectors, the services sector, tourism and public utilities. It has also developed the structure of some social sectors (particularly housing). These things have not been accomplished without some problems or some of the negative aspects that normally accompany growth and development, especially the inflation resulting from rising income levels, higher standards of living and greater expenditures on consumption. However, as one Jordanian economist says, these problems have remained very slight considering the offsetting benefits. It would seem that the most important of these benefits is that Jordan has learned how to concentrate the benefits of these transformations and make the benefits continue to accrue within the country, even though some of the regional factors that formed the initial basis for the transformation--a transformation which began in 1975 and continues to set the tone for the Jordanian economy--have now changed.

8591
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BRIEFS

CONTROLLING WEST BANK EDUCATION--Jordan has again been trying to put the Judaea and Samaria education system under its control. Our correspondent has learned that since last week, the education chambers offices in Judaea and Samaria have begun receiving official reports from the Jordanian Education Ministry, signed by the education minister himself, Sa'id Tal, reporting on the ministry's decisions. The idea is to have those resolutions implemented on both banks of the Jordan. Similarly, the heads of the education chambers will be required to provide lists of teachers, to rate those teachers' qualifications and send those lists as official Jordanian documents back to Amman. Our correspondent remarks that more than a year ago a similar attempt by Jordan failed. At the time, it appointed a director general for the education system, through whom it wanted to implement its policy. However, both Israel and the National Guidance Committee forced Jordan to give up the idea. Now Jordan is trying to send its directives through the existing education chambers. [Text] [TA261415 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 26 Aug 81]

JOINT AIRLINE WITH IRAQ--The Jordanian and Iraqi Governments have signed an agreement to establish a joint Jordanian-Iraqi company for air transport. The agreement was signed today by al-Sharif Ghazi Rakan, director general of Jordanian Civil Aviation, and by Husayn Hayyawi, director general of the Iraqi Civil Aviation Corporation, for Iraq. It was also signed by 'Ali Ghandur, board director and general manager of Alia, the royal Jordanian airline. [JN201716 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 20 Aug 81]

LAND FUND SUFFERS DEFICIT--Amman--AR-RA'Y has learned that the fund in support of the occupied land inhabitants is currently suffering a $25-million deficit. Knowledgeable sources say that this deficit is a result of the failure of those fraternal Arab countries financing the fund to abide by their commitment to pay the sums on behalf of Libya and Algeria as agreed at the Amman summit conference. The deficit, the sources add, is also a result of the delay by these countries in honoring their commitments as resolved by the Baghdad summit conference. [Text] [JN240948 Amman AR-RA'Y in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 1]

EXPORT, IMPORT FIGURES--Statistics released by the Jordanian Central Bank indicate that Iraq is the most important market for Jordanian exports. During 1980 exports to Iraq amounted to about 28.3 million dinars, or 23.6 percent of the total value of Jordanian exports. Saudi Arabia was second with 16.4 percent, followed by India with 6.7 percent. Saudi Arabia was the leading exporter to Jordan which imported about 114.1 million dinars worth of Saudi crude oil in 1980. This represented 15.9 percent of total imports. West Germany was second, supplying Jordan with 9.9 percent of its imports, followed by the United States with 8.6 percent. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Jul 81 p 2] 9123

TRADE DEFICIT--The trade deficit continued to rise steadily during 1980, amounting to 543.3 million dinars, compared with 467.4 million dinars in 1979. This increase of 16.2 percent occurred despite the palpable increase in exports, which rose this year by 50.5 million dinars, or 41.8 percent, above the previous year, and despite the fact that the value of exports rose by a higher percentage than imports. The Central Bank attributes this large increase in the trade deficit to increased expenditures on imports this year. These amounted to 714.8 million dinars, compared with 588.3 million dinars in 1979, a 21.5 percent increase. This increase in expenditures on imports was caused by the country's increased demand for machinery and transport equipment, as well as by higher prices and quantities of imported oil, as has already been mentioned. Furthermore, expenditures on imported chemical products, particularly medicine and other medical products, and various food substances, have also risen. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 22 Jul 81 p 7] 9123

CSO: 4304/109

OIL MINISTER DISCUSSES RESULTS OF OPEC GENEVA CONFERENCE

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 72, 27 Jun 81 p 45

/Interview with Minister of Oil Shaykh 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah, by Riyah Munir Shaykh al-Ard, in Geneva on the occasion of the OPEC conference, 25-26 May 81: "Oil Is One of Our Weapons in Battle; We Have Enough for 111 Years"/

/Text/ When oil runs out in all of the Arab states, Kuwait will still be producing it. It will be the last to remain in OPEC. Its oil reserves were estimated at 67.9 billion barrels in 1980, which would last until 2092 and might be stretched to beyond the 21st century if it continues to follow a policy of reducing production. In 1979, Kuwait produced 2,496,000 barrels a day. In 1980 it lowered its production by a third, to 1,666,000 barrels a day. The real engineer of Kuwaiti oil policy who put it into effect is Minister of Oil Shaykh 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah. AL-MAJALLAH asked him a number of questions immediately after the OPEC conference held in Geneva on 25 and 26 May. Here is the text of the interview:

/Question/ Your Excellency Mr Minister, on what have you agreed thus far?

/Answer/ Essentially, we have agreed to keep the pricing system approved at the Bali Conference, allowing each country to decide what to charge for its crude oil within a price range of from $36 to $41, with the provision that the maximum difference in crude oil price is to be $5. Due to market conditions and the presence of an oil surplus, some of the OPEC countries also have decided to reduce production or to continue previously announced reductions. These reductions together amount to 1.25 million barrels a day. The discussions were marked by a great deal of cooperation, and I think what has resulted from them is an understanding of how circumstances differ from one country to another. I believe that the delegates have come away from the conference with a better understanding of the circumstances of others, and this understanding will form the basis for agreement at the next conference, in Abu Dhabi.

/Question/ OPEC's statement at the Bali conference referred to an officially preferred price, but its statement at the Geneva conference did not mention any official price.

/Answer/ A change in the official price requires that a resolution be issued by the organization. As long as no resolution to that effect was issued at the recent meeting, the official price has not changed. This only means that we did not feel the need to repeat what was contained in the Bali statement because the organization did not issue any resolution to change it.

/Question/ The Geneva conference departed from OPEC's customary procedure of discussing prices to look into the question of production. Discussion of the two sides of the balance is the basis for tightening control over supplies of oil for export. Do you think that OPEC has been transformed by that into a kind of cartel?

/Answer/ No. In a cartel the basis for action are more specialized. I think that I can describe OPEC as no different from the grain council or any other organization of this type.

/Question/ OPEC has been accused of creating the crisis in the capitalist world today. What is your reply to this accusation?

/Answer/ If OPEC is accused of anything, it ought to be accused of using moderation in setting oil prices.

/Question/ And the accusation that it has created inflation in the world?

/Answer/ We have caused inflation? I don't believe that anyone believes this today, even in Western economic circles and Western universities.

/Question/ But there are many journalists who continue to accuse you of causing inflation.

/Answer/ In the press. But I said, academic organizations.

/Question/ Your Excellency, what is your opinion of the report issued recently by American intelligence refuting their previous report about the Soviet Union's need to import Arab oil?

/Answer/ Did American intelligence issue another report?

/Question/ Yes. The new report refutes the previous report and says that the Soviet Union will continue to export. What is your view on this?

/Answer/ First, I am not the director of American intelligence.

/Question/ I beg your pardon. That was not the intent of the question.

/Answer/ Second, we did not agree with the previous report, so we do agree with the current report. We know that the Soviet Union has large sources of oil.

/Question/ In light of the Israeli threats to which Syria has been subjected, can you use oil in the battle?

/Answer/ Arab oil is an entity. Its use is subject to conditions and circumstances. However, I believe that we will place all of our resources at the service of the goal of protecting Arab lands and their unity.

/Question/ What is OPEC's position on the international oil companies' effort to break the boycott imposed on transporting oil to South Africa?

/Answer/ If any company takes one drop of oil by any means to South Africa or to Rhodesia (before the recent settlement in Zimbabwe) or to Israel, it is subject to cancellation of our relations with it. This is written into the contracts signed with the companies. For example, there was a violation of this type involving carrying oil to Italy under suspicious contracts. This was at the peak of the oil crisis. We took immediate action to end the contract.

North and South

/Question/ What has happened to OPEC's role in "the dialog between North and South?"

/Answer/ We deal with this question in the Long-Range Policy Committee. I believe that a resolution was adopted on this at the Vienna conference. We announced that we would give a year or two to what was being done within the framework of the UN in the way of a "dialog between North and South" to see whether the dialog makes progress through the UN. If it does not, then we will feel that there is adequate reason to establish such a dialog.

/Question/ Your Excellency, when you speak of long-range policies, the reader's attention turns to the fact that Kuwait has oil reserves to last for 111 years on the basis of current production, and naturally more than that after you decided to reduce production this year by 16.7 percent. However, doesn't Kuwait need to diversify its economic activity and reduce its reliance on energy production?

/Answer/ We are developing our economy slowly, and in any case we have a longer ratio of supply to production than you mentioned.

/Question/ When calculating the long-range oil "formula," do you take into consideration the growth averages in the heavily developing countries in order of their relative importance?

/Answer/ What we have calculated is the total world demand, and I believe that the growth averages in the developing countries are part of that.

7587
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NATIONALIST MOVEMENT LEADER SPEAKS AT ARAB UNIVERSITY

JN221916 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1800 GMT 22 Aug 81

[Speech by Lebanese Nationalist Movement Leader Muhsin Ibrahim at a rally held in solidarity with Libya in the Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir Hall at Beirut Arab University on 21 August 1981--recorded]

[Text] Brother struggler Yasir 'Arafat, PLO Executive Committee chairman; [applause] brother struggler Salih al-Duruqi, secretary of the Popular Committee at the Arab Fraternity Office in Beirut; [applause] brother leaders of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement and the Palestinian revolution; brothers and comrades: We meet today--Nationalist Lebanese, Palestinian revolutionaries and Arab nationalists--to raise high the voice of solidarity with the socialist people's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and with the 1 September revolution and its leader Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. [applause]

We meet today to reiterate our solidarity with Libya--land, people, leadership and revolution--in confronting the vicious U.S. onslaught which yesterday took the dimension of an impudent military intervention and a dogfight in Libya's skies and over its land and territorial waters. This dogfight took place between aircraft of the U.S. 6th Fleet and the Libyan Arab fighter planes. [applause]

First of all, we would like to address greetings of pride and admiration to those eagles who daringly piloted their fighter planes in confronting the mightiest force on earth. [applause] At a time of surrender to the United States, it is not an easy thing for an Arab pilot to fly against the U.S. 6th Fleet. [applause] Our area during Reagan's administration is facing pressures much stronger than those it faced in the past. It is natural that these pressures should focus on the principal links of steadfastness. It was therefore no coincidence that the Libyan coast was chosen as a place for U.S. military belligerency. It was no accident that this impudent military provocation was carried out as part of a long campaign of instigation and attacks against Libya--people and leadership--during the past months. This campaign has even taken the dimensions of threats to kill, to launch a blatant attack and hints of occupation in order to strike at the 1 September revolution and its leadership.

It is no secret that what is bothering the United States is the important progressive, pan-Arab and patriotic role Libya is playing on the level of the all-out Arab confrontation of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance. This important

role being played by the 1 September revolution supports the liberation forces in all of Africa. This is why the U.S. onslaught is continuous. Nor was it a coincidence that the attack took place as the leaders of Libya, the PDRY and Ethiopia were signing the joint friendship and cooperation treaty. This was no coincidence, for this treaty opens a new road that constitutes a significant turning point in the course of the Arab-African liberation struggle because this treaty affirms that the road of confronting the United States is the only choice which remains open to us. It is the road that we all should pursue. This tremendous accomplishment was and still is big enough to upset the U.S. imperialist calculations in the Arab area and on the African level. Hence the U.S. attack, hence this provocation and hence the U.S. State Department spokesman promising more provocations against the Jamahiriyah and all the pan-Arab and nationalist positions and forces of steadfastness throughout the Arab area.

Brothers and comrades, we are here to greet the Libyan Arab people's stand in confronting the United States. We meet to affirm that the only response to what the Arab area is now facing is the way in which al-Qadhdhai, 'Ali Nasir and Mengistu replied and also the road represented by this treaty, which will make a distinguishing mark on the road of our liberation struggle.

We must sincerely say that there is no way out of the quagmire of defection and retreat and also out of this course of backwardness along which the Arab area is moving except through a courageous revolutionary decision by the Arab masses and their vanguard revolutionary strugglers, a decision of confronting U.S. imperialism, including its interests, positions and reactionary forces throughout the Arab arena. [applause] This alone is the decision, which will amount to confronting Israel. Israel is confronted here. On this level, we are really facing Israel.

But all other plans to convince us once again--following the bankruptcy of the course of traitor al-Sadat--that all the cards are in the hands of the United States and that all bets should be placed on the United States should merit our courageous rejection, which should call a spade a spade. [applause] Yesterday, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia proposed a plan for a Middle East solution. Those who commented on this proposal after reading its text and its articles got lost. It is not important what the plan says and what the plan demands, including Arab rights in the countries whose territories were occupied in 1967 and the rights of the Palestinian people, because al-Sadat's speech in the Israeli Knesset was more extremist and stubborn than this. [applause] Al-Sadat's speech was more stubborn in favor of Arab rights. But all of his talk was not worth anything because he had already surrendered and capitulated and was speaking from the Israeli Knesset's rostrum. What counts is not what we say. What counts is what course we pursue.

Following al-Sadat's bankruptcy, they want to tell us that conducting a dialogue with the United States, presenting constructive plans to the United States, bringing fake pressure to bear on the United States and attempting to reach a Palestinian-U.S. dialogue is your way for reaching your rights. We reply: No to this logic and no to this plan. Clashing with the United States and defeating it are the only way of reaching our rights. Those who want to fight the United States will find all ways and will find all the fronts open for them and will find all interests exposed and unprotected. There is nothing that can protect the U.S. interests in this area except Arab capitulation. [applause]

Brothers, Libya was exposed to a very serious thing. Since Vietnam, the United States has never interferred in such an impudent manner as it did against Libya. The answer to what Libya was exposed to and the answer to what the Arab area at large is facing is not to search for a patched up Arab solidarity. The answer should be through crucial and strategic classification. The answer should be through the road which was opened by the three leaders in Aden. The front of steadfastness and confrontation should meet immediately at the summit level. Its agenda should include one sole decision: The complete rupture of relations with the United States and the clash with U.S. imperialism with all types of weapons. [applause]

We tell you frankly that this is the sole way to bring life back to the front of steadfastness and confrontation, a front on which we wagered and on which we will continue to wager because it represents the more advanced positions in the Arab national liberation movement, but mere meetings and proposing bylaws to organize its work will not bring life back to this front. Life will be brought back to this front by this complete decision, which will establish the necessary connection between this front and this tripartite treaty, and organic relations will be established between the liberation, progressive and democratic forces in the Arab world on those in Africa. This will give us the means to confront the Israeli enemy and those to put an end to this excessive arrogance against the Arab position and forces of steadfastness.

Brothers and comrades, it is difficult for me from this podium, which is actually devoted to expressing solidarity with Libya--people, revolution and leadership--not to refer to the current conspiracies and schemes in Lebanon which are aimed against the head of the Palestinian revolution, the head of the Lebanese nationalist movement, the security of Syria and the security of all the forces of Arab steadfastness and confrontatio Today we are facing a serious and dangerous phase, no less dangerous than the military phase which was correctly described by my brother and comrade Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] as the sixth war. [applause]

I am certain that Israel is preparing for a seventh war. But we will also face a U.S. political war before that, a war in which they will attempt to gain from us peacefully what they could not gain by force of arms. This will take place in accordance with a plan whose features have become crystal clear.

It is ironic that two Arabs should be in the United States: Anwar al-Sadat and Bashir al-Jumayyil. The U.S. administration is exerting its efforts with al-Sadat in order to enhance his alliance with Israel. The administration is using all of its intelligence with al-Jumayyil in order to make him issue a statement saying that he will sever relations with Israel. I am saying this not to cast doubts on al-Sadat's sincerity in his alliance with Israel. I declare that he is sincere. [laughter] All I want to do is to shed light on this statement which we read today on behalf of Bashir al-Jumayyil. Following a previous contradictory statement, al-Jumayyil said in his statement that he will sever all kinds of relations with Israel. The matter is not confined to this only. Beside Bashir al-Jumayyil, the United States is moving, the regime is moving and Arab reaction is moving. There is more than one crossroad among these moves Among these, there are three crossroads which represent the Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian necks.

To begin with Bashir al-Jumayyil, we say: This statement is good, but it cannot convince us that the relations with Israel have been severed.

The nationalist movement has its own demands to this effect, which we are repeating. By doing so, we are not asking for miracles. We demand clear stands and statements regarding all the parties cooperating with Israel, explaining the various aspects of this cooperation and clearly declaring that they are determined to sever all these bonds of cooperation. Above all, and this is our right, we want to become quite sure that the relations with Israel are indeed severed. Let us say it straight forward: We demand the termination of Bashir al-Jumayyil's state. As long as Bashir al-Jumayyil's state exists, we do not trust any word regarding the severing of relations with Israel. The problem is not one of forming a committee because we demand something more. There are two sides to the problem: One is the cooperation with Israel, and the second is the establishment of a fascist isolationist state in the inside. The two sides of the problem are closely linked and, therefore, one cannot end the first side of it unless he also ends the second side as well. This is our vision of what is being said regarding the problem of cooperation with Israel.

Moreover, we consider the Americanized Bashir al-Jumayyil no less dangerous than the Zionized Bashir al-Mumayyil. Our objective is not to see Bashir al-Jumayyil replace his Zionist mask with a U.S. mask. Our objective is to put an end to Bashir al-Jumayyil's stand, trend and policy.

This brings us to face the proposed U.S. plan to solve the Lebanese crisis. We here declare our categorical rejection of this plan. Unlike the regime, we study what is being proposed to us. We accept what we find appropriate and reject what we find inappropriate. We reject the U.S. plan to solve the Lebanese crisis, in part and parcel. Why? Because this plan proposes to solve the issue of the south by liquidating the Palestinian and Lebanese nationalist presence and because it seeks the head of the Palestinian revolution. We reject this plan because it proposes to solve the entire Lebanese crisis by fully recognizing Bashir al-Jumayyil and the Phalangist Party, thus considering the Phalangist Party as the base of the coming official authority under which the Lebanese crisis may be solved. Among the priorities of such an authority will be to prevent the establishment of a real national army and to use the present army as a tool to strike at the Lebanese nationalist movement and the Palestinian revolution and to replace the Syrian Army as well.

When we mention the U.S. plan, we cannot but recall the articles of the Lebanese working paper proposed to the Arab Followup Committee. In short, the paper says that between August 1981 and August 1982 the Palestinian's arms will be gathered in one area in al-Baqa', a time during which the Syrian Army will be withdrawn and replaced by the present [Lebanese] Army which will be responsible for security all over Lebanon. This is the stipulation of the official Lebanese working paper, which also constitutes the Arab interpretation of the U.S. plan.

As we disclose all these facts, and as we call for a comprehensive Arab confrontation of U.S. imperialism, today we call for confronting and repulsing this U.S., official and Phalangist plan. This is a big responsibility and the required decision is very dangerous. So, all the nationalist, progressive and liberation forces are invited to unite their ranks and adopt a decisive and sharp decision. No to any U.S. plan. No to any fancy of opening a dialogue with the United States. No to any attempt to peddle deceptive U.S. plans. The United States has imposed confrontation on this region. Let it be so.

CSO: 4304/135

AL-JUMAYYIL URGES SYRIA TO SHOW FRIENDSHIP

NC031527 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 3 Sep 81

[Text] Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil [leader of the Lebanese Phalangist Party] has urged the Arab Followup Committee to intensify its efforts to end the tragic situation in Lebanon. He said: We have complied with all the Arab committee's requests; it remains for us to see what the committee is going to do.

The Phalangist leader continued: I believe that the Arab endeavors, represented in the Followup Committee, are tantamount to the last recourse on which we pin our hope that positive results on both the security and accord levels will be achieved and that no new conditions or further crippling obstacles will be raised before these endeavors. However, should the Arab Followup Committee fail, now that all the obstacles facing it have been eliminated, we do not believe that any other committee would be able to achieve what the existing committee would have failed to achieve.

Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil said: I am perhaps here addressing [Syrian Foreign] Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, member of the Arab Followup Committee, to emphasize that Syria might have the opportunity today to regain the friendship of all the Lebanese. I do not know the reason which makes Syria foment quarrels in Lebanon at a time when nobody wants to quarrel with it and when Syria finds itself in need of the friendship of all the Lebanese, not the antagonism of a group and the lending of support to another group, since there is no reason for disagreement on the Arab and Palestinian aspects or with regard to the general principles related to Arabism as a culture or environ [bi'ah].

Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil concluded by saying: We therefore hope that every aspect conducive to the desired solutions will be facilitated before the Arab Followup Committee so that we may achieve deliverance which is of great benefit to us, to all the parties and to all the Arab states.

CSO: 4304/135

FRANJIYAH DISCUSSES CHEYSSON VISIT, FAHD PLAN

NC021848 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 2 Sep 81

[Text] [Former] President Sulayman Franjiyah held a press conference today at which he discussed the current political situation.

At the outset of the press conference, President Franjiyah denounced the attack on [former] Prime Minister Rashid Karami's office in Tripoli, regarding it as cowardly.

Asked his opinion about French External Relations Minister Claude Cheysson's visit to Lebanon, Franjiyah said: From Cheysson's statement upon his departure from Lebanon we inferred hope and good. This is not strange, because we view France as the mother of democracy and as the leader of those defending human rights. The French minister was astonished at the presence of a people without a homeland and at the displacement of a people. This is what France has been fighting against throughout its history.

He said: What could we ask of Cheysson. The Lebanese and the Arabs are aware that Lebanon's tragedy lies, first, in its weakness and, second, in its geographical position on the Israeli border. Israel is the source of all the calamities that befall Lebanon. The least that could be asked of Minister Cheysson is to work toward the goal of having the EEC countries join hands and exert pressure on the United States so as to make Israel respect and implement the UN resolutions.

President Franjiyah then praised Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's initiative, which has been received with satisfaction, particularly by the Palestinian people, whose cause it is.

President Franjiyah emphasized patriarch Khuraysh's statement on the security explosions and the way out of the crisis. He said: I reiterate what his beatitude said in one of his messages to the Lebanese people in order to end the crisis, namely, that the state should employ force, firmness and resolve.

CSO: 4304/135

AL-WAZZAN URGES CONSTRUCTIVE MEDIA RESPONSES

NC251851 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1715 GMT 25 Aug 81

[Text] The official activities centered on the information field today. The question of information was discussed at a meeting between the president of the republic and the minister of information at a meeting in Ba'bda Palace. It was further discussed at a meeting at the Government House between Prime Minister al-Wazzan and Information Minister Iddih on one side and representatives of the newspapers proprietors and editors on the other. The purpose of the meetings was to dampen the hot climate and stop the information campaigns by certain Lebanese and other quarters.

The information minister explained that the government does not intend to impose censorship, saying: We fully adhere to the democratic freedoms. There will be no blackout or censorship. What is required is that the gravity of the situation should be realized and that constructive criticism be applied.

At the last meeting of the Arab followup committee, the prime minister said: There has been a general feeling of the importance of providing the appropriate atmosphere for any conciliation action that the committee and the Lebanese authority would follow. The most important thing is the question of information. Despite the fact that the freedom of expression has sometimes harmed us, we continue to prefer the freedom of expression.

Speaking to the press representatives and the editors, al-Wazzan said: I convey to you the wishes of the Lebanese authority and the Arab brothers, who are helping the authority to overcome the difficulties and achieve the salvation. We and they are confident that the press can contribute constructive action at this stage to save Lebanon. We demand the press today to contribute its share. God forbid that I should accept that the contribution of this share should be at the expense of freedom, right or sound objective criticism. Prime Minister al-Wazzan emphasized on the constructive and objective criticism, considering it as a contribution to the construction. He hoped that vituperations, attacks and the exchange of accusations and the violent method which heatens the atmosphere will be abandoned. He said: We hope that our words will be words of construction and not of destruction because nobody will construct for us but we construct for ourselves in all sectors.

CSO: 4304/135

TAPLINE OIL COMPANY STOPS PUMPING OIL

NC221829 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 22 Aug 81

[Text] Minister of Industry and Oil Muhammad Yusuf Baydun issued a decision this afternoon confiscating the crude oil available in the tapline tanks. The following is the text of the decision:

1. The crude oil now available in the tapline company tanks shall be confiscated to ensure the needs of the Medreco oil refinery to meet local consumption.

2. The oil confiscated according to Article 1 of this decision shall be withdrawn gradually and according to refining requirements in the Medreco refinery.

3. This decision shall go into force as of today.

This decision has been conveyed to the tapline company director in Lebanon by telephone and became official after it was pasted on the door of the company.

Minister Baydun received a call from the company director, saying that the company will comply with the confiscation decision and that it has given instructions to its employees to resume providing the refinery with crude oil. Minister Baydun received a telephone call yesterday evening from the tapline company director who said that the main office of the company decided to stop pumping crude oil to Lebanon and the Medreco oil refinery.

Minister Baydun, who briefed President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Wazzan on the confiscation decision and the details of the tapline company decision, expressed his surprise at the way he was notified with the decision by telephone. He said that this contravenes any acceptable norms, particularly as it was put into force immediately. He said: I informed [Saudi] Ambassador al-Sha'ir about the tapline company stand. He contacted the Saudi officials immediately. We are following with him the efforts to tackle this issue.

CSO: 4304/135

BRIEFS

PHALANGISTS IN ISRAEL FOR TRAINING--According to information received from al-Ashrafiyah [in eastern Beirut] this morning, the Phalangist Party sent 150 of its members to the Zionist entity 10 days ago for special training. The information also says that a member of the Phalangist War Council accompanied these Phalangist elements. The information, which was published in some of the Lebanese newspapers today, says that Phalangist armed men in al-Ashrafiyah have recently received an arms shipment from Israel which included some tanks. The Lebanese press reports say that Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam related this information this week to some of the Arab Followup Committee members. [Text] [NC280720 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 0645 GMT 28 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/135

AL-HUMAYDI DISCUSSES EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE CIVILIANS

Beirut AL-SAFIR Supplement in Arabic 11 Jun 81 pp 1-2

[Report on Interview with al-Khuwayldi al-Humaydi; in Tripoli; date not specified: "Al-Humaydi Says, 'The Armed Populace Is a Contemporary Notion Inspired by Libya's Battles'"]

> [Text] "Palestine will be liberated by the armed populace; 'the cause' is the guardian against Fascism."
> "Every citizen must become a fighter so that the revolution and the wealth can be protected."

Maj al-Khuwayldi al-Humaydi is one of the Free Officers who instigated with Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi the revolution of the first of September 1969 in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. He is the commander of the civilian mobilization project and the person who oversees the application of the slogan, "the armed populace." There is nothing in his features, in his general appearance or even in his clothing to suggest any form of cruelty and haughtiness usually associated with traditional military men.

He is one of all of them, committed to the extreme simplicity which is the general characteristic of the Libyans. Neither the official duties of his responsibility nor his involvement in civilian life has been able to affect that simplicity. Because he truly preserves the feelings of the Arab citizen who is a true believer, as all the Libyans are, one tends to find his conversation consistent with everything in the man. His is a conversation that is free of heroic display, jingling words and resounding statements. It is rather a conversation that flows sadly and quietly, interrupted occasionally by angry statements that are as rife with bitterness as they are free of vainglory.

At the Civilian Mobilization headquarters in al-Sidi Street in Tripoli we met Maj al-Humaydi so as to hear from him directly about the Libyan experience in civilian mobilization and the application of the statement, "weapons at the people's disposal."

The first question [we asked] was about the historical foundations upon which the armed populace experience in al-Jamahiriyah was based. [We asked about] the relationship of this experience to recent Libyan history, to the mobilization of civilians and to the establishment of supporting groups in other countries.

Maj al-Khuwayldi affirmed at the outset that there was no relationship in this regard between the Libyan experience and the experiences of other nations, "even though we are trying to take advantage of the experiences of these nations despite the fact that we have not imitated any of them so far. We have only heard of the Swiss experience, for example, but we are not familiar with it, and we did not try to derive any benefit from it."

Al-Khuwayldi added, "What we are doing is the beginning of an integrated study and an integrated action. Our purpose is not to imitate other nations. Our purpose is to give every citizen a gun so that the weapon and its serial number would be recorded in that person's identity card just as his blood type is. Every citizen would thus have a military identity.

"Above all our experience draws its foundations from our history, from the history of Libya's battles. It is one in a series of episodes of this battle. We found old documents indicating that Libyans were asking for the formation of popular resistance militias. We must bear in mind that 'Umar al-Mukhtar was not a military man with the rank of a field marshal or a general. But, the Libyan people did nevertheless arm themselves with all the simple materiel they could get their hands on; they followed 'Umar al-Mukhtar and achieved victory over generals and emperors.

"What tied the Libyans together was the factor of religion and that of nationalism. Thus, the current experience is a process that seeks to tie the past and the future together; we are now realizing the aspirations and the dreams of Libyans in the past."

Al-Khuwayldi went on to say, "For this reason a decision was made by the Revolutionary Council in 1972 to establish the popular resistance. Before 1972 students were being trained, and weapons were distributed to all the schools during the training. The motivation behind this was to prepare young people so they can face any danger that may result from a possible dispute between us and the United States which was forced to evacuate its bases from the territories of al-Jamahiriyah. We wanted to have a basic foundation of defense."

He said, "Our experiment is also not affiliated with western historical principles. It may thus be an incentive for other nations. We neither ignore nor abbreviate any of the experiences of foreign nations, but this experience is not imported; it is in fact [an attempt] to tie the historical past with the present. All Libyans fought the conquering Italian armies and became involved in innumerable fights and battles throughout the days of the war. If we wanted to celebrate the past or if we wanted to commemorate the anniversaries of past battles, we would need at least one third of the days of the year since Libyan battles in the past were fought over all

the territory of al-Jamahiriyah. Libyans used to fight as free men; they fought for freedom, not for power. Therefore, we repeat that what is happening now is [an effort] to tie the past with the present.

"Before the revolution the Libyan people were denied the right of observing the anniversaries of the battles they fought against the conquerors all along the coast. The Libyans used to fear the objections of the Italian ambassador or the Italian community in the country. In addition, every member of the pre-revolutionary governments was the partner of an Italian or a Jew in a business or an interest. Hence, one of the most serious decisions that was made after the revolution was that of ousting the Italians from the territories of al-Jamahiriyah. This was the revenge for our fathers and grandfathers who had been vanquished, humiliated and forcibly driven from their homes so the Italians could seize them.

"Our purpose from this experiment is to avoid the repetition of what happened in 1911 when Fascist Italian colonialism invaded the Libyan shores. We are saying there will be no colonialism after the revolution of 1 September. Since the map indicates the large area and the territorial vastness of al-Jamahiriyah, the revolution remains the significant factor in the light of the fact that there are many enemies to the east and to the west who declare their hostility to Libya because Libya speaks the truth."

Libya Is Being Targeted

The commander of civilian mobilization said that Libya was being targeted by the rulers of Egypt and Sudan, by Israel and even by Europe and chiefly the United States. "Its wealth is also being targeted because wars are now economic wars as they were in the past. Examples of this are World War I and World War II which were intended to allow the seizure of the wealth of nations and other countries. These wars brought us mistreatment and destruction."

Al-Khuwayldi al-Humaydi went on to say, "This wealth, this revolution, this small number of people and this vast area of land make it incumbent upon us to train all Libyans.

"This is also consistent with another military rationale which [pertains to] the evolution of weapons. War is no longer fought on the borders. There are now missiles that cross the borders; and there are nuclear missiles, nuclear submarines and long range airplane fighters and bombers.

"In our case even if the regular army were to amount to 1 million, that [figure] would still be inconsequential because the movement and the range of modern weapons is faster than the movement of an army."

Protecting With Weapons

Al-Khuwayldi explained, "We in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah are trying to protect the revolution's accomplishments by [using] a whole range of weapons. For what would be the use of a factory when one does not have the weapons to defend it?

"What would be the use of the (Abu Kammash) factory if it is attacked by 106 mm artillery fire with which you in Beirut are familiar?

"Therefore the existing evolution of development in Libya must be accompanied by an evolution in defense. [These two must go together] like truth and power. Now it is power that creates and protects the truth. It is power that will create and protect the Arab right. Israel has created evil: it is protecting this evil by force, and it wants to impose its existence and its conditions. If we continue in the same [mode of] decline, we may reach a situation when we find Israel dictating to us its wishes as individuals and giving us instructions on how to conduct ourselves on a daily basis. As our brother, the colonel said in one of his recent speeches, it would tell us what to do and what not to do inside our homes.

"This great and pure past of the Libyan people must be tied to the present and to the future so that the present and the future can be more radiant."

In a return to recent history al-Khuwayldi referred to the fact that the Libyan army was not an army in the true sense of the word when the revolution broke out. "Power and the right to bear arms belonged to the police and the mobile force which had advanced weapons and helicopters. Nevertheless, with determination and with few weapons we were able to bring the Wheelus [Air Force] base in west Tripoli to a standstill. We told the Americans that any airplane leaving the base would become a target for our artillery and that if such an airplane were to try to bomb us, the consequences would be worse. The United States heeded this warning, and we realized from the first moment that the United States was cowardly because it was only interested in its own interests.

"Thus, Washington which in 1969 was not able to stand up against us and bring us around is now trying to avenge itself. The expulsion of members of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington is no more than part of this revenge process. It may be its revenge for what we did to it and to its bases in 1969."

Al-Humaydi added, "Preparations for future battles that will be forced on us by colonialism must be made. For this reason we consider the resolutions issued by the recent emergency meeting in Tunisia of Arab ministers of foreign affairs regarding the current situation between Syria and Israel to be nothing more than a farce. All that the Arabs of the League did was to say, 'We are with Syria!' even though war may break out in a matter of hours or days. We were hoping that the other Arabs would follow in our footsteps, declaring their solidarity with Syria and with the Palestinian Resistance in practical steps, even if these were [no more than] sending units of their presidential or royal guard to the borders of Palestine."

Al-Humaydi went on to say, "If one wants to prevent war, one must prepare for it. The fact that one is not prepared for war encourages war. This is a fact that prevails in major international relations."

The history of Libya's war continued to press itself on al-Khuwayldi's memory. He repeated that the object of arming the people was to tie the past and the present. "The Libyans have endured much from the Italians, but at the same time they did get rid of many conquering groups.

"Since there is no immediate foreign enemy threatening Libyan territory at present, the status of relations between Libya and its neighbors makes it incumbent upon the revolutionary command to remain vigilant and prepared for a war that may be launched against us by those neighbors, even Egypt. Such an attack would be [tantamount to] a stab in the heart, but, ultimately, we say this is the challenge. Our dignity is above every other consideration."

In a reference to the declining Arab situation and to Arab helplessness in front of the Zionist enemy, al-Khuwayldi al-Humaydi compared this situation with the stern positions that the Jamahiriyah assumes in its policies. Then he brought to mind the recent visit of Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to Moscow by saying, "This is the revolution that proclaimed from atop the Kremlin that God is great. It did so both by singing the Libyan national anthem and by sounding the call to the noon prayer in the heart of Moscow."

He went on to say, "Al-Qadhdhafi is accused of terrorism and of violating international order at the time when the skies over Mecca are filled with AWACS airplanes. This is the situation we find ourselves in, and this is the situation the Arabs find themselves in."

Al-Humaydi adds, "Therefore, we give the wealth, the power and the weapons to Libyans whereas the other Arab oil countries celebrate the increase of their deposits in western banks every year. How do these Arabs compare with the Libyan citizen who lost an eye and came to us to volunteer to bear arms? We turned that citizen down because of his visual disability, but we relented when he swore that he would go home and divorce his wife if he could not join the military regiments. How do the other Arabs compare with the men who are 70 and 80 years old who come to us asking that they join the military regiments and the receive training in bearing and [using] weapons? The people of the Gulf ought to tell us how the millions of dollars will help them if they cannot protect their land?"

During our field visits to the mobilization and training sites we met a cross section of young men and young women who would be the envy of young people in other Arab countries because of their awareness. When one of the young men was given the choice between a sleek German-made car and a tank, he was not able to give up one for the other. But his response was that he wanted the car for himself and that he would work hard to acquire it. And then he said that the comfort that this car would give him would not be complete because it would not be protected by a tank.

One of the young women was given the choice between completing her training and marriage, and she chose both. She said that she would not turn down a bridegroom if one were to come along, but that she would insist on continuing her weapons training so she can protect her children.

The comment that Maj al-Humaydi made [on all this] was that the young man could not help but be truthful. "If he had said that he wanted the tank, he would have been lying. We do not want the citizens to deceive themselves or to deceive us."

As far as the female student was concerned, al-Khuwayldi seemed enthusiastic as he wondered, "What is the value of a woman who cannot defend her children in case her husband is absent or gone? We do not want in the Jamahiriyah women who moan and scream if their husbands are hurt or gone. The Libyan maiden has relinquished the cosmetics, the trinkets and the perfumes of Paris so she can fight. For her and for the Libyan man the scent of the military suit is a desirable scent. The free woman in Libya will not be the woman who wears a skirt that does not cover her knee; the free woman will be the woman who wears the military suit because she will be more secure and more assured, and she will be safe from attempts to attack or rape her."

The Peace Dove

Throughout the interview that lasted more than 2 hours Maj al-Khuwayldi did not stop his occasional references to local and Arab conditions. This tendency to expatiate and to discuss awareness had the upperhand [during the interview]. For this reason he went back to talk about the Arabs, Palestine and peace.

"If the Arabs were truthful with each other and if they would stop talking foolishly about liberating Palestine... How are they going to liberate it? By competing with each other? By fighting each other? Are they going to liberate Palestine with olive branches and a peace dove?"

Then he said sharply, "Our slogan is let the dove of peace be slaughtered, and let it be broiled on the olive branches. Without liberation the olive branches will be destroyed. The olive branches are being destroyed and burned every day in Arab lands. What is happening in Lebanon is evidence of this. There Israel is burning the olive, grape and orange trees; it is burning the vegetation and everything that is green as well. It is death that will liberate the lands of the Golan, Sinai, Palestine and south Lebanon. We will not worship the dove as the Indians worship the cow."

Al-Humaydi went on to say, "Before Islam the Arabs produced nothing besides the seven al-Mu'allaqat [heroic poems]. The question for those Arabs was a personal one. The wars of 'Antarah and others were intended to show no more than personal heroism; they were not intended to defend the family, the tribe or the nation. But after Islam and [its] message the question became that of all the people. Today, the oil Arabs and the Gulf Arabs are very much like their pre-Islamic ancestors. All their efforts now are focused on their funds which are deposited in the banks of Europe and [spent for] the female slaves that are brought to them from everywhere, from the Philippines, India and from Pakistan."

This bitter note in al-Khuwayldi's conversation continued. "If we want to liberate Palestine, it will most certainly not be liberated by those who have military rank or by wars like those that were fought in 1967 and 1973. Nor will it be liberated by the Jerusalem committee that is chaired by one who is conspiring against Jerusalem.

"The gun is the only thing that can prevent the Arabs from going under. Numayri has now joined forces with al-Sadat, so who will punish al-Sadat now for his treason? The Palestinian gun must be aimed at some of the Arab leaders before it is aimed against Israel. It must be aimed against the master traitors. Numayri could not have received al-Sadat had this gun been aimed at its proper target first."

The Role of Students

In the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and in the context of mobilizing civilians students play a primary role among those roles that are being prepared for the armed populace. In view of what we heard during the lively conversations with the students at the sites which we visited, and in view of the intense, specialized training they are receiving and also in view of the 33-year old Israeli experiment which is trasforming every Jew in occupied Palestine into a fighter, the question was this: Is training alone or training plus maneuvers enough to create a Libyan Arab fighter who can confront the Israeli fighter, the veteran of four wars, who has always chosen his timing and his weapons?

Al-Khuwayldi said, "Within the framework of the armed populace we want to create an army of students. We will train them and we will distribute them to the formations and the areas. The objective of the training program is to create this army of students by 1986. This will be a regular general army; it will be the nerve center and the active and effective factor in the framework of the armed populace structure. Students who are pressed into this army will have command responsibilities on all the lines. Every student and every citizen will assume his true position in this process. We have in the Jamahiriyah 1,050,000 male and female students who will make up our great army or our armies in the future. This figure includes all the students from the elementary grades; it includes the young boys and the young girls who were born since 1 September 1969 and who are now attending elementary and preparatory schools."

Al-Humaydi added, "By 1990 the student sector will make up almost one third of the Libyan people, and those students will be in the ranks of the armed populace. They are the people of the future. As of 1980 every school gate has become a gateway to the military college or to a military organization.

"Education in Libya is mandatory until the preparatory stage. Thus every student in school is compelled to receive military training. The school is the gateway to the militarization of the people, and we expect the members of the Libyan nation to become fighters in a few years. The schools are the bases where Libyan men and women are trained in the use of weapons. The role these students will play will be the foundation of the country's defense which will require skills in the use of all kinds of weapons.

Accordingly, the course of study will be changed and directed towards specialization in civilian subjects. We will begin moving along in the courses of study that are determined by students' wishes.

"As far as Israel is concerned," Maj al-Khuwayldi added, "we do not believe that the skill and the efficiency of the Israeli soldier were effective factors in the defeats that befell the Arabs. More than anything else, the problem is psychological. Israel has managed to convince the Arabs that they are less capable than it is, and now the Arab doubts himself and his abilities. We in al-Jamahiriyah are trying to prepare the soldier in peace time, and we are trying to create for him the atmosphere of battle. We force the soldier into maneuvers wherein he would face hypothetical situation [similar to those] he may face in a war. Our purpose is to have the Libyan citizen be well prepared for combat. Therefore, we are trying to provide him with good training and good leadership, and we are looking forward to the future when he will be on the same level as that of the Israeli soldier."

Maj al-Khuwayldi went on to add bitterly, "But we are facing an Arab problem on this field: we are being discredited for our action so that Israel can be served. There are Arab regimes that meet with Israel and Washington and call us terrorists. They accuse us of arming ouselves to the hilt, and they fault us for our relations with Russia. This is a problem that goes beyond the Arab area and includes the African continent also."

Social and Economic Effects

With regard to an Arab country such as the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah which is listed socially among the very conservative countries, a major question is being raised about the effects of civilian mobilization on the social course of the country since young women at first left home to go to school and then, at the present stage, they are leaving school to go to camp.

Maj al-Khuwayldi began answering this question by affirming that the principal objective was first and foremost the creation of a society that has wealth, power and weapons.

He went on to say, "It is power and wealth that any greedy person covets. Such a person tries to achieve his objective by the force of weapons. People may attain wealth and power, but weapons constitute the highest point of power. When we give people weapons, we would be establishing real equality among individuals."

He added, "There is no doubt that the experience of arming the populace will introduce into the lives of Libyans the factor of control and discipline, and they will become just like the military. Discipline, respect and appreciation will prevail in the laboratory, in the school and in service institutions.

"When we introduced military training into the colleges of the university, the situation changed as far as the professors were concerned. The students

became disciplined and more respectful of their professors. They became more devoted to their studies and more appreciative of them. What we are trying to achieve is popular militarization not Fascist militarization. That is, we are trying to create a citizen who is as intent on what he produces in the field as he is on what he produces in a war. What the citizen will produce in a plant will destroy economic monopoly, and it will also destroy the aggressor. The challenge of the people and the leadership to everything they face increases as that challenge increases. To achieve that the accompanying economic, cultural and social power must be furnished."

Al-Khuwayldi dealt with the subject of men and women and stated that matters were no longer separate between men and women in the Libyan Jamahiriyah since women were no longer at home [exclusively] with men being found in the office, the factory, the farm or the camp. "Men are being called upon to give women the opportunity to become physicians, teachers, nurses, civil servants and workers in factories."

He said, "In the past few years Libyan women have taken a major step forward in the areas of medicine and in other suitable professions."

He added, "But freedom for Libyan women will not be absolute freedom, since both men and women have limits to their freedom because our religion and our traditions must be observed. We see no freedom for women when they shed parts of their clothing every day. However, the military suit that women wear is one of the components of this freedom. Libyan women do have a role to play, but it is a role that does not make them overlook their responsibilities to men or make men overlook their responsibilities to women. Freedom for women will be measured by women's contribution to society."

In this lengthy interview there was some question about the fear that "militarizing the people" in Libya may turn them into a Fascist or a Nazi people as was the case in Germany and Italy between the two world wars.

Maj al-Khuwayldi said without delay, "Fascism in Italy and Germany was the Fascism of an individual. We here have presented the subject from a historical perspective. Our intention was not to turn the people into a Fascist people, but our intention was to avoid a repeat of what happened in 1911 and what happened in 1977 when al-Sadat moved his forces on our borders. Thousands of Egyptians died in the events of 1977, and al-Sadat is now making preparations for a second operation. The evidence for this lies in the death of his minister of defense and 13 other generals about 3 months ago. The generals controlled all the branches of the Egyptian armed forces. Do not believe that they were on a pleasure ride in a military helicopter over the Siwa oasis near our borders.

"Furthermore, faith in a rightful and just cause is a guardian against Fascism and Nazism. We believe in our nation and in the inevitability of its unity. It is for our nation that we are arming ourselves and preparing our people."

He added, "We do not mean [to imply] that we are making preparations to fight Egypt. We must remind [people] first that it was the popular conferences that decided on the disengagement with the Egyptian army and, consequently, on the withdrawal of our forces far from the borders. However, if a battle is forced upon us by al-Sadat, we will fight. If Numayri forces a battle on us, we will fight too. Above all else we are preparing ourselves to take part in [the battle for] the Arab cause. If the battle for that cause is not imposed on us, we will impose it ourselves. We will train the Libyans to use weapons, and we will send them in every direction. We are now preparing ourselves for a battle that may be imposed by Begin, Reagan or by France."

Al-Khuwayldi al-Humaydi

8592
CSO: 4504/54

FOOD PRODUCTION PROJECTS REPORTED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 14, Jul 81 p 18

/Text/

SELF SUFFICIENCY in food by the turn of the century is a key aim of Libya's planners. The new $62.5 billion five year development plan calls for the proportion of food requirements met by domestic production to increase from the current 53.5 per cent to 62 per cent by 1985. It is expected that Libya will be producing 35 per cent of its processed food requirements by the middle of the decade, compared with the current 27 per cent.

Food output will be boosted by two major agro-industrial contracts awarded in recent weeks, one to Holland's HVA and the other to the Danish Danfarm Contractors. The $122.2 million HVA contract is for the supply and management of a major milk products and poultry processing plant to be sited at Ghat Sultan, 55 kilometres from Benghazi. The plant will produce 9,000 litres of milk per day from 600 milking cows, and 5.5 million broilers per year. The totally integrated scheme will have an animal feed mill, milk processing and bottling plants, a poultry slaughterhouse and a yoghourt making plant. The scheme is for completion in 30 months, and HVA's five year management contract starts one year after the start of construction.

In May it was reported that the Danish consortium Danfarm Contractors had won a $168.4 million contract for a similar plant to be located at Wadi al Hari, 70 kilometres south of Tripoli. The production and facilities will be identical to the Ghat Sultan scheme. The Wadi al Hari plant is for completion in 36 months and Danfarm will manage it for five years, starting one year after the beginning of construction.

HVA won a $129.9 million contract earlier this year for another agro-industrial project of the same type, to be sited at Taourgha, some 60 kilometres south of Misrata. All three schemes are based on a feasibility study prepared by the Danish firm Danagro Adviser for the Land Reclamation and Agrarian Reform Secretariat.

The Jamahiriya's drive towards food self sufficiency was also underlined by the recent confirmation from a West German consortium that it has a $162.9 million contract to build three animal feed mills. Bilfinger & Berger will do civil works valued at $87.7 million while Buehler-Miag will supply mechanical and electrical equipment worth $75.2 million. The mills are for Benghazi, Tobruk and Sirte, and are scheduled for completion in 1983. Each will have an hourly production capacity of 40 tonnes of mixed feed for poultry, cattle and sheep, and each will have a 25,000 tonne silo.

CSO: 4500/38

RA'S AL-UNUF PETROCHEMICAL PROJECTS OUTLINED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 14, Jul 81 pp 16-17

[Article by Alan George]

[Text]

THE TINY coastal village of Ras Lanouf, on the Gulf of Sirte some 350 kilometres south west of Benghazi, was once the site of Mobil Oil's crude oil export terminal — but of little else. Now it is being transformed into the largest petrochemicals centre in the Jamahiriya, and one of the largest of Libya's new industrial towns. At the heart of the developments is a giant oil refinery. This will supply a major ethylene plant, whose output will feed a range of other petrochemicals plants. A new port is being built from scratch. Desalination plants are being established to ensure adequate water supplies. A major oil pipeline is under construction to bring crude from the desert oil fields. And to house the expected influx of workers and their families two adjacent new towns are being created.

Ras Lanouf is one of a series of coastal sites in the Jamahiriya that are being developed into major industrial cities. The new industries will assist in the diversification of the economy to which Libya is deeply committed, while the new centres will also help bring about a more even population distribution. The Jamahiriya's planners are concerned about the concentration of Libya's population in Tripoli and Benghazi, the two major cities, the result of the rapid influx of rural dwellers in the early years of the oil boom when the towns offered attractive employment opportunities.

The high hopes the Jamahiriya places in the industrial sector as a means of diversifying the economy are reflected in the scale of the allocations for industry in the new 1981-85 development plan, unveiled last January. $13,509.9 million — 23 per cent of the total plan expenditure — is earmarked for industry, more than for any other sector. The determination to industrialise is also underlined by the sector's projected 21.6 per cent average annual growth rate during the plan period, more than twice the 9.4 per cent projected annual growth rate for the economy as a whole. And within the industrial sector, the plan calls for special emphasis to be placed on capital intensive heavy industries of the type being established at Ras Lanouf and the other emerging coastal industrial cities. This makes a lot of sense in Libya, where there are abundant funds for investment but a relatively short supply of labour.

The petrochemicals complex was first mooted by the Jamahiriya's Heavy Industry Secretariat in 1976, and was initially planned for Tobruk, on the north east coast. In July 1977, however, the Egyptian ruler Sadat launched a military assault against the Jamahiriya. This was seen as a clear indication of Sadat's increasing isolation from his fellow Arabs as US pressure mounted on him to capitulate to the Zionists. The attack was repulsed after fierce fighting, but it

naturally prompted the Jamahiriya to question the wisdom of locating the proposed major industrial complex little more than 100 kilometres from the Egyptian frontier. Ras Lanouf was chosen as a more secure site, and the first work began in 1978.

At the core of the Ras Lanouf developments lies a $300 million oil refinery. Its planned eventual capacity of 280,000 barrels per day will make it the largest in the Jamahiriya. Early last year Saipem, the contracting arm of Italy's state energy agency, Ente Nazionale Idrocarbi, won a $40 million contract for the construction of the first phase, which will give the refinery a daily capacity of 220,000 barrels. Work started in spring 1980 and is scheduled for completion in September. The second phase, the contract for which has not yet been awarded, will involve the construction of a petroleum gas liquefaction plant.

The refinery will supply the raw materials for a 330,000 tonnes per annum capacity ethylene plant, the $60 million construction contract for which was won in January last year by Italy's Belleli Industrie Meccaniche. Completion is scheduled for the middle of 1982. Other major contracts for work on the ethylene plant have rivalled, and even exceeded, the value of the construction contract. Early this year it was reported that Japan's Meisei Industrial had won a $49.2 million contract to insulate, fireproof and paint the plant, with completion in February 1983. At about the same time it was reported that Italy's Carlo Gavazzi Impianti has a $9 million contract to install instrumentation and automation systems at the plant. In spring last year it was disclosed that Foxboro-Yoxall of the UK had won a $2.2 million contract to supply a process control system. Part of the contract provided for the training of Libyan engineers. And last year AEG-Telefunken (UK) won an order worth more than $1 million to supply motor control centres and other equipment for the plant.

The giant ethylene plant is the key to a range of other petrochemical projects planned for Ras Lanouf. These include a 68,000 tonnes per annum capacity polypropylene plant, a 52,800 tonnes per annum monoethylene glycol plant, a 60,000 tonnes per annum low density polyethylene plant and a high density plant of similar capacity. The capacity of the latter two plants is planned to rise to an eventual 100,000 tonnes per annum. In addition, factories will be built to produce ethylbenzene (aromatics), polystyrene, polybutadiene (synthetic rubber) and acrylonitrile (synthetic fibre). Construction contracts for these plants have yet to be awarded, but licensing agreements have been concluded allowing the latest technology to be employed at the monoethylene glycol and polypropylene plants.

Crude oil for the Ras Lanouf petrochemicals complex will be pumped from the Messla fields, deep in the Sahara, through a 611 kilometre pipeline, the $162 million construction contract for which was won last year by Japan's Nippon Kokan and Marubeni Corporation. The contract also calls for the construction of four generating stations, three oil storage tanks and camp facilities.

A major new port is being built to handle the enormous volume of exports the Ras Lanouf complex will generate when operational. The $300 million construction contract was won last year by South Korea's Hyundai Construction, and provides for two 5.4 kilometre jetties, 600 metres of quay for general cargo, port buildings and 1,600 kilometres of roads. Some two million square metres of land will be reclaimed and more than 1.5 million cubic metres dredged. The nine-berth port is scheduled for completion by the end of 1983. Plans for the new harbour were drawn up by Britain's Rendel Palmer & Tritton.

With companies from twelve countries supplying equipment for the Ras Lanouf developments, the Azzawiya Refinery Company, which is responsible for the entire scheme, last year awarded France's Société Commerciale des Transports a contract to transport equipment from countries of origin to Ras Lanouf. The work involves moving plant of up to 750 tonnes in weight and 80 metres in height.

Although the emphasis on industry in the new $62.5 billion development plan is greater than in earlier plans, Libya has been firmly committed to a programme of rapid industrialisation ever since the 1969 Revolution swept away the corrupt regime of King Idris. With the country's vast oil reserves, it was natural that petrochemicals industries should be seen as having enormous potential for development. The progress already achieved is reflected in the growing importance of the Jamahiriya's petrochemicals exports. The first exports came only in 1979, with shipments totalling 195,000 tonnes, but by last year they were already accounting for five per cent of Libya's total exports. This trend will certainly continue as the new plants being established at complexes such as Ras Lanouf enter operation.

CSO: 4500/38

BRIEFS

ELECTRIC POWER OUTPUT--The West German engineering company Brown Boveri has just won another deal worth DM 200 million ($80 million) from Libya to increase the country's power output. The order comes on the heels of a similar one from Bahrain two weeks ago (An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo, August 10). The latest order is to extend an oil-fired station at Tobruk, on the Mediterranean coast, to double its capacity to 260 MW by mid-1984. The station supplies electricity to the growing industrial region in north eastern Libya and also powers a desalination plant. In June, Brown Boveri won a similar contract to extend capacity at the Dema power station in order to meet the new requirements of the country's first large steel plant (An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo, June 29). Both orders were placed by the Libyan Electricity Corporation. /Text/ /Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 11/

MARSA AL-BURAYQAH PETROCHEMICAL OUTPUT--The petrochemicals sector is the cornerstone of the Jamahiriya's industrialisation programme and the success of the new plants was underlined on 20th May when the Jamahiriya news agency JANA reported that output at the Marsa Brega methanol plant totalled 322,233 tonnes last year. This looks set to be even higher this year, with JANA reporting that the plant is now working two shifts per day, and produced 96,474 tonnes in the first quarter of 1981--more than one third of the total for the whole of last year. The plant was opened in 1977 and JANA quoted the Jamahiriya's Heavy Industry Secretariat as saying it was one of only two of its type in north Africa. Marsa Brega, on the Gulf of Sirte, is one of the coastal towns that are being developed into major industrial centres. /Text/ /Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 19/

POLISH, ITALIAN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS--Polish construction companies have been awarded contracts in Libya valued at a total of $1,000 million, the Polish news agency PAP reported recently. About 10,000 Poles will be working on the contracts by 1984, making them one of the largest European expatriate communities in the Jamahiriya. The contracts were awarded under agreements reached by the joint Polish-Libyan commission, PAP added, but did not say when they were awarded or to which companies. The contracts, for completion in five years, include urban developments in Al Marj, and in the Benghazi and Tobruk areas. More than 6,000 homes and 60 schools will be built. The Italian community of about 15,000 is the largest European expatriate community in the Jamahiriya at present. The UK has about 5,000 expatriates and the US 2,000. Other construction and urban development contracts have been awarded in recent weeks to Italian companies. In May

it was reported that two contracts for sewerage work in Tobruk, with a combined value of $62.8 million, had been won by a joint venture between Impresit Costruzione Ricordino Esercizio Acquedotti. Work, for completion in three years, includes building 96 kilometres of sewers and two pumping stations. The joint venture will supply and install electrical and pumping equipment for the two new stations and for four existing pumping stations. Consultant is Britain's Howard Humphrey & Sons. Work is underway on contracts awarded to the Italian firm Enterprise for two office/residential complexes, it was reported recently. The combined value of the contracts is $100 million, and completion is scheduled for next year. The complexes are under construction at Tiji and Nalut, both near the Tunisian frontier. /Text/ /Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 19/

DESERT AGRICULTURE SCHEMES--As part of the Libyan Jamahiriya's ambitious programme of agricultural development, a number of irrigation projects have been established deep in the Sahara, using subterranean water supplies. In June a tender was put out for the latest of these projects, to be sited at Tenezoft, in Ubari municipality deep in the Fezzan region of south west Libya. The scheme will cover about 1,700 hectares. The tender includes the supply of a main pipeline to carry water from wells to farm reservoirs, irrigation and power networks, 40 kilometres of paved roads and about 60 kilometres of dirt roads, a drinking water supply system, including a desalination plant, a 36 hectare community centre, and civil and electromechanical works. It is also reported that Portakabin of the UK has won a $3.7 million contract for the supply of 200 temporary homes for 500 workers at Kufrah, in the desert in south east Libya and the site of one of the Jamahiriya's largest desert agricultural projects. The accomodation is for use by workers on a major housing scheme at the project, the contractor for which is Sweden's Armerad Betong Vaegfoerbaettringar. /Text/ /Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 19/

VEHICLE MAINTENANCE CONTRACT--Japan's seven major car and truck manufacturers are to help build vehicle maintenance plants in Tripoli and 43 other locations in the Jamahiriya, according to reports in Japan. The companies are to provide technicians as well as parts and equipment. The popularity of Japanese vehicles amongst Libyans was underlined in April when it was reported that the Honda Motor Company had won an order to supply 12,000 Civic cars. /Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 19/

NEW MERCHANT MARINE COLLEGE--ENERGOPROJEKT of Yugoslavia has won a contract to build a merchant navy college in Libya. The announcement reflects both the growing size of the Jamahiriya's merchant fleet and the new emphasis on training in the current five year plan. The delivery on 29th May of the new 155,200 dwt oil tanker Al Fuweihat from a Swedish shipyard brought the fleet to 24 ships, and by 1985 it is expected that 60 percent of all the Jamahiriya's imports will be carried on Libyan-owned vessels. The college, to be completed in three years, will accommodate 400-600 undergraduate students and 100 postgraduate students. Construction will be in two phases. /Text/ /Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 p 18/

CSO: 4500/38

BRIEFS

NAVAL VESSELS INAUGURATED--Under the auspices of Col al-Mu'tasam Ibn Hammud, the Omani Ministry of Defense undersecretary, four new ships were inaugurated in a celebration at Sultan Ibn Ahmad Navy Base, in Muscat today. The new ships were recently put in service of the Sultan of Oman's Naval Forces. [Excerpt] [GF311817 Salalah Domestic Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 31 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/137

PAST, FUTURE HEALTH SERVICES, FACILITIES COMPARED

Aden 14 OCTOBER Supplement in Arabic 16 Jul 81

[Article by 'Izz al-Din Kashar: "Health Services Yesterday and Today"]

[Text] Health Institutions Completed during 3-Year Plan (1971-1974)

Kind of Institution	The Source			
	The 3-Year Plan		Popular Initiatives	
	Planned	Completed	Planned	Completed
Hospitals	5	5	--	4
Health Centers	3	3	--	3
Health Units	45	23	--	91
Total	53	26	--	98

(Source: Statistics and Planning Unit, the Ministry of Health)

The first 5-Year Plan (1974-1978) followed the 3-Year Plan in continuing the progress towards firmly establishing the basic foundation of health services throughout the republic; improving the quality of those services by devoting more attention to preventive medicine and placing more emphasis on it; and by adopting the principle of centralized planning, not centralized implementation, with regard to the administration of health services. The purpose of this [effort] is to allow every governorate to manage its own health affairs and launch its creative initiatives to develop these services, free from any centralized restraints that would curb them. For the first time in the context of preventive medicine attention was devoted to care for the health of the environment; to the establishment of working departments of preventive medicine in every governorate within the Health Services Administration; to the emphasis on comprehensive, basic preventive activities; the immunization of children; the provision of necessary care for mothers and school children; and to the battle against indigenous diseases such as malaria, pulmonary tuberculosis, trachoma and other diseases. Three branches of the Health Institute were also opened in the other governorates.

By the end of the 5-Year Plan and until 1980, the total number of health institutions and adjunct facilities operating in the therapeutic field amounted to 367 institutions and facilities. Among those institutions there are 32 hospitals with 2,495 beds and 17 health centers with 267 beds. Thus the total number of hospital beds in the republic amounts to 2,762. This is an increase of 924 beds over 1967; this is a rate of 14.5 beds for every 10,000 persons in the population, compared with 9.0 beds [for the same number of persons] in 1967. The number of health units alone amounted to 276, compared with 97 units in 1967, etc.

The number of local physicians rose until the same year, 1980, to 174. Among them 39 have educational grants. This is an increase of 127 physicians over the number of physicians in 1967. This is a rate of 47 physicians for every 10,000 persons in the population, compared with 0.5 physicians [for the same number of persons] in 1967. The number of qualified nurses during the same period amounted to 1,644. This is an increase of 956 at a rate of 8.6 nurses for every 10,000 persons of the population.

The Number of Health Institutions between 1967 and 1979

Kind of Institution	The Year		The Increase
	1967	1979	
Hospitals	13	29	16
Maternity and Child Care Centers	2	1	--
Health Centers	--	17	17
Public Clinics	7	51	44
Specialized Clinics	--	14	14
Health Units	97	278	181
Sanatoriums and Quarantines	2	2	--
Educational Health Institutions	2	4	2
Total	123	396	274

--Listed from the hospitals.
(Source: Statistics and Planning Unit, the Ministry of Health)

The biggest piece of evidence we can offer [to show] the development of health services in this period lies in the progress we achieved in the field of preventive medicine, which is an important and a basic part of medicine if compared with therapy. In addition to what has already been mentioned more than 6 comprehensive preventive activities and programs have been established, compared with three activities that were in existence until the end of 1967. These [last three activities] are partial activities whose scope is limited and whose work does not go beyond the limits of a few narrow areas in the republic. These activities and programs are:

The Kind of Activity or Program	The Year 1967	The Year 1980	The Region
1. Maternity Care Centers	2	32 centers	All over the republic
2. Primary Health Care Program	--	1 center	Comprehensive program
3. Anti-tuberculosis program	--	1 center	Comprehensive program
4. Anti-malaria Program	1	1 center	Was a limited program and became comprehensive
5. Anti-schistosomiasis Program	--	1 center	Limited program
6. Program To Combat Contagious Eye Diseases	1	1 center	Was a limited program and became comprehensive
7. Maternity and Family Planning Program	1	1 center	Was a limited program and became comprehensive
8. School Health Activity	--	1 center	limited program
9. Vocational Health Activity	--	1 center	limited program

All this pertains to existing therapeutic and preventive services, but as far the prospects for further development of these services are concerned--and this is also the subject with which we are presently occupied--this is what we will try to discern from the stated facts of the second amended 5-Year Plan for 1981-1985, which is a superior plan, and from development indicators in the health field that are mentioned in the plan. Compared to the two previous plans, this health plan represents an advanced step in a series of significant steps forward in [the area of] health services.

In the second 5-Year Plan emphasis was placed on the following important aspects of the health field.

1. Health and preventive services were expanded and strengthened, and emphasis was placed on school health, maternity and child care, health education, vocational health, fighting schistosomiasis and expanding primary health care throughout the republic.

2. Therapeutic health services in hospitals, health centers and health units were expanded and improved.

3. Pharmaceutical services were regulated so as to guarantee the regular availability of the quantities and kinds [of medication needed]. In

addition, the foundation for all these services was expanded and their quality was upgraded in the various governorates of the country.

4. In the area of developing preventive health services, a number of programs to fight native and communicable diseases, to improve environmental conditions and to provide health care for mothers and children will also be implemented.

The number of people in the medical work force will rise during the years of the plan so that by 1985, the number of physicians will be 514. This is an increase of 326 physicians that provides 2.4 physicians for every 10,000 persons in the population, compared with 1 physician for every 10,000 persons in the base year, 1980. The number of qualified nurses will also increase to 2,131. This is an increase of 487 nurses [that provides] a rate of 9.9 nurses for every 10,000 persons in the population, compared with 8.6 nurses in 1980.

Educational Institutions and Preventive Activities until 1985

Kind of Institution or Activity	Present Number	Planned Number					Rate of Increase
		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	
Hospitals	29					33	13.7 percent
Maternity and Child Care Centers	1	--	--	--	--	1	--
Health Centers	106	1	1	1	1	17	50 percent
Health Units	274	--	--	--	--	325	18.6 percent
Public Clinics (Tuberculosis + Surgical and Vocational Clinics)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Maternity and Child Care Centers		4	4	4	4	4	
Primary Health Care Units		17	20	20	20	20	
Total							

(Source: Statistics and Planning Unit, the Ministry of Health)

We can conclude from the foregoing that the ongoing development in the field of health services is concentrated at present on improving the quality of those services for the purpose of achieving more progress and comprehensive development. Such progress and development are to be based on unity and, on the one hand, on the full integration of the quantity and quality of those services and, on the other hand, on prevention and treatment. [The development of these services] is tied to the requirements of the comprehensive development that is taking place all over the country in the various fields.

The continuous increase in the volume of funds invested in health services in the context of the ongoing development plans is an indication of the growing interest that our party, the Yemeni Socialist party, and the revolutionary government in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen are affording to health services. The volume of these investments in the first 5-Year Plan rose to 3,410,000 dinars. This is an increase of 2,803,707

dinars, a 4.61 percent increase over allocations in the 3-Year Plan. In the second 5-Year Plan health services allocations rose to 13,227,500 dinars, an increase of 9,817,500 dinars that amounts to a rate of 287.9 percent over the first 5-Year Plan.

This advancement which health services have experienced in the current stage of their development was not isolated from developments in the various aspects of social, economic and cultural life. In fact, this advancement did take place and is taking place in close conjunction with this development in the social, economic and cultural life as part of that development and as complementary to it. This is because the efforts of the party and of the state in Democratic Yemen are directed primarily towards achieving comprehensive development and improving the people's standard of living. [Efforts are also being directed towards] the gradual removal of the historical barriers that exist between the city and the country by means of paying increasing attention to rural areas and developing rural life by taking an interest in and improving the rural, agricultural economy and providing the services and the means of care that are necessary for rural residents.

However, this advancement which health services have experienced and are [still] experiencing during this stage of their development and which we tried to show in the foregoing [portion of our report], does not signify at all that everything in that social sector has taken place and is taking place according to plan. Quite the contrary, there is a number of problems still facing this sector and impeding the course of its progress. Some of these obstacles and problems, however, are not due to conditions that are inherent in this sector's development, but they are rather due to those objective conditions that stem from the facts of the current stage of the revolution's development and the degree of social and economic growth of society's development. These conditions are objective, general, comprehensive and irreversible. What is of concern to us now are these obstacles and problems that pertain to the sector and to its inherent conditions which can be overcome and surmounted by finding out what their causes are, treating those causes, coming up with sound solutions for them and working to put those solutions into practice, [that is], if we are definitely prepared to do so.

Despite the support and attention afforded to them by the party and the state, health services are still facing obstacles and problems because of inherent conditions alone. In our judgment these are temporary obstacles and problems that need more care, not only from the Ministry of Health, but also from all those who are working in the health field and who are related to this important field. Although there is a personal responsibility here, leadership is collective. Among the most prominent of these obstacles and problems, to give an example and not an exhaustive list are [the following]:

First, Health Administration and Health Planning

According to the scientific notion of the term, management is that art without which no activity, regardless of its kind, can be steered, guided

or developed. As far as health administration is concerned--and we are not only referring to the Ministry of Health, but we are rather referring to the health administration in general, from its highest echelons to its smallest health institution--that [body] is still suffering from some problems, especially the problem of weak structure and weak standards. This stems from lack of competence and from the degree of disparity that exists at present between the noticeable expansion and development that have been achieved in health services and the standard of health management whose present [state of] development has not kept up with the pace of this expansion and this development for several reasons. Most prominent of these reasons are:

1. Adequate care was not given from the outset to the various areas of management because the notion of management had been misunderstood and, accordingly, feared. In the past this notion was misunderstood in the same measure that it was misused. The field of management was seen as merely a detrimental area.

2. The basic medical work force, such as physicians, avoided administrative work with leadership [responsibilities] and viewed that work as though it were something secondary. On that basis they refused to assume those management responsibilities under the pretext that administrative work causes medical personnel to lose their scientific knowledge and practical skills. At the same time those people in the medical work force realize that health management is an inseparable part of health activity. In fact, health management with leadership capabilities enables qualified medical personnel to sharpen their talents and gain new knowledge and skills that are even greater than the narrow knowledge and skills they gain from their regular work and narrow specializations. The medical work force also realizes that its contributions to health services are urgently needed so that health management can be improved. This is based on the fact that mere discussions about the weakness of health management would be futile unless such discussions are supported by practical application carried out by this medical work force. This is because in all cases a spectator's position and a player's position differ.

3. There is a predominant feeling in the medical work force that while the administrative field has the greatest [number of] difficulties and responsibilities, it offers fewer opportunities than other areas of medicine do--higher academic qualifications, for example. Meanwhile, the rights, professional scales, etc. of people who are employed in this field are equal to those of others employed in the remaining fields, and this does not encourage people to go into administration.

4. The process of distributing the medical work force--especially the basic work force--lacks proper control. Thus we find some crowding of this work force in one field and in one area but not in others while the health administration field, for example, and areas in their entirety remain lacking in such personnel. This is due to the poor planning that has prevailed in health management for the past years.

5. There is a lack of any kind of analytical study of the problem of the work force in the field of health management, and there are no plans that would overcome this problem and solve it over a long period of time.

Despite the expansion that has occurred in health management over the past few years, the problem continues to present itself since the scope of the expansion did not parallel the major progress that was achieved in the quantity and quality of health services. Such progress requires management that is more advanced and more effective.

Second, Administrative Control and Work Regulations

Just as the existence of good health management is a matter of importance and substance, so is the presence of controls and legal regulations to regulate the course of work as well as the various relationships that exist within the health professions in all health organizations and activities. Work in this field can thus become more thorough, more proficient and more securely correlated to the duties with which it has been charged in everyone of its branches. One who keeps tabs on these occasional phenomena and violations in the field of work and on these gaps and shortcomings that are still perceived here and there--especially in the healing institutions whose relationship with the average citizen is a daily and a direct one--would be able to swear that no such controls or regulations exist. Let us say that if such controls and regulations exist, they are not being put into practice. This suggests that the matter of controls and regulations needs to receive greater attention and that measures that would be capable of overcoming such gaps and shortcomings are to be taken by doing the following:

1. The distinctive conditions of working in the field of health services are to be studied, and administrative measures--or rather legal measures also--are to be taken. These measures are to be formulated as regulations and laws that would regulate [the course of] work and contribute to its development in accordance with the functions and goals with which the area of health services, as an area that is related to people and oriented to their service, has been charged.

2. The various relationships within the framework of health services and in every health organization and activity are to be carefully defined so that duties and functions can be clarified. The relationship between the various health organizations and the other official and popular agencies as well as the required modes of dealing with citizens in this regard are also to be defined.

3. Strictness is to be maintained regarding questions that affect the health and safety of citizens or those that could discredit the profession. Leniency is not to be shown to those who are in any way derelict in their duties. Measures to curb such phenomena are to be taken, including firm, disciplinary legal measures. This is based on the fact that the health profession is simultaneously a patriotic and a humanitarian profession. In so far as its relationship to human life and its defense of this life are

concerned, the medical profession--if compared to military duty--is not less important. Therefore, this special feature ought to be taken into consideration when work related laws are enacted.

4. The process of supervision and follow-up is to be organized as an ancillary aspect [of management] to curb these offensive phenomena and to help in the advancement of the work. This can be done by utilizing the activity of the popular organization committees, by steering that activity in that direction and by developing the work of the health administration.

Third, Political Awareness

Being fortified with scientific knowledge in the area of health services--and in other areas as well--is important so that the standard of these services can be improved. However, this alone is not enough. Health services in our country are related to society, and society has its political goals in life. Therefore, these goals must be defined first, and then action must be taken in accordance with these goals. This requires that the political awareness of those working in the field of health services be raised so they can become profoundly aware of their duties to their people and can perform the duties that have been entrusted to them with full awareness and care.

Fourth, Capabilities and Assistance

Despite the scarcity of resources available to our country, the revolutionary government continues to provide the capabilities that are necessary for the health services sector. However, these capabilities need to be organized so they can be utilized in the required manner. This requires that more care be spent and that every available capability be protected. No form of negligence and wastefulness of these capabilities and public properties, which should be harnessed in the service of citizens, is to be allowed. In return, any such transgression is to be prosecuted; accountability is to become more stringent; and penalty is to be imposed on those who cause such [transgressions].

It is unfortunate that some people do not give their utmost attention to this problem. This is not only true of health services, but it is also true of most sectors. This is the result of inadequate economic awareness and the absence of a sense of personal responsibility for public property and how that property is to be protected as property that belongs to all the people.

In the same measure we must also utilize all the foreign material assistance that is offered to our country in the area of health. We must neither ignore nor neglect any measure of this assistance. We can do so by conducting a more serious follow-up effort of the various parties and by making an effort to implement all programs on schedule. These programs are to be subject to the goals of the development that is taking place in the health field all over the country. Naturally, this requires greater activity on the part of those who are concerned with the matter. They are not to show

any reluctance that would waste or fail to utilize any assistance that is offered regardless of its kind and amount. Foreign assistance, as far as our country is concerned, comes next in line after the domestic capabilities that are available and that must be harnessed to develop and upgrade the quality and the quantity of health services.

It is our own judgment that party organizations in the health services sector are to make a greater contribution to improve the standard of management and to help in overcoming these difficulties. They are to make an effort to raise the level of political awareness of those working in that sector so as to strengthen the leadership role of the Yemeni Socialist party and to carry out its sound policy in this significant social field.

I hope I have provided an adequate sketch of the importance of health services and health plans in our country and of the stages of their basic development as well as the problems and solutions that must be emphasized. I hope I have also given an adequate sketch of the directions in which these services are to develop in the subsequent period in the light of the development plan--the second 5-Year Plan. I hope I have been successful in making this sketch in accordance with my intention to inform the noble citizen about one of the aspects of social life and about the interest that the party and the state in our country are showing in the life of the people.

8592
CSO: 4304/108

PROGRESS MADE SINCE INDEPENDENCE DISCUSSED

GF031535 Doha QNA in Arabic 1320 GMT 3 Sep 81

[Text] Doha, 3 Sep (QNA)--In their editorials today, the Qatari newspapers continue to comment on the great achievements made by the State of Qatar during the past 10 years since its independence on 3 September 1971.

AL-RAYAH says: These past 10 years, despite all the progress and prosperity we have achieved, are nothing but a step on the long march of independence toward which the generations of our people will march with full determination to reach their goals of more achievements on the internal and external levels. They will also work to strengthen this homeland through the grace of the guidance and wise leadership of his highness the amir, Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Hamad al Thani.

The paper also praises the foreign policy of the State of Qatar on the Gulf, Arab, Islamic and international levels. It notes that this policy has given Qatar a respectable status on the international level.

AL-'ARAB says that during the past years and since the dawn of independence, our people have been able to achieve many of their hopes and to translate their ambitions through the grace of the wise leadership of his highness the amir, Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Hamad al Thani.

The paper notes that great projects have been implemented in the industrial, agricultural, educational, health and other fields. These projects have covered almost every part of the country. The paper also praises Qatar's foreign policy on the Gulf, Arab and international levels.

GULF TIMES, which is published in English, says that the past 10 years have shown that Qatar has been able to preserve its genuine, noble and national identity and that it has been able to choose its path toward a prosperous future. The paper also praises Qatar's strong support and aid to the Palestinian people's question.

CSO: 4304/137

SWEDEN WINS SECOND DAIRY CONTRACT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 34, 24 Aug 81 page not given

[Text]

The Swedish group specialising in agricultural and food processing engineering, Alfa-Laval, has won a second turnkey contract in Saudi Arabia for a $93 million expansion of a dairy farm close to the capital, Riyadh. The contract, awarded by the Saudi Arabian Agriculture and Dairy Company (SAADCO) follows an earlier one of $200 million, for the first phase of the project undertaken by Alfa-Laval.

The farm, destined to become the world's largest integrated farm for milk production, according to reports from Stockholm, was set up in 1979 on desert land. Although the contract announcement did not say what target dates for completion were, it is known that the farm when it is finished will contain some 25,000 heads of cattle imported from the Netherlands and the US. Of these, 10,000 are to be milking cows which are expected to produce between 150,000 and 200,000 litres of milk a day.

Alfa-Laval is scheduled to finish the construction part of the project within twelve months, when the present number of 3,600 milking cows could be doubled.

The expansion contract includes the cultivation of all 2,500 hectares of land held by SAADCO, which is prepared and irrigated to provide 10 annual harvests of grass and alfalfa. The dairy itself will also be enlarged and a new distribution centre with refrigirated storage space will be built in Riyadh.

To meet the expansion costs, SAADCO is raising its capital 10-fold to SR 100 million ($29.3 million). The remainder of the necessary funds for the project is being provided by an SR 240 million ($70.3 million) bank loan put up by 11 banks and led by the Saudi Investment Banking Corporation.

The Swedish group has a 12.5 per cent stake in SAADCO, a Lebanese partner has another 12.5 per cent and the 75 per cent majority share is held by Prince Abdallah al-Faisal.

Officials of the Swedish group regard the SAADCO project as proving the viability of large-scale dairy farming even in the most arid parts of the Middle East. The group spent two and a half years studying the geology and climate of the site before the farm project was launched.

CSO: 4300/98

BRIEFS

PLANS TO BOOST TOURISM--In a bid to boost Oman's annual income, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry is planning to provide several new tourism projects throughout the country. An amount of R.O. 9 million has been allocated by the government for the projects, including in the ministry's second five-year plan. Quoting an official of the Tourist Department, it was reported that the Ministry had approved the move following a survey carried out in various parts of the Sultanate. These projects include the construction of a five-star hotel near Seeb International Airport. The new hotel, which is expected to be ready by early 1983, will have 170 rooms, swimming pools, playgrounds and other facilities for tourists. Among the other projects is a plan to build a leisure centre on the coast opposite Port Qaboos. The centre will have a large restaurant to accomodate 150 persons at a time, and will also have children's playgrounds and a harbour for boating. Similar smaller centres will be provided on the Capital's beaches at Bustan, Bandar al-Khairan and near the Inter-Continental. Work is due to be completed by the end of next year. /Text/ /Muscat TIMES OF OMAN in English 20 Aug 81 p 1/

CSO: 4300/99

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AMBUSH UNIT IN ALEPPO

NC211322 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 21 Aug 81

[Text] A number of Syrian special units personnel were killed in an ambush in Aleppo and Hamah. Huge demonstrations were staged in the city of Aleppo. We have received the following report on the situation:

At 1130 yesterday, a Syrian special unit vehicle was destroyed on the Aleppo airport road, four of its occupants were killed and a large number of soldiers were injured. It was reported that a Renault car exploded while the Syrian military vehicle was passing.

Yesterday morning, massive demonstrations were staged in Aleppo, shops were closed and traffic was crippled in protest against the actions of the special units and soaring prices. Placards were seen asking for the Syrian soldiers--who were sent to Lebanon and whose fate is unknown. This came after bodies of a number of soldiers who were killed in the Tripoli incidents were handed over to relatives in Aleppo. The demonstrators clashed with Syrian soldiers using stones and batons. A number of people were injured and others detained. In the localities of Bab al-Nayrab and al-Kallasah [in Aleppo] which are under siege by the Syrian special units in search for Muslim Brotherhood members, a number of people were injured as a result of skirmishes between the people and the soldiers.

The Muslim Brotherhood distributed leaflets calling for rebellion against the authorities and threatening to bomb government establishments and assassinate [officials]. The report said that the cities of Aleppo and Hamah are witnessing an atmosphere fraught with concern and fear over the current campaign to arrest teachers, professors, engineers, intellectuals, and politicians.

CSO: 4304/135

SYRIAN POUND GAINS STRENGTH, BRINGING BROAD ECONOMIC GAINS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 4 Jul 81 pp 49-50

[Article: "Syrian Pound Regains in 2 Days What It Lost Over Several Months; the Parallel Money Market Has Fulfilled Its Promises for the Syrian Pound; Decisions for the Guidance of the Economy Lighten Imports and Reduce the Demand for Foreign Currencies; Arab Aid Improves Syrian Balance of Payments and Relieves Some Pressure on the Currency"]

[Text] A few weeks ago, the Syrians were using every possible means to convert their Syrian pounds into other currencies whose exchange rates were rising relative to the exchange rate of their currency. But just a few days ago, these same people were lining up in front of the windows of Syrian Commercial Bank branches offering up their foreign currencies in exchange for Syrian pounds before they could be caught by a new drop in the exchange rates of foreign currencies relative to the Syrian pound.

How and why did the Syrians do this? How long will they continue this trend? The answers are contained in the following report.

On the previous Monday, 22 June, the exchange rate of the Syrian pound experienced a substantial gain over all foreign currencies, ranging from 20 to 25 percent above the previous day's exchange rates.

On Syrian markets, the exchange rate of the Syrian pound went from 635 Syrian piasters per dollar on Sunday, 21 June, to 570 Syrian piasters per dollar on the following day. The same trend was observed on the Syrian markets and the Beirut free market with respect to the Lebanese lira, with the exchange rate of the Syrian pound going from 68-69 [Lebanese] piasters on Saturday, 20 June, to 74-76 piasters on the following Monday.

This upward movement of the exchange rate of the Syrian pound relative to foreign and Arab currencies continued on Tuesday, 23 June. The exchange rate for this day was 545 Syrian piasters per dollar in the Syrian markets and 79-81 Lebanese piasters per Syrian pound in the Beirut market.

This clear improvement in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound relative to all other currencies and the fact that such a large increase occurred in such a short period of time were sufficient to attract the attention of everyone concerned with the Syrian pound both within Syria and abroad. It also stirred up a large

amount of "concern and uproar," to the extent that the newspaper AL-THAWRAH was prompted to issue its edition of Tuesday, 23 June, with an 8-column, front-page headline about the event--something that the Syrian press had never done before, even at the height of its concern about and concentration on economic events.

But this marked event and the climate of excitement which has developed around it did not come unannounced, nor did it surprise many who keep up with the Syrian pound and its exchange rate--especially those who monitored the progress of the pound's exchange rate during May and June. This period followed the move to establish a parallel money market in Syria, which dictated that the Syrian Central Bank fix a specific exchange rate for the Syrian pound with respect to other currencies each day according to the principles of supply and demand. This move was intended to facilitate industrial, commercial, tourist and financial operations and transactions and free the Syrian currency--and consequently the Syrian economy--from the negative factors which arose from the existence of an artificial exchange rate that was set officially but applied in practice only within a very narrow sphere. This situation caused the Syrian economy to suffer the negative effects of such restrictions without realizing any of their benefits.

For as has been confirmed throughout the past 2 months, it is evident that the new gains achieved by the Syrian pound on 20 and 21 June formed a natural and logical conclusion to the upward trend that the Syrian pound began experiencing early in May. At this time it began a gradual ascent from a level of 675 Syrian piasters per dollar--and 62 Lebanese piasters per Syrian pound on the Beirut market--to levels that were healthier for the Syrian economy and more secure and profitable for savers and investors.

Syrian pleasure at this development was complete, not only because of the improvement in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound but also because the improvement that occurred in the parallel market within Syria could bring with it a similar improvement in the free money market in Beirut, which is considered a standard by which to gauge all the currencies and an arena in which to monitor currency exchange rates. This is especially applicable to the Syrian pound since it is the currency of one of Lebanon's neighboring and most closely related countries. Moreover, the Beirut market is the primary outlet for the Syrian pound, just as Switzerland is the primary outlet for the French franc or the Italian lira.

The upward trend that the exchange rate of the Syrian pound has embarked on was a natural development for a number of reasons. Observers of economic and monetary conditions in Syria agree on the following causes:

1. The first reason, which involves monetary structure, pertains to the changes that the Syrian authorities introduced in the money market in Syria with the creation of a money market in which the exchange rate of the currency is determined by supply and demand (see AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI, volume 2, number 54, 9 May 1981, pp 55, 56).

The mere creation of this market (even though the decision to institute it went beyond an earlier anticipated deadline) was sufficient to cause a degree of relaxation in the Syrian money and commercial market. The market became able to provide a climate of sound and healthy interaction among industrialists and

businessmen (importers or exporters), who began to feel that they would no longer have to try to evade laws and regulations, smuggle Syrian currency or arrange to get foreign currency at high prices while remaining accountable for it to the state and its agencies at low prices.

This climate of relaxation may be effectively strengthened by the measures that accompanied the decision to create the parallel market, which specified the operations that would benefit from this market and the exported or imported goods to which the market's rates would be applied. These measures showed that the Syrian authorities were prepared to widen the field of application of these decisions to include broader operations and new goods.

2. The second reason, which is also a structural one, pertains to the developments introduced by the decisions for the guidance of the economic policy of Syria in both the commercial sector and the investment sector.

These measures first began with a decision that accompanied the creation of the parallel currency market and the regulations pertaining to the move to permit credits for importation in foreign currencies. However, within a few days they developed into the decisions for the guidance of importation, which prevented the importation of foreign cigarettes, women's readymade clothing, real and artificial flowers, perfumes, marble, air conditioners and other goods.

The basis for this move was that some of these items are luxuries and preventing their importation would not only provide hard currency that would ease the pressure on the Syrian pound but would also encourage the existing national industry and enable it to increase exportation, thereby increasing Syria's income from the foreign sector.

These are not isolated decisions but rather are part of measures that the Syrian authorities began adopting some time ago when they pledged in the new 5-year plan for 1981-1985 to concentrate new investments on the completion of projects that had already begun and not to establish new projects without first determining its economic benefits. The authorities are attempting to supplement these measures with other measures to bring about an improvement in Syrian production through development of the work and activity of the Standards and Specifications Organization.

3. The third factor that played a role in the improvement of the exchange rate of the Syrian pound is the reported fact that some of the Arab states are again paying some of the stipulated aid to Syria, both within the framework of the Arab summit conferences and of the Arab's commitments to fund the Arab deterrence forces in Lebanon.

Inconsistencies in the reports circulated about the actual aid payments that have reached Syria aside, the role of this financial aid in improving the Syrian currency exchange rate is incontestable. This is especially important during the current stage in which Syria is shouldering additional burdens in its military budgets because of its military and political role in Lebanon and because of the state of extreme war fever that has developed in the region since the outbreak of the so-called missile crisis.

The importance of the role of Arab aid in this connection is borne out by the following two indicators:

1. First, from early 1981 to the present, Syria has not received most of the Arab aid it was supposed to have collected from several Arab states both inside and outside the Gulf region. Moreover, $75 million of the total aid traditionally given to Syria by AID each year since the mid-1970's ($90 million) has been withheld.

2. Second, the steep decline in the exchange rate of Syrian currency, which brought it down to over 650 piasters per dollar and about 165 Syrian piasters per Lebanese lira, took place at a time when Syria's reserves of foreign currency had fallen to a low level after the states concerned had refused to advance any installments of aid.

The benefits to the Syrian economy from this advance in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound are very great indeed.

The first is that Syria has become more capable than ever of financing many of the urgent development and supply projects that will increase the capacity of its production base and consequently result in an increase in the national income, an increase in the export capacity and a decrease in imports.

The second benefit is that the improvement in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound will undoubtedly be reflected in a reduction in the inflationary pressures caused by the rising cost of various imports, particularly food and consumer goods.

To all this can be added the fact that the substantial improvement of the Syrian pound's exchange rate will do no harm to the export sectors (industry and agriculture) since the prices of Syrian export goods based on current exchange rate levels remain competitive with those of similar goods in neighboring markets.

Moreover, the new exchange rate of the Syrian pound will not hurt the Syrian tourist sector, which is still moderately priced (though tourism is not a major factor in the Syrian economy). When these additional facts are considered, it is clear that the recent monetary developments hold many advantages for Syria without doing any appreciable harm, unless one considers the harm done to an extremely small group of individuals who have been prevented from importing certain articles. At any rate, these individuals can shift to the marketing of other articles.

This leads to the following questions: How far can the exchange rate of the Syrian pound climb in the foreseeable future? Can it achieve a greater increase than it achieved early last week? Or could it become subject to negative pressures that will erode all the improvement it has achieved?

A reasonable answer to these questions is naturally tied to a determination of the factors that have played or could play positive or negative roles in the development of the Syrian economy and consequently its currency.

If it is a fact that the establishment of the parallel market has--as Syrian Minister of Economy Dr Muhammad al-Atrash anticipated--enabled Syria to strengthen its ability to control the exchange rate of the Syrian currency and increase it while lowering the exchange rates of foreign currencies, it is also a fact that this control has strengthened due to other factors. On the one hand, it has been strengthened because of the organization and regulation of the imports sector and due to the encouragement of exports and the improvement of the export returns. On the other hand, Syria's control over its exchange rate has been bolstered by some installments of Arab aid to the country, which is poor because it spends most of its budget for defense purposes.

While this means that a continuing effort to abide by and ensure these conditions is necessary to guarantee that the state of relative health now enjoyed by the Syrian currency continues, any disturbance of this balance will threaten some aspects of the improved situation. However, this danger is virtually nonexistent at present because, first, the Syrian authorities are determined to carry through the application of the new monetary techniques and second, because the Syrian political situation and the overall Arab strategic position make it incumbent on the Arabs to cease withholding aid from Syria, if not to increase it and coordinate aid payments.

Perhaps it is this fact that prompts many workers in the Syrian economy and observers of Syria's economic progress to urge the Syrian authorities to take advantage of the existing circumstances to push economic and monetary conditions to new levels of progress and improvement by additional liberalization measures in the areas of the economy, management, investment opportunities, production and services.

Additional measures in this direction will not only reinforce the results achieved thus far but will also give Syrian, Arab, and foreign investors additional confidence in the Syrian economy (without enabling them to take hold of it) as well as attracting back superior Syrian technical experts scattered through other countries, enabling the Syrian economy--and Syria generally--to benefit immensely from them.

If a thousand-mile journey begins with a single step, then those in Syria who have initiated the recent measures must follow them up with others that will naturally complete them, although they must do so gradually.

8591
CSO: 4304/70

BRIEFS

ORGANIZATION UNDER RIF'AT AL-ASAD--Within the context of its saboteur role in Lebanon and its instigation of turbulence and anarchy, the ruling regime in Damascus has recently formed a new armed organization to carry out this role called the Arab Knights Organization [Munazzamat al-Fursan al-'Arab]. Reports say the Rif'at al-Asad, the brother of this regime's ruler, is directly supervising this organization, which has been supplied with arms and light armor. These reports point out that the aforementioned organization stands behind the bloody events in Tripoli which have been going on for 3 days and which have led to the killing of 21 and the wounding of 47 others. [Text] [JN0716555 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 7 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/135

COMPLIANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL LAW STRESSED

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 25 Aug 81 p 3

/Text/

INDUSTRIAL companies in the United Arab Emirates dragging their feet over compliance with the Federal Industrial Law which was introduced two years ago may have to face penalties.

This law required all such companies to register with the Ministry of Finance and Industry, detailing their capital formation and share distribution.

It gave foreign industrial companies until mid-1981 to transfer at least 51 per cent of their equity to UAE nationals and to ensure that both the chairman and deputy chairman of each board of directors were nationals. Only industrial companies with a capital of less than Dh 250,000 were exempt.

This week, the Director General of the Industry Department, Mr Jaffar Al Fardhan, told Khaleej Times in Abu Dhabi that only 300 out of the 658 industrial companies in the UAE had registered with the ministry. Only a few of them had ensured that UAE nationals were now majority shareholders.

He declared: "We are not going to waste any more time now. All the companies concerned know the provisions of the law and it is the government's intention to enforce them rigorously."

SPECIAL INVESTIGATION

A special investigation had already begun to uncover details of capital formation of those companies which had not yet registered with the ministry.

Dubai has the highest number of companies which have registered—127; Sharjah has 88; Abu Dhabi 53; Ras Al Khaimah 22; Ajman eight; and Fujeirah two.

The total capital investment represented by the companies so far registered amounts to Dh 2,209 billion of which the local element is Dh 1,197 billion.

Officials concede that some of the larger concerns could have difficulty in finding UAE nationals with sufficient capital to participate.

Mr Lalub A. Sadoon, a senior official of the Industries Division in the ministry, emphasised that there was no intention "to nationalise foreign companies." The purpose of the law was to ensure that national interests were respected.

Asked what penalties might be incurred by companies which delayed any further in ensuring the required degree of participation, Mr Sadoon said a special committee would consider each case and recommend a course of action against those which erred. The law provided for penalties ranging from Dh 10,000 to Dh 100,000.

He pointed out that one factor which could assist UAE nationals in finding the necessary finance would be the proposed Industrial Bank.

According to the bank's draft charter, it would have a government loan of one billion dirhams while its own capital would be Dh 500 million made up from 500,000 shares of Dh 1,000 each.

Final approval for establishing the Industrial Bank was, however, still awaited, he said.

Mr Sadoon further explained that although the special committee would examine each case and make recommendations on action, it would be the Council of the Minister for Finance and Industry that would determine matters such as compensation for companies.

The order to move on implementing the Federal Industrial Law was given by Shaikh Hamdan bin Rashid, Minister of Finance and Industry, who spoke of the need "to preserve national capital."

CSO: 4300/99

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FIGURES FOR EASTERN REGION

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 22 Aug 81 p 3

/Text/

AGRICULTURAL production in the Eastern region, which increased steadily in the past ten years, is now enough to meet the needs of Abu Dhabi and Al Ain and also leaves a surplus.

This was announced by Mr Juma Harib, director of agriculture and animal husbandry in Al Ain.

He said agriculture had become the main source of livelihood for some families in the region.

He said this great expansion was the result of the attention paid by His Highness President Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan who had ordered the issue of seeds and saplings, free drilling of wells and providing farmers with water pumps.

The President also assisted farmers by ordering payment of half the value of fertilisers and water-pumps as well as half the cost of the irrigation network up to a maximum of Dh 25,000 for each farm.

In addition, the agricultural department bears half the cost of fencing farms.

MODERN METHODS

Mr Harib said the department was trying to develop agriculture in the region further by introducing the latest systems of cultivation. The agricultural experiments station, the laboratories and the guidance centres played an important role in this regard.

The laboratories analyse soil and water to determine the type and quantity of fertilisers needed. Studies are also conducted on insects and diseases to fix the right type of insecticides.

The director said agricultural area in the region increased by 204 per cent from 16,124 dunum in 1970 to 49,102 dunum in 1980.

The number of farms rose from 290 in 1970 to 1,281 in 1980.

Fifty varieties of vegetables and fruits were produced last year and the production rose from 5,504 tons in 1977 to 13,858 tons in 1980, an increase of 140 per cent.

The loans disbursed by the department increased from Dh 2,460,384 in 1977 to Dh 9,491,853 in 1980 and 3,359 farmers benefited.

IRRIGATION

Mr Harib said spraying system was used for irrigation in government projects such as the Al Quha project. This saved 40 per cent of water compared to the flooding system.

The modern system of drip irrigation has now been implemented in private farms and it is used mostly for vegetable production. The number of farms adopting this system rose from one in 1975 to 173 in 1980 and the area from 15 dunum in 1975 to 3,163 dunum in 1980. This system saves 60 per cent of water compared to the traditional system.

There are 14 agricultural guidances centres affiliated to the department in Al Kattarah Seih bin Ammar, Al Ain, Abu Samra, Swehan, Dahan, Khazna, Al Showaib, Southern Al Wagn, Al Sad, Al Hair, Al Wagn, Medesese and Al Arad.

The services offered by the agricultural guidance division include ploughing 21,320 dunum, surveying 19,368 dunum, distribution of fertilisers to 7,601 dunum and cultivating 10,534 dunum.

The division distributed 37,500 kilograms of seeds, 14,790,600 vegetable saplings, 197,600 kilograms of potato seeds and 7,550 kilograms of fertilisers.

Regarding the department's plans Mr Harib said it would start a project for producing green fodder for animals on 100 hectares at Al Ashoush region.

LIVESTOCK

Regarding livestock, Mr Harib said the department gave awards to the nationals who breed livestock—Dh 100 for a camel and Dh 50 for every head of goat or sheep.

The number of goats and sheep increased from 49,559 in 1976 to 107,341 in 1980 while the number of camels rose from 17,037 in 1976 to 32,923 in 1980, an increase of 11 per cent.

The assistance offered by the department to the owners of livestock rose from Dh 5,885,350 in 1976 to Dh 11,243,450 in 1980 and the number of beneficiaries increased from 2,383 to 3,080 in 1980.

Animals are treated in the veterinary hospitals and clinics free of charge.

Regarding apiary, he said the number of beehives had risen from 148 in 1977 to 276 in 1980.—WAM

CSO: 4300/99

BRIEFS

FUTURE REFINING CAPACITY--UAE will rank fourth among Arab countries in oil refining capacity by 1983, according to an official study published in Abu Dhabi yesterday. The study, made by Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry estimates that the 1983 refining capacity of the country will be 290,000 barrels per day (BPD), compared to 15,000 BPD in 1979. The refining capacity of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) member states has reached 2.76 million BPD and is expected to go up to 5.36 million BPD by 1983.--WAM /Text/ /Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 24 Aug 81 p 1/

EDUCATION STATISTICS CITED--The number of students in 69 private schools in the country at the end of the 1980-81 academic year was 30,368--16,386 boys and 13,982 girls--against 25,874 students in the previous year in 57 schools. A report of the Ministry of Education said that 25 schools were in Abu Dhabi, 26 in Dubai, 12 in Sharjah, 3 in Ajman, 2 in Ras Al Khaimah and one school in Fujeirah. These schools had a teaching and administrative staff of 1,691. Private kindergartens numbered 279 with 9,233 children and nurseries, 85 with 2,697 children. Teachers and administrative staff of the Ministry of Education at the end of the 1980-81 academic year numbered 8,893. A report by the statistics division at the ministry revealed that 5,424 of them worked in primary schools, 2,829 in preparatory and secondary schools, 8, were imparting industrial education, 176 religious education and 9 commercial and agricultural education. Men numbered 4,240 and women 4,653. The report said that 3,546 teachers and administrators worked in Abu Dhabi emirate--267 in kindergartens, 2,228 in primary schools, 1,007 in preparatory and secondary schools, and 44 imparted religious education. There were 1,725 teachers and administrators in Dubai emirate, 1,525 in Sharjah, 399 in Ajman, 198 in Umm Al Quwain, 339 in Fujeirah and 1,101 in Ras Al Khaimah. /Text/ /Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 22 Aug 81 p 3/

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS PROPOSED--A number of vital agricultural projects which will ensure future food security in the Sultanate are being planned by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. This includes the study and analysis of about 100,000 hectares of land in an effort to establish whether it can be used for planting. A further 900 hectares in Wadi Koriyat, Al Kamel, Al Wafi, Al Buraimi and the neighboring areas are to be planted with wheat. The Ministry is planning to support existing research stations in Al Ramees and Salalah, and to establish others in Shanass, Ibri and Ibra. Programmes are also underway for the building of poultry research stations in Al Ramees and Al Khabourah, and the next year will see the development of 40 centres for agricultural services. Under the Ministry's

plan to make drinking water available throughout the Sultanate, wells and falajs are to be extensively modernised and improved. Irrigation projects are being carried out in 11 areas and, in addition, studies are being conducted to establish efficient ways of watering new areas of land. /Text/ /Muscat THE TIMES OF OMAN in English 20 Aug 81 p 1/

CSO: 4300/99

BRIEFS

AFESD LOAN GRANTED--The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) has granted North Yemen a loan of $5.04 million to finance its share of the pan-Arab telecommunications project. The loan comes on the heels of another one by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) for the same purpose (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, August 10). The North Yemeni portion of the $30 million telecommunications project includes the establishment of two microwave links and related equipment, expanding existing lines between the capital Sana'a and Taiz and providing technical services. The project aims to link Somalia, Djibouti, North and South Yemen to the rest of the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa with a modern communications network (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, July 6). The sectoral distribution of the project is as follows: $6.84 million for North Yemen, $9.72 million for Somalia, $5.4 million for Djibouti and $6.48 million for South Yemen. AFESD has already extended credits to the last three countries to finance part of their share. Total AFESD lending to North Yemen now stands at $132.84 million, according to reports from the fund's headquarters in Kuwait. These credits have financed three power projects, three water and sewage schemes, one road development plan and the current telecommunications project. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 33, 17 Aug 81 p 8]

CSO: 4300/98 END

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2397

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16 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2397

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'AFP' REPORTS AFGHAN REBELS RECEIVE SAM-7'S

BK021317 Hong Kong AFP in English 1255 GMT 2 Sep 81

[Text] Islamabad, 2 Sep (AFP)--Afghan Muslim resistance fighters are starting to receive a small number of portable SAM-7 anti-aircraft missiles but they have not had much success against Soviet helicopters, according to Western eyewitness accounts here.

A doctor with a Paris-based humanitarian organisation who was last month in Nangarhar Province, eastern Afghanistan, saw several of these missiles half-hidden under tarpaulins in a house heavily guarde by Mujahedeen militants.

"The local Mujahedeen chief admitted that they were portable SAM-7 missiles which a small group could carry about and assemble into an anti-aircraft battery.

He would give no details about where they came from, how many there were or their likely targets.

Two other travellers arriving here reported that several months ago the Muslim Hezbi guerrilla faction led by Mullah Yunes Khales had fired four SAM-7 missiles without a hit.

Ever since the Soviets used helicopter gunships, the Mujahadeen have been begging the West to supply them with anti-aircraft missiles to shoot them down.

The SAM-7 missile could radically alter the whole conflict in Afghanistan by preventing Soviet helicopters from strafing resistance fighters.

But sources close to Western intelligence services say that untrained Afghans have been unable to master the complexities of the SAM-7 launching device which is battery-powered.

The SAM-7 is a heat-seeking missile, but has to be aimed and fired within a matter of seconds.

A French member of a charity organisation running medicine and food into Afghanistan said that in the Ghazni region, south of Kabul, he had met a group of resisters who claimed to possess some SAM-7's.

I never saw them myself, but this group was carrying a large amount of material and an impressive number of bazooka anti-tank rockets," he said.

Tales of shot-down helicopters are rare and the Afghan resistance movement has never claimed to have hit anything with a SAM-7.

Meanwhile, Western diplomatic sources said yesterday that fighting was continuing in the Afghan provinces although Kabul seemed calmer than usual.

There have been far fewer sounds of firing and explosions this [words indistinct] rumours of attacks were also less numerous, diplomatic sources said.

Many convoys have left the capital for the nearby provinces of Parwan and Logar where several clashes and air raids have been reported.

Soviet and Afghan army units have been trying, without success, for the past 10 days to smash the rebel stronghold in Panjhir Valley, north of Kabul, according to diplomats, they have been carrying out reprisals against rebel villages by shelling them or destroying crops.

Diplomats also report that a member of the ruling Afghan Peoples' Democratic Party said this week that "the Soviets were in Afghanistan for a very long time and they will not abandon the (pro-Moscow Babrak) Karmal regime."

He added that: "The United States and the Soviet Union would probably reach an agreement over Afghanistan in exchange for concessions made to the Americans in another part of the world."

CSO: 4600/171

EGYPTIAN INTELLIGENCE ARRESTS TWO SEDITION SUSPECTS

NC072328 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2200 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Cairo, 7 Sep (MENA)--In tomorrow's issue, AL-AHRAM quotes [sources of] the Egyptian general intelligence who divulged the secrets of the anonymous leaflets and messages which contributed to the kindling of the fire of sectarian sedition.

The general intelligence nabbed the sources of these leaflets and messages which stirred up the Muslims and Christians alike. The intelligence apprehended two who, it was found out, were behind all the anonymous messages and leaflets which were recently distributed and which had a direct effect on threatening national unity by means of a preconceived plan.

The newspaper has learned that the first defendant is a Christian university professor in the faculty of agriculture at Cairo University, who was sent by the state to the Soviet Union [to study] for his doctorate. Upon his return to Cairo, he taught agriculture in Cairo and, for 3 years, was sending letters to some of the al-Azhar men of religion. Some public figures and journalists under assumed names and from various places which extended from Port Said to Aswan. In these letters, he defamed the Islamic religion, referred cynically to Muslim men of religion, attacked the Muslim faith and derided the political leaders in a pejoratively obscene and inciting manner.

The religious groups received one of these messages and published it in a leaflet which they distributed among the populace with a note in which they called on all the Muslims to be vigilant in order to confront the crusaders' plan aimed at striking against the Islamic religion. This leaflet was distributed throughout the country.

AL-AHRAM goes on to say that this incitement reached a crescendo when religious groups called for convening a conference in which all their leaders on the republic level and some Muslim brotherhood leaders would participate. In this conference, which was held at the al-Azhar University, they announced a number of recommendations which included the formation of Holy Jihad groups--and this helped drive in the roots of the sedition.

The newspaper writes that the second defendant is a 3d year Muslim student at the law faculty at the University of Alexandria and an amir of one of the Islamic groups in Alexandria. This defendant, who wrote leaflets in his own handwriting and distributed them, attacked the Muslims and called for nonparticipation in their feasts.

The paper says that these leaflets created repercussions among the Christians, and this helped kindle the fire of sedition. When this man was apprehended on 31 August at his home in Alexandria, the originals of those leaflets were seized there as well as some recorded tapes which included his speeches which he delivered in mosques. It was discovered that he had visited mosques in Alexandria, Marsa Matruh and al-Minya and that he had a baby and had married two ladies, one of whom was divorced.

In one of the messages which he addressed to a Muslim man of religion, the university professor referred to "those shaykhs with the wooden turbans and the fossilized minds who like to wade into the Christian religion and other religions while none of the Christian men of religion even thinks of talking about the Islamic faith, because we do not recognize it."

I would like to ask you, oh stupid shaykh, how did the Islamic religion enter Egypt? If, however, your wooden turban cannot come to your rescue with an answer, then let me tell you that 'Umar ibn al-'As, who conquered Egypt, told al-Muqawqas: "Either you adopt Islam or else pay a fine or fight." Thus, those among the Copts who were poor people adopted Islam, since they could not afford to pay a fine, and you are their descendant and it is for this that the Christians despise the Muslims.

One of the leaflets seized along with the law student warns the Muslims against participating in the feasts of the polytheists; participating with the infidels in their feasts is opposed to the laws of the Shari'ah for the following reasons: These feasts were either contrived or invented in the religion of the infidels or else they are embedded in our Shari'ah, and even though Islam had recognized the religion of the people of the book, it nevertheless stipulated that they should practice it in hiding--without showing up at the conventions of the Muslims. Participating with the infidels in their feasts means being allied with them, and this is a pretext to heresy. So, how can we beckon them to come to us while God has repelled them and how can we exalt them while God has humiliated them?

AL-AHRAM says that the defendants were apprehended in the presence of members of the state security prosecution who were permitted to make the detentions. The paper adds that the investigations with them were carried out amid full guarantees and the supremacy of the law.

CSO: 4504/67

LABOR PARTY PROTESTS CONFISCATION OF ITS PAPER

PM080928 Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 31 Aug 81 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Socialist Labor Party Discusses Reasons for Confiscating AL-SHA'B Newspaper"]

[Excerpts] The Socialist Labor Party has described the confiscation of Issue number 122 of the newspaper AL-SHA'B last Tuesday as a medal on the party's chest and a testimony to its paper's success. The Socialist Labor Party this week devoted its weekly meeting to discussing the role of AL-SHA'B and the National Democratic Party's [NDP] attitude to it.

Party chairman engineer Ibrahim Shukri said: Never before have I felt so reassured as I felt on the day the latest issue of the newspaper AL-SHA'B was confiscated, because what happened was tantamount to pinning a medal on our party's chest and confirms to everybody that we are doing our duty in opposition. It shows that our opposition is not calculated or restricted within a certain framework, as some people have thought and as some foreign correspondents imagined when they asked me: Why has your paper not been confiscated before?

The Socialist Labor Party leader added: The confiscation order was expected by some, feared by others and precluded by yet others. But now it has actually happened. We are certain that this is a great loss for the NDP, which has always boasted that there are opposition papers in Egypt and that nobody stops them. We wonder what the NDP wants from us. Does it want us to applaud it like the rest of the so-called national papers? Does it want us to remain silent over mistakes and excesses? If we were to do so, what is the point in our existing and continuing in the opposition?

The Socialist Labor Party issued a statement on the confiscation of the newspaper AL-SHA'B which said: The security authorities seized the copies of the AL-SHA'B which was due to be published last Tuesday from the printing press. They then obtained an order from the state prosecution service banning its circulation, although some copies had already been distributed in Cairo the previous (Monday) night.

The Socialist Labor Party expresses deep regret at the government's resort to this sort of pressure on the newspaper AL-SHA'B which, in the 121 issues published in the past 2 years, has abided by the law and the constitution and has sincerely expressed the people's aspiration with inoffensive words and true expression.

The party will continue to publish AL-SHA'B in order to voice its program, its principles and the people's freedom, always abiding by the law and the constitution, whatever pressure may be brought on it in the future.

CSO: 4504/67

'MAY' LISTS RESTRICTS ON DEPOSED COPTIC POPE

NC062257 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2235 GMT 6 Sep 81

[Text] Cairo, 6 Sep (MENA)--The weekly newspaper MAY says that President Anwar al-Sadat's decision canceling his decree issued in 1971 on the appointment of Anba Shinudah to the post of the pope will result in the invalidation of Anba Shinudah's signature and seals in all the official records of the state. It also means that Anba Shinudah will not stay in Cairo or Alexandria and will be advised to stay in his monastery in Wadi an-Natrun. As a result of this decision, Anba Shinudah also will not be allowed to meet with the masses in order to secure the people's safety, preserve the reputation of the church and protect the country's security.

In its Monday edition, the newspaper says that President al-Sadat has asked the interior minister to contact the five-member committee of bishops who will discharge the papal duties to inform them of this.

The committee will hold its first meeting tomorrow, Monday, to discuss the means to contain the sectarian sedition and consolidate national unity.

The committee assumed its work today, Sunday, However, four members were not able to arrive in Cairo because of their occupation with the Sunday prayers in their regions.

CSO: 4504/67

PAPER DESCRIBES ARREST OF HAYKAL

PM090946 Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 5 Sep 81 p 1

[Muhammad Shakir report: "What Happened When Haykal Was Taken Into Custody"]

[Excerpt] Alexandria--What happened when they [that is, persons subject to arrest] were informed of the custody order.

A police officer entered Muhammad Hasanyan Haykal's residence in Stanley [quarter] in Alexandria and served on him the writ for his arrest and for bringing him before the authorities. When Haykal inquired about the order he was told that it was a writ of summons to appear before the socialist attorney general for investigation.

Haykal asked the police officer for time in order to make a telephone call to an official. He did make the call but the person speaking at the other end of the line in the official's residence said that the official was asleep and could not be awakened.

I am Muhammad Hasanyan Haykal, Haykal said. But the speaker on the telephone repeated what he said before, upon which Haykal replaced the handset angrily. He asked the officer: Where is your car?

Muhammad Hasanyan Haykal was taken to Cairo in the same car as Abu al-'Izz al-Hariri, a former member of the People's Assembly and deputy leader of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG] party.

On seeing Haykal, al-Hariri said to him: Hello Mr Haykal. I am Abu al-'Izz al-Hariri, deputy leader of the NPUG party.

I have not had the honor.... replied Haykal haughtily. Al-Hariri said: I was a member of the People's Assembly. I am sorry I have not heard of you, Haykal replied. He then turned his face and remained silent throughout the journey to Cairo.

CSO: 4504/67

BAR REQUESTS INFORMATION ON ARRESTED LAWYERS

NC072345 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2215 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Cairo, 7 Sep (MENA)--The Doyen of Lawyers, Dr Jamal al-'Utayfi, has stated that the bar association has asked the socialist public prosecutor, adviser 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad, to inform it of the date set up for the start of the investigations with the lawyers who have been apprehended so that the association can choose a lawyer to defend them.

The Doyen of Lawyers said that the bar association would offer legal aid to those who were apprehended and who cannot afford their own lawyer when it becomes evident that they cannot do so and that the association would delegate a lawyer in accordance with the association's laws. He added that the association has asked the socialist prosecutor to inform it of the names of the lawyers who were apprehended so that it can form a body to defend them.

In tomorrow's issue, AL-JUMHURIYAH points out that the journalists' association has decided to delegate the association's attorney, Mr (Ahmad Shanan) who is also the chairman of the subsidiary lawyers' association in Cairo to defend the journalists who have been apprehended.

CSO: 4504/67

INTERIOR MINISTRY PREPARING FOR REFERENDUM

NC061404 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 6 Sep 81

[Text] The Interior Ministry has started to adopt the necessary measures in preparation for holding the referendum related to the measures and principles of national unity and social peace which were announced in the president's statement yesterday to the People's Assembly and Consultative Council. The referendum will be held next Thursday.

It has been decided that every voter will cast his vote at the constituency in which he is registered. The voter will have to present a pink voting ticket. Every voter will also be permitted to cast his vote at the nearest constituency in cases where the voter is on a trip or when his place of work is far away from the constituency in which he is registered. In such a case, the voter will have to present to the president of the constituency council a document proving his identity and the pink voting document.

The state printers are currently printing the referendum tickets, which have print on both sides. One side depicts a drawing symbolizing national unity and social peace under which appears the question "Do you agree with the measures and principles aimed at protecting national unity and social peace?" There are two circles under this question: The first is red and the second black. The red circle is topped by the word "agree" and the black circle is topped by the words "do not agree."

In the case the voter chooses the word "agree," he will put a mark in the red circle. Otherwise, he will put a mark in the black circle.

CSO: 4504/67

NO AL-AZHAR STUDENTS CHARGED WITH SEDITION

NC070912 Cairo MENA in English 0840 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Cairo, 7 Sep (MENA)--Al-Ahram learns that the persons arrested [in connection with sectarian sedition] do not include any students of al-Azhar University as al-Azhar students comprehend the correct interpretation of the Islamic faith and are far from religious fanaticism.

The ministry of the interior yesterday made public a complete record of the activities of extremist religious societies, Moslem and Christian, indicating that the incidents of az-Sawiya al-Hamra was motivated by 49 persons.

The record gave names, incidents and dates and said that the Islamic groups were led by 27 group emirs (commanders).

Anba Samuel, Bishop of Services of the Coptic Orthodox Church, welcomed the forming of a higher committee on national unity under the vice-president.

He said it is a national necessity to do everything conducive to complete solidarity of the Egyptian people in order to maintain social peace and national unity. Anba Samuel is a member of the committee formed of five bishops to take over the Pope's functions.

Minister of Religious Trusts Zakariya al-Bari declared that no imam will be allowed to stand on the pulpits of mosques on Friday except with a special permit from the ministry as required by the Islamic faith. He said that groups of preachers will go to the universities and schools in order to spread the true spirit of Islamic which is a spirit of love and tolerance.

CSO: 4500/39

AL-AZHAR REORGANIZATION AMENDMENT

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 26, 25 Jun 81 pp 11-13

[Law Number 53 for 1981 Regarding Amending Some Provisions of Law No 103 for 1961 To Reorganize al-Azhar and Its Institutions]

[Text] In the name of the people:

The president of the republic:

The People's Assembly has resolved to issue the law whose text follows:

Article One: The following provisions are to be substituted for Articles 9, 44 and 66 of Law No 103 for 1961 regarding the reorganization of al-Azhar and its institutions.

Article Nine: Al-Azhar is to have a council, and that council is to be called al-Azhar Supreme Council. It is to be formed as follows:

--The shaykh of al-Azhar as president of the council.

--The deputy [shaykh] of al-Azhar.

--The president of al-Azhar University.

--The vice presidents of al-Azhar University.

--The deans with the most seniority in each one of al-Azhar's branches in the governorates.

--The secretary general of the Islamic Research Academy.

--The legal adviser for the shaykh of al-Azhar.

--The undersecretary for the affairs of al-Azhar institutes.

--The secretary general of the al-Azhar Supreme Council.

--Four members of the Islamic Research [Academy] who are to be selected by academy members to serve for 2 years. A decree appointing them to the council is issued by the shaykh of al-Azhar.

--One of the undersecretaries of each of [the following] ministries: religious trusts, justice, education, al-Azhar affairs and finance. The shaykh of al-Azhar is to issue a decree appointing them [to the council] in accordance with the recommendations of the ministers whose ministries are represented on the council.

Article Forty-Four: Al-Azhar University is to have four vice presidents who help the president manage the university's academic, administrative and financial affairs. The vice president with the most seniority serves as president in the president's absence.

One of the vice presidents of the university is to concern himself with educational affairs and with students' cultural, athletic and social affairs. The second vice president of the university is to concern himself with graduate studies and research and with strengthening cultural and academic ties between al-Azhar University and other universities and academic institutes and agencies. The third vice president is to assist the president of the university in managing the branches of the university in the governorates; and the fourth vice president is to assist the president in managing the young women's branch of al-Azhar University.

The vice president of the university is appointed by presidential decree on the basis of a review by the authorized minister, the suggestion of the president of the university and the approval of the shaykh of al-Azhar. Service as a professor in al-Azhar University is stipulated for candidates for [the position of] vice president of the university.

A vice president of al-Azhar University is appointed to a 4-year term that is renewable. During his tenure as vice president he is considered professor emeritus. If his term as vice president is not renewed or if he leaves his office before the end of his term, he returns to his former position as professor, if that position is vacant. If the position is filled, he serves as professor on a personal basis until the position becomes vacant.

Article Sixty-Six: In compliance with the provisions of this law and with the provisions of Law No 19 for 1973 and the amendments thereto, the provisions of State Civil Service Law No 47 for 1978 and the amendments thereto regarding appointments, vacations, promotions, discipline, termination of service and other employment matters, are to be applied to the employees of all the agencies of al-Azhar with the exception of the faculty of al-Azhar University and the members of al-Azhar's legal departments.

In compliance with the provisions and executive ordinance of this law the shaykh of al-Azhar is to have the powers and authorities of a minister with regard to the employees of al-Azhar and its agencies, except al-Azhar University. With regard to al-Azhar University, he is to have the authorities determined in this law and in its executive ordinance. The deputy of

shaykh al-Azhar has the powers of an undersecretary as stipulated in the laws and regulations. The president of al-Azhar University has the power of a minister with regard to university employees and in accordance with what is determined in the executive ordinance. The vice presidents of the university have the powers of an undersecretary with regard to the employees that serve under each one of them. The secretary general of al-Azhar Supreme Council, the secretary general of the Islamic Research Academy, the secretary general of al-Azhar University and the general manager of the al-Azhar Institutes have the power of an administration chief with regard to the employees who serve under each one of them.

Article Two: A new clause, number (D) and a new article, Article Fifty-Five (A) are to be added to Law No 103 for 1961 regarding the reorganization of al-Azhar and its institutions. These texts follow:

Article Twenty (D): The city of Islamic Delegations.

Article Fifty-Five A. The deans of colleges in every branch of al-Azhar University in the governorates are to hold periodic meetings at least once every 2 months and whenever the need arises to coordinate aspects of students' and educational activities and affairs as well as examination systems at their colleges. They are to suggest methods for implementing the recommendations of the university's board and the recommendations of academic conferences, and they are to evaluate educational systems and examinations. The deans of colleges with the most seniority in the branch are to convene these meetings.

Article Three: The term, "president of al-Azhar University," is to replace the term, "director of al-Azhar University," whenever it appears in the provisions of Law No 103 for 1961 or in its executive ordinance.

Article Four: This law is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette], and it is to become effective on the day following its publication.

The seal of the state is to be affixed to this law, and it is to be implemented as one of the laws of the state.

Issued at the office of the president on 18 Sha'ban 1401 [Hegira], 20 June 1981.

Anwar al-Sadat

8592
CSO: 4504/59

AMENDMENT ON ORGANIZATION OF POLICE ACADEMY

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 31, 30 Jul 81 pp 26-31

[Law No 129 for 1981 Regarding Amending Some of the Provisions of Law No 91 for 1975 To Establish a Police Academy]

In the name of the people:

The president of the republic:

The People's Assembly has resolved to issue the law whose text follows:

Article One: The following provisions are to replace Articles 2, 3, 4, 8, 24, 26, 27 and 28 of Law No 91 for 1975 To Establish a Police Academy:

Article Two: The academy is to consist of the following:

1. A police college.

2. A college for specializing officers.

3. A college for graduate studies.

4. A college for training and development.

5. A police research center.

Each one of these colleges and the research center are considered public administrations.

The academy is to have its own budget which is part of the budget of the Ministry of Interior.

Article Three: A person whose rank is at least that of a minister's aide is to preside over the academy. He is to manage and administer its affairs and oversee the implementation of the decisions made by its board of directors. The president of the academy is assisted by a vice president who coordinates [activities] between the various colleges and units of the academy.

Each college, as well as the Police Research Center, is to have a director with the rank of a major general. The director is to manage and administer the academic, administrative and financial affairs of the college under the supervision of the president of the academy.

Article Four: The academy is to have a board of directors that is to be made up of the president of the academy as chairman and the following persons as members:

--One of the members of the Supreme Police Council who is selected annually by that council.

--The dean of one of the colleges of law in the Egyptian universities selected annually by the board of directors of the academy after the approval of the Supreme Council of Universities.

--A state adviser, the director of the formal legal opinion department of the Ministry of Interior.

--One of the members of the Supreme Council of Egyptian Universities selected annually by that council.

--The vice president of the Police Academy.

--The directors of the academy's colleges and Police Research Center or those who serve in their place.

--The director of the Public Administration for Officers' Affairs.

--The director of the Public Administration for Organization and Management of the Ministry of the Interior.

--The director of the Office of Planning, Research and Follow-Up of the Ministry of the Interior.

--Faculty members who teach legal subjects at the academy and who have the most seniority.

--Faculty members who teach non-legal subjects at the academy and who have the most seniority.

In the absence of the chairman of the board, the board member with the most seniority on the board chairs the meeting.

The director of the Office of Planning and Scientific Research or anyone who serves in his place is to serve as secretary of the board.

Article Eight: The state is to bear all the expenses for educating, training, clothing, feeding, transporting and housing Egyptian students during the course of study at the police and career officers' colleges. Every academic year a student is to pay a certain sum of money determined

by the academy's board of directors so as not to exceed 45 pounds. This money covers health insurance and cultural, athletic and social activities. The bylaws determine how these fees are to be collected and disbursed and the cases under which exemptions from the payment of fees can be made.

A registration fee for the College of Graduate Studies is to be collected. That fee is set by the board of directors of the academy and is not to exceed 20 pounds in a single academic year.

Article Twenty-Four: The minister of interior grants anyone who successfully completes the courses of study at this college a diploma in police studies. Such a person is appointed officer at the police agency with the rank of first lieutenant. He is appointed on a provisional basis for 1 year that may be extended in accordance with Article Six of Law No 109 for 1971 regarding the police agency.

Article Twenty-Six: Police officers who meet the conditions that are set by the minister of the interior after consulting with the Police Supreme Council and the board of directors of the academy are to be admitted as students in this college. The course of study at the college, the period of study, the number of hours, the system and the standards of examination are to be determined in the light of those systems that are followed in graduate studies departments in the Egyptian universities. The course of study is to include one of the groups of police subjects in the manner indicated by the academy's bylaws.

A student who successfully completes the requirements of every group is to be awarded the specialized diploma in that group.

Article Twenty-Seven: The board of directors of the academy awards a masters degree in police studies to any student who earns two of the diplomas mentioned in the previous article, or one of these diplomas plus a graduate diploma from one of the Egyptian universities or from an equivalent foreign university that the board of directors of the academy determines is related to police studies in accordance with the rules and conditions set by the bylaws.

Article Twenty-Eight: The bylaws regulate the conditions and the rules for awarding a doctorate degree in police studies to a student who earns a masters degree. Such a degree may be granted after the student submits a dissertation on one of the areas of police studies and puts it into practice. The board of directors of the academy may award an honorary doctorate in police studies to anyone who performs patriotic services or actions or conducts research that would improve operating methods and upgrade performance efficiency in the police agency.

Article Two: New articles, numbers 15.1; 15.2; and 15.3 are to be added to the aforementioned Law No 91 for 1975. The text of those articles follows:

Article Fifteen 1: Anyone who has a position teaching legal subjects at the academy or who has a position teaching prerequisite subjects that are taught by other colleges in the Egyptian universities must meet the conditions required for teaching positions at Egyptian universities in accordance with the special laws and regulations. Appointments are to be made from the pool of lecturers, assistant professors and faculty members at the academy. If none of them meets the required conditions, someone from outside the academy may be appointed. In appointing outside people to all positions the measures that are set in the organizational laws of Egyptian universities are to be followed. The academic output of those who apply for such positions is to be examined by committees designated for that task in accordance with the laws regulating universities, at the request of the president of the academy.

The laws that apply to faculty members at Egyptian universities, with regard to procedures for hiring them, determining their salaries and allowances, disciplining them and everything that pertains to personnel affairs, apply to appointees at the academy.

The conditions required of those who hold positions as assistant professors and lecturers in Egyptian universities are the same as those that are required of those that hold positions as assistant professors and lecturers at the academy. The rules that pertain to assistant professors and lecturers in Egyptian universities with regard to the procedure of hiring them, determining their salaries and allowances, disciplining them and everything that has to do with personnel affairs applies also to those in the academy.

Article Fifteen 2: If the conditions indicated in the previous article are met by one of the officers in the police agency, he may be granted the title of a faculty position or the title of an instructor, an assistant professor or a lecturer, after he fulfills the determined conditions and measures for an appointment, and he may continue as officer in the police agency.

He may teach at the academy, and he may be awarded the difference between the first salary level of the position whose title was bestowed on him and the first level of his salary in the police agency, if that is higher, throughout the period during which he holds the position whose title was bestowed on him.

He is also to be granted the difference between the university allowance that is set for this position and the total fixed allowances that are set for his rank in the police agency.

Academic output in this case is to be examined by a committee formed annually by the academy's board of directors. The committee is to be made up of university professors after approval of the authorized university board [is obtained].

If the term of service of the officer who has the title of the position

at the police agency ends, the academy's board of directors, at the request of the officer, may appoint him to that position without making an announcement for the position whose title he holds. That officer may keep his academic seniority in that position if he meets the qualifying conditions for filling that position. These provisions apply to those who have academic degrees from the College of Graduate Studies in teaching police subjects.

Article Fifteen 3: The bylaws determine the makeup of the academic departments of the academy's colleges as well as the career areas comprised in each department.

Article Three: The two following chapters are to replace Chapter Seven of Law No 91 for 1975.

Chapter Seven

The Police Research Center

Article Thirty-One: The Police Research Center is to conduct academic and applied research in police studies and in police areas of work so as to find suitable solutions to work problems in accordance with modern scientific methods. The center is to encourage academic activity as well as publishing and translating efforts in the various areas of police work within the framework of the general policy of the state and of the Ministry of Interior.

Article Thirty-Two: All the administrations and offices of the ministry are to provide the Police Research Center with the results of their academic or applied research which they obtain in the course of doing their work or with the information and the data that become evident to them in the course of their work. The center is to notify the authorized administrations and offices of the results reached in the research it conducts or of the information and the data that become evident to it so as to achieve cooperation and integration between the activities of the academy and the activities of these agencies.

Chapter Eight

General Provisions

Article Thirty-Three: A graduate of the Police College or of the College for Career Officers is obligated to serve the police a period that is not less than 10 years from the date of graduation. Otherwise, he will have to pay back double the cost of his tuition which was borne by the academy. However, the minister of the interior, after consulting with the Police Supreme Council, may exempt the officer from paying this sum or part of it if that officer is leaving police service to join one of the various operations of the state.

Any student at the Police College or at the College for Career Officers

who abandons his studies without an acceptable excuse is liable, along with his parent or guardian, for all the costs borne by the academy during his course of study there.

The sums that are due may be paid in installments.

Article Thirty-Four: After consulting with the Supreme Police Council and the board of directors of the academy, the minister of the interior is to issue the academy's bylaws, its financial ordinance and the decisions that are necessary to implement this law.

Article Four: Articles Seventeen and Eighteen of the aformentioned Law No 91 for 1975 are hereby repealed.

Article Five: This law is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette], and it is to become effective on the day following its publication. Any provision that countermands the provisions of this law is hereby repealed.

The seal of the state is to be affixed to this law, and it is to be implemented as one of the laws of the state.

Issued at the office of the president on 24 Ramadan 1401 [Hegira], 25 July 1981.

Husni Mubarak

8592
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BRIEFS

INVESTIGATION OF FRIDAY PRAYER LEADER--Cairo, 7 Sep (MENA)--The supreme state security prosecution has started investigating Shaykh Ahmad al-Mahlawi, who is accused of attacking the state regime in his Friday sermon. In tomorrow's issue, AL-AKHBAR says that the socialist public prosecutor, adviser 'Abd al-Qadir Admad 'Ali, has received a report on Shaykh al-Mahlawi's violations and that he had conducted a political investigation with him which was followed by a criminal investigation by the supreme state security prosecution which ordered his detention. [Text] [NC072330 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2213 GMT 7 Sep 81]

PAPAL COMMITTEE VISITS PRESIDENT'S OFFICE--Cairo, 7 Sep (MENA)--Anba Samuel, bishop for public and social services; Anba Athnasius, metropolitan of Bani Suwayf and Anba Yu'annis, bishop of Al-Gharbiyah and secretary of the Holy Synod--all of whom are members of the committee formed of bishops to carry out the papal duties--have visited the Presidential Office in 'Abdin Palace. They were received by Muhammad 'Ali al-Hijazi, secretary of the President's Office. They registered their names in the visitors' book and wrote the following: With all sincerity and allegiance, we place ourselves in the service of our cherished country and give our pledge to President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat to work for the protection of our national unity and social peace, imploring God to keep his excellency for the homeland and to avert every evil from Egypt. [Text] [NC071511 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1313 GMT 7 Sep 81]

NDP TO EXPLAIN AL-SADAT SPEECH--Cairo, 8 Sep (MENA)--The National Democratic Party will embark on extensive moves to explain the dimensions of President Anwar al-Sadat's statement [speech to joint session of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council] by holding political conferences in all the governorates in which the party's political bureau members, the deputies to the prime minister, the ministers, members of the general secretariat and chairmen of relative committees will participate. [Text] [NC080745 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0630 GMT 8 Sep 81]

EGYPTIAN COMMUNITY IN ROME SUPPORT--Rome, 4 Sep (MENA)--The Egyptian community in Rome has sent the following cable of support to President Anwar al-Sadat: The Egyptian community in Rome backs your wise leadership. Proceed along your path in God's care. Strike hard at the hands of the instigators of the sectarian sedition incidents. All of us, Muslims and Christians, at home and abroad are sure that this sedition is false. We are confident of your ability to foil the plans of those who want to exploit the atmosphere of freedom and democracy to realize their aims and interests and endanger the unity and social safety of the homeland. [Text] [NC041235 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1220 GMT 4 Sep 81]

AL-SADAT RECEIVES SUPPORT CABLES--Cairo, 7 Sep (MENA)--President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat has received a cable from the Orthodox Copts in Goteborg in Sweden supporting the recent decisions he announced in his historic speech to the People's Assembly and the Concultative Council. The cable is signed on behalf of the Copts by (Tadrus Edward 'Azar). His Excellency also received other cables of support from Egyptian ambassador in Rome Ahmad Sidqi and Egyptian ambassador in Caracas 'Sa Siraj ad-Din as well as a cable from Dr Jamal Hilmi Husayn, chairman of the [Egyptian] students in Lebanon sent on his behalf and on behalf of the Egyptian workers in Greece. [Text] [NC071516 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1311 GMT 7 Sep 81]

CSO: 4504/67

BEHESHTI PRAISED, BANI-SADR BLASTED BY PROSECUTOR-GENERAL

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 27 Jul 81 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Prosecutor-General Rabbani Amlashi]

[Text] In an exclusive interview with our reporter, Ayatollah Rabbani Amblashi, the prosecutor-general, answered questions about various problems. The text of the interview is as follows:

[Question] What will be the fate of the Special Civil Courts now that you have been appointed Prosecutor-General? Will those courts remain under your jurisdiction?

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate the merciful. Of course, the basic responsibility in the case of the Special Civil Courts will be such that they will be supervised by one person as is the case with the Common Courts and the Arbitration Courts. As the Special Civil Courts were newly established and required more work to be done about them, erudite and religiously devout judges had to be chosen for that purpose. This particular task had been assigned to me. However, with the progress made in this area, and with the courts having been set up in a number of provinces, these courts will, as a rule, have to be under the jurisdiction of the same person who oversees the common, civil and magistrate courts. But, for the time being, I still handle the private civil courts.

[Question] When will the other members of the Surpreme Judicial Council be selected?

[Answer] Immediately after the new appointments, the Supreme Judicial Council held a meeting to discuss about the fifth member of the Council. The preliminaries of the work have been prepared to a large extent. The Supreme Council held a meeting today which was expected to elect its representative to oversee the elections. I wonder if this has been taken care of today. The preliminaries of the matter have been done to a large extent and the candidates and the nominees of any authority will be submitted to the Imam so that if their competence is endorsed in respect of theological conversance and fairness the elections may be held. I believe this shall be one very soon.

Beheshti, the Innocent Martyr

[Question] Please speak of the history of your friendship and acquaintance with the innocent martyr, Ayatollah Dr Beheshti and your remembrances of him.

[Answer] My friendship and devotion and acquaintance with my esteemed brother, the innocent martyr Ayatollah Dr Beheshti goes back a long time. It dates back to the time in the Theological Center in Qom, but our acquaintance and friendship heightened at the height of the revolution. Contrary to the thinking of some uninformed individuals who are impressionable to the intrigues and misleading of the public opinion by a number of internal and external enemies, who thought Martyr Beheshti had nothing to do with the revolution prior to the victory of the revolution, I must say that he was always within the contexts of the revolution, particularly assuming a leadership role in Tehran at the time the revolution was picking up. He was also responsible for the organization of the revolution, including that of the revolutionary clergy. As a result we who were involved in the process of the Revolution and were active in the revolution along with brothers and friends were obviously in wider contact with him. My contact with him grew in this mode until I, too, was elected to the Council of the Experts and found the pleasure of being a representative with this honorable man. In a background of intellectual and spiritual bonds which had existed between us for a long time, the Council of Experts proved a fertile ground for the strengthening of our ties. We had more sessions for discussion, negotiation and decisionmaking. I remember that after the termination of the Council of Experts when I was still engaged in judicial work and involved in the Supreme Judicial Council in Qom, I heard that the late Dr Beheshti was supposed to remain in Tehran as before and be appointed by the Imam as the President of the Supreme Court. I phoned him from Qom one day and told him that I had to have a long discussion with him which might take several hours and which would require a long meeting with him. We arranged to meet at noon on a certain day and stay together for some hours until the business I had with him would be thrashed out and my thoughts spelled out. I came to Tehran from Qom and talked with him for 3 hours (perhaps longer). My talk revolved entirely around the proposal that if possible, and if approved by the Imam, he should go to Qom and teach at and manage the Theological Center of Qom. I told him that with the particular managerial capability that I knew he was endowed with, we could increased the productivity of the Theolotical Center of Qom. I further told him that he was needed more and could be more useful in the future and that this required his presence in Qom.

During these 3 hours, we evaluated the matter carefully and I recall that he had been impressed by my reasoning. After this meeting I phoned the Imam's house and spoke to the Imam's son, our brother Ahmad, so that to urge the Imam to put on hold whatever he was writing about it, because we wanted to talk to him about it. However, after some days I learned that he had been appointed President of the Supreme Court. It became apparent that our magnanimous Imam could not find anybody so competent as to match this great man, that he had determined that no other person would be more suitable for this position than Beheshti. These relationships persisted until our involvement in the Supreme Judicial Council brought us together three times a week and several hours each time. The closer I was to this great man my affection to and fondness of him grew. Far from exaggeration and flatterous courtesy, I must say that he was the exponent of humanity, virtue, piety, honor, mananimity, courage and bravery. He could not bring to use the slightest exaggeration even against his enemy. Even if somebody used a phrase against his enemy which was beyond the boundary of Islam and Islamic norms, he would definitely stand up against him and would tell him that the phrase was an exaggeration and that he had no right to utter it. I remember that recently, the day after the arrest of Mrs Bani-Sadr the case of her arrest and that of some of the friends and relatives of Bani-Sadr was discussed at the Supreme Judicial Council. It was said that, after they had been arrested, when the news reached Martyr Beheshti, and when he was asked what was to be done about them, he

replied that if they had any record or a pending suit against them, they should be kept under arrest. But if they had been arrested merely because they were the wife of Bani-Sadr or of somebody else's, or if they were the relatives of Bani-Sadr, then they should be released immediately. He was told that only Ms Sudabeh Sadifi had a record and was being proceeded against. Then he ordered that only she be kept under arrest and that the others be freed. This was despite the fact that this great man knew that Bani-Sadr would go to any length to destroy this great man even though Dr Beheshti knew things about Bani-Sadr which others did not know nor do they know even today. He knew how Bani-Sadr had resolved to destroy the late Beheshti. He knew these full well, yet he was not willing to outstep the Islamic norms, even in the face of his enemy. I also remember the last day that I was with him, namely the Sunday in the evening of which that heart-rending and dastardly catastrophe took place. I began speaking at the Council meeting in these words: "It seems that offenses have been committed against some prisoners by certain irresponsible judicial authorities although those authorities have responsibilities elsewhere. I have received reports to the effect that perhaps some prisoners had been wronged." It was at this point that I said I could not bear the occurence of such legal and Islamic infringements within the framework of our work. When Beheshti heard my words, I saw that he became enraged (his face became red, which happened only rarely). He told me that my inspectorial function which I recently assumed (as I was charged with the responsibility of reviving the investigation function) would require that I inspect the prisons to ascertain the allegation. He said that if any wrong has been done, we would stand against the wrongdoer. At this point another brother of ours asked him if he would stand up against the wrongdoers. He said if nobody else stands, he would and that he was ready to sign (the necessary documents). We have many such remembrances of the late Beheshti. These memories had caused me to feel sincere comradeship toward him in the inner circles. He was a religious jurispurdent in the full sense in respect of knowledge and theology. He was a just man in every sense. He was free from any political trickery, chicanery, fraudulence, and ruse in all walks of personal, social and political life. Judging on the basis of the relationship and intimacy between us, I found him a totally exceptional person. Although it is possible that in certain areas there may be others who excel him, and in the area of religious jurispurdence there are people who are even better than he was, with respect of managerial ability, I do not know, but perhaps there are others better than he was. In politics there may be people more versed than he was. As regards courage and piety, too, there may be others who excel him. However, in combining all these qualities and human dimensions, he has made himself an exceptional and perhaps unique personality. I do not know of a man quite like him. With his passing, a void was created in Islam. We hope that the vacuum can be filled with the help of God and divine succor. I can talk a great deal about the late Martyr Beheshti.

[Question] Please tell us about your recent visit to Evin Prison which you mentioned in your speech.

[Answer] In the afternoon of the same day we talked about, arrangements were made for me to go to Evin Prison and visit the detainees who had recently been arrested. Perhaps it was because of this visit to the prison that I was not included among the martyrs that night. Otherwise I, too, was supposed to attend that meeting that night. When I visited the prison I found the situation of the prison to be very good, contrary to rumors. I did not see any signs nor traces of what I had heard. I even asked individuals point blank whether they had been wronged. They all said that there had been nothing of the sort, except one or two persons who had been punished below the full amount prescribed by the law. They had been punished in accordance with the Islamic rules.

[Question] How did you find Bani-Sadr in the contacts you had with him in the Council of Experts and elsewhere?

[Answer] I have remembrances of Bani-Sadr, too, in the Council of Experts. Of course, I had had no relationship with him previously. But the Council of Experts was a good place in which one could evaluate people accurately and know them as they are. We were with Mr Bani-Sadr in the Council of Experts and the rememberances and backgrounds caused me to write and declare openly at the time of the presidential elections that we should nominate somebody other than Mr Bani-Sadr for president. The Society of Teachers of Theology, too, nominated somebody other than him and even when the candidate of the Islamic Republican Party withdrew from the race, we nominated Mr Habibi. I remember that in those very days some people asked, "You know that Mr Habibi will not be president and will not be elected. Then why do you insist on his election and resist Bani-Sadr?" I answered that our purpose was to put the reasons on record so that if the people find out about their mistake they cannot fault us and ask us why we had not insisted on another choice. These people also told us that Mr Habibi was a latecomer while Bani-Sadr had a long headstart with several months of campaigning behind him. Then why do "you make Habibi run?" When we said Habibi should be elected we meant that we did not want Bani-Sadr. Because we knew that if Bani-Sadr gained power the Islamic society would be in for a lot of trouble. While in the Council of Experts I learned that Bani-Sadr had not grasped our Islamic Revolution, did not know the society and did not accept our revolutionary clergy. One day when we were discussing the votes cast for the Tehran deputies, Bani-Sadr said all of them (or himself) had received only one vote, that of the Imam's. If the people voted for them was not because the people knew them and accepted them, but because the Imam accepted them, the people cast their votes in their favor. It is deplorable that later on he cast his 11 million votes in presidential elections into the face of the Imam. He wanted to claim that the 11 million votes had been cast in favor without any intermediary. Perhaps if he believed that the 11 million votes had been given him by force of the Imam's credit, he would not have caused all those troubles for the Islamic Republic.

Bani-Sadr and the Principle of Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent in the Council of Experts

Another recollection I have of Bani-Sadr is that at the time of the approval of the principle of Religious Guardian-Jurispudent at the Council of Experts, he opposed the principle in a most cunning way. His excuse was that he would accept the principle only if it embodied 164 conditions and qualities. He then asked who could embody all these qualities? One day in a gathering (I do not know if there was anybody else besides the two of us or not) I asked him, "When you say that the religious guardian should have numberous virtues, and necessarily embody 164 of the virtues, could you tell me if Imam Khomeyni is the possessor of these virtues and do you accept him as religious guardian? Does Imam Khomeyni have all these 164 qualities? Or does he lack these 164 points and do you reject him as a religious guardian?" To this he answered, "You are leading to a point where I cannot say anything." It was that very day when I was sure that he did not think anybody worthy except himself. There is only one person who is, in his opinion, the genius of all times and the great contemporary thinker: himself. This was the kind of remembrances I have of Mr Bani-Sadr.

After his election to presidency, once we had a meeting with our martyred brother Beheshti, Mr Khamenei, Mr Hashemi, Mr Anvari and Mr Mahallati--the latter two were supporters of Mr Bani-Sadr. When we began talking about the elections to the Islamic

Consultative Assembly, the gentlemen said that Bani-Sadr believed that the future Majles and the deputies to be elected to it should match the presidency. Some people sponsored the idea. At this point I said, "I do not think that even Reza Khan would try to impose so much dictatorship so soon after gaining power." The meaning of the sentence "The Majles should 'match' me" is that all the powers of the country should be concentrated in the hands of one person and that singular person is the president, whereas, legally speaking, it is the president, who is at the head of the executive power, who should not only adjust himself to the Islamic Consultative Assembly but should place himself at the disposal of the legislative as well as the judiciary powers. This means that he should obey totally all the orders of the legislative and judiciary powers.

[Question] What evidence is in hand to prove that Bani-Sadr was affiliated with foreign powers?

[Answer] Evidence which could be made public was done during the course of the investigation and has already been heard and seen through the radio, television, and the press. There are also other matters which should not be divulged while being investigated. However, I believe that the nation should not wait until we find evidence of his affiliation. What evidence is more certain than his own attitude, action and doings? What he did pleased America; pleased England; pleased the Soviet Union. He satisfied the antirevolutionary groups so much that it put on its war boots to defy the nation and the law on account of his dismissal. What other evidence would be better than this. Do we not admit that the superpowers recognize their interests well and that so long as they do not find somebody to be tuned to them, to be helpful to their interest, and to be a follower of their line, they would not possibly support and befriend him so much as they did Mr Bani-Sadr. Otherwise, not so many international organizations would shed crocodile's tears for him. All this support and advocacy means that he had deviated from the line of the Islamic Revolution and fallen in line with the superpowers who had opened their mouths wide to gulp down our country like a dragon. We do not need to prove that he was pro-American in the sense that he had already made secret deals with America in order to come to Iran and to gain power. We do not need to bring out that meaning. He had at any rate fallen into that line while he had fallen out of the line of the Islamic Revolution. His actions showed this fact. The nation realized this and therefore pushed him aside and requested his deposition by the Islamic Consulative Assembly. There is no need to show him seated at a conference table with the superpowers, wheeling and dealing under the board. It was enough that he was with them in deed and was moving along their line.

The prosecutor-general added: Meanwhile, I am not trying to deny that he was affiliated and in collusion with foreigners. I am trying to solve the problem for the people in another manner. Let us deepen the doubt and assume that it is proven to us that he has not sat at one table with Western imperialism and that he has had no links with them. Yet, when someone actually chooses a path and a line, it makes no difference whether or not his words, covenants and contracts match it. As if someone claims to be a Moslem while his actions are worse than those of any non-Moslem. Can we accept that person as a Moslem and let him assume the responsibilities of a Moslem? Never. However, the converse situation is possible. A person may not be a Moslem but his action may be Islamic. That person is respected by us. Mr Bani-Sadr said he was a Moslem. He perhaps said, "Death to America, Death to Russia, Neither West Nor East

Long Live the Revolution, Long Live the Imam" and such things. But what did he do in actuality? Mr Bani-Sadr was in the hands of a group of people who had lovers' relationship with this or that foreign power. Even if Bani-Sadr, presumably, was not affiliated with any of the foreign powers, he was in their hands and powerless before them. When the pandered to his ambition, they could make him do anything and get him into trouble any way they wanted.

Majles Requested to Ratify Legal Bills Quickly

[Question] When will the bill on the General Inspectorate Organization Be Ratified?

[Answer] The inspection bill of the General Inspectorate Organization which we had prepared long time ago and had it approved by the Supreme Judicial Council was submitted to the Majles, but during the past 2 or 3 days further comments have been made regarding this bill which made it necessary to be reverted to the Supreme Judicial Council. In the latest meeting which we had on Monday, still further views were expressed which were examined, formulated and prepared for submission to the Islamic Consultative Assembly. I avail of this opportunity to ask the nation's to ratify the bills submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by the Supreme Judicial Council because these bills are imperative and crucial. If the Majles deputies and the people expect more, better and revolutionary work from us these bills must be approved so that our hands may be strengthened for more work and better activity. The inspection bill must be approved as soon as possible. Other bills, including one regarding the qualifications of the judges, have been submitted which are very vital and necessary and we request the Majles to consider these bills as soon as possible and create more leeway for us in performing our duties and in discharging our responsibilities. The presecutor-general further added that the bill of Justice Tribunal, too, has been drafted which took most of the time of the Supreme Judicial Council last Thursday. The draft might be completed in one or two more sessions.

Lauding Engineer Sarza'im

[Question] What is your view of the work of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters?

[Answer] Some responsible brothers are working hard to perform their duties at the Cultural Revolution Headquarters. They toil and drudge, so much so that one of our very dear brothers and professors, Mr (Engineer) Sarza'im, the professor of the University of Science and Technology, became ill as a result of excessive work and heavy pressure. There are brothers who are busy and are working hard. We must admit that it is no mean task to revolutionalize the culture and the educational system of a country. It necessitaties a great deal of work. Our brothers are engaged in this work. However, the fact that sometimes they complain that they themselves are not satisfied with the progress of their work does not mean that, God forbid, there is negligence and inertia at work. Because of our workload at the judiciary I did not get the chance to attend the meetings of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters. I have not taken part in the meetings of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters any more since the New Year.

Regarding the manner of the enactment of the decisions of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters, the prosecutor-general, Ayatollah...Rabbani Amlashi told our reporter: "It would be appropriate for you to bring this matter up with the remaining member of

the Cultural Revolution Headquarters who are now active. However, since I was a member for a long time and do not feel myself uninvolved in the cultural revolution now, I can tell you that numerous committees are actively performing duties in the cultural revolution. In the final stage, the sum total of their views are passed on to the Cultural Revolution Headquarters for ratification. Sometimes, the ratification of the Cultural Revolution Headquarters is not sufficient because the decisions involve radical changes and must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

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GOVERNOR-GENERAL DISCUSSES ECONOMIC, SOCIAL ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 19 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] Shiraz--The governor-general of Fars Province stated in an interview with media correspondents that among the issues raised in the seminar of governor-generals from tribal provinces were the creation of a unified security policy in connection with tribal problems, extension of the period for absorbing credits, and emphasis on the need to give attention and priority to projects of road-building, provision of drinking water, cultivation of fodder, and extension of health facilities in the tribal regions. Pointing to the vigilance of the tribes against plots of saboteurs and counterrevolutionaries, he said:

"Fortunately the dear tribes of Fars Province vigilantly confronted persons who might have committed abuses on the pretext of reviving tribal customs. Right now we are relying on the tribes and on their cooperation with the security forces in order to establish security."

Nationalization of Foreign Trade

The governor-general of Fars, in connection with the situation of the Shiraz Guild Council, said: "The members of this council have been appointed, and in coming days will begin their activities as a Komiteh for Guild Affairs. The Islamic Revolution Court of Shiraz will also have a religious magistrate on this council."

He stated that the increase in construction projects in comparison with the prerevolutionary period and the reduction in the capacity of port unloading due to war conditions were among the reasons for the cement shortage, and said: "2,000 tons of cement and a quantity of steel are supposed to be sent to the province, but since the national consumption of cement is twice as much as production, this problem is not soluble in the short-term."

He added: "A speed-up in the nationalization of foreign trade and the government's direct intervention, and its control and supervision of domestic distribution will eliminate many of these difficulties."

Concerning armed brigandage on the roads in Fars Province, he said: "A number of brigands have been arrested by the security forces, but activities have not been carried out as they could have or should have been. The gendarmarie must increase

its activities. Military clashes are necessary, but the revolution courts must in addition display decisiveness. However, the gendarmarie has made some noteworthy seizures."

Concerning the means of housing the immigrants living in tents around the city, the governor-general said: "These dear people will soon be housed in a complex called 'Mehmanshahr' in the Sarvestan vicinity which has a capacity of 2,000 persons and is nearing completion."

He termed the decisions of the Islamic Council Supervising Health Services valid, and said: "This council has not been created in order to confront the honorable class of physicians. Our expectation of Moslem physicians is that they will aid the government upon taking into consideration the great difficulties arising from the imposed war, just as they welcomed the council's decision."

Counterrevolutionary Rumors

The governor-general of Fars termed the existence of long queues in front of gas stations as a result of counterrevolutionary rumors about a work slow-down in the refineries, a lack of gasoline production and a shortage of gas-station workers, and said: "We are working to solve this matter."

Concerning employment of the unemployed, he said: "The War Victims Affairs Foundation has plans which have about 10 million tumans in credits which have been approved. With respect to other unemployed people, in addition to the activities of the Expansion Center, the Bank of Fars Province has allocated about 200 million tumans for the expansion of national industries. Upon absorption of that sum, a large number of unemployed people will be attracted to these units. Other employment-creating plans have been prepared in the governor-general's office which will raise the level of employment once they receive new credits and are implemented."

9557
CSO: 4640/87

REFORMS IN PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE EXPOUNDED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Jul 81 p 13

[Interview with Minister of Justice S.M. Asghari]

[Excerpt] Concerning legal security Asghari stated: We must look at this very subtle, complicated and delicate problem and see what the meaning of legal security is. During the previous regime, if a farmer had no inheritance to show after 50 years except toil and deprivation, while someone else, taking into account the conditions and situations which ruled during that time, reached the pinnacle of riches and wealth in a period of five years by pillaging the public treasury--is the meaning of legal security that we say that whatever anyone has taken from this deprived nation must be honored as it is? And that no one has the right to touch or interfere with it in its present form? Some people interpret legal security to mean this. Well, this is a bit difficult to accept. But if legal security means that the people must have security within the framework of the Islamic laws and statutes, this is what everyone is saying, except the United States, the accomplices of the United States, and the domestic and foreign mercenaries of global arrogance, since they are only concerned with acting in accordance with the testament of Brzezinski and causing disturbances. Otherwise, everyone is striving to the end that calm may be established and legal security of this kind be guaranteed for the people. But as I said, legal security means what some people have been saying for years, like Abu Zarr: "I marvel at someone who sees poverty in his own home and does not rebel against the people with a sword." Of course I do not mean that everyone who has been deprived should draw a sword to claim his right. But one must not ignore this point: If everything a person possesses used to belong to the country and the public treasury and he has acquired it on the basis of non-Islamic regulations, and then if we do not want to touch that, not even take it by means of tax laws, while he remains in security and luxury and others are deprived, this is not legal security. However, legal security in the sense of the political freedoms of the people, freedom of occupation and business, freedom of assembly--assemblies within which there are no plots--this must be guaranteed by the ministry of justice. In the future all the executive organs and all the authority of the government of Iran must guarantee it.

Asghari, the minister of justice, was asked what bills have been prepared and sent to the Majles up until now. He answered: In spite of all the difficulties that were discussed, for not only were the leaders of the revolution oppressed--and the Imam of the community also alluded to their oppressed state--but also this revolution was oppressed, both from the domestic point of view and the point of view of

the foreign front, the ministry of justice and the supreme judicial council have prepared numerous bills. But because of the difficulties alluded to, i.e., the martyrdom of the fighting Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, who truly played a great and wonderful role in the ministry of justice, but just when the ministry began its activities and the channels of justice had newly become organized and had begun to write bills, the enemy killed Dr Beheshti in a dastardly way. In any case, in spite of these difficulties, the supreme judicial council, which is in charge of preparing bills, and the ministry of justice have prepared numerous bills and sent them to the government, and most of these bills have also been sent to the Majles. For example, one can mention the bill for the nationwide inspectorate, which will be extraordinarily effective in enriching and enforcing the law; it will prevent embezzlement and be a strong organization which can be present and observant everywhere and inspect the activities of responsible officials and executives of the government and budget. Other important bills have also been prepared, like the bill for the judicial police, the court of administrative justice which is established by article 173 of the constitution and which investigates violations by government officials. Bills have also been prepared concerning the hiring and retiring of judges.

Also in connection with the financial independence of the ministry of justice, which is very important from the point of view of judicial independence, a bill has been prepared. In addition, a bill was prepared and sent to the Majles in the area of the plan for the assimilation of the revolutionary courts into the ministry, and a short while ago it was ratified. There is also the bill for retaliation, which will be discussed in the future.

Concerning the assimilation of the revolutionary courts into the ministry of justice the minister of justice added: In fact this bill is not for assimilation but for attaching the revolutionary courts to the ministry.

The reason this is being undertaken is that, since the revolutionary courts deal with judicial investigations according to Islamic principles and statutes and apply the laws of Islam, there are a great number of individuals who even say, "Taking into account the injustice which has been done against us, order our business to be investigated by the courts of the revolution," since they know that those complicated formalities do not exist in the revolutionary courts. In the previous regime, investigation of a claim sometimes took fifteen or twenty years. The courts of the revolution have a staff which investigates with great speed. Judicial investigations take place without formalities. That is why the revolutionary courts have investigated certain instances related to retaliation and blood-money. It was necessary that they become part of the ministry of justice, and this was ratified. I am hopeful that in the future totally Islamic laws will be ratified and enforced in place of the laws ofthe past.

Concerning greater movement of the ministry in the path of administering justice Asghari said: In general in this connection the organization has to be given shape and those problems and laws which resulted in this bureaucracy and extension of regulations must be investigated and the extraneous formalities eliminated. The groundwork for the application of Islamic laws must be brought into existence and the laws must be ratified so that they can be applied.

We must encourage the activity of aware and pure university students and mollahs, scholars of law and those people who are without ulterior motives, have faith in the people and the revolution and are dedicated to the Islamic laws. Judges must be the object of special attention from the economic, professional and occupational points of view as well as from the point of view of social respect.

There is no reason for a judge to occupy himself constantly for hours and years with reading briefs. In the history of Islamic law there are instances where judges were sent every year to study for several months in order that they would not be in the tiring atmosphere of always judging and always enforcing the statutes of the law and being busy with briefs and in order that they could come out of these surroundings and study, become acquainted with the terminology of the sciences of the day and learn new and recent problems. And of course the judges must also be given security from the point of view of culture and study and other problems. Pure persons must be placed at the head of affairs in the ministry of justice. From the economic point of view also we have problems in establishing justice. If we only pay attention to laws, this will be combatting the effects. Attention must be paid to the economic situation of society and to education and cultural problems from the very beginning of primary and high school. People must become acquainted with Islamic culture, and then they will certainly not commit crimes. If attention is paid to the economic situation of society and if there were not all these class discriminations and distances, the society would become calm by itself and these discriminations and complexes would disappear by themselves. I am hopeful that gradually things will be taken into account from the economic, cultural, social and the other points of view related to the reform of the ministry of justice and that progress will be made.

Concerning how it is possible to actualize the jurisdiction of the law, Asghari, the minister of justice, said:

Has the enemy given us any respite from the very beginning of the victory of the revolution for us to busy ourselves with our own affairs? One day they broke the law in the name of the law [sic]. Seven days after the victory of the revolution they even brought a civil war into existence. In the name of certain people they began an armed conflict in Gonbad and Kordestan. From the very beginning they instigated discords, so that the point has been reached that today there are street battles, explosions and other things, which are clear and dangerous. This Islamic revolution and the flames which have lit up in the east of Iran have endangered all the prestige of the kings of global arrogance. In any way that the enemy can strike blows upon the revolution of Iran, destroy the unity of the people and maximize disorder and chaos, he does just that, so that those who are in charge of affairs will not be able to organize the domestic situation and provide occupational and legal security.

If the people would carefully pay attention to the deceptions and trickeries of foreign imperialism and its accomplices, they would realize that all of these artificial disorders and differences are brought into existence by the hand of the enemy. Spreading rumors takes away the psychological security of the people. Therefore, in order that the law may be better administered and for the sake of the law's jurisdiction in the year which the Imam has named the year of the law, for certain the executive organs, the government, the judicial power, the Majles and the legislative power must strive quickly to achieve the early ratification of laws

which are basic for the security and freedoms of society. But again I repeat that if someone wants to break the law with every trick and artifice and then raise a shout that the law has disappeared, this cannot be controlled. Explosions are not small things, nor are these marches even at the time of war with Iraq and the United States. Bringing into existence all this disorder and chaos and then complaining to the authorities: "You have not been able to establish legal and judicial security"--here there is an ulterior motive. We hope to be able to stop these disorders with the awareness, unity and familiarity of the heroic people with the trickeries and deceptions of global arrogance, especially the United States. The people must help and cooperate with the law enforcement forces and allow the authorities time with all their problems.

At the end Mohammad Asghari, the minister of justice, listed a number of subjects for improvement of the situation in the ministry of justice. The titles of these are as follows:

1. Encouragement of the fighting clergy, scholars, experienced judges and the master of the theological seminaries and reverence for their value and worth.

2. The welfare of the judges from every point of view.

3. Punishment of offenders.

4. Careful investigation of all the groundwork of the task of judging.

5. Inspection of accomplishments in order to distinguish those who serve society from lackadaisical elements.

6. The identification of those dedicated individuals who serve and also of those who are traitors to society.

7. Serious battle against giving and receiving bribes.

8. The destruction of the shameful western bureaucracy.

9. War and battle against the causes of crimes instead of their effects.

10. Careful investigation of and guaranteeing the needs of the deprived and the oppressed.

11. Decisive battle against capitalists, land-owners, hoarders and usurers.

12. Educational, cultural and literacy programs.

13. Scientific and moral strengthening.

14. Entrusting affairs to individuals who are believers and specialists.

15. Finding individuals who are dedicated and specialists.

16. Sufficient attention to the independence of responsible, Muslim and fighting judges.

17. Preparation and composition of bills on the basis of the necessities of the times and the emphatic directives of Islam.

18. Increasing the awareness of the masses and the legal articulation of this.

19. Avoiding discrimination on the basis of any kind of connections and position in the administration of laws.

20. The elimination of connections in administrative and judicial affairs and replacing them with legal rules and Islamic principles.

21. The establishment of instructional and scientific courses for judges.

22. Encouraging dedicated jurisprudents and theological students to work in the ministry of justice and as judges.

23. Explaining the fact that the lawyer is the assistant of the judge, not of the criminal.

24. Inviting dedicated lawyers to work as judges.

25. Preparation and establishment of public meetings, conferences, consultations, speeches and different kinds of publications.

26. Teaching comparative programs and fitting them into the theological seminaries and the universities and investigating different schools of jurisprudence and the sciences.

27. Inviting judges, lawyers and jurisprudents dedicated to the voice and visage of the Islamic Republic to explain legal and juridical subjects and teach the law.

28. The emphatic cooperation of mass communications with the work of the judges and courts.

29. Organizing deliberative and weekly and monthly sessions among lawyers, judges, jurisprudents and law enforcement forces, especially the notary publics and the employees of the public registry.

30. Consultation with lawyers and judges who are believers and dedicated to the Islamic revolution in the preparation of bills.

31. Scientific programs for the students of the faculties of law and students of the Islamic sciences.

32. Guaranteeing the occupational security of judges and their freedom of choice in the punishment of offenders.

33. Careful control of officials entrusted with enforcement and summoning and the like and the organization of instructional classes for them.

34. Teaching and elucidating the principles of the constitution and explaining ratified laws to the masses.

35. Widespread and extensive publicity and instruction for introducing the penal and legal system of Islam.

9831
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CLANDESTINE RADIO ON TEHRAN CLASHES

NC211650 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 21 Aug 81

[Text] While Radio Tehran, the disgraceful voice of Khomeyni, has said that yesterday's armed clash was the result of a siege on a communal house of the hypocrites [Mojahedin-e Khalq] by revolution guards and has tried to keep the news from all the people of Tehran and Iran, except eyewitnesses of the freedom fighters' pitiless fight against the mercenary guards, the facts are gradually becoming obvious to all our compatriots and all the people of Iran are now more or less aware of the details of Tehran's big clashes yesterday.

The truth is that on Thursday the alleys, streets, avenues and squares in western Tehran turned into scenes of bloody clashes between mercenary revolution guards and armed opponents of the regime. In these clashes, which lasted for several hours, a number of revolution guards were killed or wounded, and the freedom fighters gave martyrs as well.

The ignorant PARS News Agency and the lie-disseminating radio of the so-called Islamic Republic distorted facts as always and very insolently reported that one of the communal houses of the Mojahedin-e Khalq in western Tehran has been surrounded by the revolution guards and that clashes have broken out between the revolution guards and residents of this communal house. Newspapers and radios of the Western world have also reported the news, quoting the ignorant PARS News Agency and the lying voice of the Islamic Republic. However, they have added reports, quoting eyewitnesses, that the wounded bodies or corpses of a large number of revolution guards were transferred by ambulances from the scene of the armed clashes to other areas and hospitals.

Naturally, with the surrounding of a communal house and with the cruelty which is the nature of the revolution guards, these shimrs [general who killed Imam Husayn] of today and murderers use antitank bullets and mortars against any house they suspect and see the possibility of the least resistance so that they can destroy and burn.

The truth of the matter is that at 0700 yesterday, Thursday, officials of the revolution guards corps and the committees received reports on irregular activities in one of the areas of western Tehran. After receiving this information a large number of revolution guards and committee members started moving from three directions toward the said area situated near Shahyad Square. Contrary to the expectations of the mercenary guards, who intended to catch the so-called hypocrites and

rioters redhanded, they had not yet reached the scene when they became targets of bullets shot from the entrenchments in the houses. These houses had been occupied by opponents of the regime for some time and were actually used to lay a large trap for the revolution guards. In the first moments of the clash all the streets and alleys around the area were surrounded by mercenaries of the revolution guards corps and committees. Not an hour had passed from the start of the clashes when a flood of ambulances and relief groups started flowing toward Shahyad Square. In the initial hours of the clashes many of the people witnessed the loading of ambulances with the corpses and wounded bodies of the revolution guards. In this armed clash Iranian patriots and freedom fighters, who surely had the effective cooperation of the Mojahedin-e Khalq and possibly other opponent forces, opened fire by light and medium-caliber automatic arms, including RPG-7's and mortars, against the positions and shelters of Khomeyni's guards. The clashes continued until dusk, and the atmosphere of western Tehran was filled with the smell of gunpowder and smoke. Throughout the entire area of western Tehran the sound of machineguns and mortar and grenade explosions could be heard. Khomeyni and his plagued regime have not yet issued a report on the number of people killed or wounded in this incident, and even if they do issue a report it will be nothing but lies and a distortion of facts. But, according to a source close to Iranian freedom seekers, the losses suffered by the revolution guards is many times more than the number of people martyred for the freedom of our homeland.

In relation to this incident, a correspondent of the Free Voice of Iran, after contacting an official of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization reported that the spokesman of the organization, while confirming the participation of the Mojahedin-e Khalq in yesterday's Tehran clashes, said that the military actions of Thursday were the beginning of a chapter of a range of extensive activities which have already started. Contrary to the lies of Tehran Radio, Khomeyni's disgraceful voice, these clashes were extremely strong and extensive and many deaths were suffered by the revolution guards and the committees. The same spokesman told the Free Voice of Iran correspondent: Thursday's actions were the strongest military actions which have taken place in Tehran and we will witness, in the next days, the ("continuation) of this action and the strengthening of surprise armed attacks against Khomeyni's regime.

The Free Voice of Iran correspondent also reported that, in addition to Tehran, most of Iran's cities, are now witnessing crushing blows inflicted by members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization against the hireling government forces. Namely, simultaneous with the extensive Tehran activities, yesterday in Sari a strong clash broke out between Mojahedin-e Khalq and revolution guards and the latter suffered heavy losses. During the past 48 hours, a person said to be a member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, was arrested after hurling a bomb toward revolution guards. In Khorramabad, Rasht, Kermanshah, Mashhad, and Tabriz as well, according to statements by officials of the regime, clashes took place and 40 other opponents of the regime have been arrested on charges of being members of organization opposing Khomeyni's regime. In another clash in Tabriz a revolution guard was killed and an Iranian patriot was honored with martyrdom. Another report from our correspondent in Mazandaran states that in a strong clash in Sari, Khomeyni's mercenary guards arrested three members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, and, of course, they too suffered death.

Reports on clashes between opponents of Knomeyni's regime with the hireling government forces have been in the headlines of the world news agencies, and in coming days internal clashes in Iran are expected to reach a more acute stage.

Dear listeners: According to a report which I have just received, DEUTSCHE WELLE reported that six people were killed in Tehran's street fights yesterday. Tehran's disgraceful radio also reported 3 and 1/2 hours ago in its main newscast that six of the revolution guards killed in the incidents in Tehran yesterday have been buried.

Compatriots: The Free Voice of Iran will keep you regularly informed about the armed struggles of freedom fighters, be they Mojahedin, Feda'iyan, Monarchists, Social-Democrats or any other nationalist organization or group, against the mercenary forces of the usurping and illegal regime of the Mullahs. We once again recall to that group of revolution guards who have been fooled by the plots and deceits of the clerical regime to draw themselves back while there is still time and not to be a partner in the crimes of the plotting clergymen and deceitful murders who have donned the garb of revolution guards. The only fate awaiting the clergy and the revolution guards is their death by the hands of Iran's freedom seekers.

CSO: 4640/90

TEHRAN CITES INTERVIEW WITH LIBYAN ENVOY

LD222106 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 22 Aug 81

[Report on interview with Seyyed al Marghani of Libyan People's Bureau, in Tehran]

[Text] Mr Seyyed (al-Marghani), a member of the Libyan People's Bureau in Tehran was interviewed by a central news unit correspondent. (Al-Marghani) commented on the U.S. political and propaganda offensive against the Islamic revolution of Iran, and the alleged arms sale by the occupied regime of Palestine to Iran--an allegation made by the imperialist and Zionist circles--as well as the closure of the Palestine Embassy in Iran.

(Al-Marghani) said that the concept of the Islamic revolution and its identity, the revolution's uncompromising stand, has forced the United States to seek ways to eliminate this revolution. The United States tried to nip the revolution in the bud but it did not succeed. Later, the United States tried to achieve its luck once more for the destruction of the Islamic revolution. The United States has spoken of a very funny topic--namely, that Iran is importing arms from the occupied regime of Palestine. This notion does not correspond to logic. The Islamic revolution has risen against imperialism and Zionism and we can never assume that Iran and its Islamic revolution would import arms from the occupied regime of Palestine.

Continuing his remarks, (al-Marghani) referred to the vast imperialism propaganda led by the United States and said that the United States has recently spoken about the closure of the Palestine Embassy in Tehran. This is another U.S. trick aimed at weakening the Islamic revolution of Iran and harming the revolution's prestige among the Islamic and Arab countries. This trick is used because imperialism's other conspiracies have been defeated. (Al-Marghani) said the Palestine Embassy in Tehran is continuing with its task. Two days ago we had contacts with the Palestine ambassador and we did not discuss this topic whatsoever. He too denied this false news by releasing a statement.

The Libyan envoy said that the relationship between the Iranian and Palestinian revolutions is a unique one and Palestine has a place in every Iranian heart.

He expressed the hope that such a link will be maintained until the liberation of Palestine territory.

Commenting on the world-devouring U.S. conspiracies, the envoy said that harming the Islamic revolution by the imperialist circles is not a (?surprising) phenomenon.

Aggression against friends of this revolution is part of their conspiracies, such as the recent U.S. violation of Libyan water and airspace. Imperialist circles are aiming at encircling Iran, both with their propaganda and through economic sanction. They want to harm the revolution and its leaders' prestige. They accuse Iran with immoral allegations and use the U.S. propaganda machines.

With the help of God almighty, we hope their new conspiracy too will be defeated and as long as the flag of Allah is hoisted above the Islamic Republic of Iran, they will be defeated.

Answering a question on the ways of realizing a united Islamic front for the liberation of Palestine the envoy said that in order to succeed one element is essential [word indistinct] for the formation of this front. But the leaders of other Islamic member nations of this front must decide upon other factors. We will support any move which would contribute to bringing forward the date of Palestine's liberation as well as the world's oppressed liberation from the plunderer oppressors.

CSO: 4640/90

MINISTER SAYS GOD'S PARTY WILL BE DOMINANT IN SCHOOLS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 23 Aug 81 p 15

[Text] Yesterday [21 Aug] Seyyed Akbar Parvaresh, the new minister of education and training, participated in a press and radio-television conference and answered the questions of reporters concerning various problems of education and training. At the outset he said: As an introduction I consider it necessary before all else to remember the martyrs who have been active in education and training, especially the two martyred deputies of this ministry, the late martyr Musavi and martyr Shahsavari. Then during his introduction he said: Taking into account the fact that the general axis of education and training turns only upon the foundation of the student or the pupil, and whatever is as a rule made use of in this area will be on the basis of this axis, if there is discussion of an appropriate ambience and the existence of security for the student, or of the existence of a sympathetic teacher who can bring the aptitudes of this tremendous generation to fruition, or if there is talk of an appropriate framework for giving direction to the ideas of the pupils, all of this will be upon the axis of the student and this generation which Islam has totally made the object of its attention, this precious generation whose tremendous aptitudes Islam is striving to the extent possible to bring to fruition.

He added: Here in order that the introduction to my words may have a fine ending, I present some words of the Commander of the Faithful 'Ali from the "Nahj al-balaghah", words which are a piece of advice to his children. He said, "My children, the land of the existence of the young adult and the youth is like a wide land which will yield whatever you plant within it." He added: For this reason I want to say that all energy and possibilities must be employed to bring about the blossoming of these tremendous aptitudes and the growth of these precious shoots. In this path we ask for the power, aid and assistance of Almighty God, and we hope that He will be our friend and aide in this course of action. For in fact if we want to have an educational revolution, we must learn revolutionary education from Islam; and for bringing up this generation only this same revolutionary education of Islam can undertake this tremendous and momentous mission.

The minister of education and training was asked: What is the plan of the Ministry of Education and Training in relation to the cultural revolution and Islamicizing the contents of the programs of the schools?

Parvaresh answered: The cultural revolution will be taking place on a wider plane, but since in fact the foundation and structure of the cultural revolution will be

built upon the basis of the pupil, in this connection efforts have been made so that sufficient attention will be paid to the problem of schools in various committees of the cultural revolution. But the plan of the cultural revolution has to be drawn up by our brothers in the Cultural Revolution Headquarters. What we draw up is long term programs of the educational revolution on the basis of the dominance of Islamic thought and segmented programs.

The question was asked: Does the Ministry of Education and Training have any new programs in view for the villages?

The minister of education and training answered: As has been anticipated in the budget for the year 81-82, 5 billion tumans have been allocated for development plans. Of this, according to the evaluations and estimates that have been made, 70 percent must be allocated to the villages. In accordance with the programs which have been prepared in this area, we are hopeful that, God willing, we will be able to absorb this allocated budget on the level of the villages. With the speed which our brothers have shown nn the Reconstruction Organization with the help of the Reconstruction Crusade and other organs, we are hopeful that we will be able to absorb this budget in the coming years for reconstruction in the villages.

Akbar Parvaresh was asked: What is your overall program oor the Ministry of Education and Training. He answered: As a rule an overall program will comprise programs which are carried out in different areas, but naturally each of them must partake of a particular priority. However, in general, we have programs which are being carried out as follows: In the area of training teachers, the program consists of selecting 20,000 students for the centers of teacher training and the hiring of 40,000 teachers and 12,000 educational instructors on the basis of the special rules of employment. The next program is the problem of reconstruction within the ministry. Taking into account the bill which at the present moment is being studies and ratified, we expect that this bill will be ratified totally and that all those people who have been reconstructed up to the present moment will have their files investigated once again, so that if--God forbid--someone's right should have been taken away, it will be returned to him. Of course it is natural that reconstruction must continue. He added: Another problem is the retirement of some teachers who, for various reasons, might not be prepared to work or might not be able to accomplish their mission.

Concerning technical and vocational education Parvaresh said: We aim to profoundly expand the technical units since, as you know, our vocational schools have been extremely hard-pressed from the standpoint of facilities and technical and vocational teachers. Taking into account the need of our revolution for the expansion and widening of technical and vocational matters, these units must be expanded. Concerning textbooks the minister of education and training said: First we must try to make up for the deficiencies and inadequancies of the past and change some of the texts of our books which are not in keeping with out revoultuon, although of course the texts which must be changed are very few since this task has already been accomplished.

Then he alluded to the other plans of the ministry and said: This year, God willing, more activity must take place for harmonizing, strengthening and supporting the Islamic societies at the level of the schools, since this year, God willing, will be

the year of the dominance of God's Party in the schools, with God's help. So both the teachers and the students should pay attention to this question. Of course the Party of God which we have in mind is the same as the Party of God from the standpoint of the Koran, not the Party of God which--God forbid--may result in the misuse of this sacred name. Among the other questions is the changing of the name of some of the schools, names which are not in keeping with the way of the revolution.

He added: We also have a plan in view for the military service of the religious students.

The minister of education and training was asked: What programs do you have for the continuation or discontinuation of the studies of students who are supporters of various groups?

Akbar Parvaresh answered: You know that unfortunately opposition groups last year changed the very valuable and pleasant atmosphere of knowledge and awareness at the level of the schools to an atmosphere for political exploitation and personal goals. In this same connection unfortunately they misused a number--although not a large number--of our dear students, who partook of pure and untainted feelings. In connection with the overall orientation of these little groups towards the Islamic Republic, the Islamic revolution and the person of the Imam, the situation of many of these supporters became clear, and in reality, they no longer have the protection and attention that they had in the past. But it is possible that again a certain number will persist in this area. Now if they should be unaware individuals, a guidance policy should be employed in relation to them. With this policy it is natural that they will be able to come and profit from the ambience which will be prepared for them. But those who are ill-intentioned, who want to exercise their ill-intentions and who have no harmony with the overall system--it is natural that they will be confronted.

9831
CSO: 4640/88

FUTURE ACTIVITIES OF UNIVERSITIES OUTLINED

Tehran ETTELA' AT INTERNATIONAL in Persian/English 19 Aug 81 p 3

[Text] Three members of the Cultural Revolution Staff, Dr 'Abdolkarim Sorush, Dr Hasan Habibi and Dr Shari'atmadari, announced in a press and radio-television interview complete details of two new plans for the creation of both "a university complex for teacher training" and a "ministry of health and medical education." They added that these two plans have reached the attention of Dr Bahonar, the prime minister, so that they can be forwarded to the cabinet and then to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for final approval. The two plans are part of the first bills that will go to the Majles.

At the beginning of the interview Dr Sorush said: "We are about to begin the second phase of the staff's work, meaning the approval of suitable and well-thought-out plans. After approval the plans can go to the cabinet, and then if necessary to the Majles and be prepared for implementation."

Concerning plans which are ready for approval and implementation, he then said; "The announcement of a definite date for the reopening of any one university area of study is not at present within the staff's power. However, on the basis of indications, we are hopeful that if the medical plan gets through its legal course of approval it will be implemented quickly because of its importance and urgency. The programs of some of the fields in the humanities, theology in particular, are in their last phases. Furthermore, plans for such areas as agriculture and technology are relatively ready. Of course the re-opening of these fields bears a direct relation to the complete clarification of the administration of the universities. The staff is working very hard at the present time to clarify this issue."

Setting Requirements for Former University Students

Dr Sorush, concerning the position of former university students, then said: "We will try to clarify the requirements for former university students by the month of Mehr [22 Sept-23 Oct] or a little later. It is planned that these students will come to complete their outstanding credits in addition to those credits which the staff deems necessary, and thereby graduate. Then new students can enter the system and begintheir studies with new programs and professors now being hired by the staff. However, an announcement of a definite date for the reopening of all the universities is not feasible, although in our view this date is not very far off."

Dr Sorush then added that one of the Cultural Revolution Staff's decisions was that students having up to 25 credit hours outstanding would pass through the university first, and afterwards it would be the turn of students having more credit hours outstanding, probably up to 40 hours. Of course this decision has actually been made for the undergraduate program.

He added: "According to estimates, there are 15,000 persons across the country having 15 uncompleted credits. They are persons who are the least subject to the educational revolution because they have completed most of the necessary courses, and it is not proper that they should wait any longer. However, the graduation of this group of students is not purely a matter of their completing their outstanding credits. Rather, they must be taught courses requiring their deeper understanding and Islamic matters as well. They will have to take a serious examination before graduating."

Staff Council Make-up

Dr Habibi, concerning the make-up of the Cultural Revolution Staff Council, said: "Mr Rabani Amalshi and Mr Farsi are still members of the staff and Mr Bahonar as well, to whom the above plans were recently submitted in his capacity as prime minister. God willing, the newly chosen minister will take part in the staff's sessions in place of Dr 'Arefi who was a member of the staff in respect to his position. There are no plans to reshuffle the staff under consideration at the present time."

He added: "A Constitution for State Higher Education, which concerns methods of university administration, policies on university student admission, selection of professors and other matters, is being prepared for Majles approval."

Dr Habibi then spoke about the details of the plan for forming a ministry of health and medical education, and stated: "The staff came to the conclusion that the health organization had to be fundamentally revised, and that its work goals should be based on these principles: 1-expansion of medical education; 2-carrying doctors and medical service to the farthest reaches of the country; 3-use of all the country's medical potentialities for medical education."

Medical Student Admission Procedure

Dr Habibi, concerning this plan, then added: "In this plan, school educational programs are going to undergo fundamental changes. Another point is that medical students are not going to have vacations in their previous form. They are going to be occupied the entire year in hospitals, villages or other health centers. With respect to standards for selection of professors and students, the aforementioned ministry has prepared a plan for all fields of study, which will be announced as a whole. But in any case we will strive to take students for medical fields from every point in the country. We will use the old method of a national exam [Konkur]. However, there have of course been revisions in this method, so that the sole basis for selection will not be a high score. In this way individuals from the deprived regions of the country can also be accepted to university."

Dr Habibi added: "Our hope is that the medical colleges can take more than 1,000 persons for the freshman year, and that in future years this figure will reach 4,500 to 5,000."

Retraining of Employed Teachers

Then Dr Shari'atmadari, concerning means of creating a university complex for teacher training, said: "The physical facilities of the ministry of education's centers for teacher training, and the universities for high-school teacher training will be concentrated in this complex. Teachers in this university will have university status and be subject to university regulations. From now on, teachers who will be employed as teachers will study in this complex."

Dr Shari'atmadari stated in another portion of his speech: "One of the duties of this complex is the creation of programs for the retraining of employed teachers, in order that the level of knowledge of this group of teachers be raised to the desired degree."

9557
CSO: 4640/86

STATUS OF CURRENCY RESERVES DEEMED FAVORABLE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 28 Jul 81 p 2

[Announcement by Central Bank Director Nurbaksh]

[Text] The method which the General Headquarters for Economic Mobilization has followed is the best way to combat inflation. The General Headquarters must continue its work in all seriousness without paying any attention to the pressure from the leisure classes or the creation of rumors while taking into account the fact that the plan for the rationing of allotments is more to the benefit of low-income classes. This subject was announced by Dr Nurbaksh, the general director of the Central Bank.

At the outset concerning the collateral for Iranian banknotes Dr Nurbaksh declared: According to the currency and banking law of the country, 25 percent of the volume of the banknotes in circulation must be backed by a collateral of gold and currency reserves, and this percentage exists at the present moment. Of course it is necessary to point out that the gold collateral of Iran has been priced at $40 per ounce, while at the present moment gold is worth more than $400 per ounce on the international market. Therefore the gold collateral of Iran's banknotes is even worth much more than is necessary.

Concerning the vacillation of the price of gold on the domestic market the general director of the Central Bank said: The decrease and increase of the price of gold during recent political events and the warning of the Central Bank to the speculators prove that this increase in price was completely artificial and fabricated by the speculators.

Dr Nurbaksh emphasized that, contrary to the idea of certain people who have interpreted the warnings of the Central Bank as a so-called "bluff", whenever the bank feels that speculation with the price of gold will result in a blow to the monetary stability of the country, it will not remain indifferent; by importing gold from the international market to the domestic market the Central Bank will even make a large profit.

Concerning the reason for the payment of the price of the shares of the minor shareholders in the national banks Dr Nurbaksh said: This took place at the approval of the Revolutionary Council for the sake of helping the minor shareholders. Taking into account the fact that in many cases the prices of the shares had reached zero and the majority of the minor shareholders in Iranian banks were teachers and

university professors, it becomes clear why the payment was made. He added: From our point of view, the minor shareholders are persons who in no sense possess the attribute of speculators.

Concerning possible changes on the level of the administration of the Central Bank, the general director of the Central Bank said: As I also said in the assembly of the employees of the bank, if any change takes place, it will be purely for the sake of improving and increasing efficiency, and it will not take place until after study and the discernment of defects. Likewise the human resources of the Central Bank or the banking network of the country will be made use of for the post of the Central Bank's deputy director for currency. Dr Nurbaksh was asked if the Central Bank would be able to provide a loan this year to the government to guarantee part of the budget deficit. He replied: Certain resources of the bank have been set aside as grant credits for the government. This comprises clause 33 of the budget and is related to credits for industry, agriculture and housing. The ceiling of this loan is 50 billion tumans. Concerning the transfer of the amount of $1 billion of Iranian money to the Central Bank of Holland (account No 3) Dr Nurbaksh said: At this moment discussions are under way concerning the technical problems of the transfer, in particular the area of its interest. Taking into account the fact that about $200 million in interest will come due on this account, Iran has asked to receive this amount. But the United States believes that the interest must be deposited in the said account. These problems may be solved by next Monday. Dr Nurbaksh was asked what amount of Iranian wealth had been returned until now by the United States. He said: In the beginning the amount of $8 billion was deposited in our account, of which $3.6 billion was set aside for the payment of Iran's debts.

Likewise $1.4 billion of that was placed in the secured account in London for settling debts and the remaining $3 billion was returned to Iran. In addition $2.5 billion will now be deposited in Iran's account, of which $1 billion will be placed in the secured account in Holland for settling accounts and the rest will belong to Iran. Likewise of $1.3 billion in the central bank in London, certain amounts will probably be returned to Iran. Concerning the currency reserves of the country, the general director of the Central Bank said: Because of the measures which have been taken and the economies which are being made in these areas, these reserves are in a stabilized situation, and it will be attempted to keep them untouched at the present level. Concerning the proper course of action for the foreign shareholders in the banks of Iran, he declared that in keeping with a bill ratified by the Revolutionary Council, the price of these shares will be paid after evaluation. But it must be kept in mind that most of these shares have no value. Concerning how interest would be eliminated within the time limit presented to the government, Dr Nurbaksh said: First I have to make this point clear to those who have savings accounts: The rumors which counterrevolutionaries have spread in order to reach their goal--which is precisely the creation of an atmosphere of a lack of confidence--concerning the lack of security for deposits are in no way correct. As director of the Central Bank I assure the savings account holders that the Central Bank and the government guarantee the savings accounts of the people. The basis of the people's savings will certainly not be impaired in any way. Likewise it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that even in the case of the elimination of interest, a system will be devised to guarantee the benefits of the depositors. However, this system must be Islamic in order to put the minds of the government and the depositors at ease. In this area right now we are busy studying plans, and this question is being considered: If interest does not exist, what other mechanisms must exist in order to attract deposits and control economic relation-

ships in the capital market? A series of such mechanisms exist within the framework of such Islamic topics as "limited partnership." After finding a new tool we will investigate the deficiencies. It is necessary for us to approach this problem in practice. Concerning inflation and the way to control it, the general director of the Central Bank said: The main reason for inflation in Iran is the lack of control over the bazaar and the fact that individuals are taking unfair advantage of the present situation while the government is occupied. In my opinion the method the General Headquarters for Economic Mobilization has followed is the best way to combat inflation. The General Staff must continue its work in all seriousness without paying any attention to the pressure from the leisure class and the creation of rumors and the like, while taking into account the fact that the plan for the rationing of allotments is more to the benefit of low-income classes. Of course certain disorderlinesses exist which, taking into account the lack of experience of our country, are natural and will be solved with the passage of time. We are hopeful that an appropriate network of distribution will be established in our country as soon as possible. Finally, concerning how to collect taxes in the country Dr Nurbaksh said: Unfortunately up until now we have not made full use of the tax resources of the country. In this area steps for collecting taxes that are due may be taken by bringing into existence cultural and publicity programs for the taxpayers, by putting the tax collectors into action and by making use of both young and experienced human resources. In addition, for collection of taxes there are sources such as those who have occupations, the merchants of the bazaar, professionals, physicians and others.

9831
CSO: 4640/72

'VAST PROGRAM' IS BEING IMPLEMENTED TO 'ISLAMICIZE' FISHERIES

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in Persian/English 19 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] Rasht--According to the statement of the managing director of the Fisheries, Iran's caviar exports have risen from 50 to 65 tons, and a three-year contract with the Europeans has been concluded on the basis of selling 195 tons of caviar at a price of $35 million.

He added: "In addition to this, over 2,000 tons of cartilaginous fish have been exported to various countries this year, the Soviet Union taking the largest share." In this interview he requested authorities and fishermen to aid the fisheries in the implementation of a plan now being composed aimed at preventing the destruction of fish stocks, particularly money-making fish, and preserving natural resources.

Concerning the reconstruction of the fisheries, he said: "A vast program is underway to Islamicize the fisheries. While we are now giving individuals ideological training in regard to the greatest possible ideological purification of the fisheries, we will soon make sweeping changes in fisheries officials comprising 20 to 25 persons."

The managing director of Iran's fisheries, responding to a question concerning other fishery programs in effect, said: "In order to supply fish needed by the public, and to attract a greater work force, a canning factory will be built in Bandar Anzali in the future. At the present time, six fish breeding facilities are being built. Among them are two facilities for the breeding of whitefish which will soon begin activity."

9557
CSO: 4640/87

BRIEFS

FORMER OIL MINISTER--According to a VOI correspondent, Mohammad Javad Tondguyan, the former oil minister of the Islamic Republic, who was arrested by Iraqi soldiers a short while after the outbreak of the war, is living in a two-story villa in the outskirts of Baghdad. The Iraqi Government has given him all possible facilities. Our correspondent adds that the villa is heavily protected by Iraqi security forces. A white 450 Mercedes and driver have been put at Tondguyan's disposal. It has been said that the Iraqi Government has gained important and detailed information on various matters related to the Islamic Republic as a result of Tondguyan's cooperation. Tondguyan has repeatedly announced that he will not leave Iraq under any circumstances and has strongly attacked and criticized the rulers of the Islamic Republic. [Text] [GF241934 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 24 Aug 81]

MANPOWER BILL--The approval of various articles of the shameful bill on reconstructing and purging manpower resources has been carried out in the Mullahs' Majlis. The approval of the shameful articles of this bill means that if it is implemented then all 35 million Iranians should either be executed or sent to jail for life. Some of the ridiculous articles start with rumormongering and end with having been a member of the Rastakhiz party, cooperating with the former government, having been a deputy or a minister and, in general, having undertaken any form of responsibility in the past. The so-called Majlis deputy Mullahs, who shamelessly approved this fascist and inhuman law, should await its eventual application. [Text] [GF271915 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 27 Aug 81]

RADIO ON 'ALI AMINI'S STATEMENT--Supporters of Dr 'Ali Amini's National Reconciliation have issued a statement stating that Dr Amini believes attempts against the fascist clerical regime, by both the opposition in Iran and that abroad, is like a solar system with all of its separate celestial bodies orbiting around one sun, which is Iranian nationalism and national culture. In this system, each celestial body has its own position but its movements are not separate, and should not be separate, from the movement of the other bodies. Therefore, Dr 'Ali Amini supports any step taken to free Iran within this system. He believes that support for one body, which is apparently not connected with other bodies, does not necessarily mean rejection of the others, since to build Iran's future one should believe in the principle of democracy and in the diversity of ideas and thoughts. This principle should be accepted by the opposition, the sole objective is Iran's salvation. This confirmation at the movement of General Aryana as well as that of Dr Madani--announced by news sources--has been done in view of this principle. [Text] [NC271830 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 27 Aug 81]

BAKHTIAR-ARYANA ALLIANCE SUPPORT--Many Iranians residing in Canada, Germany and Britain have expressed their support for the unity and solidarity between the national resistance movement of Iran and the Azadegan organization. In statements issued on this occasion in Hamburg, London and Ottawa, our refugee compatriots have praised solidarity between combatant national groups as a great step toward the liberation of Iran. The Iranians living in Germany, Canada and Britain have also expressed their support for the students who are on a hunger strike in the Amnesty International Building in Paris, and in their statements they have called on international organizations to end its silence on the numerous executions in Iran. [Text] [NC281556 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 28 Aug 81]

BOMB AT BEIRUT IRAN TV OFFICE--Deutsche Welle, the German Radio, has reported that (?a bomb) exploded in the office representing the Iranian state radio and television in Beirut. According to latest reports two people were killed and several were wounded in the explosion. It is said that officials of Khomeyni's regime were using this office for terrorist objectives and for the recruitment of mercenary guerrillas. It has not yet been clarified whether the known nonentities of the state Iranian radio and television organization are among those killed or not. The bomb that blew up the office where hirelings were recruited for Khomeyni's regime in Beirut is said to have been a very strong one. [Text] [NC291615 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 29 Aug 81]

CSO: 4640/90

OPERATIONS OF HOUSING BANK DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-'AMAL in Arabic No 27, Jun 81 pp 40-41

[Interview with Mr Zuhayr Khuri, President and General manager of the Jordanian Housing Bank by Marawan al-Sharidah; date and place not specified: "We Financed One Third of the Housing Units Needed by Jordan"]

> [Text] "The bank is a natural place for the savings of Jordanian expatriates. We began attracting foreign currency deposits from the Arab countries."

Mr Zuhayr Khuri, president and general manager of the Jordanian Housing Bank spoke to AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL about the bank's experience and about what the bank was able to accomplish in about 7 years since it was established. The interview follows.

[Question] How do you evaluate the results achieved by the bank especially during 1980?

[Answer] The bank is still realizing record rates of growth. Its assets rose from about 112 million Jordanian pounds at the end of 1980. That was a 37 percent rate of increase. Bank deposits also rose from 86.2 million pounds at the end of 1979 to 122.6 million at the end of 1980. This is a 42 percent rate of increase. Investors' funds in loans and credit rose from 81.2 million in 1979 to 102.9 million pounds in 1980. The bank was able to maintain the interest rate it charges on personal loans, on loans to cooperative housing societies and on housing funds, and it was also able to realize net profits of 2.67 million dinars in 1980, compared with 2.13 million by the end of 1979. This was an increase of about 25 percent.

[Question] The Housing Bank does not depend only on capital and reserves to finance its activities; it also depends on citizens' savings and deposits. What are the bank's accomplishments in this field?

[Answer] In 1980 the Housing Bank continued in its policy which seeks to attract more national deposits and savings for the purpose of putting those funds together and investing them in financing the building and construction sector and other development activities. This absorbs part of the

currency in circulation in the Jordanian economy and is one of the means for curbing inflation. Last year the bank embarked upon the task of attracting foreign currency deposits from the fraternal Arab countries that have a currency surplus so as to invest those funds in the housing and construction sector. The bank is looking forward to developing and increasing its foreign currency deposits, which come in different kinds and from different sources, thereby taking advantage of Jordan's political stability and sound financial position.

[Question] Can the bank's lending and investment activities be evaluated?

[Answer] The bank's importance as a source of financing housing operations increased with the increase in the bank's investments in 1980. The bank made loans worth 27.64 million pounds, compared with 20 million in 1979; 2,877 persons benefited from those loans.

These funds were given out as loans to contribute to the financing of 5,205 housing units whose area was estimated to be 680,000 square meters. In addition, the bank has contributed enthusiastically to the financing of a few other construction projects.

In view of the housing plan's estimates of the new housing units that Jordan will need every year, the bank will have contributed to the financing of about one third of the housing units needed by the kingdom for 1980.

With regard to credit terms, loans and credit amounting to 14.56 million pounds were granted in 1980 for other development purposes. These include bank contributions to joint bank loans made in conjunction with other banks. The purpose of these loans is to finance other development projects that are consistent with the aspirations of the Jordanian Central Bank to expand the foundation of aggregate local loans so that these can replace commercial loans. This would contribute to the alleviation of the burden of exorbitant interest rates that are charged on foreign loans on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it would contribute to the reduction of the pressure on the country's foreign currency returns. The bank has been intent on investing more of its resources in the capital of industrial, tourist and financial companies. The bank's total contributions in 1980 to the capital of companies amounted to about 863,000 pounds. This is in addition to total contributions which amounted to 5.54 million pounds by the end of 1979. Thus the bank's total contributions [to the capital of companies] until the end of 1980 amount to about 6.4 million pounds.

[Question] If the bank is trying to encourage Jordanian citizens to save, has it similarly encouraged Jordanian expatriates in the countries of the Arabian Gulf and in other countries? What measures did the bank follow in doing so?

[Answer] Many expatriates are hoping to own suitable homes in the homeland, and it is this that is making housing naturally attractive for the savings of Jordanian expatriates, especially since the bank gives its depositors priority in borrowing money.

The Housing Bank was able to fulfill the housing needs of expatriates in a reasonable way, and it was able to attract savings accounts and other deposits from large numbers of expatriates who continue to transfer funds.

Furthermore, the bank followed a policy of maintaining personal contact with Jordanian communities in the Gulf countries through personal visits and communications via the various agencies of the media.

It is a fact that the bank was able to attract contributions from abroad that totaled 6 million Jordanian pounds. These contributions were subject to certain conditions among which was the condition that they not earn dividends from the bank for 2 years. After that period comes to an end, shareholders, including non-Jordanian government organizations, can receive reasonable annual dividends continuously. It is known that the dividends that were distributed to the shareholders amounted to 9 percent annually. The remaining dividends were transferred to the reserves. This is based on the bank's policy whose objective is to develop the reserves very quickly.

The number of loans that the bank granted during the past 7 years amounted to 16,795 loans. The number of housing units to whose financing it made a contribution amounted to 30,818 units during the same period. The total area of these units amounts to 390,000 square meters.

The Evolution of Housing Bank Loans from 1974-1980
(in Million Jordanian Pounds)

The Year	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total
Housing Loans	1.84	8.58	33.0	15.23	22.67	20.01	27.64	128.97
Development Loans	--	--	1.1	--	--	2.8	2.2	6.1
Credit Terms	--	--	--	--	2.0	13.8	12.9	28.7
Total	1.84	8.58	34.1	15.23	24.67	36.61	42.74	163.77

(Source: Housing Bank)

8592
CSO: 4304/116

NEED FOR FOREIGN LABOR PERSISTS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 220,20-26 Jul 81 pp 41-42

[Article: "Foreign Labor in Saudi Arabia for How Long?; Development Plans Face Negative Effects of Hiring on Harsh Terms and Training of National Manpower"]

[Text] In a recent interview, the Saudi ambassador to the Philippines stated that from 300 to 400 visas per day are issued by the embassy to workers, companies, and organizations of the Philippine Government with interests in Saudi Arabia. These figures are just one example which provides an indication of the rate of hiring of foreign labor necessitated by Saudi development plans.

From the Philippines, South Korea, the Republic of China, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, thousands of workers, technicians, and specialists in various sectors await visas every day to enter Saudi Arabia and join the more than 2.3 million other foreign workers who have gone there before them. The major obstacle before Saudi Arabia has been and continues to be the lack of experienced domestic manpower. In order to solve the problem and make up for the lack of experienced and technically qualified Saudi manpower, the doors have been opened to the recruitment of foreign labor (the second 5-year development plan saw a need for one-half million workers, but the figure had actually reached 2.3 million workers by the time the plan ended in 1980).

An analysis of the composition of labor in the private sector reveals that foreign labor has a clear lead over Saudi labor with 63 percent of the labor force.

The third 5-year plan for 1980-1985 anticipates that the civilian labor force will increase from 2.47 million at the start of the plan to 2.63 million by the end of the plan. This represents an annual increase of 1.2 percent, or 155,000 workers. However, the state of development of native manpower during the period of the third 5-year plan could run up against the same realities as the second 5-year plan despite the controls and barriers that have been instituted by the responsible authorities to restrict the hiring freedom which prevailed during the first two plans. During these two plans, authorities announced an annual increase in the rate of growth of the civilian labor force of around 7.2 percent. This represented a doubling of the rate achieved during the 1970-1975 plan, which was 3.8 percent.

However, this increase was accompanied by a decrease in the percentage of Saudi workers relative to the total labor force from 72 percent to around 57 percent.

Why Have the Saudis Not Succeeded?

The question which comes up repeatedly in this connection is, Why have Saudi officials not yet succeeded in solving the problem of foreign labor, which is beginning to have adverse effects as time goes on? Why have they not been able to ensure Saudi replacements for this large mixture of workers arriving from all directions?

There is one historical fact in the kingdom which can be overcome quickly, having been passed on from father to son in the Arabian Peninsula through training in the home. This fact is that manual labor is viewed as demeaning. Thus, the trades of the carpenter, the smith, and the poultry farmer are considered degrading, and families are customarily encouraged to hold this view.

Studies indicate that the private sector accounts for 75 percent of Saudi Arabia's foreign labor needs while the public sector accounts for only 16 percent. This is due to the fact that young Saudis prefer government sector jobs to work in the private sector for several reasons, the most important of which are the following:

1. Employers in the private sector will accept only those applicants who have sufficient practical experience, and this qualification is generally lacking among young Saudis. But even if this qualification is met, the owner of a factory or company prefers to employ a Pakistani, Philippino, Korean, or Egyptian because the pay of such a worker is only 700 riyals at most while this sum could never satisfy a Saudi worker. Because of this situation, the young Saudi turns to private employment if possible. If his circumstances do not permit this option, he takes a job in the government where he enjoys a good salary, retirement benefits, and Thursdays and Fridays off.

2. There is a gap between the demands of the private sector for native labor and qualification through training and educaion. The fact is that there is a maldistribution of native manpower in the government apparatus, with manpower overages in some organizations and manpower shortages in others. This calls for some sort of exchange process in order to achieve a balance in actual labor needs and raise the level of prpductivity.

3. The demand for education and training has taken away part of the projected native labor force. Thus, while youths between the ages of 12 and 19 represented 37 percent of the national labor force in 1975, this figure had dropped to only 21 percent by 1980 because the state placed extreme importance on education and provided opportunities and incentives to students which led many of them to continue their education all the way to the doctorate level.

4. Because of the traditions of Saudi society and the imposition of Islamic teachings, women--who make up around half of the work force--contribute only 6 percent of the labor force despite the fact that there are now some 40,000 female Saudi university graduates.

Negative Aspects of Importing Workers

Based on the facts presented above, one can easily deduce why the process of recruiting foreign labor continues in Saudi Arabia in spite of the many dangers which have resulted and may yet result from this situation. It is true that recruiting foreign labor was necessary in order to fill the tremendous vacuum of trained manpower in the fields of industry, the sciences, medicine, teaching, and construction projects. Moreover, it was beneficial because of the expertise that native Saudi labor developed through close contact with foreign workers. However, there are certain negative aspects which must be mentioned, including the following:

--The state subsidizes many goods and provides numerous free services, including medical treatment and education. Foreigners benefit from all this just as Saudis do, which imposes additional burdens on the state treasury. Some feel that these burdens are an unjustifiable waste of the people's money.

--Urban residents, who constituted 39 percent of the total population in 1970, now make up 54 percent of the total population. This concentration of population in the cities has created a major crisis of urban services. While the problems of electricity, water, and sewers have now been solved, the problem of medical services has not. There is a shortage of doctors and the hospitals are insufficient for the growing needs of the population.

In addition, the large increase in the number of incoming foreigners has caused a substantial rise in apartment rents. This has led to a housing crisis for low-income citizens, prompting the state to establish the Real Estate Development Bank to enable the citizens to borrow money. In addition, the municipalities have distributed thousands of tracts of land free to low-income persons to help solve the housing crisis. Aside from all this, the increase in the urban population is occurring at the cost of the migration of farmers to the urban areas, and this creates other problems within the agricultural sector.

--Some Saudis feel that the foreigners have brought with them customs and traditions that are completely incompatible with the traditions of the conservative Islamic society of the Saudis. They feel that this will leave a negative influence on members of the younger generation, who might pick up reprehensible and shameful practices from the newcomers!

--There are some who believe that the presence of the foreigners could upset the country's security and stability through several practices including the sale of drugs and alcoholic beverages, the smuggling of weapons, and the commission of acts of theft. While it is true that these phenomena exist in every society, intermixing and surplus population increase them. There are also frequently repeated comments about a certain danger that newcomers from the Far East could pose if a conflict were to occur in the area.

--Another negative aspect is the spread of the phenomenon of trafficking in visas. Owners of dummy companies have begun recruiting workers and granting them the right to work freely in exchange for a certain percentage of their salaries or an agreed-upon sum of money. This situation has caused considerable confusion.

Solutions to the Problem

Whatever the case may be, the Saudi authorities have begun to be convinced that the development leap must be revised so that the recruitment of foreign manpower can be dispensed with gradually and as much as possible. For this reason, Saudi authorities have resorted to the following steps:

--the issuance of new laws by which rather severe conditions are imposed on organizations before they are granted work visas. In addition, many categories of jobs have been closed to foreigners and companies have been required to reserve these job categories for Saudis only. One such category is public relations.

--withholding of the right to hire families except in certain job categories such as teachers, engineers, doctors, and pharmacists, a number of technical sectors, and high-income occupations with salaries above 5,000 riyals per month.

--the utilization of existing workers in the country by granting them the right to transfer their sponsorship to organizations other than the ones they are working for. Organizations have also been permitted to loan their workers for fixed periods of time to other organizations which need them.

--the provision of numerous training institutes to produce the technical manpower needed for the development plans. The third development plan envisioned a plan to train 250,000 Saudi youths in order to add them to the labor force. It also envisioned the training of 39,700 government employees by the Public Administration Institute, a figure which represents around 150 percent of all individuals trained by the institute since its establishment in 1960. The plan also required companies to institute programs to train a certain number of their workers rather than sending them abroad for training. There are financial inducements, incentives, and stipends for the trainees.

--The ministry of Labor recently issued a law extending the pensioning-off period to over 60 years so that the worker or employee can remain in his job as long as he is able to perform it in a normal manner.

From all these moves, it can be concluded that the state's plan for the coming years relies on replacing foreign labor with trained Saudi cadres and gradually checking the hiring of foreign labor by restricting it to professionals until native labor can fill the shortage with graduates of universities, schools, and training centers.

8591
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MODERN MEDICAL EMERGENCY SYSTEM ADOPTED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 24 Jul 81 p 3

[Article: "Details about the Most Modern Model Medical Emergency System in Our Country"]

[Text] A decree has been issued recently according to which emergency medical operations in the cities of the Syrian Arab Republic and on its principal roads are to be regulated in a manner that would guarantee that these operations be carried out with the necessary speed so that those who are injured in road and other accidents as well as people who have serious diseases can be transported from the site of the accident or from their homes or places of employment to the appropriate medical emergency center and the administration of necessary first aid for them can be guaranteed as well. The decree also seeks to provide all the requirements of first aid services at the medical emergency centers in question so that essential immediate first aid can be administered under the best professional conditions. The decree also provides for the active participation [of medical emergency staff] in rescue and first aid operations in cases of disasters and wars and for the coordination of their efforts with those of other agencies such as military medical services, civil defense and the Syrian Red Crescent organization.

The decree referred to the fact that the communications system [that will be used] in the cities and on the public roads to relay information about accidents and transporting and treating [the injured] will be determined in accordance with the size of the city, its economic and demographic nature as well as the length and the importance of the road in the capitals of the following governorates: Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Hamah and Latakia. A medical emergency command center is to be introduced into the capital of every governorate. That center is to be connected to a radio receiver and transmitter, a number of direct telephone lines with simple numbers and an automatic communications recording device.

Information is received at the center by telephone, and the center directs the ambulances to the site by radio. Communications between the center and the ambulance stations are to be carried out by radio and telephone so that the center can be notified of the emergency medical cases as soon as

they are transported so preparations can be made for receiving and treating those cases.

B. Ambulance stations and the number of ambulances:

--Every city is to be divided into sectors, and a station for ambulances is to be designated in each sector so that there would be two ambulances [for each station]. Each ambulance is to be furnished with a radio for each sector in accordance with the following:

The city of Damascus: 10 sectors; 20 ambulances.

The city of Aleppo: 8 sectors; 16 ambulances.

The city of Homs: 3 sectors; 6 ambulances.

The city of Hamah: 3 sectors; 6 ambulances.

The city of Latakia: 3 sectors; 6 ambulances.

--The two ambulances are to be permanently stationed in the designated stations, and they are to move at the direction of the command post to transport the medical emergency case to the appropriate emergency center.

C. Emergency Centers:

Emergency centers in each one of the aforementioned capitals of the governorates are to be set in the principal hospitals in accordance with the following:

The city of Damascus: al-Muwasah Hospital; Damascus Hospital; Ibn al-Nafis Hospital; University Hospital; Children's Hospital (child emergency cases); Maternity Hospital (women's medical emergencies and the delivery of children); al-Zahrawi Hospital (for women's medical emergencies and the delivery of children).

The city of Aleppo: University Hospital; al-Razi Hospital; Maternity Hospital; al-Kindi Hospital.

The city of Homs: National Hospital

The city of Hamah: National Hospital.

The city of Latakia: National Hospital.

In the capitals of the remaining governorates an emergency information center is to be introduced into the capital of the governorate in the principal hospital [in that city] or in the police station, at the discretion of local authorities. This information center is to be provided with an appropriate number of direct telephone lines that have simple numbers. Communications between the information center, the ambulance stations and

the medical emergency centers are carried out be telephone so as to send the ambulances out and to notify the emergency centers of the cases so they can be prepared to receive them.

An ambulance is to be designated for each one of the capitals of these governorates. These ambulances are to be stationed at the principal hospitals or at the police stations, at the discretion of local authorities. Ambulances are sent out at the direction of the information center to transport a medical emergency case to the appropriate emergency center.

A health vehicle is to be designated for the capital of every district and for a few of the large subdistricts. These vehicles will transport emergency cases to the emergency center from the capital of the district, from the subdistricts and from the villages that are administratively connected to the district.

The emergency center is to be located at the principal hospital in the governorate or at the hospital of the district, if there is one.

The ambulance is to be permanently located at the district hospital, if there is one, or at the principal health center in the district in the mornings and at the administrative center for the district in the afternoons.

The vehicle is sent out to transport emergency cases under the supervision of an official who attends exclusively to matters of information. Information about emergency cases is relayed by telephone or by direct contact. The principal roads are to be divided first into sectors as follows:

1. The Damascus-Homs sector.

2. The Homs-Hamah sector.

3. The Homs-Tudmur sector.

4. The Homs-Tartus sector.

5. The Tartus-Latakia sector.

6. The Hamah-Aleppo sector.

7. The Aleppo-al-Raqqah sector.

8. The al-Raqqah sector.

9. The Damascus-Dar'a sector.

10. The Damascus-Syrian, Lebanese border sector.

11. The Idlib-Latakia sector.

12. The Damascus sector.

13. The Dayr al-Zawr-al-Hasakah sector.

14. The Aleppo-Turkish border Bab al-Hawa sector.

Two motorcycles equipped with a radio transmitter and a receiver are to be designated for every sector of principal roads. The information center contacts these motorcycles and the ambulances designated for that sector at the emergency medical centers near the police stations in those sectors.

Information devices are to be allocated by the internal security forces, and they are to be designated by members of the police. Their route in the sector is to guarantee that the sector is permanently covered.

Two ambulances equipped with a radio are to be designated for each one of the principal roads for the sectors of Homs-Hamah; Homs-Tudmur; and Aleppo-the Turkish borders. One ambulance would then suffice for each one of them.

Ambulances are to be stationed at specific stations on the principal roads. These stations are to be furnished with a direct telephone line and a radio transmitter and receiver. The order of the sectors [is as follows]: al-Nabk, al-Rastan, Furqlus, Tall Kalakh Ma'rah al-Nu'man, Miskinah, Ma'din, al-Sanamayn, Maysalun, Jisr al-Shughur, al-Shaykh Miskin, Tudmur, al-Shidadah, Bab al-Hawa and al-Surah al-Sughra.

Ambulances are to be permanently located at the stations designated for them, and they are to move under the direction of the information [center] to transport the emergency case to the appropriate emergency center.

Hospitals in the governorates, in areas close to the roads or in areas located at their outskirts are considered roadside emergency centers.

The Ministry of Defense is also placing a number of helicopters, limited to three, [at the disposal of medical emergencies]. These are distributed among the principal governorates so as to cover the eastern, western, central and southern districts. A helicopter can be requested directly by the governor or health director.

Every hospital that has been considered an emergency center is to designate a wing containing a number of beds for emergency cases. That wing is to have all the requirements for diagnosis, laboratory and X-ray work and surgery. The number of beds in this wing is to be determined on the basis of the set number of cases.

Finally, the decree affirmed that the health director in the governorate was to be considered responsible for the execution of this system of regulations and for providing what is required for it with the cooperation of local authorities. The decree indicated that all agencies, especially internal security forces command, justice authorities and firefighters, are obligated to carry out the part of this system of regulations that pertains to them.

We may see that this medical emergency system is a model system that meets urgent needs.

8592
CSO: 4304/116

INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS OUTLINED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 23 Jul 81 p 3

[Article: "Three Significant Measures To Push the Wheel of Production Forward in Our Country; Ammonia Fertilizer Plant Launched; Steam Boiler Installed at Dar'a Canning Plant; Establishment of Textile Plant in Misyaf Considered"]

[Text] Operations at the ammonia-urea fertilizer plant in the governorate of Homs were set in motion yesterday morning.

The plant produces 1,050 tons of urea fertilizer and 800 tons of naphtha.

Dr Husayn al-Qadi, the minister of industry stated that the produced fertilizer will be delivered to the Cooperative Agricultural Distribution Center where it can be distributed to farmers.

It is worth noting that the plant was built by the French Creusot-Loire company at a cost of approximately 1 billion Syrian pounds.

This plant produces ammonia-urea fertilizer by relying on naphtha, which is a by-product of petroleum, as a primary material.

This plant is one of two plants that were recently built in our country. The second plant produces (al-tirbil) fertilizer; that is a petroleum by-product.

Now that operations at these two plants have begun, our country has acquired a huge industrial complex for the production of fertilizers. These two plants come next in line after an old plant, which is the nitrogen fertilizer plant.

There is no doubt that the fertilizers which were not always available at the appropriate time for reasons that had to do with import measures will now become available. If the two plants were to operate at maximum capacity, it will be possible to export some varieties of locally produced fertilizer. This can be achieved if electrical power voltage is regulated and power interruptions are finally eliminated.

In Dar'a on the other hand Mr Muhammad Mustafa Miru, the governor of Dar'a and colleague Ahmad Zanbu'ah, the official in charge of the secretariat of the party's branch toured the canning plant in al-Mazayrib 2 days ago.

They looked into the status of this plant and into the tomato processing operation following the installation of the new steam boiler that arrived to the plant 2 days ago and was installed in the evening after operations had been suspended for several days.

During that visit the governor and the secretary of the party's branch reviewed all the questions and matters that are of interest to the Syrian Canning Company in Dar'a. They looked into everything that would bring about the success of the company's work, develop production in it and achieve the plans that have been designated for it in the processing seasons this year.

An official spokesman of the Food Industries Association stated that operations in the two existing production lines at the Dar'a Canning plant were resumed last Tuesday morning following the installation of a new electric boiler for the plant. The previous boiler had been damaged as a result of a power failure which had compelled the management of the plant to operate the plant's diesel generator.

A delegation from the Syrian-Libyan Public Company for Agricultural and Industrial Investments arrived in Homs 2 days ago in the morning. The delegation includes a number of experts in the company and in the Ministry of Housing and Utilities.

The delegation set the proposed location for building a textile plant on the Homs-Misyaf Road.

The delegation met with the director of technical services and with the vice president of the council of the governorate. Steps for implementing this project whose costs are estimated at about 800 million Syrian pounds were considered; it is to be built on an area of 300 donums.

The plant will be given an estimated production capacity of about 15 million meters of fabrics. It will employ about 1,000 workers.

A decision was made to conduct technical and organizational studies of the project site so that these can be adopted as a preliminary step for the implementation of the project.

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END

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18 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2398

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BRIEFS

PLO, GUINEA COOPERATION AGREEMENT--Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar [Yasar 'Arafat] received a reply message of greetings and solidarity from Guinean President Hamed Sekou Toure expressing his pride in the heroic battle fought by the Palestinian revolutionaries in confrontation of the Zionist designs. The Guinean President affirmed his country's firm support against all the savage Zionist attacks against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. He also expressed Guinea's support for the just struggle of the Palestinian people to regain their full national rights. Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar sent a message to the Guinean President. The message was conveyed by Brother Abu 'Ala', director of the Samid Institution, who is currently on a tour of several African countries to deliver messages from Brother Commander Abu 'Ammar to the heads of these states on the glorious Palestinian-Israeli war. During his visit to the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, Brother Abu 'Ala' signed a general agreement for technical, scientific, cultural and economic cooperation between Guinea and the PLO. [Text] [JN211709 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1615 GMT 21 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/145

SIGNIFICANCE OF PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI CEASE-FIRE ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 232, 1 Aug 81 pp 26-28

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "The War of Recognition: The Cease-Fire Agreement: Facts, Question Marks and Riddles"]

[Text] It is almost the first time in the history of military confrontations between two parties that a cease-fire agreement, the one that was achieved between Palestinians and Israelis, appears to have the importance of a major agreement rather than being merely a transitory agreement required by the feuding parties so they can get a measure of rest.

This agreement has affirmed few facts; it has explained few riddles; and it left a few question marks on the horizon. Examples of these facts, riddles and question marks may be found in the following lines.

First, the day on which U.S. envoy Philip Habib announced the Palestinian-Israeli cease-fire agreement is a principal date in the course of Palestinian action on both the military and political fronts. In the future, 24 July 1981 will be increasingly remembered when Palestinian steps are discussed and decisions made. In the course of analyzing actions in the future, it will be said that Palestinian action before 24 July was such and that it became such after 24 July. The same thing may be said of Arab and international dealings with the Palestinian question.

If one may say so, the method that was utilized in announcing the agreement was breathtaking and dumbfounding. The agreement showed that diplomacy was capable of achieving a great deal, especially if it is the kind of diplomacy that Philip Habib [has demonstrated]. It is a diplomacy that is based on saying little and enduring setbacks.

The agreement is "Carradonian," somewhat after Lord Carradon. However, measured against present conditions that are being experienced in the Middle East area, the 24 July 1981 agreement for a Palestinian-Israeli cease fire seems more advanced and clearer than [UN] Resolution 242. Countries of the area had spent years arguing over the question of "occupied territories" or "the occupied territories." The agreement is also not based on a conspiratorial principle like that which Dr Henry Kissinger

utilized and which produced the formula for the Camp David accords. Had that principle been conspiratorial, the Palestine Liberation Organization would not have accepted it.

Accordingly, the agreement does not mean the end of the Palestinian-Israeli war, even though it is possible to assume that it is the most advanced step that has been taken [so far] in the area of non-military dealing with the Arab-Israeli struggle by the two principal parties in this struggle: the Palestine Liberation Organization and the "state of Israel."

The purpose behind saying that the agreement does not mean the end of the Palestinian-Israeli war is that the clashes may be resumed and the Israeli and Palestinian parties may go back to shelling each other again. Every time the Palestinian-Israeli war flares up, a call for a cease-fire will be made. Thus, from time to time--and this may have been what the creator of the agreement had in mind--the increase in the clashes and accordingly, the increase in the number of cease fire agreements will in time and in the not too distant future lead to [the formation of] a disengagement committee and [the setting up of] a tent inside which those who will formulate a disengagement agreement will sit.

Second, it is noteworthy that the U.S. envoy announced the cease-fire agreement when he was in Israel. This strengthens the agreement. As to why the announcement was made in Israel and how that would strengthen the agreement, the following may be said about these two questions:

The United States of America does not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as an entity and an organization representing the Palestinian people. In the absence of such recognition the U.S. envoy was energetic in [his efforts] to ensure that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would guarantee Palestinian acceptance of the cease-fire in addition to Syria's nonopposition to it. The U.S. envoy announced the agreement after obtaining these assurances. He did not announce the agreement from Beirut because it was Israel and the Palestinian Resistance that were exchanging the gunfire, and Beirut is the capital of the Lebanese state. In addition, Mr Yasir 'Arafat, president of the liberation organization had already announced, following the extremely brutal Israeli attack on Palestinian centers in Beirut and the south, the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli war.

The U.S. envoy also did not announce the cease-fire agreement from Damascus despite the fact that there are cease-fire agreements between Syria and Israel. He did not make the announcement from Jiddah or from Riyadh either so as to keep the matter in a Palestinian-Israeli framework. Had the liberation organization had a capital, the announcement would have been made from two places and not only from Israel. It is known that announcing the agreement from Israel is in one form or another an affirmation of the fact that Israel is the aggressor. But the organization does not have a capital; it rather has places in Beirut, Tyre and al-Nabatiyah. An announcement coming from one of those places would indicate that the notion of settling the Palestinians there was imminent.

It may be said, "Would it not have been better had the announcement of a cease-fire been made at the United Nations by the secretary general of the international organization, Dr Kurt Waldheim, instead of having the announcement come in that form?"

Such a statement would be true if the purpose was to keep the matter within its neutral framework and away from the United States. However, a cease-fire would not have occurred in such a case. It is no secret to the Palestine Liberation Organization and to the Arab countries that the United States wants the solution to the Middle East problem to be an American solution in one form or another.

Thus, any agreement that would have been reached without the United States would not have seen the light. Agreements that are sponsored by the United Nations and the resolutions that are issued by the international organization are not approved by Israel. Therefore, they remain useless.

Third, the 24 July 1981 agreement is the first cease-fire agreement between the Palestinian and Israeli parties since the second stage of the Palestinian Revolution began in 1965. The first stage was in the late forties and early fifties. The agreement, however, does not prohibit the Palestinian Resistance from launching operations inside occupied Palestine. Nor does the agreement prevent Israel from pursuing nationalist and revolutionary elements inside the country. The 24 July agreement stipulates that "any hostile military action between Israeli and Lebanese territory on both sides" be stopped. However, the method which international media agencies used to present the news of the agreement suggests that much development will take place so that the agreement will become a cornerstone in the peace process or the cornerstone itself. U.S. and European newspapers headlined the agreement on their front pages, and news of the agreement prefaced news bulletins on radio and television.

This general agreement to consider the news extremely important signifies that there is an international willingness in the media to accept the formula of a solution that may develop in the future in the light of the 24 July agreement. When we say this we do not rule out of consideration the fact that the international agencies of the media which go along with Israel--either because of sympathy or pressure--gave news of the agreement prominence to suggest that Israel wants peace and that the evidence for that lay in the fact that it agreed to stop its raids on the Palestinians in Lebanon. But this does not at all eliminate the feelings of anxiety that welled in the hearts of international media agency officials as they saw films of the terror that spread among the residents of Israeli areas which were shelled by the Palestinian Resistance from Lebanese territories.

This leads us to say that Menahem Begin did not agree to the cease-fire so as to go along with the administration of President Reagan and his envoy to the area, Philip Habib. If he wanted to go along with them, he would have done so before. Begin agreed to the cease-fire because the ability of the Palestinians to fire their missiles continuously against the residents of the Galilee area, despite the brutality of the Israeli response, spoiled

Begin's considerations and propositions, making his threats somewhat flat. It is true that what happened to the residents of the Galilee area does not add up to one part in a million of what happened to the residents of the areas of (al-Fakihani), al-Nabatiyah, Tyre and the remaining areas of Lebanon where Palestinians can be found, but the Palestinian missiles nevertheless had a considerable effect. In addition, the ability of the Palestinian Resistance to continue shelling al-Matallah and al-Nahariyah was somewhat unsettling to Begin. If this may be said, Philip Habib did descend on Begin at the right moment. Dr Henry Kissinger, for example, would not have done that because Kissinger was loyal to himself first, to his Jewish faith second, and to the United States after that. Philip Habib, however, is not overly concerned with himself, but he is extremely loyal to the United States. In addition, he is a devout Christian.

Thus Begin agreed to the cease-fire after he failed to create an official Lebanese situation that would be responsive to an agreement with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. He agreed to the cease-fire agreement after he felt or was made to feel or was informed that the Reagan administration was prepared to abandon him. This however would not signify that it was abandoning Israel, especially since Begin had just come out of an election campaign and the United States was able to make this semi-victory shrink little by little.

President Reagan may have been convinced that it was necessary to exert pressure on Israel because the shelling that the Palestinian areas were subjected to in Beirut and south Lebanon was carried out with American weapons and because Begin, who had been overbearing with the U.S. secretary of state, Alexander Haig, may be overbearing with Reagan himself. If finding solutions that would be somewhat balanced were easy before such behavior against the president of the United States were to take place, such solutions would no longer be simple at all if Begin presumes upon the president.

It may become evident in the future that Philip Habib became aware of this and that he told his president in one way or another something to signify that this was the suitable opportunity for creating a break in the Israeli-Palestinian crisis and that if pressure had to be exerted, it would have to be exerted now before Begin forms the government because the formation of the government without a negative position from President Reagan's administration on what Begin did--beginning with the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor and ending with the brutal raids on the Palestinian areas in Beirut and south Lebanon--would signify that this government will be aggressive only, and there would be no place for any effort to achieve peace in the area with an aggressive Israeli government.

Fourth, the Palestinian-Israeli cease fire agreement took place at a time when a Soviet plan that was not agreeable to the United States and its traditional friends in the area had made good progress. This plan suggests that as long as the Palestinians are staying in Lebanon, as long as Israel is engaged in a genocidal or semi-genocidal operation against them, as long as the United States is not deterring Israel from its aggression and as

long as the Arab countries are in a position of not being able to oppose Israel collectively--as long as the situation is what it is--Lebanon then is to enter into a friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union. In accordance with this treaty various kinds of missiles bases would be scattered along the coast [of Lebanon] and in the mountains. Let Israel's airplanes then try to fly freely and attack the Palestinians in their camps and bases!

In the past 5 months the Soviets had begun speaking and writing openly and frequently to their friends in the area or to those who were ideologically close to them. The Soviets also began bringing up the subject with Arab officials who were visiting Moscow. Although they brought up the subject indirectly in the course of discussing alternatives to [providing] protection to the Palestinian Revolution and to the progressive forces in Lebanon, [the intent] was perfectly clear to those who were tracking the Soviet plan. One of those visitors relates that a Soviet official said something to the effect that what seems objectionable now may become a demand at a later time. Every aggression carried out by Israel is a pressure factor on the lawful government in Lebanon to make an effort to obtain this treaty.

In this context there is information indicating that the Soviets had placed considerable pressure on President Ilyas Sarkis to accept an invitation they had extended to him to visit Moscow and that because of that pressure the Lebanese president chose to visit the United States so he would not find himself compelled to make two visits.

Had it not been for the Palestinian-Israeli cease-fire agreement, the Soviets' discussion would have broadened. It is to be noted that the discussion did not cease because this agreement was reached.

Fifth, Philip Habib did not outline on paper the stages of a plan he was to implement. Instead, he allowed developments to take their course and bring about those actions that were required. The very harsh words that were said about him and his mission did not stop him, and he did not allow words to affect his emotions.

It may be said that Philip Habib was one of those persons who was most relieved by the gross error committed by Israel when its airplanes conducted their brutal raids against the areas where Palestinians can be found in Beirut and south Lebanon. He was also one of the people who was most delighted because the Palestinian Resistance had responded on a continuous basis. Had it not been for that response, he would not have been able to come up with the formula, which despite the nebulous method that was used in announcing it, is the fomrula for a future solution. The agreement affirms that the Israeli war machinery recognizes that of the Palestinians and vice versa. What is important in view of current circumstances is that any recognition does take place. It is known that such recognition will evolve so that [eventually] there would be mutual recognition of who fired the shots, of the motives behind firing the shots and so on.

What is even more important than this is the fact that the Palestinian-Israeli cease-fire agreement will encourage President Reagan to give priority to the Middle East crisis. It may [even] encourage his administration to recognize the PLO unless this administration prefers to recognize the organization after Israel recognizes it. In doing so the Reagan administration would be like most of the Arab countries which do not seem willing to acknowledge the Israeli status quo before the organization does so.

The cease-fire agreement has invalidated some cases of the ongoing debate about who represents the Palestinian people because the Palestinian party in the 24 July agreement was the PLO and not any other Palestinian party. Besides, the organization accepted the agreement from a position of power and not only from the position of a party whose rights had been usurped. Accordingly, the power and influence of the organization's position will increase if Palestinians, Arabs and Soviets rally around it instead of the possibility of a rally around it by some of them. In any case this is the position that will endure, despite everything that will stand in its way, because it is a blend of two positions: that of the Palestinian Revolution and that of the Palestinian state.

On the basis of the current political and psychological Arab situation and on the basis of the international equations that do not appear to be capable of change, this is the position that will win the support of the vast majority of Arabs whose support will be the same as that which they gave the Resistance in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat.

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CSO: 4304/122

FRENCH WEEKLY V.S.D. ON JOINT PLO, SOVIET PLAN

TA210742 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Aug 81 p 2

[Report by France-based correspondent Gid'on Qotz]

[Text] Paris (special for DAVAR)--The Soviet Union and the PLO have agreed on a plan to set up a Palestinian government-in-exile and a regular Palestinian army. The V.S.D. weekly, which quotes Western intelligence sources, states that this plan will increase the danger of war in the Middle East in the coming months. The phases of the plan concluded during Yasir 'Arafat's visit to Moscow in June are as follows:

A. Disbanding the PLO and its military branch the Fatah and setting up a Palestinian government-in-exile which will demand the territories occupied in 1967 as the first stage in the disappearance of Israel.

B. A Palestinian Army will later be set up and this will contain tank, armored and air force units. The name of this military force will be "Jaysh Tahrir Falastin"--the army for the liberation of Palestine.

The man who was appointed by Moscow to organize the army is Ibrahim Shiraq. He was born in Azerbaijan, was a cadet of the Moscow Military Academy and trained in the Crimea and East Berlin. In the past he was used by the Soviets in Nicaragua, Angola and Ethiopia. In Lebanon he succeeded in forming a force of three divisions and organized about 30,000 to 40,000 Palestinians. As for the air force, the weekly notes it will be named "Force 14" and will contain MiG-17 and MiG-21 planes. The weekly reports that the training of Palestinian pilots has already begun.

C. The Palestinian government will later gain recognition by Moscow, Eastern bloc countries and several countries in Asia. Its embassy will also open in Moscow in September.

According to the paper, the Israeli attack on Beirut was a reaction to knowledge about the forming of the Palestinian army. Also according to the paper, 84 Palestinian technicians and communications experts were killed and another 175 were wounded. Since Israel could not massively invade Lebanon the Palestinian army was saved.

CSO: 4323/59

BACKGROUND OF WAKHAN PROVINCE ANNEXATION DISCUSSED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 31 Aug 81 pp 122-124

[Article: "Historic Gift--Has Kabul Ceded Its Strategically Important North to the Soviet Union in a Secret Treaty? Indications Are That It Has"]

[Text] The report of the TASS news agency was strikingly brief and vague:

"On 16 June in Kabul [?a treaty] was signed between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan about the course of the national boundary from the western shore of the Sorkul Lake to the Powalo-Shvaykovskiy summit. The treaty legally insures the existing guarded Soviet-Afghan border line in this area."

The Kremlin maintains silence about any detail in the treaty concerning the extreme northern tip of Afghanistan, which in the north borders on the Soviet Union, in the south on Pakistani Kashmir, and in the east--for only 87 kilometers--on China, and about why the treaty was needed in the first place. All the more vociferous was the Chinese leadership on the subject.

A protest by the Chinese Foreign Ministry declared the "border rectification agreement" concluded between Moscow and Kabul "illegal and void" because it "comprises the area of the Pamir in dispute between China and the Soviet Union."

This area of more than 20,000 square kilometers, "as was well known," had been "occupied by force of arms by czarist Russian imperialism in 1892 and since that time "no Chinese government (had) recognized the illegal occupation and domination."

There was a quick Soviet rejoinder. In mid-August the Foreign Ministry in Moscow stated coolly that "questions regulated by this treaty are the business only of the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and no one else's." China's claims had been "invented," what with the border in that sector having "originated historically" and having been "secured by an exchange of notes in the year 1894."

The big Afghan finger called Wakhan, more than 200 kilometers long, comprising only 300 square kilometers and protruding from the Hindu Kush at a height of more than 7,000 meters into the plateau of the Pamir Mountains, has all along been of the greatest strategic value.

The descendants of Genghis Khan in the 13th century penetrated in Persia and southern Europe across the frozen pass, and in the opposite direction Marco Polo found his way to the legendary treasures of Kambalik, today's Peking.

Into our times the mountain landscape populated only sparsely by Kirgiz nomadic tribes has remained a beaten path between Occident and Orient.

It was so also when late last century the Russians, British and Chinese fought for domination of the bleak area. In its expeditions of conquest in central Asia czarist cavalry forces had advanced into what is now Tadzhikistan, and Britian perceived this as a threat to its empire in India and in the semicolonial Afghanistan counted as part of India.

The Chinese had just newly conquered the Province of Sinkiang and, to the horror of the emir of Afghanistan, were preparing to extend their rule to west of the Pamir.

London had Indian troops march against the mountain tribes already under control of the Chinese. Against the more dangerous push for expansion by the czar, whose forces were camouflaged as scientific expeditions, the only help was diplomacy.

In two treaties, in 1873 and 1894, the monarchs in London and St Petersburg agreed to respect the Wakhan corridor as a buffer between Russia and the British colonial empire--under the territorial sovereignty of the emir of Afghanistan, who was dependent on Britain.

China was invited neither to the negotiations nor to become a member of the border commission; cowed after the Opium War, it was not considered respectable by the courts in England and Russia.

Thus in fact no Chinese government consented to the border line--until 1963, when China and Afghanistan concluded a border treaty valid to this day. As Peking stressed expressly in its latest protest note to Moscow, it has "no territorial problems" with Pakanistan.

Afghanistan's communists, however, had serious problems with the Wakhan province as early as 1978, when they assumed power in a bloody coup in Kabul. Hardly delighted by any red rule, the Kirgiz tribes living in the corridor left the country and fled to Pakistan.

Even then partisans made themselves at home in the deserted valleys. Particularly the guerrillas of the Chinese-supported Afghan Maoist movement "Shola-i-Jawid" (Eternal Flame) obtained an ideal basis of operations against the changing leftist rulers in Kabul.

According to high-ranking Afghan military men, the tightly organized and well armed Maoists also triggered the decision for Moscow's winter invasion.

It is said that documents were found on nine partisans taken prisoner in the Wakhan area in late November 1979 proving a plan by the Afghan President Amin, who was overthrown and killed a little later, to take up contacts with Chinese and U.S. offices, and this is what Moscow wanted to prevent.

What is sure is that, as a first Soviet wave of invasion, a whole airborne division occupied Wakhan in late December, encountering embittered resistance on the part of about 700 rebels of the "Eternal Flame."

Despite great losses on both sides, this resistance has not been removed to this day. Nor has the forced settlement of Tadzhik families from the Soviet Union in the deserted villages of the Kirgiz who had fled from the area made for greater security in the border province.

Several times and without any success so far, the Soviet occupiers in the mountainous corridor have tried above all to cut the supply lines for the Afghan rebels from China and Pakistan—there being ample military strategic reasons at least to block Afghanistan from China.

There is something even more important: if, as Pakistani papers claim, the Soviets have annexed Wakhan through the new treaty, it would mean that they have advanced to within 80 kilometers of the strategically important Karakorum highway connecting Pakistan with China. This mountain highway was built by the Chinese at enormous financial sacrifice 10 years ago.

As early as last November the Pakistan paper DAWN OVERSEAS had warned against the danger of an annexation. A number of peculiar indications prior to the signing of the treaty hardened the suspicion.

Thus the "legal insuring" of the border which is given as the reason for the mysterious conclusion of the treaty by the Kremlin had been accomplished by Afghanistan and the Soviet Union already in a treaty in 1946, in which the Soviet Union even insisted on an exact delineation of the border at the Amu Darya river (the center of the river).

In addition, Moscow's governor, Afghan President Karmal, was summoned to Moscow for a secret visit two weeks before the conclusion of the treaty, with neither Moscow nor Kabul reporting the meeting.

One month later Karmal again traveled to the Soviet Union to meet Soviet party chief Brezhnev in the Crimea. In the process, the Afghan agency AFGHAN PRESS reported in Kabul, he delivered "a document about the Wakhan region."

Radio Kabul described the document as a "historic present by Karmal," and the Pakistani paper DAWN claims that Karmal donated to the Lenin Museum in Moscow a copy of the Wakhan treaty as a "tribute to the Russian October Revolution."

In the course of this, according to the Pakistani paper, the director of the museum reportedly also showed Karmal documents about the fate of Wakhan hailing "from the time of the regime" of Karmal's murdered predecessors Taraki and Amin.

Whatever the secret border treaty may contain, it appears in any case to be a pawn of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis China's friend Pakistan.

For the first time since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, last week a Kremlin leader, Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin, traveled to Islamabad to win Pakistan over for a political solution of the Afghanistan question on Moscow's pattern.
8790
CSO: 4620/12

BRIEFS

BAHRAINI DECREES--An amiri decree has been issued establishing a new department in the Public Works, Electricity and Water Ministry. It will be called the Financial and Administrative Department for Electricity and Water Affairs. Another amiri decree has been issued establishing a Bahraini shareholding company that will be known as the Bahrain Telecommunications Company. [GF131244 Manama Domestic Service in Arabic 1030 GMT 13 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/148

HEAD OF ARMY REVOLUTION COURTS COMMENTS ON BANI-SADR'S FLIGHT

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 3 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] Hojjat Ol-Eslam Mohammadi Reyshahri, Religious judge and Head of the Military Courts of the Islamic Revolution, commented on Bani-Sadr's conduct and position connected with the organizational systems of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Military Revolutionary Courts and his flight, while talking to the reporters.

Head of the Military Courts said: "In general, Bani-Sadr wanted to promote the spirit of cult of individual within the army. To achieve this objective of his, he had been engaged in a series of activies, which were known to us. He wanted to have a strong support within the army for his rainy days. Fortunately, the army proved its loyalty to the nation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Bani-Sadr, on the other hand, with his flight together with Mas'ud Rajavi, proved that he has never been a supporter of the army, for the Mojahedi were opposed to the army from the beginning."

He added: "Bani-Sadr had always claimed that he was a supporter and the father of the army, and tried to show that in case of his removal, there would be no one else to support the army. However, we have seen that after his removal from his post as commander in chief, the battlefronts have been more organized, and the warriors have fought with more coordination and improved morale."

Hojjatol-Escam Reyshahri added: "Bani-Sadr's another failure was that he attracted the dropouts and unfits in the army, and he did the same in his office. Then, whenever he faced difficulties, he blamed the Revolutionary Courts, the Islamic Council, and the Political-Idealogical Offices of the Army. Though he himself had selected the members of the board for purging the army. However, as this board did not comply with his wishes, he dissolved it, and attributed the purges to the military courts and the clergy. At the same time, he was reinstating those who had been purged. He always supported the SAVAK agents, and military defectors, and prevented the severance of their pensions.

Regarding the trial of Admiral Alavi, Bani-Sadr said: "I should be the only person to review his file. If I consider him to be guilty, then you can arrest him. Furthermore, he supported Gen Bagheri, Commander of the Air Force, in the same way. However, the court was neither influenced nor intimidated by him,

and continued its work. Bani-Sadr also refrained from signing the orders that required the signature of the Commander-in-Chief. To this effect, there exist many documents. Contrary to Article 172 of the Constitution, he initiated the formation of wartime tribunals.

Regarding Bani-Sadr's opposition to the Islamic Republican Regime, Hojjatol-Islam Mohammadi Reyshahri, religious judge and head of the Army courts said: "Almost 11 months ago by means of a limited number of competent persons still existing in Bani-Sadr's office, we were informed that he was planning to hold a referendum for altering the Constitution. According to the same reports, after the referendum he was planning to put Dr Beheshti and other officials of the Islamic Republic on trial.

Bani-Sadr's Flight

Regarding Banisadr's flight, the religious judge and head of the Army Revolution Courts said: "Presently, there are two teams investigating this case. Investigations are incomplete, however, God willing, at the next interview, the results will be made public.

He said: "In connection with this flight, so far seven persons have been arrested. What I can mention at this moment is that Bani-Sadr had probably been hiding in the environs of the airport for two days prior to his flight. Also, at the time of the take-off, two ambulances had been noticed close to the aircraft, one of them presumably having Bani-Sadr's wife on board, who has left the country with him."

Col Mo'ezzi

Referring to Col Behzad Mo'ezzi, Hojjat ol-Eslam Reyshahri said: "Based on the report prepared for martyr Dr Chamran, which he submitted to the military court while he was still alive, the court discharged Col Mo'ezzi on [27 July '80]. Immediately after the imposed war broke out between Iran and Iraq, he was reinstated by Bani-Sadr. According to the report submitted to martyr Chamran, Mo'ezzi had full support of the Shah and SAVAK. He was the Shah's private pilot, he flew the Shah from Iran to Morocco, received gifts before and after this trip, sold his house and household effects before the departure of the Shah, and purchased a house in the United States. After his return, he said that he was going to Palestine. He took 45 days of leave, and instead, he went to the United States. After a while he was appointed commander of the Seventh base in Shiraz, despite the former commander's efficient performance. During Mo'ezzi's assignment at the base disunity became evident among the personnel, and contrary to orders, he formed phony council, following the path of the Mojahedin.

After the elections, all appointments and assignments took place on the instructions of the group that guided him. In this report, there are tens of other issues, such as his close relations with Rajavi, taking of long-wave radios out of the country, and other illegal activities that cannot be mentioned here.

9861-R
CSO: 4640/77

MUSTAFA DUDIN DISCUSSES WEST BANK SITUATION

Biography Given

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 26 Jul-1 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

MUSTAFA DUDEEN

Mustafa Dudeen is a native of Dura, a central village in the Hebron district of the West Bank, where he owns over 3000 dunums of land. He is from a tribal clan of 3000, of which the Dudeen hamula is 1000 strong. One of his brothers was a former military governor of Gaza, when it was under Egyptian rule; a second brother assists him as 'agricultural consultant' with the Village League. He has been married three times and has a total of 16 children. His six children from his first marriage, which ended in divorce, have openly denounced their father's political activities.

In 1944, Dudeen joined the Palestine Police under the British Mandate. Close associates who knew him during this period disccunt that he ever held communist beliefs prior to the creation of the Israeli state. From 1945 to 1965, Dudeen was in the employ of the Egyptian government, working with the intelligence branch in the Palestinian affairs department. During the 1948 war he travelled with the Egyptian army to Gaza.

Dudeen was vehemently opposed to the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank in the aftermath of the war. He changed his colours when Jordan, which was anxious to have Palestinians in its government, offered him a ministerial level position as chairman of a cooperative organization. As head of the Jordanian government institution, he approved agricultural loans in Jordan, including the West Bank. He stayed in the job for four years until, under the

patronage of his good friend Prime Minister Wasfi Tel, he was given the post of Minister of Social Welfare in 1969.

When King Hussein's army massacred the Fedayeen in Jordan in 1970, Dudeen participated in the battle at Taibeh village south of Amman — on the side of the Hashemite kingdom. Twenty-seven young people from Dudeen's hometown of Dura were killed in the battle. Dudeen dragged himself still farther down in the estimation of his fellow Palestinians by fulfilling an obligation to invite Prime Minister Tel to a victory lunch in Taibeh.

After Wasfi Tel's assassination, Dudeen lost the influence he once had in Amman. He was made head of Hussein's National Arab Unity Party but it ended in failure after a life of one year. Fully adopted by the Hashemite regime, Mustafa Dudeen was next appointed Jordan's ambassador to Kuwait. He served for one year before being recalled to Amman, reportedly at the request of the Kuwait government for reasons that have not been made public.

Dudeen's final political post for Jordan was a Parliament appointment from 1973-1975. After serving the British, Egyptian and Jordanian governments against the Palestinian people, Dudeen finally returned home to Dura after his wife's family reunion application, his political fortunes almost run out.

In 1976 Dudeen engineered to run a bloc in the municipal elections. Locals say the bloc was formed of a group of traditional leaders with no ideology," which failed miserably. One year later Dudeen resurfaced with the Village League scheme, backed this time by Israeli occupation authorities.

Mustafa Dudeen is known as an intelligent, wealthy man, whose motivation is not material riches but political influence. Opponents of the League feel Dudeen's newest schemings carry little weight. What is far worse, they feel, are Dudeen's collaborations with Wasfi Tel's pogrom against the Palestinian people. To this day, Dura, home village of many he martyred, has refused to join the Village League.

'AL-FAJR Interviews Dudin

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 26 Jul-1 Aug 81 pp 8, 14

[Text]

Dudeen: This association called Hebron Villages Association was established in 1978. We are considered a central association dealing with the needs of these villages, trying to improve the lives of these villagers. According to law, the municipalities are responsible only for the cities and they are not in charge of the villages.

The villages in the area here have been very poor and undeveloped for hundreds of years.

Al Fajr: Are they poorer than other villages in the West Bank?

Dudeen: Yes, yes, because there is no real income after they lost all their land in '48 or '67. They all were depending on agriculture, which they lost. Their income now comes from their daily labour in Israel. In the short time of two years we have carried out many projects to make these villages much better than before. We are planning to make a master plan for all these villages to cover all their needs.

Al Fajr: How many villages are in the league?

Dudeen: The population of this area is about 200,000. 120,000 are villagers in 60 villages, and 80,000 in Hebron.

Al Fajr: So what can the village league do, for example, that the Hebron municipality cannot do?

Dudeen: They cannot carry out any project beyond the city boundaries. Anyone who needs help comes here and we will help them.

Al Fajr: What kinds of things do people ask you to do?

Dudeen: Mainly for villages, we deal with projects. Or if they have problems we try to help them.

Al Fajr: You act, then, as a kind of municipality?

Dudeen: I want you to understand that there is no misunderstanding between them and us. We are cooperating in civil fields. We don't deal with politics at all. The mayors, some of them deal with politics. We don't deal with politics, our relations prevent us from it. All our activities are geared towards the community, the social and economic needs of ourselves only.

Al Fajr: What is an example of something political which you can't deal with?

Dudeen: None in this area except the occupation. Really, none in this area. But we believe that political activity should be carried by those who are in charge of politics.

* * *

Al Fajr: What, for example, does the education committee do?

Dudeen: We make a survey of the area, how many schools need libraries. This year we built 13 schools.

Al Fajr: Public Health must be expensive. Where do you get your money?

Dudeen: In our association we have no money. We are a link between the village councils, the governor and the people.

The government paid 50 percent of the cost. For the other 50 percent, the people collect money. Some of them get help from the Jordanian government, so they cover the other 50 percent.

Al Fajr: Do you get funds from the Joint Committee? What percentage?

Dudeen: The total sum given to villages in Hebron at this minute is JD 110,000. Most of the villages receive JD 10-20,000.

Arab countries give US $150 million to the Joint Committee, but people in the West Bank have not received more than JD 3.5 million. We have 80 village councils in the West Bank and the Joint Committee has decided to give every council JD 40,000. Out of the 80 I think 50 have taken it. The others were not given money because some of them bought electricity from the Israeli company. The rest of the money was given to small villages which do not have councils or committees. I believe not more than $10 million was given to the West Bank out of that money.

Al Fajr: Where is the rest of the money going?

Dudeen: I don't know. One village or small town in Jordan recieves more money than a district in the West Bank.

Al Fajr: What kind of relationship do you have with the military authority. It must be a very delicate situation?

Dudeen: We have no special relationship with the government but we are preparing the projects for our villages and we sit together with the Technical Committee in the governorship here, discuss the projects and when they are approved, we proceed.

Al Fajr: You said those villages governments which receive money from Amman have their budgets supplemented by the military by 50 percent. Those that don't receive money get 80 percent?

Muhammed Nasr, the Leagues's Technical Advisor: This is only in the Hebron district. And this has been achieved by this association because we are always trying to invite the generals and the big responsible men into this government. They have visited our villages...

Al Fajr: Who has?

Nasr: General Matt (Israeli Officer responsible for the occupied territories) visited three or four times in this area. And the ex-Defense Minister Mr. Weizmann, he visited this association here.

Al Fajr: Do they approve of the association?

Nasr: They have approved it. And the governor-general also approves it.

Al Fajr: How much money has the military government given the league?

Nasr: Given who?

Al Fajr: To the village league...

Nasr: To the village league? To the villagers or to the village league? Actually they don't pay the money to us.

Al Fajr: They don't give it to you, they just give it directly to the village councils?

Nasr: They pay it directly to the village councils. We don't receive the money and distribute it. No, we recommend that this village has finished such a project and they submit their invoices to us and when we approve, we send the invoices to the government and then they pay according to the invoices or according to the tenders. If the village gives a tender of, suppose, 1 million, then the government pays 50 percent of that tender.

Al Fajr: Has the military government ever refused to fund a project?

Nasr: They have never refused to pay for any approved project.

Al Fajr: Have they ever refused to approve a project? Can you think of any?

Nasr: To date, no. The people give us the projects, and we approve them here in the office.

Al Fajr: Do you have a 'Joint Committee' of the league and the military government?

Nasr: Yes. Locally it consists of me and the governor.

Al Fajr: The Joint Committee is you and the military governor? That's the Joint Committee?

Nasr: This is the local joint committee. Our technical committee is Mr. Dudeen, myself and the head of the council. If a village has a project, then the head of the council is a member of this committee. He attends and we talk, and when we ask him some questions he is a member of the committee.

Al Fajr: The joint committee, then, is the military governor and his assistant, you and Mr. Dudeen, head of the council and a member of the relevant committee – education, engineering, etc. How often do you meet with the military authority?

Dudeen: According to the law we should have their approval before we start a project. We meet them when we have projects to discuss. Therefore we inform them when we have several projects in villages so and so. And we cooperate with them to fix the time and the date when we can meet, usually within a week or 10 days.

Al Fajr: But the village league is responsible, then, for a very wide area. This is seen as legal by the military authority?

Dudeen: Yes, this is legal because it is according to the village association's regulations. And we were established according to the law.

You know before we had this we were 140,000 people out of 200,000 living in the Hebron area. So we are living in scattered groups and small villages. There is no other way to serve the people unless we make a central association for giving good services to these people.

Al Fajr: What about issues such as land confiscation in the area that affects some of these 60 villages that you are responsible for? Do you protest on their behalf to the military authorities when there are land confiscations for settlements?

Dudeen: Til now we have had no problems like this except for a small place in one village which we are discussing with the military authorities.

Al Fajr: Is that the only case of land confiscation in the last two years?

Dudeen: Yes.

Al Fajr: What is your relationship with the Jordanian government?

Dudeen: We are citizens of Jordan. We are natives, we are citizens. You know here in the West Bank is a part of Jordan. Until now the laws of Jordan are still operative in the area.

Al Fajr: You consider yourselves Jordanian citizens?

Dudeen: Yes, yes. And (I) was a minister in the Jordanian cabinet.

Al Fajr: How do you feel about a state on the West Bank? Would you like to see one federated with Jordan or an independent state?

Dudeen: Of course this land will never be isolated from Jordan. For every Palestinian family, half remained here and half are on the eastern bank of the Jordan. There cannot be isolation.

Historically it is one country.

Al Fajr: Are you against an independent West Bank state?

Dudeen: We are not against that. Maybe we will choose such a thing.

Yes, we could be independent, within Jordan...

We do not like to put the carriage in front of the horse.

CSO: 4300/105

WEST BANK VILLAGE EXPERIENCES PROBLEMS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 2-8 Aug 81 p 11

[Article by Majedeh el-Butsch: "Hizma's Sewage Woes"]

[Text]

Hizma lies north-east of Jerusalem, barely visible from the main highway to Ramallah. There has been a village on the site since ancient times. Archaeologists have found Canaanite remains. During Byzantine times a church was constructed in the village, it was found recently during excavations in that area for Roman remains. An ancient mosque dates back 1,500 years to the very beginning of the Arab era in Palestine.

Modern Hizma, like other villages in the West Bank, struggles to maintain its integrity in the face of progressive land confiscation and the obstruction of its development by the occupation. The 2,500 villagers have their homes on 180 dunams, the village's remaining 1,000 dunams have either been grabbed by the settlement of Neve Yakov or are closed to development by military orders.

The occupation authorities have only just decided where Hizma 'belongs.' Villagers were only recently informed that their community falls under the jurisdiction of Ramallah municipality. Before the Israeli military take over, Jerusalem took municipal responsibility for the area. Since 1967 provision of basic services has fallen on the shoulders of the inhabitants themselves. Garbage, for instance, is not collected, each family has to take responsibility for burning its own. Hizma villagers' plans to take electricity from the Jerusalem Electric Company had to be dropped when the Israelis confiscated the land on which electricity pylons were going to be built. While the JEC tries to draw up new plans villagers have had to fall back on the use of individual generators which they pay for themselves.

Perhaps the most pernicious problem, however, facing the village is Neve Yakov's sewage problem. The Israeli settlement runs its sewage pipes into Hizma land and discharges it into open pools. The fetid pools are a breeding ground for mosquitos and other insects. Locals are also frightened that it could cause cholera problems. Complaints to the Israeli authorities have brought no reply.

Relations with their enforced neighbours are not good. Local herders complain that if they go near the settlement with their flocks they are threatened and assaulted. Before occupation agriculture, stone cutting and raising livestock were the mainstay of the local economy. With the confiscation and restrictions there, local traders have now gone and most workers in Hizma have to travel daily to try and find work in Israeli factories and workshops.

The village has no local council. Relations with the authorities are handled by the 90 year old mukhtar who is aided by his son, local headmaster A'tta Thyab; both reject the village league. Like most small communities in the occupied West Bank Hizma has problems with insufficeint health or education services and lack of transport.

A clinic was opened about a year ago by the Women's Work Committee in cooperation with Dr. Ibrahim Dandees, who works three hours a day every day of the week. Members of the local branch of the WWC are treated

free as part of a health insurance scheme included in their membership fees, other residents pay half fees. The 'official' clinic run by the West Bank Health Department only opens once a week. "In emergencies villagers have to head for Ramallah or Jerusalem," said A'tta Thyab.

Transportation is difficult. The local bus company runs buses from the village at 5:00 and 7:00 a.m. for workers. There is then a sporadic two-way service until mid-afternoon, when most labourers return home. Internally, only the main street is paved. A project to level and pave arterial roads is still waiting the permission of the military authorities.

Working for Change

There are only two schools in Hizma, both preparatory. A'tta Thyab points out that there is no provision for children aged six and under and that all secondary education entails travelling to neighbouring towns. On the other hand the village has seen the emergence of self-help social projects in the last year. The Women's Work Committee in Jerusalem has been instrumental in establishing a literacy and a sewing centre.

About 50 women are involved in projects of the WWC who organize the literacy centre, which runs courses on cultural issues and daily problems as well as basic literacy skills. Today, the project is run by four local instructors. Attatched to the centre is a sewing project where local women learn embroidery. The centre's production is sold to local traders and all profits are ploughed back into the project. The Hizma centre paid off its starting loan to the Jerusalem Women's Work Committee after one year. During the feast of al-Fitr the local Women's Work Committee will distribute clothes to poor families in co-ordination with the Jerusalem group.

Hizma has its problems but most locals expect them to be resolved. The present generation has a long history to look back on to draw hope for the future. "They don't scare us," one local shepherd told *Al Fajr*, "this land is ours. It carries the evidence of our ancestors' presence for the last thousand years."

CSO: 4300/102

PLANS FOR VILLAGE LEAGUES ASSESSED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 19-25 Jul, 26 Jul-1 Aug, 2-8 Aug 81

[Three part article by Nura Sus, AL-FAJR correspondent]

[19-25 Jul 81 pp 5, 11]

[Text]

This is the first of a 3-part series on the development of the village associations in the West Bank. The association, or *rabeta*, is viewed by its critics as a preliminary structure leading to the imposition of Camp David autonomy.

While the village associations — now numbering three — claim to be simply cooperative organizations dedicated to economic progress in agricultural areas of the West Bank, their powers are more extensive than the elected municipalities. Palestinian nationalists attack the *rabeta* for its direct ties to the military authorities, both financial and political.

The first village association was formed in the Hebron area in 1977 by former Jordanian Minister Mustafa Dudeen. Other organizations created this year in the Ramallah and Bethlehem areas have been modelled after Hebron's. Attempts to form the league in Nablus and Jericho have foundered in the face of almost unanimous popular condemnation.

Sixteen Bethlehem area men, hopeful of forming the third *rabeta* or association of villages, have submitted by-laws to the military authorities for what will surely be prompt approval from the Israelis. The Bethlehem scheme follows by several months the creation of a similar paper association in the Ramallah area. Both are modelled after the three-year-old Hebron village league, managed by Mustafa Dudeen, a carpetbagging politico who held high government positions in both the Egyptian and Jordanian governments before resettling in the West Bank in 1975.

.... Hebron's Model .....

The association leaders criticise the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee's funding efforts in the occupied territories

and prefer to work instead with the Israeli military authorities, from whom they receive most of their financial support for development projects. In addition to their economic influence over poor southern villages, the association — and the godfather-like figure of Mustafa Dudeen in particular — wields considerable administrative power as well all with the blessing of the occupation authorities. Virtually any permit, project or favour requiring the approval of the military government potentially must go through the hands of the association where it is either obstructed or recommended. According to local sources recommendations are made, for example, for government teaching jobs, or family reunion permits more readily after an exchange of money.

The net effect is that contact between villages and the military government is no longer direct, nor is contact made through nationalist, popularly supported municipalities. Instead the Israeli government has selected, financed and protected their own choice of middlemen.

. . . From Shoulder Tap . . .
. . . . . To Top . . . . . .

Early this year the Hebron association, feeling that they "needed someone to work with in Bethlehem", tapped Bishara Qumsieh for the job. For Qumsieh, a 57-year-old metal factory owner from Beit Sahur, it was the opportunity for public recognition that he had long awaited. As his son Samir proudly tells the story, "Leaders of the 70 villages in the Bethlehem area came to our house and asked my father to lead them."

Father and son gave three reasons for Bishara's ascension to the leadership of the village association in the Bethlehem area. "Bethlehem is predominantly a Christian area so therefore the leader must be a Christian. We believe that this is necessary because of the Holy Places," they explain, although the *rabeta's* authority would not extend into Bethlehem municipality.

The other criteria are that "the man must have money for himself" and the courage to try to solve "our problems".

The senior Qumsieh claims his league has 10,000 friends, "they all know me and love me," he says. "When they know I am associated with the *rabeta* they shake my hand and say thank you." In another year he expects the number of his friends to swell to 50,000 as word of the good works of the association gets around. These figures are considered wild exaggerations by local residents.

So far, however, the only recognition Qumsieh has received from the Palestinian public is unreserved condemnation from municipal officials and nationalist figures as well as local mukhtars, village councils and refugee camp leaders. The people he has seemed to please, however, are the Israelis. For a Palestinian under military rule, Qumsieh struck a rare pose several weeks ago when he was interviewed on Israel television. (There have also been frequent favourable references to Mustafa Dudeen and his brother Muhammed, the Hebron League's agricultural consultant, on Israeli TV, as well as TV and radio interviews.)

. . . . Cash From Israel . . . .

Bishara Qumsieh explains, "I asked the Arab countries, the Arab League and the Israeli government for (financial) help. Until now only the Israeli government has agreed to help...Now they are our government; it is possible to accept money from Israel."

His main complaint, and chief reason for accepting Dudeen's offer of a 'village league franchise ' is a common one in the West Bank: "The Joint Committee money doesn't get down to the people." He is careful to point out that the fault does not lie with the Joint Committee or the PLO. "I don't trust the people here who distribute the money... Bethlehem and Beit Sahur have not done enough for the area. They brought back JD 240,000 from Amman and built houses for themselves," alleges Qumsieh. He does not think the money may be a temptation for the league's associates. "I am straight," he says.

Qumsieh claims to have the support of mukhtars and sheikhs in every village in the Bethlehem area, including even Dheisheh refugee camp,although sources close to *Al Fajr* reported that when the *rabeta* sent over a paper for signature support they were virtually chased out of the camp.

. . . Bethlehem's Reply . . . .

Bethlehem municipal secretary Jamal Salman also disputes this claim. "All legal representatives of refugee camps, mukhtars, dignitaries and tribesmen around Bethlehem are writing to condemn the league's

formation. The majority of the population in the Bethlehem area condemn the league because we find its intention is to make some cracks in the body of the Palestinian people under occupation."

The municipalities are actively working against the league by calling in villagers who have been contacted and convincing them against extending support. Meanwhile the league, along with their Israeli backers, are busy trying to exploit possible sources of friction among Bethlehem area residents for their favour. For example, arguments that insist the municipalities overlook the needs of the villages, that they take more than their fair share of the $120 million from the Joint Committee, that Christian-Muslim rivalry in some way accounts for the disproportionate help to the villages — all are enlisted in encouraging supporters. The political overtones are not discussed by the league advocates, however.

Salman sees the league, as do many others, as an undemocratic, anti-nationalist force propped up by the military government for specific political reasons. "The mayors and municipal officials — elected by the population of the area — all backed by the PLO. The people who make up these leagues are not national factors. The miltary formed the league to find people who will approve Camp David and Begin's autonomy plan. The outside paint is to help the villages but this is really a political league."

Bishara Qumsieh is circumspect on the issue of Camp David: "We cannot say whether we agree or not." His son repeats that the *rabeta* has not yet been approved — in order to explain his reticence.

So far the *rabeta* in Bethlehem has but the 16 members who put their names on the bylaws, personally submitted at Beit El military headquarters. While the main leaders of the village associations are long experienced in politics and have even run for elected posts, they look to "simple, illiterate, unknown people" for their support. But even among the politically unsophisticated, the *rabeta* is meeting stiff opposition from villagers suspicious of sudden sources of money for projects long neglected under occupation. "We see the carrot," said one resident of Azzariya, "and look for the stick behind it."

[26 Jul-1 Aug 81 p 9]

[Text]

Mustafa Dudeen is heading up what West Bank national and municipal leaders believe is potentially the most politically dangerous effort yet to substitute autonomy schemes for Palestinian self-determination in the occupied territories. Two months after Sadat's Jerusalem visit and Egypt's overtures to the Israeli state, Mustafa Dudeen — a 20-year veteran of the Egyptian government — began to discuss the idea of forming an association of villages in his native Hebron area.

With important backing from Colonel Mailson, the then Advisor on Arab Affairs to the Military Commander of the occupied territories and Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan, the Hebron Village Association was established in 1978 within months of Dudeen's initial discussions.

Using the argument that money had been diverted from village development in favor of the cities, Dudeen exploited old rivalries to garner support for his league from traditional notables, mukhtars, heads of families in village councils, governmental appointees and hamlet residents in the economically depressed Hebron district. Slowly he won all the 'front line' villages — those close to the 1967 border — into the association convincing many that the organization had Jordanian blessing. Others were induced to join ranks because of the association's promise to gain quick approval for projects that have been delayed or rejected when requested by the villages directly. Half of the project funding comes through Israeli military sources.

DOUBLE EDGES

Dudeen received steady and stiff opposition from villages that were suspicious of his previous political record (see box) and his current over-friendliness to occupation authorities. While they welcomed development projects — a new road, a much needed school, electricity — they did not want to deal with the military authorities through Dudeen. (The Dura resident, from the outset, has not tried to hide his strong ties to the military authorities. At the time of the league's establishment, he toured the Hebron area villages with Military commander Dani Matt, not a popular figure in the occupied West Bank.)

In 1979 new local councils were appointed in the Hebron district and, not surprisingly, they turned out to be strong supporters of the league. Locals are convinced that all political appointments by the military authorities are made on the recommendation of Mustafa Dudeen, and based on their compliancy with Israeli authorities.

ILLEGITIMATE COUNCILS

The majority of Beit Awwa residents have refused to recognize the village's 13-member council, appointed by the military authorities and have stopped paying property taxes. Contrary to the claim of Dudeen on Israeli TV, that the council was chosen in democratic elections, Beit Awwa residents consider the council to be illegal. Council chair Muhammad Mahmoud Sweity, who is one of three Village League spokesmen, was singled out for special wrath after denouncing the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Committee on the same Israeli-televised interview. Sweity was apparently taking his revenge after two of Beit Awwa's new councilmen were twice rebuffed by Amman when they tried to register the council and ask for financial help.

The Joint Committee, set up by the Baghdad Arab summit conference in late 1978 to fund projects in the occupied territories, has been a favorite target of league spokesmen. Muhammed Dudeen (Mustafa's brother) and the Hebron League's 'agricultural consultant' criticized the Joint Committee during an Israeli Radio interview last December, saying the committee diverted the majority of its funds into the pockets of some beneficiaries. "The villages lack the least benefits of civilization because they are neglected by the Joint Committee which gives moral and material support for cities only."

The Joint Committee represents the only sizeable Palestinian-nationalist source of project funding from outside the occupied territories. As such, its efforts are impeded at every turn by the occupation authorities. Villagers that oppose the league are punished by being forbidden to travel to Amman for consultation with Joint Committee members and money transfers from Amman to the West Bank are regularly denied by the Israeli authorities.

STEADFASTNESS MONEY CHOKED

The reimplementation of military order 284 (see page 16) also affects the economic situation of the villages. By banning West Bank leaders from meeting PLO officials, it potentially blocks Palestinian financial support from entering the West Bank.

The Joint Committee, set up to encourage steadfastness against the occupation, does not approve funding to villages which are cooperating with the Village League. In the Hebron area alone, Dudeen has worked out an arrangement whereby the military authorities supply 80 percent of the budget of a village which does not receive Joint Committee money, rather than the normal 50 percent. In this way villages are financially rewarded for giving up 'steadfastness' money.

Besides receiving funding from the military government, the league claims that it receives financial assistance for village projects from 'American volunteer agencies.' However, Dr. Amin al-Khatib, chairman of the Union of Charitable Associations in the West Bank, is convinced that, "the Hebron Village League doesn't receive any financial support from outside the occupied territories." And by Dudeen's own admission he has not yet received any money from the foreign voluntary agencies that operate in the West Bank.

Recently all charitable organizations, particularly Christian missions, that plan developmental agricultural projects in villages have been pushed by the authorities to contact Dudeen's League. They have been asked not to visit any village without a representative of the League and to coordinate all planned projects with them. There have also been attempts to drag private voluntary agencies into unwittingly recognizing the league by funding projects partially financed by military-league sources.

PROPPING UP MIDDLEMEN

Although there are only about 500 members of the league from a population of 120,000 Mustafa Dudeen has been given virtual administrative authority over the Hebron district population. Any dealings before carried out directly with the military authorities, now must be signed and approved through the Hebron League. This has taken enormous power and prestige away from the elected village councils and has substituted a middleman structure.

ID renewals, summer visit permits, community projects, exit visas, *haj* pilgrimages, government employment — all must be processed through the league building. Family reunions, 15 at a time, are announced from time to time on Israeli TV as 'accepted with the strong recommendation of Mustaf Dudeen. Likewise Hebron area residents can find themselves demoted or out of a job if they oppose Dudeen's empire too loudly. Four teachers have been transfered to other schools after they registered their opposition to the league. For example, a former headmaster of a Yatta school must now commute to Bethlehem to keep his job as sports teachers, thanks to Mustafa Dudeen.

The league operates from a substantial building on the outskirts of the city of Hebron. Although scores of men stroll in and out of the offices, village association spokesmen claim only three paid staff members — a secretary, a clerk and a typist — and no capital funds. All others, including Mustafa himself, work on a volunteer basis; they are almost all landed gentry. "In our association we have no money. We are a link between the village councils, the governor and the people."

LEAGUE STRUCTURE

With every appearance of being a regional council, the league's activities are administered by a central committee comprised of three members of a half dozen committees with wide respon sibilities. An educational committee, for example, has made a survey of the area's school facilities. Thirteen schools are under construction or have been completed in the past year. A health committee has planned health clinics in the four central towns: Yatta, Tarqumia, Beit Ummar, and Beit Awwa as well as small[illegible]inics in each village.

The major effort of the association has been in the field of agriculture, to make farming more productive for West Bank landowners, they say, but also to ensure a steady supply of good quality inexpensive crops for Israeli markets. But all of the League's successes are due to military government support. Dudeen, for example, can distribute chemical fertilizers at lower than market prices because of

military government subsidies. With project approval and funding assured, the major obstacles to village development are thrown aside.

The technical committee chair, electrical engineer Mohammed Nasser, described the League's unique 'joint committee.' It consists of the military governor and his assistant, Mustafa Dudeen, the League committee involved with the project under discussion and officers from the village concerned. The spirit of cooperation between military and Palestinian residents in the League is unknown elsewhere in the West Bank.

NATIONALISTS IN OPPOSITION

The League has been fought hard by the Hebron municipality and many villages in the area. Grafitti denouncing the league has been scrawled on walls in Dhariya, Dura and Beit Awwa saying, "No to the Village League," "The PLO is our sole, legitimate representative." Jordan has denied any relationship with the Village League and has said that it is part of Israeli plans to break up the national unity in the West Bank, even though League leaders cling tenaciously to a Jordanian identity.

West Bank national leaders have deplored the division the League has sought to create between cities and villages, while Dudeen thinks that the municipalities have overstepped their authority, that they want to govern both villages and towns. He criticizes the municipalities for being involved in political activities. "According to the law," he says, "the municipalities are in charge of services, civilian services, within the boundaries of the city. This is their job and that's all."

Every national figure, municipality, and institution in the West Bank has publicly denounced the league in speeches, newspapers and in meetings with village leaders. The Village Association has received generous condemnation from outside as well. The PLO regularly warns Dudeen on *Voice of Palestine* broadcasts to cease his activities. In a recent interview with *Al Fajr*, Fatah Central Council member Abu Jihad (Khalil Wazir) said: "We consider Mustafa Dudeen, because of his suspicious activities, to be a traitor to his people. He is tying the people to the Israeli intelligence service and pressuring them to serve only Israeli policy. His actions are followed by the PLO outside and condemned by the leadership and by all of our people inside."

Last week Mustafa Dudeen, in the name of the Hebron Village League, attended the Tel Aviv reception given by Egypt's Ambassador to Israel, Mortada, on the occasion of the anniversary of Egypt's July 23 revolution. Representatives from the Hebron League's new offshoots in Ramallah and Bethlehem also attended the affair. The presence of the three represent a political plum for the Israeli military authorities and a sweet reward for their efforts to groom an alternative to the PLO on the West Bank — however temporary and however unpopular.

[2-8 Aug 81 p 16]

[Text]

Following in the pattern of the village league in Hebron the embryo Ramallah *rabeta*, or association of villages, is attempting to convince area villagers of its 'nationalist purpose' in order to draw them onto its official registers. This tactic has not much hope, however, since the three leagues — in Hebron, Ramallah and Bethlehem — have been openly denounced by virtually all nationalist figures and organizations in the West Bank.

Like its southern model and counterpart, the Ramallah league has sought support most intensively from mukhtars and sheikhs, the traditional civil and religious leaders in the villages. In their campaign for legitimacy, the league has the 'advantage' of being supported by the Israeli military government which can wave powerful threats in front of the traditional leaders in order to push them towards cooperation.

Even before the league opened its doors in Ramallah for official business six months ago, the mukhtars of the district were summoned to the occupation headquarters in Beit El for a message from the military authorities: no projects would be approved, no help would be given to any village unless processed through the Ramallah Village League.

The Israeli authorities have backed up their suggestions with a number of actions directed at forcing individual support for the league. In the over 100 villages within the boundaries of Ramallah district, mukhtars have been told to support the league or their official stamps (for notarizing papers) would be confiscated, making the mukhtar virtually powerless in the community.

This spring the proud mukhtars were taken aside at military checkpoints on the Ramallah-Jerusalem road, their names ticked off a list in the hands of Israeli officers, and asked whether they were league supporters. Last month a prominent sheikh known for his refusal to deal with the league was called for an interview with the military governor and personally told to end his opposition to the league's leaders. In a few cases these tactics have worked to instill some fear, and with it reluctant support of the association of villages. But at the same time it has been a clear signal to most villagers that this scheme of binding villages in an administrative structure has the open blessing of the military governor.

IS 40 MILLION

The league, while espousing benefits for Palestinian residents of the West Bank and working under the wings of the military governors, has not gone far to win the confidence of villagers. Many who initially put their signatures to the league's by-laws later pulled out. They published statements such as: "We, the mukhtars of Beitunia Haj Fowzi Diab Salah, the mukhtar of Ein Arik Naji Issa Hanna Bata, and Mukhtar of Ein Kimia Mohammed Yusef Ahmed, announce to our people inside and outside that all associations and leagues of villages hurt the public and national interest. We publicly announce that we have no ties with such a league and any signature of ours is to be considered cancelled."

The organizer of the Ramallah league nucleus is a mukhtar himself in Bil'in, a small village near the so-called 'green line.' Yusuf al-Khatib, or Abu Jamil as he is locally known is a medium sized landowner and prosperous by village standards. He and his sons are about to open their third retail furniture store in the Ramallah district.

Khatib's eldest son, Jamil, described how his father became involved in the league idea. "We heard about the Hebron association," he said in his version, "and we wanted something similar. Before village projects were not well funded and couldn't get approved. Now the military government can support us." The Ramallah league, Khatib admitted to the pro-Israeli daily al-Anba, has received IS 40 million from military sources for projects for which they will be middlemen.

Khatib's league, like its Hebron inspiration, has financial and military support but lacks the respect of village inhabitants. Opposition is strongest in Khatib's home village of Bil'il where people know him best, just as Mustafa Dudeen— the Hebron league's head— has met his toughest adversaries in his hometown of Dura.

At a meeting Khatib held in early February in Bil'in he told the villagers that they should submit an application requesting electrification, water lines, a clinic and a road between Bil'in and Kharbata, the next village to the north. None of the Bil'in inhabitants agreed to Abu Jamil's suggestions, including the two mukhtars of the village. One resident summed up local reaction by saying, "We are afraid of the autonomy aims of the village."

When faced with criticism by nationalists, Jamil defends his father: "These are only rumours. We are not a high authority, we are not qualified. We are villagers." He adds, mechanically, "We believe the PLO is the sole legitimate representative."

Despite such statements area residents think differently about the Khatib's political persuasions and the nature of the village association. A small landowner calls the rabata "a branch of the military government." Another local resident, a lawyer, said the league is "only a changing of faces" from the occupation authorities.

Yusuf al-Khatib's efforts to knit together Ramallah villages under his authority are opposed even by the politically unsophisticated. By exploiting family rivalries to gain support, the league creates problems among villagers. The meetings at Beit El to pressure the mukhtars plus the strong reaction of the Arabic press and national figures, has succeeded in pointing out the close relationship the Ramallah league has with the military governor.

BAD SKELETON

The reputation of the first village league, Mustafa Dudeen's Hebron association, also warned villagers about what to expect when the league proliferated to Ramallah. "The skeleton of the league is bad," says one man in Ramallah who has known Abu Jamil all his life. "It is known to be full of spies," he says accusingly.

Private voluntary organizations, who find development projects in the West Bank, are trying to avoid dealing with the league despite the pressure from the occupation authorities. The organizations fear their credibility in the West Bank will suffer if they are seen to deal with them. One agency found out—too late— that it was sharing the cost of a project with money put up by the military government through a league man.

Like Dudeen who served in the British, Egyptian and Jordanian governments, Khatib also has a long history of working with the occupation armies in the West Bank. He was an officer in the British army and when Jordan took over the West Bank he often entertained officers at his village house. He is accused of helping the Jordanians take taxes from fellow villagers by force, among other activities.

His associations and his latest actions are beginning to mobilize villagers in an organized way against him. Locals feel Khatib is being pushed now to do the dirty work for the military government which prefers indirect involvement in, for example, land sales. The questionable sale of over 700 dunums of land near Bil'in, and next to a settlement, had been arranged through the league's leaders. The sale allegedly involved forged documents and falsified papers to transfer cultivated village land to an Israeli real estate agent. A civil court in Ramallah stopped the sale and is looking into the details of the sale.

Meanwhile, Abu Jamil has been going to and from his village for the last two weeks under the armed protection of Israeli military patrols. Villagers suspect that he has received serious threats.

CSO: 4300/105

ABNA' AL-BALAD PROTEST ARRESTS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 26 Jul-1 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

These days, the Zionist authorities are escalating their suppressive measures against the Palestinian masses in the country and in exile. These suppressive measures which have been continuous for decades take different forms and shapes.

For more than a year, northern district commander, General Ben Gal, well known for his enmity to anything Arab, issued restriction orders for a number of active members of Abna Al-Balad and the Student National Progressive Movement effectively banning them from leaving their villages or cities, from leaving their houses at night, and ordering them to report to the police daily. The orders give the police authority to break into their houses to make sure they are at home.

After one year of town restrictions, the abovementioned general issued new orders against four Abna Al-Balad activists Ghassan Fawzi Aghbarieh, Mohammed Salameh, Raja Aghbarieh and Hasan Ahmad Jabarin, as well as lawyer Ibrahim Nassar from Jerusalem and Faraj Khneifes from Shafa Amr.

Israel police also arrested two university students from Um Al Fahm, Jamal Ahmad Mahajneh and Ali Mohammad Mahajneh on July 13 and Qadri Abu Wassel from Ar'ara. All detainees have revealed that their interrogation concentrates on their political ideas. They condemn the arrests as political revenge.

All this is at the same time a campaign directed against the Abna Al-Balad movement which includes falsification of its political position.

There have also been attacks on nationalist students in the universities especially in Jerusalem. There three have already been expelled and others are waiting for trial, accused of violating the Tamir Law.

Imposing town arrests based on Mandatory Emergency Regulations restricts freedom of our activists and cuts their source of income and aims to stop them from continuing the struggle to defend their people's rights.

The Abna Al-Balad movement is deeply aware that these suppressive campaigns against active members is a link in the chain of an overall policy to suppress our people everywhere, and also extends to hit all Arab nations.

We will confront this aggression on the popular and legal levels, and we will continue defending our basic freedom; respect for our dignity and freedom of expression.

We call upon all national forces and Jewish democratic forces to stand by us in one united active bloc to stop the fascist attack on us.

But despite the fascist aggression the Palestinian people will not submit to Zionist brutality and will not cede its national rights: the right of return, of self-determination and to a national independent state on the national soil under the leadership of the PLO, its sole and legitimate representative.

* We demand the cancellation of town arrests and cancellation of emergency regulations;
* We demand immediate release for (administrative) detainees;
* We demand the return of the expelled university students to their studies;
* We demand a stop to racist incitement and an end to barbarism.

Together on the Path.
Progressive National Movement,
Abna Al-Balad Movement
and popular groups.

CSO: 4300/102

BRIEFS

MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS--50 Jewish students between the ages of 18-26 from various countries began pre-military training, July 26, in the first camp of its kind for foreign supporters of the state of Israel. The students will be trained in the use of weapons, first aid, fieldsmanship and map-reading in a youth corps base and will be trained for, among other things, guard duties in border settlements. The course, which lasts one month, is organized by the Jewish Agency with the cooperation of the military. Some of the youths are students in religious schools. The main reason cited for the fact that the training is only pre-military and not purely military is that that "might cause problems with the authorities in their native countries." [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 2-8 Aug 81 p 4]

BIRTH, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE RATES--There was a substantial drop in the birth rate among the Jewish population in the last decade, as well as a deterioration in the general employment situation. There was also a similar decline in the incomes of various population sectors, primarily of young and old people. This emerges from data compiled by the Labor and Social Welfare Ministry during the years 1969 to 1979. In that period, the Jewish population grew by 28.4 percent, whereas the non-Jewish population grew by 46 percent. Emigration reached 126,464 people, with the peak year being 1974, with 25,664 people leaving the country. Marriage rates have declined by 12.6 percent whereas divorce rates went up by 45.3 percent, especially between 1974 and 1979. [TA111410 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Aug 81 p 2]

JULY COST OF LIVING--The cost of living index went up in July by 6.1 percent. Items that had notable price-hikes are housing, by 13.5 percent; health, by 8.6 percent; and furniture, by 5.6 percent. The rate of annual inflation is now reaching a little more than 100 percent. Since the beginning of this year prices went up by 48 percent, as against 56 percent during a parallel period last year. [Text] [TA141216 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 14 Aug 81]

NABULUS BUDGET--Nabulus, 18 Aug--Nabulus Mayor Bassam ash-Shak'ah has stated that the deficit in the municipality's budget this year has already reached 13 million shekels--despite the municipality's revenues which to date total 84 million shekels. He noted that the municipality had recently approached the military government to cover this deficit through grants, in order not to disrupt local projects. Ash-Shak'ah asserted that in view of this state of affairs the municipality would soon be unable to function, and would not be able to honor its commitments to implement development projects. He was critical of the authorities' recent refusal to allow the support funds from the Arab countries--on which the municipalities had relied in drawing up their budgets--to be brought in. The military government has informed the ITIM correspondent that the question of bringing money into the area is still under examination. [Text] [TA181016 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 0920 GMT 18 Aug 81]

CSO: 4323/59

DEFENSE, INTERIOR MINISTERS APPOINTED

EA301554 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 30 Aug 81

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers, today issued two Supreme People's Council decrees regarding the appointments of a defense minister and an interior minister.

Article 1 of the first decree provides for the appointment of [Interior Minister] Colonel Salih Muslih Qasim, member of the Central Committee, as defense minister. The remaining articles provide for the annulment of any previous appointment to the post, the decree becoming effective from the date of issue, and for its publication in the official gazette.

Article 1 of the second decree provides for the appointment of [Deputy Defense Minister] Lt Col Muhammad Abdullah al-Batani, candidate member of the Central Committee, as interior minister. The remaining articles provide for the annulment of any previous appointments to the post, the decree becoming effective from the date of issue, and for its publication in the official gazette.

Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad also issued a Supreme People's Council decree regarding the appointment of a member of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. Article 1 of the decree provides for the appointment of brother Sulayman Nasir Muhammad, member of the Central Committee [and head of the Organization of People's Defense Committee] as member of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council. The remaining articles of the decree provide for its becoming effective from the date of issue and its publication in the official gazette.

CSO: 4304/148

CHAIRMAN RECEIVES IRAQI CP LEADER

EA072240 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers, has stressed the concern of the YSP and Democratic Yemen for the importance of consolidating the Arab liberation struggle against imperialism and zionism, enhancing the cohesiveness of the Arab national liberation movements and expanding and promoting relations with the countries of the socialist community, headed by the USSR, and all the forces of good in the world. He said this when he received Comrade 'Aziz Muhammad, secretary general of the Iraqi Communist Party at his office this morning.

The meeting, which was dominated by an atmosphere of cordiality, reviewed relations between the fraternal YSP and the Iraqi Communist Party and the current situation and developments in the Arab homeland. The position of the Arab national liberation movements was also discussed, as well as issues facing the region and other issues of common interest, including confrontation with imperialism, zionist and reactionary challenges to the struggle of our Arab peoples, above all the struggle of the Palestinian Arab people for self-determination.

Replying, Comrade 'Aziz Muhammad told brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad he was pleased to be visiting Democratic Yemen and meeting the YSP secretary general. He also praised our country's achievements at all levels and the prominent part played by its revolutionary experience, which had won the support and backing of all the wo ld's revolutionaries. Comrade 'Aziz Muhammad expressed pride and satisfaction at the militant bonds linking the friendly YSP and the Iraqi Communist Party.

CSO: 4304/148

RIYADH COMMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN, USSR

LD291920 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 29 Aug 81

[Commentary by Hashim Abdu Hashim]

[Text] The Afghan issue is arousing numerous and important questions, the main one of which is: What has happened to make the Soviet Union agree, through the Kabul regime, to discuss the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the framework of a committee comprising India, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan after the Soviets earlier rejected this proposal as well as the European initiatives put forward by Lord Carrington when he visited the Soviet Union recently?

What happened to cause this noticeable change in a stand that seemed impossible for the Soviets to back down from or for Babrak Karmal's regime to agree with. The Soviet pretext for rejecting this proposal was that tackling the Afghan issue in this manner would mean admitting the existence of an illegal situation in the country after the Soviets had entered the country following Karmal's advent to power--or rather, they installed him there. How has the situation changed and why has their stringent attitude turned into sudden acceptance? Surely the Soviets, who are known for their caution, their slowness in their decision-making, and their patience, have now found themselves facing difficult options after the international community saw them as invaders and as a power threatening world security and stability. These options are: Firstly, freezing their actions in all fields in order to avoid more opposition from the world community in exchange for slow gains in other parts of the world. Secondly, continuing the policy of containing the situation in Poland or abandoning it for keeping Afghanistan and concentrating their efforts in that direction. Thirdly, continuing to support regimes which are implementing its strategy in different parts of the world, or to stop this form of tactic in exchange for calming world anxiety and gaining its increasing confidence.

Yet it appears that the Soviet Union cannot neglect its strategic positions in Poland, Angola, or in the Horn of Africa. The Soviet Union is also not ready to leave the Middle East in exchange for unlimited troubles in Afghanistan.

After years of occupation of this Islamic country, the Soviet Union has discovered that it has committed a strategic error. It believed that it could jump into Afghanistan's neighboring countries and could exploit Afghanistan is temporary circumstances to make new gains. For that, it accepted risking its reputation, spending millions and sacrificing scores of soldiers. When it discovered that it could not achieve any expansionist objectives it began stirring trouble in

Poland, waiting for the appropriate chance to spring, despite the warnings it received from all countries of the world. To us it seems nothing but a matter of time; otherwise, for what reason is the Soviet fleet sailing near Poland these days?

The Soviets have chosen to temporarily freeze the situation, in Afghanistan, to reassure its neighbors and to contain the explosive situation there. At the same time they are seeking to implement their designs--known as the policy of encirclement of what they call foreign interests--through setting up a number of alliances and blocks, aimed at disturbing ranks from within and diverting attention away from the expected adventures in Poland and Angola.

The Arab and Islamic nation, while drawing attention to the danger of what is happening, reaffirms that the region's leaderships and people's awareness cannot be exploited in any way just to paint a pretty picture of the Soviets in face of the facts, and the nation's issues and major interests.

The Arab and Islamic nation draws attention to this and warns that what is happening in Afghanistan does not constitute a retreat. Rather it indicates that preparations for a huge adventure are being hatched by the Soviets who are waiting for the appropriate chance. However, these moves do not frighten anybody, do not influence the nation's thoughts, and do not change the convictions of Arabs and Muslims who find in the Soviet Union a number of ambitions that should not be underrated. Whether the Soviet Union wants to impose itself on the area and its issues, or to achieve more of its own interests, the Soviet Union and those who support it should realize that the times of deceiving this nation have gone, and the question of knowing friends from foes has become a strategic objective for the peoples of the area. There is no room left for outbidding and temptation.

CSO: 4304/148

BRIEFS

SAUDI NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT REPRESENTATION--Jiddah, 24 Aug (SPA)--Foreign Minister Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal has stated that Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz will lead the kingdom's delegation to the summit conference on the North-South dialogue to be held in Mexico in October. In a statement to the newspaper AL-MADINAH, published here today, Prince Sa'ud said that the conference is intended for consultation only and not for negotiation so that the largest measure of mutual understanding may be achieved. Referring to the foreign ministers conference of countries participating in the North-South dialogue summit held earlier this month in Mexico, Prince Sa'ud said that the foreign ministers have approved the principles and ideas which constitute the kingdom's position at the conference and have adopted them as a basis for the summit conference's work. [Text] [Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1050 GMT 24 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/148

OPPOSITION FRONT OFFICIAL REPORTS ON FIGHTING

LD071018 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0735 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] Kuwait, 7 Sep (KUNA)--A senior official of a front which is opposing the ruling regime in North Yemen was quoted here as saying today that the forces of the front have been fighting a war for more than 4 weeks against forces belonging to the army in the central region of the country.

The Kuwaiti paper AS-SIYASAH says that the official in charge of foreign relations of the National Democratic Front, Mr Yahya al-Shami, said in Aden that the Sana government had sent in seven army battalions in its campaign against the front, a campaign that now enters its 4th week, and which is one of the biggest in the history of the 12-year-old conflict between the authorities in North Yemen and the national front.

Mr al-Shami added that Sana's plan is not isolated from the fierce, widescale international game to which the region at large is being subjected, and which is meant to bring under control the central region where the forces of the front and the North Yemen forces are present, a region not far from the border with South Yemen.

He said that the national front, which is supported by Aden, had so far not raised the slogan of toppling the ruling authority in Sana. The front, he said, was striving to foil the attempts made to liquidate it, and centered its efforts on finding how best to lay the foundations of security, stability and democracy, so that the authorities may meet the democratic demands of the front.

The opposition front official, on the other hand, accused the Sana government of violating an agreement reached in Aden between the two sides and which called for a cease-fire from 10 August. He said the front was surprised to see the now 4-week-old campaign become fiercer, more violent and on a larger scale with no indication as to whether North Yemen wants to halt it.

He said that the military campaign had resulted in hundreds of dead, hundreds of arrests, homes destroyed and families driven out of their houses in the region. He stressed that the army was able to occupy some heights in the region but a fierce battle is now raging in the Eastern sector. The forces of his front, he said, were able to check the advance of the army in the Western sector, to destroy and disperse the first infantry battalion, and to weaken the 8th commando battalion.

On the other hand, the front issued orders for its forces throughout the country to step up their operations.

Mr al-Shami said that the Sana government had tried to discuss the activity of the front with Aden, but that the latter had told it that the national front was present in the North before being in Democratic Yemen.

CSO: 4304/148

BRIEFS

PDRY WAR COLLEGE VISITED--Interior Minister Lt Col 'Ali Muhammad 'Uthrub and his military delegation, who are participating in the celebrations marking the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the armed forces in the southern part of the homeland, today visited the war college in Aden. They were welcomed by the college commander, its officers and training staff. Lt Col 'Ali Muhammad 'Uthrub became acquainted with the various training practices and activities at the college. Lieutenant Colonel 'Uthrub also attended a tactical exercise carried out by the college's students. The college commander delivered a speech in which he welcomed the interior minister and his delegation and briefed them on the history of the college. Then Lt Col 'Ali 'Uthrub delivered a speech in which he conveyed greetings and congratulations from leader President Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih and all elements of our armed forces and security forces to the officers, NCO's and students of the college. He expressed his admiration for the high level of studies at the war college. At the end of his visit, Lt Col 'Ali 'Uthrub signed the visitor's book in which he expressed his happiness at this visit. He stressed that this college is one of the numerous accomplishments of the 14 October and 26 September revolutions. [Text] [JN021756 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 2 Sep 81]

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END

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21 September 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2399

IRAQ: POPULAR ARMY ORGAN DISCUSSES MILITARY TACTICS AND STRATEGY

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21 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2399

IRAQ: POPULAR ARMY ORGAN DISCUSSES MILITARY TACTICS AND STRATEGY

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 8, Feb 81 and No 9, Jun 81

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POPULAR ARMY USE OF HELICOPTERS DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 8, Feb 81, pp 64-69

/Article by Muhammad Judu' Kazim: "Airborne Popular Army Forces"/

/Text/ Introduction

A. The use of airborne troops on the strategic and tactical levels in World War Two was limited but developed in the fifties after the Korean War and assumed a new dimension in the June 1967 War and the 1975 war in Vietnam. The use of airplanes, in particular helicopters, ceased to be restricted to activities of transporting units and equipment and served as means of combat which could carry out tactical activities in circumstances which could prove difficult if reliance was made on the potential for ground movement.

B. Border units might be in a state of confusion and imbalance for a certain time as a result of a surprise foreign attack against part of the homeland and infiltration into the hinterland of the country by raiding forces. This is where the role of the various Popular Army forces in the border areas stands out; in their secret bases inside their operating areas, they watch closely over the progress of the enemy within those areas so that they can begin their activity through the medium of secret resistance operations and popular war. Therefore, they will constantly be exposed to sudden dangers and sometimes to extermination, and this requires that constant contact be maintained with them and that they be supplied through the forward lines and flanks by transport on foot or the use of various modes of transport, most important of which are helicopters.

C. Helicopters are considered an important mode of transport and are in keeping with the requirements of the Popular Army, among the most important of which are confusing the enemy, attacking the enemy's stumbling forces, destroying his reserves, taking over targets which have not been destroyed and have regrouped, and holding vital points and remaining in them until friendly forces arrive. Thus it is important that they have the power to operate behind lines and along flanks with great intrinsic resources which will enable them to skirmish with the adversary at once when their objectives are reached. Therefore, they have been equipped, reorganized and trained to attack by air by helicopter as well as to manage infiltration activities on foot and remain behind enemy lines in the effort to prevent the enemy from using his resources effectively in combat. Therefore, we must ascertain the most important tactical aspects of Popular Army forces transported by helicopter, as well as the helicopters which are used, to arrive at a clear idea of the planning and execution of their probable combat tasks.

2. /sic/ Tactical phenomena of helicopter-borne Popular Army forces

A. Mobility: the training and equipping of helicopter-borne Popular Army forces are suitable for movement at short notice and exceptional speed and are accompanied by the freedom to select hostile targets within the range of the aircraft, even if that is across rough ground or areas that are wet or obstructed with bulky weapons which might impede the movement of ground forces. Close cooperation with local inhabitants to form an intelligence network which will supply them and other commands with useful information as a result of the constant surveillance of the volume and movement increases air mobility and consequently enables them to drop in the appropriate areas in time to destroy the enemy there.

B. The movement of people borne by helicopter demands dominance over the air in the target area and the stifling of ground fire, due to the fact that these movements are managed in areas being defended by small units or are in areas destroyed by intense fire.

C. There is no doubt that surprise is one of the most important principles of combat in attaining rapid victory with little effort and scant losses. The Popular Army's chances of attaining surprise increase when they are helicopter borne, in view of the rapid air mobility with which they are distinguished and the changes in activity in flight that helicopters can make, as well as their ability to impose at the requisite speed in order to cope with the new operations of the enemy simply and without confusion. This may be summarized as shifting from one attack direction to another, and this depends on the adequate preparation of combat planning in order to direct the severest blows at the weakest enemy units when they are in a state of movement or brief rest under mere adequate guard, so that it is possible to pounce on them harshly, quickly and unexpectedly, taking a vital point as a target in order to destroy the enemy there, setting up ambushes along the axis of hostile deployments, attacking encampments and holding critical points in order to support local and central counter-attacks.

D. Helicopter-borne personnel's advantages of movement give them the ability to impose permanent, continuous threats over broad areas, most important of which are rear areas and vital points, thus compelling the enemy to deploy his forces in an attempt to counter the threats. In addition to this, this leaves an effect on the morale of the enemy, keeping him in a poor psychological state and engendering a state of panic and disturbance in his midst, restricting the movements of his units, slowing down his counterreactions and keeping them ineffective. Therefore, airborne Popular Army forces are able to achieve exceptional results by launching sudden violent attacks and raids which have a lightning effect that is bewildering to the enemy and could almost eliminate their disadvantage in volume and firepower, making the question of their exposure to losses dissolve and disappear.

E. Whatever the type of drop from helicopters may be, the force will remain exposed to danger until regroups, although careful rehearsal and constant proficient training have a great effect in reducing this period to the lowest possible level.

F. The Popular Army needs sometimes intermediate and usually heavy lifts in order to transport reserves for forces resisting infiltration, to make up deficiencies in materiel or rapidly to transport anti-tank weapon detachments in order to close the breaches which hostile armored units might create. Engineering detachments

may also be enabled to lift sections of bridges and defensive equipment and lay mines with the objective of stopping any dangerous armor penetration and breaking its spearhead. These preventive measures increase the need to transport warning forces by helicopter from safe camps to emergency sites that are opening up; in this situation, the roads will be especially crowded and lifting by helicopter by air will be an urgent necessity.

G. Popular Army combat bases perform the duty of resisting airborne unit operations and they must reach the drop area quickly in order to destroy the enemy before it becomes feasible for him to finish regrouping on the ground. The best means for rapid transportation in such tasks is the helicopter.

3. Characteristics of helicopters.

A. Flight ability: Helicopters have the ability to fly and land vertically, move to the side and the rear and hover in fixed fashion over a specific spot for a substantial period of time, increasing their ability to maneuver and the accuracy of their execution of missions, whether for purposes of reconnaissance, transportation or fire support, in various areas at the requisite speed, thus enabling us to concentrate strike efforts at the proper place and specific times. Therefore, they are considered among the best instruments of combat known in this era.

It is worth pointing out that increasing the altitude of /ordinary/ aircraft in the air has an inverse effect on their competence and ability to maneuver, and influences command and control of them, lowering the power of their engine, which, in turn, reduces their carrying capacity, and they have to take off and land in the traditional horizontal manner. A rise in the elevation of the ground above sea level certainly requires increasing the area needed for takeoff.

B. Landing area: Helicopters can land on a level area of a minimum of 25 square meters, on condition that that be free from obstacles that are more than 30 meters high. In the event there are obstacles close to the landing area, the helicopter's load must be reduced to guarantee it a secure takeoff, so that the units elements of movement and rapid transport may be achieved without their being influenced by various ground obstacles or being restricted to easily constructed airports or broad landing areas.

C. Climatic conditions: Helicopters are considered more able to fly at low altitude in bad weather conditions than other aircraft, although they are affected by such weather, since a large number of them cannot fly in conditions of heavy fog, intense wind or foreign bodies falling through the air, since that affects their safety and therefore the ability to use them in movement.

D. Helicopters have been furnished with resources for taking the enemy by surprise, attacking him from areas suddenly, then avoiding his fire, due to high maneuverability and rapid takeoff to a relatively high altitude; their flight at low altitudes conceals them from various electronic detection devices.

E. Due to helicopters' ability to move from target to target and from tactical to administrative task, as well as to their ability to move to loading sites

rather than having to move the loads to the site of the aircraft, and their ability to drop forces with equipment and materiel when necessary, has caused helicopters to realize an important element in combat, which is flexibility in the use of war resources in combat.

F. Internal and external load capacity: light helicopters can carry six persons or less, intermediate ones 24, and heavy ones between 24 and 60; it is possible to compensate for the weight of some or all persons by hanging large-size equipment outside the body of the aircraft, and helicopters can drop loads by using beams, cranes or ropes without descending to the ground--a characteristic which has enabled them to operate on various types of terrain without any significant difficulty.

G. Helicopters are vulnerable to advanced anti-aircraft weapons and also to attack by enemy fighters, because they fly slowly. This makes them an easy enemy target and therefore it is necessary to realize local air superiority or to rely on surprise by using cloud cover, flying at low altitudes or making use of deterrent electronic equipment to thwart enemy radar.

H. Helicopters' balance is considered a source of anxiety since their center of gravity is high: their power transmission systems, overhead propellors and engines are above the center of the aircraft, and therefore flying helicopters for long periods causes the pilot fatigue, and bad landings result in destruction of the aircraft.

I. The costs of helicopters are high compared with other aircraft, and the transportation cost (per ton per kilometer) by helicopter is more than two or three times as great as that of traditional aircraft. In addition, helicopters require large repair and maintenance services, as they are mechanically complex, and therefore their use must be studied and evaluated with exceptional care and weighed against the benefits gained. However, the need for having large numbers of helicopters is underlined by the fact that they are used to save a large number of lives and consequently raise the morale of fighting men when losses are evacuated and early treatment is provided for them before battle wounds start to rot.

4. Categorization of helicopters.

Helicopters are classified in accordance with the nature of their work, as follows:

A. Communications helicopters

This is a light aircraft used for purposes of reconnaissance and correction of artillery fire in forward air command operations by forward air command officers. Nonetheless, it is in its capability to transport a limited load with a number of persons and casualties and it can be used as a dispatch station and radio booster.

This craft is distinguished by its solidity, because of its small size and its excellent resources. Because of its small size and high speed, it is difficult for hostile ground and air defense weaponry to bring it down.

B. Support aircraft

Precision in identifying and destroying the enemy's positions on all types of terrain, particularly hilly terrain thick with forests, makes support helicopters better than traditional ones, and their role is more effective in attacking hostile armored units, since these craft have the ability to carry different types of free missiles, guided missiles and machine guns.

These craft are distinguished by their relatively high speed when compared with other helicopters; therefore their opportunity for combat, disengagement and rescue is greater. The success of support helicopter operations is founded on two elements, the intensity of the fire directed at the strike force and the mobilization of the greatest possible number of helicopters for support missions; modern advanced sighting and firing equipment and forward radar detection equipment work to increase the effectiveness and combat ability of support helicopters and their influence over support operations.

C. Transport helicopters.

Transport helicopters generally are heavy, since they are basically designed to carry the greatest volume and the heaviest load possible in order to alleviate the burden of ordinary transport aircraft. This type of craft can carry close to 30 tons of equipment and materiel. This type of aircraft is also the most fragile and vulnerable to the enemy's anti-aircraft weapons, and its successful use depends to a large degree on the climatic situation and the nature of the operations theater in general. The method of landing and disposing of persons and equipment from helicopters is as follows:

First, holding to on the ground, in the event the ground is favorable and there is no hostile resistance.

Second, hovering at an altitude ranging from 1 to 2 meters, where materiel and equipment are thrown out and the persons jump out easily from the helicopter, if the ground is not favorable or there is a likelihood of hostile resistance.

Third, hovering at an altitude ranging from 10 to 15 meters because of certain obstacles. The lowering of people takes place by rope ladder and the equipment and materiel are thrown to the ground in special nets.

Planning for Helicopter-Borne Personnel Operations

5. During helicopter operations planning, it is necessary to observe the following considerations:

A. A high level of training for every aircraft crew and Popular Army force detachment.

B. Dominance by Popular Army forces of the drop areas specified in the operation, methods of mounting, descending, and bearing equipment and supplies, and knowledge of ground signals for guiding helicopters.

The helicopter crew must also absorb and understand the problems of ground units.

C. Performance of joint drills and exercises before starting actual operations.

6. Considerations for planning helicopter-borne Popular Army force combat operations are not essentially different from other movements, as long as the forces are trained in the use of helicopters in accordance with set operational contexts.

7. It is necessary to form a "joint task force headquarters," which will be directly linked to the higher command, in which Popular Army command staffs and assigned command officers, as well as helicopter pilot officers and an air strike officer, are represented. These headquarters will do the following:

A. Evaluate the strength of the enemy, study the nature of the area and determine the weather.

B. Specify the task and allocate the force necessary for executing it.

C. Calculate the air effort needed to execute the operation and at the same time alert the task force.

D. Set out the following plans:

First, the tactical ground plan (to study the ground plan with the ground support plan and the ground air support plan offered by traditional aircraft and helicopters).

Second, the drop plan, selecting a drop zone for helicopter forces in various areas, providing easy approach axes to the target.

Third, the air movement and transport plan, to select the most appropriate air passages and guidance points to control transport movement and their effect on anti-aircraft resistance in terms of location and transport and on the ground plan itself.

Fourth, administrative support to prepare loading lists.

Fifth, preparation of an alternate plan to make adjustments for unforeseen circumstances, such as a breakdown in communications, the enemy's adoption of unexpected conduct, changes in the weather, and unexpected hostile intervention in the drop zone.

8. After deciding on a final plan, freedom to execute its details will be left to the task force commander. This does not mean abrogating the freedom of action given him in maneuvering and selecting targets. He distributes the force which is to be lifted in the form of detachments while determining the number of craft it is feasible to use and the load capacity of each craft (which is influenced by a number of factors and must therefore be clearly labelled on the craft before embarcation) and making sure that all units have understood their pattern of distribution among aircraft, by allotting each detachment to a craft in accordance with the number of airlifts.

9. The elements in the force must prepare the following:

A. Cloth drop pieces.
B. Wind direction guides.
C. Colored smoke grenades.
D. Flare guns with a suitable amount of colored flare equipment.
E. A forward ground communications device to maintain contact with all types of friendly aircraft.

10. Upon arriving over the target, the force must prepare to disembark, in accordance with the following conditions:

A. Approach to the target and ordinary descent onto it, in case of an air transport operation, when the ground is favorable for descent and there is no enemy threat.

B. If there is a likelihood of enemy intervention in the drop zone, the air drop will be as follows:

First, the support helicopters will hover continuously over the target in order to observe existing enemy movement there and deal with him in the event he is firmly ensconced. Bombers and close support aircraft may be assigned to that and exits from the target must be given special attention.

Second, transport helicopters armed with rockets may fire missiles into the drop zones if there is a need for that.

Third, the apertures of the craft will be opened and the force's guns will be aimed at the target.

C. In the event a clash with the enemy is confirmed, assault by air will be as follows:

First, artillery will fire on the target zone before the time for landing, on condition that the artillery fire not cause the loss of surprise and that in addition it be coordinated with utmost accuracy when necessity dictates that fire be cut off and that all cannon muzzles be stilled a suitable period before the craft reach the target zone, with attention to the line of fire, determination of the direction of flight, and the subsequent approach of aircraft.

Second, the support helicopters will hover over the target to deal with enemy positions or all other sites where the enemy is suspected to be present.

Third, the transport helicopter apertures will be open and the guns of the force being transported will be ready to fire from them.

Fourth, the armed transport helicopters will fire missiles at the drop zone, then the force will disembark while the craft are hovering at an altitude of no more than 2 meters.

Fifth, the support craft will continue to strip the enemy and destroy him along the probable approach routes and will fire on zones which have been taken over.

11. Disembarking from the craft.

A. The signal to prepare to dismount will be given by the dispatch commander before the craft drops, at which time each fighting man will lean forward in his seat to make sure that his equipment is not entangled with the seat or the equipment of his comrade by his side. The technician in the craft will open the side door of the craft.

B. Upon receiving the signal from the pilot, the force commander will give the order to disembark by issuing the executive order "dismount."

C. The force commander will disembark from the craft first, followed by the fighting men seated to the left, then followed by the group on the right. The assistant force commander will be the last person to disembark from the craft, and he will be the one to give the signal for the craft to take off after he has ascertained that it is empty of all persons, weapons and equipment.

D. The fighting men will spread out in a state of air drop/air assault immediately upon disembarking from the helicopters and will rush as quickly as possible to the closest cover and begin observing in all directions.

12. Action after disembarking.

A. The first action the force commander will take immediately upon dismounting from the craft will be to head north, feeling his way, and guide the map with the objective of determining his unit's location vis-a-vis the target, then, once his unit has become completed, lead it toward the target.

B. Inform higher headquarters, contact combat bases and friendly detachments, and coordinate cooperation with them.

C. In the event the situation is favorable, provide cloth for the craft descent, determine the wind direction and appoint a guide to receive the other craft coming in.

Conclusion

13. People's war means fighting to crush the enemy materially and morally, smash his economic base and destroy his war resources until victory by using various means of combat, including helicopters.

14. Helicopters are marked by numerous characteristics, such as air mobility in unit combat operations, enabling them to fight in any location that requires their presence and the provision of fire support for these combat bases, in addition to flexibility in use and surprise of the enemy, which are two of the most important elements of victory in combat.

15. Helicopters have become the most effective means for helping the Popular Army convey equipment, ammunition and forces to combat zones in a short time. They require precise tactical planning, proficient planning and the constant rehearsal of work sequences in order to eliminate errors which might arise on arrival at the target or the fighting, in the event of transport by air, an air drop or air combat.

16. From the foregoing the importance of the use of helicopters in all operations in modern war, especially in the combatants' battle against the enemies of the homeland and the nation, is clear to us in a manner admitting no doubt.

Sources

A number of military journals.
A number of bulletins issued by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.

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USE OF POPULAR ARMY IN OVERGROWN AREAS DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 8, Feb 81 pp 152-156

/Article by Lutfi Kamal Ibrahim: "Fighting in Forest and Overgrown Areas"/

/Text/ Introduction

1. Combat in forests and overgrown areas includes the conduct of movements in areas covered with forests and dense vegetation in which there may be deep ravines, high ground and marshes.

2. Forests and overgrown areas constitute an exemplary area for guerrilla war, and the conduct of movements in such areas requires that the command have a high degree of innate innovativeness in order to cope with the problems arising from the climate, the nature of the area and the presence of dense forests.

3. Knowledge of the terrain is an important matter, and the commanders of Popular Army formations must obtain information related to it through prior reconnaissance. It is necessary that information on climatic and seasonal changes which frequently occur in the movement area continue to be acquired.

4. The complexities of combat in such areas can be overcome by good training, the preparation of careful plans and proper acclimatization.

Natural Characteristics

5. Herewith are the natural characteristics of forest and overgrown areas:

Climate

First, climate is the dominant element in combat in forest and overgrown areas, not just because of its effect on persons and equipment but also because of complications in the nature of the terrain itself.

Second, intense heat and excessive humidity affect radio equipment, artillery fire, leather equipment cases, food and other supplies.

Third, diseases and epidemics spread rapidly and individuals' resistance to these diseases declines, leading to listlessness, a decline in people's vitality and substantial sweating, which influence the morals of enemy personnel.

Fourth, after rains, the ground becomes slippery and river and stream water turns into torrential floods eliminating and wrecking roads.

B. /sic/ Natural obstacles

There is a likelihood that the following natural obstacles will be present in such areas:

First, primitive forests (winter forests).

These forests are essentially natural, since high trees are abundant in them along with certain plants and secondary shrubs which are generally in great density along the banks of streams. In most cases, these forests consist of high trees along with dense, prickly, twisted plants. In dry areas there are short thorny forests where visibility is limited and does not go beyond 50 meters; traveling on foot within them is usually possible, however.

Second, secondary forests.

These forests consist of old thickets whose tall trees were cut while the remaining trees were left to keep growing. The trees there are generally short and dense and in some cases consist of bamboo. It is difficult to advance within such forests and they require the opening of passages by the use of hatchets for cutting trees, making movement inside them difficult and reducing visibility to just 2 meters.

Third, swamps and depressions.

These are generally hard to pass through by foot or to navigate by boat, except for certain special channels in which weeds proliferate, and they are infested with diseases.

Fourth, rice fields.

Rice fields are considered the basic crop of most forest and overgrown areas; when there is level ground that can be irrigated, that is allotted to the cultivation of rice. These fields remain covered with water throughout the growing season and therefore cannot be crossed by vehicles with tires. Even the adjacent ground is unfit for traffic by vehicles with tires, since it consists of drainage areas. These cultivated areas can be suited for the passage of persons and provide only modest cover.

C. Means of communication.

First, regions covered with forests in which overgrown areas and swamps are widespread have few roads, railways, airports or major barriers. The roads which are easy to use are generally narrow and unpaved and most bridges are primitive and unsafe for traffic. Large rivers are generally crossed by causeways and in areas of hills and high ground creeks that exist to be crossed by fords or narrow causeways and the roads have sharp curves.

Second, the road system usually will not bear the traffic of heavy tires on wheeled vehicles or a flood of heavy, constant military traffic. Some vehicles with tires

have managed to operate off roads in specific areas only and at specific times only in specific periods of the year.

Third, waterways can be used as means of communication and they are relatively useful in spite of the resulting slowness of movement.

D. Diseases.

A. The nature of the weather and the proliferation of swamps, weeds and insects make these areas a great vortex for the growth of reptiles, insects and bugs and the spread of epidemics and diseases, especially such endemic diseases as malaria, diarrhea, typhoid and inflammations from worms.

B. The diseases and epidemics which generally spread among enemy troops inflict losses greater than those from combat.

C. In 1943, British losses resulting from epidemics as compared with losses from battle were at a ratio of 160 to one /sic/, and diseases and epidemics were one of the elements that accelerated the collapse of the Japanese army in the Pacific and southeast Asia in 1945.

The Effect of Forests and Overgrown Areas on Military Movements

6. Herewith are the factors which forests and overgrown areas dictate for the movement of the enemy's military units:

A. In forest and overgrown areas, scope for surveillance, fire zones and communications is limited.

B. They guarantee good concealment from air and ground surveillance.

C. Good roads are rarely common in such areas.

D. Forests and growth help the approach to areas close to military units.

E. Untrained units become nervous as a result of the vigilance and attention against surprise attack by guerrillas that is required. Guards constantly imagine that the scope for surveillance is slight and that the enemy is approaching them by stealth, and these imaginings increase the enemy's nervousness.

F. Movement by armor and on wheels is limited to narrow areas, visibility there is limited and the units are exposed to guerrilla ambush.

G. Forests and overgrown areas impose some limitations on artillery, such as difficulty of surveillance and the lack of feasibility of adequate areas for opening fire; it is difficult to destroy the enemy's fortified positions with artillery fire owing to the difficulty of keeping direct fire in play.

H. Radio range is reduced as a result of the effect of the barrier of dense vegetation and high trees.

7. General principles for liquidation.

A. It is necessary to clear out forests at the greatest possible speed. Speed requires that forests be surrounded by fire before starting the liquidation, lest the enemy be able to escape or his auxiliaries be able to enter the forests. Light machine gun detachments are the best means to ensure this objective.

B. If the forest is very dense, it is not in the power of the fighting man to examine more than 5 yards along the front. This portion must be surrounded by fire and the arrival of a greater force must be awaited.

C. Try to deduce what the enemy is doing inside the forest and where he wants to go, and try to drive him to the ground and spontaneously kill people who are in front of ourselves in order to destroy and surround the enemy force there.

D. Try to drive the enemy toward good combat zones in a single open area so that the task of light arms and automatic rifles will be very easy, and he will be eliminated and not given a chance to escape.

E. It is necessary to preserve a mobile reserve to cope with the enemy, who might save himself and flee. The best site for such a reserve is between the forest and the enemy's route of withdrawal toward his units, to cope with any force that comes to help the enemy and fail to give the enemy scope to intervene in the liquidation process.

F. It is necessary to establish a smoke screen in front of the forest to conceal the advance to the edge of the forest. Sixty-millimeter mortars and smoke grenades are the best means for creating a smoke screen, along with observation of the wind direction and adquate time.

G. The basic strategy of liquidation is to pin the enemy force down on the front and cut off his line of communication. At that point the enemy might resort to launching an attack to reopen his lines of communication or he will be compelled to withdraw, which will result in his undergoing big losses, especially in arms and heavy equipment, which are hard to evacuate.

H. Sites which have been well prepared can continue to resist, in fact must be taken over by being overrun.

I. The enemy's forward communications lines in forest and overgrown areas are vulnerable to hostile ambushes, and small ambushes are very effective in overrunning them.

J. Attacks on defensive areas situated close to the edge of the forest are like attacks on all prepared defensive areas; a nearby edge, or ground obstacle near which the edge is situated, is considered a target. If it is necessary to launch an attack on an area totally exposed to enemy surveillance and fire, it will then be necessary to do so under the cover of smoke or darkness. The methods of attack that are used are similar to methods of attack against a prepared defensive position.

K. Training in the context of group action is very important in overcoming the enemy that is present inside the forest, and it is necessary to train in moving rapidly from tree to tree, take cover from the trees that are spread about, closely observe the trees, woods and ground while advancing, avoid open spaces, and make the best use of the ground (field craft).

Popular Army Formation Raids on Enemy Bases

8. The Popular Army force is broken down into the following sections, for purposes of cleaning out a forest which has been isolated from the enemy:

A. Barriers: these consist of light machine gun detachments which surround the forest with their fire in order to interdict and kill anyone going into or out of the forest. The machine gun site must completely cover the flank allotted to it.

B. The liquidation team: this consists of two groups, which are assigned the task of liquidating and dividing the front up between themselves. Each group goes over the section allotted to it with a fine tooth comb. One team is called Liquidation Team One and the other is Liquidation Team Two.

C. The two support teams: this is a third group, broken down into two sections, each one belonging to a liquidation team, which it follows during the liquidation process at a distance to ensure contact between them. The first is under the orders of the group commander and the second is under the orders of the assistant. The task of this group is to support the two liquidation groups immediately upon request.

9. The sequence of action.

The following sequence will be followed in liquidation of a forest by Popular Army fighting men:

A. The liquidation force commander will observe and study the situation from a higher position in order to investigate the orders and coordinate the liquidation plan, observing the direction from which he wishes to liquidate the forest and the sites of equipment, mobile reserves, jumping off spots, camouflage, and the smoke screen site.

B. He will request a group of orders, and his verbal orders will be issued in the same sequence, showing the subdivision of his forces, their tasks, their positions and the method of liquidation.

C. The group commanders will summarize the orders to the barriers (machine guns) and they will move to occupy their positions. The mobile reserve will then move in order to occupy its positions, with the support of the barriers (the far barrier will move with the support of the two near ones) while at the same time the group commanders will issue their orders to the fighting men. These generally include the liquidation group commander's orders, a determination of the fighting men's tasks, a breakdown of the front among them, and a determination of the person in charge of raising the handkerchief (the signal).

D. A smoke screen will be set up, and the signal to advance will be given by the liquidation force commander after the smoke spreads out. It is not permissible to advance until the barriers and the mobile reserve have occupied their positions.

E. The persons conducting the liquidation will take cover in a regular line parallel to the edge of the forest which has been chosen as the first springboard for penetrating. The persons conducting the liquidation will enter along the same line on the right and left edge of the forest. It is necessary to examine every foot carefully, and the speed of advance within the forest will be at the rate of the slowest fighting man. Movement will take place from tree to tree and from fire position to fire position, and the signal will be given by handkerchief or white flag from both sides of the forest in order to ascertain the distance the liquidation groups have reached. When any part of the line of persons conducting the liquidation confronts resistance, everyone will take cover in regular order and open fire in the direction of the resistance, on condition that he learns the approximate position of the enemy.

F. The people conducting the liquidation will observe their front during the advance and will carefully examine the ground before them while observing straight progress within the forest and opening fire on every position which is fit to be a hiding place for the enemy.

Staying behind Enemy Lines

10. Forest and overgrown areas give unlimited scope for infiltration operations. The following methods will be followed in attacking the enemy's communications lines by Popular Army units.

A. Combat patrols composed of one or more groups which will attack the enemy's communications lines.

B. A force estimated at one or more combat bases which will set out from a fixed base. This base will be supplied by air, land or sea.

Conclusion

11. Forests and overgrown areas are considered exemplary areas for guerrilla war and combat by means of people's war. It is in the capacity of a few men of strong determination to impose a blockade on a large hostile force for a long time in such areas.

12. During any stage of attack or defense, it may happen that small groups of the enemy will hide in forests and overgrown areas cut off from the homeland for purposes of setting up ambushes, obstructing communications and affecting morale. Activities of this type are for the most part done by people who drop in by parachute and airborne units. Therefore all Popular Army fighting men must train starting with peacetime in methods of fighting in forest and overgrown areas and methods of cleaning them out of the enemy.

Sources

1. Staff College lectures.
2. Infantry School lectures.
3. Special Forces School lectures.
4. General observations from various military books and publications.

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VARIOUS STAGES IN PREPARATION FOR WAR WITH IRAN DESCRIBED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 8, Feb 81

/Article by Sa'id Hamu: "War Preparation by the Motherland"/

/Text/ In the name of God, the most merciful and all-compassionate: "Prepare for them whatever force and whatever cavalry you can, so you can terrify the enemy of God and your enemy with them." A saying of almighty God.

1. The war we are talking about here is war the motherland wages to defend its being and its existence. We do not mean colonial or aggressive war. Therefore, the purpose of the war is to protect the motherland from its enemies, whoever they may be.

2. Many writers have written on this important subject (war preparation by the motherland) and have focused their attention on some aspects of it, especially the military ones. However, they have not investigated other aspects with as much detail and attention. Therefore I consider it useful in this article to deal with these aspects, in particular the issue of civil defense and the psychological aspect. As for the aspects on which they have focused their attention, I will deal with them briefly in order to be of well-rounded use and complete the subject.

3. The nature of modern war, with the destruction visited upon towns and property and flagrant loss of life it entails, the suffering that befalls the countries it embraces, and the motherland's money, economy and powers that are drained away (not to mention its psychological and moral effect, when comprehensive weapons of destruction are used in it), all require a nation which has a strong army and economic, moral and scientific resources, believes in its life and independence, is aware of its responsibilities and is able to endure the circumstances of war and prepare and sustain its requirements however long the war may last. In order for the nation to be at the requisite level, take part in these wars and emerge victorious from them, it is necessary to prepare it in advance in peacetime. The degree to which it is prepared for war will depend on its human, military, scientific, financial and economic resources, its geographic and strategic position, the existence of allies for it, the intentions, plans and resources of its enemies, and so on. In order for the nation to be able to wage such wars successfully it must meet many requirements and perform many activities in peace and in war.

4. Requirements and activities which must be met and performed to prepare the nation for war:

The most important requirements and activities which must be met and performed, in peace or in war, to prepare the nation for war are:

A. Political Leadership, Management of the War and the Political Program

First, political leadership and management of war:

The political leadership of a country preparing for war must be equal to its responsibility, be competent, able and aware of its duties, interact with the motherland, give its people a superior example of national sacrifice and self-denial and share with it the bitterness of war and the elation of victory. This will result in getting the motherland to give it its absolute confidence, back it up, generously offer sacrifices of its dear sons and its wealth, exert effort, and endure difficulties in order to preserve its independence and its life, while, to the contrary, if it is not feasible for it to perform its national and domestic duties in war it will ultimately fail to lead the motherland and manage the war. The duties of the political leadership are very numerous and important: it is responsible for preparing the motherland for war in the military, political, economic, financial, agricultural, industrial, moral, publicity, and social senses and to sustain them during the war, as well as managing the war and leading the motherland to victory.

Second, the political program:

The political command follows a political program which will realize the nation's higher national interests and goals and will preserve its independence.

The political program includes the following:

1. Foreign policy: the government creates allies for itself among other countries and tries to increase their number. It concludes political, military and economic treaties and agreements with them and consults with them in order to coordinate their plans in all fields. Good relations and proper intentions must dominate relations between it and its allies.

In another area, it weakens the enemy in all areas; in particular, it strips him of his allies.

2. Domestic policy: the establishment of harmony and cooperation between the political leadership and the motherland is a very essential, vital matter because government in the modern era seeks the aid of the motherland in critical and strained times. The latter must defend the government (the political leadership) and itself. Therefore the government's domestic policy must be focused on close solidarity in the homeland and the unification of its ranks; otherwise, it will not be feasible for it to wage and manage war and lead the nation, and indeed will not be feasible for it to lead it in peace either. Thus it is apparent from the foregoing that the political responsibilities of a nation which wishes to preserve its being and independence in war are many, indeed are overwhelming. It must assume them boldly and carry out all their requirements, as a consequence of which it is necessary that the motherland form solidarity with the political command.

B. The Military Aspect (Preparation of the Armed Forces)

As we have mentioned above, many books have been written in detailed fashion on the manner of preparing armed forces for war. Therefore there is no need to repeat that, although I do consider that it is useful, indeed necessary, to mention it briefly. There is no doubt that the responsibility for protecting the motherland lies on the shoulders of its armed forces. Therefore, they must be prepared in peace, and their growth requires great continuing material and moral effort which depends on many factors, most importantly the human, economic, scientific, and political factors, the country's strategic and geographic position, the duty expected of the forces, the strength of allied countries, the scope of their cooperation, and finally an understanding of the enemy's intentions, plans and resources.

The armed forces derive their life from the depths of the motherland, as a palm tree derives its nourishment from the depths of the ground. Their fighting ability and the extent to which they can continue fighting depend on the support the motherland has given them (men, money, moral support and the other ingredients of war). The longer the war lasts, the greater the dangers become along with the armed forces' need for material, moral, psychological and spiritual support. Therefore, the nation must not stint its armed forces in men, money and so forth, so that they may be able to protect it. In another area, the armed forces must most bravely and trustworthily perform their duties inside or outside the country in accordance with the policy of the country and always enjoy the nation's good will.

For the armed forces to be able boldly to take part in war, they need the following:

First, command preparation: It is necessary to prepare the command on the basis of good officers who enjoy competence, bravery, and command intelligence and physical ability in the event of the creation of a form of military alliance with other Arab countries, since it will be necessary to create a higher command and appoint a general commander for these armies.

Second, war plans: The country's military command will set out military plans in peacetime to ensure the nation's goals, and these will be developed and coordinated from time to time in the light of both belligerents' development of weapons, military equipment, electronic equipment and so forth. It is natural that this development and coordination of plans will apply to the plans of the higher command of the allied countries as well.

This development depends on the existence of up-to-date, precise information on the organization, armament, and equipment of the enemy, increases in the size of his armed forces, and his plans and intentions. Whatever the case may be, it is necessary to specify the following points most clearly and carefully in the plan:

1. Areas of concentration. 2. Combat areas. 3. Remote and nearby strategic targets. 4. Axes of advance. 5. Preparation of alternate plans. 6. The pursuit of surprise and shift of the war to enemy ground.

Third, formation of a war cabinet: Shortly before the declaration of war, or at the start of the war, the government will announce the formation of a war cabinet whose task will be to administer the war, facilitate the activities and duties of the military command and provide all the requirements of the armed forces so that

they will be able to perform their war duties as thoroughly as possible. This cabinet will normally consist of the ministers of defense, the navy, air, planning, industry, trade or economy ministers, and any minister or other person who must be present in this cabinet.

Fourth, the plan for the call to arms: The military command will prepare a good plan for a call to arms in peacetime to apply during war. This will include the callup of persons able to bear arms in the country to the armed forces.

Execution of the plan for the call to arms (general mobilization) and performance of the massing of troops in the shortest possible time demand the provision of the necessary means of transport and the mobilization of the various media.

Performance of peacetime exercises for carrying out the call to arms will facilitate and expedite its execution in war. The success of the plan for call to arms depends on many things, most importantly:

1. A good plan for call to arms: this is modified from time to time in the light of newly arising matters on which it depends.

2. The performance of exercises in application of the plan for call to arms on appropriate occasions, the retraining of various new formations, and their participation in training and maneuvers.

3. The presence of a system of roads and railways and knowledge of their capacities and capabilities, along with indication of changes in their schedules.

4. The provision of means of transport necessary to move strategic units and formations to areas of concentration. This requires the performance of a survey to determine their numbers and types and /word illegible/ them and their notation in a register.

5. The provision of competent means of communication. It is clear that it is necessary to use radio and television systems for this purpose.

6. Preparation of uniforms, equipment, weapons, various forms of vehicles, spare parts for them, and so on, so that requirements may be met and some of them may be retained as a reserve.

7. Performance of a broad campaign of enlightenment both in peace and in war preparatory to applying the plan for the call to arms. It will be necessary to mobilize the media for this purpose.

8. The adoption of strict legal measures against people who fail to join their units.

9. The provision of subsidies for drafted ranks.

10. The appointment of competent staff officers to set out the plans for a call to arms, drill in the plans during peacetime and execution of them in war.

Fifth, armed forces training: It perhaps goes without saying that we can show that good training accompanied by good discipline and high morale are the spirit and foundation of the army and that that is a very important matter, indeed an important fact. Therefore it is necessary to stress this fact constantly and without letup so that the armed forces may reach a very high level of training in their fields of specialization.

Sixth, preparation of armed forces reserves: It is necessary to ready, store up and accumulate all the requirements of the armed forces so that they will be enabled to continue the war, however long it takes. The most important of these are the various weapons and their spare parts, such as materiel, various vehicles, airplanes and their spare parts, naval vessels and their spare parts, fuel (the nerves of war), technical equipment, electronic equipment, uniforms, special technical equipment for them, provisions, and so forth.

Seventh, air bases, airports and landing fields: War requires the preparation of the air bases, airports and landing fields used in the country in peacetime and it is necessary to increase the landing area for use in cases of emergency landings. It is possible to use appropriate streets as landing fields or temporary airports and thus it is necessary to take this into account when the streets are opened so that it will be possible to use them for that purpose.

The presence of trees in such areas greatly helps hide aircraft when air bases, airports and landing fields are built. It is necessary to observe the tactical, strategic defensive, technical and economic aspects and provide a radar system to cover every area of the country, and concealment and so forth should be observed. It is necessary to construct shelters for aircraft in air bases and airports starting in peacetime and it is necessary to provide telecommunications for them as well as terrain for landing.

These will be protected by allocating anti-aircraft, ground/air missiles and perhaps balloons, and ground protection will also be provided for them.

Eighth, naval bases and ports: Coastal countries construct naval bases, fortified harbors and ports required for their fleet and their naval vessels in peacetime. In constructing them, attention is given to tactical, strategic, defensive, economic and technical aspects (water depth, tides, the effect of wind, and the fitness of the coast for the approach of vessels) and the protection afforded by the nature of the coast (such as the bases at Iskenderun and Haifa: the nature of their coasts is exemplary protection for a naval base, danger threatening the country and so forth). On the basis, they are constructed in suitable sections of the coast and a plan is organized to defend them by the use of airplanes, anti-aircraft artillery, coastal artillery, missiles and land units.

It is necessary to construct shelters for ships in bases and guarantee their protection (these are included under protection for the bases). It is also necessary to link the naval bases, harbors and ports up to a telecommunications system; at the same time a radar system is to be constructed which will cover the area in order to observe enemy ships and airplanes.

Ninth, training members of the public: Before we finish discussing the military aspect (preparation of the armed forces) I consider it necessary to point out that preparing the motherland for war requires training a percentage of its citizens in light weapons and certain support weapons, as is the case here in Iraq. The political command has been proficient in its workmanship in issuing the necessary orders for training citizens and forming the Popular Army, which can be assigned

the task of protecting important targets and installations in the country, although it is considered the best auxiliary for maintaining and bolstering the armed forces with trained fighting men in war.

Training individuals of the homeland must not be confined to weapons alone; rather, it is necessary to train a proportion of them in such public service activities as first aid, firefighting, rescuing people from rubble, repairing water, electrical, gas and telephone line facilities, and so forth.

C. Preparing the Nation Economically for War (Mobilization of the Country's Economic Resources--an Economic Call to Arms)

First, modern wars require great economic and financial resources in view of their exorbitant costs, since they exhaust many of the nation's economic, financial and human powers. The cutoff of most sea lanes in wartime has a great influence on the economic situation in the country, since consumer resources, especially foodstuffs, machinery, equipment, weapons, materiel and other materials required by the nation and its armed forces, are scarce and some such materials (especially if the period of the war becomes extended) might change within the country and it might be impossible to get them from outside. This shortage will influence the nation's ability to continue the war and this will require a prior review of matters and the preparation of an economic and financial plan in peacetime, as it is necessary to prepare the nation in this sphere as the armed forces are prepared. Therefore it is necessary to form a higher committee and a number of branch committees of people interested and specializing in the study of the nation's economic and financial needs and resources and to set out suitable economic studies by conducting a comprehensive survey to ascertain the number of various factories and plants in existence in the country, their productive capacities and the possibility of expanding them and substituting the production of some of them, according to requirements. The committees will also perform a comprehensive survey of agricultural and livestock production, various sources of fuel and energy, their production volumes, and so forth. Thus the various amounts of national resources will be calculated, the motherland's requirements of the various materials it and its armed forces need during the estimated period of the war will be calculated, they will be provided and stored starting in peacetime, and materials which are not easily procured in the country, which cannot be procured from abroad in wartime, or can be procured but will not meet requirements, will be imported. It is necessary to store an appropriate amount of the materials the country and its armed forces require and import from abroad, such as a special reserve of materials which are likely to be cut off because of the disruption of sea lanes. The following figures and occurrences prove the importance of storing the materials required by the nation and the certainty that sea lanes will be disrupted:

Britain and the allied countries cut off the sea lanes to Germany, Italy and Japan in the last 2 years of World War Two. In another area, the materials Britain imported in the same war were very scarce because of the submarine and air war Germany had been waging against it. Its shipping losses came to 600,000 deadweight tons a month, especially in the first and second years of the war. The allies' losses in that war came to 14 million tons, while the ships that Japan lost in the same war came to 8.5 million deadweight tons. These figures show the difficulty of providing the nation's requirements from abroad in war. Thus it is necessary to import and store them starting in peacetime, before the winds of war blow,

especially weapons, materiel, medical goods, oil and foodstuffs. In this manner, the nation will be able securely and confidently to continue the war against its enemies.

Second, the financial aspect is strongly connected to the economic aspect of the motherland. Therefore it is necessary to take exceptional financial measures before and during the war. The Austrian commander (Montkukuli) said that what the management of war needs is money, then money, and, third and last, money.

D. Preparing the Nation Psychologically for War (The Moral-Spiritual Call to Arms)

The nature of modern war demands that the nation be trained in various areas in a manner which is no less than that of the armed forces, because it, that is the war directed against it, basically, has the goal of destroying the ingredients of its life and crushing its will. This requires a high degree of control which all members of the nation must posses. It alone will guarantee that the nation preserves its power to resist and its ability to continue the war until victory. This control is built on understanding and awareness. The nation must be aware of the duties required by the war for which the nation has basically risen up. Therefore it is necessary to direct its policy so that it will be able to wage war in a manner which will assure its continued life, and it must sacrifice everything for its armed forces, which are its sharp sword, its protective armor and its true sanctuary. Its life depends upon its war capability. This means that the nation will be able to continue the war, however long it may last, and that it will be able to endure its hardships, burdens and circumstances at and behind the front and be a nation persevering before the dangers threatening it, remaining strong and united in face of them, and overcoming them one after the other. The nation will not be able to endure in war unless it is united psychologically. It is psychological unity alone which will enable it to support its armed forces with the material and moral strength so that it may work in its behalf, in behalf of the nation. In the event of setbacks in war, it is the nation's psychological unity which alone will aid the nation with the strength with which it can continue in the war smiling and believing in victory.

The deprivation and scarcity of foodstuffs, the lack of some of them, continued air raids and hostile missile strikes against the nation, the proliferation of losses, fires, the destruction of towns (especially when the enemy uses weapons of comprehensive destruction), the launching of psychological and propaganda war, and so forth--all these phenomena and matters are characteristics of modern war and natural results of it. Therefore it is necessary that they not influence the homeland's psychology and morale and that they not divert it from its determination to continue the war. Indeed, it must endure all these critical circumstances, defend its life, and continue the war until it triumphs over its enemies. A conscious nation which wants to preserve its being and its independence must bear the sufferings and tragedies of war and sacrifice what is valuable and precious for its sake.

Mobilizing the homeland psychologically for war depends on many things, the most important of which we list below:

First, the media: The media are considered among the main instruments that participate in preparing the nation psychologically for war. They are not used just to guide the nation and its armed force psychologically but are also used in waging

the psychological and propaganda war the enemy has launched. They must also be used to fight tendentious rumors and therefore they must be properly directed to achieve the psychological coherence and unity of the nation, raise its morale, spur it on to offer sacrifices and bear the conditions of war and accustom it to a life of asceticism and deprivation. Among the most important media which must be mobilized in order to unite the nation psychologically are:

Radio agencies, television stations, movie theaters, plays, anthems, songs, music, books, magazines, newspapers, wall posters, publications, pictures, cartoons, the presentation of speeches, poems, directives and so on.

Second, making members of the nation understand that it is the enemy that started the war: It is necessary to make every member of the nation understand through the media (at the beginning of the war) that we are not warmongers, that we did not commit aggression against anyone, and that it is the enemy who started the agression against us for no reason. Therefore it is necessary for every member of the nation to forget ideological and personal disputes, grudges and so forth during the war, melt himself into the crucible of the nation, and exert all the personal power and resources he can at and behind the front for the sake of crushing the enemy and achieving victory. This kind of sacrifice is expected of individuals only if they are convinced that the political leadership has pushed the nation to war to defend its life (the life of the nation). The political leadership must rely on the nation, support its armed forces with all the nation's powers and resources, and during the war apply traditional laws, the most successful means for forging the nation and managing the war and policy.

Third, psychological war: When the enemy follows techniques of psychological war against a nation, he must be answered with the same techniques of psychological war.

Fourth, talking frankly with the nation about the truth of situations: It is necessary to talk frankly with the nation about the truth of situations, even if they are bad, but in a manner which does not influence morals and at the appropriate periods.

The issuance of successive statements on situations in brief periods negates the factor of security; on the other hand, the issuance of such statements over long periods paves the way for hostile fifth columns, the discontented and the vindictive to launch rumors which impair determination and defeatist propaganda which circulates in the ranks of the nation as fire circulates through dry grass, especially if the homeland is not alert and its armed forces have failed in a battle or on a front. Therefore it is necessary to take the necessary measures to prevent that.

Fifth, the elimination of grumbling and dissension: It is necessary to avoid anything which has the effect of creating grumbling and dissension among members of the nation and not to give despair free rein to filter among the ranks of the nation; in fact, it is necessary to do everything which will have the effect of unifying it, consolidating its ranks and uplifting its morale and its fighting spirit.

Sixth, the elimination of fifth columns: It is necessary to purge the ranks of the nation of hostile fifth columns, destructive persons, objectors, defeatists and vindictive people, and keep close watch on suspicious persons. The failure to take

measures against these people will give them an opportunity to infiltrate into the ranks of the nation, then weaken it so that finally it will be exposed to collapse and capitulation.

Seventh, the political leadership: In my opinion, this is to be considered the most important element in competent, sincere political leadership distinguished by bravery and determination, which places the higher national interest above every consideration and serves the nation sincerely and with self-sacrifice. It is this kind of leadership which creates psychological unity and victory for the nation and then is worthy of winning its trust so that it will place all its material, human and moral resources at the command of its political leadership.

E. Civil Defense

Wars in the modern era are not restricted to battlefronts alone. Rather, they encompass the hinterland of the country participating in the war and its inhabitants and territory, since (as is well known) it is in the capacity of enemy airplanes and missiles to strike any target lying in the remotest area of the country. Indeed, missiles can strike any target in the remotest areas of continents, even with nuclear warheads. Therefore it is necessary to take all requisite measures to lessen the effect of these weapons and reduce losses. These measures are known as civil defense. The measures and activities civil defense embraces in a country preparing for war are very numerous and are interconnected. It is necessary to carry some out in peace, while others are carried out in war. In general, civil defense includes the following:

First, defense of important targets: The defense of important targets is a task of the armed forces. Therefore, the military command must set forth an integrated plan to protect these targets in all areas of the country and the occupied areas of the enemy's country as well (if it is stipulated that they are to be occupied and used), and allocate the units and weapons necessary for protecting them. The degree and type of protection depends on the importance and nature of the target, the nature of the area surrounding it, the type and degree of the danger threatening it, its proximity to or distance from the field of action of enemy air and ground units, the range of missiles, and so forth.

It is necessary to devote particular attention to the protection of projects and factories of weapons of comprehensive destruction because if they are hit by enemy weapons that will not just mean their destruction but will also constitute a danger to the inhabitants of the area. Therefore it is necessary that these be constructed in areas that are remote and isolated from public roads and inhabited areas and that it be difficult to distinguish and hit them (nonetheless, they will be exposed to discovery and destruction by enemy missiles). Rolling hilly areas are very suitable for the construction of these. It is necessary that these important projects remain hidden. Important targets such as the following can be camouflaged: reactors; special plants for weapons of comprehensive destruction; various energy sources, in particular oil installations, refineries, fuel pumps and tanks; mines; generators; electric machinery and plants; special war plants and factories; dams and irrigation projects; airports, air bases and landing fields; naval bases, harbors, ports and ship shelters; radio and television stations; railroad stations and locomotives; tunnels; straits; important bridges and barrages;

government headquarters (the political leadership); armed forces headquarters, grain depots and storage areas for provisions; sample storehouses; main warehouses; hospitals; radar equipment systems; telecommunications networks; and so forth.

These targets may be exposed to one or more of the following hostile activities:

Ground raids, air strikes, air attacks, strikes by missiles (ordinary or nuclear), heavy artillery bombardment, nuclear-chemical-organic strikes, and acts of sabotage (activities of hostile fifth columns, discontented persons, saboteurs, grumblers and so on). Thus, the requisite units for protecting these target will consist of anti-aircraft weapons, airplanes and balloons, an appropriate infantry force (which can be bolstered by some support weapons such as mortars), armored vehicles (tanks, armored cars, armored personnel carriers), anti-tank weapons, various mines, barbed wire fences, booby-traps, anti-tank trenches, and so forth. Naturally a force and weapons will be allocated to all targets according to need. While it is not necessary to allocate part or all of the weapons mentioned above to each target, it will be necessary to provide a network of radar equipment to cover all areas of the country. It will be necessary to provide telecommunications systems for units assigned to protect these targets, assign the necessary officers for these, issue clear decisive orders and recommendations on opening fire and means for distinguishing between ours and enemy aircraft and provide them (the officers) with all feasible information on the enemy.

Second, passive defense: The activities and measures included under passive defense are many and important and require prior review of matters, organization of a carefully studied plan and exercise of the plan in sequence. Otherwise, the nation will sustain great, indeed critical, losses of life, property and vital installations in the country.

1. Preparation of shelters for the population: In order to reduce losses resulting from enemy aerial bombardment, missiles and long-range artillery, it is necessary to erect shelters to protect members of the nation. Constructing these for the inhabitants of all towns will require a long time, great effort and large amounts of money, and priority in their construction should be given first of all to major towns with a concentration of population because they are more exposed to air and missile strikes (especially if they are industrial) than other. In their construction, care should be given to put them in areas of high population density, such as areas where there are factories, plants, public markets, railway stations, mosques, schools, institutes, colleges, residential buildings, movie houses and other public places. The government will continue to build more of them, the more it is able to, especially since the population is constantly growing. Basements that are well constructed (with concrete) will guarantee good protection against air strikes; therefore, it is inevitable that the government will build shelters in accordance with a carefully studied plan and will not permit the construction of any building, factory, plant and so forth without a basement. It is also necessary to construct basements in government buildings, schools, institutes and so forth; on the other hand, it is possible to use underground train areas and tunnels as shelters.

2. Public services: In wartime, public services in a country are afflicted with heavy losses as a result of enemy air raids, especially if weapons of comprehensive

destruction are used; in order to ascertain the extent of the destruction which befalls towns and their inhabitants and installations as a result of war, and to ascertain the importance of public services, it is worth pointing out some examples of that as follows:

The atomic bomb which the American air force dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 cost the Japanese about a quarter of a million dead, wounded and afflicted and destroyed about 62,000 out of a total of 137,000 houses. The second atomic bomb the American air force dropped on the city of Nagasaki on 9 August 1945 cost the Japanese about 24,000 dead and 123,000 wounded. The air raids the German air force launched against London on 16-17 April 1942 cost the British 6,000 dead and wounded and destroyed a large number of houses. The air raids allied aircraft launched against the German city of Hamburg one night in 1945 cost the Germans thousands of killed and wounded and the destruction of a large number of houses. Because of the enormity of the losses and damage, various rescue and first aid units and technical workers were lost, and, for the first time, control over the public facilities in that city, which were not able to perform their duties until the following day. The importance of public services in wartime is clear from these terrible losses and this frightful destruction. Therefore it is necessary to prepare and form the necessary units to repair or replace destroyed sections and make up for deficiencies in various public service installations and equipment, because they are vital for the life of the nation and it cannot sustain its armed forces if it is not in a good, strong position. The most important public services are:

A. Electric power sources: It is necessary to repair any destruction befalling electric power sources or any part of them without delay, because any delay in repairing them will lead to a shutdown of factories, plants, transformers, electronic equipment, water projects, hosptial equipment, especially equipment for operations and other services, and so forth. Therefore it is necessary to prepare staffs and increase repair units, distribute them among important areas, and outfit them with the necessary means of transport so that it will be feasible for them to repair damage as soon as possible.

Burying electrical wires in the ground and constructing reinforced concrete buildings for electric turbines and plants are very important and necessary and must be attended to starting in peacetime.

B. Firefighting: Many extensive fires occur in various sections of towns (especially flammable targets) because of air raids, the activities of saboteurs and so forth. Therefore it is necessary to increase firefighting detachments, prepare firefighting machinery equipment and the necessary materials and distribute them (the detachments) among areas where it is most probable fires will break out. It is also necessary to increase water points (fire hydrants). The success of firefighting detachments in performing their duties will depend on speed of action, and it is possible to guarantee that by equipping the detachments with telecommunications equipment, having the individuals in them get to know well the areas of the town in which they work, providing them with firefighting equipment, especially specialized vehicles, and training them in them thoroughly. It is necessary to organize a mechanized firefighting system in every residential building, plant, factory, government headquarters and so forth.

C. Clearing out the wounded: Enemy air raids will result in the infliction of very great losses, which will be terrible in the event the enemy uses weapons of comprehensive destruction. This will require many hospitals, doctors, and paramedics, large volumes of various types of medicine and large numbers of air conditioned first aid vehicles.

The successful evacuation of the wounded depends on two principles, speed and precision. Therefore it is necessary to devote attention to these, although it will take the presence of first aid vehicles and medical detachments in areas remote from hospitals in order for it to be feasible to transport the wounded to the closest hospitals without delay and, in another area, to increase the number of guard pharmacies in wartime.

It is necessary to organize detachments of doctors and veterinary orderlies and enlarge veterinary hospitals to treat livestock when they are injured.

D. Water distribution systems: These systems are exposed to destruction and disruption by bombing, as is the case with the abovementioned targets. Therefore it is necessary to prepare staffs and form the necessary detachments for repairing the damage that occurs to them. The pipeline system should be buried at a good depth in the ground.

E. The sewer system: The sewer system, like other systems, is exposed to sabotage, at which point it constitutes a danger to public health. Therefore it is necessary to increase detachments for these and allocate vehicles for transporting them and carrying out their duties without delay.

F. Gas systems: For the above reasons, it is necessary to prepare the necessary detachments for repairing flowing gas lines as soon as they are exposed to damage, because gas, as is well known, constitutes a danger to the population, as it is a poison and is very inflammable.

G. The telephone communication system: It is necessary to bury telephone lines (cables) underground in order to protect them from being cut and from fires to which they are exposed from bombing and acts of sabotage. It is also necessary to prepare a necessary number of detachments to prepare damage and to supply them with the vehicles required to transport them quickly.

H. Construction of housing--the repair of bridges: It is necessary to form detachments of masons and specialists in order to rebuild houses which are destroyed by aerial bombardment as quickly as possible and to build housing complexes and erect camps to house refugees and people driven from their homes, while other committees are formed to repair bridges, destroyed barrages, railways and locomotives. Other detachments will provide clothing for refugees and the dispossessed, feed and house them, and supply them with the necessary furniture.

I. Repair of airports and harbors: It is necessary to form commitees of technicians and specialists to repair airports and harbors.

J. Handling bombs--bombs which have not exploded: It is necessary to form detachments to handle bombs and incendiaries which have not exploded or have timing devices. These detachments are usually allocated from the military engineers group.

K. Saving persons under the rubble: Formation of detachments to save individuals under the rubble, since dozens, indeed hundreds of people can be buried under rubble in the course of air raids. When nuclear waepons are used, thousands of people will of necessity be buried under rubble.

Speed in saving them is very important when many of them remain alive under the rubble.

L. Observing bombed out areas: Forming detachments to observe areas which are exposed to bombing in the desire to acquire information early related to air raids, strikes with weapons of comprehensive destruction, artillery bombardment, and so forth, so that it will be feasible to make a prior review of the adoption of the necessary measures, save the wounded, give them first aid, offer them aid, prepare various detachments to repair public service facilities that have been destroyed or to rebuild bombed-out ones, and so forth, as quickly as possible.

M. Zoos: Before war, it is necessary to dispose of the animals present in zoos, especially predatory and poisonous ones, by sending them to a friendly country which is not taking part in the war, by preparing locations and pens for them underground, and so forth. Otherwise, it is likely that they will emerge from their places and inflict unjustifiable losses on the population, which are in themselves to be considered a damage.

Third, issuing guidance recommendations to the nation: In order for the nation really to be prepared for war and to reduce losses through the enemy's hostile acts, and in order for everyone in the country to know how he must behave in emergency situations and when raids occur, it is necessary to issue it the necessary guidance recommendations by means of the appropriate media, as well as preparing them from other standpoints, so that each person will know what he is to do at the time. Matters on which the directives are issued are:

1. Action when an air raid or missile strike occurs or when the enemy bombards targets with long range artillery, and so forth.

2. Action when the enemy uses a weapon of comprehensive destruction (nuclear, chemical or organic weapons), and the method for providing aid to people who have been afflicted by them and conducting first aid on them. It is also necessary to issue directives on defense against napalm bombs and aid for people who have been hit by those.

3. Saving people under rubble.

4. Action upon observing a bomb or incendiary which has not gone off or has a timing device, mines or any other foreign body and the need to provide information on it at once, point it out and prevent inhabitants from getting close to it while it is being handled by the specialized detachments.

5. The observation of suspicious persons (spies), fifth columnists, saboteurs, and disgruntled people and means for dealing with them when they try to perform any act which is harmful to the interests of the nation or when set off rumors or propaganda with the goal of weakening the morale of the nation and its psychological unity.

6. Means for fighting fires.

7. Means for performing first aid on wounded and drowning people and people who have been injured by fire.

Fourth, warning drills: It is necessary to carry out warning drills from time to time in peacetime in order to train members of the nation and get them accustomed to war conditions and methods for carrying out their tasks during them. It is necessary to drill in first aid activities, evacuation of the wounded, firefighting, repair of railways and water, electricity and telephone systems, and so forth, thereby enabling them to ascertain the extent of the preparedness of detachments and staffs and their abilities to perform their tasks. At the same time, it is possible to ascertain the extent of cooperation between members of the nation and these teams. Warnings are given in two stages as the enemy aircraft approach:

First, the stage in which people are readied to move to shelters but continue with their tasks.

Second, the stage in which people leave their places of work and residence and go at full speed to the shelters, when the aircraft are approaching the target area in which these persons are working. At the end of the civil defense period, it is necessary to emphasize the following points:

1. Providing means of transport and telecommunications for detachments.

2. Allocating special distinctive uniforms (clothing) to each of the detachments that have been assigned by the armed forces, which will wear their official uniforms.

3. The need to have the members of the detachments master their tasks and take part in specialized courses starting in peacetime.

4. It is necessary to provide the necessary equipment, clothes, maps, materials, and materiel for detachments.

5. It is necessary to benefit from relevant courses and seasoned (original) detachments, in accordance with their areas of specialization. It is also necessary to benefit from materiel, equipment, and special vehicles belonging to the private sector to facilitate the tasks of the detachments, each within their field of activity.

6. It is necessary to prepare a suitable reserve of persons for each type of detachment, various vehicles, equipment, materiel, and other necessary materials, starting in peacetime.

N. Security measures: It is necessary for a country preparing for war to take all the necessary security measures, in peace or in war, to make the enemy's spies, fifth column and media miss opportunities and prevent them from realizing their goals, which are aimed at obtaining information on the nation, carrying out sabotage, spreading propaganda and setting out rumors with the objective of weakening the nation's moral spirit and psychological unity. These hostile activities

especially rumors and progaganda, have a bad effect on the nation; therefore it is very essential to take all preventive security measures to protect the nation from the evil of these people. We list the most important such measures herewith:

First, protection of important targets and sensitive points in the country and maintenance of constant surveillance over them.

Second, maintenance of surveillance over spies, fifth columns, suspicious persons, vindictive people, troublemakers, and grumblers, whose number normally increases in war because of economic crisis and the circumstances of war the nation is going through, preventing them from meeting and prosecuting people whose guilt is established with the utmost severity.

Third, censoring publications of various types and prohibiting the issuance of publications harmful to national security.

Fourth, imposing surveillance over movie theaters and radio and television programs and mobilizing them on behalf of the nation.

Fifth, issuing intensified orders and recommendations to prevent secret (especially military) information from leaking out of official departments.

Sixth, imposing control over the movement of trains coming from and going to neighboring countries. It is also necessary to have total control over border areas in order to prevent people from infiltrating through them and keep from giving them scope for making contact with foreigners (even if the neighboring countries are neutral), except in accordance with international laws and agreements.

Seventh, controlling switchboards and imposing surveillance over the telephones of suspicious foreign persons and bodies. It is also necessary to censor radio transmissions, especially in embassies, news agencies and so forth.

O. Organizing a resistance movement: In the event of occupation of part or all of the country by the invading army as a result of the weakness of the defending army, it is necessary to follow another method for resisting the occupying enemy. Perhaps the technique of guerrilla war is the best one for imposing all possible losses on the enemy, draining away his powers, irritating him, and making terror constantly dominate him. Therefore it is necessary to organize a carefully studied plan prepared in peacetime for resisting the invading army in occupied areas. This requires the formation of chosen, trained, well-armed detachments active in resisting the occupying army in accordance with a plan that includes attacks on the enemy's camps and columns, the kidnapping of enemy personnel, the setting of ambushes, the laying of mines, the detonation of explosives in public places which enemy personnel frequent, the destruction of facilities they use such as means of communications, barrages, fuel pumps, and energy sources, and any other action which will inflict losses on the enemy and affect his war effort, while avoiding inflicting big damage on the interests of the nation as far as possible. In this manner, it is possible to weaken the enemy, impose big losses on him, affect his morale and make him anxious, nervous and unable to tell when, where or how the resistance detachments' blows will be dealt. Resistance of occupation forces by the civilian population in the passive sense, the boycott of these forces and the refusal to interact with them are a matter of extreme importance. Passive boycott, added to the positive

activities of the detachments of the resistance, will increase the vexations and losses of the forces and as a result they may be compelled to withdraw from the areas they occupy, or from some of them. The German people boycotted French units which occupied the Ruhr area of Germany, famous for its industry, in the wake of World War One, and the units met with many problems in managing the affairs of this area which as a result compelled them to withdraw from them. One should bear in mind that the German nation was in a very bad living and economic condition, which reached the point of starvation, but boycotted the French army of occupation in spite of all that. This is how a nation which wants a free dignified existence must act.

P. Administering occupied enemy areas: If the nation's strategic plan is aimed at occupying enemy territory, that will require the organization of a plan, starting in peacetime, which includes the preparation of staffs of political, administrative, military and technical personnel and assigning them to manage the hostile areas, towns and projects it is intended to take over when war breaks out so that they may dispose of and run the affairs of these areas. These measures are considered vital, planning must be made for them before war, and it is necessary to give the people appointed to administer these areas broad powers and issue clear, frank orders on them. It is also necessary to allocate a necessary number of security, intelligence and police personnel and allocate a suitable force for the purpose of controlling these areas and guaranteeing protection in the area. To facilitate the administration of it the occupied area is to be divided into sectors, each of which will be allocated to the people needed to run it, and committees will be formed from these staffs to organize matters related to the war economy and to set out plans for taking over the resources present in the area, while a special committee of experts is formed to collect surplus foodstuffs (if the situation so requires).

This issue enjoys the attention of major powers which desire to occupy the lands of countries adjacent to them. Hitler, the chancellor of the German Reich during World War Two, appointed the specialists necessary to administer the Russian area of the Ukraine before the Germans invaded it and appointed the most important persons to administer this area, such as Himmler (head of the Gestapo), Reichsmarshal Goering (head of the air force), Rosenberg (the innovator of Nazi principles and racist theories), and so forth.

Making a success of the administration of occupied territories depends on many things, the most important of which are:

First, the provision of detailed, accurate information on the areas to be occupied, especially information related to parties and various political movements, their leaders, the psychological state of the people, and knowledge of their customs, traditions, religious beliefs and so on. This information is to be obtained and coordinated in peacetime.

Second, knowledge of the volume of agricultural production and grain in storage in the area to be occupied.

Third, knowledge of the number of various factories and plants, the special function and capacity of each, the possibility of increasing them and changing their type of output, and preparation of the workers needed to operate them.

Fourth, the existence of a plan for the road and railway system, their capacity and their type.

Fifth, provision of the inhabitants' requirements, especially necessary foodstuffs, as far as possible. It is also necessary to strip them of their money and moveable and immoveable property only when the public interest truly requires that.

Sixth, appointment of competent, chaste, sincere persons assigned to administer the occupied area.

Seventh, proper treatment of the population. The inhabitants of the Russian areas the German army occupied in 1941 went out to greet the victorious soldiers (the Germans) when they crossed the Russian borders, but they quickly changed from an obedient population to a harsh enemy which waged guerrilla war against the German army, and that cost the Germans dearly. The reason for this lies in the harsh treatment with which the German army dealt with the civilian population, while Field Marshal /von/ Runsted, commander of the German armies responsible for the defense of Western Europe in 1944-45, walked about in the streets of Paris with no one to accompany him except a companion; he had issued strict orders to his armies to deal with the French most kindly and in a genuine spirit of chivalry.

Summary: The process of pushing a nation into war is not an ordinary, transitory one. It is a very serious one and has broad dimensions and horizons and decisive results, as it determines the nation's destiny. This requires that it be prepared for war in all fields before it is pushed into the furnace of destructive war.

In this article, we have managed (we believe) to present a detailed idea of the importance of and need for preparing the nation for war, and the many activities, broad measures, unremitting, continuous efforts and carefully studied, detailed plans which preparation for war requires, for action in the fields of: politics, military affairs (preparation of commanders, plans of movement, formation of a war cabinet, plan for a call to arms, training of armed forces, training of members of the populace, preparation of requirements for the armed forces, air bases, airports, landing fields, naval bases, and harbors), economics, psychological matters, civil defense, defense of important targets, passive defense, public services, security measures, organization of a resistance movement and administration of occupied enemy areas. Execution of some of these activities and procedures will start in peacetime while others are executed in war. It is natural that winning a war depends on the degree to which the nation is prepared for it. It is not possible to complete preparations and ready a nation for war from all aspects unless it is psychologically united, its ranks are closely drawn, it is sure of its political leadership and it believes in its rights. At that point it will be able to prepare itself completely for war, then wage it against its enemies confident of victory and snatch victory from them.

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WRITER DISCUSSES USE OF VEHICLES IN MODERN WAR

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/Article by Muhammad Rahumi Ahmad: "Mobile War"/

/Text/ Foreword

Many military thinkers believe that the Zionists' victory in the June war may be ascribed to their forces' superiority in the arts of mobile war and to the fact that they were distinguished by speed, mobility and good cooperation between ground and air forces.

This type of war has a long history. The use of horses by man in combat is of long standing; they were used by Alexander, Gengis Khan, Hannibal and so forth. The victories of these leaders were marked by characteristics of speed and mobility.

The victories of the Germans in the first 3 years of World War Two enabled them to reassert the value of vehicular movement. They used tanks in very large formations which can overcome machine guns and anti-tank weapons and play a big role in deep penetration movements through fruitful cooperation with the air force in striking the heads of columns and bridgeheads.

Military scientists have developed this type of war, which is based on the existence of modern armies that are concerned with advanced training and the force of arms, while preserving this force's mobility so that it will be able to use large armies. Among the people who have called for such a development are Sieck of Germany, Lidell Hart and Fuller of Britain, and DeGaulle of France. In their memoirs they have relied on an advanced technological and industrial force which is capable of supplying armies with the most modern weapons.

The Goal

A statement of the importance and requirements for the success of mobile war: I will discuss the subject under the following headings:

A. The historic development of mobile war.
B. The nature of mobile war.
C. The importance of mobile war.
D. The demands of mobile war.

E. The relationship between the Israeli-Arab war and mobile war.
F. What must be done in the field of mobile war as far as the Iraqi army is concerned.

The Historic Development of Mobile War

The technique of war among ancient peoples was simple and organized. It took place on a limited area and at that time there were no principles of war on which people could place reliance in combat. Their weapons were axes, bows and arrows and swords; some groups would raid others.

The art of war continued to develop. Horses were used in war; Alexander the Macedonian was proficient in the use of horses in his wars, making the Macedonian army able to move and sweeping over a great segment of the world. The battle of Irbil was just clear evidence of his innovativeness in this art of war. In this battle, which took place between him and Darius, the King of the Persians, Alexander used the tactics of an oblique advance, which was a successful maneuver in surprising his enemy. The penetration movement which he performed has also been the object of the amazement of commanders in the modern era. Alexander also used the cavalry as a strike force in all his battles, as modern armies now use armored units in their battles.

Genghis Khan's armies were made up of cavalry alone (except for artillery and engineers, whose equipment was carried by vehicles). There was no trace of infantry in them. They were broken down into three categories, the first comprising suicide companies whose task was to open combat, the second comprising lightning companies, which were heavy cavalry whose task was to infiltrate into the ranks of the enemy and exploit victory, and the third consisting of light companies whose task was to cover both sides and engage in pursuit. Genghis Khan devoted great importance to communications behind the cavalry, guaranteeing communications between the formations on the one hand and the army headquarters on the front and the higher war council on the other.

Genghis Khan used techniques of mobile combat, which was unknown to everyone and has remained the focus of study and comment for many long centuries. To Genghis Khan, the vital element was mobility, which he achieved by making his forces totally homogeneous. He considered the horse the best military vehicle of the time.

Cavalry was used by the great commander Hannibal in the most terrifying fashion. His wars were marked by characteristics of speed and mobility. The battle of Nisino was only one expression of cavalry war in which Hannibal made military use of cavalry, benefiting from their mobility, which enabled him to cross the Alps and sweep across Etruria.

Between 1546 and 1610 the Germans became famous for the use of cavalry in their battles, especially in movements of surrounding flanks and pursuing their enemies. This type developed totally in the time of Frederick the Great and the issue of orienting great forces against the weak side of the enemy in battle became one of the basic rules of strategy in the 19th century, when Frederick the Great used mobility as a basis for his technique in war, after turning Europe's riffraff and rabble, who had no contact with horsemanship, combat and training, into a military elite of incomparable skills.

If we look closely at the war of 1914-1918 from the tactical standpoint, we will find that it represented a development from wars of dense human concentrations to wars of combat machinery (although it has been considered a trench war). While increasing numbers lead to rigidity of defense, mechanical vehicles lead to movement, and movement means an increase in offensive power. This fact was well known between 1875 and 1913; nonetheless, the big powers piled up artillery and rifles in order to made a sweeping attack, applying Frederick the Great's statement "Winning means advancing." If they had understood the meaning of Frederick's statement, they would have concentrated on internal combustion vehicles.

The tank was used for the first time in the battle of the Somme, September 1916; the tank embraced all the characteristics of protection which fortified positions provide and in addition is a mobile offensive force bearing destructive field artillery. Therefore its appearance between 1916 and 1918 was a revolution in the art of war.

In the battle of Cambray, in February 1918, tanks were exposed to great losses from field artillery fire when the summit of (Vellixier) was attacked. This provoked an attempt to organize cooperation between assault tanks and the aircraft hovering overhead. The attempt was a success and the war ended. As soon as the war ended, this cooperation within the British army came to an end, but it appeared in the German army; the German commanders devised the tactic of assault aircraft.

In World War Two, speed was the basis of everything that took place, speed in the penetration of defensive lines and speed in the deployment of the offense within the lines. German strategy in this war was distinguished by entailing organized mechanized war over a broad scale. The Germans spread terror and dismay in the French villages, raided railroad stations, cut off telephone communications, and paralyzed the communications and command system. It was very strange to imagine the void the Panzer divisions left behind themselves.

The French view of war was old and obsolete. The mentality of the Maginot line was implanted in people's minds during the war, while the British, in their turn, were not provided with mechanized equipment.

Thus the Germans took their adversaries by surprise at the start of World War Two by applying new techniques of war that relied on surprise, speed and cooperation among different forces. They called this mobile war, swept across many countries in Europe and terrified the world with their victories in the first 3 years. In another area, France and Britain showed their lack of interest in the new elements of combat and were dominated by a comfortable notion of defense. France sought shelter behind the Maginot Line and Britain stood behind the barrier of the English Channel, while we see Hitler building roads and supplying a communications system in order to allow the movement of his forces to increase. Gen Fuller, the British writer, predicted that the Maginot Line would be France's grave, since he found the key to defensive and offensive operations in speed and mechanized movement and considered that the defense of France ought to have been a mobile defense of the area--a mixture of maneuver, organized fire and the use of land in the desire to destroy the enemy. However, the French defense was complacent. The reasons for the defeat of France were:

A. The failure to implant mechanized war in the minds of commanders.
B. The absence of unity in command and unity in thinking.
C. Their theory of war was old-fashioned and obsolete.
D. The air force did not aim at purely military targets like bridges, mobilization areas, airports and so on. Rather, it aimed at striking at towns and civilian targets.

By this victory, the Germans managed to restore value to mobile movements, using large tank formations with organized air support, and managed to overcome such weapons as machine guns and anti-tank weapons. They penetrated defensive positions and reasserted the importance of mobile war after it had been neglected for a long time. Thus we see that the major countries gave great attention to scientific aspects, especially as concerned military science, in order to come up with the most modern weapons (the scientific developments which took place in war equipment and materiel in the past quarter century have had a big effect on military thinking). The belief prevailed that mechanized equipment helped benefit from them and that scientific improvements gave as much as they took. Modern mechanized armies acquired characteristics of firepower and mobility; at the same time, administrative requirements added to the burden of the fighting sectors. Perhaps the sole difference between the wars of the past and the present is the fact that modern wars are mechanized. Small segments of modern mechanized armies have been able to cover a distance of 100 kilometers a day in advancing or retreating, while armies in the past could not cover a distance greater than 15 kilometers per day.

The Nature of Mobile War

Mobile war is a complex of efforts on the part of man and the close interconnection of forces and every type of weapon. Karl von Klausewitz (a Prussian commander) defined war by saying "It is a conflict between interests which can be resolved only by blood. By that blood alone is war distinguished from other forms of conflict for survival. It closely resembles commerce, which is also a clash between human interests."

Ferdinand Foch, author of the book "Principles of War," considers that as with construction engineering war is part art and part science. It is not necessary that a work of construction just be imposing; its beauty is contingent on what it entails. It is, however, necessary that the work of construction be subject to the laws of mechanics and the weight of bodies, which is a science over which there is no argument. The scholar Dr Gustave LeBon defined war by saying "War is conflict which flares up between two countries to obtain political objectives and economic benefits by the force of arms." Klausewitz defined it as a political means to acquire certain ends, while Dr Sami Haninah, a professor of general international law, defined it by saying that it is any conflict which occurs between the armed forces of two or more countries if one or both have the will to end the orderly relations which exist between them. In the book on military service, war is defined as the final political means for protecting the life of a country and guaranteeing its existence while the Arab Lexicon states that war is combat between two or more countries. Taha al-Hashimi defined it as a law of existence and the battle for survival which have dominated the simple since the time of creation, and the Europeans call all movements, be they tactical or strategic, war or military activity. However, they apply the term "war" to movements which take place between the massing of forces to engage in combat and the conclusion of an armistice, while

they apply the term "military activity" to activities which take place between the declaration of a general call to arms and the conclusion of peace; the period of war is part of this military activity. From the above definitions, one may conclude that war is an end which serves to guarantee the objectives of the nation, which can be realized only by means of war after all ordinary methods have failed to do so.

All definitions are in agreement on the point that war, however expressions might differ, is a means by which a nation is enabled to achieve its wishes and goals in the shortest, most violent way.

Mobility

As regards the word vehicle, the Arabic Lexicon defines that as a mode of conveyance which moves by mechanical means in order to carry passengers, goods and everything that requires transportation, while in the book "The Auxiliary" the definition of vehicle is a familiar mode of conveyance with which people proceed to progress and it is also a conveyance moving with a motor that operates by means of gasoline or various types of fuel and generates the power to draw the conveyance along and run it at great speed.

The Relationship between War and the Vehicle

From this one may conclude that there is a very strong connection between the word "war" and the word "vehicle." War is combat taking place between two parties or countries which is accompanied by rapid mechanized movement, movement by means of horse as used by Alexander, Genghis Khan, Hannibal or others, or movement by means of modern equipment such as armored vehicles, jet aircraft, and so on, or equipment used by the Germans in the war in North Africa or World War Two.

Field Marshal Rommel was an innovator in the use of this type of conflict and he achieved the greatest of victories, which will be remembered throughout the ages in spite of the numerical and mechanized resources that were at the disposal of his adversary.

The Zionist entity made use of this kind of conflict in its war against the Arabs on 5 June 1967 and was good at it.

This type of war depends on mobility and firepower derived from total cooperation among all military classes, be they on land or sea or in the air.

Movement, which has accompanied war and become a part of it, has paved the way for the party using it to ensure one of the important principles of war, which is that of surprise through rapid movement in mobilizing and using force at the decisive point. Mobile or mechanized war is a war of rapid movement aimed first at eliminating the enemy's fast-moving mechanized equipment. It is distinguished by the following:

A. Great abundance of fire.
B. The ability to maneuver.

The introduction mechanical engines into armies has multiplied their mobility and power rapidly to mobilize and has increased their flexibility and consequently their ability to surprise and take the initiative. Enemy countermeasures have generally come about slowly.

The Importance of Mobile War

The pressures which modern weapons have imposed have made a shift toward mechanization in armies very essential if these armies are to make any movement at all. The war we are faced with has become more complicated, since the art of war has become firmly linked to science from all standpoints.

Wars have been totally affected by industrial and scientific development and the spread of general education; the acceptance of the era of mechanized war has been affected by the power of the people, as was seen in the wake of the wars of Napoleon the First.

As wars took place, they proceeded to evolve. Gunpowder appeared, lead appeared, excavation works and fortifications were used, mobile defense made its appearance, movement from place to place came to resemble a tortoise shell, and the tank emerged during this period, causing a revolution in the art of combat. Aircraft became a giant instrument of war and by cooperating with tanks managed to carry this revolution a great distance, in a manner which had not been witnessed throughout all the stages of military history. Improvement in all the instruments of combat continued at bewildering speed with the rapid progress in civilization, and modern armies came to possess the capability for mechanized combat characterized by speed and mobility.

Today's armies possess tremendous firepower and the mobility which modern vehicles, airplanes and the scientific innovations which have been introduced into weapons used in the tactical arena, as well as other equipment, have guaranteed. They have opened new horizons before modern armies to embark on limited wars which are distinguished by exceptional speed and firepower. For this reason we see that among the ingredients of mobile war are:

A. Mobility

Mobility, of the tactical and strategic types, is a vital factor in winning victory in war because it is the means for achieving a mobilization of scattered forces at the point of impact by the most economic means.

Mobility in World War Two made it possible to use great force anywhere without significant delay. It contributed to the attainment of security. There occurred the preparatory air raids launched by aircraft carriers in the Pacific preceding amphibious landings for the purpose of destroying Japanese aircraft which would otherwise have been sent to defend the external point being assaulted. One can ensure mobility by the following means:

First, movement by air. It is possible to transfer the units of an entire division in a few hours.

Second, movement by water. Water equipment can in specific circumstances be the best means for insuring mobility.

Third, movement by land. Here it is possible to make use of means of land transport, mechanized armored vehicles and all other equipment.

The following principles of war (resistance, surprise, security, economy of force and cooperation) can be realized only by vehicular movement carried out on land, whose central feature is mobility. Alexander's wars were distinguished by mobility, which was a major factor in his victory over Darius, the king of the Persians, about 2,300 years ago.

B. Firepower.

The firepower accompanying mobility is considered a major, important ingredient in mobile war. One can ensure such power through total cooperation among the arms of ground, air and sea forces in order to decide any battle by mobilizing this auxiliary force at specific places and times. Silencing fire in the field of combat is considered one of the most important elements affecting the morale of troops, which is generally at a high level in the party which uses it in an effective manner and at a low level in the other party.

Firepower has great effect in guaranteeing good maneuvering. Firepower is considered the mistress of combat, and there is no doubt that battles are won by fire and movement. The goal of movement is to carry the fire through to the most secure positions of the enemy in order to affect him and destroy his morale. There cannot be too many projectiles in any battle; it is of little importance whether they are launched by artillery, missiles or recoilless weapons since the purpose in all these instruments is the same, to drown the enemy in fire. It is not necessary to launch these projectiles on the ground either; sustaining the rate of use of firepower against decisive targets of the enemy will eliminate his resources, cause him to lose his balance and consequently will lead to collapse.

C. Speed.

Speed is considered one of the elements aiding the effectiveness of mechanized forces in transforming conditions on the field of movement. This effectiveness has also led to expanding the field of movement, especially in the hinterland.

The introduction of motors into armies has multiplied their mobility and flexibility and has increased their ability to mass at the desired speed.

Speed is considered one of the most important elements in surprise and a necessary condition for offensive action. Slow forces cannot launch an attack and expect that it will succeed; indeed, in their totality, they cannot be an adversary of value. By speed or deftness of movement I do not mean rapid movement--I mean the ability to act with greater speed than the enemy has anticipated. The factor of speed has increased with the development of technology and military science and has come to be characterized by flexibility, which means material deftness of movement, high intellectual and moral ability and a high competence in quick acclimatization to the field, in accordance with the extreme speed of changes in combat situations.

The Demands of Mobile War

The development of arms and equipment and the devising of new combat methods have played a major role in preparing this sort of war. The modern tactical notions arising from the design of modern weapons and equipment are to some degree close to a general conception of what the situation in nuclear combat will be. The techniques of mobile war impose the following demands:

A. Organization.

First, mobile war does not take place unless it is accompanied by deep penetration movements that make it possible to pass beyond peripheral elements to aim at the command or conduct a maneuver aimed at severing the enemy's lines of communication and destroying his supply bases. This can occur only if there is mobility and the factor of speed, fortified by great firepower.

Second, modern armor and air power are considered classes which give a more complete dimension to this type of war. Although other factors and groups play a big role in the prosecution of this kind of war, the air organization plays a major role in dominating the field of combat through first strikes, by taking the initiative and paralyzing the enemy air force so that ground units can carry out their task as thoroughly as possible.

B. Armament and equipment.

First, air power.

In modern war, air power plays the main role in getting ground units to perform their tasks in order to reach their objectives; it also helps the ground forces by transporting some of them to the battlefield and guaranteeing air superiority over the area of movement as well as providing direct support in combat, carrying out transport activities within the combat area and guaranteeing a system which can be relied upon for forward supply. Air power is also used in operations of evacuating the sick or wounded. Air power also plays a great role in deep transport movements. Therefore it is necessary to take care to establish tactical air forces to support ground units.

There are views and theories on the use of air power. Among them are people, headed by the Italian general (Gillo Doppa), who believe that air power must be organized as a deterrent force in order to eliminate the enemy's resources in a decisive fashion and wrest victory by itself. There are people who believe that it is necessary to balance its organization in order to use it as a support force for land movements; foremost among proponents of this view is the British general Fuller. Past experience has proved that both theories are of importance in war. Destroying the war machine in the enemy's support area in depth and crushing the morale of enemy personnel are basic matters, and supporting ground forces and enabling them to help us with airpower are indispensable matters.

Second, armor.

Activity on different types of ground requires a suitable group which can guarantee rapid movement on such ground. Armor is the group which can ensure this goal and

transcend the obstacles ground forces encounter when they pass over such ground. Modern war requires this sort of equipment and in addition guarantees a strong position capable of destroying hostile armor and armor distinguished by light weight and great speed and movement.

Third, infantry.

For us to be able to make the infantry group capable of keeping abreast of the activity of armor in mobile war, it is necessary for us to mechanize it through the use of modern transports which guarantee fruitful action with armor and mutual support. This type of equipment is considered a basic requirement of mobile war, enabling us to achieve a deep thrust. We must also provide the fighting man with personal equipment which will be light and portable but will not affect his physical capability.

Fourth, artillery.

Artillery, as a mechanism, cannot keep abreast of mechanized cavalry and armor while operating off roads; therefore, in order for us to be able to guarantee fire support for units, artillery must move by itself so that total cooperation will take place in fire support over the broadest range.

Fifth, engineering.

Engineering is an important army group. Thus it is necessary that this class fulfill its duty as thoroughly as possible, in order to keep up with the groups mentioned above, by making it an armored engineering force capable of keeping up with the war activities of the other groups.

C. Competent leadership.

Even if the element of mobility is present in modern war, a very important element is still required without which one cannot insure victory, and that is the element of leadership.

All commanders and military thinkers agree that armies will not acquire victory unless their forces are provided with competent leadership. Thus the element of command is firmly connected to high morale, firm discipline, advanced training and good equipment and armament, so that we can ensure the basic goal, which is victory. Competent leadership is considered one of the most important elements in raising morale and strengthening the spirit of discipline. The importance of superiority of leadership is apparent in particular when the two belligerent parties are equal in terms of morale, discipline, training and armament. In this case, the will of the opposing commanders stands out and in this case victory is contingent on the personality of the commander. History is full of clear evidence of the great role leadership plays in achieving victory. Hannibal enabled the Carthaginians to triumph over the nation of Rome and the Arabs were victorious though they were smaller in number than the Persians and Romans when Khalid ibn al-Walid commanded them. Had it not been for the genius of Rommel, the German victory in North Africa in 1940-41 would have been impossible.

D. Training.

Modern war is in great need of advanced training, physical fitness and exceptional skill in the use of modern weapons and equipment.

Training is an important element in achieving the demands of modern war, and this is achieved through individual and group training curricula. Joint exercises also have a great effect in reaching the requisite level in training.

E. Administrative training in mobile war.

Modern war is developing rapidly and is changing from moment to moment, especially with the use of nuclear weapons and missiles. Therefore, sound administrative planning, control of administrative affairs, and the adoption of sound, decisive, quick decisions effectively help win victory. Indeed, management of combat from the administrative aspect might be the basic element in winning a battle. The real stage of planning to prepare supplies and reinforcements must start in peacetime. It is an important stage in outfitting armed forces to enter the operational stage. Peacetime means before the battle and planning during the preparatory battle and the operation itself.

F. Intelligence.

Intelligence agencies have been created to help commanders achieve surprise and protect them from enemy surprise by obtaining information on the enemy, examining it, verifying it, arriving at useful conclusions, then preventing the enemy from obtaining conclusions concerning our units. Frederick the Great said "If it is always feasible for us to have a chance to learn of the enemy's intentions before he embarks on them, we will always prevail over him, even if his force is superior to ours." Klaus Vietz said, "The essence of the measures taken in war and the activities which go on in war are the information and news received regarding the enemy."

The pursuit of intelligence in mobile war requires ability, knowledge, technique, boldness, skill and competence. It also requires the preparation of groups which might exceed the force of the army in number and must be of high intellectual ability. Intelligence is the continuous effort to penetrate the fog which hovers about war and diplomacy so that we can sketch out plans for tomorrow in full confidence. This effort will give us room to move.

G. Reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance is considered an important element in ensuring surprise. The fundamental rule is that effective, constant reconnaissance takes place at all times, night and day, and in all directions. All classes must conduct reconnaissance during combat and concentrate in particular on points of contact, flanks, and other important targets which have a relationship to our future plans or the enemy's probable intentions.

H. Communications.

In mobile or modern war, communications are considered to be direct factors of success in any battle which can be waged in rapid mobile war. If radio, television,

telegraph and telecommunications equipment, visual equipment, messengers, long-distance communication and code are not at a high level of competence and extremely up-to-date, the result will certainly be failure.

The Relationship between the 5 June War and Mobile War

On 5 June 1967, the Arab nation was faced with an organized, precisely planned Zionist imperialist aggression aimed at all our armed forces. The aggression started with a rapid, lightning air attack on the air bases and airports of the United Arab Republic; then /the enemy/ moved the weight of his air forces against the west bank of the Jordan River. After the West Bank was liquidated, he redirected the whole weight of his forces to Sinai, and, after destroying all sources of fire, directed part of his forces against Syria and occupied the al-Zawiyah area and the heights of the southwestern front.

The Zionist forces, in their war against the Arab armies, used full cooperation between ground and air forces; the air force performed its task in the most thorough manner and rapidly achieved the following objectives:

A. Striking out at bases and airports and destroying them and the aircraft lying on the ground.

B. Striking out at transport and communications centers.

C. Affecting the morale and harming the spirit of the commanders in the field.

Thus we consider that in the face of rapid mechanized attack, many other factors which might play a role in war are eliminated.

The Zionist entity brought its latest war outside the scope of combat on the domestic front and emerged from the scope of its basic defenses; on top of that, these occupied areas constitute a security belt for the vital points within it. Nonetheless, it was compelled to distribute its forces over areas remote from the center, and its strategic reserves also became extended, therefore now compelling it to embark on a long-term defensive battle which will certainly lead to the draining of its forces and the destruction of its morale.

From this war, one may observe that the Zionists prepared for it and acquired correct information through their intelligence, enabling them to embark on a rapid mechanized war which was successful as a war but failed in terms of achieving an objective. The technique the Zionists followed in their war was:

A. To acquire a suitable political position.

B. To mobilize mechanized and armored units with extreme secrecy.

C. To prepare a large number of airplances with which Arab units were taken by surprise.

D. To prepare a large amount of small airplanes spread about through Palestine.

E. Movement was accompanied by an intense propaganda campaign which concentrated on civilian population along with barbaric, terrifying acts directed against the population with the goal of expelling it from its homes and impeding the Arab war effort.

F. Spreading chaos by disseminating conflicting rumors on the collapse of the Arab resistance and achieving a cease fire after the callup of all the reserves in the Zionist army.

The political, economic and geographic circumstances of the Zionist entity do not enable it to engage in a long-range war, and this makes it mandatory that it program a system of rapid short-term war, on the one hand; on the other, its strategic plans are based on shifting combat outside the old armistice line so that it can avoid the destruction, damage and suffering of war.

These two facts demand before all else the presence of a very strong air force which will, in conjunction with its other forces enable it to snatch victory in a decisive, rapid manner with the fewest possible losses, as occurred in the movements in Sinai in 1956 (Kadish). The enemy devoted much concern and attention to the air force, establishing suitable bases, airports and landing fields in specific densities, connecting them to a good communications system to guarantee speed and flexibility in use, and establishing an air radar system covering its skies to guarantee early warning.

Conclusion

From the discussion of the research, one may conclude that mobile war is as old as man. It was applied by such great commanders as Alexander, Genghis Khan and Hannibal, whose victories were distinguished by speed and mobility.

They used cavalry in a manner and with strategic maneuvers whose use is still the object of amazement and admiration on the part of commanders in this era and is still being discussed in military academies at the present time. Mobile war was used in World War Two by the Germans, who realized great victories in the first 3 years. They used armor against cavalry and applied strategic maneuvers, penetration, movements of surrounding the enemy flanks, and establishment of the front; in their fighting they made a specific target of the command, in order to destroy the morale of the enemy troops.

In order to prepare a mobile army to wage modern war with the enemy, it is necessary that the ground forces be organized in the form of enormous brigades. Their equipment and armament will include rapid lightweight tanks with powerful artillery, modern armored personnel carriers, self-propelled artillery and artillery which can be dismantled. It is also necessary that the units contain armored engineering elements and rely on organized air power in the form of a strategic air force and a tactical air force. The forces must contain advanced, flexible administrative structures. Mobile war requires a competent command functioning under the worst conditions. The harmonization of organization is of importance in the preparation of such a force.

Scientific improvements give as much as they take; modern mechanized armies have acquired the characteristics of firepower and mobility, and the development of machinery has improved much non-tactical movement. The air, sea and mechanized transport behind the tactical field cannot be compared with that of bygone times; it has become in the capability of modern armies today to move whole formations to the remotest areas in a period which is almost not worth mentioning, in comparison with the past.

Comrade fighting man: Remember that military discipline is one of the basic elements on which the success of the Popular Army is founded, and be careful to commit yourself to it so that you may be a true mirror by which the true picture of the Arab fighting man is reflected.

Comrade fighting man: Rumors are a destructive weapon used against you and against your party and country by the fifth column and colonialism to weaken your morale. Make haste to inform the people responsible for you of every rumor along with the names of the people propagating them.

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THEORY, PRACTICE OF LAYING MINES DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 8, Feb 81, pp 122-124

/Article by Thamir Khudayr 'Abbas: "Military Culture: Minefields"/

/Text/ Minefields are considered the most effective major artificial engineering obstacles and the ones most able to impede progress and attack. This type of obstacle was used on a broad scale in World War Two. The Germans were proficient in the use of mines, applying innovative methods in this field, thanks to their industrial advancement and the establishment of specialized study centers for instruction in and development of minelaying methods. Thus minefields became elements in preparing terrain for defense.

The Importance of Minefields

The purpose of minefields is to impede hostile advance and attack, limit the movement of attacking units, affect their morale, lead them into selected combat areas and guarantee protection for the defenders with the objective of gaining time.

The importance of minefields lies in the fact that they are major obstacles in the field of defense to impede attackers. In principle they are laid for protection against attack by infantry and tanks, against attack by airborne and air-transported units, and against amphibious assault operations, providing protection from and limiting sudden attack, impeding invading units, preventing them from carrying out deep penetration and infiltration or rallying around defensive positions, and also increasing and providing immunity for forces in defensive positions. Minefields are laid in engagements to conceal the front and flanks of forward units after a successful attack and the occupation of territory, and one can use minefields in crossing operations to protect bridgeheads from counterattack following the crossing of the first wave.

Minefields have a moral and material effect on the invading force in the two stages of attack and pursuit. As regards other obstacles, natural and manmade, minefields achieve surprise, can work quickly and easily, and from the standpoint of cost are considered economic.

The war of mines used by revolutionary movements has been of extreme importance in destroying the enemy's force, draining him morally and materially, and creating a state of fear, anxiety and lack of security on his rear and on his lines of communication.

The Power and Inhibiting Nature of Minefields

The power and inhibiting nature of minefields depend on the density of the fields, that is, on the number of mines laid on every meter of the front of the field. The power and density of the field are subject to a number of essential matters:

The purpose in using the minefields.
The barrier plan.
The degree of protection required of the field.
The availability of mines to be laid and the persons laying them.
The method of laying the mines.
The nature of the terrain.
Defending units' ability to cover the minefield with fire and protect it.
The nature and armament of the enemy.

Types of Minefields

Minefields consist of an area of land in which mines are laid. They do not have a specific form--they have numerous characteristics, such as anti-tank minefields, anti-personnel minefields, or mixed fields. The main types of these fields are:

Protective Minefields

These fields are laid to help units acquire local protection for themselves by affecting and impeding enemy attack, setting the enemy organization into confusion, and providing the defenders an opportunity to repel and overcome attackers and influence them with close-range fire until early warning is given of the enemy advance.

Defensive Minefields

These are fields which are laid to prevent hostile infiltration among defensive positions, strengthen their defense, confuse the enemy attack, and make the breaches less weak in terms of the defense of the whole area.

Barrier Minefields

These are fields which are laid to repel attacking units. They are in front of the position, on the flanks or at the rear and have the objective of directing the enemy toward selected killing zones and diverting the direction of his advance, for the purpose of launching a counterattack against him and destroying him.

Nuisance Minefields

Nuisance minefields are laid to impede and confuse the organization of the attacker, delay him and prevent him from using a specific zone or road. They are laid on roads where he will probably advance during the early stages of the defensive fighting in order to delay him. In retreat, minefields result in slowing down the advance of the attacker and weakening his morale.

Illusory Minefields

These are false fields which have not been laid with mines. Their purpose is to deceive the enemy, to make an area of land seem to resemble a field which has been laid, thus saving time, effort and mines.

Ways of Discovering Mines

The following methods are followed in discovering mines:

1. The method of electronic sweepers: Sweepers can discover mines quickly and are carried by single persons or connected to vehicles. These sweepers can discover mines containing a small amount of metal.

2. The method of probing and feeling: This method is used to discover non-metal mines. The mine must be felt out before the process of probing by hand, in the event anti-personnel mines are encountered on the surface of the ground.

This method is very slow and primitive.

3. Dogs: It is possible to use dogs to discover the approximate locations of anti-tank mines, be they metal or non-metal and buried at slight depth. One cannot use dogs in forward combat areas because they are affected by the din of battle.

Methods of Crossing Minefields

The mines are cleared out after use of the methods of discovery noted above by securing and raising the mines. Other methods are used in crossing minefields, among them:

1. The use of snake charges: These are special devices made up of hoses filled with explosives that are set off by a rocket engine inside the minefield. The explosives are spontaneously detonated when they hit the ground, causing the clearing of a safe road for the passage of machinery or a passageway for infantry, according to the type of charge used.

2. The use of bangalore torpedoes: These are special devices consisting of standard pipes filled with explosives that are buried at little depth by hand in the minefields or wire barriers to open a safe passageway and seal off the explosives by suppression.

3. Mechanical methods: A number of methods can be used for clearing out minefields, among them:

A. Mine detonators: These consist of devices connected to forward tanks for the purpose of clearing mines across the field.

B. Tanks with chains: These consist of arms connected to the tanks and hooked up to a revolving axle containing metal chains which beat the ground and result in detonating and cleaning out the mines.

C. Bulldozers with blades and plows: These deal with mines that have been buried, pushing them to the side; they are then secured and subsequently raised.

4. Artillery fire and air force missiles: Artillery or mortar shells are used by concentrating the cannon or mortars on a limited stretch of minefields during the final stage of preparatory bombardment and also by using air force missiles fired from planes. Among the bad features of this method is the fact that not all the mines that the shells dislodge from their locations explode and pits are created in the area of the breach which might obstruct the movement of offensive equipment. In addition, it is not economical.

5. The use of rubber shoes: These consist of a rubber sack which is filled with air and worn by persons effecting the crossing. These work on the principle of distributing the weight of persons over a broad spot of ground.

6. The method of burning the ground. This is done by burning grassy land by using inflammables like napalm and certain chemicals, so that the mines explode in the areas harboring them, as a result of heat, so that consequently the area is cleared of mines.

7. The human method: This method is used by moving attack units through minefields and accepting losses resulting from the detonation of the mines. From reports by certain military study centers, it has been established that the losses this type of method causes do not equal the losses which are likely to occur through the use of snake charges and torpedoes, the consequent drawing of enemy attention and the discovery of the crossing spot, or through the directed enemy fire to which units are exposed when they retreat on coming up against mines.

8. Disturbing the air: This method is based on disrupting the air over the minefield, causing the detonation of mines in the area. This is done by firing explosives through missiles by means of firing apparatus carried on a truck that directs a group of missiles toward the minefield. When they crash to the ground they generate a cloud of materials which explode, generating a pressure and force which result in the explosion of the mines. In this manner one can open a passageway 12 meters wide and 1,000 meters long in a minefield.

9. The use of chemical foam: This entails the use of a mixture of a number of chemicals which resemble foam. They have the ability to harden quickly, producing a rubbery layer.

10. Water under pressure: The mines are eliminated by directing hoses with water under pressure at the site of the mines, which results in exposing them and undercutting them. This method was used by the Egyptian Arab army in the October 1973 war to eliminate the mines that had been laid before the Bar Lev Line on the bank of the canal.

The last few abovementioned methods are not considered basic or general minefield clearing operations, since some of them have recently been introduced into some armies and some others are used on a small scale. One can consider that the manual and mechanical method, the use of explosives (charges and torpedoes), and artillery and aircraft fire are the methods that are in wide use in minefield clearing operations.

Evidence of the Existence of Mines

One can determine the existence of mines by observing the following evidence:

1. Traces of occasional mines, such as piles of stones or empty cans.

2. Disruption of the ground surface, especially on roads and grassy areas or the strewing of moist soil in scattered form over grass.

3. Footsteps and vehicle tracks on stiff plants, suggesting the presence of mines.

4. High and low wire obstructions.

5. Partial or total blockage of roads, compelling vehicles to turn off the roads and automatically head toward the mine area.

6. Empty mine containers and packages and abandoned safety pins.

Preventive Guidance:

When operating in an area which contains mines, it is necessary to observe the following preventive measures:

1. Keep your eyes open at all times in all your movements and distrust every natural or manufactured object which seems incompatible with its surroundings.

2. Expect constant change in enemy methods of laying mines and mines of different types.

3. Point out every mine you have secured or observed and give notice of it immediately.

4. Do not rush forward to help people who have been injured in minefields--instead, follow the proper rescue sequence.

5. Always remember that any mistake you make will result in taking the life of your comrade as well as your own life.

6. Do not let the enemy arrive at his objective by thwarting you in any action as a result of your coming up against certain mines, since it is possible to be rid of the mines by following correct instructions.

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METHODS OF CLEANING OUT FORESTS, BUILT-UP AREAS DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81, pp 32-35

/Article by Ghazi Mahmud al-'Umar: "Cleaning out Woods and Fighting in Built-up Areas"/

/Text/ 1. Foreword

In some stages of combat, it often by chance happens that you will skirmish with the enemy in a forest or orchard or that an airborne enemy force will become concentrated in some forest or orchard on our territory. Thus, in both cases, it is necessary to clear out this forest or orchard.

2. The Objective

To train and instruct fighting men in the method for clearing out forests.

3. Principles of Clearing out Forests

A. Speed: It is necessary to emphasize the principle of speed in surrounding a forest or orchard with fire. This comes essentially from speed in the fighting man's movement with the aim of putting the enemy in a situation where it is impossible for him to escape or save himself.

Among the useful weapons in this procedure are light machine guns.

B. Accuracy: Accuracy here arises from the accuracy of the fighting men's movement and accuracy of fire as well, in addition to the need to observe the enemy's fire and movements within the forest.

4. The Sequence of Action

A. The commander of the advance unit must choose an appropriate place, as an observation point, to investigate the forest and determine the approach for cleaning it out, while observing the following points:

First, the probable enemy target.
Second, the shape of the forest.
Third, the killing zone.
Fourth, the wind direction and its effect on smoke.

B. It is necessary to set out barriers to facilitate the activity of liquidation squads which will be in effective areas on both flanks of the forest.

C. The force commander will request the group of commands, which in general embraces commanders of liquidation and support squads, ambush commanders (mobile force), and mortar detachment commanders.

5. The Course of Activity

A. First barriers bolstered by light machine guns will be sent. Their positions will be on the edges dominating the exits and the hinterland of the forest. They will move with the support of liquidation and mortar squads.

B. The ambush squad (mobile force) will then be dispatched. Its site will be in an appropriate location in the hinterland of the forest. These people's movement will be with the support of the barriers, in addition to the liquidation squads.

C. Normally, the forest is broken down into two or more sections, according to the size of the forest or orchard, and squads are distributed and assigned to tasks in the light of this breakdown. For example, the task of the right-hand liquidation squad will be the right part of the forest or orchard, that of the other liquidation squad the left side of the forest or orchard, the right-hand support squad will follow the right-hand liquidation squad, the left-hand support squad will follow the left-hand liquidation squad. This is what is called the distribution of tasks. The forest or orchard can be broken down into stages, for instance the first stage, the second stage, and so forth.

D. The liquidation squads will move simultaneously, that is, after the barriers and the ambush take their place with the support of mortars.

Smoke may be used for the purpose of facilitating the task of advancing the liquidation squads.

E. The liquidation squads must move with extreme care and slowness. Their advance will be in the form of small groups or pairs. As soon as the enemy appears, fire will open at once and the fighting men will move from cover to cover, and so forth.

F. In the event resistance occurs, causing the liquidation squad to stop, the support squad will attack through the liquidation squad or it may group around the enemy along one of the flanks if the situation is favorable for that, in order to eliminate the enemy.

G. The barrier and ambush squad will pursue and kill the enemy flushed out by the fire.

H. The support squad following behind the liquidation squad must observe the trees above the liquidation squad out of fear that the enemy may have hidden himself in the tops and branches of the trees.

I. It is necessary to use smoke screens before the forest in order to cover the forward liquidation squads approach operation.

6. Conclusion

It is necessary to stress the principle of speed and care in such movements, because they are of the utmost importance and it is not permissible to neglect them whatever the reasons might be.

Fighting in Built-up Areas

1. Foreword

Fighting in built-up areas (that is, in streets and towns) is to be considered one of the most difficult types of combat because of the great losses borne by invader and defender alike, in addition to the great difficulties of providing fire and administrative support for the force assigned to such combat. Nonetheless, good training and determination and high morale in the fighting man will guarantee the attainment of victory.

2. The Objective

Training and instructing fighting men in combat in built-up areas.

3. Among the most important problems the fighting man encounters in such combat are:

A. Surveillance is limited because there are no broad fields of fire.

B. Movement outside buildings by day is extremely difficult and the attacker sustains flagrant losses in such cases. Thus night guarantees freedom of maneuver.

C. Movement of vehicles is limited and will certainly be exposed to early attack.

D. The fact that fighting men from both sides are in close contact certainly impedes the air and artillery support process.

E. Fighting men on both sides can make use of cellars, sewers and roofs to infiltrate, maneuver and withdraw.

4. Among the most important conditions for bolstering the success of the attacking fighting men are:

A. Good training starting in peacetime.
B. High physical fitness and endurance.
C. Preparation of fighting men as marksmen distinguished by accurate, rapid fire and cool nerves.

D. An accurate, simple, flexible administrative plan guaranteeing the conveyance of materiel and provisions for the fighting men, as well as evacuation.

5. Among the basic difficulties which stand out in such combat is control of the fighting men. We can overcome this problem as follows:

A. A simple, flexible plan.
B. Clear goals.
C. Decisive orders.
D. The presence of commanders in forward positions.
E. Definition of responsibility for groups and bases and the assignment of springboards.
F. Good communications. It is possible to use couriers.

6. Techniques for Attacking Built-up Areas

There are three methods for attacking built-up areas. These are:

A. Fighting from street to street and house to house. This technique of course causes great losses.

B. Bombardment of the built-up area by artillery and the air force first, then invasion and liquidation of the area by fighting men. This method requires the performance of accurate coordination, competent communications and high skill in setting forth and executing the plan.

C. Surrounding independent units then liquidating the built-up area with fighting men or other units.

7. The Means for Cleaning out Houses

It is well known that the combat squad is the smallest liquidation unit. It can be broken down into two parts (two squads), the liquidation squad and the cover squad:

A. The liquidation squad: This can consist of a group commander and be equipped with a radio set in addition to the following: The first entry person (combatant). The second entry person (combatant). The grenade firer, who carries hand grenades.

A surveillance and observation element (overseer combatant), who carries a rocket launcher.

B. The cover squad: this may be composed of a light machine gun squad in addition to the other combatants in the squad.

8. The Method of Liquidation (That Is, the Method of Cleaning out Houses)

A. As soon as the forward squad (the attack squad) confronts enemy fire, it takes cover behind the cover which is nearby. Some squad combatants keep enemy snipers busy.

B. The force commander issues orders for carrying out the mission.

C. Then the cover squad--that is, the light machine gun group--springs forward and takes a suitable position enabling it to support the liquidation squad.

D. The liquidation squad surges forward under the protection of the cover squad toward the house set aside for liquidation. The grenade firer throws grenades through the openings of the house into the rooms. After hearing the explosion of the grenades, the first entry person goes into the house, exploiting the walls of the house in his movement. After he has entered he signals for the other persons in the liquidation squad to come in. The task of one of the combatants in the liquidation squad entering must be to observe and conduct surveillance of the roof of the house, preferably carrying a rifle. The surveillance and observation element (the overseer combatant), who is carrying a rocket launcher, then gives the agreed upon entry signal for the cover squad to enter the house, and thus the liquidation and examination of all facilities in the house are carried out.

E. It is best not to enter the house by the main door and it is best for the liquidation squads to enter through the sides of the house or the rear garden if possible.

F. After the cover squad has entered the house and cleaned it out the light machine gun must be put on the roof of the house to be prepared to support the liquidation squad assigned the task of subsequently cleaning out the other houses.

9. General Observations on Cleaning out Houses

It is necessary to observe the following while cleaning out houses:

A. Avoiding storming the house or the building from the main door as much as possible.

B. The rear garden or rear doors offer ease of assault and surprise, that is, offer the liquidation squad facilities to enter and clear out the house.

C. Your assault of rooms (the rooms of the house) must occur 1 second after the explosion of the grenade.

D. It is necessary not to be extravagant with fire. Rather, follow the rule "shoot to kill."

E. Avoiding movement in the room or hallway or in front of windows. Rather, move alongside the wall, pressing your back against it and examining all directions with your vision.

F. It is necessary that the combatant's movement from one place to another not take place without the support of one of his comrades.

G. Beware of traps for the negligent. Do not turn on a light switch or water faucet or touch a picture or anything in the house at all.

H. After the liquidation and occupation of the house, all its installations will be re-examined carefully.

10. Conclusion

This type of combat is difficult and complicated. It is necessary to prepare the combatants starting in peacetime, train them in this type of combat, and instill in them the spirit of determination and high confidence in themselves and the weapon.

It is also necessary to stress the setting out of accurate, simple, flexible plans to achieve the desired objective, which is victory.

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21 September 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2400

THE POPULAR ARMY IN IRAQ

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21 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2400

THE POPULAR ARMY IN IRAQ

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic, No 9, Jun 81

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POPULAR ARMY AS ARM OF REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 49-54

/Article: "The Popular Army: A Distinctive Experiment and Lofty Preparation in Defense of the Gains of the Revolution"/

/Text/ The formation of the Popular Army did not come about just as a passing desire that occurred to the political leadership of the party and the revolution in our fighting country. It was, rather, a revolutionary measured dictated by domestic and national requirements and the great tasks which the 17 July revolution has aspired to perform under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. The creation of this sort of popular agency, armed with faith and rifles, was made mandatory by the nature of the stage and by the crucial dangers and challenges it entails. These are threatening the national security of the Arab motherland just as they threaten the national sovereignty of Iraq and the major historic gains it has achieved through bold, persistent struggle, always relying on clear step-by-step and strategic goals and a principled vision on the creation of an organized society enjoying conscious control, a high feeling of domestic and national responsibility, and an intense zeal to carry out and make a success of the plans and programs of the revolution in all fields of construction.

The 17 July revolution has therefore devoted exceptional attention to mobilizing, organizing and arming the masses of the people and vigilantly preparing and training them in order to qualify them to be able to deter the aggression to which Iraq and the Arab nation are exposed, to protect the great progressive achievements the revolution has made in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and to defend them bravely and capably when that is required.

The revolutionary measures and procedures the revolution has taken during the 13 years of its triumphant course have been many and great. They have made Iraq a nation possessing a status that is honored and enjoying the respect of the small and great nations of the world. These measures and procedures have been based on a policy of principle functioning on behalf of Iraq and the Arab nation as it functions on behalf of all peoples in the world. Thanks to its principled ideology which is zealous to maintain and strengthen solidarity and national independence, the revolution has succeeded in building up its special experience, proceeding from the special nature of Iraq and the Arab nation and relying on their combative and humanitarian heritage.

The experience of the revolution in Iraq has been distinguished by the fact that it has been a distinctive one on various levels. However, it has not been isolated from the experiences of the people--rather, it has interacted with them, without transferring the experiences in prefabricated fashion in an easy manner. The revolution, under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, has rejected, and still does reject, easy, prefabricated approaches to revolutionary action. Thus, the experiment of the formation of the Popular Army has been a measure to which the revolution has turned in order to ensure its objectives of domestic construction and national action, in accordance with the Ba'th's independent view and its perception of the importance of domestic and national distinctiveness in our rising course of liberation.

The formation of the Popular Army, while it is just one of the revolution's achievements, is truly to be considered one of its most prominent ones, because it means the organization of the people and the preparation of the people in a conscious, revolutionary manner to defend themselves by themselves and to be an aide and bulwark for the regular army in the case of war and a tool for construction, development and the guarantee of stability and security for citizens under various conditions and circumstances.

The Experiment of the People's Army Is One of the Glorious Achievements of the 17 July Revolution

Therefore, after a year and a half had elapsed since the revolution burst forth, that is, in February 1970, it was announced that the Popular Army would be formed in the military and legal structure it now has. This does not under any circumstances mean that the party had previously organized no activities in the field of mass mobilization and arming before that date; to the contrary, numerous activities took place in passive or active combat circumstances. However, the experiment of the formation of the People's Army remains the most mature, deep-rooted, comprehensive one, a great achievement to be added to those of the 17 July revolution and its commanding party.

The importance of an experiment such as that of this armed popular organization made the leadership of the party and the revolution very anxious to guarantee that it succeeded and to provide all necessary organizational, technical, mental and other requirements before issuing the legal decree on the army. Therefore, formation of the Popular Army did not just take place by a decree issued on the subject--the groundwork for it was laid before the decree was issued, following detailed comprehensive in-depth studies that included organizational and administrative aspects, training methods, types of weapons, and the nature of the missions and duties the Popular Army would assume.

The studies on forming the Popular Army and the discussions which took place within the command lasted many months, and in-depth study continued and aspects of it were determined, before and after the legal decree on the army was issued, giving the experiment guarantees that ensured its success. The studies took into consideration the political and geographic circumstances of Iraq, the role of the masses in protecting and consolidating the gains of the revolution, the requirements of national combat, and the role of armed popular struggle in liberating occupied Arab territory, both in Palestine and in other parts of the Arab nation.

While the studies on the formation of the Popular Army in our country were based on the Arab nation's beloved heritage of the many wars of liberation it had waged over 15 centuries, they did not neglect the modern experiences of peoples and their armed struggles against colonialism, reaction and imperialism, for the sake of independence, national sovereignty and social progress.

Nonetheless, the study of the Arab popular masses' armed struggle within their national legacy, in spite of the genius and heroic acts that lies within that struggle and the experiences of people fighting against colonialism and backwardness in the modern era, was adopted as a readymade form when the Popular Army was established, in spite of the significance in terms of rich information and cautions that given experiences afforded. The command of the party and the revolution, embodying the principles and creative thought of the Ba'th, has repeatedly rejected the transfer of readymade ideas and experiences, out of its awareness of the distinctive nature of Iraq and the Arab nation and the new circumstances in the Arab and international situation in the modern era. It therefore continuously seeks to discover new things which are in harmony with the nature of the stage and the enormous size of the national and domestic tasks that lie on its shoulder as a historic leader of the Arab nation.

In this regard, the president and commander Saddam Husayn has constantly asserted the need to make efforts to discover new, meaningful aspects of revolutionary action. He, as a leader, has not been content just to appeal for that but rather has proceeded himself to exert continuous efforts for the sake of what is better and more appropriate. He lives amongst the scions of his people and stays awake late at night in order to guarantee a prosperous future for Iraq and the Arab nation and to ensure the development and consolidation of the great gains and accomplishments of the revolution. Therefore, Commander Saddam Husayn has given exceptional attention to all the central institutions of the state during the course of the revolution.

The Popular Army has been one of the most prominent institutions in which he has interested himself personally and which he has enriched intellectually and organizationally. On top of that, he has given direct concern and unlimited support to the Popular Army with the objective of making it more able and capable of defending the people, proceeding from his statement "There will be no one to take the position of defending a person who does not have the intrinsic ability to defend himself."

Intellectually and organizationally mobilizing the masses has been and remains one of the party's foremost programs in achieving its goals. However, the party, through its special experience, has realized that such mobilization, in spite of its importance, will remain inadequate as long as it is not accompanied by a military mobilization of the masses and by the provision of the ingredients that will enable them to defend the nation and the revolution under all circumstances, criticial circumstances in particular. Therefore, the president and commander Saddam Husayn has stressed that "the point of departure in turning a young person into an organized fighting force in the active struggle to develop and protect the revolution and strengthen its victories and its achievements in the passive struggle to eliminate apostate and reactionary forces and supply the battles in the struggle with fighting units which are experienced in combat" is a necessary premise which

derives its dimensions from the thinking and the premises of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and from the vastness of the dangers and challenges which Iraq and the Arab nation are exposed to.

An Armed Aware Organization that Is Derived from and Serves the People

Therefore, the revolution's concern to form the Popular Army has been an embodiment of the Ba'th's platform of enabling the people to protect themselves by themselves. Proceeding from the commander's statement "It is by means of the people alone that one can defend the security and the gains of the people," a citizen armed with faith and a rifle alone can defend the sovereignty and glory of the nation. The rifle by itself is not enough to guarantee the goals of the people and the nation unless the person bearing it is armed with awareness, clarity of thought, and faith in the propriety of the program and the justice of the cause which he is defending and sacrificing himself for, and thought alone, however bright and creative it might be, will remain unable to repel dangers and transgressions unless the person who bears the thought has a rifle. Thus the effort was made to form the Popular Army, which, after 10 years of intense military and cultural effort and care in its preparation and organization, has become a basic aware armed force defending the people and the gains of the revolution.

The Popular Army, whose legal identity began in 1970 when it was formed of party personnel chosen with care and attention, in order to avoid the possibility that errors or excesses which could prejudice the experiment might occur, and which also at the beginning was restricted to a number of governorate capitals, rapidly spread from one town to another with firm, carefully planned steps until, in 5 years, time, it had come to cover all areas of the country, from north to south, including the hills, plains, marshes and desert areas.

The process of preparation, training and acculturation has taken place in conjunction with the rapid spread of Popular Army formations. The completion of the coverage of Iraqi towns and villages with these armed popular formations has provided an opportunity to concentrate on raising the fighting people's level of military training and ideological acculturation through intensified sessions in general training camps and other intellectual, political and acculturation sessions.

In the past few years, the Popular Army has been armed with various types of light and medium weapons. Some of its units have been converted into semi-permanent military units supplied with advanced weapons. Thus, it has achieved the goal whose attainment the Eighth Regional Conference of the Arab Socialist Party approved when it asserted "Training in weapons must be one of the basic ingredients in the building of a new man and a new society. Training large numbers of the members of the people in a military fashion will also provide the country with a reserve army which can participate effectively alongside the national one in protecting the revolution and the country and performing national missions." In order to enable the Popular Army to possess the ingredients of combat technology and the optimum use of arms, in accordance with the duties and tasks which the party has specified for it, training has been continuous and live exercises and drills including various sectors have taken place. Their participation in numerous live exercises and drills with regular army units has increased the expertise of Popular Army formations and raised their combat performance level.

A Reserve Comparable to Our Heroic National Army

Perhaps the best proof of the importance of the role the Popular Army can perform in defending national sovereignty and protecting the achievements of the revolution has been embodied in our holy war against the racist Persians and the brilliant victories our heroic armed forces have achieved in this war which has been imposed upon our country. Had the Iraqi fighting man on the battlefronts not possessed military and political awareness, he would not have been able to continue fighting with anything like the concern and bravery which the world has witnessed, even if he had possessed the most modern types of weapons. Without a doubt, an important reason for the defeat of the aggressor Persian forces lies in their lack of conviction in the goal they are fighting for and the obscurity and vagueness of the cause for which they have been compelled to die, even though they are more numerous and equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons.

While the heroic regular Iraqi army is the basis for the attainment of victories over the racist Persian clique, the Popular Army has played a prominent role in standing alongside the armed forces on the lengthy battlefronts and it has participated effectively in protecting the domestic front from the folly of saboteurs and people opposed to the revolution and in guaranteeing security for the people.

The just war our country is waging against the Persian aggression has demonstrated the importance of the Popular Army in preserving the spirit of victory through its participation in holding the territories from which our army is expelling the racist Persians and its participation in purging the remaining pockets of scattered defeated remnants of the enemy on the battlefronts, protecting the rear of the heroic armed forces and enabling them totally to devote themselves to carrying out their basic combat missions.

The experiment of the popular achievement in Iraq is to be considered a progressive one in terms of those of many of the countries in the world, in spite of its recent nature. It is a distinctive experiment in form and substance since it has been derived from the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party's view of society as an indivisible whole. Therefore women have also played an effective role in Popular Army formations, participating with their brothers in bearing and being trained in weapons, thus proving a competence which has been witnessed in this field as they have proved high competence in such other vital fields as helping to make the development process and other political and social activities a success.

Iraqi women today have come confidently and worthily to enjoy the rights which various laws stipulate; they are members of the National Assembly, officers in the army, directors general and so on. As the president and commander Saddam Husayn has said, Iraqi women have the right to enjoy their rights and must take part in making a success of the development process and in defending the nation and must participate in the political, economic, cultural and social activities underway in our country, because "they are the granddaughters of the immortal Iraqi women who fought heroically with the men, organized the poetry of epic and glory, and participated in the glorious legacy of civilization."

The protection of the domestic front which the Popular Army is bravely and consciously undertaking is to be considered a matter of maximum importance, not just

in cases of war but also in cases of peace. The Popular Army formations have thereby asserted, through their heroic activities in the front inside enemy territory and in the towns and villages of the country, that they are a true, sincere reserve for our heroic army and a beloved auxiliary which supplies it with brave fighting men who are capable of using armor, anti-aircraft weaponry and other types of developed arms with competence and awareness. As the president and commander Saddam Husayn said as he was bidding farewell to a contingent of Popular Army fighting men, "You are going to the battlefronts as the Popular Army which is known throughout the world only for fighting on national territory inside national borders; you have brought forth a new law for popular armies which only your forefathers from the past have done before you."

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ARMY FIGURE DISCUSSES ROLE OF POPULAR ARMY

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 58-9

/Article: "The Commander of the Salah-al-Din Forces Talks about the Popular Army"/

/Text/ The commander of the Salah-al-Din forces asserted that the Popular Army is the brave, distinguished reserve of our heroic forces and that its role has constantly been sustained since the day it was first founded and has grown in magnitude with the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah against the racist Persians.

This was revealed during his meeting on the ground overlooking Abadan, where he evaluated the role of the Popular Army in the war and the results which have been attained by this experiment, which is unique for its kind. He said,

"Before we pause to evaluate this experiment, we must, at the outset, convey to every fighting comrade in the Popular Army the sweetest most sincere greetings in my name and the name of all the fighting men in our heroic army who are encamped on the heroic battleground about Abadan, wish each of them success in his current and future missions as well, and hope that they will be most capable, as we have continuously been accustomed to hope, in carrying out various combat missions and ordinary daily duties in order to preserve the spirit of victory and maintain the combat achievements along the road to the attainment of the hopes of the Arab nation and the goals of its great vanguard party the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party under the command of the hero of national liberation, our inspired fighting president Comrade Saddam Husayn, from whose unique historic personality we all seek the aid of determination, resolve, confidence and power.

"It is also necessary to take this opportunity to send warm comradely greetings to the Popular Army command, expressing our amazement at the great efforts it has made to develop the fighting capability of the Popular Army and mobilize it in a manner meeting the needs of all sectors and fronts."

The staff brigadier general commanding the Salah-al-Din forces added,

"The Popular Army has played a distinguished role and has been the best mass instrument for attaining the most advanced combat experiment, the first of its kind in modern history.

"We, through the activity of the Popular Army in our sector and its assumption of many combat missions, through its participation with us in liberating the city of al-Muhammarah, its protection of the thoroughfares, its aid and its fighting alongside us on the forward lines of contact, as is happening now, have discovered that the Popular Army possesses a faith, resolve, daring revolutionary spirit and high combat capability which endow it with an effective fighting impact, in spite of its relatively modest training in comparison with our armed forces' training. However, I can say that the Popular Army's participation in our just war against the Persian enemy has strengthened its combat capabilities and increased its capacity for mobilization and strategy in an indescribable manner. That may be attributed, in my estimation, to the self-sacrificing spirit of the fighting men, their unshakeable preparedness and their growing ability to use weapons, increase expertise and derive inspiration from the arts of combat.

"There is no doubt that this conclusion constitutes a lofty national achievement for the overall movement of Arab revolution, which must benefit from this experiment in all our coming national battles. It is an experiment which has yielded its fruit in the context of mass mobilization and has given every segment of the people the opportunity to bear arms in defense of the nation, the revolution and the dignity and national sovereignty of the motherland."

/Question/ Could you discuss all these facts in the language of examples?

/Answer/ The examples are so numerous that we cannot grasp them all or pick out their effective significance. On the pages of the liquidation of the city of al-Muhammarah, the protection of thoroughfares to the Karun River and the maintenance of the strategic passageways of our forces, it is the Popular Army which has been performing the most successful duties, in particular the difficult combat duties. Today, now that we are on the east of the Karun, we have installed many Popular Army personnel to perform their combat duties with our soldiers, rifle alongside rifle. It is well known what "east of the Karun" means--in precise terms, it is the daily line of conflict, hour by hour, with the Persian enemy. I, as a military commander, attribute exceptional significance to this position and am proud of the fact that up to this moment I have not examined or heard any shortcomings on the part of these fighting men. To the contrary, rather, their heroic acts are the common subject of talk among the troops.

As long as we are in the realm of examples and comparisons, we must pause to consider the facts concerning the side of the aggressors, by which I mean Khomeyni's guards. These people maintain the lowest forms of repellent relations with the Iranian troops. They compete with them ferociously, even in battles of defeat and failure. They are an instrument of repression and arrest the families of Iranian soldiers in the desire to make them fight by force. On top of all these things, they do not fight with the troops--they protect the troops' rear. They commit the crime of killing all Iranian troops who retreat in defeat as a consequence of the blows of our heroic forces, while we find the fighting men of the Popular Army, in our pioneering experiment, in their combat and their moral relations, constituting the firmest forms of a unified combat family. Once again, as we are at the anniversary of the founding of our Popular Army, we give greetings and praise again and take pride, with them, in the historic combat experiment.

On this sweet occasion, I must greet the president and commander, the fighting man Saddam Husayn, bring him the loftiest congratulations for the immortal day, wishing him good health and success in commanding this nation through our current war with the Persian enemy, and promise him with a loyal spirit that we will be sincere soldiers in the service of the nation and the war. I raise the banner of sincere greetings to Comrade Taha Yasin Ramadan, the commander general of the Popular Army, whom I, and all the scions of the Iraqi people, have seen bidding farewell and saluting the spirit of self-sacrifice among the fighting men in the Popular Army forces as they head toward the theater of our national struggle. This initiative on the part of the commander general of the Popular Army has national significance in giving confidence, determination and administrative and combat support to these forces in our triumphant battle.

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ORGANIZATIONAL, TRAINING ASPECTS OF PEOPLE'S ARMY REVIEWED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81, pp 74-77

/Article: "The Popular Army and the Formula for Preparing an Armed Populace"/

/Text/ The 17-30 July revolution, in its policy, platforms and achievements in all political, economic, social and military fields and activities, has expressed the self-renewing, forward-surging spirit of the Ba'th, drawing aid from its genuine, bright principles and ideas in order to permit the genius of the people to burst forth and to allow their creative, innovative powers to rise up, as a firm, solid basis for establishing the revolutionary Arab experiment and for placing the homeland on its historic course, which will lead to the attainment of its unity and freedom and to the building of its social and cultural progress in the context of a united socialist democratic society.

Every revolutionary achievement and experiment which has occurred on the soil of Iraq in the context of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and its unique historic leadership, as a process which is integrated and interlinked with the overall revolutionary process, has forged its special, independent way, remote from traditional patterns and forms or dependence on the repetition and mechanical copying of certain analogous experiments elsewhere in the world.

The experiment of the Popular Army was born on 8 February 1970 in the context of the consolidation and deepening of the doctrine of a revolutionary realism based on intensifying continued live interaction and interconnection between revolutionary theory and tangible reality, in its static and dynamic states. For this experiment, the command of the party and the revolution arranged all the requisites for success and continued development, proceeding from the sound premise of mobilizing the people and training them to use arms and be equipped with military arts and sciences as a basis for the nurturing of strong people who are able to bear their responsibilities and perform their duties, foremost of which is defense of the homeland and its sovereignty, confrontation with major challenges, and crushing of the Zionist and imperialist forces and foreign designs in general.

A Strategic View and Comprehensive Planning

For this reason, the experiment of establishing the Popular Army has been distinguished by emphasis upon strategic theory and comprehensive planning in a manner guaranteeing that this armed mass organization will be based on firm foundations which are harmonious and compatible with the qualitative and quantitative goals that have been set forth and specified.

The living, innovative application of the platform of revolutionary realism, as drawn up by the command of the party and revolution, has kept the experience of building the Popular Army from falling under the influence of temporary factors or requirements or sudden needs which would have the effect of influencing its structure and the way it is regarded or even definition of the general context of the experiment over the long term. Therefore, the course of the past years has witnessed a programmatic performance which is steadily rounding out the ingredients and requirements for preparing, training and arming the members of the Popular Army, strengthening its organization, and raising its capabilities for mobilization and combat so that it can truly be, as the command has wished it to be, a strong backup for our great army, performing its historic role and effectively participating in our domestic and national struggles.

In the course of the past 8 years, the command has provided all the necessary elements for the establishment of the Popular Army, its attainment of a high level of technical competence and the optimum grasp of combat arts within the limits of the missions spelled out for it, as well as furnishing it with political, intellectual and ideological preparation, on grounds that that is the progressive condition that truthfully expresses the movement and the aspirations of the masses and the vast field which absorbs the masses' capabilities and innovative resources in the field of defending the security of the nation and the revolution and preserving the peoples' gains from the presumptious acts and conspiracies of the imperialist and Zionist enemies and everyone who has designs on our land and waters and displays enmity toward our motherland.

What also imparts significance to the experiment of building the Popular Army is the fact that it is totally removed from any forms of provocation or barren display which are the characteristics of isolated regimes that try to demonstrate their power and ability for one purpose, which is to terrorize their people by making themselves appear to be powers based on an armed mass force.

Since the first days of the ferocious struggle of Saddam Husayn's Qadisiyah, the just war that Iraq, strong through its army and its people, under the historic unique command of the hero of national liberation, Saddam Husayn, and the great continuous triumphs against the aggression of the racist Persian clique, is waging, has proved the validity and the success of the unique, distinctive revolutionary experiment in the realm of establishing a Popular Army based on effective active participation. The detachments of the Popular Army have poured forth to the front like floods in order to perform their duties as a powerful backup for our intrepid army, protecting its rear lines, eliminating every attempt by the enemy to encircle our combat sectors or disrupt their supply lines through their crushing firepower, and also participating in repelling the enemy's forces in the air and protecting Iraq's airspace and combat theaters, in addition to other duties and missions in the context of protecting internal security and helping and guiding citizens to ensure their safety from air raids.

The Popular Army: the Formula for an Armed Populace

In the face of the clear strategic theory and revolutionary view of the volume and nature of the severe challenges and dangers facing our domestic and national struggle and the permanent preparations for embarking on historic battles with various

enemies and schemers which the great liberationist goals of the Arab nation require, it has been necessary for the great 17-30 July revolution, in building a strong, coherent base for the nationwide struggle within the Arab nation, to provide real opportunities for the masses' movement to perform its historic role and responsibility in all its dimensions in order to achieve the motherland's great goals of unity, freedom and socialism.

Therefore, the Popular Army format has been a progressive condition and general framework for encompassing the movement of the masses and turning the people into an armed force capable of confronting every form of challenge and danger and repelling aggression under decisive conditions for wresting victory from the enemies by the force of a powerful ideological army and an armed people prepared to enter battles at a continuous rate of combat which is not interrupted or cut off at specific points--as has been the case whenever regimes that are isolated from their people or have not provided the movement of the masses with real opportunities have tried to confront and defeat the Zionist usurpationist aggression.

This is the experience of revolutionary unionist Iraq. Through tangible activity in the field of combat, it is underlining the validity of its program and its practice. This is the historic, unique bold command of Iraq, which is offering a pioneering, distinctive model for the whole nation, not just through abstract slogans in the theoretical context, but on a basis of attainment of a progressive state of unity of revolutionary theory and innovative, creative practical application. This has led to the attainment of brilliant victories against an arrogant racist enemy which possesses the greatest arsenal of developed American weapons in the region and was, in the opinion of specialized international institutes, considered to be the fifth biggest military power, after the major countries.

Conscious efforts to construct the Popular Army based on principles and comprehensive strategic planning have been, and remain, the firm basis for putting the revolutionary mass movement on its sound historic course, that is, for guaranteeing this movement the opportunities to continue and endure, starting with its first stages of spreading political, intellectual and organizational awareness and launching the necessary mobilization about tentative and strategic goals and missions and actual practice on various levels gradually ascending to the highest stage of incentive and readiness to fight the enemy with weapons to the point of martyrdom. This is what the experience of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has witnessed on the stage of the Iraqi nation where continued political, intellectual and organizational activity and combative revolutionary education have resulted in the establishment of a progressive condition and a high rate of resurgence and combat readiness on the part of the entire Iraqi people for the sake of attaining victory. This has actually taken place in the first stage of our noble holy war against the racist Persian aggressors and the continued preservation and maintenance of the spirit of victory by raising the fighting spirit and the degree of readiness to exert effort and sacrifice.

The Enrichment and Development of the Popular Army Experiment

The period of the sacred war which our great army and brave people have been waging against the aggression by Khomeyni's wayward, defeated clique and the requirements raised by the need to inflict a comprehensive defeat on the racist Persian enemy

and compel him to grant our rights and our full sovereignty over our land and waters have provided a historic opportunity for enriching and developing the Popular Army experiment and realizing a desired quantum leap toward the completion of its structural base and the raising of the degree of its skill in grasping weaponry, attaining competence in military sciences and raising its combat capability so that it can truly be able not just to perform its missions at a high level within the country's borders but also to perform its historic role alongside our armed forces wherever wars of dignity and honor demand they be.

Real conditions during the Iraqi-Iranian war have demonstrated that it is possible to raise and upgrade the powers and resources of the Popular Army at rapid, high rates and to develop its role on the battlefront so that it can truly be the powerful reserve of our brave army by aiding it with all the factors and methods which can result in strengthening and deepening the victory to its maximum limits. One can say now that more than 5 months have passed since the Persian aggression against Iraq, that the Popular Army, in the course of its actual performance of multifaceted combat duties and missions, has managed to reach an advanced stage along the road to completion of the formula spelled out for it in circumstances of war. In addition, one cannot consider this advanced stage the point where one must stop or a final station; every quantitative and qualitative development connected to the missions that have been spelled out for the Popular Army is from the scientific standpoint matched by a change in its structural, mobilizational and fighting foundation and method of armament in a manner that enables continuously to carry out at a high level of fighting combat performance the goals and missions which the command of the party and the revolution have drawn up.

Thus the experiment of the Popular Army in the country of Iraq has been kept free from traditional, familiar frameworks which ordinarily provide the basis for armed popular organizations, which are known as "militia," in order to protect regimes and perform internal security tasks. Therefore a balanced state between the goals set forth and spelled out for the format for a armed populace and the organizational structure, fighting capability and volume and type of armament, has been attained and as a result it has become possible to assimilate and employ the powers of the whole people in the battle for sovereignty, dignity, defense of the nation's domain and the gains and achievements of the revolution, to provide the requisites for victory, and to crush the evil forces that are standing in the way of development, prosperity and welfare of our revolutionary society.

Our vicious war against the arrogant, impudent racist Persian enemy has proved that an organized, armed people are an inexhaustible combative fighting store and that the sacrifices which express the spirit of resistance among the people and combat readiness in the field of direct fighting, which are represented by a state of constant outpouring to support the front with a flood of brave fighting men who believe in the goals of their revolution and the glory and dignity of their people, create inevitable triumph, however great the sacrifices might be, because this kind of resistance, which is based on an enduring spirit of combat and on escalating the spirit with the passage of time in accordance with a program which is based on perseverance, will place the racist Persian enemy, or any enemy of the motherland, under the hammer of our heroic ideological army as a basic striking destructive force and the hammer of an armed people who continue the striking and smashing process while the defeated enemy is not granted an opportunity to catch his breath or gather his fragmented forces.

Thus the command of the party and the revolution have put the Popular Army experiment on its sound historic course, drawing out the formulas which most express the spirit and glorious heritage of the motherland in a framework which is consonant and compatible with the spirit of the age, scientific development and the great development which military and combat arts and sciences have witnessed, giving the movement of the masses its full dimensions and revolutionary import without circumscribing their movement or standing within limits which might alienate the people from their major causes and goals.

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POPULAR ARMY TRAINING PROCEDURES REVIEWED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 169-174

/Article: "A Day in the Life of a General Training Camp"/

/Text/ They begin their day in the general training camp at dawn, arising from sleep early as the hands of the clock creep toward 0500 hours in the morning. They put on their uniforms in order to be ready in half an hour or less to take the first breakfast before readying themselves for roll call which takes place at 0600 hours in the morning; then they go to the first drill in the daily schedule of their camp.

They are 700 fighting men from the al-Khalidiyah sector of the Popular Army's al-Anbar area command. They have spent 14 days in the general training camp, which ended with a drill given the name "torch of freedom" carried out by a number of fighting men in this sector who are participating in the camp.

Combat Exercise

The fighting comrades have presented a splendid picture of combat through their exercises in this camp and their successful performance of the Torch of Freedom drill.

In the course of it, they have reflected a spirit of high discipline and have all shown their enthusiasm and urge to take part in the camp's sessions and programs, as proof of their zeal and eagerness for such drills which strengthen the confidence in their spirits, increase their powers and make them stronger and better qualified to bear their mission and perform what is requested of them.

The comrade commander of the Popular Army's al-Anbar region gave us an idea of the establishment of the camp. He said "The al-Khalidiyah sector of the Popular Army in our area was assigned to go to a general training camp which would end with the Torch of Freedom drill. This was to carry out the Popular Army general command's annual plan, through the directives which the comrade general commander emphasized in the previous conferences of commanders of the regions and staff officers. This calls for assigning a number of sectors in the regional commands to go to general training camps so that military training may be provided for the fighting men participating in them and it will be possible to learn about their ability to perform the missions they are assigned from close at hand, since they constitute the force and the strong reserve of our armed forces."

Morning Lectures and Practical Applications

At this point the region commander concluded his talk about the notion of establishing the camps so that we ourselves could carry on with the day's tour with the fighting men taking part in the camp, which was established in April 1980. We learned that following roll call, which takes place at 0600 hour in the morning, the fighting men, after finishing taking their breakfast, head for the morning period lectures, which last until 1100 hours in the morning. Most of these lectures deal with engineering matters related to the combatants' duties. There are field engineering, techniques of laying mines, ways of setting ambushes, and ways of carrying out patrols to raid the enemy's areas and equipment. As soon as the hour strikes 1100, the time comes to take the second breakfast, after which the fighting men go to the next roll call, followed by a period of practical drills on the subjects the comrades have studied in the morning lectures.

Their practical exercises continue until 1400 hours in the afternoon, when they go off to eat lunch before retiring to get a little rest until 1600 hours in the afternoon, when the late afternoon roll call is taken. After that, the fighting men spread out over the playing fields and sporting grounds to engage in various sports according to their individual interests.

The Late Afternoon Period

At 1900 hours in the evening, it is time to lower the flag and have dinner, after which the evening period commences. This is considered a period of acculturation and recreation. The fighting men pass their time watching a movie, which is usually documentary, military or social. At 2100 hours everyone goes to sleep to prepare to greet the new day in the camp. The fighting men continue to pursue this general daily program for a period of 7 days, the first week in the camp session period. In the second week some changes occur in the program.

What happens?

Consecration of the Drill

We can say that the latter 7 days of the camp are almost a consecration of the practical continuous drill related to the Torch of Freedom exercises, aimed at making the drill assume proper form. The fighting men start their day at 0600 hours in the morning. Instead of going through exercises in theoretical lectures and applying what they learn in the camp, we find them meeting there so trucks can take them to the area where the exercise takes place, on the banks of al-Habbaniyah Lake, where they start to apply the sections and details of the exercise in accordance with the plan set out for that. They use boats to cross the lake and carry out the subsequent steps by laying mines in the enemy tank positions, dealing with enemy guard stations and setting up ambushes to prevent the enemy's auxiliary services from arriving or advancing, along with other details related to the drill.

At 1100 hours in the morning, the fighting men stop their work and head back to the camp to take breakfast and get some rest. At 1400 hours in the afternoon they return to the practical exercises with the goal of reapplying the exercise in the

light of new adjustments or additions or in order to eliminate some shortcomings or errors which occurred in the execution of the drill in the morning period, if there were any. This continues until the time comes to set out for camp to carry out the evening roll and take dinner, then attend the evening presentation.

Pleasant Days

Thus pass the days in the camps. However, the memory of these days remains deep-rooted in the minds of the fighting men participating in them; in spite of the many diverse drills they involve, they remain memories of pleasant life and are deeply rooted in their minds because they add much to the other activities they have learned concerning the Popular Army and the development of comradely spirit, mutual understanding, harmony, affection, enthusiasm, self-sacrifice, the acquisition of knowledge, the reacquisition of knowledge, sacrifice, self-negation and other revolutionary values and traditions in which the Popular Army has become accustomed to rear its fighting men.

In Their Movements the Fighting Men Embody a Living Picture of Combantants

The clock strikes 0500 hours.

It announces the break of dawn.

As it strikes 0500 hours, people start to get up. Movement pervades the various areas of the barracks. People prepare to greet their new day. In half an hour or less they must be ready to take their first breakfast before readying themselves for the roll call, which takes place at 0600 hours in the morning. Then they head for the first drill in their camp's daily program.

In this manner, they start their day. They are a group of young fighting men in the Popular Army, in one of their training camps. In this camp, which contains about 700 fighting men, we convey the picture of a single day of training and the manner in which the fighting staffs of our young men who have enlisted in the ranks of the Popular Army to attain a physical and mental readiness to fight and absorb all facets of combat life and ways of using weapons of all types are prepared and trained.

In this camp, which is considered one of the preliminary training camps, being followed by others prior to actual participation in combat, we live for hours with young people who have come armed with belief and faith in order to be given the honor of participating in the just struggle which our fighting country is waging against the Persian enemy, as their colleagues who are standing today alongside our heroic army on the ground of the heroic battle to defend the truth have taken it before them.

In this camp, which goes on for 2 weeks, the participants, as well as bearing and using arms, learn self-control and respect for instructions and the performance of duties.

The comrades and fighting men experienced a splendid form of combat through their drill in this camp and their successful execution of combat drills. Through this spirit of discipline, they reflected their feelings and urge to take part in the camp's sessions and programs, and this is proof of their zeal and enthusiasm for

such drills, which strengthen self-confidence, increase their abilities and make them stronger and competent to bear their mission and carry out what is demanded of them. The comrade camp commander asserted to us that this camp was established in execution of the Popular Army general command's plan through the directives which the comrade commander general laid out in the previous conferences of regional commands and staff officers, calling for the assignment of a number of regional command sectors to enter the general training camps with the goal of preparing the fighting men taking part in them militarily and ascertaining from close at hand their ability to perform the tasks assigned to them, on grounds that they constitute the force and the firm reserve of our armed forces, as we see them in al-Muhammarah and Qasr-e Shirin and alongside our armed forces on all battlefronts.

We then continue today's tour with the fighting men who are enrolled in the camp. After the end of the roll which takes place at 0600 hours in the morning, after they have finished taking their breakfast, they go to the morning session lectures, which continue until 1100 hours in the morning. Most of these lectures deal with engineering subjects connected with the fighting men's duties. There are field engineering, methods of laying mines, methods for setting ambushes, methods of carrying out raid patrols against the enemy's locations and equipment, and other subjects concerned with military and war preparations.

"What will we see after that?" we asked the comrade camp commander. He said,

"The clock is now pointing to 1100 hours. This is the time for the second breakfast, after which the fighting men come for the second roll call. Don't you want to participate with the fighting comrades in this meal of theirs?"

We sat down with the young comrades who came bearing the love to carry out every order. Through their conversations, we heard news of the fighting. One person said, "Until the time comes to join the battlefronts." Another comrade interrupted him to mention to him that there another camp was waiting for him before this desire of his would be realized. At this point the comrade commander of the camp interrupted to reassure everyone:

"With God's help, you will complete this camp successfully and will join other sessions. The important thing is that you have comrades at the front who are standing with your parent army in the theater of war, and every day you all hear of the victories that the soldiers of truth, the soldiers of Saddam's Qadisiyah, are realizing." With their pleasant conversation, we heard the sound of the whistle announcing again that this time has ended, the time of the second breakfast. Everyone stood up again in preparation for the following session, which was the second roll call. Directly after that, the fighting men distributed themselves among practical drills on what the comrades were taught in the morning lectures, and here the commanders of the detachments assumed the task of distributing the fighting men in accordance with their field of specialization. One group went off with its commander to train in methods of setting up and working ambushes and another group set out to other areas of the field and started to train in methods of laying mines in remote areas and returning rapidly to their positions. There was continuous activity in areas remote from the training field. Everyone was standing before his commander, hearing the advice and corrections of the mistakes which some of them might have made in the course of actual training.

The training continued and we ourselves continued to participate with them by observing. The hours passed, the harsh training ended and the young people went back again to the general complex. It was the lunch period and new movement started at the base; there is a rule which says, "Serve yourself by yourself." A group of people went for food while others prepared places, and we received another invitation to take part in this meal with them. This time we excused ourselves, wishing them a good meal, so that we could complete the job which we had come to carry out by ourselves, while the commander of the camp went about with us, talking to us about the other activities of the day. From him I learned that after finishing taking their lunch, the fighting men went off to get a little rest and this period lasted until 1600 hours in the afternoon, when the evening roll resumed. After that, the fighting men spread out over the playgrounds and sporting areas to engage in various games according to their individual interests.

At 1900 hours in the evening the period of lowering the flag started, followed by the dinner. After that the evening period started; this is an acculturation period when the fighting men spend their time listening to some guidance and important subjects that have been raised. They also sometimes watch movies, which are generally documentary or war films.

By this time the day's schedule has ended and at 2100 hours sharp the fighting men must all go to their quarter to sleep, to prepare to greet the new day in the camp. The fighting men continue to go through roughly this daily program for 7 days, which is the first week of the camp session.

What, however, happens the following week?

We can say that the latter 7 days of the camp are almost a consecration of the practical exercises and are aimed at presenting the drills in proper form (this is the comrade camp commander talking). The fighting men start their day at 0600 hours in the morning but instead of going through drill in theoretical lectures and applying the lectures inside the camp we find them gathering in the camp then being taken by truck to the areas where the exercises take place. There they start applying the exercise periods in accordance with the specified plan. They use boats to cross the water areas, carry out successive steps to lay mines in the area of the enemy tanks, treat the guard posts of the enemy, and set up ambushes to prevent the arrival or advance of the enemy's auxiliaries. At 1100 hours in the morning the fighting men stop working and go back to the camp to take breakfast and get some rest. At 1400 hours in the afternoon they return to the practical drills to reapply the exercises in the light of new modifications or additions or in order to eliminate some of the shortcomings or mistakes that accompanied the execution of the drill in the morning period, if any mistakes occurred. Then follow the rest of the periods which we have mentioned.

Thus end the days of the first camp. However, its memories do not end, as far as the fighting men are concerned. When this camp ends, the fighting men's zeal starts to increase while they await their actual participation in the battle of honor, as their heroic comrades who are fighting in a single rank with our heroic army in the battlefronts participated before them. They are immortal pages in the history of the fighting men of the Popular Army.

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ROLE OF WOMEN IN POPULAR FORCES REVIEWED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 183-5

/Article: "Fighting Women in the Popular Army Prepare Food for the Fighting Men"/

/Text/ In the Basrah sector of the Popular Army, you stand before one of the prominent characteristics of the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah. It manifests a fact which has become obvious, the fact that Saddam's Qadisiyah and the brilliant victory our brave progressive forces have realized is everyone's battle, and all the Iraqi people have participated and are participating in it. In a base on the sector, more than 120 Popular Army fighting women are absorbed in preparing meals for 1,200 fighting men from the Popular Army at one of the battlefronts.

You are engulfed in overflowing joy at the picture of the hands filled with loyalty and pride as they busily prepare food for the fighting men, truthfully expressing the Iraqi women's warm interaction with the battle in an Arab spirit of generosity, heroism, conscience and firm will, strengthened by the proof which emphasizes that our war against the usurper Persian enemy is the war of values and convictions, because the restoration of land and rights is certain, fixed and firm in the conscience of every male and female Iraqi. Proceeding from this premise, there is no citizen outside the environment of the war, and everyone in his position is at the service of the battle.

This firmament of fighting women, including working women, housewives, office workers and raisers of families, reflects in their eyes the bitter clashes of heroism and bravery which their brothers are dominating on the battlefronts. In this location, they embody the meanings of generosity, spirit and heroism in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah. You are prompted by a desire to be close to these feelings, by which life is transformed into palpable values which prove to the whole world that we are a nation that embraces the sun and greets eternal life.

We Feel Pride and Participate in This Honor

At the beginning we spoke with the fighting woman Layla Jalal Salih (mother of four, the oldest of whom is a university student). She said, "At the beginning of the war the racist Persian enemy imposed upon us, I volunteered for the ranks of the Popular Army. I feel pride as I participate with my fighting sisters in this sacred duty which is an honor to us all, and we promise the leadership of the party and the revolution, headed by the hero of national liberation, the fighting man Saddam Husayn, that we will be soldiers loyal to our lofty principles, our

lofty principles, our glorious Arab nation and the spirits of their innocent martyrs until total liberation.

Sharing these sentiments with her was the fighting woman Widad 'Abbud 'Ilwan, employee in the workshop of the governorate's Education Department. More than 3 years have elapsed since she enrolled in the popular Army, and she says, "The period I have spent in the Popular Army has given me expertise which has enabled me to use weapons and execute the national and domestic missions demanded of me, since I was one of the first fighting women to obtain appreciation bonuses for training. Today I have the great honor of taking part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah, which is the battle of Arab conscience against the historic racist Persian enemies of the Arab nation. It is the true beginning of the liberation of every usurped sliver of the land of Arabhood."

Total Readiness To Take Part

The fighting woman Fadilah 'Abd-al-Razzaq, an office worker, commander of a group and head of the Iraq Woman's Federation branch in the al-Thawrah section of the governorate, relates "Through my visits to the women's sectors and the families of the martyred and the wounded in hospitals, I feel that everyone is totally ready to take part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah, each in his place.

"When the blood donation campaigns take place, we see everyone racing to give blood, expressing a solidarity of destiny between the people and its armed forces and their absolute readiness to exert themselves and make sacrifices, out of their belief that our brilliant victories against the racist Persian enemy on the eastern wing of the motherland represents the proper way to liberate all Arab soil and cause the plans aimed at imposing capitulationist solutions on the Arab nation to fail."

She adds, "Everything we are offering for our just struggle against the Persian aggressors, such as this task (preparing food for the fighting men), is only minor compared with the heroic solidarity of which every sincere, proud Arab may boast and which Saddam Husayn's troops are commanding on the fighting fronts. I am proud and happy to have four brothers on the battlefronts taking part in the battle of honor and dignity to defend the nation's land, glory and sovereignty, in addition to my elderly father who also has volunteered to take part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah."

I Aspire To Bear Arms

Among the fighting women who volunteered for the ranks of the Popular Army from the first moments of our war with the Persian enemy was the fighting woman Izhar Muhammad Bashir, an office worker. She says "The decisive response to the aggressive intentions and expansionist designs of Khomeyni's clique, declared by the historic leadership headed by the hero of national liberation, the fighting man Saddam Husayn, which is to regain our usurped legitimate rights to our land and waters, has prompted the members of the populace to surge forward as one man to support and back the hosts of our heroic army by enlisting in the Popular Army, the civil defense formations and so forth. I feel pride and glory over my humble

contribution in support of the battle. I yearn for the moments when I will bear arms alongside my brother combatants on the battlefronts."

She adds, "The great victories which Saddam Husayn's troops have achieved against the racist Persian enemy have proved the Iraqi fighter's ability, strength and faith in wresting usurped rights from the hands of the aggressors. That is what every Arab who takes pride in his soil and the sacred nature of his country boasts of."

Meanwhile, the fighting woman Rasmiyah 'Abd-al-Samad, an overseer in Rawdat al-Shamukh, expresses her hope of going to the front, bearing arms against the Persian aggressors and compelling them to recognize our legitimate rights to our land and territorial waters, which all international laws, legislation and agreements have endorsed. The morrow is near to the eye, as long as we are in the right.

She adds that giving women the opportunity to take part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah is to be considered a badge of glory and honor for them in taking their honorable place alongside their brothers in defending the sovereignty and dignity of the nation from the wiles of the Persian aggressors and schemers.

In Light of the Victories

We found the same feeling with the fighting woman Nida' 'Abd-al-Husayn, a working woman in the General Oil and Gas Products Agency. She says, "In spite of my family concerns as a mother with a small child, I feel happy to be taking part with my fighting sisters in preparing meals for the fighting men, out of my belief that the battle our heroic army is waging under the leadership of the knight of the nation, Staff Gen Saddam Husayn, is a guarantee for the future and the happiness of our children, so that they may live a life of glory, honor and sovereignty in light of the glorious victories which have raised the reputation of Iraq and the Arab nation among nations and peoples."

The fighting woman Fakhriyah Ibrahim Taha, an employee in the Administrative Center of Basrah Governorate, described our heroic army's successive victories against the racist Persian enemy as having breathed the dawn of hope into the spirits of people in the Arab nation that every usurped sliver, especially in the land of Palestine, would be liberated, and is to be considered a slap in the face of slackers like Hafiz al-Asad, al-Qadhdhafi and the heroes of fraudulent slogans.

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ROLE OF PEASANTS AS POPULAR ARMY COMPONENT REVIFWED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 200-203

/Article: "The Peasants of Iraq, from the Field to the Battle"/

/Text/ Tomorrow, when military analysts, political observers and intellectuals set the results of the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah before themselves in order to analyze it and draw the lessons, meanings and added values which the war has underlined in the context of Iraqi society first of all and secondly in its reflections on the general Arab cause, there are many phenomenon which they will look at at length. Among the most prominent of these, and the one which stimulates the most discussion, perhaps, is the subject of actual participation in the battlefronts. It is well known that when various countries in the world embark on a war, they wage it by means of the army, which is prepared, trained and armed for such missions. In the same context, they seek to mobilize the internal front, which in general is relatively remote from the arena of combat and whose task is restricted to attempts to create natural circumstances, as far as is possible in the light of an unnatural circumstance such as war.

That is to say, there is a traditional division between the missions of the army, whose function is confined to waging war at the battlefront, and the staffs of the domestic front, whose missions and duties do not go beyond the official boundaries of their country, which is in a state of war.

This is a well known fact in the history of most, if not all, wars. However, a new, recently innovated development, which has come to prominence in our war with the Persian enemy, is the brilliant majestic merger of the two fronts--the front in which a powerful, strong, triumphant army is fighting, and the domestic front, whose missions have not been confined to the creation of domestic natural circumstances but have gone beyond that to turn it into a fighting front.

In our just war, therefore, there is one front, and that is the battlefront, both domestically and outside the country. There is no doubt that the most conspicuous symbol of the domestic front, if one may use the expression, is the Popular Army, which has most splendidly embodied this fact. In our setting, the Popular Army has added a new notion or principle to those of popular militias, breaking up the traditional notion of the missions of popular militias, which in general, as we have pointed out, are restricted to protection of the domestic front, innovating a new concept of participating with our heroic army in its war against the Persian clique that is hanging from the necks of the Iranian peoples.

Since the peasants have borne the main share of the fighting and sacrifices of our heroic army, as First Staff Lt Gen 'Adnan Khayrallah, the deputy commander general of the armed forces and minister of defense, said in his conversation with the newspaper SAWT AL-FALLAH on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of our heroic army, the peasants also constitute the main share of the formations of the Popular Army, as the comrade general commander of the Popular Army said in a previous interview with SAWT AL-FARAH /sic/.

This enlarged investigation is making a tour of the minds, feelings and emotions of a number of peasant organization leaders and peasants who have performed their combat missions in the Popular Army at the same time they were performing their missions in the ranks of the peasant masses, in order to increase output and cope with the requirements of the coming stage.

Perhaps the closest of the questions which go about in one's mind is the one related to the extent of the peasants' participation in the Popular Army formations and its reflection on the level, volume and quality of the Popular Army's contribution to the battlefronts.

Comrade 'Abd 'Awn al-Dahsh, member of the Executive Bureau of the General Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies, says,

"This broad mass desire on the part of peasants to join the Popular Army formations and consequently to participate in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah which our army and people are waging against the Persian enemy who has usurped our land and water under unnatural conditions was not a surprise to us.

"Now that the hour has come to rise up and take a decision, it has been necessary to take a firm decision to regain every sliver of land which the Persians have usurped, as the president and commander, the hero of national liberation, Staff Gen Saddam Husayn, has said."

The comrade and combatant 'Abd 'Awn Dahsh adds, "This just war has added a brilliant page to the record of our heroic army and it has strengthened the combative solidarity among the various segments of the people. This has become clear through the level, size and quality of the mass participation in the war outside the context of the regular army."

Comrade Hadi Jaythum, member of the Executive Bureau of the General Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies, said,

"The participation of our peasant masses in our battle against the Persian enemy has manifested itself in two basic respects: actual participation in the battlefronts through the Popular Army formations and increased production and improvement of quality, because this factor is one of the basic aspects which result in preserving the spirit of victory.

"We have triumphed in the most noble of battles of liberation against the racist Persians, and by entering onto the arena of honor and dignity we have truly taught an eloquent lesson on the defense of our Arab motherland. The victories that have been achieved under the leadership of our fighting commander Saddam Husayn have liberated the Arab people from colonial hegemony."

Comrade Khalil Jawad Kazim, member of the Executive Bureau of the General Federation of Agricultural Cooperative Societies, says,

"The most conspicuous thing a person observes in this stage is the conscious zeal on the part of our peasant masses, who are demonstrating their full readiness to carry out all the missions and duties laid upon their shoulders. This has become clearly obvious through the peasant masses' participation in the Popular Army and their effective contribution to protecting and securing the domestic front, then bearing arms and going beyond international borders to fight the Persian enemy in the depths of his territory."

Comrade Yahya 'Abdallah, chairman of the Baghdad Federation, said,

"The Popular Army started out in the villages and rural areas first of all. Therefore most of its formations consist of toilers, especially peasant toilers. Since people's true intentions are measured during the difficult tests society and the nation pass through, the level of our peasants' participation, through the Popular Army formations and the people going to the battlefront, has manifested itself in its most splendid forms, giving a surging mass thrust to the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah."

Comrade Wadhih Zabun, head of the Wasit Federation, says,

"The Popular Army command has provided our peasant masses with every possible opportunity to participate in the Popular Army formations and consequently the honor of participating in our just war against the Persian enemy and the Khomeyni clique hanging about the necks of the Iranian peoples.

"This has manifested itself in the level of training, preparation and armament. This has clearly appeared in the battlefronts, in which the Popular Army has taken part alongside the regular army."

Comrade Hadi 'Ubayd, chief of the al-Qadisiyah Federation, which went to the battlefront with the Persian enemy, stressed,

"Our peasant masses have been graced with the care and love of the commander of the people and the hero of national liberation, Staff Gen Saddam Husayn, and this has been apparent through his constant concern over their conditions, his repeated visits to their villages, areas and homes, and his inquiries about the state of each of them. This concern has automatically reflected itself in the degree of our peasant masses' effective participation in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah, since it has stressed this combative solidarity between the command and the masses, and there is no longer a traditional division between the two as is the case in other areas of the world."

Comrade 'Abd-al-Wahid 'Abd-al-Sayyid, member of the Basrah Federation, says,

"The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah has produced numerous positive results on all levels. There is no doubt that the most important and most conspicuous of these results is the effective, conscious participation by the various masses and sectors of our people in this war. The peasants have had a major share in this area, since

in addition to the efforts they have made in increasing and improving the quality of production they have taken part, with their comrades the fighting men of the Popular Army, in protecting and ensuring the safety of the domestic front and thus actively participating in the war, since the peasants belonging to the Popular Army have taken part in the battlefronts."

Comrade Wasil Jabr, chairman of the Maysan Federation, says,

"We promise the command of the party and the revolution, headed by our triumphant leader, the comrade commander Saddam Husayn, that we will remain soldiers loyal to our vow and will give up our precious blood for the sake of the soil of the nation and good name of the homeland and Saddam's Qadisiyah will remain the title of a permanent victory for us and the hope for our brilliant future."

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ROLE OF KURDS IN WAR WITH IRAN DESCRIBED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 204-207

/Article by 'Umran Rashid: "The Fighting Men of the Autonomous Sector and the Battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah"/

/Text/ To preserve the spirit of our victory over the usurper Persian enemy, so that our victory may continue to embrace the ardor of the revolution led by the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in our fighting country, fathers, sons, workers, white collar employees, peasants and shopkeepers from the north of our beloved country have come to organize themselves in the general training camp that was established in a section of Baghdad to train fighting men from the progressive nationalist and pan-Arab parties that had formed a coalition within the autonomous area's Domestic and National Progressive Front in the arts of combat and in various types of weapons as one of the brilliant portraits of the national and domestic solidarity and unity of participation in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah, a brilliant signpost in the history of the Arab nation which has come about to defend the national interests of the motherland and protect it from foreign influence and designs.

The Meaning of National Unity

During your tour of the camp and your meetings with the fighting men, you learn about the meanings of national unity as the deepest, truest phenomenon is thi stage, pulsating with vitality and the flush of heroic solidarity, which Saddam Husayn's soldiers are carrying out on the battlefronts, disparaging death at the moment of holy war and danger at the time of attack.

This fact was expressed by Comrade Walid Khalil al-'A'ish, commander of the Popular Army's autonomy area sector, who stated "This camp contains fighting comrades from the progressive domestic and nationalistic parties that have formed coalition within the framework of the Domestic and National Progressive Front for the purpose of taking part in the battle of honor and dignity, the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah. The fighting men as a whole embody the principled spirit of loyalty to the front through exertion and sacrifice along the road toward implanting national unity in defense of the gains of the revolution."

He added, "The Popular Army's presence throughout the country has enabled it to stay abreast of our triumphant ideological army as it has waged battles of honor and dignity against the racist Persian enemy. The Popular Army will remain the true aide of our heroic army in all its seminal battles for the sake of the status

and sovereignty of our Arab homeland. Our war with the racist Persian enemy is the war of every sincere member of the populace, with all its human and material powers, expecially since it is the act of protecting people fortified by faith that has been and still is what draws the masses of our people, with the Arabs, Kurds and fraternal minorities among them, to their leadership and commanding party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party; it is the command in which it has placed its faith, through its ability to continue the march to attain all its goals of unity, freedom and socialism."

Defending the Nation's Soil

Sharing these feelings was Comrade Isma'il Ibrahim, the assistant commander of the sector and nominated member of the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, who said, "The relations dominating relations among the comrade fighting men are ones in which we all take pride and boast of. They arise from their deep belief in the justice of the cause for whose sake they will be fighting on the battlefield against Khomeyni's devious clique in order to restore our legitimate domestic and national rights to territory and water. This camp embodies the most splendid forms of national solidarity in defense of the soil of our precious Iraq, our glorious revolution and the gains and accomplishments that have been realized for us all through the years of bounty and prosperity which the glorious 17-30 July revolution have passed through in its glorious life."

Comrade Isma'il Ibrahim asserted, "The masses of our people, under the leadership of the hero of national liberation, the fighter Saddam Husayn, have expressed their full readiness seriously and effectively to contribute all their resource and power and put these into the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah until truth triumphs over falsehood. The presence of the fighting men of the commanding Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Revolutionary Party as a support reserve backing up our heroic armed forces has changed all the calculations of imperialism, reaction and Zionism. This participation on the part of the parties to the Domestic and National Progressive Front has given proof of the validity of the slogan of the command of the party and the revolution: Iraq is advancing."

Comrade Murshid Kazim al-Jannabi, staff officer in the sector, asserted "The camp acquires particular significance, distinct from other camps, by the fact that it includes fighting men from all national parties which have formed a coalition within the Domestic and National Progressive Front through the bases of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Kurdistan Revolutionary Party, in addition to the various segments of our people--Arabs, Kurds and other minorities. Therefore it represents a miniature picture of the unity of our fighting people in their resistance to the racist Persian aggression against our legitimate rights and it continues its training night and day during the training period set aside for it so that the fighting men may be prepared powerfully to take part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah."

The comrade staff officer of the sector vows to the command of the party and revolution, headed by the hero of national liberation, the fighting man Saddam Husayn, that they will remain soldiers loyal to the preservation of every sliver of soil in our beloved country and every drop of water in it: "We will continue to march forward to preserve the spirit of victory, seeking the aid of determination and wisdom from the guidance of the commander and the principles of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the glorious 17 July revolution."

The meaning of national unity grows like a flaming torch rising in a dawn forged by the concerns of men whose hearts have been filled with faith, sincerity and self-abnegation in sacrifice to the country and its glory and dignity. The fighting man Isma'il 'Abdallah Khamis and his son Ra'd stand proudly on the territory of the camp, both of them insistent and eager to head toward the battlefield and fight the enemy.

They assert "The battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah has restored dignity, honor and land usurped by the racist Persian enemy to the Arab homeland; our heroic army is waging today on assignment from the people in the country and the Arab nation. We are always prepared to sacrifice and deny ourselves in defense of our territory and water."

At this national wedding, the comrade fighting man Muhammad Hamzah Rashid, commander of the al-Maghawir base, stated "Saddam Husayn's soldiers have achieved the most splendid of victories against the racist Persian enemy in a new historic bloody struggle in which the spirit of self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of the soil of the beloved nation has manifested itself and in which the heroism of our immortal forefathers has been embodied."

He added, "We, as fighting men in the Popular Army, the strong support for our heroic armed forces, are standing in utmost readiness to perform our role of heading for the battlefronts to defend the eastern wing of the Arab nation so that the racist Persian enemy will bow down and acknowledge our legitimate rights to our land and territorial waters."

He is joined in these sentiments by the comrade fighting man Rashid Ahmad al-'Abbas, commander of the support base, who said, "It is a great honor for me to have been given the opportunity to take part in the battle of dignity and honor, the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah against the racist Persians, at a time when I am repeating the vow of self-denial and sacrifice for the sake of the country and the homeland, so that we may seize our legitimate rights to our land and waters. I offer the president and fighting commander Saddam Husayn, the hero of national liberation, the loftiest of verses of love and layalty, and we will remain faithful to our vow."

The comrade fighting man 'Abd-al-Karim Hadi al-Rabi'i, commander of Base Two, promises the leadership of the party and the revolution, headed by Commander Saddam Husayn, that he will exert greater self-sacrifice and effort until total victory is attained in the restoration of our usurped rights from the hands of the racist Persians.

The Heads of the Iraqis and Arabs Are Raised

The comrade fighting man Tahir Hasan Salman, commander of Group One in Base Five, states, "Proceeding from seminal solidarity, constant sacrifices by the party and the revolution, and layalty to the nation's soil, we offer our lives as a sacrifice in defending the glory and dignity of our nation against the deceit of the Persian aggressors in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiya which has raised the heads of the Iraqis and all Arabs high."

The comrade and fighting man Ra'd 'Abdallah Mukhlif, commander of Group Four in the support base, declares "The battle which the country of Iraq is waging, with its Arabs and Kurds and all its national political parties, allied in the context of the Domestic and National Progressive Front, under the leadership of the hero of national liberation, the fighting man Saddam Husayn, by delegation from the Arab nation, against the Persian aggressors, is the battle to defend the honor and dignity of the nation. The victories the soldiers of Saddam Husayn have won against the racist Persians are living proof of the power and courage of our Iraqi people as represented by their strong national unity."

The fighting man Isma'il Muhammad Bajaluri says, "The participation in the Popular Army by fighting men from parties which have formed a coalition in the Domestic and National Progressive Front is deepening and developing this front under the leadership of the commanding party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and I have the great honor to take part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah alongside the noble leaders of the 20th century who are dominating the fierce heroic battles in the battlefronts."

The fighting man Husayn 'Ali Haydar, nominee to the Central Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, is proud to belong to the Popular Army. He says, "I am experiencing happy moments at this training camp which embodies a fighting history replete with national unity in the context of the Domestic and National Progressive Front under the leadership of the commanding party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, the true spokesman of the past and present history of the motherland against the Persian aggressors."

He adds, "This camp is to be considered a living backup for the united trench of combat against the racist Persian enemy who is threatening the unity of the nation's territory and the course of our Iraqi people, Arabs, Kurds and fraternal minorities alike."

The fighting man Sirwan Nazim Sa'id says "The victories our heroic army has realized in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah against the Persian enemy are a source of pride for Iraqis and all Arabs, and my participation in this battle is to be considered a badge of honor for me which I will remain proud of all my life, because it is the battle of honor and dignity and defense of our fighting country."

Victory and Principles

In this sentiment, he is joined by the fighting men Subhi Salih Hamzah, Tahir Hasan Salman, Tariq Fadil al-Dabbas, Sa'di 'Awwad Jasim, 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhyi 'Abbas, Jabbar 'Abdallah, Shihab Ahmad Jawad, 'Abd Majid Salman and Walid 'Ubayd 'Aftan. They stress that the brilliant victories Saddam Husayn's troops, the valiant men of the 20th century, have made against the usurper Persian enemy are only a living embodiment of their deep faith in the goals and principles of their great party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and a true expression of their unswerving determination to preserve the spirit of victory, however long the battle may take and however intensely it may blaze.

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BATTLE EXPERIENCES OF POPULAR ARMY REVIEWED

Baghdad AL-JAYSH AL-SHA'BI in Arabic No 9, Jun 81 pp 78-83

/Article: "The Actual Situation of the Popular Army in Saddam's Qadisiyah"/

/Text/ Saddam's historic Qadisiyah has highlighted an unending series of unique examples of heroism and enthusiastic rushes forward to join in the ranks of the battle and race toward its arena in every manner and form which in some cases might seem stranger than fantasy.

These glorious fierce battles and our forefathers' great sacrifices throughout the lengthy, timeworn history of the Arabs took physical form once again, perhaps in clearer form, when they sacrificed everything, their life and precious possessions, for the sake of dignity, truth and glory.

The Popular Army, through its unique example, its distinctive characteristics, and its fighting combative role as a firm reserve for our heroic Iraqi army, has offered many such unique heroic examples, aiding the glories of the first al-Qadisiyah and embodying the concrete form of Iraq, which is proud of the territory of its nation and the rights of its homeland, rushing forward, filled with resolve, strength and enthusiasm, to defend every grain of Arab sand and believing with unshakeable, firm faith in its vanguard party, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, with its wise, sagacious leadership, headed by the unique commander, the hero Saddam Husayn, who has raised the head of the Arab homeland high for the first time after a long, deep slumber, restoring the glories of Sa'd ibn Abu Wiqas, Khalid ibn al-Walid, Salah-al-Din al-Ayyubi and other early Arab leaders and washing away the stain of successive defeats whose sources were cowardly rulers who did not believe in their people and did not properly perform the role of mass leaders because they were not nurtured in the ranks of the masses, did not live in their embrace, and did not assume power through their will, in order to express this will, so that they could lead them to victory instead of drowning them in a quagmire of defeat.

Endless Stories

The living stories of Saddam Husayn's troops, unique of their kind in modern Arab history, are endless, and one cannot end them, because more of them are being born every day, at every hour and minute, and because the simplest, most eloquent description of them are that they are a boundless sea of sacrifices, an unlimited

belief in struggle, and an insistence on attaining further victories and forcing the arrogant enemy to bow down and capitulate before our legitimate rights and interests. They are stories of heroism, self-denial and the raising of the banner of dignity so that it may flutter on high.

They are stories of the young men who have insisted on becoming fighting men and joining the ranks of the Popular Army, the way station to head for the front as quickly as possible.

There is the old man who insisted on bearing a rifle and entrenching himself in the forward lines of the front, in spite of the burden and load of years. There is the family which lost one or more martyrs and raised piercing cries when others went off to join the People's Army. Indeed, there is a cavalcade of martyrs that issued forth from one home, after which the home continued to sing and utter cries to Saddam's Qadisiyah.

There is the father who bore a rifle alongside his son, the two training together in the same detachment of the Popular Army; there is the disabled man who insisted on becoming a Popular Army fighter because he proved that he could pull a trigger and pass ammunition on to his fighting comrades. There is the mother who wished she had had more than one fighting man and another who boasted that she had enough to refresh her spirit and slake the thirst of her heart. There are people who left an easy life or a prominent job and insisted on becoming mere soldiers on the front. There are people who left their brides trailing behind in their wedding garb to spend their honeymoon on the firing line.

There are many numerous examples which cannot be counted or summed up. However, it would be a good idea for us to present examples of them, just examples, which might not reflect and embody everything that has happened and is happening in Saddam's Qadisiyah, but might be an eloquent, expressive picture speaking and relating true stories which have entered history through its widest gates and have become part of the legacy of the Popular Army, the legacy of the Iraqi fighting man, the legacy of this heroic people which has forged a new history of victories, glories and sacrifices.

Without taking the trouble to select, you will find fragments of living examples surging forward before your eyes, and each of them deserves to be an introduction. However, the problem is, where will we start?

Let it be with 'Abd Jawlan Hasan, from Jalula', a retired military man of 66, who joined the Popular Army because he found that his only two sons had gone to the firing line before him, and wondered why he should sit at home, since he was a trained military man who could become a successful fighting man challenging old age, which is no stronger than one's own resolve and is always weaker than faith.

Young But a Fighting Man!

Conversely, there is the fighting man Mundhir Khalaf Khurshid, just 17, who nonetheless joined the Popular Army when he was 14 and was working in the Department of Roads in Baghdad. Perhaps he now is one of the youngest fighting men at the front, although 'Ali Husayn 'Ali, a student born in 1964, vies with him for the

title of young combatant, since the latter is now the youngest warrior in Qasr-e Shirin. The fighting man Ibrahim 'Uthman al-Sakb, first secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, left his office and his four children and joined the Popular Army to be with his two brothers on the battlefront.

The Front First of All

The likes of the story of the fighting man 'Abd-al-Rida 'Ali Hasan, an employee in the al-Rafidayn Bank, New Baghdad Branch, are many. He was engaged and about to get married when the Persian aggression occurred and he asked leave of his fiancee to postpone the wedding. He had been a fighting man in the Popular Army since 1973 and had to answer the call to go to the front as soon as possible. At the front, when he found an opportunity to go through with his wedding, he was given a 3-day leave, which was sufficient for him and his fiancee to be linked by bonds of matrimony and then for him to return to the firing line.

The fighting man 'Abbas Salman, 51, from Jalula', has eight children and three brothers in the various branches of the army, all in the battlefronts.

The fighting man Muhammad 'Ali al-Jabburi, an employee of the General Automobile Company, has three brothers on the battlefronts. His fourth brother martyred himself on 8 January 1981 in the massacre of al-Khafajiyah and he is now waiting his turn to enter the fray.

The fighting man 'Adnan 'Abd-al-Rahim al-'Azzawi, 51, an educational supervisor in the Higher Council of the Comprehensive National Anti-Illiteracy Campaign, joined the Popular Army when it was formed. He has a brother at the front and five children at home; the oldest, 12, in the first intermediate grade, is constantly imploring his father to work to get him into the Popular Army.

The fighting man Qasim Muhammad Salih from the Khaniqin Base has four brothers in the battlefronts and hopes he will be the fifth.

From Khaniqin also is the fighting man Muzhir Shati' Bahr, 46, who left his 10 children in the care of their mother while he went to the Popular Army and the firing line.

The fighting man 'Abd Ibrahim Fallah, 44, has a son in the armed forces who was wounded in the fighting. The father rushed to complete his training in the Popular Army in order to take the place of his son lying in hospital on the firing line.

The fighting man Dr Nasir Husayn 'Ali insisted on temporarily leaving the medical profession, abandoning his position in the Ministry of Youth, carrying a rifle instead of a scalpel, and going to the place where he could defend Arab honor and protect the heroes of Arab dignity.

The Fighting Family

The story of the fighting man Muhammad 'Atiyah Laftah declares that all the members of his family are on the battlefronts, among the officers, noncommissioned

officers and troops; he, the father of eight sons, refused to be separated from his brothers and not become a brave fighting man like them, and thus it happened that he found himself a place in the Popular Army.

The fighting man Nuri Muhammad Shawqi, 52, left his job as the village chief in the 14 Ramadan section of Khaniqin and headed for the front, accompanying one of his eight children, with one of his brothers in his company.

In Qaratabbah, Karim Khalaf Ahmad did not find that his job as a guard in the municipal school could take the place of participating in the battle alongside his four brothers in the Armed Forces, and he became a fighting man in the Popular Army.

Although Muzhir Jasim Muhammad, a peasant in al-Wajihiyah, is in charge of looking after the wives and the three children of his brothers, who went to the battlefront, he found the time to join the Popular Army preparatory to going to the firing line as well.

In the town of Mandali, which was exposed to the first blows of the Persian enemy, Muhammad Husayn Nayil, an agricultural worker, rushed to join the Popular Army and be in the advance guard at Sayf Sa'd along with a brother. His third brother martyred himself in the Dezful sector on 20 November 1980 while fighting in a battle against the racist Persians.

The fighting man Khalaf 'Ali Yusuf, 45, one of whose sons is in the southern sector of the battlefront, is now preparing to go to the front at any moment, since the soil of the nation and its dignity and its rights are most precious.

The fighting man Muhammad 'Ali Husayn, whose three brothers are fighting in the ranks of our heroic army in al-Khafajiyah and Dezful, is continuing to train and wait for orders to go to the front.

Although the night guard 'Abd Muhammad Mustafa is 56 and has 10 children, he refused not to be a fighting man in the Popular Army in the al-Ghalibiyah sector, not to realize his dream and not to be given the opportunity to fight the racist Persians face to face.

The fighting man 'Abd-al-Salam Muhammad Nayif also has a distinguished story. He is a student in machine industry preparatory school and insisted on leaving his studies and joining the Popular Army as soon as the fighting with the Persian enemy started. However, the commander of the sector refused his request a number of times until his strong insistence paved the way for him to take his place on the line of fire in his sector.

The fighting man Khalil Ibrahim Dis has three brothers in the armed forces, but he joined the Popular Army in Khaniqin and went to the front.

The fighting man 'Abbas Hasan Salih of Jalula' joined the Popular Army when it was formed, in spite of his old age, then went to the firing line because he considered himself no less capable a fighting man than his two sons who are in the armed forces.

In 1976, the taxi driver Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hadi 'Ayyadi found the time to get trained in the ranks of the Popular Army, in spite of responsibility for his nine children, and he now is the commander of the group of one of his children who also joined the ranks of the Popular Army and has a brother in the ranks of the armed forces in al-Muhammarah.

Faith in the cause remains stronger than age and the weight of years: the fighting man 'Ali Murad Ahmad, also a driver, is 55 and has eight children. Nonetheless, he enrolled in the Popular Army in 1974 and prepared to chant the anthems of victory with his comrades at the front. The fighting man Talab Hamid 'Abd 'Ali a driver with the Pepsi Cola Company, also joined the Popular Army when it was founded; he is now more than 50 but nonetheless has borne a rifle and gone to the front.

There are other types of examples and samples represented by families which have given every child they have to the battle; in spite of family responsibilities and the demands of everyday life, the responsibility of defending the nation is always greater and preferable. Here let us present corresponding pictures in this regard.

The fighting man Ahmad Ibrahim Rahim, a groundwater worker, has two brothers in the army and the front and another with him in the Popular Army.

The fighting man Yahya Hassuni 'Ali, has two brothers engaged in war efforts as drivers of Chevrolet trucks.

The fighting man Shiri Zughayr, a government employee in Khaniqin customs, has three brothers in the armed forces who are fighting in the central, northern and southern fronts.

The fighting man Mahdi Salih Salim, a government employee, has two brothers at the front.

The son of the fighting man 'Abd-al-Husayn Shuwayn Sa'd, a retired military man, 48, is fighting in Sar-e Pol-e Zahab while his father is in another location at the front.

The two brothers of the fighting man Ayyub Ahmad Jasim, a retired commissioner, are in the army at the battlefront.

The fighting man Mumtaz Ilyas Na'um bade farewell to his job in the General Iraqi Exhibition Agency and his wife and joined his comrades at Qasr-e Shirin. He has a brother in the Hilwan Sector.

In the Qasr-e Shirin sector, the fighting man Jasim Muhammad Fathi also met his brother and they asserted their readiness to defend the nation and its dignity.

The fighting man 'Imad Hamid 'Inayah, an employee with the General Iron and Lumber Trading Company, said goodbye to his job and wife and went to a battlefront with a brother to take part in the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah.

The fighting man Kazim Sahi Mutlak is an example of a different kind; as soon as the Persian aggression occurred, he forgot his old age, 54, and his seven children, and joined the Popular Army on grounds that that is the way station for passage to the firing line.

Since the two brothers of government employee Jasim Nasif Jasim were at the battlefront, he found it "shameful" to remain in his town of Jalula', so volunteered and became a fighting man as well.

The Khaniqin operating and maintenance station has people to operate and maintain it now, but its manager, 'Adil Isma'il Khalil, preferred to become a fighting man at a base, like his brother who is fighting in the northern sector.

The fighting man Muhammad Husayn 'Ali, a government employee, has a brother in the armed forces who is fighting the racist Persians in the southern sector. He is married and has four children.

The fighting man Khalil Makki Jasim, a peasant, is 52 now but he joined the Popular Army when it was founded and is now a group commander. His brother is with him at the same base.

The fighting man 'Abdallah 'Abd Khalaf, a peasant, is fighting in the Popular Army and his brother is fighting in the ranks of our heroic army in the southern sector, as the brother of the fighting man Muhammad Khalid Hasan is fighting at Sayf Sa'd, the brother of the fighting man Badr Shakir Mahmud is a soldier at Qasr-e Shirin, the brother of the fighting man 'Abd Aswad Salim is a soldier in the northern sector, and the brother of fighting man Radi 'Abd Hamah, in a base at Khanaqin, had the honor of taking part in the historic crossing of the Karun River.

The fighting man Khalaf Hamad, a peasant, 53, has two brothers in the armed forces, one of whom took part in the battle to liberate al-Muhammarah, the fighting man 'Abd Daham Ibrahim, who joined the Popular Army in 1975, has two brothers on the firing line, the brother of the fighting man Kamal Tahir Mahmud Sa'di, who is trained in anti-aircraft activity and is helping to defend the nation's skies, is a soldier on one of the fronts, the fighting man 'Ali Husayn Latif, who is married and has eight children, has three brothers in the armed forces and on the front, the fighting man Salim Yasin Karkuz, a farm worker, is married, has five children and has a brother who is a deputy officer in the Dezful sector and another one in the Popular Army forces in the Qasr-e Shirin sector, the four brothers of the fighting man Muzhir Nasif Jasim are on the battlefronts, the brother of the fighting man Isma'il Malik Mahdi is a driver in the Iraqi Trading Company and is an officer on one of the fronts, the brother of the fighting man Hatim Muhammad Fathi, an employee in Agrarian Reform, is a fighting man at Qasr-e Shirin, and he himself has perhaps gone to the front in turn now, the fighting man Fadil 'Abd-al-Husayn 'Abdallah, a technician, and his brother are taking part in the combat in the Qasr-e Shirin sector, the fighting man 'Amir Muhammad 'Abd-al-Razzaq has two brothers with him in the Qasr-e Shirin sector, while the fighting man 'Abd-al-Khaliq Muhammad, a teacher, and his two brothers are in the same sector, and the fighting man Hasim 'Abd Khudayr, in the anti-aircraft forces, has a brother in the Popular Army, and they both are now in actual combat. The fighting man 'Abd Hamid 'Isa has two brothers fighting in Abadan and the northern sector, the combatant 'Ali Mansur Wahib, a working man, married with seven children, has two brothers with him at the battlefront, the fighting man Kazim Sarhank Hamid has three brothers at the front, the fighting man Husayn Fulayh Hasan, in anti-aircraft, has two brothers on the firing line, all three brothers of the fighting man Khudayr Muhammad Mahdi, a government chauffeur, are on the battlefront, as likewise the two brothers of the fighting man and peasant Khamis Khalaf Hasan are at the front,

the fighting man Yahya Khalid 'Abd-al-Majid has a brother with him in the Popular Army and another one who was wounded in the fierce battle of al-Muhammarah and hopes to recuperate quickly so he can return to the front, and the fighting man Muhammad Nasir Husayn and his two other brothers are at the front. All three brothers of the fighting man Salih Shati' Bahr are at the battlefronts, the fighting man Jamal Ghadami Hamid is now training to join the Qasr-e Shirin front with his other brother, the fighting man Ibrahim Salih 'Asi has children and all his four brothers are at the battlefront, the fighting man Muhammad 'Ali Hammadi, a government worker, has six children and three brothers in the Popular Army and the armed forces and they are all at the battlefronts, all three brothers of the fighting man Kazim Khidr Muhammad are in the armed forces and at the battlefronts, the fighting man Mahdi Ahmad Khalaf has two brothers fighting in the Sar-e Pol-e Zahab sector, and the fighting man Salih Ibrahim Husayn has a brother in the armed forces and another one in the Popular Army, at Sayf Sa'd.

Thus, as we have said, since the beginning, the models and examples have been innumerable and limitless, and therefore one can say that all we have mentioned are just drops in the sea of effort, self-negation and sacrifice which Saddam's Qadisiyah has created, because it has clearly and plainly reflected the results which have been deeply implanted in the spirits of the fighting masses of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and has underlined their deep roots and firmness, and expressed their vitality and effectiveness when it sounded the horns of the call for the defense of national territory, and the masses of these people, who are well-versed in combat and in fighting aggressors, surged forward to perform their duty, raise high the banners of combat, and rally around their wise leadership under the command of the heroic leader, the courageous Saddam Husayn. The amazing surge to volunteer and to enter the arena of battle took place, these tremendous sacrifices of exertion, abnegation and martyrdom occurred, and a firm national unity came into being in confronting the arrogant enemy who became fragmented and staggered with the first blows. There then occurred the insistence on seizing and maintaining victory and rejecting every form of concession or bargaining, which totally reflected the pan-Arab nature of the fighting and the Arabwide nature of the rights to land and water which Iraqis requesting, and there occurred the prominent vanguard role the Popular Army has played and is playing in the fray. The headlong rush to volunteer for the ranks of this army which is unique in its characteristics and distinguishing features on the part of young people and old, workers, peasants, shopkeepers, and employees from all social classes has been another brilliant, shining picture of Saddam's Qadisiyah, because this headlong rush in itself has expressed brilliant proof of the solidarity between the command and its masses and the forward march behind the unique leader, the hero of national liberation, and it has been inevitable that this headlong rush and forward surge, in their meaning, import and their circumstances, replete with values, faith, solidarity about the leadership and insistence on our legitimate rights, should bring these samples and examples, which stir pride and glory and renew the sacrifices, victories and glories of our forefathers, to the forefront.

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END

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21 September 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2401

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JPRS 79021

21 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2401

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PDRY SECRETARY GENERAL RECEIVES PALESTINIAN OFFICIALS

LD101918 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Supreme Assembly and of the Council of Ministers, at noon today received in his office at the Central Committee secretariat brothers Abu 'Ali Mustafa, assistant secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [PFLP]; Taysir Qubba'h, member of the front's political bureau; Taysir Khalid, member of the political bureau of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; and Nadim 'Abd al-Samad, member of the political bureau of the Lebanese Communist Party.

The secretary general discussed with them separately the development of the situation in the Lebanese arena and ways of reinforcing the struggle against Zionist imperialist designs. He assured them of Democratic Yemen's continued support for the Palestine revolution and the Lebanese nationalist movement.

The leaders of these delegations arrived in Aden this morning on their way to socialist Ethiopia to participate in the Ethiopian people's celebrations of the seventh anniversary of their revolution.

The leaders of these delegations made statements to the Aden News Agency in which they expressed their deep gratification for the tripartite summit held recently in Aden.

The brother assistant secretary general of the PFLP said it was regarded as a great and positive step towards real confrontation against the imperialist designs led by the United States. Brother Taysir Khalid said the treaty constitutes an important strategic step towards mobilizing the forces of liberation and progress in the region to confront the onslaught of American imperialism and its allies in the region. It is also regarded as a sincere fruit of the leaderships of the three countries and it will have a positive influence on peace and security in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean region. He added: The treaty will constitute a great boost for the pan-Arab front for steadfastness and confrontation and reinforce its [word indistinct] and capabilities to confront American imperialism and its allies in the region.

Brother Nadim Abd al-Samad said this treaty is regarded as a great achievement and it (?recorded) a very important historic event in the march of the Arab and African liberation struggle. He also stressed that this treaty constitutes a sound approach for achieving [word indistinct] against imperialist designs.

The delegations were received at the airport by Brother 'Ali Shayi Hadi, candidate member of the political bureau and chairman of the committee for [word indistinct] party control; and 'Abbas Zaki, PLO representative in Aden.

CSO: 4304/150

SENEGALESE PRESIDENT VIEWS RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS

GF102004 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Text] Senegalese President Abdou Diouf has lauded Saudi-Senegalese relations and has expressed gratitude for the aid Saudi Arabia has granted his country. He has also expressed his country's support for initiatives the kingdom is making to re-establish peace in the region. In a statement to the newspaper AL-MADINAH published today, he noted the areas of cooperation between his country and the kingdom and said: On the political level, we have always agreed on all major issues. Our views have always been identical, and this is the fruit of perpetual confidence and agreement between the leaders of both countries. On the cultural level, results have always been very good, particularly on the level of spiritual values, because we are an Islamic country and the kingdom is the cradle of Islam. He added: Our country attaches great significance to spiritual values in general and to Islamic civilization in particular and also to the Arab language, which has been the medium of this civilization.

On the economic level, the Senegalese president lauded the continued assistance the kingdom is giving Senegal. He added: Saudi Arabia will take part, to a great extent, in implementing the project to improve the Senegal River by constructing dams that will enable Senegal to have good agriculture and consequently to have better control of its water resources. We may resolve part of the energy problem in Senegal in the coming few years.

He said: The kingdom is also helping us on the national level. It has granted us important loans with attractive terms to relieve our budget.

The Senegalese president lauded the Saudi initiative to establish peace in the Middle East, which was proposed by Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz. He said: I congratulate Crown Prince Fahd for making this initiative.

The Senegalese president expressed joy over the success Saudi diplomacy has achieved in stopping the bloodshed in Lebanon. He said: We attach great importance to the kingdom's efforts in this vital field, and we express our total support for all initiatives the kingdom takes to establish peace in this part of the world.

CSO: 4304/150

COMMENTS ON URANIUM AGREEMENT

GF061620 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 6 Sep 81 p 2

[Article by Shakir al-Jawhari]

[Excerpts] Mauritanian Mines and Energy Minister Mohamed Moktar Ould Zamel has disclosed the presence of a plan that is being implemented through an agreement between Mauritanian and Iraq to extract uranium in Mauritania. In a statement to AL-WATAN he declared Mauritania's readiness to meet the needs of any Arab country for uranium when production begins--according to experts--within the next 3 years. He also said that Mauritania is also cooperating with Kuwait in geological research. He said that there is close cooperation between Mauritania and Iraq in carrying out research and special studies on the exploitation of uranium, in accordance with a cooperation agreement between the two countries concluded in May 1981 prior to the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. He said that an Iraqi geological team visited Mauritania after the reactor was bombed, as part of a regular program to exchange visits by ministries involved in cooperation in the field of mining between the two countries.

He said that the production of nuclear energy in Mauritania to replace oil requires several conditions, the most important of which is the availability of financial resources and the mastering of complex technology. He said that for these reasons no plan has been drawn up in Mauritania so far for the production of nuclear energy. He said that such a plan should be viewed within the framework of cooperation with friendly or fraternal countries that meet the above-mentioned conditions. He said that we are still discussing the appropriate framework for the best method to cooperate in geological research with Iraq, Kuwait and the Arab mining company. He declared Mauritania's readiness to supply any Arab country with uranium once production begins.

The Mauritanian mines and energy minister said that there is wide scope for cooperation between the two countries in the field of exploration for oil or other minerals. He declared Mauritania's support for the oil-producing countries in their confrontation with the industrial countries. He said Mauritania advocates the maintenance of current oil prices because they are close to the real value of oil. He said that this is one of OPEC's gains, particularly as the beneficiaries are Arab and Muslim countries.

CSO: 4304/150

MUSCAT RADIO REPLIES TO PDRY CHAIRMAN'S PRESS INTERVIEW

EA072018 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1315 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] In his statements to two Kuwaiti papers, AL-SIYASAH and [name indistinct], 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, head of the regime in Southern Yemen, claimed that the Aden treaty signed on 19 August by Libya, Ethiopia and Southern Yemen constitutes neither a new alliance nor a threat in anyway to the security of the Arabian peninsula; its aim is rather to bolster the Arab causes, particularly the Palestinian cause. It is a source of strength for the Arabs to face what he called imperialist and Zionist conspiracies. In the context of the declarations on dangers arising out of the treaty between Southern Yemen and the USSR, he expresses doubts over the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] and claims that the Sultanate of Oman's membership of the GCC raises doubts about the aims of this council. At the time when the GCC was being formed he also said that none of the member-states would enjoy stability.

To begin with we must concede that what the head of the regime in Southern Yemen has been saying in this connection is not indicative of his own views nor those of the communist regime which he heads in Aden. In fact, what he has been saying is nothing but insipid repetitions of Soviet allegations following the transformation of the Aden regime into a facade behind which Soviet colonialism hides and implements its suspect aims and designs in the region.

The agent regime in Aden came to realize that it was isolated from the Southern Yemen masses and that its survival and the perpetuation of its dominance over that Arab people depended on Soviet colonialism and the presence of the latter's forces in Aden. The top people of that regime realized that the Yemeni people in the south posed a real threat to their communist and atheistic regime and that they could not be safe unless they threw themselves completely into the lap of Soviet colonialism. Accordingly, in October 1979, they came up with the brilliant idea of concluding what they call a treaty of friendship and cooperation between their Marxist regime and the USSR. They needed that ill-starred treaty as an iron chain to shackle the Arab people in Southern Yemen and to confer sham legitimacy on the Soviet military presence there. The agent regime in Aden has turned Southern Yemen into a Soviet colony like a new Israel in the south of the Arabian peninsula to perform the task of fragmenting the Arab homeland and exporting saboteurs to the neighbouring countries in the Arabian peninsula.

The USSR then wanted to expand the circles to embrace the three Marxist regimes of Aden, Ethiopia and Libya in an unholy alliance. The outcome was the conspiracy of the Soviet treaty signed in Aden on 19 August this year, by these three Marxist regimes, thus turning Ali Nasir Muhammad, Mengistu Haile Mariam and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi into a gang of conspirators against the Arab-Muslim nation and its ongoing struggle, as well as a tool serving the Soviet expansionist strategy.

It was perhaps Soviet concern to have its own representative participate in every session of the conference attended by the three Marxist regimes that representative's drafting of the agenda and his chairing of the Joint Committee on Foreign Policy that prompted the international community to look upon the treaty signed by the three regimes as a treaty providing for Moscow's friends to look after Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf. This is an extremely important point which the Arab-Muslim nation ought to be aware of because it is a significant indication of the fact that the ill-started tripartite treaty has opened the door wide to Soviet expansionism and is a pretext for exacerbating tension and conflicts between the superpowers. This is so because the three regimes have agreed that Soviet advisers be attached to military units in Libya and agreed to provide the Soviet Navy with facilities.

It was this that prompted the GCC member-states to hasten to declare their condemnation of and opposition to this tripartite conspiratorial treaty when it was signed. Member-states of the nonaligned movement also condemned the Marxist regimes of Aden, Ethiopia and Libya for setting up a joint military command under Soviet tutelage, regarding the formation of the command as a stab in the back to the nonaligned movement and to its principles.

This is one of the conspiratorial axes the USSR was eager to create in implementing its objectives and designs and also to promote the interests of the agent regimes which have tied their interests to its own. For example, in his attempts to end the Eritrean question which has shaken his regime and caused it much sleeplessness and anxiety, Mengistu Mariam of Ethiopia has turned to his allies in the Kremlin for help to rid himself of the Eritrean question as they did earlier in the Ogaden war against Somalia. It now appears that Mengistu Mariam's aim in (?joining) the Libya-Aden-Ethiopia axis reflects the desire of the Ethiopian regime to participate within the circle of Soviet interests in return for support for his measures to prevent the Eritrean resistance from gaining independence from Ethiopia. The girdle of conspiracy embracing Aden and Addis Ababa caused the Aden authorities to hasten to expel the representatives of the Eritrean liberation movement from Southern Yemen out of concern to preserve the conspiratorial relations between the two regimes.

The three Marxist regimes also agreed to support al-Qadhdhafi's expansionist policy in Africa. For their part, the Soviets would influence national liberation movements in Africa to accept al-Qadhdhafi's control over them in return for his financing their operations.

Where, then, is the Arab-Muslim interest in all these suspect moves? What benefit do they hold for the Arab-Muslim nation, when included at the top of the list of items discussed by the heads of the three regimes--and this is borne out by reliable sources in Aden--was action against the GCC charter with the aim of

destabilizing the member-states? The hostility of the three Marxist regimes toward the GCC is an extension of the Soviet attitude and an echo of Soviet hostility to the setting up of the council. The Soviets regard the setting up of the GCC as a big and important step toward (?organizing) the Gulf states' own strength. Developing this youthful strength will enable the states to resist any threat to Gulf security. This is aimed at the heart of the Soviet expansionist strategy and the subversive activities the USSR hopes to carry out in this vital region.

The GCC assertion that defense of the Gulf's security is the primary concern of the states alone and no one else's is a categorical statement on the part of the member-states of the council, declaring unequivocally the rejection of any tutelage or external intervention, even as a pretext for their security. This naturally arouses Soviet concern. It also arouses the concern of its trumpets in Aden, Tripoli and Addis Ababa.

It appears that the head of the Aden regime harbors deep hostility to the GCC because, as he himself admits, nobody consulted him when it was formed. The fact is that the position of the GCC states in this regard is in conformity with the logic and nature of the situation, inasmuch as 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's regime in Aden does not represent the Yemeni people even remotely, but has separated itself from that Arab people and their aspirations for freedom and progress. He has sold his country's freedom to Soviet colonialism, which has turned Southern Yemen into a springboard and a center from which to threaten the Arabian peninsula. He has forced many Aden people to flee the hell of life under the communist regime, a regime that has robbed them of all vestiges of decency and imposed on them customs and traditions completely divorced from the tenents of Islam and from their mores and experience.

CSO: 4304/149

LIBERAL PARTY VIEWS RECENT AL-SADAT CLAMPDOWN

PM100838 Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 1

[Unattributed report: "No Retreat From Democracy"]

[Text] The General Secretariat of the Liberal Party has confirmed that the measures and decisions taken by the political command in order to contain the sectarian sedition is aimed at bringing into effect a correction which, from its viewpoint, is necessary in order to continue the march but without jeopardizing democracy or making us retreat.

At an extraordinary meeting held yesterday morning under the chairmanship of Mustafa Kamil Murad, leader of the Liberal Party, the General Secretariat asserted that the freedom which was established by the May Revolution and which has been consolidated by experience and practice in the past 10 years cannot be undermined. The problems of democracy, however difficult, cannot outweigh the evils of going back one day to the one-party and one-opinion system from which Egypt suffered for 19 years.

The General Secretariat stressed the need to continue with the democratic march, strengthening the party system, listening to contrary opinion and discussing it with argument and logic, and giving contrary opinion access to the national media, including the newspapers and television. It asserted that public opposition opinion from the national media creates the opportunity to the clandestine emergence of incorrect views which cannot be replied to or refuted, in which case the state finds itself forced to counteract with measures and decisions. National unity in Egypt is stronger than the attempts at jeopardizing it. The Liberal Party appeals to the whole nation to take a cohesive and close-knit stand in the face of any excesses, emotional reactions, or unwise behavior.

The Liberal Party, whose program stresses that the Islamic Shari'ah is the main source of legislation and which believes that Islam is the religion of worship as well as of relationship, supports President al-Sadat's statement that "there is no politics in religion and no religion in politics" because mixing religion with politics leads to contradictory results.

Although the political command acted within its constitutional right in taking the recent measures and decisions in order to protect national unity--the right vested

in it in Article 74 of the Constitution--the Liberal Party was hoping that nothing would happen to compel the political command to use such right. The party's General Secretariat has no doubt that the process of investigation and trial of those taken into custody will be carried out within the framework of the rule of law.

With regard to the referendum on these measures which is to be held next Thursday, the Liberal Party supports in principle the need to carry it out but the party adheres to what it has demanded in all the past referendums, namely that the referendum should be on each decision separately so that the answer with 'yes' or 'no' should not be given to all the decisions at once.

CSO: 4504/90

PLOTS HATCHED BY LIBYAN PRISONER

NC101003 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0635 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Text] Cairo, 10 Sep (MENA)--The state security intelligence in Alexandria has revealed that a Libyan agent, who has been sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor and who is confined to the Alexandria prison, has been trying, for 2 months, to stir up alarm in several big hotels, industrial companies and Muslim and Christian houses of worship by sending notes from inside the prison threatening to blow up these institutions.

In today's issue, AL-AHRAM says that these notes have contributed to stirring up sectarian sedition since the prisoner signed these notes: "The Lions of Islam," "The Christian Group of God's Revenge," the Group of "Khomeyni's Fury" and the Egyptian Communist Party.

The paper says these messages attacked the Egyptian regime, expressed contempt for it, and called for its overthrow.

The paper adds that after checking these messages the security personnel found that they were written by the same person and sent from various places in the city. After investigations lasting 2 months, the security personnel discovered their source, namely: Muhammad 'Abdah Qasim, 30, who is a Libyan agent serving a life sentence inside the Alexandria prison on charges of throwing explosives [presumably meaning a handgrenade] at the Casino Miramar in 1976. Adviser Sami al-Barbari, the public attorney of the Alexandria prosecution, summoned the defendant in the prison. To his surprise, the defendant confessed that it was he who had sent all of these messages.

The defendant said he used to hand the messages to any visitor who happened to visit the prison and asked him to put them in the mail without knowing their contents.

CSO: 4504/90

BRIEFS

WORKERS FEDERATION SUPPORTS AL-SADAT--The Federation of Egyptian Workers held an emergency meeting today under the chairmanship of Minister of Manpower Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, who is also the chairman of the federation. It issued a statement on the sectarian sedition plot, expressing full support of the decisions and measures announced by President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat to protect national unity and social justice and stem sectarian sedition. The statement calls on Egypt's workers to exercise their voting right by taking part in tomorrow's referendum on these decisions, which are a revolution in the field of domestic work. It also says that the general federation of Egyptian workers is proud of everything done by its rank and file workers to support, protect and strengthen the domestic front and establish social justice. It asserts that it considers the decisions of 5 September 1981 to be a new contribution to strengthening and supporting the edifice of prosperity for precious Egypt and its people under the leadership of President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat. [Text] [NC092042 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 9 Sep 81]

RESTRICTIONS ON ENTERING UNIVERSITY COMPOUNDS--President of Cairo University Dr Hasan Hamdi issued an order yesterday stipulating that entry of students to the university or the university campus should be by identity card and that every student must have an identity card permitting him to enter the university or its campus, so that non-students will not be able to enter the university compounds. The university president also issued an order banning any student from entering the university or its compounds and campuses wearing a long robe [jilbab], in view of the increasing number of students who enter the colleges and university campuses wearing long robes, which is contrary to university appearances and traditions. [Text] [Unattributed report: "Cairo University Bans Entry to University Without Identification or Wearing Robes"] [PM091608 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 8 Sep 81 p 1]

CSO: 4504/90

ISLAMIC IMPACT ON POLITICAL AFFAIRS DISCUSSED

World Revolution Movement

Tehran KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Aug 81 pp 6

[Interview with Hojjatoleslam Hadi Ghaffari]

[Text] Question: Would you tell us about the effect of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in other countries, and also about your recent trip to Europe?

Answer: What I am going to tell you is exactly what I've learned on this trip. The people of the world, excluding the oppressors, can be classified into three categories: the first group are the ordinary people who only care about earning their living and just want to live an ordinary life. They have nothing to do with political affairs. I remember the other day I met a Briton whom I asked if he knew anything about politics. He replied "no politics, no politics, long live beer!"

The second stratum are ordinary Muslims. They think of Islam but regrettably they lack political understanding and their rulers do not allow them to enter into such issues.

The third group includes the non-Islamic world of politics comprising either intellectuals or non-intellectuals; people who are really interested in learning about political affairs. Of course, there are non-Muslim freedom fighters among this group, like the Irish. They are now fighting to liberate themselves from the yoke of British colonialism and imperialism.

We should now see what our Islamic Revolution has done in connection with these three groups. In regard to the first class, the Iranian Islamic Revolution tries to at least provide them with the insight that life is not as simple as they think; that there are other issues which should be taken into consideration, issues like honor, freedom, poverty, oppression, and so forth.

"We should not only think of having our food on time and then await the week-end to have a sunbath in the warm weather of Manchester. There are certain other matters which are more essential. This was the first encounter thought it is very weak, nonetheless it has been started, thanks be to God.

In the second stage, we are faced with the Muslims of the world. The rulers of the Islamic countries have mostly been U.S. puppets directly or have followed the U.S. line indirectly. In order to preserve their oppression these rulers have always tried to keep the Muslims in a stiff situation, in a metamorphosized religion and mental colonialsim. Since these rulers are those endowed with authority they are doing whatever they wish.

I believe that our revolution has played a very significant role in this respect. It has inspired the hope in the nations of the world that they could do something and that something must be done. They should keep in mind the fact that for launching an effort the criterion is spiritual uprightness not power. This is something that our revolution has been able to convey to the world nation.

In a city, while abroad, I noticed a wall slogan saying, "Islam is always able to liberate, Iran is an example." We see that they talk about Islam as a liberating religion and as reference point they refer to Iran. Nevertheless, there are clumsy moves against the Islamic Revolution most of which are financially backed by the reactionary countries of the region. By so doing, the reactionary rulers are trying to prevent the spread of the Islamic Revolution in their own region.

In a futile bid to consolidate the shaky pillars of their power, they have started propaganda warfare against the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Saudi Arabia, for instance, is printing a paper in London on its own and in this way, it is trying to inflict blows upon our movement, through publishing distorted and biased stories about Iran.

Our revolution here has much to do particularly that it is in connection with the outside world. Our revolution is now inspiring the belief in the Muslims that they can rise up and they should rise up to liberate themselves from the yoke of the pupper regimes in the region.

The third issue is that of the non-Muslim fighters those freedom fighters; who are prepared for struggle, the Western intellectuals who attempt to escape Western colonialism and dictatorship. In this path our revolution would show them the way to rise. In Ireland, I experienced this and the Irish people told me that they wish to launch a revolution similar to the one made in Iran, that is, a revolution which would follow the ideal of 'No East, No West.'

Of course we told them that the key to our victory was not its 'No East, No West' policy. The main factor that made us win was the Islamic nature of our revolution. They were surprised that our ideology is directly concerned with politics, particularly because it is a religious ideology! I remember that I was told in the Sinn Fein political branch office in Ireland that the important and nice thing in regard to our revolution was that the Ulema were its vanguard. "But the clergy here are not with our revolution. When we are attacked and we want to flee they (the clergy) close the doors of churches to us under the excuse that church has nothing to do with politics."

In reply I said to them that Ulema in Iran were not only fighting along with the people but in fact they laid the foundation of the revolution. It was strange for them as to whether religion could be a factor in the movement. However, both

reactionary Christianity in Europe and Marxism which is also a reaction to a reactionary religion is separate from politics, that religion calls the people to kindness and cordiality. Here, the intellectuals are gradually learning that there is one way for salvation and that is one showed by Islam, of course, not the sort of Islam practiced by the reactionary leaders of the region but the one followed by the faithful and combatant revolutionary peoples, a pure Ismal without influence from the East or West. This in the West is the spark for a new movement, the starting point for an optimism which would hopefully end in a movement. This is something that Western intellectuals are gradually understanding. As I remember, there in Ireland one of the papers had published a prediction by a European years ago, that a man would come from Paris and would strengthen Islam and Muslims in the region, and that this would be followed by a strong movement.

This was even welcomed there and some of their writers even wrote that "Islam is the only religion for Europe!! This really shows that Islam has started its work as a movement. Our revolution should not forget to educate nations alien to Islam. They should be taught culture and ideology. It is regrettable that due to certain reasons our propaganda means are weak. In Europe all the political groupings have radio stations. There are special newspapers, with special messages. They even want to send their papers to the parliament. But to express Islam we are lacking the least facilities and our enemies are very active against us.

Question: How do you view the Irish problem, particularly after your trip there? What are the current questions, struggles and the issues of the movement in Ireland?

Answer: The Irish people have embarked on a struggle that dates back 700 years. During the last three centuries, Britain has put all weak nations, particularly this country, under great pressure. Like other nations, North Ireland has been subjected to pressure, too. The Irish people insist that they seek independence and they do not want to be under the British yoke. But Britain has formally dispatched her soldiers there who roam about and, like a sharptoothed tiger about to jump on its prey, lie in wait in the public thoroughfares of Ireland. I saw myself that they were hunting for people in Belfast.

What I saw was fire, anger, aggression and the British antibomb tanks well-established in cities. The mercenary British soldiers wanted to control all the places and openings of the cities. At the same time, the Irish people who think that they should fight against the British, have not relinquished their struggle. Although our publicity is not at a low level, and despite our adamant defense of all nations seeking liberation, nonetheless many nations do not know that we support them. My recent trip to Belfast in Ireland showed this question very clearly. They asked whether we defended their movement.

When I told them that not only us, but the leader of our revolution as well, support all liberation movements, they were extremely surprised. When we visited Kiernan Doherty's house and presented them with an enamel frame, adorned with Imam's photograph, they were surprised to see a religious leader supporting their revolution. That was because they were witnessing their own clergymen supporting reaction, not revolutionary movements, and were shutting them off from the churches.

During the two and half hours we were attending Kiernan Doherty's funeral at the church, the priest was making the holy wine, the so-called Christ's blood and bottling it. He did not breathe a word about politics or say that they had died as the result of a hunger strike. His sermon revolved round Christ, the wine and so forth. When they heard that we, as the people's deputies in Parliament, supported their struggles, they were surprised.

Of course, the British tailed us step by step everywhere. When we reached Belfast, they kept us waiting. They arrested and imprisoned the brother who acted as our guide, and who led us from Sinn Fien branch to towns, and made it forbidden for anyone to visit him. I think he is still in prison. They told us that they did not have enough budget to pay for our hotel expenses.

They are so poor. Some anti-British imperialist countries are not prepared to help them, because they say that they are neither Eastern nor Western. They told us that it would be necessary for us to pay food expenses ourselves. In fact, they are fighting under conditions of extreme poverty. One day we had lunch in company, with some friends from Northern Ireland. We volunteered to pay for their lunch but not for their wine or other drinks, saying that although alcoholic beverages were permissible in their religion, they were forbidden in ours, and that we would not touch them.

They were surprised to see that despite our feeling of cordiality we would not tresspass the boundary of our religious beliefs. We explained our direction and attitude and said that we do only those things that are not prohibited. We said how it was possible that alcohol consumption could be permissible in a divine religion. They were surprised at this, because they considered us as political figures only. To this we replied, that for us, religion and politics were inseparable.

While we were attending the funderal ceremony, three helicopters were closely watching me and Mr Sabah Zangeneh, the Majlis deputy. A fighter plane was also flying overhead. At the last moments of the ceremony, the police raided, and started looking for the members of the secret Republican Army among the crowd of mourners.

Attendance of a delegation from Iran was a source of surprise for them, particularly as Kiernan Doherty was a deputy from South Ireland in the British Parliament. They were surprised to hear that we had gone there to attend a Qods ceremony, and that Qods was the day for liberation of all mostaz'af people. One of them said that at a time when we were fighting against Iraq along 800 kilometers front, and also compaigning against splinter groups in the Interior, and also were grappling with so many difficulties, how could we deal with problems outside the country?

We replied that it was an indication that we did not neglect world problems and did not consider ourselves apart from other nations, which was surprising for them. They wanted us to make that trip again, stating that it would strengthen their position against Britain. An Englishman asked in a gathering whether our trip to North Ireland would not amount to the interference in the internal affairs of Britain. We replied that we simply wanted to support a liberation movement that was seeking to rid itself from the yoke of British despotism.

World Potential of Islam

Tehran KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 29 Aug 31 p 3

[Article by Kalim Siddiqi]

[Text] Nevertheless, we must admit that these Islamic movements, by and large, did not achieve the major objectives that they set out to achieve. Their achievements have been very considerable and we must not belittle them. There is a great deal that we must learn from them. But there are also a great many lessons we must learn from their experience. And one of the lessons to which I want to refer in particular is that no Islamic revolution is possible in any country anywhere in the world following the democratic method. In fact, in my submission to you, there is no such thing as a democratic method of change. Democracy is an instrument of the status quo. Democracy does not tolerate change beyond a narrow band of variation within an existing system. Democracy has a history of development in post-industrial Europe. During this period the tensions created by the industrial revolution in European societies had to be adjusted and mitigated. The landed aristocracy had to be defenced and allowed time to transform itself into an industrial aristocracy. The feudal political system was defended against any major social change. Democracy was invented to serve this purpose. The same democratic process has been used by our political masters in Muslim countries to protect the feudal system there. Because there is a requirement to follow the method of shura in Islam, Muslim thinkers have fallen into the trap of thinking that this western democracy, this European democracy, was somehow the model of shura, a method of consultation that Allah enjoined upon us. They completely failed to understand the social, economic and political conditions that gave rise to this particular political system which we know by the name of democracy. The true nature of democracy completely deceived the Muslim thinkers who recommended that we or the Islamic movement itself should follow a democratic process. The moment you accept the democratic process you accept the legitimacy of the existing system as one which can be worked according to some of the rules of that very system; you lose your independence and become a prisoner of the existing system. Once that happens, all the doors are closed against the Islamic movement. This we have seen happening in the Sudan and in Pakistan. In Iran, on the other hand, the Islamic movement has achieved an enormous success, a success which could not have been even dreamt of only a few short months ago. The success achieved by the Islamic movement in Iran was due to a very simple expedient--the total and relentless opposition of the system prevailing in Iran. No compromise was made. The finger of accusation was pointed by the Islamic movement at the Shah and his system and this finger remained pointed regardless of what forces were thrown against it. The whole system was challenged and all its corruption was exposed. The masses of Iran erupted, revolted like one man, because despite all the so-called modernisation of Iran, the people of Iran are Muslims, their political culture is Islamic, their values are Islamic. By teaching somebody English you do not change his political culture. By putting him in trousers you do not change his political culture. This has been proved in Iran. It has also been proved that no matter how westernised the student body of Iran, of Tehran, of the universities of Iran, once the leadership offered the alternative and the credibility that is essential for a leadership, the people of Iran, the modern

sector, the westernised sector, left the existing regime and joined the Islamic movement of Iran. This is one of the greatest events in the whole history of Islam. People who have been divided into these two groups, the traditional sector and the modern sector, came together. Their coming together was never predicted by the political science of the west. This is what has caused the greatest bewilderment among the western political scientists: that they cannot understand how these people, who had been 'civilised' by their education, could follow this 'bearded mullah.' The fact of the matter is that these are not two people. Simply because they wear different clothes, simply because they have been put through two different traditions of education, of knowledge, they have not become two different people. The coming together of the traditional sector and the modern sector produces an unbeatable combination in terms of political, social and economic force in any society. My hope is that the model that Iran today represents of an Islamic movement challenging, defeating an existing system is a model which will be repeated all over the Muslim world within the next few years.

The regimes that surround Iran will be falling like nine-pins in a very short time, insha'Allah. But pushing a regime over is only half the story. The other half of the story is of picking up the pieces and rebuilding. In the last two hundred years we have lived though a hurricane of history blowing through our countries. Everything good has been destroyed except the will and the spirit of our people. We now have an enormously important job to do in rebuilding our socieites as they go through the revolutionary process one after another. This is where I want to draw your attention to the present situation in Iran. It is imperative for the revolutionary government and leadership in Iran that they should challenge and defeat all the remnants of the old system within Iran and their agents outside Iran. Let no one feel weak-kneed about it being un-Islamic to hold hostages and so on. Please remember that this Revolution is an Islamic Revolution. Once you accept that, your support for this Revolution cannot be conditional. You have to leave it to the leadership of that Revolution to decide what action is necessary to protect and promote that Revolution. You and I do not have the option, the choice, of sitting in judgement on that Revolution and that leadership. We must support that leadership and that Revolution in its totality without any reservation and without any weakness on our part. Weakness on our part is what our enemies are looking for, both inside and outside Iran. From outside Iran we can help this Revolution, we can give this Revolution our full support in every possible way that the Revolution might need and desire. We must not be seen to waver in our support of the Revolution.

We hope, insha'Allah, that the Islamic movement in the rest of the Muslim world will soon readjust, draw the obvious lessons, and a new Islamic movement will arise in the image of Iran.

Thus, the state of the Muslim world in the year 1400 is one of grim darkness, broken only by a flash of light in Iran. But this flash of light is strong enough for us to see the future that lies ahead, that can lie ahead, if only we can rise above our petty self-interests and pool our intellectual, spiritual and material resources in the pursuit of the collective goals of the Ummah. But the collective goals of the Ummah need to be articulated. The present situation is that the generation to which I belong is the worst generation ever to grow up among Muslims. We are people who misled the Ummah, in the name of nationalism,

in the name of capitalism, in the name of this -ism and that-ism. We tried to mix Islam with capitalism, nationalism, and with socialism. We are the people who have totally failed. We have nothing to show for it. But those of you who are in your twenties, you have a chance to take up this challenge of history and rebuild our society, to forget the bad dream of the colonial and the neo-colonial periods. The so-called leaders of solidarity, the so-called charismatic leaders, the nationalist leaders, the 'fathers' of the nation, the great parties that brought our countries to 'independence,' they were all products of a very low period in our history. Having realised what these so-called great people and the great parties were and are, we have the responsibility of producing something better in their place for the future.

Within the Ummah today there are Muslims in such countries as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Eritrea and the Philippines who are starving. You have other countries where they do not know what to do with their money except to put it in American banks, eventually to lose it altogether. We have all this and yet there is still plenty of oil where the other oil came from. It is not oil that makes history, it is the human material that makes the difference. We have seen that no amount of fire power that America and its agents could bring to bear could defeat the Islamic movement in Iran. No amount of fire power that France could bring to bear could defeat the Algerians.

War Effort of Moslem Tribes

Tehran KEYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 31 August 81 p 8

[Text] Sincere and brotherly Relations between the Valiant Muslim Tribesmen and Revolutionary Guards

In the Name of Allah, the Beneficent, the Merciful

There are various ethnic groups living in Iran such as the Kurd, Lor, Turk, Baluch, Torkaman, who have apparent differences with each other in view of their cultural outlook.

The sworn enemies of the Islamic Revolution, on the basis of such cultural differences, and under the cover of "autonomy" scattered throughout Iran, in order to intensify the internal clashes and contradictions... have slyly tried to place the "Kurd," "Lor," "Turk," "Baluch," and "Arab" brothers versus the Islamic Revolution so as to prevent any kind of fundamental reforms in the economic, social and cultural affairs of the country.

Since the tribesmen of Iran are valiant and combatant, the shah's regime imposed various deprivations upon them in order to prevent their growth and cohesion, such that the tribesmen living in the west of Iran particularly the "Kurds" were among the most deprived people.

The "superpowers" and their internal agents too, laid stress more than any other tribe on the "Kurd" nation because there were already prepared, in the western regions, suitable grounds for them such as "religious difference," "nationalistic

emotions" and "cultural poverty" as well as the existence of feudal lords, "Khans" and dependent "personalities."

The SAVAK (members of the shah's secret police), the fugitive members of the shah's army and the gang of the defunct Salarjaf, all led by the shah's Lieutenant-General Palizban, formed a sinister front against the young regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Supported by the alient powers including the mercenary regime in Iraq and with collaboration from the political cliques of the region, they launched local raids on the outposts and military columns stationed at the border strip. They tried to fan the flame of internal discords and create rifts between the Shi'ite and Sunni Muslims.

They took captive, tortured and martyred the self-sacrificing members of the Construction Jihad in order to prevent the development and construction of the region... In this way they prepared grounds to weaken the rule of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the western region, for the invasion of foreign troops.

From the very early days after the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the West and the East-inclined groups floundered to sow discords within the government of the Islamic Republic as well as within the various people and tribes of Iran. By taking advantage of ethnic differences and raising the question of dialects, dress, sects, and so on, they tried to weaken the pillars of the Islamic Republic.

But the closed-hearted are not aware of the fact that Islam, according to the following verse of Quran, invites all varying groups of people toward piety under the shadow of brotherhood, equality and cooperation: "O you men! Surely We have created you of a male and a female, and made you tribes and families that you may know each other; surely the most honorable of you with Allah is the one among you most careful (of his duty). (Quran, Surah Hujurat: 13)

Islam tries to familiarize various people and nations with the cultures of each other, and the variety of the people of every country from the view point of Islam is like a garden which has many different flowers.

Fortunately, in the course of the war imposed on Iran by the Iraqi regime, in spite of the poisonous propaganda launched by the enemy and its internal agents, the valiant tribesmen of western Iran, inspite of cultural differences, are fighting together against the enemy in order to safeguard the achievements of the Islamic Revolution and expel the aggressors from the soil of their Islamic homeland: As the Imam of Ummat (people) said, "War is war, and the honor and dignity of our religion and homeland depend on these struggles."

With the beginning of the imposed war, a large part of the winter pastures of the "Guran" and "Gholkhani" tribes as well as the "Jigiran" and "Dasht-e Mish" deserts, the Gilan-e Gharb, were occupied by the Ba'athist mercenaries.

As we know the war broke out when the cattle were migrating to the winter pastures, in September 1980. Therefore, a large number of them were killed. Now

the major part of clashes are in the winter quarters of the region, the pastures have incessantly been under the rain of the enemy's shelling. Most of them are burned and even the farming products which are the fruit of the round-the-clock activities of the youths from the Construction Jihad, have become the prey of the Iraqi/American enemies fire.

Most of the members of the Mobilization of the Oppressed, stationed at the western fronts, and thousands of the Muslim tribesmen are combatting the unbelievers in the various fronts of Marivan, Sanandaj, Jamyaran, Nowsud, Ravansar, Kharajian, Kivian, Sar-e Pol-e Zahab, Gilan-e Gharb, Sumar, Kerend, etc.

Although these tribes speak in various tongues such as "Lor," "Lak," "Jaf," "Kurdish," ect., and notwithstanding that under the reign of the former regime, some of these tribes had hostilities with each other and sometimes they had clashes which even ended in plundering and killing, now these various tribes and people have become unified as a result of the Islamic Revolution and are fighting the Iraqi aggressors together.

The heroic tribesmen as of May 16, 1981 have offered sixty-five martyrs to the glorious caravan of the martyrs of Islam. May their names and efforts last forever.

In addition, 72 of them have been wounded in the war and seven others have been captured by the Iraqi invaders.

Although these tribesmen follow various sects such as Shi'ism, Sunnite and Ahle-Hagh, (and this is what the enemies try to take advantage of) with their round-the-clock efforts, under the auspices of the Islamic Revolution, and with the cooperation of other Muslim soldiers are isolating the enemies in all war fronts.

High Morale

The tribesmen are symbols of self-sacrifice and resistance. Their unlimited bravery and devotion not only prevented the enemy from advancing a step forward since the first half of Mehr, 1359 (Oct. 1, 1980), but the invading troops have been forced to retreat. Particularly in the first weeks of the war, the enemy was faced with a power emanated from the heart of the oppressed masses: something he had never taken into account in his military equations and calculations.

The combatant Muslim tribesmen of Gilan-e Gharb forced the Iraqi troops to retreat with heavy casualties and they even advanced into the heart of the enemy.

They changed the town to a strong fortress. The burnt wreckage of the enemy's military vehicles and tanks in the region of Gilan-e Gharb show the strength of the blows the Iraqi Ba'athist regime has received from the popular Iranian forces.

The tribesmen enjoy a very high morale and their hearts overflow with faith in God, love for the Imam and the Islamic Republic. They are in perfect readiness

for military operations and no fear can penetrate their hearts in the face of the enemy.

Among these brothers are seen individuals of various ages ranging from 15 year old boys to old men aged between 70 and 80. In short, these mobilized forces are a powerful arm for the Revolution.

The tribesmen have voluntarily come to the battlefield and have enthusiastically welcomed martyrdom. They have not come to the fronts for rank or position, but they have set out on a way the aim of which is victory over atheism and liberating the occupied regions. They follow this aim with hearts enlightened by faith. It makes no difference for them either if they be crushed under the Iraqi tanks or their bodies remain for months on the peaks of Bazi Deraz. The branch of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Kermanshahan (Western Iran) has set up many bases in the region in order to mobilize the Muslim tribesmen, enroll them and dispatch the volunteers to the war zones.

The presence of the tribesmen in the fronts is considered a strong dam against the surprise attacks of the enemy, such that the enemy has not managed to make any advances.

The volunteer tribesmen, having risen from the midst of the deprived masses, and proceed to the war fronts in groups with the deep feeling they have for the Islamic homeland.

At the beginning of the war when the military potential of the IRGC was still limited, the presence of the tribesmen in the fronts with their arms had a special importance. On the other hand, they had no need to undergo instructions how to use "Berno" and "M1" guns.

The various seminars of tribes which are held occasionally in the western region, not only encourage the tribesmen's morale, but also prepare grounds to further dispatch them to the fronts.

In this way, the tribesmen from different tribes become familiar with the tongues, customs and morality of each other, the walls of fear and obscurity collapse, and the imaginary border which have been inherited from the past are eliminated.

Even those groups which tried to separate the Kurds from the Islamic homeland under the guise of nationalistic and chauvinistic slogans such as "Pan Kurdism," had to retreat in the face of the active and constant presence of the tribesmen on the scene.

In addition, the tribesmen have an urgent need in this region for securtiy, because the mercenary armed bandits and invaders who have been prevented from smuggling, theft and plundering are now causing troubles for the people of the region. However, the valiant tribesmen do not accept dependence and expel the bandits with the help of the IRGC.

In conclusion, the organic, constant and sincere relations between the IRGC and the tribesmen of the region has raised their confidence in the IRGC.

Now, the tribesmen not only supply manpower to the IRGC, but also by presenting their own arms to this foundation and taking proper licenses from the IRGC to keep the arms, their confidence has increased to such an extent that for instance at the last Friday of the year 1359, when the IRGC decided that the tribesmen take part in a march without their arms, they readily delivered 2,000 guns of theirs to the IRGC and after the march they received them back.

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IDEOLOGICAL STANDS BECOMING MORE STRIDENT

United Islamic Front

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 24, 29, 30, 31 Aug and 2 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] The very essence of global oppressive forces, a host of plots hatched by them and their domestic agents, during the course of nearly 18 years that have passed since the inception of Iran's Islamic movement, coupled with their ugly performance, all go to indicate that the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which was thought by them that would fall an easy prey to them, has proved to be otherwise. The revolutionary reasoning, the tactic of taking the enemy by surprise, and also the Islamic awareness demand that the revolutionary Muslims in Iran as well as the numberless supporters of Islam in the world should every moment, at every step, and with every move, remain completely cautious of th traps that are being laid in their way. In the same way as it is an acknowledged truth that the anti-revolutionary elements act in a continuous sequence, this cautioning principle should also hold that the genuine revolutionary Muslim forces, too, should undertake their surprise or pre-emptive moves in such a collective manner that the anti-revolutionaries are entrapped by them irrespective of their existence anywhere.

Presently, the anti-revolutionary spectrum is composed of the superpowers and their regional and domestic associates in different forms and garbs. The United States, similar to a bloodthirsty wolf greedily preying upon an innocent lamb represented by the Islamic Revolution, is, in itself, masterminding all the subversive plots that have taken place since the inception of the initial victory of this revolution. In the pursuit of its filthy designs, it takes advantage of even the trifle of an opportunity to inflict a blow upon the Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, if we bypass all such subservient mercenaries of America in the region as the treacherous Sadat and some of the reactionary Arab heads of state, then we come to note that the Palestine-occupying Zionist regime poses the greatest danger to the Islamic Revolution. The enmity of the usurper Israel is not only due to the fact that it no more receive even a single drop of crude from Iran, and that not even a single commodity from that country is imported into Iran, but the fright of the Tel Aviv regime mostly originates from the fact that the Islamic Revolution of Iran doesn't consider the struggle against oppression separate from the one against Zionism.

The murderous leaders in Tel Aviv know it well that no sooner the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran find themselves at ease from the Iraqi-imposed war, than America and Saddam Takriti should prepare themselves for receiving blows from Islamic militarymen who consider the liberation of Jerusalem and return of the homeless Palestinians to their enemy-usurped homeland as one of the most important objectives of the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

There also exist the domestic enemies of the Islamic Revolution whom we mention here only to affirm our recognition of them rather than from the viewpoint of the danger that they present to the Islamic Revolution. It might perhaps seem a surprise to some people that we don't speak here of the puppet Iraqi regime which has launched an open and blatant aggression against the Islamic Republic. Of course it is perfectly true that at present, the regime of Saddam Hossein is posing the worst face-to-face danger to the Islamic Revolution, but it is also true, at the same time, that Saddam hasn't embarked on launching an attack against our Islamic state merely on his own accord. Therefore, since Islam has endowed us with a revolutionary outlook, we would probe into the root-cause of these issues. We thoroughly believe that the aggressive Iraqi forces have resorted to such an action upon the orders of America and with the approval of Israel. Perhaps there might be some individuals who could accuse us of making a hollow talk without having duly investigated the matter. To them, we would like to present just one out of a thousand arguments since there isn't sufficient time at our disposal to mention them all together.

When Israeli warplanes bombed the Iraqi atomic reactor at Tamouz, Saddam began to make much clamour alleging that his regime was the most dangerous enemy of Israel, and that was the reason why Baghdad was attacked by the Tel Aviv regime. He went so far in this propaganda campaign as to claim that the map of the Tamouz installations was supplied to Israel by Iran. However, when the issue figured at the United Nations, there suddenly emerged Sa'adoun Hammadi on the scene in New York, and met with Kirkpatrick, the U.S. Representative at the United Nations.

After the mutual agreement of the two countries, a resolution was issued by the U.N. Security Council whose implementation was neither approved nor vetoed by America. Immediately afterwards, the U.S. Representative at the United Nations told the Voice of America in an interview that "this resolution safeguarded American interests in the Middle East, apart from preserving the U.S. prestige." In other words, had Iraq not submitted to the American conditions, the United States would have been compelled to veto the resolution. Such an act would have once again explicitly shown that America, as in the past, continued to be inimical towards the Muslim nations, especially the Arab Muslims in the Middle East. Ironically enough, the submissive attitude of the Baghdad regime culminated in the fact that America, according to comments of its representative at the United Nations, had the gratification of "seeing its interests safeguarded in the Middle East."

Nevertheless, we hold the belief that Saddam, with his regime, is a puppet agent. If the case was really anything other than this, then why should the French colonialists and the British plunderers supply weapons and equip the army of Saddam on purpose? Does anyone of the big powers in the West agree to extend military aid, without any attached strings, to a country without the beneficiary ensuring its unlawful interests there?

In the light of the reasoning given above, it can be said that the enemies of the Islamic Revolution have bent themselves upon hitting the Islamic Revolution of Iran from several directions and by all possible venues. The basic question now to be asked is: What harm does this Revolution bring to the superpowers that they, and especially the world-devouring America, are utilizing all of their vast resources for victimizing it? Of course, while putting forth this question, we are fully aware that anti-revolutionary nature is basically representative of the plunderous American regime. We will answer this question in our tomorrow's editorial.

Anti-Zionist Campaign

[Editorial by Zainab: "History, Mass Consciousness Debunk Imperialists Propaganda"]

[Text]

In spite of the futile and unsuccessful attempts of Zionist and imperialist loudspeakers to distort and damage the glory of the Islamic Revolution, the mostaz'afin and particularly liberation movements of the world have proven that peoples of the world are consciously aware of the authenticity of the Islamic movement and of the corrupt nature of world arrogance.

The insane claim that the imperialist media orchestrated concerning the Iranian arms purchase from the Qods occupying regime formed another link in the long chain of American efforts to defame the Islamic Revolution of Iran in the eyes of the downtrodden masses who have been increasingly inspired by its line of thought and practice. Interestingly enough being aware of the unfaltering hatred of Muslims for Zionism and the constant condemnation of this aggressive force in the eyes of the deprived peoples of the world, America thought it could divert the hopes and aspirations of the nations by relating Iran to Israel.

Being arrogant and too self-confident of its conspiracies, America speculated it could make the world believe the white dove was black and that the ominous night was a lively day and so forth.

As it had succeeded dominating the information service for many years, the CIA believed this propaganda tactic would affect and paralyze the process of the Islamic Revolution's exportation. As always, the narrow minded political brokers of the CIA and Pentagon took all factors into consideration except the force which motivated this revolution from the start.

The Muslim masses of the world, whether those who brought about this unique movement in Iran, or those who

faithfully supported its motives from the remote corners of the world witnessed how the untiring leader of this movement, Imam Khomeini, had launched an anti-Zionist campaign simultaneously with his struggle against America in 1962. At that time, Imam warned the Muslims of the ever increasing dangers of the Qods occupying regime and courageously announced amidst that tense atmosphere of suppression that "Israel must be destroyed". The Iranian nation, suffering from the relentless blows of the American Pahlavi regime, remember the revolutionary "fatwa" (religious decree) of Imam Khomeini which clearly urged Muslims to financially support the Palestinian warriors, and if possible even participate alongside the Palestinians in the war against the Zionists. This fatwa was the first of its kind from any alim of the Muslim world and it caused a major movement in support of Palestine in Iran. Following the treacherous Camp David accord in 1976, Imam sent a message from Najaf where he explicitly condemned any compromise or even negotiation with the Zionists.

As the Islamic Revolution began, the world witnessed the anti-Zionist spirit which flowed in every slogan the masses chanted and every declaration they made. When the primary stage of the Islamic Revolution had not yet succeeded, millions were chanting in the streets of Tehran: "Today Iran, Tomorrow Palestine". Only hours after the establishment of the provisional Islamic government, the despised Israeli Embassy was occupied by the Muslim revolutionary forces and the Palestinian Embassy was established in its place. Simultaneously the first foreign policy position taken by the newly established republic was the prevention of any oil sales to the Qods occupying regime.

In Ramadhan of that year, Imam announced the last Friday of that month to be the universal Day of Qods as a gesture of support for not only the Palestinians but all downtrodden nations struggling for their liberation. Finally, this wholehearted support for Palestine among the Muslim people and the internal media even led to the decision to delete the word "Israel" from all news reports and analysis and replace it with the phrase "Qods occupying regime".

The revolutionary stance of all liberation movements against the false imperialist allegations of continuing Iranian relations with Israel indicates that today the imperialists are faced with the awakened Muslim masses who have determined to take their destinies in their own hands.

In spite of these attempts Muslims shall proceed on the basis of Islam and not nationalism and in the line of struggle and not compromise to purge Israel and imperialism and all arrogance from the face of this earth.

36-Million Intelligence Network

[Editorial: "They Aim To Extinguish the Light of Allah With Their Mouths"]

[Text]

When man submits to Allah, and allows the rays of the eternal light of God to be projected upon his heart, he begins to comprehend the limitless dimensions of the unfailing light, the beauty and absolute perfection of his Cherisher. Through the discernment and understanding of Allah, man who is a perfection-seeker by nature, develops certain very strong ties of adoration and obedience and consequently Islam becomes his sole concern and Allah his only goal. At that stage of recognition man feels committed and devoted to do all he can, and to sacrifice all he possesses for the defense of Islam and the implementation of its edicts.

This has been the basic philosophy which has compelled the Muslim masses of Iran to proceed to the extent of self-sacrifice for the defense of the Islamic Republic is considered to be a manifestation of the genuine Islam.

As is evident for all, world arrogance has embarked on a boundless offensive against the Islamic Revolution since it blossomed in Iran. This offensive, which has taken shape in each time interval and in accordance with the prevailing circumstances, and which continues in diverse forms simultaneously has recently adopted one of its deadliest strategies against the Islamic Iran. International observers who can view the realities occuring in Iran apart from poisonous imperialist propaganda, attest to the fact that the dismayed superpowers have launched an internal war against Islam through their internal agents and dependents. These agents clad in the garb of the splinter groups and various political tendencies have been preparing themselves for long to play America's card of clandestine terrorist activities at the proper time. For this reason they, on orders of their masters, carefully fooled simpleminded youth, gathered various ammunitions and arms, prepared well concealed hideouts and waited for the signals to come. When the liberal pro-American line of Banisadr and his advocates was exposed by the guidelines of Imam and the vigilance of the Ummah, America decided for the total eradication of the "incompatible, radical, uncompromising, and fundamentalist" Islamic establishment. It ordered terrorist splinter groups to attack, kill and provoke a wave of terror among the people, under the guise of being guerrillas, but of course, not realizing that guerrillas can survive among the people only when they are supported and welcomed by the masses.

To counter this novel offensive, Imam Khomeini whose measures and guidelines always rest upon the infallible power and unity of the Muslim ummah, urged the nation to form a 36 million strong intelligence network, the most efficient and popular method of purging and cleansing a society from within. Imam even went ahead and presented a method which he deemed best for the establishment of this network. He asked every family to scrutinize the activities of its members and urged every family to keep an eye on the neighboring houses and what went on in them, in terms of counterrevolutionary activities.

The experience of the post-revolution period in general has shown that the Republic is in urgent need of some form of information network which would prevent foreign infiltration, espionage and plotting against the Islamic homeland. The principles which Imam put forth served as the most pertinent materialization of this theory. In only a few weeks hundreds of terrorist hideouts were reported to security forces. The Muslim nation actively responded to the call of Imam, mothers like that of Tariq ol Eslam, (who reported her son because of his counterrevolutionary acts) created a legend to show that the tie between a Muslim and God is stronger than even the strongest material ties, and realizing the calls of the Quran that: "You shall not find a people who believe in Allah and the hereafter befriending those who act in opposition to Allah and His Apostle, even though they were their (own) fathers or sons or their brothers or kinsfolk" (Quran Sura Mujadilah, 21)

As this revolutionary measure proceeded in wiping out the last remnants of the imperialist agents, counterrevolutionary societies being defeated with their final card, along with their dependent spokesmen, alleged that Imam had urged people to spy on each other, an action strictly prohibited by Islamic rules. Atheists and enemies of Islam are ostensibly more concerned about Islam than the Muslims. Although it was clear that Imam referred to spying only in the case of activities directed against Islam and not spying into the affairs of others for personal gains or pleasure, which is a form of social corruption and is prohibited by Islam, the counterrevolutionaries uselessly tried to infer what they wished from their false logic.

Well-known propagandists which do not lose any chance for defaming the Islamic Revolution, in the world, played their part of the game by depicting a false image of the internal issues of Iran and thus supposedly weakening the hopes of the downtrodden. In its report yesterday concerning the call of Ayatollah Meshkini the Friday Prayer Leader of Qom, for the formation of a popular intelligence servive to safeguard the Islamic revolution, UPI relates this idea to the satanic SAVAK of the shah in a attempt to imply similarity between the two systems. "The spying plea, ironically from a regime that fought the late Shah's dreaded SAVAK secret police, followed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's call to Iranians last week not to spare even their close family members and friends to ween out his enemies" it writes.

Now that the downtrodden masses of the world will to establish a system to confront imperialist plots, news agencies like UPI (whoch are nourished by CIA and MOSSAD the father and grandfather of the SAVAK) engage in plots to discredit their righteous efforts. UPI who has cried and sympathized much with the splinter groups of Mujahideen-e Khalq, Peykar and so forth, goes on to state the most obscene and outright lie in its reporting. UPI claims that all detentions, arrests and executions of the revolutionary courts have been based on political charges alone while only 15 lines before this agency itself reports that 70 officials and scores of other people have been killed by these splinter groups UPI seems to be caught in a vicious circle of its own reasoning.

The nature of UPI and similar media are evident for the Mustaz'afin of .he world, whose hearts have been enlightened by Islam.

"They aim to extinguish the light of Allah with their mouths but Allah strengthens His light even though the infidels are displeased".

Islamic Solidarity for Deprived

[Editorial by Rahim: "Islamic Solidarity the Hope of the Deprived"]

[Text]

The beginning of the seventh century coincides with the appearance of Islam in the Arabian Peninsula. Being taught by Islam, the Arabs who till then, had the most meager of civilizations gradually became the catalytic force in this area of the world. The lofty Islamic principles which are based on the equality and brotherhood of all human beings, regardless of race, nationality, sex and social status, and its denial of all manifestations of domination, coupled with the welcoming of the deprived and oppressed masses soon established a united and powerful nation (ummah), from scattered and weak peoples, that no power could resist. In a relatively short time, this united Islamic front succeeded in defeating the then superpowers i.e. the Persian and Roman Empires and began to rule a large part of the known world. The rapid Islamic development into an extensive territory including most parts of Asia, Africa and Europe was unprecedented. During the first few centuries, this new nation advanced all branches of science, arts, literature, agriculture, industry, business and politics and brought about a

brilliant civilization unheard of in the annals of history. The apex of ascent of Islamic civilization coincides with the climax of European decline. This very Europe passed the dark years of the Middle Age in those days, politically and culturally far behind the Islamic civilization in the manner that Third World countries nowadays are lagging behind the Western powers.

The temptation of regaining the glory of Rome and Greece, and becoming profound again in the realm of cultural and political power, coupled with the thought of defeating the Islamic greatness, encouraged Europe to invade Islamic Empire. And thus, the Crusades began to achieve the above aims by outwardly forcing Jerusalem from the hands of the Muslims. These wars continued for several centuries. The Crusades did not result in what Europe desired but caused it to get familiar with the new features of this civilization by getting in touch with the Muslims and their progressive culture.

Europe was defeated and exhausted in the Crusades. It was surrounded by Islamic states and threatened from the east, south and southwest and as a result was obliged to maintain its integrity in a few remaining countries on the north side of the Mediterranean Sea. This experience awakened them and they conspired against the danger of Islam desperately and incessantly.

Lacking for an ally to help defeat the Muslims, the Europeans appealed to the idolator tribesmen of the northeast of the Islamic Empire i.e. the Mongols. The European merchants, voyagers and explorers apparently for commerce and excursion but in fact for plotting against the Islamic Empire left for the Eastern neighborhood of the empire. It is interesting to note that Marco Polo and his colleagues as the Pope's representatives began their expedition at this very time. So it is neither accidental nor astonishing that the Islamic territory was invaded and endangered from two sides, the Mongols from the East and the Crusaders from the West, in the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries. As a result of

this cowardly conspiracy the Islamic Empire gradually lost its resistance and started its retrogression But inspite of these setbacks , Islam had not been decisively defeated. The triumph over Constantinople in the Middle of the fifteenth century by the Muslims revitalized their reputation and prestige and established the Ottoman Empire as a formidable force. The West was always looking for an opportunity to abolish the Islamic might and solidarity quietly. What could weaken the body of the Islamic states from inside better than adding fuel to religious differences?

To achieve this goal, just fifty years after Constantinople had been conquered by the Ottoman Muslims, the Safavid Dynasty officially as a Shii'ite government but in fact to sabotage the Islamic unity and Shi'ite culture was established in Ardebil i.e. directly behind the Ottoman Empire; the best place from which to plunge a dagger.

Accordingly the Islamic nation which could best form a superior state by its unity and the history has proved that, was disintegrated into two opposite empires and wasted its potential on annihilating itself. As an example, it is worthy to mention that in Chaldoran alone the blood of close to half a million Muslims was shed in one of the wars that took place between the Safavids and the Ottomans!

During these times the West by taking advantage of the messy situation firmed up its position in the Islamic East and thus colonization found its way in the Islamic domain.

The matter continues till the recent centuries when the West on one hand witnesses the results of its schemes in the Islamic states and on the other ascends to the heights of material progress. It is during these centuries that the Safavid and Ottoman Empires are blindly engaged in destroying each other. The spreading of nationalistic thoughts that received a hearing in the Islamic states in the form of "Pan-Iranism," "Pan-Turkism", Pan-Arabism" etc. under the prodding of Western colonialization, the policy of intensifying the religious differences, and finally cutting the Islamic territory into pieces and changing it into small, weak nation states.

Accordingly they have been programed against the idea of Islamic solidarity.

Not only did the West swallow the weakened Iranian and Ottoman domains but from their worn out bones made clubs for the Western puppets to use at the proper time to suppress the uprisings of the peoples of Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.

Nowadays, the West, in the light of its historical experience has realized that if the Islamic countries become united, history will reverse itself and no room will be left for the superpowers of the West of East.

If the glory and power of the Islamic world in the former centuries derived from the cultural, political, economical and military superiority, today the oil factor as the blood of industrialization has enhanced the power of the Muslim world. Therefore, the more influential the oil factor is in the existence of western civilization, the more plots proliferate to disintegrate the Islamic countries. Today, the big but disunited domian of Islam extends from Western Africa to China and from Southern Russia to the Equator. Taking advantage of rich natural resources, suitable and various conditions for agriculture and animal husbandry, geographical conditions and strategic regions, the world's biggest oil resources and on top of that the population of close to one billion to provide the manpower, these countries can, by forming a united front, establish a new power and get rid of the Western and Eastern domination. The idea of an Islamic entity with the above dimensions, has embarassed the superpowers for many years. Having learned from their colonizer ancestors, world-devouring imperialism, carried out the policy of division and discord in the Islamic countries. Occupying Palestine and establishment of Israel in the heart of Islamic countries as the good son of imperialism was planned and based exactly on this historical experience.

As was pointed out, the plan to occupy Jerusalem was proposed by the colonizers centuries ago. The establishment of Israel could, by warming the war fires in the region, spoil all the potential and powers that would be used for self-sufficiency, independence and self-improvement.

In addition, by actionalizing
the Islamic countries, the West (led by the U.S. and Britain) could practically prevent the Islamic unity from being born. Considering all the potential they have, as long as the Islamic countries are separated, politically, and economically from each other, they are very sweet fruits for America, the heir of all plunderers and criminals of all ages. Whereas the solidarity of these countries would end their helplessness under the laws of imperialism and zionism.

Historical evidence, the power of Islam as a rich ideology for improving human beings and the material potentialities of Islamic countries have inspired the Islamic intellectuals and thinkers during this century to emphasize the necessaity of the formation of a united Islamic front. Seyyed Jamaladdin Assadabadi one of the front runners of the reconstruction of religious thought movement, in the last century, warned the Muslims that the Crusading spirit was still alive and active in the Christian west and especially in England.

Seyed Jamal's realistic viewpoint, after half a century has proven prophetic. At the time the British commander of the Queen's army a Lord Allenby, in the course of quelling an insurrection of indigenous Palestinians in Jerusalem and insuring that the Zionist settlers were firmly entrenched said: "The Crusades have now ended."

Fighting against the superpowers and getting out of the circle of domination possesses its own special complexities. At the present time the first step toward that aim is to struggle incessantly against the apparent feature of imperialism in the region i.e. Zionism. And, of course, this struggle cannot be effectively achieved until it depends on the power of the Muslim masses and their solidarity.

U.S. imperialism is well aware that the victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran is a suitable axis around which the Muslims can form a united front against the superpower's interest in the region and that it could serve as the appropriate background to unite the world's deprived. The conspiracies against Iran that have occurred since the revolution succeeded, in the areas of economics politics, the military, and the world wide psychological war

coupled with the most important aim, which is to prevent the progressive Muslim and anti-imperialistic forces from uniting are the basis of the imperialist objectives in the region. The proposal to form an anti-Zionist united Islamic Front by the Islamic Republic of Iran is based entirely on the deep understanding of the Islamic Revolution about the reality of imperialism and Zionism.

Inviting all Muslims to join this front we ask if the time has not come for Islamic nations, by depending on Almighty Allah and rejecting all false gods to gain release from the disgraceful domination of East and West and regain their destined ascendancy and glory?

Martyrdom of Raja'i, Bahonar

[Editorial by S. Salman: "Martyrdom of the President and the Prime Minister of Islamic Republic of Iran"]

[Text

Lack of clear discernment of the revolutionary actions of the Iranian people has led the American imperialism and its domestic mercenaries to adopt terrorist measures. There exist different viewpoints concerning the role played by terrorism in the two fronts, namely the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and the anti-revolutionaries led by America.

In its own wishful thinking, America is seeking to create obstacles in the way of the speedy movement of the Islamic Revolution by assassinating a few personalities among government officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The issue, as to why the probe and intelligence organizations, sponsored by the world of imperialism, have reached such a conclusion, itself needs discussion. But it can be said in a nutshell that the true nature of Islam has not yet lighted upon them. They, on the basis of their own insight and limited materialistic standards, think that the Islamic Revolution of Iran relies on certain personalities. The role that they take into consideration for every single government official of the Islamic Republic of Iran not only doesn't conform to the realities of the revolutionary and Muslim society of Iran, but the experience, acquired during this brief period, indicates that imperialism has been completely puzzled by its own analyses and has found itself helpless to discern the revolutionary moves in Iran.

Opposed to this approach of America and its domestic mercenaries, the revolutionary front, while considering the existence of every single government official of the Islamic Republic of Iran to be opportune for the progress of the Islamic

Revolution, has never taken the role played by the individuals as "absolute". As such, the existence or otherwise of an individual, howsoever extraordinarily important his existence might be, is not going to have any adverse effect upon the overall movement and the specific direction of the Islamic Revolution, since the Revolution is reliant upon the Islamic school of thought, and the Islamic ideology has been so throughout the span of 14 hundred years of its history.

The progress of Islam has, at hard times, been kneaded with the philosophy of martyrdom, and martyrdom, in itself, has activated the Islamic society like a fresh wave. Many a historic example is indicative of this reality, and its most prominent specimen is now being observed by us in the course of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The revolutionary movement of the Iranian people reached its peak exactly at a time when the criminal America ventured to engage in massacring the innocent people at a vast level. The all-out massacre of September 8th of 1978, that later came to be known as the "Black Friday", in fact, infused new blood in the viens of the Islamic society of Iran that dynamized the whole nation which eventually realized the revolution. It is on the basis of this very Islamic insight and approach towards martyrdom that the Islamic Revolution of Iran cannot be assessed by material standards, and this is the ultimate reason behind the miscarriage suffered by all the plots that have been schemed and implemented by America. It can be said without hesitation that the assassination of Iranian government officials will not only fail to make any interruption in the continuity and direction of the Islamic Revolution of Iran that aims at liberating all the oppressed masses at global level, but, on the contrary, will add to the degree of its decisiveness and speed; so much so, that in the course of this speedy revolutionary action, it will totally annihilate all the major bases of imperialism within the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Global oppression — headed by America and its domestic and foreign allies, inasmuch as it is unable and helpless to analyze the realities of the Islamic society of Iran — will find itself incapable of preserving its bases in the face of the fresh wave that is bound to sweep the whole of the Iranian society after it arises from within the core of the oppressed society of Iran in the aftermath of the assassination of the country's President and Prime Minister.

As our dear readers have already learnt, the criminal America yesterday moved for the second time in recent months, to plant a bomb in the office of the topmost officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a result of which President Mohammad Ali Raja'i and Premier Dr. Bahonar were tragically martyred.

Following the bomb explosion in the Headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party as a result of which more than 72 aides of Imam Khomeini, Leader of the Revolution and Founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, were martyred, yesterday's incident was the second planned explosion by the American imperialism in an attempt to overthrow the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Whenever we take a look at the plots, being hatched by America and its domestic and foreign mercenaries, in a coordinated manner and in all fronts, we come to realize the degree of firm faith and resistance possessed by the Muslim people of Iran, and of their revolutionary capability to confront all the subversive plots. Undoubtedly, the American imperialism, after having been disillusioned by the role played by the treacherous Saddam in his confrontation with the Islamic Revolution and in his direct military aggression against it, is now trying to create obstacles in the way of the continuity of the Revolution by eliminating the influential personalities in Iran. However, the Muslim people, by virtue of their vigilance and continued presence on the national scene, have thus far neutralized all such plots, and they are undoubtedly going to do so in future as well.

In order to make our dear reader more familiar with the lives, efforts and sacrifice of Iran's Martyred President Mohammad Ali Raja'i and Martyred Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran Dr. Bahonar, we will here give a brief account of their life history. Martyred Mohammad Ali Raja'i was born in the city of Ghazvin, 250 kilometers west of Tehran, in 1933. He joined the Iranian Air Force at the age of 16 where he completed his education to become a schoolteacher. At the age of 30, he joined the anti-shah movement, and was arrested on several occasions in 1960 by the secret intelligence organization of the deceased shah (SAVAK) and also jailed in the famous prisons of Qasr and Evin. Following the toppling of the regime of the shah in 1979, the martyred Raja'i joined the cabinet of the Transitional Revolutionary government to initially hold the portfolio of the Education Ministry.

His Islamic and revolutionary insight prompted him to weed out the SAVAK-associated elements from the Education Ministry. At that time, Raja'i decisively declared that "Islam must govern all the schools in the country otherwise they will become cancerous for the revolution". He was elected to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in March of 1980, and was named as Prime Minister five months later. He accepted this post as a religious duty. Finally, the revolutionary line became victorious after the ultimate defeat of the Liberalist line that came to a compromise with imperialism. In the presidential elections that were held for the second time in Iran, he was elected as the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran by an absolute majority of votes. The martyred Raja'i, whose foreign policy was based on the principle of "Neither East, Nor West", succeeded in realizing this slogan. He was finally martyred the other day by the agents of American imperialism in the bomb explosion that took place in the Prime Ministry Building.

The second top personality that was martyred in Sunday's mishap was Dr. Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Hojjatoleslam Bahonar was born in a simple and deprived family in the city of Kerman in 1933. He got his elementary education and Quranic studies in a religious school before engaging in the pursuit of

religious sciences. He proceeded to the Holy City of Qom in 1953 where he pursued advanced Islamic studies at the local Theological Center. Hojjatoleslam Bahonar then started to pursue his university education. After have obtained a bachelor's degree in literature and philosophy, and a master's degree in education, he got his doctorate in theology from Tehran University. He entered his career as a publisher in 1956, and brought out a magazine entitled "The Shi'ite School". Hojjatoleslam Bahonar started his cooperation with the Islamic and political movement that was launched by the Muslim clergy headed by Imam Khomeini in 1962. During this cooperation, he was arrested and jailed on several occasions by the SAVAK for delivering lectures in mosques. He was instructed by Imam Khomeini to organize the general strikes in 1978. He actively participated in political activities during the course of the revolutionary struggle.

He was one of the founding members of the Islamic Republican Party. He was named a member of the Revolutionary Council by the Imam in 1978, and was subsequently elected to the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the parliamentary elections by the people of Kerman. Dr. Bahonar was appointed as Education Minister in the cabinet of the martyred Raja'i. Following the bomb explosion in the Headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party and the martyrdom of Dr. Beheshti, he was chosen as the secretary-general of the Islamic Republican Party. After the completion of the second presidential elections, he was asked to form a cabinet by the martyred Raja'i, and was finally martyred Sunday by the mercenaries of imperialism. May their souls rest in peace.

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OIL INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22, 23 Aug 81 pp 2,8

OPEC Pricing Policy

[Editorial by Zainab: "OPEC: Where Is It Heading?"]

[Text] Since its establishment the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, has been, for various political considerations and reasons, an issue of strict concern for imperialist countries. This organization which has great potential for an independent and non-aligned orientation due to its particular configuration has always been a prey of imperialist attacks.

OPEC is one of the very few international organizations composed of Third World countries, which has an effective weapon; oil at hand. Hence imperialism has constantly sought to deprive this organization of an independent stance and to influence certain factions within it to serve its particular interests. International oil cartels intimately engaged in looting and plundering the oil resources of Third World countries today have exercised an effective control over Third World economy systems, directing them to serve their interests best. This domination has never of course been limited to the sphere of economies, but in order to reach its economic goals, oil cartels control world information and propagation centers and influence political decisions to the level of leadership in Third World countries.

As the oppressed countries of the world have come to an awakening concerning their affairs, and particularly following the Islamic Revolution of Iran, imperialism has felt more threatened by the political use of oil as a weapon by these nations against imperialist attacks. Hence it has proceeded to adopt various measures that would reduce the threats facing its interests. Primarily it has begun a propaganda campaign for diminishing the importance and value of oil in the peoples' eyes and the general opinion of the world. Along with its propaganda campaign, American through its agents in the region and through various political and economic tactics has managed to create an artificial oil glut or surplus in the oil market. It has done this primarily hoping to weaken the uncompromising stance of countries like Iran, Libya and Algeria so they will be forced to lower their price demands in OPEC. Exercising the influence it has on certain elements of OPEC who submit to any imperialist appeal, America

has succeeded in forming a conservative faction representing its interest in the OPEC.

Among these elements Saudi Arabia has played the most distinctive role. Following the firm position of Libya, Nigeria and Algeria against lowering oil prices and decreasing production and particularly after the Iraqi aggression on Iran which resulted in a decrease in their oil productions, Saudi Arabia increased its production to 10.3 million barrels per day comprising 45 percent of OPEC's oil production and lowered its prices to as much as $32 per barrel, while most other OPEC members have been selling at an official price of between $36-41 per barrel. This was one of the major factors causing the present artificial oil glut.

This has caused extreme delight for the West and its powerful oil cartels. The Arab Report and Memo Magazine of Beirut confirm this fact by reporting recently that oil companies, including Exxon, Texaco, Socal and Mobil are undercutting by $4 to $8 barrel high priced OPEC crude oil due to surplus Saudi oil that they have been storing afloat.

Reports from the recent OPEC sessions in Vienna indicate that despite an almost unanimous price increase demand in OPEC, Saudi Arabia refused to lower its production or increase its prices.

It is very regretful that at a time when Muslim countries are under the greatest attacks by zionism and imperialism and at a time when the Muslims need a firm and uncompromising stance to safeguard Islam and to liberate Palestine from the zionist claws a Muslim country which is the birthplace of Islam, should adopt such loose and compromising attitude towards the great Satan of the century.

Regardless of imperialist propaganda, Muslim countries must come to understand the vitality and importance of oil not only as a consumer fuel but a godly weapon given to the oppressed so that they could defend themselves against the world-devouring powers of the East and West. Today is a time when America strongly fears the revival of Islam in Muslim countries. It is a time when their interests are greatly threatened by the intransigent struggles of a nation like Iran and the firm position of those like Libya, Algeria and Syria. Today as Imam Khomeini stresses Muslims should not be ignorant of the plots and conspiracies of America.

The Muslim nations must not give in to imperialists' desires and collaborate with them against Muslim interests, by taking compromising positions on vital issues concerning oil or the issue of liberating Qods and Palestine. Friendship with the Satan and adherence to his leadership is condemned by Islam and the Muslims. Instead now is the time when regardless of nationality Muslim countries must form an alliance under the banner of Towhid, the Unity of God, to safeguard the rights of the Muslim nations.

Search for Oil, Gas Reserves

[Interview with Mr Heshmatollah Bozorgnia, head of Exploration and Extraction Office of the Oil Ministry]

[Text] On the occasion of the seventy-third year of oil discovery in Iran, Mr Heshmatullah Bozorgnia, the Head of the Exploration and Extraction Office of

the Oil Ministry, in a press conference explained the history of the oil industry and the oil resources of Iran as well as activities underway in this regard. The following is the text of Mr Bozorgnia's speech:

Colonialism and Oil in Iran

The first oil well was drilled in Iran 73 years ago by d'Arcy in Masjed Solaiman (Southwestern Iran) and it reached oil at the depth of 360 meters.

Of course, the Iranian people's familiarization of oil did not begin from the time when the first oil well was drilled. Our people utilized oil from a much earlier time and used it for various purposes such as taring the hulls of warships.

One of the oil resources which was used in the past was the oil fields of Baku. From here oil was transported to other regions for commerce.

If we calculate the status of oil reserves and its situation among the oil producing and exporting countries, the extractable reserves of Iran, according to up-to-date data amount to some 60 billion barrels.

Considering its oil reserves, Iran is the fourth among the countries of the world after Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kuwait and it ranks second in the world in view of its natural gas reserves, totalling four hundred trillion cubic feet. Almost one tenth of the world's oil and one fifth of the world's natural gas reserves are in Iran.

In comparison with big countries, we have a little less oil than Russia but the amount of our oil reserves exceeds twice that of the U.S. and our natural gas reserves are three times the natural gas reserves of the U.S.

The sixty billion barrels of oil that we have, should it be evaluated on the basis of gold, taking an average of fifty dollars for each barrel (we will reach this level in future with regard to the ascending price system), the monetary value of these current resources will total a figure of about three trillion dollars.

During the past 73 years, a large amount of our natural gas was wasted (and of course before its nationalization all the natural gas used to be burned up and wasted), and nothing was given to us in exchange. Of course this condition continued till the time internal consumption increased. Nonetheless, still some 17 days of our production in a month is burned up (these figures belong to 3 years ago).

Another issue which had not been taken into consideration is the fact that foreign companies tried to exhaust these resources as soon as possible, while excessive use of these resources caused the rate of extractable oil to diminish a great deal of oil remains in deposits which will be possible never to be extracted.

Taking into the account the amount of natural gas which has so far been consumed and the amount of oil which is left in deposits, and considering the faulty system and the haste which has been used in extraction, we see that the money

the foreign oil companies have given us is even less than the oil and natural gas which has been wasted in the course of extraction.

Oil and Natural Gas Resources In Iran

During the past thirty one years, we have bored one hundred and eighteen oil wells the length of one of which is some two hundred and eighty-five kilometers.

In the region of Khorasan (Northeastern Iran) which is among the most difficult provinces of the country to be piped fuel, we succeeded in discovering one of the biggest natural gas resources in the world (Pangiran Sarakhs). This resource by itself has a reserve of 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

The natural gas which is obtained from Sarakhs is conveyed to "Neka," on the coast of the Caspian Sea to produce electricity and energy.

In this instance, we can extract natural gas from this reserve for some 100 years, and should we calculate it according to the highest rate of production in the recent decade, this reserve can give us natural gas for another two-hunderd and fifty years.

In addition to the Khorasan region, we have drilled nineteen gas wells, fifteen of which have reached natural gas so far.

We hope to discover new reserves in this region by drilling more wells.

And the rate of reserves we have discovered from these nineteen wells is more than that the figure found in Sarakhs.

Meanwhile, in other parts of the country, exploration operations are being carried out. For instance in the region of "Moghan" (Northwestern Iran) eight wells have been bored and a remarkable quantity of oil has been discovered.

In the central part of Iran, seventeen wells have been drilled, and the oil resources of "Qom" and "Alborz" as well as the "Serajeh" gas resource have been discovered as a result of these explorations.

However, further research showed that unfortunately the reserve of the Alborz oil field is not much and it seems that complicated engineering questions such as the rapid changing of reserve rocks and facies exist in this regard.

Since the victory of the Islamic Revolution, seven oil fields have been drilled in Southern Iran and some 14,400 meters of drilling has been carried out.

Before the beginning of the war we also were busy drilling other wells in this region. This activity ceased due to the war. In the northern region, four exploration wells were drilled in the "Khangiran" area and five oil wells in "Naftshahr" with a total depth of 20,000 meters.

On the whole, we will administer all phases of exploration and extraction by ourselves in the future.

In view of this drilling, an Iranian company has been formed to manage all drilling operations. As to geology, it has been a long time since we did it by ourselves. Considering geophysical activities for which we used to depend on foreign companies, as we used to have only two vibrographic and gravity measuring associations, we are going to increase the number of geophysical associations so as not to have any need for foreign companies. Among our other plans we want to employ new ways and technology in exploration for oil which is now underway in the northern region of Gorgan.

As a whole, the exploration and extraction of oil in Iran should be studied in two parts: one in the south which was previously carried out by the "ASCO" Company, and the other in the rest of Iran which was managed by the National Oil Company. After the victory of the Revolution, the "ASCO" company was disbanded, and at the present time all the operations for discovering and extracting oil and natural gas are executed by the Oil Ministry, that is, the groups which used to work separately in the southern and northern regions are now working together.

As a result of drilling seven wells after the Revolution some 350 million barrels of oil were discovered. Moreover, a new exploration project is underway.

In fact, with the projects that we are carrying out, only twenty percent of the underground oil will be extracted, whereas today researches are being carried out in the world to find more advanced ways for the extraction of the remaining resources.

CSO: 4600/176

HAMMADI ON WAR WITH IRAN, SUMMIT

JN061230 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0900 GMT 6 Sep 81

[Text] Baghdad, 6 Sep (INA)--Iraqi Foreign Minister Dr Sa'dun Hammadi has said that the Syrian Government is the only Arab government which is now supporting the Iranian regime in its war with Iraq.

In a statement to the newspaper AL-THAWRAH supplement, issued on the occasion of the first anniversary marking the Iraqi-Iranian war, Dr Hammadi added that the overwhelming majority of the Arab countries support Iraq's stands. He further added that a development occurred to the stands of the governments which did not support Iraq at the beginning of the war. He described this as a positive development in favor of Iraq.

He said that, among the foreign countries that have relations with Iraq, North Korea was the only state which chose to support the Iranian regime for material and selfish reasons.

He described Iraq's relations with the Arab Gulf states as good and marked by joint cooperation. He said that, since the beginning of the war, Iraq has been contacting and coordinating with the Arab Gulf states to safeguard the region's Arabism and strengthen the Arab stand in the face of the dangers posed by the Iranian policy and by the colonialist states' moves in this region.

Dr Hammadi warned the Iranian regime against exercising its old method of calling for a military presence of colonialist states in the region. He said that the Iranian regime's statements on closing the Strait of Hormuz, its attempts to attack the Arab states overlooking the Arab Gulf, the hostage issue and the Danish vessel's incident are condemned acts that attacked the big powers' influence to the Arab Gulf region.

He stressed that the Iraqi-Iranian war has led to the Iranian regime's withdrawal inside its borders after having known fro the first time that the policy of expansion is not an easy one. He said that the war has put an end to the Iranian regime's attempts to dominate the Arab side of the Arab Gulf under the cover of so-called exportation of revolution.

He added that Iraq will show greater interest in the Islamic Conference Organization in the future and said that Iraq is an active member in this organization and played a positive and active role in the At-Ta'if third Islamic summit conference.

Dr Hammadi disclosed that the Iranian stand had frozen the work of the Nonaligned Good Offices Committee. He said that the main obstacle impeding the work of the mediation committees is the Iranian regime's stand which rejects peaceful solutions to the conflict. He indicated that Iran had received the mediation committees for propaganda purposes only.

He stressed that the war would not affect the convocation of the next nonaligned summit conference next September. He said that Iraq had notified a large number of states that the preparations are going on normally to host this summit. He expressed the hope that the war would come to an end before this summit and said the continuation of the war would not affect the conference whether Iran attended or not.

He said Iraq did not object to advancing the date of the 12th Arab summit conference and said he believed this summit would discuss three important issues: the Palestinian cause, the situation in southern Lebanon and the new Arab League charter.

CSO: 4304/149

FOREIGN MINISTRY ON IRANIAN-ISRAELI COOPERATION

JN051200 Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 3 Sep 81 p 8

["Text" of Iraqi Foreign Ministry memorandum on Iranian-Israeli military cooperation--date not given]

[Excerpts] On Saturday, 18 July 1981, an Argentine cargo plane, type (Candercy L-44) crashed near Yerevan in Armenia in the USSR while it was on the third of 12 flights it was scheduled to make from Tel Aviv to Tehran to transport shipments of U.S.-made weapons, spare parts, ammunition, etc, from the Zionist entity to Iran.

On Thursday, 20 August 1981, the U.S. television network ABC in its nightline program interviewed fromer Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr. Bani-Sadr confirmed that Israel had been selling weapons and military equipment to Iran for some time. He added that he personally objected to dealing with Israel and that he used to say at cabinet meetings that Iranians must reconcile with Iraq and not enter into such trade. The former Iranian president also stated that his efforts were foiled given the fear of the ruling men of religion that if peace with Iraq were to occur, the army would be free to topple them. Abolhasan Bani-Sadr said: What was strange was the purchase of weapons from Israel, which shows that the mullas had a strong desire to remain in power. While I was in office, the matter was one of an indirect purchase, and I was against it. I said that if we had to buy weapons from the Israelis, then why don't we reconcile with the Iraqis? This would be far better.

On Friday 28 August 1981, a Cypriot Government spokesman in Nicosia stated: The Argentine plane, type (Candercy L-44) flight number 224 YR, on 17 July 1981 had used Larnaca Airport for refuelling. Asked about the plane, the Cypriot spokesman said:

1. On 11 July 1981, this plane landed in Larnaca from Tel Aviv and left for Tehran on the same day transporting 50 cases weighing 6,750 kg. Its pilot was McCafferty.

2. On 12 July 1981, the same plane landed in Larnaca from Tehran and left for Tel Aviv the same day. Its pilot was (Cordero).

Arms cooperation between Iran and the Zionist entity was no secret which needed to be revealed or confirmed by former Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr. The importance of what Bani-Sadr has revealed, however, lies in the fact that it was an admission by an Iranian official whose information cannot be wrong given the high post he used to enjoy in Iran. His statement is irrefutable evidence unless there are some who can claim to have more knowledge of Iranian affiars than the Iranians themselves. The well-known Argentine plane incident, the statements by the Cypriot spokesman on its having made three trips between Tel Aviv and Tehran, the admission by former Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr confirming that there were arms deals between Iran and Israel are not the first or last evidence on the dimensions of the arms cooperation between the two sides. Since the first month of the war that Iran launched against Iraq, there have been reports of secret contacts, directly or indirectly, between Israeli and Iranian officials for the conclusion of arms deals between the Zionist entity and Iran and reports that Israel had in fact supplied Tehran with some of the weapons, military equipment and spare parts it needed.

Information leaked to the press and other information media in the world left no doubt as to the existence of arms cooperation between Iran and the Zionist entity. [2,000-word passage omitted on details of this cooperation as reported in Arab and foreign media]

The Iraqi Foreign Ministry stresses that the military cooperation between Iran and the Zionist entity was no secret and not impossible for many parties both inside and outside our region to uncover or verify.

The ministry, however, believes that the disclosure of this cooperation acquires special importance in that it is irrefutable evidence as to the mistake committed by a few who considered the previous facts on the Iranian-Zionist cooperation as insufficient and reveals to them the wide gap between the claims of this regime and the reality of its unprincipled practices.

Regardless of the explanations given by the friends of this regime as to their stand, the scandal of the arms cooperation between Tehran and Tel Aviv confronted them with a harsh reality in that they had not only chosen to support a foreign side in a war with an Arab party which had been the victim of aggression but also had chosen to be partners in an alliance, one of whose sides, it has become clear, is the Zionist entity.

The second important fact behind the disclosure of this cooperation is to spotlight the U.S. concern over and attempts to keep this Iranian-Zionist cooperation covert and the U.S. cliams that it had no prior knowledge of it.

However, now that Jody Powell has admitted that Washington had prior knowledge of the exportation of U.S.-made weapons and spare parts to Iran through Israel, the U.S. stand has become evident. The United States is, beyond doubt, a party to this cooperation and this is not strange. What is strange is that some still hesitate and do not want to know Khomeyni's real motives in waging war against Iraq or know what parties are colluding to prolong this war.

CSO: 4304/149

KURDISH RADIO ON AUTONOMY REQUIREMENTS

JN071716 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Revolution in Surani Kurdish 1600 GMT 6 Sep 81

[Readings from the Democratic National and Patriotic Front Charter on a solution for the Kurdish question]

[Excerpts] The Democratic National and Patriotic Front [DNPF] charter says that the Kurdish question must be solved in a peaceful and democratic manner in accordance with the interests of the Iraqi masses be they Arabs, Kurds or other ethnic minorities. The modern history of Iraq has witnessed the oppression of the Kurdish people and the launching of war of aggression against them both by the agent reactionary regimes and the dictatorship which is hostile to the people's interests. These regimes have usurped the rights and freedom of the people, oppressed all the patriotic and national forces and prevented the progress of the country. Therefore, the motto of our freedom movement is: Democracy for Iraq and autonomy for Kurdistan. The Kurdish question in Iraq is part of the Iraqi democratic national issue and the rights of the Kurds are connected with the Iraqi democracy.

A peaceful solution of the Kurdish question can be realized through the following requirements:

1. A new Democratic Legislative Council should be elected for the autonomous rule. The Kurdish people will manage their own affairs and freely elect their representatives.

2. An Executive Council should be formed from the elected Legislative Council. The autonomy will have its own budget from local revenues, taxes and duties; from the state's allocations for Kurdistan; and from the loans and grants given to the central government, in proportion to the population of the Iraqi republic.

3. Special attention should be paid to the problem of education in Kurdistan in order to eradicate backwardness and illiteracy, stop discrimination against the Kurdish people, end the effects of fighting and aggression and compensate the people for their losses during the aggression against them.

4. [Words indistinct] in the autonomous region after the re-establishment of security in the region by returning the displaced persons to their former places and ending the policy of displacement, expulsion and oppression which was practiced by the dictatorial regimes [words indistinct] between Arabs and Kurds.

5. The central government will assume the responsibility for foreign affairs, justice and defense.

6. The Iraqi people must have representatives in the central government in accordance with the population without any discrimination among the Iraqi citizens.

7. Kurdish must be the official language in the departments of the Kurdish region.

8. There must be an interest in the Kurdish language and national heritage. A Kurdish committee should be formed to develop Al-Sulaymaniyah University in accordance with the region's cultural and national needs.

9. All Kurdish departments must be free, must have representatives in the central government departments and must be given the necessary aid from the center.

10. Arab-Kurdish brotherhood should be stressed and chauvinism and ethnic discrimination removed. The national unity among Arabs, Kurds and other ethnic minorities must be strengthened in order to promote the joint struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

11. The Peshmerga forces should be maintained so as to continue carrying out their duties as part of the Iraqi revolutionary forces which fought against the dictatorial regime. [Words indistinct] of the DNPF.

12. Support must be given to the struggle of the Kurdish nation in Kurdistan for its legitimate and democratic rights.

CSO: 4696/2

BRIEFS

EMBASSY EMPLOYEE ESCAPES DEATH--Beirut, 5 Sep (INA)--An Iraqi Embassy employee tonight escaped an attempt on his life by agent elements. Employee Jabir 'Atiyyah 'Abbas was slightly wounded and was immediately transported to a hospital by his colleagues. His condition is good. The armed agents fled in a Mercedes through a Syrian forces roadblock near the (Summarland) Hotel in Beirut. It was reported here that the employee's colleagues were fired upon from a Renault that intercepted them as they were returning from the hospital. Nobody was wounded. [Text] [JN052022 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2000 GMT 5 Sep 81]

CSO: 4304/149

RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM DESCRIBED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 10 Aug 81 pp 1, 7

[Article by Benny Morris]

[Text]

The ultra-Orthodox "independent" education system, traditionally shrouded in veils of secrecy and discreet disinformation, has been compelled to reveal at least part of its workings to interested, non-religious observers.

This act of throwing aside the veil has been forced upon the educators of Agudat Yisrael as a result of their party's campaign, in last week's coalition talks, to obtain increased state funding for their educational institutions, primarily for the adult yeshivot.

In the talks, the Aguda representatives told their counterparts from the Likud and the National Religious Party that for decades their yeshivot have been ill-treated by the Treasury in comparison with the country's academic, non-religious institutions of higher education, the universities.

Initially, during the talks, the Aguda demanded that the Treasury increase its funding of yeshiva students to cover some 65 per cent of their cost, only a few percentage points below the Treasury's approximate 70 per cent subsidy of the country's universities.

An internal dispute then broke out in Aguda ranks, with some important figures arguing that if the bulk of yeshiva funding came from the state, demands by the state to inspect and supervise these institutions would be inevitable. So the Aguda was persuaded to accept the lower figure of 60 per cent state funding, as compared with the present funding — channelled through the Treasury, the Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Religious Affairs — which today amounts to some 20-25 per cent.

Apparently, from now on government subsidy of the yeshivot will be solely channelled through the Treasury and will be liable to some sort of supervision by the State Comptroller's Office.

In computing just how much the Aguda was asking for, the Treasury was unable to obtain any estimate of the per capita state funding of university students.

The Council for Higher Education, which controls university budgeting, told the Finance Ministry that it was "impossible to calculate costs in that fashion." The Education Ministry was not able to provide a figure either.

The Treasury thus computed artificially — using as the model a humanities student at Haifa University, which is essentially an arts and social sciences institution — that each university humanities student is subsidized at the rate of IS15,000 to IS17,500 annually.

"It is absurd to calculate student costs in this way," reacted Hebrew

University rector Raphael Mechoulam, who says that research, maintenance, equipment and other university expenses cannot in any way be compared to running costs of a yeshiva, "which is more like a high school in this respect."

All university officials, however, reacting to the Aguda's demand for some sort of financial parity for its yeshivot, quickly pointed out that the universities are meticulously supervised by the state and that their product — the graduates — are trained more often than not in professions and skills which are of material benefit to the state.

Aguda educators, of course, argue that study of Talmud and Tora are of even greater benefit to "the Jewish people."

There are today in Israel some 300 adult yeshivot, whose students (*avrechim*) are 18 years and above, with many in their thirties and even forties. They have a total student population of about 25,000.

Of this number, some 2,000-2,500 in 15 *yeshivot hesder*, which have an arrangement with the Army whereby the students put in 18 months of military service during a four-year period, the bulk of which is spent in the yeshiva.

According to one Aguda source, some 20 per cent of the adult yeshiva population, excluding *yeshivot hesder*, do IDF reserve duty.

Another 20 of the 200 yeshivot are especially geared to *hozrim b'tshuva* (newly-observant Jews).

"These yeshivot are especially expensive to run," one Aguda source said, pointing out that there is a teacher for every two or three *hozrim b'tshuva*. Another source claimed each *hozer b'tshuva* costs the yeshiva $5,000 a year.

No one would give me a figure for the total number of teachers in the adult yeshivot.

But each yeshiva student costs at least IS10,000 a year, and if it is a boarding school, the amount is twice that figure. An Aguda source said that in the case of married yeshiva students, the wife is expected to earn extra money to supplement the meagre pocket money doled out by the yeshiva itself.

But the source added that eight children is the usual minimum for each yeshiva student's family, so it is unlikely that the wives manage to earn very much in the little time they may have after taking care of the house and family.

Though the Aguda source denied it, many yeshiva student families are known to be registered with various government offices as recipients of state social aid. Figures for this are not available.

While the state officially covers 20 to 25 per cent of the costs of keeping each yeshiva student in food and board, and provides something more through the Ministry of Social Affairs, the rest inevitably comes from donations by Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews living abroad who are keen on keeping the flame of the Tora alight in Israel.

While one Aguda source said that "many or most" yeshiva students pay tuition, this claim is dismissed by the Education Ministry.

The Aguda's effort to obtain increased state funding for its yeshivot has what can be called a "status" objective as well — the ultra-Orthodox, who for decades have watched and envied the respect accorded in Israel to the universities, are also seeking some sort of "academic recognition" for their yeshivot.

The coalition agreement with Aguda will apparently give the ultra-Orthodox educational institutions an additional IS700m. per year. Some of this money will go to the independent stream schools and yeshivot for under 18-year-olds.

In the independent stream today, there are 5,400 pupils in about 180 kindergartens, 24,700 pupils in 110 primary schools, and 10,000 pupils in about 75 *Talmudei Torah* (which are primary schools which teach almost exclusively Tora studies). Some 7,000 male and female pupils study in 42 *yeshivot ketanot* and high schools for girls.

(These figures are apart from the *yeshivot tichoniot*, which teach both religious and secular subjects and are affiliated to the state religious rather than the independent stream. The 60 *yeshivot tichoniot* have 6,500 male pupils and 2,400 female pupils).

According to Education Ministry sources, the coalition agreement with the Aguda will end a number of cases in which the Aguda kindergartens and schools are subject to discrimination in Treasury allocations.

Aguda pre-compulsory kindergartens receive only 23 per cent of their budget from the state as compared with 32 per cent for state stream pre-compulsory kindergartens, the sources said. This means that while parents of pupils in Aguda pre-compulsory kindergartens pay the same as non-religious or state religious stream parents, the institutions must find other sources to make up for the 9 per cent shortfall.

As for the primary schools and *Talmudei Tora*, the state recognizes most of them as educational institutions and gives all of them the same proportion of subsidy as it does state schools. But the state does not properly cover the extra teaching hours which are quite common in the *Talmudei Tora*, which often run until 3 and 4 p.m.

The state, according to Education Ministry sources, also does not subsidize to the same extent development and building costs for these *Talmudei Tora* and independent stream kindergartens and primary schools as it does in the state streams.

The independent stream schools — apart from some of the *Talmudei Tora* which are not "recognized" institutions — are supervised and inspected by Education Ministry inspectors, albeit inspectors of the same ideological-religious cloth as the teachers, schools and pupils they are inspecting.

It is worth noting that the IS700 million earmarked for the yeshivot will apparently go mostly towards the adult yeshivot. But some money will also go to *yeshivot ketanot*, to *talmudei Tora* and to independent stream kindergartens and primary schools. It is still unclear what criteria will be applied in the allocation of the funds.

The Treasury intends to begin these allocations during the next fiscal year, from April 1982.

CSO: 4300/104

PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY REPORTS PROFITS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 11 Aug 81 p 10

[Article by Joseph Morgenstern]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Co., Israel's largest pharmaceutical concern, has just reported that its net profits for the year ended March 31, 1981, totalled IS69.8m. The recorded profits were four times those achieved in the preceding fiscal year.

Total income, not including those subsidiaries which are not consolidated into the Teva balance sheet, stood at IS441m.

Exports have been on the rise and now total about one-third of the total annual sales. The company's balance sheet total rose by 210 per cent and stood at IS403m., as compared with IS130m. a year ago.

For the first time, the report includes the activities of Ikapharm, which is 100 per cent owned by Teva, and the second largest local producer of pharmaceuticals.

Plantex results are also included for the first time. Plantex, 50 per cent owned by Teva, specializes in medicinals and food additives for fodder. The company was established with the help of the French Rothschild family, who backed its founder, the late Dr. Philip Pfeffer.

Promedico, among the largest importers of medicinals and medical equipment, also has its results incorporated in Teva's balance sheet.

Net earnings per share came to 130 per cent, as compared with 50 per cent in the previous year.

Teva has also expressed its profit and loss statement in U.S. dollars. The net profits for 1980/81 totalled $10.9m., compared with last year's $5.6m., a gain of 93 per cent.

Shareholders received 20 per cent in gross cash dividends. This was the same amount paid in the previous year. Bonus shares in the order of 100 per cent were issued. In the previous year the company issued 73 per cent in bonus shares.

Teva is pursuing further rapid growth and in the past year has spent IS4m. on research and development. In the previous year, the figure spent for R&D was only IS1.2m.

CSO: 4300/104

POTASSIUM NITRATE PRODUCTION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Aug 81 p 8

[Article by Aryeh Greenfield]

[Text]

Haifa Chemicals, Ltd., a subsidiary of the Oil Refineries, has grown to become the world's most important producer of potassium nitrate, with exports worth $68m. in 1980. Potassium nitrate is in great demand as a special-purpose fertilizer, and as input in various chemical industry processes.

The firm's success was largely made possible by the development of innovative solvent extraction processes, the result of research by Dr. Ruth Blumberg and Prof. Avraham Baniel, of the Hebrew University's Casali Institute.

Now Prof. Baniel has invented a novel process for the separation and recovery of mineral acids from aqueous solutions, which will yield substantial savings in both energy consumption and cash expenditure.

Inorganic mineral acids are very useful in the production of many chemicals, such as fertilizers. However, their separation from the final product and their recycling can be a costly process; in many instances, there simply was no practical method to accomplish this.

Now, Prof. Baniel has developed a new family of solvents with a very wide applicability to various chemical industry processes. In countries other than Israel, rights to this invention have been assigned to a Swiss-based firm.

CSO: 4300/104

SPECIAL CHAMBERS MADE FOR MICROSHIP PRODUCTION

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Aug 81 p 8

[Text]

Ricor, a kibbutz-based research company specializing in super-cold (cryogenic) vacuum systems has begun work on an initial $300,000 research project with a leading U.S. instrumentation company to produce special chambers required in the production of electronic chips.

As the electronics revolution enters the age of the microchip, there is a growing need for increasingly sophisticated equipment and a special environment in which to build the hardware.

Ricor, owned by kibbutz Ein Harod, signed a contract in May with Veeco Instruments of Long Island, N.Y., for a two-year venture project which is expected to lead to joint production of cryopumps for the cold-surface vacuums needed to manufacture modern electronic circuits.

"We are talking of pumps that will be used to produce temperatures in the -190° to -269°C range," explained Chaim Geyari, chief engineer at Ricor in an interview with *The Jerusalem Post*.

Much in the same way as a windowshield in a cold car collects the humidity in the air and condenses water on its surface, vacuums used in electronic circuit production must have a surface cold enough to collect all the gases emitted when the circuits are bombarded or sputtered with ions.

The electronic circuits are sputtered with ions in special vacuum chambers and the cryopumps create and maintain the required super-low temperatures, effectively collecting gases in the environment such as nitrogen.

Ricor, which specializes in storage tanks for liquefied gases, had already developed a good cryogenic compressor when Veeco became interested in a joint project, according to Geyari. Ricor will do the bulk of the research on and development of the new pumps, with Veeco concentrating more on marketing and distribution. Both companies will be involved in the eventual production of the pumps.

The initial funding for the project, which is expected to be the first in a series of joint projects, is being shared by the two companies and the Israel-United States Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation (BIRD).

"It appears that these compressors may also have a computer application," explained the British-trained Geyari, who has been working with the kibbutz industry since 1949.

The two companies plan to work on the use of cryogenic vacuums in Josephson junctions, the minute angstrom-thin electrical units expected to replace the micro-chip in the next decade.

"If you cool certain metals to very low temperatures, they reach a point where they become superconductors, and that may have an important application in computers. Josephson junctions make use of this principle," Geyari explained.

Ricor, together with its parent company Palbam Metal Works which handles production, marketing and distribution, employs about 130 people, and last year had a $4 million turnover. Started as a company to produce dairy equipment for local kibbutzim in the early 1950s, it went on to manufacture kitchens for institutions, dishwashers, pressure pumps for the fruit juice industry and finally vacuum systems and cryogenic pumps for scientific use.

CSO: 4300/104

AL-QADHDHAFI RECEIVES CASTRO LETTER ON 'U.S. SCHEMES'

LD101016 Tripoli JANA in English 0812 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Text] Tripoli, 10 Sep (JANA)--The leader has received a letter from President Fidel Castro on the Cuban Republic informing him of the American aggressive intentions and terrorist schemes (?directed) against the world progressive revolutions, as well as the dirty war waged by the U.S. against the Cuban people.

President Castro stressed that the American administration "does not only threaten territorial waters but also uses lethal biological weapons against humanity."

He said: "The American administration has actually used these weapons against the Cuban people as symptoms of very dangerous diseases have surfaced recently. This is caused by the use of biological weapons, which have destroyed agricultural crops as well as inflicting losses in life among the Cuban people."

He added: "The escalation of aggression and threats have always been the pivot of American policy against Cuba and which have not been previously witnessed in the international arena."

He went on. "The United States, in affirmation of its terrorist role against the free peoples fighting the imperialist onslaught, is currently training terrorist elements in Florida in preparation for dealing blows against the world progressive revolutions in addition to carrying out subversive and other criminal acts."

President Castro denounced the dangerous methods practiced by the U.S. against the peoples. He said, "The development by the United States of its destructive weapons is aimed at destroying humanity."

CSO: 4500/44

LIBYAN ENVOY ON CONFRONTATION WITH U.S.

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 24-30 Aug 81 pp 43-47

[Report on interview with Abdulgader Ghoga by Mona el-Said]

[Text]

Abdulgader Ghoga, ranking member of the Popular Committee of the Libyan Arab Brotherhood Office (embassy) in Beirut, said last week that Libya expected a further escalation of American "terror" and was determined to fight it.

In a private interview with *Monday Morning* shortly after last week's air battle between Libyan and American war planes off the Libyan coast, Ghoga declared that there was no international law on territorial waters and demanded that a law be enacted at the U.N. to provide each country with enough territorial waters for its protection.

The three-mile limit on territorial waters which the U.S. has arbitrarily determined is unacceptable, Ghoga said, because it can be crossed by raiding planes "in two seconds."

He added.

- Libya will not use its oil weapon against the U.S. alone but wants the entire Arab nation's oil to be turned against Washington and is determined to either liberate Arab oil or burn it, because "it is better to burn the oil than to pour it into American Phantoms."
- Libya does not intend to attack American institutions in Beirut or anywhere else because "we are not a gang that preys on cultural establishments or embassies." However, in view of Arab popular rage at the American provocation, there is no doubt that American institutions are in danger.
- The 2,500 American nationals in Libya are enjoying more "peace and stability" than Americans in the U.S., and the fact that they have ignored repeated evacuation instructions from Washington means that they trust Libya more than they trust their own government.
- Libya will depend primarily on itself in repulsing any future provocations, either from the U.S. itself or from "agents" like Egypt and Sudan, but it also counts on the support of friends like the Soviet Union. Libya, however, does not want this incident to develop into a confrontation between the superpowers that would jeopardize world peace.
- The Libyan-American confrontation has had no negative effects on Tripoli's offer to provide

Lebanon with an air-defense network. On the contrary, the incident should motivate Lebanon even more to accept Libya's no-strings-attached offer, because it has once more demonstrated that American aggression can only be faced with force.

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Ghoga, who served as Libya's ambassador in Beirut in 1974-75, before the replacement of the embassy with an Arab Brotherhood Office, said that America's provocative act in the Gulf of Sidra last Wednesday appeared to have three aims: to "terrorize the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, divert the attention of the Jamahiriya from its national duties, especially the duty of supporting the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement, and reassure America's midget agents in the region that the U.S. reigns supreme and unchallengeable in the Mediterranean."

Those aims were not achieved, however, because Libya has not been terrorized, will continue to support the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement, has shown everyone that it is ready to fight for Arab causes regardless of the magnitude of the challenge "and will go on fighting until victory or martyrdom," Ghoga said.

ESCALATION

He added: "We expect an escalation of American aggression against Libya with every escalation of Libya's steadfastness, but we are ready for any confrontation. The U.S. can be expected to do anything without exception, but we will resist with all our capabilities...

"What they fail to realize is that the entire Libyan people is armed. For the first time in history, an entire people has been armed and trained. What we have is not a limited regular army but an armed people. Our schools and factories have been turned into barracks, and our people are ready to sacrifice in defense of the Arab nation and its causes...

"They fail to realize that Libya has gone beyond the stage where it can be subjugated. You can subjugate a regime, a king, a president, but you can't subjugate a people and a revolution. In Libya, there is no longer any regime. There are no longer any orders from the summit. What we have is an armed people ready and able to run its own affairs and defend itself. That is how the clash over our territorial waters occurred while the leader of our revolution (Col. Moammar Qadhafi) was out of the country...

"We in the Libyan Jamahiriya are ready to do battle with any force in the world. The United States may be the strongest power in the world, but strength alone is no longer enough to impose control on a people which has the will to resist. The U.S. has been given many examples of this on its long imperialistic journey; Vietnam was not the first example, and Libya will not be the last."

Noting that Libya had formally notified the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League Council, the Islamic Conference, the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations and related international and regional bodies of the American action, Ghoga said he did not expect the Security Council to meet on this affair and his government did not believe Libya's protection lay in those protests. "Our protection will come from our armed people and their will to fight," he said.

Future American aggression against Libya may be indirect, Ghoga added.

"When we talk about future U.S. evils, we do not mean that those evils will necessarily be perpetrated by the U.S. directly. They may come at the hands of its agents in the region, its satellite regimes, including the regime of President (Anwar) Sadat in Egypt and the regime of President (Jaafar) Numairy in Sudan. What we expect from America we expect from its tools, and our preparation to resist the U.S. are also preparations to resist its agents, be they in Egypt or in Sudan."

Referring to recent U.S. news reports about a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) plan for the assassination of Col. Qadhafi, Ghoga said there was no doubt about the accuracy of the news item since it appeared in American publications and not in the anti-American press.

The CIA's assassination plot only confirmed that Washington was still laboring under the impressio by challenging Libya it was figl man and not a people, he said. ... as if the U.S. is saying that Moammar Qadhafi is the only thing standing between America and the subjugation of the Libyan people. What makes Moammar Qadhafi what he is today is his people and their love for him. An attack on him, far from sapping our will, will make us all the more determined to fight."

[para as printed]

But if the U.S. attempts to assassinate the Libyan leader, Ghoga added, "I can only refer you to the communiqué issued by the Free Officers: if an assassination is attempted, God forbid, we will resort to proper commando action and the sword of the U.S. will be turned against it. The entire Libyan people will be turned into *fedayeen*, and they will make the U.S. realize, in its own land, just what destruction means."

The Libyan diplomat called on "the people of the Arab nation" to "rise as one man and strike at American interests in our Arab homeland, primarily oil, since oil is what gives the U.S. and its agents the ability to move against us."

Asked whether Libya had plans for imminent action against U.S interests in the Middle East, Ghoga said: "That depends entirely on the U.S. We are not aggressors. Our people are peaceable people. Our planes are not flying off the coast of New York. We are simply reacting to American aggression. It is our hope that the causes of this conflict will disappear so that the conflict can end, but we are determined to fight America as long as America fights us. We care for the American people and wish them well, but we also care for our right to a free, dignified life and our right to development. For those rights, we will fight, because we have no other choice. If anyone can show us another way to repulse American aggression, we will welcome it, but there is no other way that we can see and there appears to be little chance that the U.S. will change its ways."

Ghoga added: "The U.S. is called upon to review its accounts in this region and reconsider its relations with the Arab nation. It is called upon to weigh its interests in the Arab world against its interests in Israel. We urge it to put a stop to its constant aggression and escalation against the Arab liberation movement. Otherwise, we have no choice but to fight American presence and interests everywhere. This is a popular decision in Libya and not the decision of the Libyan authorities, because there are no Libyan authorities."

Expressing satisfaction with the sharp reaction of the Arab people to the American attack on Libyan planes and with the reaction of the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, which has demanded that all fleets leave the Mediterranean, Ghoga said: "We have many demands to put to the Arabs, but unfortunately, the Arab people themselves cannot meet those demands. All that they can do is fight to achieve them.

OIL

"Our first and most important demand is that the United States be deprived of Arab oil.

"We demand that American presence in our region, especially American military presence, be fought with all the Arabs' capabilities."

Asked if Libya intended to impose a unilateral oil boycott on the U.S., the Libyan diplomat said that Arab oil "cannot be divided."

Noting that it was Libya that led the Arab oil countries' fight against the control of foreign oil companies in the seventies, Ghoga said: "We consider our wealth as a people to be the oil of the Arabs from the Ocean to the Gulf, and not the oil of Libya alone. The question you are asking supports the goals of the Americans, who want to divide Arab oil into Libyan oil, Algerian oil, Saudi oil, and so on, so that they can deal with each oil-producing country separately, placing each country 'under siege,' so to speak, when it challenges the U.S.

"We believe that the oil in Saudi Arabia does not belong to anyone in Saudi Arabia, and that no one in Saudi Arabia has the right to use that oil against the Arab world. We do not believe that any Arab oil-producing country owns its oil and has the right to do what it pleases with it. The oil of every Arab country belongs to the Arab nation and must be used to serve that nation's interests. That is the objective of the battle we are waging now: the liberation of Arab oil. This is not a Libyan battle but an Arab one.

"And I can state that if Arab oil does not begin to serve Arab interests, it is very possible that America's interests — including the oil of Libya — will be destroyed. It is better to burn the oil than to pour it into American Phantoms that attack Arab targets."

TERRORISM

In view of Libya's announced intention to attack American interests in the Arab world, I asked the Libyan diplomat whether the increased protection of American institutions in Lebanon after the Libyan-American incident was justified.

He said: "The only justification is America's desire to make the world believe the American lie that the Jamahiriya practices terrorism. They say Libya is a terroristic country because it supports the Palestine Liberation Organization, which America considers a terrorist organization. America, however, does not consider Israel, which launches daily attacks on civilian targets in Lebanon, a terrorist country.

"The Arabs have been a peaceable people throughout their history. The Arabs have never been the aggressors; they have only resisted aggression. Terrorism is aggression. Terrorism is American pilots coming from thousands of miles across the ocean to challenge our sovereignty over our own land; terrorism is not the act of

defending one's sovereignty against that challenge.

"The Americans have asked for more protection for their institutions in Lebanon to give the world the impression that the people of the Jamahiriya are terrorists. But our people are people of peace. We are not a gang that preys on cultural establishments or offices or embassies. That is not our way. Assault and murder and destruction are the American way, not ours. Our way is to demand that all Arab countries develop a serious attitude towards the U.S. in the light of the U.S. attitude towards the Arabs and their causes."

But that did not mean that U.S. institutions in Lebanon and elsewhere were safe, Ghoga qualified.

"You may have seen the demonstrations on your way here. You may have noticed the rage of the Arab people of Lebanon. In view of this, the interests and presence of the U.S. in all the Arab world are in jeopardy and will remain so as long as Washington maintains its aggressive anti-Arab policy and demonstrates it. There is no doubt that U.S. institutions are in danger."

The 2,500 Americans working in Libya, however, are enjoying "more peace and stability than the Americans in the U.S. itself," Ghoga added. "The U.S. has asked its citizens in Libya to leave the Jamahiriya several times in the past, but they haven't left. We are proud that the American people believe the leadership of the Jamahiriya more than they believe their own government. The Americans in Libya enjoy all the rights of foreign workers on our land. We in Libya need foreign expertise, and we are happy to see that not one American has left despite the calls from Washington."

SOVIET

Asked whether his country expected any support from the Soviet Union in its confrontation with the U.S., Ghoga said Libya relied primarily on the power of its own people and the Arab nation in general, "but the Soviet Union is a friend, and we have grown accustomed to its full support of the peoples struggling for their liberty and the defense of their lands and achievements. We have no doubt that the Soviet Union, the socialist bloc and all peace-loving peoples will stand up to the American assault. We have no doubt that the Soviet Union, a dependable friend, stands with us, especially now, with this new escalation of American aggression. We rely on the support and friendship of the Soviet Union, the socialist bloc and all peace-loving peoples, all of whom have a big role to play in repulsing the American attack."

However, he added, "we do not want the intransigence of America to lead to an international confrontation that might jeopardize world peace and human civilization... We will rely on ourselves first and foremost in defending our rights in our own lands and territorial waters."

As for Washington's contention that Libya has no claim to more than three miles of territorial waters, Ghoga said this was an arbitrary American decision which was not internationally recognized.

"There is no international law on the question of territorial waters," he said. "The three-mile limit is nothing but American wishful thinking. We would favor and abide by any international law which gives every country enough territorial waters to guarantee a reasonable level of protection. The three miles

which the U.S. calls for can be crossed in two seconds by attacking aircraft."

Libya has claimed 200 miles of territorial waters, and the Libyan diplomat said that his government had formally informed all countries in the world of this.

"We have registered our territorial waters with the agencies concerned and many states have agreed to respect those boundaries," he said. "In fact, most countries in the world support the Libyan demand for enough territorial waters for reasonable defense. We have stated our position, and the U.S. has stated its position — but it is an American position, not an international law, and we are not compelled to abide by arbitrary American decisions. The U.S. coast is in no danger from the world's peace-loving people, but our coast is threatened and needs protection.

"The world has not decided on a three-mile limit on territorial waters. We demand that the subject be discussed at the United Nations, and that a law be passed to give each country the territorial waters it needs. I believe there is a tendency to take the matter up at the U.N., although Libya has made no move in that direction so far."

LEBANON

The Libyan-American confrontation has not affected Libya's offer to provide Lebanon with an air-defense network, Ghoga said.

"On the contrary, this incident should have a favorable effect on the question of the Libyan offer," he said. "It should convince every state that only force can protect it from the United States, which no longer pays any heed to international laws and conventions.

"The target of the attack on Libya is not Moammar Qadhafi or the Jamahiriya. If all we cared about was Libya and its interests, we could have easily built bridges with the U.S., lived in peace with it and increased our prosperity. But what we are fighting for is the cause of the Arab nation, and we believe the attack on Libya, the attack on Fakehani (Beirut) and the attack on the nuclear reactor in Baghdad are all part of one battle — all part of the American attempt to subjugate the Arab people. This being our conviction, we consider the protection of Lebanon as important as the protection of Libya, and our offer of an air-defense system stands."

Lebanese officialdom's initial reaction, Ghoga said, was encouraging, "although there are some in the Lebanese government who believe that we should wait for a unified Arab strategy for the defense of Lebanon. We ourselves would like nothing more than a unified Arab strategy, but we are not overly optimistic that it can be achieved at this point. That is why we made the unilateral offer to provide Lebanon with an air-defense system capable of dealing with any Israeli attack, and that is why we hope that Lebanon's final answer will be in the affirmative."

Libya, which is offering the air-defense network free of charge, has no objection to the Lebanese condition that the network be handled by the Lebanese exclusively, he added.

"There are Lebanese in the Libyan armed forces, and we don't consider them foreigners," he said. "If there are enough Lebanese to take over Libya's own air-defense system, we would like nothing better than to

hand it over to them. Our offer to Lebanon is not and can never be conditional on the presence of Libyans to operate the air-defense system. All we care about is the protection of the Arabs, their lands and the Palestinian Resistance from Israeli and American aggression, and we don't care if the people who handle the protection are Lebanese, Libyans, Yemenis or anyone else."

PACT

Ghoga stressed the importance of the friendship pact between Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia, which was signed at a summit meeting in Aden last week at about the same time as the Libyan-American air battle in the Gulf of Sidra.

"We are faced by a clear American-Israeli-Egyptian-Sudanese alliance, and all progressive forces must unite to confront it," he said. "The tripartite pact is a step in that direction. It is not a new axis. What we are after is the development of one worldwide axis against international imperialism and its constant attempts to subjugate peoples. The more countries we can bring into the line of confrontation with international imperialism, the closer we draw to victory. We believe that the agreement signed in Aden this week is a triumph, and it will bolster the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front (to which Libya and South Yemen belong), since we are all the targets of the same aggressor and we all share common goals."●

CSO: 4500/43

ROULEAU ON LIBYAN SWING TO SOVIET ALLIANCE

PM091553 Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Sep 81 pp 1, 4

[Dispatch by Erich Rouleau: "Colonel al-Qadhdhafi Moves Toward Alliance With Moscow"]

[Text] Tripoli--The decision has been taken at the highest level. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, his closest comrades and the armed forces' chiefs have agreed that Libya should propose signing a treaty of friendship and mutual defense with the USSR. The Jamahiriyah is prepared to grant "facilities," possibly bases, to the Soviet fleet, according to Libyan and foreign sources. This would, therefore, mark the end of the "positive neutralism" pursued by the Libyan Jamahiriyah since its installation barely 12 years ago.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, for his part, resigned himself to this "agonizing change," on the evening of 19 August a few hours after the destruction of two of his fighter planes by aircraft from the 6th fleet in the Gulf of Sidra. The news, which reached him in al-Dali in South Yem en, both humiliated and outraged him. Mr 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, president of the [People's Democratic] Republic of Yemen, who was dining with him, remarked: "The treaty which binds us to the USSR is not only no embarrassment to us but has safeguarded our independence and our territorial integrity." This remark did not fall on deaf ears. The aerial duel over the Jamahiriyah's "territorial waters" took place the same day as the signing in Aden of a mutual defense treaty between Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi saw the "provocation" as an additional warning: The United States was determined to overthrow his regime.

On 5 June the Libyan president had revealed his fears on this subject to Lebanese Communist Party Secretary General Georges Hawi. Two days previously the State Department spokesman had advocated "military aid" for African countries which "want to oppose Colonel al-Qadhadhafi's adventurism."

The Americans, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi pointed out to his interlocutor, had already established bases in two neighboring countries, Egypt and Sudan, which were massing troops on the Libyan and Chadian borders. At the same time Washington was seeking to "economically stifle" the Jamahiriyah. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi said he had documents which proved that NATO members and some African states had been asked by the United States to boycott Libya or at least to cut their trade with Tripoli.

The most serious matter, the revolutionary leader went on to confide in the Lebanese communist leader, is that the United States had considerably reduced its import of Libyan "crude." Indeed it has been confirmed that American companies have not renewed their purchasing contracts, forcing the Jamahiriyah to reduce its production from 1.6 million barrels per day to only 600,000. The estimated drop in income for the year from $33 to 7 billion threatens to lead to the cancellation of the new 1981-1985 5-year plan. Washington's main objective is clearly to neutralize the "center of international terrorism" which, in its view, the Jamahiriyah constitutes. Indeed the latter supports--particularly by means of petrodollars--a vast range of nationalist movements and leftwing parties in Central and South America, in Europe, Africa, Asia and particularly in the Near East.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi unwittingly bore out Washington's anxieties by stating in his speech on 1 September: "Libya is certainly negligible compared with the power of the United States. But it is the grain of sand which puts the machine out of order, the stone which prevents the kidney from working, the virus which threatens to paralyze the organism...."

A Line-up of Revolutionary Movements

The line-up of representatives of countries and movements who took part in the celebration of the anniversary of the Libyan revolution on 1 September or in the "solidarity conference" which preceeded it, was indeed impressive: more than 1,000 prominent people, heads of state, ministers, and political leaders came from 85 countries to express their support for Colonel al-Qadhdhafi or their "gratitude" for his aid. The latter included Mr Daniel Ortega, coordinator of the Sandinist junta in Nicaragua, who hailed Libya as an "international center for struggle against imperialism and racism." To which Colonel al-Qadhdhafi replied: "America, for its part, is the queen of terrorism; it terrorizes peoples who resist imperialist domination and who are simply seeking a place in the sun...."

After listening to Colonel al-Qadhdhafi giving vent to his grievances against the United States on 5 June, the Lebanese Communist Party secretary general made him an unusual proposal: the signing of a defense treaty with the Marxist governments of South Yemen and Ethiopia, both "surrounded" by American bases (in Sudan, Somali and Oman) and by the 7th fleet and both "isolated" in an ocean of hostility. This immediately struck Colonel al-Qadhdhafi as a good idea and Mr Georges Hawi was entrusted with an exploratory mission.

The coming and going between Tripoli, Aden and Addis Ababa by the communist leader who was accompanied by Mr Taysir Qubba-ah, a leader of the Palestine People's Liberation Front, and at times by South Yemen head of state Mr Nasir, took place in the greatest secrecy. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's righthand man, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, who visited Addis Ababa secretly initialled the text of the treaty in mid-July and the text took on its final form on 6 August at an equally secret meeting in Tripoli between the three countries' foreign ministers. One week before, the American press reported a CIA plan--which the White House was to deny--to mount a "large-scale operation" to overthrow the Libyan regime, involving Mr al-Qadhdhafi's assassination.

Nonetheless, the Libyan revolution leader does not regard the tripartite treaty as an "all-risks insurance." In his speeches on 11 June and 1 September Colonel al-Qadhdhafi held out his hand to Europe and to all "progressive or revolutionary" Arab countries to face the "American threat." He reestablished diplomatic relations with Morocco and proposed an amicable settlement with the Saharan nationalists. He even restored relations with Iraq, to some extent sacrificing his preferential relations with Imam Khomeyni's Iran and he is now trying to effect a reconciliation with Saudi Arabia's royal family whom he formerly doomed to the "trash cans of history," and he hopes to reach an agreement with Saudi Arabia which would make it possible to cut Riyadh's oil production and consequently restore the level of exports of Libyan "crude."

Overtures to France

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's attempt to divide Europe from the United States was, to say the least, clumsy, according to a fairly widespread view in diplomatic circles in Tripoli. His threat, although all talk, to take reprisals by bombing the American bases on the Mediterranean shores, thus inflicting a "nuclear disaster" on the old continent certainly prompted more smiles than gnashing of teeth among experienced observers.

The overtures to France were less clumsy. While Colonel al-Qadhdhafi made no criticism of Paris in his 1 September speech, the Libyan mass media are singing the praises of President Mitterrand and the "socialist government." It will be remembered that the latter, in a goodwill gesture, has restarted work on the civilian and military contracts "frozen" by the previous administration last January.

Nonetheless Colonel al-Qadhdhafi remains intransigent on the Chadian affair, which increased tension between Paris and Tripoli in the wake of the backing of the French Embassy. The embassy is now being reconstructed at the Libyan Government's expense. But Colonel al-Qadhdhafi continues to justify the presence of his troops in Chad, and maintained once again this 1 September, that his southern neighbor constitutes a "strategic buffer zone" for Libya. However, a compromise may not be impossible.

Mr Goukouni Oueddei, president of Chad's national unity transition government, who is the man most concerned in this affair, and who is due to have talks with the French leaders in Paris in 10 days' time, does not seem to share the Libyan president's views. In his speech in Tripoli on 1 September, Mr Goukouni showed noticeable reservations: He said nothing about geopolitical interest justifying the presence of Libyan troops in Chad.

Whatever the outcome of Tripoli's diplomatic offensive toward the Arabo-African world and toward Europe, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi is quite clearly determined to take his place if not inside at least alongside the socialist camp which, in his view, constitutes the surest guarantee of the Jamahiriyah's survival. The path he is preparing to take is very like the one chosen by his illustrious predecessors in the Third World, notably Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and Fidel Castro whom he makes no secret of emulating. The change cannot have been easy for a man who portrays himself as the champion of the "third way," and who went so far as to refuse to

allow Soviet warships to make mere courtesy visits to Libyan ports. His 1 September speech sounded like a bitter self-criticism: "We are being forced," he stated, "to form a military alliance with anybody prepared to defend us against America. There can be no neutralism in wartime. Neutralists would then be merely cowards and capitulators....For my part I think we should form an alliance with our enemy's enemy who will then necessarily be our friend."

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi has not announced the decision taken secretly to immediately open preliminary negotiations with the USSR whose name he did not even mention during his 3-hour speech. He will need time--his entourage maintains--to prepare Libyan opinion and the Libyan armed forces for this political and ideological about-face. He will take action after gaining the approval of a "people's congress" which will be convened before the end of this year.

CSO: 4519/54

AL-QADHDHAFI MEETS TURKISH, GREEK, ITALIAN, SPANISH AMBASSADORS

LD092036 Tripoli JANA in English 1821 GMT 9 Sep 81

[Excerpt] Tripoli, 9 Sep (Jamahiriyah News Agency)--The revolution's leader has received the ambassadors of Turkey, Greece, Italy and Spain accredited to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah.

The meeting came in the wake of the escalating campaign of distortions being waged by the U.S. administration through its propaganda apparatus and various right wing and reactionary papers in order to distort the Libyan stance and to undermine and sabotage Libya's relations with friendly Mediterranean countries. This is being done by inserting lies into the revolution leader's speech during the celebration marking the great al-Fateh revolution's 12th anniversary, and by covering up the true stance followed by the al-Fateh revolution in its affirmation of its legitimate right to defend the Libyan Arab people's freedom to confront the American imperialist onslaught. These lies are part of the conspiracies and attempts by the U.S. administration, in cooperation with puppet regimes, to undermine and sabotage the Libyan people's relations with friendly peoples.

The four friendly countries' ambassadors were unanimous, in statements they made after meeting with the revolution's leader, in asserting that their countries rejected any aggressive stand taken by America against Jamahiriyah.

They were also unanimous in stating their countries' refusal to permit America to use their lands in any aggressive act against Libya.

The ambassadors of Italy, Turkey, Spain and Greece stressed that their countries would not sacrifice their interests and historical and civilizational relations with Libya for the sake of President Reagan.

The ambassadors said that all officials in their respective governments appreciated the relations with Libya and were very keen and concerned to develop and increase their cooperation and interests with it. They made it clear that their government adopted an unwavering stand in their relations with the Libyan people in order to preserve those relations and interests. Towards this end, they strongly rejected, from the standpoint of believing in the peoples' right to defend their freedom and security, that American forces should spring from their lands to cause harm to the

Libyan people's freedom or to harm its achievements. These governments, they said, resolutely stood against oppression and unwaveringly backed Libya's right to the Gulf of Sidra. They also affirmed that their governments would not be influenced by the American attempts to spread distortions.

The statements of the ambassadors of these four Mediterranean countries refute the lies and allegations spread by the U.S. administration and diffused by the hired right wing papers, influenced by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

CSO: 4500/44

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ALGERIA SEND CABLE TO AL-QADHDHAFI

LD311258 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 0700 GMT 31 Aug 81

[Text] Tripoli, 31 Aug (JANA)--The international progressive parties and liberation movements accredited to Algeria have sent a cable to the brother commander of the revolution. The following is the text of the cable:

The brother commander of the great 1 September revolution, the committee of the international progressive parties and liberation movements in Algeria seize this opportunity of the convocation of the International Conference for Solidarity with the Jamahiriyah people to renew their pledge of solidarity and support for you in the face of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary offensive. This offensive aims at detracting from the great 1 September revolution and the destruction of its gains and achievements with a view to obstructing its march and its support for the world revolution, the struggle of peoples and the world liberation movement.

While expressing our appreciation of the revolutionary progressive stands of the socialist people's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and its revolutionary command, we state that we know that the forces of evil and aggression will not hesitate to repeat their desperate attempts to harm the revolution. We have utmost confidence that these sinful attempts will flounder on the rock of steadfastness and on the heroic confrontation by the Libyan Arab people and their revolution and command.

The world peoples who aspire to freedom and peace stand by you with all their forces against the plots and collusions.

Destruction for reaction, Zionism, fascism and American imperialism. Victory for the great 1 September revolution and the world peoples who aspire to freedom and peace.

[Signed] The International Progressive Parties and Liberation Movements in Algeria--the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the vanguard of the popular war of liberation, al-Sa'iqah; the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the Chilean Movimenieto de Izquierda, Revolucenaria, MIR; the Revolutionary National Front for the Liberation of Patani; the Spanish Communist International Party; the National Lebanese Movement; the Polisario; Supporters of the Egyptian National Rally Party; the Chilean Socialist Party; the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman; SWAPO and the African Congress.

CSO: 4504/84

AL-QADHDHAFI ATTENDS MILITARY GRADUATION CEREMONY

NC300858

[Editorial report] Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic at 0645 GMT on 30 August broadcast a live relay of the officers graduation ceremony at the Libyan Military Academy. At 0658 GMT, the announcer said that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi had arrived at the military academy a short while before the ceremony started.

At 0703 GMT, medals and ribbons were awarded to the military academy's graduates and afterward the commander of the academy delivered a speech in which he saluted al-Qadhdhafi and thanked him for attending the ceremony. The commander went on to exhort the graduates to carry out their duties and to enhance their revolutionary concepts and aspirations for liberation. He concluded by reminding them that they are the soldiers of the revolution and that the struggle will continue until its goal is attained.

Following the military academy commander's speech, a military parade was staged, and then the announcer said:

"Let America and its stooges in the region know that the people of the Arab Jamahiriyah are armed and strong and will repel the attackers. Oh brothers! The criminal aggression carried out by American imperialism by attacking two Libyan aircraft is part of the American design against the people. This is a criminal stance."

At 0730 GMT, the outstanding graduates were awarded prizes, after which the announcer said:

"Now, a document written in blood will be handed over. This is a pledge of allegiance to the leader. It says: My master, the leader: We the graduates of the Libyan Military Academy are happy, at this perilous stage through which our nation is passing, to write this document in our blood. We hereby pledge to be loyal soldiers and honorable strugglers. [Passage indistinct] The only way to restore the Arab honor which has been wounded, the rights which have been usurped and the honor which has been trampled on is to achieve unity and be ready to die for it. We will strive to achieve overall unity. We are prepared to crush any fascist attempt against our leader. We will liquidate reactionary agents wherever they may be, American imperialism and treacherous Zionist gangs. We write our pledge in blood."

At 0741 GMT, the graduating officers took the oath of allegiance to President al-Qadhdhafi and the country and then the guests attending the graduation ceremony left the military compound where the ceremony was held. The live relay ended at 0748 GMT.

CSO: 4504/84

REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES CRITICIZE CORRUPTION, REACTION

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 14 Aug 81 pp 12-13

[Text]

THE REAL problem facing Libya in this connection is the fact that the bourgeois, reactionary remnants of the old exploitative system, are still ensconced in high places within the Revolution. This unfortunate fact is partly the result of history. After the Great Al-Fateh Revolution of 1969, the new revolutionary authority had more than enough on its hands, what with the expulsion of the imperialists and remaining colonialist settlers and the takeover of major capitalist concerns, without launching a simultaneous war on the state's own bureaucracy.

In the Revolution's early phase, the Revolutionary Command Council had to make use of the existing state administrative apparatus, to carry out its decrees and exercise its authority. Gradually some of these institutions changed with the times and became, or at least pretended to become 'socialist'. In fact, as time proved, this was a mirage as empty of reality as any encountered in the desert. The whole basis of a revolutionary society consists of the revolutionary consciousness of the people. The Revolution is clearly threatened if that consciousness is undermined and nothing undermines it more than a feeling which could be expressed in the phrase, 'What's the point of revolution anyway? The state apparatus remains exactly the same, has the same privileges and behaves in the same old offensive exploitative manner.'

The bourgeois 'revolutionaries'

This feeling that the existing apparatus, even the existence of any state apparatus, constitutes a compromise of the ideals which set Libya on its present road in 1969, grew stronger during the 'seventies and led to experiments in popular democracy, finally realised in the establishment in 1977 of the Jamahiriya, the 'state of the masses', based on the tenets of Muammar Qadhafi's Green Book. The new system of power, in which the people were to exercise power over their lives directly, rather than in the indirect and unsatisfactory way of the past, had to come to terms with the problem of administration. The answer was found in the establishment of people's administrative organs actually run by the people.

But clearly there remained the need to make use of those experts within the transformed administration. Wherein lies the problem which currently faces the Revolution. There remain, within the People's Secretariats and also to a certain extent within the People's Committees, individuals whose whole outlook is in complete contradiction not necessarily with the fact of the Revolution, but with its spirit.

The counter-revolutionary example

Thus it is not very surprising that there should remain within these organs the remnants of the old bourgeois exploitative society, who now dress themselves up as 'revolutionaries' but are, in fact, nothing of the sort. These people, in the example they set, particularly when residing overseas, can cause the Revolution and its achievements untold damage, for their attitudes eat away at the heart of the Revolution, which is the mass popular consciousness. Their actions have also caused justified resentment on the part of those hard-working citizens in Libya who see their efforts nullified by the bourgeois selfishness of a few individuals in positions of administrative importance.

A few examples of the kind of behaviour which these elements indulge in, will graphically demonstrate just how damaging and indeed dangerous their activities are. These examples range across the whole gamut of administrative functions within the revolutionary society, but tend to be concentrated in those areas where bourgeois elements are bound to be more concentrated and find most comfort. Thus, key areas include the main Secretariats, especially those connected with foreign relations and foreign trade, for it is clear that individuals whose work will anyway bring them into daily contact with bourgeois and reactionary attitudes, will be most likely to indulge in incipient psychological - counter-revolution. They may no longer be called 'minister' or 'bey' or 'excellency', but they certainly behave sometimes as if nothing had changed since the overthrow of the puppet monarch Idris.

Firstly, there is a general problem which affects all those areas where the agents of psychological counter-revolution will concentrate themselves. That is they nearly all involve the use or rather misuse of public funds. In attempting, and very often succeeding, to misdirect public funds to their own benefit, the bourgeois reactionary elements are in fact squandering the hard-won wealth of the whole Libyan Jamahiriya. Thus every apparently petty little fraud is, in fact, a crime against the entire Libyan people.

Furthermore the general awareness amongst the people of the practice of such fraud, has the effect of demoralising the people, partially stripping them of their revolutionary fervour and qualifiying their commitment to the revolution's goals. Thus we must face up to the greatest danger of the activities of the reactionary agents of this psychological counter-revolution: the achievements of the Revolution and its mass base, could well be undermined and if this activity is not checked, ultimately destroyed.

Squandering

Members of the Secretariats who constitute this arm of incipient counter-revolution, are partly able to act in this way

because they simply ignore the dictate of the specific People's Committees which are attached to the Secretariats. They disregard the recommendations of the People's Congress and flout their resolutions. They promote their families' and friends' interests, rather than those of the whole people. Examples of such activities unfortunately abound.

For instance, there is the phenomenon of Secretaries spending holidays abroad and charging expenses to the public treasury. Among those who behave in this way is the wife of the 'minister of foreign affairs', who is touring Europe without control; and his excellency', a member of the General People's Congress and members of his family. Such people occupy important positions, but we ask, who foots the bill?

Then there is the phenomenon of sending the sons and daughters and relatives of Committee secretaries to study abroad, often to evade service in the armed forces. They are enrolled in European 'society schools', thereby emphasising their connection with the attitudes of the old, pre-revolutionary society.

Exploiting public wealth

Then there is the general attempt by the agents of counter-revolution to turn the clock back to pre-revolutionary days, through the exploitation of public wealth for their own interests. Such committee secretaries have intervened to prevent action against this new form of exploitation and are loudest in demanding compensation for those members of the bourgeoisie who had their wealth expropriated.

And what about the free spending on tenth-grade artists, such as those working in night-clubs and bars? This may not sound serious but indeed it is. Often they are imported by artistic agents within the 'revolutionary media' for purposes known to all people.

Then there is the phenomenon of medical treatment abroad, at society's expense. Some patients are sent abroad without financial provision by some secretaries, only to be charged to the budgets of the People's Bureaux abroad. The reason for this is because such people have relatives in 'high places' of influence, while the poor who need treatment die of 'natural causes'. Dozens more await mercy from the 'ministers', who close doors in the faces of those they consider 'scum'.

As for the problem of domestic servants of all nationalities, this can be said to have developed beyond all proportion. Thousands of dinars are being spent at the Libya Palace and Beach Hotels on mistresses of certain officials in public departments. The over-staffing of People's Bureaux abroad is now ridiculous, as they become crowded with assorted hangers-on, in one case a Bureau has over one hundred staff. Letters of appointment continue to be issued by the Office of Foreign Relations, with no justification save the fact that so-and-so happens to be the relative of such-and-such.

Waste and excuses

Other examples of counter-revolutionary misdirection abound. For example, Committee secretaries have been known to impose projects on the Libyan Jamahiriya which have not been approved by Basic People's Congresses in their areas. The cost of one such project reached the staggering sum of sixty-four million dinars!!

Then one has the phenomenon of some Secretariats opening offices in certain European countries, where large numbers of Libyans are employed on questionable tasks. Why are such offices necessary? Surely the People's Bureaux are supposed to carry out commercial tasks? They certainly have enough staff. Should every 'minister' be allowed to open an overseas office belonging to his Secretariat?

There are thousands of Libyan students abroad, in a wide arc from the USA to Britain to the Philippines. They study under the pretext that they require particular technical qualifications. But one wonders why don't we establish technical training institutions in Libya, and bring in the staff rquired for them? Or is this another way to simply enable people to leave the country on the flimsiest excuse, instead of staying at home and building the Revolution?

Then there are the one-week 'English language courses' which some officials have dreamed up for those who teach this subject at school. Is one week really enough to familiarise teachers with the problems of language tuition, or is this simply yet another stratagem to enable people to spend holidays abroad at the expense of the people?

All these abuses and malpractices have roots which lie in the mentality of the old pre-revolutionary society. It is possible to level charges of neglect at anyone. No-one is perfect. But there are those who commit these practices who are, in fact, misusing their position in comp-

lete and utter violation of the people's authority.

What is particularly galling about this, is that often it is those who are the on-lookers who are charged with the compromise of the people's authority and are blamed for the failure to put an end to such violations. It is not possible for any Libyan to now seriously deny that these practices take place. What is presently at issue is how best to deal with such practices. In this connection, the revolutionary committees have a vital role to play, a role of enlightenment and guidance.

The revolutionary committees were set up in 1978, a year after the establishment of the 'Jamahirriya', precisely because it was felt that there was a need to provide the People's Congresses, Committees and Secretariats with revolutionary guidance. That this guidance is now more necessary than ever is proved by the accusations of grave malpractices within the people's organs, itemised in this article. If ever proof was needed of how a revolution can, without the restraining hand of a vigilant revolutionary force, go off the rails, the examples cited are it.

The remedy

What must be combatted against are attitudes, for attitudes breed the actions which harm the integrity and reputation of the Libyan Jamahirriya. It is abundantly clear that if revolution is to become a living reality in the hearts of all the people, then every opportunity must be seized on to prevent counter-revolutionary activity from demoralising the people. This can be done most easily by simply exposing every malpractice, every abuse, every example of psychological counter-revolution which undermines the revolution's achievements. Through exposure, the people can become more aware of what is actually going on. It is also important to remember that simple exposure and the resulting shame of those exposed, can have another very significant effect. Exposure of all these abuses will certainly deter many others from similar abuses. The knowledge of what happens to someone whose actions invite condemnation will prove a powerful deterrent, but if that fails, then there are, of course, other methods which the revolution can resort to.

It would of course be regrettable if every single instance of laxity on the part of members of Secretariats and Committees had to be brought before the People's Courts. But if this proves to be the only truly effective method to deal with the bourgeois and reactionary tendencies within society, then so be it. In the case of the more serious offences against revolutionary morality, where the actions of individuals who regard themselves as 'above' the ordinary people actually threaten the long-term survival of the Revolution, then doubtless legal sanctions will have to be used more frequently.

Legal sanctions can punish actual offences against law, exposure can humiliate those who indulge in malpractices, but possibly the best method of all for dealing with these adverse tendencies in our society is simply eagle-eyed vigilance. If an atmosphere was created where it became clear to the incipient counter-revolutionaries that the Revolution in fact had its eyes open, was taking strong measures to close the loopholes which allow exploitationist activity to take place, then all the activities referred to in this article would certainly gradually cease. We in the revolutionary committees, shall certainly do all in our power to raise popular vigilance and expose the backsliders in our society. If necessary, we shall continue to discuss these matters in Al-Zahf Al-Akhdar, in fulfilment of our historic role.

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ROLE OF REVOLUTION, QURAN IN LEGAL SYSTEM ANALYZED

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 21 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

GREAT IMPORTANCE has been attached by the Third Universal Theory to the problem of the statute of society. Equal attention has been accorded to this problem as has been accorded the problems of democracy, economics and society. The Theory's creator, Brother Muammar Qadhafi, saw that solutions to other problems facing society would be impossible without finding a solution to the problem of law.

FREEDOM WILL be threatened if a society does not have an established statute made up of rigid laws which cannot be overturned by the tool of authority. Because of this, there has long been in the Jamahiriya an understanding of the strong link needed between the statute of a society and the freedom of the individual. The Third Universal Theory sees the law of the Jamahiriya as being a sacred framework through which every citizen is both protected and made aware of his or her responsibilities to society. Law is not seen as being an end in itself: it is the living and vital expression of the attitudes and beliefs enshrined in the Revolution.

As the key to the faith of Libyans is to be found in the Islamic religion, the thinker Qadhafi regards religion as being one of the two basic sources of law. The other source is the norm of society, which today in Libya means the Revolution and everything it stands for. Thus the statute of society is dependent on these two sources, which give it its meaning and its power.

It is impossible to consider the statute of society without considering the social framework within which it operates. Both Islam and the Revolution lay down that there are higher authorities than an authoritarian tool, who takes or is given power. In Islam's case, that authority is the Qu'ran; in the revolution's, it is the people.

In modern Libya, the two are inseparably interlinked and, in recognition of this fact, the people declared on March 2nd, 1977, that henceforth the Qu'ran would be be regarded as the statute of Libyan society. The people, the ultimate political authority in the Libyan Jamahiriya, accepted the wisdom of the Qu'ran as their guide in law, for in this law is contained both the religion and the norm of society, as Brother Qadhafi has maintained it should be.

Constitutional statute?

Over the last two centuries, both old and new nations have enshrined the principles governing their laws in written constitutions. But in doing this, nations have neglected to realise that such instruments of legal principle are the subjective instruments of power, designed to reelect the political and social point of view of either one ruler or of a ruling group. For this reason, political changes in such societies were reflected more often than not in changing constitutions, as the power which dominated societies shifted from one group to another.

Brother Qadhafi describes this in **The Green Book** in 'The Solution to the Problem of Democracy — "The Authority of the People"':

'The problem of freedom in the modern age is that constitutions have become the law of society, and constitutions are based on nothing other than the views of the instruments of dictatorial rule prevailing in the world, ranging from the individual to the party. The method by which the instruments of governing seek to dominate the people, is established in the constitution and the people are compelled to accept it under the force of laws derived from that constitution, which is itself the product of the temperament and outlook of the instrument of governing.'

Brother Qadhafi goes further in his analysis to explain how law is not something which has to be created, but is something which was already present on earth when mankind was in its infancy. This law he calls 'natural law', the law which preceded man-made law and had, and has today, a logic all of its own. In his words:

'The law of the dictatorial instruments of governing has replaced natural law. Because man-made law has replaced natural law, standards are lost. Man is the same everywhere. His physical constitution is the same and so his instinct. For this reason natural law became a logical law for man as one and the same. Then the constitutions, which are man-made laws, began to look at man as not one and the same.'

The thinker Qadhafi then turns to the actual status of a constitution and makes the central observation of the chapter on 'The Law of Society'. He says that constitutions are 'the product of the temperament of the instruments of governing' and that they exist to serve their interests. Qadhafi continues to say that this is not natural law and that, 'this is the impending danger to freedom, latent wherever the genuine law of human society is absent and is replaced by man-made laws designed by the instrument of governing to rule the masses. Properly the methods of government should be in accordance with the laws of society, not vice versa'.

A pertinent digression at this point would be to say that in this last sentence, there is an echo of an idea developed further in part three of **The Green Book**, 'The Social Basis of the Third Universal Theory'. In the chapter on 'The Nation', Qadhafi asks, 'why does the map of the world keep changing from one age to another? The reason is that the political structure may, or may not, be consistent with the social structure.' Thus the relationship between law and the society it is supposed to serve is clearly established. Herein lies the truly original idea behind the Third Universal Theory's approach to law.

Natural law

Since, as Muammar Qadhafi says, 'the law of society is not subject to drafting and codification', that is, the natural laws of nature which developed into the unwritten laws of society, it naturally follows that present-day laws governing the structure and workings of society should be inseparable from that orginal natural law. This law, the only law which prevented early humanity from sliding into uncontrolled anarchy, is the true law of society and written law should take it as its source.

Since the source itself is something that cannot be reversed, as it is a fact existing in the minds of men, rather than a statute which, once written down, can be erased from the statute books, it is logical to consider that this law cannot be altered. In Qadhafi's words, 'Freedom is threatened unless society has a sacred law based on stable rules which are not subject to change or substitution by any instrument of governing. On the contrary, it is incumbent upon the instrument of governing to abide by the law of society. Nevertheless, peoples throughout the world are now being ruled by man-made laws that are liable to change and abrogation because of the struggle for power between instruments of governing.'

The argument is further developed as the question of so-called direct action democracy is considered. Such direct action, generally through referenda or plebiscites, are not regarded as beng society's approval of some constitutional practice. They do not transform constitutional law into natural law simply because, say, 65 per cent of an electorate has voted on an issue. They simply legitimise the

position of constitutional law, the artificial law of man which has been superimposed on the existing natural law.

The inadequacy of this artificial law is at its most evident when its provisions for penalties for wrongdoers are considered. These penalties are the product of a rigid, inflexible and overly codified system of law. The penalty seldom fits the crime, the penalties, more often than not, are counter-productive in that the root cause behind a given illegal act is rarely tackled by conventional society's system of justice.

But in a society governed by natural law, it is very different for, as Muammar Qadhafi says, 'Traditional law imposes moral, not material penalties, that are appropriate for man.'

He then goes on to say that religion 'embraces and absorbs tradition', and that 'material penalties in religion are postponed until the Day of Judgement'. This is the reason for the importance accorded to religion in the Libyan Jamahiriya today, for Islam is viewed as not only a religion but also as a system for the smooth and just functioning of society, a system of tradition wherein natural law is encapsulated. It is a law which respects man, rather than a law which regards man as unruly, continually in need of being kept in check. Thus, as **The Green Book** says, religion 'does not acknowledge temporal penalties, except in extreme cases where these are necessary to protect society.'

Society: its own supervisor

Since, in the new Jamahiriya, the people are regarded as the sole source of authority, the long vexed problem of who protects the society under the law is quickly solved. **'Society is its own supervisor'**, and since, in Libya, society is governed by the natural and traditional law of the Qu'ran, this means that justice is exercised along Islamic principles, principles which antedate the later complex and unwieldy systems of constitutional justice, with which man has had to contend. These principles, easily understood by all Libyans, are the principles which have long made up natural law as they have understood it.

Therefore, they have rejected and will continue to reject, within the context of the September Revolution, all non-religious and non-traditional laws, which are the creation of one man or group with which the rest of socity is dominated. In supervising themselves, the members of society guarantee the continued existence of that original law of society, natural law.

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DPFLP'S HAWATIMAH LEAVES TRIPOLI 4 SEPTEMBER

LD051636 Tripoli JANA in English 1404 GMT 5 Sep 81

[Text] Tripoli, 5 Sep (Jamahiriyah News Agency)--The secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Nayif Hawatimah, left Tripoli last night after having taken part in the national celebrations of the 12th anniversary of the great al-Fatah revolution.

In a statement to our correspondent before his departure Mr Hawatimah said: "The participation of the Palestinian revolution in the national celebrations of the great al-Fateh expresses its strong commitment to the Jamahiriyah people in its opposition of imperialism, Zionism, and reaction.

The talks with the leader over the past few days have also affirmed the unanimity of the Libyan Arab, Palestinian and Lebanese stands in the confrontation of aggression against the Jamahiriyah people. The talks have also condemned ruling Arab reaction for its collusion with U.S. imperialism at the cost of the national and patriotic interests of the Arab nation."

Mr Hawatimah added: "The leadership of the great al-Fateh has asserted our military and political might in countering Zionist aggression against South Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution and in confronting Israeli aircraft infiltration in the skies of Beirut, An Nabatiyah, Sidon, Tyre and over Palestinian camps....

The leader of al-Fateh revolution has, moreover, affirmed the Libyan Arab people's complete allegiance to the Palestinian revolution, Syria, the Lebanese national movement and Lebanese people.

Our talks also covered oil policies, i.e. how a stop should be put to the mistaken policies followed by some of the oil-producing countries which have countered the interests of some of OPEC's member states."

Mr Hawatimah finally added: "The talks reiterated the staunch support of the great al-Fateh revolution for the Palestinian revolution in foiling the capitulatory treaties and fighting side by side in the fight against treacherous regimes in the Arab homeland."

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ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE MIDDLEMEN IN FOOD INDUSTRY

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[Text]

LIBYAN SOCIETY has already accepted the principles of the Revolution regarding trade. The essence of the revolutionary view of trade is that it is a fundamentally unhealthy phenomenon, which takes advantage of the citizens, robbing them of their wealth to line the pockets of the merchants. The maintenance of trade in a revolutionary society assists those who oppose everything which the Revolution stands for. The whole basis of the Third Universal Theory's approach to socialism as the solution of the economic problem, is founded on a deep understanding of the voracious nature of capitalism and exploitation. The practical steps taken in the Jamahiriya to end exploitation, have included this experiment unique to the world, the establishment of people's markets, where the merchant, the middle-man who charges more than the necessary cost price plus essential handling charges, cannot exploit the wealth of the people. People's markets were envisaged as an effective means of ensuring that people paid a fair price for the goods they needed.

So surely to put these people's markets back into the hands of the exploiters, the merchants, is a very strange way of furthering the aims of the Revolution? The impact of this decision may include the growth of feeling that somehow markets cannot be run without merchants and that their entrepreneurial abilities, better suited to an exploitative capitalist society, are indispensable to the smooth running of the supply of goods and services.

This dangerous assumption is the outgrowth of an attitude which holds that revolutionary tenets are one thing, while their practical application is quite another matter altogether. Is there, or rather should there be anything inevitable about this decision to reinstate the merchants to a key position of power within the economy? What possible explanations could be proferred for this significant reversal of the Revolution's internal direction?

There are two possible answers to this question. The first would maintain that in fact trade is not, in reality, an exploitative phenomenon and that this is attested to by the fact that merchants have been entrusted with the responsibility of guarding socialist institutions. This view would hold that the revolutionary forces have in fact conjured up an unjustified attack on the merchants' professional honour, and that they are innocent of the charges that they exploit others.

The second possible answer is a good deal less comfortable and rather more convincing. That is, that the forces opposed to the whole direction of revolutionary socialism are trying to circumvent it in those areas where the authority of the people has not yet been fully realised. This view maintains that permitting the merchants to work in the people's markets enables them to destroy the whole working principle behind those markets. If merchants either came near to or succeeded in destroying the socialist validity of these markets, they would come a step closer to restoring the lost dreams of the Libyan bourgeoisie. A very different answer from the first, less cosy, more compelling and a lot more frightening.

Differences between exploiters?

It is necessary to clarify the position and the status of the exploiter and what nature that exploiter can take. In order to clarify this, the following question can be posed: did the September Revolution separate the citizens' liberation from the exploitation of foreign powers, from the exploitation practised by the powerful and wealthy in the old Libya? Well, of course not — the Revolution from the very beginning never distinguished between a foreign and a Libyan exploiter. As the Leader has said, independence does not merely mean freedom from foreign occupation and exploitation; independence also means the opportunity for a liberated people to become masters of their own fate and controllers of their economic independence.

There are countries bordering and near Libya which have their independence, who have expelled their former colonialist masters, but whose people are still in reality colonised because they are oppressed and enslaved by their own bourgeoisie. Because that class does not wear a uniform or speak in a foreign language and follow a foreign culture, this enemy of the people is less easy to immediately identify and a lot more dangerous than any foreign coloniser. Thus the Revolution has from the start recognised that the realisation of the individual's political independence, cannot be separated from the realisation of his economic independence and freedom.

Thus there is no difference between exploiters, it is just that those in our midst are more dangerous and enduring than those we expelled. Before the Revolution, the consumer used to buy goods at an inflated price, complain about this and yet not understand the reason for this situation. Now, with the Revolution and institutions like people's markets, the nature of the exploiters of old is clear to all, yet they have had some of their powers returned to them.

The forces of the Revolution seem to have failed to understand this paradox, of exploiters having their powers returned to them in a revolutionary society. It is hardly possible to imagine that merchants tempted by new powers will not utilise all the old forms of exploitation and deceit, in pursuit of illegally acquired profits. It is also hardly likely that the consciences of merchants so long used to their old ways, will now be shaken by what they are doing. On the contrary they do not appear to be even flickering, despite calls on their consciences by the people and attempts to instill in them revolutionary virtue.

The leader explains

Muammar Qadhafi has looked at this whole issue and has explained its significance as follows:

'We can analyse trade and say that it is an exploitative phenomenon; that it is consumption without production, that it is the practice of buying and selling, and putting up the price of the goods in order that the merchant should make a profit ... a profit from the pocket of the consumer ... But the consumer is the whole Libyan people, including the merchants themselves ... thus they should be in favour of the abolition of trade ...'

Yet it is perfectly clear that the merchants' interest in the rebuilding of the society of exploitation, is far stronger than any evolving responsible consciousness amongst them. Brother Qadhafi believes that it is now no longer possible to convince the merchants to alter their ways and change their attitudes and that a decision is necessary to deal with this whole question. The merchants are, in his view, a non-productive class whose removal from productive society is essential if that society is to evolve into a truly equitable community of free men and women.

One way to cut out the merchants was the decision to allow the people's establishments to directly import the goods they needed, so as to remove the middle-man position of the merchants. But the merchants have not tamely acquiesced in this decision; indeed they have struggled to subvert this policy either by hiding the goods or smuggling them back abroad after delivery, in order to shift the blame for supply hold-ups on to the socialist system and reinforce peoples' belief in the indispensability of the merchant class. Brother Qadhafi himself exposed this conspiracy of silent sabotage as follows:

'Those who do not understand and those who act against their own interests, say that this is the outcome of building the new socialist society ... Look how things have disappeared from the market ... this is an incorrect understanding ... This is a lie and those who repeat it are liars. First, because trade has not been outlawed and the goods are still in the private shops. If the goods have disappeared from the shops, who is responsbile for the shops ... It is the shop owners. ... The claim that the public institutions which have been established in order to import goods, did not import sufficient quantities and thus the shop owners have nothing to sell, is not correct — and we have examined all the relevant import files.'

Brother Qadhafi went on in this recent statement to expose the methods used by the merchant class to effectively create crises, saying, 'This matter of goods disappearing is a myth. If the goods have disappeared within the country, then either they have been smuggled out or they have been stored in houses or (they) have been sold on the black market.' The question of how those who wish to sabotage the Revolution play on the occasional inadequacies of those entrusted with the responsibility to buy goods abroad, whose inexperience sometimes leads them to take the wrong decisions, is an important one and the Leader has not neglected it. The merchants will point to such shortcomings and present them as essential characteristics of revolutionary socialism.

Spreading despair

Muammar Quadhafi has rejected these claims, explaining: '... for the sake of argument, let us accept that some goods disappeared while being moved from the private importers to the public importers ... if we tomorrow appoint you to work in an import company, and you are not a merchant, it is possible that the new markets do not know you ... delays might occur ... you might buy unsuitable goods the first time ... you might not know the markets or the goods ... in other words, mistakes could be committed ... and experience will correct these mistakes in the future. ..

'But the merchants tried to spread despair among the people and convince them that it is impossible to correct mistakes or deviations ... The revolutionary forces then did not attribute the quality of exploitation to trade, but the phenomenon of exploitation is part and parcel of this profession, and the dishonest activities of the merchants has proved this ...

'The merchants have created the black market by hiding certain goods from the market, then selling them at a high price ... the victim is always the consumer, who might as a result condemn socialism. The merchants pursue their own personal interests and not those of Libya as a whole.'

Difference in price

When the merchants noticed the big difference in the prices of goods sold in neighbouring countries, compared to the subsidised prices in the Libyan Jamahiriya, they started to smuggle goods abroad to make greater and more dishonest profits. This practice led Brother Qadhafi to threaten the withdrawal of subsidies when he addressed himself to the merchants saying: 'If you go on smuggling ... we will raise the prices of goods here and withdraw the subsidy ... oil is cheap, rice is cheap, tea is cheap ... all these goods are subsidised by the public budget, but they are not subsidised in the surrounding countries ... the Libyan merchants buy them cheaply, then proceed to sell them abroad.'

Accepting the merchants have in fact sabotaged the supply of goods and that they have infiltrated socialist establishments with the aim of wrecking them, the Revolution is faced with the dilemma of what to do with them. The merchants have been given responsibility to guard the people's markets, they have obtained for themselves high salaries and all sorts of privileges, including, ridiculously enough, a danger allowance for tearing up receipts at market gates. The merchants have, and are, exploiting the people and causing the wealth of our Jamahiriya to be squandered. Thus it follows that the correct solution to the problem should be the removal of merchants from all the decision-making positions in the economy, especially in those explicitly socialist establishments, like the people's markets, which they seek to undermine.

It is clear that the merchant class will not surrender its power and position easily and, as Brother Qadhafi has said, they seem bent on ignoring the ideas of the Revolution: they neither honour productive labour, nor do they condemn exploitative values. So, given the existence of these problems, some people may ask, does removing the power of the merchants mean keeping them apart from the activity of society? This is, of course, not the aim of the revolutionary forces. If the merchants could be re-educated to perform useful tasks in society, they could become participants in the productive process. It is not entirely impossible that such involvement in normal society and the exercise of honest labour might make the merchants change their ideas. The merchants could win a victory over their own former attitudes, the attitudes which imprisoned them as well as exploited the people. If this were to happen, they could assume an honourable position in the new society.

Muammar Qadhafi has specified the avenues open to merchants in the productive sphere, were they to rebel against

their own attitudes and condition. These spheres involve the diversion of the merchants' ill-gotten gains to productive tasks, such as agricultural reclamation which could enable new farms for the breeding of sheep, cattle and domestic animals to be established. Alternatively, the merchants' capital could be used to establish factories and other productive workshops, of value to the economy of the Libyan Jamahiriya. This whole idea of Qadhafi's is based on the forward-looking assumption that through such productive work, the former merchants could acquire a distinctly new set of values and thus they could help society to eradicate exploitation (with which they will have been so familiar) and class differences. But there are dangers in shouldering merchants with the task of strengthening socialism, which cannot be ignored. The whole issue of merchants' employment in the people's markets is bound up in this question.

Difficulties

The difficulties are obvious. For example, some merchants have been allowed to stay on in their old shops after these have been expropriated. The goods sold are now owned by and supplied by the socialist establishments. This policy has generally proved to constitute confidence in the merchants, which they do not deserve. The motivation behind this policy is even more suspect: perhaps those responsible thought that the shops would anyway be returned to the merchants, so there was no point preventing them from running them.

The elements of this situation show that there are individuals amongst both the merchants and the responsible socialist administrators, who are effectively conspiring to undermine the Revolution and co-operating in the de facto formulation of a practical approach to the undermining of revolutionary goals. Thus the antagonistic contradiction between exploiters and revolutionaries is such, that only a final decision in favour of one or the other will resolve the issue. Obviously, in the modern Jamahiriya, this means that all the last vestiges of the society of exploitation must now be ruthlessly swept away.

The revolutionary stand

The Revolution has long declared that it will always adopt fundamental, rather than reformist solutions to the problem of how to eradicate exploitation. The Leader has described this revolutionary attitude as follows:

'That which is being built on Libyan soil is built on fundamental foundations — historical, scientific, revolutionary — not on compromise solutions, nor on reformist solutions. These fundamental historical transformations are not based on an individual . . . or a particular stage of development . . . the edifice we are building today is an historic one . . . we will strengthen its roots materially and spiritually in a revolutionary way daily, until it becomes impossible for any power to ever harm socialism or the people's authority . .'

Herein lies the attitude of the revolutionary stand which will make it possible to effectively deal with the remnants of the old exploitative society, manifested

in the current position of the merchants in people's markets. Solutions based on reconciliation between powers with basically conflicting interests, are fabricated solutions which will defeat the Revolution's aims. Thus the merchants must be removed from their current seat of power, given productive work and be forced to make a serious contribution to the building of Libya's new society. The exploiters must cleanse themselves of their old sins against the people through productive work.

When merchants and the agents of exploiting capital mouth socialist slogans, yet struggle at the same time to prevent the content of these slogans from ever being put into practice, we should take due recognition of such insincerity. It is imperative that we should not just identify the supporters of the Revolution on the basis of the banners they raise and slogans they shout, but that we should employ objective means to separate friend from foe.

The course of action

In response to this whole question of the position of the merchants in the Jamahiriya today, and in response to the widespread public concern that revolutionary goals are being sabotaged by merchants employed in the people's markets, the Leader of the Revolution has taken a strong course of action. He has recently announced the formation of a committee composed of the Heads of the Accounts Department, Administrative Control and Military Intelligence, which will receive reports from revolutionary committees in all parts of the Jamahiriya which will itemise known instances of exploitation. No instance of such exploitation, whether capitalist, materialist or spiritual, whether in the market place or in the forums of people's power, will be ignored.

A massive intelligence gathering exercise on exploitation throughout Libya will be launched. The revolutionary committees will collect these reports and present them to the new committee, which will then consider how best to eradicate, once and for all, the exploitation and patronage which continues to afflict the country and place obstacles in the path of the revolutionary forces' essential mission.

CSO: 4500/40

DEVELOPMENT OF MISRATAH INDUSTRIAL CENTER

Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 8 Aug 81 p 14

[Text]

● A TRAVELLER'S guide to Libya published in 1964 dismissed the town of Misrata, on the coast about 150 kilometres east of Tripoli, as 'an ancient trading centre which has become well known for its woollen carpet industry? Although it was then, as it still is, Libya's third largest city after Tripoli and Benghazi, this description reflects the torpor into which Misrata had sunk prior to 1969, when the Al Fateh Revolution brought to power energetic young leaders dedicated to the accelerated development of their formerly impoverished country.

As a key part of the ambitious development programme lauched since the Revolution, a number of the Jamahiriya's coastal towns have been assigned a major role in the country's drive towards industrialisation. Side by side with the new industrial plants that have been established have gone comprehensive programmes of urban redevelopment. Misrata is one such town, and is today undergoing a transformation that will make it unrecognisable as the sleepy backwater of the 1964 tourist guide.

At the heart of the Misrata developments lies a fully integrated iron and steel works, designed by India's MN Dastur for construction in three phases. 1985 should see the completion of the $3,300 million first stage, which provides for an annual output of 1.2 million tonnes of steel. The second stage, for completion in 1991 will increase capacity to 5 million tonnes per annum will the final phase entails expansion to an annual capacity of 7 million tonnes by the year 2005.

The Misrata steel works is one of the centre-pieces of the Jamahiriya's new $6.5 billion development plan for the years 1981-85, which was inaugurated in January this year. The first half of this year has seen a spate of major contracts for the projects and related utilities, with a combined value of about $4 billion. The first contract came in January when Japan's Kobe Steel was awarded an $801.8 million order for a bar and wire rod mill, and a shape rolling mill. At the same time it was announced that a joint venture between Japan's Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Mexico's Hojalata & Lamina had won a $430 million contract for a direct reduction plant with an annual capacity of 550,000 tonnes. This will convert iron ore into steel pellets, and the latter will then be mixed with scrap metal and fed into one of the steel production plants. These will in turn supply the rolling mills.

Contracts worth a staggering $2.3 billion were signed in February. A consortium of West Germany's Korf Engineering and Austria's

Voest-Alpine was awarded a $539.3 million contract for a 670,000 tonnes per annum capacity steel production plant, which will specialise in the production of steem blooms and billets and will have three electric arc furnaces, each with a 90 tonnes capacity for each production shift. A $674.2 million contract for a second steel production plant, to produce 650,000 tonnes of steel slabs annually, was won by West Germany's Friedrich Krupp.

Two consortia, both led by Voest Alpine, were each awarded a contract for a steel rolling mill. A $524.2 million hot rolling mill will have an annual capacity of 580,000 tonnes, while a $498 million cold rolling mill will have a capacity of 120,000 tonnes per annum.

The most recent contract for the iron and steel production plant at Misrata came in April when a consortium of West German and Austrian firms won a $339 million contract to supply a 1.1 million tonnes per annum capacity sponge iron plant, with two smelters of 550,000 tonnes each. Completion is scheduled for 1984.



• ORDERS

As well as orders for the iron and steel production plant itself, there have been major contracts for ancillary plant and utilities. In April it was announced that an Italian consortium led by Fiat Engineering and Techint Compagnia Tecnica Internazionale has been awarded three contracts, totalling $300 million, for a water purification plant, repair workshops and electricity transformer stations. In February Japan's Kobe Steel won a $49 million contract for a power and desalination plant for the steel works, entailing the supply of a power station with three 83.5 MW steam turbines and a 220 kV substation and switching station. The desalination plant will have three units, each with a daily capacity of 10,500 million cubic feet of water. The contract, for completion in 1982, also involves the installation of sea water circulation and cooling water systems. In March it was reported that a Japanese joint venture between C Itoh & Company and Nakanogumi Company has won a $53.3 million contract for non-production facilities at the steel works, to include central administrative offices and dining rooms.

Reserves

During the steel plant's first phase, iron ore will be imported through the project's own port, the $282 million contract for which was won last November by Turkey's Feyzi Akkaya.

The work includes construction of a 2,500 metre main breakwater, a 384 metre bulk berth, a small craft harbour and the intake for the steel complex's desalination plant. On land, the contract provides for about 3,600 square metres of buildings, roads, drainage, sewerage, power, lighting and telephone installations, and all port office equipment. Sezai Turkes will also supply the raw materials handling system, which includes a 2,000 tonnes per hour capacity bulk unloader, and port and pellet stockyard conveyors. The Turkish firm is to run the port for 18 months after completion, which is due about the end of 1983.

During the second stage of the steel work's operation, the Jamahiriya will switch to its own extensive reserves of iron ore, located in the Wadi Shatti area near Sebha, deep in the Sahara. A 990 kilometres railway, which has been designed by Yugoslavia's Projekt-Inzenjering, is planned to carry the ore north to Misrata.

(Jamahiriya Review)

CSO: 4530/40

BRIEFS

PEACE COMMITTEE SUPPORTS LIBYAN STRUGGLE--Tripoli, 31 Aug (JANA)--Representatives of the Arab peace committees held a joint meeting at Hotel al-Shati' here yesterday evening. The meeting discussed the basis that should be adopted to activate the Arab peace committees so that they may perform their roles in the international arena as progressive organizations which seek to end the terroristic imperialist designs, to incite the world society to combat American terrorism in the world and to call for support for the causes of freedom, justice and equality. The Arab peace committees members have highly praised the statements made by the brother commander in this speech at the opening of the International Conference for Solidarity with the Jamahiriyah people, particularly his call for the setting up of an international resistance center against American imperialism and its agent of reaction and against all forms of racial discrimination. The delegates also condemned the treacherous imperialist aggression against the Jamahiriyah people and affirmed their limitless support for the Libyan Arab people and their revolution command against the forces of imperialism, Zionism and reaction which are opposed to the aspirations of the peoples struggling for peace, freedom and justice. [Text] [LD311210 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 0700 GMT 31 Aug 81]

SANDINISTA LEADER LEAVES TRIPOLI--Daniel Ortega, a member of the National Command of the Sandinista Front, and the delegation accompanying him left Tripoli yesterday following a visit to the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. During the visit they participated in the people's celebrations of the 12th anniversary of the 1 September revolution. In a statement before his departure, Daniel Ortega said that the immortal sayings contained in the Greek book, which are being successfully applied in the Jamahiriyah, will find a suitable climate in Nicaragua through which we can work to apply them. He stressed the joint cohesion between the Libyan and Nicaraguan peoples in confronting U.S. imperialism. [Excerpts] [NC070949 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0500 GMT 7 Sep 81]

AL-QADHDHAFI RECEIVES PDRY MINISTER--The brother leader of the revolution [Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi] has received Brig Gen 'Ali 'Antar, member of the Political Bureau, first deputy prime minister and minister of local government of the PDRY, who is currently visiting the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah. [Text] [NC090859 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0500 GMT 9 Sep 81]

OIL EXPLORATION OF MALTA--A three-man Libyan delegation has visited Malta for talks on oil exploration rights in the waters separating the two countries. Relations between Valetta and Tripoli deteriorated sharply last August when Libyan warships ordered a Texaco exploration rig to cease operations in a concession awarded it by the Maltese government. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English 8 Aug 81 p 46]

METHANOL PRODUCTION--Sources of the National Petrochemicals Company in Birgayah have reported that the production of methanol till the end of this year's half reached 179,686 tons, that is at a rate of 1000 tons a day. The methanol plant in the Birgayah region is one of the most modern plants in the world and the second of its kind in North Africa. These sources added that the plant started production since 1977. Methanol is regarded as a main and vital material in the manufacture of proteins used in the manufacture of animal fodder. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Aug 81 p 9]

UREA PRODUCTION--Preliminary production tests have started at the national Petrochemical Company's first urea plant at Marsa al-Buraygah. The plant's annual production capacity is 330,000 tons. A second urea plant is currently being built and, when completed in 1984, will have an annual production capacity of 577,500 tons. Urea is an industrial fertilizer where 90 percent of production is used for providing soil with azote and nitrogen. Urea is also used in the animal fodder and other chemical fertilizer industries. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Aug 81 p 9]

CSO: 4500/40

OBJECTION TO FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY STATEMENT

LD101318 Rabat MAP in English 1226 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Text] Rabat, 10 Sep (MAP)--Members of the political bureau of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) were interpellated following the release of a declaration by the political bureau questioning the decisions of the implementation committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) which met in Nairobi on August [words indistinct] well as the interpretation that was made of them by the highest political officials of the country.

[Words indistinct], in its form and content, includes affirmations that are [words indistinct] to the dignity as well as to the moral of the nation.

So, legal actions were taken against the authors of the declaration.

On the other hand, the Moroccan Government released Wednesday night the following declaration:

"In a communique published in Paris on Wednesday, 9 September, the French Socialist Party exacts that Mr Abderrahim Bojabid and the other members of the political bureau of the USFP be released. This same communique added that the liberation of these detained persons will constitute [words indistinct] proof that some vestiges of the government's democratic system still remain in Morocco. "This interference," by its magnitude as well as by its presumptuous form, leads the Moroccan Government to make the following remarks:

"1. Morocco does not accept any violation of its home and this by no country whatever it may be, unless the vital, moral or material interests of this country were at stake or about to be endangered.

"2. The Moroccan Government notices with deep regret that by using the word "exact," the Socialist Party gave proof of unrealism and of a total ignorance of the uses and customs going on worldwide.

"3. The least one can say is that the Moroccan Government is sincerely perplexed to see the Socialist Party make a blind, deliberate and illogical defense of an anti-referendary position in the Western Sahara.

"4. (?Finally), the Moroccan Government sincerely regrets this polemic which is as ill-timed as deplorable, and politically wishes that the Socialist Party gives up the myth of dual personality and this for the good of French-Moroccan relations."

CSO: 4500/41

BRIEFS

DELEGATION LEAVES FOR USSR--Aden, 6 Sep (QNA)--'Abd al-Wasi' Salam, the PDRY deputy minister of interior, left Aden today heading a delegation to the GDR and the USSR on an official visit of several days. Aden radio quoted 'Abd al-Wasi' as saying that he is carrying a message from Col Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Battani [name as received], the minister of interior, to Gen Nikolay Shchelovok, the Soviet minister of internal affairs, pertaining to bilateral relations and ways to enhance them. [Text] [GF061835 Doha QNA in Arabic 1255 GMT 6 Sep 81]

EXPLORATION PROVES OIL AVAILABILITY--According to information available in Aden, oil exploration by the Italian (Ajeep) Company, various Soviet companies and the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation have unquestionably proved the availability of oil in the PDRY. The (Ajeep) Company has drilled five wells that have yielded very encouraging results. Soviet exploration has also proved undeniably that oil is available in marketable quantities. Estimates indicate that the PDRY will become an oil exporting country before 1985. [Excerpt] [GF081526 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 8 Sep 81 pp 1, 13]

CSO: 4304/150

PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN DISAGREEMENT EXPECTED

GF091528 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1139 GMT 9 Sep 81

[Text] Doha, 9 Sep (GNA)--The Qatari newspaper AL-RAYAH has warned that a disagreement may escalate between Syria and the PLO over the interpretation of the resolutions the Arab Followup Committee adopted in its recent meeting in Beirut. The paper stresses that any disagreement or difference of opinion between the two sides must not change or develop into something else and must not exceed its logical limits.

In today's editorial, the paper says that the basic principle established in the conscience of the entire Arab nation is that of protecting the honorable and heroic struggle of the Palestinian resistance--which has, for the past few years, been the true source of national illumination, the signal of continuing steadfastness and the mark of honor and dignity.

The paper adds that stemming from this basic principle, the entire Arab nation has supported the Palestinian resistance in all its daily battles. Syria was a pioneer in this field. It has played a distinguished role in supporting the Palestinian resistance on all levels in a way that has enabled it to stand face to face in confrontation with the barbaric attacks of the Zionist enemy.

The paper stresses that the Palestinian and Syrian sides are aware, more than anyone else, of the nature of the major threats facing the Arab nation today. They are aware, more than anyone else, of the fragmentation game many ambitious foreign powers are playing in the Arab arena. Thus, the unity of their goals imposes on them unity of confrontation with the main enemy.

CSO: 4304/149

OFFICIAL TALKS WITH SRI LANKAN PRESIDENT BEGIN

GF072023 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] The official Saudi-Sri Lankan talks began at the Royal Court in at-Ta'if at 1130 today presided by his majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the dearly beloved, and the Sri Lankan president, his excellency Junius Richard Jayewardene.

His royal highness Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the second deputy prime minister and commander of the national guards; his royal highness Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the minister of defense and aviation; his excellency Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the minister of petroleum and mineral affairs; his excellency Shaykh Muhammad al-'Ali Aba al-Khayl, the minister of finance and national economy; his excellency Shaykh Muhammad Ibrahim Mas'ud, the minister of state, cabinet member, acting information minister and the escorting minister of his excellency the Sri Lankan president; and 'Abbas Fa'iq az-Zawi, the director of the Asian and African departments at the Foreign Ministry, attended the talks on the Saudi side.

On the Sri Lankan side, Abdul Carder Shamum Hameed, the minister of foreign affairs; Mohamed Hanifa Mohamed, the minister of transport and Islamic affairs; Ronald de Mel, the minister of finance and planning; Mr John (Ratime), the director of the Middle East department at the Foreign Ministry; Mr (Ronald Dirakon), the director of the foreign resources department; and a number of officials accompanying the Sri Lankan president attended the talks.

The talks dealt with ways of strengthening cooperation between the two countries and issues of mutual interest.

On the other hand, Junius Richard Jayewardene, the Sri Lankan president, received at his residence in at-Ta'if in the afternoon, Shaykh Zaki 'Ali Yamani, the minister of petroleum and mineral affairs. The meeting dealt with bilateral relations. The Sri Lankan president also received at his residence in at-Ta'if this afternoon, Shaykh Muhammad Aba al-Khayl, the minister of finance and national economy. Bilateral relations were discussed during the meeting.

CSO: 4304/150

BRIEFS

NUMAYRI CONGRATULATES ETHIOPIAN LEADER--Khartoum, 10 Sep (SUNA)--President Ja'far Numayri today reiterated his desire to bolster the brotherhood and cooperation between Sudan and Ethiopia. In a congratulatory cable to Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile Mariam on the seventh anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution, President Numayri said: Sudan will spare no effort to support the OAU in achieving its declared objectives and in realizing the continent's unity, progress and prosperity. [Text] [JN101738 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1715 GMT 10 Sep 81]

DEBTS TO USSR TO BE RESCHEDULED--Khartoum, 7 Sep (INA)--A high-level Soviet delegation will visit Khartoum in early October for talks on the rescheduling of the Sudanese debt to the USSR. Quoting diplomatic sources, the INA correspondent here said that the Soviet delegation would be given the opportunity to discuss the question of economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Sudan, cooperation which has reached its lowest level in recent years. These sources did not disclose the nature of the delegation nor did they give the value of these debts. They only said that several years ago, Sudan obtained supply loans and aid before relations deteriorated between the two countries. [Text] [JN070959 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0930 GMT 7 Sep 81]

NUMAYRI DISSOLVES RAILWAY CORPORATION--Khartoum, 5 Sep (SUNA)--President Numayri issued today a republican decree dissolving the board of the Railway Corporation. According to this decree, the authorities of the corporation's board would be transferred to the Ministry of Transport until a new board is formed. The president also issued another republican decree decentralizing the Railway Corporation and forming a committee, chaired by Al-Rashid al-Tahir Bakr, secretary of the Political and Organizations Affairs Department, to implement this decision. [Text] [JN051820 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1745 GMT 5 Sep 81]

FOREIGN MINISTER ON LIBYAN POLICY--Khartoum, 10 Sep (SUNA)--Addressing the Arab League Council meeting in Tunis the day before yesterday, Foreign Minister Muhammad Mirghani Mubarak refuted Libyan and Syrian allegations and stressed Sudan's firm principled stands on the Palestine question as well as its faith in the common Arab destiny and the common cause of securing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people. The foreign minister said that Sudan was serious when it called for Arab solidarity and stressed the need for a common Arab strategy committing everyone. Yet, he added, voices are heard from time to time casting doubts on Sudanese policy and calling for Sudan's expulsion from the Arab League. [Words indistinct] The Sudanese foreign minister said: Libya's practices conflict with

the Arab League charter. It is plotting against the independence of member states and harboring and training elements hostile to other Arab regimes. Furthermore, Libya and its allies have signed a joint defense pact with one of the superpowers, thereby threatening the security of the Arab region. The foreign minister stressed that Libya's continuous attempts to drag its bilateral relations with Sudan into every Arab League meeting are only an indication of the conspiratorial policy it has been pursuing all these years against Sudan. [Text] [JN101229 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1040 GMT 10 Sep 81]

VICE PRESIDENT ALIER RETURNS FROM EUROPE--Khartoum, 8 Sep (SUNA)--Abel Alier, vice president and chairman of the High Executive Council for the southern region, returned to Khartoum last night from Rome following a tour that covered Britain, the Netherlands and Italy. [Text] [JN081055 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1024 GMT 8 Sep 81]

CSO: 4504/83

FUNDAMENTALISTS GIVEN HARSH SENTENCES

NC041655 Paris AFP in English 1643 GMT 4 Sep 81

[Text] Tunis, 4 Sep (AFP)--A Tunis court today sentenced 89 leaders and other militants of the fundamentalist Pro-Islamic Movement (MTI) to prison terms ranging from 6 months to 11 years.

In sentences denounced as "very harsh" by the defence, the movement's president, Rashed Ghannoushi, was among 16 people jailed for 11 years. Secretary-general 'Abd el-Fatteh Mourou and two others received 10-year terms.

Other sentences varied from 8 years to 6 months. Two defendants were acquitted.

The charges against the accused in a week-long trial included belonging to a legally unrecognized organization, impugning the dignity of the head of state and circulating leaflets containing false information.

The defendants said that MTI was originally an association of an exclusively religious nature working for the propagation of Islam and the good of society, though they conceded that this had been dissolved and a political body set up last December because "a growing number of Tunisians was turning to us."

In June they had applied formally for recognition as a political movement as required by law, the defendants added.

They denied being the authors of the tracts and said charges of insulting President Habib Bourguiba were based on distorted accounts of mosque sermons.

CSO: 4500/41

BRIEFS

ADMINISTRATIVE FRAMEWORK NAMED--Tunis, 9 Sep (TAP)--At a press conference he held today, the secretary general of the Tunisian Communist Party, Mr Mohamed Harmal, announced the administrative framework of the party derived from the party's second congress which was held last February. He explained that the administrative body of the Communist Party comprises a Central Committee, a Political Bureau and a Party Secretariat as follows: The Central Committee includes: Mohamed Harmal; Mohamed al-Nafi'; Abdulhamid Ben Mostafa; Mohamed Ibtahim; Hisham Skik; Abdul Hamid al-Turayki; Salih al-Haji; Buuum'ah al-Rumayli; Mohamed Sawid; Al-Mahidi al-Mas'udi; and Al-Ahabib al-Qastali. The Political Bureau includes: Mohamed Harmal; Muhamed al-Nafi'; Abdulhamid Ben Mostafa; Hisham Skik; Abdul Majid al-Turayki; and Salih al-Haji. The Party Secretariat includes: Mohamed Harmal; Muhamed al-Nafi'; and Abdulhamid Ben Mostafa. He pointed out that the party organ 'AT-TARIQ AL-JADID' [The New Road] will be published in the second week of November and that Mr Abdulhamid Ben Mostafa will be in charge of its editorial staff. [Text] [LD091530 Tunis TAP in Arabic 1000 GMT 9 Sep 81]

ELECTION PLAN APPROVED--The National Assembly held a general meeting this morning within the framework of an extraordinary session confined to the second and final reading of the constitutional law bill concerning the arrangement of legislative elections earlier than scheduled. The bill was proposed by 55 members of the assembly. The assembly had endorsed it in a first reading on 6 June. The proposal concerns arranging legislative elections earlier than scheduled in order to renew the National Assembly in response to [word indistinct] of the Socialist Constitutional Party in its last conference and within the framework of the openness policy announced by the head of the state and [word indistinct]. The president of the assembly, Dr Sadok Mokaddam, proposed a vote on the bill and it was endorsed by the assembly members with two members refraining from voting. Thus the National Assembly approved the constitutional bill which will be forwarded to the head of the state for signing before its publication. The following is the text of the bill: Based on the rules of Chapter 22 of the constitution, legislative elections earlier than scheduled will be held before the 31 December 1981 to renew the National Assembly. The newly-elected National Assembly will meet in accordance with this constitutional rule during the 8 days that follow voting day. The current parliamentary term of the National Assembly will end on the day the new assembly meets. [Text] [LD072336 Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 7 Sep 81]

COOPERATION AGREEMENTS SIGNED--Tunis, 4 Sep (TAP)--The official visit (2-3 September) paid to Algeria by Tunisia's premier Mr Mohamed Mzali ended by the conclusion of three cooperation agreements between Tunisia and Algeria. The agreements are on the creation of: A joint bank called Cooperation Bank of the Arab Maghreb with an initial capital of $40 million; an institute of customs and fiscal economy; an institute for the financing of development. The bank whose activities will begin next January 1st will finance several economic cooperation projects, several of which have already been identified. The two institutions, one of which will be created in Tunisia and the second in Algeria will train Tunisian and Algerian senior cadres in the qualifications announced. The two parties furthermore signed an agreement on the creation of a Tuniso-Algerian Youth Agency. Sectorial commissions will moreover meet in the coming months and before the visit scheduled at the end of the coming 6 months of Algeria's premier to Tunisia during which will be identified other cooperation agreements. [Text] [LD041701 Tunis TAP in English 1345 GMT 4 Sep 81]

CSO: 4500/41

DAILY CALLS ON ARABS TO CONDEMN AL-SADAT

GF091933 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "With Egypt...A Call to the Arab People"]

[Text] Either with Egypt or with al-Sadat. This is the stand to be defined quickly by Arab governments--in a written official form to be announced publicly--and by every Arab citizen--whether living on Arab soil or outside it.

The majority of the Arab governments have remained silent on al-Sadat, who has abused the rights of the Egyptian people, has converted Egypt into a permanent base for U.S. military operations in Africa, the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean and has created an "Arab" counterpart to Israel in the Arab homeland. These governments must make their choice. It is not in Egypt's interest that we continue to postpone adopting a stand on al-Sadat. The decision has not been made for all these years, since his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Begin in 1977. Arab governmental silence can mean nothing except full agreement with al-Sadat's suppressive measures against Egypt's sons.

The Arab citizen who sees in Egypt an Arab reality that can neither be changed nor distorted by al-Sadat is invited to adopt a nationalist stand on the side of the Egyptian Arab people. This stand will increase the depth and genuineness of national ties. Every Arab political, cultural, vocational and trade unionist organization must carry out its real task and make the issue of all Egyptian journalists, learned and religious men and politicians who were detained by al-Sadat to be the issue of every Arab citizen whether he lives in the Arab homeland or outside it.

The current situation, in which al-Sadat launched his attack against all those who disagree with his political and ideological stands, requires more than just sending cables denouncing and condemning al-Sadat's measures of obliterating freedom in Egypt. It should also provide the Arab liberation movement, with all its branches, a freedom of movement that was not available a week ago. Popular leaderships must deal with this situation scientifically and begin a carefully planned battle, in defense of Egypt and Arabism and against al-Sadat, his regime and those who support him.

The political framework and bodies of the Arab liberation movement will be able to fulfill one of their historic and national tasks by calling for a nationwide meeting

to be attended by representatives of all Arab personnel, institutions and organizations that defend Egypt's Arabism and its historic and national role in Arab politics. This gathering will form a great tent under whose ceiling a dialogue can take place, and the basic problems facing Arab citizens--foremost of which is securing the freedom of speech, action and thought for all Arab citizens--can be defined. Such a gathering must defend the hundreds of Egypt's sons who have been detained. It must move forward to defend every Arab citizen subjected to oppression, humiliation and loss of freedom.

We do not think that anyone in the Arab liberation movement wants to remain outside this great Arab tent. We do not even think that any Arab party calling for freedom and democracy finds it in the interest of the nation to stay away from this proposed national gathering. Where this meeting should be held is a question that, we think, will not occupy the minds of the majority as long as the essence of the meeting is to defend the sons of Egypt and to defend freedom and democracy throughout the Arab homeland.

Time is offering the Arab governments a golden opportunity--which can never be regained--to relieve their consciences of the guilt of remaining silent about al-Sadat's crimes against the Egyptian people, history and Arabism. If they really want to be truthful in what they declare, they can support it with action. This same situation is placing before the Arab liberation movement--and events have verified the validity of its point of view that neglecting national rights results in wasting the political rights of the Arab citizens in Egypt--the task of regaining its power and uniting its resources in a comprehensive national program that stems out of Egypt to achieve freedom for the sons of Egypt and the sons of Arabism.

CSO: 4304/149

PAPER LINKS ARRESTS IN EGYPT, ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

GF090819 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "The Strength of a Weak Regime"]

[Text] For the events now going on in Egypt to take place at the same time Menahem Begin is visiting Washington is more than a "happy coincidence" for the enemy. The "revolutionary" measures al-Sadat has taken to convince his American and Israeli friends of the strength of his regime are in fact another Deverswar [the point through which Israeli forces crossed from Sinai to west of the Suez Canal during October 1973 war] which Israel is trying to penetrate to defer its second withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982. Menahem Begin is once again reading the old testament and saying: God has asked Israel to depend on its people alone.

In the argument he will put forward to the Americans, Begin will rely in his justification for deferring the withdrawal on psychological and political plans which the enemy began to draw up after the signing of the Camp David accords. Prior to the recent events in Egypt, the JERUSALEM POST said that the Egyptian regime is unstable and cannot be relied on. All this is part of the plan to postpone the withdrawal from Sinai. The measures announced by al-Sadat the day before yesterday were "an opportunity of a lifetime" for the enemy to refuse to withdraw from Sinai, after having rejected [Palestinian] autonomy and refused to halt the establishment of settlements. Thus nothing is left for al-Sadat from Camp David except his recognition of Israel, the loss of the gains achieved in the October war, dividing the Arabs, and striking at the Egyptian people and national unity in Egypt--all this in return for "the handful of sand" that he regained in Sinai. Thus he would have achieved less than a separate agreement with the enemy.

Al-Sadat is deluding himself and wants to make others, including his American and Israeli friends, believe that the purpose of the arrest campaign is to consolidate and strengthen the regime by ending sectarian sedition. However, those who follow events in Egypt know full well that those arrested or kept under house arrest are those who oppose the Camp David accords and al-Sadat's anti-Arab policies and are not connected with the sectarian sedition that exists only in al-Sadat's schemes. This confirms that the Egyptian regime is exposing its weakness where it believes it is putting on a show of strength--and this is the most difficult of endings.

CSO: 4304/149

PAPERS VIEW U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS

GF100755 Abu Dhabi Emirates News Agency in Arabic 0648 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Excerpt] Abu Dhabi, 10 Sep (ENA)--Two papers published here today discuss Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin's current visit to Washington.

AL-ITTIHAD says in its editorial that Begin is seeking U.S. agreement to Israel's annexation of the West Bank, particularly following the increased settlements and doubling of settlers, in return for preparing Israel for a more active role in the Reagan administration's strategic plan to confront the "Soviet threat"--in the words of the Israeli prime minister.

AL-ITTIHAD asserts that secondary differences on the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia or what should be done about the Syrian missiles in Lebanon will not greatly affect relations between Washington and Israel.

In conclusion AL-ITTIHAD says that "if he returns from Washington more reassured, and this is likely," then the first thing Begin will do is launch an attack on Lebanon to liquidate the Palestinian armed presence.

AL-BAYAN says that the differences between President Reagan and Menahem Begin are like a "lovers quarrel," no more than a summer cloud that soon clears--and it usually clears in the form of a retreat by Washington in favor of the Israeli view. Another point is scored by the Zionist lobby against the State Department and the Arabs are further disappointed in the value of friendship with the United States.

CSO: 4304/149

BRIEFS

PDRY SOURCES CLAIM COUP ATTEMPT--Aden, 5 Sep (AFP)--Twelve officers were executed in South Yemen last month on charges of an attempted coup d'etat against President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, North Yemeni opposition sources said here today. The sources, members of the North Yemen National Democratic Front, reported that the officers had all been attached to North Yemen's armored corps and that their executions had been accompanied by numerous arrests of members of various other units. Among the arrested, the sources said, was the commander of the eighth brigade of paratroopers, 'Abd al-Malek al-Sayyani, on charges of complicity. A half-brother of the president, the sources further reported, 'Ali Mohsen al-Hammar, had been put in charge of the first armored brigade, with the assignment of mobilizing tribes and organizing the regular forces against the supporters of the National Democratic Front in the center of the country. The sources also reported that the head of the president's office had been dismissed without any reason being given and that security had been tightened at the presidency. [Text] [NC052203 Paris AFP in English 2138 GMT 5 Sep 81]

PRESIDENT RECEIVES PDRY ENVOYS--Brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic and commander in chief of the armed forces, received this afternoon 'Abd al-Ghani 'Abd al-Qadir, member of the political bureau and secretary of the Central Committee and 'Abdallah Ahmad Ghanim, member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Supreme People's Council Presidium in the southern part of the homeland. Brother 'Abd al-Ghani 'Abd al-Qadir conveyed to the president an oral message from his brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium and chairman of the Council of Ministers in the southern part of the homeland. The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Dr 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani and Lt Col Husayn ad-Daf'i, the president's adviser for unity affairs. [Text] [JN090822 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 9 Sep 81]

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END

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No. 2402

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22 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2402

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BRIEFS

FRENCH AID IN DESTROYING REACTOR--Diplomatic sources in Paris informed AL-KHALIJ yesterday that French intelligence had provided Israel with detailed information about Iraq's nuclear reactor. This information helped Israel destroy the reactor in the aggression it launched on 7 June. The sources said that Pierre Marion, director of French intelligence, made a secret visit to Israel in mid-August and met with Menachem Begin and the director of the enemy's intelligence. They added that security coordination between France and Israel has increased since Marion, who is one of Israel's staunchest and most committed supporters, became director of French intelligence. They said the French Government is intent on increasing security coordination between French and Israeli intelligence. [Text] [GF121719 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 11 Sep 81 p 1]

CSO: 4304/154

BLACK SEPTEMBER LEADER KHALAF INTERVIEWED

Sao Paulo O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO in Portuguese 16 Aug 81 p 16

[Interview with Salah Khalaf, principal aide to PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat, by Issa Goraieb; on 13 August in Beirut]

[Text] Beirut--A Palestine Liberation Organization that today devotes its basic action in the political field; that has renounced certain forms of particularly violent struggle but which has become the target of "Israeli terrorism" and of suspected Arab maneuvers the aim of which is to sabotage its diplomatic gains and compromise its recent international respectability: that is the image given of Palestinian resistance in this interview granted Thursday to O ESTADO DE SAO PAULO by Salah Khalaf, principal aid of PLO leader Yasir Arafat, who also performs the duties of "minister of the interior" and chief of security services of the Palestinian organization.

Khalaf, better known as Abu Ayad, is known as having been the founder of the dreaded "Black September" phantom group which emerged following the elimination of the Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan in September 1970. Among the "most spectacular" operations of "Black September" were the assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi Tall in a large hotel in Cairo, the taking of hostages in Saudi Arabia and the massacre of the Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games. In addition to the suicide-commandos killed at the site of the actions, several Palestinian leaders paid with their lives for the "Black September" adventure.

The most important of them undoubtedly was Hassan Salameh (Abu Hassan), director of "external operations" of the PLO, who was killed in an automobile explosion in Beirut in 1978, a crime clearly bearing the imprint of Mossad, the Israeli secret service. Mossad was also charged by PLO leaders with the assassination attempt, on 1 August in a Warsaw hotel, against one of the "brains" of the Munich attack, Abu Daud, who survived the impact of five revolver bullets fired at very close range by a mysterious attacker who succeeded in fleeing.

The Interview

Receiving us in one of his offices (he changes headquarters almost every day, as well as his residence, for security reasons) in the Beirut district of Fakhani, bombed last month by the Israeli air force, Abu Ayad declared that he does not have the slightest doubt about the responsibility of Israel, rejecting the versions of the Warsaw attack

to the effect that Abu Ayad's attacker had acted on the orders of Arafat himself, as Israel declared; or on the orders of the Soviet KGB, as a large London newspaper had written.

"All that is fantasy," he swears. "Israel promised a long time ago to liquidate us and the Israeli secret services are perfectly capable of operating in the East, as well as in the whole world."

Question: It is said that the only aim of the missions entrusted to Abu Daud are to keep him away from active politics within the PLO...

Answer: Abu Daud became specialized in contacts with the East European countries. Before he arrived in Warsaw, he was in East Germany, then Hungary and then Czechoslovakia. Our investigators discovered that his attacker took the same plane as he did in Prague.

Question: But it was you Abu Ayad, yourself, who 2 or 3 years ago reconciled Arafat and Abu Daud, in open conflict at the time.

Answer: That is true. At that time, Abu Daud was under suspicion of belonging or cooperating with "Abu Nidal's group" (Abu Nidal is a dissident of Fatah, of Arafat, whom he criticized as seeking a "capitulationist" solution to the Palestine problem. Having initially taken refuge in Iraq, Abu Nidal has been taking advantage of his presence in Syria for some months; a country that, nevertheless, stands as the protector of the PLO in Lebanon, where about 30,000 Syrian soldiers are currently stationed). But those suspicions proved to be unfounded and Abu Daud, of whom I am the direct superior, continues to merit all of my trust. What I do not understand is why the international press suddenly began talking about the reactivation of the "Black September," precisely following the attack against Abu Daud, preceded 3 days earlier by the arrest of two armed Palestinians in Vienna. Those two incidents have no relation to one another. "Black September" was a phase of the struggle, a phase that is long superseded. "Black September" was never part of the PLO; it was merely comprised of men and women recruited from among the most diverse organizations. But I admit that there was at least a moral responsibility on the part of the PLO, which today enjoys an Arab and international position and is devoted to political action. There is no more need today for external operations.

Question: Very well. Since that phase has been superseded, do you admit that the form of struggle chosen by "Black September" was terrorism?

Answer: I happened to assume the defense of certain operations carried out by "Black September." I am saying "certain" operations. I am obviously not in favor of the massacre of innocents, but also one cannot forget that at that time thousands of innocent Palestinians had been massacred. Today there is no longer any motivation among our men that would lead them to take actions of that type. But if they begin to massacre Palestinians, we will witness the emergence not only of another "Black September" but of a yellow, green, red, etc.

Question: To what extent was the PLO involved in the two arrests on 29 July in Vienna, which led to the cancellation of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's trip to Austria?

Answer: Do you really think that those two men were going to assassinate Sadat? If that were the case, they certainly would have acted in a less obvious manner. Nowadays there is not a single airport in the whole world that does not have electronic devices to discover immediately any weapon carried by passengers. The rifles discovered in the baggage of those two men who boarded in Damascus were put in the Austrian Airlines plane during the stopover in Beirut and did not have the slightest chance of passing unnoticed on arrival in Vienna. According to all evidence, the mission of those two men was precisely to discredit the PLO and sabotage its relations with Austria, in particular, and in a more general way, with the whole European world. They are members of "Abu Nidal's group." And let me remind you, it was that same dissident organization that claimed responsibility for the assassination of city councilor and president of the Austro-Israeli Association, Hans Nittel, last 1 May, while also threatening to assassinate Foreign Minister Bruno Kreisky.

Question: Then how do you explain the fact that those two men were being met at the Vienna airport by the director of the PLO office, Ghazi Hussein, in person; who, furthermore, is the first chief of a Palestine office officially accredited in the Western world?

Answer: All of that was the result of an enormous misunderstanding. I know that it is implausible, even unbelievable but I guarantee you that it is the pure truth. At the request of the Austrian Government itself, two members of the PLO security services were to go to Vienna to help the local authorities dismantle the terrorist networks organized by Abu Nidal. They were the ones Ghazi Hussein was waiting for. Can it be that they succeeded in infiltrating our ranks? How was that substitution made? We are continuing to investigate but at that time, pressed by a violent press campaign, the Austrian Government was obliged to declare Ghazi Hussein persona non grata, which represented an extremely hard blow to the PLO at the diplomatic level.

Question: Do you continue to have full confidence in your former representative in Vienna?

Answer: Absolutely, although he did not come form Fatah but from Saika (a Syrian-controlled Palestinian Baathist organization). Ghazi Hussein is actually the only PLO representative abroad that did not come from the ranks of Fatah. And I have nothing to reprove him for.

Question: However, we cannot forget that Syria was highly critical of Foreign Minister Kreisky at the exact time that the PLO was having an increasing number of meetings with him.

Answer: Certain Arab leaders do not know how to distinguish between political action and political agreement, the latter being considered a suspect deal. Kreisky is a friend; some of his stands are even more valid than those of certain Arab heads of state. Nonetheless, there are those who accuse us of negotiating a peace solution with the Austrian foreign minister that he had ready in his pocket. In certain parts of the Arab world there persists a backward mentality that does not understand and does not accept the PLO's exploring all political possibilities like the others. Assad and Qadhafi send their ministers abroad and nobody dares to criticize them. Abu Nidal was in Iraq since his dissent in 1974 but he seems to have extended his activities to Syria, since the two men arrested in Vienna came from Damascus and it

is in that capital that certain communiques of his are released. Taking the Syrian-Palestinian "strategic alliance" into account, on the one hand, and the mortal rivalry between the two Baathist regimes, the Syrian and Iraqi, on the other, how do you explain the tolerance that Abu Nidal receives in those two countries? Surprising, is it not? Here, take a look (at this point he shows a publication lying on the table). It is a weekly published in both Baghdad and Damascus by the "Abu Nidal group." It carries articles entitled, among others, "Arafat Takes Pleasure in Betrayal," or "Revelations of the CIA About Its Links With the Criminal Abu Ayad." Just 2 months ago I went to Iraq and saw President Saddam Hussein to try to settle the Abu Nidal problem once and for all. But this is my personal opinion: the things that Iraq and Syria prefer not to say personally, they do through Abu Nidal. We in the PLO can at least boast of having succeeded in getting the Syrian and Iraqi enemy brethren to agree, even if only on that level...

8711
CSO: 4728/109

QATARI, JORDANIAN OFFICIALS ON BILATERAL RELATIONS

GF111443 Doha QNA in Arabic 1214 GMT 11 Sep 81

[Text] Amman, 11 Sep (QNA)--Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifah al Thani, Qatari heir apparent and defense minister, has said that his discussions with Prince Hasan ibn Talal, regent and crown prince of Jordan, dealt with the current Arab situation, particularly the Palestinian question. In a statement to QNA, his highness said that the talks dealt with relations between Jordan and Qatar. A number of economic issues were discussed in addition to joint projects to be established.

His highness added: We and our military brothers in the Jordanian command discussed issues pertaining to training and exchange of expertise.

In a similar statement by Prince Hasan ibn Talal, his highness praised his country's relations with Qatar, relations established by Qatari Amir Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad al Thani and King Husayn of Jordan.

In a statement to QNA his highness said that his talks with Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifah al Thani were satisfactory. A program of bilateral cooperation was endorsed that will help Jordan implement its development plan during the next 5 years. He said he explained to his highness the Qatari heir apparent and defense minister Jordan's development program and Jordan's stand of confrontation of the Zionist enemy along the longest confrontation line.

The Jordanian crown prince said that the talks dealt with the Arab and international situations in light of recent developments and Arab contacts concerning the next Arab summit conference.

Prince Hasan noted the importance of these talks amid the difficult circumstances the Arab nation is experiencing, particularly Israel's violations in the occupied Arab territories, especially Jerusalem, and its plan to annex more Arab territory. He added that these circumstances require a united stand by all Arab states and on all levels.

Asked what is required of the Arabs and the Muslims in order to reply to the Zionist challenges, Prince Hasan said that what is required on the Arab level is an active move to confront what is happening in the occupied Arab territories. He stressed that this move must not be restricted to mere denunciation and condemnation of Israeli violations and aggression.

On the Islamic level, the prince said that there has to be an agreement in views regarding the evaluation of threats followed by an active move that corresponds to the needs of the situation.

CSO: 4304/154

SAUDI PAPER CALLS FOR ARAB 'POSITIVE NEUTRALITY'

PM111054 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 2 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Away From the Great Powers' Conflict and Alliances"]

[Excerpts] On many occasions our wise leadership has emphasized that the Arab nation will not be able to take its place in the sun and regain its lost prestige, dignity and usurped rights unless it devotes itself to ensuring the independence of its will and keeps out of the superpowers' conflict and the alliances and protection of the great.

Since the Arab area and the African continent are at present the target of Eastern and Western ambitions, neither we nor Africa can save ourselves from the big powers' designs unless we and Africa preserve the independence of our will, which calls for pursuing the course of positive neutrality rather than revolving in the Soviet or the U.S. orbit.

The unfortunate belief among some of us in the establishment in suspect alliances that really serve only the amibtions and designs of the big powers should be confronted not by quarrels among ourselves, because that would lead to interference by the big powers--which is what those powers want--but rather by making those involved in such alliances realize that they are playing with fire, which is dangerous and could consume them before it consumes us. There is no greater shame than a Muslim Arab entering an alliance against another Muslim Arab. It is shameful for a Muslim Arab to sell the independent will of his country to a superpower which in the 20th century is causing havoc in Afghanistan--a Muslim country that was secure and peaceful until it was run over by the Red Army hordes.

It is not strange if we Arabs differ in views, but it is very shameful to ally with a foreigner against one another.

Of what use are our meetings under the Arab League umbrella if some of us ally ourselves with the foreigner against his Arab brothers?

Of what use is our claim to belong to the Islamic nation if some of us stoke the fires of dissent among Islamic countries instead of putting them out? Of what use is our claim to belong to the nonaligned movement at a time when we are trying to turn this movement into a tool in the hands of one superpower against another superpower? A sincere stand is required and repentance acceptable. Otherwise we will be branded by history as those who have sold their will to the foreigner free of charge. Whoever loses his will loses his dignity. Is it not so?

CSO: 4304/156

BRIEFS

LIBYA AIDING N. YEMEN REBELS--We have received a report on Libyan financial and military aid to the al-Shafi'in tribe, which has mutinied in North Yemen [YAR]. The aim of this aid is to enable the tribe to expand its operations. [Text] [NC101925 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1715 GMT 10 Sep 81]

SUDANESE-IRAQI CONTACTS--Khartoum, 13 Sep (SUNA)--Faruq al-Maqabul, minister of cooperation, commerce and supply, today met with the Iraqi ambassador in Khartoum and discussed with him means to bolster trade and economic cooperation between the two fraternal countries. The ambassador conveyed a message from Hasan 'Ali, Revolution Command Council member and trade minister, inviting al-Maqabul to visit Iraq for consultations to bolster bilateral relations. [Text] [JN131530 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1450 GMT 13 Sep 81]

QATAR PAYS 1981 SUBSIDY--Doha, 13 Sep (GNA)--It was announced here today that Qatar has paid the third and last installment of its annual subsidy to the northern and eastern fronts, the PLO and the Palestinian people's struggle in the occupied territories in implementation of the resolutions of the Baghdad summit conference. An official Qatari source said: The installment is about $77 million. He added: Qatar has also paid a sum of $18 million, which is its contribution to the special fund for the Arab Deterrent Force [ADF] in Lebanon, now that the Arab League Council has decided to extend the ADF's mandate. [Text] [GF131346 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1125 GMT 13 Sep 81]

CSO: 4304/154

AFGHAN OPPOSITION LEADER: PDRY TROOPS BACKING KARMAL

EA121652 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 12 Sep 81

[Text] His Excellency Qays 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Zawawi, minister of state for foreign affairs, received in his office this afternoon His Excellency Prof ('Abd Rabbuh Rafiq Fayyad), one of the leading personalities of the Muslim Afghan Mujahedin [identified in the newscast headlines as "Chairman of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan]. [Words indistinct] a discussion during the meeting of the Afghan cause and the Soviet invasion of Muslim Afghanistan. His excellency the professor briefed the minister on the dimensions of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and on the Afghan issue and its development.

His Excellency Professor (Fayyad) stressed that the brave stand of His Majesty Sultan Qabus and the people of Oman in face of the communist onslaught had been crowned with success, because it (?encouraged) the Muslims to face the onslaught and to remove atheism from Muslim lands.

In an interview published in OMAN today, his excellency said that the leadership and people of Oman [words indistinct] the Russians and communists, saving the countries of the region from evil. He also said South Yemen, which the Russians converted into a den for gangs of saboteurs and terrorists, is not (?used) solely against the region but also beyond it, including Afghanistan. Professor (Fayyad) went on to say that the Russians had from the beginning used their gangsters from South Yemen to contain the Afghan Mujahedin.

The ruling regime in Aden, which is a Soviet puppet, is involved in the Mujahedin's war against communism. He also said a considerable part of the Yemeni Army is fighting on the side of the Soviet-backed Babrak Karmal forces.

Professor (Fayyad) revealed that a number of Yemenis have been killed and their nationality ascertained. He described some of the Arab regimes that are Russian puppets and opposed to the Islamic Jihad of the Afghans against their communist enemies as shaky regimes lacking the support of their peoples.

He pointed out that the recent tripartite treaty signed by the agent regimes of Aden, Libya and Ethiopia reflected mutual cooperation of the Russian agents in the region to implement Soviet plans.

With regard to Afghanistan, Professor (Fayyad) said the Mujahedin are in full control of many areas in Afghanistan and the weapons brought in by the Russians to fight the Mujahedin are now being used by the Mujahedin against the Russian themselves. He said the Babrak Karmal regime is bound to collapse and its recent call for reserve troops was a farce, since an organized Afghan Army no longer exists. He said most of the Afghan Army has joined the Mujahedin.

In conclusion, His Excellency Prof ('Abd Rabbuh Rafiq Fayyad) thanked the Arab and Muslim countries for their assistance to the Mujahedin and [words indistinct] dangers resulting from the Soviet presence in Afghanistan insofar as Muslim states are concerned.

CSO: 4304/156

BRIEFS

OPEC LOANS--The OPEC Special Fund for International Development has granted South Yemen a loan of $10.5 million to help finance a 92-kilometre two-lane paved highway between the towns of Naqabah and Nisab, the Fund announced last week. It also granted a loan of $4.35 million to North Yemen for rural electrification. The South Yemeni highway project is being co-financed by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the International Development Agency, the World Bank's soft loan affiliate. The project includes setting up an independent construction unit to undertake public works in Shabwah Governorate and to provide technical assistance to the South Yemeni Ministry of Construction. The OPEC Fund loan is its fourth to South Yemen and brings the total of aid extended to that country to $22.9 million. Two of the previous loans were for balance of payments support. The loan to North Yemen is likewise the fourth credit from the Fund, bringing its total to $19.3 million. The electrification scheme is partially financed by the IDA and is intended to bring power to 17 villages and to the agricultural market centres at Sanaa, Taiz and Hodeida. It is the first phase of a planned 18-year electrification programme intended to provide the entire country with electricity. The OPEC Fund also signed a loan of $4 million for a dam project in Laos and for $1 million to purchase capital goods, spare parts, food and essential consumer goods for the Caribbean islands of St Vincent and the Grenadines. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 35, 31 Aug 81 p 8]

CSO: 4300/107

IRAQI RELATIONS WITH GCC STATES ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1289 17 Jul 81 p 19

[Article by Sulayman al-Farazli: "Iraqi-Gulf Relations Enter Lukewarm Stage"]

[Text] When the Gulf Cooperation Council was established, it was said that Iraq did not join by its own choice so that it would not drag the rest of the Gulf states with it into war with Iran. The opposite of that was said about the two Yemens--that Sana' and Aden did not join at the choice of others. However, it has begun to come out, little by little, that the basis for the Gulf Council was what caused it to exclude Iraq and the Yemens. Iraqi President Saddam Husayn, for the first time, registered a public reservation about the Gulf Council when he noted that Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, on the occasion of the Amman summit conference, said that Iraq's exclusion from the council was neither convincing nor desirable when it is engaged in war with Iran "in defense of them and itself."

Yemeni officials, both in the north and the south, have also expressed, more than once, their desire for membership in the Gulf Council. Aden's eagerness to join was almost even more enthusiastic than Sana's.

Officials in the Gulf states are telling some in the non-Gulf states, such as Iraq and the Yemens, that the goal of the Gulf Council is not to defend the Gulf, which would require a large military force that is not available in sufficient quantity, except in the states that are not connected with the council, but to isolate a specific bloc in the Gulf from the rest of the Arab areas, which are rife with disputes. However, British correspondent Patrick Seal, commentator for the LONDON OBSERVER, went much further than that when he said in his introduction to a debate on Iraqi policy in the Gulf during a forum held last week at Exeter University that "the Gulf states encouraged Syria to go into Lebanon to control matters there, and then backed away from it, and they encouraged Iraq to go into Iran to contain the Islamic revolution, and then backed away from it!"

However, the Iraqi president, in his recent interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-ANBA', did not go to this extreme; rather, he said that there were those who told the Gulf states, in order to frighten them, that Iraq would engulf them if it was victorious in the war with Iran. Saddam Husayn described these words as worthless.

Clearly, matters between Iraq and its neighbors on the Gulf are becoming more tepid than in the past, or more precisely, less warm. The boldness of the Iraqi president,

specifically discussing Gulf affairs, although in guarded language that was not devoid of symbolism, sheds some light on present Iraqi-Gulf relations, and sheds even more light on certain incidents and measures that occurred recently in the UAE and in Kuwait.

Some time ago, after a series of explosions in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait, it appeared as if the entire Gulf area would explode. At the time, this was referred to as the "Lebanization of the Gulf." Relations between Iraq, on the one hand, and the UAE and Kuwait, on the other, have special significance in the current circumstances, in view of the Iraqis' demand for the return of the islands belonging to the UAE and occupied by the Iranians and in view of the Iraqis' demand for some strategic advantages on the Kuwaiti Island of Bubiyan, in addition to the problem of delineating the border.

Regarding Iraqi-Saudi relations, matters appear more stable. There were two differing views regarding current oil policy and its reprecussions on the Gulf war. When the pumping of Iraqi oil stopped at the beginning of the war, it was said that the Iraqis asked Saudi Arabia to make up the Iraqi markets and contracts until Iraqi pumping resumed. It was also rumored that one of the reasons for that was to enable the Gulf oil states to participate financially in Iraq's war. Specific figures have been bandied about for this participation, ranging from $9 billion to $14 billion. However, the other viewpoint, voiced by some diplomatic circles, is that the current large glut in the oil markets does not spur the impetus to stop the Iraqi-Iranian war, as would happen if the world markets were in a state of shortage instead of a state of glut!

However, the Iraqi-Kuwaiti situation continues to be more sensitive. The dialog between the two countries is still within the old framework. When the Kuwaitis demand delineation of the border, the Iraqis hear the same words, and when the Iraqis demand to lease Bubiyan Island, the Kuwaitis hear the same words. The difference is that the Kuwaitis, as a result, are more quickly injured. The Iraqi authorities admitted the presence in Iraq of two Palestinians, suspected of throwing bombs in Kuwait recently, but they refused to hand them over. The Kuwaitis muttered privately, suspecting Iraq of having arranged the explosions to put pressure on them. What the Iraqi president said in this regard reveals an important aspect of this state of tension, since he affirmed his willingness to hand over these two sought-after persons "if that was in the interest of Kuwait," which was interpreted as meaning that he would not hand them over because that would "not be in the interests of Kuwait."

The Iraqi-Kuwaiti dialogue does not always proceed in an atmosphere of tension. There have been periods of calm nerves. Therefore, it is easy to interpret anything going on in Kuwait as "out of Iraqi considerations," just as everything going on in Lebanon is interpreted as being "out of Syrian considerations." When Shaykh Jabir al-'Ali was ousted from the government and from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, some skeptics interpreted it as an attempt to shut off the dialogue between Kuwait and Iraq, especially on the media level!

Although the Kuwaitis' fear of Iraq is dominant so far, the Iraqis are trying their best to reassure Kuwait . A former Iraqi official says that he once met in Kuwait with Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abduulah, the current prime minister and crown prince, and

held a frank discussion with him about this phenomenon. He said to him: "Why do you think Iraq covets you? Do you have more oil than it has? Do you have the minerals, water, land and riches that it has? We do not want anything from you. Your blessings are yours, and your misfortune is both ours and yours."

The former Iraqi official says that he asked Shaykh Sa'd what would have happened if Iraq had occupied the three islands in the Gulf instead of Iran. He says that Shaykh Sa'd admistted that the uproar the Gulf people would have raised over that hypothetical situation would undoubtedly have been greater than the clamor raised over the Iranian occupation.

Although there is no direct friction between Iraq and the UAE, such as the friction with Kuwait, some sensitivities have occurred recently that have caused the Iraqi government, in an effort to remedy them, to confine Iraqi activity in the UAE to the federal government, i.e., to ban activity with each of the seven emirates composing the UAE individually. It is said that one of the reasons for that is "the special situation of the Emirate of Dubai!"

The Iraqi president attaches special importance to the question of the occupied islands and is concentrating on their being returned to "their owners," as he said in his interview with AL-HAWADITH last April. However, some Iraqi circles feel that there is Iranian smuggling of vital materials, which must be stopped, especially in wartime and particularly with respect to river traffic.

One of the occupied islands would revert to the Emirate of Sharjah and the other two to Ras al-Khaymah. However, Iraqi concentration on restoring them to their owners would affirm, to the maximum degree, the idea of unconditional Iraqi support for the UAE. This is the concept that Baghdad has expressed by confining activity to the federal government.

It is said in diplomatic circles in the UAE that one of the causes of that was the occurrence of a specific incident that led to a misunderstanding between the Iraqi consul in Dubai and the director of the office of the Emirate's ruler. However, that is unconfirmed, apart from the fact that the incident did happen several months ago.

No matter what the situation, the question of Iraqi-Gulf relations has been raised in public by the Iraqis in the present circumstances and it provides broad scope for a great many questions...and possibilities.

7005
CSO: 4304/91

QATARI MONETARY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PROSPECTS FOR UNIFIED GULF CURRENCY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No. 1289 17 Jul 81 pp 53, 55

[Interview with Majid al-Majid, director of the Qatar Monetary Agency by AL-HAWADITH: "The Gulf Dinar Is Coming"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The dream of unifying the currency of the Arab Gulf states, which has won minds on many occasions and more than one assembly during the past 5 years, is still a dream. However, it has become more of a reality, especially at the present time. All events begin as dreams, and they do not remain for long in the planning and implementation stages before they become reality. This is so when the best planning and the wisest preparations are based on considerations and factors of tangible fact. Those who carry the burden of unifying the currency in the Gulf states have become more optimistic than ever. To them it has become merely the making of a political decision, nothing more, because all of the factors are present and available to achieve this dream, despite the presence of some secondary obstacles.

One of the dreamers of a unified Gulf currency is the director of the Qatar Monetary Agency, Majid al-Majid, who believes that the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council is tantamount to basic support for achieving this goal, "the dream". In an interview with AL-HAWADITH, he reviewed Qatar monetary issues in particular and Gulf issues in general.

[Question] Preparatory to entering into the subject of a unified Gulf currency, we asked Mr al-Majid about the disparity in Gulf currency exchange rates and its effects.

[Answer] There are four exchange rates in the Gulf. The Qatar, Saudi and Abu Dhabi currencies are tied to special drawing rights, within a specific framework. But there is also the Kuwaiti dinar, which is tied to a basket of currencies, established according to Kuwaiti banking policy. There is also the Iraqi dinar and the Omani dirham, both tied directly to the dollar.

Generally, there is some harmony and approximation among the exchangerates, but there are specific economic, social and political factors in each of the Gulf states that causes it to follow a specific path.

[Question] When do you expect unification of monetary policies in the Gulf?

[Answer] This is expected upon the issuance of the pertinent political decision. About 3 years ago, meetings were held among the Gulf central banks. Among their goals was the study of monetary policies in preparation for formulating aspects of mutual approach to these policies, and the narrowing of the disparity in exchange rates of Gulf currencies. However, we put off making the full political decision because of our commercial orders and assets in this area.

These difficulties can be overcome because they are not fundamental, especially since the factors favoring a mutual approach are many and deep. Every Gulf state is basically dependent on oil income for its economy. During numerous meetings, which included officials from both the UAE and Bahrain, we agreed on a unified system of rate fixing for the three countries' currencies, so that it would be possible for a citizen in any of these countries to freely spend 5,000 riyals at a uniform rate in any of these states. We said that 10 Qatari riyals equals 1 Bahraini dinar or 10 Abu Dhabi dirhams. However, this system did not last, as a result of differences in economic policies. Therefore, it would be best to create a monetary unit among the Gulf states, based on specific economic factors.

It is well known that each of the region's states has a specific policy for expenditures on services and projects. There are those who are increasing expenditures and those who are cutting back, depending on the size of the revenues. This highlights the disparity between one state and another.

[Question] What differentiates the designation of government banking institutions between one state and another in the Gulf, and do you think it appropriate to unify the names of these institutions?

[Answer] In fact the name that is most recognized and is most common is "central bank." The central bank has different functions than a "monetary council," "monetary agency" or other designation. The central bank is a governmental means of fixing monetary policy and controling and supervising banks, whereas the other designations denote organizations with authority limited to the area of issuing currency and regulating it, without having the central bank's broad powers, including the control and inspection of banks and governance of the banking system.

Regarding the Qatar Monetary Agency, monetary law has given it powers similar to the powers of the central bank. It is considered a government agency, and therefore there is no difference between the two names with respect to what they in fact achieve.

[Question] You said that the political decision was the only impediment to unifying the Gulf currency or to equalizing its exchange. When do you expect that decision to be made?

[Answer] Studies have been going on for 10 years about a Gulf monetary unit, and in 1975 the political bureau met to study unification of the currency in Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. After a number of meetings, the conferees were convinced of the advantages of unifying Gulf currency exchange rates. But the decision clashed with the economic disparity among these countries. Here is certainly confirmation that economic and monetary integration are two aspects of a single currency. Therefore, there must be unity of economic action to achieve monetary unity. I believe that this hope has come close to being realized, especially after

establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council. One of the most important of its goals is to lay the foundations of economic, social and political cooperation among the peoples of the region. One of the most important of the council's objectives will be Gulf monetary unity and the Gulf common market.

[Question] What name would you recommend for a unified Gulf currency?

[Answer] Whether it is named dinar or dirham or riyal is not important; the important thing is to achieve this goal.

[Question] There have been repeated calls for a Gulf dinar. Are these calls still heard?

[Answer] The demand for a Gulf dinar is still present. This matter was among those that we studied at the meetings to which I referred. The political bureau did not agree on creating the Gulf dinar, since economic coordination was lacking. As to whether coordination has improved recently, circumstances are looking good.

[Question] What is the role of the "offshore" banks in Bahrain regarding the absorption of liquidity from the region's markets?

[Answer] I don't think that they have any role to speak of in this regard, because the "offshore" banks, located in Bahrain, are the same banks that the region has been dealing with through their main offices in Western capitals. Certainly we shall continue to go to these banks in their homelands, just as they come to us. I do not see any role for these banks in the occurrence of a liquidity crisis in the past or the present. I imagine that the liquidity crises that we have seen in recent years stem from increased investment awareness, since Gulf investment is bringing large and rapid profits by following developments in world financial markets and the rapid changes, from which we can benefit, that occur with the increased interest rate on the dollar. In addition to that, investment returns in the Gulf are small compared to the rapid profits abroad, which justify the risk in farming out capital.

[Question] Do you see any danger in the need for more banks?

[Answer] The existing banks are sufficient for the state's requirements. However, I think that we are in need of some specialized banks, such as real estate and industrial banks, to make loans to investors in these areas and to give them assistance. I think that the state must certainly participate in establishing these banks.

[Question] Can it be said that the existence of some monetary policy in the region is preferable to none at all?

[Answer] I cannot say that there is a monetary policy that is better than none at all, because each state follows a monetary policy suitable to its economic, social and political situation. If any state has achieved symmetry between its policy in these fields and its monetary policy, then its monetary policy is excellent. However, if we hope for a subordinate monetary system, we find that Kuwait follows a sound monetary program, especially as it pertains to the system of currency exchange, because it is tied to a group of currencies that have economic influence.

Accordingly, the Kuwaiti dinar is subjected to minor fluctuations, while Gulf currencies are subjected to tangible fluctuations because they are tied to another type of currency, such as the International Monetary Fund basket, or directly to the dollar.

[Question] Views differ regarding industrial investment abroad or domestically, and credit investment, i.e., through deposits. What do you think?

[Answer] I feel that the danger in investing in deposits is less than in other investments, especially abroad, because then the investor usually lives far from the projects in which his funds are invested and it is difficult for him to watch over them. However, at the same time, I believe that opportunity is opening for industrial investment in the Gulf states. It is a broad and very profitable field; despite that, investments in the form of loans abroad yield more profitable investments.

[Question] Don't you think that this negates the national role that the citizen is obligated to fulfill by sharing in building his country's industrial growth?

[Answer] I do not condemn this role as a national duty, but this feeling of responsibility requires more consciousness, and the present trend is toward the citizen investing in more profit for his money, even if in loans abroad. More profit is still the main goal for the investor.

[Question] Even at the expense of the country?

[Answer] When national economic consciousness increases, national restraint will prevail over personal self-interest. I believe that the decline of the dollar's interest will bring funds back into the nation and will revitalize the national economy. As domestic investment occurs foreign investment will dwindle.

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COUNCIL CHIEF PROPOSES PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 25 Aug 81 pp 1, 4

[Statement by Chief of DRA Council of Ministers 'Ali Keshtmand]

[Text] KABUL, August 25 (Bakhtar)— The meeting of the DRA Council of Ministers was held under the chairmanship of Sultan Ali Keshtmand, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, at the council headquarters yesterday afternoon.

Shah Mohammad Dost, Minister of Foreign Affairs, presented at the meeting, a detailed report on the DRA Government's foreign policy.

The Council of Ministers unanimously approved the statement of the DRA Government regarding the political settlement.

Following is the statement of the DRA Government on the problem of political settlement around the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

I— The securing of complete and reliable cessation of armed and, any other, intervention in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the creation of conditions making impossible the recurrence of such interference in the future must be the main aim and basic content of the political settlement.

II— Taking into account that the armed intervention in Afghanistan, as well as other subversive activiteis against it are now being carried out, first of all, from the Pakistani territory, the DRA Government has already repeatedly proposed and proposes to the Government of Pakistan once again, that the representatives of the two countries meet to discuss the questions pertaining to the commencement of the negotiations with the aim of reaching an agreement to normalize relations.

In the course of such negotiations, the Government of the DRA will be ready to consider other problems outstanding between Afghanistan and Pakistan to normalize Afghan-Pakistani relations and to ensure stability and tranquillity.

The Government of the DRA reaffirms also its proposal to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to hold negotiations with the aim of working out an agreement on the development of friendly relations and multifaceted, mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries, including the questions of trade, economic cooperation, transit and cultural ties.

The agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan and between Afghanistan and Iran must contain universally acknowledged provisions, concerning mutual respect, sovereignty, readiness to develop relations on the basis of principles of good-neighbourliness and non-interference in internal affairs, as well as, include concrete commitments of the parties on preventing armed and other hostile activities from their own territory against each other.

III— Considering the conduct of negotiations, both with Pakistan and

Iran, on a bilateral basis preferable and most promising, the Government of the DRA, at the same time, is ready to hold trilateral negotiations if Pakistan and Iran express such a desire.

However, the lack of desire to start negotiations of one of the mentioned countries shall not impede the commencement of a dialogue between Afghanistan and the other country and the achievement of relevant agreements between them, and also it should not be an obstacle to their subsequent realization.

It follows that the country refraining from negotiations in the beginning may join them or start independent negotiations with the DRA later.

The Government of the DRA does not object to its negotiations with the Government of Pakistan and Iran, whether bi- or trilateral, being attended by the UN Secretary-General or his representative.

IV— As it was defined by the Decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council on June 18, 1981, as well as by other official documents on general amnesty, the Government of the DRA will secure full freedom and immunity to all the Afghans that are temporarily living because of certain reasons in the territory of Pakistan and other neighbouring countries, when they return home. The Government of the DRA guarantees security, freedom of choice of the domicile and equal participation in the solution of the land question on the basis of agrarian reform. They will be provided with all the necessary conditions for living, fruitful labour and social activities for the welfare of the homeland.

The nomads, tribes and cattle-breeders will be provided, not only with the right to use pastures on a just basis but with the right for free movement within the country .It is meant also that the traditional seasonal migration of the nomads from Afghanistan to Pakistan and vice versa shall be allowed without hindrances.

The Government of the DRA expresses its agreement to discuss the practical aspects of the problem with its neighbours, However, if some of the Afghans do not want to return to their homeland, the relevant questions pertaining to their further stay shall also be discussed in the course of the negotiations so as to achieve necessary agreements.

V — Reliable international guarantees of agreements being achieved with regard to the cessation and the non-recurrence of armed and other interference in Afghan affairs must be an integral part of a political settlement.

The states, providing guarantees, shall themselves strictly refrain from such interference and enhance the achieved agreements by their authority. With this aim the guaranteeing countries might adopt a relevant document by which they would commit themselves to respect and observe the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity of Afghanistan and its non-aligned status .On its own behalf, the DRA would reaffirm its loyalty to the policy of peace and non-alignment, its desire to develop friendly ties with all the countries and first of all with the neighbours.

Although the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan does not determine in advance the composition of the guarantor countries, it believes, as before, that the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America as well as some other countries which may be acceptable to Afghanistan and its negotiating neighbours ought to be included in this composition.

The working out of international guarantees as well as the solution of all other questions touching upon Afghanistan's interests must be conducted with the participation of the DRA Government. At the same time it does not object to the discussion of questions pertaining to the working out of international guarantees being started simultaneously and conducted parallel with bi-or trilateral negotiations among Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran.

At the first stage, such a discussion might be conducted in the form of informal multilateral consultations and later on at a relevant international forum.

VI— In case of cessation and guaranteed nonrecurrence of armed intervention and any other form of interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, the reasons which caused Afghanistan's appeal to the USSR urging it to send the limited Soviet military contingent into its territory will cease to exist. The achievement of a political settlement, including the working out of international guarantees, will respectively give an opportunity to determine by the accord between the Afghan and Soviet sides, the order and terms or, in other words, the timetable of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The pullout of troops would be conducted to the extent of the realization of the achieved agreements. That is why the speedier the achievement and realization of these agreements, making impossible the interference into Afghanistan's affairs, the earlier would be the beginning and completion of the pullout of Soviet troops and vice versa.

VII— It is a deep conviction of the DRA Government that the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan, which can be worked out and implemented step by step, would not only meet the interests of the Afghan people and the peoples of the neighbouring countries, but would lead to the elimination of tension in this region as a whole.

In this connection, the DRA Government does not object to the international aspects of the problem around Afghanistan being discussed, together with the questions of strenghthening peace and security in the Persian Gulf region. if such an opinion prevails among the potential participants of the discussion of both these problems. But the lack of accord with respect to such a joint discussion should not be a pretext to delay the start of a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

VIII — In any variant of the negotiations—bilateral, trilateral or multilateral—in that part of them which pertains to the guarantees, the question concerning the present regime in Afghanistan, the composition of its Government as well as other internal affairs are not to be discussed. These questions are being solved and will be solved in the future only by the Afghan people but not by anybody else.

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SOVIETS BELIEVED SEEKING SETTLEMENT

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Sep 81 p 9

[Commentary by A. T. Chaudhri]

[Text] THE pyrrhic war Russia has been waging in tormented Afghanistan, since Christmas, '79, seems to have convinced the Soviet strategists that they cannot beat the Afghans into docility and if some weight is to be added to their strategic balance in Asia, then hostile sabre-rattling must alternate with friendly diplomatic fencing.

That perhaps explains the apparent "flexibility" — to which President Zia has just referred — in the new Moscow-Kabul moves on the embattled Afghan chessboard. It would be too hasty to presume that these moves are merely designed to buy time while the Afghan bomb is ticking. Nor would it be fair to conclude that the Russians are playing it soft only to take the sting out of the next Afghan resolution in the U.N. General Assembly.

Last week, a notable comment in the Western Press was: "Russians, schooled in Lenin's theories about imperialism, understand that the most efficient empire building is done not by war, but by guile and well-timed pressure."

There is, no doubt, an admixture of confrontation and conciliation in Russia's new genre of diplomacy and it is matched by the other super Power. But on the Afghan question, one must give the benefit of the doubt to the Soviet peace overtures. For, there are reasons to think that Russia cannot afford to get bogged down in the Afghan quagmire. It may like to wriggle out, as was said earlier in this column, provided a reasonable formula is hammered out to help it save its face.

Closed mind

Some superannuated "diplomats", or radical reactionaries, sitting in their ivory towers with closed minds, may decry this line of thinking as "inspired". They would like Pakistan to rush in where angels fear to tread and take on Russia, unmindful of all consequences. But those who do not suffer from Soviet-phobia will certainly plead for an open-minded approach to the new Moscow-Kabul peace overtures — without, of course, lowering our guard as a beleaguered nation.

The Afghan crisis, let's not forget, is, with all its regional manifestations and global dimensions the gravest crisis ever faced by Pakistan It is not of our making or our seeking, but it is there with all its horrifying portents. The difference between this crisis at our doorstep and the 1971 crisis, in the former East Wing, is that men could control events in 1971. Now in 1981 events may control men. That puts Pakistan on test. It has to keep all options open. It cannot let go any chance, good or bad, bright or bleak, to defuse the crisis on which hinges its future.

So, the new Kabul/Moscow offer should not be spurned as "old brew in a new bottle". Old or new, vague or clear, it merits the due meed of attention. Though the official version of the new offer has not appeared in the Press, its blurred outlines are now available. Kabul has expressed willingness to hold "bilateral, trilateral or multilateral" talks with the

concerned parties, and with U.N. participation, to end the Afghan crisis. But the pre-condition for holding a roundtable is the cessation of "interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs," to quote the Soviet news agency, Tass".

Kabul steps

In a recent interview broadcast by Kabul Radio, the Karmal regime has also announced several measures to appease the freedom-fighters and declared that if the Afghan refugees returned home, the regime would guarantee "complete freedom and security" to them.

These proposals contain "new elements", says Moscow, and could form the foundation for "peace and tranquillity" in the region. But Washington has denounced the new package as a "warmed-over version" of the Kabul plan put forward in May, last year. Nevertheless, the skeptical Western media would not reject the new proposals outright. "They concede two points to the Pakistanis. First, Afghanistan no longer insists on separate talks with each of its two neighbours, Pakistan and Iran. Second, the Afghans have agreed that the U.N. can play an active role in the talks." But this is a rather lop-sided view.

The fact is that Moscow and Kabul are now back to square one. Moscow had originally agreed to trilateral talks among Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan. Kabul faithfully toed this line for quite some time. Moscow had also accepted the active role of the U.N. in the quest for a peace formula. But subsequently is shifted ground and called for bilateral talks. Kabul again fell in line with the Kremlin. Their object probably was to divide the Afghan neighbours and confine the U.N. to the fence. Instead of U.N. "auspices", they asked for U.N. "presence" at the conference table. This somersault was made shortly before the Taif summit which shrouded the whole prospect of a political settlement in uncertainties.

At Taif, however, Pakistan strongly advocated a political solution of the Afghan problem, though the Arab leaders, barring the PLO and Rejectionist group, opposed this move. Even Iran showed little inclination to talk to Kabul until the Gulf war came to an end. (China, too, did not favour a negotiated settlement without the participation of Afghan Mujahideen in ahe initial parleys). But the twists and turns of the Afghan kaleidoscope have now brought about a refreshing change in the diplomatic scenario. The new, or not-so-new, Kabul proposals were evidently on top of the agenda of the recent Shahi-Firyubin dialogue, at Islamabad. A dialogue of sorts will also be initiated at the U.N. with Dr. Waldheim playing the role of an honest broker between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Whether or not the direct role of the U.N. would bear some fruit is difficult to speculate, but the ball has to be kept moving and rolling to "contain" the Afghan crisis before it is finally defused. Since Russia has turned a blank face to the two-tier EEC peace plan, sponsored by Lord Carrington, and since the NAM initiative and the abortive OIC move have fizzled out, Pakistan has no alternative left but to make a positive response to the marooned proposal of trilateral talks that has just been revived.

The odds are heavy, since crisisridden Iran may not find it possible at the moment to edge towards a conference room and divert its attention from the internal and external battlefronts. Yet this should not deter Pakistan from doing the spade-work for the triangular moot.

Invitation

Pakistan may perhaps be well-advised to take up the thread of the dialogue from where it was left off following the exchange of Zia-Brezhnev correspondence, last year. And, if there is a sound basis for a settlement, Foreign Minister Asha Shahi should not feel reluctant to accept the long-pending invitation for a personal visit to the Kremlin. It should not involve any question of Pakistan-losing credibility" with its traditional friends or old allies.

Nor should the prospect of American Congress holding hearings on the 3 billion dollar aid package to this country come in the way of a little tilt towards the Soviets to put the Afghan problem out of the way. After all, America, too, has lately been making "secret" overtures and offers to Russia to facilitate its retreat from Afghanistan without more loss of face.

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KARMAL TELLS GOVERNORS TO SERVE PEOPLE

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 25 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] KABUL, August 25 (Bakhtar).— Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC and President of the Revolutionary Council, received the Governors of provinces at the Gul Khana Palace, RC headquarters, yesterday afternoon and conversed with them in a comradely and friendly atmosphere.

He once again drew the Governors' attention to their "great, historic and revolutionary tasks" and said: "Your task in the present conditions of the country is extremely great and enormous. You must differ from the Governors of the past. You, in fact, are at the service of the people. You must not trample on the humanitarian and toiling piety. You must have the power to control your material and spiritual inclinations and personal pride. You must know that the revolutionary pioneers struggle for the emancipation of the people and lay down their lives in the service of the people. Our only pleasure is serving the people. Other pleasures cannot satisfy a genuine and patriotic revolutionary."

He advised the Governors to be "humane and sincere" in "dealing with the toiling and suffering people of Afghanistan" and said: "You Governors who, in fact, are Government representatives in the provinces of the country must acquire humanitarian manners of contacting masses. You must respect elders and caress and comfort our oppressed and vexed people, who had endured the oppression and tyranny of oppressive regimes. If belittling manners are pursued before our people, our party, state and people will not pardon you. You must be the new-type, progressive Governors of today, not the bureaucrat Governors of the past."

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He added: "Today we need a pious, knowledgeable, intelligent perceptive and patriotic Governor, a Governor who meets the masses with a humane attitude. We need Governors who discharge their revolutionary and historical tasks with devotion and valour and are ready to devote

and sacrifice themselves in the service of the people."

Karmal said: "In the present conditions and situation of the country, our principal and fundamental task is irreconcilable struggle against bandits and exported bands from abroad. It is the mandate of time, society and history today to destroy and eliminate all remnants of terrorist and genocide bands from Afghanistan soon. The people of Afghanistan cannot put up with terror, barbarism and robbery any longer. You Governors, who are the representatives of the Government in the provinces of the country, have been given this great responsibiltiy by history, the party, the state and the Afghan society. It is your revolutionary obligation to restore peace, tranquillity and security throughout the country and wipe out the enemies of the revolution."

He added: "Today American imperialism, Chinese chauvinism, Pakistani militarist circles and regional reaction are waging an undeclared war against the revolution of Afghanistan. Under the pretext of the so-called Afghanistan situation, they have jeopardized peace in the region. They provoke international tensions, act against detente and commit countless crimes in the international arena. It is not only our national duty but our regional and internationalist duty as well to remove the unfounded pretexts of imperialism and its criminal accomplices from our country and completely annihilate the enemies of the toiling people of Afghanistan and the enemies of freedom, independence, territorial integrity, honour and dignity of Afghanistan."

In response, on behalf of others, some of the Governors expressed pleasure over the meeting with Karmal and said that they realised their revolutionary tasks towards the party, the Government and the working people of Afghanistan and will spare no efforts to defend the Saur Revolution and the interests of the toiling people of Afghanistan.

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DAY-TO-DAY SECURITY OUTLOOK IN KABUL DESCRIBED

Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 4 Sep 81 p 3

/Report by Correspondent Uwe Engelbrecht: "Time Is on Moscow's Side"/

/Text/ Kabul--Out of a dark entryway a familiar phrase is whispered: "A skolko vremeni ? - What time is it ?" The soldiers crouching beside the small assault tank, its gun barrel trained on a wide avenue in the center of Kabul, are not Afghans; they are young Russians from Pensa, Vologda or Voronezh whiling away their time in the dark.

They are trusting and their need to talk to someone is greater than their commitment to caution despite the fact that they are urged to be careful as their stories tell. No, no, no, they say, things are not peaceful by any means; "the bandits" are still intent on killing "our people." Just recently, they relate, six were killed in Kabul alone and then there were 80,000 packs of Pakistani cigarettes confiscated, all filled with explosives.

As early as half past seven, 3 1/2 hours before the nightly curfew, it is pitch-dark in Kabul; the streets are almost deserted. But nights are far from quiet in Kabul. Every machinegun burst from the nearby mountains and every passing personnel carrier on patrol in the center of the city sets off the hordes of stray dogs for a good 10 minutes at a time. It is not until the early morning hours that their mad barking is replaced by the clanking of Soviet military vehicles returning to their positions. During the day, the Afghan army is highly visible throughout the city. By this time, the call of the Grand Mosque muezzin, amplified by loudspeakers, has roused the inner city and from 6 o'clock on the loudspeakers blare forth incessantly. There is oriental music laced with government news bulletins which has some difficulty holding its own against the loud cries of the fruit and vegetable peddlers hawking their wares in the bazaar.

As much lacking in harmony as the sounds of the capital city is the "truth about Afghanistan" which the officials here are constantly imploring the foreign journalists to report. "This government exercises power in Kabul only and has absolutely no influence in the provinces," Western diplomats are saying, admitting at the same time that there is hardly any news from the provinces to be had.

You Never Walk Alone

As for the officials themselves, they say it is "all false Western propaganda. You can see for yourself that we are in charge." And Soviets, when interviewed, will tell you: "The situation is still complicated; but there is no comparing it to a year ago. Consolidation is making progress." And observers from India and Ceylon, who speak the language and do travel in the provinces, tend to say that "the situation is difficult. Here and there, the shooting incidents are even on the increase because the rebels are better armed and more experienced now; but it is an incontrovertible fact that the government has gained a lot of ground in the past 6 or 7 months."

Rebel groups from the training camps in Pakistan have recently entered the area of the northern provincial capital of Mazare-Sharif, some 150 kilometers south of the Soviet border, which had still been quiet a month or two ago. The head of the provincial government had no time to talk to us; he was probably busy fighting the rebels.

The safety precautions taken on behalf of our small group of journalists tend to make one think. We never walk alone, not even to buy a pack of cigarettes. At night, a 19 year-old and a 16 year-old complete with Kalashnikov rifle take up position in front of our hotel rooms. But a group of Russian women instructors from the polytechnic institute move through the bazaar without a care in the world as if they had never left Odessa or Rostov. And a Soviet officer, wearing neither helmet nor cap, rolling down the main avenue with his arms folded, appears never to have heard of such a thing as an ambush.

This much is clear: this city, which houses the shrine of the fourth caliph Ali that draws the faithful to the gorgeous, turquoise mosque, does have its security problems. Tanks disturb one's sleep at night and in the distance there is intermittent gunfire at midnight. But during the day, life inside the city takes its normal course; only the guards in front of the public buildings -- young party members, members of the youth group or simply young workers and peasants-- give evidence of anything out of the ordinary in Kabul itself and elsewhere.

"We have broken the bandits' back," the government officials say. "They are no longer able to muster the forces for major engagements; they can just make small-scale attacks at night or assault some unprotected village. Then they have to return to the mountains because they no longer have any strongholds in the built-up areas. They cause a lot of damage; they kill a lot of innocent people in addition to our party members. It takes a lot of time and energy to combat them but they are no longer able to interfere with our political work."

As luck would have it, while I am speaking with the party chief of unrest-plagued Kabul province an about 17 year-old defector is brought in. The illiterate peasant boy, who does not know his exact age, admits that fear got the better of him. His father and older brother, he says, are still up in the mountains; but the brother is at odds with another resistance group with both groups accusing each other of working as agents for the government and disagreeing about the distribution of funds supplied by Pakistan. "Anything can happen here at any moment," the party chief, a former Russian teacher says. "But we are on our guard around the clock. Last year, we had a lot of problems collecting taxes in our province; but not this year. All the schools are in operation again."

In Kabul, they do not call them "rebels," "freedom fighters," much less "Mudjaheddin," on principle. They are referred to as "terrorists," as "bandits" or "mercenaries." Six prisoners are sitting at a table in the posh government hotel "Ariana" and for a moment there is a great deal of mirth all around. There is a simple peasant sitting there, wearing a black turban, who rails against the fates for having torn him away from his native village. There was a call to join the "holy war" against the government and the Soviets and he obeyed. He was supposed to plant mines in Kabul; but the taxi that was to bring him to a safe hiding place stopped right in front of a security police station. Somebody had blown the whistle on him. The government officials say that this happens all the time now: the villagers are gradually getting sick of all the shooting, the recruiting and collecting of monies.

The mirth cannot hide the fact that the Afghan drama is being played out heere and can be viewed as in a peep show. Among the prisoners there are two sophisticated young intellectuals who have obviously talked to reporters before. Their motivation in taking up the fight was clear. One of them had lost two brothers during the "first phase" of the revolution under the bloody reign of terror of Hafisullah Amin, and the other, a member of an orthodox, middle-class Muslim family had joined the resistance as a result of Amin's policy of religious persecution.

Illiterates and Mullahs - Pieces of a Ragged Mosaic

An illiterate trucker, looking for his brother, ended up by chance in a Pakistani refugee camp and once there, he says, was immediately conscripted. The two students and he were told to hijack an Afghan airliner last April. They were trained on a Pakistani Boeing 727. The attempt failed because a girl who was to participate behaved suspiciously at the airport.

The final two prisoners also are a part of the ragged Afghan mosaic: a Pakistani mullah, trained as a propagandist and active as a sometime agent of the Pakistani security police. He is the only one not to show any remorse whatever. The last of the six is a bold, young

habitual criminal from the no man's land along the Afghan-Pakistani border who loves to talk-- a goldmine of information for the Indian member of our group who gets him to tell a series of background stories on assassination attempts against Pakistani opposition politicians.

For all the skepticism about these many confessions, there is no denying that a rebel movement as diverse and as variously motivated as this one stands a minimal chance in the long run to win out over a government which is putting a clear political program into operation with the utmost resolution and energy and which, in doing so, can count on the support of an 80,000-man Soviet troop contingent by Western estimates.

A minority of resistance fighters, it is said, consists of deeply committed and fanatical fighters for the faith who feel that the Soviet intervention as well as the Kabul regime pose a threat to the future of Islam and the freedom of their country. By far the larger part, however, consists of duped illiterates, of young peasants without any understanding of politics who are forced to join in nighttime assaults on unprotected villages and of traditional gangs of bandits who pursue their customary aims under the guise of political motives.

The Kabul leadership and their small but growing group of untiringly active supporters keep offering the same argument again and again for their belief in ultimate victory. The resistance and American hopes for winning out are based, they say, are based on transitory assumptions: on ignorance, backwardness and misleading foreign propaganda. "In 3 or 4 years," when the suspicions of the faithful have turned out to be baseless and when land reform and literacy programs have taken effect, things will be completely different.

9478
CSO: 4620/13

DRA'S KESHTMAND ATTENDS MEETINGS IN QONDUZ

LD030641 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 2 Sep 81

[Excerpts] Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers, attended a meeting this morning held by the toiling and noble people of Qonduz in the Spenar Company Park. In addition to a large number of Qonduz citizens, provincial government department chiefs and employees also attended the meeting.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers first conveyed to the courageous people of Qonduz the warm greetings and good wishes of Babrak Karmal. General secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council. They were received with great sincere warmth by the people.

The BAKHTAR correspondent reports that the chairman of the Council of Ministers then spoke with the people of Qonduz in a completely free and democratic atmosphere, explaining the progressive and humane policy of the party and government for the prosperity and well-being of the toiling people of the country and prosperity of free and independent Afghanistan.

Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand said that the government is working on welfare plans for the tranquillity and well-being of the people. If this is achieved, the tranquillity and construction of a new Afghanistan will be guaranteed. Therefore, all our compatriots must participate more than before in implementing these welfare plans for their own sake. The chairman of the Council of Ministers referred to the Qonduz-Khanabad and (Gawargan)-Chahar Darreh irrigation projects which will soon be completed, saying: These projects will soon be exploited in the interests of peasants and toilers. He also spoke of the importance of the Kowkcheh irrigation project.

The speech by the chairman of the Council of Ministers was received with applause.

According to another report, Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand today visited the various sections of Qonduz Spenzar factory and attended a meeting of management and workers. The chairman of the Council of Ministers was warmly welcomed at the entrance to the factory by the workers.

Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand spoke with the workers after his visit, expressing appreciation and pleasure that the workers are playing their revolutionary role heroically and with deep feeling for progress and prosperity of the homeland, both in production

and in protecting the security of the factory under revolutionary conditions against the sabotage of counterrevolutionary elements.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers assured the workers that the PDPA and the DRA Government, under the leadership of Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council, are providing and will continue to provide the necessary facilities for the well-being of workers and will not hesitate to further improve their living standards.

The chairman of the DRA Council of Ministers also attended a meeting of officers and men of the Nahrin 20th Division and praised the heroism of the officers and men of this division in the struggle against the enemies of the homeland and revolution. He distributed medals awarded by the Revolutionary Council Presidium among those officers and men who have fought courageously to safeguard the objectives of the revolution and defend the soil of the homeland.

Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand also heard in a meeting the reports of eng Mohammad Yasin Sadiqe, member of the PDPA Central Committee and officer in charge of the zone; the deputy secretary of the provincial party committee; the governor; and the commander and head of political affairs of the division. He drew their attention to their duties and responsibilities toward the society and homeland and expressed hope that they are serving the people with all their energy and do not hesitate in cooperation and self-sacrifice in the path of meeting the needs of the toiling people of this province.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers and his entourage returned to Kabul in the evening.

CSO: 4665/11

DRA'S DOST ARRIVES IN INDIA ON VISIT

LD072154 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1530 GMT 7 Sep 81

[Text] DRA Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost and his delegation arrived this morning in New Delhi to hand a message from Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council, to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and hold a series of friendly talks toward the (?improvement) of relations between the two countries, the situation in the region and international subjects of interest to Afghanistan and India.

He was welcomed by Narasimha Rao, minister of external affairs; Ram Sathi, deputy minister of external affairs; S. K. Singh, undersecretary; (?R. C. Arora) joint secretary and (M. H. Allar) head of protocol in the External Affairs Ministry; and a number of other high-ranking officials of the Indian External Affairs Ministry; ambassador and members of the Afghan Embassy in Delhi; and ambassadors and charge d'affaires of friendly countries in Delhi at the Palam airport.

According to another report, Shan Mohammad Dost answered the questions of a number of domestic and foreign journalists at the Delhi airport concerning the friendly and sincere relations between Afghanistan and India and the DRA government statement of 24 August and a series of other topics. Shah Mohammad Dost later tonight attended a dinner which was given in his honor by the minister of external affairs in Hayderabad Hall. The dinner was attended by a number of high-ranking officials of the External Affairs Ministry; ambassador and members of the DRA Embassy in Delhi.

CSO: 4665/11

BRIEFS

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS SESSION--The DRA Council of Ministers in a meeting today chaired by its chairman Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand, approved a series of important measures as well as the proposal of Kabul municipality concerning the planning of residential quarters outside of the Kabul city master plan. The aim of this important decision is to accommodate the needy with low-cost residential homes and to prevent haphazard construction outside the Kabul city master plan. The Council of Ministers commissioned the Ministries of Public Works, Agriculture and Land Reform, Water and Power and Mines and Industry, Kabul municipality and governorate and the Department of Geodesy and Cartography to study the areas outside the Kabul city master plan for a month in order to plan low-cost residential homes and present specific proposals in this regard to the Council of Ministers for its approval. In accordance with this decision of the Council of Ministers, the Kabul municipality is dutybound to formulate detailed plans of the area in question with the cooperation of the ministries, the Kabul governorate and other relevant institutions and to begin surveying the land, constructing roads and bridges, digging wells and tending to the other requirements of residential homes. Further details regarding the residential homes outside of the Kabul city master plan and the preparation of land for the construction of low-costs residential homes will be given by Kabul municipality. The method of allocating plots of land in the areas concerned will be announced in the near future. [Text] [LD310145 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 30 Aug 81]

CSO: 4665/11

POLITICAL BUREAU MEETING OUTLINED

LD102350 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Text] A meeting of the Party Political Bureau yesterday under the chairmanship of President Chedli Bendjedid, the president of the republic and the party secretary general, reviewed the general situation in the country and the activities in various sectors of national life. Noting the rapid progress in various sectors, the Political Bureau stressed the necessity of continuing and concentrating efforts in order to bring about a comprehensive revival of the national economy and to give special attention to social affairs and issues relating to youth in the spheres of education, [word indistinct] culture and leisure.

The Political Bureau also reviewed a number of international issues, including the situation in the region, particularly following the meeting of the OAU Executive Committee in Nairobi and its decision relating to the implementation of the resolution adopted at the African summit conference, stipulating the holding of a general, free and comprehensive referendum in the Western Saharan region. The Political Bureau recorded in this connection its satisfaction with the results of the meeting, which are in the interest of the legitimate aspirations of the Saharan people and contribute to the realization of the aspirations of the peoples of the area for peace, stability and fruitful cooperation.

The Political Bureau reviewed the results of the official visit by the Tunisian prime minister to Algeria and expressed its satisfaction with the progress in the relations between the two fraternal countries, reaffirming Algeria's sincere desire to make every effort to consolidate these relations so they can always match the two peoples' aspirations as well as the aspirations of all peoples of the region.

The Political Bureau also reviewed the situation in southern Africa and in this connection condemned the attacks by the Pretoria racist regime against the People's Republic of Angola. It reaffirmed Algeria's support for them in their steadfastness and struggle to defend their freedom, dignity and territorial integrity. It also stressed Algeria's firm stance concerning the people of Namibia and the consolidation of their liberation struggle under the leadership of their legitimate representative SWAPO.

The Political Bureau also reviewed the situation in the Arab world and discussed in this connection the invitation to hold an Arab summit conference and to hold a conference of the front of steadfastness and resistance. The Political Bureau

reaffirmed in this connection Algeria's firm commitment to its stances concerning the fateful issues of the Arab nation and its total preparedness to participate actively in any constructive efforts to unite the nation and bring about the unity of the Arab ranks for the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories and the reassertion of the Arab peoples' sovereignty over their national wealth, and to confront all maneuvers that aim at the liquidation of the Palestinian issue and at deproving the Palestinian people of their right to self-determination and the establishment of a free and independent state on their own territory.

The Political Bureau also reviewed at this meeting the efforts being made by Algeria to realize effective solidarity at the level of the Third World, particularly among the oil-exporting countries, in a manner that will safeguard the legitimate interests of the peoples and the purchasing powers of the countries proceeding along the path of development.

CSO: 4504/92

INTERNATIONAL ARMS EXHIBIT TO OPEN 31 OCTOBER

PM141425 Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 7 Sep 81 pp 13, 14

[Report by Samir 'Izzat: "Al-Sadat Surprise Next October; Egypt to Become an Arms-Exporting Country; An International Arms Market in Egypt Without Brokers"]

[Excerpts] ROSE AL-YUSUF today scores a scoop over other papers. On 31 October al-Sadat will give new proof of the soundness and correctness of the decisions he makes, proof that will show the ignorance and narrow-mindedness of the leaders of the rejection front.

On 31 October Egypt and the Middle Eastern countries will witness a tremendous historical event in that Egypt will organize the 1981 international arms exhibition which will be held in the Artillery House. More than 100 international companies from the United States and Western Europe will participate in the exhibition, at which they will display the world's latest arms technology.

Invitations have been sent to the OAU member states with the exception of Libya and South Africa as well as to most of the Middle Eastern countries.

How did this idea come about and who is behind it? What are the objectives of this exhibition, which is the first to be held in the history of the area?

Defense Minister Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, one of the commanders who believe most strongly in the need to open the avenues of science to the Egyptian fighter, says:

The Egyptian fighter was able to achieve the October [war] miracle because he mastered the use of modern arms and electronic equipment, which depends on considerable science and knowledge. Therefore, it is necessary that the Egyptian fighter should keep up with the latest achievements in science and military technology. If this is necessary in wartime it is even more so in peacetime because Egyptian strategy is aimed at protecting peace in the region, not escalating military operations.

The defense minister added: Despite the present peace between Egypt and Israel there are many threats surrounding Egypt, all of which are aimed at achieving the objectives of the Soviet strategy of throttling the Arab world and reaching the oil production areas. In view of this danger Egypt must be strong militarily by

obtaining the latest products of the world's military technology so that it can be capable of repelling aggression and of immediate deterrence.

The first arms exhibition will bring together the officials in charge of armament in Egypt and leaders of this industry in the West. In fact, this exhibition is the culmination of the policy of diversifying arms sources which Egypt adopted several years ago.

Egypt is regarded as a pioneer in this field because on the one hand events have compelled it to take this course and on the other because it wants to develop its industrial and technological base which is somewhat advanced in relation to the Arab states, the Middle East area and Africa. In addition to the fact that the exhibition will enable military experts from Egypt and other countries to meet with the sources supplying arms, it will have many other advantages.

First it will enable Egypt to further project its role as a state pioneering technology in the Arab world. When the Arab industrialization authority was set up in the mid-seventies Egypt's contribution to it was to provide the technological structure and the facilities for actual production while the role of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE was to finance the project. But when President al-Sadat launched his peace initiative the financiers withdrew from the Arab industrialization authority. This was tantamount to condemning to death the first advanced industrial base established in the Arab homeland.

The irony of fate was that when Iraq was in need of arms at the height of the military battles with Iran and went to the world countries begging for arms it found only Egypt to supply it with arms. Egypt gave it arms and ammunition manufactured by Egyptian hands in the industrialization authority that Iraq wanted to destroy.

Another irony of fate was that more than 2 years after Saudi Arabia announced its withdrawal from the industrialization authority it announced that it wants to set up an industrialization authority for itself. Thus, just like their decision to starve Egypt economically, their decision to destroy the industrialization authority failed. The authority preserved its production structure and has succeeded in developing it.

Kamil 'Abd-al-Fattah, chairman of Simco Company which is organizing the international arms exhibition, says:

It will be an opportunity for armed forces personnel to get acquainted with modern technology at less cost. That is, instead of sending military expeditions to look at arms abroad, military technology will come to Egypt.

CSO: 4504/94

CLANDESTINE RADIO SCORES GEORGE BALL, WARNS AGAINST COMMUNISM

NC041430 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 3 Sep 81

[Station commentary: "The Continuation of Khomeyni's Rule Is Throwing Iran Into the Trap of Communism"]

[Text] Former U.S. State Department under secretary and staunch Democrat, Mr George Ball, who regarded the Islamic Republic with affection, said in an exclusive interview published in the latest issue of the well known U.S. magazine U.S. NEWS [AND WORLD REPORT]: "I had foreseen Iran's Islamic revolution in four stages and it is in its second stage now. The third stage will be a civil war and--if assistance is not extended during the chaos of the third stage, the period of civil war--leftists and communists will uproot the fundamentalists and clergymen. This will be very dangerous."

Mr George Ball and his illogical remarks are not going to be the topic of discussion in our talk today because this respectable gentleman, who was one of the staunchest opponents of the late shah of Iran, was invited to the White House in the latter part of 1357 [early 1979] at the peak of Iran's disturbances. He was appointed by a special commission as adviser to the U.S. administration. (?At that time he had direct contacts) with Mr Ruhollah Khomeyni's special adviser, Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, who was in Paris with Khomeyni and the (?spiritual) [words indistinct] was thus formed. This is the gentleman who is now warning the world that if they do not assist Mr Khomeyni's rule, the communists will dominate. What ignorance!

The danger of communism has, of course, always threatened and still threatens Iran; but what paves the grounds for communist domination in Iran is nothing but the rule of the "religious" clerical regime. Those who thought that by overthrowing Iran's legitimate rule, establishing Ruhollah Khomeyni as the ruler and making the religious fundamentalists the absolute leaders of Iran they would be preventing communism, have now shamefully realized their mistakes. But Mr George Ball does not want to give up.

The alert Iranian nation will never forget the experience of the past 2 1/2 years. Our country--which enjoyed calm and affluence but, of course, had social difficulties like any other country--was turned into a guinea pig. They thought that by replacing the natural regime of Iran by the robed and turbaned men, they would be

creating a safe and impenetrable area south of the Soviet Union. The mistake in this deduction which had supporters 3 years ago, has not only been proven today but it has also been witnessed how only a regime like Ruhollah Khomeyni's can push Iran to the edge of the precipice and into communism's lap. Wise Iranians were very well aware of how ridiculous this theory was 3 years ago, but alas! All the forces in nature joined hands and brought to Iran a calamity that is unnecessary to describe. Now that the international political atmosphere has changed, it is up to the noble Iranian nation to rely on its national armed forces and not only uproot these irreligious sheykhs but also take immediate steps to prevent anything sinister happening as a result of the mullahs' paving the way for the communists. The ancient country of Iran is in an extremely sensitive and destinymaking point in its history now and only an all-encompassing national attempt with Iran can give the Iranians, who are abroad and ready to move, the hope and possibility to join hands and save the dear homeland.

Oh dear youths of Iran: You were deceived by this wicked regime and you are now seeing the result. Do not allow Iran to fall from the well into the pit at your hands. Do not be deceived by the propaganda of this fascist regime which is disguised in religious garb. Do not be fooled by the crocodile tears of the leaders today in mourning for traitors, who shed the blood of your fathers, sisters and brothers. Do not be deceived by the known and unknown foreign servants of international communism--be it the Tudeh Party or any other group. Your homeland, your respect, your name are in danger of destruction. Only a nationalist movement under the aegis of the Iranian constitution of 1906 is the way to salvation.

We are saying all this with all our heart and with all our love for the ancient country of Iran. Indifference at this historic stage of the life of the Iranian nation is tantamount to treachery--a treachery which will be completely irreparable. Come and give a positive reply to our call. Long live the ancient country and people of Iran!

CSO: 4640/92

COMBATANT WARNING TO OFFICIALS

NC041755 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 4 Sep 81

[Text] A Free Voice of Iran correspondent in Bandar Abbas has reported that armed combatants in that city identified a four-member unit of the "strike group" of the Bandar Abbas prosecutor and riddled their bodies with machinegun fire some time ago. The armed combatants killed these four revolution guards from a car. One of the guards who was killed in the first moment was named (Bahram) [name indistinct].

In Tehran some time ago Sheykh Maleki, the congregation priest of (Bab Ol-Havayej) mosque was also killed by armed combatants in front of his house. A mercenary revolution guard of Khomeyni's anti-Islamic regime named Bahram Nejat was killed on Saman Street in Narmak by armed combatants. It is said that the shedding of the blood of the leaders of Khomeyni's anti-Islamic Republic and of his mercenary guards has been declared by religious leaders to be permissible by religion. This is why people throughout the country have started killing officials of Khomeyni's anti-Islamic regime and the regime's mercenary revolution guards and attack them daily. According to these reports in an attack on the sixth committee precinct in Tehran armed combatants were able to kill four guards.

In Khorramabad and Borujerd combatant braves have organized vast attacks against officials of Khomeyni's regime. A grenade was thrown at a guard named Montaham and the struggling people of Borujerd threw two Molotov cocktails at a bookshop located on 18 Metri Street there. It is said that the owner of this bookshop is a hireling Hezbollahi and a member of the Savama.

Armed combatants attacked a house belonging to Mehdi Sistani, a Hezbollahi hireling and Savama spy, and threw a grenade at his house, but he escaped the attempt.

Free Voice of Iran correspondents report that in Torbat-e Heydariyeh, Mashhad, Gorgan, Isfahan, Shiraz, Mahabad, Sanandaj, Masjed-e Soleyman, Rasht, Sowma'eh Sara, Babol, Babolsar, Amol, Ramsar, Bandar Pahlavi, Bandar Shahpur and Bushehr and in some other cities of our country armed combatants are attacking all government officials and the regime's antipeople centers of Khomeyni's regime through persistent efforts. The armed combatants have announced that if officials of Khomeyni's regime resign they will be safe from revolutionary executions. The armed combatants have also warned the revolution guards to leave the corps centers as soon as possible and to refrain from carrying out antinational acts. If they do not do so and continue to remain in the corps they will have to expect punishments planned for them by the armed combatants.

CSO: 4640/92

ANTI-IRAN KURDISH RADIO DISCUSSES UNITY AMONG KURDS

JN061452 (Clandestine) Voice of Iranian Kordestan in Bahdinani Kurdish 1400 GMT 5 Sep 81

[Excerpt]Appealto the misled brother Kurds: Dear Brothers, perhaps you recall that a few days ago, the so-called Islamic revolution radio station announced that its forces, in cooperation with Kurdish Peshmerga in northern Kordestan, had purged the region of the forces of the democrats and that the residents warmly received the guards. These claims of the so-called Islamic radio station are not new. We hear their lies and fabrications daily.

How can the people of northern Kordestan warmly receive those guards who have broken the hearts of scores of mothers and shed the blood of hundreds of Kurdish revolutionaries? [passage indistinct]

Misled brother Kurds in northern Kordestan: How long will you remain the agents of the Khomeyni regime, killing your brother Kurds for money? This regime is on the brink of collapse and is breathing its last. How can this regime, which was unable to protect its president and prime minister, protect you? Why are you killing yourselves for the interests of other people? How can this regime, which has choked the freedom of others, protect your freedom?

Brother Kurds: Stop your treason and do not sell yourselves for money. Do not fight your brother Kurds who have taken up arms for the liberation of Kordestan from oppression and tyranny. Do not kill yourselves wastefully and do not fight your brother Kurds. The struggle of the Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP] is escalating day after day and the revolutionary and progressive patriotic forces are rallying their ranks against the Khomeyni regime. It is your duty, poor toilers of Kordestan, to rally together and struggle against oppression and tyranny. If we do not unite, we will not be able to emancipate ourselves from slavery and the tyranny of oppressors and our people will continue to groan under the yoke of injustice.

Follow the example of the people's martyrs, who have shed their blood against the reactionary regime which is trying to exterminate our people. Rally around the banner of the KDP and record new pages in history. Sooner or later, the regime will face a deadlock and then, woe be to you and yours. We should unite to be stronger than the regime.

Misled brother Kurds in northern Kordestan: Once again we appeal to you to end your treason and not sell your honor and yourselves. You can still return to the fold of your brother Peshmerga. Let us clasp our hands together, struggle together and rally around the banner of the KDP, the hope of the toiling militant Kurdish people in Kordestan.

CSO: 4640/92

MOJAHEDIN LEADER DENIES RED BRIGADES CONNECTION

AU051950 Rome ANSA in English 1940 GMT 5 Sep 81

[Text] Rome, 5 Sep (ANSA)--Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the Mojahedin Khalq (fighters of the people) organization which has attacked members of the present Iranian regime, has granted an interview to the Italian daily IL MANIFESTO.

In the article which appears on newsstands tomorrow, Rajavi denied claims made by the Iranian ambassador to Italy to the effect that his organization is in contact with Italian red brigades terrorists.

"The differences between us and the "BR" are total," Rajavi said. "If Khomeyni gave us only one-tenth of the freedom and the rights that you in Italy enjoy today we would gladly hand over all of our arms," he continued. "We have always asked Khomeyni to give us the democratic rights written into the new Iranian constitution but this has been refused us. "700 Mohajedin have been killed, 12,000 are being held as political prisoners. "Is this anything like the situation in Italy?" "Can we have anything in common with a group like the BR?" He asked.

"On the contrary, the BR harms our struggle because reactionary regimes are better able to find justifications for ignoring our rights by comparing us to organizations like the BR," Rajavi said.

With regard to recent attacks, Rajavi claimed that "ours is a legitimate resistance."

He said the people of Tehran were glad to see those responsible for torture, killings and dictatorship receive their due.

"If up until now we have not ordered Khomeyni killed, something we could do with extreme ease, it is because we have our own strategy and because we have other solutions for him," Rajavi went on.

He said that his group wants to get Khomeyni before television cameras to ask him how it is that as the representative of God he claims to be, he has ordered what is happening today in Iran.

Rajavi said that his organization is opposed to the idea of a coup d'etat because "we move with the masses." "Ours is the biggest mass organization in Iran's modern history," he said.

"We want democracy for Iran, where many different nationalities and tendencies exist and we want a national and popular government that recognizes the rights of each of these diversities," he concluded.

CSO: 4600/178

MINISTER OUTLINES INDEPENDENT OIL POLICY

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 2 Sep 81 p 2

[Interview with Oil Minister Mohammad Qarrazi]

[Text] TEHRAN, Sept.1, (Pars) — "Since the time when, under the eadership of the revolutionary people of Iran, the oil price was fixed at $36 per barrel, the superpowers had tried to bring the Organisation of Petroleum Producing Countries (OPEC) to the edge of defeat and, at present with a three-million barrels surplus production, are intending to attract oil buyers towards themselves," said Iranian Oil Minister, Mohammad Gharrazi, on Sunday. Gharrazi, who was speaking at a press conference in Tehran, stressed that since the superpowers had OPEC's general policy in their hands they made no efforts to scatter the organization and had confirmed it as long as it remained a tool in the hands of the West. "The increase in the oil production by Saudi Arabia had resulted in the decrease of demands for the purchase of oil from Nigeria, Algeria, Libya and Iran," the Oil Minister said. He emphasized that the surplus oil production by Saudi Arabia was not for financial needs, therefore, firmer resistance is needed so that the Islamic Revolution of Iran would make the world understand that it is not the superpowers who make such decisions.

Asked about the threats a number of Japanese oil companies have made to the effect that if the price of Iranian crude oil did not drop they would stop buying oil from Iran, Gharrazi said that: "Iran would not establish its oil policies on the threats of this or that party. Iran had announced its views at OPEC and the general decision that the Islamic Republic of Iran had made would not change," added he.

Asked about the cut in the sale of Iranian natural gas with a revenue of more than 2.5 billion dollars and the proposals handed over to the Iranian government for renewing its sale. the Oil Minister said that during the period of the toppled shah, 5 to 6 million barrels of oil would be produced per day and the natural gas produced as a by-product would be sold to the Soviet Union. "There are independent natural gas resources in Iran enabling us to export natural gas but the important point is that we do not accept allegiance to another's will and would not tolerate losing our oil and natural gas at low prices. There is an international price for natural gas as well which could be compared with the price of other energy sources. When the Islamic Republic of Iran recognises that the sale of natural gas is in the interest of the people, it will sell it," Gharazi said.

In reply to a question regarding the stance of the compromising wing of OPEC why no agreement was reached in the extraordinary meeting of Geneva, the Iranian Oil Minister said that the reason behind this particular meeting was to disrupt the agreements achieved before and not for reaching a new agreement.

"Whatever the plots the enemy has instigated against the Islamic Revolution, the Iranian people had come out victorious. We would be wrong to imagine that the oil companies would remain silent before a nation which has revolted against their interests and set oil prices at 36 dollars per barrel," Gharrazi stressed.

Asked about the energy common market and its role in helping poor countries, Gharrazi said that 80% of the world's energy production would be consumed by 15% of the people who lived in the industrial countries which imposed their inflation on other countries. He added that it was OPEC itself which could distribute its production among the oil buyers. It was proposed at the meeting that in addition to an agreement on oil prices an agreement should also be reached on production, he said. "For example," Gharrazi added, "Iran once had a production share of five million barrels per day of the international oil market and those countries who had allocated this share to Iran in their own interests would not be suitable partners in an energy common market."

Asked about the stance of other OPEC members towards Saudi Arabia, the Iranian Oil Minister said that Saudi Arabia and its friend agreed on a $34 ceiling, Iran stressed $36 base price and others agreed on $35 provided that Saudi Arabia promised to decrease its oil production. Asked if the issue of the former Oil Minister Tondguyan (taken as a PoW by the Iraqi forces) was discussed at the Geneva meeting, Gharazi said that in the previous OPEC Conference Iran presented Tondguyan's case and since the mass media were more active, the issue was discussed to a larger extent. But, he added, during the Geneva meeting the mass media paid less attention to the issue. He expressed the hope that with the military defeat of the Iraqi regime, all the Iranian PoWs, particularly Tondguyan, would be released.

CSO: 4600/180-E

BRIEFS

GUARDS CONTROL ARMS DEPOT--After contacting a person, trusted by the regime in the revolution guards corps, a Voice of Iran correspondent gained information that on Ruhollah Khomeyni's orders all the armed forces arms depots are under the supervision and control of the hireling revolution guards. The Voice of Iran correspondent adds: Any order issued by the commanders of the armed forces on arms to be taken from the depots must first be approved by the revolution guards. After contacting some officers of the armed forces our correspondent says: This has resulted in the fact that the brave armed forces men in the war with Iraq do not receive the necessary arms. This has caused widescale reaction among the armed forces personnel on the front against Ruhollah Khomeyni and the ruling clergy. [Text] [NC041444 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 3 Sep 81]

GUARDS ORDERED TO SPY—A Voice of Iran special correspondent has reported that in order to create further repression Khomeyni's usurping regime has sent revolution guards in civilian clothes among the people. The Voice of Iran correspondent has gained information from a reliable source close to the revolution guards command that on Khomeyni's orders most of the revolution guards are sent to the bazaar and government organizations disguised and in civilian clothing, feigning to be customers or applicants in order to gain information. The same source has added that 250 patrol cars and 10 minibuses are at the disposal of these guards. Our special correspondent says: Most of the people have mobilized themselves to identify this group of hireling guards and have hindered their program by reporting them to antiregime groups. [Text] [NC041209 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 3 Sep 81]

KHOMEYNI'S SECRET RESIDENCE--A Voice of Iran correspondent has learned through indirect channels that after the explosion Ruhollah Khomeyni is terrified and worried, and has therefore decided to leave his residence at night and go to the Niavaran village. The Voice of Iran correspondent adds: Khomeyni's continuous presence in Jamaran is carried out by taking him in the morning from his new secret residence by special escort to his former residence in Jamaran where the meetings take place. [Text] [NC041158 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 3 Sep 81]

BANI-SADR CRITICIZED--A Voice of Iran special correspondent's dispatch from Paris states that on Tuesday Mr Bani-Sadr, the fugitive president and Ruhollah Khomeyni's spiritual child, received $10 million. The special correspondent quotes reliable

sources that a number of people believe that this amount has been sent by the regime through an indirect channel as hush-money. Other rumors state that this astronomically high sum has been sent to Bani-Sadr through a neighboring government in order to be used for his activities. Whatever the case may be the news that Bani-Sadr has received $10 million is true. [Text] [NC041154 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 3 Sep 81]

NATION'S ECONOMIC SITUATION--A Voice of Iran economic correspondent reports from Tehran that the foreign reserves of the clerical regime as of 22 August totaled $2.33 billion and its gold reserves $1 billion. On the basis of information gained from an official of the Finance Ministry, our economic correspondent adds that the total expenditure of the Islamic Republic is $450 million weekly. Our correspondent adds: The fact that the government's purse is empty, the shortage of foreign exchange for the import of staple goods and the back-breaking war expenditures have created a strong imbalance. Meanwhile, the people have withdrawn their deposits from the banks. In Tehran and in all other Iranian cities rumors are strong that the regime's downfall is very close and that the banks cannot be trusted. [Text] [NC041330 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 3 Sep 81]

TEHRAN CLASHES, ARRESTS--More details have emerged on the attack by Khomeyni's revolution guards on a communal house of the Mojahedin-e Khalq on Delgosha Street in Tehran. According to reports received one of the three people arrested is a small girl and the other two are a woman and a wounded Mojahed. During the clashes that took place yesterday morning 12 revolution guards were killed and 12 more were wounded. The losses suffered by the Mojahedin has been reported to have been seven dead. [Text] [NC041503 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Sep 81]

TEHRAN CLASHES, NEW GROUP--During the past 24 hours strong clashes occurred in Tehran and various other Iranian cities between armed combatants and the regime's mercenary revolution guards. Many revolution guards were killed in these clashes. Members of a group calling itself "the ideal of the oppressed" killed six mercenary revolution guards and seriously wounded four more in a clash in southern Tehran. Armed combatants and members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization also killed and wounded more than 16 revolution guards in an 8-hour clash. Even though Khomeyni's regime has refrained from giving the number of revolution guards killed during Tehran's clashes yesterday, our correspondent reported this morning that many ambulances were seen on Shahr-e Rey Avenue, the old Shemiran Road, and Delgosha Street in Tehran, and they were carrying wounded revolution guards to hospitals. Clashes on one of the streets where a house in which one of the armed combatant groups is based continued from 2000 until 0800 the next day, and after the armed combatants' ammunitions and bullets were exhausted, they themselves blew up the house in which they were based. In this explosion three armed combatants were martyred in their attempt to avoid being caught by the regime's executioner. During this 10-hour clash 14 revolution guards were killed or wounded. To prevent hitting innocent people's houses the armed combatants refraining from throwing their grenades at the revolution guards who had taken up positions in adjoining houses. [Text] [NC041743 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 4 Sep 81]

PRISON EXECUTIONS--A Free Voice of Iran correspondent reports from Tehran that on Sunday and Wednesday of this week a total of 100 armed combatants were executed in the prisons of Khomeyni's criminal regime without being tried. Therefore, the total number of people executed during the past 2 1/2 months, according to the regime's official statistics, has reached 1,000. Khomeyni, who has himself ordered that prisoners be executed without trials and charges of spreading corruption on earth and waging war against God, in a demagogic move 3 days ago called on the Islamic courts of injustice to show restraint and asked them not to go further than the norms of Islam. Khomeyni, at the same time, has confidentially told officials of his illegal regime to execute all the antiregime prisoners. [Text] [NC041747 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 4 Sep 81]

ALLEGED ARMS DEAL--The daily (HELGAR BLADID) published in Iceland, has revealed in its latest issue that the spare parts purchased by officials of the Islamic Republic from Israel have been transported to Tehran in several cargo aircraft of the (Cargo Lux) Company. According to the newspaper, the owners of (Cargo Lux) Company are famous businessmen from Iceland and Luxembourg. The Icelandic newspaper concludes its exclusive report by stating that two (Cargo Lux) Company cargo aircraft recently transported consignments of spare parts manufactured in Israel from Reykhavik airport to Tehran. It should be pointed out that the crash of the Argentinian plane in relation with these arms purchases is a separate matter and that this report in the Icelandic newspaper has revealed new arms deals and their transport to Iran. [Text] [NC051328 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 4 Sep 81]

HARBOR CONSTRUCTION--The director general of the shipping and harbors organization in an interview with the Central News Unit announced that between 30 and 40 tons of goods are loaded or unloaded daily in Iranian harbors. He added: in 1981 about 12 million tons of goods will be loaded or unloaded through harbors, railways and other customs border posts. The director general talking about new harbor installations said: Plans for building 14 harbors and small and medium-sized jetties on the Persian Gulf coastline are being studied. There is already a budget for the construction of seven jetties. Regarding the new harbor complex in Bandar 'Abbas, he said: This project is already under construction and will cost about 4 billion tomans. The project will have a loading and unloading capacity of about 1.5 million tons. A part of this harbor complex is currently in use. This project will be completed within the next 2 years and more than 3,000 people with different specializations will be employed. Also, three local trade and fishing harbors will be built in Chah Bahar which will handle goods for the eastern part of the country. The director general also added: Despite the imposed war, the capacity of Iran's harbors has considerably increased compared with at the beginning of war. The director general of shipping and harbors added in conclusion: Currently about 600,000 tons of goods are stored in the country's harbors and it is important that merchants in the private sector and also government institutions take the necessary steps to release their goods as soon as possible. [Text] [LD061256 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 6 Sep 81]

BALUCHIS' ANTIREGIME STRUGGLES--A Voice of Iran correspondent has reported from Sistan Va Baluchestan Province that the combatant Baluchis of our homeland have started extensive and pitiless attacks against the tyrannical regime of Ruhollah Khomeyni. The wave of the strong blows inflicted by the brave Baluchis who have formed organized groups, including thousands of people, have placed the hireling revolution guards in a deadlock and each day a number of these mercenaries are killed. The Voice of Iran correspondent adds: The brave Baluchis of the Baluch Unity [Organization] control all the highways linking the province and practically control all activities by Khomeyni's agents. The patriotic Baluchis who are struggling to free the country from the filthy clergy have pledged, in unison and strongly with determined faces, to be faithful to the homeland, and they do not spare their own blood to achieve glory for the great Iranian country. Quoting a Baluchi brave, the Voice of Iran correspondent says that this devoted combatant stated clearly that each and every patriotic Iranian Baluchi is carrying out an armed struggle in the mountains and fields against the mullahs to ensure Iran's perpetuity and its salvation from the hands of the tyrannical Khomeyni regime. These people have left their homes and have formed orderly strike groups led by patriotic and devoted Iranian commanders and are striving to (?achieve Iran's freedom). These people intend to hoist the tricolor lion and sun flag throughout the country and (?to ensure) the glory of Iran and of the Iranians. [break in transmission for 60 seconds] [Text] [NC081609 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 7 Sep 81]

NEW SECURITY ORGANIZATION--Khomeyni's regime, which sees difficulty in continuing its rule, ordered supporting clergymen to request the government to form a strong security organization at a ministerial level. Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, acting within the framework of this collusion, yesterday requested the regime to form a Ministry of Security and Intelligence. For some time now the regime has been trying to form such an organization whose members will be revolution guards and a group of Tudeh Party members who had infiltrated the ranks of the mullahs from the very beginning. A Voice of Iran correspondent reports that news on the formation of a new security organization will be published in the coming weeks. [Text] [NC081244 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 7 Sep 81]

ANTIREGIME STATEMENT--Former minister of education and secretary general of the Iranian Teachers' Association Mohammad Derakhshesh has issued a statement calling on the people of the world and freedom-seeking supporters to condemn the crimes committed by Khomeyni's regime in any way they can. LE QUOTIDIEN newspaper, published in France, writes that in this statement Derakhshesh has stressed that the victims of the mass murders and savage massacres committed by the Islamic regime are mostly university students and academicians. During the past 2 months many 8 or 9-year students have been sent to the firing squads. Derakhshesh has added: Why has world opinion, which strongly condemns a simple hijacking, remained silent in the face of this wave of crimes and the execution of innocent children in Iran? [Text] [NC081616 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Sep 81]

TRIBE'S COMBAT READINESS--A Voice of Iran correspondent has reported from Shiraz that on the basis of reliable information (?new arms) have arrived in the area under the (?control) of the Qashqa'i tribe and (?more arms procured) by antiregime

combatants are expected to arrive in the region. The Voice of Iran correspondent adds: Naser Khan Qashqa'i has announced that "we should prepare ourselves as soon as possible to confront the clerical regime." Our correspondent concludes his report by saying that reports coming from the region show that the brave and patriotic Qashqa'is have prepared themselves for new attacks against Khomeyni's regime and that at present most of the (?roads) in Fars Province are under the control of the Qashqa'i combatants. [Text] [NC101652 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Sep 81]

MULLAHS OUT OF ZAHEDAN--A Voice of Iran correspondent reports from Zahedan that since the beginning of Ruhollah Khomeyni's rule, the people of Baluchestan have (?always opposed the regime) and recently they did not allow Khomeyni's representatives to come to the city and they refrain from taking part in the regime's contrived gatherings. The Voice of Iran correspondent adds: Any person arriving for the first time realizes firstly that the city is empty of clergymen and mullahs. This is the reason why the only representative of Ruhollah Khomeyni, Hojjat Ol-Eslam 'Ebadi, turned for help to the employees of the Voice and Vision of Khomeyni's Republic in Zahedan and has requested that he be endorsed and that a request be made for several mullahs to be sent from Qom to Zahedan. The Voice of Iran correspondent says: Fearing attacks by the Baluchi combatants, Sheykh 'Ebadi hides in his house most of the time and hireling revolution guards have (?surrounded his house). (?The brave Baluchi people have forbidden) the mullahs to enter the city and will not allow Baluchestan Province to be occupied by the regime's clergy. [Text] [NC101530 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Sep 81]

DEMONSTRATIONS IN UTAH--After the publication of an article in the WASHINGTON POST on the unfavorable psychological and corporal condition of the former U.S. hostages, the world's hatred of the Islamic regime is being manifested more clearly. On Wednesday afternoon massive demonstrations with the participation of three of the hostages were organized in Utah, and more than 100 opponents of the Islamic Republic attended the demonstrations too. [Text] [NC101520 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 10 Sep 81]

SERIES ON EVIN PRISON--A former revolution guard of Evin Prison, who left his duty post 2 weeks ago, said in a contact with a Radio Iran correspondent in Tehran: Many of the people who have been arrested [words indistinct] even after the death verdict is issued so that their families will not be harassed and threatened by the clergy. According to this former revolution guard, 3 days after the execution of two opponents named 'Abbas Gholi Pur Moghaddam and Sa'id Mortazavi, Sheykh Gilani sent seven members of the executed people's families to the execution squad. The former Evin prison guard has also given some information to our correspondent on the method of summary trials, the torture of opponents after the death sentence is issued and the pillaging of the belongings of the executed persons' families. The first part of these remarks will be broadcast in our program tomorrow. [Text] [NC101510 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 10 Sep 81]

CLERGYMEN ASSASSINATED--Tehran, 3 Sep (AFP)--The assassinations of two priests were reported in Iranian newspapers today. Hojjat Ol-Eslam Sadeq Habibzadeh was attacked by armed men on Tuesday evening while on his way to a mosque at Rasht, capital of Gilan, in the north of Iran, the newspaper ETTELA'AT said. It did not say how many attacked him, or whether they were arrested. The Islamic Republic newspaper reported that Hojjat Ol-Eslam Morteza Khodadi was killed in his bed in the Caspian port of Bandar Antali. It gave no date and mentioned no arrests. [Text] [NC031756 Paris AFP in English 1449 GMT 3 Sep 81]

WHOLESALE PRICE INDEX FALLS--Tehran, 31 Aug (PARS News Agency)--The Economic Statistics Office of the Central Bank of Iran reported that the price index of wholesale goods in the Iranian month of Tir of the current year (July 22-July 23), has decreased by 3.4 percent compared with the previous month. This price fall was due to the large decrease in the price of fruits and fresh vegetables at the heights of the season. The said price index shows an increase of 22 percent compared with the price index during the same month of the last Iranian year. [Text] [LD030404 Tehran PARS in English 0743 GMT 31 Aug 81 LD]

CSO: 4600/178

U.S.-BOYCOTT COMMITTEE ISSUES STATEMENT

JN051105 Amman AD-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Sep 81 p 5

[Text] Amman--The Jordanian National Committee for the Boycott of American Goods and Companies has issued the following statement to citizens in Jordan:

In this statement we once again submit to you an honest evaluation of our Arab nation's attitude toward the U.S. Government and its real stand on our fateful issues.

America is the primary state to benefit from our Arab homeland's wealth. America and its allies in the West are top among the world states in their dependence on the Arab homeland's wealth. It is America and its institutions that have been looting, in the full sense of the word, the Arab homeland's precious oil wealth since World War II in the late 1940's [as published] and for 30 years thereafter. It used to buy oil for less than $2 per barrel, sharing half of the cost of production with the oil-producing states. This was an international farce that continued because of the ignorance of the Arab oil-producing institutions. Thrity years after this unjust looting, oil prices rose to a new level which is still much less than the real value of oil.

This rise in prices did not change America's previous status as the country most benefiting from Arab oil. This new situation was even better for America because the Arab oil countries deposit revenues from the oil sold to America in American banks. Moreover, the Arab oil-producing countries are depositing all the money they obtain from their oil sales to all world states in American banks, thus serving the American economy. Recently, specialized international institutions, including American, have published statistics on the Arab oil-producing states' deposits in America. These amounted to over $120 billion by the end of 1981.

These sums are actually among the most important components of the American economy at this stage. Meanwhile, America and its Western allies are the ones that most benefit from the Arab markets, which have increased their imports of consumer and industrial goods as their oil revenues have increased. The sales by American and its allies to the Arab homeland in 1980 amounted to one-third of these states' total exports to the world. This means that the Arab oil revenues are overwhelmingly in the interest of America because every piaster we do not spend is deposited in America to feed its economy; every piaster spent is paid as the price of purchases from America and its allies. The exceptions to this are meager.

The American Stand

This is one side. On the other side, how do America and its allies react to this? All we can say in this regard will not be new to the Arab citizen because he knows and remembers it well. We will only try to sum up facts and refresh his memory.

1. America is the first enemy of the Palestinian Arab people in their historical cause of confronting the zionist invasion of their land. America played a leading role in imposing the 1947 partition resolution and was the first state to recognize the zionist state. Since the moment this zionist entity was established, America has been extending absolute and continuous political, economic and military support to this hostile entity so that the zionist state will militarily remain stronger than all the neighboring Arab states, which oppose its existence, and so that it will economically be able to continue, to expand and to absorb emigrants and so that it will politically be protected from condemnation for its criminal acts and from the international ostracism it deserves.

American Aid

In fact, every weapon, aircraft, tank and bullet given to Israel throughout the last 30 years has been a gift from America. Exactly half the cost of every loaf of bread, foodstuff, piece of clothing, house, school, street and factory in Israel is a grant from America to Israel so that Israel may continue to commit aggression, hold sway, maintain its arrogance, expand and ravage the Palestinian Arab people's land and human being.

What is worse in this unjust situation is that these funds and supplies spring from the funds looted from the Arab homeland or those deposited in American banks.

America is also the first foe of the Palestinian Arab people, who were expelled from their land, in all their attempts to preserve their national character and adhere to their legitimate cause. It does not recognize their existence as a people with legitimate rights; nor does it recognize the PLO, which represents this people and which America describes as terrorist. Meanwhile, it deals with and confers full legitimacy on Begin and his clique, who are the ugliest symbols of terrorism known to humanity.

The latest act of American enmity toward the Palestinian people was the Camp David plot, which took advantage of as-Sadat's defeatism and the Arab people's difficulties in Egypt in order to detach Egypt from the Arab body and steer it in a manner that protects the Jewish state's existence. This plot is designed to liquidate the Palestinian Arab people and the issue of their usurped land.

2. America is the first foe of the Arab people and the entire Arab nation. Since the end of World War II, America has played the role of the honest heir determining the inheritance of the Western colonialist states in the region following the end of direct Western colonialism in the Arab homeland. America's role is to maintain the partition of the Arab homeland. And keep its states weak and quarreling so that they will remain under American hegemony and their wealth of oil, funds and markets will continue to serve the American economy. This situation persists today.

It is America which has supported the zionist state militarily, economically and politically in terrorizing the neighboring Arab states and expanding at their expense, imposing its hegemony and influencing their economy and even domestic administration and their rulers' relationship with their peoples. The aim is to maintain partition, backwardness and squandering of human and natural potentials.

It is America which fought and encircled Jamal 'Abd an-Nasir and his unitary liberation revolution since its emergence and managed to block its march and noble principles and objectives. It even managed to steer Egypt under as-Sadat away from its unitary progressive liberation Arab course to that of agentry to imperialism and zionism.

America has plotted against every Arab quarter from inside and outside. It has plotted against every progressive Arab revolution in Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya and the Gulf. It has resorted to immoral and inhuman methods to influence every Arab arena in order to encircle, curb and destroy the Arab liberation movement, particularly in every weak Arab state that feels that America is the force governing its destiny and existence.

It is America which encircled the Arab homeland by planting a zionist state in its heart. It also built Iran's military power, arrogance and ambitions to dominate, expand and threaten the Eastern parts of the Arabian peninsula. Meanwhile, it supported Haile Selassie's regime in Ethiopia in an attempt to complete the ring around the Arab homeland and to tighten its scheme for hegemony over its destiny. The main target of its 6th fleet in the Mediterranean and its military bases in the Arab homeland as well as its rapid intervention [at-Tadakhkhul] forces is to threaten the Arab existence, complete its siege, retain the backward and divided Arab situation and continue to hold sway over the destiny of the Arab homeland and people.

In addition to its hostile and subversive practices, America has followed a policy of minimizing and preoccupying the Arab regimes and peoples by submitting a parallel line of conciliatory plans like the Rogers plan and sending shuttle envoys and voicing empty statements against the violence practiced by the zionist entity to anesthetize the Arab liberation movement.

This is a brief and, in fact, uncomprehensive summary of the American practices against the Arab nation.

The Arab Individual's Participation in the Boycott

3. These facts constitute a challenge to the existence, interests, dignity and aspirations for survival and development of the Arab thinker and Arab individual. We admit that the divided Arab regimes, no matter how strong they are, cannot alone confront these challenges. The Arab individual must take part in this confrontation out of his own will and his conviction and faith in his right to exist and his nation's right to exist and develop.

Hence, we call on the citizen and the encircled Arab individual to depend on himself and his conviction in the need to take part in a popular initiative to reply to this unjust and flagrant American aggression. We thus follow the example

of what the rest of the world peoples have done and are still doing when faced with challenges to their existence.

We call on the citizens to boycott all kinds of American goods because we believe that the citizen realizes like us that every piaster paid for an American purchase will pour into the vein of the American economy and return to us in the form of destructive aircraft which strike at the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the displaced Palestinian Arab people in the refugee camps in Lebanon in an attempt to bring about their complete destruction. They also strike at the Lebanese Arab people in their houses, the students in Egypt's Bahr al-Baqar, the Jordanian villages and the Syrian positions and towns. They kill and destroy throughout the Arab homeland.

The Piaster and the Bullet

Brother citizen: Every piaster you pay for American goods will return to your chest and that of your son a bullet that carries death or a shell that brings destruction. O citizen: You are invited to respond to the call of your conscience. Our call for boycotting American goods is not an order or regulation imposed on you; it is a voluntary invitation addressed to your conscience, mind, conviction and feeling of dignity as well as your right to exercise your individuals will, out of which the collective will is formed.

O citizen: Now we call on you to think and come to a decision between you and yourself that this call is right and that it is your duty to respond positively to it. We will continue our appeals to your conscience and will to exercise your legitimate right to defend yourself, homeland, people, heritage and existence. We ask you to join the ranks of your people in a serious and sincere initiative to prove your existence. We ask you to boycott American goods as a first step. Success in Jordan will certainly be the first spark for a comprehensive movement in the Arab homeland that will include all fields of struggle politically, economically, culturally and militarily and on both the official and popular levels. This will lead to a clear Arab political stand that is hostile to American imperialism and that will force America to change its hostile policy and will achieve our people's desire for liberation and progress.

Enmity Toward Policy

Let it be known that this stand does not stem from enmity toward the American citizen, but toward the official administration and its hostile stands against our Arab nation and its right to exist.

Believe in the importance of your participation in the boycott because this is the first humble step with which you begin your march toward the exercise of your will in deciding on all the fateful issues for yourself, your homeland and your nation. Let our nation live free, united and noble and as one that harbors free people. Long live its struggle and steadfastness in the face of all enemies until victory.

CSO: 4304/152

SAUDI IMPATIENCE WITH UNITED STATES EXAMINED

GF131739 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 13 Sep 81 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "The Small Spark"]

[Excerpts] The remarks made yesterday by Saudi Prince Khalid ibn Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz [son of Saudi defense and aviation minister] on the "insults and criticisms" which the Americans level at the Saudis whenever the Saudis ask for arms from the United States, indicate how much the Saudis are losing patience as they see their American allies offending them whenever they ask for arms. These remarks about "U.S. insults," which also included a threat of resorting to the Soviet Union, means that the Saudi conscience is suffering a great deal as a result of the U.S. impudence and the vituperation that accompanied the AWACS deal in particular.

These remarks also demonstrate how the United States, in its hostility to everything that is Arab and everyone who is Arab, is opening the way to the Soviet Union. When a Saudi prince threatens to go to Moscow this means that the United States does not enjoy, or no longer enjoys, an ounce of respect on the part of a single Arab. The fact is that, for ideological reasons, the Saudis have tolerated the worst ally in the world, the United States. However, it appears that the Saudis are searching for outlets to vent their increasing exasperation, indeed, their anger at a behavior that has become intolerable.

This anger is bound to rise with the growing leadership role Saudi Arabia is playing on both the Arab and Islamic levels. Indeed, this matter is part of the responsibility of leadership. Othersise, it will be difficult to carry on with this leadership role for it would be impossible to continue to clash with prevailing views for a long time. If the Saudi official himself is making such remarks, it is certain that there are others who are making much stronger remarks. Indeed, he wants the United States to face the facts. And this is more important than the AWACS--the AWACS which the Israelis will not shrink from destroying when they decide to do so, as General Dayan frankly said. During the June 1967 war the Israeli's destroyed the U.S. vessel Liberty in the Mediterranean, and the sinful relationship between the United States and Israel did not change one iota. This means that nothing at all will happen if the Israelis attack the AWACS or any other target, in Saudi or elsewhere.

The strength of their conviction in not dealing with the Soviet Union notwithstanding, it is certain that the Saudis are very angry at the U.S. humiliation directed at them through the arms deal. However, other Arabs have had equally such a strong conviction but it did not withstand the pressure of U.S. hostility and insistence on destroying the Arabs.

At first, like the Saudis, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi was particularly touchy toward everything that is Soviet. However, in the face of humiliating U.S. pressure, he became a friend of the Soviet Union. What applies to al-Qadhdhafi applies to other Arabs who became Moscow's friends. This is because the Americans do not want friends, they want surrogates.

CSO: 4304/154

BRIEFS

AID TO UK MP'S ALLEGED--Libya has been extending financial aid to a group of Labour Party members of the British Parliament in exchange for their anti-Israeli stance. The group is called the Radical Group and the Young Socialists. In exchange for the Libyan aid, this group has been adopting anti-Israeli stances in Parliament and had been supporting the Palestinians and Libyan interests. This was disclosed by several British MP's to MK Gad Ya'aqobi, during a recent visit to Britain. Our political correspondent reports that MK Ya'aqobi was told that Libya also used the same method regarding political movements in Holland and West Germany. [Text] [TA041959 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1820 GMT 4 Sep 81]

CSO: 4323/62

LIBERALIZATION SEEN AS IMPERILED

PM141443 Paris LE MONDE in French 10 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Liberalization Jeopardized in Morocco?"]

[Text] The democratization of Moroccan political life started by Hassan II with the 1977 parliamentary elections seems to be increasingly in jeopardy. The release of around 100 political prisoners in July 1980--most of whom were socialist activists--had suggested that the liberalization was being consolidated but the situation has constantly deteriorated since the beginning of this year. The deterioration culminated in the violent riots in Casablanca on 20 June.

The arrest of Mr Abderrahim Bouabid, first secretary of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces [USFP], on Tuesday is another blow to a democratization which some people regarded as illusory. The fate which has just befallen Moroccan socialism's leading figure can be compared to the decision by the Court of Summary jurisdiction to postpone for 2 weeks the trial of Mr Mustapha Karchaoui, chief editor of AL-MUHARRIR, and five other political and trade union leaders, the government seeming intent on exerting as much pressure as possible on the main opposition party.

The tension between the palace and the USFP, which had been brought together since 1975 by their common objective of "winning back the Saharan provinces," has constantly increased since the referendum of 30 May 1980, following which Hassan II decided to extend to 1983 the parliamentary term which, under normal circumstances, should have ended this fall. Since the socialist leaders condemned the "illegal nature" of this measure and threatened to withdraw their deputies from Parliament when it meets again after the vacation period, the king had hinted that he might ban the USFP. That party had also criticized the monarch for his economic and social policy, deemed to be "unjust," and for his "pacifism" in the Saharan conflict.

Mr Bouabid's arrest came the very day when the USFP, which had reserved its judgment after the Nairobi mini-summit at the end of August, published a communique criticizing several provisions in the resolution passed by the OAU "committee of wise men." The socialists are demanding "a democratic people's referendum in keeping with the constitution, with a view to calling on all the Moroccan people to express their view" on the committee's decision concerning the methods of implementing the cease-fire and organizing the West Sahara referendum.

Although the king portrayed the fact that the Moroccan civilian and military administrations will remain in place during these operations as a victory, the USFP thinks that this is "a purely superficial concession" since the UN and OAU interim administration will be omnipotent in its eyes. Similarly it condemned the consultation of the Saharan refugees in Algeria and Mauritania which will give rise "to a veritable invasion by tens of thousands of elements...having complete freedom to proclaim their hostility to our country during the election campaign." Finally the USFP demanded an information campaign.

In the Moroccan socialist leaders' eyes this new crisis is inseparable from their country's serious economic and social situation which even the restoration of peace to the Sahara could not remedy without fundamental structural reforms. That is clearly a tone of voice which is bound to annoy the throne, which is involved in a difficult game.

CSO: 4519/55

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION LEADERS' TRIAL POSTPONED--Rabat, 11 Sep (AFP)--The trial of five leaders of Morocco's Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) opposition party, including its first secretary Abderrahim Bouabid, was adjourned for 2 weeks by the high court here today. The five, who are being held in custody, are being prosecuted in connection with a party statement criticizing the terms on a proposed referendum in the disputed Western Sahara, where Morocco has been fighting nationalist guerrillas of the Polisario Front. The USFP Political Bureau statement said that people in Morocco should also have a say in the future of the territory, contrary to an Organisation of African Unity Committee proposal for a referendum only in the territory itself. The OAU proposal has been accepted by the Moroccan Government. Before the court with Mr Bouabid were four other members of the USFP Political Bureau--Casablanca MP Mohamed Mansour, Rabn MP and director of the USFP newspaper AL-MURHARRIR Mohamed Elyazghi, university academic Mohamed Lahbbi and Mohamed Forkani. The five, who were cheered at length by party supporters when they arrived in court, are charged with distrubing public order, peace and security, for which they face between 3 months and 2 years jail and possible fines if convicted. [Text] [NC112027 Paris AFP in English 1902 GMT 11 Sep 81]

CSO: 4500/47

DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES PACT WITH LIBYA, ETHIOPIA

LD131232 Kuwait KUNA in English 1117 GMT 13 Sep 81

[Text] Kuwait, 13 Sep (KUNA)--The tripartite friendship and cooperation treaty signed in August between South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia contains no appendices or secret provisions, according to South Yemeni Defence Minister Brig Salih Muslih Qasim.

In an interview published in AL-SIYASAH newspaper here Sunday Qasim attributed the absence of such provisions and appendices to the attitude of his country which "does not sign treaties in the dark and does not hide anything from its people and the world opinion."

Qasim indicated his country expects danger to stem from the American military presence in Oman and Somalia, both neighbouring countries to South Yemen, and in other parts in the territorial waters of the region.

"Since our country is situated in a sensitive region, American imperialism made no efforts to hide its designs on the oil resources and the strategic potential of the region," he said.

Qasim described the "real danger" as not threatening his country only but "all the countries and the peoples of the region" and as "causing damage to their security, stability and progress."

"This danger is part of the aggressive and scheming activities of the American imperialism carried against African and Arab national liberation movements for the purpose of eradicating the legal aspiration of our peoples' struggle and reestablishing the imperialist hegemony over their fate."

Qasim said the danger to his country is also "part of the danger threatening world peace" of which he cited the example of the rapid deployment force and the spread of military naval fleets and bases in addition to carrying out provocative military maneuvers, by the imperialist circles, in the region.

The Yemeni defence minister affirmed that the organized and popular military establishments in his country "have been created and developed on the basis of growing defence needs in the light of possible dangers."

Qasim reiterated what South Yemeni President 'Ali Nasir M'hammad had previously said in this regard that their country's armed forces have been established and developed "to serve peace and not to attack anybody" but that nevertheless they will not "stand with hands tied against any attempt at their security, dignity and future."

CSO: 4300/110

COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES OPPOSITION TO REGIME

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1023, 13 Jul 81 pp 27-28

[Interview with 'Izz al-Din 'Ali 'Amir, member of the Political Bureau of the Sudanese Communist Party, by 'Abd al-Hadi Sharuf: "We Will Announce [the Formation of] a Broad Opposition Front, and the Upcoming Battle with the Regime Will Be Decisive;" date and place not given]

[Text] Developments in Sudan are of particular importance in view of the prominent role played by the working class in them. The Sudanese Communist Party has always been the de facto leading party for the Sudanese working class, and has been the party of the masses which has its roots in the milieu of the Sudanese laboring masses. AL-HURRIYAH, a few days ago, met with Comrade 'Izz al-Din 'Ali 'Amir, member of the Sudanese Communist Party's Political Bureau, in one of the capital cities of the Arab world. The result was this interview concerning the situation in Sudan and the tactics of the [Sudanese] Communist Party.

The Sudanese Working Class Will Occupy the Position That It Deserves

[Question] The Numayri regime recently put the finishing touches to its right-wing apostasy by fully catching up with the Sadat regime in this regard. During this period of apostasy, important changes have taken place in Sudan, the most prominent of which has been the broadening of the base of organized popular opposition to the regime. The last such development was the popular uprising staged by the railroad workers. How do you assess the current situation in Sudan, and what form do you expect the struggle to take during its next phase?

[Answer] There is no doubt about the fact that the Numayri regime, since its very beginning, has been a right-wing regime in spite of all of the many claims and falsehoods which have been spread about by some people. One can safely say that since the first few months of the life of this regime, it has clearly had relations with Egypt or with the Egyptian intelligence service. We believe--and this belief is not based on an analysis, but rather on what Numayri himself has previously said--that the regime never did break off relations with Egypt, never did implement the minimum resolutions among the sanctions against the Sadat regime which were decided upon at the Baghdad and Tunis conferences, and never did close its embassy in Cairo, having only temporarily withdrawn its ambassador from Egypt. In other words, in one form or another relations have existed between the two regimes, and Sudan has never seriously taken a position against Sadat's apostasy

which signalled the beginning of the process of treason in the Arab world. During this period, Ja'far Numayri's attitude toward the Sadat regime has varied between friendliness and aloofness. Sometimes he would display enmity toward Egypt, at other times he would praise Egypt, and so on. This oscillating position, based neither on principle nor on morals, was an indication of the regime's desire to continue to receive the financial aid which was being given to it by the reactionary Arab oil-producing countries, principally Saudi Arabia. Generally speaking, Numayri did not break off relations with Egypt and did not even break off relations with the Zionists. But as far as the latest uprising by the railroad workers is concerned, I can say with complete assurance that, ever since 1971 when that great popular military uprising, led by the martyr Hashim al-'Atta, took place, there has never been any period of time in Sudan when there was no political unrest. Actions and movements were constantly being engaged in by workers, farmers, trade and professional organizations, and others. Official statistics which have been presented by Ja'far Numayri himself inform us that since 1971 there have been 15 military attempts to overthrow the regime. According to our information, the number of such attempts has been greater than this. As for popular uprisings and unrest, not a single month has gone by without there being some sort of strike. This movement has escalated with the escalation of the cost of living, increasing pressures on the poor and oppressed classes, scarcity of [consumer] goods, decline in the level of production and standard of living, general decline in national income, and decline in the country's total national production. This has brought Sudan down to a level which no one envies since it has now become the third-poorest nation in the world. This fact appeared in a statistical study put out by the UN during a meeting of its International [Development] Association which deals with the development of the world's poor nations. This organization, which concerns itself with the affairs of countries of the Third World, brought out that fact, in one of its reports which it published during the latter part of 1979, that the annual rate of production in Sudan declined 6.5 percent between 1971 and 1978. If you add to this the fact that the birthrate was 2.8 percent, then this decline in production rate equals about 9 percent. At the present time this figure is 11.5 percent. So it is impossible for a country in this situation, and with its economy in this sort of shape, to enjoy social prosperity or to have enough work available for its people. The result has been massive unemployment, skyrocketing prices, and emigration--with the departure of professionals being the most characteristic feature of this emigration. There has also been internal migration, from the remote and backward areas to the edges of the cities. So the social map of Sudan has greatly changed. Oppression of the average citizen has reached the stage where he feels that he has achieved a great victory if he can get his loaf of bread.

Of course, the class of people which has been formed as a result of this process is the parasitic bourgeoisie which lives off agents' commissions, brokerage fees, etc., and the groups of people who are commercial agents for foreign companies and powers. These are the people who have everything. The rest of the people do not have anything. These are some of the important features of the important historic transformation which Sudan is undergoing. Right now, a political screening process is going on in Sudan. And I believe that, in addition to this political screening process which is sorting out the forces of the opposition from those which support the regime, a clear class-related screening process is going on. This is evidenced by the strikes and demonstrations which the working class and its leaders are engaging in for the first time in the modern history of Sudan. The

fact that this class-related screening process is going on has meant that the working class is able to organize itself and to lead the struggle against the existing regime. This represents an important qualitative change in modern revolutionary history. We believe that it is possible to successfully push on with this process.

As for the future, we believe that many of the trade and professional unions and organizations have played important roles [and thus will continue to do so in the future]. I could mention, for example, the judges who protested against the decrease in their salaries, then protested against the way justice was being administered, and ended up submitting mass resignations. The number of those who submitted their resignations was 379, out of an original total of 400 or slightly more. Numayri had no choice but to accept these resignations, and he hoped to be able to bring in judges from Egypt. But he was not able to do this, and this forced him to make the judges return to their posts. The Lawyers' Union has played, and still plays, a heroic role in defending political prisoners, in bringing out the importance of working toward the achievement of public freedoms, and in modifying and abolishing oppressive laws. This is what impelled Numayri to dissolve this union a few days ago. This happened a full week after the academic symposiums in which there was discussion of the abnormality of the laws which are in force in the country and which have nothing to do with any type of customary law. The Doctors' Union has also gone on strike more than once, and it is expected that this strike movement will broaden. As I have said, for the first time the working class is at the head of this strike movement. We have no doubt that it will succeed and will give to the working class the actual status [which it deserves] so that it can play its role in the establishment of a democratic national regime in Sudan.

Democracy and Alliances with Both Domestic and Foreign Groups

[Question] The Sudanese Communist Party has faced a campaign of bloody liquidation ever since 1971. A large number of the leaders of the party have been victims of this campaign, the most prominent of them being the martyrs ['Abd al-Khaliq] Mahjub, al-Shafi' [Ahmad al-Shaykh], and many of the members of the party's cadre. What is the Sudanese Communist Party's present status in the ranks of the Sudanese national movement, and what is its role as a moving force for the working class and the other laboring masses?

[Answer] It is true that the Sudanese Communist Party was hit hard in 1971. It lost some of the members of its basic cadre, in particular, the martyrs 'Abd al-Khaliq, al-Shafi' Ahmad al-Shaykh, and members of the military such as Hashim al-'Atta and other officers and soldiers who were killed. It also lost other freedom-fighters, either through neglect or torture in prisons or because of beatings. But even under this severe tyranny and repression, and with the aid of the broad international movement of solidarity which is present in all nations of the world, both East and West, the Sudanese Communist Party has been able to keep Ja'far Numayri from killing, slaughtering, and torturing people. Sudan has gone through a very dark period for quite a few years. But the principal cadre [of the Sudanese Communist Party] managed to go into hiding and managed to reorganize its party groups by 1974 when the organizational apparatus was completely organized. The party continued to be active--and everybody knew that it was active--both secretly and publicly at the same time. It continued putting out its publications

AL-NIDA', which comes out once a month, and its internal party journal, which also appears regularly. It also restructured its party organization which dealt with work among the unions and federations. Also, the process of closing ranks again between all of the progressive forces and those friendly to the Communist Party was achieved. Throughout its political history, the Sudanese Communist Party has believed wholeheartedly in two things. The first of these things is that in order for its political activity in Sudan to be successful, it has to take place through front organizations and with other national political forces. We have been saying this since the establishment of the Communist Party in 1946. This was last stressed in the fourth party congress in the year 1967. When we talk about an alliance on broad fronts, we have in mind an alliance with both domestic and foreign groups. For example, the Palestinian Resistance Organization is a foreign group with whom we are fully allied. In fact, in the party's constitution, which came out in 1967, we find one article which clearly states the party's position with regard to the Palestine problem. We in the Sudanese Communist Party now feel that it is necessary to eliminate the Zionist entity which is in Palestine, and that there should be the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state in which all people live as equals. This thesis represents the position of the Sudanese Communist Party, and our comrades in the Palestinian Resistance Organization know this very well. We believe that this coordination with groups abroad necessarily also means coordination with all Arab movements of a patriotic nature and with progressive content. Therefore we also feel that we should have a strong alliance with the Lebanese National Movement, and we should ally ourselves with all patriotic forces in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front as well as with all of the popular forces in the arena of the Arab world.

We believe that Sudan, as part of both the Arab world and the African world, can play a fundamental role in bringing about this alliance and close relationship between the Arab patriotic movement and the African patriotic movement. What is said about the Sudan being a bridge between the Arabs and the Africans is rhetoric. [What we want] is organic interaction between two liberation movements which imperialism and its allies have the objective of annihilating. Our party, on the Sudanese domestic level in 1957, brought out the fact that Sudan needs democracy in order to get out from under its current crisis. The party believes that democracy is not a temporary slogan, but rather is an inalienable part of national liberation and social progress. The party also feels that when democracy is absent from any country, no matter how progressive that country might be, social progress and liberation have been dealt a blow. Perhaps the clearest example of this to us is Egypt and other countries, such as Iraq, which have pursued the same course. So what I am saying is that democracy and the alliance [with various domestic and foreign groups] are the two wings which will make our bird fly. We have already brought up these issues and have begun action to make contacts with Sudanese groups and parties, both inside the country and abroad, in order to unify our political action against the regime. We have been able to reach important points of agreement and mutual understanding, and we will eventually announce the formation of a broad-based popular opposition front which will include the principal opposition parties in Sudan. These parties are basically the Democratic National Federation Party, the Sudanese Communist Party, and other leftist organizations such as the Ba'th organizations and southern opposition groups. (This opposition is intensifying and the situation in the South is about to explode.) In addition to these groups, the front will include organizations which represent the vanguard forces

of oppressed ethnic groups in the eastern and western parts of Sudan. We have been able to propose a joint political program.

Although we do not want to be too hasty in announcing the formation of our front, we believe that the principal work to be done by the front is what it actually does on a daily basis. Let us engage in this work for a year or two, until it has become consolidated. After this takes place, the writing and publishing of our charter will be merely a formality. Here is what the situation is in Sudan: The Numayri regime has definitely been responsible for polarization [of the various political forces in Sudan] since Numayri has come to represent his regime as well as those who cooperate with it such as the parasitic bourgeoisie, merchants in the service of foreigners, brokers, agents of multinational corporations, and others who constitute capitalistic pockets in the country, in addition to right-wing political elements such as the Muslim Brotherhood which constitutes a principal party in this alliance. Saudi Arabia is showering millions of dollars upon this group. The members of this group today represent the spearhead which is aimed against Sudan's patriotic movement, and they are playing the role of informers or spies--working in the service of the regime--in our factories, universities, and elsewhere. Numayri's band also includes a group of older political figures such as al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the former head of the Ummah Party. What I am trying to say is that a process of polarization is taking place with the patriotic forces as well as with the forces which are cooperating with the regime. It appears that the oppressed working masses of people have taken a hostile position toward those groups which represent the interests of the regime and its allies. This polarization has turned Sudan into two warring camps. The upcoming battle will be decisive. Either the forces representing the Sudanese people are victorious and Sudan will proceed to become a strong bastion of the Arab and African liberation movement, or our enemies will be victorious--and the latter is something which is not possible. We believe that our role is not restricted to the Arab world, but rather expands in the direction of an alliance [to be formed] in order to protect progressive and Marxist regimes in Africa--such as those in Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and Zimbabwe--from conspiracies hatched against them by American imperialism. Today we will undertake to play this role which has been imposed upon us, and we will be victorious as long as we are able to consolidate the relations and close ties, based on our joint struggle, which have been established between us and all of the progressive national forces in the Arab world and Africa.

'Izz al-Din 'Ali 'Amir

9468
CSO: 4504/47

BRIEFS

EGYPTIAN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL APPOINTED--Khartoum, 13 Sep (MENA)--Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri has issued a presidential decree appointing Mr Kamal 'Umar al-Amin the secretary general of Egyptian affairs in the Sudan. Mr al-Amin will replace Dr Nasr Mubarak, who will be on loan to the International Organization for Food and Agriculture. Mr Kamal 'Umar was previously the deputy governor of the Kassala Governorate. [Text] [NC131829 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1723 GMT 13 Sep 81]

CSO: 4504/93

'TISHRIN': U.S., NOT USSR, IS THREAT TO MIDEAST

PM271416 Damascus TISHRIN in Arabic 21 Aug 81 p 8

[Article by I'Sam Dari: "The Soviet Danger and the U.S. Danger"]

[Text] Nobody doubts that there is a real danger threatening the safety and security of the Arab area and warning of a great explosion with indefinite repercussions. But the persistent question that is being asked is: From which source does this danger come? If the source of this danger can be defined, it will be possible to protect the area against it.

Many pronouncements have been made about the danger to the Middle East region, but the strangest of these pronouncements has come from the U.S. administration, which alleges that the only thing threatening the Arab area is "the Soviet danger."

This pronouncement has been circulated by all U.S. officials, without exception. Reagan has sent senior officials to the Arab area to convince its leaders of the existence of the alleged danger.

We must not forget in this regard the actions of U.S. Secretary of State Gen Alexander Haig, who came to the area shortly after Reagan took office.

General Haig openly disclosed his administration's plan for the Arab area. He affirmed that force is the only means this administration will use to achieve its objectives and plans.

He and other U.S. officials have tried to scare the leaders of the area--particularly those who proclaim their friendship with Washington--with the Soviet bogey and communist infiltration of the Middle East.

As a solution to this problem and in order to confront the Soviet danger, the U.S. leaders have proposed the establishment of an alliance for "struggle" against communism and the Soviets that would include "friendly" Arab countries as well as Israel, at the expense of a final elimination of the Palestine problem.

This "U.S. solution" has found acceptance with some regimes, especially Israel and as-Sadat's Egypt. Both the Egyptian ruler and Begin have advocated the solution on the grounds that it is the cure-all for the area's ills.

But before searching for solutions to the problems of the area, we must ascertain that these problems do actually exist. This leads us to ask the impartial question: Is it true that the danger to the area is the Soviet danger? If the answer is in the negative, then there is no need to talk about solutions.

We need not go too far to confirm that the real danger threatening the area and the Arab existence is not the danger which the parties to Camp David talk about. It is true that there is a Soviet danger, but it is a danger to the regimes that are clients of Washington and therefore it is a support for the progressive nationalist regime and the Arab masses.

It is also true that the countering danger--the danger threatening the Arab masses and their major causes--is a U.S.-Israeli reactionary danger.

Soviet planes did not attack planes belonging to a Middle Eastern state, as the United States did by shooting down two Libyan planes.

The Soviet Union has not provoked world feeling and supplied racist regimes with the most up-to-date weapons in order to kill people and commit genocide as the United States is doing.

The Soviet Union, which is loyal to the Arab nation and its causes, defends this nation in all international arenas and supplies it with all that it needs in order to confront aggression, unlike the U.S. administration.

How can the Arabs believe that this friend is a danger to them when they see the United States daily committing aggression against them?

In view of all this it is absolutely unacceptable to profess a belief in the friendliness of the United States and hostility of the Soviet Union toward the Arabs.

The Arab people, who see the United States the same way they see Israel, will not forget the support the Soviets have given them and will continue to regard the Soviet Union as their great and lasting friend.

CSO: 4304/152

PHALANGISTS TERMED CAUSE OF LEBANESE CRISIS

JN290758 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 29 Aug 81

[Press Review]

[Text] Under the headline "Lebanon, the Crisis and the Solution" TISHRIN says: Every time the Lebanese problem is discussed and the need becomes urgent for a definition of the factors of the crisis and each party's role in it, attempts at circumvention and maneuvering increase and attempts to intentionally confuse efforts and aim at misleading the masses become more clear, diverting their attention from the only course to the solution and from the forces that are hampering them.

Despite the clarity of the issue, of the means for its solution and of the identity of the forces which have influence on it, there are still some trends which aim at avoiding any radical settlement of the problem and defining responsibility in accordance with roles that are assumed in the Lebanese arena. If dealing with the problem continues on this hypocritical course, avoiding direct confrontation of the facts of the crisis, the future stage in Lebanon will witness new roles and developments that may be difficult to control, because these forces and their extensions are preparing Lebanon for a new round of explosive situations within the framework of the preplanned conspiracy for the region. This is so because some Arab and Lebanese parties continue to insist on viewing the issue one-sidedly and because these parties continue their attempts to infiltrate the Lebanese crisis in accordance with their interests and stands, thus making it more difficult to solve. They forget the basic factor of the crisis is Israel and its direct role in Lebanon through its well-known tools, the Phalangist gangs, who divested themselves of their commitments to the Lebanese homeland and became cheap tools in the hands of all the enemies of Lebanon.

How can one discuss the basis and means for a settlement of the Lebanese crisis without settling the Israeli factor in Lebanon, embodied in the Israeli-Phalangist alliance and their overt direct cooperation in all its political and military forms?

One can be sure that the settlement of the Lebanese problem begins with and ends in Lebanon because the crisis began in Lebanon and must end in it. The only explosive factor now is the Phalangist factor and the Phalangists' rebellion against Lebanon, its legitimacy and the proposed solutions for settling its crisis. To be more clear, Syria is ready to perform what is required of it within this framework

whenever Lebanon decides to settle this issue. Linking the Lebanese crisis to the solution of the Middle East one has been a spurious attempt to also have any solution in Lebanon become linked to the solution in the region. That's why the Phalangist-Israeli alliance was formed and Sa'd Haddad's statelet was set up as an embodiment of Israel's presence in Lebanon.

TISHRIN says: It goes without saying that any solution must begin with this relationship and must pass through it, through its final liquidation, without any attempt at circumvention or maneuvering. Only then, Lebanon will face no problems and will not be linked to the so-called solution of the crisis in the region.

We believe that this clear picture is present in the minds of any party which is concerned with the settlement of the crisis. If national accord really is the basis for a settlement, then how can any accord be achieved as long as Israeli-Phalangist cooperation remains in effect?

From a logical, national and legitimate point of view, it is natural that there should be no other road or choice. Any attempt to bypass this objective reality cannot but be explained by a lack of desire to achieve a settlement and the insistence on maintaining Lebanon as a bleeding wound that will continuously pose a threat to the Arab body.

According to our belief, to the U.S. schemes and to what they have in store for Lebanon and the Arabs at this stage, Lebanon will most probably witness serious developments in which Israel and the Phalangists will have major roles and in which the Phalangists will be the factor that will make the situation explode. Despite the fact that the United States has repeatedly claimed that it is concerned over legitimacy and sovereignty, in practice it contradicts these claims. The United States does not satiate Israel with sophisticated weapons for the sake of holding parades or amusing itself with these weapons but to have it use them against the Arab nation, beginning with Lebanon and proceeding from Lebanon, given that it is the weakest link in the Arab chain and a model arena for experimentation with U.S. weapons and for the peddling of evil schemes.

We reiterate that the solution begins with Lebanon and must begin in it. We believe that any Arab summit which bypasses these basic factors when dealing with the crisis will not be capable of offering anything beneficial to Lebanon, particularly if we realize that this Arab summit will deal with the Lebanese crisis in the same manner that it is being dealt with now, disregarding the only primary cause of the crisis and searching for illusory and secondary causes.

The Phalangists and their extensions are the cause and they constitute the crisis. Therefore, any solution must begin from this point.

CSO: 4304/152

GULF RELATIONS WITH EAST, WEST VIEWED

GF141835 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 14 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "A Call for a Gulf Stand to Topple the New Alliance"]

[Excerpts] The field of operation of the U.S.-Israeli alliance will be the Arabian Gulf. This is because U.S. policy is based on provoking "battles" with the Soviet Union or with those whom the United States describes as friends of the Soviet Union in the region and its neighborhood, in order to escalate tension in this oil-rich and strategically vital area in a manner that serves the interests of the United States and the West. It is also in the interest of Israel, which has sought, and is seeking, to divide the Arab people and homeland and to strike at any area in the Arab world so as to weaken the Arabs--for the Arabs' weakness is a "strength" for Israel.

Kuwait was the first Arab country to condemn the U.S.-Israeli alliance. The current visit of Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad to several socialist countries underlines an independent, wise and rational approach in the Arab Gulf countries' international relations, based on the principles of joint cooperation and noninterference in the internal affairs of others and in view of the fact that it is the United States and not the Soviet Union that is enabling the enemy not only to expand its settlements in the occupied territories and destroy Palestin'e Arabism, but also to reach the Arabian Gulf. The F-16 and F-15 planes that reached Baghdad and flew across the Arabian peninsula's airspace are U.S. weapons, although piloted by Israelis, and achieve U.S. aims, although in Israeli guise.

On the basis of these tangible facts, it follows that the condemnation of the U.S.-Israeli alliance should pass through other channels. The most important of these is to guide the Arab Gulf countries' relations with the United States and the West in general in favor of the Arabs and their central national causes, and at the same time, hold a responsible dialogue with the socialist countries and the other countries of Europe from an independent political stance based on national interests and the requirements of preserving the security of the Arab Gulf region, the Arab homeland and the world.

The U.S.-Israeli alliance poses a real and grave threat to the Gulf countries. Reparing the "Gulf house" requires responsible action: not only by stressing

the national and historic ties that bind the Arab people in the region, but also by bold efforts to end the current regrettable fighting between the two powerful Gulf countries, Iraq and Iran. This is because it is the continuation of this fighting that encourages the enemies of the Arabs and the region--among other important factors--to make the Arabian Gulf the first candidate for the operations of the U.S.-Israeli alliance.

CSO: 4304/154

END

linked from the outset with its enemies. Morocco even went so far as to say, even though it was confident that such statements were not true, that our land was a base used by the men of the POLISARIO to attack Morocco. None of this is true."

With some bitterness and regret Mauritanians accuse Morocco of "not stopping at words and statements, but rather of acting accordingly. Morocco attacked us more than once and went so far as to attempt to infringe upon our regime last March. Thus Morocco is not giving us a chance to talk candidly with it."

We pause at Mauritanian-Moroccan relations, and we ask what is the motive behind restoring those relations to normalcy after they had been cut in the past? What is the role of Saudi Arabia in restoring the rapprochement?

Mauritanians do not deny the fact that "the Arab mediation which was carried out by the Arab League and by a number of Arab countries, chief among which was Saudi Arabia, contributed to [the restoration of] calm and the reduction of tension." However, Nouakchott thinks that the principal factor in the resumption of relations came from "the king of Morocco's initiative in announcing his agreement to hold a referendum for determining the destiny of the people of the Sahara."

After Mauritania found that the king's decision was "a step forward that opened new horizons," it decided to prevent any solution that would constitute "a grievance" in the area. Hence, a new leaf in relations with Morocco was turned.

However, Morocco disagrees with Mauritania on determining "the nature" of the referendum. This is because Morocco does not consider the referendum a form of self-determination, but rather "an affirmation" of the choice the people of the Sahara had already made.

Mauritania here firmly and unequivocally affirms that "the Organization of African Unity recorded the king's decision and that it does not consider the king's announcement to be a mere maneuver to gain time. It rather views it as an official announcement that was made with full consideration and full knowledge of its implications. The organization finds this a referendum on self-determination for the people of the Sahara provided that a neutral African committee make the preparations for it so that it would be carried out under the supervision and control of the United Nations."

Nouakchott thinks that Morocco should in no way interfere in the organization of this referendum because "in view of the fact that Rabat controls various activities in the Sahara, the population will not be able to express their opinions and choose their destinies freely as a result of the pressures that may be placed on them."

Mauritanians express their hope that the next African summit would organize the referendum and that the recent positions of the king of Morocco following his return from Nairobi will not constitute "a step backwards."

Do the Arabs, like Saudi Arabia for example, and the west, like France, have a role to play in helping to achieve a solution to the problem of the Sahara?

A Role for France and Saudi Arabia

Mauritanians respond affirmatively. They think that France and Saudi Arabia can "play an important role in encouraging the king to go ahead with his decision: France can do so as a result of its past in the Arab Maghreb area, and Saudi Arabia, because of its importance in the Arab world."

Furthermore, Nouakchott thinks that "the change in the French administration will undoubtedly bring about positive factors in the area of solving the problem of the Sahara as well as other African problems." This is because the French socialists, according to Mauritanians, "understand more and better than others the aspirations of people who have recently emerged from colonialism to independence and freedom."

But what about Mauritanian-Libyan relations and Morocco's accusation that Libya is taking advantage of its material capabilities to strengthen its political and military existence in the area, particularly through Mauritania?

Mauritanians did not dodge the question. Instead, they considered it simple, clear and indubitable. They said, "Libya has no more presence in Mauritania today than it had during the previous age during which Mauritania had special relations with Morocco."

In addition, Nouakchott thinks "the Libyan presence in the area is normal. It is an African country of the Arab Maghreb whose significance is due to its material capabilities, political position and its support for all rightful Arab and African causes."

The Mauritanian assurance affirmed, "In the past there were 9,000 Moroccan soldiers in Mauritania. Today, however, there is not a single Libyan soldier on our land."

If the question of the Sahara is the center of discussions, this does not mean that other subjects do not deserve pause.

It is true that the war was the principal problem due to its negative outcome and the effects it had on economic conditions in the country.

"The Sahara war" and the material and human capabilities that were required by it paralyzed construction activity in Mauritania and left their marks on the various vital facilities [in the country]. Hence, the second function that was determined by the new military command after it assumed power was "to reevaluate the national economic conditions."

The Difficult and the More Difficult

If the epoch of ending the war was "difficult," then the stage of building

the peace will be "more difficult." A visitor to Mauritania gets this impression from experiencing the daily reality [in the country] and from the dealings he has with the average Mauritanian and with the officials who are responsible for steering the ship of state in all its economic, cultural and social facilities.

Mauritania is a country of limited material means, at least at the present time. It has human capabilities that lack adequate preparation. It has a young generation that has just recently emerged from the control of foreign colonialism and from a difficult domestic experience.

The legacy is burdensome: debts, high prices, monopoly, an economic deficit, chaos, slavery and backwardness in society. Although the land has not withheld difficulties from its residents, the skies did add another problem to those difficulties. This problem may be the most important of all: it is the drought problem.

To begin with "nothing" is difficult, but how does one take action when one has "less than nothing?"

When the stage that a country is experiencing is extraordinary, such a stage necessarily requires urgent and extraordinary measures. This is what the present leadership has been trying to do for 3 years.

"Austerity" was the title of the economic policy that Maritania pursued to meet the deficit, to pay the debts and to reduce general expenditures. The first result of this policy was a reduction in the budget deficit; it no longer exceeds 2.2 billion ouguyas. In 1978 the deficit was about 5.2 billion ouguyas. (Each 10 ouguyas equal one Swiss franc).

To that end radical and urgent measures were taken to strengthen [the country's] purchasing power, to develop the agriculture and fishing sector and to pursue the utilization of reforms in a number of social life areas, the most important of which are purging the administration, reforming the courts and abolishing slavery, especially since this was considered a popular demand. In addition, the Islamic religion was to be relied on as the principal source from which justice was to get its directions.

Mauritanians are determined to "depend on themselves" in the process of construction and development. But they think that their country, which is going through a difficult period of transition needs "the cooperation and assistance of brothers and friends." Therefore, they opened the doors wide to foreign investments, and they gave foreign investors the freedom of action, provided that they adhered to "the sovereignty and the political and economic independence of the country and respected the laws that prescribe the limits of freedom of action." Recently the Arabs have come to Mauritania; at the forefront were Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya and others. Europe also and even China have an economic and a commercial presence in Mauritania.

If the first task of the National Liberation Movement was peaceful and

the second economic and developmental, what about the third task, which is most difficult for men who left their barracks to steer the general affairs of the country?

The third goal that was set by the armed forces command on the day after the 10 July Movement was "to ensure the establishment of actual democratic institutions" which would be charged with the responsibility of directing the policy of the country in the subsequent stage.

More than one member of the Military Committee for National Liberation, which constitutes the present leadership of the country, told us that "The military men do not wish to continue in power indefinitely. This political responsibility that they have now is an emergency, transitory one which they would not have accepted had it not been for their sense that rescuing [the country] was necessary. They want to go back to practice their basic responsibilities as soon as possible. That is, they want to go back to the barracks."

But some people admit that foreign conditions and internal climates are not presently prepared for implementation of this third task. According to them the country is still being threatened from outside. In addition, the civilian experience--a civilian was the former prime minister--was not very encouraging, especially on the eve of the recent March movement. Besides, the wheels of the development process have not yet turned as had been planned.

What is important in the view of the present leadership is to prepare individuals for direct involvement in the democratic experience by preparing them through education and learning and developing their cognitive capabilities.

But does this justify the suspension of political activities inside the country?

The leadership responds, "These activities were abolished in favor of the more urgent essential tasks which are manifested in consolidating national independence and achieving economic and social reorganization.

Mauritanian officials add, "This does not at all mean that we refuse to have citizens participate in managing the affairs of the country. Quite the contrary, we have established structures for this purpose. There is the National Voluntary Movement and there are regional councils and trade unions."

It remains to be said that betting on the future of Mauritania is difficult. It is first and foremost in the hands of the Mauritanians themselves. The question of the Sahara and of "ending the war between brothers and spreading peace in the Arab Maghreb area" remains the principal objective in a hierarchy of priorities. It remains the basic condition for economic development and democratic practice.

Mauritania, which began by putting its reproof of "the Arab brothers" on record concludes by calling upon them and expressing the wish that they "understand the need to put an end to the state of warfare between the two fraternal nations and to go ahead with the course of openness toward peace so as to keep us from reaching a dead end."

Hence Nouakchott moves from one challenge to another. After its difficult vitory over what it called the battle to ensure "neutrality," it is now making a serious effort "to neutralize" the area of north Africa, trying to stop "the fraternal struggles between neighbors and friends." The countries of that area may [then] turn to their real battle of "development and construction and set their people on the course of progress."

Will Mauritania succeed?

The first response is the same in the end as it was in the beginning. The Mauritanian says, "[We hope for] good things, God willing."

8592
CSO: 4504/61

OPPOSITION LEADER CALLS FOR REVISED CONSTITUTION

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 11 Jul 81 p 11

[Interview with Mohamed Majdoubi, deputy of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces in the Moroccan parliament and member of the World Peace Council, by Ghassan Makhul, date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] Following is an interview conducted by AL-SAFIR with Mohamed Majdoubi, deputy of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces in the Moroccan parliament and member of the World Peace Council. It sheds some light on what actually happened and assists in understanding the situation in Morocco and its likely ramifications:

[Question] In your opinion what are the causes behind the violent events that have occurred recently in Morocco?

[Answer] Perhaps we can divide the causes of the events that occurred on 20 and 21 June into two: circumstantial causes and indirect causes. The former include the increase in the prices of the basic commodities consumed by the poor masses in Morocco by approximately 40 to 80 percent. The indirect reasons consist of the harsh circumstances in which the Moroccan public lives as a result of the policy pursued by the Moroccan government in political, economic, social matters, and especially in cultural affairs. This policy is characterized by its insensitivity to the needs of the poor masses, and by its support of the bourgeoisie who is usurping the entire resources of Morocco, including the resources that used to be owned by the French colonialists, like fertile farm lands, factories, industrial, commercial, and financial organizations and the like.

Although the Moroccan masses have rejected this policy whenever they have had the opportunity to express their opinion, nevertheless the rulers continued in their policy disregarding the desires and aspirations of the Moroccan people and its poor masses. The Moroccan Socialist Union of Popular Forces expressed these demands fully and courageously. Through its long history which has exceeded 20 years of difficult opposition, the party has offered enormous sacrifices, including a large number of martyrs from amongst its fighters and its leadership, of whom we may mention Mehdi Ben Barka, Omar Benjelloul, and Mohamed Karina.

Currently Morocco is living in a period of trial democracy which has brought about the causes of the present explosion as well as the previous explosions, and has led to the crises which can be summarized as follows:

1) A political crisis caused by mock public elections and the establishment of fictitious democratic institutions that do not reflect the public will, and are unable to make the decisions required to serve this public, and meet its basic needs and aspirations to rid itself of imperialism and foreign dependency in the economic and cultural arenas.

2) An economic crisis due to the weak purchasing power of the working masses which is a result of the freeze in wages and the continual rise in prices, in addition to the increasing class disparities between the rich and the poor, for while the poor people cannot get their daily food, a small class lives the life of luxury, splendor, and dissipation.

3) A cultural crisis which has intensified in recent times and whose roots can be traced back to the 60's. This crisis led to the explosion of events in Casablanca in 1965 and is reflected in a class elite educational system that put barriers in front of the children of the popular classes that desire their continued education. Furthermore, it is reflected in the inexistence of job opportunities for college graduates, and the perpetuation of the dependency on foreign cultures and the preservation of educational institutions that are linked to foreign missions for the advantage of the bourgeois class and the sons of the ruling class.

[Question] What are the solutions which the Socialist Union of Popular Forces have proposed to deal with the current events?

[Answer] The removal of the present government and the formation of a new government is one opinion that has been voiced. We in the Socialist Union have presented a comprehensive phased program to solve the problems that trouble our country. This solution is based primarily on a revision of the current constitution which has paralyzed the organs of parliament and rendered them ineffective. We requested in a report of the conference that was held in December 1978, a revision of the constitution to grant the people the opportunity to elect a legislative assembly that enjoys complete mandatory powers to enable it to define the policy that the masses of the Moroccan people aspire to. Therefore, we do not see a correlation between the problem and a change of individuals, but with a change of the present policy in Morocco which does not serve the overwhelming majority of the masses of workers, farmers, young people and unemployed.

The present constitution divides the legislative power between the king and the House of Representatives, and gives the executive power to the government. It is our point of view that for a true democracy to exist in our country there must be a constitutional monarchy, that is, a democratic monarchy in which the government and the House of Representatives would play a role for which they are responsible vis-a-vis the masses of the Moroccan people, i.e., the government would wield wide powers and be responsible to the elected parliament. We say this because our country has passed through some harsh experiences namely the faked elections which bring deputies to the legislative organizations whom the

authorities have chosen without consultation with the masses and in disregard of their will. We believe that these experiences are some of the causes that have resulted in the present policy--this policy which on the one part has led to the complete exasperation of the masses which in turn has resulted in the explosion. This was reflected in the recent strike which the Democratic Labor Confederation called for and which the Socialist Union of Popular Forces supported to solve the present crisis that has become a dangerous crisis that makes the Moroccan people endure unbearable suffering.

The solution to the crisis lies in the establishment of true democracy and the participation of the public in its determination, conduct and execution on all levels. These are the levels which alone the executive apparatus assume within the framework of unsound organs which have been controlled by this forged majority who owe their whole allegiance to the government and their only role is to serve the government's honor and support it even in decisions that are contrary to the interests of the masses. As an example of this: the majority stood against the latest strike movement which the Moroccan working class called for, which rightfully demanded a revocation of the excessive price increases which result in their further impoverishment and a weakening of their purchasing power.

[Question] Do you believe that current happenings in Morocco are harbingers of more violent events or more general movements?

[Answer] The events of today are the beginning of a chain, unless the government repudiates its unpopular policy. We hope that the government will learn something from the results and studies of these events in order to spare the country further disturbances which will lead to further repression and the appearance of fascistic tendencies.

[Question] You don't believe that the solution in Morocco is the fall of the royal regime?

[Answer] We have grasped the experiences of the Third World and the Arab world and we have come to believe now that the problems are not problems of regime but rather they are problems of the type of government; whether it is a rule in which the masses share and which serves their interests and which equips them to realize their aims and builds experiences which they can believe in, or whether it is rule that will serve these masses in order to serve the group holding power in the country.

From here we have set down among our ideological choices the true mottoes of democracy (democracy, liberty, and socialism). We feel that it is possible that the present monarchy will evolve and become a constitutional monarchy in which the king would be a symbol of unity and rule, while the people would be represented by means of their real representatives within the framework of democracy, in addition to a government responsible to the representatives of this people.

9587
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FIGURES ON MOROCCAN RESIDENTS OF FRANCE, FRENCH RESIDENTS OF MOROCCO

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 11 Aug 81 p 3

[Text] Following are statistics on Moroccan residents of France and French residents of Morocco:

1) Number of Moroccan residents in France:

1976	347,984
1977	376,055
1978	383,376
1979	399,952

The above figures are from the French Ministry of the Interior, based on the number of resident cards in effect as of 31 December 1979. These statistics place the Moroccan community in fifth place among the foreign communities in France (after the Portuguese, Algerians, Italians and Spanish).

2) Moroccan immigration into France:

In principle Moroccan immigration into France is regulated by the manpower accord signed by France and Morocco on 1 June 1963. However, this accord has lost some of its effectiveness since the suspension of permanent immigration in July 1974.

However, Moroccans remain the principal source of seasonal labor, and France is still the major partner of Morocco in terms of emigration. The whole Moroccan community living abroad amounts to 600,000 people, two-thirds of whom are in France.

3) Categories of Moroccan residents of France:

--The privileged group: 116,650 people, or 39 percent of the total.

--The ordinary group: 142,561 people, or 48 percent of the total.

--The temporary group: 38,054 people, or 13 percent of the total.

(Nearly 20,000 Moroccan students were registered in various French universities during the 1980-1981 school year.)

4) Composition of the Moroccan population of France:

--By sex: 73.3 percent males and 26.7 percent females.

--By age: under 17, 26.1 percent; 17 to 24, 15.6 percent; 25 to 44, 48 percent; over 44, 9.5 percent.

--By region: the Paris region is clearly ahead with 31.1 percent of the total; the Rhone-Alpes region follows with 8.4 percent; the Provence-Cote d'Azur region, with 8 percent; and the northern region, 7.6 percent.

--By professional activity: some 29.9 percent are employed in the construction industry; 37.5 percent in the processing industry; 6 percent in trade; and 5.8 percent in the service industry.

Evolution of the French Community in Morocco

1) From 1956 to 1980: Totaling 350,000 people in 1955, the French community in Morocco today amounts to no more than 48,000 people. Nonetheless it remains the largest concentration of French citizens abroad and the largest foreign community in Mororro. There were only 165,000 French in Morocco in 1961 and 110,000 in 1965. Since 1 January 1975 the figure of French residents of Morocco has varied, from 54,948 at the end of 1975; to 52,690 at the end of 1976; to 51,730 at the end of 1977; to 48,607 at the end of 1978; to 48,000 at the end of 1979.

2) Socio-professional composition of the French community in Morocco: about 18,000 French citizens are engaged in the professions in Morocco; 8,000 in the public sector; and 10,000 in the private sector.

--Public sector: about 500 French serve in Moroccan embassies and consulates. About 1,000 teachers are assigned to lycees and schools coming directly under the French Cultural Mission. About 5,000 teachers are assigned under the French aid program in lycees and schools under the Moroccan Ministry of National Education. Nearly 750 French experts are assigned to Moroccan administrative entities other than cultural establishments. About 500 French citizens have been recruited directly by Moroccan government services outside the Franco-Moroccan agreement on cultural and technical cooperation.

--Private sector: about 4,500 French citizens work in the business sector. About 4,200 French citizens work in the industrial sector. Several hundred French citizens work in the a ricultural and handicraft sectors. Some 1,500 French citizens still work in the liberal professions.

3) Geographic location of the French community in Morocco: the percentage of French citizens registered in each main area of Morocco is as follows: Casablanca, 55 percent; Rabat, 19 percent; Fez, 8 percent; Marrakech, 8 percent; Agadir, 5 percent; Tangiers, 3 percent; Oujda, 2 percent. Of the 10,000 French citizens working in the private sector, almost 7,500 live in Casablanca and 1,300 live in Rabat, accounting for nearly 90 percent of the total. In the areas of Marrakech, Oujda, Fez, and Tangiers, the French residents generally work in the public sector.

5170
CSO: 4519/43

BP, MOBIL TO ASSUME OIL OPERATIONS

Doha GULF TIMES in English 25 Aug 81 p 1

[Text]

Doha: In a major reshuffle of its oil drilling and production operations Qatar is expected to shortly announce the nomination of two of the world's most influential oil giants as contractors for its onshore and offshore operations.

British Petroleum is being tipped for onshore production operations and Mobil, America's second biggest oil major, for offshore operations. However, Shell continues to be a major contender for offshore.

BP will move in on its own from September 16 when the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation's service agreement with the Dukhan Service Company expires.

The DSC is a consortium of BP, Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP-Total), all holding 23.75pc shares; Mobil and Exxon, jointly 23.75pc, and Partex, 6pc.

BP provided most staff at the Dukhan operations. Thus in the case of onshore operations it will not mean much change as most staff may remain the same.

But in offshore operations it might prove a wholesale changeover from the present service operator, Shell Service Company, to Mobil.

The Shell Service Company, successor to the Shell Company of Qatar Ltd (SCQ), will continue in its present term as contractor for offshore operations until April 1 next.

The two companies — DSC and Shell Service Company — were retained for five years in 1976 when the oil business was nationalised in Qatar.

The government bought 100pc shares of the erstwhile Qatar Petroleum Company Ltd, then the operators for the onshore operations, in 1976 and took full control of offshore operations from the Shell Company of Qatar Ltd at the beginning of 1977.

Their fee was fixed at 1.266pc of the official selling price of a barrel of crude plus a lifting allowance of 130,000 barrels a day at official price, without premium.

Qatar's present oil production totals 400,000 barrels a day — 200,000 from onshore and 200,000 from offshore.

CSO: 4300/108

DRAFT 5-YEAR AGRICULTURAL PLAN READY

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 4 Aug 81 p 3

[Text]

THE Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries has drawn up the draft five-year plan for the agricultural sector, beginning this year.

The plan stresses the importance of agriculture in the national economy. It ranks second in terms of contribution to the total national product, its contribution being 2.2 per cent. Workers in this sector now account for five per cent of the labourers in the country, compared to 7.5 per cent in 1975.

Nationals form the larger part of total labour force in this sector—they number 40 to 50 per cent in cultivation, 70 to 75 per cent in fisheries and 80 to 85 per cent in animal husbandry.

The agricultural sector provides a large number of nationals, especially the Bedouins, an opportunity to take part in building a modern economy. Therefore, the development of this sector is considered both a social and an economic goal of the state.

The sector also gains importance because it provides approximately 26 per cent of the total food needs of the country, the rest being imported.

MORE FUNDS

A number of factors contributed to the development of agriculture since 1975, one of which was the care taken by the state which is reflected in the increased government expenditure on the agriculture. A sum of Dh 928 million has been set apart as fixed capital for farm development—in which the federal government contributed Dh 180 million and the local governments the rest.

The state's concern was also reflected in the provision of loans and distribution of agricultural lands, handed over to nationals without any obligations, digging of wells, installation of water pumps, and provision of other requirements of production such as seeds, fertilisers, chemicals on 50 per cent subsidy.

There are plans to expand the area of support provided by the government to increase assistance for the establishment of a drip irrigation net work.

The state is also building fishing harbours and establishing free servicing workshops and providing marine machines, boats and fishing equipment at half the price. In addition, nationals are given financial assistance for their animals, in order to guarantee production requirements such as animal fodder. The assistance in this field amounted to Dh 13 million in 1980. Veterinary services and medicine are given free.

PROBLEMS

The assistance received by the agricultural sector for the year 1980 amounted to Dh 106 million, in addition to Dh 25 million which was provided in the form of irrigation pumps, fences, spray machines, marine equipment etc.

The plan draft also lists the problems facing the agricultural sector, which, if they continue, will affect the development plans in the coming period.

These relate to the limited area of land suitable for cultivation, high salt content of the soil and lack of organic materials in it insufficiency of rain water for irrigation, and the unorganised expansion of cultivated area in the last few years.

These factors reduced the percentage of land suitable for agricultural

production. The sector also suffers from inadequate infrastructure, and lack of local expertise and a technical cadre necessary to face the requirements of speedy development. Another problem — the large number of small holdings.

In the fisheries sector, the government is encouraging the use of modern boats.

Regarding animal husbandry traditional methods and poor feed reduce production. Other problems are lack of marketing bodies, lending institutions, lack of specialised local cadres, and limited funds.

The plan aims at using the most up-to-date scientific methods, increased use of machinery in agricultural operations, protection of national resources and raising the living standards of farmers.

TARGETS

The plan expects that the cultivated area under fruits, vegetables and other crops would reach 200,000 dunums by 1985. This area in 1980 was 182,000 dunums.

Thus the expected increase by 1985 is: 26 per cent for vegetables, 68 per cent for dates, 53 per cent for fruits, 33 per cent for wheat and 29 per cent for fodder.

The production of local red meat is to increase from 3,783 tons to 5,643 tons by 1985, poultry meat from 1,9[illegible]0 tons to 8,654 tons and dairy products from 11,870 tons to 22,332 tons, an increase of 88 per cent.

Eggs production will rise from 54 million in 1980 to 275 million. Fish production now is about 15,000 tons and is expected to increase to 24,000 tons.

The annual consumption of water reached 565 million cubic metres, while the available quantities of water is about 210 million cubic metres, resulting in a deficit of 355 million cubic metres of water.

The plan calls for support to agricultural marketing operations and establishment of agricultural bank to encourage farmers and fishermen to expand their production. Establishment of agricultural cooperatives is also suggested.

CSO: 4300/108

AUSTRALIA, DUBAI DISCUSS WHEAT SHIPPING DISCREPANCIES

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 31 Aug 81 pp 1, 3

[Article by Maruf Khwaja]

[Text]

Dubai: Gulf importers of Australian wheat have long been baffled by a mystery attending its procurement. How is it that wheat of a specific and certified weight is loaded onto a ship in Australia and shrinks by several tons by the time it is offloaded in Dubai?

Some of the importers yesterday asked this question of members of Australia's Wheat Board now visiting the region to see what more could be done for their traditional customers in the Gulf who take fifteen per cent of Australian wheat exports every year. And they found, at a meeting organised by the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry, that the Wheat Board was equally baffled.

In fact, said Ian Stewart, Export Manager of the Board leading a three-member delegation on a Gulf tour, he was intrigued at the mystery. The Board, he told Saif Ahmed Al Ghurair, President of the Chamber and other members, had conducted an extensive inquiry into the matter over a period of two years and could come up with no answer.

Weighing methods and equipment at ports of loading in Australia had been thoroughly examined, he said, and found to be without fault. The possibility of pilferage on the way was also dismissed because grain carriers were virtually theft-proof and shipment was direct. The Board had also considered the moisture content factor whereby wheat exposed to heat could lose weight en route. But this was also ruled out because Australia was a dry country and if anything the excessive humidity in the Gulf ought to add to rather than subtract from the weight of the cargo.

One possible answer which did not however figure at the very cordial discussions could be short weighment at ports of origin. Instances are said to be on record where grain exports from producer countries to the third world have been subject to allegations of short weighing by exporters. Such allegations had surfaced in a major American wheat scandal about three years ago.

In the matter of Australian wheat supplies to the Gulf, it was disclosed at the meeting that several shiploads had recently been short of recorded measurements upon receipt by the importer. And weighing machines here have been found in order. The mystery shortage ranged from .47 per cent to four per cent in one instance. Vessels, serving the Australia-Gulf wheat trade usually carry about 30,000 tons of grain each. Been over a period of some years this adds up to a fairly substantial quantity of short-measuring, and a corresponding loss to importers most of whom appear to have placed all their eggs in the Australian basket.

The matter of weighment aside, the meeting was useful and productive to both sides. Asked for suggestions about improving conditions and economies of purchase, transport, storage and milling of Australian wheat, Stewart said one answer could lie in Gulf importers increasing their

grain storage capacity. The Australian wheat board was considering a proposal to collaborate in setting up trans-shipment facilities possibly in the UAE. An official could visit the region in the near future to survey possibilities. But the proposal was still at an early stage and the delegation could give no assurance about Australian assistance in expanding storage facilities in this region.

Another suggestion was for Gulf importers to make their purchases in greater bulk. For example, said Stewart, instead of 30,000 tons single consignments could be boosted to 40,000 by use of larger vessels. Care could also be taken to place orders at times when prices were most favourable. But, he said, a request that greater credit facilities be granted and payment period of one year be given to Gulf buyers, could not be met because the Australian wheat grower would not be able to afford it. There was also an interaction of commodity price, currency value and interest rate factors and these combined to make the grant of further facilities difficult.

The Dubai side at the meeting which included an importers from Qatar, also expressed concern over the effect of labour disputes in Australia on wheat supplies to this region. Stewart said although the government there was doing its best to prevent strikes, nothing could be done about inter-union disputes which sometimes affected loading.

The Australian delegation offered to put an expert in wheat milling at the disposal of factories in Dubai to help them achieve greater productivity and iron out any technical problems attending flour milling. Stewart said the delegation will be visiting Abu Dhabi, Qatar and North and South Yemen, in the course of the present tour. A possibility of setting up a roller mill in North Yemen was being examined.

CSO: 4300/108

BRIEFS

ILLEGAL ALIENS DEPORTED--Abu Dhabi (Al Ittihad): A total of 441 workers have been deported following an inspection drive launched by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs in various UAE towns. A source at the Ministry said most of the deported workers were Indian and Pakistani nationals who were ordered out of the country for abandoning their original sponsors and working for new employers. A total of 41 labour inspectors examined the labour situation of 1,299 business establishments during the months of April, May and June. A total of 154 companies were found violating labour laws and 344 others which had committed minor offences have been notified to eliminate these irregularities. A total of 225 inspectors covered work sites throughout the country. Out of 616 workers who had been arrested during the campaign 441 were deported. The others were released for producing the necessary immigration and labour documents. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 30 Aug 81 p 3]

CSO: 4300/108

POLISARIO MEMBER DISCUSSES PROPOSED PLEBISCITE, SAHARA SITUATION

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1023, 13 Jul 81, pp 29-30

[Interview with Nur al-Din, member of POLISARIO's Political Bureau, by Zuhayr al-Jaza'iri and Simon Khuri; date and place not given]

[Text] Recently major changes have taken place concerning the Western Sahara issue on the international, Africa, and pan-Arab levels. They include Mitterrand's becoming president of France, the Nairobi summit meeting which treated the Saharan issue as a fundamental topic, King Hassan II's acceptance of the holding of a plebiscite among the Saharan people, through a neutral committee, while faced with the groundswell of the mass movement which has returned to the streets of Morocco's cities, and Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of the settlement between Mauritania and Morocco. These changes took place after Saudi Arabia's statements that the "Saharan problem" would soon end with a settlement between the parties involved, and statements made by King Hassan II to the effect that the Sahara case will be closed after the completion of setting up the Moroccan military wall around the "vital triangle" in Western Sahara. In order to clarify some of the aspects of the political map of Western Sahara, and in order to learn POLISARIO's opinion concerning them, AL-HURRIYAH held an interview with Mr Nur al-Din, member of the Political Bureau of POLISARIO.

Acceptance of the Plebiscite Is a Retreat by Morocco

[Question] Let us begin with King Hassan II's agreement to hold a plebiscite in Western Sahara. How do you evaluate the fact that he has agreed to this?

[Answer] Before talking about the importance of this decision, let us first of all talk about the motives behind it. Hassan II's decision was taken as a result of the fact that he felt internationally isolated since his country was a power of occupation and since he had rejected international resolutions. The decision was also the result of the huge losses which his army had suffered in the Saharan war, and the effect that these losses had on Morocco's internal situation. One cannot isolate the recent series of strikes from the economic and social damage which has been inflicted upon Morocco by the Saharan war.

In spite of the fact that Hassan II wanted to present his recent decision as an unexpected surprise, it still remains a fact that the holding of this plebiscite has

long been demanded by the UN and was even directly brought up when Spain was withdrawing from the Sahara region. Spain, while it was about to withdraw from the area, procrastinated in the implementation of this resolution.

The OAU, in most of its recent conferences, has adopted a resolution concerning the holding of this plebiscite. For this reason, we consider Hassan II's decision to accept the holding of this plebiscite, in whatever form, to be an admission of the occupation and a reverse of his previous decisions. When the OAU brought up the matter of a plebiscite, Hassan II at that time condemned the intervention of the OAU in "Morocco's internal affairs," and at that time he considered that the Saharan people had already decided its fate since the time that the "tribal chiefs" had marched with him in the Green March and since the Moroccan flag had been hoisted in Dakhla. By accepting the plebiscite process, the king is admitting that imperialism is being liquidated in the area.

But we, the Saharan people, have had long experience with the maneuvers of this king. However, in spite of the fact that the king, by means of this decision, wants to outflank the OAU, the decision is nevertheless a political gain for us.

Withdrawal of the Moroccan Army Is a Condition for Impartiality of the Plebiscite

[Question] After this decision was made, Morocco's prime minister, Maati Bouabid, stated that he was fully confident that the results of the plebiscite would be favorable to Morocco. What basis does he have for making this statement?

[Answer] This statement was made for internal consumption and to lull the Moroccan people to sleep.

[Question] What are the conditions which you propose in order to guarantee the impartiality of the plebiscite?

[Answer] We accept the plebiscite on the condition that it remain a Saharan plebiscite, that is, that it include the Saharan people and no one else.

Also, the Saharan people do not agree to holding the plebiscite while under Moroccan occupation and while the invading Moroccan army and police are in Western Sahara. For this reason, we consider the withdrawal of the Moroccan army to be a condition which would guarantee the impartiality of the plebiscite, and would guarantee that the plebiscite will include all the people of the Sahara—including the freedom-fighters and the refugees.

[Question] We notice that the OAU's resolution did not refer to POLISARIO as the representative of the Saharan people.

[Answer] The OAU did not determine who the negotiating parties are to be and left this matter up to the Saharan people and the neutral committee. We in POLISARIO are confident concerning our people's opinion, and when we say that we support the plebiscite, we are differentiating between the plebiscite which the OAU passed a resolution concerning, and the plebiscite which the king wants.

[Question] What is the nature of the resolution passed by the OAU?

[Answer] The OAU's plebiscite would be carried out by a neutral power and would be supervised by the UN and the OAU. The committee would get in touch with the parties involved in the issue in order to arrange a cease-fire, in order to take measures which would guarantee the soundness of the plebiscite, and to have recourse to the minutes of the previous meeting which advocated the withdrawal of the Moroccan army in order to pave the way for the neutral committee to hold the plebiscite.

[Question] Another question occurs to me, which is: How is it possible to prove the identity of the Saharans?

[Answer] In this regard, we have no doubt that the Moroccan occupiers will utilize all available means to misrepresent the will of our people. But the neutral committee has numerous documents which can prove the identity of the Saharans. They include the POLISARIO Front's documents, old documents which were used by the Spanish occupying power, and the documents which are held by the Saharans who have been distributed throughout various refugee areas.

[Question] Other than with regard to its position concerning your cause, how do you assess the recent African summit meeting?

[Answer] We in POLISARIO are very anxious to preserve the unity and coherence of the OAU. For this reason, we consider the fact that the OAU emerged from its last meeting as a coherent and united organization to be a vital factor in its success. The American administration has attempted to put pressure on the OAU to expel Libya or to take a [negative] position toward it. Also, Egypt and Sudan have tried to prevent Quadhdhafi from being the OAU's chairman next year. But these efforts were not successful in influencing the African consensus and were not able to split the organization. In its recent meeting, the OAU passed a number of positive resolutions, such as the resolutions concerning the Palestine problem, national liberation causes, and resolutions concerning improving the atmosphere [of relations] in Africa. There was apprehension that the OAU would split apart, but the OAU overcame this apprehension. The OAU emerged with a number of resolutions which were in opposition to American policy, such as the OAU's position with regard to the Palestine problem and position concerning the racist regimes.

The Military Situation

[Question] King Hassan II proudly speaks of his military victories in Western Sahara, and he bases this on his achievement of the military blockade set up around the vital triangle. Has this military wall greatly changed the course of the Saharan war?

[Answer] As far as we are concerned, this security wall is not a magic barrier which prevents us from reaching the occupied areas. Quite the contrary, we consider it to be proof of the fact that the Moroccan forces are unable to control the Sahara. Work on, and drumming up support for, this blockade began after we succeeded in liberating numerous towns such as al-Mahbes, Echdeira, Bir al-Halou, and Amgala, and after the other major towns, such as El Aaium, Bu Craa, and Smara came within range of our guns. Here Hassan II wanted to do what the French did

before their defeat in Algeria. That is, he wanted to set up a line, similar to the Morice line, around the main cities. But we penetrated this line from two directions. We penetrated it at Ra's al-(Khanafre), where we captured weapons and took prisoners, and we also penetrated it at Smara and Bu Craa. We also cleared thousands of mines and drove the Moroccan forces back 30 kilometers. At first Hassan II wanted to put electrical [barbed] wire and points, as well as mine fields, in the blockade. But then he realized how much all of this would cost and realized that the blockade was unable to put a stop to our operations in the Sahara and in southern Morocco, and the result is that the blockade today consists only of an earthen wall and the rest has been dispensed with. Our recent operations have concentrated on hitting Moroccan army groups inside Morocco and behind these barriers and on penetrating their defenses. Besides our penetration operations, we have put up bases along this blockade in order to guarantee constant bombardment of the invading Moroccan forces. In spite of the fact that the king has obtained new weapons such as the F-15 and Mirage planes, our forces [are a match for them because they] have become more experienced and more powerful.

The Role of the Americans and the Saudis

[Question] Are you not alarmed about the Mauritanian-Moroccan settlement which was sponsored by Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] We consider this to be a normal settlement because Mauritania and Morocco did not break off relations due to the Sahara issue. They did so because of the attempted coup which Hassan II undertook against Mauritania. Saudi efforts in this regard are also not something new. For some time the Saudis have been trying to bring the king out of his isolation and out of the dilemma caused by this war.

[Question] There is talk about an "American initiative" in the Sahara. Are you aware of anything of this sort?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the Americans will attempt, by political means, to obtain what they failed to obtain by force. First there was the deployment of the king's forces, which were supported by America, but then these forces had to retreat without succeeding in liquidating our forces. American policy now is oriented in the direction of granting a wider role to the Moroccan regime. For this reason, the Americans eliminated all of the conditions which they had imposed upon Morocco for supplying it with arms, and then arms began to pour into Morocco. The Americans want Morocco to take the place of France, which is no longer ruled by Giscard d'Estaing. But the assessment of the Americans is that the Saharan war is a swamp which Hassan II's regime may drown in. For this reason, they are trying to get him out of this dilemma with as few losses as possible and with a solution which would allow him to save face.

We Support the Moroccan Opposition

[Question] Your organization has invited the Moroccan opposition to have a dialogue with it concerning finding a solution to the Saharan problem. Did you renew this invitation after clashes between the opposition and the regime became more intense?

[Answer] Although we have noticed no change in the position taken by the Moroccan opposition with regard to our cause, this invitation to hold a constructive dialogue is still good. And recently our appeal demonstrated its effectiveness after the veil of democracy was ripped away from the face of the [Moroccan] regime. The bloodbaths in Rabat, Fes, and Casablance demonstrated the failure of the unsteady relationship which exists between the king and the opposition. And any continuation of this relationship helps the king's credibility when dealing with the people. If they want to enhance the effectiveness of the popular struggle against the regime, then we are ready to help them so that they can put a stop to these maneuvers by the king and so that they can pull the rug out from under the forces of reaction.

Mitterrand's Success and His Partnership with the Communists Are Two Positive Factors for Us

[Question] How did you greet Mitterrand's victory in the French elections?

[Answer] We welcomed it, because Mitterrand inclines toward the policy of liquidating imperialism in Africa. Perhaps the policy of France will not change greatly, but it will not contain the same imperialistic fervor and interventionism which it used to. This is important.

Furthermore, POLISARIO has long had relations with Mitterrand and his party. We have visited him many times, have held discussions and meetings with him, and joint communiques have been issued which favor our cause. For this reason, we consider his rise to power to be a positive change for us and for many of those who are combatting imperialism in Africa. Hassan II was against Mitterrand.

One important factor in Mitterrand's policy is the fact that the French communists are sharing power with him, and this is a positive guarantee in favor of the former French colonies and in favor of Africa's national liberation movement.

No Cease-Fire Now

[Question] After the king agreed to holding the plebiscite, did your side institute a cease-fire, or will this take place in the near future?

[Answer] So far we, for our part, have not instituted a cease-fire, and we will keep our rifles loaded until the committee from the OAU establishes reasonable conditions for a cease-fire. And if we do institute a cease-fire in order to facilitate the job of this committee, we will still keep our rifles ready and will resume fighting in case there is any hesitation or fraud concerning the implementation of the OAU's resolutions. Experience has taught us the importance of keeping our weapons ready and of being alert to the king's maneuvers at the same time.

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23 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ARAB INVESTMENT IN COMMODITIES LIKELY

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 10 Aug 81 p 2

[Text]

LONDON—Arab oil exporting countries are closely studying the world-wide commodity and metal markets as a possible major new source for investment, according to both Middle East and Western investment analysts.

This would be a major change of direction in Arab investment, which hitherto has been confined largely to the Western money markets, stock markets, companies, or real estate and associated activities.

But commodities are seen as an area with implications for Arab investment. It should meet the constant requirement of ensuring that the real value of Arab investments overseas is preserved, the analysts say.

"If a full-scale switch by the Middle East into commodities is achieved, it would be normal to hear of Kuwait investment in Brazilian coffee, or Saudi involvement in Zambian copper, just as their multi-billion dollar deposits in the money markets of London and New York are taken for granted at present," one analyst told Kuna.

However, there are no signs so far of a hurried or precipitate switch into commodities by the Arab-states.

The appreciation of the U.S. dollar, the main payment currency for Opec oil, to its highest levels of recent years against most world currencies is removing the need for any urgent action, say analysts.

While most Opec states are seeing an overall decline in their oil sales, due to the worldwide glut of crude, much of this fall has been offset by the rise of the dollar, it is pointed out.

In fact, several Opec states, while actually selling less oil, are probably finding that the overall financial revenue in terms of U.S. dollars is actually keeping steady, due to exchange rate factors, analysts say.

The combined current account surplus of the Opec nations is expected this year to total at least 75-80 billion dollars, a decline on the 110-billion-dollar surplus posted in 1980.

But the bulk of this year's surplus will probably finish up in overseas money markets, and will be seeking investment outlets, analysts say.

As the strength of the dollar wanes, due to the expected moderation of the tight U.S. monetary policy, the attraction of alternative investment prospects will probably increase, they add.

So far, private Arab business is leading the drive into commodity investment rather than the mid-west governments and finance ministries.

A number of major trading houses in the Gulf have stepped up their involvement in commodities in recent months, Western analysts say.

FORM OF AID

For instance, the Al-Futtaim group of Dubai, a big general trading group already involved in automobiles, consumer goods, electronics and construction, is beefing up its commodities interests.

It is prepared to pay up to 60,000 dollars to recruit a manager for its international commodity trading.

The job is to expand a basically non-speculative international trading operation dealing chiefly in metals and "soft" commodities, such as coffee, cocoa, and wheat.

This shows the Gulf trading houses' renewed interest in commodities, analysts say.

But the big boost to Arab commodity involvement will come when Arab governments use their surpluses to gain a foothold, analysts say.

There are other interesting implications for the Arab states' involvement in commodities. For example, a big Arab investment in tin, of which Malaysia is a major producer, could be of great benefit to that South-East Asian country.

In fact, commodity investment could act as a form of Arab aid to the Third World, in which most primary commodity production takes place, as well as providing a return on Arab aid capital, analysts believe.

Arab investment could create a much more stable price basis for certain commodities, like in the case of oil, analysts say.

The member-nations of the International Coffee Producers Organisation have, in the past, declared that they should form an Opec-type body, gaining the benefits of price stability. But a lack of the necessary funds on the part of the generally poor coffee producers, such as Colombia and Kenya, has always come in the way of realising that goal.

An array of technical problems remains to be solved before the Arab states decide on the manner of investment in commodities, analysts say. For instance, the oil exporters could take physical delivery of commodities and metals, and warehouse them in the Middle East and West, analysts say. But this could lead to great supply and transportation difficulties.

Alternatively, the Arab countries could enter the big commodity trading markets of the West, where trading is done on a futures basis and, generally, the aim is not actually to take delivery of the commodities. But such trading is often highly speculative and does not fit into the Arab investment philosophy.

Another method may be to supply finance directly to the chosen commodity producers—be it wheat, tea, coffee, sugar, or metals such as copper, tin or lead. The cash could be used for improved production and mining, or withholding the commodities or metals in stockpiles at times of depression until the world price improved.

The Arab states could then share in the consequent profits of the commodity sales, by agreement with the producing countries, conclude analysts.

CSO: 4300/108

SITUATION OF KARMAL REGIME REPORTED DETERIORATING

Mujahedin Victories

Karachi DAWN in English 29 Aug 81 p 10

[Text] QUETTA, Aug 28: The Russian-backed Afghan army launched a heavy attack with hundreds of tanks and MIG aircrafts and gunship helicopters on the camps of the Mujahideen in the area of Baglan province. The Mujahideen fought back valiantly and repulsed the blitz. The Mujahideen inflicted heavy losses of life and property on the Afghan army who later took to heels.

According to a Press release of Hizbe Islami of Afghanistan (Younis Khalis party) the Mujahideen shot down a gunship helicopter and destroyed eleven tanks.

The commandos of the freedom-fighters claimed to have encircled a large number of paratroopers being dropped in the area of Baglan province and killed them. The commandos were led by Maulvi Mohammad Gul.

The Afghan army started attacking on large scale in the areas of northern provinces but the position of Mujahideen was so strong that Afghan troops faced discomfiture on every front. The chief of Hizbe Islami, Maulvi Mohammad Younis Khalis was himself commanding the Mujahideen in the southern areas of Afghanistan where freedom-fighters had escalated their activities and achieved many strategic successes.

The reports reaching from across the border said that heavy fighting continued in Kandhar, the second largest city of Afghanistan, during the last month. The Mujahideen of Hizbe Islami of Afghanistan were reportedly inflicting heavy human and material losses to the Russian and Karmal forces.

According to reports, in the first encounter, the Mujahideen destroyed two tanks and one truck by opening fire over Russian military units stationed in the area of Kandhar city on July 18 last.

The Mujahideen also destroyed another two tanks in an attack between the area of Dand and Sarpoza inside the Kandhar city.

4 ARMY OFFICERS EXECUTED

Four military officers were captured alive by the Mujahideen and were executed later on at their positions after trial in an Islamic court. Two machine-guns were seized from their custody on July 23 last, the report adds. The Mujahideen attacked two tanks guarding the oil station of Sarpoza and destroyed them killing 20 crewmen. The Mujahideen also burnt to ashes several Government stores inside the city at the same time.

The Mujahideen killed, another report says, a captain of Afghan army and two other troops behind the Kandhar ice factory on July 29 last.

According to another report, the Mujahideen raided Zarghona High School, a shelter for Communist activists, and killed as many as 18 Government agents there.

The report says that city of Kandhar was still under the sole control of the Mujahideen at present. The Russian and Karmal forces were besieged by them in every nook and corner of the province.

Heavy fighting has also been reported from Wardak province. In a fierce fighting they killed an Afghan Major and five other Karmal troops. The second-in-command of Fourth Armoured Division of Charkhi was shot dead. Twenty Karmal military troops were captured alive by the Mujahideen. The Mujahideen seized one anti-aircraft heavy machine-gun, alongwith 500 bullets. Kabul-Kandhar road was mostly under the control of Mujahideen.

ECONOMY SHATTERED

According to a report from London diplomatic efforts to solve the Afghanistan crisis gain momentum, the war-torn country's economy seems shattered and the Government admits it is faced with host of serious economic problems.

Speaking at a civic seminar, in Kabul, Prime Minister Sultan Ali Khistmand admitted the serious problem.

Mr Khistmand referred to the measures which according to him, have been taken to activate the workers of the ruling People's Democratic Party against the "counter revolutionaries".

As part of the steps, a Central Defence Councils have been set up under the Party's Politbureau and councils have been set up at provincial and district levels which are also run by the Party.

Economic Problems

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 30 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] LONDON, Aug. 29: As the diplomatic efforts to solve the Afghanistan crisis have gained momentum, the war-torn country's economic has shattered and the government admits it is faced with host of serious economic problems, BBC reported last night.

Speaking at civic seminar, in Kabul Prime Minister Sulzan Ali Khistmand admitted the serious problem.

Mr. Khistmand referred to the measures which, according to him have been taken to activate the workers of the ruling People's Democratic Party against the "Mujahideen."

As part of the steps, a Central Defence Council has been set up under the party's Politbureau and councils have been set up at provincial and district level which are also run by the party.

All state powers have been assigned to these councils with a view to improve harmony among the armed forces, national security institutions and the party.

Mr. Khistmand also announced setting up of a special commission of the Defence Council. The commission will mainly deal with the problems of recruitment of young men in the army.

Large-scale desertations from the army are taking place all over the country. Youth are also avoiding to join the army and the armed forces are demoralized.

Mr. Khistmand admitted the problems being faced in army recruitment. He said there was need to improve propaganda about compulsory recruitment and conscription.

The Afghan Prime Minister also raised an important question about the developments and increasing the economic potential of the country.

He specially emphasised the need to improve industry, agriculture, transportation and electricity sectors.

Mr. Khishtmand said there was scope for expansion in the industrial sector. He appealed for restarting several closed industrial units.

He said the government's efforts for agricultural reforms would continue. He said the reforms were an effective means in the struggle against the "Mujahideen."

He emphatically said that with these reforms, a large majority of farmers would extend their support to the ruling PDP.—PPI.

Soviet Dissatisfaction With Afghan Troops

Karachi DAWN in English 31 Aug 81 p 3

[Text]

Reports from Kabul say that the Chief Soviet Adviser whose rank is equal to a General has expressed his dissatisfaction at the performance of Karmal troops, Radio Pakistan reported last night.

He has complained that the high Afghan Army officers lacked political loyalty and many Afghan officers were aiding the Mujahideen, and were deserting the Army and joining the Mujahideen.

He has further complained that frequent attacks by Mujahideen on highways has been hampering transportation of provision supplies and movement of the Army. The transportation of provision supplies and Army through helicopters is not only difficult but also entails too heavy expenditures, he said.

CSO: 4600/182

CHINA PROTESTS SOVIET ANNEXATION OF WAKHAN PROVINCE

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 13 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Leo Wieland]

[Text] Moscow, 12 Aug--The USSR and China are again engaging openly in border disputes. This time it concerns the "Afghan Strip," which is the salient of Afghan territory in the Pamir Mountains that extends to the border of the People's Republic of China. Beijing had raised official objections to a border treaty between the USSR and Afghanistan that is only a few months old. The Chinese protest was sharply rejected in an explanation by the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, published Wednesday by the party newspaper PRAVDA. At the same time, PRAVDA announced the details of the agreement and historic background from Moscow's viewpoint.

In Kabul on 16 June, Afghan Foreign Minister Dost and Soviet Ambassador Tabayev signed a treaty on the "national border from the western shore of Lake Zorkul up to Povalo-Shveykovskiy Peak." This mountain marks the juncture of the three countries' borders, that is, it is on the border of the USSR, Afghanistan and China. According to Moscow's explanation, the treaty "settles legally the existing and defended line of the Soviet-Afghan border in its sector there" and, thereby, confirms the "principle of inviolability of the border between the USSR and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." The question this agreement settles concerns the two signatory countries exclusively, "and no one else."

However, China still felt itself concerned in this affair. On 22 July, Beijing's Foreign Ministry sent Moscow a statement terming the border treaty "illegal" and invalid. The reason cited was that: "The disputed area impinged on the Sino-Soviet border in the Pamirs." Moscow's retort called this dispute a Chinese "invention" and accused Beijing of once again pursuing a policy of "heedless interference" in the affairs of other countries.

For some years now, the Chinese government has been trying to represent the issue as if it had some kind of treaty rights to "claims to a part of the Soviet Pamirs. But there are no such rights. On the contrary, the border in this area has evolved historically and was settled by the "exchange of notes of 1894." Even the Chinese maps showed the same delineations as the Soviet maps.

The exchange of notes of 1894 apparently dealt with an armistice agreement between China and Tsarist Russia. Whether it also is to be interpreted as a border settlement, is at least disputed by Beijing. Western sources are providing supplementary

information on this conflict. Then there arose the issue of the "Afghan Strip" which is also called the "Wakhan Corridor," based on the accord between the British colonial power and Russia. It was considered a buffer zone between Russia and India. The historic account then mentions two bilateral Anglo-Russian border agreements concerning Afghanistan's northern border on the "Wakhan Corridor."

The first understanding came into being in 1873 and determined the route of the border from Lake Zorkul (source of the Oxus River) in a southwestern direction along the course of the river. A second agreement in March 1895 covered the remaining part of this border from Lake Zorkul eastward along the mountain ridge up to Peak Povall-Shveykovskiy. Furthermore, a demarcation line was drawn in the summer of 1895. Meanwhile, China did not take part in the enactment of this settlement. British efforts to bring Beijing into the negotiations were unsuccessful. The result is, as the Chinese foreign minister indicates, not recognized even yet.

Several suppositions can be put forth on the question of why Moscow felt it necessary to confirm once again an old settlement in a particular treaty. One of them is that with its explicit recognition of the "inviolability" of its border with Afghanistan, the Soviet Union wanted to disarm the suspicion occasionally voiced in the West that it intends to annex the "Afghan Strip" with its passes to both China and Pakistan. In the event of annexation, the Soviet Union would be a contiguous neighbor of Pakistan in the Hindu Kush. According to reports of Western military experts there are two Soviet garrisons in the "Afghan Strip." Their mission is mainly to block shipments of arms and supplies for the Afghan opposition.

For another thing, the Soviet Union used the Chinese protest once again to demonstrate that it did not have any unsolved border problems with the other communist great power and regards the status quo as unalterable. The treaty between Moscow and Beijing, which sanctioned the formula for the realities created by Tsarist Russia and England, is being defended against the "provocative statement" from Beijing as a bilateral affair--not at all as a matter of "corrections" in the boundary line. The Chinese protest is regarded as having "no meaning or consequences."

CSO: 4620/15

FOREIGN, DOMESTIC TRADE REVIEWED; DIVERSIFICATION, SHIFT TO THIRD WORLD NOTED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 911, 7-13 Aug 81; No 912, 14-20 Aug 81

[7-13 Aug 81 pp 6-13]

[Article by Mohamed B. et al.: "Trade: Changes Under Way"]

[Text] This week REVOLUTION AFRICAINE begins the publication of two studies on the foreign and domestic trade of Algeria.

Concerning the first theme, we are attempting a critical analysis of trade with the West and trade with the countries of the southern half of the world, which Algeria intends to develop in the interests of its own experience as well as that of the countries of the southern hemisphere.

We will reserve the second theme for our next edition, in the form of three articles devoted to the supply of certain food products and household appliances which symbolize the needs of consumers and the availability of these products in the market.

Changes Under Way

Never since independence have we seen such interest in the countries of the Third World and the socialist countries, the traditional, poor relations of our trade. In the last 10 weeks or so more than 20 agreements of various characters have been signed with these countries, which have never accounted for more than 10 percent of our foreign trade. By a paradoxical but solid logic they were considered to be supplementary trading partners who would buy or supply what the developed capitalist countries, which take up more than 85 percent of our trade, declined or were not able to offer us.

The wind which seems to be sweeping through the established order of things apparently has not ceased to blow, since each week we see new contracts entered into with hitherto unknown trading partners.

However, more than the geographic diversity of these countries, which are found on all continents and some of which were entirely outside the scope of our trade, like Bangladesh or Sierra Leone, it is above all the contents of certain agreements which constitute the newest and most remarkable element. For a large part of these agreements the provisions only bear on the strengthening of commercial, cultural, and technical relations, as is the case with Congo, Sierra Leone, the Seychelles, Ivory Coast, or Bangladesh. On the other hand for some of them we have clearly gone outside this conventional framework to sign industrial cooperation agreements, up to now reserved for capitalist countries and multinational companies.

This is the case with the important agreement on heavy industry reached with Angola, which is a marked change from the usual trade in agricultural and handicraft products.

Two other agreements, which have unfortunately attracted little attention, clearly mark the beginning of the departure from the usual framework and bear on trade related to the implementation of the Algerian five-year plan.

The first of these agreements, signed between Algeria and Cuba, concerns exchanges of experience and concrete actions taken between the Algerian Ministry of Planning and National Development, on the one hand, and the Cuban planning organism, JUCEPLAN [Central Planning Board]. In the view of Minister of Planning Brahimi this agreement constitutes one of the "means of bringing together the conditions for self-centered and independent development."

The second of these agreements has been called by the press the first experiment in cooperation between countries of the southern hemisphere. Signed between the National Metals Company [SN METAL] and the Indian company BHPV, it involves the assignment of experts, the training of personnel, the transfer of technology for the production of framework and boiler components for the "Wahran III" and "Annaba II" units, pressure tanks, heat exchangers, and a whole range of industrial products which are much in demand by our national petrochemical, steel, and food industries. This area had been considered to be more or less exclusively reserved for Western countries.

We are undoubtedly witnessing a change in our foreign trade policy. Is this a decisive development? It is still too soon to say this, because, although the agreements signed in abundance with the countries of the Third World are unique and praiseworthy, they are nonetheless still fragile, as the deficit in this area is significant. However, if this is pursued with perseverance--and nothing stands in the way--Algeria would open up a real revolution in its trade relations in the direction of diversification and thus of independence and the total exercise of its sovereignty which the polarization of our trade with the capitalist world threatens. "In fact, the beginning of the redirection of our foreign trade and the emphasis given to certain countries of the Third World and to socialist countries are only the first steps toward applying a new policy of foreign trade, which has become imperative and even fundamental for the launching of the five-year plan, whose success Algeria wants to ensure, after bitter experience with trade with the capitalist world." In turn, the capitalist world has pressured our economy in various ways, which has led to the present stage of external debt and to slowing down the achievement of the development programs.

General reflection has refuted the idea according to which it would be absolutely impossible to respect the provisions of the plan and thus to develop the major sectors of the economy unless we move away from the area of capitalist trade. This view has become generalized over the past few months, giving place to a really new policy, supported by the highest-ranking authorities in our country. This has occurred in spite of the resistance of certain persons nostalgic for the spiritual and material charms of this Western world, with its effete, multinational firms which know wo well how to smile when necessary.

What is in the course of development in our foreign trade is only the passage from the theoretical to the practical stage of change, undertaken by Algeria on several occasions. This has occurred since the adoption of the National Charter, which recommended establishment of trade "in accordance with the choices we have made," from which would be excluded "all forms of the larvae of neocolonialism."

This determination, strengthened by the resolution adopted at the summit meeting of nonaligned countries in Havana in 1979, asking the member states to strengthen their collective autonomy in terms of economic relations, should end by giving concrete reality to the monopoly of the state over foreign trade. It was underlined in different speeches of President Chadli Bendjedid over at least the past year. It constitutes one of the major themes of debate over the five-year plan since the Central Committee of the party, at its second session on economic and social development, discussed them at length and decided on the diversification of our foreign trade.

The movement from the theoretical to the practical stage, which had begun early in 1980 with decisions on the reduction of foreign technical assistance, was to be speeded up by the promulgation and initiation of the five-year development plan, whose contents and objectives could not really be accommodated to the nature of the trading relations between Algeria and the outside world as they were. This world is monopolized by the capitalist countries, and the other regions such as the socialist countries and those of the Third World, objective allies of true and independent development, are practically excluded from it.

The trip by President Chadli Bendjedid to Africa and to two socialist countries was to be the real catalyst of an unprecedented opening toward trading partners which could, in large part, substitute for the developed, capitalist countries and which had the precious advantage of looking at trade from the point of view of mutual interest and not, as is the case for most of the Western countries, from the aspect of blackmail and pressure.

Blackmail by the Capitalist Countries

Who is unaware of the fallout of the capitalist crisis and of the activities of the capitalist system in terms of our economy. Who can deny the major responsibility played by capitalist maneuvers in our economic backwardness and the failure to realize most of our planned projects?

The facts are at hand to prove that multinational firms, taking advantage of the place which they occupy in our trade, have developed a complete strategy for blocking our development.

The economic objectives of the multinational firms have always been paralleled by political objectives aimed at weakening a country possessing three features: that of being simultaneously a developing country, having a socialist system, and being a member of OPEC. Thus, our country had everything to attract capitalist aggressiveness, aggressiveness which has not been in short supply throughout our struggle for development which our country is undertaking in order to achieve its emancipation.

Today the negative effects of the integration of our national economy into the capitalist marketing area are numerous. There are deficits in our balance of trade and of payments. There are cost overruns in our development projects, extended delays in their completion, inflation, restrictive practices, too much technical assistance and disturbances to our plans. All of this constitutes the impact of the capitalist crisis, of an outmoded and aging system, on our economy and its development. The position which the capitalist countries occupy in our foreign trade facilitated all these maneuvers and will continue to facilitate them as long as this polarization of our trade toward the West continues.

Algeria imports a great deal. Imports double in volume every 5 years. The Western countries are the principal suppliers and purchasers, accounting for more than 85 percent of our trade, whereas the socialist countries and those of the Third World share less than 15 percent (see table).

External Trade Balance Provided in the Five-Year Plan

In relation to the development of individual family consumption and national production imports are to develop at the rate of: 5 percent for food products and 8 percent for industrial goods. In constant prices imports will develop, during this five-year period, as follows, in millions of Algerian dinar:

Item	1980	1984	Total 1980-84	Percentage
Food products	7,500	9,670	43,750	16%
Industrial consumption goods	2,270	3,365	79,910	5%
Raw materials and semifinished goods	12,260	19,990	13,500[sic]	29%
Equipment goods	13,100	15,550	81,190	30%
Services	9,200	11,560	54,160	20%
Totals	44,330	59,235	273,460	100%

It is to be noted in the foregoing chart that priority has been given to the imports of equipment goods and raw materials, to the detriment of food and industrial goods for individual consumption (household furnishings, furniture, automobiles, etc.). This step has been taken in relationship to the results expected from our domestic production which should provide such products for the people. Imports will consist rather of goods needed for the development of national industry and for the bases for further savings. Another observation is valid for services which, totaling 54,160 million Algerian dinar during the period 1980-84, will have their rate of growth reduced to 5 percent, which reflects the efforts to reduce foreign assistance.

The concentration of trade with the capitalist market has not been a painless process. Caught between monetary manipulation and inflation, two weapons used by the monopolist bourgeoisie to weaken the countries of the Third World and multiply their profits, the purchasing power of Algerian petroleum, the principal source of trade income of our country, has not been able to resist the pressure. Algeria has always paid more for what it has ordered from countries which, in return, took from our country its principal export commodity, petroleum, at prices which were always devalued in real terms. Among other results this situation has led to a rather substantial trading deficit.

In most cases, chosen as partners for the construction of projects approved in the development plans, the multinational firms, in an almost systematic way, have brought with them practices which have led to the slowing down of economic development. No project has been completed for the cost and within the time period provided in the plan. One of the most important aspects of the strategy of weakening our national economy and recuperating petroleum profits on the part of the multinational firms consisted in delaying the completion of projects to give inflation time to gain a tighter grip and thus to apply the sacred principle of overvaluation.

Can one, objectively speaking, continue with this kind of cooperation at the risk of completely compromising our development plan, when we know that the four-year plan (1974-77) suffered a great deal from this form of economic vandalism? In 1977 at the end of the plan, the import price index had increased considerably, going from 100 in 1973 to 212 in 1977, or more than twice as much,[1] forcing the Algerian government to reconsider the budgetary funds approved for the financing of the plan and therefore to increase the scale of international borrowing. One example stands out among others: the Liquified Natural Gas complex at Arzew, whose cost as agreed with the Western construction firm had been agreed to be $340 million, went up in price between 1974 and 1977 to $1,220 million, thus coming to more than 4 times the initial cost.[2]

The very long maturity period for investments, as well as slowness in the implementation, had their repercussions on the rate of completion of programs agreed upon up to 10 years before. It is even estimated that there are projects which are not yet completed, dating from the three-year plan (1967-69). Apart from the delays that have accumulated, these slowdowns have led to two phenomena: the progressive loss of control over the conduct of our development program and the recourse to external indebtedness. An UNCTAD study estimates that Algeria has been required practically to double the size of its investments during the four-year plan and, in spite of that, to bring down its growth estimates from 12 to 8 percent. That is why the fundamental objective is to protect the five-year plan from attack coming from the world capitalist crisis.

Moreover, there is no choice, or the choice no longer exists; the five-year plan is our last chance to avoid pushing our economy into the abyss and to give our political independence a real content.

Let's Not Fool Ourselves!

Let's not fool ourselves! The financial indebtedness of our country, its economic backwardness and its problems are consciously caused by world capitalism. At its head are the multinational firms and financial organisms. We will have occasion to return to this theme, but to support these statements we point out to those who still believe in the philanthropic virtues of capitalism that for more than 10 years Algeria has suffered from certain restrictive practices specially applied to it as a country which has chosen the socialist path. Among other things, these practices require it to pay 30 percent down when a contract is entered into, whereas the rule for other countries only requires 10 percent.[3] Backed up against the wall, our country has often had to accept this kind of blackmail and negotiate international loans which have always worsened its financial indebtedness.

Elsewhere, and still a part of this sad chapter of organized capitalist pressure, we note the role of the juridical arsenal of world capitalism which supports the theft by the firms concerned and which has constantly weakened our country on the international market. The cost of international freight has required Algeria always to pay more for its imports and often to give up the export of its industrial products. Tariff duties, developed for the benefit of business circles, in effect are oriented on the extent of processing of the product. The more sophisticated the article, the higher the tariff. Inversely, the less it is processed, as is the case with raw materials, the lower the tariffs. This is one way like the others to steal and to weaken another country.

These are a few indications which justify and explain the determination which has been evident for several months to face up to the situation affecting our foreign trade by bringing it under control and redirecting it. This involves changes in the field of our trading partners.

The idea is not a new one. The reexamination of the situation since the adoption of the National Charter has attracted more and more support in the Algerian economic community, although there is some resistance in certain business circles which are used to the distribution of bribes and which have tried to block the process of diversification of our trading partners. This attempt has been made, despite the fact that the National Charter supports such diversification as the way to turn trade into a rational policy "with strict respect for the choices which have been made by the country," excluding "all masqued forms of neocolonialism" and certain concepts developed "for the profit of capitalist groups."[4]

In view of this political clarification in the National Charter, the situation was further radicalized at the time of the second session of the Central Committee, devoted to providing directions for socioeconomic development. At that time the Central Committee recommended "a trade policy decided on as a function of the needs and imperatives of our development, while respecting the directions set out in the National Charter." It underlined "the need to develop the policy of diversification of our trading partners and to strengthen even further our relations with the countries of the Third World and the socialist countries in the direction of serving mutual interests and safeguarding the economic independence of our country."

THE POLARIZATION OF OUR TRADE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE CAPITALIST WORLD

Table showing the breakdown of Algerian foreign trade by geographic area (in percentages);

Source: "L'Algerie en quelques chiffres" [Algeria in Concise Figures], 1980, edited by the Ministry of Planning and National Development

	1977		1978		1979	
	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports	Exports
France	24.0	12.7	19.2	11.0	18.7	13.2
Federal Republic of Germany	14.5	14.6	17.6	13.3	18.2	11.7
Italy	9.7	5.5	10.6	7.2	13.0	4.7
Other EEC Countries	9.5	3.4	11.7	5.0	13.4	5.5
Total EEC	57.7	37.2	59.1	36.5	63.3	35.1
Other European Capitalist Countries	10.05	5.0	10.1	4.3	11.4	4.5
USA and Canada	12.4	49.7	9.3	49.6	9.2	49.8
Other Capitalist Countries	0.2	5.0	0.1	3.0	0.2	5.4
Total Capitalist Countries	80.8	96.9	78.6	93.4	84.1	94.8
Socialist Countries	4.9	1.8	4.7	3.2	4.7	2.7
Third World Countries	9.8	2.3	11.9	3.4	6.1	2.5

The above percentages should be considered in addition to trade with Japan which does not appear in the table and which should be added to trade with capitalist countries.

However, it was President Chadli who defended this policy with the greatest precision with many arguments presented on several occasions, the most recent of which was during the seminar held for management executives.

The president's speech was undoubtedly a focalization addressed to the fishers in troubled waters who serve the interests of capitalist groups, despite the constant deterioration in the terms of trade. The president was clear: as of now we have to make a choice. Economic relations must rest on the reduction of imports to the benefit of domestic production and on the control of purchases abroad, as well as on "the preservation of our resources and our dignity in every contact with foreign societies." Regarding the choice of trading partners, the president was as clear and direct, if not more so, emphasizing that it is necessary "to broaden the framework of trade with the Third World," adding that "there is a large number of products which can be imported directly and at reasonable prices, instead of importing them through monopolistic firms which make substantial profits at the expense of the peoples of the Third World."

For the president the path to take is thus clearly set out and essential to follow. Moreover, it is also clear for the five-year development plan which, in the field of foreign trade, is among the most concise and is not encumbered by details.

A reading of the five-year plan is an edifying experience, with regard to the will to get out of the rut into which weakness in the control of our foreign commerce has thrown us. Taking solid note of the provisions of the National Charter on the question, the five-year plan proposes to organize our foreign trade and program imports with greater firmness in order to adapt imported products to the real needs of the economy and to intensify the use of domestic production.

Path of Independence

For this purpose and to achieve this kind of balance, the rate of increase of imports has been fixed at a maximum average of 6 percent per year, compared to an average of 20 percent in the preceding years.

In relative value imports will fall and in 1984 will represent 36 percent of Gross Domestic Product [PIB], as compared to 40 percent in 1979. Cumulatively, imports will be equal to 28 percent of the total resources of the country (Gross Domestic Product plus imports of goods and services) and 36 percent of available resources (total resources plus exports of goods and services). Definite boundaries have been fixed for the volume and value of imports and of all orders placed abroad. In gross terms imports during this five-year period should grow at the rate of consumption of individual households and of domestic production--that is, 5 percent for foodstuffs and 8 percent for industrial goods (see table).

The direction as defined by the five-year plan has two aspects: it is not only a matter of maintaining the objective of controlling and therefore mastering our foreign trade--and imports in particular--but also a matter of providing a remedy for all the anomalies which could eventually arise from improper application of these measures.

It is for this double reason that it is clearly stated that, in order not to repeat the errors of the past, "the independence and the defense of the interests of the country, that is, ensuring supplies and a choice of the conditions of supply, will require the increased diversification of countries supplying our market."

In the present order of things this diversification can only mean the strengthening of economic relations with the countries of the Third World and the socialist countries, on the one hand, and the reduction of the role of capitalist monopolies in our foreign trade, on the other hand.

Of course, this policy requires juridical and political means to apply it. The political means, due to the clear and precise positions taken by the Central Committee and the president, are already available. There remain the juridical instruments and the clear action to be taken for the benefit of the economic independence of the country. On this subject it should be remarked that, in order to bring under control foreign orders placed by economic managers, a change is being made in the Overall Import Level [Autorisation Globale d'Importation--AGI] in order to make this program into "a real instrument for the support of the planning of our foreign trade and the development of the planning of supply procurement." This measure is one of those adopted by the authorities in the framework of control of domestic trade, an essential condition for the control of foreign trade. Strengthening of coordination with the banking system is included among these measures.

This time these measures have not remained dead letters but have begun to be applied in a promising way. The Ministry of Planning and the Secretariat of State for Foreign Commerce are tending to control the AGI levels even further and to program them as a function of the priority needs of the country.

However, it is in the choice of trading partners that the efforts being made seem to be best designed, in the direction of a TRUE diversification of our trade, a diversification accomplished in independence and not in dependence, as some people have advocated, which suggested a simple change of trading partners within the capitalist world.

Battle Has Only Begun

Speaking before the deputies of the National People's Army [APN], the secretary of state for foreign trade clearly stated that, "since 1980 the diversification of trading partners has made some progress." However, he regretted that "regions such as that of the socialist countries of Europe, the South American countries, or Africa only account for 10 percent of our trade, whereas the Western countries still dominate our trade."[5]

Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Oubouzar stated that the government has taken practical measures to deal with this situation:

--Beginning this year multiyear contracts and intergovernmental agreements have been placed in effect which have had the very great advantage of permitting

contact with the socialist countries and companies of the Third World countries which the traditional "announcements of invitations to bid" prohibited and which in fact only provided privileges to capitalist, multinational firms.

--In a parallel effort and in order to establish real competition among capitalist firms, program contracts have been developed. In this way the firms can no longer influence the announcements of invitations to bid, and freedom of choice for the country will be reestablished.

--Efforts for better control of trade policy will not be limited to this level only, since very specific measures have been adopted in the areas of reliance on foreign assistance and external financing.

As a first step the objective is to succeed in controlling recourse to foreign assistance and creating the necessary conditions for the development of the internal initiative of the country. Since last year strict directives have been issued to ensure that decisions on foreign assistance are no longer left to isolated managers in a disorderly way.

--At another level and in order to avoid the restrictive credit conditions of capitalist countries, a certain moderation of recourse to the capital market is required and has been in effect for one year, already giving excellent results, since a decline in the external debt has already been recorded.[6] In the future an application for a loan will be given privileged consideration, particularly in terms of a search for the most favorable terms and, especially, governmental and preferential credits.

The financial balance for the five-year period, in overall figures, is as follows (figures in billions of dinars):

Category	Value of the objective
Exports of goods and services	409.2
Imports of goods and services	376.7
Balance	32.5

To this balance should be added certain other fiscal categories which would give an idea of the value resulting from the mobilization of the credit of our country.

Category	Value of the objective
Trade balance	32.5
Other receipts	6.3
Other expenditures	8.9
Debt service	81.3
Domestic loan	51.4

Algeria thus has a domestic loan outstanding of 51.4 billion dinars, which is a very large figure with regard to its maturity date and which consequently calls for the adoption of draconian measures. It should also be stated that this

valuation is based on the objective of maintaining the purchasing power of our exports of hydrocarbons in terms of 1980 prices. If this purchasing power cannot be stabilized and on the assumption of its reduction by 3 percent per year, the need to raise credits would amount to more than 80 billion dinars. The prospects are far from promising, and it can thus be understood why the struggle for the strengthening of economic independence promises to be a difficult one.

With the beginnings of an opening to expanded trade relations with the socialist countries and with the Third World, of which we have provided some details at the beginning of this article, the measures under way to exert control over foreign trade will inevitably lead to independence and sovereignty in our foreign trade, giving more assurance to the success of the five-year plan. However, we must realize clearly that the battle has only begun and that only perseverance in action, through the ever more sustained exercise of revolutionary democracy, will lead us to the balance we seek.

In the same way, it would be useless to seek to control foreign trade if domestic trade is not brought under control and is left to speculators of all kinds. For example, because of the actions of large middlemen firms, which have sabotaged any programming of consumption, additional imports have been carried out in order to meet demand, and foreign purchases have increased by 11.5 percent, instead of the 6 percent authorized. This was certainly foreseeable, but while we draw conclusions from the past, it is so much the more an example not to be ignored.

* * *

RESOLUTIONS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN TRADE
(Second Session devoted to directions for economic and social development)

--The Central Committee considers that particular attention must be devoted to the reduction of our degree of dependence on foreign economies.

--To this end the limitation on recourse to foreign resources must constitute a constant concern of all of our economic managers.

--Recourse to foreign help must be brought under control and be employed in a selective way, within strict limits and in rigorously planned proportions.

--A trade policy must be decided on as a function of our development needs and imperatives, while respecting the directions set out in the National Charter.

--By a policy of Algerianization it will be necessary to place it in its proper limits and to banish any form of dependence and alienation.

--The Central Committee emphasizes in particular the need to develop the policy of diversification of our trading partners and to strengthen even further our relations with the countries of the Third World and the socialist countries in our mutual interest and with a view to safeguard the economic independence of the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. Source: OPEC (cited by Abdelkader Sid-Ahmed in the document prepared by UNCTAD in 1978, entitled, "Mobilization of Internal OPEC Resources."

2. Source: Manhattan Bank, "Mideast Markets," 30 January 1978, p 13.

3. On this subject Abdelkader Sid-Ahmed writes: "It is clear that the fixing of demand accounts at the rate of 30 percent has had highly negative effects on the achievement of Algerian development programs and has involved the abandonment of projects undertaken with France, estimated at nearly $4 billion in 1975. Those are practices which weigh heavily on OPEC development programs."

4. National Charter: Title 6, Chapter VII: Trade with Foreign Countries; pages 151-155: published by Editions Populaires de l'Armee.

   The National Charter clearly states that without control of trade, in conformity with the choices made by the country, there will only be room "for the remnant forms of neocolonialism which seek to continue the exploitation of the resources, the advantages, and the labor of the country. It is particularly appropriate to consider, with the greatest reserve, ideas tending to establish in the developing countries and for the benefit of capitalist groups industrial activity presented as looking for cheap, abundant manpower or not requiring a high technological level.

   "Accepting such ideas and making them a basis for development amounts to taking the risk of encountering certain and severe disappointments. Engaging in such activities as working for the account of foreign interest groups and responding to the attraction of cheap labor comes down to forcing this labor group to undergo prolonged stagnation in its living level and to making it live under conditions similar to those of the sub-proletariat within its own country."

5. Oubouzar pointed out in particular that countries like the United States, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy in 1980 still dominated the foreign trade of Algeria with the external world, underlining the fact that, "the socialist countries of Europe, the countries of South America, or Africa only account for 10 percent of our trade." (EL MOUDJAHID, 27 May 1981)

6. The objective is to succeed by 1984 in bringing down the external debt to a level equal to about 14 percent of the total value of exports. The cabinet, following its session of 22 December, decided:

   --To limit recourse to the international financial market in order to avoid burdening, over the middle and long term, the public finances of Algeria.

   --To give priority to the use of governmental credits.

[14-20 Aug 81 pp 13-22]

[Text] 1. Electrical Household Appliances: an Improvement [by Y. Sassi]

The return of the prodigal son: after a long absence electrical household appliances have been reappearing for about a year now. At the time independence was achieved, this kind of article was almost considered a luxury. At that time having an electric oven and a frigidaire meant "doing well," while having a washing machine meant keeping up with the latest styles. The family "gas ring" is still to be found, and it does not involve charcoal fires and the inconvenient smoke which does not fit very well into the well-known "3 room apartment." A frigidaire will make it easy to keep leftover food and a more careful kind of planning for fruit and vegetable purchases. We have already seen the abandonment of the "kanoun" [brazier] as a source of heating. That is to say that the improvement in purchasing power and living conditions, by providing more effectively for basic needs, has raised other needs under the family roof. Certain electrical household appliances have acquired the status of necessities. However, as supply has not followed demand, the resulting imbalance did not take long to be seen by some people as a means for rapid though questionable enrichment. We recall that this was the period of first-hand, second-hand, and third-hand electrical household appliances, with each one taking a portion of this succulent cake in passing. Supplying the market adequately became a necessity which particularly attracted the attention of the authorities concerned. One year after the beginning of mass purchases of these appliances it is important to bring out the essential aspects of this matter. During December 1980, the impressive number of 100,000 refrigerators were received. Elsewhere the cumulative plans of the 1980 AGI [Overall Import Level] and of the anti-scarcity program achieved a record level of 80 percent. (This occurred despite the fact that the anti-scarcity program did not start until well into 1980.) The least that one can say is that this was the beginning of an unaccustomed situation and one which was a happy surprise for the public.

Extension of Sales Outlets

There were large crowds collected around the sales outlets, both publicly and privately owned. This was unquestionably a sign of the very inadequate, previous supply level. A simple example: there were only 5,000 washing machines imported in 1975, as against nearly 50,000 imported in 1980. From this figure--a multiplication by 10--we need to draw another conclusion: there is a boom in the volume of appliances ordered and marketed. It is appropriate to recall under this heading that retail sales take place outside the field of activity of SONACAT [national sales company]. Whether the appliances are imported or made locally, handled by SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] or by the private sector, they are thus handled by other distribution circuits: SNNGA [National Construction Materials Company], cooperatives, and private resale agents. That is the list of middlemen involved in the appliance retail trade. It is only recently that the public markets have been added to this group, about 40 of them in the whole country. The objective is to have one sales unit for each district capital, an important group of outlets which have strengthened one of the links in the

distribution chain. Substantial areas are taken up in stocking the appliances, and significant transportation capacity is involved. This will make it possible to fix responsibilities more clearly and to iron out the classical and too often mentioned problems of stocking and delivery. If the inclusion of electrical household appliances among the range of products sold by the public markets has surprised some people, we must note the lack of the same kind of astonishment at the sale in the markets of crockery, clothing, and leather products manufactured by SONIPEC [National Leather and Hides Industries Company].

Although they come under the OFLA (office charged with the sale of fruits and vegetables), these shops handle a broad range of items and contribute to the strengthening of the retail sales structure. This sales operation began in the province of Algiers and vicinity, with the province of El Boulaida achieving significant savings. Ships are directly unloaded into trucks from the public markets, while all of the port formalities are taken care of by agents of SONACAT, resulting in saving time, intermediate storage, and double transportation costs.

At the level of those in charge of these sales stores the interest is the same because, for them, it is a matter of contacting a larger proportion of the available customers. Providing this kind of merchandise with a more flexible distribution system is seen as an excellent way to fight against any kind of speculative or "just in case" hoarding of appliances. Large number of appliances have been sold in this way.

For example a single public market in Algiers, in the space of a few days, was able to deliver nearly 3,000 frigidaires, 600 electric stoves, 560 washing machines, 200 color TV sets, and 700 cassette radios. Priced at the same levels as elsewhere, sales take place in the usual way: presentation of an identity card and a SONELGAZ [National Electricity and Gas Company] receipt. A visible sign of the existence of considerable purchasing power, these appliances were sold very quickly. On this subject we must regret the disorderly attitude shown by some consumers and the damage done to store fixtures. In effect, whatever the clothing they wear, a certain amount of civic training remains to be taught the people to avoid having steel grills come back and disfigure the beautiful, but too often fragile glass doors.

In another area the public markets have certain obligations, like other retailers. Among other things they also must take care of after-sales service. On the whole, regarding the choice of the public markets for the sale of appliances, the officials of SONACAT state that this is a kind of "impact operation" which in no way raises the question of maintaining other distribution chains, public or private. The public markets should be regarded solely as an extension in the number of capacity of sales outlets for electrical household appliances.

Private Sales Agents and After-Sales Service: Responding to Needs

For private resales agents, a circular issued by the Ministry of Commerce defines the criteria of agreement. This circular was considered necessary because, since there were so few of them, it was rather difficult to know at first glance if such

and such a store window was that of a household appliance store. To designate the sales points and permit the public to identify them, a request was made by SONACAT that they display the articles on sale or expected to be on sale in the near future. Products and prices have thus been brought to the attention of the consumers. This measure, while it directly attacked the psychosis resulting from the preceding shortage of such appliances, initially had the reverse effect. The stores (sometimes opening at midnight) rapidly expanded in number, and impatience among the public also grew quickly. Since then marketing tensions have been substantially reduced. At present the items on sale, previously the property of SONACAT, have just been sold to private parties, who have been requested--have they always responded to the request?--to withdraw from the display windows certain brands of appliances which will not be included in future delivery quotas, as the supply contracts have been completed.

Private sales agents contacted have reported improved communications with SONACAT. The quotas established by SONACAT concern products which can be sold across the board. We are far from the kind of trade in this regard signified by the sign, "assorted lamps and shovels," carried on the shop window of a store in the center of the city. However, some small problems remain. We were told that among the items in the quotas were fluorescent tubes 1.5 m long still sold without actuators. This is what has made some private sales agents say, and correctly so, that periodic meetings were necessary to bring things up to date and discuss problems encountered.

Although real efforts have been made, there is still a great deal to be done, particularly in terms of self-sufficiency in products made in Algeria. At present, it is by means of equalization surcharges that the prices of SONELEC products are kept up, making them more accessible to the public than at their real cost. In 1981 these prices have also been more carefully considered. For a 4-burner stove, the SONELEC price has been cut by 11 percent, and the price of refrigerators has been cut a minimum of 15 percent.

In this connection, even so it is appropriate to note that certain SONELEC products are far from competitive. This is the case in particular with the Model K 7 radio, which is priced at about 900 dinars, whereas the ITT cassette radio is almost snatched off the shelf (that is almost no exaggeration!) at 570 dinars. Apart from these examples better coordination has been established between SONACAT and SONELEC. The latter also has a role to play as a technical adviser in the framework of the choice of quality of imported products. The proposals made by each manufacturer are studied with a view to examination of a sample of the merchandise before purchase. The problem remaining to be solved is the control of the merchandise upon receipt in order to determine more effectively damages suffered in transit and test the risk of failure to conform to the specifications. In any case the solution of imports cannot be a definitive one, and there is room for stimulating domestic production, particularly with regard to the large amount of foreign exchange consumed in this way.

A further, and considerable means of satisfying the needs of the market is the establishment of an after-sales service capable of meeting the needs of the customers. At present the 25 repair services coming under SONACAT are inadequate,

and private servicing firms continue to operate at exorbitant prices. There also, as is the case with original sales outlets, the increase in the number of small firms, made up of technicians in this area, is a serious advantage for the long life of electrical household appliances. This has not missed the attention of the officials of SONACAT. Thus, the import of tools and measuring apparatus is under way, following the procedure of invitations to bid. In addition to the consequent supplying of repair parts, training courses "on the product" should be organized for the benefit of future technicians and repairmen. The same is true of measures of encouragement to be taken regarding private firms, with a view toward establishing an after-sales service to deal more effectively in the respective areas of quality and price.

Reestablishing after-sales service should necessarily take place and be put in concrete form rapidly, particularly since substantial quantities of appliances have been supplied to the public. Since last year great efforts in this direction have been made, which has alleviated much of the previous tension. This has not prevented, but only alleviated, the existing difference between supply and demand for appliance service, and which must be made up. With only a few exceptions electric household appliances are no longer a luxury but are rather a necessity. An increase in the distribution circuit is not everything. It remains to make a better estimate of demand and to meet it, preferably by more dynamic domestic production, while "reinvigorating" the existing stock of appliances through the spread of after-sales service. Even in view of the difficulties remaining to be ironed out, the experience with electric household appliances has notably improved.

2. Supply of Goods: Toward a New Approach to Problems [by Hichem B.]

Trade and the supply of goods. This is a theme which is returning to our columns and our lips. Up to now how often has this theme brought together officials charged with finding a response to the difficulties encountered? How many programs have been adopted to this end? Reorganization, price control, inclusion in trade registers, anti-shortage program, impact operations--we have been through them. There is a pause, and then the phenomenon of speculation reappears a few days or weeks later, but no longer than that. Nothing seems to contain the evil, as if trade in our country inevitably found its reason for being in the black market and in unofficial distribution circuits. Trade also seems to draw its vitality from the black market, because it is quite evident that the black market day by day pushes beyond its previous boundaries and brings within its scope more and more items beyond clothing and various objects: automobile spare parts, automobiles themselves, hardware, electrical household appliances.

Changes on the Way

However, major changes in the situation are beginning to make themselves felt, and the Muslim fasting month has provided an illustration of this. After a sudden rise during the first days of Ramadan prices returned to normal, and the concern felt by the public was very rapidly dissipated. Before concluding that this was a passing period of calm, it may be worth knowing that in the area of domestic trade a greater concern over the needs of the citizens is beginning to appear. This is

not to say that previously this concern was not taken into account, but the course of relying solely on private initiative has not led to the results hoped for.

However, we should not exaggerate all these positive effects. During the month of Ramadan there was no exception to the rule: a sudden surge of groups of young men invaded the streets to sell goods. That led to cigarettes for 0.25 dinars per cigarette; a box of matches at the same price; chemma for 2 dinars; kalb-el-louz, brik, and a whole variety of other candy set out on improvised stands, in the midst of trash, sewer gas, and dirty walls. A false festival atmosphere surrounded all of these people, who walked around in most cases with gloomy expressions, appearing haggard, washed-out, worried about something.

Available distractions also were too expensive. And going to the beach or elsewhere necessarily implied having an automobile. Having no car, there was nothing else to do but look for trouble in the streets. Tourism has also become much too expensive. The increase in prices, recorded at 14.8 percent in the course of 1980, according to official statistics, could turn out to be incorrect, if one compared the high prices listed in certain shop windows or those asked by street vendors who have become, by the force of circumstances, as regular as legal trade.

Practically speaking, the state approves such activities. Now, "respect for established prices is not a simple question of control," the responsible authorities say. They add, "dishonest merchants may fear price controls when they are effective. Certainly, it is necessary to maintain that fear of the price controller. However, before considering the application of force, we should give the merchant the opportunity to obtain supplies and to assure himself of a profit margin enough for him to live decently. Take the case of a retail grocer. To obtain his supplies he must contact a large number of organizations and see to the transportation of his merchandise. These are activities which are already subject to large, speculative price increases which the merchant passes on immediately to the public, without which he could no longer live."

It is easy to put oneself in this position in one's imagination, and this is what the displays of merchandise of all these small stores in the various quarters of the city would be reduced to if their proprietors were to content themselves only with obtaining supplies at the normal price. "The day when the small merchants are no longer involved in speculation, we will be able to consider demanding strict respect of the established prices and to demand in the same way respect for the rules of the game."

The control of prices has its limits. According to officials responsible for the trade sector, it is quite clear that even now no leeway could be given to this other category of speculators, the avowed agents of fraud. These are the people who devote themselves to speculation on a large scale, the representatives and agents whose evil action in the markets shows that they have means available which are often unsuspected. The approach of Ramadan has undoubtedly brought the authorities to consider a series of measures to protect the consumers.

Controls, and Then?

Included in these measures is a campaign for the repression of fraud. By now hundreds of statements have been made, and the authorities have strengthened their capacity for control by bringing in brigades of police from several provinces.

This type of operation no doubt can provide a certain motive for satisfaction However, the authorities say, it can hardly deal with the evil at its roots. So what could contain speculation definitively? Strengthening the state stores, the SNNGA, and the public markets, but above all the availability of products on the market. Also, the Ministry of Commerce has begun a great effort aimed at opening, during the next 2 years, a public market in each commune and a branch of the Galeries Algeriennes department store in the capital of each district and province. This action, of course, is in the framework of having the state stores play their role as regulators of prices and as pilot distribution centers, complementing the small business firms in the various quarters of the city which, "they say, nothing can replace." The second point in this program is making the various products available. According to the authorities concerned, that is the essential link in any healthy sales program. That is why supplying the market with sufficient quantities of merchandise is at the heart of their concerns. However, a regular supply of merchandise remains conditioned on two kinds of factors. First of all, there is the matter of stocks of merchandise. In this connection there are no large, covered areas capable of receiving all needed merchandise, nor refrigerated facilities for perishable goods. There also, everything remains to be done. The second factor has as a corollary the domestic production of goods. As domestic production is quite insufficient, this makes it necessary to carry out massive imports of consumption goods. According to the authorities, such imports are required that the port facilities are not even sufficient to unload all the great quantities of merchandise involved. And then there is the matter of transportation. Added to that are the difficulties inherent in the fluctuations of the world market itself. For example, thermos bottles. No less than 2 million units will be put on the market to meet the need. However, no producer in the world is capable of immediately responding to such a demand. It is necessary to call on several foreign producers.

Of course, it is stated, the radical solution would be to increase national production. "Perhaps not only that. It would be necessary to consider no longer consuming anything other than what is produced within the country, with the exception of products essential to national life. Nothing, for example, justifies this massive importation of certain products." A sales policy should necessarily rest on a consumption policy. For that purpose it would be necessary to hold down considerably certain ostentatious tastes for gadgets whose use has ended in creating inequality among the population.

For the immediate future the signs which make one think that there is a noticeable improvement in the sales program show that there is greater determination and more willingness to establish an appropriate organization for the distribution of goods. That is undeniable. However, the role of the state remains and will continue to be for a long time in conflict with the demands of the citizens. When the citizen pays a high price for a product intended to be produced by the

national working force, the citizen considers the state directly responsible for this state of affairs first, before blaming the speculators. There is where the notion of the state takes on precisely all its strength and dimensions within the noble mission which the National Charter gives it. We would hope that the positive, concrete effects, described above, would constitute a step toward a new approach to the problem of selling goods in our society. "We are merchants," say the trade officials. "It is up to the political authorities to make decisions on this question."

3. Public Markets: a Socioeconomic Barometer [by Mimi Maziz]

At first it was a simple idea: represent OFLA at the Algiers International Fair. Since they had an opportunity to sell their basic products, fruits and vegetables, the officials of OFLA were then fully involved. The OFLA pavilion was crowded with consumers, happy to find merchandise there at a reasonable price. The object was to hit two targets with a single stone: keep OFLA there to satisfy the customers and at the same time amortize the cost of the pavilion. It was easily done. The stand was almost permanently crowded, but the customers were beginning to express dissatisfaction at not finding there products that were hard to find or cost too much in a state store. In addition to this first operation a project for large stores was planned, to which were to be attached wagons from the ONAB for meats; from the OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office] for vegetables and cereals; from ONALAIT for milk products. The purpose was to give a new dynamism, as desired by everyone, to this first experiment. Now it is 1976. The large store has been built. However, after a time it was necessary to reconsider the sales strategy, innovate, and, in a word, find at the same time new products, new outlets, and a new kind of management, since the public markets had been solicited for the same purpose by local authorities. In the course of this effort the right location appeared for the large store, which was to offer all kinds of merchandise at carefully considered prices. Furthermore, the alliance between the public markets and the consumers is a happy result which, however, requires great managerial skill. Now, at that time the management of four existing markets was as follows: the "Foire Pins Maritimes" was managed by the OFLA; "Cheraga," by the OAIC; "Chateauneuf," by ONAB; and "Boudouaou," managed by ONCV [National Office for Marketing Wine and Wine Products]. They operated with a kind of unbalanced autonomy, because they did not always have the situation under control. Since it is necessary to have more ideas than money to manage things, it was the OFLA, since it had excellent control over the management of the "Pins Maritimes" market, which was given exclusive management of all the public markets.

In these experiments with direct sales to the consumer, when the situation is favorable, you have to realize that the situation can very easily turn bad. When it goes badly, you shouldn't get discouraged. Put your back into it while you wait for things to go better.

Unity in Expansion

"It was barely 18 months ago," OFLA Director Bensegueni told us, "that we tried to think through the problem of establishment of other public markets. We don't hesitate to say that it was the movement of the people from place to place which

showed us that you don't have to have large investments to build a large, simply conceived store. We found this out on the ground, since the consumer public was no more attracted to the Cheraga public market, which cost about 4 billion old dinars, than to the 'Douera' market, which was built for 500 million old dinars." The sound condition of the public markets rests on the search for speed and efficiency at the lowest possible cost, because today the "SEF" [public markets] count on financing themselves. Some 20 months ago there were 8 of these markets. This year OFLA began Ramadan with 57 SEF units, all of them in operation.

This speed in the establishment of large stores is justified for two reasons: the first is based on the pressing and regular demand by the local authorities, who want to strengthen--under the suprevision of the Ministry of Commerce--socialist distribution centers. The second reason for speed is that the raw materials and construction material are produced locally--hence the virtually low cost of a "public market." At present, we were told, there are APC's [People's Communal Assemblies] which support their request for an SEF by proposing to use their own construction enterprise. Thus, the APC itself constructs the market by advancing its own funds, being reimbursed subsequently.

Responding to Demand

This spirit of sacrifice for the benefit of a common history and a common purpose is the privilege of the consumer. There are two attitudes in life, and experience proves this is so: either you join actively in things or you accept things passively. To maintain unity, you have to go forward.

The large stores are developing, and henceforth their first purpose, which was the exclusive sale of fruits and vegetables, today has largely been left behind. At the request of the consumers the market sells all products and must therefore keep that aspect of things in mind.

One can speak of a sales effort without thinking of stocking merchandise. Now, to start with, stocking merchandise is difficult because of the inadequacy of available storage areas. Thus, when merchandise is received in the ports, it is necessary to take it away quickly, in order to prevent choking port facilities, and deliver it to the company concerned. Now, that is a weak point for trade. We have spoken of management, but we have not thought of stocking merchandise suitable to the established norms. We have been told of the example of ONACO [Algerian National Marketing Office] which presently has something like 250,000 square meters of storage space available, of which a large proportion is rented out. Most often storage areas found by chance are provided, as their name indicates. So that ONACO might be in a comfortable position, it would be necessary for it to have a storage area of 750,000 square meters. Now, the program set out in the five-year plan and programs remaining to be completed from other plans provide for an additional 6,600 square meters of storage space. In fact, this is very little in terms of the needs of this sector. Furthermore, we are told that meeting these needs is not an easy matter. Up to now it has been a matter of constructing small projects which don't require much in the way of resources. Thus, their construction does not interest the large construction enterprises. It once happened, they tell us, that some rather special projects were turned

over to state enterprises like the SN METAL [Algerian national metals company], as well as all projects within a single province. At present practically all of the projects in the five-year plan and programs left over from other plans and remaining to be constructed, or 85 percent of the projects, are under study on a turnkey basis.

In this difficult environment, however, there are actions to be taken to carry out the projects. Among such actions, those taken by OFLA attract attention. In order to respond to the demand, the SEF's ceaselessly restock their products which, moreover, are immediately purchased by consumers. Thus, without really planning it, each SEF is a permanent storage area and is useful for all of the products of the state trading offices and the producing companies.

It even happens that the markets are served by up to three trucks per day.

In the face of this bubbling phenomenon for the sale of merchandise the state price supervisors have made the SEF's into real barometers. Studied very carefully in advance, the prices set for the consumers are affordable for all pocketbooks. This tendency to study appropriate prices should not make us think that the SEF's wish to replace the private merchant. Far from that. On the contrary, as the study of the prices is accomplished at the level of the Ministry of Commerce, by responsible experts for the items concerned, and taking the realities into account, this should push the private merchants to follow suit or, at least, to respect the normal profit margins. However, most of the merchants seem to be deaf and blind. This is especially the case with the butchers who, despite the fact that the meat prices at the SEF's range from 36 to 45 dinars, have not lowered their prices by a cent. You would have to believe that there are customers who do not count their change.

Today, when the SEF's serve an area, you can be sure that the people who shop there eat meat every day if they so desire. It is true that, at times, there are substantial crowds around the meat counter. However, when you shop at the market, it is for several days, when you have a frigidaire. However, to eliminate crowding around the meat counter, serious consideration is being given by the Ministry of Commerce, if the human and material resources available permit it, to adopt the system of giving the customer meat which has been previously cut, weighed, labeled (price and weight) and placed in a container. The consumer would only have to serve himself. What causes the waiting to be served is the fact that the butcher does all of that at the request of each client. Indeed, for the price of a kilogram of meat from a private merchant you can buy 2 kilograms of meat at the SEF. At the SEF in Chateauneuf, as much as 1,800 kilograms of meat are sold each day. You can easily multiply this figure by the 57 markets which presently exist throughout the country. That makes people happy, it must be admitted.

A Pilot District

El-Qoleyaa, situated as it is geographically, barely a few kilometers from the center of the capital, is furthermore a nerve center for the farmers of the Mitidja area. It is a pilot district for the OFLA. Seven markets are located there. This fact makes it possible for the self-managed farms of the region to

sell their merchandise easily. It also permits the SEF's to continue in their primary role, which is the sale of fruits and vegetables. On the other hand, the quality of the citrus fruit, the other fruits, and the truck garden vegetables which decorate the shelves of the seven markets in operation, is apparently superior at a first glance. These products are sold at really low prices, since transportation does not count for much. The markets of the El-Qoleyaa area are located in the seven communes belonging to the district. The markets are established at Douera, Mahalma Dwawda, Fouka, El-Qoleyaa, Bou-smail, and Attaba (in the last-named commune the market is in the center of the socialist village).

With its new face the SEF is a jewel for the people. It is a kind of store made to measure for the new kind of consumer, because it was established at his request. Nothing discourages the people, especially when it concerns progress in which they participate.

Everyone Benefits

The proof is there. All the SEF's finance themselves today, once they have amortized their cost of installation. In general, there are no net losses. To maintain for themselves a regular profit margin, certain market managers plan their daily sales by using a rotation of products. Thus, the Fouka market, in the El-Qoleyaa district, has planned its sales to reach an average quota of 40 million old dinars per day. However management is viewed, the profits flow in everywhere. A single obscure point is a problem for the accounting. The chief accountant of the SEF in Douera tells us that this concerns the "blank check" system which some companies--but not all of them--require. Thus, the SEF must pay the company which delivers such and such products to it, using a blank check which is filled in by the aforementioned company. The latter only sends its bill much later on, and often it is the accounting service of the SEF which is required to go and get it and bring its accounts up to date. Often that causes lost time, on one side as well as on the other. The bill is not immediately available. When it is found, it is necessary to file it. That is a system which is a problem for the management of the SEF's. We were told that, "The best way to handle this would be for all companies which supply the SEF's to agree to present their bills at the beginning and to receive payment by check made out in the amount of the merchandise delivered."

At first glance, apart from a few problems which do not affect the consumer, the SEF's are getting along well. Can we say, without exaggeration, that the SEF's contribute to the emancipation of our society? Men, women, and children flock to their doors with the same, shared concern of having a better life. Further, each SEF is a godsend for the region concerned. It holds down unemployment. At Douera there are 195 workers in the SEF, about the average for the rest of them.

Five years after their hesitant creation, the future of the SEF's seems assured, since the OFLA, at the request of the local authorities, is hastening to open a whole chain of these stores. The slogan today is to have a market in each district, for a better life.

4. Retailers: Protecting Small Business [by Mimi Maziz]

Evidently, one can always be "reconverted." That is one way, like others, to avoid restrictions, while trying to protect the substance of the business. You don't have to be afraid to say what we have been remarking for some years now--since the 1970's--that even those who had a business tradition have gradually been reconverted. Timidly, at first, then in a systematic way, the residential quarters have begun to lose their corner grocery store. Like the case of someone suffering from an hallucination, what was a grocery store has become a drugstore, a hardware store, and then, throughout the capital we began to see dry cleaners "flourish" where we used to go every day for our groceries.

Why this change? Is it to follow a "modernist" movement to satisfy a new type of clientele? Were these merchants "afraid" of tomorrow, in view of the difficulty in obtaining supplies, or were their profits too small, in view of the margins they had to operate on?

It was due to all of these things, but the most sensitive point was providing supplies to the retailer.

Today, everything is there. At first, the basic concern for the organisms involved was providing for the needs of the consumer. It was thus a matter of providing for supplies that were adequate in terms of quantity and quality and on a regular basis, avoiding the various kinds of shortages--occasional, systematic, or temporary. The Ministry of Commerce focused special attention on that, first of all evaluating overall national demand for goods, products, and services. This was considered an important element which would make it possible to place appropriate merchandise on the market, provided by domestic production and by imports, against the day when needs would be satisfied from domestic production. Regarding certain, locally made products, it is noted that they are available in sufficient quantity and that imports can thus be avoided. On the other hand, imports are necessary when certain products produced locally are considered inadequate to satisfy the consumers. A shortage of goods becomes systematic when the goods in demand do not exist on the local market.

Regarding the goal to be attained, that is, providing the products to the retailer, it is appropriate to make a comment, a fundamental distinction. On the one hand there are products for which the government spares no effort. These are the products of prime necessity, in large-scale use. There are about 40 products in this category, whose supply is followed up regularly, either directly by domestic production or by imports.

In view of past experience, when shortages occurred, despite imports, the Ministry of Commerce made a study of these interruptions in the stocks and defined the course to be followed to ensure the regular flow of these products.

Following Up on Supplies

To satisfy domestic demand, it is first necessary to follow carefully the process of supply and the distribution system, which require particular systems

for stocking, transportation, and distribution. In effect, if one of these systems fails, supplies to retail merchants will suffer.

Aware of these problems, the Ministry of Commerce and all organisms involved in the process study and prepare to implement an action program aimed at revivifying the whole commercial structure throughout the country. The basic structure is considered to consist of the companies under the supervision of the ministry. These companies will help to diversify the distribution areas in the different regions of the country. A logical division into zones will be taken into account: harbor areas, provinces, districts, and communes.

Once organized in this way the distribution network, which once consisted of a bundle of restrictions in terms of transportation, stocking, and distribution, will be easier to operate and will become more accessible to the small businessmen. The atmosphere, which was difficult to deal with for this category of merchants, will thus be improved by the companies which will assume responsibility for restimulating the distribution system. Light stocking structures, established in each region, wilaya, and commune, will facilitate the flow of the products as well as their availability. Agreements signed in particular with SN METAL and the SNS [National Steel Company] will ultimately permit the construction of these buildings.

An effort will be made in the direction of constructing cold storage facilities (it is enough for us to recall the loss of the well-known harvest of potatoes from Mouaskar; the butter which could not be found due to the lack of adequate storage). In this area the objective is the construction of a "national cold storage chain." We are told that an inventory has already been made to develop this plan, which will result in the construction of cold rooms and freezing centers.

Regarding transportation, agreements have already been signed between the various state monopoly organizations and the CNAN [Algerian National Shipping Company], Air-Algerie, the SNTR [National Road Transportation Company], and the SNCFA [Algerian National Railroad Company].

Three structures are involved in the commercial sales system, properly speaking: the large stores, including the SNNGA and the OFLA (which manages the public markets--the SEF); the consumers' cooperatives; and the small retail merchants.

The large stores are considered by the Ministry of Commerce to be the regulators and barometers of commerce. Regarding the consumers' cooperatives, discussion concerning them is going on within organisms of the party. Regarding the retail merchants, the National Charter considers them as part of daily life. Moreover, they are 350,000 in number, spread throughout the country. However, the small retail merchant, although performing indispensable services, has quickly gotten into difficulty as a result of problems encountered in obtaining his stocks of merchandise and due to the massive arrival of new, retail stores in this branch of distribution. However, all along the course of recent years certain merchants have tarnished the reputation of this sector by engaging in reprehensible activities. Nevertheless, we must say that shortages of supply, irregularities

in the market, and the indiscipline shown by consumers have contributed to the creation of a climate favorable to the temptation to make easy profits. We must also recognize that it is very difficult to escape the obstacles created under present circumstances by the law establishing monopolies and the practice of centralization in the distribution of products. For example, for a small grocer to obtain his supplies, he has to contact 10 to 12 state monopolies: ONACO [Algerian National Marketing Office], SOGEDIA [Food Industries Management and Development Company], SNIC [not otherwise identified], SEMPAC [not otherwise identified], etc. To that should be added the fact that the retail merchant must arrange for transportation of a good number of food products. The difficulties in his way are therefore really rather sizable.

Once they have been broadened, the structures for the distribution of goods will then allow retailers to obtain their supplies normally and regularly. After the installation of distribution systems at the level of the province, district, and commune, we will probably then pass to a second phase, that of door-to-door selling. We will see established a system of a traveling representative who will visit each businessman to pick up his quantitative needs, which each distribution unit concerned will then be in a position to distribute by its own transportation system. Parallel to this, in its study of this system of distribution, the Ministry of Commerce is looking at the problem of the profit margin which, according to many businessmen, is still insignificant.

Another program will be undertaken: a more functional preparation of the products for retail distribution. To facilitate the task for the retail merchant, it would be possible to deliver food products to him, not in sacks of 50 and 100 kg but already divided into quantities immediately useful for the consumer: packages of 1, 2, or 5 kg at most.

The fact that retailers have their problems is recognized by all the government offices concerned, which are considering providing this profession with a real charter of work: the "Charter of the Businessman," which will set out his rights and duties. The reality is that it is not the large stores which are in contact with the largest number of consumers, but rather the retail merchants who help to decongest the daily market.

"The Union of the Businessmen," under the aegis of the party, is gradually studying the problems which this sector of commercial activity is encountering, in order to find satisfactory solutions for it.

The role of small-scale business still remains that of distribution, the regulator of daily consumption. Retail merchants should no longer consider state monopolies as a "repressive concept." The authorities are making an effort in favor of this sector of activity, which is properly considered indispensable to the satisfaction of consumer needs. Moreover, the National Charter considers the small business sector to be an ally of the revolution.

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REPORT ON OPPOSITION PARTIES, PROGRAMS, LEADERS

Cairo AL-WADI in Arabic No 2, Jun 81 pp 32-35

[Article by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahab: "The Opposition in Egypt: Its Parties, Programs, Leaders and Differences with the Government"]

[Text] The configurations of the opposition in Egypt appear to be like the map of Africa, full of sharp ups-and-downs, level plains and high mountain tops.

Just as the ground undulations in Africa were formed over many years, so were the configurations of the opposition in Egypt; they [too] were formed over many years.

Egypt has experienced [political] opposition exactly 102 years ago on 4 November 1879. People were taken by surprise on the morning of that day with leaflets announcing the establishment of a political party that called itself the Secret National party. Ever since that day and until 16 January 1953 Egypt witnessed numerous political parties: from the National party of 1907 which was established by Mustafa Kamil; to the al-Ummah [The Nation] party which was established against Mustafa Kamil by the landed gentry with the assistance of the royal palace; to the al-Wafd party; the Liberal Constitutional party; the Sa'di party; and the al-Ittihad [Unity] party, etc.

All through the period from 4 November 1879, the date the first political opposition party appeared in modern Egypt, to 16 January 1953, the date parties were abolished after the 1952 revolution, Egypt lived through its first and longest period of political opposition.

After the dissolution of parties in 1953 political life began to assume the form of a single party. With the emergence of the Socialist Union as a single political organization, people realized that there would be no return to the multi-party system. However, the seventies brought a contradictory political surprise. The opposition returned, but it did not return at once. It returned after [a period of] preparation that lasted 27 months.

The Preparation Script

In August 1974 President al-Sadat presented what was then known as the

development paper for the Arab Socialist Union [ASU] in which he proposed the notion that it was essential to have numerous factions and opinions and counter opinions so as to move away from the totalitarian practice of democracy to democratic practice. Thus, the multiplicity of factions within a single political organization is a necessity that is based on a social reality which cannot be ignored and which is based on diversity. This happened on 1 August 1974. On 18 August Dr Hafiz Ghanim, first secretary of the Socialist Union said during a meeting with labor leaders at their annual camp in Abu Qir in Alexandria that development of the Socialist Union did not signify a return to partisan life. He said, "We are committed to the formula of the alliance of the working people's forces."

Only 1 month later the People's Assembly convened a committee to hold hearings to discuss the development of the Socialist Union and the possibility of establishing parties within the union.

From September 1974 to September 1975--for 1 whole year--Egypt was totally preoccupied with the ongoing debate over the parties and over the development of the Socialist Union. All the men of Egypt took part in the debate.

At the People's Assembly hearings, for example--and these sessions were usually heated--Muhammad 'Abd-al-Shafi, a member [of the assembly] (now in the Liberal party) asked that the 50 percent ratio for workers and farmers be abolished. He called for the need to establish two parties: the first would represent socialist principles, and the second would represent national capitalism. Dr Yusuf Idris called for the need to dissolve the Socialist Union and to give people the freedom to form political parties and publish newspapers. He said it was necessary for us to define our political philosophy clearly: either we become full socialists or full capitalists. At the same time that Dr Yusuf Idris was expressing [this] opinion, Suhayr al-Qalamawi was asking, "We are calling for freedom, but, when 70 percent of the population is illiterate, we have to ask freedom for whom?" Hafiz Badawi rejected [the notion of] parties. "We have to insist on the formula of the alliance of the working people's forces." What is important is the fact that the fiery debates ended with the hearing committees of the People's Assembly rejecting the formula for the establishment of parties. They insisted on the alliance formula. Workers and farmers rejected parties, and professionals called for the establishment of political organizations within the Socialist Union, that is an opposition on the inside.

The Platforms Step

On 9 October 1975 President al-Sadat made a statement to the press in which he said that he was not against multiple parties at a future stage. "If we go through the period of developing the union and having multiple opinions and factions within it, it will be possible for us to achieve multiplicity of this stage, the stage of multiple parties."

On 21 October Mahmud Abu Wafiyah announced the formation of the first new political platform operating within the framework of the alliance of the working people's forces. He called it the Socialist Democratic Platform.

Abu Wafiyah declared the principal features of his platform's program, and he said that they were manifested in a commitment to socialist gains, support for the public sector and the creation of an administrative revolution. He said that if the establishment of parties were to become necessary at a subsequent stage, the platform will not hesitate to turn into a party.

Only 4 days after the establishment of Abu Wafiyah's platform Mustafa Kamil Murad announced the establishment of a new platform which he called the Liberal Socialists' Platform. On that day Mustafa Kamil Murad said, "Among the most important features of the platform's program are equality between men and women; the establishment of balanced relations with the two superpowers; freedom of action for the private sector; reinforcement for the public sector so that its activity would focus on strategic industries; keeping the state from monopolizing industry, exports and imports; and devising a new tax system and a wise customs policy to serve trade, exports and imports activity so that [new] blood can be pumped into the Egyptian marketplace.

The 27th of October 1975 brought from Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub, secretary of the Central Committee, an invitation to submit applications to establish platforms to the Central Committee. At the same time he announced that the committees of the Arab Socialist Union would begin receiving opinions from the governorates and on the level of the units on the establishment of platforms within the framework of the Arab Socialist Union. The committees would receive ideas about the form of membership in these platforms: would it be open or restricted? If membership is to be restricted, what are the conditions that would have to be available in a platform member?

On the evening of the same day, 27 October, Egyptian radio broadcast the third part of a radio interview that had been recorded with President al-Sadat. Al-Sadat said, "The platforms are not molds. It is possible and natural that the platforms would turn into parties, but they would do so without struggles whose purpose is to get to power."

In 1 month the number of platforms in Egypt reached 43. Among them were aplications from an elementary school teacher, a student in the College of Dentistry, a female school teacher in a preparatory school, a troubleshooting manager at the telephone exchange, a clerk in the power company, an employee in the Chemistry Administration, a student in the College of Education at al-Azhar, an attorney and from a salesman who sells watches and their accessories. Dr Hilmi Murad applied for the National Progressive platform; Khalid Muhi al-Din applied for the Progressive National platform; and Kamal Rif'at applied for the Nasirist Socialist platform.

This deluge was stopped only by al-Sadat's address to the Central Committee on 21 November 1976. In that address al-Sadat asked that the masses be invited to participate in reaching a decision about this deluge. He said that the whole world knew only three basic trends in political action: the right, the center and the left. The president criticized this staggering amount of applications to form platforms, and he referred to two platforms in particular: Kamal Rif'at's Nasirist Socialist platform, which he said

was copied verbatim from the National Charter, and Mahmud Abu Wafiyah's Socialist Democratic platform, which enrolled 293 members of the People's Assembly in 9 days only. Al-Sadat said that this platform had formulated its program in the style of the old parties and that it would have to change it. He said, "As far as the advocates of Nasirism are concerned, we are all completing the odyssey of 'Abd-al-Nasir." The president spoke in general about his advice to the people and to the Central Committee. "We all have to be wary of leaders who infiltrate [our ranks] looking for a role and using the platforms as their front." Three days after al-Sadat's address the Central Committee held a meeting in which it decided to form a committee of 100 members, half of whom would be workers and farmers, to discuss and complete consideration of the subject before a decision is reached.

The Socialist Union collected opinions during the period from 24 November [1975] to January 1976. On 25 January the president's decree for forming a commitee to discuss platforms was issued. The committee was to be headed by Engineer Sayyid Mar'i, and it was to consist of 50 persons who were members of the Central Committee and 50 persons who were members of the People's Assembly; half of those would be workers and farmers. They would be joined by 70 persons who are members of the public trade unions and university professors.

The committee held 16 meetings during the period from 2 February to 9 March 1976. These included sessions to look into the applications of those who wished to form platforms. Only 13 of those applicants attended!

On 20 March Mamduh Salim, who was Egypt's prime minister then, announced that he was joining the Centrist platform. This was the first time the Socialist Democratic platform was called centrist.

On 30 March 1976 Engineer Sayyid Mar'i announced the committee's report which stipulated the establishment of three platforms within the Socialist Union: the right, the centrist and the left.

Directly to the Cabinet

On the day following the announcement of the committee's report--the report which had recommended that the name, platform, become organization and that of platform chairman become organization rapporteur--a delegation from the centrist organization led by Mahmud Abu Wafiyah, secretary of the organization went to the prime minister's office pledging their support for him as the organization's rapporteur. The government became a centrist government, and thus an organization got out of the Central Committee directly into the cabinet. While matters were going well in organizing the centrist [platform], disputes began appearing in the other two organizations.

After vicious disputes the matter came to an end with Khalid Muhi al-Din becoming rapporteur for the grouping, and Mustafa Kamil Murad becoming rapporteur for the liberals.

Parties: Why?

The beginning of partisan life was announced, and there actually was a party in power, which had a majority for a full session of the People's Assembly, and there were two parties in the opposition. But in his annual address on 26 July 1978 al-Sadat announced that he would go to the [people in the] street and that he was determined to form a party which he would lead. On 14/8/1978 he actually held the first meeting of the constituent assembly of the National Democratic party [NDP]. The delegates of the Misr party announced that they were merging with the National party under the leadership of al-Sadat.

Before that, on 4 February 1978 the organization of the al-Wafd party was announced. The party endured for 100 days only; then its activity was suspended on 3 June of the same year to protest the Internal Front Protection Law.

On 12 December the establishment of the Socialist Labor party led by Ibrahim Shukri was announced.

Thus those conditions ultimately gave birth to a ruling party, the National party, which inherited the Misr party, and to three opposition parties: the Liberals, the Grouping and Labor.

The National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party[NPUG]

This is one of two parties that did not change since the idea for it was simply that of a platform. The party is headed by Khalid Muhi al-Din, one of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council who was responsible for the most serious [activity] in any underground organization: the printing and distribution of leaflets and the recruitment of new officers.

The party has 120,000 members and an annual budget of 84,000 pounds.

The organizational structure of the party consists of a secretariat general of 46 members; a central committee secretariat of 16 members; a central committee of 204 members; and a congress of 600 members.

The party has organizational structures and committees in 20 governorates where it has offices and committees. Over a period of 4 years, from 1976 to 1980 the party was involved in the elections twice. It won four seats in the assembly in its first elections.

The party published a newspaper called AL-AHALI. Khalid Muhi al-Din presided over its board of directors, and Lutfi Wakid was its editor-in-chief. Only 30 issues of AL-AHALI were published; of these 7 consecutive issues were confiscated by the Ministry of the Interior. This [action] was supported later by a court order.

However, the real dispute between the party and the government, for which the price that the party paid was its newspaper and the 1979 elections, goes back to the final days of 1976 and the first days of 1977. These were the days that witnessed the events which came to be known as the events of 18 and 19 January.

AL-AHALI began waging a sharp attack on the government and on its policy. It spoke about "the fat cats" and about how the economic policies allowed for the emergence of millionaires in the Egyptian mainstream. [The newspaper claimed] that the cost of these policies was making the rich richer and the poor poorer. The newspaper dealt with the excesses of the government in the al-Ahram Hill project and in the "Bulaq Hill" [project]. It was referring to the project of selling land in the section of Bulaq, evicting its residents and transferring them to other sections.

The newspaper thus became a headache for the government.

The headache ended with the disappearance of AL-AHALI.

When the People's Assembly was dissolved in March 1979 and [a new assembly] was re-elected early in June 1979, the elections results yielded no seats won for the Grouping party.

The Socialist Liberal Party

This is the second party that has survived since the experience of the platforms. The president of the party is Mustafa Kamil Murad, one of those who took part in the 1923 Revolution. He had assumed numerous administrative positions; [served] as an appointee on the boards of directors of companies and then as chairman of the board, which he still is.

No one knows why the leaders of the party become excited when it is said that they are rightists, despite their clear program and their proclaimed policy. This party baffles one considerably, and there are many things [about it] that one cannot understand.

The president of the party says that one quarter of a million citizens are members of the party. We ask for confirmation of the one quarter million figure, and he confirms it. The secretary general of the party's youth is more realistic than the party president. He says that the party's members are not less than 1 million. Then we ask, "But the president of the party says they are only one quarter of a million!" He says, "No. The correct figure is closer to 1 million citizens. (The incident is recorded on tape, and that does not lie).

In the same manner of this incident we find the party, for example, announcing as soon as it was established its merger with the National party under the leadership of President al-Sadat. Then 5 weeks later it announced that it was staying as an independent party. It is also the only opposition party that launched a sharp attack against the al-Wafd party and the Grouping party after their announcement that they were suspending their activities to protest the Internal Front Protection Laws and the socialist prosecutor.

The party fully supports the government in the course of its foreign policy In the context of economic policy, it calls for more facilities:

more support for the private sector; a free hand for the private sector in all areas of investment; a shrinking role for the public sector and confining that role to the basic and strategic industries; economic laws and policies that give greater support to these two principles; a customs law; and a new tax law that would make it easier for the private sector to perform its role. In the first elections of the People's Assembly the party won 22 seats. In the 1979 elections it won 2 seats only. The president of the party himself was defeated in the elections in the district of Misr al-Qadimah [Old Cairo]; he lost to the candidate of the Democratic National party.

The party published the newspaper, AL-AHRAR, so it could speak through it for the party. Its first issue came out on 14 November 1977. In its first issues the newspaper dealt with numerous questions and subjects that were congruent with the party's policy.

The Socialist Labor Party

No other party aroused controversy and debate as the Labor party did. Ibrahim Shukri announced the party's program on 14 October 1978--the 45th anniversary of [the establishment of] the Young Egypt Society. On 12 December the founders announced the establishment of the party. President al-Sadat himself participated in the signing [ceremony] along with 20 representatives of the National party. In fact, President al-Sadat strengthened the party with figures and leaders such as Mahmud Abu Wafiyah and Muhib Istinu so as to strengthen the ranks of the opposition.

The party was established while an elected assembly was in session. It was nevertheless able to collect the signatures of 22 members on the application for its establishment. This was more than the quota required by the law, which requires the signature of 20 members on an application for establishing a party. Then the number of party members in the assembly increased to 26. The party is chaired by Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, one of the leaders of the Young Egypt Society Movement in the forties. He was the first member of parliament before the revolution to call for the application of agrarian reform laws. Despite the fact that his father was a superintendent of the royal property, he distributed his land to the peasants in his town of Shirbin. After the June 1979 elections the party won 36 seats in the assembly, but the number of seats it held continued to dwindle due to resignations until it dropped to 16 seats.

The party began practicing its activity after its establishment was announced. It has good relations with the government. The ruling party decided to close the district of Shirbin for Ibrahim Shukri, and nobody declared himself a candidate in that district as a favor to him. However, this response did not last long. On 1 May 1979 the party published the first issue of its newspaper, AL-SHA'B, and the problems began as a result of the newspaper.

The circumstances under which the newspaper appeared and the rumors circulated by people that the party was the government's party caused the newspaper to hasten its disagreement with the government, beginning with its

second issue. It dropped small bombshells in the course of its coverage of the elections, and it began compiling the government's errors. It came out with the headline, "The truth, Mr Prime Minister is that the National party is inheriting the property of a party." Another issue talked about conservatives interfering in the elections. The newspaper's campaign continued, calling upon al-Sadat to interfere personally and to pass judgment on these excesses that took place in the elections. The newspaper concluded that manipulations and pressures took place in the elections.

The party is always being criticized for the fact that the newspaper does not do it justice. Although the party has an actual presence in 20 governorates as well as an organizational structure, its activities and its presence in domestic political action are almost non-existent.

Ever since that date, 12 November 1976, opposition parties have continued to be like Africa's ups-and-downs, arousing controversy and debate and sometimes terror.

Ibrahim Shukri

--Born in 1916.

--Bachelor's degree, College of Agriculture, 1939.

--Appointed member to the board of directors of the Misr Cotton Ginning Company.

--Secretary general of the Socialist Union for the governorate of al-Daqahliyah; after 1964 president of the Union of Agricultural Engineers.

--In 1969 chairman of the board of directors of the Arab Company for Ginning Cotton; 1971 secretary of professionals in th Socialist Union.

--1976 member of the People's Assembly.

--Governor of al-Wadi al-Jadid. Then he left his position and worked as minister of agriculture. He resigned from the ministry to establish the Labor party.

Khalid Muhi al-Din

--Born in 1922.

--Bachelor's degree in military science, 1940 from the Military College.

--Bachelor's degree from the College of Commerce, 1951 Cairo University; member of the Revolutionary Command Council.

--Member of the Council for National Production Development, 1953-1954; he played a prominent role in the cavalry crisis.

--Editor-in-chief of the newspaper AL-MISA'; chairman of the board of directors of AKHBAR AL-YAWM; member of the People's Assembly after 1967 and member of the Central Committee.

--Member of al-Jazirah, al-Ahli and Sporting clubs.

--Lives on al-Jazirah Street in al-Zamalik.

Mustafa Kamil Murad

--Born in 1928.

--Bachelor's degree from the College of Commerce of Cairo University; Master's degree in political and economic science; he took part in the Palestine war.

--From 1952 to 1959 he worked in:

--The Public Affairs Administration of the Armed Forces; the editorial staff upon its establishment; office manager for the minister of education; chief of the National Guard in the section of Misr al-Qadimah.

--After 1959 assistant director of (al-Atimun) Life Insurance Company; a member of the board of directors of the Social Security Company and then of the Plows and Engineering Company; and then an appointed member to the board of directors of the Clothing and Supplies Company.

--In March 1967 he traveled with a National Assembly delegation to the United States. The delegation was led by Anwar al-Sadat.

--From 30 January 1967 he was chairman of the board of directors of the Eastern Company for Exporting Cotton.

--Member of the al-Jazirah and Sporting clubs.

--Lives in the section of al-Zamalik.

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MANSUR HASAN ANALYZES COMPOSITION, PRACTICE OF OPPOSITION

Cairo MAY in Arabic 22, 29 Jun 81

[22 Jun 81 p 5]

[Text] On 14 May President Anwar al-Sadat discussed the question of democratic practice and the opposition in a lengthy public address.

Reactions to the address varied. Some people thought that preparations were being made to abolish opposition parties and to go back to the one party system. Others questioned the importance of discussing the subject of democracy and the opposition under these circumstances at a time when all efforts must be directed to the urgent problems that society is facing, such as food, making goods available, the problem of prices, rent, housing, etc.

If these reactions were indicative of anything, they may point to our need to discuss the subject at this level of importance because although one of the most important benefits of the democratic system is that it guarantees for the people their right to rule themselves, one of its most significant drawbacks is that its success is measured by the participation of the greatest possible number of citizens and their conviction that [that participation] is the strong guarantee that would preserve for them their private and public interests as well as the only foundation for the safety of their social, economic, political and intellectual life.

We would not be exaggerating were we to say that nothing more important than this subject was to be discussed on this public occasion. There are two reasons for this.

First, regardless of the number and significance of the problems and questions that society is facing, the question of the political system is always the primary and the most important question. This is because it is the question that determines the method that society follows in confronting and overcoming its problems and building its future. It is one of the laws of life that every human society must face numerous problems on a continuous basis. Some of these are problems on a national scale, and some are problems of daily life. Whenever a society overcomes the problems it faces,

[such success] means that it has moved into a more advanced stage which harbors new problems that society will have to face and overcome. History has never known a society that was free of problems and questions that required attention. But societies will differ in the extent to which they prepare themselves and their capabilities for confronting and overcoming their problems with the greatest measure of efficiency and confidence.

The Essential Nature of the Political System in Managing Society

One of the most important preparatory factors, as far as managing society is concerned, may be the essential nature of the political system. It is on the effectiveness, the efficiency and the kind of people who are in charge of that system that society's ability to bring together and manage the human, spiritual and material capabilities that are necessary to achieve progress depends. If we were to look at all societies around us, we would find that they were all facing crucial questions. The problems of developing societies are innumerable, but even advanced societies, including the United States itself, which has achieved the power, progress and wealth that no other society has achieved, have their problems too. These are manifested in inflation, unemployment, energy and achieving more scientific progress to ensure their progress and superiority, etc.

The administration of each one of these societies is assigned the responsibility of confronting and overcoming problems. The success of each society depends not only on the natural resources that are available to it, but more importantly on its ability to organize and manage society, on the caliber of people who assume these responsibilities and who are active in the political field and on the standard of their efficiency and their ethics. Those who are active in the political field are the ones who are responsible for explaining the problems, determining their priorities, analyzing them, presenting alternative solutions to them, selecting the most suitable alternative, directing the capabilities for the implementation of these solutions and observing and evaluating the results. It is the political system that organizes the movement of society in that direction; it defines the institutions and organizations through which such movement takes place; it explains the duties, responsibilities and the method of accountability; and it regulates rights and the means for protecting and ensuring them.

Notwithstanding the urgency of the fundamental problems that we are facing in Egypt today--food; housing; utilities; and health, educational and cultural services--and along with the tremendous efforts that are being made to confront these problems, the time has come for us to give the question of the political system and the management of society the aware and profound attention that is due to it. This question has a vital and a direct effect on our capabilities for meeting today's problems and for making sound preparations to carve our path to progress forcefully, confidently and assuredly.

The Establishment of Sound Democracy Was the Justification for the May Revolution

Second, the principal justification and corrective objective of the May 1971 Revolution was the establishment of a sound, democratic life.

After almost entering the modern age of progress in the first half of the last century, at a period of time close to the beginning of the age of progress in Europe and the United States and prior to its beginning in Japan, Egypt was assailed by the major colonialist powers at that time who coveted its strategic location and its anticipated resources. The Egyptian National Action movement was preoccupied for a long time with fighting foreign colonialism and realizing national independence as an essential beginning for any real progress.

The July 1952 Revolution broke out as the ultimate outcome of the National Action movement, embodied in the power and youth of its leaders and men and crystallized in the six principles which it proclaimed: putting an end to colonialism; putting an end to feudalism; putting an end to capitalists' control of the government; establishing social justice; establishing a strong national army; [and] establishing a sound, democratic life.

The people rallied around their revolution from the moment it was announced. The vast majority of the people, with their various classes and capabilities, had dreamed of those principles. The revolution soon succeeded and achieved its major accomplishments inside the country and abroad. It became a command center, radiating [its principles] not only in the Arab world, but also in Africa and all the Third World. Due to the measure of its accomplishments inside the country and its influence abroad it deserved to be marked as one of the major revolutions in history.

The revolution's success relied on the expanding national popular support for it. It also succeeded in putting its principles into practice. But because it was preoccupied with foreign conditions that had begun to lie in wait for it and because it was very careful to ensure its [own safety], it did not give enough attention at the appropriate time to the application of one of its fundamental principles regarding the establishment of sound democratic life under the political regime in a manner that would turn the popular ground swell of support from its position of support to that of real participation in the responsibility for action and constructive effort on various levels.

Power Centers Formed in the Absence of Popular Participation

The fact that the revolution did not pay attention to the achievement of this significant principle at the appropriate time had serious consequences. These began [appearing] in the sixties and continued to get worse under the power centers that were formed in the absence of real participation by the people. It seemed that the revolutionary flame was dying out and that the revolution's accomplishments were vanishing.

The revolution itself needed a revolution to save it from the course into

which it had slipped and to set it on the correct course on which it should have been. The May 1971 Revolution was a revolution against the power centers that were formed in the sixties, arrogating power and the decision-making power to themselves and depriving the people of what is simultaneously their right and their duty: genuine participation [in the political process] by giving their opinions and by taking action.

Hence the establishment of a sound democratic life was the principal justification and the primary objective of the May Revolution. It affirmed the right of the people to exercise their sovereignty inside their homeland and to take part in building their future freely and independently. This objective would open the door to the revolution's major accomplishments of the October War, the liberation of the land, the restoration of Arab rights, the building of peace and the achievement of prosperity. Notwithstanding the splendor of these accomplishments and their effect on the future of the nation, the greatest accomplishment of the revolution and the one that will continue to have the most profound effect was that of establishing and enhancing the democratic system which is the foundation for these accomplishments, the framework which made them possible and [the tool that] makes us capable of accomplishing more.

If one of the chief accomplishments of the July Revolution was the fact that by eliminating the royal regime and colonialism it nationalized government so that it became a national government [acting] in the interests of the people, the May Revolution was a necessary rectification of that revolution when it undertook [the task of] changing the government from a government [acting] in the interests of the people to a government of the people [acting] in the interests of the people.

Thus the shift was made from revolutionary law to constitutional law, to the sovereignty of law and to the state of political institutions.

For all these reasons it was imperative that the question of our democratic political system remain the most significant question. It is the justification for our May Revolution and it is the framework that defines our responsibilities, our duties and our rights; it regulates our actions together for the achievement of the progress and the prosperity to which we aspire.

This question must be one of the foremost subjects of our national debate. It is more worthy of our attention because of the profound effects it has on what is happening in our society at present and what will happen in the future.

Towards an Objective and a Useful Dialogue

To make our dialogue objective and useful, we must recall the evolution of our democratic practice in the past 10 years, since the May Revolution so as to find out truthfully and objectively how far we have traveled on the road and what were the obstacles that we encountered. We must then consider the experiences that a few other countries have had and what rules, laws

and principles have become established as an inseparable part of the democratic concept and its political system.

By comparing what we have achieved so far with what we should have achieved, we can determine the positive and the negative aspects of our experience and the factors that underlie each one of them. We can then strengthen and preserve the positive factors and resist and remedy the negative ones. We would thus correct our course by means of an objective national dialogue in which we would share opinions and counter-opinions with each other so as to enhance and firmly establish our democratic political system and preserve for each citizen his humanity, his dignity and his right to participate [in the political aystem] by expressing his opinion and working within the framework of national unity which embodies the true values of Egypt: love, tolerance, confidence and respect.

In order for us to be realistic, we must appreciate the fact that building and enhancing democracy along with building peace and achieving prosperity are considered among the major challenges that Egypt is facing. It is a task about which the least that can be said is that it is a difficult and a long-term task.

Citizens of countries which have an advanced democracy, where the practice of democracy is over 100 years old and is firmly established with deep-rooted foundations, continue to hold a dialogue among themselves about improving democratic practices, controlling the details of those practices and ensuring that they not deviate. Only a limited number of the countries of our Third World have dared to embark upon this experiment; and none of them, except India, has achieved any success to speak of.

It is useful to keep these facts in mind so as not to diminish our right to value what we have achieved and embark upon the challenge that is facing us, shunning the vehemence and the convulsions of the impotent and armed with the patience and the humility of the potent.

[29 Jun 81 p 5]

[Text] It was natural for President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat to become the leader of the Corrective Revolution, the bearer of its banner and the one to herald its principles. Among the men of the July Revolution he was the one with the closest ties to the Egyptian mainstream and the popular wing of the National Action Movement; this was in the thirties while he was taking part in the preparations for the 1952 Revolution. He was in the vanguard of the revolutionary leaders who formulated and realized the victories and the achievements of the revolution. He experienced the revolution and the stages of its evolution from the inside, and he was able with his sense of nationalism and his political insight to diagnose the ailment and realize the extent of the revolution's losses as a result of the delay in establishing a real and a sound democracy.

President al-Sadat articulated his experience more than once when he said, "I began my life believing in dictatorship as a proper way to achieve

national hopes. I was one of the leaders of the revolution who voted for dictatorship when the Revolutionary Command Council met on 27 July 1952 to choose the political system. But having lived through the whole experience I hereby declare that the evils of dictatorship in one hour do not equal the evils of democracy in 100 years."

Dictatorship and democracy as political systems experienced by different human societies throughout their long history are distinguished by how broad the political decision-making circle is and by the decision-making method in the society. In totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships only the ruler by himself or the ruler with a small group of people around him has the right to make a political decision. [Such a decision] is carried out through the agencies of government. In democracies, however, the decision-making circle expands to include all the people. They take part in determining a decision through a dialogue [process] before such a decision is ratified in the constitutional institutions.

Although democracies are not absolutely free of evils, a fact that political thought is still trying to remedy and overcome, those evils are much less than the dangers that result from having the present and future of an entire society contingent upon the decision of a single ruler. In addition, this has serious effects on the psychological and spiritual makeup of the citizens themselves as a result of the fear and oppression they suffer from in most cases, and this is inconsistent with basic human rights in life.

If the July Revolution succeeded in liberating the national will when it brought colonialism to an end and achieved the national independence for which the people had struggled for over 70 years; if it had succeeded in paving the road toward liberating the will of the Egyptian citizen when it put an end to the royal regime, feudalism and capitalists' control of government, the highest objective of all of this could have been achieved: that the citizen practice his rights and his duties freely under a democratic, political system that coordinates the interaction and integration of the people's political, social, economic and intellectual forces in the fields of progress by means of an orderly constructive dialogue in which the people shoulder the responsibility of endorsing the government and its policies as an expression of their will and their hopes.

Democracies: a Long-Term Process

Lengthy experiences in history have proven that establishing democracies and ensuring their effectiveness is a difficult and a long-term process.

A society that aspires to build a democratic system has to realize that the comprehensive notion of democracy, whose philosophy has evolved in the modern age, is tantamount to a lofty ideal that can only be achieved through real and long suffering. The burden of the suffering is lightened only by the fact that its objective remain clear [in view] and that it is supported by a strong will, an aware determination and an enlightened intellect.

The difficulties of democratic practice stem basically from the idealism of democracy's goals and the factors that distinguish them. Inasmuch as democracy seeks to preserve citizens' rights, its existence and its success depend on the degree to which the citizens themselves participate in it and perform their duties.

Democratic application is based on two principal factors.

First, building democratic institutions. This factor is relatively easier because it can be carried out by legislation guaranteed by the constitution and the law to regulate the establishment of constiturional institutions including a government, a parliament, the courts and democratic political institutions such as parties, trade unions and popular alliances. [This factor] also determines citizens' rights and duties and the measures which guarantee that the government and its policy be an expression of the will and the hopes of citizens.

Second, popular practice which achieves the effectiveness and the integration of these institutions. This is the principal factor; it is the one that has a more profound effect; and it is the one that is more difficult to achieve. This is because it depends on the extent to which the largest possible number of citizens believe in taking part in the responsibility to practice democracy; how much knowledge and experience in its sound methods they have achieved; and the degree of their commitment to democracy. Numerous factors come into play and affect the ability to practice democracy: [a person's] upbringing, education, culture and social and economic conditions.

To evaluate our experience in the practice of democracy during the past 10 years, we have to review what has been accomplished to achieve each one of these two factors.

The Establishment of Constitutional and Political Institutions for a Democracy

President al-Sadat's conviction that we are to make a quick turn to democracy was emphatic because it was the result of a practical experience that had to do with the success of the national action to which he had devoted all of his life. This may explain to us his rapidly successive initiatives in that direction since the early days of his administration. These initiatives were made under conditions that were as far as they can be from conditions that are suitable to [the early stages of] building a democracy.

Were we to recall the climate and the circumstances that were prevalent in our society during that period in the early seventies, we would realize the extent of the real difficulty that a ruler faces in beginning [a journey] on the road to true democracy.

The country was suffering from the effects of a bitter military defeat, a wounded national pride and a tremendous pile-up of economic and social problems. Numerous social forces in the right and the left had been hit;

and they were scattered in the prisons inside the country and in the frustration of life away from the homeland abroad.

By any scientific and logical standards these conditions were considered fertile ground for the growth of dictatorship, even if they were to occur in any of the societies in which democracy had been firmly established. If we were to add to these conditions which prevailed since 1953 and became fixed in the country for 17 years--the age of the July Revolution--without any resistance to speak of from any group or individual, it would seem that we had surrendered to this kind of political system and that we had lost the ability to know any other system.

It was from this unfavorable situation and despite it that President al-Sadat declared his principles and his inclination in favor of democracy and liberating the citizen's will during the first month. In October 1970 [he announced] his decision to abolish telephone tapping, to burn all the tapes and the eavesdropping files and to shut down the detention camps. He abolished sequestrations in December 1970. In May 1971 came his strong blow against the power centers and for the liberation of the political system. The permanent constitution came in the same year; it became the principal official document for the system of government, affirming the principle of the sovereignty of law and a state of constitutional institutions and establishing all the political, economic, social and intellectual rights of people. The constitution affirmed the responsibility of the state in respecting, protecting and maintaining those rights.

Then came the battle of October 1973 whose consequences were not confined to the military victory that was achieved for the first time, but were rather extended to the political and spiritual aspects [of that victory] due to the fact that confidence was restored and the national wound healed. This contributed to the impetus to proceed with faster and broader steps in building democracy.

One of the prominent initiatives on this road was the Socialist Union Development Paper which President Anwar al-Sadat submitted for popular dialogue in August 1974.

One of the most important ideas mentioned in this paper was that of multiple platforms inside the Socialist Union. That idea was based on recognition of the fact that people are free to have opinions and to disagree about them. This was the first time that the principle of difference in political opinion was publicly proposed and acknowledged after the political climate had affirmed for many years the unity of opinion and the unity of rank until it appeared that difference in political opinion was a flaw that had to be avoided. This had the deepest effect on political life in Egypt. The official point of view was the only one on the scene, and only it and those who echoed it were heard. This had a serious effect: it made the citizen schizophrenic, expressing one opinion publicly and at political meetings and keeping his own personal opinion to himself or [sharing it] secretly with those who are close to him.

There was a broad national debate that continued until the National Congress of the Socialist Union was convened in July 1975.

The dialogue that took place around developing the Socialist Union and the idea of the platforms was characterized in most cases by its freedom and candor. We do not say that it was free and candid in all cases because it was natural that some of those who took part in it would be cautious because of what they had learned from previous experience and what they had been accustomed to by the methods of practice. At the same time many opinions emerged, expressing quite freely the point of view of those who held them. Besides those who insisted on a Socialist Union amended by platforms, there were those who called for the establishment of parties as legal political organizations. Although the matter was settled at that time by settling for the establishment of platforms, President al-Sadat himself had carried his thoughts further beyond many of the political forces that had taken part in the dialogue and had intellectually settled for the platforms. In an interview that was conducted by the correspondent of the newspaper, AL-NAHAR, and published in AL-AHRAM in September 1974 he responded to a question about multiple political parties by saying, "We have to look for a formula that would guarantee our national unity with or without parties. Then we have to follow that formula provided that the parties fall under [the rubric of] national unity."

Turning Platforms into Political Parties

In March 1979 President al-Sadat declared in front of the People's Assembly that the trend was to form three platforms: one representing the center--the principal movement in the country; a platform representing the right in general; and another representing the various movements of the left. Thus political multiplicity became a reality in Egypt for the first time since the July Revolution. Candidates ran in the general elections that were held in October 1976 in the name of the platforms which they represented. The centrist platform won a large majority, but there were representatives of the other platforms in the assembly. When the assembly was convened in November 1976 President al-Sadat announced to the new People's Assembly that the platforms and political organizations would be turned into legal political parties. As a result the Misr, the Liberal Socialist and the National Progressive Grouping party were formed. Each party enjoyed full freedom in managing its activities within the bounds of the constitution and the law. Being the majority party the Misr party formed the government, and the other two parties became the political opposition which appeared for the first time in Egypt since 1952.

At that time a movement had begun to organize another party, the al-Wafd party, which began publicizing itself and its leaders until it obtained approval for its establishment from the Parties Committee in February 1978. This was after the enactment of the law that endorsed the right to form parties and regulated the measures of their establishment and their legality.

Thus there came to be four parties on the political scene, and each one

of them had representatives in the People's Assembly. Three new party newspapers appeared, one for each party, with the exception of the al-Wafd party which was making preparations to publish its newspaper too. Partisan activity had actually begun before that since the establishment of the three platforms in March 1976. This activity included the al-Wafd party which began to establish its presence on the political scene; its leaders were conducting the party's activities even before it obtained the decision from the Parties' Committee approving its establishment.

Was the Dissolution of al-Wafd the Beginning of a Crisis?

The four parties continued to practice their activity until June 1978 when the new al-Wafd party disbanded and withdrew from the political arena to protest the Internal Front Protection Law which stipulated that anyone who had contributed to the corruption of political life before July 1952 was not to be allowed to join a political party for 10 years.

The newspapers indicated then that the Progressive Grouping party was thinking of joining the al-Wafd party in solidarity and either disbanding itself or suspending its activity. Why did the al-Wafd and the Grouping parties choose to place this difficult choice in front of the democratic experience despite its youth? This is what we will discuss in detail later when we come back to look into the partisan interaction and the positions of the other parties during that period. But what is important is the fact that to some people the experiment in democratic practice in Egypt appeared to be undergoing its first crisis. Everybody waited to see what will be the position of President Anwar al-Sadat, the leader of the May Revolution who took upon himself the responsibility of building a democratic system. Can the democratic experiment continue after the withdrawal of these parties from the scene? If al-Sadat is one of a few rulers in history who voluntarily gave up powers that were almost absolute so that the people can share those powers through organized constitutional and political institutions, can he be the one to insist on this [power sharing] at a time when some people are abandoning their responsibilities?

In July 1978 President al-Sadat announced that he would personally enter the arena of partisan activity and that he would head a new political party. The decision appeared curious at that time, and President al-Sadat himself stated that he had suffered as he had never suffered before in reaching this decision. What can the presidency of a new party add to a revolutionary leader, a commander of the military victory in October, the maker of the peace initiative and the president of the republic?

There was no justification for this step stronger than President al-Sadat's hope to see the true practice of democracy in his homeland. He was deeply convinced that the people have the right to participate [in the political process]; he was committed to the corrective principles for which the May Revolution had come into being; and he was determined to realize those principles.

The National party came into existence in September 1978 headed by

President al-Sadat. It was thought then that there would be no reason for disbanding the Misr party and that it would remain in the opposition after a large number of its representatives joined the new party. However, the political office of the Misr party met and decided to merge fully with the National party. The need for the emergence of another party that would assume the responsibility for the opposition along with the Socialist Liberal party continued to exist. Some time before that Mr Ibrahim Shukri had announced that establishment of the Socialist Labor party would begin. President al-Sadat announced that he supported and welcomed this step. He encouraged representatives to join the Labor party so that it could meet the legal quota to become legal according to the law. During that period President al-Sadat explained more than once in the popular speeches that he made his conviction that democratic practice cannot be complete without a strong opposition. With his understanding of sound partisan action he explained that the existence of members, representatives and leaders in different parties must not mean disunity or hostility. But love for Egypt and the commitment to its values and its morals constitute the principal and the strong tie that would tie everybody together even if each person were to try to serve the country in a different way.

On one of his visits with the people that he used to make at that time to the governorates, President al-Sadat took Mr Ibrahim Shukri on the train with him. He used to insist that Mr Ibrahim Shukri go out with him on the open platform of the train whenever the president would go out there to greet the poor masses that used to gather to greet him. When President al-Sadat was to visit the governorate of al-Daqahliyah, he insisted on visiting Mr Ibrahim Shukri in his district of Shirbin.

President al-Sadat used to do all this to affirm the concepts that he was advocating and to demonstrate the implications of the proper relations and methods of partisan action. At the same time and on the basis of [demonstrating and] explaining these meanings he wanted to encourage any assembly members who wished to do so to join the new Labor party without feeling any embarrassment or discomfort.

After some time had gone by and the Labor party was still unable to collect the adequate number of representatives, President al-Sadat took advantage of the fact that the parliamentary body of the National party was in session in November 1978, and he spoke at length about Mr Ibrahim Shukri and of the fact that he knows him to be a man of good conduct with an honorable political past before and after the July 1952 Revolution. He spoke about the importance of establishing a sound and strong opposition in Egypt so that the cornerstones of sound democratic practice would be completed. He urged all the members of the National party to join him in signing the document for establishing the party. Although this had no legal effect on the party as far as meeting the required legal quota is concerned, it did in fact have a major political and moral effect that made it easier for the Labor party after that to get the necessary number of representatives and to make an official announcement of its establishment in December 1978.

Partisan practice was thus destined to continue. Although the new al-Wafd

party had withdrawn from the scene, two new parties were established: the National party with which the Misr party had merged and the Socialist Labor party.

The following facts will become clear to anyone who considers all this development objectively and candidly.

1. It was the May Revolution and its national leaders that took the initiative to build a sound democracy despite the difficult political, economic and social conditions that could have been a strong justification for something other than that [which those leaders initiated].

2. The May Revolution made preparations for the process of building democracy by taking several measures the most important of which was the 1971 Constitution which included all the rights and guarantees that would ensure the real practice of democracy when the building [process] begins. The May Revolution itself was the first to respect the constitution and to preserve it. It was intent on not having its effectiveness suspended despite the difficult circumstances that it faced. This was quite the opposite from the way constitutions were handled in the past, ever since they came into existence in Egypt.

3. It was the May Revolution that took the initiative to discuss the right to disagree publicly with political opinion and the establishment of popular political organizations around different opinions.

4. When popular political organizations were established and their leaders and members settled for the fact that these organizations be platforms and then organizations under the umbrella of the Socialist Union, it was President al-Sadat who took the step to recognize them as legal political parties. That was a principal step in building democratic institutions.

5. Parties were established so that political trends can be expressed with absolute freedom. The Grouping party, for example, represented leftist trends including Marxism. This was a first in the history of Egyptian political action. When the new al-Wafd party was established, a number of political figures that headed the al-Wafd party before the July 1952 Revolution were among its chief leaders. These people had been subjected to court trials, arrests, sequestrations and political isolation throughout the period after the revolution. But the May Revolution came; it shut down the detention camps; it ended their sequestration and restored to them their funds, their property and their full rights as citizens. They were even allowed to resume political activity again at the head of a political party.

6. When the new al-Wafd party decided to disband and to withdraw from the political arena and it seemed that the Grouping party was thinking along the same lines that would accordingly bring about the collapse of the partisan political institutions which are an important cornerstone of democratic practice, the May Revolution did not waver or stop in the direction it was taking toward democracy. President al-Sadat himself appeared on the

scene of partisan action adding [one more burden] to his burdens. The May Revolution also welcomed the establishment of the Labor party and tried to amend the Party Law to repeal the condition requiring that a party have 20 members in the People's Assembly so as to provide an opportunity for the establishment of other parties.

Thus the national leadership of the May Revolution was consistent with its corrective rationale. It was faithful to its principal objective of establishing democratic life. It was truthful and honest with itself and with others--despite all the suffering--in using parties and opposition parties to build democratic institutions so that the cornerstones of true and serious practice would become available.

--How was the practice?

--What should be the role of parties in the practice of democracy, and what was the view that our parties had of their role?

--How does proper interaction between parties take place, and how did the interaction between our parties take place?

--Is the practice of opposition an absolute right or is it a function to serve national goals?

--Is opposition outside the political system or is it a basic part of that system with rights and duties?

--What are the disadvantages of the broad majority parties and the small minority parties in practice?

--How can we together--the majority and the minority--upgrade the level of our practice so that we can confront the major challenge and establish a sound practice of democracy in which we can reconcile the right to disagree with the obligation to love and to [show] respect?

8592
CSO: 4504/70

AL-AZHAR RECTOR SAYS ULEMAS SUPPORT ISLAMIC CALL

NC091340 Cairo MENA in English 1050 GMT 9 Sep 81

[Text] Cairo, 9 Sep (MENA)--Rector of Al-Azhar University, Dr Muhammad at-Tayyib an-Najjar, today underlined that the majority of Moslem ulemas were abiding by the injunctions of the genuine Islamic call, through serene persuasion and enlightened preaching.

Egypt, the country of Al-Azhar, was following the teachings of Islam which called for compassion and toleration among all man-kind, Dr an-Najjar told the MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY. He stressed that Al-Azhar University, with all its colleges, professors and students, were prepared to contribute to the sincere preaching of the Islamic call and fill up vacancies in preachers of privately owned mosques.

Another official of Al-Azhar, Dr 'Abd al-Mu'ti Bayyjmi, called on Moslems and Christians to live in harmony and fraternity for the good and progress of Egypt.

He emphasized that Moslems and Christians have been living for centuries now side by side and cooperating on a basis of mutual respect of each other's faith.

CSO: 4500/45

UNITED STATES DENOUNCED FOR ILLS OF REVOLUTION

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Sep 81 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, Sept. 6 (Pars) — The enemies of the Islamic Revolution of Iran are many and varied. Ever since the culmination of the Islamic Revolution in Iran the west has lost an 18 billion dollar market, a situation which has inflicted irreparable material damage to the west. Ever since the morning after the toppling of the treacherous defunct shah and immediately after the flight of American Generals from Iran, the wounded enemies of the Islamic Revolution of Iran have ceaselessly plotted against it. The criminal United States, which has suffered more serious wounds in the wake of the fall of another of his stooge governments in the Persian Gulf, has had the largest hand in the plots against Iran during the past three years.

Hardly two weeks after the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, a group of feudal landlords in the west of the country along with another group of the wanted members of the former SAVAK attacked a garrison in the city of Mahabad in an effort to loot arms and weapons. A similar attack was made on another garrison in the city of Sanandaj on March 18, 1979. Later in April of the same year American-inspired Marxist groups created tumult, violence and sedition in a predominantly Kurdish populated region in the north west of Iran under the pretext of racial recognition. They set ablaze crops of those who took exception to the seditionists and attacked their houses.

The pseudo-political groups which sprawled here and there at the instigation of the United States had hardly finished their conspiracies in Kurdestan and Gonbad-e Kavus when in June 1979 the deiendents of the defunct Shah's regime, aided by fugitive members of the former SAVAK and led by a leading member of the disbanded Rastakhiz Party embarked on randomly planting bombs in Khuzestan Province. Later the criminal United States tried noval contrivances by concocting new pseudo-political or militia groups whose task it was to create chaos and assassinate personalities. A brilliant theorician of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, Ayatollah Motahhari, was assassinated by the U.S. inspired group of Forqan in May 1979. Later, and in the wake of the seizure of the former U.S. embassy here, documents attesting to the connection betaeen those masterminding the group and the American spies in Iran were published.

The brave Muslim militants, realising the United States had been behind all these plots, finally seized their espionage den on November 4th, 1979. Subsequent searches made in the den of espionage revealed many a clandestine connection of the American spies with their internal counterparts.

The seizure of the den of the American spies and the publication of exposes in connection with the activities of the former American officials here was regarded to have been the fiercest blow in modern times on the western superpower. Later the news of the espionage activities of the American officials in the various government organizations of the host countries carried out under the cover of diplomatic functions here and there throughout the world were published ending in the dismissal of a number of so-called American diplomats in Mozambique and a few other countries. This, too, served to enlighten further, world public opinion about the Washington inspired crimes in various parts of the world.

In the wake of the hostage taking in Iran, the United States decided on economic sanctions against Iran, whereby it banned the export of any item to this country. But the sanctions, which also included orders already paid for was not in reality a new decision, since in practice and ever since the toppling of the defunct shah the United States had embarked on practical economic sanctions against Iran. Gradually other western governments prodded or intimidated by the United States participated in the sanctions against Iran, and thereby the plot evolved into all-out sanctions of the western governments against Iran.

In January 1980 the United States, launched more of its dependents on the scene for the purpose of creating fresh sedition. This time the leaders of the Muslim People's Party — a party whose connection with the United States had previously been discovered from documents found at the den of the American spies, created tumult in the city of Tabriz. Aided by the Mujahideen Khalq Organization and supporters of Qasemlu, they occupied Tabriz Radio Station for a few hours but were eventually expelled from the compound, as well as from the political scene by the defenders of the Islamic Revolution.

The United States, which gained absolutely no immediate results from its economic sanctions against Iran, and in order to save its face in the scene of political and military power, embarked on blatant military aggression against Iran in collaboration with such people as Bani-adr. The so-called rescue crew which the United States landed in Tabas (Iran) on April 25, 1980 resulted in a disgraceful failure. The act was recognized as having been a blatant transgression against the territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. To put a lid on this aborted attempt and in order to deviate world attention, U.S. agents arrived in London via Iraq and occupied the Iranian embassy there on April 30th, 1980. After having control of the embassy for five days, they killed two Iranian defenders of the Revolution and eventually surrendered to Scotland Yard.

The United States, which failed to attain any of its goals by paying its flunkeys in Kurdestan, and Gonbad, or by creating riots in Tabriz and Khuzestan or by assassinations, or military aggression, this time thought of a new plot. The atmosphere of free thought and activity which the revolution had brought to this country provided the best opportunity for the growth and development of the various political schools in Iran. The criminal United States exploited the situation here in order to botch up quasi political groups by hiring a group of flunkeys.

The idea was to create another Lebanon in the Middle East. The pseudo-political groups which were active mainly in Kurdestan and Gonbad boasted of the arms which they had looted from garrisons. Their main base was the university campuses especially the University of Tehran. The small pseudo political groups under the pretext of 'student activities' launched expensive activities in various parts of the country in an effort to bring under their own control the various geographical parts of the country. But this plot, too, was thwarted by the vigilant masses in Iran and it did not in the least avail the United States.

For want of any better plan the United States eventually designed a military coup here to be implemented by its flunkey military figures and U.S. agents, a plot which was thwarted on July 9, 1980. The last and the most recent scheme of the United States has been the embroiling of Iran in a war by giving the signal to another of its servants, Saddam Hussein, on September 22, 1980. But the brave resistance of the people in Khuzestan and throughout the western parts of the country again outdid this weapon of the criminal United States.

CSO: 4600/183

U.S. ACCUSED OF UNDERMINING FORMATION OF ISLAMIC FRONT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Aug 81 pp 1,2

[Text] Let us ask why the Voice of America has recently broadcast the false rumor concerning the closure of the Palestinian Embassy in Iran?

And let us also ask why such a false rumor has been disseminated from this provocative Western media in these critical conditions, when:

1) The Islamic Republic of Iran has proposed to the Moslem world to consolidate a unified anti-Zionist Islamic front against Israel?

2) The Palestinian militants have expressed their profound support for the establishment of this unified Islamic front?

3) Iran's proposal for the consolidation of a unified Islamic front has been appreciated by Libya, following which U.S. Airforce planes gunned down two Libyan planes in the Mediterranean?

4) The Iraqi imposed war has reached a decisive climax which has motivated all political observers to speculate the inevitable defeat of the Ba'athist Armed Forces.

5) The Saudi conspiracy concerning the 7-point Peace Plan, has been proposed by Crown Prince Fahd to betray Palestinian ideals?

Let us further ask why the determined opponents of Israel have been pressurized by frequent threats of military assailancy? Yesterday it was Libya's turn. For a long time now the Egyptian Armed Forces, in collaboration with the U.S. have posed a military threat to the Eastern frontier borders of Libya and yesterday these plans were put into effect.

As a matter of fact the attacks inflicted on the Libyan planes testify to the fact that the U.S. has attacked the unified Islamic Front first. Political observers have anticipated that in the near future, Israel will mount attacks on Syria and that the world will witness fresh Israel incursions into Southern Lebanon and the Golan Heights.

Moreover, Iran is no exception to the possible attacks since certain baseless rumors appear to substantiate such a conviction. Political maneuvers of this kind shed light on two facts. They are as follows:

a) The world colonizers have conspired an extensive political collusion for the Middle East, so as to stabilize the political status of Israel in the region.

b) The Western conspirators of such a plot are quite apprehensive of the revolutionary potential of the committed opponents of Israel and, in consequence, they have adopted decisive measures to neutralize the imminent rebellion of the committed combatants against Zionist agents and to eventually eradicate these militants from the political scene.

We have already expounded on the 7-point Peace Plan, along with the extensive propaganda, accusing Iran of collaborating with Israel. We have already emphasized that such baseless broadcasts and especially the plot of the Saudi Peace Plan, are the major items of the conspiracy contrived by the Superpowers in the Middle East.

In the course of time, the treacherous tendencies of this Western conspiracy will be divulged.

With due consideration to the recent tactics employed by the propaganda networks and the political military centers, affiliated with imperialism, we arrive at the conclusion that the U.S. has mobilized its full potential to hatch the conspiracies we have spoken of.

The U.S. is no longer satisfied with Iraq's dispatching of numerous delegations to the Islamic and non-Islamic countries to defame Iran, as the collaborator of Israel. After all, the Voice of America, along with all the imperialist oriented Western media and even the fugitive Banisadr, have made tireless attempts to make the world believe this treacherous lie.

Banisadr, the fugitive Don Quixote, is so shameless that, in one of his interviews with an Iraqi magazine, he stated, "Several times I advised the government officials not to purchase arms from Israel but they did not listen to me." Perhaps, Banisadr, when he was saying these words, had forgotten that the same Iraqi magazine had published the documents, betraying his own clandestine relations with Israel.

The exploitative colonizers have mobilized all their potential against Iran, since the Islamic Republic regime has proposed the consolidation of a unified Islamic front against the Zionist invaders, an Islamic revolutionary venture. This Islamic revolutionary proposal will jeopardise the interests of the Superpowers in the Middle East.

The U.S. has, in view of these facts, become quite furious. At present, all the conscientious individuals are aware of the fact that all the committed militants for the liberation of Qods will be unified against Israel. In these critical moments, all the Arab nations have realized that if they fail to take advantage of the revolutionary potential of one billion Moslems for the emancipation of the Holy Land of Palestine, history will not forgive them.

No doubt this innovative Islamic front against Zionism will be triumphant stride towards ultimate victory in the course of 30 years of committed resistance against Israel. The Islamic origin of this anti-Zionist front foreshadows the ultimate success of our revolutionized campaign against the Zionist agents.

The unified Islamic front will totally eradicate the imperialist and Zionist colonizers. The overwhelming fear of the U.S. dominators of the name of such a front justifies our conviction. The whole tireless effort made by the expansionist Superpowers for the annihilation of the anti-Zionist front are quite futile.

CSO: 4600/177

NEW GOVERNMENT HIRING REGULATIONS ANTICIPATED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 7 Sep 81 p 2

[Announcement by Secretary-General Abdollah Jasbi of the State Recruitment Organization]

[Text] Tehran, Sept. 6 (Pars)--The Secretary-General of the State Recruitment Organization, Abdollah Jasbi, announced yesterday afternoon that obstructive hiring regulations and differences in the salary of government employees would be removed soon, and a new recruitment law was due to replace the old one.

He said that there were 859,000 working and 603,000 non-working employees in government organizations. Considering them and their families the futures of 6 to 8 million people would be affected by any change in hiring regulations. Therefore, he added, these changes should only be made after careful studies. He said that it should be admitted that government employees, especially those with lower salaries, were under pressure which could be remedied with further financial aid if the war imposed by Iraq on Iran and other economic issues in the country permitted the government to do so.

Jasbi said that it had been decided to decrease, as much as possible, the gap between maximum and minimum salaries, He said that with ideological training, financial incentives would be superseded by moral motives in the working environment.

One of the great problems the government was faced with was the issue of those who were retired before the termination of their service, Jasbi said, adding that 31,000 people were retired last year. The retirements were inevitable in many cases but not necessary in others. He added that 90 billion rials made up the retirement budget, 50 billion rials of which was paid by the government and the rest of which was supplied by retirement deductions from the salaries of government employees.

CSO: 4600/183

COMPREHENSIVE HEALTH LAW ISSUED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in Englsh 27 Aug 81 p 2

[Text]

A new public health law, abolishing and superseding a wide range of previously enacted laws, regulations and instructions that have been operative in the country over the past half century, has just been published in the official gazette and become operative with effect from the date of its publication.

The new law (No. 89 of 1981) provides in its general objectives that society is to guarantee the sound health of citizens including their physical and social fitness. It provides for preparation of an elaborate plan and ensuring material and moral prerequisites for dispensation of integrated health services.

Provisions of the law lay emphasis on optimal utilisation of health sector manpower and urges constant care in guaranteeing sound physical and mental health of the citizen, founding of a special administration of health institutions and centres and combatting transmitting and industrial diseases.

The law also provides for efficient rendering of care to family health and aged citizens, child and maternal care, school health, uplifting nutritional level of citizens and working out new regulations and conditions ensuring sound health environment for workers in factories and other places.

Provisions in the law call for protection and improvement of the environment, dissemination of health education and propogating health and environmental consciousness, caring for psychological and mental health, securing sufficient supplies of drugs, serums, vaccines and injections.

The law calls for integrated drug industry, generalisation of the centres for medical rehabilitation and physiotherapy services and artificial limbs, encouraging vocational and health education and improving educational level of workers in the health sector. It calls for development of preliminary medical studies and promoting scientific research.

The law consists of five sections covering details of the general objectives, administration instructions, protective health, combatting transmitting diseases, therapeutic and health institutions in addition to disciplinary and organisational rules.

It upheld the element of planning in the health sector as essential for a balanced development in the sector and emphasised that protective health services represented the groundwork for activities of the Ministry of Health. The new law form-

ulated principles pertinent to citizens' good health and living conditions. There are provisions caring for hygienic conditions of public places and control measures in this connection.

Reasons given for enactment of the new law pointed to out-dated incoherent collections of laws and regulations that had been issued at different intervals when the health services had too limited scope. The expansions introduced on the health services after the 17th-30th July Revolution of 1968 necessitated the enactment of a more comprehensive, progressive law.

The new law aimed to match up with the phase of socialist construction in the country and answered preceptions and principles set for the health sector by the Political Report of the 8th Regional Conference of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party (ABSP).

The new law has provisions organising activities of health establishments and code of conduct governing the undertaking of duties by public health workers. The provisions also deal with preparation and training of medical and technical staff and refreshing courses for workers, technicians and staffers to keep pace with continuous development in the professional sphere.

The law provides for employment of developed technology to improve health services and worked out regulations for therapeutic health services both for the private and socialist sectors. Attention is given to health supervision to cover all public places and institutions.

An official source at the Ministry of Health regarded the enactment of the new law as representing the initiation of a new stage in the development of health services in the country. "It is a true revolution in the health sector assuring progressive services to citizens from the country's health and protective service institutions", he said.

The source said the law fitted well with the central goal of the Revolution and Party underlinking the humanity of the individual and acting in such resoluteness for assuring his good health. "It assures individuals good health which is necessary for his contribution in building up the bright future of Iraq", said the source.

CSO: 4300/109

AUTONOMOUS REGION SERVICE PROJECTS DETAILED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 27 Aug 81 p 5

[Text] Despite the 12-month long war against Persian aggressors the autonomous region has realised a record of positive achievements in economic and social fields, said Mr Jamal Haj Sharif, Chairman of Region's Executive Council.

He added from the first day of the battle, The Iraqi Kurds mobilised all their resources to take part in the war, support the war effort and keep up the spirit of victory.

Mr Sharif said that the authorities concerned, achieved high percentages in carrying out development projects, whether individually or as part of a comprehensive plan.

On the type and cost of projects, he said the cost of projects carried out since the battle began, has exceeded ID. 20 million, including service, housing, educational, health, social and productive projects.

He aserted that work goes on to complete a number of similar projects all over the Region at a cost of more than ID 86 million, in addition to projects ordered by President Saddam Hussein upon his visit to the Region, costing ID. 57 million.

Autonomous Region's Chairman emphasised that exceptional efforts by employees of establishments during the battle resulted in achieving higher production rates with minimum labour due to the fact that many workers join the front lines, or guard economic establishments. These efforts achieved an increase of 20% in production, he said.

Iraqi Kurds have shown a readiness to take up arms, whether in the ranks of the regular armed forces, or the Popular Army, he added saying that Popular Army membership has increased considerably and continuously since the battle began and thousands of people enroll in weapons and combat-training courses.

Mr Mezhir Mutni, Arbil's Popular Army Commander aserts that such enthusiasm is not surprising at all, since it has been a symbol of Iraqi patriotism throughout the ages.

The great efforts of workers have resulted in production rates higher prewar levels, he said.

Referring to the part of unions in the war, he said that it was of particular importance to aid the war effort and enlighten the masses on the real implications of the battle and the duties of citizens.

Unions in the region, he added, have sent hundreds of their members to weapon-training and civil defence courses, in addition to holding mobilization and production meetings. Women's union had been conspicious in such activities, he concluded.

The Kurdish Autonomy Region's Municipalities and Resorts Administration has completed 75 municipal projects all over the region at a cost of ID. 2,295,000.

Mr Suad Habib, Secretary General of municipalities and resorts said these projects are distributed as follows:

Nineteen projects in Arbil province completed at a cost of ID 1,350,000, 29 in Sulaimaniya province, costing ID 1,850,000 and 27 in Duhouk province at a cost of ID 2,095,000.

He pointed out that the Administration has finished other projects at a cost of over ID 30 million.

He reiterated that implementation and completion rate during the battle have intensified remarkably due to the increased efforts and determination of employees and workers in supporting the war-effort.

CSO: 4300/109

BAGHDAD WATER NETWORK TO BE IMPROVED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 25 Aug 81 p 2

[Text]

The Baghdad drinking and raw water networks project, now under implementation by Amanat Al-Asima (the Mayoralty of Baghdad), aims at the elimination of acute bottlenecks in water distribution caused by the desolete existing network constructed in 1924 which lacked the basic technical specifications for optimum utilisation of its capacity.

■■

Dr. Adnan Aziz Jabro, Director General of the Baghdad Water Supply Administration (BWSA), said that the limited scope of applicability of the materials used in the old water pipes network, where iron, plastic and asbestos were applied represented a major hindrance. That caused extreme difficulties in effecting repairs of any casual defect.

"Proceeding from this, and at the directives of Amanat Al-Assima, the (BWSA) embarked on the replacement of this out-dated worn out net-work with an integrated and up-to-date ductile network. This network is expected to overcome water shortages and pipe defects which seriously affected supplies of water to consumers", he said.

Therefore, a contract was concluded in December, under the supervision of (BWSA), with the French firms Spie-Capag-Soba, Ponte Amacon, Spie-Patignolles and Seureca for execution of civil, pumping, extension and design works.

Highest specifications were adopted for the planned network, to ensure the required level of efficiency for this vital public utility. The contract came into effect in March 1981 and actual work on the project started in June.

The contract provided that the 1600 mm diameter pipeline skeleton networks are to be completed in 1981, whereas further extensions of the 300-100 mm dia pipes and final connections to consumers dwellings should be finalized during 1982-83. The central area expected to be covered by this project lies between Palestine street in Risafa, Al-Rabbi

street in Karkh, south of Jadiriya and Khadhimiya. The 1500 km. long network was designed to fulfill Baghdad's needs for purified water till the year 2000.

Five raw-water pumping stations, with a capacity of 100 millions gallons per day, are planned to be erected on the river Tigris according to the same contract.

These stations were designed to provide the city's needs for raw-water till the year 2000 and to provide necessary irrigation for the future green belt of Baghdad, thus substituting 27 insufficient minor pumping stations presently in operation depending for its water supplies on the Army Canal and Al-Khair stream.

Implementation of this project is carried out alongside efforts exerted by the Sewerage Administration and other service offices for the modernization of electricity, telephone and coaxial cables within the area of Baghdad, and in coordination with Amanat Al-Assima to ensure reconstruction of roads on completion of work indicated above.

Complementary to the drinking water pipes network are 16 new ground reservoirs with a total storing capacity of 220 million gallons. These will be constructed by the Baghdad Water Supply Administration during 1982 to replace the high water storage reservoirs currently in use.

This integrated project is rightly represented a unique experiment in the fact of total replacement of existing water supply network for a major city as Baghdad and for a set period of execution which is a record time for a project of such magnitude.

CSO: 4300/109

CORN PRODUCTION, CULTIVATING TECHNIQUES CITED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 22 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Clela Khoshaba]

[Text]

The province of Babylon, central Iraq, which is the principal maize production province with maize-cultivated areas representing 70 percent of the country's maize producing areas, is expecting a bumper maize harvest this autumn.

Areas cultivated with this crop for the present season reached 71,263 donums including 41,903 donums within farmlands belonging to the General Commission for Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, 19,387 donums belonging to the State Enterprise of Agriculture and 9,973 donums within farmlands of the Babylon Agricultural Project.

Marketing of the crop is made through three main centres distributed on geographic basis within the province-one at the centre of the province, Hilla, the two others at Madhatiya and Mashroua Sub-Districts. each centre contains large yards and warehouses for storage and a plant for separating and drying up the crop.

The plant at the centre of the Province has a capacity of 10 tons per hour to which are attached two large yards and storage installations on an area of 37,000 square meters in addition to newly introduced modern equipment used for separating and drying up the maize crops to increase the capacity of the plant.

The plant at Madhatiya has a capacity of 10 tons per hour with a yard of 17,000 square meters and three warehouses as well as three dryer machines and scaling equipment. The third, at Mashroua, has a capacity of 40 tons per hour to which are attached a storage yard 17,000 square meters in area and warehouses and an automatic ground scale.

Maize cultivation in the province of Bablyon first began in 1969 on an area of 35,000 donums. The provi-

nce's maize farming potentials have since assumed a wide scale with areas planted in the crop over the past few years reached 70,000 donums.

Among the factors that encouraged large-scale cultivation of this crop are the suitability of the soil and the proper timing sowing operations made in the month of July, just after completion of the wheat and barley harvest season.

The farmer, having completed his wheat and barley harvest, resorts to tilling the land and sowing it with the maize crop instead of leaving the land fallow for the next season. The easy process of maize plantation and the high fertility of the land with proven high encouraged farmers to expand plantations year after year.

Maize plantations, with produce ranging between 750-1500 per donum, are distributed in the areas of Kifl, Nile, Madhatiya, Shumali, Mashroua and Musayyab. These are but the main crop areas although it is now the practice for every farmer in the province to grow up maize in their farms.

Agricultural authorities have increased the encouragement of maize plantation in view of the economic and industrial benefits of this crop and its close link with the development of animal wealth in Iraq. Maize is used as raw material in animal fodder production owing to its high rate of protein. It is also an important source of starch and liquid oil.

The crop can be mixed at certain rates with wheat and barley flour in the production of bread and its ears after separating the corns are used in the production of papers. The crop is cultivated in two stages, in the spring starting March and ending in June, the second in autumn starting July and ending November.

The autumn season is more common with high yield compared with the spring stage which blossoms in June which is the hot month in the country and exposing the crop to the risks of damage.

The most common variety of the crop in the province is the Nilium, which is of Pakistani origin first introduced in the country by the state farms. The crop is treated twice during its cultivation with Diazinon. First after tillage and sowing in 20 days, the second after 35 days. This treatment is essential for success of the plantation.

CSO: 4300/109

BRIEFS

HIGHWAY PROJECTS--Anbar Province roads directorate is building a number of highways, 805 km. in length, and a number of bridges, at a total cost of ID 79,900,000. The highways include the Haditha-Qaem route, the strategic line route, the H2-Rutba route, the Nakhib-Kilo 160 route, the Kobeisa-cement factory, the New Hit-Kobeisa, the Qaem-Akkashat-Rutba, and two routes linking Haditha with the Haditha irrigation dam. In addition, the Ramadi-Rahaliya desert route will be paved, as well as the Majarra-Falluja road, and a branch road linking Haqlaniya with Haditha-Qaem route. The projects also include building floating bridges at Rawa, and Juwaina east, Haditha, Bezbyz, Albu Shajal, and a fixed bridge in the Hajlan valley and the Nusur square intersection in Habbaniya. Further, 11 traffic control points will be set up on highways and a workshop for motor vehicles. On the other hand another batch of projects should be finished this year built at a cost of ID 107 million, including the Rawa-Ramana road, the Rawa-Hatra road, the Ramadi-Samarra highway road, the Fatha-Haditha road, and the fixed bridges at Ramadi, Falluja, and Khalidiya, at a cost of ID. 14 million, and five crossings in a number of villages at a cost of ID. 150,000. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 28 Aug 81 p 7]

CSO: 4300/109

STRONGER U.S. MIDEAST POLICY URGED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by Prof Amos Perlmutter: "AWAC Aircraft as a Substitute"]

[Text] At the height of the riot surrounding the proposed sale of the AWAC aircraft to Saudi Arabia, one thing became more and more clear. The United States has no clear policy vis-a-vis the Mideast and the Persian Gulf.

The administration has yet to make a clear-cut decision that a new lodestone is needed for its relations with its allies and with the various regimes in this vital area. The basis of the test must be realpolitik and not desires of the heart; it must include the difficult question: "What will you do for us?"

There is a difficulty in the adoption of such an approach, for throughout more than 30 years there has been no decisive American policy at all vis-a-vis the Mideast. In its place, U.S. governments have nurtured various approaches to Arab rulers and the interests of royal dynasties in the region in the hope of enjoying an exchange. No justification has been found for these anticipations.

Now it is necessary to say to the Arabs and to their governments that for them to receive military or other support they must grant the United States something in exchange. They should not be allowed to discharge their obligation by lip service about petroleum prices; the thing must be expressed in military or political coin. The Arab governments, and particularly Saudi Arabia, must know that the United States is prepared to protect the petroleum but not necessarily the rulers of the petroleum.

The AWAC stumbling block (as was the F-15 issue) is an eminent example of giving (in this case sale) with no quid pro quo whatever.

The Mideast experts in the American State Department who perhaps were taken aback by the public outcry that arose concerning the sale of the AWAC planes, are now promising that the Saudis will not receive the planes equipped with the special radar or without specific American military support, and that the planes will not be used by the Saudis against Israel. This is like the man who acquires a vehicle without wheels and who, sooner or later, will return to get the wheels he needs. Sooner or later the Saudis will return to demand the sophisticated accessories, precisely as they have done in the matter of the F-15 aircraft.

This is not policy. This is not even strategy. This is the changing of policy into small coins whenever a request is heard. This particular dance has demonstrated that the American State Department lacks leadership or that Secretary of State Alexander Haig has changed his views from one extreme to the other regarding the assurances proclaimed in the past. What is clear is that the Mideast experts who have been retained from previous administrations are still plying their old profession and supporting the Arab issue.

The problem of Secretary of State Haig expresses itself, among other things, in the fact that he is apt to try to recapture for himself a degree of influence at the White House after having been sorely wounded in a number of bureaucratic encounters with Vice President Bush and Defense Secretary Weinberger, one of those advocating the sale of the AWAC aircraft and its connection with the sale of the F-15. Even before Reagan took office, he promised the Saudi defense people that the Reagan Administration would support the sale of the AWACs. And why the surprise? For, as bad luck would have it, Weinberger served in the past in the top ranks of the Bechtel Company.

It appears that Haig is not an important factor in the deliberations on the issue of the Mideast. Now it becomes clear that the visit of Haig to the Mideast in which he attempted to gain supporters for the concept of a strategic consensus of the Reagan Administration, according to which Israelis and the Arabs would together be included in a collective security arrangement under American protection against communism and international terrorism, did not succeed.

The concept of a strategic consensus is not new. This is the other side of the overall political arrangement of Carter-Brzezynski.

The overall policy arrangement strives to bring Israel and the Arab states to an overall peace conference. That is utopian. As opposed to this, the strategic consensus policy strives to bring Israel and the Arabs to indirect cooperation, the goal of which is to defend the Mideast against the Soviets. This aspiration is even more fanciful.

The strategic consensus is an American-Mideast innovation. The thought and the hope contained in it are that the moderate Arabs, such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as Israel, will be armed with the armaments required to remove the Soviet threat. Thus, each government will be eligible on a bilateral basis—in the course of time even on a collective basis, a sort of a Mideast NATO—for the protection of an American anti-Soviet umbrella.

This strategic idea will be detached from reality for as long as the Arabs who are labeled moderate, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, support the extremist Arabs such as Iraq and the PLO and, even more than that, are their allies.

In effect, the strategic consensus takes the place of strategic balance which was the American version for the Mideast over the past 4 decades. In the past, strategic considerations were based on a 1 to 3 military ratio between the Arabs and and Israel, and the United States and Israel together strived for the maintenance of this balance. The thing was based on the capabilities of the governments in the region and not on their aspirations.

The new concept will undermine the military balance in the Mideast in favor of the Arab states. According to the doctrine of the strategic consensus, the United States need not refrain from an unlimited arming of the states in the Mideast and in the Persian Gulf, subject only to the limitation of the wealth of each state.

The Arab peninsula, rich in petrodollars, may become the storehouse of arms until even the United States--irrespective of the degree of its supervision--may one day find there a hellish revolution led by a Saudi Qadhdhafi or, worse, by a Sunni Saudi Khomeyni.

The Israelis, who are aghast at the strategic consensus, are as mistaken as are their American friends. The Arabs see Israel, not the Soviet Union, as their principal enemy. Their arms, even the arms of the Saudis, are directed against Israel, not against the Soviet Union.

The single basis on which Mideast policy can be established is the Camp David process and within the framework of this process the American-Israeli-Arab strategy can mature with the passage of time.

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SECULAR ELECTORATE URGED TO ORGANIZE TO OPPOSE CLERICAL AIMS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Jul 81 p 7

[Article by Natan Donevitz: "Anti-Clerical Organization Needed"]

[Text] I won't be mistaken if I argue that many present-day Israeli citizens would now like to see a serious organization, supra-party, of personalities and institutions opposed to the clerical goals in Israeli politics. These goals are not new, the pressures were not created today, but factors have arisen that pose to the interests of the secular, who are the majority in the state, a danger greater than ever before.

Greater because over the past 4 years the religious, and in particular Agudath Yisrael, have achieved what they set out to attain from the governments of MAPAI, of Labor and of the Alignment. Much had been accomplished even before, but barriers had been raised against their demands. During the first administration of the LIKUD, many of these barriers were breached.

Now a situation has arisen in which many of the cardinal demands of the religious parties (which compete among themselves for the votes of the religious voters) have been met, and now, along with the demands in the field of finances, in which Aguda people have become highly competent, they are required to come up with additional demands outside the field of religion. As a result, they seek, apparently, to forbid the residents of Haifa to ride public transportation on the Sabbath, as has been customary; to forbid the residents of the Ramot Quarter in Jerusalem from driving along the road that has acquired notoriety because of the stone-throwing on the part of the Orthodox; and to legally ban the selling of non-kosher meat in steakhouses, restaurants and butcher shops. And, of course, additional stringency on the issue of "Who is a Jew?"

These are the "ideas" that the Aguda people have raised. The NRP cannot remain passive. Today, more than ever, it must put up a fight so that those Israelis who are observers of tradition and who voted for them this time as well will not be drawn to Agudat Yisrael during the next election. It should be borne in mind that the great majority of NRP supporters, who this time turned their backs on this party, is young. Veterans and the aged remain faithful to the NRP. From several standpoints, the image of the Aguda appears to them to be more desirable than it is to the young people. And the NRP is required--if it wishes not to lose them as well--to appear in the eyes of the veteran and the senior voter as

the guardian of the embers of the faith no less than the Aguda and the Council of the Torah Sages. Thus, more demands by the National Religious Party [NRP] in the area of faith can be expected. Thus it has always been and thus it is reasonable to assume it will be this time as well.

I would not be surprised if from the ranks of the NRP will come once again the cry to close the movie houses on Friday evenings, to ban theater, music and dance performances. And it will also be required of the NRP to set forth--because of the competition with the Aguda--demands in matters of the Rabbinical Courts, dietary laws, conversion and so forth.

Against this pressure and militant organization of two groups who are a small minority in Israel, and in view of their fear of losing even more of their strength after the disappearance of the PAI (Workers of Agudat Yisrael) from the Knesset, and of the heavy blow that was dealt to the head of the NRP--against all of this, it should be expected that the secular public, which is not as organized as the religious, will finally get itself together to defend its vital interests.

Broad Organization

I don't mean another organization of another small group, party or quasi-party, but rather something far more encompassing, large and strong, of intellectuals and economists (one of the demands set forth: the banning, by force of law, of work on projects on the Sabbath), people from the arts and communications, jurists, scientists, and anyone who believes that there is a need for such an organization. And with no party domination, or "sponsorship" of professionals from the area of the war against religion. My intent is for a broad public party that crosses party boundaries, an organization whose prestige and importance will also influence the establishment of an antireligious "lobby" in the Knesset.

Note what took place last week: Three representatives of Agudat Yisrael are received by the prime minister--three notables in Torah who are not teachers of the generation, but who are businessmen and merchants. In their honor, the prime minister dons a large skullcap, is positioned among them, embraces them (as is his wont) and is photographed for the public.

I haven't seen Mr Begin don his skullcap in every secret conference, in the Knesset or in its cafeteria, with representatives of the NRP or the Aguda. Suddenly something new--a skullcap on his pate. It is the privilege of Mr Begin, just as it is the privilege of every Jew, to don a skullcap. That's his affair. And who are we to utter a word about that? However, this act of protest, in an official position--this has already been borrowed from another "opera." I understand that if Mr Begin is invited to a circumcision, or to a wedding, or, Heaven forbid, to a funeral--it is understandable that a Jew such as he, who is so near to the religion and tradition of Israel, dons a skullcap. Not to mention at a meeting with a great rabbinical personage, or a visit to a synagogue or to a holy site. But for the purpose of a photographed meeting with three of the Commandment Angels of the Aguda!

Picture of a Situation

The skullcap, in this instance, must kindle a number of alarms in anyone to whom civil liberty is precious. Those three came on a mission of a party which, during its election campaign broadcasts, displayed a young woman wearing an astonished expression and explaining to the young women voters how Agudat Yisrael helped her avoid being conscripted into the IDF. They broadcast the image of this woman of spirit time after time. And the prime minister, who is also minister of defense, dons a skullcap in their honor and embraces them in a pose resembling that of a school graduation picture. Beautiful, Mr Minister of Defense, a beauty of a picture!

To change the picture, and so that four Knesset members of 120 will not bring about the curtailing of the rights of the majority of the citizens of the state, the secular electorate has a duty to organize itself.

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NAVY SEEKS TECHNOLOGICAL SOPHISTICATION

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 2 Jul 81 pp 16-17, 51

[Interview with a senior naval officer in charge of weapons systems on Navy Day by Hayim Raviv; date and place not specified]

[Text] The disclosure of the new weapons systems in use by the Israeli Navy--the Aliyah-type missile boat with a deck for a naval helicopter and a Harpoon surface-to-surface missile--reflects only the very tip of the "technological dimension" which is intensifying in the navy to meet the growing Arab naval threat to Israel. One could get this impression from an interview which I conducted on Navy Day with a senior naval officer who is in charge of weapons systems beginning this week.

For understandable reasons it is not possible to publish the entire interview, however even the little which can be released is enough to arouse pride and a feeling of security that those who are responsible for the naval front are doing well in coping with the problems of current security and are also accurately projecting the future battlefield and are preparing accordingly.

At the beginning of the interview I asked the senior officer--young, handsome but with a serious, somewhat hardened facial expression--to cite the main milestones in the development of the navy.

[Answer] In the short history of the Israeli Navy one can discern three main periods: the period in which the focal point was the War of Independence; the period between the eve of Operation Kadesh and the first days after the Six-Day War; and the period after the Six-Day War in which the focal point was the navy's achievements in the Yom Kippur War.

Up to and including the Six-Day War, the main strength of the navy was based on outmoded ships such as destroyers, torpedo boats, and frigates. After the war, in the 1967-1968 period, the development of the navy began to be accelerated. The sinking of the destroyer Elat by the Egyptians, who were equipped with modern missile systems, stimulated this process which was expressed by the navy's entrance into the missile age. The first missile boats were built in France in the famous Cherbourg shipyards, and they arrived in Israel in 1968 after a trip of about 6000 km. The boats arrived without weapons systems and without being outfitted.

Exploiting the Advantages of the Missile Boat

In the first stage the boats were equipped only with guns, however after an intensive and extended effort, they were equipped with modern weapons systems including missiles. The upgrading, build-up of the forces and their training, extensive combat experience, and the daily, vigorous, routine preparation for the future left their imprint in the navy's brilliant operations and successes in the Yom Kippur War. These successes constitute the navy's acme of action in protecting the security of Israel. In this war a basic doctrine which the navy developed was implemented: Viewing the attack as a most effective defense method and the hope of stopping the enemy boats in their own bases. Unlike the Six-Day War, this time the navy had available the proper missiles and equipment to carry out the doctrines which it had adopted.

The results of the war proved that we have learned how to exploit all the tactical advantages of the missile boat and the weapons systems which have been developed for it through the years.

Against the background of the Yom Kippur War and the fact that the enemy demonstrated in this war that he understands the significance of sea space (among other things, this was reflected in the blockading of the Bab el-Mandeb Straits), the navy intensified its efforts to develop the missile boats, and it is continuing this effort in order to respond to the challenges of the future.

[Question] What are the navy's basic missions?

[Answer] The navy has a series of missions in the area of current security and in the area of preparing for war. In the area of current security, the navy's main task today is to maintain security along the country's coasts and to prevent the penetration of terrorist teams from the sea, and in this way to eliminate the possibility of attacks against vital population centers. Another of the navy's tasks today is to guarantee freedom of movement for Israel's merchant ships in the international sea lanes. It must be remembered that these sea lanes pass within missile range of at least some of the Arab navies.

[Question] Which enemy forces is the Israeli Navy confronted with today?

[Answer] After the peace agreement with Egypt, we face today the navies of Libya, Syria, and perhaps also Algeria. The Libyan Navy is growing daily, above and beyond all proportion, with all types of ships, submarines, and both eastern and western weapons systems.

The other countries like Syria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq are not lagging behind it. The number of enemy ships which are streaming into the area are creating an unprecedented balance of power.

The enemy's navies are equipped with ships and sophisticated weapons systems which originate not only in the East but also in the West, and as is known, these countries have no problem of money to purchase ships with advanced technology.

[Question] How is the navy preparing to cope with the enemy?

[Answer] The face of the area has changed, and the Arab maritime threat to Israel has taken on new significance. The Israeli navy cannot compete in the number of ships with the navies of the enemy. It must cope with them with a higher quality combatant and with more advanced technology.

Another prerequisite is the proper deployment in the area which will permit the navy to meet any possible trouble. We must be everywhere at all times in order not to permit the enemy to press the button before us. The future war is likely to continue for a long time. The Yom Kippur War taught us that we are likely to become involved in a prolonged situation. In the last war we surprised them, and I hope that also in the next war, if it breaks out, we will again surprise them. Although they already know how we did this, in the meantime we have made considerable progress and the problem which we will have to deal with is how to seek out and find the enemy's weak point so that we can launch the projectile toward the forehead of "Goliath" and hit him precisely and defeat him. Recently the navy was equipped with missiles which can operate beyond the horizon. With the aid of helicopters which are positioned on the deck of our boats, we are able to detect the enemy better.

Three Israeli Advantages

[Question] What is the navy's advantage over the enemy navies?

[Answer] I would cite the human factor as the primary advantage. On a boat which must operate as an oiled machine, the human factor has enormous importance. The personal ability of the sailor as an individual and that of the ship's crew as a collective permit us to master the sophisticated systems which the advanced technology has brought us.

The ship commanders in the navy and their officer corps are from the very best. These are young men who have been carefully selected and trained to be officers and to command in long and predetermined courses of study. The navy has spared no resources in order to train its officers in the best possible way, and as was stated, only the best among them have remained. Like them, the ships' crews are also from the best in the navy. Generally speaking, they come to the ships as volunteers, with advanced training and high motivation.

An additional advantage is the effectiveness of naval intelligence. It must be remembered that we are dealing today with systems that permit greater detection ranges, something which is likely to cause a distortion of the battle picture. In this complexity, we must locate the true enemy. This is a problem in itself since the sea space in which we are operating is crawling with neutral targets and ships of foreign powers. An unintentional attack on such a ship is likely to cause complications for the State of Israel. On this point I would like to note that our naval intelligence has not disappointed us to date, and I am certain that it will not disappoint us also in the future.

The third advantage is the recognition of the area and those who are working in it. This recognition helps us to exploit in a war all the possible advantages and to prevent the enemy from surprising us.

The three factors which I have cited--the human, recognition of the area, and intelligence through the integration of the sophisticated weapons systems--represent the answer to the enemy navies.

[Question] The Arab navies are bringing into their ranks foreign experts who are involved in training them in the use of the most sophisticated equipment. In light of the progress in the Arab navies also in ships, the question is asked if there is no concern that in the course of time we will also lose the qualitative advantage?

[Answer] Although it is true that some of the Arab navies can learn and advance with the aid of those experts, it must be remembered however that these experts have not had our experience on the battlefield, and this is where we have the advantage. It can be said that we have acquired with precious blood the combat doctrine and the skill in the operation of weapons.

In the final analysis, the victor in the future battle will be the side which is able to detect faster the weak points of the other side and to exploit them to its benefit. This action is not carried out by foreign experts but by trained combat crews who are knowledgeable of warfare and well versed in all its secrets.

[Question] What is the navy's technological response to the terrorist organizations' attempts to attack from the sea?

[Answer] We are striving for a siutation in which we will succeed in "closing" the coast as is the case on the northern border. We initiated this process after we discovered a number of penetrations. The attacks on Nahariya, Ma'agan Mikhael, and Tel Aviv made it unequivocally clear that every effort must be made to close the coast in order to assist the patrolling naval forces. We have learned that every penetration of the State of Israel from the sea has had tragic results and has severely shaken the morale of the people. We are now in an advanced state of implementing the plan which will constitute the suitable response to the attempts by the terrorist organizations to attack us on the one hand and will permit us better control over the sea space of the State of Israel on the other hand.

[Question] What are the main elements of the navy's plans in the area of the development of weapons systems?

[Answer] The ships which we now have for the most part have passed part of their lifespan. The balance of forces between us and the enemy navies continues to worsen. These two reasons together require us to invest every effort to modernize the navy in all areas--guided-missile ships, submarines, and landing craft and to improve all the weapons systems in order for us to be able to cope with the quantitative strength of the Arab navies.

There are numerous plans. We have just now completed the determination of the requirements for the future ships, and we are beginning the planning and production which will conclude in a few years. In this framework, ships will be built in sizes that will permit them to remain at sea for a long time and in this way to eliminate the possibility of surprise.

It must be remembered that the budget problem exists and also affects us, however by recognizing the most urgent needs and by setting a proper scale of priorities, I believe that we can overcome this obstacle.

From Wild Imagination to A Useful System

[Question] What distinguishes the work of the Israeli Navy in the development of weapons systems?

[Answer] Our uniqueness is in the fact that we represent a small and sophisticated force which functions with effective systems. Unlike other armed forces in which there is a vast difference between the technical officer and the operations officer and virtually no contact between them, with us they work closely, practically 24 hours a day. Moreover, there is close coordination between the sailor and the military industries. Thanks to this closeness, we are able to produce integrated and sophisticated naval weapons systems in short periods of time while in enlightened countries like the United States or in Europe, it takes twice as long or even longer.

[Question] How does the technique of processing ideas or findings work within the structure of the navy and what is the extent of the contribution of these ideas?

[Answer] Every sailor who comes up with an idea which can improve one of the ship's systems can write it down and send it to me for consideration. I am happy to point out that the response has been great. Tens of such ideas come to me and are reviewed by a technical committee which I head. If the committee decides that the idea has merit and can be implemented, we pass a recommendation for the review and approval of the navy commander. After the commander's approval, there begins the process of development which at times is a lengthy one since it consists of numerous stages including: Determination of operational requirements, initial planning, preparation of specifications, production of models, and tests of the system. If the series of tests is successful, we go into production and installation of the systems on the ships.

[Question] Can you provide a number of examples, and what do you estimate to be the rate of ideas which have been accepted?

[Answer] As I stated, there are many ideas, however one example will suffice, one which involves the improvement of the capability to control the missile boats. In this case, like in other cases, the ideas were the fruit of wild imagination, however they have been converted into a useful weapons system.

Generally speaking, I can say that of all the ideas that come to me, about 10 percent of them eventually reach the stage of operational implementation.

[Question] Finally, it is customary to think that the air force is able to go anywhere, and the proof is Entebbe and the atomic reactor. Can this also be said about the navy?

[Answer] Yes, and how!

5830
CSO: 4323/32

BRIEFS

FRUIT CULTIVATION EXPERIMENT--Tests to grow deciduous fruit trees--apple, peach and plum--in very meager, chalky and rock-laden soil in the plant project of Beyt Nekufa in the Jerusalem corridor, have been crowned with success. A staff of researchers from the Plant Institute in the Agricultural Research Administration at Beyt Dagan has discovered that daily feeding and watering, as is customary for pruned plants, brings about good development of the trees and high harvests. Success of the test opens the door to the planting of thousands of dunums of inferior, chalky and rocky land in the mountain region which until now were not exploited. At the cooperative initiative of the Plant Regional Commission of Matey Yehuda, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Jewish Agency and the Fruit Growers Organization, there was established in 1977 a plant project of Beyt Nekufa designed to investigate the possibilities of raising deciduous fruit trees in inferior and rocky soil. The professional administration of the project was placed in the hands of a research staff headed by Dr Yitzhaq Klein of the Agricultural Research Administration and with the cooperation of Mr Elimeleckh Barkhan of the Agricultural Committee of the farms of Matey Yehuda. The researchers tested two levels of fertilizers that are introduced by means of irrigation water in various planting gaps as well as irrigation by droplets, by spray and by discontinuous watering. At the end of 4 years of tests, it was revealed that watering by droplets with the addition of fertilizers in the first years of the plants' existence brought about accelerated development of the trees and sufficiently high fruit yield by the fourth year. About 1.6 tons to the dunum of peaches and about 1.5 tons of apples were gathered. The anticipated harvest this year is about 3 tons of peaches per dunum. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Jul 81 p 5] 8090

CSO: 4324/35

BRIEFS

'DEMOCRATIC GROUP' PROTEST--Police were called on when a number of university students, calling themselves "The Democratic Group" staged a protest demonstration outside Sheraton Hotel on Sunday night. The students--one of them a girl--carrying placards dispersed without incident when the police moved in. The students were protesting the eighth conference of the National Union for Kuwait Students, which was going on the hotel, under the patronage of Crown Prince and Premier Sheikh Saad Abdullah. The conference, which was being staged after a lapse of seven years, was opened by the Minister of Communications, Dr. Yacoub Al Ghoneim, who is also the university chancellor. Al Ghoneim told the students that the future of Kuwait was in their hands. It was their duty, now, he said, to prepare for the stage when they would be involved in the running of the country. The chairman of the preparatory committee for the conference urged the students to abide by the union constitution to ensure the continued success of the union. He reminded them of the crises the union faced seven years ago, which almost brought about its collapse. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation representative, Nabeel Ansari, told the gathering the events of the past 15 days proved the capability of Palestinians not only to maintain the struggle with the enemy but also emerge victorious. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 25 Aug 81 p 3]

CSO: 4300/108

AMAL MEMBER COMMENTS ON LEBANESE SITUATION, SECTARIANISM

Paris AL-NAHAE AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 217, 29 Jun to 5 Jul 81, pp 11-13

[Interview with member of Amal movement and Chamber of Deputies, Mr Husayn al-Husayni, by 'Abd al-Hadi Mahfuz; date and place not given]

[Text] "The Shiites Are Not an Extension of Iran or of Any Other Country."

"Those Who Accuse the Muslims of Not Being Loyal to Lebanon Basically Consider That Lebanon Is Theirs Alone, and It Is on This Basis That They Demand That the Muslims Be Loyal to Lebanon."

"As For Those Who Belong to the Lebanese Front, They Are Part of Our Nation and We Cannot Abandon Them Or Contribute Toward Increasing Their Involvement."

"The Dialogue Cannot Take Place Except Through the Legitimate Government."

In a meeting which could be described as more than an interview and less than a dialogue, Deputy Husayn al-Husayni presented his view of the situation to AL-NAHAR Al-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI. He asserted that the Amal movement is not a sectarian movement, that the Shiite sect considers Lebanon to be its homeland, and that it is not an extension of Iran or of any other country.

As far as the Lebanese crisis is concerned, al-Husayni did not appear to be very optimistic. He said: "The solutions which have been proposed are no more than temporary truces. The reason for this is that the South is the core of the Lebanese problem, and it is still not taken into consideration when proposing solutions."

His opinion is that the elimination of the sectarian orientation presupposes that there must first be elimination of discrimination between sects and then elimination of political sectarianism in a subsequent stage. He considers that the policy of having equal representation for Muslims and Christians in the Chamber of Deputies, within the framework of free elections within a single [election] district, will contribute greatly toward having everyone have the same feeling of national loyalty toward Lebanon. But as far as the office of President of the Republic is concerned, he feels that there is no harm in having this remain in the hands of the Christians "because this is in the higher interest of the Arab nations."

Concerning the army, he said that the political authorities were shirking their responsibilities and were making the army bear the responsibility for their mistakes. Al-Husayni feels that dissolution of the army would lead to people losing hope in having a united Lebanon. As far as the National Accord is concerned, his views are based on one simple principle: "By means of the legitimate government we can have a dialogue with all Lebanese groups."

Here is a transcript of the interview:

[Question] What are the Shiite institutions which were created by Imam [Musa] al-Sadr and which he participated in forming? What is the relationship between them and the Lebanese National Movement? On what basis does a religious movement establish co-operative relations with a leftist group which is predominantly of a Marxist nature?

[Answer] I exempt myself in advance from being compelled to give an answer from the Shiite point of view. We fundamentally, and as far as our goals are concerned, reject any sectarianism which is at the expense of our nation. When we say "Shiites," this designation mainly means to us the people who live in [Lebanon's] deprived areas which have constituted a basic shortcoming in the national formation [of Lebanon]. Using this concept as a basis, the first action was to create an institution which could give expression to this shortcoming since a large social group had not had any actual existence on the political level. The result was the founding of the Higher Shiite Islamic Council which is more secular than religious in nature. After only a short time had gone by, Imam [Musa] al-Sadr and the group which was working together with him discovered that, in view of the fact that this Council included all groups, from the far right to the far left, the only possible result would be that their decisions would be predominantly of a compromise nature and would not result in any actual position taken. Therefore it was necessary to form Amal, the movement of deprived people, as a means by which to achieve this basic goal. The goal is to have all groups and all regions of Lebanon participate in making fundamental national choices. This is a necessary first step in order to have Lebanese society merge into a single national Lebanese melting pot. If this can be done, we will have eliminated people's feeling of being subjected and deprived, and we will have made all regions of Lebanon become fundamental regions in our national entity.

Through practical application as well as in view of the complicated nature of Lebanese political relationships, which demand a great deal of experience on the part of those who are politically active, it was necessary that the formation of the National Front for the Preservation of the South be carried out be politicians having long experience in the political arena. Furthermore, they have been committed to our policy since the beginning. At this point I must emphasize that the Amal movement is neither of a religious nor sectarian nature. If it should become thus, then this, by definition, would mean that its existence is no longer justified.

In view of what I have said above, it is clear that the function of the Higher Shiite Council cannot be the function of the Amal movement. The function of the Amal movement cannot be the function of the National Front for the Preservation of the South. Each of these frameworks has a role which exists in its own right. There is no organizational relationship between these various frameworks, but all of them have

a common political goal. As for our relations with the National Movement, they are like relations which we have with any of the groups. We are in agreement with any group which shares our views, concerns, and interests, and we differ with any group which has differences with us in these regards. These groups which have been mentioned have their complete view with regard to the Lebanese situation and tragedy, and they have their complete program for putting an end to this tragedy and for a future formula for Lebanon. This view was established and ratified in joint meetings in 1977, and was announced at that time, and during every dialogue and every consultation we have remained committed to the contents of this view. What I could do is mention the most important guidelines of this view, especially those conerning the entity and identity of Lebanon.

The Shiites' Basic Homeland

[Question] Concerning this point, do you consider Lebanon to be the homeland for the Lebanese and the Shiites?

[Answer] In our working paper, we have said that we consider, as our homeland, the Lebanon whose borders are internationally recognized. We consider Lebanon to be a sovereign, independent state, in accordance with the wishes of all of its inhabitants, and we consider Lebanon to be an Arab country which is an inalienable part of the Arab world. We feel that Lebanon should share the fruits of the Arab world, and that it should be committed to the vital causes of this Arab world.

[Question] If Lebanon is your homeland, what is the extent of involvement of Lebanon's Shiites with the Shiites of Iran? Do you consider yourselves to be an extension of Iran? Is there a need to clarify this?

[Answer] I have already mentioned the fact that we are against the idea of sectarian entities. We reject the establishment of a Shiite entity just as we reject the other sectarian entities. But we did, and still do, support the Iranian Islamic revolution from two standpoints. First of all, we support this revolution because its previous regime, the regime of the shah of Iran, cooperated with Israel and was hostile to the Arabs with regard to their vital causes. Also, this regime theoretically represented a Shiite majority. For the Shiites, it constituted a great burden and a weak spot which made it acceptable for others to both accuse and be suspicious of the Shiites. It is for this reason that the fall of this regime was a relief to Shiites, wherever they were. And what if the new regime would begin supporting the Arabs in their vital causes? Secondly, Israel had succeeded in neutralizing both the Islamic and Christian worlds with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, Israel was even able to obtain the support of many Muslim and Christian nations. This happened at a time when the most important element of this conflict was the fact that Zionism was striving to destroy the heritages of both Muslims and Christians. The establishment of a regime in Iran which is hostile to Israel is conducive to putting an end to this process of neutralization and to paving the way for other Muslim and Christian nations to undertake to intervene in order to protect the heritages of both the Muslims and Christians in Palestine.

So from these two standpoints alone we support the Islamic revolution in Iran, but we are not an extension of Iran or of anybody else. This is particularly true since Lebanon has a nature all its own, and since it would not be right to propose for

Lebanon any religious ideology which might have a harmful effect on the higher vital interest of the Lebanese--which is coexistence between the various sects and the members thereof.

[Question] Imam Musa al-Sadr used to ascribe a fundamental role to the legitimate Lebanese government and support it in the realization of the Accord. How do the Shiite establishments stand with regard to this policy of the Imam?

[Answer] Imam [Musa] al-Sadr, and his group, feel that there are points of agreement with the legitimate goverment, and they feel that there are points of difference with it. The points of agreement do not concern the poeple who hold positions in the legitimate government, but rather concern the legitimate government itself. We do not believe in any National Accord which does not take into consideration the strengthening of the legitimate government and its basic role in achieving this Accord, because it will always constitute the symbol of our nation's unity in terms of territory, people, and institutions. We consider that the Lebanese tragedy has created a split between the legitimate government and its authority. The legitimate government has remained legitimate, but others have taken its place in the exercise of its authority.

Clarification Requested

[Question] We need a clarification. What do you mean by the expression "others have taken its place in the exercise of its authority"? Is it possible to separate the legitimate government from the people in it?

[Answer] I am referring to the armed militias here and there which have exploited the decrease in the authority of the government over Lebanese territory and have exercised authority in place of this legitimate government. The best proof of this is the fact that most of the vital institutions and utilities are under the authority of these non-legitimate forces. Our basic goal then is to have the legitimate goverment once again exercise its authority so that there will no longer be any authority exercised by non-legitimate forces and so that there will no longer be any room for non-legitimate authority.

Our points of difference with the legitimate government lie in the fact that this legitmate government is still a prisoner of the mentality which existed before the Lebanese war. This is especially true with regard to the concept of the 1943 formula which was based on duality of rule by the Maronites and the Sunni Muslims--at a time when the formula had already exploded. For this reason, it is illogical to establish a formula which does not take into consideration the participation of all sects and all groups, without exception. We will not allow any group to believe that it has no relationship to this future formula. The purpose of all of this is to eliminate sectarian discrimination among the sects during the first stage, and then to eliminate political sectarianism once and for all during a subsequent stage.

[Question] What is this future political formula which will eliminate fear and fraud and will not repeat the mistakes of the 1943 formula which was based on the existence of a majority and a minority? How can we reassure the Christians that they will not be lost in a sea of Muslims, especially after this war?

[Answer] I would like to say from the outset that I do not believe in this close relationship between the Arab world and Islam except from the cultural point of view, because in the Arab world we have not only a Moslem civilization, but also a Christian civilization, and we used to have a civilization which preceded both Islam and Christianity.

We believe in not discriminating between Chritians and Muslims, and we believe in the principle of justice and equality. In order to put this principle into practice, we need to have equal representation for Muslims and Christians in the Chamber of Deputies, on the condition that all of the members of the Chamber of Deputies be elected by all Lebanese. This shortcoming did not become a major factor in Lebanon until the establishment of election laws which made is possible for Christian deputies to ignore Muslim voters and for Muslim deputies to ignore Christian voters. This is why we see everybody today discussing things on a sectarian basis as if this were something fundamental. But if Lebanon is transformed into a single election district, this would eliminate any sectarian orientation and such an orientation would be considered national treason. Concerning this matter, we believe that the Christians should keep the post of President of the Republic. We feel this way not because of any principle of majority and minority, but because we feel that the higher interest of the Arab world dictates that there should be a Christian among the Arab presidents and kings, on the condition that this president be the president of all Lebanese and not just the president of the Christians.

Divided Loyalty

[Question] Some Christians feel that the Muslims are not true Lebanese and that their feelings are more with the lands of the Arab interior, and that they feel that Lebanon is nothing more than a village in this larger Arab homeland. These Christians who say this attribute the crisis to the divided loyalty of the Muslims. What is your opinion about this?

[Answer] Of course, I reject this accusation both in form and in principle because, in practice, on the level of Lebanese national life, we do see Muslim loyalty to Lebanon. As I see it, this accusation is being made by people who, in their own minds, are mixed up concerning their concept of what a nation is. They consider that Lebanon belongs to them alone, and they demand that others be loyal to this Lebanon which is theirs. We, however, believe that Lebanon belongs to all of its citizens and that all of them should be loyal to it. I have already said that Lebanon is the basic homeland of all of its people, and that this is the desire of its people. We always stress its independence, sovereignty over all of its territory, and its unity in terms of territory, people and institutions. This is a unity which we cannot neglect, no matter what sacrifices this may entail, because partitioning of Lebanon will take place only after all of Lebanon's land, and everything on it, has been burned. Either Lebanon has to be totally united, or else it will not exist. On the basis of this premise, we cannot be true partners with the other people in our Arab world unless we preserve our nation, by means of which we will be able to contribute our share concerning their causes, which are also our vital causes. But if our nation ceases to exist, then there can be no partnership between those who have a nation and those who do not have a nation.

[Question] Half of the Lebanese army is composed of people from the Shiite sect. And this institution has been subjected to violent criticism, especially after the events of 2 April. In what manner do you work together with this institution, and what is your position with regard to the pressures which it has been subjected to? And what difference is there between your position with regard to the army and the position taken by the legitimate government?

[Answer] Our premise is that the army is an executive arm of the political authorities, and we are not in favor of any sectarianism in this army. This is shown by the fact that we have been, and still are, against the sectarian composition which has been introduced into the military council of the army, because this act has paralyzed the effectiveness of the army and has made it the object of controversy and criticism. What we want is a national army of national origin which has nothing to do with political disputes and whose mistakes are considered to be the responsibility of the political authorities. But at the present time, unfortunately, the army is being allowed to exist as an institution unto itself and independent of the legitimate government. It is being subjected to criticism, and it finds nobody who takes it under his wing and defends it. This is at a time when all the mistaken actions are attributable to the political authorities, and not to the army.

My proof of this is the crushing blow which the army suffered at 'Ayn al-Rummanah. There the political authorities managed to avoid paying for the losses and made the army bear the responsibility. But the fact is that the army has no right to make political decisions concerning these matters. Another proof of this is the discrepancy which we see in the political authorities when the prime minister issues criticism without offering any solutions which would make this army a sound tool to be used to serve their real objectives. This whole situation exists because we are afraid to call the prime minister to account and because we are afraid of having a governmental vacuum since we may not find anybody else other than the prime minister who would form a government.

We also find groups who claim to be interested in the army as well as those who abandoned it after 'Ayn al-Rummanah or who reject it, quoting general slogans which are impossible to translate into reality. All of these people are seeking to avoid the real answer and are putting the cart before the horse. This is because it is utterly impossible to separate the molding of the army from the effectiveness of a political National Accord. The concept of an Accord is what will tend to determine the nature of the army and its composition. This does not mean that it is necessary to stop using the army until we arrive at a National Accord. It means that we should use the army in places where using it will serve to strengthen confidence in it and where it will not be a party in any dispute among Lebanese. We must realize that the core of the Lebanese problem is the Lebanese issue in the South where Israel is utilizing the pretext of protecting the Christians from the danger of genocide at the hands of the Palestinians. This is the pretext under which Israel is continuing to occupy territory in southern Lebanon and is evading the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council. This is where the role of the Lebanese army comes in. It should have a fully effective presence in the South. This would lead to eliminating the pretext of the Israelis and to putting into force the decisions of the Security Countil, on the one hand, and it would also lead to extending the authority of the Lebanese government to the territory in the

South and to strengthening confidence in the army. This would have a positive effect on the total situation in Lebanon, including the matter of an accord between the various Lebanese factions on the one hand as well as an accord between the Lebanese and the Palestinians. Any initiative which does not regard this matter as one of its top priorities will not get anywhere and will only lead to a temporary truce and will only put a new face on the existing crisis rather than solving it.

I would like to say again that dissolution of the army will destroy what hope we have left to put an end to this continuing tragedy. For this reason, we cannot accept any action which will lead to damaging the unity of the army because it is a fundamental institution in the structure of our nation.

[Question] Mr Walid Junblat recently refused to have a dialogue with Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil until he breaks off relations with Israel. Do you share Mr Junblat's position, and would you have this position apply to the entire Lebanese Front?

[Answer] We consider that the Lebanese tragedy is a calamity for all Lebanese, and we do not feel that it is useful for us to start blaming each other for what we have involved ourselves in. We do not consider that the Lebanese Front represents all Christians, and we refuse to ignore other Christian leaders. We also consider that those who belong to the Lebanese Front are part of our nation and we cannot abandon them and we cannot contribute toward increasing their involvement. We consider that we have to regain these fellow Lebanese, no matter what cost we have to pay. Furthermore, the proposal of a dialogue cannot take place except through the legitimate Lebanese government whose job it is to represent the points of view of all parties, whether it is a matter of a Lebanese-Lebanese accord, a Lebanese-Palestinian understanding, or whether it concerns relations with Syria and other nations. Although we have become accustomed to ignoring the legimate government under our present unnatural and exceptional circumstances, we still cannot accept these exceptions as being the rule. The legitimate government is the body which represents all Lebanese both inside Lebanon and in other countries. It is on the basis of this premise and by means of the legitimate government that we must conduct a dialogue with all parties and come to understand them well. But we must bear in mind that when any party has a relationship with Israel, it not only is damaging to the interests of that party, but also is damaging to the interests of Lebanon and all of the Lebanese. For this reason, we must all assume our responsibility and eliminate this Israeli intervention in Lebanon, no matter what form it takes. This is basically an Arab responsibility, and this Arab responsibility must close the Lebanese gap, no matter how costly this action is, because this is at the core of the higher interest of the Arab nations. The Arabs will bear historic responsibility for any neglect concerning this matter.

Rejection of the Settlement of Displaced Persons

[Question] The last problem which remains is that of those people who have been displaced from their urban areas and villages. This problem equally concerns all of the parties in the Lebanese war, both as organizations and as sects. In your opinion, what is the solution?

[Answer] We must not accept any status quo which would serve to keep these displaced persons uprooted, no matter what group they belong to. On the basis of this

principle, we reject settling the displace persons where they presently are, even though we realize that this problem cannot be totally solved except within the framework of a National Accord. But as far as the South is concerned, we must constantly strive, on a daily basis, to return these displaced persons to their cities and villages and to enable them to stay in their lands. The reason for this is that the emptying of the South of its inhabitants is something which is at variance with the formation of the Lebanese nation--one of the characteristics of which is the interrelationship of its demographic distribution with its geographical area--and this would threaten the future of our entire nation. For this reason also we reject the offering of aid to displaced persons from the South unless they return to their own lands, because aiding them when they are uprooted and displaced will only make their exodus permanent.

9468
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OFFICIALS DISCUSS DOMESTIC CONCERNS

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 222, 9 Aug 81 pp 27-29

[Report on Interview with Mauritanian Officials by Bisharah Albun in Nouakchott; date not specified: "Where Does Neutral Mauritania Stand in the Continent of Crises after 3 Years of National Liberation? There are Three Domestic Concerns; Fourth Concern Is Neutralizing Africa; France and Saudi Arabia Are To Encourage Rabat in the Position on the Sahara; Libyan Presence in the Area Is Normal"]

[Text] The third anniversary of the 10 July Movement, the national anniversary of the armed forces in Mauritania and the celebrations that accompanied these two occasions were the occasion for a visit made by AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI to Nouakchott where Bisharah Albun met with a number of Mauritanian officials. Chief among those were the prime minister, the minister of defense and member of the National Liberation Military Committee Col Maaouiya Ould Sid 'Ahmed Taya and the minister of economy and finance Mr Dieng Boubou Farba.

A summary of the observations and discussions about the situation in Mauritania from various political, economic and social aspects [follows].

How is Mauritania, the tawny daughter of the desert, and where does she stand now 3 years after the "military uprising in a national liberation movement" and 2 years after the drain in its desert center has been stopped?

With his quiet smile and his usual warmth the average Mauritanian would respond with an answer that is outwardly simple but profound in its implications. "Not bad, thank God."

It is true that this desert dweller who believes in God finds it necessary to refer to God and to mention Him in everything he does. This, however, does not signify that he is intolerant or rigid; on the contrary, he is open, expressing his thoughts and what goes on in his mind freely and candidly, calling things as he sees them and relating facts as he experiences them.

A visitor from the East or from the farthest point in the West is taken

aback by this openness. But he soon finds out the reality of the country and grasps its political, economic and social facts.

It is with such candor that one begins a discussion with Mauritanians about the Sahara. There is nothing curious about this since this vital problem for them is the be-all and end-all. It is the end of "a fraternal war between fellow neighbors" and the beginning of "a period of building peace between the countries of the Arab Maghreb," the principal condition for concentrating on the development process and devoting efforts to finding solutions to the economic and social problems from which the people of the area who have been recently liberated from foreign colonialism have been suffering.

It is true that as soon as the new leadership assumed command, it committed itself to implementing the first objective that it had set, which is "to put an end to the state of war with the brothers of the Sahara." This was carried out through the 5 August 1979 agreement which was signed by Mauritania and the POLISARIO Front.

Although the war inside Mauritania has come to an end, it is still going on along its borders between "two fraternal and neighboring nations." Hence putting an end to the military confrontation has not kept Nouakchott away from dangers. It will not have full stability unless the problem of the Sahara is solved and the war in the area is finally brought to an end.

As a result of its awareness of this fact, Mauritania, through its officials, has never abandoned its duty as "an Arab and an African Muslim nation" to ensure the return of "a permanent peace" to the area.

This peace will not be "permanent" in the view of Nouakchott unless it is "fair and acceptable to all the parties" and based on "respecting the basic rights of people and their evident and sincere will to choose their destiny freely."

Hence, Mauritanians think that Morocco would have to recognize the POLISARIO at least as "an acceptable negotiator" in the talks to establish a solution to the problem of the Sahara. This is because the front has established that "it does in fact exist" and that it constitutes "a serious and a real power."

But does Mauritania have a role to play in bringing about a rapprochement between remote points of view?

The response is a candid one. "We will not play any role that is not requested by this party or the other. It is true that we have committed ourselves to a neutral position on the struggle between two fraternal nations, but we will not hesitate in carrying out any positive action to bring the two nations closer together."

Mauritanians do not hide the fact that "Morocco's position toward us was not encouraging. On the contrary it upset us because it considered us

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON IRANIAN CLERGY

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BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON IRANIAN CLERGY

Qom GANJINEH-YE DANESHMANDAN in Persian Vol 8, 1979, pp 1-415

[Excerpts of book compiled by Mohammad Sharif Razi. Piruz Publications]

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IMAM KHOMEYNI

The head of religious jurists and theological authority, leader of the Shi'ites, pivot of religious law, exalted leader and religious eminence at the apex of the 14th century A.H. [12 Nov 1882-1 Dec 78], ayatollah and great scholar, named Masih son of Mariyam, Hajji Aqa Ruhollah al-Musavi--may his noble life be long--son of Martyr Hojjatoleslam Aqa Seyyed Mostafa Khomeyni, was born in the town of Khomeyn on 20 Jamadi-alsavi [25 Aug], the anniversary of the blessed birth of the Lady of Two Worlds (peace be upon her), the dear part of the heart of the Messenger of God (peace be upon him), Fatemeh Zahra, in 1320 A.H. [1902]. Because of this, one of the friends of the Prophet's family and a self-sacrificing devotee of his highness has composed:

Two glorious birthdays have coincided
And the world is drowned in joy as a result of this incident:
The birthday of the Chastity of Truth and that of the Spirit [Ruh] of Truth
That is, "Khomeyni," the beloved sign of the Almighty.
By this auspicious mother and her brave son
The world, religion, and justice are honored.
Like his mother, this free spirited, brave son
Does not compromise with tyrany and injustice.
May Khomeyni's name live forever on the Tablet of Time
May the manifestation of this love remain forever.

The instructive biography and constructive life history of this genious of the times, in his courage, bravery, and struggle against the unjust and the tyrants, deserves several volumes; and, thusfar, some books devoted to the life history of Imam Khomeyni have been written and published.

This humble servant, about 30 years ago, had also written briefly on it in Vol 2 of "Asarolhojjah" and, 10 years ago, in Vol 2 of "Ganjineh-ye Daneshmandan"; but, the Editing Office of Culture and Arts of the vile SAVAK arrested me with the book. The life history of the imam had been prepared and printed in only a few pages; but after six months, the book was released excluding the imam's life

history. However, this writer replaced it on p 192 with the unique vernal ode of his eminence on the joyous birthday of the Proof of God in Two Worlds, Hojjat ebn al-Hasan al-Mehdi--may my soul be sacrificed for him--found on pp 92-95 of Vol 2 of "Asarolhojjah" and mentioned some of his honor's valuable writings. I promised in that book that--God willing--I would make up for it at a proper time.

In Vol 5 of "Ganjineh," because of the oppressive times, I mentioned in only a few lines the name and surname of his brave son, Abu Ahmad al-Musavi al-Mostafavi, on p 42.

But--by the grace of God--at this time, with the high initiative of the imam, the constant struggle of the nation, and the efforts of the sources of emulation, after sacrificing tens of thousands of fighting Moslem and even non-Moslem youths for freedom and independence, the hated, tyrannical, and dictatorial regime and the era of stifling oppression has ended, and the pen and propagation have become free; and in the bosom of the downtrodden people, it has become appropriate for me to keep my promise in this (8th) volume.

Then, I was faced with the problem of not wanting to repeat what has already been said about the biography and life history of his eminence, although it is not considered unuseful by some (that he was born on such-and-such a day of such-and-such a year, was reared in the pious household of Ayatollah Seyyed Mostafa Musavi Khomeyni, lost his father early in life, went to Arak in 1339 A.H. [15 Sep 20-3 Sep 21] at the age of 19 after the Qom Theological Center was established by Grand Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Abdolkarim Hayeri-Yazdi with the assistance of the late crusading Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Taqi Bafeqi, he migrated to Qom and seriously began his studies with extraordinary intellect and unmatched talent and creativity, was promoted to the high degrees of theology and religious jurisprudence with the teachings of Grand Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad 'Ali Shahabadi, Ayatollah Yasrebi, and especially Ayatollah Hayeri-Yazdi; after the death of the master, he bagan general and in-depth teaching of the contemplative sciences--versification, books, similies, and abstraction--and traditional sciences--jurisprudence and principles--and trained learned, famous apprentices for the theological schools of Iran and Iraq); but, since others have written on the subject, as I myself did in 1370 A.H. [13 Oct 50-1 Oct 51], I will not repeat it here. On other topics, too, I have seen (as in the previous case) that contemporary writers have, as I mentioned, written on the biography and life history of the imam and have, to a certain extent, done their duty. I wanted not to deal with him, but I realized that this would be impossible for me for two reasons. First, I am indebted to his honor and I must repay him in part by writing here about the person of his eminence, from the standpoint of the Koran and the religious leaders.

Second, I have promised in "Ganjineh" to make up for what had been lost in the past, at the earliest opportunity. If I should pass this by merely because others have written extensively, I would be condemned and regarded inexcusable by my own conscience and by the scholars.

Hence, in order not to repeat, I decided to do an analytical study of the person and the movement of his honor from the standpoint of the Koran and the predictions of the religious leaders who are upright in their knowledge and know of the events and incidents of the world through the Hidden Imam.

It is not unknown to those with foresight that the most important thing that advanced his honor's becoming known in the East and in the West as the great spokesman, leader of Moslems, and the symbol of the clergy was his uprising and movement, which he has had in mind since his youth and which he sometimes has spoken of in private and public gatherings to Grand Ayatollahs Hayeri and Borujerdi and others. He invited them to rise up against imperialism, autocrats, the dictatorial regime, and the tyrannical government.

Also, he sometimes directly or in response to some friends wrote and openly criticised the government and the ruling group, mentioned the cruelties and corruption of the illegitimate, vile, and infamous rule of the "Pahlavi" family and warned of the dangers of their sinister plans against Islam.

AYATOLLAH TALEQANI

A bulldozer and a few construction workers are able to demolish a building. A few serious human beings are able to uproot a structure. But, construction requires time and patience; it requires work; it requires architects, masons, workers, and the right building materials at hand. We are now at this stage. The blow that colonialism and its elements can inflict is to say: This revolution came too soon for these people; it was unripe; the people did not deserve it. The newspapers which sound the propaganda of colonialism have started their work in the East and in the West. They look at us through their magnifying glasses evaluating our statements, our actions, our psychological shortcomings, and the way we treat each other. Changing the direction of the revolution to rightist or leftist extremism will pave the way for infiltration. This is exactly the way for infiltration. Hence, we must be alert that they not redirect us from the true path, polarize the extremists and keep them away from religious and spiritual leadership. In his revolutionary sermon, 'Ali said: "Let the impudent, the self-centered, and the extremists turn back to me, to us, and let those left behind join us." Today we are confronted with such a problem. A number of the people, a number of the youth, despite all their pure sentiments and sincerity of intention, and perhaps unknowingly, are extremists.

They act beyond their bounds, beyond the established limits, limits within which the revolution must move, as did the Khavarj-e Nahravan, completely faithful and sincerely nationalistic people who were extremists, hot-tempered, undisciplined, and weak in their understanding of Islam, who had learned "No law but that of God" without understanding its meaning.

HOJJATOLESLAM GOLPAYEGANI

5. The restoration and repair of the "Molla Sadeq" Theological School of Alvandiyyeh.

6. The Setiyyeh School.

7. The Eram Street Theological School.

8 Founding a library in which several thousands of printed and precious handwritten manuscripts have been collected.

9. Founding Dar ol-Qor'an ol-Karim. In this establishment, hundreds of different copies of the Koran printed all around the world and rare, precious copies of the Koran have been collected. As a collection of this kind, this establishment is rare and worthy of pride.

10. Printing a precious edition of the Koran, distributing it throughout the Islamic countries, and presenting it to great personalities.

11. Printing and publishing "Sahifeh-ye Sajjadiyyeh" in several thousand copies.

12. Printing and publishing Islamic and religious books, distributing them free of charge in Islamic countries, donating them to public and private libraries, as well as dozens of other services and significant monuments to the memory of Mehdi inside and outside the country.

In mourning this informed intellectual, this serving clergyman, this brave youth, scholars and literary persons have composed many poems and odes which are beyond the scope of this brief. I will only repeat the ode written by his honor, Mr Lotfi, for good luck.

Alas, the light and brightness have gone from our eyes
That shining star of faith and modesty has gone
The man of action, zeal and seriousness
The man of good manners, good temper, love, and generosity has gone
The great, enlightened, informed scholar
The center of learning has left this transient world
Gone away, he who was the companion of our lives and the strength of our hearts.

I, who have become all heart, have lost calm and serenity
He who hid his face from us was not one person
The world of integrity and loyalty has left the eye of wisdom.
He was killed for truth, Islam, and virtue
For God, our "Mehdi" has gone towards God
That saintly bird who was full of enthusiasm
Has flown away towards the high empyrean
The flower garden of Islam looks withered and despondent
Since this newly-blossomed flower of the Holy Family has gone
He was eager to meet with God and hence,
He has gone to meet Him, despite his youth.
I have become lonely, separation has become the companion of my soul
Alas and alas, the bright star of salvation has gone
In India, Europe, and all over the world
From his efforts, religion was nurtured
In London, Lebanon, Qom, Yasreb, and Batha
He made his mark and left the transient world
The Shi'ite world mourns him
The lamentation of the people has reached the skies
With this heavy sorrow and my weary body
Oh God, what shall I do, the splendorous phoenix has gone away
Nothing can be done but be patient and tolerant
The royal decree of destiny has left eternity
Lotfi has no cure but patience and tolerance
Alas, that light and brightness has gone from our eyes.

AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI

Hojjatoleslam of Moslems, Ayatollah Sheykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri-Najafabadi, is one of the brightest stars and burning torches of the Qom Theological Center, who is known for his virtue and knowledge. In Vol 2 of "Ganjineh," I made brief mention of him; but since at that time, he was suffering exile and imprisonment at the hands of the jailers of the tyrannical government and we could not reach him, we could not make proper mention of him deserving of his position. Hence, in this volume, I have realized this goal. His eminence was born about 1349 A.H. [29 May 30-18 May 31] in Najafabad, to a relatively middle class family. After training and studying the preliminaries and intermediate levels in Esfahan and in his place of birth, he migrated to Qom in 1358 A.H. [21 Feb 39-9 Feb 40] and resided in one of the upper chambers of the Feyziyyeh School. He made the acquaintence of Ayatollah Motahari and, since they thought alike, they established a relationship and, together with his virtuous, learned friend who also came from his home town, his honor, Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Assadollah Nurolallahi, went to the lessons of Ayatollah Mohaqqeq-Damad, Ayatollah Imam Khomeyni, and other sources of emulation, such as Ayatollah Khonsari and Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. From the time he reached Qom up to the end of his eminence's life, he attended and took utmost advantage of his lessons and reached the highest degree of religious jurisprudence.

He became a man of opinions and views . . . and wrote down the sayings of his teacher. After the death of Ayatollah Borujerdi, he joined with the leader of the nation, Imam Khomeyni, and published his sayings as well. He also benefited in rational sciences from the great savant Ayatollah Tabataba'i.

Ayatollah Montazeri, who has had a great influence on the role of the revolution, was arrested several times because of his struggle and cooperation with his great teacher Ayatollah Khomeyni, and has suffered imprisonment and exile by the criminal, anti-people SAVAK elements. He even suffered the tortures of the jailers and functionaries of the CIA and the tyrannical government during the last few years. On 3 Aban 1357 [25 Oct 78], the day of freedom for political prisoners, he was freed because of the people's movement; he returned to Qom and continued his struggle against the illegitimate government, the usurping and cruel dynasty of the Pahlavi family, until--by the will of the Almighty and the kindness of our master, his holiness Mehdi--the tree of the movement gave fruit, the palm tree of the revolution blossomed, victory was gained by the people, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi decided to escape rather than stay, the unauthorized government of Bakhtiyar fell forever, and the Islamic Republic was declared. May the rule of the tyrant end, thanks be to the God of Two Worlds.

In an interview with the Voice and Picture of the Islamic Republic about his friend and discussion companion, the late martyred Ayatollah Motahari, Ayatollah Montazeri said: We were friends for over 40 years. Most often when he was in Qom we had discussions and we were in touch. From his early student days, he kept vigilence for night prayers. He would insist that I do the same; but I was lazy and would sometimes find excuses, such as, the water in the school pond was filthy and would harm my eyes.

HOJJATOLESLAM AZARI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Ahmad Azari-Qomi, the pride of the virtuous crusaders, is one of the stars of the virtuous sky of the theological center and religious city of Qom. He was born about 1342 A.H. [14 Aug 23-1 Aug 24] in Qom. He studied the preliminaries and literary levels with the teachers of the Theological Center and he then migrated to the holy city of Najaf, where he benefited from the teachings of Grand Ayatollahs Mirza Abdolhadi-Shirazi, and Kho'i and others. After a few years, he returned to his homeland and benefited from the teachings of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Khomeyni, and Ayatollah Mohaqqeq-Damad. Meanwhile, at appropriate times during the months of Ramazan, Moharram, and Safar, he would travel to Tehran to give guidance, propagate Islam, and enlighten the people. However, for a few years now, due to many occupations, he has stopped that routine, and he has been instructed by Hojjatoleslam Azari [as published] to serve the religion and crusade against

imperialism and the hated regime of the deposed shah. For this reason, he was exiled for a few years by the defiled, criminal, tyrannical agents to Ardestan and other places. Consequently, he lost several of his dear ones in an accident. Mr Azari is one of the competent and pious individuals. His piety and virtue are endorsed by his eminence Ayatollah Khomeyni, who has appointed him to help supervise the holy shrine of her holiness Ma'sumeh (peace be upon her) as well as the Revolutionary Court.

AHADI

Hojjatolelsam Mr Haj Sheykh Yusef Ahadi, whose biography was included in Vol 7, p 416, concerning Hamadan, is one of the contemporary learned scholars. After the death of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, he went to reside in (Qoruh) in (Javin) of Hamadan for religious propagation and services. With high zeal and full strength, he has rendered his services and has been able to provide Islam and Moslems with several monuments.

1. A large congregational mosque of 1,000 square meters.

2. A religious school with a library, a lecture room with 10 equipped chambers, and about 30 serious students from primary to higher levels, who are given paid tuition and student aid.

3. Training of the above-mentioned students.

From Vol 7.

ADIB-ESFAHANI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Molla Abbas'ali Adib Habibabadi-Esfahani is one of the famous contemporary scholars, revered teachers, and high ranking prayer leaders of Esfahan. He was born about 1320 A.H. [10 Apr 02-29 Mar 03] in Habibabad. After proper training, passing his childhood, and studying his preliminaries in his place of birth, he went to Esfahan, learned religious jurisprudence and principles from the great teachers and benefited from the instructions of the great scholars of Esfahan. He then returned for a while to his birthplace and later migrated to Esfahan and began teaching in Sadr and other schools. He has also been leading prayers and propagating the religion in some of the mosques. He has authored both published and other scholarly works.

The works of Mr Adib-Esfahani: (1)"Ersolshi'eh"; (2)"Manasek"; (3) Ziarat-e Madineh; (4)"Vazifatolshi'eh"(the description of Nodbeh prayers); (5)"Hedivatol'abbad," about Sahab ebn-e 'Abbad; (6)"Qotbivveh," about the times of the cities of Qotb; (7)"Tatbiq," about changing from the solar calendar to the lunar and vice versa; (8)"Ahsan al-Taqvim," about the times of day and night in Esfahan and cities at its latitude; (9)"Ahsan al-Taqvim," for Kashan and cities

at its latitude; (10) "Ahsan al-Taqvim," for Tehran and cities at its latitude; (11) "Molhaqqat-e Qazaya-ve Amir al-Mo'menin" (peace be upon him); (12) "Ma'refat al-Qebleh," on determining the direction of Mecca in Iran by the sun all year round.

E'TEMADI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Mostafa E'temadi-Tabrizi is one of the virtuous teachers of Qom Theological Center. He was born in 1304 [21 Mar 25-20 Mar 26] in the village of Khajeh, four parasangs from Tabriz. After studying Persian, Arabic literature, grammar, and syntax, logic, and some of the religious laws and amendments at his birthplace with his revered father, the learned crusader Ayatollah Haj Mirza 'Ali Khajeh'i--who is now alive at the age of 82--at a time when, in accordance with the instructions of the defiled tyrant Reza Khan, covers were taken off the heads of Iranian women and turbans off the heads of the Iranian clergy and no one had the power to speak or question.

He then left his home for Tabriz, where he went through the higher levels and benefited from the masters and teachers of Tabriz. In 1325 [21 May 46-20 Mar 47], he went to Qom and completed his studies with Grand Ayatollah Najafi Mar'ashi. He then participated in the lessons of religious jurisprudence of Grand Ayatollah Hojjat Kuhkamari and principles with the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. He also benefited from the instructions of all the present-day ayatollahs. Meanwhile, he bagan teaching the higher levels and many students of the theological center have been and are benefiting from his instructions.

He has authored valuable scholarly works, including the following books:

1. "Sharh-e Ma'alem ol-Osul," which has been published.

2. "Shetat ol-Fava'ed," published in the margins of "Ma'alem."

3. "Moze' ol-Qavanin," up to the end of "Navahi" chapter, manuscript.

4. "Sharh-e Rasa'el," in three volumes, manuscript.

5. "Sharh-e Makaseb-e Sheykh Ansari," manuscript.

6. "Sharh-e Kefayeh-ye Akhund Khorasani," manuscript.

This writer says: His honor Mr E'temadi is one of the bright, virtuous, and pious faces, who is known for his virtues and generosity and is respected by everyone, especially by the scholars and teachers.

Hojjatoleslam and the adornment of contemporary learned men, Mr Sheykh Ebrahim Amini (Haj Amini) Najafabadi is one of the teachers and scholars of Qom Theological Center. He was born in 1304 [21 Mar 25-20 Mar 26], equal to 1345 A.H. [12 Jul 26-30 Jun 27; as published] in Najafabad. In 1330 [21 Mar 51-20 Mar 52], he went to study theology in Esfahan. He finished the preliminaries and Arabic literature in Esfahan Theological Center. He studied some of the levels with the great masters and famous scholars of Esfahan, such as Haj Aqa Rahim Arbab, Haj Sheykh Mohammad Reza Jarquyeh, Haj Sheykh Habbolah A'lamiyan Harandi, Haj Seyyed 'Ali Asghar Modarres Najafabadi and some of the other masters. In 1326 [21 Mar 47-20 Mar 48], he entered Qom Theological Center to continue his education. He studied some of the levels with great masters and famous scholars, such as Haj Aqa Reza Safi and Haj Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Soltani, and he completed the "Kefayeh" with Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani. He then participated in the lessons of religious jurisprudence and principles of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Khomeyni, and Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, but he mostly benefited from the lessons of Deputy of the Imam Khomeyni and is considered one of his eminence's old students. From 1329 [21 Mar 50-20 Mar 51], when he was exiled from Iran, he has continually attended his lessons and benefited from him.

Mr Amini, in addition to religious jurisprudence and principles, is also versed in philosophy and has studied "Manzumeh-ve Sabzevari" and "Asfaroshfa'" with 'Allameh Tabataba'i. From his early days, he participated in the beneficial research sessions of 'Allameh Tabataba'i, which were established by a group of the scholars of Qom Theological Center for the study, analysis, and interpretation of philosophical issues and their comparison with new philosophical thought. A part of the research of those meetings was later published as "Osul-e Falsafeh ba Ravesh-e Re'alism."

Mr Amini teaches and writes in Qom Theological Center. He spends most of his time in scholarly research and writing useful books. He has published valuable books which are welcomed by the public, for example:

1. "Dadgostar-e Jahan" [The Administrator of Justice in the World]

2. "Barrasi-ve Masa'el-e Kolli-ye Emamat" [An Investigation of the General Problems of Religious Leadership]

3. "Banu-ye Nemuneh-ye Eslam" [The Exemplary Lady of Islam]

4. "A'in-e Hamsardari" [The Rules of Marital Life]

5. "Hameh Bayad Bedanand" [Everyone Must Know]

6. "Eslam va Tamadon-e Jadid"[Islam and the New Civilization]

7. "Amuzesh-e Din"[Teaching Religion], in five volumes.

ANVARI

Hojjatoleslam, the learned scholar, al-Haj Sheykh Mohyeddin, son of the perfect scholar, Ayatollah al-Haj al-Sheykh Zeynol'abedin Anvari Hamadani, is one of the learned, crusading, contemporary scholars of Tehran. He was born about 1350 A.H. [19 May 31-6 May 32] in Hamadan, in a house of learning and piety. He was reared and studied the preliminaries and some literature in Hamadan. He then left for Tehran and after the completion of various levels at the lessons of the late Haj Mirza Ahmad Ashtiyani and Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Taqi Ameli, he benefited from other ayatollahs and great teachers of Marvi School in rational and traditional sciences. He also began teaching, leading prayers in one of the mosques in the bazaar, and interpreting and propagating the true culture of Twelver Shi'ism. In 1384 A.H. [13 May 64-1 May 65], accused of conspiracy to assasinate Hoseyn'ali Mansur, the prime minister of the tyrannical government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, he was arrested, along with a group of faithful and crusading young people, by SAVAK and spent 13 years in Qasr and Evin Prisons. He was freed in 1397 A.H. [23 Dec 76-11 Dec 77] and began again his services. He was sent by the great leader Ayatollah Khomeyni to Karachi, Pakistan, for religious guidance and services. He returned to Tehran and is now commissioned by the leader of the revolution to lead Friday and congregational prayers as well as propagate the religion in the Jame' Mosque of Narmak in Tehran.

According to this author: His honor Mr Anvari is one of the crusading scholars who has served the victory of the revolution and the Islamic Republic. He has suffered tragedies and violence in prisons from torture, etc. Among the scholars of Tehran, he is especially liked and is regarded highly by our dear leader, Mr Khomeyni.

BANI-FAZL

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Morteza, son of Haj Yusof'ali Bani-Fazl Tabrizi, is one of the bright faces among the scholars and teachers of Qom Theological Center. He was born in 1352 A.H. [26 Apr 33-15 Apr 34] in Tabriz. After his primary training in Tabriz, he left, in 1371 A.H. [2 Oct 51-20 Sep 52], for Qom, where he passed through the higher levels as a student of famous masters, including the late Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad Mojahedi. He benefited for a period of three years from the lessons on the protocols of prayer of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi and eight years from the lessons on prohibited trades and transactions and the complete course on the discussion of words and scholarly principles of his eminence Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni. After the exile of his honor from Iran to Turkey

and Iraq, he attended the lessons on the protocols of cleanliness of Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani and the late Ayatollah Mohaqqeq-Damad. Meanwhile, he taught the higher levels and has now been teaching at the Center for 20 years. Thusfar, he has taught 3 rounds of a course on "Makaseb" and "Kefayeh" and about 200 of the theological and other students benefit from his instructions. He has now been charged with handling some of the affairs of Azarbayejan by the leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni, and is presently occupied with these affairs.

His works are as follows:

1. The complete lecture notes on Religious Jurisprudence and Principles of Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni.

2. A description of "Kefayat al-Osul," specifically the section on "Mabahes-e al-Faz."

TABRIZI

His honor Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Javad Tabrizi is one of the respected scholars and revered teachers of Qom Theological Center. He was born about 1345 A.H. [12 Jul 26-30 Jun 27] in Tabriz. After his early training in the preliminaries, he moved to Qom and benefited from the instructions of the great teachers, Grand Ayatollahs Borujerdi and Hojjat. In 1370 A.H. [13 Oct 50-1 Oct 51], he migrated to Najaf, where he benefited greatly from the instructions and discussions of Grand Ayatollahs Kho'i and Mirza 'Abdolhadi Shirazi. He reached the high levels of scholarship and theology. He formed teaching sessions and a number of contemporary learned men of Tehran, such as Hojjatolelsam Haj Seyyed Abdol'ali Taqavi Shirazi, benefited from his instructions. In 1392 A.H. [16 Feb 72-3 Feb 73], because of pressure by the Ba'thist government of Iraq on Iranians residing in Iraq, he was forced to return to Iran and reside in Qom, where he has been teaching religious jurisprudence and principles; and a number of scholars have been benefiting from his instructions. May God grant him success in the continuation of his work.

This writer has frequently asked him for his biography, but, unfortunately, no response has been given. As a conscientious duty, I composed the above and conclude it with the following godly ode.

TAQAVI SHIRAZI

Hojjatoleslam and the adornment of scholars, Haj Seyyed 'Abdol'ali, son of the perfect crusading scholar Ayatollah al-Haj Seyyed Hedayatollah Taqavi Shirazi, is one of the truly serving contemporary scholars and propagators of the prophetic family of 'Ali's leadership in Tehran, who embodies virtue, piety, action, and sincerity. In 1362 A.H. [8 Jan 43-27 Dec 43], equal to 1320 [21 Mar 41-

20 Mar 42; as published], he was born to a learned and virtuous household in Tehran, reared in the cradle of piety and knowledge. At the age of 14, he went to Qom, where he studied the preliminaries and literature. After the death of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, he stayed for a while in Tehran and benefited from the instructions of the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad 'Ali Lavasani in Sepahsalar School. He then departed for Najaf and studied the remaining higher levels with Ayatollahs Haj Seyyed Asadollah Madani and Haj Sheykh Javad Tabrizi and benefited from the lessons of Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hassan Safi Esfahani. In 1391 A.H. [27 Feb 71-15 Feb 72], due to the illness of his honorable father ending in his death, he returned to Tehran. After the death of his father, at the insistence of many of the faithful friends of his father and the instructions of Ayatollahs Kho'i and Shahrudi and the honorable sources of emulation in Qom, he did not return to Najaf, in order to manage the mosque of his famous father, known as "Masjed Sangi," located on Adibolmamalek and Rey Streets. He has since been leading prayers, propagating religion and religious rules, teaching theology, spreading knowledge of the Prophet's family, and is one of the contemporary defenders of 'Ali's rule and fighters against the sect of Wahabism, domestic Sunnism, and the opponents of religious rule. His honor enjoys the love of the clergy of the capitol, the great sources of emulation, and the ayatollahs of Najaf, and especially of the deputy of the Imam, Mr Khomeyni. On his trip to London for treatment, he made a visit to his eminence in Paris.

HOSEYNI HAMADANI

Hojjatoleslam and famed scholar Haj Seyyed Hoseyn Hoseyni Hamadani is one of the contemporary scholars of Qom Theological Center. He was born in 1324 [21 Mar 45-20 Mar 46], in one of the villages of Hamadan called "Damaq." After studying his preliminaries, he went to the city of Hamadan to study. After two years in Hamadan, Kermanshah, and Qom, and after completing his studies in literature, he went to study in holy Najaf in 1341 [21 Mar 62-20 Mar 63], where he studied the higher levels under the instruction of great teachers. Specifically, he studied logic with the late Ayatollah Aqa Sheykh Sadra, the great philosopher and high ranking researcher, who was a unique expert in his own time on rational thought. He studied different books in this field and became famous among the theological students for his teaching of various books on logic at the age of 20. a number of the theological students in Qom and Najaf have benefited from his lessons. After resideing in Najaf for 10 years and benefiting from the instructions of the late Ayatollah Aqa Mirza Baqer Zanjani and Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, Mr Hoseyni returned to Iran and has since been teaching intermediate levels and benefiting from the instructions of great ayatollahs. He has authored the following valuable works:

1. "Al-Mohakemat-o Felqaza'," the lecture notes of Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Taher Khaqani (Al-e Shobyr).

2. "Al-Ejareh," the lecture notes of Ayatollah Haj Seyyed 'Allameh Fani Esfahani, unpublished.

3. Marginal notes for Molla 'Abdollah, unpublished.

4. Notes on the Science of Logic, including different discussions in logic.

5. Writings on religious jurisprudence and principles, unpublished.

HOSEYNI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Mohammad Reza Hoseyni Behshahri is one of the active, crusading scholars and prayer leaders of the city of Rey. He was born in 1317 [21 Mar 38-20 Mar 39], equal to 1358 A.H. [21 Feb 40] in Behshahr, Mazandaran. He studied the preliminaries and part of other levels with the late, great theological scholar Ayatollah Kuhsani in Dehestan of Kuhsan. He then came to Qom and benefited from Ayatollah Soltani and Ayatollah Montazeri in the higher levels of proficiency. He then attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollahs Khomeyni, Golpayegani, and Shari'atmadari. Later, he was sent by Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani to the city of Rey (to the shrine of his holiness 'Abdol'azim Hoseyni--peace be upon him). Previously, he had been commissioned by his honor to perform religious services in other cities.

After he reached the holy place, he began guidance, leading prayers, and propagating religious instructions. He erected a mosque called Emam Hoseyn, a public library, and an interest-free fund, and in this way, he has served the society and those in need.

His honor has numerous permits from the contemporary sources of emulation and grand ayatollahs of Qom.

HAKIM FARZANEH

The late Hojjatoleslam Sheykh Mohammad Hadi Farzaneh Shahrreza'i is one of the revered teachers and high ranking contemporary philosophers of the province of Esfahan. His father, the late Mollah Mohammad Mehdi was among the scholars, prayer leaders and sources of emulation of the people of Shahrreza, who was considered a perfect master of elementary subjects of grammar, syntax, rhetoric, religious jurisprudence and principles, etc.

He also knew mathematics, calculus, geometry, and astronomy very well. He had studied religious jurisprudence and principles under the tutelage of the great scholar, the late Haj Mollah 'Ali

Tusirkan. He then went to holy Najaf to complete his higher education, where he resided for three years and benefited from the instructions of the grand ayatollahs there.

His learned son, Hakim Farzaneh, was born in 1302 A.H. [21 Oct 1884-9 Oct 1885] to a household of science and knowledge and a center of philosophy. He studied his elementary education with his learned father and then he studied logic, philosophy, and discourse for seven years with the great philosopher Mirza Nasrollah Hakim. Because of his extraordinarily sharp talents and intellect, he was always respected and loved by his teacher.

After the death of the late Mirza Nasrollah Hakim, he went to Esfahan and completed his studies of "Fara'ed" and "Matajer" with Molla 'Abdolkarim Kazi--God's blessing be upon him--and studied religious jurisprudence and principles with the late master, Seyyed Mohammad Baqer, Haj Mir Mohammad Sadeq, and partly with the late Haj Mirza 'Abdolhoseyn Seyyedol'araqayn. He studied medicine with the late Mirza Mohammad Baqer Esfahani and then returned to his house in Shahrreza, where he kept up his scientific studies and philosophical research.

Noting the scientific degrees, scholarly rank, and knowledge of Hakim, it is quite certain that among the contemporary scholars, even among the scholars of this century, there are few of his stature in science and philosophy.

He was considered a perfect master in various fields of natural sciences, theology, and mathematics as well as literature, Arabic, discourse, religious jurisprudence, principles, and mysticism and a proficient scholar of rational and traditional thought.

Among the old philosophers, he followed the second master, Abu Nasr Farabi, and Sheykh al-Re'is Abu 'Ali Sina [Avicenna] and has done detailed research and marginal notes on the works of these two famous philosophers. If we claim that in teaching the works of Avicenna (Esharat, Shafa, Qanun, etc.), he was unmatched among the contemporary philosophers, we are certainly not mistaken. For this reason, the professors of the universities of Esfahan and Tehran frequently sought his audience and requested that he go to Esfahan and Tehran to establish scientific and philosophical circles; but, as is the case with masters of his kind, he continually refused and preferred to live privately and teach in his home town rather than travel or leave his home.

In philosophy, Hakim Farzaneh is relatively close to the Peripatetics [mashsha'in]. We say he is close to the Peripatetics, because in certain cases, his ideas are different from those of the philosophers and Peripatetics, and in proving the existence of God and monotheism, his reasoning is that of a pious man. Finally, he was a

perfect master in conforming the principles and rules of philosophy with religious laws.

As was stated earlier, after finishing his studies and returning home, Hakim Farzaneh began teaching classes in his own home, starting every day at dawn and continuing without pause for several hours, then, also most afternoons. The revered Hakim taught various sciences and books from the elementary to the highest levels for 47 years. He would by no means refuse to guide the receptive intellects and teach the lovers of knowledge. He would not consider teaching any book beneath his position, regardless of the level, and was prepared to teach every science and every book at the highest levels.

He had very enlightening classes and his lessons were open to all lovers of knowledge. A large number of people benefited from and enjoyed his teaching sessions.

The efforts of this revered Hakim in benefiting and teaching without any kind of expectation went so far that he did not close his classes and taught books, rules, verses, and philosophy until Monday, 1 Azar 1344 [22 Nov 65], just two days before his death.

Hakim's Invitation by the University and His Response

In 1325 [21 Mar 46-20 Mar 47], the University of Tehran invited Hakim Farzaneh several times to go to Tehran to teach philosophy.

In response, he wrote that, unfortunately, he had been remembered at a time when strength was becoming weak and weakness strong.

KHADEMI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Shamosoddin Khademi Esfahani, known as Abolma'ali, the revered brother of the learned Ayatollah Haj Hoseyn Khademi, is the director of Esfahan Theological Center and one of the contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of Esfahan. Their father, the late Ayatollah Seyyed Abu Ja'far Khademoshari'ah, was one of the highest scholars of his time and the son of Ayatollah Seyyed Sadroddin Musavi, who has been mentioned in "Montahi al-Amal" of Mohaddes Qomi, and who is related to his holiness Musa ebn Ja'far --peace be upon him--with 34 immediate predecessors.

He was born in 1316 A.H. [22 May 1898-11 May 1899]. He lost his father at the age of seven and was reared by his noble mother. He learned his lessons in Persian and introductory Arabic in the Elmiyyeh School of Esfahan and then entered Sadr School. He studied "Sharh-e Lom'eh" and the laws with the late Aqa Sheykh 'Ali Yazdi and the late Aqa Seyyed Ahmad Esfahani at Nimavar School. He learned from "Fara'ed" and "Javaher" with the late Ayatollah Haj Mir Mohammad Sadeq Mir'emadi and studied "Kefayeh" with the late Ayatollah Seyyed

Mohammad Najafabadi. He studied philosophy partly with the late Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali Tuserkani and benefited from the instructions of the late Ayatollah Sheykh 'Abdolkarim Jazzi and Ayatollah Molla Hoseyn Feshareki. He then moved to Najaf and benefited from the instructions of the late Ayatollah Seyyed Abol Hasan Esfahani and Ayatollah Mirza Hoseyn Na'ini. After his return to Esfahan, due to an eye ailment, he stopped his education and has been leading prayers and doing other religious services.

KHUNSARI

Hojjatoleslam Sheykh Mohammad Kazem, son of the learned Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Ali Akbar Khunsari (born in 1300 A.H. [12 Nov 1882-1 Nov 1883] and died on 18 Jamadi al-sani 1359 A.H. [24 Jun 40]), is one of the great scholars and a special companion to Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Reza Golpayegani.

He was born in 1347 A.H. [20 Jun 28-8 Jun 29] in holy Najaf. After being reared in a house of knowledge and piety, he lost his father, at the age of 12. He studied the preliminaries with the late Mirza 'Abdollah Tabrizi Khosrowshahi and with his late father. He then traveled to India, where he resided for several years. On his return to Iran, he lived in Qom for one year and learned the levels of "Lom'eH" and "Qavanin" with Ayatollah Sadduqi Yazdi and Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Hoseyn Badla. He then went ot holy Najaf and studied logic with Shams Tabrizi, some of the levels with Ayatollah 'Allameh Fani Esfahani and "Kefayeh" with the late Haj Mirza Hasan Yazdi. He benefited from Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, with two courses in the principles, and learned jurisprudence from him and others. For eight years, he was in charge of the correspondence from Shi'ites all over the world of his eminence and of Ayatollah Mirza 'Abdolhadi Shirazi, and he responded to those letters. In 1395 A.H. [14 Jan 75-2 Jan 76], as fate would have it and God Almighty willed, he moved to Iran and resided in the religious and scholarly city of Qom. By official invitation from Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, he was put in charge of letters sent to his eminence, a great position which he presently holds.

His works include: (1) lecture notes of Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, (2) the detailed biography of Grand Ayatollah Kho'i and his works, which is unique of its kind, (3) the biography of the scholars of Khunsar.

His noble father was one of the great scholars of holy Najaf and the late 'allameh Razi Haj Sheykh Bozorg Tehrani--may God bless him--has remembered him among the leaders of mankind in his "Ketab-e Rajali."

DR SADEQI

Hojjatoleslam, revered master and scholar Dr Mohammad Sadeqi, son of the adornment of orators and propagators, the late Haj Sheykh Mohammad Reza Lesan al-Mahaqqeqin Tehrani, is one of the contemporary bright faces of the world of virtue and the shining stars of the sky of knowledge and wisdom.

He was born in 1307 [21 Mar 28-20 Mar 29], equal to 1348 A.H. [9 Jun 29-28 Mar 30; as published], in Tehran. He was reared in a household of knowledge and piety. After studying Persian up to high school level, he began his studies in religious sciences. He studied the preliminaries and some of hte levels in Tehran, moving to Qom during the early days of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi's residence in that city. He studied the high levels with the teachers of the theological center. He attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Mohaqqeq Damad, deputy of the Imam, Khomeyni, and other ayatollahs. He benefited in rational thought and philosophy from Ayatollah 'Allameh Tabataba'i, Ayatollah Shahabadi, Mirza Mehdi Ashtiyani, Mr Khomeyni, Mr Rafi'i Qazvini and he studied mysticism with the late Mirza Mehdi Esfahani. After the death of the late Borujerdi and under the leadership and movement of the deputy of the Imam, he entered the scene to fight Eastern and Western imperialism. With his firey speeches in Qom and Tehran and his condemnation of the tyrannical regime in 1384 A.H. [13 May 64-1 May 65], he was hunted by SAVAK and the criminal functionaries of the monarchy, forcing him to leave the country. Then, under the protection of the Almighty and the grace of God's ruler on earth [Mehdi], he went to Iraq by the "salavati" method (that is, through unusual means and without a passport) and resided near the shrine of the Chief of the Faithful ['Ali]--peace be upon him. He benefited from the instructions of the deputy of the Imam, Mr Khomeyni, and other ayatollahs and began teaching and giving interpretations of the Koran. In 1392 A.H. [16 Feb 72-3 Feb 73], he went to Beirut, Lebanon, as a result of the pressures and threats of the sinister Ba'thist regime of Iraq. In 1396 A.H. [3Jan 76-22 Dec 76], due to the disturbed situation in Lebanon, he went to Mecca and resided near the sacred house for two years. In 1398 A.H. [12 Dec 77-1 Dec 78], he bagan teaching Ja'fari religious jurisprudence near Maqam-e Ebrahim and taught Shi'ite religious laws and spread the true culture of Twelver Shi'ism. In the month of Zolqa'deh [Oct], was jailed by the Saudi government for distributing handouts and speaking out against the hated Pahlavi regime. He was freed after a few months; and after the fall of the tyrannical government and the declaration of the Islamic Republic and freedom after 57 years of suppression and dictatorship, he returned home to visit his imam, his relatives, and his friend after 14 years. He resided in Qom to continue his spiritual and religious duties, giving topical interpretations of the Koran and leading prayers in the Jamkaran Mosque of Qom. Dr Sadeqi was jailed twice by the oppressors, first for his

speech in the grand mosque of Qom, the second time, in Mecca, by the Saudi government at the suggestion of the tyrannical government of Iran. Altogether, he lived abroad for 17 years as follows: 10 years in holy Najaf; 5 years in Beirut, Lebanon; and 2 years in Mecca. During this time, he was engaged in writing and has written a number of useful books.

REZVANI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Ahmad Rezvani Najafi, son of the late Seqatoleslam Haj Mohammad Esma'il Rezvani, is one of the Scholars returned from Najaf and a revered contemporary teacher in Qom Theological Center. His honorable father was one of the benevolent people of the city of Zanjan who spent some of his life studying and then entered commerce. During the day, he was engaged in making a living and at night he would study traditions and interpretations of the Koran until the end of his life. The son was born in 1302 [21 Mar 23-20 Mar 24] in Zanjan and was reared under the supervision of a very pious father. He completed the preliminaries in that city and at the age of 17, he went to Qom, where he resided for 9 years and studied the levels and parts of the lessons with the great scholars of the Theological Center, such as the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Abdol Karim Kho'ini, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hojjat, and Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. Then in 1369 A.H. [24 Oct 49-12 Oct 50], he went to holy Najaf, residing there for 20 years, and benefited from the instructions of the grand ayatollahs of that city such as Grand Ayatollahs Hakim and Shahrudi, studied the principles with Ayatollah Kho'i, and benefited especially from the discussions of the most learned religious scholar, Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad Baqer Zanjani. In 1394 A.H. [25 Jan 74-13 Jan 75], due to the pressures of the Ba'thist government of Iraq, he was forced to return to Iran and reside near the shrine of her holiness Fatemeh Ma'sumeh--peace be upon her--and has been teaching ever since.

ZANJANI

His father, the late Grand Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad Baqer Zanjani, is one of the great ayatollahs and revered contemporary teachers of Najaf Theological Center. He is one of the famous students of Grand Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hoseyn Mohaqqeq Na'ini, who is well known and greatly loved among the scholars of Iraq and Iran and has trained learned, virtuous students who do religious and spiritual services in most of the cities of Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq, and Afghanistan. In Vol 5, in the section on Zanjan, I have given a brief biography of his honor.

SA'ADAT

Hojjatoleslam Haj Aqa Sa'adat Maragheh'i is one of the active, crusading scholars of Azarbayejan, from the city of Maragheh. He

was born about 1342 A.H. [14 Aug 23-1 Aug 24] around Maragheh. After studying the preliminaries in Maragheh, he went to Tabriz and then to Qom, where, upon completing various levels, he attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, and others and benefited from them. He then returned home and engaged in religious and spiritual services, such as leading prayers and guiding the people. Because of his untiring efforts and good intentions, he is especially liked and trusted by the sources of emulation, especially by Grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari.

Haj Aqa Sa'adat has built many monuments in Maragheh and its surroundings. His house is always open to acquaintances and strangers, where he welcomes visitors and makes every effort to provide for their needs.

SA'ID TEHRANI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Hasan is the son of the spiritual scholar Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Mirza 'Abdollah Sa'id Tehrani (known as Jahl-e Sotuni), son of Ayatollah Haj Mirza Masih, whose biography was briefly provided in Vol 4, p 483. His eminence was born in 1337 A.H. [7 Oct 18-25 Sep 19] in Tehran and was reared in a house of learning in Tehran, where he studied the preliminaries. He then went to Qom to study the higher levels. Later, he went to holy Najaf, where he benefited from the instructions of the grand ayatollahs of the Najaf Theological Center, such as the late Grand Ayatollahs Hakim, Shahrudi, Haj Sheykh Hoseyn Helli, and Ayatollah Kho'i. He returned home to Tehran with high scholarly degrees and began his religious services, spiritual duties, teaching of religious jurisprudence and principles, propagating Islamic culture, and providing for the needs of the needy, to the best of his ability, in the Jame' Mosque. Until 1399 A.H. [2 Dec 78-20 Nov 79], he has been active and supervises a number of the theological students in Tehran. The library of the Jame' Mosque is one of the establishments founded by his eminence, which, with its valuable collection, is one of the scholarly centers of Tehran and a base for Islamic services.

SAQQAZADEH

Seqatoleslam Haj Mirza Mohammad Reza, known as Saqqazadeh Va'ez, is one of the famous contemporary preachers and speakers.

He was born on 8 Moharram 1329 A.H. [9 Jan 11] in Tabriz. His father, the late Sheykh Mohammad, who was at first a merchant, went bankrupt. Hence, in order to pay his debts, he picked up a sheep skin filled with water and sold water to the houses for 1 shahi of the time (which equals 20 shahis or 1 rial) and repaid all his debts. For this reason, he became known as Saqqa [water-carrier] and his son as Saqqazadeh [son of water-carrier].

He finished up to the 12th grade in Foyuzat and Ferdowsi high schools in Tabriz. Because of his love for and interest in the pulpit, singing about the tragedies, preaching, and giving sermons, within a short period of time, he attained the high degrees of preaching and oratory under the supervision of the late famous orator, Haj Sheykh 'Ali Akbar 'Azizi. From Tabriz, he went to Tehran and finished the school of preaching and oratory. He received many permits for reciting religious narratives and traditions from the masters and sources of emulation. Because of his great interest in unusual sciences, he studied them and wrote books, including "Ad'iyeh" and "Adviyeh," in four volumes, one of which is "Jafr."

He authored another book called "Darya-ye Sokhan," which consists of 30 sermons and talks on history. He also wrote a book called "Al-Saralmostaser" and another called "Az Har Dari Sokhani." Some of these books have been published and some are forthcoming.

His talks from the pulpit are so charming and delicate that they would absorb and charge the audience and wouls not bore them.

SAMAHI HAYERY

Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Abdol Latif Samahi Hayeri, known as Tankaboni, is the highest of the scholars of Tankabon. In 1330 A.H. [22 Dec 11-10 Dec 12], he studied his elementary education in Narenj Bon, Ramsar, at the school of the late Ayatollah Sheykh Mohammad Hoseyn, son of Molla Habibollah Samahi, of Narenj Bon. In 1347 A.H. [20 Jun 28-8 Jun 29], he went to Qazvin, where he resided in Etefatiyyeh School, to study. Later, he moved to Mashhad and then to Qom. In 1350 A.H. [19 May 31-6 May 32], he migrated to the holy lands and lived in Najaf and Karbala for many years, where he benefited from the instructions of great scholars such as the late Grand Ayatollah Esfahani, Ayatollah Haj Agha Hoseyn Qomi, Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Hoseyn Hamami, Ayatollah Mirza 'Abdolhadi Shirazi, Ayatollah Estahbanati, Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohsen Hakim, and Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mahmud Shahrudi. He received the permit for the practice of religious jurisprudence from the above-mentioned scholars. Since 1370 A.H. [13 Oct 50-1 Oct 51], he spent several months each year in Ramsar in order to attend to the people's needs and for propagational purposes. Since 1390 A.H. [9 Mar 70-26 Feb 71], when the Ba'this government of Iraq deported the Iranians, he has officially taken residence in Ramsar and during moderate and warm seasons, he has led prayers in the Jame' Mosque of the Ramsar Bazaar and teaches ideas and ethics.

Ayatollah Samahi Hayery is an unmatched scholar and a man of good temper who is respected by the people of Ramsar, the scholars of the north, and others. He has authored "Emamshenasi," "Rad-e Tassavvof," and various lectures on religious jurisprudence and principles which are unpublished.

His son, Haj Sheykh Mohammad Samahi Hayeri--who was born in 1323 [21 Mar 44-20 Mar 45] in Karbala and studied the preliminaries by 1391 A.H. [27 Feb 71-15 Feb 72] in Najaf as well as receiving a bachelor's degree--is now an able speaker and a learned writer who has so far written 17 books in various subjects, including the history and geography of Ramsar, the great men of Tankabon, etc., which are unpublished. Some of his articles have been published in Iranian and Iraqi magazines.

SHAHRUDI

Hojjatolelsam Ayatollah Haj Aqa Hoseyn Musavi Shahrudi is one of the great contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of the holy city of Mashhad. He was born in the city of Shahrud and I have mentioned him in Vol 7, p 129, among the living scholars of Mashhad. There, I also mention briefly that he lives on Bala Khiyaban in Mashhad and leads prayers in one of the mosques of that area.

His son, Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Mohammad Musavi Shahrudi, is one of the bright faces among the clergy of Mashhad and the contemporary scholars of that city, who resided for many years in Najaf and benefited from the teachings of grand ayatollahs such as the late Grand Ayatollahs Haj Seyyed Mahmud Shahrudi and Kho'i and others until he reached high scholarly levels. He returned to Mashhad to teach religious jurisprudence and principles and is now one of the known teachers of Mashhad.

Ayatollah Shahrudi's sons-in-law are scholars and preachers. One of them was the late Seqatoleslam Haj Sheykh Ahmad Kafi Va'ez Khorasani, whose works were mentioned in Vol 2 and here, we mention him on the occasion of the anniversary of his martyrdom.

The late Kafi was one of the sincere servants of religion and a true propagator who faithfully propagated the rule of the prophet's family. With his simple and decisive language, which conformed to the tradition of the infallible imams, he guided thousands of people throughout Iran, and especially in Tehran, and called them away from immorality and sin to prayer and being servants of God. He provided capital for many of the needy and brought them from a life of thievery and wandering to work and prosperity. His accomplishments are too many to be mentioned here.

SAFI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hasan Safi Esfahani is one of the bright faces among the contemporary scholars and teachers of Esfahan. He was born in Esfahan and after studying the preliminaries, he went to Qom, where he resided for some time and studied the higher levels with the teachers of the Theological Center. Then, during the time of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, he went to Najaf,

there completing "Kefayeh" with the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Abdolhoseyn Rashti, the outstanding student of the late Akhund Molla Mohammad Kazem Khorasani and other grand ayatollahs. He also began teaching higher levels and gave lessons in religious jurisprudence and principles. A number of scholars, such as Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed 'Abdol 'Ali Taqavi Shirazi from Tehran, have benefited from his lessons. During the recent events in Iraq and the pressures of the Ba'thist government on Iranians and foreign citizens residing there, he was forced to return and reside in Esfahan, where he teaches, leads prayers, and spreads the culture and religious truth.

According to this author: His honor is one of the contemporary virtuous scholars and teachers who is known for his virtues, piety, laudable qualities, and morality.

Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Hasan Safi, the son of Aqa Nasrollah, was born in 1298 [21 Mar 09-20 Mar 10]. He has benefited from the instructions of Grand Ayatollahs Najafi Mar'ashi and Khomeyni in Qom and from the instructions of Grand Ayatollahs Haj Sheykh Kazem Shirazi, Haj Sheykh Mohammad 'Ali Khorasani, Haj Seyyed 'Abdol Hadi Shirazi, Haj Seyyed Mohsen Hakim, and mostly from Grand Ayatollah Kho'i in Najaf.

SADRA

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Taqi, son of the crusading scholar Haj Sheykh Mohammad Baqer, is one of the outstanding scholars, well-known speakers and propagators of Arak in Tehran today. In Vol 2 of "Ganjineh," I have mentioned him briefly; but since it was not sufficiently detailed and there was no opportunity for more in that volume, I have included his detailed biography here. He was born in 1326 A.H. [4 Feb 08-22 Jan 09], in Arak. He studied the preliminaries and part of other levels from the great teachers of his birthplace. When Qom Theological Center was founded, the founder of the Center, Grand Ayatollah Hayeri Yazdi, moved to Qom from Arak at the insistence of the people of Qom and Tehran. For 40 nights, all the prayer leaders in Qom closed their own sessions to join his congregation. Hence, he was faced with the requests of the people of Qom and Tehran who wanted him to reside in Qom and transfer the theological center of Arak to Qom. He was hesitant and consulted the Koran to see whether he should do so. The Koran performed a miracle, as always, one of those unforgetable miracles. The verse he opened to was, "Then come ye here to me together with your family," were Joseph sent a message to his father and brothers that he had become the ruler of Egypt and asked them to come with their entire families to him.

The late Hayeri wrote to them all, quoting the verse, to move with their wives and children.

At that time, he [Sadra] was 16 and his parents would not consent. He asked the late Ayatollah Hayeri, thinking the continuation of his education a religious duty, and decided to go to Qom without the consent of his parents; but, fortunately, they consented in the end and wept for joy. Hence, he moved to Qom, among the faithful who had migrated towards God, and he completed the levels in Qom. He attended the second round of the lesson on principles and religious jurisprudence from the beginning. Before that lesson, every morning he would attend the lesson of the late Ayatollah Yasrebi, who was one of the outstanding students of the late Ayatollah Ziya'eddin Araqi, and studied "Kefayeh" with the late Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Sabeti Hamadani. He studied some of "Fara'ed" with Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Khorasani and philosophy with the late Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad 'Ali Shahabadi. He also studied "Makaseb" with these two honorable scholars. He studied "Manzumeh-ye Hekmat" and "Rasa'el-e Sheykh." In 1343 A.H. [2 Aug 24-21 Jul 25], when the grand ayatollahs of Najaf (the late Esfahani, Na'ini, etc., who were exiled to Iran and Qom where they began to teach, he was very much devoted to the late Ayatollah Esfahani . . . [as published].

When the usurping, tyrannical, monarchical rule of Reza Khan (the atheist) occurred, despite the fact that the theological students had finished their examinations and had permits, the agents of hell chased the inhabitants of Paradise to "the gate of Paradise" of 'Ali ebn-e Ja'far and even into Paradise itself. (It has been said that one gate of Paradise opens into Qom.) When the agents were entering Feyziyyeh School, the theological students threw themselves from the second story of the dormitories into the river.

The criminal functionaries of Reza Khan, under his instructions--despite the presence of Grand Ayatollahs Hayeri, Qomi, Esfahani, and others--uncovered the women (or uncovered their private parts) and attacked the shrine of the eighth imam--peace be upon him--with cannons and guns. Those of the scholarly community who knew a safe place took refuge and the rest were facing at every minute of every hour the wolves in human form who were the government criminal agents. Mr Sadra, distressed, went to Arak and began preaching in order to support the orphanage which he financially supported.

In this way, he both served his father's family and also guided the people to religion.

In 1357 A.H. [3 Mar 38-20 Feb 39], when the decree of the uniforms of jackets, trousers, and Pahlavi hats was issued and legalized, when it was ratified by the sinister Majles, in accordance with this law, thousands of tricks and means were devised, a number of people could wear uniforms as one of the three ranks of Mohaddes [narrator of traditions], Mojtahed [theologian], Modarres [teacher of theology], and those in charge of non-litigious affairs and prayer leaders [as published]. And the Jewish rabbis, Christian priests, and

Zoroastrian disciples had to have special permits from the Ministry of Culture and Science at that time.

In short, the life history of his eminence is quite detailed and is deserving of a separate book. As far as it has been possible, I have selected a condensed summary for the public. He led prayers, propagated the laws of Islam, enlightened minds, and spread Islamic culture, especially the school of religious rule, in the city of Arak. He has rendered significant services in that city and its vicinities and has left some monuments. Then, he travelled to Tehran, where he resided at the insistence and under the pursuasion of the Araki people in the capitol and began leading prayers and religious propagation in the mosque of his fellow townspeople. Among his good deeds, he has founded a library with a collection of about 3,000 different useful religious books endowed for public use. He has built nine small and one large store to provide for the expenses of water, electricity, and the attendants of the mosque, and the remainder for the imam of the mosque, which are now in use.

Mr Sadra's talks are complete, decisive, and informative. Many of those who have lost religion repent and return to religion, prayers, and religious beliefs because of his preaching, advice, and sermons.

He has a poetic style which is quite interesting, literary, and learned. I have quoted the verses that his honor has composed and sent to me about the oil industry and its values for the seekers of knowledge and learned people so that they can become acquainted with his philosophical aptitude.

TAHERI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Aqa Jalal Taheri Esfahani is one of the contemporary, crusading, and outstanding scholars of Esfahan. He was born about 1347 A.H. [20 Jun 28-8 Jun 29] in Hoseynabad, Esfahan, which has now become a part of the city. He studied Persian and introductory literature in Esfahan and went to Qom during the time of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi and studied the higher levels from the great teachers of the Center. He attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Ayatollah Mohaqqeq Damad, and Grand Ayatollah and deputy of the Imam, Khomeyni, and benefited from the above-mentioned and others. Since he was known among his fellow students for his sharp intellect, he got ahead of some of his peers and began teaching and leading discussions. After the exile of the deputy of the Imam, he returned to Esfahan, led prayers, taught, and struggled against the oppressors of the tyrannical regime. He was arrested several times by the functionaries of the criminal deposed shah, was imprisoned, and was later freed. Last year, he house was raided by the viscious agents of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi--God's curse upon him--and was captured by those executioners. This time, the people of Esfahan rose up, condemned the government,

declared their support for the clergy and the imam of the nation, and demanded his freedom even by sacrificing the blood of the beloved youth.

This writer says: Mr Taheri is one of the bright faces among the crusaders of Esfahan Province. He had a share in this movement and its victory. He is now heading the Committees of Esfahan and works 'round the clock to serve and bring to fruition the sacred uprising.

The sources of emulation, especially Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni, are fond of him. He now leads prayers in the Jom'eh Mosque of Esfahan and guides the people in his sermons.

HAYERI TABASI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed 'Alinaqi, son of Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Kazem Hayeri Tabasi, is one of the contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of the Gowharshad Mosque in Mashhad. As was mentioned in Vol 6, p 32, he was born in Karbala and after finishing the preliminaries and other levels and lessons under the tutelage of the scholars and grand ayatollahs of Karbala, and after the death of his father, he traveled to Mashhad, resided in that city, and succeeded in becoming the prayer leader of the above-mentioned mosque. He has both published and unpublished works. Among them, "Danestaniha-ye Sudmand ya Kashkul-e Tabasi" in two volumes, has gone through several printings and is well received and used by the public. In the author's opinion, the above-mentioned book is very interesting and useful and the variety of its subjects will not bore the reader. Among the delightful subjects of Vol 2, p 258, which has been quoted from "Tafsir-e Abolfotuh Razi," Vol 1, p 137, is the following story.

TASUJI

Hojjatoleslam, model for upright scholars, and a special learned man, al-Haj al-Sheykh 'Abbas, son of the late Karbala'i Mohammad Tasuji, is one of the outstanding scholars of the Qom Theological Center. He was born in 1305 [21 Mar 26-20 Mar 27], equal to 1346 A.H. [1 Jul 27-19 Jun 28; as published], in the city of Tasuj. He studied the preliminaries in Tabriz. Then in 1366 A.H. [25 Nov 46-14 Nov 47], on the 40th day after the death of the late Grand Ayatollah Haj Aqa Hoseyn Qomi--may God sanctify his grave--he came to Qom, where he completed the higher levels with the great teachers. He then attended the lessons of the late Grand Ayatollah Hojjat Kuhkamari, Grand Ayatollah Hoseyn Tabataba'i Borujerdi, and some of the other ayatollahs and benefited from their instructions and discussions. Later, he began teaching and his house was open to everyone, especially to the enthusiasts, seekers, and those who wait for his holiness the Imam of Time [Mehdi]--may God speed up his return. Every day in his house there is a gathering of the faithful and scholars. He is full of love and desire to see his holiness Mehdi--may my soul and that

of the whole world be sacrificed for him. The following verses explain his thoughts and emotions.

TAVARI

Hojjatoleslam Aqa Sheykh 'Abbas Tavari, son of Aqa Mohammad Tavari Yazdi, is one of the contemporary scholars from Yazd in Qom Theological Center. He was born about 1310 [21 Mar 31-20 Mar 32] in Yazd and in 1325 [21 Mar 46-20 Mar 47], at the age of 15, he began studying theology and learned the preliminaries and literature with the great teachers of Yazd, such as Ayatollah Sheykh Mohammad 'Olumi, Aqa Sheykh Ahmad 'Olumi, the Modarresis, Haj Seyyed Mohammad, the late Seyyed 'Alireza Modarresi. Later, in 1335 [21 Mar 56-20 Mar 57] he traveled to holy Najaf and benefited from the instructions of Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Hoseyn Helli, Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Yahya Modarresi, Mirza Hasan, and others. In 1339 [21 Mar 60-20 Mar 61], he returned to Iran to reside in Qom where he benefited from the lessons of Grand Ayatollahs Khomeyni, Mar'ashi, Golpayegani, Shari'atmadari, and Damad. In 1355 [21 Mar 76-20 Mar 77] he returned to his birthplace after 30 years of study and began to teach the higher levels at Yazd Theological Center. He has pursued no profession, such as leading prayers or preaching.

'ERFANI

Hojjatoleslam and perfect scholar, Haj Seyyed Yunes 'Erfani is another one of the bright faces among the contemporary crusading and active scholars of Tehran. He was born in 1313 [21 Mar 34-20 Mar 35], equal to 1354 A.H. [5 Apr 35-23 Mar 36; as published], in Tavalesh. In 1327 [21 Mar 48-20 Mar 49], he went to Ardebil, where he studied literature and some of the levels. In 1329 [21 Mar 50-20 Mar 51], he moved to Qom and completed the higher levels with Ayatollah Soltani, Ayatollah Haj Mirza 'Ali Meshgini, and others. He then benefited from the lessons of the late Grand Ayatollahs Borujerdi and Shari'atmadari and the deputy of the Imam, Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni. In 1343 [21 Mar 64-20 Mar 65], in the early days of the imam's exile, he was transferred to Tehran, where he resided on Hashemi Street in western Tehran and began to lead prayers, propagate the Islamic precepts, enlighten minds, and spread Islamic culture. He has rendered significant and worthy services, including founding a library with a collection of beneficial books, especially for the younger generation. In addition to these duties, Mr 'Erfani has frequently traveled for more services to Pakistan, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and has participated in Islamic conferences and given interesting talks which have astonished and brought praise from the scholars intellectuals, and upper level students. Especially in his recent trip to Lebanon on behalf of Ayatollah Shari'atmadari to participate in the memorial ceremonies for the martyred Professor Morteza Mottahari, organized by Lebanese scholars and students, he gave an

astonishing, important speech, which was reported in the newspapers of that country and other places.

In short, his eminence is one of the bright stars and self-sacrificing strugglers engaged in words and action at all times in crusading and in religious services. This, itself, would require a separate book, which, unfortunately, cannot be accomplished here.

'ANDALIBZADEH

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hoseyn, son of the learned lecturer Haj Sheykh Mohammad Taqi 'Andalib Hamadani, is one of the respected contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of Hamadan, who leads prayers, gives guidance, and propagates religious precepts in Haji Mosque of Hamadan. He was born in Hamadan and finished his education in that city and in Qom. He then returned to Hamadan, where he started his religious services.

He has authored beneficail works. His honorable brother was the late Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hasan Qavam al-Shari'ah Tehrani, who resided in Rey and engaged in spiritual and social duties. In 1387 A.H. [1 Apr 67-30 Mar 68], he went to Najaf and after a pilgrimage to the holy shrines, he answered the call of the Almighty and was buried in Vadi al-Salam near the shrine of his holiness.

In Vol 4, p 687, of "Ganjineh," we mentioned his late honor and the noble family of Qavam and 'Andalib.

GHARAVI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Mirza 'Ali Gharavi Tabrizi, whose biography was briefly contained in Vol 7, p 285, is one of the bright stars of Najaf Theological Center. His eminence has authored several scholarly works, which include "Al-Tanqih dar Sharh-e 'Orvatolvosqa," in 20 volumes, of which 6 volumes have been published. This work, which consists of the lecture notes of Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Abolqasem Kho'i, is very comprehensive and is used by scholarly centers.

Ayatollah Gharavi's teaching sessions in Najaf have become of significant interest to scholars. His lectures are comprehensive and fruitful and a large number of scholars and students benefit from them.

He enjoys the reputation of a man of good character and special position among the scholars of Najaf and Azarbayejan--may God increase the likes of him and may God add to his success.

GHAFURI

Hojjatoleslam Dr 'Ali Golzar Ghafuri is also one of the bright stars of scholarship and learning.

He was born about 1345 A.H. [12 Jul 26-30 Jun 27] in Qazvin. After studying the preliminaries in his birthplace and in Tehran, he went to Qom, where he studied the intermediary and higher levels with the great teachers of the Center. Later, he participated in the lessons of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Grand Ayatollah and deputy of the Imam Khomeyni, and others and benefited from lessons in religious jurisprudence and principles. He resided for a few years in Gilan, Damavand, and rendered religious and spiritual services. He then was transferred to Tehran to teach and study and to obtain a doctorate from the University of Tehran. For this purpose, he also traveled to Europe and France, where, because of his intellectual abilities, he finished his specialization in six months and received a doctorate. He then returned to Tehran, where he began authoring current useful books for the young generation and the intelligentsia. Through his work, he has participated in bringing about the revolution and its victory.

This author says:

I have known his honor closely for a long time. Among the friends and scholars of the Center, he is known for being pious, of high character, a man of few words, and a thinker.

On 2 Tir 1358 [24 Jun 79], equal to 28 Rajab 1399 A.H., he participated in an interesting interview on television concernign the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which was watched by most people. He has authored many books, of which the following are available to this author:

1. "Sargozasht va Shahadat-e Hashtomin Emam-e Shi'ayan Hazrat-e Emam Reza" [The Biography and Martyrdom of the Eighth Imam of the Shi'ites, His Holiness Imam Reza], published.

2. "Shenakht-e Eslam"[Understanding Islam], authored with Dr Seyyed Mohammad Beheshti and Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar, published.

3. "Rah va Rasm-e Zendegi az Nazar-e Emam-e Sajjad"[The Way to Live According to Imam Sajjad], published.

4. "Yaddashtha'i dar Bareh-ye Nihilism, Nahgara'i, Puchgara'i"[Notes on Nihilism, Negativism, and Absurdity], published.

5. "Ba Dasturat-e Eslam Ashna Shavid"[Become Familiar with Islamic Instructions], published.

6. "Barnam-e Iman Avardehha" [In the Name of the Believers], Vols 1-5, published.

7. "Biya'id Inguneh Bashim" [Let Us Be This Way].

FAYYAZ

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Ahmad Fayyaz, son of the late Hojjatoleslam Haj Molla Mustafa Forushani Sedeh'i is one of the respected contemporary scholars and great teachers of Esfahan. He was born on 17 Zelqa'deh 1324 A.H. [2 Jan 07], was reared in a household of learning, and studied the preliminaries up to "Sayuti" in his birthplace. He then went to Esfahan in 1341 A.H. [24 Aug 22-13 Aug 23] and till 1364 A.H. [17 Dec 44-5 Dec 45] he studied religious jurisprudence and principles with the great teachers of Esfahan, such as the late Ayatollah Seyyed 'Ali Najafabadi, Ayatollah Seyyed Mehdi Dorcheh'i, and Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad Sadeq Yazdabadi. Then, in that year, he went to Najaf and for about five years in Najaf Theological Center he benefited from the instructions of the late Grand Ayatollah Mirza 'Abdolhadi Shirazi, Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Kazem Shirazi, Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mahmud Shahrudi, and Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Jamalolddin Golpayegani in religious jurisprudence and principles. In 1369 A.H. [24 Oct 49-12 Oct 50], he returned to Esfahan and has since been leading prayers, teaching such things as religious jurisprudence, and engaged in other religious services.

GOLPAYEGANI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad, son of Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Ja'far Mojtahed Golpayegani (born 1300 [21 Mar 21-20 Mar 22], died 1339 [21 Mar 60-20 Mar 61]), finished his education in Tehran and went to Najaf where he lived for 10 years and benefited from the lessons of Ayatollah Seyyed Abolhasan Esfahani and Ayatollah Na'ini. He received permits for the practice of religious jurisprudence from both. He studied important personalities with Ayatollah Seyyed Abutorab Khonsari and received permits for traditional narration from him. Then, he went to Qom and benefited from Ayatollah Hayeri Yazdi and was awarded a permit for the practice of religious jurisprudence by him. But the spring of his life did not last and at the age of 40, in 1339, equal to 1380 A.H. [26 Jun 60-14 Jun 61], he passed away. He was buried with honors by Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani in New Cemetary. He left behind a learned son, Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh 'Abbas Gharani, who lives in Qom and is known for his learning and piety.

LAHUTI

Hojjatoleslam and the pride of contemporary scholars, Haj Sheykh Mohsen Lahuti is one of the scholars of the Qom Theological Center

and one of the contemporary crusading propagators of Tehran. He was born in the suburbs of Rudsar and after studying the preliminaries, he went to Qom, where he studied the intermediary and higher levels with the teachers of Qom. He benefited from the lessons of the grand ayatollahs of Qom, such as the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Grand Ayatollah and deputy of the Imam, Khomeyni, the late Ayatollah Mohaqqeq, and others. He then began his religious services and propagation in Tehran. From the beginning of the movement for religious guardianship, he was on the front lines of the clergy, establishing provincial and urban societies. In all his talks and speeches, he criticized the government and protested against the hated, tyrannical ruling regime and its American and Israeli masters. He was arrested frequently by the criminal functionaries of the organization for (anti-) security [SAVAK], was tortured, and spent several years in Komiteh and Evin prisons. He was freed when the people pressured the government to free political prisoners and he returned to his struggle against the regime until--with the help of God--the regime of tyrannical monarchy was overthrown, Pahlavi escaped, and the Deputy of the Imam returned home from Paris. Mr Lahuti, together with the late martyred Professor Motahhari--where this humble servant was also present--entered the plane carrying the imam and welcomed him. In all stages, he has rendered significant services and has been appointed to great positions by the great leader, such as supervision of the barracks (Baghshah) and formation of the Revolutionary Army.

This author says: His honor is one of the pious and learned scholars of Gilan who is known for his generosity and praiseworthy character.

MAZANDERANI

The respected scholar and religious practicioner Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Musa Mazanderani, who was mentioned in Vol 4 of "Ganjineh-ye Daneshmandan," p 553, is a revered scholar and expert among the contemporary learned men of Tehran. He has many valuable works, including "Al'aqd al-Monir Fima Yata'alaq" (Beldara hem valedananir), in 20 volumes, of which 4 volumes have been published. Among the scholars of Tehran, he is a rare personality, the like of whom must teach in Qom and Najaf Centers, where scholars can benefit from his lessons. In 1339 A.H. [15 Sep 20-3 Sep 21] and early 1358 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 80], when I was with him in Iraq, I witnessed that Najaf Theological Center honored him, especially Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Abolqasem Kho'i respected him immensely and insisted that he stay in Najaf, saying that the thousand-year-old Center needed the likes of him. A number of other scholars, too, requested that he stay.

MODARRES AFGHANI

Hojjatoleslam Sheykh Mohammad 'Ali, son of Morad 'Ali Taqaddoni Saberi, known as Modarres, is one of the stars of the scholarly communities of Najaf and Qom. He was born in 1330 A.H. [22 Dec 11-

10 Dec 12] and studied his preliminaries and other levels in holy Mashhad. In 1347 A.H. [20 Jan 28-8 Jan 29], he walked from Mashhad to Najaf and after one year he arrived at the center of Shi'ism. In Najaf, he studied the remaining levels with respected teachers such as the late Mirza Hasan Rashti, Ayatollah Hakim, Ayatollah Kho'i, Sheykh Nasrollah Rashti, Haj Sheykh 'Abdolsaffar Eslami, and Sheykh Mohammad Rashti. He then attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollas Esfahani and Na'ini, Ziya'oddin 'Araqi, Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hoseyn Kashefolgheta', Sheykh Mohammad 'Ali Kazemeyni, and Mirza Aqa Estahbanati and reached the high levels of perfection and learning. He then began teaching various levels such as Soyuti, Moghni, "Motavval," "Lom'eh," and "Kefayeh." Because of his articulateness, his perfect control, and scholarly expertise, he became famous in a very short time and became one of the official, first rank teachers of the levels. His students increased every day and during 40 years of teaching, he trained great and worthy students, every one of whom have reached the highest levels and are engaged in teaching and doing other scholarly and religious services in the theological centers of Najaf, Qom, and other places.

Mr Modarres is highly regarded by the scholars and sources of emulation, who endorse his rank, piety, perfection, and religious learning in writing and orally, some of whom are as follows.

His eminence traveled to Afghanistan at the time of the late Ayatollah Esfahani at the invitation and request of the people of that country and at the instruction of Ayatollah Esfahani. He rendered significant services such as establishing a Theological Center. He then returned to Najaf, where he resumed teaching. Towards the end of 1394 A.H. [25 Feb 74-13 Jan 75], like thousands of others, he was deported from Iraq to Iran. Since that time he has lived in the scholarly and religious city of Qom, where he is engaged, as he was in Najaf, in teaching the levels and hundreds of serious students benefit from his lectures and lessons.

MODARRES QARACHEHDAGHI

Hojjatoleslam, the late Haj Mirza Mohammad 'Ali Modarres Qarachehdaghi, son of Hojjatoleslam Molla 'Ali, was one of the great scholars and teachers of the higher levels in Tabriz. He was born about 1265 A.H. [27 Nov 1848-16 Nov 1849] in Avansar in the suburbs of Tabriz. His late father brought him to Tabriz at the age of 14. He began his studies in the Talebiyyeh School, which is the center for the students of religious scholarship in Azarbayejan. At the age of 25, he finished the preliminaries and other levels. And for five years, he studied with the late Grand Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad 'Ali, the head of the Qarachehdaghi family.

MADANI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Mohammad Madani Gonabadi is one of the contemporary crusading scholars and propagators of Khorasan in Gonabad. He was born about 1345 A.H. [12 Jul 26-20 Jun 27] in Gonabad. After studying the preliminaries, literature, and other levels in Mashhad and benefiting from the scholars of Mashhad Theological Center, he went to Najaf, where he studied religious jurisprudence and principles with the grand ayatollahs, especially the late Grand Ayatollah Shahrudi. He received permits and scholarly degrees and returned to Iran and his birthplace, Gonabad, which was the center for the propaganda of the superstitions of the Gonabad Sufis "Molla Soltan'ali" and his misguided son. There was an urgent need for a well-informed leader and generous, crusading propagator such as he. He adhered strictly to the verse: "The people will be cautioned if they return to them." He began leading prayers, propagating the religion, expo- the false ideas of the Sufis and seriously callenging them. As a result, they were abolished, the public was enlightened and saved, and their false propagations were put to an end.

In addition to fighting the dervishes and Sufism, Mr Madani has rendered significant services in earthquake-stricken areas of Qayenat, Gonabad, and Tabas by building houses, treating the injured and victims of earthquakes, rescuing a number of people from death, and giving much aid to those who survived the earthquakes. In the recent revoluiton of Iran, he has had a great share in the region because he was the leader of the crusaders, the youth, and the crusading, brave, Moslem people of that area who fought against the tyrant and his criminal agents and who fought decisively with the hated regime of the deposed shah "Mohammad Reza Pahlavi" which ended --with the help of God--in the overthrow of the dictatorial monarchy and the declaration of the Islamic Republic under the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeyni.

MOQADDASI (SHIRAZI)

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Mirza Abolhasan Moqaddasi, known as Shirazi, is one of the contemporary respected scholars and prayer leaders of Mashhad. He was born about 1335 A.H. [28 Oct 16-16 Oct 17] and after early training in the preliminaries and literature, he went to Najaf, where he completed the texts of religious jurisprudence and principles with Grand Ayatollahs Esfahani and Mirza Na'ini, Ayatollah 'Araqi, his father-in-law, Grand Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Ali Mohammad Najafi Borujerdi, who was a distinguished scholar, and other ayatollahs. He reached the high levels of scholarship and knowledge. In ethics and culture, he benefited from "Jamalossalehin" and "Qoduhonnasekin" of the spiritual scholar, the late Haj Seyyed 'Ali Qazi Tabataba'i. In 1384 A.H. [15 May 64-1 May 65], after the death of Grand Ayatollah Seyyed A'dolhadi Shirazi, he returned to Iran and resided next to the shrine of the eighth imam, 'Ali ebn Mosa al-Reza,

and by leading prayers, he engaged in guarding the threshhold of his holiness.

This writer says: His eminence Moqaddasi Shirazi is truly a generous and pious scholar and is known for his virtues and moral conduct. He is known for being patient and for being a peace-maker.

Among his offspring is his brave son Seqqatoleslam Haj Mirza Mohammad Hasan Moqaddasi, the revered son-in-law of Hojjatoleslam and the great learned man Haj Mirza Hasan Mostafavi, who is one of hte famous speakers and orators of Tehran, a true defender of religious guardianship and a crusader against imperialism and the vile, ugly, hated regime of the tyrant Pahlavi.

ABTAHI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Morteza, the head of the monotheistic house of Abtahi, son of the late Seyyed 'Ali, son of Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali, son of Seyyed Mohammad Hoseyn, son of Mir Mohammad Taqi, known as "Lehleh," is one of the great seyyeds of the Musavi line in Esfahan, whose lineage extends to his holiness Musa ebn Ja'far, and it is endorsed by great scholars and prominent Musavi seyyeds, such as the father of the author of "Rowzat." His eminence is one of the famous contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of Esfahan who was born about 1319 A.H. [20 Apr 01-9 Apr 02], equal to 1278 [21 Mar 1899-20 Mar 1900; as published], in Esfahan. He was reared in a household of greatness and after studying the preliminaries, literature, and the texts of religious jurisprudence and principles with the great teachers of Esfahan, he became the honored son-in-law of the pious learned scholar Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Faqih Ahmadabadi, the author of "Makyal al-Makarem." He attended the lessons of the learned masters of traditional and rational thought, Ayatollah Haj Seyyed 'Ali Najafabadi, Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Najafabadi, the author of the marginal notes on"Kafayeh," the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Reza Najafi, author of "Vaqayat al-Azhan" and other ayatollahs.

In the science of medicine he is considered among the highest and best known teachers. He is known for his studies and teaching. Scholars in the Esfahan Theological Center benefit from his teachings in literature and various levels of the principles and religious jurisprudence and most people in Esfahan benefit from his Islamic teaching.

His brave sons are all considered among the highest scholars of the theological centers of Qom, Najaf, and Esfahan. They are:

1. Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Baqer, who is one of the teachers of Qom Theological Center.

2. Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali, who is one of the teachers of the theological centers of Najaf and Esfahan.

3. Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed 'Ali, who is among the scholars of Qom Theological Center.

4. Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Mohammad Reza (the revered son-in-law of Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani).

5. Hojjatoleslam Haj Aqa Hojjat, among the scholars of Esfahan.

6. Roknoleslam Hasan Aqa, among the scholars of Qom Theological Center.

7. Roknoleslam Hoseyn Aqa, among the scholars of Qom Theological Center.

MOVVAHED ABTAHI

Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Movvahed Abtahi is the first son of Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Movvahed Abtahi and the descendent of the late Ayatollah Mottaqi Haj Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Faqih Ahmadabadi. He was born in 1346 A.H. [1 Jul 27-19 Jun 28] on the second night of the blessed month of Ramazan to a household of knowledge and piety. He studied religious jurisprudence and principles in the theological center (Sadr School of Esfahan) with his honorable father and the famous teachers of Esfahan, including Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Rahim Arbab and Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mahmud Mofid. In the month of Rabi'ol avval 1365 A.H. [Feb 46], he moved to Qom, where he resided in Hojjatiyyeh School and attended the lessons of the late Ayatollah Hojjat as well as those of the great leader, Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. Despite the fact that he was less than 20 years old, his comments and his participation in the discussions were noted by his eminence. He studied the books "Qaza'" and "Shahadat" with Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Ahmad Khonsari. In 1370 A.H. [13 Oct 50-1 Oct 51], he went to Najaf to benefit from the theological center in that city and from great ayatollahs and teachers such as Mirza 'Abdolhadi Shirazi, Ayatollah Shahrudi, and Ayatollah Kho'i. However, because of the extremely hot climate of Najaf, he had to return to Qom, where he studied research methods, religious jurisprudence, the life history of prominent men, tradition, and interpretation with Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, the deputy of the Imam, Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni, Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, Mr Shari'atmadari, Haj Sheykh Mohammad 'Ali Araki, and the late Mohaqqeq Yazdi. He also studied philosophy and medicine with the great philosopher 'Allameh Tabataba'i as well as Avicenna's "Qanun" with his revered father and 'Allameh Haj Mirza Mohammad Tabibzadeh. Meanwhile, he began teaching the higher levels of religious jurisprudence and principles. He now has a research and teaching circle in which a number of scholars and bright students benefit from his lectures.

He has authored a number of works, here cited for the scholars:

1. The sections on "Zakat," "Khoms," "Sowm," and "E'tekaf" of the "Jame'olahadis" of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, co-authored with Hojjatoleslam Haj Javad Khandaqabadi, Haj Jalal Golpayegani, and Haj Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali Movvahed Abtahi (his revered brother) and was presented to his late eminence and published after his death with revisions by and verification of Grand Ayatollah Kho'i.

MOVVAHED ABTAHI

Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad 'Ali is the second son of Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Morteza and the grandson of Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Faqih Ahmadabadi, the author of "Makyal al-Makarem." His eminence is among the religious jurists, masters of traditional and rational thought, and a teacher of the theological centers of Najaf and Esfahan.

He was born in Esfahan on 26 Safar 1349 A.H. [23 Jul 30]. After Persian studies, he engaged in Arabic and studied most of the books of grammar, syntax, and logic with his honorable father. He studied the system of logic of Haj Sabzevari with the great master Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Reza Kalbasi. He studied "Sharh-e Nafisi" and "Sharh-e Asbab" with his father and part of "Qanun" with the famous teacher Ayatollah Haj Mirza 'Ali Shirazi. He studied principles and religious jurisprudence up to proficiency and "Makaseb-e Sheykh" with the revered teachers of the Esfahan Theological Center, including Ayatollah Arbab and Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mahmud Mofid.

In 1364 A.H. [17 Dec 44-5 Dec 45], he went to the sacred theological center (Qom) and did most of his training in philosophy with the great philosopher and revered scholar Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Hoseyn Tabataba'i, the author of "Al-Mizan."

He also attended the lessons of his eminence on "Shafa'" and other works of Avicenna as well as other subjects. In religious jurisprudence and principles, he attended the lessons of the grand ayatollahs and teachers of the Center, including the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi and Grand Ayatollah Hojjat. He was considered among the most outstanding scholars, authors, and teachers of the Center. In the teachings of Ayatollah Borujerdi, he was noted for his questions which endeared him to his late eminence. He is one of the authors of the valuable book "Jame' al-Hadis."

In the month of Rabi' al-avval of 1374 A.H. [Oct-Nov 54], he went to Najaf and attended the lessons of Ayatollah Hakim, Ayatollah Seyyed 'Abdolhadi, and Ayatollah Kho'i. After the death of his great teacher, Ayatollah Borujerdi, he exclusively devoted his time to teaching religious jurisprudence and principles.and writing, and a number of scholars attended his lessons.

After the tragic event of the expulsion of the scholars of the Najaf Theological Center and the Iranians, he returned to Iran on 10 Jamadi al-sani 1394 A.H. [1 Jul 74], due to a heart condition, and has since been teaching religious jurisprudence, principles, interpretation, and the life history of prominent men in the Esfahan Theological Center and the people of this city benefit from him.

MOHAJERANI

Hojjatoleslam and great scholar Haj Mirza Ja'far, son of Ayatollah Haj Mirza Mohammad Baqer Mohajerani Hamadani, is one of the learned men of Qom Theological Center. He was born in 1352 A.H. [26 Apr 33-15 Apr 34] in Hamadan. He studied the preliminaries in the school of the late Akhund Molla 'Ali Hamadani and in 1368 A.H. [3 Nov 48-23 Oct 49], he went to Qom. He then benefited for a period of three years from the lessons of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. After his death, he attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollas Khomeyni, Shari'atmadari, Golpayegani, and Najafi Mar'ashi. Meanwhile, he made a trip to Najaf where he stayed for some time and benefited from Grand Ayatollah Kho'i and deputy of the Imam, Khomeyni. During the revolution, he traveled widely to awaken the people and suffered many difficulties.

He has founded or authored the following:

(1) A mosque in Lakamehsar, Lahijan; (2) a mosque in Kurijan, Hamadan; (3) a mosque named after the 12th imam in Mohajeran.

His works: (1)"Manasek-e Haj"[The Ritual of the Haj], in accordance with the five denominations of Islam: (a) Ja'fari, (b) Hanafi, (c) Shafe'i, (d) Maleki, and (e) Hanbali.

(2) The lecture notes of the grand ayatollahs and teachers of Qom Theological Center, in manuscript form.

MUSAVI MALAYERI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Javad Musavi Malayeri, son of the late Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mahmud Malayeri, is among the contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of Tehran in Khazaneh Farahabad. He was born in 1301 [21 Mar 22-20 Mar 23]. After studying the preliminaries with his late brother Haj Seyyed Hadi Malayeri, he studied for four years in Qom during the time of the three sources of emulation, Ayatollahs Hojjat, Khonsari, and Sadr. He studied for three years in Hamadan, in the school of Ayatollah Akhund Molla 'Ali. He also lived for some time in the village of Pari, Malayer, and benefited from his late brother Seyyed Hadi. He then came to Qom and benefited from the lessons of the late Grand Ayatolla Borujerdi, Grand Ayatollah Mar'ashi Najafi, and Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani. After the death of the late Ayatollah Borujerdi, he was invited to Tehran by a number

of people of Malayer residing in Tehran. Through his efforts, a plot of land was bought in Khuzaneh Farahabad in south Tehran and a mosque named after his holiness Musa ebn-e Ja'far was built. Since the completion of the mosque, with the aid of the people of that area, he has been leading prayers in that mosque and doing religious services. He has also established a public library--may God increase the likes of him.

MIR MOHAMMAD SADEQI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Mojtaba, descendent of the late Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Baqer, Mir Mohammad Sadeqi is among the contemporary scholars, prayer leaders, and teachers of Esfahan. He is from a family of learning and on his mother's side, he is related to Mirza Qomi and Akhund Molla 'Ali Nuri. His revered mother is the daughter of the late Ayatollah Haj Monirroddin, son of Jamaleddin, son of Molla 'Ali Borujerdi. His eminence was born around 1330 A.H. [22 Dec 11-10 Dec 12] in Esfahan and was reared in a household of knowledge and virtue. After studying the preliminaries and other levels, he benefited from the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Reza Najafi, Ayatollah Haj Mir Seyyed 'Ali Modarres Najafabadi, and Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Modarres Najafabadi, up to the level of practicioner of theology. He is engaged in religious services, including leading prayers in Al-Nabi Mosque of Esfahan, teaching in Sadr School of Esfahan, and religious propagation.

TASUJI

Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Ali Tasuji is one of the contemporary virtuous and generous scholars residing in holy Mashhad. He was born in 1325 A.H. [14 Feb 07-3 Feb 08] in one of the villages of Tasuj called Dizaj. He studied the preliminaries in Tasuj and then went to Mashhad, where he benefited from the lessons of the late Ayatollah Haj Mirza Habibollah Maleki Tabrizi. After a few years, he returned home and engaged in leading prayers and other religious and spiritual services. He also resided in the city of Khoy and then went to Najaf, where he benefited from the late Ayatollah Hakim, Ayatollah Kho'i, and others. In 1394 A.H. [25 Feb 74-13 Jan 75], he returned to Iran due to an illness and for other reasons and has since been living in Mashhad, near the shrine of his holiness Imam Abolhasan 'Ali ebn-e Musa al-Reza, where he has engaged in teaching and benefiting others. He is one of the good friends of Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Abbas Tasuji, who resides in Qom. Whenever he comes to Qom, he stays in the house of his eminence, who praises him for his virtues, piety, and generosity.

The Astonishing and Instructive Revelation of Tasuji

Here, I find it appropriate to mention the following astonishing revelation of the spiritual scholar and religious theologian, Haj

Sheykh 'Abbas Tasuji, which has been a lesson for this writer and should be a model for others. He said: Once, life had become difficult for me; I resorted to all the prayers that I had available to me and recited them, but no result ensued. One day, I begged God and wept a great deal, wondering what prayer I must recite to be accepted. At night, when I went to sleep, I dreamed that I was in a desert. One side was green and pleasant with a stream running through it, the other side was barren.

I saw a reverent seyyed sitting next to the stream, the bottom of whose robe was in the water of the stream, and a madman was near him. The madman started to insult me. I thought that the madman spoke evil of me to the seyyed and, hence, from our first meeting, the seyyed would pay no attention to me. But I went closer. The madman ran away. I said to the seyyed: Dear sir, I am in difficulty. What prayer should I recite for God to answer me soon? He said: Recite "havamim" and offer it to her holiness Fatemeh. Then pray and God will answer you soon. I asked what "tavamim" was. He said: Ha va mim, the ha-mims of the Koran. I woke up and counted the ha-mims of the Koran. They are seven Suras.[1] I recited them and offered them to her holiness Fatemeh Zahra and prayed. The next day my prayers were answered at that very hour and a resolution was provided which continues to date.

[1]Those Suras are as follows: (1) Ha-mim Tanzil, (2) Ha-mim Faslat, (3) Ha-mim Ghafar, (4) Ha-mim al-Ketab al-Mobin, (5) Ha-mim "Dokhan," (6) Ha-mim "Jathiyah," (7) Ha-mim "Ahqaf."

MOMAYYEZ

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Ghadir 'Ali Momayyez is one of the contemporary scholars who serves and propagates the faith in Shahreza. He was born in Zelhajjeh in 1349 A.H. [29 May 30-18 May 31]. He studied the preliminaries with Ayatollah Haj Mirza Nasrollah Zare'an and the other levels with Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mehdi Kamari in Sheykh 'Abdolhoseyn School of Tehran. Also, in Mashhad, he studied with the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Hashem Qazvini and Haj Jalal Modarres. He studied literature with Mr Hashemi and learned astronomy and interpretation from the revered teacher 'Allameh Mir Jahani. In Najaf, he studied "Manzumeh-ye Sabzevari" with the late Hojjatoleslam Haj Mirza Mohammad 'Ali Towhidi Tabrizi and studied the higher levels with the late Haj Sheykh Sadra Badkubeh'i and Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Abolqasem Kowkabi. He also benefited from the lessons of Ayatollah Haj Mirza Baqer Zanjani, Ayatollah Hakim, Grand Ayatollah Kho'i, and Ayatollah Haj Seyyed 'Abdol'ala Sabzevari. He received permits and returned from Najaf to Shahreza, where he is engaged in religious services, including leading prayers, propagating the religious precepts, and upholding religious standards at the present time, when "Ganjineh" is being written.

HOSEYNI KASHANI

The great learned late Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad al-Mehdi--his grave be blessed--is the son of religious scholar Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Sadeq Hoseyni, who was one of the highest scholars of the house of Hoseyni Kashani seyyeds.

He was a practical scholar, a perfect theologian, a pious ascetic, a chaste worshipper, and a learned teacher, who was distinguished for his knowledge of traditional and rational sciences. Most of his apprenticeship was completed with the grand theologian, the late Ayatollah Seyyed Hoseyn Kuhkamari, Grand Ayatollah Mirza Bozorg Shirazi, and others. A number of scholars were his students and have received permits from him.

He has authored valuable works in various fields of knowledge, including religious jurisprudence, principles, philosophy, mathematics, and literature, which are placed in the library of the honorable son of the late scholar Haj Seyyed 'Ali Akbar Hoseyni and are now kept by his grandson Ayatollah Haj Seyyed 'Abbas Kashani Hayeri, and which will hopefully be published through his efforts. His eminence lived in Najaf towards the end of his life, where he engaged in teaching and then passed away. Upon his death, he was honored with a great, magnificent funeral. The bazaar of Najaf as well as the theological centers closed. In accordance with his last will, he was buried in his private mausoleum in Vadi al-Salam. His tomb is famous and respected by the scholars and other faithful people.

MEHDIPUR

Hojjatoleslam Mirza 'Ali Akbar Mehdipur is one of the bright faces of virtue and knowledge in Qom Theological Center. He was born on 13 Rajab 1363 A.H. [5 Jul 44], on the anniversary of the birth of his holiness 'Ali ebn-e Abitaleb in Tabriz. After studying the preliminaries and intermediary levels, he went to Qom where he learned the higher levels from the great teachers of the theological Center. He then attended the lessons of religious jurisprudence of Grand Ayatollah Shari'atmadari and from the beginning of the Center for Islamic Propagation [Daroltabliq-e Eslami] of Qom, he was present where he studied and received a "non-Nobel" prize every year from that establishment. After finishing his education, Mr Mehdipur was appointed to teach literature, religious jurisprudence, principles, and history of religions in that establishment.

Finally, in 1395 [14 Jan 75-2 Jan 76], he was dispatched to Istanbul to supervise the affairs of Shi'ites and is presently authorized by the highest Shi'ite source of emulation to supervise the Shi'ites of Istanbul. During his four years in Turkey, through his efforts and hard work, he has taken great steps in introducing Shi'ism, some of which are mentioned below for the scholars.

NOJBAT AL-FOQAHA' LARI

Hojjatoleslam Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hasan, son of the revered scholar Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Hoseyn Lari, is one of the great contemporary scholars. He was born about 1328 A.H. [13 Jan 10-1 Jan 11] in Lar to a household of learning and virtue where he was reared and studied the preliminaries and other levels. He often went to Shiraz and benefited from the great teachers of that city. He then went to Najaf, where he studied with the great Ayatollah Esfahani, Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hoseyn Na'ini, and Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Kazem Shirazi and after receiving permits for theological practice, he returned to his own city of Lar, where he has been engaged in religious and social duties. He has authored several works including:

1. "Tazkerat ol-Fozala'"

2. "Tazkerat ol-Soleha,'" and other works.

This author met his eminence about five years ago in Mashhad in Navvab School and found him to be a perfectly humble scholar.

NEYSHAPURI KHORASANI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Ebrahim Dorudi, son of the late Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Hoseyn, son of the great scholar Ayatollah Seyyed Ebrahim Dorudi Neyshapuri, is one of the contemporary prayer leaders and scholars of Kazemayn. His eminence was born in 1344 A.H. [22 Jul 25-11 Jul 26] in Dorud, Neyshapur and was reared in a house of learning and politics. After studying the preliminaries and other levels in Mashhad, he went to Iraq in 1364 A.H. [17 Dec 44-5 Dec 45] at the age of 20. In Najaf, he studied with Sheykh Mohammad Taqi al-Razi and Haj Sheykh Fazel Qa'ini. He also benefited from the late Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohsen Hakim and Ayatollah Mirza Baqer Zanjani for a short time. After the death of his late uncle, Ayatollah Seyyed Mehdi Khorasani, in Kazemayn in 1369 A.H. [24 Oct 49-12 Oct 50], he moved to Kazemayn and began leading prayers in the shrine of the two imams, Javad ebn-e Musa ebn-e Ja'far and his holiness Imam Mohammad Taqi. He also teaches "Makaseb" and "Osul-e Mozaffar."

His late father, Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Mohammad Hoseyn, was one of the scholars of Kazemayn who was born in Samereh during the time of the late Mirza Bozorg and passed away in 1370 A.H. [13 Oct 50-1 Oct 51] in Dorud, Neyshapur, where he is buried.

The grandfather of his eminence, the late Ayatollah Seyyed Ebrahim Dorudi, was one of the great scholars of Kazemayn. Famous, pious, and faithful men (such as Ayatollah Seyyed Mohsen A'raji) were among the distinguished students of Grand Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad

Hoseyn Shirazi in Samereh. His learning and piety are more than this writer can express. His biography adorns the books of the biographer of Shi'ite personalities.

VOJDANI FAKHR

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Qodratollah Vojdani Fakhr Sarabi is one of the distinguished scholars and famous and worthy teachers of Qom Theological Center. He was born about 1347 A.H. [20 Jun 28-8 Jun 29] in Sarab. After studying the preliminaries in his birthplace and Tabriz and benefiting from the scholars of these two cities, he went to Qom in 1365 A.H. [6 Dec 45-24 Nov 46]. He studied the intermediary and higher levels with the great teachers of the time who are the grand ayatollahs and sources of emulation of the Shi'ites today. Towards the end of the life of the late Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Hojjat, for whom the school and mosque "Hojjatiyyeh" are named, he attended his lessons. After the death of his eminence in 1370 A.H. [13 Oct 50-10 Oct 51], he studied the principles and religious jurisprudence with the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, the late Grand Ayatollah Sheykh 'Abdolnabi Eraqi (who was also the son-in-law of his eminence), Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, deputy of the Imam Khomeyni, and Ayatollah Najafi Mar'ashi. He also began teaching texts of religious jurisprudence, principles, and logic and has thusfar often taught "Sharh-e Lam'eh," "Rasa'el," "Makaseb," "Motavval," and "Sabzevari." About 200-300 of the students of Qom Theological Center benefit from his lessons.

He is known for his warm, comprehensive discussions and teachings and his students understand the subjects well.

He has authored several works, including the following, which have been published:

1. "Adab-e Mo'asherat" [Codes of Conduct], published 16 years ago.

2. "Ejtehad" [The Practice of Theology], published eight years ago.

HARANDI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Abolqasem Harandi is one of the respected contemporary scholars and prayer leaders of Esfahan. He was born in 1338 A.H. [26 Sep 19-14 Sep 20] in Harand of Esfahan and after his early education and studies in literature, he went to Qom, where he completed the various levels with great teachers such as Grand Ayatollah Najafi Mar'ashi, Grand Ayatollah Golpayegani, and deputy of the Imam Ayatollah Khomeyni. During the early days of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi in Qom, he went to Najaf and benefited from the instructions of Grand Ayatollahs Shahrudi and Mirza 'Abdolhadi Shirazi as well as those of Grand Ayatollah Kho'i and others. After being a neighbor of the shrine of the Door to the City of Knowledge,

his holiness 'Ali, and enjoying the teaching of the above-mentioned ayatollahs, he returned to Iran and resided in Esfahan, where he has been engaged in leading prayers, teaching and other religious duties. He has also authored works which deal with spiritual services. This writer has known him for more than 40 years. I have never seen him or heard him do any wrong. I have found him a dignified seyyed and a virtuous scholar. I have frequently asked him orally and in writing for his life history to be used in "Ganjineh"; but out of caution and humility, he has refused. But this humble servant could not forgive himself were he not to mention him in order to pay his debt to him for his friendship and old relationship. Therefore, I wrote a few lines about his life, to reap the rewards for it when this life ends.

His revered brother Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Mohammad Harandi is also one of the contemporary scholars of Esfahan who studied for many years in Qom and in Najaf, and benefited from the late Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mahmud Shahrudi and others. He then returned to Esfahan and has been engaged in guiding the people from the pulpit. Like his revered brother, he is also known among the clergy and the scholarly community of Esfahan for his morality, virtue, and piety.

HASHTRUDI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Seyyed Hoseyn Musavi, son of the late Seyyed Hedayat Hashtrudi, is also one of the contemporary scholars, prayer leaders and servants of religion in Darband, Shemiran, of Tehran. He is a descendent of the revered Imamzadeh Ebrahim al-Morteza, son of his holiness Imam Musa ebn-e Ja'far. He was born in the village of Kalucheh, Hashtrud, in 1330 A.H. [22 Dec 11-10 Dec 12]. From the age of five, he began to study the Koran and lessons in Persian. He lost his father early in life and his mother at the age of nine, but he continued his education under the guardianship of the late Molla Saleh, known as Akhund Da'i, who was one of the pious men of his day. After his death, at the age of 18, he went to Qom and on the night of 15 Sha'ban 1348 A.H. [16 Jan 30], he entered the Theological Center. He bagan studying the preliminaries and other levels at Darolshafa' School, learned "Sharh-e Lam'eh" from the contemporary Grand Ayatollah Najafi Mar'ashi, "Motavval" from Hojjatoleslam Adib Tehrani, "Rasa'el" and "Makaseb" from the late Haj Seyyed Mohammad Mowlana Tabrizi, and "Kefayeh" from Ayatollah Mirza Razi Tabrizi and the late Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hamadani. In 1354 A.H. [5 Apr 35-23 Mar 36], he attended the lessons of the late Grand Ayatollah Haj Sheykh 'Abdol Karim Hayeri. After the death of Hayeri in 1355 A.H. [24 Mar 36-13 Mar 37], he benefited from the late Grand Ayatollah Hojjat and Grand Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Feyz Qomi. He also benefited from the lessons of Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi. Since the death of his eminence, he has been residing on Darband Street (Baq-e Shater), has founded a large mosque and library, and is now engaged in leading prayers and religious propagation and services.

He has many permits for the practice of theology and traditional narration from Grand Ayatollah Hayeri Yazdi, Ayatollah Hojjat, Ayatollah Zanjani, and Grand Ayatollah Najafi Mar'ashi.

MR JOWHARI

Mr Haj Mirza Hoseyn Jowhari is one of the contemporary orators, speakers, and literary scholars of Tehran. Although he is not a man of the sacred cloth of spiritual leadership, he is one of the scholars and speakers of the capitol who speaks in great mosques and other important meetings during the monts of Moharram, Safar, and Ramazan and at other important times. He was born in Tehran and was reared in a home of learning and literature. After finishing his modern education in the Marvi School, he finished his traditional education to the end of the levels.

Mr Jowhari has an eloquent style and much talent and has authored published books and manuscripts.

AYATOLLAH SADR

The prominent religious jurist and theologian, grand ayatollah of the two worlds, and omnicient scholar, Haj Seyyed Mohammad Baqer, son of Grand Ayatollah al-Haj al-Seyyed Heydar (author of "Al-Shobhat ol-Heydariyyeh va al-Shobhat ol-'Ebadiyyeh"), son of the great scholar Grand Ayatollah al-Haj al-Seyyed Esma'il al-Sadrol'ameli al-Musavi--may God give him a long life for the Shi'ite Moslems--is one of the contemporary grand ayatollahs and revered religious jurists in Najaf. The Shi'ite world and especially the Shi'ites of Iraq are proud of him. After Grand Ayatollah Kho'i--may God grant him a long life and success--he is the light of the eyes of the scholars of Najaf Theological Center. His eminence, whose fame of virtue, knowledge, sagacity, and insight as well as of his scholarly works has reached all the Shi'ite countries, has become the source of religious emulation for many of the Arab Shi'ites.

Ayatollah Sadr was born in 1350 A.H. [19 May 31-6 May 32] to the house of a virtuous and learned seyyed and was reared in the cradle of piety, virtue, chastity, and courage. He married the daughter of his revered uncle (the late Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Sadroddin Sadr), one of the leaders of Qom Theological Center, (the sister of the leader of the Lebanese Shi'ites).

After studying the preliminaries, literature, and the texts of religious jurisprudence, principles, and philosophy and completing the scholarly fundamentals with the grand ayatollahs of Najaf, especially the great contemporary leader Grand Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Abolqasem Kho'i, until he was promoted to the highest degrees of knowledge, he established a teaching center in Sheykh Tusi Mosque, where hundreds of scholars attend his lessons and benefit from his eloquent lectures.

In addition to being a highly ranked scholar, Ayatollah Sadr is a conscious source of emulation, an alert religious jurist, and an informed and crusading scholar. During the Iranian revolution, he praised the revolution of the Iranian people through his statements and speeches and encouraged the people to uprise, using the Iranians as a model. He invited the people to fight and crusade against the tyrants and, therefore, like the deputy of the Imam Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni, he was the target of the anger of the dictatorial regime of the Ba'thist government. His house was frequently surrounded and the people and the clergy were prevented from entering his home. Even a large number of his followers and students were arrested, some were executed, and others jailed. In early Khordad 1358 [May-Jun 79] (Rajab 1399 A.H.), he was arrested and brought to Baghdad. The people of Najaf, Karbala, and Kazemayn demanded his release through strikes and marches. Also, a flood of telegrams from Iran were sent to grand ayatollahs, great sources of emulation, scholars, and others expressing their deep sorrow and concern about the arrest of his honor and demanding his release and the release of other Iraqi prisoners.

Hence, the Ba'thist government of Iraq was forced to free him. But, his house is apparently still being watched by the officials of the Iraqi Ba'thists and no one dares to enter it.

Ayatollah Sadr has consistently been a supporter of the movement and the revolution of Iran, despised the vile regime of the deposed shah, and, in Iraq, has declared his support for Iran and its dear leader Grand Ayatollah and deputy of the Imam Khomeyni.

Like the other sources of emulation, the grand ayatollahs of Iran, the great leader of the revolution Imam Khomeyni, Grand Ayatollah Najafi Mar'ashi (who is related to him), Ayatollah Shari'atmadari, and Ayatollah Golpayegani, Ayatollah Sadr is sorrowful and unhappy because of the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr (his revered brother-in-law). In Najaf, he visited this humble servant one evening and we spoke of Imam Musa Sadr. Like others, he also believes that he is alive and in prison in Libya.

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Ahmad Ansari Qomi, who is one of the scholars of Najaf, reports the following, which has been verified by his eminence.

He said: My brother-in-law, the son of Ayatollah Najafi Hamadani (author of "Tafisr-e Anvar-e Darakhshan"), disappeared and we had no news of him. We did not know whether he was dead or alive. We were told that a woman in Kufeh could give reports of those who have disappeared. I went to that woman and, as is customary, I gave her one dirham and told her to find our missing person. She asked his name and the name of his mother. I told her. After calculating, she said: He is in prison and safe and will be freed soon. And this happened. As she had said, on 3 Aban 57 [25 Oct 78], when the

prisoners of Qasr and Evin were freed, he was also freed. I thought of Imam Musa Sadr and returned to the woman. I told her that I had another missing person. She asked for a quarter of a dinar. I gave it to her. As before, she asked his name and his mother's name. I told her. She calculated and said: This person is imprisoned somewhere like Yusef Saddiq and is safe. She added: There is no way for him to contact the outside and no one from outside can contact him. But, she said, he will be freed in the course of a world-wide movement--God willing. (And he will be like Yusef, the prisoner, the beloved of the world--God willing.)

TAJVIDI

The high ranking scholar Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Ziya'oddin, son of Haj Seyyed 'Alinaqi, son of Haj Seyyed Esma'il, son of Mir Mohammad 'Ali Tajvidi, is one of the contemporary scholars and great teachers of Esfahan. He was born in 1320 A.H. [10 Apr 02-29 Mar 03], to a house of learning and piety in Esfahan. After studying literatuer, the preliminaries, and the texts of religious jurisprudence and principles with the late Ayatollah Dorcheh'i, the late Ayatollah Haj Seyyed 'Ali Modarres Najafabadi, and the late Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mohammad Reza Khorasani, he studied astronomy with the late Ayatollah Haj Mirza Hoda Karbasi, the grandson of the great learned man, Grand Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Ebrahim Karbasi, the contemporary and school companion of Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Shafaqi. He also engaged in teaching texts of religious jurisprudence.

His eminence leads noon prayers at the mosque of the late Ayatollah Haj Rahim Arbab and evening prayers in Sheykholeslam Mosque and is engaged in other religious services. He teaches "Salat" by Haj Reza Hamadani and "Sharh-e Riyaz" in Sadr School. He is a discussion companion of the great scholars and teachers of Esfahan. Among the scholars of Esfahan and the faithful people of that city, he is known for his virtue, generosity, and piety. He has a son, Hojjatoleslam Haj Fazlolah Tajvidi, who resides in Tehran. He was born in 1345 A.H. [12 Jul 26-30 Jun 27] in Esfahan and was reared in a house of virtue and piety. After studying the preliminaries and the intermediate levels with the late Ayatollah Haj Rahim Arbab and the late Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Mohammad Husan Najafabadi and studying philosophy with the late Haj Sheykh Mahmud Mofind, he went to Tehran and attended the lessons of Grand Ayatollah Ahmad Khonsari and studied "Shavareq" with Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Zeynol'abedin Sarkheh'i. Presently, he leads prayers and is engaged in religious propagation and other religious services in Jame'-ye Mohammadi Mosque on Dowlat Street in Shemiran, Tehran.

TAHRIRI

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Mahmud Tahriri Tehrani is one of the bright faces among the scholars who is known for his piety and is one of the contemporary prayer leaders of Tehran. He was born about 1342 A.H. [14 Aug 23-1 Aug 24] in Tehran. After studying Persian lessons and the preliminaries in Tehran, he went to Qom and learned the texts of religious jurisprudence and principles from the teachers of the Theological Center. He then attended the lessons of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Grand Ayatollah and deputy of the Imam Khomeyni, and other ayatollahs and benefited from their wealth of knowledge. After the death of the late Borujerdi, he returned to his birthplace. At the invitation of a number of the faithful in west Tehran, he began leading prayers in the mosque of Estakhr Street, where he is now engaged in propagating the precepts of the true faith of Twelver Shi'ites.

This author says: His honor Mr Tahriri is a pious scholar and a person of high morals who is known among his peers for his piety and purity. He is one of the sincere believers in the house of the Prophet and a lover of his family. His sermons are useful and rich and he would not violate the boundaries of the Koran and religious tradition (the two great bases entrusted by the Prophet).

There is nothing on the scrolls of his heart but the "alef" of the beloved's height
What else could he do? His teacher had not taught him any other letter.

In narrating the tragedies of the Prophet's family, he weeps and makes others weep. His face is spiritual and his words heavenly.

In fighting the tyrant and his agents, he did his best, despite his illness, and his mosque was and is one of the strongholds for the struggle. During the month of Safar 1399 A.H. [Jan 79], Bahman 1357, when this writer had a propagational program there for 10 evenings, I witnessed the struggle of those he had trained.

He has good and worthy children named Sheykh Baqer and Sheykh Kazem, who are studying in Qom at the present time.

MORVARID

Hojjatoleslam, rare scholar and propagator of religion, Haj Sheykh 'Ali Asghar, son of the late Seqatoleslam Sheykh 'Ali Asghar Morvarid, is one of the bright stars of virtue and knowledge from Qom Theological Center in northwest Tehran and Taj Street. He was born about 1344 A. H. [22 Jul 25-11 Jul 26] in Mashhad. After studying the preliminaries and some of the levels, he went to Qom in the early days of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, where he studied the

other levels with the excellent teachers of Qom. He then attended the lessons of religious jurisprudence and principles of Grand Ayatollahs Borujerdi and the late Mohaqqeq Damad. Notably, he attended the lessons of Deputy of the Imam, Grand Ayatollah Khomeyni for several years. Since the beginning of the movement and the uprising of the great leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni, after the death of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, he entered the battlefield against corruption, imperialism, and the hated tyrannical regime of Pahlavi. He spent several years in exile or in the prisons of the dictatorial agents of the monarchy (SAVAK), but he never gave in to them and did not give up his sacred duty of holy war against the hypocrites and the anti-people anti-monotheists. He was freed two years ago and continued his struggle until--with the help of God, the generosity of the Twelfth Imam, and the initiative of the great man of the people, Imam Khomeyni, and the round-the-clock fighting of those combatants who had no support but God--the hated government of Bakhtiyar fell on 23 Bahman [12 Feb] and the Islamic Republic was declared.

His honor Haj Morvarid is a warm and eloquent speaker who is experienced in giving speeches and oratory. He knows most of the Koran by heart. Presently, he leads prayers in the mosque of Taj Street, near (Martyr) Navab Safavi Street, and is engaged in religious services. He heads the Committee of northwest Tehran, which is one of the 14 Committees of Tehran, and is active in doing his duties day and night.

His respected brother, Hojjatoleslam and great learned man Haj Sheykh Mohammad Taqi Morvarid, is one of the scholars of Qom and Mashhad Theological Centers. In accordance with the instructions of the late Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, he resides in the city of Ilam and for many years has been leading prayers and rendering spiritual and religious services and has served that area significantly.

MO'ALLEM HABIBABADI

The great scholar Mirza Mohammad 'Ali Mo'allem, son of the late Zeynol'abedin, son of Hoseyn, son of 'Ali Akbar, son of Mohammad, son of Hoseyn Habibabadi, who was born in 1308 A.H. [17 Aug 1890-6 Aug 1891] and died in 1396 A.H. [3 Jan 76-22 Dec 76], was one of the scholars, unknown writers, and great literary men of Esfahan Province.

The biography and valuable works of his late honor, as is mentioned in a memorium on the 40th day of his death, is as follows, as he himself has written. He was born in the month of Moharram 1308 A.H. [Aug-Sep 1890] in Habibabad, which is three parasangs from Esfahan, to a farming family. From the age of seven, he bagan to study in a schoolhouse and until 1322 A.H. [18 Mar 04-7 Mar 05], he learned some of the subjects. For a while, he did not study; but, once

again, in 1328 A.H. [13 Jan 10-1 Jan 11], he returned to his studies and learned most subjects from different people. He read most of the books on his own and asked about his problems from the experts on the subjects.

The lat Mo'allem, who used the pen names of Mosta'sam and Azar, is one of the persons of knowledge, literature, and history in Esfahan. although this writer was not fortunate enough to meet him, I have heard from prominent people that he was among the important scholars and literary men of Esfahan. And the people of not only Habibabad but also of Esfahan are proud of him. He has many valuable works which speak of his honor's knowledge. The list which was provided by his honor for one of the biographers of Tehran is provided below for the lovers of literature.

Revolution and Counterrevolution

It was unbelieveable, it astonished and shocked the whole world. It was more like a miracle. It did not conform to the usual occurrances and the natural events of the world. The superpowers were taken by surprise. The East and the West were shocked. It was different from all the other revolutions in the world. It was astonishing for the people of the world, because this revolution changed the foundations of sociology and psychology and shook the standards of science.

Iran had become all cries. Days were indistinguishable from nights. Tanks, cannons, and machine guns were no longer important. From the throats of children, the sound of roaring lions could be heard. The youth were destroying all the signs of despotism and dictatorship. The mosque was the battlefield of holy war. The bazaar was the center of combat, the school a stronghold for freedom fighters, and the streets and alleys a place for the display of self-sacrifice by true Moslems. The collective movement of the women, like the roaring waves of the ocean, was unafraid of any obstacle.

The Iranian woman had rediscovered the path of Zeynab and had recognized the Yazid-like tyrant. She had followed in the footsteps of that man-creating lady. All the Satanical boundaries created by the despotic governments were destroyed by the brave nation.

The theological student, the university and high school student, the bazaar merchant, the worker, the professor, the farmer, the employer, the villager, and the urbanite, all together, everywhere, simultaneously followed one goal. They shouted mottoes; they said: "God is great"; they marched towards God, destroyed the idols with stones, fought the tyrant and continued the path of Mohammad and 'Ali--peace be upon them. They would say: We are Moslems and we have just found true Islam.

Yes

The Islamic revolution of Iran (under the shadow of the clergy) was unprecedented in the world. History has never recorded such an event.

It was the highest materialization of faith and love, the manifestation of the victory of truth over Ahriman.

All the downtrodden in the world have their eyes on Iran and see their hopes in Iran.

We must guard this great revolution, this liberating battle, this godly movement, this movement of faith, this uproar of love, this cry of truth, and, finally, this fruit of the dearest, purest, and most revered blood of the martyrs; and we must continue it. We must not suppose that the work is finished; our revolution has become victorious; the enemy has been destroyed; and the tyrant has become homeless. From now on, the responsibility is greater and the duty more difficult because here, two points must be noted. The first one concerns the revolutionaries and the second the counterrevolutionaries.

1. After the victory, it is possible for the revolutionary individuals to become idle because they have been victorious, saying to themselves: We have nothing left to do. This pride could inflict harm on the revolution.

2. The changes in the enemy's tactics: The defeated enemy, like a wounded snake, will not give up revenge. He will try to change his tactics, change his face, and return with newer masks and newer methods. He will not sit idle. He might be disguised in revolutionary form, as the supporter of freedom, the defender of the rights of the suffering people and the downtrodden. Or, he might try to cause disunity by pretending to defend the revolution, inviting to unite, and defending Islam and, hence, try to achieve his goal. Basically, the people of several faces and the so-called Islam of the "hypocrites" changes into different forms each day and each hour and displays its enmity in various ways. But, it does not matter in what shape he carries out his vile intentions.

These depraved people only believe in one thing: being hypocrites. Every morning they put on a new face. One day they draw their swords against God, and the next day, with little or no justification at all, they fight for Him.

The Danger of the Hypocrites

One of the dangers of counterrevolution that we must be on the alert for is that of hypocrites who e very existence is a great calamity for the nation. In the past and at the present time, they have

betrayed and are betraying the people's revolutions. Or they put on deceptive masks, put on the guise of liberalism and defense of the deprived, and with their so-called constructive criticism, they fight the people's revolution. After our Islamic revolution, we have learned the cries of these nannies who pretend to be more caring than mothers. Every day the voices of these hypocrites are heard from some corner, these hypocrites who shed crocodile tears for the downtrodden people. God is witness that the hypocrites are liars and it is necessary for the brave Moslem nation of Iran to recognize them and with open eyes and clear minds, neutralize their plots and expose them more than ever before. "Oh Prophet, fight the heathens and hypocrites with all in your power."

The Faces of Counterrevolution

There is no doubt that the hypocrites and their counterrevolutionary friends follow different channels to shake the revolution and disperse the revolutionaries. These different channels of action are usually indirect enmity. For instance:

1. Creating Disturbances

They try their best to see that no law or discipline governs the people. Or they try to change the heckling voices of some individuals to chaos in order to create doubt in the minds of the nation concerning the administration and competence of the revolutionaries and to accuse the leaders of the revolution of incompetence.

2. Making Up News and Rumors

They try to spread false, terrorizing news in order to confuse the minds of the public and stop them from attending to their revolutionary duties. We must pay no attention to these rumors and in this way, too, neutralize the efforts of the counterrevolutionaries.

3. Creating Inflated High Prices

Through hording and raising the prices of the primary needs and creating inflated high prices, they try to influence the uninformed common people and provide the background for counterrevolution. Here, too, the revolutionary and informed people of the country must use every logical channel to destroy these plans, even if they have to bear hardship for a short period of time. They must refuse to buy expensive items, expose the horders and price hikers, and not be deceived by their Satanic appearance.

4. Creating Disunity

The sharpest and most effective weapon of the counterrevolutionaries is to create disunity among the people. They attempt from every

corner of the country to create the proper grounds for this sinister goal.

The dear reader is aware of how they have tried in these days to poison the atmosphere through their masks of defending freedom and the rights of the people.

In Tehran, they send the simple-minded women to the fore to say that they oppose the Islamic cover and to speak of the freedom of dress. They spoke of unity and the Islamic revolution but they raised the issues of Shi'ite versus Sunni and Kurd versus Persian.

I do not forget that a woman, consciously or unconsciously, was telling a radio reporter: We do not want covers, we will defend freedom. Our revolution has just become victorious. Raising the issues of the Islamic cover or Shi'ite versus Sunni or Kurd versus Persian is not the right thing to do.

The people were surprised that the issues of Shi'ite versus Sunni and Kurd versus Persian were raised. And one could not explain what connection there was between these issues and the issue of Islamic cover. But, fortunately, the nation soon recognized the trap.

These issues were raised more violently in Sanandaj, Gonabad, Mahabad, and other places. The counterrevolutionaries and hypocrites tried to escalate these differences and use the ignorant and innocent people for their vile objectives. They began by sympathizing and cooperating, but they turned out to be traitors. They shouted in defense of unity, but they spread the seeds of disunity. How they shed tears for the Turkoman brothers, but they had nothing in mind other than creating disunity, which ended in the spilling of the blood of some of the dear ones of the society.

In the course of the referendum, they had told the farmers that if they vote "yes," their land will be taken away from them, but if they vote "no," the land would be theirs. In this instance, too, they were exposed.

Here, too, every one of the brave people of Iran must recognize these tricks and eliminate them. Despite the efforts of the counterrevolutionaries, they should insist on unity and not forget the motto: "All faithful Moslems are brothers." Through unity and brotherhood and with the help of God, they must continue their sacred revolution.

5. The Remnants of the Regime

The remnants and supporters of the deposed regime, within and outside the country, like secretive microbes are spreading poison and will not rest. These mercenaries infiltrate even the uninformed and simple-minded families and by blowing out of proportion the

minor national problems, they pretend to be patriots and try to misguide those families. Here, too, we must identify these elements with open eyes and use the force necessary to punish them for their vile actions.

6. Attacking Some of the Personages

In order to create disunity and weaken the government and national forces, by pretending to love the country, they attack some of the society's or military personages. By saying that these individuals have worked for the former tyrannical regime and, therefore, must be destroyed, they insult all of our brothers. In these attacks, their purpose is treacherous. There is no doubt that certain individuals have betrayed the country in the past who must be identified and punished. But not every Moslem and fighting military person can be supposed to be the same as the above. This writer, in the course of the revolution and with the responsibilities conferred on him, has witnessed closely the self-sacrifice of some of the military brothers which made me think of the self-sacrificing supporters of the bravest of martyrs, Hoseyn ebn-e 'Ali (peace be upon him), and reminded me of the battlefield on 'Ashura. Despite all the difficulties confronting us and the dangers threatening us, I was crying for joy when I saw their bravery and faith. I felt proud when I saw that there are still many faithful people. I am certain that one of the reasons for the victory of our great Islamic revolution was the fact that our military brothers were faithful Moslems who made many sacrifices and came out victorious in this godly test. Hence, insulting these personages is one of the tactics of the counterrevolutionaries and we must prevent such attacks conscientiously.

7. Strikes and Demonstrations

No doubt some of our brothers and sisters make rightful claims and statements and their grievances must be responded to correctly and reasonably. But the fact must not be ignored that the counterrevolutionaries infiltrate these people and take advantage of their innocent grievances, finding excuses and inciting them to riot and demonstrate, while the people who have the rightful grievances are unaware of such treachery.

In the past, too, such malicious individuals have taken advantage of well-intentioned groups and have benefited from them in the interest of the tyrannical regime. They often appear as bludgeon-carriers and others. Here, too, warning and alerting the public is one of our primary duties, so that they do not beome the tools of treacherous mercenaries.

8. Not Being Content and Not Allowing a Chance

The counterrevolutionaries cannot identify themselves, but they note only the shortcomings and wherever they find simple-minded people, they begin to criticise the revolutionaries and point out the weaknesses of the Islamic government. They use these opportunities and spread poison. Here, too, by warning the people and bringing to their attention the realities, the treason of the counterrevolutionaries can be exposed. No reasonable and moderate person can deny that in a war-stricken country which has just been liberated, there is need for time for the problems to be solved gradually. If we say that something must be done immediately and that everything must be set right in two days, it would mean that we either do not understand the problem or that we have bad intentions or other motivations.

Along with the above-mentioned problems, there are also issues that will result in the same end as those intended by the counterrevolutionaries if the revolutionaries do not pay attention to them and if they ignore the realities, in which case we will be cooperating with the counterrevolutionaries unintentionally.

1. Islamic Awareness and Insight

It is clear to everyone that the previous hated regime inflicted the greatest cultural harm in all of our social areas. It even changed the meaning of terminologies and words. It misdirected "freedom of art," "intellectuals," etc. and it tried to keep the nation uninformed and unaware, especially of Islamic culture. It went so far that many of the so-called educated "intellectuals" had not even read one Islamic book and were unconsciously at the disposal of colonialism. And they still consider themselves literate experts. Their education has merely become a source of pride for them and not a source of awareness. Srangely enough, they are more ignorant than the illiterate people and they do not even know it. They have remained in complete ignorance. This requires detailed analysis, which I will not attempt to indulge in here. Under such circumstances, it is the duty of all the conscious people to make up for the damages inflicted in the course of many years and to make our brothers and sisters in the society aware. They should provide them with correct, humane insight by introducing them to Islamic culture. It is necessary for all the Moslems to learn to use the Koran and the original texts of tradition and, by acquiring Islamic insight, to avoid falling into the traps of counterrevolution.

2. Constructive Criticism

It was noted that fault-finding by the counterrevolutionaries is based on evil intentions. But we must not hesitate to take advantage of the correct constructive criticism of sympathetic and informed individuals. Here, it is necessary for the revolutionaries to speak

what comes to their minds in a friendly and well-intentioned manner and to share in the responsibilities and affairs. "Everyone is a shepherd and everyone is responsible for the people." On the other hand, the authorities of the country must take advantage of the criticism of well-intentioned, thoughtful, and effective people and avoid--God forbid--following in the footsteps of the former regime. If we do not correctly criticise in this regard or ignore criticism, we are helping the counterrevolution.

3. Making Use of Individuals

In the past, only those individuals were employed and promoted who were experts in flattery, wheeling and dealing for the traitors, and being partners of the thieves and companions of the caravan. We must learn from this experience and prevent the progress of the "glib-tongued" flatterers and those who make their small deeds seem large and the deeds of others seem small. They must make sure that the people of great character, the alert and well-meaning individuals, those who do not speak of their deeds but do their duty for God and work as much as several people, are not left behind. Otherwise, the regime will be a tyrannical one and irreparable damages will be inflicted. And this is the hope of the counterrevolution. Therefore, the faithful, thoughtful, sympathetic, and alert individuals must be encouraged and must be taken advantage of for the sake of the country and the nation.

4. Coordination

Coordination must be created on the national level in the revolutionary activities so that no one will act only in accordance with his own personal wishes and tastes, because then differences in methods will become serious differences and the united revolution of the Moslem people will be harmed.

5. Those Who Have Remained Asleep

As was mentioned above, there is no doubt that the military personnel, with their self-sacrifices, have aided greatly the Islamic revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic. They are among the most beloved children of our society. But, most unfortunately, there are some who have not yet awoken and whose thoughts are tyrannical--for instance, the official who has lived on bribes for an entire lifetime does not like the situation at the present time and is not motivated to work and assume responsibilities. Such individuals often cause a slowdown of services in the military and create indifference and discontent among the people. These individuals must be identified and dismissed; otherwise, they will harm others and, in practice, aid the counterrevolution.

6. Revenge

Obviously, the Committees have rendered a great service to the nation and have devotedly worked for the Islamic revolution. But, occasionally, certain actions of some of the individuals involved are unfortunate from the standpoint of Islam and the revolution. Occasionally, revenge and personal issues have resulted in insulting respected persons in the cities. Undoubtedly, such actions, besides being prohibited by Islam, will inflict irreparable damages on the revolution from a social standpoint and, thereby, the wish of the counterrevolutionaries will be granted. Here, the great spirit of Islam and "love and hatred for God" should be taken into consideration and not revenge and personal enmities.

7. Pardon and Forgiveness

Everyone knows that a number of people were left uninformed of all the truths and realities of life due to the expanded propaganda of the dominating organizations and they have committed certain incorrect actions (the so-called venial sins), who deserve to repent and reform today.

Here, we must not expose these people any more for their past weaknesses and dismiss them. We must, rather, remember the reasoning of the holy Prophet who said at the conquest of Mecca, "You are free and we will not harm you," and who also said, "Today is a day for mercy, kindness, and forgiveness," and in following the lead of his holiness, we must forgive and treat them with kindness.

8. Retaining Respect for Individuals

Some individuals who have not realized the true meaning of the revolution imagine that after the revolution all limits and restrictions have been eliminated. This is the meaning of counterrevolution and not of revolution. In the Islamic revolution, we must preserve respect for the competent and valuable individuals and the true servants and scholars. Also, the religious and political minorities must live with comfort and respect so that the counterrevolutionaries are not given an excuse to bring about disunity.

Therefore, we must do our duty by taking into consideration all the issues and in fighting against the hypocrites and counterrevolutionaries, we must fight any sort of tyrant and tyranny. And God has promised that they will be exposed and punished severely: "Tell them that a great, painful punishment is in store for the hypocrites."

Who Is the Leader of the Revolution?

From the beginning of the creation of the world and humankind, in every age, the leaders of the people's revolutions have been the spiritual men of the line of the prophets, then of the successors, then the sources of emulation and scholars. The history of the past and the lives of the prophets are the best evidence for this claim. Now, let us turn the pages of history, go back, look at the tyrannical reign of Nimrod, the king of Babylon. We can see how he ruled the people of Chaldea and Assyria despotically and forced those weak and ignorant people into slavery and the worship of false gods. And there was no one to awaken the people and make them aware until God commissioned a conscientious and bright youth to warn the people, to stop them from worshipping false, manufactured gods and tell them about the evil end of their actions.

The Characteristics and Qualifications of the Islamic President

As the prophet and messenger of God must have certain characteristics and qualifications for the people who lack those characteristics to follow him and obey him, the deputy and successor of that prophet must also have certain characteristics and qualifications. Also, the religious jurist and deputy of the Imam must represent the Imam in all aspects in order to be able to assume the position of leadership, the presidency of the Islamic Republic, during his occultation--and, also, to prevent those who are not qualified from wishing to take this position.

The characteristics and qualifications are as follows:

1. He must be of pure and legitimate birth and noble by nature.

2. He must be from a known noble family.

3. He must be a Moslem by birth and have been reared by nobly-born Moslem parents. (Anyone who has spent a part of his life as a heathen cannot occupy this position because God's promise does not extend to oppressors.)

4. He must be the highest and most pious of all Islamic scholars and religious jurists. That is, he must be the most knowledgeable and the most pious of all mankind, because he will represent the Imam and will be the representative of the Prophet and the infallible proof of God.

5. He must be more knowledgeable and alert about the conditions of the time than all other religious jurists.

6. He must be brave and courageous.

7. He must be a crusader for God.

8. He must be a truly devout man and a forsaker of this world. He must have no love of the world and its mortal vanities.

9. He must treat the hypocrites and sinners harshly and treat the faithful and the supporters of religious guardianship with kindness and compassion.

10. He must have strong ties with the Imam in occultation, his holiness Hojjat ebn-e al-Hasan al-Mehdi--may God hasten his return, get his inspiration from his holiness in his affairs, to be approved by him. In the opinion of this writer and the opinions of the best supporters of religious guardianship and those who await the return of Mehdi, the latter requirement is the most important of all, because the leadership of the Moslems and the presidency of Islam is a grave responsibility and if the person in this position is not to be approved by the guardian of God, . . .

My dear brothers and honorable readers who have made a revolution through your persistent struggle, who have destroyed the foundations of tyranny, broken the idols and statues in the city squares, bravely, like 'Ali, and tied ropes around their necks and legs and dragged them into the streets like the carrion of dogs, do not neglect the true friend of the downtrodden and your true master, his holiness Mehdi. If it were not for the grace of his holiness, the unseen help of his eminence, the powerful hand of his holiness, which protected the weak and unprotected nation of Iran, which is the cradle of Shi'ism, and the followers and those who await his return, you would never have succeeded and would not have become victorious.

It was the prayers and the weeping of people like the late Haj Sheykh Ahmad Kafi in the Mehdiyyeh centers, Hoseyniyyeh centers, and mosques and the cries of "Ya ben al-Hasan, ya ben al-Hasan" which made the small, weak Shi'ite people victorious over the most powerful government in the world.

And know that this is only the beginning. The enemies, the hypocrites, and the counterrevolutionaries, like wounded snakes and leopards, are awaiting the opportunity and our negligence. Firstly, we must be alert and ready, and secondly, we must not stop resorting to and consulting his holiness, the 12th Imam. We must obey him and ask from the bottom of our hearts: Oh Knight of Hejaz, help me. Oh Aba Saleh, help me. Oh Abolqasem al-Mehdi, help me. Oh Lord of the Time, help me, help me, help me. And do not abandon this wretched, poor one. Perhaps the sincere moaning, weeping, and begging of one broken-hearted person will have the effect and will bring us to the final victory.

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ISRAEL TO SUBMIT PROPOSALS TO EGYPT

TA311023 Jerusalem POST in English 31 Aug 81 p 3

[Text] Israel will submit plans to Egypt for a direct telecommunications link between Tel Aviv and Cairo when the first committee of experts on civilian normalization meets here on September 13, government officials said.

At present, phone calls between the two countries as well as Telex and telegrams are routed via Rome. The direct link would reduce the cost of telecommunications between the two countries significantly.

The proposal for the direct link was raised by the Israeli delegation in Alexandria last week.

Israel will also propose that El Al be allowed to add a fifth weekly flight to Cairo, and use jumbo Boeing 747's instead of the present 707's whenever bookings are heavy. El Al says that the four existing weekly flights are not enough to handle the traffic.

Israel will also submit its detailed proposals for the use of Ofira and 'Ezyon airports by commercial planes of Israel and other countries--a provision explicitly provided for in the Camp David accords. The prosperity of the tourist industry in Elat depends in part on international charters being able to use 'Ezyon airport. Once this airport is returned to Egypt, countries which in the past disapproved of its use for Elat-bound holidaymakers because of the Israeli "occupation," could probably be persuaded to let their aircraft fly in.

Israel will stipulate that Israeli tourists flying to Ofira must go direct and not via another Egyptian airport, as Egyptian officails said at one time.

The plans for open borders, to be presented on September 13, include the construction of two more land terminals: near Nizzana in the central Negev, and west of Elat. According to the Israeli proposal, trucks carrying goods in both directions would not need to offload at the terminal for transfer to trucks licensed in the recipient country, as at present, but would be allowed to continue all the way to their destinations.

CSO: 4300/114

TRIPARTITE SUB-COMMISSION ON REFUGEES ISSUES STATEMENT IN KHARTOUM

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 20 Aug 81 pp 4-5

[Text] Khartoum, Aug. 20 (SUNA)--The Tripartite sub-commission on Refugees of the Sudan, Uganda and Zaire concluded meetings here yesterday and issued a joint final statement on the outcome of its talks.

The statement said the sub-commission had met in pursuant to Gbadolite tripartite summit meeting between the Presidents of the Sudan, Uganda and Zaire.

It added that the discussions were conducted in an atmosphere of fraternity, frankness and mutual understanding.

The statement said the three delegations had pledged to implement and adhere to the international instruments governing the status of the refugees.

"Considering that the presence of the refugees at the border areas may constitute a source of conflict and a threat to security the three delegations resolved to transfer the refugees at the time of arrival far inland from the border region and to disarm them simultaneously," the statement said.

Convinced that voluntary repatriation is the ideal and lasting solution for the problems of refugees, the statement said, the three delegations agreed to set up bilateral missions between their countries with the UNHCR as an active observer to encourage the refugees to opt for voluntary repatriation.

The statement said the Uganda-Zaire mission will meet in Zaire in November 1981, the Uganda-Sudan mission is to meet in Sudan in December 1981, the Sudan-Zaire mission will meet in Sudan in January 1982 and the Zaire-Uganda mission is scheduled to meet in Uganda in March 1982.

The statement stressed the "paramount importance of exchanging information about the location of arm cache's, the whereabouts and activities of troublesome elements among the refugees."

In this regard, it said, the three delegations had agreed to channel the appropriate information through their respective diplomatic missions, relevant meetings and between the local authorities in the border regions.

The meetings of the tripartite sub-commission started on August 17. Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Regional Cooperation in Uganda Mr Nyakimwe, Zairean Minister of Social Affairs Lt. Gen. Babia Zongbi Malobia and Sudan's Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Hashim Osman who led their respective delegations to the meetings signed for their countries.

Giving his final address before yesterday's meeting Osman reiterated that Sudan would abide by the agreements reached between the three countries and promised to implement them honestly and faithfully.

CSO: 4500/49

ARAB-FRENCH FINANCIAL RELATIONS DISCUSSED IN TUZANI INTERVIEW

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1291 31 Jul 81 p 37

[Interview with Mr Bukar Tuzani, director general of the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce, by 'Adnan Nasrawin: "Arab Funds in France, Leaving...But Not Fleeing!"]

[Text] Mr Bukar Tuzani, the former Tunisian minister, today occupies a sensitive position in developing current Arab-French relations, in his post as director general of the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce in Paris, which oversees the course of commercial relations between France and the Arab states, particularly at this important stage in French history after the coming to power of the Socialist leader, Francois Mitterand, and the influence of that on French-Arab relations. This interview between AL-HAWADITH and the director general of the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce revolved around this.

[Question] What is your view concerning the effect of Socialist leader Francois Mitterand's coming to power in France on French-Arab economic, commercial and financial relations?

[Answer] Fears did in fact surface in the Arab world following Socialist leader Francois Mitterand's election as president of France. The Arab press repeated them, to the effect that Mitterand's presence in the Elysee Palace would undoubtedly have a negative influence on the course of economic, commercial and financial relations between France and the Arab world. However, I want to say, on this occasion, that these same fears appeared in the press and Arab public opinion when George Pompidou was elected president of France, because Pompidou had, for a long time, worked for one of the French banks well known for being anti-Arab. However, no sooner had Pompidou reached the Elysee than this fear vanished. What made it vanish was the consideration of reality, the reality of French-Arab relations, by French officials who consider, no matter what their political leanings may be, the best interests of France before their personal views regarding policy or their private relations. I must also point out that the same Arab fears over the Arab world's relations with France surfaced when Giscard d'Estaing was elected president of France in 1973, because some Arab parties accused him (rightly or wrongly, I don't know) of having firm relations with French reactionary forces, with respect to the French-Algerian war and Algeria's independence. All these fears naturally vanished, and French-Arab relations reached a very advanced stage during d'Estaing's regime.

In reply to your question, I believe the fears that appeared in Arab circles as a result of Mitterand's election as president of France will certainly vanish with time, because French-Arab relations, in economic and commercial areas, are strong and deep. Reality imposes itself in this field, and the reality is France's need for Arab world imports. The Arab world is an excellent market for French products, and France has become the largest exporter to the Arab world of the European bloc nations. Moreover, France is tied to large petroleum interests with the Arab oil states.

[Question] There has been a lot of talk that Arab capital has begun to flee Paris as a result of Mitterand's coming to power. What is the extent of truth in this talk?

[Answer] In fact there has been talk that capital was being taken out of Paris before and after Francois Mitterand's election as president of France, but I ask: Is this capital Arab or French? If it is not Arab, then it could be American or British. Arab capital in France represents only 10 percent of the total foreign capital in France. Personally, I do not believe that Arab capital has fled Paris as a result of socialism coming to Paris, because in France there are close to 30 Arab banks. These Arab banks are financed by foreign currencies, whether they be Arab or non-Arab, and they are absolutely not financed by the French franc. These foreign currencies have the right to be placed in any bank, be it in France or outside of France, because the liquidity of each bank today can turn up in another bank by mutual exchange, since dealing in foreign currency today has become an interconnected and reciprocal network. Taking foreign currency out is not considered flight, because it has a perfect right to come and go, to and from France, in any situation and under any political system, no matter what type. Flight concerns local French currency, and this French currency is located in French banks, not in Arab banks.

[Question] But, in your opinion, what will be the fate of Arab funds in French banks, especially after Mitterand's announcement concerning his intention to nationalize the French banks?

[Answer] Arab funds in French banks are in dollars; the French domestic economic and political situation has no effect on the dollar. Let us assume that an Arab has an account in a French bank in dollars. This French bank does not have any right to circulate it outside of France. Therefore, the Arab citizen has an account in the French bank, but his dollars could be in New York or Amsterdam, or any other place. The French bank remains responsible for them, but with respect to the French balance of payments, these funds entered the French banks and left them on the very day the account was opened. Changing them from a French bank to another broker bank outside of France does not constitute any danger to the liquidity of the French balance of payments. French nationalization, if it occurs with respect to banks, will have absolutely no effect on the Arab dollars in those banks.

[Question] After the Lebanese war, many banks fled Beirut and took Paris as their headquarters. They attracted many Arab deposits. What in your view would be the effect of French Socialist nationalization on such deposits as these?

[Answer] President Mitterand's program is clear concerning nationalization of the banks. This nationalization only encompasses French banks. The French Socialists, as they confirm, have absolutely no intention of nationalizing any foreign bank in Paris. As for French banks, the Socialist policy of nationalization aims at nationalizing only the most important of these banks.

[Question] President Francois Mitterand issued instructions to the government to reconsider and abolish the decree pertaining to French firms that have dealings with the Arabs and must boycott any dealings with Israel. In your view, what would the effect of this abolition be on French-Arab relations?

[Answer] There is some ambiguity with respect to this matter that must be clarified, since the French press has talked a great deal about the Arab boycott of Israel and the articles of this boycott. These provisions obligate any French quarter that signs contracts of mutual cooperation with the Arab world to adhere to the Arab boycott of Israel. The French press recently indicated that firms dealing with the Arab world must be freed from the provisions of the Arab boycott of Israel, on the pretext that these provisions are not in harmony with the law that has prevailed in France since 1977, which penalizes any French person or institution that pursues, in its dealings with others, any policy based on racial or religious discrimination. However, our view, in the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce, is that that boycott against Israel, which some firms and institutions that deal with the Arab world follow, has absolutely no connection with racial and religious discrimination, because a boycott like this is based, fundamentally, on the state of war between the Arabs and Israel. All international laws and customs prescribe that the Arabs can require those friendly nations who do business with them to economically and commercially boycott the party that is against them. In any event, I believe that there are some quarters in France that are attempting to "blow up" matters, who consider any act against Israel to be racist, and who are putting pressure on the French Government to abolish this law and open the way for all French organizations to do business with Israel, in the name of resisting racism and discrimination.

[Question] What will be your position in the Chamber of Commerce in the event this law opposing the Arab boycott is applied in France, and what will be the effect of that, in your view, on French-Arab commercial relations?

[Answer] So far, the previous law, requiring French firms dealing with the Arab world to adhere to the boycott of Israel, has not been abolished. All that has happened, so far, is that President Mitterand wrote to his prime minister, Pierre Mauroy, requesting that that decree be abrogated. A special committee was formed to study the matter. I think that this decree will only be abolished after another decree is issued regarding this same matter. France must certainly consult in this respect with the other members of the European Common Market, so that a joint position can be adopted. When the new French decree is issued concerning the Arab boycott of Israel, at that time we will take our stance, and we will consider what its effect will be on French-Arab trade relations.

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CSO: 4304/121

SPANISH CP PAPER INTERVIEWS PLO'S ABU MAYZAR

PM271442 Madrid MUNDO OBRERO in Spanish 21-27 Aug 81 pp 26-28

[Interview with 'Abd al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar, PLO official spokesman, by Teresa Aranguren in Damascus: "We Palestinians Will Continue to Struggle"--date of interview not specified]

[Excerpt] [Question] What is your interpretation of the July events in Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe that what has happened in Lebanon clarifies beyond all doubt the nature and aims of zionist policy, which have not changed since the beginning of the state of Israel. It is a policy which needs violence to achieve its aims, needs torture in the prisons, the deportation of families and entire towns and indiscriminate bombing. Organized and official terrorism is the policy of the state of Israel.

[Question] What, in your opinion, was the aim of this fortnight of constant bombing?

[Answer] Begin explained this clearly when he said that he will pursue the Palestinians wherever they are. Israel is prepared to threaten and even to destroy the entire area, if necessary, in order to put an end to the Palestinian revolution. The fact is that the Palestinian revolution is not easy to destroy. In all its operations Israel has always sought to kill the greatest possible number of Palestinians. And on this occasion they were seeking to "go for the head," by attacking not only the refugee camps in the south, as they have been doing during all these years, but also the areas of Beirut in which our organization's headquarters are located. They have bombed entire areas; women, children and whole families have been left under the rubble. As everybody knows, most of the victims were among the civilian population, because the Israeli aircraft (rather, U.S.-Israeli aircraft) never distinguish between military and civilian areas. They did not achieve their aims, but the outcome of this fortnight has been a genuine tragedy, although the Western reaction toward Israel has been, as usual, so weak.

Major Threat Is Israel

[Question] What is the state of the Palestinian revolution following this fortnight of fighting?

[Answer] The Israelis' aims were to put an end to the PLO and to force President Sarkis to sign an agreement with them. But they encountered far stronger resistance than they were expecting. We did not begin this fighting, but we know how to defend ourselves. In the end, Israel has had to accept a cease-fire, after finding that in a fortnight of constant attacks it had not succeeded in weakening the PLO's structure in the slightest and that our commandos' response took them by surprise.

Moreover, I believe that not only the Arab world but the entire world has been able to see clearly that the major threat in the Middle East is Israel and not the Soviet Union, as Mr Haig is seeking to convince people. It is not Soviet aircraft which are bombing our cities but U.S. aircraft flown by Israeli pilots. And I emphasize "U.S." because we also hold the United States responsible for this aggression. Following the bombing of the Baghdad nuclear power plant, following the July bombings in Beirut, every Arab city knows that it could be the next target for the Israeli aircraft.

[Question] Taking into account the inferiority of your weaponry vis-a-vis Israel, how do you view the future of the struggle?

[Answer] Of course we are in an inferior position. But the Vietnamese did not have aircraft, either, and their weapons were also inferior to the U.S. weapons. Like them, we have the will of an entire people and firm determination to defend our rights. The fighting over the last few days has been a good demonstration of this. Israel has had to accept a cease-fire for a war which it started and which was not proceeding as it expected. All their efforts to destroy our artillery positions failed because our commandos were trained for guerrilla warfare and constantly changed places to avoid detection. It is no easy task to put an end to the Palestinian revolution, because it is the will of an entire people which lies behind it.

Democratic State Is Aim of Palestinian Revolution

[Question] What are the Palestinian revolution's basic aims?

[Answer] In the first place, that the refugees' right to return to their homes in Palestine and to exercise the right to self-determination be recognized. This means ending the Israeli occupation. We wish to live with dignity and in peace in a democratic state in our country.

[Question] But the Israelis also say that they want peace...

[Answer] When the Israelis say that they want peace, they spell that word differently. It is not peace they want but space.

[Question] We have broached the issue of space. The PLO maintains that its aim is the setting up of a democratic state in which Arabis and non-Arabs could coexist with equal rights and without distinction of race or religion This poses the problem of space. If the refugees return to their homes, what will happen to the Jews who have been emigrating to Israel for the last 31 years? Will there be room for everybody?

[Answer] It is Begin himself who answers that question best. For a long time he has been attempting to induce the United States to pressure the Soviet Union to allow its Jews to emigrate to Israel. One of the pillars of zionist policy has been and remains the encouragement at any price of the emigration of Jews from any part of the world. The area of Palestine is larger than that of Belgium--a country which has 10 million inhabitants. In Palestine there is still room for 4 million more people.

[Question] What role, in your opinion, can Israeli citizens who are opposed to the zionist policy play?

[Answer] Of course they are a great help. People such as Felicia Langer, who has defended so many Palestinians accused of terrorist activities. Moreover, it must not be forgotten that there are 10,000 orthodox Jews who reject the identity of the state of Israel and who refuse to enter the Israeli army. What we offer is a genuinely democratic state, whereas Israel is a racist and expansionist state.

[Question] Is this democratic state only a plan for the future or are steps already being taken to achieve a democratic structure among the Palestinians?

[Answer] In order to create a democratic state you must have people who believe in democracy. Alijl currents and all sectors--workers, professionals, women and so forth--are represented in our national council. Moreover, it is important to point out that it is the Palestinian people who have achieved the highest educational standard not only in the Middle East, but throughout the Third World. We currently have 30,000 engineers, 22,000 doctors, 124,000 university students, 6,000 teachers and hundreds of thousands of specialized technicians. The illiteracy rate is only 2 percent and almost exclusively among elderly people. I could say that our only oil is education.

Situation of Women

[Question] There is a matter to which the West is particularly sensitive and which has greatly discredited the Arab world. I am referring to the situation of women.

[Answer] I do not believe that in the Arab world we can be accused of discriminating against women. In our revolution women play a role just as important as that of men. We have women writers, doctors, journalists and fighters. There are 33 women representatives in the Palestine National Council--more than in many European parliaments. Of course we are aware that, socially, women start from a situation of inferiority, and we are doing our utmost to promote their access to education.

[Question] What would happen if the Palestinians lost the only stronghold they have left--southern Lebanon?

[Answer] In the first place, southern Lebanon is not our only stronghold. Our position there is defensive, we are reacting to the Israeli attacks, and I consider it highly unlikely that we could come to lose it; in any event, if that occurs, we have enough enclaves in the occupied territories to continue our struggle. Nobody will prevent us from continuing to struggle.

CSO: 4548/2

PLO OFFICIAL SCORES U.S. FOR 'SINAI CONSPIRACY'

FL021506 Havana Domestic Service in Spanish 1045 GMT 2 Sep 81

[Interview with (Zuhdi Labib Tarazi), permanent PLO representative to the United Nations by Rolando de La Rivera; in Havana, no date given; in Spanish--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Comrade (Tarazi), what importance do you attach to this fourth UN seminar on the Palestinian question?

[Answer] Firstly, this seminar is a meeting of academics. In other words, it is another battlefield. It is not the diplomatic, political or [word indistinct] field. It is a meeting of thinkers who up to now had been kept away from the struggle of the Palestinian people. It is important for us. This seminar in Havana, Cuba, is for the geographic territory known as Latin America. That is another important feature. Since Cuba is always at the head of countries struggling for human rights and for the campaign and battle against imperialism and neofascism, it is also important. We believe that the results, by means of mobilizing the so-called intellectuals, can add another element to our struggle for the mobilization of public opinion.

[Question] At this stage in the struggle of the Palestinian people, what are your basic objectives?

[Answer] We are always pursuing the same ends. Firstly, recognition and respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine itself. At this particular time, there are many obstacles. Washington's policy is increasingly designed to literally eliminate the Palestinian resistance because it is very clear that the Palestinian resistance is the obstacle to the so-called American peace in the Middle East and the world.

[Question] What is your opinion about the current plans of imperialism, zionism and the Arab traitors to create a mercenary force to occupy the Sinai?

[Answer] The Sinai conspiracy, first of all, aims to station American forces with the blessing of the international community. And that is why they are trying to get this force by means of the Security Council. Fortunately, we were there to tell them that it was in defiance of the General Assembly resolution declaring Camp David null and void. Secondly, it was in defiance of the Palestinian people themselves and we were not going to allow it. But, unfortunately, they were able

to mobolize Colombia and Uruguay in Latin America since the United States failed to get support from even Canada, Australia or any other country with close ties to the United States.

It is a campaign to station American forces in the Middle East. The base, which is Israel, must be expanded and it is going to expand into Egyptian territory. We must always remember that there are two airports in the Sinai, airports that cost the United States almost 4 billion dollars. They are the most sophisticated airports in the area with means to attack all countries in Africa and the Middle East, the Arab countries which one day will be completely free from the U.S. yoke. It is another step to aggravate the world situation and another step in the confrontation policy of the United States.

CSO: 4548/2

HAVANA TELEVISION INTERVIEWS PLO REPRESENTATIVE

FL021955 Havana Domestic Television Service in Spanish 1700 GMT 2 Sep 81

[Interview with ('Imad Jadda'), charge d'affaires of the permanent PLO mission in Cuba by Pedro Ventura--recorded in Spanish]

[Text] [Question] Could you comment for us on the present status of the struggle for the rights of the Palestinian people?

[Answer] We could say that for the past 16 and 17 years, there has been a continuous war being launched by the zionist enemies against our people with the complete support of the imperialists in Washington.

The level or tone of this war is raised or diminished according to the political situation. At this time, we are experiencing a kind of ceasefire that has resulted from the victory of our guerrillas in the struggle that it waged for 17 consecutive days following the Israeli air attack on civilian settlements in Beirut, leading to the death of 300 persons and 500 injured with as-yet-uncalculated property damage.

This 17-year-old war is the result of an imperialist plot of many years to strengthen imperialist domination of our Middle East, of the Arab Gulf, which is of great strategic importance, since it has the largest oil reserve in the world.

On this basis, we can say that the present true situation is that the war is continuing, the struggle of our fighters is continuing. In this matter, we have to thank our brothers, the Cuban people, their party and their government for allowing this to be the venue of this fourth regional seminar on the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

Today Cuba, as always, has again taken a position of great solidarity with the Palestinian people, by agreeing to have this seminar in Havana.

CSO: 4548/2

'VOL' REPORTS ON RIFT WITHIN AS-SA'IQAH

Rift Widening

NC251950 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1715 GMT 25 Aug 81

[Text] Leaders of the as-Sa'Iqah organization are now meeting at the Beau Rivage Hotel in the presence of the organization's new command under 'Sam al-Qadi, who is backed by the Syrians. In the meantime Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], accompanied by Khalil al-Wazir, has left for Damascus to discuss the issue with President Hafiz al-Asad.

Today's meeting was preceded by a meeting which was held yesterday amidst Syrian insistence to divest as-Sa'Iqah of its Palestinian character and turn it into a Syrian group.

The two wings of as-Sa'Iqah are represented at today's meeting by Majid Muhsin of the Palestinian command in Lebanon and 'Isam al-Qadi of the Syrian defense squads.

Palestinian committees have called for demonstrations tomorrow to protest Syria's stand which aims at dividing as-Sa'Iqah. Deep contradictions have recently emerged between Syria and the Palestinians, particularly that the Palestinians insist on free action on the basis of the independence of the Palestinian decision.

Effort Fails

NC252106 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 2015 GMT 25 Aug 81

[Excerpts] The leaders of the as-Sa'Iqah organization, who have been meeting since early this evening in the Beau Rivage Hotel in the western part of the capital, have not reached an agreement on a statement to be issued at the conclusion of the meeting, because of the disagreement of the organization's leaders on basic issues, mainly the merger of as-Sa'Iqah with the Red Knights and turning it into a Syrian organization.

The discussions of Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], who went to Damascus yesterday accompanied by Khalil al-Wazir, have produced no positive results during his meeting with President al-Asad.

According to reports received by the Voice of Lebanon, orders have been issued for the arrest of Majid Muhsin, the former chief of the organization, and some of his assistants prior to their trial in Damascus. It is known that the current conflict is between Majid Muhsin of the Palestinian command and 'Isam al-Qadi of the Syrian defense squads.

CSO: 4304/166

'VOP' VIEWS ISRAELI MEASURES AGAINST ARAB AID

JN281754 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1545 GMT 28 Aug 81

[From the "With the Events" program]

[Text] The zionist military occupation authorities in the occupied West Bank have announced that new measures will be implemented within the framework of the plan that seeks to constrict economic activities in the occupied territories. One of the measures is to order the nationalist Palestinian organizations, particularly the municipal councils, to return the money received from the joint Palestinian-Jordanian committee. Also within this framework, enemy authorities have ordered a transport company in the occupied city of Bi'r Zayt to return 10,000 Jordanian dinars which the company has received in aid to develop its operations.

This racist zionist measure has generated angry reactions in the occupied homeland. Commenting on this, Bethlehem mayor brother Ilyas Furayj said that the cutoff of financial aid will cause the municipalities to reduce their services. In Hebron, acting mayor brother Mustafa an-Natshah said that this Israeli measure will hinder several health and educational projects in the city.

Reports from the occupied homeland indicate that this oppressive zionist measure hides another political objective the enemy is trying to achieve and comes within the framework of the pressures the enemy is placing on the nationalist figures and municipal councils in order to force them to accept the autonomy plot. These reports also indicate that the decisive rejection of the nationalist figures, organizations and mayors of all the conspiratorial plots, which aim at creating agent substitutes for the PLO, has forced the enemy to resort to such measures and to hint at adopting even more oppressive measures.

Observers believe that the enemy decision to cut off Arab aid and to order the return of the funds that have already been used to improve the living conditions of our folks in the occupied land are the first results of the as-Sadat-Begin meeting, during which they agreed to resume the plot of autonomy in the occupied Palestinian land.

The occupation authorities' insistance on such measures stress that our Palestinian people will face a zionist program which will definitely be more barbaric and more oppressive. This program will mark the beginning of another helpless attempt to

force the plot of autonomy on our people. In return, our masses inside the occupied homeland will face this terrorist zionist program with continued and ever developing struggle in order to undermine this program and foil all other conspiratorial schemes which aim at paralyzing our people's struggle to achieve their objectives and establish their independent state in the homeland under the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

CSO: 4304/166

TUNISIA, LIBYA SIGN ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS

LD151512 Tunis TAP in English 1453 GMT 15 Sep 81

[Text] Tunis, 15 Sep (TAP)--A Tuniso-Libyan trade agreement was signed on Monday in Tunis by Tunisia's national economy Minister Abdelaziz Lasram and his Libyan counterpart, Abu Zayd 'Umar Durdah, at the end of a working visit the Libyan official is paying in Tunisia.

Completing the agreements concluded between the two countries in 1973, 1977 and 1979, this agreement relates to the fields of industry, tourist-trade, transport and communications and electricity.

In the industrial field, the agreement stressed both sides' interest in the achievement of joint industrial projects. Specialized commissions are to be created to examine the possibilities of achieving industrial [words indistinct] notably in matters of phosphate fertilizers, industry and petrochemical industries.

As regards tourist trade, Tunisia undertook to train a great number of Libyan tourist cadres in Tunisian specialized schools.

The agreement also provides for the organization of the Tunisian skilled workers' emigration to Libya and for the creation of a joint company to facilitate the travelling of both countries' tourists and the obtainment of visas for the two countries' nationals.

In the field of transport and communications, the agreement provides for more flights between Tunisia and Libya, for the creation of a commission meant to reactivate the project of joint maritime company and for the reestablishment and strengthening of telephone lines between the two countries.

As regards the field of electricity, the agreement provides [word indistinct] the connection of both countries electrical networks. The cost of this operation is estimated at 40 million Tunisian dinars (1 Tunisian dinar equals 2 dollars).

CSO: 4500/50

BRIEFS

CONFRONTATION OF VILLAGE LEAGUES--O kinfolk in the occupied land: Yesterday, terrorist Ari'el Sharon issued an order to West Bank and Gaza mayors to return the funds received by their municipalities from the joint committee. On the other hand, reports from the occupied homeland indicate that the racist zionist military authorities are pouring money into the suspect village league to encourage the agents to assume their role in furthering the zionists' designs, which are antagonistic to our Palestinian people and their patriotic objectives. O kinfolk in occupied homeland, these league are instruments of the occupation. They are instruments which the enemy believes should be put to use at this time against you, your wills and your national institutions. O all our kinfolk, patriotic confrontation of these leagues is part of our daily battle against occupation and its instruments. [Text] [JN281748 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1605 GMT 28 Aug 81]

CSO: 4304/166

GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL MOVES TOWARD ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 8 Aug 81 p 2

[Article: "The Future of Economic Integration for the Gulf States. The Cooperation Council Prepares to Establish a Federation for Banks and an Organization to Issue the Unified Currency"]

[Text] The UAE news agench has confirmed that monetary and financial cooperation among the nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] gives promise of a flourishing future, especially in the area of recommending regulations, laws and measures of exception for oil revenues in excess of developmental needs in the Gulf Arab states. This will put them in a legal and financial position in which they will be better able to achieve their goals and protect their investments.

In a radio report yesterday, it was stated that from now on it would be important to create a unified investment strategy for the GCC nations and necessary to begin to take practical steps to develop banking and financial cooperation among the region's nations and move toward unifying the currency.

The financial role of the council's nations has become greater. This has caused their currency to be used as the basis for financial issues on Arab and international levels, which places vast responsibilites on the monetary authorities of the council's nations, the most important being to clarify monetary policy in order to safeguard the value and stability of the currencies and to define the internal lending policy, which has various effects on national growth. Therefore, unification of the currency would lead to firm cooperation among banking institutions in the region and would create the possibility of suitable speculation among them.

An Organization for Gulf Currency

To issue a unified Gulf currency, a unified Gulf organization must be created to issue it; this would be a higher authority than central banks and the existing monetary council that now issue local currencies in the GCC nations. A federation of Gulf central banks should be established to control the circulation of the unified currency and maintain its orderly distribution in accordance with each state's currency requirements. It would also be aimed at ensuring coordination in the monetary and financial policies of the member states, so as to meet any

factor affecting the value of the unified currency and its circulation and convertibility.

It would be the responsibility of the federation of Gulf central banks to define a unified position with respect to granting commercial bank licenses, instead of the differing policies in this regard now in existence. That would be in the framework of a national banking and monetary policy, aimed at avoiding fragmented deposits so as to provide the opportunity for intelligent investment and ensure the development and modernization of banking services, on the basis of encouraging banking specialization in accordance with a geographic and sector perspective. In addition, there is the importance of establishing institutions, gaining appropriate expertise and drawing up a collective agreement for payment among the Gulf states, which would extend their facilities to other Arab nations.

Undoubtedly, the GCC nations will achieve great economic benefits from issuing a unified currency for the council nations. In view of the fact that all these nations' currencies are convertible and their rates stable in the markets, issuing a unified currency comprised of these currencies would be a factor in creating a strong currency that would transcend the collective strength of the six separate currencies. Moreover, joining the council nations into one monetary bloc with a unified currency would transform this currency into one of the basic currencies of the world.

Although the IMF has reduced the currencies which it uses in the special drawing rights account, from 16 to only 5, this currency could take its place alongside the American dollar, the Japanese yen, the French franc, the German mark, and the pound sterling in the forefront of circulating international currencies.

Investment Policies

Unifying the monetary policies would pave the way for unifying economic policies and then for unifying investment policies, with a concentraion on industrialization. This, in turn, would guarantee to the region the establishment of integrated industrial projects, which would be noncompetitive and would unify efforts, ensure that resources are not wasted, raise the technical level of workers in the banking field and provide an exchange of banking experience among the council states.

Prior to achieving a unified currency, there must be a gradual drawing together among the differing currencies of the council nations by means of narrowing the margins of fluctuation among them, until these margins are completely eliminated and the currencies become convertible among themselves, in a specific and fixed ratio, so that the exchange of currency becomes a formality, based on the local currencies being replaced by the unified currency.

Gulf Financial Market

Perhaps the most significant positive result of unifying the currency, and establishing the federation of central banks, would be the creation of a Gulf financial market, which would open capital markets of some Gulf nations to others. It would facilitate the movement of capital among these countries on the one hand, and Arab and international markets on the other.

Establishing the Gulf financial market would require the availability of an appropriate number of advanced commercial banks, with the goal of creating international confidence in dealing with this market. There would also have to be a suitable number of specialized banks, investment firms and financial brokers, as well as a cash market and a great deal of commercial interplay among the banks, in addition to the availability of stocks and bonds, treasury notes, insured financial paper of various types and a stock exchange for financial documents of all kinds.

7005
CSO: 4304/126

OPPOSITION LEADER HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE IN ALGIERS

LD110816 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 9 Sep 81

[Text] Every uprising is the outcome of many factors and the present situation in Egypt is a natural outcome of political, economic and democratic aspects. The Egyptian army is an indivisible part of the Egyptian people and therefore when the people become angry, the army must become angry and revolt. Thus we are confident that the Sadat regime is now at the beginning of the end. This analysis was presented at the al-Awras Hotel in Algiers at a press conference held by Lt Gen S'ad ad-Din al-Shadhli, secretary general of the Egyptian national front and Egyptian chief of staff during the 1973 October War in which he answered questions from national and international reporters.

Lt Gen al-Shadhli pointed out that the conference was called to clarify the facts about what is presently going on in Egypt. In this context, he said that the number of detainees had reached more than 5,000, representing the most prominent political figures and religious personalities opposing Sadat and his regime. He explained that the sectarian sedition behind which Sadat hides was categorically unfounded and said that the arrests included forces which represented the extreme right, the extreme left and those in between.

Answering a question on Sadat's trip to Washington and his meeting with Reagan and whether it was connected with what Sadat was doing at present, that is terrorism against the Egyptian people and oppression, the secretary general of the Egyptian National Front said that Sadat did not believe in democracy and always tried to hit at his opponents by force; and that he had found the present U.S. President to be an ally backing him in this respect.

As to the present number of political detainees in Egypt, Lt Gen al-Shadhli said that all detainees were politicians and that Sadat did not arrest politicians who sing his praise and benefit from him through the powers, political positions and influence he has given them. He added that the Camp David policy had led to a deadlock and that Sadat was alone on the battlefield after the Arab countries had declined to join the Camp David camp. Lt Gen al-Shadhli pointed out that the current policy of oppression against the Egyptian Arab people was an attempt by the Camp David parties to prepare the climate for another solution to be imposed on the Egyptian Arab people by force.

As regards the alliance between the Egyptian National Front and the steadfastness and confrontation front, Lt Gen al-Shadhli confirmed that there was a full alliance and coordination between these parties.

He was asked on the replacement for Sadat being considered by the administration in Washington and Tel Aviv as indicated lately by a general of the Zionist army who said that recent events had shown that Sadat was a weak man who cannot be relied upon. He explained that the possibility of a replacement was in the cards and should not be excluded at all.

In this context he said that there were many opinions which had emerged lately in Washington during Sadat's visit calling for non-reliance on him because he would be meeting the same fate as the former shah of Iran. Lt Gen al-Shadhli confirmed that the Egyptian National Front did not accept changes of faces; it wants changes in attitudes.

While answering a question on the degree of cooperation existing between religious and political groups opposed to Sadat's regime, he confirmed that despite partial differences in the slogans raised by these groups, they all agreed on the objective of toppling Sadat's regime after it had been proved to them that his policy did not serve Egypt politically, economically and democratically.

Lt Gen al-Shadhli announced in his press conference that the popular uprising in Egypt was continuing, pointing out that the demonstrations which started last Friday were continuing even this morning and that Sadat's oppressive machine continues to confront the popular Egyptian rejection of his regime with terror through the imprisonment of thousands of Egyptian patriots in prisons and detention centers.

CSO: 4504/98

DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTRY'S POPULATION FIGURES CITED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 648, 15 Jun 81 pp 18-23

[Article: "Forty Fourth Million Is on Its Way"]

[Text] Egypt's population reached 43 million last January. This is how the Central Agency for General Mobilization and Statistics observes growth in the population periodically. The aim of this [watch] is to draw attention to the fact that we are on the threshold of an enormous population explosion that has to be countered by curtailing successive population increases and by raising production. Some experts have recently emerged with a new opinion concerning the population problem--an opinion to the effect that every population increase is considered an added resource that can be utilized to enhance the development rates.

The studies conducted by the demographic experts in the Mobilization and Statistics Agnecy have proven that the population reached 43 million on 14 January of last year, including 21,848,000 males and 21,152,000 females. This means that the population has risen by 1 million in less than 10 months at the rate of 1,263,000 persons annually, 105,000 persons monthly, 3,460 persons daily or one person per 25 seconds. What is meant by the increase here is net growth and not births, i.e., the increase representing the difference between the number of births and the number of mortalities.

By calculating the births, we find that the republic receives an average of one newborn every 18.2 seconds and that one death occurs in the republic every 72 seconds.

Cairo Getting Inflated

The studies have shown that the population of Cairo Governorate has reached 5,601,000 people, meaning that there has been an increase of 89,000 people in less than 10 months and that the governorate's population has come to represent 13.1 percent of the republic's population. This estimate does not include the number of those who come to the capital from the adjacent areas.

The Greater Cairo population reached 8,905,000 persons, with a growth of 181,000 persons in less than 10 months and an annual growth of 229,000 persons. The population of the Greater Cairo construction perimeter reached 7.57 million people, with an increase of 165,000 persons. We thus find that the construction perimeter contains 18 percent and the regional perimeter 21 percent of the republic's population.

The construction perimeter of the greater Cairo includes all sections of the city of Cairo, all parts of the city of al-Jizah, the city of Shubra al-Khaymah and all the villages of al-Jizah District.

The regional perimeter of the Greater Cairo includes all sections of the city of Cairo, of al-Jizah, of Shubra al-Khaymah, Shibin al-Qanatir, al-Badrashayn, al-Hawamidiyah, all villages of al-Jizah District, all components of al-Qanatir al-Khayriyah, all components of al-Khankah District, a number of villages of al-Saff District (al-Shawbak al-Sharqi, al-Minya, al-Shurafa, al-'Atiya and al-Akhsas), a number of villages of Shibin al-Wanatir District (namely, al-Zahawiyin, Nawa, Nawb Taha, al-Qushshaysh, Kawm al-Samn, al-Ja'afirah, al-Salmaniyah, al-'Attarah and al-Ghariri), the villages of al-Badrashayn District (excluding al-Shannab, Qal'at al-Maraziq, al-Shawbak al-Charbi, Nazlat al-Shawbak) and the villages of Ambabah District (excluding Abu Ghalib, Atris, al-Hajir, al-Hasasin, al-Rahawi al-Sabil, al-Qata, Umm Dinar, Burqash, Bashtil, Bani Salamah, al-Jizayah, Kaft Hijazi and al-Akhsas).

Alexandria Also

The population of Alexandria Governorate has reached 2,555,000 persons, with an increase of 41,000 people in less than 10 months, an increase of 52,000 people annually, of 4,300 people monthly, of 142 people daily or an increase of an average of one person nearly every 10 minutes.

Record Figures Reached in al-Daqahliyah

It has become evident that the Lower Egypt governorate with the highest population is al-Daqahliyah Governorate. Its population has reached 3,073,000 people. The Upper Egypt governorate with the highest population, excluding al-Jizah Governorate, is the Governorate of al-Minya which has a population of 2,349,000.

The population of al-Jizah Governorate has reached 2,756,000 whereas it was 2,417,000 in the census of 23 November 1976.

Males Exceed Females

Throughout the republic, the number of males exceeds that of females in all governorates of the republic with the exception of the governorates of Aswan and Kafr al-Shaykh where the female population exceeds the male population.

Population in Year 2000

Now that the republic's population has reached 43 million, if we want to estimate this population in the year 2000, then by using the average growth rate calculated on the basis of the last two population censuses and by assuming that this average growth will continue until the year 2000, the republic's population will reach nearly 66 million and the population of the Greater Cairo will reach nearly 15 million people.

Population Density

The total area of the Arab Republic of Egypt amounts to nearly 1 million square kilometers (1,002,000 square kilometers). The populated part of this area is 5.5 percent only, meaning that nearly 55,039 square kilometers are populated by 43 million people. Thus, the average population density amounts to 781 persons per square kilometer compared to 43.1 persons per square kilometer for the total area.

The state is exerting efforts to expand the populated area so as to avoid population accumulation, to reduce the population density and to exploit the vast unpopulated areas. This is why the state has annexed areas of land to the governorates of Alexandria, Suez, Ismailia, al-Buhayrah and al-Jizah in preparation for developing and populating these areas.

This is why the population density in the republic has dropped since 1966. This drop is due to the growth of the populated area from 35,580 square kilometers to 55,039 square kilometers.

Despite the new additions to the populated areas, the population growth has led to raising the average population density from 466 persons per square kilometers in 1937 to 781 persons per square kilometer in January 1981. This means that the population density has risen by more than 67 percent in nearly 44 years.

Density in Cairo

If we follow the population density of the city of Cairo, we find that it has been rising considerably. This density was less than 7,000 persons per square kilometer in 1927 and has risen over nearly 54 years to more than 26,000 persons per square kilometer in 1981. The censuses show that the density rose by 13,000 [persons per square kilometer] between the 1927 and 1966 censuses and by nearly 4,000 per square kilometer between the 1966 and 1976 censuses. The Cairo population density has exceeded the population density in the republic from 1927 to the present.

By studying the population density of the various wards of Cairo, we find that this density varies greatly. It amounts to nearly 7,000 persons per square kilometer in Qasr al-Nil section and rises to nearly 110,000 persons per square kilometer in Rawd al-Faraj section.

Next to Rawd al-Faraj section in density is Bab al-Sha'tiyah where the density reaches more than 109,000 people per square kilometer. Bab al-Sha'riyah is followed by al-Muski, Shubra al-Khaymah and al-Sayyidah Zaynab sections (106,000-88,000-79,000) successively.

These sections are followed by al-Sahil, Bulaq, al-Zaytun, 'Abidin, al-Darb al-Ahmar and al-Zahir sections where the population density ranges from 74,000 persons per square kilometer (in al-Sahil) to 57,000 persons per square kilometer (in al-Zahir).

Next come the sections of Hulwan, al-Jamaliyah, al-Azbakiyah, al-Wayli, Misr al-Qadimah and al-Khalifah where the density is low, ranging from 55,000 persons per square kilometer (in Hulwan) to nearly 24,000 persons per square kilometer (in al-Khalifah).

And then follow the less populated sections of al-Ma'adi, Heliopolis, al-Matariyah, and Qasr al-Nil where the density ranges from 12,000 persons per square kilometer (in al-Ma'adi) to 7,000 persons per square kilometer (in Qasr al-Nil).

It is obvious from this that the most densely populated areas are the old areas in which emigrants from the countryside settle. This is probably due to the low costs of living in these sections. A newcomer from the countryside usually seeks his relatives who are already settled in a section and then takes this section as his residential area when he himself settles down.

The emigrants from the countryside also accumulate in population concentrations on the peripheries of the capital because these concentrations are similar to the emigrants' rural environment. These emigrants then live in the city for a long period with the same rural ideas and customs.

The percentage of the population of the city of Cairo is rising constantly in relationship to the republic's total population. This percentage has risen from 8.2 percent in 1937, to 10.9 percent in 1947, to 12.9 percent in 1960, to 14 percent in 1966 and to 13.1 [sic] in 1981.

Alexandria Density

The Alexandria population density exceeded that of Cairo in the censuses of 1937 and 1947 when the population density was 9,000 and 13,000 successively in Alexandria and 8,000 and 12,000 per square kilometers in Cairo successively. But this average dropped in 1960 in Alexandria to less than half due to the annexation of new areas to it. This year, the density has reached 954 persons per square kilometer [sic].

Alexandria is unique in the phenomenon of its containing the most densely populated section [in the republic], namely al-Jumruk [Customs] Section where the density is 145,000 persons per square kilometer. This is a record figure not attained by the most densely populated section of the city of Cairo, namely Rawd al-Faraj section where the density is 110,000 persons per square kilometer.

As demonstrated earlier, the old sections of the city of Cairo are the most densely populated sections. It is also evident to us that the old sections of Alexandria register the highest population density averages, considering that these sections are the ones that attract the [rural] emigrants, as we have already seen in the city of Cairo.

Next to al-Jumruk section in population density are the sections of Muharram Bey, al-Manshiyah, Karmuz, al-Raml and al-Labban with a population density of 96,000, 86,000, 70,000, 49,000 and 48,000 persons per square kilometer successively.

The sections with the lowest population density (excluding al-'Amiriyah) are al-'Attarin, Bab Sharqi, Mina' al-Basal and al-Dakhilah where the population density has amounted to 40,000 persons per square kilometer in the first section while amounting to 26,000, 15,000, 3,000 and 2,000 successively in the other sections. Perhaps the remoteness of these sections from the center of the city is the reason for their low population density.

Population Density in Other Governorates

It is noticed that there is evident variation in population density insofar as the republic's other governorates are concerned, not only between the various governorates but also within the same governorate in the various census years.

Whereas the governorates of Damietta, Port Said and Suez ranked third, fourth and fifth in population density behind Alexandria and Cairo in 1937, we find that Suez and Alexandria retreated to the lower ranks in 1981. The reason for this is the change introduced to the borders of the governorates.

In view of the changes developing in the areas of some governorates, we find this year that the governorates following Cairo Governorate in population density are the governorates of Port Said, al-Jizah and al-Qalyubiyah. Perhaps the proximity of al-Jizah and al-Qalyubiyah governorates to Cairo is one of the main reasons for the high growth in the average population density registered by these two governorates.

The governorates of Sawhaj and Asyut are considered Upper Egypt's most densely populated governorates (behind al-Jizah).

The governorates of al-Gharbiyah and al-Minufiyah are considered among Lower Egypt's most densely populated governorates (behind al-Qalyubiyah Governorate).

The least densely populated governorates in Lower Egypt are the governorates of al-Buhayrah and Kafr al-Shaykh and in Upper Egypt the governorates of al-Fayyum and Bani Suwayf.

Generally, 1981 has recorded a big difference between the population density of the city of Cairo (more than 26,000 persons per square kilometer) and of the Greater Cairo (more than 19,000 persons per square kilometer in the construction perimeter) on the one hand and the other governorates of the republic where we find that the highest average population density has not yet reached 5,000 persons per square kilometer. This sheds light on the enormous size of the constantly inflowing migration currents from the republic's governorates to Cairo.

Population Distribution Over Governorates
on 14 [January] 1981

Governorate	Population in 1,000 Male	Female	Total	Percentage of Governorate Population to Republic's Total Population	Percentage of Males to Governorate Population
Cairo	2,757	2,744	5,601	13.03 [%]	51.0 [%]
Alexandria	1,299	1,256	2,555	5.94	50.8
Port Said	180	165	345	0.80	52.2
Suez	115	106	221	0.51	52.0
Damietta	328	319	647	1.51	50.7
Al-Daqahliyah	1,552	1,521	3,073	7.15	50.5
Al-Sharqiyah	1,502	1,444	2,946	6.85	51.0
Al-Qalyubiyah	986	927	1,913	4.45	51.5
Kafr al-Shaykh	791	797	1,588	3.69	49.8
Al-Gharbiyah	1,285	1,268	2,553	5.94	50.3
Al-Minufiyah	974	945	1,919	4.46	50.8
Al-Buhayrah	1,408	1,393	2,801	6.51	50.3
Ismailia	207	201	408	0.95	50.7
Al-Jizah	1,413	1,343	2,756	6.41	51.3
Bani Suwayf	631	622	1,253	2.91	50.4
Al-Fayyum	667	637	1,304	3.03	51.2
Al-Minya	1,191	1,158	2,349	5.46	50.7
Asyut	985	935	1,920	4.47	51.3
Sawhaj	1,098	1,073	2,171	5.05	50.6
Qina	965	953	1,918	4.46	50.3
Aswan	346	348	694	1.61	49.9
Red Sea	33	29	62	0.15	53.2
New Valley	50	48	98	0.23	51.0
Matruh	70	69	139	0.32	50.4
Sinai	101	61	162	0.38	62.3
Population Total at Home	21,034	20,362	41,396	96.27	50.8
Total of Citizens Abroad	815	789	1,604	3.73	50.8
Population Total at Home and Abroad	21,849	21,151	43,000	100.00	50.8

Development of Percentage of Cairo Population to Republic's Total Population from 1927-1981

Year	1927	1937	1947	1960	1966	1976	August 1978	January 1979	June 1979	April 1980	January 1981
Percentage	8.2	8.2	10.9	12.9	14.0	13.3	13.2	13.2	13.2	13.1	13.1

The 1978-81 percentages in this study are based on estimated figures. The percentages for the other years are the result of the various population censuses.

Development of Population Density in Period From 1937-1981
(on basis of populated area)

(person per square kilometer)

Governorate	1937	1947	1960	1966	1976	August 1978	January 1979	June 1979	April 1980	January 1981
Cairo	7,957	11,704	15,634	19,594	23,737	24,701	25,000	25,275	25,733	26,148
Alexandria	9,407	12,910	5,237	6,221	865	901	912	921	938	954
Port Said	1,539	707	617	712	3,642	3,773	3,816	3,870	3,939	4,787
Suez	1,062	319	662	860	11	11	12	12	12	12
Damietta	7,535	24,829	648	722	946	991	1,004	1,017	1,078	1,098
Al-Daqahliyah	463	538	582	658	787	826	836	848	869	885
Al-Sharqiyah	222	272	387	452	627	658	665	675	691	705
Al-Qalyubiyah	650	7,350	1,047	1,283	1,672	1,759	1,786	1,806	1,871	1,911
Kafr al-Shaykh	*	*	279	321	408	429	434	440	453	462
Al-Gharbiyah	280	331	860	949	1,181	1,234	1,248	1,265	1,291	1,314
Al-Minufiyah	728	734	890	969	81,117	1,170	1,185	1,198	1,229	1,253
Al-Buhayrah	236	269	367	431	249	261	264	268	271	277
Ismailia	*	*	343	416	244	258	263	266	276	283
Al-Jizah	675	796	1,228	1,526	2,396	2,523(1)	2,555(1)	2,585(1)	2,671(1)	2,730(1)
Bani Suwayf	514	572	655	711	839	882	895	905	930	948
Al-Fayyum	343	377	468	519	624	658	668	676	698	714
Al-Minya	467	520	686	749	909	957	973	987	1,016	1,039
Asyut	593	674	856	912	1,108	1,163	1,180	1,196	1,230	1,236
Sawhaj	726	833	1,025	1,094	1,244	1,306	1,323	1,342	1,375	1,403
Qina	569	607	746	812	922	962	975	989	1,017	1,036
Aswan	365	331	437	591	914	957	970	982	1,004	1,023
Republic	466	546	723	845	695	727	736	745	763	781

* Before 1960 census, Kafr al-Shaykh Governorate was part of al-Gharbiyah Governorate and Ismailia was part of Canal Governorate.

1. Al-Jizah area does not include area of al-Bahriyah Oases.

--Density of Alexandria Governorate (excluding al-'Amiriyah section) is 8,128 persons per square kilometer.

--Density of Suez Governorate (excluding 'Annaqah section) is 720 persons per square kilometer.

--Density of al-Buhayrah Governorate (excluding Wadi al-Natrun District) is 610 persons per square kilometer.

--The big differences in population density are due to the changes in the governorate borders.

Arrangement of Cairo City Sections According to Population Numbers on 14 January 1981 and Population Density of Various Sections

Section	Population on 14 January 1981 (in 1,000)	Percentage of Section Population to Governorate Total	Density (Persons Per Square Kilometer)
Al-Matariyah	954.2	10.6 (%)	8,764
Al-Sharabiyah	492.8	8.8	--
Al-Sahil	482.2	8.6	74,185
Hada'iq al-Qubbah	346.9	6.2	--
Hulwan	312.1	5.6	54,984
Rawd al-Faraj	297.9	5.3	110,333
Misr al-Qadimah	298.6	5.3	29,564
al-Zaytun	296.4	5.3	70,571
Al-Ma'adi	296.6	5.3	11,817
Al-Sayyidah Zaynab	274.8	4.9	78,514
Al-Khalifah	205.0	3.7	23,837
Bulaq	194.6	3.5	72,074
Al-Jamaliyah	184.8	3.3	38,500
Al-Darb al-Ahmar	160.9	2.9	57,464
Al-Wayly	157.3	2.8	30,558
Nasr City	70.8	1.3	--
Al-Azbakiyah	65.4	1.2	38,471
Al-Muski	63.6	1.1	106,000
Qasr al-Nil	42.4	0.8	7,067
(al-Tibin)	39.8	0.7	--
Shubra	141.7	2.5	88,125
Heliopolis	139.7	2.5	9,994
Bab al-Sha'riyah	120.9	2.1	109,909
Al-Zahir	113.9	2.0	56,950
Al-Nuzhah	112.3	2.0	--
'Abidin	95.4	1.7	59,625
Total	5,601.0	100.0	26,148

Density for the listed sections has been calculated collectively due to the unavailability of separate area data.

Hulwan section includes (al-Tibin) section.

Al-Wayly section includes Hada'iq al-Qubbah section.

Shubra section includes al-Sharabiyah section.

Heliopolis section includes al-Nuzhah and Nasr City sections.

Development of Cairo Population and Population Density in Period From 1927-1981

Year	1927	1937	1947	1960	1966	1976	August 1978	January 1979	June 1979	April 1980	January 1981
Cairo Population (in 1,000)	1,071	1,310	2,076	3,349	4,220	5,084	5,291	5,355	5,414	5,512	5,601
Cairo Population Density (persons per square kilometer)	6,584	7,957	11,704	15,634	19,594	23,737	24,701	25,000	25,275	25,733	26,148
Republic's Population Density (persons per square kilometer) for Populated Area	410	466	546	733	845	695	727	736	745	763	781

Arab Republic of Egypt:	(Populated) Area:	55,039 Square Kilometers.
	Population:	43 million
	Density:	781 persons per square kilometer
City of Cairo:	Area:	214.2 Square Kilometers
	Population:	5,601,000
	Density:	26,148

Arrangement of Alexandria City Sections According to Population on 14 January 1981, Along With Population Density of Various Sections

Section	Population	Percentage of Section Population to Governorate Total	Density* (person per square kilometer)
Al-Raml	492.6	19.3	49,113
Muharram Bey	367.6	14.4	95,729
Al-Muntazah	345.6	13.5	3,182
Mina' al-Basal	253.2	9.9	15,098
Bab Sharqi	243.5	9.5	26.369
Karmuz	232.4	9.1	70,394
Al-Jumruk	155.9	6.1	145,701
Sidi Jabir	146.5	5.7	--
Al-Labban	83.2	3.3	47,816
Al-'Attarin	81.5	3.2	40,347
Al-'Amiriyah	52.5	2.1	22
Al-Dakhilah	51.1	2.0	1,762
Al-Manshiyah	49.0	1.9	85,965
Alexandria Port (1)	0.5	--	--
Total	2,555	100.0	954

Bab Sharqi section includes Sidi Jabir due to unavailability of separate area data.

(1) Foreigners aboard ships anchored in port.

8494
CSO: 4504/38

ISRAELI TELEVISION ANALYZES ARAB STANDS ON SUMMIT

TA262017 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 26 Aug 81

[Excerpts] The Alexandria Summit again pointed out the importance of the local Palestinian leadership in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district. At the news conference in Alexandria, President as-Sadat said that it is clear to him that the PLO is not the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Prime Minister Begin emphasized that by saying Palestinians, he means the residents of the West Bank and the Gaza strip. He added that their representatives will be incorporated into the negotiations as members of either the Egyptian or the Jordanian delegation, as stipulated in the Camp David accords. In view of these statements, our correspondent Rafiq Halabi outlines the local leadership in the territories, trying to find out whether this leadership is both able and willing to participate in the negotiations on the implementation of the autonomy.

[Begin videotape] [Halabi] This is Anwar al-Khatib who, up until 1967, was the Jordanian governor of Jerusalem. When one wants to know what the Jordanian supporters think, one hurries to consult with him. This is what Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon did last week. Like al-Khatib, so, too, the other outstanding figures in the territories: they hold the same view and do not see themselves, at the moment, partners to the process of the implementation of the autonomy.

There is, at present, no consolidated political body in Judaea and Samaria, and yet one can talk about several groups. The first--the leading figure on it being Bassam ash-Shak'ah from Nabulus--regards the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Among its members are the mayors of Ramallah, al-'Birah, Hebron, Qalqilyah, Janin and Tulkarm Mayor Hilmi Hanun, who met with the defense minister last week. Another group is shaping these days with the help of the military government. It includes the representatives of the rural residents, and the most prominent figure on it is Mustafa Dudin from the Hebron hills. Other figures on it are mukhtars and clan heads. A third group includes the mayors of Bethlehem, Bayt Jalah and Jericho. They speak moderately and wait for the picture to clear up. The veteran leadership can be observed on this last group.

Gaza's ash-Shawwa is currently under pressure from PLO supporters, as well as from the senior officials nurtured by the military government. Here one can find Anwar Nusaybah from Jerusalem and Hikmet al-Masri from Nabulus.

The National Guidance Committee, which for years organized the rank-and-file in Judaea and Samaria is at present completely paralyzed. There are no meetings like the Nabulus Conference, or political meetings or coordination of positions. The defense minister is studying the situation now, promising to defend the moderates and looking into the possibility of establishing a front with which a dialogue could be held: Maybe from among the rural leaders or some Jordan-supporting political personalities. [End videotape]

CSO: 4323/64

ISRAEL CONSIDERED TROUBLEMAKER IN TALKS

TA301223 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Aug 81 p 5

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "Israel Is the Losing Third Party"]

[Text] Anyone fearing a crisis or confrontation in the Alexandria Summit between President as-Sadat and Prime Minister Begin was found wrong. Whoever fears this in the upcoming meeting between President Reagan and Begin in Washington at the beginning of September will also be proven wrong. There is no crisis, no explosion, no confrontation. There is a triangle of Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. relations where the Americans and Egyptians can be likened to a couple of lovers while Israel is the "third party," and the troublemaker who does not know his real place. The other two parties need the third party to a certain extent but they would like to restrict, as much as possible, its ability to disturb them on both their common road and separate lanes. They are doing so successfully and do not need an unnecessary crisis which may disrupt their continued progress--not now, now for the time being. They find it sufficient that Israel will be unable to evade the trap of the eternal convict in ever-changing accusations, the party which is incessantly forced to defend and justify itself, and with little success as such. (The raising of the PLO topic by President as-Sadat now is an example of this.)

Both the Americans and Egyptians want to gain time, and not just until after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982. The Reagan administration aspires to strengthen the U.S. military forces and change the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The economic program which was approved in congress and was marked as Reagan's big triumph is still to stand the test of implementation in and contribution to the U.S. economy. The Reagan administration wants to change the international atmosphere and the style of relations with the Western countries and Third World countries. These are integrated processes of strengthening forces and proving firmness in both words and deeds. In the meantime, the technique is one of scoring points. This is a period of strained preparation and progress toward improved and strengthened positions and toward a possible future challenge on the basis of a new balance of powers.

The U.S. deployment in the Middle East is part of this process and its timetable. The process is far from reaching its peak; its main focii are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The implementation of the AWACs deal (which is a most extensive key deal as we now know) is an integral part of this deployment plan. Israel and its

supporting circles appear in this context as a troublemaker whom it is necessary to overcome in a persistent, energetic struggle. Simultaneously, the military and political relations between the United States and Egypt are being strengthened. The Egyptian army will be equipped with modern U.S. arms at a pace and scope unforeseen earlier. One of the side results of this process: Insuring the American orientation of the Egyptian army and its commanders in the post-as-Sadat era. This can be a guarantee for the continued peace process with Israel which, as far as Egypt is concerned, is important mainly to insure continued U.S. aid and cooperation. At the same time, the military strengthening of Egypt with modern and sophisticated U.S. arms contains a military danger to Israel, if, God forbid, Egypt returns to the road of war against Israel in the next decade. Both the guarantee of peace and the war danger are future tunes. In the meantime, the United States and Egypt are interested in increasing and hastening the cooperation between them.

Egypt has a permanent interest in limiting Israel's potential to prevent it from getting increased U.S. aid. Egypt has an interest in increasing the aid it gets at the expense of Israel, since there is a limit to the U.S. funds. It is convenient for Egypt that Israel always be on the international as well as the U.S. defendants' bench. After Israel completes the pullback from the Sinai the Palestinian charge sheet will still remain unchanged.

It is no wonder than that President as-Sadat chose to raise this issue before the resumption of the negotiations in the Middle East and especially before President Reagan is finalizing its position regarding the next moves in the negotiations. As-Sadat does not desire PLO participation, neither at this stage nor in the next. He is using the PLO as a propaganda card against Israel and as a fig leaf to cover his nudity vis-a-vis the Arab world. President as-Sadat has not given up his primeness in the Arab world and will struggle to win it again in due course, after Egypt is much stronger militarily and economically, after it fortifies its status as the major U.S. partner in the Middle East, after President as-Sadat can prove to the Arab world he was right and his opponents were wrong, after Egypt reaps the two chief fruits of its peace policy--regaining the entire Sinai and winning Washington's heart and pocket, also at Israel's expense. A crisis in relations with Israel and ending the peace process will not be useful at this stage, neither to Egypt nor to the United States (nor to Saudi Arabia). They will present Israel as a victim and betrayed friend. This will only be unnecessarily harmful.

Both the United States and Egypt need a breathing space of a year, 2 years, perhaps more. In the meantime, they can content themselves with eroding Israel's ability to disturb them (and Saudi Arabia). This is the reason why there was no crisis in Alexandria and there will be no crisis in Washington either. Israel is wasting this breathing space. It is using it for festivals of forced embraces and honor guards but not for picking real strategic and political fruits.

CSO: 4323/64

BEGIN CRITICIZED BEFORE WASHINGTON SUMMIT

TA041302 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 4 Sep 81 p 3

[Commentary by Mark Gefen: "Begin--A World Strategist"]

[Text] Menahem Begin leaves Sunday for his meeting with President Reagan in Washington. Begin could conceivably expect "a good meeting," because the occupant of the White House is a man who holds conservative and rightist views, a president who is a "hawk" in his approach to international problems, and particularly in his attitude toward the Soviet Union. Who would be better fitting than Begin to offer "a strategic partnership" in the anti-Soviet alignment?

And, indeed, just before the Israeli prime minister's visit, there were leaks on Begin's desire to devote the dialogue with Reagan to the incorporation of Israel into the U.S. strategic deployment. It seems that there is no greater folly than such an approach and that there is no greater danger to Israel's future and safety than an attempt to actively involve it in the power struggle between the two great world blocs. But Begin, who possesses no new edition of the "ingenious autonomy plan," will try to score an achievement with Reagan by way of offering his good services to the United States.

And yet it seems as though Begin is misreading the U.S. and global maps. There has never been such an ebb in Israel's standing in U.S. public opinion, including among administration circles, as there is right now. The TIME magazine article published this week, in effect suggesting punishing Israel and making it "stand in the corner" as part of U.S. considerations (after describing Israel as a "burden" to the United States) was no coincidence; it reflected the current trends in the United States.

In my opinion, there are two reasons that prompt Begin to raise Israel's regional and global "strategic contribution." The first has to do with Begin's and his government's ineptitude in advancing the peace process, which has been stalled for over a year now. The fact that Begin has "succeeded" in extracting from President as-Sadat an agreement to resume the autonomy talks can only underscore the paucity of his achievements, because the autonomy talks have already been conducted in the past. At first glance it would seem that it should have been as-Sadat more so than Begin who should have been more interested in continuing the talks and advancing them. Is there anyone who can still remember the dispute over the "linkage" between the peace agreement with Egypt and the autonomy talks, when Israel conducted fierce "battles" against connecting the two? Now things

have turned upside-down, and it is Begin who regards the resumption of the autonomy talks as an "achievement."

However, beyond this formal agreement, Begin has no message that would point to any kind of progress in the direction of reaching an arrangement to the autonomy. Thus, from a clear indication of extended impotence in everything directly pertaining to the chances of reaching an arrangement in the area, Begin is trying to find refuge in salvation in a "strategic dialogue." I can recall that in the meeting in Alexandria 2 years ago--Begin tried to delude the newspaper editors with the "highly significant" statement that follows: "We conducted talks about regional and global strategy; they were very important talks. I was pleased to note that there was full accord between us."

Alongside the attempt to evade a discussion of the future of the West Bank, Begin is also spurred by unique national megalomania. Begin believes that he personally can serve as a valuable partner to Reagan in planning his world deployment. In addition to his personal contribution, Begin thinks Israel can insure the United States a margin over the Soviet Union.

The man is cut off from reality. He lives in an imaginary world, a world at whose center is himself, handing out marks and grades to presidents and prime ministers. He lives in a world in which it is not reality's facts that count, but rather the words and phrases he utters--himself held in awe by his own words. No, this is no case of "besmirching" by an opponent or a rival; this has been shown to be true a long time ago. The first Begin-as-Sadat meeting on Egyptian soil, in Ismailia, was the classic example for this.

Anyone who followed the ups and downs of this meeting, which lasted 24 hours, and those present at its end, at the news conference, knew for sure that it indeed was a total flop. Everyone sensed this--except for Begin, who, for some reason, was incredibly euphoric. Rather than speak for myself as I saw things when they happened, let me bring the words of 'Ezer Weizman as testimony (as expressed in his latest book, THE BATTLE FOR PEACE) in describing the atmosphere on the plane that brought Begin and his entourage back from Ismailia to Israel. This is how Weizman puts it:

"A heavy atmosphere prevailed on the plane. It looked as though peace was on the verge of collapse even before it managed to put on some flesh. Begin was in high spirits, smiling profusely and spewing forth innumerable gems of wisdom. He also cracked many jokes with the reporters that joined the trip. Before we took leave, with a heavy heart, of our Egyptian hosts, I managed to hear him say that he was going home 'a happy man.' I could hardly comprehend him. Is he that much removed from reality that he cannot read the map? Did Begin become intoxicated with his own words, drunk with the intricacies of international law he so painstakingly laid down before as-Sadat at such great lengths, overjoyed with the Israeli position as he outlined to its length and breadth that it bommeranged, only to persuade himself?"

So, what then is Israel's strategic value for the United States? Even if we accept the axioms that Israel is among the strongest country in the region (militarily), and one of the most loyal to the United States, this still cannot make

it preferable over Egypt, Saudi Arabia or even Jordan and Iraq, which the United States has consistently been trying to harness to the U.S. wagon.

What Begin does not seem to understand is that we are not talking about a military force and its importance for the United States, but about regional control in the face of the Soviet penetration. Israel, boycotted by nearly all the countries in the area, to a large degree serves as a block to the U.S. way of making contact with those countries. This is an objective situation that results from Israel's very existence and the denial of its existence by the Arab and Muslim world. Had the government of Israel known how to overcome this hurdle, by taking a courageous leap from the peace agreement with Egypt to a solution of the Palestinian problem and the abolition of the conquest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, then perhaps it would have been possible to break the wall of hatred in the area, encircling our country. However, the importance of Saudi Arabia and Iraq (as well as Syria) would consequently have grown in terms of U.S. strategy, alongside the significance of Egypt and Jordan, to supercede Israel's value.

Ever since Begin first rose to power, the man has been repeating the following naive formula: "If the Americans approach us with an offer of a defense pact between our two countries, we will be prepared to discuss it favorably." Here and there Begin also mentions the possibility of putting bases at the disposal of the future ally, as well as granting it other services. And, as usual, he adds: "Of course, we will not be the first to suggest such a pact..."

Lo and behold, this declaration of love has still not won any kind of official U.S. reaction. I do not know if there is any other country that is ready to provide the United States with bases and the United States is not even prepared to consider this willingness.

The explanation for this seems to be twofold. First, any formal alignment with Israel can only harm the United States in the eyes of those countries in the area with whom the United States is interested in having a close alliance as well. Secondly, why would the United States want a formal alignment with Israel? After Begin had made his declarations, the White House noted that when the time comes, the United States would be able to get all its wants from Israel, including bases on Israeli soil.

Still we have not said whether it is good for Israel to reach such an "achievement" of a pact with the United States or not. Israel is not what it used to be described as, namely "the superpower among the small countries." Its main raison d'etre is to provide a homeland for the Jewish people dispersed among the two blocs. Even though the Soviet Union's policy does not elicit too much sympathy, still the Israeli raison d'etat makes it incumbent upon us not to get involved in the inter-bloc power struggle.

It is highly doubtful whether Reagan will want to hear advice from Begin in the field of global strategy. It is even more doubtful that Begin could promise Reagan to thaw the freeze in the political process in the area. Yet there is no room for concern: there will be photographs on the White House lawn, there will be forced embraces, and many words will be aired. And then, as Weizman puts it in his book, Begin will again be able to return to Israel euphoric over the great success, caught under the spell of his own words.

CSO: 4323/64

'HA'ARETZ' DISCUSSES SHARON'S ARAB TACTICS

TA281239 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Aug 81 p 13

[Commentary by Avraham Schweitzer: "A Tiger Does Not Eat Grass"]

[Text] It should be noted from the outset that the following is an hypothesis, namely, an attempt to provide theoretical answers to the questions aroused by the combination of the defense minister's personality (or whatever is known about it) and the political situation in Israel at the time Mr Sharon assumed his post. His opening moves, especially his meetings with Arab leaders in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, aroused astonishment for good and for bad. His opinions about our relations with the United States and the nature of Israel's contribution within the framework of the global U.S. deployment aroused another kind of question, in addition to the differences which could be discerned by observant persons in remarks on the issue by the defense minister and the prime minister.

The first question is: Why did Sharon go to the so-called Arab leadership in the territories who are supporters of Husayn and members of the PLO and what did he expect to hear from them? All the defense ministers, except his predecessor, went through this process and all of them were greeted with the same tune: Occupation must end, the PLO is our representative. Mr Sharon knew beforehand that the same old tune would be played to him. Since it is inconceivable that he went to them to be persuaded, the aforementioned hypothesis contends that he went to his interlocutors for them to see and get the message.

There is no need to introduce Sharon either in Israel or to the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el. He presumably met with the Arab leadership in the territories to personally prove that he wants to promote coexistence, as if to say: Look at me and forget about an independent Palestinian state led by 'Arafat west of the Jordan River--and whoever does not want to forget, let him go to the Palestinian state east of the river. The fact that this was put across politely during a visit to an Arab leader could hardly have deceived them: his interlocutors knew who they were dealing with.

This hypothesis goes on to say that Sharon's message in his talks to leaders of the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el is the carrot in the defense minister's formula. The stick is a military move designed to remove the guerrillas and semiregular forces subordinate to the PLO and deployed south of Beirut in Lebanon. The Israeli people sometimes appear to be afflicted by amnesia and, therefore, it is worth pointing out that in spite of the cease-fire imposed on Mr Begin exactly

5 weeks ago, the issue in southern Lebanon has not yet been settled and, according to Sharon, there is only one way to settle it.

Fundamental changes have been underway in the north for several years: The Syrians and the terrorists are together eroding the area controlled by the Lebanese Christians whose strength decreases at the same rate their territory shrinks. Israel does not favor this development and neither does the West, the United States in particular, since Syria and the PLO are subject to Soviet control. This, it can be inferred that Israel's interest--to remove the PLO from the northern border--is compatible with the U.S. goal to repel the Soviets from the region. The only means to achieve this end--again, hypothetically speaking--is to have an Israeli military force sweep the area. If and when this hypothetical move has materialized the Arab public in Eretz Yisra'el will realize that Sharon's view of coexistence under Israeli rule is not their better option but rather the only one in the market: Without the military force in southern Lebanon the PLO becomes the roof organization of groups of hopeless and unimportant immigrants.

Many things can be said about Mr Sharon, some of them unflattering. However, nobody can claim that he merely talks--he talks and acts. According to the aforementioned hypothesis, the defense minister's tour among the Arab public will be followed by a move to break the PLO's military force. Although it is known that Mr Sharon has always favored unorthodox warfare methods, he is aware that the scope of the PLO's military presence south of Beirut in fact rules out the possibility of dealing with it with the help of acupuncture.

It should again be stressed that according to what is known about the defense minister's military concept, the artillery and air forces alone are not enough to repel the forces subject to the PLO's control in southern Lebanon. He did not object to the bombing of Beirut by the air force because he is a vegetarian but rather because he regarded it as purposeless. His preferences may be inferred from his objection: Only army forces making their way by land can seize, smash, and sweep the field and fulfill the Israeli wish for a calm northern border while, at the same time, provide the appropriate answer to the requirements of the Lebanese Christians.

The hypothesis goes on to add that there is little doubt that during his visit to the United States as part of Mr Begin's entourage, the defense minister will try and muster support for his concept from the U.S. administration. To this end, he will give a lecture describing the scope and depth of Soviet penetration in this area, stressing that Syria and the PLO are the local penetration agents. The defense minister is a practical person and is probably aware that in the face of firm U.S. opposition he will not be able to implement the hypothetical plan drawn here in general terms. Mr Begin will do whatever he will do in Washington. It is doubtful whether Sharon takes any interest in the issues occupying the prime minister's mind. Sharon is interested in the balance of forces in the area. He may devote his best efforts--it is not for nothing that he is known as the bulldozer--to persuade his hosts that his opinion about using Israel's force in favor of the United States is the best and actually the only possibility which can be taken into account if one does take a serious view of the global struggle theory of the Reagan administration.

It seems that Mr Sharon will be surprised upon arriving in the United States about the inconsistency--some refer to it as pragmatism--of his interlocutors. But even if he receives an elusive answer or a categorical no he will not let up. More than he is daring, Sharon is consistent in pursuing his goals. To wind up this hypothesis, it should be noted that, in Sharon's view, the Palestinian motherland is Jordan. The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon may encourage the leaders of this organization to carry out their Jordanian option.

CSO: 4323/64

FINANCE MINISTER ARIDOR PLEDGES TO FULFILL PROMISES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 17 Jul 81 p 22

[Interview with Yoram Aridor by Dov Goldstein: "I Am Not 'Yoram Who Doesn't Have' and I am Not 'Yoram the printer': I Will Fulfill All promises I Made Before the Election" date and place not given]

[Text] I thought: just as in the "before and after" weight loss advertisments, I will find Finance Minister Yoram Aridor, after the elections, changed. I was wrong. The Yoram after is no different than the Yoram before. There is only Yoram Aridor: exuding confidence, smiling, optimistic, capping all of his economic policies with positive adjectives--and promising: "What I promised before the elections I will deliver after them."

His critics could say that he spread money as a campaign bribe; his detractors can claim that he wasted dollars; economists with degrees could claim that now the moment of truth has arrived, and that Yoram Aridor will take back everything which he gave, and even collect interest on it. But Yoram Aridor is as steady as a rock: "It is correct economics. It has already proven itself, and it will yet prove itself. There is no reason to change it."

Question: During the election campaign you met a young woman in the supermarket. She asked: "Now it is good for me, but will it be good after the elections?" And you answered: "Definitely! I am not making a four month economy, but am looking forward to 4 years." Can you repeat your promise?

Aridor: Definitely. I will continue the same economic policy. There is no reason to change a policy which has succeeded. I see no cause for economic fiats or drastic measures. Before the elections there were those who believed in me and those who did not. I hope now that everyone will believe.

Question: In an interview before the elections, your predecessor Yigal Horowitz said to me that after the elections it would become apparent that not only he, but also you, had nothing. It would also become apparent that you too would be worthy of the appellation: "Yoram I have nothing."

Aridor: I am not surprised by the use of labels. I did not characterize my predecessor as "Yigal I have nothing." I do not propose that they apply names to me. We must face the situation seriously and deal with the problems. In no other country does the finance minister bundle up his papers, put on his shoes, lock the door, and go home with the knowledge that he has solved all of the economic

problems. It is not at all a question of "I have" or "I don't have." I had spoken for many months before the election about the policy which I am now implementing, and before I was appointed finance minister.

In my policy, there are fixed principles: taxation reform; reduction of the direct and indirect tax burden in all sectors, but especially among production workers in industry; various incentives for saving; preservation of the budget framework; a policy of balanced prices--not a price freeze nor an elimination of subsidies, but moderate rises--a policy of protecting exports by assuring a gateway for exporters; a wage policy which will be based on a full cost of living supplement of one hundred percent, to preserve real earnings; and a wage increase based on increase in output.

Question: perhaps you would prefer to be called "Yoram the printer" as David Levy once called Yigal Horowitz? In the last two months you have printed close to seven billion shekels, an amount which was earmarked to be put into circulation over the period of a year. Is this correct economic practice?

Aridor: The number is incorrect. Until the end of June, for 3 months (April, May, and June) the amount was 3 and one-half billion--half the number that you mentioned...

Question: I was also referring to the month of July, which according to estimates will amount to 4 billion shekels...

Aridor: There is no way of knowing what will be the amount for July. It is true, the money supply is a problem which has to be faced. But we should not forget that there were months in which money was withdrawn from circulation, and even then the economic problems were not solved. We will also deal with the circulation, and at the same time to prevent a deficit budget--is absolutely in error. This is a sure prescription for mass unemployment. I am not ready to accept unemployment as the price of reducing money in circulation.

I have already issued an order freezing interconnection between government offices. This should make its mark by reducing the input of money.

Question: What happened appears simple: since the number one problem was stopping inflation, you stopped it by a very massive injection of money. You reduced it in May to 3.3 percent and in June to 2.7 percent. But the problem which was created--the injection of money in such massive proportions--is no less serious. How will you deal with the new problem?

Aridor: We have not yet conquered inflation. We have reduced it to an annual double digit rate. This is an exceptional achievment. In the first half of 1981 inflation was less than 100 percent, computed annually. We still have to stabilize inflation below 100 percent, and later reduce it further. It is obvious that there cannot be an achievment without a price. It is clear that massive subsidy, which blocks inflation, in time causes a growth in the money supply. But anyone who proposes stopping the money supply will lead to a growth in unemployment and inflation. Is there a serious economist who supports unrestrained unemployment and inflation? I am fighting both at the same time.

Question: On the basis of what has happened in recent months, what do you estimate Will be the deviation from the budget, over the course of the year?

Aridor: During April-May-June there was no deviation from the budget. This is an example of distorted "facts" leaked by the media, purporting to be from reliable sources which are anonymous. On the basis of imagined and distorted facts, people reach distorted conclusions. In the first quarter of the fiscal year there was no deviation from the budget. When I presented the budget to the Knesset, I promissed that there would be no deviation from it, even before the elections. I kept that promise. I don't know on what basis it is claimed that there will be a deviation from the budget. It has no basis.

Question: Is there any alternative to severely cutting government expenditures, by significantly reducing subsidies, beyond the definition which you routinely cite, that there will be no price freeze and no drastic increase in the cost of living?

Aridor: I am not changing my policy. I have said it repeatedly and in all honesty and seriousness. An absolute end to subsidies means dizzying inflation. An absolute freeze on prices is artificial, and will lead to a totalitarian economic and social regime. I will continue on the intermediate road: price rises which are as moderate as possible, and reductions at every opportunity. A drastic price rise is no way to fight inflation. On the contrary, it is the prescription for dizzying inflation.

Mr Mashal claims that I promised to freeze prices. I do not know where Mr Mashal was before the elections, when his silence was thundering. Even before the elections I said there would not be an absolute price freeze. The role of the opposition is to come with its contentions to the government, but Mr Mashal in particular goes easy on the government. When I eliminate a small part of the fuel subsidy, Mr Mashal complains about why I have eliminated it; when there is a low index Mr Mashal complains that it is artificial, because of the subsidies. I have no contention with Mr Mashal, because Mr Mashal is always contending with himself.

Question: How long will the freeze last?

Aridor: It is temporary, but its duration has not been set.

Question: Will it be short?

Aridor: Only after a basic study of the results will I be able to say if it will be short, and how long it will last. One cannot be doctrinaire in matters of this sort. I am doctrinaire in primary economic matters: a liberal, non-socialist economy based on social justice, social legislation, freedom of the individual, the possibility of progress on the basis of individual initiative. The means to be employed are varied. A freeze such as this is only an economic measure, to be used according to the need and circumstances.

Question: Will you continue the campaigns to bring down prices?

Aridor: In the past I did not engage in campaigne to lower prices. I lowered the sales tax, and this reduction led to a lowering of prices. Yes. I will continue in that way. It is positive, and there is no reason to stop doing something positive.

Question: In spite of the fact that private consumption grew substantially, and expenditures of foreign exchange increased?

Aridor: It did not increase private consumption substantially. It only enabled people to buy certain commodities more cheaply. If it brought people into the market who had been unable to buy a refrigerator or washing machine--that kind of increased consumption I approve of.

Question: And color televisions?

Aridor: Oh, we finally come back to the television... I don't see anything wrong with people not paying taxes on a television receiver. I don't claim that it is an essential item...

Question: No, it is only a tool which increases the power of Elisha Spigelman, and I am sure that was your intention...

Aridor: Wait a minute. If you ask me about Elisha Spigelman, I will respond... I say to you that people who work hard are entitled to enjoy the fruits of their labor, and they should be able to buy common household devices, at reasonable prices. Sales taxes were exaggerated, and their reduction did not hurt state revenues. There was a small increase, definitely reasonable, in expenditures of foreign currency.

Question: Are you considering the possibility of raising the ad valorem tax?

Aridor: No, there are no plans to raise the rates of that tax.

Question: Are you considering raising other tax rates?

Aridor: No! There are no plans to raise taxes. On the contrary, we will eliminate the business tax in local authorities, apparently, although it is not final, the property rate on businesses. We will replace these taxes with another tax, a more just tax. I promised this before the elections. I am keeping that promise. I asked the staff of the Finance Ministry to prepare plans to eliminate these taxes, in collaboration with the Ministry of Interior and in consultation with people from the Center for Local Government and representatives of the Trade Bureau. Work was begun this week at the Ministry of Finance.

Question: If Mr Ya'aqov Meridor is appointed Minister of Economy, does that mean that he, and not you, will develop the economic policy of the government?

Aridor: I will not discuss the division of duties within the government. That is the task of the prime minister. I can only determine that between myself and Mr Meridor there is complete understanding and collaboration, and I will be happy to work with him. I very much appreciate his talents and abilities.

Question: But who, in your opinion, determines the economic policies of the government, the finance minister or another minister?

Aridor: The government determines policy, and the policies are executed by means of collaboration between its members. The finance minister has a central role in this particular matter.

Question: Why do you condemn the economic journalist of television, Elisha Spigelman? Is it wrong for him to criticize your policies? If he does not agree with you, is he to be punished?

Aridor: I do not condemn Mr Aridor [sic]. But I am not ready to be interviewed by him. I have no obligation to be interviewed by Mr Spigelman. Such an obligation is not part of the duties and obligations of the finance minister. One has the right not to be interviewed by Mr Spigelman. The journalist Natan Donvitz wrote in HA'ARETZ last Friday (and you know that Mr Donvitz is not a supporter of Likud): "It cannot be that Elisha Spigelman will conduct a private war against the finance minister, with such hostility, as is reflected in his writings and emphases." Mr Spigelman has conducted such a war using a state tool, on days when I was prohibited by law from appearing on state television. At the same time, secretly, he used the economic journalist of DAVAR, which is an opposition newspaper. Amiram Nir and Orly Yaniv did this openly and resigned from their jobs in television, before they were enlisted into the service of the propaganda machine of the Alignment. Mr Spigelman was in the morning secretly the economic journalist of an opposition paper and in the evening he served as the "objective state" commentator...

But not only do they not recognize my right not to be interviewed by Mr Spigelman. They also take measures against me. Have you ever heard of such a thing in a democratic country? If the finance minister will not be interviewed by Mr Spigelman, he is not to be interviewed at all on television? And behind this sanction stands television management, which supports the excommunication of the finance minister.

This is unheard of! The right of the public to receive information is sacred. The right of the public to free expression is a sacred right. But the right of free expression includes my free expression and the public's right to receive information also includes its right to receive information from me. On television they conducted a veiled election campaign against the government, and today they are trying to prevent a member of the government from appearing on television, because he will not submit to a dictate that he be interviewed by a certain person who has conducted a private war against him and the government, with the public medium of television.

Question: You are conducting the struggle against Elisha Spigelman as though you have a private war with him...

Aridor: That is untrue! I have no private war with him.

Question: Why then have you demanded that he be dismissed?

Aridor: I have never demanded his dismissal from any of his positions. I do not get involved in the considerations of those who are his superiors. I do not tell them how to act. I am concerned about the excommunication of a government minister, not personally, but nationally and democratically.

Now I am struggling for freedom of expression. Freedom of expression is beyond dispute. I define democracy as a regime in which the government too can express its opinion, even if the opinion is opposed by television. I defend the freedom of expression and the right of the public to know, I am opposed to coercion and those who would dictate to me that I must be interviewed by a journalist who has sinned by misusing a state instrument of communication for the purpose of a private war, by distorting facts.

I have no argument with anyone who expresses an opinion opposed to mine. It is essential for democracy that there be a contest of opinion, freedom of expression, and maximal freedom of the press. But as a citizen of the state I have the right to express my opinion. I do not condemn television. I am ready to be interviewed on television--but not by Mr Spigelman. It is television which is excommunicating me, and that is a most serious matter in a democracy. If television would excommunicate Mr Shimon peres, I would be forced to resist and would not rest until that excommunication was lifted.

Now they are trying to mark me as one who would limit freedom of expression. There is no greater lie than that! I am defending freedom of expression!

7075
CSO: 4323/43

'POST' REPORTS SHELLING DAMAGE TO QIRYAT SHEMONA

TA271147 Jerusalem POST in English 27 Aug 81 p 1

[Report by economic affairs correspondent Shlomo Ma'oz]

[Excerpt] The damage in the civilian sector caused by last month's shelling in the north will cost the treasury about 100 million Israeli shekels in compensation payments, according to the deputy income tax and property tax commissioner. This includes property damage, destroyed crops and losses to businesses forced to shut down during the PLO terrorist attacks.

Dov Staub told the JERUSALEM POST that the property tax office will pay compensation to about 300 businesses, mainly in Nahariyya and Qiryat Shemona, 60 factories and hotels, about 250 apartment owners and 15 vehicle owners.

About 7.5 million shekels has been paid already for direct damage, and the remaining 30 million shekels in this category will be paid to contractors who are to repair the damage. The bill for indirect damage such as lost business income will come to about 60 million shekels of which 14.5 million shekels has already been paid.

Property tax officials yesterday took 120 cheques totalling 1.2 million shekels to Qiryat Shemona to pay compensation for indirect damage to businesses. The amount of compensation due was based on reports submitted to the value added tax authorities in previous months. Anyone who gave incorrect VAT reports got less compensation, Staub mentioned.

The Knesset finance committee recently granted "border settlement" status to Shelomi, Ma'alot and Nahariyya, enabling residents there to qualify for indirect compensation payments.

CSO: 4300/114

ISRAELI AUTHORITIES BLOCK COMPLETION OF HOSPITAL PROJECT IN BAYT SAHUR

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 16 Jul 81 p 6

[Article by Salah al-Dayri: "Women's Federation in Bayt Sahur Continues to be Blocked in Implementing the Maternity Hospital Project in the City"]

[Text] Israeli military authorities still persist in preventing the Arab Women's Federation in Bayt Sahur from implementing the maternity hospital project in the city on the pretext that the land on which the hospital will be built is closed land, despite the fact that the land is located in an area controlled by the municipality of Bayt Sahur and is zoned for residence.

Despite this, the federation has obtained a building permit, dug the foundations and built a road to the site chosen for construction. Expenditures have exceeded 5,000 dinars, including drawing up the complete plans for the hospital but excluding the cost of the land, which measures some 9 dunums.

It was mentioned that in the Bethlehem District there is no hospital specifically for maternity, thus forcing the citizens to go to Jerusalem hospitals, which involves considerable financial expense, effort and various discomforts.

A solution to this problem represents a pressing and necessary demand on all sides.

It is well known that the aforementioned area, which is located at the end of Istih Street, southeast of the city, in addition to being a very wide open area, is located east of the city and is called Jabal Harasa. The Israeli authorities have declared it to be a closed area, in which building is prohibited for a certain length of time.

Despite that, a large part of it is populated.

Everyone believes that there is absolutely no justification for the blocking of this large, humanitarian project, and that it exceeds all reasonable considerations.

The federation has asserted that it will not renounce its right to build the hospital and that it will continue its efforts on all levels to attain this objective.
7005
CSO: 4304/121

FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES DROP SHARPLY

TA020755 Jerusalem POST in English 2 Sep 81 p 3

[Report by economic affairs correspondent Shlomo Ma'oz]

[Text] The massive injection of money into the economy of the treasury continues to make an impact on Israel's foreign currency reserves, which plunged sharply for the second straight month. The reserves dropped $77 million in August and $67 million in July, for the sharpest continuous drop in over a year.

Over the last 4 months the reserves have declined by $190 million and now stand at $2.806 billion.

Part of the billions of shekels pumped into the economy in recent months has been used to purchase foreign currency and to finance large-scale imports of consumer durables.

The drop was expected by treasury officials, who realized that the country would have to finance a large part of the current trade deficit by draining the reserves.

The massive injections of cash by the treasury continued in August, with the sum reaching 2.7 billion shekels, bringing the total since March to 9.2 billion shekels. This year's budget projected only 12 billion shekels in extra cash to be printed for the entire fiscal year.

Treasury officials said that the extra infusions of cash was behind Finance Minister Yoram Aridor's drive to cut ministerial budgets by 3 to 5 percent and to cut spending power by raising the prices of fuel, electricity, and water. These steps slow down the government printing presses in the coming months, they said.

CSO: 4300/114

ISRAELI, JORDANIAN DEAD SEA PROJECTS CONTRADICTORY

TA240930 Jerusalem POST in English 24 Aug 81 p 3

[Report by Arye Wolman]

[Text] The Jordanian plan to build a Dead Sea canal for hydro-electricity generation--as disclosed to a UN energy conference last week in Nairobi--makes economic sense, according to Energy Ministry officials who attended the sessions. But this will not hold if Israel goes ahead with its own $800 million canal project, approved by the cabinet last August.

Yona Bar-Gur, director of the ministry's planning and policy division, said yesterday that either country could undermine the economic viability of the other's project by going ahead with its own. This is because only a limited amount of water can be allowed to cascade down the cliffs into the Dead Sea to generate hydro-electric power. Otherwise, the level of the salt lake will rise too high and flood the surrounding potash works, hotels and nature reserves.

While Israel plans to build a canal from the Mediterranean across the Negev to the Dead Sea, the route proposed in the Jordanian scheme is from the Gulf of Elat to Sedom. Bar-Gur said that although the Jordanian route is longer--190 kilometres instead of 80--it involves much less tunnelling than its Israeli counterpart. On the other hand, more precautions against earthquakes would have to be taken on the Jordanian route, which passes through the Syrio-African rift, he said.

He pointed out that a committee headed by MK Prof Yuval Ne'eman had checked the 'Arava route, as well as other alternatives, before recommending the Gaza Strip-Negev-'Arad route, which was accepted by the government.

"But I don't think there's much difference between the cost of the two routes," Bar-Gur said. He added that, in principle, there should be no objection to adopting the 'Arava route if by this means cooperation with Jordan could be won.

According to Jordanian estimates, their scheme would cost $850m. And would generate about 330,000 kilowatts of electricity. The Israeli scheme envisages the generation of up to 700,000 kilowatts.

Bar-Gur said that although Jordan's current peak demand for electricity is small-apparently less than one percent of Israel's--rapid growth is forecast. This could still make worthwhile a long-term electricity project which would come to fruition only in the next decade.

But there were no hints of possible cooperation at the Nairobi conference. The Jordanian delegates refused to speak to their Israeli counterparts, and, with the other Arab states, forced through a resolution condemning the Israeli scheme.

CSO: 4300/114

U.S. FIRM REJECTS PARTNERSHIP WITH ENGINE PLANT

TA251155 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Aug 81 pp 1, 15

[Report by military correspondent Ya'Aqov Erez]

[Excerpts] The directors of the U.S. Pratt and Whitney Company, which will sell to Israel the technology for the production of the engines for the new Lavi planes, following prolonged negotiations have rejected a proposal to enter into a partnership with the Bet Shemesh engine plant in order to coproduce engines for the new plane.

At the time the negotiations for the purchase of the engines for the Lavi aircraft began it was understood that the Americans might enter into partnership with the Bet Shemesh plant.

Israeli elements expressed disappointment with the fact that the U.S. company has rejected a partnership with the plant. They, nevertheless, noted that the contract for the production of the engine will not be affected and it does not seem that the Israeli Government will adopt any sanction against Pratt and Whitney. This contract assures production, the transfer of technology and initial guidance and aid in the production of the engine.

The possible partnership between Pratt and Whitney and the Bet Shemesh engines plant had potential importance far beyond the coproduction of the Lavi aircraft engine. Such an agreement, if it had been entered, would have increased the commercial interest of the U.S. company in the Israeli plant and thus new markets and vast options could have opened for the Bet Shemesh engine plant.

Israeli elements emphasized that according to the contract signed with the U.S. company, Pratt and Whitney undertook to procure from Israel various products worth $150 million over a 15 year period. The Israeli elements added that the Americans will maintain this provision since it is on the contract.

CSO: 4323/64

WEST BANK SCHOOL STATISTICS GIVEN

TA301157 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1125 GMT 30 Aug 81

[Text] Ramallah, 30 Aug--The number of students in the Judaea and Samaria schools this coming year will amount to 280,000 compared to 260,000 last school year and 137,000 in 1967. This has been reported by the military authorities toward the opening of the new school year in the region on Tuesday [1 September]. Most of the students will be taught in 797 government schools; it is a small percentage only which will study in private schools and schools sponsored by UNRWA. The number of the teachers has increased from 8,820 teachers last year to 9,271 this year.

In view of the constant increase in the number of Judaea and Samaria students the military authorities have expanded the education system by adding new schools and classrooms. The military authorities also place special emphasis on setting up high school classrooms in the villages in order to make conditions easier for the students facing transportation difficulties to the towns. The classes are mixed, containing both boys and girls, due to small number of village students of high school age.

During the summer vacation the military authorities printed 1.2 million books according to changes lately introduced in the Jordanian school curriculum. The sum of 8.2 million shekels was allocated to this end. The elementary school students receive the books free of charge while the high school students pay the printing cost of the books.

The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria notes that the budget of the Judaean and Samarian education system for the present fiscal year will total 528,372 million shekels, compared to 115 million shekels last year.

CSO: 4323/64

WEST BANK AGRICULTURAL OFFICIAL REPORTS ON 5-YEAR PLAN

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 31 Jul 81 p 5

[Article by 'Aqqab al-Sa'id: "The 5-Year Plan and the Activities of the Cooperative Association for Agricultural Marketing and Irrigation in Qalqiliyah"]

[Text] Our correspondent in Tulkarm, 'Aqqab al-Sa'id, held a meeting with al-Hajj Ziyyad Muhammad Yunis, head of the Cooperative Association for Agricultural Marketing and Irrigation in the Qalqiliyah area, who spoke about the circumstances through which the association has passed since its establishment and about future projects.

He said that the association was considered one of the pilot associations in the field of agricultural marketing, irrigation and supply in the occupied area. Moreover, it was the first registered association and the first association to carry out marketing and supply activities, from its inception up to 1967. The association's financial position was ruined as a result of the 1967 war on the one hand, and the members' lack of financial capabilities on the other.

Attempts were made to get the association moving, through self-financing, but these efforts did not achieve the desired objective, and from 1972 to 1979, it remained at a semi-standstill. Then a last attempt to attract new members was made, and the minimum for a member's share was raised to 100 shares, valued at 100 dinars.

Membership increased to 280, all of whom paid their shares into the association.

The head of the cooperative association said that the association has accomplished a number of things, including:

The Association Center. The association's center was in an old building, which was inadequate for the cooperatives' activities. The association tore it down and did the necessary remodeling, so that it is now in its present condition. That cost 2,543 dinars.

Supply. The association prepared an appropriate site and financing for this activity and began to carry it out at the beginning of the present year. The association provided the necessary seeds, fertilizer and vehicles and replaced the old systems of irrigation with modern ones, in cooperation with the Tulkarm agricultural office and engineers specializing in irrigation methods.

Marketing. The association was unable to do any marketing for 1980-81, due to a lack of time. It will begin this activity in 1981-82. In this regard, the association has purchased 19.5 dunums of land to build a marketing center and other facilities relating to marketing activities.

Al-Hajj Yunis made it clear that the association has established a 5-year plan for its activities from 1980 through 1984, which received the approval of the general organization during its meeting on 29 December 1979. This plan's total cost will be one-half million dinars.

The plan includes financing for the association's projects, land reclamation and agricultural roads, amounting to 250,000 dinars. Financing will be through the association's and members' participation, loans from the Jordanian cooperative organization of 400,000 dinars and credits--gratis--from the Anira Institute totaling 250,000 dinars. Construction of the buildings and facilities for the marketing center on association land will cost 35,000 dinars, and the purchase of a pickup truck will require 5,000 dinars. It also requested allocation of an advance and real or estimated loans to members totalling 115,000 dinars for the purchase and operation of large-size borers for use in maintaining artesian wells. There are some 70 of these wells in Qalqiliyah.

He added that the association is considered the first of its kind and has pursued a course of supplying farmers with fertilizers, seeds and vehicles and the modern tools of irrigation.

7005
CSO: 4304/121

BRIEFS

FOREIGN MINISTRY APPOINTMENTS--Eytan Ben-Tzuri, who has completed his tour of duty in the United States as political adviser in Washington, has been appointed director of the North America division of the Foreign Ministry. In that capacity, Mr Ben-Tzuri will be responsible for handling the relations with the United States and Canada. This week Avi Pazner, who has in the last 6 years served as media affairs adviser in the Israeli Embassy in Washington, will begin serving as the Foreign Ministry spokesman. The Foreign Ministry's media affairs adviser, Naftali Lavi, is departing for New York this week where he will serve as the Israeli consul, replacing Paul Qedar who is terminating his post. [Text] [TA161039 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Aug 81 p 2]

NABULUS UNIVERSITY UPSET--There is considerable bitterness at an-Najah University in Nabulus in the wake of the reception there of military government Order No 854, which makes the opening of any institution of higher learning in Judaea, Samaria or Gaza contingent upon the institution meeting criteria laid down by the military government. The heads of the university told this reporter that the students will not take this order lying down when the academic year begins. A clarification by MA'ARIV found that this order was first issued in July 1980, and is automatically renewed each year. Until 1980, institutions of higher learning could be opened in Judaea, Samaria or Gaza without good lecturers and without libraries or laboratories. Order No 854 is intended to maintain standards for institutions of higher learning in the territories. Anyone seeking to open such an institution will have to meet certain professional criteria, and the military government will be able to supervise the level of studies in the institution. [Text] [TA191058 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Aug 81 p 4]

INCOME, PRODUCTION IN TERRITORIES--The farmers in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip earned 1.7 billion Israeli shekels in 1980, at an average rate of 50,000 shekels per farmer. The average income 2 years ago was 17,000 per farmer. The consumer price index in the territories in 1980 increased a little bit more than the index in Israel and reached 135 percent. The spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics reported that last year there was a considerable increase in the number of agricultural crops in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, particularly in the harvest of olives in Judaea and Samaria. General production in those areas rose by 87 percent whereas there was a decline of 4 percent in the Gaza Strip. [Text] [TA191928 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 19 Aug 81]

ASSISTANCE FOR HAITI AIRLINE--El Al will help Haiti establish an airline. An agreement to this end was signed last week at the end of secret negotiations which

lasted some 6 months. The Haitian airline will be owned by a group of local investors headed by Franz Bennet, an outstanding figure in Haiti's economic community. The company will be set up with the assistance of foreign investors headed by Roderick Chapim Laird of England and Avraham Rinot, the director general of the "Ararat" Insurance Company of Israel. El Al will provide the new airline with professional advice and technical and administrative support and it will also train the various types of workers. The new airline plans to operate regular daily flights between Haiti and the United States and, at a later stage, to operate flights between the Caribbean Islands, Haiti and Europe. [Excerpt] [TA241342 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 24 Aug 81 pp 1, 6]

ADDITIONAL ELECTRICITY SUPPLY--The National Electric Corporation has helped the East Jerusalem Arab Company to increase the supply of electricity. Director general of the Energy Ministry David Hago'el told our correspondent Yon Feder that this will improve the credibility of supply by the Arab Electric Corporation. Our correspondent reports that the failures recently occurring in several new Jerusalem neighborhoods stemmed from changes the company introduced into the electricity network in order to be able to receive additional supply from the National Electric Corporation. The Arab company itself produces 12 megawatts. Until recently it has received an additional 33 megawatts from the National Corporation and 15 megawatts have now been added to it. [Text] [TA240928 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 24 Aug 81]

NO NEW SINAI ACTIVITY--There are no new settlement activities planned by members of Gush Emunim in the agricultural settlements in the Yamit Strip. The MA'ARIV correspondent learned this from local inhabitants who stressed they are among the moderates in the area and do not intent to oppose with force the scheduled evacuation of the Sinai in April 1982. "The members of Gush Emunim are trying to gain a foothold in Yamit and in another temporary settlement but not in the older settlements in the area. One gains the impression that the government is encouraging them. We have made up our minds to evacuate the area without resorting to violence," the spokesman said. The representatives of the committee of settlements in the Yamit Strip have asked Agriculture Minister Simha Ehrlich to hold a discussion on the ministry's attitude toward the inhabitants of the strip and to find out the ministry's position regarding the arbitration ruled by the court on the payment of compensation to the inhabitants. "We will ask Minister Ehrlich to fulfill the promises of his predecessor, Minister Ari'el Sharon," said the committee chairman, Yitzhaq Regev, from Moshav Ne'ot Sinay. [Text] [TA261050 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Aug 81 p 6]

IDF APPOINTMENTS--Uri Simhoni was today appointed director of military training and promoted to the rank of major general. [TA011950 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1300 GMT 1 Sep 81]

GOVERNMENT MONEY INJECTION--In August, the government injected 2.735 billion Israeli shekels to the economy. The total sum injected by the government since the beginning of this fiscal year has reached 9.2 billion shekels. [TA011950 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 1 Sep 81]

DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT--YEDI'OT AHARONOT writes that Egypt is now going through a revolution and masses are assailing the Egyptian Government. We are tied to

as-Sadat and his rule without our umbilical cord and if as-Sadat disappears our relations with Egypt are also liable to disappear. As-Sadat may also have to aggravate the political line toward us in order to appease his opponents. Under such circumstances the paper is wondering whether we should speed up the evacuation of Yamit and Ofira. [Text] [TA080808 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 8 Sep 81]

QALQILIYAH SURVEY--Israeli surveyors have surveyed the entrances to the village of Bayt Amin, located south of Qalqiliyah. They were accompanied by some suspicious-looking people, and the pretext was that citizens had sold them the land. However, the landowners denied that, and they have undertaken to prevent them from attempts to control the land. The Israeli forces intervened the day before yesterday and imposed a curfew on the village. They arrested the village mayor, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hafez 'Awwad, his son, 'Abd al-Karim, and his nephew, Jalal Mahmud 'Awwad. The military court has sent a warning to the village inhabitants not to interfere with the Israeli surveyors. The village inhabitants have called on public opinion to show interest in their case. They have stated that the claims of some to the effect that land has been sold in the village has no basis in fact. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 31 Jul 81 p 4] 7005

CSO: 4304/121

JUNBLATT INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT SITUATION

PM111111 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 29 Aug-4 Sep 81 pp 27-29

[Interview with Walid Junblatt, chairman of the Lebanese National Movement Central Political Council by Salih 'Awwad in Beirut--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] It has been observed that no measures have been taken regarding the plan submitted by the Arab followup committee concerning national detente despite the imminent date fixed by the committee. What is the reason?

[Answer] To clarify things I must say that the Arab followup committee did not submit any plans. It came to Lebanon and met with the various parties in order to listen to their views, but it did not submit any plans.

[Question] Can it be said that it has revitalized detente and set a specific period of time for this achievement?

[Answer] It is true that it has set a specific period of time and was scheduled to meet 2 weeks ago, but this has not happened. We hope that it will meet next month to give a push to detente.

[Question] Do you believe that, in the light of the recent U.S. proposals, the intercession by the Americans has done away with an Arab solution in Lebanon?

[Answer] The Americans have been interceding from the beginning, since 1976. If the Americans have tried to come back in greater force through their envoy Habib, this does not change anything in the process of seeking an Arab solution. For our part we hope the U.S. plan will be compatible with the aspirations of the Palestinian Arab and Lebanese people. But so far--and for the past 30 years--U.S. policy has been contrary to Arab aspirations.

[Question] Going back to the question of detente, is there any possibility of a dialogue with the "Lebanese front" in the light of the statement on breaking off relations with Israel?

[Answer] No statement was issued about the "Lebanese front's" relations with Israel. So far we have heard about a secret statement, but no such statement has been made public yet. Where is the statement? Talking about this statement is not enough; we would like to see it. Also, the question of dealing with Israel is only a minor

part of the Lebanese problem. There is the question of political reform, democracy, and the abolition of political sectarianism.

[Question] Bashir al-Jumayyil [commander of the Phalangist forces] recently said that breaking relations with Israel does not include stopping arms purchases from it. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] Who will guarantee for us that these relations with Israel have actually been broken off? What Lebanese or Arab party will guarantee for us that the relations between the "Lebanese front" and Israel have been broken off?

[Question] There is something worth noting: While the Lebanese national movement is carrying out a large-scale mobilization, the government is talking about an air defense network and repairing the Mirage planes. As far as you are concerned, does this mean that you want to improve your position in any future dialogue?

[Answer] Naturally. This is one aspect, and the other aspect is that we want to take precautions against any attack on our areas.

[Question] Are you expecting anything in this regard?

[Answer] Of course. We are expecting a Phalangist attack and an attack by Said Haddad in the south. As for the Lebanese authorities, they are free to do what they want; it will change nothing in the balances. As I have already said, the aim of such deals is to enrich some well-known brokers, including deputies, ministers and others.

[Question] But it is known that you have close ties with Libya. Have you discussed this matter with Libyan officials, considering that Libya is interested in this matter?

[Answer] We did not discuss with Libya the question of arming the Lebanese army. In principle we object to supplying arms to the Lebanese army as it stands now, because by virtue of its structure and composition it is not a national army. Why should we arm an army whose principle of existence we still do not accept? So that it can use these arms to attack us?

[Question] Does this mean that you put the army and the authorities in the same category with the "Lebanese front?"

[Answer] Not quite; there are some differences.

CSO: 4304/161

BRIEFS

FRG TRAINING PHALANGISTS--Beirut, 15 Sep (SANA)--The Lebanese newspaper AL-NIDA' published today reports that West Germany is training a number of cadres of the Phalangist gangs as part of the U.S. arrangements to cover up Phalangist cooperation with the Zionist entity. The paper says that the Bonn government will also supply the Phalangists with arms and technical equipment. [Text] [JN151022 Damascus SANA in Arabic 0850 GMT 15 Sep 81]

WOUNDED TREATED IN MOSCOW--A Soviet medical mission has arrived in Beirut in order to visit the wounded of the "nationalist movement" preparatory to moving them to Moscow for treatment. The mission yesterday began examining the wounded and will continue its work today, Saturday, in the central political council headquarters. The council gave a dinner party in honor of the mission's members which was attended by council secretary 'Ali al-Mawsawi and Hani 'Assaf, a communist party member. [Text] [PM170903 Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 12 Sep 81 [no page given]

CSO: 4304/161

BRIEFS

NEW RAIL LINE--Budapest, August 28--Hungarian engineers will design a 170-kilometre (95 mile) railway line in Libya at a cost of 10.4 million dollars. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2823, 28 Aug 81 p 10]

MESSAGES FROM CASTRO, CAPUCCI--Tripoli, 10 Sep (SANA)--Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the 1 September Revolution, has received a written message from Cuban President Fidel Castro, informing him of U.S. premediated aggressive designs against Cuba. Castro also condemned the dangerous methods used by the United States against peoples fighting for their freedom and independence. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi also received a message from Archbishop Capucci in which he refers to the grave phase through which the Arab nation is passing and the hostile Zionist designs through which Israel ignores international laws and norms. In his message, Archbishop Capucci calls on the Arab states to take courageous decisions to confront the hostile Zionist plans against the Arab nation. [Text] [JN101020 Damascus SANA in Arabic 0744 GMT 10 Sep 81]

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POLITICAL INSTABILITY AS VIEWED BY LEFTIST FORCES

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic No 1027, 10 Aug 81 pp 37-42

[Article by Taysir Khalid: "In Saudi Arabia, Broad Scale Opposition Role for Revolution; Internal Conflicts Growing; Internal Class Changes in Saudi Arabia Compel All Opposition Forces To Form Blocs, Make Preparations for Alternatives"]

[Text] The article published below makes up a basic part of a study that was prepared some time ago. In addition to its discussion of class changes, of the regime's political role in the area and of the features of its domestic crisis, the article has other sections that discuss in a basic way the conflicts and disputes of the royal authority and the make-up of its oppressive and military agencies.

In publishing this article at a time when the destructive role of the Saudi regime returns to the Arab and Palestinian forefront, AL-HURRIYAH will try to complete this article in the coming weeks with an article that discusses the recent developments in the relationship between the Saudi regime and the current U.S. imperialist role in the Arab area and in the areas surrounding it.

On the Class Make-up of Society in Saudi Arabia

The Ruling Family

The principal blocs of the ruling Saudi family make up the predominant political "class" in Saudi society. They hold the actual reins of political power; they control the national wealth and the total national revenue in Saudi Arabia; and they decide where the funds are spent. These expenditures basically meet the needs for repressing the popular classes and the political and religious opposition inside the country; they meet the needs for bribing broad sectors of people who are employed to serve princes and to manage the affairs of their authorities; and they meet the needs for bribing a broad sector of Saudi technocrats as well. It is the ruling family that decides where a large portion of the national revenue is to be invested; most of that is deposited in foreign banks and in shares and stock in foreign companies, especially U.S. companies. It is the ruling

family also that decides to bribe and to buy the ruling classes in a substantial number of western countries. The ruling family spends money on counter-revolutions in Arab and developing countries and makes financial contributions as well to the elections campaigns of right-wing forces, even in Western Europe, to oppose the reform policy of international socialist parties in Europe, as is the case in France, Italy, Spain and Portugal. With a truly feudal policy the ruling Saudi family controls the total Saudi national revenue, and it practices in addition to that an organized plunder of the national wealth and of the national revenue without being subject to any legislative control. It sits at the top of the pyramid of Saudi society; it monopolizes political power; and it is considered the representative and the true leader of the servile, financial and landed bourgeoisie and the services bourgeoisie as well with regard to conditions in a state of transition between feudalism and capitalism. This does not mean that capitalist relations are not adequately entrenched in Saudi society. The opposite of that is the truth. But it is the system of government itself that is holding back the political and social development of Saudi Arabia in this period, which is historically backward, by depriving this country of any conscitutional, legislative, executive or judicial institutions and of any legislation on political and civil rights that would place Saudi Arabia, a country of tremendous capabilities and resources, on the road of actual capitalist change. The absolute theocracy of the class of princes in Saudi Arabia is the final form of a feudalist system that is coexisting with the capitalist relations of a consumer society. Under this condition and at this stage of development daily actions generate their mutual contradictions with little vitality and very slowly.

The Bourgeoisie

The bourgeoisie in Saudi Arabia are weak in number, in structure, in degree of influence and in their impact on political life and public life in Saudi Arabia. The bourgeoisie in Saudi Arabia do not have a political organization. All this reflects the historical stage that Saudi Arabia is experiencing. The national bourgeoisie are very weak in Saudi Arabia for several considerations, the most important of which is the regime's public policy which is holding back the development of Saudi society within the framework of a historically backward period--the final stage of feudalism under the advanced capitalist relations of a consumer society. [Other reasons why the national bourgeoisie in Saudi Arabia are very weak are]: the fact that the oil sector was controlled in the past by foreign capitalist countries and is presently owned largely by the state; the fact that consumer goods from the foreign capitalist market are dumped on the Saudi market; the fact that essential laws for protecting national capital are fragile; the fact that the national bourgeoisie invest their funds in light industries that are related to the services sector; and the broad competition this bourgeoisie are facing from the servile bourgeoisie and from the financial and landed bourgeoisie as well as the relationship between the latter and the class of princes. The principal bourgeoisie group in Saudi Arabia are the servile group as well as the financial and landed group. This is due to the ties they have with the ruling power; it is due to the fact that they benefit from the ruling power's political and legal benefits; and it is also due to

the ties they have--especially the servile bourgeoisie--with the world capitalist market and their activity in an inflationary consumer market. The servile, financial and landed groups of the bourgeoisie do not play a political role in opposition to the regime because they are basically beneficiaries of its policy. But this does not mean that they are in total agreement with the regime's public policy. In order to accumulate the maximum private capital and achieve maximum profit, these groups are interested in introducing a number of political reforms into the make-up of the regime, and they are interested in modernizing the regime with constitutional institutions that go beyond the existing absolute theocracy. Thus these groups of the bourgeoisie put pressure on the regime without clashing with it. They find the chambers of commerce to be the avenues through which they can apply such pressure. These chambers of commerce are the only organizational bodies whose legality in front of the authority the national bourgeoisie have been able to establish. These chambers harbor the political activity of the national bourgeoisie and their diligent effort to obtain legislation that would protect their interests and encourage the weak national industries--such as the National Industry Protection and Encouragement Law. There is a widely varying margin of contradiction between these bourgeois groups and the predominant political class. [This broad contradiction] must not be dropped from consideration in the struggle of national and progressive forces in Saudi Arabia.

The Bourgeoisie of the Technocrats

The bourgeoisie of technocrats made up of educated and learned professional and management groups are rapidly growing in Saudi Arabia. This growth is noticeable in the oil, education, health and management sectors. In the 1975-1980 5-Year Economic Plan Saudi Arabia did in theory spend about 15 billion pounds sterling on educational projects. There are six universities in Saudi Arabia, the most important of which is the University of Petroleum and Minerals. Thousands of students are studying in the capitalist countries. The universities of the United States alone have more than 10,000 Saudi students. All those students go back to Saudi Arabia after completing their studies and form a class of technocrats which is growing continuously. The fact that Saudi Arabia is a country where the immigration of qualified people is unknown because people with qualifications receive high incomes contributes to the growing increase of this group. Because of their education and their openness to world civilization and political movements on the one hand and because of the professional role they play in a society controlled by backward forms of theocracy, the bourgeoisie of technocrats find themselves, despite their services to the regime and their involvement in its institutions, to be at odds with its public policy which prevents this group from any form of participation in forging their political future. The tremendous expenditures for defense, for the needs of repression and for the needs of the commercial capitalist sector (transportation) and the broad deficiency in industrial spending in general and in the petroleum and mineral resources sector [in particular]--which in 1975 for example were not more than 370 million dollars--[are factors] that place this group at odds between their rapport and their involvement in the regime's public policy and their aspirations for an economic policy of

development that would give them as a minimum a measure of participation in the public policy of this regime. This is besides all the aspects of corruption, bribery and pay-offs which take place in the interests of the class of princes, the class of lackeys and the foreign companies with which the bourgeoisie of technocrats coexist without having any prescribed role to play. This compels them to play their role in serving these reactionary classes while looking at the same time for a means by which they can protest. The upper echelons of technocrats play the role of a junior partner in plundering the national wealth of Saudi Arabia and disposing of it. But despite the relative prosperity enjoyed by the vast group of this bourgeoisie, they oppose first the backward form of the theocratic regime and, second, the organized plunder of the national wealth that is carried out in a principal way in the interests of the princes, the lackeys and the foreign companies.

The Working Class

The working class in Saudi Arabia has been created recently. Its creation is related to the development of the oil industry in the early fifties. The working class is basically concentrated in the eastern district where oil is drilled; where oil refineries, gas liquefaction [plants] and other industries are located; and where the principal ports, specifically Ras Tanura is located. The western district comes second after the eastern district where auxiliary ports, refineries, gas liquefaction plants, iron and steel factories and a number of auxiliary and light industries are located. There are in Saudi Arabia 20,000 industrial and commercial institutions, varying in size between large, medium and small. The working class in Saudi Arabia is growing continuously despite the weakness of the government's allocations to the industrial production sector and despite the government's efforts to use foreign workers instead of Saudi workers. The Saudi working class has had remarkable struggles in the fifties and sixties, that is, during the principal formative period and during the period of the rise of nationalism and pan-Arabism in the area. The most remarkable of these struggles were the labor strikes of 1953, in which the working class realized an increase in wages and a reduction in work hours; the 1956 strikes which were brutally suppressed; and the labor and popular movements of 1966 and 1970, especially in the eastern district. All these movements and strikes in which the working class participated effectively and courageously were confronted by Saudi authorities with immediate repression and successive executions. The working class did not succeed in obtaining the right to strike and the right to organize unions because of various factors. The most important of these factors are [the following]:

--The authority [assumes] a hostile position to the working class in Saudi Arabia and to all the rights and democratic freedoms for citizens in general. Strikes have been prohibited since 1956 and so are all forms of political, trade union and professional organizations. One notices that in this area the authority is keeping a tight grip on conditions in this area since King Faysal ascended the throne in 1964. This brought about a radical settlement of the disputes within the government over this and other vital matters in domestic and foreign policy.

--Despite the fact that the bulk of the working class is principally concentrated in the eastern district and in the western district [as well], the ratio of workers in the principal industrial sectors to the working class does not exceed 40 percent. Another 40 percent of the working class in Saudi Arabia is scattered in the services sector, including trade and government service; and 20 percent are in auxiliary, light and vocational industries. The government channels workers' activities in Saudi Arabia in a principal way to the services sector because of its weak appropriations to the sectors of production and because of the more remarkable interest the local bourgeoisie has in the trade, contracting and real estate sectors. In view of the weak structure of the working class, all this weakens its ability to embark upon broad-scale struggles in a cohesive fashion to seize its rights.

Because of the fact that it was recently created and because of its weak structure, the working class in Saudi Arabia has not yet been able to develop its technical, administrative and professional capabilities. In addition, the state's focus in the past on applied knowledge, on aspects of vocational training for labor and on labor education has been weak. All this coincides with the social and moral values that the regime is promoting and imposing on society in general. It is influencing the development and the progress of the working class's awareness of their conditions and of the relations of exploitation and persecution to which they are subject. The government is planning to hold back the development and the progress in the condition and awareness of the working class because it fears the political and social effects this would have on the traditional reactionary foundations of the regime.

All these factors play a role in determining the role of the working class in the general national struggle and in the social struggle in Saudi Arabia. These factors most certainly curb the role of the working class, but they cannot curb it for long because of the growing effects of the laws of a capitalist market not only on the working class, but also on broader social sectors that have begun to complain and become annoyed with the vast gap that exists between the theocratic form of the regime and the capitalist stage which society in Saudi Arabia is experiencing--a stage which requires the renewal and modernization of the regime's agencies, its laws, its administrations and its various institutions. Common interests have begun to unify within acceptable limits the interests of the bourgeoisie that are represented in the chambers of commerce, the interests of the technocrats and the interests of the working class who are employed in renewing and modernizing the existing political regime. This is what the regime has begun to realize after the events of the Holy Mosque and the events of the eastern district in particular.

A final matter which has its importance in determining the factors that influence the role of the working class in the general national struggle and in the social struggle has to do with the conditions of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, especially the workers who come from Arab countries. The government fears the political and social influence of foreign workers in Saudi Arabia, and it tries to control and diminish the importance of

these influences by setting up barriers between foreign workers and Saudi workers and by placing numerous restrictions on residence and work permits. The policy of isolating Saudi workers from foreign workers exists within certain limits. In some cases those limits are very evident and manifest themselves in the work contracts with foreign companies. Saudi authorities stipulate that all workers be brought and assembled and their roles confined within those work contracts. Saudi authorities also pursue an arbitrary terrorist policy against foreign workers to force them to respect the political and social laws and traditions that are prevalent in Saudi Arabia. Those workers are natural allies of the working class in Saudi Arabia. Attention must be devoted to them; there must be action within their ranks; and the government's policy against them must be exposed so that sectors of them can be won over to the side of the Saudi working class.

The Regime's Public Policy on the Arab and International Scenes

By the mid sixties the dispute within the Saudi government about a number of significant questions that had to do with the regime's domestic policy and foreign policy was settled. The faction of King Sa'ud and Prince Tallal was defeated. It was calling for the formation of a partially elected parliament and for steering the country gradually on the road of a constitutional monarchy. That faction was calling for a foreign policy that would be less subordinate to U.S. imperialism and more open to its Arab surroundings. The 1967 Israeli war of aggression and the defeat of the national Arab countries provided an opportunity for the Saudi role in the area to grow. However, the Saudi role on the Arab scene and on the international scene began to grow noticeably in the early seventies when Saudi Arabia's ties with U.S. policy became closer and Saudi Arabia's influence grew through the diplomacy of the Saudi dollar following the rapid increases in oil prices. Since the early seventies Saudi foreign policy has concentrated with concrete effectiveness on the following principal centers:

1. Fighting communism and progressive political movements.

Saudi Arabia is engaged in broad political activity in this field on the Arab and international scenes. Fighting communism and progressive political movements heads the list on the agenda of Saudi diplomacy. Saudi Arabia utilizes religion as a cover to hide its ties with U.S. policy and to conceal its conspiracy against liberation and progressive movements and forces in the Arab area and in the world. Saudi Arabia is considered the foremost defender of the reactionary Islamic alliance policy against the national and progressive forces. It succeeded in this area by establishing the Islamic Conference which held its first convention in 1969 in Rabat; the second was held in Pakistan in 1974; and the third, in Pakistan in 1979, was held to conspire against the Afghan Revolution. The revolutions of Iran and Afghanistan are terrifying the ruling circles in Saudi Arabia. These circles have begun pressing sharply for the creation of an Islamic alliance to confront what they call the dangers of the Soviet Union and communism and the dangers of progressive movements in the Middle East area. The Saudi government appears more than willing to invest its fantastic oil wealth to serve the interests of this suspect reactionary alliance.

2. Containing the national regimes and putting pressure on them to break the ties of friendship that exist between them and the socialist countries and to force them more and more to throw themselves into the arms of U.S. imperialism. This course is thought to complement the policy of fighting communism and progressive political movements. In this area Saudi Arabia played a prominent role in the Egyptian regime's renunciation of all the progressive national and social accomplishments which the Egyptian people had achieved with their struggles during the Nasirist revolution. Saudi Arabia played a role in striking down the friendship and the relations of cooperation and solidarity with the socialist countries, and it played a role in pledging the Egyptian regime to U.S. policy. Saudi Arabia also played a prominent role in this area in both Sudan and Somalia. Saudi policy continues to apply pressure on the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in particular and to conspire against it and against national Arab regimes in general in order to roll back the course of development and progress in these countries.

3. Declaring hostility to and conspiring against liberation movements and their progressive forces in particular. And here emerges Saudi Arabia's concentration on national liberation movements and progressive forces in the Arabian Peninsula, in the Arabian Gulf and on the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas. Saudi Arabia is supporting Qabus's regime in Oman; it is interfering blatantly in the affairs of the Yemeni Arab Republic; and it is practicing its influence in the Gulf states to eliminate any aspect of freedom there, as is the case in Bahrain and Kuwait. Saudi Arabia considers these areas a vital field for its security and its stability.

Saudi Arabia is also interfering in the internal affairs of the Palestinian Revolution, advocating infighting and striking the progressive and leftist forces [within the revolution], especially the Popular Front. It is pursuing a destructive role against Palestinian national unity. This is also taking place under the cover of fighting communism and the progressive political movements in the PLO.

4. Ensuring the stability of conservative and reactionary regimes in the area and in developing countries in Africa and Asia. Saudi Arabia has advanced relations with the reactionary regimes in these countries. These relations are utilized in serving the imperialist strategy and in putting down liberation movements in these countries. The Saudi bank that finances the counter-revolution plays a role in supporting these countries and bribing their rulers on the basis of their hostility to communism and to progressive forces and on the degree to which they are tied to the course of U.S. policy. The Saudi bank that finances the counter-revolution focuses its activities on supporting the governments of the Southeast Asia Alliance to confront what Saudi Arabia calls the danger of Soviet and Vietnamese expansion. The bank supports the governments of a number of reactionary Islamic countries that have ties with the United States, such as Turkey and Pakistan, and the governments of a number of countries in the African continent where its role became evident in Morocco and in Zaire. Saudi support varies from what is necessarily conditional economic assistance to financing U.S. arms deals, invasion wars and outside intervention, as is the case in the Western Sahara and Zaire.

5. Saudi Arabia feels that its role in fighting communism and progressive movements goes beyond the Arab area, the Islamic countries and the countries of the developing world; it even goes [as fas as] the advanced capitalist countries where Saudi reactionary support for forces of the right and also for aggressive forces in these countries has become known. Saudi Arabia finances parliamentary elections campaigns and other campaigns for Christian democratic parties and for other right-wing parties in western Europe to confront even the reform democratic socialist parties in these countries. Saudi Arabia assumes a position that is more reactionary than that of the United States itself toward the participation or the possible participation of parties such as the Italian communist party in government on the basis of the historical settlement that the Italian communist party is calling for.

6. In the OPEC organization Saudi Arabia plays a reactionary role that hurts the oil producing countries. It stands in the way of setting a unified price [for oil]; it opposes raising oil prices; and it strongly opposes abandoning the dollar as a base for setting oil prices and moving to authorize use of a group of seven currencies instead of the dollar. It plays a destructive role against the national oil policy of a number of countries, and it is deliberately following a policy of pumping greater quantities of oil and exporting that oil at prices lower than those of OPEC so as to encourage price cutting and to help the monopolistic companies realize fantastic profits that vary from 118 to 190 percent at the expense of the oil producing countries. The insistence of Saudi Arabia and a number of countries in the gulf on the dollar shows quite clearly the effect of the subordination that Saudi Arabia is pursuing in its relations with U.S. imperialism. This policy of subordination is causing serious damage to the national economy and to the national imports of the oil producing countries, especially in view of the continuing decline in the value of the dollar. This decline is still keeping the actual price of oil at the level of 1974 prices. This is happening at a time when the export prices of industrial countries are continuously increasing. Developing countries in particular are suffering under the pressure of this subordination to U.S. imperialism. They are burdened by the high oil prices on the one hand, and by the prices and profits [they have to pay] for the goods imported from capitalist countries on the other hand. The practical outcome of this policy is economic stability, [satisfactory] rates of growth and high profits for the monopolistic companies and for the capitalist countries and further suffering and impoverishment for the economy of developing countries. Despite the solidarity between the developing countries and the oil producing countries and despite the fact that they have a right to invest their national resources nationally, Saudi Arabia always assumes a course hostile to these countries. In its diligent attention to its political subordination to U.S. imperialism and to the monopolistic oil companies, it rejects the dual price system for oil exports--one price system for capitalist countries and another for developing countries.

7. Saudi subordination to U.S. imperialism is also evident in the outcome of the comprehensive military, economic, political agreement that Prince Fahd signed with Henry Kissinger in June 1974. In this agreement Saudi

Arabia pledges not to raise its oil prices more than five percent per year under all circumstances until the end of 1984, that is, for 10 years. It also promises to invest its surplus oil returns in the United States. Saudi Arabia cannot withdraw its considerable funds from the United States. It can only dispose of the interest earned by these funds to finance its commercial or military deals with the United States itself. It has been estimated that the funds deposited by four Arab countries in the capitalist market of European countries, Japan and the United States until 1977 exceeded 141 billion dollars. Saudi Arabia's share of this sum comes to 77 billion. In 1979 the oil surplus funds for these countries were estimated to be about 35 billion; for 1980 these surpluses were estimated to be about 40 billion, over half of which belong to Saudi Arabia. All these fantastic surplus funds must be invested by Saudi reactionaries in the United States. Saudi rulers boast about the benefits that are reaped by all the states in the United States from these investments; [to them] this is an indication of the expansion of ties between Saudi interests and U.S. interests.

Saudi authorities dispose of the fantastic oil wealth returns in strengthening the agencies of defense and repression inside the country; in making the nationalistic countries in the area submissive to the interests of U.S. policy; in fighting communism and national and progressive political movements; and in revitalizing the U.S. economy. Due to the non-nationalistic nature of Saudi policy, Saudi Arabia does not invest this considerable wealth in developing the Saudi national economy, specifically in the areas of production such as industry and agriculture, nor does it invest those funds in the service of the national struggle for liberation against the imperialist and Zionist enemy or in the service of people who are suffering from the fires of the world capitalist market and the divisive enslavement of labor which is imposed by its laws. As a result of this policy, Saudi Arabia, with its subordinate role, contributes to the support of the capitalist economy and the monopolistic companies and to the increased impoverishment of the oppressed nations. But immediate losses to Saudi Arabia itself as a result of this policy are obvious. The oil surplus that is invested in the United States continues to lose its actual value and its purchasing power first, because of the decline in the value of the dollar and second, because of the inflation that results therefrom. The interest [earned] by this surplus hardly makes up for this loss. Besides, Saudi Arabia is risking with its policy of subordination this tremendous national wealth which is necessarily subject to the possibilities of being frozen in the United States, as was the case with Iran after the Shah's government was overthrown and the outbreak of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. It seems evident that this subordinate, non-nationalistic policy, which exposes the national wealth to dissipation, is a manifestation of the profound tie that exists between Saudi Arabia and U.S. imperialism and the fact that Saudi Arabia is counting on U.S. military protection in the presence of portents and possibilities of change.

Aspects of the Crisis in Saudi Arabia

The essential nature of the crisis in Saudi Arabia is reflected in the social make-up of the regime, in the degree of development and class

structure of Saudi society [as that is reflected] in the regime's public policy. Saudi authorities are trying to control the aspects of this crisis primarily through the agencies of repression and through turning Saudi Arabia into a consumer market that would fulfill the citizen's basic needs. In recent years Saudi authorities began building and modernizing the agencies of repression at a frantic rate that manifested itself in the tremendous expenditures on these agencies. In order to simplify the process of turning Saudi Arabia into a vast consumer market that would meet the basic needs of citizens, Saudi Arabia is resorting to a policy of sharp raises in pensions and wages. It is natural that Saudi authorities would fail to find solutions to the essence of the crisis since a policy of repression entrenches the crisis and does not resolve it. The conflicts generated by the degree of backwardness in the regime's social makeup [as compared with] the degree of development in capitalist relations, which are eating away at many of the social values in Saudi Arabia, cannot be solved by organized operations of repression or by operations of bribing the classes collectively, especially those that are now unhappy with the way the ruling authority is disposing of the national wealth, with the fact that the princes have usurped all political power and with the general policy of subordination that is directed by the diplomacy of the reactionary Saudi dollar which is opposed to everything that is nationalistic and progressive inside the country and abroad.

Vast social circles are expressing their dissatisfaction with this policy, and they are also expressing their dissatisfaction with the absence of a parliamentary body or at least an advisory council. The government had been promising these circles for a long time that such a council can be established. These circles are dissatisfied because of the absence of democratic freedoms and constitutional institutions and because of the total absence of trade union or professional organizations. This dissatisfaction is shared by circles that include a few princes; by groups of the Saudi bourgeoisie which are represented in the chambers of commerce and which are sliding into bankruptcy because of the laws of the advanced and inflationary consumer society; by the bourgeoisie of technocrats in whose ranks broad sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and the contemporary middle bourgeoisie are united; and by the working class which suffers the most damage and persecution among all these social circles. There is a number of common denominators unifying these groups and classes in their position on the government. Chief among those common denominators is [realization of] the need to begin building constitutional institutions in Saudi Arabia that rely on legal and political legislation, respond to the degree of development in society and resolve the existing conflict between the existing theocratic regime and prevailing capitalist relations. These forces realize the impossibility of a lengthy coexistence between the rule of the Saudi family, as one of the forms of a feudal government in its final stages, and the new social forces which are entering into the broad capitalist relations that are prevalent in society. For this reason they find that change is in their interest. It is natural that the interests which these circles have in the degree of change that is necessary would differ, but they all agree objectively on the framework of the bourgeois constitutional institutions that are required, such as a parliamentary body, the courts and an

executive authority. This would be apart from municipal and rural councils and trade union and professional organizations for the principal social groups and classes. Saudi Arabia is almost the only country in the area and in the world that lacks all this. At the same time that Saudi Arabia's crisis is generating forces of change to the left of the regime, it is also generating regressive opposition forces inside the country, such as the religious movements. The most important of these opposition forces is the al-Salaf group or the Brotherhood which is alarmed by the visible and concrete conflict between the declared ideology of the ruling authority and the objective reality that the country is experiencing. This group sees this conflict as a reflection of the entrenchment of capitalist relations in society. Such conflict was the actual motivation behind the recent movement [whose members] occupied the Holy Mosque in Mecca to express their rejection of the existing regime and to stage their uprising against it. Regardless of the degree of regression or the reactionary nature of the opposition religious movements, the essential nature of the crisis in Saudi Arabia on the one hand and the degree of dissolution that is latent in the social and political conduct of the ruling authority as well as the aspects of corruption and despotism [that are evident] must necessarily put pressure on these movements' agenda. As an expression of protest against the facts of modernization and capitalist relations as well they begin by advocating a return to the fundamentals of Wahabism in government and a ban on the symptoms of the social and political conduct that contradict these fundamentals, and they end by touching upon political and economic questions. The slogans of these religious movements vary from objections to the general aspects of modernization, to calls for an Islamic government that is based on counsel and to protests against the relationship of subordination to the United States as the enemy of Islam and the ally of Zionism. These movements call for the suspension of oil deliveries to the United States. In addition, they protest the corruption and despotism of the ruling family. The value of the actions of these religious movements lies in the fact that they expose the regime from the same ideological perspective--that of defending religion against the enemies of religion; they challenge corruption and those who corrupt; they frown upon the accumulation of wealth which is based on the abuse of power; they demand that the authority function in accordance with Islamic law; and they refute the authorities' claims. The political value of these actions lies in the fact that they targeted one of the most prominent actual features of the regime's public policy, that is, subordination to U.S. imperialism and the sacrificing of the country's interests to serve the interests of the United States of America. All this contributes to [the effort to] focus the limelight on the essential nature of the crisis in Saudi Arabia: it undermines the positions of the authority, and it forces the government to look for concessions through which it can to some degree defuse the general crisis.

From this perspective some aspects of the opposition by the religious movements in Saudi Arabia appear to be objectively responsive to the opposition of the secular groups and social classes. The possibility of an agreement on a middle ground through the struggle against the existing authority is axiomatic. This is what actually happened during the popular uprising in the eastern district immediately after the events at the Holy Mosque in

Mecca. This was the uprising in which the religious movements, the secular forces and the masses in the area, and especially the working class, took part. In this uprising the slogans that were heard during the takeover of the Holy Mosque in Mecca were mixed with more progressive and more concrete slogans that called for the fall of the Carter-Begin-al-Sadat alliance, the fall of the Camp David accords, solidarity with the Iranian Revolution, the release of political prisoners and the unfettering of democratic liberties. In their negotiations with the government insurgence representatives discussed several charges that revolved around the nature of the state's agencies, their functions, their monopoly of authority and the necessity of building constitutional institutions. Besides, there is the sectarian nature of the authority and the existing social injustice. This relative agreement between the religious movements and the secular political opposition was not confined to the events of the uprising in the eastern district, with its Shi'ite majority, who are influenced by the Iranian Revolution, and with its growing working class, its customs and its heritage of struggle in opposing the government. It went beyond these events to [the establishment of] solidarity with the religious movement that led the events of the Holy Mosque in Mecca.

The Consensus of All Opposition Parties

The events of the Holy Mosque in Mecca and the uprising in the eastern area reflect an advanced degree of dissatisfaction and tension in the conditions of the Saudi regime. This dissatisfaction and this tension are an expression of the social reality and of the protest against the Saudi regime's policy of subordination. If a mid-course agreement on the battlefield were possible between the religious movements and the secular political opposition, the principal role [of the opposition] would be determined in the light of the magnitude and the kind of initiatives that are to be undertaken by the religious movements and the secular political opposition, by the role of each one in opposing the government, by putting pressure on the more prominent aspects of the regime's crisis and by proposing positive solutions in their regard. And here the problem of constitutional insitutions, [that of] democratic freedoms and [the problem of] political independence from U.S. imperialism capture prime importance, since these problems constitute the common denominators for the broad popular sectors without clashing with the religious movements because they concentrate the pressure on the more salient features of the regime's crisis.

The Saudi Arabian events of November 1979--the events in Mecca and the eastern district--and of February 1980--the renewal of the disturbances in the eastern area--are considered a new stage in the struggle of the Saudi masses and their national forces. They are an indication of the Saudi Arabian people's capacity for struggle and of their willingness to make sacrifices. They are also an indication of a relatively advanced level of political maturity and sophistication. Thanks to the events of Mecca and the uprising in the eastern district, the barrier of fear and terror has begun to crumble partially despite the brutal means by which the Saudi authorities confronted those who had taken over the Holy Mosque in Mecca

and those isolated citizens in the eastern district. These events shook the Saudi family violently and noticeably. They began to review the critical situation and to strive through a set of political maneuvers to contain the regime's general crisis. They began to speak about the necessity of developing and modernizing the mentality of government, and they began to announce limited reforms through the formation of an advisory council and the determination of a basic system for the government throughout the country and in the provinces. The review, which the regime suggests it is undertaking, expresses the government's growing feeling that it is no longer capable of ruling [the country] through more oppression and terror and that necessity requires that limited cosmetic operations be carried out on the structure of the regime. The local bourgeoisie as well as the upper echelons of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie have sensed this point of weakness in the regime's position, and they have tried to take advantage of the collision and the conflict that developed between some religious forces and the popular masses in the eastern district on the one hand and the Saudi authority on the other in order to strengthen their positions and their influence and obtain new gains that would ensure their broader participation in the executive agency and give them the power to make political decisions. After the Mecca events and the uprising in the eastern district numerous movements clashed. Some of them were calling for the creation, modernization and the establishment of constitutional institutions that would coexist with the official religious establishment and at the same time add a cosmetic touch to the state's institutions and to the new institutions. Other movements were calling for the continued reliance on the present institutions of the state after purging them from those elements whose loyalty was suspect and strengthening and stimulating their role so they can provide an ideological cover for the policy and the practices of the state. It is evident here that these movements are struggling within the framework of a basic devotion to the regime. These movements are the subject of controversy between Prince Fahd's bloc, which represents the first movement, and the bloc of King Khalid and Prince 'Abdallah, which represents the second movement. In this context it seems unlikely that the authority will reduce its reliance on the agencies of repression. In fact, the facts clearly indicate that the government's reliance on these agencies is growing at a time when some of its parties are calling for some marginal cosmetic reforms. Also in this regard it seems unlikely that the government will reduce its ties to world-wide imperialism and especially to U.S. imperialism, especially since Saudi authorities feel the need for outside protection to confront the fallout from the Iranian Revolution and the effects that the revolutionary countries have in the area around Saudi Arabia itself.

On the opposite side of the conditions that the Saudi regime is experiencing, on the opposite side of the conflicts that are gnawing at Saudi society and that truthfully express the clash between a non-renewable, despotic, theocratic regime, and the new social forces that are produced by the broad capitalist relations, the interests of the vast masses of Saudis are based on the self-evident principle of the alliance of most of the social classes and groups that are hurt by the situation and the policy of this regime. The self-evident principle for the broad class alliance

against the regime can unify the workers and farmers as well as the broad sectors of the national bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie of technocrats and the petty bourgeoisie in the concentrated struggle for interim objectives that would basically apply pressure on the government to carry out constitutional reforms that would be consistent with the basic interests of this broad class alliance. In this regard the secret political forces in Saudi Arabia can capture the initiative and propose to the Saudi masses the imperatives of struggling for an elected advisory council that would have legislative parliamentary authorities, for an executive authority that is subject to the authorities of the elected advisory council; and for a judicial authority unblemished by the official religious establishments and the executive authority. Besides, they can also propose a struggle for [the establishment] of elected municipal and rural councils, for [the institution of] democratic freedoms and for the freedom to establish political organizations and trade union and professional organizations. Secret political forces in Saudi Arabia can also capture the initiative to propose a program of struggle that would disengage Saudi Arabia from its ties and its subordination to U.S. imperialism, protect independence and national sovereignty and direct Saudi Arabia's energies to confront the aggressive strategy of U.S. imperialism which is threatening the independence and sovereignty of the country as it threatens the independence, the sovereignty and the security of the people of the Arabian Peninsula and of the areas of the Middle East and the Far East. [These secret political forces] are to put these energies to use to serve Arab national causes and Arab liberation causes.

These broad lines of a political initiative may constitute a suitable background for the policy of the communist party in Saudi Arabia since these broad lines constitute common denominators for the party and for the other political forces which represent the Khomeyni-style Islamic Revolution Organization, the most prominent and the most powerful organization, especially in the eastern district of Saudi Arabia. Holding the reins of a political initiative whose general lines are these would coalesce the efforts of the communist party, the Islamic Revolution Organization, the Arab Labor party, the Alliance of the People of the Arabian Peninsula and the Nasirist groups in the course of struggle. It would open the vistas of political polarization to the broad social forces that are at conflict and at odds with the policy of the Saudi regime. It would open the prospects of struggle to the working class, to the masses of farmers and to the lower groups of the petty bourgeoisie to express their actual class interests in the course of the political struggle and to regain their heritage of struggle which was expressed by their political and clamorous uprising throughout the years 1953, 1956, 1958, 1964 and 1967. The working class in Saudi Arabia played a remarakble leadership role in these uprisings. Current indicators of conditions in Saudi Arabia point to the fact that an escalation in the sharpness of the confrontation is inevitable between the oppressed and the disadvantaged social classes and groups who are hurt by the policy of the regime and this despotic theocratic regime. Over the mid-term range the forms which this confrontation will assume will be sharp; these confrontations will reflect the growing conflicts between the backward social and political structure of the Saudi regime and the social forces that are growing within its framework but are outgrowing it historically.

8592
CSO: 4304/128

SUDANESE OPPOSITION TO AL-SADAT DISCUSSED

GF131703 Manama AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 13 Sep 81 pp 1, 9

[Excerpts] Khartoum--In their sermons last Friday preachers at mosques in the Sudanese capital and its suburbs attacked Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat and his recent decisions to dissolve Islamic organizations and arrest their leaders.

The strongest attack was made by the imam of the great mosque in Khartoum. He said that al-Sadat's rabid campaign is aimed at Islamic rites. He called on muslim governments and peoples to protest this behavior which weakens the Islamic spirit in Egypt.

Immediately after the Friday sermons the security forces increased the guards around the Egyptian Embassy, the Egyptian ambassador's residence and some other Egyptian installations in Khartoum.

Al-Sadiq 'Abd al-Majid, a muslim brotherhood leader, has said that the muslim brotherhood has contacted Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, the leader of the al-Khatmiyah [religious] community; al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the al-Ansar; Shaykh Muhammad 'Uthman, leader of the al-Ibrahimiyah [minor religious] community; Yusuf Agha, a leader of the followers of the Muhammadan tradition; and the leaders of other groups in order to send a cable to Egypt condemning these measures, and another cable to President Numayri calling for a review of Sudan's relations with the Egyptian regime.

Some sources have reported that coptic leaders in 'Atbarah and al-Masalmah are holding consultations to show their objection to what President al-Sadat said in his speech about Pope Shanudah.

CSO: 4504/96

NUMAYRI ADDRESSES EMIGRANTS' CONFERENCE

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 11 Aug 81 pp 7-10

[Text] Khartoum, Aug. 11 (SUNA)--President Numayri yesterday addressed the Sudanese Emigrants Conference and highlighted Sudanese emigration impacts on the country's economy and development plans.

The President said in his address that the nations could only be built with the efforts and contribution of all their sons and that the Revolution had advocated from the beginning national unity as a means to unite Sudanese citizens in the country and abroad to build the country.

From that point of departure, the President said, the revolution has payed due concern to Sudanese nationals working abroad and considered them a major element country's that could help in supporting the country's foreign movements. [sentence as printed]

He said this conference in itself reflects the great importance the state has attached to the role of Sudanese emigrants in the drive to build the Sudan's bright future.

The President said that we have realized that the huge number of the Sudanese emigrants would no longer permit the emigration issue to be a secondary one.

It has turned into a national issue that should attract all concerned departments and individual to find out solutions to its problems, the President said.

He said the far reaching positive and negative effects of emigration on the development and national building processes have caused the government's concern over the issue.

The President said that a difficult balance between the country's requirements of manpower to participate in the development drive and the individuals legitimate ambitions to emigrate to where they could earn a good living should be found.

He said the country's development is needed to improve the people's standard of living and to provide them with all the conditions necessary to allow them to settle in the country. And that calls for great sacrifices and patience from the part of the people until our hopes in a bright future are realized, the President said.

He said the country's development requires that all the experienced cadres should stay in so that they could contribute to the development.

The President said the real problem is that the Sudan can not compete with the sisterly rich countries attracting Sudanese cadres, a fact that opens wide doors to Sudanese emigration and hence by threatens the development process in the country.

Confronted with this delicate situation we felt that an intensive effort should be made to correct the balance in a way that would secure the requirements of the country's development and at the same time would not harm the legitimate right of the individuals to improve the standard of their living inside the country or abroad.

Stressing the point that Sudan would not hesitate to help other sisterly countries, the President said the Sudanese emigration needs to be regulated to preserve the interests of the Sudan, the sisterly countries attracting Sudanese emigrants and the emigrants themselves.

The need to regulate this tripartite relationship has motivated the emigration measures adopted during previous years, the President said.

He expressed Sudan keenness to fulfill its obligations towards other sisterly countries despite the country's need of specialized cadres and said that most of the emigrants in the active fields have gone abroad through the official channels.

The President highlighted the bad effects of emigration if left uncontrolled or unchecked and said laws and regulations would not work by their own if they had not been supported with an ethical and patriotic obligation from the part of emigrants towards the country and the people.

He urged the Sudanese emigrants to invest parts of their savings in the development projects and said that would help very much in the country's drive for an overall development.

He also urged them to direct some of their savings to bolster up the country's balance of payments according to a planned economic formula.

The President said this would turn the emigrants' savings into one of the major pillars of the economic development in the Sudan.

He said the government efforts to solve the emigrants' problems whether administrative or bureaucratic have been materialized in the establishment of a body that would help in the settlement of all the difficulties that may confront the Sudanese emigrants.

The President said that the measures adopted to control emigration are meant to provide a convenient atmosphere for the emigrants to contribute to the country's development.

He hailed the conference describing it as a forum of national dialogue and pledged that he will personally follow-up the implementation of its resolutions and recommendations.

The conference was also addressed by the Secretary of the SSU External Affairs Committee Dr. Hassan 'Abdin and SSU Deputy Secretary of the Political Affairs and Organizations Department Dr. 'Awn al-Sharif Qasim.

More than one hundred representatives of Sudanese communities abroad and 10 representatives of concerned government departments participate in the conference which will continue session here today's morning.

CSO: 4500/48

DAMASCUS DAILY CLAIMS UNREST IN COUNTRY

JN091012 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 9 Sep 81

[From the Press Review]

[Excerpt] Under the headline "Our Masses in the Nile Valley Are Cornering the Regimes of al-Sadat and Numayri," AL-THAWRAH says: As the Egyptian masses are stepping up their uprising to include all popular factions, a state of emergency was declared in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, in the wake of an armed rebellion against Ja'far Numayri's regime. A group of Sudanese officers have asked the Sudanese ruler to resign from his post due to his agentry and alliance with al-Sadat's regime in Egypt.

Continuing, AL-THAWRAH asserts that Numayri's regime has, for 12 years, been practicing all kinds of violence and persecution against the Arab people in Sudan and against their freedom and rights. Sudan has been transformed into a big detention camp where all kinds of torture and assassinations are being practiced. The main features of the Sudanese regime are political instability, ceaseless hostility to the Sudanese people and collaboration with puppet regimes, particularly that led by traitor al-Sadat. The Sudanese regime jumped on the Camp David bandwagon, conspired against the Arab nation, particularly the Palestinian issue, and expelled the PLO representatives from Khartoum.

In addition, AL-THAWRAH says that the events in Sudan are a natural extension of the Egyptian popular uprising and an escalation of the activities or opposition forces in Sudan. The Sudanese army, which is known for its close links with the Sudanese people, has carried out 15 assassination attempts against the Sudanese regime. The masses' indignation is no longer confined to the patriotic and democratic opposition, represented by its national and progressive parties, but also extends to include other broad sectors. Combating Numayri's plots is the chief target of all the patriotic elements and forces in Sudan. The defeatist Sudanese and Egyptian regimes are working in accordance with one imperialist policy to quell the opposition movement by means of their police organs and the U.S. military presence.

CSO: 4504/96

BRIEFS

RAIL UNION OFFICE MOVED--Khartoum, September 6--President Gaafar Numayri of Sudan has moved to break up the centre of labour union power that directed a 19-day national strike by railway workers in May and June. General Numayri in a decree published by the official news agency, ordered the immediate transfer of Sudan Railways main offices to Khartoum from Atbara, northern Sudan, where the railmen's union has its headquarters. Gen. Nimeiry also dissolved the Railways board of directors and put the transport minister in charge pending formation of another board. (AFP). [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2826, 8 Sep 81 p 14]

KHALIL TO VISIT PRC--Khartoum, Aug. 26 (SUNA)--The First Vice-President and Defence Minister Gen. Abdal Majid Hamid Khalil is to visit People's China before the end of this year. An invitation to this effect was delivered to the First Vice-President when the Chinese Charge d'Affaires here called on him yesterday morning at his office in the Defence Ministry. Khalil expressed gratitude for the assistance People's China is extending to the Sudan and further asked the Charge d'Affaires to communicate the greetings of President Numayri to the Chinese Head of State and the Government and people of China. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 26 Aug 81 p 1]

CONSUMER GOODS FROM ROK--Khartoum, Aug. 26 (SUNA)--Sudan and Republic of Korea Tuesday signed here the instruments of a 100,000-dollar aid to be allocated for the importation of consumer goods from the Republic of Korea. Foreign Under Secretary signed for the government of the Sudan while the Korean ambassador to Khartoum signed for his country. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 26 Aug 81 p 1]

DARFUR BUDGET--Al-Fashir, Aug. 24 (SUNA)--The Regional Government of Darfur, endorsed, yesterday, the region's general and development budget for the fiscal year 1981-82. Of the 42-million-pounds budget, 33.3% was alloted for water projects, 20% for agricultural and animal development projects, and 18% for services. The rest of the budget was dedicated for other industrial projects and support of services and installations. Dr. 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Tijani, the region's Minister of Finance, said that the Regional Government stressed on promoting the present resources and creating new ones to meet its needs. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 24 Aug 81 p 4]

NEW KHARTOUM POWER STATION--Khartoum, Aug. 24 (SUNA)--All machinery and equipment required for the installation of Khartoum North new power station have been delivered in Port Sudan and are currently being moved to the site of work. Construction works are underway as planned. A contract was signed last March between the Public Corporation for Electricity and Water and the British Northern Engineering Industries providing for the installation of the station at the cost of 43,407,619 pounds in addition to L$8,990,857. The British Overseas Development Agency will finance the foreign component of the total cost while Marples Ridgeways Company, also British, will oversea phase I of the station's construction work scheduled to be finalized towards the end of 1983. The station's full capacity will reach 360 megawatts when it is finally completed. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 24 Aug 81 pp 1-2]

TRADE FEDERATION MESSAGE--Khartoum, Aug 18 (SUNA)--The Federation of Sudan Workers' Trade Unions sent a message to all international organizations explaining some facts related to the railway workers strike late last May. The message, referring to the role of workers trade unions in liberating the Sudan from the colonialist grip, said that trade unions enjoyed a status that guaranteed them democracy and freedom. The independence of the trade unions, the message said, was guaranteed by the spirit of the country's constitution and the Basic Rules of the political organization. The message spoke about the former leaders of the Railway Trade Union and said they ignored the industrial relations prevailing in the country, and misused the right of strike. The message also praised the Sudanese authorities for reaching a settlement and releasing the workers' leaders without inflicting punishment on the strikers. The message affirmed the Federation's readiness to welcome anyone who wants to find out facts for himself. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 18 Aug 81 p 4]

ITALIAN AID FOR REFUGEES--Khartoum, Aug 14 (SUNA)--Italy will grant the Sudan 2,649 tons of wheat flour, the revenue of which to be utilized in implementing refugees projects in the country. An agreement to this effect was signed here yesterday at the Ministry of Internal Affairs between the Sudan and Italy. Internal Affairs Minister Ahmed Abdel Rahman Mohamed signed for the Sudan and H.E. the Italian Ambassador to Khartoum signed for his country. The signing took place in the presence of the Refugees Commissioner and the Italian Consul here. Following that, the Minister discussed with the Ambassador issues related to refugees requirements and ways of helping them to depend on themselves. The Minister asserted Sudan's keen concern to promote and develop relations between the two countries, particularly in such humanitarian fields. He also expressed his gratitude to the Ambassador for his country's generous offer. The shipment of the agreed quantities will begin soon from Italy, SUNA learnt. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 14 Aug 81 p 2]

KHARTOUM ELECTRICITY NETWORK--Khartoum, Aug 7 (SUNA)--The Public Corporation for Electricity and Water has begun the implementation of the first phase of a special plan aimed at expanding the Three-town Capital's electricity network. The plan would be executed gradually with the aim of securing electricity supply till the year 1986-87. Studies to this effect were prepared by a Swiss firm to the value of $350,000 to be funded by the Kuwait Fund for Socio-Economic Development. A final report on the plan will be submitted to the Ministry of National Planning for the provision of the required finance. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 7 Aug 81 p 1]

AID TO GAMBIA, LEBANON--Khartoum, Aug 7 (SUNA)--Sudan has decided to extend urgent medical aid to Gambia and Lebanon. President Numayri has decided to extend urgent medical aid to Gambia in response to an appeal by the Gambian President Dawda Jawara to all states to help Gambia heal the wounds of those who suffered during the recent abortive coup against his government. On the other hand, the President has also decided to extend urgent medical aid to Lebanon for the sake of those who fell victims of the recent Israeli aggression on several areas of the Lebanese territory. The President has directed his health minister to expedite the delivery of the donated medical aid to the two countries. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 7 Aug 81 p 1]

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH PRC--Khartoum, Aug. 11 (SUNA)--Sudan and People's China signed here yesterday a trade protocol agreement. Ahmed Salim Ahmed, State Minister of the Ministry of Cooperation, Commerce and Supply, and Chin Tu Ben, Deputy Minister of Chinese External Trade signed for their respective countries. Following the signing ceremony, Ahmed told SUNA that the volume of the protocol reached $94 million. According to the agreement Sudan will export to China cotton, gum Arabic and some other commodities. And, in return, will import building materials, tea, drugs, chemicals and rice. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 11 Aug 81 p 1]

TRIBAL CONCILIATION CONFERENCE--Nyala, Aug. 1 (SUNA)--The conciliatory conference between the Taaisha and Salamat tribes wound up sessions here Thursday night. The conference, chaired by Darfur Region Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources Yusuf Sulayman Tiknah has reached an agreement on all issues of dispute between the two tribes. Sayed Tiknah appreciated those who contributed and made the conference a success. He said the conference "has put us in a new area where we, all, should bear responsibility to preserve all what had been achieved." He called for the implementation of all of the resolutions adopted. SSU Secretary and commissioner of Southern Darfur, Ibrahim Omer Ahmed, meanwhile, praised the spirit of responsibility which prevailed the conference meeting as well as the chairman's efforts to overcome difficulties. He said all measures and directives which would help implement the conference resolutions were issued. The resolutions are designed to work out compensations for the concerned parties and to create suitable atmosphere to restore confidence. The resolutions have also provided for all lands and pastures to be treated as communal for all tribes. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 1 Aug 81 pp 1-2]

CSO: 4500/48

INFORMATION MINISTER DISCUSSES ARAB, LEBANESE SITUATION

PM110853 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 10 Sep 81 p 3

[Interview with Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad by Wafa'i Diyab in London--date not specified]

[Excerpts] Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad returned to Damascus today from London after undergoing a successful surgical operation. AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT met him in London and had a long discussion with him on the various current Arab issues. He affirmed that Syria welcomes the holding of any Arab summit which is well prepared for. He said that the Lebanese crisis will be solved only when the legitimate government plays its part in full on the Lebanese territory and warned of the dangers of current developments in the area. The following is what is most significant in the interview:

[Question] How do you view the Arab situation in the light of the present state of affairs in the area?

[Answer] The conclusion that one reaches on the basis of the resolutions of the Arab summits held so far confirms that the Arabs are a real power, an economic power and a political power, which, if rallied together will protect the Arab nation and enable it to regain its rights and liberate its lands. But this economic power and political power are not being used in full in serving the Arab cause. This is due to the lack of Arab unity and the absence of solidarity in the past period as well as due to differences in interpretations; all of which have made the Arabs abandon their commitments to the summit resolutions as well as the strategies agreed upon and the tactics serving such strategies.

What I would like to say here is that building intrinsic Arab power is vital and the use of the economic and political power in serving the Arab cause is the means that will put us on the right path of liberation.

In saying this I do not intend to appear pessimistic because I am not at all pessimistic. My confidence in my Arab nation and in Arab capabilities is unlimited.

But this should not prevent us from sensing the weak spots in our Arab position. This is what we do as Arab politicians and officials and we all point this out clearly.

[Question] On the basis of what you say, what is the next Arab summit expected to achieve?

[Answer] First I am not sure that a new Arab summit will be held in the near future. But we welcome any Arab summit which is well prepared for in order to ensure its success. But what I would like to say is that when the Arab leaders meet they are not required to invent theories and views but merely to recognize the fact that we are dealing with a national cause and that commitment to it should be a national responsibility too. The Arab leaders do not need to add a single letter to what they have already agreed upon but only to be true to the implementation of these agreements.

The Missiles Crisis

[Question] The Arab area witnessed much tension during the so-called Syrian missiles crisis in Lebanon and it appears that Begin has once again brought up this subject with President Reagan. What is the story of this crisis?

[Answer] It is unimportant that we should talk about what they called "the Syrian missiles crisis in Lebanon," but rather we should think of the significance of the uproar which Israel created over this matter. Israel, thanks to U.S. support and al-Sadat's treason, now finds itself capable of interfering in the internal affairs of the Arab countries. This is what the Arab leaders must understand. We have asserted and we do assert that should Israel foolishly commit a new aggression and launch any raid, it will not be Arab mothers alone who will cry. Israel knows this and is well aware of it. The arrogance of power which the terrorist, Begin, is demonstrating is the result of American breath that the U.S. administration has breathed into the Israeli dummies. But such a thing does not scare us because we well know how to defend our cause and ourselves. We are in a battle and the battle is continuing. The Arabs have agreed that it is not the battle of just a single country but is a national battle. Such a belief makes it incumbent upon the Arabs to shoulder their responsibilities in full regarding this matter.

The Lebanese Crisis

[Question] The Arab followup committee has adopted resolutions which have been described as very positive. Do you believe that these resolutions will help in solving the Lebanese crisis?

[Answer] I have not seen the text of these resolutions.

[Question] How then can the Lebanese crisis be resolved?

[Answer] The Lebanese crisis will be resolved when the legitimate Lebanese Government exercises its role and its powers in full, when all the parties uphold this authority, actually and not in theory, and also when the misleading slogan that claims that Lebanon's strength lies in its weakness, is abandoned. Lebanon is a

sisterly Arab state and part of the Arab nation; it endures what any other Arab country endures in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy. There are facts that must be recognized and accepted by the legitimate Lebanese Government. Otherwise, the vicious circle will continue and the legitimate government will remain unable to exploit the cards in its hands. You know that we support legitimacy in Lebanon and that we want to achieve national detente. We have striven and we continue to strive to achieve this objective. We have placed all our efforts at the disposal of the legitimate government and of the Lebanese national movement in order to achieve this objective.

We want to put an end to this crisis as soon as possible because we are making continuing sacrifices for the sake of Lebanon's unity and in order to prevent its partitioning as well as in order to build a state capable of defending Lebanese and Arab interests. We want to find a way out of this crisis because this will be for the well-being of Lebanon, the Lebanese and the Arabs. The most dangerous thing to which Lebanon has been exposed recently is the dealing between certain parties and Israel. Such dealing deprives the collaborating party of its freedom to decide as well as its personal freedom and it becomes a tool in the hands of Israel.

Such collaboration has harmed those who cooperate with Israel as well as harming Lebanon and the Arab nation. The claim that this dealing has stopped must be proved by actual facts and not merely by statements.

[Question] Does this mean that you are not optimistic about what the followup committee meetings might lead to?

[Answer] Anyone at work is optimistic and we are working to reach a solution. Therefore, we are greatly optimistic about the future.

[Question] One of the proposals put forth to solve the Middle East crisis is the idea of mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. What are the dangers that could result from such suggestion?

[Answer] I have already said that the solution lies in building intrinsic Arab power, the unity of the Arab stand, and genuine Arab solidarity. This is the solution. Any other proposal means divesting the Arabs of the cards which they are using in the interest of the Arab cause.

Cabinet Reshuffle

[Question] Certain reports say that there is a possibility of a new cabinet reshuffle in Damascus. How true are these reports?

[Answer] When the socialist Arab Ba'th Party command finds it necessary to carry out a cabinet reshuffle it will do so immediately. Any cabinet reshuffle we effect means that we want to develop things still further in the ministries. The party command so far has not yet met to discuss this matter.

CSC 4304/161

'TISHRIN': ARABS MUST CONFRONT U.S. INTERESTS

JN140851 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 14 Sep 81

[Press Review]

[Text] Under the headline "U.S. Interests in the Arab Homeland" TISHRIN says: Yesterday, Syria appealed to the Arab masses in the Arab homeland to realize the seriousness of the new situation resulting from the new U.S.-Israeli agreements and to prepare themselves for confronting this alliance and U.S. interests.

TISHRIN explains that the call for confronting U.S. interests in the Arab homeland is neither a Syrian innovation nor an extremist Syrian stand. Nor is it a specific decision to be imposed on the official Arab quarters. It is an official Arab resolution that commits all official Arab quarters and is recorded in the Baghdad and Tunis summit documents and also in the documents of the Amman summit which Syria did not attend.

This binding resolution was adopted when U.S.-Israeli relations had not reached their present serious and advanced form of direct strategic cooperation between Israel and the United States.

The Tunis summit resolutions warned the United States that its hostility toward the Arab nation and pan-Arab causes will inevitably reflect on U.S.-Arab relations and on U.S. interests in the region.

A point of regret in the Arab arena is that in addition to al-Sadat's treason and his joining the Arab nation's enemies, there are some Arab parties not committed to the Arab summit resolutions and not dealing with the United States relative to its stand against the Arabs and its complete bias toward Israel. Rather they continue to develop their relations despite the fact that Washington has escalated its opposition to the Arabs and increased support for Israel.

TISHRIN stresses that despite all the indecent talk, this development in relations with the United States can only be explained in the context of the pan-Arab commitment to the Arab nation's cause; and this explanation will not favor those who are panting after the United States, those collaborating with it and those looking for solutions or settlements from the United States. After the air bridge

in 1973, the Camp David accords, the capitulatory peace treaty between al-Sadat and Israel, the huge arms deals with Israel and the complete bias toward the side of aggression and occupation, we cannot consider the United States, from an Arab point of view, as a friend, mediator or neutral force in the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the wake of Begin's agreements with the United States, we consider the United States as the Arab nation's basic enemy.

TISHRIN concludes: The United States' complete alliance with Israel and the placing of all its military, security and economic potentials at Israel's disposal not only dictates the suspension of all cooperation with the United States on the so-called political settlement but also necessitates the adoption of immediate, courageous and decisive measures against U.S. vital interests in the Arab homeland and its relations with the Arabs. It is unacceptable that Arab resources continue to feed the war machine that is occupying the Arab territories, violating Arab rights, supporting those who seek to liquidate the Palestinian cause and forcing the Arabs to ally themselves with Israel against the Arabs' friends.

All the Arab parties that have signed the summit resolutions are committed to adopting practical, quick and decisive action against the United States; and the Arab masses are called on to confront the U.S.-Israeli military alliance, U.S. interests and those who support the enemies.

In its "Behind Events" column, TISHRIN also says: Syria's call to the Arab countries to shoulder their responsibilities for confronting the serious agreements that were concluded during Begin's visit to Washington; to adopt appropriate measures that will safeguard the Arabs' vital interests, future, security and existence; and Syria's call to the Arab masses to realize the seriousness of the new situation that has resulted from the U.S.-Israeli agreements and to prepare themselves for confronting of this alliance and U.S. interests--all this is not a new call. It is not the first time that Syria has appealed to the Arab masses to realize the dangers surrounding our nation, its future and existence.

The paper adds: Syria has always stated that our basic enemy is the United States. The possibility of neutralizing the United States in the Arab-Zionist dispute is mere talk and cannot be put to practice and is meant to throw dust in our eyes. The resolutions adopted by the Arab summits held in wake of the Camp David accords stressed that the United States has become a basic and principal enemy and that the Arab countries must warn Washington to review its calculations and policies in the Middle East and to adopt a balanced stand on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

CSO: 4304/161

INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER MOHAMED MZALI

GF130627 Manama GULF NEWS AGENCY in Arabic 1810 GMT 12 Sep 81

[Report on interview with Mohamed Mzali, Tunisian prime minister, by Qatar Radio, on 12 Sep 81, place not given]

[Text] Doha, 12 Sep (GNA)--Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali said he believes that the Saudi Middle East peace initiative will become a substitute for the Camp David agreements already rejected by the Arabs.

Mzali added that, through this initiative, Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Saudi crown prince and deputy prime minister, has expressed his opinion and should submit it to the next Arab summit conference so it can decide on it in compliance with what was agreed upon during the Baghdad summit--that our initiatives must be collective initiatives.

In an interview granted to Qatar Radio and carried by its domestic service today, Mzali said that Prince Fahd's initiative may become the platform of all negotiations and talks related to the Palestinian question and thus the Lebanese question.

In his statement, Tunisian Prime Minister Mzali noted the importance of the Arab Maghrib question and the role of his country in uniting that region. He said that his country believes that resolving the questions of the Arab Maghrib, especially the question of the Sahara, can be achieved by avoiding the problems that were inherited from colonialism and by acting through a great, united Maghrib plan.

With regard to this issue, he indicated that the Arabian Gulf states preceded the Arab Maghrib states in achieving cooperation among themselves by establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council. He added that Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba noted this in his speech at the inauguration of the constitutional socialist party congress last April when he said that our brothers in the Gulf have preceded the Arab Maghrib by establishing the foundation of a united, cooperative framework.

Commenting on the development of relations between Tunis and the Arab states, particularly in the economic field, Mohamed Mzali said that his government has begun using direct contacts and bilateral meetings in addition to exchanging visits in Tunis, the Arab capitals and the Gulf. This has resulted in achieving progress, implementing projects and also resolving problems that used to hinder such achievements.

He explained that Tunis has organized a conference for Arab investors. The presence of the Arab League in Tunis has provided the opportunity for many ministers in various fields to contact Tunisian officials and to achieve more cooperation.

The Tunisian prime minister said he hopes that Qatari heir apparent and defense minister Shaykh Hamad Ibn Khalifah al Thani's visit to Tunis, which will begin tomorrow, will result in reinforcing bilateral relations that have grown and developed since Qatari Amir Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Hamad al Thani visited Tunis in 1975. He added that these visits have continued to develop positively as a result of the visits and meetings exchanged among officials from the two fraternal countries.

Mzali said he is confident that Qatar and Tunis will be able to achieve stronger and more fruitful relations despite the great geographical distance between them. He then noted that the joint talks to take place between delegations from both countries will strengthen bilateral relations. He added that all possible fields of cooperation--economic, agricultural, tourism and financial--will be discussed in addition to consultations on political issues and issues of joint concern.

CSO: 4504/97

PAPER ACCUSES ASIAN LABOR FORCE OF COMPLICITY WITH CIA

Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 26 Aug 81 p 1

[Editorial: "The Arabian Gulf and the Asian Labor Force: Asianization or Arabization?"]

[Text] Five million Asians are working in the Arabian Gulf countries, 1 million in the United Arab Emirates alone. More than one "agency" of the Central Intelligence Agency are dispersed throughout a number of Asian capitals for the purpose of sending a labor force to the region. Yet no government officials in the region are taking clear, serious steps to stop the "Asianization" of the Arabian Gulf which is in full progress according to plans whose first and last concern is "future profit" in the Arabian Gulf region by dislodging it politically and culturally from its true historical bond as an Arab nation of Arab people.

In Manila the Philippine Government has become "angry" because "27" of its citizens were subjected to maltreatment in Qatar, or so they have charged. But in the Philippines itself there are two branches of the Central Intelligence Agency with names of trade or philanthropic organizations. One of them is the "Eastern Construction Division" and the other the "Action Brotherhood." Though many in our country and the other countries of the Arabian Gulf do not know of the ties between these Philippine organizations and the CIA, the Philippine Government knows. It also knows that any Asian working in the countries of the region, especially the Arab countries, has most certainly undergone military training to prepare him to carry out any military operation that may arise. The 5 million Asian workers in this Arab region are not isolated from the CIA, which has two main branches in the Middle East, one in Beirut and the other in Tehran, although the one in Tehran has been transferred, since the success of the Iranian revolution, to another country of the region.

The "Nixon Doctrine," which was carried out in many Asian countries on the basis of setting Asian countries against each other, creating internal battles to destroy the people, has now been employed in the Gulf. We can see its presence in a number of unsolved problems between a number of the Arabian Gulf countries. Added to this danger is the "Reagan Doctrine" which is based on military intervention in other countries, such as occurred in Libya 8 days ago, and which may be applied at any moment to one of the countries of the Arabian Gulf under various pretexts. The situation has become much more dangerous since the attack in the "Gulf of Sidra," for in the "Arabian Gulf" there are many among the 5 million Asians connected with "Agencies" that are "Gulf Affiliates" of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We must all be aware that citizens of the Arabian Gulf as well as expatriate Arabs working in the region are exposed to a real danger, not only threatening their economic position in the near term, but also posing a danger to their spirit and social status. How, then, can the ultimate outcome be anything but negative or, to be more exact, destructive? The blame can be placed on the Asians due to the cultural deformation which they inflict on the entire region.

There must be preventive measures taken on a decisive, pan-Arab scale to correct this anomalous situation. This is a truth which we consider to be the key to solving the "Gulf Asianization" problem, but we advocate that immediate steps be taken vis-a-vis what we understand to be the development plans presently proposed. "Gulf Asianization" will be the inevitable result of the 'development plans' of the region. This is a contradiction which will not be solved without a bold, historical, political decision from the people of the region. We will be returning to this topic.

CSO: 4304/162

DRAFT LAW PROVIDES FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF INDUSTRIAL BANK

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 Aug 81 p 2

[Article: "Final Draft of Industrial Bank Law; Financing Limited to Native Firms, 60 Percent of the Project Cost To Be Granted by the Bank"]

[Text] The Office of Legal Counsel and Legislation sent to the Ministry of Finance yesterday a draft law establishing the UAE Industrial Bank, along with the bank's charter and bylaws, after having completed their preparation and legal wording.

The draft describes the Industrial Bank as a joint-stock company, enjoying legal competency, and as an independent legal identity, able to carry out all actions and deeds to ensure the achievement of the goals for which it was established.

The UAE government will grant the bank a loan of 1 billion dirhams to enable it to pursue its activities. The term and conditions of this loan will be set by the cabinet.

The law exempts the bank's activities from prior control of the Office of Accounting, as well as exempting its funds and profits from taxation and fees.

The UAE Industrial Bank's charter provides for the participation of 16 national institutions, in addition to the UAE government, in the agreement establishing this bank.

The most prominent of these institutions are the National Bank of Abu Dhabi, the National Bank of Dubai, the National Bank of Sharjah, the Emirates Trade Bank, the Bank of Dubai Ltd., the Bank of Oman Ltd., the Abu Dhabi National Insurance Company, the Dubai Insurance Company, and the UAE Investment Company Ltd. The charter indicates that the bank's principal headquarters will be in the capital of the UAE and that the board of directors will be permitted to establish branch offices or agencies and to appoint correspondents inside or outside the UAE. The charter did not specify any term for the bank.

The charter sets forth the bank's capital at 500,000,000 dirhams, distributed over 500,000 shares. The bank's shares will be cash, and each share will be valued at 1000 dirhams. As for capital subscribed, it will amount to 200,000,000 dirhams, distributed over 200,000 shares. The bank's shares will be cash, and

the founders are pledged to deposit 50 percent of the face value of these shares, amounting to 100,000,000 dirhams, in local banks credited to the bank's account.

The UAE Industrial Bank's draft bylaws refer to the goals for which the bank is established; these are to participate in the development of the UAE economy, diversify the production base by establishing new industries and support the existing industry.

The draft made it clear that the bank will restrict its activity basically to private institutions and firms and to institutions and firms actively participating in the industrial sector, 50 percent of whose capital is owned by nationals or the government. The bank's activity can be extended to services required for industrial sector projects.

To achieve its goals, the bank is permitted to establish industrial projects in the UAE or projects carried out for the UAE, to participate in the capitalization of these projects and to grant loans and financial easements to firms and institutions that fall within the purview of its activities. The Industrial Bank's financing of any project, either directly or indirectly, will not be permitted to exceed more than 20 percent of its subscribed capital and its reserves or 60 percent of the project's cost, whichever is less.

The bank is permitted to finance construction and infrastructure projects undertaken by institutions and firms active within the sphere of its activity and can offer surety for loans granted by institutions and firms active within the industrial sector.

The bank is not authorized to grant loans to finance real estate operations or housing projects that are not connected with a project within its purview.

The bank can participate in the issuing of and guaranteeing of financial paper pertaining to firms active within the sphere of its activity and can issue bonds and certificates of deposit. It can accept cash deposits from those who own shares in it and from banks and financial institutions, in accordance with regulations established by the board of directors and within Central Bank guidelines.

7005
CSO: 4304/126

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS--The total land prepared for agriculture during May 1981 was approximately 16,000 dunums. This included 8,504 dunums for the northern agricultural region, 4,505 dunums in the central area, 2,958 in the eastern region, and 84 in the western agricultural zone. The monthly report of agricultural services, issued recently by the Plant-Life Resources Office in the Ministry of Agriculture, made it clear that 2,208 instructional visits were made by the guidance organization during the month to 2,868 farms, during which 9,474 instructional topics were discussed, including resisting diseases, soil, irrigation, fertilization, greens, date palms and fruit trees. The total crop acreage treated for agricultural diseases during this month was 7,768 dunums, for which quantities of chemicals were used totalling 1,589 kgs and 1,705 liters. [Text] [Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 Aug 81 p 2] 7005

CSO: 4304/126 END

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29 September 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2406

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29 September 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2406

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'ARAFAT DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN, ISRAELI WAR

Havana GRANMA WEEKLY REVIEW in English 23 Aug 81 p 3

[Interview with Yasser 'Arafat by Rodolfo Casals and Pedro Rioseco, of GRANMA and BOHEMIA]

[Text]

GRANMA: Comrade Arafat, first of all we would like to know your views as chairman of the PLO on the present situation faced by the Palestinian Resistance at a time when the aggressive policy of imperialism and Zionism is being intensified.

ARAFAT: What happened in the war last month, which lasted 15 days and was directed at the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, the Palestinian Revolution and the PLO, was an outgrowth of a war lasting 11 months, a war aimed at destroying the Palestinian Revolution, the PLO and the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples, on the orders of the United States. This was made very clear in the statements issued by U.S. officials. The most significant and explicit of these statements was made by National Security adviser Richard Allen, who said that the Israeli army had the right of hot pursuit of the Palestinians and that the Soviet Union, the PLO and Cuba were the centers of international terrorism. They feel the PLO is the weak link and that's why they are concentrating their political, military, diplomatic and information forces against the PLO.

We have been confronted with a savage war of attrition directed at the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. The most modern U.S. weapons were used in the war, even those which were banned by international agreement. These weapons unleashed an inferno against the civilian population from the air, land and sea.

Actually, it isn't just Israel alone, it is the U.S. weapons used by Israel and the U.S. orders carried out by Israel.

These savage attacks carried out for 15 days caused 2600 dead and wounded among Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. You have seen the destruction in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyeh, Hasbia and dozens of other Lebanese towns and camps where the Palestinian refugees live.

They wanted to strike a blow at the Palestinian leadership; cut off our flow of supplies by bombing roads and bridges in the south, over which we must pass; shatter the infrastructure of our military forces; and cause a split between the Lebanese and the Palestinians.

After having lived through this hell recently, I can assure you that they have failed on all four counts. We have defeated the Israelis, defeated them militarily, and we turned back five efforts they made to capture as many spots: three by sea, one by paratroops and the other with armored vehicles.

That isn't all. In the midst of this savage attack, the leadership of the Revolution gave the order to quash Israeli fire at its source. This is the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli crisis that we carried the war to the Israeli settlements.

Now they are preparing a new attack for many reasons. Of course, one of the reasons is to pave the way for the Camp David conspiracy. The new Israeli Government is already in office and will embark on another adventure for Begin to present to his master Reagan on his coming visit, thus proving the need for the Zionist watchdog who carries out the orders and machinations of the United States.

Our reports indicate that Israeli troops are being concentrated in southern Lebanon, and Begin had the gall to say that the cease-fire was temporary. Defense Minister Sharon wants to flex his muscles now, and the Reagan administration wants to write off the Palestinians. My response to all this is, welcome back. Just as they've been defeated once they'll be defeated again.

BOHEMIA: After the bombing of Beirut and southern Lebanon in mid-July, there were expressions of condemnation all over the world.

How do you view the response of the Arab countries to this new Israeli massacre?

ARAFAT: There is an Arab response which does not meet the challenge faced by the Arab nation. We have stated this clearly. We must remember that Beirut is the second Arab capital to be attacked, the first being Baghdad, where the Iraqi nuclear reactor was hit. Two Arab capitals have been bombed within a month.

The Arab nation faces an important challenge and now is blockaded by three U.S. fleets: the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and the 5th and 7th in the Red Sea, the Arab Gulf and the Indian Ocean, in addition to the rapid deployment force which has started to reach the area. Unfortunately, they were able to secure bases in Ras Banas, Egypt; Barbera, Somalia; and the island of Masirah, Oman. These are in addition to the nuclear base on Diego García Island.

Our Arab nation is faced with a challenge that is, to be or not to be. There is something else that is very dangerous: our children and our future are threatened. Most important of all, I want to tell free and honest people everywhere that a threat to security in the Middle East is a threat to the security of the world. The security of the Middle East is the security of Europe, Africa, Asia and even the Caribbean.

BOHEMIA: What is your view of the role played by U.S. envoy Philip Habib in the Middle East before the intensification of Israeli aggression?

ARAFAT: As I said before, we are confronting U.S. determination and weapons. A particular statement by President Reagan is really very threatening. When he met with some Arab ambassadors he asked why the Arab countries didn't take the Palestinians in and thus spare the United States that headache.

The United States has decided to continue the Camp David conspiracy. Habib is implementing this aggressive policy against the Palestinian and Arab peoples. Even Sadat, their agent in the Middle East, was offended during his last visit. Reagan's response reflected an arrogant contempt for all moral standards and for the UN resolutions. And that was with his agent Sadat, so you can just imagine what it's like with us. If they are contemptuous of their agent Sadat and deal with him in an arrogant manner, just imagine what it's like with us.

GRANMA: Finally, Comrade Arafat, could you tell us what are the immediate and future tasks of the Palestinian Resistance?

ARAFAT: Of course, our main objectives are the establishment of an independent state through the self-determination of the Palestinian people, implementing the Palestinian people's right to return to the territory they have been driven out of and carrying out the political program of the Palestinian National Council which was adopted in April. We must also confront the Israeli military clique and its crimes against the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples in occupied territory and elsewhere. We cannot forget that our people in the occupied territories live under very difficult conditions and face permanent oppression and systematic state terrorism from the Israeli occupiers. I ask Reagan, who are the real terrorists? Are they the Soviet Union, the PLO and Cuba, or rather Israel and behind it, the United States?

We are closing ranks more and more with our people at the mass, cultural and political levels and our grass-roots organizations at the political, diplomatic and of course military level in order to cope with Israel's ultramodern military machine.

We are strengthening our solidarity with all democratic and progressive fighters in the Arab Nation and the rest of the world because we view our struggle as part of the international liberation struggle. We feel our struggle is progressive and democratic, and we must strengthen ties with all progressive and democratic forces.

The Palestinian Revolution is a strategic factor for change in the Middle East. That's why the imperialist, colonialist and Zionist concentration of forces in the area is so great. But we are not afraid. We have been fighting for 17 years and can continue fighting even longer. Our people's determination and the determination of peoples everywhere can't be defeated because it's in tune with history. Our enemies are going against history. That is why our people will also win. Time is always on the side of the peoples.

I would like to conclude, on behalf of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian revolutionaries and the revolutionaries of the Palestinian-Lebanese joint forces with which we are in the front line of battle, by thanking Cuba, the Cuban leadership, the Cuban people, the Communist Party and Government and especially dear Comrade Fidel Castro, who support us in an honest and firm manner. They are on the side of all just causes, with the cause of the Palestinian people at the top of the list.

I want to tell you that the geographical distance is real and very great, but in our hearts we are very close.

CSO: 4300/112

OAPEC MINISTERS DISCUSS OIL SURPLUS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 17 Jul 81 p 13

[Article: "OAPEC Ministers End Al-Ta'if Conference on Oil Surplus and Achievement of a Unified Structure; al-Khalifah and Yamani Charge al-Shirawi With Completing Measures for Registration and Announcement of Oil Conversion Company in al-Manamah"]

[Text] SAUDI NEWS AGENCY reported yesterday that six Arab oil ministers and Bahrain's minister of development and industry held an unofficial meeting the night before last in al-Ta'if in which they discussed their petroleum policy.

The news agency reported that this meeting was attended only by Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah al-Sabah of Kuwait, Yusuf al-Shirawi of Bahrain, Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim of Iraq, Belkacem Nabi of Algeria, and 'Abd-al-Salam Zaqar of Libya. The states named, with the exception of Bahrain, are the member states of OAPEC.

Observers feel that the problem of petroleum surpluses, which Dr al-'Utaybah estimates at around 4 million barrels per day for the month of July, formed the central point of the discussions at this meeting. It is also known that the OAPEC ministers who attended the meeting are among those who wish to apply pressure on Saudi Arabia to decrease its population. Riyadh rejects this initiative, hoping to convince the other petroleum exporting states to lower their prices for the sake of unification.

Radio Riyadh reported yesterday that a number of matters related to Arab oil affairs were discussed during the meeting in a framework of coordination and joint consultation among the ministers.

In Baghdad, Iraqi Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, who returned yesterday after participating in the al-Ta'if meetings, said that these meetings included discussions of conditions in the international oil market, matters pertaining to the oil surplus, and means of achieving a unified structure in addition to moves aimed at strengthening and developing OAPEC.

Meahwhile, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, Saudi Arabia's minister of petroleum and mineral resources, announced that he had signed an agreement with Kuwaiti Oil Minister Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah al-Sabah and Bahraini Minister of Development

and Industry Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi for the establishment of a plant to produce light oil with the participation of the three states. The headquarters of the plant will be in Bahrain.

Shaykh Yamani said that he and the Kuwaiti and Bahraini ministers participated in a petroleum meeting yesterday attended by six oil ministers from the OAPEC states.

He said the meeting involved mutual consultation, coordination, and exchange of views on petroleum matters affecting the member states as well as the airing of opinions on the reduction of petroleum production.

REUTER quoted oil affairs analysts in Bahrain as saying: "Important member states of OAPEC pressured Saudi Arabia to reduce its huge production of oil during yesterday's meeting."

The analysts said: "Shaykh Yamani certainly faced strong criticisms yesterday because of the Saudi surplus, which is partially responsible for the current glut in the oil market."

The results of yesterday's talks have not become clear. However, analysts and diplomats in Saudi Arabia said last week that the Saudis are apparently determined to maintain their policy.

In al-Manamah, Bahraini Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi announced yesterday that an agreement had been reached concerning the study and construction of a plant for the conversion of heavy oils into light oils, which yield a favorable return on world markets. The agreement was concluded among the Saudi Petroleum and Mineral Resources Organization, the Kuwaiti Petroleum Organization, and Bahrain's Ministry of Development and Industry.

In a statement to THE GULF NEWS AGENCY yesterday, Mr al-Shirawi added that he had signed a protocol for the establishment of that company as well as the ground laying contract for the company and the company by-laws in al-Ta'if the night before last with Saudi Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ahmad Zaki Yamani and Kuwaiti Oil Minister 'Ali al-Khalifah al-Sabah.

He added that the Saudi and Kuwaiti ministers charged him with completing the legal measures for the registration and announcement of the company, whose main office will be in Bahrain.

He explained that the sum of $2 million had been allocated for economic and technical studies of the project. The size and capital of the project will then be established based on these studies.

At the conclusion of his statement; al-Shirawi said that this project is unique in that it will produce heavy fuel oils--and possibly heavy crudes in the future--in contrast to the other refineries that have been built in the region, which are restricted to the refining of light and medium-grade oils.

8591
CSO: 4304/84

BRIEFS

READINESS TO SUPPLY URANIUM--Abu Dhabi, 11 Sep (OPECNA)--Mauritania has indicated its readiness to supply any Arab country with uranium when it begins uranium production in three years' time. Mohamed Eli Moktar Ould Zamel, the Mauritanian minister of mines and energy, expressed this readiness in an interview given while visiting Kuwait. In May Mauritania signed an agreement with Iraq under which the two countries will cooperate in uranium mining ventures in the African country. Zamel's visit to Kuwait was part of a tour of Arab states. [Text] [LD141236 Vienna OPECNA in English 1400 GMT 11 Sep 81]

CSO: 4500/51

INTERVIEW WITH AFGHAN MUJAHIDIN LEADER

GF120855 Salalah Domestic Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 12 Sep 81

[Report on interview with Rasul Sayyaf, leader of Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan by 'UMAN, date and place not given]

[Text] Professor ('Abdolrab) Rasul Sayyaf, leader of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan and one of the leaders of the Afghan Muslim Mujahidin currently visiting the country, has said that the courageous stand of Sultan Qabus and the Omani people in the face of the Red Communist advance--a stand that culminated in a great victory--has greatly benefited the attempts of Muslims to resist this advance and topple the atheist ideology which the Soviets are trying to plant in Muslim countries.

In an interview with the newspaper 'UMAN, Professor Sayyaf said that in defeating Russina agents and communists the Omani leadership and people have protected the area countries against their evil. He said that the PDRY, which the Russians have turned into a den for bandits and terrorism, was not threatening only Oman but was also threatening several countries, including Afghanistan. Sayyaf added: The Russians have brought their bandits to the PDRY to fight the Afghan Mujahidin, and that the PDRY regime--a Soviet surrogate--is involved in the war that is being waged by the Mujahidin against communism. Sayyaf said: The PDRY regime has sent a large number of soldiers to fight the Afghan Mujahidin to carry out Moscow's orders.

Sayyaf declared: The Russians are using PDRY citizens in the war against the Afghan Mujahidin because they are aware of the respect the Afghan people harbor toward the Muslim Arab people. He said that these tactics are part of the deceit to which the Soviets resort in striking at patriotic forces. However, he said, the Afghan Mujahidin are fully aware of this fact.

Professor Sayyaf said that the regimes that are Russian surrogates and those that have adopted a negative stand toward the Afghan Mujahidin's struggle against their enemies, the communists, are shaky regimes that do not enjoy any popular support within their countries, and predicted a popular uprising against these regimes.

Referring to the recently concluded agreement among the puppet communist regimes of Libya, Ethiopia and the PDRY, Professor Sayyaf said: The agreement was concluded within the framework of the intensification of the Russian presence in the region to implement their plans which converge with Moscow's expansionist plans. He urged Muslim countries to unite their ranks to confront this suspect treaty.

Referring to the situation in Afghanistan Sayyaf said: The Afghan Mujahidin are tightening their control over many areas of Afghanistan. The weapons the Russians brought to kill the Afghan people have been captured by the Mujahidin and used against the Russians. He asserted that the puppet Karmal regime is isolated and does not enjoy any popular support. He said that the recent call of reservists is a farce because no Afghan army exists at present--most of the Muslim members of the army have joined the Mujahidin.

In conclusion, Sayyaf lauded the support of the Arab and Muslim countries for the Afghan Mujahidin's struggle. He urged the leaders of these countries to render more material and moral support until the invading Soviet forces are fully evacuated from Muslim Afghanistan.

CSO: 4604/9

POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF CULTURAL CHARTER DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Jul 81 p 3

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "The Cultural Charter Plan Elicits Worry Among the Berbers"]

[Text] The proposed cultural charter which is on the order of business for the meeting of the FLN [National Liberation Front Party] central committee (LE MONDE on 2 July) caps a series of debates the very nature of which has given rise to controversy. Though no one admits it officially, the launching of this vast enterprise which the regime hopes will be spectacular is the direct consequence of Berber cultural demands.

After having smoldered in the shadows for some time, these demands, which emerged into the open in spring 1980, reached a climax with the Tizi-Ouzou riots in April.

The dissidents, who were also militating for freedom of expression and information, refused to take part in the official debate and denounced it as "mystagoguery" at meetings organized at the Universities of Algiers and Tizi-Ouzou. The novelist Mouloud Mammeri and playwright Kateb Yacine made no secret of their suspicions about a "deceptively democratic process, entirely controlled in reality by the party bureaucracy and leading to conclusions elaborated in advance, perpetuating the absolute primacy of Arab-Islamic values."

"Culture," Mr Kateb Yacine told us, "is not something that can be turned on or off at will. Culture is life, and first of all it needs freedom and non-conformity to flourish." In fact, quite a few leaders of the Popular Culture Movement are expressing their reservations about the very idea of a "cultural charter." "The written word assumes such a sacrosanct character in Islamic countries," we were told by one of them, "that a document of that sort could become a real millstone around our necks instead of an instrument of emancipation."

Discussions organized "at the base" by the FLN, even though they drew only a minority of citizens, did have the virtue of highlighting in its full scope Algeria's cultural barrenness in every field and at all levels. The number of cinema houses, theaters, auditoriums, and art galleries built since independence is minute; the old structures are so rundown that some of these establishments have had to be closed for health or safety considerations. Theatrical and musical creativity is insignificant. A number of Algerian writers, particularly

those writing in French, are published abroad. "From 1962 to 1979," wrote EL MOUDJAHID recently, "or in other words during the 18 years of our independence, about 1,800 works of all kinds have been published by some 46 public and private Algerian publishers, or an average of 100 per year. In absolute terms, or even in comparison to other medium-sized countries, the nation's intellectual output appears ridiculously low."

Only the cinema, at least for a time, escaped this stagnation and acquire international fame owing to directors like Bouamari, Merzak Allouache and Lakhdar-Hamina, who got the Gold Palm at Cannes for his "Chronique des Annees de Braise." But in a number of cities and towns the only meeting halls are the mosque and the only cultural events Islamic conferences, which are especially numerous in the month of Ramadan.

Journalistic accounts stress that many participants emphasized the necessity of promoting arabization "from the perspective of unification and openness" and with the aim of promoting Islamic values. The popular debate was accompanied in the press by a broad exchange of views in which some intellectuals participated, among them Mostefa Lacheraf, the former minister of education and author of "Algeria: Nation and Society,"* Dr Otmane Saadi, and Professor Abdelghani Megherbi.

Dr Ibrahimi's Study

The most notable contribution was doubtless that of Dr Taleb Ibrahimi, minister-counselor in the office of the president of the republic, who published in EL MOUDJAHID, under the pseudonym Ibn El Hakim ("the master's file") [sic], a long study entitled "Reflections on the Algerian National Personality." If anything could defuse the Kabyle issue, that study could do it. The author praises Algeria's Berber past and does not hesitate to write: "These were long-ago times, but it is our duty to revive their memory, especially by honoring in various ways the memory of our country's illustrious sons such as Massinissa, Jugurtha, Micipsa, Juba the First..."

Emphasizing the intermixing of peoples which took place in the centuries following the Arab invasions, he concludes: "While in terms of dialects there are Arabic-speaking and Berber-speaking people, we can say without any reservations that by their origin and cultural inheritance, Algerians are Arab-Berbers." He stresses, however, that for 13 centuries the country had only one written language: classical Arabic, "which, moreover, was often taught intensely in the Berber dialect regions than in the region of Arabic dialect for the sake of Islam." And he concludes from this: "The Arabic language is therefore the legitimate national language."

As such it constitutes a "cohesive factor" and "its popularization is indispensable for the strengthening of national unity."

But this conclusion does not, for all that, lead to the disappearance of the regional languages. "Neither the nation nor the state which is its expression

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*Published by Maspero, Paris, 1976 (2nd Edition).

could with impunity require an artificial conformity which would tend either to deny or efface that which in the popular culture or one or several regions constitutes a heritage from the past. The diversity of traditions and tongues is part of the national identity."

Dr Taleb Ibrahimi calls for the creation in several universities of "centers of Berber studies" in order to "reconstitute clearly and objectively the threads of Algeria's past."

The minister, finally, who by resorting to a pseudonym wanted to show that his participation in the debate was not of an official character, reflects at length on the notion of Arabism. He defines Algeria as an "Arab-Muslim" country and asserts: "The existence of unique national features and the diversity of processes which have led to the building of different nations and sometimes of veritable nation-states do not give us any license to juxtapose the nations that exist today and that 'Arab nation' so often evoked. It is essential to see clearly that, on the one hand, that there are very concrete realities, and on the other, that aspirations and one idea endure, even though the psychological motivations and the cultural factors are real and powerful."

The "Arab Nation"

That article brought a response from Dr Otmane Saadi. In a study published in CHAAB, an Arabic language daily, this academic maintained that "the Berbers are of Arabic origin, ethnically and culturally."* He concluded that the "Algerian people" are an integral part of the "Arab nation" and cannot constitute a separate nation. The argument is not new. It had been all the rage in 1976, at the time when the National Charter was being discussed, and it ended with a compromise since that document stipulates that Algeria is "one nation and one people."

The debate on the "cultural question" has thus been more than strictly academic, and it has brought to light the existence of divergent currents even within the regime. Have the leaders of the Berber cultural movement chosen the best way to promote their point of view in opting not to participate in the debate? True, they have taken advantage of this special period of dialogue and openness to score several points: the creation of cultural "groupings" on the sidelines of all the official structures, the organization of "spontaneous" courses in the Berger language in the universities of Algiers and Bab Ezzouar.

But in the capital city at least these fragile "gains" were undone following the Student Day confrontations 19 May that pitted supporters of popular culture against Arab nationalist elements under the banner of Islam. There has been a great deal of speculation in Algiers on the origin of these incidents, and some do not discount the possibility of deliberate provocation. In any event, the security forces now tightly control access to the university and the activities of the "cultural groups" have been banned and leaders arrested.

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*Editor's Note: This is also Col Qadhdhafi's theme.

The "cultural question" remains a subject of burning interest, and the decisions of the central committee are being anxiously awaited, especially at Tizi-Ouzou. The situation in Kabyle remains tense, as was shown by the serious incidents that took place at Bejaia on 19 May. The remarks made at the opening session by the head of state, the presence of Mostefa Lacheraf--known for his openness, modernity, and moderation--on the board set up to organize the deliberations of the session--leave room for hope that the spirit of conciliation will carry the day and that a consensus can be achieved on a cultural charter that would be acceptable to everyone.

9516
CSO: 4519/25

RAJAVI ADDRESSES 'ARAB BROTHERS' IN LETTER

GF091219 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 11

[Text of letter from Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, to "Arab Brothers," dated 3 September]

[Text] Arab brothers, peace and God's mercy be upon you. I talk to you once again today in view of the increase in torture and executions in Iran. I also address you as a representative of the Iranian national resistance council and as the leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization in Iran so that you will stand by us in the difficult circumstances Iran is passing through. Iran is suffering from a very harch dictatorship. In this critical, historic stage, we need your support for the causes of the democratic Islamic revolution in the face of the regime of Khomeyni and his representatives, who regard themselves as representatives of both God and Islam.

We say to you that everything they are saying and doing in Iran is shamefully false and criminal. The Iranian people no longer trust them. If they have committed shameful acts in the name of Islam there are those who represent true Islam and are paying a high price for it.

I want to say to you that it will be Khomeyni who will fall, while Islam will rise and shine despite all that is happening. Islam will rise as a progressive and democratic regime that will not be hostile to science and knowledge. It is very important for our Arab neighbors and friends to know the truth about what is happening in Iran and to benefit in every way from this experience.

I am confident that Khomeyni's reactionary era will end soon, sooner than you imagine. A new Islamic society will rise in the world, and the true picture of Islam will emerge.

[Signed] Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Iranian Mojahedin-e Khalq organization and representative of the Iranian National Resistance Council.

3 September 1981.

CSO: 4604/8

DEMONSTRATORS ARRESTED IN TEHRAN

NC091552 Paris AFP in English 1544 GMT 9 Sep 81

[Text] Tehran, 9 Sep (AFP)--A newspaper here reported a demonstration by opponents to the Islamic regime for the first time today, while Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni reaffirmed the close link between religion and politics in Iran.

The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper said some 20 young girls were arrested in the capital Monday night while preparing to demonstrate with Molotov cocktails.

The Ayatollah, meanwhile, was meeting with a delegation of imams from the eastern Khorasan Province.

But his office announced over Radio Tehran today that the 81-year-old spiritual leader "will see nobody for two weeks from Saturday, September 12."

The communique gave no reason, but observers here said the Ayatollah had on several previous occasions canceled all visits without explanation.

They noted that he has had many visitors and made several speeches since the fatal bombing on August 30 that killed the president and prime minister.

Today, he said prayer and adherence to the teachings of the ulemas, moslem theological teachers, was not enough to defend the cause of Islam.

"Intervention in political affairs is one of the most important problems for which the prophets came," he told the Khoransan imams.

The Ayatollah said the United States would leave Iran "alone" if it was assured that [words indistinct] as would no longer intervene in political affairs.

Reporting on the attempted demonstration, the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper quoted one of the girls as saying "this type of action occurred often" in the capital.

Meanwhile, 24 alleged government oppositionists were executed between Saturday and Monday in a northern province and west of the capital, two newspapers reported today.

The ISLAMIC REPUBLIC and the KEYHAN newspapers said the accused were members of the leftist Mojahedin and the Marxist Feddayin and Peykar groups. They were condemned for distributing tracts, street fighting, explosions and other "subversive" activities, the newspaper said.

Yesterday, the head of the Islamic Republican Party, Hojjat Ol-Eslam Seyed 'Ali Khamen'i, said 10 members of the party's Central Committee have been killed in terrorist attacks. All were replaced on the 30-member committee, he said.

CSO: 4600/186

CIRCUMSTANCES OF RAJA'I BOMBING EXAMINED

Paris LE POINT in French 7 Sep 81 pp 53-55

[Article by Eugene Mannoni: "Iran--The War of the Mullahs"]

[Text] An unexpected explanation for the terror in Iran: only the high-ranking Khomeynists could have assassinated the president of the republic and his prime minister. The ayatollah's faithful followers are eliminating each other in turn.

Sorrow is certainly besetting the Iranian Shiites.

They have already been bewailing the murder at a certain date in 680 of Hussein, son of Ali, son-in-law and cousin--himself assassinated--of Mohammad. But since the penchant for martyrdom is inextinguishable among them, they have now without letup for the past 2 months been shedding their tears again. Last week they wept over the loss of their president of the republic Ali Raja'i and their prime minister Mohamed Javad Bahonar, both of whom died a violent death on 30 August.

Who, with one blow, would have wanted to decapitate the theocratic and bicephalous regime (head of state and chief of government) of the Ayatollah Khomeyni?

"The Mojahedin of the people" everybody exclaimed both in Tehran and in the West. In Tehran, they were blamed directly and they were deliberately charged so that these opponents could be better decimated; their leader, Massoud Radjavi, sought and found asylum in France with Raja'i's successor, the talkative Bani Sadr. In the West, out of ignorance, because their strength is being overestimated--although that strength is by no means negligible--they were credited with an attack that deprived Khomeyni of his two most famous representatives.

But things are much much less simple. We trust an expert on Iranian affairs who reached Paris after having spent the past 6 months in Tehran. What he knows should certainly be surprising to us.

The Khomeynists Raja'i and Bahonar were victims of other Khomeynists who were seeking revenge for 74 of their own people who were killed on 28 June upon the instigation of the president of the republic, the prime minister, and their friends.

It is in the name of Khomeyni--and unbeknownst to him--that the men who claim to follow him keep killing each other off.

The theocracy is certainly being challenged and attacked from the outside--on the left and on the right. But it is above all among its followers that there is now taking place a struggle without mercy--with explosions responding to explosions and assassination attempts responding to assassination attempts. Terror certainly strikes the dissidents. But, without parodying the night-time trials, without advertising itself as such, it rages also inside the apparently united group of the ayatollahs, the hajatoleslams, and the mullahs, mercilessly settling accounts among them which the Westerners, prisoners of opinions ill-suited for Shiite Iran in the midst of a revolution, are having quite a bit of trouble understanding.

Everything seems less surprising when one observes the manner in which the assassination on 30 August was carried out. On that day (it was another Sunday) in the buildings assigned to the prime minister, a meeting of the higher defense council was being held. In addition to the head of state and the chief of government, about 15 high officials were in attendance, turbaned or not; they had gathered in a room no larger than 50 or 60 meters square. The place was well guarded. The streets all around were under the careful surveillance of the Guardians of the Revolution and members of the revolutionary committees who were flanking the soldiers. Only reliable militants or expected personalities thus were able to get into the building and even more so into the office where the defense council was to deliberate. Now, at this point, an explosive device, precisely timed, sent the state's first and second personalities to the place which the Shiites believe to be paradise. Not counting (we have good reason to assume, although their deaths have not yet been announced) the deputy chief of the Revolutionary guards, the personal delegate of the ayatollah to that meeting, and the representative of the general staff, Colonel Fallahi.

If the perpetrator of the attack was able to get into the inner sanctum, it was because his job called for him to be there. Just as a senior officer got into Hitler's headquarters; in this way, Colonel von Stauffenberg was able to deposit the bomb which on 20 July 1944 failed to kill the nazi dictator.

The effectiveness of the explosion of 30 August was in response to the colossal deflagration which, on 28 June, without going into any further detail, had wiped out the Ayatollah Beheshti, leader of the Islamic Republican Party (the party of Khomeyni), plus four ministers, six deputy ministers, 27 deputies, and a whole lot of pious hierarchs.

Having lived under the imperial regime in Hamburg, the Ayatollah Beheshti belonged to that category of Shiite dignitaries who, having rubbed up against the West--and furthermore holding it in unlimited contempt--were aware of its existence. But they could not without risk ignore it. Nor could they ignore Marxist doctrine, no matter how hateful it may have seemed to them. The Americans--without entertaining any illusions on this subject--consider them to be possible conversation partners: one of the less bad conversation partners.

Now, this category which is relatively open toward the outside world in terms of tactics is opposed, still under the aegis of Khomeyni, by the compact bloc of

clerics and laymen, their faithful followers who, impermeable to the Western or communist universe, only want to read the Koran, the only source of individual or social morality behind laws and politics as far as they are concerned. Sure of their righteousness, they hurl their theocratic challenge at the world like the French revolutionaries of 1792 flung their decapitated enemies "at the heads of kings." Ali Raja'i and Mohamed Javad Bahonar were members of that group.

There is one detail that bothered foreign observers in Tehran.

On 28 June, several moments before the explosion, the Ayatollah Rafsanjani, president of the assembly and friend of Ali Raja'i who attended the meeting, had without plausible reason left the meeting room. This departure quickly looked suspicious to the faithful followers of Beheshti who thereafter were sure that Ali Raja'i (at the time prime minister) and Rafsanjani were both instigators of this massive liquidation.

A thousand ayatollahs (a title meaning both "verse of God" or "sign of God"), 1,200 hajatoleslams ("opinion of Islam") and at least as many mullahs ("teachers") as Iran has mosques, in other words, 200,000--that is a hierarchy which is, as we can see, powerful enough to hold power or to delegate it from the lowest to the highest echelons. It is it and it alone which holds power and glory.

But, at the same time, these members of the high and low clergy, these political-religious officials are a little bit too numerous not to be involved in dissensions, divisions, and oppositions.

The Shiite hierarchy cannot be compared to the Catholic hierarchy. It has no organizational structures. Here we have a multiplicity of religious works, a wealth of varied exegeses of the Koran and the sacred texts which entitle almost all university graduates to the designation of ayatollah or hajatoleslam. With the exception of Khomeyni, of course, every ayatollah is just like the next. He is free to recognize or to deny the spiritual authority--and now the temporal authority --of his brothers in Islam. Now, we know that specialists, jealous of their prerogatives, full of their knowledge, do not always love each other.

In short, heresy easily flares up among rivals who hold on to their privileges, that is, officials of all ranks who have gathered in groups whose revolutionary effervessence exacerbates the antagonisms to the extreme. "Some more rififi among the ayatollahs," one might say in parodying Auguste Lebreton.

Through their hit-men they grant each other no quarter. Like the Bolsheviks between 1930 and 1938, they liquidate each other in turn. Ever since Ali Raja'i was elected president of the republic on 24 July --after holding office for only two months--the religious or lay organizers of the Islamic Republic Party day after day have been falling under the blows of devout assassins. The following were murdered: the Hajatoleslam Beheshti (a relative of the ayatollah), the Tehran deputy Hadsan Ayat, the preacher of Kermanshah, two other influential members of the clergy in the province. Let us stop this listing now which is entirely too long anyway.

Groups outside the big enclave of the clergy undoubtedly may have committed some of these attacks on repeated occasions. But we will note that--although the highly

selective exterminations of 28 June and 30 August are in line with the "suicidal policy" of the Khomeynists--the Mojahedin of the People maintain that they did not take any part in that. One can believe them. If they had been able to infiltrate so close to the highest instances, they would already be in power. But their leader, Massoud Radjavi, had to go into exile in France--just like Bani Sadr. Both "a traitor to the ayatollah" and "a former supporter of Khomeyni" who, by the same token, repulse the partisans and adversaries of theocracy. Like Gen Gholam Ali Osseivi and Gen Barham Aryana (in the imperial court) who last month, before reaching the border of Iran and Turkey, organized the diversion of the picket boat "Tabarzin." Like the subtle and distinguished Shahpur Bakhtiar. Like some 50,000 Iranians, including 10,000 students, the former royalists and the latter more or less pro-Marxist dissidents. Going into exile at this point in time is not a sign of strength.

The Khomeynists now have the field to themselves, if only to kill each other off. They settle their quarrels among each other. Terror is essentially internal although it certainly without pity strikes the "accomplices" of the enemies outside. The revolution of Allah is devouring itself--under the watchful eyes of the officers. Can they do anything? Purges and exile have disorganized their caste. Their monarchist past has made them suspects which have not yet been rehabilitated as a result of the stagnant war against Iraq. Diplomats think that what remains of the army is not yet ready to go into action.

In silence, in other words, rather skillfully, the Soviets are also watching. They have a long practical history in Iran which they know almost as well as Afghanistan. Did they not in 1925 and then in 1941 occupy the Iranian part of Azerbaidjan, the twin brother of Soviet Azerbaidjan? It is there, in the Caucasus of the Georgian Joseph Stalin, that the communist party became strong, that the Tudeh party which is linked to the USSR and which, making as if it is forgetting Marx in order to respect Mohammad, is espousing the cause of the ayatollahs in the hope--not entirely illusory--of some day using it for its own benefit to put an end to anarchy. With the help, if necessary, of the four divisions which Moscow keeps concentrated a bare 250 kilometers from Tehran.

The Iran revolution still contains quite a few vicissitudes. This is an upheaval in depth. Its process may be longer than one thinks. Spiritual detachment from the troubles below? Splendid senility? Ready to detect Satan, Khomeyni proclaims before the corpses of his dead companions that "that which comes from God goes back to God." And the crowds still listen to him in a trance.

Who, in the divided ranks of his faithful followers, could challenge him directly? This would be more than a crime--it would be a sacrilege. One does not joke with the ayatollah--because that is where we are now--who handles the "interim business" of the 12th Imam, descendant of Muhammad, of Ali, and of Hussein, who "went into hiding" one day and whose reappearance the Shiites are expecting.

Opponents Everywhere

"Father, watch out on the right; father, watch out on the left." This recommendation given by Philipp the Bold to John the Good during the 14th century, applies to

Khomeyni in our time. As a matter of fact, the ayatollah's adversaries are not only countless but they are found everywhere.

On the left, first of all, we have the Mojahedin of the People, the fighters of the holy war. They accuse Khomeyni of having betrayed the revolution of 1979. Pro-Islam Marxists, estimated at more than 10,000, they are organized in three groups: the executors, the partisans, and the sympathizers. Skillful and fearless, they have infiltrated the Pasdaran (the Revolutionary Guards), the army, the government, and the clergy. Close to 700 among them were executed by the faithful followers of the ayatollah. Their leader, Massoud Radjavi, followed president Bani Sadr to France.

Still on the left we also have the Fedayin of the People, the "sacrificed," who are Marxists-Leninists. Responsible for taking hostages at the Embassy of Iran in Stockholm, they strongly assist the Kurdish insurgents. Their experience in urban guerrilla warfare goes back to the regime of the shah.

On the right, the ayatollah's chief opponents are the monarchists. They are numerous but they are divided. They are primarily the last square of faithful followers of the shah. They have established themselves in Egypt and maintain the shabanu and crown prince Cyrus Reza, they run Radio Fatherland, and they want to regain the throne of the Pahlavi family.

The Azadegan movement--"the Iranian liberation troops"--number about 15,000 military personnel from the former imperial army; they have organized themselves around the patrol boat "Tabarzin." They are under the direction of Gen Barham Aryana.

In Paris, Princess Azadeh Shafik (daughter of the energetic Princess Ashraf, the shah's twin sister) runs the Free Iran Movement which puts out bulletins and which preaches a "constitutional monarchy."

The Patriotic Organization was founded by Shapur Bakhtiar, the last imperial prime minister, and by Iranian students.

Finally, the former prime minister Ali Amini and Admiral Madani are trying to create a "centrist" tendency.

That leaves us finally with the Tudeh, the Iranian, pro-Soviet communist party. For the time being and for tactical reasons given by its own leaders, it supports Khomeyni. But its following keeps growing. Many people believe that the Tudeh is waiting for its time to come. Close to power, it watches and waits.

5058
CSO:4619/38

SETTLEMENT FUNDS PROVIDED FOR WAR REFUGEES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Aug 81 p 4

[Text] Khorramabad--Engineer 'Abedini, Supervisor of the War Refugee Affairs Foundation of Lorestan Province in a speech explained the accomplished activities of this foundation and said, "With the appropriate fund equivalent to 411,749,000 rials over 150,000 war refugee sisters and brothers have benefited from the welfare and educational services of the War Refugee Affairs Foundation of Lorestan Province." He added, "at the present time around 5800 persons are settled in refugee camps of 'Oman, 4500 in the refugee camp of Salman in Borujerd and 5500 of our war refugee sisters and brothers are in the refugee camp of Abazar and have benefitted from health, medical treatment, and the free food programs of the War Refugee Affairs Foundation of Lorestan." The Foundation pays cash rations to the poor, those without guardians the disabled, and those whom the Foundation has not been able to find jobs for.

Free Booklet

He added that around 100,000 war refugee sisters and brothers in the cities and districts of Khorramabad, Borujerd, 'Aligudarz have been under the supervision of the districts and town committees. Families with monthly incomes of less than 25,000 rials receive a free booklet from the Foundation, and are in two groups. The first group consists of families without income. Rent, food rations, and their other living expenses are all provided by the Foundation. The second group, with incomes of less than 25,000 rials, who are able to pay their rent, receive only food and living expenses. For those with an income of more than 25,000 rials full price booklets are issued and they may shop in the city and village stores. If they are in need of medical treatment or city services their needs are granted by the Foundation.

Employment Problem

Engineer 'Abedini said, "the main problem of the war refugees all over Iran is the employment problem, and for the same reason in the Lorestan Province a council under his supervision with the participation of the University Crusade has been formed. Problems pertaining to statistics, planning, employment, production and economics are the main aspects of the Council. It has tried to create work in the refugee camps in order to change the immobility and idleness,

which create corruption, to an active atmosphere. For the same reason, the Employment Committee of the Foundation in 'Oman has succeeded in creating jobs for 90 percent of those who are able to work. Also, the Foundation has been able to start the following development activities in the brothers' section:

> Constructing a four-kilometer road by recruiting 150 war refugee brothers. Building of three bathhoused in Dow Rud. These bathhouses are built in the old style in order to minimize the use of iron girders and cement, the shortages of which are visible in the market. Two of these bathhouses have been built.
>
> Introduction of 50 war refugee brothers to the municipality of Dow Rud for working in city sewerage project. Their salaries are paid by the Foundation.
>
> Erection of ten schools in Borujerd. Three-hundred war refugees were hired for this purpose.
>
> Establishment of telephone lines in Ashtarinan and study of waterway canals for thousands of hectars of irrigated farms in Ezna. The Foundation has been able to hire 80 war refugees in Maysam Malari also.

In Ahazar Ezna camp with the help of war-refugee brothers, under the supervision of the Foundation, 2000 units of residential houses are being built and at present 570 of these units are ready for occupancy.

The Supervisor of Lorestan Martyr Foundation added, "the most important part of the recruitment project from an activity point of view is the women's section."

The purpose of the formation of this section is employment and production. The main activities of these sections are as follows:

> 1. The establishment of a laundry plant. All donated clothes are washed, pressed, and packaged in this laundry plant and are delivered for the use of war refugee brothers and sisters. This plant has 20 employees.
>
> 2. Sewing workshop activities which consist of two parts, training and production.
>
> a. Training. Twenty trainees participate in a two-month sewing course under the supervision of two teachers. After the completion of the course these trainees start to work as dressmakers. The best trainees receive a sewing machine as an award.
>
> b. Production. In this section sewing machines and material are given to the housewives by the Foundation. Their products

are purchased with a fixed price set by the Foundation and are sold cheaper in the coop shops to the war refugees. So far, two hundred persons are working on the production branch and their weekly income is around 700,000 rials.

Weaving loans are also given to the war refugees and their products such as gloves, hats, scarves and wool stockings are purchased and are used in the cold season by the soldier brothers and revolutionary guards. So far around forty persons have requested weaving loans in Khorramabad and received the loans. The above programs have been carried out in all the cities and refugee camps in Lorestan.

Finally he pointed out the training activities of the Foundation, and said, "In the refugee camps some schools have been established under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and the teachers' salaries are paid by the Foundation. In the cities and provinces the war refugee students are studying in the city and rural schools."

9815
CSO: 4640/89

NEW FOREIGN EXCHANGE RULES ADOPTED FOR STUDENTS ABROAD

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Aug 81 p 4

[Article: "Those Who Have Double Citizenship or Permanent Residence Permits Are Not Entitled to Receiving Foreign Exchange"]

[Text] New rules have been announced to govern the remittance of foreign exchange to Iranian students abroad. The announcement was contained in a circular released by Dr 'Arefi, the Minister of Culture and Higher Education. According to the circular which was put at the disposal of KEYHAN by the Educational Evaluation Organization, all the student attendance certifications issued in the host countries would have to be certified by the consular missions of the Islamic Republic in the countries concerned. Also, receipt of foreign exchange would be authorized on the basis of a student foreign exchange file to be opened (for each student) in accordance with the relevant forms filled out and sent to the Student Affairs Organization.

According to the circular, those who cannot be the beneficiaries of student foreign exchange are as follows:

1. Those who are enrolled in the first or second year of unnecessary graduate courses or in the first year of other unnecessary degree earning courses in the academic year 1360-61 (1981-82).

2. Those who have the following types of citizenship or residence:

a. Double citizenship of Iran and of a second country;

b. Immigrants to other countries; and,

c. Holders of permanent residence cards or permits.

3. Those who have been found out by the missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the relevant host countries or by the Student Affairs Organization to have committed forgery or cheated in the documents they have submitted regarding their student status;

4. Those to whom foreign exchange has been remitted through more than one bank branch at a given time.

5. The undergraduate or graduate students whose parents are permanent residents of a foreign country.

6. The undergraduate and graduate students whose parents hold double citizenship and are residing abroad.

7. The students who are not followers of any of the official religions of Iran.

8. Those who have left the country after 9 Ordibehesht 1359 (29 April 1980) through channels other than the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education.

9. Those who do not hold a valid passport nor a valid student visa for the country where they study.

10. Those who are enrolled in non-accredited educational institutions. (The creditability of the institutions are determined by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education).

11. Those who study on part-time basis, or audit, or take correspondence and adult education courses.

12. Those whose studies do not lead to the attainment of an academic degree.

13. Those who have enrolled, after 9 Ordibehesht 1359 (29 April 1980) in courses that are equivalent to or lower than the degree level of their previous education.

14. Those who are enrolled in dancing or music courses, at any level.

15. Those who have scholarships granted by Iranian organizations or by foreign governments or organizations.

16. Those who study in Eastern Bloc countries against the rules set by the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

17. Those who study in primary or secondary schools.

18. Those who begin their graduate or matriculation studies beginnings with the first summer term of 1981.

19. Those who begin to study in the Associate or Arts degree of OND [Ordinary National Diploma], ONC [Ordinary National Certificate], TEC [Technical Education Certificate], HND [Higher National Diploma, or similar or equivalent courses in the academic year 1360-61 (1981-82). Those who have been enrolled in those courses prior to the above-mentioned date can receive student foreign exchange till the completion of their courses. Such students may continue their studies in the said courses so long as they satisfy the other conditions contained in the circular.

Meanwhile, those who are already enrolled in Associate Degree (A.D.) courses which can be followed up by Bachelor of Arts courses may continue to draw student foreign exchange till the end of their current courses.

20. Those who left the country after finishing high-school and have been enrolled in language and matriculation courses longer than the following lengths of time (as from the date of their departure from Iran):

a. More than 2+1/2 years in language and matriculation courses for admission into universities requiring the completion of such courses by the candidates.

b. More than one year in language courses for enrolling in universities not requiring the completion of matriculation courses (such as American universities).

21. Those who do not observe any of the following conditions:

a. Completing at least 12 credits in each term or the equivalent of that in non-credit systems (30 term credits or 45 quarter credits each year).

b. Exceeding the approved duration of their study. The maximum permissible period of study in a B.A. course in universities requiring matriculation courses is six years inclusive of the period of the latter course plus that for learning the language, or five years in the case of other universities, including the period of language study. (In the case of France, the B.A. course is considered in terms of "maitrise" which is a maximum of 5-1/2 years).

c. In the final term of the B.A. course, the student can be exempted from the litication of duration of study in case there are more credits to be earned for completing that term.

d. The students in post-graduate (above Masters degree) courses must be recognized as full-time students by the educational institutions concerned. The maximum period of the courses for M.A. students is two years and for doctoral courses after M.A. courses four years. At any rate, the maximum period of study in courses such as Ph.D., or "Etat" courses after B.A. study, is six years.

e. In the countries where enrolling in universities after earning a high school diploma in Iran would lead straight to the attainment of a Masters Degree, the duration permitted for study in the universities requiring pre-university study is eight years, inclusive of the period of the language and of the pre-university courses, or seven years in the case of other universities.

22. Those studying for a Bachelor Degree whose grade point average is lower than 1.75 under the 1 to 4 point-grading system (such as in the United States) or the equivalent of that in other systems.

23. Those studying for a Bachelor Degree whose grade point average is higher than 1.75 under the 1 to 4 point-grading system (such as in the United States) and their grade point average has fallen short of 2.5 or its equivalent under other rating systems in two successive terms.

24. Those whose annual grade point average in the Masters Degree after the spring term in 1981 was lower than 2.5 in the 1 to 4 point-grading system or the equivalent thereof in other rating scales.

25. Those studying at the post-graduate level whose grade point average for two successive terms has fallen below the 3 mark in the 1 to 4 point-grading system (as in the United States) or the equivalent thereof under other systems.

26. Those who are studying in specializing or post-doctoral courses. (They can receive only the balance of the foreign exchange allowance after the cash or non-cash grants by the relevant educational institutes have been deducted).

27. Those whose age exceeds 37 years at any point during their study (with the maximum age being 37 years in the last year of study). The following cases are excepted:

a. Where the student will graduate by the end of the academic year 1359-60 (1980-81).

b. Where the students are now in the second year of study or higher in the doctoral courses (at the post-graduate level).

c. Where the student is studying in a post-doctoral course.

28. Those who are studying in India or Pakistan without regard to quota nor to course permissibility.

29. All the previous circulars which have been issued by this Ministry to govern the foreign exchange matters and other benefits pertaining to students abroad are countermanded as of the date of the serving of this circular.

30. Transfer to the required courses or to another accredited educational center is permissible in conformance with the other rules set down in this circular. (Transfer from one country to another is to be effected with the approval of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education).

9695
CSO: 4640/74

NEW WAGE REGULATIONS ANNOUNCED FOR WORKERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 4 Aug 81 p 14

[Interview with Deputy Minister of Labor for Supervision of Labor Relations Hasan Mo'tamed Reza'i]

[Text] In an interview with the press, radio and television, Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Hasan Mo'tamed Reza'i, gave the reporters the full text of the plan for payment of bonus to workers based on increased productivity.

According to the new plan, workers of all the productive and industrial plants covered by the Labor Law are entitled to the benefits of the plan while enjoying the advantages of the Workers Secured Interests Law. Mo'tamed Reza'i noted that with the abolition of the profit-sharing law and its being superseded with the Workers Secured Interests Law, owners of the plants which were subject to the previous law were obligated to pay each worker a maximum of 85,000 rials per year to compensate for the loss of his income from his share under the said law and also as New Year gratuity and annual bonus. The sum was expected to be equal to 60 days pay on the basis of the workers' wage payable on a pro rata basis for 12 months work a year.

It was expected, he said, that with the new plan, certain regulations would be laid down aimed at stepping up the production level in various workshops, and for determining the amount of productivity bonus for the workers of such workshops. However, the rapid developments resulting from the Islamic Revolution prevented this. But toward the latter part of the year 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81], a note was added to the said bill which required that only for that year a maximum bonus of 20 days fixed wages be paid to the workers for and in proportion to the increased productivity in their plants. The regulations under the said note applied only to the year 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81] whereas increased productivity is a permanent phenomena. Therefore, along with the signing of collective agreements in accordance with Article 35 of the Labor Law, procedures were devised which would supersede the procedures under the additional note ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly solely for the year 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81] and would, at the same time, assure the profit share of the workers in connection with higher productivity. This provision was designed to meet the need of the revolutionary society and of the work atmosphere and to encourage the workers affected by the Labor Law to raise productivity along with higher quality.

Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, Hasan Mo'tamed Reza'i, described the plan for payment of bonus to workers on the basis of increased productivity as follows:

The Rules of the Plan for Increased Productivity

1. Bonus for increased productivity will be paid on the basis of the production standards of different plants.

2. Production standards of various plants which will form the basis for bonus payments are determined by taking into consideration of and on the basis of (a) uniformity of production, (b) average annual production per capita of the previous years, (c) time measurement, and (d) normal and practical methods of operation followed in each plant. Of these methods the one which produces the highest production figures will be taken as the basis for figuring and determining production standard.

Note: The highest figure of production standard of a plant is the figure on the basis of which production increase goes above that of 30 percent.

3. The basis for calculating the amount of bonus for increase production will be one percent of the workers' wages in line of the percentage of the increased production. The method for distribution of the bonus among plant workers will be determined in direction to be issued by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

Note 1. The basis for calculation of the above-mentioned bonus in plants where the average monthly wages of workers is more than 35,000 rials is 3/4th of one percent of the workers' fixed wages.

Note 2. In plants where present production level is below the standard level, the basis for calculating bonus payment until the standard is reached is 2/10th of the fixed wages of the workers for every one percent of increase in production. The lowest acceptable level of production for calculating the above amount will be 65 percent of the standard production of the plant.

Note 3. Methods for calculating the negative effects of increased waste and losses resulting from production increase above the level permitted in every plant should be mentioned in agreements regarding payment of bonus for increased productivity.

4. Workers in charge of material and production quality control are not entitled to bonus paid for increased productivity but management is authorized to pay these workers, depending on their efforts in upgrading production quality, up to 30 percent of their fixed monthly wages.

5. Intermittence period for calculation of the amount of bonus for increased production in the plant will be monthly but it could also be quarterly subject to the approval of the two parties (labor and management). The intermittence period during the time the work contract is in force is unchangeable and if at the end of the intermittence period there was no increase in production level, no matter why, there would be no bonus payment whatsoever.

6. The contract under which increased production bonus is paid should not be for less than one year and the approved contracts become effective as of the first day of the same year (in which they are approved).

7. Units that already have contracts concerning productivity, bonus for increased production, percentage payment for efficiency must continue implementing them without any changes that could result in increased production cost or renew their contracts in accordance to the new plan.

8. In cases where major changes occur in the plant such as in investment, labor force, installation of additional equipment, etc., that could effect the basis of production standard in connection with the increased production, the basis should be changed effective as of the date the changes have taken place.

9. The taking into consideration of the special cases of each plant in the contracts for payment of bonus for increased production is permissable provided it does not violate these regulations (the new plan for payment of bonus to workers).

10. Contracts about payment of bonus to workers for production increase are valid and applicable after they are approved by the two parties and receive the written approval of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

Note: Units that are under the government supervision or are associated with the government and revolutionary institutions must receive the approval of their related organizations before presenting their contracts on payment of bonus to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

11. To ensure the smooth implementation of the terms of the contracts regarding payment of bonus to workers committees should be set up by every workshop. These should be composed of two representatives of the Islamic Councils of workers, two representatives from management and one of the supervisors elected by other supervisors in the workshop. The committee will act as observer and will be responsible for settling differences arising from the contract through compromise.

Note: In the absence of a legal Islamic Council in the workshop two people representing workers will join the committee.

On the basis of the increase in production, bonus to workers will be paid in accordance to the following formula:

The total amount of bonus for increased production of the plant will be based on calculations referred to in Article Three and related notes intermittently. The said amount will be distributed among workers on the basis of acquired points gained by each worker.

The method for figuring acquired points of each worker is as follows:

A. Acquired points collected by each individual worker are the total points resulting from five factors.

1. Maximum of 30 points for attendance. This is collected by those workers who were not late or absent from work in any given month. For every hour of justifiable absence or lateness and absence due to work-related incidents they will lose two points. The minimum point of this factor is zero.

Explanation: In workshops where the work alternation period is more than one month points will be calculated on the basis of the average points during the alternation period.

2. Maximum of 20 points for wages which is calculated on the basis of at least 10 points for wages in addition to one point for every 100 rials of increase.

3. Maximum of 20 points for the workers' length of service which is calculated by adding 2 points for every year of service in the plant.

Explanation: Only newly-employed workers who had been working more than 3 months but less than one year receive 2 points each.

4. Maximum of 10 points for supervision and management. This is gained by workers and other personnel who supervise the work of another person or a group.

Procedure for giving the points is as follows:

One point for every two unskilled and non-technical workers. One point for every semi-skilled and semi-technical worker. Technical and skilled workers receive 2 points each.

5. Maximum of 20 points for efficiency and discipline. This is determined by the workers' direct supervisors by taking into consideration the workers' ability and competence in maintaining tools and equipment as well as their regards for hygienic and safety factors. The decision made in this regard is subject to approval of the supervisory committee.

B. Merit points of workers are calculated according to the following formula:

Merit points are equal to the number of days worked during the alternation period multiplied by the acquired points of a worker divided by the number of working days of the workshop during alternation period.

Secondly, the total amount of bonus for increased production will be divided among the plant's workers in accordance to the following formulas:

The rial value of each point is equal to the total amount of increased production bonus divided by the total merit points of the entire labor force of the workshop.

Production increase bonus of every worker is equal to the rial value of every point multiplied by the merit points of each worker.

9695
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IMPORTS FROM FINLAND RISE TO RECORD LEVELS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 27 Aug 81 p 12

[Report on interview with Gustaf Franck, Finnish trade commissioner in Tehran, by B., in Helsinki; date not specified]

[Text] Iran: revolution, war, street riots, and a bloody wave of executions. The normal operation of a trade office there must be completely paralyzed, right?

Not at all. The figures on Finnish exports to Iran broke all records in 1980, and the first half of 1981 showed even better results than the corresponding period last year. Traditional and nontraditional exports are both doing well, says trade commissioner Gustaf Franck. But construction projects are at a standstill, of course.

So it is "business as usual," even in the chaos that Iran, from our point of view, is going through.

Gustaf Franck does not talk about chaos, however. He refrains from discussing the political situation at all. He is in Tehran to look after Finland's commercial interests, and they seem to be worth looking after: our exports during the first half of this year totaled 265 million markkaa.

"A market of 36 million people is truly something one should concentrate on--it is more than what we are now making a bid for in, for example, a country like Saudi Arabia with only 5.5 million people, or Iraq, which has only half as many inhabitants as Iran."

The construction projects and consulting activity are at a standstill during the war, but pure trade is proceeding unhindered.

"There are, of course, the traditional goods: paper and board. And in the field of processed goods, a lot of paper sacks. But now there are also petrochemical products and electrical equipment. Iran is going in for hydroelectric plants in a big way, and it is interested in any equipment concerned with power transmission. Stromberg has gotten big orders for transformers, and Nokia's chances are also good."

Strained Economy

The Iranian economy must be very strained, so how are the payments coming in for the things we sell?

"When it comes to the old construction projects, there may be some uncertainty about who owes whom. But payments in connection with the new orders have been coming in very well. All the same, I have now had to recommend that our sellers require confirmed letters of credit, and this has not been very well received by Iranian buyers who have been good customers for 30 or 40 years."

Exports to Iran totaled 465 million markkaa last year, and the figure for the first half of this year--265 million markkaa--would seem to indicate further growth, but Franck feels that the results for the second half of this year will be somewhat slimmer.

"That war is costing a lot. Iran is having to import an abnormally large amount of equipment--and through a third country--at high prices. And the level of unemployment is also a burden to the economy. There is also a shortage of people in top positions who are used to thinking along economic lines, so obviously some mistakes are made."

Quite Calm

How noticeable is the war itself in Tehran?

"At first it was noticeable. There was a total blackout and, of course, a number of quite effective bombing raids. But now people don't bother a bit about the blackout. On the anniversary of the revolution, for example, everything was lit up. There are alerts now and then, but one has the feeling that they are sometimes used to help quell a demonstration or to save electricity.

"The telephone has worked remarkably well, at least internally. At first there were power failures, but they are less frequent now; that may be because so many plants using electricity are idle, but also because electricity production has increased. Communications have always been a little difficult. They have now introduced zones where unauthorized auto traffic is banned before noon. The gasoline ration for ordinary Iranians, which was 30 liters per month at the start of the war, has now been increased to 60 liters."

Franck mentioned that the general aspect of the downtown area has naturally changed now that perhaps 100,000 Westerners have moved away. The restaurants close early, and music and dancing are banned. Some movie houses are operating, showing mostly films of violence. There is really no public entertainment.

Cover Your Blond Hair!

Are Westerners in general in danger from people on the street--are they regarded as American or French?

"Ordinary people on the street probably could not easily distinguish between Americans and other fair-skinned types. I myself have not noticed any animosity--but with my dark coloring, it is possible that I blend into the crowd more easily."

Gustaf Franck's wife Iris was actually attacked as she stood in front of a shopwindow in downtown Tehran. A man tried to set fire to her hair and burn her eyes with a cigarette. But that may very well have been just an instance of the hooliganism that

can happen anywhere. In any case, she has become more careful about where she goes without an escort--and she doesn't let her hair be seen.

'Where we live, in the city's upper, northern section--very near Khomeyni's residence, incidentally--it is quite calm. But the very fact that we live near the leader means that we are sometimes checked when we come home at night."

Meaningful Job

Franck's circle of friends includes mostly other Scandinavians and Europeans. Contact with local officials is difficult, because they avoid foreigners as a precaution. But individual Iranian businessmen willingly accept invitations to dinner at home, since there is a mutual need for information.

How about other information?

"Two English-language newspapers are published, and of course they represent the regime's views very rigidly. But we regularly listen to the BBC on shortwave and also to the Finnish news, which is broadcast from the transmitter in Bjorneborg at 1930 hours Tehran time."

Gustaf Franck, who at the moment is vacationing in Helsinki with his wife, will have been stationed in Tehran 6 years this fall.

Isn't that beginning to seem like enough?

"I don't know--this has certainly been the most meaningful job I have ever had!"

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BRIEFS

BAKHTIAR-ARYANA ALLIANCE SUPPORT--Many Iranians residing in Canada, Germany and Britain have expressed their support for the unity and solidarity between the national resistance movement of Iran and the Azadegan organization. In statements issued on this occasion in Hamburg, London and Ottawa, our refugee compatriots have praised solidarity between combatant national groups as a great step toward the liberation of Iran. The Iranians living in Germany, Canada and Britain have also expressed their support for the students who are on a hunger strike in the Amnesty International building in Paris, and in their statements they have called on international organizations to end its silence on the numerous executions in Iran. [Text] [NC281556 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 28 Aug 81]

ATTACK ON KHOMEYNI'S RESIDENCE--Quoting ETTELA'AT newspaper, world news agencies report that some time ago combatants, opposing the mullahs' usurping regime, attacked Ruhollah Khomeyni's residence in Jamaran. Following this incident the regime has ordered the area around Jamaran base to be surrounded with anti-air tanks. [as heard] We wish to recall that the Voice of Iran newscast reported some days ago that Khomeyni is taken to the Niavaran village at night and returned to Jamaran in the morning escorted by revolution guards. [Text] [NC091355 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 8 Sep 81]

GUARDS' GARRISON ATTACKED--[Summary from poor reception] Our correspondent reports from Tehran that following the assassination of officials, explosions and the "pitiless attacks by combatants on the hirelings revolution guards corps" intensified measures for the security of the guards corps, the committees and similar organizations have been taken. After contacting an official of the revolution guards corps our correspondent says that (?fearing antiregime combatants) the revolution guards have surrounded their garrison in 'Eshratabad with heavy artillery, banning traffic and pedestrians within a radius of 500 meters." Our correspondent adds that recently the garrison was attacked by opponents of the regime. [NC091400 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 8 Sep 81]

TEHRAN DEMONSTRATIONS--Tehran, 9 Sep (AFP)--Several people were killed and some 40 people injured here today when armed security forces moved in to break up three demonstrations in central Tehran organized by the underground left-wing people's Mojahedin organization, hospital sources said. They said a "certain number of people" were killed but gave no details on the number or affiliation of the victims. Most of those injured, and revolutionary guards were among them, were hit on the square and avenue Vali-Asr, the capital's main artery, the sources said. Several witnesses said gunfire was exchanged for close to an hour on Vali-Asr Avenue after two demonstrations there were broken up. One of them said revolutionary guards shot at a car speeding by. [Text] [NC091821 Paris AFP in English 1815 GMT 9 Sep 81]

CALL FOR 'POPULAR COUNCILS'--Paris, 9 Sep (AFP)--Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of Iran's Mojahedin, the leftwing Islamic organization, called here for the setting up of "popular councils" in his country, so as to "rid it of the evil of reaction." Mr Rajavi, who accompanied Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr into exile here last July 29, made his appeal in a communique issued on the 17th anniversary of the foundation of the Mojahedin movement. "It is time," the communique said, "that the population of each (Iranian) town and each village, of each street and each avenue, liberate its neighborhood, without fear and with total trust in God in the people, alongside the national council of national resistance. The reaction of such a body was jointly proclaimed by Mr Bani-Sadr and Mr Rajavi upon their arrival. According to Mr Rajavi, more than 1,000 Mojahedin have so far been killed this year in Iran and close to 10,000 put in prison. The Mojahedin leader called on Iranians to "destroy the last vestiges of reaction so as to build a new, free and advanced society where liberation and abundance will reign in place of fear and terror." [Text] [NC092010 Paris AFP in English 1951 GMT 9 Sep 81]

CSO: 4600/186

PROFILE GIVEN OF ASHKENAZI CHIEF RABBI GOREN

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 28 Aug 81 pp 10, 11

[Article by Asher Wallfish]

[Text]

ASHKENAZI Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren's concern over the City of David dig on the southern slope below Temple Mount has been fuelled with an intensity of purpose, reminiscent of past issues which got the 64-year-old divine up in arms.

This time, however, there seems no doubt that an additional objective is motivating Goren: the wish to remain chief rabbi after his term expires.

Under the present Chief Rabbinate Council Law, that is absolutely impossible. This law, enacted in March 1980, enabled Goren and his Sephardi colleague, Chief Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, to continue serving until the next elections for the posts. These are to be held not later than Nissan 1, 5743 (March 15, 1983). But the two incumbents will be ineligible for re-election.

Rabbis Goren and Yosef were first elected for five years in October 1972. But the Knesset voted three times — in 1977, 1978 and 1979 — to extend their terms for a further year, while the National Religious Party and its minister for religious affairs dithered and prevaricated, until finally the law was restructured in its present 1980 form, to the immense indignation of the two incumbents.

The legislative ban on their standing again reflected the vicious quarrels between the two chief rabbis which, for mutual animosity, probably had no precedent since the era of the Babylonian academies.

The nation's parliamentarians were well aware that Chief Rabbi Yosef was not really at fault; that he could not possibly have turned the other cheek to Goren all the time and that, other things being equal, he *would have* merited the chance to stand again. However, the parliamentarians realized that there was no way of allowing Ovadia Yosef to be a candidate while barring Goren, so willy-nilly they drafted a bill that would make the two men sink together.

Thus, having made Yosef's life a misery, Goren also became responsible for cutting his career short; for while the Ashkenazi chief rabbi would have had no chance of being re-elected, it was undoubtedly otherwise with his Sephardi opposite number.

Then, after the law was passed, a miracle occurred. A change came over the two men. Israel's most notorious pair of enemies were suddenly seen together in public. The two chief rabbis started cooperating in various projects. Goren began praising the dignity and learning of the man who had once complained: "I am swallowing nails because of Goren. I suffer his whips as well as his scorpions all the time."

Goren assumed that, since it was his feud with Yosef that had inspired the clause barring their further candidacies, he might have a chance of persuading the Knesset factions to amend the law if he and Yosef maintained an idyll of tranquil and friendly collaboration over a substantial period.

He undoubtedly also assumed this month that a firm stand against the secular trend over an issue like the City of David dig, would prove that he was a man of unswerving principle, and scotch once and for all Orthodox allegations that he is a pragmatist — allegations which have dogged him ever since the early '50s, when as chief chaplain of the IDF he issued a learned opinion concerning the use of electric current during festivals.

GOREN'S IS a fascinating and complex personality. Few would question his learning. Born in Zambrow, Poland, in 1917, he was brought to this country at the age of 10 as Shlomo Goronchik, his first home being in Kfar Hassidim near Haifa. He began his religious studies in Jerusalem in 1928, graduating from the Hebron Yeshiva which was moved to the capital following the 1929 massacre in Hebron.

Ultra-Orthodox circles inside the Agudat Yisrael and to its right — which Goren would like to placate today in the City of David controversy — have never forgiven him, as a graduate of one of this country's most conservative yeshivot, for hitching his wagon first to the star of Mapai-Labour, and then to the star of the National Religious Party.

Goren's physical courage is as widely esteemed as his learning. In 1936, when the Mufti's gangs launched their anti-Jewish riots, he became a supernumerary policeman in Jerusalem. During the War of Independence in 1948, he became a sniper in Jerusalem, then was switched to a heavy machinegun crew. He broke his leg jumping to earn his paratrooper's wings. He rode with the front-line troops who crashed into the Old City of Jerusalem in the Six Day War, and conducted the first prayers to be held at the Western Wall in 19 years.

Few would question the claim that Goren made it possible for observant soldiers to serve in the IDF without worrying about violating *Halacha*. He was totally dedicated to giving fallen soldiers proper burial, and his concern to license remarriage for the widows of servicemen missing in action, such as the sailors of the submarine Dakar, have won him immense praise.

He put Israeli conversion procedures on a new and smoother footing, virtually eliminating conversion as a problem in this country. And he solved the so-called *mamzerim* problem.

THE ULTRA-ORTHODOX who query Goren as an *halachic* authority are a clearly-defined minority. But those who criticized him for his erratic ways, his political involvement, his public appearances, and his human relations, can be found in every part of the public spectrum.

Goren always had a penchant for showmanship, drama and exaggeration. In the '50s, when he was fashioning his image as Israel's number one soldier-rabbi, his fellow officers in the IDF affectionately nicknamed him the *Chizbatnik* the Tall-story Teller. When there was a retaliatory raid against the Kalkilya police station in the period before the Sinai Campaign, Goren went forward with the troops and came back with four different versions of his role and his whereabouts, each more colourful than the last.

Early on, he began acting out a spiritual role which he planned to fulfil eventually for the entire nation, using the Chaplaincy Corps as a logical stepping-stone. In 1952, at the celebrations in Meron for Lag Ba'omer, a festival whose links with our military annals and prowess are slender, he led an IDF unit to the centre-stage of the event. Four young soldiers, their bayoneted rifles supporting a wedding canopy, were followed by a second armed unit, for a ceremony around the Israeli flag. Goren made an exhortatory speech and got tens of thousands of Lag Ba'Omer pilgrims to roar out *Shema Yisrael* in unison. A few years later, in 1958, he went to Meron in command of a whole motorized column, which transported a Tora scroll under a canopy supported by bayonets.

GOREN'S flamboyant style, which won the hearts of the simple masses, in the way that the showmanship of certain politicians has also proven unbeatable more recently, was legitimized by his close ties with the late David Ben-Gurion, and with IDF personalities such as Moshe Dayan.

Ben-Gurion liked to talk to Goren about philosophy and the classics, subjects on which Goren had attended lectures at the Hebrew University in the early '40s. Ben-Gurion saw Goren's wedding of the army and religion as a positive embodiment of *mamlachtiut* (the centrality of national sovereignty as a value). Here was a graduate to the hard-core, conservative Hebron Yeshiva, that nest of enmity towards Ben-Gurion, who was willing to collaborate with an agnostic socialist prime minister, and seek relatively progressive solutions to modern *halachic* problems.

Accordingly, Ben-Gurion as defence minister gave Goren a free hand. Brooking no opposition in the Chaplaincy Corps, Goren took to absolute power like a duck to water.

JUST AS in later years, Goren begrudged the attention enjoyed by Ovadia Yosef, he made sure, in the IDF, that his eventual and natural successor, Rabbi Mordechai Piron, was kept out of the limelight. For years he denied Piron the title of deputy, and is said to have personally removed a sign describing him as such from Piron's office door. In order not to upset his commander, Piron had to be content for a long time with the title, "Permanent Acting Chief Chaplain."

After the Yom Kippur War, Goren tried to settle accounts with Piron in an extraordinarily machiavellian manner. He "planted" a question in a radio interview programme in order to give himself an opportunity of criticizing Piron for neglecting his duties to the bodies of fallen soldiers. The ploy backfired: he drew massive condemnation on himself for causing further anguish to the bereaved families.

Goren's spite against his own brother-in-law, Rabbi She'ar Yashuv Cohen, is legendary. When Cohen wanted to stand for election as Haifa city rabbi, Goren denied him the necessary certificate of qualification, because Cohen had questioned the chief rabbi's views

on the famous case of the Langer brother and sister, who, according to *Halacha*, were *mamzerim* Simultaneously, Goren denied the same document to the Sephardi candidate for the Haifa post, Rabbi Bakshi Doron, a scholar of great repute. But when the NRP, appalled at Goren's stubbornness, threatened to amend the law, making the certificate unnecessary for city rabbis, he gave both Cohen and Doron their certificates in less than an hour.

JOURNALISTS covering rabbinical affairs had, for many years, either to take dictated news items from Goren or suffer his abuse.

One female reporter, daughter of an eminent orthodox rabbi, who wrote about Goren's attack on his IDF successor, Rabbi Piron, was told over the phone: "You are excommunicated. You shall have no part in the world to come." Another Orthodox reporter, who quoted Goren's critics in the rabbinical world, was blasted with the Kabbalistic phrase *Sitra ahra* (the devil's own).

When newspapers gave an account of an event differing from Goren's own version, he would immediately complain to the editor about the writer's malice. As a result, he forced more than one reporter to quit the rabbinical beat in disgust.

CONVINCED that he was destined to be chief rabbi, and certain that Labour support would help him carry the day, Goren made it known, when the post fell vacant on the death of Chief Rabbi Herzog in 1959, that he wanted to stand for election.

However, the country's veteran rabbis, and part of the leadership of the NRP, opposed his candidacy. Squabbles between the NRP and Mapai delayed the election for five years, during which time the country made do without an Ashkenazi chief rabbi.

Outside of Mapai, Goren's religious backing came from the young guard of the NRP, figures like Zevulun Hammer and Yehuda Ben-Meir, who identified with Goren for reasons of age and politics alike. In 1964, Goren lost against the late Isser Yehuda Unterman by three votes, and his adherents immediately protested that ballots against him had been forged.

DURING THE previous five years of politicking, Goren had remained chief chaplain of the forces. As an aluf (brigadier) he stood for the chief rabbinate of Tel Aviv in 1968. His own uncertainty about whether or not he wanted it had helped to keep the post vacant for four years. He was elected by 46 votes against 41 for Rabbi Yedidia Frankel, but did not take up the position for three years. While the city's Ashkenazi community waited, Goren let it be known that he had more important work to do in the IDF. Well-informed circles said he feared the Tel Aviv post might interfere with his prospects in a future chief rabbinate election. But in June 1971 he finally quit the IDF, after 23 years as chief chaplain, and was installed in Tel Aviv.

Sixteen months later, he stood against Unterman again, the first time an incumbent chief rabbi had ever been challenged. With Labour and the NRP solidly behind him, Goren won by 89 votes to 57. Within days, Goren and his Sephardi colleague, Ovadia Yosef, were threatening each other, boycotting each other, and feuding.

Within three months, as *The Jerusalem Post* reported in January 1973, Goren had reduced Yosef to tears. Telling Sephardi leaders of his torments, Yosef said: "I live under a dictatorship.... he bangs on the table and that's it... you don't know what goes on in Hechal Shlomo. I am alone, fighting every step, every day, every hour. I cannot sleep for nights on end before the Rabbinate Council meetings."

Goren soon became involved in coalition politics too. He let himself be used by the young guard of the NRP, in February 1974, when they wanted to prevent the party veterans from joining Golda Meir's coalition. This issue, *prima facie*, was the "Who's a Jew" Law, as the amendment to the Law of Return is traditionally dubbed.

But when Goren ordered the NRP to stay out of the Alignment-led coalition, as it did till September of the same year, there was probably an ideological understanding between the chief rabbi and the NRP young guard over their common aspirations for a Greater Eretz Yisrael and for a new regime which might advance those aspirations.

GOREN HAD a significant effect on the psychological, political and religious consequences of the Six Day War — consequences with which Israelis are still trying to cope.

Trailing clouds of glory, wearing his mantle of warrior-prophet, and endorsed by the authority of the victorious IDF, the rabbi diffused his euphoria throughout the whole of biblical Eretz Yisrael in his mission to restore the nation's ancient greatness in the name of the Almighty.

A report in *The Post* on a symposium addressed by Goren in August 1962 affords dramatic insight into the rabbi's grandiose vision. Five years before the Six Day War, he said: "If we should conquer the Temple Mount today, we would be obliged to build the Temple on it."

The realities of government and the orders of his superiors obviously compelled him to repress and sublimate this, and similar convictions, which fuelled his behaviour later on.

Goren's "firsts" after the Six Day War — first grasping his *shofar* at the Western Wall, first inside Rachel's Tomb, first inside the Machpela Cave — need never have been controversial. But he made them so when he topped them by his helicopter flight to Jebel Musa on the eve of Shavuot to broadcast to the IDF from the very place where, according to tradition, Moses received the Tora from the Almighty. With a retinue of radio reporters and photographers around him on the Jebel, Goren blew a *shofar* and proved beyond any shadow of doubt that he was literally blowing his own trumpet.

From there, it was but a short psychological step to his Tisha Be'av service on the Temple Mount seven weeks later. It was only heavy pressure from the government, especially the Defence Ministry, and admonitions from the two chief rabbis, that compelled him to drop plans for more such services.

Chief Rabbi Goren has perplexed many people by the way his pronouncements fuse acceptable spiritual elements with transcendental rhetoric, which he would like to see as politically self-fulfilling.

There is no simpler example than his statement to Paris Jewry in May 1977: "The Yom Kippur War victory clearly proved that the hand of Providence intervened. We have entered the stage of the third Redemption, from which there is no retreat." □

CSO: 4300/111

RESEARCH MOVES INTO BIOTECHNOLOGY, ROBOTICS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 18 Aug 81 p 10

[Article by Aryeh Greenfield]

[Text]

Israel's industrial researchers are entering two new, and potentially important fields: biotechnology and robotics.

In both areas, efforts now stand more or less where this country's electronics industry stood in the mid-1960s. In both rapid growth seems likely, leading to extensive production and very large exports by the end of this decade.

University research in biotechnology in Israel has a history of many decades, and Israel scientists are abreast of the latest international developments in genetic engineering and other advanced technologies. All that, however, has not yet resulted in significant economic activity.

Two firms have been operating in the field for some time in Rehovot and Nes Ziona. The one, Interpharm, is a subsidiary of Ares Applied Research Systems, a Swiss-based company with extensive high technology interests. Interpharm produces human growth hormone; it projects its exports of that substance at $1.5m. a year.

That, of course, does not satisfy anyone. Only recently the company raised $6m. in new share capital in the New York over-the-counter market, much of it to finance additional research. Significantly, three fourths of the firm's 32-member staff work on R and D projects.

Inter-Yeda is a joint venture of Interpharm and the Weizmann Institute's Yeda Company. Its efforts are devoted to the production of commercial quantities of Interferon, a substance which already has proven its efficacy against certain viral infections. Some scientists believe it also holds promise as remedy for certain types of cancer.

The third business venture in this general sphere was officially inaugurated in Rehovot only last week. Based largely on capital raised by New York financier Frederick Adler, and on previous research at the Weizmann Institute and the Hebrew University, Biotechnology General (Israel) plans to develop and manufacture four preparations that can be of revolutionary importance to agriculture.

One is a novel vaccine against foot-and-mouth disease; a second — bovine growth hormone — is expected to raise milk production by as much as 15 per cent without necessitating an increase in feed consumption. The third will be a biological disease control agent, based on a soil fungus (trichoderma) which destroys many disease-bearing fungi.

Most interesting is the fourth programme, which aims at the development of nitrogen-fixing bacteria. Adding those micro-organisms to grain crop seeds will enable plants to fix nitrogen directly from the atmosphere, rather than requiring large quantities of nitrate fertilizers. Success in this effort will not only reduce farm production costs, but will also eliminate one of the most difficult sources of water pollution.

In the field of robotics, work is only now starting, although the subject has been studied for some time at the Technion. There also are beginnings of robot utilization in some factories.

A Robotics Research Institute is being established within the Technion's Mechanical Engineering Department, to research the subject and to train specialists.

At the same time, the Chief Scientist's Office, in the Industry and Trade Ministry, has announced approval of its first R und D grant in the field of robotics. One of Israel's large manufacturing firms has embarked on a three-year project for the development of a welding and assembly robot. Other projects in this field may well grow out of this country's fairly developed production of computerized numerical control equipment for the machine building industry.

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ECONOMIC POLICIES SAID HINDERING MAJOR PROJECTS

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Sep 81 p 8

[Article by Macabee Dean]

[Text]

TEL AVIV. — The government's economic policies will cause four national projects to remain "on paper" in the foreseeable future, Koor head Naftali Blumenthal, MK (Alignment), yesterday told the annual meeting of the Kibbutz Industries.

He said the four projects were: the continuation of building facilities for the IDF in the Negev; the construction of the third airport in the Negev; the production of the Lavie airplane engine; and the Mediterranean-Dead Sea Canal.

Blumenthal, in a highly critical speech, said that the government's policies were leading to stagnation of the economy in all fields. No economic growth could be visualized under present conditions, "and there are all indications that these conditions of non-growth will continue through 1982." He added that the first half of 1981 saw a drop of 4 per cent (in real terms) of exports (without diamonds), while imports (not including oil and raw diamonds) increased by 10 per cent. At the same time there was a 75 per cent jump in the sale of appliances (such as colour TV sets).

The adverse balance of payments grew by 70 per cent in the first quarter of the year, while investments in industry dropped by 20 per cent, following a drop of 20 per cent in 1980, he said.

He attacked the policies of the Bank of Israel (reducing the volume of credit) and of the Finance Ministry (not signing new contracts with its suppliers). "Industry is a very vulnerable sector — and easily hurt," he said, pointing out that "government ministers don't resign when we cry for help."

The role of the industrialists who wanted to export was steadily deteriorating, and "we are at a disadvantage to the extent of between 10 and 17 per cent in all fields (credits) compared to our opposite numbers in Europe. This gives our competitors there a clear advantage over us."

Blumenthal noted that "so far" there had been few cut-backs in research and development funds. "If cuts begin in R&D, the results can be disastrous." Once industry falls behind in this field, enormous efforts are needed to catch up, he explained.

He called on "all those active in industry" — the economic ministers, the industrialists, the Histadrut and the workers — to get together and work out a "ten-year development plan." By investing $10 billion over the next decade, the amount of industrial exports could be doubled. "Only through such exports can we pare away the growing gap in our balance of payments," he said.

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SOLEL BONE SEEKS NEW INVESTMENTS, VENTURES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Aug 81 p 9

[Article by David Krivine]

[Text]

Solel Boneh started life as a building contractor. It grew and grew, gave many of its workers permanency on the job, with fringe benefits and profit-sharing — as though they were in industrial employment.

The Histadrut-owned company became a giant in the field, concentrating on big projects. It put up all the country's hospitals (as prime contractor), all its universities, built most of the hotels and begat the two atomic research piles, not to mention roads, housing, ports, airfields.

And then in the 1970s the volume of construction activity in Israel fell by one-third.

Almost 50 years have passed since Solel Boneh was established. During that period it was occupied with laying the foundations of the country. In the early 1920s the population was sparse and there were few of the man-made amenities which serve a population's needs.

Now it has all been provided, the nation exists. The backlog of immigrants are housed, the flow of newcomers is down to a trickle. Soon the latest boost to development, given by the redeployment of the army in the Negev, will be finished. There is not as much building to do as before.

What effect does this change have on Solel Boneh? I turned to Ehud Shilo, one of the company's three executive directors (under chairman Shraga Rothman). The last time I interviewed Shilo was in his capacity as director-general of the Transport Ministry. Now he is back in the Histadrut, heading economics and development in Israel's biggest construction firm. "How," I asked him, "are you coping?"

"Our aim is not primarily to make profits, it's to give employment. We cannot put our men on the streets just because the profits aren't coming in," he points out. Solel Boneh had to stay in business, at a time when their main function was not fully economic.

The first answer they came up with was, if we can't build at home, let's try building abroad. Where abroad? The advanced countries are currently recession-prone — particularly in this line of business, having completed their restoration work after World War II. The Middle East oil powers are urbanizing frantically, but Israel has no access to their construction sites. What is left is: the non-Arab Third World.

That seems precious little, but Solel Boneh was not discouraged. In 1970 its foreign turnover was $3-3m., in 1980 almost fifteen times as much, or $468m. The company by now employs more workers overseas than it does at home.

At first glance this export initiative does not seem to serve the company's main purpose. It earns foreign currency, which is a good policy objective in its own right. It keeps the whole enterprise in the black, which is meritorious too. According to Shilo, the export market for his company's building services

is proving more profitable than the domestic market in Israel.

But it does not create jobs for the Israeli work-force, to replace those dwindling local orders. The foreingn-earned turnover in its entirety — equal to the turnover at home — was secured by 850 Israelis only (excluding the foreign labour), out of an employed staff in Solel Boneh twenty times as great.

If the aim is job creation, the place to do it is plainly inside Israel. The company is not blind to this exigency, but claims that the export business helps it to achieve the objective of increased employment indirectly, by supplying the cash.

Cash is needed to prime the pump of economic activity. If jobs are not on offer in Israel, they have to be created. Solel Boneh no longer contents itself with looking for sponsors, it is becoming a sponsor itself. The profits from its overseas operations, together with funds mobilized from other sources, supply the wherewithal.

Results are dramatic. During the last five years, the enterprise has taken on a new role. Hitherto it worked for others, now it works for itself. "We buy land, build on it and sell the end-product. We have under construction at this moment 6,000 flats. Most of them are our property, we offer them on the market." They used to be a contracting company and nothing else, now they are a housing and development company as well.

"We go on creating hotels, but this time as part-owners. We plan industrial zones, construct the factory premises — for leasing. All this needs techniques of financial management, techniques of marketing — things we never had to bother with before."

The advantage of the new role is that Solel Roneh is better placed to get the routine contracts for building work, on which it depends if it is to keep the labour force employed. It initiates projects, it is an associate in combines that give out contracts. Thus a shopping centre, replete with apartments, is going up in the heart of Haifa. Solel Boneh is the builder. It also happens to be a fifty-fifty partner in the venture with the Federman group.

They have started to offer turnkey projects. That means planning and constructing an entire power-station, factory or oil refinery, for delivery complete, equipped and ready to operate.

Disciplines other than civil engineering are involved. A big medical centre is going up in Quito, Ecuador. Solel Boneh put together the consortium that is financing the scheme. The Israelis are in charge of the building work, which requires the recruitment of specialized medical and engineering talents.

This imaginative new approach in Solel Boneh may spark a break with conventional thinking elsewhere, notably in the hide-bound government departments. Here is an example. Ben-Gurion Airport needs a new big terminal ready for the 1990s. Construction may well be delayed interminably, given that the government is chronically short of budget.

But why should the government build it? Solel Boneh is ready to erect a brand-new international air terminal for Israel. It will form a partnership with other business interests, and the group will retain ownership. The government as well as other users of the various facilities can pay them rent.

These bold innovations still do not exhaust the welter of ideas conjured up at the company's Allenby Street headquarters. The process of diversification described so far is essentially vertical. Solel Boneh has taken on a greater share of the building operation — investment, planning, financial and owning, as well as constructing.

The time has come to turn its gaze in another direction, towards horizontal diversification. "We are not limited to the construction process. The know-how we possess equips us to tackle, at least as beginners, certain industries which can be seen as kindred to our own occupation.

"We quarry for building materials — why should we not quarry for minerals? Our subsidiary, Herouth, employs 3,000 people in making electromechanical products needed in and around the house; boilers, plumbing installations, pipelines, air-conditioners, electric storage heaters. There is nothing to prevent them from taking a step forward into other fields, like solar energy, ecology, the recycling of materials."

Here is another example. The new power-station in Hadera is to be fed on coal, and the coal jetty is not yet complete. Solel Boneh has, believe it or not, a small shipyard in Haifa called Solmar. It has produced from this shipyard a brace of floating cranes which unload coal from bulk-cargo vessels onto barges.

Then recently, the following small news items appeared in the American publication, *Coal Week International*. It has not been denied by the company authorities:

"Israel's largest construction firm, Solel Boneh, is looking into the possibility of investing in coal-mining operations in the U.S. or in Latin America.

"The company also is considering possible cooperation with other Israeli companies to obtain mining rights to meet the growing demand for coal in Israel and other parts of the world."

Solel Boneh is not letting the grass grow under its feet. But there could be doubts about the utility of these foreign operations. It is very nice to set 25,000 foreigners to build homes and hotels and highways and railway stations and water dams in developing countries. What does Israel get out of it?

Shilo says it is the same that El Al and Zim and the diamond industry and other low-added-value export undertakings contribute to the national exchequer. El Al carries foreign travellers between foreign airports in foreign-built planes powered by foreign-purchased fuel.

"During the years 1975-1980, we converted $130m. into Israeli money. In 1980 alone conversions were $40m., out of a turnover of $450m. — and that does not include wages paid out to Israelis or money re-invested in our operations overseas."

He calculates the total added value at around 15 per cent. This figure takes into account the growth in the complexity of the ventures undertaken. A turnkey project re-

quiring engineering knowledge and technical equipment, which Israel would supply in part, must bring in more than plain construction jobs.

The financial return is a respectable one, not only as a proportion of turnover, but as a proportion of the resources invested. Net foreign currency accumulated last year must have been close to $70m., an inflow generated, as we have seen by no more than 850 Israelis, or 5 per cent of Solel Boneh's labour force.

Expectations for 1981 are as follows. Domestic income will be down by 1 per cent to IS7.2b. (A 5 per cent rise in building work is offset by an 11 per cent drop in road construction.)

Foreign income will be up by one-quarter to $550m. So total turnover will increase by 12 per cent to IS14b.

This, like many balance-sheet figures in these inflationary times, gives an optimistic version of real growth. If we base our calculation not on the foreign turnover, but on the added value only of the foreign operation, then the growth of Solel Boneh's total activities is only 3 or 4 per cent.

The export side is, however, expanding faster than the domestic side. Five years from now Solel Boneh's work abroad will be twice as substantial as its work in Israel. Not that the local opearations are billed to contract, but growth is likely to be almost entirely in the overseas branch.

Solel Boneh will in all probability not increase its employment of Israelis appreciably, but it will increase its contribution of foreign currency to Israel's export earnings. If the truth be said, that development is not out of line with Israel's present-day needs.

Much has happened in Solel Boneh during the last decade. In 1970 it could still be depicted as a rough-and-ready building outfit. The characteristic figure at that time would be a veteran Yiddish-speaking foreman in Zalman shorts, doing his sums with a pencil stub on a packet of Ascot cigarettes.

The scene in 1980 is altoghether more sophisticated. We face a predominantly international concern. The typical Solel Boneh representative nowadays is a briefcase-carrying, multilingual graduate in business administration, boarding an intercontinental jet for distant parts.

Less earthy, less homely, less true to the original labour-Zionist vision — but more in keeping with the spirit of the times.

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GALILEE ARAB TOWNS SHOW FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 9-15 Aug 81 p 4

[Article by Awad Abdel Fattah]

[Text]

The fiscal crisis in Palestine municipalities within the pre-'67 border of the state of Israel is deepening. The one-day strike held on July 29 was called by the Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Councils to draw attention to the situation and to protest discriminatory policies of Israeli authorities against the Palestinian Arab population.

Ha'aretz reported, July 31, that the average budget of Israeli municipalities in Israel is IS 3,000 per person while the average budget of Palestinian municipalities is IS 500. For instance, Acre municipality has a IS 150 million budget compared to Nazareth's IS 8 million; Nazareth has twice the population of Acre.

The report by Palestinian journalist Atallah Mansour goes on to reveal that the village of Yafia has a budget of IS 31 per person; Yarka, IS 35; Mughar, IS 37; Kufur Kana, IS 70; Usafiya, IS 72; and Arara, Tira, Taibe and Tamara over IS 90. In the same year, 1977, the Pardes Hana-Karkur budget was IS 180 per person; Nes Ziona, IS 228; and Ma'alot, Magdal Ha'emek and Eilat over IS 500; all the latter are exculsively Jewish communities.

In the last two months most Arab local councils were not able to meet their payrolls. Many council employees have faced severe personal difficulties, particularly over the recent Id el-Fitr period. To pay their workers, Nazareth municipality, for instance, had to borrow money privately at high rates of interest. In addition, several projects have been brought to a standstill midway through execution, or postponed altogether. Because of lack of cash, plans and transactions with contractors were not carried out. In Um el-Fahm, work on the second part of a drainage system had to be stopped for lack of funds after the Israeli Interior Ministry did not have the grants due to the local council. A housing project for young couples was not even started.

In Shafa'Amr, the second Palestinian town, after Nazareth, in post '48 Israel, a project to improve and widen a long internal road came to a standstill in February. A voluntary work camp, due to start August 5 in Arrabe, Galilee, was called off at the last minute when the Israeli authorities refused to authorize local council expenditure for the project.

The Roots of the Problem

The Arab local councils in Israel receive a fraction of the budget of Israeli Jewish municipalities. "We breathe discrimination," Nazareth mayor Tawfiq Ziad told *Al Fajr*, "like we breathe air." According to him, Arab local council budgets are between 15 and 20 percent of those given to Jewish local councils and municipalities. He said that if IS 100,000 is needed for paving a road, the government offers not more than IS 10,000.

One of the most common forms of harassment faced by Palestinian local councils is the delay of payment of statutory grants. Nazareth municipality and other Arab local councils face constant delays for most standard grants. Nazareth has resorted to the High Court several times to force the government to pay.

Every year the Arab local councils in the state prepare yearly budgets on the basis of the cost of basic requirements and the vital needs. These budgets are forwarded to the Interior Ministry for endorsement. In almost every case the Interior Ministry cuts the budget by half.

Nazareth's proposed budget for '81-'82 was IS 138 million: only IS 81 million was approved and this sum has not been released yet. Um el-Fahm local council budget was approved at IS 10.7 million: they applied for IS 29 million. Their approved budget has also not been released yet. Even after approval the budget is not payed out in a lump sum. Around half of the budget is held, un-indexed, for several months. This alone means that the budget in *real* terms is reduced even more. Inflation last year ran at 132 percent. At such levels it is impossible to effectively work out an annual budget, especially with unlinked grants.

No Employees

One decision forced on local councils by their financial situation is to drastically reduce their payrolls. Um el-Fahm council asked for 20 sanitation workers, but the Interior Ministry budgeted for only four. "Four sanitation workers is completely insufficient for a village of 22,000 people," said Abu Majed, the head of the local council. "In order to keep the village clean and thus avoid disease, we need more workers."

Progress Stops

Development projects have been brought to a standstill, in most Arab villages. Particularly hit is the development of education, and social and economic sides of the Arab village. Israel's Ministry of the Interior admits that the Arab education sector requires 2,600 school rooms to meet the needs of the present school population. Ibrahim Nimr, the head of the Shafa'Amr Municipal Council pointed out that the real number is much larger. Abu Majed said that there are over 100 rented school rooms in Um el-Fahm spread all over the village. They have no modern facilities.

Arab local councils have not been able to industrialize Arab villages because lack of funding and the fact that no Arab village is zoned for industry, thus any private entepreneur cannot, by law, build plants in Arab villages. "This is part of a deliberate plan to leave the Arab village retarded and subservient to the Jewish market," said Hussein Abu Husseini, a member of Um el-Fahm local council.

Another problem facing the Arab villages is the housing crisis. The most affected by the problem are the young couples who need new homes. But due to the high prices of construction materials, they cannot afford to build houses without governmental assistance or by going into debt for the rest of their lives. The government hardly ever allots money for setting up housing units in the Arab sector. The only known cases are in the Galilee where projects were established to assist the 'de-Arabization' of Acre and to resettle refugees away from their home villages. In the Jewish settlements and towns, the Jewish Agency has a massive housing budget and the government assists with schemes for deprived sectors of the Jewisg population.

On top of all other problems, the central authorities interfere in the work of local councils when they develop projects of their own. The District Commissioner of Haifa warned the Um el-Fahm local council, April 5, that it would be disbanded if it continued to excede its budget without prior approval of the Commissioner. The local council was forced to shelve plans for two new school buildings and the paving and repairing of internal roads in the village. The Commisisoner informed the local council that this year's development budget should only be used for road repairs. The head of the local council condemns the Commisisoner's move as an unjust and arbitrary decision. "This means that no development project can be started next year, " he said.

According to Ibrahim Nemir, the percentage of the development budgets of local councils in the Arab sector are petty. In most cases, he says, local levies have to be raised to cover the costs of important projects.

Ali Sanallah, the head of the local council of Deir el-Assad, agrees that the basic reason of the crisis lies in the marked difference between the budgets given to Arab and Jewish local councils. In spite of the fact that Deir el-Assad falls in the area categorized as 'Development Area B,' it does not obtain the same development budgets as the surrounding Jewish settlements do, he pointed out.

To the Knesset

As the crisis deepens the councils are fighting back. The Committee of the Heads of Arab Local Councils is planning an all out strike if their demands are not considered. MK Tawfiq Zayyed told *Al Fajr* that he will be raising the situation in the Knesset when it meets, August 10.

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GAZA ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY FACES PROBLEMS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 16-22 Aug 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Assad Kamal]

[Text]

The Islamic University, the first university in Gaza, has been an arena for heated political controversy on the local scene since its beginnings three years ago. Political control and educational goals are important questions for one of the few nascent national institutions in Gaza.

The concept of an Islamic University was officially initiated by the administrators of Al Azhar (Palestine Religious Institute) to be an "Islamic Arab institution." Along with its stated goals of offering higher education, undertaking research, graduating people to serve the community, and strengthening ties with other institutions world-wide, are the objectives of "promoting comparative study of the Islamic and secular laws and preaching of the Islamic commandents."

The interpretation of the latter two points and the weak application of the others have especially distressed secular educationists and others interested in education in Gaza. They are interested to see a university develop to meet the acute overall needs of Palestinians in Gaza and find fault with the administration's fundamentalist application of Islam.

The student body is presently divided between supporters of fundamentalist Islamic groupings and those who have been forced to go along or remain quiet.

The controversy between the two groups, however, is minimized by the chief threat of the Israeli occupation authorities who seem to prefer no university in Gaza. They do not recognize the institution officially and have blocked attempts to develop it into a full-fledged university. They have interfered in building construction, in hiring of staff and in allowing financing for the institution. This makes the name 'university' a pretentious label for what is still essentially a religious institute.

Both the university's critics and its supporters feel that the authorities' restrictions stop its development into a legitimate multi-disciplinary university centre.

WHERE CAN STUDENTS GO?

Egyptian universities used to absorb between 1,000 to 1500 students from Gaza before 1978 when they curtailed their acceptances almost totally. Admissions to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf state universities were also cut back for Palestinian students for various political reasons. "This was one of the major reasons for Gaza Palestinians to reflect on their lack of educational institutions. Five thousand students graduate annually from our secondary schools and all those wishing to attend university are not absorbed by those in the West Bank," said one Islamic University administrator.

The idea for setting up a university in Gaza, however, preceded the post-'78 period. Shafeq Tarazi, a long-time educator and director of Gaza College, the area's only private secondary school, told Al Fajr: "We (GC) tried to start university classes during the period of Egyptian rule. Because of the

open acceptance and minimal expenses for our students in Egypt, coupled with our own lack of facilities, there was no real need at the time.'

After the 1973 War, officials of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry offered financial backing for a Gaza university, but the Israeli authorities refused to approve its establishment.

In 1977, Tarazi, along with his brother Wadia' (now deceased) again thought of starting classes. this time attached to Bir Zeit University. The Israeli authorities at first ignored the request. "Later," Shafeq said,"they sent us a list of questions about staffing, program and financing, which we answered, and a group headed by the assistant to the military governor for Arab affairs in Gaza visited our facilities. They told us that there was no reason for stopping us, so we waited for written permission."

In 1979, a voluntary committee representing a number of university graduates in Gaza interested in education met under the charimanship of Haider Abdul-Shafi, head of the Gaza Red Crescent Society. The group issued a report favouring establishment of a university. "We realized the project needed coordination of all available facilities in Gaza as well as input from abroad," says Haider Abdul Shafi. The committee was to try to organise funding, administrative skills and recruitment.

Meanwhile the Azhar Institute Board of Trustees started to develop university level classes toward the establishment of an 'Islamic university.' Institute administrators and right-wing fundamentalist Muslim activists launched a stiff campaign of opposition against the secular voluntary committee. "They misinterpreted our meetings as an attempt to thwart the progress of the Islamic University, while, in fact, it was immaterial to us whether we adopted the project of developing that institution or would create an alternative," explains Abdul Shafi.

The voluntary committee as such disbanded in 1980 with some of its members becoming members of the university's board of trustees. "Things in the university were not as we would have liked," says one member, "but we thought we'd wait to see if it would eventually be O.K. — otherwise, we would try to make a new university."

In February 1981, the authorities hit directly at the board of trustees, ordering the removal of seven of 13 members. The six remaining, all also on the board of al-Azhar, include five merchants, two who are resident in Egypt, who paid for their places by financing repairs on the Institute, damaged in the 1967 War. The sixth member is Sheikh Awad, institute director, and a recognized leader of the right-wing Islamic fundamentalists.

The seven removed are all university educated professionals with more liberal notions on development of a university. Some were in the voluntary committee. One claims the removal was a coincidence of the authorities' suppression of Palestinian educational opportunity and Awad's desire to "control the university and fill the staff with sheikhs rather than PhDs."

Al Azhar Institute which initiated the university is related to the university in Cairo of the same name. The Gaza University started in 1978-79 with 123 students, 16 faculty and three administrators. Islamic religion and law and Arabic language and literature were offered. In 1980-81 the curriculum was expanded to include education, commerce, economics, and science. The official number of students was over 800, with an academic staff of 48 and 19 administrators. The university calendar predicts these figures will be more than doubled in two years and that "in 10 years time, the Islamic University will accomodate over 5,000 students."

Through the last academic year, the campus was no more than the crowded classrooms and yard of al-Azhar which were available in the afternoon only. The military authorities had denied a building permit for an adjoining site. In May, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister Mordechai Zipori finally agreed to allow completion of a one-storey building begun before 1967. Now the university has asked for a permit to add on a second storey. If all planned construction is allowed, the administration hopes to complete a sizeable campus by 1985.

Most of the faculty are Gaza residents and most studied in Egypt, especially at al-Azhar University. Most are full-time, but a minority have other teaching posts in West Bank institutions. Seven are PhDs, 15 MAs or MScs, the rest BAs or BScs. The university hopes to upgrade their staff's academic qualifications by encouraging further study, financed through scholarships provided by Saudi Arabia.

The Israeli authorities have raised obstacles to the admission of qualified faculty. "Twenty appointed (Palestinian) professors residing outside the country, who had either left before 1967 or without

obtaining 'necessary' permission from the Israelis, cannot come back," says a senior administrator, "although they were all post-'48 Gaza residents."

"We applied for work permits and they were denied. Others came as 'visitors' and applied here for their work permits. They are all 'under consideration.' "

A month ago, Ziad Hammoudeh, an Arabic language professor who had been teaching in the institute and university for three years on a bimonthly renewable visitor's visa was ordered to leave the country by the authorities.

STUDENT BODY

The student body is predominently from the Gaza Strip though it is open to any Palestinian student. There are no housing accomodations for those from outside. The authorities, moreover, have discouraged a broader entrance. "Last year they refused to give permits to three students from Nazareth to study in Gaza," according to Acting President and Dean of Education Riyadh al-Agha. Though only four Christian students are enrolled, "we are open to all who observe our rules," says al-Agha.

Students interviewed gave a range of reasons for studying at the Islamic University: proximity to home, lack of money or difficult social circumstances preventing them from going elsewhere, and the preference to go to a Palestinian university "that is part of our society." Other students gave reasons relevant to the university's 'Islamic' orientation: desire to study religion or religious law or to go to an Islamic-identified institution.

The authorities, moreover, have so far refused to recognize IU as an official four year institution. Only the freshman and sophomore years were recognized as a post-secondary institute, but recognition of the third year seems forthcoming, according to Ahmed Hassan Shawa, board of trustees treasurer.

SEGREGATION

The university is divided into men's and women's sections. A business major says he sees no reason for this. "If each respects his own principles, there should be no problem. It is important for girls and boys to get to understand and trust each other and still to build an Islamic society."

Others feel differently. They say that complete segregation is necessitated by Islamic law and the words of Prophet Muhammad.

One boy admitted that, from a material point of view, it would be more economical to have mixed classrooms but that spiritually it posed a problem. "It causes unusual relations in Egypt and in Europe problems of illegitimate children," he said.

Another expressed concern for fulfilling spiritual needs. He claimed that the university "reflects the beliefs and traditions of people in the Gaza Strip."

Within the limited facilities, the women students got second best. Between classes they can pass their time only in the outside corridor. The open yard is for the men. "Students' activities and programs were only developed for the boys," complains one first-year student. She is wearing a long-sleeved floor-length dress and head scarf. "Though many of the girls don't believe in strict Islamic dress, we're obliged to wear these clothes at school," she says.

Power in the student body rests with the right-wing Muslim fundamentalists who won all the seats on the all-male students' council. One faculty member assessed the situation: "The *sheikhs* supervised the elections, thugs were waiting outside to assure votes and young students newly entering the college have, for the most part, no defined political consciousness."

Several months ago, a gang of Muslim fanatics beat up and knived a student during a protest in the business college over a slotted increase of hours, from four to six, for study of religious subjects.

Fees

Students who register in the religious programs study tuition-free. "They are playing on our economic hardships," says a second-year geography major who feels "the administration wants to attract students to these subjects." It is popularly believed, however, that Saudi Arabia, which foots the university bill, makes this stipulation.

Ten percent of students in non-religious programs got scholarships. Dean al-Agha claims the distribution is made "according to social situation." A faculty member tells a different story: "In 1980-81, first semestre, the administration recommended those eligible. In second semestre, the students' council decided. So those known by the sheikhs got the money--religious wasta...Anyway, according to Islam, it is a sin to pay for studies or to accept money for being a sheikh."

Free Thinking

Some of the students' criticisms are echoed within Gaza's intellectual community at-large. Some criticize the lack of freedom of expression in the university. Others would prefer to see an Islamic faculty within a secular institution. And some question the notion of a university that is Islamic per se.

"I would welcome the establishment of an Islamic faculty that would promote Islamic studies in a genuine way...But we also wish to see a climate of free-thinking and dialogue," says Abdul Shafi. "Religious subjects are no good unless there's an atmosphere of the freedom present in other universities," says a recent graduate of Ain Shams University in Alexandria.

"Even an Islamic university must include all subjects--not just specialise in Islam," says Sheikh Fawzi, a long time educator now retired. "As for following the 'Islamic way,'" he continues, "we've seen many Islamic societies develop in Gaza over the last three to four years with no single line. Popularly called 'Muslim Brotherhood,' they don't actually share one name. If they all followed one line, there wouldn't be so many societies...But the authorities like it this way," he concludes.

CSO: 4300/112

LAND EXPROPRIATED NEAR RAMALLAH, OTHER AREAS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 16-22 Aug 81 p 4

[Text]

Last week, Israeli bulldozers began to plough up lands belonging to Ain Yabroud, northeast of Ramallah. The 300 dunam plot in question is 100-150 metres away from the built-up area of the village. The land is a cultivated area which was fenced off earlier this year.

Israel stated the land-grab procedure in the winter of 1980 when the Ramallah military governor showed up in the village and informed the mukhtar that a sewage system would be built for the Jewish Ofra settlement. The governor told the mukhtar that the project would require part of the village's land. The landowners directly affected by the scheme refused to cooperate with the military but a month later Israeli excavators started work.

In February 1981, Israeli bulldozers entered several more tracts of land to build a road. These areas were covered with fig and olive orchards.

One landowner told *Al Fajr*, "When I realized that the bulldozers were going to smash all the trees, I hurried to uproot the undamaged ones myself in order to plant them somewhere else."

Shortly after the incident, Ain Yabroud landowners contacted a lawyer. He contacted the military government demanding an explanation of the military's acts, but was told they "know nothing about the issue."

Abu Khalid, an old man mandated by the Ain Yabroud landowners to pursue the issue with the lawyer and the Israeli occupation authorities, added that the latest incursion started last March when the Israeli military authorities fenced off lands. This area extends from the limits of the Jewish settlement Ofra to a place 100 metres away from the eastern side of the village. Then last month, Abu Khalid said, Israeli excavators entered another area of about 15 dunams of land and destroyed all the trees there.

In another case, large quantities of soil have been taken from the village to Ofra. One local owner told *Al Fajr*, "They took the soil and left only the rocks, making my lands uncultivatable." While these depredations have been continuing, Abu Khalid and the lawyer have been preparing a court case against the military. Some wonder whether there will be any land left when the case is finally heard.

CSO: 4300/112

CONSTRUCTION PROJECT SABOTAGED IN WEST BANK VILLAGE

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 23-30 Aug 81 p 1

[Text]

After three weeks of negotiations, supporters of the 'village league' in Beit Kahil were forced to repair damage they had caused to a Joint Committee-financed school under construction in the village. On August 17, under pressure of Beit Kahil residents who oppose the involvement of Mustafa Dudeen's Israeli-backed Hebron League in village projects, the saboteurs reexcavated the foundation site which, twenty days before, they had blocked with dirt and stones.

According to village sources, the supporters were acting on the direction of a mukhtar who had been appointed two years ago by Israeli military authorities. The new mukhtar and his followers had been opposed to Beit Kahil, seeking Palestinian funding for its new school, among other projects, in preference of financial backing from the occupation authorities.

Since 1978, when Binyamin Ben Eliezer, general commander of the West Bank, visited Beit Kahil with league boss Dudeen, the military has been trying to force the village under the political control of the Hebron *rabeta*. The three-year old association of villages (see *Al Fajr* No. 64, 65, 66) is seen by almost all West Bank Palestinians as an Israeli scheme to co-opt Palestinian participation into the autonomy talks.

The few league supporters who are vocal publicly are ostracized by the small village societies who consider such individuals as 'spies' or 'collaborators.'

Ben Eliezer and Dudeen initially proposed in 1978 that the military authorities would pay half of the budget for the new school construction and for an electricity hook-up to the Israeli grid, on condition that the village pay 50 percent of the total. Planning for the projects had to be arranged through league channels.

At that time two generators provided local electricity during evening hours only and the village sorely needed a better energy system. Even so, the mukhtar, popularly elected in 1956, did not embrace the project. He asked instead that the league, if it were truly interested in rural develoment, finance the cost of the design plans which he had to submit to the military prior to project approval. The league refused and the projects were suspended.

The mukhtar has avoided any occasion for cooperation with the league's leaders. Several times he was invited to report to the league offices in Hebron to receive congratulations on the Moslem feast days of Id al-Fitr and Id al-Adha from the military governor but he refused to go.

The original Beit Kahil mukhtar also submitted a request to the military government for a bus permit since the only transportation available to and from Beit Kahil is a private taxi service which is too costly for most villagers. The mukhtar was told to process the project through the league. Because he refused, the project has been frozen by the military authorities.

Another attempt to push the village into involvement

with the league was made by Dudeen's right-hand man, Muhammed Nasser, league technical advisor as well as engineering consultant to military headquarters in Beit El. Nasser met with both of Beit Kahil's mukhtars and tribal leaders to convince them to hook up to the Israeli electric company lines which pass near the village. When the village elders refused the plan, Nasser stopped the 'sweet talk' and threatened to use the Israeli military to stop the village's two electric generators. His proxy offer of Israeli help extended to facilitating government jobs and family reunion applications but his offers were refused.

If the village had accepted the hook up to the Israeli grid they said, they would be required to pay half the costs as well as regular rental fees. In contrast to (PLO-Jordan) Joint Committee funding which pays for the entire installation as well as returning project property to the village, the league's offer was not only rejected for political but also financial reasons.

The new school, whose construction is being hindered by sabotage tactics from a new wave of league supporters, was also a project that came under the wing of the Joint Committee after being proposed by the league-military duo and then rejected by residents. Building designs were finally prepared and approved by the local education committee, then submitted to Amman for PLO funding. The school has since become the focus of the controversy between pro- and anti-league forces.

In the past two months grafitti such as, 'No to the Village League' and 'No to Dudeen's agents' and 'The PLO is our sole legitimate representative,' has been scrawled on the school's walls. The military forced the elected mukhtar to paint over the slogans. Three weeks ago pro-league forces came after dark to vandalize the school site.

According to village sources, the military authorities may appoint another new mukhtar to strengthen the league line in the village. "It is easy to make a mukhtar," one resident says. "You only have to pay JD 1,000. I paid JD 10 to help our man pay the JD 1,000 to the middleman who works for the league, to guarantee the appointment." Eyewitnesses have reported that the league man pays late night visits to the mukhtar-hopeful and that he carries a gun.

In contrast, a leader of a large *hamula* (clan) in another Hebron area village has been applying for a mukhtar appointment for over one year. He had been given verbal promises during this time but he resubmitted his request to the military authorities and was told to 'go through the league' which could process his application quicker and easier than direct contact with the military. When the man refused to approach the league — he considered it to be collaboration with Israeli intelligence — his ID was confiscated and he was summarily dismissed.

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CONSTRUCTION BANNED IN LARGE WEST BANK AREA

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 23-30 Aug 81 p 5

[Text]

An amendment to military order 418, altering Jordanian law, has effectively frozen a 500,000 dunam area of the West Bank to construction and raised local fears of more Israeli settlements. The military authorities have transferred the authority to grant building permits in this area from the municipalities to the High Organizing Council, a branch of the Israeli military administration.

The land area involved in the military order, 10 percent of the West Bank, is in the most populated section of the occupied territory: from Ain Senia in the north, to al-Arrub in the south, and from Beit 'Ur in the west, to Borka in the east. In effect, said one municipal engineer, "the order is part of a regional planning scheme for the Israelis. The military authorities are now free to 'close areas' by refusing to issue building permits and can decrease municipal borders and virtually stop development for Palestinians."

Municipalities are currently surrounded by belts of town planning areas, slated to be incorporated in eventual expansion of the city borders. No commercial, residential or public building can now be built in these planning areas without military permission.

The order, coming as it does one month after ex-agricultural minister and settlement czar Ariel Sharon settled into the post of defence minister (and therefore 'in charge of' the occupied territories), is seen as not just coincidental. The intent is clearly to take planning and development out of the hands of Palestinians and to reorganize the West Bank to the liking of Israeli settlement planners.

There was no advance warning about the order nor were there consultations between the Department of Planning and local officials. Mayors and town planners read about the new directive in the newspapers. They were not even sent maps of the area in question.

Hardest hit will be those municipalities which have not yet had their planning areas

approved. Previously 'no construction' orders have been issued by the military authorities for areas adjacent to settlements, in preparation for their expansion. For example, 6,000 dunams of el-Bireh land was closed this year, earmarked for the expansion of Beit El settlement. New building permits were also forbidden for land bordering the main roads leading from Jenin.

Bassam Shaka'a, mayor of Nablus, called the order 'a very serious step.' "This policy," he said, "attempts to create more problems for the residents by refusing construction permits. It is an effort to consolidate the occupation and pressure the residents to emigrate."

The mayor of Jenin, Ahmed Shawki al-Mahmoud, said the order was primarily against the municipalities. He described it as a political decision to cripple the construction projects, and facilitate future land expropriation.

The order is a special problem for Qalqilya, which is 2 kilometers from the so-called 'green line.' Qalqilya lost two-thirds of its buildings when Israeli soldiers destroyed the city after the 1967 war. The municipality, which took an active part in reconstruction efforts, issued more then 500 building permits per year. This progress would now have to stop, said Mayor Haj Amin Nasr.

Hebron acting mayor Mustafa Natshe, said the order was an intentional effort to weaken the authority of the municipalities, and that it was a clear violation of international law.

Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem, concurred that the order was another effort to force emigration of Palestinian residents. "We will not submit our rights and authorities," he said, "which the law gave to us." Freij pointed out that he received no offical letter about the ordinance.

CSO: 4300/112

BANKING FIGURES CONCERNING DEPOSITS CITED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 231 25 Jul 81 pp 44, 49

[Article: "Development of the Trend Toward Making Deposits in Commercial Banks in Kuwait"]

[Text] For its deposits, the banking apparatus principally draws on the local economy. Last year, deposits by residents accounted for 71 percent of all deposits --which went up in total amount from 3,017,600,000 [Kuwaiti] dinars at the end of 1979 to 3,905,400,000 dinars at the end of 1980. This means that there was an annual rate of increase in deposits of 29.4 percent, and this rate was lower than the rate of increase in banking activity, which totalled 31.6 percent. This led to a decrease in deposits' share in the formation of bank resources of from 70.2 percent at the end of 1979 to 69.1 percent at the end of 1980. This development confirms the trend of a decrease in the relative importance of deposits which has been evidenced during the past few years. Between the end of 1974 and the end of 1980, deposits lost about 16 percent of thiir importance as one of the sources of financing for banks. Their share of total bank resources decreased from 82.4 percent to 69.1 percent.

In addition to this, deposits of non-residents (foreign liabilities), which consist of deposits made in foreign currencies, have achieved progress at the expense of deposits of residents which have experienced a corresponding decrease. Deposits of non-residents increased from 803,900,000 dinars at the end of 1979 to 1,134,300,000 dinars at the end of 1980. This represents an annual rate of increase of 41 percent. This rate of increase is more than the rate of increase of deposits, totalling 29.4 percent, and is more than the rate of increase of [bank] resources, totalling 31.6 percent. Deposits of residents increased from 2,213,700,000 dinars to 2,771,100,000 dinars during the same period, and this represents a rate of increase of 25.1 percent. This rate is smaller than the rate of increase of deposits and smaller than the rate of increase of bank resources. As a result of this, there has been an increase in the importance of the deposits of non-residents in the formation of bank deposits and resources. Their share of the deposits went up from 26.7 percent to 29 percent, and their share of the market went up from 18.7 percent to 20 percent. On the other hand, the share of deposits of residents decreased from 73.3 percent to 71 percent, and their share of the market declined from 51.6 percent to 49 percent.

Bank statistics indicate that one must go back several years in the past to find the roots of this trend, and these statistics also indicate that this trend is continuing in uninterrupted fashion.

In 1975, for example, deposits of non-residents represented only 16.2 percent of all deposits, and 13 percent of all sources of income. This is in comparison to deposits of residents, which represented 83.8 percent and 87.4 percent respectively. These structural developments, to a great degree, reflect expansion of operations with foreign banks, especially those which specialize in foreign currencies--most of which operate from Bahrain.

Deposits of residents are composed of government deposits and private sector deposits which have been made in Kuwaiti dinars or in foreign currencies, and they include both short-term and long-term deposits. By law the government maintains its deposits in Kuwaiti dinars in the Central Bank. But its deposits in commercial banks are in foreign currencies. The great majority of these deposits are time deposits. Demand deposits constitute only a very small fraction of the deposits, and they are continually decreasing (0.05 percent in 1980).

In light of the special features which characterize the nature and volume of the government of Kuwait's foreign currency resources, the fact that the government makes some of its deposits in foreign currencies in commercial banks can serve the following purposes:

1. Diversification of investment channels for oil revenues, the result being an increase in the distribution of investment risks.
2. Encouragement of domestic banks (which are national institutions) to assume a greater role in the investment of the above-mentioned revenues.
3. Support for the activities of domestic banks on both the national and international levels.

During 1980 government deposits constituted about 5.9 percent of all residents' deposits. These deposits increased at relatively slow rates. Whereas total deposits of residents increased 25 percent, government deposits increased only 18 percent. This led to a decrease in the government's share of deposits down to 5.9 percent of the total of deposits of residents. In addition to this, the increase in government deposits during the last few years has been an unstable increase which has oscillated between increasing and decreasing. It has been noted that the years in which these deposits increased were years in which liquidity of the banks was subjected to some pressures (1979 and 1980) or else were years which were characterized by a national economic recession (1977). This increase, at least partially, reflects intervention by the government to lessen the intensity of the above-mentioned pressures or else to stimulate the national economy.

Private sector deposits are composed of deposits by individuals, institutions, and companies--including companies in the mixed sector. These private sector deposits are considered to be the main source of bank deposits and the backbone of the banks' resources. In 1980 these deposits constituted 94 percent of all deposits of residents, 66.7 percent of the total in deposits, and 46.1 percent of the resources of the banks. At the end of 1980 the total of these deposits amounted to 2,606,200,000 dinars, as opposed to 2,073,800,000 dinars at the end of 1970 [sic]. This represents an annual rate of increase of 25.6 percent. In the years 1977-79 the rates of increase were 30 percent, 23 percent, and 17 percent, respectively.

Bank statistics show that demand deposits in 1980 constituted 16 percent of the total deposits made by the private sector. They incressed from 410,600,000 dinars

at the end of 1979 to 418,400,000 dinars at the end of 1980. This represents a very low rate of increase, that is, 1.8 percent. It is possible to explain this low rate of increase by the conversion of some of these deposits into time deposits or foreign currencies in an effort to benefit from the high interest rates which prevailed in the case of these deposits during 1980. This was particularly true during the first and last quarters of that year, when interest rates on dollar deposits made for a period of 6 months totalled 19.56 percent and 16.7 percent, respectively, at the end of March and at the end of December of 1980.

The bank statistics furthermore show that savings deposits (time deposits in foreign currencies and certificates of deposit), in 1980, constituted 84 percent of the total deposits made by the private sector. These deposits increased from 1,663,200,000 dinars at the end of 1979 to 2,187,800,000 dinars at the end of 1980, the resulting rate of increase being 31 percent--a rate of increase equal to the rate of increase in banking activity.

Deposits in foreign currencies increased rapidly during the year, and this rate of increase amounted to 65.3 percent. They increased from 355,600,000 dinars to 587,900,000 dinars. Bank statistics indicate that the increase in these deposits has been characterized by sharp annual changes, both in the direction of increasing and of decreasing. This was a result of changes in conditions for making financial investments abroad and in predictions made concerning the condition of foreign currencies, especially the U.S. dollar. The noticeable improvement in these conditions [for making financial investments abroad] and with regard to expectations [concerning foreign currencies] during the last 3 years explains, to a large degree, why these deposits increased six-fold between the end of 1977 and the end of 1980, and why they increased from 87,100,000 dinars to 587,900,000 dinars. In 1980, savings deposits suffered a negative growth rate of 9.8 percent. These deposits decreased from 302,100,000 dinars at the end of 1979 to 272,500,000 dinars at the end of 1980. This development confirms the trend of decrease in these deposits. This is a trend which began in 1979. Deposits during that year were 302,100,000 dinars, as opposed to 313,400,000 dinars at the end of 1978. This means that these deposits decreased by 13.1 percent during the years 1979-80. This trend can be explained by the conversion of some of these deposits into time deposits or foreign currency deposits.

The changes regarding private sector deposits, in the form shown above, and an analysis thereof, lead one to confirm the following conclusions:

1. Confidence on the part of depositors in the banking apparatus, and their sensitivity to changes in interest rates. This is reflected in the fact that demand deposits constitute only a very small part of the total deposits, whereas savings deposits (time deposits and foreign currency deposits) constitute the bulk of these deposits. This is also reflected in the fact that the deposits are converted from one kind to another in accordance with changes in conditions for investment in each type.
2. Sensitivity of the deposits to differences in interest rates between the national and international markets, to the predictions concerning changes in exchange rates, and to the level of activity in the national economy.
3. The necessity to confront the variations and changes in demand deposits with assets having sufficient liquidity. Perhaps this is the reason which led the

Central Bank, in 1978, to institute a new liquidity system for national banks. This new system is based on setting different liquidity ratios for different maturity dates of the deposits. These rates progressively increase from being that of total exemption for deposits which remain [in the bank] for more than a year to a ratio of 35 percent for demand deposits. The previous system was content to impose a uniform liquidity ratio of 25 percent for the total of deposits--making no distinction between the various types of deposits among all of these deposits.
4. The great possibilities available to the banks to extend the maturity dates of their investments.

9468
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LABOR STATISTICS CITED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 16 Jul 81 p 4

[Article: "Primary Characteristics of Foreign Labor; Cases of Final Departure Did Not Reach the Level of Immigration; Koreans Have Lowest Incidence of Relocation From One Installation to Another"]

[Text] The Report on the Primary Characteristics of Foreign Labor for last year issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor indicates that Korean labor has the lowest incidence of transfer from one installation to another of any labor group. The report also indicates that, with the exception of cases of final cancellation and departure processed on a collective basis by foreign companies operating in Kuwait, the remaining cases in this category fall within the normal tour of work and have not reached the level of immigration.

The report added that transfers and cancellations of residence permits within the domestic sector differed according to type of economic activity and worker nationality. Transfers of Arab workers from one installation to another within the domestic sector accounted for 66.9 percent of all cases of cancellation and transfer, while Asian workers accounted for 32.1 percent of all cases and other nationalities accounted for only 1 percent of all cases.

Looking at particular nationalities, the main nationalities represented within the Arab group were Egyptian, Jordanian, Syrian, and Lebanese. These four nationalities alone accounted for 57 percent of all cases of cancellation and transfer within the domestic sector.

The main nationalities within the Asian group were Indian, Pakistani (including Bangladesh), and Iranian. These nationalities alone accounted for 30.2 percent of all cases of cancellation and transfer within the domestic sector.

Some 90.8 percent of the employment efforts in this category were restricted to the named nationalities within the Arab group--including Yemen--and the Asian group.

Within the Labor Market

In linking these nationalities to economic activity, it must be kept in mind that these cases represent only a portion of the available work opportunities that are filled from within the labor market. Whether the reason behind the cases of

cancellation and transfer is completion of the first job or a search for better job opportunities, the ban which prohibits labor employed by foreign companies operating in Kuwait from transferring from one installation to another has had a noticeable effect. Such a ban is in force among Korean, Indian, and Pakistani companies involved in building and construction activity. For this reason, the number of Korean workers transferring from one installation to another is very small. Similarly, the numbers of Indian and Pakistani workers transferring from one installation to another are out of proportion to the representation of these nationalities in the labor market.

The report adds that with the exception mentioned, there is no other restriction to the relocation of labor from one installation to another in the labor market within the bounds established by Decision No 37 of 1979 which regulates work permits. Therefore, cases of cancellation and transfer are found in varying percentages in nearly all fields of economic activity. This makes it appear very probable that transfers are due, primarily, to efforts to find better job opportunities rather than to termination of work per se--as well as in order to correct conflicting labor conditions. The changes in these and other indicators can be followed through the quarterly reports.

Appended tables provide final cancellation and departure data according to economic activity and nationality and offer a comparison of this data with the previous year's figures.

The Asian Group

These tables reveal the following trends:

--The number of cases of final cancellation and departure for the Asian national group represented 74.5 percent of all such cases.

The corresponding percentages for the other nationalities were 21.6 percent for the Arab group and 3.7 percent for citizens of Europe, the United States, and Canada. The remaining nationalities accounted for 0.04 percent of the total.

--On a country-by-country basis, the data breaks down as follows:

Korean workers clearly had the largest number of cases of final cancellation and departure with 35.7 percent of the total.

In this same category, the Indian group had 20.8 percent, the Egyptian group had 14.1 percent, and the Pakistani group had 8.5 percent of the total number of cases of final cancellation and departure.

The period of time elapsed since the date of issuance of a work permit for the first time adds another dimension to the status of the workers lost by the labor market, which is represented by the number of cases of final cancellation and departure. The most important trends in this area are as follows:

--The percentage of Arab workers who departed the country permanently after a period of 1 year or more was 65.2 percent of all cases of final cancellation and departure in the Arab group.

--The corresponding figure for Asian workers was 50.2 percent of all Asian workers who departed the country permanently.

On a country-by-country basis, the following trends were observed:

--The percentage of Korean workers departing the country permanently after less than 1 year (65.3 percent) was higher than the percentage of Korean workers departing after a year or more (34.7 percent). The percentage of Egyptian workers (64.9 percent) and the percentage of Indian workers (76.2 percent) leaving the country after 1 year were also high.

There was a connection between the time factor and job circumstances. Thus, it can be said that cases of final departure or workers in certain national groups after less than 1 year indicate that the jobs the workers came to perform were by nature temporary jobs. The recurrence of this phenomenon for the second straight year confirms this reading of the statistics and indicators. Moreover, it is the feeling of the Employment Organization, based on daily experience with the labor market and dealings with the foreign companies that hire groups of workers of certain nationalities, that the actual facts of the situation agree perfectly with the statistical data.

Relationship Between Nationality and Economic Activity

The relationship between nationality, level of economic activity, and time period can be perceived merely by noting the status of the aforementioned nationalities with respect to the number employed in building and construction activity, the number departing after less than 1 year, and the number departing after more than 1 year as compared to the corresponding statistics for the remaining nationalities.

From everything that has been presented, it can be said that, with the exception of cases of final cancellation and collective departures by foreign companies who have completed their projects, that the rest of the cases fall within the normal work tour and have not yet reached the limit of immigration.

8591
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MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS DISCUSSES AGRICULTURAL ISSUES

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 11 Jul 81 p 2

[Article: "Improving Agricultural Performance in Kuwait Is an Urgent Necessity; Minister of Works: 'Call for Establishment of Independent Agricultural Organization Is Unjustified'; Farmers' Circles: Establishment of Agriculture College Urgently Needed to Complete Development'; Agricultural Engineers: 'Our Work Is in the Field, Not in Offices, So Give Us Allotments!'"]

[Text] Specialized sources have stated that the country's agricultural performance is a problem with real significance, not just a superficial issue. The sources stated that matters pertaining to agriculture and agricultural and food production in the country are governed by a plan whose success is inseparably linked to the other group in the equation, namely the farmers. In making these remarks, the sources were commenting on recent efforts pertaining to the country's agricultural progress, such as the call for an independent agricultural organization and the call for the establishment of a college of agriculture at the University of Kuwait, in the context of the public effort.

Expressing his opinion on the establishment of an independent agricultural organization for the country, Minister of Public Works engineer 'Abdallah al-Dukhayl stated: "The establishment of an independent organization or institution for this purpose would mean that such an organization would perform an executive role rather than a supervisory role. The General Housing Organization, for example, constructs houses; it does not just oversee their construction. But can the proposed agricultural board actually perform the tasks of the farmers themselves?"

Minister al-Dukhayl added that he believes this cannot be achieved inasmuch as the government has no intention of carrying out farming operations. Based on this concept, the state established the Department of Agriculture to oversee agricultural operations at our numerous farms, not to actually carry out these operations.

The minister explained that the Department of Agriculture has complete independence in its operations. He pointed out that new measures will be adopted to strengthen this independence and develop the performance of the Department of Agriculture to make it of greater service to the farmers.

On the other hand, farmers' circles are presently calling for the establishment of a college of agriculture at the University of Kuwait to teach agricultural

sciences based on modern international systems and methods while allowing the student to experience the agricultural situation of the country in which he is studying. This situation differs from country to country, and thus the agricultural engineer who studies abroad and then comes to work in Kuwait often may not achieve the desired success due to lack of practical experience with the nature of agriculture in Kuwait.

For example, the agricultural engineer in Kuwait may be forced to deal with Kuwaiti agricultural land in a manner that is different from what he studied at his university. He may also have to apply agricultural methods that differ from those he studied because each country has its own soil, water resources, and agricultural conditions.

Agricultural circles believe that conditions are now favorable for the establishment of an agricultural college at the University of Kuwait to assume the responsibility of educating a generation of agricultural engineers who are capable of confronting the problems and obstacles faced by Kuwaiti agriculture and finding appropriate solutions for these problems and obstacles.

Kuwaiti agricultural engineers have their own opinions about their contribution to the country's agricultural development. They also have their own opinion about their being encouraged to enter engineering colleges, whether abroad or, if the university is destined to have a new college of agriculture among its numerous colleges, in Kuwait.

The Kuwaiti agricultural engineers feel that the state has the responsibility for encouraging Kuwaiti youth, whereas the Kuwaiti agricultural engineer has not yet received the desired encouragement from the state which would help induce Kuwaiti secondary school graduates to enter agricultural colleges in Arab countries or foreign countries--for the present, at least.

For the proposed agricultural college to succeed, say Kuwaiti agricultural engineers, the state must encourage the agricultural engineer to invest his knowledge and efforts in the service of his nation. It can do this by granting him an agricultural allotment and providing all the agricultural services necessary for cultivation, production, and marketing. Further, they feel it is a mistake for the engineer to learn and graduate merely to sit behind a desk in a government office. The real place of the agricultural engineer is in the field or on the farm.

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FORMER PREMIER INTERVIEWED ON ECONOMY

London AL-MAJALLAH Arabic No 76, 25-31 Jul 81 pp 37-41

[Interview with Salim al-Huss, former Lebanese Premier, by Rabah Munir Shaykh al-Ard; date and place not given]

> [Excerpts] In a comprehensive dialogue about Lebanon's economic situation, Salim al-Huss speaks to AL-MAJALLAH: "Lebanese emigrants help support the Lebanese economy; The Lebanese State's failure to play its role contributes to the outbreak of war; Syria is an economic partner with Lebanon...Algeria and Libya decline to give aid;" A dialogue with Rabah Munir Shaykh al-Ard.

[Question] In commenting on the Lebanese national budget, some newspapers have said recently that Lebanon's economy is "on the verge of total collapse." I believe that this comment is somewhat exaggerated and pessimistic. How can we describe the true state of Lebanon's economy now and in the near future?

[Answer] I believe that there is much exaggeration in the comment which you have quoted. It is true that wherever you look, the deficit is an enormous problem. However, let me deal with the matter patiently. The budget of the state of Lebanon, in most of the years preceding the outbreak of war in 1975, seldom showed a deficit. But, with the war, developments arose which caused a yearly deficit in the budget.

This deficit worsened year after year, reaching its peak in the 1981 budget drawn up a few days ago in the Lebanese Parliament. The cause of this deficit is directly linked to the consequences of war.

[Question] Fine. If we want to analyze these causes from the standpoint of the Lebanese budget, how shall we describe them?

[Answer] As far as budget revenues go, the state is suffering a decrease in most of its revenues. It is well known that the primary source of state revenue for Lebanon is customs taxes (duties). In Lebanon today there is a phenomenon which is cause for great concern: the presence of illegal ports, which permits wide-scale smuggling operations. This has deprived the state of most of it levied customs revenues at a time when these revenues should be increasing commensurate with the increase in the volume of imports and the rise in the prices of such imports. As is well known, duties are levied according to value, which is quantity multiplied by price. By increasing the cost of imports, revenue from duties would of course increase

noticeably and the revenue aspect of the budget should improve. However, the opposite has happened. Customs revenues, which are the state's primary source of public funds, have decreased.

[Question] What are other sources of revenue today?

[Answer] There are other sources which are less important than duties from the standpoint of filling the treasury, including income tax and other direct taxes and fees, all of which have decreased because the state is unable to collect them. All of this is interrelated, and the revenue aspect of the budget shrinks.

[Question] Of course this has been accompanied by a large increase in expenditures?

[Answer] Yes. Expenditures have increased greatly because of growing inflation and higher wages, salaries and various types of expenses. The state has also taken on additional burdens because of events which the country has endured such as the material losses sustained by many public utilities. This requires large expenditures by the state for repair and rebuilding or for further development and has led to the tremendous increase in expenditures and the decrease in revenues which we are speaking about.

[Question] The budget deficiency reflects the effects of the civil war in Lebanon on the country's economy. How do you assess these effects?

[Answer] The war had various effects. There were the direct effects represented by the tremendous material losses which affected Lebanon's economy and its internal situation as result of the war. Then there were indirect effects such as the damage to Lebanon in lost income. The Lebanese economy had been growing year by year, but with the war some utilities were completely paralyzed and others partially so, which put a stop to continued economic activity and weakened the growth which the Lebanese economy could have realized during the earlier period. The resulting loss of income must be taken into account.

Emigration--

[Question] In terms of human losses how has the Lebanese economy been affected if we take into consideration the dead, the wounded, the handicapped, the homeless and the immigrants?

[Answer] In addition to what the Lebanese economy has suffered through ruin, destruction and loss of lives in the producing sectors, the war has also brought about an emigration movement which has included much of the skilled and manual labor in search of jobs or security and peace, or both. Today you will find an unprecedented number of Lebanese abroad. This emigration has its bad and good points. The positive aspect is that those who might have been out of work because of the war and the paralization of the Lebanese economy, especially in certain regions and trades, went abroad to work and be productive. The large Lebanese community living abroad has been very successful, has shown outstanding results in various spheres and activities and continues to send much of what he earns to his relatives back home.

[Question] Remittances have increased, which has helped improve the budget. In this respect, how do you appraise the contribution of the Lebanese abroad in helping develop the Lebanese economy?

[Answer] The presence of Lebanese abroad and the success that they have achieved in general have made this contribution possible, for money has poured into Lebanon in various ways: some of it is sent to help family and relatives who have remained in Lebanon survive. Some is in the form of investments in property and real estate which have caught the attention of visitors to Lebanon these days. Despite the continuing sad, destructive events, there is noticeable activity in the construction sector. Some of the money has also been invested in the industrial sector. Some factories were renovated and the capacity of others was expanded. As a result of the influx of money from Lebanese expatriates, new industries were established.

[Question] All of these are positive results; however, the emigration of all this manpower has weakened the Lebanese economy because of the skills that were lost.

[Answer] That's true. I was talking about only the good points of emigration; however, we cannot deny that this emigration has its bad points also. We would not have talked about the good points if the Lebanese economy were in a normal state. The skilled and qualified manpower, and the labor force which left should have been used inside the country to serve the Lebanese economy and develop it, but under the devastating circumstances in Lebanon, we considered this a positive phenomenon in the short run. Instead of remaining idle in the country, this qualified labor left in order to produce, invest and assist. There is no doubt that when Lebanon is once again stable which we hope will be soon, the country will need back all this skilled labor, to contribute to rebuilding and developing the country.

[Question] However, the manpower that left because of the war helped create a kind of "international Arab Economy," including a burgeoning Arab economy in Europe. Arab companies, industries, periodicals and important banks are found in the economies of other countries. How do you assess this contribution in other economies and the role Lebanese have played?

[Answer] This is a good phenomenon. There is no doubt that during the crisis, the Lebanese actually served all the Arab economies. The offices, banks and institutions which were established in European capitals and elsewhere throughout the world had an effect on the international economy and will affect the Lebanese economy in particular and the Arab economies in general. Because all these institutions were created to be permanent, the Lebanese and the Arabs have gotten a foothold in the centers of world economic activity. These centers naturally have an effect on development in the Arab world, which will be beneficial in the long run.

[Question] Do you think there is hope that this will weaken the control of foreign countries over the Arab economies by helping to reapportion international activities and by allowing the Arabs to share in banking and finance, thus letting Arab desires take precedence over foreign desires?

[Answer] Of course. This cannot be overlooked. The departure of Lebanese to the centers of international economic activity has opened new horizons and opportunities for Arabs to contribute directly to the international economy and to develop their capabilities in all the different activities which foreigners have monopolized even within the Arab economies. This initiative should be noted, and the Lebanese have had an active, major share in it. I have reiterated that this phenomenon

points consistently to the vitality that the Lebanese businessmen and laborers share. I have said that I am afraid for Lebanon but not for the Lebanese. I am afraid for Lebanon as a land, as a country and as a society, but not for the Lebanese as individuals. The Lebanese have been known for succeeding as individuals but not as members of their society, which was one cause of the war in Lebanon. When Lebanon was shaken by war, many Lebanese emigrated and were very successful. Some of them have achieved results that showed great aptitude. However, we should not be proud of this. We want to develop the Lebanese to be a good citizen for his country and to be a part of his society. We are looking forward to the day that the Lebanese emigrant returns to Lebanon to develop it as a land, as a country and as a society. I think that if half of what happened to Lebanon had happened to another country, you would see the collapse of which you spoke in your first question. But in Lebanon things conformed with reality, and the Lebanese economy remained active. The Lebanese continued to be productive, if not in their country, then abroad, as if there was a distinction between the Lebanese and Lebanon during the war. The war and the crisis continued while the Lebanese was productive both within the country and abroad.

[Question] Lebanon had a special part in the economic life of the Arab world. How can we view the future of this economy if life returns to normal in Lebanon?

[Answer] There is a very crucial transition stage that Lebanon must pass through, one of reconstruction, rebuilding and rectifying the situation resulting from the crisis itself.

[Question] Or which caused the crisis?

[Answer] There are very persistent problems created by the crisis itself like housing, emigration and unemployment, but because many of the unemployed left to work abroad or joined the armed groups, the unemployed are not visible these days. However, there is still some hidden unemployment. Peace will be very difficult at first because of the problems created by the crisis. These problems are very acute: problems of society, labor and those related to relationships which were destroyed by the crisis, such as the relationship between the employer and his employee, the owner and his tenant and between the creditor and the debtor. All these and more were deeply affected by what happened. We tried to face these problems in 1977; that is after the two years' war, when I took charge of my first government. We believed that the crisis was over and that we were facing a new page in Lebanon's history, one of building and growth. The hardest problems that we had to face were those relationships and how to rectify them. We had discussions with all the various parties in the different areas—wide-ranging discussions, some of which were very emotional--trying to restore the relationships which were destroyed by the war over two years. Legislation and regulations were drawn up as to what the relationship should be between employer and employee, owner and tenant, creditor and debtor and many other types of relationships. However, in no time, the security situation collapsed again, and these relationships deteriorated once more.

Two Necessary Elements--

[Question] Security and peace are necessary to revive the Lebanese economy, but if the economy does recuperate, would you want it to be as it was before the war, or

to benefit from what happened, create a new kind of economy and avoid the disruption of the past?

[Answer] Of course, of course. I have been saying that reconstruction has to be an improvement and not merely reconstruction. I think that one of the reasons for the crisis to which I just referred is the imbalance inside Lebanese society and the Lebanese economy. In the past, the Lebanese economy achieved splendid results, but they were superficial rather than deep-rooted because the economy depended on the freedom and initiative of the individual. Freedom is one of the virtues that the Lebanese economy should preserve because Lebanon's most important resource is its people and a person needs freedom to give what he has. Freedom should also be preserved because it was one of the reasons for the momentum of growth of the Lebanese economy in the past. However, free enterprise does not mean in my opinion the "hands-off" way in which the state stopped carrying out its active duties.

[Question] What should the state do in the future that it did not do in the past?

[Answer] The state should carry out all its duties under an open system, which is the opposite of what was happening before the crisis. Specifically, the Lebanese government was not as concerned about the Lebanese economy as it should have been. Therefore, as a result of the "hands-off" policy, crises erupted such as inflation, visible and hidden unemployment, specific problems in certain industries such as the textile industry and the banking crisis in the 1960's which came to a head with the bankruptcy of Intrabank. All these crises indicated the weakness of the government in fulfilling its economic duties. In addition to these crises, the "hands-off" policy which the government pursued through the years suffocated some spheres of economic activity. All of us remember the jam at Beirut's port when scores of ships waited to enter the port before the war. The roads were also jammed and there was a continual shortage of electricity and water throughout the country. The transportation network could not keep up with economic growth. Even the Lebanese bureaucracy was facing a crisis and did not develop quickly enough to keep up with events. All these crises occurred because the government did not intervene before they arose. When the crises did erupt, the situation was out of their hands. The state did not make the necessary investments in various utilities, such as ports, roads, airports, and water and electrical facilities. Therefore, these crises blocked the development of the Lebanese economy.

[Question] And the social problems?

[Answer] This is the crux of the matter and very important. Because the Lebanese government neglected its duties, obvious differences arose among the various factions and regions in Lebanon. I would like to mention the catchy expressions that before the crisis appeared in the newspapers daily--"the chains of misery around the capital" and "the chains of misery." The war struck at the chains and unfortunately left the misery untouched. Rather, it struck the chains, causing disorder everywhere, and deepened the misery within Lebanese society. In Lebanon there were "great shortages" and "extensive prohibited areas." These expressions were familiar before 1975. Why were there shortages? Why were there prohibited areas? Why were there chains of misery around the capital? All this shows the government's neglect of its duties, even under free enterprise. Free enterprise does not mean that the government abandons its role. I think free enterprise

increases the government's duty to be involved. The role of a government under free enterprise is great, active and positive on three levels.

--facing crises before they occur and if they occur, containing them;

--avoiding any cut-off in public services;

--treating the economic and social situations in such a manner that no differences arise between areas or groups.

In rebuilding the Lebanese economy, all these problems should be corrected, and the government must direct, supervise and invest.

[Question] What are the instruments of these tasks? Will they be in planning or in something wider in scope?

[Answer] For this purpose we created the (Development and Reconstruction Committee) and gave it powers more far-reaching than any other department in the Lebanese government, including the Ministry of Planning, has ever had. The (Development and Reconstruction Committee) is made up of specialists and is given extensive powers to plan, finance and direct. This committee is the instrument.

[Question] One element of the financing to rebuild Lebanon is monetary aid. What are the extent and conditions of this assistance? To what degree does it keep the Lebanese economy from collapsing or support its reconstruction and development activities?

[Answer] Until now, Arab assistance has not been eough either for the level of destruction which occurred in Lebanon or for the necessary reconstruction. In addition, the Lebanese plans for reconstruction and development were not completed because of the events which have continued since 1975. We hope that when stability returns to Lebanon, extensive programs will be drawn up to rebuild and develop Lebanon and that the Arab countries will step in with sufficient financial assistance by adopting and supporting all of these plans until they take shape and succeed. Arab assistance has taken many forms so far, including the loans which Lebanon has obtained from existing Arab institutions such as the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development and the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. These are natural channels which any Arab country could turn to without having suffered destruction and ruin. We have also received a little help from some of the Arab countries in the form of grants for relief, to treat social problems, to aid the southern part of Lebanon, grants to (the settlement Council) and to others. During the Summit Conference in Tunis, a decision was made to give Lebanon $2 billion in aid to be paid within five years (about $400 million a year). This amount was divided among certain Arab countries. However, two countries declined to pay their share--Algeria, because of its financial situation, and Libya. The remainder of the Arab countries paid about $300 million, but this amount was insignificant compared to what Lebanon needs yearly to rebuild itself. The rebuilding has not started yet on a large scale because of the circumstances in the country. When stability returns, there is no doubt that the needs will be sizeable and what we will expect from our Arab brothers will be a lot more than we have gotten so far.

The Syrian role--

[Question] What is the Syrian role in the Lebanese economy?

[Answer] Syria is a natural economic and trading partner with Lebanon. It is a neighbor and has had a long and close economic history with Lebanon. Remember that they had a customs union, a duties union.

[Question] Before the "break" brought about by former Syrian Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm?

[Answer] Yes. Economic relations stayed naturally strong because of the discussions. the meshing of the two countries' economies and the natural unity between them created by history and geography. Syria used Lebanese ports and Lebanese used Syrian territory for passage. The interrelationship between the two countries was extensive and strong.

[Question] To what degree can we say that there are several economies in Lebanon rather than just one, which reflects the current fragmentation brought about by the political and military elements?

[Answer] The borders which exist in Lebanon now are temporary and accidental, and we hope that these obstacles will disappear when security and peace return to Lebanon. Despite these borders, all the elements and manifestations of economic unity still exist. The truth is that despite all that has happened, the Lebanese economy continues to operate and be active. This is for many reasons, including the presence of Lebanese abroad, the money they send to relatives and their help in rebuilding and developing Lebanon.

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NEW TELEVISION STATION BEGINS BROADCAST

TA131251 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 13 Sep 81

[From the Midday Newsreel]

[Text] Initial color broadcasts transmitted by the Star of Hope Television Station in southern Lebanon were well received in the north of the country at the end of last week. This station will move into full program of broadcasts in the coming days and our correspondent, Hayim Hecht, reports its owners emphasize again that they have no connection with hotelier Hayim Schiff.

[Begin recording] At the end of the week the initial broadcasts of the Star of Hope Television Station owned by U.S. Priest George Otis were transmitted from the broadcasting van located in Haddad's territory not far from the Israeli northern border. The color broadcasts which were received well in the northern settlements included programs for children, Westerners and documentaries on religion. Fully recognizing the sensitivity of the religious issue in Israel, the station personnel have so far refrained from preaching and settled for films on the life of Moses, for example.

The station personnel are currently dealing with putting up additional boosters which will increase the range of their transmissions. At this stage the broadcasts are transmitted with the aid of transmitters in Marun al-Ra's, in the (Nabi 'Awadah) mountain area opposite Misgav 'am.

At the end of the week a light Centurion-type plane called the Wings of Hope [last three words in English] arrived in Israel. The plane will serve the television station for the transfer of films and reports from the center of Israel and, when necessary, will be used for the transfer of wounded people from southern Lebanon to Israel's hospitals. The words--pray for peace--are conspicuous on the plane. The station's owners intend to overhaul an old British landing strip north of Metulla for the use of the plane. The pilot of the Wings of Hope is Jerry (Tubayas). (Tubayas) was one of the pilots of the White House Boeing planes intended for use as a flying command room in case of emergency.

The representatives of George Otis, the station's owner, repeat their denial of any connection to hotelier Hayim Schiff. [end recording]

CSO: 4323/65

BRIEFS

S. LEBANESE AIRLINE--Major Sa'd Haddad is about to establish an airline. It will operate under the flag of free southern Lebanon from an old British airfield in the Marj 'Uyun Valley. This was learned by our correspondents Hannan 'Azran and Yoram Hamizrahi. Our correspondents report that negotiations are now under way with an Israeli aviation company, which rebuilds planes, for the purchase of two aircraft for the airline which Haddad intends to establish. [Text] [TA132022 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 13 Sep 81]

POLICE POST OPENED--The first police station in the Christian enclaves controlled by the militia in southern Lebanon opened yesterday in the town of Marj 'Uyun north of Metulla. The station was established and is run by the militia although it is manned by policemen who have been sent to the area from Beirut. This is the first time since the enclaves controlled by Maj Sa'd Haddad declared their independence that a police station subordinate to the commander of police in Beirut operates in this area. To date, police and criminal affairs in the enclaves have been handled by representatives of Major Haddad whom he had especially appointed to this task. Militia sources expressed the hope that the policemen would impose Lebanon's sovereignty in the area beyond the boundaries of the enclaves which are controlled by the terrorists. They noted that the first task of the policemen would be to maintain freedom of movement on roads harassed by the terrorists and to regain control over the al-Qasimiyah bridge on the Litani River when its building is completed lest it be taken over by the terrorists. [Menahem Rahat] [Text] [TA161218 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 16 Sep 81 p 9]

CSO: 4323/65

INTERVIEW WITH KANE SOULEYMAN, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES INSTITUTE

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 29 Jul 81 pp 3, 8

[Interview with Kane Souleyman, director of the National Languages Institute, by Abba O. Mohamed, date and place not specified]

> [Text] The National Languages Institute [ILN] is the body responsible for concretizing our country's policy on teaching our national languages: Pulaar, Soninke, and Ouolof. Established in 1979, the ILN's mission is to make preparations for the introduction of those languages into our national educational system within the next 6 years. Since its creation, the ILN has been ready to carry out its mission.
>
> In this major interview, Kane Souleyman, director of the ILN, tells us about steps being taken to transcribe our national languages as well as about other matters affecting the progress of the Institute.

[Question] Can you tell us, Mr Director, how far we have gotten on transcription of our national languages?

[Answer] The CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] decided at its meeting held 8-18 October 1979 to transcribe our national languages: Pulaar, Soninke, and Ouolof--into the Latin letter adopted by the African states, in order to achieve compatibility and facilitate exchanges of experiences in this field.

It was decided during the said meeting to create an instrument which would be responsible for concretizing our country's policy on teaching our above-mentioned three national languages, specifically by: making preparations for their introduction into our national educational system over the next 6 years (1980-1985). This instrument is the National Languages Institute which was established by decree 79,348 of 10 December 1979.

This institution did not really get under way until near the end of 1980, and since then it has accomplished substantial work toward preparing for the insertion of the said languages into the curriculum; among its accomplishments has been the development of a national alphabet of these languages. This alphabet was adopted by decree 81 072/PG/MEN of 15 July 1981.

Others include:

--the holding of the first meeting of the scientific council.
--the development of an ILN action program.
--the holding of study sessions 20-26 April 1981, out of which ILN was able to translate teaching technology into the various languages. Experts from Mali, Senegal, and Alecso participated in these study sessions.

A list of 5,000 words in each of the three languages that can serve as a basis for teaching materials came out of the study sessions and is presently being prepared.

The institute has also sent study missions to the following countries: Senegal, Mali, Niger, and Guinea, in order to learn from their experiences in the promotion of national languages.

International organizations are also very interested in the promotion of national languages. This is why the director of ILN was privileged to be invited by the director of Alecso to Tunis last February.

The agency for cultural and technical cooperation invited ILN to participate in meetings dealing with the Peul and Manding languages in Bamako and Abidjan, and dealing with Soninke in Dakar.

The institute has taken trips to make contact and enhance awareness in the Brakna, Assaba, Guidimakha and Gorgol regions. The populations in those regions were very responsive to the decision of the CMSN and the government concerning the introduction of our national languages into our educational system.

Conscious of the need for compatibility with neighboring countries in the field of national language promotion, Mauritania adopted the uniform alphabet which emerged from the conference held in Bamako 28 February-5 March 1966 under the aegis of UNESCO [United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization], a conference in which several African and non-African linguists took part. Our country was represented by our technical adviser, Professor Oumar Ba.

[Question] What are the problems facing you in carrying out the transcription?

[Answer] With respect to problems relating to the transcribing of our national languages, the institute has found that the ground has already been cleared before it. It has reaped the fruits of the efforts of neighboring countries, national cultural associations, and African students in Egypt, in this field, thanks to our country's willingness to cooperate with them in order to profit from their experience. This is why the ILN has not run into any problems of this kind.

[Question] Why did it finally decide to transcribe the national languages into Latin characters rather than the Arabic?

[Answer] The choice of Latin letters for the transcription of our national languages was in my opinion justified. The arguments advanced above suffice to answer that question.

[Question] What lessons have you at the institute learned from the experiences of other African countries? What kind of cooperative links does the institute maintain with these African states?

[Answer] Cooperation between the ILN and neighboring countries started from its birth. It has been concretized in exchanges of missions and documents.

[Question] What steps lie ahead for you?

[Answer] The ILN is planning on carrying out research on languages in the country's interior, and will be training teachers starting this August before holding experimental classes expected to begin in October 1982. The teachers will be involved in designing the teaching materials.

Also, we are expecting training grants both at the national and international level.

In that regard, some institutions have begun to offer grants in linguistic fields.

Then we will initiate instruction in the national languages at the level of ENA [National School of Administration], ENI, ENS [expansions unknown], and launch a national campaign to promote literacy in the national languages. This is scheduled to begin in October 1982. It will focus primarily on production units and the rural sector.

The institute will be involved in training teachers who will be teaching Arabic as a second language. The international Arabic language institute at Khartoum has given us a grant in this field.

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RECENT FOREIGN BANK RESTRICTIONS ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 231 25 Jul 81 p 43

[Article: "Concerning the Curtailment of Branches of Foreign Banks in the UAE"]

[Text] As a measure taken in the public interest in order to reorganize banking activity, in order to assure that UAE laws are carried out, and in order to serve the national interest, the Central Bank has decided to curtail [the number of] branches of foreign banks operating in the UAE since the number of such branches, in fact, is greater than that which is needed by society. In order to clarify matters, the bank director said that this decision is not directed against any foreign institution (as some people later on will prefer to believe), and that it is merely a measure which, first and foremost, has been taken in the national interest.

In order to understand the problem, let us go back a few years--before every major bank had 9 or 10 branches in a country which has no more than 8 principal cities. Let us see to what degree these banks have contributed toward serving the national economy, or toward ruining it, if one may use that expression.

According to official statistics which were put out by the Central Bank, in 1976 bank credit was distributed as follows: 49.9 percent for commerce, 24.8 percent for construction, 6 percent for the government, 5.6 percent for industry, 2.1 percent for other financial institutions, 3 percent for electricity, water, and gas, 1.9 percent for transportation, 2 percent for mines and the mining industry, 1 percent for agriculture, and 7.5 percent for other activities.

What these figures show is that the nation's production sector, that is, the sectors of agriculture, industry, and mining, received only 8 percent of this credit whereas 92 percent of it went to the service sectors. The service sectors are very active and they, in turn, pay high interest rates [to the banks]. These interest rates represent money which is taken out of normal production and is turned into profits which are frozen in foreign banks, that is, profits which are never invested inside the boundaries of the UAE.

In order not to have this analysis restricted to a single year (and in order to avoid probable criticism), it should be mentioned that the year 1980 (that is, 4 years after 1976) saw no change in the situation regarding the sector of agriculture and industry. In 1980, credit was distributed as follows: 32.7 percent

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for construction, 38.25 percent for commerce, 2.35 percent for transportation and storage, 8 percent for the government, and 11.56 percent for other activities. Industry received 6.64 percent of the credit, and agriculture received 0.035 percent.

This is why it has been important to establish specialized banks to increase the efficiency of the production sectors--such as the industrial bank, land bank, and agricultural bank.

Naturally, the establishment of these banks, in addition to the other already existing national banks, will conflict with the numerous foreign banks in the country, of which there are more than the country needs. Therefore it was necessary to strive to decrease the number of branches of the main banks in order to prevent the draining off of resources necessary for the success of national banks which are supposed to strive to improve the agricultural and industrial production sectors for the sake of diversifying [the nation's] sources of income.

The Central Bank's decision is for the benefit of UAE citizens, and no heed should be paid to people who will be interpreting this decision to mean something that it does not mean. It is our right to utilize our resources and develop our production ourselves.

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END

JPRS 79101

30 September 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2407

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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BRIEFS

ISRAELI AGRICULTURAL EXHIBIT--A large delegation from Morocco has arrived in Israel to attend the exhibit of agricultural machines, "Agritech 81," which opened yesterday at the fair grounds in Tel Aviv. Other delegations have also arrived from black African countries which do not have diplomatic relations with Israel, such as Zambia, Swaziland, Botswana, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Malawi and Zaire. Report by Aharon Pri'el. [Excerpt] [TA151256 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Sep 81 p 10]

EL AL AIDING HAITI--The El Al Airline is aiding Haiti in establishing an airline. Israel's national airline has signed an agreement with the Haitian Government whereby El Al will help set up a national airline on the Caribbean island. El Al pilots and technicians will be employed by the Haitian airline. In the first stage El Al will extend advice to the new airline but after it is set up El Al will be actively involved in its operation. El Al will thus be able to expand its operation and open new lines to Central America. [TA092051 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 9 Sep 81]

DPRK SUPPLIES TO PLO--Copenhagen, 13 Sep (exclusive)--North Korea has sold the PLO an unspecified number of long-range cannons (122 to 130 mm in range). A Swedish correspondent who had been invited to tour PLO bases has said that such weapons have been displayed, and he saw them. Report by Scandinavia-based correspondent, Eliyahu Zehavi. [Text] [TA141211 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Sep 81 p 2]

CSO: 4323/67

PLO CENTRAL COUNCIL MEMBER DISCUSSES CEASEFIRE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Jul 81 p 3

[Article: Press Conference held by Abu-'Adnan member of the PLO Central Council: "The Zionist Plot Will Continue, and the Ceasefire Does Not Mean the End of War"]

[Text] Abu-'Adnan, member of the PLO Central Council warned that the Zionist plot against the Palestinians and Arabs will continue. It may take a diplomatic form after the ceasefire between the Palestinian revolution and the Zionist enemy. He said that the PLO acceptance of ceasefire across the Lebanese borders does not mean ending the war against the Zionist enemy.

In a press conference held by Abu-'Adnan at the PLO Headquarters in Kuwait, and attended by 'Awni Bitash, director of PLO office, he demanded that the Arabs take a decisive position and threaten to withdraw Arab funds from the United States and Europe. He also asked the Arabs to use the oil weapon against those countries and limit the trade exchange between such countries and the Arab nations.

Abu-'Adnan indicated that the ceasefire between the Zionist enemy and PLO will be an opportunity for a Palestinian action aimed at reorganizing the revolutionary forces, compensating for lost arms and ammunition, and supporting its forces with new weapons which will give the PLO the ability for strong retaliation if the Israeli aggression resumes.

Abu-'Adnan stated that 30 years had elapsed since Palestine was usurped. During that period, many conferences were held and many resolutions issued which were not translated into action. Any new resolution will not increase our optimism. He said that the Palestinian resistance does not expect Israel to adhere to the ceasefire resolution, and the plot will continue according to a carrot and stick policy.

The Palestinian official denied that the installation of Syrian missiles around the Lebanese capital of Beirut requires an approval from the Soviet Union. He asserted that Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, notified the Lebanese National Movement delegation that such action first needed the approval of the Lebanese state. Then Abu'-Adnan mentioned that Kuwait can play a political role within the framework of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

The Plot Is Being Renewed

At the beginning of the conference, Abu-'Adnan said that the Palestinian revolution has been living since 1975 in the shadow of a plot being renewed on a daily basis. Numerous tools are being used as part of an American-Zionist plan. He mentioned that Israel does not recognize the Palestinian people and this is confirmed by Israeli insistence on considering Gaza Strip and the West Bank as inseparable parts of Israel. The recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people by 112 nations put Israel in a critical situation.

The Palestinian official talked about the mission of the American envoy Philip Habib. He said that the mission is a continuation of the plot, but within the framework of diplomatic efforts, because the United States fears open confrontation lest it should lead to an explosion in the area, the loss of Egypt, and of all the Camp David achievements. Therefore, the present mission of Philip Habib came to existence. That mission has a goal which is not yet revealed. That goal is to employ Zionist strikes in the interest of American strategy in the Middle East region.

Three Stages

Speaking of the Israeli-Palestinian war in Lebanon, Abu-'Adnan said: "This war has been through three stages--at its beginning the Israeli enemy concentrated on hitting the bases of the Palestinian revolution in southern Lebanon in order to confuse and disperse the Palestinians, as well as inflicting heavy human losses."

He went on to say: "When Israel imagined that it had achieved that goal, it was determined to carry out the second stage of its plan, that is the war of bridges, aiming at putting the Palestinian fighter in a psychologically weak position that affects his morale. Then it jumped to the third stage, which was the attack on the headquarters of the Palestinian leadership in the most densely populated areas in Beirut."

He said that Israel used 500-pound American made bombs in that raid, which did not show any compassion for civilians. He again asserted that the three stages of that war raised the morale of the Palestinian fighter considerably, and the reason was that the fighter possessed the will to retaliate, face the aggression and destroy the Zionist colonies. For the first time, the children in Beirut were equal with the children in the Zionist settlements. As fear spread among people in Beirut and southern Lebanon, it dominated the population of the Zionist settlements too. As we suffered losses in Lebanon, they had losses in the settlements as well.

He stated that the losses for the resistance were high indeed and the Israeli strike was very devastating.

Palestinian Plan

Abu-'Adnan added that there is a Palestinian plan to strengthen the military power of the Palestinian revolution during the ceasefire period between Israel

and the PLO. He said: "We do not expect that the enemy will adhere to the ceasefire agreement because Israel and America will resort to diplomatic means to liquidate the resistance. The American envoy, Philip Habib is trying to create a fluid situation so that the American plot can go through, otherwise the plot will be renewed one way or another, through the internal machinery in Lebanon and the mobilization of Sa'd Haddad in southern Lebanon."

Abu-'Adnan demanded that the American envoy be expelled from the region, that the Arab States take a unified stand to confront Israel, restrict commerce with imperialist countries, withdraw Arab funds from imperialist countries, and use the oil weapon.

The War Decision Is Not in the Hands of Egypt or Israel

The Palestinian official mentioned that the missiles and guns of the Palestinian revolution had the power to force Israel to accept the ceasefire. He indicated that the war decision is not in the hands of Egypt or Israel as Sadat claims, but the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement can make such a decision. The recent battles and the Syrian missile crisis in the Biga' proved that Syria is able to take the war decision with the support of the Arab nation.

Abu-'Adnan earnestly called upon all Arab regimes to take the initiative to support the Palestinian resistance by all means that will enable the resistance to confront the enemy's weapons. With regard to the Arab Joint Defense Council resolution passed last Thursday night in Tunis, Abu-'Adnan said: "The application has been and will remain the only thing that counts. Based upon our experience, we expect that the resolution will have the same fate as others even more serious passed before, such as the Baghdad Summit resolutions."

He indicated that the Sudanese minister of defense should have been expelled from the emergency meeting of the Council because Sudan fights against the policy of the organization and Sudan acts within the framework of Camp David accords with the Egyptian regime.

9607
CSO: 3404/112

PLO OFFICIAL VIEWS FRENCH STAND ON PALESTINIANS

PM140847 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 12-18 Sep 81 pp 27-29

[Interview granted by PLO representative in Paris Ibrahim al-Sus to al-Majallah correspondent in Paris--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] How do you view the French stand on the Palestine problem following the Socialist Party's accession to power?

[Answer] In fact we cannot yet judge the stand of the new French regime toward our cause because the Socialist Party is new to power and has not yet had the time to formulate a comprehensive and clear foreign policy. But the indications of its attitude so far prompt me to say that it is not adequate as far as we are concerned. The new French officials clearly admit that the Palestinian people have a right to establish an independent state of their own--which no doubt is a step further than the attitude of the previous regime, which merely recognized that the Palestinians have a full right to self-determination--but, on the other hand, they allege that the PLO is not the sole representative of the Palestinian people. We have told those officials--including Minister of External Relations Claude Cheysson--that if the PLO is not the sole representative of the Palestinian people, who is the other representative? Of course, they had no answer to our question. Some of them believe that leaders of the occupied territories could be partners with the PLO in representing the Palestinian people. But the West Bank leaders who were expelled last year assured the French that they are under the PLO flag.

[Question] But French Minister of External Relations Claude Cheysson often declared that France's refusal to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people does not mean that France considers that there is another representative of the Palestinian people. What is your opinion?

[Answer] Therefore let Mr Cheysson clearly say that the PLO, which is recognized by 117 countries, is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and let him not create the legal obstacles which he is now using as an excuse. The international recognition we enjoy is a precedent in international diplomatic law.

[Question] How do you evaluate the meeting in Beirut between Yasir 'Arafat and French Minister Claude Cheysson?

[Answer] The meeting was of extreme importance in that it enabled the French minister of external relations to hear from the Palestinian revolution leader details of the PLO stand and strategy for the achievement of a comprehensive solution based on the Palestinian people's right, particularly their right to establish an independent state of their own and to return to their homeland. The importance of the meeting lies in the fact that it has deepened the current dialogue between us and France that has been going on for years. It took place at Cheysson's request. What we are hoping for now is that France will take practical measures for the materialization of this stand.

[Question] It appears that the new French regime supports the Camp David agreement more than the previous regime did.

[Answer] Before coming to power the French Socialist Party supported the Camp David agreement out of its belief that it is a step toward a comprehensive peace in the area. Now that the whole world has realized that this agreement cannot be the key to a solution of the Middle East crisis, French officials are emphasizing what they call the positive atmosphere it has created. But such a claim is groundless because all that the agreement did was to isolate Egypt from the Arab world, thus achieving Israel's objectives. With regard to the autonomy issue, some in the French leadership believe that it is a step toward the independence of the Palestinian people. These people cite as a historical example France's experiment in North Africa. We tell them that such examples do not apply to our situation and that we cannot accept less than a fully sovereign state.

[Question] Recently there was a change in France's view of the Camp David agreement in that during his recent Arab tour Claude Cheysson affirmed that this agreement is absolutely insufficient to ensure a comprehensive solution. What is your comment?

[Answer] We have noted with satisfaction Claude Cheysson's remarks on Camp David. He expressed certain reservations when he said that France believes that Camp David has been unable to secure a solution to the Palestine problem, which is the central issue. There is no doubt that this stand is even better than that of the previous French regime and allows us to be optimistic in that Cheysson stressed that what must be solved first is the Palestinian problem.

[Question] What about the European initiative, in which France played a major role and which now seems to have reached a dead end?

[Answer] We waited in vain for a serious European initiative, but in the end we found that a united European stand is imaginery. Previously they used to tell us to wait for the development of the stand of this or that country, and that there are efforts to drive a certain country in this direction. But we despaired of all this, and the European envoy's recent tour was mere talk. From now on we will refuse to let anybody talk to us about a European initiative because it will not happen. What we want now is not a united European stand but a clear stand from every European country individually.

CSO: 4304/169

BRIEFS

EXPANDING ACTIVITIES IN GAZA STRIP--Egypt has been recently expanding its activities in the territories, especially in the Gaza Strip with the aim of broadening its sphere of influence in the area. In this respect, Egypt has been taking initiatives in the spheres of economy, education and communications. Our correspondent Bassam Ja'Bar spoke today with public figures in the Gaza Strip. [Begin Ja'Bar recording] The expansion of Egypt's activities in the territories and especially in the Gaza Strip has found its expression in several recent moves which may constitute some kind of pressure on the inhabitants to support its peace policy. To date, Egypt has insisted on its refusal to accept students from the Gaza Strip to its universities so long as a delegation of dignitaries from the Gaza Strip does not come forward in support of President al-Sadat. Egypt has recently also opened economic possibilities to all the dignitaries expressing their identification with its political moves. The Egyptian authorities also allow these people free passage into and within Egypt. Egypt has recently announced its intention to set up a television station in al-'Arish. There are certain circles in Gaza that believe this move is also designed to increase Egypt's influence on the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. [Text] [TA101858 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 10 Sep 81]

ISRAELI BANKS TRANSFER PLO FUNDS--Without being aware of it, Israeli banks in Israel and overseas serve as middlemen for transferring funds from the PLO and its supporters to Arab elements in East Jerusalem, Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. The military government is currently tackling this issue. It has been learned that regulations will soon be published on the procedures for receiving funds from foreign sources and reporting on them to the military government. It has been learned from Arab sources that even before restrictions were imposed on bringing in funds which were suspected to originate from the PLO's coffers, public institutions and private persons used Israeli banks that have branches throughout the world. Recently, the need has increased for using these banks and the methods were also improved for transferring funds by legal means. Security elements last night noted that they are aware of this loophole as well as of people in the territories who have checkbooks from foreign banks overseas where funds belonging to the joint Jordanian-PLO committee have been deposited. According to these security elements, the main problem does not lie in the possibility of introducing funds emanating from the PLO and its supporters, but in creating a control system which would prevent the use of these funds without receiving permission from the Israeli authorities. Reacting to this report, bankers told the Ma'Ariv correspondent that, indeed, anyone--including people linked to the PLO--could deposit money in Israeli banks overseas and transfer it to people in Israel. They can also do this through foreign banks. Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]. [Excerpt] [TA180926 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Sep 81 p 11]

CSO: 4323/67

AFGHAN YOUTH ORGANIZATION SENDS SOLIDARITY MESSAGE TO YOUNG PALESTINIANS

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 7 Aug 81 p 3

[Text] Kabul--The Democratic Organization of the Youth of Afghanistan [DOYA] sent a message of its solidarity with the youth and people of Palestine, as follows:

Comrades! Recently the world's people were the witnesses of new barbaric attacks by the Israeli Zionists against Lebanon, particularly the Palestinian regions of that country. This direct military intervention and aggression, which took place under the aegis of U.S. imperialism's all-out support, has fueled the fires of anger and hatred of progressive humanity, including the progressive youth of Afghanistan, against Israeli Zionists and their friends.

Now that you, our dear comrades, are facing the deplorable consequences of the traitorous Camp David agreement, DOYA, representing the youth of Afghanistan, announces its unsparing, all-out support and solidarity with your just and righteous struggles for freedom, natural sovereignty, and social progress against world imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism, Zionism and Arab reactionism.

DOYA, as a revolutionary scout for the nation's youth, strongly condemned the barbaric and traitorous attacks of Israeli Zionists which took place using U.S.-built bombers. DOYA announces that these attacks cannot be excused for any reason whatsoever. DOYA believes that the delivery of four F-16 bombers to the Tel Aviv government, and encouraging Israel to make irresponsible and aggressive attacks against the Arab Moslem people have dealt a severe blow to peace in the Middle East. These acts have greatly aggravated the critical situation. In this fashion the aggressive Zionists are encouraged to intensify the aggressive madness of international monopoly against the just struggles of the people of the region and the world.

Thus DOYA once again demands that the U.S. imperialists and their allies in the region, Zionism and the Sadat regime, cease all the reactionary plots they have launched against the righteous struggles of the Palestinian youth and people versus imperialism and Zionism.

Crusading comrades! DOYA totally condemns the inhuman attacks the Israeli Zionists have launched against the heroic Palestinian people, and once again states its support for the struggles waged by the Palestinian youth and people for the restitution and complete freedom of their occupied lands.

DOYA believes that despite the traitorous and bellicose attacks of the imperialists and Zionists against the revolutionary forces of Palestine, the heroic struggles of the people, youth and determined officials of Palestine will triumph in the end.

Victory to the just struggles of the Palestinian people!
Death to world imperialism, Zionism and Arab reactionism!

According to another report: A similar message was also sent to Lebanon by DOYA's Central Komiteh in order to express DOYA's solidarity with the struggles of the youth and people of Lebanon, and its condemnation of the traitorous attacks of Israeli Zionists on Lebanon's soil using U.S. bombers.

9557
CSO: 4665/10

GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, OPPOSITION LEADERS DISCUSS POSITIONS

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 11 May 81 pp 12-18

[Article by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahab: "The Opposition and the Government Face to Face"]

> [Text] Opposition parties say, "We are seeking power; we are calling for ending disputes with Arabs; and we are calling for reconsideration of the open-door policy."
> The government's party says, "We reject the dictatorship of a minority; we are not the reason behind the hostility with the Soviet Union; and the Arabs will return very soon."
> Fikri Makram 'Ubayd says, "The pages of ROSE AL-YUSUF are an affirmation of democracy."

Egypt assumed its position on the road to democracy since the May 1971 revolution.

Having been buried in the shadow of a single political organization, the word, parties, reappeared in the vocabulary of Egyptian politics.

The man in the street became accustomed to hearing the word, opposition, after it used to arouse fear of dire consequences.

Despite the errors of partisan practice which are due to inexperience, President al-Sadat did declare more than once that, "There would be no retreat from democracy." He said that the remedy for the errors of democracy lies in more democracy.

From this premise we thought we would bring the opposition parties and the ruling party together face to face in an objective round-table debate. Each would express his position and make his statement, sometimes defending his position and sometimes attacking [the other's position]. It is certain that ultimately the outcome of the debate will serve the cause of democracy.

It's been said a long time ago that differences of opinion do not spoil the cause of friendship.

There are differences of opinions and positions between the political parties that are now in existence in Egypt. The opposition is being accused of taking advantage of the public's suffering during the period of building for prosperity. [It's being accused of the fact] that its only concern is to assume power and that to do so it is resorting to methods of provocation and agitation.

The ruling party affirms its adherence to democracy and its open-minded attitude toward the opposition, [as long as such opposition is expressed] in a framework of objectivity and the country's supreme interests are placed above all considerations.

We interviewed all the parties involved about the questions over which there is disagreement between the government and the opposition. We are reporting the interview truthfully without comment.

An Attempt To Create a Public Opinion

Mustafa Kamil Murad, president of the Liberal party says, "Opposition as a political method is tied basically to the social conditioning of the people. If we as individuals do not understand the meaning of having a difference of opinion or the meaning of criticism and if we as groups and as individuals still think that there are problems that may not be debated, how can there be a healthy political opposition [in our midst]? Political individuals are ultimately the product of the climate and the predominant cultural framework. Herein lies the importance of discussing the question of the opposition in Egypt.

"Therefore, parties prepare their ranks and educate and train them to use the democratic method in political action. On another level these parties communicate with the masses to discuss with them the parties' programs which affect political, economic and social problems. They do so in an attempt to create for themselves a public opinion and to broaden their base among the people.

"It is quite normal for the opposition to be criticized because no one expects to express opposition and to have his opposition acceptable in all cases. [It is quite normal that] charges be made against the opposition and that reservations be expressed regarding it. In my opinion all these are political methods whose purpose is to undermine the political power of other parties, power which they gain from communicating with the people. These methods are recognized in the world of politics, and this is normal growth for the opposition and the democratic experience.

"From the points of view and the reservations that are presented and from the reactions that are made to those points of view and reservations an agreement is produced and the form of a relationship between the parties is formulated. [One party] would be accused of agitation and provocation, and that charge would be refuted from the other point of view. We would hear all the opinions, the charges and the reservations and we would also hear the refutations, but this would take place in the context of a legal

accusation. Instead of making generalizations, we have to be specific and say that party X is charged with XYZ and there is a law that rules [in this case].

"It goes without saying that the objective of the opposition is to attain power. Yes we do aspire to power. What would be the significance of political action otherwise? The party that does not have the attainment of power as one of its objectives is not a party. However, we have to make it clear that we in the Liberal party see power as a means and not an end. Power is a means by which we can realize our program which will not be realized unless we attain power.

"Regarding reservations on the form of opposition, we in the party are committed to the notion that when we criticize the government, we are presenting another opinion and the considerations upon which that opinion is based. At the same time I am affirming that we are not taking advantage of the public's suffering and that we will not do so.

"All parties have to know and understand that errors and excesses are inevitable. We all have to be equally tolerant about the excesses of both the ruling party and the opposition."

The Results of the Opposition

Mumtaz Nassar speaks for the independents: "I see no reason for complaints or for dissatisfaction with the opposition. Objective opposition serves the government and does not hurt it. Accordingly, it sheds light on the government's course and corroborates opinion. In fact, it is in the government's interests to listen to the opposition and to ask it for another opinion. The government should not be embarrassed if it finds that the opposition's opinions were correct and if it adopts them.

"As far as I am concerned as a member of the independent opposition, I have not departed from the framework of objectivity. I have not made a single statement that implies a personal attack or an infringement upon a single person.

"If one person in the opposition were to deviate, it is not right to generalize the complaint and to become intolerant of all the opposition. One person's method will be different from that of another. Similarly, one party's method of opposition will differ from that of another party. Hence, the government may think that the opposition's opinions imply agitation and provocation, but the opposition may not subscribe to that view.

"Therefore, to make our democratic experiment successful, differences of opinion must not have any damaging effects on the opposition.

"The law must be the standard and the authority when any person or party is censured. If the government finds substantive objections and legal evidence, it should take the one who committed the error to court. No one is sovereign but the law. To achieve what is in the interests of Egypt the government has to extend its hand to the opposition without being defensive about it."

Half a Percent

Khalid Muhi al-Din of the Grouping party says, "Since we've chosen and accepted for ourselves a political system that is based on multiple parties, opposition becomes a citizen's right. If 99.5 percent of the people were of one opinion and the other 0.5 percent had another opinion, it is the right of this minority to express that opinion and to express its opposition.

"In political action there is no such thing as the consensus of the people because this would mean that if there were an agreement among the majority over an opinion, then the opposition would have to hold its peace, and this would not be proper.

"There are fundamental principles in political action and in life that we must understand. There is nothing in life that is cannot be changed or amended. When people agree on something, that agreement is neither permanent nor sacred. Opposing a policy adopted by the state is not a departure from the consensus; it is the right of legitimate political organizations.

"The modern history of Egypt has a clear example of this. When Egypt signed the 1936 treaty, some people supported it and called it a treaty of honor and independence and others opposed it and called it a treaty of humiliation and dishonor. We can never say that those who supported the treaty were against the interests of Egypt or those who opposed the treaty were against the interests of Egypt.

"Taking advantage of the people's suffering is a complaint and a permanent reservation expressed against the practices of the opposition in general. In my opinion this is not true. The mere statement that suffering is being exploited is an admission of the fact that suffering does exist. We did not create this suffering; it is rather the product of existing conditions. No political party can agitate the public or make them feel their suffering merely by talking to them. If we were to close down the opposition and confiscate their newspapers, will the suffering cease? The [government's] defensive posture is a result of the fact that the government is dissatisfied with our assertion that it is not devoting attention to [the task of] confronting the causes of suffering.

"When I speak about the Grouping as an opposition party, I assert that we are not against the existing regime. It is true that we disagree with it, but our disagreement is objective. The evidence for this lies in the fact that the statements made by the party in response to the government's statement criticize and propose an alternative. In fact, we demonstrated the utmost in objectivity since we offer a dual alternative to what we criticize: an alternative that we think is an application of our policy, and on another level we offer solutions that are consistent with the policy which the government is practicing. The records of the [sessions of the] People's Assembly attest to that.

"It goes without saying that the purpose of our opposition is to achieve power. Yes, we admit that we want power, but we want it in the manner and the way that are laid out by the constitution and determined by the laws.

"We want power so we can put our programs into practice and achieve our policy. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of our party or of having multiple parties?"

We Do Not Offer Alternative Solutions!

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi speaks for the Socialist Labor party, "I will begin by saying that it is in the nature of things that any ruling party will object to everything that the opposition does regardless of time and place. We do not expect the ruling party to lavish praise on the opposition, nor do we expect it to be satisfied with the opposition.

"Regarding what is being said about the agitation and the provocation which are being carried out by the opposition, we hope that the government will find evidence of this and that it will take those who do such things to court. The sovereignty of the law rules for me or against me. But as far as taking advantage of the suffering of people is concerned: if there is suffering, it is no virtue to conceal it.

"It is being said that the opposition does not offer alternative solutions. It is our opinion that offering solutions to a certain situation is a mistake because it is not my function to offer the government a solution to a situation. This is not the role of the opposition because the opposition belives in a specific integrated plan. But if the government did actually want to hear the opposition's alternatives, it would have to come to an agreement with us first about the principal elements and the broad lines of the major national issues.

"There is nothing shameful about wanting to attain power so we can realize our objectives and our programs if we do so in a legal manner. When we oppose [something], we do so not because we love to oppose. Differences of opinion are not supposed to spoil the case for friendship."

No Democracy Without Opposition

Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, deputy prime minister for People's Assembly affairs, [speaks for] the National party, "At the outset I would like to remind everyone of what President al-Sadat said and what all of us in the party are convinced of: there will be no retreat from democracy because the National party is set up basically on two pillars of support which are nationalism and democracy.

"But the simple question that is being raised is this: is it possible to have a democracy without an opposition? Actually no. God did not create us in molds; we are rather different in the way we think, in the way we view matters and in the way we perceive things intellectually. Consequently, since we believe in democracy and since we have accepted it, it

is self-evident then that we believe in opposition and that we accept it.

"But what is opposition? Most certainly it is not derision, derogation or defamation; all these are matters that have been wiped out by time a long time ago not only in Egypt but also in the entire world. Accordingly we in the National party reject an opposition that is based on disrespect and innuendo.

"We welcome opposition as long as it is objective and not spurred by personal motives.

"Regarding their statement that they want to attain power, attaining power is their legal right, and there is no dispute about that. But the dispute is over how the opposition attains power. Does it attain it by persuading and convincing the people and winning popular support or by [fomenting] class struggle?

"If the opposition is saying that it does not have an opportunity to express itself, such a statement is misleading. The Grouping party had its newspaper, AL-AHALI, and it stopped publishing it. If a few issues of the newspaper were confiscated, this was done by court order. Not the government, the party or any person in Egypt has a mandate over the courts. The courts are above everybody, unless they are raising doubts about the integrity of the Egyptian courts. But this is another matter.

"The Grouping [party] stopped publishing its newspaper and is now publishing a bulletin called AL-TAQADDUM. No one has objected. If the Grouping [party] says that the printing presses refused to print for it, what is the government to do about that?

"If the government were annoyed with the newspaper or wanted to stop its publication, why has it allowed the publication of AL-TAQADDUM which publishes everything that used to be published in AL-AHALI? Why does it allow the publication of the newspaper, AL-SHA'B, and why does it allow two citizens to file suit against the president?

"The truth is that the National party is more democratic and more tolerant than they are. If we do not accept anyone's authoritative command, we accordingly do not impose our authoritative command over anyone. But we do reject the logic of arm twisting, and just as we do not welcome the dictatorship of the majority, we also reject the dictatorship of the minority. Let me give you examples of what I am saying.

"After the Camp David accords were signed an official invitation was issued to Mr Ibrahim Shukri in his capacity as leader of the opposition to attend the meeting of the Council of Ministers to discuss the agreement. It was a lengthy meeting attended by military experts who explained in detail all the military aspects of the agreement. The minister of foreign affairs explained the government's strategy and objectives, and he discussed the agreement politically. Ibrahim Shukri came out of the meeting convinced of the Camp David accords and expressing his approval of them. Afterwards

he assumed positions that were incomprehensible. Isn't the opposition supposed to support the negotiator? Who said that the negotiations had reached the point of no return for him to withdraw his approval? Is not this a democratic posture on the part of the National party?

"Is it not a democratic posture on the part of the National party to permit the publication of the AL-TAQADDUM bulletin and to accept the fact that one of its issues said that the regime was going through a stage of "dissolution and collapse." Another time they said the Israelis were entering Egypt as victorious conquerors. They are beginning to promote rumors and are saying that the government will sell the farmers water for irrigation. Another time they say that economic relations with Israel are abnormal relations and that they were founded by force on the conditions set by conquerors. Is not this an indication of the democracy of the National party which hears this and keeps quiet? However, it is our right to reject this and to say that this opposition is not objective and not constructive and that it is agitating [the public].

"Our final example is an explanation of the dictatorship of the minority. When a bill is being debated in the People's Assembly and they disagree about it, they leave and they say they are registering a position. Is it not better and more reasonable to register a position through discussion? Another member [of the assembly] may be persuaded to accept [their] point of view. For example, after the law of elections by (party) lists was passed, they withdrew from the elections. Who then is practicing the democracy of the majority?

"Is not the fact that ROSE AL-YUSUF is publishing this interview an indication of democracy?

"These are examples and a part of the whole [picture]. If we were to list evidence for the opposition's lack of objectivity, the examples would be innumerable. Accordingly, it is proper for the National party to demand that there be a framework for the opposition. When we say a framework we are not implying an authoritative control, restriction or curtailment. However, we have to reject the lack of objectivity and to reject having the parties be mouthpieces for foreign countries.

"In saying this we are not accusing anyone of working for another country. We are not casting doubts about the patriotism of anyone, but we are saying that there are some parties that link their strategy with that of foreign forces. This is objectionable because it is not loyalty to Egypt.

"To be told that we want a tame opposition is "petty" and is not worthy of a response.

"Opposition, yes, but casting doubts, no.

"A final point remains to be made. A popular referendum does not mean the silence of the opposition. I am saying, are not the people the source of power?

"I summarize by saying that we are not restricting the opposition; we are not intolerant of it; and we do not exercise authoritative control over it. But opposition should not be carried out through defamation, agitation or the casting of doubts. All that we are asking of the opposition is to commit itself to a clear framework of sound patriotic conduct."

Four Principal Questions between the Government and the Opposition

Peace, foreign policy, economic policy and the question of freedom and democracy are the four questions on which the opposition assumed a position that differed from that of the government.

What is the magnitude of the difference? What are the participants in the interview saying about it?

Mustafa Kamil Murad (the Liberals) says, "I am in complete agreement with the govenrment over the steps it took for the question of peace. The time has come for us to stop the continuous bloodshed and the drain of funds in the continuous wars. President al-Sadat's step was extremely intelligent and courageous because it exposed all the allegations of Israel and showed the recalcitrance of Menahem Begin's government.

"As far as foreign policy is concerned, we are in agreement with the government in general, but we are asking that a new leaf be turned in [relations] with the Soviet Union and that an attempt be made to put an end to the disagreement. We are asking that our role and our presence in Africa be furthered and we are asking that Arab differences be settled. We have a leadership role in the Arab area, and we have to tolerate our brothers and extend our hands to them. The suspension of official relations does not mean estrangement. Instead, we have to send popular delegations [to the Arab countries] to strengthen relations and attempt to put an end to the disagreement.

"As far as the economic policy is concerned, we disagree completely with the government. We are calling for a complete overhaul of the wages policy and a complete overhaul of the tax law that would be based on encouraging investors and reducing tax rates. We are asking that the role of the public sector be reduced to the strategic industries and that holding companies be established.

"Regarding the question of democracy, although we realize that the experience is still a recent one, we do think that it can be furthered by removing all the restrictions on the press and [allowing the press corps] to elect their leaders from the press organizations. We think the president of the republic should be elected; the shaykh of al-Azhar should be elected; the supreme council for the courts should be elected and kept totally separate from the Ministry of Justice; and that no person whatsoever regardless of his position should have an honorary or an actual relationship with the courts."

The Military Alternative

Khalid Muhi al-Din (the Grouping [party]): "As far as the question of peace is concerned, we are not against peace, but we disagree with the government radically over its course in solving the Arab-Israeli struggle. We think that the solution of the Arab-Israeli struggle took place outside the framework of the United Nations and that it ignored the Arab parties in the dispute.

"There are reasons why we object to the peace. The government accepted the demilitarization of parts of Sinai while the Negev is heavily armed. It has also ruled out the military alternative: it ended the state of war; and it closed the door to the only arms supplier, which is the Soviet Union.

"As far as foreign policy is concerned, we do not agree with the government's foreign policy. We are against having the government link its strategy with the strategy of the United States, and we are against its opposition to the Soviet Union everywhere in the world. We support an Arab policy that is fundamentally based on Arab solidarity. Egypt's power lies in its solidarity with the Arabs, and Egypt's political and economic security are tied basically to the Arabs. We support positive neutrality and non-alignment, but the government is aligning itself because its foreign policy is an expression of its class positions inside the country.

"We also disagree radically with the government on economic policy. The Egyptian economy is suffering from structural deficiencies, from a deficit in the balance of payments and from the poor standard of services. The remedies that are being applied are partial remedies and not radical remedies for an economic problem.

"As far as the question of democracy in Egypt is concerned, we think that the ruling party is hampering democracy. It controls the agencies of the media. Consequently, the opposition is denied the right to express itself and to communicate with the public. Furthermore, there is a set of laws that restrain freedom such as the Law of Shame, the socialist prosecutor, the Suspicion Law and numerous laws that impede the course of democracy."

Mumtaz Nassar (the Independents) says, "We think the peace treaty is an infringement on national sovereignty and does not bring about a just, comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle. If the Egyptian negotiator were able to achieve better conditions in the presence of the parties to the dispute and with their approval, our position would have been better than it is now.

"As far as foreign policy is concerned, we in the Independents' Front believe in balanced relations with the two superpowers and with the Arab area. We think that major reform is required in the economic situation and that the economic openness policy must be reconsidered because of the damages it has caused to the Egyptian economy. We are against economic policies that will produce nothing more than further suffering.

"We are against the ruling party's control of the agencies of the media and the fact that no news of the opposition is being published. We are against the fact that space is not provided for the statements of the opposition."

The Dead End Road

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi (Labor): "No two people can disagree about their love for peace. We approve of a just, comprehensive peace that would solve the question of the Arab-Israeli struggle without concessions. Therefore, we did initially approve of the Camp David accords and the peace treaty, and we had seven reservations about the treaty. But then we were surprised that Israel was not honoring the spirit of peace and that it did not want peace. After the peace agreements Israel annexed Jerusalem and expanded its construction of the settlements and its expulsion of Arab residents. It intervened in Lebanon and declared that it would not permit [the establishment] of a homeland for the Palestinians.

"We think that these positions call upon us to view [the situation] and reconsider the peace agreement. When we became certain that Israel did not want peace, we revised our position and withdrew our support for the agreement.

"As politicians we are not indifferent; we are stirred by events. We calculate [our moves] in accordance with the variables, and this explains our position. We supported the negotiator, but when our political instincts told us that the road which the government was about to pursue was a dead end road, we assumed the position we took. We think that it is possible for the Egyptian negotiator to capitalize on our position.

"Regarding foreign policy we believe in non-alignment, in a balanced foreign policy with the two superpowers and with the need to restore a balance in political relations with Europe, especially since it has emerged as a political force of consequence.

"Our economic policy is against the consumer [oriented] economic openness policy. We are against the policy of borrowing from any country unless the loans are used for national production and for increasing national production. Even then there must be limits.

"We want to devote attention to small and middle-sized industries because they will ultimately increase national production and create jobs for labor.

"Thus we support a clear, comprehensive development plan.

"When we come to a discussion of democracy, [I say that] we want to have secure freedom, that is, the freedom that I practice when I say no or yes should be a freedom without fear for one's livelihood, for one's children or for one's work.

"Furthermore, the ruling party arrogates for itself all the means of communicating with the public such as radio, television and newspapers. All these are national means for communicating with the public, and they are supposed to be available to all parties and not restricted to one party."

And the Government Says

Fikri Makram 'Ubayd (the National party): "First, as far as peace is concerned, I will respond to everything stated by the opposition in specific points.

"1. Peace is not a mere word and an agreement. It is a clear and a declared position as well as a political philosophy. Consequently, the logic of using a military alternative as a pressure tool is impractical because the entry into the peace negotiations was based on a declaration that the state of war between the two parties had come to an end in the search for a permanent peace. Otherwise, what would be the significance of negotiating with an opponent when there is a state of war that has not come to an end? Such negotiations would be truce negotiations and not peace.

"2. Once again those who are claiming that the use of a military alternative is possible are ignorant of the fact that the world's balances of power will not permit a future struggle in the area to take place. If such a struggle were to take place, [these powers are determined that] its outcome must not be settled in the interests of the Arabs. Accordingly, this amounts to a drain on Arab resources. As an indication of this I mention that the Soviet ambassador in an urgent message to Aleksei Kosygin on the evening of October 7 asked for a cease fire instead of asking that more weapons be sent. I am mentioning this for those who are regretting that the Soviet supply of weapons has been stopped.

"Regarding thwarting national sovereignty and the conditions in the agreements which they claim would restrict the political decision makers in Egypt in the future, I respond to them hypothetically by asking: does the restoration of the national soil thwart national sovereignty, or does occupation of the national soil thwart it?

"I believe that as far as restricting the Egyptian politician in the future, these agreements will not restrict any politician unless there is an actual war between the two countries. I would imagine hypothetically that the significance behind a politician's decision to go to war is that the objective and private international circumstances will accept his decision to abrogate the treaty.

"This is a hypothetical response in an argument with those who like to discuss politics in hypothetical terms.

"The final point in the question of peace is [directed] to those who would punish Israel for its positions by withdrawing their support for the treaty. Would it not have been better to join forces with the Egyptian negotiator and concentrate their efforts on helping him by giving him an

objective opinion instead of taking world-wide action as a socialist party and an opposition party to mobilize world-wide public opinion against Israel?"

We Are Not the Reason for the Hostility with the Soviets

"It is also being said that Egypt is adopting American points of view and that it is joining its interests with those of the United States. All these statements are well-known accusations, and our position is quite clear. We befriend those who befriend us. The relationship between us and the United States is one of friendship, just as there was a time when we had friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Did that mean that we were then revolving in Moscow's orbit and that we were communists, and so on and so forth?

"Not at all. International conditions and Egypt's interests dictated that condition to us. All those who work in politics know that there are no permanent friendships and no permanent hostilities and that there are rather common interests.

"When we offer the United States facilities, we do so on the basis of clear positions that are announced. There have been so many similar facilities, which almost turned into naval bases for the Soviet fleet, that were offered to the Soviets! The details and the heroes of the Mersa Matruh base incident are still alive.

"We did not initiate and we did not cause the hostilties with the Soviet Union. The door is still open for strengthening our relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of mutual respect.

"We agree with the opposition about the importance of relations with Europe and with Africa, and there is no disagreement between us about that.

"Regarding the Arab nation we are declaring a fact that is dictated by history and created by geography: there can be no Egypt without the Arabs and no Arabs without Egypt. I may not be revealing a secret if I were to say that the next brief period will bring about a return of numerous [Arab] countries to the folds of Egypt, the motherland.

"We agree with the opposition that there are economic difficulties and there is suffering, especially in prices and services. This stage is essential and inevitable, especially when we are shifting from a specific economic system to another, but we have to understand this and to avoid its mistakes.

"It is true that the open-door policy has not yet offered all that it should offer, but this is a problem that will end soon. The party is in the process of completing its evaluation of the economic policies. There is a study on wages and a study on the public sector. There are studies which comprise the tax law, the customs law, housing plans, utilities improvement and preparations for a 10-Year development plan. Studies for all this are

being prepared in the party. An announcement will be made as soon as this is completed. Accordingly, I say to the opposition to join us and come up with studies, projects and opinions. Let us all discuss the interests of Egypt and its citizens through the legal institutions because Egypt is above all parties."

Fikri Makram 'Ubayd added, "Perhaps my replies to everything that was raised by the opposition in ROSE AL-YUSUF, which is a national publication, constitute the most serious evidence of the democratic climate. It is a climate that gives them the opportunity to express their opinion and gives us the opportunity to respond."

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OPPOSITION LEADERS COMMENT ON OPPOSITION CONTROVERSY

Cairo MAY in Arabic 1 Jun 81 p 3

[Interview with Muhammad Hasan Durrah, Vice President of the Labor Party and Member of the People's Assembly and Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi, Assistant Secretary General of the Labor Party by Mahmud Mu'awwad; date and place not specified: "Opposition Leaders Speak to MAY"]

> [Text] The vice president of the Labor party says, "I reject cooperation between the Labor party and the Leftist party; I do not approve of what Deputy Ahmad Farghali said; the Labor party is part of the regime, and there is no dispute between it and the government." The assistant secretary of the Labor party calls for a direct meeting between the majority and the opposition.

The scope of the discussion about the question of the opposition has begun to grow.

Opposition leaders themselves began taking part in the discussion which MAY presented around this significant question.

Muhammad Hasan Durrah, the vice president of the Labor party and member of the People's Assembly and Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi, the assistant secretary general of the Labor party assumed the initiative and decided to discuss the questions of the opposition on the pages of MAY.

The vice president of the Labor party affirmed that the objective dialogue between the majority and the opposition was the greatest guarantee for democracy and that what happened on the scene of partisan life in recent days was caused by the fact that some people had departed from objectivity and had turned the question into personal battles.

The man, who 3 years ago had convened in his home the meeting at which the Labor party was founded, said that he rejects any cooperation between his party and the leftist Grouping party. He said he expressed reservations about the attendance of Khalid Muhi al-Din, president of the leftist party, at the presss conference of the Labor party, and [he said] that he also

expressed reservations about what was stated at the press conference by Ahmad Farghali, member of the Labor party and the representative of Asyut.

Muhammad Hasan Durrah affirmed that the Labor party was not opposed to the regime and was not involved in a dispute with the government. He affirmed that no one can deny that democracy had been restored to Egypt under the administration of President al-Sadat after an absence of 20 years. The assistant secretary general of the Labor party asked that a direct meeting between the National party and the Labor party be held to forestall those who are trying to create problems between the two parties.

Hasan Durrah Speaks

The first question that MAY asked the vice president of the Labor party was a question about his opinion of the method of democratic practice in the recent period.

[Answer] In the first place there are principles for democratic practice that are indisputable. These involve a commitment to the values and the instructions of the divine books. To me these represent the center of opinion in every question. Proceeding from this premise I believe that every Egyptian who loves his country and who is loyal to it regretted the past events that our democratic experiment lived through during the last few days when some people from the majority party and from the opposition departed from the framework of the true democracy that we want to be a quiet, objective dialogue which ought to be characterized by wisdom and reason. This departure was carried out in a manner that was marked by rage and passion. It thus violated the method that God Almighty prescribed for us when He said, "Call men to the path of your Lord with wisdom and kindly exhortation. Reason with them in the most courteous manner" [The Bee: 125].

All the parties without exception have departed from the purposeful partisan commitment which is first and foremost in the interests of Egypt, and they have [become involved] in marginal personal battles that involve defamation and argumentative debates carried out at the expense of our domestic problems and questions.

[Question] Do you believe that the Labor party and the Progressive Grouping party, the Left, have departed from the purposeful partisan commitment which you affirm, should be first and foremost in the interests of Egypt?

[Answer] Don't ask me about the Leftist party because I do not believe in the Marxist theory. In fact I repudiate it. By the way, let me ask the government a question: how can it permit this party to hold debates within the sight and hearing of the government to support the party's candidate in Misr al-Qadimah and then blame the Labor party afterwards simply because the president of the Leftist party attended the press conference of the Labor party?

[Question] Is not this on behalf of democracy?

[Answer] My own personal point of view and my position from which I do not deviate is this: I reject any cooperation or any solidarity with the Leftist party, and I have expressed my reservations about the attendance of Mr Khalid Muhi al-Din at the press conference of the Labor party.

As far as the practice of the Labor party is concerned, it is unfair to accuse the Labor party of constantly rejecting what the government is doing. We, I mean the Labor party, have supported many of the government's decisions and projects. No one is denying those major accomplishments that were achieved, thanks to God and His favor, under the administration of President al-Sadat, such as purging the country from the Soviet presence and the October victory that restored to Egypt and to Arabism their dignity which had been violated after the June 1967 setback. Also no one is denying that democracy has been restored to Egypt under the administration of President al-Sadat after an absence of 20 years during which Egypt lived under a single opinion totalitarian government.

I would like to affirm, as God is my witness, that everybody knows that we in the Labor party are not opposed to the regime and that we are not at all in a dispute with the government because we consider our party to be complementary to the framework of true democracy which cannot do without the factions of an opinion and a counter-opinion.

I would like you to ask me why I decided to return to political activity after an absence of 30 years.

[Question] Go ahead, [tell us].

[Answer] My purpose is to take part through political action in codifying the Islamic law so that we can assure the whole world that it is possible to establish a sound society based on the One Law to which everybody would be subject without any deference being shown to anyone. [I want us to show the world] that we can achieve the delicate balance between the individual and society so that individualism would not be attacked and groups would not be attacked. [I want us to show the world] that it is virtuous conduct that achieves social peace in this society and that it is in virtuous conduct that the principles of enjoining good and forbidding evil, of social justice, social solidarity and of counsel in government are manifested. In such a society an individual can feel safe about his life: he would not be persecuted; he would not be hungry; and he would not be naked.

The truth is that we have found the beginning of the road in this regard.

[Question] Can we devise a framework that would regulate the relationship between the majority and the minority? How can this be done?

[Answer] I do not forget one of President al-Sadat's splendid political speeches in which he said, "The public will have no confidence in any organization that develops under the protection of the government."

I think that the National party is strong only because of its leadership, about which there is no dispute.

I would like to affirm that opposition is not a verbal war or a war of slogans. Consultations must also be the foundation of political action. Otherwise we would have unilateral decisions either by the majority or the minority. It should be known that decisions are sometimes made within the minority without consultation.

The minority's objection to some decisions does not diminish the importance of those decisions. Quite the contrary it gives them strength and it gives the partisan regime that is devoted to democracy a shot in the arm. It is enough that it allows the other opinion to voice an objection.

I have had reservations about what Brother Ahmad Farghali said at the press conference. In my judgment democratic tolerance is the sweetest feature of the practice with which we must adorn ourselves now during the period of democratic immaturity.

I am also calling upon the minority to rise to the same level: not to minimize the import of the accomplishments. As long as it is calling attention to the negative features, it should also mention the positive ones.

God Almighty says, "Do not tamper with the property of orphans, but strive to improve their lot until they reach maturity: [Cattle: 152].

The minority must also not take statements out of context.

The state is facing many problems, and we do not doubt for a moment the government's sincerity in confronting them. Examples [of such problems are]: the phenomenon of seizing control of the state's property, abusing influence, illicit gain and housing.

The fact is that our opposition in [the matter of] housing was not merely for the sake of opposition. Our role was to affirm that the present capabilities could not help solve this problem. Our objective was [to obtain] more financing and capabilities to alleviate the sharpness of the crisis only.

Yes we have turned the spotlight on violations in Cairo which is teeming with its people. There is a building for example that has a permit for seven stories, which is the elevation permissible by the width of the street. How can one imagine that this building would rise to 25 floors, violating the provisions of the law and affecting traffic?

[Question] What is your opinion of democratic practice in the People's Assembly?

[Answer] The majority party has absolute [control of the] opportunity [to express one's opinion] and does not give the opposition party the suitable opportunity to express its opinions especially when political questions are

being discussed. But to be fair we must say that the president of the Assembly, Dr Sufi Abu Talib is trying to be neutral. Dr Sufi was the only member in the recent session of the People's Assembly who gave the opposition the full opportunity to defend itself after the People's Assembly Law and Ordinance went into effect.

[Question] What are your observations on democratic practice before and after the revolution?

[Answer] My observations about the parties before the revolution are that they were extremely solicitous of the regime and only the regime. In the last cabinet of al-Wafd, which was headed by al-Nahhas Basha--and Fu'ad Siraj al-Din was secretary general of al-Wafd then and the king and the al-Wafd cabinet did not get along--it was noticed that the cabinet would not last in government more than a few months.

I recall an incident in al-Wafd's last cabinet in 1950. Al-Wafd leaders affirmed a new principle of going along with the king and appeasing him in every way so they can rule the country.

[Question] What in your opinion is the significant word [of advice] which you would whisper to the opposition and to the majority?

[Answer] To the majority I would say that the president of the National party must issue his official instructions which are binding on all the ministers and the governors to deliver services to citizens who are members of all the parties without discriminating between the government's party and the parties of the opposition because there is a large group of people who left the Labor party because their businesses had come to a standstill.

The wise word that I would whisper to the opposition is that it should not take things out of context, and it should not wait to catch mistakes.

A Meeting Between the Majority and the Opposition Called for

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi, the assistant secretary general of the Socialist Labor party said that a direct meeting between the leaders of the National party and the leaders of the Labor party was essential since such a meeting could restore the bridges of understanding, help build democracy and lay down the broad lines by which the majority and the opposition have to abide.

"This meeting," as Dr al-Hadidi says, "will intercept those who want to broaden the disagreement between the Labor party, which is considered part of this regime, and the National party.

"A dialogue between the two parties will create bridges of mutual understanding that can ultimately be a pact for all of us. The errors of the majority and of the opposition were in fact the product of action and reaction. They were the product of numerous circumstances.

"The National party has the means and the authority to pursue openness with the public. This can make the opposition defensive when it feels that it is under the influence of certain reactions.

"For example, there are numerous question marks that need many answers. If these are not explained by the majority, we may have to make them up or hear them from other sources."

I told him, "What in your opinion is the difference between the Labor party and the other forms of the opposition?"

Dr al-Hadidi said, "The Labor party is different from the rest of the opposition. The other parties of the opposition are parties that differ with the regime.

"But the Labor party is part of this regime. Hence, it has responsibilities in that regime. Therefore, everything must be made available to it so it can perform its mission as best as possible. The Labor party shares everything with the majority, which must not be the only one discussing public issues."

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LABOR PARTY PRESIDENT DISCUSSES OPPOSITION TO GOVERNMENT'S POLICY

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 16 May 81 p 11

[Interview with Ibrahim Shukri, President of the Socialist Labor Party by Manar Bars; in Damascus, mid April: "Exclusive Interview with President of the Socialist Labor Party in Egypt; Ibrahim Shukri Says, 'We Endorsed the Camp David Accords under Special Conditions, but We Are Rejecting Those Accords now; We Are Coordinating Our Efforts Inside the Country with the Grouping Party; We Reject Military Facilities for the United States"]

[Text] The basic change in the Socialist Labor party in Egypt, which is the official opposition party, is that it has now shifted to a position of opposing the Camp David accords after having supported them in the past.

In this interview with the president of the party, Ibrahim Shukri, which was conducted by Manar Bars while Mr Shukri was in Damascus attending the meetings of the Palestinian National Council in mid April, Mr Shukri reviews the general lines of his party's politics. He settles the matter of the party's rejection of the Camp David accords, and he affirms the relationship of coordination "whenever there is a need for it" with the National Progressive Unionist Grouping party. At the same time he rejects the present form of the Arab boycott of Egypt, and his rejection appears closer to being an invitation [to the Arab countries] to maintain diplomatic relations with al-Sadat's regime.

The interview explains quite clearly the significance of this kind of opposition in Egypt and the prospects for it. We will let the reader judge it and its effectiveness.

Ibrahim Shukri, who heads the Socialist Labor party, which has 33 seats in the present session of the People's Assembly, is a founding member of the Young Egypt Society. He has been a member of the Egyptian parliament since 1949. He is a leading member of the Arab Socialist Union and was one of the few to be chosen by the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir for a leadership position in the Socialist Union despite his previous separation from the course of the Egyptian Revolution. This was due to the fact that he was one of the traditional political symbols.

When 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration came to an end and al-Sadat came to power, Ibrahim Shukri was one of those who won President al-Sadat's confidence. He held the position of a minister in al-Sadat's government in 1977-1978. The text of the interview follows.

[Question] It is known that your party came into existence after President al-Sadat announced that he would allow multiple parties in Egypt for the purpose of creating an official and a superficial opposition. Can you explain to us the conditions and circumstances of your party's creation?

[Answer] Although our party is relatively young, since it was licensed in accordance with the Parties' Law that is currently in effect late in 1978, its historical roots go back to the thirties. I was at that time with a group of young people, and we made up the Young Egypt party, which was led by Ahmad Husayn. This was the party that became the Socialist party in 1948. Late in 1949 I was elected to parliament to represent this party, [and I did so] until the party's activity ceased a little after the revolution broke out in 1953.

During the revolution I took part in the activities of the Arab Socialist Union. I was one of the leaders chosen by President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir to be [the union's] secretary for the governorate of al-Daqahliyah, the largest governorate in the northern part of Egypt, where my electoral district is located.

In 1977 and 1978 I held the position of minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, but I resigned to call for the formation of the Socialist Labor party. We ran in the 1979 elections, and we won 33 members in the People's Assembly. Thus we got the leadership of the opposition in the assembly.

There were discussions at first about the essence and the objective of our call to form the Labor party at a time when President al-Sadat was calling for the formation of his party, which is called the Democratic National party. It was our judgment that there was a plan for the regime to have its effective party and an opposition it can trust. But the positions of the party, followed by the fact that we ran in the elections after the party was formed and won a number of seats, as well as our positions and our practices inside and outside the assembly in all the cases that dealt with domestic and foreign policies confirmed the truthfulness of our intentions and the staunchness of our opposition. Thus we succeeded in winning the confidence of the remaining opposition, and more people aligned themselves with our opinions.

It may be said that the positions we assumed in more than one question enabled us to assemble an opposition in a semi front. Although this front is not declared as an organization, it does prove its existence in all the important positions. Our newspaper, AL-SHA'B, is in fact a platform for all the opposition; all honest patriotic writers can write for it. This newspaper led campaigns after campaigns in more than one location and in more than one cause.

The Camp David Accords: Yes and No

[Question] At first you supported the Camp David accords, but then you withdrew your support after a crisis was reached. How do you explain this position?

[Answer] As far as the Palestinian question and the Camp David accords are concerned, the party at first assumed a position that was dictated to it by the circumstances of its formation at the outset. Although it was clear that the majority of the party's supreme committee was completely opposed to the accords, party members who were members in the previous parliament of 1978 preferred that the party announce a guarded position on the Camp David accords, autonomy and the peace treaty. At the same time the party was to express provisional approval depending upon these reservations that were set by the party. This position had to do with circumstances the party knew it would face in the elections, which we learned at that time would be held after the People's Assembly ratified the accords.

In all situations and discussions on every occasion the party would raise the question of Israel's recalcitrant conduct on all the questions since the accords had been reached. It was evident that Israel's conduct was that of a country that had been assured that Egypt had abandoned the position of opposition, hostiltity and firmness and assumed a position of a country trying to find an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve the policies that were being sought by the Camp David accords.

One of the most important questions that we raised in the People's Assembly regarding these accords and as far as autonomy for the Palestinians was concerned was that concerning the subject of digging a canal that would carry [the waters of] the Nile to the Negev. This project had been announced in Egypt.

We succeeded in mobilizing all the honest patriotic writers and all the opposition parties to stand in one rank and oppose this idea. Finally, the government was forced to withdraw this project [from consideration].

We also raised the subject of the settlements, the subject of proclaiming unified Jerusalem the capital of Israel, the attempts to "Judaize" the power company in Jerusalem, the aggression on the lands of Hebron and the poor treatment that citizens, leaders and mayors of cities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were getting.

We noted how the 26 May 1980 date had come and gone without the autonomy talks reaching any results, and using the logic of those who approved of the accords and the logic of those who presented them and tried to link the Egyptian-Israeli treaty with the autonomy agreement, we indicated to them that Israel will not fulfill any pledge it tock upon itself regarding anything that had to do with the Palestinian question.

On 26 May the party issued a statement considering the provisional approval that was expressed by the members of the People's Assembly in the 1978

parliament not binding on the party. The party's statement rejected the accords and their results and consequences regarding Egypt's isolation and its departure from the Arab [course of] struggle against Zionism, and [it discussed] how these positions had totally damaged the Palestinian cause. We called upon the Egyptian people to resist the consequences of the accords, especially what is called the normalization of Egyptian-Israeli relations.

This statement was announced at a conference that was attended by all the forces in the opposition, from the ultra-right to the ultra-left. Opposition representatives spoke in the same vein or with the same logic in so far as the necessity to fight all the results [of the accords] that have to do with the development of relations between Egypt and Israel.

We can thus say that the party was able to give form to the opposition's unified position, even the opposition that is outside the People's Assembly. Many of the organizations that participated in the aforementioned conference are not represented in the People's Assembly.

[Question] Some of the Egyptian opposition forces think that the repudiation of Camp David requires first that the Egyptian regime and specifically President al-Sadat be overthrown. Where do you stand on this question, and what are the means of your coming to power?

[Answer] Naturally, we as a party operating within a legal, constitutional framework, with representatives in the People's Assembly and with a newspaper that speaks for us, expresses our opinions and thoughts and provides space for opposition opinions to express themselves, even those that clearly disagree with the government's opinion, find that the means to a solution for this question is the democratic means: enlightening the people [and informing them] of the policies that the party thinks are in the interests of the party and in the interests of the principles that are stipulated in the Egyptian constitution, namely, that Egypt is part of the Arab nation. We are hoping that with the pressure of public opinion our party will be able to force the government to change its course.

We have not lost our hope for free, honorable and neutral elections in the future so the people can give their true opinions. I feel [quite strongly] that the results of neutral elections will be quite different from the results that are announced now both in the elections and in the referenda which are conducted by the ruling party under pressures and with methods that I can say are in violation of the law.

One of the most prominent methods by which we are trying to establish these facts is that of filing suit in the state court to establish that there was no compliance with many of the measures that are required by the law regarding the referenda or the elections that were held and that they are therefore to be considered invalid.

[Question] What if the game of democracy does not succeed? Do you believe that it is the only means you have to attain power?

[Answer] I can be specific in my statement and say that if neutral elections were to be held, the results cannot possibly be like those that are announced now. The ruling party is likely to lose its majority if proper, viable referenda were conducted. I can say that the Labor party along with other factions of the opposition can form together a larger majority than that of the ruling party.

The Grouping Party Is a Progressive Party

[Question] How do you view the National Unionist Grouping party?

[Answer] The Grouping party is one of the first three parties that were formed initially. It had a limited number of representatives in the People's Assembly which was elected in 1976 and which continued to serve till early 1979. However, the party lost those seats in the recent elections. It is a progressive party, and I can say it is appreciated among the intellectuals and some of the working classes. Some of the Grouping's positions are in agreement with ours in all the fundamental questions that were presented for [public] opinion in the past 2 years. The Grouping party had a newspaper, but it ceased publication. It is now publishing a bulletin for its members. There are also leaders who represent the Nasirist trend; there is the Muslim Brotherhood Society; and there is the new al-Wafd party which suspended its activity. However, it has leaders who converge together with a few of the other leaders on national positions. There is also a group that represents the old National party and another group that represents the independents. They had their positions of leadership in the years before President al-Sadat's administration. Some of the leaders are trying to form new parties, and so far they have not been able to do so. All these factions and groups are in agreement about their opposition to the Camp David accords and their results.

The Relationship with the Grouping: "Occasional Coordination"

[Question] Do you have relations with the Grouping to coordinate [efforts]?

[Answer] It may be said that we coordinate [efforts] with the Grouping in every situation that requires coordination. For example, the most recent coordination situation occurred during the elections of the Press Union. There was coordination between us and them.

The Arab National Front: Opposition inside the Country, not Abroad

[Question] What is your evaluation of the experience of the Egyptian National Front which is headed by Gen Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhli?

[Answer] In general, with regard to the course of events in Egypt, I am not inclined to attribute results of significance and consequence to the opposition abroad. We consider the opposition that can be effective to be opposition inside the country among the masses of the people who are the proprietors of the question, the ones who have the right and the will to

change. Therefore, I do not wish to go into the details of investigating the subject of the opposition front abroad.

[Question] Why don't you coordinate with them inside the country?

[Answer] I do not believe that an opposition front abroad can make changes with regard to strengthening the opposition inside the country except to a very limited extent. It can acquaint the opposition inside the country with situations that occurred and that are related to the Arab countries when the opposition inside the country lacks the opportunity to receive this information from the publications in Egypt since these are affected by the ruling party's policy and do not publicize [such information] to the Egyptian people. Even though as you see we began as an opposition [party] inside the country, we do maintain an open-door policy towards the other parties abroad both in the Arab homeland or elsewhere. Our contacts with the PLO can relay to us the facts about the developments of events which are related to the Palestinian question--the Arabs' primary question--in a good manner that would allow us to form the soundest opinion with regard to this question and to the way it is being handled with regard to the policies of the ruling party in Egypt.

Egyptian Communists Are Ineffective Secret Parties

[Question] What is the role of communists in the Egyptian opposition?

[Answer] As far as the subject of Egyptian communist parties is concerned, these are parties that are not declared or recognized. Therefore, making a judgment of their activity is not easy. I believe in general that communist thought does not find for itself a suitable climate amidst the Egyptian people. This is because the idea of communism means atheism, and this makes it objectionable to the people of Egypt.

[Question] But the communists are against Camp David, why then don't you coordinate efforts with them?

[Answer] As I told you we do not know who represents these parties so that we can coordinate [efforts] with them. Regarding the notion that they represent the opposition to Camp David, [let me say that] the scene is full of factions that are opposed to these accords. The communists did not contact us. They also make up numerous parties whose identity and whose conditions are difficult to know so as to make a judgment about their course and determine whether or not we can coordinate [our efforts] with them to oppose Camp David.

The Arab Boycott Hurts Egypt and the Arab Countries

[Question] What is your position on the Arab boycott?

[Answer] I am not a supporter of undermining Arab relations between any Arab country and the remaining Arab countries. I think that the power,

the future, the pride and the prosperity of the Arabs lie in their unity and in the coordination of their policy. Therefore, I have always repeated the appeal that formulas be devised so that the preservation of this fundamental strategic course can be reconciled with the expression of the difference in policies which emerged. Such differences of opinion can always develop between governments on any subject.

I feel that this picture was not altogether far from the minds of the Arab countries. When they decided on kinds of boycotts against Egypt, these boycotts were always careful about preserving the interests of the Egyptian people. Therefore, the boycott did not include, for example, the work of individual Egyptians in Arab countries, nor did it include some kinds of cultural and economic cooperation through non-governmental organizations.

The fact is that Egypt's isolation from its Arab sisters is something that cannot benefit the Arab countries and cannot benefit Egypt.

[Question] But how can al-Sadat be forced to retreat from the course of Camp David?

[Answer] The declaration by Arab governments that they disapprove of the accords and that this opinion is a consensus opinion is their right. A declaration of disapproval naturally does not require the institution of a total boycott between the Arab countries and Egypt. Such a boycott is not natural and hurts the basic cause of strengthening the current of Arab unity and not breaking up the Arabs. Ultimately, such disunity is in the interests of those Zionist or superpower forces that do not want the Arabs to amount to anything.

Camp David: a Difference in Points of View

[Question] How then do you explain al-Sadat's unilateral steps and the Arab reaction to them?

[Answer] The whole matter is that there are differences in points of view. This group thinks the solution is one way and another group sees it another way.

As far as the Palestinian question is concerned, it is in a special situation since points of view on the Palestinian question differ and opinions on it vary. I cannot imagine, for example, that Mauritania offered for the Arab-Israeli struggle what Egypt has offered. It is the right of anyone to express his opinion and to say this is our view of the solution. Al-Sadat is being faulted for speaking for the Palestinians and not just for himself. He should have waited until acceptable formulas were found.

Egyptian Facilities: Rejected Product of Camp David

[Question] What is your position on the facilities that Egypt is offering to the U.S. rapid deployment forces?

[Answer] The facilities that are being offered by the Egyptian government to the United States come under the framework of the results of the Camp David accords. They are a form of the military facilities which our party rejects. Anyone who has been reading our newspaper, AL-SHA'B, will notice that we are against these facilities which amount to a restoration of military bases in Egypt and in the area.

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LEFTIST PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES CURRENT SITUATION IN COUNTRY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 Jun 81

[Report on Interview with Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, Head of the Egyptian National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party [NPUG] by AL-DUSTUR: "The Leader of the Egyptian Opposition Grouping Party Opens His Files to AL-DUSTUR: 'It Is Religious Values Which Constantly Move People to Progress!'"]

/19 Jun 81 p 7/

/Text/ There are people who say of Khalid Muhyi-al-Din that he is a "Communist," "non-religious" or a "nihilist." We believe that through his conversation with us on the subject of religion, the man has repudiated everything said about him on his own behalf.

Rather, as far as he is concerned, the case is different with regard to an objective analysis of the role of religion in life, and the role of the Islamic religion in building a better society. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's conversation with us today deals with spiritual values in Oriental society.

This was the text of his conversation with us:

The National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party believes that all divine religions have a progressive mission and that the essence of religious missions, as I believe it, does not conflict with the real conditions of life.

The conflict between religion and progress is in reality a purely European problem whose likes our countries have not seen. In the Middle Ages the church in Europe was linked to the feudal system and it had economic interests and a political influence which made it necessary that the feudal system survive in order that it be protected. Thus the senior clerics in the church in Europe rejected any move toward capitalism and, after that, socialism; in general they opposed any trend toward scientific and technological progress. Egypt or the Arab nation did not witness any such situation, and the Coptic Church did not have any such economic and political role.

Christianity laid the ground for the cultural progress which has been observed in Egypt since the fourth century AD. Islam brought the Arab nation to a new stage of civilization by which the whole world was affected.

The divine religions were and still are a creative force contributing to the development of good, equal treatment among men and moving society forward. Our history and our present circumstances bear witness to that.

The true religious values man derives from religion have become an inalienable part of our cultural heritage and have a great motive power in the holy war of man and the masses for a better life.

Egypt's Coptic heritage and the role of its national church in fighting the waves of foreign invasion and in giving power to the values of love and fraternity is one of which all the people of Egypt, Christians and Moslems, are proud.

Islamic jurisprudence is considered to be a form of genius in the context of the general teachings and overall principles of religion; through it, our nation has added brilliant peioneering pages to the entire human heritage throughout its glorious history in the periods of Islamic splendor.

This jurisprudence contains a treasure of supreme examples, lofty principles and humane values which are still valid for self-denial, emulation and inspiration in consultation and democracy, discussion, thinking, elevation of the status of the mind, appreciation of the role of innovative and independent-thinking scholars and respect for human expertise in promoting the quest for knowledge and the rejection of blind mimicry, freedom of thought, respect for opinions, in liberating the conscience from fear, intellectual terrorism and intellectual stagnation, in resisting oppression, corruption, apostasy and deviation, in rejecting foreign dominance and colonialism, in supporting national unity, condemning fanaticism and factionalism and /supporting/ the sanctity of the expiation of Moslems, and in asserting the unity of human fraternity, world peace and the right of self-determination.

The National Progressive Unionist Grouping has the objective of making religion, in its tolerant, proper sense, a force from which our people may derive aid in overcoming their current problems, building their new society to realize their interests, and regaining their worldwide cultural role.

The genuine religious values which the divine religions have brought forth are not afflicted by debilitation or obsolescence; they still are and will remain a great force constantly driving man and human society toward progress.

Islam, and the strictures it has brought forth, must be sought for inspiration as a major source of legislation, in bringing its principles into focus and underlining its brilliant essence.

Islam distinguishes between permitting ownership and giving property free rein. While it makes ownership legitimate, it makes property a social function: "Spend from what you have been appointed the overseer of." It prohibits usury and exploitation, rejects monopolization and harm, prohibits the hoarding of wealth and blatant differences among people: "Lest there be a nation of the rich people in your midst." It approves of the principle of public ownership; the prophet, on whom be God's peace and blessings, said, "The people are partners in three things, water, pasturage and fire." He emphasized that human activity is the sole criterion of values: "People own only what they have striven for." He made men and

women equal in human worth and compensation for work and made social peace contingent upon social justice, which is just peace between the dominant and the dominated. He called for the acquisition of knowledge. The prophet of God, on whom be God's blessings and peace, said "Whoever goes forth in quest of knowledge is in God's path until he returns" and "For anyone who has trod a road in which he seeks knowledge, God will facilitate a road to paradise for him." The Koran urges respect for specialization and human expertise: "Ask of people of good repute when you are ignorant."

While Islam stipulates that sufficient material goods are to be provided for people, but notmonopolized, exploited or used for self-aggrandizement, it also stipulates the right to benefit from money within the limits set forth by God, without exploitation, on the condition that such rights as this wealth possesses be used for the benefit of God and society. As Abu Bakr the Just did with people who refrained from giving alms, the ruler may use the right of society to set these people's crooked path right even if by force. Indeed, religion considers leaving just one member of society lost or hungry to be a denial of religion itself: "Have you seen those who negate religion? They are the ones who abandon orphans and do not urge the feeding of the poor." The sayings attributed to the prophet, on whom be peace, are "No one monopolizes except the wrongful" "Let anyone who abandons the feebleminded (weak children), let him come to me," "Whoever possesses a good thing which has grown, let him bestow it on those whose good things have not," and "Let there be neither harm nor damage."

Christianity has offered us splendid examples of brotherhood among man, renunciation of the pleasures of life and social solidarity. Jesus exhorted his disciples "Do not acquire gold, silver, copper, or raiments." (The Gospel According to Matthew, 9:10). Concerning the first Christian society, it was stated in the Acts of the Apostles, 2: 44-45: "All those who believed were together and they had everything jointly; they sold and divided up property and possessions among all, and everyone had needs. There was no needy person among them."

Our belief in the real understanding of religion has made us stress the importance of the role of religion in advancing the people's struggle against tyranny, colonialism, backwardness and ignorance. The events of history underline the truth of what we are saying. The noble al-Azhar was in the forefront of society in defense of civilization and human values, and the church called for love, brotherhood and peace. Therein lies our emphasis on supporting these religious institutions so they can perform their role in defending truth, freedom and man in an integrated society.

True religious faith does not at all conflict with the movement of ideas or with human efforts on behalf of a better life. Almighty God has stressed the need to exert human effort and the strength of its effectiveness, saying, "God does not change the circumstances of a people until they change what is in their own spirits."

Out of concern for the soundness of the framework in which the mission to religion is placed, the Grouping considers that mosques and places of worship are open tribunals for the broadest masses and must be liberated from the power of the state and trusteeship of government agencies. This, in particular, is to be brought about through:

1. Uniting the mission in the Office of Religious Endowments and al-Azhar under the supervision of a committee of elder scholars, with attention to raising the material, moral and intellectual level of the people giving the call.

2. Choosing the Shaykh of al-Azhar by election from the committee of elder scholars and electing the committee of elder scholars from among the religious scholars.

The question has now become clear. It is an interconnected series. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's political thinking is not distinct from his religious thinking. The material world and religion, therefore, are two sides of the same integrated coin, which is life.

There is an extremely important point on the question of social affiliation. That is women, and also the issue of young people and other important subjects.

Until the next instalment, tomorrow.

/20 Jun 81 p 9/

/Text/ Liberating the occupied territories and defending national independence are being raised again in Egypt and are being presented in the same forms as they had been before the 23 July revolution and complete Egyptian independence under the aegis of this revolution.

Shall we cast blame on al-Sadat or on the Egyptian people? Shall we cast it on the nationalist forces, on Israel, on the Arab countries, or on America?

The fact is that it is a complicated circle with interlocking sides. However, we are highly honored that Khalid Muhyi-al-Din is present with us to devote himself to a description of these dimensions. This was the text of his conversation with us:

Among the facts of history which no longer admit of dispute is the fact that planting Israel in the heart of the Arab nation was a colonialist scheme aimed at settling people whose goal was to continue guaranteeing colonialist interests in this area rich in mineral resources and oil, to continue to dominate its excellent geographic situation, and to prevent the development or unification of the peoples in this region, which would constitute a danger to colonialist interests. International capitalism gave its blessing to this colonialist plan and took part in carrying it out, developing it and protecting it and in developing its own role in this sphere, subsequent to the development of its movement and change of the center of gravity within it until the United States of America came to occupy its center.

Also among the facts of history which no longer admit of dispute is the fact that the United States of America's interests in the Arab nation and the American presence in the Middle East did not just start with the existence of Israel--rather, they preceded it by many years for reasons bearing on the strategy and the interests of the United States of America in the world and in the Middle East, when America emerged from its isolation, began actively to come forth into the world at

the end of World War One, and took part in the exploitation of the oil of Iraq, then, in the forties, gained a monopoly over the oil of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Out of all this, history has recorded an important fact which is no longer easy to deny or distort, which is that the Arab-Israeli dispute, since it began, has in essence been a struggle for liberation launched by the liberation movement of the Arab nation against world colonialism, the world Zionist movement and its aggressive embodiment in the state of Israel.

Throughout the stages of this struggle, no change worth mentioning has taken place in the parties to it, since we observe that from the outset it has been going on among:

1. The forces of colonialism and international imperialism, principally Great Britain and France at the beginning, then the United States of America, world Zionism and its embodiment Israel.

2. The Arab liberation movement, with Palestine, Egypt and Syria at its heart, supported by the Arab peoples and all progressive forces, foremost among them the national liberation movement in the world and the Socialist countries.

The contradiction between world colonialism and the Arab peoples is a major one which will not admit of reconciliation but will end only with the liquidation of colonialist dominance and the aggressive Zionist presence in the Arab nation.

America and the Arab Nation

America leads the imperialist powers in the region. The United States of America has been strategically interested in this region, and America is increasing its interest in it, because it is acquiring increasing importance with every year.

To give proof of that, it is sufficiant to point out that the proved and declared reserves of Arab crude oil, the nerve of modern Western civilization, come to 49.7 percent of the total reserves of the entire world, that the Arab world's total exports of oil in 1980 are estimated at about 30 million barrels a day /sic/ or 73.4 percent of total oil exports in the whole world, that the Arab nation produced 17.9 million barrels a day in 1978 and 19.6 million barrels a day in 1979, that the Arab Gulf area alone produced close to 15 million barrels a day in 1978 and 16.4 million barrels a day in 1979, that it is thus becoming the most important center of economic influence on America and Europe in particular and in the whole world, and that just four Arab oil producing nations possessed an estimated cash surplus from the receipts from their exports in 1977 of $141 billion (these were the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with $77 billion, Kuwait with $38 billion, the state of the United Arab Emirates with $21 billion and Qatar with $5 billion). It is expected that cash surplus in 1980 will come to close to $300 billion by the most conservative estimates; most of this surplus is directed toward investment in the countries of Western Europe and the United States of America, and a large part of it is spent on importing from these countries--showing the Arab nation's tremendous economic effect on the capitalist world. To this one should add the increase in

the volume of American investments in the region and in Israel, above and beyond the strategic position of the Arab nation as a crossroads between the continents of the world and the beacon of world illumination since earliest times.

It is very important that the Arab national liberation movement not fail to follow up on the development of the very special relationship which binds America to Israel. From the economic standpoint, American investments in Israel are greater than $1 billion, representing more than half the foreign capital invested in Israel; these have been made by 200 American companies. Twenty percent of Israel's foreign debts are to the American government and American institutions and organizations and at least 40 percent of the massive annual balance of payments deficit arises from unequal trade with America. The economic aid America offers Israel each year without letup represents about 40 percent of the aid America gives the whole world. From the military standpoint, since the signing of the first Separation of Forces Agreements in 1975, Israel has received American loans and aid of not less than $12 billion.

America's interests in the Middle East in general and in Israel in particular make the support of Israel, in particular, mandatory for America. The relationship between the two has been proceeding in the direction of increased American action in the Arab nation in the past 50 years, but the objectives of the movement have to a large degree been fixed. One can summarize the goals of current American strategy in the Middle East as revolving about a desire to monopolize influence in the area by means of:

1. Attainment of its comprehensive strategic interests in guaranteeing the continued stable flow of oil at reasonable prices.

2. Attainment of its regional strategic interests in reasserting its influence in the Middle East, not just by relying on Israel and the conservative Arab powers but also by expanding American influence to all countries in the area without exception.

3. Cutting the Arab national liberation movement off from its friends in the world national liberation movement and the socialist countries and setting them against one another to deprive the Arab nationalist movement of the support and aid it has been receiving from them.

American strategic interests in the Middle East explain to us the nature of the American role and activity in the region since 1967, when it, and Arab reaction, gave Israel the green light to carry out the June 1967 aggression in order to strike out at the Egyptian revolution and liquidate the Arab national liberation movement and the Palestinian revolution. The United States of America succeeded to a large extent in exploiting the results of the defeat of the Arabs in June 1967, stamping the struggle in the region with its mark and leading to a perceptible development in the style and format of the confrontation.

The defeat was also a suitable opportunity for the conservative Arab forces to gain increasing influence over the totality of common Arab action against the Israeli aggression, and it helped bring the remnants of the reactionary classes

back onto the political stage in Egypt; they tried to acquire new positions through cooperation and coordination with parasitic capitalistic elements. These forces tried to press their special interpretation of the defeat and press their opinion on how to confront the aggression and regain the occupied territories. These forces gradually succeeded in gaining support for their viewpoint. They were helped in this by the late Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir during a delicate stage of the development of the Egyptian-Israeli confrontation, and these forces managed to occupy influential positions in the agencies of the authorities and the media.

Thus two contradictory policies of confronting the Israeli occupation have come to prominence since the aggression. They express contradictory social interests:

The First Policy

This has been embraced by parasitic capitalist elements, major agricultural landowners and the remnants of the classes which the 23 July revolution identified. This is founded on separating the Zionist aggression from imperialism, in particular the United States of America. Consequently, it is concentrating its efforts on satisfying America in the name of its interests in the Arab countries, in the hope that Washington will abandon its stepdaughter, and is trying to persuade it that the Arab countries can play Israel's role in protecting American interests and in carrying out American strategy. From the beginning, this policy has entailed the danger of responding to pressure and offering repeated concessions not just with regard to the Palestinian people's cause but also in stressing America's positions in the Arab nation and preparing the way for Israel, under the slogan of peace and good relations, to play the role which it has long dreamed of, the role of general agent for the multinational corporations in the area.

The Second Policy

This has been embraced by the national and progressive forces and is founded on a perception of the truth of the organic relationship between Zionism and imperialism. It is aware of Israel's basic role in the schemes of colonial dominance in their new and old forms. It is also aware of the mentality of the European settlers who have established dominance over Israel and are causing it to imagine that it can exist in the area only through military force which can impose a fait accompli and regional expansion, crush the Arab will, then extend economic influence over the natural resources of the region, foremost among them oil, and hit at Egypt as a basic Israeli target, since a strong, liberated progressive Egypt will be an insurmountable obstacle to Zionist and colonialist dreams and designs. Therefore, when we are fighting or negotiating, we Egyptians are engaged in an Egyptian battle which at the same time is an Arab one, since Egyptian security is firmly linked to Arab security. The history of the Arab nation has proved that the submission of any part of it to foreign domination soon encompasses the whole area, and that the liberation of any part of it cannot become established until the whole area is liberated.

America has not hesitated to use its influence to establish the fait accompli that resulted from the aggression in order to weaken the national springboard for liquidating the aggression. It suspended the Geneva Conference, thwarted the

mission of Gunnar Jarring, the United Nations representative, and prevented the issuance of a Security Council resolution condemning the Israeli aggression and stipulating full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories which was oriented toward the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, until the October 1973 war took place, giving strong support for the proponents of a policy of effecting a resolution via the United States of America.

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din has demonstrated to us in a manner which is not tinged by doubt that America is responsible.

However, are there any positions which have proved the firmness and genuineness of Arab society, including, for example, the 6 October 1973 war? This is a long story.

/21 Jun 81 p 15/

/Text/ What is the truth behind the October war, and what are the achievements made by Anwar al-Sadat, specifically? Are they individual achievements or the result of the struggle of the whole Arab people? Was the October victory really, as al-Sadat has pointed out, the step which made contact with Israel inevitable?

al-Sadat, Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's comrade in struggle, was a member of the Free Officers' Group. Together, they were involved in the most difficult, complex and critical situations in the revolution. What is Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's view on the policy al-Sadat is now following, especially after the great achievement of 6 October, which was a purely Arab one, not just an Egyptian one?

What is the United States' ultimate role in guiding Egypt's policy? These are all issues which in essence are the headings of subjects to which Khalid Muhyi-al-Din responds today. This is the text of his conversation with us:

The October 1973 War Opened the Way to a Solution of the National Cause

The October 1973 war, on which President al-Sadat issued the decision, was the product of a number of factors; without all of them, it would not have been possible to issue the decision to go to war or achieve the results which were attained. First of all, it was based on the unremitting effort exerted by the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and the military commanders to rebuild the armed forces on modern foundations, a process which was started directly after the aggression and continued until the war took place. Secondly, it was based on the efforts and sacrifices of Egyptian workers, technicians, and engineers in building missile bases and on the productive capacity available to the public sector, which was mobilized to serve the Arab public. Thirdly, it was based on the war of attrition and the experience and lessons the armed forces acquired from their various struggles. Fourthly, it was based on Soviet military and economic aid and Arab aid. Thus, the October war occurred as a consecration of the efforts and sacrifices of the Arab people over the years of defeat and their insistence on liberating their occupied territory through the force of arms. This war was severe, ferocious and painful for the Zionist entity, since it established the corrupt nature of the theory of Israeli security, the possibility of inflicting severe losses on the Israeli army, and the Arabs' ability to use modern weapons in accordance with the most modern

military theories--showing the possibility of increasing their ability to confront Israel. On top of this there was the tremendous destruction which modern weapons inflicted on all sides in the war. These results helped promote an interest in many world capitalist circles in arriving at a sound political settlement to the Arab-Israeli struggle. The United States of America was active in making a determined attempt to arrive at an American resolution to the Arab-Israeli struggle, and in this it was in agreement with Israel.

America wants a solution which will permenently guarantee its interests and support its economic, political and military dominance of the region. Israel wants peace with the Arab countries in circumstances favorable for it which will permit it to establish economic and cultural relations with neighboring Arab countries--thus enabling neocolonialism to tighten its grip on the economy of the Arab countries. It has not been lost on Israel that that cannot be achieved unless it is in a position of strength which will permit it to impose this new state of affairs. It has armed itself in an unprecedented manner, and its source has been the United States of America.

The Egyptian authorities have embraced the policy of resolution via the United States of America as a natural result of its social, political and economic options, as represented by the economic liberalization. In this, it has coincided with the American role, and the policy arose of proceeding step by step, /building/warning stations, accelerating reconstruction of the canal cities immediately upon termination of the October war, prior to Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, and making the partial separation of forces agreements, while America was arming Israel to the teeth and supporting the influence of the reactionary regimes in the area in affecting the Arab-Israeli struggle and drawing it away from its true nature as a national liberation movement hostile to colonialism and Zionism. America also strove to isolate Egypt from the Arab countries and to cause the situation in Lebanon to explode with the goal of liquidating the Palestinian revolution, creating a vortex of tension and kindling the Arab struggle far from the front lines with Israel.

These steps have led to their logical conclusion. There occurred President al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, which in reality entailed a partial solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle and a separate peace between the Egyptian government and Israel that included the abandonment of the Palestinian cause in exchange for the return of a demilitarized Sinai of faulty sovereignty. America played the role of the full partner, adopted a military role in Egypt, and brought the Egyptian government and Israel together in a strategic alliance in defense of American interests in the Arab nation. Egypt entered the roster of the countries subordinate to American hegemony and thus the independent country of Egypt was transformed into part of the imperialist scheme, carrying out its role as a partner in the new trilateral alliance with Israel and the United States of America.

This thwarted the results of the October war and achieved the opposite of what ought to have happened, and the Egyptian authorities bear the responsibility for this. They have no excuse. From the beginning, the national forces have given warning of the gravity of this course. The National Progressive Unionist Groupiny Party recorded its clear stand in the party's first response to the government

statement to the People's Assembly in December 1976, stating that Israel's real objective was to have peace take place between itself and the Arab countries under circumstances favorable for it which would allow it to establish economic and cultural relations with the neighboring Arab countries, enabling neocolonialism to tighten its grip on the economy of the Arab countries. Israel is determined to achieve these objectives from a position of strength on the one hand, with every means of deception on the other.

From the first moment the National Progressive Unionist Grouping also opposed President al-Sadat's visit to Israel and declared with absolute clarity "The practical result of a continuation of this policy will be the practical elimination of the Geneva peace conference and the creation of a sole peaceful alternative which will lead to a separate resolution with Israel whether we like it or not. Attaining a partial resolution is the attainment of a basic part of the Zionist dream, whose price will be paid by Egypt first, above any other Arab people. Peace in this form will not, as some people claim, achieve a solution to our economic problems: "Peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel in accordance with the context set forth by the Camp David agreements will not in practice just result in what we have called a separate solution--it will consecrate the process of ending and liquidating Egypt's Arabhood and Egypt's Arab affiliation; to the contrary it will determine Egypt's future alignment with strategy in the Arab region and Africa."

This was the National Progressive Unionist Grouping's position as it declared it in its statements in 1977 and 1978; it has come to pass in full and became a fait accompli in 1979 and 1980, by the acknowledgment of all parties.

The result is that the United States of America has consolidated its political and economic influence over the Arab world and has increased its military presence through military bases in Sinai and the gulf area, military facilities in Egypt, Somalia, Oman and Kenya, and fleets in the Indian Ocean, Red Sea and Mediterranean area. It has announced without equivocation its readiness to occupy any part of the Arab nation in which the situation will threaten the vital interests of the United States of America.

This is not to be considered the only development resulting from the policy of a separate peace with Israel. Rather, the Zionist presence in the region is no longer based just on armed invasion and colonialist racist settlement in Palestine--it has also come in Egypt to be based on agreements and treaties which are unequal but have been clothed in the garb of legitimacy. Thus the Zionist presence has adopted two main forms which for the first time in the history of the struggle are intertwined.

The first form: settler colonialism in Palestine.

The second form: neocolonialism of a special type in Egypt. Here the source of the danger lies in the fact that Egypt is the main link in the Arab body and that dominating it means opening the door to dominance over the whole Arab nation. To that one should add that through the peace treaty Egypt has become isolated on the Arab stage and has departed from the arena of Arab confrontation; thus the Zionist

danger in the Arab nation, with all its regimes, resources, especially oil, and possibilities for unity, is multiplying in a manner which cannot be compared with any previous stage. This dangerous situation explains to us the reasons for the conservative Arab regimes' opposition to the policy of a separate peace between the ruling regime in Egypt and Israel. It threatens these very regimes with the danger of falling under Zionist dominance.

This dangerous situation places us directly before our historic responsibilities of formulating a proper strategy for resolving the national cause. What should be the objectives of this strategy? What should be its basic components? What is the appropriate program for putting it into practice?

The proper strategy for resolving the cause must be an integrated alternative to the joint strategy of imperialism and Zionism.

The requisite strategy must specify its general goal as that of attaining a permanent comprehensive just peace instead of a separate one.

Comprehensive peace here means turning the region of the Middle East and southwest Asia into an area of peace devoid of foreign military bases, foreign fleets and all forms of military connection with foreign countries.

Such a peace cannot be achieved without a solution to the Arab-Israel struggle which is based on the recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people to return to their homeland, their right to determine their destiny and establish their national independent state on the territory of Palestine, and the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories.

Such a peace cannot be attained without the participation of all the parties concerned in the efforts exerted to attain it, and it must be underwritten by the international community through the United Nations.

Such a peace does not mean the suspension of the struggle against colonialism and Zionism and their goals.

This goal will meet with violent attacks from American imperialism in the region and must therefore rely on support from a broad international front which our party and the other nationalist forces will try to win to the ranks of this strategy. In the forefront of the forces whose interests prepare them to take such a position are Japan, the countries of Western Europe and the socialist countries which find it in their interest to eliminate the factors of tension in this region and to prevent the United States' monopolization of dominance over it.

The essential condition for building this broad international front which can support the strategy of a just comprehensive peace as an alternative to a separate peace lies in the coalescing of Egyptian and Arab nationalist forces as a nucleus of the nationalist forces in the area of the Middle East and all of southwest Asia in order to mobilize international public opinion behind this goal.

However, this will all require adequate time and will demand a perceptible change in the Egyptian and Arab situation. This makes it incumbent that the Egyptian national forces take the initiative of achieving a national program for proceeding along the road to a just comprehensive peace.

The National Program

1. Liberating Egyptian will from American and Israeli dominance and liquidating the American military presence in Egypt.

2. Liberating occupied Egyptian territories and rejecting all diminution of Egyptian sovereignty over all Egyptian soil.

3. Preventing the extension of the policy of a separate peace to other parts of the Arab nation and resisting it in Egypt on the popular level in order to make it fail.

4. Struggling to bring Egypt back to its natural status as the leader of the Arab national liberation movement, the group of African and Islamic countries and the nonaligned movement, instead of its current status as a partner in the execution of American strategy in the region.

5. Supporting intrinsic Arab powers, conducting full coordination among Arab nationalist and progressive forces in confronting the American Zionist scheme of dominating the region, stressing the linkup of national causes and considering military power a basic condition for the possible attainment of a real solution to the national cause.

6. Causing the main struggle against the policy of a separate peace to dominate over peripherial side struggles among Arab countries.

7. Providing the necessary conditions for the Arab people in every country to exercise their basic democratic rights and freedoms, participate actively in formulating decisions and overseeing their execution, and constructing a broad Arab popular front containing all forces and parties of different intellectual and social origins around a single cause, which is that of bringing down the policy of a separate peace and striving with all military, political and economic means to have the "Arab peace" plan take the place of the "Camp David peace" plan.

8. Comprehensively supporting the struggle of the Palestinian people on and outside the occupied territories to defend their national rights, materially and morally supporting the Palestinian revolution, maintaining full solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization on grounds that it is the fraternal people's sole legitimate representative in their struggle for their right to determine their destiny and their right to establish their democratic state on the territory of Palestine (which will guarantee equal rights for all its subjects despite differences of religion, race and belief), and supporting the right of the Palestinian revolution to continue the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy in the battle, its right to adopt independent political decisions without tutelage from anyone regarding anything related to its destiny and the destiny of its people, and its right to take part independently in all efforts made to liquidate the Israeli aggression and restore peace to the region.

9. Constantly unearthing the negative features of the policy of a separate peace on economic and democratic conditions in Egypt and its role in aggravating the economic crisis and anti-democratic measures.

10. Strengthening Arab solidarity to liberate occupied Arab territories.

11. Mobilizing all forces, especially the forces of national liberation of the peoples of the third world, the Islamic world, the countries of Western Europe and the socialist countries, which support our struggle in the international context.

It appears that Khalid Muhyi-al-Din has preferred not to embark with us on the adventure of talking about international relations.

When he raises the issue of America in the Middle East in his conversation, he must of necessity be aiming at more distant matters. In any event, we will leave you until the next instalment, tomorrow.

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/Text/ International relations: this phrase, in fact, is the most urbane way of describing those suspect practices in the relationships among the major powers! In an era governed by big entities, such as this era of ours, the smaller entities, by which we mean the countries of the third world, must adopt one of two positions for themselves--alignment or nonalignment--and must bear the responsibility for either option, in order to achieve independence and dignity for themselves. The American game in the Arab East is well understood and has been exposed, even if it has been professionally played!

Today Khalid Muhyi-al-Din is talking to us about international relations, relations between the big and the small, and the American game.

This was the text of his conversation with us:

Our party is still pursuing its trade union missions at a time in which the climate is clouded over and imperialism is intensifying its attacks on the policy of international detente and exposing world peace to grievous dangers.

The draft of our party program stipulated "The main phenomenon of international relations is the constant triumph of the policy of peaceful coexistence, the growth of a policy of international detente, and the increased ability to repudiate war as a method of international struggle." This definition is correct if we take up modern developments in their general historic course. However, it is a definition which might expose our analyses to flagrant political errors if we neglect the fact that imperialism must fiercely resist every achievement benefiting the peoples of the world and that the course of international detente must consequently face convulsions and vicissitudes.

The Crisis of Capitalism

This is because success in achieving certain steps along the road to international detente does not mean that imperialism's nature has changed or that it has

abandoned its aggressive methods. Rather, they have perhaps increased in ferocity with the increased aggravation of long-term crisis that international capitalism has been going through since the early seventies. The effects of this crisis are plain to the eye: inflation, unemployment, monetary problems and an intensified struggle for markets. To that one should add the fact that the trend in international capitalism is toward mergers and the establishment of multinational corporations, none of which has alleviated the severity of endemic contradictions. All that has happened is that these contradictions have been met by the growing military power of the socialist world, which has made it mandatory to avoid comprehensive nuclear confrontation with that world, with the result that confrontation has taken other forms.

The fact is that international detente which has highlighted the need to renounce overall nuclear war has not yet put a limit to the flare-up of wars using traditional weapons. These wars have proliferated in Africa, Asia and Latin America in recent years. The outbreak of such wars in the third world is only an expression of the fact that circumstances are not yet ripe for responding to imperialist schemes and achieving the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of the third world without resorting to war.

The Flourishing of the Arms Trade

So far, decisive results have not been achieved in limiting nuclear armament, nor have there been tangible results in lessening armament in general and establishing demilitarized nuclear arms areas. America has frozen the final signing of the second strategic arms limitation agreement and has decided to supply Western Europe with a new mountain or nuclear missiles. The arms trade is flourishing in many areas of the world, especially ours.

While it is true that the climate of international detente has achieved results in limiting the danger of direct military confrontation between the capitalist and socialist worlds, it has not yet had the effect of alleviating the intensity of the tension between the advanced capitalist countries and the newly-independent countries of the third world. In fact, the opposite may perhaps be the case.

Imperialism has started seeking new ways to co-opt the countries of the third world again and prevent their political independence from growing into economic independence. This is because imperialism is deficient in responding to the legitimate demands of the third world now that it has received its sovereign rights to determine its destiny by itself. If imperialism responds to these demands it must threaten the essence of their values with ruin.

The New Economic Order

For this reason, imperialism is insistently standing against attempts by third world countries to establish a new world economic order. The third world has become the major arena on which the most violent international confrontations are taking place. This is what the draft of our program talked about when it specified that international detente is not preventing the continued, indeed aggravated,

confrontation between the victories being won by the world movement against imperialism and the grave dangers which neocolonialism still poses.

While the prevention of nuclear war between the socialist and capitalist world has become a matter of benefit to all mankind, the peoples of the third world who are completing their political, economic and cultural liberation and are fighting on behalf of the progress of their peoples are of necessity bearing the torch of change and development in the entire world situation. Stabilizing the conditions of the world in the form it is in now means continuing their exploitation and subservience. Therefore they are fighting for national liberation and are fighting to rid themselves of different forms of exploitation and subservience, the awareness of the organic interrelationship between national revolution and social progress is increasing among them, and a large number of them are viewing the socialist camp as a natural ally, as they are all benefiting from the balance of power between the two superpowers, who have crushed the monopoly of power which once belonged to capitalism.

The Third World, Scene of the Struggle

Thus the third world, as it often is, is the main stage for the most conspicuous confrontations between the great powers themselves. This in particular is the case with respect to the Middle East specifically. Since the formulation of our party's draft was completed in mid-1977, Egypt has witnessed transformations which prove that it has totally abandoned the premises of its former foreign policy which dated from the time of the revolution--transformations which were not restricted to means for confronting the Arab-Israeli struggle alone but went beyond that to include all the features of the country's foreign policy. President al-Sadat in November 1977 made the visit to Jerusalem, as a result of which a qualitative change occurred in the method of confronting Israel, since the Camp David agreements were signed, then the separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. The source of danger in what has happened is that the change does not concern Egypt and Israel alone, or the national dimensions of the Arab-Israeli struggle, but that Egypt, along with Israel, has come to constitute an axis taking the place of Iran in the American scheme to dominate the Middle East. After the fall of the Shah's regime, it has been determined that Egypt, along with Israel, is to constitute the nucleus of a new American alliance, or, in other words, that the United States has the goal of having Egypt, with Israel, assume the role of policeman to defend its strategic, economic and oil interests in the Middle East.

The purpose of this treaty was not to remedy the bases of the Arab-Israeli struggle and transcend its causes, but to constitute a jumping-off spot from which America could set out to confront the rising liberation movements throughout the African continent and the Arab nation, specifically in the southwest, facing the horn of Africa, so that the centers of regions surrounding the Iranian revolution could be consolidated on America's behalf and the revolution could be contained through them. In conjunction with the effort America has made to guarantee the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, its fleets have begun to move about in the Indian Ocean, American security has been re-established in the gulf area, and these military measures of special importance have become prominent, now that America has failed to make Saudi Arabia bear the burden of supporting the Camp David agreements.

We have entered into the context of the imperialist game with the Arab world. It is a game in which we cannot conceal our curiosity for Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's followup and examination of facts, and, with his promise that we will receive that, our appointment will be the coming instalment, tomorrow.

/23 Jun 81 p 11/

/Text/ Here we are, at the final way-station of our tour with the fighting man Khalid Muhyi-al-Din. Here, in this instalment, he gathers up the findings he has made in the past 13 instalments on the Arab situation and imperialist conspiracies.

The Arabs' position at this moment still holds promise. All the imperialist Zionist schemes have failed, more or less, except for the scheme of the Egyptian-Israeli peace! All America's gambles have failed in the face of Arab rigidity, Arab oil and the religion of the Arabs, Islam! Here Khalid Muhyi-al-Din is completing the discussion on this point, detailing the Egyptian leftist party's in the coming stage.

This is the text of his final conversation with us.

The Religious Currents

Religion as a point of departure, has been an extremely important element in wrecking the American scheme which is aimed at gaining support for the Camp David agreements from Saudi Arabia and the conservative Arab states. It is not in the power of these countries, which believe that Islam is a religion and a state, to give agreement to the framework of a peace with Israel which would neglect the Palestine cause and would fail to guarantee the return of Arab Jerusalem. In addition, religion has come to have a growing role in Arab political life with the rising status of Arab regimes that derive their legitimacy from Islam and have come to have great influence thanks to oil resources.

Our party rejects the Western claims that have been spread about since the Iranian revolution in the attempt to depict every resistance to imperialist schemes based on religious premises as firmly and exclusively characterized by a quality of fanaticism, backwardness and reaction. There certainly are reactionary fanatic religious currents, and our party opposes them. However, our party totally rejects the statement that every political movement which operates from religious premises is of necessity reactionary and backward in character. We have proof today that this fact is not restricted to the Islamic world alone. In numerous other arenas, especially in Latin America, Christian religious currents have risen to prominence and have attained such status and gravity that Pope John Paul II has found it incumbent upon himself to deal with them in his visits to Latin America. The stage of religion is one of the prominent stages in the modern political struggle, especially in our Arab nation. Our party refuses to abandon this stage in order that the forces of imperialism and reaction may act tyrannically within it.

The Nonaligned Movement

Our party, in the face of imperialism's renewed attempts to strike out at the achievements of international detente and to increase the state of tension and

dangers of war in the world--especially in the Middle East region, in spite of all America's claims to be attempting to make peace reign there--adheres to the premises and principles of the July revolution in Egypt's foreign policy, foremost among them the principle of nonalignment.

Recent evidence has grown that the nonaligned movement is still an effective force in the international arena, capable of standing up to aggressive imperialist schemes. Before the convening of the sixth conference of the nonaligned movement in Havana, the imperialist and reactionary media gambled that this movement had entered a state of contraction. However, this conference of nonaligned countries had the greatest representation of all this movement's conferences, as it contained 96 countries.

Thus the movement proved that it is advancing, not retreating. At this conference, the Palestine cause dwarfed the Camp David agreements, supported the rights of the people of Palestine to determine their destiny and establish their independent state, and stressed the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate leader of the people of Palestine.

Our party has committed itself to the fixed principles of nonalignment. This has been conspicuous in the party's position on the events in Afghanistan. The party's statement on these events held that while it rejected aggressive military intervention into the affairs of Afghanistan which imperialism and Pakistan have embarked on, it also did not approve the continued presence of Soviet Union forces on the territory of Afghanistan and recommended a remedy to the Afghan crisis in the context of the nonaligned movement, far removed from interventions by any of the two superpowers.

The Party's Principles

The current escalation of dangers in the region and the world call more than at any previous time for our party to arm itself with revolutionary awareness, to adhere more than at any time in the past to the basic principles of the party, and to confront everything that arises in the international and regional context from the premise of the interests of the liberation and progress of our country and Arab nation. This means, in practice, that:

In confronting warmongers and people who benefit from the intensification of international tension, we will fight to protect peace on firm, true bases, on just foundations, for the sake of the triumph of international detente and peaceful coexistence.

In confronting the spread of nuclear weapons, we will struggle to prohibit them and to have the Middle East region devoid of these weapons and all foreign soldiers.

In confronting the colonialist plunder of the resources of the developing countries, we will struggle to put a limit to this issue and will support the establishment of just, equal economic relations in the context of a new world economic order.

In confronting the attempts of international capitalism to exploit oil surpluses in order to consecrate backwardness, social injustice and class bias, we will struggle to have oil money invested for the sake of development and social justice and the spread of national cultures.

In confronting imperialist attempts to attract Egypt in order to integrate its strategy with comprehensive American strategy, we adhere to the principles of nonalignment, refuse to join international blocs and military alliances, and establish balanced relations with the major countries on grounds of respect for our independence and nonintervention in our internal affairs.

In confronting efforts by the international forces of reaction to distort the picture of enlightened religious movements which stand up to colonialism and social injustice, we are fighting to expand the area of political struggle so that it may offer honorable devout nationalist forces the best opportunities to take off.

Our party, notwithstanding laws which do not permit it to establish relations with progressive parties outside Egypt, has not neglected foreign policy in its struggle. We have always supported the nonaligned movement and have demanded that it be supported and be closely joined together. We have welcomed the resolutions of the Havana Conference and have risen up against displays of American air power in Saudi Arabia with criticisms and warning. We are constantly striving to expose the establishment of American bases especially on the territory of the Arab nation.

The imperialist conspiracies and schemes we have referred to, and the tragedy which has befallen the land of the Arabs, must not make us forget the fact that we in Egypt are experiencing the triumph of peoples. In the past 4 years, Mozambique and Angola have become independent, revolution has occurred in Iran, Indira Gandhi has returned to power in India, Mugabe has swept the elections in Zimbabwe, the people have triumphed in Nicaragua against a 40-year dictatorship and power has been assumed by a progressive government, and the revolution in Ethiopia has triumphed under terrible circumstances bequeathed to it by centuries of backward feudal rule. As all of these have triumphed, so must the Arab liberation movement triumph with its democratic, social and unionist horizons, because the Arab people aspire to this victory and are bringing forth the fighting people who can achieve it.

In conclusion: Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, one of the heroes of the 23 July 1952 revolution, is still following up on the course of the revolution in Egypt, although the Nasirite era has ended and the regime in Egypt is trying to pursue another course totally removed from the course of Nasirism and Arab socialism, a course which is alienating Egypt from the course of freedom, socialism and unity.

In spite of it all, our confidence that the Egyptian opposition parties will return things to their proper place and that everything will return to an Arab, unionist Egypt as it was, so that it will play its national progressive role in the region as the best it was, still remains.

Egypt will remain Arab, in spite of the conspiracy, in spite of the tragedy.

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POLITICAL STABILITY OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC HAILED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 14 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab: "Political Stability"]

[Text]

Since the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was formed the political opponents and the enemies of Iran have always tried to make the world believe that the Islamic regime will not last long. When the premier of the deposed shah fled to Paris, in his first televised interview he promised that in less than six months the "regime of Khomeini" would collapse and "democracy would come back to Iran". At the end of his six-month period Bakhtiar fixed another unspecified date.

On every occasion the Western media have been promising the imminent downfall of the Islamic regime. The criminal Iraqi self-imposed president, in the beginning of his war against Iran, said, "Khomeini has died and his regime has collapsed". On the anniversary of the abortive Nozheh coup d'etat, certain T.V. stations started to utter in chorus that "the Iranian regime is weakened and the army barracks are expressing their loyalty to the anti-Khomeini forces". And finally, recently the deposed Banisadr has been assuring his Western masters that the Islamic regime will fall in less than three months.

Whilst the enemies of the Islamic Republic are fully aware that what they say is without any foundation. why then do they spread much rumors?

In our opinion these elements try to show to the world that instability reigns in Iran. They think that if they succeed in deceiving the world opinion they will be able to isolate the Islamic Republic politically and economically. A last example of our enemies' attempt to make believe that Iran is not stable is the false report they give to our petroleum customers. These people pretend that the Iranian government cannot keep its promises in delivering oil on the time stated in mutual contracts. But almost every buyer of the Iranian oil knows that

despite the Iraqi-imposed war we have been constantly in position to show our trustworthiness to the outside world. As most of the oil dealers know, our defensive systems have downed more than 40 Iraqi warplanes near our oil terminal. Moreover all military experts are fully convinced that the Islamic aircraft have free access to the enemy's oil installations. Whenever we have decided to bomb the Iraqi oil terminals we have done it successfully. Concerning political stability, all political analysts know that if any one of the grave political assassinations like the ones in Iran had been carried out in any Middle East country the situation there would have been much different than that in here. When the criminal explosion killed more than 72 of the best servants of the Islamic Republic, many foreign radios started saying that the Islamic regime has been crushed. But very amazingly we saw that all the lost men were replaced and the Islamic Republic continued its way with more momentum and energy.

When President Raja'i and Premier Bahonar were martyred again our enemies celebrated the "downfall of Khomeini's regime". But we again saw that notwithstanding the losses among the very dear servants of Islam, the government was re-formed and life continued normally in Iran. And now our numerous enemies have lost all form of credibility and no intelligent individual has the least respect for what they say. The world public opinion has full confidence that the regime in Iran does not rest on a sole personality. Imam Khomeini, referring to the fact said, "If Khomeini is dead, Islam is alive" and who does not know that we have accomplished the revolution for Islam? If so, why do the terrorists still commit crimes by assassinating the top officials in Iran. For these savage acts we do have our own interpretation. They have reached a deadlock. And everybody knows that, as Imam said, a cat at bay would jump at a lion. The terrorists in Iran, within a wide spectrum, are now fully aware that their plots have miscarried and their objectives have not been reached. The evidence is their last crime committed in Tabriz. Without any respect to religious rites they have exploded a grenade killing an old prayer leader as well as six innocent people. We take this last attempt as a clear sign of political bankruptcy. The terrorist groups know that the morale of their partisans has degenerated and, in order to still retain their unaware followers, they resort to such crimes. On whom do the terrorists count? Don't they know that with each similar crime the public

wrath will escalate against them. Then why do they commit such crimes? If they wish to tell the world that the Islamic regime is shaky and that no law and order reigns in this country they are entirely wrong. In their private conversations the foreign diplomats express their esteem for the firmness and political maturity of our people. Today we can rarely find a diplomat who does not praise the stability of this regime. Terrorism exists all over the world. West European countries are vivid examples of our assertion. But what is praiseworthy is the fact that with all plots and attempts against this regime national consolidation presents itself in all dimensions. Today in the Islamic Republic, side by side the combatants, who are fighting against the Ba'athist enemy, we see the determined men and women who have decided to defend their freedom and independence. If political stability means the presence of masses at all political scenes, we are stable.

Let all our enemies know, as do know our friends, that as long as one Iranian remains alive, the Islamic Republic in this country will be stable and remain powerful. The heroism of our fighters in various war fronts, the determination of our brave people will force the world to believe that this republic is stable and will remain so.

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'PARS' RIDICULES CARTER AS 'ISLAMOLOGY' SCHOLAR

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN, Sept. 11 (Pars) — Jimmy Carter, the former U.S. President spoke on the Persian program of the VOA (Voice of America) at 5:00 on September 5th, in which he slated Ayatollah Khomeini's actions and said that by resorting to terrorism, assassination and massacres, Khomeini "has betrayed the principles of Islam."

Carter, who was being interviewed by the NHK (Japan Radio and Television) in Osaka added that in his opinion, Khomeini's influence in Iran was rapidly dwindling. According to Carter: "Khomeini is an unpredictable person, weak at times of crisis and betraying his aides." Carter who is visiting Japan with his family, also commented on the American hostage crisis in Iran, saying: "I still think Khomeini's regime intended in the beginning to take the Americans hostage only for a few days. But, when the terrorists seized the Americans as hostage, they themselves became powerful political agents and then the Ayatollah exhibited his weakness, keeping in mind weaknesses, and set out, backed up by public opinions, to betray the ones whom he had appointed to government posts, and violated Islamic law by punishing innocent men."

Pars Commentary on the Carter Interview:

The very important point which can be derived from Carter's speech, is his self-elevation to the level of an Islamic scholar, and in this new status he has recognized the violation of the Islamic law in Iran and according to the fatwa (religious award) of Mr. Carter, the newly-converted "Muslim American", it seems that the execution of the American agents and the people who are assigned by the former SAVAK, and the CIA in Iran, to undermine the bases of the Islamic Republic, is a kind of betrayal to Islam.

After the defeat of all the conspiracies of the enemies of Islam against the Islamic Revolution and while all the satans with all their wicked schemes to crumble the Islamic Republic of Iran, have been disappointed, now we witness new plots using religion against religion, are being engineered by the enemies of Islam to fulfill their sinister goals and they are trying to fight the Islamic government of Iran by adducing to a distorted Islam.

For long, most of the reactionary rulers of the Islamic countries have presented the Islamic nations in deviatory fashions to idiotize their subject nations. It is amazing that people like Jimmy Carter assume the facade of the Islamic scholars to confront the Islamic Revolution of Iran, and vilify the Islamic regime for violating the Islamic laws. The more interesting point in Carter's remarks is his comments about the Leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Nothing except this can be expected of a person, who has come to pieces as Carter has and whose failure in the presidential elections, as confirmed by all the observers, was due to his absurd acts vis-a-vis the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the hostage events.

As if Carter had forgotten that he has time and again predicted the imminent fall of the Islamic Republic of Iran ever since the victory of the Islamic Revolution and even at times, in order to prove the realization of his predications, resorted to absurd acts like military intervention in Tabas desert, Nozhe coup plot, Kurdestan events, the massacre of people in Turkaman Sahra and Gonabad, the Khuzestan explosions and the onslaughts of the Iraqi soldiers. Now that he should have come to himself after the lethal blows or defeat in U.S. elections, he is still repeating the same old things and talks about the "dwindling Khomeini influence". While any blind, short-sighted person with a little bit of political insight, certainly laughs at this hilarious, childish remark of Carter, he who has seen the million turnouts of the Iranian nation in the funeral of the martyrs of June 28th and August 30th and who should deem himself deserving the treatment he received from Imam which led to his toppling at once.

As for his other accusations that the Imam is "unpredictable, weak in times of crisis, and betraying his friends", one must note that the "unpredictability" of Imam Khomeini has always been one of the White House's greatest problems and as the friends and enemies of ours admit, this same unpredictability of Imam has always caused the leading diplomats of Washington never to reach the goals which they deemed they would fulfill for sure after the so-called scientific predictions. About as for his "weakness in the times of crisis", one need only to recall the Imam's bold and decisive measures after the eruption of each crisis which

have all guided the country to a more correct path and has bereft the enemies of Islam. As for "betraying friends" certainly what Carter meant, was not the true authentic aides of Imam, because if this had been the case, it would have meant great happiness for the U.S. President and his friends, and now that Carter has mentioned such a thing as the negative side of Imam, then it is clear that he means the rejection of the aides of the White House by Imam which has saddened Carter. Carter is glum over the rejection of certain people with U.S. inspired tastes.

Carter's remarks about the hostage events have no other reasons but an excuse to vent his rage, and the fact that he considered the 444 day captivity of the hostages as a weakness for Imam is amazing, because if we consider the unprecedented forbearance of the Imam vis-a-vis all the efforts of the satans as weaknesses, then woe to the U.S. superpower and its intelligence/military networks, which for 444 days resorted to all their plots and which still failed to defeat a "weak" person despite their complex machinery against him.

If Carter had been defeated in the elections after his confrontation with the Islamic Revolution, he could have referred to the leader of the Revolution and the Muslim nation as "weak", but he is ignorant to see that everyone knows that however much he gives the Imam and the Islamic Revolution importance, after his failure in the presidential elections, he would exhibit his desparate efforts to justify his defeat, And in addition to that, the future American generations will curse Carter for having countered a "weak" leader and a nation and he himself was defeated instead, and brought disgrace for those who run the US regime.

CSO: 4600/200

ACADEMICIANS DENOUNCE KHOMEYNI SAVAGERY

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 36, 4 Sep 81 pp 8-9

[Text] The Democratic Association of Universitarians, an organisation of "anti-imperialist and democrat" academics from universities and technical schools throughout Iran, has appealed to academics and intellectuals round the world to help stop the wave of repression in the country in a document widely circulated throughout the world in the past month.

It asks them to contact Iranian officials to protest against the executions and holding of political prisioners, to send fact-finding missions to investigate the state of political prisoners in Iran, especially the use of torture, and to publicise the atrocious situation inside Iran to their compatriots.

The association says: Two and a half years have passed since the heroic uprising of the Iranian people put an end to the tyrannical rule of the Shah's puppet regime in February 1979. This victory was achieved at the cost of tens of thousands of lives [sic] and hundreds of thousands of injuries. All these sacrifices were made to put an end to the reign of a regime which severely suppressed all democratic rights of the people, practiced systematic torture, filled the prisons with political prisoners and finally shot and killed unarmed demonstratros in the streets in order to preserve and further the interests of the imperialist powers in our country. The ominous memories of executions and torture of the revolutionaries are still alive in the minds of our people and all progressive people of the world. After all the sacrifices the Iranian people made to overthrow the Shah's regime, they had hoped that those horrible crimes would never again be repeated against them. However, this dream did not come true. Only during a short period after the uprising did the people enjoy a fair amount of freedom and democracy.

Those who came to power after the uprising did not take any notice of the aspirations of our people. Instead, step by step they strengthened their hold on the organs of power and moved to eliminate and brutally suppress all manifestations of popular power. Freedom of the press, one of the most highly cherished fruits of the people's struggle, was gradually suppressed and is now completely non-existent. The democratic rights of the oppressed nationalities and religious minorities were completely ignored. The Kurdish people, for example, are denied any degree of self-determination and are presently subjected to severe economic s ge. Thousands of Kurds, young and old, have been massacred by the regime's "revolutionary guards" and the Imperial Army of the Shah which has supposedly become Islamized by the new rulers. Nevertheless, the heroic struggle of the Kurds has continued and has achieved many victories.

The revolutionary organizations which actively took part in the struggle to overthrow the Shah's regime and offered many martyrs to the cause of liberation have been denied the right of political activity and at this moment thousands of their members and sympathizers are in prison. Political activists are subjected to barbaric tortures in prison, and are targets of regime's bands of terror outside.

Iran's universities, which were major centers of resistance against the Shah's regime had resumed academic activity immediately after the February 1979 uprising, hoping to increase the anti-imperialist and democratic awareness of the people. The new rulers, under the cover of "cultural revolution", organised an attack by club and knifewielding thugs against the universities, killing tens of students, and injuring many more. Numerous students and professors were arrested, some of whom later faced the regime's firing squads. A month later, all institutions of higher education were taken over and shut down for an indefinite period. Many progressive professors have been purged or subjected to severe pressure to resign or toe the line. Bookshops not "in-line" have been subjected to medieval attacks. The ultra-reactionary laws of "Islamic retribution" have been increasingly practiced throughout the country, with punishments such as stoning, cutting off fingers, etc. meted out.

All this savagery is committed by a regime totally unable to meet the economic needs of the masses. Industrial and agricultural production is at a nadir, inflation is rampant, economic dependence on international monopolies is gaining renewed strength as evidenced by "secret" oil contracts and multi-million dollar deals with the likes of the Bankrupt British Talbot Company.

In the past few weeks the wave of terror and repression has reached a new and unprecedented peak. The Islamic Republic Party, the sole fully "legal" party, has monopolized all power in its hands. The remaining non-party newspapers were shut down. The slightest hint of opposition to I.R.P. or the meekest expression of dissatisfaction is no longer tolerated even from within the ruling clique, and dissatisfied elements have been purged. Street demonstrations against the new wave of repression have been bloodily suppressed. Hundreds were shot and killed in the streets of Tehran alone. Many political prisoners were murdered by firing squads without trial. Saeed Soltanpour, a revolutionary poet with a glorious record of struggle against the Shah's tyranny both inside and outside of prison, was executed. Mohsen Fazel, another leading revolutionary and a political prisoner of the Shah's regime, was also put in front of the "charge" of taking part in the recent street demonstrations. Mohammad Reza Sa'adati, another well know political prisoner of both regimes, was "sentenced" to ten years in prison before his trial a few months ago. Shockingly, the blood-thirsty regime murdered him by a firing squad a few weeks ago with the "charge" of "conspiracy against the regime" in prison. In recent weeks hundreds of young innocent people have been executed within hours of arrest without any trial.

As Iranian academics, members of the Democratic Association of Universitarians, we feel obliged to expose the abhorrent situation in our country. We appeal to all democratic people of the world to support the current struggle of the people of Iran.

CSO: 4600/194

CULTURAL ATTRIBUTES OF REVOLUTION DEPLORED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 36, 4 Sep 81 pp 9-11

[Text] Since the start of the revolution in Iran, the revolutionary leaders have insisted on obliterating everything Iranian and replacing it with what they consider to be Islamic. They have removed the lion and sun emblem from the Iranian flag, have burned the flag itself during nationalist demonstrations staged by the National Front, have changed the name of the Red Lion and Sun Society to the Red Crescent, are planning to change the name of the Pars News Agency to God knows what; and in their latest move, the revolutionary leaders have dismantled the Ministry of Arts and Culture and are handing the arts and culture of the country to the Ministry of Islamic Guidance.

The "doctrinaire" leaders wishing to rewrite Iranian history have destroyed historical monuments and schoolchildren no longer learn the history of the Achaemenian and Sassanian empires. Rather their text books begin with the Arab conquest of 642 AD when glorious Islam came to the Iranian plateau.

Sheikh Khalkhali, that known authority on killing cats and men, has now become an authority on Iranian culture and history. He is bent on destroying all monuments and has declared the lion and sun emblem on the Iranian flag as Zionist. No one has informed him that the lion and sun emblem was used by the Parthians on their coins some 200 years before Christ.

The religious fanaticism associated with the Iranian revolution is nothing new. Iranians are by nature poetic and by character deeply religious, and religious fanaticism was prevalent long before Islam. That is why amid signs of obliteration and destruction one is at times heartened by definite signs of an Iranian culture deeply embedded in the make-up of every Iranian.

Who is an Iranian? One who reads Saadi, or quotes long passages from Ferdowsi? Not really. An Iranian cherishes his traditions, he celebrates Now Rouz. Last Now Rouz Khomeyni asked the people to remember their brothers at the war front and to tone down their Now Rouz celebrations. The people ignored his request and celebrated Now Rouz in a better and bigger fashion than before.

More than anything else the revolution in Iran has afforded the layman the opportunity to show his flair for poetry and rhyme. The walls of every village and town are covered with a wide range of slogans. Any name can be rhymed with any line to suit any circumstance. Some slogans are very witty.

Now a single band of blue writing declaring the victory of Islam over American imperialism and inviting the oppressed to rise against their domination circles the entire walls of the U.S. embassy, and one wall has been painted with scenes of the revolution. The calligraphy of this inscription, in the true Persian style of writing, is very beautiful and artistic.

The jokes made at the expense of the revolutionary leaders are both clever and funny and show a very subtle sense of humour. A poster describing various types of regimes for the benefit of the layman reads:

Communism--If you have two cows, the state will take both away and give a little milk.

Socialism--If you have two cows, the state will take one away and let you keep the other.

Fascism--If you have two cows, the state will take both and kill them.

Islamic Republic--If you have two cows, you will give one voluntarily to the state and the other one will produce so much milk that you will be able to feed your neighbours.

Students from university of Teheran changed the last caption to: Islamic Republic--If you have two cows you make one the head of the National Radio and Television (meaning Sadegh Qotbzadeh) and the other Minister for Foreign Affairs (meaning Ibrahim Yazdi).

Then there was the cable from Taleqani ostensibly sent from paradise to Khomeyni saying: "Mohammad Reza Pahlavi arrived. No sign of martyrs. Am worried." Most of the jokes were made up by university students, bastions of counter revolutionary activities. Perhaps it's no wonder the universities were closed down.

The first 6 months of the revolution witnessed the blossoming of a liberated society capable of developing an independent and advanced culture. Newspapers were a stirring testimony to this blossoming.

Ayandegan, a Tehran daily, published accurate news, original and blod interviews, editorials and articles in good, intelligent Persian, and the layout was extremely well designed. Iran had nothing of that standard ever before. The Ayandegan offices were raided, burned and finally closed down on charges of using Israeli-made machines. The same machines are now used to produce a trashy piece of literature called Sobh-i. Azadegan.

Ahangar, a cartoon magazine with a political slant, was also closed down because it made fun of the revolutionary leaders. Its cartoons were well drawn and its captions highly imaginative.

Even the theatre enjoyed a revival. Beizai wrote a play called "Death of Yazdegerd" in which he openly compared the Arab conquest of 642 A.D. to the Islamic revolution of 1979. The play was a fantastic success. "The House of Bernarda Alba", a play produced and directed by a woman with an all-woman cast, was allowed to play for only three nights, however. No explanation was given for its closure.

The Mullahs have declared all these activities un-Islamic, however, belonging to the "corrupt era of the detested Pahlavi regime." A Muslim society, they declared, enjoys no such corruptions. The Islamic societies in turn put on exhibitions with terrifying posters of a glowering Khomeini walking through the severed veins of the oppressed, and gruesome pictures of the so-called martyred revolutionary guards.

But even the Islamic exhibitions have an Iranian flavour. Iranians truly love and create martyrs. Islam has a very rigid culture, not so expressive, not so fluid. The culture born out of the revolution in Iran is very Iranian. Even the brand of Islam preached by Khomeyni and company is Iranian. It is otherwise known as Safavid Shi'ism, introduced to Iran in the 16th century by Shah Ismael, the first Safavid King.

CSO: 4600/195

KHOMEYNI REGIME HELD INVULNERABLE TO ASSASSINATIONS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English Vol 5, No 36, 7 Sep 81 pp 3-4

[Text]

The bomb which killed Iran's President Mohammed Ali Rajai and Premier Mohammed Javad Bahonar last week has triggered off a welter of predictions that the end of the mullocracy is in sight. A lot of this has been wishful thinking and it is hard, however, to see why Ayatollah Khomeini's way should be ending.

As the huge throng at the funeral of the two leaders demonstrated, the Ayatollah and the ruling Islamic Republican Party can count on considerable popular support and replacing both Mr Rajai and Mr Bahonar is not presenting any serious difficulties. There seems little reason therefore to pay much heed to boastful forecasts by exiles of the imminent collapse of the regime in Iran or to look upon the exiles as a credible alternative at this stage.

That said, there is little doubt that Iran will continue to sink deeper into political, social and economic turmoil. Ayatollah Khomeini's admonition last week to the revolutionary courts to respect the law is unlikely to slow down the tempo of executions of the government's enemies and these killings will in turn act as a spur to the Ayatollah's foes to carry on their campaign of bombings and assassinations. But for the time being, a bloody stalemate seems the most likely outcome. This situation could well continue for as long as Ayatollah Khomeini is alive.

There are three reasons for this prognosis. The first is that Ayatollah Khomeini provides the political *mullahs* and the IRP with the cohesive force of his own person and political will; his disappearance would be the signal for a struggle for power inside the IRP; for all of its outward appearance of unity, the IRP is riven by numerous factions.

Secondly, opposition to Ayatollah Khomeini is fragmented and there seems little or no likelihood that his enemies will come together; they range from followers of the late Shah on the far right to the *Moudjahidin e Khalq* and groups still further to the left; as former President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr shows in an interview with this newsletter (see following article).

much of the energies of the exiled enemies of the Ayatollah are expended in quarreling with each other.

The third reason is that there will be no shortage of replacements for assassinated leaders and no indication at present that the *mullahs'* misrule will provoke either a popular uprising or a coup by the armed forces; the Iranian revolution has been characterised by a progressive deterioration in the quality of its leadership together with a steady worsening of economic conditions and a rise in political violence and repression, but it is a revolution of the poor and the capacity of the dispossessed to accept suffering should not be undervalued.

Although the war with Iraq is essentially a *Stitskrieg*, it does keep a large portion of Iran's armed forces away at the front and out of politics. Besides, there have been frequent purges and more are probable as the *mullahs* strive to be rid of opposition from any quarter. So the armed forces, despite Mr Bani-Sadr's efforts to cultivate their loyalty, would very probably think twice about taking on the Revolutionary Guards and other armed supporters of the mullocracy.

There remain, of course, the non-Farsi minority communities which together constitute roughly half of Iran's population. There is fighting in Kurdestan and considerable unrest at the other end of the country among the Baluchis. But the Azerbaijanis remain an unknown quantity even though their religious leader, Ayatollah Kazem Shariat Madari is known to oppose Ayatollah Khomeini. And despite Iraq's efforts to stir up trouble in Khuzestan, Iran's Arabs appear to be quiescent.

And while Ayatollah Komeini and the IRP have blamed "agents of imperialism" for the deaths of the President and Prime Minister, Iran is benefiting from a relatively low level of foreign interference in its affairs. This is because the US, although it is the "Great Satan" to millions of Iranians, has no interest in pushing Iran into additional turmoil which would probably most benefit the Soviet Union and Moscow has no desire to see chaos on its southern border which could so easily spill over into the Muslim communities in Soviet Asia. An additional incentive to the Russians to tread warily is the alliance between the IRP and the *Tudeh* (Communist) Party.

All of the above leads this newsletter to believe that reports of the imminent death of Iran's Islamic Revolution are greatly exaggerated.

CSC: 4600/191

KHOMEYNI 'ROYAL' FAMILY'S CONNECTIONS TRACED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 36,4 Sep 81 p 11-12

[Letter from M Changizi]

[Text] Last week your correspondent wrote about Mrs Ahmad Khomeyni, daughter-in-law of Ayatollah Khomeyni, niece of Ayatollah Moussa Sadr, sister of top regime official Sadegh Tabatabai and granddaughter of Khomeyni at the same time. She perhaps instances for our western friends the fact that little has changed in Iran in some respects since the revolution and that the Khomeyni clan plays the same game as the Pahlavis did.

Ayatollah Khomeyni's mother married four times and she was the mother of the present Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani and his brother, who is now head of the national television and radio network, and of a sister Mrs Lahouti, whose husband has a top post with the revolutionary courts. Mrs Khomeyni's son by her first husband has been appointed head of the Tehran public bus company, and her son by the second, Pasandideh, is managing director of Iran's army industries.

Khomeyni's wife's sister, Mrs Kianouri, is wife of the son of Shaikh Fazloolah Nouri, and her eldest son is Noureddin Kianouri, who is head of the Tudeh (pro-Moscow Communist) party which enjoys the protection of the mullahs' regime and Khomeyni himself. And another son has been made governor of Yazd.

Meanwhile Khomeyni's sister is married to Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeyni's heir-apparent, whose son, a top official of the regime and Majlis member, died in last month's massive bomb explosion at the IRP headquarters. Their daughter is the wife of Ayatollah Qoddusi, the revolutionary prosecutor-general. Meanwhile 's daughter was married to the missing Ayatollah Moussa Sadr, whose daughter is married to another prominent regime official in Sadegh Tabatabai, who is generally credited with being the brain behind commercial profiting by the family from the sale of carpets and other valuables from the former royal palaces. Tabatabai's sister is married to Ahmad Khomeyni, Khomeyni's eldest son.

Another daugher of Ayatollah Khomeyni is married to Ayatollah Eshraghi, another top official of the regime; two of their daughers' husbands became ministers after the revolution. One is former oil minister Moinfar, the other former PTT minister Ghandi, who also died in the IRP headquarters bomb blast. The list could continue, for the extended family has its tentacles in all areas of administration and life in Iran.

CSO: 4600/196

EXCESS IMPORTS SEEN OVERBURDENING ECONOMY

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English Vol 5 No 36, 7 Sep 81 pp 4-5

[Text]

Quite apart from the political turmoil in Iran which renders unpredictable the future course of events in the country, economic problems are apparently becoming unmanageable. The only safe statement that can be made at this point is that for the next few months Iran's economy looks set for further deterioration. Imports continue to rise – by 30 per cent in the first six months of this year – against a background of falling production, high unemployment, a haemorrhage of foreign currency and constantly decreasing oil revenue. With an additional $400 million a month going on arms purchases and to pay for the war with Iraq and no prospects for a quick end to the fighting, the country's rulers have no bed of roses to look forward to.

According to figures recently released by the Iranian Customs, Iran imported $6.65 billion worth of goods in the first six months of 1981, with the last month going up to June 21 alone accounting for $1.7 billion. This represents a 30 per cent increase in Rial terms over the similar figure in the first half of 1980.

Although trade with major Western partners has fallen dramatically in the last two years (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, April 13) Iran's exchanges with countries of the Eastern bloc have soared. This is reflected by the 84 per cent rise in the value of imports through the country's four northern ports on the Caspian Sea in the first six months of this year, and is confirmed by recent official statements on Iran's economic policies.

The Undersecretary for Economic Affairs at the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Ahmed Azizi, said in a policy statement last month that his country favoured economic ties with the Eastern bloc states because they were "rational and reasonable." Although the policy statement expressly condemned trade with both of the superpowers, Mr Azizi indicated it would be easier in the future to conclude deals with the Soviet bloc.

In the first half of this year, goods entering through the Soviet Union amounted to more than 20 per cent of total imports and were valued at $1.4 billion. Moreover, limited traffic has resumed at the Bandar Khomeini port

on the Gulf as fears of air attacks by Iraq have receded.

Indications of the increasing precariousness of Iran's export prospects came from reports last week that Japan, Iran's leading customer, was considering reducing or even stopping oil imports. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) told reporters in Tokyo that upheavals in Iran, the high price of its oil and the uncertainty still hanging over the $3.6 billion Bandar Khomeini complex being built by Mitsui (see box) have cast doubt on continued Japanese imports of Iranian oil.

Japanese refinery companies and trading houses suspended liftings of 230,000 b/d of Iranian crude last month pending negotiations for a cut in the official price of $37 per barrel. The Japanese are seeking a price of $32-34 per barrel in line with Saudi Arabian Light, which is of the same quality as Iran's crude.

Officials at MITI said some importers may reduce their imports and others may refuse to renew their contracts altogether with the National Iranian Oil Company. These contracts are up for renewal in the next 90 days.

But, Iran's hard stance at the last OPEC meeting will not help it boost its exports if it sticks to its stated policy. The country's new Oil Minister Mohammed Gharazi said that Iran would persist in keeping to its prices and was not in any hurry to reduce them. Looked at in the context of the estimated revenue called for by the budget, Mr Gharazi's statement does not make much economic sense, as revenues forecast for this year were based on sales of at least 1.4 million b/d, a target which has so far not been achieved. Oil export figures are not given by the Iranian authorities and estimates by experts vary from 400,000 b/d to 800,000 b/d at present. Even assuming that the higher figure is correct, with estimated revenues of $30 million a day, Iran must be eroding its reserves given its spiralling level of imports and war expenditure.

With an official price of $37 per barrel of oil, and the world glut expected to persist for at least a few months, Mr Gharazi may well have to retract his words and to offer attractive prices to customers if Iran is to avoid total financial chaos. And although denominated in an "imperialist" currency, additional oil revenues in currently high-yielding dollars would be a welcome boon to Iran's diminishing reserves.

CSO: 4600/191

JAPAN TO WITHDRAW FROM PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English Vol 5 No 36, 7 Sep 81 p 4

[Text]

The Japanese government announced last week that it had paved the way for the withdrawal of the Mitsui industrial group from the $3.6 billion petrochemical complex it is building at Bandar Khomeini in a fifty-fifty joint venture with Iran. Officials at the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) said the ministry would be prepared to pay export insurance to the group to cover some of its losses if it decided to pull out of the venture.

Work at the petrochemical complex is 85 per cent complete, but has never resumed properly since the first stoppage in late 1978 because of the revolution which toppled the Shah. Since that time, the cost of the project has risen by about $1 billion, largely due to Iraqi air raids last September, which inflicted damage estimated at $800 million.

It is probable that Mitsui will pull out of the project as it has sent repeated delegations to Tehran to negotiate new financing terms with the authorities there but has received little response. The group has put forward a proposal that the Iranian side should fund the remaining work and repairs to be done at the complex since the Japanese cannot provide any more money. But the authorities in Iran have been stalling a decision for six months and it appears increasingly unlikely that they will be able to accept Mitsui's proposal in the light of the poor health of the Iranian treasury.

CSO: 4600/191

RICE PURCHASING PLAN DISCUSSED BY DEPUTY MINISTER

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 18 Aug 81 p 12

[Text] Seyyed Hasan Tabataba'i, deputy minister of agriculture and rural development for cultivation explained a rice-purchasing plan in a press interview]

Price Stabilization

He said: Rice has a special importance, since according to statistics given, this item makes up 20 percent of a consumer's food budget. The Economic Mobilization Staff has therefore decided to stabilize its price and prevent a price increase, while paying due attention to production costs and a fair profit being given to the producers. For this very reason the Ministry of Agriculture was asked to calculate production expenses and prepare a plan for rice production and distribution.

Rice Production and Distribution Plan

He continued: In order to prepare a plan, we took steps in the two provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran to form Komitehs of committed persons, Ministry of Commerce experts, and officials from the governor generals' offices to study the production costs. After these studies, a plan was prepared, given to the Economic Mobilization Staff and approved. Then it was approved by the Supreme Council on the Economy, and its budget was set.

Level of Rice Production

Seyyed Hasan Tabataba'i added: Since the level of production does not meet our needs, it was decided to eliminate the middlemen. Thus according to this plan the government will purchase surplus production and put it at the consumers' disposal. Our production is about 900,000 tons, 300,000 tons of which are consumed in Gilan and Mazandaran. We have forecast that the government will buy about 600,000 tons of surplus production.

Control of Import and Export from Gilan and Mazandaran Provinces

He said: In conjunction with this plan the government therefore decided to completely control all imports and exports from the provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran, and to prevent the export of rice by the private sector. On this

basis, persons living in Gilan and Mazandaran provinces can buy rice for their own consumption. However, the State Economic Mobilization Staff is responsible for the distribution of rice in all of the country's provinces except these two.

Prices of Various Kinds of Rice

Concerning the purchase price of rice, the deputy minister of agriculture said: The two Ministry of Agriculture Komitehs in Gilan and Mazandaran set a guaranteed price for rice last year on the basis of production costs. The prices were set at 125 rials per kilo for grade-one Gilan rice, and at 115 rials for grade-one Mazandaran rice. Later this was revised, and prices were set at 145 rials for grade-one Gilan rice, and at 135 rials for grade-one Mazandaran. It was then decided that the stabilized price be one tuman higher than the guaranteed price. Thus the price of grade-one Gilan rice was set at 155 rials, and that of Mazandaran at 145 rials. Thus at least 25 percent has been added to the prices. Concerning the prices of other kinds of rice, he said: On the basis of local experts' opinions, the rice in each province has been divided into 50 categories according to the way it cooks. It has also been divided into three grades on the basis of the percentage of broken grains and half-grains. We consider that grade-one can have up to 10 percent broken grains and half-grains, grade-two up to 15 percent, and grade-three up to 20 percent.

We contemplate a price of 155 rials for grade-one rice. It has been decided that the Komitehs in provincial centers and city-regions can price the other grades.

Potential Rice Cultivation

Seyyed Hasan Tabataba'i, concerning potential rice cultivation, stated: Our potential for rice cultivation is limited to the two provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran. Of course in Fars Province the possibility exists of cultivating rice on about 30,000 hectares. Furthermore, the possibility of rice cultivation exists in Ilam and Khuzestan. But in any case, our land under cultivation is limited. Gilan and Mazandaran provinces comprise about 400,000 hectares. For this reason we decided, with respect to plan implementation, to work on the basis of figures for rice grown in areas of higher productivity.

Purchasing Komitehs

Concerning rice distribution, he said: This plan comprises two parts, purchase and distribution. In the plan it is contemplated that the Ministry of Agriculture will do the buying, and that the Ministry of Commerce will be responsible for distribution. That is to say, this is a joint plan between the Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture which will be implemented with the cooperation of the Economic Mobilization Staff. According to the plan, a purchasing Komiteh will be organized in the province's center, under the supervision of the governor-general, the director-generals of the Ministries of Commerce and Agriculture, a representative from the Economic Mobilization Staff, a representative from the Reconstruction Crusade, the revolution prosecutor and trustworthy locals. The

Komiteh which will actually buy is composed of three persons, representatives from the Rural Cooperative Organization, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Reconstruction Crusade. This Komiteh will grade the rice, price and purchase it, transport it to warehouses, sack it and then deliver it to the storehouses of the Organization for Commercial Services Expansion.

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CSO: 4640/91

BRIEFS

AL-QADISIYAH PROJECTS--As part of the investment program plan for the current year, the local government administration in the governorate of al-Qadisiyah has undertaken the establishment of a number of health, service, and rural roads projects at a cost of 8 million dinars. Mr Qabbat Tahir Sadiq, assistant governor of al-Qadisiyah for local government, said that the projects include a building for the 'Afak police department at a cost of 120,000 dinars, a building for the secret police department of the southern region at a cost of 120,000 dinars, and a building for the al-Najdah police department at a cost of 100,000 dinars. In the health field, Mr Sadiq stated that the expansion of an emergency hospital has been completed at a cost of 450,000 dinars in al-Diwaniyah. Also completed are the construction of a central dental clinic in al-Diwaniyah at a cost of 100,000 dinars and a village medical aid center on the al-Diwaniyah-Samawah Road at a cost of 30,000 dinars. In the rural roads area, a rural roads network linking the agricultural areas with the district centers and the farmers districts and agricultural cooperatives has been paved at a cost of 7 million dinars. The total length of road in this network is approximately 140 kilometers. /Text/ /Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 15 Aug 81 p 6/

8591
CSO: 4304/139

RESUMPTION OF RETALIATORY POLICY URGED

TA111131 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 11 Sep 81 p 5 weekend supplement

[Moshe Dayan commentary: "Between September and April: The Return Retaliation, After Preemptive Strikes"]

[Text] One of the slogans the prime minister was most fond of--particularly during the election period when he also served as the defense minister--was: "No more retaliation: We will hit the PLO with preemptive strikes." Indeed, such was the policy adopted by the Begin Government for a long time.

The policy of preemptive strikes ended in a devastating failure. Our massive bombings, including the destruction of the bridges on the Litani River, did not prevent the terrorists from continuing their strikes on our settlements with Katyusha rockets and long-range cannons. As for the political aspect, our defeat was even more devastating. We agreed to the cease-fire of our own free will knowing for a fact that not only would the PLO not get farther from the Israeli border but, on the contrary, it would bring personnel and arms reinforcements to Southern Lebanon, it would entrench and strengthen and, when the time came, its forces would be ready to launch operations against us from a better position than the one it had before we dealt our "preemptive strikes" at them.

So far the cease-fire has been holding. Various efforts are being made in Lebanon to rebuild it as an independent and perhaps eventually as a sovereign state. Arab and even foreign governments are involved in these efforts. Many of the voices are not pleasant to us: the declaration of the Chirstians about severing their ties with Israel, the permanent status assured to Syria in Lebanon (mainly in the al-Biqa' Valley) and so on. Nevertheless, the tone of the declarations currently made by our spokesmen--both in the government and in the opposition--is much lower. We have learned our lesson. Our (U.S. made) aircraft cannot do just anything militarily without us having to pay a very dear political price for it.

We do not know what will be the status of the PLO in the new edition of Lebanon. It is clear that it will not be expelled from this country and that its military strength, both concerning arms, equipment and personnel, will even increase.

The main question which should bother us is: How are we going to deal with it if and when it violates the cease-fire and resumes firing on our settlements?

It seems to me that we will have to go back to the policy of retaliation. First of all, political circumstances will not enable us to adopt preemptive measures. One may quote the best maxims of our late sages--who said that if anybody sets out to kill you, you should kill him first--or read some "selected chapters" from interviews with Qaddumi, or 'Arafat's speeches and the Palestinian charter. All this proves that the PLO and its weapons have only one goal: to annihilate Israel. The combined weight of all these elements is not enough to alter the chief desire of the United States and the European countries to prevent a flare-up and to seek ways to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict through peaceful means.

The logic of retaliatory actions lies in the hope that the opposite party should realize that it is not worth its while to hit Israel. In this respect, "the opposite party" does not refer to the group of terrorists taking part in the operation but to the civilian inhabitants and their government. The period of calm will continue and the inhabitants of Southern Lebanon will presumably return to their villages. Also, if the efforts to rehabilitate the Lebanese Government bear any fruit there is hope that the new government in Lebanon (even if under Syrian influence) will realize the destruction it brings upon its country, its citizens and its status as an independent state because of the PLO's activities against Israel. Retaliatory actions (they should not be carried out with kid gloves) give the enemy leeway to pull back. Their significance is that if Israeli citizens are not allowed to live in peace, life in Lebanon will also become hell. However, if the PLO does not open fire on our side of the border then we will not operate against them either, even though we know that they are fortifying and preparing themselves to attacks us one day. When that "day" comes, we will settle the bill. However, we do not want to bring that day closer by conducting a policy of "preemptive strikes."

CSO: 4323/67

DAYAN COMMENTS ON SINAI PULLBACK

TA111140 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 11 Sep 81 p 5 weekend supplement

[Moshe Dayan commentary: "Between September and April: The Chosen People"]

[Text] Following the visit in Alexandria of Menahem Begin and his ministers, all the disputes and the rancors which had built up since the summit meeting in Ofira were removed. The past was forgotten and the discussions revolved around the future.

The question of the Israeli pullback in April 1982 obviously figures prominently in the talks. The defense minister and his aides conducted in-depth discussions on the issue with their Egyptian counterparts and when our delegation returned to Israel it reported that full understanding had been reached.

However, things at home are not that tidy any more. Therefore, the government has entrusted the agriculture minister with the task of winding up the question of compensation to the settlers in the Rafah approaches. Who is better suited than Ehrlich to finally conclude this complex and painful issue? A minister with two deputies. All his life he has been attracted by agriculture. He is determined, he speaks clearly and has unambiguous definitions.

On the eve of the evacuation the government decided--neither unanimously, nor very willingly--that all the mobile equipment should be pulled out from the area and that the agricultural infrastructure should be dismantled: waterpipes, packing houses, hothouses and so on. First of all, this precious equipment can be used by agricultural settlements in Israel and, secondly, one should not encourage tens of thousands of Egyptian inhabitants to establish a settlement founded on this infrastructure on Israel's border.

Constructors on behalf of the settlement authorities arrived in one of the settlements in the Rafah approaches this week to dismantle a hothouse. They returned empty-handed after a few hours. They were confronted by a united front of those settlers opposed to the evacuation who did not allow them to do their job.

There is no need to have a sixth sense to forsee what will happen. The settlers will evacuate the region. Ehrlich will pay and the equipment--either all or part of it--will remain in the area to be used by the Egyptians. The time available for its removal will be too short. We will be busy with internal quarrels until the last minute. This is how we look and this is how we act. We will both fight, evacuate the area and leave the equipment behind: "A bathtub with tiles and all comforts."

CSO: 4323/67

EYTAN ON NEED TO SET ISRAEL'S BORDERS

TA141355 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Sep 81 p 2

[Report by Sha'ya Segal]

[Excerpt] "The time has come for the argument here over Eretz Yisra'el to reach its end. To this very date our borders are not yet recognized, even the 1967 borders have not yet been recognized. At some point, one way or the other, the discussion over Eretz Yisra'el should end and a decision should be made on what are its borders, who lives in Eretz Yisra'el, and where."

Refa'el Eytan, who made these statements, stated that setting clear cut borders for Eretz Yisra'el is one of the four immediate national goals. As another objective he noted limiting our dependence on foreign sources. "First we must exhaust ourselves, and later go and ask for help. This also has political ramifications, and it means that we should work hard and say: Thank you, no, we do not need help."

The third goal set by the chief of staff is removing the threat that the people of Israel be exterminated in Eretz Yisra'el. "We should make sure that we cannot be overcome here. This has to do with the army's level and its technical capability. Possibly, if they recognize that the destruction of the people of Israel in Eretz Yisra'el is impossible, other countries will start talking to us."

The fourth goal the chief of staff outlined is for Israel to become a magnet to attract those who have no affiliation with Israel. "We should become an attraction to the Jews of the Disapora, to let them have something to care for."

CSO: 4323/67

VILLAGE ASSOCIATION DENOUNCED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 14 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by Salah al-Dayri: "Public Organizations in Bayt Sahur Denounce the Attempt To Form Bethlehem for Villages Association]

[Text] Representatives of public organizations in Bayt Sahur held a public meeting yesterday at the municipal hall in which they denounced the desperate attempts to establish what is called the Bethlehem Villages Association.

Hanna Khuri al-Atrash, mayor of Bayt Sahur refuted claims made by one of those in charge of the association issue on the Israeli television last Saturday night. Mr Khuri said that the municipalities play their role perfectly. The services rendered by municipalities since 1976 are excellent. No similar services had been rendered at any previous time. At the same time, the municipalities did not abandon the villages in the area; it exerted a great deal of effort with officials in the Arab world to maintain and support them. He stated that the doors of the municipality are open to all citizens, and everyone will attest to that fact.

Al-Atrash mentioned that all villages in Bethlehem area will be electrified and that water will reach every zone which did not have water before. He indicated that the villages association idea did not stem from concern for offering services to citizens, but it stemmed from the critical situation which resulted from our people's rejection of Camp David Accords and the autonomy project. It was hoped that the association idea will be an alternative to what was rejected by our masses.

Those who attended the meeting condemned the attempt and the accusation aired on Israeli television against the mayors in general and the mayors of Bayt Sahur and Bethlehem in particular.

The participants issued a statement in which they repudiated the desperate attempts by some individuals to establish what is known as the Bethlehem Villages Association. The participants considered the attempt as a link in the chain of conspiracy against our cause and a part of the attempts to impose the autonomy and establish an alternative to the PLO. They also denounced the attempts to play the mayors who reject the association off against each other.

9607
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PARTY PREFERENCE POLL PUBLISHED

TA180932 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Sep 81 p 3

[PORI Public Opinion Poll]

[Text] Had elections been held in the first week of September there would have hardly been any change in the political map in Israel. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of Ha'aretz.

An analysis of the findings reveals that the Likud would have increased its strength by 1.5 percent form the 37.1 percent it received in the elections to the 10th Knesset to 38.6 percent. The alignment would have lost less than 1 percent of its strength, from 36.6 to 35.8 percent; the NRP would have lost about 1 percent of its strength, from 4.9 to 4 percent. Moshe Dayan's telem list would have lost approximately half of its voters and would have dropped from 1.6 to 0.9 percent. Tami would also have lost 0.5 percent and would have dropped from 2.3 to 1.8 percent. In contrast, Shulamit Aloni's Ratz would have risen by 0.5 percent, from 1.4 to 1.9 percent; Agudat Yisra'el, Shinuy and the Tehiya movement would have receive a number of votes identical to the number they scored in the elections to the 10th Knesset.

The pollster, Pori Institute Director Refa'el Gil notes that the public continues to cast a considerable number of votes for lists which did not meet the minimum quota. In the Knesset elections these lists received 4 percent of the votes and in the latest poll they even scored 5.1 percent of the votes.

It should also be noted that the number of abstainees in the poll reached 20.1 percent, similar to the 21.5 percent who abstained in the last elections.

Following are the findings of the poll compared to the results of the elections to the 10th Knesset (the figures are in percentages):

Party	Current Poll	Elections	Change
Likud	38.6	37.1	&1.5
Alignment	35.8	36.6	-0.8
NRP	4.0	4.9	-9.0
Agudat Yisra'el	3.8	3.7	&0.1
Telem	0.9	1.6	-0.7
Shinuy	1.5	1.5	---
Ratz	1.9	1.4	&0.5
Tehiya	2.4	2.3	&0.1
Tami	1.8	2.3	-0.5
Others	5.1	4.0	&1.1
Minorities	Not Polled	4.6	

The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 1,200 male and female elligible voters over the age of 18, who were confidentially interviewed in the privacy of their homes.

CSO: 4323/67

INJUNCTION AGAINST SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY--The Israeli Supreme Court issued its order forbidding the military administration from taking any action regarding the land it had confiscated near the settlements of Qiryat Arba', Ari'el, and the settlements of Mizpe Guvrin until a final decision is reached in the appeal filed by 30 of the owners of the confiscated land. The latter maintain that the military government confiscated their land because it was considered state land. This is against the Jordanian law. They demanded that the investigation of the matter by the military appeals committee be stopped. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in Arabic 13 Jul 81 p 5] 9607

APPEALS AGAINST SEIZURE OF LAND--The Hebron Municipality has taken up an appeal by two members of a prominent local family against a military government order that classifies land they claim as their own as "state land." A municipal lawyer is representing (Taisa) and Shahda Jabari, members of the most influential family in Hebron, who received an order last month informing them that land they claim in the Ar-Ra's area near the town is considered state land. The parcel of land is said to be adjacent to a larger tract known as (Giv'at Ja'Abara) which was to have been allocated to the Jewish suburb of Qiryat Arba'. That allocation was blocked by the high court of justice. Military government officials yesterday informed village Mukhtars in al-Mazra'ah Ash-Sharqiyah near Ramallah, that 800 dunams of land between their village of Kafr Malik were being seized for military purposes. Surveyors are reported to have mapped the land 10 days ago. [Text] [TA180721 Jerusalem POST in English 18 Sep 81 p 2]

FIRM DEVELOPS MISSILE DETECTION SYSTEM--What may be the world's most advanced early-warning system for detecting missiles has been unveiled in Israel. With details on the system, called Siprtact, is reporter Jerry Cheslow: [Begin recording] Spirtact developed by the El-Op [Electro-Optical] Company of Rehovot for the Israel Navy is capable of detecting enemy missiles or ships at long range through the heat they generate. The instrument, which looks like a large barrel mounted on legs, operates instead of the ship's radar making the vessel more difficult for the enemy to detect. Spirtact, unveiled at a news conference this afternoon, is just one of the new optical systems developed by El-Op for the Israeli defense forces. The company also showed a laser-operated fire control system for the Merkava tank, a special infrared map light and a portable communications system that works on laser beams making messages and transmissions virtually impossible for the enemy to decipher. [Text] [TA061901 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 6 Sep 81]

AFFORESTATION CONTRACTS UPHELD--The military government has published a regulation extending the validity of contracts that the Jordanian Government concluded with private landowners for afforestation projects on the West Bank, thereby preventing the return of the land to is original owners for another 10 years, the East Jerusalem DAILY AL-QUDS reported yesterday. In a front-page article, the newspaper reports that Jordan seized several thousand dunams of land for afforestation projects particularly in the Hebron and Tulkarm areas. Under the contracts concluded at the time with the landowners, the land was due to be returned to them with the trees after a period of 15 years. The agriculture department of the military government has now published a regulation which extends the validity of these contracts by

another 10 years, according to the report. Military government spokesmen were unable to comment on the report last night. The legal department of the military government has in the past extended the validity of powers of attorney, which under the Jordanian law applicable in the territories are only valid for 5 years. Local lawyers claim that by extending the validity of powers of attorney, Israeli land-purchasing companies are able to avoid registering land transactions and so disguise their purchases. The military government maintains that such extensions are necessary because of the large number of absentee landowners in the area. Report by David Richardson. [Text] [TA141132 Jerusalem POST in English 14 Sep 81 p 3]

FINANCIAL OVERDRAFT INCREASES--The government's overdraft--the difference between its tax revenue and expenses--was during the past 2 months double the 1980 average and was 50 percent higher from April to August than the same period last year. This was reported yesterday by Bank of Israel Governor Arnon Gafni to the bank's advisory council. This excessive demand, the growth in government expenditures and an accompanying increase in private consumption--which also upsets the balance of payments--have stimulated local consumption, Gafni said. At the same time, he continued, there has been a virtual freeze in exports. Gafni said that the government's recent measures, such as freezing new contracts and cancelling subsidies, are in the right direction. However, it is vital that a comprehensive programme be developed both to fight inflation and to improve the balance of payments. While superficially there has been no change in Israel's trade deficit (the gap between imports and exports) over the first months of the year, Gafni said, when such factors as the fall in the diamond and general stocks and the decline in fuel prices are taken into account, then the deficit has increased significantly. The central bureau of statistics reported yesterday that the country's exports during the first eight months of the year were worth $3.473 billion, compared to $3.431 billion during the same period last year. Industrial exports (not including diamonds) increased by 10 percent. According to the Bank of Israel, the quantitative growth in exports is 23 percent over the same period last year. [Text] [TA080854 Jerusalem POST in English 8 Sep 81 p 1]

MORE HOUSING UNITS IN W. BANK--The agriculture ministry is working out a plan to bolster the settlements in Judaea and Samaria in order to substantially increase the number of inhabitants there. Deputy agriculture minister, Mikha'el Deqel, told the DAVAR correspondent that an initial plan worked out by the ministry calls for 30,000 housing units to be built in Judaea and Samaria in 5 years within the framework of bolstering the settlements there. The idea is to construct them through public and private companies. According to the plan, each year between 7,000 and 8,000 units will be built in Judaea and Samaria. The financing should be supplied by the companies that build the housing units as well as those who will purchase them. The government's share in the plan will be in the form of investment in the infrastructure needed for the establishment of the housing units. The investment in housing units, including the investment in the infrastructure in Judea and Samaria, is estimated at 6 million shekels. The overall investment in constructing the 30,000 housing units will amount to 180 billion shekels in 5 years. The deputy agriculture minister reported that after the plan is worked out in detail, it will be brought to the agriculture minister and the ministry executive for discussion, later to be raised for discussion at the cabinet. Deqel also said that three to four new settlements will be established in Judaea and Samaria. Also, there is a plan to establish three agricultural settlements in the Yattir District near 'Arad. Report by Agricultural Affairs correspondent, David Mosheyof. [Text] [TA171313 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Sep 81 p 3]

JORDAN'S W. BANK PAYMENTS ACCEPTABLE--It looks as though in the aftermath of the Israeli Government's decision to stop any direct or indirect aid from PLO funds to the inhabitants of the territories. Jordan has decided to take this new measure in an attempt to ease any possible financial distress of the West Bank inhabitants. It has been reported by military government circles that if so far Israel has not objected to having veteran military government workers receive their salary from Jordan, there is no reason why there should be any objection to having newer employees also get their salary--or half thereof--from Jordan. It should be noted that Jordan fully cooperates with the PLO in the framework of the joint Jordan-PLO committee that meets periodically in Amman and which decides on and implements joint Jordanian-PLO policy in the territories. The mayors of Nabulus and Bethlehem, Bassam Ash-Shak'ah and Ilyas Frayj, announced last night that they do not oppose this new move, but wish to include municipal workers in it as well, seeing that the municipalities are experiencing a constant financial distress, particularly lately. Report by Yehuda Litani. [Excerpt] [TA090931 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Sep 81 p 1]

WEST BANK SALARIES--The East Jerusalem paper AL-QUDS reports that the government of Jordan has decided to apy the salaries of Arab civil servants in the military government in Judaea and Samaria who were appointed to their jobs after the 6-day war provided the offices were in existence before 1967. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari points out that if the report is true, it augurs a meaningful change in Jordan's attitude toward Israel's military government. To date Jordan did not recognize those appointments and hence refused to pay the salaries of the employees. Our correspondent notes that AL-QUDS has good information sources in the capital of Jordan. The paper adds that the salaries will be paid retroactively from August 1980. A civil servant in Judaea and Samaria will receive half the salary of a Jordanian civil servant. Civil servants in offices established after 1967 will still not receive salaries paid by Jordan. [Text] [TA081632 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500, GMT 8 Sep 81]

GUSH EMUNIM LAUNCHES IMMIGRATION CAMPAIGN--Gush Emunim has recently begun dealing with another field; bringing new immigrants and establishing nuclei for zionist fulfillment. The reason for this is, according to Gush Emunim leaders, a glut in the settlements. The decision to deal with immigration has not been made official, but our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh reports that the Gush Emunim activists have already begun dealing with this issue. [Excerpt] [TA090619 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 9 Sep 81]

SETTLERS OCCUPY EVACUATED HOUSES--The 15 families that occupied houses in Moshav Talme Yosef in the Yamit District last night have announced that they would forcefully object to any attempt to evacuate them. Our correspondent in the South, 'Ofer Taller, reports from Talme Yosef: [begin videotape] There was an uproar today in Talme Yosef that is in the Yamit District as former settlers who had already evacuated their homes and began moving to the new Moshav in the Besor District found out that their homes had been taken up by 15 families of Gush Emunim followers. [Excerpt] [TA101947 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 10 Sep 81]

SINAI HOMES TAKEN BY IDF--From now on, any house that is evacuated in the Yamit District will immediately be taken up by the army. This was announced today by Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich. A practical decision on how to deal with the people who had already occupied houses in the district will be made immediately on the return of the defense minister to Israel Sunday, 13 September. [Excerpt] [TA102001 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 10 Sep 81]

DRUZE RETURNING IDENTIFICATION CARDS--Within 1 week, 15 percent of those holding Israeli identity cards in the Druze villages on the Golan Heights asked to return them to the Israeli Government. This has been learned by our correspondent, Yo'el Dar. All in all, less than 400 people hold these identity cards. It has been learned that each Druze returning his card is asked by the committee of families of Druze prisoners in the Golan Heights to donate 400 Israeli shekels to the fund for the release of these prisoners, thus obtaining the right to undergo a symbolic ceremony in which the religious and social boycott imposed on all those holding Israeli identity cards is lifted. [Text] [TA110802 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 11 Sep 81]

GOVERNMENT AGREES ON EVACUATION TERMS--Members of the Ne'ot Sinai Moshav in the Yamit District have reached a settlement with the director-general of the agriculture ministry which will allow the Moshav to be evacuated even if the government and the settlers have not agreed on the amount of the compensation. According to this arrangement, the agriculture ministry and the residents will submit their own estimates of the value of the equipment at the site. After the points in dispute have been noted, the Moshav residents will permit the equipment to be dismantled and will evacuate the site on the day determined by the government. They will also be able to receive compensation according to an estimate to be made by the agriculture ministry, without losing their right to request more money after the evacuation itself. At the same time, the movement to stop the withdrawal in Sinai has stated that its members will arrive in every settlement where buildings are evacuated, and will oppose any attempt to evacuate them from the buildings they have already seized. [Text] [TA180730 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 18 Sep 81]

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX UP 3.9 PERCENT--Last month the consumer price index went up by 3.9 percent. Since the beginning of the year the index rose by 53.6 percent. Last month the main item that went up was apartment maintenance, which went up by 6.8 percent; fruits and vegetables rose by 4.8 percent and the health component by 4 percent. Our correspondent Gid'on Zelinger says that there was hardly any government activity in regard to prices last month, and therefore it appears that as a result of the government's decisions in the last two weeks, the next few indexes will be higher. A hint at this trend could be discerned in the wholesale price index, which rose by a rate higher than the consumer price index: 4.6 percent. The cost of residential building index rose last month by 3.5, reaching 3,600 points. Since the beginning of the year, that index rose by 82.2 percent. A spokesman for the finance ministry has said that the ministry will continue to do everything possible to limit the rise in the index under the given circumstances. [Text] [TA151513 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 15 Sep 81]

ZIONIST OFFICIAL ON W. BANK SETTLEMENT--The head of the world Zionist Organization Settlement Department, Matityahu Drobles, disclosed yesterday that today there are about 24,000 Jews in Judaea and Samaria settlements. He said that in the past 6 months some 1,870 housing units have been built in Judaea and Samaria, adding that this figure also includes the urban settlements. Through this move, the Jewish population in Judaea and Samaria has increased by 7,000 people. Mr Drobles was speaking in the Zionist organization general council deliberations. He added that after the masterplan for setting up 20 settlements in Judaea and Samaria has been completed, it will in the near future be possible to establish an infrastructure for an additional 2,000 to 4,000 housing units, provided this is given the necessary

financial resources. Referring to employment in the Judaea and Samaria settlements, Drobles said that in 12 older settlements, between 60 and 80 percent of the residents are employed in the settlements themselves, whereas in the newer settlements those employed in the settlement is only 20 to 40 percent. In reply to a question, Mr Drobles said that last year 23 settlements were established in Judaea, Samaria and the Jordan Fift Valley. In the last 4 months eight more have either been established or are under construction. In total, there are 62 settlements in Judaea and Samaria, and 20 in the Jordan Rift Valley. Four settlements have been set up in the Jericho vicinity and a fifth, Zori, is currently under construction. According to this plan, two more settlements will be established in that area. Report by Gid'on Alon. [Text] [TA041130 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Sep 81 p 12]

COAL SUPPLY--The National Company for Coal Supply has signed a memorandum according to which a South African company, General Mining, will supply coal to Israel from 1983 onward. The agreement calls for the supply of 900 tons per year. Thus, South Africa will become Israel's largest coal supplier. [TA150549 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 14 Sep 81]

NEW AGRICULTURAL COMMITTEE FOUNDED--A committee opposing the agriculture associations operating under the aegis of the military government has been organized in Judaea and Samaria. It is called the committee for the safety of the Palestinian villages and it is connected to the national guidance committee circles. Today, it distributed leaflets in Judaea and Samaria, urging the farmers to support the PLO. Our correspondent notes that in one of its last meetings, the joint Jordanian-PLO committee in Amman decided to fight to the bitter end these agriculture associations. [Text] [TA031023 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 3 Sep 81]

CSO: 4323

WEAPONS DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGY DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 530, 17 Aug 81 p 27

/Article: "Concerning the Kuwaiti Decision: Diversification of Weapons Sources Is an Established Strategy"/

/Text/ British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher will arrive in Kuwait at the end of September in her second Gulf tour in less than 6 months. Kuwaiti press circles say that Mrs Thatcher will offer to sell British weapons to Kuwait as she did previously during her first Gulf tour last April.

Discussion of the British offer and the expected Kuwaiti reply came in commentary about Kuwaiti Defense Minister Salim Sabah al-Salim's recent statement announcing Kuwait's rejection of the American offer to sell 60 Hawk air-to-ground rockets for $150 million.

Kuwaiti circles commenting on the defense minister's statements indicated that the anticipated Kuwaiti response to Britain's offer must necessarily proceed from the Kuwaiti armament strategy newly defined by Salim Sabah al-Salim.

The defense minister and the foreign minister and acting information minister revealed that Kuwait had rejected the American offer because the rockets offered in the sale were exorbitantly priced, besides which the new developments made in the rocket were not worth the price increase.

The Kuwaiti minister said that Kuwait will buy modern, advanced weapons from any source whatsoever directly without any intermediary. He said that this position falls within the framework of a Kuwaiti strategy which has been authorized and put into effect. This strategy will extend to air, ground, and naval rocket weapons as well as advanced aircraft.

With regard to Kuwait's rejection of the American offer, informed circles here say that the matter is not confined just to economic factors but also related to Kuwait's endeavor to inaugurate and firmly establish balanced relations in the international sphere.

In this connection, the Kuwaiti circles pointed out that Minister of Defense Salim Sabah al-Salim also announced that a Kuwaiti military delegation will travel to Moscow within approximately a month and a half to complete talks concerning Soviet military weapons and equipment. These talks were begun with senior military leaders in Moscow at the beginning of July.

The Kuwaiti minister denied reports by Western sources that Kuwait will sign new contracts for American weapons. He said that Kuwait wants very much to select for its forces those types of weapons that are suitable in terms of sophistication, usefulness, and the degree to which they coincide with Kuwait's strategy.

Salim Sabah al-Salim asserted that the Kuwaiti army has the capability to absorb modern weapons and that this capability has been tested in the Arab-Israeli wars on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts and in Sinai and the Golan Heights. This capability has also been demonstrated through the formulation and execution of military plans and the execution of military maneuvers.

Kuwait's decision to reject the American rocket deal has caused resentment in some Western capitals and Washington. In interpreting this, some Kuwaiti sources have pointed out that Kuwait's rejection--besides establishing the pillars of a balanced Kuwaiti policy in the field of foreign affairs--also inaugurates in practical terms Kuwait's rejection of American propaganda alluding to Soviet threats facing the Persian Gulf area.

These sources add that the West feels concern at the possibility that the Gulf states could oppose the American rapid deployment forces with Soviet weapons.

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END

JPRS 79127

2 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2408

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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EDUCATION MINISTER RATABZAD DEFENDS REGIME, REFORM

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Sep 81 p 10

[Article by Bruce Stannard]

[Text] National security is the most important problem in Afghanistan just now. Representatives of the Soviet-backed Afghan Government told Australian TV producer Bruce Stannard that work to transform Afghanistan's feudal society has had to be stopped. Stannard's first report from Afghanistan was published in Sunday's edition of DAGENS NYHETER.

Literacy classes for the country's women, for example, are no longer compulsory. And the veil for women is being retained until they themselves want to take it off. Stannard met with Minister of Education Anahita Ratabzad, who explained that opposition from the men and the clergy made it necessary to slow down the pace of reform.

Forty years ago a well-known traveler in Asia, James Michener, wrote that Kabul's old town could not have changed appreciably since King Darius of Persia marched through it in 500 B.C. On the whole, that observation still holds true.

Camels still sway through the streets, there are swarms of donkeys and black sheep with blase expressions in the alleys, and the air is still thick with the fine bluish-gray dust from the mountains--called "khak" by Kabul's inhabitants--and a truly unbelievable blend of smells: the pungent stench of excrement, the sweet odor of hashish, the dry white smoke from bakers' ovens, and the strange, musty sour fumes that rise out of every small dark cellar hole.

The only change seems to be that there is now a Soviet garrison in the old granite-walled colossus of a fortress that rises above the old town's clay-tiled shacks.

The Karmal regime has already ordered the demolition of the old town's slum quarters. The idea is that their hovels will be replaced as quickly as possible by the dreary gray concrete complexes that already line the road to the airfield in row after row, all built according to the same Soviet model. But that transformation is not expected to be complete until about the year 2000.

Reform Projects

But neither than plan nor any other of the government's planned social reforms has the slightest chance of being carried out as long as the guerrilla fighters continue their extremely successful opposition struggle. Government representatives openly admitted that they could not guarantee our safety on the roads between the various Afghan cities.

Guerrilla control of the countryside is so effective that the government was recently forced to subsidize airline ticket prices heavily. Here and there, however, one still sees packed buses driving out from the capital to the countryside. But one also sees long lines of common ordinary citizens waiting at the airport for a flight to carry them over all the roadblocks.

The Afghan regime likes to say that Soviet troops were called into the country to save the revolution. But judging from what we could see during our hectic 10 days in Afghanistan--which admittedly were extremely circumscribed in every way--the revolution still seems to be in an exceedingly critical and precarious stage.

Neither the government nor the occupying power has been able to inflict a quick and decisive defeat on the guerrilla fighters. Weapons are still streaming in over the Pakistani border, and--worst of all for formerly popular nationalists such as Karmal--the Soviet occupation has meant a national humiliation that is going to sting for a great many years to come.

The revolution is perhaps not as totally paralyzed as it was before Amin's fall, but the guerrilla fighters, who have now managed to arm themselves with modern American weapons, are not likely to give it the chance to make any fast headway.

Liberation

It is precisely those goals that the revolution chose and has been based on--a redistribution of land, the struggle against illiteracy, and women's liberation--that have all slipped into the background to make way for the task of holding the guerrilla fighters at bay. Even so ardent a revolutionary as Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mohammad Dost has had to admit that "national security" must be viewed as the Afghan regime's most important goal just now.

He says: "We cannot carry out our reform programs until we have secured peace and order in the country and in its immediate vicinity.

"We Afghans need peace first and foremost--we need it more than any other nation in our part of the world."

It is said that the government is still spending considerable sums on the literacy campaign, at least in the cities, where security is more or less assured. According to the campaign's highest administrative official in Kabul, it comprises about 18,500 teachers instructing approximately 26,000 classes in how to read and write one of the five languages spoken in Afghanistan.

Compulsory

Spokesmen for the regime claim that it has managed to enroll nearly half a million students. The classes are compulsory for all males between 10 and 50 years of age, but even though comprehensive schooling is compulsory for both girls and boys, women's participation in the literacy campaign is now entirely voluntary. That is one of the more important concessions that the government was forced to make following the Amin regime's fiasco when it tried to bring all the women into the campaign's classes in one sweep.

Afghan men regarded that kind of education for their women as a direct threat to their own power and authority as lords of house and family, and when the women had to remove their traditional veils on orders from zealous teachers, it was construed as a clear attack on women's sanctified freedom from molestation. The result was that hundreds of teachers and party members were chased out of the villages in a hail of stones--when they were not physically assaulted or shot.

Slowed Down

Now the regime is following a considerably more cautious path in that as in many other revolutionary campaigns. But the result is that the pace of the revolution has also been slowed from a gallop to an almost fumbling, step-by-step advance, due as much to the regime's restraint as to guerrilla activity. Despite its basically Marxist views, the regime has also found itself compelled to seek cooperation with the powerful Moslem clergy.

In reality, it uses the "progressively" inclined members of the clergy as spokesmen in its literacy campaign. Outright reactionary groups may still view widespread literacy as a threat to their own positions of power, but Minister of Education Anahita Ratabzad claims that the clergy in general are favorably disposed to the campaign.

She says: "We tell the members of the clergy how they are to present the matter to the people.

"Following the prayers, they explain to their listeners that one must be able to read in order to rightly understand what the Koran says. We are a Moslem people, and we must be able to read the Koran properly. If we cannot read what the Koran says, neither will we be able to pray in the right way. That is what we have the clergy say to the people, and that is why the people are beginning to return to our literacy classes."

Demolishing the Old System

According to Ratabzad, Amin jeopardized the entire revolution by his "zeal to rush off ahead of the masses."

She said: "Amin battered down all the doors out in the villages. He tried to demolish the old feudal and tribal system in one stroke and urged the women to come out of their homes and start learning to read and write in classes where they would be taught by unknown men. That was not the right way to go about it in Afghanistan. The broad people's masses have never come anywhere close to catching up with the party, the

government, and the revolutionary leadership. And the enemy was able to slip in through that gap.

"If we want to carry out a national democratic revolution, we will have to carry it out with the people's support, try to get the masses to understand us, and then train them in a new way of thinking and feeling."

Ratabzad estimates the number of illiterate Afghan women at considerably more than 90 percent.

She says: "But women can advance rapidly to high positions of leadership in both the government and the party.

"The path is staked out and leveled off for them. We have reached a situation where every housewife in our country can hope to become president."

As far as the traditional veil for women is concerned, Ratabzad emphasizes that the current regime is not contemplating any steps for doing away with it, even though it would like to see the veil--the chador--disappear.

Amin's regime tried to ban it but failed, and according to Ratabzad, it probably will not be possible to do away with the chador until a step-by-step enlightenment campaign has been carried out. Ratabzad says it is impossible to expect any rapid changes in the position of Afghan women. The Afghan revolution is a national democratic revolution, and the move to socialism can therefore be made only by a coming generation.

"I scarcely expect to see a socialist Afghanistan in my lifetime. I regard communism as the best imaginable social system for human society, but in our current system, which is half feudal and half tribal, communism is still too advanced."

Bitter

Although Ratabzad herself received a Western education--she was trained as a nurse at the University of Michigan in 1949--she talks bitterly about the Western nations, which are now enjoying the fruits of their own revolutions but lack either the will or the ability to see the need of a similar revolutionary struggle in Afghanistan.

She says: "It often seems to me that Americans and Europeans do not want to understand us. But if they could come here and see my country with my eyes and understand its people and their troubles, I am sure they would realize that we must also struggle for the opportunity to choose our own way of life, improve our living conditions, and construct a new Soviet Union in the heart of Asia."

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CSO: 3109/243

STRATEGIC POSITION OF SOVIET FORCES EVALUATED

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 1 Sep 81 pp 3, 2

[Text] An Indian magazine, INDIA TODAY, in its latest issue of August 1-15, 1981 has published an article captioned "Afghanistan--Tightening the Screws."

Following is the text of the article:

British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington's frantic dash to Moscow last month symbolised a depressingly familiar scenario. Ever since the Soviet military machine punched into Afghanistan in December 1979, frantic diplomatic efforts to carve out a compromise on the "Afghanistan problem" have come up against a blank wall of Russian obstinacy. Carrington's European Economic Community (EEC)-backed proposal for convening an international conference on Afghanistan merely represented the latest such attempt and predictably met with a firm Nyet from the Soviet side.

The Soviet rebuff to Carrington however has once again fuelled intense speculation on what is the most intriguing question of the decade--what exactly are the Soviet plans for Afghanistan? With media coverage of that ill-starred country virtually non-existent since the clampdown on journalists' visas over ago, a possible answer has been shrouded in uninformed guess-work and fragmented and often biased diplomatic reports. INDIA TODAY Correspondent Asoka Raina, however, managed to obtain a visa for Afghanistan last month and spent 10 days in Kabul and the major trouble spots to make an on-the-spot assessment of the Soviet strength and weaknesses, their current strategy in Afghanistan, the extent of rebel activity and what effect the Soviet presence has had on normal everyday life in the country 19 months after the Soviets moved in. His report:

Elsewhere, the Muslim world was withdrawing into a period of deep religious significance--Ramzan. A month of abstinence and self-sacrifice. In Afghanistan, Ramazan merely ushered in unobtrusive changes. The restaurants and souks were emptier than usual and though the curfew had been extended till midnight, Kabul is a ghost city by early evening, just as it has been for the 19 months since the Soviets moved in Soviet tanks and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCS) still rumble through the streets at night but in far greater numbers and their deep-throated nocturnal growls are now challenged by the high-pitched whine of 200 Soviet-made Niva jeeps that criss-cross city on 24-hour patrols. The jeeps, painted a dazzling white, have been recently brought in from the Soviet Union

for the exclusive use of the dreaded Afghan secret police Khamida Idara Daulahi (KHAD).

Judging by the dramatic increase of activity the Soviets are making plans for permanent presence in Afghanistan. The jerry-built barracks and tents, hastily erected to accommodate the massive influx of troops early last year have been replaced by permanent structures in virtually every Soviet military base, with proper mess halls, dining rooms, bars and recreation facilities.

Kabul airport is a beehive of activity with MIG-21s and MIG-23s in a constant state of combat alert while ponderous AN-12s and AN-24s land and take off at regular intervals, bringing in equipment and weaponry and taking out casualties from rebel encounters.

Soviet movements: Last fortnight, the Soviets signed a yet unpublicised 'agreement' with the Karmal Government that gives them total control of the Wakhan bulge, a narrow strip jutting into the Pamir plateau. The bulge, which is now out of bounds for the Afghans, offers the Soviets a strategic springboard into China's Sinkiang province. Military intelligence sources in Kabul say that the Soviets had moved two new infantry divisions and were building an airstrip and three helipads in the newly-acquired territory. With the latest additions, the Soviet military strength in Afghanistan according to these sources, is now an estimated 12 divisions (120,000 troops) deployed mainly in a crescent stretching from Timriz, just inside Soviet border, embracing the major air bases of Kunduz, Baghlan, Kabul Kadhar Shindand and Herat and finishing at the mouth of the trade route at Toghundi where they have recently completed a railhead.

The Soviets have evidently reconciled themselves to leaving the rest of the country untenanted and in rebel control since further military expansion inside Afghanistan would entail the deployment of a much larger force. The last 19 months have taught them the bitter lesson that massive firepower and armour is still no match for the determined rebels using guerilla warfare in mountainous terrain. This was dramatically demonstrated in a July 4 encounter near Mibackhot, a bare 40 kilometres from Kabul. The encounter which started at 11 a.m. and lasted five hours, ended with 30 Afghan and Soviet soldiers dead or seriously wounded. The rebels, who had ambushed a Soviet convoy en route to Kabul, were equipped with anti-tank rockets and anti-tank mines. A day later, rebels invaded the Kabul Golf and Country Club in Kargha, on the outskirts of Kabul, and set ablaze the Spozhmya restaurant, popular with diplomats, Afghan bureaucrats and senior Soviet officers.

The attack and its aftermath were both a measure of rebel confidence and Soviet overkill. For a week after the event, a Soviet tank straddled the green on the 6th hole of the golf course while helicopter gun-ship strafed the hills overlooking the course from where the rebels had attacked. Like the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets are paying a heavy price for their continuing presence in this embattled country. Intelligence sources estimate their losses in rebel skirmishes since December 1979, to be at least 6,000 men. Last May, a five-man high powered military team led by General Okolosky arrived in Kabul to ascertain why Soviet casualties were abnormally high in what is a limited and localised flushing out operation.

Determination: Recently, the Soviets have been working night and day to complete an oil pipeline from Hayraton, inside the Soviet Union, along the main Salan Road linking Kabul with the Soviet border, another overt indication of their determination to make a last night for heads of state permanent base in Afghanistan. Similarly, they have over the past 6 months started requisitioning houses for the steady trickle of civilian, military and intelligence "advisers" who flit in and out of Kabul. "They (the Russians) are throwing us out of our own houses till their accommodation is ready and we are forced to stay in rented houses," said a former Afghan diplomat in Kabul.

Intelligence sources also see as significant the fact that the Soviets are bringing in advisers from other Warsaw Pact countries. A number of high-ranking East German intelligence officials have been in Kabul for the past few months to impart specialised training of KHAD operatives and refurbish their intelligence-gathering apparatus. Retribution for aiding the rebels is now done in far more subtle ways. Instead of bombing areas suspected of harbouring rebels, the Soviets are now employing indirect methods such as cutting of power and food supplies. Kandahar, in area of known rebel activity has, say these sources, been without electricity for the past six months.

The Soviets have still not abandoned their efforts to woo the local population in rather naive but nonetheless effective ways. They have established "friendship shops" filled with consumer and electronic goods imported from Eastern Europe which are far cheaper than what is available in the local shops. At first, there was a concerted effort on the part of local population who still make no bones about their hatred for the Soviets to boycott the friendship shops. But gradually, natural greed and financial constraints have triumphed, and the shops are doing a roaring business. Simultaneously large groups of Afghan teenagers are being transported to the Soviet Union, after being vetted carefully, for indoctrination in Moscow and for Russian language courses. Last fortnight a batch of 400 such boys returned to Kabul after a six-month stay in Moscow. In Afghanistan's schools, Soviet textbooks, painting glowing portraits of Soviet life are now part of the curriculum.

In many other ways, however, the Soviet presence is only succeeding in kindling the slow-burning fires of resentment building up against the "Russians." "They are raping our country in the name of friendship. Afghanistan as we knew it is lost forever," says an Afghan teacher recently conscripted into the army. Prices of essential items have risen dramatically over the past year and gross domestic product is estimated to have declined by an incredible 70 per cent since 1978. The acute shortages of fuel, food and other basic commodities have also succeeded in pushing up prices. In fact, the price spiral forced the Karmal Government into announcing a wage rise of 26.6 per cent last March for public sector employees while low-income workers were given a wage hike of 40 per cent. Other extraneous factors have, quite literally, taken their own toll. "Everyone collects toll these days," says a dry fruits merchant in Kabul, "the Afghan soldiers, the rebels and indirectly, the Russians."

Sharp divisions: On the face of all this the Karmal Government has stepped up its efforts to win a greater measure of popular support, but with little

discernible success. The divisions within the Karmal Government have grown sharper in recent weeks with the internecine feud between the Khalq and Parcham factions showing no signs to abating. On June 16 a reshuffle in the politburo further reduced the strength of the Khalqis and elevated Sultan Ali Keshtmand to Prime Minister and also saw the induction of Karmal's brother Mahmoud Baryalai, as an alternate member of the politburo. The latest changes leave just three out of the nine politburo members of the Khalik camp, thus ensuring another power struggle is almost certain to erupt within the ruling clique in the near future.

There are now four distinct groups within the power structure jockeying for power, the Parchams, led by Babrak Karmal; the Keshtmand group which includes Shah Mohammad Dost Minister for Foreign Affairs Major-General Mohammad Rafiete, Minister for Defence and Mohammad Baha, Chief of KHAD. The third group comprises the fence-sitters who have adopted a neutral posture and is led by Ghulam Dastagir Panjsheri, a member of the Central Committee. The fourth group is, of course, the Khaliqs who are gradually being pushed into the background. So far, the Soviet efforts to patch up the differences and give the Government a semblance of unity has failed miserably. It was at Soviet insistence that efforts were made to form a broad National Fatherland Front with the intention of giving the impression of non-party support for the Karmal regime. Plans for the formation of the Front were announced by Karmal in December 1980 and it was said that its inaugural conference would be held before the Afghan New Year on March 21. Till last fortnight no conference had been held and mention of the Front has faded from the front pages of the Government controlled press.

Out of the turmoil in Afghanistan has been born yet another threat to the Karmal regime and, indirectly the Soviets.

The threat is in the form of the Nationalist Front Movement (NFM) peopled by intellectuals and professionals such as doctors, lawyers and professors. The NFM which also comprises members of former Afghan cabinets sees the distinct possibility of a compromise between the xenophobic rebels group and the Soviet-backed Marxist regime. "We want democracy in the real sense of the word," says an NFM leader, "since the present Government is not acceptable, we would like to hold Jirgas (parliaments of the people through meetings of tribal head) at national and provincial levels to elect new leaders." They see this as the only solution to the stalemate in Afghanistan and have been trying to privately convince members of the Karmal regime and rebel leaders to hold a meeting where a working relationship for future negotiations could be established. They also see the possibility of India acting as impartial mediator to ensure that the negotiations are peaceful and both sides keep their word. That, however, would mean that Karmal would have to step down and the Soviet stranglehold would be loosened. In Afghanistan's current context such consummation is tragically too much to hope for.

Dilip Bobb with Asoka Raina in Kabul.

CSO: 4600/192

SIGNIFICANCE OF WAKHAN ANNEXATION ANALYZED

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 2 Sep 81 p 9

[Article by Michael Strupp: "Political Dynamite in Three-Country Triangle--Moscow-Kabul Treaty About Wakhan Corridor Alarms Peking--Acute Revival of Soviet-Chinese Controversy About Borderline in Pamir Plateau"]

[Text] There is evidence of a further exacerbation of the Soviet-Chinese controversy about terrirotiral claims in the Pamir Mountains--a controversy newly enlivened by a border treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. An official Soviet statement on 11 August in which Moscow propounded its point of view regarding the treaty with Kabul and the drawing of a borderline in the Pamir Plateau as well as in the Wakhan corridor has been rejected by officials of the Foreign Ministry in Peking. As reported by the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, Peking takes the view that "the Soviet authorities these days have taken over and even increased the big-power chauvinism and expansionist strivings of czarist Russian imperialism." Michael Strupp, instructor in modern written Chinese at the University of Passau, in the article given here explains the origin of the Russian-Chinese conflict and its historical and international legal aspects.

On 12 August 1981 the Soviet party organ PRAVDA published an official statement by the Foreign Ministry in which Moscow confirmed for the first time the conclusion, on 16 June of this year, of an international treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan concerning the final confirmation of an important sector of the existing Soviet-Afghan border. The sector in question is the Pamir borderline between the western shore of the Lake of Zorkul and the Peak of Powalo-Zhvaykovskiy, forming a Soviet-Afghan-Chinese border triangle. At the same time the Moscow statement rejects a position taken 3 weeks earlier, on 22 July, by the Foreign Ministry of the Chinese People's Republic, issued in Peking, with the comment that the Chinese side with the help of "historical hodgepodge" is trying to "corroborate" its territorial claims against neighboring countries, particularly the Soviet Union. In their pronouncment the Chinese had stressed the fact that the above-mentioned Soviet-Afghan border treaty of June 1981 had "illegally and invalidly confirmed the (Soviet) occupation of more than 20,000 square kilometers of Chinese territory in the Pamir Mountains."

This triangle border relationship between the Soviet Union, Afghanistan and China has an interesting background in history and international law. The borderline, about 1,400 kilometers long in all, between Afghanistan and the USSR begins at the Zulfikar Pass in the west (which at the same time forms and Iranian-Soviet-Afghan triangle), crosses the southern part of the Kara Kum Desert and at Kwaya Salar connects with the Amu Darya. The border then follows the center line of the center of the navigable channel ("thalweg") of the Amu Darya until the mouth of the tributary Panj in the immediate proximity of the Afghan border of Kuruk. From there the channel of the Panj forms the Afghan-Soviet borderline.

Pawn of Colonial Empires

At the point where the Panj, after running almost due south, turns eastward at almost a right angle the so-called Wakhan Corridor begins. This Afghan border territory forms a tube 300 kilometers long and 20 to 60 kilometers wide between southeastern Soviet Tadzhikistan, taken up by the Pamir Plateau, and the territory of Kashmir, the subject of dispute between Pakistan and India. This peculiar strip of land had the approximate form of a lizard, the open mouth in the extreme east forming, with its contours, the Chinese-Afghan border, which is only about 60 kilometers long, and which was codified in international law by a border treaty between Peking and Kabul as early as November 1963.

This Chinese-Afghan border treaty was never considered by the Chinese to be in a way "negatively prejudicial" to their own territorial claims vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the Pamir area, and this in fact does not run counter to general international law. The northern borderline of the Wakhan strip, which was the subject of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of this June, at the same time borders on the region of the Pamir Plateau claimed by China in the south.

The present Afghan-Soviet borderline certainly was not determined by agreements founded in international law, and the then emir of Afghanistan did not play any role other than ceremonial. Even then, in the second part of the 19th century, this weak and only nominally independent buffer state served as a pawn in the power-political configurations of interest of the superpower colonial empires of Russia and Great Britain. In the area of today's Afghanistan and the bordering terrain of the Pamir Mountains, there clashed the hegemonic claims of the czarist empire expanding from the west, from Turkestan, to the east and south, and of the British Empire advancing from the Indian subcontinent to the north. To avoid an open military conflict, a comparatively careful delineation of the spheres of interests on both sides in the Central Asian area was agreed on.

An outcome of these efforts was the Russian-Afghan borderline fixed in a Russian-British exchange of notes in 1872-1873, in corresponding protocols of the years 1884 to 1888 and the British-Russian so-called Pamir Agreement of March 1895. The latter was a downright classic example of a colonial-political agreement about zones of influence without regard to the actual desires and needs of the indigenous population. In this connection it was very convenient that it was possible for the British and the Russians to "persuade" the emir of Afghanistan to assume the sovereignty over the Wakhan Corridor, where local tribal leaders of generally Tadehik origin had been in charge up to that time. Such an, albeit narrow, buffer zone under Afghan suzerainty was urgently desired by the strategists in London and

and Saint Petersburg in order to prevent direct territorial contact between the two colonial empires.

All these consultations proceeded without any kind of consultation or coordination with China. In particular the Pamir Agreement of March 1895, which fixed the northernmost terminal point of the Wakhan tube at the Kokrash Kol Mountain (Powalo-Shvaykovskiy Peak) came about without any kind of--not even pro forma--participation of the Chinese. Historically justified claims to sovereignty on the part of China in the area north of the Pamir region extending nortward north of the Wakhan Corridor thus were not taken into consideration at all. It had been a consistent element of Chinese historiography that the traces of Chinese advance into this region, such as military expeditions, the establishment of bases and appointment of local administrative organs (duhufu) by Chinese central authorities in the partly very inaccessible and desolate areas of the Pamir zone, reached back into the time of the Han Dynasty of the first century BC and had been further strengthened and confirmed in the time thereafter until into the 19th century. It is therefore no wonder that in the Peking journal LISHY YANJIU (Historical Research), after it came out again at the end of the counterrevolution in the seventies, several historians of the Chinese People's Republic presented corroborations, partly with new reference material, of historical Chinese claims to large parts of the Pamir zone.

China's Territorial Claims

In comparatively clear form, the Chinese territorial claims in the area of the Pamir region were announced for the first time after the outbreak of the ideological split between Moscow and Peking in two Chinese government statements shortly after the dangerous Ussuri incident of March 1969. As regards the eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet borderline--in other words, the area of the Manchurian border rivers Argun, Amur and Ussuri--"more than 600 of the 700-plus islands on the Chinese side of the center of the navigable channel, with an area of more than 1,000 square kilometers," were mentioned as constituting Chinese territory according to international law but as having been illegally annexed by czarist Russia or by the Soviet Union. As for the western sector of the joint border, only the Pamir territory was mentioned explicitly. There the Chinese territorial claims amount to "more than 20,000 square kilometers." This area, which, as stated above, lies north of the Wakhan Corridor and coincides with about one-seventh of today's Soviet Republic of Tadzhikistan, had been "occupied by...czarist Russia in violation of the provisions of the protocol concerning the Sino-Russian border in the area of Kashgar of the year 1884."

In both cases, that of the Manchurian river islands and that of the Parmir territory, the Chinese People's Republic evidently, in line with previous Chinese governments, takes the position that a territorial acquisition irreproachable according to international law took place in China's favor in the past--that is, at least before the de facto occupation of these strips of terrain by Russian or Soviet troops (in the case of the Pamir territory in 1891-1892). According to conservative estimates, the Chinese territorial claims against the Soviet Union therefore amount concretely to 21,000 to 22,000 square kilometers (and in no way to 1.5 million square kilometers, as is claimed time and again by Soviet authors).

The Exchange of Notes of 1894

As regards the rest of the Chinese demands in connection with the border dispute, they are of a rather formal nature. With the important exception of the borderline in the area of the East Pamir along the Sarykol mountain range--where, according to the traditional Chinese view, including the time of the emperors and the republican time, there does not exist any border determination in accordance with international law--the Sino-Soviet borderline, also in Peking's view, is based without a doubt on formal treaties under international law between the past empires of China and Russia. According to traditional Chinese concepts and, intriguingly, traditional Marxist-Leninist (and therefore Soviet) theory of international law, these treaties, being "unequal treaties," are illegal and null and void ab ovo. The originally Marxist-Leninist theory does not except treaties of territorial cession from this rule.

Consistent with this, the Chinese consider necessary the conclusion of a new "equal" treaty confirming the entire borderline in a manner unexceptionable under international law, with the shape of the past borderline being maintained except for the Sarykol border sector in the eastern Pamir Mountains. As regards the islands in the Manchurian border rivers claimed by China, the borderline need not be changed at all, for at the time of the Sino-Soviet treaties of Aigun and Peking--in the middle of the 19th century--in accordance with definitely predominant practice among countries the "thalweg" principle was the governing guideline in assigning sovereignty over islands in border rivers if the text of the treaty proper was silent on the subject. It follows that, in the Chinese point of view, within the framework of new Sino-Soviet negotiations about settling the border dispute by legal treaty it is definitely called for to take into account the "normative force of facts" such as accrues to cessions of territory executed in the comparatively distant past without regard to any kind of "birth defects" relevant to international law. According to Chinese claims, this does not apply to those cases in which the opposite side keeps territory under occupation in violation of the content, granted to be binding to the above extent, of the old "unequal treaties"--in other words, to the case of the Pamir Plateau.

As part of the Chinese chain of arguments against the opposite Soviet thesis, according to which not China but the czarist empire acquired territory in the Pamir area in a way unexceptionable according to international law, one point weighs particularly heavily: both in previous Soviet positions since the year 1969 and in the latest statement by the Foreign Ministry in Moscow concerning the Soviet-Afgahn border, there crops up the assertion that in an exchange of notes between the Chinese ambassador in Saint Petersburg, Xu Yingcheng, and Russian Foreign Minister Giers in April 1894 the Sarykol mountain chain on the eastern fringe of the Pamir was recognized as the final de jure border between China and Russia. In fact, however, the passage in the original text, not disputed by the Soviet side, contained in the 1969 Chinese Government documents reads as follows: "Acceptance of the above-mentioned measure (the temporary continuation of the respective stations of forces of both sides along the Sarykol heights) does not signify in any way that China is abandoning its rights regarding the territories in the Pamir region--territories lying beyond the stations currently occupied by Chinese forces. China advocates the maintaining of these rights based on the border protocol of 1894 until a satisfactory agreement is reached."

Czarist Ambitions

Indeed article 3 of the abovementioned "Supplementary Protocol Concerning the Northwest Border of Kashgar" of 22 May 1894 envisaged a division of sovereignty in the Pamir region that was far more favorable to China than that which resulted later from one-sided Russian military action. In the note of Arpil 1894 China evidently, rather than enter into an obligation to recognize the Sarykol line as a formal state frontier with all the consequences under international law, wanted at least to see to it that the military status-quo or armistice line along the Sarykol heights was not changed unilaterally by force of arms. This position of the government of the Manchu Dynasty has not changed under the subsequent Chinese system of government. In this connection one must also take into consideration the fact that the government of the czar, neither during the exchange of the notes in 1894 nor within a reasonable period after it, raised any objections to the clause added by the Chinese. On the contrary there are a number of indications that the Russian side too at the time was not necessarily bent on confirming the Sarykol line as the final borderline in the Pamir territory, particularly since ruling military circles in the emperor's Saint Petersburg had even much more far reaching ambitions in regard to the Chinese territories east of the Sarykol mountain chain--in other words, with an eye on Kashgar and the extensive bordering steppes of the Chinese border province of Sinkiang (East Turkestan).

As Soviet historians concede without demur, the armistice line along the top of the Sarykol heights has not been physically delineated to this day. Also after the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Sarykol line was given as "not yet confirmed" or as "not the final borderline" in all maps and atlases of official or semiofficial origin of one form or another. Similar reservations concerning the validity of the Sino-Soviet border Pamir frontier can also be found in leading Western atlases.

8790
CSO: 4620/17

POLICE REASSIGNMENTS, REORGANIZATION IN CAIRO

Three New Divisions

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 11 Aug 81 p 8

[Text] It has been decided to form three new divisions in Cairo's police force within the framework of a plan to reorganize the police directorate in order to cope with urban expansion and work requirements in the capital city. There were also transfers between the [district police] commands which involved 25 officers. The divisions which Maj Gen Salah Amin, assistant minister of interior and director of police in Cairo, authorized the creation of are: the al-Sharq [East] police division, to which the al-Matariyah and 'Ayn Shams precincts are subordinate; the Shubra police division, to which the Shubra, al-Sharabiyah, and al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' precincts are subordinate; and the 'Abdin police division, to which the 'Abdin, al-Muski, and al-Izbakiyah precincts are subordinate.

Maj Gen Salah Amin also authorized transfers, involving 25 officers from the [district police] commands of the directorate and involving the delegation of authority to deputy directors of police. Those reassigned were:

The following major generals: Faruq Nur al-Din--to East Cairo, 'Abd al-Hamid Mansur--to West Cairo, 'Abd al-Mu'ti Abu al-Khayr--to South Cairo, and Muhammad Salah al-Sharif--to North Cairo. The following major generals who are assistant directors of police: Khalid Hamdi--to personnel, and 'Abd al-Qadir al-Tawansi--to public security.

The following brigadier generals: Mahmud al-Nazir--to financial and administrative affairs, Hasan Kazim--to the units, and 'Izz al-Din Mustafa--as assistant public inspector for civil defense. Reassignments as assistant [commanders of] divisions and departmental directors involved the following brigadier generals: Raf'at al-Jundi--to B Division as assistant [commander], Sayyid al-Nawawi--to A Division, Mansur Hilmi--to D Division, and Faruq 'Abd al-Hamid--to the East Division.

As for inspectors, the following brigadier generals were reassigned: 'Abd al-Mun'im Farghal--to the Shubra Division, Ahmad Husni Bakr--to G Division, Mustafa Munib--to the 'Abdin Division, Ahmad al-Qadi--to A Division, Ahmad Imbabi--to H Division, Yahya al-Tanbari--to E Division, Muhammad al-Khawas--as chief of the dispatch department, Fayiz Abu Sikinah--as chief of complaints and

investigations, Jalal al-Shirqibali--as director of the training division and superintendent of the athletic training center, Samir Shatta--to [illegible] of traffic, and Samir Dhihni--chief of criminal investigation.

Col 'Abdallah Ghalush was reassigned as chief of the supply and domestic commerce department.

Maj Gen Salah Amin stated that the reassignments involving precinct commissioners, deputy precinct commissioners, and [those in] the criminal investigation department, and other officers, will be issued during the next 2 days.

Police Reassignments

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 7 Aug 81 p 15

[Article: "Police Transfers Involve 400 Officers; 23 Major Generals From Among Department Commissioners and Deputy and Assistant Directors of Police; Transfers Begin 22 August in All Governorates"]

[Excerpts] Mr Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister and minister of interior, has authorized the reassignment of police officers. The transfers involve 400 officers of various ranks, and will be carried out starting 22 August of this year. It has also been decided to appoint the new officers from among the graduates of the Police College--starting 10 August. The new officers will go to the academy next Monday and receive their orders. The transfers involve 23 major generals from among department commissioners and deputy and assistant directors of police. Maj Gen Ahmad Bulbul, director of officers' affairs, stated in a press conference yesterday that the reassignments were made this year, within a very narrow scope, and that the purpose of the transfers was to achieve the stability necessitated by work [requirements] and for the benefit of the officers.

There were the following appointments and promotions of the following major generals to the positions of deputy police director and department and office commissioner:

Ibrahim 'Abd Rabbuh--prison commissioner, Wahib al-Zibadi--supply commissioner, 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Wafa--port security commissioner, Muhammad 'Abd al-Fattah Hasbu--training department commissioner, Qadri al-Harmil--civil defense commissioner, Jabir Nazlawi--civil defense commissioner, Jamal al-Din Khalifah--electricity police commissioner, Husayn Qatim--administrative affairs commissioner, Muhammad al-Kumi--police supply commissioner, Muhammad Kamal al-Din Jad--deputy director of police in Aswan, Muhammad Rushdi Makkawi--deputy director of police in Qina, Hamid al-Sarawi--deputy director of police in Kafr al-Shaykh, Muhammad Wahdan--deputy director of police in al-Fayyum, Muhammad 'Abd al-Tawwab al-Ansari--deputy director of police in al-Minufiyah, Jamil 'Abd al-'Alim Abu al-Dhahab--deputy director of police in al-Gharbiyah, Sa'd Salam--deputy director of police in al-Daqahliyah, 'Abd al-Mu'ti Abu al-Khayr--regional deputy director of police in Cairo, Muhammad Salah al-Din Sharif--regional deputy director of police in Cairo, Muhammad al-Sayyid Khattab--assistant director of police in al-Qalyubiyah,

Mahmud Fahmi Mubarak--assistant director of police in al-Minufiyah, Muhammad Farid 'Abd al-Hafiz--assistant director of police in Bani Suwayf, Rif'at Zakariya 'Abd al-Khaliq--assistant director of police in Qina, Hasan Husni 'Yad--assistant director of police in Qina.

The following brigadier generals were appointed to the following positions:

Salah Ibrahim Nasif--assistant director of police in al-Minufiyah, Muhammad Shawqi al-'Azab--assistant director of police in al-Buhayrah, Sa'd 'Abd al-Salam al-Millahi--assistant director of police in al-Daqahliyah, Munir Fu'ad Murqus--assistant director of police in Damietta, 'Abd al-Fattah al-Samaduni--assistant director of police in Asyut, Rif'at Rushdi Salah al-Din--assistant director of police in Qina, Sanbut Hanna--assistant director of police in the New Valley.

Chiefs of security force divisions:

Col Faruq 'Antar Isma'il--al-Buhayrah, Col Fu'ad Ibrahim al-Misri--Qina, Lt Col 'Amr 'Abd al-Halim 'Ali--the New Valley.

Other appointments in General Investigations:

Brig Gen 'Isam Muhammad 'Uways--director of investigations in Bani Suwayf, Brig Gen Fathi Habib Hanna--chief of surveillance in the Red Sea, Col Yahya al-Saqa--director of investigations in Aswan, Col Sami Zaki Fawzi al-Rakaybi--chief of general investigations in Aswan, Lt Col 'Abd al-Wahhab 'Abd al-'Azim Hashim--chief of general investigations in Ismailia, Lt Col Jalil al-Dasuqi--chief of juvenile affairs in Asyut, Lt Col Hamid 'Abd al-'Aziz--general investigations at the port in Port Said, Lt Col 'Ali Raghib--narcotics division, Lt Col Mahmud Mahmud Muhammad al-'Ajami--chief of the vice squad in Qina, Lt Col al-Siba'i 'Ali Abu al-Layl al-Sayyid--chief of the vice squad in the New Valley.

9468
CSO: 4504/62

NEED FOR AL-AZHAR UNIVERSITY TO GAIN INDEPENDENCE STRESSED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Nos 75, 76, 77 Nov, Dec 80, Jan 81

/Article by Basyuni al-Hilwani and Hani Imam: "al-Azhar, the Fortress of Islam: Where Is It Going?"/

/Nov 80 pp 24-26/

/Text/ How is al-Azhar, the fortress of Islam, the light of knowledge and faith which has stood proudly for more than 1,000 years before the oppression and tyranny of rulers, whose scholars have preserved their Islamic legacy and led many revolutions against oppression, occupation and despotism, faring now? What is the state of its scholars? What is their state, now that they have entered the class of government employees, as far as appointment and dismissal go? What is the difference between the al-Azhar of today and the al-Azhar of yesterday? Why has al-Azhar lost its leadership role as a pulpit for Islam and Moslems? What is the duty of the scholars of al-Azhard, with the dawning of the new Islamic century?

AL-DA'WAH presented these questions to some of the scholars of the noble al-Azhar, who opened their hearts to it and spoke frankly.

What is the difference between the al-Azhar of today and the al-Azhar of yesterday?

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Khafaji, former dean of the College of Arabic Language at al-Azhar and author of the book "al-Azhar over 1,000 Years," says, "al-Azhar has remained proud, with its banner high, and its scholars have been anxious to have al-Azhar's voice heard by the rulers on every occasion. For example:

"Shaykh-al-Islam Shihab-al-Din al-Sinbati, who violently confronted the Turkish governor Da'ud Pasha in 1541 and shouted out to him 'Da'ud, you are a Mameluke and a slave and it is not permissible for you to take power. Your rule is null and void.'

"Shaykh Sulayman al-Mansuri, who opposed the decree of the Ottoman caliph and his governor in Egypt cutting off the philanthropic stipends of the people entitled to them, saying 'There is nothing in the power of the sultan that can oppose Islamic law.'

"Shaykh al-Dardir, who led a popular revolution which emerged from al-Azhar against the Mameluke commanders in 1783, saying 'We will rebel with the young, will shake the throne of the Mamelukes and will die as martyrs or God will cause us to triumph.' The revolution ended with the codification of a written national charter before the French revolution in which human rights were declared. It stipulated the freedom of the people and the fact that the nation is the source of authority and that it is legitimate to impose taxes only by the will of the people.

"Shaykh-al-Islam 'Abdallah al-Sharqawi, who held a popular conference in al-Azhar in 1792, proclaiming a popular revolution against the Mamelukes which ended with the stricture that the commanders submit to the verdicts of the courts and that the hands of the people extend to members of the people only rightfully and by Islamic law.

"Shaykh 'Umar Makram, who led the second revolution of Cairo from the heart of al-Azhar in 1797, then led a revolution against Muhammad 'Ali and called for resistance to him so that he would submit to the people's will that new taxes not be imposed and that recently-created taxes be abolished. He said, 'This ruler is an imposter and must be removed.' Muhammad 'Ali banished him and removed him from his position, and the shaykh answered that by saying 'Exile and death are the objective I desire, lest I be responsible before God for the oppression which befalls the people.'

"Shaykh 'Abd-al-Majid Salim, who raised his voice and wrote his famous article in 1944: 'Tightfistedness here (referring to al-Azhar, which was being oppressed at that time) and profligacy there (referring to Capri).' When the chief of the court threatened to remove him, he, may God have mercy on him, said "As long as I go back and forth between my home and my mosque, no danger will befall me, if God wills.'"

al-Azhar Has Lost Its Leadership Role

That is the al-Azhar of yesterday, and these are its scholars, as Dr Khafaji says. As for the al-Azhar of today, he said, "What can we say about the al-Azhar of today? Shall we say of it what the old Sufi poet said, 'The tents are the same as theirs, but the living men are not the same as theirs?' The scholars and elders of al-Azhar have relinquished their duties and have submitted to the despotism of the rulers of our ear. The result of that is that the Moslems' confidence in the al-Azhar of Islam has grown weak and al-Azhar has lost its leading role as a tribunal for Islam and the Moslems that appoints people who rule by God's book and removes those who do not."

Concerning the al-Azhar of today and the problems it is suffering from, Dr 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi, former secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research, says "There is no doubt that the state of al-Azhar now inspires discontent, because it has ceased to enjoy the scientific power and the deep study which it enjoyed before. The sources of its weakness are two, and I hope that the men of al-Azhar and the men of the government together will remedy them:

"1. Weakness in its students. For some years, al-Azhar has been admitting only weak students and people who have been rejected by secular schools. This level imposes a great burden on the instructors in al-Azhar, they cannot bring the students up to the level of missionaries of Islam, and the students in al-Azhar, as I have observed, are backward in every branch of learning. In spite of the effort I have noticed on the part of professors, I would like a new curriculum to be set forth for al-Azhar in which there is coordination among the subjects being taught, meaning above all else the sciences of al-Azhar, and I would like its curriculum to be separate from that of the secular schools.

"A divorcement between the students' stipends and the religious trust funds which had been set aside for them. We are now in circumstances which require expansions in courses, and Islamic law does not allow the severance of trust funds allocated for a specific purpose, especially the search for knowledge and the study of religion."

So That al-Azhar May Regain Its Status

Concerning the difference between the al-Azhar of today and the al-Azhar of yesterday, Dr 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi says, "There is a vast difference between the al-Azhar of today and the al-Azhar of yesterday. In the modern al-Azhar, there is nothing which can give the Moslems help in what they need, there is nothing in its current course of study which can awaken passion for Islam or prepare one for the study of modern problems in the light of the teachings of Islam, and there is no one among the people in al-Azhar now who can stand up to attacks by orientalists and the activities of missionaries. In fact, people from remote areas who turn their attention to al-Azhar are often shocked when they do not find what they had been hoping for."

In order for al-Azhar to regain its status, in the view of Dr Shalabi, two basic things are necessary, which cannot be separated from one another; these are:

"1. Spiritual life must be rekindled within al-Azhar. By spiritual life I do not mean the passive life of monasticism and mystic withdrawal--I mean the effectiveness of belief, and the adoption by the emotions of the glory of this mission, which has brought people out of the shadow into the light. I mean the awakening of Islamic sentiments and the perception by the young and old men of al-Azhar that they have a sacred duty, which is to fight a holy war for the sake of God in order to spread this religion about. It is on behalf of this duty that the trappings of the life of the world become petty and everything that has pomp and status becomes cheap.

"2. It should reacquire its serious deep studies. The shallow formal study that al-Azhar is engaged in now does not have the effect of producing thinking men or worshippers. It does not add to the eradication of religious illiteracy. It is not the likes of study that touches people's hearts and awakens the emotions. Many of the people who have performed these studies have turned away to material things and the excessive accumulation of wealth. When we look at the leaders of Islam in its various eras we find that it was their scholarly training that was the prime basis of their ascetic life and their rigidity in the critical positions of defending Islam."

Egypt Is of al-Azhar; al-Azhar Is Not of Egypt

The former secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research goes on to state, "Egypt's loss through the decline of al-Azhar and its loss of its role is too blatant to be dealt with lightly. Egypt is of al-Azhar, and al-Azhar is not of Egypt. If this loss is not grasped now, the near future will reveal it. It is sad that active movements of theological studies are arising in European countries, along with missionary leaders who are performing their duties with frightening success in many countries, while we find deadly lethal diseases spreading through al-Azhar."

Dr Barakat 'Abd-al-Fattah Duwaydar, dean of the Faculty of Principles of Religion and the Call to Islam in Tanta /sic/ wonders: "Where does al-Azhar stand with regard to the phenomenon of adherence to religion which God sought to spread among the young in abundant fashion in the last period of the 14th Islamic century? Where is the role of the scholars of al-Azhar vis-a-vis this good phenomenon, which betokens good things? Have they taken the hands of the young people and encouraged them to continue along the road of guidance?" With a voice full of sorrow and sadness, Dr Barakat answers himself by saying "I do not believe that al-Azhar has performed its duty vis-a-vis this good phenomenon and toward these young people who have lost hope in modern civilizations and have sought refuge in Islam. Instead of standing by the side of these young Moslems and offering them aid, it has started attacking them and accusing them of extremism here and accusing them of fanaticism there, and making all the rest of these charges which are being directed at our Moslem youths, who are innocent of them."

The dean of the Faculty of Principles of Religion and the Call to Islam in al-Azhar continues his discussion, stating, "Some scholars and elders in al-Azhar have abandoned their duty, have neglected to command what is proper and have fallen silent over what is abhorrent, in order to satisfy the ruler here or out of fear for their temporary chairs there--although the task of religious scholars and the men of the noble al-Azhar is to state the word of truth at all times and under all circumstances without looking out for what is behind it."

The Duty of al-Azhar's Scholars

On the duty of scholars in the noble al-Azhar as the new Islamic century is dawning, Dr 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi says "There is no doubt that the men of al-Azhar, in their capacity as scholars of the Islamic religion, its guardians, and people to whom God has bequeathed his book, bear more responsibility with respect to spreading Islam and defending it than any other Islamic group or body. Their responsibility will not change with the change in centuries or the turning over of the years. They are on a constant voyage and unremitting holy war. However, the features of their activity change with the changes in events and the turnover of circumstances. Their work may be just one of teaching and guidance in order that a generation may not arise which is remote from Islam in its ideas and behavior, and it might be a defense against an attack on an Islamic base or the repulsion of ambiguities introduced by an orientalist or someone else. They must thus confront every circumstance with the appropriate solution. Our present generation cannot play the role of the first Azharites because it is preoccupied with the possessions of the world and its goal has become material wealth, which it pursues everywhere and for which it abandons its duties."

al-Azhar and Atheistic Currents

I asked Dr Shalabi, "What is al-Azhar's position on the currents opposed to Islam, especially the spirit of the Crusades, Communism and Zionism?"

His eminence said, "It is very unfortunate that al-Azhar is completely unfamiliar with these atheistic currents and the results of European designs bearing on Islam. For example, there is an educated Crusader spirit which is spreading its poisons and distributing its germs, adopting numerous windows and paths; European writers are producing a flood of books, research works and publications which the wily West is proficient in producing and by which it deceives the naive East, portraying Islam in a vile manner and attributing qualities to the prophet of Islam whose falsity is known only by those who have modicum of thinking and culture. Messianic Christian movements are more anxious to defame Islam than bent on spreading about Christianity. Then there is the devious Communist current, in whose orbit all the materialistic currents in the form of the Masonic order and the material creed which calls itself humanist, but is in reality a renunciation of humanism, circulate. The former secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research goes on to state, in a calm, poised voice, "For some years, Communism has been infiltrating into our Eastern world fearfully and warily. It found assistance among people who prefer their material world to their hereafter. Now, however, it has found assistance from senior persons who are handing their Islamic country over to it against the will of its people and the Moslems!

"Alongside that there is Zionism. For years it also was trying to set its feet on the territory of Palestine, but now it is denying the people of Palestine their rights. While al-Azhar has not played a practical or political role in this area, its foremost duty is study and culture; as holy war is carried out by the sword, it also is carried out by the pen and the tongue!

"These destructive creeds and currents which are aimed at defaming Islam and casting doubt among its people must be studied by a specific group or groups in al-Azhar so that they can know their enemies and have the ability to fight them."

Dr Shalabi concludes his conversation by saying, "These are duties which I urge the people of al-Azhar to be concerned with, and I am afraid to say that this is the appeal of a man in despair and the cry of a sorrowful person."

AL-DA'WAH

There is no despair when one has faith or sorrow over what has passed. That is the way things have been determined; however, hope is broad, determination is certain and it is from God that one seeks help.

What does al-Azhar believe, since this is the opinion of some of the people working in it? Has the time come for us to hear a voice, to see a glimmer, if only it is a delusion? God, lay open the hearts of the men of al-Azhar and inspire them to depend on you alone, to be in poverty for your sake, to be submissive to you and to fear you.

"Let anyone who wants God to guide him open his heart to Islam." God says the truth and guides the way.

/Dec 80 pp 48-49/

/Text/ In this issue, AL-DA'WAH is continuing the series of its journalistic investigation into the noble al-Azhar and the problems and obstacles it is suffering from at the present time, which prevent it from performing its divine mission. When AL-DA'WAH talks about the greatest flower of Islam, it does not have the ulterior motive of calumnying or acting prejudicially toward any of its eminent scholars. Rather, its goal is clear; this is to reform al-Azhar and restore to it its brilliant past as a fortress and pulpit for Islam and the Moslems, expressing free Islamic opinions at every time, under every circumstance.

What are the problems and obstacles al-Azhar is suffering from today?

We directed this question to Dr Ahmad al-'Assal, former chairman of the Department of Islamic Culture of Riyadh University and one of the scholars of the noble al-Azhar. He replied, "al-Azhar's problems did not start suddenly, but began a long time ago. Perhaps one could fix the date of that at the time when the motherland was cursed with colonialism. This comes to nations only as the result of internal weakness; a strong body will repel any microbes that seep into it. Therefore the theory of holding colonialism to blame for everything is wrong, and we must remove it from our minds as people working for Islam and people seeking proper solutions.

"Had al-Azhar had its original strength and pioneering role, it would have been able to repel this vicious attack which befell it: al-Azhar was the citadel of teaching in this area of the world and in Egypt because it produced proselytizers, scholars, learned men and judges. The first delegations which studied medicine were from al-Azhar, which gave the motherland educated people of every description. Perhaps this teaching expresses the spirit and comprehensiveness of Islam. When colonialism came to Egypt, it felt, through its study of the resistance to the French invasion, that al-Azhar was the glory of these revolutions and the nourishing force for these tremendous powers, because Islam places the fact in the mind of the Moslem that glory belongs to God, his prophet and the devout and that God will never give infidels a way to prevail over the devout.

"Therefore, colonialism concerned itself with finding another teaching, a teaching which would not take Islam as a basis and focus but would take it as a covering, a ritual and secondary matters."

Dr Ahmad al-'Assal goes on to say, "Since that moment, al-Azhar has been going through its suffering. There is a form of broader teaching which faces problems, analyzes them and studies them. When for example it deals with the issue of literature, economics or society, we find departments of literature or society in modern universities concerned with every idea or theory occurring in these fields of knowledge, whereas al-Azhar has remained rooted in its place. Therefore Imam Muhammad 'Abduh and Shaykh al-Maraghi--on whom be God's blessing--realized that it was necessary to develop the fields of knowledge in al-Azhar in a scientific

manner in order to serve Islam and the Moslems, not to develop them in a marginal way aimed ultimately at crushing Islamic values and stripping the young people in al-Azhar of them, which is what we are observing in al-Azhar today!"

Dr Ahmad al-'Assal summarizes the diseases of al-Azhar today in three major points:

1. The poor quality of students.
2. The poor quality of teachers.
3. The poor quality of the administration.

As regards students, that is because very extreme laxity has been observed in the conditions by which students are accepted into al-Azhar. Whereas it was not possible for students to enter al-Azhar until they had memorized and become proficient in the holy Koran and attained a good standard of writing and arithmetic, al-Azhar, in recent years, has been lowering these conditions and the students at al-Azhar have become weaker in their background than students in the regular educational system, indeed more ignorant than them!

Also, in the case of instructors, and care in promoting and indoctrinating them, al-Azhar's faculties, in past periods, were strong from the standpoint of the heritage, understanding of heritage, and understanding of genuine and basic sciences. You would find that the Faculties of Islamic Law, the Principles of Religion or the Arabic Language were strong in scholarly subjects, but today memorandums have become widespread in these faculties while reference to the fountainheads of religious and Arabic books has become scanty. This all has an effect on the level of the graduates of al-Azhar, and consequently you rarely find a good professor in a science of Islamic law! Then admitting people who have failed in coordinating offices in other faculties as well as admitting people of a poor level in schools into the religious institutes of al-Azhar have had a great effect on the graduates of the noble al-Azhar.

The Lack of a Good Administration

Dr al-'Assal goes on to say: "Teaching is uplifted, advanced and developed by a progressive, vital curriculum, good students and good professors who understand and are aware of what they teach. This is crowned by an administration which understands what it wants. But where is this administration in al-Azhar?" As the head of the Department of Islamic Culture at Riyadh University says, "al-Azhar has become not independent in itself but an appendage of the Ministry of Education. This is one of the basic problems; al-Azhar's lack of independence in its teaching, its students, its professors and its budget have deprived it of an opportunity to possess the internal strength which would cause it to offer good students, good professors and a good administration. This has all been reflected in al-Azhar's contributions to society; we have few good imams, wise religious jurists or brave scholars who can say the truth everytime and everywhere!"

The Age of Decline at al-Azhar!

Concerning the reasons which have led to the decline in the level of teaching at al-Azhar in the last part of the 14th Islamic century, Dr Kamil al-Fiqi, former vice chairman of the Arabic Language Faculty and a scholar at the noble al-Azhar,

says "The reasons for the decline in the level of teaching at al-Azhar in this period lie simply in the general reasons which have led to a decline in the general level of teaching in Egypt, although al-Azhar also adds the following to that:

"1. The new development which has taken place in the university has occurred at the expense of the sciences of Islamic law and Arabic. Its goal has become not to graduate Moslem doctors and Moslem engineers but to strip the young people in al-Azhar of Islamic values and alienate them from the basic sciences, which are the sciences of Islamic law and Arabic. It has been proved that the notion of development grew in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir through Soviet-American guidance!

"2. The admission of people of poor quality from schools into the institutes and faculties of al-Azhar. Their poor quality in Arabic is obvious, and they have not memorized any part of the holy Koran.

"3. The lack of competent teachers in the faculties and institutes of al-Azhar, affecting the level of students.

"4. The spreading of memorandums throughout the faculties of the university, especially memorandums teaching Arabic and Islamic heritage; the students in al-Azhar used to study in a special manner, through writing based on argument and discussion, but have started to study memorandums on every subject, and they are empty works. There is no difference between them and other students in the schools and universities--indeed, I find a seriousness and determination in some faculties of other universities, and the period of the academic year in these universities is at least 2 months greater than that in al-Azhar University and its institutes.

"If you want to compare the past with the present, with respect to scholarship, the vast difference will scare you, indeed terrify you! Most professors are deficient in lecturing in the classical Arabic language and there are people in al-Azhar who make language mistakes and blatant errors in repeating the holy Koran!"

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Khafaji, former dean of the Arabic Language Faculty at al-Azhar University, says "The old al-Azhar knew how to perform its mission by having its scholars steep themselves in the various sciences of Islamic law, religion and language and in high characteristics, virtue, righteousness, dignified behavior and praise, so that they became examples for people in their religion and their everyday life and became their spiritual leaders in their lives, their national spirit and their struggle with the enemies of Islam and the Moslems."

The Greatest Crime Committed against al-Azhar

I asked Dr Ahmad al-'Assal, "Some people consider that the greatest crime committed against al-Azhar was the plundering of its wealth and religious endowments. What is your eminence's opinion?"

He said, "What cannot be doubted is that readers of the holy Koran face strong encouragement to spend for the sake of God. Islam has made the tithe an inseparable part of the establishment of Islamic society. Islam is established only by eloquent proselytizers, and God made al-Azhar the institution of eloquence. Who is

to be in charge of spending on the proselytizers of eloquence? It is through the grace of glorious almighty God that he has made a share out of the tithe called 'for the sake of God' which is to be spent on people fighting holy wars and on proselytizers of glorious almighty God."

One of the traditions and lofty high moral precepts which Islam has taught to its children, as Dr al-'Assal says, is that it has made them anxious to spend their money and endow it for good ends:

"Thus one of the tragedies which have befallen Islamic instruction, especially in al-Azhar, is that this money which by Islamic law, canon law or tradition cannot be diverted from the conditions set down by its endower (it is not permissible by Islamic law to sell religious endowments unless use is not made of them and, if they are sold, alternatives to them must be purchased)--what has befallen the endowments of Moslems is that they have been improperly disposed of. This has all had an effect on al-Azhar's mission and has diminished its ability to confront problems."

Dr Ahmad al-'Assal continues, "We are now living in a world in which there are individual foundations which have endowments, such as Ford, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Fulbright organization in America. Money from these endowments is spent on research. This used to be the task of Moslem endowments. See how Western society is advancing and Islamic society is falling back, now that the money endowed for seekers after knowledge and scholars has been plundered!"

/Jan 81 pp 62, 63/

/Text/ The noble al-Azhar, the beacon of Islam and its unassailable fortress, which lived through a prosperous past and kept abreast of the movement of Islamic history and thought, is going through a convulsed state, vacillating between performing its genuine mission and being modernized in a direction diverting it from its mission and aiming at a future which no one except clarvoyants knows.

In the past two instalments, we reviewed the ailments and problems al-Azhar is suffering from today.

In today's instalment, we will try to ascertain one aspect of the problems the citadel of 1,000 years has been experiencing through our dialogue with some august scholars of al-Azhar covering the material and intellectual independence of al-Azhar and its ability to advance in its movement.

Dr Muhammad al-Bahi, former minister of religious endowments, says, "When the noble al-Azhar was built, some benevolent donors, students and faculty, offered the money that had to be spent on educational matters so that it would be kept apart from government spending and consequently be kept apart from the policies of the existing regime, so that it could be independent and its scholars would be independent in the views they propounded and the positions they declared and adopted regarding events in any Islamic society. Thus the scholars took positions against unjustice domestically and colonialism abroad. Some personalities of al-Azhar, in the era

of the independence of their Islamic institution, held views which kept the identity of the Egyptian nation from being torn asunder by the tempests of injustice and tyranny wrought by the rulers of Egypt throughout the ages!

"al-Azhar and its men took these famous positions in the face of the French invaders led by Napoleon and British occupation in its various periods, especially in the 1919 revolution. This made every Moslem, domestically and abroad, remember al-Azhar's independence and effectiveness in the name of Islam, on the bases of its principles, and feel sorrow over the dominance and decline it is suffering from now!"

al-Azhar And Its Sorrowful State

Dr Muhammad al-Bahi recounts the beginning of the government dominance of al-Azhar and its scholars, stating "In 1915 the financial advisor, who was English, wrote the Shaykh of al-Azhar telling him that the revenues from al-Azhar's endowments were scanty and were not adequate for its scholars' expenses. At that time, they came to 3,000 pounds, to which another 5,000 pounds were added, making a sum of 8,000. He sent that to the Shaykh of al-Azhar, who along with the persons around him, was gladdened by this measure. The English advisor promised him more, on condition that the Shaykh of al-Azhar waive his supervision of the endowments so that the government could take charge of the affairs of these endowments through a department which was established at that time, the Department of Religious Endowments (which was later changed to the Ministry of Religious Endowments). The supervision devolved upon the government, which dealt as it wished with financing the call to Islam and the scholars of al-Azhar, and it became Egyptian policy to choose the employees at al-Azhar. Every year the government's dominance of al-Azhar and its scholars has been increasing, to the point where I find that the worst period in the history of al-Azhar has been the last quarter century!"

His eminence Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali considers that al-Azhar's lack of independence is to be considered a direct factor in its decline, adding, "The hands that guide and direct al-Azhar according to their whim must be removed and the people of al-Azhar must be independent in the affairs of their venerable institution, keep it close to God, and keep it removed from the world of politicians and the demands of people who are working for themselves. This institution was founded on behalf of God and must remain on his behalf alone. Therefore I consider that al-Azhar must totally be independent of subordination, which will turn it into an appendage of certain political fronts or others."

Dr Muhammad Kamil al-Fiqi, former vice chairman of the Faculty of the Arabic Language at al-Azhar, stresses: "al-Azhar's lack of independence is in contradiction with the nature of its mission." He says, "al-Azhar is a source of spiritual strength, and this naturally is not compatible with its subordinate status and the fact that it derives guidance from others, whoever the guides might be. al-Azhar guides and is not guided. The time has passed when people foreign to Egypt, indeed to the Arabs, could rule. The people of al-Azhar guided those who were rulers, turning those who were sultans from their waywardness. The Mamelukes ruled in the 13th, 14th and 15th centuries, in the distant past, and the scholars

compelled them to respect the rights of the people. al-Sharqawi, 'Umar Makram and others sought refuge in the will of the nation and imposed it on the rulers. al-'Izz ibn 'Abd-al-Salam ruled that the Mamelukes were to be sold and there were scholars who refused to meet with the khedive; herein lay the pride of al-Azhar. Today, however, there is none of that. The pride has been lost, the scholars of al-Azhar have lost their venerability, their voices have become stilled, and the commanding of the good and interdiction of the repugnant have become part of the tasks of others beside them!"

Liberation of al-Azhar Is a Necessity

I asked Dr Muhammad al-Bahi about the goal in developing the sciences of al-Azhar. His eminence replied by saying, "The goal in developing the sciences of al-Azhar is to have Moslem proselytizers in every walk of life, to have Moslem doctors and Moslem engineers in the material world, because Islam is an integrated religion and almighty glorious God says "We have neglected nothing in the book." When we call for the development of al-Azhar, we do not mean the formal development that is imparted to the sciences of Islamic law and Arabic, such as we see in the modern al-Azhar! Rather, our goal is clear, and that is that there should be two integrated interlinking curricula by which we can train an Islamic personalities promoting Islam through all the means of the modern era."

His eminence Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali agrees with Dr al-Bahi on the need to develop al-Azhar in a purposeful, scientific manner, saying, "Development is not shameful, in our general estimation. I consider that it is not bad that there are faculties of medicine, engineering, pharmacy and the other walks of life in al-Azhar, because graduates of these faculties are distinguished from their colleagues who have graduated from other faculties in that their Islamic culture qualifies them for the call, and for spreading the call, through their conduct, their dialogue about Islam, and their proper presentation of the call for truth. We have seen that doctors, engineers and so forth who belong to other religions are able to serve the missions to which they belong and work in their service, and their work has had a deep effect and a long range in various countries!"

Well-Trained Quality Is Required

How can the level of instruction in al-Azhar be raised? Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali says, "In order for the instruction at al-Azhar to be successful and fruitful, we will have to improve quality and not be interested in quantity. A small number of graduates with the requisite fully rounded scholarly attributes are far preferable to unlimited numbers of people who are half- or quarter-educated and bear diplomas which, it saddens me to say, are counterfeit or pro forma. People who graduate from al-Azhar, when their link to the Koran is broken off, when the verses are not consistent in their consciousness, when their relationship to the sayings and doings of the prophet is feeble, and when the traditions, and the traditions of the life of the prophet, are not clear in their minds--these people who belong to the flower of Islam cannot serve the book and the sayings and doings of the prophet because, according to the specifications that have been written down for the scholar in al-Azhar, he is supposed to know the Koran, have studied it, know the sayings and doings of the prophet, be knowledgeable in the

literature of the language, be a judge in Islamic jurisprudence, be perspicacious in his scope for proselytizing and have clear ties with religion and the material world. Is that what we see now among the graduates of the noble al-Azhar? The real state of affairs says the opposite!"

The remedy, in the opinion of Shaykh al-Ghazzali, is easy and feasible; it does not require genius or need discoveries. It is necessary that instruction be serious, not ludicrous as it is now, and that the people chosen for it be of precious mettle and be serious intellectual powers and expertise. Many of the people who belong to al-Azhar arrived there through connections in name or form, not through truth and spirit. This type of graduate is not fit for the call to great almighty God.

Alongside concern for serious knowledge and study and the training of men who can be considered receptacles of precious human knowledge, Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali considers that al-Azhar must be distinguished by an element on whose fulfilment we may deal laxly with others but will never deal laxly with al-Azhar, and that is religious atmosphere and religious upbringing, through determined oversight of the progress, conduct and appearance of the students and performance of the five prayers in groups and oversight over every word uttered by the people in al-Azhar, holding them to task if they err, purging al-Azhar and its university of fancily dressed working women and students, and respecting Islamic values and rituals, because the instruction in al-Azhar is scientific study, moral upbringing and spiritual worship.

Finally, Dr Muhammad Kamil al-Fiqi considers that he should inspire every scholar who belongs to the noble al-Azhar with a mission. He says: "My brother scholars, your negligence has lasted a long time; wake up, the enemies of Islam are surrounding the Moslems with sharp weapons and a carefully studied intellectual onslaught. Prepare a platform for the future, be awake and meet together to study this future, now that dissension has befallen al-Azhar and the Moslems like the dark of night. Brothers, do we have a group endowed with knowledge, opinions, nationalism and religion which can bear the responsibility and illuminate the road for coming generations, as our forefathers illuminated it for us? God, enable us to support your book and spread about your law by actions before words."

We Have a Comment

Ultimately, al-Azhar must possess venerability and dignity in order to confront the enemies of religion and humanity and shelter this trustworthy country and its people. Its scholars must work diligently to study the light and shadowy aspects of Law 103 for 1961, which marked the start of the strange transformation in al-Azhar's tolerant religious mission, and to strive to graduate sincere proselytizers for great almighty God, who possess the gift of speech and pen, the spirit of tolerance and a heart far removed from caprice and whim, so that al-Azhar may regain its brilliant prosperity.

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RELIGIOUS MAGAZINE CRITICIZES DOMESTIC PRESS

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 77, Jan 81 pp 46-48

/Article by Salah-al-Din al-Maqsud: "The Egyptian Press in the Defendants' Dock"/

/Text/ Anyone pondering the real nature of the press in the lands of the Moslems will see that it revolves in the firmament of the people who hold power, languishes in their grace, follows their commands and justifies their errors and sins for them!

Since the people who hold power in the Islamic world revolve about in the firmament of the enemies of Islam, this press, in turn, is revolving about in a firmament of vindictive Crusader or apostate Communist thinking, both of which are the enemies of Islam and the destroyers of the Moslems!

Persons who follow it consider that it contains deliberate infringements of Islamic causes, misguiding of Islamic public opinion, distortions of fact, aspersions on Moslem young men and chaste girls, a mockery of scholars and accusations against sincere proselytizers!

One fact of history is that the press came into Egypt with the French occupation, arose at the hands of the Christians of the Levant, graduates of missionary institutions, and had as its first goal to serve colonialism and carry out the Crusaders' designs against the land of Islam!

The press, with its wealth of strong connections, is one of Zionism's means for achieving its expansionist ambitions.

The Jews were the first people to sell the news and spread about destructive ideas and theories of decadence through the press, and they now dominate the major press organizations in Europe and America. They were the first to come to the land of Islam to pick up the ball again following the normalization of relations.

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, member of the People's Assembly, says:

"The press is a means for presenting contents which might be good or might be otherwise, and what is legitimate or forbidden is attributed to the contents of the press, but what contents does the press present? These contents are to be welcomed when they are a constructive factor, but they are most unfortunate most of the time, when the press propagates unveiled women's appearances, disruptions

which have destroyed morals in the East and the West, pictures drawing one to deviation and inspiring passions and lust, poses of people hugging and kissing, and writings of a strange character against our religion, our values and our holy beliefs.

I invite readers everywhere to weigh what they read by religious criteria, because almighty God says "Hearing, seeing and the heart--for all this, he has been responsible." Good things are welcome, evil is to be rejected, and silent, quiet negativism is to be deplored!

The Press and Islamic Issues

In Lebanon, statistics on the media 5 years ago showed that there were 259 media organs, including the daily press, weekly, semi-monthly or monthly magazines, news agencies, and radio and television stations. The Moslems had only one humble monthly magazine whose subscribers numbered no more than a few hundred, and alongside that there were 13 papers on horse racing and gambling!

Let us confine ourselves here to Egypt: does the press serve Islamic causes?

Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad, former minister of education, responds by stating,

"In its totality, the Egyptian press does not serve Islamic causes as it must, in quantity or quality. It is not enough that the daily newspapers allot a weekly page or a daily column to these causes, because they are so numerous and varied and because they need analysis and interpretation if certain erroneous notions which are defamatory to Islam but of which it is innocent are to be set right, and if its teachings, which we want Moslems to adhere to, are to be supported."

Dr Hilmi Murad goes on to say, "If we look at the position the press takes on young people in the Islamic groups, for example, we will see that rather than embracing these pure, devout young people and conferring advice when it is necessary for young people who go beyond what it considers their limits, we find that it is taking a wary position with regard to them which is transformed into an attack, adhering to the government's position when misunderstandings occur between it and groups of these young people. That is a stand which we demand that the government not endorse and above all it is the approach of the press, the tribune of opinions and the profession of people of ideas and fine writing!"

The Press Has Contented Itself with Surface Issues

The press does not serve Islamic issues, as Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il says; it has contented itself with surface issues and has ignored the essence, as far as its duty of serving these issues goes. This is the most dangerous thing to have afflicted the press at a time when it has become the fourth estate! There is no excuse for the people in charge of it, unless they can prove that they are not free in what they write.

However, the worst thing that has afflicted the press is the fact that while it serves an Islamic issue in one part of its contents, it violates all the notions of Islamic culture in most of the material the papers offer.

On this occasion, I wonder, along with the poet who says:

"How can the structure reach its limit some day,

"If when you build it up someone else tears it down?"

Deliberate Infringement

There is a deliberate infringement of Islamic causes in the press of the Islamic world. We will content ourselves by giving an example of this from the country of science and faith, the country in which the press represents the fourth estate! We are not quoting anything original with ourselves but rather a thesis on the position of the daily press regarding issues of religious thought in the period 1 January 1965-31 December 1974, as a result of which the person who wrote it, Muhammad Munir Hijab, received a doctorate from the Media Faculty of Cairo University. He broke the study down into four periods, specifying the position of the press on Islamic issues and using as a basis a comparison of the newspapers' interest in Islamic affairs with their interest in sports.

On the ratio of the space occupied by religious subjects to the space for editorial material in the period 1 January 1965-2 June 1967, that is, before the catastrophe, he found that:

In AL-AHRAM it was roughly 1.74 percent, in AL-AKHBAR it was 3.03 percent, and in AL-JUMHURIYAH it was 3.28 percent. He also discovered, sadly, that the ratio of space allotted to religious issues to that allotted to sports was:

In AL-AHRAM, .14, in AL-AKHBAR .22, and in AL-JUMHURIYAH .36 approximately! In the period 2 June 1967-October 1970, the ratio of space allotted to religious issues to the space for editorial material was:

In AL-AHRAM 2.74 percent, in AL-AKHBAR 2.03 percent and in AL-JUMHURIYAH 3.7 percent.

The ratio of the space allotted to religious issues to the space allocated to sports was:

In AL-AHRAM .3, in AL-AKHBAR 3.48 /sic/, and in AL-JUMHURIYAH .73!

In the period from 1 October 1970 to 5 October 1973, the ratio of the space for religious subjects to editorial space was:

In AL-AHRAM 0.03 percent, in AL-AKHBAR 3.48 percent and in AL-JUMHURIYAH 3.88 percent. The ratio of space allocated to religious subjects to the space allocated to sports was:

In AL-AHRAM .54, in AL-AKHBAR .72, and in AL-JUMHURIYAH .62.

In the period from 6 October to the end of December 1974, the researcher found that the ratio of religious subjects to editorial space was:

In AL-AHRAM 2.22 percent, in AL-AKHBAR 2.56 percent and in AL-JUMHURIYAH 3.27 percent!

The ratio of space allotted to religious subjects to the space allotted to sports was:

In AL-AHRAM .54, in AL-AKHBAR .79 and in AL-JUMHURIYAH 1.9.

The Press in Service of the Rulers

The press in Islamic countries is in service of the rulers and is one of their instruments. They have found the press to be dangerous and do not hesitate to suspend it or exert pressure on it. It expresses the thinking of the rulers, even when that is against Islam.

Dr Hilmi Murad, former minister of education, says: "Since it is the rulers who have appointed and dismissed people in the press and have financed the press, and since the law gives them powers over the press and exempts them from resorting to a chaste, independent judiciary, freedom-loving writers have to hide and the press loses its independence and becomes an instrument in the hands of the ruling authorities and a trumpet for expressing their ideas and defending their actions."

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il comments by saying, "I beg leave to point out that it is not just the press that is in the service of the rulers but also the radio and television, for the reason that the giants of scholarship write much in the service of truth in the press and there is bitterness over the truth in the throats of rulers, so the press does not publish, and public opinion does not learn, /the truth/ but accuses the holy warriors of absolute silence! No one is allowed to speak on television except people who have declared that birth control and propagation of the ideology of the rulers are legitimate!"

The Nationwide Papers Are the Trumpets of the Authorities!

What are termed the nationwide papers, as Dr Hilmi Murad says, are so-called nationwide government papers, because they are biased in favor of the government in the views they publish--indeed, they refrain from publishing news about adversaries of the government, even when these are deputies in the People's Assembly or belong to parties represented in it. They also refrain from publishing foreign news which is not in keeping with government policy. Therefore their mission has become one of defending the government viewpoint, right or wrong!

Cowardice and Hypocrisy

The nationwide papers, as Prof Fathi Radwan, former minister of culture, views it, cannot publish a letter infringing men in office, not to mention their leaders. They in no way have command themselves but are commanded, operated, guided and guide themselves! This is because the people who are appointed to the press are appointed by decree of the president, as senior officials are appointed, and the president has the power to dismiss them at any moment he wishes or keep them, then take every power away from them. Therefore the fact is that we read one paper, written by the authorities, although they bear the names of four or five papers!

Oppression of Islamic Papers

Prof Fathi Radwan goes on to say "The Islamic press is oppressed literarily, is hated by the authorities, and does not get the slightest bit of assistance the authorities' papers get. However, ultimately they are dozens of times more powerful than the subsidized papers, because the latter are bought by people to read what the Islamic papers do not write, such as the prices of foreign currency, airplane schedules and cheap arts!

"Also newspapers of opinion which function truthfully and are vigilant over the national interest are given a great deal of distress and suffering!

Mr Fathi Radwan, former minister of culture, stresses that if the ruler feels that his future conflicts with the survival of these papers, he can do away with them, in Egypt and elsewhere. Rulers in countries where leaders are too weak to express frank opinions have the power to do everything from material oppression to imprisonment."

Dr Hilmi Murad, former minister of education, says:

"I accuse the so-called nationwide newspapers of being biased in favor of the government and the party it belongs to and of hiding behind the rubric of being nationwide, whereas in fact they are totally remote from that. In their bias, these papers reach the point where they are silent about such vital matters as supplying Nile water to Israel and they do not publish the two lists' views regarding seminal issues such as the treaty concluded between Egypt and Israel. Indeed, in their bias they reach the point of publishing government statements in which the government defends itself against charges raised against it, although these charges do not include the responses they receive to declarations by the government or the people speaking in its name, while the law compels them to publish such responses!"

Prof Fathi Radwan, the former minister of guidance and culture, charges that the nationwide papers are government papers which offer the reader only what pleases the ruler, and this is not the function and mission of the press.

"I accuse them of having writers who poison the minds of Moslems and cast weakness into their spirits, diverting them from everything that is of benefit."

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, member of the People's Assembly, accuses the press of employing people who propagate destructive creeds which they will not desist from spreading. This is the bane of freedom when they use it on behalf of satans and creeds of deviants, at a time when they are deficient in serving the solid truth!

"I believe that proponents of decadence still exist, and among them are people who attack Islamic opinions and pure Moslem youths, people who attack the tendency to apply Islamic law, and people who defend waywardness in quest of the material world and all the rest!"

The Children of Zion and the Press

The Jews dominate most media organizations in Europe and America. Previously, they had influence in the press in many Islamic countries, and today these "cousins" are coming back, in the wake of the normalization of relations, to carry out their designs!

The Protocols of the Elders of Zion stated:

"Literature and the press are the two greatest, most dangerous instructive powers.

"For this reason, our government will buy the greatest number of periodicals and thereby we will negate the evil influence of every independent newspaper and will triumph with a very great power over the human mind."

Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad comments on this by stating:

"There are clear dangers from Israel's insistence on attaining its designs of dominating the region through peace under the cover of normalizing relations instead of occupying territory by armed force, which costs it a great deal and provokes resentment against it."

"Israel after normalization," as Mr Fathi Radwan says, "will establish newspapers, will set up a publishing and printing house, and will assume every guise which will enable it to achieve its goals. An Islamic paper might appear, pretending to be Islamic but headed by a Jewish editor.

"The Jews used these methods even before Israel was established. In Egypt the biggest advertising firm was the Oriental Advertising Company; through advertisements, it directly controlled newspapers and their circulation. Now that the country has opened its doors to the Jews, their efforts to achieve their designs will multiply!"

The Egyptian Press Is for Destruction, Not Construction

Mr Fathi Radwan, former minister of culture, asserts that the press in the Islamic countries, especially in Egypt, is not constructive, except for a few papers and a few noble people who are working in the government press in the narrow area in which they are permitted to operate; except for them, the press, if it has not been an instrument of destruction, is an instrument of construction /sic/!"

Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad, former minister of education, considers that what the so-called nationwide papers publish with the result of deceiving the people, twisting facts, blacking out certain forms of news and making misleading justifications for certain actions and decisions is not to be considered just a factor of destruction but also treason to God and his prophet and treason to the Moslem people as it deprives them of their right to know the course of events in their country and the whole world on the one hand and deters them from adopting the necessary stands, weakens their morale and destroys their power to protect their interests on the other.

This is as far as the bitter state of affairs in the press is concerned. Has the time come for the press to commit itself to the law of Islam, so that it can take part in building the nation of Islam?

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MILITANT RELIGIOUS YOUTH DIRECT DEMANDS AT AL-SADAT

Cairo AL-I'TISAM in Arabic Nos 8, 9, Jun-Jul 81 p 7

/Article by Hilmi al-Jazzar: "An Open Letter to the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt from the Young People in the Islamic Societies"/

/Text/ When we opposed the peace treaty, it was not our intention to criticize any conduct, oppose a particular action or raise provocations against anyone. We are as remote as we can be from personalities, because our religion, Islam, which we cherish and whose platforms we insist on applying, orders us to keep our exhortations above the level of personalities. We have known the Jews as any Moslem who has read God's book knows them; they are the most intensely antagonistic people toward the devout, and there is nothing more to say, now that God has spoken.

We are certain that these people are the most antagonistic of God's creatures toward peace, because that eliminates their aspirations and designs. Our proof of that is the fact that the map of greater Israel is still hanging on the walls of the Knesset, even following signing of the treaty which has been said to have ended the wars in this region. We totally understand that this map has not been kept hanging there by chance, but that it is an indication that Israel's role in this area will end only with the takeover of all the lands of the Moslems on which they have designs. This will not come about haphazardly, but rather can be carried out only by force. How can we believe that the peace treaty has ended the wars in this region? We were sure that the Zionist enemy was not seeking peace by signing the treaty with Egypt but rather that that was his first step in fragmenting the Moslems. We say for the sake of truth that many rulers of Islamic countries have had the greatest influence in prompting Egypt to take this adventure of unknown consequences.

We knew that the Zionist enemy, after securing the Egyptian flank, would turn to the Islamic countries, one by one, causing their territory to shrink, crushing their economy, destroying their morals, and alienating them from their beliefs; the events which have taken place yesterday and are taking place today are the truest testimony to the veracity of what we are saying:

1. Continuous raids against southern Lebanon.

2. The failure to carry out autonomy, which we reject.

3. Establishment of Jewish settlements on Islamic territories by force and plunder.

4. Violation of the airspace of Islamic countries, as happened recently.

5. Destruction of productive facilities in Islamic countries, as happened in Iraq.

6. The ideological and moral destruction which it is spreading in all Islamic countries, deviously and shrewdly through the media.

7. Eliminating our national economy now that they have been permitted to normalize relations and exchange embassies.

8. The twisted, devious position they have taken toward you has made you and your ministers state that Israel, in its conduct, is violating the stipulations of the peace treaty, which we rejected from the outset in letter and spirit.

9. Its adherence, up to today, to the lie of Israeli security, under whose aegis it is perpetrating all its odious crimes against the countries of the Moslems and the other innumerable evil acts of this ignoble Jewish Zionist people.

Everything we have presented you have seen and known of. We are not presenting you with anything you do not know. Rather, we have stated it in preparation for presenting you with our demands which will remedy these dangers, considering that we are the young men of this generation which bears all the burdens of struggle and holy war in raising the status of this beloved Islamic nation on its shoulders. We are expressing this view of ours because we are citizens and have every right to present every view that suggests itself to us in behalf of our country:

First, it is not enough that Egypt protest against what Israel has done in Iraq. It is necessary to take a practical step to deter Israel, to eliminate its arrogance, to awaken it to the reality of Islamic consciousness and to prepare the young people for total self-sacrifice in regaining the total rights of the Moslems.

Second, eliminating and suspending execution of the normalization process and freezing steps toward it.

Third, withdrawing the Israeli ambassador from Tel Aviv and expelling the Israeli ambassador from Egypt.

Fourth, calling all young people to holy war under the banner of Islam, following application of the law of great almighty God. From these young people you will witness things that gladden the soul and give people incentive to be zealous of preparing to work self-sacrificingly in every mode and manner.

Fifth, preparing the nation for holy war and calling upon the men of al-Azhar, the religious endowments and religious rulings to spread out in the towns and villages to disseminate the Islamic call from the educational standpoint, not just from the scholarly standpoint.

Sixth, getting the media to stop their degenerate programs which are detrimental to morals and contradict the simplest rules of God's law.

Seventh, notifying the United States that its lax positions regarding the actions of the Zionist enemy is a subject which all Egyptian people condemn.

Eighth, eliminating the obstacles in the way of the Islamic societies so that they may engage in their activity, because they are among the strongest elements for reviving Islamic consciousness; good and proper acts and reforms will never be achieved in this country except at their hands.

Ninth, opening the mosques to the proselytizers of the Moslems so that they may perform their duty in an atmosphere of calm and security and an absence of provocation.

The mosques are the seat of governance in Islam, the consultative assembly and the department of codification and execution.

Finally

God knows that these young people who are presenting these demands bear love and benevolence for all sincere working citizens and that they have no ulterior motives in what they are demanding except absolution from guilt before God almighty. They have laid what is working in the depths of their heart bare for a single goal, which is that great almighty God may see them working on his behalf by their hands, their tongues and their hearts, toward which they have found a sound, chaste Islamic way.

May almighty God grant everyone success in what he loves and is satisfied by.

/signed/ The Islamic societies in the universities of Egypt.

11887
CSO: 4504/91

OIL MINISTRY CANCELS ALL IMPOSED CONTRACTS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 8 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN, September 8 (Pars) — The Oil Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran announced null void (cancelled) all imposed contracts with multi-national oil companies. The full text of the Oil Ministry's announcement reads as follows:

The disgraceful coup d'etat of August 1953, paved the way for the continued domination of foreign oil companies upon the oil and economic resources of Iran. The imposed contract of the Consortium was signed between the coup regime and oil companies owned by the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, and France. The said companies, under the cover of this cntract plundered the oil resources of Iran during 1954 until 1979, while Iran, who in fact is the justified owner of these resources had only little benefit from the contract. The 1954 cotract included a major term of 25 years and three five-year renewal periods amounting to 40 years in all. The contract was due to end in 1980, but was cancelled on 1973 and another 20 years contract was imposed upon the Iraniannation.

The victory of the Islamic Revolution of Iran put an end to the presence of foreign oil companies in the Oil Industries of Iran. Iranian staff and experts began running the oil industries. Also the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran on March 1980 approved a bill for the formation of a special commission to study the oil contracts. According to the bill, all oil contracts which were contrary to the Oil Nationalization Law of Iran were cancelled by this Special Commission which was appointed by the Oil Minister. Any claims resulting from these contracts and their implementation could be settled upon the verdict of the said commission.

Subsequently the Commission studied the oil contracts which had been signed before the revolution and found them all contrary to the Oil Nationalization Law and therefore announced them null and void.

The decision of the Special Commission was conveyed to all related oil companies by the Iranian Oil Minister.

The combatant Muslim nation of Iran can be certain that with the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the oil industry of our country after 80 years is liberated from the claws of Imperialism and multi-national oil companies and the industry is now being operated by Iranian experts, and its revenue now belongs to the public treasury.

Now that all the oil contracts made during the former regime are canceiled, the Oil Minister of Islamic Republic of Iran has missioned a commission to investigate any claims resulting from the contracts and their cancellation add follow up the matter, possibly through international circles until their final settlement and recovery of the ligitimate rights of the Iranian people.

CSO: 4600/193

WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION RALLYING AGAINST KHOMEYNI

Identity of Bombers Sought

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 pp 1-2

[Text] The conjecture over who placed the bombs that have killed so many leading officials of the Islamic republic in recent weeks continued with added fervour among Iranians and journalists everywhere over the past week.

The Tudeh (pro-Moscow communist) allies of Khomeini, now seeing their chance to isolate the ayatollah by killing his leading henchmen; the Mojahedin, rather sheepishly neither denying nor claiming responsibility for sophisticated killings which most observers saw as beyond them; elements of the military now thoroughly discontented; or monarchist elements--all have been mooted as the culprits.

Khomeini and his regime have seemingly no doubt as to who is responsible--the Mojahedin and former president Bani-Sadr getting the full blame. Most western observers have expressed their doubts that the Mojahedin is behind the bombings, whose precision has impressed people far outside Iran's borders. But they had no real clues to offer.

Moscow, on the other hand, has decided that the monarchists are to blame. Tass gave the royalist supporters the credit in a report early in the week, perhaps giving the supporters of the Pahlavis their biggest boost for a long time. Even their most ardent followers, bemused by the efficiency of the killers behind the bombings, had not had the temerity to make the claim for themselves. Tass said the killers' aims were the overthrow of the Islamic republic and restoration of the monarchy.

Perhaps Moscow had had a whiff of the rumours that Tudeh were responsible for the killings and wanted to hurriedly divert suspicion from its proteges. Though Tass a few days earlier had echoed Bani-Sadr's claims that there was a new threat of the "imperialists" coming back to power in Iran.

As far as Khomeini and his officials were concerned it was business as usual--no matter how many martyrs were sacrificed. Khomeini said Iran was the most stable country in the world and the killing of the prime minister and president would not destabilise the regime as its enemies hoped.

Khomeini said he had been told that eight attempts had been made on the lives of American presidents, four of them fatal. But America was still the strongest nation in the world.

At Friday prayers at Tehran university Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani declared that he was ready for martyrdom and considered he had already lived 20 years too long. Mrs Rajai, wife of the assassinated president, also told the crowd at the prayers that she had always wanted her husband to be a martyr. Rafsanjani related to the crowd how Rajai's body had been identified by his teeth, so badly was it burned.

Rafsanjani continued that Bani-Sadr and other "hypocrites" had called many of the regime figures reactionaries. "We are proud to be reactionaries. If reaction creates such people," he said, "we had better say then that God is a reactionary, so are all the prophets and the saints, and all that is truth in the world is reactionary!"

But the new premier Mahdavi-Kani did concede, more realistically, that security must be one of his prime considerations in the near future. There were renewed calls, the latest from Ayatollah Montazeri, for one security organisation to take over responsibility for protecting all figures of the regime and the clergy.

Meanwhile the list of executions of alleged Mojahedin activists and the assassinations of religious figures and revolutionary guard officials went on up and down Iran. The Islamic Republic newspaper in one edition recorded 45 executions the previous day. The daily Kayhan on Saturday reported that revolutionary courts had sentenced 70 people to death on Thursday. Dozens of killings of mullahs and bombings which the foreign press could not cover were reported. In Shiraz, a bomb destroyed 24 shops and 10 houses, killing two people and injuring many more. Every part on the country appeared to be affected.

The government-controlled radio, television and press backed up the officials in their attempt to show some equanimity. They announced new projects which they claimed had begun in areas which are known to be virtually no-go areas for government forces, never mind officials, and gave accounts of meetings by officials that suggested that very little was wrong.

But the announcement that people would be restricted to one litre of milk per person every 12 days, with families with children allowed an unstated quantity more, reports of queues at bread, meat and other shops and fewer people on the streets of Tehran than normal over the past few days reflected the worries the public must have. Many petrol stations were also closed, with petrol being very hard to find at all in many provincial areas.

And Minister of State for Executive Affairs Behzad Nabavi went on radio and television to admit that recent events had led to delays in all governmental organisations and that he had not been able to attend sessions at the economic mobilisation organisation. But he said there had been no changes in government policies and people were going about their daily work.

Other reports said that 1,000 pasdars had defected with their arms since the deaths of the prime minister and president. Defiant statements by officials were seen as

designed to discourage further desertions. Many of the pasdars are said to have been revolted by recent executions.

Fears that the military might be considering some action to try to bring some new order to the situation in the country were fanned by reports from Tehran on Tuesday that 153 military personnel had been arrested.

Warning from Shia Theologians

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 pp 2-3

[Text] Prominent Shia leaders, some considered to be senior to Ayatollah Khomeini, have again warned the revolutionary mullah to toe the orthodox line or face excommunication, highly reliable sources in Iran said this week.

Ayatollah Hassan Qomi, Ayatollah Zanjani, Ayatollah Shirazi and several other senior theologians in Qom and the holy city of Mashad have given the following list of demands to Khomeini, which, they say, must be met soon:

1. The parliament, currently referred to as the Majlis Shoraye Eslami (Islamic Council) must be changed to its official name of Majlis Shoraye Melli (National Assembly). These theologians maintain that any assembly in which the top Shia leaders--Shariat-Madari, Golpayegani and Najafi--are not represented cannot be designated as an Islamic one.

2. Ayatollah Montazeri, considered to be Khomeini's heir-apparent, must be ousted from his position as the senior teacher at the Qom Theological School.

3. Ayatollah Meshkini, Friday prayers leader in Qom, must be sent back to Tehran. He and Montazeri are regarded as too junior to carry the title of Ayatollah.

4. Hadi Ghaffari, a south Tehran underworld operator who has recently put on a religious robe and turban, must be publicly denounced as an imposter and he should be de-frocked. He is the leader of the Hezbollahis (fanatics who terrorize Tehran streets to beat off Khomeini's opponents). Some sources say that Ghaffari also directs Khomeini's information and security organisation.

5. Revolutionary courts must be closed down, and clerics acting as judges must receive instruction and guidance from qualified theologians.

The sources claim that the above five demands were communicated to Khomeini through his son Ahmad Khomeini. Ali Agha Boroujerdi is said to have been used as the messenger. He asked Ahmad Khomeini to come to see him, and during the visit the two discussed the above five points. It was then agreed that Ahmad would inform his father about the demands.

So far Khomeini's reaction is not known. On another occasion 15 months ago when Ayatollah Qomi sent him a similar list of requests, Khomeini used the occasion of a meeting with university students (an arranged meeting to suit the occasion) to blast at "mullahs who are not revolutionary." No other mullah could give him lectures in politics, Khomeini said.

Now a week has passed and Khomeini has not yet made any response.

Discussions of Opposition Groups

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 pp 3-4

[Text] The arrival of Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi in Europe, along with the spectacular killings of officials in Tehran, seems to have sparked off a flurry of new activity among all the opposition groups.

The two recent arrivals themselves were said to have had talks with two former officials of Khomeini's regime who fled into exile sometime ago and are now involved in opposition. They are Admiral Madani, who was a minister of defence, and Hassan Nazih, who saved the oil industry from collapse after the revolution and thus helped the regime to survive. A representative of another active politician in the post-revolutionary period, Moghadam-Maraghei, was also present, reports said, along with members of one or two other leftist groups.

Meanwhile rumours persisted that Shahpour Bakhtiar had gone to Istanbul to meet General Bahram Aryana, head of the Azadegan organisation, and other monarchist activists.

And reports from Switzerland said no fewer than 18 monarchist or nationalist groups had been represented at a meeting there to discuss cooperation. A source said two of the groups were based in the United States, the rest in Europe. Though no decision on any leader was reached, the source said there was a general agreement that cooperation should be extended.

It became clear that reporters and observers feel that Bani-Sadr needs Rajavi and the Mojahedin much more than they need him. Newsmen who met the former president continued to be startled by his seeming obsession with his own role, while Rajavi is considered much more realistic politically. Bani-Sadr continued to issue presidential-style calls to the people of Iran to rise up against those who had thrown him out. But the majority of observers and journalists expressed opinions that he has no political future.

Kurds Blocking Border

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 p 4

[Text] Thierry Desjardins, correspondent of the Paris daily FIGARO, says in an account of a recent brief visit he made to the Irano-Turkish border that dissident chiefs who have broken away from the Kurdish Democratic Party called in Khomeini's revolutionary guards to protect them when KDO leader Ghassemloo launched his peshmerga forces onto them recently.

The result has been the withdrawal to the south of Ghassemloo's forces, which are said to number 30,000 well-armed men. The Kurds also have about 50,000 armed civilians, he said. But the tribal chiefs' call to the pasdars had cut off the important access route into Kurddstan for the moment. Money would have to reopen it.

Significantly, Desjardins' story showed that monarchists, Bakhtiar supporters and even leftists were working in seemingly much better harmony together in Turkey and aalong the frontier than they do in Europe. This in spite of the fact that Ghassemloo still backs Bani-Sadr while all the other groups see him as a creation of Khomeini. This, however, was not seen as an insurmountable barrier to cooperation.

A former commander of a brigade in the Shah's army told Desjardins that in addition to Ghassemloo's men, thousands of former imperial army men were now in advanced stages of preparation for what was planned as a nationwide insurrection which Khomeini could not resist. While the revolutionary guards and the regime were in control on the main towns of the west, the rest of the area was in the hands of opposition elements, who could also circulate freely in the large towns at night.

"In fact, we could easily take over all the towns in the west region tomorrow," the former brigade commander told Desjardins. "Militarily that is not a problem. We are there like fish in the water. But it would be an error. Khomeini would immediately send his planes to bomb the towns and there would be heavy civilian casualties.

"No, our strategy is simple. We are organising everywhere. Not only throughout the western region, but also in Baluchestan, in all the provinces of the country and in Tehran. We have, certainly, many friends who are still in the army and they, too, are waiting. What we want is to launch on D-Day a gigantic insurrection everywhere at the same time."

Asked when this might happen, the officer replied, "Time presses. If in two months we can do nothing we must wait until next year, for the winter will paralyse us."

Desjardins said people told him the Kurds were divided in their loyalties between Ghassemloo and his leftists and Shahpour Bakhtiar, in addition to the monarchists. Bakhtiar obviously had a sizable following, and people the writer spoke to seemed to see no problem in a restoration of the monarchy, in apparently constitutional form, with Bakhtiar as prime minister.

The alternative, according to those Desjardins quoted, was a victory for the pro-Moscow Tudeh communist party, whom most people there seemed to be convinced were responsible for the bombings that have destroyed many of the leading officials of the regime. The aim, they said, was to create a vacuum around Khomeini. But the liquidation of their enemies delighted the centrists and rightists, too.

Desjardins said that his trip to Kurdestan had convinced him that the opposition to the regime in Iran was now organising itself positively.

Dissention Among PLO Members

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 p 5

[Text] There have been several signs in the past week that the Palestinian Liberation Organisation may be sharply divided over its policy towards the Iranian regime.

While talks were reported between PLO number two Hani al-Hassan and Massoud Rajavi in Paris the PLO offices there and in Beirut issued categoric denials that such a meeting had taken place.

But the following day a French newspaper published a photograph of al-Hassan and Rajavi sitting together at Auvers-sur-Oise, where Rajavi now lives along with Bani-Sadr.

Rajavi himself has stated in an interview that Yasser Arafat has difficulties with Tehran and that he is confident of PLO support. And al-Hassan has been quoted as denying that PLO relations with the Khomeini regime have been soured but it was natural that, with the Palestinians' concern for the brotherly country of Iran, and because of past contacts, the organisation should be anxious to talk to the Mojahedin and see how it could help in the situation.

Iran watchers said that although this hinted that al-Hassan, who was the Palestinians' first ambassador in Tehran, was trying to mediate, reports insist, as IPS has previously reported, that there is some friction between the Tehran officials and the Palestinians.

With Libyan president Moammer Kaddafi having also reportedly cut off his aid to the Tehran regime and urged a settlement of the war with Iraq, Iran's relations with Arabs seem to have reached a low ebb. The Tehran press has been extremely critical of Saudi Arabia since the latest OPEC meet, calling Saudi oil minister Yamani "the Shah's alter ego in another Islamic country."

Khomeini and other clerical figures have also talked darkly of "so-called Islamic leaders who are themselves the main cause of Muslim disunity" in speeches marking the pilgrimage to Mecca. Khomeini accused some leaders of supporting Saddam Hussain, "who is in the hands of the Great Satan and Israel as well."

The ayatollah said the Haj (pilgrimage) was of political as well as spiritual significance and Iranian pilgrims should use the occasion to tell all Muslims about their real duties. He urged all Muslims, "both in East and West," to support the Iranian way of Islam, the true Islam, and to rise up against the puppets who were weakening Islam.

Meanwhile Isfahan's Imam Jomeh Ayatollah Taheri told the pilgrims that Saudi authorities had last year warned the pilgrims they must not carry out propaganda but they would do it this year "if Shah Khaled allows us."

He said: We believe that the Haj is a vast Islamic Congress. If last year our revolutionary Muslims had been able to participate in the Haj, they would have been able to explain to our Muslim brothers who were coming from all corners of the world, what our revolution is all about. This is what we mean by exporting our revolution. The Imam and other responsible organs have often stated that by exporting our revolution we do not have any imperialistic ideas; rather, we wish to explain to Muslims how they can take the reins of their country into their own hands. This is our understanding of Islam.

"We had no problems, rather it was the Saudi government who insisted that we do not carry out any propaganda. We were very worried by this condition. We did not mean to start any fights. We only meant to have slogans against imperialism and Zionism in a place where all Muslims had gathered. If this year Shah Khaled allows us, we will make amends for last year."

Military Commanders Blamed

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 p 6

[Text] The commander of the revolutionary guards stationed in Sar-e-Pol-e-Zehab and Qasr-e-Shirin, on the southern front of the war with Iraq, has blamed "speeches and expressed opinions" of some military commanders as being partly responsible for the Iraqis extending their grip in the region.

With or without knowing, he said, they gave away some security secrets which led to the Iraqis ruining the Iranian forces' plan for an attack. "We must not become the enemy's information centre and must be extra careful not to give away security secrets," he said. Mortar attacks in the west had been aimed at weakening the morale of the Iranian forces but this had not been achieved. The commander added that during 11 months of fighting against Saddam's forces on the Qasr-i-Shirin front, the revolutionary guards had lost 500 of their brothers, but nevertheless they have been a barrier against further infiltration of Iraqi forces. At the moment the war had become a war of attrition and they were merely exchanging mortar fire.

Regarding the difficulties and problems that the revolutionary guards corps faced at the beginning of the war, which led to the fall of Qasr-i-Shirin, the commander said that there had been many difficulties which he would discuss elsewhere in full, but he would briefly say that "two months before the start of the war we were aware of Iraq's intention to attack Iran and we told the responsible authorities. And five days before the actual attack we had exact information regarding the day on which Iraq was planning to attack. We told our commanders, but they would not listen to us."

He added, "During the visit of Bani-Sadr to this region, when his helicopter met with technical problems, I was with him. I told him our local problems and warned him that this region was the gathering place of all counter revolutionary forces, and that there was a possibility the enemy might attack the whole of the western region, but he paid no attention. Despite all these difficulties, we did well at the beginning of the battle and until the day that Qasr-i-Shirin was surrounded, we were fighting and we took the first prisoners of war and one Iraqi barracks. The Baathists could not have penetrated this region until our secrets were given away. The Iraqi soldiers entered the town from behind us and we were unaware of the fact that we had been surrounded. Lack of ammunition made us leave Qasr-i-Shirin. I can honestly say that I saw disloyalty and treason. It was an incredible day."

Malakian added: "We have had 500 martyrs so far, and we ask the government to assist us with our difficulties. Ninety percent of our problems were connected to Bani-Sadr, because he was against all revolutionary institutions. Bani-Sadr

wanted to separate the army from the revolutionary guards because he knew that the guards were directly under the command of the Imam. He wanted to create differences between the armed forces so that he could benefit from the result..."

Malikian pointed out: "With the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran, large groups of Savak agents, royalists and those connected to the previous regime fled to Iraq. Saddam has given them asylum and they have been stationed in a region called Chahab Kalar from where they command attacks against Iran. They have been given money and other facilities by Iraq and they have collected 12,000 people led by Sadar Jaf, Palizban, and Oveisi. Even Bakhtiar and Ashraf (Pahlavi) come and go in this area..."

Uprising Predicted

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 pp 6-7

[Text] After the betrayal by Khomeini the Iranian people will put forward their own conditions for rising up against the regime, Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, former M. P. who was a strong critic of the late Shah's regime and now secretary-general of the exile Union for Freedom Party, told IPS' diplomatic correspondent in an exclusive interview in Paris.

The overthrow of Khomeini would require a completely opposite scenario to that which brought the ayatollah to power in Iran, he said. "Someone must come forward and plant the Iranian flag somewhere inside the country and the people will later rise up and support him," he contended.

Bani-Ahmad said he believed that after Khomeini the country would remain in the hands of the army for some time. "The flagbearer will come from the army, and anyway, nothing can be done without the 100 percent collaboration of the armed forces to get rid of Khomeini," he said.

With the departure of former president Bani-Sadr the last vestiges of democracy disappeared in Iran, the former deputy continued. Not only had the president his own popularity with the people, but he also enjoyed the support of strong left wing organisations like the Mojahedin-e-Khalq. Yet when Khomeini cast him away 99 percent of the people remained indifferent. This showed the people had set a price for giving their backing.

The present regime was born and lived with anarchy, Bani-Ahmad said. Anarchy created its own environment and he believed that if law and order were restored the regime would fall. It obeyed no order and the positions of prime minister and president, the Majlis were all superfluous. "No such jobs existed at the beginning of Islam and all have become meaningless," Bani-Ahmad said. "Hasn't Khomeini removed the president elected by 11 million people with a single sign of the thumb?"

The reason the people constantly made up with the regime was that they lived between life and death, he continued. The killings, the uncertainty that one could be executed at any time, made it possible for people to support even the hardships of jail just to keep their lives. The pressures and problems created for the people by the regime had put them into this state of mind.

Bani-Ahmad said that when Khomeini died the effect would be something like an earthquake or a volcano. A straightforward coup-d'etat was difficult at this stage. So getting rid of the regime needed time and perseverance.

A first step should be the opposition outside the country becoming an "echo" of events inside Iran and preparing to harness this unity for use in Iran at a later stage. He recommended the creation of a national state council of the people and leaders who had not cooperated with the Khomeini regime or the corrupt one which preceded it.

Bani-Ahmad rules out any takeover by the Soviet Union or the breaking up of Iran into a series of mini-states. He accused the Tudeh (communist) party of following a "Machiavellian policy of ends justifying means," but said they had no place among Iranians.

As for Bani-Sadr he considers that he is "finished." Heaadvised the former president to denounce as much as possible Khomeini's crimes and "make a complete confession himself."

Revival of Muslim People's Party

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 pp 7-9

[Text] The Muslim People's Party (MPP), which was suppressed by the Khomeini gangs in December 1979, has once again revived its activities, latest reports from Iran indicate.

Two weeks ago partisans belonging to this party captured a main revolutionary committee headquarters in Tabriz and disarmed at least 20 guards before withdrawing to their hideout. Then two days later government-supported gunmen arrested three prominent Tabrizi merchants who were known to have sympathies with the MPP and executed them by firing squads.

This angered the MPP activists, who had earlier taken care not to harm any of the 20 guards they had disarmed. So the MPP activists assassinated several militant mullahs and their bodyguards. The regime's radio acknowledged only one mullah's assassination because he was far too well known for his death to pass unrecorded.

Now members of the MPP both in Tehran and in Tabriz are organising themselves. Last week they distributed leaflets condemning the new bill on Reconstruction of Government Departments and Personnel, which is specifically brought to enable the regime to further purge the administration to make room for more of the Khomeini gang and their allies.

The MPP sources have stressed that while they maintain full respect for Ayatollah Shariat-madari, their erstwhile leader, at this stage they have avoided contacts with him or his aides. The reason is that they do not want to endanger his life or the lives of his relatives or associates.

The MPP was set up in March 1979 by liberal and centrist groups to uphold and safeguard achievements in Iran since the 1906 revolution. Many members and sympathisers of the National Front joined the party, among them notable writers

MPP headquarters on Asjad' Avenue, close to Sepah Street, were a bastion of well-reputed popular figures. However, the majority of its founders were from Tabriz, a city which played a leading role in the 1906 revolution and which feels a mandate to safeguard the modernism and liberalism which that revolution brought. The Tabriz link was extended to Ayatollah Shariat-madari, whose son (a civil engineer) joined the party.

From the very beginning the Khomeini gang were bent on crushing this party. But they did not dare to act at that stage, mainly because of the party's strong influence in Tabriz. So they began a smear campaign which was carried out by Tudeh party and Mojahedin-e-Khalq publications.

But these tactics were not effective. The MPP's newspaper had a circulation of 200,000 in Tehran alone, against the Mojahedin-e-Khalq newspaper's 70,000, the Islamic Republican Party newspaper's 15,000 and the Tudeh paper's 12,000. The MPP newspaper was willingly bought by ordinary people, while newspapers of the Mojahedin, IRP and Tudeh were actively promoted by partisans.

In October 1979 more than 200 Tehran University professors joined the MPP and in a dramatic gesture mobilized a cavalcade of cars to drive to Qom and talk to Ayatollah Shariat-madari. The state-run radio-television ignored the occasion, but the press reported it widely. The drive to Qom was a rebuff to Khomeini personally, because the group refused to meet him. At the time Khomeini was living in Qom. The following day, when the group was leaving Qom to return to Tehran, armed gangs led by hanging judge Khalkhali tried to attack the convoy of cars carrying the professors. However, precautions had been taken and supporters of the MPP moved in and dispersed the attackers.

A week later the MPP members in the constituent assembly publicly renounced theocracy as proposed by the followers of Khomeini. Then mullahs belonging to the Khomeini camp began their own smear campaign, which was backed not only by Tudeh, Mojahedin and Fedayeen newspapers but also by the so-called popular press, whose management by then had fallen into the hands of the IRP.

When the U. S. Embassy fell into the hands of the so-called students following the Khomeini line, the mullah-controlled media began to report that at the embassy documents were discovered showing links between the MPP and the CIA. Though the charge could not be proved the IRP was by then able to terrorize the people and unleash armed thugs against the MPP offices in Tehran and the provinces.

At the party office in Tabriz attempts by revolutionary guards to occupy the premises were resisted. An armed battle ensued and the MPP cadres brought the city, including the airport and the radio-television, under their control. Two plane loads of revolutionary guards sent to Tabriz had to return because they were not allowed to land.

Khomeini dispatched Bani-Sadr as his personal envoy to give his word that articles dealing with the theocratic nature of the Islamic Constitution would be revised. At this point Ayatollah Shariat-madari advised the MPP to accept Khomeini's word. So Bani-Sadr was allowed to land and he publicly announced that the constitution would be revised.

Meanwhile, Mojahedin elements, supported by a large number of Palestinian commandos and according to some sources, helped by armed communist gangs, arrived in the city and in a sudden attack disarmed the MPP supporters. They staged a mock trial at which they sentenced 20 MPP supporters to death. Among those executed were Ayatollah Mohammad Irani and Taghi Rostam Khani. Since then the MPP has gone underground.

Having been stabbed in the back by Mojahedin, MPP supporters did not move to protect them against the Khomeini gang two months ago when Bani-Sadr was ousted. To them Bani-Sadr and Rajavi are traitors who are being killed by other traitors.

To MPP supporters it seems that while the regime has won the latest round against the Mojahedin it has suffered so much loss of power and prestige that it is now much weakened. So the MPP can now begin its own harrassment of the regime. At one time it claimed 3 million supporters, who are concentrated in Azarbaijan, Tehran, Mashad, Qom and some areas of Khuzestan. If they succeed in coordinating their activities with anti-theocratic forces in Kerman, Shiraz and Isfahan, their combined strength could bring down the Khomeini regime, which no longer enjoys real popular support.

The MPP originally supported the 1906 constitution minus monarchy, but it is now said to be ready to support any secular nationalist group, such as that of Bakhtiar, in a wide national united movement.

The foreign press, especially London's Fleet Street, has frequently misrepresented the MPP, describing it as a purely Azarbaijani group seeking autonomy for Turkish-speaking Iranians. Nothing could be further from the truth. The MPP is a secular, nationalist party with nationwide support. It says that Azarbaijan has been an integral part of Iran since the beginning of Iranian nationhood, and that the notion of Azarbaijanis being different from other Iranians is a false one fabricated by the Soviets in 1944 and now publicized and perpetuated by writers on Iranian affairs possessing little knowledge of Iran or its people.

Opposition Groups Abroad

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 37, 10 Sep 81 pp 9-13

[Text] Some 60 groups and organisations, the majority monarchist, and many having little more substance than the papers on which their aims and propaganda are written, exist outside Iran in France, Britain, the United States, West Germany, Canada and other parts of West Europe.

Some of the monarchists are legitimists who are outright for the return of the Pahlavi dynasty to the Peacock Throne, others are for the establishment of a consitutional form of monarchy. These latter people want a return to the 1906 constitution which also provides for a monarchy and which can be changed by the people if they agree on the change. Opponents of the late Shah and even many of his supporters criticise him for ignoring some of the conditions of the 1906 constitution.

The other groups range from leftists, through liberal nationalists to republicans. More than one-third of them have their headquarters in France, where leaders like

Shahpour Bakhtiar, Ali Amini, Hassan Nazih, Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, Houshang Nahavandi, and two of the Shah's former top generals Bahram Aryana and Gholam Ali Oveissi are centred.

Admiral Ahmad Madani, another leading opposition figure, lives in West Germany but makes regular trips to Paris to talk with other opposition personalities. A number of the bigger Paris groups have branches in other parts of Europe and the U. S. A.

A minority of them are military, but some of the political groups also have military wings. A number claim links with groups inside Iran and inside the army but these are very hard to verify. While some actually do send their newspapers and propaganda to be xeroxed and disseminated inside Iran, others do little more than issue a communique once a month or even less regularly.

Groups like Bakhtiar's National Iranian Resistance Movement, the monarchist Dezhban, the Iran Liberation Army, Iran-e-Azad and on the left the Mojahedin-e-Khalq do seem to find ways of getting their material into Iran. Bakhtiar also has two radio stations beaming into Iran, and his organisation and the Mojahedin appear to have substantial funds to back up their facilities. Overall, however, the opposition organisations exist on very limited finances.

Iran-e-Azad, led by Princess Azadeh Shafik, niece of the late Shah, appears to act as a coordinator for a number of small and medium sized monarchist groups. One of the earliest in the field it has remained active and possibly the most dynamic of all the organisations in the past two years, organising many demonstrations and producing a lively, blunt-speaking weekly newspaper in French and Persian.

The leftist Mojahedin-e-Khalq, Fedayeen-e-Khalq and PayKar groups all have active groups in European capitals and other countries where there are sizable student bodies.

A tentative list of some of the organisations, with deductions made from literature and statements put out by the groups, is as follows:

France

National Iranian Resistance Movement, led by Shahpour Bakhtiar. The largest opposition organisation with offices in several countries, two radio stations and a number of newspapers in West Europe and North America. Apparently well financed. Policy is to try to secure a return to a secular Iran and the setting up of a social democracy. Keep its links with the monarchists but has not expressed outright support for monarchy. Its personnel include both republicans and monarchists. Retains the support of a majority of former National Front supporters, a wide section of the professional classes, and many who favour return of constitutional monarchy; but is weakened by unrealistic position of its leader towards people who worked for the previous regime who would swell his support. As a result the NIRM has lost ground to some monarchist organisations in recent months.

Iran-e-Azad. Led by the daughter of Princess Ashraf, who had little to do with court life in Iran and was not associated with its wide commercial interests,

this group is made up largely of young people who are constantly demonstrating against Khomeini and for the monarchy. It has a youthful military wing which calls itself Javan (Youth) and which took part in the recent hi-jacking of an Iranian navy gunboat off Spain masterminded by another monarchist group Azadegan. It was also effective in dealing with the Khomeini gangs who at one time were a growing threat to the exile community in France. The group has in general pursued an open, honest policy in its campaign against the post-revolutionary regime in Iran, marred only by an over-reaction to criticisms by Bakhtiar of Princess Ashraf which at one time threatened to do considerable harm to the exiles' cause. Iran-e-Azad has attached groups in other parts of West Europe and Turkey.

Iran Liberation Army (ARA). Although created by military men the group has been more politically active than militarily so far. It has a mixed civilian and military central council whose members are scattered through Europe and the United States and it says, inside Iran. It publishes a fortnightly newspaper which is said to circulate considerably inside Iran, especially among military garrisons. It favours constitutional monarchy and wants the present Reza Shah the Second to have the throne.

Azadegan. Under the leadership of General Bahram Aryana and now famous for its hijacking of the Iranian navy gunboat Tabarzin this is a small monarchist military organisation said to have strong links with the armed forces inside Iran. Admiral Kamal Habibollahi, the former navy chief of the Shah who led the gunboat raid, told a French newspaper that Azadegan has a following of around 12,000-15,000, mostly inside Iran.

The Salvation Movement of Iran. Also military and supporting the monarchy this small group is led by another of the Shah's top generals Gholamali Oveissi. Very active inside Iraq until war broke out between Iraq and Iran the group also has a radio station beaming into Iran, but is now said to be curtailing those activities.

Neda (The Call). Reportedly for constitutional monarchy it is made up of intellectuals and university teachers studying plans for the future Iran. It publishes a fortnightly newspaper called Soroud-e-Ma (Our Hymn).

National Reconciliation Movement. More an idea that an organisation this is an effort led by veteran statesman Ali Amini to try to link the different opposition groups to advance their effectiveness. His efforts embrace the right, centre and the left, while it has also launched fervent appeals to moderates and nationalists inside Iran to resist the Khomeini regime.

National Front of Iran Monarchists. A front for the restoration of the monarchy. Neghab (Mask). Formerly associated with Bakhtiar's organisation as his military wing it is said to have organised the abortive coup which ended in tragedy for many of its activists inside Iran in the summer of 1980. Since then it has separated from Bakhtiar's group and more recently has splintered into groups itself. It publishes a fortnightly newspaper called Ghayam-e-Iran.

Organisation of Intellectuals and University Professors. Said to be led by Hushang Nahavandi, former minister and chancellor of Tehran University. It comprises technocrats, researchers and other professional groups who support a constitutional monarchy.

Independent Organisation of Iranian Students Outside Iran. A student group which supports Bakhtiar's organisation.

Union for Freedom. Political group of Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, former Tabriz M. P. who challenged the Shah to provide more political freedoms in the last few months of his reign. He pays allegiance to neither the monarchy nor Khomeini.

Organisation of Guardians of the Iranian Kingdom. As its name implies, a monarchist group working for women's rights.

Organisation in Defence of Women's Rights.

Iranian Front for Women's Freedom. Supports Bakhtiar's NIRM.

Third Force. Supporting Bakhtiar.

Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran. Led by a former Tudeh (communist) party member and now convinced republican Khosrow Shaker, it comprises a group of lawyers.

Organisation of Intellectuals and Researchers. Left-leaning organisation supporting Bakhtiar's NIRM.

Pan Iranist Party. Led by well-known Iranian politician Mohsen Pezeshkpour this is a continuation of one of the early nationalist organisations in Iran. It can best be described as an ultra-nationalist group which enjoys a considerable amount of support among exiles as a result of that fact. It publishes a weekly called Nation.

Namara (National Iranian Liberation Armed Forces). Led by Pezoshkpour's brother General Ehsan Pezeshkpour, this is a small military organisation supporting the monarchy.

Entegham (Revenge). Another small group made up of military and other factions and supporting the monarchy.

Iran Teachers Association. Led by Mohammad Derakshash strong critic of the Shah's regime, now equally strong anti-Khomeini, Nationalist.

West Germany

Iranian Freedom Front. An amalgamation of several small political parties and organisations based in the FDR. Nationalist, it was intended to bring together different groups in opposition to Khomeini but at present appears in the doldrums.

Organisation of Iranian National Patriots. A monarchist group.

Organisation of Iranian Nationalist Guerrillas. Monarchist.

Khashm (Wrath). A compilation of the initials of "Khoda, Shah, Mihan" - God, King and Country.

Organisation of Iranian Patriots. Monarchist.

Organisation of Iranian Nationalists. Monarchist.

Switzerland

Nedaye Iran Azad. Close to Iran-e-Azad. Monarchist.

Iranian Freedom Lovers and Patriots Organisation. Monarchist.

Austria

Organisation of Iranian Nationalist Workers, supporting Bakhtiar's NIRM.

Belgium

Iranian Front in Benelux Countries. Monarchist.

Organisation of Iranian Students in Belgium. For Bakhtiar's NIRM.

The United States

Association of Soldiers of Iran. Monarchist.

Gamma. A military grouping, supporting monarchy.

Organisation of the Union of Iranian Nationalists. Monarchist.

ASA (Iranian Secret Army). A monarchist group led by a young officer who was recently sentenced to 50 years in gaol by a U. S. court for allegedly setting fire to a pro-Khomeini carpet dealer's property.

Arash Kamangir. A group whose name comes from Iranian mythology. Monarchist.

Association of Iranian Jurists in the U. S. Unattached.

Iran-American Committee for the Defence of Freedom in Iran. Unattached.

Committee for the Defence of Iranian Rights. Supports Bakhtiar's NIRM.

Union of Iranian Nationalist Workers. Left-wing.

Guardians of the Flag of the Iranian Kingdom. Monarchist.

United Kingdom

Movement for National Unity. Monarchist.

Dezhban. Active rightists supporting monarchy. Publishes a newspaper which it circulates inside Iran as well as in the United States and Europe.

Iranian Resistance Front. Monarchist. Organises weekly meetings at Speakers' Corner and demonstrations in support of new Shah. Has young para-military group, and women's group, Iranian Women's Vanguard.

Free Iranian Women's Association. Newly-founded women's rights movement open to women of all political complexions.

Sam. Monarchist.

Sangar. Monarchist.

Greece

Ariou Barzan. Collection of groups supporting monarchy.

Shahin (Eagle). Monarchist.

CSO: 4600/190

RADIO-TV MANAGING DIRECTOR SPEAKS ON REORGANIZATION

Tehran BAZAR-E RUZ in Persian 24 Aug 81 pp 1, 4

[Article: "We Shall Eliminate Deficiencies and Discord in Radio and Television"]

[Text] Mohammad Hashemi, managing director of the radio and television organization of the Iran Islamic Republic, who has recently been appointed to this position, provided details about the radio and television organization's general policy during an interview.

Hashemi said: "From an educational and political point of view, this organization is one of the most important organizations of the Iran Islamic Republic. Equally, from a technical point of view, it is especially intricate and complicated; according to the Imam's interpretation, this is like a university, because there is at least one radio in each home. From the point of view of diffusion and communications, considering the programs aimed at both the domestic and foreign public, and also the various radio and television programs, this organization is of interest to all various age segments. Therefore, if the organization continues to move on the proper path of the revolution, it can be of worthy service to Islam and stand truly as a university."

In another part of the interview, Hashemi said: "In society, we do not reach only special sectors or groups and moreover, the organization belongs to the whole society. Therefore, in the production of programs, by taking into consideration their Islamic contents, we must proceed in a way that will make them attractive and useful for various sectors."

In answer to the question about the present condition of the radio and television organization, the managing director of the organization replied: "Following the many changes and transformations and replacements that have taken place in this organization after the victory of the revolution, on the whole and from various aspects, the situation is not very pleasant. There are deficiencies and discord, and an attempt is being made to get rid of them so that we can have a coordinated and purposeful organization."

Referring to the training of new personnel, Hashemi said: "We have decided to reopen the former radio and television school, which is fully equipped in relation to technical facilities and has a 250-student capacity. We have been in touch with the Cultural Revolution headquarters and very soon, probably by the 23rd of

September, the school will begin admitting students who are committed and Hezbollahis. On the whole, efforts will be made, in long-term programs aimed at creating cadres for the radio and television organization like the cadres in the rest of government organizations--and even stronger, given that this organization is more sensitive--to turn these students into persons committed to Islam and the revolution."

In conclusion, and considering the fact that the managing director of the radio and television organization is responsible for the preparation of all programs and for all plans and projects, as well as for all expenditures, Hashemi said: "I have set up a number of monitors for every program and every undertaking, so that a full assessment will be made as to the rightness of all programs and their propagation of Islamic culture, and also in order that they avoid any kind of deviation from Islamic principles, as well as any non-Islamic imitation."

CSO: 4640/100

PAPER SAYS ISLAMIC REPUBLIC ABLE TO SURVIVE DEATHS OF LEADERS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Sep 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] First, the Islamic Republic by all means is a 'system.' A 'system' in one of its important meanings, denoting a collection of unified phenomenons which has an independent characteristic different of its components.

If we pry for an answer to the question that "what has been the main motive behind the conversion of an autocratic system to a socialistic one in the history," we conclude that in a country when an individual is the absolute ruler, in case of his downfall or extermination, the whole system is dissolved. But if the same country is being ruled by a system rather than an individual, we will notice that in case of extermination of any individual, no changes are visible in the system. Because a 'system,' when defined will denote a network which is not subjected to a specific individual.

Our people from the early days of the victory of the Revolution, on the top of their voice said, "Revolution and Islamic Republic is not relied on individuals." But a number of countries and people did not believe this just claim of our people. In all of the conspiratorial centers of the West and East, in Washington or London, all of the political observers and experts, in planning their plots against the Moslem nation of Iran, announced that the character of the Islamic Iran is relied on the Leader of the nation. Several times, they had said that as long as the Imam is alive, we cannot do very many things in Iran. They even exploited the blood pressure of the Imam in their papers with banner headlines not once but a number of times. They even consoled themselves with fairy-tale lies for several times. Lies such as "people have not met with the Imam for two days, it is possible that his health is deteriorating." Another report said "A Spanish physician, has dreamed that the blood pressure of the Imam will go up soon." Another dubious report said that "A foreteller has predicted that the Imam will die in a matter of 23 hours and 30 minutes."

And still more, "The NASA researchers in U.S. have stated that after a number of exact computerized calculations, a relatively huge meteor will enter the atmosphere in Oct. 1984, and will directly hit the house of Ayatollah Khomeini."

About the other characters of the Revolution like Rajai, Beheshti and Bahonar, they had made similar predictions, however in a lower level. They had claimed that if Behesti dies, the Islamic Revolution will be half-paralyzed and that too forever.

It is interesting that the two pro-Western wing had planned itself in conformity to such analysis. They also quoted Banisadr who had claimed last year that the Imam will not live longer than 15 days, with an assured smile decorating his face. He (Banisadr) believed that after the Imam, it will be the dawn of his reign. And that was why he had delivered a chaotic speech on Shahrivar 17th of last year. He hoped to psychologically harm the Imam this way. And he thought that after the Imam, Islam will be exiled from Iran.

All the conspiracies that have been formed during the last two years are indications that all of the plotters believed the Islamic Republic to be conglomeration of personalities, and the Imam is at the top of such a collection. They did not believe in it as a system. The events on Tir 7th and Shahrivar 8th cleared such suspicions from the heads of the enemies of the Revolution. Before the killing of these personalities they still hoped that they have the chance to succeed. Behesti, Rajai, Bahonar and Qoddusi, with their martyrdom, proved to the world that the Islamic Revolution is not based on some true servers and sincere aids of the country. They disappointed the U.S. in its struggle against Islam. The multitude number of people who attended the funeral procession of the martyrs of Shahrivar 8th and its reflection on the reports of the foreign press medias, is an indication of this.

Now the poisoned propaganda of the anti-Islamic Revolution forces are aimed in barring the export of the Revolution rather than uprooting it. And this was only possible through the dedications and sacrifices of the martyrs, who devoted them-selves in the cause of Islam and made the Islamic Revolution known to the world.

Secondly, the martyrdom of our dears not only proved that the Islamic Republic is by all means a 'system,' but also a stable 'system.'

Wherever in the world, when the leader of a country dies, the foundation of the political, economical and social character of the country is confused and even in most cases it is totally changed. In Spain, when Franco died, all the policies of the Government were basically altered. At his time it was claimed that a stable and invulnerable system is ruling Spain. However, after his transfer to the hospital and the rumor of his death, the country was in a chaos. And he recovered for a couple of days, dictatorship became dominant in the country again. And a week later when he died, it was felt that everything was a nightmare.

The story is same in other countries, even in the U.S. which is said to be one of the most stable systems. After the death of the president the whole thing will be changed as well. Fortunately our nation is not burdened with an overwhelming knowledge about the history of the U.S. but as it is said when President Lincoln was assassinated, the whole country was confused. It is said after his

death, the situation in Washington was chaotic for years. This has been the case about the other presidents of this country. It may be better remembered that when President Kennedy was assassinated, the situation in the country became so chaotic that it even effected the elite circles. The situation of all international stock exchanges became unstable when Kennedy was assassinated. And all his internal and external plans were cancelled or changed completely, because they were fruitless.

And the recent assassination attempt on the life of Reagan which we all know about it. However, he was not assassinated for good purposes, but right after he was wounded, the dollar plummeted and the price of gold went sky high and the armed forces of U.S. got on alert, and conflict between the powerful cadres in Washington was intensified.

These are the after effects of the death of leaders of such countries on the political, economical and social relations. The countries which are prone to such calamities audaciously claim that there is no stability in Iran.

It is really strange!

The Great Satan who claimed once that Iran is the Island of stability, is now claiming that it is an unstable sea, and we can see how unstable the U.S. is itself.

And the Islamic Republic while being called as a government about to collapse by the Superpowers, stands so stable that after the martyrdom of 72 of its high officials, no changes occurred and no short-comings were seen anywhere.

The existing contradictions in the world among the statements of the great powers is something undeniable. And after all those hard days we can straightly claim that if there exists any force that can stop the current of Karoon River, then the same force can stop the move and spread of the Islamic Revolution. And the world that has witnessed all these miracles from Islam should believe this statement.

CSO: 4600/203

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON COMBATANTS' SACRIFICE

NC122003 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 12 Sep 81

[Station commentary]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots! The city of Tabriz witnessed yet another epic yesterday. An Iranian youth killed another ruling mullah of the bloody anti-Iranian regime at the cost of his own life. This Iranian youth showed that Iran and the Iranians are still alive and that they will never die.

The struggles of the Iranian people against this criminal regime are intensifying more and more each day. Despite the regime's futile efforts to depict the strength of its opponents as unimportant, the Iranian combatants are displaying their firm determination by such acts and by inflicting strong blows on the sinister regime.

In a short period of time, less than 3 months, at least 80 percent of the ruling heads have been killed. The attacks by the combatants and their precise aiming at their targets are signs of their strength. There is no doubt in this.

Compatriots! Despite the savage fire of the revolution guards, who are standing on extremely shaky grounds, the streets and alleys of our homeland's towns and cities are now witnessing the demonstrations by devoted and combatant Iranians. Iran is also witnessing epics, an example of which was displayed to the world by a single person (?whose act has stunned) the world.

Compatriots! Demonstrations against this bloodthirsty regime are gaining momentum more and more each day. This is not a claim but a reality to which the world bears witness. It is up to us to join in unison with the Iranian combatants and act with these self-sacrificing people as quickly as possible and with all our potential before our homeland sees more murders, crimes and bloodletting by the executioner and before our homeland is further destroyed.

CSO: 4640/103

CLANDESTINE ON OPPOSITION LEADERS' STATEMENTS

NC221750 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 22 Sep 81

[Text] Dear compatriots and listeners: Following the insane decision by the mullahs ruling Iran on the massacre of all the regime's political opponents, even of the wounded and children, and the intensification of the wave of executions in Iran, Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran, called on all international organizations to put all their possibilities to work to prevent this (?unprecedented) [word indistinct].

In relation to the same issue, Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization; Dr Fereydun Keshavarz, a former Tudeh Party leader; and General Bahram Aryanna, leader of the Azadegan Movement have sent messages which you will hear.

The text of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar's cable to the UN secretary general, the International Human Rights Commission, UNICEF, the Society of Democratic Lawyers and Amnesty International is as follows:

The Islamic Republic of Khomeyni, which, according to facts, has since the beginning followed no policy other than that of (?killing) and crushing freedom seekers is now becoming more bloodthirsty in the face of the increasing wave of the Iranian nation's protest and rebellion. The increase in the (?wave) of bloodshed, summary group trials and savage massacres with little precedence in history which have surpassed the limit of savagery of cruelty, especially in the past 3 days with the execution of young children and adolescent boys and girls, has caused great concern among the Iranian nation and the public opinion of the human society.

By taking Iran back to the dark era of barbarianism and by starting a bloodbath under the aegis of its policy of terror and repression, the regime is now, according to officials in its judiciary, trying demonstrators in the streets in groups and is executing them in prison before (?sunrise) and, contrary to all human laws and international agreements, is immediately killing the wounded [words indistinct].

While the Islamic republic has been beheading innocent people for more than 2 years now and the average number of announced executions has passed the 90 percent mark; at a time when judiciary authorities do not refrain from immediately executing children, whatever their age may be, and who speak about antiregime demonstrations;

at a time when the punishment of demonstrators has been specified to be death in the worst way or by amputating the right arm or left leg, the request of the Iranian nation of responsible international organizations which are working toward ensuring of human rights is that they break their silence in the face of these numerous crimes and express all-aspected protest. They should also use all their efforts and capabilities to stop the ever-increasing killing of the Iranians to justify the reason for their existence.

A blood flood has started in our country, and no policy or consideration can justify the silence of international organizations in the bloodiest days of Iran.

CSO: 4600/204

CLANDESTINE RADIO CLAIMS SOVIETS TRAIN COMMANDOS

NC170959 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 16 Sep 81

[Station Talk]

[Text] Compatriots! In previous programs we have spoken many times about the activities of the Feda'ivan-e Eslam and Soviet experts training these people. Today's talk is about the formation of a new 5,000 men commando group, consisting of religious students of Qom who are all members of the Feda'iyan-e Eslam, the Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since its establishment and always rightly having considered the armed forces as its opponent, the Islamic republic formed the Revolution Guards Corps as an organization to resist the army and it did its best to strengthen this corps. Developments in our country and the impact they have had on the Revolution Guards Corps during the past 6 months were new warnings to the officials of the Tehran regime. The weakening of the Revolution Guards morale [words indistinct] which came to light recently, started 6 months ago. At that time some of the ruling clergymen who had a better foresight started to think of seeking a solution. Sadeq Khalkhali, leader of the Feda'iyan-e Eslam, the person responsible for killing thousands of our compatriots, was among those who forewsaw the future and started implementing the plan of forming a 5,000 men strong commando force that obeyed orders only from him and is known as the "Khalkhali commandos."

Sadeq Khalkhali himself chose the members of this commando group who had to belong to the Feda'iyan-e Eslam organization and had to be theological students of the Qom Feyziyeh School and possibly of religious schools in Mashhad and other cities. The theological students handpicked for this commando group [words indistinct] (?have to) pledge to fight opponents of Ruhollah Khomeyni and the Islamic Republic until their last breath. Therefore, the most (?fanatic and reactionary) persons are chosen for this job.

These people are being trained in two stages and in groups of 200. Each group is first trained for 2 weeks at Sadeq Khalkhali's mansion in Shemiran which previously belonged to Nader Jahanbani, the executed airforce general. They are trained under the supervision of a second colonel of the former shah's special force. This officer ousted from the special force--notorious among armed forces personnel for his brutality and strong fanaticism--leads the first stage of the intensive commando classes, aided by two Syrian deputies and three Iranian associates. After the

2-week course, the members of the commando force are immediately sent to the Asalom area in north Iran where they undergo another 2 weeks of operational training under the supervision of Soviet experts.

It is necessary to note that at present approximately (?17,000) Soviet citizens are dispersed throughout our country, either officially or unofficially. Many of them have been chosen from among the most expert agents of our northern neighbor and are well acquainted with regional dialects such as Mazandarani, (Gilaki), Azeri and Kurdish. They are in continuous contact with Khalkhali and his agents.

The expenses of the 5,000 men strong Khalkhali commando group are met by Khalkhali himself and through the confiscation of (?property belonging to executed people). Sadeq Khalkhali (?forces) people to be executed to write out a will transferring their property [words indistinct] and then, on the basis of these wills, he confiscates their property.

The commando group has headquarters in Qom and [word indistinct] at the Lavizan and Saltanatabad garrisons in Tehran. However, these men live separated from others and do not have the slightest contacts with revolution guards. Many of the followers of their eminences Shari'Atmadari and Qomi and other religious leaders such as Allameh Mazandarani, Hojjat ol-Eslam (Gorgani), Ayatollah Hajj (Qavam Khatib) and Ayatollah (Mowla'i), now in Evin prison, were arrested by members of the Khalkhali commando group.

Compatriots! History has always shown that no arbitrary rule can resist the firm determination of a (?rebellious) nation. However, Radio Iran considers it as its duty to inform the combatants, who have armed themselves and whose objective is to overthrow Khomeyni's regime, of this last futile effort by the clerical regime.

CSO: 4640/103

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS NOTED BY CLANDESTINE RADIO

NC171836 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 16 Sep 81

[Station Talk: "Has the Iranian Regime Neared Its Downfall?"]

[Text] In our talk today we will briefly glance at the situation facing Ruhollah Khomeyni's regime as well as discuss the current events in our country based on information from our dear listeners.

Facts show that the ruling regime is in that stage of its life that on the one hand it is facing its neighbors' aloofness and on the other it is drowning in a sea of difficulties stemming from assassinations and explosions by armed opponents inside Iran. The regime's relations with foreign organizations, whose influence at one time extended even to the Revolution Council and which once trained the armed men of Khomeyni's regime, have changed so much that their distance from the leaders of Tehran is gradually increasing.

Recently, Hani al-Hasan met with a number of the regime's opponents in Paris. The meeting was a show of support for this anti-regime group and a sign of the changes in the political strategy of Khomeyni's former friends. An interesting point is that when Hani al-Hasan was in Tehran he was so trusted by the clerical regime that he could directly participate in the decision-making conferences of the Revolutionary Council and voice an opinion in the council's decisions. It was after the meeting between Hani al-Hasan with the anti-regime group that the alarm was sounded in Tehran and the rage of Khomeyni's officials over his visit was revealed. The newspaper SOBH-E AZADEGAN, the organ of the Revolution Guards Corps, published a (?commentary) condemning the meeting. In retaliation for this meeting, Iranian officials issued orders for the arrest of two of Khomeyni's body-guards who were PLO members and sent them to Evin prison on charges of plotting to assassinate Khomeyni.

The regime's concern over the good relations between opponents and an organization that was formerly friendly with Khomeyni increased because this organization was an effective force in organizing the revolution guards and the committees. Since the explosion at the Prime Ministry, the regime has become even more terrified with the infiltration of members of this anti-regime group. This (?terror could be seen) in the remarks by Khomeyni's prosecutor Amlashi.

The clerical regime's officials are extremely worried that the severence of cooperation with organizations that were once supporters of Khomeyni might further weaken the regime's (?already) shaky security, even though secret agents of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran helped by the Moscow-affiliated Tudeh Party have been mobilized to strengthen the security forces of Khomeyni's regime.

Together with these developments, Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Colonel Namju left for the PDRK on Monday. In addition, Mir Hoseyn Musavi yesterday left for Libya, where he will participate in the meeting of the leaders of the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. He will also meet with these leaders to discuss the current problems with the organizations that previously supported Khomeyni.

What is noteworthy is the infiltration of the regime's opponents into the highest ranks of the government's various (?organizations). The revolutionary prosecutor general's remarks on Sunday confirmed this. Furthermore, facts show that Khomeyni himself is no longer safe. This infiltration by the regime's opponents is so extensive that according to the TIMES newspaper, last month opponents planted a defused bomb in Khomeyni's residence in Jamaran with a note attached to it that read: It is better for Khomeyni to surrender and to withdraw.

In light of the current developments, Khomeyni has canceled all his meetings for 2 weeks and Hashemi-Rafsanjani, a member of the Presidential Council and speaker of the regime's Legislative Council, is visiting the PDRK. Their absence from the scene of the current developments is coupled with the clashes between revolution guards and opponents of the regime. This confrontation is becoming more open each day and the people are no longer afraid to organize street demonstrations. As an example, we can look at the incidents on Tuesday, 15 September, when the people demonstrated in Tehran and the regime said that they burned a bus. The regime's opponents have said that after the recent clashes many of the people who are disgusted will take to the streets like Tuesday and that confrontations, rebellions and general strikes will overthrow the ruling regime.

In addition, the presence of soldiers of the National Iranian Army led by General Aryana on Iran's border is in itself a heralder of other extensive activities and that in the near future effective steps toward the country's liberation will be taken. Another important point is the presence of the determined opponents of Khomeyni's regime in Paris whose sphere of influence both inside and outside Iran is widening and the strategy of a number of whom is the gradual elimination of Khomeyni's close associates.

Today's talk cannot end without mentioning another important point, that is, the clashes of opinion among the revolution guards and that following a request by Mahdavi-Kani and Ruhollah Khomeyni's (?confirmation), Mohsen Reza'i was chosen commander of the corps in a bid to prevent differences among its various factions.

Informed political circles in Iran believe that with the continuous attacks by the compatriot Kurds, the pitiless (?attacks) by the combatant patriotic Baluchi, the unrest in Azarbayjan and the presence of sworn armed forces personnel on the Iranian border are all heralders of the end of a regime that, for the past 2 years and some months, has brought nothing but death and calamity and the destruction of Iran's ancient culture.

CSO: 4640/103

CLANDESTINE REPORTS ON DOMESTIC UNREST

NC181722 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 18 Sep 81

[Text] According to news agency reports, clashes between armed combatants and Khomeyni's hireling revolution guards continued yesterday, the 12th consecutive day of clashes between them.

In view of the fact that there are no foreign correspondents in Iran and in order to keep the people uninformed about incidents in Iran, reports on the armed clashes in Tehran and other towns are not broadcast as they should be by the world's mass media. But Free Voice of Iran correspondents have sent various reports on the clahses in Tehran, Shiraz, (?Isfahan), Kordestan, Baluchestan, the Persian Gulf coastal provinces and cities in the northern part of our homeland which will be broadcast for your information.

According to a Free Voice of Iran [VFOI] correspondent, explosions and clashes occurred in several parts of Tehran yesterday and a number of Khomeyni's revolution guards and the regime's officials were killed. In demonstrations held in Tehran, the demonstrators expressed their disgust over the fascist acts of Khomeyni's regime and chanted the slogans "Death to Khomeyni" and "Death to reaction." In the offensive against the regime's leaders, a bombwas hurled at a house in Tehran where a number of the regime's officials live, killing three and wounding three. Because of the problems faced by the FVOI correspondent in contacting our clandestine transmitter, he was unable to give details about the three people killed. Tehran's censored newspapers too did not mention the names of the persons killed. So far, we have received no reports on the losses inflicted on the revolution guards in the last 2 days of clashes. However, in one armed clash in front of a Mojahedin-e Khalq meeting place several guards were killed.

The FVOI correspondent reports from northern Iran that yesterday, too, big clashes broke out between armed combatants and mercenary revolution guards in which more than 15 guards were killed and wounded. These clashes followed massive anti-regime demonstrations supported by armed combatants. Our correspondent also reports that anti-regime demonstrations in northern Tehran were more massive than the demonstrations on previous days. The armed combatants are expected to heighten their armed activities in the coming days.

According to the same reports, the wave of strikes is gradually spreading to government organizations and offices. In addition 33 people were arrested following the strike by employees of the tobacco company.

The FVOI correspondent reports that simultaneous with the intensification of the armed combatants' clashes with the guards, the assassinations of personalities and officials of the regime and of people close to Khomeyni are increasing. Yesterday in Shiraz, Hojjat ol-Eslam (Habib), a fundamentalist clergyman was assassinated by armed opponents. In Mashhad, a famous fundamentalist clergymen was killed by a shot fired by an unidentified person. The name of this clergyman has not yet been announced and the occupied radio of the "Islamic" regime has not mentioned it.

Meanwhile, Khomeyni's regime is continuing to execute combatant and freedom-seeking youths and adolescents in the prisons. Nineteen combatant and revolutionary youths of our homeland, including a 16-year-old girl, have been sent to the gallows. During the past 2 and 1/2 months Khomeyni's regime has executed more than 1,850 people without trials. In the same period, about 2,000 people have been placed in Khomeyni's (?prisons).

CSO: 4640/103

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON MADANI SLAYING

NC121607 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 12 Sep 81

[Text] A new organization opposing Khomeyni's regime has assumed responsibility for murdering Asadollah Madani, Khomeyni's representative in Azerbayjan. This was reported by the French newspaper LE DAUPHINE LIBERE.

According to the French newspaper, an anonymous person contacted the newspaper's office by telephone and said that an organization, of which he himself is a member, is responsible for the killing of the Tabriz Friday imam, Asadollah Madani. The French newspaper reports that the anonymous person, who said that he was an Iranian, told the shift employee of LE DAUPHINE LIBERE that the movement of the followers of the religions law [Nehzate-e Peyrovan-e Shari'at] is responsible for the slaying of Asadollah Madani in Tabriz.

This Iranian, who refused to give his name, added that in the near future the movement of the followers of the religious law will implement other plans against Khomeyni's regime. He said that among his organization's plans are those to kill elements close to Ayatollah Khomeyni and officials of the regime ruling Iran.

The only thing the undentified person said about the movement of the followers of the religious law is that this movement has great influence in Mashhad, Yazd, Lorestan, Kordestan, Azerbayjan and in the areas near Turkey along the Iranian border, and that it includes a great number of people. The LE DAUPHINE LIBERE also added that the unidentified person said that the center of the movement is in Tabriz. He announced that from now on the members of the movement will commence extensive underground activities. The French newspaper has not made any reference to whether the movement of the followers of the religious law has assumed responsibility for slaying other officials of Khomeyni's regime or not.

After announcing this the Free Voice of Iran's political analyst said that the slaying of Asadollah Madani in Tabriz is probably connected with the recent execution in the city.

CSO: 4640/103

BRIEFS

PETURN OF FUNDS DEMANDED--Tehran, 16 Sep (PARS News Agency)--The head of Iran's nuclear power plant, Reza Amrollahi, said in Tehran yesterday that in response to a lawsuit by the German Kraftwerk Union filed with the International Arbitration Court in Geneva, Iran has demanded the return of all money it has paid to the German company for the company's violation of the text of its agreement with the Iranian Government. He said sometime after the culmination of the Islamic revolution the provisional government cancelled its earlier contracts with the German Kraftwerk Union because Iran would thereby have to expend as much as 7.8 billion Deutsche marks and at the same time enter into numerous costly sub-contracts incurring unfathomable costs. The Iranian offical said following the cancellation of the contract the German company had filed a claim for damages to the tune of 1.7 billion marks with a Paris tribunal. He said the lawsuit is now being investigated by an arbitration court in Geneva. The Iranian nuclear official added that the German Kraftwerk Union had violated certain provisions of its agreement with Iran including its due delivery to Iran of parts and components which it was bound to deliver before the Islamic revolution. He added insofar as the text of the agreement stipulates Iran has no commitment to the contracting company until such time as all parts and machinery ordered are fully unloaded in the Iranian ports, and that on the strength of the text of the contract Iran has demanded the return of the money so far paid to the German contractor. Amrollahi noted that Iran is making an effort to use all available machinery to its optimum. [Text] [LD160950 Tehran PARS in English 0755 GMT 16 Sep 81]

RESISTANCE COUNCIL CALLS FOR STRIKES--Paris, 19 Sep (AFP)--The Paris-based Iranian National Resistance Council has called on supporters in Iran to "organize strikes" to oppose the "dictatorship" of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni and obtain the respect of national and popular rights, the group said here today. In a communique, the council said that the strike call had been distributed in Iran during the past week by the Peoples Mojahedin, the major opposition movement to the Iranian Islamic regime. [Text] [NC191240 Paris AFP in English 1229 GMT 19 Sep 81]

GUNBOATS IN INDIAN OCEAN--Algiers, 22 Sep (AFP)--Three French-built Iranian gunboats, attacked off the Spanish coast in August by an anti-Khomeyni commando, are now in the Indian Ocean, sailing toward Iran, Western diplomatic sources reported here today. The three vessels reached the Indian Ocean via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea after a brief stop in Tripoli, the sources said. The Khanjar, Meyseh and Tabarzin left military dockyards in Cherbourg, western France,

on 1 August. The Tabarzin was boarded on 13 August by a party of armed anti-Khomeyni gunmen off Cadiz, Spain. The gunmen surrendered to the French Navy in the southern port of Toulon 6 days later and the Tabarzin sailed to the Algerian port of Mars-al-Kabir to rejoin the other two gunboats. There had been no news of the three vessels since they left Mars-al-Kabir on 2 September. [Text] [NC221222 Paris AFP in English 1117 GMT 22 Sep 81]

CODED MESSAGES REPEATED--Attention, attention! Coded messages to the armed combatants, communications branch: Please record these messages and after decoding them inform the supplies branch: Resistance cell of unit 44: the storks are on their way. [Repeated] Resistance cells 19, 21 and 30: The chests of Shiraz, Esfahan and Tabriz are ready. [Repeated] Unit 51: The Friday mosque, range two, is waiting. The sweets have been sent in a box. [Repeated] Unit 24: The flowers have blossomed. The apple boxes will be sent tomorrow. [Repeated] Units 12, 9 and 38: Open the locks. The eagles will return to their nests. [Repeated] Pay attention to the general code numbers: 25, 34, 96, 071, 333. [Repeated] The lights are on. Over. [Text] [GF131626 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 13 Sep 81]

OFFICIAL RECEIVES BELGIAN AMBASSADOR--The central news unit reports that the Belgian ambassador to Tehran this afternoon met with the political undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of our country. At this meeting questions of expanding the political and economic relations between the two countries were discussed. The political undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs elaborated on the stance of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran with regard to world political issues and the war imposed on Iran by the Ba'thist regime of Iraq. [Text] [LD121809 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 12 Sep 81]

GOVERNOR DENIES KEROSENE SHORTAGE--Muslim Khuzestani people, following the issuance of a rumor that the price of kerosene will be increased, we have deemed it necessary to inform you Muslim people--who are always on the scene--that the price of white kerosene used in houses will not be increased under any circumstances. Its price is fixed at 2.5 rials per liter. The cost of white kerosene used in houses will not be increased in the future. It is necessary to remind you that the formation of long lines to purchase kerosene and the storage of petroleum products is very dangerous and violates every precautionary rule. [Text] [Communique issued by the Public Relations Department of the Khuzestan Governor General's Office on 17 September 1981] [GF171542 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 17 Sep 81]

SHAH'S MESSAGE DISTRIBUTED--World news agencies have reported that the activities of monarchist groups inside and outside Iran have greatly intensified. According to these reports, cassette tapes and numerous statements supporting Reza Pahlavi, the son of the late shah of Iran, have been widely distributed in various Iranian cities and some Tehran neighborhoods. In these cassette recordings of Reza Pahlavi's

message, it is said that we have a shah who is awaiting the people's invitation to return to Iran. Informed sources and political observers in Tehran have stated that this is the first noteworthy move by monarchist groups in the past few months. [Text] [NC181738 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 18 Sep 81]

ANTI-BAZARGAN WAVE--Mehdi Bazargan has described Behzad Nabavi's remarks as baseless. Nabavi has said that during his premiership Bazargan gave opponents of the regime and the Mojahedin-e Khalq the opportunity to infiltrate government organizations. Bazargan, Khomeyni's first prime minister, strongly rejected these remarks. In the staged Friday prayer in the Tehran University, Musavi-Ardabili too bluntly called owners of the MIZAN newspaper U.S. agents. We wish to remind you that MIZAN newspaper, which published Mehdi Bazargan's views, was closed down together with Bani-Dadr's ENQELAB-E ESLAMI newspaper, the national front's organ JEBHE-YE MELLI and the (?Tudeh) Party's organ KARNAME-YE MARDOM, all of which were banned by the regime some months ago. Recently, attacks on Bazargan and on his group by Khomeyni's regime and the mullahs have increased. Some time ago Hashemi-Rafsanjani strongly criticized Bazargan and the group supporting him during a meeting of the clerical majlis. [Text] [NC191732 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 19 Sep 81]

ENVOY RETURNS FROM USSR--Last week Mohammad Mokri, the Khomeyni regime's ambassador to the Soviet Union, returned to Tehran in order to report to Khomeyni on his activities in Msocow. It is said that during his visit to Tehran, Mokri conveyed the Kremlin leader's proposals and conditions for continuing its support for the Islamic regime, which consisted of giving a wider hand to Tudeh Party members in ruling the country. Well-informed sources believe that Khomeyni's regime intends to use the said experts and officials in Savama and in the huge intelligence service that supposedly is to be established. [Excerpt] [GF201650 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 20 Sep 81]

OPIUM ARREST--According to the central news unit, the personnel of the Kami post near Torbat-e Heydariyeh, yesterday succeeded in discovering 57 kgr of opium from a person who intended to travel to Mashhad from Zabol. He was handed over to judicial officials. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 19 Sep 81]

DRUG SMUGGLERS--According to a PARS News Agency dispatch, in an armed clash between the Islamic Revolution Guards and members of the antinarcotics staff on the one hand and five professional smugglers on the other which took place in the (Nashtighan) region in Khash yesterday, three smugglers were wounded and another two were captured. According to the same dispatch 140 kg of opium were found on the smugglers and the wounded were moved into a hospital for treatnment. The other two who were captured were handed over to Mashhad's Islamic Revolution Public Prosecutor's Office. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 19 Sep 81]

CSO: 4640/103

FINNISH FIRMS, AFTER YEAR OF UNCERTAINTY, START PROJECTS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 1 Sep 81 p 26

[Article by Renny Jokelin: "'Vise-Phenomenon' Has Passed, Iraqi Projects Again in Full Swing"]

[Text] After nearly a year of uncertainty and unrest the exports projects of Finnish enterprises in Iraq once again resumed normal operations in the fall.

Over the summer Finnish firms received approximately 1 billion markkas in continuation funds and exporters are relatively optimistic about continuation work. In the opinion of many, Finnish resources are, however, beginning to reach the saturation point in one country.

The reputation of the Finns suffered some blows in Iraq primarily as a result of the problems and bankruptcy struggle by Vise and the VS-Group. In the first part of summer the Iraqis became fed up with the situation and unilaterally decided to cut off all negotiations with the Finns for a full month. VS was finally able to re-solve the situation and now several Finnish contractors are breathing cautious sighs of relief: we are living in a period after Vise, a spectacle which could have become a nightmare has now passed.

At the present time the Finns have contracts worth approximately 3.5 billion markkas. This sum is, however, quite prone to fluctuate for many reasons. In several projects development has already progressed so far that a portion of the money has already been paid and a part of this amount is already in Finland. According to some calculations, the sum of the "projects currently under construction" includes in their entirety even such projects which are almost completed.

Thus, for example, the completion of the conference center contract in the capital city of Baghdad next year will drop 800 million markkas from the sum in one fell swoop.

Enterprises have not announced the markka value of their projects partly because of competition, partly at the request of the Iraqis. In many instances the final monetary value of the project is not known since it is normal that the project will swell by 15--25 percent due to delays and overruns.

In talking about the value of these projects the sums normally quoted are those of the original estimates for the projects while still in the planing stage. The Iraqis are no more enthusiastic than the Finns about publicly quoting fluctuating money amounts.

All this is further complicated by the fluctuations of the U.S. dollar since the majority of the projects in the Near East is arranged in dollars.

"Nationalization" of Labor Force

In recent months a clarification of the situation has once again brought hundreds of Finnish workers and family members to the enclaves of barracks in the middle of the desert. Many of those returning have not even been frightened by the continuing war between Iraq and Iran, which has, however, quieted down to a subdued stationary war.

Due to the continuous back-and-forth traffic there are no reliable figures on the number of Finnish workers in Iraq. According to the Association of Construction Contractors there are close to 2,000 Finnish workers in Iraq, or the same amount as there was when the border war broke out in September.

At the end of last year the number had dropped to 250—350 Finns while, on the other hand, Pakistanis, Filipinos, and Iraqis on Finnish payrolls continued to work. According to an interview conducted by HELSINGIN SANOMAT there are at this time more than a 1,000 Finnish workers in Iraq and more than 3,000 other related people.

Many enterprises have attempted to "nationalize" their projects, in other words, Iraqis or workers from the Third World have been trained for more demanding jobs. At many job sites -- particularly in continuation projects -- Finnish participation is limited to supervision, planning, and the execution of more demanding phases.

Peak Period Next Year

Only a couple months ago Finnish contracts in Iraq were clearly experiencing a downward trend. According to current schedules the majority of previous contracts will conclude in the middle and fall of next year. The milestone is the summit conference of nonaligned countries, which will be held in Baghdad.

The capital city's conference center and the luxury hotels surrounding it must be completed before the above-mentioned conference convenes. Several of the Lohja Company's units and projects will be completed by the fall of 1982. Without new agreements the number of Finnish projects will decline at a stable rate.

The most recent Finnish project is the 600-million markka construction project obtained by Perusyhtyma and Vesto in the beginning of August. The agreement provides that these companies will deliver to the Iraqi State Construction Association (Sccco) multipurpose facilities, libraries, movie theaters, restaurants, and meeting- and sports facilities over the next 3 years.

Of the 600 million 70 percent will go to the Finnish firms, which is an exceptionally large share. Normally the percentage of the project amount going to Finland is calculated to be 20--30 percent.

The enterprises want to avoid the "Vise-phenomenon" at all costs and concluded the agreement in the greatest secrecy. The enterprises are also not revealing the locations of the construction sites in accordance with the requests of the Iraqis.

Perusyhtyma will in addition to the above construct a municipal facility for the city of Mosul alone. The project is estimated to last until 1982 and its value will be 160 million markkas.

Another recent contract is the AS-companies' (Are Company and Sahkoliikkeiden Company) deliveries of equipment and construction materials to three cities at a value of 350 million. This contract is a result of unfinished work by the bankrupt VS-Group, which a year ago was involved in a several billion markka air-conditioning and electrification contract.

It has been calculated that the contract will provide 600 man-years of work and will last 40 months or there will be enough work for 200 people for 3 years. Approximately one-third of the project will be completed in Finland and a third in Iraq with Finnish labor. The remaining third will be accomplished by foreigners in Iraq.

Constracts concluded over the summer also include Valmet's agreement for exporting 50 million markkas' worth of tractor-excavators. Valmet will build the excavators in completed plant faclities. Later the annual production will be increased to 600 units.

Around the Palace

The largest single Iraqi project has been the conference palace to be built in Baghdad, which has been contracted by a consortium of four Finnish enterprises, the Irco Group. It includes Lemminkainen and its sister company Palmberg as well as Polar and Terasbetoni.

The contract obtained in July 1978 was orginally supposed to have been completed in the fall of 1981, but the war and expansion work on the contract have stretched out the schedule. Director Antero Kallio of Irco states that the project will be completed by the end of March 1982.

According to Kallio the value of the project has increased "significantly" from the 500--600 million. This means approximately 200 million markkas.

Irco is employing 450--500 Finns on the palace contruction project, approximately 50 other Europeans and more than 1,000 Asians. The front portion and framework of the palace are completed, finishing work and the interior remain to be done.

Numerous other Finnish enterprises with smaller contracts and subcontracts have gathered around the palace.

The electrical work worth tens of millions has been given to the Elco Group, which includes Are, Hankkija, and Sahkolahteenmaki. In May 1980 Finnav received a 5.5-million marrka acoustics and sound project.

Huber has received a 40-million markka heat and water equipment installation contract for the luxury hotel, Residential, to be built near the palace. The project has doubled in value in a couple years. There are approximately 45 Finnish workers on the project, which will be completed by the end of the year. Huber is doing the work as a subcontractor for a Swedish firm.

Lohja Has Additional Projects

The Lohja Company, which is negotiating with the Iraqi State Construction Association on completing Vise's unfinished portion of the agricultural institute contract, is at this time the front runner for any new projects. The value of the completion work is approximately 150 million markkas.

Project Export Director Arto Korhonen of Lohja believes that a positive agreement will materialize in September or October as a result of the continuation work. At the present time these continuation projects are employing 100 Finns and a couple hundred Pakistanis for 2 years.

Lohja participated in the construction of 28 technical and vocational schools and six agricultural institutes together with Vise and Sccco. Lohja's portions of the project will be completed at the end of the year. The withdrawal of Vise from the picture transferred the completion of the projects to the other partners in the work group.

At this time Lohja is employing 300 Finns, 650 Pakistanis or Filipinos as well as 50--100 Iraqis in its Iraq projects.

The value of Lohja's contracts is now approximately 300 million markkas. Lohja has built five element plants in Iraq and elements are being delivered for 2,600 housing units.

According to Korhonen the Al Qaim plant- and delivery project is more than half done and work is progressing normally. The war between Iraq and Iran delayed the project 3--4 months, but the time will be made up by 90 Finnish and 300 Pakistani workers. The Al Qaim contract is worth approximately 250 million markkas.

Lohja's most recent projects are the two element plants and deliveries for a railroad project agreed upon in June and August of 1980. Lohja will build stations between the cities of Al Qaim and Ramad. The value of these projects is approximately 45--48 million and they will employ a total of 30 Finns and 200 Pakistanis or Filipinos. Both projects are to be completed in the fall of next year. More than half of June's deliveries and one-third of August's are completed.

An attempt is being made to minimize the proportion of Finnish workers in these projects by means of training.

Nokia to Begin

More promising prospects for the future have been predicted for Nokia, whose sister company Nokia Engineering is currently beginnin work on two projects valued jointly at 400 million markkas. Included in these projects are numerous subcontractors, the Ensio Miettinen Company, among others.

The majority of the largest 350-million-markka contract is taking place in the two sections of Baghdad, where Nokia is delivering and installing electric cables. Cables amounting to a value of 55 million will be extended to a "thousand" small villages, the location of which the Iraqis are not quite clear.

The 400--500 million-markka continuation contract is predicted for Nokia, but according to Assistant Director Matti Nuuttila it is premature to talk about any "negotiations".

The Malempo Group formed together with the Iraqis by Lemminkainen and Polar will also begin a new contract. The consortium has delivered 140 million markkas' worth of municipal engineering equipment to the Doran section of Baghdad.

The second phase just acquired will last 2.5 years and is valued at 110 million. It will employ only a few Finns, but approximately 500 Iraqis.

Yleinen Insinooritoimisto (YIT) [General Engineering Office] and Vesi-Pekka have contructed a resort area on the island of Tajiat in the Tigris River, the original value of which was 320 million markkas.

According to Lasse Johansson, YIT's area chief responsible for Iraq, 20--25 percent more work could, however, accumulate or 1 million markkas' worth. The war delayed the project a little, but the schedule will be made up with 100 Finns and 550--600 Filipinos.

From Contracts to Exports

In the opinion of several exportors the Finns can look hopefully at Iraq, but, on the other hand, they believe that Finnish resources have already reached the saturation point in one country. Because of risks, projects should also be distributed to other countries.

Kyosti Peippo, the trade counsellor in Baghdad, is urging Finnish enterprises to make a transition from contract projects to exports.

10576
CSO: 3107/124

TEXT OF AMIR RAMADHAN'S SPEECH

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 24 Jul 81 p 3

[Article: "In a Speech to the Kuwaiti People and the Arab and Islamic Community, The Amir Calls for Effective Confrontation of Israel and Those Supporting It; Demands that the Arabs Rise to Their Historical Responsibilities"]

[Text] His Highness the Amir of Kuwait called on the Arab Nation to reject the concept of trying to dominate one another to restore the lack of trust among themselves, and to rise to their historic responsibilities, at this decisive stage of their lives, in order that the Arabs may have comprehensive and effective positions, with which to confront Israeli aggression and those who support it.

In a speech directed to the Kuwaiti people, and the Arab and Islamic community, on the occasion of the last ten days of Ramadhan, His Highness said that the bloody aggression against Lebanon and the heroic Palestinian people, and the killing of innocent civilians without discrimination, can only be considered a new Dayr Yasin, perpetrated by the same evil hands, who have killed innocents before, blown up houses, and thrown the martyrs down the village well.

His Highness added that this aggression was the Ramadhan salutation and greeting card, which Israel sent to the Arabs and Muslims, and to all peace loving people. With respect to the world around it, Israel only exists among protests, condemnations and valueless resolutions, some of which are closely supportive of it, in terms of effective opposition.

His Highness asserted that distrust and the desire of some to dominate others does not give an opportunity nor yield benefit in any meeting or joint undertaking. Intentions must be improved. He called for effective support for Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution, which must have an effect on Israel and those who support it. Without this support, Israel could no nothing. His Highness said that the first thing to do was for us to speak out frankly about our problems. After the divisive and argumentative words, one word becomes clear and that word is will. The will is a positive and continuous action.

His Highness also called for consultation among Muslims, in the name of the Prophet of God, may God's prayers and peace be upon him, to stop the shedding of Muslims' blood during these holy months, referring to the Iraqi-Iranian war.

At the conclusion of his speech, His Highness implored the citizens to adhere to national unity, increase their strength and the love in their hearts, and reject

those who wish evil for the country, so that it will continue to be, as it always has been, a secure and safe haven for its sons and residents. He said that each individual and institution should bear the responsibility, upon which that depends.

Text of the Speech

The following is the text of the speech of His Highness the Amir of the country:

"In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Praise be to God, the Lord of the world. Peace be to our lord, Muhammad, seal of the prophets, and on his companions, and those who follow him until judgment day.

My brothers:

I wanted to speak to you during this most holy month, the month of Ramadhan, and during the best days, the last ten days, in which we enjoy the night described by God, may he be praised, as: "The Night which is better than a thousand months. The angels and the Spirit descend in it with the permission of their Lord--granting Peace till the rising of the morning."

May God save you and grant you long life [etc.]

May you prosper, and God's blessings be upon you.

May God grant us success and bring us the blessings of Ramadhan.

May we carry faith and piety through the remainder of the year, and increase our capacity for bearing responsibility. Responsibility is faith in religion and in this world. It is fulfilling the law of God, the nation and the people.

The Prophet of God says: "All of you are the flock, and all of you are responsible for the flock."

In this noble saying, responsibility appears clearly defined, distributed and balanced within the community. Each individual and institution bears responsibility, in light of this prophetic saying.

A New Dayr Yasin

My brothers,

In this blessed month, in which the unity of the Muslims is expressed through abstinence and love, the faithful crowding the mosques, and the flourishing of study groups and Koran readings...

In this month, we saw bloody aggression against Lebanon, and against the heroic Palestinian people, and the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians, including many men, women, children and the elderly.

It was a new Dayr Yasin, perpetrated by the same criminal hands which have killed innocents before, blown up houses, and thrown the martyrs into the village well.

This is the solutation of Ramadhan, and the greeting card, which Israel has given to the Arabs, Muslims, and to every friend of Islam.

The Attack on Iraq

Before this, there was the perfidious attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, a blow against the Arab march toward scientific progress. And before this, a long series of attacks, from which the al-Aqsa mosque was not safe, nor the Church of the Resurrection, nor muslim or christian holy men.

It is a comprehensive plan of aggression (against the holy sites), which extends into the past and continues into the present by attempting to erase its signs, and by attacking it and destroying it. That action is also continuing into the future through restricting access and striking at its institutions. With respect to the world around it, Israel only exists amid protests, condemnations, and useless resolutions, some of which are closely supportive ofoIsrael, in terms of effective opposition.

A Major Power Supports Israel

Israel could not carry out such aggression if it were not for the support it receives from a major power, which claims to carry the flag of justice and human rights. This power supplies Israel with money, science and advanced weapons, and supports it officially and actively in the international arena. This assistance is being increased and broadened, despite everything that Israel is doing.

Countering Israel and Those Who Support It

My brothers,

While we are seeing Arab land being devoured, illegally seized, ruined and devastated, we see disputes between the Arab nations and powers, becoming worse in their intensity and wider in their scope. Distrust, and the desire of some to dominate others, does not give scope for opportunity nor bear fruit, in any meeting or joint venture, unless intentions improve. There is no obstacle that can block our path, if we rise above all this, to the height of our historic responsibilities, at this decisive stage in our lives. The Arabs must have comprehensive and effective positions, with which to confront the Israeli aggression and those who support it. It is a repeated aggression, and it has begun to expand.

We do not want our support for Lebanon and the Palestinian revolution to be mere words; that cannot relieve famine nor stop aggression. On the contrary, our support must be effective against Israel and those who support it for without this support, Israel would be helpless.

This cooperation among us should not be a transitory thing, which ends when the problem is finished, rather, it should be an ongoing matter and a way of life which many nations, larger in size and resources than us, have been following, and the positive benefits of which have been realized. Only then would Israel, and those who support it, realize that we will defy them in a new language, which only they can understand, as events have proved.

My brothers,

The first thing we must do is to talk over our problems among ourselves frankly. After the divisive and argumentative words, one word shall be clear to us, will. The will is a positive and continuous act. Hence, I wish to say to my nation:

Lets go forward as equals, so that we can bear together the responsibility of the present and future, with all our forces and our strength!

My brothers, God bless and watch over you. His prophet and the true believers called for consulation, especially if matters worsened for them. He said:

"Thus it is by God's mercy that thou art gentle to them. And hadst thou been rough, hard-hearted, they would certainly have dispersed from around thee. So pardon them and ask protection for them, and consult them in (important) matters. But when thou hast determined, put they trust in God. Surely, God loves those who trust (in Him)."

The faithful extol, by saying in prayer:

"Those who respond to their Lord and pray, and deliverate among themselves shall be rewarded."

The best kind of deliberation occurs in an atmosphere of friendship and compassion, along with clarity of objective and resolution of direction.

A Call to Stop the Bloodshed of Muslims

My brothers,

At the third Islamic summit conference, Kuwait called for the formation of an Islamic court of justice, created for the issues, judgments and interests among the Islamic nations. It supported and still supports any effort leading to the saving of Arab and Muslim blood. It supports the efforts of reconciliation and peace committees.

We are now in the blessed month of Ramadhan, and are approaching the pilgrimage season. Can we not stop the shedding of Muslim blood in this blessed season? It is a cry from our Lord in his blessed book, which I voice. I believe that the millions of Muslims should likewise voice their cries, to their brothers in Iraq, and to our brethren in Islam in Iran, in order to stop the fighting, and leave to the judges and the people of good offices to determine, on their part, what is just for neighbours and brothers.

A Secure and Friendly House

My brothers,

I pray to God for his blessings upon you in Kuwait. May we live in friendship and in love, recognizing what is best for our country and defending it with our souls. May we all give thanks to the Lord.

[Several sentences follow giving thanks to the Lord and asking for His blessings upon Kuwait]

In the name of God, the Beneficent, the Merciful. Peace be upon you, and may God shower His mercy and blessings upon you.

7005
CSO: 4304/104

LOAN TO ZIMBABWE REPORTED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Jul 81 p 13

[Article: "Kuwait Loans Zimbabwe KD8 Million"]

[Text] A loan agreement was signed yesterday between the Zimbabwe National Railroad and the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development. By its provisions, the fund will grant a loan, valued at 8 million Kuwaiti dinars, to share in a project to expand the Zimbabwe National Railroad operation.

At the same time, an agreement was signed between the Republic of Zimbabwe and the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development, the obligations for which the borrower contracted were guaranteed by the government.

The loan agreement was signed, on behalf of the Zimbabwe Railroad, by Mr N. Likukas, the director general. The insurance agreement was signed, on behalf of the Republic of Zimbabwe, by Mr Munyar Adzi, deputy finance minister, and signing, on behalf of the fund, was 'Abd al-Latif Yusef al-Hamad, minister of finance and planning, and chairman of the board of the fund.

The project is aimed at expanding the operation of the Zimbabwe railroad, through the purchase of 25 new diesel electric locomotives, each with a capacity of 2200 horsepower, in addition to spare parts, and the training of technicians in their maintenance and operation.

Total costs of the project are estimated at KD8.3 million, of which 96 percent is covered by the fund's loan.

Implementation of the project is currently underway, and it is expected to be completed by the end of December, 1981. The term of the loan is 20 years, including a 3-year grace period. Payment will be in 24 installments, semi-annually, with the first one due on 1 February 1985, and the last on 1 August 2001. Interest on the loan will be 3.5 percent a year plus 0.5 percent annually to cover the costs of administration and loan agreement implementation services.

7005
CSO: 4304/104

AIRLINE FACES GRAVE DIFFICULTIES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 36, 7 Sep 81 p 5

[Text]

Lebanon's national flag-carrier Middle East Airlines is in dire straits, if the accumulating body of evidence on its poor health is at all accurate. First, the airline has sustained heavy losses because of the closure of Beirut airport for 23 days in the Spring; then came the announcement that a contract to buy five Airbuses had been postponed; after that, the company said it was raising its capital to meet operational and investment costs; and the latest news is that MEA may have to consider firing 2,500 of its estimated 5,000 staff, who in any case are being asked to forfeit the extra month's salary paid at the end of the year in order to help the company stay afloat.

In an interview with a Lebanese news agency last week, MEA Chairman Assad Nasr warned of the gravity of the airline's situation and gave the following figures: the volume of operations had fallen by 69 per cent so far this year, in comparison with the same period of 1980. Last year was already a "difficult" one since traffic had fallen by 30 per cent over the previous year.

MEA's monthly losses are estimated at between LL 10 million and LL 12 million ($2.1-2.5 million), and the year's losses are expected to reach LL 71 million ($15 million). Furthermore, the volume of actual work to be done by the company's staff has fallen by 35 per cent compared to 1974, Lebanon's last golden year before the war.

As a result of these factors, continuing insecurity in the country, a worldwide recession in air transport and the high cost of the dollar, Mr Nasr outlined a two-point "rehabilitation" programme. At a first stage, the employees of the airline will be asked to forego the 13th month's salary, paid in many of Lebanon's businesses. The company is in danger, he said, and cannot continue to draw on its reserves, and thus a second stage may be reached when the 2,500 employees may have to be made redundant. In Lebanon's already depressed labour market and widespread disguised unemployment, an extra 2,500 workers will obviously not improve the overall economic situation.

Mr Nasr pointed out that the only hope for the company's survival at present levels of staffing is a rescue operation by the state. MEA's Managing Director, Selim Salam, stated last week that the airline would seek a "soft" loan from the government of LL 50 million, "which the Lebanese government has already offered."

Mr Salam also proposed another plan for rescuing MEA. He said the airline could only be saved if it expanded further and opened new routes. Being considered, Mr Salam said, were new services to North and South America as well as the Far East.

If the company's proposed expansion plan can get off the ground, MEA will begin new services to New York via Paris and to the Far East through the Gulf before the end of this year. A new route to Brazil through Africa is planned for next April. According to Mr Salam, the expanded list of routes will be operated by three Boeing 747s, which the company had leased to Saudia under a three-year agreement that expired last May.

The immediate cause for concern about MEA's finances has resulted from the return of these Boeing 747s. Their lease, which included the crews trained to work on them, brought MEA enough income to cover the salaries of the company's staff. These three Jumbos are now back with no open routes to utilise their capacity, and worst of all, they are MEA's three most fuel-efficient aircraft.

To use these aircraft effectively, MEA has two choices, taken separately or in combination. Either Mr Salam's plan of long-haul routes is followed, or a combined joint venture with Trans-Mediterranean Airways (TMA) has to be hammered out. Lebanon's national cargo carrier, TMA has suffered extensive cutbacks in

its operations to most European capitals and has, like MEA, been threatening widespread redundancies, affecting an estimated 60 professional staff alone, other than semi-skilled and clerical workers.

A look at the seriousness of both airlines' positions suggests that a joint venture or merger between the two should be chosen by both companies – or even imposed on them. The Lebanese government indirectly owns a controlling interest in MEA through its controlling interest in Intra Investment Corp, a major share-holder in the airline. Although TMA is a private company, its owner, Munir Abu-Haidar, has always maintained an open mind to a joint venture with MEA.

MEA's Chairman, by contrast, does not have the freedom of movement enjoyed by Mr Abu-Haidar and his effectiveness has come into question of late, as a result of very long delays over the ordering of fuel-saving equipment. Such delays could be fatal in the airlines business, especially in the present circumstances of MEA.

Later this month, the company's General Assembly will be asked to ratify a capital increase of 50 per cent, decided by MEA's Board of Directors recently. The second in less than a year, the raise will take MEA's capital from LL 100 million ($21.25 million) to LL 150 million ($32 million). Part of the reason behind the increase is the need to finance expenditure associated with the acquisition of new and more economical Airbus A-130s, ordered last year (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, December 1, 1980). The signature of the sales contract was postponed recently because of the highly uncertain future facing MEA (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, August 24).

MEA raised its capital from LL 95 million ($27 million) to LL 100 million ($28.5 million) last November, when the dollar was worth LL 3.50. At record high rates today, when the exchange value of $1 is now LL 4.70, MEA's capital of LL 100 million has effectively fallen by $7.25 million in dollar value since last year.

The shares of the various holders in the company's capital will most probably remain in the same proportion after the increase is approved. At present, a Lebanese-Arab company, Intra Investment Corp owns 63 per cent of the capital, Air France holds another 30 per cent and the remaining 7 per cent is distributed among small share-holders, including the airline's employees.

CSO: 4300/115

FIVE-YEAR PLAN REFLECTS GOVERNMENT'S OPTIMISM

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 35, 31 Aug 81 pp 4-5

[Text]

Somewhat late, Syria's parliament, the People's Council, has approved the country's new five-year development plan for the period 1981-85. The plan calls for annual growth of 7.6 per cent in Gross Domestic Product from S£ 55.273 billion ($1 = S£ 3.927 at the official rate although it has been reported to go up as high as SL 5 in recent weeks) in 1980 to S£ 79.763 billion by 1985. According to the new plan's projections, *per capita* GDP will thus grow at a rate higher than the 2 per cent reportedly achieved under the previous five-year plan.

Such ambitious targets reflect the optimism of Syria's economic planners, which is in marked contrast with the government's reported preoccupation in recent months over internal unrest, successive crises in Lebanon, tension with Jordan and near-war with Israel. These factors are understood to have been at least partly responsible for the six-month delay in the ratification of the plan by the People's Council.

The 1981-85 plan envisages a rise of 8.5 per cent annually in Syria's Gross National Product, from S£ 118.1 billion in 1980 to S£ 132.45 billion in 1985, while employment is projected to increase by 4.2 per cent over the same period. Such expansion is to be achieved by continued growth in investment, which is targeted to reach S£ 102.493 billion by 1985 at an annual growth rate of 6.6 per cent. The volume of investments is to be divided between the public and private sectors in a ratio of about 4:1, with public enterprise receiving S£ 80.788 billion and private firms getting S£ 20.705 over the plan period.

Of these totals, S£ 17.2 billion have been earmarked for agriculture, and S£ 734 million will go to tourism, including S£ 233 million for new projects. Education is another area that has been given importance in the investment programme, although no detailed figures have been published. The allocations for investment expenditure in the new plan reflect renewed concern with productivity growth, as there had been a noticeable down-ward shift in Syria's investment spending in recent years, with the main emphasis on current expenditure.

To pay for this new spurt of investments, Syrian planners have forecast a rise of 5 per cent in tax revenues, accounting for 15 per cent of GDP in 1985, compared to 10 per cent in 1980. Furthermore, exports are to be boosted by 6.5 per cent annually, while imports are projected to grow by no more than 3.4 per cent a year, a target which is expected after the recent restrictions applied especially for private sector imports (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, July 20). It is hoped that with these measures the country's current account deficit will drop to S£ 5.65 billion in 1985, from about S£ 6.5-7 billion last year.

Agriculture's share of S£ 17.2 billion in investments over the next five years is roughly triple the amount allocated under the 1976-80 development plan. And while no figures are given for investment in education, the new plan calls for the construction of 23,000 primary level classrooms, 6,000 secondary level classrooms and an end to the double shift system prevalent in most schools whereby one group of students use the buildings before noon and another group in the afternoon. Earlier this year a law was passed introducing comprehensive compulsory education for the 6-12 year-old age group. Previously primary education was only compulsory in certain governorates and some cities.

A major factor affecting the plan's resources is defence, traditionally the largest single sector in Syria owing to the country's position as a confrontation state with Israel. Ever since the Camp David agreements between Egypt, Israel and the US were signed in 1978, Syria has set itself the almost impossible goal of attaining one-to-one strategic parity with Israel. And despite the treaty of friendship and cooperation it signed with the Soviet

Union last year, Syria envisages military spending representing more than 50 per cent of total expenditure of S£30.5 billion under the 1981 budget.

Arab aid inflows are estimated to be running at around $1.4 billion annually, though precise figures are impossible to obtain as there are no official declarations concerning Arab aid. Sources in Beirut estimate that a $4 billion aid package has recently been concluded between Saudi Arabia and the Syrian authorities.

Under the last five-year plan, Syria achieved average growth of 6 per cent annually, half of original projections when the plan was drawn up in late 1974. Syrian planners have admitted that the 1976-80 plan was over-ambitious and that it failed to account for the strains resulting from population growth and the country's poor infrastructure, which resulted in serious bottlenecks in industry and food distribution. Sporadic internal unrest as well as Syria's heavy commitment in Lebanon, where Damascus maintains a 30,000-strong contingent of an originally pan-Arab Deterrent Force, have also resulted in additional strains on the economy.

CSO: 4300/115

GAS STORAGE FACILITIES PLANNED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 27 Jul 81 p 2

[Article: "$320 Million To Build 7 Liquid Gas Storage Tanks On Das Island"]

[Text] A contract was signed yesterday for the design and construction of seven new liquid gas storage tanks on Das island. Three of them are to have a capacity of 80,000 cubic meters for the storage of liquefied natural gas, and for tanks to store liquefied petroleum gas, with a total capacity of 50,000 cubic meters.

The contract is valued at $320 million, out of the total cost of developing a complex of liquefy gas, which will amount to $525 million.

An English firm will implement the project, under the supervision of the Abu Dhabi National Petroleum Company. Work will begin before the end of this year, and the project is expected to be completed in 1985.

His Excellency Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, the minister of Oil and Mineral Resources, and chairman of the board of the Abu Dhabi Liquid Gas Company, Ltd., and Mr William Alexander Boug, chairman of the board of the English firm C. B. I., signed the contract.

The contract signing ceremony was attended by Dr Mahmud Hamra Kruha, director general of the Abu Dhabi National Petroleum Company Ltd.(ADNOC), Dr David Horn, director general of the Abu Dhabi Gas Liquification Company Ltd. (ADGAZ), Mr Idris Habush, the company's deputy director general.

Dr al-'Utaybah said, after the contract was signed, that the project was considered the first of its kind in the Middle East. He said: "In view of its importance, the intention was to develop the project by building new tanks, which will be able to contain the gas products."

He indicated that His Highness, Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Zayyid, the crown prince and deputy supreme commander of the armed forces, would pay special attention to this vital project, which is considered a school for the training of young UAE men in the UAE men in the gas industry.

7005
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END

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No. 2409

INFORMATION ON THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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5 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2409

INFORMATION ON THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY

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NEW LAW ESTABLISHES NASIR MILITARY ACADEMY

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH /The Official Gazette/ in Arabic #31 30 Jul 81 pp 14-25

/Law: "Law No 128 for the Year 1981 Issuing the Bylaws for Nasir Higher Military Academy"/

/Text/ In the name of the people:

The president:

The People's Assembly decreed the following law, and we have issued it:

Article One. The provisions of the bylaws of the Nasir Higher Military Academy accompanying this law are now in effect.

Article Two. The validity of the bills and decrees regarding the Nasir Higher Military Academy that were in effect on the day this law went into effect will remain, insofar as they do not conflict with its provisions, until the executive bills and decrees for it are issued.

Article Three. Law 54 for 1967 on the establishment of the Nasir Higher Military Academy will be abrogated and all provisions conflicting with those of this law will also be abrogated.

Article Four. This law will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH and will be in effect as of the day following its publication.

This law is stamped with the seal of the state and will be executed as one of the laws of the state.

Issued at the Office of the President on 25 July 1981.

/Signed/ Husni Mubarak

Bylaws of the Nasir Higher Military Academy

Chapter One
Formation of the Academy

Article One. A higher armed forces military academy will be established, to be called the Nasir Higher Military Academy, and it will be directly subordinate to the minister of defense.

Article Two. The academy will be competent to do the following:

1. Qualify and develop the abilities and skills of senior officers in the armed forces for occupying higher positions in the armed forces.

2. Qualify and develop the abilities and skills of senior civilian government employees who are nominated by the bodies where they work.

3. Take part in everything related to higher military studies and scientific research in the military sphere and other spheres connected to support of the strategic assets of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

4. Implant cultural and scholarly relations with similar academies and scholarly authorities in the Arab and international contexts.

Article Three. The academy will be composed of:

The Higher War College. This will be competent to:

1. Qualify and develop the abilities and skills of senior officers for occupying positions in the armed forces.

2. Provide instruction and conduct scientific research in the field of military science in order to prepare and qualify senior officers in the armed forces to carry out planning and command activities and manage military operations at the tactical and strategic levels.

The National Defense College. This will be competent to do the following:

1. Qualify and develop the skills and abilities of senior officers in the armed forces and senior civilian government employees for occupying higher positions in the government.

2. Provide instruction and conduct scientific research in the planning field to realize national security and implant national strategy with all its political, military, economic and social aspects.

Other colleges and institutes that are established within the academy by decree of the president, in accordance with a presentation by the minister of defense and recommendation of the academy's higher council.

Departments may be established within the colleges of which the academy is composed by decree of the minister of defense, in accordance with a recommendation by the academy's higher council, with care to avoid duplication in the establishment of similar departments in its colleges.

Chapter Two
Administration of the Academy

Article Four. The administration of the academy will be assumed by:

A. The academy's higher council.
B. The academy council.
C. The director of the academy.

The administration of each college or institute belonging to the academy will be assumed by:

A. The college council.
B. The director of the college or institute.

Article Five. The chief of the armed forces war staff will be in charge of the general supervision of the college and he may request the academy council or the various technical committees in the academy to discuss and study specific issues bearing on general teaching policy in the academy and link them to the requirements of the country, its armed forces and their resurgence in order to express opinions and take decisions with regard to them.

Article Six. The councils stipulated in Article Four and the commands stipulated in the following articles will take charge of the progress of activity within their respective fields of specialization and set forth the activity in a manner achieving the goals of the academy in accordance with the provisions of the stipulated laws, bills and statutes.

Each of these councils may form permanent or temporary technical committees from its members, other members of the colleges or specialists to discuss issues that lie within their fields of specialization.

Article Seven. The academy's higher council will be composed of the following:

The chief of the armed forces war staff, as chairman.

The commanders of the main branches of the armed forces; the heads of armed forces organizations and departments on whose appointment a decree has been issued by the minister of defense;

The director of the academy;
The directors of the colleges and institutes belonging to the academy;

No more than five members possessing competence and technical expertise in affairs of higher military studies or areas related to the purposes of the academy, for a period of 2 years which may be renewed, to be appointed by decree of the minister of defense in accordance with a recommendation of the chairman of the higher council of the academy, as members.

The assistant director of the academy for educational affairs, as secretary.

The chairman of the higher council of the academy may summon any persons to whose information or expertise he may find it fit to seek recourse to attend the council's meetings and discuss matters presented to the council, but they may not have a valid vote.

Article Eight. The higher council of the academy will be competent to do the following:

1. Draw up the general policy for study and scientific research in the academy, work to guide and coordinate it in a manner consonant with the country's needs and facilitate the attainment of the national and scientific goals of the government and the armed forces.

2. Approve the study curricula in the colleges and institutes belonging to the academy and recommend that they be developed.

3. Recommend the establishment of new colleges, institutes and departments in the academy.

4. Approve the draft executive bill of the academy's bylaws and approve the draft executive bills of the colleges and institutes belonging to them.

5. Give agreement to the nominations bearing on faculty members of the academy and approve general policy on the scientific studies of faculty members, in accordance with a recommendation of the academy council.

6. Determine the number of instructors for the academic terms of each college or institute and the places set aside for each military man or civilian within the limits proposed by the academy council, in accordance with its resources.

7. Grant honorary scholarly degrees of the academy or its colleges to citizens of the Arab Republic of Egypt or other countries.

8. Give agreement to the recommendations made by the academy council on granting badges and medals to competent faculty members and prominent instructors.

9. Approve the evaluation of academic degrees and equivalent studies issued by foreign faculties on military and strategic matters.

10. Other matters the minister of defense may see fit to present to the council.

Article Nine. The higher council of the academy will meet by invitation of its president at least twice a year or whenever need so requires. A council session will be valid only if a majority of its members are in attendance. The council chairman will specify the subjects to be listed in its agenda. The transactions of the council will be secret and decrees will be issued by a majority vote. In case of a tie, preference will go to the side voting with the chairman.

Article 10. The chairman of the higher council of the academy will present the council's decrees to the minister of defense for approval and these decrees will be in effect as of the date of approval.

Article 11. The academy council will be composed of: The director of the academy, as chairman.

The deputy director of the academy;
The directors of the colleges and institutes belonging to the academy;
The deputy directors of the colleges and institutes belonging to the academy;
The assistant director of the academy for research, as members.
The assistant director of the academy for educational affairs, as secretary.

The council may invite the heads of departments to attend its meetings when discussing subjects that enter into their field of specialization, but they will not have a valid vote.

Article 12. The council will meet by invitation of its chairman at least once a month or whenever need so requires.

Meetings of the council will be considered valid only if a majority of its members is in attendance, and the chairman of the council will specify the issues to be included in its agenda. Its transactions will be secret and its decrees will be issued by a majority of the votes of those in attendance. If the votes are tied, preference will go the vote of the side the chairman is on.

Article 13. The academy council will be competent to review the following:

1. The presentation of a plan to execute general education and research policy in the academy and presentation of a plan guaranteeing that adequate resources are provided to achieve the goals of the academy.

2. The presentation of a plan to complete and construct buildings and bolster the installations, equipment and libraries in the academy.

3. The regulation of procedures for the admission of students to the academy and recommendation of appropriate numbers of students, matters bearing on various study grants and awards, and the cultural, athletic and social affairs of students.

4. The preparation of general policy on books, memoranda and academic references.

5. The regulation of the academy's administrative and financial affairs.

6. The proposal of executive bills bearing on the colleges and other installations of the academy.

7. The determination of the specializations of the academic departments and recommendation of the establishment of new departments.

8. The presentation of a general system for lectures, discussions, research, graduation certificates and delegation of the necessary authorities for these.

9. Discussion of the report by the academy director and the annual reports of colleges and institutes and evaluation, review and determination of academic systems in the light of all the above and in the context of scientific and educational progress and the demands and advanced needs of the armed forces and the government.

10. Recommendations on granting medals and badges to competent faculty members and prominent instructors in accordance with presentations made by the relevant college and institute councils.

11. Nomination of civilian and military faculty members to occupy scholarly positions.

12. Recommendation of the determination of the study periods of terms, date of the commencement of terms and organization of holidays.

13. Recommendations on granting scientific and honorary degrees of the academy or its colleges or institutes to citizens of the Arab Republic of Egypt and others.

14. Expression of opinions regarding the level and quality of study and research.

The academy council can delegate powers to the academy director concerning some of the above areas of specialization with regard to specific issues for a period of time. The council will have the authority to abrogate any decree issued by the councils of the colleges or institutes of the academy if they are issued in violation of the laws, bills or organizational decrees in effect in the academy within 30 days following conveyance of this decree to the council.

15. Subjects which the minister of defense and the chairman of the higher council of the academy submit to it.

Article 14. A decree on the appointment of the academy director will be issued by the minister of defense in accordance with the recommendation of the Armed Forces Officers' Committee. The academy director will have the special powers of a deputy minister for financial and administrative affairs and the powers of military regional commanders on all military matters.

Article 15. The academy director will take charge of administering the scholarly, administrative and financial affairs of the academy. He will be the one to represent it before other bodies and will be responsible for observing the execution of the laws and bills in effect as regards the academy and the decrees that have been issued by the higher council, within the limits of said laws and bills. He must present a report to the higher council of the academy at the end of each year, after presenting it to the council of the academy, concerning the followup, study and scientific research affairs and other aspects of other activity in the academy and recommendations for upgrading them.

Article 16. Each college or institute belonging to the academy will have a council which will be formed, and whose areas of specialization will be determined, by a decree of the minister of defense in accordance with a recommendation by the academy council.

Article 17. College or institute directors will be appointed by decree of the minister of defense in accordance with nominations by the director of the academy, following agreement by the higher academy council and the main armed forces officers' committee.

Chapter Three
Faculty Members

Article 18. The academy faculty will be composed of military men and civilians who are available full time or less than full time and will be broken down into:

First, heads of departments.
Second, faculty members.

Article 19. Academy faculty members will be appointed by decree of the minister of defense, in accordance with nominations by the higher council of the academy.

Article 20. It is a condition that anyone appointed academy faculty member belong to one of the following classes:

First, military men who have graduated from an academy college or institute or from foreign faculties which the higher council of the academy considers to be their equivalents.

It is permissible to appoint members to the academy faculty who have not graduated to work in fields of specialization which are not represented on the faculty, on condition that they have completed the highest studies in the specializations they are appointed to work in or have prominent scholarly expertise in these specializations, in accordance with the opinion of the academy council and the agreement of the higher council.

Second, civilians who have graduated from a college or institute of the academy, have graduated from an Egyptian university and have acquired the doctoral degree or its equivalent in a subject qualifying them to occupy the position, or who have acquired a degree from an educational authority or acknowledged scholarly institute in Egypt or abroad which the Higher University Council considers equivalent to that, in accordance with the laws and bills in effect.

Article 21. With attention to the provisions of the preceding article, the military faculty member with the most senior rank will be appointed head of the department, and the executive bill of each college or institute will set out the fields of specialization of the heads of departments.

Article 22. It is permissible, by decree of the minister of defense, in case of need, to appoint members to the academy faculty who are military men possessing the conditions stipulated in the preceding articles when they are transferred to retirement for a period of 1 year which may be renewed, in which case the rules and stipulations in effect regarding faculty members will apply to them.

Article 23. In case of need, it is permissible for faculty members and researchers who are not available full time and are exceptional military or civilian scholars in their research and expertise in the subjects assigned to them to be appointed to the colleges or institutes belonging to the academy. This will take place by decree of the minister of defense following agreement by the higher council of the academy, in accordance with a recommendation by the academy council and a request from the college or institute council, for a period of 2 years which may be renewed.

Faculty members who are not available full time may combine their membership with another public position or any other activity that does not conflict with the requirements of this membership.

In all cases, it is not permissible to combine positions of administration in the academy with that of a less than full time faculty position.

Article 24. It is permissible, by decree of the minister of defense, in case of need, for colleges and institutes belonging to the academy to seek the aid of competent foreign faculty members and researchers as visiting faculty members for a temporary period by recommendation of the director of the academy, on the basis of a request from the college or institute council.

Article 25. Compensation for military and civilian faculty members who are not available full time will be determined in accordance with the regulations set forth by the executive bill of the academy, to a maximum of 2,000 pounds per year.

Chapter Four
Students

Article 26. The executive bill will set forth the conditions by which military and civilian students may enroll in the colleges and institutes of the academy. It is a condition for civilian students to register in the National Defense Faculty that they be nominated to assume higher leadership positions in their original places of work and possess the following conditions:

Enjoy citizenship in the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Have obtained university credentials.

During the period of study in the faculty, civilian students will retain all the material benefits they received in their basic positions upon enrolling for study in the faculty.

Chapter Five
Study and Examination Systems and Student Affairs

Article 27. It is a condition for anyone presenting himself to obtain a doctorate in the colleges or institutes belonging to the academy that he be a graduate of an academy college and have obtained a master's degree in military science granted by a military college or institute in the Egyptian armed forces or its equivalent or that he have obtained a master's degree from an Egyptian university or the equivalent if he is a civilian academy graduate.

Article 28. The Arabic language will be the language of instruction in the academy colleges and institutes subject to this law, unless the academy council stipulates the use of another language.

The examination will be taken in the language in which the person giving the paper has studied. The faculty council may in special cases permit the student to answer

in another language, and doctoral dissertations will be written in the language the academy council decides. In all cases, the theses must be accompanied by an adequate summary in Arabic and another one in a foreign language.

Article 29. The council of the academy, on the basis of a request from the councils of its faculties and institutes, will grant scholarly degrees and diplomas attesting to the successful completion of the study courses shown in the executive bill.

The executive bills of the faculties and institutes will, each within its field of specialization, specify the other conditions required to obtain these degrees and diplomas.

These degrees will be given only to people who have successfully completed all the stipulated examinations for acquiring them, as listed in the provisions of the executive bill.

Article 30. Registration for higher studies will be at times stipulated in the executive bills. Registration will take place after the college or institute councils and the academy council have given their agreement, and the registration or abrogation of registration of doctoral theses will be by agreement of the academy council.

Article 31. Doctorates will be fundamentally based on innovative research taking a period of no less than 2 years and will be completed with the submission of a thesis accepted by the adjudication committee. The student may be assigned to perform some advanced studies in accordance with the stipulations of the executive bills. It is a condition for receiving the diploma for a doctoral thesis that it be a work of value giving proof of the personal ability of the student in his research and studies and that it represent a new addition to scholarship.

Article 32. Academy graduates will be granted the following scholarly degrees:

A. Faculty fellow of the Nasir Higher Military Academy, for people successfully completing studies in the Higher War College.

B. Fellow of the National Defense College, Nasir Military Academy, for people successfully completing study in the National Defense College.

C. Fellow of the Nasir Higher Military Academy, for people successfully completing study in the Higher War and National Defense Colleges.

Graduates of the academy will wear a distinctive emblem to be determined by decree of the minister of defense.

Chapter Six
Concluding Provisions

Article 33. The executive bill and other bills and decrees necessary for the execution of this law will be issued by decree of the minister of defense on the basis of a recommendation by the academy's higher council.

Article 34. Five copies of each publication or book issued in the Arab Republic of Egypt in military, scientific, historic, political, economic or social fields with which the academy is concerned as specified by the executive bill will be placed in the academy library free of charge.

In regard to that, the rules and provisions that apply to similar publications and works in Egyptian public libraries and university libraries will be in effect.

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NEW LAW ISSUED ON TROOPS BELOW OFFICER RANK

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH /The Official Gazette/ in Arabic #29 22 Jul 81 pp 19-60

/Law: "Law No 123 for the Year 1981 Issuing the Law on Service of Armed Force Honor Guard Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and Soldiers"/

/Text/ In the name of the people:

The president:

The People's Assembly has stipulated the law whose text follows, and we have issued it:

Article One. The attached law on the service of armed force honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers will be in effect and Law 106 for 1964 regarding the service and promotion conditions for armed force honor guard officers, assistants, noncommissioned officers and soldiers will be abrogated.

Article Two. The provisions of the laws and republican decrees bearing on the modification of basic salaries, including the periodic raises and fixed compensations issued before the date this law goes into effect, will apply to people working in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article Three. The ministers must carry out this law, each within his field of specialization, the minister of defense will issue the necessary decrees to carry it out, and the decrees, orders and instructions issued before this law went into effect will remain valid if they do not conflict with the provisions of this law until they are amended or abrogated.

Article Four. This law will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH.

This law will be stamped with the seal of the state and will be executed as one of its laws.

Issued in the Office of the President, 21 July 1981.

/Signed/ Husni Mubarak

Law on the Service of Armed Force Honor Guard Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and Soldiers

Section One

Chapter One
People Subject to the Provisions of This Law

Article One. The provisions of this law will apply to armed forces personnel of the following descriptions:

A. Honor guard officers, volunteer noncommissioned officers and soldiers and their equivalents.
B. Conscripted noncommissioned officers and soldiers and their equivalents.
C. Noncommissioned officers and soldiers held over in service or called up for reserve service.
D. Student volunteers.
E. Drafted noncommissioned officers and soldiers.
F. Volunteers who are citizens of Arab countries; the rules regulating their voluntary service will be determined by the executive bill.

Chapter Two
Military Ranks and Uniforms

Article Two. The word military person /'askari/ will be applied to everyone joining the military for compulsory military service, by volunteering or through the draft. This term will include all military ranks and grades.

Article 3. The military ranks of noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the armed forces will be broken down into:

A. Basic ranks, which are:

Private /jundi/.
Corporal /'arif/.
Sergeant /raqib/.
Sergeant major /raqib awwal/.
Warrant officer junior grade /musa'id/.
Warrant officer /musa'id awwal/.
Chief warrant officer /musa'id mumtaz/.

B. Master ranks, which are:

Private first class /wakil 'arif/.
Corporal first class /wakil raqib/.
Master sergeant /wakil raqib awwal/.

Chief warrant officers will be given the rank of honorary second lieutenant in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article Four. The insignia and uniforms of the ranks and grades of honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers will be determined by decree of the minister of defense, in accordance with a recommendation by the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

Section Two
Military Service and Types and Periods of Military Service

Article Five. Military service will be voluntary or compulsory.

Chapter One
Compulsory Service

Article Six. The period of compulsory military service will be the period of military service stipulated in the National and Military Service Law issued by Law 127 for 1980.

That will be broken down into active service and reserve service. The National and Military Service Law will specify the rules for such service.

If an individual is conscripted for an additional year in accordance with the National and Military Service Law, it is permissible to authorize that this year be removed, in accordance with the laws and conditions determined by the executive bill.

Article Seven. Conscripts are people performing compulsory service in accordance with the national and military service law.

As regards the provisions of this law, persons of the following description will be considered conscripts:

A. Ordinary volunteer noncommissioned officers and soldiers.

B. Conscripted noncommissioned officers and soldiers whose continuation in service at ordinary salary has been approved for a period not to exceed 1 year following the completion of this compulsory service, until they meet the conditions for re-enlistment at high salary.

C. Noncommissioned officers and soldiers whose return to service has been approved at ordinary salary for a period not to exceed 1 year until they fulfil the conditions for re-enlistment at high salary.

Article 8. Service in the reserve will be either by remaining in service when the date for the person's transfer to the reserve falls due or by his being called for service in the reserve in accordance with the provisions stipulated by law.

During the period in which they remain in or are called up to service in the armed forces, persons in reserve will be treated like conscripts in every respect except financial rights.

Article Nine. The minister of defense may, in accordance with a recommendation by the Armed forces Organization and Management Authority, suspend the transfer to

reserve of some of all conscripts who have completed their compulsory active service period for a period of 6 months which may be renewed one time only, as of their stipulated date for transfer to reserve. This period will be deducted from these persons' reserve service period, they will be considered to have remained in service during this period, and during the period all the provisions of laws and bills bearing on reserve personnel will apply to them as of the aforementioned date. The executive bills will determine the cases in which transfers to the reserve will be suspended, in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Chapter Two
Voluntary Service

Article 10. Volunteers at high salary are persons who volunteer for service at non-commissioned officers' and soldiers' ranks to which grades have been assigned in the armed forces budget and are assigned from among the graduates of educational installations in the armed forces.

It is permissible to accept the volunteer service of women and citizens of Arab countries in the armed forces. The conditions, rules and systems for volunteer service will be determined in accordance with the executive bills.

Persons of the following description will be considered equivalent to volunteers:

A. Compulsorily conscripted persons who show a desire to volunteer at or during their service as of the date specified by approval of the organization and management body which is competent to accept their volunteer service.

B. Compulsorily conscripted persons who complete their active compulsory service and whose request to re-enlist in service at high salary is accepted, as of the date on which the contingent of their year is transferred to reserve.

C. Compulsorily conscripted persons who have completed their active compulsory service and whose request to re-enlist in service at high salary is accepted, as of the date specified by approval of the competent organization and administration body.

D. Volunteers who have previously completed their service and whose request to re-enlist in service is approved as of the date specified, by the approval of the competent organization and administration body.

The validity of the provisions of Article 20 of this law will be observed with respect to the groups listed in Paragraphs C and D.

Article 11. Persons of the following description will be considered students in accordance with the provisions of this law:

A. Any male or female whose volunteer service at high salary is accepted.

B. Compulsorily conscripted persons whose transfer to volunteer service at high salary has been accepted at the start of or during their compulsory service.

This will be as of the date stipulated for the acceptance of their volunteer service or their transfer, up to the date of entitlement for receipt of the high salary.

Article 12. If the service of a volunteer student who has not previously performed compulsory service in the armed service is dispensed with before successful completion of studies, the study period will not be computed as part of his military service period.

Article 13. If the competent organization and management body determines to end the service of a volunteer in the first 3 years of his volunteer service in accordance with the provisions of this law, and he had been compelled to perform military service, he may be compulsorily conscripted for a period which will complete the stipulated period of active compulsory military service. If his volunteer service period exceeds this period, the excess period will be computed as part of his reserve service period.

Chapter Three
Re-enlistment in Service

Article 14. Re-enlistment in Service means granting permission to persons conscripted compulsorily or volunteers to continue in military service in the armed forces after the termination of their active compulsory service or volunteer service, in accordance with the rules and conditions set forth in this law and its executive bill.

Article 15. Re-enlistment in service in the case of conscripts and volunteers will take place in accordance with the rules and conditions specified by the executive bill, with attention to the following:

A. Re-enlistment in service will be on the basis of the individual's desire, in writing.

B. His direct commander will recommend that he re-enlist.

C. He will be physically fit to continue in service in accordance with the medical levels specified by the executive bill.

D. The budget grades must permit this.

In all cases, following re-enlistment, the individual will commit himself to performing the work for whose sake his re-enlistment in service was approved.

Article 16. The competent organization and administration body may approve re-enlistment in service at high salary for conscripts completing their active compulsory service period who, by re-enlisting, wish to continue in active service until they have completed meeting the conditions for re-enlistment, provided that the period in which they are held over not exceed 1 year.

Article 18. The volunteer will continue in service in the armed forces for a period of 5 years as of the date on which he /starts to/ receive high salary unless he completed his service before then for one of the reasons set down in this law.

It is permissible to re-enlist in volunteer service for successive periods every 5 years from the date of the day following termination of the previous volunteer service period. The executive bill will spell out the measures for re-enlistment in volunteer service.

Article 19. Anyone who has completed 15 years of actual service and remains in service until retirement age will be exempt from re-enlistment in volunteer service unless he completes his service before then for a reason stipulated by law.

Chapter Four
Re-enlistment in Service

Article 20. Re-enlistment in service means approval for individuals to resume their military service after having left it, in accordance with the following rules and conditions:

A. The individual's previous military service must have been completed through his transfer to reserve or a civilian position, because he did not wish to re-enlist, or through resignation.

B. His moral rating must not be less than good.

C. No more than 2 years may have elapsed since he left military service.

D. He must be physically fit to return to service in accordance with the medical standards in effect.

E. He must be of good behavior and conduct and a verdict must not have been issued against him for a crime or misdemeanor detrimental to honor and trust.

F. The age of the conscript re-enlisting in service must not be greater than 30 when the re-enlistment was approved.

G. The competent organization and administration body must approve the re-enlistment.

Article 21. Re-enlistment in service in the case of volunteers will be at the same rank at which they completed their service, and the re-enlistment date will be considered a continuation of their service at the rank for which they have re-enlisted. Their seniority will be calculated as follows:

A. If the re-enlistment in service occurred within 1 year of the date on which they left it, their original seniority relative to the comrades who were at their rank will be restored to them. If the comrades have been promoted to a higher rank, they will be promoted to that rank when they have fulfilled the conditions for promotion, except for the condition of remaining in service for the stipulated minimum time period.

B. If the re-enlistment in service occurred later than 1 year after the date on which they left it, they will be put in the numerical position they had occupied on the seniority list at the rank at which their service ended, even if their comrades have been promoted to a higher rank.

Conscripts will re-enlist at the rank in which they were supposed to re-enlist for the first time at a high salary.

Article 22. The competent organization and administration body may approve the re-enlistment in military service of conscripts who have been transferred to the reserve for a period of at most 1 year at ordinary salary, when they fulfil the conditions of re-enlisting, except for the qualification condition.

Approval to disburse high salaries will be made when they fulfil the conditions of qualification during that period. In the event they do not fulfil this condition by the end of the year, their service will end.

Chapter Five
Lost Service Periods

Article 23. Military men will lose the following portions of their service periods;

A. Periods for punishments restricting freedom issued as a disciplinary measure or by ordinary or military courts.

B. Periods of suspended imprisonment for crimes in which their guilt has been proved before ordinary or military courts.

C. Periods of absence without leave in the event of conviction by a military court.

In the event they are sentenced to a disciplinary measure, they will lose the periods of absence without leave, if the periods are greater than 5 days.

D. Periods of desertion.

E. Periods of capitivity in the event of war, if they are taken captive out of their own negligence.

F. The periods of their presence in hospital, if it is proved that they have feigned illness or contrived sickness or injury or if the sickness or injury was caused by a crime for which their guilt is proved.

G. Conscripts' study or training periods in the Reserve Officers' College or educational installations inside or outside the armed forces, if they are not completed successfully, in accordance with the rules and conditions set forth by the executive bill, with care taken that the salary disbursed to the conscripts during the study period not be collected.

The abovementioned lost service periods will not enter into the computation of pensions, compensations, or completion of the two service sections.

Article 24. A maximum period of 30 days of their service periods which they have lost because of disciplinary imprisonment may be restored to them if such a restoration will have the effect of enabling them to transfer to retirment with their contingent. The conditions for this will be specified in the executive bill.

Section Three

Files of Individuals, Lists,Seniority and Competence Reports

Article 25. Two files will be set up for each military person when he first joins the service. One of them will be kept in the competent military records body and the other in the unit where he serves. The data in the file kept in the military records body will duplicate that in the file kept in the unit.

The executive bill will stipulate the data which is to be set down in the file, the method for filling the data out and the method of retaining them.

Article 26. The competent military records body will allocate a military number to each military person which will be set down on the file and his service forms when he is enrolled in service. The number will remain attached to him throughout the period of his service, whether he is in active service or the reserve or has completed his service.

This number will be noted down before the military person's name in all documents, papers and correspondence related to him.

Article 27. The executive bill will determine the conditions for preparing general and special seniority lists for groups of volunteer noncommissioned officers and soldiers who have high salaries, and no modification may be made in this list except in accordance with military orders issued in this regard.

Article 28. Volunteer honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers with high salaries will be subject to the competence report system. These reports will be written up annually and the executive bill will determine the procedures for preparing these reports, the bases to be followed in setting them out, the method for approving them and the manner of protesting against them.

Section Four

Promotion

Chapter One
Promotion to Honor Guard Officer Ranks

Article 29. Promotion of chief warrant officers to the rank of honorary 2nd lieutenant will be in accordance with the following conditions:

A. Their chiefs must so recommend.

B. They must have spent at least 4 years in chief warrent officer rank.

C. Vacant grades in the budget must permit their promotion.

D. They must be fully qualified in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by the Armed Forces Training Authority and that must be approved by the minicter of defense or whoever he delegates.

E. The competent officers' committee must give agreement to the promotion.

Promotion will be in accordance with the seniority stipulated in the chief warrant officers' seniority lists for anyone fulfilling the conditions for promotion.

The chief warrant officers recommended for promotion to the rank of honorary 2nd lieutenant will be nominated and put on probation in their rank for the period of 1 year in their original units. If they pass that successfully, they will be confirmed in the rank of honorary 2nd lieutenant as of the date they were put on probation.

If they do not pass it successfully, the period will be extended for another year in which they will serve in a unit other than their original ones. If they pass that period with success they will be confirmed in the rank of honorary 2nd lieutenant as of the date they were put on probation the second time.

If they do not then pass it with success they will be stricken from the lists of candidates for promotion and will revert to their original seniority relative to the comrades who were with them in their rank.

Article 30. Promotion of honorary second lieutenants to the following honor rank will be in accordance with the seniority stipulated in the seniority lists of honorary officers, whenever they meet the following conditions:

A. They must have spent an actual service period of at least 2 years in the rank of honorary 2nd lieutenant for promotion to the rank of honorary 1st lieutenant, at least 3 years in the rank of honorary 1st lieutenant for promotion to the rank of honorary captain and 4 years in the rank of honorary captain for promotion to the rank of honorary major.

B. Their chiefs must recommend their promotion.

C. Vacant grades in the budget must permit the promotion.

D. They must be fully qualified in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by the Armed Forces Training Authority and that must be approved by the minister of defense or whomever he delegates.

E. The competent officers' committee must give agreement to the promotion.

The honorary officers will not be permitted to present themselves for qualification groups or for examinations for promotion to higher rank more than three times in succession. If they have not passed these examinations successfully, they will remain in service at their rank until the stipulated retirement age unless it is decided to transfer them to retirement before then in accordance with the provisions of Article 109 of this law.

Chapter Two
Promotion of Noncommissioned Officers and Soldiers at High Salary

Article 31. Volunteers at high salary will be promoted to the grade of chief warrant officer by seniority when they fulfill the following conditions:

A. The commander of the main branch, commander of the force or director of the department to which the volunteers belong must so recommend.

B. They must have spent at least the minimum period of actual good service stipulated for service in every grade.

C. Vacant grades in the budget must permit the promotions.

D. They must be fully qualified, as follows:

1. They must have acquired mandatory educational courses and qualifications as stipulated by the Armed Forces Training Authority.

2. They must have gone through the promotion examinations or tests of skill at the stipulated level in accordance with the conditions set forth by the competent body.

E. They must not have been imprisoned provisionally, put under military detention or brought to trial. In the event verdicts of innocence were issued, they will be promoted by the same schedule as they were to have been promoted by in accordance with their seniority if they have met the conditions for promotion.

F. Their good standing must have been restored to them as a consequence of the verdicts of military or ordinary courts, if the effects of the disciplinary penalties imposed on them in accordance with the conditions stipulated by the executive bills have been eliminated.

Article 32. Promotion will be by the seniority stated in the seniority lists for everyone fulfilling the stipulated promotion conditions stated in Article 31. Filling of the grades listed in the budget will be in accordance with the stipulated policy for filling these grades issued by the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

Article 33. Statutes for the qualification of military people who are on assignments or fellowships outside the republic will be set by the Armed Forces Training Authority in cooperation with the Armed Forces Organization and Administration Authority.

Article 34. Military men may not present themselves for examinations for promotion from one grade to a higher one more than three successive times and they may not absent themselves from one of these examinations except in the following two cases:

A. If they have suffered an injury that prevents them from taking the examination and that is established by a report by the competent military hospital. The department to which the military persons who have absented themselves with cause belong must notify the Armed Forces Training Authority of that by a date not to exceed the period in which the examination is held.

B. Their presence on an assignment or fellowship outside the republic.

If they have absented themselves for reasons other than these, that will be counted as one of the three examination times.

It is permissible to dispense with the service of an individual if he has failed the promotion examinations three successive times.

If his service is not dispensed with, he will remain in service until the age of transfer to retirement stipulated for his rank, unless his service is terminated for some other reason. However, in the case of noncommissioned officers of the rank of warrant officer junior grade and above, they will remain in service at their grades until they reach the stipulated age for transfer to retirement for their grades.

Article 35. The minimum periods for promotion for people with high salaries to grades directly above theirs is as follows:

A. At least 2 years in the rank of private, for promotion to the rank of corporal.

B. At least 4 years in the ranks of corporal, sergeant or sergeant major, for promotion to the ranks above.

C. At least 3 years in the rank of warrant officer junior grade, for promotion to the rank of warrant officer.

D. At least 4 years in the rank of warrant office, for promotion to the rank of chief warrant officer.

Article 36. Anyone taking his turn for promotion according to seniority who has not yet completed the actual good service period stipulated for his grade may complete this period from an actual service period which is surplus to the periods stipulated for his previous grades, for a maximum of 2 years, on condition that he have fulfilled the other conditions for promotion and that that be once during his service.

Article 37. The executive bill will determine the powers delegated to each commander in promoting volunteer noncommissioned officers and soldiers to the various ranks listed in this law as well as the rules and conditions regulating promotion to these ranks.

Chapter Three
Promotion of Conscripted Noncommissioned Officers and Soldiers

Article 38. Conscripted noncommissioned officers and soldiers will be promoted in accordance with the conditions and regulations set forth by the Organization and Management Authority in cooperation with the Armed Forces Training Authority.

The executive bill will specify the powers delegated to each commander for promotion to various ranks.

Chapter Four
Master Ranks

Article 39. It is permissible to grant master ranks to noncommissioned officers and soldiers within the following limits:

A. Master sergeant, within the limits of one quarter of the grades allotted to the rank of sergeant major in the budget.

B. Corporal first class, within the limits of one third the grades allotted to the rank of sergeant in the budget.

C. Private first class, within the limits of one half the grades allotted to the rank of corporal in the budget.

Master ranks will be granted to volunteers and conscripts alike, and the executive bills will specify the conditions and rules for granting them.

The grant of master ranks may not result in any changes in general seniority or exemptions from the conditions for promotion for basic ranks, nor may any prejudice to seniority result from the withdrawal of master ranks.

Chapter Five
Exceptional Promotion

Article 40. It is permissible to promote a military person in an exceptional capacity to a following grade or rank, without restriction to the promotion conditions or the minimum period stipulated in accordance with the provisions of this law, if the military person has performed glorious exceptional acts in the battlefield or in service in the armed forces, in accordance with the regulations and conditions stipulated by the executive bills.

Military seniority in the rank to which a person has been promoted on an exceptional basis will be set as of the date on which the promotion took place.

It is not permissible to promote a military person to two basic grades or ranks in 1 year. The year will be calculated as of the date of the first promotion.

Section Five

Demotions in Rank, Determination of Seniority in Rank, and Restoration of Rank

Article 41. Demotion in rank for disciplinary purposes will be to one rank only each time. Demotion in rank will be to one rank or more by decree of a military court.

Demotion in rank for disciplinary purposes for noncommissioned officers, including warrant officers, to three ranks, will be at the discretion of the commanders and chiefs in accordance with the bill on military discipline in effect in the armed forces.

Article 42. If a military person is demoted to a lower rank, his seniority in that rank will be determined by considering him the most senior person in it.

The executive bill will organize the rules and conditions for demotions in rank.

Article 43. It is permissible to consider restoring the rank of demoted military persons to the ranks from which they were demoted, in accordance with the rules and conditions specified by the executive bill to this law.

Section Six

Seniority in Service

Article 44. Seniority among noncommissioned officers and soldiers of equal rank will be as follows:

A. Volunteer noncommissioned officers or soldiers.

B. Noncommissioned officers or soldiers who have remained in service following completion of their active compulsory service period, during the period in which they fulfill the conditions for re-enlistment.

C. Noncommissioned officers or soldiers who have re-enlisted in service after completing their compulsory active service periods, during the period in which they fulfill the re-enlistment conditions.

D. Conscripted noncommissioned officers or soldiers.

E. Reserve noncommissioned officers or soldiers.

F. Drafted noncommissioned officers or soldiers.

Article 45. Seniority among military men who have acquired equal grades in seniority lists will be in accordance with the dates on which they acquired these grades. In case the dates are the same, it will be computed as of the date on which they acquired the previous grade, then the one below that, until date of graduation from the educational installations or the date of joining service. If these are all the same, reference will be made to the graduation seniority lists or seniority by military number, according to the case.

Section Seven

Transfer, Enrollment and Appointment

Article 46. The executive bill will specify the rules, conditions and statutes for transferring military men from one unit to another within armed force branches and departments.

The transfer of military men from one armed force branch to another or from one department to another will take place by decree of the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

In all cases, it is necessary that transfer permits be issued specifying the date on which that is to occur. It will be necessary to effect the transfer as of that date.

Article 47. It is not permissible for military men from one unit to enroll in another. However, in case of necessity, according to the requirements of work imposed by demands of the public interest upon the armed forces, it is permissible for a military person from one unit to enroll in another within his basic branch in the armed forces for a period not to exceed 6 months, in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by the executive bill.

Article 47. It is permissible to appoint a volunteer for a maximum period of 4 years to serve in an armed force unit outside his basic branch, and it is permissible not to be restricted by the appointment period if that is required by demands of the public interest or medical conditions in accordance with the rules and conditions specified by the executive bill.

In all cases, the approval of the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority for this appointment is necessary.

The appointment of honor guard officers will be in accordance with the provisions of Article 61 of Law 232 for 1959 regarding the conditions of service and promotion for armed forces officers.

Section Eight

Transfer from One Occupation to Another

Article 49. It is permissible to transfer a military man from the group for which he volunteered to another one in the following cases:

A. The existence of a surplus among the members of the group for which he volunteered.

B. Consolidation of the completion ratios of various groups.

C. Consolidation of levels of skill, statutes of promotion and interaction within single group or between similar groups in the armed forces.

D. Acquisition of the necessary qualifications and skills for the group to which transfer is desired.

E. A decline in the physical level of the individual from the stipulated level of the group for which he volunteered.

The transfer will take place by approval of the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority, and the executive bill will organize the procedures for transfer from one group to another.

Section Nine

Salaries, Compensations and Bonuses

Article 50. The salaries of military men are:

A. Base salary:

This is the stipulated salary for the grade, including periodic raises, according to the contents of the table accompanying this law.

B. Fixed compensations:

These include allowances and raises from which persons on reserve derive their retirement pay in accordance with Law 90 for 1975 issuing the law on retirement, insurance and pensions for the armed forces.

These include the fixed compensations from which persons on reserve derive their retirement pay for the base salary in calculating the compensations stipulated at a certain percentage of salary.

C. Added Compensations:

These include the allowance and additional raises from which persons on retirement do not receive retirement pay.

The modification of the basic salaries and fixed and added compensations and the rules for applying them will be by decree of the president, on the basis of a presentation by the minister of defense.

Article 51. Military persons will receive the salaries stipulated in the accompanying table, with attention to the following rules:

A. Conscripts who have intermediate credentials will in the last 6 months of their compulsory service period, be granted a comprehensive monthly bonus equal to the first salary level of the class stipulated for their credentials in the government's administrative apparatus.

B. People who have been held over, summoned up or drafted will be dealt with financially in accordance with the abovementioned provisions of Law 127 for 1980 and Law 87 for 1960 concerning general mobilization.

C. Students, as of the date stipulated for accepting their enrollment will receive a monthly bonus equal to the first level of the grade at which it is stipulated they are to leave, until the date they become entitled to higher salaries.

D. Volunteers will be entitled to payment of the higher salary for their rank at which it is stipulated they are to leave, as of the dates stipulated by the executive bill.

E. Conscripts whose continuation in service at ordinary salary until they meet the conditions for re-enlistment has been approved will be granted the salary for the rank in which they remain until they meet the conditions for re-enlistment, and they will then be granted the first salary level of the grade in which it has been approved they will stay, as volunteers at high salary.

F. People re-enlisting in service will be dealt with financially as follows:

1. Conscripts re-enlisting in service at ordinary salary will be granted the salary for the grade to which they return.

2. Conscripts re-enlisting in service at high salary will be granted the first salary level for the grade to which they return.

3. Volunteers who have re-enlisted in service will receive the last salary they had been receiving before they left service, and their status will be settled in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of this law.

Article 52. The financial treatment of honor guard officers will in all cases be in accordance with the provisions of the abovementioned Law 232 for 1959.

Article 53. The salaries of noncommissioned officers who have been demoted one or more ranks in accordance with the provision of Article 42 of this law will be demoted by the amount of the last full periodic raise they received as of the first of the month following the demotion in rank.

Article 54. Military men, when they are promoted up to the rank of chief warrant officer, will be granted the beginning salary level of the rank to which they have been promoted, or one raise for that rank, whichever is greater, provided that that not affect the date on which they are entitled to periodic raises.

Article 55. Military men will be granted their periodic raises on 1 July of each year and their salaries will gradually increase in accordance with their entitlement to periodic annual raises, until their salaries reach or exceed the beginning salary level of the following rank, when they will be given the periodic raise for the class of the following rank. After that, their salary will gradually increase each year as they receive the periodic raises stipulated for the rank annually, provided that their salary not exceed the uppermost level for the rank following their original ones.

The 1-year period at the end of which entitlement to an annual raise will fall due, will be computed as of 1 July following the date of entitlement to payment of higher salaries or the date of the last periodic raise obtained. If this date does not coincide with 1 July, the entitled person will be granted part of the raise, which will be computed on the basis of one-twelfth of the value of the periodic raise for each month of good service, while rounding fractions of a month off to a month.

In any case, periods of lost service or special leaves without salary will not enter into the calculation of periodic raises.

The salary on whose basis the entitlements of persons ending their service before the date on which they are entitled to periodic raises will be settled will be computed by adding a percentage of the raise that is equal to the period they spent in service from the date of their entitlement to the last raise to the date of termination of service.

Article 56. It is permissible, by decree of the president, to grant military persons the following compensations and allowances:

A. Stipulated compensations to meet acctual expenditures.

B. Compensations required by circumstances of service in which the individual is exposed to special dangers or which require the exertion of efforts which are distinguished from those demanded by ordinary service.

C. Nature of work allowances.

D. Residence allowances for people serving in areas where the living conditions demand that such allowances be stipulated, during residence in these areas.

E. Scholarly or professional compensations for people acquiring specific educational or practical credentials or for people holding a specific job or performing a specific occupation.

The measures of disbursing these allowances and compensations will be set out by decree of the minister of defense.

The military allowances and compensations stipulated for actual expenditures which are defined by decree of the president will not be subject to taxes.

Article 57. Honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers with high salaries in the armed forces who are appointed to professions or fields of specialization for which raises, allowances or occupation or specialization compensations are stipulated, or persons accredited in accordance with service laws to general or special staffs in the government, will be entitled to raises, allowances or compensations for the same classes that are stipulated for their equivalents by these laws. It is not permissible to combine them with any compensations stipulated for this purpose in the armed forces; rather, whichever is greater will be paid out.

The granting of raises, allowances or compensations will be as of the date of issuance of a decree in this regard by the minister of defense.

Article 58. It is permissible to grant financial bonuses to volunteers as follows:

A. A financial or re-enlistment bonus, upon approval of the volunteer's re-enlistment for the first time, not to exceed 6 months' salary.

B. A financial or re-entlistment bonus for certain fields of specialization upon re-enlistment to volunteer status for the second time, not to exceed 1 year's salary.

C. An appreciation bonus for reaching retirement age at the end of service, upon transfer to retirement, in execution of the provisions of Article 109 of this law, or for loss of physical fitness, death in combat or ordinary death. This will equal the total of the final salary and fixed compensations for 6 months. In the case of ordinary death or death in combat, the value of this bonus will be disbursed in accordance with the provisions of the aforementioned Article 76 of Law 90 for 1975.

The procedures for disbursing the compensations referred to above will be set forth by decree of the minister of defense.

These bonuses will be exempted from taxes and levies of all kinds.

Section 10

Services on Loan, Fellowships and Study Leaves for Volunteers on High Salaries

Article 59. It is permissible to loan out honor guard officers and volunteers to foreign and international governments, authorities and organizations as well as to local civilian bodies.

To carry out service on loan, it is a condition that the volunteer give agreement to it in writing. The period of the loan will be considered service in the armed forces. The executive bills will specify the period, conditions and circumstances of the loan, and the period of the loan must not exceed 3 years.

The salaries and compensations of persons on loan will all be payable by the body borrowing the services.

Article 60. It is permissible to send honor guard officers and volunteers on fellowships inside or outside the republic for a limited period on the conditions set forth by the Armed Forces Training Authority, in accordance with the stipulations of the executive bill.

Article 61. It is permissible to grant honor guards and volunteers a study leave once, not to exceed 4 years, with or without salary, in accordance with the conditions and rules specified by the executive bill.

Section 11

Leaves

Article 62. It is not permissible for people subject to the provisions of this law to suspend their work except during leaves they receive within the limits of the leaves stipulated in the following articles and in accordance with the regulations and procedures set forth in the executive bill.

Article 63. Leaves for military persons will be broken down into:

A. Ordinary leaves.

B. Occasional leaves.

C. Commander's leaves.

D. Exceptional leaves with salary.

E. Sick leaves.

F. Pilgrimage leaves.

G. Special leaves without salary.

H. Maternity leaves for female volunteers.

I. Leaves for re-enlistment to volunteer service.

J. Leaves for termination of service upon transfer to retirement.

Article 64. Ordinary annual leave periods will be as follows:

Fifteen days, for conscripts.
Thirty days, for volunteers.
Forty five days:

A. For honor guards.

B. For volunteers who have reached age 40 or whose service period totals 20 years of actual service, whichever comes first.

Article 65. It is permissible to grant military persons occasional leaves totalling 7 days per year. It is also permissible to grant them commander's leaves for a period not to exceed 6 days per year if their ordinary and occasional leave periods have been used up.

Article 66. If an honor guard officer or volunteer uses up his ordinary leave period, it is permissible to grant him an exceptional leave at salary for a period of 30 days by approval of the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

Article 67. Military persons will be granted sick leaves upon emerging from hospital or the competent military medical council so recommends.

The executive bills will stipulate the periods for these leaves and the powers that are to be granted, provided that they not exceed 180 days per year. This year will be computed as of the first sick leave to be granted to the military person, for one or more illness, in successive periods. The executive bills will determine the procedures, rules and conditions for granting them and the method for granting such leaves to military persons who have been treated abroad, as soon as they return.

Article 68. It is permissible to grant honor guards and volunteers a pilgrimage leave at full salary; this leave will not be calculated as part of their ordinary leaves, provided it does not exceed 15 days, including the period of round trip travel. This leave will be granted only once during the service period.

Article 69. It is permissible to grant volunteers, after their first service period has ended, a special leave without salary for a period not to exceed 4 years during their service period for compelling reasons, on condition that the Armed Forces Organization and Administration Authority give its agreement and the minister of defense or whomever he delegates give his approval in accordance with the requirements of service, and on condition that during the leave the volunteers remain subject to the Military Verdicts Law and other military statutes. It will not be permissible to wear military uniform during the leave.

It is not permissible to review the subject of persons' promotions or entitlements to periodic raises while they are on leave. Their seniority upon their return from special leave will be determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 21 of this law.

The provision of Article 98 of the abovementioned Law 90 for 1975 will be in effect with respect to the special leave period.

Leaves without salary will not be given to chief warrant officers recommended for promotion to honorary 2nd lieutenant during the period in which they are under probation.

Article 70. Maternity leave with salary and compensations will be given to female volunteers for a period of 3 months a maximum of three times during the service period.

Article 71. Volunteers whose re-enlistment has been approved will be given a re-enlistment leave of 30 days during the first 3 months of their following re-enlistment period. The other leaves they may have been granted or may be entitled to during the year will not affect entitlement to this leave.

Article 72. Honor guard officers and volunteers who reach the legal age for transfer to retirement will be given an end of service leave of 30 days during the last 3 months of their service, and the leaves they may have been granted during the year will not affect entitlement to this leave.

Article 73. Honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers whose travel on all types of leave stipulated in this law, except for leave without salary, will be given free travel permits or forms for railways and all land communications run by the government, the public sector or companies with commitments to the entity from which they wish to take leave.

The grant of these permits or forms, their number and the procedure for granting them annually will be in accordance with the rules and conditions specified by the executive bill.

Article 74. Military men may not work for or without pay for others during the leaves stipulated in the previous articles. If it is proved that they have done so they will be deprived of their pay for the entire leave period, and in addition the rules stipulated in the Military Verdicts Law and its executive decrees will be applied.

However, it is permitted to give military men permits to work during special leaves without salary following approval by the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

Article 75. The Christian year of 1 January to the end of December will be adopted as a basis for calculating the leaves granted to military persons.

Article 76. The executive bills will determine the following:

A. The rules and conditions for granting the leaves specified in the previous articles, the procedures for requesting them and the authorities which can approve them.

B. The method for granting them in circumstances of service in the field.

C. Permissibility of carrying them over from 1 year to the next, reducing their period, postponing them, cutting them off or abrogating them, in accordance with the requirements of the circumstances of service in the armed forces.

D. The military persons' rates of absence from their units and the instructions they are to follow during leave.

E. The measures and authorities for approving leaves spent outside the republic.

Section 12

Duties of military Men, Acts from Which They Are Prohibited, Punishments, and Removal of Punishments

Chapter One
Duties and Prohibited Acts

Article 77. Military persons will swear an oath of obedience upon starting their service. The formulation of the oath and the body before which they will swear it will be determined by decree of the minister of defense.

Article 78. Military persons must perform the work assigned to them by themselves and perform it carefully and trustworthily. They must devote the official working time to the performance of their work; otherwise they will place themselves in a position of doubt and suspicion.

Article 79. Military men will be prohibited from performing any of the following activities by themselves or through an intermediary:

A. Purchasing real or moveable property offered for sale by the administrative and judiciary authorities in the area in which they are performing the activities of their job, if that is connected to it.

B. Performing commercial activities of any type whatever, especially if they have any interest in activities, contracting work, or auctions linked to the activities of their job.

C. Renting land or real property with the objective of using it in the area in which they are performing the activities of their job, if this use has a connection with their work in the armed forces.

D. Participating in the establishment of companies or accepting membership in their boards of directors or any other position in them, unless they are assigned by the government.

E. Gambling in clubs, messes, public places or casinos.

F. Speculating in stock exchanges.

G. Taking alcoholic beverages in public places.

Article 80. Military men may not perform work for others for salary or bonuses or free of charge, even if that is outside official working hours.

Nonetheless, they may, for a salary or compensation, assume the activities of trusteeship, guardianship or power of attorney for absent persons if the persons connected to the trusteeship or guardianship or the absent persons are related to them by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree.

It is permissible for them to assume, for a salary or compensation, guardianship over funds in which they are partners or in which they have an interest or which are owned by people related to them by blood or marriage up to the fourth degree.

In all cases, the individuals must inform their chief's office of this and a copy of their notice will be retained in their service file.

Article 81. Military persons will be prohibited from expressing political or party views, engaging in politics or belonging to parties, authorities, societies or organizations possessing political principles or tendencies.

They will also be prohibited from organizing party meetings or engaging in electoral publicity.

Article 82. Military men may not belong to an authority, society, club or organization of any kind, including benevolent, athletic, or religious clubs, unless they have obtained approval from the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

Article 83. All military information which military persons acquire while performing their duty or while assigned to a special mission will be considered the property of the armed forces and it is not permissible to spread it about in any form. Military men are also not permitted to divulge information or broadcast any descriptions of subjects which must remain secret by their nature or by virtue of special instructions in any form, and it is not permissible for them to express their opinion on any military subject or reveal directly or indirectly any military information to other persons, even after completing their service, unless they obtain special approval from the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority to that effect.

Article 84. Military persons will be prohibited from publishing or printing any government publications, including maps and topographic pictures taken officially or unofficially belonging to government installations or property or any facility connected to defense matters unless they receive permission to do so from the competent department.

Article 85. All military persons will be prohibited from taking any papers, documents, carbons or the like which are related to the work they are performing

outside their area of work without written permission from a responsible officer.

They may not retain any official papers for themselves unless these concern work personally assigned to them.

Article 86. Military persons will be prohibited from helping any private authority or institute in training personnel or students or preparing them for any military tests unless they are officially permitted to do so by the Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority.

Article 87. Military persons will be prohibited from marrying foreign women. Nonetheless, they may, by special permission of the minister of defense, marry female citizens of an Arab country on condition that the father of the wife be of Arab origin.

This will also apply to female volunteers and other women subject to the provisions of this law.

Article 88. Inventions, modifications, innovations or works which military persons initiate while performing their service or as a result of it will be the property of the government in the following cases:

A. If the invention, modification, innovation or work is the result of official experiments.

B. If it is within the scope of their work.

C. If the invention, modification, innovation or work has a connection to military affairs.

Article 89. Military persons who have completed their military service in the armed forces for any reason may serve in foreign armed forces only after receiving special permission to do so from the minister of defense.

Violation of the provisions of this article will be considered a crime and the person committing it will be sentenced to prison for a period no less than 1 year and a fine no less than 500 pounds and no greater than 1,000 pounds, without prejudice to any more severe punishment or other effects arranged by law.

Chapter Two

Punishments and Removal of Punishments

Article 90. Punishments imposed on military persons will be broken down into:

A. Punishment imposed by military courts.

B. Disciplinary punishments imposed by direct commanders and chiefs.

C. Disciplinary punishments imposed by competent officers' committees, as regards honor guard officers, in accordance with the provisions of the abovementioned Law 232 for 1959.

Article 91. Punishments imposed by military courts are listed in the Military Verdicts Law which specifies the military courts' power to impose them.

The Bill on Military Discipline in the Armed Forces will determine crimes and disciplinary punishments, the commanders' powers to impose them, and the method for removing their effects.

Article 92. The Ministry of Defense will retain the receipts from deductions from salary and compensation in execution of disciplinary punishments or punishments imposed by military courts on military persons who are subject to the provisions of this law or the disciplinary punishments imposed on honor guard officers under the jurisdiction of the competent officers' committees, as well as the receipts deducted from their salaries for days of provisional imprisonment, absence or desertion.

Disbursements of these receipts will be for social,athletic, cultural purposes in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by Law 50 for 1974 regarding the establishment of the Evacuation Fund Organization of the Armed Forces.

Section 13

Badges, Awards and Medals

Article 93. Honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers in the armed forces will be granted the badges, awards and medals given to officers in the armed forces, and all the provisions included in the abovementioned Law 232 for 1959 will apply to them.

Article 94. Honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers who have previously been given either class of the Order of the Republic will continue to have the financial bonus for this order disbursed to them, and it will be raised as of the date on which this law goes into effect to 10 pounds per month in the case of the Order of the Republic, First Class, and 5 pounds per month in the case of the Order of the Republic, Second Class.

Section 14

Termination of Service

Chapter One
General Rules

Article 95. Active military service in the armed forces will be terminated for one of the following reasons:

A. In the case of conscripts:

1. Transfer to the reserve.

2. For reasons of final exemption or exception stipulated in the National and Military Service Law.

B. In the case of volunteers:

1. Transfer to retirement.

2. Completion of volunteer service or re-enlistment.

3. Resignation from service.

C. In the case of conscripts and volunteers:

1. Physical unfitness for military service.

2. Dismissal from service.

3. Dispensing with service.

4. Loss of citizenship in the Arab Republic of Egypt.

5. Death or death in combat.

Article 96. Military service in the reserve will be terminated for the following reasons:

A. Completion of the stipulated period of service in the reserve.

B. Cases stipulated in the abovementioned Law 127 for 1980.

C. Cases stipulated in Paragraph C of the previous article

Article 97. In all the cases of termination of service stated in Article 95 except for those of death and death in combat, a certificate must be given to the military person stating that military service has been performed and noting the reason for termination of service.

It is permissible to write out a certificate of performance of military service in place of a lost one in accordance with the conditions set forth in the executive bill.

Article 98. A certificate of appreciation from the armed forces will be given upon termination of service for the persons noted below:

A. Anyone terminating his service upon reaching the legal age.

B. Anyone receiving a medal for long service and good example, a medal of exceptional promotion or a medal for the war wounded.

This certificate will be given to the heirs of any military person dying as a result of service or killed in military operations.

Article 99. The morality ratings of noncommissioned officers and soldiers, when recorded on official forms, certificates of performance of military service or any other papers will be determined as follows:

Excellent example, very good example, good example, bad example.

Article 100. A military person who evades service will be stricken from the roster of the force in the unit as of the date of his evasion, in accordance with a decree by the investigating council formed for that purpose.

Units and departments will send forms on evaders and the investigating council's measures to the competent military registry body.

In the event they are wounded or die during the period of their evasion, after being stricken from the force, their rights as stipulated in accordance with the provisions of the Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance and Pension Law will be settled by considering they discharged as of the date they are stricken off, unless it is proved that their absence from the unit was for a cause outside their will.

Article 101. Measures will be taken to terminate the service of military persons whose service is terminated for any reason while they are sick in military hospitals, and they will remain in the hospitals until they are cured, their condition becomes stable or they become able to travel for treatment. They will remain under treatment, and medicine, clothes and accessories will be given to them free of charge, but they will not be entitled to salaries or compensations as of the date of the termination of their service. The transportation of corpses of people who have died in local or foreign military hospitals to their homes or the place of residence of their families will be at the armed forces' expense.

People injured as a result of war operations or conditions stipulated in Article 31 of the Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance and Pension Law and persons wounded or ill as a result of service will be excepted from this and will continue in service until they are cured or their medical condition becomes stabilized, and measures will be taken to terminat their service. Their salaries and compensations will be paid out to them throughout their treatment period.

Article 102. Upon termination of their service for any reason, except for expulsion, resignation or dispensing with service, the pension of honor guard officers must not be less than that of chief warrant officers whose service has been completed for the same reason.

Article 103. It is not permissible to leave service before the competent authorities have issued orders terminating it and the executive bill will specify the measures to be followed upon termination of service.

Chapter Two
Transfer to the Reserve

Article 104. Active service for conscripts will end with their transfer to the reserve in the first contingent whose period falls due after completion of their stipulated service period.

Article 105. Conscripts who reach age 36 will be transferred to the reserve even if they have not completed their active compulsory service period.

Article 106. It is permissible, by decree of the minister of defense or whomever he delegates, to transfer conscripts to the reserve before termination of their compulsory service, for considerations of the public interest.

Article 107. Conscripts transferred to the reserve will be entitled to an end of service bonus up to the stipulated day for transfer to the reserve.

Their travel to the area where they were conscripted or to any area they specify within the republic will be at government expense.

Chapter Three
Transfer to Retirement

Article 108. The service of honor guard officers and volunteers will be terminated with transfer to retirement for the reason that they have reached the legal age for termination of service stipulated in the abovementioned Retirement, Insurance and Pension Law.

Article 109. The minister of defense may transfer a volunteer honor guard officer, noncommissioned officer or soldier to retirement before he reaches the legal age for termination of service, in accordance with a recommendation by the competent officers' committee or the Armed Forces Organization and Administration Authority, in accordance with the rules and conditions set forth by the executive bill.

In this case, people transferred to retirement will be treated the same as persons transferred to retirement by force of law.

Article 110. With attention to the conditions listed in Article 114 of this law, honor guard officers who have accumulated an actual service period of 20 years as of the date of disbursement of high salary will have the right to request to be transferred to retirement, and their pensions will be settled in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of the abovementioned Law 90 for 1975.

The Armed Forces Officers' Affairs Department may hold these persons over in service for a period not to exceed 6 months.

Article 111. It is permissible to call up honor guard officers who have been transferred to retirement, if they have acquired special expertise, to work in the armed forces for a period of no more than 2 years, on condition that the age of the persons called up not exceed 60 years during the callup period.

Chapter Four
Termination of Service after Completion of the Volunteer or Conscription Period

Article 112. It is permissible for the actual service of a volunteer who has completed his volunteer service period or has re-enlisted to be terminated either because he does not want to re-enlist or because the competent organization and administration body has not given its approval. In both cases, the service period will end as of the date stipulated by the competent body; in either case his pension or bonus will be settled in accordance with his salary and service period.

If need so requires, the organization and management authority may keep persons who do not want to re-enlist but have high salaries and have not reached the age for transfer to retirement in service for a period not to exceed 2 years, in accordance with the rules and conditions set forth by the executive bills to this law.

Chapter Five
Resignation from Service

Article 113. The resignation of volunteers will not be accepted before they fulfill their first volunteer service period in full, except by a decree of the minister of defense or whomever he delegates.

Article 114. Volunteer honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers may request the termination of their service by resigning in the service period which follows their first volunteer service period, on the following conditions:

A. That that not be with the intention of evading trial for a crime they committed or evading the execution of a punishment imposed upon them.

B. That they not be liable for any financial commitments to the armed forces.

C. That the director of the competent department give his agreement.

D. That the competent officers' committee or Armed Forces Organization and Administration Authority give its agreement.

Chapter Six
Physical Unfitness for Military Service

Article 115. A military person's service will be terminated if it is proved that he is physically unfit to continue in military service.

In this case, it is permissible to transfer volunteers with high salaries to the reserve if they are physically fit for service in the reserve for the remaining period of the military service to which they are bound.

Article 116. The Military Medical Council will be competent to determine physical unfitness for military service, provided that it not so determine until all means of treatment in the military hospitals have been exhausted.

Article 117. The competent military medical council will by its own decree specify the type of ailment or wound, the date of the ailment or wound from which the person's physical unfitness for military service resulted, and the date and the percentage of disability resulting from the ailment or injury.

Article 118. Cases of illness or injury leading to the person's physical unfitness for military service must be examined by the competent military bodies in order that the causal relationship between the ailment or the injury and military service may be proved. The executive bill will specify the examination measures and the authorities approving the examination decree.

Article 119. The Armed Forces Organization and Management Authority may keep people who have been wounded in military operations or wounded in one of the cases stipulated in Article 31 of the abovementioned Law 90 for 1975 in service if their physical unfitness for military service has been determined, if they so wish, provided that they be assigned to work which is compatible with their medical condition and that they submit to periodic medical examinations to guarantee that the service has not affected their medical condition.

Chapter Seven
Discharge from Service

Article 120. Volunteers' service will end when a final verdict is issued against them separating them from public service or discharging from service as a basic punishment, subsequent to the imposition of punishment for a felony or as the result of their conviction by a final judicial verdict for a crime detrimental to honor, along with a verdict of punishment depriving them of freedom which is not accompanied by a comprehensive suspension.

Article 121. It is permissible to terminate the service of a military person by dismissing him from service in the armed forces if he has been sentenced to imprisonment by a military or ordinary court, in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by the executive bills.

Chapter Eight
Dispensing with Service for Technical Unfitness

Article 122. Volunteers' service will be dispensed with if they are students in a school or military training center and have not successfully passed the courses of study in accordance with the conditions of volunteer service.

It is permissible to dispense with the service of a volunteer if he has failed promotion examinations three successive times in one rank, in accordance with the rules and conditions stipulated by the executive bill.

It is also permissible to dispense with the service of a volunteer if he has received three successive secret annual reports with a rating of "poor."

Article 123. The service of a military person will be dispensed with for reasons connected to motives of the public interest by a decree with cause by the minister of defense, for the rules and conditions set forth by the executive bill.

Chapter Nine
Loss of Citizenship in the Arab Republic of Egypt

Article 124. The competent organization and administration body will terminate the service of military persons who lose citizenship in the Arab Republic of Egypt, in which case they will be treated as persons whose service has been dispensed with.

Chapter 10
Termination of Service because of Death or Death in Battle

Article 125. Any military person who dies or is killed in battle will be stricken from the roster of the force as of the day following the date of his death or death in battle.

Article 126. Any military person lost in service will be stricken from the roster of the force as of the date he was missing and will be treated as dead or killed in battle by decree of the minister of defense after four years have elapsed from the date he was first missing and his death or death in battle or the fact that he is still alive have not been officially proved.

Article 127. An investigation must be made by the competent military bodies into any death occurring during military service to prove the causal relationship between the death and the military service. The executive bill will specify the investigation measures and the powers to approve the investigation decree.

Article 128. The death of military persons will be established by presentation of an official death certificate issued by the competent administrative, military or medical bodies, according to the case.

Section 15
Rulings on Administrative Disputes

Article 129. The following military judiciary committees will be established in the armed forces:

A. A branch military judiciary committee in the armed forces main branch commands, field army commands and military areas. The scope of competence of each branch committee will be determined by decree of the minister of defense.

B. The higher military judiciary committee, on the level of the armed forces.

Article 130. The military judiciary committees mentioned in the preceding article will be concerned to the exclusion of others with ruling on administrative disputes concerning armed force noncommissioned officers and soldiers with high salary as regards the application of the provisions of this law, except for contestation of disciplinary punishments.

Article 131. Branch military judiciary committees will be formed in the competent organization and management branches, as follows:

A. The chief of staff or assistant commander of the main branch, army or area, as chairman.

B. The chairman of the competent organization and administration branch.

C. The chairman of the personnel branch of the competent organization and administration branch.

D. The chairman of the competent military judiciary branch, or whoever represents him.

E. The chairman of the investigation branch or department of the competent organization and administration branch.

F. An officer with expertise in the personnel branch of the competent organization and administration branch, as secretary.

Article 132. The higher military judiciary committee will be formed in the following manner:

A. The competent assistant minister of defense, as chairman.

B. The director of the Military Judiciary Department or whoever represents him.

C. The chairman of the competent department of legal opinion.

D. The assistant chairman of the Organization and Administration Authority for personnel.

E. The chairman of the Legal Affairs and Investigations Branch of the Armed Forces Organization and Administration Department.

F. The chairman of the Personnel Branch of the Armed Forces Organization and Administration Department, as secretary.

Article 133. Contestation of final administrative decrees issued in regard to volunteer noncommissioned officers and soldiers with high salary must be based on one or more of the following reasons:

A. That the decree was imposed in violation of the law.

B. That the decree was marred by an error in application or interpretation of the law.

C. That there was a mistake or flaw in the measures followed in the issuance of the law, as a result of which the rights of the plaintiff were harmed.

D. That the decree was issued by a body which was not competent to issue it.

E. That the decree was marred by the flaw of misuse of authority.

Article 134. The deadline for contesting the abrogation of the final administrative decrees before the competent branch military judiciary committee will be 60 days of the date of publication of the administrative decree being contested, in accordance with the rules followed in the armed forces or the declaration by the person concerned.

Article 135. Requests will be submitted to the branch judiciary committees in writing by the person concerned or by his lawyer in two copies. The request must contain the following data:

A. The military number, rank, name, branch and unit of the plaintiff.

B. A statement of the subject of the demand or a summary of the administrative decree being contested.

C. A statement of the reasons on which the contestation is based.

D. The plaintiff's demands.

Article 136. Contestation of an administrative decree will not result in its suspension unless the competent military judiciary committee so orders.

Article 137. The secretariat of the competent judiciary committee will be in charge of contacting the competent military bodies and relevant persons in order to obtain data, papers, memoranda and other materials required to prepare the case.

Following completion of the case, the secretary of the committee will place a report in the case file specifying the particulars of the case and the legal issues it raises, while presenting a legal opinion on it with cause.

The committee secretary will set a date and place for the military judiciary committee meeting after contacting the chairman of the committee, and this will be declared to the committee members and the plaintiff in writing.

Article 138. The plaintiff will be notified of the date and place of the session in a period of no less than 15 days. The plaintiff may seek the aid of a lawyer to aid him in his defense at any stage of the case.

Article 139. The military judiciary committee may issue its decree in the absence of the plaintiff if it is proved to the committee that he was told to attend but was absent without acceptable excuse.

The military judiciary committee will issue its decrees by a majority of votes. In case of a tie, preference will go to the side the chairman is on.

The committee's transactions will be considered secret.

Article 140. The plaintiff and the competent military body may contest the decisions the branch military judiciary committees issue before the higher military judiciary committee.

The deadline for contestation with respect to both parties will be within 60 days of the date of the issuance of the decree.

The measures stipulated in this law with respect to the branch military judiciary committees will be followed before the higher military /judiciary/ committee.

The higher military committee will issue its decisions abrogating, amending or supporting the decision of the branch military judiciary committee.

The decisions issued by the higher military judiciary committee will be approved by the chief of war staff of the armed forces or whomever he delegates, unless the

decision being contested is issued by the chief of war staff of the armed forces or the minister of defense, in which case approval of the committee's decision will be by the minister of defense.

The committee's decrees will not be considered final until they have been approved.

Article 141. The competent authorities must approve the military judiciary committee decisions or, in the event agreement is not given to the decision, return it to the committee which issued it within 60 days of the date it was issued so that the subject may be reviewed, along with a statement of the reasons prompting that. The decision of the committee with which it ends up following review of the subject will be considered approved.

Article 142. The armed forces officers' judiciary committees will be competent to rule on administrative disputes bearing on honor guard officers in accordance with the provisions of Law 96 for 1971 regarding the contestation of decisions by armed forces officers' committees and Law 71 for 1975 regarding the regulation and definition of the fields of specialization of the armed forces officers' judiciary committees.

Article 143. Contestation of abrogations in accordance with the provisions of the above articles will be restricted to final administrative decisions issued after the date this law goes into effect.

Section 16

General Provisions

Article 144. It is permissible to accept the enrollment of noncommissioned officers and soldiers in military colleges and institutes and the Police Academy and College when they have met the stipulated conditions.

The executive bill of this law will set forth the rules to be followed with respect to persons who have been admitted to the colleges and other entities referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Article 145. It is permissible to transfer a volunteer to a civilian position after the initial period of volunteer service has been completed, at a minimum, in accordance with the regulations set forth in the executive bill.

Article 146. In the event an honor guard officer, noncommissioned officer or soldier with a high salary is transferred to a civilian entity, he will be transferred to the civilian grade or position equivalent to his original military grade or rank, and his seniority in the position will be calculated as of the date on which he has received the military grade or rank, unless the grade or position to which he is transferred is the equivalent of more than one military grade or rank, in which case his seniority in that will be determined as of the date on which he has acquired the lowest military grade or rank equivalent to that. In either case his seniority may not be less than that of persons who are equivalent to him in credentials and in date of graduation in the entity to which he is transferred.

Honor guard officers or volunteers with high salaries will be transferred to the civilian grade or position above the grade or position equivalent to their military rank or grade when one of the persons equivalent to them in credentials and graduation date in the entity of the civilian position has been promoted to that. Their seniority in it will be calculated as of the date on which their equivalent has been promoted to it.

The president may by his own decree transfer an honor guard officer or volunteer with a high salary to the civilian grade or position equivalent to the rank or grade above his military rank or grade, and his seniority in that will be calculated as of the date of his transfer.

The salary of the honor guard officer or volunteer with high salary in the position to which he has been transferred will be calculated in terms of the base salaries he has received in military service plus the fixed compensations stipulated for his military grade or rank and the stipulated salary for the position to which he has been transferred, whichever is greater.

Honor guard officers or volunteers with high salaries who have been transferred will retain the difference between the total base salaries, fixed compensations and compensations set by decree of the president to which they had been entitled in the military positions and the total stipulated for the civilian position, until this difference is eliminated through promotion, raises or compensations.

The provisions of Paragraph Four will apply to honor guard officers or persons with high salaries who had previously been transferred to civilian positions and were still continuing in these positions as of the date on which this law was published, but no financial differences for the past will be paid out or collected.

In determining the details and value of the fixed compensations which enter into the settlement of the status of the honor guard officer or person with high salary, consideration will be given to the stipulations made in their regard as of the date on which this law goes into effect.

Article 147. Military persons will have the benefit of riding railways and all other land communications operated by the government, the public sector or companies with commitments at half fare, according to the class allocated to them.

Article 148. In the event they are nominated to occupy a civilian position in a ministry, department, general authority, local government unit or public sector unit, honor guard officers, noncommissioned officers and volunteer or conscripted soldiers will have priority in appointment, in the event all the conditions necessary for occupying the position are equal or the passing grades are equal in the event a prior examination for filling this position is held, on condition that they have obtained a moral rating no less than "good."

Article 149. The provisions contained in this law with respect to conscripts or people held over in service will apply to noncommissioned officers and conscripted soldiers in the following bodies:

A. The Police Authority and government departments and authorities with a military system.

B. National work brigades, with attention to the provisions of the National and Military Service Law.

Article 150. In cases of war, general mobilization or limited or emergency military operations, it is permissible temporarily to suspend the effectiveness of Articles 18, 29, 30, 31, 34, 105, 110, 112, 122 and the articles of Section 15 of this law.

Section 17

Temporary Provisions

Article 151. Noncommissioned officers who are in voluntary service or have been conscripted and have acquired a local rank will continue to enjoy the benefits of this rank until they acquire the basic rank for it.

Article 152. During the 2 years following the date on which this law goes into effect, it will be permissible not to be restricted to the minimum time period stipulated for promotion from chief warrant officer to the rank of honorary 2nd lieutenant in accordance with the requirements and circumstances of service and vacant grades in the budget.

Article 153. If a consequence of the application of Article 54 of this law is that the salary of someone with seniority is below that of someone with less seniority, putting them in the same seniority list while the settlement is made, the salary of the more senior person will be increased to equal that of the person with less seniority.

Article 154. The first periodic raise for military persons in service on the date on which the provisions of this law go into effect will be due in a manner proportionate to the service period of each computed in the raise as of the date the last periodic raise falls due, until the date stipulated for disbursement of the periodic raise in accordance with the provisions of Article 55 of this law.

Table on Salary Classes for Armed Forces Personnel

Rank	Volunteers at High Salary Monthly From Pounds/ Milliemes	to Pounds/ Milliemes	Annually From Pounds/ Milliemes	to Pounds/ Milliemes	Periodic Raises Monthly Pounds/ Milliemes	Annually Pounds/ Milliemes	Ordinary Salary Monthly Pounds/ Milliemes	Annually Pounds/ Milliemes
Chief Warrant Officer	55.000	112.000	660.000	1,344.000	4.000	48.000	----	----
					then 5.000 until the salary reaches 71 pounds	60.000		
Warrant Officer	46.000	104.000	552.000	1,248.000	4.000	48.000	----	----
Warrant Officer Junior Grade	39.000	96.000	468.000	1,152.000	3.000	36.000	----	----
Sergeant Major	33.000	89.000	396.000	1,068.000	2.000	24.000	7.000	84.000
Sergeant	28.500	83.000	342.000	996.000	2.000	24.000	6.000	72.000
Corporal	24.500	60.000	294.000	720.000	1.500	8.000	5.000	60.000
Private	23.000	45.000	276.000	540.000	1.500	8.000	4.000	48.000

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NEW DECREE PROVIDES SOCIAL SECURITY FOR TROOPS BELOW OFFICER LEVEL

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH /The Official Gazette/ in Arabic #31 30 Jul 81 pp 17, 18

/Decree: "Decree of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt 433 for 1981 Organizing Social Insurance for Armed Force Reserve Officers and Conscripts"/

/Text/ The president:

Having read the constitution;

Law 234 for 1959 regarding the service and promotion conditions for armed force reserve officers;

Law 106 for 1964 regarding the service and promotion conditions for armed force honor guard officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers;

Law 54 for 1975 issuing the law on special insurance funds;

Law 90 for 1975 on armed force retirement, insurance and pensions; Decree of the president 304 for 1981 on the supplementary social insurance system for officers and volunteers of other ranks in the armed forces;

Decree of the president 406 for 1981;

And on the basis of a presentation by the minister of defense and war production,

Has decreed:

Article One. The minister of defense will be permitted to take the measures necessary to establish a social insurance system for armed force reserve officers and conscripts in accordance with the provisions of Law 54 for 1975.

Article Two. The revenues of this system will consist of the following sources:

1. Monthly payments by beneficiaries of the system, in the following classes:

Reserve officers, 500 milliemes per month per officer
Conscripts, 150 milliemes per month per conscript.

2. The contributions of any active officers and the equivalent who agreed to make them, in the amount of 250 milliemes per month per officer.

3. The allocations made annually by the government budget on behalf of the system.

4. The allocations made by the minister of defense from the receipts of certain various revenues, within the stipulated limits and in accordance with the laws, decrees and bills regulating these revenues.

5. Grants and donations received by the system.

6. Revenues from the investment of fund money.

Article Three. A cash sum totalling 1,000 Egyptian pounds will be disbursed in accordance with the rules and conditions contained in the bylaws of the system to everyone subject to this system in the event of the death of the beneficiary during his service in the armed forces for any reason except death as a result of war operations.

Article Four. The armed forces supplementary insurance fund established in accordance with the abovementioned Presidential Decree 304 for 1981 will be in charge of pursuing this system.

Article Five. The minister of defense and war production must carry out this decree.

Issued by the Office of the President on 26 July 1981.

/Signed/ Husni Mubarak

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PRESIDENTIAL DECREE CONFERS BONUS UPON GENERAL

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH /The Official Gazette/ in Arabic #32 6 Aug 81 p 2102

/Decree: "Decree of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt 423 for 1981 Granting Gen Fu'ad Muhammad Ahmad Dhikri an Authorship Bonus"/

/Text/ The president:

Having read the constitution;

Law 354 for 1954 issuing the law protecting the right of authorship; Law 4 for 1968 regarding command and control of the affairs of the defense of the government and the armed forces;

Article 308 of the financial bill of the budget and accounts and Decree 406 for 1981;

And a presentation by the minister of defense and war production,

Has decreed:

Article One. An authorship bonus of 5,000 (five thousand) pounds will be disbursed to Gen Fu'ad Muhammad Ahmad Dhikri for his book "The Egyptian Navy and the Road to October."

Article Two. The publication rights to the abovementioned book will belong to the armed forces.

Article Three. The minister of defense and war production must carry out this decree.

Article Four. This decree will be published in the Official Gazette and will be in effect as of the date on which it is published.

Issued by the Office of the President on 25 July 1981.

/Signed/ Husni Mubarak

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ARMY CONDUCTS MASSIVE MANEUVERS IN NORTHERN SINAI

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 5 Jun 81 pp 28-31

/Article by Hamdi Lutfi: "Martyr Ahmad Badawi Military Maneuvers in the Depths of Northern Sinai"/

/Text/ As the nation prepares to celebrate the 5 June that followed October--5 June 1981--our armed forces made a massive military maneuver over the theater of Egypt's main line of defense, in the Umm Burjam area [as published] in the depths of northern Sinai, as a practical test of its competence and size.

This maneuver has been given the name of the heroic martyr Field Marshal Ahmad Badawi, the commander general who died on 2 March 1981.

This joint armed force military maneuver which the armed forces held at the end of last week on the military theater in the northern hinterland of Sinai was witnessed by Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense and commander general.

The joint military maneuver embraced the form of modern combat. Participating in it, alongside the main infantry and air defense forces, were tank, missile artillery, air force, engineers' and signal units and reconnaissance and chemical warfare groups.

The formations which held the maneuver from the Second Field Army forces under the command of Maj Gen Ahmad Salah 'Abd-al-Halim applied an Egyptian innovation in the application of field and missile artillery combat. French-manufactured helicopters cooperated with them and they played a major role in the artillery bombardment of enemy targets, after precise electronic additions and equipment were added to the Hell's Gazelles aircraft which were designed by Egyptian engineering groups in the Artillery Department and the Arms and Ammunition Department of our armed forces. When the general command of the French armed forces learned of these Egyptian additions and their successful practical tests, it asked us to allow it to apply this Egyptian engineering innovation.

For this massive maneuver, scientists of war operations in our armed forces and the second Army planned the site of a large mountain pass representing a bottleneck in the way of the attacker, impeding his defense ability, then carrying out groups of engineering equipment able to conduct engineering fashion operations in

the mountain pass in front of the forces concentrated on the theater of battle so that they could regain freedom of movement in their defensive positions, then launch an attack to destroy the counterattack through an informal or non-traditional method, then establish a number of defense lines acting independently while co-operating with one another at the same time--one of the forms of development of the arts of combat and fortified defense on open and mountainous land which our armed forces applied after the glorious October war.

This maneuver reflected our forces' abilities in building modern military engineering fortifications founded on new theories which have not been exhausted and are not traditional either, with reliance on local resources on the theater of operations in which these formations are concentrated.

Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah said, "The good use of terrain is the first step in the application of fighting competence. It also gives defending forces the freedom for successful action under circumstances of concentrated enemy attack. Thus we must distinguish ourselves by the ability to make high level military engineering preparations and build non-traditional fortified positions."

The formations in the maneuver used modern electronic equipment, ground radar with which the artillery forces have been supplied for observation operations and distance and direction measurement, and the most modern methods for producing tactical and strategic ground-to-ground missile fire.

The military battles of the future, be they on land, sea or air or joint force battles, will not possess the requisite reserve of high battle laws and arts because they are run by advanced electronic weapons or missiles with a destructive effect that is greater and more dangerous than their predecessors--indeed because fighting men who will run these battles will possess the greatest amount of practical knowledge and expertise and the most abundant quantity of courage arising from practical study and indoctrination on the battleground and will be proud masters of the most complex of weapons, however their electronics and technology might develop. In this climate, they will of necessity be able to discover gaps and weak spots in their resources and the powers of their resources with a most mature conscious adult vision which will not allow errors to be repeated.

Photo Caption: Commander-in-Chief Lt Gen Abu Ghazzalah, to his left 2nd Army Commander Maj Gen Salah 'Abd-al-Halim, in one of the forward fortifications in northern Sinai.

Photo Caption: The minister of defense and 2nd Army Commander, above one of the fortified positions in the Umm Rajm area, visit the front line troops after completion of manuevers.



Photo caption: At one of the motar artillery positions, the minister of defense questions the crew on how to shorten battle readiness time.

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DEFENSE MINISTER OUTLINES FINAL POLICY ON MILITARY SERVICE EVADERS

Cairo OCTOBER in Arabic #250 9 Aug 81 p 19

/Article by 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sadiq: "The Final Word on People Who Have Evaded Conscription"/

/Text/ Once again one gives attention to the humane decree which Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense and war production, has issued settling the status of all young people who have evaded conscription both inside and outside the republic. This settlement must take place before the October holidays, and has the objective of solving the problem of several thousands of our sons in a bold revolutionary manner transcending red tape, complications and obstructive philosophies!

Subsequent to the humanitarian decree, the minister issued his instructions to the Secretariat of the Defense Ministry, the Conscription Department and the Military Judiciary Department settling the status of evaders and terminating their problems. He also issued a decree forming a special bureau in the Conscription Department to be headed by Maj Gen Imam Hammudah, assistant director of conscription, to receive the families of young people who are abroad, respond to their questions and look into their complaints.

In an interview with Maj Gen Imam Hammudah, I asked him,

"I would like you to tell the citizens something at the outset about the activity of the special office on whose establishment the minister issued a decree, which you are heading."

He said, "The minister of defense's instructions are clear. They are aimed at solving the problems of our young people who evaded conscription domestically or abroad as a consequence of the application of the new conscription law effective last 1 December. In the context of the execution of these instructions, the minister's decree was issued establishing an independent office under my command to prepare to solve the evaders' problems in a radical, informal, untraditional manner."

/I asked/ "Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah's instructions were issued right before the Holiday. Today is the first day it has gone into effect,

following the Holiday. What is the plan of action of the office of whose affairs you have taken charge?"

He said, "We have prepared instructions which will be sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which in turn will send them to Egypt's consuls in the various countries of the world to inform our young people abroad of the minister of defense's decree ending their conscription problems by applying the new easy terms, while making them understand that these terms are the last opportunity for people evading conscription and that after this evaders will be punished by imprisonment and fines."

/I asked/ "Are these instructions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs enough to get young people to ready themselves to go to the military committee in Washington, London or Paris in order to end their conscription problem for good? Large numbers of our young people do not have passports. Some passports have expired. Some have been lost or are retained by employers, especially in some Arab countries!"

He said, "This is true. It means that these young people are unable to move except inside the countries where they are staying. That is, they cannot get to the places where the three military committees, which are to be in Washington, London and Paris, will meet. Therefore, we will send the Foreign Ministry instructions to grant passports valid for a period adequate for the young people to go from the country where they are living to any of the three capitals, whichever is closer, to put an end to their conscription situation."

/I asked/ "Does that mean giving passports which are valid up to the end of next October, for example?"

He said, "I believe that the minister of defense, upon his return from abroad, will be better able than we are to determine this time period, whose beginning I imagine will be date of the formation and travel of the committees and will extend to the end of the period the minister specifies.

"Here I do not want to miss an opportunity to draw the citizens' attention to the fact that the new conscription law was issued on 10 July 1980 and it began to be carried out in December 1980--that is, the transitional period between issuance and execution did not exceed 4 months and 20 days. This is not an adequate period."

/I asked/ "Will these three committees which will be formed and will travel with the objective of ending the problem of the young people who have evaded conscription include military judiciary personnel?"

He said, "Yes, they will include personnel from the military judiciary and also from the Conscription Department. The committee will include wholly integrated personnel."

/I asked/ "Do I understand from that that they possess the authority to issue military verdicts against young people who have evaded conscription? In the form you refer to, are they able to solve the problem in accordance with the stipulations of the law?"

He said, "There is no doubt that the committees, through their formation, will be able to end the problems where they meet. A study was completed on this subject which concluded that the law allows this. Do not forget that a committee inside the building of an Egyptian consulate or embassy in any country of the world is on Egyptian soil. On this soil, it is possible to apply Egyptian laws!"

/I asked/ "I believe that this statement of yours will reassure many of our young people in European countries and America, and will also reassure their families. What, though, about our young men in Arab countries?"

Maj Gen Imam Hammudah said, "A study is now being made of the problem of our young people who have evaded conscription and are working or are present in Arab countries. There is no doubt that the study will conclude with a decree ending their problems in a manner similar to that of the decree on our young people in Europe or America, that is, an informal manner!"

/I asked/ "This means that the study has not yet been completed. Could you say something to reassure our children in the Arab countries and their families?"

He said, "I can assure you that before the committees finish clearing up the problems of our children in Europe and America, committees will have been formed, a decree will have been issued, or a system will have been determined for ending the problems of our young people who are present in the Arab countries."

/I asked/ "In your capacity as chairman of the new office which has been assigned to follow up on the completion of the problem of young people who have failed to appear for conscription, what do you ask each young man to prepare before he comes to the military committee?"

He said, "His three names, the date and place of birth, and a military card if there is one. However, more important than all this is the identity card. I know that many of our young people who have failed to appear for conscription do not have an identity card. My advice to every young man is to present himself as of now to the consulate to get an identity card copied out. Agreement has been made with the Foreign Ministry to have our consulates abroad dispense identity cards to people requesting them without complications and free of red tape."

Maj Gen Hammudah added, "I hope that every young person will understand the degree of importance of the identity card. In accordance with Law 260 for 1960, it is the beginning of the relationship between the young person and the Conscription /Department/. From it is derived the military card. Without an identity card, a young person cannot be registered in conscription. This means that it is out of the question to terminate the conscription situation of any young man unless he has an identity card in his possession."

/I asked/ "If there is a young man abroad who is not registered with the Conscription /Department/, what is requested of him in order to correct his situation and solve his conscription problem?"

He said, "At the outset, as I stated, copying out an identity card from the consulate. As a result of that, a military card will be made up in the Conscription /Department/. Quite simply, and apart from any technical jargon, he will be registered in the conscription records and the committee will examine his situation and end his problem. I believe that this condition applies to young people who were born outside Egypt, who left Egypt before reaching age 16, or who left Egypt illegally. Here I would not like to miss the opportunity to announce most clearly that it is not our task to examine or discuss the circumstances of a young man's travel, whether his travel was legal or illegal. Our task, as the minister of defense has defined it, is to solve the problem of young men who have failed to appear for conscription and discuss the exemptions and deferments which the young men acquired before they traveled; from all of this we will be able to determine his position and decide if this young person failed, or did not fail, to appear for conscription. If he has not failed to appear, that is well and good--'Home, no evil has befallen you.' If he has failed to appear, it will be possible to listen to his justifications for failing to appear, and his situation will be terminated with the imposition of a mere fine of a maximum of 1,000 pounds!"

The deputy director of conscription added, "It must be understood that this is the last chance, and that it is given to young people over age 30. In the future, failing to appear for conscription will be punished by imprisonment and a fine."

/I asked/, "A father who has a son working in Australia talked to me by telephone and asked me how he could get to Washington, London or Paris to terminate his problem. I asked him why he didn't come to Cairo--it would be an opportunity to visit, see his family and solve his problem here."

Maj Gen Imam Hammudah said, "You yourself have observed our activity close at hand. There is no doubt that you know full well that ending the situation of a young man who has failed to appear for conscription will take no more than a week or 10 days at most, after an effort of no more than 2 hours for a few days. Then his problem will be ended for good. Isn't that so?"

/I said/ "That is true, but wouldn't it be better if these facilities could be extended to all our children fairly, that is, extended to everyone instead of being restricted to America and Europe?"

He said, "What do you recommend to extend the justice to our children outside America and Europe and extend them the facilities the minister of defense has specified?"

/I answered/ "Regarding our children in the Arab countries, you have clearly told me what might reassure them. With regard to what I have heard about the son working in Australia, and with regard to what I know about people we have in some African countries, I recommend the formation of two additional committees, one of which would meet in an African capital, and one of which would select a capital in Asia. I believe that this recommendation would achieve justice."

He said, "I promise you that I will present this recommendation to the Secretariat General of the Defense Ministry in order to discuss the possibility of carrying

it out, and will present the matter to Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense and war production."

I hope that in the statement by Maj Gen Imam Hammuday, the deputy director of conscription, which I am publishing in these lines, the readers will find an answer to many of the questions going about on people's lips since the humane decree was issued.

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NEW TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS IN MILITARY REVIEWED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic #2441 5 Aug 81 p 14

/Article by Faruq al-Shadhili: "New Fuel for Missiles and a Computer System Hookup"/

/Text/ What are the inventions and research works that have been achieved here, in the factory of the weapons scholars, men whose task is to develop, modernize and follow up on all that is new in weapons technology?

Inside the Military Technical College there are dozens of inventions and hundreds of research projects and minds working on behalf of Egypt and its army.

AKHIR SA'AH met with Egypt's scientists in the field of arms and military technology development so that we could learn about the results of a full year of effort, sweat and thinking from them. This is a picture of the most recent things that Egyptian military technology has come up with:

The most prominent thing it has provided this year is preparation of a material used in missile fuel, making Egypt the fourth country in the world in this field, after the United States, Britain and Germany.

There are dozens of other inventions and research items, including:

An instrument for following the sun, which is used to direct such heat-seeking missiles as the Strella (SAM-7), along with the addition of some modifications providing it with greater accuracy in guidance.

A computer used in combat to manage fire, giving distances and angles within seconds and defining target positions with extreme accuracy, bringing the assured strike rate above 85 percent.

A system for determining the site of buried metal objects; this is used to discover the locations of mines, electricity cables, telephone wires, water pipes, weapons, and ammunition. It is an apparatus of use to men in the special forces air missions when working behind enemy lines. Reconnaissance personnel also use it when advancing ahead of forces in combat.

Transmission of sound via light waves, which is used in communications between people by the use of fine luminous glass filaments instead of copper telephone wire, which betrays movement in remote areas through its frequencies.

An instrument for testing cable airplane rocket-bearing cable connections.

A comprehensive study to determine the rates of depreciation of spare parts for American C-130 transport planes, French Mirage 5 defensive fighters and British Commando helicopters. Through this study, it is possible to work to provide the necessary spare parts and estimate the time they take to depreciate so that in war time the air force will not be exposed to spare parts shortages which might result in paralysis of their movement.

A short 7.65-millimeter automatic pistol, an Egyptian design combining the characteristics of a 9-millimeter pistol and a short machine gun, which also has mechanical devices regulating the action of moving parts in order to control fire and prevent the waste of ammunition and has the ability to fire manually or automatically. It can be used as a pistol and machine gun. It is lighter in weight than the ordinary machine gun and is used as a personal weapon for paratroopers, commandoes and armored crews. It was designed by Capt Muhammad Sa'id Abu-al-Khayr and Lt Ibrahim 'Abdallah Ibrahim.

New Rocket Fuel

While missiles are the most complex form of weapons technology or effective weapons against all the armaments of the age, the missile's fuel is its spirit, its main combat element. Since this fuel is expensive and cannot be provided in abundance when needed, the Egyptian weapons scientists' factory has been working tirelessly to provide the missiles with their life blood. How could it be otherwise, since they are the men who fought with missiles and used them before the people who invented them did?

The men of Egypt have managed to prepare materials used in rocket fuel and plastics explosives, to make Egypt the fourth country in the world, after the United States, Britain and Germany.

This Egyptian technology is for processing this material from local raw materials and has enabled them to process a laboratory product with a high grade of purity reaching 84 percent. It is now being processed in some Egyptian war factories belonging to the Ministry of Defense and War Production.

This was developed by Lt Col Shukri 'Abd-al-Sami' al-Mursifi under the supervision of Lt Col Dr Mustafa Kamil 'Abd-al-Basit.

Plastic Explosives

The plastic explosives project is distinguished by a reduced sensitivity offering greater security to people distributing the explosives in minefields. They do not dissolve over time and are easy to handle. They are used in certain types of rockets and can also be detonated under water with modern types of Western ammunition (Hishi). This project was carried out by Lt Col 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Halim 'Uthman.

A study made by Lt Col 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Mahallawi for a master's degree from the college on the effect of high speeds during the formation of metals, through which he proved that the rapid formation of metals increases their mechanical characteristics and adds to rigidity and tensile strength.

He made a special device for creating high rates of formation in order to be able to make samples and study mechanical characteristics. It is the first study in the Middle East in this field.

Computer System Linkup

Col Mahmud al-Dassuqi, an Egyptian fighting man, has preoccupied the thinking of the world and interested French thinking in applying what he has developed. Mahmud al-Dassuqi, an Egyptian weapons scientist, has also managed to earn the amazement and esteem of professors in the University of Illinois in the United States, which has been assigned by the American Department of Defense to study what the Egyptian scientist has developed.

He has innovated resources for hooking up computers on a nationwide or regional scale, so that everyone using computers will be able to acquire information which might not be available in their systems. The information available to every computer user will be in his own location. The American Defense Department has agreed to apply part of this research to establish mobile command and control information centers and France has applied it in its computer system.

Noise Measurement

Noise has become a serious phenomenon in modern society. The measurement of the noise that exists as a consequence of various sources has become very serious as far as the environment is concerned, because of increases in the speed of machinery, means of communication, arms development and missiles and aircraft. It has been necessary to measure noise in order to determine how much each individual can stand in his place of work. Maj Dr Mahmud al-Mallah has conducted research on the possibility of making preventing equipment or treating the noise itself and has developed a noise measurement instrument which operates like an early warning system in the event machinery is disrupted, or in order to discover breakdowns in them in the event the frequencies emitted by them are irregular.

The First Contingent in Installations

The first contingent specializing in installations, or civil engineering, has graduated from the scientists' factory. This is concerned with the construction of air bases, missile bases and military communities. Lt 'Ayman 'Abd-al-Majid al-Sutuhi, one of the top graduates in the contingent, has made an integrated design of airbase installations of reinforced concrete, a meeting hall and mess for officers, a water tank to be built in an original manner affording protection, and an administrative building and offices.

His comrade, Lt Shirin Faruq, has made a design for a tourist complex and village for the disabled in the city of Hilwan. He chose the site from property owned by

the armed forces and put forth special designs for the residential, treatment, certification and recreation project, sites for doctors and nurses and a service area.

The third construction project was presented by Lt Ibrahim Mahmud Ibrahim for construction of an armed force central meeting hall and public library and a hall for holding international military conferences which is safe from every angle and is also fit as a place for discussing military science papers which is outfitted with a library.

11837
CSO: 4504/60

NEW EASY TERMS OFFERED FOR PEOPLE AVOIDING CONSCRIPTION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Jul 81 in Arabic p 1

/Article: "Final Settlement by October of the Status of People Who Have Failed to Appear for Conscription"/

/Text/ Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, the minister of defense and war production, has issued instructions to the Ministry of Defense Secretariat, the Conscription Department and the Military Judiciary Department on the need to settle the status of all young people who failed to appear for conscription, be they inside or outside the republic, so that the coming settlement can be completed before the October holidays.

The instructions contain a number of facilities permitting the settlement of the problems of thousands of young men who have failed to appear for conscription, leaving them no justification or excuse for failing to appear after that.

In order to settle this matter, it has been decided:

1. To establish a special office in the Conscription Department chaired by Lt Gen Imam Hammudah, the assistant director of the Conscription Office, to receive the families of Egyptians abroad who have failed to appear for conscription, answer their queries and create a communications link with these citizens so that it will be feasible to resolve their problems.

2. To form three military committees, which will fly to London, Paris and Washington on 1 October. Each committee will stay for a period of 10 days, during which it will be working out of the offices of Egyptian military attaches in these countries in order definitively to settle the status of these young people. These young people will be told to appear at the three embassies during this time if they are in the country it is in or at the embassy that is closest to them.

These citizens must prepare the following data:

Date and place of birth.
A copy of their identity card.
A conscription card, if one exists.
All documents with which they had previously departed from the Arab Republic of Egypt.

Agreement has been reached with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have our consulates abroad fill out identity cards for people who do not have such cards in their possession, in order to facilitate the problem and resolve it in an informal manner free of red tape and complications, especially since their number is estimated to be in the thousands.

The Wisdom of the New Easy Terms

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im, AL-AHRAM's military correspondent, writes:

The basic motive behind this step is the minister of defense's conviction that the transitional period for putting the new conscription law into effect--the period which was to have been between 10 July 1980 and 30 November 1980--was not adequate to settle the status and inform the thousands of young people who had failed to appear. Those who were informed and came to Cairo discovered that they had arrived during the summer vacation season, a season in which the civilian judiciary is also on annual vacation. In view of the fact that the young people had work contract or personal study commitments, they were compelled to return by instructions from the Ministry of Defense but did not manage to settle their conscription problems.

It is well known that according to the new law the fine for avoiding conscription does not exceed 1,000 pounds, which is to be paid by everyone whose excuses are accepted by the committees that will travel to Washington, London and Paris, if their conscription status is definitively settled. This experiment will be considered a first stage preparatory to applying it to our sons who are present in Arab countries, especially since some of these countries withdraw the passports of people who make contracts with them for any activity. Consequently these people have been unable to appear during the transitional period.

Proceeding from the same principle, it has been decided to apply these easy terms to young people present in the republic who were not able to present themselves to the conscription departments to which they were subject during the transitional period when the new law was put into effect.

AL-AHRAM's military correspondent has learned that the comprehensive easy terms the Ministry of Defense is offering for the first time are being made in acknowledgment of the difficult conditions the country went through before October 1973 and in appreciation for these citizens' commitments to work abroad, which ultimately have an effect on Egypt's good name and support its economy.

In another area, these facilities will be an opportunity for people who have failed to appear for conscription; afterward they will be exposing themselves to punishments of fines and imprisonment.

11887
CSO: 4504/60

OFFICERS' HOUSING PROJECTS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 30 Jul 81 p 8

/Article by Husayn al-Habruk: "70 Million Pounds a Year to Establish 20,000 Officers' Housing Units"/

/Text/ Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, minister of defense and war production, has announced that he has obtained the agreement of Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy vice president for financial and economic affairs, to allocate an annual loan of 70 million pounds at 3 percent interest to carry out the future plan aimed at constructing housing units for officers.

At the celebration of completion of the second stage of al-Tawfiq city in Madinat Nasr, the minister said, "Contributing to the solution of the housing problem is a national duty. Therefore we have started the great project to solve the problem of officers and volunteers and have completed the study on people who wish to obtain appartments. They are 20,000 in number, 11,000 of whom have two rooms and a living room and the rest three rooms and a living room. The project has been 60 percent modified and the Engineering Authority set forth the bidding last October."

Maj Gen Eng Muhsin Sidqi, chairman of the Armed Forces Engineering Authority, gave a talk in which he said "We are proud to be offering this great project achievement to the second contingent; this totals 1,850 units with two rooms and a living room 95 /square/meters in area and 720 units with three rooms and a living room. Three coeducational primary schools and a coeducational preparatory school are to be built."

He said that the minister had approved execution of the second stage of the project and that the department would finish the units in Cairo, al-Jizah and Alexandria to provide officers' housing requirements.

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END

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5 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2410

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5 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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NATION-WIDE LITERACY CAMPAIGN BEING CONDUCTED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 8 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] "Following the Jaddi 6 change, rightfully called the phase of salvation of the homeland and the revolution, very significant decisions were made towards improving the economic, social and cultural condition of the toiling people of this country. In accordance with the revolutionary spirit, literacy courses were revived and, to popularise and spread literacy throughout the country, a nation-wide programme was undertaken.

"The Fundamental Principles of the DRA strongly emphasises the promotion of literacy and its Article 24, 26 and 27 define the duties of the Government towards total eradication of illiteracy in the country. Thus, with a correct understanding of the society's conditions and the role of literacy in development and evolution of the revolution and society, it is the duty of all literate people to take an active part in promoting literacy among the various strata of the society."

Stating this in an interview with the Kabul New Times, Dr Batinshah Zafarzai, president of literacy department of the Education Ministry, talked also of the Literacy Day in Afghanistan, the magnitude of the literacy campaign and its role in the process of the glorious Saur Revolution and its impact on the consciousness of the people.

He said: "Illiteracy is one of the basic problems of our society. Special attention is being paid to it and all-sided efforts are being made to solve this problem. Greater attention is paid to popularisation of literacy among various strata especially among the adults. Similarly, wide-scale efforts have been made in establishing literacy courses at the centre and in the provinces."

"For instance", he added, "the establishment of numerous literacy courses in the Government organisations and factories for men and women in the provinces by provincial literacy departments, holding of literacy courses for women for families, the weekly seminar for literacy teachers at the centre in 14 different zones, and the seminar of directors of literacy courses in the provinces held from Jauza 12 to 23 this year in Kabul, are among the steps taken to create a favourable atmosphere for exchange of views and experiences among the workers of the department at the centre and in the provinces."

"Likewise, the opening in Wazir Akbar Khan Mena of the first auxiliary education centre called 'Functional Literacy School' for women and a similar centre in Shah Shahheed, and establishment of similar schools planned for near future in Khairkhana Mena, Mirwais Maidan and Sayed Noor Mohammad Shah Mena are among other positive steps towards this end", he pointed out.

"Other activities of the department include implementation of a pre-school education programme for children, the first of the kind in the country, holding a 10-day workshop with the cooperation of the UNICEF to acquaint the teachers with the method of teaching of the first book for pre-school children during which the participants

took a practical part in compiling the teachers' guidebook and the teaching material. Similarly, with the implementation of the preschool education programme a number of children aged between nine and 14 who for one reason or other were deprived of enrolment in the school were afforded an opportunity to complete the four years of schooling in two years' time. Upon completion of two years' education, these children can either enter the fifth grade of primary schools, or at the auxilary education centres. At present there are 25 literacy courses established for small children in various parts of Kabul city," he noted.

"Following the new phase of the Saur Revolution until the end of the last Afghan year 1359", Dr Zafarzai said, "Some 515,000 illiterate compatriots were enrolled in nearly 2,300 literacy courses, showing an increase of 1,500 persons compared to the plan target. However, during the current Afghan year 1360, it planned to enroll some 550,000 adults in the literacy courses, and this figure shows an increase of 50,000 compared to the previous year. Likewise, following the new phase of the Saur Revolution, some 95,000 of our compatriots, including office workers and soldiers, graduated from the literary courses".

"All the expenditures of department such as salaries for teachers and employees of the department, teaching equipment and material, transportation etc, comprising nearly 93 per cent of the expenditures, is borne by the state. The remaining seven per cent of the expenditure is contributed in the form of stationeries, teaching materials, transportation means etc, as well as training of personnel at home and abroad by various international organisations such as the UNESCO, UNICEF, UNFPA and UNDP", he added.

"In addition to courses opened during the past year, 1359, at present both in the centres and in provinces, some 20,000 courses are functioning under the supervision of over 10,000 officials and honourary teachers. Each provinces is duty-bound to send its quarterly report of activity to the centre. For instance, in 1360, in Kabul, 38,000 people are to become literate. According to the report received during the first six months, some 20,000 people are enrolled in the literacy courses and as planned some 550,000 will be enrolled in the literacy courses this year in some 36,000 courses", Dr. Zafarzai said.

CSO: 4600/5

WINTER COAL SUPPLY BEING DISTRIBUTED IN KABUL

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] Over three hundred tons of coal for fuel is being distributed to the Kabul citizens a day. The distribution of the coal bricks to be used as fuel in winter began in the beginning of August and will continue towards the end of December. Every day, over 300 people receive coal bricks at the Factory itself or its branch at Khair Khana Mena.

This was stated by Dr Mohammad Mahfooz Nedayee, president of the Northern Coal Enterprise, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

Elaborating on supply of and demand for coal in Kabul during the current year, he added: "To help our compatriots to receive their coal requirements for winter, without any difficulty and on a regular basis and finally to prevent any undue rush, the enterprise decided to begin the distribution of the coal in early August this year. It is hoped that, by advent of winter, all our compatriots would have received necessary amounts of coal. The arrangement this year has made the distribution much easier and it has also removed the unnecessary worry on the part of our cocompatriots caused by the coal shortage."

Dr Nedayee said: "The coal bricks now being distributed were extracted from the Karkar coal mine and can be directly used as fuel. The coal brick manufacturing plant has made every possible effort to facilitate the distribution of coal and to prevent disorganisation in doing so."

"As of now", he pointed out, "an average family is entitled to receive 1,000 kgs of coal against Afs 1,000 on presentation of the identity card to Government officials and Government employees on the basis of the certificate by their concerned organisations".

"As the demand for coal bricks is high, in addition to the centre of the plant, a sale outlet has also been opened in Khairkhana Mena, a populated area. As planned, some 30,000 tons of coal is to be distributed to the Kabul residents by the beginning of winter", he noted.

"Though coal, under present conditions, is largely needed as a source of power for industrial firms, yet on the basis of the policy of the revolutionary Government, to meet part of the needs for fuel, it was decided to distribute coal to the residents of the Kabul, Baghlan and Balkh provinces", Dr Nedayee pointed out.

"Due to increasing demand for coal as fuel, it is planned to increase its sale in the Kabul province by nine per cent, in Baghlan by five per cent and in Balkh by six per cent", he added. "At present, adequate supply of coal is available at the centre of the plant as well as in the depots of Pule Khumri and Balkh, ready for distribution."

"In Kabul, coal is mainly available in the form of powder and some coal in the form of bricks is also available which is to be distributed to some Government organisations, embassies residing in Kabul which find it difficult to use other forms of coal", Dr Nedayee said.

"There has been no change whatsoever in the price of coal this year compared to last year, and the difference is subsidised by the Government", he clarified.

"According to the plan, some 110,000 tons of coal is scheduled to be extracted from the coal mines in the northern parts of the country and, during the first quarter of the current Afghan year, some seven per cent more coal was extracted than planned", Dr Nedayee said.

CSO: 4600/5

MUSAVI'S ROLE IN STEADFASTNESS FRONT LAUDED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab]

[Text] *After the much needed initiative of the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic in suggesting the formation of a united Islamic and anti-Zionist front, Foreign Minister Musavi has taken the second positive step by accepting the invitation of Abdul Atii-Al-Abidi, his Libyan counterpart. Musavi's trip to Benghazi, his first trip abroad since he has taken office, indicates the importance Iran gives to the anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist struggles of our Muslim brothers in the Arab world. This trip takes place at a time when pressures have been increasing from all sides to keep us entangled in internal matters. On the other hand, in continuation of a long chain of plots, the declaration of "strategic cooperation" between the U.S. and the regime of occupied Palestine gives more importance to the meeting of the Iranian Foreign Minister with the leaders of the Steadfastness Front. The significance of this meeting is further highlighted by the upheavals taking place under inspiration from the Islamic Revolution in countries like Egypt.*

The four countries plus the PLO, which constitute the Steadfastness Front, have reason to be buoyed up by the Iranian participation. Iran too should utilize this new initiative as a good start to fulfill her anti-Zionist duties.

If we want to keep the Islamic Revolution (IR) in an offensive position, as is its nature so far as the struggle against the superpowers and their puppet regimes is concerned, neither we nor our Islamic Muslim brothers should lose the initiative in taking adequate and timely decisions.

When the treacherous Sadat gave in to the Israelis and sold the Palestinian cause out to Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy plotting, Syria remained alone before the aggressive regime of Begin. The Palestinian movement on

the other hand suffered drastic blows in the war imposed in Lebanon and what was left for millions of Palestinians was despair and frustration. The formation of the Steadfastness Front should be seen as a hopeful attempt in reviving the struggle against the Tel Aviv regime.

For a long time, because of the hypocrital position of Saddam's regime (which was a member of the front), no effective measures were taken. When the Iraqi regime showed its real (western dependent) face by allying itself with the reactionary Arab regimes in the region on the one side and by getting closer to the U.S. on the other, the front found itself in a perilous position. The threat of the Iraqi regime's betrayal became more tangible when Syria and Libya declared openly their support for the Islamic Republic in the war imposed upon Iran by Saddam's regime. Moreover the recent provocations of Israel against Damascus under the pretext of the presence of Syrian missiles in Lebanon, and U.S. violation against the Libyan space necessitated a more determined attempt in consolidating the anti-American-Israeli opposition.

And still more important than the aforementioned points, the brotherly ties between the Muslim masses of Iran and the countries in question inspired our Foreign Ministry to meet its responsibilities. The news of the suggestion to form a united front against Zionism based upon the Islamic teachings, encompassing even the Steadfastness Front, was a very hopeful sign for the brother countries whose leaders Musavi will meet in Libya. The Libyans, by sending him an official invitation to Benghazi expressed their support for Musavi's proposals. Iran's Foreign Minister took this invitation as a first step for explaining what he means by his suggestion and at the same time give more muscle to the anti-Israel front already formed.

In addition to these two objectives, the presence of Musavi in Benghazi viewed as a sign of stability in our foreign policy and a first step toward realization of our slogans for the unity of the Islamic world. As he said in Mehrabad Airport, Musavi will discuss recent dangerous events of the "strategic cooperation between the U.S. and the Tel Aviv regime". In this so-called "cooperation" we see the very suspicious objectives of the U.S. in the Middle East. The timing of this "strategic cooperation" is darkly ominous for the Muslim world.

After the recent meeting between the leaders of Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen (which could give a direct control over the Bab Al Mandab waterway in the Red Sea to these states), Reagan and Begin seem to have struck an

effective blow by choosing Israel as the warehouse of the U.S.'s sophisticated weapons. Whatever argument the political analysts make for this new Washington-Tel Aviv alliance the question remains, "What danger is threatening the Zionist regime at this time?" Has not the Sadat regime signed a "never war again" agreement with Begin? Has not the recent multi-billion dollar aid to Tel Aviv been enough to strengthen the aggressive designs of Israel? Does not the 24 hours flight of AWACS in the Middle East give the necessary information to the U.S. to prevent any hypothetical danger? Has not the Iraqi regime engaged the Islamic Republic in a very large war front? Do not the presence of the rapid deployment forces in the region give adequate guarantee to the world-devouring America to continue its illegal presence in the Persian Gulf? Then what are the reasons behind the strategic cooperation? Though the Islamic Republic has its own analysis of this dangerous "cooperation", it is up to Musavi to discuss with his Steadfastness Front brothers the perspective of the future events following this grave U.S. plan.

With all the hopes that we carry for the success of Musavi's trip we should re-emphasize the independent nature of the Islamic Republic manisfested in the "Neither East Nor West" slogan. Our Foreign Minister will represent in the Benghazi meeting a people who have firmly decided to remain faithful to the slogans of the Islamic Revolution. We do welcome any step taken in the course of "anti-American" struggle but we also firmly express that the happenings of the last decade in Egypt, Somalia and elsewhere should not be forgotten as useful guidelines. And finally because we believe in the alliance of the people rather than that of the governments, even though fortunately they conform in some cases, Musavi will not forget that the skeleton of the brotherly joint action, if inspired by the Islamic slogans, will be warmly welcomed by the people. And we know that this decade is the one which has given the chance to the masses to manifest their will in the form of pressures on their governmnets. In spite of the extent to which our common enemies try to keep us apart, we do hope that fruitful results emerge from the Benghazi meeting.

— S. MOADAB

CSO: 4600/6

FINNISH GROUP WINS $135 MILLION CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 43

[Text] A FINNISH consortium, consisting of the country's eighth and twelfth biggest contractors — Perusyhtymae and Vesto — has won a $135m contract from Iraq's state building organisation. The project is for multi-purpose and public buildings, housing, a library and cinema, and catering, conference and sports facilities in Baghdad. It is to be completed in three years by 100 Finns and 400 other workers.

Interviewed by *8 Days*, export directors of both the firms reckoned they just had the edge in a highly competitive scramble. Heikki Koivu of Perusyhtymae said: 'It was normal tendering, but our type of planning and expertise appeared to tip the scales.'

Since last year, the unnamed consortium — in which each partner has a 50 per cent stake — has been working on a municipal engineering project for the ministry of housing at Mosul in northern Iraq. Valued at $35m, this will be completed in 1982.

In 1980 Perusyhtymae and its subsidiaries — the Pera group — got just over half their sales of $411m from exports, mainly to the Soviet Union (48 per cent), Africa (39 per cent) and the Middle East. The company has branch offices in Baghdad and Tripoli. Perusyhtymae is completing a $20m municipal engineering venture at Al Khums and Al Khamis in Libya, while with a subsidiary, Makrotalo, it is building a training centre at Beni Walid.

It has also teamed up with fellow-Finns Lohja and Otto Wuorio in the LWP consortium in Saudi Arabia. This operation has concentrated its efforts in Riyadh, where it is constructing a high-rise block of 252 flats, and a 4,000 sq m shopping precinct. In addition, Makrotalo has built three site villages for the mammoth Philips-L.M. Ericsson telecommunications project in Saudi Arabia.

Vesto recently completed a $18m grain silo and bagging plant at Al HudayJah in the Yemen Arab Republic. Of its revenue, 25-30 per cent comes from exports, of which 75 per cent goes to the Middle East and 25 per cent to a ship repair scheme in Vietnam.

Besides building, Perusyhtymae and Vesto will plan and deliver equipment for their new Baghdad project, which brings Finnish orders in Iraq to $730m.

CSO: 4400/2

FINNISH CONSORTIUM WINS $76 MILLION ELECTRIFICATION CONTRACT

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 43

[Text] The AS group, a new Finnish consortium comprising two companies specialising in electrical contracting and wholesaling, has won a $76 m deal to subcontract for the Yugoslav enterprise Trudbenik in the construction of three towns in Iraq. This replaces an earlier $87 m agreement between Trudbenik and the Finnish VS group.

Operating from a remote provincial town, VS was declared bankrupt in July. It clearly suffered delusions of grandeur and a tendency to bite off more than it could chew. Moreover, early in 1980 it blundered by boasting that it would secure the entire mammoth deal in Iraq. In the end, despite efforts by the Iraqi ambassador to push the Finnish government into granting guarantees, it got a mere 8 per cent. Trudbenik anticipated VS's demise, and cancelled its contract.

AS — formed solely to handle this contract — has inherited all the VS deal except the structural design part. It will start operations at the end of August, and complete them in 40 months.

Juhani Heinonen, president of AS's larger partner, the Are group, told *8 Days* that the Yugoslavs, despite their earlier disappointments in Finland, were convinced that the new set-up would work. Are has a budget of $92m this year — one-third from domestic contracting, one-third from the Middle East and another third from the Soviet Union — and has 57 years' experience in the field.

In Iraq Are is already involved in work on the Baghdad Congress Palace, which Heinonen expects will be completed on schedule despite delivery delays caused by the Gulf war. Are's biggest venture in the Middle East is the Riyadh-based Arabian Lamah Company, 49 per cent Finnish and 51 per cent Saudi owned, which is currently working on about 20 jobs in Saudi Arabia.

While acknowledging that several Finnish contractors are pulling out of the tough Middle East market, Heinonen is optimistic that Are will withstand the competition. As evidence, he cites a new $9m maintenance contract in Libya.

CSO: 4400/2

PROCEDURES FOR WESTERN BUSINESSMEN DETAILED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 pp 34, 35

[Text] The Iran/Iraq war should not obscure the fact that Iraq remains one of the most lucrative markets in the Middle East. War-related damage has boosted the already lengthy shopping list drawn up by Baghdad, and Iraq has plenty of money to pay for an ambitious development spending spree: oil earnings trebled from $3.5 bn in 1978 to $10.8 bn in 1980.

Much of this revenue heads westward: In 1973 western imports had levelled out at $900 m but in 1980 the West piled up $14 bn worth of Iraqi orders.

Broaching the Iraqi market can be a complicated task, however. For a start, according to the UN development forum, there are around 250 public sector organisations that have procurement rights. Each of these has its own revenue and expenditure budgets, and many are heavily subsidised by the government, so that such concepts as profitability need not affect their ability to continue importing.

All these public sector companies are officially encouraged to give priority to other Arab states, centrally planned economies and Third World countries. These brotherly aspirations notwithstanding, western industrialised states found their share of the Iraqi import total increasing from 54 per cent in 1973 to 82 per cent in 1979. The socialist states, however, saw their share drop from 25 per cent to a mere seven per cent during the same period.

One reason may well be the number of Iraqi technocrats who have received their training in the West. Many of the top civil servants were schooled in America, and have become accustomed to western equipment. In addition a general (albeit unmentioned) disillusionment with the performance of some Eastern European companies has helped western competitors. Stores abound in Baghdad of hotel doors opening to nowhere, and other unfortunate examples of shoddy work.

Hoping to profit from Eastern European losses, the major western firms are grouping into consortia when bidding for Iraqi contracts. This sorts well with Iraqi's desire for turnkey operations, because it has a shortage of manpower.

The big firms have their lines of communication carefully laid down, and many are cruising on proven performance ability, but for those still looking for Baghdad business, several steps should be closely followed:

Registration is compulsory for all foreign firms seeking business in the public sector. The requisite forms are issued by the ministry of planning, but be careful, because their format changes from time to time, so ensure you have the latest form or your application will be invalidated. You will not receive acknowledgement — just assume that the application has been filed.

You are now cleared to write to the ministries and state organisations of your choice. Address all letters to the 'Director General' of the ministry even if you know his name, and mention you have already registered with the ministry of planning.

Now comes the task of deciding to which of the 250 organisations and ministries you should write. Generally the large-scale contracts are handled by the ministries and are extensively advertised abroad, while the state organisations concentrate on the smaller items. If you specialise in small, low-maintenance items of simple design, you will find the Iraqi contracting partner — usually a state organisation — will act as your agent, collecting the standard commission on sales.

Private commercial agents, contrary to many reports, exist legally in Iraq, but they are strictly confined to selling to the Iraqi private sector. If dealing in this sector, check any p. ate agent's licence and don't commit yourself to paper until you have retained a recognised Iraqi lawyer. If you subsequently seek business in the public sector, you must file the agreement you have made with your agent with the registrar of commercial agencies.

If you are a consultant, Iraqi law requires you to form a partnership with a local consultant, but the UN development forum claims this requirement is regularly being waived these days.

Unlike the case in many other Middle Eastern states, it is not a precondition to have local joint venture partners for major construction contracts, and such partners do not necessarily give the foreign firm an advantage. Large foreign firms should, however, make themselves known to the Iraqis by having their senior executives included in trade missions. For the specialist equipment folk, the annual Baghdad Trade Fair is an unparalleled opportunity to show their wares, as all the ministries and state organisations are present. Official figures claim that half of the country's annual purchases are made at the fair, and this figure is rising steadily.

All public sector contracts require bid and performance guarantees. Unconditional bank guarantees must be made through a correspondent of the Rafidain bank in Baghdad, which will then issue a corresponding guarantee to the purchasing agency. Surety bonds are not accepted in Iraq. A bid bond of about two per cent of the bid amount is standard for big contracts, but can go as high as five per cent for the smaller deals. The guarantee is returned if the bid is unsuccessful, but if the successful tenderer does not sign a contract the guarantee is lost.

Within two weeks to a month of the contract being signed the bid bond is converted to a performance guarantee of about five per cent of the contract for large firms and up to ten per cent for smaller ones. Five per cent of the contract is usually retained until the foreign company obtains a 'final acceptance certificate'. Most western contractors find it uneconomic to retain staff until the certificates come through after a year or so, and forfeit the bond as a form of final discount.

A warning: there are no force majeure clauses in Iraqi contracts. Labour disputes, delays due to port congestion and even border disputes — no matter how serious — are not considered force majeure.

Training remains one of the best lures for Iraqi contracts, but note that while Iraq is willing to pick up part of the cost of training Iraqis, any overseas schooling is expected to be paid by the foreign firm.

CSO: 4400/2

DEMOGRAPHY, POPULATION STRATEGY OUTLINED

Amman AL-'AMAL in Arabic 1980 pp 5-24

[Article by Dr Taysir 'Abd-al-Jabir, Undersecretary of Labor and Dr Bassam al-Sakit, Director of the Economic Department of the Royal Scientific Society: "Demographic Strategy in the Arab Homeland"]

[Text] First, Introduction

The purpose of this study is to present and analyze the demographic situation in Jordan and to affirm the future strategies that would be suitable for the eighties. Jordan, a developing Arab country, is considered a good model when the characteristics of its population are analyzed and its demographic policies outlined.

This study was one of the studies presented at the 11th Arab Summit Conference that was held in Amman in November 1980. Therefore, the study derives from Jordan's experience specific strategies and policies that are suitable to the Arab world. On this level the study sets forth a comparison between the Arab countries, referring to similarities as well as differences. This study will also incorporate a regional framework, especially with regard to the relocation of workers, income differences, differences in life styles and the possible areas of cooperation and coordination.

Outlining national and regional demographic strategies is an important step that helps officials take appropriate measures. The United Nations Organization also plays an important role in population questions, utilizing numerous methods in doing so, especially those of offering advice; financing and implementing demographic projects that are consistent with regional development plans; organizing seminars, symposiums and conferences that help focus on specific demographic problems; and disseminating information on a broad scale.

It has also been observed that there is some ambiguity and a lack of specificity in the operations of the UN organizations that specialize in this area, and it is not unlikely that there is some duplication [as well]. But it is also known that the UN Fund for Demographic Activities is the international agency that is more relevant than others in population

questions. Nevertheless, the need does exist for the coordination of demographic activities among UN organizations. This statement applies specifically to the UN regional economic committees--the West Asia Committee and the Africa Committee with regard to the Arab World--the International Labor Organization, the UN Children's Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the UN Development Program, the UN Institute for Training and Research and others. Such coordination would increase the effectiveness of the United Nations and would increase the benefit from the resources that are available for population programs. Accordingly, this study will refer to the role of the Demographic Activities Fund as an international organization that concerns itself primarily with population problems.

Second, the Demographic Situation in Jordan

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an Arab country located in west Asia. Before World War II it was part of the Ottoman Empire. After the end of that war the East Jordan emirate and Palestine came under the British mandate. In 1946 the independence of the emirate was declared, and it was called the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In 1950 the West Bank became part of the kingdom, but in 1967 it was occupied by Israel. The kingdom has an area of 96,188 square kilometers, and the West Bank makes up 6,644 square kilometers of that total area.

The Jordanian economy has a number of principal characteristics which we summarize as follows:

1. The scarcity of natural resources is a factor which has restrained and controlled the speed and the directions of Jordanian development. Except for phosphates whose commercial exploitation began in the early fifties, other natural resources are limited, especially arable land--87 percent of Jordan's area is desert or steppe--water resources, energy, minerals and forests.

Except for potassium, for whose exploitation a major project is being built, the resources and the salts of the Dead Sea remain unexploited.

2. The scarcity of financial resources has compelled Jordan to devote continuous attention to the mobilization of its local resources. Nevertheless, the need for foreign aid and assistance increased and grew under the ambitious development plans. In addition, current government expenses were growing to meet the growing pressure on public services. The 1976-1980 5-Year Development plan assumes that the use of 60 million dinars in foreign financing and 267 million dinars in loans will be available, compared with a total investment volume for the plan of 765 million dinars.

3. Services prevail [as a source of] national revenues, compared with the commodities sector such as agriculture, industry, water and electricity. In 1979 the commodities sector did not provide more than 30 percent of the national product, whereas the government services sector, and the trade sector were the most important sectors in the Jordanian economy as far as generating income is concerned.

4. Despite the scarcity of natural and financial resources in Jordan, the country was able to achieve significant progress especially economically. During periods of stability from the early fifties and until 1967 and from 1976 till the present the Jordanian economy grew at an annual rate of not less than 10 percent. [This was reflected] in national revenues.

5. The Jordanian economy has encountered economic disorder more than once, and this brought the course of development to a standstill for a period of time. Afterwards, the Jordanian economy was able to resume its development course.

This occurred in 1948, and there was a more critical occurrence in 1967 when a major question was raised about the Jordanian economy's ability to survive.

6. The principal foundation for Jordan's success in its development experiment--with the exception of the aforementioned periods of disorder--is its appropriate economic policy and the quality of its human resources. Jordan's economic policy settled on encouraging individual initiative under the umbrella of an active role for the government by establishing principal joint projects, drawing up development plans and regulating economic and social life. Jordan utilizes a liberal policy as far as foreign currency and imports are concerned, and it encourages investments and the establishment of stable and energetic industrial labor relations. Reference will be made to the quality of human resources in a subsequent part of this study.

In view of these principal characteristics of the Jordanian economy, the demographic characteristics of Jordan may be presented in the following section.

The Size of the Population

Jordan's economic stature is relatively small regardless of the standard measure that is used such as area, national revenue or population. Table Number 1, [showing] Jordan's population in the 3 Years during which a population and/or a housing census was conducted, indicates that the population of the East Bank rose from 587,000 persons in 1952 to 2,152,000 persons in 1979. The table shows that the population of Jordan rose from 1,529,000 persons to 2,902,000 persons during the same period also.

The results of the 1979 Population Census were surprising. It was believed that the number of people was higher and that the population was probably 2.8 million persons in the East Bank only. This discrepancy may be the result of the growing number of Jordanians living abroad. It is estimated that they are about 750,000 persons.

The population in the East Bank grew rapidly; it quadrupled in less than 30 years. Between 1961 and 1979 the real rate of population growth was about 4.95 percent annually, whereas the normal rate of growth was 3.8 percent. These rates are considered among the highest in the world. If

we were to apply the 3.8 percent rate of growth to the future, the population of Jordan on both banks will be 6.5 million persons by the year 2000.

The rapid growth of the population in Jordan must be studied not only as a demographic phenomenon, but also with regard to its economic and social impact. The rate of growth of the population and, accordingly, the size and age distribution of the population have a direct effect on the speed and the directions of the Jordanian development process. This mutual effect can be extrapolated to the impact of the population on the labor market; on the increased demand for services; on urbanization; on the growing pressure on rare resources such as water, agricultural production and energy; and on environmental protection. The social peace which Jordan is enjoying at present may be threatened whenever opportunities for the younger generations become tight in the future. Therefore, if a low rate of population [growth] is to be maintained, the impetus for development must be preserved and appropriate policies must be developed to deal with the factors that are mentioned in this paragraph.

There is another alternative: that of reducing population growth through the factors that reduce the birth rate. It is noteworthy that the Jordanian government has not yet constructed a policy for limiting the population. The development process has produced the opposite result: it has increased the birth rate from 47.3 per 1,000 persons in the population in 1961 to 50 births per 1,000 in 1979.

At the same time the death rate declined from 21 per 1,000 in the early fifties to 11.8 per 1,000 persons in 1979. This led to a natural increase instead of a decline in the rate of population growth. In 1961 the rate of population growth was 3.1 percent; in 1979 it rose to 3.8 percent.

Age Distribution

Among the principal demographic phenomena in Jordan is the high ratio of younger people in the population. According to the 1979 Census the number of people who are less than 15 years old made up 53.2 percent of the population, whereas the ratio of people who were 60 years or older was 1.9 percent. Thus people who are of working age represent only 44.9 percent of the total population. Table Number 3 shows that the age distribution of the population has become less favorable in 1979 than it was in 1961.

The present age distribution of Jordan's population is due to two principal factors. They are, first, the high fertility rate and accordingly the high birth rate; and second, the improvement in health care and sanitation services, which clearly reduced the infant mortality rate to 89 deaths for every 1,000 births in 1977. A 1977 study of fertility in Jordan shows that on the average a Jordanian woman bears 5.4 children after 10 to 14 years of marriage; 8.3 children after 20 to 24 years of marriage; and 9.2 children after 30 years or more of marriage.

The large percentage of children in Jordan's population has significant social and economic effects. Among the most important of these are the following:

A. A high average of dependents. We will show this in detail subsequently.

B. A growing demand for services, especially education, health, social services, transportation and others.

C. There is a positive factor [in this phenomenon]: the high number of workers who will enter the employment market in the coming years.

The Geographic Distribution

It has been noticed that the geographic distribution of Jordan's population is linked to the agricultural mode and to the rainfall. Due to the fact that 87 percent of the area of Jordan is desert or steppe, the people have been concentrated in the northwestern areas of Jordan which are the arable areas. Table Number 4 shows that 78.5 percent of Jordan's population were living in the governorates of Amman and Irbid in 1961. In 1979 this ratio increased to 83 percent. Among the other factors that contributed to the concentration of the population are the emigration of citizens from the West Bank in 1967 and later as a result of the arbitrariness of the Israeli authorities of occupation; the concentration of economic activities, including government services, in Amman; and migration from rural areas to the cities. The Jordanian government became aware of the fact that the concentration of the population was an unhealthy phenomenon and it defined the fairer distribution of economic activities among the areas of the kingdom as one of the principal objectives of development planning. This objective has recently been emphasized through a number of measures. These measures are:

A. Regional plans whose purpose is to determine the resources that are available in every governorate and to prepare priority projects are to be devised. So far the plans for the governorates of Amman, al-Balqa', the Jordan Valley, Irbid and al-'Aqabah have been devised. A regional plan for the governorate of al-Karak is also under consideration. It is hoped that an in-depth study of the production capabilities of each governorate will arouse special interest in developing the governorates and that this will reduce the trend toward the concentration of the population [in certain areas].

B. A number of new development centers is being built outside the area of Amman-al-Zarqa'. These areas will attract more people to them. Among these centers are those of the potassium project near al-Karak, al-Yarmuk University near Irbid, the cement project and the tourist facilities in al-'Aqabah.

C. The government is working energetically to have the delivery of social and economic services included in the development plans so that the basic needs of citizens, including those who reside in rural and remote areas, can be met. Examples of [these efforts] are the rural electrification projects, road building, water delivery, the establishment of social centers and providing the areas with postal and telephone services.

Urbanization

In addition to the geographic concentration of the population in Jordan, the continued internal migration from rural areas to the cities is one of the principal demographic phenomena in Jordan. The percentage of people living in cities with 10,000 or more persons rose from 43 percent in 1961 to 62.7 percent in 1979. The number of people in the three principal cities of Amman, Irbid and al-Zarqa' make up 45.4 percent of the total population in 1979, with Amman making up 30.1 percent.

The high average rate of urbanization reinforced the impact of the forces of the marketplace which had yielded the concentration of economic activity in a number of principal cities, especially Amman, which has the largest share. In offering its services the government was unable to keep up with the flow of the population from the rural areas to the cities, especially with regard to water, electricity, roads, telephone and sanitation services. Although home construction has become one of the expansion activities since 1973, the growth in housing for low and average income people has been less than the demand for such housing. There are still poor quarters in Amman and in the other principal cities.

The migration from rural areas to the cities has deprived the traditional non-irrigated farming [activities] of one of the important factors of production: manpower. This has contributed to the stagnation of agricultural production at the same time that demand for imported foods increased. Internal migration is usually the first step towards immigration to the oil exporting Arab countries.

It is essential that the Jordanian government adopt those policies and implement those measures that would reduce the average rate of urbanization. The most important of these policies and measures are the following:

A. Development centers relying on specific production activities are to be promoted in various locations in the country.

B. Suitable economic and social services are to be offered to the rural areas.

C. A major project in the non-irrigated farming areas is to be devised and implemented to increase those areas' agricultural production by using more productive devices.

D. Housing projects are to be built by the Housing Organization in areas outside the principal cities, and low-cost housing loans are to be offered for the construction of homes in rural areas.

Manpower and Employment

We previously mentioned that the quality of manpower in Jordan is considered the principal resource in the country's development. In the fifties and sixties the supply of Jordanian manpower exceeded local demand, and

this caused an 8 to 10 percent rate of unemployment. The creation of new work opportunities was among the principal over-all objectives of the 1964-1970 7-Year Development plan and the 1973-1975 3-Year Development plan.

The immigration of Jordanian workers to the oil exporting Arab countries began in the late forties, and it is still going on now.

It has been noted that one of Jordan's principal demographic features is the decline in the average rate of participation in the work force. This rate was estimated at about 19.6 percent in the 1976 survey of families. [That rate] was 34.7 percent for males and 4.1 percent for females. The results of the 1979 population census showed that the rate of participation in the work force was 19.9 percent.

This is considered a low rate even when compared with the rate in other developing countries.

There are several reasons for the decline in the rate of participation.

A. The high ratio of children to the total population. In 1979 this ratio rose to 53.2 percent.

B. The low rate of female participation in the labor market. In 1976 the rate of female participation was estimated at about 4.1 percent; in 1980 it rose to 12 percent.

C. A high percentage of the population is enrolled in schools and training institutions. In 1979 that percentage amounted to 34.5 percent.

D. Jordanian workers move to the oil exporting Arab countries, but some of their families stay in Jordan. If we were to take this fact into consideration and adjust the figures accordingly, the rate of participation would rise somewhat, but it would still be much less than that in many countries.

The low average rate of participation in the work force signifies a high average rate of dependency in Jordan. Every worker has to support himself and four other persons also. This mode has a negative effect on the trends of consumption and investment.

The employment situation in Jordan has undergone considerable improvement.

A. Jordan has reached the stage of full employment. In fact the shortage in manpower has been met by importing Arab and foreign workers.

B. The establishment of the Vocational Training Institute and the institutes for training has provided workers with opportunities for training and upgrading their abilities.

C. Average wages in Jordan rose at a rate that exceeds that of inflation, and this led to an improvement in the real wages of workers. Workers, especially those in major organizations, obtained material benefits in the areas of housing, transportation, savings funds and others.

D. The Social Security Law establishing the Public Organization for Social Security was issued in October 1978. The organization began insuring workers as of January 1980 for disability, old age, death and work related injuries. This step gives workers a new incentive, and it also improves their work conditions.

The distribution of the work force among the sectors reflects the fact that the services sector prevails in the Jordanian economy. Table Number 7 shows the distribution of employment by sector in 1961 and 1975. The percentage of workers in agriculture declined from 33.5 percent to 32 percent, but the percentage of workers in services rose from 46.1 percent to 50.6 percent in the aforementioned period.

On the basis of what was mentioned above, we offer below a number of proposed public policies in the area of manpower and employment.

1. The creation of new work opportunities must remain an objective of development, especially in view of the annual 3 percent increase in the work force in Jordan. However, the priority of this objective will vary from one period to another depending on the conditions of the labor market.

2. It is essential to expand training facilities so that people who are entering the labor market would have the opportunities for receiving formal training. Wage scales must reflect the levels of skill, and these must be classified and officially confirmed.

3. The development of the work force is a dynamic process that must be pursued so that the capability for assimilating and developing the methods of modern technology can be developed.

4. Higher education is to be guided sensibly so that a growth in the supply of some specializations can be avoided and the need for graduates in non-traditional areas can be met.

5. The relationship between wages and prices is to be taken into consideration in settling labor disputes so that workers' real wages would not decrease in time and an increase in those wages would not raise costs greatly. The emphasis is to be placed on improving material benefits for workers.

6. Labor legislation is to be reconsidered periodically, and it should be updated so it can stay in step with economic and social developments as well as changes in the manpower and employment policy.

7. Necessary measures are to be adopted, including amending labor laws, to encourage women's participation in the work force.

Emigration

Jordan has experienced several kinds of emigration. They are:

1. Forced emigration from occupied Palestine in 1948 and 1967. This had broad economic and social effects in the area.

2. Continuing migration from rural areas to the cities.

3. The relocation of workers abroad: this [trend] began clearly in the late forties and has continued till now.

4. The arrival of Arab and foreign workers to Jordan since 1974.

Jordan is following a liberal policy regarding the relocation of its work force abroad. It has not imposed limiting restrictions to limit the number of emigrants. This policy depends on the following considerations:

1. The increase in the supply of labor in Jordan in the fifties and in the sixties led to a rate of unemployment that varied between 8 and 12 percent. Consequently, the relocation of Jordanian workers in neighboring Arab countries helped alleviate this unemployment, especially among the educated people and university graduates.

2. Revenues from the funds transferred by Jordanians working abroad increased significantly and became the major source of foreign currency. Funds transferred by Jordanian workers through official channels amounted to 180.4 million dinars in 1979. This figure represents 30.6 percent of the gross national product for 1979. It is confined to those transfers that are carried out through the banking system. It is estimated that the value of other [monetary] transfers carried out by both parties as well as material transfers is comparable to that of official transfers.

3. The Jordanian government regards supplying the Arab oil exporting countries with Jordanian labor to be a principal ingredient in the process of Arab integration and cooperation. Accordingly, a percentage of these workers, especially teachers, judges and medical professionals, move to these Arab countries under official programs of cooperation between the Jordanian government and the other Arab governments. Accurate figures about the number of Jordanian workers abroad and their specializations are not available, but estimates vary from 150,000 according to a study by the International Labor Organization to 300,000, according to the estimates of the Ministry of Labor. We believe that the second estimate is the one closer to the truth. It has been noticed that females make up a small percentage of Jordanian workers abroad, no more than 2 or 3 percent. Professional and highly qualified workers make up a high percentage of Jordanian workers abroad that amounts to about 20 percent.

The impetus of development in Jordan and in the Arab countries that export oil has been accelerating since 1974. Demand for trained manpower exceeded the supply in those countries, and this led to the admission of a large number of Asian workers to the area. In Jordan unemployment was eliminated, and it was replaced by a growing demand for workers. This required that workers be brought from abroad to meet the shortage in the local labor

market and to control the rise in wages. It is estimated that the number of non-Jordanian workers in Jordan is about 70,000; 76 percent of those workers are Arabs and 15 percent are Asians. Those workers, most of whom are semi-skilled, are employed in construction, services and in agriculture. The offficial [monetary] transfers of those workers abroad are estimated to be 24 million dinars for 1979.

Recently a few changes were introduced into Jordan's policy on the emigration of workers in response to the developments of the local employment market, and especially the shortage in skilled and professional workers in the areas of construction, hotels and project management. In recent years the average rate of wages has also risen by an average of 15 percent per year. Although the figures of Jordanian workers' [monetary] transfers are quite large, the individual and social cost of educating and training them is also high. The turnover among government workers and employees in Jordan rose, and this narrowed the scope of action for those who are in charge of employment policies. It may have [even] reduced workers' productivity.

The most important measures that were taken by the government to organize the work force follow:

1. Jordanian workers are to be granted financial incentives and material incentives such as wage increases; social security against work injuries, disability, old age and death; and transportation and housing services.

2. Material benefits reduce the wage differences that exist between Jordan and the oil exporting Arab countries. This would encourage a larger number of workers to stay in their present positions.

3. The number of trained workers is to be increased by establishing new vocational training centers and expanding existing ones. Major organizations are to be encouraged to set up their own training facilities.

4. Restrictions are to be placed on the entry of foreign workers to ensure that their number and their quality remain consistent with the needs of the Jordanian economy which cannot be met by Jordanian workers. It is essential to avoid the tendency of employers to employ foreign workers as an alternative to Jordanian workers because of the wage differences. Therefore, any foreign worker must obtain a work permit. No non-Arab worker will be allowed to enter Jordan until the employer who wishes to employ him obtains prior approval from the ministries of labor and the interior. This measure explains the sharp rise in work permits during 1980, compared with previous years (Table Number 9). The Jordanian government is devoting considerable attention to the effects that the emigration of its workers abroad [have on the country]. His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hasan affirmed in a keynote address to the International Labor Congress in June 1977 the importance of labor relocation and compared it to the transfer of goods and capital. He affirmed the need to take measures to remedy the negative effects of the emigration of qualified people from the developing countries. His highness also proposed the establishment of an international

labor compensation fund to help the developing countries and to compensate them for their loss which is the result of the emigration of their highly qualified people. This proposal may be put into practice on a regional level, but it is necessary to distinguish between the emigration of qualified persons to the advanced countries and the relocation of the work force within the area. [The latter] is considered a factor in the integration and cooperation of the countries of the area.

Third, a Demographic Strategy for the Arab World

The 11th Arab Summit Conference that was held in Amman on 25 November 1980 was the first Arab summit to deal directly with economic aspects and to focus on joint Arab economic action, especially during the 1981-1985 planning period. The economic working paper dealt with numerous subjects among which were development, national security, the principal problems that confront comprehensive planning on the national and regional scales, and a proposal for a national plan with specific goals and methods and financial requirements.

The national plan gives major importance to the development of human resources. Its first and second objectives stipulate the following:

1. The mind and the will of the Arab citizen are to be liberated; human resources are to be developed; and workers are to be trained in the context of a common national effort and regional action as well. The movement of workers between Arab countries is to be regulated and facilitated so as to serve the interests of exporting and importing countries equally.

2. Technological capabilities are to be developed and modern technology is to be assimilated. The development of human resources and other demographic factors are getting noticeable attention in the long-range [list] of Arab priorities (until the year 2000). This part of the study will depend on ideas that have already been mentioned about the demographic situation in Jordan. This section will also present briefly the demographic characteristics of the Arab world. It will be followed by a detailed discussion of a number of proposals that pertain to an Arab demographic strategy as part of a comprehensive Arab strategy for economic action.

The Arab Demographic Situation

Most of the demographic characteristics that are prevalent in Jordan apply on the average to the Arab world. Naturally, this does not mean that the same population mode prevails in each Arab country. There are principal differences which we will discuss later. The most important characteristics of the Arab world follow:

1. A high rate of population growth that varies from 4.34 percent in the Gulf states to 3.18 percent and 2.86 percent in west Asia and North Africa, respectively. These rates are high when compared with the rate of growth of the world's population, which is 1.8 percent. The number of people in

the Arab world was 150 million persons in 1980. That figure is expected to reach 300 million by the year 2000.

2. The people in the Arab world are young. The percentage of children, that is, those who are less than 15 years old, is 45 percent of the total population.

3. The rate of workers' participation is low. The number of people in the Arab work force is estimated at about 37.9 million. Thus, the average rate of participation is about 25.2 percent.

4. The rate of dependency is high. There are 85 children and 5 elderly persons for every 100 persons in the working age.

5. Urbanization in the Arab world is high and growing. It is estimated that urbanization is 43.8 percent in North Africa; 55.7 percent in west Asia; and 76.9 percent in the Gulf states. In most of the Arab countries the capital city has a high percentage of the country's total population, especially in the Gulf states where incoming workers contributed to this population density.

6. Women's participation in the Arab work force is low. This rate is estimated at about 10 percent, compared with 30 to 40 percent in the advanced countries.

7. The quality of educational and health services in the Arab world improved rapidly as was the case in Jordan. But the quality of these services varied, and the rates at which students were enrolling [in schools] varied from one country to another. [However], 50 percent of females and 30 percent of males in the Arab world from the age of 10 and over remain illiterate.

The most important differences among the Arab countries from the perspective of this study are as follows:

1. There are differences in average per capita income and wealth, especially between the oil exporting countries on the one hand and the remaining Arab countries on the other. Average per capita income varies from a minimum of 100 dollars in Mauritania to a maximum of 15,480 dollars in Kuwait.

2. These income differentials represent the diversity of economic structures in the Arab countries. In the oil exporting Arab countries pumping oil and exporting it constitute the principal economic activity, whereas the other Arab countries have a diverse economic structure.

3. The condition of the local labor market varies from one Arab country to another. In the oil exporting Arab countries there is considerable reliance on incoming workers; but the second group of Arab countries are those countries that export labor. They include Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt,

Sudan, Democratic Yemen and Syria. The third group includes the Arab countries that simultaneously export and import labor, such as Jordan, Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq and the Sultanate of Oman.

The local work force in the countries that import labor were estimated at about 2,270,000 workers in 1980, whereas foreign workers in those countries amounted to 1,816,000 workers--41 percent of the total work force in those countries. The importance of incoming workers varies from 23.1 percent in Bahrain; 71 percent in Kuwait; and 86.1 percent in the United Arab Emirates.* The ratio of incoming Arab workers to total incoming workers amounted to 72.4 percent in 1975. It has been noticed that this ratio began to decline and that it was estimated at about 56 percent in 1978. This trend is expected to continue in view of the ambitious development plans that are being implemented by the oil exporting Arab countries as well as the growing shortage of labor in their local markets.

4. Due to the discrepancy in the ratios of the factors of production among the Arab countries, their population policies vary, especially with regard to population growth. While we find oil exporting countries encouraging population growth, other Arab countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, are adopting policies to reduce growth in their populations. In other Arab countries, however, we find that a population policy has not yet been determined.

During the past 30 years the Arab world has seen some of its work force relocated in the United States, Canada and in the European countries. Thus, Arab countries, like the remaining developing countries suffer from the emigration of qualified people whose numbers are estimated at about 5,000 to 7,000 persons per year. In addition to those qualified Arabs, ordinary workers with few skills emigrate to the advanced countries. It is estimated that there are about 1 million workers from the countries of the Maghreb working in the European Common Market countries. It is also estimated that the number of Arab immigrants in the United States, including people of Arab origin, is about 1,707,000 persons.**

These figures are to be taken with caution due to the fact that records are not accurate and the fact that we are relying on figures that are available in the countries that recieve the workers.

An Arab Demographic Strategy

The foregoing indicates that the ingredients and the priorities of demographic strategies can differ from one Arab country to another due to discrepancies in their conditions and population policies. Nevertheless, the

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* The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, "A Study of the Develo Development of Human Resources in the Arab Homeland," Kuwait, 1978, p 74.

** Arab Labor Organization, "The Emigration of Arab Intellectuals, " Baghdad March, 1980, Supplement 3, p 7.

demographic strategies proposed below may be suitable for the Arab world as a whole or for a group of Arab countries without this being necessarily true for each Arab country separately.

1. Outlining a Population Policy

It has been noticed that population questions are receiving increasing attention from the Arab world since they are interconnected on the one hand with the process of development with regard to the high percentage of investments in development which is directed at basic necessities and, on the other hand, with the need for the availability of a work force to implement the development plans. Accordingly, we see that there is a need for outlining clear population policies within a strategy of joint Arab action. These policies require more details than [those which are available] in the regional development plans for the period between 1981 and 1985. The UN Fund for Demographic Activities can play an important role in outlining Arab population policies. This program can be financed directly by the Arab countries.

2. Developing Human Resources

A study conducted by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development concluded that the Arab world was suffering from a shortage in professional and skilled workers and that this shortage was encouraging workers from other countries to come and it was affecting wage levels. Therefore, the development of human resources must be a matter of principal priority on the national and regional levels. Mandatory education must include everyone in the population between the ages of 6 and 15, and plans for the flow of education must be carried out so that shortages or surpluses can be avoided in the various specializations. Arab cooperation is to be strengthened in the areas of education and training, including institutions, teachers, curricula and training.

3. Establishing an Arab Fund for Demographic Activities

The Arab League organization has a large number of specialized organizations that are comparable to the United Nations and to the other UN organizations. There is of course an interest on the regional and on the international scales that the establishment of new organizations be not excessive. Nevertheless, there is a need for establishing an Arab fund to support the research and the studies, to collect information and [to provide] technical training and cooperation with regard to population questions. This fund may not begin as a fully independent organization; instead, it can be managed by the Arab Fund for Development. But this fund must have its own private financial resources and it must carry out its activities on the basis of rendering assistance not lending money. It must also begin on a small scale and expand in accordance with regional and national needs. The UN Fund for Demographic Activities can play a leadership role in implementing this suggestion.

4. Integration in the Work Force

One of the objectives of the 1957 Arab Economic Agreement and the 1963 resolution of the Arab Common Market was to free the movement of the ingredients of production, especially labor and production. The statement was made in the evaluation of Arab economic integration that liberating the movement of the aforementioned ingredients between the Arab countries was more beneficial than liberating trade between those countries.* In actual fact we find that the interaction of the forces of the marketplace generated a brisk relocation of the work force in the area involving more than 1 million workers, in addition to the numbers of Arab workers in Europe and North America. Arab integration must lead to the creation of an Arab labor market in which the gaps between real wages are narrowed; in which social security benefits cover every Arab worker in the work force regardless of his nationality; and in which policies and measures that would achieve a unified Arab labor market would be promoted.

5. An Agreement over Emigration Conditions

The achievement of an Arab labor market is a long-term objective that requires a strong political will and continuous perseverance. During this period it is essential that efforts be focused on overcoming the immediate obstalces facing the incoming Arab worker. The Arab Labor Organization has reached an agreement on the relocation of the work force between the Arab countries, but the Arab workers are in fact facing difficulties in relocating in other Arab countries and in their work in those countries as well, such as obtaining visas, paying agents' commissions, wage discrimination, restrictions on foreign currency transfer, difficulties in relocating members of their families and the restrictions imposed on their ownership of commercial businesses and activities. These problems cannot be overlooked if we have the desire to preserve the movement of workers between Arab countries on a level that is suitable to the needs and the interests of the Arab world.

6. Establishing Arab Vocational Training Centers

The mode of education in the Arab world led to an emphasis on general secondary education and on the humanities in higher education. On the other hand, Arab development plans include a large number of projects whose implementation and management depend on the availability of different skills. It is fortunate that in recent years an awareness of the need to give vocational training special priority [has surfaced]. In addition to the need for regional vocational training centers, there is a need for the establishment of joint Arab training centers whose locations are to be selected in the Arab countries that export labor. It is noteworthy that

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* Dr Taysir 'Abd-al-Jabir, "Studies in Arab Economic Integration," The International Arab Studies Institute, Cairo, 1972.

the Arab Labor Organization is presently building the Arab Center for Preparing Trainers in Tripoli in the Libyan Jamahiriyah. We are proposing that additional centers of this kind and of other kinds be built.

7. An Arab Labor Compensation Fund

The proposal made by His Highness Crown Prince Hasan to have the UNCTAD Organization, the International Labor Organization and other UN organizations establish an international labor compensation fund has been studied. This proposal is based on the fact that the countries that admit workers are to make payments to this fund, and the countries that export the workers are to benefit from it in accordance with the importance of the flow of the work force. The aid offered by this fund need not be financial aid. In fact, the fund can support the establishment of training centers or other centers in the countries that export labor so as to cover part of that country's investment cost in its human resources.

This proposal was presented at regional meetings and seminars, but the countries that import labor were not enthusiastic about it and did not offer strong arguments against it. It has become known in the economics literature that the countries which export labor suffer negative consequences as a result of the emigration of their work force, especially if this emigration is concentrated in the professional, technical and skilled labor force since this work force is essential for the implementation of national development plans. Emigration disrupts the wage scales in the countries that export labor, and the excessive liquidity, which comes as a result of the [monetary] transfers [from this work force], usually leads to an increase in imported consumer goods and to inflation. [Monetary] transfers from workers abroad are not considered a substitute for compensatory financing because [these] transfers are part of the workers' incomes and do not represent an additional cost to the importing countries or a direct revenue to the governments of the exporting countries.

Therefore, it has become essential that the establishment of an Arab labor compensation fund as a regional measure be studied to compensate the Arab countries that export labor for the investments they make in human resources and for the disruption that befalls their labor market.

8. An Arab Center for Demographic Education

Regardless of the demographic policy that each Arab country will pursue, there is a need for educating society as a whole and those who are in the working age in particular about the population. This subject has so far been dealt with in some of the Arab countries with the cooperation of international agencies, especially the UN Fund for Demographic Activities. The creation of an appropriate awareness among citizens of the effect of demographic factors on society's economic performance is considered one of the aspects of the Arab demographic strategy. The future interaction between population growth and the scarcity of resources such as water, food security, health, education, housing, arable land and others is to be emphasized.

An Arab center for demographic education may be set up as a joint project between the Arab fund and the UN Fund for Demographic Activities. However, it is not necessary that the establishment of this center be dependent upon the establishment of the Arab fund since the Arab countries that wish to set up that center can pursue that [objective] with the cooperation of the UN Fund in the context of a regional project.

9. A Regional Program for Children

We stated previously that one of the demographic characteristics of the Arab world is the high ratio of children to the total population--45 percent. This fact reflects a major increase in the supply of labor during the next two decades. It also indicates the need for devising an Arab program with the cooperation of international agencies to protect and develop Arab children so that the necessary resources can be allocated in accordance with this program, including mandatory education, the expansion of health services, meals in children's schools in poor areas and so on. UNICEF can set up this program and implement it.

10. Helping the Less Developed Arab Countries

The discrepancy in average per capita income among the Arab countries varies from two extremes: one is very wealthy and is found in the oil exporting countries, and the second is very poor and is found in the less developed countries. These are Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Mauritania, Oman, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. These countries are among 25 countries in the world with low [per capita] income and high illiteracy; they are the least industrialized countries in the world.

There is no doubt that these difficult economic conditions have a direct effect on the population, especially with regard to the decline in medical services, school enrollment, shortened life expectancy, the high rate of infant mortality, a reduced productivity and other [such problems]. Therefore, the Arab demographic strategy must include assistance to these Arab countries so they can improve their human resources. [This assistance is to comprise] bilateral aid and the resources of the Arab Fund for Demographic Activities after it is established.

11. Increasing the Average Rate of Work Force Participation

It is essential that national policies be devised to increase the average rate of work force participation in the Arab world. At present this rate is estimated at 25.2 percent. The participation of women in economic and social activities must be encouraged, especially since women represent the reserve labor in the Arab world. Among the most important factors that affect the participation of women [in the work force] and require appropriate measures are traditions, some labor laws, a shortage in support services such as kindergartens and the absence of adequate educational and training opportunities, compared to those available for men.

The supply of labor can be increased any time by encouraging part-time

work and extending the retirement age. Practical studies about the productivity of Arab workers in the Arab homeland are still rare and incomplete. Therefore, it is essential that these studies be carried out so that the appropriate methods for increasing productivity can be identified. Workers must also have opportunities for upgrading their professional abilities and increasing their capability of making adjustments.

12. Affirming the Work Ethic

In view of the shortage of skilled labor in the Arab countries we find that workers' interest in discipline and productivity tends to be weak. The quality of the work as well as the degree of proficiency thus become of secondary importance compared with finishing a job. Workers' steadiness and adherence to work conditions and existing regulations decline further when skilled labor is in short supply than they would when there is a labor surplus.

Therefore, we find that there is a need for instituting in the Arab world a special program for labor education to affirm the work ethic and work discipline. Labor unions can play a principal role in this program by spreading awareness among workers.

13. The Forced Migration of the Palestinian People

Among the principal demographic questions in the Arab world is the expulsion of most of the Palestinian people from their homeland in 1948 and 1967. The fact that Israel occupied four fifths of Palestine in 1948 turned about 1 million Palestinians into refugees. In 1967 the Israeli occupation authorities expelled about 400,000 Palestinians from the West Bank to the East Bank and to other Arab countries. Since 1948 the Palestinian people have remained in a state of homelessness and banishment, and this has undermined their social cohesiveness. At present there are Palestinian communities living under Israeli occupation, in the West Bank, in Ghaza, in the East Bank, Lebanon, Syria and in Kuwait. There are smaller Palestinian communities in Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Libya, the remaining Gulf states and in North America.

As is the case in political Arab strategy, the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab territories and its recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and of their right to determine their destiny and return to their homeland and receive compensation would have demographic consequences. As long as 20 percent of the Palestinians live in camps, the hardships they endure will continue to affect stability in the area until a just, peaceful solution is reached.

Therefore it is essential that special programs be devised to help Palestinian communities in exile. At the forefront of these communities are those which are suffering from Israeli occupation, exploitation and usurpation of their lands and resources. So far occupation authorities have seized 30 percent of the area of the West Bank and built 103 settlements on

that land. At the same time the United Nations Organization and its specialized agencies have been asked to offer assistance to the Palestinian people and to strengthen their economic capabilities.

14. Bringing Back the Qaulified Arab Expatriates

The emigration of intellectuals or qualified people means the relocation in the advanced countries of the work force which is scientifically, professionally and vocationally qualified. About 5,000 to 7,000 qualified persons emigrate every year from the Arab world to North America and western Europe. The reasons why qualified persons emigrate from the other developing countries apply to the Arab world. These reasons are divided into two groups: inducement factors and disincentives.*

The eighth session of the Arab Conference which was held in Baghdad in March 1980 considered the problem of the emigration of qualified Arabs. The conference adopted a number of measures to encourage those qualified Arabs who were living abroad to return [to their homeland]. The Arab Labor Organization has appealed to those qualified people to return. It is essential that other more effective measures be taken, such as improving work conditions. The Technology Transfer (TOKTEN) Program can be carried out through the citizens residing abroad with the cooperation of the UN Program for Development. [For example], a regional program can be set up so that the Arab countries can make use of their qualified people who are living abroad.

15. Developing Regional Growth Centers

The rate of urbanization in the Arab world is high as has already been mentioned. Therefore, in addition to the programs each country has for the distribution of its economic and social activities and the establishment of new locations that would achieve an equitable geographical distribution of the benefits of development, it has become necessary that the following measures be taken on the Arab level:

A. Huge agricultural projects are to be implemented in some Arab countries such as Sudan and Somalia. These projects would achieve a number of goals such as food security, profitable investment of Arab resources and a distribution of the population that would reduce the growing trend toward urbanization and the concentration [of people] in the cities.

B. The common borders between two or more Arab countries are to be developed for the establishment of industrial areas or other activities.

C. Regional roads, means of communication and ports are to be developed. These usually lead to the opening of new areas and the growth of various services around those areas.

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* The UN Institute for Training and Research, "The Emigration of Qualified People from Five Developing Countries," (in English); New York, the United Nations, 1971.

16. Improving Demographic Data

Demographic data in the Arab world are still incomplete. Recent figures about the relocation of the work force, the wage levels, the rate of women's participation [in the work force], the distribution of the work force by sector and other data are not available. Population censuses in the Arab countries must be carried out in the same year and during the same periods.

Due to the fact that complete demographic data are unavailable, most of the Arab countries have found it difficult to devise comprehensive plans for the work force. Information about the labor market must be compiled regularly to help officials make their decisions. The Arab Organization for Employment was recently established as an agency affiliated with the Arab Labor Organization to compile data about the condition of the work force in the Arab world and to analyze the demand for workers, the increase in the supply of workers and the exchange and relocation of workers.

There is a need for implementing a regional project whose purpose is to improve the compilation and analysis of demographic data. The UN Fund for Demographic Activities plays a leadership role in implementing the project with the cooperation of the duly authorized Arab agencies.

Demographic Factors in Jordan

Table 1: Total Population in Jordan

Area	1952	1961	1979	1985
The East Bank	586,885	900,776	2,152,273	2,686,800
The West Bank	742,115	805,450	800,000	876,800
Total	1,329,000	1,706,226	2,902,273	3,563,600

Table 2: Jordan's Demographic Indicators

The Indicator	1979
Annual rate of growth	3.8
Raw rate of births	50 per 1,000 persons
Raw rate of deaths	11.8 per 1,000 persons
Total rate of reproduction	7.8
Life expectancy	61
Males	64
Females	

Table 3: The Age Composition of the Population in Jordan

Age Groups	1961 percentage	1979 percentage
Less than 15	45.4	53.2
15 to 59	50.3	44.9
60 and older	4.3	1.9

Table 4: Population and Population Density According to Governorates in the East Bank of Jordan in 1961 and 1979

1961

The Governorate	The Population Males	Females	Total	Ratio to Total Population	Population Density per Square kilo meter
Amman	230,72	202,856	433,618	48	24.09
Irbid	173,524	136,452	273,97	30.5	12.18
al-Balqa'	40,277		79,057	9	52.70
al-Karak	34,680	32,531	67,211	7.5	14.43
Ma'an	26,164	20,750	46,914	5	1.09
Total	469,407	431,369	900,776	100	10.12
1979					
Amman	622,454	565,296	1,183,750	55	65.76
Irbid	315,100	296,558	611,658	28	27.18
al-Balqa'	78,884	72,498	151,382	7	100.92
al-Karak	66,021	60,061	126,082	6	28.02
Ma'an	40,518	32,883	75,401	4	1.75
Total	1,123,477	1,027,296	2,152,273	100	24.18

Table 5: The Population of the Principal Cities on the East Bank

The City	1961 Population	1961 Percentage	1979 Population	1979 Percentage
Amman	246,475	27.36	648,587	30.13
al-Zarqa'	96,080	10.56	21,687	10.0
Irbid	44,685	4.96	112,954	5.25
al-Salt	16,176	1.79	32,862	1.53
Madba	11,224	1.24	28,509	1.32
al-Ramatha	10,791	1.18	27,292	1.27
al-Mafraq	9,499	1.05	21,399	.99
al-'Aqabah	8,908	.99	26,982	1.25
al-Karak	7,422	.82	11,805	.55
'Ajlun	5,390	.60	4,551	.21
al-Tufaylah	4,506	.50	12,495	.58
Wadi al-Sir	4,455	.49	24,497	1.13
Jarash	3,796	.42	10,105	.47
Ma'an	6,643	.73	11,305	.52

Table 6: The Population and the Work Force in Jordan

The Location	The Population	The Work Force *	
In Jordan (East Bank)	2,152,273	430,000	19.99
Outside Jordan	750,000	300,000	40.00
Total	2,902,273	730,000	25.15

* An estimate

Table 7: The Distribution of the Work Force on the East Bank of Jordan According to Economic Activity, in Percentages

The Economic Activity	1961	1975
Agriculture	33.5	32
Mining and Industry	10.2	11
Trade	8.4	14
Construction	10.2	4.2
Transportation and Storage	3.5	6.4
Services	13.2	27.4
Other activities	21	5
Total	100	100

Table 8: The Jordanian Expatriate Work Force

The Destination of the Work Force in 1978			1979		The First Half of 1980	
Country	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Saudi Arabia	4,523	90	7,311	98	3,242	96
Libya	484	10	119	2	139	4
Total	5,007	100	7,430	100	3,371	100

* The Source: The Ministry of Labor

Annual Work Permits Issued by the Ministry of Labor for Foreign Workers (Including Work Permit Extensions)

	1978		1979		First 8 Months of 1980	
Nationality	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Arab Countries	13,310	71.0	18,287	69.2	43,285	76
Egypt	11,796	62.95	16,522	62.45	40,243	70.85
Syria	103	.54	190	0.72	1,158	2.04
Lebanon	1,179	6.29	1,000	3.78	1,813	1.43
Other Countries	232	1.23	575	8.96	1,044	1.74
Asian Countries	4,583	24.0	5,836	22.1	8,211	15
Pakistan	1,244	6.90	1,206	4.56	2,478	4.37
India	1,001	5.34	1,248	0.48	2,381	4.20
Korea	1,441	7.79	1,427	0.23	2,280	3.79
Thailand	172	0.91	126	4.72	329	0.58
China	195	1.04	60	5.40	358	0.63
Other Countries	480	2.56	1,769	6.70	3,085	5.44
European Countries	845	4.0	2,068	8.7	1,371	2.0
Britain	320	1.70	676	2.56	451	0.79
France	42	.22	90	0.34	145	0.25
Russia	--	--	10	.04	--	--
[West] Germany	39	0.21	116	0.44	196	0.34
Other countries	110	0.58	1,076	4.07	579	1.04
Other countries	334	1.0	224	0.5	3,856	7.0
Total	18,738		26,415		56,723	

Table 10: Students Enrolled in Schools on the East Bank in 1979, According to Sex and Level of Education

Level of Education	Males	Females	Total
Kindergartens	9,719	7,441	17,160
Elementary	235,440	212,971	448,411
Preparatory	86,459	72,131	158,590
Secondary			
General	45,291	34,882	80,173
Vocational	6,656	3,224	9,880
Higher Education			
University	7,055	4,702	11,757
Teachers' Institutes	2,410	6,211	8,621
Vocational	6,042	924	6,966
Other	106	76	182
Schools for the Disabled and Charitable Institutions	317	208	525
Total	399,495	342,770	742,265

Table 11: Students Enrolled in Schools on the East Bank and the West Bank in 1961 According to Sex and Level of Education

Level of Education	Males	Females	Total
Kindergartens	7,040	5,868	12,908
Elementary	138,649	81,339	219,988
Preparatory	32,916	11,743	44,659
Secondary	15,235	4,615	11,226
Other	--	--	3,242
Total			300,677

Table 12: Demographic Indicators in the Arab World

Demographic Indicator	1980			2000		
	North Africa	West Asia	The Gulf*	North Africa	West Asia	The Gulf*
The Population (in thousands)	108,731	48,281	1,317	183,666	88,348	2,607
Ratio of Dependents per 100 persons	87.2	94.7	69.0	73.1	82.6	72.9
Rate of population growth	2.86	3.18	4.34	2.32	2.80	2.65
Rate of births	40.8	44.6	37.6	31.5	37.2	32.5
Rate of deaths	12.3	13.5	8.6	8.4	9.2	6.4
Life Expectancy	56.2	54.7	61.6	62.0	61.1	67.3
Urban Population	43.8	55.7	76.9	58.3	68.5	84.5
Population Density	13	12	5	22	23	8

The Source: UNFPA Estimates, UNFPA, The Population Situation in the Arab World, Facts and Impacts, April 1980.
* Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates

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CSO: 4304/123

REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR NATIONAL ACCORD EXPLORED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabi No 214, 8-14 Jun 81 p 15

[Article by Emil Khury: "Crisis of Two Accords"]

[Text] The United States has asked the government to rely on it to solve the Lebanese crisis, because the new administration has come to fully understand this crisis and the way to deal with it. It has also asked the government to persuade certain Lebanese factions to give up any dealings with Israel and reject any kind of cooperation with it so that the Arab world remains open, not closed to Lebanon.

A ministry source made this announcement while speaking about the importance which the government attaches to the mission of U.S. envoy Philip Habib and to the role Saudi Arabia is playing to support the legitimate authority and strengthen its presence.

The source said that the messages exchanged between President Reagan and President Sarkis are cause for satisfaction. As he was leaving Israel and returning to Washington, President Reagan's envoy Philip Habib sent a two-page telegram to President Sarkis. In it he expressed appreciation both for his wise conduct during developments of the situation in Lebanon and the region and for his facing these developments with judicious and reasonable positions. He assured him that the U.S. had come to fully understand the reality of the Lebanese crisis, and it was ready to deal with it wholly and profoundly, in isolation from the Middle East crisis. He confirmed that he would transmit to President Reagan the results of the contacts he had made in Lebanon and submit to him his proposals to solve the crisis. He said that he would inform President Sarkis upon his return to the region, of the results of his meeting with President Reagan.

The ministry source was asked about the proposals which U.S. envoy Philip Habib is expected to transmit to President Reagan as a basis for solution of the Lebanese crisis. He said that as far as is known, these proposals bring out the necessity of relying on and strengthening the army so it may become the real power of the government and of working to achieve its deployment throughout all Lebanese territory, because the nation has no sovereignty or authority without it.

This requires that the reservations of certain leaders concerning the use of the army be eliminated. These reservations can be eliminated with Syrian help and Saudi initiative.

The source himself added that U.S. envoy Philip Habib had listened to various political and party leaders in Lebanon and was assured that there were no important differences about the army, and that they could be settled easily in cooperation with Syria. Walid Junblat told Philip Habib, "If Syria has agreed to use the army, then leaders who are sympathetic toward it also agree."

Therefore, whether through it or Saudi Arabia as the intermediary, the United States is focusing on giving a role to the army in accordance with an American decision already reached which stipulates that the army gradually assume responsibility for maintaining security in place of the Arab Deterrent Forces [ADF].

In his telegram to President Sarkis, the new French President Francois Mitterrand pointed to the role of the army in strengthening the governmet and expanding its sovereignty.

Riyadh Has Proposed

Informed sources say the army will receive more American and French arms in order to be able to carry out its full role.

The sources themselves add that Saudi Arabia, which revoked a decision to stop financing the ADF and agreed to continue financing and supplying these forces, is trying to reach agreement with Syria on setting up a program for the staged withdrawal of the ADF from Lebanon and for the army to assume responsibility for maintaining security in the regions from which the ADF has withdrawn, in accordance with this plan. Therefore, it supports the proposal for army troops to occupy the hills of Sannin and Zahlah.

In addition, the entry of the army into the South, without any opposition or security or political obstruction, by any party, as occurred previously, will encourage the assurance of the army's entry into other regions.

The Syrian authorities echoed the desire to expand the army when Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam informed his counterpart Fu'ad Butrus during their meeting in Shtawrah that Syria agreed to the Lebanese working paper which it had not accepted previously.

This paper contains the following:

1. Consolidating the cease-fire.

2. Restoring normal life in Zahah, by having the Internal Security forces enter the city, taking over al-Mu'allaqah bridge, eliminating armed manifestations from the city, taking over the hills and heights or Sannin, and removing armed foreigners from the city.

3. Insuring airport roads for all travelers.

4. Opening roads of the passage between the eastern and western sectors.

5. Studying the possibility of the army's entering the contact lines.

6. Eliminating armed manifestations in the sectors and confiscating arms from units, especially heavy arms.

Bilateral Meetings

In the political arena the paper proposed bilateral meetings between parties, the study of political solutions and formulas concerning the way to end the crisis, and the new structures and contexts of relations among Lebanese, plus discussion of Lebanese-Palestinian relations, and the way to implement the agreements concluded.

Foreign Minister Khaddam asked Foreign Minister Butrus to add the Constitutional Charter to the Lebanese working paper.

Certain government sources felt that inclusion of the Constitutional Charter in the text of the accord would be a hindrance, because this charter is obsolete as far as certain leaders are concerned. They no longer accept it. President Sarkis would not be prepared to offer political concessions at the end of his administration and would prefer to leave the discussion of these concessions to the next president.

However, as informed sources mentioned, the Syrian authorities promised Islamic leaderships to implement demands for political reform which they frequently made, to eliminate the fraud about which they complained, in return for their support in confronting complicated security problems in Lebanon. In this manner the security accord which is materializing for Christians, with their agreeing to the use of the army, is being met by a political accord of the Muslims, with their agreeing to offer concessions and the Christians ceasing to cling to certain privileges which do not actually constitute guarantees, as some of their leaders claim.

Will the political accord be achieved on the basis of adopting certain articles of the Constitutional Charter, or will the controversy over this be a reason for not realizing the security accord and using the army?

7811
CSO: 4304/62

CUSTOMS REVENUE LOSSES REPORTED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabi No 215, 15-21 Jun 81 p 32

[Article: "Loss of Customs Fees"]

[Text] Once again Lebanon is in the vortex of war, and it is paying the price. The main negative effects shown in figures are customs fees which declined last April and May by nearly 75 million Lebanese pounds compared to figures for the same 2 months of last year.

On an annual basis this means losses of 450 million Lebanese pounds, while estimated revenues in the Lebanese national budget should be in the neighborhood of 8 billion pounds. If it were possible to improve the collecting of fees, then one should estimate approximately 2 billion Lebanese pounds per year.

The first observation from the decline in the volume of customs fees during the 2 months it occurred leads to the decline in Lebanese imports. This decline in fees is between 55 and 60 percent. This decline is due to the following causes:

1. Reluctance to import luxury goods for which increasing customs fees are paid, especially cars.

2. Refusal by industrialists to import raw materials, under unstable circumstances.

3. Unloading of a large portion of goods shipped to Lebanon at the ports of Cyprus and Greece, since work has come to a halt at the port of Beirut, and the decline of this port due to the dangerous security situation in its surroundings.

The second observation is that customs fees show that economic facilities have suffered the most damages. The port of Beirut has been hurt the most. Customs fees received through it have fallen off between 69 and 81 percent, indicating the extent of the losses it has sustained.

Customs fees received through Beirut Airport have fallen off between 65 and 73 percent, because work has come to a halt there. The decline in customs fees is evidence of the losses of the two Lebanese airline companies in transporting cargo.

In the Shtawrah district the decline has been between 30 and 47 percent. Facilities which have gained in activity are the ports of Tripoli, Juniyah and Sidon. However, both the treasury and Lebanon are the greatest losers.

	April 1981	April 1980	Percent Change (%)	May 1981	May 1980	Percent Change (%)
Beirut						
-Port	7,777,015.12	41,371,412.32	81.2	12,892,670.98	42,232,552.48	69.4
-Airport	4,357,364.33	12,429,427.68	65.0	2,993,750.93	11,464,867.56	73.8
Tripoli	7,668,744.28	3.949,461.59	94.1+	8,488,371.40	5,582,285.21	52.0+
Shturah	2,010,751.07	2,882,082.38	30.	1,733,772.69	3,298,983.85	47.4
Junih	1,057,934.21	756,418.30	40.0+	1,018,868.20	632,126.54	61.1+
Sidon	376,141.39	1,000,964.75	62.4	694,807.17	329,962.85	11.0+
Total	23,247,950.41	62,389,767.02	62.7	27,822,241.37	63,540,778.49	56.2

PROTECTION OF CONSUMER SOUGHT IN REGULATION OF FUEL SECTOR

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 215, 15-21 Jun 81 p 33

[Article by Michel Murqus: "The Gas War"]

[Text] Officially a bottle of gas in Lebanon is 15 pounds. The companies have priced it at 17 pounds. The consumer pays 18.20 pounds. The state supports gas to the amount of 63 million and requests bonds to pay. The companies demand more payment and do not offer securities. The problem is that the companies ration it and the citizen pays, as if the tragedies of war are not enough. What is the problem?

On 9 June 1978, in other words, 3 years ago, the minister of industry at the time, Michel Dumit, submitted to Prime Minister Salim al-Huss a study on "a new index to set liquid gas (butane) prices. It was stamped "secret." Its introduction included the following: "Ever since November 1977 the General Directorate for Oil has made extensive efforts to study the subject of liquid gas. It has contacted storage and bottling companies and distributing companies asking for basic information and data concerning this matter. However, the companies have reacted negatively and refused to give the information requested.

"When it became necessary to compile a study upon which to base a new price index for the sale of liquid gas, the General Directorate, faced with the liquid gas companies' refusal to cooperate, had to be content with the existing information and data in its archives and with the information and data it was able to obtain.

"In the light of requests by gas bottling companies, Minister of Industry and Oil Yusuf Baydun set up a committee last 21 May to study technical costs which enter into the index setting gas prices, including storage and bottling fees, the distribution fee (the cost of the bottles, transport fees and administrative expenses), sales commissions, the cost of gas and the turning over of storage facilities and bottling plants.

"However, on 4 June of this year Oil Minister Baydun set a definite time limit for the committee to carry out its task. It had suggested to him that he take this step, after gas bottling and distribution companies had snubbed it and refused to attend its sessions. It pointed out that it was impossible to compile a study without essential information which had to be obtained from the companies."

Thus the problem of gas has been turning in a vicious circle since 1977. Bottling and distributing companies want to raise the price, and they want support. They are asking the Ministry of Industry and Oil to implement their demands. The ministry is helpless, because it cannot compile a serious, complete study of the cost of liquid gas. The citizen pays out of his pocket LL 18.20 per bottle weighing 10 kilograms.

Reproaches Against the Companies

The companies are still demanding that support be raised to 660 Lebanese pounds per ton, and they accuse the Minister of Industry and Oil of delay and procrastination.

However, the companies are mistaken in their accusation, for they are a party. It is not up to the General Directorate for Oil to take at face value the information which the companies give it, or else it would be considered to be in collusion with them. There would be an accusation of collusion by an administrative institution running a sector which comprises approximately one-fourth of the national budget of Lebanon.

How can the General Directorate for Oil pay the set amount of support per bottle for bottles which are sold without confirmation that they have actually been sold? What documentary proof does it have in order to pay?

Where Are the Consumer's Rights?

The companies which proclaim their efforts on the consumer's behalf disregard his rights because they consider him weak. They sell the bottle to the distributor for 15 Lebanese pounds and deny this fact. It is impossible to get at the truth without confirming the invoices. The distributor gets a receipt for the number of bottles delivered and their price, so that responsibility is clear. It is also up to the companies to record the weight of the bottles and their maintenance.

The gas companies forget that they are using the citizen's money. For approximately 3 years they have been receiving security deposits of about 100 Lebanese pounds per bottle. The number of bottles is growing, because the Lebanese citizen is forced to live in more than one place, seeking security, and because he must take precautions for fear that gas will be cut off. In addition, he uses two or three bottles in the house for heat and hot water, after the prices of oil rose and proprietors refused to provide central heating and hot water to tenants. The security deposit per bottle has risen through the years. The companies have 1 million bottles of gas (according to the indices which set gas prices of the State Authority for Oil). Some citizens do not return bottles and claim the security deposit, because they need the bottles. Because of all this, the companies dispose of at least 50 million Lebanese pounds in security deposits on bottles. It is foolish to claim that this money is frozen and that the bottle wears out and must be changed. Citizens do not hold bottles and return them all at once, or else the operations of the company would come to a halt. The returned bottle is handed over to another person. Maintenance and depreciation are earmarked in the index of technical costs and are paid for in the price of a bottle each time a citizen uses one.

Thus compliance by the gas companies in providing information facilitates the work of the General Directorate for Oil. If it is prevented from fulfilling its obligation, then citizens will side with the companies.

Reproaches Against the Authority

Reproaches against the gas companies do not prevent reproaches against the General Directorate for Oil.

First, with regard to the market for gas, it is the only one among petroleum derivative markets which still has free trade and marketing. It is subject to pricing and support by the Authority. When the government began to support wheat, it controlled the monitoring of its sales and marketing through the Office of Grains and Sugar Beets. The General Directorate for Oil controls the sale of all petroleum derivatives, their production, marketing and importation, with the exception of the importation of gas. Why doesn't it import gas itself through public invitations to submit bids and store it in its own facilities and in the companies' storage tanks and turn it over to these companies at the price it wishes, with a computation of technical costs which is acceptable to it?

Second, with regard to technical costs, there are matters which must be considered:

1. The cost of maintaining bottles was established when the bottles weighed 12.5 kilograms, and they were filled 6.12 times per year. When the weight of the bottle dropped to 10 kilograms, it was filled and sold 8.5 times, thereby increasing the cost of bottling and maintenance.

2. Workers' wages have risen. They must rise in proportion to increases in wages in general.

3. The index of technical costs, even though it includes sales commissions among its liabilities, does not specify these commissions in a separate clause as it does for the other cost components. Here it is necessary to clarify something which must be taken into consideration. The index which sets prices contains three separate clauses:

a. Price of gas going to centers for bottling and delivery.

b. Price of the bottle going to a small distributor (shop, store and center distributing gas to the consumer directly).

c. Price of the bottle going to the consumer at the distribution site.

4. The increase in the volume of money invested brings an increase in profits. Lebanon consumes approximately 100,000 tons per year. For 3 years the price was 63 million pounds, and it is now 117 million. If the trader's profit is 10 percent, this profit has risen from 6.3 million to 11.7 million. If the General Directorate for Oil applied the principle of importing gas, at its expense, it would save the companies from assuming responsibilities, opening credits and paying increasing interest, because prices are paid in dollars.

Regulation of the gas sector is essentially regulation of the gasoline sector. Perhaps what is necessary is the regulation of the fuels sector in its entirety.

7811
CSO: 4304/62

INTERVIEW WITH CHERIF LEMINE, DIRECTOR OF SOMIR

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 30 June 81 pp 3,7, 1 Jul 81 pp 3,7

[30 Jun 81 pp 3, 7]

[Interview with Cherif Lemine, managing director of SOMIR [expansion unknown; possibly SOMIREMA, Mining Exploitation and Prospecting Company of Mauntania] by Sidi Mohamed O. Babana; date and place not specified: "The Nouadhibou Oil Refinery to be Operational at the End of 1981 or the Beginning of 1982"]

> [Text] The Nouadhibou oil refinery is among the sizable economic projects of ours which were shelved as a result of the fratricidal war which was forced on us by the toppled regime.
>
> This refinery was supposed to have been operational in June 1978 but none of the conditions had been met which would have made it possible to take delivery and start operation of the facilities.
>
> This situation has created a number of difficulties including particularly the dispute which has pitted us against the Austrian company Voest Alpine as a result of the plant not having started up. In the first part of the interview Cherif Lemine, managing director of SOMIR (which is responsible for the refinery), points out the considerable efforts which have been undertaken to realize this project.

[Question] The Nouadhibour oil refinery is among the sizable economic projects which had suffered from the toppled regime's policy of abdication. It is known that this refinery was supposed to have been operational in 1978 but that no steps had been taken to provide for taking delivery, much less for actual refinery operation.

Since the advent of the 10 July Movement for the first concern of the cognizant authorities has been to consider what measures would make a rapid start-up of this refinery possible. Mr Managing Director, could you give us a rundown on the steps which have been begun along these lines?

[Answer] As you yourself have said the oil refinery which was to be operational in June 1978 has neither been set up for delivery nor been, fortiori, started up in operation to be actually used.

In fact, none of the conditions had been met which would have made it possible to take delivery and start up operation of the facilities, mainly due to the economic and political situation existing at that time in our country.

Due to this situation, neither was the crude oil available which in the normal course of events was to come from Algeria (since the refinery's concept was based on the use of Hassi Messoud crude), nor were the financial resources available which were necessary to obtain substitute petroleum and have the essential working capital to cover expenses of all kinds.

The refinery's failure to start up operations has given rise to a dispute between us and the Austrian company Voest Alpine since it was quite necessary to make use of the conceptual defects found in the plant in order to refuse delivery of a set of facilities which we did not have the resources to start up, in the light of the very unfavorable economic circumstances mentioned above.

The first action undertaken after 10 July consisted of clarifying the situation of the refinery so as to determine the most favorable course of action in the country's interest to adopt.

The Ministry of Mines made me responsible for follow-up on this matter and thus I had to do some travelling all over Africa, particularly in Togo and the Congo.

The experience of these two countries was all the more interesting because the former had started up its refinery in a usual fashion while the Congo (RPC [People's Republic of the Congo]) was involved in legal proceedings against the consortium which had built its oil refinery.

The set of actions we undertook led us, at the end of little more than a year, to an amicable resolution of the dispute with the builder with the signing of a December 1979 agreement. This agreement removes legal hindrances which were the first obstacle to getting the refinery underway. As a reminder I will recall for your readers that this agreement made it possible to reduce the refinery's initial cost by more than $40 million and made it possible for our country to defer and spread out the debt recorded for this project in accordance with what our national recovery plan required.

With the establishment of the Mauritanian Refining Industries Company, which is responsible for fixing up and starting up the refinery, I think that we have come a substantial distance considering the difficulties which existed at the start.

By way of conclusion with regard to this question, I can tell you that the main elements making it possible to put the refinery in service are, practically speaking, assembled, and we anticipate start-up for the plant at the end of 1981 or beginning of 1982 at the latest.

[Question] The agreement signed in 1979 between our country and Voest Alpine obligates you to start up the refinery before 1 June 1981 or else guarantees on the equipment will be lost. Do you think that this time limit has been honored?

[Answer] First of all you must be aware of the fact that the 1979 agreement which we took a little over a year to negotiate only maintained a limited number of contractual guarantees since those guarantees only involved hidden defects and welding defects. Having weighed the risks being incurred we had to give up the main initial guarantees. We could not do otherwise given the specific obligations of the original contract which had not favored Mauritania by a long shot. We are losing, and sensibly so, the remaining guarantees in the 1979 agreement due to the fact that we have unfortunately not been able to start up the refinery as anticipated before June 1981, and this is in spite of all the tireless efforts which have been made. However, those guarantees do not seem to necessarily bother us unduly since the refinery's upkeep, for the most part, seems to have been seen to by the builder in an appropriate manner.

We hope that the favorable conclusions reached by different oil experts who have come to a judgment regarding the state of the refinery will not be proved wrong.

Finally, the 1979 agreement includes clauses which allow us to go back to the Austrians with whom good relations have been revived.

[Question] Several negotiations have been carried out with Arab countries and in particular with Algeria with a view to getting this plant started. Can you tell us the results of these neogitations?

[Answer] A number of negotiations were in fact carried out with Algeria with a view to starting up the oil refinery.

They obtained fairly significant results. It is these results which have made it possible for me to say that the refinery's start-up is scheduled for the end of this year or at the latest the beginning of next year.

In the framework of cooperation between our two countries, Algeria has granted us a loan of $20 million meant to finance mainly the goods and services necessary for starting up the refinery. And along with this, under conditions which are very compatible with the recovery plan, Algeria will supply us the Hassi-Messaoud crude oil, for which the refinery was designed.

Also in that same framework we have signed an agreement with SONATRACH to second five high-level experts who have sufficient professional experience to help us to prepare and get the Nouadhibou plant underway and make use of it.

Finally, an agreement relating to training Mauritanian personnel will be signed shortly with SONATRACH.

[1 July 81 pp 3,7]

[Interview with Cherif Lemine continued from 30 June 1981; "Operation of the Nouadhibou Refinery Will Make Better Control Over Petroleum Products in the National Market Possible"]

> [Text] In yesterday's paper we printed the first part of the interview granted to us by Cherif Lemine, managing director of SOMIR.

In this second part which we are printing today, Cherif Lemine talks about the difficulties being experienced by the refinery as well as the manpower training programs.

[Question] Building the refinery falls within the framework of this replacement industry which is currently being developed in the country. What do you foresee regarding import of your raw materials?

[Answer] The way the refinery is currently conceived, and this is one of its major shortcomings, limits possible processing exclusively to light varieties of petroleum from Algeria, Libya and Nigeria.

For the moment we are counting on starting with the Algerian crude on the basis of which the refinery was conceived.

[Question] In addition to satisfying the country's needs in terms of petroleum, do you envisage exporting your products to other countries? What is the refinery's production capacity?

[Answer] The refinery's capacity is 1 million barrels a year. Given the low level of domestic consumption (less than 300,000 barrels per year) we will be exporting mainly on the international market.

[Question] With this plant starting up will we be able to hope for a reduction in the price of motor vehicle fuel?

[Answer] Precisely what Mauritania can principally get out of the use of an industrial unit like this one is control over the prices of petroleum products on the domestic market and independence in the area of the supply of these products. This is because now it is only a matter of importing the crude which is available in a number of countries with which we have government-to-government relations and because the fuels (fuel oil, diesel fuel, marine fuel, and natural gas) which industries, active economic sectors and consumers need will finally be available.

The consumer will very probably be able to count on natural gas availability at favorable prices. He might also be able to receive benefits from other repercussions in the form of a reduction or more likely greater stability in the price of electricity, if fuel oil is substituted for diesel fuel in power plant usage as we are hoping.

Otherwise the consumer can also hope for a reduction or at least greater stability in motor vehicle fuels to the extent that they are supplied not on the basis of prices of the Rotterdam market but on the basis of a petroleum which is of course imported but processed locally.

In all cases the final decision belongs to the government, which can take measures allowing reduction in prices of not all products but of at least certain ones.

To take an example, having natural gas used by a greater number of Mauritanian households is very important for a country like ours because of the persisting drought.

The use of wood and wood charcoal by the majority of our countrymen only manages to aggravate deforestation, thus adding to the drought and the trend toward desertification.

The price of natural gas, an excellent fuel, could be adjusted to make it available to a large number of Mauritanians and this could be done via policy, either by reducing taxes on its consumption or by subsidy.

[Question] What will be the refinery's relationship with SMCPP [Mauritanian Company for the Marketing of Petroleum Products]?

[Answer] SMCPP's purpose is to market refined petroleum products within the country's borders.

The purpose of our company, SOMIR, is to refine crude oil at the Nouadhibou oil refinery and to market production surpluses abroad.

Put another way, when the Nouadhibou refinery starts operating, the marketing of its production, which is to go to the domestic market, will be handled by SMCPP.

[Question] Mr Director, an industrial complex like this one needs a specialized workforce. What have you planned in the area of managerial training?

[Answer] As you yourselves have said, putting an oil refinery into service and operating it requires, generally speaking, specialized personnel at nearly all levels.

Not only is refining technically complex but also discipline and reliability in the operational process are needs which must be satisfied absolutely because of the dangerous nature of the products being handled.

Since this kind of activity is quite new in terms of our country, the number of managers which could be immediately available is at the moment almost limited to a single digit figure, to those people who had been previously trained, which is to say a total of three in the technical area. This means that with regard to putting trained managerial personnel in place everything has yet to be accomplished. We have already looked at the training possibilities, particularly in Algiera, and our work schedule provides for setting out a cadre recruitment and training program next July.

This program will include one aspect relating to the recruitment of engineers belonging to other professional bodies to whom we are proposing a retraining period.

Regarding training of technical operating personnel, that training has entered the implementation phase since we have already sent 40 Mauritanians to Algeria for training of around 8 months.

We have set out a program which anticipates training 150 advanced technicians, operating personnel, assistant operating personnel, and lab assistants who will constitute the oil refinery's skilled staff and operational workers. The program has been established in accordance with the anticipated work schedule decided on for starting up the refinery's different units.

[Question] We know that a plant cannot operate without hitches. Might we know what your principal difficulties are at the present time?

[Answer] Starting up a refinery which has a large a capacity as does Nouadhibou calls for much in the way of resources, especially in the financial area.

For the Nouadhibou refinery, taking into account the complete standstill of the facilities, certain parts of which had stopped being assembled in 1977, the price to be paid is a relatively high one. In fact, between the cost of crude oil, and the provisions required to insure repairs (necessary even if maintenance is done), and the start-up of operations, an investment on the order of $50 million will have to be planned.

Although the main part of the problems relating to this matter has been resolved, certain minor financial aspects concerning local expenditures make up the last obstacles which we must surmount.

The high total mentioned above shows you why it has not been possible to get the refinery quickly underway as we had wished. Taking into account the extremely small availability of specialized personnel at all levels, putting our facilities in place does not present insurmountable difficulty but does present a matter for concern which is not negligible.

In addition, getting the refinery underway is conditioned on providing water in sufficient quantity. In fact, in the current situation, there are many problems in Nouadhibou and more particularly regarding the SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] installations in Boulanoir.

We are genuinely afraid that the current situation might bring about a delay in the implementation of our start-up work schedule.

This last point is at the present time our main difficulty. Of course we are in the process of examining all possible solutions to resolve this difficultiy, given the fact that any delay registered in starting repair work with a view to starting up operations can result in additional cost.

In conclusion, what I can say is that I am certainly optimistic, since the principal difficulties have been surmounted thanks to the considerable efforts made since July 1978 to save an ailing project which was in bad shape.

Of course the game will not be won until the refinery is running properly and in the interest of our country's economic development, which means not until solving the technical problems linked to conceptual errors which have not yet been corrected.

9631
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FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL BANK DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 56

[Text] AS PART OF its industrial development plans the UAE's ministry of finance is to establish an industrial bank. The new institution has yet to receive government approval, and some bankers in the country are sceptical about it ever coming to fruition, given the length of time that it took to set up the Central Bank. 'We'll believe it when it's actually in operation,' said one cynical financier.

The Industrial Bank will be a joint venture between ten local banks, five insurance companies and the government. The government will hold a 51 per cent share with participating banks and insurance companies jointly holding 49 per cent.

The final draft of the charter for the Bank was approved at the beginning of July after a meeting of the managers of the banks and insurance companies with officials of the UAE ministry of finance and industry.

All the bankers interviewed by *8 Days* agreed that an industrial bank is essential, as most of the financial institutions in the UAE are primarily interested in trade financing for quick returns. Industrial financing, particularly for small projects, is difficult to obtain. According to one banker: 'There has been no capital easily available for industrial projects basically because banks in the UAE find it much more profitable to put their money into trade projects. But as industrialisation becomes an important aim of the planners it is essential to think of means of financing smaller indusrial projects.'

Banking circles in the UAE expect the industrial bank to be similar to the Kuwait Industrial Bank, which was established in 1973. In 1975 it received Kuwaiti dinars 100m ($354m) from the government at an interest rate of one per cent, and a similar sum was injected into the system recently. Its function is to develop industrial growth in Kuwait by providing soft loans (at three per cent interest) and identifying suitable projcts.

According to a Central Bank spokesman in Abu Dhabi, the reason why details of the UAE industrial bank have not been publicised is 'because in this country any federation proejct has to take into consideration the amount of participation by each emirate'. He added that the Central Bank had not been consulted labout the new bank as yet but is likely to hold shares in the industrial institution once cabinet approval has been granted.

Under the 1981-1985 federal development budget of $3.67bn, $2.27bn has been allocated for projects already under way, while the remainder will finance new schemes. Fujairah will receive $386.8m, Abu Dhabi $327.2m, Ajman $110m, Ras al Khaimah $292.9m, Sharjah $217m, Dubai $145.8m and Umm al Qaiwain $138.7m.

The industrial bank will need to ensurethat the private sector keeps pace with public spending. It will mainly finance small-scale ventures such as paper recycling mills, bottling industries, wire factories, cement and asbestos products manufacturing while large-scale projects will remain in government hands.

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END

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BRIEFS

ANNUAL PLEDGE $500 MILLION--Kuwait, 23 Sep (KUNA)--The ministers of finance and economy of five Arab petroleum countries began their meeting here today to agree on the bases of spending $500 million annually over the next 10 years within the framework of the development contract endorsed by the Arab Summit Conference held in Amman in November last year. The sums will be allocated to support the development process in the poor Arab countries. The meetings, which are held at the headquarters of the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development, is attended by the finance ministers of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Qatar, and the UAE. The Kuwaiti minister of finance and planning, 'Abd al-Latif al-Hamad, opened the meeting with a speech expressing his hope that they will succeed in pushing the wheel of cooperation and the spirit of joint Arab economic solidarity forward. The sums allocated for the contract and which the five countries have undertaken to cover annually, will be spent through the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. [Text] [LD231116 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0906 GMT 23 Sep 81]

CSO: 4404/1

PRESENT OIL GLUT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 217, 29 Jun to 5 Jul 81, pp 37, 38

[Article by 'Afif al-Razzaz: "The Prices Were Silent So That Production Would Talk"]

[Text] The Kuwaiti Minister of Oil: "Every Crisis Is Followed by a Glut, and Then the Glut Disappears."

The International Energy Agency: "A Blessing Has Come From the Desert, But It May Not Last."

After the oil glut on the world market reached a peak which this market has not known since before the first "oil crisis" in 1973, the two matters of oil production and supply began to be of primary concern among international economic circles. The question of oil prices became of secondary importance after the surplus in supply served to limit its degree of urgency for the authorities in the countries most concerned about them.

Last week there were two meetings, held by two interested parties, where the question of supply was discussed. There was the meeting of ministers of the International Energy Agency which was held in Paris, and there was the meeting of the Long-Range Oil Strategy Committee of OPEC which was held in Geneva. Both meetings discussed future prospects--which are based less on facts than they are on predictions which are still subject to change at any moment.

The Kuwaiti oil minister, Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah al-Sabah, in an interview which he gave to a Kuwaiti newspaper, anticipated that the present oil glut in the international market will disappear during the next 6 months, that is, by the end of this year. He said: "Those who are planning and making their calculations on the basis of the present abundance of oil in the market are making a mistake. Usually, when there has been a crisis, this has been followed by a surplus, which shortly thereafter disappears."

If this reasoning concerning the disappearance of the surplus of oil in the world market appears ill-founded, in the view of observers who are specialists in the field, nevertheless the International Energy Agency did not depart from the framework of such semi-metaphysical reasoning when it states its apprehension that this oil surplus blessing, which had "come to them" from the desert, would not last.

During the meeting of the ministers in Paris, the Agency's administrative board admitted that the surplus had led to an improvement in the oil situation in the world market. But it attributed this improvement to the fact that there had been a decrease in oil consumption in the large consumer countries--the advanced industrial countries. The board also cautioned against relaxing one's efforts because of these results, because the continuation of "stability" in the market depends on a continuation of the policy of the consumers tightening their belts.

The current chairman of the administrative board of the Energy Agency, Australian Minister of Energy John L. Carrick, said that the 11 member-nations in the Agency should not be fooled by this decrease in the intensity of the crisis because the oil market "is still a fragile one."

The experts of the Agency noted that the stocks of oil in these countries, at the present time, appear more than adequate for the coming winter--the season when consumption of oil and of energy in general noticeably increases. At the beginning of last April, stocks of oil in all of these countries taken together amounted to 430 million tons, and it is expected that these stocks of oil will amount to 445 million tons by next 1 October.

The caution which Carrick displayed with regard to the "fragility" of the market is based on the expectation--still unconfirmed--that there will probably be a revival of the economy of the large industrial capitalist nations during the second half of this year. If this happens, this would necessarily increase oil consumption. But Carrick refused to quote figures when dealing with the probabilities of this revival and the probabilities of subsequent developments in the oil market. The experts in the Agency also avoided giving any estimates linking these two factors.

Nevertheless, Carrick pointed out that the International Energy Agency does not expect the oil imports [of the industrial countries] in the year 1990 to exceed their current imports, which amount to about 19.1 million barrels per day. He said that if there is any probable change, it would be in the direction of a slight decrease in imports.

The American delegates at the meeting of the Energy Agency once again exercised political pressure on their Western allies, attempting to have them participate in the "protection" of the sources of oil in the Middle East. The American secretary of energy, James Edward, stressed the efforts which his country had made to decrease its consumption of oil, and he pointed out that its strategic oil reserves will amount to 195 million barrels by the end of the current fiscal year. The U.S. assistant secretary of foreign affairs, William Clark (who, during Congressional hearings prior to his appointment, became famous for his absolute ignorance concerning foreign affairs), took it upon himself to present the political side of the United States' view of the oil situation. Clark said that the other factor which constitutes a danger to guaranteeing the necessary supply of oil is the factor of instability in the Middle East which "has multiple causes and is multifaceted." He pointed out that "energy depends on the degree of Western influence in the region."

Such a cautious orientation was the rule in the meeting of the ministers of the International Energy Agency, and it was an orientation which insisted that Saudi Arabia, in particular, had played no role in securing the present oil surplus by

holding its production at a high level for about the past year. However, alarm was the most prevalent characteristic at the meeting of OPEC's Long-Range Oil Strategy Committee which was held in Geneva, chaired by Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani, the Saudi minister of petroleum.

In addition to Saudi Arabia, this Committee includes Algeria, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela. The Committee is an advisory one and its decisions are not binding. It was formed more than 2 years ago in order to formulate a strategy for setting oil prices and oil production. The [formation of this] Committee was supposed to be brought up for approval at the OPEC summit conference which was to be held last November in Baghdad. But the Iraqi-Iranian war, as well as differences within OPEC, prevented this meeting from taking place.

The most important point which today is on the agenda of this Committee--which started out as a temporary committee but which apparently has become a permanent institution--is the evaluation of the previous estimates of OPEC's share in the world oil market. These estimates must be corrected in light of the increase in production on the part of oil-producing nations which are not members of OPEC, and in light of the increasing role which is being played by coal and nuclear power.

The Venezuelan minister of energy, Humberto Calderon, explained that during the past 2 years OPEC had made predictions of its share in the world oil market, but that these predictions had turned out to be inaccurate. Since that time OPEC's production has fallen from 31 million barrels a day (in 1979) to between 24 and 25 million barrels a day at the present time.

Right now there is nothing which indicates any possibility of making more accurate predictions in view of the contentious policies of the two parties, or two blocs, toward each other--with one of these blocs representing the interests of the large consumers and the other representing the interests of the producers. This is especially true since the operation of penetrating the [other party's] positions from inside has already begun to bear fruit. And the unfortunate thing is that this penetration is still being done by only one of the parties.

9468
CSO: 4304/75

STUDY DISCOURAGES CLOSE TIES WITH U.S.

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 233, 8 Aug 81 p 20

[Article by Najib 'Abd al-Hadi: "Profit and Loss Statements of Arab Moderation; A Political-Economic Work Plan that May be Adopted by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)"]

[Text] A political study carefully prepared by special Gulf (political) circles says that the friendship which the countries of the area have with the U.S. is no longer justifiable, and that these countries must change their political paths if they want to become important in the international field. The study concentrates on the economic aspects and the scientific method the rich Arab oil countries must follow in dealing with the West in general and the U.S. in particular.

The study says that the existing Arab power will not exceed its being financial with limited influence or political authority unless this financial power becomes an economic power. The study suggests that the concerned nations must establish the scientific foundation for transforming the power of Arab money into an economic power.

Gulf political sources told AL-MUSTAQBAL that the study (the new political and economic work plan) was distributed to the member nations of the GCC for review and study of its contents including details, information and documents and to give their opinions concerning it prior to implementation.

The sources said that the first step the rich Arab oil countries will take is the announcement of the formation of an international investment organization with a huge capital which is subject to annual increases. And further, that this organization will be given broad and widespread authorities and financial and economic jurisdiction in various countries around the world. This organization will operate on strictly economic principles, and its main objective will not only be profit-making, but will also concentrate on financial investments that have both economic and political returns.

The sources said that the (organization's) proposed initial capital is $6 billion, subject to annual increases at very high rates.

AL-MUSTAQBAL also learned that this investment organization will not be limited to rich oil countries, but its doors will be wide open to every Arab nation that wishes to participate. These sources believe that this direction toward building a unified and strong Arab economy will create better political climates and will make the Arabs an effective power that cannot be ignored, particularly since economics has become firmly tied to politics. A strong economy, as a prominent Gulf official said, creates a strong and effective policy; while a weak economy is inevitably accompanied by a weak policy that remains unable to achieve any political gains.

Some Kuwaiti political and economic agencies anticipate that this work plan will have great significance in the world and will also create political and economic climates that never existed before. Therefore, these agencies see the necessity of expediting the implementation of this plan.

These agencies also said that they favor the presentation of this work plan to member nations of the Arab League so that they could first voice an opinion and later participate in the plan's proposed capital which will have an effect and influence on many economic activities in the world.

AL-MUSTAQBAL also learned, from gulf political sources, that the GCC will acknowledge this study and announce its adoption officially during the first summit meeting held by the member nations. It is worth noting here that the ministers of finance and economy in the gulf nations had held a conference in al-Dammam, in Saudi Arabia during last June to conclude discussions regarding this study. They also approved the proposed investment agency's basic laws. The sources said that all viewpoints were in total agreement.

The source also says: "It is time to establish new bases for dealing with the west, and in particular the U.S., which is expanding its ties with Israel day after day, ignoring other relationships and friends in the area, and also ignoring its own widespread interests in this area. We have tried in the past, to follow a policy of moderation in our political dealings. However, this path no longer serves our Arab and national interests and it had not resulted in any worthwhile political gains. Therefore, continuing in this current path will leave negative repercussions that involve many risks. This makes it our duty to work fast toward linking economics to politics in a manner that serves our crucial interests, the most important one being the central cause; the Palestinian cause."

The source also emphasized: "Putting the Arab economy to use for serving economic [sic] causes will be one of the most important and prominent aims of the organization. The organization will also employ all its energies and power in order to benefit from advanced technology, using it in various fields and spheres in the Arab world."

9455
CSO: 4304/125

SOVIET MILITARY POSITION ASSESSED

Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 29 Aug 81 pp 32-38

[Article by Peter Scholl-Latour: "How Afghan Warriors are Beating Russia"]

> [Text] The Soviet occupation army in Afghanistan is fighting Moslem guerrilla units in desolate mountain areas with armored helicopters. The Afghan guerrilla fighters, trusting in Allah, are having more success than the Kremlin could expect. With a TV team which obtained special permission to cross the Afghan border from Pakistan, accompanied by Mujaheddin warriors, special ELSEVIER correspondent Peter Scholl Latour--wrapped up in a local disguise--climbed up on a donkey and gun in hand, sized up the situation in this war theater which is so crucial for Moscow.

The enterprise began as a masquerade. We had Afghan clothing made for ourselves in the Peshawar bazaar and tried on in astonishment the shapeless, wide trousers. A flattering shirt, which fell to the knees and a coat also went with them.

On the evening before our departure, when we looked at ourselves in the mirror under the enormous Pashtun turban or under the round cap of the Nuristani, we seemed very ridiculous, all the more so since our beard stubble--in the Yassir Arafat fashion--stood out on our faces.

But the Mujaheddin of the Afghan resistance organization Hisb-i-Islami which we wanted to accompany over the border to Afghanistan, had absolutely insisted on this outfit, otherwise we would not have any chance of passing through the Pakistani inspections and in Afghanistan itself, we would risk the greatest dangers in European clothing.

We were summoned at 0600 hours in the morning to the main headquarters of the Hisb-i-Islami in the Fairabad section of the city.

Three brightly painted Afghan buses, in which about 180 Mujaheddin had already squeezed, awaited us. We would hide inconspicuously in this crowd and in case of emergency pass ourselves off to the Pakistani police as Turkmens or Uzbeks.

The mood in the buses was pleasantly excited. Most of the young men who were still unarmed, in the framework of a carefully selected rotation system, were returning to the battlefield after a period of rest in the hinterland and longed for their "Holy War."

Heavily armed guards with Kalashnikov machine guns stood before the entrance of the main headquarters of the Hisb-i-Islami and searched every visitor for weapons or explosives. We were repeatedly asked in Peshawar why we had deliberately picked the Hisb-i-Islami as traveling companions. I had quite consciously turned to this extreme Islamic group. They want, besides the fight against the Russian invaders, to subject their own feudal lords to the egalitarianism of early Islam and, on the other hand, are suspicious of the obscure or at least naive beliefs of the local mullahs. I know from experience that in the partisan war, the future belongs to the radicals, to the uncompromising organizations.

The founders of Hisb-i-Islami and also the present leadership come to a considerable extent from the Afghan intelligentsia and a section of the petty bourgeoisie, who, going back to the fundamental principles of early Islam, are seeking a religious and especially social renewal. It appears that these Moslem revolutionaries, who are related in many respects to the Moslem brothers, have conspiratorial and organizational capacities which the other fighting groups lack.

We had already bought in Peshawar four donkeys and six horses to transport our heavy TV equipment. The night in Terremangal was mainly occupied with packing and preliminary conversations--with green and black tea which kept us awake and made us nervous. We practically were not able to sleep. The departure in the dark and the mud--it had rained days before--took place in great confusion.

When we hastened over a steep slope, which seemed never to end, towards the border, the sun spread its first light. Luckily the Pakistani border troops did not stop us at the last moment. The Afghan border station on the other side was destroyed and burned out. We discovered a destroyed Russian armored car beside it. Shahid, who rode beside me, declared that this area already was liberated from Russians and communists 2 years ago. Tall green pine forests led us down the mountain. We found ourselves in an area where, before the outbreak of hostilities, German development assistants had helped in a large forestry project. But all foreigners had already long disappeared from this area. Only the outside walls of the sawmill were standing. Commander Shahid, who only spoke

Pushtu and Dari--the Persian colloquial language, especially in central and northern Afghanistan--informed me through our interpreters (the Afghan engineer-student Wali from Hildesheim and the sociology student Amin from Strasbourg) that we should advance from now on in small groups of from two to three men.

At about a distance of 6 kilometers, he showed us a reinforced military camp, which still was in the hands of pro-Russian government troops and from which fire was opened from time to time on the Mujaheddin passing through. Shahid declared, "generally speaking they act peacefully, in the expectation that we also will leave them alone. They are supplied by helicopter and are completely isolated there."

We went through a series of villages, which were still partly inhabited, even if holes were shot in the walls now and then by rocket attacks. The grain was high and apricot trees were already bearing their first fruits.

Our escorts were not especially well armed. They carried British Enfield rifles from the Second World War and gave the appearance of some nervousness, as it was suspected that the Pashtun tribe of the Dsjordsji would not be a reliable partner in the struggle against the Russians and could be bribed now and then. The rivalry between the Afghan resistance groups possibly was also expressed here for the first time. Far from all the Mujaheddin sympathize with the fanatic zealots of the Hisb-i-Islami.

The distance which we would have to cover, going and coming, amounted to 600 kilometers as the crow flies. In fact, in the mountains, it was certainly double that. And we had already learned on this first day that the Mujaheddin's ideas of time and distance were far above our powers. Among the Afghans, it apparently is a characteristic of masculine competition--there is some bluff in it--to climb a large and difficult high mountain in a minimum of time. Only this almost unbelievable mobility and endurance explains the resistance against the Russian show of power in the entire country standing its ground. After 2 weeks of marching, we probably would have reached such a degree of exhaustion that operating cameras would no longer be possible.

About evening we reached Laredar in a rocky mountain valley. Before the commander continued from here with his partisans on the way to Asrow--10 hours of walking and bombarded by the Russians in the early days--we took our leave with the threefold brotherly kiss, as is customary among the Afghan mountain people. Two armed Mujaheddin were left behind to protect us, which was not any excessive precautionary measure, for the equipment and also the cash which we were

carrying represented unimaginable wealth in this wilderness. Our stay in Laredar became an extraordinary experience. We apparently were in one of the important infiltration routes of the resistance fighters, which leads to the Kabul area and to the extreme north of Afghanistan. New groups of Mujaheddin of different races and political convictions arrived continuously. They rested a short time at our samovar, drank a cup of tea and cooked some rice. Afterwards, they said their prayers with devout fervor. They kept their rifles nearby within reach. The respective leaders acted at the same time as pastor, as "Imam." The Fatiha, a chapter of the Koran, rang solemnly through the rocky mountain valley.

Two old men with white beards spoke animatedly and amicably with us. They pointed to the sky and described the helicopters, cursed the "sjoerawi" of the Russians and imitated the noise of machine guns. Even for these old men, who moved with amazing agility over the steep terrain, this "holy war" was a great joy.

Whenever an armed group appeared, we asked to what political group it belonged. If they were men of the Hisb-i-Islami, our two bodyguards embraced them and we sat down with them around the fire. But as soon as partisans of the "Harakat-inkelab-i-Islami appeared and affixed a poster with the likeness of their leader Mohammadi on the stone wall of our tea house, the atmosphere became tense, almost hostile.

In Laredar we spent the night on the bare ground with the steaming samovar. During the first night our camera team were the victims of countless flea bites. These insects would always accompany us after that. We were offered as first course some rice and a couple of potatoes, along with the sugared, green tea. We would not settle down. The "host" of our establishment stumbled regularly over the sleeping men, to get scanty supplies out of their boxes and cases for new groups of Mujaheddin. The fighters sat a few hours around the campfire, warmed themselves and continued indefatigably their march through the mountains. There also came a caravan with wounded which was led further in the direction of Pakistan. The Russians had bombed the Tessin Pass which leads over the Kabul-Jalalabad road. Moreover, there were 17 dead and many wounded.

Already in the early morning camels approached from the direction of the Pakistani border, which were loaded with bazooka ammunition. To our great surprise the Mujaheddin's weapons' arsenal was much better than could be expected. Hunting rifles and old-fashioned rifles loaded with grape shot had disappeared long ago. The Russian Kalashnikov, also named the AK 47, is a part more and more of the basic equipment. It also includes light Russian and British produced machine guns and a relatively high caliber antiaircraft weapon which the Russians call "Dashka." We looked curiously for the origin of

the many bazookas. Apparently they were part of a tacitly agreed policy to supply the Afghan partisans with Russian produced equipment or at least with Russian types. A bearded Pashtun type, a giant declared to us, very credibly and with the agreement of his fellow combatants, that the Mujaheddin have long ago overcome their fear of the tanks and that they often dance with joy when Russian tanks are reported. The "Holy War" fighters then fight for the honor of firing the bazookas from a long distance.

The Russian pursuit planes, mostly the Mig-21 have lost much of their effect and are valued mainly as a psychological factor in warfare. On the other hand, the Russian helicopters of the Mi-24 type are deadly and almost invincible. Because of their heavy titanium armament, they cannot be brought down, even with the 12.7 millimeter calibre heavy machine guns which have been delivered recently by the Chinese over a circuitous route. The Afghan resistance obviously lacks surface-air missiles. The fighters in the mountains are helpless at the mercy of the missiles and weapons on board the Mi-24.

The Russian troop movements on the roads controlled by them during the day consequently take place under the indispensable protection of their invulnerable helicopters.

You can imagine without much difficulty how the general strategic situation would change if the Afghans would actually be equipped on a certain day, even to a modest extent, with surface-air missiles of the type, as for example, the Russian Sam-7. In that case, the war would take a decisive turn. The Russians would then be forced on to the defensive and in all probability not even will be able to hold the indispensable communications roads which run from Amudarja via the Salang Tunnel to Kabul and from there over the important circumferential road to Kandahar and Herat.

On the following days of our march I was able to determine that a comparison between Afghanistan and Vietnam would be misleading. Continuing on our way to Asrow, we came through mountain villages which perhaps were bombed now and then, but a systematic destructive operation by the Russian air force, as was customary in Indo-China in the "free fire" zones by the American Air Force, has not taken place in Afghanistan until now. The numerical strength would develop more and more in favor of the resistance. Experts recommend a numerical proportion of 1:10 in combating partisans, in order to have a chance of success. One is far removed from that in Afghanistan. Even if the Russians, instead of the 85,000 men as is always officially indicated, should have stationed 100,000 soldiers--of which in the most favorable case 20,000 would be actual combat troops--that is still absolutely insufficient. The Afghan government army, which is fighting on the Russian side, has shriveled up in recent months like goatskin. Its combat readiness leaves much to be desired. It amounts

to wholesale desertion. The present strength of this army is estimated at 35,000 men at the most. On the other hand, according to careful estimates, there are about 100,000 well armed, highly motivated Mujaheddin, experienced in mountain warfare. Accordingly, to that are added at least 100,000 partisans, who live during the day as farmers and traders, but are available to the different resistance movements at all times as armed auxiliary forces.

In 1979 Abd el-Wadud, as the head of the Mujaheddin, gave the government of President Hafizollah Amin, who was murdered later, the false impression that he wanted to join with 300 followers in the struggle of the Marxist government against the rebels. He took delivery of 300 rifles, went over to the resistance with them and led the first attack on the northern city of Faizabad.

Abd el-Wadud, whom we met in a remote camp, was originally a teacher, but meanwhile he has developed into an outstanding leader in the "Holy War". He assembles his men under the picture of Hekmtjar and the student Kais from Kabul leads the speaking choruses with a megaphone. The Mujaheddin have speaking choruses for their party, the Hisb-i-Islami, their leader Hekmatjar and the independence of Afghanistan. But the continuously recurring cry is heard "Allahu akbar!" Besides scorning the Soviet Union, communism and the red "Quislings" in Kabul, there also sounds: "Margbar America"--"death to Americans!"

The attitude about Moscow has not led at all here to reconciliation with the West. In later conversations we find out that most of the resistance fighters do not favor Khomeini's Iranian revolution, either.

The bearded guerrillas share the bold dreams of their leader Hekmatjar. Meanwhile our five man television team fitted into Abd el-Wadud's military group without problems. At the Aserre Camp--a small resting place on our march through a wild mountain landscape which it was difficult to pass through--the Mujaheddins conversation constantly revolved around the military situation. For these simple men from the mountains who normally earn their living laboriously as tenant farmers or day laborers, the "Holy War" is the great adventure in their life. We learned that the Soviet Army controls only very incompletely Afghanistan's most important cities, such as Kandahar and Herat. A relatively well functioning intelligence organization apparently exists between the resistance groups in the various provinces, although the war circumstances create a chaotic impression for a western observer.

There are numerous tribal organizations in the interior which are hardly known in Pakistani Peshawar or Quetta and which are carrying out their "Djihad" with complete independence. However this multiplicity can also benefit the Pakistanis. Not the slightest chance

exists for the Russian military machine to wipe out its opponent's front once and for all with a well planned operation. The Afghan resistance is a sort of hydra on which new heads continually grow again. Moreover, the oriental mentality of these fighters brings every European strategy to despair. But on our trip through Afghanistan we could confirm that the so-called "free areas" are extending and are constantly affected less by Russian intervention.

Abd el-Wadud answered my question that the military training of his men is so relatively satisfactory because many officers of the former Afghan Army have joined the Mujaheddin and are taking care of systematic instruction.

Commander Abd el-Wadud showed himself to be an excellent horseman and a born "chapendoz." At night we slept in the mosque, at the foot of the shrine of the "Mihrab," which was a special honor for we unbelievers. Abd el-Wadud had advised us to continue further on the way to the northeast with his group. We would run into difficulties finding fodder for our animals. After the bombardment of Tessin Pass we probably had to cross completely impassable terrain and especially there would be no opportunity to film the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in daylight, because we would have to move in all haste at night.

The Mujaheddin's breaking camp was originally planned for the time of morning prayer, about 0530. However, those plans were suddenly changed. The departure now took place at 0200 hours. Within a quarter of an hour, this group of about 300 men was again fully ready to start. We needed much more time to load our pack horses and with a small escort, we set out on the way in the opposite direction. The previous day so much noise and shooting took place in the neighborhood, that we had to expect in all seriousness the arrival of Russian helicopters. Darkness was our best protection.

I appeared so haggard, that I was stopped by older men who wanted to have a conversation with me in Pushtu or Dari. After a strenuous climb, we reached the next resting place, we set up camp around the inevitable samovar and spoke with the help of our interpreter, Amin about the problem of islam. Even the very simple Mujaheddin proved to be remarkably well informed about the events in Iran and the Arab world. Our reliable bodyguard was a small but powerfully developed Hazara, a Mongol from the neighborhood of Kabul, named Daoed. He developed a special fondness for me because of my quotations from the Koran. We discussed why the fundamentalists of Hisb-i-Islami refused to seek active support against the Russians from the Americans. It involves here a fundamental, almost theological question. The Islamic proverb: "La illaha illa 'llah!"--there is only "one God, the only God"--is logically transferred to politics. Submission or even relying on a superpower would, in a certain sense, seem to betray the principle which declares that God is greater than everything else--"Allahu akbar!"

The Afghan Mujaheddins have great sympathy for the Moslem Brotherhood movement in the Arab World. On the other hand, they regard the Syrian Baath regime of President Hafez al-Assad as godless, as a sattelite of the Soviet Union, even as an "open ally" of Israel.

On the way back from the mountains, we were in a hurry to get out of Terremangal for the mood among the Pakistani there was unpleasant. It came to violent political skirmishes under a placard in honor of Khomeini. When the night quarters were set up, we noticed that we were in a very (homofiele) environment. Suddenly we were out of the solemn mood of the "Holy War" and had ended up in the atmosphere of a "midnight express."

Amin and Wali had organized with their usual efficiency a bus full of Mujaheddin in which we submerged ourselves. Meanwhile because of our beard stubble and our dirty clothing, we appeared remarkably more credible. The vehicle was lined inside with a silver colored plate, like a tabernacle.

The Pakistani inspections were stricter than on the trip out because the Islamabad security authorities feared that the armed opposition against the regime of President Sia ul-Haq--especially the supporters of the executed former President Zoelfikar Ali Bhutto--would want to infiltrate out of Afghanistan agents and saboteurs of the banned "Pakistan People's Party."

The Hisb-i-Islami prepared a special surprise for us directly in the border area. Dr Karim, an Afghan physician practicing in Osnabruck, who had organized our expedition from the beginning, had two Soviet soldiers,who had been taken prisoner by the Mujaheddin, brought before us. It involved a Russian sergeant from the Perm area in the Urals, who claimed he had been separated from his comrades at Bagram and at first he had feared he would be killed by his guards. Now he gave the impression of again being very trustful. His name was (Juri Grigorjewitsy Powarnizyn). The second soldier was a Turkmen, named (Jaskuliejew) whose first name (Mohammedgul) marked him as a Moslem. He called himself a deserter. While (Powarnizyn) fell into the hands of the Mujaheddin in the Bagram area, (Jaskuliejew) changed sides at Sjarikar along the road which goes to the Salang Tunnel. Thus further proof was supplied that the Mujaheddin can move fairly unhindered and make remote regions unsafe, even in the area which is regarded as the center of the Russian show of force in Afghanistan. The Turkmen (Jaskuliejew) complained that he had been badly treated by the Russian superiors in his unit. "I was often beaten," he asserted, "like that can only happen among us with wives." He now wanted to join in the "Holy War" and declared after some hesitation that the Islamic revolution would spread to the Moslem peoples in Soviet Central Asia. Both of these Soviet soldiers refused my offer to deliver letters to their families via the Red Cross--the Afghans agreed to it.

Back in Pakistan, we spoke with a high Pakistani security officer, who is in charge of surveillance of the entire border from Chinese Sinkiang to Baluchistan. "We are confronted with a startling and shocking fact" says this border commissioner. "The Russians are losing their partisan war in Afghanistan. For whoever does not crush such guerrillas with absolute military and political superior force is ultimately the loser. The world and the western media are not sufficiently informed about this development." So we fly with our assignment back to Europe, to announce to the Free World that the Soviets are faring bitterly in Afghanistan.

8490
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KARMAL SPEECH TO YOUTH ORGANIZATION REPORTED

LD120342 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 10 Sep 81

[Speech by Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council, delivered during 8 September meeting of activists of the Democratic Youth Organization of Afghanistan in the DRA Armed Forces, at the Valam Khana Hall of the DRA Revolutionary Council--recorded]

[Excerpts] Young soldiers and dear comrades,

It is my pleasure to have the opportunity of meeting you representatives of this courageous organization and those who have devoted their youth for struggle in the ranks of our heroic army for the prosperity and well-being of the noble people of Afghanistan and for the development of our beloved homeland.

Today there is no other sacred and more important duty than the armed defense of the glorious objectives of the Sawr Revolution, the total elimination of counterrevolutionary elements and providing peaceful conditions for peace and creative work for the toiling people of Afghanistan.

Dear youth, recently noticeable and important changes have occurred in the PDPA and in the life of the toiling people of Afghanistan. The DRA Defense Council has been formed, as a result of a Politburo decision, to consolidate all of the forces of the government and the people for the elimination of counterrevolutionaries. It has as its authority all of the power of the government. Important decisions have recently been made by the Defense Council for the strengthening of the armed forces and local governments in securing (?uninterrupted) activities on the communication routes of the country.

Similarly, a session of the party activists of the PDPA has been opened for the first time since the victory of the glorious Sawr revolution. During this session the duties of the army, government intelligence service, Sarandoy, party and government organs for the intensification of the struggle against counterrevolutionaries has been considered and evaluated in a very cordial atmosphere.

The Central Committee of the party and government have also raised a series of peaceful initiatives in the international field. So far armed aggressions are taking place, as before, on the sacred soil of our beloved homeland, Afghanistan, mainly from the territory of Pakistan. The Government of the DRA once again

proposed to discuss and consider (?subjects) connected with the normalization of relations with the Government of Pakistan. Similarly, regarding the establishment of friendly relations with Iran, we have reaffirmed our readiness for the advancement of discussions in this respect. All of these peaceful initiatives for the removal of armed interference by sinister imperialists in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, as part of an international guarantee, is viewed as security for our young republic.

Comrades, the law of evolution of human societies and the law of young liberating revolutions have proven that it is the youth who, in the frontline of struggle on the path of freedom and justice, are sacrificing their dear lives.

Comrades, despite the great efforts which are taking place by our party, because of the activities of the U.S. imperialists and other enemies of the noble Afghan people, bloodshed is continuing on the sacred land of our beloved country. Irrespective of this, the lackeys of counterrevolution, who are instigated by the United States and their Chinese [word indistinct] are striving to unify their efforts and concentrate their forces.

They provide supplies of weapons and food for the rebel bandits in preparation for new conspiracies and intrigues.

The savage crimes of the enemies are still continuing. Armed rebels have set fire to mosques, schools, houses and agricultural production units and have been murdering children and elders. They have been plundering the property of the people and are committing the most savage crimes in order to threaten the people, to dispossess them from the benefits of revolution and to drown in blood the inclination of the noble people for freedom and prosperity. They are acting most cunningly and [word indistinct]. They are not only committing sabotage and terrorist actions, but they want to (?damage) the firm determination of the people of Afghanistan through ideological sabotage, the fabrication of lies, (words indistinct] and misleading class awareness, and weaken in their minds the faith in a bright future.

The enemies are striving to sow discord among the tribes, nationalities and inhabitants of our country and are striving to [word indistinct] against our gains, that is to say the Afghan-USSR friendship. This disinterested and internationalist friendship which has now achieved solidarity through struggle and has [words indistinct] in the struggle against the enemies of the DRA, is the most valuable and precious gain of the people of Afghanistan. My visit which took place recently with L. I. Brezhnev, the great friend of the people of Afghanistan, and general secretary of CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, is a vivid demonstration of this infallible friendship. [applause]

The bravery and heroism of the people of Vietnam is unprecedented. The Western imperialists during tens of years wanted to subjugate revolutionary Vietnam, but they themselves were defeated. [applause]

[LD120820] U.S. imperialism, this cunning and powerful enemy, set fire to the soil of this heroic country [Vietnam] and eliminated millions of Vietnamese strugglers. However, it could not succeed in winning victory from the people of Vietnam and from their iron-like determination to gain freedom. Now the people of Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and the heroic people of Palestine, with relentless struggle and heroic resistance against the imperialist forces, are fighting for a prosperous future for their children. These and similar examples indicate that a new life, free from oppression, injustice and exploitation, cannot be achieved easily. It must be earned as a result of a stubborn struggle. This struggle requires the effort and combativeness of all forces. It requires self-sacrifice for the freedom and prosperity of the toiling people. Every noble youth and person who loves the homeland must realize this fact. In the history of our country and in the memories of our future generations the names of those who are fighting in the ranks of heroic strugglers and the names of those who sacrifice their lives for a bright future will remain forever. The future generations of our country will accept the heroism and epics of todays youthful heroes as the standard by which to measure their lives. They will keep them in their hearts as a measurement of loyalty to the homeland.

The homeland will not forgive those who keep themselves aloof at this critical moment and who do not stand on the side of defending the glorious future of the homeland. History will forget them and will reject them as blood-devouring enemies.

Everyone in this respected audience is a participant in these great changes and is writing the most glorious pages of the history of the Afghan homeland with their blood and lives. The Sawr revolution and the currents of the revolution once again reveal the correctness of the great leader of international proletarianism that to gain power is easier than keeping it.

I would like to bring to your attention the matter that all counterrevolution forces and regional reaction, who are supported by the U.S. imperialists and Chinese hegemonists, are endeavoring with full intensity to preserve and maintain oppression, exploitation, poverty, backwardness, illiteracy and a lack of culture, which has been suppressing the free soul of the noble Afghan people for centuries. Those who think that victory, in the struggle for a prosperous and glorious future, can be achieved without the heroic work and struggle of tens and hundreds of thousands of patriots, very much misunderstand life and history. You must know that the defense of the gains of the glorious Sawr revolution is a matter which depends, more than anything else, on the noble people of Afghanistan themselves. Therefore, the effort of every Afghan individual should increase every day in this struggle and the people of Afghanistan, should defend their liberating revolution with heroism, courage and vigilance. This is the command of our fatherland: [applause] I must very clearly declare to you youths, and also I declare to the people of the world that the limited military contingents of the Soviet Union are as a force in reserve in Afghanistan against the external imperialist reactionary aggression. However, the defense of revolution and the struggle against rebels and thieves and [words indistinct] the construction of a new socioeconomic society is entrusted to you, the youths of Afghanistan. [applause]

Such an inclination for [word indistinct] most of all is the formation of the National Fatherland Front. The formation of this organization is another witness for the defeat of the enemies who strive to impose and to revive the past hated regime with the use of weapons and terrorism. We are optimistic and (?firmly) believe that the noble people of our country will have the capability to toss off their shoulder the heavy burdens of the past century and with a spirit of enthusiasm they will begin to work and struggle; and with the assurance of a prosperous, successful and blossoming future they will build a new life.

The significant role for the defense of the revolution and struggle against the enemies of revolution is the duty of the patriotic youth. Only the army, equipped with modern weapons and ammunition with organized, and from the political point of view highly-aware personnel, is capable of defeating the devilish forces of the enemy and of eliminating them totally.

The army, government intelligence service and Sarondoy, are among those forces in our young republic, which the people time and again have looked at with hope. They regard them as liberators and as their genuine defenders. Our armed forces have proven their faithfulness and belief in the lofty objectives of the Sawr revolution. At present are defending its lofty objectives and are eliminating the enemies of the revolution.

Our courageous and patriotic soldiers in [words indistinct] struggle against the enemies of Afghanistan's toiling people, are showing heroism and self-sacrifice.

[LD120915] Hundreds of officers, NCO's, army men and Sarandoy have received government medals and badges. The strategic initiative is totally in the hands of the government and our armed forces. The large bands of counterrevolutionaries have been eliminated and their remnants have dispersed into small and minor groups which are engaging in terrorism [words indistinct] and the creation of dangerous and tense situations, terror and fear. In order to attain final victory, the noble people of the country and our heroic armed forces must untiringly carry out further actions, and in this regard the scope of the activities of the army's youth organizations is truly unlimited.

In conditions of severe class struggle, we need discipline and firm military order, and the majority [words indistinct] to secure this awareness in the broad masses of army personnel is the important duty of you [word indistinct] activist youths of the armed forces. As a matter of fact, you should act as assistants and close aides of the commanders, political employees and the army organization, and you should help mold our army into a unified and powerful organization [words indistinct] united iron determination and (?attract) tens, hundreds and thousands of people for the fulfillment of the objectives--that is, the elimination of counterrevolutionary elements. [applause]

You are dutybound to nourish in every young soldier a feeling of responsibility for the fate of the Sawr revolution and the toiling people of Afghanistan, and to encourage the masses of soldiers to heroism and self-sacrifice with samples of manhood and bravery.

The army of the DRA is based on the ideology of the working class and defends the interests of the toiling peasants and progressive intelligentsia and other patriots.

No one should forget this fact. You young activists must be the close aides of the army in training the soldiers in ideology and revolutionary beliefs so they will be able to understand class struggle and perceive who are their friends and enemies, against the latter of whom they should struggle for a bright future.

Our forces will be increased by large numbers as long as every patriotic youth in the army defends with body and soul the lofty objectives of the Sawr revolution.

Dear young comrades: The homeland has placed at your disposal modern weapons and war equipment. You can demonstrate your patriotism (?by learning how to use) these weapons and by skillfully wielding them in battle. The skillful use of arms along the political awareness of patriotic soldiers will make us invincible. [applause]

Self-sacrificing Afghan youth: The enemies of the revolution must fall in fear in face of power and ability and [words indistinct] and confront you in any part of the country [words indistinct].

I address you, brave [words indistinct] reinforcement personnel, artillery men and pilots. The enemy must feel with their flesh, skin and bone your war skill and high training power and should be eliminated forever from the bloodstained territory of Afghanistan.

Our [words indistinct] is linked by unity with the people. The army is enjoying the support and the best sons of the people and is struggling for the bright future and progress of Afghanistan. We must consolidate this unity. People are united with [word indistinct] and are forging ahead towards a united objective. They are invincible. [applause]

Comrades and youths: Every one of you must broaden the Afghan-Soviet friendship and the military cooperation between the DRA and the comrade soldiers of the limited Soviet units for the defense of freedom, independence and the revolution. You must guard this friendship and do your share in consolidating a friendship atmosphere. [applause]

Comrades: At the present time there is no more important duty than the quicker and complete elimination of counterrevolutionary elements and the bringing about of conditions of peace and calm and an atmosphere in which the Afghan people can engage in peaceful work.

The year 1361 [beginning 21 March 1982] must be a year in which we finally eliminate the enemies and provide conditions for peaceful work and the economic and cultural construction of a free, independent and proud revolutionary Afghanistan. All our efforts must be devoted to these objectives.

Long live the glorious Sawr revolution. [applause]

Long live the PDPA, the leader and inspiration of our revolution, a party of heroes and martyrs on the path of the salvation of the toiling people of Afghanistan. [applause]

Long live the eternal and infallible Afghan-Soviet friendship. [applause]

Long live the heroic DRA armed forces, these earnest guardians and reliable defenders of the glorious Sawr revolution, these earnest guardians and reliable defenders of the freedom, independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Afghans. [applause]

Long live the proud DYOA which has participated with the PDPA in heroic and patriotic episodes in Afghan history. [applause]

Comrades and heroic youth of Afghanistan: All of you, along with the party, government, people, revolution and all of your forces, must side by side and shoulder to shoulder forge ahead toward the total elimination of the counter-revolutionaries for the sake of the revolution of the workers of Afghanistan. [applause]

CSO: 4665/1

DRA-USSR COOPERATION DESCRIBED

LD192006 Kabul Radio in English to Europe 1900 GMT 18 Sep 81

[Text] (?Diploma) Engineer Mohammad Isma'il Danesh, the minister of mines and industry, has returned home after paying an official and friendly visit to the Soviet Union. In connection to this trip, and regarding cooperation of the Soviet Union with Afghanistan, (?We) have interviewed the minister of mines and industry.

In reply to a question the minister of mines and industry said: During 1 week's stay in the Soviet Union the Afghan delegation visited a number of places, in coal exploitation and institutions as well as one coppermine exploitation and enrichment complex. The Afghan delegation discussed the expansion of economic and technical cooperation in the field of coal mining with the authorities of the Soviet Union and have signed a protocol regarding the start in expansion of cooperation in the area of coal exploitation and training of technical cadres, which is of high importance in the development of coal and metallurgy in our beloved country, Afghanistan. The Afghan delegation, during its stay in the Soviet Union, has also visited a number of historical cities and Moscow, and some beautiful KK cities of Uzbekistan, such as Tashkent, Samarkand, etc, during which they felt the warm, friendly, and fraternal feelings of this people of the Soviets toward the government and people of our revolutionary country, Afghanistan.

Our observation of historical relics of the cities of Moscow and Tashkent reveal the fact to what extent the government, people and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, contrary to the false and baseless propaganda of the mass media of imperialistic countries, tries in preserving the historical relics and cultural traditions of all nationalities and peoples of the Soviet Union, especially the people of Afghanistan.

The results of our visit in the Soviet Union, in addition to experiences and fruitful results in the technical field, is bringing the warm and fraternal message of the people of the Soviet Union regarding peace and neighborliness (?in) the revolutionary people of Afghanistan. In connection to the cooperation of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in the areas of mines and industries, [we] must state this cooperation is based on unshakeable, consolidated selflessness and goodneighborly relations established between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union by Valdimir Ilyich Lenin, the great October Socialist Revolution.

These relations were established after Afghanistan gained its political independence in the year 1919 from the British colonialists, and it has perpetually strengthened during the past 60 years. These relations culminated the unshakeable and fraternal (?level) after the victory of the glorious Saur revolution. The cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union has especially expanded unprecedentedly in the past 20 years. The Soviet Union has rendered assistance in cooperation during this period to a large number of infrastructural institutions such as hydropower, construction of modern asphalted highways, diversion dams and tunnels, irrigation networks, big exploitation and exploration of (?ferrous) mines and natural gas (?projects), chemical fertilizers and thermal power, (?factories), textiles, [words indistinct] etc, from which billions of Afghanis [words indistinct] to the government's revenue. These [words indistinct] are of high importance in the growth of national industries in insuring the economic independence of Afghanistan, which guarantees the victory of our people in their struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism.

An amount of more than 10 (?billion) of Afghanis was added to the government's income from the export of Khwarja Gogerdak and Jarqodoq natural gas in the past year, which in fact constitutes 30 percent of the budget. The important industrial projects which are currently under construction with the assistance of the Soviet Union are as follows:

Qandahar cotton textile with the annual capacity of 40 million meters of cotton cloth 1,000 tons of [word indistinct] and 50 million meters of [word indistinct] textile, Herat cotton textile, with the annual capacity of 12.5 million meters of cotton and 500 tons of [word indistinct] and the expansion of [word indistinct] textiles with the annual capacity of 12 million meters of cotton textile.

In addition, in accordance with the economic cooperation agreement of March 1979 and December 1980 between the governments of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the cooperation of the Soviet Union is foreseen in a number of highly important projects, the most important of which are as follows:

The oil refinery project with the annual capacity of 500,000 tons of crude oil, [words indistinct] exploitation and enrichment complex with the annual capacity of 140,000 tons of pure copper, establishment of simple agromachinery in Herat Province; expansion of work of (Tabushak) coalmine, resulting in expansion of (Jangalak) car-repair factory; creation of [words indistinct] energy complex; rebuilding and expansion of [word indistinct] factory in Kabul; expansion of geological exploration of oil and natural gas in the (?north region) of Afghanistan, etc.

With completion of oil refinery factory, a large amount of oil requirement of the country, which is currently imported, will be met. With completion of 'Ainak copper mine, exploitation and (?enrichment), a modern city will be built in (Mohammad) of Lowgar which will have a population of more than 30,000. In addition, a large number of our engineers, technical and skilled workers will be trained in an amount of 13 billion Afghanis [as heard] with 6.2 billion Afghanis net income will be added to the income of the government.

For the realization of the importance of the Afghan-Soviet cooperation in the area of industry, it is sufficient to say that 65 percent of its annual resources in the finance of developing projects of our country during the past year will receive from the unconditional credit of the Soviet Union and this is in addition to 100 million grant of the Soviet Union during the past to the people of Afghanistan. [sentence as heard]

CSO: 4600/1

BRIEFS

SOVIET TEACHERS IN UNIVERSITIES--New Delhi, 22 Sep (AFP)--Soviet teachers have started filling up vacancies in Afghan universities caused by the desertion of Afghan teachers opposed to the present government, Western diplomatic sources said here today. Politically non-committed teachers are also being replaced by young teachers who are members of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). The sources here, quoting a circular signed by the Afghan deputy minister of education, said that the university authorities had been asked to give preference to teachers who hold "progressive" views. Area experts here said that the latest Soviet move was part of a drive to make fundamental changes in Afghanistan. During the past 2 years, Afghan young people, mainly males in their late teens or early 20's have been sent to the Soviet Union for advanced education. To ensure that government policies are properly followed in educational institutions, the government gave teachers an ultimatum last February to join the party or be dismissed. Subsequently a number of teachers chose to flee the country. [Text] [BK221137 Hong Kong AFP in English 1117 GMT 22 Sep 81]

CSO: 4600/1

GOVERNMENT PARTY MEMBER CRITICIZES VARIOUS OPPOSITION FIGURES

Cairo MAY in Arabic 8, 15, 29 Jun, 6, 20, 27 Jul, 3, 10, 17 Aug 81

/Article by Muhammad Rashwan: "A Calm Dialogue with the Opposition"/

/8 Jun 81 p 13/

/Text/ Mr Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, secretary general of the dissolved Wafd Party and former minister of the interior and finance, sent a message to President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat which the papers published. He used his constitutional rights as stipulated in Article 62 of the constitution, which states "Every person has the right to address the public authorities in writing (under their signature)," providing that we are living in the era of constitutional legitimacy and democracy, no matter what excesses there might be. From time to time the pasha tries to appear on the surface, after having become sated by hearing and seeing things, and he has made a number of attempts to revive the old Wafd Party and give speeches in the Lawyers' Union, but he forgot the maxim of almighty glorious God which states: "Say, God, yours is the dominion; you bring dominion to whom you want and take it away from whom you want?"

Mr Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's message contained the statement that the contents of the president's speeches did not accord with proved historic facts. This is what I am trying to reply to in this article.

It is the pasha's right to defend his leader Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, out of loyalty as he was a partner of his in government. However, it is not his right to twist history's arm, since history does not forget or forgive.

The first question I will ask the pasha is:

"Who ruled Egypt before the 23 July revolution?" While we are on the subject of history, I remember a statement contained in Lord Cromer's memoirs which went, "We did not rule Egypt, but we ruled the people who did." That is, the English and colonialism ruled the old parties, including the Wafd. They ruled the palace which the king represented in a manner in which colonialism is well-versed and which the pasha knows. I do not believe that the pasha has been afflicted by failing memory, but I can remind him of a loathing I have lest he claim nationalism or heroism for a regime which time and history have judged corrupt.

Has the pasha forgotten that he issued an order for the arrest of President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat while he was minister of the interior and that the charge leveled against al-Sadat was the most noble one in history, that is, patriotism? They accused him of taking part in the murder of Amin 'Uthman Pasha, the Wafdist minister of finance, who was proud of saying "The relationship between Egypt and Britain and the 1936 treaty are eternal, like a Catholic marriage." Has the pasha forgotten that he issued orders for the arrest of patriots who were disrupting British security and attacking their camps and that he arrested the leaders of Misr al-Fatat, the Moslem Brothers and other parties?

While we are on this subject, we will ask the committee recording the history of the revolution to publish the documents of the political police reports which the pasha supervised and in accordance with which arrest orders were issued. This is the most eloquent reply to the pasha, who said that he was one of the men who fought the English in the battle of the canal in 1951.

Abrogation of the 1936 treaty, which you are bragging about, and which Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, the man of exalted status, called the treaty of honor and independence but everyone knows was a party maneuver "to embarrass the king" after you had become aware of the isolation of the cabinet--abrogation of the treaty was of no constitutional effect and had no effect in international law, since it was abrogated by one party. To you, the poet's statement applies: al-Farazdaq declared "if he were to be killed four times over that would be better news than great safety, oh you squatting on the throne."

After you abrogated the treaty, the English deployed themselves at the entrances to the canal towns and along the roads to the canal, inspecting cars, obstructing the security of the citizens and setting themselves up as the legitimate authority in the country, killing policemen and free officers in al-Isma'iliyah. You were squatting on the throne of power as the number of people in the occupation forces increased, but you did not adopt a single patriotic measure, although it was in your power, you who claim to be a patriot, to imprison a number of Englishmen in Cairo as hostages. You were worried about the throne of the regime, which had started shaking under you--an issue which had a postscript after the 23 July revolution, when three countries among them Britain, attacked Egypt in the 1956 aggression. Would that the revolution had arrested all the British soldiers and experts at the al-Isma'iliyah base and Tall al-Kabir! Your voice is raised now, but what was your response when King Faruq dismissed your cabinet on 8 October 1944 in his message dismissing the Wafd cabinet, stating the following?

"Since I have been anxious to have a democratic cabinet ruling my country which applies the constitution in letter and spirit, treating Egyptians equally in terms of rights and obligations and providing food and clothing for the people, we have considered it fitting to dismiss you from your position."

Would that you had responded when Ahmad Najib al-Hilali Pasha accused your cabinet of corruption and the following appeared in his speech accepting the formation of the cabinet:

"The regime has come to be hedged about by ill will, the seats of the representatives of the nation have become the object of bargaining and auctioneering, and we

are anxious to revive the codes of justice now that bribery, nepotism and commission-taking have become widespread in all the affairs of the country, among them government positions, which have become an open pasture for relatives and in-laws." What was your reply to that, your excellency the pasha, now that it has been testified to by a witness who was in it?

If you had talked about Egyptian morals and values, that in no way would mean political ignorance, but we do stand up to people who claim to be nationalistic and heroic at the expense of the people, who want to enter politics through the back door, and who feign ignorance of the 30 years of history of the July revolution.

I have been anxious in my article to convey to your ears and to the young people of Egypt some historic facts, among them the name given your last cabinet in the era of party corruption which was formed on 12 January 1950, that of "the government of Wafdist capitulation," when you gave in to all the wishes of the king. Do you remember, your excellency the pasha, King Faruq's decree appointing Mr 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan Pasha minister of state, which was issued on the royal yacht Fakhr al-Bahar in 1948 on the Isle of Capri, when you issued a constitutional ruling that the royal yacht was Egyptian territory?

In spite of that, yours was the cabinet of concessions, and King Faruq gave you a slap when the 27 January 1952 letter of dismissal stated:

"We are most regretful over the disturbances which have befallen the capital, as a result of which there have been losses of life and property. The cabinet's efforts were deficient, as a result of poor Security, and I have therefore considered it fit to excuse you from your position."

In conclusion, I do not claim to possess the expertise and political sagacity that you enjoy, but I can claim that I possess the ability to remove the dust from the legacy of the past and show the truth, and indeed it does not blind one's vision--it blinds the hearts in people's breasts.

/15 Jun 81 p 13/

/Text/ The issue I am raising with the chairman of the Labor Party is that of the pursuit of democracy and its relationship to the sovereignty of the law.

Article 65 of the constitution stipulates that the government is subject to the law. Article 40 of the constitution stipulates that the citizens are equal before the law, and I hope that Mr Ibrahim Shukri will agree with me that the May Revolution which President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat led has implanted the principles of the sovereignty of the law, which has become one of the basic guarantees of the people.

What prompted this subject was the discussion Mr Ibrahim Shukri made in a conference in Cairo when he reviewed the cases being heard by the judiciary, in which come deputy prime ministers were being tried, and also reviewed the withdrawal of

parliamentary immunity from some National Democratic Party members of the People's Assembly on the basis of requests by the socialist public prosecutor and the Office of the Public Prosecutor.

Mr Ibrahim Shukri furnished as proof of that the statement that what had occurred was a manifestation of the deviation of certain executive leaders or People's Assembly members.

Mr Ibrahim Shukri engaged in political activity before and after the July revolution. He read and heard of grave issues infringing on the probity of the regime, such as the case of the black book in the era of the Wafd cabinet and so forth. The agreement between the previous cabinets of the various parties was that they would not take one another to trial; indeed, the oriental secretary of the British Embassy would interrupt to stop his discussions on these subjects in order to protect party members who were cooperating with the English.

I hope that he will agree with me that the issues he has mentioned are the pride of President al-Sadat, who has propounded the sovereignty of the law, which has become a real fact. It is the government which requested the Office of the Public Prosecutor to promote the general cases against a certain minister, and it is the socialist public prosecutor, who had previously been portrayed by the opposition as a device for liquidating opposition views, who presented a demand for the withdrawal of immunity from a National Party People's Assembly member. This shows that when it gives its agreement to the withdrawal of immunity, the National Party parliamentary majority is an enlightened majority far removed from narrow party vision.

I hope to draw Mr Ibrahim Shukri's attention to the fact that reviewing the names of God's servants in a public conference before the judiciary issues its verdict against them is something that conflicts with the principle of the sovereignty of the law.

Since Article 67 of the constitution stipulates that accused persons are innocent until their guilt is proved and that what the chairman of the Labor Party resorted to was an act of political slander, I hope that he will review it, so that we can deeply implant the traditions of a chaste opposition.

We should all place the principle of the sovereignty of the law above party bickerings, and he should take part with us in deepening the democratic experiment. I call upon him to look at the statement by the prophet of God, on whom be God's blessings and mercy, who said "Your people who came before you would leave a nobleman if he stole from their midst but would impose flogging upon a weak person who stole from their midst." Consider, leader of the most intelligent.

In conclusion, I hope that we can all agree that we are going through a splendid democratic experiment, and I hope that we can place the judiciary authorities, in their sanctity, probity and justice, above the party struggle, returning grace to those who possess it. The declaration Mr Ibrahim Shukri made is an honor to President al-Sadat and the National Democratic party.

God is the master of success.

/29 Jun 81 p 4/

/Text/ I have used my political right to reply to some opposition articles, with objectivity and graceful discourse as my goal. I had expected that the reactions in these articles would be at the same level, so that we could thereby firmly implant the style of democratic practice. However, I was amazed when the newspaper AL-SHA'B burst upon us with a personal attack far removed from objectivity. This is what we call political bankruptcy. The article was also unsigned, and this is not a characteristic of literary courage.

It appears that my articles hit the opposition in a vulnerable spot. Their arrows flew wild, they became distressed, they imagined that no one could vie with them in argument, their pens became disturbed, and they abandoned the basic issues and sought refuge in calumny and insolence. Thus the mask was removed: they could not bear dissident opinions, but engaged in intellectual terrorism and brought us back to the era of the blackshirts.

Some people have asserted to me that Dr Hilmi Murad is the person who wrote the article. This does not concern me in any way. I remember that a parliamentary committee was formed following the events of 18-19 January 1977, one of whose members was Dr Hilmi Murad. A government official at that time told him, "I ask you to swear, Dr Hilmi, in trust to the knowledge you possess--is the government's economic policy of guiding consumption in keeping with scientific rules?" The doctor answered him, "It is, but you haven't learned how to play it right."

Therefore I tell Dr Hilmi, "Play with the people, or play with the rope--the mask has fallen off, you have been discovered, and the people have learned of your ability and significance."

The unknown writer of the article said that I had previously attacked Dr Hilmi Murad in an article in the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH. The story of that article is that I conveyed the facts on the expulsion of the minister Dr Hilmi Murad from the cabinet, quoting from an article written by one of the power centers, Mr 'Abd-al-Majid Farid, in the newspaper 23 JULY which is issued in London and financed by Iraq and Libya. Dr Hilmi could not deny these facts and mentioned that the government rewarded me for this article by appointing me head of the Public Transport Authority in Cairo, contrary to the stipulation of the law.

Dr Hilmi Murad reached the position of minister as a result of reports he wrote against his fellow university professors for the power centers. When he tried to engage in the same game against his colleagues in the cabinet, President 'Abd-al-Nasir found him out and dismissed him from the cabinet.

His excellency has penetrating powers. He has been a Nasirite, then a Wafdist, then a socialist in the Labor Party. This is where public opinion wonders about his abilities to shift opposing political beliefs.

If vindictiveness has blinded some people's vision, because they have not been able to endure the truth, I therefore state that Article 28 of the People's

Assembly Law stipulates that members of the People's Assembly may not take government positions unless the appointment is the result of a promotion or transfer from one body to another. Since I had occupied higher management positions in the chairmanship of companies, my appointment to head the Public Transport Authority, which resulted in no change in my salary, was tantamount to a transfer from one position to another.

When I acquired my colleagues' trust as People's Assembly vice chairman, I did not obtain any financial benefits--rather, my income dropped and I refused to take a minister's expense allowance, as stipulated for a People's Assembly vice chairman, because I originally received one from my original position.

As regard the Ward bus case, the purchase contract for this transaction was signed 10 months before I started work in the authority. In spite of that, legal measures were taken to preserve the authority's right to compensation.

The Japanese trams which disturb people living in villas and palaces belong to the people and not to him, and they have been the salvation of Cairo. They are the same model that is running in Alexandria and Heliopolis. The Simaf Company, which is in the public sector, has started manufacturing these trams in Egypt.

The articles by Mr Fayiz Halawah which you referred to and have kept, Mr Doctor, I responded to when they appeared, but my dear friend Mr Anis Mansur, may God be tolerant with him, to whom I delivered the response, promised me he would publish it and I have been waiting for that for 3 years.

I introduced advanced operating methods which solved many problems into the Public Transport Authority in Cairo, and these have been acknowledged by transportation experts in Cairo and World Bank experts. The calumny and slander you have resorted to will never damage me. I have chosen the path of national action and have defined may political approach toward the July and May Revolutions through belief in God and the nation.

You ask where the National Party stands with regard to the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'. My answer to that is, where do you stand with regard to the man in the political street? Some of our political leaders who stayed in their places in Cairo departments for 77 hours collapsed with exhaustion; our political action was faster than all the schemes which had the security and safety in which the people of Cairo are living as their target.

In an article, Dr Hilmi Murad criticizes the budget allocated for Central Security, then, in another article, wonders where Central Security was.

The officers and men in Central Security played a splendid patriotic role. The easiest decision Mr Maj Gen Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il could have made was to shoot. Therefore I remind you of what the newspapers published some days after the events at dusk, and the contents of cables stating that there were 1,000 people killed and wounded as a consequence of the police firing on the masses. Sir, did you want a massacre in Cairo?

The minister of interior directed control operations in Greater Cairo with the highest degree of competence, wisdom and appreciation of responsibility. We do not need advice from coffee-house generals.

We are still hoping that your pens will be cleaned up and you will put your trust in God, change you inflammatory policy lest your hands be burned someday, and look at the constructive role of the opposition in civilized countries. Eternal Egypt is the mother of civilization.

Peace be upon those who follow guidance.

/[illegible] Jul 81 p 4/

/Text/ Can we take up the issue of the Lawyers' Union?

Some people might reply that that is a professional issue concerning a specific group that has interests in common.

Therefore, I can reassure everyone that I will not address myself to the professional angle. The people who run the operation are the masters of their union, and, as the president said, the lawyers must correct their own conditions themselves. I will deal with the issue in general terms, especially since the opposition newspapers have dragged the union into the stock exchange of political auctioneering, while we had preferred that that be left to the people in it. The lawyers have studied constitutional law and political systems and do not need tutelage from certain people whose hearts are filled with rancor, people who have corrupted political life, or people who receive inspiration from outside Egypt, have become implicated and have sold national values at the lowest prices.

Through an investigation into the truth, scientific curriculum and the foundation-laying of the constitution, we find that in Section Three, related to public freedoms, rights and duties, Articles 55 and 56 of the constitution spell out the citizens' rights to form societies or establish trade unions and federations on a democratic basis. The law regulates the contribution of the unions and federations in carrying out social plans and programs.

Since the 1971 constitution was set forth in the context of the current Trade Union (Law 61 for 1968 on the Legal Profession), issued in the era of the Socialist Union and the authoritarian regime, and since it would be useful in laying the foundations for the legislators' ideas on the issue of the unions for me to return to the minutes of the preparatory committee which set out the draft of the constitution (the Committee on the Regime which was convened on 26 June 1971), we can find that the issue of the unions and federations was discussed under the title "mass organizations" and was the sole subject of important discussions.

In the minutes of the 12th committee to set out the draft constitution, the following appeared:

"The Lawyers' Union has not yet aspired to assist people who are unable to solve their problems; this has been left to the government. Moreover, it has not

established a higher institute to train lawyers or follow ways of raising the level of the profession and increasing its effectiveness in serving the people." It was also stated that we must base these organizations on sound democracy and the people's causes of production and service.

Comment

At a time when the resources of this union have increased and are now estimated at millions of pounds, this union has not offered social and economic services to its members, and the thousands of young people who have graduated in law can find no offices that will accept them for training or provide health services.

The union has contributed 1 million pounds to establish the Tradesmen's Bank, and one member of the board was appointed a member of this bank, raising doubts about exploitation of influence. Then the union deposited large amounts of money with the bank in savings bearing interest.

It would have been better had it built office complexes to sell to young lawyers in appropriate instalments, so that they could rise up the ladder of the legal profession in confidence and security. This could realize greater profits for the union than interest from banks.

Where can one find a lawyers' training institute building that is worthy of Egypt?

Where can one find a hospital for lawyers and medical services such as those offered by other unions?

Many facts show that the union's money is not put to use on behalf of the community of lawyers or the people, who contribute more than 30 percent of the union's revenues.

Is the money being set aside to invite a delegation of Arab lawyers to come to Egypt as observers at the trial of Ahmad Nabil al-Hilali, who is accused of being a communist?

Here the question arises: does the Egyptian judiciary need anyone to observe it?

Are there no lawyers in Egypt who can perform this mission without spending and squandering money?

All these questions, and more, are revolving about in the discussions on the budget and rejection of the budget by committees of lawyers in the National Democratic Party who want to discuss democracy inside their unions; it is apparent to them that the union's money has been spent for ends other than those which had been approved or has been spent without cause.

The 1968 Law on the Legal Profession, in Article 165, stipulates four categories of registration fees in the general table, starting with 20 pounds for lawyers in training and rising to 80 pounds for lawyers who have been accepted before the court of cassation. At the latest general assembly, the union raised the

registration fees in the general table, creating new classes according to age. For example, anyone wanting to register in the general table after 60 years of age will have to pay a fee of 1,000 pounds. This means that judges, who have given the best years of their youth to cases, upon being transferred to retirement, when their income dries up and their talents have become mature, will, wanting to continue the practice of law, find it impossible to raise this fee, and this means preventing elderly judges from registering in the general union table. This we call capriciousness in the use of rights. In addition, where will lawyers starting their careers get the money to pay the registration fee of 50 pounds, which used to be 20 pound, while the registration fee in the Physicians' Union is 5 pounds?

The union, or the general assembly, also raised the lawyers' stamp fees from 20 piasters on minor cases to 1 pound. That is, the stamp fee has been turned into an indirect tax. Likewise, other stamp fees have been raised five times over, though the union's budget shows millions in union savings. The union's exploitation of its powers in raising the fees and turning them into disguised taxes is something which requires a review of existing legislation on the tax situation.

Public sector lawyers who have agreed to work in government organizations, whose revenues are limited, do not receive care from their union, and the union does not grant them representation in the delegations traveling on the pilgrimage at the union's expense. Do you suppose they do not meet the conditions for defaming and slandering their country?

The union chief Mr Ahmad al-Khawajah points out that these men once backed him, but now the members of the union board mention them in words which I am embarrassed to utter. Perhaps you have heard them, your excellence the union chief, indeed have read these words in the newspaper AL-SHA'B and in articles by men of the law. I wonder about the application of Article 74 of the law, to the effect that lawyers must not swerve from the requisite respect for judges and their lawyer colleagues.

The newspaper AL-SHA'B refers to them with distasteful words; why doesn't the union congress meet and rise up in defense of these men, to protect their dignity?

Your excellency the union chief, you have formed a committee on freedoms; this is a civilized thing and we are happy with it. What did this committee do when Libya violated the sovereignty of the law and abrogated the legal profession, when human rights and dignity were violated in Iraq and Syria, when men, women and children were killed and flayed without trial? Where was your role in the Arab Lawyers' Federation; was this role restricted just to defiling Egypt and its people? Why have you violated Article Three of the union's bylaws, which regulate the system for summoning the general assembly calling it at night through the trick of presenting an hour for the general assembly to meet but ignoring the lawyers' right to read the publication of the invitation in two morning papers and to have a copy of the announcement tacked on the announcement boards in various grades of lawyers' rooms in the court complex? None of these conditions have been met, and here it is clear to us that the general assembly meeting which Mr Ahmad al-Khawajah headed has lost its legitimacy by failing to fulfil the legal procedures. To that one should add that no general assembly members were sent reports on the budget and budget chapters or statements of revenues, expenditures and projects to study, providing them with the reasons why they were rejected or accepted.

Chaining the doors of the union shut in the face of thousands of lawyers is a serious precedent which has not happened in any era or other professional union.

One matter which one must both laugh and cry over is the fact that the union opens its doors to marxists, Wafdists, people implicated with the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th and other people who are not lawyers, such as Eng Mahmud al-Qadi, then closes them to lawyers in the public sector and the National Party. The Labor Party publication calls the latter's march on their union "a childish attack."

The Labor Party, seeking a stick to lean on, finds a ripe opportunity to enter the stage although it has no business in the matter.

Legal work is a fine art, and lawyers, by the nature of their work, bring forth ideas and arguments on the defense stage. Therefore, we ask why the union's board has eliminated the lawyers' real right to express their opinions, for the weak, feeble reason that the people who stood beyond the doors were not lawyers. The answer to that is, did you read the membership cards? How can one see the invisible? A member of the union stood up and described these colleagues as "riffraff," the loudspeakers were withdrawn from the members of the union council lest they comment on the budget, and the electricity was cut off so that the fans could be shut down and the lights shut off in the face of 2,000 lawyers.

The publications you issue will never form opinions. What will form opinions, rather, is the genuine right of every union member to express his opinion with complete freedom without being exposed to calumny, defamation, expulsion from the union of submission to a union disciplinary committee, as is happening now.

Indeed, the union needs a committee on freedoms, because union freedom and professional freedom are being violated within earshot of public opinion, which looks for shelter to this impregnable fortress.

It may be said that this discussion is an invitation to amend the Law on the Legal Profession. My answer to that is that this is something I have no control over, since it belongs to the legislative power, which is influenced by public opinion, especially since there have been draft amendments of laws on the legal profession in the assembly for more than a year. Whatever the situation may be, all the amendments must reassert democracy and union freedoms and set forth every guarantee to keep them from deviating like this union from their original mission, make them spend union funds for the sake of their members, and have the heads of the branch unions which are elected from the broad base of the lawyers represented on their board.

/20 Jul 81 p 4/

/Text/ The opposition still is the prisoner of the mentality, methods and programs of the prerevolutionary parties. The gap between the opposition and the political, economic and social developments we are experiencing is increasing every day and therefore it contradicts and stumbles in its political practices.

It imagines that we are looking for an advantage when we are performing our role in national action or stand up with an opinion on how to correct the mistakes to which it is falling prey. It measures things by the criteria it knows, which it exercised previously when some people in it resorted to legal or illegal means to achieve personal ends.

The National Democratic Party has thousands of conscious political leaders who are performing a splendid role and participating devoutly in the course of national action in various fields, among the masses, without compensation, because we believe in the statement of almighty glorious God:

"We will not cause a person who has worked well to lose his wages."

It appears that Dr Hilmi Murad, the former minister, who is trying to cast aspersions on me, does not want to abandon Machiavellian thinking.

Therefore I consider it my duty to expose the cheap method to which he resorted in his recent articles, when I was abroad.

He asked whether I had received a ruling from the party to be the party's official spokesman, since I am engaged in writing in MAY, the newspaper of our great party.

He imagined, in ignorance, that that would expose me to problems with the party leaders.

I can assure his excellency that our great party does not impose tutelage in our writers or thinkers. We exercise political dialogue within the party freely and most democratically, but we are not disciples like you. To us, the minority respects the opinion of the majority and commits itself to it. President al-Sadat told us that all National Party members have the same rights and duties as those stipulated for the chairman of the party, as far as political movement among the masses goes.

Here I raise a question: Who asked Dr Murad to give us advice?

His excellency was previously the loyal advisor and counsellor to Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din (Pasha) when he held the position of vice chairman of the New Wafd Party. The party's demise lay in his blessed hands. I hope that the Labor Party, which I sincerely hope will continue and long survive, will not meet the same destiny.

The doctor talked about the first vice chairman and the second vice chairman of the People's Assembly, out of the notion that that would create a rift between me and my colleague Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan.

I challenge the gentleman (who is a man of the law) to tell us where these titles came from and where they can be found in the constitution or the People's Assembly bill.

We, sir, are working through the People's Assembly board commission under the leadership of Dr Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the assembly, with the utmost coordination, in a deep understanding of our constitutional responsibility.

Dr Hilmi Murad meant to say that someone wrote the last article on the Lawyers' Union for me. I do not believe that the gentleman is complaining of a lapse of memory; I argued with him and replied to him in the People's Assembly when I was occupying the position of parliamentary representatives for several cabinets. The gentleman tried to confront Mr Ahmad Shinan, head of the Lawyers' Union, in Cairo and ask him if he was the person who had written the articles for me. The union head gave him a lesson on the limits of polite discourse and differences in age, and I hope that Dr Hilmi Murad has absorbed that lesson.

Is legal culture, which is taste and fine art, prohibited to people who are not in the law?

I have been working in a legislative body for more than 10 years, representing the people. This is through God's grace, which God brings to those whom he wants, for God is the possessor of great grace.

The doctor talked about the National Party's immense activity in Cairo and the political organizations spread about everywhere. He wondered if that was to satisfy the party leaders.

I can tell you frankly that you have brought happiness to my spirit, because I found you following up on our political activity in Cairo, as if you had left the Labor Party and were devoting yourself full time to the National Democratic Party. I have a question here; isn't it my duty sincerely to work for the party to which I have committed myself? Is being sincere a trait that you do not believe in? Sir, we can return to the statement of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace:

"God wishes that if any of you does a deed, he does it proficiently."

The chief of the Lawyers' Union, Mr Ahmad al-Khawajah, held a party to end the day's fast attended by the elite of his supporters in the union building, but refused to invite lawyers who might have opinions at variance with his. The discussion at this Ramadan occasion was not on the virtues of the fast month but on my humble person, though I was absent and could not reply.

Do you not see the statement of almighty God:

"If any of you wished to eat the meat of his dead brother, you would hate him."

It is acceptable when Mr Ibrahim Shukri talks about the Lawyers' Union, though he is an agricultural engineer, because what he says goes with the wind.

However, when Muhammad Rashwan talks, that is to be rejected, because he is not a man of the law; God has his ideas regarding his people.

Mr Khawajah, the union chief, became agitated when he learned about the People's Assembly decree selecting me to be chairman of the fact-finding committee, since I expressed a view on the subject of the Lawyers' Union in the press. He imagined

that it was not permissible for me to assume the chair of this committee, which changed its decree when I was abroad.

I would like to tell the union chief that this committee's activity is political investigation; it is not a judiciary fact-finding committee, because our constitution adheres to the system of separation of powers. I will also direct his attention to the fact that the chairman of the political factfinding committee, which includes two opposition representatives, is the man who organizes its activities but he is not the chief of a court to whom one can reply. In addition, the committee chairman hides no opinions from anyone, and the factfinding committees' reports are subject to oversight by the People's Assembly, the body that makes the decisions and expresses the opinions on the discussion. This is what we call parliamentary democracy.

You spoke about the People's Assembly's right to discuss the subject of the Lawyers' Union, which you called interference in its affairs. I would like to draw your attention to Article Three of the Constitution, which stipulates that sovereignty belongs to the people, who are the source of authority and who alone can exercise this sovereignty.

Isn't it the right of parliament, which is a representative of the people, to conduct surveillance over the Lawyers' Union's funds since they are considered tantamount to public funds by the definition included in Law 35 for 1972 on the protection of public funds?

It may be the Lawyers' Union's right to discuss a national issue in order to realize a public benefit but not a personal goal. However, the union has gone beyond all objective bounds and has formed a political society with a regular opposition slant from some of its members consisting of Wafdists, marxists and some independents. The political symposiums which the Lawyers' Union holds are quoted the same day on Tripoli Radio. Can you imagine that al-Qadhdhafi is concerned about freedom in Egypt, since that is what his people have totally lost, or is he the Rejection Front attorney for the Lawyers' Union?

The union, by its political practices, has been transformed into a front which has assumed the form of an illegal party, thereby violating the Party Law and the National Unity Law--indeed, more than that, the Iraqi and Syrian Ba'th Parties (which do not agree at all) have agreed that the person of Prof Ahmad al-Khawajah should be an Egyptian opposition representative in the office of the Federation of Arab Lawyers.

Doesn't this merit intervention from the People's Assembly in order to examine the facts and present them to the people, who are sovereign and to whom the oversight of execution of the laws has been entrusted? Or would you like to turn the union into a collection of back rooms and secrets the people are not permitted to know about? The union derives its legitimacy from the law issued by the People's Assembly.

At every conference he holds, Mr Ibrahim Shukri refers to what he calls "the vicious attack on the opposition by the ruling party." The followers of the

Labor Party have started mimicing these expressions, but this repetitious drama has failed to stir up the masses, which are known for their awareness. The National Democratic Party does not go near the opposition's conferences, papers or headquarters, so we do not know whether it wants the National Democratic Party to give the Labor Party, for example, morning expenses every day.

I hope that the Labor Party chairman will ask his professor of political action, Prof Ahmad Husayn, whether the Misr al-Fatat Party complained to him about acts of aggression by the Wafd Party, and will also ask him about the Wafdist units that burned down and destroyed such opposition papers as ROSE AL-YUSUF, AKHBAR AL-YAWM, the newspaper AL-SIYASAH and AL-KASHKUL. It is strange that yesterday's enemies should be the friends of today, now that the Labor Party has made an alliance with the Wafdists.

The opposition has an important, vital role to play in the democratic system, but if it exploits democracy improperly the arena will be disrupted and abandoned to political chaos. Here I cite a statement which appeared in a book by Mr Homayun Kabir, former minister of culture in the Indian government, titled "Knowledge, Democracy and Islam":

"On some occasions, the minority arrogrates to itself a monopoly on the wisdom that exists in society. That might be proper for a short period, but history gives no record of a minority governing harmoniously on behalf of society; its justifications are often for special objectives."

In conclusion, I derive inspiration from the call of the prophet of God, may God's prayers and peace be upon him, to guide us along the right path:

"By God, I will protect you from knowledge which is of no benefit, labor which does not uplift and hearts which are not humble."

/27 Jul 81 p 4/

/Text/ Public opinion is one of the basic elements of political science and administration. It has become necessary for legitimate institutions to protect it from destructive elements which twist facts or disrupt social peace.

Parties are national podiums which help fashion public opinion through their press and their conferences. Can we pause before this issue, lest we get drawn into the struggles and negative aspects of the past regarding negative party practices which could destroy rather than think of building, or even lead to alliances with the devil, although we know that glorious almighty God has warned us of that through his statement "The devil has been a clear enemy of man?"

This does not mean that we are telling the opposition what its role is. This is the task of the constitution and the law, and the methods they choose. Rather, we are addressing public opinion and presenting exhortation and advice, guiding ourselves by the words of glorious almighty God:

"Call people wisely and with good exhortation to your lord's path and fight them with superior values." Before I deal with the issue of the opposition front and the conflicting groups within it, I would like to mention the constitutional plebiscite which took place in April 1979 on the peace treaty and the reorganization of the government. It spoke of the need to eliminate party corruption, clean up political life and commit oneself to moral conduct, and mentioned that anyone deviating from the results of this constitutional plebiscite was deviating from the consensus of the nation and the will of the people.

How was the opposition front formed? Who stands behind its formation? What are its goals?

I thought of dealing with this subject when I was visited by the Cairo correspondent for the American magazine TIME. A discussion took place between us on democratic practices in Egypt, which is a new experiment in the Middle East, an area dominated by authoritarian regimes.

I was struck by his emphasis on the subject of the Egyptian opposition front and the groups in it, in addition to the newspapers that appear on the Arab stage and derive pleasure from slandering Egypt; fishing in troubled waters imparts political dimensions to this subject which are at variance with the true state of affairs.

The world is following our pioneering political experiment now that Egypt has adopted a multi-party system, has granted freedom of the press and has abrogated exceptional laws and measures. We believe that the presence of an enlightened national opposition is the true guarantor of political democracy and that the fact that the National Democratic Party holds political power offers a golden opportunity for the opposition to build itself wisely, if it will take the nature of the development of things into account and realize that leaping over fences in haste to arrive at the seats of power will not lengthen people's lives or realize goals, but could cause shock in people's minds.

In the past issues, the newspaper AL-SHA'B published opposition front resolutions without declaring the front's nature and political form. Public opinion may think that the Labor Party holds the reins of this front, but in fact it is no more than a cart drawn by Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, chairman of the Grouping Party.

A correspondent with the Lebanese newspaper AL-SAFIR held an interview with Mr Khlaid Muhyi-al-Din last February in which the latter revealed for the first time that there was coordination between himself and Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, former People's Assembly member, who is trying to form the National Front Party. This interview revealed that Dr Mahmud al-Qadi set forth a draft plan to form an opposition political party in Egypt and that Khalid Muhyi-al-Din welcomed this plan and introduced some modifications into it.

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din declared:

"As a result of contacts and meetings between the Grouping Party and other forces, we feel that the ground has been laid for front activity to create radical changes

in Egypt." He then added, "Nothing that happens in the opposition can happen without the Grouping Party."

We observe that the words Khalid Muhyi-al-Din used, the phrase "front action," is an expression used in communist parties in the Arab nation; we find no equivalent for it in the Egyptian political lexicon.

Why has the Grouping Party welcomed this coalition?

The Grouping Party was formed at the end of 1976 out of organizations on the Egyptian left. It was joined by the first pioneers of the Communist Party in Egypt, Hadetu, which was headed by the Jew Henri Curiel, who was found murdered in Paris last year. The first rift occurred in the party when Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Sami', elected secretary general of the Grouping Party, resigned and revealed the methods the communist members were using to dominate the assets of the party totally. A large number of young party people resigned along with him.

The Nasirites also felt frustrated because they did not acquire a prominent role in the party's political action, especially after the death of Mr Kamal Rif'at.

The security agencies discovered communist cells that had become involved with agents abroad and a large number of Grouping party leaders were removed in Cairo and some governorates and arrested for flagrant violations which were punishable by law.

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din complained to an official about the numerous cases the security agencies had brought, and the resulting arrest of many party leaders by the Office of the Public Prosecutor. When he asked him a question on the extent to which he was convinced that such measures had been taken, and whether the law had been carried out, his answer was "It is unfortunate that all the measures the minister of interior is taking are legal."

From this brief review, we can imagine the state the Grouping Party has reached in throwing confusion into its members, as well as the financial disputes resulting from rumors of the appearance of some deviation in the party and the threats Khalid Muhyi-al-Din resorted to last year of resigning and going into seclusion in Alexandria for a while. This has all caused the Grouping Party leaders to resort to new tactics to make up for the ground the party has lost. It stumbled on a starting point by cooperating with Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, who is good at political maneuvering; he managed to exploit the counsellor Mumtaz Nassar, his colleague in the National Front, to influence Mr Ibrahim Shukri to get the Labor Party to join this so-called front. He succeeded in that, and then it subsequently became easy to get the detachments of the dissolved Wafd Party or certain independents who were looking for leaders to join this front.

The front spread the rumor that some religious forces, including the Moslem Brothers, had joined it. We were fully prepared for this, since the brothers are shrewder than that internally contradictory group. In addition, the publication AL-DA'WAH, in its issue last June, leveled much criticism against Mr Ibrahim Shukri for his visit to Damascus and directed an embarrassing question at him on his

opinion of the massacres to which the Moslem Brothers were exposed in Syria at the hands of Hafiz al-Asad and his myrmidons. He has not yet answered this question.

Coordination between this front and the dissolved Lawyers' Union has been extensive, since some fugitive opposition groups have formed an alliance with rejection forces in the Arab world. This is apparent through the similar tones of resolutions the Egyptian opposition movement has issued and all that is being broadcast from Tripoli, Damascus and Baghdad and published in their newspapers.

Mr Ibrahim Shukri appears to be happy to be heading up this front, although he has not studied the grievous effects to which the Labor Party is exposed, among them the fact that he is monopolizing decision making without getting the agreement of the Labor Party conference to this political procedure. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's presence at recent Labor Party conferences has disclosed the extent of the coordination and cooperation between the Labor Party and the Grouping.

I told the correspondent with the American magazine TIME "This party grouping of opposition members and some independents has revealed the true nature of these parties, which is that the ideologies they adhere to differ; they are friends today, because of their transitory interests, but enemies tomorrow."

The Labor Party has also revealed the true nature of its political weakness; otherwise, why would it have formed a front with the leftist Grouping Party? In addition, the latter, the Grouping Party, which claims to have party bases everywhere, has also revealed the deteriorated nature of the political structure of the party. In addition, the independents who have joined the rear of the caravan have revealed their intellectual incompetence. It is just a matter of gathering up little microphones on behalf of fugitive groups so that voices can be joined and made to appear to be loud, now that they have failed in mass action.

I will deal with one of the resolutions issued by the opposition front's second conference:

"Condemnation of the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' which threaten national unity, over which the opposition front is most concerned."

I find no problem in commenting on this resolution except in referring to the issues of the Arabic newspaper AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that were issued last week, declaring, on the front page, in large type, "Terrible Street War in Britain--London Is at Its Nerves' End--Disturbances in London Assume Racist Form Following Strangling of Pakistani Moslem Woman--500 Dead and Wounded; Arrests in the Thousands--Police Department Wrecked in Burmingham--British Government Tries To Issue Legislation To Facilitate Its Task and Establish Special People's Courts."

On page two of the same paper, issued on 1 July 1981, there is a complete journalistic report under the title:

"Who is the loser in the sectarian events in Cairo?"

The article is full of slander and lies, but we will quote the last paragraph, which states:

"The Egyptian political front of various opposition elements is putting the final touches on the flaming canvas of sectarian struggle." The Arab papers which give prominence to the opposition viewpoint and beat its drums have bluntly accused the opposition of throwing oil on the fire. Here, the question immediately arises: is this your role, and what have you offered, gentlemen, in support of national sovereignty?

It would be better for you to throw your front's resolutions into the wastebasket. You look at the mote in Egypt's eye even though, thank God, nothing like the destructive disturbances that have shaken Britain, which is distinguished by political stability, has happened.

You are great, Egypt, but on your soil you harbor people who are trying to ruin your honor.

Could we call on these fugitives for guidance while we are in the fast month? "God, guide us along the straight path, the path of those on whom you have shown mercy, not those who are the object of wrath or the wayward."

In coming articles I will follow up on the remaining resolutions of the so-called front so we can come up with a reply to the questions I set forth at the beginning of the discussion. My success lies only with God; on him have I relied and to him do I turn in repentance.

/3 Aug 81 p 4/

/Text/ In last week's article, we revealed, through calm, honest analysis, the secrets of the formation of the opposition front, through documents and objective facts, and the manner in which Dr Mahmud al-Qadi managed to ally himself with Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, chairman of the Grouping Party, to form an opposition front to enable the Grouping Party to regain the ground it had lost. After that Dr al-Qadi made another deal, and the Labor Party joined this alliance in exchange for letting Mr Ibrahim Shukri become a leader of this front.

How did the adversaries of yesterday turn into the allies of today? How did the Labor Party become the cart drawn by Khalid Muhyi-al-Din and Dr Mahmud al-Qadi? Here we raise a question, in hopes that Mr Ibrahim Shukri might remember things, rethink the deal that has been made, and review the profit and loss account.

What is Dr Mahmud al-Qadi's opinion on the Labor Party?

In the 28th session, on 31 January 1979, as he was following up on the government's statement, Dr al-Qadi declared the following:

"The Labor Party has been established, you have endorsed it, the president has endorsed it, and you must be satisfied with it, as you are the people who are choosing your supporters and opponents."

Mr Ibrahim Shukri answered him, stating, "One cannot rely on the persons who greeted the establishment of the Labor Party or greeted it--ours is an objective

opposition. As regards the National Party's welcome for the establishment of the Labor Party, we consider that this welcome is an endorsement for us." Dr Mahmud al-Qadi followed this reply by saying "When I hear what you say, I believe you; when I see what you do, I am amazed."

While we are recording the Labor Party's political positions, we find that at the 61st session (the session of 10 April 1979) Mr Ibrahim Shukri, in discussing the peace agreement, recorded the Labor Party's agreement, indeed extreme enthusiasm, by saying the following:

"In the name of the Socialist Labor Party, I declare our approval of the agreement--approval by a person who has made a careful study and become won over, not the approval of a blowhard; the approval of a person who determines what is possible and what must be done in the future; the approval of a person who determines that the coming stages will be much more tortuous than the stages we have gone through. This all requires support, so that we may make this step which has been taken the start of the peace process. We approve of the agreement, but our joy will be consummated when we take over al-'Arish, al-Tur, the passes and all of Sinai. Greetings to the people of Egypt and greetings to the man who made the decision on 6 October and the man who made the peace initiative."

Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, then stood up in the People's Assembly in the 17 January 1980 session, in the discussion on the government's economic and foreign policy, supporting this policy,Praising the Egyptian economy, giving the Labor Party's complete trust to the National Democratic Party government, and praising the democracy and the dialogue which had manifested itself during discussion of the government statement.

Through these numerous stands, we find that Mr Ibrahim Shukri praises the National Democratic Party's greeting, considers that an endorsement of which he should be proud, and supports the peace treaty with all his strength, out of conviction and careful study. Then he most objectively supports the government's policy. Why then did the winds and tempests blow and turn the Socialist Labor Party from a purposeful, objective opposition into one absolutely rejecting everything and bickering? Indeed, it got to the point of alliance with the leftist Grouping Party and fugitive opposition groups which have neither color nor flavor.

Mr Ibrahim Shukri--not, I believe, because of his poor memory--ignores the political principles and positions to which he committed himself as the party's representative before the legislative body and public opinion. He is crying crocodile tears today over the democracy he praised yesterday, which is gaining new ground every day. We have the right to ask why he has turned around like this. Almighty glorious God says "Whoever turns completely around harms God in some way, and God will bless those who are grateful."

The peace treaty which the Labor Party blessed has achieved its objectives and is on the verge of returning all of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, and not just al-'Arish, as Mr Ibrahim Shukri had wished. Egypt remains the political power that is objectively defending the Palestinian cause, rallying world public opinion

against Israel now that the Arab nation has tried the policy of rejection for half a century to no avail.

If we make an anlysis of the state the Socialist Labor Party has come to, we will find that a few members of the Misr al-Fatat Party took over the leadership of the party, considering themselves the owners of its legacy, opinions and all party rights; through this group, the decree was issued appointing Dr Hilmi Murad vice chairman of the party by means other than those stipulated by the rules of the Labor Party's bylaws--nor was the opinion of the parliamentary body, which was composed of 30 People's Assembly members, taken.

This has caused fragmentation within the party. One result of this has been resignation of 13 deputies. Mr Ibrahim Shukri tried to hang his mistakes on the National Democratic Party hanger, saying that these deputies were a burden on the Labor Party, ignoring that they were national leaders who helped establish the Socialist Labor Party, provide it with legitimacy and round out the legal quorum. They even begrudged these men words of loyalty and comradeship! The Labor Party charged that that was a conspiracy we had devised, although the deputies resigned to express their rejection of the party's policies and the abyss matters had reached; they have not presented applications for membership in the National Democratic Party.

The appointment of Dr Hilmi Murad marked the beginning of the coordination between him and Dr Mahmud al-Qadi to link the Labor Party to the detachments of the opposition in Egypt and the rejection forces abroad, in the Arab countries. One sign of this was Ibrahim Shukri's visit to Damascus, which was the subject of condemnation in public opinion, then the flood of interviews the gentleman gave to the press issued in the Arab countries, including the interview which the MANAR PRESSE held with him in Damascus, published by the Lebanese paper AL-SAFIR last May, in which Mr Ibrahim Shukri stressed the relationships of coordination and alliance with the National Progressive Unionist Grouping. What strikes one is the following question the editor posed to Mr Ibrahim Shukri:

"The opposition forces in Egypt consider that it is possible to do away with Camp David and the peace treaty, on condition that that be preceded by the elimination of the regime in Egypt; what is your position on this matter and the way to attain power?"

Mr Ibrahim Shukri, who was minister in this regime 3 years ago and shared in ministerial power and responsibility did not denounce the question, which was full of poison; rather, he gave a devious reply, stating that he would resort to enlightening the Egyptian people, and claimed that his party would put pressure on public opinion so that that could be achieved.

I can reassure Mr Ibrahim Shukri that public opinion in Egypt is too shrewd to accept inspiration or enlightenment from the Baghdad-Damascus network; we are more aware of our interests and higher affairs than the people who rule their people by iron and fire.

After Dr Mahmud al-Qadi had fulfilled his mission in the Labor Party, he infiltrated the Lawyers' Union, used its headquarters and telephones for his activity, and

succeeded in rounding out his schemes to turn the union into a fifth party to the rejection front, although he had lost legitimacy.

Dr al-Qadi lost the position of Alexandria Federation Club chairman then lost his position in the People's Assembly, and yearned for the limelight. That is his right, but we fear that the price once again was the Labor Party. His precious, valuable advice brought about the end of the New Wafd Party; might the result of these political maneuvers be the preparation of the groundwork for the establishment of the National Front Party, which he heads, after the existing opposition parties are struck down?

Mr Ibrahim Shukri enjoys our good will because of his national action, but we are afraid that he will squander this good will in a massacre of untenable claims and that the new alliance will push him into a deep bottomless pit. We hope that the gentleman will review his calculations and seek the advice of sincere persons.

To return to the right party is a virtue, and your friend is the person who is truthful with you, not the person who believes you.

At the end of this instalment of the dialogue, I would like to stress that my goal is not to defame the opposition and its cavalcades but to reveal the errors and contradictions to which they have succumbed, which have been recorded in their statements in the People's Assembly or in the newspapers published on their behalf abroad. The internal crises these parties are passing through in their political identity cannot be remedied at the expense of the National Democratic Party or by accusing it of launching a vicious attack on the opposition or repressing it.

The National Party calls for a strong national opposition that can set Egypt and the Country's higher interests above personal passions and be the axis of competition over the important issues that concern the people, but that will never come about through political maneuvers which time has effaced, alliance with Arab rejection forces or conversion of the opposition into domestic mouthpieces for these forces, or by offering the masses illusions on a big plate and leaving them to drool in a political void in which the opposition is dominant.

On concluding the following sections of the dialogue, we would like to conduct a review within ourselves so that the opposition may rearrange its accounts and review the result of its wanderings, examining the truth so that it may ultimately be judged by the masses, the party with the real interest, so that public opinion will be able clearly to see who has guided the way. Happy holidays.

/10 Aug 81 p 4/

/Text/ The past 2 weeks, I have dealt with the marriage that took place between the leftist Grouping Party and the Socialist Labor Party, "from which there emerged the newborn baby" which has been called "the Egyptian rejection front."

In this article, we will take up a discussion of the subject of the dissolved Wafd Party which is still run and operated by Fu'ad Pasha Siraj-al-Din along with the remnants of the Wafd, using the same old political methods the old parties

engaged in before the July revolution. Political signs do not show that the Pasha has joined a political alliance with the front; he is not pleased with Ibrahim Shukri's leadership of the opposition front, since he considers himself greater than that, and the rivalry between him and its two parties cannot be ignored. The last Wafdist cabinet of 1950, in which the pasha played the role of minister of interior, was called the White Cabinet, and Fu'ad Pasha, the interior minister, called the socialists and leftists "the red gang" and issued orders for the arrest of their leaders.

Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din came to power with the speed of light in 1942, the sixth al-Nahhas cabinet, although he had no good will within the national movement or in the ranks of the Wafd. He managed to get rid of Makram 'Ubayd Pasha, Sa'd Zaghlul's comrade in arms and the minister of finance in the first al-Nahhas cabinet of 1928. The pasha reached the ministry because of the family connections and money he possessed.

Here we will pause to review the pasha's method of governing. Did he believe in freedom of the press, the sanctity of parliamentary experience and respect for the constitution, democracy and opposition rights? Did he protect the domestic economy, national independence, and the nation's repute at home and abroad? Or did he violate all these sacred values in order to satisfy the king and his corrupt retinue and ensure his survival in power?

Modern writers, including Mr Ahmad Baha'-al-Din, in his book "Faruq as King," have written that the last Wafdist cabinet was the cabinet of capitulation to the king, that it carried out his demands, and that the structure of the old Wafd began gradually to deteriorate.

In 1950, Mustafa Bey Mar'i, member of the Senate, presented a request for information on the acquisition by Karim Thabit Pasha, of Lebanese origin, who was press advisor to the king, of 5,000 pounds from the Charity Society, the manipulation of traffic in arms, and the bad ammunition bought for the Egyptian army during the Palestine war. Muhammad Husayn Haykal Pasha was the chairman of the Senate then. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din spoke as a representative of the government, saying "The ministry has investigated the arms deal and the investigation has denied responsibility for anyone who had a hand in this matter." He refused to have the Senate form a fact-finding committee, then warned the Senate chairman that he had observed that the chairman's seat was shaking and defended the conduct of Karim Thabit and the retinue, as a result of which the chairman of the Accounting Bureau resigned in protest against the government's actions. What was the result of this request for information? The government obtained a decree from the king terminating the membership of 19 members of the Senate, including the chairman of the Senate, the man who had presented the request for information, Mustafa Bey Mar'i, Lutfi Pasha al-Sayyid, and others.

When the Wafdist cabinet refused to make some minor financial allocations to support the noble al-Azhar, at a time when it was showering millions of pounds on the palace and the king's retinue, the senior imam and the shaykh of the al-Azhar mosque, His Eminence Shaykh 'Abd-al-Majid Salim, who was unanimously considered to be a man of knowledge, a man of virtue and a sublime scholar, wrote an article titled:

"Stinginess here and profligacy there." What was the Wafd's wisdom in issuing a decree dismissing the shaykh of al-Azhar Mosque without an investigation?

In the pasha's era, a law was issued prohibiting the broadcasting of news on the palace; Mr Muhammad Zaki 'Abd-al-Qadir described this as a blatant violation of the constitution. In addition, a Wafdist deputy presented three drafts of laws which were submitted to parliamentary committees to restrict freedom of the press.

As a result of this corruption and aggression against freedom and the constitution, some members of the opposition, including Hafiz Ramadan Pasha, 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Rafi'i, Shaykh 'Ali 'Abd-al-Raziq, Dassuqi Abazah Pasha, and others, presented the king with a petition stating "We want to tell you frankly, out of concern for respect for God and the nation, that the Wafdist cabinet is satisfying the retinue in order to guarantee that it will stay in power. The belief prevails that the parliamentary system has become mere ink on paper, we are afraid that the country is becoming faced with financial, political and moral corruption, and we sincerely hope that the regime will be cleaned out along with the people who have harmed the country and its reputation, have eliminated Egypt's awe and esteem, have failed to allow its freedom to grow and have destroyed everything beyond the point of destruction. All Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, the minister of the interior, had to do was issue an order prohibiting publication of this petition in the newspapers, confiscate the papers which published it, order the arrest of the people distributing the papers and put them in prison. Fu'ad Pasha Siraj-al-Din described the people who presented this petition as criminals and traitors. The matter reached its climax on January 25, 1952 with the aggression by British occupation forces against the Governorate of al-Isma'iliyah and the Security Department, when the officers and soldiers who died in the battle died; had the Wafdist cabinet had the least sense of self-respect, it would have resigned from its position in order to preserve the dignity of the regime, as Sa'd Zaghlul did when he received a warning from Lord Allenby, the British high commissioner, after the murder of the commanding general and offered the resignation of the cabinet to preserve the dignity of the regime. These are examples of the political practice of the Pasha and his cabinet. There is no enmity between me and the Wafd, and I had no part in political life before the revolution, thank the lord; nor was I "plotting" against the Wafd. The facts that appear in this dialogue have their legitimate sources, including "The History of Egyptian Cabinets" issued by AL-AHRAM's Center of Political and Strategic Studies, the book "Political Movement" by the professor and counsellor Tariq al-Bishri, "The Trial of the Constitution" by Prof Muhammad Zaki 'Abd-al-Qadir, and so forth. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din Pasha's only good attribute was that the unsuccessful Wafd cabinet policy in which corruption and exploitation were rife, in whose era positions were assumed by relatives and in-laws, and the government capitulated to the king and his appetites helped escalate the revolution in public opinion, and this paved the way, although the Pasha did not know it, for the warm popular reception by which the people greeted the July revolution 6 months after the dismissal of the last al-Nahhas cabinet. These examples, which are a few of many, reflect the Pasha's tendency to commit aggression against democracy and the constitution. What inspires amazement is the fact that the Pasha emerged after the 15 May revolution, infiltrated the Lawyers' Union and gave a lecture which he published in a book on democracy, political freedom and the Wafd's patriotic efforts; the Pasha did not neglect to distort every achievement of the July

revolution. We do not know the secret behind the harmony between the Pasha, who stands on the far right and reaction, and the former union chief Ahmad al-Khawajah, the man of extreme socialist ideas, who, had it not been for the July revolution, would not have reached the position of union head. We do not know how this deal was made and what the conditions behind it were, converting the pasha into the first advisor to the dissolved Lawyers' Union, helping to draw up its plans and choosing some of its members--indeed, choosing the names of people to represent Egypt in the Arab Federation of Arab Lawyers. We hope that time will shed light on all these questions! No sooner did the July revolution take place and the Wafd made sure that the king had been expelled than the Pasha hastened, along with the late Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha, to the Revolutionary Command Council to bless and support it, thinking that the revolution had taken place just to expel the king.

The decree on Law 179 for 1952 was issued by the Revolutionary Command Council organizing political parties. These parties were requested to organize their ranks in a manner compatible with the new regime and to remove everyone from their ranks to whom acts of exploitation of influence or illegal gain were attributed by the cabinet or other persons; the Pasha was gladdened by the law and exploited it to purge the Wafd Party of his political adversaries and remain at the pinnacle of the summit himself. However, the July revolution was not so politically stupid as to hand the reins over to everyone who had corrupted life.

The May revolution's role was to deepen political life; the constitution became the legitimate document of the regime, concentration camps were shut down, and the sequestrations were abrogated. The Pasha regained his money and political freedom and hastened to form the New Wafd Party and the Pasha's palace turned into a political club where he exerted temptations of every kind to get members of the People's Assembly to join his ranks, so that he could fill up the quorum for the new party. The members of the parliamentary committee of the New Wafd Party included communists, Moslem Brothers, Nasirists, Wafdists and others, and it was not possible for this internally contradictory group to get along or act in harmony, it exploded from within, and the Pasha gathered up the Wafdist committee and issued a decree dissolving the party because it had not learned the lessons.

Question

What is the opinion of 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan Pasha on the May revolution? He is a man who is capable of speaking and is a prominent figure in the Wafd Party.

At the 19th session in 1977 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan Pasha said the following:

"I declare, in the loudest voice, my full and total support for the president, Mr Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat--full support which will not admit of conditions, restrictions, or reservations, as with every step he is succeeding in implanting the buttresses of democratic freedom. I support him by my sight, my perspicacity, my blood and the blood of my children. We are living in a real, true democratic climate and I am afraid to say that whoever ignores or denies that is blindfolded or has a bandage over his eyes and must take it off so that he can see and find his way."

The May revolution took place in order to correct some of the errors of the July revolution and some of the excesses which occurred as a result of the power centers, but that cannot make us forget the great achievements of the revolution, which succeeded where the Wafd Party and other parties that had exercised control for decades had failed, offering the people nothing but false hope and political anesthesia.

The revolution took place and did away with all that, returning their dignity and their legitimate share of social justice and the national income to the workers and peasants, because they were the party with the real interests. Are you surprised that the Pasha condemns the fact that they have a 50 percent share of the constitutional institutions and is aware of the contradiction and incompatibility in political thinking between himself and this national regime, between himself and the parties of the opposition front, but participates in the context of the political maneuver and the coincidence of tentative interests in order to damage this regime and cooperate with the opposition?

The awareness of the people, the firmness of their domestic front, and their support for their national leadership, the leader of this nation and the commander of its victory, President al-Sadat, are the true guarantee of social peace, national unity and political stability, and we can tell all of these people, "If talk is silver and silence is golden, and you love gold, say what is proper and accept it, and the people will accept it from you."

This article is for the young people of today and I hope tomorrow first of all. Though people who dream of power are smitten with failing memory, history will not forget.

In the coming article we will complete the dialogue, with God's permission.

/17 Aug 81 p 4/

/Text/ In the preceding instalments of this dialogue, we dealt with the way in which the opposition front was formed out of the leftist Grouping Party and the Socialist Labor Party and how it appointed Mr Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, a leader of this front; we have discussed the political movement Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din is making with the other Wafdists and how these parties became internally fragmented, leading to the formation of this unholy alliance.

In this article we will present an example of some fugitive groups on the political scene, including the National Front Party, which has not been able to fulfill the legal bases for its establishment in accordance with the Party Law and whose affairs are in the process of being reviewed by the administrative judiciary.

It is recognized in democratic countries that parties should not be formed in the form of fronts, since parties are groups of members with political ideas that closely coincide in economic and political fields and party programs which they defend through the basic causes to which they have commited themselves. We find the term "front" used only in certain communist countries like Bulgaria. It is to be noted that the people founding this party are persons who faced economic and

political problems in the time of the power centers. After the May Revolution, they came to enjoy economic and political freedom and to desire to liquidate their accounts with the past at the expense of the democracy established by the May Revolution, which returned rights to the people who had lost them, closed the concentration camps, and eliminated press censorship and emergency laws. Political stability and social peace became a fact in Egypt acknowledged by enemies even before friends. Dr Mahmud al-Qadi was a member of the National Assembly in 1957 and beat the father of Maj Kamal-al-Din Husayn, member of the Revolutionary Command Council, in elections in the Binha district with the help of Mr Zakariya Muhyi-al-Din, minister of the interior at that time, in the wake of struggles which had been going on among Revolutionary Command Council members.

As is well known, in 1958 the People's Assembly was an elected assembly from the standpoint of form, but in reality was more or less appointed by the National Federation, which presented delegates to candidacy for membership in the National Assembly. After the dissolution of the assembly in 1958, Mr Kamal-al-Din Husayn, member of the Revolutionary Command Council, managed to take revenge for his father's defeat in the elections and deprive Dr al-Qadi of his political rights and also his university work, and enmity developed between them.

After Dr al-Qadi regained his personal freedom in full, as assured by the May Revolution, and returned to his seat in the People's Assembly in 1971 and in 1976, Kamal-al-Din Husayn became a member of the same assembly. The two fast friends sat next to one another in the seats of the independent opposition and Dr al-Qadi greeted his former adversary with an embrace and supplied him with his precious advice, as a result of which Kamal-al-Din Husayn was removed from the People's Assembly for acting with prejudice against the duties of his position by violating the constitution and the law. Then Dr al-Qadi stood up in the People's Assembly and said "Kamal-al-Din Husayn has committed a grievous egregious error and deserves to be punished, but I hope his parliamentary punishment will be lenient." It was as if he had meant the noble saying of the prophet, which held, "When you slaughter, do it well." Dr al-Qadi bade Kamal-al-Din Husayn farewell as he was leaving the assembly compound, as if to say "I have taken my revenge." After the District of Binha which Kamal-al-Din had been representing became vacant, Dr al-Qadi nominated his brother to run in it, but he received only a few votes.

On 11 November 1976, the elections for the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship of the People's Assembly took place; Eng Sayyid Mar'i presented himself for the chairmanship and Dr Mahmud al-Qadi presented himself as his competitor; presenting himself for the vice chairmanship for the workers' seats was Dr al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Sayyid, and Mr Ahmad Taha, the far leftist, presented himself as a competitor to him. Eng Sayyid Mar'i and Dr al-Sayyid 'Ali al-Sayyid won by an overwhelming majority, while Dr al-Qadi and Mr Ahmad Taha got just 25 votes. This shows the coordination between Dr al-Qadi and Mr Ahmad Taha.

By parliamentary tradition, the members stand to present the office of the chairman with the confidence of the People's Assembly. Dr al-Qadi stood and said "Mr chairman of the People's Assembly, in the context of democracy and freedom I present Eng Sayyid Mar'i with the confidence he has received from the overwhelming

majority that manifested itself in the elections, although I naturally would have liked that that not be your fate." I will let the dear reader of MAY newspaper read between the lines, which reveal that the man was seeking leadership and running after it, albeit by hitting his head against the wall.

At the start of this assembly's activities, President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat declared the abrogation of the authoritarian Socialist Union system and the formation of parties. These were to be the Egypt Party, the Liberal Party and the Grouping Party, which represented the three political tendencies in the world, center, right and left. None of these parties agreed to offer Dr al-Qad a position of leadership and he refused to join them because he was too big for that. He continued as an independent member of the opposition, trying to lead the independents' front in the assembly, though it was fragmented and full of internal rifts because no single political idea bound it together. I will not review Dr al-Qadi's parliamentary style of People's Assembly opposition; I attest that he is a parliamentarian of independent judgment; though I have opposed his method of exercising democracy, this is not the place to discuss it here.

Dr al-Qadi proceeded to form the National Front Party, which remained mere ink on paper and was not based on legitimate status. We find the man acting nowadays as if that is an existing party whose name is linked to the rejection front in the former Lawyers' Union or the groups of fugitives and people implicated abroad. Out of shrewdness, he managed to persuade Counsellor Mumtaz Nassar to be a leader of this party, though it has not yet come into being. It is well known that Counsellor Mumtaz Nassar also has a case against the power centers, which fired him in what was known as the judiciary massacre. The president then issued a republican decree restoring his judiciary chair, although he was above legal age and had been transferred to retirement, because the president's great heart always sets an example of moral values.

We found that Counsellor Mumtaz Nassar, who is new to political activity, boarded the opposition boat. One should bear in mind that the requirements of the present made it mandatory that a gentleman use a judge's conscience in ruling on matters, when supporting or opposing them, and that he not be subject to the influence of people who have the taste for leadership, such as Dr al-Qadi and Dr Hilmi Murad. The gentleman knows that leadership is a matter of national effort which goes on for many years and that suffering, national sacrifices, love given the leader by the people and success from almighty glorious God are all matters which have brought al-Sadat to the heart of the people. Indeed, the heads of states in Europe and America have underlined the lofty nature of al-Sadat's leadership, and the iron lady, the prime minister of Britain, has stated "We hope that we in Europe can have leaders like al-Sadat."

Therefore we find that what is called the National Front Party consists of the person of Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, who moves with the Grouping Party or personalities to whom he is linked by common interests domestically or abroad.

On the political stage we then find personalities who rise to the surface then disappear, having no political weight with the masses, and to claim that they have

committed acts of heroism which time has eliminated. Among them, for example, are the professor and great lawyer Mustafa Bey Mar'i, who is proud to be the author of the famous request for information on ruined weapons in the Senate in 1950; because of this, he was removed from the Senate, along with some other men. However, we must learn the rest of the story, which is that the honorable senator presented the request for information on the first day it was reviewed in the Senate, that the government set the discussion for the request for information on the following day--and that we find that the honorable member was not present at the discussion of the request, left Cairo, and traveled to Alexandria on the excuse that he was on his way to Europe for the summer vacation.

We did not consult the sources we read for an explanation of this faulty parliamentary style, since it is well known that members of parliament are lawyers for the nation in the nation's cases; how can a lawyer abandon a case before the presentation is completed?

On the stage, we find personalities who are still active though the people forgot them, such as Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, who lost the throne of the al-Ahram Organization and claims to be a professor of political strategy and a great political analyst. Here I am referring to his famous articles before the October War on the state of no peace, no war, in which he declared that the Israeli army could not be defeated because our armed forces could not stand up to the Israeli army, which was equipped with the most up to date technology of the age. These articles created frustration with the members of the public; we protested against them but found no echo. However, to the contrary, al-Sadat was smiling with certitude and faith over these articles, because, although Heykal did not know it, they constituted part of the strategic plan of misrepresentation which our armed forces had prepared, while Israeli intelligence imagined that Heykal, who was deeply versed in the essence of things, was writing out of knowledge and understanding. However, the world was taken by surprise with the earthquake that occurred on 6 October 1973 when the banners of victory were raised with the soldiers' cries "God is great," the Bar-Lev Line fell in 6 hours, and Israeli intelligence, and Mr Heykal along with it, were laid bare after our armed forces had achieved a splendid victory by all military criteria and international standards. The man is trying to rise to the surface once again and become a roving writer for some foreign papers or a political advisor to al-Qadhdhafi; we read some articles by him some time ago, published by the Labor Party newspaper; the people turned away from them and the paper stopped publishing them.

To the old-time politicians, we say that Egypt's social map has changed and that the sons of peasants who collected worms on the pashas' farms have become engineers and doctors, and sons of laborers working for a few piasters have become officers and university professors.

We also say to the people who have lost influence and power and used to be appendages of the power centers that the people have come to possess their will and their freedom, and that, as President al-Sadat has said, there is no turning back from democracy.

To people who are scrambling to become leaders or clear up old accounts, we say that opposition is not a matter of contriving illusory positions or creating

fantastic issues or alliances which are in no way linked to the causes and interests of the people. Rather, it is political programs which take up economic and social development, remedy the masses' problems, and set forth solution. It is not through political vindictiveness that Egypt will be built or its resurgence will be brought about. There is no place for promoting goods imported from the rejection states or marxist warehouses, because what benefits the people lies in the ground, while the froth vanishes with disdain.

In the coming article we will finish the dialogue on some fugitive detachments which have sold our honor and our country outside Egypt for the lowest price, and the suspect relationship between these detachments and some opposition parties in the domestic front will be explained through analysis.

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POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS DISCUSSED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2773, 3 Aug 81 pp 23-25

[Article by Majdi Mahanna and Sharif Shukri: "Politics, Yes; Partisanship in Actions of Professional Associations, No; Most Bylaws of Associations Are Unconstitutional"]

[Text] Despite the fact that 70 years have gone by since the first trade union in Egypt was established, the controversy is breaking out now about the purpose of establishing these associations, about their authorities, about when their general assemblies can declare no confidence in their board [of directors] or take away the membership of one of the members.

ROSE AL-YUSUF posed two questions to the associations of lawyers, journalists, agronomists, teachers and physicians. The first question was about the role that each one of them played in political life.

The second was about the line that separates an association member's partisan action from his association actions. What did the results state?

The president of the physicians' association, Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid said that the affiliation of every member of the association with a party is legitimate. "However, an association's affiliation with a party is an undesirable mistake. A professional association must stay away from partisan action. If we were to look at politics in the broad sense, everything that an association does is political: health service is political, and the professional classification and upgrading of the profession is political. But politics in the narrow sense of becoming engaged in partisan bickering is not useful, and it is unsuitable action for a [professional] association.

"The principal purpose behind the actions of [a professional] association is to defend the interests of the members of the profession. But an association that is also part of the national community has national responsibilities. A member of an association must contribute his opinion on national problems because we are not a group of opportunists or a group of mercenaries, and we are to become involved in national action and in national questions whether these have to do with development, with independence, with daily work or with the public's suffering. All this is called national action and not partisan action.

"A professional association that shuns its responsibility is shortchanging the people's rights and the homeland's right, especially since professional associations are the essence of thought in Egypt and cannot be asked to isolate themselves from the country's problems.

"For example, we assumed a position on the problem of normalizing relations with Israel. This is a political question, and we do not find ourselves dissenting from the national consensus. This is because I am looking for what is in the interests of the profession and because I consider the normalization of relations [a measure] that caused me to lose the large Arab support [I had]. This Arab support is [the measure of] my true depth, especially when one finds out that 7,000 Egyptian physicians are working in the Arab countries and another 7,000 are on their way to work there. I cannot sacrifice the interests of the profession and the interests of those in the Arab area in exchange for narrow interests that will be of no good to me.

"Does this mean that I am dissenting from the national consensus? No. I did not interfere in the question of peace. We support peace, and my inquiry here stems from a national and a pan-Arab logic.

"The appeal that is being made to confine the activities of professional associations to the social aspect only signifies that the role of professional associations as a national group first, as a charitable group second and as Egypt's brain power third is being ignored. The sum total of the professional associations is the sum total of Egypt's brain power. How can Egypt's brain power be barred from participating in national action and from outlining the country's policy?

"[Egypt's professional associations are to participate in national action, but in doing so they are to adhere to] a national and a pan-Arab concept of such action and not the narrow partisan concept. They are not to destroy and libel the country's reputation abroad.

"A final point: every association has its bylaws which prescribe certain obligations and responsibilities for that association. The bylaws of the physicians' association expect me to express the opinion of physicians on social, economic and national questions, such as our relationship with Israel and our relationship with the Arab countries and the question of peace. I am also being called upon to defend questions of national independence, social progress and Arab unity in accordance with the bylaws of the association."

Questions and Answers

We took our questions to the writer Tharwat Abazah, member of the journalists' association, and he told us that the association was a group of people of a certain profession [organized] for the purpose of preserving the interests of that profession. He said that interference by such an association in politics was not legitimate. "Therefore, one finds that

associations' bylaws do not interfere in politics in the first place. This is the case not only in Egypt, but it is the case all over the world--the civilized world and not the communist world. This is because there are no professional associations in the communist world, and any such group is killed before it is formed. Professional associations are found in the civilized world."

"What then is the role of a professional association?"

"To preserve the interests of the members of the profession, such as increasing wages, increasing leave hours and reducing work hours.

"If an association departs from this role, it turns into a party. This applies to all associations without exception. Although the largest association which is active in politics is the journalists' association, its bylaws prevent it from being active in politics. Although our work as writers is connected with politics, the bylaws of our Writers' Alliance bar the alliance from involvement in politics."

"How can you be connected with politics and not be active in it?"

"It is true that there is no literary figure who is not connected with politics as an individual, but as a member of an association, no."

"How can that be when an association is a group of individuals?"

"It is true that an association is a group of individuals, but those individuals are many-sided. One is a husband, a son and a politician. When one joins a union, one's function becomes that of protecting the members of one's profession. One states one's political opinion in the political party to which one belongs."

"But the law of professional associations permits those individuals to engage in political action, [does it not]?"

"This is a mistake. Every individual has an opinion which he may hold as long as he wishes. As a member of a professional association that individual should not become engaged in political action, but as a human being he can. Professional associations can express their opinions of some projects from a professional point of view, not from a political point of view."

"Some associations, like the journalists and the bar association, have committees for liberties. What is your concept of the work of these committees?"

"The liberties committees defend an individual's freedom to join any party that a member of an association wishes to join. If a member of an association were to say that he wished to join a particular party, and the association were to stand in his way, the liberties committee would intervene and tell the union that it had no right to do so."

Tharwat Abaazah adds, "There are indisputable national problems, such as the peace process. We in the Writers' Alliance were the first to extend our congratulations for that."

"Is not this considered political interference?"

"This is not political interference because it is a national question. We polled those who were present and it was up to them to decide whether they wished to express support or opposition.

Egypt's Brains

Ahmad Rashid, the secretary general of the Association of Education Professionals which has 400,000 teachers said, "Without the professional associations there would be no political life because professional associations have the elite of the educated people in Egypt. If these associations have no course or opinion in politics, this would mean that we are nullifying 75 percent of society's thoughts.

"The role of the teachers' association in political action is greater than that of any other association because this is the association that raises the generations and shapes the minds of students and young people in the schools and universities. My association action is to co-exist with the state's political life. The association has the right to discuss the problems of daily life, the questions of the public and the questions of peace. This is stipulated in its bylaws.

"What is important is that the associations are not to come under the influence of any parties. Quite the contrary, it is the associations that must influence the parties without confusing the actions of the party with those of the association."

Ahmad Rashid adds, "The appeal to confine the actions of an association to social activities is an appeal for nullifying the thinking minds of Egypt. If those people are not active in politics, who then would be?"

Agricultural Engineer Hasan Salim, secretary general of the association of agronomists told us, "The fact is that the old laws used to bar professional associations from interfering in politics. Then these laws were amended after 1952, and the associations were allowed to interfere in the national policy that the country agreed to produce. The association of agronomists gained prominence in supporting all the national and pan-Arab steps over which there were no disputes."

He added, "An association must not join any party. The association of agronomists in particular, which has about 150,000 engineers, cannot come together on one subject and agree to support one party. But each individual by himself, may privately choose to join any party he wishes to join. But he is prohibited from pursuing his partisan activity at the offices of the association.

"I articulated this trend in the meetings of the bar association and the association of engineers when the Alliance of Egyptian Professional Associations was being formed. [I said] the alliance should stay away from partisan politics and interfere only in the national politics about which the associations agree."

Hasan Salim adds, "I am reminded here of the initiative of the association of agronomists when President al-Sadat asked the professional associations for an opinion and directed to them a specific question: do we keep the platforms or do we turn to parties?

"This opinion was discussed at the board [meeting] of the association, and we concluded that the platforms constituted an unnecessary step and that the parties ought to be established directly. The physicians' association and the bar association shared our opinion."

"But some people are demanding that the activities of an association be confined to serving the members of the association!

"There is no dispute about the fact that when professional associations were first thought of, politics was not being considered. The purpose was to bring together people [who practiced the same] profession and to look after their affairs. After that purpose, I as an Egyptian have to express my opinion on national matters, but not in the context of the group. Otherwise, the association would turn into a party."

Nabil Zahir, an attorney in the Supreme Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Administrative Court stated that the bylaws of each association set several objectives that an association was to implement. The bylaws also set the activities that an association was to pursue. The first lines of the bylaws of every professional association give that association the freedom to take part in political life, to express a theoretical opinion about that political life and to try to serve national questions. An association that has objections about participating in political action is in violation of its own bylaws; it would have departed from what was prescribed for it.

"It is the right of an association--as citizens--to participate in political life. But there is total separation between the actions of an association and partisan activities."

The Opinion of the Law

This was the consensus among the associations about their role in political and partisan life. It remains for us to find out what the bylaws of each association state about the purpose of establishing that association and the authorities of its board.

Among the objectives of the physicians' association are: mobilizing the energies of physicians so they can carry out the mission of medicine and solve the health problems of the people; expressing the opinions of physicians on social, economic and national questions; and strengthening

relations with other countries to solve health problems and to serve the questions of humanity, freedom and peace.

The bylaws of the bar association stipulate that the association seeks to cooperate with similar professional associations and organizations in the Arab countries and in other countries to serve the Arab nation for the purpose of achieving national goals, c ampioning the questions of liberation and world peace and setting down plans for professional and political action to serve justice, production and the problems of application.

The bylaws of the association of agronomists stipulated that the forces of the members of the association were to be mobilized and their efforts organized to serve society, to achieve national goals and the goals of economic development and to form technical committees that would help the political organization (the Socialist Union at that time) solve the problems of application.

It was the opinion of the board of the teachers' association at its first meeting in March 1955 that its uppermost responsibility was to affirm the political freedom and the social freedom of each citizen, to liberate the homeland and the citizens and to affirm the unity of the Arab nation, provided that the National Affairs Committee of the teachers' association prepare research and studies on current national conditions and on Arab and local questions. The Arab Affairs Committee is also authorized to investigate the questions of the Arab homeland and the challenges that are facing it and to devise plans for activities to oppose these challenges.

Withdrawing Confidence

The bylaws of the physicians' association set the procedures for withdrawing confidence from the board in case it violates the bylaws of the association. This may be done by the general assembly after the approval of 150 members.

Confidence is withdrawn from the board of the bar association in accordance with a petition signed by 20 lawyers. An emergency meeting of the general assembly is then convened and attended by half the members whose numbers amount to 20,000 attorneys. An emergency meeting of the general assembly of the association of agronomists is not legal unless at least 500 members of the association attend the meeting.

Perhaps the most serious fact revealed by this investigation is the fact that the bylaws of professional associations are unconstitutional. Most of these bylaws were issued during the period when we had a single political organization, and membership in the Socialist Union was a prerequisite for membership in a professional association. This condition still exists in the bylaws of each association, along with other stipulations and articles that are unconstitutional and require amending.

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NEW HEAD OF BAR ASSOCIATION DISCUSSES ROLE OF ASSOCIATION

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2774, 10 Aug 81 pp 24-26

[Interview with Dr Jamal al-'Atifi, President of the Egyptian Bar Association by Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahab; date and place not specified: "Dr Jamal al-'Atifi, President of the Bar Association"]

[Text] "I will not conduct trials or issue verdicts."
"We welcome opposition but not enmity."
"The association will not turn into a political organization."
"I hope to complete my mission before the end of the set year."

Public opinion has been preoccupied for several weeks with the question of the board [of directors] of the [Egyptian] Bar Association. When the People's Assembly issued its resolution to disband the association's board, everybody asked, "Who will undertake the difficult task of putting the house of the bar association in order?"

The new president is a veteran of professional and political action. He is the author of the Sequestration Elimination Law; he is one of the members of the committee that drafted the constitution; he is the vice president of the People's Assembly; the chairman of the Legislative Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee; a minister of information; a member of UNESCO's "wise men's" committee or the McBride Committee; and president of the Egyptian Society of Economics and Legislation.

The new president of the bar association is Dr Jamal al-'Atifi.

Our interview was about the question of the hour.

The Association and Polarization

[Question] The fact that you were assigned the duties of the president of the bar association was a surprise because quite honestly no one expected that.

[Answer] Let me tell you quite honestly also that my assignment was a surprise to me. In the last 3 years I have been totally devoted to the duties of my profession and have stayed away from the limelight of public life. It did not occur to me that I would be appointed president of the bar association. But when the offer was made, I considered the matter very realistically and thought that the circumstances made this incumbent upon me for [several] reasons.

I am a professional man and a member of the association, and my association is going through a difficult situation. It would be disloyal to abandon it in its critical situation.

It is certain that there is discord inside the association's board. For years, and specifically since the sixties, the bar association has been a center for political activity which prevailed over the purely professional activities [of the association]. Although the form of political life has changed and although the notion of political life itself has changed as well, the association has nevertheless been subjected to partisan polarization. This does not mean that the bar association is not to have a relationship with politics. An attorney, by virtue of his profession and its connections with the values of justice, truth and freedom comes in frequent contact with numerous political problems.

Thirdly, a decision to disband the board of the association has actually been made, and the association has to manage its affairs. An acceptable person must be available to assume the responsibility of steering the course of the association's business, such as accepting attorneys, [managing the problems of] their retirement, their medical treatment, their problems in the public sector, their problems with taxes and training young attorneys and so on.

[Question] But was this decision made in a democratic context that is consistent with the bylaws of associations?

[Answer] I do not want to consider the past, and I cannot discuss the circumstances or determine who was responsible for the deterioration of the situation and forcing it to the brink of a difficult and a bitter decision that is contrary to the original purpose of a democratic professional association that depends on elections.

But we are facing an existing fact, and we all have to do business on its basis since there would have to be someone, in the aftermath of the decision to disband the association's board, to assume the responsibility of managing the association's affairs during this period and to formulate a rational and a balanced view that would ensure the rights of attorneys and preserve the mission of the profession by drafting the new law of legal practice. The appointed board has been assigned this task.

[Question] Does this mean that the former board was remiss or negligent in managing the affairs of the association?

[Answer] I am not in a position to make a judgment on that, and I did not come [to this position] to put the members of former boards on trial. I myself was one of those who took part in the activities of professional associations till 1975. I worked with members of professional associations such as the late Mustafa al-Barad'i and with association president al-Shurbaji, may god grant him a long life, and I benefited from them. I cannot possibly claim that I by myself will come up with solutions for all the problems of attorneys. Any new statute in the association's bylaws regulating the association's activities to ensure that it performs its mission cannot succeed if it has no connection with the opinions and wishes of attorneys.

It cannot succeed if it is merely a theoretical study. I am certain that my task would be easier if I do not overwhelm myself and the new board along with me with the disputes of the past, with partisan or class struggles or with the settlement of association accounts.

As long as I with everyone's consent stay away from any blocs and as long as I am not a member of any one of the parties, I will be qualified to succeed in my mission, to achieve the unity of the association and to steer it on a level course away from partisan polarization.

Opposition and not Enmity

[Question] Do you think that what happened inside the association involves a mere professional dispute?

[Answer] Without entering into the details and the facts that are related to this subject, because I do not have enough tools to make a judgment on the subject, it is certain that the lines that separate national political action or actions that are related to the legal profession and a proscribed partisan solution are not discernible. However, the context of a counter or an opposing opinion may make the opposition appear hostile. We all accept [the principle of] opposition, and we believe in it, but we reject enmity. Let me give you a personal example. When I discussed on the pages of ROSE AL-YUSUF the law regulating the authority of the press, the committee that was formed to draft the law adopted some of the observations and did not adopt others. This discussion did not create a problem. In fact, it did not prevent my selection later as a member of the Supreme Press Council. This is because the objective framework in which an opposing opinion is presented and the fairness with which all points of view are to be presented constitute the method that indicates there is respect for the other opinion and an urgently needed stability in the significance of democracy.

[Question] Speaking of presenting different points of view on a subject, no one forgets the television debates [that were aired] when you assumed the responsibility of the Ministry of Information. Is the establishment of a season of political debates in the bar association on the agenda?

[Answer] This will most certainly not take place because there is a

difference between an information medium and an association. The fundamental purpose of a [professional] association is not politics. [Therefore], discussions within the association must be confined to the association's mission and to its bylaws. Attorneys may have a political opinion on a general subject by virtue of the fact that such an opinion is related to the association's mission, but they are to express that opinion without turning the association into a political organization.

Why? Let me clarify this point. A principal part of the state's mission is to ensure justice. This is done by entrusting attorneys with the mission of defending [people]. Attorneys must have an organization because they work independently. The state relinquished some of its responsibilities and left the task of organizing the profession to an association that would assume that responsibility. Therefore, the role of the association is basically a professional role. But the confusion between the notion of defending truth and freedom and that of political action and the legal profession allows allusions to be made to political aspects on the scientific points in which law and politics are confused.

But the normal place for discussing purely political problems as questions is found in the constitutional organizations, the parliamentary bodies or the [organs of the] political press. Therefore, I will strive to keep the association from being polarized by any of the majority or opposition parties. If there is a difference of opinion on major national questions, such a difference is [to be discussed] with the dignity of an attorney and with objectivity. Arguments are to be compared dispassionately with the truth, without allowing this [exercise] to become a cover for the achievement of political objectives.

I Will Submit a Report

[Question] The law that was enacted by the People's Assembly stipulated that among the duties of the appointed board is the task of drafting a new law for the legal profession. It stipulated that elections are to be held 2 months after the new bill on legal practice is ratified. However, the law did not determine a period of time for that. Does this mean that this can take more than 1 year?

[Answer] I am hoping and trying hard to concentrate my efforts and the efforts of my colleagues to conclude my mission before 1 year is over. I hope to send a letter to the People's Assembly, presenting a report and asking that the matter be deferred to the democratic foundation--the general assembly of the bar association--and that elections be conducted.

[Question] But is it necessary to amend the bylaws of the bar association now? Has this need emerged suddenly after all these years?

[Answer] The state and the professional associations are responsible for the slackness in the task of revising the bylaws of the professional associations and for the fact that the bylaws stayed as they are despite the change in political and constitutional conditions. This is because the

notion of politics has changed from a totalitarian regime to one that is based on multiple parties and opinions. Therefore, the bylaws of professional associations must stipulate that the partisan garb must be shed outside the professional associations and that professional associations remain basically professional. There are now constitutional channels through which opinions can be expressed: there are parties, parliamentary bodies, opposition newspapers and so on. Inasmuch as the political role of these constitutional organizations is strengthened, the political role practiced by the professional associations is diminished.

I would add to this that when I vote for a candidate in a professional association, I vote for him so he can protect my professional rights and not so he can express a political opinion. I have my own private opinion, and as long as I am capable of expressing it in the method, in the form and at the appropriate time through the constitutional and political organizations, the association would not be the suitable place for expressing that opinion.

[Question] It's been said that the government has assumed this position on the association's board because of the board's opposition to the government on political questions.

[Answer] First, what is the significance of the government assuming a position on the board of an association because of its opposition? Is this basically the board of a political organization? However, let me give you an example of a serious, objective discussion that would be appropriate for scientific associations and agencies. I have been the president of the Egyptian Society of Economics and Legislation. The board of directors includes colleagues and illustrious professors from various schools of thought and disciplines. We have with us Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah, Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad, Dr Rif'at al-Mahjub, Dr Zaki Shaf'i, Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id and Dr Ahmad al-Ghandur. The society holds an annual convention for Egyptian economists, and during the convention sharp criticism--in fact, the sharpest kinds of criticism--of some of the economic policies is made and no objections are raised by anyone.

Why? Because the criticism is directed in its place, in a scientific society. Not only that, but the speaker or the scholar presents his ideas as an economist and, regardless of his methodology, speaks in a scientific style, not in his capacity as a proponent of a political position that he wishes to force on the discussion, even though he has a right to his political differences. Therefore, this convention does not issue resolutions or recommendations, but it is satisfied with a discussion of the disciplines that come up for discussion.

[Question] Dr Jamal al-'Atifi, do you have anything else to say?

[Answer] The responsibility of an association in these circumstances surging with sentiments and a breach of confidence is critical. I need sincere, objective opinions during that period. In order for this task to achieve success, I must draw a line separating the successive developments that preceded this period from the construction of a future acceptable to attorneys and favorable to their guiding mission.

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SECTARIAN UNREST ANALYZED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2777, 31 Aug 81 pp 4-5

[Article by Salah Hafiz: "Analyzing the Civil Strife"]

[Text] I do not know what President al-Sadat will say in the analysis he is prepating about the incidents of sectarian sedition in Egypt in recent years, but the most that I am hoping for is that the document will be a political analysis, that it will be comprehensive and complete, discussing the reasons for the civil strife and probing [this phenomenon] quite apart from its symptoms.

The required analysis must deal with the phenomenon of sectarian unrest in Egypt and not merely with this or the other incident.

Fortunately, such an analysis is not difficult. The phenomenon is new and sudden. Similarly, the reasons for it must be new and sudden. We wil not have to dig into ancient history to look for its roots.

The July Revolution inherited a society whose slogan was "Religion is for God and the homeland is for everybody." It inherited a society that allowed the shaykh of al-Azhar to speak from the pulpit of a church and the patriarch to speak from the al-Azhar Mosque. Both spoke against the real enemy of the Egyptian nation: colonialism.

But what was handed to us by the July Revolution was a society of a different kind: a society that puts people on trial if they stir up one class against another, but does not put them on trial if they stir up one religion against the other.

Let us take, for example, the incident of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' or the incidents before it or those that followed it. The principal perpetrator in all these incidents were those elements that have been goading the two [religious] elements in the nation against each other daily and continuously. They are the ones who are plowing the soil and preparing it for sedition; they are the ones who have been dousing the area with oil regularly and precisely so that every passing spark would turn into a destructive conflagration.

There are organizations among the ranks of Muslims whose function is to make the Muslims believe that the question for Egypt is the presence of Copts in the country. And there are organizations among the Copts whose function is to make them believe that Jesus Christ will not be satisfied unless they rule Egypt. In all these Muslim and Christian organizations there are intelligence elements from all the foreign countries. Religious organizations are the best tool in the world for gathering news and secrets because their members belong to all classes of society and all agencies of the state. They are also easier to lead and more effective when circumstances call for upsetting the authority in any country.

Among the advantages of religious organizations also is the fact that loyalty to these organizations is considered loyalty to God Almighty. And loyalty to God supersedes any other loyalty, whether it be to the homeland, the government, the regime or society. Religious organizations are then an ideal tool for conspiring with a clear conscience, for destruction [committed] for the purpose of higher principles and for practicing falsehood and terror as long as the objective is upholding the word of God.

The state is quite familiar with the history of these organizations, with the features of their thought and with the record of their actions. The state also knows the kind of publicity these organizations are spreading among the people. They do not spread their publicity in secret papers; they do so in periodical newspapers that appear regularly and are sold all over the country.

The only concern of one of these newspapers is to charge the state with apostasy because it considers the Copts citizens when it should be considering them non-Muslim subjects and collecting from them a capital tax. The state should not accept their testimony in court. The other newspaper does not describe the Copts as non-Muslim subjects or Christians. It refers to them as crusaders so as to make the people of Egypt believe that the Crusades have not yet come to an end and so as to make Muslims believe that all the Copts in Egypt are part of the army of the late Richard the Lion-Hearted, an army which he forgot in the land of Muslims after his departure from it. This newspaper does not consider the Copts proprietors of this land with us and soldiers who [fought and] died for it when they fought against the crusaders themselves. The newspaper does not [recall] that one of the first persons who lost his life in the battle of crossing the canal in October was a Copt.

This organized goading of Muslims' emotions against Christians and of Christians' emotions against Muslims is what I expect the state to look at in the aftermath of the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'. I expect the state not to be satisfied with arresting the limited agents of sedition and putting them on trial, leaving the soil plowed and the climate prepared for scores of civil strife incidents that could erupt at any moment anywhere.

In the past the function of the regime--the government, the writers, the artists, the organizations and the leaders--was to awaken our minds--we, the humble people--to the challenges that we were facing as a nation. These

people would interpret for us the science, the art and the literature of Europe which was more advanced that we were. They used to prod us against the British occupation which was humiliating us, and they used to teach us that our enemy was the foreigner and that our weapon against that enemy was to unite against him, Muslims and Christians.

But our regime is now providing an opportunity for the new generation to learn new and different concepts. The new generation is being told that science is incapable of understanding life; that all its conclusions are suspect; that the question of our society is not to catch up with the advanced world and not prosperity for the deprived millions, but rather that of forcing women to wear the veil and modest clothing, building a mosque opposite every church and paying attention to the battle that is still being fought between Muslims and Christians ever since the Arabs conquered the Roman Empire.

Those who were teaching our generation were teaching us to confront the challenges of our age and to devote ourselves to the questions of our future.

But those who are teaching the present generation are teaching them to settle battles that ended scores of centuries ago. They are leading them to believe that the question of their lives is not that of catching up with the space age and the atomic age, but rather that of going back to the past and settling the score of the Crusades.

I hope that the analysis will turn to that [point], and that it will not be satisfied with looking for "guilty parties" who will be [merely] lumped together on a criminal record.

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ARMY CLAIMED TO BE ENDOWED WITH 'SELF-REFINING SYSTEM'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 1 Aug 81 pp 1, 10

[Text] The eventful days of the past week witnessed the formation of a total conspiracy against the armed forces of the Islamic Republic. If there is not an awareness of the Muslim nation, the days to come will surely be a witness to the completion of this conspiracy. Today, the Islamic army is faced from all directions with high and low tides of intrigue. Intrigues, whose designer is, in short, worldwide oppression, and whose aim is nothing but to separate the army from the people and to belittle the Islamic Republic's armed forces in the international arena.

The review and analysis of last week's events indicate that certain elements have openly begun to move towards disgracing the armed forces and discrediting it amongst the people (all this in the midst of a destiny-making war).

If an Argentinian aircraft carrying cargo for Iran from Iceland is destroyed in Soviet skies and then through international satanic propaganda networks it is said that the aircraft's cargo was weapons, more so Israeli arms purchased under secret agreement from the occupying regime of Jerusalem, the intention is to prevent Iranian warriors through propaganda bombardment from entering into combat with Israel in the near future.

When it is said that the aircraft's consignment was weapons, the fate of that aircraft becomes tied to the armed forces of the Islamic Republic. And when it is stated that those weapons were purchased from Israel, through a secret contract, inevitably, doubt is introduced as to whether the Iranian military has had secret negotiations with the Zionists. As a result, the blare of Zionist propaganda has been set in motion in order to create pessimism amongst the Muslim masses towards the credibility of the Islamic Republic's warriors in the war against the occupiers of Palestine.

When Bani-Sadr, along with Rajavi and the Shah's pilot, escaped with a military plane from a military base to France to join Bakhtiar, his main purpose, before anything else, was to belittle the armed forces of the Islamic Republic.

Because, considering his close collaboration with the Democratic Party and the hypocrites, he could have easily escaped from the Kurdish border without impersonating a woman and employing James Bond tactics. In that case, he would not have lost his mustache either. But do you know why he selected this dangerous route? His goal

was to discredit the defenders of this country's bounderies. Maybe he wanted to avenge the communiques that were issued [by the army] in support of the Islamic Republic and Constitution at the time of his dismissal as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces. By his escape, Bani-Sadr tried to create a gap between the people and the armed forces, while he was fully aware that such a gap would have led to the destruction of the armed forces. Of course, such an action by him was predictable. From the very beginning, he regarded the army as a mount that would carry him into the realm of absolute power. When following the events of March 5th and the scandal regarding his personal guards, he misused his position to force the Joint Staff of the Army to change the name of the guards to "Protection Unit" and have it [operate] under him, many of our military brothers became aware of Bani-Sadr's vay of thinking about them.

The communique, the issuance of which Bani-Sadr imposed on the Joint Staff of the Army, did not deny the barbarism exercised by the presidential guard but only connected the guard (and its savage behavior) to the armed forces. By this action, which received strong opposition from the armed forces--because the comminique of the armed forces was published a week after the issue of the guard had been raised--, in order to advance his selfish political aims, Bani-Sadr used the honor of the soldiers (who, during the reign of the Shah, despite severe threats, had escaped from their barracks, suffered casualties in the name of Islam, were martyred and created epics that earned them honor among the nation,) and by exerting pressure on the army, forced it to say: "Compatriots, it was we who suppressed you on March 5th." This was contrary to the truth, for in reality, during those days the armed forces became a miserable victim of Bani-Sadr.

Bani-Sadr was a follower of the leaders of the school of thought who are of the opinion that "as long as my bowl is not full, no one else's should be full!" As long as he could use the armed forces as a stepping stone towards his own advancement, the soldiers at the front were regarded as devoted warriors; but after those same warriors rejected him, mythical events like that of Shireedi were considered to be obsolete.

As long as he was hopeful to use the army as a means to achieve his goals, he called himself the only defender of the army. Now that he is no longer in power and has been discharged, he is belittling the same army not only in Iran, but throughout the world also.

The whole world now knows the story of Bani-Sadr's trip to Israel and about the excellent relationship of his protege Nowbari and other colleagues with Israel. While pretending to have influence within the Iranian Armed Forces on the threshold of the Gods [Jerusalem] Day, and in tune with the Zionist networks of international propaganda, he is trying to metamorphose the anti-Zionist goals of the armed forces. These efforts are taking place at a time when his claims of enjoying the support of the Iranian Army is refuted by anyone who has even little knowledge of political affairs.

Bani-Sadr's escape to France is sufficient reason to prove that he does not have influence among the armed forces except for a few isolated and unorganized groups. For, he knows that after his escape, those who are found to have any sympathy with him will be purged from the army. If Bani-Sadr had had so much influence within the army that he could have done more than steal a plane, he would have reserved his capabilities for a bigger accomplishment.

Today, it is probably proper to call Bani-Sadr the deposed Abol-Hasan in analogy with the buried Mohammad Reza [the Shah]. For truly, the two have had a similar destiny. They not only shared their mutual fate in having had an inflated ego but also in their statements and behaviors.

If Bani-Sadr says he has gone to France to intensify the struggle, Mohammad Reza was also saying that he was taking a vacation to recuperate. If Bani-Sadr says that only 3 million participated in the elections [of the presidency], the Shah's regime used to say "it's only a tape!" And if Bani-Sadr, after the devastating elections of July 24th, escaped from Iran, Mohammad Reza fled the country after the Hoseyni 'Ashura. And if Bani-Sadr claims today that he has influence in the army, Mohammad Reza claimed the same thing yesterday.

Bani-Sadr and other Bani-Sadrs can say whatever they like, let them do that. Before God, and for this nation, the martyrdom of Shahrawfars is sufficient to make the army proud and to strengthen the trust of the people in it. The Shirudis, Lashkaris, Adabians and thousands of other warriors who have sacrificed their lives for the protection of the Islamic fatherland's borders, testify every day and every moment, that this army is fighting sincerely for Islam, and that their testimony is sufficient. Today, the army of the Islamic Republic has reached a self-refining stage which is the highest level of growth for any organ. Today, any decay whice might develop within the armed forces will be eliminated automatically from within, before any outside reaction can take place against it.

Last year, on these days the Nowzhel coup was neutralized from within before being coped with from outside. And this year, after Bani-Sadr's flight and before anyone's demand from outside, for the purge of the military personnel responsible for the flight, the Muslim officers themselves have been exerting pressure on the authorities to achieve this purpose. These two examples are indicative of the existence of a self-refining system in the army.

As long as this system exists, it will fight the waves which lend to create a division between the people and the army, and while this system prevails, people will have peace of mind.

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POLICY BEING DISCUSSED TO COORDINATE FOREIGN TRADE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 9 Sep 81 p 6

[Text] Since the bill to nationalize foreign trade, which is being studied in the trade committee of Parliament, has been presented to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, it is expected that, after amendments and ratification in that committee, the bill will be addressed in the general session of Parliament for ratification.

To nationalize the present system of foreign trade requires a gradual transitional period. What follows is an investigation and critique of how the foreign trade policy is being devised in the Ministry of Commerce and offers some of the objections to it as well as solutions for the establishment of a system which will be capable, in the transitional period, of providing the necessary grounds for the precise specification of the items and the implementation of the stages of Principle 44 of the Constitution.

The statistical data on national imports and exports show that in 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81], the nation imported 11.01 tons of goods at a cost of 823.7 billion rials. On the other hand, national exports, other than oil, in that same year amounted to 299,300 tons valued at 51.1 billion rials.

National monetary payments for the imports amounted to 1,424,275.8 billion rials during that year, which is 67.7 percent of the total monetary payments. The ratio was 54.2 percent in 1358 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 80], 40.7 percent in 1357 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79], and 55 percent in 1356 [21 Mar 77-20 Mar 78].

The monetary difference between national imports and exports is made up through the sale of oil. Everyone agrees that this is capital which belongs to the future generations and must be used for economic

growth and national self-sufficiency. Our country must gradually cut out its reliance on the exportation of its oil to provide for its monetary needs and, in essence, free itself of a single-item production economy, which is the result of the policies of large colonialist countries. This very issue shows clearly the importance of foreign trade and its effect on the national economy.

Even though devising a foreign trade policy requires an organized, detailed plan which will directly affect the politics, economy, and even the culture of the society, unfortunately, no such plan existed before the victory of the revolution. And afterwards, it has not gone beyond the efforts of a few caring people who had faith in the revolution. Hence, the foreign trade policy has been incoherent and no acceptable system has been found to control it.

The causes of this confusion should be studied at another time. But, in short, this situation is due to such things as the general national problem in the course of the past three years, the lack of a general direction for foreign trade, the lack of a minister after the fall of the transitional government, and the power struggle within the Ministry.

It must be noted that Martyr Javad Asadollahzadeh, after taking charge as deputy minister of foreign trade, and with the effective help of the commerce minister of the time, made much effort to take the necessary preliminary steps to organize and plan for foreign trade. His untimely martyrdom put a stop to his efforts.

Basically, the implementation of a foreign trade policy is, on the whole, designed to achieve the following goals:

1. To support domestic industry

2. To balance supply and demand

3. To provide government revenues

4. To control monetary flow

5. To provide guidance and control social consumption

But, what is the ultimate goal of economic planning? In the introduction to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic we read:

"In strenghthening the economic foundations, the basic principle is to respond to the needs

"of human beings in the course of growth and development and not as in other

"economic systems, the concentration and accumulation of wealth and profiteering."

Therefore, in the Islamic Republic, the essential objective of all these plans is to bring about the growth and development of human beings and to prevent the accumulation of wealth and building treasures. But, unfortunately, thusfar, foreign trade has been an instrument in the service of and protecting large capitalists, merchants, and plunderers.

The lack of a plan appropriate to the economic peculiarities of the country and its non-conformity with the basic needs of the society--with the importation of many unnecessary consumer goods--has accustomed the socio-cultural structure of the society to foreign cultures and destroyed the spirit of creativity, construction, and innovation. Also, that group of investors, importers, and wholesale merchants who have made abundant profits from the import of foreign goods act as domestic supporters of those countries and are used, when necessary, as a base to assert those countries' influence.

In any event, planning a national foreign trade policy with overall consideration for the general conditions of domestic industries and agriculture and the execution of proper short and long term programs is a very sensitive and delicate task which can gradually put a stop to the economic influence of foreigners and bring about economic self-sufficiency and independence, which are requirements for true national independence.

(Chart No 1 shows the make-up of goods imported from 1356-1359 [21 Mar 77-20 Mar 81])

Since the national foreign trade policy is recorded in the form of a book of import and export regulations every year, first, we will take a look, in passing, at how it is devised and then offer certain suggestions to improve it.

1. Devising General Import and Export Regulations

Devising general import and export regulations which are the result of the overall national trade policy is the most detailed, the most sensitive, and the most basic stage in the implementation of the foreign trade policy.

Authorized imports and exports are distinguished from unauthorized and prohibited imports and exports according to these regulations and the necessary restrictions are established. These regulations make clear to what extent the government will transfer its monopoly rights over imports and exports to merchants (before foreign trade is completely nationalized), to what extent it will have direct control, to what extent the customs revenues or consumer interest will be taken

into consideration, what economic region or country will be restricted, the import or export of which items will be encouraged, what monetary controls are to be used, and, basically, what economic direction is intended for the country.

Devising such detailed and vital regulations requires strong, coordinated planning in cooperation with other related organizations. It requires an experienced, alert, and active team. Making decisions in this regard is impossible without the availability of sufficient and reliable statistics and data.

Unfortunately, these statistics and data are not available to the Ministry of Commerce, which determines the general national trade policy. In carrying out its policy of supporting domestic factories and producers, this Ministry lacks the precise understanding of the number and kind of products and the level of production and consumption in the country. Traditional productions have not been identified and no adequate precepts dominate the devising of regulations.

Presently, before the end of each year, the book of regulations on imports and exports is devised on the basis of abacus-styled calculations, which rely on individual judgments. After its publication, three offices for the execution of these regulations (1. Non-Metal Goods, 2. Machinery and Metal Products, 3. Vehicles and Electrical Equipment), using standards prepared on the basis of who-knows-what documents and data, began to issue permits for the ordering and delivery of goods. Since these standards are not prepared on the basis of sound, acceptable data and statistics, they often do not have the intended effect on the society. At the same time, the many ambiguities in devising them which exist and their lack of centralization in an identifiable place have left room for misuse. The following examples are mentioned here as samples and it must be noted that these cases are numerous.

Below, in Tariff 84/52 of the booklet of standards for the import of calculators, we read that 30,000 desk calculators and 40,000 accountants' calculators are authorized for importation. How these figures were obtained or on what basis they were determined is not clear to anyone. And basically, it is unclear how the level of shortages or national consumption were derived to determine the above figures, since there is no record anywhere. Furthermore, transferring the permits for their import to individuals raises many questions.

Also, the book of standards of the Ministry of Industries and Mines, which is available at the Ministry of Commerce, mentions under many tariff regulations that permits for the import of items should be issued on the basis of domestic production, or after a shortage is felt in the marketplace, or at the level necessary to supply production units, etc.

Obviously, determining the consumption and shortage situation in the marketplace and providing for production needs require detailed study and records, which can only be accomplished by a group of experts and an organized institution.

In short, the present situation of devising regulations is as follows:

In devising import and export regulations, no basic standards exist which are appropriate to the economic situation of the country. For this reason, the executive organizations, including the centers for the provision and distribution of goods and the Iranian Customs Office, are faced with many difficulties.

During the present transitional stage of nationalizing foreign trade, basic changes must be made in the method of devising regulations.

Also, the lack of coordination between organizations which are in some way involved in foreign trade and contradictory decisions are among the factors which slow down the task and add to the bewilderment of the people.

2. Suggestions:

2.1. Preparation of Data and Statistics

As was mentioned earlier, planning the national foreign trade policy is impossible without the availability of precise, reliable statistics and data. The Ministry of Commerce and, in fact, all the related organizations are weak in this regard and lack an organized system for collecting statistics and data. Hence, this is a first step in establishing such a system. Of course, numerous organizations collect such statistics and data, to fulfill their own needs. But these efforts are scattered and uncoordinated. These activities must be coordinated and centralized within the Ministry of Commerce to be studied, analyzed, and compiled for later use.

2.2. Providing Identification Cards for Import Goods: Determining the import policy of every item requires much information. After it is collected, it should be recorded on a card called an "Identification Card for Import Goods," in accordance with the sample below. These cards would contain the following information:

Name of item

The customs tariff on the item

The level of domestic production of the item within the past few years

The level of customs tax on the item and the conditions on its entry (authorized, conditional, prohibited)

The level of national consumption of the item

The classification of the item (investment, intermediary, consumer)

The classification of the item's consumers (government sector, private sector)

The distribution system (governmental, cooperative, private)

Statistical data on imports of the item during that year

And so on.

(Attachment No 1 shows the form of the identification card for the import item)

The following ministries and organizations can be of valuable assistance in providing the identification cards for imported items:

The Ministry of Industries and Mines

Iranian customs

The Central Bank

The Organization of Iranian Light Industries

The Ministry of Agriculture

Production units

The Chamber of Commerce, Industries, and Mines

Other organizations

2.3. Creating a Coordination Center

In order to coordinate a single policy among all the organizations related to foreign trade, including the production and distribution centers, customs, the Ministry of Industries and Mines, and the Central Bank, the establishment of a coordination center in the division of the Office of the Deputy for Foreign Trade is essential.

Presently, because of the lack of coordination resulting in the issuance of varied instructions and policies among the different units, there is, in practice, a kind of dualism and at times, overlaps in the decisions and the execution of affairs, which, in

addition to wasting time and creating conflicts, have caused items be held up in customs.

The Iranian Customs Office, which is responsible for carrying out the policies devised by the Ministry of Commerce, functions under the supervision of hte Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, perhaps because of the revenues obtained from customs duties and taxes. However, on the whole, because of its close relations with the Ministry of Commerce, the kind of work and quality of its management affiliated with this Ministry, it should, as a matter of course, come under the domain of the Ministry of Commerce.

The Iranian Customs Office, with close to 5,000 employees, of whom more than 50 percent belong to the technical (customs) cadre, is a great human resource. The faithful and responsible individuals of this group can be used to make up the shortages in other cadres, especially in production and distribution centers, which suffer from shortages of competent experts. These employees, who have thusfar been carrying out the trade policies of the Ministry of Commerce, are familiar, more than others, with the work and the decisions of this Ministry. Presently, this Ministry seeks help from the customs experts in preparing and devising regulations on exports and imports. The transfer of the Iranian Customs Office to the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce can, under present conditions, eliminate the deficiencies resulting from the misinformed decisions and will, at the same time, provide a competent and expert cadre.

2.5. The Formation of the Commission to Study the Export and Import Regulations

The export and import regulations of the country may, due to various political, social, and economic problems, require changes, reforms, or the preparation of new regulations in the course of the year. Failure to give timely attention to them could cause great material and spiritual damages. Therefore, there is a need to form a commission to continually study the economic changes in the society and devise appropriate regulations.

It should be mentioned that, at the present time, such a commission is unofficially and partially at work within the division of the Office of the Deputy for Foreign Trade. This commission, which was formed in accordance with the instructions of Martyr Asadollahzadeh, the deputy minister for foreign trade at the time, was able, from the beginning of its formation, to take significant steps, including the ratification of bills 19220, 12702, and 19568. With the implementation of the above ratifications, the situation of many of the items left in the customs of the country was made clear. They were either covered by the just distribution of goods or, in accordance with needs, were placed at the disposal of revolutionary institutions for cultural and educational purposes. But, since this commission has

threatened the illegitimate interests of many individuals making windfall profits due to the lack of revolutionary standards or those base people from inside the Ministry who, in their own self-interest, were taking advantage of the ambiguities and shortcomings, gradually the grounds were laid for the destruction of this commission. Finally, with the martyrdom of the late Asadollahzadeh, the work of the commission was stopped altogether. Supporting and strengthening the above commission, completing its membership, and providing the necessary means for it to carry out its work, as well as writing a charter for it, and making it official, can eliminate many of the difficulties with which foreign trade and the release of items are confronted.

9593
CSO: 4640/96

IRAN

DETAILS OF PLAN FOR NEW TAX STRUCTURE ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 81 p 10

[Excerpts] With the ratification of the general national budget, public opinion, especially that of economists, has focused on the ultimate issue of the country's sources of revenue. Given the vital importance of this issue, PARS NEWS AGENCY directs the attention of the people to it through a report.

Obviously, the government needs revenues in order to provide for the needs of the people, to render services, and to engage in essential investments in the country. And, naturally, these revenues must come from some source. In various countries worldwide, taxes are considered a major source of government revenues. Of course, the comparative importance of this source depends upon the activities of the private sector and governmental supervision over it. In our country, due to the nature of the former dependent regime, despite the prosperous activity of the private sector, the amount of taxes collected was, on the whole, small; in addition, it came from the indirect taxation of low income people, although the largest part of government revenues was provided from the sale of oil, which is one of the country's most important capital resources.

Concerning the governmental increase in tax revenues, PARS NEWS AGENCY held an interview with Engineer Ezzatollah Sahabi, head of the Budget Commission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and Mohammad Qasem Mohammadian, tax deputy for the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, which follows.

Engineer Sahabi pointed out the role of taxation in the national economy and said that a sound tax policy can provide for the expenses of the government. Also, we can benefit from taxation by either balancing incomes and providing encouragement, or by freezing incomes and activity. He added: I believe that the oil revenues must only be used for fixed, essential investments. Therefore, most of the current expenses must be provided for from taxation.

Sahabi added: The pre-revolutionary governments of Iran, due both to domestic policy and the desire to carry out foreign colonialist programs to continue dependency, first began the uncontrolled expansion of government organizations and second, in order to quiet the protesters, were forced to pay subsidies on goods and render numerous services without taking needed steps. Also, these governments established commercial production and service companies to provide an income; but, contrary to their expectations, on the whole, these companies showed losses. For instance, last year, the losses of these companies for the government were at close to 200 billion rials.

Engineer Sahabi added: Therefore, a system must be divised whereby the 2200 billion rials in expenses for the current year will be obtained from taxes or government revenues. I think a major portion of this amount can be obtained from taxes or government revenues. I think a major part of this amount can be provided for from taxes [as published].

Of course, we must note that the major source of these revenues must be direct taxes.

Obviously, the tax increase means direct taxation of private businesses, because, unfortunately, since the revolution, the heaviest taxes have been on salaries, whereas direct income taxes on private businesses have been insignificant.

This was for two reasons:

1. Tax rates

2. The tax collection system

Tax rates in our country have not conformed to actual economic and social conditions. The rates must reflect increases in personal income such that the percentage of taxes increases as does the income, until, at a pre-determined level of income, the taxes will be 100 percent. With little calculation, it is clear that the average tax rate will be 50 percent. That is, on the average, 50 percent of the income of the private sector must be paid to the government as taxes.

Engineer Sahabi added: The income of the government employees in this year's budget is close to 900 billion rials. Considering the fact that, according to available statistics, 80 percent of these incomes are below 50,000 rials per month, they cannot be taxed further. We can only increase the taxes of establishments which are not subject to national employment. And this will create an increase of 40-50 billion rials in taxes. However, the general national revenues will not stop at such a figure.

The national revenues in 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81] amounted to a figure of about 5,000 billion rials. After the amount concerning salaries was deducted, the figure of 4,100 billion rials was attributed to private business.

If 2,00 billion rials of this income is collected on the basis of a 50 percent tax rate, the government will have no problems. But, you see that the total revenues of the government for the current year are estimated at 544 billion rials, a figure which is about one-fifth of the tax revenues which truly belong to the government.

Of course, the fact remains that collecting such taxes requires economic and production prosperity and we are a long way from such a situation.

There are several reasons for this: (1) tax rates, instead of being at 50 percent, are at about 33 percent and, therefore, must be increased; (2) the tax system is extremely weak and tax officials do not collect the proper taxes from the main people with incomes, such as import merchants, doctors, and all the businessmen in the private sector; (3) tax officials do not have sufficient regulations and means at their disposal to collect the taxes.

Companies, individuals, merchants, private workshops, doctors, various middlemen, and others--none of them record their monetary transactions, or the transactions are not accurately recorded.

Key-money transactions are not recorded anywhere. The transactions of middlemen are done from homes and over the telephone. And there are other kinds of transactions that occur without the knowledge of the authorities.

Engineer Sahabi added that the nation's tax problems concern reforming the tax collection system. We must note that we have competent tax officials, he said, who can determine the incomes of people without looking at their books. Of course, we cannot deny that we have a shortage of responsible, experienced officials. This problem must be resolved at all cost.

We must train conscientious, religious, and responsible tax assessors.

In addition to training assessors, the economic and financial system of the country must be reformed.

The people's wealth must be recorded in books.

The annual income of individuals must be determined. We must prepare tax booklets for everyone.

The total current and non-current income of individuals must be taxed.

The head of the Parliamentary commission also pointed to the increase of unnecessary luxury items which are now sold on the black market for much more than their true value as another short-term source of government revenues and demanded an investigation into the matter.

Concerning this issue, Mohammad Qasem Mohammadian, the financial deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, said: Obviously, government tax revenues must provide for more of the general expenditures in the budget. Of course, this depends on taxation in connection with economic growth and gross national production. A look at the tax rates of industrial nations shows that these rates are generally below 50 percent.

In this regard, in accordance with the approval of Parliament, .5 percent of the tax revenues are to be devoted to training, hiring, and encouraging tax employees. Also, the lack of comprehensive, restrictive tax laws and irresponsibility on the part of a number of taxpayers are among our other problems. For example, doctors do not have invoices and expense receipts; therefore, they can fail to report their true number of patients and their fees. The law does not require private businessmen and tradesmen to keep records. Middlemen and investors who do not have specific places of business and who gain their incomes without physical exertion do not pay any taxes at all.

Unfortunately, the law provides for tax exemptions which most industries take advantage of. Presently, these tax exemptions are being studied and steps will be taken to ensure that only nationally needed industries and the producers of basic goods will be exempted. Agricultural exemptions will continue as before. Mohammadian added: The taxpayers' failure to keep tax records, their lack of knowledge of the tax laws, lack of coordination between the growth of tax resources and the growth of human resources, and the lack of a set of centralized data on economic statistics for tax purposes are among our other problems. The tax deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, concerning the current and future projects of this Ministry, said: It has been two months since the committee to devise a direct tax law was formed. All the experts who believe in Religious Guardian Jurisprudence are invited to present their views to this committee. The committee hopes to devise a comprehensive tax plan. In this plan, property taxes will also be taken into consideration.

Another committee has also been formed in this Ministry to devise emergency projects. Of course, we believe that after the revolution, no extensive steps were taken to balance wealth. Therefore, the implementation of Principle 49 of the Constitution must precede the

heavy taxation of the wealthy. In this area, my tax colleagues have declared their readiness to cooperate professionally with the concerned institutions. Mohammadian added: It is said, at times, that the private sector has made a certain amount of profit without paying taxes; but this is not correct, because the taxes belonging to the last fiscal year are collected at least a year and a half after the end of that fiscal year. The statistics show that in the first four months of 1360 [21 Mar-22 Jul 81], taxation of companies had increased by 53 percent compared to the same period in the previous year.

He added: In the plan which is being prepared, tax exemptions on salaries will increase; in fact, the ratio of taxes on salaries will decrease and taxes on the income obtained from the work and investments of businesses will increase. In conclusion, the tax deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance requested responsible fellow citizens to report, in writing, with documentation, to this Ministry any tax frauds, unidentified wealth, and, on the whole, any tax evasion. They can rest assured that this information will only be used to collect taxes and will be considered absolutely confidential.

9593
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BAGHDAD RADIO ON U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS

JN121846 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1615 GMT 12 Sep 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] If some Western observers believe that the secret Zionist-Persian arms and trade cooperation over the past year has been one of the important and immediate consequences of the unpublicized decisions reached by the ruling regime in Iran during its negotiations with the U.S. administration to secure the release of the hostages of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, a more important consequence has recently begun to surface openly in the domain of U.S.-Iranian relations.

According to the information of some observers in the U.S. Department of the Treasury who preferred to remain anonymous, these relations have begun to go back to normal in an active manner through the steps taken by the ruling authorities in Tehran in the past few weeks.

The first of these steps was the approval of the Tehran authorities to refer their dispute with the U.S. banks on the revenues of the recently released Iranian assets to a nine-man arbitration committee which includes three U.S. specialists. This step shows that the Iranian authorities have bowed to the insistence of the U.S. banks on not dealing with them as long as this dispute is not resolved.

The second step in the same direction was approval by the ruling regime in Tehran to meet the financial demands of the U.S. oil industry monopolies, which had turned down Iranian oil unless they are compensated for losses incurred during the period of the transfer of power in Iran from the shah's regime to that of Khomeyni.

Statements by some U.S. officials make it clear that the steps taken by the Tehran rulers have succeeded in accomplishing the objectives of those officials who want to mend fences with the U.S. companies and regain the oil market. This can be deduced from assertions by the same U.S. sources which confirm that U.S.-Iranian relations have begun to improve in various spheres in response to the efforts of the Tehran rulers.

While this is denied by the Tehran rulers who claim to adopt a hostile stand toward U.S. imperialism, it should be noted that these efforts by the Tehran rulers are in full harmony with the U.S. trends which paved the way for this following the release of the hostages last January when the U.S. Department of

the Treasury ordered several U.S. companies, particularly those dealing in agricultural products and electronics, to lift the embargo of U.S. products on Iran in February 1981 and to seek to restore U.S.-Iranian trade relations to normal.

Thus, based on deductions which say that the centers for planning and guiding Zionist-Iranian cooperation are to be found in Washington, it is clear that the stage for improving U.S.-Iranian relations has begun its first experimental phase with equally fast Zionist and Iranian steps which are heading toward the same central point; namely, the second stage which is witnessing direct appliation of the same wish. This does not mean that there was a period of severance of these relations prior to the completion of the farce of the hostages' release. All there is to it is that stage witnessed a certain secret channeling of the aforementioned relations that has been exposed by U.S. press reports whose authenticity was confirmed by subsequent events.

CSO: 4404/1

PAPER WARNS AGAINST 'U.S.-ZIONIST SCHEMES'

JN131145 Baghdad INA in English 1120 GMT 13 Sep 81

[Text] Baghdad, 13 Sep (INA)--Iraq's leading newspaper today warned against the dangerous consequences of the recent visit by the Zionist terrorist Begin to Washington and his talks with U.S. President Ronald Reagan and other senior U.S. officials.

ATH-THAWRAH, the daily organ of the Arab socialist Ba'th Party, said what has been achieved by Begin's visit to Washington is directly aimed against all Arabs, in their fields and countries without exception.

What has been achieved was in fact the start of a new phase of intervention, robbery and aggression, the daily added, while urging all Arab countries to act with full responsibility towards their present and future.

Referring to Zionist benefits from the visit, ATH-THAWRAH said they were a full U.S. guarantee for the protection of the Zionist entity, an allout support in all fields and to provide all wanted covers and justifications for Zionist schemes or fulfilling its prepared role in joint U.S.-Zionist schemes.

The Zionist entity has obtained new privileges, the most important of which were to draw out a new basis for the strategic U.S.-Zionist relationship and dialogue, forcing the U.S. to deal with the Zionist entity as if it was a U.S. state, put its reconnaissance information at the disposal of the Zionists and allow the Mossad to work freely inside the United States, to make available all the prerequisites for the completion of the Zionist nuclear programme, to increase U.S. military and economic aids, to reschedule Zionist debts and the principle agreement on carrying out joint military manoeuvres over the Palestinian territories and airspace, ATH-THAWRAH summarized.

In its conclusion, the daily affirmed Arab path towards construction, emergence and the consolidation of Arab potential is the same binding path for the confrontation of the forces of aggression and it is also the only path to resist the cases of weakness, deterioration and rift.

The forthcoming 12th Arab Summit Conference is demanded more than ever for a daring, objective and comprehensive stand that will put an end to Zionist aggression, American robbery and to their old and new joint aggressive schemes, ATH-THAWRAH said.

CSO: 4400/1

RELATIONS WITH USSR, IRAN ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 217, 29 Jun to 5 Jul 81, p 22

[Article by N.M.: "Taha Yasin [Ramadan] Makes a Preparatory Visit: Saddam Husayn Will Soon Be in Moscow"]

[Text] The Iraqi delegation in Moscow, led by Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan, was willing to discuss economic and trade relations between Moscow and Baghdad. The membership of the delegation included Mr Tahir Tawfiq, minister of industry and minerals, and Mr Ahmad Husayn, deputy minister of foreign affairs.

During the 3 days of the visit economic agreements were signed. They included the protocol for economic and technical cooperation and the protocol for the trade agreement concerning Iraq's 5-year plan. The fundamental occasion for the visit was the emergency session of the Permanent Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation. This committee meets once a year in order to review the agreements between the two countries which have been carried out during the year. Usually the level of the Iraqi delegation which attends these meetings is determined by the state of relations between Moscow and Baghdad.

This year the head of the delegation was the man who is in third place in the hierarchy of Iraq's leadership, and for this reason there was very clearly a positive atmosphere in the talks between the two parties. The real motive for the visit was interest in developing friendly relations. Thus the motive was to achieve political agreement--to be followed by the achievement of agreement concerning economic relations, which was published in the visit's final communique. The final meeting which was held between Mr Ramadan and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Mikolay Tikhonov, "was characterized by frankness and an atmosphere of friendliness." This was a clear reference to the fact that the two parties had brought up matters concerning which their points of view differed. In any case, these were political matters.

The visit took place in the midst of an Iraqi and Arab political atmosphere that was difficult to disregard, not only because Israel had bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor before this visit. A more important factor was the developments which took place right after this Israeli operation.

One of these developments was the fact that the Syrian-Israeli crisis proved that the Soviet Union is very capable of helping, and perhaps even protecting, its allies. All those who have met with Soviet leaders after this crisis have noticed their intense and urgent interest in helping Syria. There is a difference in Iraq's and Syria's international circumstances, as shown by the fact that the U.S. was anxious,

through the mission of the American president's personal envoy Philip Habib, to keep Israel from being militarily involved in the missile crisis. But in spite of that difference, Moscow has introduced a new factor into the factors concerning the Middle East. It is the opposite of what Egypt has been saying as a result of the history of its relations with the Soviets, namely that Moscow is unable to protect its allies. This factor does not eliminate Iraq's traditional sensitivity concerning its relations with the superpowers, but the Israeli attack on its nuclear reactor has served to sort out friends from enemies in its international relations, and this is something which nobody can disregard.

One indication of the fact that this sorting out has occurred is the position which U.S. President Ronald Reagan, took with respect to the attack on Iraq's nuclear reactor. Not only did he come to sympathize with the position of the Israelis who are afraid of Iraqi nuclear power, he also regarded Iraq's war with Iran as an invasion similar to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Agreement Concerning Iran

The second development concerned the situation in Iran. Eastern bloc diplomatic sources in Beirut have said that the Soviet Union views the developments in the Iranian situation with great alarm. The most important of these developments, of course, has been the fall of President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr and his defeat at the hands of the Islamic Republican Party. These sources believe that the leaders of this party--or at least most of them--will deal with the Soviet Union the way they have dealt with the United States. This would mean that the Soviets would lose even the limited role which they have been playing in one of their neighboring countries.

Iraq, from its standpoint, does not consider the fall of President Bani-Sadr to be a factor which will promote the desire for peace which Baghdad has been demonstrating in order to end its war with Iran. This is in spite of the fact that Baghdad, in principle, does not care who is in power in Iran.

However, this would not prevent indirect agreement in the Soviet and Iraqi positions concerning the necessity of jointly monitoring the Iranian situation. But there has been no change with respect to Soviet reservations concerning Iraq's position with regard to Iran, and with respect to Iraqi reservations concerning the Soviet position with regard to Iraq and the fact that the Soviet Union, in times past, has not fulfilled its commitments made in the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Baghdad and Moscow. For this reason, traffic along the road between the two capitals is still moving very slowly. An Iraqi diplomatic source asserts that the Soviets have responded to Iraq's needs concerning its development project. These sources reject the denial of what has been said concerning the fact that various types of Soviet weapons have begun to be sent to Iraq.

But why did Mr Ramadan not meet with the Soviet chief of state, Leonid Brezhnev?

Informed Arab sources have said that the Iraqi leader, in principle, did not request a meeting with the Soviet chief of state. This is because Iraq does not want to see dramatic developments in its relations--neither on the pan-Arab nor on the international level. What Iraq wants is to have each positive and emerging position quietly become known.

But these same sources say that Mr Ramadan has succeeded in establishing a favorable atmosphere for the visit which President Saddam Husayn will soon be making to Moscow.

9468
CSO: 4304/75

BRIEFS

PRESIDENT BESTOWS MEDALS--Baghdad, 14 Sep (INA)--President Saddam Husayn said the Kurdish question has been used and is still used for certain aims by several countries which built hopes on it. President Husayn said so while awarding Monday the Medal of Courage for three Iraqi Kurdish citizens, members of the Popular Army, who fought with incredible obstinacy in defence of the country and the principles of the revolution. This is the first time the medal goes to civilians. The president said those countries were betting on the deviationists but "We bet on the great Iraqi Kurdish people in the same way we bet on the Iraqi Arabs and Turks and on all other Iraqis from different religions and nationalities. Our betting was realistic because it was not the bet of gamblers but the bet of those who hold principles and know their people in detail and feel their daily life" President Husayn said. He explained that all those who advocate the nationalistic rights of the Iraqi Kurds realize that they were agents of a country which does not recognize the very simple rights of the Kurds while in Iraq, a Kurdish citizen has the right of an Arab in addition to the autonomous rule. President Husayn affirmed that the revolution in Iraq "Is for the Kurds as it is for the Arabs and the Ba'th Party is for the Kurds as it is for the Arabs and for the others since they live in Iraq and struggle for Iraq." [Text] [JN141924 Baghdad INA in English 1845 GMT 14 Sep 81]

CSO: 4400/1

PRESS QUOTES NATO SOURCES ON SAUDI AWACS

GF171209 Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 17 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] London--NATO sources have leaked very important information on the U.S. AWACS planes purchased by Saudi Arabia. The sources say that for some time Israel has been developing a station that will be used to monitor Arab communications systems in order to benefit from the information transmitted by the AWACS planes to ground stations and command centers in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The sources, who refuse to disclose their names or positions, add that within 1 month Israel will be able to pick up all the information provided by the U.S. reconnaissance planes in Saudi airspace and shared equally with Saudi Arabia.

The same sources indicate that previously Israel tried to convince the United States to allow Israel to share the information collected by the AWACS, whether from the ground or from space, through an agreement governing the exchange of security information between the two countries. However, the United States expressed reservations because of its sensitive relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab world.

The sources also say Israel is capable of evading this problem by obtaining the information illegally by reinforcing its spying and listening equipment which can then obtain the information collected by the AWACS from Arab communication systems.

The sources recall what Israel has been doing since the June 1967 War, that is, collecting information about Arab armies through its listening equipment. Two years ago Israel was able to install electronic listening equipment to monitor the telephone line between Syria and Jordan.

The NATO sources believe that by using military information made public in the 1970's advanced states have been able to develop their equipment so much that it is almost impossible to preserve the secrecy of information in any country in the world.

CSO: 4404/1

PAPER INTERVIEWS IRAQI OIL MINISTER

GF121510 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 12 Sep 81 pp 9, 18

[Interview with Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, Iraqi Revolution Command Council member and oil minister, by 'Abdallah al-Qaq, in Baghdad--date not given]

[Text] [Question] You recently made several visits to Saudi Arabia and Britain. What is the nature of these visits and of the talks that were held?

[Answer] The purpose of our visits and the visits of many colleagues to Saudi Arabia was to exchange views, coordinate between our two fraternal countries, and strengthen bilateral cooperation to serve our common interests and the higher pan-Arab interests during this critical stage in the Arab nation's history, as well as to study the present oil situation and to discuss the best ways to face the imbalances in the world oil market. Thanks to the firm fraternal ties between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, these visits achieved constructive and positive results.

Our recent visit to the United Kingdom was at the invitation of British Secretary of State for Energy David Howell. One can say that the talks which the Iraqi delegation held with British officials and British companies achieved positive results that will greatly influence the development of cooperation between the two countries and opened the way for British companies to participate in the implementation of development projects in Iraq according to the principles to which Iraq adheres in its dealings with the outside world.

[Question] What can you tell us about Iraqi oil production? Is it possible to make up for it after the war?

[Answer] Prior to the racist Persian aggression against Iraq and the Arab nation, the Arabian Gulf was the principal outlet for most of our oil exports. As a result of the war, we now rely on pipelines through Syria, Lebanon and Turkey, and [we are producing] within the limits allowed by the capacity of these pipelines and our commitments to these countries. Of course, Iraq has the necessary capability and flexibility to return to the level of exports commensurate with its capability for oil production after the war.

[Question] The foreign press often says that the Iraqi economy has been greatly affected by the Iraqi-Iranian War. Is Iraq continuing its development plan as usual despite the war?

[Answer] The glorious battle of Saddam's Al-Qadisiyah that is being waged by our heroic hordes against the racist Persians on the Arab homeland's eastern flanks is a truly unique phenomenon in the history of the world. It is the first time a developing country has proved its ability to wage a protracted war against an enemy that is more numerous and has more equipment along a 1,200 km front while at the same time continuing its battle for development and construction at a higher rate than that before the war, thanks to the awakening and enthusiasm generated by this sacred battle and the historic and outstanding leadership represented by the hero of national liberation, President Saddam Husayn. It is not surprising that our victories on the battlefront and our achievements in the battle for development should arouse rancor that governs the conduct of certain foreign quarters and their attitudes toward Iraq and the Arab nation.

[Question] The world market is still suffering from an oil glut. Do you believe it necessary to reduce production by 10 percent as OPEC decided, and do you believe that some OPEC members did not abide by this decision?

[Answer] Very early on Iraq warned that the absence of a unified structure for oil prices and the pursuit by some OPEC member countries of pricing and production policies that conflict with the national interests of all OPEC members and other developing countries open the way to world imperialism and the monopolist oil companies to implement their schemes to undermine OPEC by creating an imbalance in the world oil market. Regrettably, these schemes have succeeded in achieving their wicked aims because of the lack of response by some OPEC member countries to the sincere efforts exerted by Iraq on various levels to unify oil prices and bring about an agreement on a realistic production policy that protects the price structure. The Iraqi initiative during the recent Advisory Conference of OPEC Oil Ministers held in Geneva 19-20 August 1981, almost succeeded in bringing about a total agreement at the conference on the posted price of oil and relative increments and thus insured OPEC's unity and safeguarded its members' interests had it not been for the intransigence of some of our brothers and their rejection of the compromise solution proposed by Iraq. The conference thus ended without reaching an agreement, although our proposal was accepted by the majority of OPEC member countries.

The present glut on the oil market is a serious phenomenon that threatens the unity and very survival of OPEC, which now suffers from a lack of coordination on production to face the fall in demand. Moreover, there are several, and noncompetitive, prices for OPEC oil.

In our view the elimination of this phenomenon requires that OPEC members rise to the level of their responsibility and take OPEC's interest into consideration, even if this should call for sacrifices. Thus the reunification of the pricing structure and the regulation of production in a manner that will restore the balance to the market, strengthen the pricing structure and at the same time insure that the interests of an OPEC member or group of member countries are not harmed can be achieved as soon as possible.

It is the fall in demand for OPEC oil at a time when some OPEC members raised their production to levels that have far surpassed the highest level reached

in the wake of the equipment crisis of 1978 and 1979 that has resulted in this glut--despite the fact that most OPEC members have reduced their production by 10 percent as decided. The restoration of balance to the market requires that all OPEC members, and particularly those countries that maintain high rates of production, reduce their production to the level that insures for each country its former share of oil production. Whether this should require a 10 percent reduction in oil production or more or less than 10 percent depends above all on current levels of production as well as on the level of demand for OPEC oil on one hand and the level of prices that are agreed upon on the other.

[GF121652] [Question] Do you think the next OPEC meeting will maintain the present oil prices or will increase them? Do you believe that maintenance of current prices will lead to a return to the two-tier price system?

[Answer] In his national speech on the 13th anniversary of the glorious 17 July Revolution in Iraq, President Saddam Husayn asserted that Iraq sees no justification for welching on prevalent prices. Iraq's stand on this matter is based on a thorough assessment of prevailing oil prices in the light of the constant inflation of prices of goods and services which OPEC countries import from the industrialized countries. Oil prices have not yet reached the level that guarantees the developing countries that export this vital commodity economic revenue commensurate with the economic and strategic importance of oil and its nature as a depletable commodity.

Moreover, a retreat by OPEC on existing prices is in its view a step toward the organization's dismemberment. Our stand, as I explained in my answer to your previous question, stresses the importance of reunifying the price structure and ending the multiplicity of price levels. However, our efforts in this regard were not successful during the advisory meeting for the reasons I have mentioned.

[Question] Will Iraq review the contracts of some oil companies in light of the stands of their countries on the Iraqi-Iranian war? Do you believe that the French stand is in harmony with cooperation in the petroleum field [presumably Iraqi oil exports to France] which constitutes a large proportion of Iraqi production?

[Answer] Iraq has always dealt, and continues to deal, with world countries and foreign companies on the basis of their stands toward the Arab nation's causes of destiny and the extent of their respect for our legitimate aspirations. We view oil as the most important source of economic and political strength for the Arab nation. Thanks to nationalization and exercising national sovereignty over oil resources and all aspects of the petroleum industry, Iraq has been able to apply this policy effectively and in a way that has had a profound effect in furthering our national and pan-Arab aims and in establishing close relations with many countries, particularly developing countries.

[Question] Does Iraq intend to carry out new oil exploration? What are Iraq's plans to develop this activity? Is Iraq endeavoring to diversify its sources of revenue?

BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCTION FALLS--AL-WATAN has learned that Kuwait's current oil production is 500,000 tons of crude oil a day. Prior to the fire at the Ash-Shu'aybah refinery, Kuwait's oil production totaled 800,000 barrels a day [figures as published]. Kuwait's gas production has also fallen as a result of the decrease in oil production. Preliminary estimates indicate that the losses incurred from the Ash-Shu'aybah fire amount to more than $100 million rather than $50 million, as reports from London said the day before yesterday. Informed sources said that the losses could total $120 million and that this figure includes the cost of the burned fuel deports and oil as well as lost revenue during the period in which the refinery's production was stopped. [Text] [GF071127 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 6]

CSO: 4404/1

BRIEFS

ANGOLAN LEADER THANKS AL-QADHDHAFI--The leader of the great al-Fatih Revolution has received a written message from the Angolan president in which he expresses the Angolan people's appreciation for the stances of the great al-Fatih Revolution and its leader regarding the consolidation of the Angolan popular struggle against the aggression they are being subjected to by U.S. imperialism and the facists in South Africa. The Angolan president valued highly the firm attitude which the Jamahiriyah bravely adopts in confronting U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, the racists in Africa and world zionism. [Text] [LD181404 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 18 Sep 81]

INDEPENDENT BELIZE RECOGNIZED--Tripoli, 21 Sep (JANA)--JANA has been informed that the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah has announced its recognition of the independent state of Belize. The secretary of the People's Foreign Liaison Bureau today sent a message of congratulations to Belize's foreign minister on the occasion of his country's independence. In his message, the secretary of the People's Foreign Liaison Bureau expressed the Libyan Arab people's pride in this great event stressing the international role played by the great al-Fatih Revolution in supporting just causes and consolidating the people's struggle for freedom. It is worth noting that Belize, a former British colony, is situated in Central America, surrounded by Mexico in the north and Guatemala in the south and west. It has an area of 23,000 square kilometres. Sugar cane is its main resource, in addition to various kinds of citrus fruits. [Text] [LD211904 Tripoli JANA in English 1713 GMT 21 Sep 81]

STEADFASTNESS FRONT ISSUES FINAL COMMUNIQUE--Benghazi, Libya, 19 Sep (AFP)--The Arab "Steadfastness Front" said here Friday night that the United States, by concluding a strategic-cooperation agreement with Israel, had "barred the way to any possibility of reaching a just settlement" to the Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. In a final communique after a two-day meeting, the front said "the Israeli-American alliance has upset the regional situation (in the Middle East), putting the United States in a state of direct confrontation with the Arab world and giving birth to the risk of a Soviet-America conflict." The front asked other Arab countries to "reconsider their relations with the United States" and to use all economic pressure, including the "oil weapon," to combat the Israeli-American alliance. The Steadfastness Front, comprising the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Algeria, Libya, Syria and South Yemen, was formed in December 1977 to fight against Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat's attempts to make peace with Israel. [Text] [NC190637 Paris AFP in English 0622 GMT 19 Sep 81]

CSO: 4500/2

MUSCAT COMMENTS ON PDRY REGIME'S ANTI-ARAB POSTURE

LD182243 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1315 GMT 18 Sep 81

[Commentary: "Behind the Truth"]

[Text] A number of important questions have arisen in the Arab-Islamic arena following the coming of power of the ruling regime in South Yemen. These questions constitute a regrettable and [word indistinct] in Arab circles, and require objective and scientific answers.

Among the most prominent questions--perhaps the most serious--is the big question: Why Marxism? Why is Marxism the course followed by the South Yemen regime? What are the objective (?bases) of this course? Is Marxism a sound and natural alternative to pan-Arab and Islamic ideology? How can we understand the nature of relations between international communism and the ruling clique in South Yemen? What precisely are the causes, dimensions and objectives of these relations?

All these questions cropped up a long time ago in the Arab arena. They need convincing answers, only by means of which can we define the nature of the crazy and irrational course of politics in South Yemen, both internally and externally.

It is obvious that the regime of South Yemen took over in suspect and confused conditions. It emerged from its shameful record in national work stamped with treachery and betrayal. The regime has existed in an ideological vacuum ungoverned by any affiliation to the land, Arab heritage or traditions.

It was confronted with complicated situations beyond its feeble capacity and the shallow and superficial abilities of its leadership. For this reason, this illegitimate regime was established on foundations of terror and oppression and on authority which had no loyal support from the fraternal [Yemeni] people.

Consequently, the South Yemen regime found itself isolated after it turned its back on the Arab nation, its traditions and heritage and ignored the Arab-Islamic affiliation of the Yemeni people. In the face of this bitter reality, it was natural that the forces of terror and the destructive elements should overcome the trend toward social peace, the potential for construction and the elements for good.

All this came about under communist principles and Marxist values inculcated--under conditions of extreme [word indistinct]--into the minds of misguided youth under the label of crash party studies. International communism aimed to prepare this youth for the future as cadres, imbued with Marxist ideology.

This is the great shock that will hit the Arab nation, especially when this time-honored nation realizes that international communism is aware that the present leadership of the agent regime in South Yemen is only performing a transitional role, even if it adopts extreme slogans and exaggerates its stands.

The continuing process of liquidation is perhaps the best evidence. [as heard] On this basis we see concentrated Marxist teaching in schools financed by the Soviets in South Yemen--such as the proletariat schools, the Torch schools, the Red Star schools and other such centers of brainwashing--in addition to the scholarships offered for studies in the USSR and elsewhere in the communist states, where the [word indistinct] youth from South Yemen is poisoned into turning its back on its Arab-Islamic reality.

The ruling regime has forgotten that anyone who misleads youth [words indistinct] ignores the Arab-Islamic reality, exaggerates in slogans [word indistinct] and distorts reality, cannot build a society [word indistinct] or lead to progress and development.

Development requires economic and political thinkers who are capable of having original ideas, not adolescents vying to outbid one another, or superficial theoreticians. Above all, what is required is faith and to be true to one's origins. We can truthfully say that the principal impression given by the behavior of the ruling regime in South Yemen is one of ignoring reality and the current conditions under which the fraternal people in South Yemen live.

Another impression is that the regime is ignoring the laws of social development, and is turning its back on the Arab nation as a civilized cultural entity which is marked by its own political and economic characteristics.

The present Marxist regime has tied itself to the wheel of the Soviet brand of communism. It later expanded its affiliation to include international communism as practiced in many other states. South Yemen has become an advanced base for communist influence. It is not strange, therefore, that the ruling regime should conclude three friendship treaties, with the USSR, East Germany and Czechoslovakia--when that country's president visited South Yemen a few days ago.

It is beyond argument that the visit by Czechoslovak President Gustav Husak to Ethiopia, Libya and South Yemen revealed the scope of the role laid down for the Tripartite Alliance. It is a role that contradicts [word indistinct] the higher objectives of the Arab nation such as stability, peace and prosperity. The general lines of that role become clear when we look for the reasons that make Libya and South Yemen enter into an alliance with Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is not an Arab state, in fact it is a state that has seen many instances of hostility and problems with more than one Arab state. South Yemen and Libya have turned their backs on the Joint Arab Defense Agreement. They have also disregarded Arab treaties and conventions for aims that have nothing at all to do with Arab interests. From the above, we deduce the reasons for the conduct of the ruling regime in South Yemen. The fact is that the regime has lost its firm base and has nothing but muddy quagmires ahead.

CSO: 4404/1

BRIEFS

NEW APPOINTMENTS--Sultan Qabus has appointed Col 'Ali Majid al-Mamari as his first aide-de-camp and head of the palace office, and Ahmad al-Suwaydan as deputy head of the palace office on the same grade. Ibrahim Hamud al-Subhi, Oman's ambassador to the PRC, is transferred to the General Office of the Foreign Ministry. Ahmad 'Abd al-Nabi Makki, ambassador to France, is transferred to the General Office of the Foreign Ministry. [Text] [EA180118 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 17 Sep 81]

CSO: 4404/1

PRESS REPORTS ON PAKISTAN'S ROLE IN U.S. STRATEGY

GF171848 Ash-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 17 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "What Does Pakistan Say?"]

[Excerpts] If the Israeli-U.S. alliance has caused a dangerous gap in the Arabs' "national security," the United States' attempt to involve Pakistan as a third party in its "strategic understanding" in the Middle East, the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean region will certainly destroy all hopes of Islamic resistance to this "gap." This new alliance will embroil a Muslim side, and perhaps more than just one side, in political conflicts and a cold war that will harm the Islamic (determination) confirmed by the At-ta'if Islamic Summit Conference. The summit declared that the Palestinian question and liberating Jerusalem from the Israeli usurpers are Islamic goals that can never be given up.

While admitting that Pakistan's policy is an internal matter, we find it incumbent upon us to warn that Washington's efforts to embroil Islamabad in the U.S. adventures in the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean regions under the pretext of countering the Soviet threat have much to do with us. This is so because the U.S. and Israeli statements--which explain the goals of the Israeli-U.S. alliance--affirm that the alliance was established to confront "some" Arabs in addition to the Soviets, and that Israel would provide an air umbrella to support any military "campaign" in confronting the Soviets on their "agents" in the Arabian Gulf and Mediterranean regions. Thus, we arrive at a solid conclusion that the Camp David "method," which isolated Egypt from the rest of the Arabs--though just temporarily--and was also the foundation of the (open) Israeli-U.S. alliance, is being developed by Washington to divide the Islamic states or perhaps to make a number of Islamic state confront other Islamic states. All this is for nothing except that the United States is afraid of losing its (interests), which are being threatened by the Soviets in the Arabian Gulf, Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.

It is the duty of all Arab states, and the Arabian Gulf states in particular, to warn Pakistan about the danger of the U.S. military plans we have been hearing so much about. The Arab states provide Pakistan with a considerable amount of aid, and the greater part of Pakistan's national income consists of the wealth of Pakistani's working in Arab countries, particularly Gulf states.

Over the past 2 years, U.S. officials have spoken about the planned Pakistani role in the so-called "Gulf security." The U.S. media closely associated with the CIA depicted Pakistan as if it were the "Gulf's gendarme" following the collapse of the shah and his regime. However, on more than one occasion, Pakistan said that it would never agree to play such a role. It also reiterated its stand on the Arabs and their central issues, foremost of which is the Palestinian question and the liberation of Jerusalem.

However, James Buckley--who has visited Islamabad and met with its leaders several times--has made statements about involving Pakistan in the United States' efforts to achieve a "strategic understanding" in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. This requires a clear stand by the Pakistani leadership. Hence, the Arabs, all Arabs, understand the official U.S. announcement to declare Pakistan a third party in the Israeli-U.S. alliance, which will be declared officially in November.

CSO: 4404/1

'AL-ITTIHAD' ON AWACS DEAL, U.S.-SAUDI RELATIONS

GF170618 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 16 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial]

[Excerpts] The U.S. AWACS deal between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States has become a "thermometer" or a balance to measure relations between the kingdom and the United States. This is the way the Saudis view the issue and this is exactly what causes President Reagan's administration concern. His administration suddenly finds itself pushed around by the twists of the Arab-Israeli conflict and asked to adopt a stand--whether with or against the Arabs or the Israelis.

No former U.S. administration had faced a situation in which the U.S. President lost his temper in front of congressmen who oppose the deal in support of the Israeli point of view.

The military value may not be the real touchstone of the importance of the AWACS deal. Rather, as Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal put it, its importance is in the many questions it raises on the future of U.S.-Saudi relations. Hence its importance is in the "policy" behind its acceptance or rejection because the United States must eventually choose whether to continue its policy of supporting Israel in exchange for losing the Arabs--and all the Arabs mean economically and geographically--or drop its unlimited support for Israel in exchange for continuing its relations with the Arabs on the bases of exchanged interests, exchanged respect of sovereignty, and the principles of international relations that reject hegemony, domination and threats.

This is the great predicament faced by U.S. policy on the Middle East. It is a difficult predicament for the United States because the Reagan administration is not wise enough to be able to escape from it. Furthermore, the growing Arab currents rejecting U.S. policy in general do not permit the United States to continue its playing with all sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is indeed the great U.S. predicament.

CSO: 4404/1

NEW SOCIAL SECURITY LAW ISSUED

Dubai AL-RAYAN in Arabic 22 Jul 81 p 4

[Article: "Za'id Issues Federal Law for Social Security; Law Provides for Increased Subsistence, and Includes Families of Prisoners, the Abandoned, and Married Students Who Continue Their Studies"]

[Text] Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayan, president of the UAE, issued a federal law for social security. The provisions of this law include the bases for allocation, and determine the social assistance, measures and conditions for application, and the categories of those who are entitled to it.

The law requires that the minimum social assistance for any person will be 800 dirhams monthly, and that the maximum will be 4,640 dirhams.

The provisions of this law are applicable to those who enjoy UAE citizenship, residing in its territory, and who fulfill its conditions. A female national, married to a foreigner, is exempted from the provision of UAE citizenship, and is entitled to social assistance, as is a widow, whose foreign spouse is deceased.

The law provides that the following are entitled to social assistance: widows and divorced females, those with physical disabilities, the aged, orphans, unmarried daughters, those suffering from pathological disability, students, the families of prisoners, and the abandoned.

The law also grants a stipend to encourage school students below university level, to whom the regulations of this law apply, or to their families. A cabinet decree will be issued determining this stipend and regulating the bases relative to it.

In accordance with the provisions of this law, relief assistance will be offered to families and individuals who are faced with public or private financial difficulties. A cabinet decree will be issued determining the amount of assistance, and the bases relative to it.

Sayf al-Jarwan, minister of labor and social affairs, stated that the amended social security law, promulgated by Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayan, president of the UAE, made allowances for increasing the level of assistance, and the need to add categories, which were not eligible under the previous law, before inserting the new amendments into it. Among them are families of prisoners and the abandoned, and married students who continue their studies.

Moreover, it includes increased social security assistance. The maximum number of beneficiaries of a family is increased from 10 individuals to 16 individuals, so that the maximum assistance for a family of 16 persons is 4,640 dirhams.

The increase includes raising the amount for the first individual, or the minimum amount of assistance, from 375 to 800 dirhams, the second individual from 300 to 480, and for each person from the third up to the sixteenth 280 dirhams, instead of 150, which was only paid up to the tenth person before the law was amended.

The minister of labor and social affairs said that the amended social security law provides for the need to create schedules to regulate payment of assistance. The most important of these is the schedule pertaining to those with material disability. This means those citizens whose income is less than that of a family benefitting from this law, as amended. This includes paying of assistance equal to the difference between those citizens' income and the income of the family benefitting social security assistance. This category includes farmers, fishermen, persons of rare and minor occupations, provided that this assistance not be the cause of their leaving their jobs or abandoning their places of employment in the future.

The minister added that this schedule would also regulate the method of assisting the person able to work, but who cannot find the opportunity to work or scope for earning, especially the handicapped.

He said that the law also includes a schedule pertaining to regulating the payment of assistance for public and private disasters.

The minister of labor mentioned that the law includes some provisions, which deal with certain negative aspects, which appeared when applying the law before being amended. Because of that, it provides for a committee to be formed, chaired by the undersecretary for social affairs, to undertake the study of allocating new cases entitled to assistance, from the various categories. These include widows and divorced women, those with physical disabilities, health disabilities and senility, orphans, unmarried daughters, and sons of families entitled to assistance, who are less than 18 years old and who are still in school, as well as those with material deficiencies.

The committee will also study the dropping of cases, which have lost the right to benefit from social assistance.

The law also provides for the formation of a committee for complaints when necessary, to look into a complaint, which may be submitted by the citizen, to appeal the decision of the previous committee. That decision can be appealed to the minister, whose decision is final.

His Excellency added that the item pertaining to social security in the ministry of labor's present budget has been increased, in view of the amendments to the social security law.

Sayf al-Jawran referred to the fact that the increase, which the amended social security law contains, will play a share in improving the living conditions of citizens benefitting from this law.

He said that it came at a time when the government was undertaking to improve the conditions of employees working for federal organizations, by granting them social allowances, which was recently announced. Moreover, some of the governments and local offices in the various emirates would be applying these allowances to their employees.

His Excellency mentioned that a number of executive decisions would be issued shortly pertaining to this law, including the formation of a supreme committee for social assistance, chaired by the undersecretary for social affairs, to study the allocation of pending cases for assistance, and the dropping of non-entitled cases, the formation of a committee for complaints, to study the appeals submitted by citizens, in the event that their requests had been rejected, a decree regarding the measures and bases for physical examination in cases of health disability, handicapped persons, senility, etc., and a decree establishing the conditions of acceptance in academies and vocational training institutions, the opening up of which will be for the purpose of allocating social assistance for work and production. On the other hand, 'Ubayd Musa Hareb, director of the office of social security in the ministry, stated that steps taken to apply the new amendments would include re-examining all the present cases.

He said that one of the aspects included in the newly amended law was the allocation of social assistance for work, with respect to those who are able to. Therefore, the organizational structure of the ministry will include the creation of a new office for training and vocational education, which will take on the setting up of a training program to train those able to work, but who do not have jobs, as well as to qualify the handicapped who came seeking social security assistance. The person will be paid a stipend, during this training, aside from the social assistance.

It is worth noting that the first law for social security was promulgated in 1972. The present law was introduced in 1976, and its amendments included the first increase in the amount of social assistance, and included various categories, who are presently benefitting.

The number of cases benefitting from social security assistance, in various categories, totals 36,000. Monthly assistance entitled to, in these cases, is estimated at about DH 22.5 million.

The budget of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, for the present year, has been credited with the amount of 700 million dirhams for social security assistance, in light of the increases that have been included, for the second half of this year.

7005
CSO: 4304/98

OIL MINISTER DISCUSSES OIL WEAPON

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 21 Jul 81 p 7

[Article by Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources: "Oil...a Political Commodity; Oil Has Become Prominent as a Political Weapon, and Has Not Lost its Effectiveness, Despite the Present Glut"]

[Text] For years, debate has raged over whether oil is a political or economic commodity. The debate, regarding this matter, reached its peak in the 70's, and the answers received were disparate and differing, according to the political beliefs and systems of each state, whether it was an oil producer and exporter, or a consumer. From the start, whether in private or in the press, the debate was noticed. I also felt it in meetings, which we were holding within the OPEC framework, through the visits that I made to several major industrial nations, and through my interviews with foreign newspapermen.

Let us begin with some answers for this question.

Like it or not, oil is a strategic, economic, political commodity. Everyone tries to deny this description (political), or tries to mislead others, or to cover up the truth.

Political Commodity

Evidence for the validity of this description (political) must go back to the start of preferential contracts at the beginning of the present century. We find that several nations, who attached great importance to oil, were putting their political, military and economic weight behind obtaining concessions for drilling for oil. This was the case for the first concession granted in the Arab Gulf area and the Middle East, i.e., Iran. Considerable pressures were brought to bear in order to obtain that concession. There was also intense competition among the parties of this concession.

Subsequent concessions were obtained in similar circumstances, where political pressures were the main effective factor. The competition many times led to disputes and military clashes between one state and another.

Oil and War

During World War I and World War II, we note that oil was a political commodity, in addition to being a strategic military and economic commodity. Germany in World War II got into devastating battles with the Soviet Union, who was its ally at the start of the war, over ambitions to occupy the oil fields in the Soviet Union (Baku) and the oil fields in Rumania.

At that time, the Soviet Union and Rumania were among the principal oil-producing and exporting nations.

This Nazi Germany drive to occupy the Soviet oil fields was one of the main factors for Germany's defeat. The reason is that they opened a broad front, deploying a large number of their troops and weaponry, without achieving the occupation of the Russian oil wells.

Hitler, the leader of Nazi Germany, understood well that his tanks and military equipment would continue to be severely limited, unless they had the oil supply required for their operation.

This also happened to Germany's ally Japan, since we know that the Japanese armies drove toward the Southeast Asian countries, reaching Indonesia and the oil fields there, and Burma, for the same purpose. This led to their being compelled to deploy their forces over vast areas, and in many countries, and consequently, this deployment was one of the elements in their defeat in World War II.

Eisenhower's Statement

Another example that we can cite as evidence for our statement that oil is a political and strategic commodity, in addition to being an economic commodity, is the statement of the commander of the allied forces in World War II, General Eisenhower. His famous words in that war were: "Give me sufficient oil, and I will guarantee you victory."

This evidence makes clear to us the maximum importance of oil as a military, strategic and political commodity.

If we were to revisit history, what would we find?

After the end of World War II, and the defeat of the Axis Powers and the Allied Powers' victory, we find that some allied states inherited from the defeated powers--Germany, Turkey and Italy--some oil concessions, which those defeated nations had established. In fact, England, France, the United States and Holland obtained oil concessions in our region, in the UAE and Iraq. It is worth noting that the Allied Powers threatened to take Mosul province away from Iraq, unless it agreed to grant a concession to them. Iraq in fact agreed to grant the concession to the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), which was an extension of the Trucial Coast Petroleum Company, and then the Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company (ADPC), as we now know it.

The Stage of Deception

These matters bring us to the ensuing stages of politicizing oil, and of recognizing it as a political commodity.

In that period, this matter was clear and obvious, with respect to one of the concerned parties, i.e., the principal oil-consuming nations, and the large, international oil companies, subordinate to those nations. At the time that the second party, which had the main legal claim, was ignorant of this role for oil, brainwashing was being employed against it, to confine oil's role to just that of a normal commercial commodity, which should not be dragged into politics.

Birth of OPEC

In 1960, OPEC was created for the purpose of making the oil-producing nations sensitive to the importance of this commodity, as an economic, political and strategic commodity. It saw that, through collective bargaining, it could achieve effective control over this important resource.

At the outset, OPEC faced a great many kinds of wars, resistance and non-recognition, until in 1970 and 1971, it was able, through the Teheran Agreement, to begin a new era in the oil industry. It was an attempt to control some aspects of this industry, correct certain errors, and lift the prejudice, from which the principal oil-producing states suffered. The income tax and royalty tax were amended, and the price of oil was raised for the first time, after the decline of prices in the 50's.

Although that increase in prices was a formality, it was a start, and the first step along the route we have been travelling since the Teheran Agreement.

Partnership Agreements

After that, the partnership agreement arrived in 1972. Within it, we felt the extent of the interlocking between politics and the economy in oil affairs. We discovered how the nations that owned the companies had begun to pursue the political role, political window-dressing, and political repression at certain times, to defend their companies and give these companies sufficient support so that they could stand up to the oil-producing and exporting nations.

At the same time, as OPEC nations, we began to use the same weapon. The kings and presidents of the OPEC nations sent messages to the heads of the large industrial states, which set forth the determination of the governments of the OPEC nations to obtain their full rights. The late King Faysal sent a well-known letter to the president of the United States in 1972, after which the oil companies were broken up, and partnership agreements came to be applied.

The Ramadhan War

In 1973, oil passed through a decisive stage, a turning-point in the oil industry's history, since for the first time, it was used as a political weapon in the battle.

The fourth war between the Arabs and Israel began in October of that year. At that time, we were in Vienna, discussing with the major oil companies an oil price increase. The war broke out during these negotiations, and the oil companies procrastinated, hopeful that the Arabs would be defeated in this war, because they represented the major force within OPEC, since they were the largest producers of oil in the world. In addition, they owned the largest oil deposits on their territory. Among the 13 members of OPEC, six members are Arab.

In the face of the companies' procrastination, we decided to meet in Kuwait on 16 October. Accordingly, there were 10 days between the start of the war on 6 October and our meeting in Kuwait on 16 October. This was the time limit for the companies to make their final decision; either comply with our demands, or we would take appropriate steps, on our part, as producers.

The Arab Will

Time passed, and the oil companies did not respond within the time limit we had given them. We met in Kuwait on 16 October, as OPEC Gulf oil ministers. We decided, for our part, to increase oil prices.

The following day, 17 October, we met as Arab oil ministers, after the balance of the war had swung to the enemy's favor, since his forces had breached the western fronts in Sinai, and in Golan, and had penetrated areas close to Damascus and Cairo. Arab voices were raised that oil, with all its weight, must be put into the battle. Shaykh Zayid's famous statement was: "Arab oil is not dearer than Arab blood."

The UAE had the honor of firing the first shot in that battle.

We met in Kuwait on 17 October, as Arab oil ministers, to deal with the subject of oil and its political role. Debate was intense among us as to the method of using this political weapon in the battle.

There were those who said that the world oil companies must be nationalized, in order to punish the major powers that stood by the Zionist enemy in the war.

There were those who saw the need to withdraw the Arab capital, which was small and of no significance at that time.

The principle of cutting off oil from every state that supported Israel was openly supported.

However, this decision did not win approval.

The UAE was the author of this proposal. Ultimately, it was agreed to reduce oil production, across-the-board and gradually, by 5 percent per month, until the international community clearly responded to the Arab right.

At that time, we found that this action was inadequate, and that rapid and urgent steps must be taken to put matters into their true perspective.

The least that should have been done was to cut off every state that supported Israel from oil. The United States, at that time, had completed establishing an airlift to gradually compensate the Israeli enemy for all its military losses.

The Reins of the Initiative

At the direction of His Highness, Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan Al Nuhayan, we decided in Kuwait to stop the flow of oil to the United States. We announced that we would cut it off from every state that continued to support Israel. This decision was later applied against Holland.

Three days later, the other Arab states followed us. Iraq also nationalized the American companies' share in its oil companies.

At the same time, some other states regrettably had not cut off oil even from the United States, and Arab oil, or a part of it, continued to flow to it.

This economic, political transformation came about as a result of specific political circumstances, which manifested the strong connection between the political and economic facets of this commodity.

Previously, the Arabs had used the oil weapon against Israel, when they had applied an oil embargo against it. This oil embargo had also been applied against South Africa. Arab oil was forbidden to go to South Africa, out of solidarity with the African bretheren. Later, this embargo was applied on the OPEC level.

Declining Investment

After that, other steps were taken, which did not have that luster that had appeared during the use of oil as a political weapon in the battle in 1973.

I do not want to go into the historical details of the use of the oil weapon, and its effects, because that would require many more pages. However, I will rapidly touch on the highlights with respect to political oil.

A system known as multiple-basing for oil pricing was established at an OPEC meeting in Doha in 1978, where the majority of OPEC states decided to increase oil prices by 10 percent. However, Saudi Arabia and the UAE decided to raise their prices by 5 percent.

From then to this very day, we find that this development has clearly continued, especially after the Islamic revolution in Iran, so that the differential between various types of oil was more than $10 per barrel, at the beginning of this year, whereas, before the Doha meeting, it was no more than $2.

This step had, from the beginning, a political ramification, which can be briefly stated. Oil has a political role, which must be carried out, except when a sacrifice was made by this difference in increase.

We felt that oil must be used as a political weapon in peace, after its success as a political weapon in war. By that I mean that oil must be used as a tool to

achieve one's wishes, to gain more friends, and to encourage the hesitant to adopt positions of support for Arab issues, so that they adopt these positions and clearly speak out with regard to these issues.

The Moderate Goal

From this basis, our position, along with Saudi Arabia, was a moderate position, which some might think was more tolerant, but when we consider the matter deeply and look at it comprehensively, we find that our position was necessary, especially after the present oil glut appeared. A group of OPEC members and outside nations began to compete on reducing oil prices.

Our position, along with Saudi Arabia, stemmed from our understanding of the important and principal oil role in times of peace, that political and strategic benefit must be gained from this role, and that we should not consider it merely as a commercial commodity, from which we try to gain as much profit as possible.

This theory should really be put forth by private foundations and companies, whose only goal is to make quick profits, whereas we as nations take a comprehensive look at matters. However, there are long range political and strategic gains, which must be made, aside from material profits, which we also consider important.

Positions of Europe and Japan

The Islamic revolution occurred in Iran, and oil's political role again became prominent. Arab oil appeared as a main factor and as a primary support for the world's economy. The Western nations began to compete to gain the Arab nations' friendship. Europe and Japan began to take positions that were more just with respect to our national issues.

I do not claim that they took pre-Arab positions. I do not hope for that. On the contrary, our only hope is that these nations take a moderate stand, not biased toward any one of the contending parties.

The so-called 'rifle' declaration appeared. Europe, in regard to this declaration, took a position independent of the U.S. position, which at that time was drifting toward what became known as the Camp David capitulation agreements, and which constituted humiliation and shame for the Arabs, after all the sacrifices and struggle they had gone through for the past 30 years.

Japan also began to follow the path of understanding and justice for the Arab issues, or rather, it preceded Europe on this path. The UAE had a big role in this field. We opened a dialogue with Japan. We also sponsored the Japanese-Palestinian dialogue, and used our relations with Japan to serve this noble goal. Oil plays the primary role in our relations with Japan, since it is a political and economic commodity.

Through this Japanese-Palestinian dialogue, which we sponsored and encouraged, Japan recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people, and the right of the Palestinians to self-determination and to have a national homeland.

An office was also opened for the PLO and the Palestinian flag raised over the office building. The PLO used to have a representative in the Arab League office. The Japanese government and parliament began to deal with the PLO representative in Tokyo on the basis of mutual understanding and support.

Conscious Use

The UAE also undertook to open the same dialogue between the PLO and Italy and West Germany.

I suggested to the Germans, when I was visiting them last year, that a dialogue be started between the Palestine National Council and the German parliament, as a beginning, because it was not necessary to have just one method of dialogue between the PLO and any state, but several methods could be pursued, provided that they result in the same objective. That goal is recognition of the PLO as a sole, legal representative of the Palestinian people, and of the Palestinian people's full rights, led by their right to have a homeland.

I personally broached this matter to the French and British governments, when I visited them this year.

The purpose in mentioning all this is that the UAE, as a principal producer of oil, is attempting to play a modest role, by using this important and positive weapon, in times of peace, to gain friends and encourage the reluctant to take just positions, with respect to our national issues.

International Strategies and the Region's Will

Even in the Egyptian-Israel peace treaty, we find that oil had a political role, since Israel insisted that Egypt commit itself to supplying Israel with quantities of oil. This has, in fact, happened. The United States pledged, and President Carter promised, that the United States, in the event of a scarcity of oil materials for Israel, would supply Israel with its oil needs.

Then the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out, with all the international political and economic unrest it caused. It also caused the creation of rapid intervention forces, the need to protect the oil wells, and the fear of Communist expansion. This was in addition to the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. These movements by the major powers, whether Eastern or Western, had oil as the purpose behind them. Oil as a political and strategic commodity, not merely as a commercial commodity.

The Russians dream of reaching warm waters and of obtaining a share of this booty, while the Western nations try to keep this booty for themselves, because of the influence it has on their economies and the future of these economies. Therefore, the struggle rages furiously between the major powers and the various international blocs.

Therefore, we find that our role, which we must undertake, is to safeguard our independence, to keep away from the logics of influence and these struggles, to strengthen ourselves, and to cooperate with our brothers, who share with us the view of keeping international struggles out of our region.

Zionist Aggression and the Effectiveness of Oil

Then there was the recent incident of the strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor by Israel. We understand the negative effects left by this action upon the Arab soul. It is our memory of what happened in 1967, when Israeli aircraft bombed Arab aircraft, and the Arabs were subjected to a relapse, leaving behind impressions upon them that have lasted to this day.

The bombing of the Iraqi reactor, which is more than 1000km away, makes us see how the Zionist arm, with its unlimited support, can reach out to any area of the Arab World. Therefore, after this incident, there was unrest that the Arabs would use the oil weapon. The world financial market was convulsed, when the Arab foreign ministers met. Unrest still grips many observers and officials in various nations of the world, with respect to the Arabs using the oil weapon again.

I was in London, during this period, and several questions were put to me about the steps we would take to restore Arab honor, after this insult to their pride and morale.

I said that oil was also a political weapon, and had not lost its effectiveness, despite the glut on the world oil market. Arab oil will continue to be a political weapon in time of war and in time of peace.

We must not be influenced, we must be governed by our intellects. We must act wisely and with equilibrium, because he who loses control of his thought and his mind, cannot make a sound decision, especially if this decision relates to the fate of a community and the future of a nation.

7005
CSO: 4304/98

DH 174 MILLION ROAD PROJECTS

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 23 Jul 81 p 4

[Article: "174 Million Dirhams for New Road Projects in Abu Dhabi"]

[Text] Work is beginning on main roads projects in the central area of Abu Dhabi, in which most of the traffic, activities and population is concentrated.

This expansion includes widening the airport road, on which work has in fact begun, as well as Shaykh Khalifah, Hamadan, Zayid al-Thani, al-Fallah, and the rest of the streets which tie them together, such as al-Sallam, Zayid al-Awal, and King Khaled streets.

Engineer 'Azmi Abu Taleb, director of the office of city planning, in the municipality of Abu Dhabi, told AL-BAYAN that, in accordance with the orders issued by Shaykh Khalifah Ibn Zayid, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, deputy supreme commander of the armed forces, and chairman of the executive council, and in accordance with the instructions issued by Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Bati, chief of the office of the municipality of Abu Dhabi and city planning, work will start on these projects, which are included in the city's 5-year plan, during the next few months. At the present time, they are in the competitive bidding cycle.

Abu Taleb added that, when these projects are implemented, the availability of places set aside for waiting vehicles would be taken into consideration, along with areas required for pedestrian traffic and improvement of sidewalks, in addition to establishing new methods of handling various service lines, such as pipelines, electricity and water, so that they will be separate from the modernized main roads. This will ensure that there will be no obstacles to traffic movement, when emergency repairs are made.

He also added that these projects, which are in the competitive bidding cycle, will undertake a study of public bus routes in the city, the establishment of a main vehicle parking area, near al-Difa' gate, in addition to subsidiary parking areas in the various quarters.

He went on to say that there are other projects under implementation, which are included in the city's 5-year plan, such as completing the al-Difa' entrance bridge, the al-Riyadhiyah city bridge, and expanding the airport road. These projects amount to nearly 174 million dirhams.

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7 October 1981

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BRIEFS

LIBYA, IRAN ARMS DEAL--Iran is conducting negotiations with Libya on an agreement for the supply of a considerable amount of military equipment, our military correspondent Roni Daniyel reports. Iran's foreign minister, who is taking part in the rejection states' meeting in Bengazi, is seeking Libyan agreement to supply his country with arms, spare parts and ammunition. It is reported from Bengazi that there was an incident between the meeting's host, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, and the Iranian foreign minister--after which the Iranian delegation walked out of the meeting. [Text] [TA180730 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 18 Sep 81]

CSO: 4423/2

TUNISIA, QATAR, FRANCE BANK VENTURE NEARING COMPLETION

London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 pp 36-37

[Text] TUNISIA EXPECTS that tripartite banking schemes involving France and the Gulf states will play a major role in financing investment during its sixth Five Year Plan (1982-1986). The first venture — with Qatar as the Gulf participant — is nearing completion, and multinational development banks with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are also envisaged.

The document officially establishing the Banque Arabe Francaise Internationale (BAFI) will be signed in Tunis by representatives from Tunisia, France and Qatar either in late September or early October. The bank's initial capital has been set at Tunisian dinars 250m ($481m) with Tunisia providing 40 per cent, France 30 per cent and Qatar the remainder.

BAFI will be headed by a Tunisian, with Paris and Doha each appointing a deputy vice president. Major decisions need a 75 per cent majority, so all partners in the venture automatically have the power of veto.

The bank will assist the financing of important investment schemes in industry, agriculture and tourism. In addition, BAFI will be able to go to the euromarkets for medium to long term credits, and open up branches outside Tunisia.

When the idea of the bank was first mooted in June 1980 by Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali, Iraq was chosen as the Arab partner because of its close ties with France. However, the Gulf war forced Baghdad to withdraw from the venture. Invitations to take Iraq's place were sent to most oil-producing Gulf states, but Qatar was a favourite because of its close relations with France.

Then the Tunisians had to overcome the intransigence of the French state-controlled bank, Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), which was tipped to be the major French participant in the banking consortium. BNP negotiators insisted that the new multinational bank should specialise in financing French projects in Tunisia. This was unacceptable to Tunisian bankers, who want the new institution to be free to choose its projects and clients.

BNP also insisted that the French funds frozen in Tunisia since the country's independence in 1956 should be incorporated into BAFI's capital. As far as the Tunisian government was concerned, the question of the French funds was a matter for direct discussion between Paris and Tunis, and in the event talks with BNP were suspended.

During Premier Mzali's visit to Paris last February, the government of former president Giscard d'Estaing suggested that as a compromise Credit Agricole, another state-controlled bank, should take BNP's place.

Two months later in Doha, the Tunisian premier cemented the tripartite arrangement. The election of President Francois Mitterrand has not changed France's intention to go ahead with the venture and this was confirmed by Minister of External Affairs Claude Cheysson during his brief trip to Tunis in July.

Nonetheless, problems could develop with the Qatari end of the dea. The Doha government is worried about the inclusion of communist ministers in the new French cabinet, and the Qataris have reportedly withdrawn funds from French banks.

government is worried about the inclusion of communist ministers in the new French cabinet, and the Qataris have reportedly withdrawn funds from French banks.

The success of BAFI and other multinational banks, as well as the existing offshore banking units (OBUs) depends on the promised liberalisation of the country's banking legislation. The Banque Centrale de Tunisie (BCT) exercises total control over the 12 local commercial banks, limiting their foreign exchange dealings.

The activities of the fledgling OBU sector has been substantially curtailed by tight limits on profit margins in Tunisia, and as a result foreign operators prefer to go elsewhere. The four banks that set up OBUs in Tunis under the 1976 law — Citibank, the Bank of America, the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and the French-based Union Tunisienne de Banques (UTB) — have so far reported disappointing results.

CSO: 4500/1

SAUDI PAPER INTERVIEWS SENEGALESE OFFICIAL ON AFRO-ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 19 Jul 81 p 6

[Article on interview with Mustapha Sisi, Senegal's Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Executive Committee Chairman of the African Council for Islamic Coordination, by 'UKAZ: "An Afro-Islamic Conference Before Year's End to Discuss Affairs of the Islamic Message and Important Economic Projects"; date and place not specified]

[Text] An Afro-Islamic conference will be held before the end of 1981, under the auspices of the Muslim World League (MWL) in Mecca and the African Council for Islamic Coordination (ACIC) in Dakar, to discuss affairs of [preaching] the Islamic Message in the African continent.

This was announced by His Excellency Mustapha Sisi, Senegal's ambassador to the Kingdom and ACIC Executive Committee Chairman, who explained in his interview with 'UKAZ the council's task and its Islamic role on the African level.

He also talked about the council's activities. During the course of the interview, he lauded efforts exerted by the government of His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd Al-'Aziz in helping the Islamic countries and offering moral and financial support to the Islamic organizations in the African continent to enable them to carry out their work.

Commenting on the establishment of the ACIC and its tasks, Mustapha Sisi said at the beginning of the interview:

"The African Council for Islamic Coordination is a fully independent body, for it is not a political body at all. The council was established through an initiative by the MWL, which saw that the Islamic organizations in Africa are many and spread throughout the African continent and that they work toward the achievement of one aim. Therefore, the League called for convening an African conference in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. The conference, which comprised not less than 500 Islamic personalities, was attended by all the Islamic organizations in Africa. After discussions lasting two days, the conferees realized that it is necessary to have a coordinating body for the Islamic organizations, whose function is to coordinate, plan and create means of cooperation among these organizations, so that they will carry out their tasks of directing Muslims, in a true Islamic way, and preach the Islamic Message with all means available.

"Thus, this Islamic council was born in Nouakchott five years ago; it was chosen to be headquartered in Dakar, Senegal's capital. After that the council's executive committee was formed; I was elected its chairman. I am still in this position."

His excellency added:

"I remember that the current Senegalese President, His Excellency Abdou Diouf, who was a prime minister then, opened the first meeting of the executive committee in Dakar, with the attendance of the MWL secretary general and his assistants."

What will the coming meeting discuss?

On the council's forthcoming meeting, Sesi said: "We are about to convene an Islamic conference in Senegal before the end of this year, 1981, to discuss the affairs of the Islamic Message and the problems of Muslims, in order to work out adequate solutions for them. I had earlier held a meeting with the MWL Secretary General Shaykh Safwat Al-Saqqa to discuss this issue.

"The forthcoming Afro-Islamic conference will also discuss the creation of important economic projects benefiting Muslims and enabling them to carry out their duties of establishing hospitals, Islamic cultural centers, and schools for teaching Koran, religious sciences and sciences of the modern world, since the ideal Muslim should be aware of all the sciences which are of benefit to man."

The Kingdom Supports the Council.

On the Islamic countries' support for the ACIC, Mustapha Sisi said: "As a matter of fact, until now the council has not received moral support from some governments. However, it has received financial support from the Government of Saudi Arabia, which always supports Muslims.

"There is a cadre at the headquarters in Dakar; the employees of this body receive their salaries from the MWL. As I said, the council, until now, has been shouldering the responsibility of direction and coordination among the Islamic organizations; it functions as a link among them. It sends preachers and lecturers to African countries and distributes books to the organizations belonging to it.

"It is noteworthy that several national councils have been established. As you know the continent is divided into four parts: the North, South, East and West. Therefore, there is a national council in each of the four African regions. There are also national councils in each Islamic country. For example, there is a national federation for the local associations in Senegal; it comprises 35 associations, whose aim is to spread and teach the Arabic language since it is the language of Koran, religious education and the true Islamic Message. These 35 associations are spread in West Africa, where Senegal is a link between the Western Arab countries and the African countries."

9826
CSO: 4304/105

BENDJEDID SEEKS TO AFFIRM, LEGTIMIZE AUTHORITY

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "The Necessary Rearrangement of Choices in Algeria"]

[Text] The replacement of great men is always difficult. This is particularly the case when it takes place in an atmosphere of legality and in the name of continuity. The succession to the late President Houari Boumediene is no exception to the rule. In a period of 30 months since his death the shadow of the man who made a deep mark on the Algerian revolution and who fashioned the structure of the state has disappeared a little. Prominent visitors are certainly still invited to come and bow before his tomb. The present chief of state himself paid Boumediene this homage on 5 July, on the occasion of the 19th anniversary of independence. However, the press only rarely mentions his name and only occasionally makes reference to his speeches or to what he did. The anniversary of the "revolutionary rectification" of 19 June 1965, an expression approved by official speeches to mark the coup d'etat against Ben Bella, is celebrated with a growing discretion. Ben Bella himself has regained his freedom after 14 years of imprisonment.

If the memory of Boumediene is blurring, his successor as Algerian chief of state, President Chadli Bendjedid, has to fight no less hard a battle to impose his authority in a real sense. His designation as the candidate of the FLN Party, by a unanimous vote of the party congress in January, 1979, as well as his election as president the following week, with 99.51 percent of the valid ballots, should leave no illusions. The chief of state, in fact, was imposed on the country by the army at the end of a negotiation between two of the closest associates of the dead president, the minister of foreign affairs, Abdel-aziz Bouteflika, coordinator of the FLN, and Col Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui.

Will President Chadli Bendjedid be "picked up" by one of the clans which have just engaged in a ferocious dispute over power? Will he be, and for how long, a transitional president, managing the crisis and cooling off the clashes? On the contrary, will he succeed in affirming his authority? These are the questions which were raised in the aftermath of his election. Two and one-half years afterwards, and half-way through the presidential term, the last-mentioned hypothesis seems to be the right one, even if nothing has been definitely decided.

The task was all the more difficult for the new president, who was not prepared for it. When the Army appealed to him, Col Chadli commanded the Military Region of Oran. Moreover, it was in this capacity that he was included in the Council of the

Revolution in 1965, a body established by Boumediene to lead the country. He played no major political role in it and did not appear to have been given any particular mission. He never emerged from the performance of his military tasks, which no doubt won him the particular confidence of the army. He is not an ideologue, like his predecessor, but on the contrary is a pragmatist. Coming from a modest background, he is oriented to a popular form of Islam as well as to traditional values. His service in the Algerian War, his contact with poor farmers despoiled or exploited by colonialism sowed in him a certain demand for social justice which seems to relate more to morality than to political analysis.

He will have a tendency to model Algeria in his own image. He had to respect the fragile balances which came out of the party congress, and he needed to assemble his own team "as he went," by progressively eliminating certain men occupying responsible positions in order to bring others into them. This effort was all the more difficult since Bouteflika and Yahiaoui paid only lip service to his authority, as is the case, moreover, with the Boumediene old guard which is watching the strategic points of the state and, in particular, as it holds the Directorate of Military Security, the real political police of the regime.

The new chief of state must finally take into account, in the course of his activities, another constraint which serves him and annoys him at the same time: the need to reaffirm the continuity of the Algerian revolution, which has been elevated to the rank of a real myth. This myth is essential since it is the basis for the legitimacy of the present leadership team. It is therefore necessary to avoid anything which could appear as a rupture with the past. President Chadli is consequently required to exercise prudence in the face of his adversaries. However, the consensus in favor of legality and respect for established institutions works to his benefit in the sense that the Constitution gives him very extensive powers.

Safeguarded Powers

The first "victory" of the president consisted precisely in keeping these powers in their entirety, as they were at the time of the constitutional reform of 30 June 1979. There were many who suggested a revision of these powers in a more collegial direction. They were not supported. The length of the presidential term has, of course, been reduced from 7 to 5 years in order to match the periods between party congresses. However, the chief of state and secretary general of the FLN continues to preside over the government and to lead the army, since he holds the defense portfolio. The constitutional reform required him to designate a prime minister. However, the latter has only limited powers, "delegated" by the president of the republic, who remains the chief of government. The new constitutional text finally opens the possibility of naming one or several vice presidents, which has aroused considerable speculation. However, these posts have remained vacant, and the collegial procedure preached in the name of a "return to the sources" of the FLN, but which in fact was no doubt aimed at limiting the powers of the chief of state, has remained a dead letter.

Beyond the letter of the Constitution, Chadli Bendjedid had to confront men, and more particularly his two "rivals," Bouteflika and Yahiaoui. To tell the truth, the fate of the former figure was almost arranged already. Even if everything was

done so that is would not appear clearly at the time, the former leader of Algerian diplomacy was the big loser at the fourth congress of the FLN in January, 1979. At the end of the sessions of the congress he was certainly made a member of the political bureau which succeeded to the already dissolved Council of the Revolution. He was even a member of the government. However, as a minister counselor of the president, he had no grasp on any of the machinery of the state. He would henceforth attend government meetings very rarely.

In Algiers Bouteflika is openly described as the leader of the right wing, favoring the liberalization of the economy. That hardly does him justice. Certainly, Bouteflika has a considerable awareness of the inadequacies of the ultracentralized economic system established by Belaid Abdesselam and his team, its gaps, the blockages to which it led, its excessive cost, and the dependence on the West which it involved. He spoke out for a return to economic realism. He wanted to break up the bureaucratic choker around the economy and give more room to investment and to private initiative. President Chadli and his advisers say the same thing today. However, Bouteflika did not question the socialist choice already made and the dominant role of the state. In addition, for 15 years he was the incarnation of a foreign policy oriented to the support of liberation movements, non-alignment, and the establishment of a new international economic order. The Western countries, and particularly France, know to what extent he was a difficult and critical opposite number. Concerned with modernism and progress, including on the social plane and in the area of morals, more turned toward the Mediterranean than toward the Arab Middle East, he no doubt attracted the enmity and the hate of the Muslim fundamentalists.

However, in January, 1979, Bouteflika above all paid for his contacts with Boumediene, of whom he had appeared to be the designated successor for a long time. He also paid for his belonging to the "oujda group," whose most celebrated members, in addition to himself, are Medeghri, Cherif Belkacem, Tayebi Larbi, and Kaid Ahmed. The ranks of this clan had thinned out over the years, but, as an expression of the power of Western Algeria, it had attracted, in a country where regional passions are still very strong, a substantial amount of animosity on the part of men from Eastern Algeria, who clearly intended to take their revenge. Bouteflika, whose activity as a result of his position took place mostly outside the country, had no serious support in the state apparatus or in the army. He had lost from the beginning. His recent elimination from the political bureau only culminated a defeat which had been largely achieved after the fourth congress of the FLN and which was only revealed in stages for appearances' sake.

The elimination of Colonel Yahiaoui was not so easy. This 50-year old colonel enjoyed and still enjoys solid support in the party and among the military. Charged by Boumediene in 1977 with democratizing and dynamizing the FLN, he seemed to have succeeded in this task, initially bringing new men into the leadership of the mass organizations. The trade union members and the young people, above all, had confidence in him. As the former director of the military academy at Cherchell from 1969 to 1977, he had "Algerianized" this institution and had committed it in part to the retraining of former guerrillas, who were thus able to find a place in the army and were grateful to him for it. This man from the high plateaus--he was born in eastern Algeria in a modest family, like Boumediene--presents himself as one pledged to continue the work of the late president. His reputation for great integrity does not seem to be exaggerated. Resolutely socialist, he wants to establish the regime on popular bases and renovate the party by purging it of its opportunist or corrupt elements. This former taleb (teacher in a Koranic

school) is a convinced supporter of the process of Arabization--moreover, he himself has some difficulty in expressing himself in French--and of the Arab-Islamic traditions. For the lack of a better example, he could be defined as a "progressive Muslim."

The support which the Algerian communists gave him--whose support he accepted and appreciated, like the support he had from Moscow--were both skillfully exploited in January, 1979, to disqualify him in the eyes of the army. Anti-communism is one of the most tested tactics of Algerian political life. The officer corps preferred Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, but the latter had to take Colonel Yahiaoui into account and negotiate with him the composition of the Central Committee of the party, where the one who appeared as the leader of the left wing had brought in a number of his friends. As a member of the political bureau, he kept the task of party coordinator.

For nearly 18 months, from February, 1979, to June, 1980, Algeria therefore had a two-headed government. The accent was placed on the FLN, whose central apparatus was considerably strengthened and which saw an absolute primacy recognized for itself in the definition of directions for the country and the control of their application. Large committees provided with extensive powers were established for this purpose. Although, by virtue of the Constitution he incarnated the combined leadership of the party and the state, the president of the republic in fact did not control the FLN.

However, the latter remained paralyzed by personal quarrels and factional conflicts, as well as by the weight of a bureaucracy concerned above all with preserving its privileges. The party was to show its weakness, its inability to maintain a grasp on events, first in December, 1979, at the time of a long strike by students demanding the immediate Arabization of the entire administration. Then later, during the spring of 1980, at the time of the development of the Berber cultural conflict, which was to attain its culminating point in April, with the riots in Tizi-Ouzou.

There was nothing surprising, therefore, that Colonel Yahiaoui was accused before the Central Committee in June, 1980. The party had allegedly failed in its task of education and training of the masses. It did not have them under control. Not only had the coordinator not known how to maintain order, the first and permanent concern among the military, but also he was suspected of having encouraged disorder by supporting the students favoring immediate Arabization in a hidden way and by provoking the Kabyles of eastern Algeria in order to be able to repress them later. The Central Committee was called on by the spokesmen of the army to recognize the full and entire authority of the chief of state. He was forced to bow before what certain persons would not hesitate calling "a real coup d'etat." The post of party coordinator was abolished, as were the large committees. The fact that Colonel Yahiaoui was kept in the political bureau, a political bureau moreover reduced to the role of a figurehead, had no other purpose, once again, than managing the transition. The last stage was reached at the time of the reorganization of the political bureau on 2 July 1981, which involved the simultaneous departure from it of two former pretenders to the succession to the president. This was a false kind of symmetry tending to diminish what was felt by the left wing to be a new defeat.

For the progressive Algerians the evolution of the regime to the right is less and less a matter of doubt. However, there are few who challenge the need to rearrange the choices made by Abdesselam's team and to make corrections in the system which he established. The proposals put forward in this regard by Abdelhamid Brahimi, minister of planning and national development, a very close associate of the chief of state whose economic and social policy he inspires, seemed the only ones capable of restoring a badly damaged situation. The choice in favor of massive industrialization involved the formation of a modern industrial sector bringing together 17 ultracentralized, national companies employing 350,000 workers. Their low level of productivity was as shocking as the fact that they needed colossal investments, consuming the largest proportion of the oil revenues of the country and even mortgaging future petroleum income because of the size of the debt incurred. This unambiguous choice certainly had some positive effects, particularly in the matter of jobs, but it also led to the sacrifice of an agricultural system which, moreover, was not without advantages. It further led to financial and technological dependence on the industrialized countries and to the neglect of the essential needs of a population which, with one of the highest growth rates in the world, has already doubled in 20 years. In a society which is rapidly becoming urban and where the conditions of daily life are hard--a dramatic shortage of housing, inadequate urban equipment, frequent shortages of water, chronic inflation, lack of adequate distribution systems, bureaucratic problems--managers and workers in industry are privileged figures, thanks to the application of an advanced social policy in this sector. These advantages--dispensaries and private medical service, higher salaries, canteens, distibution cooperatives, vacation camps for children--may appear modest, compared to those of Western workers. However, the other Algerian workers, and especially those in the administration, look at these advantages as so many instances of inequality, all the less justified since they are not the result, in general, of higher productivity but are financed by petroleum receipts.

It is therefore necessary to re-establish the broken equilibrium: to restore elementary economic principles, such as the law of supply and demand, the link between salaries and productivity, encouragement of individual initiative by providing a minimum profit, at least, in commerce. The government is trying to do that, but it has made certain choices in that direction--decentralization, restructuring companies, reducing the range of salaries, unification of the sanitary services--which have aroused misunderstanding, distrust, and even the hostility of officials who have often given the best of themselves for years and accept, only with difficulty, seeing their work and their methods questioned. The trials of some of them for mismanagement, which have been concluded in some cases by an acquittal pure and simple, have not been likely to dissipate their reservations toward the government effort. Quite the contrary. As for the workers, they have decided to protect their "achievements" and are less and less hesitant to launch "wildcat" strikes. These have occurred on many occasions in the last few months and at times have been repressed with violence.

The "progressives," and among them the communists of the Socialist Avant-Garde Party (PAGS) in fact suspect the chief of state of wanting to empty the socialist choice made by the country of all its meaning and of only keeping its appearances under the pretext of wanting to carry out reforms. They point out as evidence the measures taken against them to eliminate them from positions of responsibility in the mass organizations, and particularly in the trade unions. To counter the influence

of the communists in the government enterprises, the FLN party is establishing cells there which complete with the affiliates of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA). This offensive has developed particularly since the appointment in June, 1980, of Messaadia, an old hand in the FLN apparatus, to the post of permanent secretary of the Central Committee. He is a determined opponent of Colonel Yahiaoui. The zeal shown by Messaadia has not gone for nothing, but quite the contrary, since he was promoted in July, 1981, to the political bureau.

The Influence of the Progressives

The influence of the progressives no doubt would be greater if, since 1970 and the launching of the agrarian revolution, they had not "stuck" to the regime under a policy of "critical support" in order, they say, "to be in a position to influence the choices it makes." Thus they have taken on themselves the heavy responsibility of cautioning against the building of a system of state capitalism imposed from above without much consideration for the economic and social realities and without real participation by the people. As a result, they can hardly appear as a credible alternative in the face of difficulties of the present situation. However, how can one fail to understand their concern over the rising force of Muslim extremist currents which seem to have an influence even within the very center of the government? It is not so much the construction of mosques throughout the whole country which is in question as the strong social and political pressure exerted more and more openly by those who are called, for convenience, the "Muslim brothers." Having recourse to violence without hesitation, the latter are opening prayer rooms in administrative offices, in factories, in the universities. In the university faculties they do not shrink from real commando operations against young men suspected of "Marxism," whether of not they are members of the very officially approved Nation Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA). It happens that some of the latter have been dragged before improvised "popular tribunals" to answer for their "crimes." The "Muslim brothers" sometimes take hotel bars or merchants selling alcoholic beverages as their targets. They visit families and advise parents to dress their daughters in clothing presented as the only kind conforming to the precepts of religion: a long, flowing, dull-colored dress leaving nothing uncovered except the eyes, and without any kind of make-up. A matter of conviction? Family pressure? A desire thus to be sure of peace in public places in this way, or is it even a wish to follow a new style which may at times be attractive? In any case the "Muslim sisters," to use a popular expression, are more and more numerous in the streets of the large cities, even if the phenomenon remains very much restricted to a minority. A more serious matter is the fact that one sees an expansion in the number of so-called "wild" mosques which are not under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and where it is not unusual to hear the Imams question, sometimes in violent terms, the government and the socialist option. One often hears it said, "Boumediene would never have permitted that." The massive industrialization program, the exodus from the rural areas, the development of the school system, the contact with the West and, above all, with France through emigrants but also through French volunteers, have profoundly overturned a society already traumatized by the liberation war. The traditional structures, and especially the families, have broken into pieces, like the values which they carried with them. For a number of disoriented young people Islam appears to be a solution or at least a refuge. The leaders are aware of this and use it, with more or less success, in controlling this "deep wave" which is breaking on the

whole Muslim world, from Tehran to Rabat. They do not hesitate before a certain kind of auctioning process. "We have no Islamic lessons to learn from anyone," President Chadli Bendjedid likes to repeat. Since his coming to power he has already gone to Mecca twice. And recently he went as far as stating before the Central Committee, "Our ideology is Islam."

Facing the Rise of the Islamic Current

Such views are a matter of concern for the defenders of the socialist option. What kind of Islam are they talking about, in fact? The statements made by the minister of religious affairs, Abderrahmane Chibane, on 3 July 1981 on the occasion of the beginning of Ramadan, are not of a kind likely to reassure them. He said, "Whoever denies the obligatory character of fasting may be sentenced to death. His body will neither be washed, nor wrapped in a shroud, nor buried in a Muslim cemetery. Regarding those who recognize the obligatory character of fasting but do not repect it, they are liable to corporal punishment, imprisonment, and being deprived of food and water." Such punishments are in no way provided for by Algerian law, which respects freedom of conscience, even if Algerian law proclaims Islam to be the religion of the state. And, coming from a member of the government, this kind of speech risks being considered by some people as an encouragement to take justice into their own hands. Perhaps an even more revealing fact is that the same minister stated, at the 14th seminar on Islamic thought in September, 1980, "Nationalism if impotent by itself in providing the matrix for cultural behavior... It is certainly out of an awareness of this fact that President Chadli Bendjedid sought to re-establish a hierarchy of values by placing faith in God above any other allegiance."

Some people ask themselves therefore if the Algerian revolution has not entered on the path to a "petty bourgeois Islamic socialism," which would have for its principal characteristics the development of the middle classes through access to property and the encouragement of the private sector; the satisfaction of a thirst for consumption by massive recourse to imports; the application of distributive social justice, as Islam denies the existence of classes; the exaltation of traditional values and socio-cultural practices, particularly as they concern the status of women; finally, the struggle against foreign ideologies and cultural influences, whose "harmfulness" is frequently denounced by a newspaper like CHAAB, an Algeirs daily newspaper published in Arabic.

Would such an evolution of the regime be enough to hold off the pressure of Muslim fundamentalists by joining them, a pressure which manifests itself in the country in a way which still seems confused and which seems to find many sources of finance outside the country. This is not clear, as the Muslim fundamentalists are finding in the shortcomings of Algerian society, and particularly in the developement of social inequalities, choice arguments for their propaganda. On the other hand such an orientation would apparently complete the rupture with the Muslim or marxist "progressives." Some 20 years after independence was achieved, when new generations are appearing who did not know colonialism, the nationalist unanimity of the Algerian revolution seems to be undergoing a rude test. Encouraged by the climate of relative freedom of expression which has been established in place of the struggle of rival clans for the control of the government, the ideological debate is going on at full force, and the notion of a single front, until now maintained against any kind of pressure, might well not survive a radicalization of these struggles.

"L'Algerie:" an educational publication in which the presentation of the principal contemporary aspects of Algerian development (population, industry, agriculture, transportation, urbanization, schools) is illustrated by a series of 21 photographs with commentary. A summary sets out the essential characteristics of the country in the geographic, demographic, and economic areas. (La Documentation Francaise, in "La Documentation Photographique" series, No 6,054, August, 1981, F 24, 124 Rue H Barbusse, 93308 Aubervilliers Cedex)

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VETERANS' MINISTER DISCUSSES PEOPLE-ARMY TIES

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 913, 21-27 Aug 81 pp 12-16

[Interview with Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche, minister of veterans, on the occasion of the celebration of the national holiday of 20 August, commemorating the general offensive of 20 August 1955, by Y O M, a REVOLUTION AFRICAINE staff correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] On the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of 20 August, Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche, member of the Central Committee and minister of veterans, has given us an interview in which he recalls for us the meaning of this date and the situation in society in which those who achieved our national liberation find themselves.

[Question] The date of 20 August 1981 brings back to us 26 years of struggle, effort, and sacrifices made by the veterans who provided the impulse for the armed and social revolution undertaken and continued by the nation. What significance and what importance should be attached to the celebration of this anniversary?

[Answer] Just one year after the beginning of our struggle for independence, a memorable date was to be engraved in history forever. This was the date of 20 August, a date which will remain historic and essential to the history of the Algerian revolution, since it is the concrete expression of the solidarity and the intimate alliance of the people with their army. The armed offensive of 20 August 1955, by its material and human sacrifices, proved to the enemy that the Algerian revolution had been organized on the military plane. The Soummam Congress of 20 August 1956, a natural extension of this historic date, was to establish the political bases of a revolution engaged in liberating the country.

[Question] Could you recall for the younger generation the impact and the historic framework in which this event took place and its repercussions in the Arab world and the African continent?

[Answer] The breadth of the revolution, both in national as well as international terms, made it imperative to define a political program. Thus it was that on 20 August 1956 the Soummam Congress adopted a political-military platform which, in addition to bringing the general situation up to date, consolidated the organization of the struggle and set it up in coherent form both within the country as well as

abroad. The Algerian revolution, which had become a reality difficult for the colonial power to conquer, forced the latter to adopt a new colonial strategy to break the will of the people. By granting autonomy to Tunisia and Morocco it sought to concentrate all its forces in Algeria.

[Question] Still in the same context, could you recall for us the conditions in which the Soummam Congress was held and set out for us again its objectives and the principal results achieved?

[Answer] The Soummam Congress was a necessity which was felt by all of our soldiers. It was the faith animating the soldiers. The need to drive out the occupying power imposed on those engaged in the revolution not only an armed struggle but also the organization of that struggle.

Thus it was that on the political-military plane the ALN [National Liberation Army] was to consolidate the unity of its strategy by the planning and coordination of ways and means to be adopted to achieve the liquidation of the colonial system.

Regarding domestic objectives, the congress aimed at the mobilization and organization of all the healthy energies of the Algerian people in order to achieve the liquidation of the colonial system.

The external objectives included:
--the internationalization of the Algerian problem.
--the achievement of North African unity in its natural, Arab-Muslim framework.
--within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, the expression of our active sympathy toward all nations which would support our liberation struggle.

In order to achieve the objectives listed above, the congress provided for a reorganization of the existing Algerian structures, as follows:

I) Organization of the Army;
   a) Organization of the command structure
   b) Organization of the wilaya [province] structure
      1) A political and military leader (rank of colonel)
      2) A military deptuy (rank of major)
      3) A political deputy (rank of major)
      4) A deputy charged with coordination, information, and intelligence (rank of major)

II) Organization of combat units
   a) The battalion
   b) The katiba [company]
   c) The section
   d) The group

III) Administrative organization
   a) Health service
   b) Equipment service
   c) Liaison service
   d) Intelligence service
   e) Financial service
   f) War materiel service
   g) Press and information service

[Question] It would be useful to recall the organization of the FLN and the ALN, established by those who are now veterans. Also, from 1 November 1954 to 20 August 1955, what were the principal stages experienced by our revolution?

[Answer] The beginning of the armed struggle on 1 November 1954 was an outcome of the revolutionary dynamism of the Algerian people. Thus, the general offensive of 20 August 1955 proved unquestionably that the Algerian revolution was not a revolt of an anarchical, localized character, without coordination, without political leadership, and doomed to failure. Rather, it was a true revolution, organized, national and popular in character, and led by an army capable of guiding it to final victory.

Although the beginning of the armed struggle was carried on with a variety of weapons, it was due to the effective organization of the ALN, which was formed progressively, that the combat soldiers were able to go through several important stages:
--Repair of weapons obtained from a variety of sources.
--Picking up many weapons seized from the enemy in the course of combat.
--Local manufacture of certain munitions (grenades, bombs, etc).

[Question] Today, the veterans are part of the active forces of the nation. Their responsibility is total in passing the ideological, political, and revolutionary torch to the younger generation. In this connection what are the actions taken by your ministry to complete writing the history of the armed revolution?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the survival of peoples is conditioned by the survival of their history and by their glorification of their heroes' grandeur. The Algerian people have suffered martyrdom in all its forms, including that form which consisted of burying its history. This would have succeeded, had it not been for the vigilance of its sons who gave the best of themselves to seize our freedom. For this reason it is essential to record and to describe all the events relating to our liberation struggle. This must be done to record in concrete form the firm will of our people, expressed clearly in this sense in the National Charter. This noble mission is incumbent on the present generation, from which, more than from any other, it is demanded that it describe the price of our historic patrimony, which will constitute the message to be transmitted to future generations.

In this sense, in the institutional framework, within the Ministry of Veterans there is a Directorate of Historical Research, whose objective is to stimulate and to encourage the taste for research among the younger generation, which did not have the occasion to experience the war of liberation.

Historical research is a matter for everyone. Nevertheless, for the present the Ministry of Veterans has undertaken a large-scale, nationwide effort for the construction of regional museums, commemorative markers, monuments and restoration of historical places connected with the war of national liberation, construction of cemeteries for the fallen [chouhada]. In addition, campaigns for the collection of documents, objects, personal effects, statements related to the liberation struggle are carried on regularly. Elsewhere, it is appropriate to recall the reconstruction of the National Veterans' Museum established to preserve this form of our national, historical patrimony.

To complete this whole historical chapter, it has been decided to give priority to establish a complete national collection of monographs on the liberation war. In the future the Ministry of Veterans will recommend in particular:
--establishment of a commission which will have the role of preparing a textbook on the history of the national liberation war, to be included in educational programs.
--encouragement of researchers to take in hand the writing of history.
--establishment of a commission charged with encouraging and considering the correctness of film production on this subject.
--organization of seminars and competitions on the different themes of the liberation struggle.

[Question] Regarding social action and reintegrating veterans into national life, could you give us an overall picture of the different forms of action undertaken on behalf of the veterans?

[Answer] The social protection of the veterans and their heirs, recognized and provided for in the basic laws in effect in this country, has been accomplished by many and varied actions undertaken by our ministry. The different measures taken up to the present are included in a policy of social action aimed at improving the living conditions of the veterans and their heirs.

For example, we can give some figures to provide a better appreciation of the impact of these different actions:
--in 1981 alone the sum of 1.7 billion Algerian dinars has been allocated solely for pensions, as a consequence of the relatively recent decision on the indexation of pensions to the guaranteed minimum wage.
--in the area of jobs more than 71,000 persons have been provided employment in different sectors, divided as follows:

a) public sector: 25,000 people.
b) economic and industrial sector: 45,000 people.
c) agricultural sector: 11,000.

--licenses distributed up to the present are as follows:

a) taxi licenses: 14,648
b) tobacco store licenses: 10,063.
c) alcoholic beverage licenses: 6,535.
d) provision of commercial premises: 2,163.
e) transportation routes in rural areas: 170.
f) yellow cards: 185.

--provision of loans: loans for the veterans and their heirs have been extended in several phases:

a) 1969 program: this involved 638 veterans. The sectors concerned included the commercial sector (495 loans); the industrial sector (80 loans); the transportation sector (large trucks: 7; small trucks: 1); the animal husbandry sector (37 loans); the agricultural sector (18 loans).
b) 1974 program: this program involved 718 veterans. It would be appropriate to distinguish between loans allocated for the purchase of trucks and loans provided for veterans who invested in different sectors of activity. These sectors included the commercial sector (7 loans); the industrial sector (21 loans); loans for the purchase of large trucks (403); loans for the purchase of small trucks (287).
c) the loan program which has been progressively applied since 1969 has provided 1,356 loans whose total value up to the present is 1,311,631,550 Algerian dinars.

Beside the programs directly linked with the improvement of the living conditions of veterans and their heirs, there are also other programs which have been carried out at other levels, such as:

a) medical-social action: three centers for providing artificial limbs for wounded veterans were established in 1966 in Algiers, Stif, and Wahran. These centers provide prosthetic and orthopedic devices, as well as accessories and repair services. As an illustration, these centers in 1980 distributed more than 9,914 orthopedic shoes and devices. Four rest homes established in Guelma, Hammam Righa, Hammam Bouhadjar, and Saida provide for the reception, housing, and treatment of 1,500 veterans per year. Widows of soldiers killed during the liberation war [chahid] travel free of charge on the entire domestic transportation network.

b) training and orientation: following independence the problem relative to the care of the children of our martyrs [chouhada] became acute. To deal with this situation the state established 54 orphan asylums charged with providing education and schools for more than 10,000 children. Considering the rapid evolution of the age pyramid of these young children, beginning in 1974 different forms of action have been undertaken to provide for the orientation and placement in educational and training institutions in order to place them later in the economic and social life of the country. These young people continue to benefit from several advantages, such as clothing, school supplies, and follow-up teacher assistance. Further, five training centers for the traditional arts (CFAT) were progressively established, beginning in 1973, in order to provide for the training of our martyrs' children and for veterans who failed to pass through the regular school system. These centers at present provide for training in the following disciplines: design and decoration, sculpture and wood-carving, ceramics, embroidery, cutting and sewing tapestry. These different centers, up to the present, have trained more than 1,700 students, who have received diplomas in the areas noted above. The training program is not limited to the children of our martyrs but is also extended to veterans, since the latter have priority of admission in training programs organized by companies by which they are employed. They also have priority to undertake higher studies through special sessions.

[Question] What prospects can be foreseen for veterans and their heirs in terms of pensions, jobs, training, and medical care?

[Answer] Although praisworthy efforts have been made to clear up all applications for pensions, it is nonetheless true that a substantial number of applications remain to be acted on. In view of this situation and considering the advanced age of our veterans, the Ministry of Veterans is presently undertaking short term action:
--consideration and rapid and definitive action taken on pending applications.
--in clearing up these cases inquiry committees have been set up at the regional and provincial levels.
--the medical control commission has set the following objective for itself:

a) to consider and to regularize the pensions of deceased veterans who were wounded during the liberation war, at the definitive rate of 100 percent.

b) deceased veterans would not have to have their heirs provide the details of their applications. Legislation must be prepared for this purpose to benefit the heirs.

c) reform commissions should facilitate medical expert procedures for older veterans.
d) a proposed IPP base rate of 50 percent could be granted to veterans over 55 years of age, without needing to be submitted to medical reviews which take too long to complete.

The ministry at present is trying to make up for all accumulated delays, particularly in order to consider disputed applications, to avoid requiring the veterans to travel some distance to be heard. The definitive completion of action on pension applications is presently being achieved by harmonious medical and administrative action. The forthcoming resolution of the veterans' applications will facilitate and speed up consideration of other applications.

Regarding medical care, different proposals for the establishment of new centers are in the course of implementation. Their location will be in the vicinity of various hot bath centers: Hammam Bouhanifia, Hammam Essalihine, Hammam Zelfana, El-Kala Center, and Hammam Bouhadjar.

Concerning training and jobs, various regulations are either being prepared or are being applied. The following examples can be given in this connection:
--the organization of special classes to prepare the children of our martyrs for university study when they have reached third year in high school will begin to become a reality, beginning this year.
--broadening the priority of our martyrs' children for professional training in the different sectors of economic activity.
--expanding the opportunities for training for the children of deceased veterans and the children of seriously crippled, wounded veterans.
--regarding retirement, draft legislation has been prepared to improve further the pensions provided to veterans.
--for veterans still active, special provisions are contained in the regulations for the application of the general law of the worker, particularly as they concern the availability of jobs.
--at the organizational level tasks have been simplified with a view to facilitating the work of administrative employees.

Finally, it is appropriate to point out that the state has decided to provide aid to veterans in the form of loans. Thus, the appropriation bill for 1981 and a variety of decisions by the interministerial council encourage this kind of program. In fact this kind of action is aimed at a double goal: on the one hand to improve the situation of veterans and, on the other hand, to permit veterans having certain aptitudes and qualifications to make their contribution to the work of national development.

The object is to create the conditions for the transition of the veteran from his status as an assisted person to that of a party taking a role in the building of the national economy.

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VETERANS' GROUP HEAD STRESSES IDENTITY, REVOLUTION

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 913, 21-27 Aug 81 pp 9-11

[Interview with Youcef Yaalaoui, secretary general of the ONM (National Veterans' Organization), on the occasion of the celebration of the national holiday of 20 August, commemorating the general offensive of 20 August 1955, by Y O M, a REVOLUTION AFRICAINE staff correspondent; date and place not specified]

> [Text] On the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of 20 August, REVOLUTION AFRICAINE had an interview with Youcef Yaalaoui, member of the Central Committee, secretary general of the ONM, in which he explains the political and historical meaning of this commemoration. He also raises with a member of our staff questions relative to the writing of history, to the situation in which Algerian veterans find themselves, and to the future concerns of youth.

[Question] Our revolution is celebrating the anniversary of 20 August 1955. Under what theme does the National Veterans' Organization place this event?

[Answer] First of all, we have to thank the Algerian press for the importance which it is giving to this historic event of 20 August. The theme under which this event is celebrated today is that of national unity and revolutionary continuity for the younger generation. It is therefore under this double symbol that the festivities marking this historic event will unfold. This event still contains the same meaning as in the past: it refers to our struggle, to our identity as a unit, and to revolutionary continuity. These are principles which made it possible for the Algerian people to persevere to final victory and, today, to put in concrete form the ideals for which the veterans fought.

[Question] What is the function of the veterans' organization in the mobilization of the soldiers of yesterday in the achievement of today's ideals?

[Answer] We consider that today's objectives must lead to the achievement of a better life for each citizen and the building of a healthy society, based on social justice and from which the exploitation of man by man has been banished. We veterans are acting and working for these principles and objectives and for their constant broadening and deepening. These are the principles which have guided the actions of men who have come out of the ALN [National Liberation Army] and the FLN [National

Liberation Front]. It could not be otherwise today, because it is this heritage and these ideas which the younger generation should take upon itself, take in charge, and perpetuate for the building of our society and of our nation.

[Question] Could you give us your views on the situation and on the evolution of your organization?

[Answer] The organization is going through a very favorable evolution. For those whose responsibilities do not permit their active presence within the organization, we must say that they still remain attached to the ideals of the organization. A considerable number of veterans are members of the organization, not to mention the fact that 80 percent of them are at the same time members of the FLN Party, are officials of the party and of the state.

We can say that, in terms of its structure and of the resolution of veterans' problems, the organization has gone through important stages and, within the party and the nation, holds the place proper to it and it is assuming the missions which have been turned over to it by the revolution.

[Question] Your organization has a very important role to play in writing the history of the national liberation struggle. It should, in particular, assemble the principal eyewitness accounts and documents, which are the bases for all historical work. What is the contribution of the ONM to this task, to which the congresses and the meetings of the Central Committee of the FLN Party attach particular attention?

[Answer] Today history is still not written on solid bases and in accordance with laws. Many things have been written, of course, but in a disorganized and not very rational way. Further, it is even more regrettable that it was foreigners, in particular senior officers of the colonialist army, who attempted to write our history from only their point of view, without any kind of objectivity. Further, other persons wave written in their own name or for commercial motives suited to the interests of the publishers.

That is what has been done in this area--very little accomplished in a scientific, rigorous, and controlled fashion and without any mass distribution to the citizenry through the press, television and radio.

The fifth session of the Central Committee, in the framework of the application of cultural policy, has placed emphasis on this aspect of the need for the writing of history. We are going to organize a conference in the last week of October which will bring together historians, professors, writers, and responsible officials who participated in or experienced the liberation struggle, in order to study the ways and means of making a rigorous effort to write history. This meeting will constitute a beginning to provide the ideological bases and the human and material means on which this work should rest. This will involve questions such as the collection of documents, eyewitness accounts, the museum of the revolution, and regional and even local museums. It is necessary to leave to future generations the evidence of the greatness of their history, of their people, and of their nation.

[Question] Various efforts have been undertaken on behalf of veterans and of their heirs. How does the ONM envisage improving the situation affecting veterans?

[Answer] The conditions for an improvement in the situation affecting veterans come down to drafting the texts of laws and regulations. Various stages have been completed, and problems have been dealt with in terms of pensions, reclassification, and promoting the interests of veterans. The party, the state, the mass organizations, the various institutions--all of them have contributed to an improvement in the situation of veterans and their heirs. However, much remains to be done. It is difficult to wipe out and put an end to the heritage of colonialism, which sowed death and destruction during 132 years of pillage, 7 and 1/2 years of war, and which caused the death of 1 and 1/2 million martyrs. The will exists to reach durable and viable solutions to veterans' problems. A strategy exists today on this subject and it will lead to the completion, in a vigorous way, of the efforts and actions already undertaken.

[Question] What will be the future actions of your organization in the present phase of the mobilization of the energies of all those in active life in achieving the objectives of the revolution and applying the decisions of the party and of the organization itself?

[Answer] The essential role of the organization, according to the National Charter, is and remains safeguarding the values of the revolution and of the components of our national identity. We remain attached to these objectives while we undertake various kinds of action. Of course, this is in addition to the work of the organization in the activities of the FLN Party. For veterans a range of actions has been undertaken in terms of training, culture and professional guidance, and to improve the situation of veterans and obtain recognition of their legitimate rights.

[Question] Today's youth, called on to replace their elder brothers, the veterans who died on the battlefields, and carrying on a ceaseless struggle for the progress and well-being of the nation, have decided to continue, under other forms, the struggle which began on 1 November 1954. What message do you have for these young people?

[Answer] Our young people are dear to us. They are of our blood and, as is the case for all those who are dear to us, we wish for them their well-being and progress in terms of healthy and noble orientation toward the future. The veterans did not fight in order to live but rather in order to die, so that young people might live in liberty and dignity. Young people should attach themselves to this ideal and make it a reality in order to keep the promises of their elder brothers. Liberation is not only that of our country and of our fatherland. It is also the elimination of every form of alienation from one's own culture and the re-establishment of our language, our culture, our religion, our personality. Liberation is also that. Certainly, we turn the page on the past from time to time, but our youth, in order to follow the path of their elder brothers, must perpetuate the love of the fatherland and our Arab-Islamic values and must constantly feel the grandeur of their history. It is toward these ideals that we call upon today's youth to work with determination, without any withdrawal into themselves, nor shunning the outside world. On the contrary, the complete development of our youth demands an opening out toward the external world in order to learn and capitalize on the experiences of others, in order to open themselves continuously toward other horizons in our contemporary world. This is the way that our youth will continue the work of yesterday's youth. This is the message which we would like to address to them on this occasion.

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CSO: 4519/50

ENERGY COOPERATION WITH JAPAN OUTLINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 41

[Text]

JAPAN'S wooing of Algeria as its biggest market in the Maghreb region is bearing fruit. The most significant recent development is the Algerian award to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of a $54m contract to instal gas-lifting facilities in the Zarzaitine oil field.

The order, issued from Algeria's state-run oil corporation, Sonatrach, is still provisional and subject to formal approval by the Algerian government, due in September. It represents the second major construction order since the visit to Algiers by a powerful economic mission headed by Yoshihiro Inayama, president of Japan's Federation of Economic Organisations (Keidanren), in April.

Inayama is reported to have had extensive talks with the Algerian finance minister, Mohammed Hadj Yala, for 'positive' Japanese involvement in Algeria's current five-year economic plan.

The first project contracted for on the basis of Keidanren's pledge has a $270m petroleum gas liquefaction installation at Hassi Rmel, 650 km south of Algiers. It went to Kobe Steel through the Marubeni Corporation. The plant, to be completed in 1985, will liquefy 1.2m tonnes of petroleum gas a year.

Japan's Export-Import Bank (Exim Bank) is to finance the export by providing a 'buyer's credit'.

Economic sources say that behind the Keidanren pledge of 'positive cooperation' with Algeria's economic programme is Japan's desire to cultivate Algeria as Japan's biggest outlet for commodities and technology in the Maghreb area. After the second oil crisis Japan, following its basic policy of diversifying its sources of oil supply, stepped up its search for other sources in Africa, Latin America and other areas.

It was only in 1980 that Japan imported any appreciable amount of oil and oil-related products from Algeria. Total imports from Algeria in that year stood at $451m, close to an eight-fold increase from the $57m of imports in 1979. In 1978, the total was only $38m. Until 1980, trade between Algeria and Japan was one-sided in Japan's favour. Last year that trade was more or less balanced.

At the end of 1979, the cumulative total for trade cooperation amounted to $108m, used for improving and expanding communications facilities.

Direct loans from the Exim Bank at the end of 1979 stood at $588m. This was all committed to Sonatrach, for projects including gas processing.

CSO: 4500/1

SOLUTION TO LNG PRICE DISPUTE WITH FRANCE REPORTED NEAR

London 8 DAYS in English 29 Aug 81 pp 54-55

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

A SOLUTION to the bitter twenty-month row between France and Algeria over LNG prices is at last on the way, and could be officially announced at the November summit between Presidents Mitterrand and Chadli.

France, like the US, has refused Algeria's demand to link its LNG price to its high-grade crude oil on a heat-content basis. But during the visit to Algiers earlier this month by Claude Cheysson, France's external affairs minister, both sides agreed to work out a modus vivendi.

Since last spring Algeria has been fully honouring its two existing LNG contracts with the French utility, Gaz de France (GDF), but it warned it would make no deliveries for a third, and larger, deal before an acceptable compromise was reached. Algeria offered to change the initial indexation formula, by replacing as benchmark its own expensive crude with a basket of Middle East and North Sea oils. This would have reduced the price per million British thermal units (Btus) of LNG from $7.07 dollars to around $5.50.

The French, however, still find this too high. Under the old indexation formula they are still paying only $4.25 per million Btus — and moreover are loath to accept the principle of gas-oil equivalence lest it might jack up the cost of future natural gas imports to an insupportable level.

Thus the task of hammering out a compromise solution will fall to a special 'committee of wise men' whose recommendations will form the basis of a new round of negotiations between GDF and Sonatrach.

French energy experts have warned their government about the cost of conceding too much to the Algerians. Firstly, they point out that excessive 'generosity' towards Algiers would immediately encourage Soviet negotiators to raise the ante in the current talks on the purchase of an additional 8bn cubic metres per year of Siberian gas, starting in 1985-86.

Also, an excessive rise in gas import prices can only boost French inflation, now running around the 16 per cent level. Since last spring, the average price of gas for French consumers has risen by 28.5 per cent. Finally, a higher gas import bill would add several hundred million dollars a year to the growing French trade deficit, predicted to be near $15bn this year.

The two-year transitional energy programme, which will be presented to the French parliament next autumn, projects that natural gas will provide 17 per cent of the country's energy consumption, or 39m tonnes of oil equivalent, by 1990. Algeria is slated to supply about 20 per cent of this total.

The coming negotiations will undoubtedly be hardnosed, for President Mitterrand's personal adviser on energy matters is Gerard Renon, who previously represented GDF in gas talks with Sonatrach. Because of his often intractable position his Algerian counterparts dubbed him Monsieur Non. For all that, the political will to reach compromise on LNG is now evident on both sides. Indeed, French officials hope that a future Franco-Algerian LNG accord will serve as a model for more equitable North-South relations.

CSO: 4500/1

BRIEFS

TALENZANE OIL EXPLORATION--France's state-owned Elf-Aquitaine oil company is to start exploration in September over 9,000 sq km of Algeria's Talenzane area, the rights to which were granted last September. Elf, though in partnership with the Algerian state oil and gas company, Sonatrach, will bear all exploration costs. Development costs and subsequent liftings will be shared, 60 per cent to Sonatrach and 40 per cent to Elf. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 47]

CSO: 4500/1

TWO-PART REPORT ON EGYPTIAN WORK FORCE AT HOME, ABROAD

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 6, 7 Jul 81

[6 Jul 81 p 3 Part I]

[Article by Muhammad al-Barad'i]

[Text] First study of its kind reveals all the secrets of government employees.
How do they work? What do they produce? What are their difficulties and their dreams?
[What to do] before the Egyptian civil servant turns turns into a major puzzle inside government offices.
Working women now make up 16 percent of the number of employees.
Cairo has the lion's share of government employees; there are 708,000 employees in the offices of ministries: a rate of 40 percent of public service employees.
Civil servants achieve the highest degrees of learning while others in a grade two position are illiterate.

In the course of a lengthy journey inside government offices the Egyptian civil servant has turned into a major puzzle that experts have been at a loss to understand.

Cairo's share of civil servants has exceeded 40 percent of all the civil servants in the administrative agency. There is tremendous congestion in the ministries and in the public sector in the capital, and yet there are offices in the governorates without employees.

Women make up over 16 percent of the state's employees.

Despite their large numbers, one charge is being leveled against these employees: half or more than half of them are non-productive.

They are quick to respond, "We have many difficulties, and we want them to be remedied. [Remedy them], and we will give you a good product."

Experts who went out to every government office in Egypt said, "We have employees who have achieved the highest degrees of learning, and we also have people in grade two positions who are illiterate."

Experts have pinpointed all the secrets and difficulties of the Egyptian employee, and they have come up with a prescription to remedy all the ailments of the state's administrative agency.

How does the Egyptian employee's image appear to scientists and researchers now?

The features of this image as reflected by the most recent and the most important study prepared by manpower and planning experts of the duly authorized national councils indicate facts that are extremely dangerous and provocative.

There is an increase in the number of government employees that actually amounts to a surplus and supersaturation. At the same time there is also a shortage that is almost incapacitating in several locations and specializations, and there is a shortage in services as well which is not at all consistent with the growth in the number of workers.

There is also a distinguished rise in the standard of high-ranking, scientific proficiency. However, there is still a pervasive illiteracy which curiously affects a government employee in a grade two position.

There is a major rise in wages countered by an even greater rise in prices, and this is always putting a strain on the pocketbook of the government employee.

A few governorates are falling all over themselves to secure government employees at a time when greater Cairo is keeping to itself almost half of the state's workers. This is happening at a time of decentralization and administrative independence for every governorate!

There are facts that would turn the tables on many of the beliefs that are being held in the curious world of government employment. While a green revolution is breaking out over the black and yellow soil, the academic pendulum is swinging to indicate that there is a fearful surplus of agricultural engineers. At a time when we are about to be inundated with technology flowing to us in the climate of the open-door policy, we find that there is a noticeable surplus in many specializations among the graduates of industrial secondary schools and industrial apprenticeship programs.

What is even more curious than this and that is the fact that despite everything that has been said and is being said about the defects of theoretical education, there is a shortage among the graduates of [the schools of] law, literature and social service.

Let us take those facts and figures further and raise the question: what is to be done?

It may be that the principal objective that led the Manpower Education, Planning and Training Section of the National Council of Education and Scientific Research and Technology to embark upon this study was to clarify the characteristics of employment in the government sector, which is considered the primary beneficiary of the educational agencies' ourput, by measuring and classifying the government's work force, finding out about its development and finally deducing indicators and phenomena and making the necessary recommendations [accordingly] about the size and the development of government employment. The study indicated that the total number of civilian workers in the government sector in the beginning of 1980 amounted to 2,134,488 workers. Almost half of them were employed in local government and the rest in the central government and in public agencies. In 1979 the number of workers rose 137 percent over the 1965 figure while the total population rose 35 percent during the same period. This means that the relative increase in employment was four times that of the population increase.

Women make up a considerable percentage of the work force that comes to more than 16 percent. Most of the female employees are in the supply and domestic trade sector even though the nature of the work in those sectors requires that most employees be men. The percentage of working women in the culture and media sectors and then in the research and education sector is also high. The lowest percentage of working women is found in the insurance sector.

The number of employees varies from one governorate to another. Cairo heads the list of governorates since it has close to 708,000 public service employees in the government system. Thus it has close to 39.4 percent of the government's work force. It is followed by al-Jizah governorate with 7.8 percent, and tailing the list are the governorates of Aswan, the New Valley and the Red Sea. The reason for the high number of workers in Cairo, as the study asserts, is the fact that the central government is centrally located in Cairo and so are the vast majority of its public agencies. In addition, there are those who work in the general offices of Cairo governorate, in the sections of the governorate and in the services departments that are affiliated with the governorate of Cairo.

Regarding the employment situation, the number of workers who are actually performing the work amounted to 1,963,602 employees.

The numbers of those who are not on the job either because they are on loan or have been assigned [to another agency] or have special leave, academic leave or leave for military service amounted to 170,886 workers. Thus the ratio of those who are undertaking the work in the government system is 92 percent.

The ratio of people who are on loan or special leave rises with regard to specialized jobs, amounting to 4.5 percent and 6.4 percent, respectively. This is due to the fact that those who hold these positions have high degrees--physicians, engineers, accountants, etc. They are people

with experience who are in great demand. The ratio of scholarship recipients is also high in this group because of the expansion in scholarships for them. Desk positions come second as far as special leaves are concerned. Finally, there are the support services positions of office personnel and custodians.

Regarding the educational status [of the work force] the study indicated that the largest group in the work force is that with mid-level degrees; they make up 27.9 of the work force. This group is followed by a group of people with university degrees; they make up 26.4 percent of the work force. This group is followed by a group of people who have no degrees but who can read and write; they make up 22.4 percent of the work force. Then there is a group of people who have above average degrees; they make up 9.3 percent. Among them are people with below average degrees; that group is 7.3 percent. Then there is a group with graduate degrees, and that group makes up 6.4 percent of the work force. And in the last place there is a group of illiterate people who make up 4.3 percent of the work force.

Although the group of illiterates is last on the list, the study does indicate that the government system is still suffering from the presence of illiteracy. In 1980 the number of illiterate people was more than 91,000 workers. Their ratio in grade six positions is high, amounting to 17.4 percent. That ratio decreases gradually until it becomes 0.6 percent in grade two positions. These people are the remaining office personnel and craftsmen who have been in service for a long period of time and who benefited from the Employment Proficiency Laws.

Regarding the surplus and the shortage in the state's personnel system the surplus ratio in the colleges and institutes of higher learning amounted to 17.4 percent. As far as the other stages of education are concerned, the surplus ratio reached its highest in the commercial secondary schools, in the industrial and agricultural secondary schools and in industrial apprenticeship programs. The highest surplus ratio was among the graduates of agricultural colleges and institutes who represent 78.8 percent of the surplus university graduates.

The highest shortage ratio was among those who had the social service diploma and those with certain specializations, such as engines, machines, telecommunications and plumbing, in industrial secondary schools. There was also a similar shortage in certain specializations in industrial apprenticeship programs.

In comparing the development of the work force with the development of services the study focuses on what has already been mentioned about the large increase in the size of the work force in the government system. This increase amounted to 137 percent in 1979 over 1965. The study notes the change that took place in the same period in the standard and the volume of government services in government sectors that have a large number of employees. These are the education, health, agriculture, transportation, communications and social services sectors. The study indicated that, compared to the other sectors, the education sector achieved the highest rate

of growth in services. In general, however, growth in services was not consistent with the growth in the size of the government's work force. This means that the growth in the government's work force was due to other reasons. The most important of these reasons was the commitment to hire surplus graduates and those who were discharged from military service. More than 200,000 of those discharged from military service have been hired.

With regard to the development in wages and salaries across the board of the government sector, these increased from about 311 million pounds in 1965 until they reached almost 1.269 billion pounds in 1979. This is a rate of increase of 408 percent. By comparing the ratio of increase in average wages to the ratio of increase in the standard cost of living index in 1980, it is possible to conclude that the average real wage has declined.

And now what are the most important recommendations made by the study of the duly authorized national councils?

The study asked that the state design a policy for all the stages of education so as to effect the necessary balance between the output of education and the employment process. The study recommended that the future needs of graduates of colleges, institutes and schools that suffer from supersaturation be considered and that training agencies be stimulated so as to turn these specializations into those areas that are required by the labor market. The study recommended that females be directed to the kind of education that would give women the proper preparation they need to assume those positions that are suitable to their nature.

To confront the problem of 92,000 illiterate employees the study called for a plan whose purpose would be to wipe out their illiteracy in a suitable period of time by using positive and negative incentives. The study asked that a vocational training method be used to train office personnel and custodians for vocations and professions that are in short supply in the labor market.

The study also recommended that the Central Agency for Organization and Management be given all the authorities to prepare a manpower plan in the state within a certain period of time.

The study asked that the state reconsider the salary structure of those working in the government so as to make it as compatible as possible with the cost of living.

To solve the problem of state employees being concentrated in Cairo and to observe the decentralization policy, the study asked that rapid and firm solutions be devised to stabilize the central government's work force for a certain period of time that can be determined by agreement with the Central Agency for Organization and Management and the agencies of the government.

[7 Jul 81 p 3 Part II]

[Article by Khamis al-Bakri]

[Text] The first study to reveal all the secrets of a government employee.
The expatriate Egyptian employee: checks and balances in the Egyptian immigration market.
A curious fact: there are no specific files so far about Egypt's emigres.

Although experts studied for a long time the difficulties and dreams that the Egyptian employee has inside government offices, they also studied with care everything that Egyptian emigres suffer from--those people who immigrated to the countries of the world in search of better conditions of work and life.

According to the 1980 statistics about 10 percent of the total Egyptian labor force emigrated from Egypt.

In 1 year the Egyptian treasury has recorded over 3 billion dollars transferred in hard currency from those emigres. What is important [here] is [to know] how these Egyptian emigres birds are living in all the countries of the world. What are their difficulties? What are their dreams? How do we keep them attached to the mother country?

Is there a chart of Egyptian emigration showing its magnitude, its course, its advantages and its disadvantages? How does this emigration affect the labor mechanism inside Egypt?

The arrow of emigration has pierced through Egypt. In less than 20 years Egyptians' minds have changed. The Egyptian is no longer that peasant who is tied to the land by roots stronger than those of the old sycamore tree in his field. He is no longer that person who "stays put for a whole year so as not to cross a ditch."

The Egyptian now stands at the helm of ships that sail the high seas, and he stands at the helm of construction projects, factories, hospitals, schools, universities and even advanced atomic and space research centers.

A delightful study that was prepared by the Manpower Education and Training Section of the National Councils was issued a few days ago. The study fully explains the features of the question that is being raised.

--How has the Egyptian citizen changed? What has forced him to cross the borders?

The facts state that the Egyptian people are not migrant by nature. However, in the late forties immigration to the Arab countries began on a very small scale. People emigrated to work as teachers or in a few other professional occupations. In the early sixties when oil began to flow in

the Arab countries and when the economies of those countries began to develop, the demand for Egyptian labor to take part in the development plans in these countries grew stronger.

This was due to the abundance of professional labor in Egypt in addition to the cultural and social ties that link Egypt with these countries. There is no doubt that high wages in these countries were a principal reason for attracting this labor. In the mid seventies the number of emigrants increased sharply, especially after the 1973 October war. The rise of the price of oil helped the countries embark upon ambitious development plans that required increasing numbers of workers.

Egyptian immigrants abroad are divided into two kinds.

Permanent immigrants to a new land, specifically to the continents of Australia and America, and transient immigrants to the Arab countries. What about permanent immigrants?

Permanent immigrants are characterized by their small numbers, compared to transient immigrants. Between 1962 and 1969 there were about 31,500 permanent immigrants. In 1969 the annual number of immigrants came to 5,600. To the number of permanent immigrants one may add the number of academic scholarship recipients who refised to return. Their number amounts to 24,500 [scholarship recipients]. The danger of permanent immigration lies in the fact that among the permanent immigrants are highly qualified and well trained professionals and those who speak foreign languages fluently. Of the total permanent immigrants those who are in the employment age (from 20 to 39 years old) amount to about 17,000 persons. This age group is highly productive and has a long span of [productive] life. This explains why the new home countries insist on certain age groups of workers. It has been observed that 62.7 percent of those who immigrated permanently are technical and scientific professionals who have doctorate, masters and bachelors degrees such as physicians, engineers, agriculture specialists, university professors and scientists. They represent 16.2 percent of the labor force in Egypt. Because of the high educational standard of the permanent immigrants, they constitute a burden on the educational and training system because of the high investments that are necessary to prepare such professionals whose returns are then denied to the Egyptian economy. In fact the balance indicates that there is a loss as a result of the fact that those emigrants do not transfer part of their incomes to Egypt. At the same time the elderly among them receive pensions that are transferred abroad indirectly.

The fact is that after embarking upon the battle of prosperity, setting off the construction revolution and penetrating the desert, Egypt now needs all these specialties. However, because it believes in its duty to the Arab brothers, it has provided them with the full opportunity to meet the needs of the Arab employment market with Egyptian expertise. For example:

The shortage in graduates of civil engineering, architecture and electrical engineering departments amounted to about 39 percent of total graduates.

Nevertheless, the foreign demand was met by 2,358 engineers from the same departments.

As far as physicians and nurses are concerned, 3,054 physicians and pharmacists and 3,044 nurses have left the country. The shortage in accountants amounted to 40 percent; 8,765 of them left the country. Despite a 71 percent shortage in law school graduates 2,680 law school graduates and 882 specialists in employee affairs, most of whom are graduates of the law school also left the country. The shortage among graduates of the school of social service amounted to 69 percent of total graduates. Nevertheless, 1,149 social workers left the country. The shortage among librarians amounted to 99 percent. So far, the departure of 360 of them has been approved. The shortage in the number of graduates of the schools and institutes of foreign languages and translation exceeded 180 percent. Despite that, the Arab world has been provided with 479 translators. All this was done in 1980.

All this information leads us to a question about the effects of transient immigrants.

There are undoubtedly positive effects.

From a political standpoint the presence of large number of the Egyptian work force in the Arab countries after relations with these countries were severed has affected the continuation of close relations between Egypt and the Arab countries. This in itself is a gain.

From an economic standpoint the increased funds that transient immigrants transferred from their savings amounted to 3 billion [dollars] in hard currencies. This helped Egypt purchase the equipment and production requirements that were necessary to create new employment opportunities. These funds also reduced the burden on the state budget and enabled it to use part of its revenues to provide food security and to spend on domestic investments.

The contrived rise in the wages of people in some specializations and professions as a result of their emigration, followed by inflation and the rise of prices, led to the emergence of new classes and a radical change in the social structure. This forced the state to raise the salaries of the classes who were hurt by this situation and whose wages did not rise at a rate that would help them confront inflation. The state was also forced to increase the subsidy for a few essential goods; and it was forced to amend the tax law and the customs law, etc. in a manner that would ensure the redistribution of income and guarantee that the subsidy reach those who deserve it.

Naturally one of the most dangerous [consequences] of this emigration is the departure from Egypt of intellectuals and people with technical and professional experience. Training centers lose 40 percent of their trainees as a result of emigration.

Finally we come to the methods of remedying the problems that result from emigration. The efforts of the various agencies of the state must be joined together so that the following can be achieved:

1. A balanced, long-term development strategy is to be devised to meet the basic needs of the population. This plan is to depend on realistic investments so that the state would not have to change it every now and then, upsetting thereby all the considerations of the manpower plan and keeping us from achieving a real balance in the domestic employment market.

2. Detailed and complete data on labor turnover inside the country and abroad must be compiled. In addition, the reserve Egyptian manpower abroad in each country must be restricted by organizing the departure and entry of citizens in a manner that does not impede the freedom of movement that is guaranteed [to Egyptians] by the constitution.

3. A system is to be devised to ensure that education and training agencies receive data regularly and for a long period of time so they can provide the necessary investments to expand the specialties for which demand will increase and can provide the equipment, the devices, the teachers and the trainers that are necessary. At the same time they are to limit the number of graduates in those disciplines where there is a surplus if these agencies are to maintain their status. It is necessary to revise and develop the courses of study so as to make them compatible with the requirements of the changing labor market inside the country or abroad so we can guarantee improving the efficiency and productivity of workers and so we can guarantee that we can compete with the Asian labor force in the Arab markets.

4. Inasmuch as the state has not yet interfered in organizing the emigration of labor, a few Asian countries have found out the importance of exporting their surplus labor because of its numerous benefits. The most important of these are obtaining foreign currency receipts, reducing the pressure on their domestic markets and acquiring advanced skills. It is therefore recommended that the Korean system of work groups be studied. This system has conquered the Arab markets to the point that it is competing with Egyptian manpower inside Egypt itself and in the area of construction in particular. Egypt has been known for the abundance and the skill of its workers in that field. It has been the principal source of supply for the Arab markets.

5. It is recommended that the emigration law which is now being considered by the ministerial committee for services be issued promptly. This law includes:

--Devising a comprehensive policy for emigration and working abroad whose purpose is to make the best use of human resources inside the country and abroad.

--Unifying the laws to which emigrants and people who work abroad are subject.

--Preventing the exploitation of the work force or traffic in human resources.

--Ensuring and guaranteeing the rights of emigrants and people who work abroad and giving them useful incentives to break into this field.

--Establishing a firm and a close tie between the homeland and its citizens abroad through continuously flowing legal channels.

8592
CSO: 4504/58

COURT ACTION REGARDING GEN AL-SHADHLI'S RELATIVES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Jul 81 p 12

[Article by Husayn al-Habruk: "Why Did the Court of Values Revoke the Travel Ban for the Families of the Defendants in the Case of Retired Gen al-Shadhli"]

[Text] Last Sunday the Court of Values headed by Justice Ahmad Rif'at Khafaji revoked the decision to prohibit the children of the defendants in the case of retired Gen Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhli from traveling. The court granted them the freedom to travel. The court said that personal freedom was an established right that may not be curbed or diminished except for public interest and then within the limits of laws and regulations. The right to travel, which is a part of an individual's personal freedom, may not be taken away without due cause. None of the defendants' children is accused in the case that is now before the court.

The socialist prosecutor had asked the appointed justice at the Court of Values to prevent 15 children of the defendants from leaving the country. These defendants are accused in the conspiracy case in which retired Gen Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhli and others are implicated. [The request was made] because of the requirements of the investigation which the socialist prosecutor was conducting. It had to do with the fact that the husbands and fathers of those persons were reported to have participated in a secret organization abroad whose objective was to overthrow the regime in Egypt by illegitimate means.

On 5 July the socialist prosecutor presented the travel ban order to the court and asked that it be extended. The court scheduled a session to consider the request during which the socialist prosecutor insisted on his request. Then the court ruled as stated earlier to revoke the prevention decision.

The court stated that it is an established fact that personal freedom is an established right that may not be curtailed or restricted except for a public interest within the limits of the laws and regulations. The court stated that the right to travel, which is part of an individual's personal freedom, may not be taken away without cause, opposed without good reason or restricted without justification.

To affirm this concept Article 13 of the International Declaration of Human Rights, which was approved by the UN General Assembly in December 1948, stipulated that each person had the right to travel freely from one place to another within the borders of any country; that he had the right to choose a place of residence; and that he had the right to leave his country and to return to it.

Accordingly it becomes evident that preventing a person from leaving his country is a restriction on his freedom and a serious measure that affects that person's being in his capacity as an individual living in an advanced human community. Thus the imposition of such a restriction must be contingent upon causes that would require the taking of such measures. If these causes are non-existent, there can be no justification for the travel ban. Similarly, if there were justifications for such a measure and then the justifications therefor were removed, the need for the continuation of this measure ceases to exist.

Since there is written evidence that the ban against leaving the country had been issued during the stage of gathering the evidence in the case, and since this stage did come to an end after the socialist prosecutor turned the case over to the court on 25/6/1981 against 19 defendants none of whom is one of those persons against whom the travel ban had been issued, and since the case has been in court since that time, [the court found] that there is no justification for continuing the travel ban and therefore revoked it.

8592
CSO: 4504/58

ESCALATING TERRORISM SEEN UNDERMINING KHOMEYNI RULE

Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Sep 81 p 5

[Article by Shahpur Haqiqat: "The Final Battle Will Pit the Supporters of Khomeyni Against the Disillusioned Former Supporters of the Imam."]

[Text] Since the fall of President Bani Sadr the escalation of terror and repression has accelerated in Iran. The fundamentalist clergy is plagued by almost daily attacks, exhausted by revolts of minorities, and by a war of attrition absorbing all their attention and which, intentionally or not, relegates to the background an ever deteriorating economic situation. Nevertheless the fundamentalist clergy relentlessly struggles against progressive forces and leftist groups, described as "Satan's children," "enemies of Islam," or "counter-revolutionaries controlled long-distance by international imperialism."

At the beginning of August (10 August 1981, in a radio broadcast speech) the Imam Khomeyni summoned the population "in the name of religious obligation" to keep watch over suspicious neighbors and report them to the authorities. "The government does not have the means to avail itself of an effective information system everywhere throughout the country. You, yourselves, should become government information centers. You should observe what the neighbors around you are doing. You keep tabs on them and they in turn will keep tabs on you, reciprocally,...Parents should check up on their children; not let them get out of touch; counsel them; if need be, report them to the authorities. This is a divine obligation. If you do not fulfill it, you will become accomplices of the conspirators."

Brought together under the sign of the Islamic Republican Party (PRI) [IRP], the violence of the fundamentalist clergy is to be explained by their determination to take over and maintain sole control over the key positions in the country. From the beginning their endeavor had been hampered by the sharing of power with the "liberal" and "moderate" bourgeoisie, generally hostile to instituting a theocratic dictatorship.

Unwilling to accept any obstacle to unconditional control over affairs of state the fundamentalist clergy immediately after the revolution had already more or less succeeded--with the complicity of the "liberals" for that matter--in eliminating the leftist groups who had extensively participated in the downfall of the imperial regime, and in harshly repressing the Kurdish and Arab rebellion. Subsequently, a slow and progressive elimination of the "moderates" became necessary. For this purpose the fundamentalist clergy, with support from the petty urban bourgeoisie,

In the economic field and in foreign policy, he made no real effort to change fundamentally the preexisting economic apparatus or even to challenge the capitalist structure of production, the principal basis of imperialist domination during the time of the Shah. On the contrary he was inclined toward a repid resumption of economic and commercial relations with the West, with the same connections with international markets as in the past. He did not hesitate to exaggerate the communist danger and the threat of "Soviet imperialism" to justify this aim. Nevertheless emphasis was placed on cooperation and exchange with Japan and Europe, rather than with the United States.

Is it possible to underestimate Bani Sadr's involvement in the errors, deviations, and perversions of the current regime, in the political as well as in the economic fields? Perhaps it would be unjust to hold him entirely responsible in view of the constitutional limits which hampered his authority and the constant erosion of his power, particularly since on several occasions he spoke up courageously against the exactions of the mullahs, the summary executions, the absence of freedom of speech, the hegemony of "religious fascists" and their political shortcomings. However, these protests, at least until his fall, only aimed at the form, not the structure, of the regime.

Liberals' Setbacks

The fall of the chief of state was the result of a social conflict much deeper and more prolonged than it might appear: the frustration of certain categories of the "liberal" bourgeoisie and the Bazaar merchants who had vainly sought an occasion for a break with the regime. This category of malcontents was increasingly unwilling to support the imam's government and, having no interest in rejoining the monarchist opposition, after Bani Sadr's fall found a more "comfortable" alternative than the one offered by those harking back to the former regime.

The "liberal" bourgeoisie was pushed into the opposition by several factors:

1) Confusion and disorder in society

The proliferation of decision-making centers, the absence of a central government capable of controlling anarchy and the excessive and unexpected interventionism by the high Shiite clergy in the economy and in the state merely accentuated the disintegration of society. Moreover the "liberals" were by no means spared in the curtailment of liberties, the repression on all sides, the arrests, and the searches.

2) The absence of a plan to stimulate the liberal economy.

Economic bankruptcy went hand in hand with the disintegration of the political situation. To economic stagnation and growing unemployment were added the powerlessness and political shortcomings of the leaders. Moreover the establishment of a war economy provided the opportunity to the team in power to hide its inaction and shortcomings.

The economic paralysis harshly affected the Bazaar merchants; their interests suffered a great deal because of the stagnation in production and consumption. Bureaucrats and officers, accustomed to a middle class life, also saw their salaries

the under-proletariat, and the mass of unemployed, ceaselessly opposed the infiltration of "liberals" into the government, and restricted their influence in the economic structures of the country, although they had played a predominant role in providing training, and in financing and organizing the revolution.

Mr Bani Sadr's Policy

The first aim of the "liberal" bourgeoisie after the revolution was the return to calm and the rapid normalization of society, needed for an economic revival of the country. They were ready to form any coalition to protect against a possible overrunning by the left. Thus, the first measures taken by Mr Bazargan, who shared these views, sought above all to reestablish order and security. His plan was to eliminate the institutions borne of the revolution, push aside Marxist organizations, and forbid strikes in the factories.

His fall, on 4 November 1979, was the first setback of the "liberals" and the beginning of the countdown that would lead one and a half years later to the fall of Mr Bani Sadr.

Either by conviction or in order to oppose the mullah's seizure of the country's key power positions, which was constantly undermining his power, Mr Bani Sadr soon took refuge in the "liberal" camp, adopted their views, and associated himself with their demands. In fact, his political views resembled those of Mr Bazargan in more ways than one. Despite his occasionally virulent criticisms of the latter's government, Bani Sadr, former activist of the National Front, later on did not hesitate to copy his methods, point by point.

From the beginning of his accession to the presidency in January 1980, he too sought to institute order and centralize power. He displayed a certain conservatism, favoring the safeguarding of existing institutions, slightly tinged by a few economic reforms. To contain the progressive forces, he threatened them with "exemplary punishment" if they did not respect the constitution. He approved the repression under way intended to "purify" Kurdistan, and defended, sometimes strongly, the traditional forces of the army.

Mr Bani Sadr made no secret of his views: a few days before his fall he stated to LE MONDE, "Only a strong president endowed with the broadest powers is able to govern a country like ours."

Even at the height of his power he took no steps in the direction of an opening toward the popular forces in the social field. He participated in the "purging" of the factories, favoring the abandonment of the shoras (local elections) in enterprises, whose existence had been tolerated by the constitution. He approved the laws adopted by the preceeding government forbidding trade union activity, and believed, like Bazargan and Khomeyni that "Those who incite workers to continue striking are guilty of treason..."

He bears considerable responsibility in the matter of the universities. At the end of April 1980 he proclaimed the "Islamic Cultural Revolution: in collaboration with the Revolutionary Council, and, on orders from the imam, he proceeded to the "cleansing" of the university establishment, but his real aim was to remove Marxist students from the University. The result was several dozen deaths.

reduced, sometimes by more than one half. Professors and teachers were unemployed since the closing of the universities.

3) Unexpected nationalization

It is true that some governmental decisions concerning nationalization of banks and insurance companies (June 1979), of automobile assembly plants, of mines, of steel, of food production industries (July 1979), and the pharmaceutical industry, were above all aimed at the upper bourgeoisie, but it also affected the "liberal" bourgeoisie. This wave of nationalizations threatened to affect foreign trade, the Bazaar merchants' resource of richness. This had been diverted away from them during the time of the Shah by businessmen and brokers. This was at the root of the great discontent and of the revolt of the Bazaar merchants. Moreover, the excessive ferment and the constant setting off of popular unrest in the name of Islam for a "social justice" and an "Islamic equality" frightened the affluent. Thus the radical clergy propagated a kind of "Hatred of the rich" climate throughout the population. For the have-nots, it was up to the rich to show how they got their richess.

If, despite the privations, the petty urban bourgeoisie and mass of have-nots remained on the whole favorable toward Khomeyni, it must be pointed out that a growing part of the bourgeoisie came to the conclusion that it would obtain nothing from this regime and that in order to prepare for the birth of another society more favorable to its interests and objectives, it should stand apart from the regime.

It is not impossible that by again posing as the defender of popular and ethnic demands, and concerned for freedoms and democracy, the "liberal" and "moderate" bourgeoisie may attract the majority of discontents and opponents of the Islamic regime, and in the absence of a solid popular organization assume leadership of the struggle and present a bourgeois alternative as a "reasonable" and necessary solution for the future of Iran.

Leftist forces have not hidden their fears in this matter. As of now, none of them (except the Mojahedin, who made a tactical agreement with Mr Bani Sadr) has come to the support of the Iranian ex-president's policy.

The Fedayin (minority), the Peyker, the Komaleh (Marxist-leninist Kurdish combattants), all hostile to the Khomeyni regime, consider that the fallen president was too much compromised with the regime in power; his alternative regime would be a mere "softer" extension of the Islamic Republic. But the audience of leftist groups is still not sufficient to make a counterforce. The chances of the monarchy in exile, because of its weak popular basis, are also thin, except at the price of a bloody coup d'etat. Everything suggests that the final battle will pit the supporters of Khomeyni against those who have stopped supporting the imam.

9772
CSO: 4619/34

BRIEFS

KIBBUTZ PRODUCTION STATISTICS--Today, the kibbutz population represents 3.5 percent of the total population of Israel, and only 21 percent of the total rural population. However, despite these relatively small numbers, the kibbutz sector produces around 40 percent of Israel's agricultural products and around 5 percent of its industrial products. This information was contained in a pamphlet on the kibbutz recently published by the publication service of the information center. The pamphlet includes chapters on the history and development of the kibbutz movement, its principles, patterns of kibbutz organization and management, lifestyle and the changes that have taken place. The publication also details the demographic and economic changes on the kibbutz which are interrelated to the extra-kibbutz system. The publication was written by Avshalom Rokeah and 20,000 copies have been distributed to shcools, educational institutions and to the public at large via local bureaus of the information center. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 81 p 3] 9811

COMPUTER ENGINEER SHORTAGE--At a meeting of engineering school administrators held this week, Mr Ostrovski, deputy general manager of the Israel Aircraft Industry (IAI), reported on the anticipated shortage of computer and software engineers. Given the absence of an institution for training in the software field, the IAI runs a course in programming for senior engineers. The IAI also conducts courses on industrial trends, management and computers. Graduates receive a certified technician diploma from the Government Institute for Technological Training under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor Welfare, in cooperation with the Ministry of Education and Culture. In the academic year 1980/1981, 670 computer engineers were trained by the Institute through engineering schools. In the framework of engineering studies, 10 million lira were spent this year on the purchase of equipment for engineering schools where modern teaching methods are being used. The curriculum for computer engineers, including 2,500 hours of instruction and practice, is the only one recognized by the state certification bureau, in conjunction with the Institute and the Engineering Union. Graduates of the program present, in the course of their studies, an independent project which gives them real work experience in the industry. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 81 p 5] 9811

DECLINE IN JEWISH POPULATION--Between the years 1960-1979 the Jewish population in Israel declined to 83.9 percent while the non-Jewish population increased at the rate of one percent from 1974 to 1979. These data were released in a social report on Israel recently published by the information section of the Ministry of Labor and Welfare. According to the findings of the report, which were based on the

Statistical Annual and other data, the Jewish population at the end of the year 1979 was 3,218,400 (83.9 percent), while the non-Jewish population was 16.1 percent (617,800 people). The report reveals that there has been a significant increase in the percentage of elderly people in the population, from 7 percent in 1969 to 9.4 percent in 1979. Further, the report indicates that between the years 1976-1979 there was a negative immigration balance of 126,464. The peak year of this negative immigration balance was 1974, with a net loss of 25,664 residents. It is also clear that the number of residents in the occupied territories declined between 1974 and 1979. This fact was due partly to the reduced birthrate. In 1979, the population in Yehuda and Shomron was 700,000. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Aug 81 p 1] 9811

DECLINE IN INVESTMENTS REPORTED--Investments in fixed assets (buildings, equipment and ground transportation vehicles), in fixed prices discounting for seasonal investments, declined by 4 percent in the first quarter of 1981 as compared with the previous quarter. Thus, the investment level for the first quarter was 2 percent lower than the parallel quarter in 1980. This declined was especially influenced by reduced investments in construction and ground transportation vehicles. On the other hand, there was a noticeable increase in the purchase of machinery and equipment. This was reported by a spokesman for the Central Bureau of Statistics and was based on provisional estimates formulated in the framework of the quarter-annual federal statement. The breaksown of investments by type of property, after discounting for seasonal influences, shows that for the first quarter of 1981 construction investments (housing, buildings and other construction projects in various sectors) were around 6 percent lower than in the previous quarter, and around 10 percent lower than in the same quarter of the preceding year. Investments in housing fell by around 3 percent, and there was an 11 percent decline in investments in buildings and other construction projects in the various sectors of the economy (agriculture, industry, etc.), comparing the first quarter of 1981 to the preceding quarter. Investments in private housing construction, in fixed prices, were the same during the first quarter of 1981 as in the previous quarter. There was, however, a significant decline in investments in public housing construction, which were off by 9 percent for the first quarter of 1981 as compared with the last quarter of 1980. The data from the Central Bureau of Statistics also point to an 18 percent decline in investments in ground transportation vehicles, in comparison to the last quarter of 1980. This decline was influenced by restrictions on the purchase of buses, down 30 percent from the fourth quarter of 1980. On the other hand, in the first quarter of this year purchases of other transportation modes (commercial vehicles, trucks, passenger vehicles purchased by commercial enterpirses) rose by 30 percent as compared with the last quarter of 1980. [illegible]estments in machinery and equipment (locally produced and imported) on the par[illegible] [illegible]rious sectors of the economy increased by around 2 percent during the first quarter of 1981 as compared with the previous quarter, and by 6 percent compared to the same quarter last year. [Text] [Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 6 Aug 81 p 4] 9811

CSO: 4323/51

PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE OPENS

PM180909 Beirut AN-NAHAR in Arabic 11 Sep 81 p 4

[Unattributed report: "'Solidarity Conference' Opens Its Meetings, Concludes Saturday; 'Arafat: Begin Carried to America Plan Against the South; Ibrahim: We Are Not Against Real Solutions to Lebanese Crisis"]

[Excerpts] Beirut--PLO executive committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat has declared that "Israel is preparing for a large-scale military operation in this south" and pointed out that "the Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin carried details of this plan with him to the United States." He stressed that the situation in the area is extremely grave and accused the United States of undermining peace opportunities by clinging to the Camp David accords.

'Arafat said this at the "world conference of solidarity with the Lebanese people and the Palestinian people" which opened its meetings yesterday with a debating festival at the Carlton Hotel. Those who addressed the conference were Yasir 'Arafat; Muhsin Ibrahim, general secretary of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement; Michel Kamil on behalf of the Egyptian "opposition movement"; 'Uman al-Hamidi, general secretary of the Arab People's Congress, and the representatives of Angola, Nicaragua and Cyprus.

The participants in the conference came from more than 30 countries, representing leftist organizations and popular and official bodies. There was a total of 200 persons from Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia who came in response to an invitation from the PLO.

At the opening session a steering committee was selected. This consisted of representatives from the world women's federation, the WFTU, AAPSO, the WPC, the WFDY, Lebanon, Egypt, Palestine, the Arab People's Congress, the Soviet Union, Eugene Johnson of the United States, Nicaragua, the African National Congress [ANC], Bangladesh, Angola, Mr (Silvester) from Italy and SWAPO.

Lebanese deputy Albert Mansur was elected chairman of the meeting. He welcomed the participants to Lebanon, "the land of confrontation and steadfastness," and said that "we highly appreciate your solidarity with the Lebanese and Palestinian people in opposing the Israeli aggression against our peoples and our Arab nation."

Addressing the conference the Angolan delegate said: "We cannot separate your revolution from our revolution, because it is an international revolution." He conveyed greetings to the participants from the African peoples. Speaking on behalf of the Soviet Union, Boris (Viliniyev), chairman of the Soviet-Palestinian Friendship Society, greeted the conference, "which is being held in conditions under which the Israeli expansionists are continuing their attacks on the Arab peoples and the imperialist forces are continuing their military penetration of the area." He conveyed President Brezhnev's greetings to the participants.

Vassos Lyssaridhis, representative of the Cypriot delegation, then spoke. He said: "I refuse to be just an ally of the Palestinian revolution, because I am part of that revolution."

Olima Ramirez, head of the Nicaraguan delegation, conveyed to the participants the greetings of the Latin American peoples and said that "progressive movements in Latin America are committed to cooperation with all the liberation movements in order to counter Zionist propaganda and stand with the just cause of the Palestinian people."

'Umar al-Hamidi, general secretary of the Arab People's Congress, attacked the "reactionary Arab regimes that are waiting for American protection."

Michel Kamil, speaking on behalf of the Egyptian "opposition movement" said that al-Sadat's repressive measures against all the leftist and trade unionist forces, thinkers and university professors are a sign of "al-Sadat's bankruptcy." He said: "The Egyptian-Israeli peace depends on one man, and if that man goes the peace will collapse." He stressed that "our struggle in Egypt is an indivisible part of the struggle of the national liberation movement."

Speaking on behalf of Lebanon, Muhsin Ibrahim addressed greetings to the Egyptian people and said: "The countdown for al-Sadat's regime has begun. Egypt, which has always been in the forefront, will now be coming back to you to lead the Arab nation."

Referring to the situation in Lebanon, he said: "We are now in the midst of a political war which the United States is waging in order to take peacefully what it failed to take through war. In this war it is trying to infiltrate our people and our masses by portraying the nationalist movement's stand as intransigent and hard and by rejecting any solution as well as by insisting on keeping Lebanon embroiled in an endless civil war. We are not and we will never be against any genuine solution to this crisis. But today we cannot see any genuine solution or even an acceptable U.S. solution to the crisis, for the simple reason that the United States will not be able to impose its solution as long as we exist, as long as there are Palestinian revolutionaries and as long as Syria stands fast. What the United States wants is a separate solution for Lebanon that will achieve the interests of its agents.

'Arafat began his speech by welcoming the participants in the conference. He then talked about the fighting in southern Lebanon between and since the cease-fires, calling these clashes "the sixth war" and stressing that they occurred "within the framework of an all-out U.S. onslaught on our area."

'Arafat then spoke about the al-Biqa Syrian missiles crisis and the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor with the aim of "obstructing any cultural development in the area."

After reaffirming commitment to the cease-fire "from a position of strength, capability and commitment to international responsibility," he pointed out Israeli military concentrations and air and land exercises in northern Palestine and the Golan. He said: "They are preparing for a new large-scale operation. We must be alert and vigilant. The details of this operation were carried to the United States by Begin and Sharon. The situation is, therefore, extremely serious, and we must prepare ourselves for the future confrontations. We are facing great difficulties and obstacles that prevent us from achieving the just peace to which we aspire."

He attacked "the self-administration plan which constitutes a grave plot against our people and our consistent national objectives as well as perpetuating Israeli occupation of our territories."

'Arafat expressed the belief that "the area is facing an extremely dangerous and explosive situation since it is encircled by three U.S. fleets--in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and the Gulf--in addition to the bases set up at Ra's Banas, Masirah, Berbera and Oman."

Concluding, he called for "action for the sake of an independent and bright future for our heroic Lebanese people, to achieve what they aspire to in their free, united, and independent homeland." He said: "Our people refuse rehabilitation and reject an alternative homeland. I say here on behalf of our people and revolutionaries that our struggle is for the sake of Palestine, for whose sake we are fighting and dying. It is for the sake of our beloved Palestine and our independent and free state, for which there is no substitute, and for our sole capital, holy Jerusalem."

CSO: 4404/5

OIL FOR GOODS BARTER DEAL WITH INDIA

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 631, 29 Aug 81 p 10

[Text] Libya has joined Algeria in proposing an oil for goods barter deal with India in a bid to counter pressure for a reduction in the official price of its crude.

In a report from Bombay, the FINANCIAL TIMES said last Tuesday that Libya had asked Kamani Engineering Corporation to accept oil instead of cash as advance payment for a transmission construction contract currently being negotiated.

The Bombay based corporation would not discuss the value of the contract but said it was one of two they were bidding for in Libya with a combined value of about 23 million dollars.

The advance payment would affect about 10 per cent of the value of the transmission contract. The matter has been referred to the state-owned Indian Oil Corporation for study, the FINANCIAL TIMES said.

The oil for goods proposal is the second to be made by a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countires in the last week. At the weekend Algeria proposed a similar barter deal with Japan.

They follow the failure of the OPEC oil ministers to agree on a unified pricing structure for OPEC crudes at their meeting last week in Geneva. At the end of the deadlocked meeting several ministers predicted that a number of the OPEC countries would soon be compelled by the market forces to cut their offical prices.

OPEC's highest prices producers--Algeria, Libya and Nigeria--were expected to come under pressure to lower their levels, still eight dollars above the 32 dollars marker price charged by Saudi Arabia.

CSO: 4500/3

BRIEFS

TEN AIRBUSES PURCHASED--The Libyan Arab Airlines, Libya's national flag-carrier, has signed a contract with Airbus Industries for 10 wide-bodied European Airbus jets of an undisclosed value. Reporting from Tripoli, the Libyan news agency, JANA, said the first two planes were due for delivery in June of next year, with the others following at a rate of two a year over a five-year period. According to JANA, LAA plans to carry 3.6 million passengers annually when the planes, and others on order, are delivered. Present operations provide the airline with some 1.5 million passengers annually. JANA did not specify the type of Airbus involved. The manufacturers make two versions of the twin-engined jet, one of which, the A-310, is favoured by other Arab airlines. The most recent Arab purchase of the A-310 was the $350 million order for five aircraft by the Lebanese company, Middle East Airlines, which last month requested an extension of the contract to confirm the purchase because of financial problems besetting the airline. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 11]

AID TO NICARAGUA--Managua, 10 Sep--Libya has pledged its political and economic support for the Nicaraguan revolution, Daniel Ortega, co-ordinator of the Nicaraguan Government, said here on his return from Libya. Mr. Ortega, who also visited Algeria, said Libyan leader Moamar Kadhafi provided the plane he flew home in and the costs of the trip were borne by the Libyan Government. (AFP) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2827, 11 Sep 81 p 13]

CSO: 4500/3

KING HASSAN'S POLICIES EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 p 23

[Text]

Morocco's King Hassan has cautious support from most political parties for his peace initiatives on the Western Sahara, but faces growing criticism following June's widespread social unrest.

MOST MOROCCAN political parties have publicly expressed their confidence in King Hassan following his proposals of a ceasefire in the Western Sahara and a self-determination referendum at July's OAU summit in Nairobi.

The general feeling is that a peace solution must be found to the Western Saharan war, if Morocco is to put its economy back on its feet. But many politicians are nonetheless wary of Hassan's peace plan, fearing that the political tolerance of the past few years would gradually decrease once the palace no longer needed a broad national consensus for the 'recuperation' of the Saharan provinces.

The leading opposition party, L'Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP), is divided over the peace plan. The majority, headed by Secretary General Abderrahim Bouabid, accepts the principle of a referendum, but claims that Hassan's OAU proposals opened a subject which they considered closed. A faction led by USFP Parliamentary Spokesman Abdelouahd Radi has declared that the OAU resolutions on the Sahara, as published in the press, did not correspond to what was discussed at Nairobi. Radi suggests: 'Morocco should contest the OAU text, which does not reflect the spirit of the discussions which took place.'

Spokesmen for the nationalist Istiqlal Party, part of the government coalition, have said that if the OAU peace committee 'sets itself up as a tribunal, Morocco should not accept its findings'. The communist oriented Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (PPS) claims that 'a referendum in the Western Sahara is a mere formality, as it can only confirm the Moroccan character of the province.'

The rural-based Mouvement Populaire, also a member of the ruling coalition, is more circumspect. Its leader, Mahjoubi Aherdane, commented: 'I did not expect the latest turn of events. Is it right to ask a Moroccan if he really wants to be a Moroccan?'

The head of the recently created RNI splinter group Les Indepéndants Démocrates, Khalli Henna Ould Rachid--state secretary for Saharan affairs--expressed confidnece in the peace initiative: "It will allow us to distinguish between real and fake Sahrawis."

While there is a certain amount of support for the king on the Saharan issue, June's social unrest and the ensuing government crackdown may mark a turning point in internal politics.

Around 2,000 people were arrested as a result of the 20 June general strike, triggered off by massive price increases for staple foodstuffs and other necessities. Scores of trade union leaders and members of the USFP were arrested, as well as rioters, and USFP Parliamentary Spokesman Radi condemned "the policy of systematic repression which will lead nowhere, except to political bankruptcy."

The USFP and its allied trade union--La Confédération Démocratique du Travail (CDT)--have been hardest hit by government repression: 21 activists were condemned to a year of prison at the end of July, while another 26 received four-month sentences and 13 others were given six-month terms. More trials are expected.

Moreover, eight members of the USFP's national administrative committee were arrested plus 30 CDT officials and the secretary of the "Small Shopkeepers' Union." Two USFP journals--the Arabic-language daily AL MOHARRIR and the French-language weekly LIBÉRATION--were shut down. The PPS newspaper, AL BAYANE, was suspended until mid-July.

Relations between the USFP and the government had seriously deteriorated even before the riots. The party had boycotted communal elections in a number of provinces in May, in protest against the lack of guarantees for "free and fair" elections. USFP criticism of government economic policy, and charges of corruption and mismanagement, had exacerbated ill-feeling.

Some observers believe that the current wave of repression against the USFP goes far beyond the desire to cement the cracks in the home front to achieve an acceptable solution to the Saharan conflict. The USFP had threatened to walk out of parliament in protest against postponement of legislative elections for two years, by means of a constitutional amendment extending parliament's term from four to six years. The recent anti-USFP measures could be intended to make sure that the party's MP's are present when the new parliamentary session opens in October.

CSO: 4500/1

BRIEFS

LIBYAN EMERGENCY REPORTS DENIED--Khartoum, 9 Sep--Sudan has derided Libyan reports of a state of emergency being declared in Khartoum, describing Libyan news agency reports of the situation as "ridiculous". The Sudan News Agency (SUNA), quoting an "authoritative source", said in a report Tuesday that "our people, who are leading their normal peaceful life in Khartoum, will learn from this new Libyan lie how deep the Libyan media has sunk into the swamp of lies". The source said that it was to make life difficult for Libyan agents in Sudan that "the security authorities are carrying out inspection raids", SUNA added. (AFP)--[Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2827, 11 Sep 81 p 12]

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END

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9 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2413

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9 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2413

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VISITS FOCUS ON LATIN AMERICAN SINAI ROLE

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 p 19

[Article by Ignacio Klich]

[Text] As Egypt's deputy foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, left Latin America last month with a firm Colombian commitment to send troops for the US-led Sinai monitoring force, Saudi Arabia's Prince Saud al Faisal flew in for a four-country visit.

AS EGYPT'S deputy foreign minister, Boutros Ghali, left Latin America last month with a firm Colombian commitment to send troops for the US-led Sinai monitoring force, Saudi Arabia's Prince Saud al Faisal flew in for a four-country visit.

After Mexico and Venezuela, the Saudi foreign minister travelled to Argentina, where he signed a trade and technical cooperation agreement. Last year, Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales started imports of 22,000 barrels a day of Saudi oil sold directly by the state-owned Petromin concern. In July 1980, the Saudi commerce minister, Abdul Aziz al Solaim, visited Buenos Aires to see which Argentinian goods could be used to promote Saudi efforts to diversify sources of imports.

Saud al Faisal also questioned Foreign Minister Oscar Camilion about Argentina's offer to send 'some help' to the Sinair force. Camp David was not the answer, said the Saudi minister. Instead, he briefed the cautious Argentinians on Crown Prince Fahd's peace proposals to set up a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem, and recognise Israel. However, it is doubtful whether the Argentinians are prepared to make more than a token gesture towards the Sinai multinational force, and the Arab League is trying to persuade Colombia and Fiji not to send troops.

In Brasilia, Prince Saud signed a similar cooperation agreement and the Brazilian government presented the visitor with a plot of land in the capital where a mosque and Islamic centre will be built. Earlier this year, the Saudi-backed World Assembly of Islamic Youth held its first gathering of young Latin American Muslims in Brazil which, together with Argentina, has become home for many Muslims who came originally from the Arab world. There are larger Muslim communities however, in Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, where immigrants from Pakistan and Indonesia settled.

The Brazilian gesture towards Saudi Arabia — the country's main oil supplier since the Gulf war hit imports from Iraq — resembled an earlier show of pragmatic affection. In 1974, the visiting Saudi minister of state for foreign affairs, Omar Sakkaf, was decorated with the Souther Cross. The Brazilians praised the Saudis for having 'included us in the restricted list of friendly countries to which the petroleum supply was maintained' after the 1973 oil embargo.

Prince Saud's declared hopes for a prompt decision on the opening of a PLO information office were intended to remind President Joao Figueiredo that two years have lapsed since he first broached the matter with Iraq's vice presient, Taha Moheddin Marouf. Meanwhile, the man in charge of the PLO desk at the Brasilia Arab League office remains accredited as the league's first secretary.

Saudi interest in Latin America is quite recent. Until the middle of the 1960s Saudi Arabia was represented only in Mexico. Then came the opening of an embassy in Venezuela followed, early in the 1970s, by resident missions in Argentina and Brazil. Direct investments in the region are limited to Saudi shareholdings in the Lima-based Arab Latin American Bank, and Rio-based Banco Bozano Simonsen de Investimento.

Last November, Saudi Arabia obtained observer status with the Organisation of American States. If this was meant to signal Saudi interest in widening the scope and nature of its ties with the region, Prince Saud's intinerary suggests that Riyadh's main concern is still to cultivate strong links with Latin America's heavyweights.

CSO: 4400/8

PETRODOLLARS BACK A RALLYING YEN

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 p 45

[Article by Koji Nakamura]

[Text] A resumed flow of petrodollars, notably from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, has triggered a substantial recovery in Japan's bond and securities markets, which had been in the doldrums because of the yen's nose-drive [as printed]

The yen hit a 15-month low of 247 to the dollar in early August, but recovered to Y230 levels towards mid-month. While financial experts, including the Bank of Japan's, had talked worriedly about its being unjustifiably 'undervalued,' the yen had been forced by high US interest rates to levels that caused the Japanese central bank to release dollar reserves in equalisation operations.

The oil producers re-entry into the bond and securities markets played a leading role in halting the slide. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had clearly seen the yen bottoming out early in August and started their yen-buying operations through investments in the markets. The yen's recovery--it had depreciated by some 20 per cent in two years--and the resumed petrodollar investments are thus interrelated, and some financial institutions including the Bank of Japan, are now confident that Y210-200 levels will be reached by next spring at the latest.

Clearly the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) feels confident too, and has resumed purchases of national bonds amounting to an estimated Y60bn. The agency, which had been buying $200m in national bonds from the Bank of Japan every month since April 1980, suspended purchasing operations in early August when the yen was dropping daily.

However, as the yen rallied SAMA bought Y10bn in medium-term national bonds through securities firms — and then Y50bn in long-term national bonds from the Bank of Japan. With the monthly $200m buying, SAMA's national bond holdings alone are estimated at $3.4bn, nearly 14 per cent of oil producers' total $25bn investments in Japanese financial markets — more than half the Japanese assets held by non-residents.

As of March 1981, the investments held by oil-producing countries (mainly Middle Eastern) were as follows: $5.36bn in the bond market, $15bn in bank accounts, $1.68bn in short-term bonds and $3.57bn in the stock market.

Buying by oil producers, notably Kuwait, was also a factor behind the recent registration of an unprecedented Y8,000 in the stock exchange's Dow average. Besides the yen's recovery, the 'high profitability' of Japanese securities is also quoted as one reason for the market activity: securities market sources say that the profitability of Japanese stock on 10 August stood at 123, compared with 113 in the US, 105 in the UK, 69 in West Germany and 59 in France (based end-1979).

The surplus balance of Japanese stock acquisition held by non-residents amounted to Y845.5bn in 1980 and Y878.4bn in the year since August 1980. While the total non-residents' stake is around only one per cent of the total Y80,000bn current value of securities listed on the Tokyo stock exchange, the share is steadily rising in terms of individual firms.

Hitachi, for example, one of the world's largest electronic manufacturers, is now owned by foreign shareholders to the tune of 22.3 per cent of its Y130bn capital (as of end-March 1981). It was 13.0 per cent the previous year: foreign investors now rank fourth and fifth among the firm's major stock-holders.

● Three Swiss banks are to expand their involvement in Japan's stock market, according to European banking sources. Swiss Credit Bank, Swiss Union Bank and Capital International Investment Bank. The reports said Union Bank was about to establish a fund which will exclusively manage Japanese securities. While the funds' size has not been officially disclosed, Frankfurt sources were quoted as estimating it initially at 80m to 100m Swiss francs ($38m-47m).

Swiss Credit Bank is planning to open a SFr 100m ($47m) Japan fund. The bank is already involved in Japanese securities operations, representing Middle Eastern countries through an SFr 180m ($85m) net-asset Japanese securities in the fund at end-July stood at 22 per cent, compared with 12 per cent in the same month last year.

Capital International Investment Bank, whose total management asset is estimated at SFr 5bn ($2.3bn), is reported to have decided to increase the Japan share from end-June's 30 per cent to 40 per cent.

CSO: 4400/8

IRAQ-TURKEY TRADE AGREEMENT EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 pp 38, 39

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text]

LAST week's signing of the trade protocol between Iraq and Turkey marks a turning point in the relations between these traditionally suspicious neighbours.

The importance of the trade agreement can be ascertained by the calibre of the delegation despatched to Ankara by Baghdad. This included Iraq's first deputy prime minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, the petroleum minister, Tayeh Abdelkarim, and the trade minister, Hasan Ali.

After the outbreak of the Iran/Iraq war, Turkey tried to remain neutral, but this became more and more impossible as Iranian army generals began to defect, and were welcomed by the military rulers of Turkey. During the past few weeks Iranian newspapers openly criticised Turkey's attitude, but Iran is aware that the rift between the two countries must not be allowed to escalate, as Turkish land routes and air space are important for the transfer of goods between Europe and Iran.

Taking advantage of Iran's difficult position, Turkey decided to go ahead with its plan to strengthen ties with Iraq. The trade agreement has guaranteed half Turkey's annual oil requirement: Iraq has pledged to supply about 8.5m tonnes of crude oil next year, and also promised to purchase about $400m worth of goods from Turkey this year.

On 15 August the Turkish prime minister, Bulent Ulusu, said about the Iraqi visit: 'Issues to which we attach special attention have been the increase and diversification of exports from Turkey to Iraq, increased service activities of the Turkish contracting companies in Iraq and broadening of mutual cooperation in the fields of transportation, oil, natural resources, banking and tourism.'

On the transportation front, the Iraqis are hoping Turkey will give them the use of Mediterranean ports such as Mersin and Iskenderun. It was reported in Turkey that a tentative promise was made by Turkish authorities to improve and construct special facilities at these ports. If true, this would give Iraq access to the Mediterranean without the need to go via Syria.

Iraq hopes that this rapprochement between the two countries, and the large-scale gains Turkey will get out of the trade agreements, would divert Turkish interest from the Ataturk dam project on the Euphrates. As an Iraqi diplomat in London said: 'If Turkey gives up the idea of the dam, we might be able to help in other agricultural and irrigation projects.' The proposed dam was one of the main causes of the rift between the two countries.

Iraq already represents the second largest export market for Turkish goods. (West Germany is the largest.) During the first five months of this year the value of exports to Iraq was $201m, compared with $64m in the same period last year.

Iraq also has a lot to gain from the protocol: Turkey could become a very important outlet for Iraqi oil and goods. The existing oil pipeline, which can carry up

to 35m tonnes annually from the Iraqi oilfields at Kirkuk to Turkey's Mediterranean terminal at Yumurtalik, has become more important to Iraq since the war closed loading terminals in the Gulf. The other major outlet of Iraqi oil is at Banias in Syria, and as political relations between the two Arab states fluctuate constantly, it is in Iraq's interest to guarantee the availability of Turkish pipelines at all times.

Turkish officials announced last week that the government wanted the present fee of $0.38 per barrel for pipeline use increased to at least $1. Turkey has been pressing for an increase for some time.

The Iraqis are also offering to set up an international transport organisation with Turkey at Mediterranean ports, along similar lines to the agreement between Iraq and Jordan for transferral of goods from the port of Aqaba. The Iraqis are also persuading the Turks to build a new link between Iskenderun/Mosul railway line.

In political terms, the trade agreement is being seen as a foothold for Turkey in the Arab world. One Turkish analyst said: 'Turkey is deeply suspicious of Nato — look what happened in 1974: Nato stopped delivery of arms when the country needed it most.' It is economically and politically advantagous for Turkey to have the Arab and Islamic world on its side.

CSO: 4400/5

BRIEFS

KUWAIT HAS 250,000 JORDANIANS--Kuwait, Sept. 12--About 25,000 citizens from the West Bank enter Jordan during the summer and between 75,000 to 100,000 persons leave for Arab Gulf countries during the year, according to a report received today. About 75,000 Jordanians are working in Kuwait, and if their families are included, the total will reach about 250,000. The report added there was no accurate census figure of the population in Jordan itself. The Jordanian Prime Minister recently said that the country is suffering from a shortage of inhabitants and rejected the idea of birth control. The subject of refusal of visas to Jordanian nationals by some neighbouring countries has been discussed by the Foreign Ministry. Reciprocation, the number of entrants from and to Jordan from a particular country, the security situation and economic factors were taken into consideration. Commenting on the rush at the foreign embassies, Jordan Foreign Ministry official said this was due to the huge number of applicants for visas and the limited staff at the embassies. The main problem was with Gulf, US, Canadian and West German embassies. The report added that officials at the Jordanian Foreign Ministry would discuss the situation with the ambassadors of these countries to make it easier for Jordanian citizens to obtain visas. Reciprocation will be the basis of the talks. Jordan hopes to have agreements with some countries to cancel the need for visas between them and Jordan, the report concluded. [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 3 Sep 81 p 6]

INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS--Qatar's Crown Prince Sheikh bin Khalifa al-Thani signed an agreement in Rabat last week under which Qatar and Morocco will exchange expertise in the field of information. The agreement also covers exchanges of news and television and radio programmes. Sheikh Hamad signed a similar agreement with Jordan during a visit the previous week to Amman. Sheikh Hamad conferred in Rabat with King Hassan II and discussed agricultural cooperation, including the possibility of exchanging expertise and manpower. Qatar and Morocco were also reported to be discussing the possibility of industrial cooperation, notably between private entrepeneurs in the two countries. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 6]

CSO: 4400/3

GCC TRADE PROTOCOL FINALIZED

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 17 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

KUWAIT — The unified economic agreement between the six member states of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council will push forward joint venture projects in their private sectors, sources here said yesterday.

The agreement will also lead to the coordination of regional industrial policies and the improvement of energy situation.

A final draft of the agreement was endorsed by the Council's foreign ministers and will come into force when ratified by the AGCC summit meeting later this year.

The proposed agreement is viewed in economic circles as the most outstanding achievement in the Gulf region which will substitute bilateral trade protocols previously concluded by different Gulf states, a Press report said.

The 28-point protocol will provide for complete coordination of economic, financial and monetary policies.

It will also contain a set of commercial and industrial legislations as well as new customs regulations to govern joint activities.

According to the agreement, the respective states of the council will exchange commodities as originating from one and the same country and no customs dues will be imposed on the exchange.

When the agreement is ratified at the AGCC November summit, nationals of the six states will be allowed to engage in business in the entire region without discrimination and no restrictions will be imposed on the movement of capital.

As part of the plan for economic integration, the agreement stipulates complete coordination of policies in the fields of oil industry, utilisation of gas resources and energy sources.

In accordance with the new protocol, the six states will be bound to adopt a unified stand in international platforms particularly at meetings of the UN specialised agencies.

The agreement will guard against duplicity in projects and rule on locations for new industries according to the economic viability and feasibility studies of each respective project.

In planning for joint venture projects, the agreement will put stress on industrial and agricultural schemes that will lead to the realisation of regional development on proper basis and the ideal use of government and private capital resources.

The unified agreement will encourage research in fields of science and will provide for plans related to the transfer of selected technology.

The agreement stipulates means of manpower mobility within the region, coordinates training policies and ends all types of unnecessary competition.

According to its contents, the agreement will facilitate coordination in fields of transport, infrastructural projects and international investment.

To achieve parts of those objectives, the council's member states will set up a Gulf international consortium with a suggested capital of 18 billion Saudi riyals.

CSO: 4400/7

KARMAL REGIME PLAGUED BY GROWING HOSTILITY

Attack on Governor

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 14 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] London, Sept. 13--The Governor of Logar province was injured in an attack launched by Afghan freedom fighters and his two bodyguards were killed.

Agency Afghan Press reported that the attack was made in the subdividisonal headquarters Mohammad Aagha on Aug 25 at a time when the Governor was on a visit in the heart of the town. He was near Mamoor Hotel in the town when suddenly the guerillas opened fire on him. Governor's two bodyguards were killed on the spot while he himself suffered injuries. The freedom fighters escaped after the attack.

The same night the Mujahideen damaged two tanks patrolling the town by firing rocket launchers. On the same day, the Mujahideen attacked a mobile Karmal force at a place Kulangar on Kabul-Gardez Road in Logar province and destroyed four armoured cars and two army trucks. A number of troops carried by the vehicles and armoured cars were eliminated. On Aug 27, the Mujahideen attacked a Soviet force at a village Kanjak in Logar province. This village is 40 kilometres off Kabul. Ten Soviet soldiers were killed in the attack while two tanks were destroyed. One Mujahid was killed.

Attempt Foiled

Mujahideen led by their commander Yamin Khan frustrated an attempt of setting up a new telephone exchange in Kalat Gilzai in Zabul province. They seized the equipment worth million of Afghanis. Earlier the guerillas on Aug 27 destroyed the Kalat exchange from where the security force fled away leaving behind nine dead bodies.

On Aug 31, some new machinery of telephone exchange was being carried to Kalat Gilzai in a truck when the Mujahideen seized it 10 kilometres away from the town. The Mujahideen carried the machinery to their liberated area.

Notes Cancelled

The Karmal administration has cancelled all currency notes of 50, 500 and 1000 Afghanis of the times of Tarakki and Hafizullah Amin which carried no water mark.

These currency notes which carried in bold letters the world 'Khalq' and the insignia of the government had been printed in Moscow when the Soviet Government had obtained the contract of printing the Afghan currency. It is reported that besides the agreed number of notes, the Soviets had printed extra currency notes which had been distributed among the communist workers without bringing the fact to the knowledge of the successive Kabul administrations. Presently in Afghanistan the currency notes of the times of King Zahir Shah, Sardar Daoud, Tarakki and Amin are also being used.

Student Agitation

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 14: Reports coming here from Kabul say that the student agitation which started in Kabul last week has now spread to all the educational institutions in the capital, BBC reported tonight.

The reports also said that two girl students were killed on Wednesday last and 30 wounded when troops opened fire on a group of girl students demonstrating in a school.

Immediately after the shooting incident, about 1,000 students came out on the streets and shouted anti-Government and anti-Soviet slogans.

Attendance in Government offices is said to have come down to 50 per cent.

There is also an unrest because of the protest over fresh conscription of soldiers under the age of 35.

Since the State Radio announced the new call-up, trucks have been touring the capital making appeals on loudspeakers to ex-servicemen to resume service.

Western diplomatic sources said street patrols have also been stepped up to check the identity papers of the people.

The conscription drive is aimed at holstering the depleting armed forces.

The total strength of the armed forces when Marxist rule was established in Afghanistan in April 1978 was around 90,000 officers and men. Defections, casualties and purges have depleted the Afghan army to about 30,000.

To supplement military personnel, the Government has formed volunteer defence groups drawn from the ruling People's Democratic Party's youth organisation.

The Afghan media frequently publicise the departure of these armed young men called "soldiers of revolution" to the provinces to fight guerillas and spread the Marxist message.

In a statement on the controversial new enlistment order, Chief of General Staff Baba Jan said: "The Government and the party are resolved to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces and strengthen their war preparations.—PPI/Reuter.

Opposition to Forced Recruitment

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 15 Sep 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 14--A military call-up which was reported to have sparked protests in Kabul has highlighted the Afghan Government's problems in building up an army to quell insurgency.

The demonstrations last week in which several people were said by diplomats to have been injured, followed an official announcement last Monday ordering discharged soldiers below the age of 35 back to the service.

The protests were the most serious since about 100 conscripted policemen, incensed by the extension of their two-year period of duty, went on the rampage in Kabul last December.

Since the State radio announced the new call-up, trucks have toured the capital making loudspeaker appeals to ex-servicemen to enlist. Western diplomatic sources said. Street patrols have also been stepped up to check identity papers.

The conscription drive is the latest of several efforts over the past year to bolster the armed forces, facing a serious manpower shortage.

The total strength of the armed forces when Marxist rule was established in Afghanistan in April 1978 was around 90,000 officers and men. Since then defections, casualties and purges have depleted the Afghan army to about 30,000.

A major reason for the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan that brought President Babrak Karmal to power was the Afghan army's steady disintegration, which threatened to leave forces hostile to Moscow in control of the country.

One of the tasks of the Soviet forces has been to put the Afghan troops in shape to face the challenge from Mujahideen fighting against the Marxist Government in Kabul.

In a speech last month, President Karmal told the armed forces: "Stability has been established to some extent in the cadres of the army and police....and the process of depletion of officers loyal to the revolutionary duties in the armed forces is ending."

Diplomats said the main problem confronting the Government was desertion by Afghan soldiers, reluctant to fight anti-Government Mujahideen.

Kabul has repeatedly offered amnesty to the deserters and the State radio claimed recently that many soldiers who had joined "saboteurs and troublemakers" had returned and were now fighting against the "counterrevolutionaries."

Offer of improved salaries and service conditions have been made to the troops in an apparent attempt to rally military support, boost morale and prevent desertion.

President Karmal, who is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, said last month his Government was trying to improve the "material and moral status and living conditons" of the troops.

His Government's latest inducement to military officers is to allow them to retain land in excess of an official ceiling on land holdings on condition that their children serve in the army.

The toughest and most organised conscription drive was launched in September last year when the Government decreed compulsory military service for men aged between 21 and 46.

Severe penalties were laid down for evading conscription or for desertion. But thousands of young men were said by diplomats to have defied the law and fled the country.

To widen recruitment, the Government last January reduced the draft age by a year to 20 and offered financial inducements to soldiers who stayed on after their discharge.

Graduates at present serve in the army for 12 months and non-graduates for two years.

Kabul-based diplomats have reported eye-witnesses as saying security forces forcibly pick up young men even below the conscription age of 20 years to draft them into the army.

To supplement military personnel, the Government has formed volunteer defence groups drawn from the ruling People's Democratic Party's youth organisation.

The Afghan media frequently publicise the departure of these armed young men called "soldiers of revolution" to the provinces to fight Mujahideen and spread the Marxist message.

In a statement on the controversial new enlistment order, Chief of General Staff Baba Jan said: "The government and the party are resolved to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces and strengthen their war preparations."

"The mobilisation of lieutenants and soldiers will make it possible to increase the effectiveness still further," he said.--Reuter

Kabul Underground

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 17 Sep 81 p 4

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 16, (Dispatches) — Many young people in Kabul have gone underground to avoid a new call-up order by the Afghan authorities, western diplomatic sources said here today.

Radio Kabul announced at the beginning of the month that people under 35 who had served in the army but who were discharged before October 1978 would be called up to serve an extra year.

Visitors to government ministries in Kabul reported many ex-servicemen were missing from their offices and at one Western Embassy in Kabul all Afghan employees and contract labourers who would be subject to the recall asked to be paid off and had disappeared, the sources said.

The call-up provoked demonstrations in Kabul in which two girl students were reported killed when police opened fire. Sporadic demonstrations continued throughout last week, the sources said.

The communist authorities hope to boost the strength of the Afghan army, which has dwindled through defections from 80,000 to 30,000. They later exempted teachers and other categories of workers from the call-up.

Mediating on behalf of Soviets captured in Angola, Afghanistan also the International Committee of the Red Cross is awaiting replies from the Soviet Union and Pakistan on its proposal to transfer two Soviet soldiers captured by Afghan resistance fighters to a neutral country for internment, a spokesman said Wednesday.

The proposal by the all-Swiss Humanitarian body is part of the services offered by it under the Geneva Conventions. Spokesman Jean-Jacques Kurz said internment would have to be in a country "considered by everybody as neutral."

A Red Cross delegate meanwhile has visited Soviet Sgt. Maj. Mikolay Pestretsov who South African forces say was captured in Angola last month. A report on the visit and the conditions of his internment has been handed to the Soviet Embassy in Luanda, Kurz said. Such visits are also provided for under the convention so neutral observers can see whether prisoners are humanely treated.

Riots in Schools

Karachi DAWN in English 18 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] Islamabad, Sept 17--Reports of disturbances in the schools of Kabul have been coming in during the past whole week, according to BBC.

The disturbances were sparked by the recent directives for the re-enlistment of ex-servicemen below the age of 35.

Though Kabul has never been completely peaceful after the 1978 revolution, yet after the induction of the Soviet troops in the country and the assumption of power by Babrak Karmal in place of Mr Hafeezullah Amin in December 1979, the mopping up of each other by the workers of Parcham and Khalq factions intensified since the activities of the opponents of the present Kabul Government have increased and they appear to be getting support to an extent from official circles and from men in the army, BBC said.

But there have been mass disturbances during the past one and a half years and there have also been disturbances by the police and these are clear signs of disliking against the Government. In April and May last year, there was serious unrest among the students, and the girl students demonstrating against the Russians were fired at.

Death toll was 57. Many people were wounded and arrested, BBC reported.

Disturbances continued erupting in the Kabul University and colleges throughout the year. A general strike call was given in December, on the completion of one

year of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The call was, however, not much successful.

But on December 25, the policemen created disturbances because Kabul Government was not prepared to relieve those who had already rendered two-and-a-half year service.

There are now reports that the Government is taking measures to check those who are trying to escape conscription. Check-posts have been set up and identity cards and other papers of students who are coming back after vacations are being checked, BBC said.--APP

CSO: 4600/7

REGIME APPLYING SOLUTIONS TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Warning Against Forged Banknotes

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Sep 81 p 4

[Text]

KABUL, September 12 (Bakhtar).— Recently, a number of Afs 500 banknotes of the DRA have been photocopied and forged on normal paper and put in circulation, according to a notice by D'Afghanistan Bank.

The difference between the genuine and the forged notes is clearly noticeable. The specifications of the new DRA banknotes are so complicated and safe that they cannot be forged easily and put into circulation. Discovery of the forged banknotes is, therefore, very simple.

As soon as the banknotes were put into circulation, they drew the attention of the concerned authorities. The security forces are in search of the forgers.

To avoid being cheated, the public may note the folloing points:

1—The forged banknotes are being photocopied without the security chord, which is noticeable at the centre of the right half of the genuine banknotes.

2—In the forged banknotes, the watermark, prepared in a miniature circle in the genuine ones, is not seen. In the left part of the genuine notes, the word "D'Afghanistan Bank" is noticeable in embossed 'nastaaliq" calligraphy but it is not seen in the forged ones.

3—The special symbol of D'Afghanistan Bank which is clearly seen in the genuine banknotes is completely confused and even the numbers of the forged banknotes are generally from one banknote and is not seen in its proper position.

4—All of the colours on the forged notes, particularly, the writings and signatures are blurred.

The public is requested to pay due attention in money transfer of the DRA Afs 500 banknotes and try to count the notes one by one.

If, during the money transfer, any suspected or forged banknote is noticed, the owner of the note in the capital may be introduced to D'Afghanistan Bank or the nearest police station or the security forces.

Similarly, in the provinces, the owner of such a note may be introduced to the D'Afghanistan Bank branch offices or the security forces.

The specifications of the genuine Afs 500 banknotes, which are legally valid as the past, are being shown on the television in contrast with the forged ones.

Amendment to Land Reform

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Sep 81 p 3

[Text]

"Supplement no. 1 of RC decree no. 8, is for sure ,a step forward for the well-being of our needy people and indicative of true respect for the religious rites and profound observance of the national and tribal traditions that the party and Government have ensured for the various strata of the nation after the victory of the new phase of the glorious Saur Revolution".

Stating this in an interview with the Kabul New Times, a source of the Council of Ulema and Clergy of the Islamic affairs department said: "Appendix no. 1 of the RC decree aims at assuring the religious Muslim compatriots of the fulfilment of the commitments made in the Fundamental Principles and the party and the Government's policy after the victory of the new phase of the revolution and the profound respect for the national and tribal traditions of various strata. By its implementation, on the one hand, the sanctity of the holy places is observed and, on the other, the services of the patriots, soldiers and the honest servants of the homeland are highly valued which is a source of inspiration for serving the motherland".

The source added that, in pursuance of the enforcement of Article 3 of the appendix, the extra acreage of the lands belonging to the holy places and respected personalities such as nationalities and tribal elders, officers, soldiers and defenders of the revolution are not to be expropriated.

At present, while the majority of our compatriots suffer from lack of adequate vocational know-how, the only way to improve the living conditions of the people is engagement in agriculture and better utilisation of the land is directly related to improving the working conditions on the land and satisfaction of the deprived class of people who have for years suffered from poverty and consequently to augumentation of the national income.

The source pointed out that, since the mankind is the descendant of a single father, the Muslims by virtue of the holy Islam emphasize fraternity and equality. According to the holy Islam, 'if a Muslim's needy neighbour goes to bed hungry in the evening, sleeping is prohibited for the other one satisfied with his dinner'. Therefore, every attempt by the party and our govern-

nment for ensuring social justice in the country is useful, necessary and in accordance with the Islamic shariat. The holy Koran upholds justice.

In short, the appendix is indicative of further scrutiny, consideration and assessment by the party and government of the mistakes eminating from shortcomings during the first land reforms operation prior to the new phase of the glorious Saur Revolution.

In reply to another question, the source said that the first supplement of the RC decree pays ample attention to revering the sacred places and the defenders of the revolution. The difference between the operations of the first land reforms before the new phase of the revolution from the viewpoint of people's interest is considerable. The previous operation was not all-sided. The content of the new supplement is fully in accord with people's will. "Those who ignore this crystal-clear fact are like bats do not notice the sun-light".

"We believe that it is up to the peasants that, by popularization of the supplement and enjoying its benefits, to further expand their activities in agriculture, fulfilling their mission in improving the working conditions and promoting agricultural production, liberating themselves from the yoke of slavery of the big landlords and feudalists", the source added.

The source also noted that the ulema and intelligentsia of the country consider as useful and fruitful the measure adopted by the party and the Government.

"Our message to the ulema, intelligentsia, patriots and working people is to render every effort and sincere support for implementation of the supplement and enlighten the people", the source said.

Help for Trade Unions

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Sep 81 p 3

[Text]

At present, there are 614 primary organisations of the trade unions throughout Afghanistan. In the first congress of the Trade Unions held in Kabul on 7 March 1981, the President of the Central Council, of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan had reported that there were only 400 such organisations in the country. However, in the span of five months since then, an increase of more than 50 percent has been made in the number of TU primary organisations.

"This indicates that the trade unions of Afghanistan have become centres for the toiling people of the country. It is also manifestation of the rallying of workers and toiling people of this country around the party and their revolutionary Government. They are now showing a great deal of interest in the defence of their material and moral interests and are getting organised into mass organisations", said Qadir Mahboob, chairman of the Education Department of the Central Council of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan in an interview with a reporter of the Kabul New Times.

He said, out of the 614 primary organisations, 274 are in the Kabul city itself,

19 in the neighbourhood of Kabul and the remaining are organised in the provinces. According to the latest reports obtained on July 12 this year from the Provincial Councils of the trade unions. the total number of the trade unions has reached 175,000 and the workers and toiling people are increasingly getting organised into trade unions.

Answering why the increase in the number of primary organisations is not proportional to the number of members he said: "In organising the unions, the production principle and area are taken into account. That is, in each production unit, there is one primary organisation. Thus, first, we organise unions in the industrial centres and organisations where the number of workers and employees reaches to thousands. However, in a number of factories and industrial plants the number of workers is between 20 to 30 only, which makes the growth in number of primary organisations and that of the members improportionate."

In the course of past five months 214 primary organisations have been set up, showing a vertical rise. Since the holding of the first congress, provincial councils have been set up in Bamian, Ghazni, Samangan, Kapisa and Paktia provinces with elected members.

The syndicate movement in our country is very young and in its infancy. We do not even have the necessary experienced cadres with good knowledge of syndicate activities. This makes the trade unions of Afghanistan unable to fully utilise the interest and willingness of the toiling people and get them mobilised around the party and the revolution."

All popular governments ought to have social bases in society. In this country, following the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, when the state power fell into the hands of the PDPA, that is the political organisation of the working class and all the toiling people of Afghanistan, obviously the working class, peasants, and all the toiling constitute the social base of this new type of state. Thus, the role of any union in any country where the working class party holds the political power, including Afghanistan, is to establish a contact line between the ruling party and all the workers and toiling people.

In such cases the party leads the unions through the union members. As the want of the party is actually the want of the workers and toiling people, the leadership acquires a systematic form with workers and toilers every day rallying around the party and the revolutionary government with more confidence.

Following the Jaddi 6 change, in pursuance with the popular policy of the PDPA, the vanguard of the working class, a more favourable political and social atmosphere was created in the country with the regaining of confidence of the workers and toilers by the party and the Government and they were mobilised and organised through the unions in defence of the revolution and its new phase.

Qadir Mahboob noted: "In the countries where the working party does not possess the political power, the unions are struggling for reaching their goals aimed at ensuring their political, and social rights as well as their material rights including providing better working and living conditions.

"However, in the countries where the worker's political organisation (the new-type working-class party) holds the political power, the duty and objective of the unions in the first step is to raise the level of productions and achieve the growth of national economy, guaranteeing the welfare of all workers and toilers. With this objective in mind, the unions are taking direct part in building the society and the country, This participation ranges from taking part in drawing up productive plans, control and supervision of the affairs and are being translated into action.

"Fortunately, the unions in our country, relying on the party and the Government which has given extensive authorities to the unions, are forging towards achieving this end, as they are aware of the nature and power of the working-class Government which guarantees their interests."

The internationalist solidarity, struggle for ensuring peace, democracy, national independence and progress on world-scale constitute the principles of international struggles of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan. That is why the Trade Unions of Afghanistan has entered the membership of the world syndicate federation and stands firm in the international struggles for implementation of these principles, Mahboob said.

The Trade Unions of Afghanistan is taking part at many of the international regional and syndicate conference in support of the peoples of Asia, Africa and has defended its principles. It has close relations with syndicate of friendly countries as well as progressive, capitalist and developing countries.

The Central Council of the DRA Trade Unions has already held the first congress of the Trade Unions in the country. This is a great achievement as there are syndicates in the world who have been able to hold their first congress only after five years of their beginning.

The Central Council of the Trade Unions of Afghanistan, with the help of sister organisations, has been able to provide training to its cadres and so far 200 of its members have been trained with help of sister syndicates. "The DRA Trade Union is also taking active part in international struggles", he concluded.

CSO: 4600/13

RADIO FREE KABUL, FOREIGN AID BOOSTING MUJAHEDIN CAUSE

Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Sep 81 p 7

[Article by Marek Halter]

[Text] Free Radio-Kabul exists. It broadcasts. Bernard-Henri Levy, Renzo Rosselini and myself have just returned from Afghanistan where we gave the first three transmitters to the Afghan resistance.

Two months ago, in this very place we launched an appeal to set up a free radio station in Afghanistan. This project is being achieved, thanks to the donations of some people, and to the determination of others.

The first broadcast and the station call-theme made the most hardened mountaineers weep. For what they suffer from most grievously in the field is solitude. Like the old senator from Migrahar Province, Mr Ghulam Nabi, they are convinced that "God will punish those who do not come to the aid of Afghans, God or their conscience," but for the moment they must admit that neither conscience nor interests have moved many people to help them.

Despite the promises of President Reagan (Declaration of 9 March 1981) the United States prefers to help Egypt make its Soviet-constructed munitions plants run, rather than aid the Afghans directly.

Until now, Egypt is the only country to have furnished a large quantity of war materiel to the Mujahedin. Egypt declares it is prepared to furnish more, provided the rebels unite. (Declaration by President Sadat to representatives of the Afghan rebels. Cairo, January 1981) But Egypt is experiencing transport problems. The first shipment was loaded at Oman and discharged on the Pasni coast in Pakistan. There it reached Peshawar, hidden in trucks filled with vegetables. There, the Pakistan Government is too much concerned about its powerful Soviet neighbor not to hamper this kind of exploit. Its president, General Zia, knows full well that the 85,000 Red Army soldiers stationed in Afghanistan can invade his country in 48 hours, or arm the Baluchis and Pathan autonomists to encourage them to revolt.

Thus, when in the beginning of May 1981, deserters from the Afghan army crossed over into Pakistan in the Ouetta region with a tank of Soviet origin and an assault helicopter, the Islamabad Government immediately returned them to their owner. A little earlier it had turned over to the Soviet Embassy several Soviet prisoners found in the hands of the Mujahedin.

Iran, bogged down in its war with Iraq, considers the majority of Afghan parties too liberal for its tastes. It only helps the Hezb and Islami, the most fundamentalist group. At that, this aid remains timid and half-hearted, according to the chief of that group, Gulbudin Hekmaktiar. Imam Khomeyni does not wish to provoke the Kremlin under current circumstances.

There remains Saudi Arabia, which from time to time dispatches a cargo of light weaponry bought at Interarms in Manchester. As for the Palestinians, with which the Afghans most willingly identify themselves, and who could have helped them as they help other guerrilla movements, they prefer to support Babrak Karmal's regime and remain in the so-called "socialist" camp.

Thus, the Mujahedin's arms are limited to those they were able to take from the Red Army at the beginning of the invasion, to arms turned over by deserters from the Afghan Army--reduced from 75,000 men in 1979 to 20,000 today--and "shelhe" arms of local manufacture, from the Dara or Landi-Kotal shops in the tribal zone.

That is little compared to the Soviet war machine, which seems slowly to be adapting to local terrain. It does not seek contact with the Mujahedin and seeks to maintain its partial but durable installations.

Thus, the "chourawis" (the Soviets) have built two permanent bridges over the Loxus, the river separating Afghanistan from Soviet central Asia. They have widened the Salang road, over which most of the military road traffic passes, and expanded all the airports, even the most insignificant ones, to permit the reception of the most modern military planes. Most of the airports are therefore now under construction. This is true for the one at Baram, near Kabul; at Kandahar, built by the Americans under Daoud; at Mazir-i-Sharif; at Shindand, at Herat, at Jelalabad or at Kunduz where the first light division of emergency forces has been installed, like the American Green Berets, and which showed its mettle at the beginning of July in the Dangam valley, between Baricot and Asmar, to the north of the Kunar valley.

Resistance does not abate, despite this strategy of stringent control; despite an intense propaganda campaign conducted by radio Kabul and the Soviet radio in the Afghan language broadcasting from the closest USSR city, Duchambe; despite a policy of "cultural autonomy and modernization" strangely reminiscent of the sovietization of the Moslem republics in the 1930's; and, finally, despite the cleaning up of the frontier regions, cleared of their populations. On the contrary resistance is increasing.

They hold the mountains, which cover three-fourths of the Afghan territory, and which for the moment the Soviets have abandoned their plan to conquer. Yet the Mujahedin are realists and they know they cannot obtain a military victory.

"For us," they say, "it will be Outer Mongolia, or, better, Finland." But in order to escape becoming satellites they need the support of world opinion and international diplomacy.

How can one make the Afghans, who rightly or wrongly consider themselves as one of the last ramparts between the energy sources of the West and Soviet expansionism, understand that their appeal to Reagan's America renders them suspect in the view of American liberals, and that the fact of fighting against the USSR alienates a good part of the European left from them? That left has not yet learned to oppose Soviet imperialism as it opposes Western imperialism. Devoted to "progressive" ideas and to plans for new societies, it has difficulty encouraging a people who has no other model of society in mind than its own. A model which they themselves, moreover, consider democratic.

"What is more democratic," explains a leader of the Afghan resistance to us, "than a society where intelligence and courage (mostly courage) are valued more highly than riches, where the chiefs are elected by assemblies and ousted by them, where religion is considered as a realtionship between God and the individual, in which no one can intervene, not even the mullah."

Even if this idea is far from the ideas to which we are accustomed, even if the Afghans' struggle does not correspond to the idea we have of national liberation struggles, the indisputable fact remains: a country is occupied by a foreign power, and a whole people seeks to liberate themselves from it.

Should we sacrifice them on the altar of our theories or should we revise our theories and try to save a people?

Afghans, like all peoples that are struggling, passionately follow current events, and are aware of the interest that the French Government has in the Third World and its liberation movements. "A solemn declaration in our favor from your president would be of immense help to us," an Afghan leader stated to us.

Free Radio Kabul is a sign of solidarity of a few thousand individuals. Afghans received it with appreciation. Mr Safi, commander of the Pech region, even said to us, "The radio that you brought us is worth more than a thousand kalachnikovs."

However, we only gave the Afghan resistance 3 transmitters and they need 36 of them to cover all the country. (Gifts can be sent to the Committee for the Rights of Man. Free Radio Kabul. 152 rue du Chateau, 75014 Paris.) What is more just and more uplifting than to be able to give persecuted men the means of expressing themselves, of informing themselves, and of communicating?

Free Radio Kabul is just that.

9772
CSO: 4619/42

SAHARAN DEVELOPMENT PLANS SLOWED BY WEATHER

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

ALGERIA'S efforts to develop its extensive southern provinces are being severely hampered by torrential rains this summer, which caused considerable damage to the town of Tamanrasset, the administrative centre of Algeria's deep south. Flood waters running off the nearby Hoggar mountain range caused massive destruction and several deaths in this Saharan oasis of 70,000 inhabitants, and the government has pledged to make funds available for an ambitious rebuilding and urban improvement programme.

But the task facing government relief operations is daunting. Thousands of tonnes of cement and other building materials have to be shipped by lorry some 1,500km, from the coast, and the rains have washed out large sections of the trans-Saharan highway north of Tamanrasset. Another handicap is the dearth of skilled technicians. Civil servants from the coastal areas are reluctant to go to Tamanrasset, considering it internal exile in an inhospitable zone. Higher salaries and other financial incentives have failed to sweeten the pill.

The scanty Saharan population — mainly Tuareg nomads or semi-nomads — has found it difficult to adapt to modern life. Almost all young Algerians in the northern part of the country currently attend school, but only about half the children in the Saharan area go to class regularly. President Chadli Benjedid's government aims to make Tamanrasset more attractive to northerners and improve living conditions by creating agricultural villages as part of the agrarian revolution.

Tamanrasset is to be considerably expanded during the current Five Year Development Plan (1980-1984). A large and modern primary school, a technical high school for 1,500 students and a high school of similar size for the arts are planned. The ministry of telecommunications is to build a new post office block, as well as a modern telephone complex to handle satellite communications. Efforts are being made to build up social services throughout the administrative unit. Six health centres, ten telecommunication sub-stations and 15 new post offices are to be set up in the province's principal oases.

Work on two agricultural villages with modern amenities is nearly finished. One is at Amsel, 30km northwest of Tamanrasset, and the other at Silet, 130km to the southeast. It is hoped that the Tuareg population will be able to earn a decent living through market gardening and the cultivation of dates.

Tamanrasset's future also depends on its role as the nub of regional lorry traffic on the trans-Saharan highway between the Mediterranean and sub-Saharan Africa. Algerian officials hope that the two spur roads from the town will reach the Niger and Malian frontiers by 1982-1983.

Algeria's Saharan provinces are not, however, limited to Tamanrasset and its hinterland. The administrative unit of Bechar, along the Moroccan frontier, has considerable potential.

But the Saharan climate is also playing cruel tricks on agricultural schemes in the

Bechar. The irrigated polder at Abadla has failed to live up to expectations. Designed to turn this water-scarce region into an 'Algerian California', the scheme was to bring 10,000 hectares under irrigation, but only 5,400 hectares were ever brought into production, with water being provided by the Djorf Torba dam on Wadi Guir. In 1979, unprecedentedly heavy rains swelled the lake behind the dam to dangerous levels, and government officials decided to drain away 920m cubic metres of water. Unfortunately, rainfall in 1980 and 1981 has been sparse, and the Djorf Torba lake is now practically dry.

The 1980-1981 crop was wiped out, and there are serious problems in getting the scheme back into operation, even if rainfall returns to normal.

CSO: 4500/5

BRIEFS

PILOT TRAINING--Pakistani pilots are presently training the Algerian pilots. They are increasingly replacing the instructors from the Eastern countries. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 28 Sep 81 p 107]

CSO: 4519/7

GOVERNMENT ORGAN CALLS FOR DECISIVE MEASURES AGAINST OPPONENTS

Cairo MAY in Arabic 22 Jun 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Confronting Dissension!"/

/Text/ There is almost complete agreement among the people of this nation that the repeated events which are threatening the health of the national Union and are working to spread poison and vindictiveness between the two components of the nation are not something that one can be silent about, whose significance one can take lightly, or on which one can take a position of ambiguity and indifference.

The official and unofficial statements and details which have come to light about the incidents of factional strife in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' reveal that most of the fire comes from sparks that were held to be of little significance, as they say, and that interventionist, insidious elements provoked feelings of fanaticism among innocent, devout groups, exploiting certain minor disputes here and there to that end and using means of provocation and incitement by spreading about false news and fabricated rumors. The course of the fire soon started to rage, inspiring ignorant elements and appealing to motives of dissension and sentiments of primitive souls who think that religion is just structures, shrines and erected buildings, that defense of a belief means eliminating the proponents of the other belief, or that the triumph of God's word can be realized by perpetrating crimes of arson, killing or sabotage.

We do not want, and cannot allow, the members of a single people, the people of Egypt, to turn Egypt into another Lebanon rent by factional disputes and destroyed by religious deviation, its destiny and its future the plaything of personal or factional caprices, hatreds and ambitions of people who traffic in religion or seek political or worldly influence by stirring up religious passions.

We, as children of a deep-rooted nation whose people have known the meaning of tolerance, fraternity and mercy, do not want, and cannot permit Egypt to turn down the same road that Ireland was drawn down some years ago because of factional religious disputes, as a result of which oceans of blood are still flowing and in whose name different forms of chaos, destruction and ruin are being spread about.

We do not want, and cannot bear, the luxury of attaching ourselves to feeble causes of dispute and dissension from which arise tempests such as those which we

hear about in India, in which massacres take place among suicidal religious factions, in which the nation forgets its real problems in a flood of factional disputes over insignificant matters which lead nowhere.

Confronting dissension of this sort, whose repetition we have become fatigued by from time to time, requires serious, aware vision, intelligent, wise planning in which the efforts of Moslems and Christians join ranks, efforts by religious, party and political groups, and efforts by government agencies, if such incidents are to be kept from erupting again. We wonder why there isn't a committee of wise or intelligent men from both parties in each such section, village or quarter, whose formation the National Party will call for, whose function will be to confront such petty disputes and quarrels and resolve them in a peaceful manner before they become aggravated and people who provoke discord and dissension intervene to expand them.

The role the popular and party bodies play can be of benefit first in resolving such problems and secondly in exposing and uprooting elements of discord and dissension.

More important than all that, however, is the need to strive to apply the law most decisively and severely against people whom judiciary investigations have proved are responsible for fanning the fire of dissension, against people whose unlicensed possession of weapons and destructive equipment is proved, and against people who are working by various means to stir up emotions, spread about lies and fabricate false stories.

In exchange, it is necessary to confront such events by publishing the facts in full, so that public opinion inside and outside Egypt can realize that the people who try to play with the country's security and unity cannot work in hiding or under cover.

Egypt, throughout its long history, has realized how its people have lived together in spite of their diverse ethnic groups and creeds under the banner of tolerance, unity and alienation from fanaticism, in times of prosperity and in times of hardship. The time has come to put everything back in its proper place and eliminate the roots of evil, wherever and whatever they are.

11887
CSO: 4505/71

GOVERNMENT PAPER CONTEMPLATES CRACKDOWN ON DISSIDENTS

Cairo MAY in Arabic 29 Jun 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Political Integrity"/

/Text/ In every country of the world, mistakes, acts of deviation and transgressions, individual or otherwise, intentional or unintentional, take place; they are discovered in the first moments after their occurrence, or time passes before they are discovered, but they take place, and one cannot claim that societies exist which do not experience them at any time or place.

Such wrongs, if committed by ordinary persons who do not occupy political or public positions or centers at any level of leadership and responsibility, become ordinary matters which the law deals with through indictments and punishment. However, they become out of the ordinary when they infringe on party or political personalities who bear public responsibility or undertake political activity.

In every democratic, open society, it becomes difficult, even impossible, for such mistakes and deviations to stay hidden or enveloped in secrecy, because democratic societies are founded on the dissemination of facts and on participation by the broad base of the people in responsibility, the responsibility of choosing and the responsibility of making decisions as well. They are also founded, consequently, on holding everyone accountable in accordance with the size of his responsibility and the extent of his ability to bear it and bear its trust. If an act of deviation or a mistake occurs--and here we are talking about people who are involved in public political activity, in political parties, in the popular and constitutional bodies, or in public positions--it is necessary for the responsible body, whatever it may be and wherever its location may be--in the party leadership, the organization or the government--to take the initiative to unearth this act of deviation, investigate it, determine the responsibility for it and enable the law to hold the person who committed it to account and deter him.

There is nothing shameful in having a mistake occur in the biggest parties or organizations; what is shameful, rather, is when some people imagine they must hide, conceal and cover up the mistake to protect themselves and maintain the respect and appreciation they must enjoy, lest their status be damaged in the eyes of the people and their weight be diminished before the masses.

This kind of backward thinking is valid only in closed societies and is adopted only by countries where people are broken down into two groups, one which is subject to the law and its powers and one which is above answering to the law and its authority. That is acceptable in the context of dictatorial and authoritarian regimes where blessed classes of members of a single party or the ruling elite enjoy rights others do not enjoy.

We in Egypt have chosen the system of party pluralism and have adopted the democratic system which makes the sovereignty of the law a principle that is respected by all and is applied to all members of the people, from the president to the lowest member. The law, like the constitution, sets forth the methods for holding people to account, making them answerable and punishing them; it does not make a single exception which can be personally exempted from responsibility and accountability.

These articles which the constitution stipulates and the law sets forth are not formal or superficial ones, and this process is not cosmetic or voluntary. Rather, it is an essential necessity for preserving the purity of political action and guaranteeing that it is permanently and constantly cleansed of the elements of corruption and deviation which enter unseen into the arena of political action, or try to benefit from their activity in the political field to cover up their acts of deviation and their transgressions.

In any event, the process of revealing and extirpating the elements of deviation, especially in the field of political action, is the best guarantee of the survival and success of democracy; at the same time it is the best proof of the vitality of political action and of those engaging in it because it entails the power of renewal, of renewing the blood in the body politic and cleansing it of the elements of corruption and contamination. Egypt, throughout its political history, has seen parties that were strong and dominant but abandoned themselves to elements of rot, dissipation and deviation, soon became corrupt, then were dissolved and fell into oblivion, because they were not aware of the lessons of history and the wisdom of political action.

11887
CSO: 4504/71

PRELUDE TO GOVERNMENT TIGHTENING REVIEWED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p7

/Editorial: "Confronting Laxity"/

/Text/ The coming month will witness the beginning of a stage of intensified activity on all government levels aimed at controlling progress, realizing discipline, and putting a stop to all manifestations of laxness which affect the quality of political action and divert people from confronting real problems by turning them toward side struggles and dissension which are futile and of no benefit.

Preparatory to this stage, President al-Sadat has asked all ministers and officials in all fields of executive and political activity to end their summer vacations at the beginning of the coming month, September, so that every official may return to his position without delay and efforts may be consolidated to take rapid, firm measures that can be carried out decisively and seriously before laxity becomes an endemic phenomenon which will be difficult to deal with the more its causes grow. Perhaps one of the most important features of this stage is the appeal President al-Sadat is expected to direct to the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly to hold a joint session in which the people, through their representatives and the legislative power, will hear a comprehensive report on the results of the investigation the Office of the Public Prosecutor has made on the events of factional strife and the emerging facts and circumstances which will set out relevant details and will define in full the responsibilities of the elements which enflamed or tried to enflame the fires of factional strife and have tried from time to time to provoke episodes of dissension and cause chaos to erupt uncontrollably--benefiting from the climate of freedom and democracy which the law has guaranteed.

On his speech on the occasion of the July Revolution holidays, President al-Sadat promised to put the facts of the situation with respect to this grave problem in full before the people now that the prosecutor's office has finished investigating them and the judiciary has said its piece. It is not reasonable for us to turn away from such events, which affect the security of the internal front and threaten the pillars of national unity, without revealing their causes and without setting forth decisive rapid measures to remedy them.

Therefore, with the complete statement which President al-Sadat will deliver, we can expect the declaration of a series of decrees and measures which will guarantee that the events fed by feelings of religious fanaticism, such as the events of

al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', will not be repeated and that limits and rules will be placed on the activities of religious groups, whatever they might be, Moslem or Christian, so that they do not go beyond the limits of sound religious appeals for all that is the best, without provocation or violence, and are not turned from religious groups into political parties that are not subject to accountability and stock-taking.

Such decrees and measures must be passed under the aegis of the sovereignty of the law and in accordance with the provisions of the constitution, not through exceptional or individual measures, so that the wrongdoer will know the error before he commits it and the deviant person will realize his deviant act before he succumbs to it.

Also connected to this problem is the need to stand up to the phenomenon of laxity in its broader context, to hold negligence to account wherever it may be, and to extirpate deviation by its roots whatever the motives for it might be: the problem of religious fanaticism and its ramifications arises in most cases from social conditions which provoke feelings of frustration and extremism and prompt young people to seek out measures which are marked by violence and confrontation, in the desire for change and reform. Nothing will be of use in resisting this current except greater determination and severity in holding the phenomena of deviation to account, hemming it in, prosecuting it and enabling the hand of justice and the law to catch up with it, so that it will become clear in every persons' conscience that the scale of justice is not balanced by two measurers and that no one is above the sovereignty of the law and above accountability to it.

Overcoming and dominating these problems become essential when we seek to concentrate our efforts and focus our powers on surging forward with all our capabilities toward greater work and production, toward the horizons of prosperity and economic and social growth. Therefore it is necessary that we take our affairs in this stage more seriously and pay greater attention to people who are absent and lose hours of work and production in our lives. It is necessary to review labor laws and wages in order to link wages to production in all fields and eliminate the phenomenon of laxness in government offices, companies and factories. It is necessary that producers and persons who exert efforts be rewarded and that the slothful and unproductive who are living high on the shoulders of others be punished.

In this stage, the deputies and representatives of the people would do well to prescribe a firm tradition for themselves: to return to their districts and popular bases in the vacation period in order to ascertain their constitutents' problems in real conditions, study their issues and feel the pulse of their movements and trends. If they resume their activity in the coming parliamentary session, they will be more responsive to the masses' feelings, more aware of their problems and better able to take part in solving them.

11887
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SUSPICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS WITHIN OPPOSITION PROBED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 25 May 81 p 7

/Editorial: "An Unholy Alliance!"/

/Text/ The position of the Labor Party and its newspaper has in recent days raised a number of important questions.

The opposition, in the party's view, has turned to attempts to defame, attack and contrive positions by which it intends only to provoke and stir up trouble. The press, in the opinion of the party newspaper, has become merely provocative, totally removed from objectivity and the attempt to seek the truth.

Lest we forget, for a whole year the Labor Party newspaper has been harping on a theme which hardly a single issue has failed to mention, stating that it cannot find paper, that it is threatened with a shutdown and that it is not enjoying material support from the "government" or others. What has happened?

Paper is now available to the newspaper in unprecedented amounts. Proof is that it is now able to print any quantity it wants; indeed, it has doubled its price, increased its revenues and started realizing big profits from each issue.

The party newspaper therefore is not suffering from obstructions or difficulties, as it has been accustomed to stating on its pages for many months. The newspaper has been turned into a provocative paper seeking material gain; every week the paper publishes what its overall quest demands that it do, even when that is at the expense of objectivity and the truth.

This all raises a number of important questions:

Is the Labor Party using democracy as a cover for getting at something which in reality does not serve democracy?

Has it started begrudging the Egyptian people all the achievements realized by the head of the Egyptian family, Anwar al-Sadat, in the form of closing down concentration camps, supporting freedom and giving maximum free rein to a democracy from which there will never be any turning back?

Has an unholy alliance taken form among the Labor Party, the communists, vindictive persons and the remnants of the power centers, so that they have formed a front which is trying to bring Egypt back either to the period of the parties before the 23 July 1952 Revolution or to the era of the power centers in the sixties?

The unholy alliance we are asking the Labor Party about contains Soviet intelligence agents in the Arab nation and people who are working secretly and openly, and it contains communist parties of various designations, starting with all the democratic national liberation movements and ending with the latest up-to-date forms of communist bodies. It also contains groups of people from the Arab nation who bear grudges against some regimes in it, and some of their rulers, including some leaders of various Palestinian organizations and people who control papers published in Arabic in Kuwait, France, England, Damascus and some other Arab countries. All these papers, in addition to the Labor Party paper and the publication of the Grouping in Egypt, have started functioning in the media environment which Soviet agents have contrived to form a yellow press practicing political fraud in the region, especially in Egypt.

The unholy alliance also includes the remnants of the pre-1952 Egypt Party and some dreamers left over from the 23 July Revolution leadership who are on the verge of oblivion and who, when democracy arose in Egypt, thought they would be able to ride the wave and return to leadership in Egypt. The alliance also includes groups from the power centers who ruined people's honor, trampled freedom underfoot, imposed sequestration, established concentration camps and spied on people.

The strange thing is that all these parties have now come to rally around the chief of the Labor Party and have infiltrated into his midst in the well known communist fashion, currying favor with him and starting to deal with him as if he were the "leader" and savior; the head of the Labor Party has believed them and been won over by their plan to use him "provisionally"--an expression they use--to get what they want, after which it will be easy to get rid of him.

Has the whole Socialist Labor Party entered into this unholy alliance?

Can this be the lawful opposition which arises in every democratic regime and considers itself, that is, the opposition, to be part of the regime in whose shadow it lives?

Can the legitimate opposition be converted into a group of provocateurs, as occurs with the system of secret communist cells which try to overthrow the regime in order to crush it?

It is strange, also, that every Arab regime around us, except for the Sudan, Oman and Somalia, seizes news of the alliance and the coalition which calls itself the opposition and publishes word of it. Why?

The answer, sirs, is obvious:

To keep Egypt from remaining alone, in the heart of the Arab world and the Middle East, an island of security, safety, freedom, democracy, stability, and peace.

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ACTS OF LAWYERS' UNION CONDEMNED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 27 Jul 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Trade Unions Are Not Parties"/

/Text/ The crisis which the Lawyers' Union council provoked, and the complications which led to the issuance of a People's Assembly decree demanding that it be dissolved and that a temporary council be formed, have raised an important, serious issue which deserves to be treated calmly and wisely, in the context of the social and political conditions whose democratic pillars we are all trying to implant and protect from the causes of chaos and manipulation which fragment the ranks of nations and keep them from achieving their goals.

This issue is the need to agree on the role of professional unions in the context of the democratic system we have adopted which is based on a government of institutions and sovereignty of the law, and regulates the boundaries separating legislative, executive, judiciary press powers. What are the limits of the role the professional unions, among them the Lawyers' Union, are performing? What are their rights and duties vis-a-vis the people representing these unions on the one hand and public issues and problems on the other?

Without going into many details, a professional union, any union, is a grouping or league which includes workers in the realm of a given profession and performs its duties on three levels:

The level of defending the rights of the people working in the realm of this profession in the moral and material senses and enabling them to enjoy them; preserving the traditions of the profession; advancing it; ensuring and guaranteeing the exercise of the profession; and preserving the dignity of the people working in it.

It should be a vessel of expertise in the area of its specialization, contributing carefully studied opinions and honest, conscious advice on the public problems raised which bear on the affairs and the constituencies of this profession. The Teachers' Union is the best able to give a cogent opinion on problems of education and educational reform. The Engineers' Union is the most fit to talk about problems of manufacturing, production, agriculture and housing. The Lawyers' Union is the most entitled to give an opinion on the presentation of laws and legislation and the guarantee of justice and freedom.

There then comes the third level, which is that of expressing special opinions by taking part in the formulation of public opinion vis-a-vis national and seminal issues and problems of domestic and foreign policy, so that the members of the union can feel the duty of national participation and defense of the interests of the nation, considering that a duty and a responsibility for every member of society.

We will note that the first level of professional union activity, which is to defend the rights and interests of employees, represents the first, most important duty and lies at the heart of the daily, practical pursuit of the union's task. It is that on which our efforts must concentrate and for which it must be held to account only by the groups of people belonging to it, to the exclusion of other groups and factions.

The second and third levels enter into the realm of public activity in which numerous groups and bodies take part. The groups have equal rights to express their views and exert influence through legitimate channels on the decision-making agencies, be these agencies at the level of parties, the government, or the elected legislative councils which represent the people. It is the right of the Teachers', Engineers' or Lawyers' Union, for example, to express its opinions on problems of education and housing, on grounds that it is a group, and not the only group, of the public that is affected by these problems. These unions also have the right to announce their opinion on national and seminal issues, on issues of war and peace, on the issue of the struggle with Israel or on relations with Arab countries.

However: There is a difference between expressing an opinion by legitimate means and dictating an opinion by illegitimate means; there is a difference between expressing an opinion at variance with what the popular consensus has settled on, on a national issue such as the Camp David agreement, and attempting to impose the opinion by entering into struggles against the elected national authorities and siding with foreign powers which adopt a position of hostility and enmity toward them.

This is the error to which the dissolved Lawyers' Union council succumbed. In the past 2 years, the activity of the Lawyers' Union council was focussed totally on entering into a confrontation with every decision and policy adopted by the government and endorsed by the People's Assembly. The Lawyers' Union council has been transformed into something resembling an opposition party, although it does not have the attributes, powers, elected representatives or political program of a party. It is well known that the council members of any professional union, when they nominate themselves and are elected, do not nominate themselves and are not elected by their colleagues in the profession as their political representatives but rather solely as union representatives. Thus the Lawyers' Union council exceeded the bounds of its powers and area of competence when it conferred upon itself the right to enter into political struggles in which it spoke for a few thousand members whose opinion on any given issue was not taken and who did not give a vote of acceptance or rejection on it.

Such mistakes and transgressions ought not to happen to us, but they are an opportunity for us to set forth clear, evident bases, traditions and limits between union practices and party practices so that everyone may be aware of his rights and obligations without violating any of them.

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PRO-GOVERNMENT PAPER CRITICIZES WAFDIST LEADER

Cairo MAY in Arabic 1 Jun 81 p 7

/Editorial by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "No, Pasha!"]

/Text/ We do not know exactly what Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din wants. We do not know what he could do to persuade people of the soundness of his course of action, since he had assumed many vital positions in the Wafdist cabinet before the 23 July 1952 Revolution burst forth!

He imagines that people forget, that memory with the passage of time betrays the people who hold it! Otherwise, what is the meaning of his current attempt to turn the truth upside down and speak about glories, acts of heroism and positions, whose falsity, waywardness and vileness no two people will disagree over?

The great error to which the 23 July 1952 Revolution succumbed was that it turned the page of the past and prohibited all talk about the Wafd party experiment of the final years preceding the revolution. It imagined that people knew the secrets and the corrupt nature of this experiment. It also imagined that the people would never forget what they had suffered at the hands of the people who had deceived them, who became rich at their expense, left Cairo to burn, and went off to register the purchases of new buildings to add to their properties and possessions!

The expectations of the leaders of the revolution were erroneous:

The new generation which has arisen since the revolution knows nothing of these facts. It does not know what the political merchants did to their country and what they did to themselves. More serious than that, the 15 May 1971 Revolution allowed the merchants of politics to come out of their graves and crypts. It thought that it would have been possible for them to have benefited from their mistakes, to have rid themselves of them, and to have turned a new page. The democracy of May allowed them to return again to the political stage. It agreed to the re-establishment of their party. It expected that the leaders of this party would engage in politics in a manner different from the old method, which the July 1952 Revolution had arisen only to crush and to save the country from its miseries!

None of any of that took place!

We were taken by surprise to see that the man who had sullied the experiment of the old parties was the same person who is leading the new party! We were further taken by surprise to see that the people whom the people who had unanimously agreed were loathesome, disreputable and corrupt were returning today and ascribing to themselves fraudulent acts of heroism, different positions and nonexistent sacrifices!

Most unfortunately, they found people to listen to them, people to believe their lies, people to think well of them! It would be unjust for us to hold simple-minded people to task for having been deceived by the merchants and corruptors of politics. The fault was not theirs; it was the fault, rather, of people who did not reveal the truth to them and did not write the true history of things on their behalf, the secret things, the oversights which cannot be changed and must not be forgotten!

Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din grabbed his pen and wrote a letter which he submitted to 'Abidin Palace, requesting that it be presented to the president. What is baffling is that he signed it in his capacity as secretary of the old Wafd Party and chairman of the New Wafd Party. That is, he did not hesitate to assume an identity which was not his! He spoke of two parties which do not exist: the first was dissolved by the people after the 23 July 1952 Revolution and the second dissolved itself by itself and became irrelevant! How can he come today, without embarrassment, sign what he signed, and move history back to the time when he started his career in parliament, in 1936, by forging his birth certificate and adding 4 years to his age so that his application for candidacy would be accepted!

At that time people commented on that by saying that the former pasha had started his public career by forging official documents; shall we find fault with him today for ending his days, after a long life, by assuming an identity which is not his?

What has most angered the former pasha is that he was said to have been a plaything in the hands of the king and the hands of the British. We do not know how we can deny facts that have been proved and ignore official documents in which every letter speaks of this fact, which the Pasha is now trying to ignore and deny.

We have decided to publish Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's letter in full and not comment on it. We have selected what others besides us have said in replying to the many lies which were contained in the letter. We have chosen what colleagues of his in the dissolved Wafd Party said about him, we have chosen what was stated in the legal defense memorandum presented by Mr Fathi Radwan against Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, and we have chosen what the secretary of the British Embassy said about him in an official cable retained in the records of the British Foreign Office. We leave it to the reader to comment on that himself!

Once again, we wonder:

What exactly does Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din want? Or, more precisely, what can the former pasha do to forge history and destroy the facts?

It's a question which no one can answer but Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din himself!

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GOVERNMENT PARTY PAPER DENOUNCES DOMESTIC CRITICS

Cairo MAY in Arabic 18 May 81 p 7

/Editorial by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "Opposition!"/

/Text/ For a long time there has been nothing from the press and the mouthpieces of the Syrian government except insults against the Government of Egypt, attempts to disparage its achievements and an insistence on casting doubt about its intentions, principles and Arabhood!

The papers of Damascus have no concern except to slander President Anwar al-Sadat for no purpose! The statements by Syrian officials, from President Hafiz al-Asad down to the lowest Ba'thist Alawite official, are full of violent phrases and dangerous charges, all directed against the Egyptian government in general and President Anwar al-Sadat in particular!

What the mouthpieces of Syrian propaganda are doing against the legitimate government of Egypt is also being done by the mouthpieces of Libyan propaganda, the mouthpieces of Palestinian propaganda and the mouthpieces of Iraqi propaganda!

These Arab countries--fraternal Arab countries--have the right to write, talk, and be concerned as they please, just as they have the right to be hostile to foreign governments which do not agree with them or are not in accord with what they deem fit and call for.

These countries have the right to do all this, as long as their rulers plan media policy and define who their countries' friends are and who their enemies are!

It will not harm Egypt in any way if some people slander it or cast doubts on the positions of its legitimate government. It may perhaps sadden Egyptian citizens when they read a paper issued in a fraternal Arab country, for example Syria, and find many things in it that neither the mind nor the heart, nor taste can accept! Egyptians may be pained when they hear Radio Tripoli, Radio Baghdad or the Voice of Palestine from Damascus and find that they are trying to stir them up against their government, their leader or all the national, domestic and Egyptian issues they believe in and feel strongly about!

Grief alone constitutes the reaction of Egyptian citizens when they read Arabic papers cursing their country and listen to Arab broadcasts slandering their government and leaders.

We are not proponents of replying to curses with greater ones. We are not people who demand that our papers and broadcasts organize constant attacks against the ruling regimes in Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli and elsewhere in response to their attacks against Egypt and its regime.

However:

There is a big difference between ignoring the base charges these regimes are levelling against us and extending our hand and shaking those of the leaders of regimes that have planned the hate campaigns with which they fill the columns of their newspapers and with which they pack their speeches and radio talks!

There is a big difference, a very big one, between my trying to end Arab-Egyptian disputes and between my ignoring some people's curses, going to these people, embracing them, holding discussions with them and declaring my support for their positions and policies!

There is a very big difference between my opposing the policies of the Egyptian government in Cairo, protected by the democratic atmosphere we enjoy, and flying to Damascus, for example, in response to an invitation from the Syrian government, meeting with Hafiz al-Asad, getting information from him, quoting from him, then returning to my country triumphant and victorious!

There is a big difference--a very big one--between my writing against the Egyptian president in an opposition newspaper issued in Cairo and my meeting with Yasir 'Arafat, the head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, in a rejection /state/ capital, and carrying out lengthy discussions with him in which our views coincide and at the conclusion of which we issue a joint communique declaring our solidarity, alliance and cooperation!

If it happens that one of them attacks my country, my people, my legitimate government, and my head of state, and then I try to meet with this person, embrace him, talk with him, and declare my support for him, my position has no meaning except that I am practicing wrongful opposition and exploiting the atmosphere of democracy in order to defy the feeling of all Egyptians!

If I ignore everything that is said about my country in loathesome terms that go against courtesy, and then agree to accept the hospitality of the people who use these terms, listen to them and eat their food, I do not believe that the most severe domestic critics would permit that or agree to it!

I cannot imagine that there are people who see no embarrassment in leaving Cairo, accepting an invitation from Hafiz al-Asad--who reviles my country, attacks the head of my government, tortures the Syrian people, prosecutes the Moslem Brothers, blows up the homes of Lebanese, and threatens the faithful--meeting with him, listening to him and sharing his positions!

What I cannot imagine has actually happened! What we cannot accept some people have proceeded to do!

It is a real tragedy, a tragedy which calls for a pause, merits study. In reality it represents a current which does not express the real Egypt, and underlines a tendency which is rejected by every Egyptian who supports or opposes his country's policies.

Strong, and true, opposition is the opposition that opposes the ruler for a political position and does not go to shake hands dirtied with blood and talk with people who have cursed Egypt, attacked its legitimate leadership, and sent their agents to try to stir up discord and spread about terror within the country!

Opposition, as I view it, means saying "no" to Anwar al-Sadat if you have an opinion different from him. It is not opposition when you go to al-Asad or 'Arafat, agree with him and shake his hand as he competes and vies with others to curse Egypt and curse its legitimate president, Anwar al-Sadat!

I really am at a loss as to how to choose a proper way to describe this opposition!

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PRO-GOVERNMENT CLERICS, OFFICIALS DISCUSS WAVE OF RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic 20, 27 Jul, 3, 10 Aug

/Article: "AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's Symposium: Religious Extremism"/

/20 Jul 81 pp 4, 5/

/Text/ All of us without exception are deeply concerned about Islam. All of us without exception are proud of our tolerant religion.

All of us without exception wish the banner of Islam to stand high.

All of us without exception are striving earnestly to advance God's words.

Who among us is not happy about the devout young people who know their lord and seek shelter in his contentment?

Who among us is not happy about the young man who are devoted to God in their conduct, openly and inside themselves?

Who among us does not hope that all of our young people will turn into men of God?

What does concern us, however, is that some of our young people are inclining toward extremism, with, on some occasions, the violence that leads to, which Islam dismisses and rejects.

What does concern us is that our young Moslems in their understanding of their religion are turning away from the proper course!

Therefore AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI has convened this symposium, to ascertain the reasons lying behind the phenomenon of religious extremism so that a way may consequently be found to remedy it.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: Any call for reform must be constantly focused on establishing morality, supporting its structure, and surrounding it with an impregnable wall which will preserve it from the vicissitudes of time. The divine religions have arisen on this basis; if they are observed to the letter in full, they will put people on the sound path and will lead them by the hand to success and prosperity.

There is no doubt that our experiences in life, and the events of time that history has recorded, have taught us to have an unquestionable faith that nations can properly emerge and live a happy life only in the context of noble morals and manners and that if they deviate from God's law their star will fall. This matter is to be taken for granted, according to experience as well as the notice that almighty glorious God has given us in his beloved book.

On this basis, we can say that the foundation of the resurgence that can be our lot and that our lives can settle on in Egypt are Islamic principles and establishment of these principles in people's spirits. This notion, I believe, is what we have come here for today.

We are now faced with an issue which is one of intellectual extremism and religious extremism. There is no doubt that extremism in anything is a matter to be censured. The Islamic religion is distinguished only by being a mediating religion. It is mediation which has made ours the best religon that has been revealed to people.

Therefore we would like to deal with this problem, that is, the problem of religious extremism, and, with guidance and perspicacity, ascertain the causes which have led to the appearance of such extremism in Egypt, the country in which the noble al-Azhar is situated, the country in which Islam is studied extensively.

How does this extremism exist in our midst, or how could it exist when we have al-Azhar with its faculties, institutes and scholars?

There must be reasons. It is those reasons which we must look into now. If we put our hands on these reasons it will be easy to set forth a wholesome solution to this phenomenon.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I am pleased to talk at this blessed symposium on a subject which I truly believe to be the issue of the hour.

Religious extremism has two sides, a theoretical side and a practical one.

I might let myself be guided by my trade as a professor of history and offer a summary historic introduction to the subject, as Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar has been so gracious as to speak about the problem from the point of departure of our pure religion.

I have practical experience, since I am connected to the most important sector in the government, which is that of the students.

I have found that the phenomenon of violence manifests itself clearly among students, especially students in universities.

When I say "violence," I mean violence in speech, which may spread and become aggravated, turning into physical combat.

I have observed through experience that the phenomenon of violence is a phenomenon that does not arise from within us but one that has been brought to us!

I can assert, through experience, observation and testimony, that "violence" is an imported phenomenon and has not been fashioned by our environment. The sources of "violence," as a phenomenon that has now manifested itself in our midst, are not Islamic. They are communistic or atheistic.

Islam does not inspire violence. Its grandeur, nobility and perseverance lies in the fact that it does not call for violence, indeed that it calls us to renounce it as much as possible.

There are many factors which feed the phenomenon of violence in our midst, most importantly our student children's travel abroad.

All our children who travel to Europe and America return bearing the phenomenon of violence.

However, in spite of that, I consider that the phenomenon of violence must not cause us fear or disturb us, because our tolerant religion commands us to renounce it and because freedom of opinion is the way to deepen our understanding.

Shayk Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: Extremism in thought, as Prof al-'Adawi has pointed out, is relevant for the most part; it is a matter on which there is no conflict.

My statement will be confined to the phenomena of extremism in religion that I see.

Religious extremism is a matter which is not new to Moslems; indeed, it has existed since the era of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and blessings.

Perhaps we might recall the subject of these people who were companions of the prophet, some of whom were young men, and went to his home in his absence, questioning his devotion and work. When they gave notice of it, as if they thought little of it, in the words of the narrative, and when the prophet heard their questions and what they had understood to be his scant devotion and their plea that he be forgiven, he told them, "Haven't you said this, this and this?" They said, "Yes, prophet of God." He said, "I fast, I break the fast, I get up and I go to bed, I marry women and anyone who loathes my sayings and doings is not on my side."

I believe that this notion, which brought these people to the prophet's house, wondering about his devotion is a kind of extremism; extremism which must devote itself to being devoutly religious and performing God's due we can in any event also call extremism.

Moslems were not created just for worship. They have other obligations, which are those of the succession which God brought to man when he distinguished him from the angels: "Your lord told the angel, I am making a successor on earth, and this succession has its significance."

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: Do you mean that this kind of extremism might lead to violations against religion?

Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: That is what I am getting at. We have now been witnessing an absence of religion among students, indeed in Egyptian society, for a long time, whether in school or the university, or even in the home--an absence of religion in the sense of religious training and religious supervision and guidance.

In the coutext of this absence, imported ideas have come, have taken root in the minds and spirits of young people, and have possessed them.

History tells us that during the wave of translation, especially the translation of philosophy, during the era of Harun al-Rashid and al-Ma'mun, in that era, in the wake of the broad extensive translation movement, signs of extremism emerged. Where did it come from? It came from imported cultures that had been brought in.

We also have opened up to the world before us, and the world has become like a single nation. In the context of this intellectual or cultural opening, many ideas, creeds and ideologies have come to us which we have unfortunately not been able to stand up to thoughtfully or fortify our young people against. There has been nothing in our radio broadcasting, our schools or our programs which could make our young people understand the true nature of these ideas and how they were brought in, what their centers were, or what their scope was in the context of the provisions of Islam. This is what we have missed and what has been lacking in our midst.

There also are groups of young people who have formed what are called religious societies. In this I am certain there is nothing wrong, or the least danger.

The danger, rather, comes when these groups deviate from the proper religious course.

Some of these religious groups might become extreme and take religion out of its context. They might imagine that Islam is exclusive devotion to worship; they might imagine that Islam is a particular kind of clothing.

Where did these unsound notions come from?

They all arose in the absence of the presentation of the proper Islamic religion in student milieux at the level of the grades of instruction, indeed on most occasions in the family environment.

Dr al-Husayni Hashim: The essence of the Islamic religion was truly summarized by almighty blessed God in the mission of his prophet when he said, "We have sent you only kindness for both worlds."

The Islamic religion is kindness for both worlds, for Moslems and non-Moslems alike, for man and the rest of creation.

The prophet is the guilding kindness, all the laws of Islam are nourished by the holy Koran, and the sayings and doings of the prophet explain the holy Koran.

We see that all the laws in the holy Koran are motivated by a style of kindness, in the name of God the all merciful and most compassionate. The chapters of the Koran

begin with the name of God the all merciful and most compassionate. This is proof that Islam is endowed with kindness in all its matters and that Islamic creation is the great creation.

There is a difference between education and upbringing; I consider that upbringing truly is more important than education, though the attention education receives now is very great. In the mosques, many givers of sermons and proselytizers give people proper information: they instruct people and support their role as fully as possible. Thus the imams state knowledge and convey it to people.

Many people possess knowledge but do not act in accordance with it. The reason for that is a lack of upbringing: "Our growing youths grow up in accordance with what their fathers have accustomed them to." How many crimes are committed by people who are the best informed about them, and how many traits people display when they know they are blameworthy and not approved by religious law! The cause of that is upbringing. To that end, I recommend upbringing; upbringing, as psychologists say, is of greatest importance in the first stages of life.

The phenomenon of deviation in the universities is just a collection of roots which children clutched at when they were in the prime of their life, were still in the nursery, then were in primary, preparatory and secondary school, and they bore them with them as poisonous roots into the university. The phenomenon of deviation has arisen as a reaction to intellectual deviation.

In every aspect, deviation is an evil and there is no doubt about it.

Religious deviation is a reaction to communist intellectual deviation, or, in similar words, deviant communist thinking is what has given birth to deviant religious thinking.

As his eminence Dr al-Hajjar has shown, Islam is the mediating religion; the meaning of "you have been a mediating nation" is "just," because mediation is justice. As the philosophers Plato and Aristotle say, virtue is mediating between two evils: boldness is a virtue and recklessness is an evil; cowardice is also an evil and dignity a virtue, and so on.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: It occurs to me that we ought to have carefully defined the notion of "extremism" at the beginning of the discussion. What is it and what does one mean by it? It is true that it has appeared on the tongues of our gentleman and colleagues who have spoken about part of this notion, but it is possible that it would be better for us to pause to define it.

In my view there is the extremism which exists in thought. Extremism in religious thought is extremism on the rulings of religion themselves and on interpreting the import of certain Koranic verses, as we have seen--the interpretation of certain Islamic groups of certain Koranic verses, for example. People act with excess in interpreting certain Koranic verses, setting definitions out for them which are not their true definitions, for example their interpretation of God's almighty statement "Those who are not governed by what God has revealed," and so forth.

Some people also interpret the methods for dealing with Christians and Jews which have appeared in our religion in a Western manner which the intelligence cannot accept.

Acting in excess and extremism in understanding--and here, by understanding, I mean the understanding of religious stipulations--is the first point before which we might pause and which we might call extremism.

The second form of extremism is embodied in the application of this notion. People might understand religion in a specific way, then subsequently try to apply it as they understand it.

Some people might understand, for instance, that the best thing in worship is exclusive devotion to it, and leave their work and worship day and night. This notion might come to certain people's minds; practical application to prayer day and night, abandoning work and the quest for a livelihood, is to be considered a definition of extremism, in the sense of applying these notions which I have mentioned as the first form of extremism.

We can then move on the the third form of extremism as I envision it, which is concentrated in the effects derived from understanding religious precepts and applying them in a certain way. There are effects which are derived from application, these derived effects are what I might call "violence."

Violence is the effect which results from an erroneous conception of relgion or an erroneous application of religion!

I place the phenomenon of "violence" in third place; I can call it "extremism," and characterize it by a special designation, which is "violence" as a result of extremism.

This clearly helps us penetrate deeply into the reasons for each one of these three forms, and therefore we can wonder:

Why do we see that some people are extremists and others are not? Why? Upbringing might be the same in their cases, on may occasions.

Thus it is necessary for us to seek out adequate reasons for this extremism, This is not the easy matter that some people might think it is.

We might wonder: does this extremism, which we have seen and witnessed and whose manifestations we have witnessed, arise from wrongful religious information or a misconception of religious precepts?

Is it the result of psychological reasons of upbringing, in the sense that upbringing has not been properly guided from childhood and has not proceeded in its proper course, for one reason or another, leading to deviation? Dr Abu-al-'Azayim might point to some of these aspects.

Some of the educational and psychological aspects which have manifested themselves in childhood might prepare a person to become in the future a vicious extremist dealing harshly with everyone! When this kind of person turns to religion, the extreme features of his personality are reflected in his religious conduct and he becomes an extremist in religious matters as he is extremist in his personal and private affairs.

That might in my opinion be a reason for religious extremism.

Might extremism be attributed to religious enthusiasm itself, such as faith and extreme zeal for religion, which become transformed into extremism or violence?

Is extremism attributable to the blind imitation of foreign trends?

Is extremism an imported qualtity?

Is extremism political in essence, adopting a religious exterior? These are all in reality just conjectures whose validity, or lack of validity, we cannot judge.

The matter requires that we devote serious scholarly study in which psychologists, sociologists, theologians, and political scientists will participate, and which will take up an investigation into the phenomenon of religious extremism in order that one might arrive at its causes and that it might as a consequence be feasible to remedy it.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: The fact is that the issues which have sprung forth, which Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan has discussed, are more individual than general. We cannot say that they are general ones subject to general criteria; rather, they are forms of perversion which occur at times.

I believe there are general bases which must dominate, and these are religious upbringing. If some people deviate, there are other reasons prompting them to deviation, and this is a deviation which cannot be measured.

Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr: In reality, the subject of extremism and the means for remedying are a big issue, a subject which needs copious study, and there may exist, in some libraries or other places, special research into this subject, albeit in generalized form, or simple references.

I am speaking to the very elite of thinking and opinion:

I say: extremism may seem to us to be an excess of thought and intellectual consciousness. If the thinking of a person, or his understanding of a given issue, is bad, then his love of this thought will acquire that quality.

Deviation might lie in belief and opinion and it might lie in conduct. One phenomenon of such deviation in belief is the fact that some people believed that the prophet was not human.

The almighty glorious lord of honor ordered his prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, to show the people in more than one place and on more than one occasion that he was human like them, lest they go to excess in their love, as some people in the past went to excess and raised him to heaven and to the status we have seen.

The prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, told the people "Do not lavish praise on me the way the Christians lavished praise on Christ the son of Mary."

The phenomena of extremism are old and have not been introduced into Islamic society recently. The phenomena of extremism existed at the death of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace. We know the defiant ideas which raised these people to levels which might be above those of man, and we know the violent nature contained in these ideas and the violence which occurred because of them; as a result of wrongful belief and a result of the love of extremism in religion, certain wrongful notions and conceptions revolved about them.

As a consequence, a strange laxity manifested itself which led to the renunciation of the major companions of the prophet; this is the peak of extremism and the peak of intellectual deviation.

Thus we find that one of the manifestations of extremism are the extremist beliefs some people hold.

There also is the Wahhabi creed, which basically arose to eliminate heresy and superstition.

It was a good idea when it first arose, but soon, in the course of time, deviated; it was the darwishes who belonged to it and smashed everything and everyone who opposed them that caused it to deviate. In fact, they threw out everyone who did not embrace their views of the Islamic religion and considered him an infidel.

We know the statement of almighty God: "T. H. /introductory letters/: we did not reveal the Koran to you to make you miserable."

We know the statement of almighty God: "God wishes you comfort and does not wish you hardship."

The Islamic religion is the religion of mediation--indeed, it is the religion of comfort.

On the Symposium

An enlightined elite of scholars of religion and thought, university professors and specialists have raised many important points in AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium, with respect to:

Religious extremism, its roots, its causes, its remedy, among them: The phenomenon of religious extremism and the violence that accompanies it do not arise from our midst--the phenomenon is imported and brought in from abroad.

Religious extremism is not something new or newly created in the ranks of Moslems--it is an old phenomenon which has existed since the era of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace.

In the absence of religious upbringing and guidance in the school, the university, and the home, and in the context of the intellectual opening to the world, wayward, misleading notions have done to us which we have not stood up to in an objective manner and protected our young people from.

There is no danger in the emergence of religious societies. The danger lies merely in these groups' deviation from the proper religious course.

Extremism is the effect which results from a wrongful conception and wrongful application of religion. The wrongful conception of religion is the inevitable product of the absence of a proper introduction to the Islamic religion.

There is unanimity, or near-unanimity, that the matter needs serious scientific study in which psychologists, sociologists, theologians and political scientists will participate, taking up an investigation into the phenomenon of religious extremism, so that it can arrive in a scientific, objective manner at its causes and thus its remedy.

Egyptian schools are proficient in scholarship but they do not give young people a proper religious upbringing.

There is a religious void which people who have infiltrated the call to Islam have exploited, occupying the field, spreading about their wayward call and disseminating extremism among young people.

Our young people are now exposed to corrupt, destructive intellectual currents which they must be protected from!

Participants in the Symposium

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, President of al-Azhar University; Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haww, the mufti of the Republic of Egypt; Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, Vice President of Cairo University; Dr al-Hussayni Hashim, Secretary General of the Academy of Islamic Research; Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, former head of the Teachers' Union; Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman, religious consultant to the National Party; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, scientific consultant to the Ministry of Religious Endowments; Dr Jamal Madi Abu-al-'Azayim, professor of psychiatry; Prof Jabir Hamzah Farraj, general director of information at al-Azhar; and, for AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, Mahmud Mahdi and Sami Diyab.

/27 Jul 81 pp 4, 5/

/Text/ AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium is still in session.

The phenomenon of "religious extremism" is still the subject of a debate with many ramifications.

Our intellectuals, religious scholars and university professors are still carrying on a dialogue on the phenomenon, presenting reasons and seeking a remedy.

Many new causes of the phenomenon of religious extremism have been introduced in this instalment. In this instalment, also, the serious discussion of the remedy began.

Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman: Our young people would be the best there are, if they followed an upright program and the straight path.

Modern young people, at this time specifically, consist of young people who sincerely believe in God and his message; young people who are irresponsible about their religion and morals and are fugitives from their lord; or religious, extremist, intense young people who are zealous about their religion and, through their extremism and zealotry, have gone beyond the limits which Islam has brought forth through God!

In my opinion many reasons lie behind the phenomenon of religious extremism; these are stated by the questions I present and raise:

Are schools now providing a proper upbringing? I do not believe so!

Schools teach lessons but they do not nurture spirits and consciousnesses.

Have we managed to stand up to the cultural onslaught with all the means it entails for destroying the spirits of our young people? We absolutely have not.

I do not accept the phrase "religious deviation," because it means religious rebellion; it would be better for us to say "deviation in the name of religion."

Young people are exposed to numerous cultures. Islam is self-evident and does not need explanation, because man of bedouin backgrounds went to the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and asked him about Islam, "Tell me something about Islam so that I need not ask anyone about it after you." Then the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, brought together two words and said "Say 'I believe in God,' then be devout."

Spread the message and do not run away, for the Koran is self-evident, the sayings and doings of the prophet are self-evident, and the history of the devout is filled with heroic acts of Islam which established the nation of Islam on a basis of piety and good will toward God.

I do not want to go on at length, but I can say that the tremendous piercing power of the call to Islam remains strong, calling for God wisely and with good exhortation and calling for God perspicaciously. The call for moderation and a commitment to the sound Islamic program, Islamic morality, and the straight path are the duties of every person making the call. The prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, has made the goal of his mission the nobility of morality: "I have been sent down to fulfill the nobility of morality."

I do not harbor ill will toward young people. Our young people are devout and religious but it is waywardness in understanding that is doing them harm.

There also is an important matter to which I would like to draw attention: there is a religious void which people who pretend to give the call are exploiting, taking over the field and harming Islam and Moslems; they have been a major cause, through their improper appeals, of the spread of the phenomenon of extremism among our young people.

Islam is not internally contradictory and its verses do not differ over any matter, unless some people want to bend them to something other than God's religion for special purposes alien to God's religion.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: I can say that a home is a Moslem home only if the proselytizers perform their duty. The proselytizers must perform their duty for the public,among men and women.

A Moslem home will grow if both parents are virtuous; in their virtue there lies virtue for their children, on grounds that they are the exemplar and model. If a Moslem home grows, Moslem children and Moslem young people will be raised in turn.

Dr James Abu-al-'Azayim: In reality, if we look at extremism we will find that it is the product of an introverted personality.

There are two personality manifestations: there is introversion and there is extroversion. Both of them are pathological. The Koran tries to create people of moderate disposition who do not fall on their faces or go about ecstatically on earth.

As time passes, a personality which has been introverted since childhood does not reach the degrees of maturity which it ought to.

Therefore we must devote great attention to remedying the phenomenon of introversion, lest the person who possesses or is afflicted by it deviate from the natural course, in spite of himself.

Human growth passes through stages; there is physical growth, psychological growth, and social growth, and there is also religious growth.

The more people in their lives are in the intermediary position the Koran calls for, the more they progress with this growth and reach it at the suitable time, not stopping at any period.

You might ask me what hazard there is in such a stoppage of growth, if it occurs.

The hazard in the stoppage of growth lies in the fact that people whose growth has stopped at a specific period and who have not completed their natural course are easy to tempt and are easy to lead into zealotry.

This ease of being tempted and being led exposes them to being influenced by other personalities.

These other influential personalities might in turn be pathological and lead immature personalities, fill them with thoughts and form many different groups out of them and others!

Yes, Islam has left everything clear to us, but we must be anxious to investigate every mystery, because our current social life is growing complicated in a very amazing manner.

Jabir Hamzah: There is an introduction which must be made before one starts to talk.

Ibn 'Abbas, may almighty God be pleased with him, says: "We made nine-tenths permissible, out of fear of succumbing to what is forbidden." Therefore it is not

permissible to term adherence to religion and the preservation of the appearance of religion extremism.

It would have been more appropriate for us to direct attention, criticism and reform to the phenomena of deviation and waywardness which exists among young people of both sexes in society, and we must properly understand the statement of almighty God: "Call for your lord's path with wisdom and good exhortation."

This blessed verse is being repeated on the tongues of many scholars and ordinary people. In my opinion, stating it and interpreting it in the obvious sense is alien to the essence of this verse and the noble goals and honorable ends it is aimed at.

"Call for your lord's path with wisdom"--here wisdom does not mean permissiveness; rather, wisdom means putting things in their right place. The situation might require a good word; here wisdom requires that we use a good word. Wisdom might require severity, violence and war; here, wisdom is for us to do so, and if we do not we will deviate from wisdom.

I have some observations on what we in particular call religious extremism:

First, what cannot be doubted is that religion is a blessing, and what cannot be doubted as well is that there is no blessing in excess, and no excess in blessings.

Consequently, we do not accept this expression known as religious extremism.

Second, perhaps the reason for this expression, that is, "religious extremism," may be attributed to disrespect for the status of religion, as a result of which ordinary adherence to religion has become strange to society because society has become deviant. If people adhere to their religion, but in a sound manner, they will become perverted in the eyes of this society and strange in people's views and understanding.

Third, attributing extremism and violence to religious people specifically is not permissible, since confining different types of violence and perversion to religious persons alone or as a consequence of intensity in religion or adherence to religion is not to be accepted.

Fourth, there is an abundance of deviation that has been transmitted to us from abroad and did not previously exist in our midst.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: Most of what the people who have been invited to the symposium have said revolves about the fact that religious extremism has many manifestations and numerous causes; it is desirable to enumerate these manifestations and define these causes be through thorough studies in which men of religion, psychology, sociology and education take part so that it will be possible to set forth a suitable remedy for each manifestation.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I would like to stress to the gentlemen here that religious extremism is a problem which has been imported from abroad. Our children are good and have never in their lives deviated. I wish to say this, not as flattery: as long as the edifice of al-Azhar is standing, God willing, nothing will happen.

Our base is sound. I consider that the symposium must concentrate on a specific point, which is that our children today are exposed to imported tendencies. We must look after the students and young people who come from abroad and spread destructive ideas among our young people.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: Dr 'Adawi, you are concentrating on the point that extremism has been imported. That is one cause, but are the currents coming in from abroad all the causes of extremism? Of course not. There are many other causes which lead to religious extremism, besides those that are brought in.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I am like a baker standing in front of the oven; because of my pursuit of my job, my affiliation with university students and my complete understanding of problems and events going on around them, I still assert that the phenomenon of religious extremism or religious deviation is an imported one.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: That is, your opinion is that you give the reason that the phenomenon of religious extremism is an imported one preponderance over the other reasons. We say that imported trends are one of many reasons that lead to or create what we call religious extremism.

Yes, we agree with you that the currents that have come from abroad are among the reasons for the religious extremism that is becoming widespread among our young people now, but there are many other reasons besides that, which have been mentioned by our colleagues. Dr Abu-al-'Azayim, for example, spoke about psychological disturbances since childhood; there also is the erroneous conception of religion and its stipulations and there are other reasons.

We are not belittling the weight of the problem you talked about, and we are not belittling the weight of this. To the contrary, I am participating in hopes that we can remedy it. The problem which has been raised now is the young people's aversion to meeting with men of religion. It is necessary that we think of a solution to this.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: In support of what Dr Radwan said, we ask Dr al-'Adawi: if we prevent our young people from traveling abroad, will we have stopped our young people from being affected by foreign trends? Will we have put an end to religious extremism as an imported phenomenon? Will religious extremism in our lives and society thereby be ended?

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: I don't argue with you. All I am saying is that we have come to this symposium to deal with the problem of religious extremism and we must consequently concentrate on that, find a remedy for it and get rid of it for good without getting into mazes that keep us away from the heart of the problem.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: Now we have discussed the problem of religious extremism from two angles and have become acquainted with its roots that are deeply grounded in history.

We have also become acquainted with the reasons that lead to it, among them the absence of religious training in schools, universities and the home, wayward ideas

that lead people astray and came to us from outside the borders, and the religious void that has been exploited by interloper proselytizers who have spread extremism about among our young people.

We say that it would now be worthwhile for us, now that we have become acquainted with the causes of the problem, to devote ourselves entirely to discussing successful, decisive remedies. It is not impossible for you, who are elite intellectuals and religious scholars, to come up with a remedy now that you have set forth the causes.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi: The phenomenon of religious extremism and the violence that accompanies it are, as I mentioned previously, imported and our children are therefore in urgent need to being shielded and protected.

We must look after the students, follow up on them and supervise them.

This does not mean that I am demanding that censorship be imposed on them or their behavior spied on. What I mean, rather, is supervising their behavior in a paternal way, as fathers supervise the behavior and conduct of their children. If they are late coming home at night, one should ask them "why are you late," so that this behavior will not be repeated.

We must also ascertain the problems of students and young people in general in order to remedy them, and we should find solutions for them and protect them from error.

This is a point of the utmost importance. The second point, as far as our environment is concerned, is that I lay responsibility on religious education instructors in the schools. They are primarily responsible for the unnatural or improper religious phenomena that are dominating the stage now.

I would like to see the day when religion instructors become the young people's primary guides and leaders. I would like to see the day when the main emphasis is given to religion instructors in the schools. At that point we will eliminate the phenomenon of religious extremism and its equivalents, and will pull it out by its roots.

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: We thank Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi for these views, which we can summarize in the point that the basis for the existence of these extreme ideas may lie in the fact that religious education in the schools is not as it should be in our Islamic environment and that we must, to remedy the phenomenon of extremism, be active in performing our duty in this field. We share this view and thank him for it.

Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: When the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, was faced by a clan of his followers who were worshipping to excess, he tried to cure them, because worshipping to excess is a form of extremism.

How did the prophet cure them? How did he remedy this phenomenon?

The prophet remedied this phenomenon in a manner which was devoid of violence, severity or censure: he remedied it in a manner full of mercy, wisdom and upright guidance.

He told them, "I fast, I break the fast, I get up and I go to bed, I marry women, and anyone who loathes my sayings and doings is not on my side." This is because some of them had said "We fast but do not break the fast," others said "We get up but do not go to bed," and a third faction said "We do not marry women."

These are serious matters as far as the identity of the Moslem, his spirit and his self are concerned; he was not created just for worship, but has other duties, the duties of divine succession which God brought to man when he made a distinction between him and the angel--"When your lord told the angel, 'I am placing a successor on earth.'" This divine succession is of importance in settling terrestrial life, and therefore the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, confronted people who called for religious extremism, demanded that they commit themselves to his sayings and doings and his path, and explained them to them.

We must think of the remedy, starting now, as leaders, fathers, mothers, professors and instructors.

There must be a decisive, rapid remedy.

Perhaps one idea going about in my mind is that guardians should intervene in the schools or even universities lest the people taking charge of the remedy be isolated from young people's gatherings. Indeed, it is necessary that there be people in their midst who are closely attached to them and know their sufferings and the ideas going about in their minds; it is also necessary that their remedy be drawn from the true nature of Islam, to which our young people must turn in all of their gatherings.

On the Symposium

In this instalment of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium, which is being held on religious extremism, its roots, its causes and its treatment, scholars of religion, university professors and specialists have raised many points, most importantly:

Extremism is engendered in introverted personalities and therefore we must devote great attention to remedying the phenomenon of introversion, lest the people who possess it or are afflicted with it involuntarily deviate from the natural path.

Human growth passes through stages. There is physical growth, psychological growth, social growth and religious growth. The more a person is in the intermediate position which the Koran calls for, the more he will progress in this growth and reach it at the proper time.

We must avoid succumbing to the error which is embodied in labelling adherence to religion and maintenance of the appearance of religion extremism!

Our children are in serious need of a form of shielding and protection. We must look after the young, follow them and supervise their behavior in a paternal fashion.

We must become acquainted with the problems of young people and try as far as possible to set forth solutions to them.

We must deal with the phenomenon of extremism the way the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and blessings, did, in a manner full of mercy, wisdom and upright guidance; it must be a remedy devoid of violence, severity or censure.

The person conducting the remedy must be closely connected to the young people being remedied and know their sufferings and problems and the ideas going about in their minds.

The treatment of the phenomenon of religious extremism which prevails among our young people must be dealt with from the standpoint of the true nature of Islam.

We must respond to every aspect in the ideas that come into the country and conflict with our religion in an objective, convincing manner, so that our young people's minds may be implanted with protection and shielded from being influenced by every destructive idea that appears!

Participants in the Symposium

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, president of al-Azhar University; Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University; Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, former head of the Teachers' Union; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, scientific consultant to the Ministry of Religious Endowments; Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq, the mufti of the Republic of Egypt; Dr al-Husayni Hashim, secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research; Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman, religious consultant to the National Party; Dr Jamal Madi Abu-al-'Azayim, professor of psychiatry; Prof Jabir Hamzah Farraj, general director of information at al-Azhar; and, for AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, Mahmud Mahdi and Sami Diyab.

/3 Aug 81, pp 4, 5/

/Text/ In the third instalment of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium, the conversation focussed on remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism.

The participants said that the remedy lies in correcting understanding and in supervising conduct.

They said that the treatment lies in opening the dialogue with young extremists.

They said that it lies in proper religious upbringing, which is embraced by the school as well as the home.

They said that it lies in the elimination of contradictions in the society which bring extremism to the fore.

They said that it lies in providing a climate of trust between religious men and young extremists.

They said that it lies in providing remedies to the social problems which sow anxiety and a feeling of alienation among the spirits of our young people.

Many notions were presented by our intellectuals at AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium in considering where the decisive remedy to extremism lay.

Dr al-Husayni Hashim: Remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism, or similar wrongful religious phenomena, must start with infancy.

Children, as Imam al-Ghazzali says, are born with a clean slate on which the good may be inscribed. Children must be brought up, as they are still pliable and can be molded, in an Islamic manner, or you will face problems later on.

A second point: it is necessary to review religious books and materials in the nursery school and the primary, secondary and university stages so that the student will be reared on the Islamic religion and on teachings that will protect him from imported principles.

A third point: we must seek the assistance of professors who specialize in religious education and we must reply to imported ideas and strange scientific theories which conflict with the bases of our religion. We must reply to every detail in them in an objective, persuasive fashion, with religious teachings and proof, so that we can implant in our young people's minds the material that will protect and shield them from being influenced by all destructive ideas that come in.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: In order for the remedy of the phenomenon of religious extremism to be decisive and successful, we must have a scientific study in which psychologists, sociologists, theologians and political scientists take part, and this study must look empirically into the phenomenon of religious extremism so that we will be able to come up with a remedy to this phenomenon.

The reasons for extremism differ from one environment to another, and consequently the means of treatment differ as the causes differ.

In general, the educational process, starting with childhood, is of utmost importance.

As regards small children, it is necessary that the educational process, from the beginning, take place in a manner which will guarantee us that such extremism will not afflict his conduct, starting with childhood.

The mother has major responsibility in this regard in her home, then, subsequently, in the school.

We must implant stories of religious tolerance in young people's consciousnesses. We must implant love in their spirits in the home and the school, as a value and a means for dealing with people, engage in a debate over what is the best, and call for good exhortation.

These are all values which must be disseminated from childhood in the spirits and consciousness of the young in order that they may grow up with them, so we can guarantee that when children reach adulthood the phenomenon of extremism will not dominate them.

If a student reaches the secondary or university stage, we must be concerned to let religious notions take their sound course and not act with excess in understanding or interpretation.

Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr: In reality, remedying any problem must take place first by correcting understanding; after correcting understanding comes the role of supervising conduct.

A young man went to the prophet of God, on whom be God's prayers and peace, and told him, "Permit me to commit debauchery." The companions of the prophet rose up against him, but the prophet started a calm, logical, persuasive dialogue with him, and, through the dialogue, managed to persuade the young man of the harm and unreasonableness of what he was asking permission to do, and the young person's spirit was soothed by the conversation and became calm.

We must emulate this art of dialogue which the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and blessings, has embraced and set forth with these people of religious extremism.

We must engage in calm, objective, persuasive dialogue with them, must most calmly understand their ideas and demands, and reply to them logically so that we can instill in them a sound understanding of their religion.

We must not abandon them to be easy prey to satans or people whom they consider to be models and exemplars:

We must meet with them, listen to them and offer them advice.

Every official must play his part in order to eliminate the phenomenon of extremism.

Schools must play their part in this.

Homes must play their part.

All the media must play their part to remedy this phenomenon.

Once consciousness is spread, there must be oversight. Who will perform the oversight?

First, both parents.
Second, the people supervising the education.
Third, people with high responsibilities in the government.

They must all spread awareness and at the same time perform oversight.

Every reform must be preceded by corrections, as for conduct, that must be subjected to oversight, and the task of spreading awareness or surveillance does not lie on a specific person or body but lies on everyone, without exception!

Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman: I consider that the pillars of righteousness are founded on the home, the school and the media; consequently the remedy must be performed by the home, the school and the media.

Home is the basis. Responsibility in the home is very great, because fathers in the home raise, discipline, teach, hold accountable and punish, as do the mothers;

mothers are schools, and if they are prepared they will prepare a people with solid roots.

Are homes now providing a proper Islamic upbringing?

Here homes differ, because the family is the basic brick in the structure of the society. If the father is religious, devout and sincere in his belief, he will raise his children sincerely, faithfully and in obedience to God, as will the mother.

Are the schools now providing a proper religious upbringing?

I do not believe so!

Is Islam now being applied as a mode of conduct in every home?

Islam asks Moslems to comport themselves as Moslems through conduct in their homes, their schools, their media, their institutes, their universities, their factories and in all their dealings!

We are experiencing contradictions. We are living in a society of contradictions. In order for us to base our structure on piety, we will first have to eliminate this contradiction!

I am building and others are destroying!

We need to have the home, the school and the media cooperate in bringing up young people.

I support the view that we must meet with the young extremists in order that a clear, open, broad dialogue may take place between us through which we can correct the young people's programs.

We want to have a bold meeting with the young people!

Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim: As regards the phenomenon of violence, we assembled 100 court cases which involved violent behavior and assigned them ordinary employees who showed no form of rash judgment. We took the results, went to specialists in sociology, religion and medicine, and went to prisons and sat down with these people who acted rashly and learned about the characteristics of their personalities.

We found that some of them were addicted to narcotics, we found that some of them had just finished military service and were good at using weapons, and we found some people who had weak personalities and had turned to violence and the use of weapons.

We must shed light on all these matters so that religious persons may be fully aware of them.

Making religious men aware of this kind of unstable personality pattern and ways of remedying it will make them, when they talk or deliver exhortations, do so on solid ground, from the real conditions they have experienced.

Therefore it is necessary to continue the religious scientific research. By religious scientific research I mean research in which religious men take part in order to benefit and absorb many of the highly complex psychological and social phenomena of life.

There is a serious matter I would like to raise. In Cairo we have addiction treatment clinics.

When we sat down with and examined addicts in order to treat them, they told us, among other things, "The Koran does not prohibit marijuana or opium--it just prohibits intoxicants!" I believe this is a firm belief on their part!

Seventy percent of them believe that there is no stipulation in the Koran prohibiting narcotics!

When we say that a group has taken over young people's minds, the responsibility lies directly on religious men!

We are not being at all far-fetched, but how can we reach young people? How can we make young people trust us?

How can we reach these extremists? How can we make them see the total picture of Islam within us?

Then how can we bring religious men up to a level where they can attract young people to themselves?

In order for it to be possible to provide all this, it is incumbent on men of religion to be models for the young people in everything, and it is incumbent on them to be enlightened and civilized. Extremism, in my view, is a disease and we must thus diagnose this disease and view it scientifically and objectively.

We must study the phenomenon of extremism that exists in Cairo and we must also study the phenomenon of religious withdrawal.

Extremism is a psycholgical disease on which we must shed light so that we can diagnose it, since we will lose a great deal without diagnosis.

When I as a psychiatrist tried to treat an isolated case of extremism directly, I found that the person was suffering from an obvious disturbance. When I gave him a treatment for the disturbance, his personality began to be stabilized, he started to abandon his introversion, and consequently he started to abandon extremism and enter into an intermediate, stable life along with us.

On many occasions, society is afflicted with waves of what we call "psychological disturbance." There are groups which can take young people over in the context of such dominant psychological disturbances.

A second point I would like to raise, if you would permit me to, is how can we release the great powers that exist within men of religion so they can attract young people? How can we establish mutual trust among young people and men of religion?

There is excessive anxiety in society, there is alienation from society, and there are many problems, such as the housing problem and others. These problems affect families and consequently young people's personalities. This effect on the family, with the narrow benefits they possess prompts young people to go elsewhere!

How can we try to influence young people's free time so that they can frequent the warm places where their families are situated and where religion and constructive powers exist?

How can we set out a summer program for young people in order to organize their time without abandoning them to be victims of an idleness which will lead them into what we are fighting against now?

The dominant reaction to depression and social problems in society is extremism or deviation. We must eliminate this depression and anxiety in the spirits of young people lest this lead them to extremism.

It is a great mission which the family, school, factory, mosque and club must perform.

If they all rise up and perform the mission in full, and religious men are behind them, we will eliminate extremism and arrive at an Islamic middle ground.

Jabir Hamzah: The treatment of religious extremism, I am certain, may be summarized as follows:

1. The rule of life is that it is a mixture of good things and bad, that a struggle has existed, from the outset of succession to the end of life, and that as long as deviation exists on the part of some groups, there will be an intense adherence to truth.

2. If we want to specify these forms of deviation and the reasons why they have arisen, we will find that they are linked with the emergence of television, since there is no balance between programs which are full of folly and caprice and programs of culture, spiritual reform and religion. These come into people's homes and invade our beliefs and traditions.

3. There is a need for religious supervision by men of religion who specialize in television programs, so that they may not drop to a level which sows deviation in the spirits of our young people.

4. One must refuse to permit people who are well known for their fanaticism and provocative nature to excercise various activities in government mosques, especially since there are some mosques which are considered clubs for tendentious societies within sight and earshot of the Ministry of Religious Endowments.

5. One must refuse to settle for the curricula in educational institutions. Indeed, it is necessary to resort to public lectures, in view of the interest people have in them.

6. The government has a role in preserving general religious appearances, in the sense of not allowing liquor and materials prohibited by religious law to be sold and being careful to shut down shops and departments during the Friday prayer.

7. One must refuse to permit foreign tourists to comport themselves and appear in a manner violating the customs and traditions of the country.

8. One must refuse to permit our young people to travel abroad on summer vacations, in view of the bad traits we have seen them bring back.

9. It is observed that the different media give opportunities to people who are not specialized in passing judgment on matters of Islamic law, and improper judgments are made, causing confusion in thinking.

10. The soundest type of upbringing has been furnished by Islam, and we must observe that. Islam is concerned with upbringing from birth, and in this is far superior to all modern types and theories of upbringing. This is clear from the fact that the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, gave the call to prayer in the ear of newborn children and give the prayer in their left ear. The prophet's motive in this was to teach the nation so that God's would be the first word closely to touch the infant's inner spirit and conscience when he emerged and first embraced life.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: From this it is apparent that religious upbringing and study curricula play a big part in remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism. Therefore, it is necessary to give attention to the programs and ingredients of religious upbringing and choose them on sound bases.

The school must not support the religious upbringing here alone; rather, the home must support it along with the school.

In addition, men of religion and proselytizers have a great burden in explaining the essence of religion so that the errors of their beliefs and behavior will be apparent to the extremist groups. Thus what is needed is to provide enlightened men of religion so that young people may be won over by them and may respond to their guidance.

Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan: I support Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim's statement on the need to have a climate of trust between religious scholars on the one hand and young people on the other, because it is a climate of trust which will pave the way for the first step toward the establishment of a dialogue with young extremists.

The dialogue with young extremists must be preceded by the establishment of trust between religious scholars and young people.

In order for this trust to exist among young people, it is necessary that we be good examples for them. Every official in the government must be a good example, so that we can provide the atmosphere of trust that must exist in order to establish an open dialogue with young religious extremists and in order to get them to listen to us and our ideas and views.

Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq: We must proceed along the road toward young extremists by the best means, as God has taught us. We must not go to them and tell them "You are deviants or extremists." Rather, we must make our children understand their issues, issues which we ourselves might call deviation or extremism. We are always hearing that these young people are corrupt and spread corruption, must be resisted with violence, and so forth. This is wrong. First we want to bring out what is in our own spirits, and this is a matter we must approach. We must go to them and tell them, "What are you up to?" They must present us with their questions, and their questions must be aired, just as the answers to these questions must also be aired.

We must refrain from always saying that religious groups are deviant, because we want these religious groups to attract young people, we want to have more of these religious groups which can attract young people. This is better than having our young people afflicted with purposelessness, as is the case in Europe. This is better than having our young people attracted to licentiousness!

All we must do is describe the correct conceptions of Islam to these young people and these religious groups so that they will not lose their way, deviate from the path and succumb to error!

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar: We all believe that this is the proper point of departure, and this is what people will surely consider to be the prelude.

When we start by condemning deviant persons or extremists, that is not a logical method or a logical, desirable or feasible appeal.

It is natural that when we call for God we are calling for wisdom and good exhortation. This is a point that no one doubts.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: One recommendation we would like to raise before you gentlemen is to strive by every possible means to provide a climate of trust between religious scholars, intellectuals with respected views, university professors and superintendents of clubs and societies on the one hand, and extremist youths on the other.

We consider that a climate of trust is the first step toward establishing an open, constructive dialogue with them which will correct religious notions. Perhaps one way of providing a climate of trust is to provide young people with good examples in the form of religious and intellectual leaders, to understand their problems and to conduct a debate with them over what is the best.

Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim: I would like to add something else: religious scholars must enlarge their participation with psychiatrists and social experts in treatment groups in order to examine and remedy many psychological problems, such as problems of extremism, deviation and the like.

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI: We can summarize some of the remedies that have been raised in this symposium for the phenomenon of extremism by saying that Dr Jamal Abu-al-'Azayim has concentrated on the point that psychiatrists play an important role in treating the problem of extremism, since introversion is the basic cause of extremism and consequently must be treated psychologically from the beginning, and the point that states of anxiety, depression or disturbances and the problems of modern life in the form of housing and the like are to be considered some causes which lead to deviation and extremism.

Prof Jabir Hamzah has emphasized the need for moderation and balance in media programs, especially television, on grounds that that is the most widespread, lest trivial programs corrupt the material the serious religious programs offer.

Participants in the Symposium

Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, president of al-Azhar University; Dr Ibrahim al-'Adawi, vice president of Cairo University; Dr Muhammad Mahmud Radwan, former head of the Teachers' Union; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, scientific consultant to the Ministry of Religious Endowments; Shaykh Jadd-al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd-al-Haqq, the mufti of the Republic of Egypt; Dr al-Husayni Hashim, secretary general of the Academy of Islamic Research; Shaykh Muhammad Hafiz Sulayman, religious consultant to the National Party; Dr Jamal Madi Abu-al-'Azayim, professor of psychiatry; Prof Jabir Hamzah Farraj, general director of information at al-Azhar; and, for AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI, Mahmud Mahdi and Sami Diyab.

/10 Aug 81 pp 4, 5/

/Text/ This article is a contribution by Dr Jamal-al-Din Mahmud, secretary general of the Higher Council of Islamic Affairs, on the subject of AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium on religious extremism. The writer of the article was away from Cairo when the symposium was held.

Religious extremism is to be considered a phenomenon alien to the course of life in this age, at first glance. Its existence in Islamic countries specifically should be considered especially alien, because such extremism, relative to Islamic thought, arose more than 1,000 years ago and sound Islamic thinking has risen above it for many centuries. Extremism is a violation against moderation and an adherence to sides that lack moderation. There is no scope for extremism except when dialogue, discussion and differences of opinion are accepted; extremism is inconceivable in fixed scientific study. The danger of extremism emerges when all the affairs of life do not depend just on the stipulations of life alone, where matters are either right or wrong; rather the various forms of religious, political, social and economic reform in every society depend on the discussion of ideas and the study of and constructive dialogue on ideas, so that right can be distinguished from wrong first of all, then, subsequently, and this is a matter of importance, so that what is best or will best achieve the public interest may be determined. Judgment is rendered on ideas by discovering what is most beneficial or what will best achieve the public interest, not just by taking one side or another, because that is unimportant. 'Umar ibn al-Khattab, may God be pleased with him, realized this when he said "The wise man is not the man who can tell good from evil; rather

the wise man is the one who can tell the greater of two evils." This is a statement which reveals the infeasibility of extremism, which sees only good and evil, black and white, acceptance and rejection, and subsequently cannot tell how one can correct evil, how one can appraise matters neutrally and chastely, and how one can see the various aspects of things so that the judgment on them will be sound.

We cannot ignore the stipulations of the general rules of Islamic law, whose application requires that we conduct research and dialogue and listen to various opinions so that our application will be sound. The rule "harm is not eliminated through harm", the rule "one must bear the lesser evil in order to ward off the greater one," and the rule "one must bear private harm in order to ward off public harm"--all these rules and their like are tantamount to rules for choosing between conflicting interests and rules for righting wrongs which balance the scale of harm and interests. When one adopts a specific verdict in Islamic law, all these rules and their like without a doubt depend on the awareness of all aspects of the idea, the discussion and examination of it, and the discussion of all opinions regarding it, so that one may arrive at a sound verdict in religious law. No doubt siding with one of the two parties in basically accepting or totally rejecting an idea and adhering to a specific position, while neglecting all other views, cannot lead to the sound application of these rules and their like in religious law.

It is strange that extremism in interpreting religious stipulations or the general rules of Islamic law arose in the era of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace. Genuine books on the sayings and doings of the prophet relate that a group of companions wished to isolate themselves from the world and repudiate the things of the world that God deemed lawful, thinking that that meant closeness to almighty glorious God. The prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, refuted them by saying "I am protecting you and making you fear God, but I fast and break the fast, I get up and I go to bed, I marry women, and anyone who loathes my sayings and doings is not on my side." This glorious prophetic lesson calls upon Moslems to be moderate. Almighty God is worshipped for what he has stipulated and it is not for us to be severe on ourselves and bind ourselves to what Islamic law does not hold us to, since commitments by extremist parties entail excesses which lead to monasticism, which Islam forbids, while commitments to disdainful attitudes are a form of negligence which releases us from the religious duties of Islamic law. Both are to be rejected in Islam, which does not accept extremism, even when intentions are proper and goals are honorable.

The fact is that extremism in religious interpretation /itself/ represents no danger to society. The persons who espouse it will be held to account or punished as long as extremism is restricted to the persons espousing it, for that falls under the category of wrongful interpretation, whose exponents may learn and retreat from it, as happened with the companions whom the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, taught. However, an extremism which is wrongful will become dangerous if the intent is to spread it about and gather people around it in order to realize other goals, because wrongful opinions always are relevant in matters of religion and the terrestrial world, and the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace, set forth his rule, which is replete with mercy and justice, saying "If a ruler makes an independent judgment and is right, he should receive two recompenses, and if he makes an independent judgment and is wrong, he should

receive one recompense." This means that error in individual judgment on the part of anyone who is able to exercise it is not insubordination in itself, if the situation does not go beyond a mere error in understanding resulting from a deficiency in knowledge or incompetence in viewing matters, and the person involved will not be held to account or punished. Rather, society's duty will lie in talking to the person who has erred and explaining what is right to him, and it is not proper for us to isolate him from society, because such isolation will make him introverted in his views and increase his adherence to them. The Moslem scholars were the people who most severely adhered to that, especially in the era of independent judgment in which the Islamic creeds arose. Indeed these sublime religious jurists, who were the best of persons at understanding Islam in its general overall stipulations and rules, all called for freedom of views and thought and for various opinions and refused to be copied and to have what they said followed and fanatically ahered to. One of these statements was one by Imam Abu Hanifah: "We taught this opinion but when people brought us something better we accepted it." Another was the statement by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal: "Do not mimic me and do not mimic a Malekite, Shafi'ite or a revolutionary; learn as we have learned." Herein lies a prohibition of fanaticism, which is more loathesome than extremism.

However, society has the right to protect itself from the danger of perverse opinions and extremist thoughts, if a desire to spread them about exists, since that bears on society's right to protect all its members, including the weak, who do not have the power to review or contend with arguments and determine which is the stronger, and people who are fascinated by new ideas even if they are wrong, such as young people whose protection is a duty of society so that they can acquire the cultural and intellectual wherewithal in religion to enable them to cope with the errors of fascination to which they are exposed. Therein lies the duty and responsibility of the ruler: to rally Moslems together around statements of truth and resist anything that will fragment them and turn them into sects and parties.

There is no doubt that the first extremist group to appear in Islam was the group of Moslems with whom the great dissension began. By that I do not just mean the Kharijite group which rose up in opposition against Ali, may God be pleased with him; I also mean a group which appeared before them, and prepared the way for them, the people who rose up in opposition to 'Uthman, may God be pleased with him, because they were not content to declare their opinion, in which they considered that error had been committed by the caliph, and were not won over by the arguments and views the caliph presented to them, providing security and stability for Moslems, but rather went to excess in their extremism, besieging the caliph and committing the crime of killing him. Here the matter is not just one of error of opinions or extremism in ideas; it is a crime which is punishable by Islamic law and cannot be justified by anything. This extremism continued until its purpose became to use religion and not to serve it or defend it. Therefore, Imam 'Ali ibn Abu Talib at the outset took, against this extremist thinking, the position of an imam who teaches an erroneous ignorant person, arguing at length with the people who had risen up in opposition to him and rebuking them with strong arguments, so that many of them who had at the outset been deceived in the name of religion were won over by his views. Ibn Qutaybah, in "The Imamate and Politics," relates that they, that is the Kharijites, demanded that the imam repent for what they called his apostasy by accepting arbitration between himself and Mu'awiyah ibn Abu Sufyan.

He most intensely refused, and told them "By God I have not been an apostate toward God since I became acquainted with him." After he fought with Mu'awiyah's army they made a strange demand of him, which was that he entitle them to the children and women of the people who had opposed them as booty--a corrupt, wrongful view that was not proper in terms of Islamic law. A lengthy debate ensued between them and he finally rebuked them with an argument to which they complied, when he told them, "If I entitle you to their children and women, to which of you will fall 'A'ishah, the mother of the devout, who was in Mu'awiyah's army, and whom Imam 'Ali had shown hospitality though her opinions were opposed to him?" When he presented them with this question, they became embarrassed and departed.

However, the situation had turned from argument and the contention of arguments to something else which Islam does not hold legitimate, which is the commission of crimes. Some Kharijites killed 'Abdallah ibn Khibab ibn al-Art and his wife, who was pregnant and about to give birth, after they asked the man his opinion about 'Ali ibn Abu Talib, he answered them with the truth he believed, and they led him and his wife to the bank of the river and killed them with injustice, hostility, and terror for the devout. The strange thing is that one of them found his companion chewing on a date which he had picked up beneath a date tree owned by a non-Moslem; the companion ordered him to spit out the pit and pay the price for it to the owner of the tree. See how extremism, when it grows and becomes intense, leads to disruption of the balance of the mind, until it becomes permissible to kill someone unjustly and hostilely but not to take a fruit without paying for it?

When Imam 'Ali ibn Abu Talib fought them and killed some of them, because the matter had become one of aggression against people and violation of their honor, blood, bodies and money, and not just an error of opinion met by arguments and persuasion, or even neglect, and because the situation had revealed a desire to use religion, not to serve it, and to lead people astray, not teach them, the ruler's right to guard religion and prevent corruption on earth arose.

Therefore, Moslem society must protect itself from dissension and fragmentation, and, if Moslems are a single nation, as the Koran stipulates, it is not permissible for us to turn the nation into groups and parties. If mosques belong to God, then it is not proper for us to divide them among people; Moslems are the worthiest of people to come together and not be fragmented, because all religion comes from God and God has preserved his book and guided us to the proper sayings and doings, which in themselves are a shield against disputes to which there is no limit and extremism which will accept no mediation or moderation. If caprice enters the theories and philosophies which people set forth, prompting dissension and disputes, it would be better for us to glorify Islam than to descend to the arena of struggle over ideas, theories and philosophies, even if some people try to draw us into this arena, which is not worthy of the honor of Islam and the thinking of Moslems.

/Signed/ Dr Jamal-al-Din Muhammad Mahmud.

Recommendations of the Symposium

AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI's symposium recommended the following as a remedy to the phenomenon of religious extremism prevalent among our young people:

Opening a dialogue with young people in general and religious groupings in particular and trying to understand their ideas and demands and respond to them with a logic which will impart to them a sound understanding of their religion.

The problem of extremism must be remedied by correcting understanding, first, then by observing conduct and imparting enlightenment. The responsibility for observation here must not be laid on a particular person or specific body; rather, it must be assumed by everyone without exception.

Extremism is the offshoot of a contradiction which dominates society; therefore, we must eliminate this contradiction, first of all, if we wish to eliminate the phenomenon of extremism and establish our structure on piety.

In order for us to be able to reach young people and cause them to trust us, we must show them that the full picture of Islam exists inside us.

Men of religion must be a model for young people in everything, and they must be civilized and enlightened.

Extremism is a psychological illness. Therefore we must shed light on it, identify it as a disease, and look upon it in an objective, scientific way.

We must release the great forces within men of religion in order to enable them to attract young people.

We must create a balance and equilibrium within the media, especially television, as that is the most widespread of the media, so that trivia programs will not corrupt the material offered by serious religious programs.

We must not allow people who are known for fanaticism and destructiveness to engage in their activities inside the schools.

Islamic upbringing must be provided in the home and the school from childhood. Religious upbringing plays a big role in remedying the phenomenon of religious extremism; therefore one must pay attention to its curricula and provisions and choose them on sound bases.

Men of religion must explain the essence of the Islamic religion so that extremist groups will see the errors of their beliefs and behavior.

Dialogue between young extremists and scholars of religion must be preceded by mutual trust between them.

Therefore it is necessary to furnish an atmosphere of trust between scholars of religion and extremist youths as a first step toward a dialogue that will bring them together.

In order for it to be possible to provide this atmosphere, every official in the government, including religious scholars, must offer a good example to young people.

We must make the way toward extreme youths through good deeds, as God has taught us. They must raise their questions, we must respond to them objectively, and the questions and answers must be aired together.

It is necessary to expand the introduction of religious scholars in the treatment teams, along with psychiatrists and social specialists, in order to examine and treat many psychological problems, foremost among them extremism.

Psychiatrists play an important role in treating the problem of religious extremism, since introversion is the main reason for extremism and consequently must be treated psychologically from the beginning.

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PRONOUNCEMENTS HAIL FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF GULF WAR

Ba'athists Called Menace to Gulf

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 20 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by S. Moadab]

[Excerpts]

A year has passed since an unwanted war was imposed on the Islamic Revolution (IR).

It is true that hundreds of our Islamic fighters have been martyred and it is equally true that parts of our Islamic homeland remain under the occupation of the Ba'athist forces of Saddam. But it is also true that, surely, none of the objectives the Iraqi dictator had in view when he invaded Iran, have been reached. Beguiled by the Americans, encouraged by the reactionary regional states, ill-advised by the remnants of the ousted regime and lured by the malicious dream of becoming the gendarme of the Persian Gulf, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq committed the gravest of crimes by sending his over-equipped forces to "topple the regime of Khomeini."

A promise which should have been realized in three days but after a year has proved to be a chimera. What lies before the frustrated eyes of Saddam today are unbelievably heavy casualties in men and military equipment. Over Khark island alone more than forty Iraqi planes have been shot down. Iraqi oil exportation has been brought down to almost zero. Nearly all vital installations in Iraq have been hit at least once by our airplanes. More than four thousand men of the "victorious army of Ghadessieh" are now in numerous POW camps in Iran. In this war the IR showed its fidelity towards its original slogans of independence and liberty. It also manifested the human and Islamic values to which it is bound before taking any retaliatory measures.

From the first days of war more than eighty of our war planes have flown en masse over Iraq to show that we are indeed militarily quite potent, yet, not even a single civilian target was hit. History will record with glory that our artillery range goes beyond the military targets but not a single bullet has been

aimed at the cities and villages. The future generations in Karbala, Najaf and Baghdad will read that at time of full-scale war, the skillful pilots of the Islamic Air Force of Iran flew with bombs and rockets over these cities but what the people saw falling from these war planes over the cities were the leaflets titled "Why We Defend Ourselves."

The present day Iraqi POW's will tell their children, when they return to Iraq, how the Islamic morality has nurtured men who do not permit themselves to treat the POW's in an un-Islamic manner. And on the other part, history will report to the next Iranian generation how hospitals, houses, villages and cities were bombarded by Saddam's mercenaries. Our children will read that, because the Iraqi pilots did not dare to fly over military targets, they bombarded the civilian targets. Dezful, Ahwaz, Khorramshahr, Abadan, Kermanshah and... will remain as symbols of heroism for our fighters and the scene of innumerable crimes committed by the enemies of the IR.

"For years, since the Ba'athist regime was installed, the Iraqi leaders have hidden themselves under the slogans of progressive claims. Although the non-participation of the Ba'athist forces in the war of 1967 and 1973 has proved the falsehood of Ba'athist claims, although the plots against PLO and the assassination of its representatives in Paris and elsewhere has revealed the animosity of the Ba'athist regime to the Palestinian movement, and the neutrality of the Iraqi forces in Jordan during the Black September felonies has shown the complicity of the Baghdad regime, another big test was necessary to unveil the colonized mentality of Saddam and his regime. The invasion of his forces gave this opportunity to the whole of the Muslim masses and progressive people to see that in Baghdad power is usurped by men who have no sympathy with the liberation of the region from the imperialist domination.

Today, one year after his grave mistake, Saddam knows that in the near future he will have to stand before the Iraqi people to answer why he has stabbed the IR in Iran. Saddam is fully aware of his imminent fate. This is why, in order to escape it, he has decided to sell out not only the riches of Iraq but also all the commitments the Iraqi people had. The "anti-imperialist," Saddam now is a will-less puppet of the Washington-Paris-London triumvirate. Since very recently, after the contrived Tamuz bombardment by the zionist planes, he leads a regime leaning towards Tel Aviv. Saddam has no logical answer to give to the Iraqi people as to why he is getting closer and closer to the reactionary regimes of the Persian Gulf states.

The people of Kuwait, who are cognizant of the expansionist dreams of Saddam, see him hankering after Kuwaiti lands. Hundreds of trucks and vehicles now take all manner of goods from Jordan to Baghdad daily. Is not the Jordanian monarch the same man whom Saddam called for his overthrow? Saudi cargo planes take thousands of tons of material aid to Iraq everyday. Are not the present leaders in Riyadh the men whom Saddam has been insulting in his mass media for years? Today Saddam knows how downgraded he has become and how isolated he is in the Islamic world.

In order to cherish the memory of all our brothers and sisters and to show the crimes of Saddam to the world and show our people how effective their cooperation has been, a week, commemorating the war anniversary has been declared with the Friday prayers and will end with the prayer of next Friday. The program chosen this week is a comprehensive affair to show different aspects of the mutual influence the imposed war and the continuity of the revolution have had.

Before bringing the editorial to an end, it is noteworthy to take a look at the U.S.'s desperate plots in order to distract popular attention from the imposed war. As we have shown in detail in our previous editorials, the world-devouring America helped indirectly and encouraged Saddam to attack Iran in order to consolidate its position in the Persian Gulf region. In order to prepare the ground for Saddam for a fast victory, America has played all possible tricks and laid all sorts of traps for the IR.

Liberal Stooges, Mojahedin, Tudeh Denounced

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 22 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial by Zainab]

[Text]

After serving the temporal interests of the Western powers for some time, liberalism proved impotent in realizing its ideals any further, due to the superior level of consciousness among the Muslim masses; a consciousness which enabled them to reject this deviation decisively. Disillusioned from its consecutive defeats in the face of Islam, America quickly dislodged its liberal stooges and adopted a new offensive against the movement. This offensive, engineered by bankrupt politicians of world arrogance, can be defined, in simple words, as "Terrorism" aimed at the elimination of key figures. Its more complicated mechanism, involved the employment of all forces opposing the Islamic Republic; making use of those which have a larger following and influence within the country.

The Mujahedeen Khalq (Munafiqeen) meet these requirements most precisely. The Islamic outer core and religious taste this group carries has been a major factor in its partial success in gaining some foothold among, particularly, the youth. It has been evident for a long time, to those who watch the internal developments of Iran, that political groupings with secular and atheist lines have absolutely no chance of attracting the attention of the masses. Hence, Western imperialism has resorted to groups, which because of their eclectic character carry a Islamic color but capitalist or Marxist content. Even

Eastern imperialism has been compelled to give in to this reality and its internal base in Iran, the Tudeh Party, has for long claimed to have merely political orientations. It (Tudeh Party) uselessly attempts to deny its atheist and Marxist foundations, by acclaiming pro-Islamic "tendencies" and "Muslim members" and so forth.

However, in all cases their success in obtaining a mass following was minimal. The Muslim nation of Iran under the enlightened leadership of Imam Khomeini had reached a level of consciousness where it could distinguish all deviatory and hypocritical lines from the pure Islamic line of the Imam. As a result, the Munafeqeen who were very ambitious about grasping the reigns of power and who believed that Imam could not establish a government after overthrowing the shah, had to refer to an organization like the Mujahedeen Khalq. They were totally disillusioned upon seeing that the Islamic nation did not fall an open prey to ambitious power struggles and eclectic ideologies. Consequently, at that point the Munafeqeen's hostility against the Islamic Republic became fused with America's unrealized dream of undermining this revolution, and a de-facto alliance was formed. Hence, the armed auxiliary of the Munafeqeen began to launch an assassination campaign" against the key figures of the Islamic Republic under the programing and support of America. This alliance is a strange one, in that it aligns an apparently radical force alongside a strongly conservative one; but in reality, its main focal point is none other than opposition against Islam. Thus, the Munafeqeen have taken up arms against the nation, motivated by their feeling of revenge against those who did not follow or vote for them and America joyously watches as "some one else" does the filthy job, it always longed to see done.

What will cause the defeat of this imperialist strategy, like others, is the ignorance of both the Munafeqeen and America of the Islamic nature of this establishment.

The fact that they have resorted to terrorize in their state of desparation basically indicates that they consider certain figures and personalities to play a vital and irreplaceable role in the Republic. This stems from the liberal and westernized outlook that they carry.

Unlike the West, in an Islamic society the motivating factor is the ideology and faith prevalent among the masses. True, the most committed and faithful are appointed to leadership roles, but the Islamic society

always has potential capcity of developing and training committed and faithful individuals. Thus, we see that the courageous Muslim nation invests its ultimate hope in the ideology, in Allah and in Imam Mahdi.

When their most beloved officials are martyred they chant "Iran is full of Behesties, Raja'is and Bahonars."

Again, uncomprehensible to the West, is the fact that the committed Muslim expects martyrdom as a natural evolution in his struggle towards God. Hence Imam calls the event of the IRP bombing a tragic yet "expected" event. Martyrdom is innate in the school of Towheed, the red line of martyrdom is the line of Mohammad (S.A.) and Ali (A.S.).

As a result, the Muslims are ready to confront and endure such hardships with no sign of weariness or despair.

The ominous alliance of America and the Munafeqeen must realize that if it aims to uproot Islam, Islam is not summarized in personalities it is projected in Allah, in an absolute eternal school of thought. If it aims to create despair and fear among the nation, it must have witnessed how these acts have consolidated the nations unity and faith. If America aims to prevent the Republic from true progress and to disrupt development progress for the Mustasafin, it must know that if the nation has to elect 20 presidents during a year it will do so and will maintain its stability.

Finally, let the enemies know, that we have a sun, which is in occultation. By eliminating the stars which shine in this night of occultation, the enemies of Islam hasten the emergence of that sun. For the disappearance of the stars gives good tidings of the dawn of the great sun of Islam — Mahdi (A.S.).

Virtues of Islamic War Extolled

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 23 Sep 81 p]

[Editorial by Zainab]

[Text]

In Islamic culture, war does not necessarily imply a negative meaning. Wars are controlled and directed by men and they obtain their value in context of the direction for which they are employed. In a world where oppression and evil prevail on one side and the downtrodden suffer under the boots of tyranny on the other, war can have three forms. Most common are the wars that world arrogance wages against the mustaz'afin, particularly when they have

risen to obtain their rights. Then there are the wars that the downtrodden wage against the usurper powers. Thirdly, there are the wars when no side is just, but both are armies of falsehood entangled in battle.

Islam has a clear and decisive position vis-a-vis all these types of war. As long as injustice and oppression prevail, the Muslims fight and wage wars against oppression in all its social, cultural and economical forms. Hence contrary to the incorrect Western impression that war is always "bad" and peace always "good", Islam welcomes a war which is directed towards abolishing of falsehood, and denies that form of peace which ignores the rights of the oppressed.

If we endeavor to view matters in this context and in spite of the poisonous smog imperialist propaganda has left before our eyes, we can study, impartially, the value which the war imposed upon the Islamic Republic by Iraq has had for the Muslim Iranian nation.

First we must keep in mind that the accepted values and criteria that the west implies in its evaluations are not applicable to the assessments which Islam presents. Western conceptions are based upon fallible and biased human experience whereas Islam relies on none other than absolute divine revelation.

One year ago the arrogant Iraqi regime committed a mistake which will ultimately undermine its rule over the deprived nation of Iraq. Deceived by the tempting but hollow promises of American imperialism and stimulated by its own expansionist line and internal crisis, Iraq dug its own grave.

Through imposing a prolonged borderline war, which was only one aspect of the multi-faceted war imperialism has waged against the Islamic Republic, the Iraqi infidel engaged the Muslim nation of Iran in a struggle which enhanced their unity and solidarity against world arrogance. Generally the development and purification of man's character and soul is best achieved in an atmosphere of pressure and hardship. It is at these intervals that man realizes his weaknes-

ses and shortcomings and endeavors to improve himself. This prolonged war served as a catalyst for the growth of the Islamic nation. Scenes of youth joyously embracing martyrdom, mothers encouraging their sons to fight, women striving behind the fronts to serve the warriors, old men crying for acceptance as volunteers and a thirteen year old tying a grenade to his waist and jumping under an Iraqi tank all are signs of a noble and unprecedented morality among a nation.

Imam rightfully described the nation as resembling the followers of Islam at the time of the Prophet. He stressed they fulfilled their duties 100 percent.

The increased need for spare parts and artillery, particularly after the war broke out, compelled the Iranian industries to step up and increase their independence seeking programs, hence this past year the nation witnessed strides taken in various technological fields towards the goal independence. Imam had said correctly that we must be isolated and attacked to achieve independence.

A comparison between the conditions (morally and logistically) of the armed forces before the war and today, after a year of struggle, will clarify the fact that if the Iranian army had any points of moral or material weakness, or if any incompetent elements had infiltrated among its ranks, today it can certainly be said that more than ever before the armed forces are in line with the Islamic Revolution, they are soldiers of Imam-Zaman (Mahdi A.S.), as Imam says.

Additionally, on the internal scene, this war, which again can be considered as an enhancing development and growth, led to the nation's ever increasing awareness of the deviant lines and tendencies within the country which were taking advantage of the social situation for their own interests. The ultimate result was the overthrow of Banisadr (chief representative of the pro-western eclectic line of thought) and the continuing purge of the internal ranks.

The virtues of war on the external side remain to be discussed.

CSO: 4600/14

PROFESSOR REVIEWS TUDEH'S PRO-SOVIET RECORD

Paris LE MATIN in French 1 Sep 81 p 11

/Report by Historian Khosrow Shakeri: "From the Specter of the Islamic Republic to the Gulag Apocalypse"/

> /Text/ With the death of Iranian President Radjai and Prime Minister Bahonar, the dismal series of attempts-repression continues in Iran. It is more impossible than ever to give an opinion on the future of Imam Khomeini's regime. In this situation, as confused as it is tragic, Khosrow Shakeri examines the role played by the Tudeh party, which is considered as the "official" heir of the PCI /Iranian Communist Party/. He especially wonders why one "overestimates" the importance of the Tudeh party, which "since its foundation" has had a "policy of protecting Soviet interests" in Iran.

During a recent statement, the pro-Soviet Tudeh party opposed the appeal for the creation of an international committee against repression in Iran. The attention given to this statement made by the Tudeh shows an overestimate--even propaganda--which is made about this pro-Soviet party, as if it was on the same footing as the Italian and French communist parties. Now the following question arises: why this overestimate? Why is this attention given to a party which has shown unfailing loyalty toward the Soviet Union, whether it is led by Stalin, Khrushchev or Brezhnev. In the eyes of some, this loyalty is sufficient as a necessary justification for them to exaggerate the importance of this party, by giving it a disproportionate place on the Iranian political scene. At best, the latter do not understand that they are rendering a free service to the expansionist policy of the Soviet state; at the worst, they are unaware of it.

Let us see then why. It is a question there of a complete misinterpretation of the not very distinguished past of this party, a party which has all the defects of a communist party, without, however, having any of its merits. What is the history of this party?

Created in 1941, the Tudeh is considered the official "heir" of the Iranian Communist Party, the PCI, which was founded in 1916 by Iranian workers who emigrated to Baku. These workers had been active before in the PSDI [Iranian Social Democratic Party], which had played a major role in Iran's constitutional revolution between 1906 and 1911.

At the end of the First World War, the PCI set itself up in Iran and reactivated the PSDI's left wing organizations. It participated with Guilan's Jangalist revolutionaries in the creation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran in 1920. This republic was liquidated a year later by the new strong man of the Iranian royalist government, Reza Khan Pahlavi, but also with the complicity of British imperialism and the new so-called socialist government in Russia, seeking international recognition.

Going underground, the PCI had to conduct from that time on a desperate struggle against Asiatic despotism in Iran. Despite a bloody terror, the PCI managed to maintain itself on the Iranian political scene. Only the Stalinist purge, which struck it very early, already in 1932, was able to seal the fate of this revolutionary party with an independent spirit; its most experienced cadres and leaders were pitilessly liquidated for having had the courage to follow a line independent of Moscow and oppose the USSR policy of support for the Pahlavi's dictatorship. In the middle of the 1930's, a few intellectuals close to the PCI leaders tried to organize an independent Marxist group which would avoid Stalinist influence. Penetrated by a man loyal to Moscow, this Marxist study group headed by Doctor Arani was betrayed and reported to the Pahlavi police, curiously at the same time as the Moscow trials. Arrested and given prison sentences, this group which was yet another attempt to develop an independent socialism in Iran, was dismantled by the political police. Arani, the group leader, was killed in prison at the age of 37 years.

On leaving prison, after the occupation of Iran by the allied forces in 1941, a few old friends of Doctor Arani founded, with other intellectuals, the Tudeh party which, in view of the bitter lessons of the 1930's, started from the beginning to show its loyalty to the USSR. Consequently we must reject the Tudeh party's claim that it is the "intellectual heir" of the PCI, for the Tudeh party has never had a revolutionary and even less a communist program. At a time when the most vital forces in Iranian society were conducting with weapons in their hands a bitter struggle against the Shah's despotic and pro-imperialist regime, this party, comforted by the good neighbor relations between the Shah and Moscow, spent its time in applauding "royal" reforms and attacking the armed revolutionary movement, the Mojahedin and the Fedayin of the people. This attitude of the Tudeh party was not anything new during the 1970's. Already, during the 1940's, its collaborationism had not escaped the attention of the British ambassador, during the period of imperialism dominating

in Iran. In a note sent to British consulates in Iran during the Iranian election campaign of 1943, the ambassador emphasized that "it is not in our interest that such candidates [of the Tudeh] be prevented from running in elections (...) On the contrary, staunch candidates pledged to progressive and liberal ideas, who probably will promote reforms, should be encouraged..." In a report sent to London, the ambassador asserted that "there is no communist party in Iran. There are communist individuals, but they have not formed a communist party. The Tudeh party, which is frequently considered communist, repudiates this name and its program is reformist." Even a superficial survey of the Tudeh party's publications would confirm this assertion, without a shadow of doubt.

Moreover, this same party conducted a bitter struggle against the patriotic and anti-imperialist movement led by Mossadeq, calling the latter "a crafty old man in the pay of American imperialism" and "a traitor." (Note the continuity of this way of thinking, when Kianouri speaks of the revolutionaries of today such as the Mojahedin.) At that time, it was strangely the present party secretary general N. Kianouri who led the party organization which a few years before was in a governmental coalition with Qavam, a big landowner and leader of reactionary petty politicians. The leadership of this same party, after the coup d'etat of 1953 against the government of the anti-imperialist leader Mossadeq, in which Ayatollah Khomeini and his mentor Ayatollah Kashani--it is now certain--were involved, left its cadres and its members at the mercy of the repressive apparatus of the Pahlavi regime; as a result of the flight of party leaders to eastern Europe, including Kianouri, hundreds of party cadres, especially of its military organization, were victims of repression and perished.

In short, the policy of the Tudeh party has been, since its foundation, the protection of Soviet interests. The Tudeh party made coalitions with Iranian reaction and against the anti-imperialist forces. (Even with General Bakhtiar, the organizer and first chief of SAVAK who fell into disfavor.) The spread of socialist ideas was the least of this party's concerns. The collection of translations of Marxist works accomplished by the party is very slight. During its existence, it has taken a position both for and against the Islamic movement. Since the renewal of this movement, it has condemned the "reactionary" mullahs, this is to say Khomeini and his followers (June 1963): This position was recently transformed into support for Khomeini's anti-imperialist line. One of the Tudeh candidates in the entire country on the occasion of the election to the "Assembly of experts" (summer 1979) was the famous Ayatollah Khalkhali known for his iron hand.

The present secretary general of the party, Kianouri, in an interview granted to the American weekly NEWSWEEK (see LE MATIN 24

January 1979) claimed that "the oil field workers only obey instructions given by the Tudeh party; we enjoy broad support among the intellectuals, the middle-class, the 'national bourgeoisie' and the bazaar merchants (...). I have learned of the existence in the National Front of a movement favoring collaboration with us and we do not see any objections to collaborating with a bourgeois party." Is this a change of policy or mere bluff? No doubt, it is both of them! Those with whom formerly it had no objection to collaborating with, the National Front, the Mojahedin, the Fedayin, (so-called minorities), the Democratic Front, etc are today "the united front of counterrevolutionaries," they are murderers and "they deserve the death penalty" and their supporters "should be reeducated in work camps," in the gulag!

But what is the real importance of this organization so sure of itself? The Tudeh party has always maintained the point of view that its strength, while it was underground, was about 100,000 members and it mobilized more than 200,000 people during the street demonstrations when it opposed the nationalization of the British petroleum company. Now the Iranian population has more than doubled since then (15 million to 35 million). It is not without interest to point out that, in the light of what we have seen of this party's existence, candidate Kianouri and the party's "celebrated philosopher," Ehsan Tabari, have not received respectively more than 50,000 and 55,000 votes during the legislative elections of the summer of 1980 in Teheran (a city of 7 million people without outlying areas) at a time when the party, allied with the fundamentalists, was leading a legal life. "The increasing political influence of this party is made more obvious when we observe that the candidate of the Peykar group (Marxist-Leninist, a deserter from the Mojahedin and considered responsible for the murder of several Mojahedin leaders during the Shah's reign) received during the same elections a larger vote than the pro-Soviet party's candidates. It is thus natural for Kianouri to declare to the representative of the AFP that he did not know the number of members of the party which some claim have come from all the communist parties in the Middle East and which is "the best organized, experienced and the most disciplined of all the Iranian political parties and organizations."

Having said that, we do not have the least intention of lessening the importance of the Tudeh party as an organization at the orders of a great power which, at the right time, is going to use the latter to take over Iran and dominate the area. The interest of democracy demands that all the democratic and progressive forces be vigilant and come to the assistance of the pluralist and democratic left and all the forces of democracy in Iran to aid them at the moment when they are being subject to the heaviest blows in their existence. At the same time it is necessary to keep an eye on the stranded petty politicians in the pay of the enemies of democracy in Iran and the Middle East who are trying to use every enterprise for their personal ends.

It is necessary to act here and now with vigilance. Reacting to the fait accompli as in the case of Afghanistan, will be as futile as it is hopeless! To describe the forces of democracy as "counterrevolution" and those who are the horsemen of the apocalypse of gulag in Iran as "revolution" is undoubtedly only a service rendered to the cause of expansion of totalitarianism in the world.

8490
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FEMALE MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES VARIOUS ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Sep 81 pp 3, 13

[Interview with Majles representative Maryam Behruzi]

[Text] In an interview with ETTELA'AT, Maryam Behruzi, representative of the people of Tehran in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, presented her viewpoints and opinions concerning various questions, especially questions related to women and the society of women.

What you will read is the text of her interview with ETTELA'AT.

Mrs Behruzi, in order that the people of Tehran may come to know you better as their elected candidate, please give us some details about your past struggles and also your occupation, the level of your studies and your life.

Behruzi: I was born into a religious family in the year 1945. My father was a man of faith and a follower of the religious authorities and used to attend sermons and perform his religious duties.

To the extent he was able, he influenced my character traits, spirit and soul from the point of view of training and religious teachings.

At 15 years of age I entered into a contract of marriage with a pious man trained in the religious sciences for a dowry according to the custom of the Prophet, which is basically religious intruction. From the very first week of my marriage I began studying the religious sciences (jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, Koranic commentary, philosophy and law). At the age of 22 I began teaching and propagating the faith. Although I was a supporter of the movement and a follower of the line of the Imam from the year 1963, my political struggles began in the year 1973. Without any ties with any organization or group I undertook politico-religious propaganda and the explanation of Islamic government. At that time when young people used to ask my advice about cooperating with the organization of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, I would tell them that in my view the work of that organization was not Islamic. I used to try to encourage and incite them to follow the way of the Imam and the religious authorities.

In the year 1975 we set up two secret classes in the library of the Musa ebn Ja'far Mosque under the titles investigation of Koranic verses as related to problems of the day and commentary on philosophy. In addition to instruction, the participants underwent training in karate and weapons.

Of course only a short period of the activities of these classes passed before they were ended by the regime and I was forbidden to teach. But under assumed names I continued speaking in short courses. In the year 1978 when the Imam issued an emphatic order for the activity of the propagandists, I spoke under the name Behruzi for one week during the month of Ramazan at the invitation of the martyr Dr Mofatteh in the Qaba Mosque. On the seventh day, in spite of the efforts of Dr Mofatteh to deliver me from the claws of SAVAK, I was taken into custody in front of the Hoseyniye-ye Ershad and transferred to the Komiteh Prison for interrogation.

After a week of solitary confinement and repeated interrogation, I was transferred to military court and then to Evin prison. After Sharif-Emami came to power and a group of political prisoners were freed, I was released.

Deviation from the Line of the Imam

Concerning recent events, the discovery of safe houses and the capture of young girls who have lived in these houses is a special situation, what is your view and analysis?

Behruzi: At the beginning I must say that when any band of group deviates from the line of the Imam, it has no destination other than collapse and misfortune. The only life-giving road is the straight path of God in its relation with the religious authorities and Velayat-o Faqih [Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent]

But since in the first days of the revolution a number of unaware and excited young people were inclined to become active in a revolutionary political organ, they were attracted unawares and involuntarily to those safe houses because of the existence of dangerous traps set by the enemies of the revolution. As a consequence, they found no way but to continue their bat-like movements.

Moreover, since the organization separated adolescents and youths from their fathers and mothers and from religious authorities and experts, and since they trained them to be impudent and self-opinionated, once the families became informed of how their children had been entrapped, they saw no way for them to return. In other words, the organization displayed only a single road to naive young people: this is that same evil plan of imperialism, which blocks all ways and leaves open only that way which leads to itself.

At the same time one must say that these problems are not new. For during the past regime also, because of the influence of western and imperialist culture, a number of our young people, especially uninhibited and alienated girls rejected by their families, sought refuge in dancing, gambling and sometimes corruption, prostitution and addiction.

But after the revolution, when these roads were closed, a number of unaware and emotional young people who had been raised on the false culture of earlier times were caught in the trap of this organization. These people are usually uninformed about the verities of Islam and were raised by families which were outwardly religious but which lacked a sound ideological and political view.

Of course I am hopeful that with the quick movement of the ideological revolutionaries, the course of the revolution will continue without any contamination.

Decisiveness in the Face of the Counterrevolution

What is your view toward the difficulties of the people in your electoral district?

These difficulties are not the same for everyone. Some people have legal difficulties, especially in relation to family law, and these certainly must be investigated in the family courts.

Another group is faced with the problem of preparing basic articles, especially foodstuffs.

Of course this problem results from not having an Islamic culture. For in the past, people have been made to become accustomed to squandering, that is, the consumer culture, so they are not able to tolerate the present situation. But if the consumer culture were to be changed to Islamic culture, which is production and frugality, then the dimensions of this difficulty would be reduced.

But an important problem with which everyone is afflicted is the lack of security, which exists in a palpable way from the road to the home and the hospital. It is for this very reason that with one voice everyone has asked the ministry of state to establish security as soon as possible throughout the country. The people want the counterrevolution to be dealt with decisively and they want greater attention to be given to confronting them, especially by the law enforcement agents and the police.

Exporting the Revolution

You who have entered the Islamic Consultative Assembly as an ideal example of a Muslim and dedicated woman of present-day society, what problem do you see as more acute for presentation in the Assembly?

Although our revolution was not an economic revolution and basically we rose up in order that genuine Islam might be actualized and Islamic culture be brought into existence, we are still forced to deal with economic problems, for the counterrevolution is taking advantage of this very problem. As for me, although I consider the problems of war, the refugees and foreign policy important, nevertheless, in order to put the domestic situation in order, I consider foreign policy in connection with the goal of exporting the revolution the most important problem.

Women in the Bill on Retaliation

Please tell us, after the revolution, what has been your principle activity, and how have you divided your time among social and political activities and family affairs?

After the revolution, my activities have consisted of organizing meetings for discussion and criticism, teaching (commentary of philosophy, the "Nahj al-balaghah," in Arabic, the "Osul-e kafi" and jurisprudence), analyzing the political problems of the day, speaking in the cities and the villages, research and preparation of legal and political reports, propagating the line of the Imam and explaining the role of the Velayat-e Faqih.

Concerning the division of my time, I must say that, although I do not condider myself very successful in all areas and I only have hope in God's kindness, still I believe that "to desire is to be able." So in spite of my heavy responsibilities, which include the care of my family because of the death of my father, leading and guiding my friends and acquaintances who come to me for advice and raising and caring for four children, through God's kindness I am able to accomplish what I can.

In any case I myself perform most of my household tasks, and I am satisfied, since God has promised, "Those who struggle in Our cause, surely We shall guide them in Our ways" [Koran].

How do you view the situation of women in the bill on retaliation?

The bill on retaliation, which was written with the blood of the martyr Ayatollah Beheshti and his efforts, and against which certain protests are being made by those who are ignorant of Islamic rights and laws and sometimes by those who are opposed to the revolution, is completely in accordance with the book of Islamic retribution. Its opponents are in reality objecting to Islamic laws. As far as I have heard, most of the objections are directed at two of the articles of the bill.

First, if a man should murder a woman, he is not to be killed, unless he should murder two women. The rumor had been spread that, for example, if a man should enter a women's public bathhouse and kill a number of women, he would not be punished or retaliated against.

But in fact, this is not so. In other words, if intentional murder is proven, three ways exist for recompense in the holy law: blood-money, retaliation and pardon. The blood-money for a woman is one-half that for a man, i.e., 500 miskals of gold. This is the statute of God, who says in the chapter on women, "To the male the like of the portion of two females" [Koran]. In the Sura He says, "The female to the female," that is, the statute concerning a murdered woman is related to the statutes which are enacted concerning women. These statutes say that if a man should murder a woman, the family of the woman has two choices: Either they can take the amount of 500 miskals of gold from the murderer; or, in exchange for paying one-half of the blood-money to the murderer's family, the man can be retaliated against. The philosophy behind paying the blood-money to the survivors of the murderer is only for the sake of protecting the family. For even if the man is corrupt and a murderer, his wife, dependents and children are innocent. Of course in the second case, if the family of the victim does not have the financial ability according to the finding of the judge of the divine law, then this amount will be paid from the treasury of the Muslims.

The other instance which has been seized as a pretext by the rumormongers and deviationists concerns the article which says that if a man should see his wife committing adultery with another man, he has the right to kill both of them. But if a wife should see her husband committing adultery, she does not have such a right. In the first part of the article, which exists for defending honor, protecting the family and removing any kind of contamination for the society's culture, there is no debate. The protests are directed at the second part of the article and grow out of not paying attention to the religious statutes. For a man can choose more than one wife, and it is possible that they not know about each other, i.e., in reality the man may not have committed any sin.

Of course my purpose is only to explain the statutes of the divine law; and the position of women has been taken into account in this bill.

The Rights of Women in the Revolution

To what extent have women in present-day revolutionary society benefitted from the rights which Islam has given them?

There is no question that women have not yet completely attained their legitimate Islamic rights in our present-day society. But one must search for and investigate the reasons for this. First, the legal problems of women and the family in general have still not been discussed in the Assembly. Second, some people are unfamiliar with the culture of the Islamic family and with questions of the divine and civil laws. In addition, the differences and difficulties are for the most part the result of undisciplined marriages, not observing the Islamic rights of the husband and wife and considering one another's responsibilities as unimportant. God willing, with the spread of Islamic culture and the total application of the statutes of the divine law, women and men, and as a result all members of society, will attain to their rights.

As a female representative to the Assembly, what role do you see for yourself?

I can say that a woman does not go to the Assembly only for establishing the rights of women. On the contrary, her goal is joint deliberation, presenting proposals and striving in composing the life-giving laws of Islam, and especially in revivifying the rights of the family and society.

I think that I will have mainly a legislative role, and I hope that with God's help I will be able to be a thread of connection between the people and their Assembly, that I will be able to accomplish this heavy responsibility and that until the last day of my life I will be able to serve society in the way of God.

9831
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VEILING IMPOSED ON IRAN AIR WOMEN ABROAD

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German No 36 Aug 81 p 122

[Text] Female employees of Iran Air are supposed to cover their heads in Europe as well. But they do not want to.

The audience was brief. Ayatollah Khomeyni squatted as usual on his patterned blanket, before him Alice Schwarzer and a group of European feminists. The bearded Islamic religious leader thanked the Western emancipationists for their "help against the dictatorship (of the Shah) and the oppression of the Iranian people."

But on that March day in 1979 Khomeyni remained silent to all the women's questions about chador and the fate of their Persian sisters. "We were interviewing a mute," said one disappointed Frenchwoman.

Now the misogynistic old man has given the Western women a belated answer: He tried to extend his power over women beyond the borders of the Islamic republic.

All female employees of Iran Air in the FRG, on orders from Teheran, must in future cover their hair, forehead and eyebrows under a 90 X 90 cm square cloth--greetings from the Ayatollah.

Mohammed Kaboli, the head of Iran Air in Frankfurt, wanted to carry out Khomeyni's order on German soil. Anyone refusing to wear the cloth, he ordered, would receive a warning every day. He threatened his female ground staff, seven Germans and one Iranian, openly: "Three letters, and you're fired!"

The Iran Air women went before the Frankfurt Labor Court in a body the week before last to fight the veiling order and won a temporary injunction.

If Iran Air continues to force its female workers to cover their heads, the company faces a fine of DM 1,000, or 6 months in prison for the manager. The judges in Frankfurt ruled that the Iranians were in violation of Article 87 of the works' constitutional law, which states that the dress code cannot be changed without the agreement of the work's council. A DAG [labor court] spokesman voiced his fears: "If we had tolerated the head scarf, we would soon have woolen stockings, the dark cowl and plain shoes."

This fear is not without justification, because there is some annoyance about Khomeyni's decree on clothing in other major European cities.

Kaboli, until recently the head of the Rome office, had already created an uproar in Italy. Italian employees at the Rome office in the Via Bissolati now have to greet their cleintele modestly, with a head scarf pulled low over their foreheads.

English employees of the Iranian airline, on the other hand, have found a compromise with the mullah's fashion. They fix the dark scarf so loosely and provocatively in their hair that it is more like a fashionable accessory.

Athenian women can continue to go without a veil, in no small measure due to massive intervention by the Greek government in Teheran, but as a concession they must wear long stockings, even at temperatures of 40° Celsius in the hottest summer.

Their colleagues in the Champs Elysees, who have to sit behind bars for fear of attacks by Persians in exile, are still bare-headed. They too were commanded to wear dark scarves and long dresses. One Frenchwoman said: "We will never accept that."

The Iranian flight attendants have no choice. Many of them have lost their jobs and had to make room for men. The few female flight attendants who remain are now following Mohammed: They are to cast down their eyes, conceal their charms and "draw the veil across their bosoms" (Koran 24.31).

They know that in Iran today the will of Allah is receiving solid assistance: When two employees of the Tedcharat Bank in Teheran only partially concealed their curls under a scarf, the Islamic bank council wanted to have the two unchaste women flogged in the tellers' area. They just managed to escape. The council had the director beaten as the one responsible for the religious omission.

9581
CSO: 4620/14

BRIEFS

BRITISH WIN POWER CONTRACT--Ruston Diesels of the UK, a GEC subsidiary, has won a $126m contract to supply Iraq with 70 small power stations. Under the contract, which was won against competition from West Germany, Scandinavia and Japan, each power station will generate no more than 2MW to supply local industries. It is believed that Iraq has chosen to generate electricity on a small scale for strategic reasons. Delivery of the first generators will start next month. They will be installed in prefabricated buildings to be shipped out by Ruston. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 44]

INDONESIAN BIDDING PARTICIPATION--Indonesian contractors are taking part in international tenders for various development projects in Iraq. One of the projects is the construction of a 28.5km road. Their participation was discussed in Jakarta on 18 August during a meeting between Hadjisaroso Purnomosidi, the minister for public works, and Hisham Fakhri Nafi Tabaqchali, the Iraqi ambassador to Indonesia. After the meeting, Purnomosidi told reporters that he thought Indonesian contractors were competitive because of a novel technique called the 'hen's claw' system, used in road construction, first developed and successfully applied in Indonesia. This technique, he said, would be suitable for application in Iraq since the soil over which the road is to be constructed is very soft. The 'hen's claw' system is being used in the construction of the new international airport of Jakarta. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 45]

CSO: 4400/5

PRESIDENT NAVON PROPOSED AS NEW ALIGNMENT LEADER

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Aug 81 pp 11, 12

[Article by Mati Golan: "The President's Dilemma"]

[Text] Since the elections, the Labor party has been going through a process of discovery, a low-keyed discovery at present. Some are still whispering, and some raise their voice discreetly in saying the name of the person who can save the party from its exile in the opposition: the president, Yitzhaq Navon.

The party apparatus has only recently started to consider Navon an electoral asset, and a worthy leader. For years, the party apparatus thought the opposite, or at least acted as if it thought the opposite. When Navon wanted to be Knesset speaker, it put Yisra'el Yesha'yahu against him, who defeated him with its help. When Navon presented himself as a candidate for president, they, at the last moment, presented Prof Efraim Katzir, as their candidate.

Even Navon's natural home, the Rafi party, did not support him. In the struggle over representation of this bloc in the government, its members prepared Gad Ya'aqovi, and the highest position that Navon ever got, was that of chairman of the Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee.

Begin had to rise to power for Navon to get what his own party refused to give him. The prime minister got it into his head that the position of president should be filled by somebody from the oriental community. He sent messengers all over the place to find a suitable man, and at last they found him in Paris. But when the "Cinderella," Prof Yitzhak Shave, was brought to the presidential mansion, it was discovered that the shoe was much too big for him. Only then did the party functionaries look towards Yitzhak Navon, and only then did he get to see all the members of his party voting for him as president.

Cheers Are Better Than Rotten Eggs

In all fairness, we have to say that the Labor party as far as Navon is concerned, is not what it used to be. The death of Golda Me'ir and Pinhas Sapir has brought an end to the hatred directed towards anyone who has ever been associated with the Rafi party. The fact that the Labor party today craves for a leader who is charismatic and popular, is tragic and understandable. It is a result of the trauma that this party underwent in the last election campaign. Even though the

Labor people feel contempt towards the style of Begin and his supporters, they still envy them, because cheers, even if they are vulgar, are better than fists and rotten eggs.

The biggest problem is that in Israel popularity has proved to be unstable. Begin was unpopular for 29 years, and today he is called "the king of Israel." In the first half of 1977, a public opinion poll was taken, regarding the preferred candidate for prime minister: Peres got 55 percent, Yitzhaq Rabin--22 percent, Begin was somewhere in the bottom tenth!

There is no doubt that Navon's popularity is not only based on his high position. There have been presidents before him, and he is among the most popular. His personality and his qualifications have a lot to do with his popularity. The presidency, by itself, is not a guarantee for popularity and an automatic jumping board to the prime minister's position. Everybody respected the former presidents of Israel, but most of them would not have been considered suitable for the position of prime minister.

Without a Protective Shield

Even so, the presidency has something to do with it: the person in this position is perceived as being beyond party differences and governmental wrongdoings. He deals only with favorable topics, he is spared criticism. Take this protective shield away, and he would be vulnerable. If he got into the political arena, nothing would protect him anymore. He would have to attack and be attacked, to criticize and be criticized. He would be judged by his ability to withstand all this and not by the fact that he was president.

Navon did not get to the presidency from the academic world, but from the world of real politics, so he probably understands the problem quite well, maybe better than his friends who ask him to seek the prime minister's position. Therefore, he is not as enthusiastic as they are. Before he makes a decision, he is bound to consider his steps very carefully, with the measure being what is possible and not what is desirable.

In any case, he will probably try to postpone a decision, until his present term as president expires in about 2 years. By then, it seems, the fate of the Begin government, and at the same time, the fate of Shimon Peres, will have become clearer. That will make the situation much easier for Navon. If there is one thing Navon wants to avoid, it is a struggle with his friend and political ally, Peres. At the moment it seems, that only a unanimous party decision to ask him to run, or a voluntary decision by Peres to step down, can make Navon decide to run for the position of prime minister.

Both situations are highly unlikely at present. The Labor party is still waiting. Peres thinks, and many others share his opinion, that the election results do not justify his stepping down. But this atmosphere will change if the new Begin government proves to be stable.

Everybody assumes that in a year or two, this problem will be clarified. But it is doubtful whether Navon and the Labor party will be given this much time to

consider their course of action. It is possible that the time for decision will arrive much earlier.

Passage of the Law--A Political Death For Navon

All depends on whether the Likud decides to revive its initiative regarding the passage of a law which would forbid the president to engage in political activity for 5 years after resigning or finishing his term as president. Such a law was already discussed during the last days of the ninth Knesset. If such a law is presented, and if it becomes clear that it has good chances for passage, Navon will have to make a difficult decision before final approval of this legislation. Staying on the job after the passage of this legislation will mean political death for him.

It is possible that Navon will decide to give up future political activity, thinking that it is more important for him to finish two terms as president. The most difficult problem probably is the fact that it is not clear whether the choice is his. There is a possibility, a certainty as far as the Likud is concerned, that Begin would like "to have his cake and eat it, too": He will try to get Navon out of the political arena and at the same time will replace him as president at the end of the present term. It is no secret that Begin is not happy with the fact that the president's roots were "among those wretched monopolists," and in the headcutting atmosphere which is prevalent now, it is doubtful whether he would like to bow his head before somebody who has always pursued "the right way."

There is no doubt that the Likud is afraid of Navon being the leader of the Labor party or even one of its leaders. This fear has a firm foundation in reality and it might make Begin cool down and try to prevent Navon from resigning now or at the end of his present term. It is possible that the Likud will not push for passage of the law in return for a commitment by Navon to continue for a second term, or that prior to submission of the law to the Knesset, the coalition will assure Navon that it will support him for another term as president. In any case, Navon is already a political topic. For the time being only in private conversations, but we can assume that not long after the formation of the new government, it will become an open political subject. A lot of people and a lot of parties will have to make hard decisions, but the hardest decision will be that of Navon himself.

9433
CSO: 4323/50

MILITARY GOVERNMENT TRIES TO NEUTRALIZE PLO

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 18, 26

[Article by Tawfiq Khuri: "Military Government Attempts to Pave the Way towards the Establishment of Autonomy"]

[Text] The Military Government for the Territories has changed its course in recent months. Most of its activity today is directed towards encouraging moderate local bodies which will be ready, in time, to accept the Autonomy Plan in the Camp David framework.

Following the brutal attack near Hadassah House in Hebron last May, the Military Government has charted a "heavy handed" policy which aims at restoring quiet and eliminating terror. As a consequence of this policy, two mayors from the Mr. Hebron region have been expelled, restrictions haee been placed upon most members of the Guidance Committee in the Territories and a severe clamp down on demonstrating students has been instituted. Control over institutions of higher learning and professional organizations has been stepped up. These and other activities have brought a calm in whose shadow many new settlements have been founded during the past year.

Now, with the final pullback from the Sinai at the top of the agenda and the need for achieving Israeli-Egyptian agreement on autonomy growing, the Military Government must gear its policy in the Territories toward creating a comfortable political climate.

Several months ago the Military Government increased its control over transfers of funds to the Territories by the Joint Jordanian-PLO Committee. It was intended to weaken the relationship between residents of the Territories and the PLO and Jordan, both sworn opponents of the Autonomy Plan. City governments and institutions in the Territories protested the strict controls, which have resulted in budgetary short-falls that are impeding implementation of development plans. While the Military Government does aid the city governments and institutions, it cannot replace funding from the PLO and Arab countries.

Despite controls, the borders have not been hermetically sealed to Arab money from the PLO and Jordan. The Military Government allows funds to be brought in from Arab countries for development plans which it approves. Several mayors have, in recent years, conceived plans for building institutions of higher learning,

supporting national organizations and institutions in the Territories, aiding families of terrorists, defending individuals imprisoned on security charges, and building new neighborhoods in order to create facts and limit Israel's ability to confiscate lands for building new settlements. Such plans, of course, are not accepted by the Military Government for the Territories, primarily due to their character. Funds from Arab countries are, therefore, not permitted for such projects.

Lately, the Military Government has taken additional initiatives in order to weaken the link between residents of the Territories and the PLO. City leaders and public figures were summoned by the military governors and requested not to meet with PLO leaders in the course of their visits to Arab countries and to refrain from making statements favoring the PLO, in accordance with 1968 regulations explicity forbidding residents of the Territories from meeting with PLO representatives. Until now, the Military Government has not enforced these regulations. Mayors and public figures who visited Arab countries since 1968 have met PLO leaders, including Yasir Arafat himself, with relative freedom. The Military Government would only summon these people on their return for information concerning these meetings. It was frequently claimed that these public figures from the Territories were meeting PLO leaders as emissaries of the Israeli Government.

The only explanation for the Military Government's latest move in resurrecting the 1968 regulations is that it is aimed at neutralizing extremist groups in the Territories which are receiving orders from the PLO to oppose the Autonomy Plan.

Concurrently, the Military Government continues to encourage the formation of new groups in the Territories which, when the time comes, will be a replacement for the present extremist leadership. Several years ago the Rural Union was formed in the Mt. Hebron region, led by Mustafa Dudin. Dudin declared at the outset that his group intended to work for the development of the villages in the Mt. Hebron region, and pull them out of decades of neglect. Gradually, Mustafa Dudin gained the support of the Military Government. He became involved in political issues and held meetings of farmers from the villages. Today, the Rural Union in the Mt. Hebron region is considered a powerful political organization.

A similar attempt at creating a rural union in the Shechem [Nablus] region failed, despite the Military Government's support. Recently, mukhtars [village heads] and notables in the Ramallah area succeeded in forming a similar organization. Mustafa Dudin and many Mt. Hebron notables participated in the opening ceremonies. A third union was formed about a week ago by village representatives in the Bethlehem region.

Leaders of city governments in all these regions are well aware of the fact that the sole aim of these unions is to present an alternative to their authority. The city leaders are seriously troubled by these organizations and are devoting most of their efforts to prevent their recognition by Jordan and the PLO and to discredit their leadership.

Mustafa Dudin, the head of the Mt. Hebron Rural Union, sounds as if he has declared a war of annihilation upon the city leaders. This week he stated that he would not rest until a similar union is formed in Samaria. Once these unions have spread throughout the West Bank, Mustafa Dudin hopes to be the decisive force in the politics of the Territories. He maintains that 70 percent of the Territories'

will now be sweeter still. Those in the Military Government and the Coordinating Office for the Territories who still believe that this will strengthen the position of those representatives which the Military Government would like to impose on the Territories, are sorely mistaken. The PLO will gain or lose strength as a result of the actions of its leaders in Beirut or Damascus. Restrictions imposed on the relations of the residents of the Territories with the PLO will only strengthen the PLO's influence.

Since Ezer Weizman's resignation as defense minister, Dani Mat, coordinator for the Territories, who is an officer with the rank of major general, has, in effect, been making Israel's policy for the Territories. He is assisted by regional commanders. There is no active participation by any authorized civilian body, merely tacit approval. The current policy is based more on "don'ts" than "dos". The Mt Hebron populace is allowed to support such leaders as Mustafa Dobin, the Israeli Government favorite, who is despised by the actual West Bank leadership.

The reign of Major General Dani Mat is characteristically black and white, with little room for grey. Consequently, during this period most of the West Bank leadership has been lumped on one side of the fence (the black side, in accordance with the government's interpretation) while precious few have been placed on the other (white) side. Grey has all but disappeared. Previously, there were many more subtle shades of color.

The population [of the territories] has often found itself caught between several hammers (the PLO, Jordan, Egypt, Arab countries, and others) and the Israeli anvil. Its leaders are forced to walk in the rain and try to stay as dry as possible: getting wet in this case means either ending up in an Israeli jail or being murdered in the courtyard of one's own home by a PLO or other hit-man. How many of them falsely call on the PLO and would be happy about that organization's demise, or at least, of its leadership? Others truly believe that only the PLO can bring salvation. Some wait, alternating trips between Amman and Beirut.

This is the reality which is difficult to change with an administrative order from the Military Government. The reality in Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah will not change because Dani Mat's office decided to change it with silly words. Nablus, Ramallah and Hebron reflect Beirut, Damascus and Amman. The West Bank towns are reflections of Arab capitals in miniature. Only positive or negative change in the latter will produce change here.

We may soon hear Palestinian leaders in Gaza, el-Bireh and Tulkarm referring to the PLO as "a band of murderers," "terrorists" and "the so-called PLO," but unlike Mr Begin, they will accompany these words with a wink and a broad smile.

8770
CSO: 4323/45

WEST BANK REGULATIONS AGAINST PLO CONTACTS CRITICIZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 9

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "The Conqueror's Trap"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin does not use the abbreviation PLO and, instead, refers to this organization as an "organization of murders," "the so-called PLO," etc. Mr Begin's terminology will soon be employed by an unexpected group: [Arab] residents of the Territories. The Coordinating Office for the Territories and the Military Government sought and found regulations dating from 1968 which forbid the Territories' residents from meeting with PLO leaders and outlaw calls for PLO support.

Personalities, mayors and East Jerusalem newspaper editors have been summoned by the Military Government and warned that during trips abroad they must not meet with PLO leaders and that at home in the West Bank and Gaza Strip they may not call upon the population to support the PLO in any manner. In this way, perhaps, the leaders of the security network believe that PLO support among the Territories; population will gradually cease.

Why have these old regulations been reactivated now, after so many years of free and open contact between West Bank and Gaza leaders and the PLO in Arab and world capitals? "Something had to be done once and for all," a security official told me this week. He stated that the situation has become unbearable. PLO leaders, through the joint PLO-Jordanian Committee which regularly meets in Amman, or directly from Beirut and Damascus, had been issuing instructions to supporters in the Territories via the local leaders with whom they met. This sparked constant agitation, the security official stated. He further stated that the newspapers and leaders calling for PLO support were, in fact, engaged in anti-Israeli provocation which Israeli authorities are now trying to halt.

We spoke with Nablus Mayor Bassam Shak'a prior to his latest trip abroad, the security official told me. He was warned not to meet with PLO leaders and functionaries and not to make public declarations of support for the PLO, which he is, in any case, doing. We approached other representatives and newspaper editors and hope they will comply with the regulations.

Members of the Military Government are satisfied. The letter of these regulations seems to be observed. However, their spirit is certainly not observed. Who can be

so naive as to believe that the PLO's supporters will stop listening to its leaders, even if Israel outlaws meetings? Instructions, advice and guidance can be disseminated in many other ways, such as radio broadcasts from numerous stations, directly or through secret messages, and via emissaries from among tens and hundreds of thousands of visitors from Arab countries who yearly visit the Territories from across the Jordan bridges.

If Bassam Shak'a doesn't meet in Amman or Beirut with Yasir Arafat, he can meet with Yasir Arafat's representative, who need not be a PLO member, someone who could pretend to be a supplier of pipe for the Nablus water company, for example. There are thousands of ways to connive and scheme. Meanwhile, having deluded ourselves in the late 1960s and early 1970s into thinking that we could be an enlightened conqueror, maintain a liberal military government, rule over a foreign population and still be nice guys, we are, with heavy bearlike steps, walking right into the classic trap of all conquerors.

The trap is the illusion that it is possible to rule over a foreign population through quislings. That the character of its leadership can be changed by reliance upon so-called moderates, to the detriment of those forces which the ruler considers extremist, agitating, and instigating. The trap is the delusion that if people are not permitted to say a specific word, it won't be on their lips anyway.

It reminds me of the children's story about a king in a far-off land who forbade his subjects certain human functions. It is a decree which the residents of the Territories cannot obey. Mayors can be forbidden to meet with each other and members of the National Guidance Committee, the supreme body of PLO supporters in the Territories, can be prohibited from leaving their city limits. Lands can be confiscated for settlements on the pretext of "security." More prohibitions, deportations, curfews and fines can be imposed, but people's thoughts cannot be governed.

If these personalities and mayors are prevented from publicly calling for PLO support, they will do so clandestinely. Those involved in propoganda know that frequently clandestine propoganda is most effective. This is particularly true in Palestinian society, which has grown accustomed to foreign rulers and to speaking about issues using indirect references, rumors and secret mutterings.

When a Palestinian in the Territories reads AL QUDS, AL FAJAR, or AL-SHA'B the three East Jerusalem dailies, he doesn't look for what is there, as we Israelis do, but for what is missing. Frequently, based on what does not appear, he learns much more about what is going on. The papers are subject to the strict supervision of military censorship, which deals with the East Jerusalem press in a completely different manner than the Israeli press. Most of the writing, from foreign reports about Arab countries to death notices, utilizes allusions and hidden messages well known to readers.

Technically speaking, [the new regulations] will make it difficult for representatives and mayors from the Territories to meet with PLO representatives at the Joint Committee in Amman, or in Beirut or Damascus. However, as indicated, in a short time new lines of communication will be established. This will result in the lifting of the present restrictions. Stolen water is sweet: The taste of conspiracy

population is rural and demands that their voice be heard on issues that will determine their future.

Now, one can only ask: Will the Military Government succeed in cutting the Territories' residents off from the PLO and fostering a rural leadership representing the majority of the Territories' population in a short period of time?

It would seem that only sworn optimists can entertain the idea that significant changes in public opinion in the Territories can occur and allow the establishment of autonomy according to the Camp David Accords.

8770
CSO: 4323/45

BRIEFS

NEW HAWKISH LABOR GROUP--A new hawkish group, called "A Lever for Zionist and Social Activism," was established in recent days. Several dozen Labor party activists from the city and from the agricultural communities have already joined the group. The group sees as its aim "preventing the subversion of the party's and the Alignment platform." The members of "Lever" are going to meet with Shimon Peres, the chairman of the party, to talk about the aim of the group, which will conduct ideological discussions open to all members of the party, and about an action plan for the group. Knesset members Shlomo Hillel, Yehuda Hasha'i, Amos Karmel, Me'ir Bar'eli, David Qoren, Prof Aryeh Har'el, Matilda Gez, 'Amos Hadar, 'Ada Golan, Naftali Ben-Yehuda, 'Ezra' Beles, David Petel, Yehuda Har'el, Shimon Shabes and others have already joined this hawkish group. This hawkish group rejects: "the attempts by a few MKs to disregard the platform of the Labor party, as they did after the declaration of the Saudi prince, Fahd." The spokesman for the group, 'Amos Karmel, said: "The platform of the Labor party is not 'Mao's Red Book,' but it is an obligation of the party to its electorate, and the party representatives are obliged to honor it, and whoever does not do so, must draw his own conclusions." [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Aug 81 p 3] 9433

CSO: 4323/50

PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION TO BE INCREASED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 pp 5-6

[Text]

Jordan accounted for 10 per cent of the world's phosphate exports in 1980, third behind Morocco with 41.6 per cent and the US with 33.2 per cent, it was reported from Amman last week. According to the Director-General of the Jordanian Phosphates Mining Company, Ali Nsour, the value of these exports last year was about Jordanian Dinars 47 million ($142 million), constituting some 30 per cent of total Jordanian exports.

With 60 per cent of its soil rich in phosphates, from which fertilisers are produced, Jordan hopes to expand its production rapidly and narrow the gap with its two leading competitors, the US and Morocco. Output has already trebled in the last five years, to reach nearly 4 million tonnes in 1980, and Mr Nsour says his company plans to spend some JD 60 million ($180 million) to expand mining operations and seek new markets in the Far East and Europe, and reach an export figure of JD 100 million ($300 million) by 1985. By the end of the decade, Mr Nsour, told reporters recently, production will be at about 6.5 million tonnes.

By then, enormous new deposits at Shidiya in the South of the country are expected to be coming on stream, only slowly eating into Jordan's proven reserves of 1.5 billion tonnes.

So far, Jordan's main export markets have been in Asia, especially India, Eastern Europe and one or two Western countries.

In order to enhance its position as a major supplier, Jordan is seeking to develop its own processing and transport facilities so as to supply the finished product, rather than just a raw material. To this end, a $400 million fertiliser complex is planned. It is to be built close to the Red Sea port of Aqaba, from which all phosphate exports leave the country. It is expected that by 1990, Jordan will be processing about 30 per cent of its total phosphates output into fertiliser.

In addition, Jordan has huge potash deposits, of around 2 billion tonnes – considered the largest deposits in the world – which will also greatly increase the country's ability to become a major producer of fertiliser. Already, the state is investing some JD 92 million ($275 million) in a five-year potash industry scheme in the Dead Sea (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 9, and March 24, 1980).

According to scientists working in Jordan, some of the local phosphates deposits have an unusually high uranium content, which could be developed commercially following the American example. A West German consultant has been hired to study the feasibility of such a project and is due to report back within the next two years, when the price of yellow cake (raw uranium) should be even higher than today and therefore make such a project even more attractive.

CSO: 4400/6

EXPLOITATION OF COPPER, OIL SHALE PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 pp 38-39

[Article by Stephen Ross]

[Text]

JORDAN's Natural Resources Authority (NRA) is mounting large-scale operations to exploit geological wealth in two areas of the country: the southern Jordan Rift Valley for copper and central Jordan for oil shale.

Copper is found in many parts of the Wadi Araba — the section of the Rift Valley that stretches from the Dead Sea down to Aqaba — and has been exploited since ancient times. Relics of a copper-smelting industry have been discovered in the Iron Age ruins of the town of Etzion-Geber, near Aqaba.

The area on which the NRA is concentrating contains at least 60m tonnes of 1.36 per cent copper oxide ore, said NRA geological survey and mines director Mohammed Abu Ajamiyeh.

The NRA started geological mapping and test drills in the area in the 1960s. A study in conjunction with the French agency Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minérales was pessimistic about the project's feasibility, largely because of the instability of copper prices. The latest study, by UK firm Seltrust Engineering, was completed in October 1979. It concluded that exploitation of the mineral was feasible. The NRA has now floated tenders for the construction of a pilot plant to process the copper ore.

If after six months the pilot plant proves satisfactory, it will be upgraded into a 'cottage' plant, producing 3,000 tonnes a year of almost pure copper by electrowinning — dissolving the mineral and extracting the metal by electrolysis. If this is successful, Jordan will start commercial production.

The NRA is more optimistic about its plans to exploit Jordan's deposits of oil shale. On 4 August the NRA announced a programme, in cooperation with West Germany, to explore and evaluate shale reserves between Amman and Maan in the south. Germany will provide technical expertise and deutschmarks 1.6m ($660,000) in finance.

Last year the NRA signed contracts with a Soviet agency and a West German consortium for studies on generating power from Jordan's oil shale. The Soviet agency Technopromexport will study the feasibility of direct combustion of the shale in a proposed 350-400MW power station to be built at Lejjoun in southern Jordan, where there are proven deposits of 1.3m tonnes of shale. The German consortium (Kloeckner and the Lurgi group) is in charge of the study on processing the shale.

CSO: 4400/6

ECONOMIC PROTOCOL SIGNED WITH ROMANIA

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 15 Sep 81 p 6

[Text]

BUCHAREST. Sept. 14 (KUNA): A protocol for economic cooperation between Kuwait and Romania was signed here during the two-day visit of H.H. the Amir to this friendly socialist republic.

The document calls for further development and diversification of trade exchange and economic cooperation between the two countries in various domains of activity.

The protocol was signed by the Minister of Trade and Industry Jassim Khalid Al Marzouk and the Romanian Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Trade Cornel Burtica.

This is the second protocol of cooperation signed which started September 8. The first protocol was signed with Bulgaria.

Kuwait and Romania today called for a just settlement to the Middle East problem, ending the armament race, realising the new world economic order and fostering their bilateral relations especially in the economic field.

In a joint communique issued here following a two-day visit to Romania by H.H. the Amir Sheikh Jaber Al Ahmed on the third leg of his five-nation Balkan tour, the two sides noted with deep concern the increasing deterioration in the international situation and stressed the need for creating a suitable atmosphere for strengthening peace, detente and international cooperation on the basis of equity, respect of national independence, sovereignty of all countries and non-interference in their internal affairs for the purpose of realising constructive and positive cooperation for the good and prosperity of the peoples of the world. They called for strengthening the role of the Non-aligned countries and the UN in world affairs.

Arms race

The communique said that the Romanian side showed special interest in realising security in Europe and the two sides emphasising that the European security and cooperation positively affects peace, security and cooperation in the world and eases tension in international relations.

The two sides expressed deep concern over the armament race which they viewed as a serious threat to world peace and security and they reaffirmed their support for quick disarmament measures especially in the nuclear field and ending the production of weapons of mass destruction.

The two sides also noted military competition in the international waters which threatens the coastal states and stressed the need for curtailing and ending this military competition and presence.

In this connection, Kuwait and Romania stressed significance of application of the UN declaration announcing the Indi-

an Ocean as a peace zone.

Special attention

When discussing the Middle East problem, the two sides gave special attention to the delicate situation resulting from the continuity of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories including Jerusalem and Israel's refusal to abide by the UN resolutions in this respect and to recognise the national legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and the continuing Israeli aggression against Arab countries.

On the Gulf situation, the two sides emphasised that safeguarding peace and security of this region was the responsibility of its countries without any foreign interference. They expressed deep concern over continuity of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and called for ending it by peaceful means through negotiations.

When discussing the world economic situation, the Kuwaiti and Romanian sides stressed the importance of pushing forward the wheel of development in the under-developed countries and the establishment of a new world economic order on the basis of equality and justice for the purpose of advancement, ending world economic problems and development of world economy.

On the bilateral relations, the two sides noted with satisfaction the growth in fruitful cooperation between their two countries in various fields and stressed the need for further increasing these relations especially in the economic field. They also expressed the desire to strengthen this cooperation in the field of food industry, health, tourism, communications, infra-structure, as well as in the financial and commercial fields.

CSO: 4400/7

NUMBER OF CO-OP SOCIETIES TO INCREASE

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 15 Sep 81 p 7

[Text] KUWAIT, Sept 14 (KUNA): Kuwait's consumer cooperatives will be developed so as to cope with the increasing population, a spokesman for the Ministry of Social Affairs said today.

The existing number of cooperative societies will be doubled within ten years to reach 49, at the rate of two societies a year.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Education is introducing a special syllabus at Kuwait Commercial Institute to cater for students studying cooperative movement philosophy.

A joint committee comprising representatives of the ministries of Social Affairs and Commerce in addition to delegates from Kuwait University, the Technical and Vocational Training Authority and the cooperatives sector will be formed to prepare that syllabus.

In addition to existing services, Kuwait's cooperative movement will be gradually directed to engage in production and agricultural output, the director of cooperatives at the Ministry of Social Affairs Abdullah Al Fawzan said.

Objectives

To achieve those objectives, plans are ahead to prepare qualified national cadres to undertake the increasing activities of the movement, the director added.

In 1979, the number of cooperative societies reached 27 compared to three in 1963 which operated on a KD 76,000 capital and a total membership of 695 nationals.

In 1979, the membership shot to 100,000 while the capital increased to KD 3.25 million and the annual turn-over reached 70.25 million dinars.

In 1965 there was one cooperative society for every 156,000 persons and in 1970 there was one for every 50,000.

Planning on the basis of a forecast that Kuwait's population will reach 2.45 million by 1990, the Ministry is keen to maintain the present ratio of one society for every 50,000.

In 1979-1980, the twenty seven societies provided work opportunities for 3,469 employees including 148 Kuwaiti nationals of whom 50 are holding executive posts.

The relatively small number of Kuwaitis in both general and managerial capacities, indicates the need for preparing national cadres, the director said.

CSO: 4400/7

BRIEFS

REAL ESTATE INVESTMENTS DISCUSSED--Kuwait Real Estate Investment Consortium (Kreic) is the nation's real estate investment arms, providing sound and legitimate opportunities for individual investors, a report said. Jointly owned by the Ministry of Finance, the Public Institution for Social Security and a number of leading firms, the consortium engages in the coordination of Kuwait's real estate activities in Arab and foreign countries. The consortium's activities range across a broad spectrum of construction and investment in hotels, offices, apartments, residential housing, industrial commercial complexes, the report by Kreic directors said. To maximize return from these ventures, the consortium is involved in the construction or purchase of hotels, resort complexes, restaurants, motels, villas and a variety of other related activities. The consortium is engaged in projects in various parts of the world including Morocco's tourism sector where one of its companies, Maroco-Koweitien de Developpement is operating from Casablanca. A similar project is also run by the consortium in Tunisia, under Tunisio-Koweitien de Developpement. The consortium is active in Egypt where it has formed a partnership with Cairo governorate for the development of new sites. The Yemeni-Kuwait Real Estate Development Company follows the consortium's joint format, with investors also from Saudi Arabia. The consortium's success in the Arab world has led to new investment opportunities elsewhere including the United States, the report added. A number of opportunities were evaluated before the consortium entered its first US joint venture in the southern city of New Orleans. Arab projects will continue to have a higher priority and joint venture partnerships are active in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Bahrain, it concluded. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 633, 12 Sep 81 pp 13, 14]

INCREASED PORT ACTIVITY--According to a recent report published by the MIDDLE EAST MARKETS magazine, the cost of transiting goods through Kuwaity ports has risen by eight percent due to congestion and the shortage of trucks and manpower. The report added that ships are calling by the hundreds at Kuwaity ports due to the closure of ports in Iraq and Iran. Another factor attributed to the increase charges was that the local government has passed resolutions preventing goods from being stored for a long time in Kuwaity ports. The magazine quoted authoritative sources as saying that goods to the tune of 10 million tons are likely to pass through Kuwait this year. According to the magazine, an average of 80 ships wait daily in Kuwait ports for a berth. Some must wait 60 days before getting a berth, the magazine added. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 634, 19 Sep 81 p 11]

TRUCK ASSEMBLY PROJECT--A spokesman for the Kuwaiti National Automotive Manufacturing and Trading Company disclosed recently that a local company will shortly engage in a truck assembling project with an annual capacity exceeding the one thousand count. The project, the first of its kind in the Gulf region, will assemble trucks for civil and military use in accordance with the latest international specifications. The foundation stone of the plant was laid earlier this month while the actual phase of construction is expected to be completed within three months. The company had already obtained concessions from a leading West German car manufacturing complex, to assemble seven types of trucks averaging between seven and 23 tons. West Germany was chosen for its advanced technological capacities and its vast experience in the Middle East car markers, said the company's managing director, Adil al-Atiqy. The assembling operations will begin at an annual rate of 150 trucks, and the factory will reach its maximum capacity of 1,000 trucks within four years. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 634, 19 Sep 81 p 11]

MAJOR RESHUFFLING OF ASSETS--Although the government of Kuwait has not announced any reshuffling of assets, bankers from Kuwait to New York are abuzz with reports that Morgan Stanley and Co. picked up about for billion dollars of the gargantuan investment account and that Chemical Bank is in line to manage the remainder. The loser, if the reports are correct, is Citibank. Bankers say the Kuwaitis were rankled by what they felt was a lukewarm investment performance at the bank. A series of leaks to the news media about the account also bothered the Kuwaitis, noted the bankers. None of the New York financial institutions involved in the reports will comment. But investment bankers in London and New York say Morgan Stanley scored a coup by capturing the hefty investment business of the Kuwaitis. Although a well-known as an underwriter and investment banker, Morgan Stanley's money management arm is dwarfed in size by the portfolio operations at the large New York banks and the biggest insurance companies. According to bankers in Kuwait, the transfer of the remainder assets, valued at some three billion dollars, to the Chemical Bank is not nailed down, and Citicorp is fighting a last-ditch battle to keep at least a portion of the massive account under its wings. Dissatisfaction was heard this summer in the New York financial community leading Citicorp's competitors to view the Kuwaiti funds as up for grabs. In July, Kuwaiti Parliament criticised what it called the "unimaginative kind of investment government is making of its surpluses." Several members of the parliament took exception to the fact that a US bank was managing the portfolio. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 634, 19 Sep 81 p 10]

BLACKLISTED FIRMS CITED--According to a report carried in the official gazette, KUWAIT AL-YOM, the government has approved with a long list of blacklisted companies and vessels accused with violating the Arab boycott of Israel rules. United States and West German companies topped the blacklist, which also included firms in Britain, Austria, France, Turkey, Japan and Liberia. A ban was imposed upon the US firm "Monsanto" and its West German subsidiary. A similar sanction was adopted against the British company "Van Leer" and its subsidiary "Parsons Brothers of Hull." The US company "General Refractories" and two of its subsidiaries "Rades International" (France) and "Osterreichisch Amerikanische Magnesit" (Austria) were blacklisted because of holding shares in the Israeli firm "Dead Sea Periclase Limited".... A ban including the non-calling on Kuwaiti ports for

loading, off-loading of supplies will be imposed on a number of vessels of which: the Turkish ship "Paboug Oglou," the British ship "Crown Prince" (both are accused for calling on Israeli ports); the Liberian tanker "Gale" came also under sanction while a ban was lifted from the German vessel "Burhavensand" after owners had presented documentary evidence to abide by current regulations. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 6]

TRANSIT COSTS INCREASE--Kuwait, Sept. 15--The cost of transiting goods through Kuwait has risen by eight per cent due to the congestion in ports and shortages of trucks and drivers, a recent report in the Middle East Markets magazine said. The report added that ships by the hundreds had flocked to the Kuwaiti ports due to the closure of several ports in Iraq and Iran. Another factor attributed to the increase in transit charges was that the Kuwaiti government has passed resolution recently preventing goods from being stored for a long time in Kuwaiti ports. The magazine quoted authoritative sources as saying that transit goods to the tune of 10 million tons are likely to pass through Kuwait this year. At present there are 80 ships waiting for a berth in the Kuwaiti ports. Ships have to wait for 60 days in Kuwaiti ports sometimes before getting a berth, the magazine reported. Kuwaiti authorities are charging a four per cent fee on all transit goods. Some malpractice has also come into play, the report said. Some businessmen are marking their goods to Kuwaiti markets, though they are meant for other destinations. Goods for the local market are given priority, and hence the malpractice. [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 16 Sep 81 p 6]

UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS CLAMPDOWN--Kuwait, Sept. 9--The Dean of Student Affairs at Kuwait University has laid down special regulations for bulletins, wall stickers and other publications issued by students' organisations or societies at the university. The regulations said freedom of expression is guaranteed for students, but the chief editor would be responsible for all the published material with the writers also held responsible for their articles. The name of the publisher, chief editor and that of the press must be mentioned in all printed matter. The regulations banned publication of any article that could disturb Kuwait's relations with other countries or which harmed public behaviour. All printing matter will be censored by the dean. He ordered the formation of a committee to look into punishments or appeals. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 10 Sep 81 p 7]

CSO: 4400/7

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT REVIEWED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 9-15 Aug 81 pp 10-11

[Article by Sheikha Ibrahim]

[Text]

The Lebanese National Movement LNM brings together a wide range of forces with differing ideologies differing origins, age and organizational structure communists, socialists, nationalists, Nasserites and Baathists, on the basis of a minimum platform concerning the most pressing political issues in Lebanon and the region. Some of its component parts are native to Lebanon; others are affiliated with pan-Arab movements.

By bringing together such a broad spectrum of those forces opposed to imperialism, Zionism and reaction, the LNM has presented a positive example for the patriotic and progressive forces in the area as a whole. In Lebanon the very existence of the LNM attests to the falsity of the fascist forces' claims that the Lebanese are not part of the Arab world and that their aspirations lie with 'the West.'

The non-sectarian practice of the LNM counters attempts to paint the Lebanese conflict as a religious one. The majority of its organizations do not derive their following from a particular sect, but have gained popular support as a result of their political line. Thus, the LNM has thousands of Christians in its rank-and-file. On the other hand, reactionary Moslem leaders have opposed the LNM and keep channels open to the Lebanese rightists.

The Lebanese National Movement has evolved into a front composed of 12 organizations. While some of its component groups have a much longer history, and forms of cooperation which existed between them, the LNM's origin dates back to 1969 when a coalition of progressive and nationalist organisations was formed under the leadership of Kamal Jumblatt. These forces had a dual platform: democratic political and economic reform, and the defense of the Palestinian Revolution.

These goals still constitute the cornerstone for the movement's unity and have placed the patriotic forces on an inevitable collision course with the confessional system, and with rightist forces allied to Zionism. The radicalization of the movement climaxed in the 1975 - 6 civil war, when it systematically took up arms in order to reinforce and defend its political and social struggle.

In April 1972, the successes of an electoral coalition between communists, socialists, Baathists and Nasserites gave status to the movement as a countrywide political force. In the same year, Kamal Jumblatt was prominent in the formation of the Arab Front associated with the Palestinian Revolution on the regional level.

In 1973, the movement exerted an important influence on the popular level when it rallied to oppose the

regimes attempts to restrict political activities in Lebanon when in the spring of that year, the Lebanese Army attacked the Palestinian camps patriotic forces launched a political and military campaign to defend the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as well as their own political freedom. The Resistance's alliance with the LNM was its enemies what most wanted to avoid — an overall Arab mass struggle. Thus, the nationalist Lebanese became a prime target for rightist and Zionist attacks.

The two events most often designated as sparks to the 1975-76 civil war clearly illustrate the intertwining between the LNM's aims for Lebanon and Palestine. One was the fishermen's strike in Saida, February 1975, which addressed itself to economic and social injustice in the Lebanese system. This strike against Chamoun's fishing monopoly was supported by LNM forces and opposed by the state which sent in the Army. The other incidents was the Phalangists massacre against a busload of Palestinians in Ain al Rummaneh in April.

Initially the LNM raised the demand. for banishing the rightist Phalange from any role in the institutions of Lebanese politics. By August, the movement had begun armed struggle to supplement its political reform of the political system (August 18, 1975) with the stated aim.

"to equip the growing popular movement with a phased program which defines their main demands in the various domains and constitutes a working guide for them at this stage of their long struggle for a progressive, democratic, Arab nationalist Lebanon."

In the introduction, the LNM explain its reason for concentrating on political reform.

"Political denominationalism, with the privileges it maintains, runs contrary to the real interests of the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people. It is the main feature of our retrogressive political system and the source of the major aspects of confusion characterizing this system. On the basis of inherited denominational privileges, the Lebanese political system discharges its function of protecting the prevalent economic, social and cultural privileges, concecrating Lebanon's isolation from the rest of the Arab area, and giving predominance to a class of political feudalists who are incapable of providing effective solutions *to the economic and social problems resulting from Lebanon's capitalist evolution. Moreover, rivalries created by the existing denominational system and the backward tribal political relations consecrated by it have prevented men of competence from asserting themselves and from assuming positions of resposibility, with the result that the state has fallen down to a level of incompetence that threatens the future of democracy itself..."*

The program advocates electoral reform with the adoption of proportional representation, based on considering Lebanon as a single constituency. It calls for increased power to the legislative branch at the expense of presidential power, and that the army be entirely subject to the political authority. Moreover, "the Army's sole function will be to defend Lebanon's frontiers and national independence and to shoulder the national obligation towards the Palestinian cause and Arab causes. It should not be involved in governmental problems or internal matters." As well the program calls for the abolition of all political restrictions on the formation of political parties, trade unions, societies and clubs, and complete freedom of the press.

The LNM as a whole continues to adhere to this program as the only solution to the Lebanese crisis. While some of its forces tend to regard this program as an end in itself, other organizations view the enactment of such reform as the path for creating better conditions for a continuing struggle. The Marxist-Leninist organisations in the LNM emphasize the abolition of the Lebanese class struggle to assume its true and full dimensions. It is also important to note that this program is directed at the state,

whereas the LNM's program vis-a-vis the masses takes more varied forms, as can be seen in the organizations' political stands and practice.

The rightist attacks in 1975 confronted the LNM with the necessity of taking up arms despite the lack of systematic military preparation. It also faced the movement with innumerable political, social and economic responsibilities. From August through December 1975, the main battles were inter-Lebanon. Due to the support of the vast majority of the Lebanese people, the LNM in alliance with the Palestinian resistance, gained control of 80 per cent of the country. For more than a year, the LNM met the needs of the population in these areas, which swelled due to the influx of refugees from other areas. Temporary administration was set up, and schools and hospitals were staffed by LNM members when state employees failed to fill their posts.

Having pooled their resources during the war, The LNM crystallized its organizational structue in July 22, 1976, with the formation of the Central Political Council, headed by Kamal Jumblatt, seconded by four vice-presidents from the LCP, the SSNP, the Baath party and Murabitoun, and an executive general secretary (CAO). Also in 1976, coordination with the Palestinian resistance in the South was institutionalized with the formation of the Joint Forces.

After Jumblatt's assassination in March 1977, it was agreed to implement collective leadership. All organizations are represented in the Central Political Council and in the regional political councils, which are subject to the decisions of the central council. (The central council also includes 6 independent figures.) Local councils function throughout Lebanon, also in some areas under rightist military control. The 11-member Executive Committee, elected by the Central Political Council, includes representatives of the major trends within the movement. In addition, the LNM has established departments to deal with social services, information, popular security, military affairs, Arab and international affairs, as well as planning and research. Its newspaper *Al Watan* (the Homeland) is the largest circulating daily in Lebanon.

With the cessation of the war, the LNM entered a stage of crises. The assassination of Kamal Jumblatt deprived the movement of a dynamic leader that had commanded respect on th Lebanese, Arab and international level. Moreover, the LNM had to face a difficult dilemma vis-a-vis the state authority. The LNM believes that it is the state that bears responsibility for meeting the population's needs. The majority of LNM organizations view their own administration as a temporary phenomenon designed to fill the state into assuming its gaps left by the state's incapacity and professional discrimination, and to pressure the state into assuming its full responsibility. This stand counters the rightist pracice of setting up auto-defense and auto-administration, which in fact constitutes partition of the country. In contrast, the LNM has emphasized maintaining the unity of Lebanon — its territory, people and institutions.

However, the state's very structure and the increasing overt cooperation of the executive and the Army with the rightists precludes, their functioning as neutral or unifying forces.

The dilemma vis-a-vis the state has been a recurring theme of the political developments since the war. On June 28, 1977, the LNM forwarded a new program. While declaring adherence to the principles of its 1975 program, the LNM now singled out certain basic, but less comprehensive demands, with the aim of creating a broader national front for the reunification of the country:

1. reunification of the state administration; dissolving the 'private entities' set up by the various parties; restoring state authority throughout the country, for full responsibility.

2. establishment of a balanced political system through democratic distribution

of power, entailing readjustments in the Army and Parliament

3. reaffirming the Arab identity of Lebanon and ending the 'good fence' policy vis-a-vis 'Israel'

At this time, the LNM pledged its support to President Sarkis' efforts to unify the country. However, renewed rightist provocations, and the president's negligence regarding this, brought the LNM into renewed conflict with the authority. In December 1978, the Communist Party demanded Sarkis' resignation. In 1980 the LNM launched a national accord initiative on a set of principles to which Sarkis paid lip service. The national accord was met by rightist resurgence in which the executive and the army cooperated. While some forces of the LNM may have banked on national accord as a real solution, the revolutionary organizations, utilized this program as a tactical approach.

Since the civil war the LNM has escalated its military and mass activities in South Lebanon. The Israeli invasion of 1978, the occupation of the border strip by Saad Haddad's sepatatist militias and the relentless aggression against the masses in the South has graphically illustrated, say the LNM, that their task of defending the Palestinian resistance is synonymous with defending Lebanese sovereignty. As well as joining the Palestinian resistance in confronting the invasion, the LNM organized relief work, reaching approximately 30,000 families who were made homeless by the invasion. The Joint Forces have been created with steadily growing strength, witnessed by the 2 week long Katyusha attack on northern Israeli settelments last month.

CSO: 4400/6

AMBITIOUS DEVELOPMENT PLANS REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 pp 21-39

[Text] Like all other oil states, Libya is intent on investing its wealth in industries that will lessen the national economy's dependence on oil in the medium term, and create a flourishing industrial and manufacturing base as a source of income and national wealth in the long term.

Libya is also capitalising on the particular advantages it enjoys over most other oil states, such as the presence of European markets across the Mediterranean, the ease of communications with Europe and the high quality of its 'sweet' crude.

Petrochemicals produced from this oil are pivotal to the country's future plans for expansion. The 1980-1985 Five Year Plan has a budget of Libyan dinars 18.5bn ($62.5bn), of which light and heavy industrial development is assigned $8.7bn. Petrochemicals takes a massive 25.3 per cent share ($2.2bn) of this allocation, second only to metal production expenditure.

Among the petrochemical projects planned or already under way are the Methanol II plant at Marsa Brega ($135m), Urea II, also at Marsa Brega ($203m), a fertiliser plant at Sirte ($338m), and the third stage of the petrochemical complex at Ras Lanuf which involves the production of aromatics, polyester and fibres ($237m).

The Libyan planners are aiming at a 38.9 per cent growth in the coming five years. And at the heart of the country's chemical development is the Abu Kammash plant. Built by the West Germans, the project is complete but for some downstream product lines. It should be in full operation by the beginning of next year.

A Japanese company, *8 Days* understands, has been awarded the contract for the third stage at Ras Lanuf. This is Japan's second large contract this year in Libya, coming on top of the one for the first stage of the steel complex at Misrata. The building of the polyethylene plant at Ras Lanuf is already under way, and the contractors, the Anglo-US company Stone Webster, have also just won the contract to maintain it when completed.

Above even petrochemicals in the Plan, however, is metal production. By expending 31 per cent ($2.7bn) of the Plan's industrial allocation on this, the Libyans intend to increase metal production by 60 per cent — a highly ambitious target. One of this scheme's key factories is the aluminium plant at Zuwarah, the building contract for which has just been awarded to a Yugoslav firm. The plant has a planned output of 100,000 tonnes of aluminium a year.

Existing plants for metal production include the scrap steel plant in Tripoli, the foundry and forge project at Sirte and the Misrata iron and steel complex. It is targeted that the value of Libyan metal output will increase from $7.8m in 1980 to $81m in 1985. The first stage of the complex at Misrata is scheduled to produce 1.26m tonnes of molten steel per year, using imported ore and locally produced gas.

Much of the metal produced will ultimately supply the manufacturing industries budgeted for in the 1980-1985 plan. By the Plan's end, work should be under way to build plant to produce aluminium cables, electricity and water meters, transformers, woodworking machinery and equipment, fluorescent lamps, trailers, metal frames for buildings and other structures, household appliances and car and truck exhaust systems.

The Libyan motor industry could also eventually become a major consumer of Libyan steel. At the moment Fiat is building a truck and bus assembly plant at Tajoura, 20km east of Tripoli. Massey Ferguson is to

build an assembly plant for 2,000 tractors a year for the Libyan Tractor Company.

The biggest deal, however, is the car plant that the Libyans want. At first this will simply be an assembly plant for parts manufactured elsewhere. But in time, like the Hindustan Company in India, Libya will be producing cars from scratch, using jigs and dies supplied by the manufacturers.

Earlier this year it looked as if Fiat was almost certain to get this plum contract. It is the obvious choice, since the Libyans already have a 15 per cent stake in the company. But in recent months Libyan planners have been making approaches to Japanese, British and German car builders. A diplomat at the British embassy confirmed to *8 Days* that British Leyland had been approached.

The first Five Year Plan taught the Libyans about over-optimistic projections. The planners have admitted that in the last plan (1976–1980), performance 'fell far short of targets planned'. The aim for annual growth in the first plan was 15.8 per cent: at the end of the five years it emerged that growth had in fact run at 2.9 per cent annually.

It was also revealed that the allotted investment of $4.1bn for the Plan had been increased by $1.4bn. In the end only 86 per cent of all this money was spent and 70 per cent of the planned projects got under way. Therefore, one of the second Plan's top priorities is to catch up and finish uncompleted projects left over from the last one.

Industrial administration is divided into two secretariats, one each for light and heavy industry. The secretary for heavy industry, Omar Muntassa, is quite frank about the inefficiencies that caused the shortfalls in the first plan: one grave oversight was that many schemes were planned without proper preliminary studies.

Embodied in the draft of the second Plan is the firm intention for both the industry secretariats to establish a monitoring unit 'which should undertake periodical evaluation studies' and ensure that plant is being used to maximum capacity.

All public institutions have been instructed to procure maximum benefit from invested capital by playing their part in streamlining projects, and ensuring that they will fulfil their stated targets. From now on planners are enjoined to undertake 'more efficient preparation and evaluation of these studies, in order to avoid construction of new factories with built-in technological and/or economic deficiencies.'

The new Plan points to another very important requirement that will affect industry and manufacturing. It stresses the need for the Libyan authorities to invest in human resources. While many young Libyans travel abroad for technical training of one sort or another, there are fears that there may not be sufficient qualified people. Libyanisation of projects is a reasonable enough desire. But if there are not enough trained managers, technicians and other experts, then important projects will have to remain in the hands of foreigners. While no one doubts the efficiency of these overseas personnel, the fact remains that they are doing the work for money, not out of any particular loyalty to Libya. It is admitted that, in the long run, this must be bad.

The current Plan has also admitted in as many words that Libyans are going to have to work harder. The final section of the draft plan includes the statement: 'According to the Green Book's dictum, "workers are partners, not wage-earners". It is necessary to find a more incentive-orientated system of remuneration in order to stimulate the workers' interests for higher productivity.'

How this is to be done remains to be seen. One diplomat felt that it was likely that the authorities would embark on a drive to encourage Libyan workers to be more conscious of the revolution's achievements and their partnership in it, and take a personal pride in working for new successes.

The plan also calls for the careful monitoring of all manufacturing. It points out that: 'At present there is no link between the targets of the national development plan and the operation of the basic economic units which are supposed to implement the planned targets and objectives.'

To tighten this up, the authorities are going to be calling for short- and medium-term plans from industrial enterprises as a 'prerequisite' for their success, and to make sure targets are stuck to. This means Libyan managers will have to give the secretariats to which they are responsible thorough analyses of what is happening with their plant and production lines. No one is talking about profit, which is almost an alien concept in Libya. But what the authorities do mean is that they want no more losses and no more waste.

One particular way in which they feel they can reduce this is to cut down the number of small manufacturing firms which employ less than 20 people.

It is only 12 years since the Libyan revolution shot the country to prominence on the

world stage. Previously, it was the one Arab state which other Arabs dismissed. Now no assessment of the Middle East can be made without reference to Libya.

It is usually Libya's politics which hit world headlines. But there is another, equally newsworthy, side to Libya since the revolution: its rapid move towards development. Some $62.5bn is to be spent on the second five-year plan, which began this year. Its keynote, in keeping with Colonel Qaddafi's Green Book of political philosophy, is self-sufficiency.

From this come the ambitious plans to set up local chemical and petrochemical industries — as well as a host of light industries — and to build a steel works and an aluminium smelter. Agriculture, too, is set to receive billions of dollars. The vision is quite simple: to transform what was a backward and barren land only 12 years ago, with nothing but oil to sustain it, into a thriving industrialised state capable of feeding itself without relying on imports.

Tripoli, not surprisingly, is now awash with people trying to sell what will convert these visions into reality.

Western and Far Eastern businessmen have the edge in winning Libyan contracts. There may be political difficulties with certain western governments, but Libya wants quality and will often refuse, for example, East European goods. Reflecting this, over 80 per cent of Libya's trade is with Italy, France, Japan, the UK and US, and West Germany.

There is no doubt that companies maintaining offices in Tripoli often land contracts simply because they are there on the ground. Libya is very conservative in its business dealings, and prefers to work with those it knows and trusts. There are, for instance, over 70 West German representative offices in the country which are constantly picking up new business.

In two recent examples of this, a West German turbine supplier was asked to build an Olympic-sized swimming pool and a Portuguese hydraulics firm requested to supply the structural steel for new agricultural storages. Both were firms of proven reliability who chanced to be in the right place at the right time.

The sheer scale of Libya's development plans has, of course, produced its problems. But the signs are that the new approaches are taking root in Libyan society: the public-sector supermarkets, for example, have improved remarkably.

Libya's electricity system is expanding rapidly to meet the growing demand for power. Before the revolution, Libya produced only 100MW of power. Now the country's power stations are putting out 1,200MW, and by the end of the second Five Year Plan in 1985, Libya will be generating 3,000 MW.

At the moment, the country is divided into three unlinked grids. That for Tripoli stretches from Tunisia to Bu Ghrain, and south to the mountains. The Benghazi area runs up to the Egyptian border, and the Sabhah grid covers the south of the country.

By the end of the Five Year Plan, the three grids will have been linked into one national grid. The 3,000km of power lines needed for this are being put at the moment by the Yugoslav company energinvest, which is in equal partnership on the project with the Secretariat of Electricity. The project is costing Libyan dinars 141m ($525m), which works out at $175,000 per kilometre. The work is being done as quickly as possible, because upon Libya's flexibility in power generation depends the success of a great number of industrial projects that are themselves currently under construction.

The under-secretary for electricity Mohammed Agial, said: 'The rate of demand is always much higher than we plan for.'

Agial hopes that power cuts will soon become things of the past. The problem has always been balancing peak and minimum demands: Libya has no power storage facilities. At one time minimum usage used to be only 20 per cent of peak load. This consumption has now been improved to 50 per cent, but at times of lowest demand, normally between three and four in the morning, consumption is around 50 per cent.

Peak use normally comes between eight and nine at night, and it is interesting that the peak season is summer. Agial explained that this was not because of air conditioning units being switched on, but because of the extensive use of water pumps for irrigation.

As energy-guzzling heavy industrial units like the aluminium plant at Zuwarah come onstream, the new national grid will face great demands. The Zuwarah factory will need 240MW a day but since it is likely to be closed for the night, there could be a very serious waste of power, as obviously, power capacity is going to have to be increased to meet its daytime demands. The electricity Secretariat, accordingly, is trying to per-

suade the Secretariat of Heavy Industry to work the aluminium plant with two shifts.

Among the power station, most of them oil-fired, to be built during this Five Year Plan is a 720MW plant at Zuwarah — the contracts for which are due to be awarded at the end of this year — and another 720MW unit at Zueitina, the specifications for which have not yet been issued. Prequalifications has now closed and letters of invitation to tender will be sent within the next six months.

At present the German contractor Deutsche Babcock is building four 120MW units at Homs, which will all be completed by 1985. One unit is already operating, but Agial says that the project is running behind schedule. The Homs plant, on the coast 150km east of Tripoli is, like other power stations to be built on the coast, scheduled to produce water as well as power — the unit will incorporate a desalination plant to produce 70,000 cubic metres of water a day. Eventually it is anticipated that Libya's entire domestic water supply will come from desalination, most of it produced as an ancilliary process to power generation. The Tripoli West power station, with two 120MW units, one of which is already operating, will produce 450,000 cu m of desalinated water a day.

Other smaller inland power stations, like those at Tajoura and Zanzur, use gas turbines. Besides these conventional power stations, Libya is to get a nuclear power plant, although is not budgeted for in the current Five Year Plan. The 400MW nuclear station, which is to be built by the Soviet Union, comes under the Secretariat for Atomic Energy, although the power it produces will go the national grid. However, since it has not yet been decided where to site the nuclear reactor it is unlikely that this formidably complicated project will be completed before 1990 at the earliest.

One plan likely to be completed a lot sooner, within the next two years in fact, is the construction of a power line that will link Libya with Tunisia. Tunisia has its peak power use season in the winter. This means that each country will be able to exchange 150MW of power when they find their supplies are getting low. The project is budgeted at between $55m-$75m. The feasibility of supplying electricity to Chad is also being investigated.

While these larger plans are being considered and carried out, the electricity secretariat is concerning itself with a few smaller difficulties in Tripoli. The capital is getting 3,000km of 220-volt line to update the system. Some of the city's houses are still running 120 volts.

The day the national grid comes into operation, sometime in 1985, the old national power station in Tripoli — the country's first and for a very long time its only power station — will turn off its generators, explained Agial. It will then be pulled down, because the municipality wants the site for development. Only one small portion of that plot will keep its link with electricity — for housing a small electricity substation.

Libya's future communications plans focus on decentralisation. The emphasis ever since the revolution has been to build up airports, roads and ports to meet the growing needs of the country, but even during the last plan, communications development was seen in terms of creating a basic infrastructure for those areas where the largest numbers of people were to be found. Tripoli and Benghazi consequently got more than their fair share of investment. The same applied in every other sector, except agriculture.

Under the new plan, not only is agricultural development to be intensified, but new industries are being deliberately set up in areas other than the two main cities, in the hope that by 1985 the trend of migration to the cities can be arrested, even reversed.

Even in small countries decentralisation, particularly of the means of production, needs a highly efficient communications system. In a country the size of Libya, where distances between areas of population have always been enormous, it is vital.

Before the 1969 revolution, the lack of a basic communications infrastructure was a prime factor in hampering national unity. As figures for 1970 — just a year the revolution — show, the situation was deplorable: there were just 3,000km of road. The 'international airport' at Tripoli consisted of a few old hangars, one of them serving as the terminal building. The rest of other airports were in a much worse state. Most population centres, no matter how isolated, had to make do with only occasional flights in, the planes being forced to land on sand strips.

Libya's maritime and air fleets were just as limited; the national carrier had three Caravelles and two Fokker Friendships, and managed to carry a grand total of 200,000 passengers a year. There were only two commercial cargo vessels of substantial

size, and three petroleum tankers.

All Libyan officials love to impress on foreigners the change in figures since the revolution and: Assistant Secretary of Communications Salim Mednini enthusiastically points out that, by 1980 ten years of massive investment had pushed up the figures to 11,000kms of roads, 240,000 telephone lines, a fleet of 30 planes for Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA), including ten Boeing 727s, eight commercial vessels and 13 tankers.

For the future, with decentralisation the driving force, the goals are even more ambitious: the aim is to double these figures in the next four years. Already the contracts are going out, and the various departments implementing the projects planned by the secretariat of communications are awash with foreign businessmen eager for contracts.

Stars of the decentralisation show are a 1,300km railway network centred on the steel works being built at Misrata, and United African Airways (UAA), Libya's new second airline. Though intended primarily for cargo, the latter will probably outstrip LAA in size by the end of the plan period. Its budget over the next five years has been initially estimated at Libyan dinars 300m ($1bn). But with plans for ten wide-bodied planes — Boeing 747s it is hoped — and talk of at least 30 other smaller planes such as 707s and either British Aerospace 146s or Fokker Fellowships, the budget could easily exceed LD500m ($1.6bn). Equally impressive is UAA's plan to develop Sabhah airport into the largest aircraft maintenance centre in Africa.

To 'support effectively the planned growth in the economy,' as the planners put it, the development of ports is essential. Normally the harbour in Tripoli is constantly crammed with row upon row of containers full of machine tools, heavy goods vehicles, road making equipment, cement mixers, combine harvesters, cars and all equipment necessary for development

In fact, Libya's ports have been developed systematically since the revolution, particularly Tripoli's. The problem — and it applies as much to every other sector as to the ports — is that, even before a project is complete, it is rendered inadequate because of ever-growing needs.

Crucial to any plans for decentralisation — though not as spectacular as a new railway or new ports and airports — is a comprehensive road network. Despite the enormous road building programme of the 1970s, including some impressive highways in and around Tripoli and Benghazi, officials and contractors alike regard the network as inadequate.

Contractors, for example, maintain that the lack of sufficient roads is causing costs to rocket. According to one company's estimate, it costs about $1,000 to transport heavy equipment just 50km in areas poorly served by roads, which perhaps explains why Libya has become so single-minded about extending the network. One British consultant for example is currently involved in building 1,700km of roads.

This year alone, about half the communications secretariat's development budget of LD306m ($1bn) will go on roads. Over 1,000km of rural roads are to be built, while a further 3,000km of existing country roads are to be improved. One stage up, the network of main roads outside the towns is to be increased by 2,000km.

Old road projects shelved some time ago are to be resurrected. One highway which runs almost to the centre of Tripoli but stops abruptly not far from the central hospital, is finally to be extended after years of delay.

The economy may be the prime moving force behind communications development, but there is no intention to forget the human factor. If people are to be encouraged to move out of Tripoli and Benghazi to the new agricultural settlement zones in the countryside or to the new towns such as Brega, Ras Lanuf, Misrata and Zintan, where the emerging industries are being located, there have to be adequate communications facilities.

Moreover, with people's expectations constantly on the rise, the facilities have to be comparable to those in Tripoli and Benghazi. Thus more local airports are planned at Sarir, Ghadames, Ras Lanuf and Brega, among others; there will be an expanded bus fleet, extended passenger services and over 35 passenger stations on the new railway network, and 390,000 more telephone lines.

Telecommunications development alone will cost LD349m ($1.17bn) and will include a new international telephone exchange, telex facilities for Misrata, Derna and Sabhah, the upgrading of automatic exchanges and a general rehabilitation of the microwave system.

The communications planners are only too well aware that unless their efforts succeed, Libya's aim of a decentralised yet highly coordinated economy could well be jeopardised. However, all those involved

seem to proceed with the utmost confidence.

Libya's railway will undoubtedly be one of the stars of communications development over the next few years, even though proposed investment during the new plan period is only Libyan dinars 76m ($256m).

That is a lot less than other transportation sectors are to get during the same period: airport development will receive LD135m ($455m), while expansion of the main-road network will need a massive LD386m ($1.3bn).

However, trains — even when pulled by today's mundane diesel engines — have a habit of catching the imagination, and Libya has not proved an exception to the rule. The director of railways and his staff happily admit they are hooked on trains.

Much of the interest shown, however, is because this is a totally new venture in transport and as such, LD76m is just the starting point. There used to be a small and colourful narrow gauge network serving Tripoli and the surrounding areas till the late 1950s, but that was ripped up by the old regime in the mistaken view that trains were a thing of the past.

The plan is for a new 1,300km standard guage network in the western part of the country, centred round the new steel town and port of Misrata. From Misrata the line will run 210km westwards to Tripoli, where High Speed Trains will take passengers the 170km to Ras Jadir on the Tunisian border, and then up to Tunis and on to Algiers. East from Misrata the line will go to Bu Ghrain and then south to Sabhah and the nearby iron ore mines.

The Misrata-Sabhah link, the most important section in economic terms as it will run from the steel works to the iron ore mines, will not be operational by the end of the current plan period and probably not until 1989, though contracts are expected to be awarded before the end 1983. However the other two lines, which officials estimate together will cost at least LD200m, ($675m) should be partly operational by 1986 at the latest, but maybe even by 1985.

So far, however, planning has been split into three separate programmes: Ras Jadir-Tripoli-Misrata, and Misrata-Sabhah, each planned as if the others did not exist. Ras Jadir, according to the consultants — the Hungarian firm Tesco — will be run by 672 employees with 11 locomotives, eight maintenance and work engines, 13 passenger wagons and 550 freight wagons.

The Tripoli-Misrata line, designed by the Libyan Consulting Bureau, is officially to have 21 locomotives with another four for work and maintenance, 42 passenger wagons and 761 freight wagons. The preliminary estimates for the Misrata-Sabhah line are 2,160 employees, 18 locomotives, 11 maintenance and work (engineering) locomotives, 25 passenger and 622 freight wagons.

The railways department now feels that these figures may be too high, and so last month asked France's Sofrerail to produce a study for all three projects as a single network.

Because a rail link has been under discussion with Tunisia since the early 1970s, it will be the first of the projects to get under way; at least the 170km Libyan section will be. A line already exists from Tunis to Sfax, but it is narrow-gauge. The Tunisians plan a new standard-gauge line from the capital to the frontier, but the railway authorities in Tripoli do not expect it to be ready before the Libyan section. The contract for the latter — both for civil engineering and signalling and communications — should be awarded in the next few weeks, and work is planned to start before the end of the year.

The Indian Railway Construction Company, which submitted the lowest bid, has high hopes of getting the construction contract, and it is understood that their offer is being very seriously considered. West Germany's Phillipp Holzmann, which does a massive amount of work throughout the country, is also a front-runner.

Like the rest of the planned network, the Ras Jadir-Tripoli line will initially be single track, operating with diesel engines and a design speed of 160 kph. Double tracking and overhead electrification, though preferable, are being left to the future, partly because of costs but also because of the time factor; the communications secretariat's promise is that the whole railway should be ready shortly after the Misrata steel works come on stream. The line will have 14 stations in all, including stops at Abu Kammash Zuwarah, Sabratah, Az Zawiyah and Zanzur.

As can be seen from the proposed figures on rolling stock, cargo transport is the main objective, and there will be branch lines to the new Abu Kammash chemical works, to the Az Zawiyah oil refinery and to the ports at Tripoli and Zuwarah. Preliminary forecasts for 1990 estimate cargo traffic at 3.6m tonnes annually. Not that passengers are being ignored: with 11 passenger trains running up and down the line each day, it is

estimated that 1.9m people will be using the line at the beginning of the 1990s.

The Tripoli-Misrata line is to have only ten stations, including a major one at Homs, and a branch to Misrata's port at Kasr Ahmed. There will also be a branch near the beginning of the desert line out of Misrata, for the limestone quarries at Sidadah. The main line, however, will go down about 900km to a junction at Brach, where the track then divides to Sabhah and to the iron ore loading terminal at Talut.

Although the network will be economically centred on Misrata (estimates for the year 2000 are that 12.6m tonnes of cargo — mostly iron ore for the steel works — will be moved into Misrata on the desert line alone), the main station together with the operational headquarters will be in Tripoli. A station complex is to be built 7.5km from the centre of Tripoli, and will include the operations base, a mosque, an hotel and shopping facilities. The project has already been designed by the Libyan Consulting Bureau and ten companies have been prequalified to bid for the contract. It is expected to be awarded before the end of the year. The administrative headquarters for the railways will be located elsewhere in Tripoli.

Nor is this the end of the story, or in this case, the line. All of eastern Libya still needs track, and it is hoped that — once Egypt returns to the Arab fold — the new Libyan network can be joined up to the Egyptian system, thereby creating a trans-north African railway. The only slight technical problem is that the Egyptian system is broad-gauge, which might involve some Egyptian rebuilding. According to the railways director, a consultancy contract will be awarded next year for feasibility studies to continue the lie from Bu Ghrain 1,300km to the Egyptian frontier, going via Benghazi.

More ambitious — should it come off it would change the political and economic face of the land-locked states of central Africa — is the proposal to continue the line from Sabhah down to Chad, to Niger and to the Central African Republic. Though still in the discussion stage, the current plan itself refers to either Misrata or Benghazi eventually becoming a 'major transshipment centre for Africa'.

Logically the choice would be Misrata — going on to Benghazi would only involve further distances — and indeed this now seems to be the official thinking.

Tripoli's Corniche has changed a lot in the last twelve years. The sea no longer laps against the walls of the old castle, which has guarded the city since Carthaginian times: nowadays you look beyond the Italianate balustrades of the seafront out across hectares of reclaimed land to the capital's busy harbour.

At first sight all seems well. But Tripoli port is a victim of its own success. With its sister harbour at Benghazi and the brand new docks at Misrata (completed in 1978) it has been the channel through which millions of tonnes of goods have passed, much of them materials and equipment to help keep up the momentum of Libya's ambitious development plans.

The load has proved too great at times. This month Lloyd's of London has reported that queues of vessels are standing off Tripoli awaiting their turn to discharge their cargoes.

Libya's minor ports — Tobruk, Zuwarah, Derna and Brega — have been handling around 100,000 tonnes a year of general cargo each, and in 1975 all Libyan ports handled a total of 9.7m tonnes of goods. It was planned to increase port capacity to 15m tonnes by last year, but this has not happened, because of falling demand for the import of building materials

In 1978 Misrata's 1,120 metres of quay came into operation, and the new port expansion at Tripoli added 4,100 metres of docks. Developments to other ports added 1,147 metres of docks. These schemes have brought the total cargo handling capacity of Libya's seaports to around 13.7m tonnes of dry cargo a year.

Further dock expansion has already begun: Tripoli is to get a second-stage development which will produce a third mole to encompass the two existing structures; Benghazi is being expanded to take 3.5m tonnes of cargo a year; Misrata, which at present can only handle 1m tonnes a year, is nearing the finish of a second stage which will add 3m tonnes capacity; the iron and steel works at Misrata is getting its own port, already under construction; and Tobruk, Zuwarah, Derna and Brega, although not yet earmarked for major development, are also being refurbished.

Libya is in the midst of an ambitious expansion of civil aviation, which planners hope will not only bring the country closer together but also establish it as a major transit and aircraft maintenance point on the routes into Africa

The old tin hangar that once greeted arrivals at Tripoli airport is still standing, but nowadays passengers are passed through a modern, air-conditioned terminal built nearby. Before the 1969 revolution the

country had few main airfields. Libya's director of civil aviation, Marid Abu Zaqaq, told *8 Days* — at Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha. There were also a few wartime airstrips. Flight supervision for the whole of the country was run from Malta, that Libya could exercise no sovereignty over its airspace.

Four years after the revolution, Libya had trained enough personnel and installed sufficient equipment to take over its own air traffic control. On 6 December 1973 Libya assumed control of the airspace between latitudes 34 degrees 24 minutes and 22 degrees north.

Since then civil aviation has grown rapidly. The airport at Sebha has been brought up to international standard and can now accommodate jumbo jets. A new airport has just been completed at Ghat on Libya's southwestern border and the first phase of an airport has been built at Sarir on the oil fields. Jaghbub in eastern Libya has an airport and another is under construction at the oasis town of Ghadames on Libya's western border with Algeria.

Benghazi is to have a major new international airport including a new terminal, runway, aprons and taxi ways, all separate from the existing facilities. *8 Days* understands that the designs for this development have already been made by the Basle firm of Gesellschaft Fur Wirtschaftlichesbauen (GWB). Approaches to build the project have been made to companies in Germany, Sweden, Japan, Korea and Italy. GWB planned for the work to be done in five stages, but the Libyan civil aviation authorities obviously attach a great deal of importance to the development and are pressing for the work to be rescheduled so that it can be accomplished rather more quickly in just three stages.

A second stage development at Tripoli airport is expected to start soon. The apron is to be extended in two stages at a cost of Libyan dinars 16m ($54m) for the first part and LD 11m ($37m) for the second. *8 Days* has learnt that there are also plans to build a second terminal at Tripoli, the design of which is being undertaken by the British architects Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, who were responsible for the first terminal. The civil aviation authorities will use the old terminal for domestic flights and the new one, estimated to cost between LD 80m – LD 100m ($270m – $290m) for international passengers.

The secretariat of housing has plans to complement the development with an airport hotel. A hotel is also planned for the new Benghazi airport. There is also a scheme, which though not approved seems certain to go ahead, to build a second runway at Tripoli, north of the present terminal building.

At present Tripoli airport can handle 2.5m passengers a year, coping with 1,450 passenger arrivals and departures an hour at peak times. The plan is to boost capacity to 5m a year. In Benghazi the new airport will be able to cope with 1,650 people an hour during busy periods and 3.5m people in a year.

The development at Sebha is part of the plan to make Libya the gateway to Africa. There are two huge new hangars capable of accommodating some of the wider-bodied planes. These are the start of planned repair and maintenance facilities which the Libyans hope will make Sebha the major African aircraft service point.

To back up this massive expansion of facilities, Libya has an efficient air traffic control system (ATC). It is customary for pilots to criticise the failings of Greek and Moroccan air traffic control in particular, but one pilot of a Hercules transport used in Libya to lift oil rig equipment told *8 Days*: 'The Libyans are very good indeed. Traffic density isn't as high as in some of the ATC horror spots like the Adriatic but you get a great feeling of confidence with the guys they've got out here.'

ATC is backed up by flight information centres in Benghazi and Tripoli and by a network of over one hundred navigational aids, or non-directional beacons. These are being replaced by the highly sophisticated VORs (Variable Omnidirectional Range beacons). When this process is completed, says civil aviation director Marid Abu Zaqaq, 'there will be no need for us to raise the number. The feeling is that Libya will be sufficiently covered by navigational aids and facilities.'

The whole navigation system is also being linked to computer. A new ATC training institute is being built at Gebha 17km south of Tripoli, where Libyans will be taught to operate the new equipment. The institute will be able to take between 250 and 300 students.

There will be plenty of work for these people when they graduate. Ultimately the civil aviation authorities intend to build paved runways wherever they think there is a need. Some, like that at Hun in the Kufra area have already been constructed. There is also an airstrip and passenger facilities at

Bani Walid, 200km to the south of Tripoli, and at Nalut and Ubari, west of Sebha. Design contracts have been signed with the British company Scott Wilson for new airports at Ras Lanuf and Brega. Within a few years, with all this development air travel is going to be the rule not the exception in Libya.

To move passengers around this network of airports, Libyan Arab Airlines is to be joined by a new Libyan carrier, United African Airlines (UAA). At present Libyan Arab Airlines operates ten Boeing 727s, seven turboprop Fokker Friendship F27s and a single Boeing 707 cargo variant which wears the all-white livery of a subsidiary, Libyan Arab Cargo. Eight more Fokker Friendships are to be delivered in 1982 and the company also has ten European Airbuses on order. Libyan Arab had also bought and paid for three Boeing 747s but Washington vetoed their supply, claiming that they could be used for military purposes. The airline was forced to sell the jumbos to South America.

The Airbuses, two of which will be all cargo, are to be powered by General Electric CF 26 engines built in France under licence from the US. This avoids Washington's ban on Pratt and Whitney engines which are the most common power plant for the Airbus. Libyan Arab are also considering the purchase of the new British-built, highly fuel efficient short haul jet the BAE 146. Airline officials already have models of the plane decked out in Libyan Arab livery.

United African Airlines will complement Libyan Arab's operations. Its operational base will be Tripoli, but its maintenance home will be Sebha where it will also undertake work on planes from Libyan Arab and other international airlines. It is understood that UAA intends to fly a large fleet of Boeings. UAA planes will run a 70 per cent cargo service and ultimately the company could have a fleet of over 40 aircraft.

The need for air cargo capacity in Libya is now great. British Caledonian, which operates five passenger flights a week between Tripoli and London, is also authorised to make five cargo runs a week as well. However, so great has been the demand for air cargo space that in recent months, *8 Days* understands that the Scottish airline has been making an average of a flight a day. A company spokesman admitted that the Libyan trips for both passengers and freight were one of the airline's most profitable routes.

Expansion of air travel is central to plans to decentralise the economy. In the early days of oil in the 1960s there was considerable movement of people away from the countryside into the cities. Because jobs and wealth seemed to be concentrated in towns, agriculture and the whole structure of rural life suffered as people sought better work away from the land. The new air network with its small feeder airports will help Libyan efforts to reverse this trend.

Housing construction in Libya has slowed down markedly in the last year, simply because the goal to give everyone a roof over their head set in 1969 has been largely met.

In the days of King Idris, 40 per cent of the population lived in tents or shanty towns. Now there is a roof for everyone. But work continues to improve the housing stock and iron out anomalies in the housing system. One problem has been that housing was allocated only to married couples. It was assumed that young people would live with their families until they married. The wrinkle in this concept showed up as young men were sent to work in jobs away from their home towns. There was no temporary housing for them and many have had to live in hotels. The authorities' solution is to embark upon a building programme of studio flats to house these people.

The Libyans are also increasing their housing stock by 30,000 homes a year to add 150,000 units by 1985. Libya, with a population of just 3m, has one of the highest growth rates in the world and planners believe that the number of citizens will reach 4m in four years' time. The hope is that as the number of people increases, Libya will be able to spread its population throughout its huge territory. Therefore seven new cities and 15 villages are planned. The cities will be at Zintan, near Gharyan, south of Tripoli, Medina al Wasit, in the middle of Libya, Sarir by the oilfields in East Libya, Brega, Ras Lanuf and Misrata.

Eighty per cent of housing in Libya is built by co-operatives and individuals. The co-ops register with a central office, draw up plans for their homes, normally flats, get the plans approved and then go to the housing bank for interest-free loans. The local municipal housing committee then awards the building contracts.

The Libyans are also taking a greater interest in the quality of architecture. By and large no one regrets the passing of such ornate architectural creations as the Grand

and Mehari hotels, which are seen as the symbols of the Italian occupation. But there is a growing awareness of the value of indigenous architecture. Housing Secretariat officials such as the under-secretary, Abdurrahman Tir, point to a new trend to encourage traditional styles of building, adapted to modern standards.

One manifestation of this new architectural consciousness is the scheme, still under discussion, to rehabilitate Tripoli old town. 'We are trying to keep it as it is,' said Tir, 'but it will need time.'

However, although house building has slowed down compared with the frenzied activity of the past decade, there still remains much construction work to be done, most of which will be done by foreign firms. There are 52 national building companies working on various projects, but these are heavily outnumbered by the 300 foreign construction companies that are registered in Libya. Another 200 foreign firms are waiting to be registered.

The hotels are full of foreign consultants. At the moment the lion's share, around 70 per cent, of all consultancy work goes to British firms. The actual building work goes to West German, Italian Korean and Turkish companies in particular. Within the past few days the West German company, Philip Holzman, which built Tripoli's water system, has been awarded a contract to build a conference centre and village for the 250 OAU delegates who will hold their annual conference in Tripoli next July. Libya will hold the presidency of the OAU during 1982.

Contracts are awarded in Libya in one of three different ways — traditional open competition, closed competition among invited companies and finally direct approach, normally to the Libyan office of a registered foreign firm. This last method is quite frequent for relatively simple works. A company that has done one job well is generally rewarded with more work.

Once a contract has been signed, foreign contractors still face a number of particular problems in Libya. For a start they share with Libyan firms the problem of labour. 'There isn't any,' said one contractor. A senior planning official in the Secretariat of Housing confirmed this. 'Labour is our biggest problem,' he said. There is no unemployment in Libya, so the construction industry has large numbers of foreign labourers. Much of the work is undertaken away from the towns, often in the desert. This poses great logistical problems for construction companies, whether Libyan or foreign.

One construction man told *8 Days*: 'Most of the work is where people are not.' Building a desert road to an airport site highlights the problems. The planned route was extremely difficult. The construction crews had to transport their equipment and the buildings in which they were to live 600km south of Tripoli. While the work was in progress the firm had to take in supplies daily as well as bring crews out for rest periods and take new men in. 'It costs a lot to keep men in the desert,' said the construction man. The road needed 100 tonnes of bitumen every day. Libya does not yet produce its own bitumen so the tar had to come in through Brega.

But despite such logistical problems, foreign companies are still queueing up for work. In February this year Libya had $13bn in foreign currency and gold reserves. Although this has probably fallen with the demand for Libya's high-priced oil, officials are confident that the country is well able to meet its existing commitments and take on more projects without any trouble, even if the present oil glut continues for another year.

One way that the Libyan authorities have sought to avoid paying out too much foreign currency is to offer companies contracts in which they would be paid for their work with oil. This barter arrangement is available for contracts worth as little as LD12m ($40m). One German subsidiary of Krupps is understood to have agreed such a contract with the Secretariat of Electricity last month. Apparently Krupp is taking a drop in profits of around three per cent. *8 Days* understands that other barter deals are being negotiated.

At the moment, Libyan companies take 25 per cent of the contracting work in their country. This capacity is going to increase as more local companies, referred to in Libya as 'establishments', are created each year. Libya is also seeking to become as independent as possible in building materials. The second Five Year Plan makes the point that the country has abundant supplies of raw materials such as dolomite, limestone, silica and gypsum. Cement production has increased from 700,000 tonnes in 1976 to 2.1m tonnes last year. The Homs II cement factory, with a production capacity of 2.5m tonnes a year is to make Libya completely self-sufficient in cement. There are plans to expand cement works to produce special prefabricated cement products, as well as plants to produce lime, glassware, bricks

and sanitary ware.

Libya has a long way to go before it can entirely replace foreign construction expertise with its own people, but the basis for the takeover is there.

With export earnings dropping this year back to their 1979 level while imports rose by 22 per cent. Libya is studying carefully its financial options to guarantee the full implementation of its $62.5bn five year plan.

At a time of increased administrative responsibilities in Chad, the squeeze may toughen through 1982 with prospects of continued sluggish world oil demand and mounting pressure from fellow Opec members in Africa, such as Nigeria, desperate to recoup their share of the market at almost any price.

By slashing petrodollar income by around 50 per cent during the second half of 1981, the glut may easily cost $7bn to $8bn in lost income to the Jahamiriyia. Total earnings are not expected to exceed $15bn, against administrative and development outlays of the same magnitude in the civilian sector.

Contingency plans are already being drawn up. Rajeb Missellati, governor of the Central Bank, outlined what he sees as the main options open to Libya to cushion the effects of the oil glut:

● Dip into government reserves, which are now more than $14bn. The law provides that each year, the Secretariat of Treasury must set aside 30 per cent of its oil income in a specially-designed reserve fund held in a Libyan Dinar account at the Central Bank. Those accumulated funds are now running at well over half of the country's total reserves perhaps about $10bn. With a total import bill of $10bn expected this year and civilian and military expenditures that will easily outpace petrodollar earnings, the secretariat will hardly be able to meet the 30 per cent target in 1981. So far, however, there has been no withdrawal. But during the two previous gluts in 1975 and 1978, in addition to shaving its prices, Libya was forced to slice 36 per cent and 20 per cent respectively off its total reserves. 'Of course, if we are facing a temporary cash flow problem, we will resort to our reserves. Isn't that what reserves are for?'

● It may also choose to tap the domestic capital market, first because the outstanding public debt is minimal — less than 10 per cent of the national budget this year — and secondly because the domestic banking system's liquidity remains very high after drastic measures since last year to cut down money supply by a third to LD800m ($2.7bn). Idle funds are now estimated to be about 50 per cent of total liabilities among the five commercial banks, a staggering figure which includes the non interest-bearing 15 per cent reserves deposited at the Central Bank. Libyan sources indicate that such a pool would amount to LD3bn or just over $10bn.

● The Treasury could also turn to the international capital markets. 'Sure enough, instead of doing barter agreements, I would much prefer going on the international markets. I don't say we will but if needed, we'll do it. We have never been to that market before and we think we can get a lot of money there,' says Missellati. Indeed, Libya would certainly rate among the best credit risks in the world with total liabilities vis-a-vis commercial banks of the top 14 industrialised countries amounting to $686m last year.

● 'We can also improve our tax collection,' says Missellati, who admits it is 'not very strict'. By Opec standards, Libya's is among the highest income tax rates for both companies and individuals. For any registered venture, foreign or domestic, a 60 per cent flat rate is slapped on earnings exceeding LD150,000 ($500,000) with an additional 4 per cent special 'Palestinian tax'. Moreover, since June the authorities have tightened social security tax collection which, in terms of contributions, can easily reach 8.75 per cent on an LD100,000 ($337,000) monthly payroll.

The sharp appreciation of the dollar, at a rate of 29 per cent on an arithmetical basis from July 1980 to June 1981 against nine currencies originally included in Opec's long term pricing strategy has obviously been a great comfort for the Central Bank. Since the dinar is pegged to the dollar, Libya's purchasing power has increased by 16 per cent against IMF Special Drawing Rights.

Missellati estimates that for goods and services, this enhanced buying power has grown by more than by 29 per cent. The Italian lira dropped by more than 40 per cent against the dollar — and therefore against the dinar; especially fortunate for Libya as Italy is its main trading partner.

Libya is to invest $9.1bn in agricultural development during the next four years. This will be the largest single amount that any sector is getting under the 1981-1985 development plan, and Libya hopes that this time agricultural output will rise substantially. At the moment, about 50 per

cent of food consumed is imported, a situation the authorities find both economically unnecessary and politically insecure. The goal — one close to Qaddafi's heart — is self-sufficiency. Not for nothing is the revolution called 'green'.

Agricultural output is intended to rise by an annual 8.5 per cent. Assistant Planning Secretary Bashir Salama has every confidence that it will do so, and that there will be no repetition of the last plan's disappointments. The planned agricultural growth per year for that was nearly 16 per cent, but in the event, it was around three per cent. This was, according to Salama, partly because of adverse weather, and partly because land development projects got behind schedule. These have now been completed so, with less ambitious targets, there is, he believes, no reason why they should not be achieved.

The face of Libyan agriculture has changed beyond all recognition in the past 10 years. The coastal strip around Tripoli, and the Jebel Akhdar (Green Mountain) area behind Benghazi, are still highly important in terms of production, though they are now being completely reorganised and extended. However, they are no longer the only areas of major production: equally important now are the Gefara Plain and the Solul al Khadra zones, respectively southwest and southeast of Tripoli, the Sarir and Kufra areas in the west and a string of projects in the Fezzan.

So important are these new projects that around $3m is being invested in them during the current plan. That is $400m more than during the last plan, and accounts for nearly a third of all agricultural spending in the next four years.

The change is the result of a comprehensive strategy for land use worked out in the 1970s by the agricultural planners and based on two factors: first and foremost water resources — from which can be assessed the most suitable crops to grow — and secondly, the proposed land tenure — public establishments or individual farmers. So far the only rule of thumb is that, because of the massive area required, cereals should be in the public sector.

As in all arid countries, water in Libya is too precious a commodity to waste. Not unnaturally, therefore, it influences all agricultural planning.

The availability and quantities of water have been systematically worked out so as to use it to best effect. For example, areas with over 200mm of rainfall are to be reserved for dry farming — usually cereals and olive plantations — while those with rainfall from 200mm to 15mm will be used for irrigated farming — vegetables, animal fodder, fruit trees — and below that for grazing, pastures and forests.

The Secretariat of Agriculture has been able to work out from this basis what Libya's total cultivable land resources are, at least in terms of dry farming, pasture and forestry. According to Ahmed Gartaa, who is in charge of planning, it gives Libya a total of 600,000 hectares for cereal use on dry farms, and 13m hectares for grazing, pasture and forestry.

Irrigated land, however, is more difficult to work out. The yardstick of 15mm to 200mm does not take into account those areas of minimal rainfall that can be irrigated either by using local sources of underground water, or water piped in from elsewhere. Altogether, it is intended to raise the figure of irrigated land from the current 180,000ha to at least 220,000ha by 1985.

The planners' next step is to decide who is going to do the farming: public establishments or individual farmers. Development schemes are planned either as production or settlement projects; the former for large state farms usually producing cereals, though it could just as well be sheep or cattle rearing, and the latter for division into small units on which to settle individual farmers and their families. These come free, though the size is dictated by the type of farming involved. If all irrigated, then the smallholding may well be only six hectares. A dry farm, on the other hand, could be 15ha or even 30ha. The yardstick is that each family should have an income of at least Libyan dinars 3,000 ($10,000) a year.

Further to the west is the Maqnusa production project, with its vast and apparently endless green circles of cereals looking as if they have just dropped onto the desert. Installed and managed by the General Food Corporation of Seattle, each is 80ha in size and irrigated by a giant revolving sprinkler system. The system has so impressed the Libyans that it is now accepted as the basic means of irrigation for future production projects, and there is a plan in hand to open a factory in the country to produce the equipment.

Such equipment is vital to agricultural development. Just as there is cooperation with the Secretariat of Electricity to desalinate water, the Secretariat of Light Industry is moving to set up the necessary factories.

The Libyan Tractor Company already assembles 2,000 Massey Ferguson tractors

a year, and it has just been agreed that the Libyan company can start manufacturing certain parts for the two models it assembles, eventually with a view to producing Massey Fergusons under licence.

Another series of measures to conserve water in the Tripoli belt are being considered, such as the possible use of greenhouses for growing vegetables, controlling the supply of water to the plants. At present only 40ha are under glass, but contracts have been signed recently to increase this by 100ha.

There is also a feeling in the Agricultural Secretariat that the water problem should diminish substantially by 1985, at least for the area surrounding Tripoli, when the two desalination plants planned for Tajoura, east of Tripoli, and Zanzur, to the west, come on stream. Altogether they should produce 450,000 cu m of water a day, which should take care of the area's domestic and industrial demands. There are also plans to recycle waste water for agricultural use, and some such projects are already in operation, like the Hadba al Khadra pilot scheme on the outskirts of Tripoli. As yet, however, the system of reusing waste water is still in its infancy.

It is more simple just to take the water from where it is abundant — the south — and pipe it to where it is needed, which is what the planners have decided to do. There will be two pipelines from the southeast, each capable of carrying 1m cu m of water a day, up to the coast.

The first will run from Tazerbo near Kufra, where there is plenty of water, north to near the Sarir oil fields, where the second line will start, and from there both will go up to the coast south of Benghazi. There the lines will divide, one going to provide water for the Benghazi region, and the other to supply the region between Agedabia and Sirte.

Even the number of water wells to be sunk seems massive: 270, 150 of them in Sarir, the rest in Tazerbo. When complete, it should be possible to irrigate an extra 40,000ha in the Benghazi region and some 15,000ha west of Agedabia. At least one of the pipes should be operating by 1985, putting water into Benghazi, and allowing the development of at least 10,000ha in the area.

CSO: 4500/4

INDUSTRIAL GROWTH SINCE REVOLUTION DETAILED

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 1 Sep 81 pp 16, 17

[Text]

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT has been accorded the highest priority by the Libyan Jamahiriya's planners ever since the Revolution of September 1, 1969. The strategy was clearly spelled out by the Secretariat of Planning last year: 'The fundamental task of manufacturing industries consists in responding to the ever increasing extent of growing domestic demand for different kinds of industrial products, and through import substitution and export expansion, in supplementing and eventually replacing oil as a predominant export commodity and earner of foreign exchange.'

BUT IMPORT substitution and export expansion are not the only aims of our industrial development. Revolutionary thinking in the Libyan Jamahiriya, has always stressed that political independence is unattainable without a parallel independence in the economy. Any country relying heavily on the outside world for essential manufactured products is open to a variety of blackmail operations that slowly erode political independence as well. As a socialist country, the Revolution's drive for industrialisation also shows its commitment to the well-being of our citizens in every field, and the provision of adequate employment opportunities is seen as a central tenet of policy.

Industrial development in Libya can be divided into two main categories: light industry and heavy industry. The former aims at achieving the goal of import substitution by the creation of factories producing foodstuffs, electrical goods, machinery and the like, while heavy industry, essentially involved with petrochemicals, iron and steel, seeks to produce the new exports. Since the Revolution, heavy industry has formed the back-bone of the Libyan Jamahiriya's industrial development programme. Both oil and non-oil sectors have a major role to play and with the strategy that crude oil should be used as an industrial raw material rather than as a straight export, the development of petroleum products and petrochemical industries has so far received a major slice of investment allocations.

Traditionally, oil was sold cheaply to the northern industrialised countries, who then transformed it and sold the various end products of the industry back to the southern countries at exorbitant prices. The development of a local petrochemical industry cuts out that spurious

middle-man, producing excellent and cheap goods for the home market. Beyond supplying the needs of the country, the industry also aims at eventually selling 80 per cent of its petrochemical and petroleum production abroad. Hence the factories established since the Revolution often have output capacities well in excess of what would be required to meet only the needs of our domestic market. Western comments, often snide, at what they call 'over-extension' or overambition, usually coupled with allegations of 'throwing petrodollars out of the window' are far off the mark, and not only show a biased Eurocentric view of things, but also analytical shortcomings as they do not take into account the Libyan Jamahiriya's long-term planning.

Heavy Industry

In the heavy industry sector, just as in agriculture, much attention has been devoted to a number of key projects, whose realisation also provides the basis for new industrial cities. In June, 1980 the foundation stone was laid for town housing, initially for 40,000, as Ras Lanuf on the Gulf of Sirte, where a refinery and methanol and urea plants are being built. Other petrochemical plants are to follow later including a complex producing aromatics and fibres such as polyester. New generation polypropylene technology is to be used at the 68,000 tonnes per annum capacity new plant, acquired by Azzawiya Refinery Company under licence.

Other schemes at the Ras Lanuf complex, include a 220,000 barrel a day oil refinery currently under construction; a project to supply 52,000 tonnes per year monoethylene glycol plant, whose products will be used by a 60,000 tonnes per annum low density polyethylene plant and a high density plant of similar capacity. With such industries, Ras Lanuf will undoubtedly become our country's petrochemical city.

Further to the West, about 170 kilometres on the road to Tripoli, another new industrial city is planned around the town of Misurata. By the end of the century Misurata could well have a population of a quarter of a million, easily making it our third city. Misurata's development is centred around a project that is easily the Revolution's most ambitious in the heavy industry sector, the construction of an iron and steel works. When the first stage is completed in 1987, output is planned to exceed a million tonnes a year, and this stage alone will cost Libyan Dinars 1 billion. The plant is to supply steel for our future industries as well as, hopefully, for export. Initially the iron ore will have to be imported, but even there self-sufficiency is the order of the day, and once mines in the south of the country are developed and a railway built, Libya will use its own ore.

To the West of Tripoli, the towns of Zawia and Zuara are already in the process of expanding because of new industries, primarily the oil refinery at Zawia and the Abu Kammash chemical plant near Zuara. Just as the Misurata steel works will dominate the industrial development scene until 1985, Abu Kamash was the star between 1976-1980. The plant is one of the most modern in the world, and certainly the most sophisticated in Africa. Earlier this year two major contracts for petrochemical projects at Marsa Brega, on the Gulf of Sirte were announced, assuring the town's future as one of the three foci of the Libyan Jamahiriya's rapidly growing petrochemical sector. One of the new plants will produce 1,750 tonnes of urea a day, and should be completed within 34 months. The other contract was for a 1,000 tonnes a day methanol plant to be completed in late 1983.

There already are two urea plants at Marsa Brega, with a combined capacity of 2,000 tonnes per day. The port town also has a methanol plant of 1,000 tonnes per day and an ammonia plant of identical capacity. A second ammonia plant is currently under construction. The petrochemicals complex draws its raw materials from the Hatabai gas field deep in the Sahara. At Zuara a 170,000 tonnes per annum petroleum coke plant will be built. The plant includes a distillation plant, a catalytic cracking unit, a liquefied petroleum gas recovery unit and associate utilities. Its output of calcinated coke will be used in 100,000 tonnes per year aluminium smelter to be built at Zuara. Power for the smelter will come from fuel gas from the coke plant, whose by-products will include gasoline and fuel blend stocks.

Light Industry

But this emphasis on heavy industry in no way means that light industry has been forgotten, on the contrary: it is a prerequisite for a flourishing industrial sector, independent of foreign imports. In May this year a statement by the General People's Committee for Planning revealed that 44 new factories were to be set up shortly. Of these, 14 will be for chemicals and petrochemicals; ten will be for food processing, four for timber and paper, four for building materials and five for textiles and leather goods.

With the evergrowing need for new houses, let alone offices, hospitals, radio stations, ports,

New projects listed in the 1981-85 plan

CHEMICALS
Soap (Zanzour)
Soap (Benghazi)
School bags (Tripoli)
Travel bags (under study)
Plastic slippers (under study)
Polyvinyl sheets (Abu Khammash)
Magnesia (Abu Khammash)
Vinyl Tiles (Abu Khammash)
Chemical complex (Marada, under study)
Phosphate fertilisers (under study)

BUILDING MATERIALS
Cement factory (Sebha)
Cement factory (Western Jamahiriya)
Export cement factory
Lime factory
Light bricks plant (Souk el Khamis)
Sand bricks plant (Souk el Khamis)
Red bricks plant (Sebha)
Refractory bricks plant
Eternite sheets (Zanzour)
Sanitary ware (Gharian, new)
Sanitary ware (Gharian, extension)
Wall tiles (Gharian, extension)
Chalk production (Tripoli)

PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
Refinery (Ras Lanuf, 2nd stage)
Refinery (Misurata)
Refinery (Murzuk)

PETROCHEMICALS
Methanol II (Marsa Brega)
Urea II (Marsa Brega)
Fertiliser (Sirte)
Petrochemical complex (Ras Lanuf, 3rd stage, aromatics, polyester, fibres)

METALLURGY
Aluminium complex (Zuara, under study)

METALWORK, ENGINEERING AND ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT
Metal cans (Sebha)
Metal structures
Metal containers
Different aluminium products
Aluminium cables (Zuara)
Metal houses
Dry batteries (Tajoura)
Electrical transformers assembly
Water pumps
Household appliances (under study)
Car assembly (under study)

Source: Draft Plan, Secretariat of Planning, Tripoli

factories and a host of other buildings necessary to the well functioning of a modern industrialised society, there has naturally been a high demand for cement and other building materials. In 1980 a new cement works was inaugurated at Khoms, on the coast east of Tripoli, which will have a production capacity of one million tonnes per annum. Established at a cost of LD 60 million, the Khoms works employs 300 producers and its estimated revenue is 13 million dinars per annum.

Feverish activity

The foundation stone of a LD 52.5m cement factory was laid at Ziltan also in 1980. This too will have a capacity of one million tonnes per annum. At the same time another cement works was inaugurated at the Zawia oil refinery. This is a smaller project with a production capacity of 100,000 tonnes a year. Given this feverish activity, it is not surprising that in 1979 cement production had surpassed the previous year's level by 23 per cent, having increased from 1.3 to 1.6 million tonnes. This figure was nearly equalled during the first nine months of 1980, and it is by now clear that self-sufficiency in cement will be achieved before the proposed date of 1985.

But cement is only one example among many to show the success of the Libyan Jamahiriya's industrial sector. Our healthy oil revenues, and the fact that the industrial sector was so poorly developed at the time of the Revolution, have meant that it has been possible to establish the most modern plants in a wide range of light industrial sectors. Between 1969 and the beginning of 1979 58 factories were established, making products ranging from food to textiles, from leather to glass and metal goods. Between 1975 and 1978 an average of ten new light industrial plants opened each year.

The new Cargi cigarette factory in Tripoli, opened in late 1979, typifies the high technical standards of these establishments in our country. The factory, which has 1,000 producers was designed and constructed within a three-year period. The complex includes not only the plant itself but a small hospital, an ultra modern mosque, sports club, supermarket and guest house. All the buildings are set in parklands of lawns and fountains. The plant itself has a capacity to produce between 15 and 20 million cigarettes an hour, which will more than satisfy demand within Libya itself. Export markets, especially in Africa, are being sought for the new Libyan cigarettes. The plant was described as 'the best plant in the world', by a western broker who pointed to the mix of the best equipment from a range of countries —the UK, Germany and Italy, and the use of tobacco from an equally wide range of sources — Brazil, Greece, the United States, and home grown.

Ultra modern

Similarly ultra-modern light industrial complexes are currently under construction elsewhere in Libya. Among these is a textile complex at Beni Walid with a production capacity of 620,000 square metres of non-woven, and 250,000 square metres of woven carpets and 400,000 rugs annually. Food-processing industries are also witnessing rapid development. In Khoms a major project is under construction involving a fully automated

plant for the production of industrial and medical alcohol, vinegar and dry bakery yeast. In September 1980 a flour mill complex opened near Tobruk, including five grain silos with a total storage capacity of 10,000 cubic metres and an hourly production of 18,500 kilos of flour. Flour, the basis of bread, couscous and pasta, will be produced at a self-sufficiency level by 1985.

Other commodities which should reach near sufficiency by 1985 include animal feeds (70 per cent sufficiency), cotton textiles (82 per cent), leather (76 per cent) and lime (94 per cent). Though such heights may not be reached in other commodities, their planned effect on the import bill in 1985 is just as startling. By then, for example, our country will be producing 56 per cent of the tractors used, 23 per cent of buses, and 12 per cent of trucks. Nearly all the factories producing these goods were planned or started between 1979-1980. However, one of the best examples of how our light industry has developed in the past few years, given that it started almost from scratch, is the enormous textile factory at Zawia. Not only has it given jobs to hundreds of people from the area, but its products — printed cottons of varying qualities — can be seen in our shops throughout the country, replacing imported materials.

The growing significance the Revolution places on light industry was highlighted by the production figures for the first half of 1980. The value of production had risen to LD 57 million while in most enterprises output was up by 120-216 per cent in real terms over the corresponding period in the two previous years. The detailed sectoral production figures reveal the breadth of the Libyan Jamahiriya's light industrial base: milk production, 19 million litres; flour, 110,000 tonnes; feedstuffs, 130,000 tonnes; aluminium piping, 14,000 tonnes; plastic piping, 5,200 tonnes; bricks, 40,000 tonnes; shoes, over 2 million pairs; skins, 1,960,000 square feet; shoe leather, 845,000 tonnes; ready to wear men's suits, 152,000; macaroni 55,300 tonnes; spun wool yarn, 360,000 tonnes; tinned foods, 18,420 tonnes; and furniture, both school and domestic, 65,250 items.

Side by side with the expansion of the industrial sector in the Libyan Jamahiriya has gone a parallel increase in the availability of facilities for the acquisition of industrial skills. By 1978 there were six industrial education institutes, capable of giving information to over 3,000 students a year. In 1969, prior to the Revolution, only 423 students received industrial training. In addition to the six institutes, there were two centres for industrial training, offering instruction at a higher level. On top of this the Revolution enables our citizens to avail themselves of any required training overseas, at public expense.

The various developments that have taken place in the industrial sector in the Libyan Jamahiriya indicate that a real industrial revolution has been achieved. But this achievement did not happen in the more or less chaotic and exploitative fashion it happened in the northern countries last century: the precepts of the Libyan Revolution ensured that these developments followed a socialist line. The motto underlying the need for industrial self-sufficiency is stated in The Green Book: 'The liberty of man is not complete if his needs are controlled by others. Need inhibits freedom.'

A central proposition of the Third Universal Theory relates to the status of the worker, and is thus extremely relevant to the industrial sector. This proposition shows how wage-labour is essentially a form of exploitation, as a factory owner employing workers will do everything in his power to keep labour costs low so as to maximise profits. In Libya therefore the revolutionary slogan defining the working environment is 'Partners not wage-earners'. This is central to light industry, as those establishments range from large complexes to small family units employing four or five people.

The General People's Committee for Light Industry has therefore worked out a series of rules which govern the setting up and the running of light industrial establishments. These rules ensure that ownership of the industrial establishment is equally divided between the producers who work in the said establishment, and the income from production is distributed between the producers, each according to his contribution in the production process. This means, in effect, that the traditional exploitative structure still dominant in most industrialised countries has been abolished and that the workers are in the true sense of the word 'partners'.

Thirty years ago Libya was officially described by the United Nations as one of the poorest countries in the world, a description that was all too apparent to those who visited the country at the time. Today, the Libyan Jamahiriya is on the way to becoming an industrial nation, which can look forward to a bright, revolutionary future.

CSO: 4500/6

SPECULATION ON ITALIAN IMPORT PAYMENTS IN LIRA

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 233, 8 Aug 81 pp 41-42

[Article by 'Abd al-Karim al-Khalil: "Libya's Initiative, Between Italian Friendship and American Impossibility"]

[Text] At the end of June, an official in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah's embassy in Rome quoted some information, indicating that the Jamahiriyah had proposed to Italy that it pay for its Libyan oil imports in Italian lira, instead of dollars.

A few days after this information was reported through some of the media, which did not give it its due, in terms of exceptional, or even ordinary, interest, it become apparent that that information was derived from a statement by Mr Musbah al-Safrfali, secretary of the Federation of Banks and Insurance Companies in the Jamahiriyah. It later become evident that al-Safrfali's statement, about selling Libyan oil to Italy an Italian lira instead of dollars, might not express an official position of the Libyan authorities. It might be merely an idea, a proposal or a wish. Doubt regarding reaching a decisive position in this regard, became mixed with the attention, which this information had produced among the Italian authorities, to such a degree that the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested its embassy in Libya to officially ask the Libyan government whether it was in fact prepared to consider accepting Italy's payment for its imports of Libyan oil in lira instead of dollars.

So far, neither the Libyan authorities nor the Italian authorities have issued any action or information or any indication that the matter is true, or that the two countries intend to pursue this plan, or that they are engaged in studying its formula, advantages or its provisions with respect to them both. The subject might be looked at from two angles:

The first angle concerns both Libya and Italy, and their mutual relations.

Libya is considered the main, primary source of Italian crude oil imports. Italian imports of Libyan oil, in 1980, amounted to about 11 million tons, totalling about $3 billion. In consideration of 1981's rise in the dollar's exchange rate to the Italian lira, and toward other currencies, this would mean Italy bearing a heavier burden and additional pressure on its currency, which would have a negative reflection on many of the pertinent economic indicators. If Libya accepted or approved of reducing the value of its crude oil exports to Italy, this would mean Libya's

sharing in lessening the burden on Italy, and a positive role by Libya in improving the Italian cash flow, in a way that would reflect on the entire Italian economy.

Naturally, Libya's acceptance of that would require mutual understanding about the details of a specific monetary formula, by which the price of crude oil exported to Italy could be determined in lira, so that the positive agreement with respect to Italy would not reflect negatively on Libya. However, agreement on that could be a means or channel for increased expansion in the economic and technological relations between Italy and Libya, and consequently, a larger role for Italian firms in the development of technological and production capabilities of the Libyan economy. This, at least, could be the price that Libya would require, and which for Italy could lead to satisfaction and contentment.

Of course, arriving at such a formula as this for Libya and Italy could only upset the U.S., as a leader in the international monetary system, and as the home of the dollar, which is considered the principal and overwhelming currency in terms of reserves and in internatiinal commercial intercourse, and as one of the United States' tools to maintain its economic (and political-military) dominance over the non-Communist world, or rather even over the Communist world many times.

The United States' distress at this action--if it should come about--would not be only with Italy and Libya's rebellion alone, abainst the principle of pricing and paying for oil in dollars. On the contrary, there would also be the possibility that this Italian-Libyan rebellion, against "American dominance" in the field of international finance, could be the start of a rebellion by other nations from the oil-producing "camp" and from the importing "camp," as well as the start of a rebellion by other nations from the "camps" of the developing nations, which export raw materials, along with other nations who import these raw materials. The Italian-Libyan rebellion, at that time, would be the start of a serious and effective rebellion of the entire world against the monetary (and non-monetary) dominance of the United States over the world.

This is the second angle, from which this subject could be viewed, and which is of concern not only to Italy and Libya, but also concerns every nation of the Third World, and every nation of the Second (Communist) World, including the nations of Western, Northern and Central Europe that complain, albeit timidly, about their subservience to the First World (the United States), except that the Second and Third Worlds share a common interest with it, in terms of the dollar and the owner of the dollar.

If the United States were to endeavor on all levels to pre ent the conversion of any idea, such as this one between Italy and Libya, into reality (if it began to be converted, or there was an intent to do so), and if the United States, in order to prevent that, were to use everything it has, in terms of economic, diplomatic and military "weapons", starting with its NATO relations with Italy, since its Sixth Fleet is permanently based in Naples, and ending with using Sadat's Egypt and its threats against Libya, then the question is, why has it not yet begun? Why doesn't a movement toward some kind of rebellion begin now against American monetary dominance, by those who suffer from it, by the whole world that complains about direct or indirect American dominance?

Is the Third World waiting for something more unjust than what America bestowed upon it at independence, a constant superiority that does not impart any short or long-term justice? If the Communist World is bound in all this to Moscow's position, which sets their positions and policies, in accordance with its capability to polarize and divide through conciliation and controversy with the United States, then why does Western Europe, suffering under "the dollar's policies," expect more than the negative answers, which it heard from Reagan's mouth, before, during and after the recent summit conference of the seven major industrial powers in Ottowa?

Is the whole world unable to get rid of this dominance and despotism, which the United States practises, except that, by means of them, it is able to neither rule the world justly, nor to control the world, which complains about the excesses and abuses of power?

7005
CSO: 4504/65

BRIEFS

INDIAN CONSTRUCTION PROJECT--New Delhi, September 14--The state-owned Indian company National Buildings Construction Corporation (NBCC) has secured another 222 million U.S. dollars' contract in Libya for the construction of roads, public buildings and houses, the ECONOMIC TIMES daily said today. Current Corporation projects in Libya include New Ghat airport project, Brak airport, planning and designing of 2,000 houses, construction of 500 houses at Al-Orban, a 120-bed hospital at Ghat and school building at Ghat and Beniwalid. [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2828, 15 Sep 81 p 13]

CSO: 4500/6

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CIVIL DEFENSE DECREE

Nouakchott JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE MAURITANIE in French No 542-543, 25 Feb 81 pp 119-225

[Ministry of Interior Decree No 80-087 of 2 May 1980, concerning the general regulation of civil defense]

[Text] Section I. Central Organization

Article 1. The provisions of this decree are aimed at applying the rules established by Law No 71-059 of 25 February 1971 concerning the organization of civil defense.

Article 2. The minister of interior heads, coordinates and oversees the drafting and implementation of the civil defense measures throughout the national territory.

To that effect, it has the Civil Defense Directorate and is seconded by a National Civil Defense Commission, which has an advisory capacity.

Article 3. The National Civil Defense Commission is made up as follows: the minister in charge of the permanence of the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) or his representative; the minister in charge of equipment and transport or his representative; the minister in charge of finance or his representative; the minister in charge of national defense or his representative; the minister in charge of the Merchant Marine or his representative; and the minister in charge of health, labor and social affairs or his representative.

This commission is headed by the minister of interior or his representative. It meets at least once a year, when called by its chairman.

The Civil Defense Directorate provides the secretaryship of the commission.

Article 4. Within the commission, as provided in Article 3, the following committees will have the individual tasks enumerated in Article 4 of Law No 71-059.

a) Civil Defense Committee: Headed by the minister of national defense or his representative, the Civil Defense Committee includes: the director of civil defense; the national chief of staff or his representative; the inspector of the National Guard; the general director of National Security; a representative of the

minister in charge of the permanence of the Military Committee for National Salvation; a representative of the minister of equipment and transport; a representative of the minister in charge of the Merchant Marine; and the commander of the National Guard or his representative.

b) Supply Committee: Headed by the minister of transport, it is made up of the following members: a representative of the minister of finance; a representative of the minister in charge of the permanence of the CMSN; a representative of the minister of interior; and a representative of the minister of commerce.

c) Rescue and Aid Committee: Headed by the minister of public health, it includes: a representative of the Ministry of Youth, Sports, Handicrafts and Tourism; a representative of the Ministry of Interior; the representative of the minister in charge of the permanence of the CMSN; the representative of the minister in charge of national defense; the representative of the minister of finance; and a representative of the Mauritanian Red Cross.

These committees meet when called together by their chairman or at the request of the minister of interior.

Article 5. The members of the National Civil Defense Advisory Commission can call in the assistance of experts from their respective ministries.

Article 6. If need be, the minister of interior can decide to set up one or more special committees, which can be either temporary or permanent.

Article 7. The work of the National Civil Defense Advisory Commission and its committees provided for in Article 4 is summarized in a report which is to be approved by the chairman and filed with the Civil Defense Directorate.

Section II. Role of Other Ministers

Article 8. Contingent upon the provisions contained in existing law, every minister will study, within the framework of the directives of the minister of interior, the drafting of civil defense measures in establishments under his authority or placed under his supervision. He submits these measures for the approval of the minister of interior and is in charge of their implementation in keeping with the terms defined by this regulation.

Close coordination between the civil defense measures and active defense is always ensured by the ministers in question.

Section III. Territorial Organization

Article 9. The organization of civil defense is obligatory throughout the national territory.

The terms of this organization, which will vary depending on the relative size and particular situation of the districts, will be the subject of instructions from the minister of interior.

In practice, if one excludes the general defense measures applicable in all regions, whatever their size, the other special measures concern only the regions, departments, districts, areas, and so on, specifically designated by orders from the minister of interior.

These orders, which specify the provisions for each individual region, department, district, area, and so on, are not published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ISLAMIQUE DE MAURITANIE. Copies are sent to all ministers, governors and prefects individually.

Article 10. The governor coordinates the drafting and implementation of civil defense measures in his region. With the aid of the prefects and district heads, he assumes responsibility for the direction, planning and execution of civil defense measures.

He draws up the general plan of organization for his region from the standpoint of civil defense and every year, summarizes the preparations made.

This report is sent to the minister of interior.

For this purpose, the governor has a regional civil defense department and is aided by a regional civil defense advisory commission which he heads.

Article 11. The makeup of the civil defense advisory commission, provided for in Article 10 above, is established by an order from the minister of interior, on the governor's report.

In principle, this commission has the following composition:

a) titular members: the president of the regional deliberative assembly; the deputy inspector of the National Guard; the police commissioner of the regional capital or, in his place, an appointed police commissioner; an officer from the Gendarmerie or the head of the regional capital brigade; the prefects; the representative of the Mauritanian Red Cross; and the heads of the regional departments.

b) other future members: a representative of every establishment compelled to have self-protection; and officials chosen by the governor and particularly representatives of trade unions or associations that might contribute to civil defense measures.

This commission handles civil defense problems under the central ministries at whose levels there will not be any ministerial civil defense commissions.

Article 12. The titular members of this commission are spread out over the committees provided for in Article 4.

Nevertheless, the governor can, with the approval of the minister of interior, set up other committees.

Article 13. At the departmental level, the departmental civil defense advisory commission is set up by an order from the governor upon the proposal of the prefect.

This commission, headed by the prefect, includes:

a) titular members: heads of districts, the police commissioner, if required, the Gendarmerie detachment head, heads of departmental departments and the representative of the Mauritanian Red Cross;

b) other members: a representative of establishments that may be required to have self-defense, and officials chosen by the prefect, particularly representatives of the trade unions and associations that may be able to contribute to civil defense measures.

Article 14. Local civil defense committees may be set up at the district level by an order of the prefect, upon the proposal of district heads presiding over them.

These committees will include: local administrative officials; and any other officials chosen by the chairman of the local civil defense committee.

Article 15. Either because of their individual situations or exceptional circumstances, permanent offices may be set up at the prompting of the governor in certain departments or districts.

Article 16. Decrees establishing the makeup of the departmental advisory commissions and local advisory committees will specify the operating rules of the organs.

Section IV. Special Security Measures

Article 17. All establishments, enterprises and companies, whatever their legal nature, may be designated to ensure their own defense as soon as they present national or public interest.

This national or public interest must be evaluated in terms of one of the following characteristics:

a) the importance of their activity to the national defense or life of the country; or

b) the number of persons who may be assembled there, for whatever purpose.

This designation is made by an order of the minister of the interior upon the proposal of the governor, based on the opinion of the minister in question.

The establishments, enterprises and companies directly under the minister of national defense and laboratories, enterprises, companies or establishments which, through an interministerial understanding, when struck in peacetime, come under the authority of the minister of national defense during special periods, are automatically declared to be free of such strikes by virtue of a special order. Their list is sentto the governors and prefects involved as soon as peace is restored.

The orders containing the designations provided for in the preceding paragraph are not published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL. They are sent to the parties involved by the proper administrative authorities.

Article 18. The defense of the establishments, enterprises and companies named is planned and ensured under the authority of the governor of the region, in keeping with the instructions of the minister of interior, to be completed, if need be, by the technical specifications drawn up by the minister in question.

The defense of the establishments, enterprises and companies automatically designated by virtue of Article 17 is planned and ensured under the authority of the regional governor in keeping with the instructions of the minister of national defense, with the approval of the minister of interior.

Article 19. Every minister studies the measures and work necessary for the defense of central departments within the framework of existing laws and the terms of application drawn up by the minister of interior. Subject to the latter's approval, he ensures their execution under the conditions set forth by existing legislation.

Article 20. In accordance with the minister of interior, every minister draws up a list of his departments or fomestic facilities whose defense is ensured under his direct authority, within the framework of the instructions of the minister of interior.

If defense of departments or domestic facilities is not on that list, it is provided under the double supervision of the minister of interior and the minister in question, by the governor of the region with the aid of the department heads in question.

Article 21. Every minister appoints from under the officials under his authority the chief of civil defense in charge of ensuring liaison with the Civil Defense Directorate of the Ministry of Interior.

Section V. Plans and Programs

Article 22. The planning of civil defense requires the drafting of plans and programs.

Plans objectively set the goal to be attained. They indicate needs and their order of priority. They are drawn up in terms of technical possibilities with the greatest concern for economy, but disregarding budgetary limitations. They are accompanied by estimates.

They are drawn up within the framework of the provisions of this section and in keeping with the technical structuration of the minister of interior, later to be completed by those of the other ministers involved.

They are drawn up by the minister of interior in keeping with the credits granted to him and following the opinion of the ministers involved when it is a question of programs to be carried out under their direct responsibility.

Article 23. The planning of the organization of civil defense means the drafting of an overall plan which is the synthesis of the individual plans named below:

1) Special civil defense equipment plans aimed at ensuring: general and local security (alert, blackouts, and so on); defense through removal (scattering, evacuation, and so on); on-the-spot protection, individual or collective; rescue means (firefighting, pollution, emergency clearing and excavation, the rescue of persons and property, and so on); and sanitary protection;

2) Plans concerning the organization of liaison (transmission, transport);

3) Recruiting plan;

4) Plan of instruction aimed at the training of cadres and the population; and

5) Plan of psychological action to facilitate the implementation of the preceding plans.

Article 24. In order to set up these various plans, it is first of all necessary to: determine needs, survey resources and provide for the creation of new additional resources indispensable to meet needs.

The creation of new resources is the subject, in each special equipment plan, of supplemental plans: requisitioning, studies, experiments, works, purchases of materials or products, storage, and so on.

Article 25. Technical instructions from the minister of interior, to be completed by special directives from the ministers involved, will be sent to the administrative authorities in charge of the planning and execution of plans provided for in Article 23.

Instructions concerning the drafting of plans relating to establishments required to have self-defense programs are sent to them by the proper administrative authorities.

Article 26. Following the drafting of special equipment plans, the minister of interior draws up the country's overall equipment plan for civil defense.

This plan supplies a total evaluation of needs based on the goal to attain and the country's economic and budgetary possibilities.

Article 27. The minister of interior plans the various equipment programs to be carried out in several annual installments.

These programs, drawn up in terms of the objectives set, establish the order of priorities for projects, considering both industrial and financial possibilities.

They serve as a basis for the evaluation of budgetary estimates. Their execution is pursued in terms of credits available.

Article 28. Measures to be taken in case of international tension are the subject of a special two-part study: One concerns the works, requisitions, purchases, changes and so on that cannot be done in advance. The other spells out the part of the programs to be executed. It requires repeated updates to keep up with programs.

Section VI. Execution of Programs

Article 29. When the overall equipment plan and programs for execution have been drawn up, if need be, the minister of interior notifies either the ministers or regional governors of modifications that must be made in the special civil defense equipment plans.

Execution of programs requires: technical studies and experiments; purchases of consumable materials and equipment; furnishings; the storage of consumable materials and equipment, their maintenance and the maintenance of property.

Article 30. It is the task of the Civil Defense Directorate to ensure, on the national level, the uniformity of the equipment policy and the standardization of materials. It is in charge of technical studies and experiments concerning civil defense.

For that purpose, it exchanges all information and documents helpful in the accomplishment of its mission with the technical organs of the various ministries; and

It calls all meetings of technical commissions in charge of studying the different types of materials, products or facilities that might be used by civil defense.

In connection with the Ministry of Interior, the departments of the Ministry of Public Health make the technical studies and do the experiments concerning sanitary protection.

Article 31. In the field of research, the Ministry of Interior can call upon the proper national organizations.

It can also procure the aid of specialists and private organizations that might contribute to the completion of studies and technical experiments that it could not conduct under the conditions provided for in the previous paragraph. Payment of expenditures resulting from such work is made in keeping with the existing public accounting rules.

Article 32. In order to obtain supplies of consumable equipment and materials, the ministry of interior, who knows the country's needs, can, with the approval of the National Marketing Commission:

1) on the national level, do the buying itself or request a specially qualified government department to do the buying and deliver the necessary quantities to the parties involved; or

2) on the regional level, entrust the governors or departments involved to buy the necessary quantities of materials and products themselves.

In all cases, the Civil Defense Directorate will: choose the type of material or indicate the quality of the product to be purchased; indicate the maximum unit prices; and oversee the execution of the purchases or work.

Article 33. All action concerning construction or property, carried out within the framework of the plan to provide shelter for the population, is required and is the responsibility of: the government when it is in the public interest; the establishments required to ensure their own self-defense if the work to be done fits into the protection system of the establishments; and of the owner when the work planned concerns only the protection of his own property or that of renters.

Article 34. Civil defense work and arrangements can be done by: government agencies and departments; regional organizations; establishments required to have their own defense system; and private parties. Such undertakings are permitted when done in a building belonging to them, when the work is required for the protection of the persons involved or when done in the general or local interest.

If the work is not done in the time required by the property owners mentioned above, then the minister of interior automatically has the work done.

Article 35. The ministers concerned receive notification of the program phases concerning: work planned under private plans; and work that is subsequently to be completed by the different departments in their buildings as civil defense measures of general or local interest.

The ministers therefore ask the minister of interior for the credits needed to carry out these programs. For this purpose, they plan the corresponding technical projects and the specifications defining the nature and size of the work.

Article 36. Upon notification from the National Civil Defense Advisory Commission, the minister of interior determines the risks against which buildings must be protected and, in agreement with the minister of equipment, draws up a typical regulation establishing modes of construction and the materials to be used in order to reduce their vulnerability in peacetime.

Using this typical regulation as a model, each minister issues orders, countersigned by the minister of interior, for the public departments, public administrative establishments and industrial and commercial establishments placed under his authority or supervision.

Under these same conditions, the regional governor, following notification by the regional civil defense advisory commission, issues an order determining the obligations imposed for the construction of buildings in his region.

This order must be approved by the minister of interior.

Article 37. The minister of interior also has the power to prescribe, through an order countersigned by the ministers involved, the measures to which certain industrial and commercial establishments can be subjected and whose nature demands special protection techniques.

This order must be approved by the minister of interior.

Article 38. The application of the different measures set forth in Articles 36 and 37 is ensured on the occasion of the delivery of the building permit, instituted

in Nouakchott by Decree No 64-081 of 12 May 1964 (city planning regulation) and subsequent regulations.

Article 39. For this purpose, the permit required for new construction and major remodeling is not delivered by the proper authority until that authority has observed that the project respects the special civil defense provisions.

However, if, upon the examination of a dossier, a difficulty arises or if a waiver appears necessary, the subdivisionary of public works must go to the government (regional civil defense department).

The latter may request the opinion of the special civil defense committee, which gives its decision within 2 months.

Article 40. Before the building permit may be issued by the minister of equipment or the regional governor, the minister of interior is directly consulted.

Article 41. If such construction is exempted from the building permit because of a dispensation granted by an order, the inspection covered by the preceding articles is made directly by the proper ministry, with the approval of the minister of interior.

Article 42. In the case of new construction or major building remodeling in his region, the governor may envisage the establishment of additional civil defense premises or facilities.

On the other hand, for major works intended for shelter purposes, the government sends the dossier to the minister of interior, including in particularly the opinion of the regional civil defense commission and the report of a specialist on the value of technical provisions envisaged and on the financial estimates for the operation.

At the same time, he informs the owner of the additional obligations that might be imposed on him.

The minister of interior must reveal his decision in principle on the proposals put before him so that the building permit may be issued within the time prescribed. Notification is sent to the owner along with delivery of the document.

Article 43. Civil defense work of local or private interest may be done by the organizations and private owners involved.

Article 44. Supervision of public shelters is the responsibility of administrative authorities, who may entrust their management to other organizations.

Article 45. Plans and specifications relating to works which are normally the responsibility, for the protection of their personnel, of regional or departmental departments and private enterprises required to provide their own protection, are sent to the governor, who submits them to the regional civil defense commission or one of these committees for an opinion. Only then are these projects are forwarded to the minister of interior.

Article 46. For certain projects or facilities, only public departments are used for construction and maintenance. These departments are chosen by the minister of interior in agreement with the minister involved.

The regulation of public transactions is applicable to these works and projects.

Article 47. Facilities and supplies involved in the various civil defense undertakings of the government must respond to equipment needs, either on the national, regional or departmental level.

Storage and maintenance expenditures are to be borne by the government. But when materials are assigned to a region, the expenditures then belong to the region and become obligatory in keeping with the provisions of Article 33 of Section VII.

Article 48. The storage and maintenance of materials destined to meet national needs are ensured by the minister of interior (Civil Defense Directorate).

Article 49. Materials permanently assigned to the special protection of a region are maintained and used by permanent personnel holding certain diplomas issued under conditions set by the minister of interior (Civil Defense Directorate), or by specialists approved by the ministry, upon the proposal of the governor, which personnel perform maintenance and use on contract.

The same is true of the maintenance and use of materials and equipment of the public departments and private establishments.

Article 50. Property and buildings are maintained at the expense of the government or of the organizations or establishments required to have their own protection.

The minister or regional governor issues the instructions needed to set the conditions for this maintenance and inspections.

Article 51. Private establishments required to have their own protection undergo inspection visits under the same conditions.

Section VII. Financial Provisions

Article 52. The financing of civil defense planning and equipment is to be borne by the government.

Operating expenditures are the responsibility of the regions.

Nevertheless, the government may make certain officials or cadres available to organizations, paid out of the state budget.

Article 53. Facilities and supplies of civil defense equipment and materials from the government, for the special protection of an organization or public department, become the respective property of that organization or department, which will have sole charge of maintenance and conservation under government supervision and, if need be, must organize the services needed to perform this function.

Maintenance and operating expenses are the obligation of these organizations in public services.

Article 54. Establishments designated in keeping with this regulation to provide their own protection must bear all expenses for installation, supplies, maintenance and conservation.

Nevertheless, the government may contribute to the defraying of these expenses under the conditions set forth in Article 59.

Article 55. Estimated civil defense expenditures concerning the Ministry of National Defense are included in the budget of that ministry.

Article 56. Anticipated civil defense expenditures concerning the sanitary protection plan and whose responsibility belongs to the minister of public health are included in the budget of that ministry.

Article 57. Estimated civil defense expenditures concerning ministries other than those named in Articles 55 and 56 are included in the budget of the Ministry of Interior.

The credits needed are made available by the minister of interior to the ministers involved, in keeping with existing public accounting rules.

In addition, certain materials can be issued in kind to the ministry in question by the minister of interior or, when it is a question of sanitary equipment and products, by the minister of public health.

Credits are granted and materials delivered in accordance with the provisions of Article 29.

Article 58. Credits needed for the civil defense of regional and prefectoral departments are allocated to the governors in keeping with the provisions of Articles 29, 33, 42, 45, 49, 52 and 53.

On the other hand, expenditures for establishments, enterprises or companies or those organizations required to provide their own protection are borne either by: the budget of those establishments, enterprises or companies, if it is distinct from that of the organization; or by the budget of the organization, subject, in both cases, to the possible participation of the government, in keeping with the provisions of Article 59 below.

Article 59. The establishments, enterprises or companies so designated bear the expenses needed to plan their protection.

The government can furnish aid, either in the form of a loan made at the rate of advances from the Central Bank plus one point and repayable by annuities within a maximum period of 10 years.

Such loans are made only if the enterprise can demonstrate that it cannot meet, within the time allotted, all or part of the initial outlay required of it for

civil defense protection. Such loans cannot exceed two-thirds of the expenditures provided for by equipment plans.

Article 60. Public or private individuals who undertake new construction or major remodeling of existing constructions must bear the defense expenditures resulting from such work.

The additional expenditures resulting from the future construction of premises or facilities for civil defense in the general interest are to be borne by the government.

Article 61. The minister of interior has, for civil defense: allocations provided for in the state budget; and 2) the funds provided by Decree No 71-157 of 10 June 1971.

Article 62. The minister of interior can make available to the ministers those credits needed to carry out civil defense projects, in keeping with the provisions of Article 29.

The ministers must include a budgetary line in their respective budgets.

Article 63. Violations of the provisions of this decree are punishable by the penalties set forth in Articles 12 and 13 of Law No 71-059 of 25 February 1971, concerning the organization of civil defense.

Article 64. All provisions contrary to those of this decree are hereby abrogated.

Article 65. The minister of interior, the minister of national defense and the minister of health and public affairs are individually entrusted with the execution of this decree, which will be published following the priority procedure.

Decree No 2 of 26 January 1981 Concerning the Establishment of Regional Groups

11,464
CSO: 4519/58

FOOD PROCESSING INDUSTRY DECLINES; SOLUTIONS SUGGESTED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 21 Aug 81, pp 1, 6

[Text] At its general assembly, the Federation of Food Processing Industries of Morocco (FICOPAM) heard its president, Hadj Hamid Lahlou, present a report on the past year. He underlined the fact that the processing of food from the past harvest took place under somber and very delicate circumstances, characterized by a difficult international economic situation and unfavorable weather conditions which affected the principal agricultural products needed for food processing. He also noted that there had been substantial price increases affecting all the factors of production.

The president said that this situation had the following immediate consequences:

-- the fact that our products were non-competitive on the international market, compared with those of our principal competitors;

-- a slowdown in activity in all sectors.

Following are the principal points made in President Lahlou's speech: although the harvest season of 1978-79 recorded very satisfactory results, with exports of 125,153 tons and a value of 423.8 million dirham, the most recent harvest season unfortunately reflected a noticeable decrease. The export tonnage for the period from 1 October 1979 to 30 September 1980 was only 93,930 tons, for a value of 369.7 million dirham.

On a sector by sector basis the decline was general, with the exception of the processed olives industry, which more or less maintained its position by comparison with 1978-79.

Olives

Some 40,000 tons of olives were exported in 1978-79, for a value of 138.4 million dirham, while in 1979-80 only 39,304 tons were exported, for a value of 136.6 million dirham.

Fruits and Preserves

This sector recorded the largest decline in production, or 53 percent by comparison with the previous year. Only 15,899 tons were produced in 1979-80, compared to 33,690 tons produced in 1978-79, for a value of 47 million dirham, compared to 71.7 million dirham in the previous year.

This situation had the following principal causes: a very bad agricultural harvest, a price level fixed by Morocco which was clearly higher than that of competitive countries, and strong competition from Greece, in addition to the problem caused by the replacement of apricots by other fruits (peaches and pears subsidized by the EEC).

Fruit Juice

Compared to 1978-79, when production totaled 17,049 tons for a value of 47.3 million dirham, this sector, due to a decline in the tonnage of crushed citrus fruit, recorded a substantial decline in 1979-80 in the order of 33 percent in tonnage exported and 24 percent in terms of receipts (11,430 tons exported, for a value of 36.1 million dirham).

Normal supply of fruit to fruit juice factories was hampered by the increase in exports of fresh fruit and by demand on the local market, which made it possible for citrus fruit growers to obtain better prices than those paid by the preserving industry.

Vegetables

Going from exports of 18,202 tons down to 14,177 tons, with a value declining from 78.6 million dirham to 74.7 million dirham, this sector also recorded a decline amounting to 22 percent in terms of tonnage and 5 percent in terms of value.

Gherkins

Despite a decline of 18 percent in tonnage, with 9,530 tons exported in 1979-80 instead of 11,531 tons exported in 1978-79 and with the value of gherkins exported declining by 11.5 percent (31 million dirham instead of 35 million dirham), this sector continues to reflect a certain dynamism. Results achieved remain higher than those of previous years. As the 1978-79 harvest season was characterized by very favorable conditions, it can be considered an exceptional year.

Capers

This sector was no exception and also declined, with 23 percent less produced in terms of tonnage (3,500 tons produced in 1979-80 compared to 4,674 tons in 1978-79) and a decline of 16 percent in value (44 million dirham compared to 52 million dirham).

Sales

The dependence of this sector on the EEC, as the following figures show, remains a constant element in our sales structure.

PERCENTAGE OF SALES TO THE EEC BY ITEM

Gherkins	99.6
Fruit Juice	98.7
Fruit	97.14
Vegetables	93.7
Olives	83.2
Capers	74.2

The only case of diversification recorded in our markets is to the credit of our olives and capers, which have begun to be sold in eastern markets.

However, although for the export of olives this market diversification has been noted from year to year, the shipment of capers to the eastern markets has amounted to the reactivation of these markets which had been inactive for a long time, and which must be maintained and developed.

Thus, this situation of a "traditional market" continues to concern our Federation by reason of the evolution on the EEC.

This evolution no doubt will be reflected by the strengthening of EEC restrictive and protectionist measures against our products, measures which have already led to the disappearance of exports of tomato concentrates.

Diversification of outlets for our industries is therefore an imperative need, which our industries fully appreciate. However, to ensure the kind of success hoped for, such diversification should take place in a progressive, realistic way, responding to objectives and guidelines previously defined.

This sales effort concerning our products and the change in the present structure of our production necessarily and specifically imply abandoning different factors of production which were long considered logistical means for the promotion of our exports. They also imply the definition and application of new departures in our sales program in order to establish ourselves in new markets and develop with them. For example, this means more suppleness and adaptation to this new system of our administrative measures, as well as speed in decision-making.

This listing of conditions necessary for such a change is in no sense based on ill-considered demands. Rather, it reflects what is required to face up to competition which has become widespread and pitiless.

Action by the FICOPAM

In accordance with the continuing policy of our Federation, following the submission of our White Paper to the government, we have carried on a dialogue with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, the Ministry of Ocean Fishing, the Directorate of Foreign Commerce, and the responsible officials of the OCE [Marketing and Export Office]. Specific committees were established to work with the OCE to go more deeply into various questions.

The Federation, for its part, in timely fashion had prepared and submitted documents dealing with the major problems facing us. Certain of these problems, like adjusting the advance export payment, payment for OCE services, and regionalization, have met with satisfactory solutions. More complicated problems, such as transit questions, call for more detailed study.

In terms of relations between our industries and the OCE and on the occasion of the holding of the SIAL [International Food Products Salon] exhibition in Paris in 1980 the FICOPAM participated for the first time in that event in the Moroccan pavillion, alongside the OCE.

This action by the Federation, which was favorably received, led to other, fruitful contacts and to satisfying requests for information on the different sectors of food processing in Morocco.

Taking advantage of this important economic event, our Federation organized a round table with Morocco's European customers for processed fruit. This meeting made it possible to undertake with our trading partners an objective analysis of the present situation in the apricot market and to identify the steps needed to be taken to avoid having the same thing happen to another sector of our industry.

It is appropriate to be pleased with this cooperation between our industry and the OCE, a kind of cooperation whose field of activity should be further enlarged.

Agricultural Problems

Specific aspects of the activities of our industry and difficulties encountered in the past have made the Federation and its various sectors very sensitive to agricultural problems.

Certainly, various private initiatives have involved making very valuable efforts, often under difficult conditions, to maintain the good name of our quality agricultural products. Contracts for developing new varieties of fruit have been entered into with farmers, whose success has made possible the introduction and spread of such new varieties in many areas of the country.

Well aware of this basic question, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform now intends to make its contribution to the resolution of these problems.

Contacts are presently underway between the Office of Agricultural Adjustment of Doukkalas and FICOPAM, under the auspices of the Ministry of Agriculture, with a view to producing everything required for agricultural development in the best way possible and in the mutual interest of the partners. Most recently, the King has presided over the Agricultural Economy Festival in Marrakech. Our Federation was represented there by the president, who took part in its activities and was a member of the sponsoring committee.

The committee made the following recommendations regarding canned vegetables:

1) the early establishment of a contractual system between agricultural producers and food processing industries, in order to guarantee minimum prices for

agricultural products and the supply of agricultural products to the factories on a regular basis, in both qualitative and quantitative terms;

2) reserving a portion of state lands to provide agro-industrial establishments with agricultural products;

3) creating a permanent agro-industry commission, including representatives of the government, specialized organizations, and industries concerned, in order to consider the problems of this sector and take timely action as appropriate;

4) encouraging the establishment of agro-industry in production regions and to do what is necessary for this purpose in terms of the revision of the Code of Industrial Investment;

5) encouraging exports by means of a special export premium like that available in competing countries;

6) reviewing the operation and organization of the ports and rearranging them to facilitate the task of exporters;

7) diversifying agricultural production and redirecting it, particularly in irrigated areas, toward products which can be canned or otherwise preserved;

8) reviewing provisions relative to export insurance to make such insurance more effective;

9) employing engineers specialized in agro-industry and food technology in order to improve the quality of agro-industrial products.

The establishment of the bodies recommended above and the application of the suggested measures will tend to resolve a considerable part of the difficulties with which the food processing industry is faced and will tend to encourage and promote exports.

Regrettable Division

The overall situation which the past harvest reflected demonstrated how closing our ranks and tightening our cohesion were essential in similar circumstances. At present the dynamic elements of our industry are divided into two associations, and this is profoundly regrettable. This situation, as many people engaged in the food processing industry feel, damages the interests of our industry. Today more than ever, our industry needs to move past personal and marginal problems.

Faced with an uncertain future, our industry has every interest in tightening our ranks to face up to our problems and to provide a better structure for our working equipment in order to respond to the needs of our members.

My wish is to see this appeal take concrete shape. Bringing together the efforts of all responsible members will end, I believe, in the result we all seek.

Our Federation has gone through a difficult year which has had an impact on the normal functioning of its internal activities. The participation of our members and the commitment of our sector must not be subject to any restriction or circumstance--quite the contrary. The audience we reach and the effectiveness of our Federation will depend directly on the participation and commitment of our members.

5170
CSO: 4519/51

BRIEFS

OIL PIPELINE CONTRACT AWARDED--A 20.5 million dollar contract for laying oil and gas pipelines has been awarded to the Oman Construction Company (TOCO) by the Omani Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals. A 325 km gas pipeline will connect the Saih Nihayda gas field in the central part of Oman with the Marmul pipeline. It will help to provide gas to power stations in the south. The terms also include laying of gas and oil pipelines connecting the Rima oilfields with the main Marmul line. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 633, 12 Sep 81 p 14]

CSO: 440/3

BRIEFS

JAPANESE WIN DESALINATION CONTRACT--Sumitomo Heavy Industries of Japan has won a contract worth $123m to build the final extension to the Ras Abu Fontas desalination plant in Qatar. The deputy director of the Water Department at the Ministry of Electricity, William Lee, said the extension was due to be completed by 1983. The contract covers the supply of four waste-heat boilers and desalination units. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 44]

CSO: 4400/5

GROWTH OF SAUDI INTERNATIONAL BANK EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 33, 22 Aug 81 pp 42-43

[Article by Lionel Peters]

[Text]

SMILING members of the board of directors adorn the first two pages of the Saudi International Bank's 1980 report. Their pleasure is understandable — SIB, unlike many Arab consortium banks formed after the oil price rises of the 1970s, has gone from strength to strength.

In addition, SIB's interim statement for this year (as at 30 June) reflects continuing progress, particularly in SIB's emphasis on asset growth and global lending. The total balance sheet has nearly doubled, in sterling krms, from £852m at 30 June 1980 to £1.6bn for the same period this year. The depreciation of sterling against the two currencies in which the bank operates, the US dollar and the Saudi Arabian riyal, had a major effect on the figures. If measured in dollar terms, the rise over the year would have been 60 per cent. Loans and other commercial banking assets showed a substantial rise, accounting for 40 per cent of total assets. In line with expected growth in business worldwide, a representative office was opened this May in New York.

Western bankers are partly responsible for the rapid growth in the bank's business since its inception in 1976. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York has 20 per cent of the bank's equity, and plays a major role in the everyday running of the bank — it has been so successful that its contract has been extended to 1984.

Other western bank shareholders include Bank of Tokyo, Banque Nationale de Paris, Deutsche Bank AG, National Westminster and Union Bank of Switzerland, which each have 5 per cent. There are three Saudi shareholders — Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) with 50 per cent, National Commercial Bank (Saudi Arabia's largest commercial bank) with 2½ per cent, and Riyad Bank which also has 2½ per cent.

The board of directors' members work closely together and include Lord O'Brien, former governor of the Bank of England, the Saudi minister of finance, Sheikh Mohammed Abalkhail, who is the chairman, and Andreas Prindl, formerly with Morgan Guaranty in the Far East, as chief executive.

Despite the influence of western banks, there is strict adherence to Arab tradition and the bank pays attention to the Arab blacklist of firms trading with Israel. Before accepting a participation in a syndicated loan, the bank has been known to ask the lead manager for the names of other participating banks.

Loan syndication has become one of the main growth areas and the bank lends worldwide, not just to Arab borrowers. The bank made its first appearance in the syndicated loan market in 1978, as a manager in the $667m credit to Sonatrach

of Algeria. During the same year, SIB was a manager in the SR169m syndicated guarantee facility to Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Company of the Philippines and a manager in the $100m credit to Chrysler Financial Overseas Capital NV.

Activity increased in 1979 with the bank managing or co-managing ten loans, for a combined total of more than $1bn. to Algeria, Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria and Spain. It also played its first co-lead manager role, in the SR165m to Saudi Hotels and Resort Areas Company, co-leading with Gulf International Bank and Al Bank al Saudi al Fransi.

But Saudi International Bank really began to make the market aware of its presence in 1980 — it was a lead manager on 15 occasions, including some prestige loans lead-managed, only $53m was to an Denmark. Of the total $2.1bn worth of loans lead — managed, only $53m was to an Arab country, which underscores the bank's global outlook. It was also a manager 14 times, for loans totalling $3bn.

This year could prove to be a record one for euromarket lending. In the first half, the bank was a lead manager in 11 loans totalling $2.2bn and a manager on 17 occasions for $2.3bn. Again, most of the lead managements have been to non-Arab countries. It was a co-lead manager in the $600m credit to the Kingdom of Denmark and the $1.2bn — credit — partly in SDRs — to the Kingdom of Sweden.

CSO: 4400/4

BRIEFS

LIBYAN PLOT ALLEGED--Khartoum, September 14--Libya is responsible for the scarcity and rising prices of consumer goods in Sudan, the daily paper AL AYYAM charged on Sunday. It said the Tripoli Government was financing a plot to exert economic pressure. While it might not affect the state, it would certainly affect day-to-day consumer needs and create popular discontent, AL AYYAM said. People were being recruited to monopolise essential commodities and to demand the highest possible prices, the paper said, without being more specific about the methods used. It said part of the plot was to dump perishable goods such as vegetables in the River Nile to ensure a scarcity. AL AYYAM said refugees were another cause of the high cost of living here in the capital, and in other urban centres. Eritrean, Chadian and Ugandan refugees in many cases made straight for Khartoum or for other big towns after crossing into the country and became a heavy burden on food supplies, public transport and health and other services, it argued. There was also a security threat because some of the refugees smuggled arms and ammunition into the towns, the newspaper said. AL AYYAM said the refugees should be confirmed to camps away from the townships. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2828, 15 Sep 81 p 12]

ARMS SMUGGLING INCIDENT--Khartoum, September 13--A truckload of arms said to be destined for sale in West Sudan was seized by police here last week, the Sudanese News Agency reported today. Five Sudanese nationals were arrested, according to a Security Forces statement quoted by the agency. The arms were found hidden inside sacks of onions. The five, who had confessed their guilt, said they brought the arms from Eastern Sudan and were planning to take them to Mujlad in the west of the country for sale there, the agency reported. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2828, 15 Sep 81 p 12]

CSO: 4500/6

COOPERATION BETWEEN SYRIA, USSR UNDERSCORED

Moscow APN DAILY REVIEW in English 10 Sep 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by Yu. Borisov and V. Chemodin: "Fruitful Cooperation"]

[Text] The people of Syria are living in the hard conditions created by the unceasing Israeli aggression, the continued occupation of some sovereign Syrian land by Tel Aviv soldiery, and the overall drastic rise of tension in the region caused by the intensified scheming of US imperialist elements. The nation has to combine its construction effort with that of defence, having to spend a large proportion of its national income for defence purposes.

Equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two friendly countries--the USSR and Syria--has been quite fruitful. The Euphrates Hydroengineering Complex, the key project in Soviet-Syrian economic co-operation, has become a unit of national importance, a major factor behind the Republic's economic growth. It has generated 12,500 million kwh of electricity since it was started up. On the other hand, the high dam across the Euphrates, which required as much earthwork as eighteen Cheops pyramids would have, has put an end to flood danger. The Al-Asad reservoir, thus formed, has made possible the irrigation of 640,000 hectares of land and an enlargement of the area under cotton, cereals, and other farm crops so essential to Syria.

Open-work towers of high-voltage power transmission lines have sprung up all across the land from the town of As-Saura, the home of this complex, over a distance of 1,670 km.

Cooperation between the Soviet Union and Syria in oil industry development has been going on for almost twenty years. Soviet-assisted geological surveying and prospecting has served to discover some oil-bearing fields and estimate the overall geological oil reserves in North-East Syria, which meant laying the groundwork for full-scale commercial petroleum production. At present Syria is not only meeting her domestic demand in full, but exporting some of her oil.

Steady headway is being made in Soviet-Syrian cooperation in the development of transport services. The Soviet Union has been assisting Syria in designing, reconstructing and building 1,400 kilometres of rail track. The railway lines from Kamechliye to Lattaquie (760 km long) and Tartus-Akkari-Homs-Mhin and further on to the phosphate mines of Palmyra (300 km long) built with Soviet assistance,

are of great importance for Syria. The exploitation of these lines will yield a great economic effect.

The USSR is offering Syria technical assistance in enlarging the seaport of Lattaquie to handle up to 7 million tons of cargo a year, which is a matter of great importance for the development of Syria's external economic relations, as well as in building four bridges across the Euphrates, two of which are already open to traffic.

In the process of joint work at these projects, Soviet specialists are generously passing on their wealth of know-how to their Syrian friends. More than 32,000 Syrian skilled workers, engineers, and technicians have been trained during the years of cooperation at their places of work, training centres, established with Soviet assistance, as well as at higher and secondary educational institutions. Many Syrian specialists have had on-the-job training in the Soviet Union; Soviet organisations are providing assistance in building a railway training centre at Aleppo and a number of secondary vocational schools.

All this is certainly contributing towards consolidating the country's public sector which is fundamental to the process of national industrialisation and the creation of a diversified modern economy. These guidelines of Syria's economic development have been reaffirmed in the latest, Fifth Five-Year Plan, recently approved by the Syrian leadership, committed, as before, to creating a self-determined economy.

Damascus

(Sotcialisticheskaya Industria, September 10.
Abridged.)

CSO: 4400/6

CABINET APPROVES SCHOOL, HEALTH, OTHER PROJECTS

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

THE UAE Cabinet at its weekly meeting in Abu Dhabi yesterday approved a proposal for the setting up of temporary schools in some rural areas of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi.

The meeting, which was presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister, Shaikh Hamdan bin Mohammed, decided to earmark 16 million dirhams for the project. These temporary schools will be set up in industrial townships of Mussafah, Jarn Yafoor and Bani Yas. According to informed sources the schools will later be turned into permanent institutions.

The cabinet also approved a recommendation from the permenant projects committee for increasing the budget for the construction of clinics in industrial townships of Abu Dhabi. The sum earmarked for the clinic to be set up at Jaran Yafoor was increased to 1,870,000 dirhams, and that for the clinic at Mussafah to 1,960,000 dirhams.

The cabinet increased the allocation for the extension work in progress at Abu Dhabi radio station to Dh 386,000.

The Cabinet also approved a memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources for the execution of the third phase of the minerals survey programme at a cost of six million dirhams.

A memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the payment of UAE's share in the budget of the UN forces stationed at the Golan Heights and the budget for the Unicef's regional office in Abu Dhabi, was also approved.

The cabinet reviewed a report, prepared by the audit department, on the closing accounts of the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation for the year 1978.

WAM adds: Education Minister Saeed Sulman told after the meeting that the Cabinet had approved a proposals put forward by the Ministry of Education and Youth concerning the requirement of teachers for the academic year 1981-82.

The Cabinet approved 1418 posts for new appointments from Arab countries, he said.

The minister said that the Cabinet also discussed a proposal for providing accommodation to teachers in Abu Dhabi and Al Ain. The proposal would be discussed again at the Cabinet meeting next week.

Mr Saeed Salman said that the Cabinet approved the formation of the board of directors of Emirbus transport company. The company, he said, would also be responsible for providing transport facilities to schools.

CSO: 4400/7

LOCAL FIRM WINS WATER CONTRACT

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 16 Sep 81 p 15

[Text]

AN agreement was signed yesterday in Dubai between the UAE Ministry of Water and Electricity and the Galadari Engineering Works (GEW) to modernise and regulate activities in the Dhaid waterfield. The contract is worth Dh 5.4 million.

Mr Humaid Nasser Al Oweis, Minister of Water and Electricity, and Mr M.S. Khan, director of GEW, signed the agreement under which GEW will supply, install and maintain submersible pumps and also an observation and control system at Dhaid.

A ministry spokesman said the contract, first of its kind to be awarded to a national company, involves supply and installation of highly sophisticated instrumentation for quality check of water.

The project, to be ready in ten months, will automate most of the operations in the field.

Waterflow from each well, main-tank water level, pressure, total dissolved salts level, PH measurement, temperature and quality of water all could then be read in the control room.

At present pumps are operated separately till the main tank overflows. There is also no facility for recording the level and quantity of water pumped from each well.

The new project will also have a workshop for repair of pumps and engines from Dhaid, Dibba and Fujeirah.

The Ministry is planning similar projects for Dibba and Fujeirah water fields, the spokesman said.

CSO: 4400/7

BRIEFS

FOREIGN LABOR PROJECTIONS--There will be more than half a million foreign workers in the UAE sometime in 1982 if present trends continue. A report from Abu Dhabi last week said the size of the labour force in the UAE was increasing at an annual rate of 13.6 percent and that Planning Ministry figures showed there were 422,548 foreign workers in the Emirates at the end of last year. Construction employs about 145,000 workers, representing 34 percent of the work force. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 6]

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE FIRM--The final work on implementing a project to set up a pan-Arab aircraft maintenance company will be complete by the end of September and the $32.5 million company will then be launched, according to reports from Abu Dhabi last week. The new firm is to be called the Gulf Company for Aircraft Maintenance and it aims to be able to handle all the maintenance of Arab-owned aircraft within the next four years. The Director General of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), Nasser al-Noueyssi, who is also a member of the Board of Directors of the new firm, said that in the first stage of its operations the company would provide maintenance services for Gulf Air, which is jointly owned by several small Arab states. Later, Mr Noueyssi added, the firm would handle about 10 percent of the maintenance work required by other airlines flying to the area. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 11]

BRITISH WIN POWER CONTRACT--The British engineering firm, John Brown of Clydebank has won a £30 million $55.5 million) contract to supply a turnkey power station to Abu Dhabi, involving the company's first sale of a new fuel-efficient "Frame 6" gas turbine. The order is for the manufacture, installation and commissioning of a power project of over 100 Megawatts at Bani Yas town power station for the water and electricity department. The Frame 6 gas turbine is no bigger than previous models producing 25 Megawatts but has a capacity of 35 Megawatts, thus saving fuel in electricity generation. An official of the British firm said last week that the order was won by John Brown Engineering against severe competition from Westinghouse of the US, Brown Boveri of Switzerland, and the British General Electric Company. No details were given on the project's completion target. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 38, 21 Sep 81 p 12]

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTIONS--According to the latest amendments to the five-year plan, submitted to the Cabinet, production of vegetables and fruits in the UAE would rise to 333,000 tons in 1985 from 194,000 tons in 1980. This represents a growth rate of 11.3 per cent. The plan expects meat production to rise to 53,000 tons and eggs production to 200 million eggs from 80 million in 1980. Fish production target is 106,000 tons against 68,300 tons in 1980. The agircultural sector's investments will amount to about Dh 3.7 billion against Dh 1.7 billion in the last five years. The value of agricultural production in 1985 will be about Dh 1,363 million against Dh 817 million in 1980. At its last meeting, the Cabinet had ordered the ministries to study their plans and to amend them in the light of the latest developments. [Text] [Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 19 Sep 81 p 3]

CSO: 4400/7

END

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No. 2414

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ISRAELI, EGYPTIAN POLICE COOPERATION--The Israeli and Egyptian police forces will cooperate in the war against drugs, in manhunts for smugglers and in various activities on the common border between the two countries. There will also be a direct link between the Interpol branches in the two countries. This was decided during the visit of an Israeli Interior Ministry delegation to Egypt. Our correspondent Avshalom Ginosar reports that the two delegations are to meet again in 2 months. [Text] [TA271536 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 27 Sep 81]

CSO: 4423/4

'ARAFAT SPEAKS TO PALESTINIAN WORKERS CONFERENCE

LD240927 Beirut AS-SAFIR in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 4

[AS-SAFIR report: "Concluding the Palestine Workers Conference in Suq Al-Gharb, 'Arafat Says: 'Israel Is Making Full Preparations for the Battle and We Are Prepared to Fight the Marines Also'"]

[Text] Suq Al-Gharb--PLO executive committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat has stated that Israel is making full preparations for the battle in the south. He expressed the readiness of the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement for the battle, even if the U.S. marines participate in it.

'Arafat was speaking at the closing ceremony of the seventh conference of the Palestine Workers Federation held at the Is'ad at-Tufulah school in Suq Al-Gharb. PLO executive committee member Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh was present.

'Arafat began his speech by saying: The hero among our people is the prisoner in the occupied territory, the one who is standing fast in Upper Galilee and the Negev, the child who has turned his country's rocks into bombs against the zionist enemy and the fighter within the ranks of the Lebanese-Palestinian joint forces who has been able to triumph in the sixth war which was planned to destroy the Palestinian people, the PLO and the Lebanese-Palestinian forces.

He added: Brothers, the plan was clear when Richard Allen stated that the statelet called Israel had the right to exist and when Reagan came [to power] and found nothing to do other than attack the Palestinian people and the PLO. The lid came off recently, especially after the announcement of the U.S.-zionist alliance and strategic cooperation. It is no coincidence that our area is surrounded by three fleets, the fifth, the sixth and the seventh; and it is no coincidence that they have been able to establish rapid deployment bases in Egypt and Sudan.

'Arafat said: Difficult days are awaiting us at a time when Haig has been talking about the reinforcement of the emergency forces and the expansion of their area and of their powers to the north of the Litani River, the prevention of the flow of arms to the [Palestinian] resistance and other matters related to the Lebanese Government which do not concern me.

Referring to the situation in the south, 'Arafat said: According to the WASHINGTON POST, the invasion of the south is a matter of time. We say: Welcome, winds cannot move mountains. If the strategic alliance should bring U.S. forces, we

would be anxious to fight the "marines." I am saying this so that Begin, Reagan and agent as-Sadat can hear me and realize that "not every bird's flesh can be eaten."

'Arafat added: In the 15-day war Sharon tried to stage five deversoir-type operations [reference to site of 1973 Israeli operation on Suez Canal]: Three from the sea, one landing with air cover and one attack with tanks on ash-Shaqif. All five operations failed and Israel was compelled to accept a cease-fire. We also agreed, not from a position of weakness but from a position of strength. Our agreement came 4 hours after Israel's agreement.

Talking about the Israeli concentrations, 'Arafat said: They are preparing for the battle. Naval and ground maneuvers are staged every day. There is a concentration [of forces] in north Palestine estimated at three or four divisions strong. This means that they are making full preparations. Meanwhile, political storms are being stirred up and statements made about solutions and an alternative homeland. However, we should not acquiesce in such statements because they are part of an international campaign led by the United States to escalate tension in the world, agitate the hot spots and prod the areas from the Caribbean and El Salvador to Southeast Asia, including our area and Africa, into fighting. There is a decision to strike at all the liberation movements in the world. It is no coincidence that Begin told Reagan that there are three centers of terrorism in the world: The Soviet Union, the Plo and Cuba. Naturally, the Soviet Union cannot be a target and striking at Cuba would cause a third world war. Therefore, the weak link, in their thinking, is the PLO. However, I say that we are not the weak link but are the strongest link in the Middle East.

'Arafat then moved on to talk about Egypt. He said: All this is happening at a time when 'Abd an-Nasir's Egypt is not present with us, but I have not lost my faith in the people of Egypt. I told the first Egyptian delegation to visit the Palestinian revolution that Egypt's gloom will not last long and that I am sure that the Egyptian people will return to their proper place to defend our Arab nation.

'Arafat concluded his speech by saying: They must understand that we are the difficult element in the Middle East equation. They must also understand that there can be no peace, no peaceful solutions and no stability by overstepping the rights of the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights, including their right to return [to their homeland], to self-determination and to estabish their own independent state with Jerusalem as its capital.

CSO: 4404/13

VOP URGES PALESTINIANS TO OPPOSE SHARON POLICY

JN241806 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1600 GMT 24 Sep 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Our people in the occupied territory: Terrorist Sharon returned from Cairo yesterday with a new concession from as-Sadat to help him carry out his policy in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. The declared target of the Camp David partners at this stage is the Palestinian citizen in the occupied territory--the Palestinian masses in the West Bank and Gaza.

The instrument is Sharon's so-called new policy, which seeks to achieve several objectives. Foremost of these are: Undermining national and trade unionist institutions in the occupied territory through oppression, suppression of liberties, house arrest of Palestinian figures and economic blockade and strangulation by preventing funds, no matter how little, from reaching municipal and village councils. Second, encouraging agents to act as a political facade for the autonomy conspiracy. To achieve this, Sharon declared his plan to set up a civilian administration. Zionist leaders have also made no secret of the role played by the suspect village unions in helping the enemy carry out the autonomy plan and undermine the national institutions.

Third, the general idea behind the Sharon plan is to deal a blow to the PLO by trying to set up institutions whose role will be to serve the occupation and deprive the PLO of the right to be the sole legitimate representative of our people. These are the general outlines of the policy pursued by Sharon, who returned from Cairo yesterday with as-Sadat's endorsement of this policy.

Our people in the occupied territory: The enemy is trying to say that there has been a drastic change in the situation in the West Bank and Gaza and that the zionist military administration has become a civilian administration. The enemy is spreading the word in the occupied territory that Sharon's measures are strictly administrative in nature. Agent Dudin is publicizing this.

However, the political objectives of Sharon's measures have revealed the truth. Occupation is occupation whether in military uniform or civilian clothes. Professor (Nielson) who is Sharon's candidate for heading the civilian administration, is, in fact, reservist Colonel (Nielson) in the occupation army. The conspiracy is in a new disguise, pursues indirect methods, and has become most dangerous.

Crushing the conspiracy and its tools calls for escalating national struggle against occupation, in all its forms and methods, the main task of the current phase is to deter every agent recruited by the enemy to play a role against his people and homeland.

Our people in the occupied territory: We are now facing a new round of struggle against the plots, especially the autonomy plot. Your weapon to crush the occupation's new masks and tools is adherence to national unity, intensification of the resistance and repudiation of all agents. The revolution shall remain the masses' shield and iron fist against all agents and deviates.

CSO: 4404/13

JORDAN GRANTING FINANCIAL AID TO JUDAEA, SAMARIA

TA221148 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Sep 81 p 2

[Report by Yosef Tzuri'el]

[Excerpt] The Jordanian authorities have been taking advantage of the military government's decision banning the entry of PLO funds into Judaea and Samaria and have been granting benefits and privileges to personalities and institutions associated with them.

It was learned yesterday from Arab sources that the impression in Jordan, as well as in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, is that Israel and Jordan have a common interest with respect to financial aid to the local Arabs. This explains why, on the one hand, Jordan has been piling obstacles on PLO representatives in the joint committee in everything that has to do with extending financial aid to the Arabs of Judaea and Samaria while, on the other hand, it has operated independently to increase its standing by way of granting financial benefits to its supporters and to those who might support it in the future.

According to the Arab elements, the financial situation of the local councils and the public institutions has been growing worse as a result of the military government's decision to ban PLO funds from entering the territories. They believe this might induce a feeling that Jordan is the sole savior in the region.

Security sources reported that in the last 14 years Jordan has preferred to be the only addressee to aid requests from Judaea and Samaria, and only in the last few years was it forced to cooperate with the PLO. That is why from time to time Jordan is trying to undermine this cooperation and even sidestep it.

As for the aid from Jordan, the security elements reported that there is no ban on the introduction of funds from the Jordanian regime, but this must only be done in accordance with the longstanding military government procedures.

CSO: 4423/4

'HA'ARETZ' CITES ARAB SOURCES ON ANTI-'ARAFAT PLOT

TA221557 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Report by HA'ARETZ envoy in Egypt, 'Oded Zaray]

[Text] Cairo, 21 Sep--Yasir 'Arafat has recently refrained from traveling by land between Beirut and Damascus and, if he has no choice but to undertake such travel, jeeps accompany his car in front and behind.

Reports from Arab sources reaching Cairo intimate that 'Arafat's organization uncovered a plan by the Syrian leadership, led by President al-Asad, to murder 'Arafat. The plan was worked out in Damascus and, according to it, a large truck was supposed to have collided with 'Arafat's car as if it were a chance accident.

The sources point out that Syria's leadership had decided to liquidate 'Arafat and replace the PLO leadership. The Syrians have also prepared the groundwork for the formation of a new leadership in the terrorist organization. Among other things, it was reported that the Syrians are backing 'Arafat's former deputy, (Salah Half) alias Abu-Iyad, and Abu-Nidal, the head of a faction which seceded from Fatah. Abu-Nidal transferred his headquarters from Baghdad to Damascus.

The sources also reveal that last week an explosion occurred at the headquarters of the ruling Ba'Ath party in Damascus which caused dozens of deaths and injuries. Syrian authorities imposed an absolute news blackout on this report.

CSO: 4423/4

ABU IYAD URGES ACTUALIZING ALLIANCE WITH USSR

NC191635 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in English 1445 GMT 19 Sep 81

[Text] The General (?Federation) of the Palestinian Workers, Lebanon branch, opened its seventh regional conference at noon today at the Suq al-Gharb school for Palestinian martyres' children. Fatah Central Committee member Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] addressed the meeting and said: Numerous voices have already attacked the American-Israeli agreement. But what is required is a strategic differentiation between the [word indistinct] of enemies and that of friends. The steadfastness and confrontation front resolutions must be transformed into serious decisions so that we will be able to tell all Arab states that they must take control of the oil weapon and use it.

Speaking about the Egypt people's uprising, Abu Iyad saluted the heroic Egyptian people and pledged to remain proud and standing by their side in confrontation of as-Sadat's reason. He also saluted the Sudanese people who are confronting the oppression of Numayri's regime and noted that national unity is a foundation for facing all conspiracies.

Abu Iyad added that cohesion with the Lebanese national movement is certain to foil all plots and stressed the necessity to confront all conflicts [word indistinct] national rank bravely. Abu Iyad said that the objective of the series of explosions in the national [word indistinct] lately was to damage relations between the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement. He went on to say that these explosions will not affect this cohesion negatively, but will rather strengthen it.

Referring to as-Sadat's expulsion of the Soviet ambassador and Soviets experts in Egypt, Abu Iyad said: We in the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement tell the Soviet Union that there is only one agent, as-Sadat, who tries to harm the Soviet Union. If there is a strategic American-Israeli alliance, there is also an Arab-Soviet alliance. It is absolutely untrue that there is a Soviet danger which threatens the region.

Finally, Abu Iyad demanded that the steadfastness and confrontation front actualize its alliance with the Soviet Union so that the Arab nation will realize that it does not face the danger alone, but is accompanied by great friends, the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc.

CSO: 4400/10

BRIEFS

SA'IQAH APPOINTMENT--Differences within the pro-Syrian as-Sa'iqah organization have led to the arrest of Majid Muhsin. Col Salah al-Ma'ani has been appointed head of the organization's military department after he stormed several as-Sa'iqah positions in Sabra camp with the assistance of 800 Arab deterrent forces' soldiers. [Text] [JN200805 Baghdad Voice of Arab Syria in Arabic 1950 GMT 19 Sep 81]

PALESTINIAN WORKERS MEETING--Damascus--The seventh regional conference of the General Federation of Palestinian Workers--Syrian branch, has reiterated its rejection of initiatives and agreements not serving the Palestinian cause. It stressed its commitment to the Palestinian people's inalienable rights and our people's right to return and to establish their own independent state on all of the Palestinian soil. In its final statement, the conference called for strengthening the militant solidarity and cohesion that exists between Syria and the Palestinian revolution--to become the rock on which all forms of conspiracies will founder. The conference called for providing complete support for the steadfastness of the Syrian Arab people inside the occupied territories. It also called for supporting progressive and nationalist forces in Arab Egypt to foil the treacherous as-Sadat regime and to establish a nationalist and progressive rule to enable Egypt to resume its militant role alongside the progressive forces and regimes in the Arab homeland. The conference elected a new administrative committee for the branch. The conference was held 24-26 September. [Text] [JN270907 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0415 GMT 27 Sep 81]

CSO: 4404/13

NEW PLAN ENVISAGES ENLARGED SOCIAL ROLE FOR MOSQUES

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No 1, 6 Jul 81 p 4

/Article by Khamis al-Bakri: "The Comprehensive Mosque: An Overall Plan Aimed at Turning 40,000 Mosques into Integrated Cultural Centers"/

/Text/ In Egypt there are now 40,000 mosques which open their doors for a limited period only five times a day, then close their doors during the /remaining/ hours of the day.

What might happen if this tremendous number of mosques were to be turned into cultural centers serving the environment in the religious, social, cultural, medical and productive areas? This goal is not just a wish--there is a comprehensive plan, and there are direct instructions from President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat aimed at rapidly bringing that about. Men at the highest levels of responsibility are devoting long hours to this plan.

This goal is not a departure from religion, either--rather, in fact, it is a return to religion's original mission, whose principles were implanted by the prophet of Islam when he piously founded the Mosque of Qiba', the first mosque of Islam, in the location of Mirbad al-Tamar in Madina. This mosque was a place of prayer, decisions, judgment, and consultation and the banner of holy war emerged from it to return crowned with triumph. It was a full life, and that is how it must become once more.

The development of the mission of the mosque in Egypt may be summarized in two words: the comprehensive mosque. President al-Sadat has given the minister of religious endowments directives stressing the need to give attention to mosques and their mission and the need to establish new comprehensive mosques in every district in the republic containing hospitals, outpatient clinics, nurseries and libraries comprising fine Korans with commentaries so that young people can memorize the Koran and recite it well.

The question we raise now is, What has been achieved in this area?

Before that, let us pause a bit with Dr Husayn Mu'nis, a scholar of Islamic history, so that he can cast some light on the mosques of olden times!

"The mosque was the center of the intermingling of Islamic society and its tangible material structure. Society was made complete only by mosques which would bring its members together to meet to pray and exchange views, to visit to learn news of their society, to meet with their chiefs, or go just to listen by sitting in one of its corners, as people say when they visit parks to relax. The mosque also possesses this religious,political and social function as far as every individual Moslem is concerned and as far as the entire society of Moslems is concerned, because the mosque is God's house and is also the house of society and the house of each individual member of society. It is the only thing which the society used to possess in common, whether the person who built it was a sultan, a caliph or the government. Therefore, Islamic society used mosques for running their public affairs and thereby became independent of the ruler of the state. I can present an example of that, Moslems' use of mosques as judiciary buildings, which arose because judges and people of piety wanted to manage the judiciary in its own manner, removed from the influence of the government and the people in it, sat down in the mosques, which belonged to the society, and used them as sites for judges and places for judiciary rulings.

"For the same reason, society used its mosques as institutes of learning."

Pioneering Volunteer Initiatives

Let us then return to the present and mention that individuals and groups have made pioneering volunteer initiatives to return their comprehensive mission to mosques. Dr Mustafa Mahmud has established the Mahmud Mosque in al-Duqqi, turning it into a real model for mosques of the new Islamic 15th century. In addition to its social and health services, he has outfitted it with an astronomical observatory on the roof so that Moslems may observe the splendor of creation on the far horizons, and he has equipped it with a natural museum of organisms and rocks in order to bring geology close to the minds of young people.

His eminence Shaykh Sulayman Rabi' has established a complete religious and social institution in the mosque of Abu Bakr al-Sadiq in Heliopolis which, in addition to a clinic, an old persons' home and a library, contains a chamber for special occasions which will meet requirements for weddings and funerals, along with a similar Islamic edifice in al-Ma'adi and in many sections of Cairo and the governorates through intrinsic volunteer efforts.

The al-Fustat Islamic University

The experiment becomes more appealing when it restores to the comprehensive mosque the old glories of higher learning from the times when al-Azhar had a role as a major Islamic university, as was the case with the al-Zaytuniyah Mosque in Morocco. Thought is now being given to establishing the al-Fustat Free University within the confines of the Mosque of 'Amr ibn al-'As, the first mosque to have been erected in Egypt--indeed in the entire continent of Africa. This mosque will contain three institutes, for economics, accounting and Islamic appraisal, and instruction will take place in it in the manner of a free dialogue among senior scholars and thinkers. On that subject, there is a group of distinguished men and scholars of Egypt serving the environment, headed by Dr Ibrahim Badran, chairman of the

Academy of Scientific Research, in the Mosque of 'Amr ibn al-'As. What is being done now, in the context of the party and the government, to transform 40,000 mosques into cultural centers in the service of society?

Mr Mahir Muhammad 'Ali, assistant secretary general of the National Party, replies "The popular development sector is concerned with services, and integration exists in our activity among the material, moral and social elements. There are numerous projects to provide popular service, to avoid casting the entire burden for services on the government. Among these services is the establishment of the national committee for comprehensive mosque services, which has the goal of making the mosque a center of cultural advancement in the environment in which it is located. This committee has held a number of meetings on the official and popular levels for people who are interested in the service of comprehensive mosques and they have concluded by setting forth the draft of a bill providing a conception of the services the mosque can provide through people for people investing their human powers and intrinsic resources. The goals which have been set down for the mosque to perform are many, including establishment of a nursery for children, a reception building for old people, a chamber for special occasions which will meet people's needs for social purposes, classes for enriching students through the mosque, anti-illiteracy groups, committees for collecting tithes, medical clinics, /courses on memorization/ of the holy Koran, and other services which arise from the mosque, so that it will truly become a mosque offering comprehensive services. It is possible that each mosque in a section will provide one or several services so that ultimately the mosques in the section will /collectively/ cover all service needs and requirements in the area. This bill concludes that the family in each mosque will be made up of working groups. Each group will be available for a given service--for example, a group will be available for the service of burying the dead, another will be available for looking after and employing girls, and so forth. Among the people appointing these families will be a group made up of officials who will be appointed by the Ministry of Religious Endowments, to be called the mosque's board of directors, and on this basis there will be a broad popular base for each mosque which will be active in performing services while at the same time there will be a responsible council running the activities of this greater family of the people. One of the most important positive achievements the comprehensive mosque will realize is that it will be a meeting place for young people who will find within it channels of activity as scope for putting their piety and religious interests to work, and we will thereby be protecting them from all fanatical or aberrant forms of deviation. In fact, societies can be formed to carry out certain economic projects which the section requires as a solution for shortages in certain goods and provide the various needs of the masses surrounding the comprehensive mosques."

A Comprehensive Islamic Mission

What about the role of the Ministry of Religious Endowments?

His eminence Shaykh Ibrahim Dassuqi, advisor to the ministry, says "The ministry has set forth a bill organizing the boards of directors of the comprehensive mosques and specifying the role of the ministry with regard to its mosques in terms of memorization of the holy Koran, establishment of enrichment courses and treatment centers, holding religious competitions among young people in the section, constructing libraries and stimulating alms committees."

It remains for us, finally, to shed light on an experiment which began a year and a half ago in the same mosque, 'Amr ibn al-'As, which had suffered from much neglect, to the point where its condition had deteriorated and even the obligation of performing the prayer was discontinued there. A board of directors has been formed for this mosque which includes Dr Ibrahim Badran, chairman of the Academy of Scientific Research, Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid, chairman of the Doctors' Union, Muhsin Muhammad, editor in chief of AL-JUMHURIYAH, Fahmi 'Allam and Hilmi 'Abd-al-Majid, leaders in the contracting sector, Dr 'Abd-al-Fattah Shawqi and an elite of religious men, including Shaykh Sulayman Rabi' and Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Wahhab, the imam of the mosque. Dr Ibrahim Badran says, "This group has assigned itself the task of laboring for the sake of God and Egyptian society, which takes precedence over all the people in this country. The decision has been made to create a revival among the young people of the Mosque of 'Amr ibn al-'As, this has been a great victory, and contributions in cash and kind have poured in. Contacts have been made with the Antiquities Authority and the Cairo Governorate apparatus to keep our projects from conflicting with the value of the antiquities and the desire to preserve the legacy. Thanks be to God, 10,000 people come to the mosque to perform prayers, and this is just a beginning. God blesses every sincere action in behalf of almighty God, and this is the least duty we can perform here and for our nation, which has provided us with everything. What is of benefit to people stays in the ground." This is just a beginning.

11887
CSO: 4504/82

PRESS CHIEF TALKS ABOUT RELIGIOUS MEDIA COVERAGE

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No5, 3 Aug 81 p 1

/Article: "Safwat al-Sharif, Chief of Radio and Television Federation: Egyptian Radio Bears the Trusteeship of the Religious Media"/

/Text/ Concerning the Islamic voice of Egypt abroad, which is disseminated by programs broadcast throughout the world, Mr Safwat al-Sharif, chairman of the board of trustees of the Radio and Television Federation, declared that Egyptian radio bears the trusteeship of religious media and instructions which are founded on the bases, principles, heritage, values and history of the Islamic religion.

He said that Egypt, the leader in the Islamic and Arab worlds and the pioneer in Africa and Asia, addresses the continents of Asia, Africa, North and South America and Europe through 20 short wave frequencies in 33 languages covering a time period of more than 70 hours a day.

Mr Safwat al-Sharif added that the main network is the General Program in Arabic, which is broadcast over 15 short wave frequencies and directed at the areas of the Middle East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf, Africa and Europe. In addition, the Arab network, the Voice of the Arabs, the Voice of the Sudan and the Voice of Palestine are broadcast over eight different short wave frequencies for a total of 69 hours and 30 minutes a day and are directed at the regions of the Middle East, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Gulf, Africa and Europe.

The chairman of the board of trustees of the Radio and Television Federation went on to say that the short wave programs emitted are broadcast from eight stations with a capacity of 250 kilowatts each and 10 stations with a capacity of 100 kilowatts each. Thus the total power of the short wave stations is 3,000 kilowatts. There is also a technical engineering section to study and analyze technical reports on audiences of Egyptian short wave broadcasts, which include letters from people listening to our programs in the foreign world, so that the Islamic voice of Egypt may reach all the ears of the world.

11887
CSO: 4504/82

PROMINENT RELIGIOUS ACTIVIST DISCUSSES THEORIES, VIEWS

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No1,6 Jul 81 p 5

/Article by Muhammad al-Zarqani: "Shaykh al-Ghazzali Talks to AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI About the Wisdom of Fasting"/

/Text/ Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali, the great Islamic proselytizer who has been prominent in the field of the call to Islam in Egypt and abroad, spoke with AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI about the wisdom of fasting as Islam as called for it, stating "The call to Islam must accompany world progress." His eminence Shaykh al-Ghazzali then stressed that if Moslems returned to their pure religion and adhered to its tolerant principles, the disputes among them would end.

My first question to Shaykh al-Ghazzali was on the wisdom of fasting as almighty God has called for it; his eminence replied, "The fast month has, unfortunately, become far removed from its substance in Islamic life. It has almost become the month of eating and has almost become the month of the flesh, not the month of the spirit. When Islam codified the fast, it did not do so for this reason; the wisdom in the fast is in the statement of almighty God 'Perhaps you may become pious.' In the noble traditions, whoever fasts in Ramadan /does so/out of faith and reflection, that is, out of sincere devotion to God and in expectation of his fate. We must realize that worship sometimes becomes a pleasure for people who perform it. In the noble tradition, 'Whoever is pleased with God as a lord, with Islam as a religion, and with Muhammad as a prophet and messenger of God has tasted the sweetness of faith.' Faith has a sweetness which draws the person who possesses it to further worship and further obedience.' We truly would like our acceptance of this worship, and our performance of it, to be linked to a heart which knows and is devoted to God."

Performing the Islamic Call

On the means for performing the Islamic call, the man of the call said,

"Islam is a dynamic religion; it is not limited to a single place. Moslems have known this truth about their religion since the course of Islam began; therefore, the Islamic call has been familiar in their lives and has influenced their course and conduct.

"Perhaps they were not familiar with people's languages and different tongues and therefore did not transmit the teachings of Islam in these various languages, but there is a well known international language in which the early Moslems became very proficient, and that is the language of morality. The early Moslems presented Islam to various peoples through just rulings, gracious behavior, the exertion of sacrifice and extensive compassion. Therefore Islam spread and hearts opened up to it, and this has been understood by many western writers who are fair minded. For example, Welles, in the book 'Milestones of Human History,' forcefully denies that the sword was a factor in the spread of Islam. He says that there were social and cultural upsurges with the spread of Islam and that Islam was close to being a general progressive movement from the time its rays first spread forth. It appears that Islam, by being compatible with the ordinary makeup of man and agreeing with his disposition, and man's impatience with philosophical complexities, Byzantine politics, and so forth, all prepared the way for Islam.

"Naturally, with the resurgence of human civilization and the spread of the scope of international communications, the call to Islam must adopt new methods. The nature of these methods must be presented in terms of the nature of the great international progress which we have now attained. Distances and time have been shortened in this era, in the sense that when Islam was to be presented to China, Asia or the coast of the Atlantic, that used to take a number of months, but now news can be transmitted from Cairo to any place in the world in a few moments. The shortening of distances of time or intelligence makes us think seriously of having our appeal for Islam based on facts and on high examples of lofty humanity.

"Therefore, with the general methods for spreading about the appeal to other corners of the world and transmitting Islamic teachings to them, it is necessary to facilitate instruction in the Arabic language and to present others with our traditional, genuine sources of Islam so that they may see what we possess.

"I consider that the situation, as far as the call to Islam is concerned, is still related to the state of the Moslems themselves in their countries, since people aspire to a stable society dominated by mature traditions in which the Islamic nation lives in the context of sound policies and human rights, and rights and obligations are mutually held by the various factions that have accepted this religion.

"My opinion is that the scholars of Islam and the people in charge of the call to it, have now been assigned a number of things in order that their appeal might succeed.

"The first thing, I consider, is a positive one and that is based on revealing Islamic teachings from their true sources. The second thing is to reply wisely and with forbearance to lies and slander which are spread about against Islam by its enemies and have filled the horizon with smoke to which there is no foundation."

Concerning the reason for the disputes the Islamic countries are suffering from, and how we can rid ourselves of such disputes, his eminence Shaykh al-Ghazzali said,

"The disputes which have occurred among Moslems are the result of their alienation from Islam. When they proceed truthfully and state that the straight path is the shortest route between two points, the truth brings together those who possess and belong to it, while falsehood sets people out on a thousand paths; most of these disputes may be ascribed to international currents which attract weak people, and people working with international Crusaders or international colonialism attract some others."

Islamic Civilization: How Should It Be?

On the road to returning Moslems to their former honor and glory, the Islamic proselytizer says,

"Islamic civilization dominated the world when it was based on the book of God and on the sayings and doings of his prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace. If Moslems are to regain their glory, they must rise to the level of their religion, take from it, and apply it properly. When this is presented to Moslems, they will, God willing, regain their glory. Let us read this prophetic tradition: 'No nation is sacred where rule is not established through truth and the weak do not receive their rights.' This means that a nation in which truth is not respected, in which scientific truth is lost, in which political truth is violated and in which some people oppress others without shame is being kept from divine care and does not live in God's protection. The truth must be made sacred.

"In order for the Moslems to regain their glory, they must be a society in which the truth shines, in which the nation may offer an international paragon of Islamic teachings. Islam is the religion of cleanliness, in the sense that it cleanses the body, cleanses clothes, cleanses homes and cleanses roads. If a foreign tourist comes and sees that that nation is truly clean in its dress, clean in its homes, its roads, its smells and all its affairs which the eye can reach, then he will certainly be pleased by it, and his pleasure will extend to the intellectual and spiritual sources which have furnished the nation with this conduct. This is the basis on which Islam triumphed and spread in olden times. However, for the nation, in practical terms, to be contrary to its religion harms it and the religion it embraces.

11887
CSO: 4504/82

ACHIEVEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC RADIO PROGRAM REVIEWED

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic 13 Jul 81 No 2, pp 4, 5

/Article by Khamis al-Bakri: "The Islamic Voice of Egypt in Asia and Africa Speaks 32 Languages!"/

/Text/ A major American media official who holds the position of vice president of Radio Voice of America recently made a visit to Egyptian broadcasting, examined the activity of the foreign programs it broadcasts to the various peoples of the world, especially ones directed to the peoples of Asia and Africa, and heard Egyptian officials' description of the 40 radio services it offers daily over a period of 62 hours in 32 languages.

The American media official's mouth hung open in amazement when he learned that this activity was carried out on a single short wave frequency.

He raised a question in a search for information on the reverberations of the Voice of Egypt abroad and the number of letters that reach Cairo from its foreign listeners.

The answer was given him: Cairo Radio annually receives 30,000 letters on foreign programs aired and 35,000 letters on the Arabic language instruction programs on the radio; there is a postal bridge between Cairo and its listeners over which 50,000 letters, 300,000 books and thousands of gifts are sent annually. The amazement of the vice president of Voice of America grew and he said, almost believingly, "Our broadcasts are aired over five short wave frequencies but they do not receive this massive number of letters."

The senior America media official could not understand the secret. 'Ali Rushdi, the vice president of Radio Egypt for broadcast programs, says, "The secret lies in Islam and in the Egypt of al-Azhar, to which reach out millions of Moslems in the depths of forests, villages and hamlets in Africa, three quarters of whose area is dominated by Islam, and Asia, which contain a Moslem population estimated at several times that of our Arab world.

"Egypt, as is its custom with its Moslem brethren, is not stingy; notwithstanding the single short wave frequency on which it broadcasts and the meager budget for the programs aired, which does not exceed 160,000 pounds, it offers 62 broadcasting hours a day, including 20 news broadcasts, 20 commentaries, 20 news programs and 20 cultural programs in most of the languages of the world, except Russian,

Japanese, Chinese and Persian. We broadcast in the English and French to Africa and we also broadcast in national languages which have flourished since independence, such as (Uluf), Lingala, Amharic (Wasiliyah), Somali, and Afar. To Asia in addition to French and English we broadcast also in national Asian languages such as Indonesian, Thai, Malayan, Bengali (Bangladesh), Hindi, Urdu (Pakistan), Turkish and Pashtu (Afghanistan).

"The Islamic people in Asia and Africa anxiously seek information about the affairs of their religion and their terrestrial world by asking for religious rulings from the men of al-Azhar."

Before we continued the discussion with 'Ali Rushdi, the broadcasting vice president, a meeting took place with Mahrus 'Abd-al-Wahhab, director general for Europe, who at the same time is in charge of religious affairs on the foreign programs aired. By the way for 5 years he has been presenting a successful program which is translated into various world languages and broadcast concerning the life of Muhammad, on whom be God's prayers and peace. Answering a question on the Islamic media philosphy of Cairo's broadcasting programs, he says, "One can enumerate the goals which have produced the broadcasts aired, from the religious standpoint, as follows:

"1. Propagating religion; religion is the basic component of the Egyptian personality. Our attitude toward the religious media is the same as that toward the media governing Egyptian politics, economics, society, and so forth; therefore propagation of religion is broadcast to everyone who listens to Arab Republic of Egypt broadcasts that are aired, regardless of his religion--that is, in this there is no difference between Moslem and non-Moslem listeners.

"2. Defense of religion; all the abuse directed against the religion of the Egyptian people is abuse directed against the personality of the Egyptian people.

"3. The call for religion, which is a goal that the programs aired are working toward in regions where government policy requires that a call to Islam be made.

"4. Religious instruction. This goal is basically restricted to listeners in Islamic and semi-Islamic areas abroad."

A Religious Tide in the Programs

The man in charge of foreign program religious affairs goes on to say:

"Of course the broadcasts aired have served these four goals since they were established in the early fifties, but the religious aspect did not appear strongly at that time, as is the case now that it represents 40 percent of the broadcasts' contents; that remained the case until the mid-sixties because of political circumstances that prevailed and the basic interest in political aspects in that period.

"After the 1967 war, concern with religious aspects in the programs aired began to increase, then reached its peak in the last few years because of the rise of the Islamic tide in the Middle East region and its political effects, prompting some

foreign countries like America to increase its attention to the study of Islam and observe Islamic movements in various areas of the world." Mahrus 'Abd-al-Wahhab says, "Previously there was no special department for the programs aired for religious affairs. Recourse was made to the General Religious Affairs Department in the radio in reviewing the religious materials broadcast and also in acquiring recordings of the glorious Koran. Now, however, with the expansion in the volume of religious programs broadcast, which is probably close to half the contents of the broadcasts, it has been considered proper to establish a special religious affairs department for the programs aired."

What is the quality of the Islamic programs the broadcasts aired provide?

Hasan al-Shaykh, director general for Asia and the Middle East, says "They are extremely varied, including recitations and interpretations of the holy Koran, the traditions of the prophet, Islamic history, intellectual issues, religious rulings, the life of the prophet and the lives of outstanding Moslems.

"In Ramadan, for example, there is a program titled 'The Worldwide Nature of Islam' which depicts Islam as a clear, easy, simple, human religion which deals with the actual state of man and elevates man and describes it as a religion which coexists with people of other religions, organizing the relationships between them and Moslems. It is a religion for all times and places, thanks to the firm principles and variables it contains. It is a religion for all people, and its mission has been a general one since the revelation of the prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace.

"The program 'The Worldwide Nature of Islam' also deals with everything of concern to the pure religion in the form of beliefs, rituals, legislation and morality. There are eight series of conversations with major Moslem scholars concerning various issues twice a week.

"There is a conversation broadcast every day titled 'Light on the Fast Month,' an interpretation of the Holy Koran by famous Islamic jurists of al-Azhar, and programs on Islam as one must know it, the nature of faith and religion, the nature of Islam, the true nature of religion, and the difference between devout persons and infidels.

"There is a program on the life of our lord Muhammad, the prophet of man, crystallizing the real nature of Islam, Islamic issues on war and peace, Islam's position on aggressors and the relationship of Islam to religions and peoples. There is a program on the imams of Islam, starting with Malik, al-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifah, a program on commentaries titled 'The spirit of the Koran', a program on the embrace of Islam dealing with testimonies by people who have been fair in discussing Islam, such as 'Why Did I Become a Moslem?' by Henri De Castrie, a program titled 'When the Prophet Talked about Matters of Social Equality and Dealings among Moslems,' and programs on the story of a verse of the Koran, Islam and Islamic civilization. There are three broadcasting magazines that are sent out, 'Islamic Egypt,' 'The Islamic Magazine' and 'Science and Faith.'"

Which of our scholars take charge of the sublime activities?

"The senior imam, the Shaykh of al-Azhar Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman Bisar, our eminent scholars Dr al-Ahmadi Abu-al-Nur, Dr Musa Lashin, Dr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Najjar, Dr Badawi 'Abd-al-Latif, Dr Ahmad 'Umar Hashim, Dr Nijah al-Ghunaymi, Dr 'Abd-al-Jalil Shalabi, Dr Muhammad Hisam-al-Din, and many others."

They Ask for Religious Rulings

As the director general for Asia and the Middle East for broadcast programs points out, the most important thing that concerns Moslem listeners, in addition to their requests for political, social and cultural information, are the requests they present to the men of al-Azhar for rulings regarding the affairs of their religion and their ordinary lives. These are examples of requests for religious information from listeners:

Is it legal in Islamic law to eat crocodiles?

May Moslems give their non-Moslem parents part of a sacrifice as a gift?

What is the method for cleansing oneself externally and internally and what is the best method of praying?

What is the verdict on ceasarian operations in birth and the use of birth control devices?

If a girl is in love with you and gives you money to go on pilgrimage with, is that legitimate?

Is it legitimate to change one's skin color with chemicals?

How are we bringing about the attainment of Islamic law in Egypt?

What is the verdict on persons who are not proficient in Arabic and want to go on pilgrimage?

What is the ruling on marriage between Moslems and non-Moslems?

How did our father Adam marry our mother Eve, and who were the witnesses?

I have a tape recording that has the method for performing the prayer and I perform the prayer in accordance with that tape: is this prayer acceptable?

Two spouses embrace Islam after Christianity; is their marriage to be performed again?

Why do Moslems differ among themselves and form different groups? Is it permissible for people who belong to the al-Ahmadi creed and consider that Muhammad, on whom be God's prayers and peace, is not the seal of the prophets to go on pilgrimage?

What is the ruling on reading the holy Koran without understanding its meaning? Is it proper for non-Moslems to enter Mecca?

What is the ruling on Moslems who die in the heart of a Christian society and are buried in the Christian manner?

Arabic Language on the Radio

There are 84 broadcasters from Africa and Asia who translate letters from their national languages for Egyptian officials to read and hand over to scholars and experts to reply to.

'Ali Rushdi, the broadcasting vice president for aired programs, says, "The areas where Cairo Radio is listened to in Africa and Asia are under constant observation, not just through the flood of letters that pour in alone but also through the dispatching of experts from Egypt. We have noted that listeners, especially African Moslems, passionately aspire to learn the Arabic language, on grounds that that is the sacred language of the Koran, the language of the prophet of Islam and the language of paradise which, according to their belief, only people who speak Arabic can enter.

"The relationship between the listeners and the programs aired evolved when Egyptian Radio declared that Arabic language instruction programs were being initiated on the radio for people who wanted them and requested that listeners who did want them send letters to it. We were most amazed when tens of thousands of letters came in from all corners of the world welcoming the project and appealing to Moslem Egypt, the Egypt of al-Azhar, in the hope that Egypt would continue this activity, since there are no sources in non-Arab Islamic countries for Arabic instruction, except for a few religious schools in which local instructors give their information on the Arabic language in limited, traditional form. A poll of listeners was taken and Arabic instruction started on the radio in 1959 after a scientific study, so that the courses could be reasonable and feasible for Moslems in Asia, Africa and Europe. It adhered to scientific aspects, in terms of listening devices, the use of audio equipment and commitment to the terms and language of the holy Koran in setting forth curricula, with simplifications and gradual progressions arranged in a manner which would not present obstacles to listeners and students. At the outset words were used to assist in English and French, then requests poured in to use national languages, and books were prepared of which we sent out 300,000 copies to listeners. For the record, we do not just teach reading in Arabic, but also writing, we send our listeners thousands of examination questions, and they send us back their answers, which we correct for them, sending them the results and also certificates for their successful completion and exceptional performance." The broadcasting vice president for aired programs also says, "Many listeners have presented these certificates to certain places of employment in their countries and have received jobs as a result. Poor handwriting has been observed in the examinations, notebooks on proper Arabic handwriting have been distributed to listeners and fruitful results have appeared. The Radio Cairo Arabic language instruction program has played a superb role in creating a firm bridge of communication between Egypt and the various peoples of the world. The contacts increase on religious occasions and holdiays, especially the month of Ramadan and Cairo sends them books

and gifts despite its limited material resources. For the record, some people working on the programs that are broadcast are compelled to spend money from their own pockets, especially in sending gifts and answering requests from listeners."

The Horizons of the Appeal over the Air

What now are the ambitions of the people responsible for the programs being broadcast, as regards further concentration in the areas of the Islamic appeal to Asian and African countries that have suffered from a destructive colonialist proselytization which is aimed at replacing their beliefs and abusing their religion?

The broadcasting vice president for aired programs, 'Ali Rushdi, says, "our aired broadcasting, although on a single short wave frequency, has, in spite of the forest of competing short wave frequencies from big countries and radio and television in local countries, been able to fill the international arena, reach areas which are suffering from a void in Egyptian media and culture, and stand up to rejection /state/ radio services that try to distort Egypt's appearance and marxist front radio services that distort the facts and spread about the call to atheism. It has been possible to expose these methods and policies to various peoples.

"What is needed is to strive to increase transmission hours and the number of frequencies and to have many bodies which are concerned with our foreign media and our Islamic role, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Information, the Ministry of Higher Information, al-Azhar, the League of Islamic Peoples and the Arab League join together in solidarity--and why not the Supreme Press Council along with them?"

From what he has learned in his tours of Africa and Asia, 'Ali Rushdi recommends that the May Publishing House or AL-AHRAM issue an Islamic newspaper in Arabic, French and English. He expressed the readiness of experts in the programs broadcast to offer their translating and writing services. This proposed newspaper, as the broadcasting vice president says, "Above and beyond being an excellent media activity, is something we badly need, now that the world scene has been totally stripped of all our information magazines, which were shut down in the mid-sixties." It is also a profitable economic project, since this newspaper, as the man states, will be circulated by the millions, as it is the Voice of Islam emanating from Egypt, the Egypt of al-Azhar.

11887
CSO: 4504/82

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS REFLECT INCREASING STRIFE

Summary Executions Encouraged

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 39, 24 Sep 81 pp 3-5

[Text]

The new prosecutor-general of revolutionary courts, Ayatollah Mir-Hossein Mursavi-Tabrizi, has confirmed earlier reports that those arrested in street demonstrations or in other confrontations with the Islamic regime were shot on the spot and without trial.

"Anybody who is against us, who is armed or follows an armed group or shows his opposition to us, and who falls into our hands is executed instantly," Mussavi-Tabrizi said in an interview broadcast by Tehran Radio last Friday.

"We do not delay it," he said. "We cannot take them to prison to feed them at the expense of the Islamic administration. We have no right to waste money on feeding them. Their trial has taken place on the streets. If he or she insults the Imam (Khomeini), or shoots at our men or helps our enemies in any other way he or she is already an infidel whose blood must be drained."

He said the revolutionary courts had no time to go through the time-consuming procedures. "When two people give evidence of the fact that somebody is our enemy that is procedurally enough," he said. "So two revolutionary guards who were involved in a gun battle can shoot and execute their enemies on the spot; the trial is on the street."

He also said that according to his knowledge of Islamic law there was no provision to take prisoners or to have mercy on the injured. "If we take our enemies and other counter-revolutionaries prisoner, or if they lie on the ground injured, we kill them there and then; we say let the injured receive a bigger injury and die in his own pool of blood."

This, he said, was how the revolutionaries were ordered to do not only in Tehran but also in the provinces. "These are infidels who set banks, buses, shops, offices and houses on fire," he said. He also warned relatives and parents of the counter-revolutionaries not to ask for their dead bodies from the Government. "Why do they ask for the bodies of their sons and daughters?" he exclaimed.

The following is the full text translation of the statement made by Mussavi-Tabrizi.

In the name of Allah, the Merciful and the Kind, I must first pay tribute to my predecessor who was martyred in a just path and in an effort to safeguard the Islamic system. I pray to God that I will be able to fulfill my duties to His satisfaction. Well, let me tell you that decisiveness is the most vital element in our success. Where the revolutionary courts have shown decisiveness and taken harsh steps they have been successful and blocked the path of the counter-revolutionaries. Look at my own record in Azarbaijan. You know that Azarbaijan, West and East, was our biggest problem but we managed to pacify the region because I showed a decisive stance. That is what Islam wants of us, people who shouted for Islam want of us.

So let me go back to the essentials; the 10-point declaration that my predecessor, the late Qoddussi, proclaimed will, in essence, remain our guideline. So there is no change in principle, but I will introduce qualitative change. That is, to increase decisiveness. The enemy cannot survive if we deal with them decisively. That is what the people who have given us martyrs want. There will be no mercy since we do things in an Islamic manner.

Well, there is the problem of terrorism, you know. These grouplets were isolated. The 10-point declaration of the late predecessor of mine who was acting to implement the Imam's own directives was decisive and as a result the grouplets found out that they have no place among the people. Indeed, these wayward youngsters and others who have organised themselves in grouplets are fascists. They hide in dark corners and fire at dedicated and committed Muslims. Well, they have killed dedicated people. In Tabriz they killed a worker who was active in his factory's Islamic association. In Tabriz they killed a man who had lost his arm in the Iraqi war because he was always regularly attending Friday prayers. They killed children in Isfahan and elsewhere.

Now they feel isolated. They saw the millions of people took part in the funeral processions of brothers Bahonar and Rajai. If on Tir 7 (June 28, when Beheshti and 70 others were killed by counter-revolutionaries) they claimed the number of people taking part in the funeral was small, they then listened to foreign radios, which said that one million took part in the funeral of Bahonar and Rajai. So, they feel isolated. They have nowhere to go, nowhere can they sleep at night. Then they see contradictions. They ask questions of their leadership as to why their leader is abroad. Then their leaders threaten them that if they do not carry out orders they and their relatives will be killed. That is what many of those who have been arrested tell us. That is what we read in the wills of the counter-revolutionaries we kill. Of course, if they come to us to ask pardon, to give us information, to show us the location of the hideouts and leaders, provided that is before having used their guns or bombs, we will give them protection. In parenthesis, I must say that we will protect those who come to us. We will not kill them or even imprison them. We will give them a safe house to live in until we deal with the confirmed enemies of ours.

But we also have responsibility to all the revolutionary institutions. That is what the people want of us. Courts must act on the basis of Qassas (retribution). They have set banks, buses, offices, shops and houses on fire. One man arrested in Tehran with a Molotov cocktail in his hand told us his house was bombed by Iraqis. Well, he should fight Saddam, but he is fighting the Islamic government.

Well, our principles are that we must safeguard Islam and the Islamic system. That is not to say our tasks are limited to saying your prayers. We must enforce Islamic rules on infidels.

Anybody who is against us, who is armed or follows an armed group and shows his opposition to us and who falls into our hands is executed instantly. We do not delay it. We cannot take them to prison to feed them at the expense of Islamic administration. It is a waste. We have no right to waste money on feeding them. They are baghis (sic) and enemies of Islam proven beyond doubt by their own very acts. So, they must be disposed of immediately. What we do is not commended but in fact is binding. There is no need for formal trials, for procedures. Their trial has taken place on the streets. There is no reason to keep them one night. We execute them on the spot. If he insults the Imam who has given us our revolution and led us through difficult times, or shoots at our men, or is in possession of arms, or helps our enemies in any other way, he or she is already an infidel whose blood must be drained.

Revolutionary courts cannot waste time on procedures which are in any case fruits of liberalism. What they do is enough to condemn them; so two people give evidence, two witnesses confirm what they have done, that somebody is our enemy, that is procedurally enough. So the revolutionary guards, for instance, who are involved in a gun battle, have witnessed the enemy shooting at them, that is enough, that is the thing to do. They can shoot and execute their enemies on the spot. The trial is on the street.

A couple of kids who have no knowledge of Islam; then they come and lecture to us that our deeds are not Islamic. They are ignorant. Kids cannot teach us Islam. If we take our enemies, or any other counter-revolutionaries prisoner, or if they lie on the ground injured, we kill them there and then. We say: let the injured get a bigger injury and die in his own pool of blood. This is in the writings of ancient ulama --Sahid Awwal, Shahid Thani and others. Kids cannot lecture us.

And please, I like to say that their (those executed) parents must not expect us to give them bodies of the infidels. Well, we enforce Islam's rule and execute them. Why do they ask for the bodies of their sons and daughters? These are bodies of infidels. What do they want to do with the bodies? Well, let them come and get the bodies. We have given bodies in some cases. But the parents and relatives who receive bodies (of those killed) must publicly declare that their sons and daughters are infidels. They must not hold Islamic services for them. For ignorant people cannot profess to know Islam. This is the way we do it in the provinces and this is the way it is going to be. Last night I

talked with a couple of girls who were arrested. They said they had not been home for several months. Now, a question comes to mind: parents must wonder about a girl of 16, 17, 19 or 22, living in a hideout with men. Is that Islam? Is that service to the people? What have these grouplets done? Are they really Islamic as they (the Mojahedin) claim? How many Americans or people belonging to the Pahlavi regime have they killed to claim Islamic character? This is a good yardstick. I can claim credit for having killed several hundred men and women belonging to the dirty Shahanshahi regime or were members of Pahlavi administration. Well, that is a yardstick. Now, can they lay such claims in front of me? So why do they call themselves Islamic revolutionaries?

This is to inform their parents that the grouplets are infidel, not anti-imperialistic. If you are a mother or a father you must publicly disown a son or daughter who goes wayward. Your first task is to prevent them going astray. If they went the wrong way, then do not come to us asking for compassion, for mercy, for pardon. The Imam gave amnesty, gave pardon. That is enough. Think hard; if you fall into our hands we have no choice but to execute you. Our task is to enforce Islam.

The 10-point proclamation, among other things, makes it a capital offence to insult Khomeini, or know somebody is against Khomeini but fail to report him, to provide shelter or food for counter-revolutionaries or to be a counter-revolutionary.

Reza II Claims Army Support

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 39, 24 Sep 81 p 6

[Text]

The Iranian army still supports the monarchy and will play a big role in changing the regime in the country, Shah Reza the Second has told the weekly Paris-Match in an interview.

Even though it has lost its former leaders and its power has been affected by the chaotic conditions in the country the army remained a force, the Shah said, and kept its beliefs. He also knew, as a result of visits from all kinds of Iranians, that the people of Iran still held the monarchy in high regard and wanted its return.

"We are not isolated here," the Shah said. "I regularly talk with the opposition leaders. I receive personalities and tribal chiefs who are still living in Iran and who meet me at risk to their lives. They come to inform me and assure me of their loyalty. I recently received a Kurdish chief whose name I cannot give you, and the leader of the Balouchi opposition--Aman Allah Khan, head of the military arm of the Balouch Unity Front.

"Similarly, I have contacts with diplomats, political figures, members of governments and even foreign heads of state. The circle of our friends grows every day."

The Shah said he was confident that national reconciliation could be achieved. So many people now regretted that they had stayed inactive in the face of a movement that they did not really want. Until now only monarchy had been able to ensure peace and stability in Iran and it was because of this that there was now such widespread and growing support for constitutional monarchy, based on the constitution of 1906. There were already many active groups of supporters of monarchy at work in Iran and others were ready to join in.

The Shah said he was confident that the world would judge his father and his service to Iran in a positive way in the future. History showed that it took some time for the contribution of a personality to be correctly assessed, and it was too early to judge his father's role properly. But he pointed out there were already many historians who said that the situation in Iran today made it possible to come to a positive judgment much earlier in the case of his father. What was happening in Iran was already making many things clear.

Paris-Match also displayed photographs of Balouchi opposition groups in military action in their province.

Speculation about Raja'i Bombing

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 39, 24 Sep 81 pp 7-8

[Text]

Who planted the bomb in the prime minister's office which killed president Rajai and prime minister Bahonar? Gossips and rumour doing the rounds in Tehran came up with several theories. One was that the Mojahedin did, as the government wanted everybody to believe. A second theory said that the Army or former SAVAK agents did it. But the most persistent theory, which was damaging to the mullahs, said that the Tudeh party did it and that the Tudeh agent who carried it out was Minister of State in charge of executive affairs Behzad Nabavi.

Nabavi, who achieved fame when he negotiated release of the American hostages, has long been regarded as Moscow's most prominent agent in the Khomeini outfit. He is also in charge of the office of economic mobilization which manages rationing of food since the Iraqi invasion. In fact, he had prepared a plan for putting retail trade on a kind of East European system before the war. He is an advocate of closer ties with communist countries. Nothing is known about his real background but this is not strange. Not only the cabinet ministers but also others in the Khomeini regime were obscure characters. Before the revolution nobody had heard of Beheshti, Bahonar, Bani-Sadr, Yazdi and even Khomeini himself was known only in religious circles. But Nabavi's background is really suspect.

Rumours persisted so much that the regime found it impossible not to take some sort of action. So, Rabbani-Amlashi who is now prosecutor general (he too was an unknown character until recently) took to Tehran Radio and made a most astonishing statement--the man who planted the bomb was now (so everyone thought) buried as a martyr alongside the victims Bahonar and Rajai! His name: Massoud Kashmiri. His job: secretary to the National Security and Intelligence Council.

Then Majlis leader Hashemi Rafsanjani (who was an obscure real estate agent before the revolution) took to the radio and said: Now our brother Nabavi has been exonerated. He also said that Kashmiri was a Mojahedin agent. The Mojahedin were so desperate that they sacrificed an agent who could give them secret information on security affairs in a fruitless attempt at destabilizing the regime, i.e. planting the bomb!

Nobody in Tehran at first took this information seriously. Nor did anybody accept the other news that the killer of Qodussi was another agent named Hossein Fakharzadeh. Indeed, people saw such statements as the sign that the regime was badly shaken.

Rafsanjani later went to North Korea together with Defence Minister Col. Namjou, while Foreign Minister Hossein Mossavi went to Benghazi to talk with the Libyan , South Yemeni and Ethiopian leaders.

Possibly on the agenda was intelligence help from Gaddafi for Khomeini's Savak, which is supposed to have a network of 36 million agents. That means every Iranian is an agent, even those in Evin prison.

Finally, came the announcement that Kashmiri had, in fact, escaped and had not been killed in the blast at the premier's office. This story seemed more credible and by this week it was clear from the nervous statements of officials that they felt the regime was well and truly infiltrated anyway.

Tehran sources reported a few days ago that new platoons of Palestinian mercenaries had appeared at crucial security spots in the capital. They were said to be in evidence installing themselves around Khomeini's home in north Tehran, where already a sophisticated computer-controlled radar system watches for any possible attack from the air. The chief of the air force said more pilots would be purged and others barred from flying.

In addition it was known that a number of friendly countries had been approached to discuss the problems of improving the security and intelligence situation. Foreign Minister Hossain Mussavi was thought to have discussed the problem in Libya.

In Tehran itself it is reported that the homes of officials, revolutionary guards and other pro-regime figures are marked secretly and come under attack during the nights. Many families have moved out andothers sleep away from home, it is reported.

Influential members of the government, deputies and leading religious figures use ambulances and other types of non-passenger vehicles to drive around without being recognised. Many of the guards have also exchanged their uniforms for ordinary clothes because of repeated attacks on them. Desertion among them is said to be on the increase.

A big group of foreign technicians who help to keep the military and security forces in operation are now said to be living together in the west tower of the Hilton hotel in Tehran. Guards protect them there.

Widespread Discontent in Army, Society

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 39, 24 Sep 81 pp 8-9

[Text]

Iranians noted the end of the first year of the war with Iraq with a widespread sense of approaching doom.

The troops at the front, according to reports from families in Iran, are more concerned about the domestic situation than they are about the war, which, in spite of the claims of both sides, remains virtually stalemated. Officers wondered what might have been as they realised the hostilities with their Arab neighbour meant they could not play a key role in trying to resolve the chaotic situation in the country.

As for the public in Iran, they were beginning to wonder what they had done to have earned such an overflowing cup of misery. In the capital itself the majority of people stayed at home as far as possible as the Mojahedin and their friends fought the revolutionary guards and the maniacal hezbollahis by day and night.

As the government issued lists of those it said it had executed and parents sat in fear of hearing their children were among the dead, it was only the feeling of rage that America and other Western imperialists should have imposed this misery on the country that kept the country from bursting out into a yet wider burst of rage. The propaganda of the past three years, intermingled with the complex mystical and other naive feelings of a people who have had virtually no real contact with the rational pragmatism of the industrialised western societies, meant the hapless public did not know who really to hatemore for the fate imposed on them.

It became clearer than ever that only the charisma of Khomeini was keeping the country from wider civil war and even more unbridled cruelty. The mindless callousness of public statements by the revolutionary prosecutors might only have produced a fierce backlash from wider sections of the public if Khomeini had not still been there at the top, telling millions who claimed they saw his face in the moon before he came to Iran that it was in their interests that their wayward compatriots were dying.

Both Iranians at home and round the world duly noted that not a single western government uttered a word of criticism of the mullahs for their brutality. Outside the exiles noted a U.N. human rights body saw no reason to indict the regime for killing Muslims, but the oppression and murder of Bahais was another matter. "Oh, if only the mullahs had slaughtered a few European and American Christians in the last couple of months just how different might have been the response," sighed numerous embittered Iranians.

In Iran itself the problems of daily life, the shortages (heating fuels went up by 10 rials a litre this week) and the lack of security seemed to have reduced the capacity of the country to try to assess its losses since the revolution, and especially since the outbreak of the war.

Independent sources have put Iraqi losses in the war at 10,000 killed and Iran is said to have lost more. In addition Iran has a million and a half war refugees. Both sides are said to have suffered $50 billion in damage, not including the economic losses which experts put at twice that figure.

Oil production capability is now said to be no more than 1,500,000 barrels a day and exports have dropped to 500,000 barrels, largely because of the price. Officials of the national oil company are discussing sales with European and Japanese companies, reports said this week, but no offer of a price reduction had yet been made. But oil experts say that exports will drop to even half the present figure soon if the price is not brought down radically, and this could make Iran's financial problems far worse.

But there were signs for the first time that the present rulers of Iran were becoming so desperate that they could even consider trying to find an end to the war. There were persistent reports that the visit of Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani and Defence Minister Namjou to Malaysia was to put forward possibilities to the Islamic Conference for ending the hostilities. In addition, it was believed the pair had discussed the war with Soviet representatives in North Korea during their visit there.

"If this is true," commented a Paris observer of the Iran scene, "it certainly suggests the mullahs know they are now fighting for survival. It also suggests that the advantages of having the army tied up in the war so that it cannot interfere in domestic affairs can no longer be taken into account and that the economic situation is too serious for the war to go on.

"Perhaps even the mullahs are beginning to realise, in spite of their blood-curdling war cries, that the spell they appear to have put on the Iranian people is evaporating and they might not have much longer to go if they don't work some miracle."

Friction with Arabs

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 39, 24 Sep 81 p 10

[Text]

Relations between Iran and Arab states like Libya, which have deteriorated considerably since the Khomeini government's onslaught on the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and other leftist groups with longtime links with the hardline states, dropped to a new low after Colonel Gaddafi last week asked Iran's foreign minister to quit the hardliners' conference in Benghazi in the midst of an anti-Iraqi tirade.

Iranian Minister Mussavi was participating as an observer at the conference, which was attended by representatives of the host country Libya, Syria, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO.

He insisted afterwards that he left the conference when official work, from which observers are usually excluded, was beginning. But Western sources reported from Libya that Gaddafi asked Mussavi to cut short his attack on Iraq, as there was no Iraqi representative to reply. It was also reported that Mussavi insisted on using the term Persian Gulf instead of Gulf, or Arabian Gulf.

Mussavi, speaking over Radio Iran, said afterwards that Syria's President Assad had defended his position. But he quit the session "because I didn't want to create trouble for our brother Gaddafi." Agency reports, however, said Gaddafi had called on Mussavi to halt his attack on Iraq.

The new outburst of bloodletting in Iran, has, however, left relations between a number of Arab states, including Algeria, which represents Iran's interests in the United States, at a much cooler level than since the revolution. Even Libya is now distancing itself a little from Tehran, while pro-Libyan newspapers in the Arab world are supporting the Mojahedin and Massoud Rajavi.

Even as good a friend of the mullahs' regime as Syria has begun to have doubts. Sources close to the Tehran government told IPS that both Damascus and Tripoli had reduced their aid to Tehran. Military aid from Syria had come to a standstill; Libya's supplies had been drastically cut.

CSO: 4600/22

KHOMEYNI COMMENTS ON ANNIVERSARY OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in Persian and English 23 Sep 81 p 2

["Statements of Imam Khomeyni Concerning the War Imposed on Iran by Iraq"]

[Text] *— The Iraqi regime has launched an aggression and cruelty against the defenseless cities and of innocent Muslim brethren. Many houses and residential places have been destroyed and many children and innocent women have been mercilessly massacred.*

— Saddam Hussein revealed his ugly, anti-Islamic face, having made up his mind to destroy Islam and the religious university of Najaf. For the pleasure of Carter, he did what the Mongols did to the oppressed.

— The same way that the Iranian army rose and joined the people the Iraqi army must do the same thing. This war is against Islam. Is the Iraqi army willing to fight against Islam?

— It is no wonder that Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Baqir Sadr and his sister have attained martyrdom. What is wrong is that the noble nation of Iraq may pass indifferently by this great calamity that has affected Islam and the household of the Messenger of God.

— The chivalry and bravery of the army and other Iranian armed forces such as the Pasdaran and others remind us of the self-sacrifices of the Islamic armies in the early days of Islam.

— Numbers and quantities are not important in war, the important factor is the intellectual attitude of man.

— The armed forces of Islam have the status of the army of the Prophet. I give you good tidings that if you kill the enemy you will be rewarded by going to paradise and if you are killed you will go to paradise.

— The weapon of Islam is Allah-o-Akbar, no other weapon can defeat this weapon.

— Our people have been transformed from a weak nation into a strong one of which every single individual longs to be martyred. Such a nation never feels fear and will be triumphant with the help of God.

— Saddam resorts to Arab nationalism and repeats saying he is an Arab. Saddam is not an Arab, he is an American puppet.

— Now Islam has come under attack and we have to defend Islam, the matter of compromise or peace is out of question. We never enter into negotiation with such corrupt elements.

— The infidels have engaged two Muslim nations in fighting while they have themselves sat aside and are seeking to take advantage of this fight.

— While our noble people are peace-loving and justice-seeking, according to the Islamic teachings they also treat the prisoners of war in a human and Islamic manner.

— Even if we were to forget our own people, how could we answer to the people of Iraq? How could we, who say we are Muslims sit at the same table

and say "Let us make peace" to a regime which has ruled Iraq illegally and killed so many people, how can we say this to a man who has martyred so many religious scholars.

— In this war, we have not lost more than at the Battle of Siffin, much less than that. When it is for Islam what do we fear? The war woke us. The impotence which was found was transformed into firmness and strength.

— People should not tire of the war. The war is a good thing. Of course we did not start the war, but now that it has been imposed upon us, it has fine results. One of the results is this, that our enemies have lost respect in the world.

— The history of Islam, except for a period at the beginning of Islam has not recorded the likes of the young people of Iran. Where in history have you seen young people so in love with war, in love with defending their own country in this way.

— How can I praise the attention which you have towards God, the Most High, this strong determination and this unique courage. You are today the Guardian of Islam.

— Today the totality of Islam is confronted by the totality of atheism.

— Those who bring separation and division among the Muslims by resorting to phrases such as nationalism or nationality and the likes are the army of Satan, contributions to the superpowers and the enemies of the Quran.

— Martyrs who present their lives which is the most valuable thing they have to offer for the sake of God, will be rewarded by the removal of these veils. Then they will envision God-as the Prophets did, because they want everything for God and their self no longer remains.

— Today, the entirety of those who here united against the Islamic Republic of Iran are directly or indirectly connected with the United States. When the U.S. noticed that a military incursion made by one of its servants, that is, the Iraqi government had only served to further consolidate the ranks of our people. It resorted against creating tumult within our borders.

— Our Leader is that 12 year old child with a noble heart, worthier than hundreds of pens and words who throws himself with a grenade under an enemy tank and destroys it and attains the glory of martyrdom.

— Our country and army are committed to Islam. It is an army that flies over Iraqi cities and pounds the Iraqi military installations situated in the farthest point of that country near the Jordanian border without dropping a single bomb on the Iraqi cities. This is an Islamic country and armed forces.

--Why are the Muslims ignorant of their power? Why should the Arab countries be struck and humiliated by the Zionists for so many long years? The power of Islam is stronger than and superior to any other power. The power of Islam is the strongest weapon.

--We are defending Islam. A defender of Islam safeguards Islam with his body, soul, his everything including his beloved ones. He will never quit whether being vitorious or defeated.

--When we say that our Revolution should be exported, it should not be misinterpreted. We are not seeking to capture any place. We seek to export our awareness, the awakening which took place among Iranians and led to curtailing the hands of the superpowers from our own resources and wealth.

--When I saw on T. V. that a group of women from one area were baking bread or packing foodstuff for the youth at the battle fronts, I felt ashamed before them. You have seen that aged men, one of them came to me, imploring to be dispatched to the war fronts. Such a country come into being only as the result of God's blessing.

--We entered this battle against infidelity like Imam Hussein (A. S.) Like him we welcome martyrdom.

--Here is a nation whose youth perform night prayer in the battlefields who struggle in the path of God who take pride in doing so.

--Until when will the Muslims resort to such tactics as compromising with the superpowers instead of standing against the enemies of Islam and using firearms and military and God inspired power.

--Our youth and people who are ready to embrace martyrdom do not fear death. Our nation has seen many of these people martyred while thousands of others have been injured and are still resisting.

--The Blessed and Supreme Lord loves this country, and He is safeguarding Islam by the hands of our enemies for the people desired to lead us astray, they mined their own path. We trust in a being which is the sole originator of the universe.

--I pray to the Blessed and Supreme Lord for the victory of Islam over disbelief and hypocrisy.

"Greetings be to the treaders of the Rightful Path".

CSO: 4600/19

POLL SHOWS SHARON MOST POPULAR MINISTER

TA200948 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Sep 81 p 3

[PORI public opinion poll]

[Text] The first public opinion poll since the elections on the popularity of the various cabinet ministers--conducted by the PORI Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ--shows that Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon is the most popular minister (50.3 percent are satisfied with his performance). Prime Minister Begin is slightly less popular (45 percent are satisfied with him). Foreign Minister Shamir has 43.5 percent support among the public, while Finance Minister Aridor has 34.6 percent backing. Interior, Religious Affairs and Police Minister Yosef Burg has the support of just 21 percent of the public.

Among the five senior ministers, Sharon has the lowest percentage of dissatisfaction: Just 15.2 percent are dissatisfied with his performance--though 22.7 percent have not yet formed an opinion about him.

There was a sharp rise on the prime minister's popularity after the elections. While only 25.4 percent said they were satisfied with his performance at the beginning of the year, the figure is now 45 percent. This percentage is still far below the ratings of over 70 percent that Mr Begin enjoyed when he first took office.

Foreign Minister Shamir's popularity has risen from 17 percent, when he was appointed to the post (April 1980) to 43.5 percent now. When he first took office, half the public had no opinion at all about him, whereas now most of the public views him as a positive foreign minister.

There has been virtually no change in the finance minister's popularity since he was appointed. In March 1981 he had a 30.9 percent popularity rating, in April 1981 it was 33.4 percent, and now it is 34.6 percent. It should be noted that just about the same percentage of the public is dissatisfied with Aridor: 34.5 percent.

There has been a slight decline in Dr Burg's popularity since the elections, from 23.1 percent before the public went to the polls to 21 percent today. Before the elections 53.5 percent were dissatisfied with him, while today the figure is 56.6 percent.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were personally interviewed in their homes throughout the country.

CSO: 4423/4

TWELVE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEES ESTABLISHED

TA280822 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 28 Sep 81 p 1

[Report by Dalya Shehori]

[Text] The cabinet approved yesterday the composition of 12 ministerial committees, as proposed by Prime Minister Menahem Begin. These committees do not include the ministerial defense committee, which has not yet been set up due to an excess of candidates to the committee, nor the economic ministerial committee, due to Finance Minister Yoram Aridor's absence from the country.

Prime Minister Begin said he hoped to set up the ministerial defense committee in the nearest future.

Knowledgeable circles doubted whether the premier will succeed in forming the ministerial defense committee by "holding talks," since ministers will not be inclined to forgo their committee membership even if it is not essential. The circles estimated that the prime minister will have to make a drastic cut eventually and decide on a very tight committee of five members only: the prime minister, the defense minister, the foreign minister, deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich, also on behalf of the Liberals, and Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg, who will also represent the NRP. This composition also may have to include Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abu-Hatzera (Tami).

The committees formed yesterday are--the Ministerial Committee on Internal Affairs, Services and the Environment (chairman: Dr Burg); the Ministerial Committee on Legislative Affairs (chairman: Moshe Nisim); the Ministerial Committee on Autonomy Affairs (chairman: Dr Burg; members: the defense minister, the foreign minister, the agriculture minister, the justice minister); the Ministerial Committee on Emblems and Ceremonies (chairman: Yitzhaq Moda'i); the Ministerial Committee on Social and Welfare Affairs (chairman: David Levi); the Ministerial Committee on Foreign Service Appointments (chairman: Yitzhaq Shamir); Government Representation on the Immigration and Absorption Authority (chairman: Yoram Aridor); the Ministerial Committee on the Transfer of Fields of Activity Between Ministries (chairman: Ya'aqov Meridor); the Ministerial Committee on the Distribution of Bequests to the Government (chairman: Moshe Nisim); the Interministerial Committfairs (chairman: Moshe Nisim); and the Ministerial Committee to study the Lands Problem in Judaea and Samaria (chairman: Airi'el Sharon).

Committees already appointed during this government term in office are: The Ministerial Committee for Qiryat Shemona; the Committee on Permits for the Issuing of Books [by former civil servants]; the Ministerial Committee on Government Basic Regulations.

CSO: 4423/4

EYTAN DISCUSSES TERRORIST; CEASE-FIRE ACTIVITIES

TA182028 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1820 GMT 18 Sep 81

[Interview with chief of staff Refa'el Eytan before his departure for the United States by Ron Ben-Yishay--videotaped]

[Text] [Question] The terrorists give wide publicity on the reinforcement they are effecting in their units in southern Lebanon, and they also declared that they would soon resume their activities against Israel from southern Lebanon. How much reality is in those declarations?

[Answer] There is reality in the terrorists' redeployment and in their absorbing heavy-type weapons, and this very process is likely to encourage them to do something. I don't think that they could, with the armored cars that were seen in the press today, resume the terror on the Lebanese border or attack the Christian enclave in the south. Or to endanger anything of ours. But to them this could give a distorted and false feeling of security, which might inspire them to adopt steps that can only mean fire. It may be there is also someone who is inciting them to such steps. It may be, I do not know. We are watching the developments and they are unable to reach a capability for confrontation.

[Question] You said there may be someone urging them along to such steps. Is it the Soviets that you have in mind?

[Answer] I am not going that far, but they may be also incited by the Libyans and by the Syrians as well, for the sake of realizing interests of their own and not necessarily of the terrorists, the Palestinians in Lebanon. The Syrians may have an interest in engendering fires of some kind in Lebanon for reasons of their own. And the Libyans are happy with engineering a conflagration in any place their hand with match can reach.

[Question] What is your assessment today of the results of what the terrorists call the Ramadan war, those 2 very hot weeks in July this week?

[Answer] My answer may perhaps sound strange to you. I'd like to say that since 1948, even since the days of the mandate, but this was especially notable in 1948, in 1956, very notable in 1973 and at the present, too. When the Arabs were facing a collapse or a difficult malady, someone came to their rescue, helping them not to break down. We know that the terrorists, in the last days of the fire, were facing a collapse. In spite of this, katyushas were flying here and there. But

they were facing a collapse and ran to their patron-state and said, if there is not a cease-fire within 2 or 3 days, the Palestinian revolution will collapse. And at that time, we reached a situation where their infrastructure, their bases, their equipment, their axes, their storage facilities were being systematically destroyed by us. The method of their activity, long-range terror, to fire katyushas...

[Question] A kind of artillery terror.

[Answer] The solution is simply to remove them beyond their range. And in July we did not adopt this method. If the fire had lasted for another day or two, we may have been hit by a few more katyushas, but on the other hand we may have arrived at a situation where this capability of theirs to do this would have collapsed. For example, there was one gun which shelled Nahariyya, a single gun. And we had difficulty finding it. A single gun stands hidden, unlike batteries of artillery deployed in an orderly manner, according to a customary system. One single gun, which can be hidden in an orchard, under a tree, near a road or a house. The moment we found and located it, we attacked it and Nahariyya was calm again. No more shells fell on Nahariyya. The same happened with the gun that had shelled Qiryat Shemona. It was located north of Hasbayya and was difficult to find. Eventually, however, we found it, destroyed it and cannons were no longer shelling Qiryat Shemona. This process was beginning to bear fruit. We know they did have terrific transportation problems. The bridges were blown up, the roads were barred--we barred also one road--the headquarters were destroyed, and this was the reason why they sought the cease-fire. We did not request a cease-fire.

[Question] Should the fire be resumed. Do you think the fact that the terrorists are maintaining a kind of mini-state in the region of Tyre and Sidon, will make them wary of risking an endangering of that state by opening fire?

[Answer] I don't know whether they have rational considerations. Do not know. I do not know whether they are thinking by the same logic we do. But we still have very many tools and abilities and methods how to make sure that our citizens do not constitute a target of any sort. One must keep in mind that, unlike us, the targets of the terrorists are Israel's citizens, its villages, cities, the border towns, and every Jew in Israel is a target for the terrorists. We, on the other hand, our sole target is the terrorists themselves. If the terrorists managed to fire a shell on Rosh Haniqra, or on Qiryat Shemona or Misgav-'Am, they had, in their eyes, accomplished their goal. Their target is any Jew in any place. We, thanks to very good intelligence, are seeking and finding them, and attack only them. This is what distinguishes us. This makes things more difficult for us than for them, their goal being entirely different. Every child in Israel is to them a Jewish soldier, even a baby, such as had been murdered by them in cold blood, babies in Nahariyya or in Misgav-'Am. But we shall not deviate from this custom, from fighting morale, we shall continue like this and, in my view, we shall achieve results.

CSO: 4423/4

REAL WAGES UP 12 PERCENT IN 1981

TA221012 Jerusalem POST in English 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Report by economic affairs correspondent Shlomo Ma'oz]

[Text] The average monthly gross salary rose in real terms in the first half of 1981 by 12 percent as compared with the same period last year. This has compensated the workers for the nine percent drop in salaries which occurred in the first half of 1980 according to figures issued yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics.

It emerges from the figures that workers, under Finance Minister Yoram Aridor [who assumed office last January), were more than compensated for the decline in wages under the previous finance minister, Yiga'el Hurvitz.

The figures also show that in June the average wage of employees including workers from the territories, reached 6,500 Israeli shekels per month (gross). The average wage will reach 8,500 Israeli shekels in the October salary (which will include cost-of-living increases paid in July and October).

The net salaries have in fact increased even more in percentage points than the gross salaries, because the level of taxation on income was reduced by Aridor last April.

The employees with the highest average wage were those working in the electricity and water corporations. Their average salaries increased in the first half of this year by 32 percent, reaching 12,900 Israeli shekels in April.

According to the statistics bureau, the lowest paid employees are those working in personal service, such as hairdressers. Their gross salaries dropped by one percent in real terms in the first half of this year as compared with the first half of last year, reaching 3,600 Israeli shekels per month on the average.

The average wages of industrial workers rose by 14 percent and reached 6,800 Israeli shekels per month and those of construction workers rose by 5 percent (5,000 Israeli shekels). Those of workers in food services rose by 9 percent (is 5,000).

The salaries of workers in communications and transport rose by 10 percent, reaching 8,900 Israeli shekels and those of workers in public and community services rose by 15 percent, to reach 6,000 Israeli shekels per month.

CSO: 4400/10

MINISTER DISCUSSES ENERGY-SAVING SYSTEM

TA222021 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 22 Sep 81

[Interview with Ya'Aqov Meridor, economic minister, by economic affairs correspondent Elisha' Spiegelman--videotaped]

[Text] [Question] Mr Minister, over 2 and 1/2 months have passed since you made your declaration about your invention to save energy. Has there been any progress? Can you tell us today that the invention works?

[Answer] Yes, absolutely. I am pleased to inform you today--and I was pleased to so inform the prime minister this morning--that the researchers and my supervisors--who are neutral and have a very high standing in the world of energy science in this country, but who must still remain anonymous, informed me yesterday at midnight that the first-stage experiments had concluded, and that the results were highly promising. The rate of energy utilization [nitzolet] in these experiments was 60 percent.

[Question] What does 60 percent utilization mean?

[Answer] Utilization of 60 percent means, as follows: the power stations in Israel work on utilization of 37 percent. If we take into account that in another few years the country will need 10 million tons [of coal] in order to feed the three power stations, this will mean that on every percentage you will be saving about 100,000 tons. Make no mistake: 100,000 tons is approximately 5,000 box cars per day for 1 percent. If you multiply this, you understand, from 37 to 60, you will obtain the difference. That is, we are talking about a saving--in our own case, with coal--of at least 2.5 or close to 3 tons, if we stay at the level of 60 percent utilization. The fact is that this is the minimal figures, and with more advanced equipment the hope is--and I am being very cautious--that another 10 percent augmentation can be effected. This is something revolutionary in general terms, because there is as yet nothing like it in the world. That is, it confirms what I said on election day, true, a few days late, but this happens even with scientists, who also had difficulties, as I did.

[Question] Mr Meridor: You say that the invention works, but with all our belief perhaps you would explain to us why we cannot photograph this invention.

[Answer] Everyone including famous scientists in the country who did want to look at it--warned me to be cautious as long as it is not patented. If we make

it public, or a picture or a film on this subject is made public, the patent is not worth a cent because those who will use the patent without permission will be able to say that it was published in the press, and nothing we say will help. That is, we must have patience regarding this subject for at least another few months.

[Question] Who are the scientists who examined the invention? You yourself, Mr Minister, are not a scientist. It is as if to say: I examined it, and I with my scientific prestige, which I put on the line here, can say that this invention is a breakthrough.

[Answer] If you promise not to reveal his name or his identity and that you will not photograph him, I shall arrange for you to meet with this senior scientist.

[Question] Can you name a date: within how much time will we have electricity from this invention?

[Answer] Electricity is something else, that is already a practical use. Practical use means the planning of sophisticated installations, and will, I think, take several years. But to see it and be convinced, to touch it--I think, to put it cautiously, will take a few months.

[Question] Mr Minister: It is my impression that the invention will be far less revolutionary than what you said at first. Then you said you had an input of 17 kg of calories to produce 23,000.

[Answer] What I said then, on the spur of the moment, was about 5 minutes after they mentioned these figures to me. I did not give them to the media, but at a luncheon of the Tel Aviv Commercial and Industrial Club. I also do not know what the meaning is of 60 percent relative to 1 kg of calories, how much you put in and how much you extract. I am convinced that these details will become known.

[Question] Mr Minister: How would you define this moment, when you are announcing the conclusions?

[Answer] I would say that a load has been taken off my mind. Today, I would say, is a good day, a great day. And do not forget that it is Tuesday, when we say twice: It is good [in the daily prayers].

CSO: 4423/4

GAZA MAYOR OBJECTS TO PLAN FOR TERRITORIES

TA271742 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 27 Sep 81

[From the evening newsreel]

[Text] The defense minister's new plan for administering the territories is coming up against strong opposition from nationalist groups there. With Ari'el Sharon's presentation of his plan to the cabinet, Gaza Mayor Rashad ash-Shawwa has again turned it down completely. Our correspondent in the territories, Arye Gus, heard what Rashad ash-Shawwa had to say:

[Gus--live] Whatever the aim of Israel's new policy, Rashad ash-Shawwa said, those in Israel who are responsible for the affairs of the territories must understand that the Palestinians, both inside and outside--and this, of course, refers to the PLO--are united around one line, one demand, from which they will not deviate. The Palestinians' demand, the Gaza mayor said, is self-determination and an independent state. The replacement of the military government by a civilian administration is nothing but a superficial change and would mean a continuation of the conquest. The Palestinians are demanding that the government announce a change in content, not form; not an exhange of military uniforms for civilian clothes.

If the intention is really to implement autonomy, ash-Shawwa said, then there are serious differences of opinion with Israel. Even Prime Minister Menahem Begin says autonomy will not lead to self-determination and an independent state. In our opinion, as I said during my talk with Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon, we must have self-determination and an independent state. There are two views, ash-Shawwa said in picturesque words: one in the east and the other in the west and the twain shall never meet.

In brief, ash-Shawwa has again rejected the new plan for the separation of the military and civilian authorities in the territories. In his view, the encouragement of a moderate leadership will not change matters because there is nothing in any of this that can answer the Palestinians' demands and aspirations.

CSO: 4423/4

DAYAN BLASTS U.S. FOR 'ANTI-ISRAEL' CAMPAIGN

TA251106 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew political supplement 25 Sep 81 p 1

[Moshe Dayan commentary: "The Wrong Foot"]

[Text] Prime Minister Begin's trip to Washington early this month to meet with President Reagan was not one of those "working visits" we have grown used to in recent years. This was their first meeting after Reagan's election and after Begin was empowered to serve as Israel's Prime Minister in the 10th Knesset.

The meeting was not hastily arranged. Egyptian President as-Sadat preceded Begin and presented to Reagan his position on the Middle East and particularly regarding the United States, Egypt and Israel. Thus, from Israel's point of view, this visit was aimed at laying the basis for cooperation and at enabling the two leaders to get acquainted and arrive at understanding.

Even those who believe (as I do, for example) that we should not have "pushed ourselves forward," saw nothing wrong in Israel's representatives presenting to the new administration not only our problems but also our capabilities and our ability to assist the United States, if and when it needs such assistance.

Unfortunately, this get-acquainted visit ended in failure. It left a bitter taste, and, let it be said at once: It was not the prime minister and his entourage who were responsible for this, but the U.S. President and his aides.

I realize that it is still too soon to draw the practical conclusions from this visit. It is possible (the more so if Congress approves the AWACS deal) that many requests that were made will be fulfilled. The interest rate on our debts will be cut. We will receive military hardware, we will be allowed to produce and renovate U.S. military equipment, and more.

But this is not the question. The question is the understanding and the nature of the relations between Israel and the U.S. Administration. Here we met with a cold blast and sometimes with hostility. The official representatives declared over and over that the cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East is cooperation between it and Saudi Arabia, and that they intend to implement their plan even it if does harm to Israel's security. Secretary of State Haig made a scramble for the prime minister's plane, which was about to take off for Israel. He had the flight delayed, and warned him about the serious consequences for Israel if Saudi Arabia does not get the AWACS planes.

What stuck out most in the anti-Israeli information campaign was the recruitment of the U.S. ambassadors who are posted in Arab countries--Syria, Riyadh, Algeria and others--to have them explain to congressmen and senators how these Arab countries would view "strategic cooperation" with Israel.

I have no doubt that the U.S. ambassadors serve as faithful spokesmen for the Arab states. I can imagine--without fear of being wrong--how many anti-Israeli slanders were spewed out in their reports. It is the administration's right and duty to update the elected representatives about the mood in the Arab states; but this show in Washington, which was ostensibly performed in order to lay the basis for cooperation with Israel, was mixed with a large dose of hate for Israel.

No good.

CSO: 4423/4

HERUT TO ESTABLISH CITY BEYOND GREEN LINE

TA231143 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 81 p 6

[Report by economic correspondent El'azar Levin]

[Text] The Herut movement will set up a city, to be called "Kokhav Ya'ir," beyond the green line near Kfar Saba. This will be the first city to be established by Herut beyond the green line. It will be named after Ya'ir Stern, the commander of the Lehi [underground group that operated prior to the establishment of the state of Israel], who was killed by the British. The city will be populated by some 5,000 inhabitants who will reside in approximately 1,400 apartments.

The initiative to set up "Kokhav Ya'ir" came from the Herut youth and settlements movement. The president of the constructors' center, Mr David Stern--who is Ya'ir's brother--has been helping the initiators. They have also received help from a group of South African businessmen who are close to the Herut movement.

Authoritative sources yesterday said that whoever wishes to buy an apartment in Kokhav Ya'ir would be able to do so and sale would not be limited only to Herut members. It was reported that the intention is to sell some of the apartments to new immigrants from the United States, Western Europe and South Africa. The plan is to finance most of the investments by selling the apartments at current prices in the market.

Nevertheless, it has also been learned that the initiators of Kokhav Ya'ir have received aid from South Africa through the local zionist federation, whose leaders are mostly members of Herut. It seems that this aid is necessary to finance infrastructure works on the spot. There is currently an observation post inhabited by 16 families in Kokhav Ya'ir. Work to pave roads has started and planning is underway. A specific timetable for the beginning of construction has not yet been set.

CSO: 4423/4

BRIEFS

VILLAGES LINKED TO POWER GRID--The military government in the territories is taking steps toward linking villages in Judaea and Samaria to the Israeli power grid. In recent days the military governors ordered the disconnection of generators that have been installed in a number of villages, in order to enforce the linkup of the villages to Israel's power grid. The mukhtars of a number of villages were summoned to the military governors, where they were notified of Israel's intention. The villages to be linked up also have a local power-generating station. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that the joint Jordan-PLO committee discussed these Israeli measures and decided to oppose them. The military government explained to our correspondent it was inconceivable for every village in the territories to have its own generating plant. [Text] [TA221228 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 22 Sep 81]

GAZA RELIGIOUS SCHOOL--Defense Minister Sharon today gave his approval for a 3d year of studies at the al-Azhar Religious College in Gaza. This has been learned by our correspondent Bassam Ja'bar. Many Gaza notables had recently asked Israeli authorities to allow a 3d year of studies at al-Azhar to accommodate local students. For 2 years Egypt has refused to allow new students from the Gaza Strip to attend its universities. [Text] [TA221533 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 22 Sep 81]

FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES--Israel's foreign currency reserves in the Bank of Israel dropped by 2.5 percent in August, reaching $2.806 billion, compared to $2.88 billion in July. There has been a continuous drop in foreign currency reserves since April when they reached a peak of $2.99 billion. Nevertheless, the balance in August is much higher than it was in January and February this year when reserves amounted to $2.7 billion. [Text] [TA231250 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 23 Sep 81 p 8]

POLL RESULTS--According to a countrywide PORI Institute public opinion poll commissioned by HA'ARETZ, most of the Israeli public thinks--3 years after the signing of the Camp David agreements--that Israel was right to sign the accords. However, about a quarter of those polled have reservations about the agreements. Question: "This month marks 3 years since the Camp David agreement was signed. Do you think today that Israel should have signed it or not?" To this question 66.8 percent gave a positive reply, 18 percent a negative one, and 7.2 percent expressed reservations. Those with objections said Israel should not have agreed to evacuate the Yamit district and should have placed more emphasis on expediting the process of normalization of relations with Egypt. Of those polled, 7.4 percent

had no opinion on the subject. The opposition to the Camp David accords is most prominent among persons who have lived in the country since pre-state days, 27.9 percent of whom thought that Israel should not have signed the agreements. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed personally in their homes. [Text] [TA240906 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Sep 81 p 8]

FUEL IMPORTS--Israel spent $2.1 billion in 1980 to import 8.2 million tons of fuel, according to a report issued by the Delek Company. On the average, a ton of crude oil cost Israel $240 in 1980, compared with $160 in 1979. Average per capita consumption declined somewhat in 1980, totaling 2.04 tons, compared with 2.08 tons in 1979. Data of the Central Bureau of Statistics show that in the first quarter of 1981, energy consumption in Israel--in all its forms--totaled 1.95 million tons of crude oil, a drop of 4 percent, compared with a like period last year. [TA241322 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Sep 81 p 3]

MILITARY INDUSTRY SALES--Total sales of Israel's military industry in 1979 were 1.15 billion shekels, with exports accounting for approximately two-thirds of sales. Over one-half of the military industry's exports were of items developed by Israel itself, such as the Galil assault rifle, armor-piercing ammunition for tanks, and illumination flares. These data appear in the new government year book to be published by the information center. [TA241322 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Sep 81 p 3]

PLO-JORDAN AID TO W. BANK--The East Jerusalem paper AL-QUDS reports that the joint PLO-Jordanian committee will begin paying a second salary to the Arab civil servants in Judaea and Samaria effective from the end of next month. The payments will be made through the Jordanian Cooperation Bank. Our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari, notes that this bank is a branch of the Jordanian Ministry that deals with West Bank affairs. At the time, the PLO opposed the creation of this ministry. It would appear that a compromise has thus been reached between the PLO and Jordan regarding the ways to sidestep Israel's decision to ban the introduction into the territories of funds originating with the joint committee. Jordan's stand was that the aid should be provided through the Ministry for West Bank Affairs, while the PLO insisted that the aid be given in the name of the joint committee, Israel's ban notwithstanding. [Text] [TA240822 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 24 Sep 81]

WORK CONDITION OF ARABS--The National Labor Court today leveled sharp criticism at the subhuman working conditions of workers from the territories employed in Israel. Among other things, the ruling of the court's president stated: If these working conditions should be categorized, we had better forget that we are talking about the land of the prophets Isaish and Amos and say we are talking about the state of Timbuktu. In that case, we would be able to say that the facts reveal the ugly face of Timbuktu where migrant workers toil in subhuman conditions. These harsh remarks were made by the National Labor Court President, Tzvi Bar-niv, when he ruled in favor of a suit submitted by the widow of a worker from al-'Arish who was killed in a work accident. Although the man's employment did not come under the employment service law, the justices determined that the members of his family should not be punished and barred from receiving an allowance [from the National Insurance Institute]. Our correspondent notes that this ruling is

very significant with regard to the right of workers from the territories to receive allowances and grants after suffering work accidents in Israel. [Text] [TA241433 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 24 Sep 81]

PRO-SYRIANS OPPOSE LOCAL COUNCILS--Syria's supporters on the Golan Heights have launched activities to disperse the local councils in their villages, claiming that they were appointed by the Israeli authorities and they do not represent the inhabitants. This is reported by our correspondent, Yo'el Dar. Interior Ministry sources confirm that this information has reached them. However, to date no official request to dismantle the councils had been submitted. Meanwhile, the only Druze Qadi on the Golan Heights, Shaykh Muhammad 'Ali (Farkhat), from the village of Buq'ata, has said that neither he nor the members of his family intend to give up their Israeli identification cards. The Qadi--who has been subject to a religious and social boycott on the part of his colleagues--said he would continue to be an Israeli citizen even if he loses life in this as well as in the next world. [Text] [TA260821 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 26 Sep 81]

SALVADORAN LEFTISTS RECOGNITION REQUESTED--Paris, (exclusive)--The Labor Party will consider joining the French-Mexican initiative to recognize the liberation movement in El Salvador. It was asked to support this initiative by the French Socialist Party. This was stated by party chairman Shim'on Peres at the end of the socialist international session in Paris, which expressed support for this initiative. Peres said that in his talks with Latin American leaders, they said that Israel's standing has been severely weakened in the continent and warned that the danger exists that it might be completely expelled unless it changes its policy of supporting tyrannies. Peres invited former President Leopold Senghor and the secretary-general of the Spanish Socialist Party Felipe Gonzalez to Israel, to participate in the Ben-Gurion day events. Both expressed agreement in principle. In a conversation with Mitterrand, the question of ties with the Greek Socialist Party was raised. Mitterrand promised Peres to help create ties between the Israeli Labor Party and Andreas Papandreou, who might win the next Greek election and who has so far been ostensibly anti-Israeli. [Text] [TA271002 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Sep 81 p 3]

EASING OF WEST BANK POLICY--The military government has abandoned a policy of committing Al-Birah inhabitants to prevent stones from being thrown at Israeli cars. Deputy Attorney General Dorit Beinish informed the High Court of Justice of this today. About 2 months ago, 15 inhabitants of Al-Birah appealed to the Court against the military government, claiming that it was forcing them to establish a sort of civil guard to prevent stones from being thrown. As stated, following the appeal, the military government has retracted this policy. Our correspondent Arye Gus points out that after the announcement by the Attorney General's Office, the inhabitants of Al-Birah stated that they were satisfied. [Text] [TA271826 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 27 Sep 81]

BORDER GUARDS IN TERRITORIES--Next month the border guards will be given most of the routine security tasks in the towns of Judaea and Samaria. Our correspondent Moti 'Eden reports that the official reason for the transfer of security responsibility in the area to the border guards is the need to release reserve units from that type of activity. The area north of Jerusalem is already the

responsibility of the border guards and from next month border guard personnel will also be stationed south of Jerusalem. [Excerpt] [TA272117 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 27 Sep 81]

JORDAN-PLO TO PAY POLICE SALARIES--The joint Jordan-PLO committee has decided to pay salaries also to Arab policemen in the territories who were appointed after the six-day war. Policemen who have been serving since before that war have been receiving double salaries for quite some time now. According to the Camp David accords, internal security following autonomy is to be based on local policemen. [Text] [TA280942 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 28 Sep 81]

ORDER AGAINST WEST BANK ACTIVIST--The commander of the central command has issued a confinement order against Salah (Baransi) of at-Tayyibah, the leader of the sons of the village organization, who was one of the founders of the (Al-Arab) movement and is known as a fervent PLO supporter. The order was issued at the beginning of this month but (Baransi) was only informed about it yesterday. (Baransi) told our correspondent Bassam Ja'bar that he had been about to leave for England to attend a convention of the heads of the Galilee Fund, a fund established by former Israeli Arabs and pro-Palestinian British. Our correspondent notes that more than 1 year ago a restriction order had been issued against Salah (Baransi). However, the court annuled the order. [Text] [TA281753 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 28 Sep 81]

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION HEAD ELECTED--Israel's Netan'el Lorch has been elected head of the Association of Parliamentary Secretary Generals. The 17-nation organization is now holding its annual convention in Havana, Cuba, along with the Interparliamentary Union Convention. Lorch was the only candidate for the 3-year post. The representatives of eight Arab countries said that they might have to pull out of the organization. [Text] [TA220722 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 22 Sep 81]

WATER RATES--The Knesset water committee yesterday decided on a 26-percent increase in water rates, to go into effect in the coming days as a direct result of three price increases in electricity in the past 2 months. [TA221844 Jerusalem POST in English 22 Sep 81 p 1]

IMPORTS, TRADE DEFICIT--Imports of consumer goods rose by 63 percent in the first half of the year, with cars rising by 113 percent and foodstuffs by 58. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, import of production input excluding diamonds and fuel, rose by only 19 percent. Imports of fuel dropped by 3 percent apparently because of the lower prices. Import of rough diamonds decreased by 51 percent and that of investment goods, excluding ships and planes, by 8 percent. Israel's trade deficit grew by 10 percent during the first half of the year, reaching $1,351 billion. The growth is the result of a $76-million rise in imports and a $44 million drop in exports. Imports reached $4.081 million during this period, a 2-percent rise compared with last year; and exports reached $2.653 million, a drop of 2 percent. [TA221844 Jerusalem POST in English 22 Sep 81 p 10]

CSO: 4400/10

STUDENTS PARTICIPATE IN PRODUCTION PROJECTS

Tripoli AL-TALIB in Arabic 30 Aug 81 pp 6-8

[Article: "Toward Achieving Self-Sufficiency for Society"]

[Text] As confirmation of the revolution's continuous advance, sweeping away all the puny obstacles before it and overcoming all barriers built by the enemies of life and freedoms, as continuation of the leadership revolutionary course, led by the Arab masses in the Jamahiriyah, and in accordance with the facts, showing that our student masses, throughout our great land, have proved their value, efficiency and readiness to build the new socialist society, which the glorious First of September Revolution and the Third World theory are trying to emphasize throughout the world, so that happiness and freedom can be achieved for all the masses that reject submissive slavery, our students have made great strides forward, when measured against the short life of the revolution and the student movement in the Jamahiriyah.

Our students in the Jamahiriyah were the ones who took part in the revolution right up to 2 March, a historic day in the life of mankind. They were the ones who achieved the students' revolution of 7 April, producing a series of civil uprisings and demonstrations, boldly undertaken by our students in 61, 64 and 65. As a decisive result of the aforementioned facts, our students are emblazoned on the pages of history. They were the first students in the world to turn to being productive.

To that end, student conferences in the Jamahiriyah and abroad decided that there was a need to participate in production, that students should not depend on society's other groups for productivity, and that their roles should not continue to be negative and dependent at the expense of society, since that is completely rejected in the new society. Everyone shares equally in the new society; accordingly, the Fifth Jamahiriyah Students Conference, held at Qariyunis University in Benghazi, recommended:

"Students' conferences have stressed the achieving of self-sufficiency for society. The memorandum in this regard established a way to do that. The Jamahiriyah's students, who are determined to do this, are offering pioneering experience to students of the world, to develop their role, from mere tools of rejection, exploited by forces battling against authority, to producers of material and moral change in their societies."

This recommendation was a strong cry, which the students of 7 April sent forth to the students of other societies to follow on their path, in order to achieve self-sufficiency, and to lay the foundations of the new society, in which power, wealth and weapons are in the masses' hands.

The administrative committee of the General Conference of Jamahiriyah Students turned the recommendation over to the General People's Committee for practical implementation, which in turn formed a committee to study effective ways to employ the students, in accordance with the premises upon which this sector's participation in implementing projects of the plan would be based. These projects could be implemented by them on the level of each municipality, in accordance with numbers targeted for employment.

This year, students have been employed at production sites, which are basically dependent on muscle power and on that type of production that is far from offices and air-conditioning. This is with the proviso that students, above the obligatory level at specialized technical institutes and colleges, be employed in their specialties, while general secondary students may work in any of various production sites.

Construction Projects

These are represented by the construction of large cisterns in Tobruk by students of the Tobruk secondary school, construction of dirt roads by students from the Darnah Teachers Institute, construction and afforestation of gardens by the students of the Abu Zar al-Ghafari school in Benghazi, and construction of new gardens in the town of al-Zawiyah, in which students of the al-Zawiyah secondary school and the Sarman secondary school participated.

Afforestation

Students of the Darnah Teachers Institute undertook the planting of Wadi Darnah with trees. The students of the city of Tripoli also dug holes for planting trees in the Tarhunah and Ghariyan agricultural projects.

Maintenance and Cleaning

The students of the Darnah Teachers Institute are maintaining schools and institutes in the area, along with students from the Jamal 'Abd al-Nassir secondary school in al-Fateh, and students of the Jaber Ibn Hayan school in Sarat. Students of the Haun secondary school in al-Jafrah are cleaning irrigation ditches in the agricultural project.

Moreover, students of the Teachers Institute in Marzag are cleaning irrigation ditches for projects in al-Hamirah, Turaghan, Umm al-Araneb and Zuwaylah, as well as road maintenance and paving.

Students of the Brak Teachers Institute, during the first stage of their employment program, are also cleaning irrigation ditches in the Brak agricultural project. In Awbari, students are participating in maintaining schools and institutes, and in maintaining the dirt roads, along with students from Sauf al-Jin,

Zulaytan, al-Khams, Tarhunah, al-Zawiyah, al-'Aziziyah, Ghariyan, Yafran, Subha and Tripoli.

Excavating

Excavation activities are especially represented by the digging of water canals or laying underground cables, whether for electricity or telephone.

In Darnah, during the first stage, students took part in laying underground cables. Students in al-Fateh also participated in digging a canal to channel the waters of the al-Ghurayq.

In Benghazi, during the first stage of the employment program, students dug and maintained protective canals for the city of Benghazi, and dug a reservoir for the waters of the al-Khadhra'.

In Marzaq, students of the Marzaq Teachers Institute are being used to dig canals and to extend electricity lines. In Ghadamis, students are extending electricity lines, and students from Suf al-Jin are taking part in digging a canal to connect water wells in the Zamzam project. Students from al-Khams are also extending water networks in the town. In the town of al-Naqat al-Khams, students are working to fill up the ponds and swamps.

Stabilizing the Sand Dunes

It was thought to use students to resist and stabilize the encroaching sands, by preparing earthen walls. This is a very important matter, especially in the southern area of the Jamahiriyah, where the advancing desert is considered more of a threat than anything else.

On this basis, students of Suf al-Jin will participate in preparing earthen walls, and students from the city of Ajdabiya will take part in controlling sand dunes.

Reports received have indicated that use of students this year is reaching a very excellent level, and a percentage of its success has been dependent on the persistence and determination of the students to become productive, apart from from their scholastic duties.

Let us review a report published about the use of students in the town of al-Jabal al-Akhdhar. It will clarify for us the extent of the success achieved by the idea of employing students, and the recommendation of the student masses, which they themselves adopted without urging or being ordered to, since all those forms have been done away with in the age of the masses, in which the order is the people's conferences' order, power is the people's power, and implementation belongs to the people's committees.

First. The number of departments, to which students were allocated, during the first stage of employment, was eight:

1. Education
2. Agriculture
3. Health
4. Housing
5. Communications
6. Utilities
7. Electricity
8. Social Security

Second. Number of projects in each department:

Education	22
Agriculture	5
Health	3
Housing	2
Communications	1
Utilities	4
Electricity	12
Social Security	1

Third. Number of students in each department:

1. Education: 280 male and 50 female students were transferred, for a total of 330; 158 male and 32 female students, total of 190, worked.

2. Agriculture: 152 male students were transferred; 8[illegible] worked.

3. Health: 20 male and 30 female students were transferred, for a total of 50; 14 male and 28 female students worked, for a total of 42, in addition to 8 students from the Medical College and the Health Institute, making the total 50.

4. Housing: 31 male students were transferred; 18 students carried out the work.

5. Communications: 24 male students were transferred; 7 students worked.

6. Utilities: 100 male students were transferred, plus 6 female students from the Engineering College in Benghazi, to work for a 2-month period. The total was 106 students; 76 students carried out the work.

7. Electricity: 120 male students were transferred, of whom 96 worked.

8. Social Security: 7 students were transferred, and 7 worked.

Fourth. Jobs performed by students at production sites: Students did some valuable work that cannot be overlooked. Students cleaned out and regulated the reservoir, maintained schools and institutes, and organized and classified books and papers for schools and institutes. Female students also washed blankets in domestic departments. Students also trimmed and pruned trees, tilled the soil, cleared the land of underbrush, maintained some of the agricultural machinery, harvested some of the agricultural crops, and removed waste and garbage. Students also erected posts and extended cables, as well as other work.

Fifth. The total of all students (male and female) in all the departments:

The total of male and female students, who were deployed for work, was 827.

Sixth. The total number of students who actually worked was 529, i.e., 78 percent.

Seventh. General observations:

The committee to supervise and follow-up employment in the Department of Public Services, in the municipality of al-Jabal al-Akhdhar, noted that no reports had been received from some departments about the first period of employment. There were some letters that stated the number of students allocated to them, and the number of students who worked in these departments

1. Education: We received letter number 1/1/111/1140 dated 14/7/81, to which was appended lists of the students' names who had actually worked for this department. In addition to this, there was letter number 1/1/111/1172 dated 22/7/81, and letter number 1/1/111/1166T dated 21/7/81.

2. Communications: We received letter number lm/4179/94 dated 26/7/81 setting forth the number of students' jobs during this period.

4. Social security: We received a copy of letter number 3/2/2847 dated 21/7/81, concerning the disbursement of remunerations.

5. Health: We received letter number 53/1/27/41/81m, concerning students who had not done their jobs.

The committee noted that there were departments which had prepared excellent progress reports. These departments are:

a. Agriculture
b. Utilities

6. There are some statements mentioned in this report, such as the jobs that the students performed, and the numbers of students who worked, which were in connection with the departments and those who supervised the employment in each department. These departments are:

a. Electricity
b. Housing
c. Education
d. Health

7. The committee made one excellent observation, that most of the departments paid out their remunerations immediately upon completion of the first period, while some other departments paid it immediately after 'Id al-Fitr. Those supervising employment in the departments were thankful for this, as well as those who prepared the remunerations.

8. The committee transferred a large number of students who live in other municipalities to work and participate with their brother students at production centers.

The municipalities to which the students were transferred are:

a.	Tobruk	5
b.	Darnah	29
c.	al-Fateh	22
d.	Ajdabiya	32
e.	Benghazi	5
f.	Misratah	16
	Total	139 [sic]

9. The committee noted that some departments that have some projects in the provinces did not have adequate transportation to distribute the students around the production centers, which led to keeping a large number of students from work. Therefore, we hope that the second period will be better, in terms of availability of transport.

10. The committee noted that most of the departments did not prepare the required report, nor did they send it to the student employment committee immediately after completion of the period. Therefore, we ask that the report for the second period be prepared immediately after completion of the final period. We ask that reports be prepared as follows:

a. Number of students transferred by the student employment committee in the Public Services Department.

b. Number of students who actually worked.

c. Jobs and accomplishments by the students at the production sites.

Seventh [sic] The Results

The results that we obtained during the first period of employment were:

1. Students who were transferred were students who wanted to work, and to whom the first period of employment was applicable, and who were deployed to production sites, were from:

a. Al-Fateh secondary school in al-Jabal al-Akhdhar
b. 'Umar al-Mukhtar Teachers Institute in al-Jabal al-Akhdar

2. There were excellent and productive jobs performed by the students during this period, and they were cited in the report.

Al-Damur Martyrs Camp

The al-Damur Martyrs production camp is located 30 kms from the city of Ghariyan. There are about 280 students located there, in their first period of employment.

The students are employed at this camp on two projects, Ghariyan's terraces, in which they are doing the stone work and the planting, and the project of grazing lands in Ghariyan, in which they are doing the inside and outside fencing. This is in addition to productive work within these projects, which continues for 8 hours a day. Apart from that, the students are continuously active all summer long. In addition to their work, there is a mixture of intellectual and vocational lectures, cultural and journalistic activities and popular sports activities.

O Masses of the Glorious Front!

O Masses of the free world and those longing for freedom!

These then are the students of the age of the masses. Thus, they decide and implement their own decisions. Students of the age of the masses pledge to their Arab nation that they will not be unproductive students, and that they will be armed to defend the honor, integrity and security of the Arab nation. Forward!

7005
CSO: 4504/76

BRIEFS

MISRATAH DEVELOPMENT DATA--The department of follow-up and implementation, in the General People's Committee for Planning of the town of Misratah, reported that development expenditures for the first half of the first year of the 1981-85 five-year plan, for all sectors of the Misratah Municipality were 17,897,000 dinars. The percentage of implementation was 48 percent of the total target expenditures for 1981, i.e., an increase of 13.4 million dinars, compared with the same period of 1980. It was also stated in the report that the total disbursements in the utilities sector reached 69 percent, while disbursements in the agricultural reclamation sector were 66.5 percent, the economy 52.4 percent, and the electricity sector 51.9 percent. The contracts concluded during the follow-on period amounted to 10,355,000 dinars, and were concentrated in the fields of public utilities, the economy, communications and agriculture. [Text] [Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 13 Aug 81 p 2] 7005

CSO: 4504/76 END

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14 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2415

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14 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2415

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IRAQ-BRAZIL BANK TO BE ESTABLISHED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 pp 11,12

[Text]

There were renewed reports last week that Iraq and Brazil were planning a joint banking venture capitalised at $40 million with headquarters in Rio de Janerio. According to the reports from London, the two sides have finished preliminary negotiations and discussions on the venture and a formal agreement is to be concluded early in November, when a Brazilian trade delegation visits Baghdad.

This newsletter reported the project at the end of last year (See *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, December 29, 1980) when the figure being quoted for the new venture's capital was $50 million, to be jointly held by the Iraqi Rafidain Bank and the Brazilian Bank, both state-owned. Though attractive to both countries which have become increasingly important trade partners, it is likely the project was shelved due to Iraqi preoccupation with the Gulf war and the recovery of some of its oil market, lost during the first few months of the war.

According to reports from Brazilia, Iraq recently resumed its place as Brazil's largest oil supplier, although precise figures of Iraqi oil sales have not been published. For its part, Brazil exports important quantities of arms and foodstuffs to Iraq, and some of its major contracting firms are working on infrastructural projects in the Arab country.

The banking venture, if it comes into being, will be the first of its kind for both the Iraqis and the Brazilians. Kuwait has been Brazil's most rapidly expanding banking and investment partner in the Arab world, with the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company (KFTCIC) leading more than $300 million worth of loans to Brazil's national development bank (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 4, and July 20, 1980) as well as industrial joint ventures between the two countries, notably Kuwait's shareholding in VW-Brazil.

CSO: 4400/12

JORDAN, IRAQ PLANNING JOINT AIR DEFENSE

TA231207 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 81 p 2

[Report by Correspondent in Britain Yosi Melman]

[Text] London, 22 Sep [exclusive for HA'ARETZ]--Jordan and Iraq are planning to establish a joint aerial defense system. This was disclosed to the HA'ARETZ correspondent by knowledgeable military sources in London. The sources noted that in the wake of the increasing military-economic cooperation between the two countries, senior officers of the Jordanian and Iraqi air forces have begun discussing the establishment of a joint aerial defense system.

Initially, the reference is to exchanging intelligence data gathered by the radar systems and, later, to the possibility of establishing anti-aircraft missile batteries as well as radar and monitoring stations which would be run jointly by officers of both armies.

According to these sources, discussions of this issue have increased following the Israeli air force attack on the nuclear reactor in Baghdad. The heads of the Iraqi and Jordanian armies have been holding contacts with their counterparts in Saudi Arabia with the intention of integrating the Saudi air force in the establishment of the joint defense system.

However, according to the military sources, the Saudis have made it plain that their participation in the talks might hamper their chances to receive the five AWACS because it would strengthen the opponents to the deal who would then claim that the sale of the AWACS to the Saudis will cause important intelligence data about Israel to be transferred to its enemies. According to the sources, the United States has asked Saudi Arabia for assurances that it would not transfer data gathered by the AWACS to Iraq and Jordan.

CSO: 4423/6

'AFP' REPORTS ON MRS THATCHER'S TALKS IN KUWAIT 28 SEP

NC281030 Paris AFP in English 1023 GMT 28 Sep 81

[Text] Kuwait, 28 Sep (AFP)--Increased economic ties with particular emphasis on British arms sales were the subject of talks here between British prime minister and Kuwaiti leaders, informed sources said today.

Mrs Thatcher stopped in oil-rich Kuwait on her way to the commonwealth heads of government meeting at Melbourne, Australia.

Her talks late yesterday with Defence Minister Shaykh Salim al-Sabah concentrated on arms sales, the Shaykh announced after the meeting adding that Kuwait was to send military delegations to Britain to follow up on the talk.

Informed sources said that during her visit here Mrs Thatcher repeated Britain's stand on the Middle East which calls for mutual recognition of Israel and the Palestinian cause.

The British prime minister said although Britain was willing to join a suggested United States-led rapid intervention force in the Gulf individual Gulf countries were responsible for their own defence.

Britain considered the U.S. the only Western power able to put sufficient pressure on Israel and Britain supported the Camp David agreement, Mrs Thatcher told Kuwait leaders.

Mrs Thatcher also told Kuwaiti leaders she recognised the Palestinian question was no longer a refugee problem, the sources aid.

Meanwhile, Kuwait newspapers today attacked Mrs Thatcher for her "hostility" to the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which she accused of "terrorism."

Mrs Thatcher's hostility to the PLO was a change in Britain's attitude towards the Palestinians, the Kuwait newspaper al-Andaa said.

Another newspaper, al-ra'y al'-Amm, said Mrs Thatcher had ruled out an independent role for Europe in the Middle East peace process.

CSO: 4400-11

MUJAHEDIN REPORTED EQUIPPED WITH SAM-7 LAUNCHERS

Paris LE MATIN in French 3 Sep 81 p 11

[Text] The Afghan Moslem resistance fighters have begun to receive small quantities of portable ground-air SAM-7 launchers of Soviet manufacture, but they still do not seem to have been able to use them successfully, say several Westerners who have resided in Afghanistan clandestinely.

In the month of August in the province of Nangarhar (eastern Afghanistan) a doctor who belongs to a humanitarian arganization saw several launchers half-concealed under the tarpaulins of a closely guarded house. The local resistance chief confirmed to him that the launchers in question were indeed SAM-7's, but was unwilling to indicate where they came from, how many there were and for what they were being used.

Two other travelers had reported at the beginning of the summer that the group of the Hezbi Islami movement led by Mullah Yunes Khales had unsuccessfully fired four of these devices for which the Mujahedin had been asking since the beginning of Soviet intervention to put a stop to the invincibility of the MI 24 armored helicopters.

The SAM-7's could alter the appearance of the conflict in Afghanistan. But according to sources near Western information services, the untrained resistance fighters are having little success in mastering the firing system of the launcher.

A French member of the Guild organization of the raid which convoys medical and food supplies intended for the Afghan populations of the interior likewise came across a group of Hazaras resistance fighters in the region of Ghazni, south of Kabul, who declared that they possessed some SAM-7's. "I personally did not see them," he points out, "but those Hazaras were transporting an impressive lot of materiel, and especially dozens of RPG-7 rockets."

The observers note, however, that stories about downed helicopters remain quite infrequent, and that never yet has the resistance in Afghanistan claimed to have hit an objective with the help of a SAM-7.

Furthermore, Western diplomatic sources indicated on Wednesday that fighting is continuing in the Afghan provinces, whereas Kabul seems calmer than usual. The number of rumors heard this week in the capital about shootings and explosions has been smaller, while rumors about attempts have also been less numerous.

Nevertheless numerous convoys have left Kabul for the neighboring provinces of Parwen and Logar where several skirmishes and bombings have been reported.

The Soviet and Afghan units, which 10 days ago unsuccessfuly tried to invade the rebel stronghold in the Panshir valley north of Kabul, have not returned to their billets, and remain stationed in the province of Parwan where, according to the diplomats, they are engaging in various operations against the villages won from the resistance by bombing the houses or destroying crops.

The diplomats likewise report that a member of the Democratic Party of the Afghan People is believed to have stated during the week that "the Soviets are in Afghanistan for a very long stay and that they will not abandon the Karmal regime." "The United States and the USSR will probably reach an agreement on Afghanistan in exchange for concessions made to American interests in some other region of the world," this party member is believed to have added, according to diplomatic sources.

9498
CSO: 4619/37

ENEMIES OF ISLAM DENOUNCED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 64, Aug 81 p 3

[Article: Preface to Issue, Including a Prayer, a Denunciation of Enemies"]

[Text] In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

My fellow reader, many happy returns [on the occasion of the Bairam feast] to you and to all your brothers everywhere on earth. We hope that you are well, that you are prosperous and that all is well with you.

May you accept from all of us, Lord, the fast [that we have completed], our existence [in your service], our reading of the Koran and our good deeds.

We ask God Almighty that when He brings back this feast to our nation [next year], the victory of the freedom fighters will have been achieved in Syria, in Afghanistan, in Palestine, in Eritrea, in the Ogaden, in the Philippines, in Pattani and everywhere the banner of fighting for freedom flutters.

We pray God Almighty that He break the back of every ruler who betrays his religion and his nation, who overpowers his people and sympathizes with the enemies of God: the Jews, the Crusaders and the communists. We pray God that He strengthen His message and that He unite the hearts of all the citizens of this nation under the banner of "There is no God but Allah" and under the leadership of "our lord, the messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation."

We pray God that He make us examine ourselves so we can change ourselves, so He can change our nation to what it ought to be and to what is satisfactory [to Him]. We pray God Almighty that He accept us among His loyal soldiers and that He set us firmly on His path so we can come to Him unchanged, unthwarted and unmoved by temptation. Amen. Amen. Amen.

8592
CSO: 4504/86

GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO UPHOLD RELIGION, CONSTITUTION CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 64, Aug 81 pp 14-15

[Article by Salih 'Ashmawi: "We Are Calling for the Resignation of the Cabinet"]

[Text] In its issue which came out Monday, 20 Sha'ban 1401 [Hegira], which coincides with 22 June 1981, the newspaper AL-AHRAM published a cartoon by Salah Jahin on page 9 entitled "Events That Hurt National Unity." The cartoon showed Egypt portrayed as a mother with three male children, representing unity, harmony and secularism. In front of them stood a young woman called sectarian sedition. Under the cartoon there was [this] inscription: "Egypt: These are my sons, and I know they are good children, but whose daughter are you?" What concerns me about this sketch is Egypt's posture as it looks after, embraces and expresses pride in one of her "good" sons whom she called secularism. The idea behind the sketch belongs to Salah Jahin who produced it, and Salah Jahin is a Marxist artist whose inclinations are known and who is known for his non-religious and secular tendencies. He has assumed postures and produced cartoons about Islam and its precepts and scholars. These cartoons are on record and can neither be forgotten nor obliterated. Perhaps one of the most remarkable of these postures was his vicious campaign against His Eminence al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali because he stood at one of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's conferences attacking the fact that the consumption of alcohol was being tolerated while the use of narcotics was being fought. [At that time al-Ghazali had said], "What is the difference between a bottle of alcohol and a piece of hashish?" At that time 'Abd-al-Nasir's lackeys unleashed their writers and their artists against al-Shaykh. Salah Jahin then headed the list of attackers, sketching al-Shaykh al-Ghazali for several days in a row in postures that ridiculed him and made fun of him. Attacking Islam by mocking it and making fun of its scholars is a well-known communist tactic.

That dark period of Egypt's history is gone, and we hope that it will not return. The administration, the rulers and the constitution have changed, but Salah Jahin cannot hide his resentment and his spite against Islam. These undoubtedly rise to the surface and flow to his pen in many situations. Perhaps the most recent such situation was that when Salah Jahin took advantage of the events of the civil strife at al-Zawiya

al-Hamra' and produced a sketch that was more eloquent and more profound in its statement and in its effect than an article. In that cartoon he portrayed Egypt as a secular state. Secular states are states that have washed their hands of all religions wholly and separately. These states do not have an official religion, and religion--any religion--has no effect on their policies or their social and economic life. The most remarkable example of a secular state in our time is India. When Kemal Ataturk abolished the Islamic succession and proclaimed Turkey a secular state, he stipulated in the Turkish constitution that people were not to be called to prayer, that the Koran was not to be read and that religion was not to be taught. He forced Turkish Muslims to wear hats, and he forced Muslim women to unveil their faces in public and to mix with strange men just like western and Russian women do.

What did Salah Jahin mean when he portrayed Egypt boasting about one of her children who is called secularism? Has Egypt really detached itself from Islam and has it turned its back on its religion and its faith? Is this what Salah Jahin is hoping for and advocating openly and boldly? Does Salah Jahin want the call to prayer to be unheard in Egypt, the country of a 1,000 minarets as it's being said? Does Salah Jahin want to forbid the reading of the Koran? Does he want the reading of the Koran forbidden in God's houses of worship and in the homes and gatherings of Egyptians? Does Salah Jahin want to abolish from the schools the subject of religion so children would grow up in Egypt without a religion and without faith, not practicing any of the cornerstones or the rituals of Islam? The fact that Salah Jahin published this sketch in the midst of the events of al-Zawiya al-Hamra' when nerves were tense, hearts were overflowing with emotion and rumors were filling the air could have been explained as partiality to the oppressive group and an abandonment of Islam and of the Muslims who were treacherously shot in the back while they were in a mosque, in a house of worship. In this way it would have been very easy for Salah Jahin to turn this sectarian strife in a corner of Cairo into a civil war that would sweep the country from Aswan to Alexandria.

Where Is the Constitution?

Is Salah Jahin unaware of Egypt's constitution which stipulates that the official religion of the state is Islam and that its language is the Arabic language? Is he unaware of the fact that the constitution also stipulates in another article that Islamic law is the principal source for legislation? Hasn't Salah Jahin heard the speeches of the president which he had delivered after a previous incident of sectarian strife when Egypt's Copts in the United States demonstrated against the head of the state and the symbol of its policy while he was visiting in a foreign country? These Copts proved thereby that they were the most disloyal people to Egypt and that they lacked the simplest principles of ethical and good conduct? The president said in that speech something to that effect: "I am a Muslim president of a Muslim state which is not an ordinary Muslim state, but rather a leading one that has been carrying the banner of Islam and defending it throughout the centuries and the generations. The fact that al-Azhar is in it makes Egypt a beacon that emits the radiance and the light of Islam to all the countries of the Islamic world."

Where Is the Editor-in-Chief?

If Salah Jahin is the principal perpetrator and the primary person who is responsible for the terrible transgression [that has been committed] against Egypt, where I wonder was the editor-in-chief? How did he permit the publication of this sketch under the circumstances that existed then? I can hardly imagine or believe that such a dangerous sketch in a situation that was so complicated and critical would not be reviewed by the editor-in-chief of AL-AHRAM.

Where Is the Shaykh of al-Azhar?

If we were to leave AL-AHRAM, its artists and its editor-in-chief, where is the shaykh of al-Azhar? Salah Jahin's claim that Egypt is a secular state infringes upon [the religious leader's] faith as a Muslim, and it also affects his position as the shaykh of al-Azhar. A secular state would not have an al-Azhar or a shaykh for al-Azhar.

Where Is the Patriarch of the Copts?

I cannot ignore Father Shanudah , the patriarch of the Copts. Salah Jahin's appeal for secularism affects not only Islam and Muslims, but it is also an affront to Christianity and to Christians. Secularism does not acknowledge Islam, Christianity or any religion.

Where Is the People's Assembly and Its President?

It is curious that such a cartoon would pass and be published in AL-AHRAM, which is read by hundreds of thousands of people and circulated among them, without moving the spiritual leaders or the People's Assembly, which represents the legislative authority [in the country] and is the guardian of the country's constitution. In my article in the last issue [of AL-DA'WAH] I referred to what had happened during a discussion of the report of the Media Committee and of the Religious Affairs Committee regarding the suggestion of the honorable member, Mahmud Nafi' of abolishing wanton movies and provocative embraces from [the fare that] was being presented on television and on the movie screen. The discussion turned into a sharp argument between the independent member al-Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il and the president of the session because al-Shaykh Salah had said that the underlying premise in our media was not Islamic but secular. In this discussion Mr Muhammad Rashwan, vice president of the assembly and the chairman of the committee meeting said, "Describing Egypt as a secular state is objectionable." Are the People's Assembly and its vice president provoked when al-Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il declares that the underlying assumption of the media in Egypt is secular, and do they reject this description? And then when Salah Jahin says the same thing, not between four walls in a parliamentary committee, but in a cartoon in a newspaper with a large circulation, their response is silence? It's being said that silence is a sign of acquiescence?

Where Is the Public Prosecutor?

If we were to leave the legislative authority and shift to the executive authority, we would be entitled to ask and to wonder, "Where is the public prosecutor who represents society, who is the keeper of the public trust and the guardian of the constitution and its stipulations against any verbal of physical attack?"

Where Is the Minister of Information?

Or rather where is the minister of information who is the overseer of the press, notwithstanding what is being said about the press being a fourth authority? Where is the minister of information especially when AL-AHRAM, which published this cartoon, is one of the national newspapers with which the government--in any situation and in any form--has close relations?

Where Are the Prime Minister and the Ministers?

Lastly but not finally, where are the deputy prime minister and the ministers? Did they not take an oath to honor and protect the constitution? Is not describing Egypt as a secular state an attack on more than one stipulation of this constitution? Why is nothing being done about Salah Jahin?

A long time has gone by since this cartoon was published, and none of the officials has taken action. This may be interpreted as an endorsement of the statement mentioned in the cartoon about Egypt being a secular state and a tacit recognition of it. This is treason against the religion and the faith of the state and a plain challenge to the constitution. Therefore, we are calling for the resignation of the cabinet.

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BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL ACTIONS DEFENDED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 64, Aug 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Mustafa Mashhur: "From the Knowledge of the Sacred Calling: Lessons in Passing; the Muslim Brothers, Politics and the Policy of Parties"]

[Text] It is curious to find that some people regard the Muslim Brothers as a group of austere men of the cloth who know nothing about politics, political maneuvers and the methods of enemies and so on and at the same time to find others, whose Islamic agenda does not include the establishment of an Islamic state, who regard the Muslim Brothers as people preoccupied with political matters and exposing themselves therefore to hardship and persecution which they can manage to do without.

Then we see the rulers who have prevailed fighting the Brothers and making false accusations against them to justify their war. They accuse them of seeking power, of hiding behind religion and of [attempting to] overthrow the regime. If they were fair, they would amend the charge to rectifying the regime, which is in a state of disorder and disarray. A controversy may arise over whether the Muslim Brothers will let the educational aspect prevail over the political aspect or whether they will do the opposite. There are other matters which [may be the subject of controversy and which] we will try to explain with some clarity, may God help us in this.

We Reject the Separation of Religion and Politics

First and foremost we reject the notion of separating religion and politics. The statement that there is to be no religion in politics and no politics in religion and the consequences thereof, implying that political parties are not to be established on a religious basis and religious societies are not to be involved in politics, are groundless and extremely erroneous. Anyone who thought that religion--or more accurately Islam--does not allude to politics or that politics is not one of its domains does himself an injustice and does his knowledge of Islam an injustice [as well], but he does not do Islam an injustice. Islam is the law of God and is beyond the reach or falsehood.

Regarding the Brothers' position on politics Imam al-Banna says, "People say that the Muslim Brothers are a political group, that their message is political and that they have objectives other [than those of Islam]. We don't know how long accusations, doubts and insults will be exchanged in our nation while certainty supported by fact is brushed aside for the sake of casting doubts [on others]. O people of our nation, we are calling upon you with the Koran in our right hand, with the prophetic tradition in our left hand and the deeds of our worthy ancestors, the citizens of our nation as our guide. We are calling you to Islam, to the precepts of Islam, to the provisions of Islam and to the right guidance of Islam. If this seems politics to you, so be it. If those who are urging you [to adopt] these principles are politicians, then thank God we are the oldest practitioners of politics. If you wish to call this politics, call it what you will. Names won't hurt us when the names become clear and the objectives are revealed. Islam has a policy which harbors happiness for the world and righteousness for the hereafter. This is our policy. We do not seek an alternative to it. Be guided by it, and impose it on others so you would win glory in the hereafter. 'You shall before long know its truth' " [Al-Huzn: 88].

Our Islam is not a clerical religion or a monastic religion for individuals. It is a complete system of life. It is a religion for one nation. It covers all the matters of this world and the hereafter, including government, legislation, fighting for the faith and telling all people about Islam. This is the Islam in which the Muslim Brothers believe. It makes the government one of its cornerstones, and it relies on execution just as much as it relies on right guidance. The third caliph, may God be pleased with him, said, "God attributes to authority what He does not attribute to the Koran." The prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, made government one of the mainstays of Islam. In our books of knowledge government is considered a matter of doctrine and principle and not one of knowledge and [its] branches. We see Imam al-Ghazali, may God be pleased with him, saying, "I know that Islamic law is the basic principle and that the king is its guardian. Whatever lacks a foundation is destructable and whatever lacks a guardian is lost." The Islamic state can only be based on the message so that it can be a state with a message and not an administrative system or a spiritless, mute, lifeless government. The message also cannot be established unless it has a sponsor who protects it, publicizes it, transmits it and strengthens it.

We find the martyred imam talking to us about Islamic government and the need to deliver government from those who do not put [Islamic law] into practice. He says, "Islam is as much government and execution as it is legislation and education and law and compliance with that law: they are all inseparable. If an Islamic reformer is satisfied with being a scholar of jurisprudence and a guide, affirming orders, reciting instructions and expounding applications and fundamentals while letting functionaries enact for the nation laws that are not sanctioned by God and allowing them to use their executive power to force the nation to disobey His orders, the natural outcome of this [situation] will be the loss of that reformer's

voice--a voice lost in a wilderness and a puff of dust, as they say. Islamic reformers' satisfaction with the status of preachers and guides may be understandable if they were to find functionaries who would heed the commands of God, carry out His provisions and convey the deeds and the traditions of His prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. But since the case is what it is, with Islamic legislation on one end of the pole and actual executive legislation on another, the reluctance of Islamic reformers to seek power is an Islamic crime that can be atoned only by seizing the power of the executive authority from those who do not subscribe to the provisions of true Islam. This statement is plain; we did not make it up, but we are using it to establish the provisions of true Islam. Accordingly, the Muslim Brothers would not seek power for themselves if they were to find in the nation those who were prepared to assume this burden, fulfill this charge and rule according to an Islamic Koranic method. Such persons would be their soldiers, their supporters and their helpers. If the Muslim Brothers do not find such persons, [seeking] power will be on their agenda, and they will make an effort to seize power from every government that does not carry out the commands of God.

There is one statement that must be made in this situation: the Muslim Brothers have not seen one government among contemporary governments which can assume this burden or which is truly prepared to champion Islamic thought. Let the nation know this; let the nation demand its Islamic rights from its rulers; and let the Muslim Brothers go to work.

The Brothers' Agenda

The Muslim Brothers mean to have a Muslim individual, a Muslim household, a Muslim nation, a Muslim government and a Muslim state that would lead the Islamic states, unite the scattered Muslims, bring back their glory and restore to them their lost lands, their usurped homelands and their stolen countries. Such a state would then raise the banner of a holy war and the banner of God's message so that the world may rejoice with the precepts of Islam.

It is on this basis that the Brothers devoted attention to the political aspect [of their agenda] which pertains to the achievement of these goals and the establishment of political awareness among the individual members of a group and among the Muslim public as well. The educational programs that are pursued by the Brothers include this political awareness and Islamic questions. The Brothers' press is providing appropriate coverage for this aspect, thank God.

Ever since the days of the martyred imam the Brothers have shown an interest in popular conferences at which Islamic questions are reviewed for the purpose of awakening political and Islamic awareness on the popular level, clarifying [people's] view, exposing the masks of deception, diagnosing the ailment, identifying the remedy, giving the people a sense of their responsibility and a sense of duty and infusing a spirit of earnestness and positiveness instead of one of negativism and carelessness.

The Muslim Brothers regard the questions of the Islamic world questions of faith and religion and not questions of land and soil. They view them as struggles between atheism and faith and between the enemies of God and Muslims. We find such struggles in Palestine and we find them in Afghanistan, in Syria, in the Philippines, in India and everywhere.

The Muslim Brothers and Parties

With regard to the political parties that have emerged and are emerging on the scene of Islamic countries, the Brothers reject such parties which are based on earthly principles. Some time ago the Brothers had asked for the dissolution of these parties because they had hurt and were hurting the country. They light the fires of animosity and resentment in the hearts of those who rule and those who are ruled. In most cases these parties consist of a mere association of people formed around persons who are surrounded by trappings of leadership, heroism, cheers, applause, support and other methods of commotion. Some parties are established on earthly principles that are devised by imperfect humans. We can do without all this because our Islam is a complete system for which there is no substitute because it comes from God the Wise, the Omniscient.

Political parties resort to devoting their attention to numerical quantity regardless of steadfastness and quality. In most cases a large number of this large membership is opportunist, coveting the benefits of power which is the major and the greater objective of these parties. We reject such a frail foundation on which to establish an Islamic entity for a stable Islamic government that would withstand the snares of enemies.

Parties often resort to changing their slogans, and they do not abide firmly by a principle, except whenever there is a benefit to be reaped or a goal to be achieved. The enemies of God or the superpowers often find some political parties prepared to cooperate; they support these parties even at the expense of nations.

Fronts or coalitions are often established between some parties, but these are soon broken. The Brothers believe that the idea of a coalition between parties is fruitless; they believe it is a sedative and not a cure. Those who form a coalition soon break it up, and the war between them is soon rekindled at a pace more furious than that [which prevailed] before the coalition [was formed].

Thus we see that the Muslim Brothers are neither a religious, charitable society, nor a political party in the usual sense of these terms. They are [rather a manifestation of] Islam with which and for which they take action to meet all Islamic requirements and views. They are interested in Islamic education, and they are interested in political awareness. Those interests are coordinated and orchestrated in a balanced way without extravagance or waste in any aspect. The Brothers adhere to the course of God's messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation, in proceeding [forward] with Islam and in establishing an Islamic state on a solid foundation in which the strength of faith, the power of unity and the power of hands and weapons are achieved.

Politics has its glamor, its ornaments and its insidious splendor. These tempt a few weak-spirited persons who are fond of leadership or of appearing to emerge and to win these political leaderships. Let the Brothers beware of being deceived by such appearances, and let us be faithful to the course we began, following in the footsteps of God's messenger, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and being loyal to God. We are all engaged in God's work, and none of us is to gain prominence delivering the message of God. We are to weigh matters, situations and persons in accordance with the scales and the standards of God and the Koran so as not to expose Islamic action to slips, deviations or failures. We are not to rush the fruit before it ripens. We always ask God for success and guidance.

Thus it becomes evident that the Muslim Brothers are not a group of austere men of the cloth who know nothing about politics. Nor are they politicians preoccupied with politics at the expense of religious matters. They do not seek power for themselves; nor do they seek material or earthly goods. They are not a political party or a religious society with specific objectives. They do not hide behind religion as tyrants accuse them of doing. How can they hide behind religion when their adherence to religion is the reason for the hardships and the perils to which they are exposed? Nor are they terrorists or saboteurs; they are the most loyal people to their homelands. They have never been a tool of any government; they have never carried out any objective other than their own or pursued any course other than that of Islam. They combine Islamic education with political awareness, and they deal with questions from the point of view of Islam. They are interested in the total question, which is that of establishing the Islamic state and restoring the Islamic succession. They abide by the law of God in their actions and in their methods. They do so not to promote themselves, but rather to uphold the supreme word of God and His prohpet. They thank God for every position, triumph or victory. In doing so they do not confer any favors on God, but it is rather God who is bestowing His favor on them in guiding them to the true faith.

After this clarification we call upon all Muslims to form a single rank and to carry out the religious duties [prescribed by God]. Among these duties is seeing to it that God's word reigns supreme in their countries and then in the whole world so that the mercy of Islam may prevail throughout this universe. [We call upon all Muslims to form a single rank] for the sake of the single rank which is in itself a religious duty, calling upon every Muslim to join. If not a single rank, then Muslims are to devise a formula for cooperation. If not a formula for cooperation, then they are to be friendly and to pray. This is the least we ask of every Muslim. God speaks the truth and guides to the right path.

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SOLUTIONS TO TENSIONS BETWEEN COPTS, MUSLIMS, GOVERNMENT OFFERED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 64, Aug 81 pp 28-29

[Article: "Honest Advice to the Christians of Egypt"]

[Text] I am giving honest advice to the Copts of Egypt for the sake of God because God Almighty made me their neighbor, and God entrusted our neighbors to us.

"Serve Allah and associate none with Him. Show kindness to your parents and your kindred, to the orphans and to the needy, to your near and distant neighbors, to your fellow-travellers, to the wayfarers, and to the slaves whom you own" [Al-Nisa': 36]

Neighbors are each others' partners in prosperity and in adversity.

My relationship with the Copts began in my earliest years when I was able to perceive differences. The first Copt I knew was Master Yusuf Murqus, the carpenter, and then Master Jirjis, the paymaster. Master Yusuf was responsible for the water wheels, the plows and all the tools of the field. He was good natured and we liked him. We used to gather around him, and he used to humor us often. We were friendly with Master Yusuf, but Master Jirjis, the paymaster, was known to us by his book and his donkey whom he treated in a special way. He used to place a large amount of hay and beans in front of him. All the paymaster's work was with [our] father, and we knew nothing about it.

My father, may God have mercy on his soul, was well-known for being extremely devout. He used to reckon harshly with his children and with the people of his household about everything that pertained to religion.

Nevertheless, I do not perjure myself when I swear that I never heard as a child or as an adult any remarks that disparaged the Christians--this was how we referred to the Copts. In fact God used my father to fulfill many of the Christians' needs, and they used to turn to him to arbitrate any disagreement that would develop among them.

The days went by, bringing incidents involving attackers and their victims. He would punish the attackers and deal fairly with the victims regardless of the faith of each one of them.

I recall that when I was performing the duties of the prince regent to Egypt's crown, I received numerous complaints most of which were from Copts. God enabled me to solve these problems easily, and I received from those people letters of thanks.

What I am relating here about myself is in fact a picture of Muslims in our beloved country. Public and private matters proceeded regularly, and incidents occurred as they were preordained. The courts dealt fairly with all without prejudice for a religion, fear of a position or rank or sensitivity. Truth deserved more than subservience to one person's pleasure or another's indignation.

Britain tried to use the Copts against the Muslims and to create the sedition of hateful intolerance, but the patriarch of the Copts rejected this and foiled every attempt by the colonialist to create disunity and to sow the seeds of hatred.

Thus matters continued to improve until Mr Shanudah was appointed patriarch of Egypt's Copts. Unprecedented matters, the likes of which had never been seen, emerged after his election. Verbal and physical challenges began [to emerge].

There were those who said that Egypt was Coptic and that there was no place for Muslims in it. Demands were made that were almost protests against government in accordance with the Koran and the prophetic tradition. Then we saw a blatant attack on a mosque or a church or an attack on a Muslim because he was a Muslim or on a Copt because he was a Copt. Copts abroad formed blocs against Muslims according to instructions from Egypt. They greeted the president of Egypt ungraciously [when he visited] the United States, and this led the president to discuss the subject of religious intolerance. It is regrettable that he did not settle matters [then] and did not try to deal with the sedition.

...Not until the bullets of the Copts were fired in al-Zawiya al-Hamra' and the government itself saw the dead and the wounded Muslims.

Then came the Muslims' reaction, and the fires of sedition blazed in the quarter of al-Sharabiyyah. Had it not been for the intervention of reasonable Muslims, the consequences would have been grave.

The situation now is as follows:

1. Anticipation and preparation on the part of Muslims and Copts.

2. A government that has done nothing. It did not try to establish peace between the two parties, and it did not try to disarm the aggressors.

Therefore, being intent on good relations, on good neighborliness and on avoiding sedition I am turning in all sincerity to our fellow Copts.

I am saying that he who sows the seeds of animosity among Muslims is an agent for foreign countries interested in fomenting sedition. The evidence for this is clear and simple. If there is civil strife and Muslims and Copts become enemies, peace and stability are lost. This is not in the interests of Muslims or Copts. If Muslims were to refrain from doing business with Copts, the consequences would be against the Copts.

If the Muslims and the Copts were to clash and blood were to be shed, I say that the loser will be the Copts. The Tatars in the east and the crusaders in the west will attest to that.

Therefore, I state that those who foment civil strife are enemies of the Copts. They turn them into a cat's claw, a pressure [tool] to eliminate Muslim and Coptic Egyptians.

O Copts of Egypt, Muslims are devoted to good neighborliness and fruitful cooperation. We have lived together so far in harmony without intolerance or aggression.

Wake up to what is being contrived against you in the dark: propaganda that is based on falsehood, deception and poisonous hopes that lead to destruction.

This is sedition, and all those who advocate it wish you evil, even if they were wearing monks' clothing. Know that Islam is the refuge and the impregnable stronghold for all Egyptians. It guarantees every individual self-protection and protection of his honor and his funds. It gives every individual full freedom. "There is no coercion in religion. You have your religion and I have mine."

Before I conclude my statement I would like to say, "The government has first and foremost responsibility [in this]. I have nothing to say to the government. God told the government [what it should do], but it did not listen. "Allah's help is all-sufficient for us. He is the best Protector. We belong to Allah and to Him we shall return."

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CAUSES OF SECTARIAN STRIFE REVIEWED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 64, Aug 81 pp 48-51

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Quddus: "A Frank Confrontation of the Reasons of Sectarian Sedition"]

> [Text] The Copts of Egypt are the most fortunate minority in the world.
> Coptic leaders departed from their primary duty of honoring Islamic Egypt and respecting the feelings of Muslims.

The sectarian strife that occurred in Egypt in recent years has several reasons. As long as we are not confronting these reasons firmly and frankly and pulling them out by the roots, these strifes will continue as long as we insist on hiding our heads in the sand and as long as we remain satisfied with extolling [our] tolerance and the slogans of national unity.

This article is a step in the right direction, the direction of confronting the reasons of sectarian strife.

"The Copts of Egypt are the most fortunate minority on the face of the earth. All their material and moral rights are made to thrive and even multiply." This is how al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali began his statement to AL-DA'WAH. The shaykh says, "It is a manifestation of the tolerance of Islam that it does not recognize the term, minority. It is a term that appeared in recent ages only."

Islam views those who have a different religion in a normal manner. Islam sees them as part of Islamic society, enjoying the same rights that Muslims have and having the same obligations. From a political standpoint, they have Islamic citizenship. The state fights for them and looks after their affairs inside the country and abroad. A person with a different religion, even if he were one individual, lives within the large Islamic entity in absolute security. We saw in an account by al-Bukhari how a Jew in al-Madinah had asked the messenger of God, may God bless him and grant him salvation, to deposit a pledge for the goods he had sold the prophet. He was not afraid of making that request. He was certain that neither his funds nor his own person would be harmed.

Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali goes on to say, "Islam's treatment of those of a different religion and the religious freedom they enjoy [under Islam] are unknown in the history of all humanity. We need only make a quick comparison between the non-Muslim subjects in Islam and the Muslim minorities that are living in Christian and pagan countries, regarding what happens to Muslims in the Philippines, in India, in the communist countries and in Ethiopia and what happened to the Muslims in Andalusia where Christians there exterminated more than 1 million Muslims.

Rights Are Balanced by Obligations

In view of the excellent situation in which the Copts and the non-Muslim subjects in general are living in Egypt, they have obligations that they must abide by.

Dr Ahmad Yusuf, instructor of Islamic law at the College of Dar al-'Ulum in Cairo University summarizes these obligations by saying, "These involve refraining from anything that would hurt Muslims or diminish their religion. They are to refrain from selling prohibited goods in the capitals and cities of Muslims, such as alcohol and pork. They are to submit completely to the law of the Islamic state, especially in business dealings where they are to abide by the provisions of financial and civilian dealings in selling, leasing and [forming] partnerships, etc." Dr al-Sayyid Salih 'Awad, the chairman of the department of the Principles of Jurisprudence in the College of Islamic Law at al-Azhar University says that non-Muslims are to respect those among whom they live; they are to observe the dignity of the Islamic state which provides them with its protection and its care; and they are not to betray a Muslim because this would ruin the trust that exists between them and Muslims. They are not to rail against Islam, its messenger or its [holy] book, and they are not to promote beliefs and ideas that refute the faith and the religion of the state.

"In summary, two matters are being asked from non-Muslims:

--"They are not to appear to be challenging the Muslim public. If they challenge Muslims, the ruler must order them to stop doing that. If they do not comply, they are to be compelled [to obey].

--"If they engage in any of the activities that are prohibited by Islam, activities which contest the rights of Muslims but are permissible in their religion, they are to do so without proclaiming those activities or announcing them among the Muslims."

The Incident of the Copt Who Assailed the Noble Prophet

Dr al-Sayyid Salih 'Awad says, "Al-Tabarani quoted 'Arafah ibn al-Harith as saying that he had passed by a Christian from Egypt and that he had called upon him to adopt Islam. The Christian said evil things about the Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and ['Arafah] reported this incident to 'Amr ibn al-'Ass. 'Amr said, 'We gave them our promise.' And 'Arafah ibn al-Harith replied, 'God forbid that we should give them

promises and agreements so they would speak ill to us of God and His messenger. We promised them free access to their churches where they could say what they wished, and we promised them that we would not demand from them more than they could deliver; we promised we would fight behind them; and we promised them free access to their laws unless they were to come to us and we would then make a judgment among them in accordance with what God ordained.' 'Amr said, 'You are right,' and the Copt was arrested and punished."

Non-Muslims have financial obligations, namely the head tax, the land tax and the tithe. Dr Ahmad Yusuf says that these obligations do not violate at all the principle of equality between Copts and Muslims because a Muslim pays in blood to protect the security of the non-Muslim subject whereas the latter pays the head tax. The Muslim also pays alms for the plants and the crops [he reaps] in return for the non-Muslim subject's payment of the land tax. The Muslim pays alms for traded merchandise, and the non-Muslim subject pays the tithe.

The Penalty for Failing To Meet Obligations

His Eminence al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali says, "The Muslim ruler must punish everyone who betrays the Islamic state in a manner commensurate with the transgression in which [the traitor] becomes involved. If the case is one of high treason, as is the case of the Lebanese Sa'd Haddad who allied himself with Israel or Ya'qub Hanna who allied himself with the French conquerors of Egypt, the penalty may be the loss of life. This is not strange because if a Muslim were to commit such a crime, his blood would be shed [too].

If such a person were to mock or challenge Islamic rites by disparaging the Koran or by making fun of its provisions, the state would have the right to inflict upon him the punishment that he deserves and that would deter those like him. What is important from the Islamic point of view is that no one under Islam is treated unfairly because he subscribes to another religion. He is treated with the justice that encompasses him and other worshipers of God. Islamic justice may not be used to betray the Islamic community."

Dr al-Sayyid Salih 'Awad says, "Keeping promises made to the non-Muslim subjects is an obligation, as long as they keep their promise; but if they were to change or to betray the Muslims, then they are not to be trusted. If non-Muslims are now living in an Islamic society like the rest of Muslim citizens, they must not exceed their bounds in the atmosphere of tolerance in which they are living and engage in actions that would hurt the religious feelings of Muslims or hurt their interests. Otherwise, it becomes the duty of the ruler to stop them from engaging in those actions and to punish the violator. No one is to be punished for what another did.

Blatant Challenge from Coptic Leaders

The truth that is being said is that the Copts in Egypt have known and

abided by their obligations for hundreds of years, and they have been living with Muslims in harmony. There were rarely any incidents between the two parties. But in the 20th century the position of Coptic leaders changed, and the spirit of challenge was manifested among them. Scores of actions undertaken by them indicated that. It was natural that incidents of sectarian strife increase because the Copts were not adhering to their primary duty of respecting Muslims' feelings and honoring the Islamic state under whose protection they were living. There are several factors that encouraged the leaders of Egypt's Copts to proceed on this rocky road."

Al-Shaykh Hafiz Salamah says, "The weakness of Muslims was one of the most important factors that encouraged the Copts to challenge them. This weakness went through two stages.

--"The decline of the Islamic succession and the dissolution and dispersal of Muslims.

--"The tyranny practiced by Islamic governments, especially in Egypt and Syria, against the Islamic communities, as was the case in 'Abd-al-Nasir's massacres of the Muslim Brothers in 1954 and 1965. This cleared the scene from serious Islamic action.

2. Hilmi al-Jazzar, the commander of Islamic communities mentions another reason, namely that the government spoiled the Christians. An example of this is the statement made by the head of state that "The Copts of Egypt asked for 30 churches, and I gave them 50." Churches have been built beside mosques in the new cities at the expense of the Muslim state; and there is the idea of the religious complex."

3. The commander of the Islamic communities says that the government in Egypt did not deter Coptic officials from their previous seditions, and this led them to persist in their conspiracy.

4. The foreign material and moral support for the Christians, like the lavish reception in the United States for the leader of the Copts, Shanudah , and the decision that was made in 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration to elevate the rank of the leader of Egypt's Copts to that of a pope from that of a mere patriarch. The superpowers and Israel are attempting to conspire against Islam in Egypt by means of pushing some Copts in Egypt to rebel against [the Islamic government]. The Coptic minority is also playing an active role in some countries like Australia, Canada and the United States by promoting falsehoods about the situation in Egypt and attempting to win world public opinion to the side of the Copts of Egypt.

He adds, "Among the most dangerous occurrences in Egypt in recent years is the fact that many Christians in Egypt have acquired licensed as well as unlicensed weapons. Many churches and monasteries, especially in southern Egypt, have been turned into weapons arsenals. This is what some Muslims saw in al-Minya, but we did not hear that the Ministry of the Interior has taken it upon itself to inspect these monasteries and confiscate the weapons that are found in them, the weapons which Christians use to kill Muslims.

"It has also been noticed that the churches which were built in recent years were built as though they were strongholds for battle and not houses of worship. Many architects think that the large quantity of reinforced concrete that was being poured in the walls and roofs of these churches was not at all proportionate with their use as places of worship. This may be part of the plan by Christian leaders to turn Egypt into another Lebanon.

"All these reasons amounted to strong incentives for Egypt's Copts, and chief among them is their leader, Shanudah , and for the leaders of the church to challenge the Muslims. Their conduct and their thoughts are considered blatant violations of their obligation to honor the Muslim majority."

They Refuse To Recognize Islamic Egypt

All these actions that we will mention now are pointing in one direction and leading up to one objective: the refusal to recognize Islamic Egypt. This tendency spread after the Camp David accords and the temporary dispute that [followed] between Egypt and most of the Arab countries. The most remarkable of these actions and ideas that conflict with the Copts' obligation to honor Islamic Egypt are the following:

Refusal To Enforce the Islamic Law

Coptic leaders led by Shanudah assumed an authoritative posture on the request by the Muslim majority to amend the second article of the constitution so that it would stipulate that the Islamic law was to be the principal source for legislation after it was merely a source. They absolutely rejected this amendment.

Dr Ahmad Yusuf, instructor of Islamic law in the College of Dar al-'Ulum says that to say that Islamic law is not to be put into practice because this would hurt the Copts is totally objectionable for several reasons:

A. We have no choice about putting or not putting Islamic law into practice because this is a divine command.

B. Actual fact has established the falsehood of that statement. While Muslims have been exterminated or are in the process of being exterminated in many Christian and pagan countries, non-Muslims have enjoyed all the privileges and the rights [that Muslims enjoy] in the Islamic countries, and especially in Egypt.

C. Copts cannot be guardians over Muslims. The minority cannot impose its will on the majority, especially when the arguments upon which their opinions are based are false arguments.

D. Dr Ahmad Yusuf wonders what harm could come to the Copts, in case Islamic law is put into practice, if they are free in their faith, their worship and their personal affairs? The only thing that will change will be the public law. Instead of being a law that is derived from foreign laws, it will be an Islamic law. What is the harm there?

"I can understand that this harm could have existed if the Christian religion regulated people's dealings [with each other] and their life styles as well and if that was the system that was being enforced and we repealed it and instituted the Islamic law. But what we want to abolish are those positive laws that are foreign to our environment so that they can be replaced by the Islamic law which is based on the principle of 'no harm and no loss' as far as the non-Muslim subjects are concerned. This is based on the principle of 'What is ours is theirs, and what we owe, they owe.' The most that any minority in the world aspires to is to get the same treatment that the majority is getting, and this is what Islamic law achieves for them."

The Popularity of a False Idea: Egypt's Copts Are Its Original Inhabitants!

Another trumped up falsehood promoted by the priests in Egypt and by Coptic leaders among their followers is that the Copts of Egypt are Egypt's original inhabitants and that the Muslims came to it as outsiders. Some went even farther than that and said that just as Andalusia was liberated from Muslims, so will Egypt be liberated.

Dr al-Sayyid Salih 'Awad, chairman of the Department of the Principles of Jurisprudence says, "It is clear that this fabrication is an enormous lie. The claim that the Muslims of Egypt are outsiders who came from abroad is ridiculous. The people of the country throughout history came to like Islam and they adopted it in hordes. Does their adoption of a religion by whose principles they were dazzled cause them to lose their relationship with their country? No sane person would say that. The Arabs who immigrated to Egypt were limited groups. Can this limited number reproduce 42 million Muslims, which is the number of Muslims in Egypt at the present time?"

An Attempt To Give Different Locations a Christian Character

It is noteworthy that the principal reason for the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' was the attempt by some Christians to misappropriate a piece of land owned by Muslims for the purpose of building a church.

Al-Shaykh Hafiz Salamah, president of the Islamic Guidance Society in Suez says, "This is not an isolated case, but it is rather part of a well-considered, comprehensive plan that is attempting to plant churches in the largest possible number of places and to purchase land from Muslims at exorbitant prices. This is how Palestine was lost; Islamic Egypt, however, will not be lost." His Eminence al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali says, "The scholars of Islam have stated their opinion that the Muslim who sells his land to the Jews in Palestine is an apostate. This ruling most certainly applies to Egypt if the purpose of the buyer is malicious, namely fight Islam and to attempt to uproot it."

There is another observation in this regard. While Islam advocates good treatment for those of a different religion, we find church leaders emphasizing to their followers the need for fanaticism. For example, we find that most of the tenants in an apartment building which is owned by a Copt

are Copts. We find that Copts would rather deal with a Christian physician than a Muslim one. This fanaticism creates a chasm between Muslims and Christians. Most certainly it is the Copts who will be the losers if the Muslims were to pursue the same policy.

An Exaggeration of Their Numbers

There is a misleading fact that implies a large measure of ugliness and is mentioned by al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali. This is the effort on the part of Coptic leaders to show that the number of non-Muslims is larger than it is for the purpose of seizing more rights. What has been determined in all the censuses that have been carried out in Egypt since the British occupation until now is that the ratio of Copts to Muslims is 7 percent. Al-Shaykh al-Ghazali adds, "Exaggerating the figures of non-Muslims is not a phenomenon in one particular country. It is rather a general colonialist plan. Attention must be directed to the fact that a carefully planned census war is going on on a world-wide scale to show that the Muslims in the whole world are a minority and to show others that [followers of other religions] are more numerous. Enlarging the number of non-Muslims is a well-known [practice] in all the Islamic countries. In fact, attempts are being made in Lebanon to show that the number of Christians makes them the larger sect. This is false, and those who have made up those numbers know this better than anyone else."

The Claim that Their Rights Are Curtailed in Employment

What is curious is that some Coptic leaders in Egypt want to divide the country along sectarian lines, as is the case in Lebanon, as far as jobs are concerned. They argue that they are discriminated against in areas of employment and jobs. All the scholars and the Muslim missionaries whom I met agreed that the opposite was the exact truth." His Eminence al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali says, "The Christians have rights and material, moral, economic and social capabilities that obviously exceed their numerical ratio. They may occupy one third of some economic institutions and social activities. If the matter went no further than their numerical ratio, obstacles would have been set in place to prevent them from achieving those high ratios. But Muslims are usually lenient, giving more than they have to and taking less than they should. It is true that some positions are confined to Muslims such as that of the head of state, for example. Not since the Islamic conquest has Egypt been ruled by a non-Muslim ruler. This is natural: Egypt is an Islamic state; how can it be ruled by a non-Muslim?

"With what logic or justice do we ignore the vast majority of Muslims and allow Egypt to be ruled by a non-Muslim ruler? Can this happen in any country in the world, even in those countries that are called democratic countries? It is the majority that rules in the different countries of the world. It is natural, logical and self-evident that the majority would always rule."

Distribution of Leaflets and Attempts To Preach

In the recent period in particular the distribution of Christian leaflets has grown. These leaflets blatantly attack Islam, the Holy Book of God and His noble prophet. It is curious that those who are responsible for these leaflets are the church leaders and the Coptic leaders. Dr Ahmad Yusuf says, "These leaflets are a serious violation of the minority's obligation to honor the Muslim state and respect the feelings of Muslims. What raises questions [in our minds] is the position of the Muslim state in not punishing those who are putting out these leaflets. Missionary schools are also carrying out their activities under the supervision and protection of the Muslim government. Muslims must become aware of the danger of these schools: they are not to enroll their children in those schools because they are, to say the least, trying to drive Muslims away from their religion and make them doubt their faith.

To the Copts of Egypt: Beware of This Conspiracy That Some of You Are Promoting

His Eminence al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali and al-Shaykh Hafiz Salamah agree that the major conspiracy against the Islamic world manifests itself in the creation of religious and sectarian governments on its vast terrain so as to undermine its forces. This is the secret behind the partitioning of a small country like Syria into Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and finally Israel. What is being sought now is the partitioning of Lebanon and Syria into Maronite, Druze, Sunni and Christian governments. A few drunks and intransigent Copts in Egypt are thinking of carrying out this conspiracy in Egypt and establishing a Coptic state. But this is absolutely out of the question: the people of Egypt are keeping their eyes open to the conspiracies of colonialism and the treacheries of clients. Our country will always be strong, proud and Muslim.

A Final Word

This article was not intended to revile Egypt's Copts or their leaders publicly. I only wanted to reveal the principal reason for the repeated [incidents of] sectarian strife, namely the violation by those people of their primary obligation to honor Islamic Egypt and to respect the feelings of Muslims. The violation of this obligation manifested itself in the ideas the church has been promoting among the Copts and in the actions that it is carrying out, actions which we mentioned in this article. When these actions cease and these ideas disappear, sectarian strife will spontaneously disappear and Muslims and Christians will live together in harmony as they always have.

How Do We Eliminate Strife?

If the government wishes to do away with these incidents of strife, the government will have to publish accurate statistics about the number of Muslims and Copts in the following agencies:

1. The railroads and the telegraph and telephone agencies.

2. The corps of engineers in the air force.

3. The cultural committee in the Ministry of Education.

4. The number of Muslim or non-Muslim merchants in Wikalah al-Balah.*

5. The landlords in Nasr City, in Wadi al-Natrun and in the northern coastal areas from Alexandria to Wadi al-Natrun and Marsa Matruh.

6. The population strongholds that are being built on the coast of al-'Ajami in Alexandria.

7. The price of a square meter in al-Zaytun and neighboring quarters.

8. The number of weapons permits [issued] in the past 10 years, so that the world would know who owns these weapons in Egypt.

9. The number of physicians, attorneys, engineers, accountants and journalists.

10. Other innumerable facts requiring the publication of accurate statistics.

Islam has never been unfair to a non-Muslim living under Islam. Behind the fact that non-Muslims in Egypt are being favorably treated are those known by all Egyptians whether they are officials or not. Only those who play with fire are burned by it, and being ungrateful for a blessing is one of the most important reasons for the disappearance of that blessing.

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* Translator's note: Wikalah al-Balah (pronounced Wikalat al-Balah) is a commercial center in the quarter of Bulaq, a prime location in Cairo on the banks of the Nile opposite **Zamalek**, one of Cairo's prime residential areas. It is an area where second hand spare parts for engines and machinery, reconditioned and re-cycled goods for industry and salvaged construction materials are traded.

8592
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VIOLENCE SEEN BECOMING ONLY POLITICAL PROCESS

Paris LE MATIN in French 1 Sep 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Marie-Claude Decamps: "Survival of the Regime in Question"]

> [Text] There is a risk of violence becoming the only means to "free up" a system paralyzed by the political void it has itself created. If, in accordance with yesterday's assessment by the Presidential Provisional Council, it is true that "the ship of revolution is rushing along at full speed, even on turbulent seas, for its leader, the Imam Khomeyni, is the Noah of our times," it seems nevertheless that the old man is having some trouble keeping his grip on the helm in the counterrevolutionary upheaval he is going through.

More than an upheaval, actually; a veritable civil war in disguise which for 2 months has continued to derive its impetus from the fast deterioration of Iranian political life. To the point that yesterday, while Tehran in mourning was in the process of burying its president and prime minister, in spite of the reassuring official terminology many wondered if even the survival—let alone the supremacy—of the Islamic government was still possible.

After the attack of 28 June, which resulted in the death of 74 Islamic leaders, the Iranian authorities waited 17 hours before announcing the news of this new attack which had decapitated their government.

How indeed were they to explain without embarrassment—if not confusion—to the population that once again the "counterrevolution" and struck the government to its very heart? For if one bears in mind that the premises of the prime minister have been very strictly guarded since the explosion at the end of July of a booby-trapped car barely 200 meters away, it is undeniable that the terrorists had accomplices, first of all to get through the roadblock set up by the pasdarans and the members of the revolutionary committees, who banned traffic within a radius of 300 meters; then to find out exactly where President Raja'i and his prime minister Bahonar would be. As a matter of fact, two simultaneous meetings were going on in the building, a "security council" meeting in which the two men were actually taking part, and an "economic council" meeting.

Moreover, the critical intelligence report formulated by several leaders against the security services yesterday morning at the time of the funeral, reflected in

full measure the regime's feeling of malaise provoked by an invisible enemy hidden among its own ranks.

Before he was eliminated himself, Javad Bahonar at the beginning of the month had announced the formation "of a war cabinet to fight against the most serious threat to be leveled at the Islamic Republic since its creation."

What came of it? A few hasty measures, such as the "patching up" of the security services decreed by Davud Karimi, the head of the pasdarans, who had organized roadblocks and searches on the major routes serving the capital, while his troops, who were already fighting beside the regular army on the Iraqi front, found themselves invested with the weighty task of protecting the VIPs of the regime.

Finally, what is one to say of the appeal in favor of denunciations, encouraged by Imam Khomeyni himself, whose only effect was to promote a prefabricated revolutionary Egeria on TV screens who claimed to be delighted that her son, a young adherent of the opposing faction, was to be executed. But it is true that denunciation is becoming a regular feature even in the Islamic committees, members of which are more and more judged to be unreliable.

In spite of the fact that the Islamic authorities reinforced police dispositions in Karaj, near Tehran, as well as in eight other key sectors of the city, attacks continued.

Thus, at the end of June, the imam of Tehran's Friday, the Hojatoleslam Kamanei, was wounded by the explosion of a boobytrapped tape recorder, while 2 days later, the director of the Evin prison, Muhammad Kachui, was killed by bullets. In July, shortly after the election of Raja'i on the 24th, attacks increased, causing the death of some 50 supporters of the regime for the month of August alone.

Corresponding to this progression in the bloody arithmetic of attacks has been a new progression, namely in executions. On the average, 10 opponents are killed each day with "peaks" like last week, when 500 people were arrested, in Azerbaijan particularly, and 73 were executed in 2 days, which brings the total number of opponents shot for these last 2 months to nearly 800.

To think that Iranian political life is becoming no more than this incessant cycle of attacks and repression which is being enacted by 30,000 pasdarans and 10,000 to 15,000 Mojahedin, those Islamic progressives who, after having populated the prisons of the Shah, now feed the firing squads of the Islamic Republic.

In fact, the political process had ceased to exist in Iran for a long time now; Ali Raja'i was only the spearhead ot the RPI [Islamic Republic Party] to get rid of President Bani-Sadr. But was the departure into exile of this fallen president, who did not succeed in bringing about an army uprising, still significant? As a matter of fact, if Bani-Sadr formerly mustered numerous supporters, he never had a real party behind him.

Having gone to sleep after that second revolution, the takeover of the American embassy, the heirs of the Mossadegh National Front have today become a clandestine group. The same is true of the majority of lay liberals, harried by the regime.

The only support (unnaturally) of the religious fundamentalists' government is the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist party, which lives in a dangerous liaison with the government, officially with the hope of seeing the revolution reach the goal which it [the Tudeh] itself determined upon: to triumph over the vestiges of imperialism in Iran. But if it is a fact that the Tudeh, which nevertheless remains a semi-clandestine group before the attacks of which it is the object within the government itself, provides the Tehran government with a certain ideology, it possesses no tangible force to place at its service.

What is more, for having listened in large measure to the Tudeh, the Tehran government, already under attack on its left flank by the Mojahedin of the people, is now being attacked on its right by the bazaris and the officials of a middle class which is unhappy with the gradual nibbling away of the private sector (70 percent of business has been nationalized) and the setting aside of the traditional bureaucracy. Not to speak of the "inconveniences" of a war economy that drags on and on.

It is a discontent which manifests itself within the religious hierarchy itself, also far from being homogeneous even if it remains--still-relatively silent. The clerics have always been supported, including during the revolution, by the Bazar, If the latter is totally going over to the opposition, does not this indicate that, after having isolated itself, the Islamic Republic is undermining its own foundations?

Already, right in the Qom theological school, did not the Ayatollah Golpayegani--one of the important /ozma [in italics] ayatollahs (those listened to most)--decry "the lack of respect for private property, which nevertheless is sacred for Islam"? At the same time Shariat Madari, second in the Shiite hierarchy, for the meantime almost under house arrest in the holy city, maintains continuous contact with his native Azerbaijan, still outside the rebellion, and from which the majority of the leading bazaris originate.

Lastly, there is the final ferment of disintegration, the oppressed Iranian Kurdish and Baluchi minorities among others, from whom opponents of all stripes, it seems, receive the warmest welcome.

If the Islamic Republic Party, seriously decapitated this time, does not succeed in unifying the Islamic Republic movement, even in the direction of still greater radicalization, the only possible arbitrator will be the Imam Khomeyni himsllf who has remained popular despite everything. But the ultraconservatism and one-upmanship discharged by the regime that he himself approved are such that, even if he wanted to, it is not certain that the "guide of the revolution" could still lead his country firmly in the direction of the "overtures" which ex-president Bani-Sadr proposed to him yesterday.

And what if violence alone should succeed now in "freeing up," by exploding, this system, which has gotten jammed in too great a political void? This hypothesis, although extreme, is not to be pushed aside, which would explain that, from bunches of monarchists to the people's Mojahedin fighters, they all court the army, still silent--and powerful?--which the Tehran government with emotion again enjoined yesterday "to fulfill its Islamic duty."

9824
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BACKGROUND OF RAJA'I BLAST DISCUSSED

Paris LE MATIN in French 1 Sep 81 p 8

[Article by Bernard Poulet: "A Coup by Professionals"]

[Text] Those responsible for the attack--military men, policemen, or Mojahedin--no doubt have accomplices in high places. The new attempt on the lives of the Iranian leaders confirms that, in spite of repression, opposition to the Islamic Republic is becoming more and more daring. Nevertheless, nothing shows that the Khomeyni regime is on the verge of collapse.

To succeed in placing a bomb in the head of government's office, probably very close to him because it was he, the president of the republic, and some of their associates who were killed, and not all the others who attended the meeting, one must no doubt be strong. Very strong even, when such an attack is perpetrated 2 months after that other which at a single blow decapitated the general staff of the Islamic revolution, leaving 74 dead and provoking in retaliation frantic repression and a spectacular reinforcement of security measures around the surviving leaders.

Those responsible for these daring attacks are undoubtedly experienced men, professionals. Furthermore one may imagine that military men had a hand in organizing these attacks. The hijacking of the vedette boat Tabarzin off Cadix had shown that they lacked neither audacity nor savoir faire. But even more than that of 28 June, Sunday's attack required having accomplices at the highest level so that it might be discovered where, when and with whom the meeting of the Iranian leaders would be held.

If the former officers of the Shah have something to do with the assassination of the Iranian head of state and prime minister, then it must be admitted that they have already insinuated their men into the holy of holies of the Islamic Republic. Apparently absurd, this hypothesis is not totally unlikely if one remembers that, in contrast with the army, the Shah's repression apparatus was not completely dismantled after the fall of the monarchy. Often the same men are found in the Savama, the regime's new secret police, which without faltering, took up the torch from the sinister Savak of the monarchy. The name of the organization has hardly changed and, finally, the enemies have remained roughly the same: Islamic Marxists, and leftists of every kind. Nothing therefore forbids the thought that having accomplices in these circles could facilitate organizing an attack.

But in fact, the monarchist opposition, divided despite recent efforts towards reunification, including with former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar, is chiefly spoken of overseas and commands little popular support inside the country. The fact that many people are murmuring privately that they regret the era of the Shah in no way makes them active militants for the restoration of the monarchy. And even if there are undoubtedly royalists left in the army, the latter has been so deeply purged and demoralized that there is little probability of its being ready, at short notice, to become involved once again in a dangerous game.

Well then, if it is not the monarchists, is it the Mojahedin? In spite of the fierce repression that has hounded them for several weeks, actually they remain in the best position to strike the Islamic Republic to the heart. For they are one of its branches. Under the Shah they operated clandestinely and carried on gureilla warfare with the blessing of one of the most important religious leaders. the Ayatollah Taleghani.

Not only are they often professionals in clandestine operations (they hid the former president Bani-Sadr and arranged his escape), and in armed struggle (it was they who organized the armed insurrection against Bakhtiar), but they have long-standing friendships at all levels of the Iranian regime. Was it not said only a short time ago of Ahmad Khomeyni, the grandson of the imam, that he was one of their sympathizers? A section of the clergy may still sympathize with their objectives and above all, they had a real following among young people which cannot have disappeared in a few months; at the time of the presidential elections in January 1980, even his opponents admitted that Massud Rajavi would have won several million votes if he had authorized to stand as a candidate for the Mojahedin.

Indisputably, they represent the chief force of mass opposition to the Khomeyni regime, and when the revolution broke out they had even succeeded in establishing deep ties with the young officers of the army.

Nevertheless, they have not succeeded either in bringing about the downfall of the mullahs' dictatorship, especially as they have long displayed an ambivalent attitude towards Khomeyni whom, until recently, they refused to fight directly. If Rajavi's escape with Bani-Sadr proves their ability to organize coups de main, it also shows up their weaknesses because in this way they admitted that they could no longer guarantee their protection.

Despite the decimation of its officials, it certainly seems that the Islamic Republic will not be destroyed so easily. The presence of a million people yesterday at the funeral of Raja'i and Bahonar proved that it is not totally isolated. The most serious crisis that threatens it is undoubtedly the breakup of the only stratum that really gives leadership in the country: the clergy. But it is hard to see yet how that could come about before the disappearance of Khomeyni.

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CLANDESTINE RADIO COMMENTS ON KHOMEYNI'S 'WAR WEEK'

NC242152 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 24 Sep 81

[Station Talk]

[Text] The face of the contrived republic has been revealed even more sinister than it is during the "war week" declared by Khomeyni's Islamic Republic and with the commencement of the new academic year.

A year has passed since the war was imposed by the Islamic Republic on the Iranian nation. It has been a year now, and every day the clerical regime reports on extraordinary progress and continuous victories achieved on the war fronts. But it is surprising that Khuzestan is still burning and each day a new group is added to the millions of war refugees. It is odd that despite all these successes Mahdavi-Kani wants to fight until the last breath on the one hand and asks for the help of Islamic countries on the other.

The truth is that a year after the war was imposed by Khomeyni on our country, the length of the front has increased from 500 to 700 kms. During this year more than 50,000 Iranians have been killed; millions of sick and distressed war refugees are wandering and billions of dollars in losses is what the war mongering of the Mullahs has brought to the Iranian nation. But the Imam of Jamaran and his wretched associates are happy with all this calamity that has befallen on Iran because they have something to attribute all of Iran's ills to, and they think that they have trapped the army and kept it far from the political scene.

How is it that every day Khomeyni bellows that "we are fighting with Kaffirs" and then his own prime minister, Mahdavi-Kani, says that "there is a war between two Muslim countries and Islamic countries should mediate"? Which of the two is correct? How is it possible for a regime to want peace, according to its prime minister, and to also declare a "war week"?

The truth is that Khomeyni has declared a week of war against the Iranian nation. Every day tens of Iran's children are executed on charges of opposing the contrived republic and for protesting against repression and tortures. From the outlook of the old bloodsucker of Jamaran, the "war week means the week to crush the nation's rebellion. By making an even larger number of rebels to taste death the regime thinks it will be nipping the rebellion in the bud. It chains children and executes adolescents. It riddles the bodies of students with bullets and executed the people it has arrested by nightfall.

In the week of war against the Iranian nation the executioners of the Islamic Republic have orders to murder demonstrators without trials and to kill the wounded on the spot. In this week Ruhollah Khomeyni wants to terrify in order to stay. He kills in order to save his own self from death. He sets up gallows in the streets in order to lock breaths in the chests. All of this is a clear sign of the daily weakening and the terror of the regime.

Today all the world, both those who had a hand in the setting up of this inauspicious and contrived republic in our homeland and those who have indifferently sealed their lips, agree on one thing: that death is knocking strongly on the Islamic Republic's door, that the regime is alarmed and is threatening death itself.

The regime's savage and bloody laws in justifying its lust for power and the wave of the calamities it creates and the killings it carries out cannot be found in any celestial book. Fear of downfall has made the Islamic dictatorship place group killings and murders on the top of the list of its government's programs.

In the week of war against the Iranian nation Khomeyni wants to start a bloodbath, but he is unaware that he and his bloodthirsty executioners will be drowned in the bloodbath that they will create. Khomeyni does not know that when an entire nation rises wrathfully and determined to break the chains of slavery and bondage no satanic power can confront it.

Compatriots: this half-dead but revengeful executioner will commit even more frightful crimes in order to postpone its downfall. If it stays a little longer it will kill more and distress more even further. Its immediate death should be wanted today. The head of this wounded snake should be immediately beaten against the rock. This regime cannot last. Death has nested in its foundation.

Coordinate your strikes and blows. Before the fall of our homeland into the precipice we should free ourselves from the carcass of this monster.

CSO: 4640/6

AYATOLLAH MADANI WAS HATED IN TABRIZ

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 18 Sep 81 pp 6-7

[Text] Ayatollah Assadollah Madani, the Friday prayer leader of Tabriz who was assassinated last Thursday, was one of the most hated men in the Khomeyni regime. He was held responsible for the murder of over 100 army officers and soldiers, as well as for hundreds of civilians in Tabriz, during the past two years.

He was born in a village near Hamadan in northwest Iran, where people speak a dialect close to the Azari language of Azarbaijan. In the 1950's he was among the theological students who joined Khomeyni in the Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, known as Fedayeen-e-Islam. Hanging judge Khalkhali was also among them. Madani travelled widely in the Arab world and at one time was banished to a small town in Khorassan by SAVAK.

During the revolution he was active in Hamadan and later he was sent by Khomeyni to organise hezbollahi gangs in Bijan and Sanandaj in Kurdestan. In September 1979 he was sent to the Constituent Assembly from Hamadan.

In November that year Khomeyni's gunmen murdered the then Friday prayer leader of Tabriz, Mohamad Ghazi Tabatabai, who was freely chosen by the people and was close to the Muslim People's Party. Then Khomeyni appointed Madani as his personal representative and Friday prayer leader in Tabriz. Many Tabrizis believed that the plot to kill Tabatabai was hatched to replace him by Madani, Khomeyni's trusted man. Madani's arrival in Tabriz was met by anti-Khomeyni demonstrations, when people tore down pictures of Khomeyni and sacked the offices of the Revolutionary Corps, which were then manned by Palestinians. The uprising then spread and people occupied the T.V. offices.

The uprising was crushed ruthlessly and with a great deal of deception. First, (ex-president) Bani-Sadr arrived in Tabriz with the promise to amend article 105 of the constitution, which gives Khomeyni unlimited powers. He then asked the public to evacuate the T.V. offices and the airport. The people did so, but they held on to the headquarters of the Revolutionary Corps. Then, with the airport in their hands the Khomeyni side brought in large numbers of armed men from Tehran, including some Palestinians, and in a sudden raid, captured the headquarters of the Revolutionary Corps and arrested some 700 members of the MPP, along with many air force and army officers. Madani was in charge of the operation, while Mussavi-Tabrizi, who has just succeeded assassinated Ali Qodussi as chief revolutionary prosecutor, acted as the judge at a series of mock trials

which resulted in the killing of several hundred Tabrizis. The people of Tabriz subsequently nicknamed Madani Liakhov after a Russian general of the Soviet occupation force in the area early in the century. Madani and Mussavi-Tabrizi were also referred to as commanders of the "Arab occupation army."

The two men's presence in Tabriz was so vital that on two occasions Khomeyni vetoed the appointment of Madani and Mussavi-Tabrizi to positions in Tehran. Now as fate would have it, Massavi-Tabrizi is in Tehran to fill the vacancy created by Qodussi's killing, while Madani himself has been murdered. Ironically, Ayatollah Meshkini, who succeeds Madani in Tabriz, was himself regarded as persona non grata in Qom, where senior theologians had earlier demanded his defrocking and demotion.

It is rumoured that the man who killed Ayatollah Madani was an employee of the Tabriz-based Mercedes Benz engine manufacturing plant, whose suicide mission was to avenge the execution earlier this month of plant manager Taher Shokrai.

Shokrai was in West Germany on a short visit early in the summer. Later on his return to Tabriz he was picked up by the revolutionary guards and taken to their headquarters. Nothing was heard from him for some time; then two weeks ago his name was mentioned along with the names of other people who were executed by firing squad. The people of Tabriz were shocked when they heard the news, and Sokharai's friends vowed to avenge his murder, reports say. People said that Muscavi Tabrizi and Madani would pay for this murder. Madani was subsequently killed, but Musjavi-Tabrizi escaped.

The authorities have arrested Shokrai's German-born wife, but the fate of his two daughters in Iran is not known. Another daughter and a son are studying in the United States.

Since the killing of Madani the authorities have also arrested and killed Mohammad Moghadam Qazi, a prominent physician, on charges of complicity with Shokrai. But the charges against Shokrai have not yet been specified.

CSO: 4600/21

NO WAY OF FREEING NATION EXCEPT BY MILITARY MEANS, SAYS RALI SPOKESMAN

London IRAN PRESS in English 18 Sep 81 pp 5-6

[Text] The newly founded Paris-based political group, the Revolutionary Army for the Liberation of Iran [RALI], in a first public statement has told IPS' diplomatic correspondent that it believes there is no way of freeing Iran from the Khomeyni regime except by military means.

A spokesman, who refused to identify himself because, he said, the organisation was remaining totally secret, said that Khomeyni had at least two million to defend the regime. It had no less than 100,000 well-armed and well-trained fighting men.

The divisions between the opposition were one of the main reasons why Khomeyni continued in power, he said, calling on all the exile groups to unite to save Iran before it was too late. The task was a big one, for Khomeyni's revolution had at least 1,000 years root in Iranian society (the arrival of Shi'ism).

Every one of the revolutionary guards was being paid 70,000 rials (about $900) a month, while professional people like university professors received much less. The guards also had the freedom to loot, to buy and sell cars and houses, and other privileges, and were ready to die for the Imam.

The spokesman accused the opposition of "sacrificing force to content" when what was necessary was a union of all revolutionary and progressive forces opposed to Khomeyni. A united opposition would give more courage to opponents of the regime inside Iran. These opposition organisations had to be transformed and transferred to Iran to take up the struggle.

The motto of RALI, he said, was maximum secrecy inside Iran, maximum publicity outside for what was happening in the country under the present regime.

The spokesman strongly condemned former president Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi for leaving Iran on board a military aircraft, thus setting off a purge of air force officers and pilots and practically grounding the air force's planes when they were needed for sorties into Iraq. RALI believed effective armed forces were a prime necessity; therefore, the forces should remain as much as possible untouched and nationalistic.

The RALI official said his organisation had evidence of a Tudeh, Soviet and Palestinian spy ring working for Khomeyni. That was why the regime had been able to move so quickly against the Mojahedin and the Fedayeen-e-Khalq. Every time one hiding place of these groups (team houses, as the regime referred to them) was attacked, three houses, one either side, were also searched and looted by the revolutionary guards. This made it very difficult for people to provide shelter for the groups and also to avoid denouncing them to Khomeyni's men.

As far as a future regime in Iran was concerned constitutional monarchy would have to be considered, for the monarchy had a 3,000-year-old tradition in Iran. The other choice would be a western-style republic. The very fact that Bani-Sadr had said that a return to monarchy had become a dream for Iranians showed just how much the people had been affected by the sufferings imposed by the present regime.

His organisation favoured a provisional government made up of the different opposition groups, with no single group having the ascendancy, for a period of five years after the Khomeyni regime quit. Everyone must work for reconstruction of the country and the establishment of a stable government.

CSO: 4600/21

KHOMEYNI UNCERTAIN IN FACE OF CRITICISM BY CLERGY

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 18 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeyni has blown hot and cold in his reply to a five-point demand by the senior clergy who demanded the removal of the word "Islamic" from the Majlis and revolutionary courts, defrocking of some of pro-government mullahs and generally dissociating religion from extremely harsh measures which the government has adopted. (See IPS No 37)

Khomeyni's instinctive reaction came last week when during a speech he said: "Today everybody has become an expert on Islam. Even Carter (former U.S. president) and Sadat (Egyptian president) claim to be well-versed in Islamic jurisprudence. Tomorrow Begin (Israeli premier) may also claim that he too knows Islam better than we do."

Such a broadside at the three leaders was clearly meant to ridicule those ayatollahs who had asked Khomeyni to signal his acceptance of their five demands, especially on the Majlis. They indeed served notice that if Khomeyni cannot remove the prefix "Islamic" from the Majlis, he should move to dissolve it.

Khomeyni's reply on this point came in a statement the following day, when he told the leadership of the Islamic Republic Party to guard the Majlis diligently.

"The Majlis is a prime target for destruction by our enemies," he said. "They want to destroy the Majlis because it is a bastion of Islamic purity and strength."

Khomeyni was in fact talking about the need to tighten security measures to safeguard the Majlis building and its members. But to those well acquainted with polemics employed by the Shia clergy, especially Khomeyni, the real implication was obvious. Ayatollahs Zanjani, Shirazi, Qomi and several others had clearly said that the present Majlis does not qualify to carry the "Islamic" label.

In this way Khomeyni was brandishing this stick against contestants to his claim to theological seniority. But at the same time he sent the new prime minister, Mahdavi-Kani, to seek an audience with Ayatollah Qomi, who was among those putting forward the five demands. It was significant that Mahdavi-Kani was going to see Qomi and not Khomeyni's favourite and heir-apparent Ayatollah Montazeri.

Then in a commentary the Tehran Radio said that the door to give guidance to the laiety was open to all the Ulema and that the Majlis was simply providing

guidance on day-to-day affairs. It also said that Majlis members would lose no opportunity to benefit from the guidance given by the senior theologians.

Sources in Tehran believe that Khomeyni feels very insecure in his position as both the religious and political leader of the country. As a religious leader he is junior to four theologians: Shariat-Madari, Najafi and Golpayegani in Qom and Ayatollah Khoyi in Iraq. But theologians like Shirazi, Qomi and Zanjani also claim to be equal, if not senior, to Khomeyni. The Shia clerical set-up is not based on a rigid hierarchical structure and any theologian who reaches 'ijtihad' can declare that he sticks to his own inference of jurisprudence. To avoid such individual independence, Khomeyni has taken advantage of his political power to place very junior mullahs, who would obey his theological doctrine, to positions of high importance. This policy has antagonized other leading clery. It must be stressed that the title of ayatollah is not officially conferred; rather, pupils of a mullah call him ayatollah and he becomes one. After the revolution many small-time preachers suddenly assumed the title, without every reaching the level of 'mojtahed.'

CSO: 4600/20

REGIME HOLDS CRITICAL CLERICS IN JAIL

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 18 Sep 81 pp 3-4

[Text] A prominent former Iranian journalist who has escaped to Europe after being held in prison in Iran says that he learned while held that at least 60 ayatollahs and other senior clergymen who are followers of critics of Khomeyni, Ayatollahs Shariat-Madari and Qomi, are being held in jail.

In an exclusive interview with IPS Paris diplomatic correspondent Siavusn Bassari, who worked for the influential ETTELAAT newspaper under the last regime, named Ayatollah Alameh Vahid-Mazandarani, Ayatollah Rahmati from Kerman, Ayatollah Haj Ghavam Khatib, Ayatollah Moulai, Hojatoleslam Raissi-Gorgani and an 80-year-old former childhood companion of Khomeyni himself in Hossaingholi Homayuni as among the held clergymen.

Bassiri also warned that anyone moving against Khomeyni must bear in mind that hanging judge Khalkhali, who is closely associated with the Fedayeen-e-Eslam (Muslim Brotherhood) in Iran, had overseen the training of an elite corps of 5,000 students from the theological schools in Qom to serve as a fanatical bodyguard for the country's leader and fight for the regime to the last drop of their blood.

The journalist said they had been trained in batches of 200 at the home of executed general Nader Jahanbani outside Tehran by Lt. Col. Hamid Taati, himself a former rangers' commander in the Imperial Army. They have been trained in such a way as to become utterly ruthless and ready to sacrifice their lives for Islam against any odds.

Bassiri said that when he himself was questioned Khalkhali's men demanded to know where he kept any arms he might have. The reason for this, he later realised, was that former president Bani-Sadr had forbidden the supply of arms to Khalkhali for his own purposes, and this was how the fanatical mullah was gathering his own armoury.

Bassiri told a chilling story of how prisoners were treated in the jails, especially during the period when Khalkhali was in charge of handling so-called drug offenders. He said 'so-called' because it was general knowledge inside Iran that many of these people were in fact political offenders in the eyes of the regime. Bassiri said Bani-Sadr was aware that this was going to happen when he appointed Khalkhali to take over the drug squad, but obviously appreciated its advantages for getting rid of opponents.

Bassiri himself was three times put before a wall and submitted to a mock execution, he said. On one occasion he was the only survivor of seven who were taken out for execution. One trick used by some revolutionary guards was to carry out mock executions after allowing prisoners to make out their wills. Then they would take the prisoners back to their cells before accompanying them to the bank where the prisoner was forced to admit he had the money mentioned in his will. The guards would then take the money and the prisoner would be executed shortly afterwards.

During one period when 300 people were executed the names of only 180 could be counted in the newspapers, the journalist continued. The other names were later recorded from time to time as having died by natural causes. When he was arrested he was beaten repeatedly over a period of 17 hours before he finally lost consciousness. Besides physical violence he was subjected to constant mental torture. Most of the guards were youths of 15 and 16 years of age and they carried out executions with machine guns on most occasion, rather than with single weapons. Afterwards they would swarm over the bodies firing "coup de grace" shots into the heads of the victims, frequently missing and the bullets striking the bodies in other places.

Most of the men political prisoners, Bassiri said, had their hair shaved in the form of a cross over the middle of the head, with half a moustache cropped, and in the case of women, one eyebrow shaved, too. Beatings were delivered with cables in the case of men and water hosing for women.

On one occasion, he found out, when three busloads of alleged drug addicts were brought to the prison, Khalkhali sentenced all the passengers to jail terms without even seeing them. He gave two years to those in the first bus, three years to those in the second and five to those in the third.

CSO: 4600/20

WARNING ON OVERESTIMATING MOJAHEDIN'S POWER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 18 Sep 81 p 5

[Text] While the Western media was busy building up Masoud Rajavi and his Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisation over the past couple of weeks Iranian exile groups, the exile press and other individuals in closer touch with Iranians at home were issuing warnings about exaggerating the importance and strength of the Mojahedin movement.

Typical point of view was that expressed in a letter by a Mr Shifteh to the independent Paris based weekly IRAN-VA-JABAN. He observed that in his many interviews with the foreign press Rajavi had not given up his old habit "of talking to youngsters of limited knowledge."

"Rajavi says he will not collaborate with those who worked with the Shah or Khomeyni," he wrote..."forgetting that Bani-Sadr (who has appointed Rajavi as his 'prime minister') was Khomeyni's closest aide and adviser, the first president of the Islamic Republic and thus responsible for the mass killings of thousands of Iranians."

Rajavi had also stated that he did not want to cooperate with those unsuccessful in the past, but his man, Bani-Sadr, could hardly be described as a success. Was his success to help Khomeyni imprison and subsequently slaughter hundreds of his own people? The writer also had doubts about Rajavi's plan for Islamic democracy when there wasn't room for both Islam and democracy. "We are afraid Mr Rajavi's democracy will be that found in East Europe, Libya and South Yemen people's democracies."

IRAN LIBRE, the organ of the Iran-e-Azad (Free Iran) monarchist movement, said that like Khomeyni the Mojahedin wanted its own martyrs, so as to be highly regarded by Iranian public opinion. It described this as "an infamous, sentimental blackmail" which had so far wasted the lives of hundreds of young Iranians in the hands of killers.

The newsletter said the middle class and the bourgeoisie now seemed to be becoming dupes of the Mojahedin. It warned them they would become the next prey of the Mojahedin.

IRAN LIBRE rejected Mojahedin claims that it did not hold Marxist ideas, and said it had "irrefutable" documents proving that Moscow contributed to the Mojahedin, contrary to what Rajavi said.

CSO: 4600/20

CLANDESTINE RADIO ASSESSES MOJAHEDIN ANTIREGIME ROLE

NC271215 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 24 Sep 81

[Fifth Talk in Series Discussing Antiregime Groups]

[Text] The Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, which was among Ruhollah Khomeyni's close associates and friends at the start, commenced its actual anti-Khomeyni struggle when the clergy wanted to depose Bani-Sadr. The Mojahedin hoped that if they took to the streets together with their allies in the name of supporting Bani-Sadr, the people too would join them and Khomeyni's regime would fall or, at least, it would be forced to retreat in the face of the Mojahedin and Bani-Sadr and to grant them some concessions. But the incidents on Monday 15 June proved the inaccuracy of this assessment by the Mojahedin leadership. On that day the Mojahedin tried to implement their plan, but Khomeyni's clique, knowing of their plan, acted first by sending its mercenaries to the streets, and, thus, it neutralized the Mojahedin and their allies.

The Mojahedin faced another defeat after this one and their second defeat came when Bani-Sadr was dismissed from all his positions and was not granted support by the army. Following these two defeats the Mojahedin resorted to harsh and armed reactions. However, the scattered attacks which took place and are taking place against the regime's associates do not come only from the Mojahedine-e Khalq. Nationalist and freedom seeking groups have also carried out successful armed acts against Khomeyni's regime during the past 3 months. Officials of Khomeyni's regime are condemning all their opponents and all those executed in the past 3 months of being members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq or Peykar organizations, intending in this way to show to the people that the Islamic Republic has no other opponent other than the Mojahedin. The West's propaganda network and especially the BBC repeat this same claim with the intention of inflating the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. But the truth is that not all of the bombings, assassinations and attacks have been carried out by the Mojahedin and not all the people executed were only Mojaheds and Peykar organization members. To prove this point we will refer to remarks made by Mr Mas'ud Rajavi, member of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Central Committee, in his interview with the French newspaper LIBERATION 1 and 1/2 months ago when he said that among the 800 people executed, 300 were members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. No one asked or said who the remaining 500 were. The number of martyrs given by nationalists and freedom seekers was almost double the number of martyrs given by the Mojahedin and their associates and the armed acts by the nationalists against Khomeyni's regime were more than those by the Mojahedin in the same proportion.

Disregarding the armed struggle against Khomeyni's regime, there are major differences in the combat tactics used by the Mojahedin and the nationalists. The Mojahedin and their allies had calculated that the regime will weaken as a result of the armed acts against it. This, of course, is correct. They then intended to take to the streets and thought that the people would rebel in support for them and, as the result, the regime would be overthrown as was the former regime. But we saw that the leadership of the Mojahedin-e Khalq was mistaken since it counted on Khomeyni's clique displaying the same reaction to street demonstrations as the Shah's regime did, while what we saw was that the Hezbollahi criminals opened extremely merciless machinegun fire on the demonstrators and crushed the demonstrations by killing dozens of people. We heard the last decree issued by Khomeyni and his associates saying "kill the wounded in the street and execute the arrested on the same day."

The Mojahedin leadership had also thought that by starting strikes in industrial units and by spreading these strikes to the government offices it could crush Khomeyni's regime. However, a study and assessment of the support enjoyed by the Mojahedin shows us that the influence this organization has in industrial units and government offices and especially among the oil industry workers cannot be compared in any way with the influence, presence and superiority in number of national and freedom seeking forces and that any strike that takes place in industrial units and government offices will be actually put to the credit of national forces.

Another big mistake committed by the Mojahedin and its associates was that the thought that by using methods that led to the downfall of the Shah's regime they would be able to overthrow Khomeyni's regime. However, they did not pay sufficient attention to the differences between these two regimes. In confronting opposition Khomeyni uses utmost brutality while Mohammad Reza Sha Pahlavi retreated step by step.

In our next talk we will discuss the struggle tactics used by the nationalists and freedom fighters against Khomeyni's regime.

CSO: 4640/6

AMBASSDOR MEETS WITH SYRIA'S AL-ASAD

LD241136 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 24 Sep 81

[Text] During a ceremony the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran presented his credential to the Syrian president. According to the central news unit, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad said in a speech during the ceremonies: The Islamic revolution in Iran showed the true nature of Islam to the world. The Islamic revolution freed Iran from being the prime base of U.S. colonialism, through which the United States controlled an important part of the region.

Addressing the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hafiz al-Asad said, we admire Iran; in this connection you have suffered important losses and casualties and what you are confronted with stems from colonialism, for colonialism cannot tolerate you. In spite of all that, you resisted.

During the ceremonies, while presenting his credentials to the president of the brother country Syria, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran said: Our martyr-nurturing nation, under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, is alongside the brave Syrian nation and other Muslim brothers, in the battle trench in order to overthrow the occupying upsurping regime of Zionism and establish the government of Palestine in the occupied Islamic land of Palestine.

He added: At the top of the priority list of the activities of the Islamic Republic, is the relentless fight to erase and destroy the world-devouring colonialists, headed by the criminal United States; that is why the necessity is felt to form the Islamic, anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist front, comprised of Islamic countries.

CSO: 4640/6

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON HEZBOLLAHIS' CLASHES IN MEDINA

NC241921 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 24 Sep 81

[Text] Thirty Hezbollahis sent from Tehran have been arrested by the Saudi Arabian police. This group first clashed with pilgrims in the An-Nabi Mosque in Medina and then clashed with the Saudi Arabian police that had arrived on the scene. The Hezbollahi group consisted of agents of Khomeyni's regime who had gone to Saudi Arabia as pilgrims and had started demonstrations against the Saudi Government and nation during a religious ceremony. After clashing with the people and pilgrims, the 30 Hezbollahis were armed with weapons and attempted to shoot at the police. But the police, with the cooperation of the people, succeeded in arresting them.

Reports received indicate that had the Saudi police not intervened immediately the 30 Hezbollahis sent from Tehran would have been killed by the pilgrims in An-Nabi Mosque. At present, 18 of the 30 are in prison, while the remaining 12 whose injuries were serious are being treated in the hospital.

It is said that in their demonstrations the Tehran regime's terrorists called the officials of Saudi Arabia kaffirs, read Khomeyni's message to the people in which he, in the name of the deputy of the Imam of the ages, had claimed that the Saudi Government should be overthrown and an Islamic Republic be established there.

Meanwhile, in a report broadcast by the Tehran State Radio confirming the clashes by the Hezbollahis in the An-Nabi Mosque in Medina, the text of the protest letter by the "guidance ministry" of the regime to the minister of pilgrimage affairs and AWQAF of Saudi Arabia was read. In this strong protest Mo'adikhah, Khomeyni's "guidance" minister, while condemning the Saudi Government for negligence in carrying out its duties has tacitly warned that it will resort to retaliatory acts. The Tehran State Radio did not say why the pilgrims to God's house, the Saudi people and the Saudi police clashed with the Hezbollahis sent by Khomeyni to Saudi Arabia. The Qom Theological School is expected to confess tomorrow morning to the arrest, imprisonment and the wounding of the regime's Hezbollahi mercenaries in Saudi Arabia.

CSO: 4640/6

MAJLIS DEBATES DOMESTIC ISSUES 28 SEPTEMBER

GF280741

[Editorial Report] Tehran Domestic Service in Persian on 990 KHZ at 0514 GMT on 28 September begins a live relay of Majlis proceedings. The open session begins with the reading of the agenda by Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani followed by a recitation from the Koran. The agenda is stated as follows:

A. Preagenda Speeches.

B. Discussion on the Road and Transportation Commission Report.

C. Discussion on Land Allocation.

D. Discussion on the Economic and Budget Commission Report.

E. Discussion on the Judicial Affairs Commission Report.

F. Discussion on the Economic and Budget Commission Report.

G. Discussion on the Agricultural Commission Report.

H. Announcement of Names of Latecomers and Absentees.

I. Announcement on Adjournment of Session and Date of Next Session.

The station is unheard from 0521 to 0526 GMT when the announcer appologizes that, due to a technical fault, contact has been lost with the Majlis. The relay will resume as soon as the fault is corrected.

At 0538 GMT the station is heard carrying live Majlis debate. A deputy is heard talking on the values of martyrdom.

The Astara deputy starts his preagenda speech by praising Khomeyni and the Islamic Revolution and condemning "counterrevolutionary elements." He describes the importance of agricultural self-sufficiency and urges land reforms. The deputy asks the minister of roads and transportation to pay attention to the restoration of Astara roads.

An unidentified deputy, praising the recent victory of the armed forces, denounces counterrevolutionaries and points out shortages in health care in his hometown, which is indistinct due to bad reception.

At 0555 GMT Hashemi-Rafsanjani describes the recent victory of the armed forces over the Iraqis in Abadan. The Majlis speaker says that "with the Abadan victory all of Saddam's army has been defeated." The rest of the deputies are heard shouting "God is great." Hashemi-Rafsanjani describes the high moral that the Islamic forces enjoyed during this offensive and says that the Islamic forces could have done the same thing a few months ago but, due to Bani-Sadr's wrong policies, the army could not carry out decisive attacks. He adds: "Bani-Sadr was relying on unhealthy elements in the armed forces who were advising him badly. Bani-Sadr's plan was to let the Saddamists enter Abadan and Khuninshahr and to defend Dezful. I told him several times and even cried when I asked him not to let these two cities fall, but he would not listen."

At 0612 GMT reception becomes very poor to unmonitorable. Hashemi-Rafsanjani is praising the armed forces and asking the Iraqi forces to lay down their arms and not fight against "Islamic forces."

The speaker then reads a message signed by deputies extending their congratulation to Khomeyni and the armed forces on recent victory in Abadan.

At 0620 GMT a road and transportation commission report is discussed which deals with the Tehran-Karaj highway. Reception once again deteriorates and becomes very poor to unmonitorable.

The station is heard again at 0630 GMT with voting on the road and transportation commission report. The Majlis then continues debate on the next agenda item on land allocation, the report on economic and budget commission on the Khuzestan power and water department, and amendments to its regulations.

At 0701 GMT the speaker asks the deputies to not leave the Majlis as they are in the middle of voting. He asks Khalkhali to return to his seat and proceeds to voting on the said amendments.

The Majlis then debates the economic and budget commission report on collection and exemption of loans paid to ministries and government employees, and the agricultural commission report on expansion of silk production.

The names of deputies who are absent from the session are called and the session adjourns at 0713 GMT. The next Majlis session is scheduled for 0530 GMT on 4 October.

No further processing planned.

CSO: 4640/6

EXECUTIONS, ANTIREGIME STRUGGLES COMMENTED ON BY CLANDESTINE RADIO

NC291530 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 29 Sep 81

[Station Talk]

[Excerpts] Another 110 combatant youths of our homeland were placed in front of the firing squads of the regime's mercenaries and were killed on charges of patriotism and their love for Iran.

Ruhollah Khomeyni, this bloodsucking Mullah who is now the ruler of Jamaran, guarded by foreign soldiers and carrying out the orders of his foreign masters, has in a period of less than 3 years drawn our homeland to the edge of destruction and has made of the Iranian nation a rebellious and enraged people. It is surprising that with the daily increasing wave of opposition, protest and resistance, this helpless regime is still speaking of "antiregime minigroups," what minigroup is this when each day the membership increases. What minigroup is this that inspite of hundreds of executions daily still continues to act? It should be asked how unimportant this minigroup is, when in order to find them the regime sees itself compelled to set up spying centers even in kindergartens and elementary schools? What minigroup is this that kills groups and groups of the regime's bloodthirsty officials? According to Hashemi-Rafsanjani the Mullahs do not fear it. Then how odd that this minigroup is so strong and extensive as to have roots in kindergartens and elementary schools, among adolescents, 9-year-old girls and 13-year-old boys. Today it has become very clear to the Islamic Republic's ruffians that this opposing minigroup comprises the entire Iranian nation--a nation that is fed up with the oppression of the Islamic fascists, a nation that has lost patience with repression and tortures imposed on it by the Koran-carriers and has taken to the streets.

Yes, the Iranians have risen and with their insurrection they have (?proved wrong the calculations) of Western and Eastern colonialists. The nation's blows to the regime have now led the Mullahs to dread their sinister fate. The Iranian nation is struggling for freedom, independence and justice and does not fear executions and tortures. The nation is crushing the [words indistinct] and will prove to the East and the West that they should forget their dreams and wishes.

In tomorrow's free Iran there will be no place either for fifth-column Mullahs, or for agents and puppets of the West, nor will there be the least ray of hope for the Eastern Tudeh Party and the treacherous, servile and Xenophile Tudehs.

CSO: 4640/6

BRIEFS

HIGHER NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS--A nightletter, published last Sunday night by the underground PARS organization in Tehran, called on the people to resist Khomeyni's bloodthirsty regime as strongly as possible. It is said that not only will the patriots not surrender to the despotic leaders but they also will avenge the blood of the innocent patriots with an iron will. In the nightletter of the underground organization PARS or the guardians of the monarchical regime [Pasdaran-e Rezhim-e Saltanat] it is added: sooner or later those responsible for the deaths of Iran's freedom-seekers, including the prosecutors and heads of Khomeyni's courts of injustice, will pay for their savage acts. Another person who cooperates with the voice of Iran, quoting very reliable sources, has reported that between Thursday and Monday the Islamic Revolution courts executed more than 515 opponents but in an effort to prevent any type of international reaction it was mentioned that only 193 were executed. Nevertheless, even the announcement of a falsified number of executions has met with international reaction and the press described last Friday and Saturday as the bloodiest days of the Mullahs' regime. Reliable world newspapers believe that the intensification of the opposition's demonstrations and attacks against the state revolution guards in the past 2 weeks should be considered as the beginning of the end of the Islamic Republican Regime. [Text] [NC231223 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 22 Sep 81]

CLANDESTINE ON AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CABLES--Amnesty International has sent cables to the officials of the Islamic regime in Tehran expressing strong aversion to the executions of Iran's nationalist youths. Amnesty International has criticized Ruhollah Khomeyni and Mahdavi-Kani for not sparing adolescents from executions by virtue of their new orders. [Text] [NC231505 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 23 Sep 81]

IRANIAN SILENCE TO AMNESTY PROTEST--Ruhollah Khomeyni and his Prime Minister Mahdavi-Kani have (?kept) silent on the (?protest) by Amnesty International on the daily increasing killings of youths and opponents of the regime and refrained from replying to this protest. In a letter to Ruhollah Khomeyni and Mahdavi-Kani, Amnesty International has expressed its deep regrets on the intensification of executions in Iran and has strongly condemned remarks by officials of the regime on the execution of children and wounded. [Text] [NC241218 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 23 Sep 81]

MUSLIM STANCE ON EXECUTIONS--Following the statement issued by Shaykh Zad al-Haq, 'Ali Zad al-Haq--the highest religious personality of Egypt--in which he rejected the opinions of the ruling Iranian Ayatollahs on the punishment of people wounded in antigovernment demonstrations, religious officials and dignitaries of several other Muslim countries have strongly attacked and criticized Ruhollah Khomeyni's religious associates and have described Mohammad Gilani's remarks as a blatant distortion of the laws of Islam. The statement issued by Egypt's grand Mufti states: Islam considers even the execution of wounded non-Muslim prisoners. Religious officials of Muslim countries already previously protested and condemned acts committed in Iran under the veil of Islam and stressed that the spirit of Islam is completely contrary to the inhumanities committed by the Ayatollahs' regime in Iran. [Text] [NC231341 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 22 Sep 81]

CLANDESTINE ON BANI-SADR ANTI-KHOMEYNI STATEMENT--Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the dismissed president of the Mullahs' regime, has issued a statement in Paris condemning Khomeyni's regime for clearly violating ("Islamic") principles. He stressed that the acts committed by Khomeyni and by the regime's other leaders do not in any way conform with (?the logic of Islam). In his statement Bani-Sadr called on the Iranian people to resist Khomeyni's fascist and anti-Islamic regime and [words indistinct] inflict blows on it. The dismissed president of the clerical regime also asked the world's industrial countries to refrain from selling their products to Khomeyni's regime and to impose an economic siege on the fascist Tehran regime. He announced that any agreement signed by Khomeyni's regime with countries of the East or West ("is void") as far as the Iranian nation is concerned. [Text] [NC240810 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 23 Sep 81]

ANTIGOVERNMENT REPORT ON KILLINGS--Twenty-two youths and opponents of Khomeyni's regime have been executed by firing squads in Isfahan, Chalus, Nowshahr, Borujerd and Aghajari. Also, Tuesday, 24 opponents and freedom fighters were sentenced to death on charges of participating in demonstrations and armed antiregime activities. In addition to these 46, more than 65 others were secretly executed in one group. The regime has refrained from officially reporting the (?charges) and names of the executed people. A group of students of the former Tehran University and of the Aryamehr Industrial College are now preparing a (?documentary) report on secret executions, how the executions are carried out and the number of people executed. They intend to place this report at the disposal of the Iranian nation and international law associations and organizations. [Text] [NC241426 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 23 Sep 81]

PURGES, DISMISSALS IN AIR FORCE--Colonel Mo'inpur, the new commander of the air force, has promised the regime's high officials to dismiss antiregime officers, second class technicians, and NCO's from the air force as soon as possible. He said that these people total about 20 percent and that personnel not coordinated with the Islamic Revolution regime will be fired. The decision to fire 20 percent of the already weakened air force--bearing in mind the executions, dismissals, the number of persons purged and [word indistinct] the continuation of the war with Iraq--is a treacherous act leading to the destruction of one of the strong arms of the Iranian armed forces. The Iranian air force which, before Khomeyni's rule enjoyed fifth place in the world as far as its strength and expertise were concerned, has suffered most of the blows since February 1978 and hundreds of its officers. Second class technicians and NCO's have been either executed, fired or imprisoned.

It should be noted that last week Colonel Mo'inpur issued orders for the arrest of a number of air force personnel on fabricated charges on involvement in Bani-Sadr's escape. [Text] [NC24150 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 23 Sep 81]

CLANDESTINE ON SCHOOLS BECOMING SPYCENTERS--'Ali 'Akbar Parvaresh, the Islamic Republic's minister of education, announced yesterday on the occasion of the commencement of the academic year in Iran that the regime of the Velayat-e Faqih should set up spying and intelligence centers in all elementary schools and even kindergartens in order to place all students and children under full control, to identify children who are counterrevolutionaries and against Ruhollah Khomeyni's regime and to hand them over to officials of the regime. [Text] [NC241502 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 24 Sep 81]

DISMISSAL OF MINORITY TEACHERS--Agencies report that following the firing of Jewish and Armenian teachers of Iran from the ministry of education, the clerical regime is attempting another purge. A free voice of Iran correspondent in Tehran reported that in the regime's propaganda play yesterday, which was organized by spies of the "organization of Islamic Councils of Schools," and following the regime's confidential orders on the compulsory participation of students in this ceremony, members of the "Islamic Councils of Schools" and the children of Mullahs and of officials of the regime apparently called on the regime to purge opposing teachers. We add that during his term as Minister of Education Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i had identified, dismissed or transfered a large number of Iranian teachers who had nationalist and freedom-seeking tendencies. Khomeyni's regime has not yet revealed the correct number of Armenian, Assyrian and Jewish teachers of Iran who have been dismissed. Also, Khomeyni's "Islamic" regime has trampled on the legal rights of the minority schools with the registration of students from all classes and the handing over of the management of these schools to the Mullahs. [Text] [NC241913 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 24 Sep 81]

CLANDESTINE CITES MOJAHEDIN PARIS STATEMENT--The Mojahedin-e Khalq of Iran has issued a statement in Paris revealing that Khomeyni's executioners ask for 1,000 tumans per bullet used to execute opponents when asked by their relatives to hand over the corpse. The statement adds that last Tuesday Khomeyni's mercenaries received 15,000 tumans for the 15 bullets used to execute one of the demonstrators of recent days from his relatives in return for his mutilated corpse. The text of this statement has been given to all foreign news agencies. [Text] [NC251004 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 24 Sep 81]

MEETING BETWEEN ARMY, GUARDS--Officials of the Revolution Guards Corps have requested the commanders of the Iranian armed forces to find a solution to end the hostility shown by the soldiers of the armed forces toward members of the guards corps. Our correspondent reports that in a joint session attended by commanders of the armed forces' general staff and the security force with officials of the Revolution Guards Corps, General Fallahi, chief of the general staff, warned the Revolution Guards not to intervene in war policies and described their lack of military and war knowledge as an element preventing the armed forces from advancing in the war with Iraq. He stressed that as long as the Revolution Guards Corps is placed in a position facing the officers, NCO's and other personnel of the armed forces rather than next to the armed forces, it will be impossible to establish further under-

standing and cooperation. Our correspondent adds: General Fallahi and Khomeyni's representative in the Revolution Guards Corps attended an interview in which they spoke coldly about an agreement and coordination. But what was not achieved in this joint meeting was an agreement and coordination between the Iranian armed forces and the regime's Revolution Guards. [Text] [NC251757 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 24 Sep 81]

MINIGROUP MEMBERS EXECUTED--By verdicts of the Islamic Revolution Courts of Tonekabon, Babol, Rasht, Torbat-e Heydariyeh, Sistan and Baluchestan and Some'eh Sara, 22 active members of the hypocrites [Mojahedin-e Khalq] and other American mini groups were found fighters against God [Mohareb] and transgressors against God [Baghi], on charges of participating in armed demonstrations, assassinating people and killing defenseless people, possessing weapons, corrupting and forcing students to participate in armed demonstrations against the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, forming and attending communal houses [Khaneh-ye Timi], endorsing the organization's policy of armed struggle and stealing printing and copying machines. They were sentenced to death and the sentences were carried out. [Text] [LD261152 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 26 Sep 81]

CLANDESTINE REPORTS ON KHOMEYNI'S HEALTH--According to the Free Voice of Iran [FVOI] correspondent in Switzerland, following the heart attack suffered by Ruhollah Khomeyni on Thursday, the embassy of the Mullahs' regime in Geneva sent two Swiss doctors by the names of Dr (Monar) and Dr (Arian) to Tehran in a chartered Falcon. Our correspondent adds: The doctors who went to Khomeyni's side the same night immediately undertook remedial action. However, on the morning of Friday, 25 September, Khomeyni suffered a second and stronger attack which has put him in a coma, causing grave concern among the doctors and people around him. Khomeyni's doctors, who had contacted Switzerland in order to obtain modern equipment, have announced that his situation is grave. Both doctors have told their colleagues in Switzerland that a third attack would probably kill Khomeyni. Political observers in Europe believe that the regime's present efforts to crush the opposition and promote Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri in widespread propaganda is a sign that officials of the Islamic regime are worried over the imminent death of Khomeyni and the matter of his replacement. [Text] [GF281704 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 28 Sep 81]

ECONOMY, BARTER TRADE--Mohammad Banki, minister of state in charge of the plan and budget organization, in an interview with PARS news agency on the effects of the imposed war, said the war imposed on Iran by Iraq should always be evaluated in the context of the Islamic Republic's constant struggle against American imperialism. He added that the impact of Iraq's aggression initially was severe with regard to imports and the country's production. However, the country's resources and its achievement of the stage of self-sufficiency made it possible to prevent the country's economy from suffering serious harm. The minister of state further said: For the government, one of the positive results of the war has been the appreciation of the need to avoid relying on the sale of oil and for saving foreign exchange. In conclusion, he added: our experience so far with regard to our barter trade with various countries has been extremely useful and, by means of such trade exchange, we have been able so far to defend our interests to some extent against America's aggressive policy to reduce the country's foreign exchange resources to a minimum. [Text] [LD011216 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 1 Oct 81]

HAMEDAN CONSCRIPTION NOTICE--The Hamedan Gendarmerie Regiment announced that all conscripts who are high school and college graduates born between the years 1958-61 should report for registration to the military service department of Hamedan Gendarmerie Regiment from 10 to 13 October. All those who have not yet reported themselves to the local regiments or the Hamedan Regiments should do so at the earliest with relevant documents so that their dispatch may be scheduled. [GF261304 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 26 Sep 81]

BANKERS VISIT U.S.--Representatives of the Bank-e Markazi of Iran have left for New York to participate in the annual session of the International Monetary Fund. [GF261239 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 26 Sep 81]

BANDAR-E LENGEH CONSCRIPTION NOTICE--The Bandar-e Lengeh Gendarmerie Regiment has announced that all conscripts who terminated their service between 21 March 1977 and 20 March 1978 should report to this regiment between 26-28 September. All those who do not report on time will be dealt with in accordance with wartime regulations. [GF261405 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 26 Sep 81]

IRANIAN LOSSES, COUP ATTEMPT CONFIRMED--London, 30 Sep (INA)--Iranian sources have revealed to the London newspaper AL-'ARAB that the Iranian regime has begun to transport the victims of its war against Iraq to hospitals in the interior. These sources confirmed the death of more than 3,000 Iranians in the last 2 days of battle in the Abadan region and added that large numbers of wounded were airlifted to Khomeyni Hospital, formerly Pahlavi Hospital, in West Tehran, to Mustafa Khomeyni Hospital in South Tehran and to the National Iranian Oil Company Hospital in Ahvaz. According to information received from Iranian military sources by telephone the day before yesterday, the sources said that the 3,000 Iranians were killed in the Iraqi counterattack prior to Iraq's decision to transfer its troops from the Eastern to the Western Bank of the Karun River. The same sources disclosed that Khomeyni had decided to send the 77th division located in the city of Khorasan to the front after having received confirmation that some of the division's commanders were planning a coup d'etat. Khomeyni also had summoned General Fallahi before his death and told him that he should undertake military action at the front to divert attention from the clashes taking place inside Iran, which have turned into street fighting in Tehran and other towns. [Text] [JN301440 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1405 GMT 30 Sep 81]

DEATHS IN MILITARY PLANE CRASH--London, 30 Sep (INA)--Reliable Iranian sources have said that several senior Iranian military commanders were among those killed in last night's plane crash near Tehran. After telephone conversations with their acquaintances in Tehran, these sources said that among the dead were General Faruzan, defense council member; Mohsen Reza'i, commander of the revolution gurads; (AKHIANI), commander of the Gendarmerie; Zahir-Nejad, commander of the ground forces; and three other colonels. Sources added that the number of the dead is 80 and that Tehran hospitals were evacuated to receive those injured in the plane crash. Musa Namju, minister of defense; Fallahi, acting joint chief of staff; and Fakuri, former defense minister; were also among the dead. [Text] [JN301516 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1458 GMT 30 Sep 81]

SOMALIA, SUDANESE ENVOYS--The ambassadors of Sudan and Somalia met separately today with Foreign Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi upon the conclusion of their missions in Iran. The two ambassadors thanked the foreign minister for helping them to carry out their duties during their 4 years in Iran. [GF241843 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 24 Sep 81]

AMBASSADORS PRESENT CREDENTIALS--The Belgiam ambassador in Tehran presented his credentials to Mahdavi-Kani, member of the provisional presidential council and prime minister, yesterday. In the course of a statement during the presentation ceremony, the Belgian ambassador said: We believe that your revolution is a spiritual and divine revolution. Iran is able at this time to carry out its role in the best manner. Mahdavi-Kani said in reply: Small and large states are not viewed by the Islamic revolution of Iran on a geographical basis but are assessed on the basis of the services they contribute to mankind. The New Zealand ambassador also met with and presented his credentials to the prime minister. On receiving the ambassador's credentials, Mahdavi-Kani said: We believe that geographic distance does not separate us. What separates us is the distance between hearts. The prime minister urged the New Zealand ambassador to seek to strengthen relations between Iran and New Zealand in economic, political and cultural fields. [Text] [GF020546 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 2 Oct 81]

CSO: 4604/1

BRIEFS

ASSASSINATION OF IRAQI BA'THIST--The [Pro-Syrian] 'Iraqi Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party has announced the death of comrade Struggler Shawkat Adham al-Hadithi, who was recently assassinated by the Iraqi regime. The Iraqi Regional Command has issued a statement which said: The Iraqi regime continues its campaigns of liquidation against the nationalists and progressives in Iraq. Saddam Husayn's intelligence organs have committed a new crime with the assassination of one of the leaders of the socialist Arab Ba'th party in Iraq. On 17 September 1981 security and intelligence forces of Saddam Husayn's regime raided the residence of struggle comrade Shawkat Adham al-Hadithi, a leading cadre of the socialist Arab Ba'th party (of the Iraqi Regional Command), and took him to an unknown destination where they subjected him to worst kind of torture before they liquidated him physically. And on 30 September 1981 the comrade's body was handed over to his family. Signs of torture on the comrade Struggler's body who died under torture were evident. [Unattributed Report: "Iraqi Regime Assassinates Comrade Shawkat al-Hadithi"] [Excerpt] [PM251615 Damascus al-Ba'th in Arabic 20 Sep 81 pp 1, 2]

IRAQIS PURSUING MUSLIM PARTY MEMBERS--Cairo, 29 Sep (Mena)--Reports received from Baghdad say that organs of the Ba'thist regime in Iraq are pursuing the members of the ad-Da'wah al-Islamiyah [the Islamic call] party after liquidating its leader Imam Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, who was executed a few months ago. These reports say that the authorities of the Iraqi Ba'thist regime have recently discovered the existence of a plan between the ad-Da'wah al-Islamiyah party and the Iranian revolution. This matter led these authorities to execute a group of officers who sympathize with the Shi'ite activity in Iraq. They also purged the armed forces and the state organs of Shi'ite elements. These reports say that the Ba'th party organs are continuing their campaign against the religious activities and to besiege religious organizations in the Iraqi cities. [Text] [NC291008 Cairo Mena in Arabic 0840 GMT 29 Sep 81]

SPARE PARTS CONTRACT--The Canadian firm Bombardier has won a $17 million contract from the Iraqi government for the supply of spare parts for diesel-powered electric locomotives. Company sources said in Montreal last week that delivery would begin later this autumn and be spread over a period of 18 months. Bombardier supplied Iraq with the diesel locomotives in 1975. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 p 12]

CSO: 4400/12

NEW KNESSET MEMBERS DISCUSS THEIR ROLES, AIMS, POLICY POSITIONS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Jul 81 pp 10, 37

[Article by Mikhal Meron: "New Faces in Knesset"]

[Text] The important journalists are not yet interested in them. Most of those in the parliament do not even recognize them. Even the doormen sometimes make a mistake and ask the new MK for his pass to be in the building.

They walk about the Knesset building somewhat confused. They do not yet know what, when, how, why and how much. They have many hopes and a lot of faith in their power. Of course they will shine. Of course they will be active, full-time members of the Knesset. Of course each will be prominent in his area. Of course they will try to breath new spirit into the parliament.

Despite the fact that most of them have spent years in various political ranks, and despite the fact that some of them feel like veteran warriors, at the moment they are sworn into the Knesset, and at the reception of the president, they will be very moved. Most of them appeared with neckties and were well kempt, accompanied by their families who had come to see father in his glory. Some of them chat with ease. Others, like Mikha Reiser for example, will wait a bit until they show themselves to the voting public.

Mikha Reiser does not look like a new face. When you see him, it seems as though he has always been here. Indeed, he has visited here a lot, but this time the rules are different and he is a new MK, no longer David Levy's "man known to the public."

Mikha, a 35-year-old red head, sat in the cafeteria drinking coffee and eating a dry cracker (his diet) and spoke about his lottery. He feels like one who has won the lottery

In the internal elections he was chosen for place 24, which seemed to him a bitter personal failure. He says: "As far as I was concerned my candidacy for the Knesset was a difficult issue, and I did not succeed in facing it in a proper manner."

He threw up his hands and decided, "OK, maybe in the next election." Reiser simply did not believe that the 45th position was a realistic one.

At that time he was drawing bad cards. On the day of the internal elections, his wife broke her leg. He was elected to a poor spot somewhere near the end, and "I thought that was it." He confesses that "bad things come in bunches" and that the closing bell at the polls would be "our eulogy at the elections."

He was definitely excited when he was informed that he had made it. But the true excitement came when he was sworn in. Almost at the end, when they reached the letter "R," for Reiser, he stood up, flushed as always, and declared: "I affirm the oath."

Now he is already on the inside. He knows the building and its wings well. "Including the cafeteria, which is a bad place to waste time and get confused."

Reiser promised that he would not be appointed, at the beginning of his tenure, over MK's prominent in the parliamentary and personal landscape. First he intends to learn well how things work. Only then will he begin to run for the radio and television. He will do this in spite of the "coalition of 61 to 59, where everyone can be a star if he only drops a hint that he will walk out on his faction on some crucial issue."

Reiser's faction is liberated from his threat, at least for the first month or so.

Reiser would be happy if they would let him concentrate in his Knesset work on those areas where he knows how to maneuver—such as construction. (Up until his election to the Knesset he was a senior official in the Ministry of Housing.) He would also like to work to improve sports in the country and is ready to take part in a subcommittee for sports, on condition that he will be chairman.

He thinks out loud: "Perhaps I will also get involved in the issue of the quality of life and the environment. In the Likud, no one has chosen to work in that area. I already have a team of volunteer experts for that issue."

In the meantime, he is enjoying the cracker and the handshakes of friends. One of them wishes him success, "in spite of the fact that I did not vote for you and did not want you here." Reiser smiles. He already has both feet inside.

Anyone who does not know 48-year-old Musa Kharif from the Knesset remembers him from his impressive appearances on television, in the campaign ads of the Allignment.

Even his first appearance in the Knesset is impressive. He is well dressed, but it is not over done. He has a warm and penetrating glance, with bright eyes. He is a member of Kibbutz Tsora, an architect and city planner. When asked if he is satisfied to be here, his measured answer seems suited to the man. He says: "It is too soon to say. In the meantime, I am only in first grade, learning the operational rules of the place, with the help of students in the higher grades." In the Knesset for the first time, he finds it difficult to define his goals and aspirations. He says:

"In general, I would like to hope that the almost standoff results of the elections between the parties will lead us to new elections. Meanwhile, we accept

the decision of the voters, despite the fact that this means disappointment. Knowing the material, I knew that the results would be close. At more than one meeting, I said that a mandate of one vote was not enough. More is needed. But in political life, nothing is hermetically sealed. The NRP did a post mortem and discovered that it lost half of its strength to the Likud following its romance with it, a romance with which neither side is satisfied. Perhaps now we will be able to bring down the government and have new elections." In any case, he proposes that this time (in time to effect a change) his party begin now to build and operate its election staff.

Dan Tikhon sits at the end of the cafeteria. To judge from the number of pipe smokers with serious faces around him, one might err and think that he has been in the Knesset for years. But no, Dan Tikhon, a 44-year-old Jerusalemite, held the 28th position on the Likud list, and this is the first elected office for him.

Wearing a necktie, handsome and looking self-important, he tells of an impressive background from 1969 to 1974 as advisor to the Minister of Industry and Commerce. Today he has an economic consulting office that specializes in industry, tourism and construction.

Dan Tikhon wants to be on the Finance Committee. Of course, all of his vast experience, he says, was accumulated in the field of economics. "I am also a big exporter of flowers, a businessman with a lot of experience in finance," he says, and a smile creeps across his blue eyes.

As an MK who wants to produce a lot, as much as possible, he wants to participate only on committees whose subjects are familiar to him. Education, for example, is not one of those subjects.

Even though he has been in the Knesset only a few hours, he feels that the Knesset is not ready to carry out its role. He says: "The first hours are similar to a struggle between lawyers on all kinds of procedural rules. But within a few days, everything will be worked out."

No, he does not expect new elections in the near future. This leads him to think that he will sit in his position for at least four and a half years. And one can see that this thought gives Dan Tikhon a great deal of pleasure.

Hanan Porat is about to be the bad boy of the Knesset. For the first day he wears his shirt out, and his hair is wild and he is unshaven. He was not surprised by the surveys that promised him a seat in the Knesset. He was not even excited by them. "I am a man who knows how to work under pressure," he explained, "and any excitement in reading the election pictures before the final tally was it seemed to me imprudent."

Hanan Porat, who entered the Knesset at the last minute, when everyone had already predicted that he would be on the outside, did not come here out of ambition and careerism. His personal ambition is concentrated in the area of education and the purchase of real estate for the good of the country.

He says: "I already know this institution from my contacts with it as a member of Gush Emunim. From the beginning, I have had no illusions about the joy that awaits me here. In my membership in the Knesset, I see a public mission in areas that are in bad condition today. I see as critical the land of Israel and the people of Israel. The work to be done in these areas is great. Therefore, do not make a blessing on my arrival in the Knesset. Because the work is so great and the goals have yet to be achieved, such as saving the settlements of Ofira and the Yamit region, I will make the blessing only after that work is completed."

Hanan Porat, who is pictured by many as the angry prophet of the right, does not intend to limit his activity to these or other small areas. He is going for great things: anything connected with society, the Torah and the state, and policy questions.

He says, without a trace of a smile: "I am devoted particularly to the need for raising the level of the land of Israel. I want to be its man in the Knesset. I want to cancel the decision on autonomy that will lead to a Palestinian state. I want to push forward the process of settlement in the land of Israel. I sense that a general malaise has stricken the people of Israel."

He continues: "Today we are in the process of achieving a great return to Zion. This is only the beginning of the way. My role is to raise the banner of the return to 9ion for all of the people of Israel, in a pure and Jewish spirit." Porat speaks in a voice of messianic quality.

Rafi Adari, of the Alignment, is a Moroccan but not a "professional" one. He says: "I am proud of my roots, but I am opposed to professional manifestations of ethnicity. Anyone who has the talent should reach his appropriate position without reference to his ethnic background." Thus Rafi Adari, who came to the Knesset from the 7th place on the Alignment list.

Adari gives the impression of a quiet and able man. He wears a suit and tie and is still moved by finding himself in the 10th Knesset.

He wants to be involved in the Finance Committee and the Labor Committee. "I have been involved in finance since I can remember," says the director general of Shikun Ovdim Co. and the chairman of one of the largest construction companies in the country. He also sees his role in labor, as one who grew up in a development region and underwent all of the pain of absorption as a new immigrant to Israel. He sees himself as close to that part of the population for whom this Knesset must work to advance.

He feels good in the Knesset, not completely new, because he used to visit here, but, he says with a smile, "I did not have a seat, certainly not in the first row, near the great ones. But I will get used to it," he promises.

In the meantime, he is learning, and absorbing impressions, ready to proceed to his parliamentary work and to be an active MK.

At home, in Herzliya, his wife and three children are happy about his election. "Yes," he says, "only three children. I said that I am not a racial Moroccan, but I am not a plastic Moroccan either."

Beni Shalita, 45 years old, was 44th on the Likud list. He has been head of the local council of Menahemia for 24 years. He is happy that he was elected, but he puts his parliamentary work in the Knesset second among his priorities. The local council of Menahemia still holds first place. This in spite of the fact that he confesses to having held that position for too many years.

Beni Shalita says: "Being head of a local council is a much more senior position. The pinnacle of my life was when I reached that position at such a young age." He says this without a trace of sadness in his voice. "Such pinnacles do not recur. Even my election to the Knesset does not equal that pinnacle. It is too bad that mayors and heads of local councils want so much to be in the Knesset."

The fact that he was in the 44th position and not especially realistic before the elections he blames on his colleagues in the Liberal Party. "In spite of the attempts of certain persons, they did not entirely succeed." He already knew before the elections that his position was marginal. So he did not entertain great hopes. He knew why they did not want him in the Liberal Party. He was considered too independent. He considers Pesah Gruper among those who tried to torpedo him. He points to his whitish hands and says: "Even though my hands have been tanned in farm work for so many years."

Daily he will make his way from Menahemia (between Tiberias and Beit-Shean) to Jerusalem, because he definitely intends to be a full time member of the Knesset.

7075
CSO: 4323

SHARON'S RECORD IN TRYING TO END AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES SEEN AS FAILURE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 15

[Article by Avraham Tsahar: "What Kind of Minister of Agriculture Was He?"]

[Text] Minister Sharon is the clear antithesis of a politician. Both his admirers and enemies share the opinion that the "reprimanded general," who for many years was considered "the bad boy" of the IDF, transferred to political life (when he was appointed Minister of Agriculture) the methods to which he had grown accustomed in the IDF, and he did not hesitate to push aside anyone who stood in the way of his realizing his goals.

Less than a year after his appointment to the cabinet in the Begin government, Sharon succeeded in getting embroiled with the only natural allies that he had among farmers--the heads of the Agriculture Union. He likewise became embroiled with the whole leadership of the Liberal Party, and his comments on the abilities and qualifications of Minister Patt or Minister Modai were damaging to agricultural settlement. Arik Sharon is also known as the person who "threatened" a deputy prime minister "to strip him naked" and hinted that the originator of leaks from government sessions was another deputy prime minister. Within less than three years, Sharon removed most of the upper echelon of his ministry and replaced them with others from the same sector (most if not all were from moshavim) and all of them, without exception, from the opposition party....

Almost everyone agrees that this was done as a stubborn attempt to achieve his goals. The dispute between his admirers and enemies (almost no one is indifferent to the man) revolves around what are in fact and what were supposed to be his goals.

Arik Sharon gave an enormous boost to agricultural settlement in the territories and in Galilee. But his accusers claim that he did not work to establish points of agricultural settlement but rather "political hotels" whose inhabitants would only live in them temporarily, not because of devotion to the soil but to prove something to themselves, to the people of Israel and especially to the non-Jews.

During his 4 years as Minister of Agriculture, many upheavals occurred in that sector. If prior to his tenure the agricultural branch was considered income producing, things were turned around and troubles multiplied. Everyone knows of the crisis that occurred in flower growing, orchards, dairy production, poultry and so

forth. Opponents of Sharon claim that the source of the crisis stems from his "shoot from the hip" methods in areas where he was in charge. When he became convinced that livestock enjoyed an exaggerated subsidy, he ended the subsidy in the wink of an eye. When he was convinced that his step would lead to the unavoidable collapse of that sector, he renewed the subsidy but increased it. The same thing occurred in poultry.

Those close to Sharon claim that the dispute over subsidies, which is going on among farmers and the Israeli public at large, dates back to the first days of Zikhron Ya'aqov and the disputes that occurred with the officials of the Baron. The farmers had simply grown accustomed to living in the shadow of one benefactor or another: it is the same thing whether we speak of the Baron or the Israeli Government. Against this background, Sharon, with his own appointments, began to work to put an end to this system of incentives to various branches. As director general of his ministry he appointed a moshavnik by the name of Avraham Ben-Meir, who during the tenure of Aharon Ozen as Minister of Agriculture had resigned from his post as director general because of opinions which he had voiced regarding what has been defined as free competition in agriculture without government intervention (read: without subsidies or supervision). The days of Ben-Meir's tenure were numbered: he eliminated the subsidies for poultry and eggs, and he began to encourage the construction of flower hot houses. The results were not long in coming; within two years the branches of flowers and poultry were both on the verge of collapse. The former occurred because of the lack of profitability, in the wake of which occurred waves of shortages and surpluses the like of which had never been seen. The second occurred because of surplus production which no market--neither in Israel or abroad, could have absorbed.

Arik Sharon worked rapidly. After he dismissed the director general of the Flower Council, Shlomo Luzatto, and attempted to dismiss the director general of the Poultry Council, Ya'aqov Doron (an attempt which succeeded only a year ago, after protracted struggles), the director general of the Ministry of Agriculture himself, Avraham Ben-Meir, resigned.

Crisis followed crisis, and after each the turnover in official manpower increased. After the resignation of the deputy director general of the ministry, Mr. Molkho (who had also been appointed over fisheries, development and the Flower Council), an attempt was made to "behead" the director general of the Vegetable Council, but that was unsuccessful: the director general refused to resign willingly, and workers' organizations also joined the struggle to prevent his dismissal. All that Sharon could do was to empty the authority of the director general of all content.

Other persons, including (past) director general Haim Molkho, branch head Y. Gil, and many others of the top echelon of the Ministry of Agriculture, are on the list of dismissals and "replacements" that were executed in the last two or three years.

More than once Sharon has been accused of trying to purify the Ministry of Agriculture of the old guard of Haityashvut Haovedet (read: Alignment). There is no truth in these claims; the first directly general appointed by Sharon to head his ministry was Mr. Avraham Ben-Meir, of Tel Adashim, who after his resignation joined the Telem list and became one of its candidates for the 10th Knesset. And appointed to replace him was none other than his older brother, Mr Meir Ben-Meir, of

Moshav Yokneam, a veteran of Hahityashvut Haovedet, who during the regime of the Alignment was appointed as Water Commissioner (a position which he still holds today, in addition to his post as director general of the Ministry of Agriculture).

Likewise, those who replaced the persons dismissed from the Flower Council and the Poultry Council, who had been members of moshavim identified with the Alignment, themselves came from the same sector and the same political background. But this is only one side of the coin. There are those who claim that the persons who were dismissed, against the background of crises that visited agriculture, had worked to implement the policies of Minister Sharon, policies that were proven to be an economic disaster. Those close to Sharon do not believe this to be so. They claim that those who were dismissed were dismissed because they were either unwilling or unable to properly carry out the ministry's policies.

But in fact, was there any policy within the Ministry of Agriculture? Two years after the appointment of Ariel Sharon as Minister of Agriculture, subsidies in most of the principal branches had been eliminated. But in less than a year, the subsidies have been renewed and their scope enlarged so that today they are larger than before the election of Likud. Prior to the appointment of Sharon as Minister of Agriculture, Israeli agriculture developed at an annual rate of 4 to 6 percent. Since Likud came to power, agriculture has been frozen. The heads of the Ministry of Agriculture claim that the activities of the ministry stem mostly from political pressures. Those who hold this position claim that the drastic elimination of subsidies for dairy products, and before that for eggs and poultry, was forced on the ministry by the Finance Ministry and the Finance Minister at that time, Mr. Simkha Ehrlich. Likewise, the renewal of the subsidies at unprecedented scope came about on the eve of the elections, as part of the pre-election policy of Minister Aridor. When Avraham Ben-Meir resigned as director general of the Ministry of Agriculture, he refused to give his real reasons for resigning. Those close to him say that he agreed to leave his position only after "bitter disappointment" over the inability of his boss to pass in the Knesset and in the Finance Ministry the resolutions that were supposed to have prevented the deterioration of whole sectors of agriculture.

There is no shortage of such examples. Minister Sharon failed to get passed in the Knesset the law for encouraging capital investment in agriculture because of the opposition of the Liberals. To get the law passed in spite of this, Sharon was forced to take the unprecedented step in Israeli parliamentary life and permitting a Knesset member of the NRP faction to present the law, because he was interested in its passage as a privately proposed law. The Liberals agreed to this, and the law was in fact passed. A similar process occurred with the law for an arrangement to market flowers abroad. The Ministry of Agriculture was interested in the law, a neutral committee of experts recommended its passage and the farmers also supported it. Nevertheless, the proposed law did not get to a first reading. Sharon--the military man turned politician--succeeded in creating such strong antagonism to the law among his colleagues (the Liberals) that they torpedoed any attempt to even bring it up for discussion.

Thus, the tenure of Sharon as Minister of Agriculture weighs in negatively. The member of a moshav, who after his military service became a farm owner, and who

loves to characterize himself as a "farmer," tried but failed to change agriculture into a sector that would support those engaged in it without the need of "gifts."

It is said that Sharon set for himself the goal that farmers would milk cows and not the government and the public. And he failed in this. Agriculture remains subsidized as it was at the beginning of his tenure in the Likud government.

7075
CSO: 4323

MANY STUDENTS SEEK TECHNICAL, ENGINEERING TRAINING OUTSIDE UNIVERSITIES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Jul 81 p 6

[Article by Rimona Maisels-Schiff: "About 10,000 in Technical Schools in Israel"]

[Text] "Not a few students who are enrolled in faculties for the humanities are transferring from academe to study engineering and technology at institutes of technology and schools for engineers and technicians. They want to acquire a practical profession in terms of the market place that will assure them a good living."

This was noted by Dr Danni Milin, director of the Branch for Training and Developing Manpower in the Ministry of Labor. He is in charge of all technological institutes in the country.

The 10 institutes of technology and 33 schools for engineers and technicians in the country are training their students for degrees as engineers, technicians and professional directors. Some of these schools are working in collaboration or under institutions of higher learning such as the Technological Institute of Beer Shaba, the Engineering School of the University of Tel Aviv, the Engineering School of the Technion at Haifa, the Jerusalem ORT Technological Institute of the Hebrew University and the Higher School of Technology in Jersualem. These institutions impart a professional rank identical to that of engineering workers in the engineering sector. Moreover, those certified as technicians by these institutions enjoy credit in studies for the engineering degree at universities, and a student can save himserlf up to one academic year by studying at them.

There are 10,500 students studying at institutes of technology and schools for engineers and technicians, and 25 percent of them are women. In the coming academic year it is expected that their number will increase by 10 percent, and the number of women by 15 percent. "The number of women is growing each year, especially in industrial management, computers, construction, architecture and textile technology," Dr Danni Milin notes. In the last 5 years, about $10 million has been invested in developing laboratories, which enables a much greater absorption of students as well as study and specialization in sophisticated specialities such as computers and microcomputers.

The method followed in the institutions is flexible. There are study days and study evenings for workers. The preferred major subjects are computers, automatic data processing, medical electronics, chemistry and industrial management. In the coming academic year, a number of new majors will be developed: landscape technology, food technology for those specializing in the dairy branch, water and land technology and medical electronics. One of the projects for the coming year is the establishment of a center for technological training in Nazereth for both Jews and Arabs that will grant the degree of technician, engineer and professional worker.

7075
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KPC TO AID THIRD WORLD IN OIL EXPLORATION

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 pp 10, 11

[Text]

Kuwait is to participate in oil-prospecting schemes in countries of the Third World which cannot afford the sort of conditions prevalent among international oil companies. The Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC), which owns 25 per cent of the shares of the Geneva-based International Energy Development Company (IEDC), will take part in oil exploration projects recently approved for the Republic of Congo and Australia. The IEDC also includes companies from Canada, the US, Sweden and Switzerland, which are all shareholders in the firm.

Under the scheme, IEDC signed a protocol with Hydro-Congo, the state-owned energy company of the Congo, to undertake a joint petroleum exploration development project. The protocol covers exploration in the Marine 1 offshore area of about 1,500 square kilometres. Exploration will be carried out jointly with the operator of the field, Sociétés Pétrolières Cities Service and Petrobras (Brazil). The International Gas Development Corporation (IGDC), a subsidiary of IEDC, has also signed an agreement with Hydro-Congo for the supply of technical assistance in developing local gas reserves.

In Australia, IEDC has won two exploration permits: one in the offshore area of the Perth Basin, and the other in the south-western area of the Canning Basin in Western Australia. IEDC is already involved in an exploration programme in Australia under concession agreements covering an area 47,000 square kilometres inside the Canning Basin, where it is the main operator. Preliminary exploration work is also going on in the Murray Basin.

IEDC was set up in November 1979 as a Swiss company aiming to develop all energy resources principally in Third World countries. So far, the company has signed exploration agreements in Sudan, Angola, Oman, Turkey and Australia, and has been commissioned by the World Bank to provide consultancy services on the problems of energy development in Bangladesh.

The other shareholders in the company are AB Volvo of Sweden, AZL Resources of the US, Sulpetro Ltd of Canada and the Geneva firm, Sogener.

CSO: 4400/12

MINISTRY OF OIL CITES POLICY, PROJECTS

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 23, 25 Sep 81 pp 23-27

[Text] KUWAIT FORMULATES its oil policy on the basis of the country's national interests, also taking into consideration the mutual and reciprocal interests of the oil-exporting countries and the reinforcement of economic and political relations with other countries. Kuwait has played a leading and coordinating role in the achievements of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in recent years, undertaking a fundamental role in preparing and issuing the decisions concerning the rectification of the price of the organization's oil exports which have led to an increase in the price of Kuwait crude from $11.23 per barrel in December 1976 to some $35.50 in January 1981.

Similarly it has also taken part through OPEC in reinforcing cooperation and consolidating economic and political relations on the international level, particularly with the countries of the Third World, by supporting all efforts to ensure an increased flow of aid to these countries through its participation in the estabishment of the OPEC fund for international development. Kuwait has also participated in some of the exploration activities and projects aimed at strengthening fruitful cooperation with these countries through the establishment of the Kuwait Overseas Petroleum Exploration Co., with a capital of 100 million Kuwaiti dinars, which has undertaken — with other participants — exploration operations in a number of countries, among them, for example, Sudan, Angola, Australia and Morocco.

Kuwait has supported all efforts to bring about a constructive and productive dialogue among the various international economic groupings with the aim of establishing a new world economic order to achieve compatibility and equilibrium among all countries and stability in the international community. Nor has Kuwait spared any efforts to preserve the unity and solidarity of OPEC in order to enable it to continue its pioneering role. It has also taken part in OPEC's information campaign by participating in the establishment of the OPEC news agency in order to publish and explain the facts regarding OPEC's positive attitudes toward all other countries. Kuwait has also participated in the formulation of a long-term strategy for the OPEC countries which includes a pricing policy aimed at introducing gradual increases in the price of crude oil until a real economic price is reached. The OPEC strategy also takes into account the circumstances of the developing countries and their economic situations.

Believing in the strengthening of ties and relations among the Arab countries, and in pursuit of the common interests of these countries, these countries, Kuwait has joined the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and has participated in all its activities at both the Arab and international levels. In the sphere of strengthening and developing the oil industry in Kuwait, the government has reorganized the oil sector and

has established the Kuwait Petroleum Corp. to incorporate all oil companies and activities into one integrated body representing an effective executive instrument for carrying out the state's petroleum policy on the local, regional and international levels.

The government is giving continuous attention to oil exploration, which covers most regions of the country and various onshore and offshore areas, using the most modern technical methods in the various operations being carried out. The preliminary findings have resulted in the discovery of a number of new fields and reservoirs in such formations as the lower Fars sands and the Tuba limestone, which are currently being appraised and developed. In the coming period the country will witness stepped-up exploration activities on an unprecedented scale as part of an exploration program covering all parts of the country, typified by the seismic survey in the west of Kuwait which includes 3,300 kms. of seismic lines. The result of this program and the interpretation of data can be expected at the end of 1982.

A deep-water offshore seismic survey is also being carried out, covering the former shell concession area as well as Kuwaiti territorial waters exceeding 3.5 meters in depth, and the completion of this survey and the evaluation of its findings are expected in the first half of 1982. Also in progress is a survey of shallow offshore waters and Failaka Island aimed at surveying waters less than 3.5 meters deep and at linking together onshore and offshore areas as well as carrying out a full seismic survey of Failaka Island. This survey is scheduled for completion during 1982. On the basis of the results of the seismic surveys and of exploration wells, repeated surveys and reinterpretation of seismic data might be required for some other areas.

Concerning drilling activities, a number of modern rigs at present are in use. These include two rigs exploring in the Burgan field for very deep accumulation of natural gas, a rig for development drilling, a rig for well workovers, and a fifth rig for shallow wells. It is also intended to intensify exploration and development drilling activities in offshore areas, and it is planned to acquire two rigs for deep-test drilling, two further rigs for development drilling, and one rig for exploration in offshore areas.

The country's oil policy requires the optimum exploration of oil reserves and their conservation for as long as possible in their natural reservoirs, and consequently the limitation of production. The general tendency in the government is to reduce production below the highest level permitted by law, however, subject to the constraints referred to above. The level of production is affected by a number of factors such as considerations of the country's higher interests, technical requirements in the fields, and the maintenance of Kuwait's position and leading role in cooperation within OPEC and OAPEC. In implementation of this policy, the government decided to reduce the daily production level to a maximum of 1.5 million barrels as of April 1, 1981, and at this level production would continue for some 150 years.

In the past four years the government had begun the study and implementation of a number of important oil projects which will provide the state with profitable investment opportunities, as well as representing the completion of steps to establish the foundations of an advanced oil industry and to achieve balanced growth and full and coordinated development in the oil sector in Kuwait.

At the beginning of 1979 the project for the utilization of associated gas was completed, the most advanced project of its kind in the region, whose implementation has put an end to the squandering of this important resource. This project had been highly profitable and its costs have been recovered within one year. Natural gas is gathered and transported to the gas liquefaction

plant where liquid gases such as propane, butane and natural gasoline are recovered and exported and the remaining gas is distributed for domestic uses. The capacity of the project is some 5 million tons/year of gas liquids.

In addition the state is planning further utilization of natural gas resources and will shortly proceed with the implementation of new associated gas utilization projects at Khafji and in the Neutral Zone. The government notes with pride the pioneering role played by Kuwait in the marketing and processing of gas liquids, which has made it possible to obtain the highest prices of any country in the region for gas exports and has made Kuwait the established pricing reference point for many other gas-exporting countries.

Concerning the refining and processing of oil, the government takes care that the greater part of oil exports should be in the form of refined products and manufactured materials. It also intends to develop an advanced refining industry on both the local and international levels in order to capture as much as possible of the value deriving from the production of the more valuable and higher quality lighter fractions by taking advantage of the price differential between light, medium and heavy products. Plans for the development of the refining sector in Kuwait call for the expansion of refining capacity of 750,000 b/d with result that some 60 per cent of crude oil production will be exported as refined products.

The government has carried out the necessary studies for the modernization of the Ahmadi refinery in order to cover most local demand for oil products. Studies required for the modernization of the Mina Abdulla refinery in order to produce premium products are currently under way. The Shuaiba refinery is considered to be one of the most modern and advanced refineries in the world, particularly after the completion of supplementary projects to upgrade the performance of its main units. Plans for the development of refining activity include the achievement of complementarity and integration in the operations of the three local refineries in order to attain the greatest possible operational and economic efficiency.

In addition Kuwait is planning to participate in the establishment of hydrocracking refining units outside the country in the Gulf, Southeast Asia and Western Europe. The government intends for the private sector to participate in refining projects abroad through the Kuwait International Petroleum Investment Co., one of the first companies established by the Kuwait Petroleum Corp.

The government has given special attention to the development of the petrochemical fertilizer industry, thereby obtaining for the country a greater return from its oil resources as well as a bigger share and more prominent role in this important oil industry, and promoting the petrochemical industries company to the front rank of international companies in terms of the size, diversification and variety of its products, and extending its activities to numerous countries in various parts of the world.

On the local level, final preparations are now under way for the commencement of work on a fourth line for the production of ammonia with a capacity of 330,000 tons/year at a cost of some KD 31 million. Among the projects it is planned to carry out in the coming years is the construction of a unit for the production of diammonium phosphate with a capacity of some 230,000 metric tons/year, a pioneering project in the region. The government also intends to set up a new sodium chloride and chlorine plant to produce some 25,000 metric tons/year of chlorine and 28,000 metric tons/year of caustic soda. The total cost of this project is estimated at KD22 million.

The state-owned organizations are planning an expansion in petrochemical industry in cooperation and partnership with sister Arab states and

friendly foreign countries. The Gulf Petrochemicals Co. has been established to produce ammonia and methanol as a partnership among Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and the Petrochemical Industries Co. is a participant in the Industries Chimiques Maghrebines in Tunisia, which produces phosphate fertilizers.

In the sphere of petrochemicals there are plans to establish plants for the manufacture of olefins and aromatics. The aromatics plant will produce 280,000 t/y of benzene, 60,000 t/y of orthoxylene and 87,000 t/y of paraxylene while the olefins complex will produce 220,000 t/y of ethylene, 339,000 t/y of stylene and 135,000 t/y of monomethylene glycol. These products are the basis for the construction and development of modern petrochemical industries. The cost this two important projects will be around KD 300 million.

It should also be noted that the Kuwait Petroleum Corp., has recently established a limited company for the manufacture of intermediate and final petrochemical products with the participation of the Industrial Bank, and continues to provide assistance, advice and expertise to the private sector in the production of various final petrochemical products.

As far as domestic consumption of oil and gas products is concerned, average consumption has reached a high level. The cost of meeting this consumption at prevailing price levels is an issue which deserves consideration, since the quantities of refined products such as gasoline, domestic kerosene, diesel oil and fuel consumed locally rose from 17,000 b/d or 1 per cent of crude oil production, in 1980. The subsidy given by the state in this respect has risen from KD 15 million in 1975 to some KD 126 million in 1980. It should be noted that the foregoing subsidy and consumption figures do not include oil products, crude oil and gas used in plants to produce electricity and water and do not include gas consumed for industrial and other purposes.

There is no need to point out the cumulative effect on state revenues in the long term of the increasing level of local consumption of various forms of energy derived from oil and gas production particularly when local price levels are taken into account. The government therefore feels compelled to review its policy on domestic consumption of oil, gas and products in order to bring it into line with general policy on the conversion of national resources, to consider the price of fuels while channeling subsidies only to those parties who deserve it.

The government is also turning its attention to the development of the national workforce in the oil sector in order to increase its participation and raise its technical standards in the various specialities and vocations relating to the production and processing of oil through training, education and the creation of wider job opportunities at all levels. In the past five years (1975-80), the local workforce has increased as a percentage of the total workforce in the Kuwait Oil Co., the Kuwait National Petroleum Co., and the Petrochemical Industries Co. The number of Kuwaiti employees rose from 1,865 in 1985 — 27.7 per cent of the total workforce of 6,710 — to some 4,132 or 36 per cent of the total workforce of 11,476 in 1980.

Training takes place either on the job or through training sessions of varying duration both locally and abroad. The number of training sessions completed in 1975-1980 was 9,532, in addition to 200 grants to Kuwaiti youths for studies in 1976-80. Work is at present under way on the construction of a comprehensive training institute for 400 trainees at cost of KD 5.8 million. Plans are being drawn up to increase enrollment at a cost stage to 1,500 trainees in order to meet the oil sectors employment requirements.

This is in addition to the current training programs at KOC and KNPC aimed at creating skilled personnel in all the specialities and technical vocations relating to oil activities.

The following table shows the level of per capita energy consumption reached in Kuwait in comparison with various other countries:

Per Capita Energy Consumption in Selected Countries – 1979
(Barrels of oil equivalent)

Country	*Consumption per capita*
United States	*63*
Kuwait	*52*
West Germany	*34*
United Kingdom	*29*
France	*26*
Japan	*24*
Italy	*19*
Spain	*15*

NOTE: The consumption of energy in industrialized countries such as the U.S. and Japan fell in 1980-81 as a result of the energy conservation and fuel economy policies pursued in these countries, while consumption in Kuwait continued to increase.

CSO: 4400/12

BRIEFS

SEWAGE TREATMENT CONTRACT--The British firm Simon-Hartley has won a £ 5 million ($9.3 million) contract to supply sewage treatment equipment to the Emirate of Sharjah in the UAE. Under the contract, Simon-Hartley will provide complete mechanical and electrical equipment of a turnkey station for sewage treatment. Completion dates and other details were not disclosed. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 p 12]

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END

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2416

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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BRIEFS

LIBYAN REQUEST FOR OVERFLIGHT IGNORED--Tripoli, 25 Sep (JANA)--The Saudi authorities have ignored and did not reply to a request made by the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah that a Libyan civilian aircraft, carrying an Arab Libyan delegation due to take part in the Yar's celebrations of the 19th anniversary of the Yemeni revolution, be allowed to cross Saudi air space. [Text] [LD251948 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1910 GMT 25 Sep 81]

CSO: 4504/14

PROSPECTS OF SOVIET STRATEGY DISCUSSED

Paris LE FIGARO in French 29-30 Aug 81 p 4

[Article by Denis Legras: "Nicolai Firioubine's tour in Pakistan and in India. The long term strategy of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan."]

[Text] Although passed over completely in silence by the Soviet media, the mission of Nikolai Firioubine in Pakistan and in India does not appear to have been useless. General Zia-Ul-Haq's comments give the impression that the deadlock in the Afghan question could be broken.

The Afghan government's declaration, made public last Tuesday just as the Soviet deputy foreign minister was arriving in Islamabad, does not seem to justify the Pakistani chief of state's optimism, which viewed the Kabul leaders as showing "considerable flexibility."

In fact, if one compares this text with the first proposals for discussion made by the Karmal regime on 14 May 1980 there is only one difference: the fact that Afghanistan is ready for tripartite, and no longer bilateral, conversations with its neighbors, Pakistan and Iran. The text does not define this further other than to say that Kabul thinks separate conversations would be more fruitful.

Even if the United Nations is invited, the second part of the "concession" is not new, either. The idea was put forward last January by Anahita Ratebzad, Afghan minister of education and confidante of Babrak Karmal, during a stay in Delhi and completely corresponded to the intent of the proposals that Leonid Brezhnev had made there one month earlier.

His plan for settling the international aspect of the Afghan crisis, considered in the context of the sub-continent and the Indian Ocean, is to be found, moreover, in veiled terms in the text published by the Tass agency. It involves guaranteeing the ending of "foreign interference" in Afghanistan by the two superpowers and other responsible nations, that is, at best, the members of the United Nations Security Council. One can see that this is a response to the European proposal presented by Lord Carrington in July.

In this, too, there is nothing that could impel the Pakistan president to say that the conversations he had with Nikolai Firioubine had "greatly contributed to improving the relations between Afghanistan and his country." So, outside the official texts, what was negotiated? What did Moscow undertake that so radically changed Islamabad's attitude?

The answer, or at least a kind of answer, can be found in the paragraphs apparently annexed to the Kabul government's declaration and which directly concern the relations between the two countries. While the text of 14 May 1980 included a "call" to all Afghans in exile to return to their country, and assured them amnesty, "strict respect for the principles of Islam" and respect for the "sacred" character of the religion, the text made public 14 months later is far less precise in this area. "The government of the democratic republic of Afghanistan," it reads, "has undertaken to guarantee to Afghans residing temporarily on Pakistan territory, for whatever may be the reason, immunity and total freedom the day they return to their fatherland.... Their personal security, freedom of choice of domicile, and an equitable participation in the soluiton of the agrarian problem within the framework of reform...."

Possible Dialogue

The text also states: "Nomads, tribes and shepherds have not only the right to utilization of pastures on an equitable basis but also to freedom of movement within the country, which means that the seasonal migrations of nomads from Afghanistan to Pakistan and their return should take place without hindrance."

In other words, and this had never before been stated with such clarity, the Kabul government undertakes to return to the "status quo ante," not to close its frontiers, and above all has agreed to grant total amnesty and freedom of movement to around 1.5 million refugees. It stands to reason that Nikolai Firioubine contributed the Soviet Union's guarantee to this declaration of faith, and this could be what made General Zia-Ul-Haq seem so confident in the future of Pakistani-Afghan relations.

Delivering Islamabad in good conscience from the thorny and costly refugee problem, with a few "cooperation" projects thrown in the balance, probably was enough to dissolve the last and above all fundamental objection that Pakistan had to a dialogue with Kabul: that any negotiation implies de facto if not de jure recognition of the government installed by the Red Army on 27 December 1979.

If such is the case, the Kremlin has scored a victory. It has prepared this campaign for a long time, forcing Babrak Karmal to launch an offensive, contrary to all ideological logic, against the middle class and small proprietors, by creating a "National Patriotic Front," a strange structure to welcome all the vital forces of the country, and hence at least the refugees if not the rebels. Within this framework, assuring them a pardon and security is the more credible if the Soviet Union guarantees it.

The dialogue between Kabul and Islamabad, which is basically the only one that counts, could henceforth begin, and in parallel, any other international negotiation on the security of the region which would lead to a Soviet withdrawal. It is a long and exacting task and today it seems to have begun. That might explain the reason why Nikolai Firioubine did not return directly to Moscow, but thought it well to inform Delhi, since the USSR counts heavily on India's concerned support in the multilateral phase of the negotiations.

9772
CSO: 4619/2

ALGERIAN PAPER SCORES U.S.-ISRAEL STRATEGIC COOPERATION

PM180935 Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Strategic Alliance"]

[Text] Terrorist Menahem Begin's visit to Washington was crowned by what he said was "an important agreement in principle on strategic cooperation." We wonder what this "strategic cooperation" means, this term which began to emerge with the arrival of Reagan's Administration in the White House?

This new term sums up Reagan's policy toward the Zionist entity within the framework of a comprehensive policy aimed at encircling the revolutionary tide in the Middle East and the African continent.

One of the components of this policy is to reinforce the existing military bases and revive those which have been neglected as well as to seek to obtain new bases. In other words, "strategic cooperation" within this context means reinforcing the Zionist entity as an advanced base primarily in order to strike at the national liberation movement in the Arab homeland.

We can visualize the "forerunners" of this special cooperation between Washington and Tel Aviv from the statements of the butcher of Dayr Yasin himself. Within the framework of this "cooperation" Begin proposed that Washington use Isareli airfields and ports, encouraging this by saying that "the 6th Fleet in this case can anchor in our excellent ports on the Mediterranean."

Begin also proposed the "storing of specific numbers of U.S. tanks in Israel as a reply to the Soviet tanks in Syria and Libya."

We are here facing a plan to gradually incorporate the Zionist entity in NATO legally and openly in the wake of its actually incorporation since its emergence in 1949. The United States is here playing the Trojan horse of the Western alliance just as happened and is happening in Spain, whichin its turn is preparing to join the alliance.

Begin also saves us the trouble of looking for the principal enemy of the U.S.-Zionist "strategic cooperations." Just as the two sides reached an agreement in principle on this "cooperation" they also agreed on unifying their views on the

Palestine problem on the basis of the view that "the PLO is a nazi organization serving Moscow" and therefore, according to terrorist Begin's statement, "can never be negotiated with."

These results confirm two complementary facts:

First, that Begin is totally blind to the Palestinian people's problem and, therefore, there is no hope for peace at his hands. This conclusion was reached by the U.S. ambassador to Damascus recently.

Second, that Reagan's Administration is totally blind to the problems of national liberation in the world and the peoples' struggle for independence and dignity.

Therefore, it is not worthwhile for the national liberation movement to look to the "Statue of Liberty" because it only sees in them "the phantom of communism" and "the secret hand of Moscow."

Only defeatists and agents can argue these two points which dictate a specific stand and a particular method of action which the strugglers fully realize. However much the present balance of power may be to the disadvantage of the forces of liberation, it is possible to change it once there is a sincere will and sincere readiness to struggle and to make sacrifices.

CSO: 4504/16

CONFRONTATION OF U.S.-ISRAELI ALLIANCE URGED

PM250847 Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 18-19 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Axes of National Action"]

[Text] The meetings of the national steadfastness and confrontation from which opened the day before yesterday centered on the Arab situation in general and the new developments in the light of the U.S.-Zionist strategic alliance and also on the consolidation of the front's ranks in order to face these developments.

Discussion of this subject at this time in particular goes to prove that the front still reflects deep national awareness and is alert to events that affect the destiny of the Arab nation, including the new trend of the U.S.-Zionist alliance.

The danger in this trend lies in the transformation of the Zionist entity into an advanced U.S. base which is gradually being integrated in the advanced plans to defend imperialism's economic and strategic interests and into a bridgehead for the rapid deployment force [RDF], which is ready to strike at any danger threatening these interests at any moment.

This means that the imperialist danger threatening the Arab nation has become direct and affects every Arab country however distant it may be from the central point of conflict, occupied Palestine.

The U.S.-Zionist alliance in this framework appears to be a new link in the Camp David conspiracy, which goes to prove the far-sightedness of the national steadfastness and confrontation front, which realized the serious implications of the U.S.-Zionist-al-Sadat agreements from the first moment.

These dangers have prompted the front to make confrontation of the Camp David conspiracy the objective of its activities in the past 4 years. The front today finds itself more than ever in the forefront of national reaction to the new trend in the U.S.-Zionist alliance and is therefore called upon to take rapid and intensive action on three principal axes:

Strengthening coordination between the parties to the front so as to remain the nucleus rallying national reaction to the Camp David conspiracy.

Acting in the Arab arena to achieve this rallying and widen the active and effective opposition in order to thwart this conspiracy.

Organizing an Arab and international campaign against the new trend in the U.S.-Zionist strategic alliance.

Programmed and systematic action on these axes will definitely bear fruit. The Arab nation will once again rise as one man against the conspiracies threatening its fate and the imperialist-Zionist designs hindering its progress.

CSO: 4504/16

ALGERIAN PAPER ON ANTI-U.S. VIOLENCE IN GERMANY

PM281301 Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16 Sep 81 p 1

[Editorial: "The Tension That Breeds Violence"]

[Text] The attempt to assassinate the commander, U.S. Forces in Heidelberg came 2 weeks after the Ramstein attack on the USAF headquarters which resulted in the wounding of 20 officers, including some senior men. It also came after other, less important incidents and the noisy demonstration that greeted U.S. Secretary of State General Haig during his visit to the FRG last week.

This series of actions against NATO centers and the alliance's senior officers in the Buhr city clearly indicate that, 36 years after the end of World War II, military occupation has become a heavy burden to the various factions of the German people. This feeling could increase with time.

The intensity of this military presence (250,000 U.S. soldiers in 245 square km, in addition to the British, Canadian, and French units) makes it no longer an alliance but a kind of disguised occupation.

What makes the feeling of this intensive military presence more acute is the identity of the official German views with the U.S. stands--an identity which is sometimes total.

A third factor is the psychological torture to which the German people are being subjected through the media under the influence of world Zionism. These media incessantly chide German youth by daily reminding them of the crimes and failed adventures of the nazis.

In view of these and other factors, the wave of violence against the U.S. presence in the FRG constitutes another unknown quantity to be added to the other unknown quantities in play in the European arena.

It is to be noted that the wave of violence was renewed following President Reagan's decision to produce the neutron bomb and in the wake of talk about deploying new types of nuclear missiles in the heart of Europe.

Probably this wave of violence was one of the counterproductive results of such decisions, that have escalated tension and taken Europe back to the cold war atmosphere of the fifties.

These decisions have indicated to observers that Washington is deliberately creating tension in Europe in order to prevent any rapprochement between the Eastern and Western parts of the continent, so that there will always be a justification for the intensive presence of its forces in the FRG in particular. Observers find in the White House interference to stop the Ostpolitik pursued by former Chqncellor Willy Brandt a strong argument to support their view.

Probably this growing awareness of the relationship between the escalation of tension and the continued U.S. presence in Europe explains the relation between that tension and the wave of violence against those responsible for it or their representatives.

It is likely that large sectors of German youth no longer understand or accept the inculcation of a peaceful trend in their ranks while the FRG is being turned into a U.S. nuclear arsenal and a shield in the confrontation with the socialist countries, in other words a battlefield in the event of an outbreak of conflict in Europe between East and West. This is what drives them toward launching operations "against U.S. imperialism," as happened in Ramstein and Heidelberg.

CSO: 4504/16

TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER, DELEGATION DEPARTS ALGIERS

LD032308 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 3 Sep 81

[Excerpts] Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali and the accompanying delegation left Algiers this afternoon after a 2-day working visit. He was seen off at Houari Boumediene International Airport by Mohammad Ibn Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghani, member of the Political Bureau and prime minister, and Hadja Yala, member of the Political Bureau and minister of finance.

Before leaving Houari Boumediene International Airport, Mr Mzali made a statement at the airport VIP lounge in which he spoke about the results of his visit to Algiers and said:

[Begin Mzali recording] It was a very short visit but fertile as far as results are concerned. All that we agreed upon sometime ago and was laid down by our colleagues and experts was signed this morning. During this visit I had the honor of meeting President Chodli Bendjedid who entrusted me with a fraternal message to the Supreme Combatant President Habib Bourguiba. On the other hand, the numerous and exciting meetings I had with my colleague and brother Mohamed Ibn Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghani dealt with all the issues concerning bilateral cooperation and the exchange of views over the problems of the region.

I believe that this visit, like the previous ones, has contributed to the construction of an atmosphere of fraternity and cooperation and the coordination of positions between the Republic of Algeria and the Republic of Tunisia.

CSO: 4504/16

BRIEFS

FLN, PCE COMMUNIQUE--The secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party [PCE] left Algiers last evening after a 4-day visit. Following talks between the FLN and the PCE, a joint communique was issued in which the two sides stressed their belief in the independence and unity of all countries, the sovereignty of all peoples and their right to self-determination. They also stressed their solidarity with the Saharan people under the leadership of the POLISARIO front. They condemned the Camp David accords and reaffirmed their support for the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO. [Text] [LD070826 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 6 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/16

PARLIAMENTARY HEAD DISCUSSES APPROACH TO OPPOSITION

Cairo OCTOBER in Arabic No 252, 23 Aug 81 pp 18-20

/Article by Hamid Dunya: "Dr Sufi Abu Talib: I Oppose You, But I Am Not an Enemy of Yours"/

/Text/ This notion--I oppose you, but I am not an enemy of yours--is the proper rule for defining the objective opposition, as Dr Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the People's Assembly, states. There has been much talk about the extent to which the opposition has exploited the climate of democracy now dominating the atmosphere in Egypt. What guarantees can determine the fine line between being an opponent to whose views the majority listens receptively and appreciatively and becoming a hostile foe of the regime under the cover of declaring different opinions? How can we make sure that the pen will not become a destructive tool in the hand of the person holding it?

Dr Sufi Abu Talib, from the perspective of his responsibility as chairman of the People's Assembly, talks about the guarantees of democracy and freedom, supporting himself by the style which President al-Sadat has innovated in foreign policy, relying on persuasion, arguments and logic, not on the sword and gold of al-Mu'izz. The chairman of the People's Assembly stressed these notions in the following conversation after the parliamentary session ended a few days ago.

I said, "The opposition has departed from the system to which it must confine itself, especially in the important stage the country is now passing through, and this has had unpopular repercussions with the man on the political street. By what rules and limits must the opposition act in our parliamentary system?"

Dr Sufi: "Democracy is based on a given opinion, and a different opinion. The parliamentary system is based on two fundamental pillars: the majority and the opposition.

"Freedom, in the context of the democratic parliamentary system, means granting opportunities for the expression of opinions, not just to members of the majority but also to the opposition. Some countries apportion time for speaking under the rotunda in public sessions and committee sessions among the majority and the opposition in accordance with their numerical ratios, and leave the apportionment of this time among the members of the group to the head of each parliamentary group.

"If we applied this rule to Egypt, the opposition would not be able to express its opinion on all the issues presented to the assembly for review, on account of the small number of opposition members. Therefore, the system by which we have proceeded has been to enable the opposition to express its views whenever it requests the floor, be it the Labor Party, the Liberals or independents, regardless of their numerical ratio. This method has met with a good reception by the opposition and approval on the part of the majority.

"The purpose in this has been to enable the opposition to express its views and deeply implant the notion of an assembly opposition founded on the party system. It was expected that the opposition would express the opinion of the party to which it belonged on the subject presented to the assembly. However, this method has not prevailed in all instances. On some issues, opposition speakers have expressed the view and philosophy of the party on the subject presented.

"In other cases, the opposition has expressed its opinion in a diverse form on some of the stipulations presented, without forming a specific philosophy behind the opposition to the stipulation presented.

"In some cases, the opposition has been in agreement with the majority on some of the subjects presented for discussion.

"On other subjects, the distance between the views of the majority and the opposition has been vast. These things are all natural.

"It had been hoped that the majority and the opposition would discuss the method of parliamentary action in the general committee and set forth rules for that, but the pressure of work has not helped us crystallize these ideas in final form. Perhaps we will be able to set this forth in the coming session of the assembly, God willing.

"While I restrict my statement to the opposition within the parliament, I can say that the opposition in most cases has acted in its capacity as part of the regime. In a few cases, the opposition has recited ideas and principles under the rotunda of parliament which are alien to the regime, especially on nationwide issues.

Opposition and Enmity

"The fact of the matter is that both the opposition and the majority represent two wings within the regime, in accordance with the principles the constitution and the law have sketched out. However, it has been observed that some persons in the opposition have confused opposition with hostility or enmity. Some majority members have also confused criticism with slander, and considered every form of criticism slander. The fact is that the regime has in a short period of time gone through numerous developments here which have led to the emergence of classes and groups that have by their own will set themselves outside the regime. The 23 July Revolution made a radical change in the notion of our political, social and economic system; its principles were deeply implanted in the conscience of the nation and codified in the constitution and the laws. However, some people still reject these principles, foremost among them, for instance, the land reform laws and the

50 percent /representation/ for workers and peasants. They imagine that they have the right, in the name of the opposition, to be given the right to express their opinion. This falls under the category of enmity toward the regime, and is what we have called attacking the regime.

"The same is the case with respect to persons who rejected the May 1971 Revolution, the corrective action it made to the course of the July Revolution, and the democratic system of rule which it established. These are people who have been given the designation of power centers. Some of them are pleased to clothe themselves in 'Abd-al-Nasir's shirt and call themselves Nasirites, ignoring the fact that Nasirism has been an inseparable part of the principles of the July Revolution since the correction of its course.

"People who reject democracy as a system of governance, and the shutdown of concentration camps and universal spread of freedom that that has entailed, have on many occasions been rejected by the people. The latest of these occasions was the referendum which took place in 1979. This group does not belong to the opposition groups; rather, it belongs to the groups of hostility and enmity.

"The same is the case with the groups that reject the principles of the July and May Revolutions and want to tie our regime to the wheels of other foreign regimes. They are not part of the opposition in any way.

"The same characterization applies to anyone who wants to change the system of the society by blood and force. They do not belong to the groups in the opposition.

"In summary, I can say that the pre-July 1952 Revolution groups and the power centers are enemies of the May Revolution and people who reject the July and May Revolutions. None of them are living under the aegis of the regime's policies; rather, they are outside it. Therefore they cannot be described as part of the opposition; rather, they are elements of hostility and enmity."

I asked "So what is the best way to make the fine line between opposition and enmity clear?"

Dr Sufi: "It is incumbent on the opposition that it not confuse the principles and ideas on which the system is based, which are in essence the principles of the July and May Revolutions in the context of our Arab Islamic values, with principles and ideas which have the objective of destroying the whole system. This is the crux of the matter. Some people insist on being given an opportunity to express their views under the aegis of the opposition, although they believe in ideas and principles which are aimed at destroying the whole system; some members of the true opposition succumb to a great error when they embrace notions of hatred and enmity.

"There is no quality whatever in opposition when it gives an opposition newspaper scope for ideas and principles that are aimed at bringing back the pre-23 July Revolution regime or bringing back the regime of the power centers.

"In another area, the opposition members must open their hearts to every criticism which has the objective of guiding, setting right and supporting the principles and bases on which our system is founded, as stated in the constitution and the law."

Parliamentary Oversight

I said, "Let us move on to the most important function of the legislative assembly, which is parliamentary oversight over the activities of the executive power. Bluntly, a question has arisen on how it is feasible for oversight over government activities to arise from an assembly whose majority belongs to the party the government belongs to, the National Democratic Party, especially if we want to have a form of oversight which is aimed at realizing the interests of the masses in the optimum form, whether it is on the side of the majority or the opposition."

Dr Suf;: "The fact is that no one is immune from error, and the methods for applying the policy agreed upon by the National Party governing relations between the members of the assembly and the government might cause this application to deviate from the desired goal. Therefore requests for information have come into being as a means where an assembly member who belongs to the same party may enlighten the minister involved of violations in the application of the desired goal. It is also a means in the hand of the opposition for revealing mistakes to which, from the standpoint of the opposition, a government official may have succumbed.

"Through the questions which the deputy directs at the minister involved, the masses' problems are brought into the rotunda in parliament, where the government, along with the assembly, arrives at the most appropriate means for resolving these problems.

"One of the most prominent methods of oversight is to form factfinding committees on subjects around which controversy has been raised that are of special importance to the masses of the people. The facts become revealed to the people through these committees' activities."

I asked "What have the positive results of the factfinding committees been, especially on certain issues which have been the object of people's comments, such as the events in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', the Lawyers' Union council, and so forth?"

Dr Sufi: "One phenomenon which has truly drawn the attention of the masses during this session is the formation of factfinding committees. What has been new in this session is the fact that some of these committees were formed in accordance with a request by the president, who appealed to the assembly for a legal decision because he considered that he needed to have the people informed of the truth of the matter in total neutrality and chaste disengagement.

"An example of this is the factfinding committee on the issue of the Lawyers' Union council. A debate was provoked on the People's Assembly's right to discuss such subjects, and the ruling, based on the report by the committee formed for this purpose under the chairmanship of Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, the vice-chairman of the assembly, was that the general principle is that the People's

Assembly, in its capacity as a representative of the will of the people, who possess sovereignty, can, indeed must, take up all subjects except those on which the constitution has assigned factfinding to specific authorities and bodies. This is the rule the assembly has adopted in previous years, on matters such as the episodes of factional strife and student unrest; it is the same rule by which all parliaments in the world proceed, foremost among them the British Parliament, which has carried to a proficient degree the principle that parliament has the power to review any subject and issue a decision on it, except, as they say, decisions to turn a man into a woman or a woman into a man!

"The assembly has also asserted its constitutional right to preserve accountability to parliament permanently and eternally, even in cases where the law actually assigns jurisdiction on a given subject to a judiciary or administrative body. Parliamentary responsibility is different from responsibility before the judiciary, be it civil or criminal, or administrative responsibility.

"This is also the case in the matter of depriving a member of membership if he actually commits a crime punishable by law, as happened in the case of the member Ahmad Farghali, who was deprived of his membership because he falsely alleged that the government was arranging the assassination of Mr Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, chairman of the Grouping Party, while he was in a town in Asyut Governorate, and as was the case in the assembly's discussion of some issues presented to the judiciary as happened in the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'."

Women under the Rotunda

I said, "Some people consider that the experiment of giving specific seats to women (30 in number) in parliament has not yielded its desired results yet. What is your view, now that this experiment that our country is going through for the first time in our parliamentary history has gone through two complete sessions in this legislative season?"

Dr Sufi: "Women have planted their feet firmly in parliamentary activity, under the rotunda of the assembly and in international and regional parliamentary conferences. Proof of that is that some laws have been proposed by some female members of the assembly.

"The number of proposed drafts of bills presented by women that the assembly has agreed to is nine, out of the total of 28 proposed drafts of laws approved by the assembly. That is, one third of the proposed draft laws have been presented by women, although the number of female members does not exceed one-twelfth of the assembly total.

"The assembly also inaugurated its past session with the proposed draft of a law presented by Mrs Fayidah Kamil on the employment of people working in mines and quarries, and the assembly completed its activities with the proposal of a draft law presented by the lady member Nimat Isma'il Yadim on the approval of some facilities for citizens in the Governorate of Matruh. Among the proposed drafts of laws which women have presented is the proposal of a draft law by the lady member Suhayr Jalbanah on some facilities for the citizens of Sinai, the proposal

of a draft law from the lady member Dr Zaynab al-Sabki on protection from dangers of smoking, and the proposal of a draft law on the Academy of the Arts presented by Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi.

"Women's voices have been prominent in People's Assembly discussions, not just on the part of old members of the assembly such as Mmes Nawwal 'Amir, Fayidah Kamil, Imtithal al-Dib, Buthaynah al-Tawil, Ulfat Kamil or 'A'ishah Husayn, but also on the part of lady members who have engaged in parliamentary activity for the first time in this legislative season, of whom there are many.

"Women such as Dr Farkhandah Hasan, Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi, and Dr Zaynab al-Sabki have played a promenent role in international conferences and parliamentary delegations abroad, having been given the opportunity to take part in them.

"It is worth noting that a large number of women who belong to the assembly are careful to attend the assembly and assembly committee sessions on a regular basis."

Through Persuasion and Argument

I said, "What are your observations on our venerable assembly's role in presenting our issues to international public opinion after an exchange of parliamentary delegations with the various parliaments of the world in Europe, America, Asia and Africa?"

Dr Sufi: "One, we have received a delegation from the Israeli Knesset and have sent a parliamentary delegation headed by Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ilah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the People's Assembly, to Jerusalem. This is a historic event which is of importance and is a natural result of the establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel following the joint approval of this peace.

"Two, the policy of economic opening to the outer world has enabled us to consolidate our relations with countries where great distance had prevented us from meeting them in suitable form, such as the countries of Latin America and the African countries. One product of these meetings has been the support of many of these countries for Egypt's policy and the readiness of some of them to take part in the peace force in Sinai.

"Three, this opening up to the foreign world is an honest translation of Egypt's fixed foreign policy and an embodiment of the style of conduct in international relations which President al-Sadat has innovated; while some countries base their method of action in foreign policy on the sword and gold of al-Mu'izz, in a context of Machiavellianism, President al-Sadat--as all the leaders of the world will testify--has put the method of the sword and gold of al-Mu'izz to the side and substituted the method of quiet persuasion and the confrontation of argument by argument for that. He has also rejected the Machiavellian method, substituting the method of honesty and penetrating vision in a context of moral principles for that."

The Consultative Assembly

I asked, "Could we hear something about the Consultative Assembly, since that it is the supplementary source of opinion in our legislative process?"

Dr.Sufi: "The Consultative Assembly experiment, although still recent, gives promise of much benefit. The Consultative Assembly has truly performed its role as a partner in bearing responsibilities through the deep, thorough study which the assembly has made on the drafts of bills submitted to it and the issues which it has undertaken to study, all of which were under review by the members and committees of the People's Assembly during its discussion of the matters presented to it. Therefore I can say that the Consultative Assembly's activity has in a most objective, truthful, real fashion complemented the People's Assembly's activity."

I said, "One might imagine that the termination of the session means a shutdown of assembly activity. To what extent is this statement correct?"

Dr Sufi: "It is wholly incorrect. The fact is that the assembly committees continue to operate between sessions and that during this period the assembly is pursuing its foreign activity. We will be taking part in the coming 67th international parliamentary conference which will be held in Cuba next September, and other delegations will be returning visits by delegations of some countries that visited us this year, in Latin America and in Europe."

My conversation with Dr Sufi Abu Talib ended after it had lasted for 4 consecutive hours in his office in the People's Assembly. During it, he was visited by Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, the assembly vice-chairman, Counsellor Ibrahim al-Sharbini, secretary general of the assembly, Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ilah, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Dr Ibrahim Salih, the counsellor of the assembly. I left Dr Sufi as he was preparing to travel to his town of Tamiyah in al-Fayyum, where he will meet with the people of his district on a quick 2-day vacation. I wish the People's Assembly members a happy holiday, which they should spend in their districts with their people and constituents so that they can form an idea on everything they want and desire by the time, with God's will, they start the period of the third session. Happy holidays to the deputies as they work in the family spirit and the traditions and morality of the village, the spirit of love and close cooperation with government members under the leadership of the head of the Egyptian family, the son of Mit Abu-al-Kum, the pious man President Anwar al-Sadat, for the sake of the status of Egypt and the happiness and welfare of its people, and work to achieve a just, comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

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CSO: 4504/69

WRITER DISCUSSES RELIGIOUS STRIFE WITH COPTIC LEADER

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2967, 21 Aug 81 pp 4, 5

/Article by Makram Muhammad Ahmad: "A Comprehensive Policy for Coping with Factional Strife"/

/Text/ I can state frankly that I am incapable of believing that there is a factional problem in Egypt, because Egypt's tolerance embraces its whole history and because Egypt never has known this kind of extreme fanaticism on the part of either side.

I have never seen an Egyptian look at a sign before entering a shop, to learn whether the shop owner was Moslem or Christian. We may have quarreled dozens of times as colleagues in the same school, but we never quarreled as Moslems and Copts and never set upon one another in the streets!

The impression that always took form in our minds on our common, deep-rooted life on the territory of this nation is not the picture of people who add to dissension through extremism, is not the picture of people who help outsiders take over their country in periods of weakness or occupation, but rather the picture of the Archbishop Sergius at the pulpit of al-Azhar during the events of the 1919 revolution, when the whole nation had formed a single rank behind Sa'd /Zaghloul/ to demand independence.

The impression that always took form in our minds is one of the relationships of deep affection and intimacy that have stamped our national unity with a pure Egyptian metal, our common blood which we commingled in the sands and shores of Egypt as we repelled the invaders of Byzantium, the French, the British and the Israelis from our united Egypt, as we forged the majestic battle of October, as we called out together on the ruins of Bar-Lev the cry of the united Egypt, "God is great," for that is the God of our common faith, because it is God to whom all our hearts turn, whether we as Moslems turn our faces toward the grand mosque or we as Copts turn our faces toward Jerusalem, the city of God and the gathering place of his three divine messages.

Yes, Egyptians are religious by their nature and have eternally borne strong religious sentiment. However, since the dawn of Islam in Egypt, it is love that has bound its moslems and Copts together, because, as the New Testament teaches us to love our brothers, our neighbors and our nation, the Koran teaches us that

the most intensely affectionate people are those who have said "I am a Christian," and because Egypt has taught its Moslems and Copts the meaning of tolerance and the true notion of tolerance in religion. Christians have shared a common life alongside Moslems although they have lived in separate sections in some towns. The Copts of Egypt no longer live now in separate sections in all of Egypt--the belt of towns and people has linked people together densely. Nor is there any longer any of the vocational or professional discrimination that we noticed when Egyptian administration emerged, in days when the Copts had the jobs of money-changers and gold traders and all the postal and railway station superintendents were Copts. The Copts of Egypt now are more prosperous and intermixed.

Before the episode of the Church of Good Will, we asked ourselves why the episodes of strife had occurred in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and not in the section of Shubra, where 3 million Copts and Moslems coexist in peace and affection. We found a partial explanation in the fact that it is perhaps easy for people who want to kindle the flame of strife to find fuel in minds where the light of guidance and tolerance has not penetrated or among people who want an opportunity to create turmoil in areas of the least awareness, because they find more than one opportunity to loot and steal in the chance for turmoil.

Even in the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' Moslems who understand their Islam properly were the ones who protected the Dayr al-Mallak Church from people seeking a chance for turmoil and dissension. In many of the homes of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', families received one another--Moslem families received Christian families and Christian families received Moslem families to seek salvation together from the dangers of this blind dissension with which the mob violence of some masses of people who wanted an opportunity to loot and steal clad itself.

We stressed that type of explanation in the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' until the episode of the Church of Good Will took place in the Shubra section, which is inhabited by 3 million Copts and Moslems and whose peace had not been sullied for many years of history by any factional quarrel. Therefore there must be something else. The episode was brought in, imported and the product of intervention, even if its instruments were some deranged spirits, because there really are people who wish ill for Egypt, people who wish it to turn its head away from the proper road and go into side labyrinths, people who wish it to turn away from its eternal choice as a nation of moderation, tolerance and mediation.

What perhaps shows that the episode was imported and did not arise in its own soil is its carefully-calculated timing: the episode took place when President al-Sadat was heading for London on his way to the United States, on these schemers' supposition and illusion that something of this sort could ruin the trip or wreck American public opinion's deep appreciation of the personality of al-Sadat and his regime.

These people who want to plant the seeds of religious extremism in Egyptian soil must know that the Egyptian street, the Egyptian home and Egyptian history will never aid them in their impossible mission, because the sentiment of the Egyptians, which has matured over 7,000 years, rejects extremism, rejects religious coercion and realizes out of a sort of spontaneous taste the true heritage of religion,

because the feelings of the Egyptians, which have matured over the course of a long civilization, have had as one of their motive forces the notion of seeking God and of refusing to have the compulsion of past times return, and because the Egyptians, who know through a form of spontaneous feeling the difference between the essence and the surface, realize that in every religious heritage, even in the Islamic heritage itself, there are things that are related to a specific time and place, things related to bygone circumstances which it is difficult, impossible, to bring back, things related to other facts which are above restrictions of time and above restrictions of place.

We have before us what has happened in Iran and what is still happening there; the lesson of the Iranian experience, which ought to be clear to everyone, is that no religious power must take command of temporal rule.

Who can ask Imam Khomeyni what has befallen Persia now?

Who can ask him where he is leading Iran, while Iran is burning in chaos and ruin, as long as the imam considers that his will is the will of God, as long as he considers that he is the sole and final source of reference, as long as he appropriates the acts of all institutions, including the presidency itself.

The lesson of Iran states most clearly:

The imam must indicate but must not act, must not take command of temporal rule or consider himself to be an alternative to the law. The most the imam can do is be a guide and instructor advancing his opinion through wisdom, light and good exhortation; he is the voice of independent judgment concerning the truth, not the truth itself. Therefore he does not have the right to appropriate recognized temporal powers for the sake of his own power, especially since in the human sphere no one is infallible, even if he attains the status of a prophet.

To be a just tyrant is above the capacity of human achievement, because just tyrants who have alone been assigned to guide everyone along proper divine paths never existed in history. Perhaps history has witnessed many persons who came close to that, but they all fell as tyrants more than they lived on as just persons.

The imam, embodied in a person or a group, must not act, and must not take command of temporal power, for another simple reason, which is that we are living in a political world ruled by positive law, ruled by human custom and the daily necessities of life.

In this context, in this context alone, we must have an understanding of the relationship between religion and state, of the limits to which everyone who is partial to a religious group must be bound, whether that be Islamic or Christian.

It is not in man's power to condemn others for apostasy. Faith is a matter whose source is God's ruling. Nor is it in the power of anyone, or in the capacity of a group, to impugn the patriotism of another person or group. Publications which

I do not doubt a third party is propagating have nothing to do with religion, even though they bear the signature of people who make the biggest display in the name of religion.

I asked Pope Shannudah, as we met 2 weeks ago for a long discussion, whether we were talking about both sides and what we could say about the lesson to be learned from the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

The man replied, "I say that it is not for a Christian to fire on other people, even if his excuse is self-defense. This is outside the scope of our religious understanding of what a true Christian is. I must also say that these people who are striving by tendentious rumors to get latent dissension moving must be more responsible for their acts."

I told him, "Your holiness the pope, if you want me to be frank, I consider that your stand since last Easter has not helped create a climate of confidence among the Copts of Egypt. You prohibited celebration of the feast day in the homes of Christians in response to an event whose motives you are aware of and the government position on which you know. You prohibited Christian children from having smiles on their faces on the day of their celebration, and you prohibited bells from ringing--something which has happened for perhaps the first time in the history of the Egyptian church. Through this conduct you have turned the issue into one of church and state, which it certainly is not--it is an issue involving extremists on both sides. Do you consider that there is anything to indicate that the government is partial to such extremism?"

The man said, "God forbid that I should have had such an opinion. President al-Sadat visited me here twice and laid the cornerstone for the Mar Murqus hospital in this great religious complex which was built with basic assistance from the government. We prayed together there. He prayed in this hall with his companions and we prayed in the adjoining room; we prayed together on the ground at al' 'Arish.

"God forbid that I should have had such an opinion. I will never forget his position in Asyut when he attacked extremists with great courage, attacked them on both sides; we have and still do appeal for him with the utmost affection."

"Your holiness the pope, if this is the case, why should you have ordered the candles or lanterns of the church to be extinguished during the holiday?"

He said, "That was not my decision alone. It was the decision of the holy society. People's spirits were heavily laden with sorrow in the wake of last year's events, and we felt that the people who wanted strife to erupt between the Moslems and Copts of Egypt must be under the hand of the law, be they Moslems or Christians. We have the Law on National Unity, we have other laws that protect the nation, and we cannot be patient with these people, be they Christians or Moslems, because they are alienated from a true understanding of religion.

"Nonetheless, I remain ready to discuss the decision we adopted. I agree to discuss, I agree to speak frankly, and I also accept what the president sees fit, because he rules all."

I asked him, "How do you view the relationship between the church and the state?"

He replied by saying, "The church does not have the right to involve itself in political issues in any way whatever. Politics is the concern of the state; concern for religion is the task of the church.

"Perhaps the church may convey its subjects' observations to the state, just so that a comprehensive view of all circumstances may be available to the state."

"Your holiness the pope, could I ask you a blunter question? Why, in the context of your ordination, are rumors being spread around in the streets about weapons in the vaults of churches and monasteries? I am raising the question not because I have suspicions or believe the rumors, but I am asking why, in the context of your ordination, such rumors are being stread around?

His holiness Shannudah said, "What I am saying is that there are people who try, through rumors, to create dissension, and there are people who are always trying to portray my position incorrectly. However, I can tell you that I am prepared to open all monasteries and all churches to inspection campaigns in the search for weapons. If there is a single weapon, the church will have deviated from its role, its rights and its religion."

I asked him, "Your holiness the pope, could I ask you a blunt question? If some measures exist which are related to the construction of churches and you do not feel comfortable with their complexity, why doesn't the church follow legal channels in order to facilitate the measures instead of continuing, helping or being quiet about construction without permits? In many cases, the dispute over plots of land which are under dispute, and this raises problems."

His eminence replied, "Your question might be valid, but I must say that the construction of churches in which Copts worship is something that harms no one's interests. We need to implant and spread about this feeling: the Christian religion is a moral restraining force for every Copt, just as the Islamic religion is a moral restraining force for every Moslem, and our mission is to help build morality.

"It is not my motive to give a press interview; rather, my true motive is to have every party realize the true limits of the relationship between religion and the state and to have every party realize four facts in the light of this modest exercise of judgment:

"First, that there is nothing in the heritage of religion where a group, no matter what the group may be, claims that it has been assigned to correct the course of society or the course of its members, therein borrowing the instruments of /temporal/ authority or using the means of compulsion.

"Second, no religious extremist group has the right to inflict harm on any believer or holy place of any other religion that it coexists with.

"Third, temporal law must be strict with people on either side who try to play with the country's national unity, because Egypt is too dear to us for us to make it lose a day in peripheral labyrinths, especially since there are people who wish it ill because they do not want it to turn its face toward the future.

"Fourth, the church must be above attempts on the part of some pressure groups which might be represented by some Coptic intellectuals who cannot sleep because the top 10 people in medical faculties have always been from the group or cannot sleep because the opportunity to go on a delegation traveling abroad has not devolved upon one of their colleagues! I consider that these limited groups are the strongest pressure groups now, although the overwhelming majority of the Copts of Egypt know full well that no sectarian discrimination exists in Egypt.

"These limited personal motives must not be a basis for setting forth relationships in present-day society.

"These are the limits of my personal vision and this is my limited individual judgment."

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CSO: 4504/69

BRIEFS

NEW PAPER--The [Socialist] Labor Party is preparing to publish a newspaper under the name of AL-JAMAHIR as the party organ instead of the newspaper AL-SHA'B, whose license has been withdrawn. Party Secretary General Rif'at al-Shahawi announced at the party weekly meeting last Tuesday that [Socialist] Labor Party Council Chairman Dr Subhi 'Abd-al-Hakim requested a permit to issue the newspaper. Al-Shihawi said that the main obstacle to publication of the newspaper is that of printing and that the party expects the AL-AHRAM printing presses, which used to print AL-SHA'B, to refuse to print the new newspaper. He added that they would try to overcome this problem and that, should AL-JAMAHIR not be permitted, they would issue another newspaper under a different name. [Text] [PM281107 Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 1]

ARMS SMUGGLING BY PALESTINIANS--State security intelligence has uncovered a new attempt by a Palestinian organization to smuggle arms between Egypt and the occupied territories. The seized arms include four surface-to-surface missiles and 350 bombs which were found in the house of a Palestinian in the town of al-'Arish. Investigation conducted by Prosecutor Muhsin Mabruk has revealed that the arms were hidden in his house by two Palestinian students: Khalid Ibrahim of Alexandria University, and Hasan Abu Mani'ah, of Cairo University. The source of arms was 'Awdah Sulayman Hasan, a Palestinian residing in Cairo. The original agreement was that the two students should transport 23 missiles and 950 bombs. Counselor Raja' al-'Arabi, the advocate general, decided to hand over the seized arms to the armed forces and to order the arrest of businessman 'Awdah Sulayman Hasan, who is still a fugitive. It has transpired that the seized arms came from an arms dump in Sinai. [Unattributed Report: "Attempt to Smuggle 4 Missiles and 350 Bombs"] [Text] [PM011425 Cairo OCTOBER in Arabic 17 Sep 81 p 3]

SEDITION CASE INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE--Cairo, 4 Oct (MENA)--The Socialist public prosecution organ today resumed investigations of the instigators of sectarian sedition who are being held under custody. It investigated 17 defendants under the supervision of Socialist Public Prosecutor Adviser 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali. The first on the list of defendants who was investigated was Fu'ad Siraj al-Din. During the 5-hour investigation, the prosecutor presented him with evidence available against him in the sectarian sedition events and for kindling its fire in the nation. The prosecutor also investigated former Lawyers Association member Hamid al-Azhari. It has been decided to complete his investigation on 18 October. The investigator allowed his wife and sons to meet with him after the investigation. Tomorrow, the Socialist public prosecutor will conduct an investigation of 18 defendants held under custody. He will also complete investigation of former people's assembly member Dr Mahmud al-Qadi. [Text] [NC041648 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1622 GMT 4 Oct 81]

MILITARY TRIBUNAL POSTPONES CONSPIRACY CASE--Matruh, 3 Oct (MENA)--The Supreme Military Court in Matruh decided today to postpone until 2 November its consideration of the case of plotting and sabotage in which five agents of the Libyan intelligence are accused. They are Ibrahim al-Sanusi Muhammad, 'Uthman Salih Jamudi, Muhammad 'Ali an-Nawi Marta al-Shuli, 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali, Sha'artah 'Ulaywah and Yusuf 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman. [Six names as received] The postponement was decided to enable the defense to study the dossiers pertaining to the case. The military prosecution had referred the defendants to the court on the charge of plotting with the Libyan intelligence to implement a subversive plan in Egypt aimed at forcibly annexing the Egyptian Western Desert--SIWA Oasis--to Libya. The prosecution demanded the imposition of penalties on the defendants. [Text] [NC031048 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1016 GMT 3 Oct 81]

OPPOSITION FRONT TRIAL POSTPONED--Cairo, 4 Oct (MENA)--The court of ethics has decided to adjourn investigation of the Egyptian National Front led by former Lt Gen Sa'd al-Din al-Shadhili until 15 November. The case was adjourned in response to the defense request to study the documents that Assistant Socialist Public Prosecutor Adviser Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid asked to be added to the indictment against al-Shadhili, including the investigations of the state security prosecution of certain defendants who al-Shadhili managed to recruit, issues of Arabic newspapers that indicate al-Shadhili plotted with Libyan Colonel al-Qadhdhafi against Egypt in return for 5 million pounds as well as radio talks by al-Shadhili attacking the Egyptian regime and casting doubt on the combat ability of the Egyptian army. [Text] [NC041902 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1837 GMT 4 Oct 81]

FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY TO BE DISSOLVED--Cairo, 29 Sep (MENA)--It has been decided to dissolve the Arab-Society Friendship Society. The liquidation should be completed within 6 months from the date of the issuance of the decision. The dissolved society's assets will revert to the higher committee for winter relief. [Excerpt] [NC291010 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0940 GMT 29 Sep 81]

APPROACH TO SECTARIAN STRIFE--AL-MUSAWWAR's political editor has learned that President al-Sadat has concluded a study of all the dimensions of the attempts recently made to fan sectarian strife in Egypt. The study concluded that it was necessary to adopt a comprehensive policy to strike at the roots of dissension and the people striving to provoke it, especially the proponents of religious extremism on both sides. The political editor has learned that investigations have also proved that some opposition group elements have sought to exploit the dissension and have constantly been trying to enflame it, particularly through their continuous contacts with certain religious groups. The editor has learned that the investigations have proved that seven of the people who belong to the opposition have been in constant daily contact with a leader of Islamic groups in Alexandria for this purpose. According to statements by a high-level source, President al-Sadat totally rejects the processes of levelling mutual accusations of apostasy that are going on between the extremists on both sides and sees in some of the publications distributed by some Islamic groups conduct which is contradictory to and strikes out at national unity. President al-Sadat also considers that the Islamic proselytizers must exhibit Islam's true, proper face of tolerance without seeking to attempt to spread dissension through certain wrongful interpretations of the facts of religion. In conclusion, one can say that the comprehensive policy which President al-Sadat will proclaim at the annual meeting of People's and Consultative Assembly members that is expected to take place in early September will be aimed at extirpating the roots and foundations of dissension. /Text/ /Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2966, 14 Aug 81 p 8] 11887

CSO: 4504/69

NEXT YEAR BUDGET TO BE BASED ON PRODUCTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Aug 81 p 13

[Text] Basic reliance in preparing the next year's budget will revolve around this axis: Iran considers itself in constant war with imperialism and simultaneously is taking steps toward self-sufficiency in all fields.

These issues were stated by Dr Mohammad Taqi Banki, minister without portfolio and supervisor of the Budget and Plan Organization.

He opened by saying: "Relying on the sole creator and the unending force of the martyred nation and the self-sacrificing fighters, we intend to build a completely Islamic society, that is, a society whose fundamental relations and composition are based on divine justice. We also intend to build such an economic, administrative and political system that would be a pattern, a sample and a witness for other oppressed people. On the road toward achieving such a society, attention should be paid to the following points:

1. Our desired economic and social system should be solidly based on such authorities and forces that no kind of obstacle would prevent it from achieving the previously defined lofty goals.

2. In this system, economics are not the goal, and an assessment of affairs should not be based on economic output in a manner that would jeopardize the growth and advancement of human society.

3. In such a system, implementation and authorities must be in full coordination with each other, so that the economic system should be an element to facilitate and expedite the social take-off of our nation toward ideals of Islamic doctrine.

4. In this system, economic relations must be such that any kind of domination of man by man should be eliminated and destroyed.

5. This system must work in such a way that it should not only do away with excessively materialistic stimuli--that cause deviation from instinct--but, considering human nature, it should be the cause for an increase in the morale for sacrifice and forgiveness."

He then added: "In order to achieve such desirable goals, we are now confronted with harsh realities that make our start quite difficult."

The minister stated: "on the one hand, we are faced with world imperialism which, under the leadership of the great satan, is sucking the blood of the oppressed of the world; and on the other, we are up against a rootless economic system that we inherited from the former regime. This bankrupt economy has some special characteristics that consist of:

1. The country's industries are dependent and nothing but assembly lines, which, in reality, facilitate the use of the industrial output by the West.

2. As a result of erroneous and treacherous policies, agriculture and animal husbandry have lost their self-sufficiency and are in a state of dependence.

3. The portion of reconstruction and industrial investments out of the total of the net national income is insignificant in relation to the portion of the service sectors and is fundamentally unable to even absorb that low level.

4. The output of the non-productive and semi-productive sectors such as building and city services has risen so disproportionately in relation to the productive sectors that it has resulted in an awful influx of refugees, in the overpopulation of the cities, in slum dwellers and suburbanites.

5. The drop in industrial productivity, even in the assembly-line industry, that came about so impressively after the victory of the revolution, the increase in imports, the flourishing of the commercial and brokership sectors, hoarding and speculation and the resulting absorption of manpower in commercial activities have constantly risen, and as a result of the huge profits of the trading sector, the desire for productive investments is practically nil.

6. The erroneous handling of the banking system and the flight of capital into non-productive activities has had a harmful inflationary impact on society that has resulted in a drop in the purchasing power of the oppressed.

7. The absence of a strong and sure foundation that would make possible, through its growth, the expectation of self-sufficiency and industrial independence within a period like 15 years."

Continuing his remarks, the minister said: "We intend to increase the importance and effectiveness of the Budget and Plan Organization; and through the constant cleansing of manpower and through efforts in absorbing and educating the committed forces, we intend to carry out the planning for society. Taking into account the needs for the preparation of a general program and the coordination of the Budget and Plan Organization for the elaboration of the next year's budget as opposed to former methods, the preliminaries for the preparation of a circular related to the budget have been carried out, and the pertinent circular, as well as the detailed report on this preparation are ready to be signed by the prime minister."

Dr Banki then said: "Basic reliance for the preparation of the next year's budget revolved around the following axis: Iran considers itself at constant war with

imperialism and basically relies on taking steps toward self-sufficiency in all fields, more specifically on the food and the defense industries. Additionally, in the preparation of the next year's budget, the basic reliance will be on change in the direction of current budgets toward productive and job-producing budgets, and a replacement of non-productive by productive jobs. Priority will be given to fixed and reconstruction investments and to fundamental, productive, job-producing and unaffiliated investments with quick returns."

Brother Banki concluded by saying: "The people's active and decisive participation in the preparation of the budget at all stages will be of special importance. Fundamental stress in regional planning will be affected through active participation of the people. Moreover, efforts will be made so that through a renewal of the organization and reinforcement of the provincial plan and budget departments with a view to providing for their personnel needs at a minimum levels necessary steps can be taken toward competence and unity."

The minister said: "One of the programs under consideration is to activate supervision in all projects, and this supervision will be provided by the competent units in charge of thorough review and supervision."

He then added: "The secretariat of the economic council will be revived, in order to make it possible for those projects proposed to the council to undergo expert and careful review beforehand; and thus the project will be prepared and approved with a copious content and in coordination with all the economic and social problems of the country."

In regard to agriculture, Dr Banki, the minister without portfolio and supervisor of the Budget and Plan Organization, stated: "In the field of agriculture, our basic reliance will be on self-sufficiency in basic products, and to this end, we shall attempt to prepare plans for rendering services to peasants and the tribes. We shall also make every effort toward the fair and timely distribution of the goods needed by the true sector of the peasants and cattle breeders."

In conclusion, he said: "With regard to commerce and industry, special stress will be attributed to articles 44 and 49 of the Constitution so that, through repeated review of the plans, programs and activities of these ministries, plans should be drawn, while providing for public needs, to provide for independence and self-sufficiency; and in the sector of major industries, we shall attempt to reactivate them through managerial strengthening."

CSO: 4640/14

CHANGES EXPECTED IN JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT, ARMY

TA221110 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Sep 81 p 7

[Report by 'Oded Granot]

[Text] Arab sources in Lebanon anticipate wide-ranging changes in the Jordanian Government, intelligence and the armed forces within the framework of a comprehensive reorganization plan King Husayn intends to implement.

The Lebanese weekly, (AL-MAWQAF AL-'ARABI) reported that the changes will affect the intelligence branch leadership as well as senior army officers.

For the moment, the background for these changes has not been disclosed. Nor is there any confirmation to the report in that weekly that Muhammad (Rasul al-Kaylani), who for years was in charge of the security forces and who has been in retirement, would be reinstated and hold the post of the chief of the general intelligence service.

Middle East observers estimate that the possibility of changes in the top Jordanian leadership can be linked to the increasing feeling of frustration the king has been feeling, mainly because of the growing rift between Jordan and the United States. According to these observers, the monarch has been deeply disappointed with the administration's objection to supplying sophisticated arms to Jordan. This feeling was enhanced recently because of the decision on the strategic cooperation with Israel. It is against this background that the observers are inclinced to view King Husayn's attempts to increase his ties with the Soviet Union and to work out new arms deals with Moscow.

On one plain the observers trace some feelings of concern in the Jordanian administration over statements made recently by Israeli figures regarding the realization of the idea of "a Palestinian state--in Jordan." The reference is mainly to expressions that have explicitly hinted that the solution to the Palestinian problem would be the establishment of a Palestinian state not in Judaea and Samaria, but in Jordan, where the Palestinians constitute a majority.

CSO: 4423/8

TRADE UNIONS URGE ANTI-U.S. MEASURES

JN261310 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 26 Sep 81 p 19

[Dispatch by Muhammad Abu Ghawsh]

[Text] The General Federation of the Jordanian Trade Unions has condemned the U.S.-Zionist alliance, which is directed against the Arab nation and liberation movements.

In a statement issued yesterday, the General Federation condemned the U.S. strategy which relies on Israel as a strike force in the region and by means of which it seeks to achieve military hegemony over the region's countries and subjugate the Arab nation to new forms of subservience and bondage.

The General Federation also attacked the United States for supporting the zionist aggression against our Palestinian Arab people, the confrontation states and the countries that constitute the strategic depth of Arab struggle against the zionist presence. It also attacked the United States for supplying the enemy with destructive weapons and with the most modern equipment of the U.S. military arsenal so that the zionist enemy can continue its repeated aggressions against our Arab nation.

The General Federation said: In its search for kindling a world nuclear war, the United States finds in the zionist enemy a loyal ally to implement its aims of subjugating the region and turning it into a base where lethal weapons and destructive atomic and other nuclear bombs are stored. It also wants the enemy to use the occupied Arab territories as points from which to swoop down on the Arab countries and all world liberation movements and national forces.

The federation indicated the extent of the U.S. financial penetration and sway over various industries in several Western capitalist states. It stressed the need and importance of adopting effective and practical measures against the United States and its policy in the region. Among these measures are:

Suspension of Arab oil supplies to the United States and prevention of its flow to it via its followers and allies wherever they may be.

Withdrawal of Arab assets from U.S. banks in order to prevent the United States from benefiting from these funds and from investing them in striking at the Arab homeland and world liberation movements.

Employment of Arab oil and funds in the service of battle against the zionist enemy for the sake of restoring the Palestinian Arab people's rights and enabling them to attain their freedom and independence on their land, in addition to serving Arab development objectives.

Addition of the topic of a political boycott of the United States to the proposed measures because it is impermissible to remain silent over its belittlement of our presence and entity and its plotting against us.

The federation believes that such a program cannot be achieved by mere wishes, but requires the mobilization of our people's latent potentials, particularly those of the overwhelming majority, by better appraising the dangers of the U.S. ambitions and of Israel as well as the danger that the zionist presence and U.S. policy pose to the future of our Arab people's future, sovereignty and presence on its land.

The federation believes in the need to stop all dealings with the United States and to boycott it as this would be a sound step along the path of defining and naming the real adversary of our people's interests and ambitions. This would also be a true expression of our people's desire to promote its struggle in defense of their right to a free and dignified life.

CSO: 4404/21

LEBANESE NATIONAL MOVEMENT OUTLINES ITS STAND

PM291055 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 24 Sep 81 p 3

[Unattributed report: "The National Movement Emphasizes the Unity of Its Stand Toward the Government and Calls for the Implementation of the Followup Committee Resolutions. It Says: 'No Truce With a Government Which is Seriously Tampering with the Homeland's Destiny'"]

[Text] The executive committee of the Lebanese National Movement Central Political Council has emphasized the national movement's united stand toward the government.

The committee called for speedy implementation of the Arab followup committee resolutions, questioning the reasons for the failure to set up the body for observing the ports and shores and its [executive] instrument, and repeating its demand that the corridors on all the contact lines be opened, that the militias be withdrawn and that all the armed manifestations be removed from the two sectors [of Beirut], as well as that the army be withdrawn from its present positions and that all vital installations and institutions be freed from factional control.

The committee held a meeting last night during which it discussed the developments of the political and security situation and, according to the statement it issued, reached the following decisions:

1--The executive committee reviewed the results of the meetings held by the higher coordination committee in Damascus and learned that the coordination committee, during its meetings in Damascus, did not discuss the details of the implementation of the Arab followup committee resolutions on the grounds that this subject was not on its agenda and that the implementation process must be supervised by the followup committee representatives in Beirut in consultation with the Lebanese parties and the government. The executive committee was also briefed on the general trend approved by the higher coordination committee during the meetings in Damascus in this regard. The gist of this trend is that the Lebanese national forces alone constitute the party that is fit for a dialogue on methods of implementing the Arab followup committee resolutions and that has the right to put forward whatever proposals and basis it deems appropriate to ensure the serious and complete implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Arab ministers during their meetings 3-4 September. Therefore the Lebanese authorities and the followup committee must discuss with the national forces all matters relating to the implementation process. The government must also refrain completely from insinuating that the question of implementation rests with Damascus in an attempt

to nullify the national ranks, embarrass Syria and hide the sides which are really obstructing the process of implementing the resolutions.

2--The Lebanese National Movement calls on the Arab followup committee representatives in Beirut to quickly ensure that the committee's resolutions are implemented. The national movement emphasizes that, while what is required is the implementation of all the resolutions at once, priority must be given to the resolution on setting up a body to monitor Lebanese ports and shores and a security force to be attached to that body for the purpose of verifying the phalangists' claim that they have halted their links with Israel, since the Arab followup committee convened at ministerial level 3-4 September basically to settle the question of links with Israel. Why then does the committee not immediately start setting up this monitoring body and its [security] instrument? As for the cease-fire decision and the decision to open corridors and roads between the two sectors of the capital, the national movement restates its demand that these decisions be implemented on a basis that will ensure permanent genuine security. This process can be achieved only if it involves all the contact lines, the withdrawal of militias and the removal of all armed manifestations from both sectors in addition to the withdrawal of the army from its present positions, the freeing of vital public utilities and institutions from the control of armed factions, and the assumption by the internal security forces of responsibility for maintaining security.

3--The executive committee also emphasizes the need to adopt firm methods to implement the security resolutions adopted by the higher coordination committee in order to control the security situation in the national arena, protect it from hostile violations and give the necessary national support to the Arab deterrent forces and the internal security forces in their capacity as the legitimate instrument responsible for the maintenance of security and for countering criminal sabotage networks.

4--The executive committee affirms the unity of the political stand of the national movement, in all its branches, regarding the government and its overall negative behavior on the political, security and social levels--a stand which holds this government responsible for going along with the plan to impose Bashir al-Jumayyil as false representative of the Christians and to consecrate his militias' separatist entity as a means of controlling the country's destiny; for continuing to build a sectarian factional army that is the ally of the phalangists, thereby predetermining the fate of the political solution; and for breaking up, fragmenting, impoverishing, depriving and starving the national areas so that they will eventually be annexed as vanquished parties to the phalangist state. For this reason the national movement embarked on its campaign to bring the government to account. The movement will continue this campaign to make the prime minister and the ministers face their responsibilities because it is determiend to wage the battle in defense of the Lebanese nationalists' interests and rights, which constitute the interests and rights of the overwhelming popular majority--the majority that comprises various broad communities, areas and social groups. There will be no truce with a government that is now seriously tampering with the country's national destiny.

CSO: 4404/21

BRIEFS

USSR OFFERS MEDICAL TREATMENT--Fifty-four injured and handicapped persons belonging to the Lebanese National Movement parties will leave for Moscow today to complete their medical treatment in Soviet hospitals. The 54 injured persons constitute the first group chosen by the Soviet medical committee which came to Lebanon especially for this purpose. The committee consists of Professors (Yumashev) and (Vasilyev). [Excerpt] [PM281309 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 24 Sep 81 p 7]

CSO: 4404/21

AL-QADHDHAFI BUDAPEST PRESS CONFERENCE REPORTED

LD240212 Tripoli Voice of Arab Homeland in Arabic 2313 GMT 23 Sep 81

[Text] The leader has affirmed that a basic truth should be understood about the fateful struggle between the Arabs and Israel, namely, that America is Israel and Israel is America. This has been confirmed by the recent alliance between the United States and Israel. The leader called for the realization of Arab unity in the face of this imperialist-Zionist alliance.

The leader also affirmed at the press conference which he held in Budapest that during the next Arab summit conference the pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front will forcefully raise its decision to use oil as a weapon against the United States. He added that the Arab nation will seriously think about using this weapon in the battle now that America has become an ally of Israel militarily.

The leader expressed the appreciation of the Libyan Arab people for the stand of the pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front beside the Jamahiriyah against the U.S. aggression on the Gulf of Sidra which is considered as domestic waters and a very important security area to the Jamahiriyah. He said: We highly appreciate this attitude taken by the front at its fifth conference held recently in Benghazi.

In reply to the Libyan oil future and the extent of the effect of flooding the world oil market, the leader affirmed that there is no fear over this future. The Jamahiriyah has not exhausted its oil resources. We also believe that the continuing crisis over marketing the oil will help to prolong the life of Libyan oil reserves.

Concerning relations of friendship and cooperation between the Jamahiriyah, the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community, the leader expressed confidence in this friendship. He explained that we are linked by common aims of combatting imperialism, establishing world peace and opposing and destroying international terrorism led by the United States. He said: We are together in this confrontation.

The leader affirmed once again the readiness of the Jamahiriyah to provide an air cover against continuing Israeli attacks on Lebanon. He said: We are still keeping our promise. The matter is up to the Lebanese side.

The leader answered a question about the future of relations of cooperation between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and the People's Republic of Hungary. He explained that cooperation between the two countries exists in various fields and has developed in the interests of the two friendly peoples. He said that his current visit to Hungary will delineate future outlines for strengthening and consolidating relations of cooperation.

At the end of his press conference, the leader expresses his satisfaction with the progress of relations between the Jamahiriyah and the Hungarian Republic explaining that we have worked for deepening cooperation and finding ways to produce positive results of this work. We also have found more understanding than in the past from the Hungarian side in the context of bilateral relations. He said: This is a natural and positive thing.

CSO: 4504/14

BRIEFS

SUPPORT TO GRENADAN PREMIER--Tripoli, 3 Oct (JANA)--The brother leader of the revolution has sent a letter of solidarity to the prime minister of Grenada, Mr Maurice Bishop. The following is the text of the letter: Dear friend, Maruice Bishop, the Prime Minister of Grenada. We have learned about the meddling and provocations the friendly Republic of Grenada has been subjected to recently by the United States. These meddlings and provocations, in our opinion, come within the framework of the imperialist policy of the new U.S. administration aimed at frightening and terrorizing the small nations and attempting to subugate them and threaten their political and economic independence. I convey to you the Libyan Arab people's condemnation of these meddlings and confirm that we stand at your side with all our resources. At the same time, I would like to express our total conviction of the need to rally the efforts of the small states and unite their stances and policies to abort the hostile U.S. plans. That, in our estimation, is the basic weapon in our common battle. [Text] [LD031646 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1445 GMT 3 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/14

BOUCETTA INTERVIEWED ON SAHARA ISSUE

PM051329 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 29 Sep 81 pp 1, 4

[Unattributed report on LE MONDE correspondent Paul Balta interview with Moroccan Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation M'hammed Boucetta in Rabat: "The Saharan Case? It Is Essentially a Psychological War Being Waged Against Us"--date not given]

[Text] Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation M'hammed Boucetta granted an interview to Paul Balta, LE MONDE's special envoy in Rabat, relating mainly to the Sahara and the referendum announced by his majesty the king during the OAU implementation committee meeting in Nairobi.

"It is my duty to give evidence," Mr Boucetta began. "I have worked alongside his majesty the king on this Saharan affair for almost 4 years. I must say the considerable personal efforts he is making day and night, the time he devotes to this problem, which he regards as a matter bound to the nation's destiny, his personal presence at international conferences and the decisive role he plays at them defending Morocco's cause, the explanations he gives in his messages to the nation, the determination he shows in all spheres--military and diplomatic and in the development of the Saharan provinces--to lead Morocco to a final victory, can leave no room for suppositions like the allusions I have just mentioned. [Sentence as published]

As regards the Istiqlal, I told you all the necessary explanations have been given at all levels. What are the facts? Battles are being fought against us and we are fighting on all fronts. It is now much more of a psychological war that is being waged against us, at the diplomatic level in particular....

Paul Balta: By whom?

Mr Boucetta: By Morocco's adversaries and by Algeria in particular.

Paul Balta: For what purpose, to achieve what?

Mr Boucetta: To thwart Morocco in the completion of its territorial integrity and for hegemonist ends. The Polisario, which it created, is rather like a group of boy scouts with subversive tendencies. You know our position on this subject. But saying it was a question of defending an oppressed people or certain sacrosanct principles was primarily a position which concealed something else.

Indeed our position was known back in 1974. In 1975 there was the green march and we said the matter was closed once and for all. A war is being waged against us--a war which has several aspects as I told you before. The matter is being presented with a great deal of fuss and expense in international opinion and more especially in African opinion as a question of defending an oppressed people who have not been able to express their will. We have repeatedly said they have expressed their will.

I will move on quickly. First to the Freetown and then the Nairobi summits. And I will say that, at the insistence of many friendly countries (let's not talk about Morocco's adversaries who unfortunately would continue to be adversaries for other reasons which have nothing to do with the Sahara), at the insistence of many friendly countries, who found it easy to understand that since, in our view, that will had been expressed, there is no reason to persuade those adversaries to have it confirmed or repeated. [Sentence as published]

It was in that spirit that we accepted and that his majesty the king proposed this referendum. It was precisely to counter that psychological war to which I referred and which is being waged against us, saying that Morocco refuses, Morocco is intransigent, Morocco is violating principles, Morocco should be condemned and isolated.

Thus, to counter all those threats and attacks it was necessary to face the situation with political realism but without affecting the root of the problem or Morocco's fundamental rights. But the Socialist Union of Popular Forces' position has become dangerous, objectively speaking, in that, instead of seeing these operations as a political and diplomatic action necessary to deal with a situation, it accuses the rest of the world of naivety and resignation.

At the start, you will remember--you particularly because it was to you I had cause to say at the outset, 5 years ago--the Algerian side made three mistakes in assessing the political situation concerning the Algerian leaders in 1974, so I will remind you.

The agreement with Mauritania:

--The first fundamental mistake was that the Algerians believed that Morocco would never dare tackle this problem by claiming the territory because there could never be an agreement with Mauritania.

Immediately afterwards it became apparant that that agreement could be reached and moreover it could be reached at that level or permanently. I, together with Bouabid and Larasi, who was then foreign minister, was asked by his majesty the king to go and attend the UN session and it was there that the agreement with the Mauritanians was drafted.

Paul Balta: What year did that happen?

Mr Boucetta: It was at the 1974 session. That was where the meeting with Ould Mouknasse took place and the great fear was that the Istiqlal, whose position on Mauritania was known, would be an obstacle in that affair. I can tell you that I personally had a great deal of difficulty persuading my friends in the party to

say that...first to face up to this Algerian evaluation that the agreement with Mauritania could never be reached and hence the Sahara affair could never be opened and hence that the Sahara affair could never be set in motion. [sentence as published]

I will not go into details because I think the whole Mauritanian affair was started then. Even the overthrow of Ould Daddah and Ould Mouknasse in 1978 is only the result of all that, but that is another matter which we may be able to discuss one day.

[The Agreement]With Spain:

--The second mistake was that the Algerians or their leaders at that time believed or considered themselves to be the only door to Spain (which was what it was at the time), as the only door to the Third World, the Arab world and the Nonaligned Movement. Some 2, 3 or 4 months later an agreement was reached between Morocco and Spain. Hence that was a major error of judgment by the Algerian leaders of the time.

The Moroccan people's unanimity:

--The third mistake was that the parties comprising the various political forces in Morocco were in opposition and that the king could never have the unanimous support of the Moroccan people when he launched the operation to win back, not to claim because it had always been claimed, but to win back [presumably the Sahara].

They thought there would never be unanimous support for the government and the king for this attempt to win back [the Saharan provinces] because of the parties' opposition.

Paul Balta: However there was....

Mr Boucetta: From the start there was unanimity. And that is the most important thing.

Paul Balta: Fine, fine.

Mr Boucetta: If there was still some uncertainty among domestic opinion it was necessary to dispel it. I told you it was necessary to tive the Moroccans explanations and to tell them what political package was necessary without abandoning any of Morocco's fundamental rights. That was the role of political leaders.

Paul Balta: Yes, yes in a given context....

Fine. But nonetheless there is also the future. I remeber what Mr Guedira said to me yesterday. He told me that, after all, there is a letter, one of the first which President Mitterrand wrote to the king urging him to agreee to the referendum, so it is not very consistent for the PS to start attacking now.

Mr Boucetta: Yes, that is a problem which constantly worries him.

Paul Balta: Nonetheless there is this referendum problem. Do you think it involves no risk, or do you think the risk is limited.

Mr Boucetta: Didn't the other operation involve a risk--the operation of isolating Morocco, condemning it, facilitating the so-called Saharan Democratic Arab Republic's admission to the OAU, not responding to the requests of friendly countries and allowing things to take on unreasonable proportions.

Paul Balta: I know that Chadli had remarked to Cheysson: I see no reason why the West Sahara should not become an autonomous province in the framework of Morocco provided there is a referendum, that the referendum takes place. Well, that might....

Mr Boucetta: If he is asking for a referendum why is he talking to a province which is or is not autonomous. He is asking for a referendum. We have accepted the referendum, we want it, as I told you a short time ago, to convince all those who do not believe that the will has been expressed, and to make them see it and observe it again.

Therefore the operation is clear. The matters which concern us on the domestic plane have already been started to determine the special characteristics of some of our regions. Moreover, this might be in keeping with the requirements of good management, good administration and good integration even in the Moroccan nation.

This is the significance of the council which his majesty the king has just set up to examine those special characteristics and to bring about that integration.

The population expressed its will through the Jemaa, the appropriate body which has always been considered essential and corresponding to the customs and usage of the region and representing all the tribes. When it expressed the population's will to rejoin Morocco, people changed their tune.

We were told that the Polisario represented "a people," that it controls the territory and is like a fish in water there...."

It has been completely proved, in the presence of dozens of journalists from all backgrounds, that we control the territory, that the population is living in peace and tranquillity, that suicidal attacks even outside the Saharan provinces are repulsed. That is not enough. More is needed.

It is important to understand the state of these populations. They lived under Spanish domination for 70 or 80 years in conditions which I will not describe. The things that have been done in those regions and for those populations in 5 years bear witness to it.

Paul Balta: That is true, I have seen it.

Mr Boucetta: This is an important element. There is not one child wandering the streets or who does not have a place in the classroom. There are no longer any sick people who cannot find a hospital bed or immediate care. There is nobody without drinking water, yet formerly very few people had drinking water.

Paul Balta: That's true, I saw and described the things that have been done in considerable detail....

Mr Boucetta: If somebody is interested in a population's fate or in people in one form or another, then he must look at them from the aspect of security, social life and freedom of speech. All that has been done, and his majesty the king made a statement before going to Nairobi. He addressed the whole nation once again to say: This is what I have done. Before going to Nairobi and on his return he explained everything objectively so that the nation remained united and mobilized. Morocco will never abandon this Sahara affairs, because it is its destiny, and because it is convinced that the expression of its population's will is bound to express their Moroccan nature again. This is our deep conviction. So there is no point in sowing discord. That is why, and I apologize for coming back to this, you could have said anything you liked about the Istiqlal or an economic or management problem and it would not have been so important.

Paul Balta: No, no, I understand, I wanted to ask you another question....what you have told me is very coherent and is the truth. After all, Morocco has a number of important cards. Nonetheless you are a politician, you face the facts, moreover you have demonstrated that. You have spoken of realism. Nonetheless, whatever people say, over the past 5 years something, an entity, an element, call it what you will, called the Polisario, has emerged, in other words something which I do not think can vanish overnight. In order words, it isn't going to disappear.... There are, so to speak, a number of things which resist, there is a group of 50 states which have recognized....

Mr Boucetta: I understand your concern.

Paul Balta: Well, the referendum will take place, let's say 80 percent vote for Morocco and 20 percent for independence. The principle in democracy is that the minority should bow to the majority. Do you feel that things will happen or could happen as simply as that. I am asking you this question.

Mr Boucetta: I understand your concern to seek out or imagine what could happen. My personal feeling, which is my own view as a party in this conflict, is that the Polisario is fundamentally not [apparent line drop] and independently of the fact that people are trying to use it as a tool or a shield or as something brandished for other ends.

But basically speaking, when I analyze the case of the Polisario officials, there are a number of them. There are several units or at most a few dozen and we know them all individually.

I know them. I analyze them individually. Well, believe me. First one 10 to 15 percent of the leaders are natives of the so-called Sahara region. I know them, they are either people from the north of Morocco, and hence, in a way, are oppositionists outside the country or they are from Mauritania.

[Presumably Paul Balta]: There are some Saharans who, through an analysis of the basic facts....

Mr Boucetta:...They represent no more than 5 to 10 percent of the total Saharan population. However that does not mean that they should not be taken into consideration. His majesty the king has made appeals in the past telling those who want to

return home, those who want to take part in their region's development, those who want to participate in running their country, that we may consider accepting them. This is still an important factor and, we said so before, it could correspond to some aspects of regionalization.

Paul Balta: You are referring to the council.

Mr Boucetta: The problem has now been posed on the African scene and the international scene and people must decide. This operation for their return can take place before or after, it does not matter much. But the main thing, and this is my deep conviction, is that all are Moroccans and wish to continue to be. Some of those in Tindouf are there against their will.

They would like to return to their families for considerations which may have nothing to do with politics but which concern human and family problems, which relate to problems of their personal comfort in being where they want to be.

Paul Balta: That is true, yes, absolutely true....

Mr Boucetta: They are being prevented from doing so. Others have been abducted and are being held prisoner or hostage. But there are others who, when they left, who were at a given time....

Paul Balta: Enthusiastic.

Mr Boucetta: Perhaps, at a given time they believed that they were going to do something interesting, in some way, I don't know.

Paul Balta: Yes, it is true, it is difficult, and I have stated this in articles: it is true, it is difficult to assess.

Mr Boucetta: There are disputes even with humanitarian organizations such as the High Commission for Refugees. On several occasions delegates of the high commission have come here and have seen Algerian prisoners.

Paul Balta: Yes, yes, yes, yes.

Mr Boucetta: They have seen under what good conditions they were living. I will not describe them, but it is our duty, it is our duty primarily to observe international conventions, to align with the countries which observe these conventions. On the other side, for reasons that are now well known, there is always a reluctance to show the real situation and to allow people to meet with representatives of the High Commission for Refugees.

From time to time a group of journalists or other people are sent there and they are allowed to visit a prepared group. That is irresponsible--and then to say that it constitutes a state....

With regard to the figures that have sometimes been misquoted, it is forgotten that official documents exist. I have letters signed by Bouteflika, addressed not to me but the UN secretary general, to the chairman of the Assembly of the High Commission

in Geneva, which state very specifically that in February 1975 all the refugees driven out by the drought, the Malians, the Nigerians and others totalled 50,000--a figure written in words and digits--and "constitute a burden for us, in connection with which we request aid."

Paul Balta: Yes, but....

Mr Boucetta: To talk after that in terms of 150,000 or a year later a million Saharans--not to mention the Nigerians and Malians--is irresponsible.

Paul Balta: That is what I told them.... Moreover I wrote it and it was I who published the story about the 750,000....

Mr Boucetta: Yes.

Paul Balta: ...which I believe was poorly reported by the agencies. It is true that at that time two documents appeared in Algiers, one after the other, with a fortnight or a month between them.

One mentioned 150,000, the other 1 million.

I read them and discussed them. In any case there is a big difference between 50,000 and 1 million. That is some difference. I raised this issue at the time. What I said was: Where do you get those figures? How can you explain it? Then when the subject came to be discussed figures were produced which ranged from 150,000 to 250,000: Where did they come from?

I was told at the time: that is in fact the total Saharan population, in other words including southern Morocoo: Tan-tan and Tarfaya--because we consider that part Saharan--and north Mauritania.

But, they said, they are in a way our people. Our fight is taking place within border inherited from the colonial period. So I told them: Very well, but how do you reckon the figure, that is, how did you reach the figure of 750,000 let a-one 1 million. They told me: Well, because we know the tribes. If you go from Tan-tan to Zouerate through the tribes you get to know them and you reach that figure.

So I told them: Very well, but since you say that your struggle is taking place within the Western Sahara, what is your estimate of the figure for the Western Sahara? They contested the Spanish figure of 73,000-74,000....

Mr Boucetta: When the Algerians spoke responsibly they mentioned two figures....

Paul Balta: Yes, between 4,000 and 5,000 Saharans in Tindouf.

Mr Boucetta: With regard to the total number of refugees for whom they were responsible and for whom they were requesting assistance as refugees--though specifically citing their countries of origin as Mali and Niger--they gave the total official figure of 50,000....

Paul Balta: That is so, yes.

Mr Boucetta: When they mentioned the Saharans, they cited a figure of 7,000.

Paul Balta: That was right at the start.

Mr Boucetta: Of course, and it was possible to add to that number the ones who were abducted at a certain point, and there cannot be more than a few dozen of them, or even just a few individuals. In any case we know who they all are--the ones discovered on the desert roads, or in a hiding place or who were taken away by force.

If we consider everyone who left the region we will find a figure of about 4,000-5,000 Saharans. Furthermore, I must tell you that many of them left but did not specifically return to Morocco. Some of them rejoined their families in Mauritania: Yes, I saw that the last time, yes.

Paul Balta: In Mauritania.

Mr Boucetta: There are some in Europe--we know who they are.

Paul Balta: Yes.

Mr Boucetta: There are some in the Canary Islands.

Paul Balta: Yes, it is true, yes.

Mr Boucetta: Well, quite seriously, there should be not more than 4,000-5,000 Saharans in Tindouf, including men, women and children.

Paul Balta: Yes, it is difficult to say.

Mr Boucetta: According to the analysis which it is possible to make, I cannot defintely quote a particular figure.

Paul Balta: It's just that once when we overflew them I counted and they said that there are 19 camps.

Mr Boucetta: Yes.

Paul Balta: And in one camp I counted 30 tents in one direction and 20 in another. But I cannot say exactly how many.

Mr Boucetta: Several of them are certainly empty. In 1978 particularly when there was a great heatwave there was a sharp rise in the population and I must say moreover that even inhabitants of the region, Algerians, found that it was easier to find bread and water in the camps than in their "douar." That is without mentioning Mali, which was in a disastrous state, and Niger. In addition to that there were the Mauritanians.

CSO: 4519/10 END

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19 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2417

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FRANCE'S POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE EAST EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 234, 15 Aug 81 pp 38-40

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "Message to President Mitterand Before His Visit to Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] In a few days President François Mitterand will be on his way to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to pay his first official visit to the Arab world.

There are some observations regarding this visit which may be made as follows:

First, this visit reciprocates King Khalid's visit to France, but it is the promptest reciprocated visit made in the history of official visits. If we were to exclude the period of the month of Ramadan and the feast of Bairam, it would become evident that the period between King Khalid's visit to Paris and President Mitterand's counter visit does not exceed 2 months. And one is taking into consideration the fact that August is the month during which rulers prefer to take it easy.

President Mitterand's desire to reciprocate King Khalid's visit quickly resembles the desire that King Khalid expressed when he suddenly decided while on an official visit to Britian and before another official visit to Spain to pay a visit to France.

Just as King Khalid's visit cannot be considered official in the traditional sense of the term, some aspects of President Mitterand's visit can also not be considered official in the traditional sense of the term. King Khalid's visit appeared to have been an urgent mission that could not be delayed. President Mitterand's visit to Saudi Arabia appeared to a certain extent to assume the feature of visits that take on the appearance of urgent missions.

Second, sudden visits that assume the quality of urgency are usually caused by the fact that a ruler inherited difficulties from his predecessor and that he wants to correct the course of relations with the country that

suffered hardships because of the predecessor's policy. As far as Saudi Arabia and France are concerned, President Mitterand inherited from his predecessor, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing a fortune; he did not inherit debts. The statement that the inheritance was a fortune is a true statement. It is a concrete fortune. Until the moment when Francois Mitterand assumed power, Arab-French relations were good. They were flourishing and likely to continue flourishing. For an industrial country like France, [such relations] represent the utmost of its aspirations. If one may say so, President Mitterand's mission is to maintain the relations that were good originally and to use those relations in a manner that would cause them to flourish even more.

Third, the aspect of caution in the subject of the visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the fact that President Mitterand wants to go ahead with this visit so he can visit Israel afterwards. This is based on the fact that he took a pledge upon himself to do so. If this does happen, what has been built over a period of 10 years may be exposed to an earthquake.

What is more likely is that Saudi officials did not tolerate such a French interpretation of the action that President Mitterand intends to undertake. In fact, deep down it is their preference that if this were the purpose of the visit, the visit should not take place. They would prefer that a more dynamic dialogue precede the visit and that the dialogue be concluded with a process of dotting the i's and crossing the t's.

And here a question comes to mind: Is Saudi Arabia and are most of the Arab countries refusing to have France assume a balanced position? Does this mean that these countries wish to have France side with them altogether?

Accordingly, is it possible for France to take sides with the Arabs, and will such a disposition achieve anything effective in the area in the way of solving the crisis of the Middle East? Or would it be better, as far as such a solution is concerned, to adopt an even-handed posture?

The answer to all this is that the Arabs are emotional by nature and that they prefer an ally who makes them feel that he is with them 100 percent in the good times as well as in the bad times. This is due to the fact that the United States assumes such a position on the side of Israel, and the Soviet Union, instead of doing the same thing with the Arabs, is assuming an evenhanded posture.

It is true that the French position with the style utilized by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and by the late President Georges Pompidou before him (according to principles laid down by Gen de Gaulle) did not achieve anything fundamental in the area of an international solution to the Middle East crisis. However, it would have achieved something in the future. This is because whenever French economic prestige, especially toward the Arab world, is strengthened, France becomes prepared to play an effective role.

Fourth, it is very important that President Mitterand's first visit to

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia take place apart from the influence that may be created by the ideas which, according to some sources, some advisers in the Elysee Palace, are trying to promote in the hope that these ideas may be used as chief principles for the method of dealing with the Arabs. These ideas are based on the principle of creating a breach between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iraq and assuring Saudi Arabia that plans to do business with it will not be affected, provided that the Saudi position be not tied to the Iraqi position. These ideas are somewhat disturbing, and they are the kind of ideas that hurt the feelings of Saudi officials. In addition, they signify that the interpretation by [all] or some of the Elysee advisers, who have an ability to influence [policy], of the visit made by King Khalid to France was not a deliberate interpretation. What King Khalid had in mind in visiting France was not an exclusive relationship with France to justify the fact that ideas promoted by some Elysée advisers were calling for an exclusive relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

It is true that the visit did not follow coordination and deliberations with some Arabs. Hence developed the desire in the hearts of some Elysée advisers to play the contradictions game. However, King Khalid's conversation with President Mitterand during the few hours of the visit was terse and clear. It may even be assumed that had it not been for the Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor, King Khalid would not have undertaken his sudden visit to France.

King Khalid's visit was dictated not by proximity or even by the desire to reassure the new French president, in the sense that King Khalid would think of visiting the French capital because of the proximity of Paris to Geneva, and greeting the new president so as to inform President Mitterand that Saudi Arabia with what it stands for was supporting him and that Giscard d'Estaing's loss in the elections did not mean anything to it. Such a matter would have been relevant if there had been a strong friendship in the past between Saudi officials and François Mitterand and if those Saudi officials, now that their friend was in power, wanted to give him their utmost support. But such a friendship does not exist. Such a matter could also have been relevant if King Khalid were obligated to accept an official invitation from Mitterand's republic to visit France and if a long time had elapsed without him making the visit. But the visit did take place only a few days after President Mitterand had officially assumed the duties of his office.

King Khalid came to Paris on a national mission whose exigencies transcended considerations that are to be made when a new administration begins its term. In other words, the visit took place before President Mitterand had had a chance to rearrange the cards and catch his breath following the grinding elections campaign. It may be said that King Khalid made this visit to tell the new French president in a symbolic way that as far as the Arabs were concerned the French papers did not need rearranging; they needed someone to keep them as they are. He wanted to say quite clearly that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia thinks that France ought to rebuild the

Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was attacked by the Israelis, and that it was prepared to pay the cost for that, which amounts to 300 million dollars.

Although the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia did not consult and deliberate with Iraq on this matter before an official announcement was made, considering King Khalid's surprise visit to France, Saudi Arabia's action was based on the fact that developments were occurring at a fast pace. In addition, King Khalid made the visit primarily for Iraq's sake. But the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia placed Iraq in an environment which King Khalid and President Mitterand had not investigated and which Iraq had not requested, with regard to rebuilding the reactor. Saudi Arabia did not announce what the king had requested, leaving Iraq to make that announcement if it thought such an announcement was appropriate. But Iraq did not make the announcement, and this forced the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to make a reference to this matter more than 1 month after the meeting between King Khalid and President Mitterand. Its purpose in doing so was to confront the French president with a matter that had been discussed at the Saudi-French summit meeting and to inform him that this matter would be an item on the agenda for future Saudi-French talks.

Fifth, it is true that the Arab people are satisfied with doing business with France, but [it is also true] that there are reasons for this state of satisfaction. The Arab citizen who appears satisfied because his government has entered into a contract with a French company, purchased a French weapon, placed an order for French passenger or military airplanes, etc. is a product of the fact that the France of Gen Charles de Gaulle had stood on the side of Arab rights. This does not mean that French goods are poor and that any Arab region disregards the quality of the goods a little and goes along with French policy. French goods are good, but they are not the best; French companies are good, but they are not the best; French weapons are good, but they are not the best; and French airplanes are good, but they are not the best airplanes in the world.

There is no doubt that when President Mitterand examined the file on French-Arab business, he discovered that the French company that builds a hotel, a road or a factory, for example, in Iraq or in Saudi Arabia, used to be favored over many other foreign companies despite the fact that the prices submitted by French companies were always higher. This was a gesture of appreciation [on the part of the Arabs] to encourage the French political course. Moreover, German, British and Japanese companies had made many efforts to obtain lucrative contracts. However, the desire to go along with the French position was what made the French companies win these contracts. Although these companies have subsequently begun exploiting the official French political situation in a manner that is not free of greed, President Saddam Husayn, for example, continued to be considerate of the French situation and to advise most rulers of Third World countries, especially those who receive some aid from Iraq, to cooperate with French technology. However, matters changed when greed began to grow and assume an unfamiliar form in the world of business.

French companies, for example, were not awarded contracts with the Iraqi navy after it became evident that Italian companies had submitted better proposals. Representatives of French companies came after contracts had been initialed and expressed their willingness to reduce a 2 billion dollar deal by 300 million dollars. Had Iraq not initialed the contract, it would have held firm and received a reduction of 500 million dollars. The purpose of referring to this incident is to explain the magnitude of the profit that France used to get. If the companies are prepared to reduce their proposed figure by 500 million dollars and still make a profit, their profits then must have been fantastic.

Sixth, it may be said that development plans in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in Iraq as well will suffer if the nature of business with France is disrupted. This is true to a certain extent, but France's loss will be great indeed.

Saudi Arabia and Iraq may be able to spur Britain and West Germany [to become] a semi-ready replacement for France, but France can do nothing about it. To give an example and not to discuss this exhaustively, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait and all the Gulf states together may be able to collect 5 billion dollars and to ask a few advanced western countries to develop Arab military and technological needs, and they would be able to achieve what they want.

This may be achieved for the Arabs in the course of 5 years. In fact, these countries are capable during this period of developing the military airplane that they want. Some time before Valery Giscard d'Estaing lost the elections, Arab-French negotiations were underway to ensure a large amount of capital with which France can develop its Mirage 4000 airplane that would compete with U.S. and Soviet airplanes. Had Giscard d'Estaing remained in office, the negotiations would have continued; the required Arab funds would have been ensured; and the development process would have begun.

Seventh, President François Mitterand knows that if there were an Arab shift away from France and toward Britain, West Germany, Belgium, Austria and Italy which are "ready to be responsive and which began some time ago a process of normalizing the political situation in the direction that would encourage the Arabs," going back [to a former state] would be difficult.

President Mitterand knows that the France which he rules today was withering and weak and hardly able to stand on its own when Gen de Gaulle took it over. With Arab funds, however, and as a result of the political course that Gen de Gaulle had pursued, France became strong, [one of the] stronger nations in Europe.

What is sad in this case is that a discussion about Arab-French relations has been taking place for a few months under the cloud of burdensome and worrisome climates. The grounds for Arab motives to look for a European replacement [for France] are increasing every day. President Mitterand's positions are sympathetic with Israel, and the statements that he and some key figures in his government are making are not friendly to the Arabs.

It may be said that President Mitterand needs more time to let the logic of power replace that of the opposition. This is true, were it not for the fact that the French president does not let an occasion go by without reinforcing Arab anxieties. Sometimes he does so in a statement; sometimes with a position; and other times with steps that are difficult to explain. None of this dispels what is being said about utilizing a policy of having an exclusive relationship with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia at the expense of Iraq. This is a matter about which the people of the Saudi court will not let President Mitterand bring up for discussion with them. Two facts remain:

The first is that when King Khalid made his sudden visit to France, President Mitterand had not yet brought his communist allies into the government by appointing four communist ministers. The status of the franc was much better than the sorry status to which it dropped after the communists were added to the government and after the instances of nationalization in France increased. The second fact is that Mitterand's visit to Saudi Arabia is taking place at a time when the French franc is beginning to be exposed to daily tremors and is unable to stand up against the dollar and the pound sterling.

When Arab-French relations were good, matters were good and the franc was strong. Will Arab-French relations regain their vigor after the visit, or will the countdown begin for the European replacement of France?

If we were to ask any Arab citizen from the ocean to the gulf, whether he be a ruler or a subject, what he hoped for, he would say, "I hope that President Mitterand would preserve what Gen de Gaulle built; what the late president, Georges Pompidou protected; and what former president Valery Giscard d'Estaing developed."

What the Arab citizen is hoping for, the silent French majority is hoping for as well. [The French people] do not want what is happening now in Poland to happen to them after [a few] years.

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OIL'S BLEAK OUTLOOK CITED

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 pp 16-19

[Article by John Leroux]

[Text] TOTAL Opec exports have fallen to 18m b/d — a level last seen in 1968 — and could hit 17m b/d by year-end if traditional inventory patterns hold. There are also widespread rumours on the spot market of unofficial discounting. Worldwide crude prices are under so much pressure that, unless a last-minute compromise at $34 can be reached, next month could see unprecedentedly fast falls.

Dr Herman Franssen, chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA), said that stock building normally reaches a peak of 2m b/d above actual consumption in the third quarter, and is followed by a drawdown of equal volume in the final quarter. He told *8 Days*: 'This year inventory drawdown has already started in the July-September period, to the tune of well over 1m b/d. It could easily reach 3m b/d through the final quarter. All will depend on how cold the winter is, and how eager consumers will be to fill up their tanks.

'Secondary and tertiary inventories, down to the retail end of the market, are very low now throughout the non-socialist world. But with the feeling of security that is now prevailing, I don't expect a major comeback to the market, at least never to the situation of 1979-80. That could mean consumers will keep their tanks low and ask for more frequent deliveries from fuel distributors.'

IEA officials are expected to review their latest estimates of world oil supply and demand this week, and may find it necessary to warn the 21 member countries about destocking too fast.

'The problem is that oil companies are now out to defend their own position with staggering interest rates,' said Dr Franssen, 'and there is not much we can do about it.' Total inventories through the non-socialist world should stand at 5bn barrels (well over 100 days' supply) by the end of this month, with a further dip of only 4 to 8 per cent by year-end. As a result, the picture is getting bleaker every day for oil producers.

Despite claims to the contrary, Saudi Arabia is having problems in selling all its crude, even though production was slashed by 1m b/d to 9.2m b/d earlier this month. Since the August Opec meeting in Geneva, the popular Arabian Light benchmark has slipped by 60 cents a barrel on the European spot market to just under $32. US oil traders add that volumes marketed by the state through Petromin are even moving at around $31, and that traders seldom approached to buy Arabian Light from Saudi sources have been quoted prices ranging from $30.50 to $31.20. This indicates how difficult the kingdom's balancing act, both defending Opec and resisting higher prices, will be through autumn.

Against official selling prices of $36 for the top-quality Brass River (41.5 API) and Bonny Light (37 API) Nigerian crudes, the presidential office in Lagos, under the direction of the former head of oil marketing in the country, is now selling Brass River at $33 on a cash-and-carry basis and $34.20 with 90-day credit. Batches of up to 2m barrels were actually contracted at such prices by US traders, which significantly underbids the benchmark crude by some $2 once quality and market proximity differentials are taken into account. (Until August, Nigerian crudes were selling at $8 above Saudi Light (34 API).)

Some of that crude is earmarked for export refineries in Singapore, where the

heavier end of the barrel will eventually be bartered against other commodities. Trading sources in Rotterdam expect that Nigeria's $36 official selling price will not hold long because it is 'still far too high'.

Indeed, two majors — one European and one American — will reportedly increase their liftings to meet only 15 to 20 per cent of their needs, and will use intermediaries to bid at lower spot prices for the balance on their behalf for a cheap commission. One London trader claims that the market needs about a month to see whether liftings of Nigerian crude will change significantly. 'If there is a good pick-up,' the source added, 'it can only further weaken Opec prices, because of very tight consumption.'

Libya and Algeria, Nigeria's two closest competitors for sweet crudes, may be seriously hit if their official selling prices are not soon lowered. Some batches of Sahara Blend, Algeria's top grade, is reported on its way to the US Gulf at a delivered price of $36.50 — against official fob prices of $40. Late last month, one cargo of a US operator in Libya was reportedly sold in Trieste for about $35 a barrel (Sarir crude, 38.5 API) to a West German affiliate. During the anniversary celebrations last week in Tripoli, Colonel Qaddafi insisted that official prices wouldn't be lowered by a penny.

In Iran there were growing hints that the authorities, who resisted an Opec compromise at $35 in Geneva, would consider $34 or even less for the country's light crude (34 API). In late August, the Japanese oil firm Showa was forced to dump Iranian crude, which it had earlier bought at $37, for $34 to make room to cheaper crude in its storage tanks.

In Kuwait, the authorities' offers of premium cuts and rebates of $1.75 seem to have been rejected by most lifters. Threats to close down some buyers' offices and to take legal action have been made. Up to 470,000 b/d are involved.

Even North Sea crudes are affected, with Britain Forties (36.5 API) delivered to the US Gulf at $35.50, only 50 cents above official fob selling prices. In fact, since 26 August UK Brent crude is selling under official prices on spot markets.

While market trends appear to be readable now, future price momentum is subject to a number of factors. Rotterdam oil dealers believe that under-the-table discounting will spread within a month or two and that some Opec countries will offer bargains below the Saudi reference of $32. 'That's when we could make a lot of money, since 60 per cent of Saudi's output goes to the US,' said one trader.

In the ARA (Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp) triangle, more than 4.5m tonnes of crude (about 33.5m barrels) are stored in tanks, and the product market is very thin. 'The spot market has been virtually dead since mid-June,' said Yan Oskam, spokesman for the Rotterdam Oil Traders' Association and secretary-general of the European Oil Merchant Federation. Indeed, less than one per cent of world oil trade now goes through the ARA region, against the usual 5 to 6 per cent.

Yet these are significant factors that could influence the market at a time when no company wants to commit itself in 1982 lifting contracts:

- The real impact of Japan's import cutback of some 500,000 b/d since late August (mainly from Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Algeria and Nigeria) remains unclear. Japan has close to 120 days' supply in stock.
- Although US cumulative daily average crude imports this year are more than 20 per cent down on last year, total stocks are scarcely dwindling — by only 5 per cent since the 19 June peak of 416m barrels — and still boast 93 days' imports. This year's biggest drops in inventories recorded so far are for distillates and residuals, at 13 and 20 per cent down on the same period last year.

One indication of the mounting pressures on oil exporters comes from the IMF, which has showed that total foreign reserves (minus gold) accumulated by at least five nations (Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria, the UAE and Venezuela) had peaked in May and dropped by $1.6bn in June. During the same period last year, those reserves had in fact risen.

Consultations among Opec countries on a $34 price resumed when Sheikh Ali Khalifa al Sabah of Kuwait flew to Taif, the Saudi summer capital, late last month to meet Sheikh Yamani and other Saudi officials. The organisation has about a month to strike a new compromise before it finds itself incapable of agreeing on $32.

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YAMANI INTERVIEW ON STRATEGY CHANGES

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 23, 25 Sep 81 pp 20-22

[Interview with Ahmad Zaki Yamani by Muhammad M. al-Shibani, editor in chief of SAUDI BUSINESS, date and place not given]

[Text] In a wide-ranging interview, Editor-in-Chief Muhammad M. Al-Shibani talked to Sheikh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, minister of petroleum and mineral resources, on the controversial long-term strategy. The oil minister confirmed for the first time that the Kingdom has agreed to grant Iraq the right to extend a crude pipeline through its land. Excerpts from their talk:

Question: Your Excellency, why was it decided to review OPEC 's long-term strategy? What exactly is the motive?

Answer: In the first place, the picture has changed.

When the strategy was mapped, it was based on a price that had not exceeded $18 per barrel. After the prices rose to the present levels, with a sharp decline in demand, it became necessary to reconsider the bases upon which the strategy was founded. In regards to our relations with the industrialized states and the developing nations, the former's oil need was no longer so much as before. Therefore, the oil card no more enjoyed the same power as it did earlier. With an oil glut and no hope of the occurrence of any scarcity in supplies for a long time, the need of emerging nations also began to vary. In view of an expected fall in the output of oil-surplus states which could lead to a withdrawal of some of their surplus funds, aid to emerging nations will also differ in volume and concept.

All these facts will have to be reconsidered.

Q. When do you expect this review will be complete?

A. We have already embarked on studies on supply and demand. On these bases an amendment will be carried out in the oil strategy.

Q. Is the point of difference over the strategy still the same – whether the proportion of increased prices should be evaluated according to the degree of growth of industrialized states, or in accordance with the rate of development of OPEC states?

A. Pricing ought to be based on the factors of the markets as well as supply and demand. This is a fundamental yardstick.

The ratio of increased prices was in conformity with the average rise in demand in the industrial world, when the oil price was low, and it was possible for us to control the price rise in keeping with the rate of growth in the industrial world. But when the price rose to a degree which led to a drop in demand and a glut, we found that the law of supply and demand would not allow OPEC to adopt a resolution contrary to the provisions of this law.

Q. If the strategy is finalized, will a change be made to implement its pricing system immediately, or will there be a transitional period? What would happen in that period?

A. First, any strategy that is approved must be so flexible as to accept amendment and change during implementation.

Second, during the current period, oil prices must be frozen for a period (extending at least to) the end of 1982, to be extended perhaps up to 1983.

Q. Regarding the unification of price which the organization 's strategy is trying to achieve, how do you think it will take place if an agreement cannot be reached on average output?

A. The unification of prices itself, as well as OPEC's pricing system will carry in their fold an automatic system for the output.

In other words, if every country sincerely adhered to OPEC's price, any drop in demand would be distributed among the producer countries on an almost equal basis.

The old pricing system had led to a drop in the Kingdom's output between 1975 and 1978 to such levels which had sometimes gone down to 7 million barrels per day. As such, the pricing system itself is inclusive of an order for the programing of the output without the need of adopting any resolution.

Q. Perhaps this is in the interest of other states of OPEC, which complain of high production by Saudi Arabia?

A. Yes. As we have always said, Saudi Arabia's production will never drop to a degree considered justified, except through a unified price.

Q. The question then arises, which occurs first, the unification of price or the volume of output?

A. As I said, the limitation of output is absolutely not necessary. Therefore, it's not important which comes first but what is actually needed. It is the unification of price which is most needed.

Q. Countries like Ecuador and Algeria expect their oil reserves to deplete within this decade, compelling them to adopt harder stances on the question of prices. Do you think this will impede an agreement on a unified price throughout the present decade?

A. In fact, there are some more states, besides Ecuador and Algeria, which are facing a depletion in their oil reserves and whose interests are different from the interests of Saudi Arabia. We have, therefore, reached a point on which we cannot show courtesy to anyone. The responsibility of Saudi Arabian government toward its people and the coming generations call upon us to act in the light of our own interests.

Q. In the context of Saudi Arabia 's surplus which is invested in Western banks, do you believe it is worthwhile investing all of it in money markets, or should a portion of it be invested in order markets?

A. My purely personal opinion is that it is necessary to enter into markets other than the money markets, in what is known as equity capital, to make purchases in companies — mainly those that are active in the field of technology or energy.

But this is my personal view. The official view must be taken from Sheikh Muhammad Aba Al Khail, the minister of finance and national economy.

Q. What is the position of OPEC 's proposal on leaving the dollar as a basis for pricing and adopting the basket of curren - cies, which OPEC had applied up to 1974?

A. This proposal emerges and is given currency whenever the price of the dollar goes down on exchange markets. Now that the dollar rate is well known, no one in OPEC speaks about it, because the OPEC countries have been able to raise their actual revenue to more than 15 to 25 per cent from what they used to get for a mere rise in the rate of dollar in proportion to other currencies.

Q. When do you expect final approval for the establishment of a national Oil Company, to replace Aramco?

A. As is known of this country, matters are being processed in a studied and quiet manner. Gradually, Aramco's executive elements are being made up of Saudi Arabians, and the Kingdom itself dominates Aramco's decisions and policies. I hope that before long, we shall see our national company becoming the real economic power of the country, managing and administering the affairs of this organization in distinct manner.

Q. That means you are waiting to pre - pare capable national cadres during this period to run the company?

A. This what is being done exactly.

Q. According to reports, Saudi Arabia intends to construct another east-west pipeline, following the success of the first one (Petroline) which was recently commissioned.

A. There is no intention or thinking on the matter. It is always possible to increase Petroline's capacity.

Q. But the capacity of the present line is limited to 1.85 million barrels. In case you don't intend another pipeline, do you not believe there is need for it?

A. As a matter of fact, the strategic need is there, but the economic aspect is not very pressing.

Q. Is it true that Saudi Arabia has agreed to allow Iraq to transport its oil across Saudi Arabia to a specific port on the Red Sea coast?

A. Iraq has disclosed this, and Saudi Arabia has no objection in responding to Iraq's request.

Q. How shall Iraq be treated in this case? Will it be dealt with on the basis of rent, and who will build the port?

A. The details have not been discussed yet.

Q. According to some reports, some oil fields in the Kingdom have begun to suffer from depletion because of the present high production. Is this true?

A. This is not true. Our oil fields can produce more than what they are producing at present if we so wish. The Kingdom's reserves are also very big and could be enough for our generations in the next century.

Q. For how long the reserves will last?

A. It depends on the average output. It will be necessary for Saudi Arabia to maintain oil reserves to meet its need, at least for the whole of the next century.

Q. When do you expect the oil committee of the Gulf Cooperation Council to meet?

A. We hope it will be soon, as the need is pressing.

Q. Do you expect it to be committed to a unified pricing strategy?

A. The Gulf states must have a unified strategy in all economic fields, the most important of which is oil.

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'MASSIVE RESPONSE' TO MILITARY RECALL REPORTED

BK080551 Kabul NEW TIMES in English 20 Sep 81 p 2

[Article by Ghaus Amer: "Need for Military Recall"]

[Text] The latest decision so wisely taken by the DRA Council of Ministers on the partial military recall has evoked an undoubtedly massive response.

At this critical juncture of our resistance to world-devouring U.S. imperialism and its lackeys, our neighbours are slow in responding to the peace overtures advanced by our humanitarian and popular leadership.

The imperialist leaders, and their allies continue relentless efforts to prevent a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. They want to keep alive a diplomatic, economic, military psychological warfare against the government and the people of Afghanistan. They take the side of the counter-revolution and invent subterfuges in a bid to stall a settlement for peace.

This dictates the need for well-equipped and powerful armed forces, capable of dealing with any contingency in case the offensive is escalated against our revolution.

On the very evening when the peace proposals were announced, the peace-loving people of our country were jubilant. The people and government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, upholding their revolutionary cause, fully realise the need to settling disputes through political and peaceful means.

Our gratitude goes to all our friends in the world who have hailed our peaceful gestures and have expressed their support for our sober stand at this juncture, though we were being slandered in the most cynical way by the henchmen and hirelings of imperialism and hegemonism.

It is quite true that the freedom-loving Afghan people will never let themselves be overwhelmed by the threats of the enemies and intimidated by bullying. The Afghan history bears witness to the fact of Afghan patriotism and bravery in times of crisis. Nothing is more precious to the Afghans than their freedom, independence and peace. This is our flesh and blood and can never be bargained at any time with any party.

U.S. Talk

Today it is common knowledge that the policy of the Soviet Union calls for open espousal of the national liberation movements in many parts of the world in support of national independence, peace, disarmament, detente and relaxation of international tension. The nature of the Western monopolies led by the U.S. is different.

They are always seeking to increase tension, colonization and exploitation of oppressed peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

They are solely concerned with ensuring their own interests. And they talk of an alleged Soviet interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs.

In connection with this concoction, the U.S. media have also been conducting a venomous propaganda campaign against the new, evolutionary phase of the SAWR revolution and screams that danger is hanging, like the sword of Damocles, over the heads of Asians, while it is the U.S. penetration and military escalation in the region that has become a source of threat to the region.

The attitude adopted by the Pentagon is virtually designed to subvert and thwart the latest peace proposals advanced by the DRA in order to achieve political settlement of the situation created around Afghanistan and normalise relations with neighbours. The U.S. administration is trying to ascribe to Soviet Union and Afghanistan the actions committed by itself and its allies.

Production and deployment of neutron bombs is but a single example of the U.S. activities and initiatives. In the face of such bellicose measures adopted by the Reagan administration, all progressive nations of the world, which have chosen a new way of life and are embarking on the construction of a new society, must strengthen their defensive forces.

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KABUL 'NEW TIMES' EDITORIAL ON MILITARY RECALL

BK080519 Kabul NEW TIMES in English 19 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Defending DRA Without Disrupting National Life"]

[Text] In deciding on partial recall of the former soldiers, the DRA Government has not been oblivious of its responsibility for smooth social and economic activities in the country or of the human problems involved.

To ensure the continuation of normal life in the country in the first place, teachers, lecturers and university and school students, as well as those who have completed the crash military course and are now holding key jobs within the government organisations, were exempted from the recall. Similarly, in order not to disrupt the socio-economic life, the drivers of the government-run and private transport belonging to the unions practically engaged in handling the government transport, the material amenities of the people and the passengers between the provinces and the city, are not called for military service on the basis of the decision of the Council of Ministers.

It was also announced the other day that, in accordance with articles 53 and 54 of the military draft law, those who are the sole bread-winners for their incapable parents, who cannot sustain themselves financially, are to be exempted from the military service for one year, which is extendable.

Others who come under the exempted categories are those who have a child, or a brother or sister incapable of working and unable to support themselves and has no other bread-winner other than the one to be recalled.

Those who cannot enter military service on health grounds will also benefit from the same privilege, provided they can present a verified and legal medical certificate. If there are two or three brothers in one family, one of the brothers will not be called for military service at the choice of their parents, who are unable to support themselves.

The decision of the government to strengthen the armed forces, is too, aimed at the welfare of the people and blossoming of the country and further ensuring of security and peace for our toiling people. The resolution of Sunbula 8 of the Council of Ministers is certainly fully compatible with the interests of the workers, peasants and other toiling people of Afghanistan, and it is a guarantee of the freedom, territorial integrity and independence of Afghanistan.

The glorious SAWR revolution, under the PDPA, was carried out as a result of persistent and untiring efforts of the oppressed people of Afghanistan and the victorious uprising of the armed forces. The revolution brought impressive achievements for the people of Afghanistan. As all the happiness enjoyed by toiling people of Afghanistan is the outcome of this historic revolution, especially its new phase, the majority of masses support it as a guarantor of the socio-economic development of the country.

Our noble compatriots have always stood by the armed and security forces in defending the country's territorial integrity and the revolution and are carrying on the all-sided struggle against the counter-revolutionary elements, the sold-out lackeys of imperialism.

The mounting and massive response to the partial recall is the manifestation of the ardent will and desire of our toiling people to defend the gains of the revolution and ensure a happy and prosperous future. As reported, every day large number of our youth are showing up in the enlisting centres, chanting slogans and demonstrating their willingness to serve in the army.

Those youth who are joining the army, under the partial recall, are provided unprecedented privileges, leaving no room for undue worries.

The patriotic urge shown by our youth to defend their homeland and the gains of the revolution makes it certain that it will not be long before the country is freed from the menace of counter-revolutionaries, and advance toward a bright future, which is the objective of the popular revolution.

The landslide response to partial recall is a proof of our people's iron will to consolidate the gains of the revolution.

CSO: 4600/29

BBC'S 'PROPAGANDA WAR' ON COUNTRY SCORED

BK080558 Kabul NEW TIMES in English 23 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial: "The Propaganda War on Afghanistan"]

[Text] Experience has proved that the gigantic imperialist propaganda machinery has always spread false and baseless canards about countries where its vested interests are endangered and whose people are striving to build a new life, free from exploitation. The revolution in Afghanistan and the fundamental and positive changes taking place in the interest of our people and homeland as well as peace in the region and in the world, too, have provoked a campaign of lies by the Western mass media.

From the very first moment when our people, under the leadership of PDPA, became the masters of their own destiny, ousting the tyrants, lackeys and servants of imperialism and reaction so that the toiling masses in this country may progress towards material and moral prosperity, after ages of hardship and misery, the imperialist circles who saw their interests endangered in this region not only began hatching conspiracies against the popular revolution in this country but also launched a virulent propaganda offensive against the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan.

They spread brazen lies about the revolution, but none of these fabrications helped to cover up their base and ominous designs. Their false propaganda has only helped to expose them. Now, the people not only of Afghanistan, but of the entire region recognise these media in their true colours--as instruments of international monopolists.

The BBC, the mouthpiece of British imperialism, has now once again exposed its true nature as a rumour-mongering apparatus of the West and a sentinel of the imperialists interests.

In its last Sunday's [20 Sep] programme, the BBC "reported" that the Soviet Embassy in Kabul was subjected to a rocket attack. It even claimed that the building of the embassy's trade representative was destroyed in the raid. Afghan counter-revolutionary elements in New Delhi were mentioned as a "source" of these reports.

The BBC authorities, who have burnt their fingers all too often, should know better by now than to rely on these "sources."

The BBC claims to have been broadcasting "independent" views and opinions, yet all its broadcasts are stained with hostility, mischief, provocation and slander against the independent countries of the world, who are striving to build a new life.

The hostile and antagonistic nature of the BBC broadcasting, the mouthpiece of the "free world," is well known to our people as well as the world at large. In the past the falsifications and fabrications of this propaganda machinery of imperialism had been instantly refuted by facts themselves and the BBC has made a laughing-stock of itself time and again.

The BBC's war on Afghanistan is of a piece with its tireless crusade against all nations and peoples, who earn its displeasure by opting for true independence and assert the anti-imperialist imperative of the struggle for peace and progress.

The Soviet Embassy in Kabul was not, of course, subjected to any attack. The BBC's dis-information campaign is nothing but a manifestation of the anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet hostility, long adopted by imperialist radios and mass media.

The message broadcast by the BBC is loud and clear for the people: imperialist propaganda against the truth of the revolution is ferocious, but futile.

CSO: 4600/29

BRITISH DOCTOR CITED ON REBELS' WILL TO FIGHT

BK080901 Hong Kong AFP in English 0840 GMT 8 Oct 81

[Article by Alain Faudeux]

[Text] Islamabad, 8 Oct (AFP)--A British woman doctor, who has just returned from working among the rebels in central Afghanistan, said here today that their will to resist was unbreakable, despite certain differences between rival groups.

Dr Jeanne Frossard of Guernsey helped open a clinic of "medecins sans frontieres" (doctors without frontiers) at Jaghari in Ghazni Province where she worked for 3 months.

The clinic treated 800 patients daily.

"The confidence of the Afghans in themselves is astonishing and, despite their differences, their morale is so high that they give the impression that they could only be beaten by nuclear bombs," she said.

But she added that at one time tension between various rebel groups was so fierce that she feared civil war would break out.

"I have seen members of the two main groups of Hazaras rebels--the Ittehadia and the more powerful Ali Beheshti group--exchange looks of absolute hatred and the only bullet wounds we treated were not inflicted in fighting at the front."

But she said that rebels, despite their differences, united in face of the enemy and fought together.

Dr Frossard said that the Soviets, after trying to seize Jaghari 10 months ago, had given up the attempt. Wrecked tanks still lay near the central bazaar after fighting during which there were heavy civilian casualties, according to local sources.

She said that as there were no local medical centres, sick people had to go to Kabul for treatment.

But she believed there was a shortage of doctors in the Afghan capital because "certain prescriptions that I saw could not have been drawn up by qualified physicians, but must have been written by medical students."

Dr Frossard worked with a French doctor and said that they had problems getting accustomed to local conditions. Often they had to chase goats out of their clinic.

On one occasion two armed rebels wanted to throw them out because France had given asylum to ousted Iranian President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr.

She was shocked at the condition of women, which was "much worse than I imagined."

"A girl is purchased for 40,000 Afghanis (800 dollars) by a man she has never seen in her life. She will generally have 10 children, but fewer than half will survive to adulthood. She will remain cloistered in her village for her whole life."

CSO: 4600/29

ECONOMIC ENTERPRISES ACTIVATED FOR PUBLIC BENEFIT

Cement Plants

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] "The Ghori Cement Febctory is running at maximum production capacity, turning out 400 tons of cement a day. More than 2,000 bags of cement is supplied to Kabul daily, fully meeting the city's requirements for this very essential construction material", Mohammad Ishaq Kawa, president of the planning department of the Ministry of Mines and Industries, told a reporter of the Kabul New Times recently.

The Ghori factory has opened six sales outlets in Kabul through which cement is distributed to people. The distribution is well arranged and programmed and those who are in need of cement can obtain their requirements without any difficulties, he said. He hoped that, until the severely cold winter season begins when demand for cement is far greater for construction purposes, people will be able to get their required amount of cement without any worry caused by shortage.

Of late, some useful and positive changes have been introduced in the system and the procedure of distribution of cement, reducing to a great extent the undue difficulties and administration bottlenecks. Under the new system and procedure, an end has been put to the black-marketing of cement. The distribution to individual and constructions firms are strictly controlled through the factory's management and each individual can obtain between 30 to 50 per cent of their requirements, said Kawa.

Unlike earlier when cement was being distributed through the liaison section of the factory, it is now distributed thorugh the heavy industries department of the Ministry of Mines and Industries, thus preventing mis-management and meddling of middlemen in the sale of cement which used to result in black marketing.

FIRST COME

Now that the distribution of cement is regularised, the liaison section of the factory has again been assigned to control and supervise its supply. The applications for supply of cement is received directly by the lialson section and cement is supplied to the applicants according to the first-come-first-served basis. The applicants deposit the price of the required cement to the bank and receive the cement on the presentation of bank receipt, from the nearest sales outlet, Kawa said.

Presently, there are six sales outlets in Kabul located in Barikot, Mirwais Maidan, Khairkhana, Qalai Fatullah Khan, Wazir Akbar Khan Mena and Sayyed Noor Mohammad Shah Mena, through which daily, more than 2,000 bags of cement is supplied to the Kabul market. Cement is brought to the factory's sale outlets according to the daily need and is distributed under the supervision of an authorised committee appointed by the Ministry of Mines and Industries.

The output of cement during the first quarter of the current year was estimated at 24.4 thousand tons, however, due unforeseenable technical defaults in the production line, the factory produced 20.28 thousand tons during the same period. All of this amount was distributed through the

sales outlets and to Government organisations, said Kawa.

The number of individuals who are demanding cement daily reaches between 250 to 300 and that of official organisations to an estimated number of ten. The actual daily requirements for Kabul is 300 bags of cement but some 2,000 to 3,000 bags are distributed daily in Kabul. According to plan some 95,000 tons of cement will be produced at the Ghori Cement Factory by the end of the Afghan year 1360.

Efforts are also being made to revitalise the Jabulseraj Cement Plant so that along with the Ghori factory it can further meet the needs of the people.

In view of the growing need for cement in the country, the Government plans to build a new cement factory with a production capacity of 1,400 tons daily, Kawa said. The new factory will be sited next to the Ghori Cement Factory. The technical and economic feasibility study is under progress for the new plant. The construction and montage of another cement factory in Herat with a production capacity of 700 tons daily is in full progress.

With the completion of the new plants and reactivation of the Jabul-Seraj cement factory (which is now inactive due to power shortage) the output of cement will increase and will meet the needs of the nation satisfactorily, Kawa added.

Housing Project

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] Upon completion in 1362 of the first stage of the Shahrara Housing project, 256 apartment houses will become ready for distribution to house 1,800 people .

The Kabul Municipality, in pursuance of the progressive policy of the party and the popular Government, as an organisation in the service of people and in accordance with the developmental plans of the Government, has been making efforts to fulfil its obligatios especially in construction of urban projects and residential quarters, thus contributing towards reconstruction of the Kabul city .The municipality has geared its efforts, as far as its physical and technical means permit it, to development of the city.

In addition to distribution of plots for houses, on an unprecedented scale, as well as other useful and constructive steps taken ,the municipality for the first time undertook a gigantic housing project in Shahrara. The project, to cost Afs 2,100,-000,000 and to be financed from the Government budget, is one of those envisaged in the 25-year master plan for Kabul

Work on the project began recently following completion of the blueprint and designs by the architects and engineers of the project-making section of the municipality.

Stating this in an interview with the Kabul New Times, Eng Adena Sangeen, Kabul Mayor, added: "In order to join other Government organisations in rendering required services for the residents of Kabul and to take part in developmental plans of the city. and meeting the people's housing needs, and finally in order to prevent an unplanned growth of the city, the municipality decided to undertake a low-cost housing project in which all amenities required by modern and decent houses are taken into consideration".

"The first such project", he said, "called Zeyarstonky Mena has already been completed and put on use. This is the second similar project, on a much larger scale and of a larger dimension".

He added: "The project consists of four-storey building apartment houses and, on the main road, the construction of five to nine-storey buildings is planned".

"The project has a superb location and, when completed, a number of homeless families will become owners of their houses and the housing shortage will be removed in Kabul to some extent. Demarcation, macadamezation and leveling of a part of the main road has been completed and work has begun on actual construction", Eng Sangeen said.

"The total cost of the construction of the project, including interior engineering, wiring, central heating and sewage is estimated at Afs. 1350 million, other amenities including purchase of lands and external engineering networks at some 800 million, and the total cost of the project at Afs. 2100 million", he noted.

"The work on the first stage of the project will take two years, at the end of which, until 1362, some 256 apartment houses, ranging from two to four rooms, will have been built covering an area of 22,000 square metres, housing more than 1800 people", he pointed out.

"Being the biggest residential project undertaken by the municipality, the project will cover 38.5 hectares of land upon completion of which some 16,000 people will become owners of decent living quarters", he said.

"The modern apartment houses will be distributed to the deserving persons on favourable conditions. The project will consist of kindergartens, a market, sport grounds, recreation centres, garages and a mosque. The project will be completed in 10 years on five stages under the supervision of local and foreign engineers of the municipality", he added:

"Other concenred organisations such as the Public Works Ministry are helping the municipality in extension of power lines, water supply and sewage and the number of workers on the project will vary from time to time, depending on the amount and volume of works", he said.

CSO: 4600/36

COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL BANKS DECLARE GAINS

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR in Dari 22 Sep 81 p 4

[Text] Following the meeting of the Board of Directors of the Pashtun Commercial Bank, it was announced:

The total assets of the bank increased in 1980, compared to the previous year, from 5,682,000,000 million to 6,997,000,000 afghanis. Afghani loans and foreign exchange loans increased from 5,759,000,000 to 6,148,000,000 afghanis; and the money in circulation increased from 6,178,000,000 to 10,154,000,000 afghanis. Also, the holdings in current accounts and securities increased 44 percent; the volume of letters of credit increased 18 percent; revenues from commission increased 66 percent, and assets in foreign banks increased 2 percent.

Fortunately, the gross profit of the bank in 1980 amounted to 551 million afghanis, and its net profits amounted to more than 359 million afghanis which was 150 percent more than for 1979, and these figures are unprecedented in the bank's activities.

This striking progress of the Pashtun Commercial Bank is due to the valuable and prudent policies and statements of the DRA government--especially in its evolutionary stage regarding the immunity, privacy and protection of secrecy in transactions and assets of accounts of the honorable people, national businessmen and organizations in the banks.

Likewise, the net profits of the Industrial Bank of Aghanistan during the last year amounted to more than 38,815,000 afghanis which in comparison with 1979, it shows an increase of 60 percent. The following matter was also announced at the end of the annual meeting of the Board of Directors of the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan: The volume of bank loans during 1980 amounted to more than 639,000,000 afghanis.

CSO: 4665/3

SIDELIGHTS OF WAR ELUCIDATED

Confession of Terrorist

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 17 Sep 81 p 3

[Text]

The security authorities of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan recently made known to the public through mass media, misdeeds of one ringleader of the notorious Gulbuddin's terrorist band, who was killed during an encounter with security patrols while fleeing after an abortive attempt on the life of a 'soldier of revolution' in Kabul.

Investigation were carried out on the basis of clues and documents discovered from the dead terrorist. Following persistent and untiring efforts by the security forces, the brother of the dead man, identified as Najibullah, son of Nehmatullah, was arrested. In an interview with the Afghan television, Najibullah confessed to some of his crimes and spoke of his links with foreign-based imperialist networks and his counter-revolutionary acts against the people of this country. Following is the text of the interview with Najibullah:

Question: Will you introduce yourself?

Answer: My name is Najibullah Alekozai, son of Nematullah Alekozai. I am a graduate of Habibia highschool. I am now a student of the Roshan Teachers' College in Kabul, and a resident of Bibi Mehro.

Q: When and which counter-revolutionary group did you join?

A. Two years ago, i.e. in 1358 I was drawn to the Islamic Party.

Q: What was the motivation and reason for you to join this counter-revolutionary group?

A: The anti-Government propaganda of the party led me to join it. Of course they misused my clean Islamic sentiments, too, in inciting me to this action and drawing me to this path.

Q: Did you enter their military training camps for training in carrying out your activities?

A: Yes, Sometime ago I spent a while taking a special course in Pakistan.

Q: When and how did you go to Pakistan?

A: In the beginning of 1359, when the underground cell of the Islamic Party in Kabul was uncovered and its members were arrested. There was a danger that I and a number of other members of the party would also be arrested. Therefore, I fled first to the northern province where I joined other members of the group who had gathered there one by one. They included Farid, Tamim, Nasir, Karim, Mehrajuddin, Habib, Salem, Naseem and others. After forming our 20-member group there, led by a guide, we went to Moshwani, next to Zema, and from there to Bandikhana. From there we went to Khoi Safi, from Kohi Safi to Tezan, then, to Mangal, Rakhel, and finally we entered Pakistani territory from the Speen Ghar pass and Jaji.

Q: On your immediate arrival in Pakistan, how did you establish close contact with your allies. Will you please provide some detailed information on this?

A: Well, when we entered Pakistan territory, the first place where we stopped was Para Chinar. There is an office of the so-called Islamic Party there. We approached them and handed over to them the letter we had brought with us from the leader of our group in Shamali (northern province). After being acquainted with them, we were sent by a car to Peshawar city. There we settled in a house called Kabul House. The in-charge of this house was a man named Rhamanyar. After one and a half week, I was told to be prepared to receive military training. After a few days, they gave us 50 Pakistani rupees, military uniforms and other essentials and we were taken by car to a special place which was a military camp.

Q: How long did you undergo military training?

A: The military training lasted for four months.

Q: What did you learn in four months?

A: The military training, conducted by American, Chinese and Pakistani instructors was in two phases. The first was training for the front. We learnt the use of heavy weapons such as artillery, howitzers, field guns, rocket launchers etc. The second phase was meant for guerrilla warfare. This is training to use various types of machine guns, bombs, pistols, and other gadgets used for political assassinations and terrorism, The training was imparted by the American and Chinese instructors and their instructions were being translated by Pakistani instructors. We also received training by Ostad Sadiq, Ustad Sarwar and Jamaluddin, all Pakistani instructors, during this course. One day some Americans and Pakistanis came and selected from amongst us a number of the more competent students and sent them to some other place. These centres, where training is given are all based in Pakistan, close to the borders, at places like Parachinar, Meeramshah, Zakel and Jangal Khel. In addition to these centres, there were other training camps located elsewhere.

Q: What did you do and where did you go after finishing your military training?

A: After finishing the military course I was sent back to Peshawar. There I met Islamuddin whom I had seen during my training and who had been chosen by the American and Pakistani instructors. I asked him whether he had gone back to Afghanistan. He replied in the negative. He added that his select group had received special training from American and Pakistani instructors. This training, he said, consisted of the theory and practice of terrorising people and he also told me that he was specially trained for hijacking planes." I was personally trained in hijacking of the Aeroflot model planes", Islamuddin told me. When I asked him who were the other members with him he said they were namely Habib Saleh, Nasim Darvesh, Mohammad Ali Pawer, Mohammad Salem Kohestani and Mohammad Bashir Kabir, whose passports may be under preparation somewhere in one of the Arab countries. In addition to Pakistani passports, we were given a few hundred dollars also. It is possible that soon we may visit one of the Arabic countries.

Q: Some of you wanted to travel to one of the Arab countries, and dollars were also given to you. Will you tell us how you returned to Afghanistan?

A: When we wanted to reenter Afghanistan, we were given some arms to be brought to Afghanistan. The arms were being transported, of course, by a car from Peshawar to Mangal. The arms-loaded vehicle was stopped somewhere on the way by the Pakistani authorities. When it was made known to them that the consignment belonged to Hazbi Islami it was released and we came to Tera Mangal. After distributing these arms, which included the Kalashinkovs made in China, American rocket launchers, Egyptian pistols and diverse American, Chinese and Pakistani bombs, we brought additional ammunitions loaded on camels to Musai Logar. But there confrontation with the Afghan security forces took place and all the weapons vanished.

Q: Will you please tell us an eye-witness account of how people who have fled Afghanistan live in Pakistan?

A: Beside military aid, America, China, Pakistan, Egypt and others are giving money to the Pakistani Government to help the Afghan refugees. Of course a

big part of that money is going to the Government of Pakistan and a small portion is being given to the refugees. This small dole cannot meet their needs and they are short of food, clothes etc. They are living a hard and miserable life. In the summer they live in the burning deserts under the old tents and in the winter on moist lands. Medicine and doctors are not available and thousands of children are dying of starvation and diseases, and hundreds of others are deprived of basic education. A number of families who have realised the situation, wanted to return to their homeland but they are being prevented from returning near the borders of Pakistan.

Q: Tell us what criminal activities you participated in before going to Pakistan and why were you arrested.?

A: Before going to Pakistan I was an active member of the cultural committee of the Hazbi Islami. My duty was to secure links between our party members, paying the membership fees, distributing propaganda sheets and night letters of the party. When I returned from Pakistan to Afghanistan, as I was trained for military as well as terrorist activity I intended to get some practice. First I wanted to set on fire Bibi Mehru school, but we failed. We wanted to make another attempt at terrorism and subversion. Thus, according to earlier instructions of the head of our group, we gathered in the house of Ahzam Mohammad in Qalai Wazir Abad. After distributing arms, at 10 p.m. we left this house for carrying out a subversive operation. Since I was unaware of the plan of action and only the ringleader knew it, we met a patrol car on the way and we had a clash with them. Then we escaped and hid in a house. By that time the whole area was encircled by the security forces. Following a house to house search, we were arrested the next evening by the security forces.

Q: You said you wanted to set on fire the Bibi Mehru school. How would you describe such an action?

A: It is an inhumane and anti-Islamic action. We had not realised the reality then and we wanted to resort to such action.

Q: Are you repentent of your past deeds and do you regret the activities of your band and the so-called party of yours?

A: Yes. It is obvious that each Afghan youth harbours clean, patriotic sentiments and worship God. Our sentiments were misused. Of course any youth can commit such an error and I am personally very remorseful of my action. I wish our noble people and especially the youth, who are the builders of the future of this country, will not be deceived by the enemies.

(Bakhtar)

CSO: 4600/24-E

'BBC' Story Refuted

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, September 22 (Bakhtar).— The falsifications and baseless propaganda ruses of the BBC, the rumour-mongering apparatus of the West and a sentinel of the imperialist interests, have often been exposed and this so-called mouthpiece of the 'free world' has proved to be nothing more than a disseminator of lies, writes the Bakhtar political observer.

Such hostile and mischievious fabrications had been instantly refuted in the past by facts themselves. There is no need to cite instances, which the whole world already knows of.

Yet this mouthpiece of Britain, the known enemy of the people of Afghanistan, claims that it broadcasts "independent" views and opinions, although all of its broadcasts are tinged with hostility, mischief, provocation and slander against the independent countries of the world.

For instance, the BBC in its news broadcasts on Sunday again resorted to fabrication and spread the false and baseless rumour that the embassy of the Soviet Union in Kabul had been fired upon by rockets.

The BBC went ever further to claim that the commercial section of the embassy has been "completely demolished".

The British radio has quoted as the source of this news the Afghan counter-revolutionary elements in New Delhi.

The BBC bosses may be asked whether the utter unreliability of information from these sources on Afghanistan has not been proved many times in the past.

No attack has, of course, taken place on that embassy. Such fabrications and spreading of dis-information is nothing but a manifestation of the hostile anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet propagandist atttude long ago adopted by imperialist radios and mass media.

Ceteka adds: Inhabitants of Kabul can see for themselves that the commercial department of the Soviet Embassy is intact, although it should be in ruins after a bandit attack according to Western news agencies.

Journalists have no easier task than to see the truth on the spot.

The Soviet embassy is on the Dar-ul-Aman avenue, one of the busiest streets in the Afghan capital. It is the site of a number of ministries and other important institutions.

Life is as busy as ever there today. The embassy, taken by most Kabul residents as a symbol of friendship and Soviet aid to Afghanistan, stands unharmed.

Aid to Panjshir People

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Sep 81 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, September 22 (Bakhtar).—The Armed Forces have recently carried out a successful operation in Panjsher valley.

Reports from the valley say that the soldiers and officers crushed all foreign hirelings and bandits and have captured alive a great number of them.

Similarly, their ammunition depots, given to them by their imperialist masters for killing innocent people and for plundering their properties, were completely destroyed.

These arsenals, contained assorted lethal weapons such as rockets, anti-tank mines, anti-human mines, artilleries, and explosive materials.

In addition, depots of other materials belonging to the counter-revolutionaries were discovered by the Armed Forces.

The people of the valley warmly welcomed the heroic Armed Forces and poured out complaints about the inhuman crimes of the murderers.

ATROCITIES

These criminals, contrary to the Islamic code, looted the people's foodstuffs, cash and clothings, destroyed and burnt houses, schools, mosques, Government structures, bridges, roads and gardens.

They prevented people from going to other parts of the country and kept them in captivity. The local people, unable to get primary necessities were facing a serious famine.

The bandits ruthlessly and forcefully took men, women, children and the old people to the mountains with them, in order to use them against the Armed Forces as a buffer.

Since the people of Panjsher were quite aware of the humane and friendly attitude of the Armed Forces, they dissociated themselves from the bandits soon after the arrival of the forces and returned to their homes.

The Panjsher operation was supported by the people of Panjsher. While resuming their normal life, they have expressed their solidarity with the PDPA and the revolutionary state and pledged to take part particularly in the construction of the Panjsher Road.

CSO: 4600/24

BRIEFS

EX-KING ISSUES STATEMENT--Rome, 5 Oct (AFP)--Ex-king of Afghanistan Zaher Shah, in a statement sent to the AFP bureau in Rome, reaffirmed his "solidarity with the Afghan people in their national and religious struggle." The former ruler, who has been living in Rome since his exile from Afghanistan in 1973, also expressed support for the Loya Jirgah (Grand Assembly) meeting of resistance fighters currently being held at Pishin, Pakistan, near the Afghan border. [Text] [BK050800 Hong Kong AFP in English 0209 GMT 5 Oct 81]

TRANSPORT COMPLEX--Kabul, 4 Oct (Bakhtar)--The foundation stone of a big state-owned overland freight transport complex was laid by Sher Jan Mazduryar, minister of transport and tourism of the DRA, here today. The large-scale state-financed project intended to accommodate three transport organisations each having a fleet of 300 Kamaz transport vehicles will be built in two stages in an area of over 200 thousand square metres. The first stage to be completed in one year at a cost of 22 million Afghanis will be funded by the DRA Government. The second stage consisting of installation works, the building of metallic hangars and other will be financed from the credit extended by the Soviet Union to the DRA. The buildings are equipped with workshops, warehouses, administrative buildings, parking facilities and other needed structures. The servicing and repairing works of the cargo fleet will be done by these organisations themselves. [Text] [Kabul Bakhtar in English 0420 GMT 5 Oct 81]

CSO: 4600/29

INDICTMENT AGAINST MEMBERS OF STUDENT GROUP IN PARIS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 13 Aug 81 p 10

[Article by Mustafa al-Tarabishi: "Text of Indictment in Case against Organization of Egyptian Students in Paris; Syrian Intelligence Recruiting Its Members and Training Them for Sabotage Activities; 40,000 Dollars Earmarked for Organization To Overthrow the Regime in Egypt"]

[Text] Counselor Raja' al-'Arabi, public attorney for the Supreme State Security Prosecution announced yesterday the indictment in the case against the organization of Egyptian Students in Paris. The indictment includes three defendants, and the prosecutor asked that they be turned over to the State Security Court and that they be sentenced to hard labor.

The indictment was announced after the papers of the case were reviewed by public prosecutor, Counselor Salah al-Rashidi.

The defendants are Kamal Fawzi Hanin (35 years, an imprisoned translator); Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hadi Hasanayn (29 years, an imprisoned student); and Hasan al-Banna Muhammad Hindi (27 years, chauffeur).

The indictment prepared by Chief Prosecutor 'Asim 'Abd-al-Hamid accused the defendants of creating, organizing and managing an organization whose purpose was to advocate opposition to the principles of the state. The indictment accused them of taking part outside the country in establishing and managing an organization called the League of Egyptian Students in Paris. The objective of that group, [the indictment charged], was to oppose the principles and the foundations upon which the regime of the socialist government in the state is built by encouraging hatred and contempt for it; to advocate resisting the authorities by establishing alliances between similar organizations to oppose the existing regime in the country; to turn the masses against the regime; and to carry out sabotage activities inside the country for the purpose of overthrowing the regime.

[The indictment accused them of] communicating with intelligence employees of the Syrian Arab Republic with whom they agreed to carry out sabotage activities inside the country to create disturbances for the purpose of trying to overthrow the existing regime in the country.

[The indictment accused them of] receiving from the intelligence of the Syrian Arab Republic 2,000 Syrian pounds; 1,000 U.S. dollars; 15,000 French francs; 600 Iraqi dinars and other material objects indicated in the investigation to carry out the objectives of the organization they established and to oppose the existing regime in the country in an effort to overthrow it. [The indictment accused them of] promoting among themselves and in public opposition to the basic principles upon which the regime of the socialist government in the state is based and of inciting hatred and contempt for the regime by lecturing in public debates and publishing leaflets that promote and encourage principles and foundations that counter those upon which the existing regime in Egypt is based. [The indictment accused them of] calling for the overthrow of the regime and broadcasting provocative propaganda to disturb public peace and damage public interest. Some of these leaflets were seized in the possession of the first defendant. They had been prepared to be shown to others.

The list of witnesses included two, one of whom was a physician, Dr Yusri al-Badawi Yusuf who stated that while he was in the city of Nice in the south of France, he got to know the first defendant who invited him to visit him at the house where he was living with an American woman called Carolyn. When he visited the defendant on 8/9/1979 [8 August 1979] in Paris, the defendant informed him that the defendants had established an organization called the League of Egyptian Students and that they held their organizational meetings at one of the coffee shops. The first defendant also informed him that the organization's activities were financed by monthly subscriptions paid by the members. In a meeting between Dr Yusri and the first defendant the latter met with another person who was introduced to Dr Yusri as Mustafa, a man employed as cultural attache at the Syrian Embassy in Paris. The two spoke privately, making sure they were not overheard by Dr Yusri.

Dr Yusri added that the first defendant spoke with him about his opposition to the policy of the existing regime in the country. He also said that he saw the defendants preparing about 3,000 copies of leaflets with printed statements describing the president and the ruling regime as traitors against the Arab nation for signing the peace treaty.

The second witness, who is Engineer Shafi'i 'Ali Mahmud Shafi'i stated that when he was in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, he met the first defendant on 5/12/1980 [5 December 1980] in the al-Salam Hotel in Amman. The first defendant claimed that he was a professor of economics at the Sorbonne University in France and that he had come to Jordan to study the economy of the Arab homeland. [The defendant] spoke with him about the collapse of the Egyptian economy because of the principles and the policy that are being pursued by the ruling regime. He also informed him that he belonged to an organization that was receiving assistance and financial support from foreign agencies, among which was Syrian intelligence, for the purpose of overthrowing and demolishing the existing regime in Egypt and abrogating the peace treaty.

The first and second defendants confessed that they established, organized

and managed an organization called the League of Egyptian Students to oppose the existing regime in Egypt and its foreign policy toward Israel; that they held conferences; that they published and distributed leaflets in public places in Paris for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the organization with material support from the president of the League of Students of the Syrian Arab Republic in Paris who is called Khalil; that they communicated with one of the men of Syrian intelligence who works at the Syrian Embassy in Paris and who is called Hasan Dawud 'Ali and who is known in the movement as Mustafa; and that they traveled to Damascus with Syrian passports delivered to them by the aforementioned Syrian intelligence officer. These passports were issued under false names so they can receive financial assistance from the Syrian agencies to achieve the objectives of the organization and also so they can receive military training in the use of various weapons and explosives for the purpose of carrying out sabotage activities inside Egypt. They added that they and the third defendant had met a few Syrian intelligence men in Damascus after the period of their military training in one of the Syrian camps had come to an end. They also received from Syrian intelligence the sum of 2,000 Syrian pounds; 1,000 U.S. dollars; 15,000 French francs; and 600 Iraqi dinars to carry out the objectives of the organization.

Information reports of the National Security Agency established that late in 1978 the defendants and others formed an organization called the League of Egyptian Students for the purpose of opposing the fundamental principles of the existing regime in Egypt and working for its overthrow by all means. The reports established that to that end they had published leaflets calling for the overthrow of the regime in Egypt, condemning the signing of the peace treaty with Israel and accusing the regime of treason and of working for colonialist forces and Zionism. They also held conferences that were sponsored and financed by a few officials of the embassies of Iraq and Syria in Paris. [The reports also established that] Syrian intelligence recruited the three defendants and issued them Syrian passports so they can use them in the actions with which they would be charged. These passports did not have their real names. [The reports established that] the three defendants traveled to Beirut on 12/5/1979 [12 May 1978] and that they traveled from Beirut to Damascus where they were received by Syrian intelligence officers and housed in the camp of 949 Battalion where they were trained in to use some weapons and to assemble and use explosive charges and hand grenades so they can carry out destructive operations in buildings and public places and assassinate the president and some public figures.

The National Security Agency provided two photo copies of two passports issued in Damascus on 25 March 1979 by the Syrian Department of Immigration and Passports of the Ministry of the Interior. A picture of the first defendant is attached to the first passport with the name Habib Muhammad Rajab, a Syrian citizen; and attached to the second is a picture of the second defendant, named Hamdi Yusuf al-Ahmad, a Syrian.

Several papers, leaflets and statements against [the regime] and published by the league have also been seized.

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HAYKAL REVIEWS ARAB SITUATION

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 28 Feb, 1, 2 Mar 81

[Interview of Egyptian Journalist Muhammad Hasanyn Haykal by Muhammad Zayn; date and place not specified]

[28 Feb 81 p 9]

[Text] When Mr Muhammad Hasanyn Haykal attributes the present instability of the Arab world to the suspension of Egypt's role in the region's affairs, no one can accuse the man whose name for the past three decades has been synonomous with progressive national thinking of speaking from a narrow, biased point of view.

A recent tour of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan—during which he met with President Saddam Husayn and King Hussayn--has convinced Mr Haykal that the region is headed into a period of danger unlike any experienced before. He believes that Egypt's withdrawal from the conflict [with Israel] has not only laid open the principal divisions that plague the region, but has suspended Egypt's dual role as mover and innovator. One consequence of Egypt's action, he believes, is the upsurge in the development of small, but legitimate defense a-liances in the extreme eastern and western parts of the Arab world.

Although Mr Haykal is not directly involved in politics now, he continues, since President Nasir's days, to be viewed as a man of great knowledge, depth and intellectual independence. On his tours and in meetings with political leaders Mr Haykal tends to maintain his independent vision. He zealously guards his objectivity while seeking information at the source.

On this occasion, Mr Haykal did not present his views in an article as usual. Instead, the man who was twice featured in the SUNDAY TIMES, and whose articles aroused the ire of certain people, chose to speak to us directly. While his views may arouse even greater displeasure, there was no deliberate or premeditated attempt to do so.

[Question] What is your view of the situation in the Arab world?

[Answer] I'll give you my general impressions. The Arab world is moving into a period of danger unlike any in the past. Here is why: every person needs a set

of concrete, material resources to sustain him. This is also true of governments. Take yourself as an example. What are the things that give you security and enable you to face the everyday challenges of life? You belong to a family or a tribe, and you know that you do. You have acquired a certain position in society through inheritance, education or some other social factor. You have acquired a certain degree of education. You know enough about the world and yourself to handle everyday affairs. You have a profession and have gained some experience in it over the years. When you write something, it is based on a reservoir of knowledge and experience; it does not spring from a vacuum. A person's mental and material security, therefore, rests on his family ties, his social connections, his tribal and national loyalties. A person's security, therefore, rests on the fact that he does not face life alone. Now take the Arab nation. It believes, or at least dreams, that it is one nation. A certain measure of inter-Arab relations contributes to this feeling. This feeling of oneness, based on geographic and historic ties, was strong in the 50's and 60's. During the past 30 years, however, inter-Arab conflicts and disputes have come to the surface. I am referring, of course, to political conflicts. Every Arab country now has two distinct policies, one based on geography, the other on politics.

Thirty or 40 years ago, the Arab nation knew where it stood relative to the rest of the world. Although faced by a set of conflicts then, the conflicts served to give the Arab nation its identity. The nation knew what it was, where it was, and what it wanted. The nation was trying to declare that it was one. Although each individual country was free to put its own interests above that of the nation, none did. We chose to emphasize our oneness as a nation despite the absence of common constitutional and other legal bounds. The feeling of unity was predominant, and it helped us to overcome our first conflict, the conflict over our identity. Each country knew that it belonged to one group, and that it stood with that group in opposition to the colonialists who were trying to dominate the region. Having resolved its identity problem, the nation thus faced its second conflict, the confrontation with the colonialists. As you know, control of this region has been contested by two superpowers, one a geographic neighbor, the other motivated by economic and strategic interests. We believe then that we could maintain the conflict between these two superpowers in balance if we could only preserve our independence.

A second factor that served to preserve our identity as a nation was our common struggle against Israel, the enemy that was planted in our midst. In brief, we knew who we were, we knew our common enemy, and we managed to maintain balance.

Although as a nation we were faced with social struggles pitting the poor against the rich, we at least faced the 50's knowing what to do. We faced the 60's with still clearer vision. Even after 1967 [reference to Arab-Israeli war], a most difficult time for the Arabs, we still knew where we stood. But look at our situation today. In Egypt we now speak of our pharaonic ancestry. Religious zealots are putting Islam above patriotism. We are beginning to lose our identity. Some say we are descendants of the Pharaos; others claim we are Assyrians. Still others maintain we are Muslims. We have begun to retreat from the choice we made at the beginning of this century.

Furthermore, where do we stand in the conflict against the colonialists? We now hear of a rapid deployment force. We hear about military training exercises by this force in Egypt. A [U.S.] naval fleet patrols in the Gulf. The Soviet Union is established in some parts of the Arab world. The conflict between the two superpowers in the region threatens to go out of control. We no longer know where we are. Some of us still speak of non-alignment, but what does non-alignment mean when some Arab countries are inclined to sign friendship treaties with the Soviet Union? We are in a real crisis.

And what about our conflict with Israel? What about our social conflict? How do you tell the progressive from the non-progressive? Before, one could refer to the populous Arab countries as the progressive ones and to the oil-rich ones as the conservative ones. The strange thing is that the populous countries are dealing in strange ways with their social problems. In short, there is confusion about our basic beliefs, about our own identity and that of the enemy.

When a nation fails to see clearly its primary problems, its secondary problems tend to come to the forefront. When a person loses hope, he loses his identity as well. The result is that this region, which once was a bastion of pan-Arabism, and in which Egypt had a paramount role, is now openly divided. Its principal divisions have been exposed. Syria, for example, is beset by a struggle between the Sunnis and the Alawites. Lebanon is contested by the Maronites, the Shiites and the Nationalists. We had a civil war in Yemen and Algeria. War nearly erupted between Jordan and Syria and between Syria and Iraq. We are plagued by tribal and sectarian internal disputes. Where will all this lead us?

The suspension of Egypt's role is now conspicuous. I am not trying to sound overly nationalistic or partisan, but Egypt makes up one-third of the Arab world. This, of course, is no accomplishment of former President Nasir, but Egypt plays a dual role in Arab affairs. It is both a mover and an innovator. When Egypt began to take on the appearance of a modern state under Muhammad 'Ali, missions were sent abroad to learn about other cultures. A veritable [intellectual] revolution followed. Most Arab intellectuals flocked to Egypt. The country's population increased. Egypt's impact through such intellectuals as al-Arabi, Mustafa Kamil and Sa'ad Zaghlul made itself felt. Then came the great poets [Ahmad] Shawqi and Hafiz to further intensify the image of Ugypt as an Arab country. The establishment of the Arab League was but a natural consequence.

When Egypt withdrew from the Arab world--for reasons which I prefer not to discuss--what happened? Egypt's role as a modernizer ceased and the country became a Westernizer. While Saudi Arabia now sends missions abroad, it, nevertheless, cannot supplant Egypt as the modernizer of the Arab world. It can at best serve as a Westernizer. The reason is that times have changed and Saudi Arabia lacks the large population to serve in that role. Modernization is more than books. Modernization needs human resources. Thus when modernization stopped and the United Arab World began to fall apart, geography became the most important consideration, just plain dumb geography. The Arabian Peninsula began to chart an independent course. We now see a new entity within the once larger Arab entity. The same trend is about to take hold in the Maghreb [the Western part of the Arab world]. While that trend, in my opinion, will develop more slowly on account of the Moroccan-Algerian

dispute, it is, nevertheless, clear that the Maghreb is moving in the same direction as the Arabian Peninsula. The trend will not spread as quickly to the Fertile Crescent either on account of the Syrian-Iraqi dispute and owing to the fact that the center of international strategy has shifted from the Mediterranean and the Gulf of Suez to the [Persian] Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Consequently, Iraq, which traditionally sought to reach the Mediterranean by way of Syria, now looks toward the Gulf nations. The result of all this is that progress and intellectual development have ceased. Economic development is not enough. Economic development must proceed with human development. In short, our situation is basically unsound.

Three weeks ago I published an article in which I maintained that the coming period will see us concentrating on the Islamic movement. The article was written in connection with the Islamic Conference. It is no surprise that the only block capable of movement now consists of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. Saudi Arabia, in my view, has always put religion before nationalism.

In my article I argued that the religious current will dominate the Arab [nationalistic] one. I stated that the Arab League is headed for a period of neglect or semi-neglect. A week later the SUNDAY TIMES sent me a telegram stating that the representative of the Arab League in London has protested what I had written in that newspaper. A copy of Mr Shazli's letter to the SUNDAY TIMES was sent to me. I made no objection to the publication of the letter. But I must tell you that the Arab League has a problem and its problem is that Mr Chedli Klibi is its secretary-General. The fact that the Arab League is headquartered in Tunis is itself an indication of a national crisis. Mr Klibi was at the Islamic Conference, so were Mr Waldheim and the Vatican representative. That, of course, is no problem, but the problem is that we refuse to face reality. When you tell the secretary-general of the Arab League that his organization faces a crisis he gets angry. But if he were to look in the mirror he would see why. Of course he is not personally responsible for the problem. On the personal level, the man is honorable, but the strength of any regional organization is reflected in the strength and characters of its members and the way they deal with one another. So when the founder of the organization [Egypt] is outside the organization, is not that an indication of a crisis? We continue to refuse to face reality, but reality will impose itself on us whether we wish it or not. I am an optimist by nature, but our situation does not call for optimism. The next few years, I believe, will be extremely difficult and the world around us is not compassionate. What we once considered as our strengths, our cards, are becoming liabilities. How long, for example, will our oil last? The strategic importance of our lands from a maritime point of view, how long will it last? What can Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states do by way of "human development" in the time left before us?

Egypt is intent on letting a historic opportunity go by. By failing to exploit it to its advantage, the opportunity is lost for the entire Arab nation as well. The tragedy is that while we continue on our escapist route, no one is doing anything to reverse our course. Everyone looks after his own interests. No one looks beyond his nose.

[Question] What do you mean by escapism?

[Answer] I mean our inability to face problems. We all agree that the Arab League is in a crisis. Although I admire the secretary-general, he must realize that he must accept constructive criticism. The crisis in the Arab League is just a sample of the mess we are in. Escapism is to feign blindness while reality looks you in the eye. How do we begin to face reality unless we are ready to make corrections?

[Question] In the 50's, President 'Abd al-Nasir had thoughts similar to those you expressed a moment ago. In those days, however, the order was the Arab sphere, the Islamic sphere, the African sphere. The order now seems to be the Gulf sphere, the Arab sphere, the Islamic sphere.

[Answer] No. There is no Gulf sphere. The Gulf sphere remains a part of the Arabic-Islamic framework. You know, sometimes we get confused about who we are. We tend to fall into useless arguments reminiscent of the riddle of the chicken and the egg. That is precisely what happened to me in my discussion with Iranian youth. I discovered that they were a bit confused in believing that there is a contradiction between one's nationality and Islam. We spent 4 hours debating this point. I told them that for 14 centuries we have been one nation, speaking the same language and subject to the same laws, and, more or less, the same government. In referring to 14 centuries, the same language and the same culture, I was, of course, emphasizing our common Islamic heritage. But Islam has two aspects: Islam the religion, and Islam the civilization. Islam, the religion, belongs to God; Islam, the civilization belongs to the nation and the state.

Now we seem to be reviving the old contradiction. The Gulf sphere is not in reality a distinct sphere. It is a part of other spheres. When [Egypt] the modernizer and mover abandoned its role, geographical considerations became important. A certain geographic mass of the Arab world suddenly discovered that its various elements have common interests. Perceiving a threat to their security, these elements naturally drew closer to each other. What it boils down to is that the withdrawal of Egypt separated the eastern and western parts of the Arab world. Egypt was the link. More precisely, Egypt's participation in the [Arab-Israeli] conflict was the actual link.

I believe--and President Nasir shared this view--that Egypt would continue to be at odds with Israel even in the absence of a Palestinian problem. Egypt traditionally had two clear strategies, one centered on maintaining the security of the Nile waters in the South, the other centered on maintaining the security of its eastern territory for a thousand historical reasons including travel, commerce, and the holy places. Egypt never permitted a shutdown of its land routes to the East. That would have meant isolation. Egypt always joined the East and the West. Despite the existence of Israel, Egypt's presence as a partner in the conflict symbolized the unity of East and West. But Egypt abandoned the conflict.

We have a real split. The Arab League is one fragment. The Maghreb is another fragment. Every part is concerned about its own security. I do not blame the Gulf states for what they are doing. I am sorry to see these things happen, but I believe they are historical necessities, even Arab necessities.

[1 Mar 81 p 9]

[Question] In view of the overriding importance of oil in regional policies, do you agree with the theory that after the Palestinian problem is over the Arab world will experience an oil problem, possibly leading to foreign occupation or an international collision over the oil region?

[Answer] No, I don't. I believe that the Soviet Union, at least for the foreseeable future, is not interested in Arab oil for several reasons. First, the supply of oil produced here is limited [sic] and the Soviet Union has enough oil of its own. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is seeking other sources of energy and does not covet the oil supplies of Arab countries. I imagine, however, that the Soviet Union is more interested in the geographic location of the Arab world. Our oil has no value unless we sell it to the West. I also believe that when the Gulf states say they do not wish a foreign-imposed security, what they really mean is that they do not believe that their oil is being threatened. Both the West and the East realize that. Our conviction that our oil revenues are not threatened translates--although we don't say so--into the sources of oil are not threatened. Were the Soviet Union to occupy the sources of oil, it would still sell the supply to the West. The Soviet Union does not need the oil. For this reason the arms that the Gulf states buy overseas is more than an expression of their political sovereignty. The ability to buy and possess arms anywhere else is an expression of political sovereignty. That is not the case in the Gulf states. You know that if a real military conflict were to erupt it would be the United States against the Soviet Union. The arms the Gulf states buy are not meant to repel foreign threats. A second point concerns money. If you look carefully you will learn that the Gulf region which provides one-half of the world's oil supplies buys one-half of the West's arms production.

But these weapons, as you know, will not be used in defense of the oil sources, even if there is a real threat to these sources. The Gulf states merely get together to coordinate their arms purchases and internal security and to settle tribal migration issues. Most of the Gulf states claim the tribes as their own. The so-called Gulf axis is in fact a self-defense pact. When the pan-Arab national movement stopped suddenly, every state in the region rushed to provide for its own security. It is a defensive move but a necessary one.

[Question] In an interview with the JERUSALEM POST about the Iranian war, President al-Sadat predicted that both governments [Iraq and Iran] would fall. Any comments?

[Answer] I imagine President al-Sadat's prediction is based on information not available to me. That's not quite the way I see it. When you say that the Iranian government would fall, you are admitting that a government exists. In reality, there is no government in Iran. What there is is a state of revolution which is yet to stabilize. There is a person, Khomeyni, who is a symbol of this revolution.

The present condition will continue as long as Khomeyni is alive. When he dies--and that is bound to happen--there will be changes in the form of government. I do believe, however, that Iran has passed the point of no return. When Khomeyni

departs the scene, I believe the Republican Islamic Party will attempt to govern for a while. This will be followed by a military regime. The question is what kind of a military government. Will it be fashioned after the Zia-ul-Haq [of Pakistan] government? Or will it emulate the Nasair government?

My visit to Iraq was very productive. I had been aware of the magnitude of the development programs in Iraq before my visit, but what I found far exceeded my expectations. I also found greater support for the war than I had expected. I had not expected the Arab-Persian conflict—I had written about it in this context, and had expressed the hope that we could transform it from a struggle of aggression into one of non-aggression [sic]--to be so heated. Even the old Iraqi politicians were deeply involved in the conflict.

I do not believe that Iraq with its economic capacity and stability—12 years under the same government--is close to a political need [sic, the word intended here is upheaval]. I do not believe the [present] government will fall so easily. This worries me. The war is likely to continue for a long time. President al-Sadat's prediction that the war would end in the summer, when one or both governments would fall, is probably based on information not available to me. From what I can see, however, the war is not about to end so soon. Unfortunately, Arab Iraq is in the midst of an armed confrontation with Islamic Iran, and there is nothing we can do. In the meantime, what is the rest of the [Arab] nation doing? King Husayn stands behind Iraq. When I saw him, he told me that he was very anxious about Egypt's pullout and the fragmentation in Lebanon. He emphasized that Arab unity had come apart, and that the Arabs were engaged in Islamic sectarian strife. He could see no end in sight to what was happening. That was his view.

In Egypt, President al-Sadat believes one of the governments would fall. Libya and Syria are supporting Iran for reasons of their own. You, the Gulf states, at first supported Iraq, but your support dwindled when the war became earnest. What then? What can we do as Arabs, despite our differences, to bring about a just solution? A-l we do is stand around as spectators. How can we do that? What has the Arab League done? Nothing, and this despite a war that threatens our political and cultural boundaries [sic].

[Question] Mr Haykal, what is the solution in your opinion? What you said, I believe, is true, but the fact remains that they seem to be unable to find a solution. They have no idea how to begin.

[Answer] But why have they failed. Because they have lost everything [most likely the word intended here is opportunity]. The danger, as I see it, is that we may not be able to rectify this error. I used to believe that when a family breaks up, at least one part of that family would attempt to act in a unifying, if not innovative, role. But, the way I see it, all you are doing is to isolate yourselves to preserve your own security. I believe my brethren in Saudi Arabia that they have traditionally acted in a supportive role. For example, I reminded them that it was King 'Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, not King Faruq, who had supported the creation of the Arab League, that it was King Saud who had stood with Jamal 'Abd al-Nassir against the Baghdad Pact, that it was King Faisal who had supported Egypt in the October [1973] war. I reminded them that Saudi Arabia had stood

behind the Syrian-Iraqi alliance during the Baghdad Conference following Egypt's pullout. When the alliance came apart, I reminded them, they continued to support Iraq for a while. When the war started, I reminded them, they felt that Iraq had become too preoccupied to give them full attention. At any rate, I insisted, the question remained as to what they had done. Whether they wished it or not, I emphasized, they had to respond to the challenge.

The Arabian Peninsula is like early [frontier] America. When the settlers were attacked by Indians, they pulled their wagons in a circle for protection. The Arabian Peninsula today is no more than a collection of drums full of oil, but the drums are just waiting for a spark.

[Question] Mr Haykal, whether the war stops or goes on, do you think it endangers the Gulf states?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] In what ways?

[Answer] The Iran-Iraq war is limited. When I say limited I do not mean the extent of its violence is limited. Both sides are fighting with all the strength at their disposal. The war is limited in that it has limited goals. Up to now, the war has been limited in scope because both sides want it that way. The two superpowers want the war to remain limited because that is in their interests.

Before the war, Iraq was the prime mover. The decision to oppose the Camp David accords was made in Baghdad. By virtue of their greater numbers and resources, as well as due to their superior strategic position, the Arabs played the more active role. Iran began to call for an Islamic revolution. If you examine the situation carefully, you would see that Iran is the greater strategic prize, not Iraq. By this I mean each of the two superpowers wants control of Iran. The Soviets want Iran because they share with it 2,500 kilometers of border and because Iran lies between them and the Indian Ocean. Another factor is that Iran is in a state of revolution. The U.S. wants control of Iran for similar reasons [sic].

On a visit to the Soviet ambassador while I was in Iran, I had a feeling that the Soviet Union would do anything to get closer to Iran. The Soviet Union so far has given Iraq nothing because it [the USSR] has its eyes on Iran. As for the United States, I played a role in the hostage issue and took part in a secret meeting with Harold Saunders in London. Saunders let it be known that it is still possible to build bridges to Iran. International strategy is inclined toward Iran. The Arab position is not quite clear. I am not saying that we must line up behind Iraq, but that a group of Arab nations must look for a solution. The problem now is that all parties are pulling farther apart. Although as Arabs we would like to preserve the Iraqi government and stand on guard against the Iranian revolution--a very large human phenomenon--what have we done so far? Nothing. Iraq refuses mediation for a known reason, and Iran refuses mediation due to a historical complex dating back to the early days of Abu Musa al-Ash'ari. We abandoned the UN effort at mediation without launching one of our own. A foreigner from the UN, ignorant of Iraqi and Irani psychologies, went to Iraq to mediate but could do nothing. The non-aligned

block tried. Cuba's foreign minister went to Iraq and Iran but accomplished nothing. If we, with our Arabic and Islamic understanding, try to find a solution that satisfies the minimal demands of both countries, we might succeed. But because we are divided, we have not been able to. In the meantime, the war continues with no end in sight.

[2 Mar 81 p 9]

[Question] One of the phenomena of today's life in this region is a decline in the prestige of the press and the broadcast media. Do you attribute this to the preoccupation of people with the region's major, open political developments or to an actual decline in the size of the news industry?

[Answer] The dissemination of information through the news media is a way to describe what is going on. You cannot describe a poor set of conditions in strong terms. The Arab position is in a state of decline and disunity and this fact is reflected in the media. The situation and strength of the media in any given place is a function of geographical location. In Western societies, for example, the media enjoy constitutional and legal protections. Historically, the legal protection on which the freedom of the press is based falls into three categories. The first category is based on tradition and is traceable either to religion or to tribalism. The second category has a constitutional and legal basis and is predominant in those countries which have been able to solve their social and economic problems and establish the rule of law and the logic of liberty. As long as our position remains in disarray, we cannot have democracy.

The countries which have solved their social and economic problems have been able to create political environments where democracy can survive. By contrast, in primitive societies, authority rests in tribal or religious leaders. In either case, the development of political rights, including the freedom of the press, depends on one man. At any rate, the press is a part of political life in every country. A country with a tribal political system has no press in the strict meaning of the term. What it might have is best characterized as a system whose function is to praise the leader, criticize the enemy, and glorify the country's war dead. In countries with constitutional governments, it [apparent reference to freedom of the press] is also a part of political life. Wherever there is a multiplicity of political and social forces, you can be sure there will be a stable press, a stable parliament and a stable judicial system. This is characteristic of societies where political life permits diversity. Let us reflect on our situation. Were we to accept the premise that the press is part of our political life and that its development hinges upon the appearance or disappearance of a single man, we will quickly discover the consequences. At its best, the press should be a part of political life, or rather, an instrument of it.

Some people claim that I was close to 'Abd al-Nasir. I don't deny it. I challenge the Third World to establish a strong press. It is not possible to do so unless the freedom of the press is accepted as an integral part of political life, but this cannot happen under autocratic rule.

The battle for government by the people is going on. Those who do not join it will always be followers. The press in the Third World has no choice but to be a part of established authority. The government controls the press industry. It either owns the newspapers or licenses those it does not own. The situation of the press is as follows:

1) It is weak because it speaks from a weak position. You cannot have a strong press when your position is weak.

2) Because the Arab position is in a state of disarray, the press, which reflects that position, is in a similarly weak state. The Arab Government [whether the reference is to a single government or all governments is not made clear] is afraid and, being afraid, does not permit debate. It simply gives orders and has no time for debate. This accounts for the crisis of the Arab press, which has degenerated into a tail of the authorities. We have replaced a strong press with visual, auditory and musical palliatives. The media worldwide have entered the business of commercial advertisement. The Arab media have not even done that much.

[Question] Mr Haykal, on my last visit to Cairo, I read that al-Sadat was planning to publish a new magazine to be called MAYO. Subsequently, I wrote an article in which I interpreted al-Sadat's plan as an attempt to change some vestiges of the past regime. If he goes through with this plan, he will end up in control of MAYO, in addition to AL-AHRAM and AL-AKHBAR. The debate at that time centered on the contention that Haykal's strong articles derived their authoritativeness from his close association with the center of power and information. Al-Sadat, it was claimed, was looking for a new Haykal to express his views. Apparently, he has not yet succeeded. Any comments.

[Answer] It was alleged that I was the only journalist, that I had a monopoly on the news and [government] views. I have been out for six years and I'd like to ask what has happened since. Where is the news? Where are the views? It is there, open to all people. The question is not whether Haykal is in or out. I believe that even if I were still associated with the centers of power, I would not write any more than you read in today's press. I challenge anyone to show that I ever praised Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in any of my articles. By contrast, al-Sadat gets more praise in his papers in a single day than Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir received in 18 years. Although this is no crime, it does, I believe, reflect a new situation. The fact that there was a vacuum in my absence does not mean I had a monopoly on the news. What it signifies is that I had important news to report. The news was important not because Haykal reported it, but because the political situation in the region was the focus of worldwide concern. We were indeed involved in news making. We were involved in writing on nonalignment, national liberation movements, ..., Africa. When I wrote in those days, my articles were viewed as depicting the way it was in Egypt.

[Question] Do you mean to imply that a writer's effectiveness derives from political developments?

[Answer] No. Interaction with political developments does not create a journalist or analyst. Success in journalism hinges on one's ability to engage and become

involved in political debate. The best poet or writer who chooses to remain isolated can only speak from vacuum. There are two aspects to the problem: the first is historical developments at a given time; the second is one's ability to interact with and be a part of these developments. This is so not only in journalism but in other professions as well.

I was chief editor of AL-AHRAM for 17 and 1/2 years. In the 6 years since I left, that position was filled by six people. How can you have effective journalism when the chief editor is replaced every two or three months? Not even the police authorities transfer their men so frequently.

[Question] In his last book "International Challenge," Servan-Schreiber proposes the creation of an alliance, based on common interest, of Europe, Japan, and the oil nations. Such an alliance, Servan-Schreiber claims, could change international balance and rescue the Third World. What are your views on this idea?

[Answer] Servan-Schreiber proposed more than that. The theory of "complementarity" did not originate with Schreiber. The idea of an alliance between technology and capital first appeared in the early 70's, when oil revenues began to increase. The alliance was to be based on Egypt's labor pool, Arab capital and Western technology. Servan-Schreiber is merely reproposing an idea originally raised by 'Abd al-Nasir in the "Covenant." In the "Covenant," 'Abd al-Nasir claimed that it was possible to make the transition from backwardness to modernism without passing through the traditional intermediate stages.

In "International Challenge," Servan-Schreiber is restating 'Abd al-Nasir's belief that the steam engine stage and other stages could be skipped altogether. To demonstrate this point, one of the reasons for building the [Aswan] High Dam was to enable the rural areas to pass directly from the kerosene stage to the electric stage. According to Servan-Schreiber, the age of electronics has created new means of production--Japan is an example. Based on this reasoning, Servan-Schreiber believes that it is possible to go directly to the computer stage and to skip the electronics era. I think Servan-Schreiber is too optimistic. He had proposed the same idea in an earlier publication entitled "The American Challenge." Experience, however, showed that that was not possible. I believe that Servan-Schreiber's idea will not work in the Third World. It is not possible to pass from a state of backwardness to a state of advanced technology without going through the traditional intermediate stages. Picasso's art, for example, did not pass directly from the realm of the concrete to the realm of the spiritual [or psychological] overnight. Picasso had first to master the realm of concrete representation. Were we to jump into the electronics era without proper preparation, it would not be progress.

We cannot skip the intermediate stages. 'Abd al-Nasir's approach was more realistic. He believed that passage from backwardness to a state of advanced industry must necessarily take us through an educational stage first. One cannot progress to the electronics era without mastering the electric era. One cannot deal with computers before one masters the computations [mathematics] of the computer. When Japan, for example, jumped from the stage of computers to the stage of advanced technology, it was already the greatest ship-building nation. It possessed a foundation on which to build greater industrial progress.

[Question] How do you assess the new initiatives of the smaller European countries, the so-called European initiative?

[Answer] There is no such thing as a European initiative. What has been referred to as a European initiative is a mere rehash of the Security Council's resolution. In order to speak of initiatives in the true sense, two requirements must be fulfilled: there must be an independent political will, and this will must be capable of action. Europe is a diverse collection of political wills, some towing the American line, while others are tuned to a different source. Even assuming the existence of an independent European will, what does this will have in store for the Arabs?

I believe that our interests clash with those of the West. The West does not want to see an independent power develop in the East. I further believe that we must resolve our differences with the West peacefully, by negotiation. The view of Europe as a benevolent power seeking our best interests is flawed thinking. Western Europe up to this moment is bound to America. While it can question and debate the American decision, it does not have the power to back its will. It lives under America's nuclear umbrella.

I have met with some of the leaders of the so-called European initiative, and they are the first to deny the existence of such an initiative. The whole thing is a chorus of interpretations of the Security Council's resolution. These leaders believe that they could impart some flexibility to the American position. Their position is akin to ours relative to the Arab-Israeli conflict. There is little we can do to influence that struggle. We say, for example, that we want America to pressure Israel to withdraw [from occupied Arab land], but where is our will to pressure America to do so? It does not exist. Where is America's will to pressure Israel? It does not exist. Peres was recently in Europe on a speaking tour to discuss the autonomy issue. He made it clear that he would not dismantle the settlements [on the West Bank], would not cooperate with the organization [PLO], and would play for time. Next year there will be elections for the U.S. Senate. Soon thereafter there will be a presidential election. It is, therefore, evident that no one can serve Arab interests more effectively than the Arab will.

[Question] I suppose that in your meeting with King Husayn you discussed the possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Jordanian option.

[Answer] No, and I don't believe King Husayn is interested in such a settlement. We must realize that certain historical conflicts have no solution. There is no shame in that. What I mean is that there are conflicts with which one must live until the balance of power changes [in one's favor]. One of these is the Arab-Israel struggle. 'Abd al-Nasir held this view. He often said: "I am not interested in a quick war with Israel. I don't need to fight Israel today or tomorrow. What concerns me is not to recognize or deal with Israel. At this time, Israel is stronger than me militarily and I must first concentrate on building my strength. Meanwhile, I will not recognize Israel."

Ben Gurion himself used to say "this land [Palestine] cannot belong to more than one people. It either belongs to the Israelis or the Palestinians. Israel will not recognize the Palestinian people, their state or revolution." the reason for

Ben Gurion's statement is easy to see: Israel's recognition of the Palestinian people is tantamount to negating the existence of Israel. The existence of one of the two peoples is a negation of the existence of the other. Consequently, we face an insolvable problem. Two parties are struggling over possession of the same thing. Therefore, I ask you not to appeal to my sense of realism to accept any solution. Don't tell me either that, in view of the apparent endlessness of the struggle, the only solution lies in launching an instant [surprise] war. There are conflicts which can be contained until the balance of power changes. We must not forget that from 1967 to 1974--the year of the Rabat resolution--there was nothing but the Jordanian solution.

I will let you in on a secret to which King Husayn is a witness. During the last session of the Khartoum Conference--the no recognition, no peace, ... etc. declaration--the delegates asked King Faisal and King Husayn to keep in touch with the United States and Houari Bou Medienne to keep in contact with the Soviet Union.

We were trying to press on all fronts. King Husayn later visited 'Abd al-Nasir. During that visit, 'Abd al-Nasir said to him: "Brother Husayn, I am not worried about Sinai. I know that it will be returned and that the Israelis will not be able to change its features. I also know that the Israelis cannot long sustain their challenge of Egypt. The Israelis' goal is to remove Egypt from the Arab confrontation line. I am very concerned, however, about the West Bank and Jerusalem because their essential features can be changed." "Go to America," 'Abd al-Nasir continued, adding, "You have a carte blanche from me to do whatever you wish and to talk to whomever you wish. If you succeed in retrieving the West Bank and Jerusalem, I will stand by you and forbid any attack against you."

King Husayn went and spent seven years negotiating with America and, at least, seven years in indirect negotiations with Israel. His reward was the "Allon" proposal. If anyone believes that King Husayn went to Rabat solely for the reason of making the PLO the only spokesman for the Palestinians, then he is wrong. King Husayn went because he was convinced that the problem was going to take a long time to solve, and in recognition of the fact that the problem was much more than a Jordanian problem. So you see, there is no Jordanian option. There will be no Palestinian State until the balance of power changes. We, the Arabs, keep saying that we must be realistic, and being realistic, as we understand it, means we must sign a piece of paper. This is not realism. Don't be surprised when I tell you there are other ways. There are ways to keep a struggle going politically and economically, until the balance of power tips the other way. Realism does not mandate that we surrender. How can we accept this kind of realism while America refused to talk with the Palestinians? America refused to talk with China for 20 years. Why can't we wait another 50 years without recognizing Israel? What would happen if we do not recognize it for another 100 years? But we [Egypt] made peace, repeat, made peace with Israel.

What is Israel's future? Do you know of any other country in the world with an inflation rate of 150 percent? The average per capita income in Israel is $1,800 per year, but of this $1,400 comes in the form of aid from abroad. The average per capita production is $400 per year. Half a million Israelis--not Jews--work in New York alone. There is the problem of emigration. Israel is a structure that

cannot sustain itself. It has, to be sure, a well-equipped armed force because it has a specific task in this region.

Kissinger once told me that he wanted to deal with Egypt alone. I told him that was not true. He said he wanted to deal with a few Arabs. I responded that if that was really what he wanted to do, then he should forget about dealing with Egypt's 38 million people, who on the average earn $240 per year by backward means. I insisted that what he had to contend with was Egypt's role.

Before the 1967 Security Council resolution [was made public], President 'Abd al-Nasir received a message from President Johnson. The message said clearly: "Take back all of Sinai in exchange for breaking with the Arab front." Dr Mahmud Fawzi, who was present, said to Mr 'Abd al-Nasir: "Mr President, they [the U.S.] are asking us to exchange Egypt's role for a hand full of sand. Egypt's value lies in its historical and civilizing role. If you deprive Egypt of that, you will be depriving her of everything."

We have all the means and resources needed to continue the struggle, so why are we rushing? Israel, exactly like Lebanon, has a job to do, to eradicate a people; her armed might is the tool for accomplishing the job.

Israel's real weakness lies in the fact that it is not viable. The last time I saw King Husayn, he was repeating what 'Abd al-Nasir used to say: "Let us wait; why hurry?" We must first work to change the balance of power, King Husayn has begun to pay attention to the economic and security problems within Israel.

[Question] In barring a return to stability, is there no hope that some power [coalition] might come up with a solution?

[Answer] If a solution is found to the Iran-Iraq conflict, if Iraq were to take a role in a Gulf coalition, and if it is possible to give this coalition a predominantly Arab character, it is possible to create a nucleus. What is needed now is an Arab coalition consisting of the nations of the Arabian Peninsula and Iraq, with the possibility of adding Syria and Jordan later. Jordan is ready. Were such a coalition to come into being, it could play a role comparable to that played by Egypt. Such a coalition could take charge of Arab destiny and express the Arab nation's aspirations and options. But such a coalition does not exist.

[Question] My last question. Do you think that the gains realized through the Camp David accords were enough to compensate for Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab front?

[Answer] No, unfortunately. Please tell me how it is possible to settle a historical conflict in 13 days? How can al-Sadat, Carter, and Begin solve the problem in 13 days. With sincere respect for two of the three, it was obvious from the beginning that the autonomy issue was left suspended in fog. The only definitive agreement related to the Sinai. If the problem concerned only Sinai, one would understand the rationale for a unilateral peace agreement. The problem, however, is much more. The problem has to do with Egypt's historical role.

[Question] And until this role is resumed, do we go on fighting Israel?

[Answer] Let the struggle continue. Why does that bother you? Egypt's role [as a leader] in the region was there before Israel came into being. Shawqi and Hafiz [Arab poets] were Egypt's voice before the struggle began with Israel. Khalil Mutran, the press [Egypt was the first country in the Arab world to introduce the printing press], 'Abd al-Wahhab, ..., Umm Kulthum [famous Egyptian singers] were not engaged in the struggle against Israel.

Germany is divided, but it survives. America is unable to resist the march of Communism led by the Soviet Union.

Why do you suppose that you can end the struggle? If you succeed in solving one problem, does that mean the end of your problems? Life in its entirety is a struggle. One's friends and enemies are a matter of categories. Egypt cannot permit anyone to close its routes to the East. Let the struggle continue until the balance of power changes. This is how I see it.

9063
CSO: 4504

PLAN FOR INCREASING REFINING CAPACITY

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 17 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by Khalid Jabr: "Petroleum Refining Capacity in Egypt To Increase from 15 to 65 Million Tons by the Year 2000"]

[Text] The Ministry of Petroleum has prepared a comprehensive plan to upgrade the crude oil refining sector. The purpose of the plan is to increase the refining capacity to 65 million tons annually by the year 2000. The plan is to be presented at the next meeting of the Council of Ministers for approval.

The quantity of oil refined in Egyptian refineries last year amounted to 15 million tons per year. In 1973 the crude oil that was refined amounted to 7.5 million tons only. This quantity is used to cover domestic needs and to reduce the vast difference that Egypt is paying to purchase refined oil imports. This difference amounted to 411 million dollars (289 million pounds).

Engineer Ahmad 'Izz al-Din Hilal, deputy prime minister for production and minister of petroleum said, "The sector has set the goal of expanding the refining and industrialization of petroleum to cover [domestic] needs and to export the surplus to foreign markets. Our long term policy is to undertake the establishment of new refineries in some areas of the republic where consumption is expected to increase."

The petroleum sector succeeded in increasing production of intermediate refined products (kerosene and diesel oil) at a rate of 200,000 tons. Two units have been placed in operation in Musturud and in al-'Amiriyah to refine this oil for the purpose of improving the specifications of oil products in addition to making them suitable to the special needs of the armed forces and airplane fuel.

The petroleum sector has also succeeded in increasing natural gas production from the refineries or the Dahshur plant at a rate of 160,000 tons annually; this represents a burden on the balance of payments.

This is in addition to what the petroleum sector is undertaking at the

present time: it is establishing a new complex in Alexandria for the production of lubricating oils and increasing current production capacity of these oils from Suez and al-'Amiriyah so that total oil production capacity of about 260,000 tons per year can be reached. Thus self-sufficiency in oil is achieved; we are now importing oil that equals 45 percent of local market needs.

The deputy prime minister says, "The principal reason for delaying [the process of] beginning the development of the oil refining capacity is that studies which were carried out by Egypt did establish that exporting crude oil was more profitable than exporting it in the form of refined products. This is due to world market conditions and to successive expansions in the refining capacities on the world level. In addition, increasing the capacities of oil refineries requires tremendous investments that can be directed toward other areas that are more feasible for economic and social development."

8592
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KHOMEYNI RULE PORTRAYED AS BLOODY CHAOS

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Sep 81 pp 136-139

[Article: "Iran: 'Parents Must Report Their Own Children'"]

> [Text] A climate of fear has spread through Iran, similar to the French Revolution at the time of Robespierre. The citizens are afraid of arrest and execution, the mullahs of assassinators who are striking again and again and whose identity has still not yet been established. Hojjat ol-eslam Khamen'i, an irreconcilable person and to date the leader of Friday prayers in Tehran, became the leader of Khomeyni's party--and the most powerful man in Iran.

Loud crying could be heard over Radio Tehran, belying the Ayatollah's words when he spoke to his people.

"The nation is calm," were the words coming from Khomeyni's rattling voice, "and it is sure that those who have suffered a martyr's death will be replaced by volunteers who will likewise be willing to die as martyrs."

But that is very questionable, because it is getting lonely around the Ayatollah. Since the end of June alone approximately 100 of his closest confidants, leading members of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), have died a violent death.

On 28 June, 74 of them perished when a bomb exploded in the IRP headquarters in Tehran. Among the victims were Ayatollah Beheshti, the leader of the party and one of the most radical supporters of Khomeyni. And when a bomb exploded the Sunday before last in the president' chancellery, seven people were killed, among the President Mohammad Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammad Javal Bahonar. Both of them had been in office only a few weeks.

Khomeyni's prominent supporters seem no longer safe anywhere, whether they are heavily guarded in their offices, whether in the streets or in the mosque. Killers come speeding through sidestreets on motorcycles and fire fatal shots at a mullah victim. After the last bomb blast, Hojjat ol-eslam Morteza Ayatollahi, imam of the Tehran Gorgani Mosque, died in this manner, as did many other clergymen in the meantime.

The perpetrators disappeared again in heavy traffic even before the surprised bodyguards, young revolutionary guards loyal to Khomeyni, could react at all.

But in its stead revolutionary tribunals are taking over. Approximately 900 real or alleged opposers have been executed since June, since the deposed president Bani-Sadr went underground and later escaped to Paris together with Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of the anti-Khomeyni rebel organization Mojahedin-i-Khalq.

More and more, Persia is turning into a country marked by chaos, blood and violence. The prisons of the country are overcrowded, even more than during the time of the Savak, the notorious secret police of the Shah. During the last 2 months alone, 4,000 "counterrevolutionary elements" were arrested.

Nevertheless, even these extensive mass arrests and mass executions are no guarantee for the mullahs that they will survive. "Security," the circle for religious sciences in the holy city of Qom declared, "has the highest priority. Without the restoration of security nothing can be accomplished." Now the friends of the Ayatollah are openly demanding the establishment of a powerful, vigilant secret police force, stationed throughout the country and patterned after the Savak.

But as far as Hojjat ol-eslam Rafsanjani, the president of parliament, is concerned, the matter is much simpler. "All counterrevolutionaries must be killed," he demanded, "because they burned the bridges behind themselves. What other penalty could be suitable for them?"

Rafsanjani is also certain who is behind the bombing attacks. Whereas others name the "Satan United States" or the "Fifth Column of Iraq" as the culprit, he is convinced that nobody but former President Bani-Sadr and the Mojahedin leader Rajavi are the guilty ones.

The president of parliament has certainly good reasons why he should fear for his life. In the opinion of former President Bani-Sadr, he is one of five leading Iranians whose death would topple the current regime. Two of those on Bani-Sadr's list, President Raja'i and Prime Minister Bohonar, are already dead. The other three--in addition to Rafsandshani they are Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani and Ayatollah Ardebili--are currently in charge of Iran's government affairs.

Mahdavi Kani, formerly minister of interior and supporter of a strict execution policy ("We must clean house if we want renewal"), became transitional prime minister, Ardabili is functioning as the supreme judge.

In the meantime, however, the opinion is spreading in Tehran that the ayatollahs are looking for the real perpetrators in the wrong direction. The story goes that members of the Mojahedin would never have been able to get a bomb past the strict controls of the revolutionary guards and into the chancellery of the prime minister.

That leaves only two possibilities: Either the Mojahedin succeeded in finding sympathizers among the guards or even within the closest government circles or, something that has been hidden to date, a bloody power struggle is raging among the mullahs.

In today's Tehran the second thesis seems no longer farfetched. The Iranians noticed with interest that three close confidants of Prime Minister Bahonar were arrested shortly after the assassination.

Suspicion was also aroused by the fact that the assassinations freed the way for one of the most radical hardliners of the Ayatollah, so he could move up. He always felt that he had been passed over when important government positions were assigned. It is Hojjat ol-eslam 'Ali Khamene'i, leader of the Friday prayer in Tehran.

Now he became secretary of the IRP, a position that had previously been occupied by Ayatollah Beheshti and after his death by Prime Minister Bahonar. As a consequence Khamene'i moved up and he is now the most powerful man after the Ayatollah Khomeyni.

The clergyman, one of Khomeyni's pupils, had incited a group of ardent Islamic students at that time to occupy the American Embassy, and then he managed to thwart the release of the hostages for months.

He used to preach his sermons at the University of Tehran only with a gun slung over his shoulder, and he was partially responsible for the fact that the country's institutions of higher learning have been closed for over a year. According to him they were "spy centers and headquarters for the recruitment of counter-revolutionaries."

It was primarily through his influence that the Islamic revolution made the decisive change to uncompromising radicalism; in the end even hardliners like Beheshti and Raja'i were no longer at ease.

Consequently, insiders are convinced that the bomb which was hidden in a cassette recorder and which exploded on 27 June near Khamene'i in a Tehran mosque was not the work of the Mojahedin. The Shiite clergyman was only wounded. Insiders also believe that a religious person was responsible for the bomb that exploded the following day, 28 June, in the IRP headquarters.

At any rate, it is a fact that because of the death of his spiritual brothers Khamene'i is today the most influential candidate for the office of the presidency, who according to the constitution must be elected within 50 days. If Chamenei should take over the helm, it appears improbably that the era of arbitrary executions, bloody reprisals by the opposition and new executions will some come to an end.

In the meantime fear has led Iranian clergymen to believe that they can effectively defend the values of their revolution only by subjecting the people to ever new grotesque as well as cruel restraints.

It is evident in all areas of life. It is nothing unusual, for instance, when young zealots who call themsleves Hesbollahi (partisans of God) tear the clothes of women in the middle of the street if they feel that they are not adequately covered--so they say--to protect virtue.

Since Western popular music is considered decadent, all music stores have been purged of Western music. Records or cassettes with music by Bach, Beethoven or Mozart are no longer available in Iran.

Nobody in Iran can be sure any longer whether he may not in some way sin against the goals of the Islamic revolution. A few weeks ago, a man who had been given a prison term was taken from his cell in Tehran and executed.

His crime, worthy of death: He had been observed exchanging a few words in prison with a person who had been sentenced to death. According to the judges, it was a clear indication of a lack of Islamic spirit; such a person does not deserve to live.

Since 25 August a catalog of new penal regulations has been in use. One of the provisions calls for punishment for the "use of words and writings" against the government.

As a consequence the average citizen makes every effort possible not to attract attention. But as was the case in revolutionary France during the time of Robespierre, a person can also be suspect if he does not continuously exhibit his revolutionary spirit in a loud and impressive manner.

Persia's Islamic taskmaster, however, is even more pervasive. In a speech he demanded that even families should not be exempt from searching out one another to find out whether they are loyal to the Islamic faith.

The Ayatollah Khomeyni demanded, "Parents must counsel their children, children must counsel their parents and brothers and sisters. If they do not take the advice, they must be reported." It is their "religious and national duty," he said.

Some Iranians actually took his words seriously, as is demonstrated by a horrible example. Hoseyn Tariq ol-eslami, 25, from Isfahan was reported to the revolutionary guards by his own mother; she accused him of being a member of the Mojahedin and a "Marxist." He was sentenced to death and executed.

The state television beamed a live report about the incident. The Iranians could watch the young man weeping while he extended his hand to his mother, desperately trying to convince her that he had sworn off "terrorism" a long time ago.

But she remained inexorable. "When I heard about your arrest," she told her son before he took his final steps, "I prayed to Allah that you should no longer be in a position to continue your misdeeds. You will not be shot to death, confess your cirmes to Allah."

Such steadfastness in her faith aroused the pleasure of the old man in Ghom. He cited the exemplary behavior of this woman when talking to his police officers. "I would like to see more mothers like this one," the Ayatollah said, "who will surrender their children so courageously without shedding a single tear. That is true Islam."

Rafsandshani, president of parliament, also praised the mother and included her in his Friday prayer. One hundred ten deputies sent her a letter of commendation: "We recognize you as a duitiful mother and teacher."

Hojjat ol-eslam Khamene'i, who may be Iran's future strong man, also used the most powerful words: The event was one of the greatest epics in the history of Islam.

"The ship of revolution," the PARS news agency described the present course, "will continue its journey through the stormy seas unimpeded. Imam Khomeyni is the Noah of our time."

8991
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KHOMEYNI'S RIVALS SEEN PLAGUED BY DISUNITY

London 8 DAYS in English 19 Sep 81 pp 20-21

[Article by Tim McGirk]

[Text] IRAN's fundamentalist regime, besieged by Iraq and battered from within by the many armies of the opposition, seems near collapse. But, while most of Ayatollah Khomeini's senior politicians have fallen to assassins, no single opposition group has the strength to wrest complete control from the mullahs and restore stability in Iran.

At the last count, there were at least 20 rival opposition groups. They represent every political strain imaginable, from pro-Albanian marxist-leninists to Kurdish separatists. It seems doubtful, however, that these disparate factions will unite against Khomeini's theocracy in the way they once rallied to topple the Shah.

No one has yet emerged in Iran to match Khomeini's popular appeal. Even his closest contender, ex-President Abolhassan Bani Sadr, stands small against the Ayatollah's shadow.

The 1978 revolution moved with the velocity of a jet stream, blasting away the Shah with the same astonishing speed that a reluctant Khomeini was swept in. Once installed as Iran's leader, however, Khomeini wasted no time in consolidating absolute power. The civil war against Khomeini — for that is what it has become — still lacks a real leader, someone who can get all the main power blocs in Iran behind him: the military, the bazaar merchants, the clergy, and, of course, the deeply religious urban and rural poor, who make up most of the country's population.

As the strife-torn Iranian revolution enters its next critical phase, *8 Days* examines the leading opposition groups and assesses their chances of seizing control.

Mujaheddin-e-Khalq: Constantly on the run, first from the Shah's police and later Khomeini's regime, the Mujaheddin's leaders are strong on guerrilla tactics but weak on political ideology.

The group's notion of 'Radical Islam', said Massoud Rajavi, its leader who fled with Bani Sadr to Paris, is based on the concept of *Towheed* — a united Islamic community. 'Some people call it socialism, but we call it Islam,' said Rajavi. To win support from the powerful bazaar merchants, Rajavi expanded his notion of *Towheed* to allow a place for private property and a middle class.

The Mujaheddin's bazaari strategy may be working: several merchants interviewed by *8 Days* claim that the latest wave of government takeovers has pushed many of the smaller traders towards the group. One London-based Iranian merchant explained: 'In nine cases out of ten, Khomeini's nationalisation has meant that the big import-export firms handle the bulk of foreign trade, scooping up incredible profits, while the smaller merchants are going broke.'

For the Mujaheddin to succeed, the support of the bazaaris and the senior ayatollahs is crucial. Rajavi has told *8 Days* that influential theologians like Mashad's Ayatollah Ali Tehrani, Ayatollah Alemi in Hamadan and Hojatoleslam Enshouri (now facing execution at Evin prison in Tehran) have denounced the fundamentalist regime.

Despite Rajavi's claims that the latest mass arrests netted few Mujaheddin leaders, the execution of over 700 party sympathisers in the last two months must be hurting the guerrillas. But, if anything, this has only made them intensify their grim

campaign. Political observers say that the bomb attack on President Mohammed Ali Rajai and Prime Minister Mohammed Bahonar, after a similar blast that killed 74 leading Islamic Republican Party politicians, has left the few survivors in Khomeini's fundamentalist regime badly shaken.

The Mujaheddin's ability to pick off their enemies one by one, despite the mullahs' many bodyguards, indicates that they have penetrated the country's armed forces and the paramilitary Revolutionary Guards.

Fedayeen (Minority): Only in topsy-turvy Iran could a 'minority' faction outnumber a 'majority' group of the same party. That's the case with the Fedayeen-e-Khalq, a marxist-leninist organisation that split after the Iranian revolution.

The Fedayeen (Majority), meaning the majority of the guerrillas' politburo, voted to support the fundamentalist government, but since then the breakaway Minority faction has been involved in guerrilla warfare and sabotage against the regime. This is especially so in Khuzestan and northwest Iran, where the Minority is assisting Kurdish separatists.

Tehran political observers said that, when the Fedayeen split, most of its people sided with the Minority. This faction's leaders received training in South Yemen during the Shah's reign, but has not joined Bani Sadr and Rajavi's National Council of Resistance.

Diplomatic sources claim that the Mujaheddin and the Fedayeen (Minority) have staged joint guerrilla operations against the fundamentalists near the Caspian Sea region.

The Peykhar group: Iran's opposition, both before and after the revolution, has been riddled with feuds and schisms. Peykhar is a marxist-leninist organisation, of unknown size, that splintered from the Mujaheddin.

The Mujaheddin started out as an Islamic, anti-monarchist group in the early Seventies, one faction later rejected Islam and tried to steer the organisation into marxism-leninism. The ensuing power struggle was so savage that one of the Islamic Mujaheddin was reportedly burned alive by his marxist-leninist rivals.

Peykhar has claimed responsibility for several bombings in Tehran. Political observers doubt that the group will rejoin the Mujaheddin in the struggle against Khomeini — or, for that matter, the Fedayeen (Minority). One analyst of contemporary Iran commented: 'All these groups spend as much time attacking each other as "petit bourgeoise" as they do denouncing Khomeini.'

Tudeh: Despite its Islamic label, Iran's revolution was more nationalistic than religious. And the pro-western Shah was not its only victim: *Tudeh*, the Iranian Communist party, also fell by the wayside. Through a string of bad political errors, the old guard Tudeh communists lost the following that they had painstakingly built up in nearly 30 years of clandestine opposition to the Pahlavi's monarchy.

Tudeh's decision to back the Khomeini government earned it the instant vilification of the young leftists that the communists had tried so hard to recruit. Inside Iran and abroad, it was widely believed that the party's support for the regime was ordered by the Kremlin. While no direct proof linking Tudeh and Moscow has surfaced, political observers say that, by sticking close to Khomeini, it can ensure Iran's continued hostility to the US.

Ethnic minorities: The Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis and Azerbaijani Turks have long resented being governed from the Persian heartland of Tehran, and were brutally repressed under the Shah. When the monarchy collapsed, the minorities — the Kurds in particular — pressed for regional autonomy. Khomeini flatly refused their demands, and sent the army into Kurdistan. The region has been aflame ever since.

Massoud Rajavi recently told *8 Days* that the leading Kurdish separatist faction, the Kurdish Democratic Party, had joined the National Council of Resistance. A civil war against the mullahs would probably move south from Kurdistan.

The fate of the Khuzestan Arabs is bound up with the Gulf war. Iraq's Saddam Hussein threatened to make Khuzestan, Iran's richest oil province, into a small Arab republic in the early days of the conflict, but it seems that Baghdad's intelligence badly misjudged Arab support for the Iraqi offensive.

Iran Liberation Movement: Headed by Mehdi Bazargan, the 70-year-old engineer who served as Khomeini's first prime minister, the ILM, an offshoot of the old National Front, once had a strong power base with the bazaar merchants and the Grand Ayatollas at the top of the Shiite hierarchy.

However, Bazargan's approval of Khomeini's Islamic constitution, which invested the Ayatollah with supreme authority, and his decision to participate in the Majlis lost him valuable support in the influential bazaari network. He may yet decide to throw his weight behind Bani Sadr and the 'National Council of Resistance'.

MOJAHEDIN ASKED TO PINPOINT AUTHORS OF RECENT BLASTS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Sep 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] Days before the explosion of the prime ministry, we had some questions for supporters of armed groups, particularly the group called the Mojahedin-e Khalq. In our view, the best question would concern the tragic painful incident which recently led to the oppressed martyrdom of four people. In this connection, we continue our former discussion entitled "Several questions for...":

Do the supporters of the Mojahedin ever ask themselves who the "agent" was who actually "carried out" these blasts, including those of the party office and the prime ministry? Of course it is evident who did the original planning and preparation and provided the information. Our people had reason to let loose shouts of 'death to the United States' immediately. But in any case, the question remains as to which person, group or organization was the agent which committed the act.

For a supporter, a supporter who thinks for himself and does not fear independence in reading, thinking and understanding, the matter has but two aspects. Either the aforementioned explosions are the masterwork of the Mojahedin-e Khalq or they are not. In both instances, the leaders of the Mojahedin, in particular their fugitive leader, have so far made the most absurd and bungled statements.

Observe carefully. When Rajavi arrived in Paris after fleeing Iran, he gave an interview to RADIO BBC, the old voice of British colonialism. To the radio correspondent who asked "was the party office explosion your work or not?", he answered: "The resistance movement in Iran is growing(!)... Due to the particular situation we had in Iran, I did not receive sufficient information in this regard, and I do not know whether this was the work of our organization or not(!)" This was one instance.

At another time, this same gentleman, during an official interview in France, after a bit of his perpetual repetitive eloquence, said: "I do not think(!) that the prime ministry explosion was our work(!) Furthermore, I do not believe that the announcement published in London (in which the Mojahedin claimed responsibility for the explosion) was issued by us(!)"

Do these erudite opinions really belong to that person who claims all that knowledge of both new and old historical and theoretical sciences? The same person who considers himself a first-rate teacher, a first-rate martyr, a fully-qualified

religious authority, a learned religious scholar and a professor of philosophy and scientific logic? Do the supporters of such an organization ever consider how such speeches should be analyzed? It is possible to say that these words are quotations and are not reliable proof. In fact, concerning Rajavi's escape, some imprisoned militia members said: 'They have made someone else up to resemble Rajavi!' But as for these quotations, what could be more reliable proof than the voice of that excellency which was directly boradcast by BBC? The first statement was in an interview with that radio station, and the second was an official public speech which was officially made in a recent press interview. The second one is also completely in harmony with the first statement as far as content is concerned.

Observe carefully. When Rajavi was asked "was the party office explosion your work or not," he first uttered slogans instead of giving an answer, and says: "The resistance movement in Iran is growing," and sentences of this sort. If we knew Rajavi to be an independent man, unattached to any organization, we would have been able to ignore many of his replies and his manner of speech, just in the same way as one must take Bani-Sadr's statements. In studying the words of His Majesty [Bani-Sadr] one must also take into account his Quixotic spirit. But Rajavi had and has the position of a "religious" authority in a well-organized organization, an organization which in each case plans, discusses and refines each word before expression and each act before commission, whether right or wrong. Unless we were to say that the virtues of his companion [Bani-Sadr] had affected him! Or as we have said before, these are the cries of a drowning man.

Therefore, when Rajavi is asked whether the explosion of the party office is his work or not, and instead of denying or corroborating it, immediately replies: "The resistance movement is such and such," every listener understands that this is an explicit sanction of the aforementioned explosion that slaughtered 72 human beings, and of the other explosions, and also an implicit confession of involvement in these tragedies, joined with a boasting tone. So why does he prefer to recite poetry instead of answering yes or no? Is this a wise thing to do, or is it a kind of boasting in lonely exile?

Noting that this interview apparently was conducted by telephone, you do not really think that he did not know what to say, and in making such an introduction he was stalling while he made a decision?! Or that he had thought everything out so that when the conversation turned to this topic, he boasted a bit and immediately adopted an ambiguous position which would harmonize with any reply given later! Like prepared introductions which fit with any sort of composition about any topic!

Rajavi then says: "Due to suppression and the particular situation we had in Iran, I was not able to obtain sufficient information, and I do not know whether we blew up the party office or someone else did." This statement of opinion is made at a time when the aforementioned authority, during the same eloquent interview, makes another boast which completely contradicts that which came before. He says: "I gave Bani-Sadr a place in my home in the heart of Tehran, and no difficulties arose in this respect." In summary, they safely passed many days in complete ease in the city's center, a place which was exposed each instant to the danger of investigation and discovery. The companion and mentor of this gentleman, namely His Honor Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, also told the same radio station and

other media: "In Tehran my situation was such that I could easily go into the streets and see everything personally!" Asked how he was able to fly to Paris, he answered: "As I have told you, in Iran we are stronger than the government."

Thus, which of them are we to believe? These claims of Rajavi and his boss, Khan Abolhasan, that in Tehran they were more powerful than anyone else, that they walked about in the streets, that they were in the heart of the city and no one was able to discover them, or this claim that 'due to the particular situation and lack of contact we were not able to obtain sufficient information and find out whether or not the big explosion of the party office and the slaughter of 72 persons was our work or not'?!

Is this after all just a manner of speech? Is this logic? It is not absurd to say that the gentlemen's logic is limited! Do these supporters, militia members, guerillas working part-time or on shifts, and such really not think about this logic and its content? On the one hand, the head of an advanced, tightly-structured organization, a man who by himself is better than all the rest of the people combined, was able to baptize Colonel Ma'zi, the Shah's pilot, and with his help penetrate everywhere. In addition, by seeking aid and assistance from God knows what centers inside and outside the country's borders, he was able to make the preparations for such an escape, an escape which necessitated a great many contacts, comings and goings, meetings, and the acquisition of much information. For to quote the gentlemen again: "The national resistance council, after studying the matter during its sessions, made a decision concerning the transfer of Their Honors to Paris." Of course this required the holding of sessions of the so-called "Resistance Council!", continous contact with the members of the central cadre and other newly-initiated members, and leaders of the so-called resistance and struggle. On the other hand, these two gentlemen, due to the particular situation, were not able to obtain the requisite information and become informed about their most important action, meaning the explosion of the party office! And they also remained in doubt from Tehran to Paris as to whether this was their work or not?!

When they are proving their power, they term themselves the ultimate power, such that one would think they were in touch with reality. However, when they announce their view of an explosion, they so tragically cry out about the particular situation(?!), absolute suppression, and the impossibility of contact and acquisition of information that one would think that even the members of the central cadre, who doubtless have the role of planning every important action, not only did not see each others' faces for days and weeks at a time, but did not even have telephone or written contact!

Oh you supporters, do you understand these philosophical statements? We surely do not. Don't you think about these statements? We do! In your opinion, why was it that after this magnificent flight and arrival in Paris, Mr Rajavi, Ma'zi and Bani-Sadr developed such flying logic and made verses that even 'Atar Neyshapuri [famous mystical poet] would not have been able to understand? In your opinion, was the explosion of the prime ministry and the party office the work of these gentlemen, or not?

To be continued.

9557
CSO: 4640/94

HASHEMI-RAFSANJANI DISCUSSES DEATHS OF MILITARY LEADERS

LD021224 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 2 Oct 81

[Excerpts] Simultaneously with the widespread and united participation of the risen and fighting nation of Iran in the fateful presidential elections and the Islamic consultative assembly byelections, funeral services for the fighting clergyman and the esteemed scholar Hojjat ol-Eslam Hasheminezhad, and the brave commanders of Islam; the martyr Maj Gen Vali Fallahi; the martyr Brig Gen Javad Fakuri; the martyr Brig Gen Seyyed Musa Namju; the martyr Kolahduz and the other martyrs of the C-130 plane crash were held by Imam Khomeyni this morning with the participation of large masses of the Muslim and ever-present people at Tehran University, the meeting place of the worshippers of God and the seekers of the path of the Koran and Islam.

According to the Central News Unit, beginning this morning various groups of Muslim people in Tehran marched from the four corners of the city toward Tehran University, the meeting place of the faithful, in order to attend the services; the crowd was so large that some of them gathered in the streets around the university.

According to the same report, the families of the martyrs, a large number of clergymen and military and guard brothers attended the services for the martyrs of the crash.

Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, the temporary Tehran Friday imam started the Friday prayers. Explaining the concept of retribution in Islam, he said: The guilty, the corrupt and the sinner are, in Islam, like the sick, which should be cured at the first opportunity; if not cured, in order to prevent the spread of corruption, the corrupt member should be amputated.

He then described the hypocritical activities of the hypocrites [Mojahedin-e Khalq] and their plots to serve imperialism and the severe treatment given by the Islamic Republic to them. He said: We have given them an ultimatum. He then referred to Bani-Sadr's treason during the war and the plot by the liberals. He said: They intended to submit to a forced peace; but, now, our army combatants, with their continuous and outstanding victories, have shown that they would fight like Imam Husayn and with faith until they have overthrown Saddam, that American pawn.

He then referred to Bani-Sadr and counterrevolutionaries having been given asylum and freedom in France and the treacheries of the so-called freedom-seeking government of France against the heroic people of Algeria throughout their struggles against France, and called France a government that follows the imperialistic path.

He also referred to the crash of the C-130 plane. He said: According to the research carried out by experts, the crash was most probably an ordinary accident; but until it is completely clarified, the matter will be pursued.

CSO: 4640/11

U.S. 'MERCENARIES' ACCUSED OF PLOTTING AGAINST TRUE ISLAM

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in Persian and English 16 Sep 81 p 5

> [Text] The propagators of American style Islam consider any Moslem who fights U.S. imperialism a communist.
>
> "The Moslem World League," created by the CIA, spreads its poison against the leadership of the Iranian revolution.
>
> The reappearance of the whipping-board in Pakistan and the Hindu-Moslem war in India are the results of CIA conspiracies.

As soon as one speaks on behalf of the downtrodden and deprived and against the palace-dwellers and usurpers of people's rights, they say it is communism.

From Imam Khomeyni, during a visit with the Council of Guardians.

"Islamology is on the increase. Well, even Saddam has become an Islamicist. And Sadat is one of the Islamicists who can determine what is in accordance with Islam and what is not. And, recently, Mr Carter has also joined the ranks of the Islamicists. In a meeting Carter had said that what is done in Iran is not in accordance with Islam . . . Tomorrow Begin will most likely become an Islamicist, as well, or perhaps he has already become one."

From Imam Khomeyni's statements during a visit by the Cabinet which was introduced by Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

When the planners of the U.S. intelligence agency, the CIA, overthrew the legitimate government of Dr Mohammad Mosaddeq with their infamous coup d'etat of 28 Mordad [19 Aug], creating a blood bath in Iran, the experts of this infernal agency began preparing the grounds for the cultural metamorphosis of an alert and revolutionary nation in order

to plunder the natural resources of our country with a clear conscience. They also wanted to make use of Iran as the so-called "island of peace and stability" and the most secure imperialist base. Among the activities of the CIA was the nurturing of a kind of Islam which is known today as Americanized Islam, suppressing the true, revolutionary Islam. For this purpose, U.S. imperialism, with its old ally, decrepid British imperialism, employed all its efforts to spread this kind of Islam. During those years when the untiring combatant, the late Ayatollah Taleqani, was intermittently jailed and tortured by the jailers of the corrupt Pahlavi regime for defending Islam and for his persistent and uncompromising struggle against tyranny, dictatorship, and subjugation, and at a time when all the works of his late eminence and other thinkers and strugglers of true Islam were among the "harmful," banned books and owning or studying them would bring about the most violent interrogations and punishments, the royal preachers were busy making appearances, one after another, and praising his honorable "majesty," Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, this mercenary servant of U.S. imperialism. In the same way that Reza Khan, the Anglophile, pretended to be a Moslem and would make annual pilgrimages, as he thought, to Mashhad, his son, the cursed and buried Mohammad Reza, was also learning to put on the guise of being a Moslem and learning to cheat from the CIA and the Intelligence Service.

In 1341 [21 Mar 62-20 Mar 63], when the uprising of the struggling Moslem nation of Iran, based on Islamic ideology and under the leadership of Grand Ayatollah Imam Khomeyni, shook the foundations of the subservient Pahlavi regime, especially after the bloody uprising of 15 Khordad 1342 [5 Jun 63], the planners and propagators of Americanized Islam gave the shah new directives. It was on the basis of these directives that the mercenary Mohammad Reza spoke of his dreams, miracles, and his deep belief in Islam. The royal preachers, too, spoke in praise of the kingly White Revolution and the devotion to Islam of the shah.

The Thesis of Land Worship

These events took place at a time when Imam Khomeyni was exiled abroad for defending the rights of the oppressed Iranian nation, exposing the injustices of the United States and Israel in Iran, and defending the foundations of sacred Islam and Moslems, which were endangered by the cooperation of the United States and the cursed shah, and at a time when the red blood of thousands of the revolutionary, Moslem people of our country had colored the streets of Tehran, Qom, Tabriz, Mashhad, and many other regions of Iran. After the so-called 2,500th anniversary celebration, during which the hated Pahlavi regime imagined it had destroyed the Islamic revolutionary movement of Iran through the imprisonment and torture of hundreds of clerics, students, and, on the whole, old and young Moslems, that regime tried to metamorphose Islam by spreading a perverse culture.

For this purpose, the propaganda loudspeakers of the regime as well as its colorful theoreticians propagated the thesis of nationalism and land worship and thought of revitalizing the so-called greatness of the Sassanian and Achaemenian empires.

The Influence of Zionists

The main goal of U.S. imperialism, which held the strings of the new events, was to replace any revolutionary idea with perverse national ism. On the other hand, it used this weapon to pit the Iranian nation against the Arabs both to prevent, as it believed, the influence of communism in Iran and to create a second Israel against the revolutionary Arab forces in the region. In this connection, the buried shah used the historical example of the liberation of 6,000 Jews who were captives of the government of ancient Babylon, by Cyrus, the Achaemenian king, to make Iran into an arena for the activities of the criminal Zionist regime of Israel. Hence, the Zionists infiltrated all the organizations of the country and the Iranian economy was put under their domination and that of their American masters. The treacherous Mohammad Reza thought he was another Cyrus being kind to the Jews; but, he was serving criminal international Zionism and not the Jewish nation, which has been and is dominated by the Zionists who rule occupied Palestine.

The Pseudo-Moslem Mercenaries

In 1355 [21 Mar 76-20 Mar 77], when signs of the Islamic revolutionary movement of Iran began to appear, the mercenary Pahlavi regime realized that despite spending billions of rials of the wealth of this suffering nation and employing the various U.S., Israeli, and other mercenary experts of worldwide imperialism, it had been unsuccessful in putting out the burning flames of the Islamic revolution in Iran. The movement which began on 15 Khordad 1342 [5 Jun 63], under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, would turn into a roaring river to totally uproot the plundering domination of the Pahlavi regime and its American masters. U.S. imperialism also realized that it must try to metamorphose the great Islamic revolutionary movement of the Iranian people by any means, especially the propagation of Americanized Islam. The government of Sharifemami, who was introduced by the regime as a pious Moslem person, was in line with the U.S. propaganda and efforts. Sharifemami, who was a partner in the plunder and crimes of the regime for three decades and more, closed the casinos and gambling houses and presented himself as a true Moslem. But, history did not stop with these tricks, even for a moment. The shah's hired agents, the royal clergy and the court pseudo-clerics, made every effort to present the murderous shah as a Moslem. In this regard, Daneshi, the infamous pseudo-cleric, was ahead of others. With the fall of the hated Pahlavi regime and the victory of the Islamic revolution of Iran, U.S. imperialism tried, this time, to strengthen the leaders of those particular political

lines which were friendly to the United States. Of course, it had not forgotten the royal clerics. The propagators of Americanized Islam tried intensely between '57 and '58 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 80], to isolate Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and thereby to defeat the Iranian revolution.

The Assassination of Personalities

The United States and all the imperialist news agencies would support the minigroups which assumed a Moslem appearance but were really pro-American, such as Khalq-e Mosalman, and at the same time, tried, unsuccessfully, to label the Islamic revolution, especially revolutionary Moslems, as "communist." It was in the course of these low propaganda efforts that the United States and its functionaries, within and outside the country, presented the Islamic land reform as a communist plan, denigrating the system of the just distribution of goods, which was implemented at the time of the forced war of the mercenary regime of Saddam against the Islamic Republic of Iran, with base slogans such as "coupon-ism, communism." And for the purpose of the character assassination of members of the clergy who follow the line of the Imam and that of national political personalities in sensitive posts, they spread unfounded rumors. Now, since they did not attain their sinister goals in this way, today, they have begun to literally assassinate these personalities through their mercenaries, while none of the royal clergy and defenders of the line of compromise with the United States are targets of such conspiracies and assassinations. The propagators of Americanized Islam try from within and outside the country to tarnish the reputation of Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thusfar, several times persons in Islamic guise who were in reality pro-American, throughout the world, especially in Egypt and Morocco, have made banal and empty statements against Imam Khomeyni. These statements and accusations against our Imam are also rooted in the conspiracies of the criminal United States. On a worldwide scale, too, CIA agents are actively engaged in spreading the brand of Islam they support against true Islam, and especially the Islamic revolution of Iran. In Saudi Arabia, with a regime whose dependence is known and, therefore, needs no explanation, they have established an organization called "The Moslem World League," which functions as the loudspeaker of the United States and Americanized Islam. This American-made organization has also spoken many times to the effect that Imam Khomeyni has deviated from Islam and is denigrating the Islamic revolution of Iran. But the plunder of millions of barrels of oil from Saudi Arabia by the plundering oil companies is ignored. This CIA-made organization presented the buried shah as an exemplary Moslem. From the standpoint of this organization, any Moslem or Islamic government that rises up against the tyranny and injustice of U.S. imperialism is "communist."

Other branches similar to this organization exist in Egypt, which are fed from the feed bag of the functionary and treacherous Sadat and conspire against the countries that are the members of the resistant Arab front, especially Syria and Libya, and play a basic role in escalating the fire in Lebanon.

On the Indian sub-continent, when the military regime of Pakistan puts out the whipping-board and presents itself as the defender of Islam, or in India, after the government with U.S. and Western leanings, "Janata," is set aside and Mrs Indira Gandhi comes to power with an independent, anti-American spirit, the Hindu-Moslem war begins. All of these events show the depth of U.S. conspiracies against true, revolutionary Islam. The U.S. fear of the Islamic revolution of Iran, which neither supports capitalism nor communism, is clear enough when we consider that since the fall of the corrupt Pahlavi regime, hundreds of different conspiracies have taken place, and still continue to take place, against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the direct military transgression in Tabas, the creation of regional and ethnic wars, and, finally, the assassination of clerics who follow the line of the Imam and of revolutionary personalities by the United States. But, since "Allah" is the protector of true Islam and the Islamic revolution of Iran, these intrigues and conspiracies of the criminal United States and its allies will also be neutralized. The mask has already been removed from the faces of the propagators of Americanized Islam. They will be identified and exposed no matter what form they hide behind.

9593
CSO: 4640/4

RADIO DISCUSSES REACTION TO OPPOSITION GOVERNMENT

NC031645 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 3 Oct 81

[Text] Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization [MKO], in an interview with AFP submitted the program of the provisional government-in-exile and said that Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime is breathing its last breath and has actually been caused to yield. On the possibility of cooperation between the MKO and the National Resistance Council with other antiregime factions, including the National Resistance Movement of Iran led by Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, the MKO leader said that the Mojahedin-e Khalq do not (?intend) [words indistinct].

The second channel of French television has broadcast part of an interview granted by Abolhasan Bani-Sadr to its correspondent. In this interview Bani-Sadr referred to the presidential elections and said that the Iranian people will refrain from voting. The clerical regime's dismissed president, who was speaking on behalf of the Iranian people, added: The Iranian nation has chosen me as its true president. Bani-Sadr claimed that he has always been the true representative of the people's wants.

World agencies have reported that Shapur Bakhtiar has described the announcement of the formation of a provisional government-in-exile by Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the dismissed president of the clerical regime, as ridiculous. He stated this in a press conference. Leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran, Bakhtiar said that if Iran was not facing such sad conditions he would have (?referred to this announcement) [words indistinct].

The last prime minister of Iran's former regime then referred to (?the executions without trials) by the clerical regime and said that, (?according to statistics which he has), the officials of the "Islamic" regime are executing members of his party too.

Azadegan organization has rejected any type of cooperation with Bani-Sadr. World agencies have reported that after the announcement on the formation of the provisional government-in-exile by the deposed president of the clerical regime, Azadegan organization announced that Bani-Sadr was involved in the (?group) executions of the Iranian military personnel and people and that uniting with him is completely out of the question.

A spokesman for Azadegan organization added that Bani-Sadr was involved in the economic, industrial and cultural destruction of Iran during the 2 1/2 years of the mullahs' rule and (?was one of the regime's agents).

The Azadegan organization is led by Dr Bahram Aryana, who is considered to be among the most virtuous heads of the Iranian army and who enjoys great popularity within the army. While ruling out cooperation with Bani-Sadr, the Azadegan organization spokesman has not ruled out a unity between the MKO and the Azadegan organization to overthrow Khomeyni's regime. Informed observers believe that this can be a sign of the opening of the doors of talks to the KMO by the Azadegan organization toward the destruction of Khomeyni's fascist and illegal regime.

The French Foreign Ministry has issued a warning to Abolhasan Bani-Sadr. This warning came after Bani-Sadr's remarks on the formation of a provisional government-in-exile. A spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry said that he had come to know of Bani-Sadr's statement through the press.

By virtue of the French laws, political refugees should refrain from participating in political activities as much as possible.

We wish to recall that the only person who was a political refugee in France and used the best and most propaganda media and had the possibilities for the most extensive political activities was Sheykh Ruhollah Khomeyni.

CSO: 4640/11

BANI-SADR LABELED AS 'MEGLOMANIAC OF CENTURY'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Sep 81 p 6

> [Text] The United States, seeing Bani-Sadr hungry and restless for "power," used him as a "pawn" to create a deviation in the course of the Islamic revolution of Iran, escalated his hungriness for power, and was ready to call this psychologically sick man the "second Nader Shah."

At a time when the victory of the Islamic revolution shattered all the political standards and dealings of U.S. imperialism in Iran and the roaring flood of the Moslem people of Iran shook the strong foundation of all the world-devourers throughout the world through their shouts of "death to America," there remained no doubt for any human being that the wounded United States would try to overthrow the new, ideological regime of Iran. We do not want to renumerate the U.S. conspiracies in Iran, political, military, or otherwise. Briefly, however, we will discuss one of its pawns, who was trained for many years, under quite appropriate circumstances, for the day when he would be able to repay his debt to his master. This pawn is none other than Bani-Sadr, a personality everybody already recognizes, and everyone knows the story of his hunger for power and of his downfall. Recently, in an interview with a Japanese newspaper, he made certain statements. Let us study them together in order to better know him.

"The former Iranian president, Mr Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, said in a newspaper interview with CHA, published in Tokyo: I guarantee that if the Iranian regime closes down the revolutionary courts, the assassinations of government personalities will stop.

"Bani-Sadr also said that he will refuse any compromise with Ayatollah Khomeyni in order to return to Iran. He said: The only possibility for the survival of the Islamic regime in Iran is to be faithful to its previous commitments and establish true freedom in Iran. Bani-Sadr said that he still considers himself the president of Iran because he was elected by the people. The former president of Iran said that he receives daily reports on what is happening and what is

about to happen in Iran and issues daily instructions as to what must be done."

Bani-Sadr's Fear of the Revolutionary Courts

One of the problems that should have made the authorities of the country aware of Bani-Sadr's ideas was his grudging enmity with the revolutionary courts. Even at a time when the revolutionary courts were sending elements such as Nasiri, Moqaddam, and Hoveyda before the firing squad, Bani-Sadr did not agree. But, since he knew that these courts were endorsed by the people, he could not attack them directly. Now, with Bani-Sadr's statements concerning the closure of the revolutionary courts, we can identify the main points of his ideas about these revolutionary courts, which can, in itself, lead to a general understanding of him. The most important reason for Bani-Sadr's wish is that he knows the above-mentioned courts identify influential figures through the confessions of those captured and many of his plans, and ultimately the future plans of the United States, are thereby neutralized. Bani-Sadr knows that with these courts, the "democratic games" which would result in the escape of the likes of a Bakhtiar or Madani would be ineffective since the courts deal decisively with the criminals. Thus, we see that the revolutionary courts are so vital that Bani-Sadr says if they are closed, the assassinations of personalities will stop. Precisely, Bani-Sadr wants to show himself as a man who does "business." Doing business with the lives of the people! If only he were courageous and manly enough to say clearly that if the lives of the American pawns are protected, he would be ready to end terrorism.

The Uncompromising Bani-Sadr

When Bani-Sadr says, "I am not willing, by any means, to compromise with Imam Khomeyni," we can readily picture his hypocritical face. We remember well that during Bani-Sadr's rule, he emphasized over again in his interviews and speeches that he would, by no means, oppose the imam, and he even called himself the imam's son! He unabashedly lied. He was, in fact, the political son of the world-devouring United States. If he called himself the son of the imam, it was merely because he knew that Imam Khomeyni has a very vast and deep base in the people. And if he were to oppose the imam directly, he would be the target of the people's anger and would be trampled under their feet. But, finally, the computorized American information and public opinion poll of the Office of Coordination put aside the modicum of precaution on the part of Bani-Sadr and, by assuring him that the people would support him, put Bani-Sadr at the head of the anti-people movement of the armed functionaries of the United States in the country (Mojahedin-e Khalq). And it was confronted with the swift reaction of the Moslem people, who always strangulate the calculations of the United States at the throat of its computors. But, it is interesting that Bani-Sadr was lured by the promises of

the United States and thought that in the near future, he would return to Iran as the autocratic president! That is why he stressed that he would not compromise with the imam. Even Bakhtiar, who had listened to the promise of the United States earlier and had counted on it, has not made such a statement, because he has, at least, realized how the world laughs at these playthings in the hands of U.S. imperialism.

The Unfulfilled Nader Shah the Second

One of the distinguishing features of Bani-Sadr used by the United States was his pride in the personality cult which had taken him over completely. And the United States would implement its objectives through Bani-Sadr by aggrandizing him. In short, the United States stirred up this horrible disease in him and if Bani-Sadr had only remained in the seat of power for a little while longer, he could have been called "Nader Shah the Second."

In any case, despite the fall of Bani-Sadr, in his sick mind, he still believes that he is loved by the people, that the people are still fond of him after all that bloodshed of which this honorable Bani-Sadr was the ultimate cause. As a result, he sinks into his dreams and claims that he is still the elected president of the Iranian people. Someone should ask him: Mr Elected-by-the-people, would you dare to come, even for two minutes, among the people who, you say, have "elected" you and benefit from their kindness? In short, the unfulfilled Mr Bani-Sadr should go to a mental hospital to be cured of his delusions of grandeur.

Studying the Reports of Assassinations and Bombings

In another part of the above-mentioned interview, Bani-Sadr, quite unabashedly, indirectly assumes responsibility for the bombings and assassinations, shows himself larger than he really is, and presents himself as the commander of these crimes. He says: "I receive the reports of the operations and give instructions." This type of self-aggrandizement of Bani-Sadr's is nothing new to us. If you will recall, when he was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he spoke regularly of the front lines of the war front. But, later, it became clear that the gentleman, for the purposes of public deception, would go to one of the cities in Khuzestan and, in a safe and secure place, along with the leaders of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, plot against the regime. Of course, in order to give the appearance of having accomplished something, he would sometimes ride a motorcycle and occasionally predict for the people his death on the hot sands of Khuzestan. But we later witnessed that the man who predicted his own death on the hot sands of Khuzestan had hid in women's clothing in a ladies room and, instead of Khuzestan, he took refuge on the Champs Élysées. On the whole, the main objective of Bani-Sadr and other American elements in saying that Bani-Sadr is leading the terrorist

operations is to force the people into a new train of thought. Now, since they have been unable to gain the trust of the people through pretty words like freedom and nationalism, they are trying to drag the people into following them through terrorism and the method that Mr Bani-Sadr used to refer to as "Stalinist." But, they are unaware of the fact that the Islamic Republic and the Moslem people are complements of one another and are inseparable. Bani-Sadr, and ultimately the United States, must realize full well that in order to mend his wound, he must stay away and not try to take revenge, because a government movement in which the people have a share is invincible. Especially when the basis for its movement is ideological and Islamic, never, under any circumstances, will figures such as Bani-Sadr--even if they try to wield their influence in the post of the presidency to indulge in the greatest of conspiracies--be able to stop its movement. We hope for the day when all those who have been unable to strike at the superpowers in order to be free of their shackles become victorious and, along with those who are in step with beloved Islam and on the path to perfection, become our companions.

God willing

9593
CSO: 4540/2

KHOMEYNI, MOJAHEDIN CONSIDERED SIMILAR BY MONARCHIST PAPER

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 14 Sep 81 pp 1-3

/Text/ The Western mass media are treating the subjects of the "Mojahedins" and "Bani-Sadr" with a superficiality and a partiality not in keeping with professional ethics. The Iranians in Europe and the United States are really disturbed about it. Under the circumstances, the fragmentary and incomplete presentation of facts is certainly more dangerous than the mere statement of an untruth would be.

We know well that for too many journalists--European and American--the Iranian problem can only be important to the extent that it provides material for sensational and preferably original articles. It is in this state of mind that some commentators approach these days the question of the Mojahedins and their puppet ally Bani-Sadr. Hurriedly written articles, superficial broadcasts made like film strips, tend to give the public a false picture both of the Mojahedins as well as their chief, Radjavi and Bani-Sadr.

Thus hardly 10 days ago, the American politician, George Ball, published an article in the WASHINGTON POST, reproduced again in Paris by the HERALD TRIBUNE. In this article, George Ball emphasized that the Mojahedin, while being profoundly Islamic, are not Marxists, in his opinion. In addition, he did all he could to deny the existence of bonds between the Mojahedins and Moscow, declaring it is essential that the West support them. Now George Ball was precisely in 1978 the consultant specially entrusted with Persian Gulf affairs in the U.S. National Security Council. Because of his position, he made a trip to Iran, after which he drew up a report intended for President Carter. It was a report which had helped considerably to guide the decisions of the Carter administration and to hasten the fall of the Shah on behalf of the "liberating" Khomeyni regime. We know today the benefits of this so highly supported "liberation."

Moreover, TIME magazine recently devoted an article to the Mojahedins, singing their praises and those of their leader suddenly transformed into a political superman, the only one capable of governing Iran (hand in hand with Bani-Sadr, that is understood).

All this leads us to seriously ask the following question: could it really be that these so-called experts and these journalists have not taken the trouble to study deeply the organization of the Marxist-Islamic Mojahedins for terrorist activity?

Could it, in fact, be that no one has attempted to investigate the relations, sometimes open and sometimes secret, which the Mojahedins maintain with Moscow? Everybody agrees, saying over and over again that the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, is in the pay of Moscow, while the Mojahedins are only exciting young Islamic and independent socialists. Let us be realistic: if the Tudeh has been cunning enough to infiltrate into the nooks and crannies of the Islamic republic (and it has done it), how can we imagine that it has not also wormed its way into the ranks of the Mojahedin organization? There is a point which, nevertheless, would deserve to be studied.

Having said that, the articles and broadcasts are very scarce which have had the honesty to mention the Mojahedins' terrorist background: air hijackings, bank robberies, assassinations of state officials and attempts perpetrated, before the revolution, against American advisers. And who then has ever remembered that it is these same Mojahedins who, after having helped Khomeyni to come to power, officially supported the actions of the revolutionary courts, exhorting them to be even crueler and harsher.

These tendentious methods, which circulate biased and untrue news throughout the world have facilitated the takeover of power in the past by the Pol Pots and Khomeynis, let us not forget it. Remember: Khomeyni, the idol, the prophet of Neauphle-le-chateau... Who then at the time had taken the trouble to consult the works of the old man, where, however, everything was written. History repeats itself continuously. It was only after 1945 that one began to read "Mein Kampf." Now and in a period of 3 years, the same scenario is developing, like a Nieme "remake" of Robin Hood.

We know and we solemnly declare that if the destiny of Iran should be entrusted to the Mojahedins (thanks to one of these foreign interventions which we are used to!), the bloodbath which would result from it would be by far more terrible and more systematic than it is now. Our country would be doomed to the fate of Cambodia and delivered to complete genocide. In time, it would inevitably fall in the hands of the Soviets. We know that the USSR has been in contact with the Mojahedins for several years, through the medium either of the PLO or certain Arab countries. We know that the Mojahedin benefit at one and the same time from money, weapons and advice from Soviet Russia.

We do not exaggerate when we assert that the Mojahedin organization, just like the other small groups of the Iranian left, operates

in Iran with exactly the same methods as the Baader-Meinhof Gang and the Red Brigade in Europe. Would it ever occur to anyone to imagine these terrorists taking over in Germany or Italy? It is true that some perhaps consider that Europe is the cradle of modern civilization, while Iran is so far away and so uncivilized that the similarities and the differences between a Khomeyni and the Mojahedins do not matter much.

Among us, only the weekly LE POINT has been able to show realism in its number on 7 September, exposing the myth which surrounds the supposed power of the Mojahedins.

In fact, the Iranian people, exhausted, starving, traumatized and disgusted with everything, only ask to recover a stable, sensible government. The Mojahedin adventure is not designed to tempt them. And if the Mojahedins enjoy a relative popularity at the moment, it is because they have revolted against Khomeyni and are making war on him. Today, in Iran, if the devil in person came to stand up against Khomeyni, he would enjoy the same popular support.

It would be mistaken to think that the temporary support given, for lack of anything better, by part of the population to a band of terrorists at war with other terrorists stronger than they, is an expression of affection and popular confidence. It is certain that once they are delivered from the criminal mullaharchy, the Iranians will not allow it to be replaced by another clique of torturers, who are also Islamic extremists whose activity is strangely reminiscent of the Khomeyni supporters.

The country's silent majority, both among the civilians as well as in army ranks has not yet expressed itself. The Iranians are human beings with exceptional resources, history has shown it. It would be better for the most serious observers and experts, not to count their chickens before they are hatched.

8490
CSO: 4619/3

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES FOREIGN POLICY PRINCIPLES

GF060910 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 6 Oct 81

[Text] Hoseyn Musavi, the foreign minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a statement to the CBS television network about the characteristics of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the crimes of U.S. imperialism and the Egyptian people's revolutionary movement said that Iran's foreign policy is based on the principle of neither East nor West. This principle has historic roots, he said, and the Iranian revolution has given it a materialistic character.

The Iranian foreign minister attributed the failure of the American people to understand the Islamic revolution of Iran to the influence of the international news agencies that are submissive to imperialist hegemony. The foreign minister said that Islam today is in a period of resurgence and the Iranian revolution is the harbinger of general and international changes in the Islamic countries.

Moreover, Musavi affirmed that Iran's foreign policy does not dictate meddling in the affairs of others. The developing movement in the Islamic world is only the movement of the Islamic masses inspired by the Iranian revolution. The Muslim peoples, in their action, will force their governments in the future to pursue this direction.

The Iranian foreign minister referred to the resurgence of the Islamic movement in Egypt, saying that the reasons behind the resurgence are the same as those that kindled the Islamic revolution of Iran. The detention of more than 2,000 leaders of the religious opposition clearly shows the upcoming changes in Egypt.

Our foreign minister described the former Iranian-U.S. relations as those between the wolf and the lamb. He said Iran will not have relations with the United States as long as it pursues its militant and imperialist ways.

CSO: 4604/2

MINISTER OF STATE DISCUSSES TRADE ACCORD WITH ROMANIA

LD021346 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 2 Oct 81

[Interview with Mr Banki, minister of state in charge of the plan and budget organization, by unidentified correspondent--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Mr Banki, would you be kind enough to elaborate on the importance of the agreement signed today in Tehran [at the conclusion of the visit of the Romanian economic delegation headed by the Romanian deputy premier].

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful, as I said when the delegation arrived in Tehran the reason behind the delegation's visit to Iran was to acquaint them with the concept of the Islamic revolution. They were very impressed, specially when touring Tehran's Behest-e-Zahra cemetery and in the front of the grave of the martyr, late president Mohammad Ali Raja'i. They were impressed by the people's morale.

The other reason behind the delegation visit was to discuss our economic issues and the issues relating to our mutual ties in the transportation of goods bought by Iran from Romania and the sort of commodities bought by Iran. There were problems which we discussed in detail. We obtained a number of very suitable commitments from them, and they committed themselves to removing these obstacles.

Yet, I believe that the greatest success was achieved in expending our mutual ties and cooperation. We decided to increase considerably the volume of our mutual trade, and we achieved some success concerning nonoil commodities. Romania accepted a number of new commitments. It was decided that Iran's nonoil exports to Romania should not fall below U.S. $70 million. This is against the background that the volume of our nonoil exports to Romania in previous years has not exceeded U.S.$60 million. The new success is due to efforts made by our brothers in the Ministry of Commerce's export division.

In oil exports we reached agreement to the effect that the volume of our oil exports to Romania in 1982 will exceed 4 million tons annually. They also agreed to honor their previous commitments by the end of this year. This in itself is a considerable figure, if we bear in mind that Romania was buying only 2.5 million tons of oil annually from Iran.

We also reached agreement on pursuing the pattern of barter trade more efficiently. We decided and agreed that in its purchases from Romania Iran should also pay more attention to this aspect of barter trade. This policy is, of course, specially favorable to Iran.

When we invited the Romanian delegation, we did so in the light of a policy of not involving ourselves in a kind of sophisticated technology--we commit ourselves to becoming involved with cheaper and less sophisticated technology--and such agreements would contribute to implementing such policies.

[Question] Mr Banki, would you tell us the effects of such accords on our society?

[Answer] As I said earlier, the most important effect would be to mobilise us toward achieving greater production. We believe that the other front on which our great nation is fighting is the front of production: domestic output must increase. We can realize our slogans of independence and liberty only through such channels as increasing our domestic output.

The agreement reached with Romania on the basis of which we would export U.S.$70 million worth of our home-produced goods to Romania, commits us to increase domestic output through a precise program. We intend to reach similar accords with other nations. Increased domestic output is very important from our viewpoint.

As far as our oil exports are concerned and the agreement which we signed for the purchase of machinery, in view of the fact that Romania's industry is not sophisticated and complicated, we are killing two birds with one stone: we are satisfying our needs while providing the opportunity for our industries to achieve self-sufficiency.

CSO: 4640/11

MITSUI READY TO WITHDRAW FROM PETROCHEMICAL VENTURE

London 8 DAYS in English 19 Sep 81 pp 56-57

[Article by Koji Nakamura]

[Text]

THE JAPANESE government will support the withdrawal of the Mitsui consortium from the ill-fated Iran-Japan Petrochemical Company (IJPC) should Mitsui so decide. This announcement by Japan's international trade and industry minister, Rokusuke Tanaka, on 1 September — following the assassination of both Iran's president and prime minister — underscores the growing pessimism of the Mitsui authorities towards the future of the Japanese yen 750 bn ($3.2bn) project, construction of which has been suspended since the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war last September.

Tanaka told a press meeting that 'the ministry would respect the judgment Mitsui may reach' on whether or not to withdraw from the project. Toshikuni Yahiro, president of Mitsui and Company, which leads the Iran Chemical Development Company (ICDC), had declared on 31 August that the situation in Iran was 'beyond the capacity of a private corporation to counter.' The ICDC is the Japanese investing firm of the IJPC, and consists of five companies affiliated with Mitsui.

Tanaka's statement was apparently made in response to Yahiro's remarks, which clearly implied Mitsui's intention of withdrawing. Mitsui sources said the company is even preparing to file an application with the government for a Y150bn ($648m) 'export insurance' arrangement to reduce its huge losses.

The Mitsui group is apparently preparing to make a choice. It can either monitor the situation for some time and then take a decision depending on how the situation develops. Or it can dispatch a delegation to Tehran giving the Iranian leadership notice to withdraw from the project.

According to Mitsui sources, the latter is the more likely choice since the delegation promised from Tehran 'now appears to be impossible.' Even before the current turmoil set in, the Mitsui group was rather pessimistic. The project — located in Bandar Khomeini, some 100km from the Iraqi border — has been bombed by the Iraqis five times sustaining 'considerable though repairable' damage.

In talks between the Iranians and Japanese representatives in Tehran in late July and early August, Iran turned down Japan's request to change the equal equity arrangement before work on the 85 per cent completed project was resumed. The Japanese team insisted that Iran should bear 'all expenses that have been incurred since the outbreak of the war and will be incurred after the work resumption.'

Though rejecting the Japanese demand, Iran nevertheless strongly urged the Mitsui Group to resume work on the basis of the agreement, concluded in 1971, which stipulated an equal capital share. It was agreed

that Iran would send a delegation headed by the acting petroleum minister, Hassan Sadat, to Tokyo in August to finalise the talks.

Mitsui sources say the 'subsequent events in Iran have made it all the more likely that we would withdraw from the project ... while we may watch developments for some time, we may eventually feel compelled to send a delegation to Tehran to express our intent to withdraw.'

These sources pointed to their inability to continue financing the project. The Japanese investing firm — consisting of Mitsui and Company, Mitsui Petrochemical, Mitsui-Toatsu Chemicals, Toyo Soda and Nippon Synthetic Rubber — has invested Y72.5 bn ($313m) in capital and Y250bn ($1bn) in credit facilities. Original construction expenses were estimated at Y270bn ($1.17bn) to be shared equally by the two countries.

Growing construction expenses made the Japanese government decide in October 1979 that it would make Y20bn ($86m) available in the form of state investment. A total of Y5.4bn ($23m) has so far been committed. Mitsui stopped financing the project in April 1981, due to the 'financial inability' of the investing firms, which had been affected by recession. Interest on the credit alone has amounted to Y100m ($430,000) per day.

CSO: 4600/27

BRIEFS

GUNBOATS IN BUSHEHR--The Iranian gunboats docked at the second naval district base in Bushehr today. According to a report by the Central News Unit, the three Iranian gunboats--Tabarzin, Khanjar and Neyzeh--docked at the base's jetty and were given a warm welcome by base personnel and their families. Hojjat Ol-Eslam Sedaqat, temporary Bushehr Friday Imam; Bushehr governor General Horri; the base commander; the revolution guards commander; and other local officials were also on hand. Special ceremonies were carried out during the docking. [Text] [GF031647 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1530 GMT 3 Oct 81]

MUSAVI-TABRIZI'S SAVAK CONNECTIONS--Ahmad Salamatian, a dpeuty in the mullahs' Majlis who has escaped to France, in an interview with France Inter Radio announced that Hoseyn Musavi-Tabrizi, Khomeyni's Islamic revolution prosecutor, had been a member of SAVAK and on its payroll. He announced that documents concerning Musavi-Tabrizi's cooperation with SAVAK will be published soon. Musavi-Tabrizi said in an interview sometime ago with (?Eve Ouise), a French radio correspondent on assignment in Tehran, that all opponents of the Islamic regime must be executed even if they number over 100,000. [Text] [GF051743 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 5 Oct 81]

NEW KHUZESTAN APPOINTMENTS--The public relations department of Khuzestan's governor general's office announces the selection of 'Abdol Karim Fat'ani, acting mayor of Hendijan, as district governor of Hendijan. Masha'allah Hayati, acting district governor of Hendijan, has been appointed acting district governor of Bandar-e Khomeyni. [GF051855 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 5 Oct 81]

HUNGARIAN, INDIAN ENVOYS--The Central News Unit reports that Mr Lajos Nagy, the Hungarian ambassador to Tehran met today with Mr Ahmad 'Azizi, the acting minister and thedeputy in charge of international and economic affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Economic relations between the two countries were discussed and the Hungarian ambassador expressed interest in expanding these relations. Mr Ahmad 'Azizi announced the willingness of the Islamic Republic of Iran to increase cooperation with countries which are not seeking domination over Iran through their relations and which are in favor of a rational balance of trade. He said: The Islamic Republic of Iran is prepared to meet its needs and develop its industries, technology and agriculture by expanding relations with such countries and emphasized that in this connection, the independence of those countries and their stance with regard to the Islamic revolution and its enemies will be considered. Mr 'Azizi also met today with Akbar Mirza Khaleeli, the Indian ambassador to Tehran. At this meeting they discussed relations between the two countries and other topical current issues. [Excerpts] [LD061156 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 6 Oct 81]

ROYAL FAMILY LEAVES EGYPT--According to a report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent, following the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (?yesterday), members of the family of the late shah of Iran who were in Cairo left Cairo in a special plane. They have gone to a country in North Africa. It is possible that the royal family has gone to Morocco. [Text] [NC071639 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Oct 81]

MOSCOW CONFERENCE--The environment organization has announced that Reza Hoseynmirza-ahari, the prime minister's representative and the supervisor of the state environment organization, has departed for Moscow to attend the interregional session on pollution. [Excerpt] [LD020524 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 1 Oct 81 LD]

AMBASSADOR TO ALGERIA--Mr Mohammad Mehdi Korrani, the Islamic Republic of Iran's new ambassador to Algeria, left for Algiers to begin his diplomatic activities there. [Text] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 1 Oct 81 LD]

'PARS,' SANA' AGREEMENT--The PARS News Agency delegation led by Kamal Kharrazi arrived in Tripoli, Libya, yesterday from Damascus where it had met with the undersecretary of the Syrian Information Ministry and the directors of the collective information media and inspected the Syrian news agency SANA. In Damascus Kharazzi held talks with officials of the collective information media on the development and promotion of the exchange of news between the two countries. PARS and SANA also agreed on the method of their cooperation. [Text] [GF020805 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 2 Oct 81]

'PARS' DIRECTOR IN ALGERIA--PARS director general Dr Kamal Kharrazi met in Algeria yesterday with the Algerian information minister and discussed Algerian-Iranian information relations and the need for a unified information front against imperialist media. Iran's proposal on establishing an Islamic news agency was also discussed. [GF061720 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 6 Oct 81 GF]

HUNGARIAN AMBASSADOR--Ahmad 'Azizi, the Iranian Foreign Ministry deputy for international affairs, received Hungarian Ambassador S. Lajos Nagy yesterday. They discussed furtherance of economic relations. 'Azizi said Iran is ready to deal with any country on an equal basis for the development of our economy and technology in agriculture and industry. 'Azizi also briefed the ambassador on the U.S. conspiracy against Iran illustrated in the recent alleged air raid on the Kuwaiti oil complex. [GF070432 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 7 Oct 81 GF]

CSO: 4604/2

ARAB MAYORS CITE FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Jul 81 p 17

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "Arab Authorities in a Bind"]

[Text] Local Arab authorities in Israel have chosen the easy way out. Every chance they get, they repeatedly emphasize that the Ministry of the Interior and other government offices are treating them this way and that. While the local authorities in Israel have budgets averaging 3,000 shekels per capita, the Arab settlements average 500 shekel per capita. On the face of things, their claim is convincing--even shocking.

Tawfiq Ziyad, Knesset member and mayor of Nazareth, is not satisfied with this economic determination, but rather compares Nazareth to Acre, for example. He claims that the Ministry of the Interior granted a 150 million shekel budget to Acre but only 80 million to Nazareth. Ziyad claims that while Nazareth's population is double that of Acre its budget is half.

Taking a better look at things, we find the following misleading comparisons: in Kfar Yafi'a, for example, per capita expenditures in 1977 by the local council amounted to 31 shekels. In the Druze village of Ikr'a, per capita expenditures came to 35 shekels, 37 shekels in Mag'ar, 70 shekels in Kfar Kan'a and 72 shekels per capita is Osafia. On the other hand, in 'Ar'ara, Tira, Taiyiba and Tamra, per capita spending was over 90 shekels. The level of expenditures is not consistent in Jewish settlements either. In Pardes Hana-Karkur per capita expenditures by the council were around 180 shekels; in Nes-Tziona, 228 shekels; in Ma'alot, Migdal Ha'emek and Eilat more than 500 shekels were spent per person.

An appalling level of services

The principal factor determining the rate of expenditures and the size of the budget is the level of services provided by the local authority to the residents. In Nazareth, for example, there is only one municipal high school (eight other high schools are run by Christian church groups). This is obviously reflected in the city's budget. Since the Ministry of Education does not channel funds for salaries to teachers in church institutions through the municipality, Nazareth's budget appears meager as compared with the budgets for Acre or 'Afula which include salaries to teachers in all area high schools.

This problem is even more dramatically expressed with regard to the services which, in most cases, are not provided by the Arab authorities. In most Arab settlements, for example, there is no sewage system, nor would you find public parks, swimming pools, playgrounds worth using, child care centers or municipal dental clinics. There is no public library in Nazareth or in most other large Arab settlements. Roads are very poorly maintained and the approach to Nazareth from 'Afula, Haifa or Tiberius is not equipped with lighting befitting a city which attracts pilgrims and visitors from all over the world. Visitors to the city are greeted by piles of trash and rubble. There are no sidewalks on the main thoroughfare, no bus stations or other basic public services. The erratic transportation schedules attest to crying neglect.

On the other hand, it is important to note that in Nazareth, as in all Arab settlements, there are no shelters under construction, no maintenance costs to inflate the city's budget. By the same token, the Arab authorities are not obligated to subsidize the salaries of religious personnel or the upkeep of synagogues and religious baths. Nor do they maintain food programs for school children.

The level of municipal services in most Arab settlements is undoubtedly minimal. Of course, every local council employs a full-time chairman. In many villages the secretary also serves as treasurer. Sanitary services are performed by private contractors who remove but do not collect garbage. Even the social worker, in many cases, works only part-time, as does the tax collector. This latter is naturally a function of the small amounts of taxes collected. The Ministry of the Interior has noted an improvement in this area over the last few years, especially last year as the date approached for linking the council's debts to the index and for enforcing time payments with interest on delinquent accounts.

The Ministry of the Interior also stated that most of the Arab councils responded to its demands for significant increases in municipal tax rates. Although these increases will double low tax rates, they will do little to reduce the gap between Arab and Jewish tax payers.

Confrontation indeed?

The major claim of the mayors and local council chairmen against the Ministry of the Interior is that although Israel Kenig, the northern district commissioner, has allowed a 120 percent increase in their budgets, this will only barely cover price and salary increases. Further, a 120 percent increase on a low starting base still leaves them in a depressed state.

Mr Ziyad, mayor of Nazareth, claims that he and his deputy have, since their election 5 years ago, been employed as all purpose clerks and have had to be constantly concerned with salaries for city employees arriving on time. The increases in prices and salaries delayed by several months the payment of salaries to city workers. The fact that the monies had to go first through the Ministry of the Interior increased the pressure even more.

As the 'Id al-Fitr holiday approaches, Mr Ziyad is running around between banks to secure funds to pay Muslim municipal employees their June wages, not to mention July. Ziyad says that "this cannot continue." If no significant changes take

place following Wednesday's protest strike, Ziyad will be obligated to his friends, who are leaders of other Arab authorities, to initiate prolonged strikes beginning 15 August and to delay school openings scheduled for the beginning of September. These actions are intended to modify the low tax base and bring municipal services into balance with those provided in Israel. Even the head of the national council of local Arab authorities, Mr Ibrahim Namar Husayn, mayor of Shefar'am, declared that he would follow suit. The question is whether the situation will result in a confrontation with the Ministry of the Interior. At the Ministry, they say they will not back off easily.

9811
CSO: 4323/54

ANTI-JEWISH FEELING SEEN AMONG WEST BANK ARABS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Aug 81 p 15

[Article by 'Atallah Mansur: "From the Depths of the Scorched Earth"]

[Text] I first heard about the "open door, close ear" policy espoused by the Ministry of Defense with regard to the population of the territories, on a television broadcast following a depressing conversation at the home of friends in Ramallah. My visit was a "voyage into the past" taken while on annual vacation. I made this voyage only after great hesitation. From reading the newspapers and from conversations with guests visiting the Galilee from cities on the West Bank, I knew that the people in the territories were not overflowing with contentment. But when I began to miss the many friends I had acquired during the 4 years I worked on the West Bank [1967-1971), I decided to go visit them. In order to save myself from listening to the endless, inevitable attacks, I decided to avoid all attempts to meet with businessmen or politicians, but to content myself with visits to the ordinary people I had known well. I knew from experience that these people tend to forget that they are talking to a journalist from Israel, and would treat me as a personal friend, a member of the family, and would therefore talk with me enthusiastically about personal matters.

During my 4-day trip, I visited Janin, Nablus, Ramallah, East Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Beit Jala. In each place I ran into a feeling of depression unlike any I had encountered before. In Janin, for example, I heard for the first time that the Jordanians who administered the high school matriculation exams had retaliated against Palestinian students this year by lowering their scores (blocking their entrance into any of the more popular departments at the University of Jordan). This claim was repeated in other conversations. Over a cup of coffee in Janin, I heard a dealer in building materials say that he was considering relocating to Amman. Why? "The Jews treat us like dogs." When I asked him what kind of treatment Palestinians could expect in Jordan, he swallowed a choice curse, adding: "But in Jordan today there's money to be made, a lot of money. The dirty work we do today for the Jews is being done in southern Jordan by Koreans and Philippinos." My host was willing to go into more detail. He had just returned from a visit to Amman where, according to his appraisal, they had just discovered the small, submissive far eastern woman. Every man of means in Amman in 1981 has a far eastern "maid" or "governess" or "second wife." "And in Amman, they don't pay taxes at all. Nothing stands in your way...to the contrary: the whole world is open to the residents of Amman." A Saudi guest interrupted the conversation at this point to

comment on the fine weather in Amman. My host from Janin decided this time to defend his native city. The weather in Janin is beautiful, too, he said, and the hope that better days are yet to come is encouraging. The Saudi visitor (of Palestinian descent) was quick to apologize, saying that he was only comparing Amman's weather to that of Saudi Arabia.

Left against Right

In Nablus they tell of large sums of money streaming in from Jordan to support the various political factions. Most of the money goes to supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood who last year took over the local univerisity, El-Naj'ah, and arranged for all members of the student council to be voted in from among their own ranks. Others remained on the outside. An open debate between supporters of the "Brotherhood" and the nationalists within the PLO ended in an altercation. Jordanian supporters of both groups send money to their counterparts on the other side of the river. Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other conservative forces are interested in controlling the remaining universities to maintain their influence in Nablus, East Jerusalem and Hebron. At Bir-Zayt University I was told that the Left governs the student council. But, there too the Muslim Brotherhood represents a significant force (and we are talking about an institution established with the support of Protestant missionaries.) The university in Bethlehem (established and supported by the Catholic Church) is ruled by leftwing and communist groups.

My partner in conversation in Nablus was a pharmacist. When I first met him, he was mainly interested in the good life, in food and drink. Today, he talks only politics. He finds it difficult to understand why the military government pursues the communists in particular. "They are the only ones in the West Bank who espouse the idea of a Palestinian State along side Israel, with mutual recognition by both peoples. Yet they receive the most hostile treatment from the Israeli government." My friend asked what I thought about Israel supporting the Muslim Brotherhood, when this latter is "duping" the people with mystical and anti-national ideas. According to him, the Brotherhood rejects the PLO ideology and opposes its actions. In the face of an armed struggle they demand a return to pure religious belief, to the universal percepts of Islam, and to a union of all believers, without regard for their country of origin, skin color or language--a humanism of sorts.

The pharmacist said that the intelligentsia from the West Bank cities adhere to two main lines: the Muslim Brotherhood are supporters of Jordan on the one hand, the leftists for whom the communists are the focal point on the other. In both camps there are extremists and moderates. The animosity between them probably equals their hatred against Israel and they fear each other more than they fear the military regime. This is due to the fact that in the case of the leftwing and rightwing factions, everyone knows everyone else. Since one attack could result in a bloodbath, they avoid each other. A few days after this conversation I heard that a terrorist network had been discovered which was planning an attack of the leader of the communists in Sir El-Barguti. When I mentioned the subject to a man from East Jerusalem who had in my presence defended the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, he quickly denounced that "gang" as a group of "partisans whose actions should not be construed as official decisions." He claimed that I "was forgetting" that the Right had been a target for leftist violence in the past.

He mentioned, for example, the communists and their friends who had attacked Mahmud Abu al-Zalaf, editor of the best circulated newspaper in the territories, AL-QUDS.

Disgraceful treatment at check points

The worst things of all were said against the Israelis, and not just against the Jewish settlers in the occupied zones who are crass and haughty in their relations with the local population. The border guards are considered by many to be symbolic of the ugly Israeli, aggressive and brutal. A professor of economics from Bethlehem told me that every time he's stopped at one of the check points, he expects and receives a fair share of insults. In his opinion, the behavior of the border guards is due in part to jealousy and frustration, because he has a nice car, a pretty wife, and a respected position. They always delay him "to check him out" or to see if his car is stolen. When I asked why he didn't complain, he told me that one of his friends had complained and since the complaint was registered with the police, the border police have visited him daily to investigate why he "sleeps on his left side" or why he snores, or to determine if he knows Mr X or if he has had contacts with Mr Y. In short, they made life miserable. The situation was impossible until the border guard in question was transferred to Lod Airport. How did my friend know that the border guard was transferred to Lod? My young friend went to Lod with his friend, the one who had dared to complain, to meet a visitor from the United States. They had no sooner arrived at the airport when they were most warmly greeted by the very same border guard who made them strip to conduct a body search, all the while mumbling about the "son-of-a-bitch" who had dared to complain about him. My host had heard about attempts to smuggle explosives into the airport. I didn't have to remind him of this fact. "But, that kind of action by a border guard incites and encourages terrorism." I tried to pacify my host by telling him that Arab citizens of Israel, including public officials close to the ruling authorities, received the same kind of treatment and that the matter had been referred to the deputy prime minister, Simcha Erlich. But my host was not pacified. He feels that he is being humiliated by a violent, enemy force.

Cops and robbers

A nun from Bethlehem and a merchant from Ramallah had similar complaints about the border guards at the check points. Of course, I can't determine the extent to which each complaint is true. But the fact that I heard them time and again (with most of the blame being laid on the Druze) means that the government (and the Minister of Defense who promised "an open door and a close ear") should set up an effective system for handling complaints from the public and for screening those whose over-zealous attitude sparks latent enemies.

To illustrate the anti-Israeli sentiment in the territories, I will quote a few comments made following a "regular" armed robbery in Ramallah which took place about a week ago, during my visit. Three people wearing masks entered a jewelry store. Whan a youth of 17 who was in the store resisted, they shot him and fled. A police car gave chase but didn't catch them. "The police car protected them and escorted them out of town," a merchant said. A boy who was in the shop added that they weren't robbers at all but that the masked men were Jewish police. A

taxi driver who had happened into the store told me that he himself went to Abu Kabir to help the family of the slain youth release the body for burial. An employee of the institute ("from the Gaza Strip") said that he didn't know where they'd find the doctor to grant the release. Only after he received a "gift" was he ready to look for the doctor. Then an Israeli employee ("Jewish") prevented him from looking for the doctor until he, too, received a similar "gift" of 100 shekels.

Regime of rumors

My protests against this slander were drowned in general laughter. It became clear that the prevailing attitude in the territories is one of unquestioned acceptance of any claims against the corrupt Israelis. I told my friends that they were exaggerating and that due to freedom of the press in Israel, they were getting the wrong impression. My hosts quickly corrected me, pointing out that the press in the territories is not free. In fact, the military censor had that very day prevented the publication of certain articles in AL-SHA'B and AL-FAJR. The editors of these papers are bound by administrative orders. Instead of an article that has been cut, they publish "Apologies" and in so doing destroy the readers' faith in freedom of press in Israel. In the absence of such faith, rumors abound. When you add to such rumors a bit of cruelty at a check point or two, a few instances of corruption, and incidents of the kind that are only natural in occupied territory under military rule, the result is a feeling that the human relations between people in the territories and Israelis are lost in the depths of the scorched earth.

Here and there I heard sympathetic comments about Rakah and Sheli. My hosts asked me to explain why Israeli voters "betrayed...these peace sympathizers." This underscores the fact that young, educated Palestinians, especially Christians, support the idea of the coexistence of Israel and a Palestinian State side by side. If one can judge by newspaper circulation, then among readers of newspapers there is an absolute majority supporting the Right, the Muslim Brotherhood and the pro-Jordanians. Whenever I asked about newspaper circulation I got the same answer: AL-QUDS has twice the circulation of its competitors, AL-FAJR and AL-SHA'B. The Israeli Arabic-language paper AL-ANBA' (published by a public group under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office), has almost no readership in major West Bank cities. Communist newspapers cannot be circulated in these cities. Therefore the West Bank is almost completely cut off from Israel. I had no opportunity to investigate the amount of radio or television viewing. But in about a dozen homes that I visited I heard no indications that Israeli television was being watched. Everyone, however, watches programs from Amman and listens to and quotes PLO broadcasts from Damascus. And I'm referring to families who are far from radical.

I tried to find out if there had been any rapprochement between the people in the territories and Israel since the Israeli occupation. I don't doubt for a moment that the gulf is wider today than ever before. Prior to 1967, they hated the Jews and demeaned them without even knowing them. Now that they know them better, especially their darker sides, the gulf is deeper and more substantiated.

9811
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WEST BANK MILITARY AUTHORITIES COPE WITH TIGHT BUDGET

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Jul 81 p 20

[Article by Yosef Tzuri'el: "On the West Bank Taxes are Low but Services are High"]

[Text] They call it a "military government" but what they're usually referring to is the presence of soldiers in the cities, check points on the highways and the capture and trial of terrorists. The military government, however, is also responsible for the performance of civil services, economic functions, industrial and commercial activities, employment and welfare services, health and education.

During the recent fiscal year of the "iron hand policy," as it is dubbed by the Arabs--or in the words of the regional commander, Lt Col Benyamin Ben Eli'ezer, "consistent restraint"--the military government could only concentrate on matters indirectly related to security and directed toward establishing a foundation of civil services.

The government had the relatively meager amount of 437 million shekels at its disposal. Only one-tenth of that was earmarked for development. The remainder was intended to underwrite current expenditures.

Thus, for example, the field officer in charge extended loans to workers for the purchase of automobiles and housing, granted loans to the local authorities for the development of electricity, roads and water, and guaranteed loans taken by individuals for commercial and industrial undertakings.

Agriculture and telephones

In the agricultural sector, production reached 1.8 billion shekels, an increase of more than 220 percent over last year. In three areas of production (olives, wheat and barley, and sesame), studies are being conducted to aid local residents. In the area of marketing, the military government is working to establish agricultural unions to reduce political dependence.

The telephone symbolizes economic development in the territories. In cities and rural areas telephones are in demand. In the eyes of many, this is the symbol of progress, but it is hard to catch up after decades of slow development in this area. In the last year, 662 new telephones were installed on the West Bank. In

Bethlehem, they're working to triple the number of lines. In Jericho, a central switchboard is being set up which will add 600 lines and in Janin, where today there are only 200 lines, there will soon be 1,000.

Automobiles

Another indicator of the economic situation on the West Bank is the increase in the number of automobiles. In 1980, there were close to 21,500 cars of all types, and in 1981, this figure increased to 25,000. A year ago there were 27,000 licensed drivers. This year there were more than 30,000.

Twenty-one new facilities for the care of mothers and children were opened, bringing the total to 79. Almost 300,000 residents now have health insurance. All area children have been immunized against small pox, measles, dyptheria, tetanus and tuberculosis. Data indicate that 1,342 people from Judea and Samaria who suffered from serious and complicated illnesses were treated in hospitals in Israel, and 2,479 people were examined at Hadassah Hospital, Tel Hashomer and other medical facilities in Israel proper.

In the field of education, a revolution is taking place. Since all children were given the opportunity to study at no cost, there has been a constant increase in the number of classrooms in all schools. Last year, 203,552 students attended 792 schools with 5,915 classrooms and 7,108 teachers.

Probation officers and special social workers have been brought in to rehabilitate youth with adjustment problems. These services and others cost money. People everywhere are rarely happy about paying taxes. On the West Bank, the payment of taxes is seen as taking money from the citizens' pockets in order to purchase planes and tanks.

Direct tax rates are lower on the West Bank than in Israel proper. In the last fiscal year 45.5 million shekels were collected, 40 million in customs and excise taxes.

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SOVIET POSITION ON PROPOSED U.S. SETTLEMENT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 234, 15 Aug 81 pp 12-13

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Soviet Green Light for the Proposed U.S. Solution; Ibrahim Qulaylat, Back from Moscow Says, 'New International Factors Dictated that the Middle East Crisis Be Dealt with Seriously' "]

[Text] One of the well-known and memorable Arabic proverbs is the one that states, "Silence is a sign of acquiescence or agreement."

Would it be correct to say that this well-known proverb applies mostly these days to the Soviet Union's position on the U.S. action to deal with the Lebanese crisis and the early indications for solutions to this crisis that are implied therein? Sometimes, these early indications of solutions come close to the core of the crisis, which is the problem of the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Ever since Washington, through its envoy to the area, Philip Habib, and through Arab and non-Arab diplomatic channels, began to take hold of the Lebanese crisis and to propose possible solutions and remedies for that crisis, the Soviet Union has not tried to object in practical terms to the fact that Washington was unilaterally undertaking this action or this role. Similarly, no concrete Soviet attempt has emerged to thwart the effect of this U.S. action.

In recent months rumors and much information have been circulating. Some of these went so fas as to assert that Washington's present actions on the Lebanese scene and in the area have been given a Soviet green light which prescribed for Washington the red lines of the limits of its action. The rumors and the information state that what Washington has done and is doing until now is not taking place apart from Moscow, but rather with its consent. Editorials that are published every now and then in PRAVDA, or by the Soviet NOVOSTI Agency or TASS attacking the U.S. action and U.S. imperialism are no more than actions that conform to a practice and to ideological positions and do not always reflect the communications and agreements that take place behind the scenes in Soviet-U.S. relations in the context of what is called the "game of nations."

Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis has become one of the few leaders who realize now the truth about the Soviet position on the joint U.S.-Arab action to bring about the Lebanese accord and to solve the problem of the south.

In addition to the Lebanese president there are Lebanese and Arab parties who are concerned about the struggle and who realized from the outset that the ongoing U.S. action was getting Soviet approval, albeit limited, and that Moscow's actions pointed in the direction of calling for an end to the complications of the Lebanese crisis and an attempt to solve the serious complexities that control this crisis.

It was amidst these climates that Mr Ibrahin Qulaylat, leader of the Independent Nasirist Movement, al-Murabitun, arrived in Moscow for a visit for which he had received an official invitation. The visit lasted 10 days and derived its significance from the rank of the Soviet officials who took part in the negotiations with Mr Qulaylat and the delegation that accompanied him. Chief among those officials were **Karen Brutents, Deputy Chief of the International Relations Committee in the Soviet Communist party; Vladimir Kudryavtsev, Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries; Alexander Dzasokhov, first Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee; and Yuriy (Drugin), secretary of the committee.**

This matter was the subject of interest in numerous Lebanese circles as well as some Arab circles known for their friendship with Moscow and their knowledge of the rank and role of those Soviet officials who took part in the negotiations that were conducted by the leader of al-Murabitun and the delegation that accompanied him to Moscow. This was considered an indication of a noticeable development in the style and the method with which the Soviets were dealing with the forces of struggle in Lebanon and in the Middle East.

If it is normal to say that these negotiations focused in a special way on the Lebanese problem, the Middle East crisis and the future of the situation in Lebanon and in the region, it seems important to say here that [members of] the al-Murabitun delegation returned from their visit to Moscow with a clear vision of what was taking place on the scene of the Middle East crisis and what was taking place behind the scenes internationally for this area, especially with regard to the Lebanese problem and the Palestinian problem.

This view confirms western diplomatic information which states that the channels of communication between Moscow and Washington are open and that an in-depth study of a new framework for achieving peace in the Middle East is being conducted via these channels.

It is being said in some circles that the belief with which the al-Murabitun delegation returned from Moscow is that there is some kind of Soviet-U.S. understanding in the not too distant horizon over achieving solutions to the Lebanese crisis and that this would strengthen the position of the legal authority and create cases of openness and stability

on the Lebanese security and political scenes, provided that this be a starting point for the search for a solution to the crisis of the area.

Information that has become available states that Washington has been given the role of undertaking this task on the Lebanese scene, that is, the role of controlling the Lebanese situation and preparing the Lebanese scene for the beginning of a new thrust toward a solution to the Middle East crisis.

This information does in fact answer several questions, and it justifies some of the Soviet positions toward U.S. action in the area. Accordingly, it explains the truth about two phenomena that attract attention. They are:

First, the fact that Washington undertook its actions and initiatives toward the Lebanese crisis and proposed solutions to that crisis and to the problem of the south without Soviet opposition for this action so far. In fact, one Soviet point of view relayed to some parties affirmed the positive quality of the Saudi role at this stage and described it as a national role.

Second, the special attention that Moscow, through its ambassador in Beirut, gave the subject of achieving the Lebanese accord and the fact that it encouraged the continuation of this step till the end. This was sensed by President Ilyas Sarkis, and he expressed satisfaction with it. He considered it a positive indicator of the truthfulness and earnestness of the international and Arab tendency to get Lebanon out of its predicament and to place it on the road to well-being.

In light of these incipient and serious stated factors, AL-MUSTAQBAL asked Mr Ibrahim Qulaylat the following question upon his return from his visit to Moscow.

"You conducted significant negotiations with senior Soviet officials. It's been said that you have concluded from these negotiations that there are no Soviet objections to all the political actions--either U.S. actions or those that are carried out through the Arab Follow-Up Committee--that are being carried out to achieve a settlement for the Lebanese crisis and the problem of the south. Therefore, in what context do you place the stage through which the Lebanese crisis is going and by extension, the crisis in the area in general?"

The leader of the al-Murabitun movement replied, "It was quite clear that there are new international assumptions that are dictating that the Middle East crisis be dealt with seriously and directly in its national Lebanese, Palestinian and Arab dimensions.

"So far, the clear indication of this may be the direct political intervention initiated by the U.S. administration through its envoy, Philip Habib, and the military intervention effected through the Zionist enemy in an effort to get a hold of new cards that would set the stage for the

attainment of a distinctive position to determine the future of the Middle East area and to solve its problems through its three dimensions.

"The matter that should be referred to or rather emphasized is that the greater accord we, as a Lebanese national movement, as a Palestinian revolution and as progressive Arab countries, can achieve on forming a single position to achieve a specific goal, the more legal and legitimate justifications we can give the friendly countries, chief among which is the Soviet Union, to carry out at this stage a real, balanced role along with the effective U.S. role, and especially on the Lebanese scene. [This could have been the case] since the war of last 2 April, including the story of the missiles and the Israeli attacks on the south and on Beirut and up to the plan to approve the cease fire with all its dimensions and consequences.

"In our opinion the cease fire plan is an important card held by Americans. Washington will play this hand in the course of future attempts to solve the crisis of the area. This requires the forces who manage the struggle in the area--the Syrian, the Palestinian and the National Movement--to settle any conflict they have on the confrontation program so as not to provide the Arab countries with an opportunity to insert their individual initiatives and theories for the purpose of dealing arbitrarily with the crisis at this crucial stage.

"The way things are going now is not in the interests of the Palestinian Revolution or of the Arab question in its entirety."

I told Mr Qulaylat, "If the situation is going as [you say] it is, does the absence of Soviet opposition to the U.S. action on the Lebanese scene mean that this U.S. role is confined to certain boundaries and that its results do not ultimately affect the boundaries of the Soviet role in solving the Middle East crisis?"

"We cannot say that there is no Soviet opposition to this unilateral U.S. action on the Lebanese scene. From a logical, scientific standpoint any position the Soviet Union assumes must necessarily be based primarily on its clear and specific posture on the posture the progressive, Arab, national forces and the Palestinian Revolution assume with regard to the U.S. role and with regard to this U.S. action and the initiatives that are pouring into the area. When such a clear, specific position is assumed, we would have formed clear foundations for the position of the mighty friend, the Soviet Union and its role and participation in any decision made to solve the questions of the area. Without that, our friends the Soviets cannot determine the formula for the position and the method of action that would solve the question on behalf of the principals in the case and those who have the main interest in it."

Mr Qulaylat said, "It was evident during the negotiations that we conducted in Moscow that the Soviet Union was committed and would remain committed as it always has been to the vital and ideological positions that would lead to the achievement of a just solution to our crucial questions. And

here it is necessary to distinguish between the Soviet Union standing on our side and its commitment to our causes and our clearly defined existing positions and having the Soviet Union define for all of us the dimensions of the case and the position on it. It is our responsibility as the principals in the case and as those who have the main interest in it to define that case. Hence, the following stage would be that of obtaining support and assistance from the friendly countries, chief among which is the Soviet Union."

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RETIRED PAKISTANI MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SECURITY JOBS

Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2830, 22 Sep 81 pp 12-13

[Text] Islamabad, 22 September--Pakistan has asked Libya to supply information about thousands of ex-servicemen recruited for security jobs in that country, it was announced here Monday.

According to reports, some 3,500 retired Army personnel, were recruited by a Libyan-based firm this year to work as security guards and supervisers.

Endorsement of the plan was given by Pakistan's Labour Attache at Tripoli who provided that the emigrants would get training in Libya but would not be used in military, para-military or other defence organisations.

Rumours had circulated that Libya had sent the trained Pakistanis to Chad for active fighting and their relatives, hearing nothing from them for six months, approached the authorities.

Newspapers here also reported that the Pakistani emigrants were subjected to "maltreatment and were not accorded facilities" stipulated in the service agreement.

Desert Training

Official sources said the Government was fully aware of the situation and was trying to find out the correct state of affairs and "ameliorate the difficulties" faced by Pakistani emigrants.

According to recruiting agents, letters received from the workers said that they were being trained in handling Libyan arms in the desert and this prevented them from writing home.

Authoritative sources said that Pakistan had expressed "deep concern" with Libyan authorities and had asked Tripoli to allow Pakistani officials to visit the camps to check on the reports of maltreatment. (A.F.P.)

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HARDENING OF POLICY HINTED, NEW U.S INITIATIVE URGED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 234, 15 Aug 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Saudi Arabia and the United States: Saudi Arabia Waited for Haig's Promises, Received Reagan's Intransigence; In Response to Broken Promises by the United States, Saudi Arabia May Undertake an Oil Step That Could Upset U.S. Interests"]

[Text] Despite the fact that Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat commended what he called the role of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in achieving a cease-fire agreement between the PLO and Israel in Lebanon during the press conference he held in London while he was visiting that city early this month and on the first day of his visit to Washington, it has nevertheless been noticed that official and unofficial Saudi media totally ignored the statements made by the Egyptian president just as they ignored his visits to London and Washington.

Informed political circles in Riyadh explained Saudi disregard for President al-Sadat's visit and for his statements, in which he also called upon Saudi Arabia to play a greater role in the process of peaceful settlement, by saying that Saudi leaders know that President al-Sadat was using these statements to try to get out of the crisis in which he finds himself after reaching a dead end with the Camp David accords and living in the isolation that was caused by the Arab boycott. A diplomatic observer said, "Al-Sadat's game was revealed by these statements. If he were not making a serious effort to thrust the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia into the Camp David process through Washington, he wants at least to suggest to the world that the kingdom is a party to the process of peaceful settlement which al-Sadat wishes to have established on the principles of the Camp David accords whose failure has been proven." The diplomatic observer was quoting an informed Saudi source who was commenting on the Egyptian president's invitation to Saudi Arabia in London and in Washington to play a greater role in the peaceful settlement process because Saudi Arabia "through its communications with Washington was able to assist in reaching a cease-fire agreement between the PLO and Israel."

The statements that were attributed to the Saudi source were enumerated in diplomatic reports that arrived in al-Ta'if last week. These reports

stated that Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat wanted President Reagan to make Washington exercise "its influence with Riyadh in order to make Saudi Arabia participate in the peaceful settlement that will be based on the principles of the Camp David accords. [Al-Sadat wants Washington] to convince Saudi Arabia that there is no practical alternative to the Camp David accords and that Riyadh, with the influence it has with the Palestinians and the Syrians, will not be able to convince them of moderating their positions as it convinced the PLO to accept the cease fire with Israel. The reports add that President al-Sadat turned to Washington to save him from his crisis and also to put pressure on Israel and especially on Menahem Begin to activate the state of inertia that his agreements with Israel had reached by resuming the autonomy talks and by bringing in the Palestinians in those talks. Al-Sadat wanted President Reagan to play this role because in the next few months the U.S. president will meet Menahem Begin, who will visit Washington next month, and King Husayn, who will visit Washington next October. President Reagan will also meet Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz during his visit to Washington which some people expect will take place next November.

Despite these reports Saudi leaders paid no attention to these attempts and statements by al-Sadat because they realized that the Egyptian president was doing everything possible to keep his peace with Israel from being an isolated case. This is the peace that Saudi Arabia proclaims its absolute rejection to on every occasion.

During the past few days the attention of Saudi officials has turned to the position which the United States could assume on what it described as a reconsideration of its special Middle East policy. This is the policy that U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig promised Saudi officials, during his visit to Riyadh early last April, Washington would reconsider in the light of the results of the Israeli elections.

Accordingly, for the past few weeks Saudi officials have been waiting for Washington to formulate its "new" policy on the Middle East crisis. However, statements made by the U.S. president and by his secretary of state during the Egyptian president's visit to Washington affirmed that the present U.S. administration was still adamant in its refusal to recognize the PLO and that it was still insisting on the principles of the Camp David accords for any peaceful settlement in the area. All this means that there is nothing new in the present U.S. administration's positions on the question of the Middle East. Saudi officials were accordingly greatly disappointed with these U.S. statements and positions, especially since they had been hoping that the Reagan administration would change its posture on dealing with the Middle East crisis. Therefore, less than 2 days after these statements were made by U.S. officials, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz criticized U.S. policy on the Middle East question in an interview with the Saudi Press Agency on 7/8/1981 [7 August 1981]. Prince Fahd cautioned that the continued disregard by successive U.S. administrations of the question of Palestine and the rights of its people will expose "U.S. relations and accordingly U.S. interests with the Arab nation to danger." To explain further that Saudi Arabia was still dissatisfied

with the over-all U.S. policy in the Middle East, especially with regard to the question of Palestine and the rights of its people, the Saudi heir to the throne said in this regard, "We regret greatly the fact that the U.S. government is still insisting on the Camp David accords whose failure has been established. However, we had hopes and we still hope that President Reagan's administration will concede the futility of the Camp David accords as a framework for a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East."

In his statement Prince Fahd did not forget to mention that recent events in Lebanon did dictate the need for the U.S. government to recognize the PLO because it is a true fact. Any comrephensive peace in the area must depend on fact and must be based on the truth.

So as not to have it said, as Egyptian President al-Sadat is saying, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arabs in general do not have a practical concept that would bring about a peaceful and just settlement of the Middle East crisis, the Saudi heir to the throne proposed eight principles which he said can be a guide in bringing about a just settlement. He said that these principles had been approved and repeatedly confirmed by the United Nations in the past few years. These principles are:

First, Israel is to withdraw from the lands it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

Second, the settlements that Israel established on Arab land after 1967 are to be removed.

Third, freedom of worship and of practicing religious rites in holy places is to be guaranteed for all religions.

Fourth, the right of the Palestinian people is to be affirmed, and Palestinians who do not wish to return are to be compensated.

Fifth, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are to be under the supervision of the United Nations for a transition period that is not to exceed a few months.

Sixth, an independent Palestinian state is to be established with Jerusalem as its capital.

Seventh, the right of the countries of the region to live in peace is to be affirmed.

Eighth, the United Nations or some of its member countries are to ensure the implementation of these principles.

To emphasize the fact that these principles can be carried out Prince Fahd presented three conditions which he said were realistic and had to be achieved so as to bring the peaceful settlement into existence. These conditions are:

First, unlimited U.S. support for Israel is to be stopped.

Second, Israeli arrogance, whose worst personification is Menahem Begin, is to be brought to an end. This condition may be achieved spontaneously if the first condition is met.

Third, the fact that the Palestinian factor, as Brother Yasir 'Arafat says, is the principal figure in the Middle Eastern equation is to be accepted.

Diplomatic sources in Jeddah found that the warnings and the criticisms directed by the Saudi heir to the throne to the United States--these were included in his interview--consisted of harsh statements and harsher warnings. The real implication of these statements and warnings was that in view of the United States' continued full adoption of Israel's policies and aggressions and in view of continuing U.S. support for Israeli intransigence, the continuation of any relations with the United States was no longer defensible or pursuable, especially since Washington has shown no good will to strengthen the positions of "moderate" Arabs against the Arabs who are calling for the need to settle the situation with the United States. Western diplomatic sources in Jeddah fear that Saudi Arabia may take steps that would bear on the economy and oil and that that would upset the interests of the western world in general and those of the United States in particular. A western diplomat in Jeddah did not rule out that Saudi Arabia would give the United States a "real shock" that would threaten its economic interests in the area and cause it to reconsider its absolute support for Israel and its total disregard for the PLO. The western diplomat predicted that the first practical steps which Saudi Arabia can take to upset U.S. and western economic interests in the area were steps to reconsider its oil production and pricing policy. The same diplomat pointed to the fact that Saudi Arabia agreed to attend the emergency conference for the ministers of OPEC countries. This conference will discuss the subject of the oil surplus in world markets, a subject Saudi Arabia had [previously] refused to discuss before a reasonable and a unified pricing policy was achieved. The western diplomat said that there was no doubt that the laying down of a unified price and production volume strategy for OPEC will not please the United States and the other western countries that are benefiting at present from the chaotic situation in the oil markets. The same diplomat stated that the Saudis were also unhappy with the positions of the Common European Community. The Saudis think that those Europeans have kept the area preoccupied for the past months in discussions about a new European initiative without showing any such initiative. The diplomat referred to a statement by the crown prince himself who said, "Talking about the responsibility of the United States in the Arab-Israeli struggle does not exempt the countries of western Europe, and especially Britain, from their responsibilities. Britain is now presiding over the countries of the European Common Market, and it bears a major responsibility for what it brought upon the Palestinians during the period of the mandate. The interests of western Europe in the Arab area are no less important or vital than those of the United States. We have heard a great deal about a European action and a European initiative, but we have not yet seen anything specific. In my judgment a European action must

proceed in two directions: one direction would be toward the Middle East and the other toward the United States in its capacity as the principal partner in the Atlantic Pact and the leader of the free world."

AL-MUSTAQBAL asked a responsible Saudi source about these expectations that diplomatic circles in Jeddah were presenting, but this source refused to confirm or deny any of the expectations, saying only, "The statements by Prince Fahd are clear. He wants all the countries of the world to bear their responsibilities with regard to the current and serious situation in the Middle East area." When AL-MUSTAQBAL asked the same Saudi source to comment on Israel's and Egypt's reaction in rejecting the principles proposed by Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz to complete the just and comprehensive peaceful settlement, he said, "It is not strange for Israel to refuse the eight principles that would establish a just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis. Prince Fahd said that these principles had been approved by the United Nations. It is also not strange for Israel to consider these principles a threat because putting those principles into action means putting a limit on Israel's continuing expansion and aggression against the Arab nation. This is something that Israel can never accept. But we prefer not to say anything about the Egyptian president's comment on those principles when he described them as old."

8592
CSO: 4304/133

ENI IN NEW SAUDI DEAL

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 35

[Text] SAUDI ARABIA is to sell oil to Italy again, after a 20-month suspension following the notorious ENI/Petromin commission scandal. An agreement on the resumption of supplies was reached in mid-August after lengthy negotiations, and will offset the results of Agip's decision on 1 August to suspend purchases from Libya. Although Italy's move was ascribed to Tripoli's high prices, it has been generally interpreted as part of Nato's American-sponsored strategy to isolate the Libyan regime.

Italy received limited amounts of Saudi crude after the outbreak of the Gulf war, on the basis of an understanding between Baghdad and Riyadh under which the Saudis partially compensated Iraq's customers for the resulting cuts. Now the Italians, who obtain 70 per cent of their energy requirements from oil, should be able to face the winter without last year's repeated power cuts.

The Saudis have agreed to supply 200,000 b/d over the coming six months (5m tonnes), which will account for 10 per cent of Italy's annual imports. A similar quantity of Saudi crude is being delivered to Esso-Italy.

An official ENI statement explained the background to the agreement: 'The present situation of the international crude market, together with ENI's patient work to re-establish optimal relations with the Gulf producers — which was crowned by the ENI-Opec Rome conference in May — has created the conditions for the resumption of normal supply relations between Saudi Arabia and Italy. These were sanctioned in discussions between Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and the Saudi authorities in recent weeks.'

The communiqué added that the oil will be bought at the official Saudi price of $32 a barrel, which was in force before the latest Opec meeting in Geneva.

Privately, ENI officials believe that the reconciliation with Petromin reflects Italy's desperate need to obtain adequate energy reserves for the winter, rather than a change in ENI's recent policy of diversifying away from its traditional suppliers.

ENI's diversification policy, launched after the dismissal of its pro-Arab chairman Giorgio Mazzanti, calls for the organisation's coal, chemical and nuclear sectors to be built up at the expense of the traditionally dominant oil activities. It was exemplified two months ago by an agreement between ENI and the American giant Occidental, which set up Enoxy — a joint company combining Occidental's US coal business and ENI's chemical sector.

A further step towards diversification came late last month when ENI acquired oil tycoon Raffaele Ursini's private Brazilian-Italian chemical and biotechnical empire. The takeover, in addition to strengthening the state company's ties with the Americas and providing it with a set of processed chemicals plants and refineries in Italy, has made ENI a major company in Brazil.

The 14 Latin American firms acquired by ENI are active in finance, marketing and production. They constitute a compact structure which is fully integrated into Brazil's economy, and boasts multi-million dollar annual profits. The jewel of the deal is Liquigas do Brasil, with a turnover of $100m in 1979 and a 26 per cent share of the Brazilian gas distribution market. In the chemical sector, the most important acquisition is Liquichimica do Brasil, with a turnover of around $28m. For ENI, the biotechnical part of its Brazilian deal is a new departure.

CSO: 4400/13

SAUDI AGRICOMPANY: STRESS ON SELF-SUFFICIENCY

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 41

[Article by Jamal Rasheed]

[Text] SAUDI ARABIA has established the National Agricultural Development Company as part of the kingdom's efforts to boost domestic food production. The company, set up by Royal Decree, has a capital of Saudi riyals 400m ($117m), with the government holding 20 per cent, while the remainder of the shares will be offered to the public. Its brief is to identify new projects, overhaul the existing system of agricultural subsidies and bring much-needed land under cultivation.

The kingdom's third five year plan (1981-1985) stressed the need for agricultural self-sufficiency. At present only 2m hectares — less than one quarter of one per cent — of the kingdom is cultivated, and much of this area is not fully exploited. The plan allocated SR7.9bn ($2.3bn) for agricultural development and loans of over $10bn are anticipated from the Agricultural Bank.

The private sector, which currently controls all agricultural production, cannot boost production without government help, says Dr Abdul Rahman al Sheikh, minister of agriculture and water, and chairman of the new company. The company will therefore do the groundwork, bringing more land under cultivation for subsequent sale to private farmers. In addition the system of cash subsidies to farmers regardless of the quality of produce is to be reorganised.

Dr Sheikh has recently approved two new agricultural projects, one for the annual production of 6,340 tonnes of wheat, 6,000 tonnes of millet, dates and oranges in Sudayr, and the second, near Riyadh, for the glasshouse cultivation of some 660 tonnes a year of vegetables. Both projects will be financed by the Agricultural Bank.

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END

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21 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2418

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21 October 1981

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No. 2418

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OPEC FUND LOAN GRANTS APPROVED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 pp 6-7

[Text]

The governing board of the OPEC Fund for International Development last week approved grants and loans worth a total of nearly $115 million.

The Fund is to extend a grant of $25 million to the Rome-based World Food Programme set up by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation. The grant will be used to increase the food stocks of the international emergency food reserves during 1981-82 and to meet the "urgent needs" of the World Food Programme. The Fund has also approved a technical assistance grant of almost $3.3 million for the International Centre for Agricultural Research in Dry Areas (ICARD). The money will be used to construct the centre's first fully-equipped research laboratory.

Turkey will receive a $25 million loan as balance of payments support. Barbados will get a $2 million loan for the same purpose. The Fund has extended balance of payments support loans to Barbados on two previous occasions. Costa Rica is to receive a $13.4 million loan for a hydro-electric project and Morocco will get $15 million for economic development.

The OPEC Fund has decided to loan $21.8 million to Thailand to help finance the Chiew Lam hydroelectric power project. The loan carries an interest rate of 1 per cent plus an annual service charge of 0.75 per cent. It has a 20 year maturity with a five year grace period.

The project, on the Salween River, envisages the construction of a dam, powerhouse and transmission lines and the resettlement of 315 families living in the reservoir area. It forms part of a Thai government programme designed to reduce the country's dependence on imported oil by developing its indigenous energy resources.

The Fund has now lent a total of $43.8 million to Thailand, including this fourth loan. The other three were also for energy projects: two were for rural electrification schemes and the third, at Mae Mo, was for a project to generate power from lignite. Thailand will also benefit from a project loan by the Fund to Laos, since it will receive some of the electricity generated by the scheme.

A $7 million loan will go to Burundi as the Fund's contribution towards a sugar complex to be built near the capital, Bujumbura, at a cost of $70 million. Other contributors include the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) which is loaning $10 million, the Abu Dhabi Fund ($5.5 million), the African Development Bank ($12.6 million), the West German government ($5.5 million) and the Mehta Group ($1.5 million). The government of Burundi is putting up $16.5 million.

According to Mr Chely Ayari, BADEA's President, the $10 million loan is for 17 years including a four-year grace period and interest at 5 per cent. He stated that the Bank had so far invested $22 million in Burundi, including $4 million in a sewerage project, $6 million in a road scheme and $2 million in an emergency aid programme.

The project is designed to make Burundi's 4.3 million people self-sufficient in sugar throughout the 1980s as part of a drive to reduce the country's foreign exchange spending. An OPEC Fund spokesman said that the project also involved the construction of a new township just outside Bujumbura to house 5,000 people. The money will be used to cultivate 1,925 hectares of sugar cane and to build a sugar cane processing plant. The new town will be self-sufficient in energy, since sugar waste will be used to generate power.

CSO: 4404/14

OPEC OUTPUT DECLINES AS OIL GLUT CONTINUES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 p 9

[Text]

The combined production of OPEC countries has dipped below 20 million b/d, the specialist journal *Arab Oil and Gas* reported last week. It said output in mid-September was only 19.1 million b/d, a fall of 24.7 per cent when compared with production of 25 million b/d during the same month a year ago.

Arab Oil and Gas said five countries had been hit hardest by the oil glut. Libya, it reported, is down to 500,000 b/d from 1.68 million b/d, a fall of 70 per cent. Iraq's output, restricted by the year-long war with Iran, has suffered a similar drop of 69 per cent from 2.9 million b/d in September 1980 to 900,000 b/d at present. Nigeria, which has felt the financial pinch from falling sales worse than the other oil exporters, has seen its production fall by a somewhat smaller percentage. Nigeria's current output, *Arab Oil and Gas* reported, is down from 1.58 million b/d in September of last year to 750,000 b/d at present, a 53 per cent decrease.

Kuwait's production is likewise down by just over half when compared to last year's figures. *Arab Oil and Gas* reported that Kuwait's output has fallen by 51 per cent from 1.28 million b/d to 620,000 b/d, but this low figure is due in part to reduced consumption as a result of the recent big refinery fire. Algeria has meanwhile cut its production by 39 per cent, from 900,000 b/d in September 1980 to 550,000 b/d in mid-September of this year.

Arab Oil and Gas said two countries, Iran and Ecuador, had managed to buck the downtrend and had increased their production. Ecuador had pushed up its production from 180,000 b/d to 200,000 b/d and Iran's output was up from 1.1 million b/d in September 1980 to 1.2 million b/d at present.

Indonesia, which has enjoyed a privileged position as a Far Eastern supplier to Japan, has not escaped the adverse effects of the oil glut. Exports of crude oil and petroleum products fell by 19.9 per cent in July when compared to those of the previous month, OPEC's news agency reported from Djakarta. Quoting figures from Bank Indonesia, the central bank, *OPEC-NA* said July exports were worth $941.96 million, a decrease of $178.04 million on June's exports worth $1.12 billion. Pertamina, Indonesia's national oil company, was responsible for $476.47 million worth of export sales, with the remainder coming from Pertamina's foreign contracting companies.

CSO: 4404/14

KARMAL BELIEVED SEEKING PEACE SETTLEMENT

London 8 DAYS in English 5 Sep 81 p 8

[Text] An end to the diplomatic deadlock over Afghanistan may be in sight, now that Kabul has agreed to an active United Nations role.

THE Afghanistan government, on the eve of another Kabul-Islamabad shuttle by a special UN representative, has agreed to an active UN role, and has also agreed to hold talks with Pakistan and Iran on a trilateral basis.

Previously Kabul had demanded recognition of the Karmal regime as a prerequisite, and wanted talks on a separate basis with each country. The Afghan regime also took an unprecedented step when it said: 'The limited contingents of Soviet troops would be withdrawn after foreign intervention ceases.'

The possibility of an end to the diplomatic deadlock over Afghanistan coincided with reports that Babrak Karmal's regime is weaker than ever. There is good reason to believe that Karmal now has no alternative but to start talks with his neighbours. After weeks of bitter feuding between the Khalq and Parcham factions which make up the ruling party in Kabul, Babrak Karmal has himself, for the first time, called for an end to the internal violence.

At night Kabul has turned into a battleground, as the two factions assassinate each other's leaders. In a recent speech to political commissars, Karmal said that: 'the party's central committee has consistently demanded that factionalism in party groups, the armed forces and police be decisively prevented, and those against unity be thrown out of the party.' But, he added, infighting had continued and the party's commands went unheeded.

This admission of infighting the first since he came to power 20 months ago, highlights the disintegration taking place within the Afghan state. The army has already been crippled by desertions on a massive scale, which have brought its 80,000-strong force down to less than 25,000 men, and the police can only operate in a few major towns.

The government has all but reversed the ambitious land reform programme initiated after the overthrow of President Daoud. Concessions recently announced over Kabul radio have restored to Muslim clergy, tribal chiefs and feudal landlords the freedom to own and inherit land. Most of these landowners fled the country when land reform limited every family's holding to six hectares. Although these lands have now been restored, it is doubtful whether any former owners will return to claim their rights, as most are refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

The redistribution of confiscated land begun in 1979 was a dismal failure due to the lack of trained personnel to carry it out and the resistance of the tribes. Large areas of farmland have been left uncultivated.

This policy turn-about also reflects on the failure of Karmal's most important political initiative, the 'National Fatherland Front'.

Formed earlier in the year, and intended to include non-party members from all sectors of society in an attempt to broaden the power base, most of its leading members have been assassinated or threatened into silence by the Mujahaddin.

There have been reports from the 'Internal Front' — made up of non-Pathan minorities such as the Hazaras, Baluchi's and Uzbeks fighting the Soviets — that its ranks have been swelled by Afghan army deserters formerly of the Khalq faction. Much of the Internal Front's activity has gone unreported in the western media because it has no offices in Peshawar, where all the Pathan-dominated groups are based.

It has been announced in Peshawar that yet another formal alliance has been created between five fundamentalist groups resisting the Soviets. They have formed a 50-member 'majlis-e-shoora' (advisory council) which hopes to form a permanent leadership and military command structure. This is the fifth such official alliance formed since the Afghan resistance began. The others were broken up by bitter factionalism and disputes between the rival groups. The Hezb-i-Islami fundamentalist group, led by Gulbuddin Hikmetyar, has even attacked rival guerrilla groups within Afghanistan. His opponents say that Gulbuddin is the most unpopular man in Afghanistan after Karmal.

This is also an important time for Pakistan's foreign relations, as both Soviet and American diplomats visit. Talks will no doubt centre on the Afghan peace initiative, and now it is firmly in the American camp. Pakistan evidently feels better equipped to hold talks with the Soviets. The visit of the Soviet deputy foriegn minister, Nikolai Firyubin, to Islamabad is the first by a top Soviet diplomat since the Afghan invasion.

The Soviets are thought to be increasingly concerned about the Karmal regime's inability to obtain credibility for itself or the Soviet role in Afghanistan, and the Soviet minister is expected to offer increased economic aid and an expansion of the Soviet Union's already heavy commitment to Pakistan's steel plant in Karachi.

Also awaited are Jeanne Kirkpatrick, US ambassador to the UN and USAID administrator Peter McPherson. Kirkpatrick has already strongly defended the US commitment to Pakistan during some hard talking with Indira Gandhi in New Delhi, and McPherson is expected to reassure Pakistan about the immediate delivery of at least some of the $3bn worth of arms and goods the US has promised to Pakistan. Pakistani officials are worried that the US is delaying delivery of F16s.

CSO: 4600/23-E

SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO IMPROVE WORKERS CONDITION PRAISED

Kabul HEYWAD in Dari 23 Aug 81 p 6

[Article by Wali Laywal-Saghar: "Role of the Soviet Union in the Quantitative and Qualitative Growth of Our Working Class"]

[Text] The fighting and epic-making proletariat of Russia, through its unity and alliance with the vast classes of farmers, toilers and progressive intellectuals, under the leadership of chainbreaking workers party, toppled the corrupt and oppressive czarist regime, and by breaking the chain of captivity and slavery, for the first time it established the rule of the workers and toilers on earth.

The Great October Revolution, as the most important historical event and the beginning of a new phase in the life of the human community, was not merely a national change within the boundaries of czarist Russia, but is considered as the origin of great international evolutions in the world order.

As a result of the victory of the Great October Revolution the world was divided into two opposing camps, i.e., the camp of peace and socialism and the camp of warmongerism and aggression, and a clear line was drawn between the oppressors and the oppressed in the international arena.

As a result of the victory of the Great October Revolution, the scope and depth of the class struggle has increased all over the world and the intensified struggle between imperialism and socialism has become a leading factor behind the growth of world revolutionary movements. As a result, the struggling power of the workers and toilers has risen to a global level.

The Great October Revolution landed a shattering blow on the body of the dragon of imperialism, pushed the colonialist system into a crisis, shook the unchallenged rule of imperialism on the underdeveloped countries, and bridled the untethered restive horse of imperialism for the first time.

The October Revolution reversed the balance of power on international scale which in the past had favored the savage and looting forces of imperialism over the toiling masses. The spiritual impacts of this extraordinary global change shined thunderously on the world and awakened the toiling masses of captives and the colonies from their sleep of dereliction. The newly established and young state of the Soviet Union, as a moving force of freedom in the world, and

a pivot for national liberation movements throughout the globe, became a powerful base for struggles against colonialism and imperialism. Concurrent with this extraordinary international change, the freedom-loving people of Afghanistan intensified their struggle against foreign invaders and declared Afghanistan's political independence. The young state of the Soviet Union, as the best base of support for the toilers of the world, praised the just fight and struggle of the freedom-loving people of our country by dispatching an emotional and revolutionary message from the government of the farmers and workers; and prevented the isolation of Afghanistan in the international arena, carefully conspired by the imperialist nations, by recognizing our independence.

Thus, as a result of this good-neighborly gesture and the unblemished support by the workers government of the Soviet Union, the foundations of Afghanistan's political independence became firm and the borders of our country with the birthplace of the Great October Revolution turned into the borders of peace, friendship and mutual cooperation. Growth and expansion of revolutionary movements in our country have been the results of the dynamics of the Great October Revolution in the region and in the world, and the birthplace of the Great October Revolution, as a center for dissemination of progressive thoughts in the world, has played a major role in awakening the toiling classes of Afghanistan.

Soviet Union's economic and technical assistance to Afghanistan has led to the weakening of the colonialist and imperialist positions and has played a major and noteworthy role in the creation and strengthening of our national economy. Many industrial centers, projects and public welfare facilities have been constructed and installed in our country with the Soviet Union's assistance. To give a very small sample, one could mention the diesel power plant of Herat, asphalt and concrete factory, Jangalak factory, silos in the capital and provinces, fertilizer and power plant of Mazar-i Sharif, housing construction factory, gas and petroleum exploration and extraction, Daruntah reservoir, the 70-km Nangarhar canal, Salang tunnel, Kabul-Qandahar-Turghandi highway, Kabul international airport, Politechnic Institute, Jangalak Technicom, Sher Khan bandar river port, Behsud-Jalalabad bridge, Kabul asphalt factory, Madalabad Diesel Power Center, Naghlu hydroelectric plant, Sardeh dam, Nangarhar project, extension of power transmission lines from Pule-Khumri to Qandahar and asphalt roads, constituting 75 percent of our country's asphalt roads. In this fashion the Soviet Union has practically facilitated qualitative as well as quantitative growth of our working class by financing and creating projects, and by constructing factories and workers centers in Afghanistan. For in these projects thousands and thousands of skilled and half-skilled workers are trained and integrated into the productive and revolutionary activities. Establishing friendly relations with the first workers state in the world which believes firmly in internationalism of proletaria, counts as a strong and powerful factor in speeding revolutionary changes in our country. Workers and toilers of our country respect the Afghan-Soviet friendship, based on internationalism and patriotism which constitute the two inseparable aspects of our progressive policy, and will make every effort in strengthening and expanding it.

9861-R
CSO: 4665/12

OFFICIAL ON SELECTION PROCESS FOR MILITARY SCHOOLING

LD040346 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 1 Oct 81

[Interview given by Col Jamaluddin Omer, head of the Education and Training Department of the Ministry of National Defense, to unidentified Kabul radio reporter; date and place not given--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] As our dear compatriots know, the academic year at military educational institutions will soon begin. According to the plan of the Ministry of National Defense, thousands of the country's youths are being called up to enroll in these institutions.

In relation to this subject we invited esteemed Col Jamaluddin Omer, head of the Education and Training Department of the Ministry of National Defense, to shed some more light on the subject. Please tell us how many students you are going to accept, from which grades will they come and to which educational institutions they will go.

[Answer] In accordance with the plan of the Ministry of National Defense for the new academic year, about 3,000-4,000 persons will be selected as students for the military academy, the technical academy, the air academy, the music school, the military school, short-term military courses and NCO courses. Among them will be students from the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th grades and the 11th grade for NCO courses, students of the 11th grade or higher for the short-term officers courses and graduates of the 12th grade or higher for the universities.

[Question] Please explain the requirements for admission to the educational institutions.

[Answer] We have no specific requirements for admission to universities and military schools. Of course, there are some general requirements for the entry of students: suitable physical condition; the proper education standard for military institutions; and the absence of a criminal record. In addition to this there are also some special standards set for some schools and professions--for instance, for the political faculty or for pilots training, which requires a special checkup and has age standards.

[Question] Please explain the stages in the selection of students.

[Answer] The Ministry of National Defense has appointed commissions which go to all the provinces and remote regions of the country and select students who meet the requirements for entry. After completing a medical checkup, they are flown to the capital in military aircraft. Here the highest ranking of the commissions makes the final selection by reviewing educational certificates and medical records and occasionally by administering a test.

CSO: 4665/4

PAPER PROTESTS RELEASE OF IRAQI 'TERRORIST DIPLOMATS'

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in English 30 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Provocation in New Delhi"]

[Text]

Again we witness still another violation of diplomatic etiquette by the Ba'athist regime. This time it is not a PLO representative who is shot in Beirut or in Paris but a group of students upon whom the "terrorist diplomats" open fire. The strange story is as follows:

Students affiliated with the Islamic Association of Iranian Students in India staged a demonstration on the occasion of the anniversary of the war imposed upon the Islamic Revolution of Iran. This peaceful rally had been authorized by the Indian police. The demonstration was held before the Iraqi Embassy and it consisted only in chanting slogans denouncing Saddam's regime. In the short duration of the rally the Indian police were fully in control of the situation and the students following their revolutionary discipline did not disobey the Indian laws. Suddenly, near the end of the rally, Iraqi terrorists get out of a car having diplomatic plates and start firing on the Iranian students. Some of the gunmen escaped and others were arrested and released after interrogation.

We know that it is not the first time the Ba'athist mercenaries have committed such a flagrant violation of international law. We have not forgotten how in Berlin, Vienna, Paris and elsewhere Iraqi diplomatic parcels have been full of guns and other illegal equipment to furnish the Iraqi or Iraqi paid terrorists. We have not forgotten how the so-called Iraqi "diplomats" shot and killed a French police officer before assassinating the PLO representative in Paris. Neither have we forgotten how our representatives have been threatened by the Ba'athist terrorists since the victory of the Islamic Revolution (IR) all over the world.

This time, the case is totally different. A group of students who are neither diplomats nor government employees have been chosen as a new target for this plot. Student demonstration in India, like in any other part of the world, and any other kind of rally and protest, should be tolerated and permitted if authorized by the responsible officials in advance.

Knowing and respecting these formalities the Iranian students had received official permission for their demonstration. Furthermore the property of Iraq in New Delhi was not trespassed by the rallying students. The logical question is why should such an unexpected and abnormal event take place in front of the security officials of the Indian government.

So far as India is concerned we distinguish between the position taken by the mass media and the government of Mrs. Gandhi. Unlike the former, that unfortunately has been intoxicating the public opinion in various forms concerning the Islamic Republic, the latter has been regarded as friendly. The Indian Premier as well as the Indian masses know the reasons why a revolution has taken place in Iran.

Our brothers and sisters studying in different cities in India have often complained about the biased positions taken by the Indian mass media. To their consistent demands that the authorities of the Islamic Republic break the silence, they think we observe, the authorities have always told them that they themselves can be cultural ambassadors of the Islamic Republic and their behavior could be the best, most valuable and effective means to neutralize the false reports that papers, radio and T.V. diffuse in India.

Fortunately those who have listened to the above mentioned advice know how positively their deeds have altered the situation in favor of the Islamic Republic.

Between India and Iran the friendly and historical ties are very old. We prefer not to cast unfriendly clouds over the bright oriental sky of friendship between the two countries. But the "regles de jeu" in the warm existing relations let us ask our friends to assume their responsibilities. We must ask the Indian government via her respected representative in Tehran is it acceptable that our students are fired upon by the terrorists enjoying diplomatic immunity in India? We are fully aware that the latest Iraqi provocation has been precisely calculated and the gunmen, disguised by diplomatic covers have acted by direct orders received from the Iraqi Embassy in New Delhi.

Let us assume that our students had not maintained their discipline and had attacked Saddam's terrorist center in the Indian capital. Then could we logically disapprove the reaction of our revolutionary children? The Iraqi regime should know that our cordial ties with India and the Indian people cannot be influenced by this sort of inhuman action.

Tehran and New Delhi have reasons to be proud of their existing relations. It is for this very reason that our brothers and sisters in India have protested the release of the envoy terrorists of the Ba'athist regime. We think that a firm reaction by the Indian police would prevent Iraqi agents from committing further deplorable actions in India and other parts of the world.

It is to be re-emphasized that good relations between India and Iran is what the two people desire to be strengthened, and a categorical reaction from the Indian Foreign Ministry is an inevitable, logical expectation if we really want to realize the wishes of our people.

CSO: 4600/37

CLANDESTINE RADIO WARNS OF NEW PLOT AGAINST NATION

NC061150 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 6 Oct 81

[Station talk]

[Text] Compatriots! We begin our talk today with a warning and with a voice rising from the depths of our hearts, with a fervor stemming from the depths of our spirits and as the true voice of the Iranian nation, a voice which, as history proves, utters no word but "Iran" and "Iranianism," which is today's warning. Know that the colonialist world devourers have hatched another plot against our homeland. Know that other General Husyers and new Ramsey Clarks have set off to throw our justice-seeking insurrection and national movement off the path once again. Knowing about this plot, we warn today that you should be awake. The East and West are plotting. They have linked their hands and their agents are trying to implement the plot. The imperialists have written a new scenario for our oppressed and Khomeyni-stricken people. They want, through deceits, to once again deceive our risen nation which is fed up with Khomeyni's Islamic oppression, terror, tortures and stonings and to once again throw our national movement into an impasse. The preliminaries of the plot have already been prepared.

The actors of this new plot who until yesterday had a role in the previous plot, today, like their former imam, are speaking of freedom, independence and justice. They are speaking of a new Islam. They are talking about a new Islamic republic the true face of which is veiled with the word "democratic." Instead of the Islamic courts, they want to set up people's courts. Instead of the secret revolution council, they want to form another secret council. They want to replace the ruling fascism with their new fascism. They want to once again send thousands of people on empty and false charges to the gallows. Instead of the Revolution Guards Corps they want to form a people's corps and to throw this at the people's throats. They want to transfer the distribution of food and rationing from the Islamic centers to people's councils. They want to tighten the chains of the nation's bondage further, to plunder our homeland and to turn our Iran into (?debris).

Compatriots, be vigilant and remember that in February 1978 one person, yes only one person from among the 36 million Iranians, shouted and warned that fascism is coming. But everyone--both the nation that had rebeled for freedom, independence and justice and those who claimed leadership, intellectualism and broad-mindedness--were deceived and fell into the traps of the colonialists. Remember how remorse

(?was in vain). The same person is once again shouting and warning for you to be vigilant. Another plot is being prepared. Be vigilant because fascism is coming in a new mask. Do not allow this insurrection to be led to an impasse. Do not allow the remainder of the Iranian Army to be destroyed. Do not allow thousands of other people to be executed by people's courts. Safeguard the (?nation) and nationalism and close the road of deceit which foreigners and their agents want to use. Know that (?if this time we are deceived again, any feeling of remorse will be too late and, this time, forever).

CSO: 4640/15

INITIATIVES BEING UNDERTAKEN TO STRENGTHEN ECONOMY

Oil Pipelines to North

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Aug 81 p 1

[Interview with Dr Mohammad Sadeq Ayatollahi, deputy of Oil Ministry]

[Text] People should not store oil products. because the government does it for them.

Yazd--Dr Mohammad Sadeq Ayatollahi, deputy of the Oil Ministry, following a visit to Ayatollah Sadduqi in Yazd, answered questions in an interview with the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY.

He described the goal of his trip to Yazd as an investigation into the progress of building the pipeline and said: This pipeline from Esfahan to Yazd, Kerman, and Sistan-Baluchestan is under construction. With its completion before winter, we hope to be able to bring oil products from the refinery to these cities more quickly, more safely, and less expensively. And we also hope that the responsible organizations and local authorities will help in this operation.

The deputy of the Oil Ministry added: On a national level, we have more than 20,000 km of pipeline which carry crude oil and oil products. God willing, with the completion of the Rey-Rasht and Rey-Sari pipelines, the north and northeastern parts of Khorasan Province as well as Rasht, Qazvin, and Karaj will be covered by this network.

He also added: The creation of a pipeline between the Esfahan refinery and Tehran will enable us to send the surplus of the Esfahan refinery to Tehran. Of course, in our future plans for southern cities such as Chahbahar, the water routes of the Persian Gulf will be used.

Ayatollahi, concerning the long lines at gasoline stations, said: This crowding at gasoline stations is one of those things which fluctuate from day to day, because the coupons of previous and future months are used. If people would use the coupons of each month for that month only, the problem would be solved.

He added: This problem produces a psychological effect. When a person sees several vehicles waiting at a gasoline station, he thinks that tomorrow there will be no fuel and he as well joins the line. Another problem concerns the coupons with which the counterrevolutionaries have flooded the market, most of which have been collected. Concerning domestic consumption, we ask the people not to store oil products, under any circumstances, because this is what we do for them.

Ayatollahi said in conclusion: Keeping oil products at home, in addition to being a fire hazard for family members, especially children, can cause chronic diseases.

Farm Service Centers

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Sep 81 p 15

[Text] Tehran, PARS NEWS AGENCY--A member of the Construction Crusade announced in a press and radio-television interview that the plan for the creation of rural and tribal centers, near implementation, is a step in the direction of self-sufficiency and independence from the West. According to this plan, 1,600 rural and tribal service centers will be created in the villages, more than 10,000 rural Islamic societies will become official, and the general program of the Crusade and its charter concerning the function of the Crusade and its relationship with other ministries will be implemented.

Brother Abbas Akhundi, member of the Central Council of the Crusade, also told the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY that the budget of the Crusade in '60 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82] was about 55 billion rials. Of this amount, nothing has been set aside for the implementation of this plan during the current year. We hope that in '61 [21 Mar 82-20 Mar 83], a budget is assigned for this plan.

He added that the government requested 125 billion rials for the budget of the Crusade in '60. The government first reduced it to 80 billion rials and then to 55 billion rials.

Concerning the plan for rural and tribal service centers, he said that, in fact, an American agricultural engineering company had studied this plan in '54 [21 Mar 75-20 Mar 76], of course, for capitalistic and imperialistic purposes. Accordingly, they were to establish centers in villages to improve the conditions of the farmers. This plan was part of the Organization of Planning and Budget until '56 [21 Mar 77-20 Mar 78]. When the revolution occurred, it was stopped; but after the revolution, this plan was ratified by the Revolutionary Council with emphasis on spiritual and Islamic content as the plan for rural and tribal services and the Ministry of Agriculture was charged with its implementation. However, because of the backlog of work in this Ministry--such as land distribution

and so on--the plan did not make much progress. During the premiership of Martyr Raja'i, the Construction Crusade worked on this plan for six months.

The member of the Central Council of the Construction Crusade also said that the general program of this plan is to move towards self-sufficiency and independence from the East and the West. According to this plan, 1,600 rural centers will be established in villages within 5 years to provide for the needs of the villagers. In addition, the continuation of the work of the Crusade and rural activities are included among the programs of this plan.

Brother Abbas Akhundi, in response to a question by the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY concerning how much of this plan has thusfar been implemented and what programs have been undertaken in rural services, said: This plan is new and has not as yet been implemented. Presently, Commission No 7 of the Assembly is studying it. However, a few rural centers have been established as examples and the villagers have enthusiastically welcomed them. From the cultural and social standpoints, and in providing for the needs of farmers, these centers have been very effective and villagers have expressed their satisfaction.

According to the report of the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY, the member of the Central Council of the Construction Crusade continued his interview and, in regards to the issue of land, said: The land issue has been the essential basis of this plan and the seven-member commissions are completely coordinated with the Crusade.

Concerning the reason for conferring this plan on the Crusade by the government, he said: The reason was that at the present time, our villagers only recognize the Crusade as a representative of the government. The relationship of the Crusade with the ministries for maximum progress in providing services to the villagers has also been mentioned. Also, one of the important issues pointed out in the plan is to make official the rural Islamic assemblies. Presently, more than 10,000 Islamic assemblies are working unofficially.

The member of the Central Council of the Crusade, in regards to the aid of the Crusade to the war fronts and war inflicted regions, said: The Crusade has dispatched most of its forces to the front. Presently, the primary responsibility and the role of the Crusade concern the operations of the engineering division on the war fronts. Also, the reconstruction of war-struck regions is one of the important programs of the Crusade. This is in connection with the rural and tribal service centers. In this case, priority has been given to establishing rural service centers in the war-struck regions.

In conclusion, he made mention of Engineer Mohammad Taruchi, the supervisor of the backup headquarters of the southern front, who was

a member of the Crusade and who was martyred on the front, and said: At a time when all the counterrevolutionaries are trying to stop the progress of this revolution, we hope that despite all the problems, the Crusade will be able to take steps to advance the Islamic revolution by implementing this plan in order to bring hope to the deprived villagers that the authorities and the revolution are concerned about them. The least that will be accomplished by this plan is the education of 10,000 villagers by the University Crusade in the educational centers. Presently, about 300 persons are receiving the necessary training at the Polytechnic University, with the help of the University Crusade, to bring about maximal self-sufficiency.

Reduction of Wheat Imports

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Sep 81 p 14

> [Text] Thusfar, 700,000 tons of farmers' surplus wheat have been purchased. This figure shows an increase of 300,000 tons over a similar period in the previous year.

Also, with the increase in domestic wheat production, the purchase of foreign wheat was reduced by 1.4 million tons annually. With the reduction of this amount of foreign wheat, $420 million has been kept from leaving the country. This was announced by Mohammad Javad 'Asemipur, the general director of the National Grain Organization in a press and radio-television interview.

'Asemipur said: If we look at the report of the activities of the administration of Martyr Raja'i, we will be astonished by the progress. This progress was made at a time when various poisonous elements were trying to disrupt the situation.

He added: What was accomplished during the life of Martyr Raja'i was so significant and praiseworthy that it caused the counterrevolutionaries to despair. Today, we are approaching the anniversary of the forced war and we can inform the martyr-nurturing nation that the level of wheat production is so marvelous that it has astonished many of the experts. It must be pointed out that the plan for purchasing and selling flour and wheat has been implemented in Iran for the first time in order to eliminate the middlemen and to control the flour and wheat market and this is one of the duties of this organization. Also, with the willingness of the farmers to sell their surplus wheat to the government, to date, two months before the end of the purchasing season, about 700,000 tons of domestically produced wheat have been purchased and stored in the silos and warehouses of the Grain Organization. This figure shows an increase of 300,000 tons over a similar period in the previous year.

He added: From Khuzestan Province, despite the war, 21,000 tons of wheat were purchased. And from Kermanshahan Province, 90,000 tons of wheat were purchased, a figure showing an increase of 932 percent over the previous year. Also a look at the purchasing statistics will show that we have purchased 18,000 tons of wheat from Kurdistan Province, a 776 percent increase. Purchases from western Azarbaijan mark a 5,379 percent increase increase compared to the previous year. 'Asemipur added: These figures show the role of the Islamic crusaders. With this level of domestic purchasing, the purchase of foreign wheat has decreased by 1.4 million tons, which, in turn, has prevented $420 million in national funds from leaving the country.

Also, it has halted the purchase of wheat from abroad until the end of Esfand [21 Apr-20 Mar].

'Asemipur said: As a result of the implementation of correct programs regarding the purchase of farmers' surplus wheat, the elimination of middlemen, and the imposition of controls over the wheat and flour market, the prices of these two items have decreased. The indicators of the Central Bank reveal this fact.

'Asemipur said: Presently, the wages of millers and the price of the bran needed for cattle raisers have not been fixed and the intermediary elements and the price of food products made of flour have also been fixed [as published].

'Asemipur said: Of course, there are shortcomings in the methods of purchasing wheat, which we are trying to eliminate. We propose that in purchasing rice, as well, we follow the plans of the purchase of wheat.

He then referred to the silos under construction and said that by the end of this year, four silos will have been completed in the cities of Yasuj, Borujerd, Mashhad, and Shahr-e Kurd with a full capacity of 200,000 tons. If all the silo construction programs are completed, the capacity of all the silos in the country will reach 2.07 million tons.

He then referred to the baking of machine-made bread by the Grain Organization and said: The total production of machine-made bread during six months of '60 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82] was 4,300 tons, which signifies an increase of 3.5 times over a similar period during the previous year.

He also announced that the subsidy which will be paid by the Grain Organization in the current year will be 29 billion [rials].

Expansion of Cooperatives

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Sep 81 p 4

> [Text] Habibollah 'Askar-Owladi, the minister of commerce, participated in a press and radio-television interview today and provided the correspondents of the mass media with information concerning the accomplishments related to Principle 44 of the Constitution and the future programs of that ministry.

According to the report of the economic correspondent of KEYHAN, he first said: In order to better implement Principle 44 of the Constitution, three new deputy posts have been added to this Ministry. These three deputy posts are: purchasing deputy, export deputy, and cooperatives deputy. The reason for the creation of these new deputy posts was that each of the four previous branches had important jobs to do; if we were to confer on them new responsibilities, we could not expect sufficient success in our work. The minister of commerce then said: The purchasing deputy is responsible for all the purchases of the Ministry of Commerce in connection with the nationalization of foreign trade. In this section, one prepared individual will have control over all domestic and foreign purchases.

Concerning the export deputy, this deputy will be responsible for the expansion of exports so that they are done in the best possible way and the national monetary funds are increased significantly. The cooperatives deputy was also formed in order to seriously handle the cooperatives. The cooperatives must be formed as rapidly and as properly as possible in order to serve the society.

Then, concerning the ratification of the bill for the nationalization of foreign trade by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, 'Askar-Owladi said: The Assembly's Commission is completely prepared to ratify this bill. Of course, in some instances revisions must be made. The Assembly's Commission believes that the problems must be dealt with realistically.

Upon approval by the Commission, we are fully prepared to go to the Assembly with any kind of explanation about the bill in order to accept the proposal of the representative brothers and implement this principle of the Constitution. 'Askar-Owladi then said: If the Ministry of Commerce were to undertake distribution on a retail level, it would be out of line with Principle 44. If, for instance, this Ministry should want to distribute its steel directly, this would be out of line with the implementation of the foreign trade policy. Of course, in order to prevent misuses in distribution, the Chamber of Commerce and the Committee for Guild-Related Affairs, with certain changes, will supervise distribution and will try to prevent

the cooperatives which will be established from becoming places of plunder. In this regard, the Ministry of Commerce proposes the establishment of limited cooperatives. These cooperatives must include the downtrodden of every trade within that guild. With lowered prices of shares of every guild unit, they should be affordable. Therefore, distribution will be done by the cooperatives, with the approval of the Ministry of Commerce, guild-related courts, guild committees, and the Chamber of Commerce. The study of the distribution plan by the cooperatives will be completed in the next 7-10 days.

'Askar-Owladi said: One of the most important goals of this Ministry is to form the cooperatives so that distribution is carried out in a more appropriate manner.

'Askar-Owladi added: Those in the society who have caused high prices and stockpiling and who commit these two kinds of infamy try to make foreign trade look bad in this society.

He added: Based on the studies which have been done, when the cooperatives are established, they will be put in charge of distribution.

Of course, we will put primary consumer goods at their disposal and, if necessary, this will be done through the cooperatives and government offices.

He said: During the time of the tyrant, this country was a consumer's market. Since the revolution, imports have decreased and efforts are being made to strengthen the established centers in order to improve the situation of imports.

He said: In the private sector, we are pursuing the stockpilers, price hikers, and plunderers in order to eliminate them. However, the private sector will be strengthened by distribution.

'Askar-Owladi then referred to the export of non-oil products and said: Under present circumstances, non-oil products must be encouraged and certain provisions must be made in this regard to bring in funds from the export of non-oil products and also to decrease smuggling.

He said: To increase exports, we must also expand export cooperatives. The preliminary steps for this have been taken. 'Askar-Owladi added: This year, we have more than 50,000 tons of pistachios and this figure is quite significant.

Also, the level of domestic rice production has reached one million tons and the wheat is quite good. This is truly something to be proud of.

'Askar-Owladi said: The Islamic assemblies in the Ministry of Commerce have worked well so far and we will make use of them. But it must be said that the task of the Islamic assemblies is to enccurage good deeds and discourage evil. If they decide to govern, they will be deviating from the right path.

In conclusion, 'Askar-Owladi said: If the country wants to import its needs, it must import from countries which offer better conditions and we will buy goods without any preference.

Land Distribution

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 21 Sep 81 p 6

[Exerpt] After the flames of the Islamic revolution of Iran reached their height in '56 [21 Mar 77-20 Mar 78], under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, this pillar of uprisers and suppressor of oppressors, after the participation of all strata and classes in this great Islamic movement, after the persistence of this movement, after the passage of one year since the crusaders who confronted the regime were martyred, after the gradual martyrdom of thousands of our brothers and sisters, after the crippling of a large number of those who raised their voices during the days of uprising, and after the continuation of this movement, finally, on 22 Bahman 57 [11 Feb 79], the people of Iran attained their greatest religious and political glory. With the liberation of the great nation from the shackles of colonialism and its domestic and foreign siblings, the deprived farmers, which form a large percentage of the country's population, and the supporters of the revolution attained the right to be free of the shackles of the dictatorship of local mini-shahs who acted uniformly under the supervision of the big idol. They demanded to taste of true independence, freedom, and the Islamic Republic (their true weapon in the days of blood and fire). As a result of the operations of the transitional government and Mr Izadi, the minister of agriculture of this revolutionary government, all of their wishes turned into a mirage. The bad policies which were formed as a result of the liberal thinking and liberal nature of the officials of the government doubled the ruling power of the local mini-shahs in certain regions. The khans and landowners who felt ill at ease in the villages during the revolution and had preferred to escape rather than stay, due to the revolutionary and Islamic wrath of the people, now returned, happy and proud, to the villages.

This was a good excuse for those groups who were waiting for such an event to seemingly defend the deprived people under these conditions. We saw how the deprived and downtrodden people of Torkaman-Sahra, Anzali, Kurdistan, Khuzestan, etc. were liberated from suffering. In any case, the occupation of the spy nest was a new step in the history of the struggle of the downtrodden of the world. This movement was a touchstone for the separation of the impurities from the

purities and the elimination of the deviant figures by the people. In the course of this great movement, the Ministry of Agriculture took steps in a new direction, which was the wish of all of the villagers, and placed the issue of land as uppermost on its list of programs. Thus, it removed a great excuse from the opportunists and the proposal for distributing and revitalizing the land, which was approved by Grand Ayatollahs Meshkini, Montazeri, and Beheshti, and was then ratified by the Revolutionary Council, was implemented as one of the rightful demands of the villagers. In this way, those of the large rural stratum who were left disappointed and helpless due to the actions of the transitional government once again saw a ray of hope. With the formation of seven-member commissions in the cities, the opponents began objecting to this proposal by raising issues such as religious legitimacy and production declines. In Esfahan Province, they can be divided into three groups:

1. Those who question the legitimacy of land distribution and consider it as a preliminary step toward changing the country to communism.

2. Those who fear the disorganization of affairs and the executive problems and who believe that production must be handled by the landowners, but with controls. However, it must be pointed out that in the combination of capitalism and feudalism, those who control the economic arteries impose their own views.

3. Large landowners and capitalists whose interests were somehow threatened and who, it can ultimately be said, were the organizers of all the opposition.

Of course, we cannot ignore the dependent political factions who can be an important and effective factor in creating differences and expressing certain viewpoints. The makeup of these three groups can be a factor opposing the Imam's line (the current leadership in how the bill is supported and ratified). Issuing underground publications, circulating open and secret letters, threatening the farmers, and making political threats are among the various methods used by this group. On the other hand, the ties between the pseudo-religious large landowners and the opponents of Islam have always brought despair and hopelessness to the villagers, such that most of them (the villagers) think that Islam supports feudalism. Finally, these events continued to the extent that they caused the temporary suspension of Paragraph C [jim]. Here are the experiences we had gained before the suspension of Paragraph C.

1. Political Effects

A. The breakdown of all the oppressive systems ruling the villages and the return of the Islamic personality of the villagers, which had

been forgotten as a result of several years of rule by the landowners.

B. The breakdown of the myth of administration and control by the landowners so that the villagers themselves, despite the lack of resources, were able to obtain the desired results through their own administration.

C. The clarification of the anti-subjugation and anti-dictatorial nature of Islam and the Imam's line.

2. Economic Effects

The economic rule of the villagers has had the following effects:

A. The economic system has been changed to the disadvantage of the large ruling landowners and to the advantage of the treasury and the farmers. Since the resources of the landowners, such as land, workers, and the farmers who needed work, have been taken away from the landowners, the opportunity for one-sided investments and the imposition of the previous oppressive policies have become non-existent.

B. The farmers, with their land (uncultivated and barren) and the loan put at their disposal by the commission, will generally realize the necessity of economic independence.

C. The distribution of land has resulted in the return of a large number of the villagers who had migrated to the cities and this can be an important and effective factor in increasing production.

D. In some regions, due to the distribution of land coinciding with the lack of transference of the necessary tools and equipment from the large landowners to the farmers and due to the economic crisis, the opportunity for investments has decreased and the landowners' fear of the future has, in practice, prevented production increases.

Note: The study of the economic effects not only concerns the actions of the commission for land distribution, but it depends on the whole political atmosphere.

The Reason for the Land Not Being Cultivated

1. In regions where farmers or landowners have been unable to reach a just agreement, cultivation has been postponed. One of the characteristics of these regions is that the existing land has been confiscated by the villagers themselves. This has caused the reappearance of the enmity of many years. Now, neither side can achieve results through discussions and negotiations. On the other hand, the landowners have escalated the crisis by signing contracts with the villagers of other regions.

2. The interest of the landowners in creating industrial and animal husbandry complexes so that the farmers would have no claims to the land later on.

3. The buying and selling of the land of small landowners in order to create non-agricultural units in cases where the lack of sufficient executive power and the fear of land distribution have resulted in the cultivation of the land. In conclusion, it must be pointed out that with the supervision and the continual actions of the Cultivation Council and other institutions as well as the rural councils, this situation has been prevented to a great extent.

Ban on Cosmetic Imports

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Sep 81 p 11

> [Text] The importation of any raw material for cosmetics has been declared prohibited in the country. Permits will be issued for the production of permitted products in 1360 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82] at an amount equal to 30 percent of the average amount spent on imported raw materials for the years '58 and '59 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 81].

In this regard, this announcement was addressed to all the producers of cosmetics by the Ministry of Industry.

The Prophet has said: "Woe be to the people who wear what they do not weave." The motto of the Ministry of Industry regarding "neither Eastern nor Western, but Islamic Republic" suggests that we not consume what we do not produce unless it is a vital necessity. Hence, the Ministry of Industry, after the necessary studies and consultation with the Ministry of Health and the producers of cosmetics, has announced the following.

1. The import of all raw material for cosmetics is banned and only the import of the raw material for the following is permitted.

A. All kinds of cremes and powders

B. Lipstick

C. Perfume, cologne, and deodorant (non-spray)

D. Cleansing creme

E. Hair coloring

The production of other products is banned and with this announcement their permits are revoked . . .

Note. In order to aid the production units, previous orders for raw materials which are used in products other than those mentioned above

must be made into finished products at the latest by the end of 1361 [20 Mar 1983], with the knowledge of the Ministry of Industries. Obviously, at the end of the above period, the products will be banned and will be subject to the related regulations.

2. The payment of any kind of royalty and the like by domestic companies and production units to foreign companies and producers is forbidden.

3. The import of any kind of glass or packaging items for cosmetics will be prohibited from the beginning of 1361 [21 Mar 82] and the factories and producers of cosmetics must purchase their needs from domestic producers.

Note 1. Due to the inadequate capacity to produce domestic glass, the Ministry of Industries will take the necessary steps and make recommendations to the glass producers for the production of the non-deluxe glass needed by producers of cosmetics.

Note 2. For the current year of 1360 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82], the producers of cosmetics may purchase their glass from abroad in an amount equal to 25 percent of the average funds paid in '58 and '59 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 81].

4. The level of raw material for producing permitted items in 1360 shall be set at 30 percent of the average expenditures for all the imported raw materials of 1358 and 1359.

Note. Licensed producers of cosmetics may transfer the funds specified for the import of raw materials or packaged items only through 1360 and can take the necessary steps to make up their shortages.

5. The import of any boxes, decorative paper, metal and non-metal boxes with commercial markings, or printed material to be used in the packaging or decoration of cosmetics is prohibited.

6. The Ministry of Industries emphatically recommends to the producers of cosmetics that they use domestic products whenever possible and try to find new domestic sources for their raw material needs because, in the future, more restrictions will be placed on the entry of raw materials.

7. Obviously, this Ministry will not hesitate to offer any assistance to those who request it, in order to move towards industrial self-sufficiency.

8. Licensed producers may receive their allocated foreign currency for the import of raw material and glass by filling out the attached form and going to room 125 of the Ministry of Industries.

9593
CSO: 4640/5

SOCIETY OF AUTHORS' ANTIREGIME STATEMENT REPORTED

NC080003 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 7 Oct 81

[Text] [Words indistinct] The Society of Iranian Authors has issued a statement calling on all the people of Iran and the world to defend the political prisoners in Iran. We draw your attention to parts of this statement:

Oh combatant Iranian people, oh freedom-seeking people of the world: The Islamic Republic has reached such a point in confronting the political forces of the country and the people's desire for freedom and independence that it knows no limit in committing its brutal actions. For the past 2 and 1/2 years this regime has wasted all the gains of the revolutionary movement of Iran, has trampled on all the political and [words indistinct] rights of the people and has (?executed) groups and groups of protesting and dissatisfied people. It set the machinery of torture to work and took the final step (?by breaking up) the people's peaceful demonstrations with the bullets of its revolution guards (?and by starting) the killing of [word indistinct] and political prisoners.

In the sinister race which has begun to kill Iran's revolutionary youths, the regime's shar' magistrates are displaying their overt grudges and (?hatreds) for renowned combatants and those who, for years, resisted the past despotic regime and who have bright records of fighting for freedom. They are secretly executing them on empty charges. (?Now) the lives of many of the country's outstanding political combatants are in danger in the prisons of the (?ruling) regime. Abolfazl Qasemi, a (?progressive) and freedom-seeking author who has spent a lifetime in [word indistinct] (?Iranian history) and in combating despotism and reaction, has been in prison for over a year now on false charges and without being given a trial.

Oh combatant Iranian people, oh freedom-seeking people of the world; the lives of combatants and of hundreds and thousands of unknown but determined and undefeatable revolutionary children of our homeland are in danger now. Prevent the execution of these brave and revolutionary women and men of Iran (?with your struggles). Do not allow the agents of the clerical regime to shed the blood of these freedom fighters. Defend the political prisoners.

[Signed] The Society of Iranian Authors, Shahrivar, 1360. [Month ending 22 September 1980]

CSO: 4640/15

RAMSAR TO GET MARITIME CARGO FACILITIES

Moscow VODNYY TRANSPORT in Russian 24 Sep 81 p 1

[Report by M. Berchiyan, our special correspondent in Baku]

[Text] Ramsar is an Iranian town on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. There is no port here, or even a moorage. Nevertheless, Ramsar was chosen as the terminal point for locating a special floating dock which began its trip at the West German city of Mannheim.

The operations plan has been approved by the Main Shipping Office for Extra-Heavy Cargo of the Caspian Shipping Lines and the Brown-Boveri Company. Two 145-ton transformers for Mannheim have been shipped to Dortmund on the river. Here the cargo was waiting for another floating dock--a maritime one--on which the transformers would be delivered to Rotterdam.

The Caspian icebreaker "Captain A. Radzhabov" arrived in Rotterdam from Finland after warranty repairs. It is now making its long-distance voyage towing the special floating dock on the route: North Sea - Kiel Canal - Baltika - Volga-Baltic Canal - Volga River - Caspian Sea.

Why were the Iranian towns of Enzeli and Nowshahr not chosen for the off-loading point for the transformers instead of the empty shore at Ramsar? It is because the whole southern coast of the Caspian is crossed by small streams flowing from the high mountains, and the bridges over them are not dependable for extra-heavy freight. The seaside resort town of Ramsar is located closer than the other places to the site where the electrical power plant is being built.

The cargo delivery facility on the Caspian coast at Ramsar has progressed to the digging of a 100-meter canal. Here further work on staging by tugboat is being assigned to two small auxiliary vessels that came to this operation on the final stage of a long voyage. With their help, the floating dock will be put in the canal, and they will lead to the road which is also being built. Here the floating dock will lower its stern ramp on which the trailers are to be raised. Functioning together are hydraulic lifters on which the transformers had been mounted in Mannheim. The low-speed convoy is headed for the new electric power station.

The first part of the operation was crossing the North Sea and the Baltic Sea--which was successful. At present, the convoy is sailing in the internal waterways of our country.

Operation "Ramsar" is headed by Captain Aleksandr Fyodorovich Filiminov who is the captain of the ship "Captain A. Radzhabov" and also a worthy worker of the Transport Service of the Azarbayjan SSR.

CSO: 1829/26

BRIEFS

MAJLIS SESSION INTERRUPTED--The session of the mullahs' Majlis was strongly disrupted today during a speech by the first prime minister of Khomeyni's regime, Mehdi Bazargan. The regime's radio, which was relaying this session live, cut its program after the disruption of the session. In his speech Bazargan said that the present terrifying oppression in Iran has endangered the people and religion, and that the wave of executions is intensifying the (?spirit) of vengeance. At the beginning of Khomeyni's sedition, Mehdi Bazargan--acting according to General Huyser's plan and with Qarebaghi's cooperation--paved the ground for shattering the Iranian armed forces. It is said that with the cooperation of Ebrahim Yazdi, Mehdi Bazargan received a namelist from U.S. officials of armed forces leaders who should be executed. This namelist was placed at the disposal of the mullah's Revolution Council. [Text] [NC072340 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 7 Oct 81]

FORMER PREMIER'S MESSAGE TO UN--Following the strong protest made by the leader of the national resistance movement of Iran, Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, to the UN Human Rights Commission, which avoided condemning the mass executions of combatant Iranian youths, the former prime minister of Iran, 'Ali Amini, sent a cable yesterday [as heard] to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim describing this policy as astonishing. 'Ali Amini said that while more than 100 innocent Iranian people are being murdered daily by the executioners of the Islamic regime, the UN refuses even to condemn this act. He added that the result of this policy will be for Iran's future rule to review its relations with the UN. [Text] [NC072324 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 7 Oct 81]

CLANDESTINE CLAIMS PURGE IMMINENT--A Free Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that Khomeyni's Islamic Republic has prepared a long namelist of officers and NCO's of the armed forces and intends to execute them immediately on various charges, including cooperation with the Mojahedin-e Khalq and coup attempts, once the armed demonstrations and street clashes end. Khomeyni's regime has recently realized that (?large) quantities of arms and ammunition have disappeared from the Iran-Iraq war front. It is not yet clear whether the arms and ammunition have been placed at the disposal of [word indistinct] or other groups. The list of names of the officers and NCO's has not been revealed, but it is said that many of the present commanders of the armed forces units are included in it. [Text] [NC071644 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Oct 81]

CSO: 4640/15

GOVERNMENT THREATENS TO SUE KENYAN PAPER

Libel Alleged

Nairobi THE STANDARD in English 24 Sep 81 p 4

[For related material please see JPRS 79256 Sub-Saharan Report No 2506, 20 Oct 81 pp 21-22 article titled "Qadhdhafi Is Dared To Sue Newspaper."]

[Letter To Editor]

[Text] *Libya has threatened to sue 'The Standard' over the publication of a memorandum issued "to all participant states in the 18th Summit Conference of the Organisation of African Unity" in Nairobi in June.*

Following is the letter sent to 'The Standard' by Mr. M. A. Khan, a Nairobi advocate who is acting as a lawyer for Libya.

UNDER CERTIFICATE OF POSTING
16th September, 1981

The Editor,
The Standard,
P.O. Box 30080,
NAIROBI.

The Standard Newspapers Limited,
P.O. Box 30080,
NAIROBI.

Dear Sirs,

I act for the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya its Embassy and H. E. Dr. Ali A. Tureiki, The Foreign Minister of Libya and under their instructions I write as under:

My clients' attention has been drawn to the contents of the Editorial Page in the issue of *The Standard* of the July 17, 1981 entitled "You're Backward, Gadaffi Tells Black Africa — The 'Memo' That Shows up Libya," and the editorial entitled "Libya Insults Black Africa."

These reports purport to reproduce and comment upon a "Memorandum" supposedly issued by my client, H. E. Dr. Tureiki, the Foreign Minister on behalf of the State of Libya. You state that the same is a "Memorandum" to "all participant states in the 18th Summit Conference of the Organisation of African Unity." You further state that the "Memorandum" is "signed by the Head of the Libyan delegation to the 18th O.A.U. Summit in Nairobi.

Both these statements by you are completely untrue. My clients deny completely and forcefully that said Memorandum was issued by them. The Government of Libya has not issued the said Memorandum at any time. Nor has the distinguished Leader of the Libyan Delegation, H. E. Dr. Tureiki, The Libyan Foreign Minister, at any time signed such a memorandum. Your own 'facsimile' shows no signature, whether Dr. Tureiki's or anyone else's.

It would have been a simple matter for you to have checked with the Kenya Foreign Office as to whether they had received the "Memorandum". This your report shows has not been done. Or with any other Foreign Office official amongst O.A.U. Member States to ascertain whether they or any of them had received the "Memorandum". This too is absent in your report.

If such a "Memorandum" had been sent you should have expected that exception would have been taken to the contents by the Foreign Office of the Republic of Kenya and other O.A.U. Member States and that some Official Protests lodged. This too you could have checked. And this also you have not done.

If the "Memorandum" were addressed as it shows by your own 'facsimile' to "All Participant States" then it would be received by the various Foreign Offices in the O.A.U. Member States and there would be no necessity of stating as your Editorial contends it "has surfaced in Nairobi".

The fact is no such "Memorandum" was ever received by the Foreign Office of the Republic of Kenya or any O.A.U. Member State from my clients, nor has the Government of Libya received any protest or complaint from any O.A.U. Member Government. And the simple reason is that no such Memorandum was ever written or sent by Libya to anyone.

It is strange that out of over 50 Governments and hundreds of newspapers in O.A.U. Africa only *The Standard* alone has discovered this malicious "Memorandum", and 'exposed' it.

These twelve statements and their reckless and/or malicious publication have been made without truth, justification or lawful excuse and has tended to degrade, revile or expose to hatred, contempt and ridicule my clients with intent of disturbing the peace and friendship between Kenya and Libya. They have also constituted a most serious and damaging libel upon my clients and each of them.

My mandatory instructions therefore are that unless within seven (7) days from the date hereof:—

(a) You produce to me the photo-stat copy of the Memorandum including the signature and the State Stamp thereon to enable me to show it to my clients;

(b) Publish in the next issue of your newspaper a full and complete

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SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYAH

Office of the Delegation of the SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYAH to the 18th ORGANISATION of AFRICAN UNITY CONFERENCE Nairobi, Kenya

The enclosed memorandum by Brother ALI ABDUL SALAM TUREIKI is forwarded with the compliments of the SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYAH

THIS is the official 'Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah' complimentary slip accompanying the memorandum issued by Ali Abdul-Salam Tureiki, head of the Libyan delegation to the 18th O.A.U. Summit in Nairobi. The memo appears on the right.

withdrawal and apology in terms to be approved by me on my clients behalf in as prominent a position as the Article complained of;

(c) Pay to my clients a proper and suitable sum as damages for the injury to the reputation and for the embarrassment and distress caused to them which my clients will donate to a charity of your choice in Kenya and;

(d) Indemnify my clients in respect of the costs which they and each one of them will have incurred in this matter.

I am to take steps to file appropriate court proceedings against yourselves.

I am as per my instructions copying this letter to The Honourable The Minister for Foreign Affairs, The Honourable The Minister for Information and The Honourable The Minister for State in the Office of The President and also The Secretary General of the O.A.U. for their information.

Yours faithfully,
M. A. KHAN.

c.c.

1.
The Honourable,
The Minister for
Foreign Affairs,
P.O. Box 30551,
Nairobi.

2.
The Honourable,
The Minister for Information &
Broadcasting,
P.O. Box 30025,
Nairobi.

3
The Honourable,
The Minister of State,
P.O. Box 30510,
Nairobi.

4.
The Secretary General,
The Organisation of African Unity,
P.O. Box 3243,
Addis Ababa,
Ethiopia.

5.
The Charge De Affairs,
The Socialist Peoples Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya,
Nairobi.

الجماهيرية العربية الليبية الشعبية الاشتراكية

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYAH

A MEMORANDUM TO ALL PARTICIPANT STATES IN THE 18th SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Brothers

With the victorious ending of the 18th Summit Conference of the Organisation of African Unity, it is the duty of all participant States not only to rejoice at the successes that have been achieved but also, in the interests of African unity, to acknowledge and correct the subversive policies that have threatened this victory.

It must be said that the chief of these subversive policies has been the activities of some members who have tried to discredit the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and to deny the Brother Colonel Muammar Gadafi his rightful status of leadership. States regimes, jealous of the brilliant successes of the Libyan Revolution, are never ceasing in their attempts to prevent the purity of the Brother Colonel's teachings from benefiting all Africa in its struggle against imperialism. In these days, when Africa is in the shadow of the American imperialist threat, such betrayal serves the enemies of Africa and cannot be allowed.

It is well understood that the attitude of these States is basically due to a lack of political and social development through the influence of the cultural backwardness that afflicts much of Africa. Their current regimes are the victims of their people who hear the call of their brothers but cannot answer. The voices of their people must be heard! These regimes must be compelled to accept the leadership of those who are fitted to lead. they cannot be permitted to play an equally negative role at next year's Summit in Tripoli, or continue with their disruptive activities in the meantime.

The 1982 Summit will take place in a greatly different atmosphere from the Summit that has just ended in Nairobi. It will be the most important milestone in the history of the OAU. The delegates of the great States of black Africa will be required to rise to the enlightened and progressive political and cultural level they will find there. In this stimulating revolutionary atmosphere they must be determined to work together unimpeded by under the guidance of Chairman Brother Colonel Muammar Gadafi for the greater unity of Africa and extermination of Africa's enemies.

The Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriyah congratulates the member States of the OAA on their recognition of Africa's need for the leadership of Brother Colonel Muammar Gadafi and is confident that the 1982 Summit will be an overwhelming victory for the African Revolution over its imperialist enemies.

ALI ABDUL-SALAM TURKI

HEAD OF THE DELEGATION OF THE

SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYAH TO THE

18TH SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

Paper Responds

Nairobi THE STANDARD in English 25 Sep 81 p 4

[Text]

LIBYA has threatened to sue "The Standard" for allegedly spelling the name of the country's leader, Col. Muammar Gaddafi, by publishing a memorandum issued to delegates attending last June's O.A.U. Heads of State Summit in Nairobi by the leader of the Libyan delegation.

The following are just some of the many incidents of human rights violations in Libya, murders of Libyan nationals abroad, and support for international terrorism by the Gaddafi regime.

FREE officers in Libya have managed to leak an account of Gaddafi's recent crimes. They say Gaddafi has executed 91 officers. His aides also killed all the soldiers who were wounded in the fighting in Uganda so as to prevent bitter feeling on the part of their colleagues.

Among the Libyan public figures whom Gaddafi has killed in Europe have been journalists, businessmen, students, workers and diplomats.

Gaddafi's henchmen have killed 6,000 citizens and hung their bodies in the public squares, to terrorise the Libyan people. They have also arrested 2,000 people in the middle of the night.

The list of Libyan victims cited by the free officers, who number in the hundreds, includes the following:

On 28 March, 1980, a Libyan journalist, Muhamad Mustafa Ramadan, was murdered. He worked in the Arab Department of the B.B.C. He was killed by the Libyan "murder squad" after concluding his Friday prayers in a London mosque.

A Libyan lawyer, Mahmud Nafi, was murdered in his office in London on April 25, 1980.

A Libyan businessman, I'arf Abd al-Jalil, was shot and killed in April 1980 near the De Berry coffee house in the heart of Rome. His murderer was Yusef Masrata.

The body of the Libyan businessman, Muhamad Salam ar-Retimi, was found in his car in Rome on March 21, 1980.

A Libyan, Abd Allah al-Qazimi, was murdered in May, 1980, near a railway station in Rome.

A Libyan diplomat, Omran al-Mahadi, who worked in the Libyan embassy in Bonn, was shot and killed on May 9, 1980, in the centre of the city. His murderers were Libyan intelligence personnel.

Shots were fired at the Libyan citizen Muhamad Abu Salam as he left his office at an Arab translating agency in the Kensington section of London.

A Libyan exile, Abd al-Latif al-Mansur, was murdered on April 28, 1980. His body was discarded in one of the suburbs of Beirut.

The decapitated body of a Libyan worker, Abu Bakr Abd ar-Rahman, was found in Athens on May 21, 1980.

On May 21, 1980, a criminal, Mansur Bakqasim, tried to murder Muhamad Salam al-Fazzani, owner of the Al-Andab restaurant near a railway station in Rome.

During March, 1980, the following people were murdered in Milan: Omar Taher ad-Dagini, Muhamad Bencna, Muhamad Hussein as-Sagir, Muhamad Fuad Abu Hajir, a lawyer Muhamad Abd as-Salam Rafa, a lawyer Osman al-Bizanti, a Libyan citizen Oz ad-Din al-Hadari, and others.

In March, 1979, 20 Libyan officers were executed after returning from military training in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. They were accused of setting up a secret organisation against Gaddafi.

The Libyan National Movement then called upon the masses in Libya and outside its borders to oppose the Gaddafi regime and to expose the truth about his absolute dictatorship. The movement says that prisoners are kept for long periods in Gaddafi's jails, secretly and in illegal conditions.

They are subjected to cruel, violent treatment and to physical and mental tortures by specialists in such techniques, who force the prisoners to make false statements and sign forged documents.

• Western intelligence circles have much evidence that Gaddafi is financing and training European organisations that carry out political terror, mainly in Ireland, Italy and West Germany.

In a Press release issued on October 25, 1980, Fakhal al-Masoudi, one of the leaders of the Libyan opposition, stated that the only thing Gaddafi had given the Libyan people was corruption, destruction and anarchy. He noted Gaddafi's dubious connections in aiding international terrorist gangs and Fascist organisations throughout the world.

Gaddafi has also attacked mosques and arrested worshippers.

• Groups of Libyan students have fled to other Arab States to finish their studies. The students say that Gaddafi's terror and pressure have made Libya unbearable.

• Gaddafi's call for the establishment of a mercenary army have also failed, after he published notices in the Press asking discharged soldiers from any Arab army to join the Libyan army.

He then tried another system, forcibly recruiting Arab students into his Libyan Moslem Corps, giving them military training and sending them to Arab countries to carry out terrorist missions.

Gaddafi also uses standard pressure techniques, such as threats, dismissals from work and confiscation of workers' pay which has been deposited in banks, in order to force his subjects to join the Libyan army.

Travellers arriving from Tripoli say that no one in Libya feels safe, since anarchy has taken over all institutions, due to the "revolutionary committees" which Gaddafi has imposed on the Libyan people.

On March 15, 1981, the "revolutionary committees" in Tripoli carried out high-level purges, and set up a special court to "eliminate the enemies of the people who are trying to return the previous regime to power".

One of the Egyptian teachers living in Libya died on November 14 due to medical neglect by the Libyan authorities. Egyptians living in Libya have also complained about poor treatment by official bodies, due to their refusal to join Gaddafi's army.

•Twenty-one young men in black hoods marched in a small park opposite U.N. headquarters carrying signs denouncing the rule of Gaddafi. They said they were Libyan students in American schools, but declined to give their names on the grounds that they feared retaliation against their families back home and against themselves.

One of the signs they carried bore a drawing of Gaddafi and read,

"Wanted for murder, Dead or Alive, the Dictator". Other signs called for a stop to export trade, killings of the innocents, and violations of human rights in Libya.

One demonstrator told a reporter there were 7,000 Libyan students in the United States and some of them were demonstrating in Seattle, Washington, St. Louis, Missouri and New Orleans, Louisiana, as well as New York, to commemorate the hanging of three students in Libya four years ago.

•Recently the Libyan National Association held a conference in Cairo, which was attended by a large number of Libyan nationals residing in Egypt, as well as by many Islamic and public leaders, to discuss Gaddafi's policy with regard to Islam.

The chairman of the association, Mr. Mustafa al-Sadiki, speaking at the opening of the conference, called for action against Gaddafi's anti-Islamic deeds.

At its completion, the association published a statement to the effect that Gaddafi was conducting a premeditated campaign against Islam, in order to foster atheism and agnosticism, as exposed in the desecration of graves and the cutting of corpses into the sea, handcuffs with the hands of these murdered abroad, as well as the persecution and murder of clergymen.

•The Libyan regime has turned terror and subversion into a central tool of its foreign policy. Gaddafi supports terrorist operations elements inside Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco, Oman and Somalia and other areas.

In Lebanon, the leader of the Shi'ite community, the Imam Musa Sadar, and other leading figures, have been murdered for their activities against Libyan interests and influence in Lebanon.

•Libya instructs, arms and finances the activities of called dissents working to subvert "moderate" regimes. As a result of such activities, relations have been severed with several African countries in recent years, such as the Central African Republic, Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone. These Libyan activities damage Western interests and help advance those of the Soviet Union.

•Gaddafi's vision of an Islamic revival, and his leadership ambitions, have led him to support and encourage Islamic extremists to rebel against the central authority of their countries. The Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, various countries in Africa are such examples. Gaddafi also supports the Khomeini regime in Iran and its Islamic revolution.

•Since Gaddafi came to power in 1969, Libya has given support to almost every terrorist movement in the world, whether covertly or openly. He has supported support for the I.R.A.'s armed struggle in Ireland and for the Basque separatist movement in Spain.

The bonds between Libya and the Italian Red Brigades, the Red Army in Japan and the Baader-Meinhoff gang in Germany are also well-documented. Furthermore, it is known that Carlos, one of the central figures in international terror, maintains close ties with Libya.

•Libya serves as a sanctuary for those who carry out acts of terrorism throughout the world. Algerian Islamic and nationalist fled political refugees in Libya. Moreover, Libya also maintains more than 20 bases and camps in which terrorists and subversive elements of various nationalities are trained.

In addition, Libya's diplomatic missions play a part in promoting international terrorist activities. Its diplomatic pouches constitute an efficient and secure channel for transferring weapons, explosives and forged documents to the terrorists.

CSO: 4500/11

FRENCH AUTHOR SEES QADHDHAFI AS SEEKING MODERATION

Paris LE MATIN in French 3 Aug 81 p 10

[Interview with Thierry de Beauce, French author, by Laurent Dispot, LE MATIN staff correspondent; date and place not specified]

[Text] Behind the numerous statements made, there is a relative coherence in Libyan policy, states Thierry de Beauce having interviewed one of the most controversial men of the moment. Thierry de Beauce, international relations expert and author of "L'Ile Absolue, Essai sur le Japon" [The Absolute Island, and Essay on Japan] (1979) and of "Desire de Guerre, la France dans le Troisieme Conflit Mondial" [Desire for War, France in the Third World War] (1981), has just had the occasion to have a long, private meeting with Colonel Qadhdhafi, the Libyan chief of state. He gave us his impressions of this interview.

[Question] The American magazine NEWSWEEK has just entitled one of its covers, "Qadhdhafi, the Most Dangerous Man in the World." What do you think of this, after having spent several hours in a private interview with this "international public enemy No 1?"

[Answer] In effect, there is a real American press campaign against the Libyan regime. In the United States each administration has its pet hates. One could prepare a list: Nasir, Fidel Castro, the Palestinians. Today, it is Qadhdhafi's turn to be in the focus. After all, it is better to find a foreign explanation for the troubles which gnaw at a country. Are there troubles in the Philippines? It is Qadhdhafi's fault. The Red Brigades in Italy? That's Qadhdhafi, too. The Basques in Spain? Qadhdhafi. The troubles in Africa? It is still Qadhdhafi. The Palestinian conflict? Qadhdhafi again. You do not build a reasonable policy on such examples of paranoia.

[Question] What about terrorism? Colonel Qadhdhafi is strongly suspected of organizing it and of indirectly controlling it.

[Answer] If he is a terrorist, he should be condemned. However, too often the charge of terrorism serves as an alibi for weakness elsewhere. It avoids having to consider basic problems or it deflects attention from more serious evidence: the terrorist policy of the State of Israel, for example. Is someone who drops bombs

on a foreign capital, under the pretext that he has been quite officially ordered to do so by a sovereign state, less questionable than I don't know what splinter group of revolutionaries? Add up the horror involved, and you will see the difference.

[Question] In your view, what of the Libyan policy of intervention in Chad?

[Answer] Qadhdhafi has experienced the temptation of Bismarck: extending his empire by force. Then he had to consider that it was not so simple. You do not join so easily with a weaker neighbor. There are no longer dynastic marriages. Thus, the union with Tunisia has been challenged, and union with Chad is no longer discussed. Officially, Libya is content to show its influence there, to maintain order, and to prevent the installation of a regime that would be hostile to it. Its troops reportedly will be reduced in number. By the nature of things Libya must have a realistic and prudent state policy. Compared with the policy of Bismark, Qadhdhafi seems to want to carry on a policy like that of Metternich and become one of the essential partners of the status quo in Africa.

[Question] However, the African countries regularly denounced his interventions.

[Answer] Panic serves both to justify foreign assistance and to erase domestic problems. We should not always submit our analyses to the excuses made by others. Moreover, the African countries tend to use a kind of double language, since they have just agreed to give Libya the position of OAU president for 1982, at the conference in Nairobi. The effort is not unskillful: they have recognized the legitimacy of Qadhdhafi in Africa, but at the same time they have discreetly involved him in the respectable continental alliance. In 1982, he will have to play the game of African responsibility. Metternich did not hesitate to do that. Look, in the Sahara conflict he is playing a moderating role and comes to the aid of the king of Morocco, against all expectations. Would it have been possible to begin to negotiate if the Libyans, who supported the POLISARIO, had not clearly shown their wish to favor a dialogue? In Black Africa, Libya is showing a more supple attitude regarding Chad. One can even imagine that normal diplomatic relations will resume between Libya and all of the moderate African regimes.

[Question] Qadhdhafi preaches the unification of the Arab nation, even the unification of Islam. What is Libyan policy in this regard?

[Answer] In the name of the Arab nation, Qadhdhafi today seems to choose moderation. After the Tammouz raid, it was very clear: priority belonged to the struggle against Israel. That was enough to justify a rapprochement with the conservative regimes, a return to the "great brotherhood," from which only Egypt, with its divisive policy, would be vehemently excluded. Morocco has already taken advantage of this. And I myself met Sheikh Zayed from Abu Dhabi in Tripoli. In any case he is not a dangerous revolutionary. Moreover, it is not impossible that Libya would resume normal relations with the Saudis. The Americans, who are continuing their double game by letting Israel do what it will, despite their verbal protests, will have to take into account the existence of a more united Arab front--everything is relative--where Libya will have its word to say.

[Question] Colonel Qadhdhafi is sometimes treated as a madman. What was your personal impression?

[Answer] Whenever a statesman does not reason in terms of our own criteria, we accuse him of being crazy. This Western-centered view is a little infantile. We must know how to analyze the relative coherence of Libyan policy, behind the many statements made. For example, there are the economic ties maintained even with American petroleum companies; the rapproachement with Europe by real economic and industrial integration with Italy (Fiat has 15 percent Libyan ownership). This did not stop Italian President Pertini from sharply denouncing "Libyan intervention" each time he has a problem at home. There has been the development of trade relations with Federal Republic of Germany, the constant search for cooperation with France. Finally, Algeria has done more strategic going and coming than Libya: have we not seen successive "priorities" adopted of cooperation with France, then with the USSR, then, though discreetly, with the United States, then trade diversification with all countries?

[Question] Is is said of Qadhdhafi that he is reportedly a Soviet agent.

[Answer] That was said of Nasir. Seen from Washington, any nationalism that is a little jealous of others becomes a creation of the Comintern. It is true, Qadhdhafi is looking for counterweights. He certainly has Soviet advisers. However, until recently he also had French advisers. The USSR is participating in Libya's economic development, in terms of the ambitious cooperation agreements. However, the Federal Republic of Germany or Italy are also important trading partners for him. This is also true of even the United States, of which Libya is one of the major foreign suppliers of petroleum. The systematic rejection of marxism, the establishment of "people's committees" which have nothing to do with communist ideology, the spread of Arab nationalism, the development of religion--all of these prevent any in-depth influence by the Soviets. They will remain foreigners, suppliers of weapons (among others). This is one point, that's all. Let American hostility be less apparent, and the Soviet counter-weight will seem less necessary. Let Europe come into existence politically, and it will be less necessary for him to go and caress the idols of a costly alliance with the USSR. Nasir, we should recall, was infinitely closer to the Soviets than Qadhdhafi will ever by. That did not stop him from undertaking a change in alliances, without any drama, and without the Soviets baving the means, and even the time, to attack him.

[Question] The election of Francois Mitterrand in France nevertheless creates a new situation.

[Answer] Today the state of grace is still a notion which is for export. However, more basically, the Libyans have been very much interested in the new French approaches to the situation in Africa. They have read the statements made by Jean-Pierre Cot, who emphasizes the equality of the cooperating countries, a willingness to consider the problems of development in a different way, the rejection of neo-colonialist temptations. We may recall that the election of Francois Mitterrand caused concern to certain African regimes which tried to find a kind of substitute support from the Americans, and the Americans did not refrain from offering their services. Political natures abhor a vacuum. The Libyans understood this perfectly well. The African continent cannot live without foreign partners. Everything considered, it is better to have France and Europe than the United States and the infernal involvement in the rivalries between the superpowers. The hardening of political attitudes in Africa would have obliged Libya to choose and to place itself more clearly in the Soviet camp, to counter the American efforts at the same level. And Libya, believe me, above all does not want to risk this kind of sharp division.

Qadhdhafi has no taste at all to become a kind of Fidel Castro, little by little turned into a Stalinist out of necessity. His nationalism at times leads him to make alliances with the devil. However, if he is realistic, and personally I am convinced that he is realistic, he will know how to avoid going too far.

[Question] When he speaks, does he appear to have an exalted manner, as they say?

[Answer] Certainly not. With Colonel Qadhdhafi you have a cold dialogue. I was impressed by his precise questions, by his cutting comments which prevented skidding too much into ideology. He is a man who knows the world and who has acquired experience with power. After 12 years, all that counts. Above all, he has the temptation to withdraw, as he likes to read, to isolate himself, to meditate in the desert. He does not have affected manners but rather an awareness that daily excercise of power is gnawing at him and that a real statesman must continuously try to get away from it. Contrary to all expectations, he is an intellectual in politics and a realistic intellectual. Before judging him, consider without emotion the prudent development of his strategy and do not pay too much attention to the letter of his statements. In effect, in the Arab world, speeches often serve to ward off reality. They are a kind of drug or spell. However, behind that there is the reality of a certitude, as far as Qadhdhafi is concerned. France interests him, as does the wish of France to carry out an independent policy.

5170
CSO: 4519/452

YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN REVOLUTION PRAISED

Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 19 Sep 81 p 8

[Text]

•Among the sectors celebrating with great festivity and pomp the twelfth anniversary of the First of September Revolution in the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is the important section of youths. Going around the streets in spontaneous car-cades and participating in public meetings and demonstrations, the youths of the Jamahiriya are exhibiting their support to the ideals and achievements of the Revolution.

It is obvious that the younger generation has well understood the objectives of the revolution. They are destroying all links with the past and they have embraced the ideals and dicta of Colonel Mu'Ammar Gaddafi as put forward in the now world wide famous "The Green Book".

The younger generation are conscious of what the needs of the country are and what can be achieved. Youths are imbued with the revolutionary spirit and have had a real change in mentality. The Revolution has crept into young people and the burden of the revolution has been shouldered by the young intellectuals. They have understood well the role they ought to play in the purporting of all that the revolution stands for.

And the revolution needs this role because the youth sector is one of the most important spheres on which one can rely in carrying out the revolution's programmes. Youth is an age when one is in the prime of life brimming with energy and ideals. A time when one wants to do something really worthwhile with one's life... when the world seems to be just opening in front of one and seems to be there for the taking.

Here we quote Major Abdussalam Jalloud, who when addressing a youth camp recently declared that, "the revolution is an historical action shouldered by a generation and passed on to the coming generations and the revolution cannot continue without young people. The continuity of revolutionary action was not linked to a specific period because it was an historical action which lives with the generation and each generation shoulders its responsibility and passes it over to the next generation. Young people are the fuel of the revolution and the backbone of the nation. They are entitled to moral, spiritual, scientific, material and social care to help them carry the message of the revolution."

One can also add that the First of September revolution is a revolution of youth and is one of the effective revolution in history. Its principles include the changing of society and the improving of its abilities for the benefit of man. This is mainly done through scientific advancement based on sound foundations. By translating the goals of the revolution intellectually and practically, the revolution is doing all in its power to build up an ideological human being who can carry strengthen the people's power.

INVOLVED

Though the revolution is being carried forward by qualified revolutionaries, ideologically and intellectually, youths are also very greatly involved because they have responsibilities to shoulder. Youths have become an able and effective force in the revolutionary

march and accept their responsibilities particularly now that the Jamahiriya has been founded and people's power established. "Youths should therefore rise to their intellectual level and prepare themselves to achieve their revolutionary goals."

On its part the revolution is greatly concerned abouth youths and their formation. The policy is based on appreciation and understanding of role of young people in this revolutionary phase both in the Jamahiriya and the world. The revolution makes available all necessary moral and material potentials for this sector so that objectives and goals aspired to by the revolution can be achieved and realised.

To this end the Jamahiriya has thousands of youths studying abroad in European countries, including the Soviet Union and the United States to specialise in their studies. These will be a great asset when they end their studies and return to their homeland. Youths are also urged and aided to participate in sports gatherings and tournaments as well as competitions abroad so as to give a full image about the revolution's home achievements and about the youths and their role in building their society.

Military discipline has also been introduced for youths in the Jamahiriya with very good results. Youths have now accepted this system and feel all the better for it, because it not only occupies them in worthwhile curricula but it also forms them into educated disciplined and sound men and women.

Besides, the revolution also organises camps for voluntary work, sports, and cultural competitions and tours to neighbouring Arab countries. Seminars and conferences are also held under the supervision of experts and specialists in youth affairs and social welfare. Youth hostels and numerous sports centres have been set up.

Everything is done with the aim of aiding youth and channelling their energies and ideals into the right directions. Youths have to be helped to do away with the past, work through the present and look to the future. Such transitions as the one taking place now in the youth of the Jamahiriya is obviously not an easy one.

It cannot be carried out overnight. It is therefore very satisfying to note that the pace in this regard in the Jamahiriya has been a quick one. And one can easily say that it has been a very successful one from what is shown by the enthusiasm the youths of the Jamahiriya have for the ideals and dicta of the great First of September Revolution.

CSO: 4500/10

BRIEFS

CONVENTIONAL MISSILES--London, 25 September--The dozen or so Soviet SS-12 missiles deployed in Libya are probably not equipped with nuclear warheads, sources at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) said. The missiles, the positions of which were not specified in the latest IISS report, are capable of being armed with the nuclear warheads, but they seem for the moment to carry conventional charges, the sources said yesterday. The Thursday issue of the DAILY TELEGRAPH quoted an independendent source as having seen "the newly delivered Russian missiles installed in bunkers cut into the hills outside Tobruk." (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2831, 25 Sep 81 p 13]

DAIRY OPENING--The opening of Al Gabal Al Akhdar Dairy in Al Baida was celebrated by speakers from people's congresses and committees and the producers. They all hailed the gigantic achievements of the Libyan Arab people in various sectors through the Great Al Fateh revolution. The dairy has the capacity per shift of 60,000 litres of pasteurised milk, 2000 litres of yogurt in addition to various kinds of cheese. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 19 Sep 81 p 9]

FODDER PLANT OPENING--As part of the Libyan people's celebrations marking the 12th anniversary of the Great Al Fateh Revolution a new important industrial project was opened in Tripoli. The factory, largest of its type in Africa, will produce animal fodder. Present at the popular celebration to open the factory were the secretaries of the people's committees of light industry, electricity, planning and education as well as secretaries and members of the qualitative people's committees in Azizia and a large number of people. A number of speeches were read out at the ceremony in which the speakers hailed the Libyan Arab people's giant achievements guided by Great Al Fateh revolution, which has succeeded within 12 years to surpass the achievements of many countries. The plant's production capacity is 30 tons per hour of fodder for cattle and poultry. The complex covers a 12-hectare area and has 36 silos for storing raw materials and sections for mixing, pressing, packing, loading and others. The factory, run by 65 producers, also has the most advanced laboratories and equipments. With the opening of this plant, Jamahiriya's fodder production will reach 375,000 tons per year, said a spokesman of the general company for mills and fodder. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 19 Sep 81 p 9]

TRACTOR PLANT--Amid the celebrations marking the 12th anniversary of the great Al Fateh revolution, leader Muammar Qadhdhafi last-night opened a tractor factory in Tajoura, a huge industrial monument to be added to the series of heavy industry achievements made possible by the will of the Libyan Arab people within the

enormous revolutionary transformations on the Libyan soil. The leader was received by huge crowds who came to confirm their consolidation with the Great Al Fateh revolution and its leader. Amid revolutionary slogans expressing the determination to defend the revolution and its great achievements, Colonel Qadhdhafi unveiled the plate, announcing the opening of this industrial monument, after which he wandered around the various sections of the factory and listened to briefs on the capacity, production line, operation and progress. The producers then offered the leader a tractor produced in this factory in appreciation of the leading role of Colonel Qadhdhafi in defeating the desert and challenging nature as well as creating a green agricultural revolution that spread throughout the Jamahiriya. The production capacity of this factory is 3,000 tractors per year with various sizes based on one work shift. This could be increased to 5,000 tractors by two working shifts. The factory will absorb 300 producers per one shift and 450 when increased to two shifts. The total cost of the factory reached 10 million dinars. It was built on 12 hectares site. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 19 Sep 81 p 9]

MISSILE BOATS LAUNCHED--The seventh of 10 Combatante IIG fast patrol missile boats, with 311 tons displacement and ordered from the French ship construction yard, CMN, was launched on 23 June in Cherbourg (France). The boat, called the Beir Alkrarim, was laid down on 11 March 1980. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French No 41 Aug 81 p 10] 5170

PURCHASE OF MAZDA VEHICLES--"Sumitomo," one of the principal Japanese business firms, has entered into a provisional agreement with Libya for the delivery of 30,000 "Mazda" automobiles and pickup trucks, for a value of ¥30 billion. [Text] [Paris AFRIQUE DEFENSE in French No 41 Aug 81 p 11] 5170

CSO: 4519/452

BRIEFS

ALIREZA WINS HOSPITAL CONTRACT--The Saudi-British joint venture construction company Laing Wimpey Alireza has won a £50 million ($92 million) contract to build two 100-bed hospitals for the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Health, it was announced last week. The two hospitals are to be similar in design; one of the hospitals is to be located at Al-Bukayriyah, about 200 miles northwest of Riyadh, and the other 50 miles away from the first at Al-Midhnab; the two hospitals are to be built simultaneously and are to be completed within 23 months, according to the terms of the contract. Each of the hospitals will have facilities for maternity wards, gynaecology, pediatrics, physiotherapy, radiotherapy and dentistry; each will also have two operating theatres, a blood bank and a haematology laboratory. The buildings will each occupy about 100,000 square metres of land and will have in situ reinforced concrete frames and pre-cast spandrel panels. The main buildings and their recreation centres and ancillary buildings will be clad in marble. This will be held away from the inner wall to provide an insulating cavity. John Laing Design Associates are acting as architects and structural engineers. Two Italian firms, Total Termica and Redi Electric, have been awarded subcontracts for the main services of the hospitals. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 p 6]

PILGRIMAGE FACILITIES COSTS--The Saudi Ministry of Hajj and Awkaf (Pilgrimage and Religious Endowments) has spent a record sum of Saudi Rials 680 million ($198.5 million) to provide increased services and facilities required by this year's Hajjaj (pilgrims), who have already started flocking to the Kingdom. The pilgrims go in their millions every year to visit the holy city of Mecca in accordance with one of the five injunctions of Islam. The head of the Saudi Ministry, Sheikh Abdel Wahab Abdel Wasse'h, said last week that his department had undertaken a number of projects at the cities of Mecca and Medina and in other sacred shrines. These projects include construction and improvement of water distribution stations and reservoirs, installation of large awnings at various points on the pilgrimage route, establishment of pilgrimage information centres and ancillary work such as signposting. Sheikh Abdel Wahab added that further funds had been allocated to finance construction of a pilgrims' city in Medina and housing facilities at Mecca. These projects have yet to receive final approval from the Saudi authorities. A series of measures to regulate the flow of Muslim pilgrims coming from all parts of the world, often not knowing any Arabic, were also announced by the Minister. Among these are collective passes for groups of pilgrims to facilitate checking procedures at the entrance of the holy city of Mecca, which is closed to non-Muslims, better coordination between the Ministry and foreign pilgrimage associations organising package tours and a new system to avoid fatal accidents that sometimes occur during the circumambulation of the Kaaba (Black Stone) in Mecca. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 p 6]

SAUDI LOAN TO MALTA--Saudi Arabia has extended a $20 million loan to Malta to assist in the financing of a modern port to be constructed on the island. It has also made a $5 million grant to build a new shipyard. The aid package comes in the wake of a visit to the Maltese capital, Valetta, last month by a Saudi delegation which explored possibilities of aid to the island. Malta's Prime Minister Dom Mintoff was in Saudi Arabia last week on a three-day official visit during which he had talks with Saudi Finance and Economy Minister Sheikh Mohammad Aba al-Khail on ways of strengthening bilateral relations. The Saudi Press Agency reported that further Saudi aid would go to help finance a shipyard, a water desalination plant and a telecommunications scheme. Mr Mintoff had previously visited the UAE, where he also received promises of assistance for his country. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 39, 28 Sep 81 p 8]

CSO: 4404/14

EMIGRE WORKERS' CONFERENCE ISSUES RECOMMENDATIONS

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 16 Aug 81 p 1

[Text] The first Sudanese Emigre Workers Conference ended its sessions at noon yesterday, at the Friendship Hall in Khartoum. Its final report was issued, containing over 30 recommendations.

In the area of supporting national economy and services, the conference recommended that emigre workers pay income tax equal to that paid by workers in the country provided its categories are defined in accordance with their income levels. It was also recommended that this procedure be preceded by the cancellation of the 20 percent [taxes], and that each emigre Sudanese worker transfers a minimum of $500 and a maximum of $1000 annually [to Sudan] at the official rate of exchange. It also recommended conducting studies for the establishment of a bank to gather the savings of the Sudanese working abroad and invest these savings in production and services fields. The conference recommended the origination of a new law to offer incentives and exemptions for the monies transferred by emigres into Sudan for investment purposes. It also recommended studying the possibility of transforming the Sudan Airlines organization into a corporation which Sudanese workers inside and outside Sudan can participate in. In the area of emigration policies and employment of Sudanese workers abroad, the conference recommended giving more attention to training the work force and establishing institutes and centers for such training. It also recommended the issuance of a general legislation for organizing the emigration of workers and the establishment of additional "labor attaché offices" [al-mulhaqiyat al-'ummaliyah] in the Sudanese embassies. The conference also recommended the simplification of procedures to change profession in the passport and to acquire certificates of good conduct for those working abroad. In the media area and also in relation to organizing the emigrant communities, the conference recommended the establishment of a fund called the fund for media support which would be financed through the participation of Sudanese workers inside and outside the country. The conference also recommended the publishing of quarterly magazine addressing emigre workers. The conference also praised the policy of holding festivals and cultural weeks in sister nations. It recommended the establishment of additional media and informational attaché offices abroad. The first emigre conference's recommendations included a proposal that this conference be held once every 2 years provided the second conference is held before the end of 1983. The conference also recommended that the secretary general of the Sudanese Socialist Union form a committee of specialized personnel to follow up the implementation of the conference's recommendations. The conference also

praised the people's armed forces, who were celebrating their annual holiday, for the protection of the nation and for defending its land. The conference recorded a message of thanks from the secretariat of foreign relations in the Sudanese Socialist Union.

9455
CSO: 4504/104

BRIEFS

CENTRAL REGION BASIC COMMODITIES--The central region's government allotted the sum of 2,500 pounds to support the basic commodities in the areas of this region. Mr 'Abdallah Imam, Regional Minister of Finance and Economy, told AL-SAHAFAH that great quantities of consumer goods have actually been stored in accordance with the regional government's decisions regarding increased efforts to insure the availability of consumer goods and products in the region. Fifty thousand sacks [measure] of corn were purchased via the Agricultural Bank, in addition to large quantities of flour which were distributed for the feast. Also purchased were edible oil, rice, lentils, soap and petroleum products. Mr 'Abdallah Imam also said that, within the framework of the regional government's policy of encouraging the establishment of cooperatives in order to guarantee delivery of goods to the citizens at legal costs, the consumers cooperative complex was opened in the city of of Kosti, supported by the regional government with a sum of 25,000 pounds, in addition to support by the consumer complexes in the cities of Wad Madani, Sanar, al-Manaqil,(Riak),and Rafa'ah. Mr 'Abdallah Imam concluded his report by expressing that concentrated efforts are now expended to support and continue the flow of goods in order to make them available to the public. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 15 Aug 81 p 1] 9455

WHITE NILE RICE CULTIVATION--A Japanese delegation is currently visiting the country to evaluate work in the first phase of the rice production project in Khawr Abu-Qasabah in the White Nile. This phase includes a technical and economic feasibility study for rice growing and the establishment of an experimental farm. The news media learned that this phase proved the success of rice production and its economics. The second phase, which will begin following the delegation's visit, includes expansion in rice production in an area of 90,000 acres. The delegation left Khartoum yesterday to visit the project site. Upon its return, it will meet with the responsible authorities in the ministries of agriculture, cooperation, trade & supply, and the University of Khartoum. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 15 Aug 81 p 1] 9455

EASTERN REGION AGRICULTURE ALLOCATIONS--Professor Hasan Ahmad Hayish, minister of agriculture, nutrition and natural resources in the eastern province, announced to the media that the sum of one million pounds was allotted from the general financial development budget for 1981/82 to reorganize and complete the existing agricultural developmental projects in the region, numbering 42 projects. These projects include dairy and poultry farms, forest nurseries, horticulture, and veterinary services. He said that the ministry has developed a work plan to correct and modernize agricultural work which consists of a detailed program highlighted by the most efficient utilization of natural resources. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 1] 9455

JUBA AIRPORT CONTRACT--Khartoum, 29 Aug (SUNA)--The French International Contracting firm C.C.I. has won a tender for the execution of civil works of Juba airport. The signing of the contract is scheduled for next November. Work on the 17.9 m. European unit of account (25 million dollars) is expected to be completed in two years. It is worth noting that the total cost of the project is estimated at 28 m. European unit of account (39 million dollars) funded by the European Economic Community. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Aug 81 p 1]

ELECTRIFICATION IN MADANI--The sum of L.s 500,000 was earmarked for the electrification of the countryside, announced the Regional Housing and Public Works Minister here. A programme was drawn up in collaboration with the Public Corporation for Electricity and Water for electrification of some 24 villages in the Gezira Province, he added. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 4 Sep 81 p 5]

ROAD AGREEMENT--Khartoum, 6 Aug (SUNA)--President Nimeri yesterday issued a decree endorsing the Juba-Ladwar road agreement between the Sudan, Norway and Kenya for 1981 signed in Nairobi 31.7.1980. The agreement aims at financing the designs of the 580-Km road which links Sudan and Kenya. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 6 Sep 81 p 1]

RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA--Khartoum, 6 Aug (SUNA)--Being an advocate of international peace and security, Sudan has established a foreign policy which is based on the promotion of friendship between all peace-loving countries and on the need to fight all sorts of colonialism, President Nimeri has told Yugoslavia's new Ambassador to Sudan. When receiving the credentials of the Ambassador yesterday, the President said Sudan was a staunch supporter of the struggle against zionism, colonialism and all sorts of foreign intervention in Africa and the Arab Region. Sudan and Yugoslavia share the belief that the nonalignment movement could play an important role in the consolidation of international peace and security, the President said stressing that the two countries were advocates of a new economic order that is based on equity. He said the two countries were firm opponents of all sorts of colonialism and that they had always supported national liberation movements either in Africa or the Arab Region. President Nimeri further praised Yugoslavia's active role in the international scene and within the nonalignment movement. The ambassador pledged to exert the best of his efforts for promoting the Sudan-Yugoslavia ties. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 6 Sep 81 p 2]

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END

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ABU IYYAD DISCUSSES U.S. POLICY, OTHER ISSUES

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 17 Aug 81 pp 15, 18

[Interview with Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad), Member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement; in Beirut; "Abu Iyyad Tells AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, 'There Is Nothing New in the U.S. Position; the Objective Is To Liquidate Our Revolution' "]

> [Text] Israel is behind the attempt to assassinate Abu Dawud while he was on a mission for the revolution.
> The Palestinian Revolution may not be defeated.
> The Syrian front is open to us; the obstacles are still in place as far as the Jordanian front is concerned.
> If we held sway over liberated land, we would have set up 1,000 Soviet bases.
> The Arabs are holding back on the matter of supplying us with arms; we asked everybody for ammunition.

Mr Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyyad), member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement held Israeli intelligence, the Mosad, responsible for the attempt to assassinate a member of the movement's Revolutionary Council, Abu Dawud, in Warsaw last week. He called for the restrengthening of relations between the state of Kuwait and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and he described these relations as abnormal.

The senior Palestinian official said that under the current balances of the struggle on the international scene, the Palestine Liberation Organization was prepared to sign a treaty with the Soviet Union. He said that had there been liberated Palestinian territory, the Soviets would have been allowed to establish bases on those territories. Abu Iyyad warned against the new U.S. plot "which seeks to liquidate Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization or to bring them into the settlement framework."

This was stated in the following important interview that AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM conducted with Abu Iyyad in Beirut.

The Attempt To Assassinate Abu Dawud

[Question] The attempt to assassinate Abu Dawud in Warsaw was the second

attempt on his life. It was accompanied by many statements and rumors which were relayed by news agencies and which indicated that Palestinian parties were involved in these operations. How true are these reports?

[Answer] There have been attempts to distort the truth about the attempt on the life of Brother Abu Dawud in Warsaw. This is not the first time for this fighter to be the target of an assassination attempt. However, we are not in the habit of announcing the numerous aborted attempts against our people.

I have reason to believe, in fact, I am confident that it is Israel that is behind this operation because I do not believe that an Arab or a Palestinian can carry out an assassination attempt against such a fighter who has an honorable history. Abu Dawud has been working with me since 1967. Whenever he was assigned a task, he completed it in the best way regardless of the nature of these tasks. He is definitely an honest fighter.

As far as our information is concerned, we have a lead on this crime which can possibly produce the details [that would lead us to] the criminal. So far, all the evidence [we have] points to the fact that Israeli intelligence, the Moussade, is the real perpetrator. By the way, the Moussade is widely spread in Warsaw, where its support and its instigation of anti-socialist elements is playing an active part in the sabotage operations that are being perpetrated against the socialist regime in Poland. And here we note that a few agencies tried to refer to the fact that Abu Dawud had led an uprising within the movement in 1972. I believe that these references do not deserve a response; they are rather silly. At no time ever has this fighter been against his movement, the Fatah Movement, or against the revolution to which he belongs. However, as one of the fighters he can have his own private opinions and ideas, for we have become accustomed to the practice of democracy in our domestic life in the movement. Even the attempt to promote [the rumor] that Abu Dawud had relations with splinter groups or with groups that had split with the movement has no basis of truth. We hope that he will recover from this blow, especially since it was not a simple one, and that he will speak about some of the facts which he knows for certain about the perpetrator and about the attempt to which he was subjected.

The Restoration of Esteem

[Question] It has been noted that the Palestinian leadership, specifically Abu 'Ammar, has been bent on restoring to Abu Dawud his esteem, since there were some past clouds....

[Answer] To be quite honest Abu Dawud did not stop working more than 6 months. After that he continued to work with me. I used to assign him to missions that were in the interests of the revolution and in the interests of the movement. To be specific I assigned him to the last trip during which the attempt on his life occurred. And here let me affirm that Abu Dawud was charged with an honorable mission. What hurt me was not only the

fact that he was the target of an attempted assassination, but that he completed his mission with considerable success. The mission had nothing to do with the countries which he visited; it had to do with our struggle against Israel.

Our Blood Is Not Cheap

[Question] The attempt to assassinate Abu Dawud was not the first such attempt. More than one Palestinian staff person lost his life to the bullets of assassins. What is the revolution's response?

[Answer] Regardless of the methods of terror used by Israel against our people, it is my opinion that the response to them should be made inside the occupied territory so that public opinion in Europe and in the world would know that the makeup of this state is terrorist and Fascist. Our position on this point does not diminish the importance of the revolution's staff or allow their blood to be shed with impunity; rather, as I said on more than one occasion our blood is not cheap. This is on the Israeli side. On the Arab side, we are tired of talking. The fact that we do not respond here in the same style is neither weakness nor an inability [to act]. We have in fact the ability to lay a trap for more than one Israeli or Zionist figure in any country. However, so far we prefer making our response inside the occupied homeland, and this exposes Israel to world public opinion further. I also do not believe that the decision not to respond will continue indefinitely. The Resistance will most certainly be compelled to use the same method against those who carry out these assassinations regardless of their identity. The fact that we are biding our time in responding is the result of our desire to let world public opinion know the extent of our patience in the face of the attempts against the lives of our people and our fighters abroad.

The New U.S. Plot

[Question] The United States has recently proposed a two-part plan for a solution to the Middle East [problem]. The first part talks about Camp David and its development. The part about Lebanon has a direct bearing on the Palestinian Resistance. In that part the United States proposed ideas about expanding the area in which the emergency forces in the south are deployed, strengthening the position of the Lebanese government and, most seriously, preventing the arming of the Palestinian Resistance. What is your comment on this plan?

[Answer] We were not notified of any conditions with regard to the cease fire. The party that talked with us directly about this subject was the United Nations Organization, and specifically Waldheim himself through his representative in Lebanon, Gen James Callahan. More than 24 hours have passed since Abu 'Ammar's meeting with Callahan took place during which a meeting of the joint command was held and a decision was made to comply with the UN appeal.

I want to emphasize once again that we were not notified of any conditions

by any agency. Not the United Nations or any Arab or non-Arab country notified us directly or indirectly about any conditions.

This is as far as the cease fire question is concerned. I am glad that we referred to it because it is being rumored that Israel is linking the cease fire to three conditions: expanding the territory in which the UN emergency troops are deployed; strengthening the Lebanese government and the Lebanese army; and preventing the arming of the Resistance. We have nothing to do with these conditions which Israel imposed on the U.S. administration or on the agencies that called for the cease fire.

I believe that as far as the emergency troops are concerned, we have made their work and their task easier despite the fact that we did not recognize the decision that was made. I believe you will recall that when the emergency troops first came into [Lebanon], their arrival coincided with some events, and some people opposed [their presence] on the scene. But we used all our influence to set the stage for these troops so they can do their work and so that the Lebanese people and the Lebanese government would not feel that we were the reason for Israel's invading or overrunning the south. But we did so without impeding our work in accordance with the articles of the Cairo Agreement. This was recorded in the minutes of a UN meeting. We said that we would not relinquish the bases where we had been allowed to operate, and it was according to that basis that we accepted the presence of these troops.

What is being expected of these troops now? I do not want to anticipate events in the position [that will be assumed] on the UN forces or on other [matters] before we know the magnitude of the new factors [on the scene]. If these factors affect and impede the agreements and if they keep us from protecting our people, we and the National Movement in the south will assume a negative and a rejectionist position, and we will resist. But if these new factors do not conflict with these agreements and with our presence with our people in the camps, our position will most certainly be different.

On our part we think that any new mission for the emergency troops should turn toward liberating the occupied part of Lebanon's territory and not turn backward [and expand the area of deployment]. This is with regard to the first condition.

The Lebanese Government

As far as strengthening the Lebanese government is concerned, we have never objected to that. We wonder, however, is the Lebanese government lacking in funds and weapons?

We think that strengthening the Lebanese government will only be accomplished by achieving the intra-Lebanese accord and by having the government assume a clear position on those who deal with Israel. Never in my life have I seen a government that does not recognize Israel and says it is

part of the Arab league and part of Arab nationalism and [at the same time] pampers those who deal with Israel so that if one of them were to make a statement that is vaguely against dealing with Israel, many people would praise it. Why is the future of the accord left in the hands of one party? Why doesn't the Lebanese state, together with the national and non-national parties, undertake serious efforts toward [establishing] the accord? Why isn't the accord within the reach of all the parties, from the National Movement to the Broad Front, to Sulayman Franjiyyah and to all the forces and groups that are outside the National Movement such as the Amal Movement? Why are they trying to show the struggle and the question in terms of a struggle between Christians and Muslims?

The events have proven that this is not true and that the principal conflict now is that between those who are dealing with Israel and all the Lebanese. What is called for is an accord between the Lebanese government and the parties that have a conflict with those who deal with Israel so that those who deal with Israel can be fought if they continue dealing with Israel.

It is such a position that would strengthen and reinforce the government. Funds will not strengthen the government; nor will the army with its present makeup strengthen it. As the National Movement says the army cannot be suitable for any security mission.

A Silly Condition

The third condition is in itself silly. I cannot understand how the U.S. administration can supply Israel daily and annually with all kinds of weapons which Israel uses to destroy our Lebanese and our Palestinian people and then ask a nation, a movement, a revolution or an organization not to arm itself in self-defense. I do not know what standard is being applied in this logic. Therefore I say that this is a silly condition and [does not deserve] a reply. Quite the contrary, we are arming ourselves, and we are strengthening our sectors even further in the foremost fortifications--we and the Lebanese Movement and all the Arab revolutionaries in the Palestinian Revolution. These conditions are unilateral and we are not bound by them.

The Saudi Role

[Question] There has been talk that Saudi Arabia played a political role in bringing about the cease fire. It became evident during recent months that relations between the liberation organization and Saudi Arabia were not bad. Through these relations, do you expect the cease fire decision to have a bearing on the new U.S. position on the Palestinian question, especially since some people are referring to the recent war as the war of recognizing the PLO?

[Answer] There is one war in history in which an agreement was reached beforehand. It is the October war. To be fair we must mention that the agreement over what is called peace came from the Egyptian side, not the

Syrian side. This peace was in our view and in the view of all the Arabs high treason in the course of which the blood of the Egyptian people and the blood of the Egyptian army was utilized so that al-Sadat could set himself on the course which he later pursued.

I am a historic witness in this matter. Al-Sadat himself told me that the war would be limited to 10 days. Al-Sadat cannot pre-determine the duration of a war unless he has an agreement over that with Washington. I had a discussion with him about that question, but he denied this and tried to exonerate himself.

Now, if there had been an agreement over our recent war, it may be said that it was a war for [gaining] recognition or mutual recognition. But the fact of the matter is that we were exposed to aggression, and we opposed that aggression in a manner that was a credit to every Arab.

It is true that Saudi Arabia put pressure on the U.S. administration to effect a cease fire, but there was no discussion about recognition either with Saudi Arabia or with any other country. There was something ludicrous as far as the whole world was concerned. When Israel agreed to the cease fire, it tried to portray it as a cease fire agreement with the Lebanese government because it refuses even to articulate the name of the liberation organization, and this [stance] was mocked all over the world.

It was normal for Saudi Arabia or for another country engaged in the process of putting pressure to effect the cease fire to have discussions with the U.S. administration, even if these discussions were by telephone, and it was normal to mention the name of the liberation organization even though the U.S. administration does not actually recognize the PLO.

In all honesty there is nothing new in the U.S. position: there was nothing new before the war or after the war. The evidence for this is clear, and [one can discern it] by following al-Sadat's visit to Washington and the dialogue that took place between him and U.S. officials about the liberation organization, even though it is dishonorable for any Palestinian or Arab to have al-Sadat speak on his behalf. But the nature of this dialogue affirmed that there was nothing new in the U.S. position on the Palestinian question and on the liberation organization.

War and Political Gains

[Question] We have been accustomed on the Arab scene to the fact that a conspiracy follows every war, and it is feared that there might be a new Kissinger-style conspiracy intimating recognition to sow conflict within the Palestinian scene, to deal a blow to Syrian-Palestinian relations and to create confusion again so that the U.S. administration can reshuffle the cards in accordance with its interests.

[Answer] This is curious in our Arab nation. There are people who like to analyze and belittle any victory. On this basis we notice that after

every victory [we have had], a campaign which states that something abnormal is behind this victory is launched.

Ultimately, however, despite the rumors that are going around and the fanciful ideas and analyses that have emerged, man is his own master, and he makes his own decisions.

In my opinion what happened in south Lebanon is a victory for the joint forces. It was a victory for all the Arabs because a small group with limited equipment confronted this Israeli war and stood fast against it until a cease fire decision was reached. This led to the creation of an uproar in world public opinion and in the European press against the fact that the PLO was being ignored. Are we being asked to denounce this European protest? And when a hostile newspaper like LE FIGARO calls for recognizing the PLO, are we being asked to say no, do not recognize us?

This would be unreasonable because this is a political gain, and every war must be followed by political gains. Is there a loss if a state recognizes us? Is there a crime in this? We are not against the United States recognizing us, and if such recognition were a crime, then why do all the Arab countries and the revolutionary regimes exchange embassies with the United States?

There is most certainly a difference between what I am saying and proceeding with a U.S.-European plan through what is called the European initiative for the sake of what is called recognition.

The Crime of Taking Up Arms

Therefore, I am saying that we must not cast doubts on this victory. But with regard to the other part, the true actual position is that the liberation organization is being written off as far as Israel and the United States are concerned because those people consider us criminals because we took up arms as Palestinians or rather because the Arabs took up arms with us. They fear that this experience may become widespread, especially since the Lebanese National Movement took up arms in sympathy with the Palestinian Resistance. In addition, many Arabs inside the Palestinian Revolution and in the National Movement took up arms with the Palestinian Revolution.

I recall that in a meeting with an Arab official we discussed with him the decision on universal conscription, and he told us, "Go ahead! Take all the Palestinians in our country. We will give each one of them two bombs and a rifle on the condition that they do not return to our country." This means that with some Arabs taking up arms is a crime.

Quite frankly I am saying that it is a major crime not to utilize every military battle politically.

Our Revolution Is Incompatible with Regionalism

[Question] Don't you believe that this victory which was achieved by the joint forces may lead to the strengthening of Palestinian regionalism because some people may think that the revolution can liberate Palestine by itself?

[Answer] If such thinking were to develop, it would be superficial. If we were confident when we launched our revolution of our ability to liberate our country by ourselves, we would not have hesitated for one moment in embarking upon the decisive battle of liberation regardless of the high price we may pay.

In this battle any person is allowed to be regional, but the Palestinian is not. This is because we are convinced that the Palestinian alone without his Arab nation cannot liberate one inch [of land]. And here you find reference to the fact that the reason for all our struggles with the Arab regimes has been our faith that our strikes and our revolutionary action inside the occupied territory, through the sacrifices of the guerilla who for a long time has not been the lonely Palestinian, are capable of creating a revolutionary climate even in the countries that are remote from the circle of front-line confrontation.

And here I say that guerillas from all the Arab countries--from Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab Maghreb--are fighting in the ranks of the revolution.

Therefore, we in the revolutionary command are always saying "Revolutionaries are in the Palestinian Revolution" and not "the Palestinian revolutionaries." Time has actually established that identification with the Palestinian Revolution is an identification with the struggle and not at all with the region. The mere statement that the Palestinian Revolution is for Palestinians means that we are not thinking of a serious liberation.

It is no coincidence that we do extend a [helping] hand to all Arab liberation movements despite the fact that we cooperate with many regimes for considerations that have to do with recognizing the organization as an official entity for the Palestinian people. We consider ourselves part of the Arab and universal liberation movement; and this is something we are not ashamed of because we realize quite well that our cause cannot be solved by us and the Arab world only in isolation of world support.

Treaties and Bases for the Soviets

I am telling you quite frankly that under the current balances of the struggle in the area and in the world, if we had the capability of signing treaties with the Soviet Union, we would have signed 1,000 treaties. If we had land on which we could grant the Soviets bases, we would have given them 1,000 bases because we are facing an enemy that is greater than Israel. Our enemy is the United States with whom more than half the Arab regimes go along through relations that depend on depleting the Arab economy. For this reason we are saying that the revolution would not be

victorious without the Arabs and without an ally and a friend with the stature of the Soviet Union.

The War of the Joint Forces

[Question] Why then did you call this war the Palestinian-Israeli war when you know that this may provoke some people even in the ranks of the Lebanese National Movement which fought alongside the revolution in the context of the joint forces?

[Answer] I want to say something in relation to this matter. As a matter of form the National Movement cannot address the Arab governments or the United Nations. From a purely tactical standpoint the president of the PLO, Brother Abu 'Ammar, cannot address the United Nations, the Arab League or any Arab or international official on behalf of the joint forces. Therefore, he is compelled to address these agencies on behalf of the Palestinian forces, the forces of the liberation organization. And here I affirm that we did not issue a single statement in which we said that we as Palestinians had fought alone. All our statements and our addresses emphasize that we fought as joint forces. In fact, we used to mention the Amal Movement because its young people took part with us in the battles.

The War Revealed the Plan

[Question] With your permission let us go back to the U.S. position. In your judgment is this position the product of the battles, or is it the product of Habib's shuttle trips in the area?

[Answer] So that we do not lose sight of [what happened], let us say that Philip Habib's mission in the area began with the missiles crisis between Syria and Israel. The war broke out while he was traveling in the area. This war expedited the disclosure of the plan; but it did not create a plan.

In my opinion the United States has begun thinking seriously of the Lebanese problem. It is no coincidence that Bashir al-Jumayyil was summoned to the United States. Nor were Habib's travels a coincidence [either]. Today there was news that Habib would return to the area soon on a specific mission related to Lebanon.

In my reply to a previous question I talked about the substance of the U.S. plan which is based on blocking the arming of the Resistance, strengthening the Lebanese government and expanding the area in which the UN emergency troops are deployed. This is in addition to the Israeli statements that were made by the new government and that indicate that there would be a new round [in the future].

The Next Round

This affirms that the United States is inclined to liquidate the liberation organization. The U.S. administration would put its Arab friends in a

corner and ask them to persuade the organization to accept the Israeli conditions for a cease fire. Herein lies the contradiction between the Arab position that is cooperating with the United States and the position of the liberation organization. Israel would thus justify its aggression, and the United States' Arab friends cannot put pressure on the United States again to effect a cease fire.

In my judgment this is the objective of the U.S. plan. The Americans know that whatever Israel was not able to take away from us as a liberation organization and as joint forces in the war, it will not be able to take peacefully and amicably.

Therefore, there will be a round in the future and it will be coming up very soon. This is not a prediction. The strike will be much more cruel. The United States has armed itself with this new position, and Habib will bring it to the area. So far this position has not been presented to us, but I am confident it will be. The Americans know in advance that we will turn it down outright, but their purpose is to give Israel and the friends of the United States in the area a position and a justification.

Syria and the Organization

It is for this reason that I am saying that the integrated plan has been in existence through Philip Habib even before the war because the United States is giving Syria and the PLO only two options: join the settlement or [risk] liquidation. Syria is in Lebanon just as the liberation organization is.

Thus this plan and its choices can be imagined through the Lebanese crisis in which both Syria and the liberation organization are two concerned parties. It is my opinion that this must be the focus of our principal thoughts in the next stage.

The Nature of the Next Round

[Question] You spoke about a round that was to take place soon and that was to be violent. What is the magnitude of this round, and what are its fields?

[Answer] Everything is to be expected. Last 20 July THE HERALD TRIBUNE published a statement by the director of Israeli intelligence in which he stated, "We were determined to strike Lebanese civilians who were harboring Palestinian leaders. We will continue these operations against civilians until they rise up against the Palestinians and throw them out."

Therefore, if we were to look at the implications of these words, we can very well imagine that everything is possible including the possibility of overrunning the south, [launching] a war of annihilation, carrying out special operations of a limited nature, bombing cities and carrying out assassination operations. These operations began with the attempt to assassinate Brother Abu Dawud, and they will reach every person in the Palestinian Revolution the Mosad can reach.

U.S. Decisions

[Question] But the United States is saying that it supports wiping out the seats of tension in the Middle East at the present stage of the process of developing Camp David. This means that there are no possibilities for a military strike until after a new U.S. round, does it not?

[Answer] Any analysis that does not direct its attention to the organic relationship between Israel and the United States is not a logical analysis. There is always a margin of exceptions for Israel which is called the right to security. And Israel makes a decision on that whenever it wishes to do so. Believe me, this includes bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the Syrian missiles crisis and the recent strike: all these are U.S. decisions.

I believe that Habib's arrival in the next round will be effected under the cover of solving the Lebanese crisis. Reagan is saying for the first time that the Lebanese crisis must be brought to an end.

How would the Lebanese crisis be brought to an end?

Reagan intends to bring it to an end according to the U.S. style and the Israeli style. This would be based on crushing the Palestinian Revolution, the Lebanese National Movement and all the Lebanese national forces. The solution would come after that. I am certain that the Americans will propose the solution through Syria first; the pressure will be placed on Syria first and then finally on us.

With regard to the scope of the strikes, we expect them to be commensurate with the U.S. resolution: total extermination, annihilation and a total invasion as I said.

The Challenge for the Arabs

[Question] Early in the cease fire few officials in the leadership of the liberation organization said that aircraft flying even on reconnaissance sorties was considered a violation of the cease fire agreement. However, the flights have not stopped. What are the methods of confronting this daily violation?

[Answer] This is a challenge that has been placed in front of the Arabs. As a revolution our capabilities to react are limited. We wish we had all the weapons to confront the Israeli air force, including SAM-6, 7, 9 and 11 missiles or rather all kinds of missiles.

But these missiles, whether they are Soviet or American, are owned by Arabs who make the decision to purchase them, to bring them and to give them to the Resistance. If we had a single missile and an Israeli airplane were to go out on a flight, we would fire our missile on that airplane. But we do have anti-aircraft weapons, and we use them; but they can do no more than create interference for the aircrafts and [thereby] prevent them from

striking [their targets] with precision. I assure you that not a single Israeli airplane has flown over Beirut or the south without being opposed by us with those weapons that we have at our disposal.

Therefore, I am saying this challenge is a challenge for the Arabs. This is the cause of the Arabs, all the Arabs.

In this regard discussion about the Arabs causes us considerable pain because no Arab country, without exception, can provide Lebanon and the Palestinian Revolution with weapons that resist all airplanes. Therefore, the Arabs must feel humiliated because the Israeli air force has free access to Arab Lebanon's air space on a daily basis.

We Requested Weapons from Everyone

[Question] A short time ago you said that if we had land we would give the Soviets bases on this land. Why don't the Soviets give you these missiles? Did you make such a request to the Opposition and Defiance Front and specifically to Syria and Libya?

[Answer] To say that we did not ask would be misleading because it is well-known that we asked all the Arab countries for military aid. As far as we are concerned, weapons have no color. We take any weapon that comes to us from anywhere. We asked everybody, but every Arab country has its own circumstances.

And why should we turn to the Soviet Union when the Arabs have all the weapons that could protect Lebanon from any airplane and could at least prevent the contentiousness over Lebanon?

In this regard all the Arabs are saying that they have their own conditions, some of which are foreign and others have to do with the Lebanese government.

This is regarding the missiles; but with regard to other kinds of weapons, the truth is that the three countries that you mentioned, the Soviet Union, Syria and Libya, are helping us. To be specific, they are giving us missiles and guns.

The Need for Heavy Weapons

[Question] Israel is saying that part of its attacks was to prevent progress in arming the Resistance and to prevent Libyan, Syrian, Saudi and Soviet weapons from reaching it. The question that is being raised now is this: Does the Resistance actually need this kind of weapons? Does this mean that the Resistance has begun to shift from its reliance on manpower to reliance on weapons machinery?

[Answer] With regard to a people's war I will always remember a statement that Gen Giap told us when we visited Vietnam in 1970 with a large Palestinian delegation that was headed by Brother Abu 'Ammar. Before we

met Gen Giap we went on a tour during which we saw SAM-6, 3, 2 and 5 missiles as well as anti-aircraft artillery. We [also] saw large tanks in the training camps. At the same time we saw small commando units. That is, we saw all the ingredients of a classical war and the weapons of an ordinary war. There were firing groups around the SAM-6 missiles, [armed] even with Kalashnikov guns, and all of them would fire when raided by airplanes.

When we met with Giap, we told him that all our thoughts were on the fact that the Vietnamese were fighting the United States with manpower only. And he said, "There is no war of the people in which you can distinguish between classical weapons and the weapons of a people's war. I don't see any contradiction."

This means that if we had Arab forces around the occupied land, any Israeli raid or heavy Israeli shelling would be returned by Arab artillery and by the Arab air force while the guerillas by comparison would fight with their rifles and their bodies. But as a result of the absence of an Arab response we were forced to own these weapons so we can use them to return the fire. The fact that we own these weapons has made all Israel scream in the recent war. What will be Israel's position if there were an Arab response from the air and from heavy artillery? Let others answer that question.

Not Everything That Is Known Is Being Said

[Question] Some people are saying why are the Lebanese people alone enduring all this pressure while there are possibilities for using other Arab fronts? Hafiz al-Asad has announced more than once, "The Golan is open to you." It is known that the dense presence of Palestinians in Jordan provides the possibility for action from this front.

[Answer] Not everything that is known is being said, and this is not being done to cover the position of any party whatsoever. I am saying that Syria allowed us to carry out operations from the Golan. It was up to us to choose the kind, the timing and the scope of the operation without going into the details because the details are our secrets.

As for the Jordanian front, we will carry out our activities [there] when we will have the opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, many of our patrols are arrested by the Jordanian army, and our fighters are put in Jordanian prisons. Nevertheless, on many occasions we do infiltrate and we strike despite all the obstacles that are placed in front of our revolutionaries. Once again, unfortunately, these obstacles protect Israel whether the Jordanian leaders wish this or not.

The question that the Arabs must ask is this: Why are we not allowed to take action from the Jordanian front?

[Question] It is being said that during Jalud's visit to Jordan, Libya asked that the Resistance be allowed to operate from Jordan, [is that true]?

[Answer] Yes, but King Husayn refused and said that Jordan was not adequately armed to confront the Israeli reaction.

The Bottleneck and Other Choices

[Question] The presence of the Resistance in Lebanon only means that the Resistance is in a bottleneck, and the U.S. plan that we talked about seems serious and imminent, [is it not]?

[Answer] There is a matter that I always like to emphasize. This is that we have choices that we do not mention all at once, but there is a principal and a general choice we do recall. We as a revolution are not allowed to be defeated. This is our general choice. The other choices come after that, and they will remain there.

I am saying that Israel and the United States and their allies are greatly mistaken if they think that one or more strikes or an invasion can terminate this revolution because our revolution is enduring, and it has many choices. If it is weakened on one front, it will enter another. We have the experience of Jordan. It is true that we were vanquished militarily in Jordan, but our Palestinian people and the Jordanian people were not and will not be vanquished. The [United States and Israel] have a few agents who are close to them; they will come to power and go in the seasonal governments they have.

At any rate we have many choices as I said, and our only choice is that we may not let this revolution be defeated.

Decisions That Are Not Carried Out

[Question] Since you know this Arab fact, why did you call for a meeting of the Arab Defense Council?

[Answer] You asked a while ago whether or not we were asking the Arabs for weapons and positions. We know quite well that the requests we make at any Arab gathering will not be met, but we must put those requests on record for history. How can we incite the Arab nation against most of its rulers if we are not heard loudly and clearly by this nation? We request the meetings and we call for them so that decisions can be made. Even if these decisions are not carried out and they remain ink on paper, they at least record our positions and those of others for the Arab masses and for Arab posterity.

[Question] In one word, what were the results of the meetings of the Arab Defense Council?

[Answer] In my personal opinion, nothing. When the Arab ministers of defense and foreign affairs meet, their meeting signifies a foreign and a military policy is being outlined for implementation. But what has been implemented? Nothing. What weapons and munitions did the Resistance get as a result of these meetings? Also nothing.

And here we say that we approve of any Arab government trusted by the Lebanese government, such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, entering Lebanon and bringing in missiles, if the government fears the Syrian or the Libyan missiles.

[Question] Did you make suggestions to that effect?

[Answer] You can be quite certain that we asked everybody. We asked the Arab Defense Council, and decisions were made. But what matters is this: Was anything carried out? Nothing was carried out except for little ammunition from here and there that can add nothing qualitative to what we have.

The Munitions Problems

[Question] It's been said that the Revolution faced problems with munitions during the days of the battles. Have you taken specific measures for such a situation in the future, especially since you are talking about future rounds?

[Answer] It is true that we did suffer a shortage in some munitions during the days of the battles, but now there is absolutely no fear of this problem. We have made all kinds of weapons and ammunition available, and all the possible precautions are in place. However, most certainly our reserves are not like the reserves of the U.S. or Soviet army. We are a revolution; we are a revolution beseiged even by the Arabs.

When we fight we know how to use and regulate our weapons. We take into consideration the fact that we may not be able to obtain replacement weapons and ammunition during the days of the battles. Therefore, we know how to act with the weapons we have.

The Sources of Weapons

[Question] Israel is saying that you are getting heavy weapons from Libya, and it has been noticed that your communications with Libya during and after the days of the battles were continuous.

[Answer] Allow me to speak on behalf of the Fatah Movement. After the first meeting that took place between the Libyan and the Fatah command, relations proceeded and developed well. I believe that an important factor in our ability to resist in the south was that of the weapons and the ammunition that came to us from al-Jamahiriyah.

It is true that some other Arabs are sending us weapons and ammunition, but they do so in small quantities. We did receive munitions from Saudi Arabia and from Algeria.

As for Syria, its position on the battle fronts is clear. Iraq sent us weapons before the battles [in accordance with deals we had made with it].

During the days of the battles, however, it seems that there were difficulties in the means of communication. Iraq even sent us some heavy weapons before the battles.

I am saying that it is not necessary to airlift weapons to us from this or the other country. We do not want to take the kinds of weapons that would affect the nature of arming the units of Arab armies. But when we get funds, we can purchase weapons from all the world markets. Weapons are available everywhere, and the weapons factories in the capitalist world in particular depend in their business on the seats of tension in the world.

Iraq and the Steadfastness Front

[Question] In the face of the military buildup on the Libyan borders, many Resistance leaders, including Abu 'Ammar, announced that the Resistance would stand alongside al-Jamahiriyah. Does this mean that you intend to send military units to defend al-Jamahiriyah?

[Answer] I do not believe that al-Jamahiriyah needs Palestinian military units to defend its territories. What is intended by support is the political position. What is intended is the cohesion between the Palestinian Revolution and the Opposition and Steadfastness Front. We hope that Iraq or any other Arab country, will join this front and become a principal party in it. Such cohesion would strengthen the conditions of the Arab nation. Division gives our enemies the capability for isolating any Arab country.

And how much did our enemies benefit from the Iranian-Iraqi dispute!

As far as we are concerned when Brother Col al-Qadhdhafi called for Arab solidarity after the Iraqi reactor was bombed, Brother Abu 'Ammar and I traveled [back and forth] across the ocean and the gulf to call upon the Arabs to rise above their differences. We have put up with the philosophies of some Arabs here on the scene, and we said we do not care about all the classifications as long as the basic question is in jeopardy. Therefore we contacted everybody, except for those who crossed the red line and did in fact betray the cause.

We have traveled more than once. If you were to ask whether these travels succeeded or failed, I would say they did not quite succeed except between Baghdad and Tripoli, between Aden and Baghdad and between Morocco and Libya.

But the principal accomplishment is the Iraqi-Syrian meeting; we are looking forward to it because of its great implications. In my opinion, this meeting will take place as soon as the Iraqi-Iranian war comes to an end.

Our fellow Iranians and Iraqis are supposed to understand that no one will achieve victory in this war of attrition. We have to stop it. I have been saying since the beginning of th war that we and the people of Iran and Iraq are the losers in this war.

The Arab Summit

[Question] Despite all these contradictions, is the Palestinian leadership still insisting on convening an Arab summit? What do you want from this summit?

[Answer] We have never been against the Arab summit or against any Arab meeting or consensus. Basically, common Arab action coincides with our aspirations as a revolution and as a liberation organization.

The confluence of the common Arab effort would strengthen our positions in our armed struggle against our enemy. This is in addition to what I said previously about the fact that such meetings and conferences will help us mobilize the forces of our masses against all the weak and wavering positions.

Most Arab summit conferences have ended in inter-Arab reconciliations at the expense of the conference programs themselves and accordingly at the expense of the resolutions for which we aspire. Due to this point specifically we are saying that there is no benefit from these conferences, but we have never given up on bringing the Arabs together. We have not given up on having a successful Arab summit, provided that the Arabs think once responsibly and earnestly of how to confront Israel with a unified position and approach.

We are not to come out with further separations on the Arab scene. I am saying here, unfortunately and bitterly that even the front that was now likely to become an examination center is suffering from parlaysis. Let us ask quite frankly, why hasn't the Steadfastness and Opposition Front met during all these long periods during which new events have been occurring daily? Does not this mean that this alliance is also suffering from paralysis?

The Problems of the Steadfastness Front

[Question] According to your perceptions during your recent Arab tours were there specific reasons why the Steadfastness Front did not meet?

[Answer] Yes, there are reasons, but they are reasons that can be dealt with in minutes if we wanted to deal with them. But if we choose to harden our position, these problems will not be solved for years. I would like to add that if the reason for not holding meetings of the Opposition and Steadfastness Front is to preserve Arab solidarity, we see no conflict between convening a Steadfastness Summit and common Arab action. There is, for example, the Gulf Cooperation Council which meets continuously, and it has its agencies. But all the agencies of the Steadfastness Front are inactive and have not met.

Abnormal Relations

[Question] Abu Iyyad, we want a frank answer. Some tension previously

prevailed in relations between the liberation organization and Kuwait. What is the status of these relations now?

[Answer] The U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian plan that began the implementation phase following the Camp David accords tended to frighten the governments and the peoples of the Gulf from the presence of Palestinians in these countries. These scare tactics went in two directions. The first was that the Camp David accords did not solve the problems of Palestinians abroad and accordingly Palestinians will be forced to settle where they are in the Arab countries. This forced some governments in the Gulf to harass the Palestinians and to deny them entry visas.

The second trend was that of carrying out sabotage operations and implicating the Palestinians to stop their entry into Kuwait or into any other Gulf country. This created a state of hostility as a reaction to these rumors and to the U.S.-Israeli-Egyptian plans. These harassments reached an unreasonable level. Can you imagine that a Palestinian in the Gulf is not allowed to bring his newborn child if that child is born outside his place of residence or work? This is just an example and not an exhaustive list. In some Gulf countries the law is no longer being applied to Palestinians in the spirit of the law; it is rather applied according to the letter of the law, and this damages fraternal relations.

On our part we have tried everything we can to reassure the brothers in Kuwait and in the Gulf in general that we refuse settlement [in their countries], that we reject Camp David wholly and separately and that we are fighting against Camp David and against attempts to settle us.

But these efforts were not fruitful, and the confidence factor was shaken. Relations now require a re-evaluation because they are not normal. In my judgment Brother Abu Jihad's recent tour was one of our attempts to explain the position further and to settle these problems.

Salute to Public Opinion

For honesty's and history's sakes I am asking the Kuwaiti government and the Kuwaiti people to remember that when Kuwait experienced a few crises, it was the Palestinian who was prepared to take up arms side by side with the Kuwaiti to defend this part of the Arab homeland. I am also asking the Kuwaitis to remember that we have been accused of setting off more than one explosion and carrying out sabotage activity, such as the attack to which AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM was subjected, but the course of the investigation established that we were as far as we could be from such operations. The newspaper, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM explained this, and we are grateful to it for this posture.

As a revolution we have no interest or objective in blowing up a newspaper or a magazine. We are rather against this kind of terror regardless of the objectives and the justifications. I believe that you noticed when you came here that all newspapers are being sold in front of my office, including the separatist newspapers that specialize in insulting the Arabs and insulting our people and our revolution.

8592
CSO: 4304/165

FURTHER GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL UNITY DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 234, 16 Aug 81 p 19

[Article by Najib 'Abd-al-Hadi: "Gulf Cooperation Council Establishes a Federal State With a Central Capital"]

[Text] Despite the complex political problems facing the Arab region at the present time, the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] remains the primary focus of attention for senior officials in the Persian Gulf area. The area states wanted earnestly for the council to experience natural development. Now their wishes have been fulfilled and the GCC has come into being despite Arab reservations about the project.

The GCC's secretary general is moving forward with evident deliberation, and it would appear to be wise to hold back on the official announcement of the executive measures required to complete the setting up of the GCC's organizations. This is especially important since the proposed executive measures are being subjected to intense political scrutiny at the regional and pan-Arab levels. Moreover, the member states in the council realize the sensitive nature of their step and are aware of the repercussions it will have on the other Arab states--particularly those that have expressed reservations about the council on the pretext that the taking of such an important and inovative step will mean a return to a policy of Arab axes and blocs.

The GCC states recognize this and perhaps much more, besides. Therefore, they hastened to announce that the establishment of the council does not mean a return to a policy of axes and political blocs, declaring that they remained committed to the resolutions and agreements of the Arab League states. They stated that the purpose behind the establishment of the GCC was to organize housekeeping matters and deprive the two superpowers of the opportunity to interfere in area affairs, especially in light of Washington's announcement of the formation of the rapid deployment force for the purpose of protecting the Gulf region from the threats that surround it, according to the American view.

Apparently, the purpose behind the haste in establishing the GCC was to close the door to superpower interference in Gulf affairs. It is untrue that its timing was in any way linked with the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran as had been rumored.

AL-MUSTAQBAL has learned from widely informed Gulf sources that the executive measures will be announced soon and that one concept that has been brought up for discussion among the member states in the selection of a permanent capital for the council.

There are some who propose the establishment of a model city in the partitioned zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Some members also lean toward the establishment of a fedral union among the council states patterned after the United States of America. The presidency of this federation would rotate among the countries in alphabetical order, with the president in each term invited to reside in the proposed capital during the length of his term. The proposed capital would be a political capital containing all the embassies, diplomatic organizations, and international offices of the United Nations.

At the domestic level, each state in the council would have local autonomy. The local administration would remain in existence while the elected representative assemblies would continue to carry out their duties. However, the idea of a federal representative assembly has begun to take shape according to which each state would have equal representation in the assembly. In other words, the population of the member stses would not be the ruling criterion, with a state such as Qatar having the same number of members as Saudi Arabia and the rest of the states. Parliamentary powers would be granted to this body. These powers would extend to the enacting of federal laws and regulation as well as control over the course of the federation's general policy from the political and economic standpoints.

Perhaps among the most important issues wihich the leaders of the GCC member states will deal with will be those directly connected with the security affairs of the region. For this reason, it is not unlikely that the organizations arising out of the council will begin drafting a number of formulas to consolidate the basic military structures from the standpoints of armament, training, and equipment. Nor is it unlikely that the entire area will be linked by a highly advanced rocket system and powerful, high technology air and naval defense installations. It is believed that the states are seriously contemplating (and may have already begun implementing) the building of a huge naval fleet which would be capable of protecting the shores of the Gulf as well as filling the vacuum which Washington and other Western capitals have persistently invoked as a justification for intervening and protecting their interests from dangers they allege to exist.

Sources close to GCC Secretary General 'Abdallah Ya'qub Basharah said that the secretary general will soon begin a series of visits to council states. They also said that he will soon start taking practical measures and making arrangements in preparation for the upcoming meeting of the heads of member states slated to convene in Riyadh before the end of the year.

8591
CSO: 4304/131

PUBLICATION OF NEW MAGAZINE HAILED, CRITICIZED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2770, 13 Jul 81 pp 9, 10

[Article by Fathi Ghanim: "From My Private Notebook on Literature and Art: Important News of the Press: al-Azhar Publishes a New Magazine"]

[Text] Al-Azhar has taken a significant step in publishing the first issue of the weekly magazine, RISALAT AL-AZHAR. It is a magazine in the sense that it concerns itself with news, press reports and subjects and sections that are known in periodicals of the popular press. It has sections on the theater and the arts, subjects that have to do with women and children, fiction, health and sections on exploration, humor, science and cartoons.

Al-Azhar's entry into the field of journalism in this manner is a historic event. It is our duty to welcome it and to expect this to have far-reaching consequences on public opinion and on the activity of the press as well.

The statement by His Eminence the Great Imam Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Baysar, which was printed on the first pages of RISALAT AL-AZHAR, explains to us the purpose behind publishing this magazine. He is proclaiming that al-Azhar, "the powerful stronghold of Islam for more than 1,000 years," will oppose in this new magazine the false news and the misleading news that try to distort al-Azhar's role and seek to influence the hearts and minds of young people in particular.

Al-Azhar found that its monthly scientific magazine, which concerns itself with religious studies and research and which focuses its attention on Islamic thought, was not enough to confront the anxieties and the deviations in people's hearts that were being aroused by other contemporary factions. Al-Azhar thought that the matter had to be confronted promptly so that the correct answers and the proper solutions to the daily problems can be offered. Hence came the need to publish a weekly magazine that would ward off [the falsehoods] that were being raised around al-Azhar or Islam and to offer a quick remedy to the pressing needs of Muslims.

His Eminence the Great Imam described the magazine in words of special significance and importance when he said, "This magazine is to become a platform for all the believers. It speaks gently; works truthfully and listens to all problems with a kind heart and an open mind."

The magazine followed this style of speaking gently and listening with an open mind when it actually dealt with a discussion in more than one article of the relationship between Muslims and the followers of other divine religions including Jews and Christians.

The magazine published a report from Bonn, the capital of the Federal Republic of Germany about the dialogue that took place between the president of al-Azhar University, religious representatives and representatives of German and foreign cultural agencies in Bonn. It also published a report about the scientists' exchange program for Muslim and Christian scholars in the area of Islamic studies, and about expanding the horizons of human knowledge and understanding among the nations and making Islam known and understood in Europe.

On the subject of "good neighborliness in Islam" Mr Jabir Hamzah Farraj, the general manager of information in al-Azhar reminded us that the Prophetic Tradition mentions that the non-Muslim neighbor has rights with his Muslim neighbor. He reminded us of Aba Dajanah al-Ansari who used to leave the mosque in a hurry as soon as he was through with his prayers at dawn so that he can protect the fruits of the palm that belonged to his Jewish neighbor. The branches of that palm spread over the courtyard of his home, and he used to fear that the wind would blow and the ripe dates would fall in his courtyard. His hungry children would then eat the dates when they had no right to do so.

The meaning [here] is clear. Islam is a religion of tolerance and fraternity. It protects the rights of those who subscribe to other religions. It protects and upholds those rights. A Muslim does not violate the rights of non-Muslim subjects even if the Muslim's children are hungry. At the same time al-Azhar realizes its world-wide responsibilities. It calls for cooperation and universal understanding with the Christian societies to serve human knowledge and to affirm understanding among nations.

However, the fact that I am welcoming all this does not prevent me from making an observation on the comment published by the magazine on a cartoon by Salah Jahin. The cartoon had appeared in AL-AHRAM last month under the title, "Events that Hurt National Unity." The cartoon showed Egypt saying that her children were "Unity, Harmony and Secularism" and that it rejected sectarian sedition as one of her children.

It is natural for RISALAT AL-AZHAR to reject the notion that secularism would be Egypt's daughter, and it is natural that al-Azhar's opinion would be that Islam, which is the religion of the state, was more merciful and more just to non-Muslims than secularism; that non-Muslim subjects have lived in contentment; and that both Muslims and Christians were being asked by their [respective] religions to look after each other. The recommendations of both religions ensure the continuity of mercy, tolerance and fraternity in Egypt and everywhere true Muslims and true Christians can be found.

All this is wonderful, and it is to be expected from a magazine published by al-Azhar. But what worried me was the fact that I found in that comment a violation of what His Eminence the Great Imam described as the magazine's style of speaking gently and kindly. Salah Jahin was attacked by insinuation and innuendo. There were statements such as "the one with well-known tendencies," or "motivated by well-known objectives," or "his obvious game." Then there was a final but not overt accusation, but it was off the cuff, that communism was behind all that.

The magazine has a right to attack communism, and it is its duty to oppose any atheistic appeal, but I do not believe that the method of using obscure words to attack people and then making a general off the cuff accusation is the method that the magazine outlined and accepted for itself.

I am saying this because I am concerned about this magazine's message, because I expect much good to come from it and because the need for it in our society is urgent. Since the magazine did announce that it would confront and oppose the problems and deviations, I expect it to set for us [an example] of high standards in the ethics of discussion and debate.

More than an abundance is being published about Islam today in the newspapers of the world. This places on all of us tremendous responsibilities to correct erroneous ideas and unsound notions [that linger]. I am quite confident that those who were guided by God to publish the new magazine, RISALAT AL-AZHAR will pursue the traditions of al-Azhar which they have upheld for more than 1,000 years in protecting, defending and spreading the religion. We welcome them to the world of today's press.

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CSO: 4504/73

BRIEFS

BAN ON FOREIGN CURRENCY DEALING--Lawyers for the Palestine Bank are preparing the necessary documents to lodge a case in the Supreme Court against the military government and its representative, the supervisor of banks in the Bank of Israel in Jerusalem because the Palestine Bank has been barred from dealing in foreign currency in which it used to deal before the occupation. An official source in the Palestine Bank said that the military government and its representatives had violated the agreement signed between them and the bank administration which provides for the bank to return to its normal operation. He also stated that this discriminatory treatment between the Palestine Bank and Israeli banks that do deal in foreign currencies is aimed at paralyzing the bank's operation. It should be noted that this unusual treatment of this national institution comes at a time when the minister of defense and Israeli officials are publicizing improved treatment of the people in the occupied areas. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 30 Aug 81 p 5] 8389

DISPOSSESSING NEGEV ARABS--The Israeli newspaper MA'ARIV stated yesterday that Israeli authorities had begun to use another approach in their constant attempts to remove the Negev Arabs from their land. The newspaper explained that the Israeli authorities had begun to install new headmen over a number of tribes in the Tel al-Milh area to facilitate the removal of the inhabitants from their land. It should be pointed out that the authorities have employed a number of repressive approaches recently against the Negev Arabs, including firing shots and killing some of them and destroying their tents and homes with bulldozers. The authorities have also seized their livestock and prevented them from reaching wells and their farm land in an attempt to dispossess them. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 6] 8389

WEST BANK STUDENT ENROLLMENT--Official statistics show that there is a total number of 280,000 students in schools of the occupied West Bank, as compared with 260,000 during the past school year. The same figures show a total of 9,271 teachers in the West Bank schools. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 5] 8389

HALHUL FACING BUDGET CRISIS--Hijazi Mudiyah, acting mayor of Halhul, stated that the municipality of Halhul had received a notice to pay 69,000 shekels for water for a 4-month period, noting that the town has been suffering from a severe water shortage for a long time. Mudiyah also stressed that the town has been unable to pay employees salaries and if the Israeli authorities continue to bar bringing funds from abroad, the municipality itself in the very near future will find itself unable to provide its services to the people and will stop projects essential to the town. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 2] 8389

NEGEV ARABS OPPOSE AIRFIELD--The Negev Arabs last week defied the Israeli bulldozers working to level the military airfield in the Negev which is constructed on land expropriated from the Negev Arabs. The people there drove off the Israeli machinery working on the airfield with rocks. It should be noted that the Israeli authorities had expropriated 85,000 dunums of Arab land in the Negev to build this airfield. The Negev Arab owners of this land had refused any settlement with the authorities who had offered them compensation and a move to another place having built 'Aro'er and to move them there. Sulayman al-Nasasirah, headman of the 'Arab al-Nasasirah tribe, told the Israeli newspaper HA-ARETZ, "We will not be removed from our land, even by force and even if this leads to war. No one can remove us from our land except over our dead bodies." It should be noted that this is not the first time the Negev Arabs have defied the Israeli bulldozers and machinery working on their land. Since work started on the airfield, the Negev Arabs have waylaid the Israeli authorities and have blocked the Israeli bulldozers, hindered their work and pelted them with rocks. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 30 Aug 81 p 2]

CSO: 4304/174

GOVERNMENTAL CHANGES REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic Vol 11, 10 Aug 81 pp 26-27

[Article: "Morocco: New Organization for the Parliamentary Majority; Party To Play the Role of the Opposition Established"]

[Text] In the third week of July 1981 an official announcement was made establishing a new party in Morocco called the Democratic Liberal party. The announcement of this party was preceded by a significant number of the parliamentary majority splitting from this parliamentary majority and establishing a new party that opposed the parent majority party, the National Liberal Grouping, and attacked it verbally throughout the recent session of parliament. Last Thursday, April 16 it went beyond that to an event which the newspaper of the National Rally of Independents [RNI] described as "an attack on the speaker of parliament and an invitation to urgent deliberations to confront the dangerous situation." It would not be an exaggeration then to describe the circumstances of the birth of the new party in terms of a Ceasarean section since the question that comes to mind [now] is this: What are the reasons for this split? Accordingly, who wanted to impose this split?

The new separatist movement included not only parliament and its existing majority in circumstances that were very delicate, but it also included the government organization as well as members of government. There were those who stayed with the RNI, and there were those who joined the new party even though membership in the government of Prime Minister Maati Bouabid is formed on the basis of limited and specific political standards, just as the parliamentary majority is formed on the same standards. If seven other deputies were to join the new party, the Istiqlal party would have parliamentary majority and would then have the right to aspire to the duties of prime minister. This is what the Istiqlal party is publicly calling for now in its capacity as the party with the majority. The number of its members approaches that of the former majority after the split.

Ever since the duties of prime minister were assigned in the winter of 1979 to neutral Matti Bouabid instead of to majority leader Ahmed Osman, questions about the reasons that led to keeping the duties of prime minister

away from the majority leader have not ceased. These duties were assigned to Maati Bouabid who does not have a single voice in parliament.

The removal of Ahmed Osman was soon accompanied by other actions [designed] to do away with this uncoordinated majority. The party's dynamo, Abdessalam Zenined was removed: he had hardly settled in his position as minister of tourism for a few months before he was appointed ambassador to Baghdad. He thus lost his position as parliamentary representative of the Ouezzane district. His party, the majority party, lost one voice in his team; that voice was won by the Instiqlal party which obtained representation of the Ouezzane district.

It may soon occur to one that the justifications for a split within a party or a semi party would be based on an ideological difference or a doctrinal choice of leaning more toward the right or more toward the left. However, the reasons and the causes for the split of the Moroccan majority are almost non-existent. Even the equality in the cultural, social or political standard of both parties lingered.

Those from the old group who remained in the government--until an anticipated new change takes place--were Reghai, the minister of finance; Ghissassi, the minister of agriculture; Gharnit, the minister of social affairs; Bencheich, minister of planning; and Ramzi, minister of religious endowments. Members of the separatist party who remained in the government were Arsalane El Jadidi, minister of labor; Moussa Saadi, minister of power; and Khali Hanna Ould Rachid, minister of desert affairs. Whereas the speaker of the parliament, Dey Ould Sidi Baba stayed with the first party, the general manager of the largest government bank for development, Abdelkadir Bensliman remained with the new party.

However, Ahmed Alaoui, minister of tourism, who is distinguished by the fact that he is the person closest to the political indicator, assumed a position of neturality and continued to publish news of both parties in his newspapers.

Sixty deputies stayed with Osman's first party, whereas 44 deputies split [and went] with the new party.

It was thus not possible to draw more than a very slight distinction between those and the others, a distinction which members of the new party were trying to attribute to themselves: this was the closeness of their lords to the Bedouins. They called themselves the party of Arabism, that is, the party of the Bedouins. But those who are close to Ahmed Osman, president of the party, which is the subject of discussion, do not hide the fact that behind the contrived events there were strong trends trying to use the new party as a tool to justify increasing the chances for a future government that would be free from the pressure of the numerous figures in the cabinet who are on the side of Ahmed Osman. In fact, those who sympathize with the former prime minister do not hide the bitter fact that the new party is closer to the centers of influence and the new centers of power.

At any rate these possibilities will not be off the mark, but it is possible that another more affirmative possibility can be added. Because of its class makeup the new party may be qualified to play the role of the alternative opposition party instead of the Socialist Union party [USFP] in case the latter withdraws from the current session of parliament and becomes illegal, in accordance with what was stated in the press conference that was convened by King Hasan II early last June. It will be natural then for parliament to continue [its business] for 2 additional years without a Socialist Union--in accordance with the constitutional amendment that stipulates this extension--but with the new opposition of the Liberal Democratic party. The ranks of that party suffer no lack of senior opposition experts and veterans of the ranks of old opposition parties, such as Arsalane El Jadidi, who was at some time a fighter in the ranks of the Moroccan Labor Federation and Abdelhamid Qasimi, who was at one time a fighter in the ranks of the National Union of Popular Forces [UNFP]. The same possibilities go even further, forecasting that some opposition leaders in the union, who are being pointed out, will dissociate themselves from the Socialist Union to strengthen the ranks of the liberal democrats, whether those play the role of the opposition or enter [the scene] to assume power in place of Osman's group.

This is the ultimate goal!

But the fact that the majority party split into two must be placed in the proper perspective of the inescapable destiny that had to be attained.

In addition to the struggles for power there are the successful maneuvers by the intelligent opposition in the union for which the majority had no other choice. The opposition of the union is dynamic, and the majority must try to outstrip it in its actions despite its lack of dynamic factors on the public opinion level. The choices of the majority are like the tunes of the folk singer.

Thus the characteristics of political action in Morocco which are marked by freedom in establishing parties and publishing--except for [actions that] infringe upon public security--still allow any political organization to pursue its rights to hurt its adversaries and to plant political bombs in the structures of other parties.

Members of the Socialist Union toasted the victory they achieved in the process of blowing up the majority party, the NRI.
The time bomb that realized the Socialist Union's objective was a news report published by their newspaper, AL-MUHARRIR on 26 January 1981. The report was about a question Moroccan public opinion called the Shumi question in which union members made a charge against a deputy in the majority [party]. Despite the fact that the majority group met at the invitation of Deputy Abdelhamid Qasimi and threatened to file suit against the reporter for libel and for publishing false news, most of the majority did not agree with filing the suit. This made the suspicion turn to certainty, and thus this article was the straw that broke the back of the majority.

8592
CSO: 4505/63

AGREEMENT WITH PRC EMPHASIZES HEALTH, CULTURAL INTERCHANGE

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 17 Aug 81 p 1

[Article: "Signing of Agreement Between the Sultanate and China on Cultural and Health Affairs and Information Exchange"]

[Text] There was a ceremony the evening of the day before yesterday in Peking for signing an agreement between the Sultanate of Oman and China on cultural and health affairs and information exchange. This agreement, which comprises 10 articles, will open new horizons for cooperation between Oman and China in the areas of culture, instruction, science, health, athletics, publishing, information and agriculture.

This agreement is to be viewed as a turning point in the course of the existing friendship between the Omani and Chinese governments.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Sultanate by H.E. Ambassador Ibrahim al-Subhi, the ambassador of the Sultanate accredited to Peking, and for the Chinese by Huang Zhen, Chinese Minister of Culture.

During the signing ceremony, the Chinese minister praised the wise leadership of H.M. Sultan Qabus, saying that His Majesty plays an important role in that area. He expressed his best wishes for the success of the Omani people under the rational leadership of His Majesty.

The Chinese minister expressed his conviction that relations between the two countries would develop although it has been only a short time since diplomatic relations between Oman and China were established.

The signing ceremony, which was held in the Great Hall of the People in Peking, was attended by representatives of the appropriate Chinese authorities and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, the Chinese ambassador accredited to Oman and members of the Omani embassy in Peking.

8389
CSO: 4304/141

PROGRAMS TO COMBAT TEEN-AGE DELINQUENCY DISCUSSED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 663, 14 Aug 81 pp 56-59

[Article by 'Abdallah al-Rabitin: "A Journey Into the Minds and Hearts of Those With Unformed Souls"]

[Text] The heroes of this report are young children and youths in their adolescence. These groups represent some of the people under detention at the Social Supervision Home.

All of them have unformed minds and are in need of treatment rather than punishment. They are not criminals, but they are perhaps sick individuals who suffer from a disturbance of their social and psychological equilibrium caused by idleness, emotional deprivation, lack of school care, and parental neglect, as well as poverty and bad companions. These factors--and these alone--are the underlying reasons behind their delinquency, as they freely confess.

In this report, we do not advance a speculative opinion but rather present a living record made among these boys. We present this record in untouched form with all its spontaneity, candor, and simplicity. Our goal is that the situation of these children who are detained in the Social Supervision Home will be reexamined and that educators and psychologists will take part in defining the size of the problem and determining the means to solve it.

We found, for example, that most of the crimes that brought these adolescents and juveniles to the supervision home were ordinary crimes--perhaps no more than a fight, a traffic accident, or even an incident of theft which occurs spontaneously and is not preplanned. This suggests that these juveniles are basically good individuals who have been pushed into delinquency by accidental circumstances.

When we say this, we are not defending delinquency or crime. But we are defending these youths because we see them as individuals who can be good if given the chance.

However, this article is not an attempt to smooth over the issue. In fact, exactly the opposite is true, because a look at the situation of these juveniles will inevitably lead us to reexamine the Saudi family itself and the individual or social problems that surround it.

The family is the nucleus of society, and proper behaviour and delinquency are the natural results of the conditions of the family and its place in society. For this reason, our universities, institutes, and scientific and social organizations must conduct field studies on the position of the Saudi family in the wake of the changes that have taken place in society during the last quarter century. With such studies, we will be in a position to grasp the issue.

In subsequent articles we can discuss the guidance and information media and their role in safeguarding the mind and thoughts of the citizen. We can also discuss the role of the schools and institutions of learning as the way of preparing youth for the future.

All of these considerations imply that the issue must be dealt with on a scientific basis, even though it may appear simple.

We are convinced that the state has given the citizen all the necessary means for a life of decency and prosperity. It remains for the citizen himself to share some of the responsibility.

At any rate, this report from the supervision home by AL-YAMAMAH provides an opportunity to present an important social issue, namely, the issue of the Saudi family along with all the internal and external factors that affect it.

We stayed overnight in the supervision home where we heard true-life stories of such complexity that it would require a writer to relate them and a psychologist to interpret them.

Our investigation began in the boys' living quarters located south of the home. The younger children are separated from the older ones and both groups are placed under the supervision of specialized personnel. They receive excellent boarding care which is beyond reproach.

We began by talking with several of the boys. The conversation went as follows:

Name: R.M.

[Question] What happened to you?

[Answer] I took a car from al-Ma'dhar and wrecked it. Then the police arrested me and brought me here.

[Question] How long have you been here?

[Answer] One month and 15 days.

[Question] Has your family visited you during this time?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Are you happy in the home?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Why not?

[Answer] Because my family hasn't come to visit me.

[Question] What do you think about the supervision and food in the home?

[Answer] It's good.

[Question] What grade are you in at school?

[Answer] The fourth grade.

[Question] How was your standing at school?

[Answer] Good.

If we analyze the situation of this boy, we find that it was caused by the fact that his parents fell far short in supervising and monitoring their son. Otherwise, how could he have gotten up the nerve to take a car at his age? It would seem that his parents wanted him to end up in this situation since they have not visited him or inquired about him. Can the home give him the affection he lacks if his parents have denied it to him?

The following conversation occurred with another boy:

Name: A.H.

[Question] What brought you here?

[Answer] Stealing money from a company.

[Question] How did it happen?

[Answer] I was with one of my friends and he went into a company and stole some money. They arrested us both.

We talked to another boy who was also sent to the home for stealing.

When I discussed with these two boys the underlying reasons behind their stealing, I found that in one case, the boy's father never gives him any money and in the other, the boy lives with a divorced mother and does not have any one to provide for him.

Parents like these do not care how their children end up because they have never thought about them but have always had their thoughts centered on themselves. How can we prevent boys like these from stealing when parents of this sort are one of the reasons they steal?

The case of Muhammad S. is a very unusual one. He got into a fistfight with his brother and consequently was sent to the home. He says that his father is in al-Qasim and that if he had been at home he would not have come here.

And thus we encounter small problems such as these in which the family or one of its members is an important factor in the delinquency of the boy, who receives no care or attention. For example, a boy named 'Abd-al-Rahman came to the home as a result of a fight with a worker. Another boy came because of disgraceful behaviour. Thus these innocent children become the victims of factors that are primarily family-related. They are sacrificed because their parents have failed to discharge their trust adequately.

In short, delinquency occurs as a result of lack of supervision and neglect on the part of a legal guardian who is concerned only with himself. Had the guardian carried out his responsibility, the delinquency would never have occurred in the first place.

After hearing the conversations with some of the inmates, we shift our attention to our discussions with officials of the home. We talked first with the supervising social worker at the home, Mus'id Isma'il Yusuf.

[Question] What is your function in the home?

[Answer] My job consists basically of receiving the juveniles who come to the home from the police, opening files on them, and conducting individual sociological examinations on them. I monitor the inmates during their stay in the home and receive social reports on each boy's conduct and actions. These reports are submitted by the social supervisor each week or any time something happens. Based on all these reports, intense discussions with the juvenile, and constant observation on my part after the case comes from the police, I prepare a sociological report on the juvenile. This report is then submitted to the juvenile judge so that he can consult it in issuing the final decision, which is the judge's responsibility. The decision issued by the judge can include release, flogging, or both flogging and imprisonment. This depends on the nature of the case.

Next we met with another supervisor by the name of Ibrahim al-'Uthman.

[Question] What is your role?

[Answer] I supervise and monitor the boys, lead them in prayer, and provide guidance for them.

[Question] Are you happy with your work?

[Answer] Yes, thank God.

[Question] Do the boys give you very many problems?

[Answer] Just a few, nothing to amount to anything.

[Question] Haven't they ever hit you?

[Answer] No, none of them has ever attacked me.

[Question] At what hours do you work?

[Answer] Only during the day.

Next we talked with investigator Muhammad al-Sharif:

[Question] What is your role here?

[Answer] I am the connecting link between the police and the home. The juveniles here are sent by the police stations and I attend the interrogations that are conducted with the juveniles inside the home, because they do not go to the police stations.

[Question] Some of the juveniles have been here for long periods of time—as long as 7 months, in some cases—without legal decisions on their cases having been issued. What are the reasons for this?

[Answer] They may have been accomplices with older individuals in other cases and perhaps these cases are in the adult summary court and have not yet been concluded because of continuing investigations. However, decisions are issued on most of the cases within a very short time. For example, traffic cases are decided within 3 days to a week. However, theft cases are relatively drawn out because fingerprints must be taken and matched with those of the juvenile. Decisions are not issued in traffic cases even in those involving assault and battery where the cases are dropped and settled out of court. The police can usually conclude traffic cases without legal decisions.

Finally, we naturally met with the home's director, Muhammad al-Malik. We had the following conversation:

[Question] What are the purposes of the home?

[Answer] The supervision home is one of the homes belonging to the Undersecretariat for Social Affairs. The home was established in 1973. One home has been opened in Jidda and another last year in al-Dammam.

The purpose of the home is to care for males between the ages of 6 and 18 who fall into one of two groups:

—Juveniles who are taken into custody pending investigation or prosecution by the security authorities or the responsible judicial organizations.

—Juveniles who are placed in the home by the decision of the judge.

Another purpose of the home is to study the causes of juvenile problems and recommend appropriate solutions based on practical experience with these problems. This is done in cooperation with other responsible agencies.

[Question] Is the function of the home limited to certain acts of delinquency for which the juveniles are placed in the home?

[Answer] All infractions and acts of delinquency committed by juveniles in the specified age groups are grounds for placement in the home, whether the infraction is large or small.

[Question] Which acts of delinquency are encountered most frequently among the inmates?

[Answer] Traffic violations represent the largest share of juvenile offenses, followed by theft. It should be noted with regard to the acts of theft that they are minor in nature, such as the theft of tapes, automobile hub caps, a radio or tape recorder, and the like. None of the offenses committed by these juveniles takes place as a result of specific planning or on the instructions of other individuals as occurs in other states. Rather, all of them are spontaneous and random acts that occur because of certain conditions which lead to such thefts.

[Question] What about pills and alcoholic beverages?

[Answer] Incidents involving these things are very rare, and we are thankful for that.

[Question] In your view, what are the causes of the acts of delinquency?

[Answer] There are many causes, which can be summed up in the following points:

1. The lack of emotional gratification on the part of the juvenile due to the dissolution of family ties through divorce of polygamy.

2. A low standard of living—"poverty."

3. Bad companions or delinquent friends with whom the juvenile associates.

4. Idleness, inasmuch as a large number of juveniles leave school and find themselves unemployed without anything to occupy their time. This leads to delinquent behaviour.

5. The lack of sources of recreation and relaxation to help the juvenile occupy his free time. It is evident that the majority of juveniles who enter the home spend their free time in the streets or cafes.

6. The lack of sufficient attention on the part of the school to the formation of the juvenile's personality. The school bears the largest share of the responsibility in conditioning and guiding the youth and preventing delinquency.

[Question] Does the home study the case of the juvenile to find out what led to his delinquency in order to achieve positive results that will prevent a recurrence of delinquent behaviour should one of the causes you mentioned earlier arise?

[Answer] After we find out what compelled the juvenile to commit the crime, we discuss the problem with his legal guardian and help him solve it. We reach agreement with the guardian on a plan of treatment to prevent the juvenile from committing the crime again. In addition, the home also conducts follow-up care

after the juvenile is released so that his connection with the home will not be broken. We have a specialist whose job is to monitor the juvenile after his release from the home. This is called follow-up care.

For example, if the crime is caused by unoccupied spare time, we try to enroll the juvenile in one of the vocational training centers. We then monitor his studies in the center and make sure he continues them until graduation. In this way we can confirm that he is on the right track and reassure ourselves about him.

[Question] What if the problem is caused by the individual's financial circumstances?

[Answer] If his family is poor, we try to find him suitable work commensurate with his age and academic standing. Job opportunities are plentiful, especially since we work with the Ministry of Labor. It is easy for us to find him a job in a private company or in any other organization that will help in solving his problem.

[Question] What system of organization is employed in the detention of these juveniles?

[Answer] There is a specific plan of organization by which the juveniles are divided into two groups. The younger boys are placed in a separate group under the control of special supervisors and specialists. The older boys form another group under the supervision of different specialists. This prevents mixing between the two groups and keeps the groups from influencing each other.

[Question] Is there segregation based on the type of crime committed?

[Answer] Yes. Juveniles detained because of traffic violations form a separate group because their infractions are minor and their detention usually lasts for no more than a week.

[Question] What measures are taken as soon as the juvenile is placed in custody?

[Answer] When the juvenile enters the home, he is given a medical examination by the home's doctor to make sure that he is free from contagious diseases. He is then issued clothing and put into the appropriate group for his age. In addition, the specialized supervisors such as the health director, the athletic director, the technical director, and the supervisor prepare reports on the detainee which are submitted to the social supervisor, who forms them into a single report.

[Question] What are the ages of the majority of these juveniles?

[Answer] The majority of them are between the ages of 12 and 15.

[Question] Do these boys participate in recreational activities?

[Answer] They pursue technical training activities, simple manual tasks, all sorts of athletic games, swimming, television, cards, and motion pictures. We present films which aid the inmates and help in raising their social and religious consciousness.

[Question] What about education?

[Answer] With regard to education, it is difficult to give them specific courses in classrooms similar to the ones they encounter in school because of the differences in the levels and types of instruction among the pupils. The home has pupils from various schools and it is very difficult to open classes for these individuals. However, we have instructors who supervise them while they learn their lessons. The instructor helps them understand and solve the problems they have difficulty with. If a detainee is enrolled in a school, he can continue his studies by learning his lessons under the supervision of these instructors in various subjects, including mathematics, English, Arabic, and so forth. When it comes time for examinations, we make it possible for the boys to take them.

[Question] What about inspirational lectures?

[Answer] The home does conduct various inspirational lectures. The juvenile judge gives a lecture each week, and we also call on learned individuals from time to time to give lectures in addition to the supervisors, who perform a similar role.

[Question] What is the daily schedule of these juveniles?

[Answer] Every day the boys get up at dawn to pray. Next they do athletic exercises. Then they eat breakfast, after which they separate into groups for various activities. Some engage in technical training, some study, and others pursue cultural activities--newsboards, the library.

[Question] It is said that some juveniles are more delinquent and disobedient when they are released from the home as a result of mixing with various groups that influence their future behaviour. What comment do you have about this?

[Answer] This is not true, because the intermixing of the pupils occurs only under the supervision of the directors. Moreover, they are not given any free time to talk to one another. They are always busy and it is very rare for any of them to return to the home after being released. When one of them does return, we have expected him to come back and this is because the guardian fails to cooperate with us. Let's assume that the boy's problem was caused by bad companions with whom he associates and we have advised the guardian to keep his boy away from them but he doesn't listen to this advice. In this case, the boy will definitely become delinquent again and consequently will return to the home.

On the other hand, perhaps the father marries a second wife and loses touch with his children and fails to look after their upbringing or direct and supervise them. In this case, the boy will inevitably commit additional acts of delinquency. Or if the family is not cooperative, we also expect to see the boy commit another crime and be returned to the home. But if the family cooperates with us and goes along with the plan we draw up for them, the juvenile rarely returns to us.

[Question] It is said that each group sleeps in a single room without a supervisor, which could lead to a certain amount of deviation. What is your opinion?

[Answer] This is not true. Each group consists of five individuals in one room and the supervisors are present with them continuously. As I indicated previously, we have three shifts and each shift consists of three supervisors. A social worker oversees these supervisors. Nothing at all can happen because the individuals are under the surveillance of the supervisors. MOreover, the supervisors possess a very high standard of qualification, character, and religious commitment and must be of a certain age. None of the officers is of a young age.

[Question] Are there ever any clear cases of disobedience or outright attacks?

[Answer] A fight sometimes may occur among the boys themselves, but that is all.

[Question] Do any of the boys ever run away?

[Answer] This happened once or twice when we were in a rented house that was not prepared for this purpose. But no one can escape from the present building because it is sealed. In addition, the police also provide surveillance. They patrol the outside of the building and the fence. The supervisors and directors perform this function inside the building.

[Question] How is the principle of reward and punishment applied?

[Answer] If an individual commits an infraction within the home, he will certainly be punished for it.

[Question] What are the established punishments?

[Answer] The punishment varies according to the offense. It could be a reprimand, detention, deprivation, or flogging.

[Question] Are the inmates paid any allowances?

[Answer] No allowances are paid to them. Instead, they are provided with food and seasonal clothing.

[Question] Is there cooperation or are there visits between the home and other related agencies?

[Answer] No, because these boys are detained in accordance with legal decisions and if they were to leave the home this would be considered a violation of these decisions.

[Question] I mean, do the supervisors make visits to schools and agencies which share the goal of consciousness-raising and crime prevention?

[Answer] We visit the schools if former inmates of the home are attending them. This is part of the specialist's role of follow-up monitoring to find out how well the boy is proceeding with his studies, whether or not he has dropped out, and how he is behaving after his release from the home. Is he improving or not improving.

[Question] What is the difference between the home and a prison?

[Answer] The home differs from prison by association, and the quarters consist of large, air-conditioned, well-lighted, and clean rooms equipped with separate beds for five individuals. The lavatories are clean and are continually maintained by workers. I don't know the exact extent of the difference between the home and prison, but what you observe when you visit the living quarters will show you that the place is as much like a regular home as possible in terms of the furniture, air conditioning, lighting, and food.

[Question] What are the visiting periods for the detainees?

[Answer] There are three visiting days a week: Sunday and Tuesday afternoons for women and Thursday afternoon for men.

[Question] Doesn't the home supervise young women who commit certain offenses?

[Answer] There is the Institution for the Care of Young Women which is responsible for placing girls who commit offenses. We have no connection with this institution, but are responsible for boys, only.

[Question] Does the home suffer from any problems?

[Answer] The only problem the home has is a shortage of manpower.

[Question] What are the reasons for this?

[Answer] One reason is the fact that Saudi citizens do not want supervisors' jobs because, as I mentioned previously, they are on three shifts and are not permanent. Saudis will not accept night work at all—especially married men. Thus, we are compelled to contract outside the kingdom and contracting has now become difficult. We must write to the Civil Service Commission and get their approval. This is contrary to the way it was in the past when the ministry did the contracting itself. This means that there are complicated and drawn out procedures involved in contracting which hinder us from filling the shortage we are suffering from.

[Question] How many detainees are there at present?

[Answer] At present there are 79. However, this number is not fixed. Sometimes it goes as high as 130 and sometimes it is less, according to the number of offenses committed.

8591
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INTERVIEW WITH TAIEB BACCOUCHE

Paris AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 223, 16 Aug 81 pp 27-28

[Interview with Taieb Baccouche in Tunis, date not specified: "The Secretary General of the Federation of Tunisian Labor Unions Says, 'Our Position in the Elections Will Definitely Be Distinctive;' Steps for Liberalization To Be Completed by Declaring General Legislative Amnesty' "]

[Text] Since its establishment in 20 January 1946 the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] has been a sensitive indicator in all domestic political equations. During the period of struggle against French colonialism it broke the controlling restraint of narrow social demands and won the political prestige that made it the backbone of the national struggle during the major strikes that it organized in August 1947, in November 1950, in March 1951, in the two general strikes of December 1951 and January 1952 and throughout the years that followed.

In the following period—beginning in 1956—the labor unions became a principal figure in the political balances between the poles of power. The unions experienced struggles and liquidations among their leaders [in incidents] that were related to the developments that were being pursued by the government's policy.

This was the case until the pressure coming from the unions' membership grew and became crystallized into a new political and social awareness in the seventies which contributed to changing the federation of unions to a center attracting various kinds of opposition. The political power made every effort to clip the wings of the unions. Such efforts went as far as creating an alternative union that supported the regime and was called the Tunisian Labor Force. Soon, however, this union disappeared.

The failure that befell this "policy of incentives and terror" forced the former administration of the ruling party to begin implementing the plan for the immediate elimination of the unions. This forced the union leadership which was headed by Habib Achour to proclaim a general strike to defend its existence and its independence.

The strike turned into a medium for expressing disgruntlement. Demonstrations broke out in all the major cities; a large number of people were killed and wounded when the police and the army intervened; and union leaders were arrested.

Then the government arranged a superficial conference during which it installed a new leadership which found itself isolated in an ocean of union rejection until the events of 1980 and the political changes that ensued occurred. Labor union members began to be released in groups, and then a joint committee of the legal leadership and the leadership that supports the government was formed on 3 October 1980 to make preparations for the emergency conference that was held in Gafsa last 29 and 30 April (AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 10 May 1981). At the end of that conference Taieb Baccouche was elected secretary general of the Federation of Labor Unions.

AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI met Baccouche and interviewed him for 2 hours about the union leadership's view of the current situation and its future role inside the country and abroad, especially since the country is on the verge of premature parliamentary elections. The federation's position will influence these elections. The text of the interview follows.

[Question] After the recent conference of the two offices of the UGTT and the Alliance of Employers formed a joint committee to follow up on the settlement of the questions that resulted from the crisis of recent years. Is this a return to the dialogue between the two organizations? [If it is], on what basis is this dialogue being conducted?

[Answer] The recent social crisis that lasted 3 years and actually preceded the events of 26 January 1978 created numerous barriers between the workers' organization and the employers' organization.

The situation became complicated after the events of 25 and 26 [January] as a result of the fact that a few owners of firms were inclined to terminate employees individually and collectively and to practice various forms of vindictiveness and revenge against the workers, especially those who were members of labor unions.

It is not easy to get rid of the vestiges of resentment and malice since this requires one to exercise considerable restraint of his primitive emotions and to make a psychological effort as well to get rid of those emotions and to establish professional relations that are based on dialogue and respect rather than expressions of exploitation on the one hand or resentment on the other.

The meeting that took place between the two organizations took place in that context. Its principal point was to lay down new foundations for a candid dialogue and to look into ways for clearing the social climate and establishing new relations.

[Question] There was a wave of strikes in the capital and in a few major cities after the Gafsa Conference. How do you explain this phenomenon? Is

the settlement of this phenomenon part of the agreement between you and the employers' organization for clearing the social climate?

[Answer] There are numerous reasons for the strikes that occurred recently. Some of them are normal professional reasons that are manifested in old demands to meet some of which an agreement was reached in 1977 or January of 1978. The events [of 25 and 26 January] were used to freeze these demands. It was not curious then that these demands would move workers [again] since they had lost their benefits for years. Other reasons for the strikes are due to a bad habit for which the supervisory power of the previous administration is responsible. This is manifested in not meeting any demand regardless of its legitimacy until after a strike [occurs]. This was what made workers undertake the strike from the outset to gain time, whereas interest would dictate that a strike come as a last resort after all attempts at dialogue fail.

Accordingly, there are also a few psychological reasons for the strikes such as the unconscious reaction to years of oppression and suppression. These are examples of the reasons which are numerous; time is required to change the methods of doing business.

The April 1972 Law

[Question] The proceedings of the meetings of the National Assembly on 10 and 11 January 1978 show that the federation requested a review of the foreign investment law which allows European capitalists to establish industrial organizations in Tunisia. This law is known as the April 1972 Law. Today, most of the strikes are occurring in the firms that have been established in the context of this law. What method do the unions have in mind to deal with this phenomenon?

[Answer] I think that some confusion has occurred regarding the federation's position on the export firms or on those firms in general that come under the framework of the April 1972 Law and of similar laws that came after it. The federation's objection to the laws that created these firms is represented in its dissatisfaction with firms that remain on the periphery of the national economy and do not truly enter into that economy's "circulatory system." There is no interaction between them and the national economy with regard to the use of local primary materials or the transfer of technology, an activity which still remains a fiction. Most of these firms are not bringing about any real transfer of technology. Furthermore, these firms are not diverse since most of them are confined to [the production of] clothing for export. This makes the principal reason for their existence, ultimately, the exploitation of cheap labor, despite the relatively limited employment opportunities they provide.

The federation is intent on keeping the new colonialist mentality out of these firms. It is also very interested in the dignity of male and female workers which is part of [their] human rights as well as national feelings. Some people were wrong in thinking that the federation was trying to expel these firms by harrassing them with strikes. This is what a few proprietors

of these firms are claiming on the basis of possible excesses committed by a few union members. We are now in the process of studying the situation of these firms closely.

No Alternative Program

[Question] Ever since its establishment the federation of unions has had its own economic program. It is known that the Destourian party did not have a clear program when it assumed power and that it adopted the federation's program in the mid fifties and early sixties. Is it possible to talk today about an alternative economic program for whose application the federation of unions is struggling?

[Answer] We do not believe that it is the duty of the federation to come up with an alternative program that would be the basis for the government's full policy. The federation is not a ruling party or an opposition party; it is rather a labor union organization and a social sounding board which, like every labor union organization, has clear objectives to achieve which it contributes to the formulation of the major lines of the economic and social choices. The government and the political parties then have to formulate [these choices] in detailed programs and plans. The federation expresses its opinion on the programs and plans that are presented, and it evaluates the results and the practices on the basis of standards that focus on the actual progress [achieved] in social justice in the comprehensive sense of the term.

[Question] The federation has always had representatives in parliament. Do you intend to take part in the next parliamentary elections? [If so], what will be the form of your participation?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the subject of parliamentary elections will be raised this year and that it will be raised for the first time in a new way that differs from the way it has usually been raised in the past. In general, adjustments will be made in the situations in accordance with the degree of democracy that the government will be prepared to establish and in accordance with the positions of the various opposition movements.

The federation's position on all this will undoubtedly be distinctive by virtue of its nature as a labor union organization that does not behave like a political party or isolate itself from what is taking place on the national scene.

As far as formulating the labor union's position is concerned, the next National Assembly will settle the matter in accordance with what is dictated by the interests of the federation.

[Question] The demand for a general amnesty is being made by all union members at all meetings and gatherings, before and after the Gafsa Conference. What has the new executive office achieved in this area?

[Answer] The demand for a general legislative amnesty is not new for the UGTT. It was among the union's demands in the National Assembly that was convened in January 1978 considering the fact

that it would be a principal factor in clearing the political climate in the country. Since this demand goes beyond amnesty for union members, the union, along with all the democratic forces in the country, will continue to make it.

With regard to union members, particularly those who were victims of the 1978 crisis, we have been able to form a task force, which despite its shortcomings, has been able to suspend the cases against the union members and enable all those who received sentences, except for Brother Habib Achour, to receive a presidential pardon according to which the sentences were repealed. This is what gave labor union officials the right to go back to pursuing labor union activity and to assuming labor union responsibilities.

However, we think it is essential to complete this significant step and enact the general legislative amnesty law for all union members so that the injustice committed against them can be wiped out. This would go beyond repealing the verdicts to repealing what was considered "a crime." After the Gafsa Conference a committee of the union's Executive Office was formed. Its function was to rectify the damages that resulted from this crisis.

[Question] What about Habib Achour?

[Answer] Following a meeting I had with the president recently, I was personally able to get a promise that the restrictions which were placed on Brother Habib Achour would be lifted soon. This may be done on 3 August.

[Question] At first the position of the International League of Free Labor Unions on the new leadership was reserved. Then it changed in the direction of recognizing the leadership and normalizing relations with it. How has the position of the International League changed, and what are the motives for this change?

[Answer] We have been members in the International League of Free Labor Unions for 30 years. However, we do not think that this affiliation allows this or any other organization to set itself up as a guardian over our organization for whose independence we have fought. We do not believe that the International League of Free Labor Unions had any reservations toward us at all. In its official publications this organization considered the revival of this national labor union committee a significant step toward solving the labor union crisis in Tunisia.

However, the absence of the league's representatives from the Gafsa Conference is due to the fact that the league thought there were deep differences between union members and that the presence of its representatives would be embarrassing and would be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the union. Therefore, it preferred to await the results of the conference and to honor the will of the conference majority. It was not difficult to find out the truth about new occurrences at the conference

which was open to Tunisian and foreign journalists from beginning to end. In addition, Brother Hamid Jalud, the secretary general of the International Federation of Arab Labor Unions was present; al-Haj 'Ali al-Hafishi, president of the African Labor Union Unity Organization was present; and so were representatives of fraternal labor union organizations such as [those in] Morocco, Algeria and Palestine. All those who attended the conference agreed that it had a rare democratic character. Therefore, the International League of Free Labor Unions assumed the normal posture of honoring the decision of the majority.

On the sidelines of the 1967 International Labor Symposium I had a working meeting in Geneva with Otto Christian, secretary general of the International League of Free Labor Unions and with a number of his aides. A decision was made during that meeting to normalize relations once and for all between the federation of Tunisian labor unions and this organization. Relations had been frozen with the leadership that was installed by force following the events of 1978. A few days ago I attended the business meetings of the regular session of the Executive Authority of the International League of Free Labor Unions in the capital of the Netherlands since the UGTT is one of the three permanent members of this committee, representing the African group in the innermost part of this organization's executive authority.

[Question] What is your position on Morocco's events?

[Answer] We have expressed from the outset our full solidarity with the Moroccan members of the union, and we have called for the release of the leaders who are under arrest and for honoring union liberties. On the Arab scene we have shown full readiness to take part in a special session held by the International Federation of Arab Labor Unions to look into the subject.

8592
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ROLE OF OPPOSITION EXAMINED

Paris AL-MANAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 223, 16 Aug 81 p 26

[Article by Rashid Khashanah: "15 Minutes Brought Back the Communist Party to Public Activity; Harmel Says, 'Mr President, the Party Is Banned;' Bourguiba Says, 'Let's Lift the Ban;' Islamic Movement Threatened by Siege unless Opposition Circumscribes Government's Action"]

[Text] Tunisia has not experienced since 1977 a political summer that was as hot as this one has been. Events followed each other in an unaccustomed fashion: the one party system came to an end; the communist party was issued a permit to return to public activity; all Islamic leaders were arrested, and preparations for their trial were underway; there was a struggle between the government and the left over opening coffee shops and restaurants in the day time during the month of Ramadan; and there were demonstrations against the Club Med because the club openly declared its sympathy with Israel.

But the most remarkable event in all this was that of lifting the ban on the communist party. The year 1981 will remain in the books of Tunisian history as the final year for the one party system after 18 years of absolute control by the ruling Destourian party.

Last 18 July was the turning point that shifted the country from one situation to another. The decision was a surprise that hit everyone unexpectedly. [Consequently] no one believed what he had heard. Even some members of the Political Bureau and some members of the government heard of the news just as any ordinary citizen would have. On that day President Bourguiba met the secretary general of the communist party, Mohamed Harmel, who had come to thank the president for permitting the publication of the newspaper, AL-TARIQ AL-JADID. Mrs Wassila Bourguiba, the president's wife had arranged that meeting after having met Harmel twice herself.

Communist party circles relate that the following conversation took place between President Bourguiba and the communist leader during their meeting which lasted no more than 15 minutes.

"Mr President, the decision authorizing us to publish the newspaper,

AL-TARIQ AL-JADID is a historic and a positive decision. However, it is still inadequate because the communist party has been banned for 18 years from participating in Tunisia's battle. What is keeping us from taking part [in that battle] is the decision which was made in 1963 to ban the party's activity."

"We can lift the ban."

The decision that restored the flow of matters in the pipelines of politics which had rusted after 18 years of inactivity was that simple. The communist party and the other political movements--except for the Marxist Leninists--had receded under the ungenial burden of the one party system. Ever since the mid seventies, however, the communist party has been reconsidering its actions and preparing itself for its return to the scene along with recently created movements such as the MUP [Popular Unity Movement], the MTI [Movement Tendence Islamique], and the MDS [Socialist Democratic Movement].

Now that the one party system has come to an end, there are now in Tunisia two official parties. It was the specific position of the party, compared with the other organizations, that caused the authorization for this party to be issued before others. This was explained by Mohamed Harmel in AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI (No 218). The communist party is not a recently created party applying for a permit to exist. It is a party whose existence goes back to the thirties and whose activity had been suspended by an administrative decision. Therefore, its return to the scene does not depend on the results of the next elections.

After the decision to lift the ban was issued, the communists proceeded to take deliberate steps to confirm it. The first step was that of making preparations for the publication of the weekly newspaper, AL-TARIQ AL-JADID; the first issue is expected to come out in September. The communist party also began to list its supporters and active members so it can open branches in the internal regions. This return of the communist party will have a negative effect on the Marxist Leninist leftist organizations because the communist party began attracting some of their supporters and even the members of their staff since it is giving them the opportunity to work in public. In the context of this reorganization process a few communist circles are discussing the possibility of convening an emergency congress of the communist party which has not held a congress since 1962.

But the question that is being asked often following the return of the communist party to [public] activity is the following: Will the communists take part in the next parliamentary elections after these developments, especially since they had not proclaimed their absolute refusal to participate in the elections in the past?

Mohamed Harmel thinks it more likely that the communist party will participate in the elections with a list of candidates shared with the opposition organizations which agree to run in the elections with the communist party in a united front. The only party that is a candidate for such

participation is the MUS. Both the MUP and the MTI are still refusing [to join forces with the communists].

Arrests

The matter becomes more complex as far as the latter organization is concerned because all its leaders were arrested on 18 July, the day the communist party became legal again. Despite the disparate estimates about the number of persons who were arrested, it is certain that the 25 charter members whose names were announced when the MTI party was established last 6 June have all been arrested, with the exception of three women and the media official in the leadership.

Opposition circles, which condemned the arrests, believe that this campaign is a step backwards which may match the gain reaped by the communist party in the battle for multiple parties. The charges that are being made against the leaders of the MTI, in the context of the preparations for their trial, are: detaining the dean of the College of Sciences last 20 February and "organizing acts of violence." What is being referred to here is that demonstrations which took place in the city of Djerba, south of the capital to call for the expulsion of the French official of the Club Med who toasted Israel in a song during the celebration that was held to celebrate the national day of France. This angered the people, and they formed a large demonstration in which even officials of the ruling party in the city took part. These events led to the expulsion of the French official and the arrest of 20 residents of the city. So far however, the involvement of the MTI in the events has not been established, and no evidence of this has been presented. Other events of less significance have occurred in Ksar Hellal between the police forces and the supporters of the Islamic Movement when Rached Chanouchi, leader of this movement was getting ready to deliver a sermon in the city's mosque.

These arrests have added another major question on the list of questions that are being asked by observers in Tunisia about future political developments, especially about the participation of opposition parties in the elections. But what is evident in all cases is the fact that the government will set boundaries around the activities of the religious movements to set the stage for their liquidation. In this regard the Political Bureau of the Destourian party did decide to focus its attention on the mosques so as to drive the religious movements away from them and to adopt the question of defending religion so as to pull the rug from under those movements which emerged since the early seventies. Will the trial of the leaders of the MTI become the culmination of this plan, or will the opposition succeed in forcing the government to change its mind about the trial?

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PROS, CONS OF ESTABLISHING LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE DISCUSSED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 15, 16, 17 Aug 81

[Article by 'Ali Lashin: "Has the Time Come to Establish a Stock Exchange in the UAE?"]

[15 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] There Are Billions of Dirhams Worth of Company Shares Circulating in the Domestic Market Which Require a Focal Point of Accumulation and Investment.

The Central Bank: "We Are Ready to Work Together with the Economy, Chambers of Commerce, and Municipalities."

The System of Selling Through Agents Is Responsible for the Increase in the Phenomenon of Fictitious Companies in the Country!

The world of dealing in stocks and bonds is a world which is enveloped in secrecy and obscurity as far as the great majority of people are concerned. Only a small number of people, who have acquired expertise in this area, understand the secrets of this large and rich field. It was only after bitter experience, during the course of which they made some profits and suffered many losses, that they came to understand the secrets of the game and were then able to make big profits.

The profits, unfortunately, were at the expense of small savers who were seeking a means of making legitimate profit. How can we protect this group of oppressed people from the danger of losing their savings or having their savings frozen in fictitious companies which do not bring any real profit to society by offering it a service or a product which society really needs? Could the solution be the establishment of a stock exchange for stocks and bonds in the UAE for the purpose of organizing one of the country's important investment activities?

'Abd al-Malik al-Hamr, director of the Central Bank, has already stated that the Bank is currently studying the possibility of establishing a stock exchange in the UAE.

In the following report you will see the conflicting opinions of those who support and those who oppose this idea. What do specialists in this field say concerning this subject?

We are presenting this report within the framework of a series of several articles, and the following is the first article in the series:

Yusuf 'Abd al-Latif al-Sarkal, member of the board of directors of the Al-Fujayrah Cement Company, welcomes the idea of establishing a stock exchange in the UAE. He emphasized that this would protect shareholders from being exploited by brokers and middlemen because the stock exchange would continually clarify, for all parties concerned, what the [current] stock quotations are.

Kuwait's Experience

He said: "Why do we not benefit from Kuwait's experience in this field? The al-Manakh area there consists mostly of places and offices where stocks are bought and sold. Right next to them you have the stock exchange which enables you to keep track of the level of current prices before going to the offices which sell the stocks to conclude a deal with them."

"Here in the UAE the operation proceeds on the basis of individual judgements. Many people have no means of getting in touch with Kuwait in order to learn the latest stock quotations. Therefore, they are subject to exploitation by the brokers and middlemen who earn enormous profits by playing the role of a parasite."
Mr al-Sarkal went on to say: "Actually, in Sharjah there is an area which is similar to the al-Manakh area in Kuwait. This area in Sharjah is located at the beginning of al-'Urubah Street, where there are a number of offices which deal in stocks. In addition to these offices there is a group of auditors and accountants who engage in the operations of putting the shares up for sale, getting subscriptions for them, and keeping accounts concerning them."

"However, before establishing the stock exchange it is desirable to undertake the task of organizing the procedures for establishing and starting up new companies. The government should supervise this operation, either through the Ministry of Economy and Trade or through the Central Bank so that these procedures will be legal and sound and so that the companies whose formation is being announced will be real companies and not fictitious companies."

Founders and the Sale of Stocks

Mr al-Sarkal explained the reasons for the founders of the companies selling their shares before the legal time period, saying: "Some people buy these shares by taking out a loan from a bank and try to repay it rapidly in order not to pay the large interest payments which may not be covered by the profits expected from owning the shares in the long run."

"Some founders of companies sell the shares because they want to transfer their cash to another investment activity before the legally prescribed one-year period goes by. As we know, the shares remain in the name of the founder [of the company] during this period of time after they are sold, and they are registered in the documentation offices in the Ministry of Justice, in the name of the new owner, only after the expiration of this legal time period."

He went on to say: "This phenomenon cannot be eliminated as long as we have the system of selling [shares] through agents. However, it is possible to lessen the seriousness of the problem by increasing primary liquidities in the markets and by increasing people's awareness of the importance of holding on to their shares so that they can earn reasonably good profits in the future. Naturally the existence of a stock exchange would help to create this awareness among stockholders."

The First Thing Needed Is the Law Concerning Companies

"Before thinking about establishing a stock exchange for securities, precious metals, and other minerals in Dubai or in any of the other Emirates, we need to pass a law concerning the founding of commercial, industrial, and professional companies, and [we need to pass] the remaining parts of the commercial law regulating economic activity in the country."

"If these laws, with their implementing regulations were passed and if they definitely became in effect, then the stock exchange would by one of the pillars of this orderly system."

"Therefore I feel"—and here we are quoting Nasir 'Abd al-Latif, head of the Dubai National Bank--"that the present process of circulation of stocks, in spite of its material benefit, is to be considered unsound and requires that the government intervene in order to regulate it."

Mr 'Abd al-Latif continued explaining his point of view with regard to stocks, saying: "In the absence of laws regulating the processes of putting shares up for subscription, there have been many excesses committed which are not in conformity with justice." "From the time that the subscribers pay the nominal value of the shares to the banks, and until the assignment [of shares] takes place, those in charge of the new companies, which are in the process of being formed, use for their benefit the money which has been collected from the very first day it comes to the bank. They are not supposed to use this money until the assignment [of the shares] takes place because this money is considered to be paid as a deposit to secure the purchase of shares. Thus it is not permissible to use this money, and the money is supposed to be treated as it would be treated when opening a credit account. A letter of credit is opened for a period of 3 months, and the only thing paid for it is the fees for opening the credit account, and they amount to only 0.12 percent. Then we apply to this account the prevailing interest rates in the market except when the amount is actually paid to the source bank."

"This procedure may be followed between the time of subscription for the shares and the time when [the shares] are assigned. But if the owners of the companies, whose shares are being put up for subscription, insist on using the money of the subscribers, then this should be for the benefit of the subscribers themselves and they should receive the profits. When their money is returned after the assignment [of the shares], it should be returned to them along with the interest so that they are not subjected to exploitation."

The Stock Exchange Is a Monetary Tool

Muhammad al-Hadi, director of the Dubai branch of the Central Bank, began his remarks concerning the stock exchange by saying: "The value of company shares

circulating in the local market at the present time total billions of dirhams. What we need is a focal point where these billions can be accumulated so that they can then be invested and channeled on sound bases. This, of course, can be achieved by means of a stock exchange."

Mr al-Hadi continued his statement concerning the importance of having a stock exchange, saying: "In all of the advanced economies of the world, stock exchangers are considered to be one of the basic foundations of their monetary and financial systems. Whoever owns shares and wishes to have them transformed into liquid assets goes to the stock exchange and this is accomplished immediately."

"If a government wants to withdraw liquid assets from the market, it utilizes the stock exchange to put up government bonds for sale which pay high interest so that the public will buy them. This decreases the volume of demand for goods and services, and thus limits inflation. Thus a stock exchange is considered to be an effective tool for carrying out monetary policy."

"The Central Bank is totally prepared to work together with the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the chambers of commerce, the Association of Banks, the municipal councils, and all parties concerned, and is ready to pave the way for this new financial institution and lend it a helping hand until it reaches safe ground and is recognized in the UAE, throughout the Gulf area, and internationally."

What Is Expected of the Stock Exchange

Mr al-Hadi went on to say: "The stock exchange needs to be set up in a location among the banks and commercial companies. The Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir Square in Dubai is the most appropriate place for this."

"The stock exchange needs to develop itself so that it becomes suitable later on for the circulation of domestic, Gulf, and international stocks. This, of course, means that the stock exchange will have to be staffed with professional personnel possessing a high level of economic and financial knowledge and expertise. It also requires that there be means available for the stock exchange to contact all of the international financial centers in London, Zurich, New York, Tokyo, and other important cities."

"This stock exchange also needs to put out a daily bulletin containing the names, number, and price quotations of stocks which are circulating, and the motto of the stock exchange should be 'Our word can be trusted.'"

Mr al-Hadi drew our attention to one very important point, which is that of opening up the stock exchange to both UAE citizens and to non-UAE citizens. He said that 60 percent of the stock market should be reserved for UAE citizens and that 40 percent should be reserved for non-UAE citizens. He said that the purpose of this is to encourage non-UAE citizens to invest their savings inside the UAE so that these savings do not go out of the country.

[16 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] First It Is Necessary to Reorganize the Investment Company Chaos.

Why Did the Two Stock Exchange Experiments of the "Private Sector" in Dubai and Sharjah Fail?

The Story of the Company, the value of Whose Shares Quintupled Before It Began to Operate!

Yesterday we met with three of our citizens who expressed their points of view with regard to the establishment of a stock exchange in the UAE. Two of them welcomed the idea, whereas the third one had his reservations and demanded that, before this step is taken, the necessary laws be passed which would guarantee the success of the stock exchange in case one is created.

Today we continue our discussion of this subject by shedding more light on its various aspects. We will do this by presenting some new opinions expressed by those who have expertise in this field. "In the national financial arena, indicators have appeared which suggest to us the necessity of establishing a stock exchange in the UAE." This statement was made by Rashid ibn Hamid al-Mazru'i, a businessman in Dubai. He went on to say: "One of these indicators could be considered to be the passage of three commercial laws all at once--the law concerning commercial agencies, the law concerning the UAE Petroleum Corporation, and the law concerning the UAE Transportation and Services Corporation. The result of these laws will be the appearance of new corporations whose shares will be put up for sale to our citizens, as has been the case with Emirtel--the Emirates Telecommunications Corporation."

"There is also another trend being promoted by His Highness Shaykh Sultan al-Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah. He wants the shares, which are owned by the Sharjah government, to be made available to citizens for subscription at their nominal prices which are far less than their actual prices."

Emirtel's Pioneering Experiment

He went on to say: "Emirtel's experiment deserves our attention because it is a pioneering experiment which we hope will be emulated. The government puts the shares of this corporation up for sale, and the corporation guarantees an annual rate of profit of at least 10 percent for each share at a nominal price of up to 100 dirhams per share, whereas the actual value of each share in the market is 1,000 dirhams. We consider this to be obvious assistance given by the government to our citizens and to be a successful means of improving their income levels."

"If we expect this procedure to be applied to all foreign companies and agencies in the country, we would then have an enormous number of shares up for sale in the market. If that happens, it will be necessary to have a stock exchange in order to regulate the process of circulating these shares."

Companies Far from Their Objectives

'Ubayd Muhammad al-Shamisi, a prominent dealer in stocks and bonds in Sharjah, spoke frankly to us and expressed several constructive opinions. He said: "Any given company is established in order to achieve a particular objective. What was achieved by the numerous companies which have been established since 1976? These companies were originally established in order to stimulate economic activity in the country and to overcome the recession which we suffered from during the years 1975-77. Did these companies achieve this objective?"

"Actually this is not the only shortcoming we have seen. There have also been a number of other shortcomings. For example, it has been permitted to establish more than one company at the same time. This has affected our primary liquidities in that they have been withdrawn from the market, frozen, and then invested abroad." "As an extension of my previous remarks, I would like to say that we find duplication of companies and the establishment of numerous companies in the same field of activity. This means that they end up harming each other's interests and creating a situation involving harmful competition."

"We should also inquire about these companies' economic feasibility. Is the economic feasibility of a company being studied before it is established, or is this whole process being carried out in improvised fashion?"

"And the small investor wants to know who the people are who are in charge of a given company so that he can be reassured concerning his money."

"Will the company avoid fields of activity and investments which are forbidden by Islam?"

"We should have clear answers to these questions regarding any given company before we permit it to be established."

"Let us speak even more openly. Agriculture has been suggested as an alternative, both for the present and for the future, to oil. Geological surveys and tests have proven that the Dubai area contains huge reserves of ground water which, without exaggeration, would be enough to supply the agricultural needs of the whole Gulf area. In Sharjah, the Gulf Agricultural Development Company was established and it was said that some of the objectives of this company were the creation of farms to cover the country's needs in terms of agricultural foodstuffs, the establishment of plants to produce dairy and meat products, raising cattle, and the establishment of a fishing fleet which would operate on the high seas."

"Four years after this company was founded, which of these objectives have been achieved?'

"Unfortunately the results have been very meager."

"Just as agricultural shares were sold in the market, industrial shares have also been put up for sale. The Sharjah Group was founded in order to carry out an industrial plan which was appropriate for the circumstances of the region in terms its small labor force. Those in charge of the company said that the company would set up plants involving intensive capital [investment] and which would be very

advanced in terms of technology. This company also has not achieved any of its objectives."

"Another example of this is the Medical Services Company which is also in Sharjah. Why does this company restrict its activities to that of opening private hospitals? Why does it not specialize in the production of medicines which would be something which is more useful and beneficial to society?"

"There are many other examples of such companies which were originally established to stimulate investment inside the country but which, unfortunately, invest most of their money abroad."

"The natural result is that when the number of national companies increases, with the consequence being an increase in the shares circulating in the market, then it is necessary to have a stock exchange in order to regulate this activity."

The Attempt Made by Dubai and Sharjah

Habib Kawkar, head of the investment office in the Bank of Oman, feels that it is necessary to have a stock exchange in order to complete the foundations of the country's financial apparatus, and that by means of such a stock exchange it would be possible to transform shares into primary liquidities at any given time. He said: "An attempt was made years ago to establish a stock exchange for minerals and securities in Dubai, and the idea was actually carried out. The stock exchange was active for only 6 months, then it had to stop its operations because it lacked legal backing and support on the part of the government. Why do we not try once more to do this after dealing with these shortcomings?"

Sharjah's Attempt and Individualism!

The story of Sharjah's attempt is told to us by Jawdat al-Barghuthi, head of the shares department in the UAE Commercial Projects Company. He says: "'Abd al-Rahman Bu Khatir, head of the Gulf Financial Center, became very enthusiastic about the idea of establishing a stock exchange in Sharjah. He created a headquarters for the stock exchange at the beginning of the 1980's and provided it with 6 telex lines as well as a number of telephone lines in order to facilitate contact with all areas of the world."

"However, the idea did not get anywhere, and the location intended to be the headquarters of the stock exchange was given over to the Sharjah Cement Company which wanted to expand its headquarters. My belief is that this failure was due to the fact that this step was taken as an individual initiative."

"The lack of a stock exchange in the UAE has tied local commerce in stocks and bonds to Kuwait. Opening prices are set at 9 am in Kuwait, within an hour the prevailing prices become apparent, and at 12 pm the closing prices are known."

"Among the approximately 30 Gulf companies whose shares circulate in the markets, the shares of approximately 15 of them are noticeably active. In fact, the nominal value of a share of one of these companies which was in circulation increased five-fold even though the company was still in the process of being formed!

We know that this is due to speculation and we also know who is benefitting from all of this."

He pointed out some of the excesses which take place in the field of dealing in stocks and bonds, saying: "We notice the establishment of numerous companies, at close time intervals, which engage in similar fields of activity. Before the subscription period for one of the companies ends, in the same emirate another new company puts up its shares for subscription."

"Right now in the country we have seven cement companies existing at the same time. What logic is there in this? Does this not indicate a lack of industrial coordination not only on the national domestic level, but also on the pan-Arab level?"

"There is something else which should be remarked upon. Current civil law prohibits the founders of companies from disposing of the shares of new companies before 1 year has gone by after the subscription date or the publication of the first budget--whichever is the shorter period. But the founders of the company, in order to get around this legal clause, have invented the system of selling through agents. This way they can sell their shares as soon as their price doubles in the markets, and the negative effects of this practice are boundless."

"Therefore, it is necessary for the government to intervene to deal with these shortcomings. This cannot take place unless there is a stock exchange by means of which actions of this sort can be monitored. Also required is the existence of a law which would regulate all of these matters and would stipulate that any action concerning the disposal of stocks which takes place outside of the stock exchange would be considered unauthorized."

[17 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] The Fictitious Investment Companies Are Responsible for the Loss of Primary Liquidities in the Market.

One Bank Earned 15 Million Dirhams Merely by Serving As an Agent for Subscriptions for a New Company!

One Group of Employees Is in Favor of Postponing the Stock Exchange Until the Conditions for Its Success Are Present, and Another Group Favors Establishing It Immediately in Order to Stop the Fleecing!

The purpose of this report has been to call for the establishment of a stock exchange in the UAE. But it so happens that we have touched upon another subject, which is that of the creation and establishment of new companies and the tricks and forms of exploitation involved in them which it has now become necessary to counteract--now that they have become known and revealed to everyone.

The first two articles in this series have contributed toward explaining many aspects of this subject. In this last article in the series we will hear some remarks made by a group of experts and specialists who are very knowledgeable in this field. They will confirm what the others have already said, and will add some new remarks which are of considerable importance.

Sayf al-Gharir, head of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, said that it really is a cause for astonishment when we see in the papers every day announcements concerning the formation of new companies—at close time intervals—which are in similar fields of [economic] activity, without the existence of any controls which regulate this process.

He inquired about the role of the federal government in regulating these matters, saying: "The establishment of any new national company should be subject to the authority of our federal government, which should decide on the soundness of establishing this company and determine whether or not the people of the UAE really need the product or service which this company would be offering." "If matters proceed on the basis of this premise, then we will have shares belonging to actual companies and not to fictitious companies as is presently the case."

"Then the stock exchange will be necessary because it will become the mirror which will reflect the financial status of each company in terms of its strength and weakness. When that day comes, we will have the best possible honest competition between companies which will attempt to prove their financial and administrative capabilities."

The Largest Stock Exchanges in the World

When an expert in finance and investment talks about an important subject such as the stock exchange, what he says is of great value. This is something that we were able to sense when we heard the remarks of 'Arif al-Badayri, the financial expert in the Dubai branch of the Merrill Lynch Company which engages in financial speculation and investment.

Mr al-Badayri began by saying: "First of all, we should define what a stock exchange is."

"A stock exchange is actually nothing more than a meeting place for a group of people who specialize in a given field of activity, whether this field is that of precious minerals, other products, stocks, securities, or anything else connected with these things." "As we know, the largest grain exchange in the world is in Chicago. The largest center for grain distribution is in Rotterdam. The largest exchanges which deal in gold are located in London and in Zurich. The largest tin exchange is in Kuala Lumpur. And the largest exchange for stocks and deferred contractual arrangements has its headquarters in New York."

Factors of Success for the Stock Exchange

"But for the stock exchange to be successful and to accomplish its tasks in the best possible manner, several conditions need to be met. The first of these conditions is that people must have a high degree of awareness concerning the importance of the stock exchange, and a large number of people must conduct business there."

"The second necessary condition is that there be a large number of national corporations which circulate their stocks in the markets."

"However, these companies must be subject to sound financial regulations and laws

concerning the issuing and publication of periodical information concerning their financial status, commercial activities, profits and losses, and other basic information."

"As we know, sound financial principles do not permit the stocks of any company to be put up for sale in the stock exchange until that company has published its first general budgetary report." "But if the company is in the stage of being established, its shares should be put up only for subscription and not for circulation in the stock exchange. This is one of the advantages of having a stock exchange, because any transactions which take place outside of the stock exchange are considered unauthorized."

Stages of Establishing Corporations

Mr al-Badayri went on to say: "Before we speak about the present day disparities which exist, let us define the stages of establishing a corporation."

"Let us assume that some people have agreed among themselves to establish a corporation in order to undertake some given activity in the sector of production or services. The first thing that has to be determined is the amount of capital, and then the capital has to be divided up into equal parts which are then called 'shares.' Then the nominal value of each share has to be determined."

"The next stage is that of determining the number of shares which the founders of the corporation will be subscribing for and the number of shares which will be put up for public subscription." "The next step is to determine the subscription period. This is something which is very important, as we will presently see." "After the expiration of the subscription period, there comes the stage of assigning [the shares]. During this stage the ultimate number of shares which can be granted to each subscriber is determined."

Strange Present-Day Disparities

"Can you imagine the following happening? The nominal value of each share of a company is 1 dirham, and 2 months after the company is established, the value of each share in the market goes up to 5 dirhams, with the result being that the founders of the company earn huge profits. Each of the founders has earned 4 times the amount that he put into the company even before the company has initiated any activity."

"Most such people who establish companies are from abroad and they are undermining the economy of the country in order to serve their own personal interests. They are draining liquidity from the market without contributing any significant economy activity." "And there is another new company, the demand for whose shares put up for subscription was so great that it covered [the original cost of] these shares 400-fold."

"What does all of this mean? The first logical result is that the values of the shares in the market will sharply increase over their nominal values. Of course, those who benefit from this are the people who establish the companies."

"The second result is the accumulation of a large amount of capital during the subscription period, and this capital is invested for the benefit of the company's founders until the process of assigning the shares begins!"

"Enormous profits are earned by means of this method. In fact, one local bank earned 15 billion dirhams simply because it served as an agent for the subscription [for shares] of one of the new companies. And those 15 billion dirhams were only part of the total profit earned in this case."

A Limited Number of Business Transactions Are Taking Place

Ibrahim Ramadan, who is in charge of investments made by the Al-Futtain Group of Companies, is in favor of postponing the stock exchange. He says: "The [limited] number of corporations, and consequently [limited] volume of shares circulating in the market in the country at the present time, do not justify the establishment of a stock exchange in the UAE because only a limited number of business transactions are taking place." He assures us: "The great liquid assets of the Al-Futtain Group of Companies are being invested in the purchase and sale of both domestic and international stocks. This, of course, is taking place through agents."

Mr Ramadan then explains the idea of investing in stocks, saying: "The value of the shares of successful companies increases with time. Thus the objective of purchasing shares is to earn a rate of profit which is greater than the rate of profit earned from fixed deposits in banks. In other words, these shares constitute financial assets which steadily increase in value."

Incorporation of the Foreign Companies in the UAE

Mr Ramadan goes on to say: "When all of the foreign companies in the country have been transformed into corporations, the establishment of a stock exchange will be necessary. The existence of the stock exchange, and everything connected with it, will be very beneficial for investors. It will provide an overall and accurate idea of all of the companies, it will take over the operation of registering the sale and purchase of stocks as well as all other transactions concerning stocks, and it will furnish the actual prices of the shares without any fraud or swindling entering into the picture."

Factors of Success for the Stock Exchange

But how can the stock exchange succeed? Mr Ramadan provides an answer to this question: "The government should pass a law concerning the stock exchange, and the stock exchange should be steered by the government. It should be a condition that the shares of any company should not be registered in the stock exchange until 3 years have gone by since the establishment of the company and after it has begun its [economic] activities as a company. This is because if their shares are allowed to circulate before this time period goes by, the interests of small savers and investors will be harmed. Their savings will be squandered and will flow into the pockets of the large-scale investors without any actual increase being achieved in the country's total production and services."

Right Now It Is Better to Postpone It

'Abd al-Qadir Ijaz, of the Arab General Investments Company "Shu'a'," has a different opinion concerning this matter. He says: "We would welcome a domestic stock exchange in order to curtail the role of foreign stock exchanges in terms of their influence over our financial markets. There is a big difference between being subordinated to these stock exchanges and being exactly like them. No doubt we would be influenced by them, but we could also exercise influence over them at the same time."

"However, I feel that we should postpone the establishment of a stock exchange until the Central Bank stands on firm ground and becomes familiar with all of the forces which control and direct the country's cash reserves. When that happens, we can then establish the stock exchange as one of these forces."

"Postponement of the stock exchange at the present time is also necessary until a study has been made of the markets of the region. We do not know if there is justification for establishing a new stock exchange in addition to the stock exchanges which already exist at the present time in both Bahrain and Kuwait."

"We need to conduct such a study here in order to guarantee the success of our stock exchange in case it is established."

Each Company Is Considered a Stock Exchange

Muhammad Sulayman is in charge of the shares department of the company called the Gulf Financial Center. This company specializes in dealing in domestic and international stocks as well as in precious minerals, and is located in Sharjah. He says: "All of us are wholeheartedly in favor of the idea of establishing the stock exchange. However, in order for the stock exchange to be a success we need to have the government pass a law concerning its establishment and concerning regulation of its activity."

"The stock exchange will also need to have a large number of qualified professional employees and experts in stock exchange matters, and they will require the services of a group of administrators. All of these people will need to have a spacious and neat headquarters area which will be provided with the most modern communications equipment."

"If this takes place, then we will no longer have the chaos which presently characterizes our commerce in stocks. At the present time each company which deals in buying and selling stocks considers itself to be a [type of] stock exchange which exists in its own right."

Periods of Recession and Periods of Increased Activity

Mr Sulayman characterized the periods of recession and periods of increased activity in the stock market, saying: "There is no doubt that feasts, holidays, and summer months are periods of slow activity in the field of commerce in stocks."

"On the other hand, we find the period between October and April to be a period of

considerable activity in the circulation of stocks. This is particularly the case right after the companies publish their [annual] budgets and after they hold their [annual] general meetings when information is given concerning the profits and percentage of each share. Even before these profits are announced, rumors circulate which exaggerate the profits. When such rumors circulate concerning these profits, this causes the market value of the shares of these companies to increase."

The Stock Exchange Means Protection for Investors

"The fact that there is a large number of corporations in our country at the present time has made it necessary to establish a stock exchange in the UAE so that economic activity in the country may increase and so that the buyers and sellers of stocks can meet locally and not have to go to a neighboring Gulf country."

These words were said by Tariq Barakat, who is in charge of the shares department of the Gulf Medical Projects Company in Sharjah, at the beginning of our conversation with him.

He went on to say: "Those people who currently want to deal in stocks run the risk of being fleeced and sometimes are the victims of fraud and of being misled. The establishment of a stock exchange is necessary in order to eliminate these excesses and in order to protect investors."

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CENTRAL BANK ISSUES FIGURES FOR EXPECTED OIL REVENUES

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 14 Aug 81 p 2

[Article: "Oil Revenues Expected to Fall Off by 6.3 Billion Dirhams From Last Year"]

[Text] Economic statistics issued by the Central Bank have forecast that the oil income of the state will exceed 65.8 billion dirhams, or $18 billion, by the end of the year.

This figure is 6.3 billion dirhams under the oil income for last year, which was 72.1 billion dirhams.

This reduction is due to a decrease in the UAE's production from about 1.7 million barrels per day to the current level of around 1.3 million barrels per day because of the glut in the world oil market and a desire to slow the depletion of diminishing oil resources and conserve them for future generations.

The value of oil exports rose during 1980 by 65 percent over the 1979 figure of 49 billion dirhams.

Bank sources indicated that $10 billion of the income is expected to be spent on import operations during the current year. This is because of continued large increases in imports, which have risen by 21 percent since last year with a jump from 26.5 to 33 billion dirhams.

These sources predicted that imports for the current year would rise by 10 percent allowing for the world inflation rate, which varies between 12 and 15 percent.

The bank sources stated that the current year is characterized by the application of a balanced government policy aimed at ensuring a resumption of growth while at the same time skirting the problems of inflation and labor force expansion. In this connection, the sources pointed out that the difference between oil revenues and the expected cost of importation operations will be allocated for investment in domestic economic sectors.

In a related area, the per capita share of the UAE's national income was 95,000 dirhams in 1980. This corresponds to $25,676 per year. The national per capita income is expected to reach 130,000 dirhams by 1985.

These figures were among the economic indicators published in the state's first 5-year plan prepared by the Ministry of Planning. These indicators also revealed that the per capita share of the domestic product reached 107,200 dirhams in 1980.

8391
CSO: 4304/131

REGIONAL MARINE STUDIES CENTER, LOCAL FISHERIES PROJECTS CITED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 4

[Article by Walid al-'Aridah: "50 Million Dirhams for Marine Resources Project in the Gulf; 4 Million Dirhams for Fish Resources Research in the UAE"]

[Text] The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries yesterday sent a letter to the secretariat general of the conference of Arab ministers of agriculture of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula urging the member countries of the conference to respond to the ministries proposals and to the study which it had prepared on establishing a regional center for marine resources research. The ministry set 15 September as the final date to receive the responses of the Arab countries in the area of the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula concerning that center.

Dr Rif'at Mustafa, resources advisor at the ministry, stated that the ministry had, at the instructions of the conference of Arab agricultural ministers in the countries of the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula, prepared the necessary study on establishment of a regional center for animal resources research. Copies were sent to the countries concerned for them to study and express their views so that a start could be made on implementing the project which will serve all area countries in the field of developing and protecting marine wealth, and engaging in scientific experiments on the types of marine life in the waters of the member countries, and on ways to increase their numbers.

The fish resources advisor said that the project which was proposed for the UAE would involve buildings and laboratory facilities as well as a scientific research ship that would cost more than 50 million dirhams, over and above the cost of the buildings and facilities.

Dr Rif'at Mustafa stated that the projects management department in the ministry had earlier this week talked with fish resources management officials about implementation of the project for a regional center for marine research and the positions and anticipated responses of the countries concerned with the project regarding the study that had been prepared in this regard.

During the meeting there was also discussion of the steps needed to implement the project for engaging in agricultural research on forestry for which the ministry appropriated 600,000 dirhams in this year's budget for making a preliminary start on implementing the project on the coastline of Abu Dhabi to establish its usefulness, with it then being possible to extend the experiment to the other coasts of the UAE.

He explained that the goal of this project is to introduce commercially useful types of trees [lumber and lumber by-products] because the successful cultivation of trees on the UAE coastline would serve as protection from erosion and provide a proper environment for the proliferation of various types of marine life, in addition to their importance in feeding marine and land animals and the use of the wood in certain industries.

In this regard, he said that the ministry had submitted a memorandum to the permanent committee on projects requesting permission to begin work on the project in preparation for submitting it to specialized companies before the end of this fiscal year.

Dr Rif'at Mustafa turned to the fish resources research project to be implemented in the UAE, stressing the importance of carrying out this project that is aimed at engaging in research for estimating the commercial reserves of fish in UAE waters as well as possible studies of the factors which affect these fish and of determining age and size at maturity and areas and seasons of plentifulness so that it would be possible to determine the best fishing methods and times for banning fishing so as to protect fish resources and to draft appropriate legislation.

He stated that this project would not be fully completed this year because of lack of funding, estimated at 4 million dirhams. The project will require the ministry to lease a research ship and to attract a number of specialists in fish research. As an alternative, the ministry is making its own efforts to try to use available capabilities to make some studies and surveys of the shallow coastal waters of the UAE.

With regard to the fish breeding project, the fish resources advisor stated that the meeting which had been held recently between projects management officials in the ministry and fish resources management officials had, in addition to the above projects, reviewed the project for fish breeding in the UAE on which work is in its first phase involving research on types of food suitable for freshwater fish, [al-bayyah?] and shrimp with the experiments being run in special pools under controlled conditions.

8389
CSO: 4304/141

END

JPRS 79278

23 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2420

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23 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2420

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BRIEFS

IRANIAN OFFICIAL PRAISES LIBYAN REVOLUTION--Tehran, 11 Oct (JANA)--A member of the Iranian Consultative Council, 'Izzat Sihabi, praised the gigantic achievements recorded in the Jamahiriyah by virtue of the incessant effort of the great al-Fatah revolution. He also expressed his great admiration for the Jamahiriyah's constant support for liberation causes everywhere and its championing of Islam and Muslims. In an interview with our correspondent in Tehran he touched on the assumption of people's authority achieved whereas the Jamahiriyah (state of the masses) now governs itself without interference or control from any side. He went on to express admiration for the immense steps taken by Libya in all vital fields especially in the economic, agricultural, industrial, education and health sectors. He said what he had witnessed during his visit to the Jamahiriyah indicates the extent of sincerity and earnestness in the effort exerted by al-Fatah revolution to enable the Libyan Arab people to reap the fruit of their own resources. [Text] [LD111050 Tripoli JANA in English 0841 GMT 11 Oct 81]

CSO: 4500/12

BRIEFS

GULF MINISTERS APPROVE AID PLAN--Finance ministers from five Gulf countries have approved a $5 billion Arab Development Decade Plan to reduce differences in living standards between rich and poor countries in the Arab world. The plan will place special emphasis on aid to six Arab countries--North and South Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, Mauritania and Djibouti--which figure on the list of the world's 31 least developed countries drawn up by the UN. The finance ministers of Iraq, Kuwait, Qata, Saudi Arabia and the UAE agreed to fund the plan with $5 billion for the first five years at a meeting in Kuwait on September 25. The Arab Development Decade springs from a decision taken by Arab heads of state at their summit meeting in Amman in 1980. In addition to the goal of narrowing differences in living standards, the plan also will seek to achieve self-sufficiency in food for Gulf countries and to reduce the dependence of these countries on non-Arab workers. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 7]

CSO: 4400/17

CAPTURED REBEL APPEARS ON TELEVISION

LD110938 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0509 GMT 11 Oct 81

[Text] Kabul, 10 Oct (BAKHTAR)--Abdul Latif, a recently captured counterrevolutionary element, in a television interview said: I was appointed as a member at the administration section of the attorney office in 1974 and continued working here until 1978. In the middle of 1978 Abdul Raof, a representative of the so-called Jamiat Party in Herat, told me that Islam was in danger and that you should fulfill your obligation. Thus I became a member of the so-called Jamiat Islami Party in 1978.

Answering a question regarding the duties he was charged to carry out, he said: From 1978 to 1980 I was not given any duty to perform but in the middle of 1980 I was assigned to go to Iran and I went to Iran.

Answering another question, he said: I have travelled to Iran and Pakistan and the only reason behind my travel abroad was the pressures and threats inflicted upon me by the miscreants.

Regarding his stay in Tehran, he replied: I worked for about a year for the so-called Cultural Committee of the Rebels Party in Tehran. My job was to register the names of those miscreants who were killed in Afghanistan. Their lists were given to me by another person. Then I gave the listed names to the Cultural Committee for publication.

Answering another question, he explained that the financial assistance was given by the Arab countries including Egypt and Saudi Arabia. A small portion of this aid was distributed to the counterrevolutionary elements of Afghanistan and a larger portion of it was given to the anti-Khomeyni forces of Iran to fight against the Khomeyni state for preventing the Islamic revolution of Iran in Saudi Arabia.

Abdul Latif added that military training is given to Afghan miscreants by Americans, Chinese and Egyptians but as I had a leg problem I have not received military training but I have followed a 25-day photography course which was taught by Americans who could talk in Pashto and Dari.

Later I was sent to Afghanistan. After a number of photographies, I was charged to take photos of an operation which was going to take place in Herat--Torghundi

Road. When I went there I observed there were two barrels of petrol with a number of plastic ribbons. The miscreants there instructed me that when the caravan traverses Herat-Torghondi distance we set the caravan on fire by petrol and I was charged to take pictures of the scene. It was during this operation when I was caught by the armed forces.

I would have sent the pictures to Ziai office in Tehran, Iran, if I was not captured.

Answering another question concerning the activities of the counterrevolutionary elements of Afghanistan against the popular state of Afghanistan, he expounded: While I was in Iran and Pakistan, the counterrevolutionary elements intimidated me that if I went to Afghanistan and was caught, the government of Afghanistan will torture and kill me. But when I came to Afghanistan I witnessed the subversive actions of the miscreants instead. The ruffians set the mosques, harvests, and the schools on fire, killed the innocent people and destroyed the bridges. I suffered very much when I observed the subversive actions carried out by them. Finally, I was caught by the armed forces. However, I have been treated so well by the DRA armed forces and by my interrogation officers. Such a humane treatment persuaded me to expose the crimes of the counterrevolutionaries to the audience of radio and television of Afghanistan.

CSO: 4600/52

SCHOLAR ON REBEL-ARMY RELATIONS

BK150334 Hong Kong AFP in English 0310 GMT 15 Oct 81

[Text] Islamabad, 15 Oct (AFP)--Skirmishes are becoming infrequent between Afghan rebels and the communist regime's troops, who are passive in many districts out of complicity with the rebels, it was reported here today.

A French university expert on Afghanistan who spent 2 months with the Mujahedeen saw much evidence of tacit understandings between Afghan soldiers and rebels. There were even instances of collaboration.

The expert, Oliver Roy, 32, said the rebels control all the rural area: "Army outposts isolated in hostile villages survive by staying very discreet. And the rebels prefer to ignore the soldiers cloistered in their outposts rather than attack them, which would draw Soviet bombardment of the villages in reprisal.

"Twice during my journey, my guides said: 'Do not approach that building. It is an army post. It is better that the soldiers should not know a foreigner is here.'"

Roy, who speaks Dari (a Persian dialect) fluently, asked a man in one village if he had taken part in an attack on an Afghan fort in Mangarhar Province, which borders on Afghanistan. [As received] Roy had heard the explosions during that attack.

The man answered that he was the deputy commander of that fort and that the attack was a phony one staged by rebels to make two British news correspondents think the Mujahedeen were eager to fight.

The officer, who was visiting his family on furlough, said the false battle also was an excuse to justify the disappearance of munitions, which the garrison had given to the Mujahedeen.

The Frenchman approached as close as 30 kilometers (20 miles) to Kabul, the capital, in its northern suburbs. He stayed 4 days in a village sheltering several urban guerrilla commando groups belonging to different rebel organizations.

"They said the soldiers themselves come to tell the names and addresses of communist officers to be ambushed, the [illegible] they take to go home, and the time they start home," Mr Roy said. "A six-man commando group told me they had executed four party members and carried out a night attack on a Kabul winery during which nine people were killed."

In Panshir valley, 60 kilometers (40 miles) north of Kabul, the resistance is especially well organized, Mr Roy said. When army officers came there on home leave, the Mujahedeen explained to him: "We want the soldiers to desert to bring us weapons, but we prefer to have their officers stay at their posts to spy for us."

Two French doctors running a rebel hospital in Panshir valley told Mr Roy that Masood, the chief of the Mujahedeen, warned them correctly at the start of September what day and time the hospital would be bombarded.

The Soviet Army is relatively passive too, except during big, carefully-planned antirebel drives, he said: "I crossed the Kabul River while Soviet helicopters were flying over it, and crossed the strategic road of Salang pass 30 metres from a Soviet jeep. Soviet outposts unleash artillery barrages when they are harrassed at night, but they do not try to control the terrain during the day."

An exception occurred when thousands of Soviet soldiers against Panshir valley. [As received] Helicopters landed, many of them on the ridges overlooking the valley.

"That tactic was much more effective than trying to force passage with tanks in the valley bottom. The Mujahedeen were in difficulty. But just as the resistance fighters were about to retreat, the Russians turned back," Mr Roy said.

The Mujahedeen said the Russians pulled out because five of the senior officers in command were in one of two helicopters that were shot down.

"I saw the wrecks of the helicopters. They were shot down by heavy machinegun fire.

"The Panshir offensive killed about 50 resistance fighters and more than twice as many civilians. But the only dead I saw myself," Mr Roy concluded, "were an executed police official who belonged to the Parcham (one of two communist factions) and two victims of a clash between three resistance groups not far from Kabul."

CSO: 4600/52

BRIEFS

KARMAL, KESHTMAND-U.S. JOURNALIST MEETINGS--Kabul, 11 Oct (BAKHTAR)--Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the Central Committee of the PDPA and president of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA received Strobe Talbott, the correspondent of TIME MAGAZINE, printed in the United States, at the headquarters of the Revolutionary Council today. Babrak Karmal answered the questions put by Strobe Talbott in an atmosphere of frankness and sincerity. The American correspondent later held separate meetings with Soltan 'Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DRA and Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost. [Text] [Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0503 GMT 12 Oct 81]

VISIT TO CSSR--Kabul, 11 Oct (BAKHTAR)--Sarwar Mangal, deputy minister of higher and vocational education, leading a DRA delegation, left today for an official visit to an observation tour of Czechoslovakia. [Text] [Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0445 GMT 12 Oct 81]

RESTORATION OF MOSQUES--Kabul, 11 Oct (BAKHTAR)--Work on the programme of restoration and repair of historical and important mosques at state's expense is continuing in full swing in the DRA. Repair and resotring the decoration of the Congregational Chopforoshi mosque has recently begun in Kabul. Similar kind of work in two other congregational mosques, namely Pulikhishti, Shahi Dohamshira is continuing, the Islamic Affairs Department reported. [Text] [Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0455 GMT 12 Oct 81]

AMBASSADOR TO GDR--Kabul, 12 Oct (BAKHTAR)--Mohammad Shafi, deputy chairman of the Commission of International Relations of the PDPA, is accredited as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the DRA in GDR by the government of the German Democratic Republic. Born in 1947, the new Afghan ambassador is a graduate of the Technical Teachers Training Institute in Kabul. He completed higher education in the Federal Republic of Germany. [Text] [LD140530 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0442 GMT 13 Oct 81]

LAND REFORM MEETING--Kabul, 13 Oct (BAKHTAR)--A meeting of the senior officers and representatives of the ministries of agriculture and land reforms, interior, national defence, transport, Agricultural Development Bank was held under the chairmanship of Fazil Rahim Mohmand, minister of agriculture and land reforms, regarding the implementation of the third phase of the operational plan of the democratic land reform of the DRA here today. The issues discussed in the meeting were the organization of farmers and landowners in the agricultural cooperatives,

provision of material and technical aid and other necessary facilities to them and the adoption of security measures for the implementation of the said plan. The implementation of the third phase of the operational plan will go into effect on 21 March 1982. [Text] [LD150616 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0438 GMT 14 Oct 81]

EDUCATION DELEGATION TO GDR--Kabul, 14 Oct (BAKHTAR)--An Afghan delegation led by Dr F.M. Yaqubi, minister of education of the DRA, left for Berlin, GDR, to attend the international conference of ministers of education to be held there shortly. [Text] [LD150616 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0432 GMT 15 Oct 81]

JOURNALISTS DELEGATION TO USSR--Kabul, 14 Oct (BAKHTAR)—Dr Haidar Masoiod, chairman of the Central Council of the Union of Journalists of the DRA and deputy minister of information and culture, left for Moscow today. He will head the Afghan delegation to the ninth congress of the unions of journalists to be held in Moscow. [Text] [LD150616 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0435 GMT 15 Oct 81]

CSO: 4600/52

ROLES OF RULING, OPPOSITION PARTIES ANALYZED

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2766, 15 Jun 81 pp 22-26

[Article by 'Abd-al-Sattar Tawilah: "Democratic Practice and the Opposition"]

[Text] Those who were close to the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir used to say that when evaluating the power of his enemies, he used to multiply their real power by 10 and then begin to confront them on that basis.

This course naturally led to disasters the least of which was the terror that prevailed over political life for many years.

I must admit quite frankly that because of the outcry that has been raised in recent weeks about partisan opposition, many people thought that this opposition was very close or about to come to power. Therefore, it was normal that intense campaigns be focused against it to weaken public opinion support for the opposition so it would not be able to take away a majority of seats in the parliament from the ruling party.

But any political observer or even average citizen who is politically quite illiterate can discover quite easily that the coming of the opposition to power is merely muddled wishful thinking because the existing government is firm, strong and supported by the masses.

The Grudges of Totalitarianism

This major outcry over the opposition may stem from the fact that our experience with parties is very recent, following an experience with a total dictatorship that lasted for about 20 years. This undoubtedly left in the heart of everyone who holds an official position in this country the latent notion that the other opinion and criticism were strange matters, if not basically unacceptable.

There is also no doubt that some of those who have another opinion stepped out of line when they expressed their opinions in a manner which affirmed that they did not understand the novelty and the circumstances of the [democratic] experience which requires that the matter [of political opposition] be pursued gradually and slowly.

We will attempt in this discussion, in which we initiate a dialogue about democratic practice and the opposition, to deal quite candidly with the questions from various angles. Nothing is more deserving of such candor than a discussion of this question.

The Majority Party

The first perspective is that of the ruling party's attitude toward the opposition.

We indicated at the beginning of the discussion that this party exaggerates and magnifies the power of the opposition. This exaggeration entails that numerous conditions and variables in our political life have been ignored since May 1971.

The first of these variables lies in the fact that we began following the method of economic freedom. Because numerous social contradictions are created by economic freedom, [a free economy] requires that there be political freedom. This requires that the social contradictions be reconciled and overcome by a democratic method.

The justification for restricting political freedom in 'Abd-al-Nasir's age was the totalitarian economy which required that there be one political organization, one opinion and one decision.

Despite the fact that the most economically totalitarian countries in the world, which are the communist countries, are beginning to reject this theory--and evidence for this is what is happening now in Poland and the fact that the principles of Euro-communism are spreading and flourishing and calling for the multiplicity of parties and opinions in a socialist regime itself--some Third World countries are still adhering to this theory. That is, they are adhering to the worst in the socialist regimes.

Opposition is inevitable. We can almost say that it is an inborn phenomenon that more closely resembles man's essential instincts. People's minds are not made of the same metal; nor do they have the same cellular makeup. People do not live in the same environment whose reality is similarly reflected on these cells so as to create the same reaction.

Throughout history man's battles have affirmed the need to recognize the truth about this dispute and difference of opinion. Then man discovered this curious innovation that is called democracy. Democracy allows opinions to play a role and to be expressed so that the course of progress in human life can be pushed forward.

People discovered that if the other opinion is suppressed and persecuted, an explosion, no matter how long it takes, is inevitable.

The experiences of what happened and what is happening in Syria, South Korea, Cambodia and Poland, etc. are in front of us.

The leaders of the revolution of 23 July 1952 ignored these facts until matters were restored to their normal course in May 1971 when our plan to pursue the course of democracy [was begun]. That plan culminated in making it possible for multiple parties [to exist].

As the October Paper stated, a party is the political expression of the interests of a class or group of citizens.

It is not a condition that these interests be consistent with those of other groups. In fact, it is normal that they differ and that every group determine the scope and the boundaries of this difference. At the same time all the other groups reveal the extremes or the precision of these boundaries.

The Opposition's Right To Rule

It is the right of every political party to try to come to power because that is the means through which it can put its program into practice. Coming to power is legitimate and quite common. Every party in the world strives to achieve this goal. The only thing that is forbidden in the pursuit of power is the use of illegal methods and especially the use of force.

Therefore all people were surprised, especially outside Egypt, by the fact that a writer [who is a member] of the National Democratic party [NDP] would attack in writing the president of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping party [NPUG] because he declared publicly at a press conference that his party was seeking power.

It is the right of the opposition to seek power, and it is the right of the ruling party to hold on to that power and to prevent the opposition from attaining it by all legitimate means.

On the other hand people are surprised by the constant discussion about the limits of the opposition as seen by the ruling party. One time the discussion is about the need for an honest opposition; [another time] it is about a constructive opposition or such and such methods.

It is naturally the right of every party to criticize the methods of its adversaries and even to reveal the opposition's methods and whether or not they are destructive or dishonest, etc.

But it is surprising that the ruling party's majority has the strongest means of publishing and influencing public opinion, whereas the opposition has no more than two poor newspapers.

I am saying that despite this fact and despite the fact that the ruling party is using its capabilities to confront the opposition and to maintain its campaign against it, the ruling party sometimes says that the opposition is no more than 20 individuals. Other times it says the opposition [consists of] a small number of professional politicians, etc.

The question that comes to the mind of the average man is this: Why this uproar and why this anxiety over 20 persons or a small number of professionals?

Actually, this course of action exaggerates the value of the opposition and contributes to it free publicity and influence. This is exactly what happened with regard to the Egyptian journalists who are working abroad. Their role was exaggerated despite their lack of influence in the country. Briefly, this course of action makes heroes of the opponents of the regime.

Reproaches and Threats

The matter often goes as far as demonstrations of benevolence. There has been much discussion about not opening the detention camps, as though this were a hint that they would be reopened even though the public had rallied in May 1971 around President Anwar al-Sadat because he had proclaimed the slogan of democracy whose principal feature then was the irrevocable closing of the detention camps. This was followed by greater and more far-reaching steps that culminated in the victory of October 1973 and then with the soon to be achieved liberation of our national soil.

These demonstrations of benevolence go as far as the constant emphasis on the fact that it was the Democratic party that played a principal role in establishing one of the opposition parties.

All right. Even if this were so, who said that even a son had to abide by the course [of action] and the thinking of his father when he comes of age?

When al-Sadat closed the detention camps, he did not close them so that those who had been arrested would sing his praises. Al-Sadat closed those camps so that those who had been detained could say what they had to say without fear. The former ruler did not imprison those who sang his praises. The detention camps were usually for those who insisted on their right to say what they wanted to say.

It is also conceivable that any ruler gives a group or a party the right to express itself. Such expression need not necessarily be confined to supporting the ruler. If that were not so, the fact that the group of the party gained the right to express itself is merely a fantasy.

Partisan Methods

I was recently in France during the presidential elelctions, and I saw and heard what would make the parties in Egypt appear to be using the methods of very "innocent virgins" compared to what is happening in Europe.

In Italy deputies strike each other under the dome of parliament, and no one tells them this is shameful.

In Belgium I saw the opposition parties calling for the separation of Flanders from the motherland and the formation of a federal state.

Parties in the United States, in Britain, France, Italy, Germany and in all the countries of western Europe whose democratic systems are praised by most writers of the Democratic National Party, especially in the context of comparing them with the eastern countries, exchange even personal accusations and accusations that have to do with relationships with women.

Despite this partisan struggle in every country that has multiple parties, whose "shameful" limits as we know them in Egypt are exceeded by leagues and miles, these regimes are stable, and a ruling party may rule with a one percent or a two percent majority without anxiety or tension.

We cannot forget the appearance of Willy Brandt, the chancellor of West Germany, when he addressed a meeting in West Berlin a few years ago. A young woman ran toward him, threw a bottle of ink at him and called him the worst names.

Brandt took off his coat and wiped his shirt with the sleeve of the coat. He then handed the coat to one of his aides who was standing nearby. Meanwhile the police arrested the young woman as she was trying to get away. She continued insulting Brandt while he went on with his speech. The young woman was sentenced to 6 months in jail.

The ruling Socialist Democratic party was not jolted; nor was the regime shaken. This is because undue concern with the errors of democratic practice magnifies these errors and places obstacles on the road of democratic practice because it places more value on these errors they they deserve.

Elections by List

As we discuss the question of the method that is used by the opposition in an attempt to come to an agreement over some of the formulas and practices [that are in use], we must try to show the opposition's thinking and reactions to some of the legislation which it finds is restricting its activity and [its ability] to represent the people who support it, notwithstanding of their limited number.

An example of this is the Elections by List Law with absolute majority. The system of voting for an individual gives each party an opportunity to have a number of its members win seats in the various kinds of parliamentary councils. But the countries that have an older tradition of democracy discovered a method that was more expressive of democracy. That method is the system of election by list with proportional representation. This system does not waste any votes that are won by any party, and thus the parliamentary council is truly representative of all the political forces and movements in the nation.

Suddenly, however, the Democratic party called for the introduction of a proportional representation system with absolute majority. This meant that 49.9 percent of the electorate's votes in any area will equal zero.

This makes the opposition feel that it is being besieged, especially in the municipal councils where matters of daily life in the administrative districts, in the small towns and in the villages are discussed. Because experience has shown that in areas remote from the capital numerous deviations occur that are covered up by family solidarity and tribal interests, the presence of the opposition becomes necessary in the interests of the central government in Cairo. Newspapers have published much about operations to expose some members of these councils for their deviations. The newspapers even published stories about the fact that these councils expel members of the opposition to get rid of them.

Isn't the opposition right in imagining, while it feels that it is being strangled, that the law gave comfort to these councils once and for all by preventing the opposition from attaining positions on these councils in the first place?

What about the Opposition?

If we have talked so frankly about the ruling majority party, we will talk just as frankly about the opposition.

It seems obvious that the opposition is not aware of the conditions under which democracy in Egypt is being practiced and of the fact that the experience is novel. This means that there are strong opponents lying in wait for Egypt, hoping that the country will turn into a gloomy darkness of dictatorship and totalitarianism.

Had the opposition realized this, it would have utilized different methods that would be incompatible with provocation and the stirring up of hostilities.

The opposition has conducted its opposition in the style of "oppose and run." This course has so far made it incapable of offering any considered and earnest solutions to our problems and to the daily problems of our masses. The opposition agitates only by exposing the negative aspects and the flaws [of the regime].

I have not yet read by any one of the opposition parties a simple study of the problems of high prices, transportation, telephones, housing and food security. There has been only one good study of one of these problems by the Grouping party. That was a study of the housing problem by Dr Milad Hanna.

I did not see a single opposition party contact the public directly to help the people solve their daily problems such as eradicating illiteracy or cleaning up city quarters or anything.

The propaganda and agitation on problems in general are desirable, but it is also desirable that the opposition go to the public to help the people solve their daily problems.

'Abd-al-Nasir's regime struck down all the freedoms, even the freedom to form a society for burying the dead, without police permission and inquiries. But al-Sadat opened the door to every popular action taken in the interests of people in societies and various social organizations.

In fact 'Abd-al-Nasir did not establish a political party on purpose. This means that the field was open for the forces that wanted to assail the revolution and its gains.

One cannot be but truly surprised and bewildered at how Anwar al-Sadat was able to preserve the accomplishments of the July revolution without establishing this party until a short time ago: the public sector, the 50 percent [representation for] workers and farmers; the gains of workers; and free education. In fact, al-Sadat added to these gains new domestic ones such as pensions and insurance coverage for every Egyptian. He increased minimum wages, and he expanded the regional universities, that is, expanded free education. And there are other accomplishments which the opposition shows no interest in supporting.

It is the function of the opposition to support as well as criticize. This would make it gain the respect of the public because it makes it appear to be objective and honest.

An Alternative for the Regime?

One of the opposition parties, the Grouping party, made a grave political mistake in early 1977. Its proclaimed positions in what was then its newspaper, AL-AHALI, made it seem that the Grouping party was presenting itself as an alternative to the existing national regime as a whole.

This was despite the fact that when the political parties were formed, it was known that the system was more like a national front umbrella with the parties differing and arguing with each other in the context of [expressing] the different opinions of different national forces.

The president of that party, Khalid Muhi al-Din stated several times on the pages of ROSE AL-YUSUF that his party was part of the regime and that a discussion of that question would be futile and wasteful.

However, the conduct and the policy pursued by the party afterwards was in most cases at variance with [Mr Muhi al-Din's assertions], and he insisted on refusing to answer the question we put to him several times.

"Are you the other opinion within the regime, or are you the alternative to the regime?"

It is the right of any political party to consider itself anything it wishes--an alternative to any regime, for example--provided that this party bear the responsibility for this consideration in accordance with certain historical circumstances.

Isolation from the Masses

The opposition, and I am referring specifically to the leftist party, committed a serious political error when it opposed the initiative in November 1977. This brought upon it a more serious political loss from the standpoint of the public, and it isolated it from the public. Being isolated from the public makes it easier to strike any party or at least to cut it down to size.

It was not understood why the initiative was being opposed. That initiative meant a flexible, intelligent application of the principle of negotiating with the enemy. It affected world public opinion and had been accepted by the whole world and by 'Abd-al-Nasir. The left lost [here] a golden opportunity to patch up the breach with the national regime that had occurred in January 1977.

The Socialist Labor party committed another political error when it announced its opposition to the Camp David accords after having had supported them earlier.

We do not understand the significance of opposing the agreement. Does that opposition mean having the agreement abolished as though nothing had happened, along with the ensuing return of Sinai by Israel or Israel halting its evacuation of the rest of the occupied part of Sinai?

Does the party's opposition to the agreement mean that we abrogate what we have been able to achieve in the way of establishing autonomy for the Palestinian people? This is what Israel calls a nameless Palestinian state, and it has therefore dragged its feet in implementing its articles.

The Camp David accords have so far achieved [the following]:

--The evacuation of Sinai.

--The achievement of peace between Egypt and Israel.

--The placement of the Palestinian question at the forefront of the world's attention.

We can understand statements by the Labor party and by other parties that in view of Israel's intransigence in implementing the agreement, it is essential that an international conference with new parties be convened so as to force Israel to yield to the national hopes of the Palestinian people and withdraw from the Golan. And we can understand statements about the agreement achieving this and failing to achieve that, as Giscard d'Estaing, the former president of France used to say.

But what can sheer opposition to the agreement possibly mean?

This erroneous posture on the part of the Labor party provided the opportunity for attacking it and for isolating it from the masses.

Provocation and Mrs Jihan

Some opposition parties sometimes resort to provocation. An example of such provocation is an article by Dr Hilmi Murad which touched upon the activities of Mrs Jihan al-Sadat.

A female Egyptian pilot called Mrs Lutfiyah realized publicity for Egypt in the thirties merely because she was the first Egyptian female to fly an airplane. Mrs Jihan al-Sadat realized the greatest publicity possible for Egyptian women and their status and development in public life in Egypt, thanks to her constant activities in all the corners of the world where she defends Egypt, the rights of Egypt and the progress of its people. She has earned the respect and support of all those who heard and saw her. This respect is not hers alone, but it is also for all the Egyptian people.

This Egyptian woman who has achieved everything that a woman anywhere can aspire to achieve, having her husband become the president, could have taken it easy and [sat back to] enjoy a life of prosperity and contentment.

But she works night and day with cancer patients in the fields of public service. She is the one who lifted from her husband and from all of Egypt the burden of looking after the disabled veterans of the war; she earned the encouragement and support of agencies and countries; and she built a model complex for them.

Is not this the responsibility of the people of Egypt for whom those heroes made their sacrifice?

Who shouldered the responsibility for all Egypt in this regard? Was it not Mrs Jihan al-Sadat?

But she does not stop with that; instead, she chairs a local council for al-Minufiyah. Farmers, workers and civil servants have won many projects, and these were completed thanks to her chairing this council.

She also looks after cancer patients by presiding over the Cancer Society. In fact, her activities have extended to an interest in health insurance. Who benefits from health insurance? Isn't it the workers of Shubra al-Khaymah, al-Mahallah and the National Spinning [Company], etc.?

She also sponsors the Students' Fund, which brought about a project for providing students with clothing at the lowest prices.

In other words, Mrs Jihan al-Sadat takes part in significant work in a country where societies and fanatic organizations are fighting to put women back behind the walls of the harem and the chains of the veil.

When the president's wife goes out and makes a public contribution to daily life, is not this a contribution that pushes the women's liberation movement forward? With her support and her contribution gains in the area of personal status have actually been achieved.

Is not this the positive aspect that we must focus on, instead of talking provocatively about the constitutional status of the president's wife?

All the active wives of presidents work usually in the field of public affairs.

These are some of the mistakes that the opposition makes when it is carrying out its work. And now, what is to be done?

We must turn to establishing a general dialogue in which the question of the opposition would be proposed as a public question that is of interest to public opinion in our country.

National Reconciliation

We have been calling for this dialogue for the past 5 years. At times this goal was almost achieved, but, unfortunately, this did not happen.

If the president of the National Democratic party, who is also the president of the country, were to meet with the presidents of the parties and to discuss the situation with them, it is certain that he will be able to reconcile many of the differences and bring about an agreement over the method of dealing with the remaining points.

We must tolerate the opposition. The trend toward democracy in the world now is strong, even in the totalitarian countries.

China put Mao Zedong's wife on public trial for violating democracy.

In Poland the government and the communist party yielded to the workers' demands to establish democracy in political life for the first time.

In Tunisia a decision was made to establish a multiple party system. This has also taken place in Ghana. Egypt is the only country that has democracy. Let us light more candles for it.

As long as the opposition parties do not use or advocate the use of force in order to impose their point of view, let them exercise their right and let the government respond to them.

Let the opposition parties deal with the problems of society in a constructive manner in the sense of offering solutions and studies. Earning popular support for these solutions would make them more worthy of protection.

Let the opposition make a clear distinction between the national regime and the government in its criticism so that there would be no confusion. Let it realize the dimensions of the historic period in which we are living.

Let us stop using the methods of violence and personal attacks. This is not useful and causes considerable damage.

But as we said before, let there be a dialogue on all levels, all the way to the top. It is from here that we begin to strengthen democracy and to strengthen the existing national regime.

8592
CSO: 4504/73

MAJLIS SPEAKER LAUDS KHOMEYNI'S REPLY TO KHALID

GF110907 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0554 GMT 11 Oct 81

[Speech by Majlis Speaker Hojjat al-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani during live relay of Majlis session in Tehran on 11 October 1981]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate, the brother and sister deputies all heard our esteemed leader's reply to the Saudi king's letter last night. The text of the imam's letter and his forceful remarks reached great heights.

The meaning of leadership is completely embodied in our glorious leader. God has completed his holy gift to these oppressed people in this respect. Khalid attempted to make allegations in his letter and tried to depict events in Mecca as something contrary to the spirit of the Haj and worship. He talked about narcotics and attempted to distort the truth by altering the slogans of the Iranian Muslims. He tried to appear innocent. His letter also shows the inability of Saudi leaders to resolve their problems and their need to resort to asking our leader for help.

The imam's reply showed that our leader is the deputy of the imam of the ages. Everything that needs to be said to the world of Islam today was included in the imam's reply. He showed that the Haj has deviated from its true path. If we were faced with a true Haj in the Islamic sense then we would not need AWACS and other things. The imam showed the road to Jerusalem from Ka'ba and the holy grand mosque. He also condemned the anti-Islamic actions being carried out around God's shrine in the name of Islam. The innocence of the Iranian pilgrims, who carried Islam's message under dangerous circumstances, was defended very well. The imam's leadership and his greatness also surfaced when, in a part referring to his changing the slogans and lies, he remained silent since replying would have seemed like self-defense. In his message, King Khalid said the Iranian pilgrims had chanted "God is great, Khomeyni is God" or "God is one and Khomeyni is one." All Muslims know that our chant and slogan is "God is great and Khomeyni is the leader" and "God is one and Khomeyni a (?messenger)." Khalid changed the word to "one" and said that the pilgrims had said "Khomeyni is one" in an attempt to make Muslims think that they are equating God with the imam.

If the Guidance Ministry and the Foreign Ministry carry out their duties as spokesmen on the subject of this letter [Khomeyni's letter], then the direction of

movement by Muslims, especially during Haj and at a time when Saudi officials have made it a subject of the day, will become clear. This shows that Saudi stompers [chakmeh-pushan] who--in the name of defending the holy Haj--entered the holy mosque and made arrests and beat people up are the criminals. The Muslims following the way of Isma'il--which has been specifically designed for such purposes--in the house of God and beside the Hajar al-Aswad [black stone in Ka'ba] chanted "Death to America and Israel." They are the true faithful and are not guilty. The Saudi police are the guilty party and are not defending worship. Anyway, I only wanted to say these few words because of the pride I feel and the feelings that the [word indistinct] letter by the imam created in me.

CSO: 4600/25

'NVOI' CRITICIZES DISREGARD FOR CONSTITUTION

TA121233 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1730 GMT 11 Oct 81

[Unattributed commentary: "The People's Confidence Should Be Gained in Practice"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: Several days ago, Mr Musavi Ardebili, the revolution's prosecutor general, during an interview, addressing misled individuals who have made blind terrorism as their method of action, declared: If these individuals desist from the wrong, counterrevolutionary and antipeople method they will be able to participate in political activities the same as all nonreligious political organizations and parties. It should be stated that these remarks by the revolution's prosecutor general have to some extent caused the alleviation of the worries and aroused the hope of the true forces of the revolution.

Inviting misled and deceived individuals to desist from terrorist and subversive activities against the system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and giving them an official promise that should they abandon this condemned method they will enjoy the possibility of political activity as well, has aroused this hope among the true forces of the revolution and the parties and organizations committed to the revolution that possibly government figures and authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran have finally decided to pay heed to Imam Khomeyni's repeated warnings regarding misled and deceived individuals, and instead of adopting a vengeful attitude they will adopt a policy of guidance and persuasion.

Addressing judges of the revolution courts sometime ago, Imam Khomeyni said: I warn all courts that this mischief should not cause them to lose control and act in excess of the law of Islam. The martyrdom of dear ones should not cause the courts to adopt more severe measures than necessary. Some time has passed since this just warning by Imam Khomeyni, following his previous repeated warnings, and the explicit promise by the revolution's prosecutor general. As a rule, the country's judicial authorities and officials of the Islamic Republic should by now have taken steps toward implementing the explicit promise of the revolution's prosecutor general in accordance with the imam's warning and guidance, but unfortunately they have not done so. It is natural that with the continuation of the situation as before, gaining the confidence of enthusiastic and patriotic youth fallen into the trap of the liberals, the Savakists and remnants of the former regime, seems difficult.

You be the judge: Under conditions in which there is the continuation of the obvious violation of many of the constitution's principles, including the section pertaining to the rights of the people, how can a misled and deceved individual trust the promise made by the revolution's prosecutor general? It has been more than 1 year now, despite the explicit principles of the constitution, that the offices of some of the true revolutionary parties have been under the occupation of irresponsible individuals and Savakists who have changed color. During this period, despite the guidelines of Imam Khomeyni, the decree by the Supreme Judicial Council, the 10-article statement by the revolution's prosecutor general and the principles of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, not even the slightest step has been taken to expel the clubwielders and the Savakists from the offices of the true revolutionary parties. This fact by itself, willingly or unwilling, causes the following question to be asked by every individual: Under conditions in which officials of the Islamic authority, contrary to the four above-mentioned legal sources, and foremost of all the country's constitution, are not ready to free the offices of the parties and an organization which under the most difficult conditions sincerely defended and are defending the revolution and its gains and the independence and freedom of dear Iran, how can one trust the promises of the prosecutor general?

It is here that the true forces of the revolution are rightly saying that the peopel's confidence should be gained in practice. The history of human society, from the slavery period until now, teaches us that neither assassination and murder, nor execution and imprisonment, whatever the intensity of their scope, cannot destroy an opinion stored in the brains. Therefore, simultaneously with decisiveness against mercenary and counterrevolutionary elements, it is only through guidance and persuasion that one can replace the wrong opinions of misled and inexperienced individuals with correct views.

Some time ago, in connection with the extensive wave of blind terrorism, planting of bombs and subversion on the one hand, and execution and imprisonment on the other, one of the revolutionary parties, in a statement, in order to bring back calm based on law and social justice in society, presented the following proposals to the Islamic authorities:

1. Issue of execution verdicts against all members and followers of leftist organizations who did not participate directly in assassinations, inciting people to revolt, planting bombs and the subversions that had taken place, should be halted.

2. Such individuals should be assured by the revolution's prosecutor general that should they, in the future as well, not participate in the aforementioned crimes, they will not be sentenced to death; and if they distance themselves from terrorist and subversive activities, and condemn such activities, they will be able to participate in legal political activity whithin the framework of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

3. The 10-article statement by the revolution's prosecutor general in connection with the freedom of activity of political parties and groups who respect the constitution should be implemented without any alteration.

It is said in this statement that we are confident that such important political measures will separate a major section of those misled from the professional adventure-seekers who cannot be reformed and also from the Savakists, monarchists and professional criminals, and will sincerely bring them back to a normal, legal political life without fear and alarm from death and without resorting to lies and tricks.

Yes, it is only through such a course that the Islamic authorities and the revolution's prosecutor general can gain the confidence of the people, particularly of deceived individuals fallen into the trap of the liberals, monarchists, the American Maoists and the great Satan. By returning calm based on law and social justice, the Islamic authorities and the revolution's prosecutor general can maintain the continuity and broadening of the popular and anti-imperialist revolution and foil all the plots of the great Satan and its Iranian agents and mercenaries.

CSO: 4600/25

REACTION TO AL-SADAT ASSASSINATION 13 OCTOBER

GF[illegible]936 [Editorial Report] Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian at 1330 GMT, Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian at 1500 GMT and Mashhad Domestic Service in Persian at 1430 GMT on 13 October did not report or comment on events in Egypt in the wake of President al-Sadat's assassination.

Tehran International Service in Urdu at 1415 GMT on 13 October carried news items on Egypt including a message from an Islamic student association to Egyptian students asking them "to arise against despotism." Another news item said that "Husni Mubarak was being imposed on the people of Egypt" and that the U.S. Government was to supply arms to Egypt. In its press review, the radio cited the newspapers SOBH-E AZADEGAN and JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI as publsihing reports on the arrests of Egyptain army officers.

Azhedan International Service in Persian at 1530 GMT on 13 October broadcast a detailed item on the Egyptian situation and the announcement by the Egyptian interior minister than anyone creating disturbances would be severely dealt with. The radio also noted that the police had orders to shoot on sight anyone who behaved suspiciously. The station also reported that pictures of five rebels presumed to have been responsible for the Asyut riots are being flashed on Egyptian television.

In its commentary following the 1530 GMT newscast, Zahedan International Service in Urdu says: "Al-Sadat's exit heralds the end of an era of dictatorship." According to the radio, the revolution that has begun in Egypt is similar to the Islamic revolution in Iran where "the ousting of the tyrant was the first step."

Tehran International Service in Arabic during its newcasts on 13 October continued to carry reports on the latest developments in Egypt. At 0400 GMT the radio quoted AP on the Egyptian authorities' announcement that anyone trying to disrupt order and disturb peace would be shot. At 1100, 1230, 1430 and 1730 GMT the radio reported that union of Muslim students in Europe had called on Egyptian students to help topple the regime in Egypt. The plea called on the students to benefit from the experience of the Iranian revolution.

CSO: 4600/25

TEHRAN ON IMAM'S REPLY TO SAUDI MONARCH

GF121453 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1810 GMT 11 Oct 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] The movement witnessed in the pilgrimage arena this year was not aimed at creating a breach in Muslim ranks, nor was it aimed at stirring up disagreement or disputation among the Muslims. The movement was aimed at reinforcing relations among all Muslims and increasing their concern about the central issue, that is, preparing ourselves against our joint enemy--Zionism and U.S. imperialism. The "death to America" and "death to Israel" slogans that Iranian pilgrims shouted are not contrary to Islamic guidelines which call for cleansing the land of all usurpers and for confrontation of all those who fight Islam and the Muslims. Neither have the slogans had any negative effects on Muslim unity. On the contrary, these slogans can be a platform for uniting the Muslims and best utilizing their efforts and resources.

The holy shrines witnessed unprecedented Islamic solidarity. All Muslims joined their Iranian brothers and participated with them in the big demonstration. They shouted with an eloquent Arab tongue "death to the United States," "death to Israel."

What terrifies the enemy is the participation of all Muslims in the Muslim cause. We firmly believe that what took place in Mecca has terrified Israel more than any thing else. Why, then, should this loud voice be (?silenced)? In whose interest is it for a Muslim demonstration against Israel and the United States to be stopped? Any move in this direction is in fact voluntary service to the enemy even if the one who commits it does not realize the dimensions of his act.

How can this demonstration contradict Islam? Does Islam allow a Muslim to lag in his duty and does it forbid political action by him? We pose this question to every living conscience of Muslim Ulema everywhere on earth.

Perhaps there are people who will blame us for the slogan: "God is great, Khomeyni is a leader" which was raised among other slogans and which was conveyed to the kingdom's authorities in a reverse way.

What King Khalid's contention in his message that Iranians were shouting "God is great, Khomeyni is great" is not true. If the authorities had sincere and faithful police organs--as the imam said in his reply--they would know the nature of the situation and would understand the honorable goals of Iranian and non-Iranian pilgrims. They would also know how these organs treat the guests of God who have borne difficulties and labored on the road to meet God.

Despite all that has happened, the voice of the imam is still ringing everywhere. This angelic voice is urging all to abandon differences and to unite on the joint goal. This is God's call to the people and the Koran's call to Muslims when it orders them to hold firmly to God's rope and to unite. Khomeyni repeats his call: "I beg Saudi Arabia to join its voice to ours in order to be brothers in Islam."

In conclusion the imam defined an Islamic medium in relations between Muslim countries. He called on all Muslim countries to unite on the foundation: "Hard against the unbelievers, tender among themselves." [Koranic verse]

When will Muslim governments wake up and adhere to the Koran and define their way on its path? When will hands join against the infidel enemy? When will these Muslim hands stretch to their brothers instead of being stretched to the enemy? In short, these are the call and goals of the Islamic Republic. This is the call of the imam, great Khomeyni.

CSO: 4604/4

MAJLIS SPEAKER PREDICTS END OF WAR WITH IRAQ BY 1982

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Oct 81 p 1

[Interview with Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, Majlis speaker, date and place not given]

[Text] TEHRAN -- "If the existing conditions remain unchanged, it will not be possible for the Iraqi forces to stay in Iran in future weeks, or months" said Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, Majlis Speaker and member of the Presidential Council in an exclusive interview with the TEHRAN TIMES.

Commenting on last Tuesday's air crash, he said that it was until now considered an accident unless the contrary can be proved. Rafsanjani further stated that if the Moslem and Arabic countries used their oil as a military weapon against Israel's supporters such as the U.S. and Britain, then Israel would lose collapse.

The full text of our reporter's exclusive interview with Rafsanjani follows:

Q: What is your idea on the future of the war and the Ba'athist mercenary Army with regards to the recent victories of the Islamic Republic combatants?

A: In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful. Even before the recent victories we - according to the received data - believed that the Iraqi Army had lost its power of resistance and what our forces needed to do, was only to attack them using a carefully planned strategy. I was sure then that the Iraqis would either succumb or flee and we have already witnessed this to be so in some regions and the East-Karoon operations proved us to be right.

Now, this belief is accepted by the majority of our Armed Forces and it is quite possible that we will launch more such raids upon the aggressors and certainly the more we proceed with attacks; the more victories we are going to achieve. If the existing circumstances do not change I can predict that in a matter of few weeks - or speaking more cautiously, a few months - our land will be purged of the Iraqis. Later on, Iraq shall be a defeated country and thus it will be we who can determine the conditions to end the war according to the damages inflicted upon the Iranian and Iraqi nations.

However, if nothing unexpected occurs, most certainly our forces will accomplish the defeat of the Iraqi aggressors before the end of the current year. Of course, we did not initiate the war in order to make our demands. We really intended to have peaceful relations with our neighboring countries. But since they started the war and caused us a great deal of damages, we have necessarily to think of the price the Ba'athists should pay for launching their insane war against us.

Q: Will you please let us know the outcome of the latest investigations made on the crash of the Air Force C-130 plane?

A: The reports have been doubtful from the beginning. According to some of the reports, an unexpected malfunctioning caused the aircraft's four engines to stall. Some farmers in the vicinity of the crash area had seen fire coming out of the plane when it was crashing. But the official investigating teams could not strongly confirm whether it has been an act of sabotage or not. Although they have not rejected the idea outright it could nevertheless not clearly be determined as to what had caused the crash. Even the pilot has not been able to give a clear account of the matter.

By the way, it is still possible that it was an act of sabotage. But we have not insisted on it for fear that it might be assumed that we wished to blame the opposition for the incident. From our point of view, therefore, we have for the present to regard it as an accident unless the contrary is proved.

Of course, according to the counterrevolutionaries' general policy who have tried to lessen the effect of our recent victory, we believed that they could have committed such a crime if they could. All those who were martyred in the crash such as Chief of

Staff, Fallahi, the Minister of Defense, Namju, the ex-Air Force Commander, Fakouri and the Deputy Commander of the IRGC, Kolahdooz were all involved in the East-Karoon victory.

Q: In the Quds Friday prayers you said that "If the Arabic countries do not export oil to Israel, we would be able to do away with it". Will you please explain?

A: I do not think that I asked (Arabic states) not to sell oil to Israel in that lecture. It's sure that they do not sell oil to Israel directly. It was the U.S. that I was talking about. I have always believed that it has been a U.S. and Western plot not to let the region's countries use oil as a political and military weapon, which is in fact a very effective one.

In that lecture I discussed that it was impossible to do away with Israel without using the oil issue. If one day we seriously engage ourselves in a war against Israel, we have to employ the oil issue to a very large extent. Wherever they get their oil from the U.S. and Western countries will also supply Israel with it. Oil is never a problem for Israel. Israel is a member – and since it is in a dangerous region, it is a dear one – to the family of Western imperialists.

What we say is that the Arabs and the Moslems must use their oil as a military weapon. In other words they should not sell oil to any country who supports Israel such as U.S., Britain, France, Germany and others. If only the Moslem and Arab countries employ their oil to put political and economic pressures on Israel and its supporters, without even being involved in a war, Israel will collapse in the very near future and we can already predict that.

Q: It has been admitted by you and other responsible brothers who have travelled abroad that we have been negligent of foreign propaganda for exporting our revolution and in defense of it. What do you have in mind for overcoming such a problem, considering the fact that there is still no Islamic Revolution newspaper that is circulated worldwide?

A: Lack of good foreign propaganda is certainly felt by us and when we go abroad and make connections we feel even more this lack and how important it is to have a foreign propaganda organ to be able to talk to the people around the world.

The lack of an active foreign ministry in the past did not allow us to do anything in this regard. But now with Mr. Musavi in charge, the Foreign Ministry has been activated. All our embassies abroad should be furnished with cultural and press advisers. The Minister of Guidance must also take a good deal of interest and make greater effort in this regard.

We must invest more on the papers we have and try to distribute them throughout the world. We should invite and encourage honest reporters to travel to Iran and we must participate in more international meets and use them as forums to express our ideas. We should not isolate ourselves from global meetings and associations simply because they do not in all respects conform to our criteria. We have to be realistic and then seek out the good people who could invariably be found everywhere and let them know what we have to say.

Q: Will you please explain what plans and laws enjoy priority from a Majlis point of view?

A: We declared early in the current year that there were several basic matters to be decided by Majlis. Part of them have already been discussed and approved such as the articles on political parties, the press, restructuring of governmental manpower, budget and urban lands.

There are some other bills which will soon be brought up in the Majlis like the issues of councils and the establishment of new institutions such as judiciary bureau for governmental offices, the States Inspection Organization and Judiciary Police Department.

It is hoped that with empty seats refilled in the near future, the Majlis will proceed with existing matters even more efficiently.

CSO: 4600/58

CONCERN EXPRESSED FOR REMAINING IN WORLD BANK, IMF

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Oct 81 p 2

[Comments by Governor of Central Bank Mohsen Nurbakhsh]

[Text] TEHRAN, Oct. 3 — Dr. Mohsen Noorbakhsh, the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran, on Wednesday, expressed Iran's views on the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and the reasons for Iran's continued membership in these organizations.

Dr. Noorbakhsh said: "The decision to stay in those organisations, was based upon the guidelines of the Foreign Affairs Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran. According to these guidelines, we should use the international organizations to express the views of our country and help the oppressed countries free themselves from the yoke of dependence. It is quite clear that the US would be delighted if we were to leave the IMF and the World Bank, because its opponents would then be fewer in those bodies. In fact, our presence in those two places and the expressing of our revolutionary views, is another kind of struggle with US imperialism at the international level. Joint cooperation among the countries of the world is indispensable for the formation of international monetary and trade relations but this cooperation must be based on correct principles. Henceforward we'll fully support the formation of institutes like the World Bank and the IMF as long as its members have correct relations with each other."

Concerning the assessment of Iran of the world economic outlook presented to the IMF session, Dr. Noorbakhsh said: "The international economy is witnessing increased inequity, chaos in production, an increase in inflation, unemployment and successive irregularities in foreign exchange and interest rates. The industrial countries, like the US on the one hand, by withholding all raw materials and on the other hand, controlling the foreign exchange markets export inflation and unemployment to the world, especially the developing countries. The stabilized increase in the US interest rates weakens the financial strength of the European countries and Japan confronting them with unemployment, social problems and economic inactivity and also, decreasing the limited access of the developing countries to the capital markets. Fluctuation of the interest rates destabilizes the foreign exchange rates and thus the developing countries, which are dependent on the exports of one or two goods for their survival, are the ones which are greatly affected by this. High interest rates decrease the possibility of social progress. They stop new initiatives and investments in various economic sectors and give rise to non-productive activities, without greatly reducing inflation, but worsening unemployment. Only the industries allied with the governments are immune from these dangers of the changes of interest rates. The arms industries in particular are not affected. At this moment the economies of the industrial countries, especially those of the US, are becoming militarized. This has endangered the international peace.

"The floating system of exchange rates has not helped normalize the economies of the countries and the balance of payments. It has even forced countries to keep a greater amount of the foreign exchange reserves." Dr. Noorbakhsh added: "This IMF system, not only has not stabilized foreign exchange markets and rates, but it has further complicated the international monetary system. The International Monetary Fund, which belongs to all its members and must according to its constitution, work for the goals such as the development of international monetary cooperation, a balanced growth of international trade, raising and maintaining employment and real revenues, the development of the productivity of all its members, a stable and orderly foreign exchange system has so far, not been able to meet those goals. As long as the existing constitution does not change to the benefit of the majority of its members, any of their efforts, albeit with goodwill will be meffectual. The voting power and the share of the developing countries in the IMF must increase, but due

to the shortcomings of the constitution, the important decisions of the Fund are taken by 80 to 85 percent of the majority votes.

"The US with more than 20 percent of the votes has always been able to stop any decisions against its interests. In fact, the US has de facto veto power in the International Monetary Fund. This country has never acted accoreding to its own responsibilities to preserve stability and the international monetary balance. The US measure to freeze all the Iranian assets in the US and elsewhere, shows that whenever a country decides to be independent from all, the US will violate all international regulations even what it itself respects, namely, private ownership. The freezing of our assets has no political or economic justification. This was directed not solely at the Islamic Revolution of Iran, but at any country which might wish to be independent of imperialism, and advocates the decrease in trust in banks. Following this, all our efforts to pay back all the loans to the US, have been paralyzed by the direct cooperation of the US banks with the US government to the extent that the Iranian government has been accused of not being sincere in its commitments despite its good credit record. After the Algerian Agreement, Iran paid back all its loans at one time. Now when our country is entangled in the war with the Iraqis and is in great need of its exchange reserves, it respects all its commitments and will continue to do so. This is at a time when the complaints of Iran to the IMF have been fruitless. It was crystal-clear in the beginning that the US will jawbone on all these issues.

"We are aware of the fact that the international monetary crisis must not be blamed on the IMF, because at present the IMF has been turned into an instrument of the US government. The main responsibility is that of the US. The fact that the IMF blames the imbalance of payments, and especially the surplus of the oil exporting countries for the international monetary instability, is very unjust. Except for a handful of the oil exporting countries which sell oil beyond their financial needs and spend its revenues for purchasing lethal arms and storing them thus adding to the international and regional tensions, the independent oil exporting countries, have always been threatened by the western oil companies' various threats, sanctions and impediments of all kinds. The money the OPEC members receive for their oil is less than what they received in 1974 prices. This is at a time when these countries are exporting on the one hand, their vital natural resource and on the other hand, importing in its place, not the capital goods of the west, but the goods which only encouraged increased consumption of the white elephant industries of the west.

"Instead of solving them themselves, the western countries, intend to export their own problems to other countries, especially the developing countries. The budget deficit of the industrial countries has always been the main reason for the instability of the international monetary system. Enormous amounts of money are being consumed without benefit by the US to produce the lethal neutron bomb."

The Governor of the Central Bank of Iran said: "All these points have been told by our representatives in the IMF session and the Iranian mission has asked for the eradication of these problems through constructive discussions."

About the possible membership of the PLO in the IMF and the World Bank, the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran said: "Since the UN General Assembly recognized the PLO in 1978, the PLO according to the UN Charter is a member of the UN organizations. In 1979, Dr. Walid Kamawi, the Head of the National Fund of Palestine, asked for official participation of the PLO in the two organizations as observers, but the US promptly opposed it along with other western countries. Then after the request of the PLO, the official request was given to the Group of 77 to be further studied and the Group supported the PLO. The request was later given to a joint group to be studied but due to the composition of the group, their work was deadlocked. In the future session the PLO request will be presented again and Iran will back it fully."

CSO: 4600/55

TAX PLANS ENVISIONED TO REPLACE OIL REVENUES

Tehran BURS in Persian 18 Aug 81 pp 1, 6

[Text] In the future, tax revenues must replace oil revenues. The present tax rates and the system of tax collection are undesirable. Certain committees have been formed in the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance to devise short-term tax plans. Income taxes and property taxes will be included in the new plans. Income taxes will decrease and taxes on private trade will increase. Bring any undeclared wealth which is subject to taxation to the attention of the authorities.

With the ratification of the general national budget, once again the attention of the public and especially that of economists has been drawn to the almost always important issue of general revenue resources for the government. The economic team of PARS NEWS AGENCY, because of the vital importance of this issue, finds it necessary to bring this issue to the attention of our fellow citizens through a report. Obviously, the government as the servant of the people requires revenues to provide for its needs, to offer services, and to make essential investments in the country. And naturally, these revenues must come from some source. In various countries of the world, taxation is recognized as one of the major sources of government revenue. Of course, the importance of this source depends on the activity of the private sector and the control and supervision of the government over it. In our country, due to the nature of the previous dependent regime, despite the profitable business transactions of the private sector, the volume of collected taxes was small and, then, it came from the indirect taxation of low-income people. The largest portion of government revenues was provided through the sale of oil; in other words, it was the most important source of national income. A study of the makeup of government revenues from 1352-1358 [21 Mar 73-20 Mar 80] reveals that tax revenues made up about 22 percent of the annual income of the government. With the Islamic revolution of our country putting an end to the previous dependent regime, it is the religious and patriotic duty of every Iranian to help the government to the best of his ability. One way to help is to pay the rightful taxes. In order to increase the

percentage of tax revenues in the total income of the government and consequently to reduce government dependence on the sale of oil, and, given the fact that the business sector seems to be thriving since the revolution, it is necessary to implement basic changes in the rate of tax revenues as well as the system of tax collection. In the decade before the revolution, and even after the revolution, due to the dependent, single-product economy of the country, the percentage of oil and natural gas revenues constantly increased. In 1347 [21 Mar 68-20 Mar 69], it was 48.5 percent, reaching 63.4 percent in 1357 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79]. The increase of tax revenues was, to a great extent, a reflection of the expansionist operations of the government in various economic sectors. After the revolution and since 1358 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 80], different policies have been implemented. In the beginning, the transitional government, by granting exemptions to delayed tax debts and increasing tax exemptions, took certain steps to help taxpayers. The implementation of these policies along with the decrease in the imports and the slow down of the activities of the government and private companies in '57 [21 Mar 78-20 Mar 79], resulted in a decline in tax revenues by 18.6 percent in 1358 [21 Mar 79-20 Mar 80]. The 463.7 billion rials of the previous year reduced to 377.4 billion rials. During this year, with the formation of national concurrence committees [komitehha-ye tavafoq-e melli], the owners of private businesses were relieved of the payment of back taxes to a great extent. Taxes on businesses were stopped at 8 billion rials as this decrease continued. In '59 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81], taxation rates on inheritence and on salaries changed. This added an insignificant amount to government revenues. Of course, this cannot answer the numerous difficulties of the government. It appears that in order to increase its revenues, the government must address itself to other areas for taxes, such as businesses, consumption, and sales, which have the capacity for more rapid growth.

Since the revolution, due to the particular economic conditions, most businesses have been thriving. Inefficiency in the tax collection system in this tax area has, despite the growth of the activities of the private sector and the bazaar resulted, on the whole, in business taxes remaining an insignificant portion of the government tax revenues since 1353 [21 Mar 74-20 Mar 75]. Under present circumstances, with the dire need of the government to provide for its vital expenditures from domestic sources and, also, the lack of resources to implement essential changes in the tax system on a short-term basis, the only practical solution to increase revenues is to collect taxes from the owners of trades and businesses. In this regard, the government revenues can be increased to a reasonable extent, relative to the conditions of the market, with proper revision of the rates of taxes on businesses.

In regards to the increase in government tax revenues, PARS NEWS AGENCY held an interview with Engineer 'Ezzatollah Sahabi, director of the budget committee of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and

with Mohammad Qasem Mohammadian, the deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, which follows.

Engineer Sahabi pointed out the role of taxes in the national economy and said: By devising a sound tax policy, we can provide for government expenditures. Also, we can benefit from taxation by either balancing incomes and providing encouragement or, on the other hand, we can freeze incomes and activities. He added: I believe we must only use oil revenues for fixed, essential investments. Therefore, most of the current expenses of the government must be provided for from taxes.

Sahabi added: Iranian governments before the revolution--due both to domestic policies as well as the fact that they were trying to implement foreign colonialist programs and continue the extraordinary dependence--firstly, indulged in the uncontrolled expansion of government organizations and creating expenses and, secondly, in order to quiet down the protestors, were forced to pay subsidies on numerous goods and services without taking essential steps. Also, these governments, in order to provide revenues, began to establish commercial, production, and service companies which, contrary to their expectations, showed losses. For instance, the losses of these companies for the government last year came to about 200 billion rials. Engineer Sahabi added: Therefore, we must devise a policy whereby the 2,200 billion rials of current expenses for this year will be obtained from taxes or government revenues. I think a major portion of this amount can be obtained from taxes. Of course, it must be noted that the major source should be direct taxation. Obviously, the intention in collecting more taxes is to directly tax private businesses, because, unfortunately, since the revolution, the largest collected tax figure has been on incomes. Direct income taxes on private business has been an insignificant figure. This was for two reasons:

(1) Tax rates and (2) the system of tax collection.

Tax rates in our country have not yet conformed to actual economic and social conditions. The rates must be set such that with the increase of the individual's income, the percentage of his taxes also increases, so that on a set income level, tax rates reach 100 percent. With little calculation, it becomes clear that the average tax rate will be 50 percent. That is, on the average, 50 percent of the income of the private sector should be paid to the government in taxes.

Engineer Sahabi added: The income of the government employees in this year's budget is close to 900 billion rials. Noting that according to statistics, 80 percent of these incomes are lower than 50,000 rials per month, no more taxes can be collected on these incomes. We can only increase the taxes of organizations which are

not subject to national employment, and that alone will create an increase of 40-50 billion rials. However, the general national revenues will not stop at such a figure.

The national revenues in 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81] amounted to a figure of about 5,000 billion rials. When salaries are deducted from this amount, 4,100 billion rials are attributed to private business. If 2,000 billion rials of these are collected on the basis of a 50 percent tax rate, the government will have no problems. But, you see that the total tax revenues of the government for the current year have been estimated at 544 billion rials, a figure which is about one fifth of the rightful government tax revenues. Of course, the fact remains that collecting such taxes depends on economic and production growth and we are a long way from such a situation. There are several reasons for this:

(1) Tax rates, instead of being at 50 percent are somewhere around 33 percent, and must, therefore, be increased.

(2) The tax system is very weak. Tax officials do not collect the correct amount of taxes from the main people with incomes, such as merchants, importers, physicians, and all the owners of private businesses. (3) Tax officials do not have sufficient regulations and standards at their disposal for the collection of taxes.

Except for companies, real persons, including merchants, private workshops, physicians, various middlemen, etc., do not record their transactions or record them falsely.

Security deposit [sarqofli] transactions are not recorded anywhere. The transactions of middlemen are handled from homes and over the telephone. And there are other transactions which take place without the knowledge of the government.

Engineer Sahabi added: The tax problems of the country concern the reformation of the tax collection system. It must be noted that we have competent tax officials who can determine the income of individuals without looking at their books. Of course, we cannot deny that we have a shortage of responsible, competent officials. This problem must be solved at all cost. We must train conscientious, religious, and responsible tax assessors.

In addition to the training of tax assessors, the financial and economic system of government must also be reformed. People's wealth must be recorded. The annual income of individuals must be determined. We must provide tax booklets for every individual.

The total current and non-current income of individuals must be subjected to taxation.

The head of the budget committee of Parliament also pointed to the increase in prices of unnecessary and luxury items, which are presently sold on the black market many times their true value, as another short-term source of government revenues and demanded an investigation into the matter. On this point, Mohammad Qasem Mohammadian, the financial deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, said: Obviously, government tax revenues must provide for more of the general expenditures in the budget. Of course, this depends on taxation in connection with economic growth and gross national production.

A look at the tax rates of industrial nations shows that these rates are generally below 50 percent. In Iran, from 1340-1357 [21 Mar 61-20 Mar 79], collected taxes made up 3-4 percent of the national revenues. Since the revolution, the possibility for increasing tax rates to 50 percent does not exist. Given the economic condition of the country and the fact that the economic apparatus has collected 90 percent of the taxes from taxpayers during the revolutionary years, and given the present status of the companies and the closure of alcohol-producing factories, this issue becomes more clear.

Mohammadian added: Attributing the differences in incomes, injustice, or any other factor contributing to the accumulation of wealth and the increase in the wealth of the rich to taxation is not correct.

Essentially, in an Islamic society, this kind of profiteering and increase of income through stockpiling, monopolies, etc. must not be allowed. He added: Therefore, first, the distribution and pricing systems must be corrected and controlled, because, if this situation continues, even if we succeed in collecting taxes off illegitimate incomes, these taxes will directly increase the price of goods and services and, in fact, will add to the burden of the downtrodden. In our opinion, the government must first implement Principle 29 of the Constitution, according to which the government must confiscate the money obtained through illegitimate means, such as bribery and stockpiling, and return it to its original owners.

The tax deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance then raised the issue of the difficulties of tax officials. He said: One of our main problems is the shortage of a responsible tax cadre and the need to strengthen the work tools. In this regard, reconstruction and reforms are necessary. Also, permission must be given to employ a youthful, responsible, and revolutionary cadre and tax officials must be given sufficient financial resources to take care of their needs. In this connection, in accordance with the ratification by the Parliament, one half percent of the tax revenues

is allocated to the training, hiring, and encouragement of tax employees. Also, the lack of a comprehensive, restrictive tax law and irresponsibility on the part of a number of taxpayers are among our other problems. For example, doctors do not have invoices and expense receipts. Therefore, they can fail to report their true number of patients and their fees.

The law does not require private businessmen and tradesmen to keep records. Middlemen and investors who do not have specific places of business and who gain their incomes without physical exertion do not pay any taxes. Unfortunately, the law provides for tax exemptions which most industries take advantage of. Presently, these tax exemptions are being studied and steps will be taken to ensure that only nationally needed industries and the producers of basic goods will be exempted. Agricultural exemptions will continue as before. Mohammadian added: The taxpayers' failure to keep records, their lack of knowledge of the tax laws, lack of coordination between the growth of tax resources and the growth of human resources, and the lack of a set of centralized data on economic statistics for tax purposes are among our other problems.

The tax deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, concerning the current and future plans of this Ministry, said: It has been two months since the committee to devise a direct tax law was formed. All experts who believe in religious guardian jurisprudence are invited to present their views to this committee. This committee hopes to devise a comprehensive tax plan in which property taxes will also be taken into consideration. Another committee has also been formed in this Ministry to devise emergency projects. Of course, we believe that after the revolution, no extensive steps have been taken to balance wealth. Therefore, the implementation of Principle 49 of the Constitution must precede the heavy taxation of the wealthy. In this area, my tax colleagues have declared their readiness to cooperate professionally with the concerned institutions. Mohammadian added: It is said, on occasion, that last year the private sector made a certain amount of profit without paying taxes; but this is not accurate, because the taxes belonging to the last fiscal year are collected at least a year and a half after the end of that fiscal year. Reliable statistics show that in the first four months of '60 [21 Mar-22 Jul 81], taxation of companies increased by 53 percent over the same period in the previous year.

He added: In the plan being prepared, income tax exemptions will increase. In fact, the ratio of taxes on incomes will decrease and taxes on income obtained from work and investment (businesses) subject to taxation will increase. In conclusion, the tax deputy of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Fiance requested responsible fellow citizens to report to this ministry in writing, with documentation, any tax frauds, unidentified wealth, and, on the whole, any tax evasion. They can rest assured that this information will only be used for the collection of taxes and will be considered absolutely confidential.

9593
CSO: 4648/8

QOM SCHOLARS URGE EGYPTIAN MUSLIMS TO RISE

LD110850 Tehran PARS in English 1633 GMT 10 Oct 81

[Text] Tehran, 10 Oct (PARS)--The scholars of the Qom Theological School today, in a message addressed to the Muslim people of Egypt in connection with the worldwide Islamic movement which in Egypt led to the assassination of al-Sadat, called on the Muslim people of Egypt to continue their struggle with complete firmness and strength.

One part of the message said that today the Egyptian nation was responsible to (?rest) control over events in Egypt from the United States which has been shakened by recent events in Egypt, and to continue their efforts still [for the] establishment of justice without fearing any of the empty threats of the U.S. and not to allow another corrupt agent to be imposed upon them.

The message further added that it was the responsibility of the religious leaders and committed students to fulfill their God-given obligations to lead the Egyptian nation which has now arisen to attain its rights. They should [words indistinct] hand in hand with the masses of people take to the streets and break the shackles of captivity one after another and (?not) given in to the satanic orders of the diabolists and return Egypt and the Egyptian people to the glory of Islam. Towards this goal God almighty is behind them, continued the message. At the end the scholars said that while they supported the Muslim people of Egypt and all the oppressed nations of the world, who awaited seeing Islamic justice implemented in their societies, invited them to resist and to adhere to unity of expression for the will of righteous would be victorious and the destiny of al-Sadat is awaited his colleagues. [Sentence as received]

CSO: 4600/51

ANTI-SAUDI PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN BEGUN

NC130106 Paris AFP in English 0018 GMT 13 Oct 81

[Text] Tehran, 13 Oct (AFP)--The Iranian revolutionary regime has begun suggesting that King Khalid of Saudi Arabia might suffer a fate like Egyptian President al-Sadat.

Open criticism of the Saudi establishment started as a result of recent clashes in Mecca between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police when Iranians disturbed prayers in the great mosque by chanting "death to Israel and to its guardian, the United States."

Iranians were also arrested for hanging pictures of Iranian spiritual leader Ruhollah Khomeyni and Iranian flags on buses in Mecca.

The newspaper AZADEGAN editorialized here yesterday: "The Saudis are mistaken if they think they can carry out the mission assigned by Washington to vanquish the true Islam (the Iranian pilgrims) with boots and weapons.

"With the (American) AWACS (radar warning planes) and the aid of America and Zionism, Khalid wants to put the sky over the most sacred place in Islam under control of Islam's real enemies."

The newspaper concluded that the Saudi version of Islam was "American Islam" and said King Khalid was afraid "of having the same destiny as al-Sadat."

The day after Egypt's president was assassinated, the newspaper ISLAMIC REPUBLIC published by Iran's ruling Islamic republic party warned that leaders of other Moslem countries would risk "instability" and "the same end as al-Sadat" if they failed to rely for backing on Moslems alone.

Then Ayatollah Khomeyni threatened that Islamic leaders who no longer relied on God "but on earthly powers like the Soviet Union and United States" would be annihilated by their own peoples.

Mecca Governor Prince Majid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz served notice last week that Saudi Arabia would "not allow trouble-makers (Iranians) to use the pilgrimage to Mecca for non-religious purposes."

Iran's minister of Islamic orientation Hojjat ol-Eslam Abdolmajid Moadika, who was himself in Mecca at the time, replied: "If this gathering of Moslems cannot mobilize against Israel, then it is no longer the 'hajj' (the pilgrimage to Mecca every Moslem is expected to go on once in his lifetime)."

It is a religious duty to shout "death to Israel" and "death to the anti-Islamic super-powers," he affirmed.

CSO: 4600/51

PILGRIMS MARCH THROUGH MECCA

LD121736 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 12 Oct 81

[Text] According to the Central News Unit, following the release of Imam Khomeyni's message to the Saudi Arabian Government, thousands of Iranian pilgrims assembled in groups this morning in [word indistinct] square, near Abotaleb cemetery. The demonstrators later staged a march, led by invalids of the revolution, to protest the treatment accorded to Iranian pilgrims by the Saudi security and police. The marchers carried pictures of Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution, and banners against the world devourer, America, and against the occupying regime in Jerusalem. They were under intense control by the Saudi security forces. The marchers chanted slogans calling for Muslim unity, death to America and death to Israel, death to the enemies of Islam, neither West nor East, and Islamic revolution.

The demonstrators passed the vicinity of God's house and were received warmly by other pilgrims.

According to the same report, slogans such as "There is no God but God," "Israel, enemy of God," "God is one, Khomeyni is the master" could be seen in Mecca today, and the Muslims' anger against their archenemy, America, gave Mecca a special anxiety.

The marchers sat down opposite Safa and Marveh [two points between which the pilgrims run as part of the Haj ceremonies] and chanted the slogan "God is great, there is no God but one God." They attracted the attention of their sister and brother Muslims to the call of the Islamic revolution, and prayed for the victory of the Islamic revolution.

The marchers later entered God's house and conducted noon-time prayer along with other Muslims.

CSO: 4600/25

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON COMMUNISTS' GOALS IN IRAN, REGION

NC140232 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 12 Oct 81

[Unattributed talk]

[Excerpt] (?What is important is to see why, despite the clamitous situation created in Iran and the regime's destructive policies, the Tudeh Party continues to support Khomeyni.)

(?1. The reason why the communists, led) by the Tudeh Party and assisted by the Soviet Union's (?numerous spies and experts, who were given a free hand after the establishment of Khomeyni's regime), support Khomeyni and his rotten regime with all their political, economic and ideological might, and with [words indistinct] of their vast underground organizations in Iran--they are watching any [word indistinct] and anti-Khomeyni trend and hand over opponents to the pitiless judges and shar' magistrates [words indistinct] even if the opponent is only an adolescent--is because the continuation of Khomeyni's rule is of vital importance as far as the establishment of the communist system in Iran is concerned.

2. The continuation of the anti-Islamic rule of Khomeyni and of his (?supporters) will definitely weaken the people's deep and true religious feelings which, in the past, were the main obstacle facing the progress and infiltration of communism in Iran, and the crimes committed by the clerical regime will help incline the people toward communism.

3. The Soviet Government, which directed and led and continues to direct and lead the Iranian Communists topped by the Tudeh Party in all stages and conditions, has been able to denigrate its rival, the United States, in Iran and to inflict the greatest damage on the United States' international credibility. At the same time the Soviet Government [words indistinct] and thinks that by the hands of Khomeyni, in the name of religion and by supporting the world's oppressed it can implement the same programs and plans in the remaining Middle East and Persian Gulf countries. You recall how this program began in the first months of Khomeyni's rule under the title of "exporting the Islamic revolution to other countries of the world," and you can see how it still continues. All that happened in Mecca, Medina and other parts of Saudi Arabia during the Haj ceremonies were preliminary to a riot which was prepared and which was foiled because of the vigilance of that country. Iraq too was the target of Khomeyni's danger before any other country, and, in a bid to prevent the fanning of the flames of chaos,

Saddam Husayn ousted tens of thousands of Muslims who could have been affected by the venomous propaganda of Khomeyni and his agents. Since he did not consider this measure sufficient, he committed a mistake by starting the war against Iran, the result of which was the continuation of Khomeyni. (?Undoubtedly) the Iranian nation's nationalism and patriotism were hurt by this act and, disregarding their domestic enemy, the Iranians rose to fight against the foreign aggressor first. Similarly, the other Persian Gulf nations have also been targets of the instigations of Khomeyni and his agents, and it is not at all clear what sinister fate similar to that of Iran's is awaiting them if all of them don't resort to a logical and collective act to remedy the situation.

Nevertheless, the potential danger facing Khomeyni and the Soviet-led communists is the deep feeling of nationalism and patriotism of the Iranian nation which has risen to struggle both with black reaction and with red colonialism. Those zealous and patriotic youths who are the targets of the pitiless bullets of the regime's mercenaries and revolution guards are the biggest obstacle facing the reactionaries and communists. The more the criminal and treacherous regime and the antinational [words indistinct] (?communists) increase their bullying, the more zealous and extensive the struggles of the patriotic youths, the firmer their resolution to free Iran, the more inpenetrable their raging movement and the louder become their voice that can be heard throughout Iran shouting "Good by Islamic Republic."

CSO: 4600/25

INDIAN WRITER ASSESSES 'THE BANI-SADR EPISODE'

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 4 Oct 81 p 2

[Letter from Abdulla Mujahedi]

[Text] *The Managing Editor,*
Kayhan International.

Dear Sir,

I have for many years taken keen interest in Iranian affairs which increased with the advent of the glorious Islamic Revolution under the leadership of Imam Khomeini.

With the start of Ba'athist Iraq's naked aggression against Iran on 22nd September 1980 and events which followed the ousting of Mr. Banisadr, I had time and again to go to the press on this side to put the record straight with the critics of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. In this connection, I send herewith an article entitled "The Banisadr Episode" which I have sent to an Indian weekly and which is expected to be published soon and I hope it will find a place in your esteemed newspaper and also the Farsi edition after translation.

On the occasion of the first anniversary of Iraq's aggression against Iran, I convey my salutations to Imam Khomeini, the martyrs who laid down their precious lives for Islam and Iran and the brave people who are continuing the sacred struggle against armed aggression and international gangsterism. God is with you and final victory is yours — Inshallah.

With kindest regards and salaams,

Yours faithfully,
ABDULLA MUJAHEDI

The Banisadr Episode

Ever since the start of the revolution in Iran to overthrow the monarchy, it has been observed that the proponents of the old order in the West and some others are not prepared to take a realistic view and are doing all in their power to belittle and harm the young Islamic Republic. It is clear that the opponents of the Islamic Republic of Iran, because of their inherent prejudices are so blinded that they are just not capable of making a proper assessment of the situation with its historical background and the human endeavor involved.

It took a bloody revolution to overthrow the powerful and despotic monarchy and make the world at large believe that the Shah had after all to go and this is now more than confirmed by every writer on the subject. A study of the autobiography of the Shah will also convince any intelligent reader that he and his friends stand self-condemned

However, when things did not turn out as hoped for by the imperialists, they turned jittery not only because of what they would be losing in Iran but also because of what they stood to lose in the area if the new movement was to spread. Accordingly, the old and new imperialists with their hangers on could just not stomach the will and aspirations of the Iranian people and we see their devilish efforts directed against the Islamic order established in Iran.

The opponents believe that in the ouster of Mr Banisadr and his escape they have a golden opportunity to beat down the Islamic Republic of Iran. How naive they are. These very people did not

have a good word for Iran even when Mr Bansadr was president and the most blatant example of their animosity was their ostrich like attitude in respect of Ba'athist Iraq's naked aggression against Iran. What Iraq could not achieve for the imperialists, they hoped to secure through the Bansadr episode. Overnight the ousted president becomes a great liberal and modernist Muslim, a fine product of French education and, above all, one who understands Islam best. It is really like the devil quoting the scriptures. I have elsewhere outlined the role played by the clergy in Iran for around 150 years in the struggle against the despotism of the monarchy and the exploitation by foreigners.

The recent revolution which culminated in the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran had its roots in the movement led by Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom during 1961-1963 which resulted in great bloodshed and his deportation. He continued his activities from abroad and people are more or less acquainted with the developments in 1978 and early 1979 when the Shah had to leave. Mr Bansadr was one of the persons opposed to the rule of the Shah and served a short term in jail. He took residence in Paris when he came close to the Mujahideen Khalq Organisation ('Iran Quest for Security' by Dr K.R Singh). In October 1978, he got in touch with Imam Khomeini in Paris and returned with him and others to Tehran on 1st February 1979.

Bansadr was very much in the picture with the drafting of the new constitution under which he was elected president with the blessings of Ayatollah Khomeini. However, the wolf in sheep's clothing soon started showing his true colors and did everything to undo the constitution under which he was elected president. Ayatollah Khomeini made every effort to educate Bansadr and get him on the right path but to no avail.

Events came to a head and the people asked for his impeachment and ouster. Having realized which way the wind was blowing, Mr Bansadr went underground from where he openly announced that he would overthrow the Islamic Republic by force.

In the meantime, he still hoped that the election for the new president would be a tame affair which would give him a chance. When there was a massive turnout, he decided that discretion was the better part of valor and escaped to Paris with Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahideen Khalq. So far so good. Immediately, there started big noises from all over that Iran has now had it because the great Mr Bansadr has declared war against the Islamic Republic. What wishful thinking!

There is also plenty of noise about the action being taken against the terrorist elements bent upon creating chaos and anarchy and getting their orders from Paris. There has been severe criticism that the countermeasures are cruel and against human rights and what have you. Do the critics expect the authorities to sit with folded hands and allow the terrorists to run amok? It must be kept in mind that the terrorist organizations were the first to start the attack long ago when they did away with Ayatollah Motahhari, Dr Mofatteh and the editor and other executives of a leading newspaper. On 26th June 1981 when Mr Bansadr was underground, Hojatoleslam Sayed Ali Khamene'i in his sermon to the prayer meeting (Friday) made reference to the activities of the underground organizations and mentioned that they would soon be exposed.

The very next day when he was lecturing in a mosque, he was severely injured by a time bomb and on 28th June, the world was witness to the most dastardly act of the blow up of the Islamic Republican Party headquarters when 72 of the finest representatives of the Iranian people were martyred.

In the meantime, the cowardly attacks against all and sundry continue. Under the circumstances, I wonder what any fair minded person expects the authorities to do. The answer, of course, is quite clear.

Another gimmick or catch phrase put up by the critics of the Islamic Republic is that the 'Maktabis' (those belonging to the school and generally applied to the clergy) can hardly be expected to deliver the goods. What kind of goods, I do not know. However, it will be appreciated that the school is of the utmost importance in any revolution especially when it is 1400 years old and its teachings still hold good. We have seen non-clergy people like the late Dr Ali Shariati and late Dr Mostafa Chamran as shining examples of Maktabis.

The former was a revolutionary teacher and suffered much at the hands of the Shah's SAVAK. He obtained a doctorate in Sociology from Sorbonne University in France and has left behind a vast treasure of religious, social and political thought. Dr. Chamran obtained a doctorate in Electronics from the U.S.A. and was for many years leading a guerrilla campaign against the Israelis from South Lebanon. After the Islamic Revolution he returned to Iran, was made a member of the High Defense Council and was put in charge of the irregular forces and was killed in action in June.

The 22 member cabinet recently presented by the Prime Minister, Dr. Bahonar, consists of three clergy-men and the rest non-clergy, all Maktabis, highly educated and young. I consider the average age of the members of the cabinet at 38 years to be one of the lowest at present when compared to other countries.

Those who day in and day out ridicule the Iranian clergy, should take a little trouble and study Iranian history when they will realize the valuable part played by the people of God in the struggle against the despotism of the Iranian monarchy and foreign exploitation. Many examples can be given

but here it will suffice to mention a few from the book — "The Strangling of Persia" by the American — W.M. Shuster. The reference is to the Russian (Tsarist) 48 hours ultimatum to Iran of 29th November 1911 on cooked up charges and which among other things demanded an apology. Shuster writes as follows:-

"It was an hour before noon, and the Parliament grounds and buildings were filled with eager, excited throngs, while the galleries of the chamber were packed with Persian notables of all ranks and with the representatives of many of the foreign legations. At noon the fate of Persia as a nation was to be known.

"The Cabinet, having made up its mind to yield, (under British advice) overlooked no point, which would increase their chances of securing the approval of the Majlis. Believing, evidently, that the ridiculously short time to elapse before the stroke of noon announced the expiration of the forty-eight-hour period would effectually prevent any mature consideration or discussion of their proposals, the Premier, Samsamu's-Saltana, caused to be presented to the deputies a resolution authorizing the Cabinet to accept Russia's demands.

"The proposal was read amid deep silence. At its conclusion, a hush fell upon the gathering. Seventy-six deputies, old men, and young, priests, lawyers, doctors, merchants, and princes, sat tense in their seats.

"A venerable priest of Islam arose. Time was slipping away and at noon the question would be beyond their vote to decide. This servant of God spoke briefly and to the point. 'It may be the will of Allah that our liberty and our sovereignty shall be taken from us by force, but let us not sign them away with our own hands.' One gesture of appeal with his trembling hands, and he resumed his seat.

"Simple words, these, yet winged ones. Easy to utter in academic discussions, hard, bitterly hard, to say under the eye of a cruel and overpowering tyrant whose emissaries watched the speaker from the galleries and mentally marked him down for future imprisonment, torture, exile or worse.

"Other deputies followed. In dignified appeals, brief because the time was so short, they upheld their country's honor and proclaimed their hard earned right to live and govern themselves."

Critics of the Islamic Revolution have also made out that under the clergy there is no place for women in political activity and there again I could do no better than quote briefly from Shuster: "The Persian women since 1907 had become almost at a bound the most progressive, not to say radical, in the world. That this statement upsets the ideas of countries makes no difference. It is the fact.

"It is not too much to say that without the powerful moral force of those so-called chattels of the oriental lords of creation the ill-starred and short-lived revolutionary movement, however well conducted by the Persian men, would have early paled into a mere dis-organized protest. The women did much to keep the spirit of liberty alive.

"Having themselves suffered from a double form of oppression, political and social, they were the more eager to foment the great Nationalist movement for the adoption of constitutional forms of government and the inculcation of Western political, social, commercial and ethical codes. Equally strange is the fact that this yearning by the people received the support of large numbers of the Islamic priests, — a class which stood to lose much of its traditional influence and privilege by the contemplated changes.

"On another, more recent occasion, a large crowd of poor women came to the Atabak Park to demonstrate against me because the Treasury had been unable to pay the Government pensions, on which there was over a million dollars then due. The available funds had been necessary for the volunteer troops who had been fighting against the ex-shah.

"I had them told that they would be given an answer on the following day if they dispersed quietly, which they did. I then sent to one of the women's societies a simple explanation of our financial straits and the impossibility of paying these pensions because of the needs of the Constitutional Government with a request that they prevent any further agitation against the Treasury. Though it did not become possible to pay the pensions, there was never another demonstration by women on this account." (Mr. Shuster was the treasurer general of Iran in 1911)

Another famous writer on the subject of the constitutional revolution of Iran of 1906 is Mr. E. G. Browne and it will be interesting to give a brief quotation from his book "The Persian Revolution of 1905–1909" "Most of those who watched the Persian constitutional struggle were struck by the rare phenomenon of a popular movement in which the Clergy played so prominent a part, since this movement, if successful, could hardly fail to deprive them of a large part at least of their influence and power.

"It must be remembered, however, that, like the Irish priests, the Persian mullas are an essentially national class, sprung from the people knowing the people, and, if suspicious of administrative innovations, yet more suspicious of foreign interference. The movement which gradually became constitutional was, as we have seen, in its inception a popular protest led by the Clergy against the extravagance of the Court, which, to gratify its caprices, was ready to surrender the country into the

hands of foreigners and unbelievers. Without the support of the Clergy the people could neither have broken down the Tobacco Monopoly nor have extorted from the Shah a Constitution."

In an interview in Paris (The Observer, 9th August) Bassadr stated that while underground in Tehran, he learnt a great deal by reading Mujahideen Khalq literature. So the great liberal and democrat who claims to have spent twenty years in intense political activity and wants to lead Iran, has had to attend a refresher course at the Mujahideen Khalq school.

In the meantime, Bassadr stands exposed by his own lieutenant and leader of the Mujahideen Khalq, Rajavi. In an interview in Paris (the Observer 23.8) Rajavi stated that his earlier support for Ayatollah Khomeini was a "sham" and a tactical move to overthrow the Shah. Now, if Rajavi's support for Imam Khomeini was a sham, it becomes crystal clear that Bassadr's association with the Imam was also a sham and he has proved himself to be a Judas and a Trojan horse combined. So these cunning men took advantage of the upsurge of Islamic sentiment for their own ronin ends and engineered to assess weapons when the arsenals of the Shah were broken into by the faithful and simple followers of Imam Khomeini who mainly faced the bullets. And now these weapons are being used against the very people who sacrificed their all in toppling the powerful monarchy. The opponents of the Islamic revolution have nothing to get excited about because the people who could bring down the 2500 years of monarchy and more than hold their own against the Iraqi armies — which many thought would cut into Iran like a knife through butter — can, by the Grace of God, easily crush the aimless and misguided mercenaries.

CSO: 4600/57

'WAR WEEK' EXHIBITS COMBAT MOMENTOS

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 4 Oct 81 p 8

[Text] **On the occasion of the 'War Week' several exhibitions were held throughout the country to show different aspects of the one-year old battle imposed on Iran by the Iraqi regime and its effects on the society. Among these exhibitions was one entitled "We are the War Men" held at Rudaki Hall in Tehran.**

"We Are the War Men" is an exhibitions of the bitter and sweet scenes of war and narrates the life of a people who battle valiantly and sacrifice themselves to defend their rights. The exhibition tells the story of the life of vagrants who abandoned their town and village with all they had saved after years of labor and hard work due to the aggression of the tyrannical regime of Iraq, but they know that it will not take long before they'll return to their homes victoriously.

The exhibition shows that characteristics, the power and talent Iran enjoys and how Iramans can provide the needs of their countrymen the most sensitive moments and separate and throw out the links of dependence by making various parts of military equipment and arms with their powerful hands.

We Are the War Men" is a demonstration of the power and unity of the Muslim people of Iran which promises victory. The people who come to visit this exhibition sense the upcoming victory of observing the process of the war movements, the advance and cohesion of the combatant forces and the valiance of the heroic Iranian people.

The exhibition consists of various sections. At the center of the hall, the pictures and posters of the one-year old war are displayed. In other parts stand pavilion s holding the military equipment of the army as well as some war spoils. Beside these arms, the equipment and military devices made by the personnel of the Army and the University Jihad are seen.

In the courtyard of Rudaki Hall, three captured Iraqi tanks are seen standing parallel to the three streets encircling the premises.

Past the entrance, at the beginning of the hall, part of a concrete shelter made by the Construction Jihad is displayed which reminds the visitor of the early days of the war, the yellow and red alerts and the underground shelters of houses and offices.

In the courtyard of the Hall, the smashed pieces of downed Tupolov and MiG fighters of Iraq, are symbols of the anti-aircraft defense of Iran.

The auditorium of Rudaki Hall is filled with pavilions exhibiting military equipment, photos, posters and paintings. In the center of the Hall, every picture depicts either a moment of heavy battle or the crimes of the aggressive Iraqi regime. We see homes in Abadan and Khorramshahr which have collapsed on the heads of their innocent dwellers and children who with their crushed skulls and mutilated bodies, illustrate the crimes of Saddam Hussein's regime.

The pictures and posters of the martyrs of the war remind everyone of the devotion and self-sacrifice of the brave children of Islamic Iran.

In a picture, we see a child who has lost one of his legs but still laughs and has no sign of despair and hopelessness on his face.

The pictures show how all the people ranging from the old to the young, and from men to women, have risen against the invading enemy and are fighting bravely.

Around the hall, various pavilions of the armament and military equipment of the three armed forces are displayed. In the pavilion of the logistic command of the Ground Forces, samples of spare parts from military vehicles and various parts of different factories affiliated to the army, are on exhibition.

Some of these pieces which have been presented to the view of visitors are: the firing pin of the 120 mm. mortar launchers, the

cooler for the dynamic of the Chieftan tanks. The pad of the 175 mm canon, the spring of the cooling system for antiaircraft guns and the firing pin of the 106 MM. Gun.

In another pavilian a tripod for the 12.7 mm. or 50 Caliber anti-aircraft automatic gun is seen which has been modified by the army for its better functioning and sparing its crew from digging trenches.

The Iranian made RPG7 is also one of the interesting sights which draws much attention from the visitors in another pavilion samples of light arms like the G-3, UZI automatic guns which are used in the battle against the enemy have been collected.

In the same pavillion several specimens of spring antipersonnel mines which have been looted from the Iraqi forces are seen.

The director of the logistic pavillion of the army says, "Most of the pieces that are being displayed here have been made by our military personnel after the Revolution and especially in the wake of the imposed war. All of them are used in the war and they have proved capable in combat. In this way huge amounts of currency which used to leave the country for purchasing such arms have been saved.

The Havaniruz (air division of the ground force) has displayed the models of its various helicopters in another pavilion.

In this pavilion, the Cobra and Shaok helicopters which are used for raiding and transportation and have borne a major responsibility in the war, are familiar to everybody. The 214 and UH2 helicopters are among the other varieties which have been exhibited.

On the corner of the Havaniruz pavilion, a modern transistorized feeding source used for amplifying wirelesses attracts many visitors' attention. This device has been made by a research group in the telecommunications centers of Iran.

Beside samples of the war spoils including trench glasses, wireless and gonimeters, a chart is hanging which gives an account of the year's activities of the Havaniruz.

According to this chart, the pilots of Havaniruz have managed to destroy 932 tanks, 241 cannons, 647 military vehicles, 16 munitions depots and 3 helicopters of the Iraqi army since the outbreak of the war. This is only a part of the activities of our brave pilots.

The naval force of Iran have also displayed a number of its supplies and equipment and reminded us of it's powerful presence in the war fronts. The models of some Iranian gunboats and the helicopters of the Naval force give news of Iran's naval strength.

Parts of the missiles and cannons possessed by the Naval Force are seen in these pavilions where their function and peculiarities have been described. The models of the "SAM" and "Hengam" warships, the amphibious chieftan tanks and the Sikorski helicopter as well as mine detectors are among the most interesting and spectacular samples of the Naval Force pavillion.

The director of this pavilion says, "In the very early days of the war the Naval Force of Iran almost completely destroyed the Iraqi naval force, and most of the arms which have been displayed in this pavillion have never been used against the enemy because of the weakness and incapability of Iraq's naval force.

On the wall of the Naval Force pavillion pictures of the martyrs of this force have been posted. Some of these pictures belong to the naval commandos who created epics of honor in the course of the war.

On another corner of the "We Are the War Men" exhibition the Air Force of Iran has presented to view models of its fighters and transportation airplanes.

This pavilion has caused the visitors to become more familiar with the activities of the Air Force.

The model of the F-14 fighter which has a speed 2.4 times as much as that of sound and a flight ceiling of 54,000 feet is seen in this pavilion.

This fighter bomber is capable of carrying a two-member crew and an assortment of missiles.

Also the models of the F-5 and C-130 plases are exhibited in the Air Force pavilion. The former is for war missions and the latter is for transportation and carrying parachutists.

In one of the corridors of the Rudaki Hall, samples of war supplies and ordnance which have been made by the Construction Jihad and the University Jihad of Babolsar Township (Northern Iran), are shown.

Among these devices some anti-tank mines are on display. Several 40 and 60 piece grenades, manufactured by the Technical School of Babol (Northern Iran) are also among the arms which have been exhibited here on the occasion of the War Week.

Another part of this exhibition is allocated to semi-heavy arms used by the Ground Forces in the war.

The 81 mm mortar launcher, the G-3 automatic rifle, the 12.7 mm automatic gun, the "Tav" missile launcher, and the 106 mm gun are among the arms which have been displayed in this pavillion.

The director of the pavilion explains the specifications and functions of each of these arms to visitors.

In the upper storey of the hall, an audio visual exhibition, further introduces and explains some of the issues of the war to the people. In this section, various scenes of the war events and films on the life of the war-stricken people as well as the cooperation and mutual sympathy of the people during the war effort are shown to visitors.

CSO: 4600/56

BACKGROUND OF 'KUWAITI AFFAIR' AIRED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 4 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial by Zainab]

[Text] *On the morning of Thursday October 1, three Iraqi MiGs entered Kuwaiti airspace and in compliance with instructions given by their American masters, bombed Kuwaiti oil installations in the Om Al Ash region close to the Iraqi border. One of the MiGs was allegely downed by Kuwait's anti-aircraft guns. The two others returned safely to their airbases inside Iraq to receive awards and encouragement from their imperialist masters.*

As Iraq fulfilled its role in this novel imperialist conspiracy, the Yankee loudspeakers came into play along with the reactionary leaders of the region to finish the job for America's sake.

In order to give credence to the fabricated story of Israeli-Iranian relations and to isolate the ever spreading Islamic revolution, reactionary Arab leaders and the imperialist conspiracy thus launched against the piercing light rays of Islam. The devilish agents of America continue their propaganda war against the establishment of God's rule.

When studying events pertaining to the Islamic Republic of Iran, particularly when they are reported through dependent news media, the observer must be warned of traps and pitfalls prepared for him by American policy makers in their vast misinformation compaign against the Islamic movement.

Since the first sparks of the Islamic movement in Iran, imperialism has consistently exercised this method of misinformation and distortion in order to cover the authentic nature of this movement. Faced with the undefeatable progress of Islam and the inevitable spread

of this movement throughout the region, America escalated its conspiracies in various fields in order to safeguard it's vital colonial interests in the world.

From the start of the Iraqi aggression on the Islamic homeland vast plots were conceived to project Iraq as an anti-Zionist Arab state which had gone to war against a pro-Israel anti Arab state (supposedly Iran). To convey this false picture a whole chain of events was facricated to the detriment of Iran begining from the absurd Iraqi allegations, that it is anti-Zionist, to Israel's pretentious attack on the Iraqi nuclear plant and leading to the recent attacks on Kuwaits oil installations.

While exposing the depth of the imperialist conspiracy network, these fabrications signify the deep fear of Islam that has deprived America from all calm.

Even if we limit ourselves to the reports received through dependent news agencies on liberation movements throughout the world it would be sufficient to show that America has an evident reason for such fear. The recent Islamic uprisings in the region ranging from Tunisia to Egypt where the movement has greatly heightened, to Iraq and finally Saudi Arabia which has been seriously threatened by the Muslim Hajj gathering (an event which has been almost totally neglected by news agencies) increases this fear. The factors threatening Saudi Arabia following the revolutionary participation of Iranian Muslims and Muslims from liberation movements who succeeded in politicizing the event, have increased Reagan's anxiety to the extent that he actually confessed in his recent press conference that he would not allow Arabia to become another Iran. This he mentioned as a pretext for the sale of the AWAC's espionage planes to Arabia, a sale which is based on conditions of American control and the lack of any anti-Zionist activity. Of course Alexander Haig confessed the fact that the AWAC's were under American control by saying that they had monitored the so called Iranian planes which attacked Kuwait.

Hence, a new intrigue has been contrived to activate America's policy in the region, at a time when the victory of the Islamic forces over the Iraqi mercenaries on the war fronts and the American grouplets on the internal front has become evident. America's propaganda play has escalated now as it seeks a legimate pretext under which it can deploy its rapid deployment forces in the region.

The fabrication of the Kuwait incident can be deduced through certain reports and claims such as the fact that

even Reuter asserts that diplomats were not allowed to visit the sight and domestic reporters were compelled to report only official statements in Kuwait.

World arrogance escalates a wider conspiracy against the Muslims, it is up to the downtrodden masses to increase their awareness and consciousness in the face of their plots. For when the Ummah adheres to Allah, He guides them to the straight path and to the light.

— ZAINAB

CSO: 4600/54

BRIEFS

BANDAR ABBAS PROJECT--According to a Central News Unit report, the Italian ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran met and conferred this morning with Mr Mohammad Hadi Nezhad-Hoseynian, minister of roads and transport, at the latter's office. They discussed bilateral relations and it was decided that the implementation of Bandar Abbas Port project, which is under construction by an Italian firm, be expedited. [Text] [LD101164 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 10 Oct 81]

PILGRIMS 'CLASH' WITH SAUDI FORCES--According to a Central News Unit report from Mecca, all the Iranian pilgrims accompanied by their brother Muslims from other countries currently on pilgrimage to Mecca following a 3-day stay in 'Arafat, Mena, Raml and Jamarat, carrying the colors of the Islamic Republic of Iran and encircled by Saudi security forces, chanted slogans of revolution, Koran revolution, death to America and death to Zionism, Haj is a religious duty and Khomeyni is the leader. This was staged yesterday following midday prayers. The participants were encountered by Saudi security forces, which resulted in minor clashes. Several persons were arrested and sent to prison. [Text] [LD111132 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 11 Oct 81]

ARREST OF RAJAVI'S PARENTS--Agencies have reported that Mas'ud Rajavi's parents have been imprisoned in Mashhad on the orders of Tehran regime officials. Following this, one of Rajavi's relatives contacted UPI and stated that the leader of the Mojahedin-3 Khalq organization of Iran does not attach importance to his parents' arrest, since the parents of many are now being tortured and executed in Khomeyni's prisons. He also said that Mas'ud Rajavi's father is 84 years old and his mother is 75 years old and that both are suffering from a heart ailment. [Text] [NC101700 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 10 Oct 81]

IRANAIR DOMESTIC FLIGHTS--The Iranair office in Shiraz has announced that four flights will operate between Shiraz and Bandar-e Lengeh each week. [GF110429 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1500 GMT 10 Oct 81]

ARREST OF MOJAHEDIN--Tehran, 10 Oct (AFP)--A total of 67 people have been arrested in the provinces in recent days on suspicion of collaborating with opposition factions, the DAILY ISLAMIC REPUBLIC reported here today. In a break-down of the arrests the government party newspaper said that at Rasht, 200 kms (120 miles) northwest of here near the Caspian Sea, 39 members of "fringe groups with American links" were in custody, while at Gorgan, 250 kms (155 miles) northeast of Tehran,

three leftwing Mojahedin-e Khalq and two Marxist-Leninist Peykari were under arrest. Fifteen other Mojahedin had also been arrested in the same area at Babolsar, Ashrafiyeh, and Rudsar. The paper said that at Asnan, in the central provinces, "four monarchists connected with (the shah's last prime minister) Shapur Bakhtiar and the fringe groups" were found in possession of "arms, ammunition, playing cards, alcohol and opium, anti-Islamic tape-cassettes, and subversive books." In the Khuzestan capital of Ahvaz four "hypoctires" (official jargon for the Mojahedin-e Khalq) were being held for questioning, while another was arrested in the Gulf oil city of Abadan for "having dealings with the Iraqis," according to the Islamic prosecutor's office there. "The hypocrites have grown so weak today that they are forced to ask children to empty their money boxes in order to cover their spending," the report concluded. [Text] [NC101246 Paris AFP in English 1131 GMT 10 Oct 81]

PILGRIMS IN JIDDAH FREED--Jiddah, 11 Oct (PARS)--Jiddah Airport was prepared on Sunday for the return of the Iranian pilgrims back home. PARS correspondent reported that the Iranian pilgrims on their last day while marching towards the great Jamara for throwing stones at the Satan, were attacked by Saudi police. In this incident eight Iranians, among them five women, along with a number of black Muslims who had joined the Iranian demonstration were arrested. Latest reports reaching here indicate that two of the arrested persons have been freed. The Iranian pilgrims who were carrying portraits of Imam Khomeyni and the flags of the Islamic Republic also chanted revolutionary slogans condemning the great Satan and the usurper regime of al-Quds [Jerusalem]. This year the Iranian pilgrims were the third largest in number after Nigeria and Egypt. [Text] [LD111736 Tehran PARS in English 1622 GMT 11 Oct 81]

PILGRIMS RELEASED IN SAUDI ARABIA--Tehran, 12 Oct (PARS)--Thanks to patient and persistent efforts by the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Jidda, all of the Iranian Haj pilgrims arrested by Saudi officials on various charges, were freed prior to the commencement of the major and religiously indispensable Haj ceremonies enabling them to participate in these ceremonies. Some 47 Iranian pilgrims had been arrested, 16 of whom were women. This unexpectedly quick release for these pilgrims excited the wonder and admiration of other imprisoned persons who shouted "Long live Khomeyni" on seeing the Iranian pilgrims freed. This demonstration of credible efficiency and effective influence exercised by the embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran (?impressed) the diplomatic community there. [Text] [LD121144 Tehran PARS in English 1040 GMT 12 Oct 81]

BATTLE ACTIVITIES ON WESTERN FRONTS--Tehran, 13 Oct (PARS)--The Islamic combatants killed 51 Iraqi soldiers during the past 24 hours in the war fronts of Zahab, Gilan-e Gharb, Sumar and Zil, destroying one enemy munitions carrier, one personnel carrier equipped with missiles and 23 group and individual bunkers. The report from Kermanshah added that exchanges of artillery and heavy arms fire continued in the fronts of Nowsud, Zahab, Qasr-e Shirin, Dalahj, Sumar and Gilan-e Gharb. [Text] [LD132136 Tehran PARS in English 1739 GMT 13 Oct 81]

BAHRAINI ISLAMIC FRONT MESSAGE--The Islamic Front in Bahrain [al-Jabhah al-Islamiyah in al-Bahrayn] has addressed a message to 'Ali Khamene'i, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on his election. The message says: We believe that this election is evidence that our region has entered a new phase with the aim of ridding Muslims of the tyrants' yoke. [Text] [GF111844 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 11 Oct 81]

CSO: 4604/4

ANGLO-JAPANESE CONSORTIUM WINS CONTRACT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

Jordan has awarded a consortium of British and Japanese firms a £ 1 million consultancy contract for an electricity and telecommunications cables production project aimed both at foreign and domestic markets. The consortium, sponsored by the Jordanian Pension Fund, is made up of the British companies Peat, Marwick Mitchell, and W F Johnson and Partners, and of the Japanese firm, Hitachi Cables.

Under the agreement, the contract will be carried out in several phases. The first stage of the work will consist of a detailed feasibility study, to be conducted over six months, including a market survey of Jordan, an analysis of the Jordanian economy and an estimate of demand for cables. This study will also have to outline the best strategy for breaking into the market and generating sales.

The second phase of the contract is made up of technical feasibility study covering processes, plant machinery, equipment, buildings, materials and personnel requirements. Financial evaluation of total capital needs and manufacturing costs, as well as forecasts of revenues and an assessment of the returns on the investment will comprise the third part of the consultancy work.

Furthermore, Peat, Marwick Mitchell will conduct "sensitivity analysis" of possible variations in key factors such as product prices, sales volumes, material costs, labour costs, overheads, energy costs and equity loan ratios. In certain cases, the British firm will develop special computer models to analyse the data.

If the initial feasibility study shows that the proposed product is viable, the next phases will be set in motion, covering the detailed design of factory and other buildings, construction and commissioning of the plant, and technical management and training.

Financing for the actual project will be provided by a consortium of Jordanian banking and investment interests.

Both British firms in the consultancy consortium have extensive experience in Jordan. Peat, Marwick Mitchell has undertaken a number of projects there for the Electricity Authority, the Phosphates Mines Company and the Municipality of Amman. W F Johnson is presently working on a consultancy contract with the Jordanian Armed Forces Social Welfare Fund which includes technical management and training.

CSO: 4400/18

BRIEFS

U.S. AID GRANT--The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) last week pledged over $5 million to Jordan's National Planning Council. The money, which comes in the form of a grant-in-aid, is to promote agricultural projects in Jordan. According to a National Planning Council spokesman, the $5.6 million dollars will be used for establishing a centre for agricultural services in Jordan, and developing technological knowhow. Under the agreement, USAID will provide two laboratories, one for water and soil analysis and the other to control agricultural pests. The spokesman said that the centre would also conduct research to overcome agricultural problems and improve production. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 3]

CSO: 4400/18

EXAMINATION OF POLITICAL FACTIONS

London 8 DAYS in English No 38, 26 Sep 81 pp 18-20

[Text] LEBANON'S three million people have produced a complex mosaic of political organisations and alliances. Sixteen religious sects and nearly 40 political parties have spawned more than 20 separate armed militias. The complicated patterns of loyalty make it extraordinarily difficult to keep abreast of political developments.

Lebanon's president is Elias Sarkis, a Christian who has remained in office since 1976. Sarkis is said to be backed by the 'silent majority' of Lebanese, but he has no organised support, no party or militia.

Prime Minister Shafiq Wazzen is head of Lebanon's Islamic Council. His cabinet reflects the traditional 'confessional' system, which allocates administrative positions to communal groups according to the pattern laid down in Lebanon's National Charter of 1943. Under this system the Christian communities dominated the administration, the judiciary and the army.

Sarkis's government enjoys only limited authority in Lebanon, for rival factions exercise de facto political control over most of the country. Where the government attempts to exercise its own authority it is through the Lebanese National Army. Lebanon's army largely disintegrated under the pressures of the civil war in 1975-1976, and this force under Victor Khoury is a product of the Army Law of 1979 which aimed to create a strong, independent body responsible only to the president and parliament. In addition, the government can call upon the Deuxième Bureau, which carries out certain policing functions.

The most effective nationally-organised force is that of the Arab Deterrent Force, established in 1976, and now largely composed of Syrian regular troops. The ADF controls much of the environs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley and Eastern Lebanon. Through the Higher Security Committee it coordinates with the forces of the Palestinian movement and those of the Lebanese left. The ADF can call upon some 20,000 men.

In the south a further external force — the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil) — passively patrols a 'neutral zone'

Lebanon's political parties proper can be divided into three groups: the organisations of the Lebanese National Movement (the LNM), those of the Lebanese Front and a number of independent groups.

The LNM claims to speak for all the people of Lebanon — it does not differentiate on a confessional basis, although in practice it draws its support largely from the poorer layers of Lebanese society, and therefore principally from Muslims.

The LNM originated in the loose coalition of socialist, communist and Nasserist organisations formed under the Druze leader, Kemal Jumblatt, in 1969, and is committed to economic and social reform and to support for the Palestinian movement.

In 1972 the coalition achieved some electoral success, and in 1973 undertook its first military operations against Lebanese army units attacking Palestinian camps. In 1975 a formal alliance was declared, announcing a 'programme for reform'. This expressed opposition to the confessional system and to the conduct of the administration, judiciary and army.

In 1976 a Central Political Committee was formed, headed by Jumblatt, and later that year it started to liaise with the Palestinian organisations. Its executive committee includes representatives of all the major organisations of the LNM.

The movement cooperates with the Arab Deterrent Force, and organises locally in West Beirut, the coastal cities and the Bekaa Valley, those areas not under rightwing control. Its daily paper is *Al Watan*. The LNM coordinates 13 organisations, of which the most important are:

The Progressive Socialist Party, formed in 1949, also under Jumblatt. The PSP advocates Arab unity and a non-marxist form of socialism, being a member of the Socialist International group of parliamentary parties.

Although a wealthy landowner, Jumblatt occupies a special place on the Lebanese left, being the key figure in drawing together the alliance. On his death in 1977, the PLO announced: 'Jumblatt's death is for us as terrible as that of Nasser.' He was succeeded by his son, Walid.

The PSP experienced one serious setback, when it failed to coordinate its planned National Front of Lebanese parties with Syria in 1977. The PSP has an almost exclusive following in and around Jumblatt's village of Mukhtara in the Shouf, south of Beirut, and among the Druze communities of the central mountains.

The Independent Nasserist Movement is popularly known by the name of its armed wing, Al Mourabitoun, which emerged in 1975. The Mourabitoun organise under Nasser's slogan of 'Freedom, Socialism, Unity', and aim 'to provide charismatic leadership — Nasserism is not dead'. They are strongest in Beirut, having a large following among the poor of the Sunni Muslim population. The Mourabitoun leader is Ibrahim Qlaylat.

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party was formed in 1932 as the Parti Populaire Syrien. The SSNP stands for the unity of geographical Syria, including Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, today's state of Syria, and Cyprus — 'the Fertile Crescent with Cyprus as its star'. The SSNP was made illegal during the 1940s and again in the 1960s after a failed coup in 1961, which led to years of intense repression.

Its rather unusual development — drawing on both nationalist and socialist traditions — also led the SSNP during the 1950s into an alliance with Camille Chamoun's NLP against the Nasserists. The SSNP emphasises its expressly secular politics: 'We fight confessionalism — we are a 100 per cent lay party.' It draws its members from all sections of the population, having a large number of supporters in the Phalange-dominated areas of Mount Lebanon, and a successful military wing still in action in the Metn mountains, within the Phalange stronghold. Its president is Inam Raad.

The Lebanese Communist Party was founded in 1932. Declared illegal in the mid-1950s, the LCP grew rapidly after re-acquiring legal status in 1970. Unlike most communist parties in the Middle East, the LCP engages in armed struggle. It has substantial support outside Lebanan in Tripoli, Sidon and Tyre, and though most of the membership is Muslim, many leading members are of Greek Orthodox origin. The LCP's secretary is George Hawi, and its daily paper is *Al Nida* ('The Call').

The Communist Action Organisation was formed in 1970 by a merger of the Organisation of Socialist Lebanese, led by Mohsen Ibrahim, and a group of independent socialists led by Fawwaz Trabulsi.

The organisations of the Lebanese Front are dominated by the Phalange, or Kataeb, which was formed in November 1936 under the leadership of the Maronite businessman, Pierre Gemayel. It was originally known as the 'Phalange Libanaises', after the Phalange or militia units associated with European rightwing organisations in the 1930s.

The Phalange claims to represent the interests of the Christian community, and 96 per cent of its members are Christian, most of them Maronite. It argues for a return to the system prevailing before the civil war — Gemayel describes the 1943 constitution which guaranteed Maronite privileges as having been 'fashioned by geniuses'.

The Phalange is adamantly opposed to the presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Gemayel describes them as 'a fifth column'. Fighting under the slogan 'God, Family and Country', the Phalange regards its dispute with the PLO and the Lebanese left as 'a struggle against international communism'. It believes in the 'Phoenician destiny' of Lebanon, seeing the Christian population as different from and essentially superior to the Arabs of the region.

Gemayel, now 74, a member of parliament and an ex-president of Lebanon, remains the political head of the Phalange. His son, Bashir, is its aggressive military leader, commanding a well-trained militia (estimated as being at least 12,000 strong), armed and supplied principally by Israel. His eldest son, Amin, is also a leading member. Like his father, he often seems embarrassed by Bashir's 'megalomaniac

violence'.

The Phalange controls the Maronite enclave occupying most of the northerly Mount Lebanon area. Its headquarters are at Jounieh.

The National Liberal Party, Al Ahrar, is led by a Maronite lawyer and businessman, Camille Chamoun. It was founded in the mid-1940s after Chamoun broke from Raymond Edde's Constitutional Bloc. Chamoun seeks an alliance with 'whoever allows the Christians to rule'. The NLP is committed to 'bringing the Palestinians to heel' and 'distributing' them among the Arab states. It wants 'a state based on Christian democracy'.

The NLP has long opposed the Syrian presence in Lebanon and is an especially vocal supporter of Haddad's Christian enclave in the south. The Chamoun family's traditional base was among the Maronite population of the town of Damour and the coastal area of the Shouf, south of Beirut.

The Zghorta Liberation Army of Suleiman Franjieh draws upon traditional support in and around the northern town of Zghorta. Franjieh was president of Lebanon during the civil war. Though he has cooperated with the other rightwing organisations, Franjieh has opposed Phalange plans for the partition of Lebanon and for collaboration with Israel. He enjoys good relations with Syria.

In January 1976 the organisations of the right formed a Front for Liberty and Man, and two months later announced the formation of the Lebanese Front (LF), creating a unified command, and declaring a general mobilisation of all Lebanon's Maronites. The LP was based upon the Phalange, the NLP of Chamoun, and Suleiman's Zghorta Liberation Army. It also included the small Maronite Order of Monks under Father Sharbel Qassis, the Guardians of the Cedars under Fuad Chemali and Etian Saqr, and the Maronite League of Shakr Abu Sleiman.

The organisations of the LF cooperated militarily during the civil war, when it was estimated that their joint backing from Israel reached some $100m, but by 1978 the alliance had begun to break up. In May 1978 Franjieh's ZLA withdrew, and one month later members of Franjieh's family and 30 supporters were killed by the Phalange in the first of a series of incidents that led to a bloody vendetta. In 1978 and repeatedly in 1980 Phalange and NLP fighters also clashed in open battles over territorial control within their Maronite enclave. By 1981 the Phalange had established its hegemony over the rightist forces.

Today the nominal president of the Lebanese Front is Camille Chamoun, but real power lies with the commander of the unified military wing, Bashir Gemayel.

An undeclared wing of the Lebanese Front is the militia of Saad Haddad. Haddad — a major in the Lebanese Army during the civil war — declared a 'State of Free Lebanon' in the area of the south bordering Israel, carrying with him a large section of regular Maronite troops. After the invasion of 1978 Israel put its 'security belt' under Haddad's control. This enclave is now thoroughly integrated into Israel economically, and is de facto a military extension of Israel northwards into Lebanon.

Although a participant in the Joint Committee for Military Cooperation, along with the PLO, the LNM and ADF, Amal, 'Hope', is a distinct movement. It is supported by many of the Shiite Muslim population, and has replaced the traditional Shiite leaders like Kemal Assad, with the backing of the clergy of the Shiite Higher Council.

Amal has enjoyed a swift rise to its present prominence. It was founded by Imam Musa Sadr on the basis of his Movement of the Deprived, which expressed the growing resentment of the many Shiites from South Lebanon who have traditionally been the most underprivileged in Lebanese society. Sadr, who had come to Lebanon from Iran in 1957, disappeared in mysterious circumstances in 1978. Assuring his 'return' is still a priority for Amal, whose present leader is the lawyer Nabih Berri.

Amal was formed with the support of the Syrians, the LNM and the Palestinian movement, but today Amal, mistrusting its secularism and socialist ideals, distances itself from the left. Although Amal's charter declares a formal support for the Palestinians and militant opposition to Israel, Sadr insisted to the PLO's Yasser Arafat that 'Jerusalem will be liberated only at the hands of believers'. During the civil war Amal played no military role.

Today Amal has some thousands of men under arms, especially in the south and among the 300,000 displaced Shiites of south and west Beirut. There have been many clashes with the PLO and Lebanese left, which have encouraged both the Israelis and the Lebanese right to look for agreements with Amal on the basis of a

common commitment to the partitioning of Lebanon on a confessional basis.

Fitting into none of these categories, the small militias of the traditional Sunni Muslim leaders are of some significance. They represent the continuing influence of rural landowners who until the civil war headed the official organisations of the Sunni community. Most prominent are the Reform Pioneers of Saeb Salam, and the supporters of Rashid Karami.

When fully mobilised it is estimated that the Lebanese militias, together with those of the Palestinian movement, are able to rally some 100,000 fighters — one for every 30 of the Lebanese population

CSO: 4400/18

SABHAH CONGRESS SECRETARY SPEAKS ON CHAD-LIBYA RELATIONS

LD061722 Tripoli JANA in English 0830 GMT 6 Oct 81

[Text] Tripoli, 5 Oct (JANA)--The secretary of Central Sabhah Basic People's Congress delivered a speech to participants in the rally in which he saluted the revolution's leader and the Chadian president.

He said: "Today we start at this place to commemorate one of the dearest and most immortal occasions, the (?20th) anniversary of the demonstration led by the then student Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the great al-Fatah revolution, against the separation of Syria and Egypt, reaction, colonialism and for the realisation of Arab unity."

He added: "On 5 October 1961, the revolutionary student moved with his colleagues under the fire of the mobile forces and the police in rejection of the separation of Syria and Egypt, and in condemnation of events then taking place in the African and Arab world.

"The Libyan Arab people's dream came true in 1969, after the eruption of the great al-Fatah revolution. The Libyan people were thus in command of the greatest revolution mankind has ever known and where authority, wealth and arms were transformed to the people."

He continued: "Through popular victories we have affirmed our constant readiness to defend freedom everywhere against all colonisers and in support of the weak. Here at Sabhah, we declare to the world with pride that the Jamahiriyah's people will stand side by side with the Chadian people to enhance their freedom and realise their free will.

"We also declare our readiness to support the Chadian people who, under Frolinat's leadership, achieve security and stability in the country. We declare this support in the belief that the Jamahiriyah and Chad's security are interrelated. Furthermore, the two peoples have deep cultural, civilisational, spiritual and geographic links, and a history of long common struggle."

The Basic People's secretary said: "The (?fate of the Libyan) and Chadian people are intertwined. This common path was sealed by blood sacrificed by both peoples in a common quest for freedom and the unity of both peoples."

[Words indistinct] on the path of the great al-Fatah revolution, are intent on continuing the march for strengthening the people's authority, and building the society of the masses so that worldwide freedom gains victory and all forms of oppression and exploitation are forever eradicated."

CSO: 4500/12

INTERVIEW WITH PEOPLE'S COURT PROSECUTOR

LD110008 Tripoli Voice of Arab Homeland in Arabic 2150 GMT 10 Oct 81

[Excerpts] Brothers, God's peace, mercy and blessings be upon you. Here is an interview with Dr Ahmed 'Abd al-'Al, chief prosecutor of the Arab People's Court which passed the sentence of high treason on Al-Sadat. We start by asking Dr 'Abd al-'Al his views on the official version being disseminated by the radios and information media of Cairo about the death sentence against Al-Sadat.

['Abd al-'Al] The official claim made by official circles in Egypt is in fact [word indistinct] the event and coverup of the Egyptian people's rejection of all the plots hatched by the regime. It is an attempt to blind the world and Arab opinion to the facts about events inside Egypt. The truth of the matter is completely different.

In my opinion what has taken place in Egypt is a great event, by far bigger than many had imagined. It is in fact an implementation of the Arab people's views on Al-Sadat's regime.

Let us return for a moment to the Arab People's Court before I proceed to prove that what happened was an implementation of the sentence passed by the Arab People's Court. The Arab People's Court was not formed easily. It was the result of hard work and numerous conflicts among many quarters. Many fought against the court idea because they knew of its objectives. They knew what was intended by it, for it meant that the Arab people could try any Arab head of state who betrayed the national interests. They could try him while still in office, not after his death, for the sake of history only, but try him at the height of his power. This was a serious precedent and all fought against the court idea.

But despite the fight, we succeeded in convening the court, which had yet another aim: to underline Arab unity and prove that the Arab peoples are one people.

The court consisted of judges from the various Arab homelands: one judge from Iraq, another from Syria, a third from Egypt, a fourth from Yemen and so on. Yet all had a clear understanding of all matters. In discussing sentences, however, there were conflicts of opinion.

All agreed on rejecting the capitulatory course. When the court was set up, everybody said that it would never convene. But we said it would. The Arab People's Congress said it should convene and so it did.

They also scoffed at the court, saying it would have no influence and its sentences would never be carried out. They said Al-Sadat suppressed the Egyptian people by force, he could do whatever he liked and the Egyptian people would submit to whatever he did. But we said the court's sentences would be effective and the Egyptian people were capable of carrying out the sentence.

We were asked: Who will carry out the sentences? They asked this mockingly sometimes and seriously at other times. They asked: Who will see to the implementation of the sentence? We said that for every court, there is a body, an executive body, but since our court is of a particular character, for we are a political court in the first place, then the body to be entrusted with the implementation of the sentence will be the Egyptian people, who have a vested interest in it. The Egyptian people will be the ones to implement the sentence. The Egyptian people have truly executed the sentence.

If we were to review events in Egypt, we would readily discover that what happened was actually an implementation of that sentence. This is because the Egyptian people started with political opposition. They started with demonstrations. The opposition intensified. Al-Sadat began to imprison scores of people. The opposition mounted further, so he dissolved the People's Assembly and expelled the opposition. He exhausted all the undemocratic methods. Yet the opposition continued to intensify gradually against Al-Sadat's policy. Finally, he got fed up with the opposition and threw them all in prison. He did not leave left, right or middle. He used sectarianism as a pretext and tried to use it to crush the opposition to him.

This proves that the assassination did not come out of nothing. It was preceded by serious opposition and escalation of opposition until it reached a peak. Here came the proper moment for executing the sentence of the Arab People's Court, which had convicted Al-Sadat of high treason.

The way the sentence was carried out is indicative of extreme courage. This is not strange coming from the Egyptian people. The Egyptian people have a great history. They previously fought the British and the French with sticks, and did so against guns and arms. I believe it was not too much to ask the Egyptian people to implement the sentence against Al-Sadat, after he had committed so many crimes against his people and his Arab nation.

[Question] And now, Dr Ahmad 'Abd al-'Al, chief prosecutor of the Arab People's Court, what are your comments on the reactions to the assassination of Al-Sadat, particularly those of the Americans, the Zionists, the Europeans and the reactionaries?

[Answer] All the reaction was natural. It is extremely natural for the United States to protest and to get angry and the same applies to Zionism and the reactionaries. Looking at the western press and at the funeral, we reach the conclusion that those who oppose the Arab People's Court sentence are the enemies of the Arab nation. They are completely and specifically known. Begin, Carter and Ford were all extremely sad because they have lost one of their tools in the Arab area. At the same time, they were frightened and disturbed by the events. This is because they realize that their intelligence departments, the Egyptian

and the Zionist intelligence, despite all their strength and despite all the weapons and sophisticated equipment and American experience provided by the American intelligence, failed to protect him in the face of the wrath of the Egyptian people and the wrath of the Arab people, of whom the Egyptian people are only a part.

The Arab People's Court which passed the sentence was not an Egyptian court but an Arab court; yet the Egyptian people implemented the court's sentence.

There is a progressive country on our borders: Libya. What takes place in Libya is bound to have repercussions in Egypt and what takes place in Egypt must have repercussions in Libya. The two peoples are brothers and always had cordial relations, as was the case during 'Abd al-Nasir's days. Today what takes place in Libya has repercussions among the Egyptian people. Here lies the fear of the revolutionary tide in Libya and the revolutionary tide that manifested itself in Egypt. Hence the 6th Fleet is preparing itself to calm down any revolutionary move inside Egypt or any development in Libya.

I do not believe that the 6th Fleet, the 7th Fleet or even the 500th Fleet can stop the revolutionary tide. If they were really so tough, they would have been able to check the revolutionary tide in Iran or elsewhere. Defeat is always the fate of imperialism. Victory is always for the peoples.

[Question] Dr 'Abd al-'Al, it is said that every president who comes to power in Egypt takes a policy completely different from the policy of his predecessor. What do you say about this theory at this precise time?

[Answer] It is a dangerous theory. There is nothing to indicate that every president pursues a new line. Al-Sadat's case, coming after 'Abd al-Nasir, is unique. This is because Al-Sadat's policy did not represent Egypt or even any particular class in Egypt.

Every president must be held responsible for every step he takes. Let Al-Sadat's example be a lesson to all. Every president must be responsible for his actions.

Yet I still say that the regime continues despite the fall of its leader. We must be very careful lest we think that the question is very simple and that since Al-Sadat has gone, everything will become normal again as it was before him. No, this is a superficial view. The regime continues to stick its paws in the body of the Egyptian people.

We all must be on the alert and have a clear view. Huge responsibilities still lie on the shoulders of the Egyptain people and their national leader internally and externally, but most particularly internally. The road is still long. Either the officials learn the lesson and pursue the right course, which is the road of the people, or the people will destroy anyone who stands in their way. The Egyptian people are, I am sure, very sensitive and very clever. They know well who is good and who is bad. They know well what policies are in their interest and what policies are against their interests.

[Question] Could you, Dr 'Abd al-'Al, give us your evaluation of the recent events in Asyut, Alexandria and Cairo?

[Answer] [Words indistinct] The people may triumph at one time or be defeated by the regime at other times. But be confident that the Egyptian people [words indistinct]. I am confident that the Egyptian people will not stop the struggle until they remove all traces of treason and eradicate the disgrace from their forehead and the forehead of the Arab nation--a disgrace that has befallen us without our being responsible for it. The people are capable of rectifying the course and will change the course. The people will bring the regime down however hard they fire at it. This is the nature of the Egyptian people.

I am confident that the resistance will escalate and the arms will rise in Egypt. Four years ago I told my brothers everywhere: The only way to deliver Egypt from the treason and the regime is to resort to arms. The battle has started and arms were used. The battle will continue until the regime is toppled and Egyptian territory is cleansed of all its traces.

CSO: 4504/22

NEED FOR CULTURAL POLICY IN ORDER TO HAVE REVIVAL STRESSED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 29-30, 31 Aug, 1 Sep 81

[Article by D. Zeine: "For a Cultural Revival"]

[29-30 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] On the morrow of their independence, the developing countries, most of them former colonies, are facing a myriad of political, economic, social and cultural problems. These problems are often so pressing and their means for meeting them so limited that it becomes necessary to give priority to some and neglect others for a time. And yet, the choice of priorities is in itself a problem that is not always correctly resolved by these countries.

In fact, in the face of several problems to be solved, priority must be given to the one whose solution will help solve others or will have the greatest possible effect on their resolution. In a sense, one focuses on the main problem, on whose solution that of others depends. Unfortunately, in most of these countries, the people are in too much of a hurry, are too careless, too irresponsible to knock themselves out, to bend over backwards to determine that priority problem. Rapidly and without paying too much attention to them, they consult foreign technical advisers (trained in terms of a completely different experience) and decide to concentrate on a given priority. In our countries, we change priorities as often as we change advisers, allies or boubous and these changes are too often the result of a whim and not a position long reflected upon and selected within the framework of an established, long-term policy unfailingly followed and applied with flexibility. Instead of acting, we react to the (very often aggressive) "solicitations" from abroad. It is not for nothing that some call us "big babies."

The many problems that our country has had to face following our accession to independence undeniably include the cultural problem, but the single cultural aspect that has always monopolized the attention of public opinion and sometimes that of the rulers is the linguistic aspect.

This aspect is naturally very important, but it is not everything. The language is the vehicle, the driving force of any culture, but culture does not only mean language. Culture grows around language, but goes beyond it and transcends it. For a long time, we limited ourselves to the linguistic aspect of culture, practically (or almost) neglecting all other aspects. The cultural problem that mobilized our

intellectuals was the problem of languages, which some considered to be the priority of priorities. When, in 1979, a solution satisfactory to everyone was found to this problem of languages, our intellectuals reverted to their lethargy and some, faithful to their customary unilateralism, turned to sports, tempted to interpret culture once again as being limited to sports.

This is perhaps the time to speak plainly: Sports are an important element of culture but not all of culture.

Culture is also painting, sculpture, architecture, literature, philosophy, poetry, economics, and so on. It is time to put an end to this unilateralism and design a cultural policy that would encompass all these varied aspects, a policy that takes our secular cultural heritage and the extremely rich contribution of the rest of mankind into account.

II. Culture: Definition, Importance

For some, the definition of culture is easy: It is all the knowledge that a human being possesses. This definition is naturally valid, but it is only the very restricted, common and scarcely scientific meaning of the word. Actually, we tend more and more to agree on the fact that culture covers the entire range of activities of a given human group, as well as the ideological representations which that group makes of itself and of the milieu in which it is found. From this standpoint, culture includes domains as varied as mores, customs, religious beliefs, the sciences, economics, morals, literature and arts. In a word, culture is everything that man does not find ready-made in nature, everything that man adds to nature. However, we are considering here only the restrictive definition limiting the concept of culture to all the ideological representations (literature, poetry, art, morals, and so on) that we make of our relations between ourselves and the relations we have with our milieu.

Is culture eternal, immutable? Does it not ever change?

No, culture is not eternal. On the contrary, it is very relative, very linked to evolution and historical changes. Every human group evolves quantitatively and qualitatively, changes ways of living, instruments, acquires more experience, more control over the natural milieu in which it lives.

That milieu undergoes transformations in its turn, transformations that are slow, naturally, but they are continual and major and force man to change in order to be able to adapt. Because of all these things, culture does not remain the same over the centuries. It is enriched by new experiences, new contributions.

On what is the importance of culture based? Must one consider the cultural (and not solely linguistic) problem as the priority of priorities? In my opinion, yes. It is only by promoting a cultural leap that one can witness an economic leap and greater moralization of our administrative and political life. A people scarcely open to modern sciences, mostly illiterate, and whose intelligentsia -- still a small group -- manifests very little real and sincere interest in the problems of the people and total sterility on the level of intellectual creativity, that people cannot face the challenge of underdevelopment. It is not the number of

loans obtained from friendly countries and foreign organizations that will enable us to emerge from underdevelopment, but above all, our ability to use them in an intelligent manner and without waste in order to promote modest, but productive, investments. It is not the fine plans, the lofty resolutions and ringing slogans that will pull this country out of its current difficult situation, but men who love their people, men who are devoted to their interests, in a word, honest men.

How are we to interest our people in modern science? How can we make our people literate? How can we make our administrative personnel honest? How can we give rise to an intellectual elite capable of guiding this country toward progress? The only way is to arouse a cultural renewal, a renaissance of our arts, our letters, promote an opening to the achievements of the rest of mankind, without fear or timorousness. Those who are already crying "alienation" (when the country has scarcely emerged from its secular isolation) are demonstrating a poorly oriented zeal. The danger facing us today is not the risk of alienation, but the degree of stagnation. We have too many things to learn from peoples who have taken up the torch of scientific progress from the hands of our ancestors.

We need a Mauritanian cultural renaissance in order to create the conditions for an economic, political and social takeoff in our country. Such a renaissance means a return to the modernized values of the past, an opening to other cultures, and above all, creativity, innovation. Only such a movement will shake up our intelligentsia and encourage it along a path of active participation. If the people are the driving force of history, the intellectuals are then the driving force of the people.

[31 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] Cultural Tradition of Mauritania

While the pre-Islamic period is practically unknown to us, it is undeniable that the penetration of Islam is going to lay the foundations of an unprecedented cultural leap in our country.

Well before the arrival, during the 9th century, of the great masters of the country: Abdellahi Ibn Yassine and Eliman El Hadrami, there already existed important cultural centers in the empire of Ghana and in Aoudaghots.

The accelerated Islamization resulting from the Almoravid Empire, the Beni Hassan invasion in the 15th century and the defeat of the Lwaya (that forced them to devote themselves to intellectual things) in the Char Bebba war: All these events contributed, in one way or another, to the cultural thrust of the following years. The disappearance of the Almoravid Empire, which once again plunged the country into relative isolation separating it by thousands of kilometers of desert from the great intellectual centers of the Machrek and the Maghreb, caused the appearance within it of "a powerful class of clerics, the jealous and influential possessors of religious science and piety capable of transmitting and increasing, by the written works of their own scholars, that traditional knowledge." (De Chassey)

The first "mahaders" (real universities) appeared in the 12th century, but it was beginning in the 17th century, the start of a true cultural renaissance in the country, that they reached their peak.

The program of the mahaders was as varied as it was rich. Theology, law (figh), logic (Mantig), grammar (Nahou and Carf), rhetoric (Belaga), metaphysics, and so on, were taught there. Their flaw resided in the fact that no history, geography or exact sciences (physics, chemistry, mathematics, and so on), which were influential in the Machrek, were taught there. Nevertheless, places such as Chinguetti, Oualata and Ouadane were known all over the world for their ulemas and erudite scholars. Throughout the country, poetry enjoyed a true golden age, to such a point that Mauritania came to be called the "country of a million poets."

And yet, this renaissance began to die out with the colonial penetration. The political instability due to the confrontations between and within emirates, the economic stagnation (no noteworthy technical innovation during the period), accentuated by the successive droughts that struck the country, favored the cultural ebb, which in my opinion is still continuing.

Current Situation

One must have the courage or mere intellectual honesty to recognize that the current situation is depressing.

The most serious thing is not the fact that we are culturally far behind others and our own needs, but our ignorance and unawareness of the situation, our tendency to try to rest on our laurels, that is, our past (poor consolation for our forefathers).

Let us closely examine where we are, after these last 20 years of openness to the outside world.

Scientifically speaking, we do not yet exist and this is fairly normal, especially if we consider the fact that during our cultural "golden age," the exact sciences were not yet being taught.

But while that scientific backwardness can be explained, it is nevertheless disturbing in a world of science, and the degree of its mastery is becoming the criterion separating civilized peoples from barbarian peoples.

The social sciences (sociology, economic, archeology, and so on) are still almost unknown. A small minority of intellectuals has a vague idea of them but do not try to go further or above all, to use them as research material in order to analyze our own circumstances.

Let us look at our literature, if we have one.

The genres such as the novel or the essay are practically unknown. Our intellectual class has not given birth to any novelist or essayist (worthy of the name would be a pleonasm). Our children's textbooks are filled with everything but the works of Mauritanians.

Mauritanian theater is practically nonexistent, except for a few works that are scarcely ever performed. As for poetry, it is the genre in which the Mauritanians excel.

Practically every young Mauritanian is a potential poety. It is an undeniably popular genre that has given birth to marvelous poems.. One example of the degree of attraction which poetry has for young Mauritanians is that when cultural officials organized a contest to choose the best novel and the best poem, they received a single novel and dozens of poems. This commitment of the Mauritanian people to poetry deserves to be the subject of research.

It remains to be seen whether our students will pick up the challenge.

However, it must be noted that for centuries, that poetry has had three subjects that have practically not varied: religious (for didactic purposes), the description of scenery (accompanied by lyrical transports) and love (treated with discretion and reserve.

The poet very often composes in the line of his predecessors but does not have a conscious idea of the artistic conception guiding him. There are very innovations with respect to subject matter.

Finally, painting and sculpture are unknown in our country. It is true that in this field, we have practically no tradition, but this does not justify the degree of abandonment into which they have fallen. A whole aspect of human artistic creation is thereby neglected.

One must add that we have practically no cultural activities: no lectures, few exhibitions (often photography exhibitions, rarely any painting), no cultural festivals or cultural weeks.

There is no national literature price to encourage creation. There is no theater in our country to encourage those who would like to form groups, and so on.

What is the reason for this, one must say, pessimistic picture of our cultural situation? First of all, because it is true and the truth must sometimes be spoken.

Second, it is time to sound the alarm, to attract the attention of our people and our leaders to this other form of "desertification" of our country that threatens to dry out what our ancestors have bequeathed to us.

Furthermore, we must fight the climate of complacent satisfaction and optimism that reigns among our intelligentia, causing total lethargy. The cultural sector has stagnated for far too long in this country. While it was a lesser evil during the period when our people remained relatively isolated, the opening to the modern world and the increase in relations with it no longer allow us to continue that stagnation. Either our culture develops and modernizes or we shall be forced to assimilate the one more in keeping with today's conditions that the imperialist countries tried to sell us. The alternative is now clearly posed.

[1 Sep 81 p 3]

[Text] V. Elements of a Cultural Policy

Any realistic cultural policy must be based on a certain number of factors that are characteristic of our country if it does not wish to amount to mere subjective

desires that go no further than paper. Among these factors, one must emphasize that: a) this country is Islamic and this people is 100-percent Muslim; b) this people is made up of four different communities, each with its own language, its own mores, its specific characteristics and its traditions, in a word, its own culture and the perfect right to develop it; c) the people are culturally very backward, even if the literacy rate (thanks to religious education) is not among the lowest in Africa. This means that in order to spread culture at their level, a relay system must be used. This system is made up of the intellectuals.

Without supporting an elitist culture, I believe that it is necessary, for the time being, to go through an elitist period.

d) It is necessary to promote a liberalization and democratization of the entire cultural sector. Intellectual creation can not be taught or oriented in terms of objectives set in advance. Things connected with art do not always follow the same path as reason. The artist must be allowed to freely express his "fantasies, give free reign to his creative genius, without giving him a certain mold he must follow. As it is stated in one friendly country, the flowers must be left to bloom and schools to freely compete. Art cannot be directed precisely.

The measures that could be taken in order to give rise to a cultural boom can be of two kinds: a) measures of awareness and popularization; and b) measures of encouragement.

Measures of awareness and popularization: We must increase the number of lecture in the capital on economic, political and especially literary topics, ensuring that the level will be high and realizing that only a small group of intellectuals could attend.

These lectures should deal with current national or international subjects, but above all, be enriching and be adequately publicized.

We must, whatever the cost, rapidly set up a cultural journal on a high level that would arouse the interest of our intellectuals and result in their participation.

Many of our cadres want to and can write, but they do not have a free platform with a sufficient audience in order to do so.

In such a journal, they could make their literary debut.

We must increase the number of literary and poetry contests in order to choose the best works in the fields and especially the young people who manifest talent. These young people should receive privileges (scholarships, material aid, gifts of books, training programs) in order to be able to improve upon their natural gifts and take advantage of the experience of other writers in the world. Above all, we must not allow them to be more "murdered Mozarts" -- that is, stuck in administrative or other tasks that are unworthy of them and that make them waste their precious writer's gift.

We must institute an annual festival of culture to which international lecturers and foreign theater groups will be invited. This festival will in a sense be an annual cultural festival, a meeting place at which we can draw up the balance sheet of what has taken place over the past year and comment upon the latest international innovations in the literary and artistic fields.

We must organize exhibitions of painting and sculpture in order to make these disciplines known to our people and make them sensitive to their importance. We must encourage young talents that are manifested in this field.

We must create a national theater and form a national artists group. The theater is an important means of reaching our masses and many of our intellectuals can write interesting works. But how can they write if there is no theater to perform their work?

Measures of encouragement: These can consist of the establishment of three national prizes of a high sum of money (100,000 to 200,000 monetary units) in order to encourage annually: a) the best novel or essay; b) the best work of poetry; and c) the best piece of journalism.

These prizes, whose equivalent exists in all countries of the world, are necessary in order to arouse a rivalry among our intellectuals and give rise to a climate favorable to the growth of our culture.

In addition, the country's large enterprises and banks can also create their own annual prizes in order to encourage literary creation, as their colleagues do everywhere in the world.

In applying these measures, we must systematically avoid the creation of new structures that will be added to those already in existence and thereby further encumber the system and make it inoperative. The second danger consists of entrusting the stimulation of the cultural sector to persons who view it as identical to all other administrative posts.

Entrusting a cultural institution to someone who does not passionately love culture is exactly the same thing as entrusting the management of an atomic plant to an ecologist.

It is not difficult to imagine the result. If we succeed in creating an elite passionately fond of culture and convinced of the need for its dissemination among the people, we shall contribute to a new cultural renaissance in our country.

11,464
CSO: 4519/59

SHALE OIL EXPLOITATION AGREEMENT SIGNED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 10

[Text]

The Royal Dutch/Shell oil group last week signed an agreement with Morocco to help carry out a feasibility study and develop a pilot plant to exploit large shale oil deposits in remote areas near Tarfaya on the edge of the Western Sahara. The Tarfaya oil shale reserves are estimated at 10-20 billion tonnes and are more substantial than those near Timahdit in central Morocco. However, they have a lower oil content, yielding 45-60 litres a tonne compared to Timahdit's 74 litres a tonne.

Earlier this year, Morocco signed a $13 million agreement with the US company Davy McKee to build a pilot plant to exploit the Timahdit oil shale deposits (see *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 4 and April 27, 1981). The Timahdit plant, scheduled to go into operation in 1983, will be followed by a commercial demonstration unit comprising two 5,000 tonne furnaces. A production target of 100,000 tonnes a year has been set for 1985 and Morocco's Energy and Mines Ministry hopes to achieve a figure of 400,000 tonnes a year in 1986.

Producing oil from shale is a central part of Morocco's ambitions to become self-sufficient in oil, natural gas and uranium by the year 2,000. The 1981-85 five-year development plan allotted $938 million for the shale oil programme out of a total expenditure of $2.7 billion. Morocco's oil shale deposits are reckoned to be the fourth largest in the world after the US, Brazil and the Soviet Union. They could eventually cover the country's current demand for energy, which is running at about 5 million tonnes a year of oil equivalent, although the technology involved in the extraction process is relatively untried.

The Moroccans envisage that the Tarfaya pilot plant will ultimately lead to construction of a commercial production unit with a capacity to process 70,000 b/d of shale oil, equivalent to about 3.7 million tonnes a year. Shale oil is heavy (about 20° API), but if Morocco can extract it at the target cost of $29 a barrel, it should go a long way towards meeting domestic needs at an economic cost.

CSO: 4500/15

BRIEFS

NEW OIL FIND--New deposits of oil have been found in commercial quantities offshore close to Qatar's Bunduq oilfield, the Qatari government announced last week. The oil is of 40° API quality and tests have shown that the deposits are easily exploitable. The Qatari statement gave no figures for the size of the deposits but said they were likely to add considerably to the state's 4.6 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. The find was made in the Arab-C zone on the Qatari side of the Bunduq field, which Qatar shares equally with Abu Dhabi. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 10]

CSO: 4400/17

BRIEFS

SWEDES WIN CONTRACT--The Swedish state-owned firm, Kockum, has won a $228 million contract to supply the Saudi National Shipping Company (SNSC) with four roll-on/roll-off vessels. The financially-troubled Swedish company announced the contract last week after several years without any foreign orders in its books. It attributed its success in winning this deal to its offer to deliver the vessels six months earlier than other bidders. The ro-ro ships will be the largest in the world, at 38,500 dwt each, according to shipping sources in Stockholm. Their capacity of 2,000 teu (container) capacity corresponds to 25 per cent of Saudi Arabia's annual container traffic. The vessels will operate between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The first ship is due for delivery in the spring of 1983 and the last at the end of that year. The Swedish Ministry of Industry has provided Saudi Arabia with a guarantee of delivery for the four vessels. According to Ebbe Krook, the managing director of the Malmo shipyard, where the ro-ros will be built, workers' redundancies will now be halted as a result of the order. Reductions in the workforce have been going on since January, following a $114 million loss for Kockum last year. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 11]

CSO: 4400/17

SYRIA PLANS NEW SOURCES OF INCOME

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 4

[Text] TAX revenues in Syria are to be doubled between now and 1985. The money is needed to pay for the new $26bn Five Year Plan, which runs till 1985 and should have started at the beginning of the year. However, the Plan was only approved by the National Assembly last month.

The aim is that tax revenue should increase from the 1980 figure of 10 per cent of GDP to 15 per cent in 1985. Since the Plan document puts GDP in 1980 at $14bn and says it will rise to $20.3bn in 1985, the expectation is that tax revenue should go from $1.4bn to $3bn. Just how the extra revenue will be raised — whether by increased output and sales as the living standard rises, or through an increase in rates of taxation — is yet to be made clear.

The government of premier Abdul Rauf al Kasn — who was brought in January last year to revitalise the economy and revamp the Plan (hence the delay) is well aware that extra tax revenue will not be sufficient by itself to raise the necessary finance for the Plan. It wants to increase personal savings by about 11 per cent a year, which means that Syria's low interest rates could be raised quite soon. At the moment there is more incentive to borrow rather than save. However, the government hopes that savings should be worth $4.5bn in 1985, compared with last year's figure of $2.7bn.

Exports are also to be boosted by 6.5 per cent yearly, while imports — already rigidly controlled — are to be kept back to a growth rate of only 3.4 per cent. Only last month the government restricted some imports, including cigarette lighters, fish, cheese and watches, while banning others — air conditioners, cigarettes, perfume and frocks — outright. The authorities also tightened foreign exchange regulations.

Given the meausres already introduced, it is expected that the above policies will be put into operation and incidentally so have a beneficial effect on the country's foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, there is still expected to be a trade deficit of well over $1bn by 1985.

One of the prime goals of the new Plan is social development, and the government has set itself the task of creating 460,000 new jobs by 1985. Particular emphasis is being put on education — especially following the decision earlier this year to make primary schooling compulsory throughout the country — with plans to build 29,000 new classrooms (23,000 of them for primary schools), and end the present doubling-up system in schools whereby one 'shift' of pupils uses the building in the morning and another in the afternoon.

Nevertheless, despite a planned annual 7.6 per cent growth in GDP, there is a noticeable shift in emphasis away from industrial projects. Agriculture is made a top priority and is getting $4.4bn during the five-year period; that comprises just under 17 per cent of the total Plan investment and is about three times the amount the sector received under the last Plan. Nor apparently does it include planned spending on agro-industrial projects.

Tourism is to get $169m, $57m of it for new projects. The government expects a private sector involvement in the Plan to be about 20 per cent — somewhat less than the private sector's current slice of the economy, which is put at between 25-30 per cent. However, technocrat Premier al Kasn has high hopes of the private sector, which in the past has proved far more efficient than the cumbersome state sector. Both prime minister and National Assembly were highly critical of the state sector's previous performance while the Plan was being discussed last month.

CSO: 4400/18

BRIEFS

IDB LOAN FOR GARBAGE--The Islamic Development Bank is lending Syria $5 million, the IDB announced in Jeddah last week. The loan is to be used to finance construction of a factory to recycle garbage from the city of Damascus, the IDB said. In June, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) granted Syria a $7.9 million loan for a similar purpose (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, June 22) but it is not clear whether the latest IDB loan is for the same treatment plant. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 4]

CSO: 4400/18

TUNISIA'S OIL PRODUCTION POTENTIAL OUTLINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 38, 26 Sep 81 pp 54-55

[Article by David Buckman]

[Text] THE NEWS that Tunisia will apply to join Oapec at its 8 December ministerial meeting in Abu Dhabi has focused attention on a state that rarely makes oil headlines. Many new-prospect watchers within the industry, however, rate Tunisia as the dark horse among Arab producers. Although its production has for years hovered around a modest 100,000 b/d, the north African country has considerable potential, mainly offshore.

The renewed enthusiasm for prospecting off Tunisia by leading international companies indicates that, given the right conditions, the country could become one of this decade's Mediterranean drilling hotspots. Moreover, the government appears keen to foster explorer activity.

Tunisia's oil output last year met domestic needs, and earned over $750m from net exports. But the lack of major new production, and an indicated decline in the tiny volume of gas gathered onshore, had raised the prospect that Tunisia could become a net energy importer by the end of the 1982-1986 development plan. The effect of this on the balance of payments, with oil prices set to climb, would be grave.

Traditionally, the country has relied on its onshore oilfields, but their performance has never been dazzling. Just over half the 100,000 b/d of recent years has been produced onshore, almost entirely from the El Borma field. This is operated by Sitep, a partnership of Italy's Agip and the Tunisian state oil firm, Etap.

It has been necessary to waterflood El Borma to maintain output. In view of the impending membership of Oapec, it is interesting to note that the Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation, an Oapec associate body, promised Etap $40m towards its share of the cost of this waterflooding in 1979.

The country's remaining half-dozen onshore fields are all tiny, and depend heavily on the expertise of Italian and French companies — the traditional non-indigenous operators. The last of the fields to go onstream was Agip's Chouech Essaida in 1977, to the tune of a few hundred barrels daily. Amoco raised hopes in 1979 when its Sabria North wildcat well tapped nearly 1,000 b/d, all the more because it was the first strike in the Chott Djerid area in the southwest. By this time, however, the Tunisians were fast realising that offshore was where the real potential lay.

This turnround in thinking had begun in December 1973, when the French firm SNEA brought the Ashtart field in the Gulf of Gabes onstream. It remains the only producing offshore field, and has shown that an initially unexciting find off Tunisia can be economically viable. The discovery well yielded only 1,500 b/d, which is poor by Middle East or North Sea standards, but Ashtart lies in shallow water (about 60 metres) and is only 80km from Sfax, a key port for offshore oil activity.

The operator reckoned that output levels of 50,000 b/d were feasible, so to reduce capital costs a trunkline to shore was dispensed with. Instead, Ashtart was developed using the increasingly common offshore production system concept. In this

case, it was a mix of steel platforms, a storage tanker and mooring buoys which permitted shuttle tankers to load.

Ashtart's output has had to be supported by water injection since 1975, but the field remains a major contributor to national output. Moreover, it has piloted a production concept which could well be adapted at other Tunisian offshore fields.

Tunisia has had several encouraging signs in its offshore search recently. Big international operators, such as US Occidental, are now keen to acquire new acreage, even if it means having Etap as majority partner. New commitment is being seen from major existing concessionaires such as BP and Shell, who are both now active searchers. Also, the discoveries are fanning out across the continental shelf, with potential sites in the Gulfs of Gabes and Hammamet: there are now over a dozen significant oil and gas finds.

Four oil finds with interesting features should be watched as front-running potential producers over the next few years: Tazerka, Halk el Menzel, Isis and Didon. Tazerka promises to be the biggest subsea production project in the Mediterranean. The field lies in the Gulf of Hammamet and was discovered by Tunirex (Shell) although the initial wells drilled in 1979 went largely unremarked by the industry.

Then, in December 1980, Single Buoy Moorings, a company with a growing interest in fields based on subsea wells, announced it had received a letter of intent for the engineering and project management of a system for Tazerka. The integrated floating production, storage and offloading complex is due to be installed in the summer of 1982, for oil to start flowing at end-year.

It will use five subsea wellheads initially and will be centred on a tanker of just over 200,000 dwt. No output rate has yet been disclosed for the field, which is believed quite small.

Tunirex has other finds in the Gulf of Hammamet which should prove of long-term interest. It has had some success with its Birsa and Oudna wells. Also watchable are the efforts of BP, which took over as operator in the Gulf on acreage where Buttes, a US independent, made the promising Jasmine oil finds in 1976-77.

A group led by Elf Aquitaine, which made the Halk el Menzel discovery in 1977, is also studying production in the Gulf. In 1979 a fourth well proved encouragingly productive. Elf reckons it has a potentially viable small field, but says plans must await interpretation of the wells.

The other two fields moving towards production are, like Ashtart, in the Gulf of Gabes. The first is Isis, found by Total of France in 1974, with a discovery well which flowed a promising 2,500 b/d. However, the marginal nature of the reservoir prompted Total to seek favourable development terms from the government. Although an agreement was reported to have been signed some three years ago — and despite the fact that Total claimed up to 40,000 b/d seemed feasible — development has been held up until the International Court of Justice rules on a median-line dispute in the Gulf.

The Didon find, which was discovered as long ago as 1976 by Sofratep, with Elf Aquitaine as operator, is also near Libyan waters. Just over a year ago the British firm CJB Offshore announced that Etap had asked it to study recovery of Didon 1 oil with a view to development.

Tunisia has in the past suggested to Libya the formation of a company to explore in the Gulf of Gabes jointly. Libya is known to have substantial offshore oil and gas finds in the region awaiting exploitation, and apparently did not respond favourably.

Alongside these oil prospects, Tunisia is examining the future of several gas fields offshore. The evaluating body is Segma, an organisation set up by Tunisian and French interests. The Oapec associate Apicorp has a 20 per cent stake in it, which is further evidence of Tunisia's burgeoning relationship with the Arab oil-producer group.

Tunisia may never be a big exporter by international standards. For the offshore driller, however, it promises steady business for a long time — and there is always the tantalising chance of an exciting find.

CSO: 4500/13

POLISARIO'S POSSIBLE STATUS DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 38, 26 Sep 81 p 27

[Text] MAURITANIAN leaders are deeply concerned over the OAU's proposed referendum in the Western Sahara: they fear that if the vote is in favour of maintaining links with Morocco, the Polisario's military command will move their operations into northern Mauritania.

Mauritania was a participant at the Nairobi OAU summit in June and initially welcomed King Hassan's surprise proposal of a supervised referendum in the Western Sahara. But as it has become increasingly clear that Rabat intends to maintain both its administration and its army in the region during the referendum, Nouakchott spokesmen make no secret of their belief that the Polisario cannot win.

'We believe that the Polisario has been deserted by many of their former African supporters and that with voting on the basis of a very old Spanish census, the voting cannot favour them,' said one high ranking official. 'The military will then move from their bases in Tindouf, Algeria and Hawza in the Sahara and set up camp in Mauritania.' The Spanish census was conducted in 1974 and records 74,497 inhabitants, while the Polisario claims that at least half a million people fled the territory after the Moroccan army entered in 1975 and 1976.

Mauritanian officials fear that any large-scale influx of the Polisario and its followers would destabilise the precarious ethnic and political balance within the country. It was in order to rid itself of external tribal pressures and military expenditure that Nouakchott withdrew from the fray in the first place.

In early August, Mauritania's military government announced a ministerial reshuffle including the appointment of Major Ahmed Ould Minnih as the country's new foreign affairs minister. Perhaps in recognition of a tougher stance by Mauritania, the Polisario quickly released 86 Mauritanian civilians, policemen and soldiers who had been held for some time.

The Polisario is fully aware that its claims of kinship with the northern Mauritanians could provide its members with a refuge, and it is this that worries the Nouakchott authorities. With the Polisario active and warmly received by northerners, Mauritania's African southerners would probably turn their allegiance to their own kinsmen in Senegal, thereby polarising the country's two communities and endangering national unity.

Saudi Arabia is watching events with deep anxiety. Saudi aid has helped develop the Moroccan-administered Sahara.

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END

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23 October 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2421

ACTIVITIES OF EGYPTIAN LEFT

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ACTIVITIES OF EGYPTIAN LEFT

[The magazine AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI is a publication of the Egyptian Communist Party which is edited by the well-known CP member Michel Kamil.]

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BEIRUT LEFTIST PAPER REPRODUCES PARTY DOCUMENTS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 17, 18, 21 Nov 80

/Article: "The Egyptian Communist Party: Documents of the First Conference"/

17 Nov 80 p 11

/Text/ The general program approved at the start of the first conference of the Egyptian Communist Party will present the historic course of the Egyptian national revolution in three parts: one, the revolution before July 1952, two, the revolution of July 1952, and three, the period after the counterrevolution.

This abridged historical review concludes that the course of the revolution before July 1952 "transcended the bourgeoisie's methods of resolving the national issue by negotiating and haggling with the British occupier. The conviction began to take root in the masses of the people that they should undertake armed struggle against the occupation and they imposed this approach in fact in the end of 1951 as a major combat technique in the Egyptian national movement."

It also concludes that the constant deterioration in the economic conditions of the popular masses touched off the class struggle, which began to experience a series of major labor strikes and sit-ins starting in 1946 and involved peasant uprisings--in fact "the economic strikes extended to the ranks of the people working in the agencies of repression themselves (the police strike of 1948 and the constables' strike in 1951)."

From this, the historical introduction reaches the conclusion that a real opportunity would have arisen for establishing a democratic national front at that time, had colonialism and the palace not contrived the plot of the Cairo fire on 26 January 1952, imposed martial law and struck out at the national movement.

"However, the severe blow did not save the alliance between colonialism and local reaction from its oppressive crisis."

This is the crisis to which the July 1952 revolution responded.

In the 23 July 1952 revolution, the Free Officers' Organization managed to seize power in the light of specific subjective and objective conditions in which the class struggle flared up but the political parties which were able to resolve this

struggle on behalf of one of the two basic poles to the struggle were absent. The national and petty bourgeois parties were incapable of standing up to the alliance of colonialism and feudalism, and the weakness and rifts in the vanguard of the working class, the Egyptian communist movement, its alienation from the broad base of workers and peasants and the continuous violent blows which it received from colonialism, the palace and reaction, did not enable working class to do away with this ruling alliance and take power through a people's revolution.

With the occurrence of the July 1952 revolution, a distinctive stage began in the democratic national revolution in Egypt.

The Free Officers' Organization

The organization which conducted and led the 23 July 1952 revolution included, in terms of class composition, junior officers of intermediate and petty bourgeois origins. From the standpoint of political composition, it embodied a coalition of different, indeed contradictory, political tendencies belonging to different political currents functioning in the ranks of the Egyptian national movement before and at the start of the revolution. There was a major bloc of elements with a bourgeois orientation and there were marxist elements linked to secret communist organizations, elements linked with the Wafd Party and other elements belonging to the Society of Moslem Brothers--in fact, it was later discovered that the organization contained elements with suspicious ties to American and British circles.

On the eve of the outburst of the revolution, these elements with their different political tendencies reached agreement on general national goals which were embodied in the six goals of the revolution. With the evolution and accompanying polarizations of the class struggle, the leadership of the Free Officers' Organization, which basically belonged to the national bourgeois current, proceeded to liquidate the marxist and Moslem Brother elements, and the process of class polarization shifted to the ranks of this main bloc itself. The leadership of the July revolution witnessed further liquidations and constant purges through the evolution of the national and social struggle, under the influence of changes in the balance and relationship among local, Arab and international forces.

This phenomenon was most conspicuous, in particular, after the attainment of political independence, when the social struggle among the class groups which had been allied erupted over the response to the question "To whom will this independent nation belong?"

Evaluation of the July Revolution and Its Measures

A lengthy debate arose in the ranks of the Egyptian communist movement, from the time the revolution occurred, over its evaluation and definition of the nature of the power that emerged from it and the economic and social measures it adopted.

The Egyptian communists' positions on this revolution ranged from sound to erroneous ones. These positions changed and were exchanged with the course and development of the revolution.

From the beginning of the revolution to the end of 1952, two positions on the July revolution were crystallized within the Egyptian communist movement. The first was a sound one which supported and backed the national democratic revolution; the other was a leftist, erroneous one which attacked the revolution from the first moment and committed aggression against it, characterizing it as fascism, a military dictatorship or an American military coup.

From the beginning of 1953 to April 1955, the July revolution resorted to prosecuting, imprisoning and detaining communists and other political forces, started to encourage the entry of foreign capital into Egypt, opened the door to negotiation with British colonialism (with which it ended up signing the Jamal-Hyde treaty), and flirted with American imperialism.

These actions by the July authorities led to a rapprochement among the Egyptian communists' positions and a consolidation of their comprehensive attack on the revolution. Dominating the ranks of the Egyptian communist movement was the characterization of the revolution as a military coup or fascism, and the people espousing the sound tendency ceased evaluating the July revolution in terms of their former position, in the course of the fierce general leftist wave which dominated the Egyptian communist movement.

In the stage from April 1955 to the end of 1958, features of a national character of hostility to imperialism gained prominence in the positions the July authorities took (the Bandung Conference, the Czech arms deal, the recognition of People's China, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the tripartite aggression against Port Said, the prominent leadership role of the July revolution within the non-aligned movement, support for national liberation movements, and so forth). This was all accompanied by the closing down of the concentration camps in 1956.

During this stage, the Egyptian communist movement in general adopted a position of supporting and backing the revolution in general, with differences in tones of criticism of the revolutionary authorities, but it lacked an objective critical study of the erroneous position some communists had taken at the start of the revolution.

In the stage from January 1959 to the middle of 1961, with the increase in tension in relations between the July authorities and the Soviet Union and the socialist camp, the intensifying contradiction between the July revolution in Egypt and the July revolution in Iraq, the faltering Egyptian-Syrian union, and the consignment of thousands of Egyptian communists to prisons and camps, exposing them to the terrors of torture to death and slow physical liquidation, the differences in positions within the Egyptian communist movement reappeared. Part of the Egyptian communist movement readopted the erroneous position which had appeared at the beginning of the revolution and redirected the accusation of treason and subservience to America against the leadership of the July revolution. In addition to this, the July authorities were accused of serving Egyptian monopoly capitalism. Conversely, another segment of the Egyptian communist movement clung to its position on the July authorities, regarding them as a national power representing the interests of the national bourgeoisie in spite of their anti-democratic, violent and wrongful measures against Egyptian communists and progressives.

This position was an extension of the sound one which was adopted at the beginning of the revolution and the position over which the Egyptian communist movement reached unanimity in the period from April 1955 to late 1958.

In the wake of the broad nationalization measures of 1961, there emerged two deviations which had arisen in turn from the single-minded vision of the national bourgeoisie. This vision failed to comprehend the manifestations of the schizophrenic nature of the national bourgeoisie, which sometimes was blind to the negative aspects of the July revolution and its grievous errors and at other times was dazzled by the positive features and great achievments of this revolution.

This all resulted in the Egyptian communist movement's failure properly to act as a mediator in pursuing the program of unity and the struggle against the national bourgeoisie.

While the left-wing deviation described the measures of the revolution as hostile to the people and aimed at serving monopoly state capitalism, the right-wing deviation exaggerated the revolutionary powers of the July revolution's national bourgeois leadership to the point where a segment of it imagined that it was very gradually approaching marxist-leninism and described the measures of the revolution in that period as socialist.

A scientific class-based analysis of the July revolution will of necessity lead to the following conclusions:

1. The July 1952 revolution has been the most important stage in the Egyptian national revolution, because it succeeded in carrying out a fundamental change in the class composition of the higher political force in the country by shifting this power from the hands of a monopolistic feudalistic colonial alliance to the hands of the Egyptian national bourgeoisie (fundamentally the middle bourgeoisie). This revolution enabled the national bourgeoisie, for the first time in the history of Egypt, actually to take exclusive hold of political power. On the other hand, the July revolution, in spite of all its zigzags and fluctuations, succeeded in making big strides in the democratic national revolution and the attainment of many of its missions.

In the national sphere, the revolution seized national and social independence, brought off the British military evacuation, established a national progressive power taking positions hostile to imperialism and Zionism, deepened Egypt's Arab affiliation and supported national liberation movements in Africa and Asia.

In the economic and social sphere, the revolution directed mortal blows against feudalism, deprived it of its political privileges, nationalized the Suez Canal, Egyptianized the banks and foreign capital, directed important blows against numerous segments of the large bourgeoisie (indeed the middle bourgeoisie), made great strides in building an independent national economy founded on a broad modern industrial base, realized an important amount of independent economic development by relying basically on the countries of the socialist world, and established a strong public sector playing an important role in leading the domestic economy.

2. In spite of the importance, scope and depth of the political, economic and social transformations which the July revolution achieved under the leadership of the prominent national leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, these measures did not go beyond a national democratic framework, especially since they did not create a radical change in the class nature of production relations in the city and the countryside, did not extirpate exploitative relations and did not close the door to the birth and constant growth of capitalism and the emergence of new bourgeois classes. Agrarian reform, for example, failed to offer a radical solution to the agricultural problem and did not completely eliminate the investments of large close-knit landowners but just contented itself with reducing their size. It did not create a qualitative change in the conditions of poor peasants, agricultural workers and migrant workers. The broad nationalization decrees did not eliminate the basic rules of capitalism, which continued to play its part in the increasing impoverishment of the toiling masses and the increasing enrichment of the bourgeoisie, facilitating the loss of democracy of production in the public sector, technocratic leaders' control of management of the sector through their interlinking interests with private capital, the birth of parasitic activities, the mobilization of the public sector in service of the private sector and use of it as an instrument for achieving further accumulation of capital in the private sector. In another area, the important economic and social transformations which the July revolution realized continued to fail to make political changes of corresponding importance by launching mass initiatives to the maximum degree. To the contrary, the July authorities resorted to practices that renounced democracy and violated citizens' freedom from which no national forces were safe, not even the Nasirist youth and numerous Nasirist elements themselves.

Because of the class nature of the leadership of the revolution, its firm position of hostility toward democracy and popular oversight, and its firm adherence to the monopolization of absolute power, the forces opposed to social progress inside and outside power managed to distort the measures of the July revolution, rally around them, empty them of their progressive content and turn some of them into were dry slogans. Class groups and segments emerged which opposed the authorities and for whom the appropriate climate was created to grow, develop, then launch an assault to impose a total retreat.

The Egyptian Communist Party: Documents of the First Conference

On 1 May 1975, the establishment of the Egyptian Communist Party, or more precisely the re-establishment of this party, was announced.

It is well known that two communist parties existed in Egypt, the product of a series of unification operations which took place in the fifties among the numerous communist organizations which started in the forties and ended in the beginning of 1958 with the consolidation of the Egyptian communist movement into one party, which soon broke up into two parties.

However, these two parties declared their dissolution in 1964 and 1965, successively, as a result of subjective circumstances and out of a specific awareness that a crisis had arisen in the Egyptian communist movement in confronting the Nasirist phenomenon.

In 1968 marxist organizations and circles started to take form and began to consolidate themselves in the country. Some of them issued a document in 1973 condemning the dissolution of the communist movement's organizations by internal decree in 1964 and 1965, describing that as "a major deviationist blunder." This is a document which the party established in 1975 adopted.

However, the establishment of this party has not yet led to the consolidation of the Egyptian communist movement. In addition to the Egyptian Communist Party there are still other communist organizations, most prominently the 8 January Egyptian Communist Party and the Egyptian Communist Workers' Party.

However, the Egyptian Communist Party remains the greatest and most important of these organizations, in terms of the size of its presence and influence on Egyptian political life and also in terms of recognition by international communism.

This party held its first general conference in Egypt last September; that is the first general conference to be held by an Egyptian communist organization.

The five documents which this conference approved were recently broadcast in Beirut. They are the party program, its bylaws, its organizational report and two working papers, "The National Democratic Front in Egypt" and "Consolidation of the Egyptian Communist Movement."

In the next few days, AL-SAFIR will publish selections from these documents with the objective of presenting them for open constructive discussion among concerned people in the Arab and Egyptian contexts.

One must note an essential reservation in this sphere, which is that AL-SAFIR is aware that the selections it publishes from the documents will not by themselves be enough for a fruitful discussion, because however extensive they might be they remain fragments.

Therefore AL-SAFIR has considered it appropriate to put full copies of the documents at the disposal of people interested in this discussion, so that they may be a more thorough source for the dialogue.

/18 Nov 80 p 11/

/Text/ The section which AL-SAFIR published yesterday on the program of the Egyptian Communist Party concluded, in its analysis of the July 1952 Revolution, that the class nature of the leadership of this revolution and its hostility to democracy and popular surveillance enabled the counterrevolutionary forces themselves to grow, develop then launch an assault to impose a total retreat.

This section, which we are publishing today, contains a review of the development of the counterrevolution and its policies and development and a survey of the popular movement and its development since 1952, ending with a conclusion whose gist is that the overall developments in Egyptian political life that had previously been reviewed demonstrate the national bourgeoisie's inability to lead the national democratic revolution and show that the assumption by the Egyptian

working class of the leadership of the national democratic revolution is the essential condition for the success of the revolution and the guarantee that it will complete its tasks and pave the road toward socialism.

Herewith is the Egyptian Communist Party's review of the course of the counterrevolution.

A. In the Realm of Politics

The first step in the political retreat was the initiative al-Sadat proclaimed on 4 February 1971 in the wake of his meeting with Rogers. Following the May coup, the steps of political retrogression started to follow one another rapidly: termination of the mission of the Soviet military advisors and experts, sabotaging of Egyptian-Soviet relations, the furious embrace of the American solution to the national cause, the ill-starred Jerusalem initiative, the separate peace with Israel which diminished Egypt's sovereignty over its territory and for the first time in its history gave it separate political and military boundaries separated by more than 2,000 /square/ kilometers, abandonment of Egypt's Arab commitments, the severance of Egypt's relations with the Arab countries, abandonment of Egypt's Arab affiliation, the nourishing of regional chauvinism hostile to nationalism, the establishment of a tripartite alliance (Sadatist, American and Israeli) against Arab and African national liberation movements and the revolutions of development countries, conversion of Egypt from a pillar of the struggle for liberation against imperialism to a base for the export of counterrevolution and a tool in the hand of neocolonialism, the provision of military bases and military facilities for American imperialism and their use against the peoples of the region, the mobilization of Egyptian armed forces in service of imperialist schemes, protection of the interests of imperialism in the region, and the maintenance of security to protect American imperialism and puppet regimes (military intervention to thwart the progressive revolution of July 1971 in the Sudan, the fabricated armed clash with Libya, military support for the Sultan of Oman (Qabus) against the people's revolution in Oman, military support for Israel's puppet separatist forces in Lebanon, and so forth).

B. In the Realm of Economics

Under the slogan of "releasing individual initiative," "the return of the free economy," and the opening to international capitalism, the counterrevolution has continued to liquidate the economic and social achievements of the July revolution.

The steps of regression from agrarian reform, the retreat from agricultural cooperation, deprivation of the peasant masses of the fruits of its services, and the return of the rural areas to a quasi-feudal society have followed in succession, and a retreat has been made from industrialization as a basis for establishing the productive base through measures of dismembering the public sector and turning it into a subservient servant of foreign and parasitic capital by eliminating general organizations, offering shares in successful public sector companies for sale, and letting these companies enter into joint projects with international monopoly capital.

The apostate regime has kept handing the keys of the domestic economy over to the world's multinational corporations, restoring the era of foreign concessions and linking the Egyptian pound to the American dollar.

The apostate regime has drowned the country in foreign debts to the point where their balance came to 2 billion pounds whereas the balance of foreign debts in 1970 did not exceed $1 billion, then jumped in 1976 to $11 billion. The burdens of foreign debt service in the form of instalments and interest have also leapt to more than 70 percent of the country's total exports, whereas these burdens in 1970 did not exceed 17.7 percent.

The apostate regime has begun responding to the terms of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund regarding the elimination of subsidies on basic commodities, opening the door wide to the growth of parasitic, unproductive activities.

C. In the Realm of Freedom

At the outset the counterrevolution tried to conceal its ugly face with phoney liberal slogans about the sovereignty of the law, the state of institutions and the liquidation of concentration camps. It was compelled, under the pressure of mass struggle, to offer partial concessions in the area of democracy, such as limiting torture, eliminating political isolation, and legalizing political platforms, then limited, restricted political parties. However, the false democratic mask rapidly fell from the face of the apostate authorities. The democracy of 15 May showed its claws and teeth and the anti-democratic regime's essential hostility to the popular masses was laid bare. This was fundamentally embodied in the following:

The brutal unprecedented repression of labor strikes and student upheavals in 1971-75 and the popular upheaval of 18-19 January 1977.

The periodic campaigns of arrests against the national democratic and progressive forces and the fabrication of political charges against adversaries of the regime.

The establishment of massive repressive systems, foremost among them the Central Security Forces, supplied with the most modern weapons and equipment for crushing any mass movement, and the mobilization of a tremendous army of spies, monitors and security agency agents.

The consolidation of absolute powers for the president in the 1971 constitution, enabling him to monopolize adoption of the most serious seminal decisions without reference to executive or legislative institutions.

The arsenal of antidemocratic legislation prejudicial to Egyptian human rights which the apostate authorities have issued subsequently (Law 34 for 1971 on Sequestration, Guaranteeing the Interests of the People, The National Unity Law of 1972, Law 2 for 1977, the Law of 1978 to Protect the Domestic Front, Law 36 for 1979 Amending the System of Political Parties, the Law to Protect Values, and so forth).

The escalating aggression against trade union freedoms and repression of the student movement.

Elimination of the freedom of assembly, organization of demonstrations and the press.

Destruction of parliamentary immunity, the removal of opposition deputies, restriction of the freedom of campaign publicity and the crude falsification of parliamentary elections.

Development of the Popular Movement

Observation of the popular masses' movement since 23 July 1952 will clearly show that the class and national struggle in Egypt has not ceased for a day in spite of all the July authorities' attempts to paralyze it, sometimes by repression and sometimes by co-option.

The class struggle continued at times to ebb and flicker and at other times to grow and burst forth. The popular struggle continued to endorse the authorities, supporting and backing them, when they adopted decisive positions against imperialism and local reaction and responded to national needs and the realization of the masses' social demands, while this struggle confronted and clashed with the authorities when their positions and policies were marked by vacillation, retreat and intense hostility toward democracy.

The masses of workers and peasants, through their revolutionary sentiments, greeted the newborn revolution and supported its progressive steps of removing Faruq from the throne, advancing agrarian reform, eliminating the royal regime, and promoting Egyptianization and nationalization.

The day the tyrannical tripartite aggression took place against Egypt in 1956, the masses rallied around Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's leadership in splendid national unity, and the popular masses stood up to the forces of the British-French-Israeli invasion alongside the armed forces. The Egyptian communists played a prominent historic role in leading the armed popular resistance to the occupation of Port Said. However, in exchange, the July authorities' hostility to the popular masses' independent action in general and the independent working class movement in particular led to clashes between these authorities and the popular movement on numerous occasions.

Directly after the July revolution, the newly-emergent authorities met a sound economic strike on the part of workers in Kafr al-Dawwar with brutal repression, unprecedented in the history of Egypt, and executed two of the labor leaders, the martyrs Khamis and al-Bakri, after a military trial in the field.

In the wake of Egyptian communists' protest against the evacuation treaty of 1954 and the demand that political freedom be granted which they made during the March 1954 events, the July authorities intensified their campaigns against the Egyptian communists and other democratic forces and military councils and exceptional courts continued to mete out sentences of hard labor for communists and leftists.

This period also witnessed a clash between the July authorities and the Society of the Moslem Brothers in the wake of the attempt to assassinate President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir; the leaders of the society were executed and thousands of citizens were detained and imprisoned on the charge of belonging to this society.

In the wake of the Egyptian national bourgeoisie's success in realizing political independence and its important progress toward economic independence, it proceeded to spread about the notion of ending its struggle against colonialism, and its secondary contradiction with the working class and the popular masses proceeded to dominate over its main contradiction with colonialism and local reaction.

The dispute between the July authorities and the Egyptian communists and democratic and progressive forces over the democracy of the regime and the trade union movement's independence of the authorities intensified.

The position on the 14 July Revolution in Iraq, a revolution in which the role of the Iraqi working class began to become increasingly prominent, the undemocratic program for attaining union with Syria, and the national bourgeoisie's mad race for the booties of the national revolution, especially after the Egyptianization measures, /were to further such measures/.

The authorities launched a broad campaign of arrests against communists, proponents of peace, trade unionists, leftists, Wafdists and democrats and engaged in torturing them to death in the Abu Za'bal, Oasis and al-Fayyum concentration camps.

When the setback occurred in 1967, it was natural that the class contradictions should erupt in severe form, especially since the defeat revealed the national bourgeoisie's inability to carry out the tasks of the national democratic revolution--indeed its inability to protect national independence itself. The popular masses realized that the defeat was the natural fruit of the negative aspects of the revolution and the non-radical nature of its class leadership. In the ranks of the popular masses, including the bases of Nasirist youth, there emerged the increasing conviction that it was necessary for the people to take their destiny into their own hands.

When the leader of the July Revolution announced his resignation from the presidency on 9 June 1967, the masses of the people burst forth in a determined uprising, declaring their insistence on continuing the struggle, demanding that Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir remain in his position, raising the slogan of radical change and protection of social gains, and standing up to the counterrevolutionary elements which had started to prepare to seize power.

The masses of 9-10 June did not go out into the street prompted by motives of hero-worship of the national leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir; rather, they rose up in defense of their nation and protection of its achievements, once they had become certain that the class which had assumed charge of the struggle and monopolized leadership of the national revolution had abandoned the field. The masses of the people imposed on the leadership of the July Revolution the burden of remaining firm and continuing to confront the enemies, and raised their independent slogans.

The 9-10 June upheaval was tantamount to a cornerstone for a new revolutionary phenomenon which imposed itself on political life in Egypt in the wake of the setback: the phenomenon of independent mass movement.

For the first time in 13 years, the popular masses dictated their will to the political leadership, vied with it, seized the reins of the initiative from it, drew it into the proper position, and raised high the banner of continuing with the struggle and adherence to the political, economic and social goals and achievements of the July revolution. In another area, the rays of independent organizational forms began to appear through initiatives on the part of the Egyptian communists, a limited number of whom challenged all the unfavorable conditions and circumstances and re-established their independent organizations. This was tantamount to a historic response to the decision to dissolve the communist organizations in 1965 and a practical condemnation of this deviationist blunder, and it was followed by the emergence of secret marxist contacts as pockets inside and outside the regime's organizations.

The July authorities soon frustrated the masses of 9-10 June in their hopes for requisite comprehensive radical change, showed their inability to transcend their negative features, failed to make use of popular support, and contented themselves with taking limited superficial measures of a conciliatory character, so that feelings of bitterness and frustration and elements of shaken confidence in the spirits of the masses started to grow rapidly.

The reduction of the verdicts issued against the people responsible for the air setback in the 1967 war caused the anger of the masses to erupt, and in February 1968 demonstrations of workers and students erupted in protest against the continued policy of laxity vis-a-vis the requirements of the struggle against colonialism and Zionism and the constant retreats before the pressures of the left.

The July authorities tried to co-opt the popular anger, issuing the 30 March Declaration and determining to rebuild the Socialist Union from top to bottom. However, this statement, and the manner in which it was applied, did not slake the masses' thirst and the popular explosion resumed in November 1968.

In the wake of the death of President 'Abd-al-Nasir in September 1970, the forces of the reactionary right tried to exploit the tremendous vacuum which the disappearance of the leader of the July Revolution had left. The masses became aware of the dangers of the movements of the opposition forces and the rifts among the authorities, and set out to a man to turn the consignment of the leader of the July Revolution to his final resting place into a giant popular demonstration, declaring in a resounding voice the masses' insistence on continuing along the road of the revolution and their rejection of hesitation.

In the wake of the May 1971 coup and the apostate regime's pursuit of its antinational policy, the organized marxist detachments rose up to oppose the regime and its policies and the political class struggle erupted in serious form; since the middle of 1971, the country has witnessed a series of class and political battles in which the working class has played a growing leadership role.

Labor strikes and sitins in the main industrial centers followed in succession: among the iron and steel workers in July 1971, the workers in the coke plant and the al-Nasr Automobile Company, the shipyards in Alexandria, the private sector workers in Shubra al-Khaymah in 1972, workers in the military factories in Hilwan in January 1975, the uprising by the workers in the Egypt Textile Company in al-Mahallah in March 1975, the public transport workers' strike, the strike by workers in al-Nasr Manufacturing and Equipment Company in al-Mahallah, and the sitin by workers in the Lumber Trading Company. In addition, successive student upheavals occurred in 1972, 1973 and 1975.

The peasants rose up in arms against attempts to expel them from the land and return it to the old property owners against whom sequestration had been lifted (Kamshish, Abu Kabir and Dikarnas).

In the wake of the issuance of the economic decrees of January 1977, a tremendous popular uprising burst forth on 18 and 19 January in which various classes of the people took part and in which the working class played a leading, assertive role.

Although the apostate regime met this upheaval with brutal repression and a series of anti-democratic measures, it failed to silence and stifle the popular opposition which resumed escalating in 1979 in a manner that had had no precedent since July 1952. The masses of the people proceeded to express their opposition to all aspects of the apostate policy; the masses' struggle escalated in particular against the anti-democratic measures and legislation. The opposition to the anti-democratic policy followed by the regime attracted an important segment of Egyptian intellectuals and members of the judiciary, who proceeded decisively and honorably through their club to defend democracy and the masses' freedoms. Rulings by the Egyptian judiciary reaffirming political freedoms followed one another in succession.

The base of opposition to the policy of economic liberalization is expanding rapidly and attracts increasing segments of the productive national bourgeoisie and national technocratic leaders of the public sector every day. Opposition to the Camp David agreements and the normalization of relations with Israel has also started to grow and increase, and opposition has been growing in the armed forces--a matter which explains the continuing liquidations in the military command ranks. In addition, opposition has grown within the ranks of Egyptians living abroad. Thus the camp of popular opposition to the puppet apostate regime encompasses the various political forces in the country, from the Communists to the Nasirists, the Wafdists, religious groups and people of liberal tendencies. The opposition has not been restricted to secret parties and groups but has also embraced a legitimate party, the National Progressive Unionist Grouping, and even the Labor Party, in whose establishment al-Sadat took part in an attempt to establish a pliant opposition as an alternative to the Grouping Party, has increasingly started upping its opposition to the regime's policies, and increasing number of former staff members of the regime have begun to express their open opposition to its policies.

Thus the rays of a national democratic front containing class and political forces with an indisputable interest in thwarting the counterrevolution and carrying out the tasks of the national democratic revolution have started increasingly to flicker on the horizon.

Conclusion

The course the Egyptian national revolution has followed underlines an important scientific fact, the gist of which is that in spite of the important progressive role the national bourgeoisie can play in the first stages of the national democratic revolution, it is totally incapable of leading the revolution to its conclusion, not just because of the social movement which advances part of this class into positions in the large bourgeoisie, with its parasitic nature and its interests commingled with world monopoly capital, but also because the natuional bourgeoisie, with its various groups, is no longer able to continue to lead revolution. All the objective international and local circumstances stress that by advancing to its conclusion the revolution will mean the triumph of socialism and the termination of class exploitation.

The nature of the tasks set forth before the national democratic revolution in the current period--the period of transition to socialism, where the tasks of national liberation from colonialism are increasingly interacting with the tasks of social liberation from exploitation--demand that the working class rise up in firm alliance with the poor peasants to play an increasing leadership role.

The Egyptian working class must perform this role. It is an appropriate role for it, because it is the class which has provided the Egyptian national movement with most of its effective weapons--the political party, mass organization, mass organization and an integrated political program for the national democratic revolution. Throughout the course of the revolution, the Egyptian working class has also demonstrated that it is the most conscious, most rigid and most self-sacrificing of classes in the field of political struggle and in the areas of armed combat and that it has never taken a class position of a narrow scope, but rather has always put the requisites of the national struggle above its narrow class interests.

Assumption by the Egyptian working class of the leadership of the national democratic revolution is the essential condition for the success of the revolution and the guarantee that its tasks will be completed and the road will be paved toward socialism.

The working class' failure, for objective or subjective reasons, to rise up to its responsibilities, and the national bourgeoisie's adamant monopolization of the political leadership of the revolution and exclusive control of power, in spite of its increasing inability to continue to lead, will result only in one inevitable result, which is:

Faltering, stumbling and apostasy.

/21 Nov 80 p 13/

/Text/ The two sections which AL-SAFIR has published on the Egyptian Communist Party program dealt with a brief critical evaluation of the history of the Egyptian national revolution. This concluded with a descriptive and critical review of al-Sadat's apostasy against the Nasirist 23 July Revolution and the proposition which

holds that this apostasy reveals the inability of the Egyptian national bourgeoisie to complete the tasks of the national revolution and that these tasks can be consummated only under the leadership of the working class.

The program proceeds from this conclusion, to deal with the circumstances and tasks of the Egyptian national revolution, starting with its position vis-a-vis the international situation, in terms of its relations with this situation, summarizing that as follows:

1. The Egyptian democratic national revolution is taking place in an era of transition toward socialism.

2. The major contradiction in the current era exists between the world socialist system and the world imperialist system.

3. The world revolutionary process in the current era will be consummated through combative solidarity among three major revolutionary forces--the international socialist system, the revolutionary working class movement in the advanced capitalist countries, and the international movement of national liberation, in which the working class is playing a growing role.

4. This era is witnessing the fragmentation and collapse of the world imperialist system and a deepening of the general crisis of capitalism.

5. Nonetheless, the phenomena of fragmentation and the crisis which world imperialism is suffering from do not in any way mean the elimination of the danger of American imperialism.

6. The contradictions among imperialist countries are becoming increasingly aggravated.

7. International developments underline the decisive role which the world communist movement is playing in the world revolutionary process.

From this, the program moves over to a discussion of "the Egyptian national revolution and the Arab situation." It deals with the Middle East problem, the scheme of imperialism, the main contradiction, the dangers of apostasy, the export of counterrevolution, the victories of the Arab liberation revolution and the faltering of the Arab revolution.

That is what we are publishing here.

The Egyptian democratic national revolution is an inseparable part of the Arab national liberation movement. Therefore, this revolution is an influenced by the Arab situation as it influences it, and the liberation of the entire Arab nation from imperialism and Zionism is the indispensable guarantee for achieving, asserting and maintaining Egypt's political and economic independence.

1. Middle East Problem

The Arab-Israeli struggle, in less than 30 years (1948-73), has resulted in the outbreak of four wars in the Middle East region and has produced repeated aggressions against the independence of the Arab countries adjacent to Israel, the violation of these countries' sovereignty over their territory, and the hemorrhaging of their resources and powers.

The developments in this struggle have clearly revealed that the essence and basis of the problem is the Palestinian cause, as it is impossible to build true peace under whose aegis the countries of the region will enjoy safety through the continued refusal to note and pay attention to the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people.

This aggressive Israeli policy proves, in a manner which no longer permits debate, that what stands between the Arab nation and Israel is not a racist struggle, a factional struggle, or even a regional struggle over borders, but is a struggle for liberation constituting an inseparable part of the world struggle against imperialism.

Israel, since the declaration of its establishment in 1948, has constituted:

A bridgehead for world imperialism in the heart of the Arab nation.

An aggressive base mobilized in the service of the strategies of neocolonialism in the region.

A racist settler body which has its own expansionist objectives and designs within the Arab countries.

An abyss of war which is permanently and directly threatening international security and peace.

For all these reasons, the solution to the Middle East crisis has come to constitute a basic link in the vital struggle the Arab liberation movement is waging against imperialism, Zionism and reaction for the sake of economic and social progress.

It will not be feasible to solve this crisis through the Sadatist capitulationist platform, through questionable individual deals, through imperialist Zionist solutions, be they partial or comprehensive, through empty hysterical positions which are content to release resounding slogans or through adherence to perverted solutions which have been transcended by events, such as Resolution 242, whose inadequacy has been recognized by the majority of the world community and which only the apostate regime and its masters in Washington and Tel Aviv still adhere to.

The revolutionary alternative to all these treasonous, adventurous or crooked policies is to formulate a comprehensive integrated Arab strategy:

A strategy which will consciously determine the tentative and strategic goals of the Arab struggle.

A strategy which will with awareness choose the means of struggle to guarantee that these goals are achieved.

A strategy which is able to mobilize, mass and move the forces and human, military and economic resources of the Arab nation, at the forefront of which are Arab oil and revenues and interest from Arab funds which are still to be considered the prime financial force in the institutions of neocolonialism and the international monopolies and their exploitative projects.

The requisite Arab strategy must distinguish clearly between the strategic solution to the Palestinian cause and tactical solutions to the Middle East crisis. It is clear that the entity that has the first, decisive say in determining the optimum strategic solution to the Palestinian cause is the body whose cause it is, the Palestinian people under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of this heroic people.

This is because, while the Palestinian cause is a national one, that does not permit the Palestinian people's genuine rights to self-determination to be usurped.

Proceeding from, and out of its commitment to, this notion, our party is setting forth its special conception of the strategic solution to the Palestinian cause:

The establishment of a democratic secular state on all the Palestinian soil that existed at the time of the British Mandate--a state under whose aegis will live Moslems, Christians and Jews as citizens with equal rights and obligations, a state in whose confines there will be no place for Zionism or antisemitism.

However, this strategic solution is a combative long-term demand which can be realized only through the common struggle of all inhabitants living on the territory of Palestine, be they Moslems, Christians or Jews, by all ways and means of struggle, in order to arrive at the attainment of brotherhood among them.

This solution depends on numerous interconnected, complicated international, Arab and local factors and circumstances, foremost among them:

The need to carry out a change in the balance of forces in favor of the Arab liberation movement by liquidating the influence and positions of imperialism in the region.

The need to have a change in the class nature of the leadership of the Arab liberation movement, by having the Arab working class assume leadership of it, and to have socialism triumph in the main parts of the Arab world.

The need to have the democratic movement hostile to imperialism and Zionism grow within Israel itself and to have it coincide and be in solidarity with the Palestinian people's struggle in the occupied territories in particular and with the struggle of the Arab liberation movement in general.

The ceaseless struggle to achieve this ultimate goal must not divert the Arab people from the struggle to arrive at direct tactical solutions to the Middle East crisis which can realize the following tentative goals:

Total liberation of the Arab territories occupied since the 1967 aggression through the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli forces from them.

The Palestinian people's exercise of their right to self-determination on their territory and establishment of their independent national state on their territories from which Israel withdraws.

Establishment of the prelude to a real peace in the region.

It is clear that the establishment of a true permanent peace in the various areas of the Middle East cannot be achieved just by eliminating the effects of the Israeli aggression of 1967.

This kind of peace can be achieved only by eliminating the abyss of war and by liquidating the base of aggression itself. This requires:

Elimination of the colonialist character of the state by Israel by eliminating its role as a base of colonialism and a policeman for American imperialism and eliminating all forms of military and political alliance between it and the United States of America.

Eliminating the expansionist settler character of the state of Israel by stopping the emigration of Jews to it, rejecting the statement that it is the nation of all the Jews in the world, stripping it of its expansionist designs in the region, returning the members of the Palestinian people to their homes and giving them back their plundered land and property.

Eliminating the racist character of the state of Israel in order to rid it of dominance by the Zionist movement, eliminating all racist legislation and policies which consecrate discrimination among inhabitants, and implanting progressive democratic rule which will guarantee equal rights for everyone.

Liquidation of this racist aggressive colonialist settler phenomenon does not in any case mean confronting Zionist fanaticism by antisemitic fanaticism, exterminating the Jews residing on the territory of Palestine, or throwing them into the sea.

This task will be realized only by continuing the Arab liberation struggle in which the Palestine Liberation Organization will play a major role and closely attaching this struggle to the battle of other forces opposed to imperialism and Zionism within Israel itself and on occupied Arab territory, principally the Palestinian Communist Party and the Rakah Party, which are fighting a fierce, heroic, escalating struggle against Zionism and its aggressive policies.

The requisite Arab strategy must be based on the foundation of comprehensive struggle against imperialism and Zionism and it must scientifically link the various methods of struggle.

Therefore our party rejects any singleminded views on methods for struggling against imperialism and Zionism, be they views which omit from their calculation the totality of the armed struggle and are affected by defeatist claims on the impossibility of gaining military supremacy over the Zionist enemy and the

impossibility of confronting American imperialism; those which rigidly reject any political solution, clinging to a single solution, the military one, and belittling the political struggle or diplomatic effort; those which confine the military struggle to regular war, ignoring the role the masses of the Arab people must play in the battle of liberation; or those which promote a wrongful notion of popular war of liberation as an alternative to regular war, disdaining the important part the regular Arab armies must play in confronting the vicious Zionist enemy.

The artificial division among the various forms of struggle, or the presentation of one form as an alternative or antidote to the others, imposes the most grievous damage on the Arab liberation movement. Therefore our party considers that regular war, armed popular struggle, popular resistance actions against the Israeli occupation forces, popular uprisings, strikes and sitins in the occupied territories, the struggle against reactionary Arab regimes which are puppets of American imperialism and Zionism, and diplomatic efforts in international circles are all closely joined, interconnected methods of struggle which serve, supplement and support one another. There is a dividing line which separates political solutions of a revolutionary nature from political solutions of a capitulationist imperialist nature. Therefore our party stands against the political solutions which are deceptive formats for treason, capitulation and neglect of the rights of the Arab nation, and stands alongside political solutions as the fruit of our Arab nation's comprehensive revolutionary struggle against imperialism and Zionism.

There is great danger in confusing strategic and tactical goals in an unscientific manner.

Presenting a tactical goal as a final goal which is a substitute for a strategic one means submitting to the imperialist-Zionist fait accompli in the region and falling into the morass of treason and capitulation, whereas adhering to the strategic goal as a direct, urgent goal means feigning unawareness of the objective and subjective circumstances that exist and sliding into a labyrinth of adventures with uncalculated results.

Therefore, our party is opposed to any tactical solution at the expense of the strategic goal and supports any tactical solution which serves the comprehensive Arab struggle to achieve the strategic goal and provide better conditions for this struggle.

2. The Imperialist Scheme and the Major Contradiction

American imperialism has sought recourse in escalating its aggressive plans in the area by declaring the new Carter Doctrine and impudently threatening direct American military intervention to protect American imperialist interests. These schemes concentrate on increasing reliance on the aggressive role of Israel, hastening to establish a tripartite American-Israeli-Sadatist aggressive military alliance, acquiring military bases and facilities in Egypt and other countries in the region, concentrating the American military presence and forming a special rapid direct military intervention force.

In spite of these blatant aggressive schemes which require a united Arab revolutionary confrontation, and in spite of the fact that the major contradiction in the current stage of the Arab liberation movement is the one that exists between imperialism and Zionism and its local pillars on the one hand and the Arab liberation movement as a whole, clarity of vision continues to be lacking to a large degree, the Arab nation continues to be engulfed in the vortexes of side struggles, and the secondary contradictions among Arab nationalist regimes and Arab detachments of liberation have often escalated to the point where these contradictions take precedence over the major one.

The battle of life or death which our Arab nation is waging against imperialism, Zionism and local reaction requires that all detachments of the Arab liberation movement rise to the level of their responsibilities, transcend disputes among themselves, cause joint national interests to prevail over narrow intrinsic ones and get rid of complexes and touchy feelings. It also makes mandatory the unity of national, decocratic and progressive forces inside each Arab country and the establishment of the progressive Arab front on a nationwide scale among national and progressive parties, forces and regimes.

3. The Dangers of Apostasy and the Export of Counterrevolution

When al-Sadat's regime's proceeded to strip Egypt away from the front of struggle against imperialism and bring it into the enemy front, that unquestionably constituted a painful blow against the Arab liberation movement, and, now that Egypt has fallen into the circle of imperialist influence and is returning to colonialist subordination, that has constituted the most dangerous rallying point for colonialism in its siege of the Arab liberation movement. One must not view this fantastic action as the conduct of an individual ruler or just an "Egyptian" phenomenon; it is the result and product of class policies which express the interests of the parasitic puppet bourgeoisie. This class segment has started to grow in more than one Arab country. Therefore, the Arab peoples must be alert and bury the elements of apostasy alive in their cradle lest the parasitic Arab bourgeoisies become able to spread about apostasy and spread it to other Arab countries.

In another area, imperialism and Zionism, by alliance and coordination with Arab reactionary forces, are escalating their conspiracies to convulse the Arab nationalist regimes internally by stirring up national, religious and sectarian struggles and by exploiting different aspects of the shortcomings these regimes suffer from, foremost among them the absence of political democracy and isolation from the masses of the Arab people.

Thwarting these conspiracies depends on having these regimes abandon despotic, bureaucratic styles of governance and getting the masses of workers and peasants to participate effectively and actively through their political parties in administering the affairs of the country.

These regimes' adherence to their negative features weakens their ability to confront imperialist and reactionary challenges and eases attempts to co-opt them or eliminate them through direct foreign aggression or domestic apostate coups.

4. The Triumphs of the Arab Liberation Movement

In spite of all the faltering, vicissitudes and convulsions to which the Arab liberation movement has been exposed here and there, it has managed to achieve increasingly greater victories and has been enriched by deep progressive economic, social, intellectual and political notions, thanks to the Arab working class' success, in alliance with the toiling masses and revolutionary intellectuals, in occupying progressive positions in the revolutionary process in the Arab nation. This has been clearly embodied in the revolutionary developments in the Democratic Republic of Yemen, which have resulted in the establishment of the first Arab regime to pursue a platform of true scientific socialism. While the flags of Marxism-Leninism have fluttered over the land of the fraternal Democratic Yemen, the winds of inevitable change have started to blow over the reactionary and conservative regimes (Saudi Arabia and Tunisia), while the isolation of Numayri's regime in the Sudan grows deeper each day. In addition, the Palestinian revolution, under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, by waging a struggle for liberation against imperialism and Zionism, has enriched the Arab liberation revolution through important new dimensions, depths and areas of expertise.

In another area, al-Sadat's impudent divisive movement has created an appropriate circumstance for the Arab liberation movement in areas where it did not wish to do so, whetting the awareness of the Arab masses, deepening their hostility toward American imperialism and Zionism in an unprecedented manner and causing imperialism's attempts to push an American-Israeli solution through in the area, draw more Arab countries into the arena of Camp David and link them to the orbit of capitulationist settlements to fail, and imposing an oppressive isolation on the puppet regime in Egypt.

5. The Faltering of Arab Unity

The faltering of the Arab struggle for the sake of Arab unity, the failure of all unificationist formulas which Arab regimes have established and the aggravation of the phenomena of fragmentation and dissension in some parts of the Arab nation cannot be separated from the class nature of the ruling Arab regimes which are taking charge of the process of unification.

The failure of these regimes that have a national bourgeois, tribal, feudal or parasitic character to realize Arab unity may be ascribed to their positions of subservience to imperialism or ambivalence toward it and to the fact that they cause their selfish narrow interests to predominate and pursue nondemocratic methods of achieving unity. Therefore the success of the Arab nation in achieving its unity will be basically contingent on the growing leadership role of the working class in the Arab liberation movement.

Arab unity is not a goal in itself; rather, it is a means for the Arab masses to reach their basic goal, which is to continue the national democratic revolution along the road to liberation and socialism. Therefore the proper position of principle on the issue of Arab unity cannot be one of mere emotional support for any unity formula.

The Egyptian Communist Party is struggling for the sake of Arab unity, which embodies the will and the interests of the masses of Arab workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals and other toilers.

Arab unity with a nationalist content, firmly hostile to imperialism.

With a progressive democratic content, opposed to feudalism and large capital.

Willed Arab unity based on free choice, not imposition or coercion.

Arab unity which is backed by a democratic front alliance containing all national democratic progressive forces, taking into consideration the tangible reality in every country and the objective conditions peculiar to it, acknowledging that other ethnic groups have the right to exist, and respecting their rights.

11887
CSO: 4504/99

WRITER SINGS PRAISES OF DOMESTIC COMMUNIST PARTY

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 12 Nov 80 p 11

/Article by Mustafa al-Husayni: "Communists, Nationalists, Unificationists, Democrats"/

/Text/ You have recovered, comrades of the Egyptian Communist Party; you have recovered as martyrs and fighting men; you have recovered as fighting men and martyrs.

You have recovered as democrats as well.

This is your first conference in 60 years of struggle.

Sixty years of struggle?

Yes! Sixty years of struggle, 60 years of martyrdom, 60 years of relapse, 60 years of stumbling, 60 years of mistakes, 60 years of correcting mistakes through proper acts, 60 years of achievements that no one can deny.

Sixty years of broken, continuous history; broken history, in which your party was cut off from the masses of its people and its working class, sometimes through force, from the late twenties to the early forties, and, because of what you and we realize was a deviationist blunder, between the years 1964 and 1975.

A continuous history, because, even in the periods when the party was cut off, the Egyptian communists did not cease struggling in the ranks of the national movement and in the ranks of the labor movement, and spreading the idea of socialism by every means and through every way until socialism in Egypt became the dream of our masses, in spite of the viciousness of the counterpropaganda, and until socialist thought became the latent seed in the consciences of all Egyptian patriots.

Sixty years of struggle for the sake of liberation, democracy and justice for every man. The most important thing your first conference is declaring as a result of its lessons today is that the Egyptian communists have always been on the side of democracy for the masses, have managed to be democrats with themselves, and, for the first time, are holding a general conference for their party, perhaps because you have realized, through bitter experiences, that an absence of democracy within the organization, for any reason, for any cause whatever, is a plague which has

given birth to fragmentation, a plague which has prevented review and evaluation, in times when need for it has become intensified--as the prelude to your program points out, when your positions vacillated and conflicted with regard to the July 1952 Revolution in a manner which harmed it, harmed you and harmed the Egyptian and Arab struggle.

It is just to specify that that is not only your responsibility but that it is also the responsibility of the other nationalist parties which have repressed you or been silent about your repression.

You have recovered, comrades of the Egyptian Communist Party, as you, through your first democratic conference, restore the moral fiber to Egyptian national progressive action which has long been absent and which it has long experienced poverty over. You have recovered since you are leading in a democratic manner a conscious extension of the Egyptian national revolution which is inheriting its glories, greeting them and is proud of and enriching its legacy.

You have recovered, as a party "committed to the principles and general rules of Marxism-Leninism, observing the national and ethnic characteristics and the distinguishing features of the Egyptian situation, honoring the historic and revolutionary traditions of our people and nation, realizing the objective needs of the current stage and the horizons of its development."

You have recovered as a party devoid of illusions, seeing a distant horizon for Palestine, a complete, free democratic secular Palestine, seeing a nearby horizon for Palestine embracing the Palestinian people's right to determine their destiny on their national territory, with possession of the legitimacy of leading it and making decisions in its name belonging to its national organization.

You have recovered as unificationist Arabs seeing in Arab unity the masses' road toward liberation, democracy and socialism.

You have recovered as an Egyptian national communist party, seeing that the goal in Egypt today is "establishment of national democratic authority," hostile to parasitic capitalist power, accommodating no segment of this power, and decisively rejecting every illusion or claim on alliance, cooperation or convergence with the existing authorities or any segment of them.

You have recovered as democrats.

Nationalists, progressives and democrats might differ with you, but they are in agreement with you on the essential points, on the issues of the freedom of the nation, democracy and justice.

You have recovered as martyrs and fighting people, you have recovered as fighting men and martyrs.

This is a greeting from the position of an "independent friend."

And it is the prelude to a dialogue.

11887
CSO: 4505/99

NATIONAL DELEGATION ATTENDS 26TH SOVIET PARTY CONFERENCE

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #29 Mar 81 pp 4, 5

/Article: The 26th Conference of the Soviet Communist Party"/

/Text/ On 23 February, the 26th Conference of the Soviet Communist Party was inaugurated in the Hall of Conferences in the Kremlin. This conference embodies an event of the utmost importance as regards the Soviet Union, the communist movement, international labor, issues of war and peace and international relations between the socialist and capitalist camps.

It is well known that the Soviet Communist Party conference, which is held once every 5 years, is the highest political authority setting out the broad lines of the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and determining the main orientation on many seminal decisive issues in the international context. Thus the attention of political persons and observers has turned to the Hall of Conferences in the Kremlin where this great event is taking place. This conference has acquired special importance as it is being held in circumstances of grave international tension and in the light of a campaign of grave escalation of aggression led by American imperialism in the Middle East, the Arab Gulf, Latin America and Africa, in an attempt on its part to rearrange matters to its benefit and consolidate its military presence.

Preparation for the Conference

The convening of the conference was preceded by broad preparatory activity covering a period of 8 months. The enlarged party central committee meeting in June 1980 adopted its resolution to hold the 26th conference, set the proportion of representation of conference members at one representative for every 3,350 party members, and determined the conference agenda and the system for holding conferences in sections, regions, provinces, departments and branches of the party in the federal republics.

In addition to the election of conference members, these conferences, which were held in various areas of the Soviet Union, discussed issues of economic and social development, execution of the 10th 5-year plan (1976-80), the resolutions of the 25th party conference, and other matters.

In another area, the draft social and economic program for the eighties (up to 1990), which was presented by the central committee of the party, was presented for general popular discussion. More than 121 million people participated in this discussion. The newspaper PRAVDA, the central committee spokesman, also took charge of covering these discussions and published more than 22,000 articles and letters from readers and more than 1,300 proposals for amendment of the draft.

According to the tradition that is followed, the conference preparation period became an important political occasion in which tens of millions of workers in various fields of material and cultural production at construction sites, government and cooperative farms, factories, and scientific research, education and service organizations undertook to achieve tangible accomplishments in expressing special appreciation for this important event.

The Conference Agenda

At 1000 hours in the morning of 23 February, which corresponds with Soviet Army Day, Leonid Brezhnev declared the opening of the 26th conference of the Soviet Communist Party. The members and guests of the conference stood for a minute of silence in eulogizing the martyrs of the communist and labor movements and the national liberation movement who lost their lives in the period which had elapsed since the convening of the previous party conference.

Attending the conference were delegations from the communist, labor and national democratic parties and other parties and organizations from 109 countries in the five continents. The National Progressive Unionist Grouping was represented by the fighting man Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, secretary general of the party, and the Egyptian Communist Party was represented by Comrade Michel Kamil, member of the party's political bureau.

Comrade Suslov, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, presented the conference agenda, which contains four chapters:

1. The report by the Central Committee and the current party tasks in the realm of domestic and foreign policy.

2. A report by the party's Central Inspection Committee.

3. The basic trends of economic and social development in the Soviet Union for the years 1981-85 and for the period up to 1990.

4. The election of the central party boards.

Leonid Brezhnev then presented the Central Committee report to the conference. The report dealt with the Soviet Communist Party's international policies, including cooperation with the socialist countries, the development of relations with the liberated countries, the world communist movement, relations with the capitalist countries, the policy of peace, cooperation and resistance to forces of aggression, the deepening of detente, and the curbing of the arms race. The report

The report then addressed itself to the party's economic policy in the phase of advanced socialism, the social, political and spiritual development of Soviet society, the tasks of the party, and issues of party construction, party leadership, and party ideological, political and educational activity.

On the Situation in Poland

In his report, Leonid Brezhnev stressed strong political, economic, and military relations between the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist system. He pointed to the need for every socialist country to benefit from other countries' experiences in regulating production and management and resolving the issues of the domestic economy. Brezhnev mentioned that the rates of economic growth of the member countries of the Committee on Economic Cooperation (Comecon) in the last 10 years were double what they were in the advanced capitalist countries.

In another area, Brezhnev pointed to the difficulties the socialist countries are facing and said "We are far from painting a canvas of the contemporary socialist world only in brilliant colors. There are also complications in development in our countries."

Brezhnev declared the Soviet Communist Party's position on events in Poland by stating, "In addition to the destructive acts of imperialism, errors and mistakes in domestic policy have prepared the ground to stimulate anti-socialist elements. This is what has happened in fraternal Poland, since the enemies of socialism, who are stirring up chaos, are trying, with support from foreign powers, to direct the development of events toward channels of counterrevolution. As the latest session of the central committee of the United Polish Workers' Party pointed out, in Poland a danger to the foundations of the socialist state has appeared.

"Events in Poland reaffirm the extent of the importance of listening closely to the voice of the masses and struggling determinedly against all phenomena of bureaucracy and administrative tendencies and the extent of the importance of democratic socialist development through activity and the application of a realistic balanced policy in foreign economic relations as far as the party goes, consolidating its leadership role."

New Soviet Initiatives

In the central committee report, Comrade Brezhnev presented a number of new initiatives as regards the situation in Afghanistan and the Middle East as well as in relations between East and West, especially in the realm of strategic arms limitation and reduction of the severity of the tension.

On the situation in Afghanistan, Leonid Brezhnev said,

"Imperialism has launched a real undeclared war against the Afghan revolution. This constitutes a direct threat to the security of our southern borders as well. This situation has compelled us to offer the military aid which the friendly country requested.

"The schemes of Afghanistan's enemies have been stifled and the carefully studied policy which responds to national interests and which the Afghan People's Democratic Party and the Afghan government under the presidency of Comrade Babrak Karmal are applying has strengthened popular rule.

"As for the Soviet forces, we will be prepared to withdraw them through agreement with the Afghan government. Therefore it is necessary completely to stop sending counterrevolutionary gangs to Afghanistan, this must be established in agreements between Afghanistan and its neighbors, and it is necessary to provide guarantees to prevent further intervention. This is the Soviet Union's position of principle, and we will adhere to it firmly!"

The Iranian Revolution and Islamic Slogans

Brezhnev declared, "The Soviet Union considers the Iranian revolution, in spite of its complexities, essentially an anti-imperialist revolution, although domestic and foreign reaction are trying to change this character. The Iranian people are seeking a way toward freedom and prosperity. we wish them success from the bottom of our hearts, and we are prepared to develop good relations with Iran on a basis of equality and reciprocity.

"Recently, in some countries in the East, Islamic slogans have been raised in intensified form. We communists respect the religious beliefs of people who believe in Islam and other religions also. The main point may be summarized in the goals which are manifested by the forces which raise a given slogan. Struggle for liberation can develop under the banner of Islam. Historical experience proves this, including the most recent experience. However, the same experience proves that Islamic slogans are also used by reaction, which declares counterrevolutionary mutinies. Consequently the entire issue may be summarized by the actual contents of a given movement."

The Iranian-Iraqi War

Brezhnev attacked the imperialists' position on the liberated countries and their attempt to take over their natural resources and use their territory to achieve their strategic intentions, relying on the old imperialist policy "divide and rule."

/He said/ "The West is specifically taking these positions on the Iranian-Iraqi war, which has been going on for 5 months. It is a war which has absolutely no meaning at all in terms of the interests of these two countries. However, it is very beneficial for imperialism which is dreaming night and day of regaining its positions in this region. We hope that the necessary conclusions on this issue will be drawn in Iraq and Iran alike."

"The Soviet Union is determinedly calling for this fratricide to end as rapidly as possible through a political solution to the struggle. We are trying to help this in practice as well."

The Middle East Issue

In view of the importance of the Middle East issue and the new Soviet initiative which Brezhnev presented at the conference, we will present the entire text of the report's contents on this subject:

"Let us now deal with the problem of the Middle East. The United States of America has, in an attempt to dominate the Middle East, pursued the road of the Camp David policy, the road of splitting up the Arab world and arranging a separate secret understanding between Israel and Egypt. American diplomacy has failed to turn this separate secret anti-Arab conspiracy into a broader capitulationist agreement, but it has succeeded in something else: a new, growing crisis has occurred in the situation in the region and settlement in the Middle East has been pushed backward.

"What is to be done? We believe that the time has come to bring the issue out of its state of paralysis and that the time has come to go back to a collective, chaste discussion of settlement on a just realistic basis. In the circumstances that are arising, it will be possible to attain that, for example, in the context of an international conference held to that end.

"The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in this sort of activity in a constructive spirit and from the standpoint of good-will efforts. We are prepared to do this in participation with the other parties concerned, with the Arabs (including of course the Palestine Liberation Organization) and Israel, and we are prepared to have such a discussion in participation with the United States of America. Let me recall that we had a specific experience in this regard some years ago, and we are prepared to cooperate with the European countries, with everyone who expresses a sincere ambition to guarantee a firm just peace in the Middle East.

"The United Nations Organization, it appears, can continue to perform a useful role in this entire matter.

"As regards the essence of the issue, we are certain, as in the past, that real peace in the Middle East will demand the elimination of the Israeli occupation from all the Arab territories usurped since 1967 and that the fixed rights of the Palestinian people must be applied to the point of establishing a state for them. It is necessary to guarantee the peace and sovereignty of all countries in this region, including Israel. These are the basic principles. As for the details, they of course can be the subject of negotiation."

Gulf Security

Brezhnev brought to mind the Soviet initiative regarding measures to support peace and security in the Arab Gulf region which he presented during his recent visit to India. He said,

"We have totally different ideas regarding the means for guaranteeing real peace in the Arab Gulf region and the areas bordering on it. Instead of accumulating more and more air and naval fleets, forces and weapons there, we recommend the elimination of the danger of war from this region by signing an international

agreement; by combining efforts and by observing the legitimate efforts of all parties, it will be possible to establish an atmosphere of stability and tranquility here which can guarantee the sovereign rights of the countries in it, and the safety of marine communications and the other communications that link it to the rest of the world."

Relations with the West

Brezhnev's report dealt in detail with the Soviet Union's relations with the capitalist countries in Western Europe and the United States and presented a number of recommendations for improving the international climate, curbing rearmament, and repelling the danger of nuclear war. He said, "The Soviet Union has not tried and will not try to gain military supremacy over the other party, but it will not permit others to get supremacy over it."

Leonid Brezhnev presented a constructive program aimed at strengthening peace, deepening detente and curbing the arms race.

The Soviet Union is prepared to carry out measures of trust in the military field embracing every European segment of the Soviet Union, on condition that an appropriate expansion take place in the area of measures of trust taken by the Western countries. It is prepared to enter into tangible negotiations with all the countries concerned regarding measures of trust in the Far East.

The Soviet Union is prepared to continue negotiations without delay with the United States of America on strategic arms limitation and reduction while preserving all the positive achievements that have been arrived at so far in this field. The Soviet Union is prepared to conduct negotiations on limiting all types of arms.

The Soviet Union proposes an agreement now, specifically, on suspending the distribution of new intermediate-range nuclear missiles to the NATO countries and the Soviet Union in Europe, that is, freezing the current level of this equipment in terms of quantity and quality, including of course the United States of America's nuclear armaments in advanced positions in this area.

The Soviet Union recommends that a high-level international committee be formed comprising very prominent scholars whose purpose will be to show the vital need to avoid nuclear catastrophe, and it recommends the convening of a special Security Council session, in which the senior leaders of member countries of the council will take part, in order to discuss the key to reviving the international climate and preventing the outbreak of war. Perhaps it will be possible for the leaders of other countries to take part in the session. All of these measures will help bring about a major goal, which is to protect peace not just for the sake of the people who are living now but also for the sake of dozens of future generations.

Statement by the Egyptian Communist Party Delegation

The statement which Michel Kamil, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party, made before the 26th conference of the Soviet Communist Party:

Dear Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party;

Dear comrade members of the 26th conference of the Soviet Communist Party;

Comrade leaders of communist, workers', and national progressive parties:

In the name of the Central Committee of the Egyptian Communist Party, we send our combative greetings to you and to all Soviet Communists and the friendly Soviet people, wishing the great party of Lenin and its glorious conference every success in carrying out its giant plans to build the material-technical base for communism, raise the standard of living of the Soviet citizens, and support and protect world peace and the security of peoples.

Comrades:

All the forces which are struggling for the sake of peace, democracy, national independence and socialism are looking toward this conference of yours, considering that it is a prominent new link in the course of man's triumphant struggle to liberate man, and are concerned with it and zealous to follow its activities and conclusions, because the firm internationalist platform the Soviet Communist Party is following has implanted the conviction among citizens, progressives and democrats in all areas of the world that every success the Soviet Union realizes responds to the loftiest interests of the Communist and labor movement and movements of national and social liberation and world peace.

Adding to the importance of the 26th conference is the fact that it is occurring at one of the most dangerous stages through which mankind is passing. Imperialism, as a result of its aggravated crisis and the tilt in the balance of world power in favor of various peoples, is working to create tension in international relations and to kindle the fever of "cold war." It is resorting to nuclear blackmail, implanting nuclear warheads on a broad scale in various areas of the world, pushing the arms race forward with new steps, establishing broad networks of bases, alliances and aggressive military formations, consolidating its fleets and "rapid deployment" forces, and preparing for military intervention, especially in the area of the Middle East and Latin America.

Imperialist circles, especially American ones, find support in the destructive role which the Chinese leadership is playing through its transition to a status of alliance with imperialism and reaction.

Comrades:

The Middle and Near East occupy an important position in aggressive imperialist-Zionist schemes, and the area is witnessing an intensification of the American and Western military presence. Washington is obtaining more bases and military "facilities," is exerting pressure to hasten the establishment of subordinate aggressive blocs in the gulf and the Red Sea, is concluding deals for astronomical sums to provide weapons for regimes which will use them only for repressing the Arab liberation movement, and is striving to inflame local wars, cause the struggles

among national forces to explode, kindle factional, regional and ethnic disputes, encourage Israel to continue and escalate its aggressive activities in southern Lebanon, and provoke the forces of factional hegemony to liquidate the Palestinian people and the Lebanese national movement.

All this is going on through full coordination with local reaction, to which imperialism is assigning an increasing role in the context of the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary alliance.

The Camp David agreements and the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have decisively crowned the Egyptian regime's role in serving the American schemes. This tripartite political-military alliance has become the main source of danger to the national and social liberation movement in the Middle and Near East areas and in Africa. The Egyptian regime is offering military bases for "rapid deployment" forces, is enlisting our army in its service, in effect annexing it to the American military establishment, is officially requesting that it be linked with the Atlantic Treaty, is expressing its readiness to store military materiel, including nuclear and bacteriological weapons, on Egyptian territory, and is carrying out its military adventures and hostile intervention against national regimes and movements. Indeed, Washington is calling on and urging the escalation of its aggressive intervention against the peoples of the region and coordinating with France to support the forces of counterrevolution and joint intervention in Africa.

In confronting the serious dangers that threaten the region, Comrade Brezhnev has presented a gulf security plan which includes the liquidation of all military bases, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region, the prohibition of the use or threat of use of force, nonintervention in domestic affairs, respect for the right of the countries of the gulf to their natural resources, and the pursuit of a policy of nonalignment. Our party and the national and democratic forces in Egypt and the Arab world have expressed their support and adoption of this peaceful plan, which is in keeping with the interests of our peoples.

The focal issue in our struggle is to thwart the Camp David scheme. In our estimation, the effective confrontation and the fundamental condition for success are represented by major factors, of which the most significant are to implant and support the unity of all progressive, national and domestic forces throughout the Arab world, forces which are linked by a position of drawing clear lines between the camp of friends and enemies; decisive enmity and challenge to American imperialism and its positions, bases and interests; strategic alliance with the forces of world revolution, headed by the Soviet Union; decisive confrontation of the Israeli Zionist enemy; rejection of all capitulationist American and Western European solutions; adherence to the Palestinian people's right to return, determine their destiny and establish their independent national state under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization; support for Syria's perseverance on grounds that is is the main front of confrontation with the Zionist enemy; support for the Lebanese national movement; and frustration of attempts to break the isolation of al-Sadat's regime.

Comrades:

The Camp David conspiracy has come about as the climax of a series of preparatory measures in our country which have involved all aspects of political, economic, social and cultural life. Since the May 1971 coup, the reactionary bourgeois authorities have been striving to liquidate the achievements and gains our people acquired through their hard struggle in the stage of the July national revolution. The reactionary bourgeois authorities have directed their main blow against the state sector, which in the past constituted the base of independent economic development, relying, in this, on what is called the policy of independent economic liberalization, which has led to a decline in the rates of development, an intensification of Egypt's foreign debts, imported inflation, blatant high prices, and the emergence of a parasitic character and monopolistic tendencies in our country's economy.

In the context of these relations, an accelerating process is underway to redistribute national income in favor of the rich at the expense of the poor, the standard of living of toilers and people with fixed income is dropping to the level of actual starvation, and the rate of unemployment and people emigrating in search of work has risen to about 40 percent of the total workforce.

To protect the ruling clique and the interests of its imperialist masters, the regime is resorting to the exercise of the severest forms of repression domestically, relying on an integrated system of repressive laws and institutions and exercise of terror.

For all these reasons, our party's program determines that the existing authorities are totally and finally aligned toward the West and continue to constitute an organic part of the body of world journalism, and consequently the contradiction between our people and the current authorities has become a major one which will be resolved only by the removal of the latter. From this point of departure, our party is trying to constitute the broadest political front of forces with an interest in eliminating al-Sadat's puppet regime while not ignoring the establishment of a strategic class alliance to lead the working class in order to arrive at the elimination of the exploitation of man by man and the construction of socialism.

Comrades:

In spite of the relatively short time period which has elapsed since the restructuring of our communist party, it has now become an effective force in political life, with deeply implanted roots among the masses of the working class and toilers in general. We can assert, without boasting, that no political or class movement has occurred in Egypt in recent years in which our party did not have an influential, leading role, thanks to its sound political plan, the mixture of overt and covert means of struggle, its members' adherence to the state of the toiling masses, the defense of their interests, and the adoption of their legitimate aspirations.

Last September our party held its conference within the nation, in spite of circumstances of repression and prosecution, stressing its ability to transcend

difficulties and challenges. The convening of our first conference represents an important turning point in the course of our party and a tremendous force for forward takeoff for the sake of the attainment of our people's national, social and domestic goals.

Comrades:

Our party, which proceeds from the principles of proletarian internationalism, considers itself a part of the world communist movement and tries to develop its comradely relations with the parties in that movement.

Our party holds great esteem for the glorious party of Lenin, a point which was expressed in the documents of our first conference and the conference delegates' message to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Our party will fixedly continue its progress in the policy of defending friendship with the nation of the October revolution and the socialist system and mobilizing other national forces to stand up to the intentions and policies of enmity to the Soviets which the reactionary Egyptian bourgeois regime is pursuing.

History has never known and never will know an enmity to the Soviets which serves national interests. People who are sincerely devoted to the causes of their people can only be friends of the Soviet Union. Unity between true nationalism and proletarian internationalism is the first lesson of history that our people assimilate.

Long live the 26th conference of the Soviet Communist Party!

Long live the Soviet Communist Party!

Long live friendship and common struggle between our peoples!

Long live proletarian internationalism!

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LOCAL PARTY ATTENDS WEST GERMAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #33-34 Jul-Aug 81 pp 7, 8

/Article: "The Sixth Conference of the German Communist Party, Hanover, under the Slogan 'Everything for the Sake of Peace'"/

/Excerpts from text/ Under the slogan "Everything for the sake of peace," the German Communist Party held its sixth conference in the city of Hanover in northern West Germany between 28 and 30 May. Participating in the conference were 85 delegates representing approximately 50,000 members, with delegates from 75 communist parties and national liberation movements in attendance.

The issue of peace, and attempts by the United States and some ruling powers in Western Europe, to turn Western Europe into a nuclear missile base, took the lion's share of the activities of the conference and delegations' statements.

From the Statement by the Egyptian Communist Party Representative

With the escalation of the aggressive intentions of world imperialism, especially with the advent of the Reagan administration, our country, specifically, is occupying a position of prominence in the strategy of expanding and intensifying the American military system.

West Germany is the prime ally and the basic European buttress of the Atlantic Pact. Attempts are being made to turn it into an arsenal of nuclear weapons under the slogan of "the program of nuclear modernization," in confronting the opposition of the forces of peace and the pressures they are exerting within the Social Democratic Party itself. The Schmidt-Reagan meeting has produced a demagogic maneuver to promote the American plan in exchange for murky statements of no weight on negotiations to take place with the Soviet Union in the future on arms limitations!

For the first time, the Atlantic Treaty, in its latest meeting (the second week of May), has adopted resolutions that deal at length with the subject of the treaty's activities outside the European context. The statement issued on the (Opiote) meeting declared that events outside the scope of the Atlantic Pact might influence "our vital interests," such as exposure of the oilfields in the gulf to invasion and that "the common goals may require that the treaty members offer facilities to the rapid deployment force outside the region" in support of "the vital interests of all members!"

Comrades:

These grave developments are not taking place in isolation from the activities of the aggressive American military buildup in the areas of the gulf and the Middle East. The rapid deployment forces have acquired a number of bases in Egypt, Bahrain, Oman, Somalia and Kenya, and, in addition, there are the military presence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the fleets, and the blocs of military character which the reactionary subordinate regimes are establishing, such as the "Council on Gulf Cooperation" and the plan for a similar alliance in the Red Sea.

Since the signing of the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace, Egypt has been turned into a major base for the deployment forces and has become the pillar for the American military structure in the Arab world. al-Sadat's regime has offered the bases of Cairo West, Cairo South, and Ra's Banas on the Red Sea, and discussions are now underway to formalize the American military presence in Sinai under the cloak of "international peacekeeping forces" so that it may become a part of the rapid deployment force, interacting from strategic points from Rafah and Sharm al-Shaykh.

The Egyptian regime is pursuing a policy of supporting counterrevolutionary forces in Africa and the Middle East with forces and war materiel, from Zaire to Oman and Afghanistan, is preparing to invade Libya, and is conspiring to liquidate the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Today this subordinate regime stands alone among all the Arab countries in condemning Syria, which is facing the danger of Israeli aggression, is threatening to cause a comprehensive war to burst out in the region, and is declaring that if a clash occurs that will not affect the process of normalization and development of relations with Israel.

Therefore, the grave, distinctive role which Bonn and Cairo are playing in the schemes of American military construction and the policies of aggravating tension and military adventures are clear, and therefore our party forcefully supports the peace initiatives Comrade Brezhnev set forth in the 26th conference of the Soviet Communist Party to turn the gulf area into a region of peace, hold an international conference to resolve the Middle East problem and hold discussions to limit arms in Europe.

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TWIN COMMUNIST PARTIES ISSUE JOINT STATEMENT

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARBI in Arabic #30 Apr 81 pp 24, 25

/Statement: Joint Statement of the Egyptian Communist Party and the Sudanese Communist Party"/

/Text/ After intensified consultation between the leaders of the two parties, and with their full authorization, representatives of the two parties held a joint meeting on 28 November 1980 in Khartoum. This took place in a friendly, comradely atmosphere, in the context of the historic relations which the bonds of joint struggle between the two peoples and the two parties have woven and supported.

The joint meeting witnessed an exchange of views on a number of issues and reached the conclusions incorporated in a joint declaration, of which we publish some paragraphs herewith:

Fifth: The two parties reviewed the history of the common struggle between the two parties and recorded that the communists in Egypt and the Sudan were heroes and men who fashioned the slogan "joint struggle." In the face of the slogan of the Egyptian and Sudanese bourgeoisie concerning the unity of the Nile Valley under the Egyptian crown, the Sudanese and Egyptian communists raised the slogan of the joint struggle against colonialism and the Sudanese people's right to self-determination. The two peoples responded to this slogan and considered that it expressed their common interests of struggle against the common enemy. In expression of that, the two national movements joined in solidarity in Egypt and the Sudan in the important events to which the two countries were exposed, the Sudanese and Egyptian national and democratic forces exchanged aid and assistance, common fraternal relations between the labor union movement and leaders in the two countries were supported, the leftwing and progressive press in the two countries opened their pages to the noble Sudanese and Egyptian statements, and the blood of martyrs in Egypt and the Sudan became intermixed in battles of demonstrations and within the walls of prisons. In application of this slogan and in commitment to the international spirit, the communists in Egypt and the Sudan exchanged mutual aid and comradely assistance, and, in the course of the common struggle, formed historic relations of a comradely nature between the two parties.

Sixth: The joint meeting conducted a dialogue on the nature of the revolutionary stage in the two countries, the nature of the regimes existing there, the political,

economic and social program of each and the foreign policy of the two regimes. The joint meeting exchanged views on what is called "the platform of political action and economic integration between the two countries" and came up with the following conclusions:

1. This platform is founded on a base of subordination to imperialism and neocolonialism and the policy of liberalization they are following, with everything that implies. It is also founded on enmity to communism and democracy, the usurpation of natural, basic rights and freedoms that that entails, repression and tyrannization of the working class, the toiling masses and their national, progressive and communist forces and organizations, the raising of the slogan of enmity to the Soviets and all forces of socialism and world progress, and the program of capitalist exploitation and the imposition of its dominance.

2. The "mutual defense agreement" between the two regimes, in the context of the subordination of both to American imperialism and the role of each as an instrument for carrying out the American-Saudi scheme in the region, has, in addition to the mission of protecting Numayri's delapidated, weak regime, a number of goals, among them freezing the policy of diverting the Egyptian army from its basic task, turning it into a regional instrument for exporting counterrevolution, proceeding toward the execution of the "Red Sea security" scheme and preparing to conduct aggression against Ethiopia.

3. The foreign policy of the two regimes in Egypt and the Sudan correspond in essence and in appearance. They are founded on subordination to American imperialism and are oriented toward the establishment of an alliance under its leadership, embracing all the counterrevolutionary forces in the region, with the goal of striking out at and thwarting all the political, social and progressive transformations in it.

4. The parliamentary institutions and the executive agencies in the two countries meet periodically to impart an alleged legitimacy and a false legal character to this reactionary policy.

5. The joint meeting stresses that the two parties are not, in principle, against the platform of economic integration, joint defense agreements and other forms of coordination or consolidation of domestic and foreign policies between Egypt and the Sudan; however, the two parties specify their tangible positions in each case from a clear, specific revolutionary class premise, which is embodied in the question: "In whose hands does the power lie in each of the two countries, consequently which are the class and social powers served by the platform of political action and economic integration, which goals is this platform aspiring to, and will this platform therefore serve or harm future relations between the Egyptian and Sudanese people?

6. Pursuant to that, the two parties consider that the relationship that exists between the two regimes, which is embodied in this platform, the mutual defense agreement, and so forth, has the overall goal of imposing the capitalist path on the two countries from positions of subordination and neocolonialism, foreign multinational corporations and Arab oil capital and of imposing the imperialist

reactionary alliance's schemes in order to dominate the two countries and the whole region. The two parties consider that the relationship arising from the above-mentioned platform and agreement is unequal, violates the dignity and national policy of the people of the Sudan, obstructs their struggle to regain their natural rights to draw up their domestic and foreign policy, imposes a regime and authority on them they are not pleased with and harms the good neighborly relationship between them and their neighbors, turning their territory into a way station for aggression against neighboring peoples.

7. The Sudanese Communist Party considers that acceptance of this unequal relationship by Numayri's authorities results from their nature as apostate authorities whose policies and conduct have led to a fatal isolation from their weakness and inability, and therefore from their increasingly deep reliance on foreign support for their protection and survival and their increasing neglect of the independence and national sovereignty of the Sudan.

8. The Egyptian Communist Party considers that the unequal relationship embodied in the platform of political action and economic integration expresses the interests of parasitic Egyptian capitalism, aimed at attaining its interests at the expense of the real current and subsequent interests of the Sudanese people, and that therefore it represents a regression from the notions and national and progressive powers of the Egyptian people and the anticolonial traditions and practices of the era of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. The Egyptian Communist Party considers that the mutual defense agreement is totally opposed to the national interests of the people of Egypt and destructive of their relations with the people of the Sudan and a number of Arab and African peoples.

9. The two parties consider that it is possible in the context of the two regimes that exist now in Egypt and the Sudan to establish an "integration" which is dedicated to the interests of their two peoples and that opening the door to such integration will require the elimination of the existing powers in the two countries and the guarantee of democratic freedoms in them, specifically the freedom of organization, self-expression, formation of parties and even political activity and the like, which will empower the masses to take part in drawing up a national policy and the course and the future of relations between the two countries. The two parties stress the revolutionary importance of the slogan of common struggle and cooperation between the two parties and the revival and expansion of relations between the two parties that that requires, at various levels and in all fields, in an effort to eliminate the regimes in Egypt and the Sudan.

Seventh: The two parties reviewed the policies of the puppet Egyptian authorities bearing on the granting of military facilities and bases on Egyptian territory to the United States and also the authorities' intentions to supply Israel with water from the Nile. The two observed that these policies serve the plans of American imperialism and the Zionist state of Israel and their planning is taking place through full coordination and cooperation with the two of them. The two parties condemned the policy of granting military facilities and bases to United States forces in the Ra's Banas area and other Egyptian territories on grounds that that measure is prejudicial to national independence and Egyptian sovereignty on the one hand and provides an opportunity for the United States' rapid interference forces

to repress national liberation movements and threaten the independence of countries in Africa, the Arab Gulf and the Middle East region on the other. The two peoples in Egypt and the Sudan. Agriculture in the two countries needs more Nile water. The two parties record that this policy constitutes a violation of the will and the rights of the peoples and countries of the Nile River basin and conflicts with their interests.

Eighth: The two parties reviewed the current conditions in the Arab nation and Africa as well as international conditions, and agreed to the following:

1. The two parties reject the platform of separate peace with Israel and they reject all partial and comprehensive capitulationist solutions. The two parties declare their determination to continue the comprehensive struggle for the sake of the liberation of Sinai and all other occupied Arab territories, the unconditional withdrawal of Israeli occupation forces from them, and the restoration of total sovereignty over them to the Arab countries. The two parties stipulate their support for the various forms of struggle the Palestinian people are waging under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, for the sake of exercising their rights to determine their destiny on their territory and establish their independent Palestinian state on the territories from which Israel withdraws.

2. The two parties warn of the dangers of the military facilities and bases which have been granted to the United States in Kenya and Somalia, which threaten the independence and sovereignty of the African countries, and the two parties declare their intention actively to participate in every unified activity the national and progressive forces perform in the countries bordering the Red Sea in order to thwart the American conspiracy to turn it into an abyss of international tension. The representatives of the two parties asserted their parties' solidarity with the African liberation movements which are fighting against colonialism and racial discrimination and the two parties support the Ethiopian revolution under the leadership of the fighting man Mengistu Haile Maryam.

3. The representatives of the two parties expressed their belief in the need and importance of building international relations on a foundation of international detente, on grounds that that is one of the major gains of the international revolutionary movement. The two parties view with deep anxiety the insistence of world imperialism, especially American imperialism, to increase world tension and raise Atlantic Pact military spending, which will threaten to revive the cold war.

4. The two parties condemn the policy of the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, which has played an important role in aiding and supporting the regimes of al-Sadat and Numayri, in addition to their destructive role in the ranks of the world movement of national liberation, through which they had the goal of destroying and fragmenting their relations with the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union. The two parties stress their condemnation of the divisive role the Chinese leadership is playing in the ranks of the world communist movement.
/Signed/ The Sudanese Communist Party--the Egyptian Communist Party.

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U.S. AID PROGRAMS SEEN AS COVER FOR CIA OPERATIONS

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #32 Jun 81 p 14

/Article: "Central Intelligence Operates in Egypt under the Cover of the 'Development Agency'"/

/Text/ The British magazine MIDDLE EAST ECONOMICS has published a secret report issued by the American Embassy in Cairo exposing the failure of the America aid system and the way in which it serves American goals alone, failing to bolster the structure of development in Egypt. If we look at the massive sums which the Americans are offering Egypt, we will find that they are in any case returning once more to American pockets.

The first case: It is well known that what is not spent each year reverts to the American treasury and that the amount of this aid which is spent in Egypt does not amount to more than half of the total, or $400 million.

The second case: America imposes the condition of buying from American companies, which sell high-priced goods that do not meet specifications, making the aid, in reality, merely aid for the American exporting sector and the companies in it. For example, the Ward company exported a group of buses to Egypt which the Egyptians called "the Carter buses." They were badly made, fell apart rapidly, are a threat to passengers' lives and make a lot of noise and commotion--that is, they are scrap buses. Today Egypt is demanding $10 million in compensation from that company.

The third case: There are 225 American officials administering the aid in Cairo. They live in luxury, are served by 400 other employees from Washington who receive fantastic salaries (in addition to dozens of middlemen and intermediaries), and all live with one another at aid expense. The American administrators receive one-quarter of the money allotted for aid, meaning that more than $100 million revert to the pockets of the Americans.

The remainder of the aid is "programmed" so that people with influence, millionaires and officials in Egypt who are linked to America, and not the poor people can benefit from it; while people see the factories, dams and roads the Soviets built in Egypt and the Arab countries, we cannot find a single vital project that the Americans have built in these countries. Indeed, we find the draining and domination of their wealth through their agents. The remainder of the aid is allocated

to these agents and it is through them that the Egyptian institutions are penetrated, especially the media and educational organizations, to acquire information on Egypt and the Egyptians on behalf of American intelligence, of whose agents the aid agency in Egypt contains many.

The Egyptian University today has become the scene of American espionage activity operating under the cover of "the Development Agency," which offers disguised bribes to university professors to work on projects of whose ultimate goals they know nothing. The "Development Agency" has also offered $10 million to universities in the name of "peace fellowships," stipulating that 1,900 grants are to be given to students to study in America, in addition to the "project to integrate Egyptian and American universities" and numerous projects which have the objective or preparing Egyptian minds in the American manner in order to be the "staffs" on which America will rely to administer matters in Egypt to its benefit.

In addition to infiltration into all the Egyptian ministries and authorities by American advisors, giving them the upper hand in adopting all decisions, relying on their financing of the so-called aid, we find that in the Department of Information and Radio and Television they are concerned in particular with cases of influencing public opinion. In this regard, we might mention that $2 million have been spent as bribes offered to higher leadership figures in radio and television out of a sum of $16 million allotted to the family planning program "Look about You" and to publicity for this suspect project, through which America uses Egyptians as guinea pigs by distributing birth control pills that are under tests.

If the new birth control pills succeed, and there are no enormous additions to the Egyptian population, the American companies will market them in their own country, and, if they do not, will sacrifice more Egyptians in more experiments.

The goals of the American aid programs in Egypt have been exposed on the pages of Egyptian magazines and in the university. The report of the first conference of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party referred to American domination of the government's institutions under the cover of American aid.

University professors' questions and their doubts about many American projects, especially those which assume a character of theoretical research, are increasing.

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RELATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT, ISRAEL AFTER NORMALIZATION CONDEMNED

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #32 Jun 81 pp 9, 10

/Article: "A Year after Normalization: the 'Camp' Agreements Are Dying and the 'Camp" Regime Is Tottering"/

/Text/ We publish herewith basic extracts from the editorial published in the March 1981 issue of the newspaper AL-INTISAR, the organ of the Egyptian Communist Party.

A year has passed since the flag of Israel was raised over the building of the Israeli embassy in Cairo.

Two years have passed since al-Sadat's ill-starred visit to occupied Jerusalem.

During the first year of normalization, the system of monopoly capitalism and its allies in Egypt rounded out all the manifestations of treason and subservience. After abandonment of Egyptian sovereignty over the territory of Sinai, there occurred the surrender of Egyptian oil to the Israeli enemy, al-Sadat's repeated promises and assertions that the water of the Nile will be conveyed to Israel have followed incessantly and Egypt has guaranteed Israeli nuclear supremacy by signing the nuclear weapon nonproliferation agreement at a time when Israel has refused to sign it and is acquiring further atomic bombs. There then occurred the arrival of the American military presence on Egyptian territory, actual acceptance of and dealing with the Israeli settlements and Jerusalem as a capital of Israel, the opening of Egypt's markets to the flow of Israeli goods, and the granting of permission for Egyptian thinkers to be exposed to the racist Zionist intellectual onslaught. In 1 year, 150,000 Zionists have come to Egypt in the guise of tourists, journalists, researchers and students in order to feed and support Israeli espionage networks and activities.

The subject was not restricted to bilateral normalization between the puppet regime in Cairo and the Zionist enemy. Rather, normalization had its dimensions in the international sphere as well, since the puppet regime in Cairo worked tirelessly within the United Nations to prevent a modification in Resolution 242 in favor of the Palestinian people, out of the Sadatist regime's attempt to satisfy its masters in Tel Aviv.

al-Sadat did not content himself with arrogating to himself the designation of representative of the Palestinian people in the autonomy negotiations--indeed, he began trying, out of despair, to demolish Arab consensus and the increasing international recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and started calling for the establishment of a temporary Palestinian government of agents, freely inviting it to have its headquarters in Cairo alongside the Israeli embassy.

The apostate policy in the national and domestic field had its other face in the economic field. The puppet authorities began to think of abusing the country's economic independence and began to liquidate the productive public sector units and sell them to the monopolistic multinational corporations at the lowest price, increasingly linking the Egyptian economy to the international capitalist economy.

In the fact of the growing crisis of the regime, al-Sadat saw no way out of his plight but to escalate the fascistic techniques of repression and deterrence through which he has faced the increasing hatred and vengeance of the Egyptian people. Therefore, al-Sadat's regime has turned the streets of the capital and main cities into mobile barracks for the Central Security forces, and the state's money, which was failing to meet the just economic demands of various classes of the people, began to be devoted to outfitting the police forces with the most up to date repressive systems and equipment, so that the Egyptian police would turn into the greatest police strike force in the third world--all this at a time when the mission of our armed forces in the context of the policies of capitulation were transformed into performing such subordinate civil roles for the bureaucratic system as building bridges and paving streets, or performing subordinate military roles for world imperialism in Chad, Zaire and elsewhere.

However, none of the techniques of repression, tyranny, police terror and media deception have saved, or will save, the regime, deliver it from its predicament, or bring it out of its stifling isolation in the local, Arab or international contexts.

Day by day the pictures of the Egyptian people's rejection of the policies of capitulation follow in succession in all fields.

Day by day the death of the Camp David agreements grows closer, as the people who made it collapse.

Here is Carter, who has turned out as he has. Here is Begin, in the hands of satan. Here is al-Sadat and his regime, destined to fall. Here is the new American administration, heading to go beyond the Camp David formula.

The forms of rising opposition to the Camp David agreements and normalization, which secret and open political parties and mass organizations in the form of trade unions, organizations, cultural groups and religious societies have expressed, do not arise in a vacuum. Rather, they express social forces and class groups of increasing breadth.

Raising the Palestinian flags and burning Israeli publications, conducting an broad boycott of Navon's visit, having professional and labor unions' refuse

normalization with the Israeli enemy, placing the names of the minority that is dealing with the Zionist enemy on blacklists, having our people refuse to travel to Israel in spite of all pressures and inducements, creating a festival of international books, and waging the battle that the Egyptian labor movement has taken up against the policies of liberalization and handing the public sector over as a tasty morsel to world monopoly capital--all these manifestations of mass rejection and resistance to policies of capitulation stress that the hour has come for the puppet authorities.

However, the arrival of the revolutionary moment dictates the ripening of the objective and subjective factors necessary for the success of revolutionary change.

In any event, the phenomena of escalating mass rejection stress a number of important facts, which we must observe and absorb:

First, the base of opposition to the policies of capitulation are increasingly expanding.

The regime's isolation is becoming increasingly aggravated.

Rejection of these policies is no longer restricted to the Egyptian Communist Party, the Egyptian marxists or the Grouping Party alone; rather, the opposition extends to all national democratic forces. Here the Socialist Labor Party, which accepted the Camp David agreements the day they were signed, with a number of reservations, is deciding to join the camp of the people rejecting the treaties of treason and subservience. Here some leaders of the General Federation of Workers who belong to the ruling party are accompanying the broad labor bases in opposing normalization and defending the public sector.

Second, the battle against normalization is a proper crucible for fusing the unity of national forces and ripening front action. The statement issued by a multitude of nationalists demanding the boycott of the Zionist book at the book fair had an apparent front character.

Third, attempts by the government media have failed to lead the masses of our people astray, separate them from the Arab nation, usurp our people's Arab affiliation or divert the national forces from the Palestinian cause.

Finally, the battles of conflict in the recent stage have underlined an increasing solidarity between the political struggle and the class struggle and an increasing role for the working class and revolutionary intellectuals in the arena of combat against the policies of apostasy.

The objective and subjective circumstances for bringing down Camp David and the Camp David regime are ripening continuously. However, our party and all national and democratic forces must concentrate their efforts to hasten the speed of their collapse. In the first place, this will require:

1. A constant raising of the masses' consciousness by politicizing them on the widest scale. This will guarantee that revolutionary action will be in solidarity

with the masses and will not be alienated from people's feeling of it even for a moment.

2. Aware planning and organization by organizing the masses of the people in their national political parties and innovating advanced forms of front action.

3. Stressing and deepening an awareness by the masses of the people of the source of their wretchedness and despair, which are the foreign and domestic policies of the ruling regime and the need to link the national struggle to the social struggle, which is not an easy task, since revolutionary action often suffers from the separation of the national struggle from the social democratic struggle.

Tangible steps along the road to attainment of these tasks have started to appear on the horizon. The rays of front action are progressing with firm strides toward the crystallization, establishment and proclamation of the national democratic front.

The people's consciousness of the irrevocable link between their daily struggles and policies of apostasy and capitulation is being rounded out more and more each day and more and more the masses have started raising questions of importance:

What have we gained from America? What have we received from the initiative? What has the liberalization brought us?

The answer to these questions comes every morning:

More vile inflation.
More voracious exploitation.
More wealth for the rich and poverty for the poor.
In spite of all that, the situation requires greater and greater effort, enlightenment, organization and solidarity.

This is essentially the responsibility of our party and the responsibility of the other national and democratic forces.

Forward, toward greater awareness of the class enemy and the greater exposure of his policies!

Forward, toward greater solidarity on the road to the national democratic front!

Forward, toward a greater struggle for the sake of a national democratic regime!

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BLAME FOR FACTIONAL UNREST LAID ON REGIME

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #33 & 34 Jul-Aug 81 pp 17, 18

/Article by Salah Ibrahim: "The Lastest Factional Events in Egypt: The Role of the Regime in Stirring up the Latest Factional Events in Egypt"/

/Text/ Once again, news of factional strife shook Egypt and the specter of schism dwelt within the ranks of the Egyptian people when the Christians and Moslems in the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' area of Cairo entered into a dispute characterized by violence, claiming as victims more than 10 deaths and 50 wounded.

This is not the first time that Egypt in the era of al-Sadat has faced the trial of factional strife. The years of his reign have been marked by the outbreak of struggles between Moslems and Christians. That is a phenomenon that Egypt did not witness in or before the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir.

An Early Warning

What al-Sadat underlined in his latest speech in Damanhur was not strange. He tried to lower a curtain of silence over the latest events in Egypt, saying that there were many details he did not yet want to talk about since the matter had been submitted to the judiciary! This was after the events had repeated themselves and the phenomenon had become recurrent during the years of his role, establishing the regime's role in kindling the fire of disputes between Moslems and Christians.

The statement the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party had issued before al-Sadat's visit was not a coincidence either: it warned of attempts to inflame the fire of factionalism in Egypt with the goal of smashing the noose of popular isolation around the Egyptian regime, from which the masses had parted company after they had come to see the dangers of subordination to the United States and of offering concessions to the Zionist entity and the concomitant aggravation of economic and social crisis.

In spite of this prior warning statement, the regime and the media did not flinch from trying to fix the charge of stirring up the latest incidents on the Egyptian opposition. Indeed, the matter reached the point where al-Sadat himself led this campaign of vilification, telling the Cairo newspaper MAY that the Communists were behind these events, which they were directing in service of their interests.

However, these charges no longer deceive the masses of the Egyptian people, especially now that the regime has tirelessly striven to repeat them whenever it faces a predicament of rising national opposition activity or exposure of its treasonous platform and its alienation from the masses.

The latest events, and the charges and attacks against the opposition, are stressing this again; they have occurred at a time when the opposition's arms are becoming flexed and the anger of the masses of the people against the regime, its capitulationist policies and practices, and its alliance with the United States and the Zionist entity are increasing.

A Popular Awakening!

The regime has continued to allege that the masses of the Egyptian people support it in its policy and to belittle the importance of the opposition. al-Sadat, in all his speeches, has reiterated that they are a minority. Then the people's festival held recently in Cairo, containing various groups of the nationalist opposition, inflicted a blow on the regime.

In this festival, which was attended by Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, leader of the National Grouping Party, Ibrahim Shukri, the chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, and thousands of Egyptians, cries were raised condemning the Camp David agreements and demanding the fall of the regime and a return to Arab ranks; it was established in a manner leaving no room for doubt that the Egyptian opposition was gaining increasing influence among circles of the masses of the people every day and was proceeding with sure steps toward the establishment of the Egyptian national front.

One can reveal the regime's role in inflaming these recent factional disputes in the light of this popular awakening, especially now that the security agencies' position on the events has been laid bare with the Egyptian minister of the interior's acknowledgment of the position of his men during the struggles that broke out and statement that the police "controlled" itself in order not to hit innocent people. On top of that, there have been the regime's attempts to hide the facts from the people on the spreading of rumors and the stirring up of religious sentiments among Copts and Moslems, increasing the aggravated state of events.

The Era of Fanaticism

This is not the first time the regime has resorted to stirring up factional strife. It has worked hard to fabricate this sort of dispute to cover up its failure to solve the masses' problems and to divert their attention from its capitulationist policy. In fact, at other times it has undertaken to stir up and feed the strife in order to use it as a pretext for striking out at the opposition.

In 1972, which witnessed the student uprising in protest against al-Sadat's reluctance to confront the Zionist aggression against Egyptian territory, Egypt experienced a number of events of a factional nature which reached their peak with the engineering of the fire in the Society of the Holy Book in al-Matariyah. Information at that time revealed that religious societies were behind these events, and proof emerged on the implication of three of al-Sadat's aides who played a prominent role in the May 1971 coup, 'Uthman Isma'il, Ahmad 'Abd-al-Akhir, and Hamid Mahmud, who had formed terrorist extremist youth religious cells within the university with the objective of opposing Christians, Nasirists and communists.

That year, using the excuse of putting a limit to these events, al-Sadat issued what is called the Law on National Unity, Law 34 for 1972, the law which totally usurps freedom of thought, expression, organization and political action in a manner which the laws of no previous dictatorial regime have known, and none of whose articles deal with any factional issue.

The laws restricting freedoms followed in succession after Law 37 for 1972, known as the Law on Freedoms, giving the president the right to impose restrictions on residence, movement, and assembly and to approve or abrogate judiciary verdicts.

This firm system of legislation which was restrictive of freedom has not prevented the rise and development of popular activity. This movement reached its peak toward the end of 1975 with the Hilwan workers' strikes. Throughout 1976, these upheavals were an expression of the Egyptian masses' grumbling over the second Sinai agreement and their frustration over the economic liberalization policy which started in 1974. At that time, which witnessed the escalation of movement among the masses of the people, the regime fabricated factional strife, when al-Azhar presented the draft on the declaration of war against people who have turned from Islam. This is the draft which, in its narrow interpretation, means executing a Christian if he has embraced Islam then tries to return to his original religion.

Striking out at the Opposition

With the start of 1977, the masses of the Egyptian people, on 18 and 19 January, rose up in protest against the rise in prices, and the upheaval spread when the masses of the people raised cries in protest against all the regime's policies. The regime confronted this upheaval with a broad campaign of arrests which involved all nationalist forces and it announced another group of repressive acts of legislation, most important of which was Law 2 for 1977 on protection of the freedom of the nation and the citizen, imposing sentences of hard labor for life on demonstrators.

The masses had hardly unearthed the practices of the regime, which had the goal of putting restrictions on their movements and treating all forms of opposition and protest as felonies, when they were shocked by the episode of the kidnapping and murder of the shaykh Dr Muhammad Husayn al-Dhahabi that was carried out by an extremist religious group, one of the groups which grew and gained strength by encouragement from the regime. This episode was the prelude to other factional incidents. Directly after that there occurred the episode of the burning of the main church in the Governorate of al-Minya, which was carried out by some young people in extremist religious societies, prompting Christian youths to burn the city mosque the following evening. The factional flame of fires and physical attack spread, and these disputes continued until the end of 1979.

This time the perpetration of these factional incidents offered a new opportunity to launch an attack on the opposition, carry out a broad detention campaign and issue another group of repressive laws, including Law 333 for 1978, called "The Law for the Protection of the Domestic Front and Social Peace," which prohibits opponents of the regime from having higher policy-making positions or leadership or from being candidates for membership in local boards, cooperative societies or

boards of directors of trade unions--above and beyond a series of specific repressive laws, such as the Law on Public Sector Employees, the Cooperative Law, or the Publications and Press Law, which, in their totality, give the authorities free rein in these fields and subject the people working in the fields directly to the agencies and men of the authorities.

Finally, al-Sadat crowned these laws with the Law on Impropriety which gives absolute powers to what is called the socialist prosecutor and forms special courts of men from the ruling party to try the party's political adversaries. This law makes all forms of intellectual, artistic, literary, scientific and political activity a felony and is aimed at destroying all movement or initiative with which the ruling party is not in agreement. In addition, the punishments which the law stipulates deprive citizens of political participation, prevent them from joining parties, deprive them of the right to run as candidates for trade union or local boards, unions or authorities, and go so far as to deprive citizens of natural human rights by preventing them from traveling outside the country, limiting their residence or preventing them from residing in specific areas or occupying positions.

None of these restrictions imposed by the regime have managed to prevent the masses of the people from expressing their frustration over promises of welfare and peace. In early 1980, the masses began publicly to declare their opposition to the regime. The Egyptian opposition experienced increasing growth and enjoyed varying degrees of consensus over goals and positions on the regime and its policies. In the same period, a number of factional incidents broke out. Last April al-Minya, Asyut and Alexandria witnessed disputes between Moslems and Christians.

Continued Repression

What is perhaps striking is that this series of factional events has been concentrated in al-Sadat's era. Similar disputes did not occur in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir, which witnessed a number of broad social measures that embraced the Egyptian people and did not discriminate between Moslems and Christians. The achievements of the Nasirist stage were for everyone, and everyone payed their cost.

However, in the era of treason against the national soil, in the context of the lack of equality among citizens and the monopolization by some people of the country's benefits and achievements, there is no way to continue to rule except by laws of repression and tyranny, the tightening of police seizure of everything, the provocation of disputes, the nourishment of religious extremism, the spreading of dissension and alienation among the ranks of the people, and the directing of accusations against one nationalist group or another.

al-Sadat will continue the same policy, which will be a pretext to strike out at the Egyptian opposition, prosecute Egyptian nationalists and detain Egyptian leftists. It is certain that ht will also find a cover in the latest factional events to continue with the policy of repression and the pursuit of capitulation.

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COMMUNIST PUBLICATION QUOTES PROGRESSIVES ON MOVE TOWARD FRONT

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic 29 Mar 81 p 22

/Article: "The Front of National Salvation and the Conditions for Building the Front"/

/Text/ AL-TAQADDUM, the newspaper of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party in Egypt, is continuing to hold a live, fruitful dialogue among opposition nationalist forces on the subject of the front, the conditions for establishing it, its programs, and the forces which deserve to take part in it. We are conveying to our readers some paragraphs of this vital, important dialogue. The dialogue began with Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, a leader of the National Front Party. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din commented on his appeal and sent out an open appeal for a dialogue. Dr 'Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah, an independent national opposition leader, responded with an important article on political parties. Dr Ibrahim Sa'd-al-Din, member of the Grouping Party's Central Committee and founder of the Socialist Institute, wrote an article in which he discussed some issues that Dr 'Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah had raised, and Nabil al-Hilali followed with an article titled "The National Salvation Front--What For, Among Whom and How?" Nabil al-Hilali is standing with 30 of his colleagues today in the defendant's dock, facing al-Sadat's military courts.

The Bourgeoisie's Anxiety over the Liberalization Policy

Dr Ibrahim Sa'd-al-Din, an economist who experienced 'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment in building an independent, liberated national economy, also contributing abundantly to it, describes the positions of some Egyptian and Arab bourgeois segments and groups concerning al-Sadat's policies, saying:

"Important segments of Egyptian and Arab capitalism, even some people who are allied with the United States of America or are trying to coordinate with it, are taking a position of rejecting the attainment of a contemptible peace with Israel, which will consolidate the Zionist state and give it the upper hand in the Arab region. Therefore they reject some of the steps that have been taken, in particular the separate Camp David peace and the normalization that has followed it, and are seeking to obtain better conditions.

"Other segments of Egyptian and Arab capitalism refuse on religious or nationalist grounds to accept the existence of Israel at all and consequently reject any conciliation with the state of Israel. Some of these people are shifting to a

position of enmity toward the United States of America and its aggressive policies in the region as a result of American support for Israel in particular.

"In spite of the Egyptian boureoisie's acceptance, in general, of the policy of economic liberalization and policies which are aimed at facilitating capitalist growth, important segments of the upright bourgeoisie feel legitimate anxiety for their interests as a result of the policy of throwing the door wide open to foreign capital, foreign imports, an obvious foreign role in resources, foreign misuse of what is available, blatant corruption in the government, and reliance on massive indebtedness in order to achieve equilibrium between revenues and expenditures. They feel anxiety in particular over what an increase in the severity of class differences could lead to as a result of the government's current policies and the accelerating growth of parasitic groups through speculation, bribery, embezzlement, commissions and other illegitimate practices.

Monopolization of Power

"All opposition political forces, including those that speak for segments of the Egyptian bourgeoisie, also realize where these cries about democracy, respect for the rights of citizens, sovereignty of the law and the construction of the state of institutions have led.

"The authorities' concentration has increased in an unprecedented fashion. The president, who at the same time is the prime minister, chairman of the ruling party, chairman of the Higher Council of Judiciary Bodies, supreme commander of the police authority and supreme commander of the armed forces, alone adopts, without participation from any organization and authority--even those he heads--the most serious decisions related to the country's national rights. He invites foreign countries to use the country's land and waters to serve strategic goals and relinquishes Nile water, or offers to relinquish part of it, without referring to the legislative bodies, as he does in the case of other serious decisions.

"At the same time, numerous rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution have been negated by a massive arsenal of legislation restricting freedoms which has been codified in the last 5 years.

"These restrictions are not used, and were not codified, just to facilitate a return to a capitalist society dominated by the Egyptian private sector. Rather, they are used in particular to support the monopolization of power and to protect the group of policies aimed at facilitating the growth and construction of a parasitic bourgeois class that is working in connection with and at the service of foreign capital, although all attempts have led to criticism and opposition, whether they have emanated from individuals or groups of the bourgeois forces themselves with the aim of more properly guiding the growth of capitalism in Egypt, or from forces of the people which essentially reject all the current orientations of the regime."

The National Salvation Front

What for, among whom and how?

Nabil al-Hilali wrote,

"The Grouping's case for opposition raises three questions:

"Unity for what?

"Unity among whom?

"Unity how?

"First: unity for what?

"Each national group has short term and long range goals. It is natural that these groups will agree or disagree among themselves on these goals, but there will always remain a minimum of agreement on short range goals on the part of all national democratic groups.

"Political struggle is different from a steeplechase. Therefore it is out of the question for nationalist groups to transcend revolutionary stages and leap over their short range goals in order directly to strive to realize their long-range ones.

"Therefore we all, in every revolutionary stage, must discover the pressing issue in that stage and determine, in the light of it, the urgent duties which lie on our shoulders and about which we must unify our statements.

"The pressing issue today is salvation of the nation from the policies of the regime and from the infiltration of imperialism and Zionism. The pressing demand today is to bring all honorable nationalist and democratic forces together in a 'national salvation front' which will not have the goal of unifying these forces to struggle for the sake of attaining the long range goal of a given group but will aim, rather, specifically at uniting them for the sake of a short term goal which all nationalist and democratic forces can agree over.

"This is a unity which sets out alternate policies that will guarantee a free dignified life for Egyptians in the light of:

"A politically and economically independent nation which is decidedly hostile to imperialism and Zionism.

"An ethnic nation which constitutes, in fact not in word, part of the Arab nation and strives to achieve Arab unity with a content which is hostile to imperialism and its local buttresses.

"A democratic nation guaranteeing the broadest true political freedom for all political forces.

"A progressive nation guaranteeing the protection and enhancement of the social goals of the masses of the people.

"While the national salvation front's call is for a common struggle for the sake of urgent goals, it does not mean usurping each group's right to struggle separately for the sake of long-term goals.

"Second: unity among whom?

In the light of the current revolutionary stage, interaction must take place among the political forces opposed to the regime's policies on three levels:

"First, strategic alliance, unifying the forces which are in agreement among themselves to preserve not just the short range goals but also the long-range ones.

"Second, different forms of limited temporary agreement with all forces expressing their readiness to cooperate in a partial cause or more, to the extent we wish to and are able to.

"It is most incorrect for enthusiasm over a strategic alliance to lead us to the point of imagining that that can cause us to dispense with tactical alliances.

"It is also most incorrect for zeal over tactical alliances to prompt us to suppose that such alliances alone are the desired objective.

"Tactical objectives, by their nature, are not eternal. This is because they of necessity contain forces which are united by the struggle for short-term goals and are divided by the struggle for long range ones.

"Therefore the context of tactical alliance is not frozen or fixed. It arises within the revolutionary process of extension and contraction.

"It is idealistic for us to imagine, suppose or demand stability in the positions of the parties to the alliance from the beginning to the end of the road, since there will always be political forces and social groups that will separate themselves from the caravan during the journey--indeed will sometimes slip away into counterrevolutionary positions."

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REPORT PAINTS GRIM PICTURE OF DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENT

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #32 Jun 81 pp 16-19

/Article: "Letter from Cairo: To Save National Independence"/

/Text/ The National Progressive Unionist Grouping has prepared an important political document titled "To Save National Independence," which it presented for discussion at the first policy session of the party's first general conference. It held its session under the same slogan, "To Save National Independence," in the period 8-10 April.

The authorities took the initiative of launching a broad campaign on the night of 28 March to arrest some of the leaders and fighting men of the party, and the campaign involved a large number, more than 100, leaders and nationalist and progressive elements. Among the people detained were Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq, the editor in chief of the party's bulletin AL-TAQADDUM; his wife the writer and fighting woman Faridah al-Naqqash, member of the Committee to Defend National Culture; Nabil al-Hilali, member of the Lawyer's Union council and a prominent protagonist of democratic freedoms; Eng Fawzi Habash; the great labor fighting man Muhammad 'Ali 'Amir; and Sabir Zayid. The authorities were compelled to release a number of them after a few days, but the majority is still being detained pending the current trials.

The direct objective of the campaign was to try to prevent the conference from being held; the authorities had been counting desperately on that, in spite of all types of pressure and boycotts against the party. It was also the party's gift and earnest friendship on the eve of the visit by Alexander Haig, the American secretary of state, to Egypt to rearrange conditions in the region and get agreement to have the American rapid intervention forces occupy the bases in Sinai under the aegis of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, as a link in the series of military bases, or "facilities," belonging to the new alliance.

Preparation was made for the new stage, the stage of consecrating the American military occupation and military bases and closing ranks around the protective imperialist treaties in the region, through a flood of new laws and legislation aimed at closing the gaps in the laws issued by the regime of the 15 May coup, whose failure to this day to muzzle the growing nationalist opposition and stifle its voice had become proved through practice. Among these were Law 2 for 1977, which

imposes the penalty of hard labor for life on anyone participating in a demonstration, strike or sitin; the Law on Impropriety and the Socialist Prosecutor's Court; the Press Law and its disgraceful bill; the Law on suspicious Persons; and the Law on Parties and the State Military Courts of Security.

Rumors spread about Cairo intensely just before the celebrations of the anniversary of the 15 May coup concerning al-Sadat's intention to resort to his customary referenda to stifle the opposition parties which, in his view, had become deeply implicated in "impropriety," as well as to dissolve the current People's Assembly and prepare legislation to amend the law on exercise of political rights, taking the system of election by party lists on the basis of an absolute majority, not relative majority, of party lists, with the objective of getting the government party totally to monopolize the parliament and totally eliminate the opposition. The Consultative Assembly recently gave agreement, as part of this drive, to amend the current system for electing local council assembly members in accordance with this system of lists, by absolute majority, to frustrate the opposition wherever it might be. It is worth mentioning that the local council elections, which took place in November 1979, ended at that time in the victory of a large number of National Grouping Party members in addition to independents. Included in the overall new legislation, which is aimed at stifling the opposition movement, is the conversion of the Consultative Assembly, or the "council of wise men," which is for the most part appointed, into a parliamentary assembly with full powers along the lines of the old Senate or council of prominent men. May God have mercy on the king! Cairo is also talking about a comedy routine with the announcement expected on 1 May of a tangible increase in salaries about which the regime's newspapers and media have started to spread the good news already. This will be tantamount to a bribe to allow these blatantly tyrannical measures to pass through on behalf of Cairo's smart shops, its black market merchants and its plunderers who are preparing to "suck up" this increase on the first day--if they have not already blotted it up before it is announced.

Amendment of the Law on Parties

This wave of "reforms" and hysterical restrictions has affected the Law on Parties. The People's Assembly gave its agreement to the recommended draft of a law amending some provisions of Law 40 for 1977 on the political party system. The amendment concentrates on the addition of two new paragraphs to Article Two. The first requires the chairman of the Party Affairs Committee, the Chairman of the People's Assembly, the chairman of the Consultative Assembly and the socialist public prosecutor be informed of the names of people establishing all new parties so that the people, as represented by their deputies, may, as the draft puts it, be apprised of the names of the founders of the new parties and their political tendencies! Thus the socialist prosecutor will exercise his right to protest, as he has done with the labor unions and societies! Thus all persons committing violations will be uprooted at the source! The amendment also requires that the Committee on Parties review requests to establish new parties within 4 months; if this period elapses without the issuance of a decree of agreement, that will be considered tantamount to a denial of the establishment of the party--that is, the Committee on Parties has the right to oppose the establishment of any new party without giving its reasons!

Tax Exemptions and the Restoration of Properties!

It is always interests--the lowly interests of the ruling classes and groups, which at the same time are voracious and decadent, and behind those, the strategic interests of their imperialist, capitalist and international Zionist allies--that are behind all these "reforms." It was not long before the draft of a new tax law appeared in the morass, totally exempting from all types of tax agricultural activity, which one of the preferred fields of activity of the ruling groups and families and the target of a large portion of their investments and the current operations of plunder, under the title of "self-sufficiency in food" and "development banks," under the protective umbrella of the governing National Party and its monopoly rule. The draft also contains a reduction in the maximum tax to 50 percent from the 90 percent in the old law--in favor of the big millionaires, of course--in exchange for illusory reductions for people with limited incomes. This draft was preceded by a notorious tax ruling by the minister of economy calling for the exemption of taxpayers from all forms of punishment and penalty in exchange for payment of taxes based on the statement presented, without a review of the reliability of the "honor" and "conscience" of the taxpayers! In the same context, a draft law has been prepared declaring all orders imposing sequestration on people and their families and heirs void and eliminating all resultant effects, with the provision that all funds and properties be returned to their owners. On that subject, the law sanctifies an actual situation; most of these funds and properties had already been returned to their owners some time ago, and properties of Israelis are being returned now!

All this that is going on on the local, Arab-wide and international level falls under the category of "threatening domestic independence." Egypt is being reinvaded and reoccupied militarily, politically, economically and culturally. It is handing over its territory, its airports, its markets, its universities and its culture to imperialism and world capitalism, including Zionist capitalism. In such circumstances, the conference of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, which leads the nationalist opposition in Egypt and recently held a conference under the banner "To Save National Independence," acquires the utmost significance. Herewith is a summary of the important report we referred to, which was presented to the conference under the same title:

Our party is devoting its political meeting this year to a focal issue, the loss of Egypt's independence politically, economically and militarily in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli-American alliance and the vital missions imposed by the state of subordination to foreign dominance, foremost among them the establishment of a front containing all forces in our country that are anxious to maintain national independence and see Egypt regain its dignity, status and personality as a country with a pioneering history and combative history with deep roots in the heart of its Arab nation, in the context of its Islamic and African environment and nonaligned countries.

While our party has had the right to conduct a criticism of itself, that is because of its failure to realize that apostasy in Egypt has reached the point it has reached--and what has happened so far is not the end of the journey. It has come to possess characteristics that must be most carefully defined.

First, the dimensions of the loss of national sovereignty.

1. The military dimension.

The authorities are frankly declaring their readiness to give military facilities to American forces on national territory. These facilities have actually been given to America, in the words of the foreign minister, Mr Kamal Hasan 'Ali, on Egyptian air, naval and land bases, in the West Cairo Airport, and the Qina Airport. A base is being built for this purpose at Ra's Banas on the Red Sea.

The president says that what he is giving America are facilities, not bases, that he is prepared to store American weapons in Egypt, and that the government of Egypt is not in need of American forces but can mobilize 1 million Egyptians for the sake of the protection and stability of the region and resistance to the manifestations of chaos that have become widespread there. There is absolutely no mention at all of the fact that granting facilities to America is for the sake of confronting the Zionist enemy; rather, as America states frankly, they are to confront the oil region, in view of the vital interests that represents for the West. Of the Ra's Banas base, the American press has stated that it is the best location in the whole Middle East for confronting the gulf. Thus this base has been erected, at a cost of $2.6 billion, and Egypt is being asked to pay part of the expenses of erecting it--to serve America's international strategy, not to serve the interests of Egypt. Thus the distinction between "facilities" and "bases" is no longer founded on any basis of reality.

The arms that America is storing in Egypt may include nuclear weapons, especially since Egyptian officials are not divulging what is being stored. This means exposing Egypt to being a target in a nuclear war. The unsuccessful American military operation to save the hostages in Iran took off from Egypt, and the contradictions in the statements by Egyptian officials at that time on the veracity of that were certainly to be explained by the fact that most of these officials--including the prime minister and the minister of defense--were not aware of Egypt's involvement in this operation, which is a blatant example of Egypt's loss of sovereignty over its territory.

The fact is that the proliferating forms of American military presence in Egypt and the repeated performance of joint military maneuvers have imbued this presence with a permanent character, which is not linked to protection of Egypt's security or its higher interests but rather to intervention and aggression in neighboring countries and the service of American strategic objectives of guaranteeing American interests in the region. Therefore, it is directed in the first place at the oil countries and is an extension and assertion of Carter's doctrine on the gulf.

Thus it is clear that providing America with facilities in Egyptian military bases threatens Egypt's foreign security by deepening Egypt's isolation from its Arab, Islamic and African environment--indeed threatens Egypt's security domestically and conflicts with the constitution. America, just by having guaranteed itself a military presence in Egypt, must guarantee a government which is loyal to it in order to defend that presence, and this means intervening in Egypt's domestic affairs and violating Egypt's internal security, not protecting it.

One cannot claim that the character of occupation will be removed from the presence of American forces in Egypt by the fact that the authorities are happy with it and have requested it. The character of occupation was not eliminated from the entry of British forces into Egypt in 1882 by the fact that the khedive demanded the entry of these forces with the goal of striking out at 'Urabi's revolution.

2. The political dimension.

The military presence in Egypt must have its effects on the nature of the political system in Egypt and its political orientations, not just on the Egyptian government's abandonment of the policy of nonalignment and its alignment toward the West, toward America specifically--indeed the most aggressive circles in America. America is being requested to abandon the Vietnam complex and to escalate its confrontation of the Soviets in a manner which exceeds the capacity of the American rulers themselves. Thus Egypt has become a party which is clearly aligned in international struggles, and that is confirmed through its foreign policy, since the government claims to be pursuing a policy in which the peoples of the region will triumph but which only serves imperialist schemes vis-a-vis these peoples. This is clearly apparent in the two most important issues preoccupying the government lately:

First, the issue of Afghanistan.

The government is trying to portray its position as one of protecting Islam against the danger of communism. Nonetheless, it finds no embarrassment in declaring, officially, that it is offering the mojahedin military support and that it is overtly interfering in the domestic struggle which is flaring in Afghanistan against the existing government, without noting that this government has a seat in the United Nations and in the nonaligned movement and has diplomatic relations and exchanges embassies with various countries, including America.

We do not intend to defend the Soviets' position on the issue of Afghanistan. Our party has a position which has been recorded in this regard. However, we can only note that at the same time the Egyptian government is challenging the Afghan government, it is taking a negative position on the issue of Israel's takeover of Arab Jerusalem.

Second, the issue of Chad.

What has happened in Chad is that the legitimate government rid itself of French influence with the support of a number of African countries, among which Libya had a prominent role. We do not intend to defend the declaration of union between Libya and Chad that has been made, but the declaration of union cannot be considered a justification for withdrawing Egypt's ambassador from Chad, for demanding that France intervene in Chad to punish al-Qadhdhafi or that Egypt coordinate with France and Hissein Habri to resist the legitimate government militarily, or for having the government present what has gone on as a Soviet plot to encircle Egypt--as if it were possible for Chad to threaten Egypt.

Subservience to American imperialism finds a symbol in the domestic situation of Egypt, through the status and influence the American Embassy in Ciaro has come to

possess and all the annexes and branches it has. It has become a state within a state, indeed a state above a state, and the American bodies and institutions, especially the American Aid Authority, have spread out and infiltrated into all Egyptian economic, research, educational and informational bodies and organizations and in the field of observing and gathering data. There is no government department that does not have an American expert of one form or another, since this expert has the financing of projects in his hands and his "opinion" ultimately plays a decisive role in determining the course of affairs, so that his presence in this form must be accompanied by different corrupting forms.

3. The economic dimension.

The fact is that dependence on foreign advisors and foreign aid--or, in broader terms, the policy of liberalization, including the subordination to the bodies of the world capitalism, these bodies' supervision over the Egyptian economy, and economic subordination that that entails--are what lie behind the different features of political and economic subordination that Egypt is suffering from today.

Egypt has now come to rely on the outer world, and on America in particular, to provide 40 percent of its food and 78 percent of its wheat. Is it in the power of the authorities, in conditions of this sort, to be independent of America in their decisions? The Egyptian national movement gave warning early on that the issue of economic independence is at the core of political independence. The real meaning of subordination to some country in the economic sense is that one borrows in order to buy at a time when one does not possess the reserves to pay the debts one owes. Thus Egypt's indebtedness surged from $2.1 billion at the end of 1972, before liberalization, to $17.2 billion last year. Arab grants and aid do not enter into these debts.

In order to increase Egypt's revenues, the authorities have tried to raise the transit tolls in the Suez Canal, to rely on revenues from tourism--from the Arab countries specifically--and to rely on the savings of Egyptians working in oil countries. However, the Arab tourist revenues have shrunk because of Egypt's isolation and the savings of Egyptians, by virtue of the logic of liberalization, are for the most part being dissipated in the acquisition of imported consumer goods.

To discover additional sources of financing, one has started to depend on miracles, such as the announcement that Egypt has made serious oil discoveries. These statements are not based on reliable information. Egypt produces 29 million tons and consumes 20 million tons a year. The government, in accordance with annexes to the treaty, has committed itself to selling 2 million tons a year to Israel, and exports the rest, 7 million tons, an amount which it would have been more appropriate, in light of Egypt's limited reserves, either to keep in the ground, to guarantee that its price increases, or to use in the form of petrochemicals.

It is worth noting that Egypt's commitment to export no less than 2 million tons of its oil annually to Israel, with no time limitation placed on this commitment, entails extreme risk. In fact, the most dangerous economic commitment is that in exchange for the receipts from the oil, which are estimated at $500 million, the Egyptian government must buy goods from Israel, which is a permanent link to the Israeli economy and a weapon used by Israel to invade Egyptian markets.

4. Egypt's relations with Israel in the context of its current relations with America and the West.

The conditions of subordination to world imperialism will inevitably leave their imprint on Egypt's relations with Israel and will ultimately end with the Egyptian authorities' submission to Israel's terms. Forty percent of the territory of Sinai is still occupied by Israel--not 20 percent, as the authorities claim.

Israel has the right of oversight over all of Sinai and this is represented by the fact that Sinai will remain indefinitely demilitarized, and consequently deficient in sovereignty, at the mercy of Israeli occupation at any time. There are signs that Israel's withdrawal from the rest of Sinai is no longer a matter that has been settled, even in the event of the evacuation of all Sinai.

The citizens of each country, according to the treaty, will have the right to reside on the territory of the other and to take part in joint projects. The planning is for Sinai to be transformed into a buffer society between Egypt, Israel and the Arab world and to be a subservient society connecting Israel and Egypt, while Israel contributes its settlements, which have actually been established, although their names are to be changed to /those of/ joint Egyptian-Israeli projects. Sinai is being prepared to be the governorate of economic integration with Israel; for this purpose, the nuclear power plant America is to build has been transferred from western Alexandria to the east of al-'Arish in order to produce electricity and desalinate seawater for a common system which is to encompass the Negev and Sinai together.

Thus the presence of the Israeli settlers will continue unimpeded in Sinai, and Egyptian Sinai will remain the hostage of American peace on Israel's terms.

The Israeli presence in Egypt is no longer restricted to Sinai alone. It has been publicized that Israel will have a permanent intelligence base in the heart of Cairo--an item of news the authorities in Egypt have not denied. It is not customary in international usage for the intelligence center of a foreign country to be accepted in the territory of another state, with that state's knowledge, without that being taken as a blatant loss of the sovereignty of the latter. Now it is not the Israelis who are facing the charge of espionage and spying but Egyptians and Palestinians who are being accused of belonging to the FATH organization.

5. The cultural dimension.

The conditions of dependence inevitably highlight cultural dependence, which is represented by a negation of Egypt's Arabhood, indeed of Egypt's Egyptianness, and the adoption of the American way of life as a model to be emulated, although Egypt is not endowed with the productive base that would put it among the advanced societies of the West. Therefore this affiliation has become a perversion, a cause for bringing out numerous corrupt features and deviant values which reflect the actions and ideology of the parasitic classes of society that are cooperating with imperialism, imparting to them, in the eyes of the imperialist countries, the character of a subordinate body, not the character of a partner.

Indeed, cultural subordination has reached the point of opening up culturally and intellectually to Zionism, considering it to be a major key for opening up to the "civilized" world. Zionist books are being sold in Egypt while Arabic books are confiscated, curricula are being reformulated to depict Israel as a friend, not an enemy, and the doors of our universities, institutes and research centers are being opened to Israeli experts in all research areas.

In conclusion, the conditions of subordination whose manifestations, special features and premises are numerous, are the opposite of those which directed the struggle of the Egyptian people to assert their national independence in previous stages:

Instead of liquidating the positions of colonialism economically, politically, militarily and culturally, to the contrary the positions of foreign capital allied with world imperialism and international Zionism are now being developed.

In place of a policy of independence, based on the liquidation of the centers of puppet classes, the development of new parasitical groups is now taking place.

In place of reliance on the forces of the working people, with their workers, peasants and national capitalists, these forces are now being struck down and an independent political movement is being inhibited from functioning.

In place of solidarity with the third world liberation movement, there is isolation from it and the policy of nonalignment is now being relinquished.

In place of unity with the Arab nationalist movement, alienation from it and opposition to it are now occurring and a coalition is being formed to oppose it with imperialism and Zionism.

Instead of relying on the socialist countries' support for the Arab liberation movement, hostility is now being shown to these countries on the regional and international levels together, under numerous guises.

These orientations underline the conditions of dependence which are now being implanted and developed.

Second, domestic Egyptian problems today.

There are items of evidence which betray Egyptian nationalism's deficiency in meeting the challenges of the current stage, and our party must record this most truthfully if we wish to overcome the deficiencies and provide the circumstances for building a national front on firm foundations. One can summarize the most prominent of these items of evidence as follows:

1. The fact that the phenomena of the people's rejection of the government's policy toward Israel is confined to narrow limits. These phenomena appeared in their most striking form on the day normalization was declared, on 26 February 1980, and took form, in the positions of our party and the Labor Party, through statements

by political personalities under the title of "national coalition," and the positions of some professional unions, headed by the Lawyers' and Journalists' Unions and some labor unions.

2. Israeli President Navon's visit to Egypt was another such occasion. Ultimately the visit produced only contacts which were confined to the ruling party, and the masses took a position of indifference toward it. Nonetheless, at the outset the phenomena of rejection by the people did not exceed the limits of a personal rejection or a silent collective one. They gradually rose to a more positive stance, the most conspicuous phenomenon of which was the refusal by the workers of Hilwan to receive him, in response to and under guidance from our party.

3. The masses' reaction to the issue of American military facilities, which has a more serious character; tangible rejection was restricted to a number of writings or party symposia by our party and the Labor Party.

At the outset one must determine that the responsibility for the various aspects of the failure to set off a national movement is in the first place to be borne by the vanguards and aware political forces. This means our party, above others. One cannot absolve oneself of this responsibility by casting blame on the masses--although this does not mean, either, that leaders who avoid playing their role and shedding crocodile tears today because the mass movement has been deficient in taking off are to be excused from responsibility.

The political map of Egypt today underlines the fact that the policy of violating national sovereignty that the government is pursuing is not an object of acceptance, that the opposition is on its way to increasing and is no longer confined to the left--indeed includes forces belonging to the right which have been rendered anxious by the isolation of Egypt--and that the government has failed to realize any of its promises of peace, welfare or stability. In spite of that, the opposition movement has not yet acquired the dimensions of an organized mass movement which is able to put a limit to the government's policy. It is necessary to specify a number of objective factors which influence the gap between the actual state of the opposition movement and what it ought to be:

First, the Egyptian people are for the most part under 30 and have only lived through the experience of the revolution. They have no familiarity with the physical presence of colonial occupation, which left in the early fifties; therefore the notion of "military bases" no longer stirs the mass reactions that it did in the forties. The need to concentrate on this notion, with all the special meanings it entails, stands out, now that colonialism has started imposing it in a devious manner in which it considers it proper to avoid directly provoking the feelings of the masses.

Second, the restoration of a national sense, after every setback that has afflicted the national movement in the history of Egypt, has required hard combative struggle that has taken a certain amount of time to bear fruit. The national struggle to overcome the effects of the 'Urabi defeat in 1882 was not consummated until 1919 and the attainment of national independence. Ridding Egypt of the imperialist presence took a hard struggle and was not consummated until the fifties. Therefore

it is necessary to realize that the dimensions of the current setback entail the struggle of a whole era, with regional and international dimensions, in confronting imperialism, and that its destiny is not confined only to what is going on on the Egyptian stage.

Third, it is also necessary to realize that the Egyptian bourgeoisie is not the bourgeoisie of the 1919 revolution, which fought on behalf of its domestic market, and is not the domestic bourgeoisie which discovered the benefits of national unity and the horizons of the national market after 1952. This bourgeoisie is in defeat today and dominance has been restored to wings of the bourgeoisie that are cooperating with imperialism, including groups that have been enriched by liberalization as well as groups that were defeated by the 1952 revolution and are getting their revenge now. These parasitic bourgeois groups, by their character, feel no ties to the land of Egypt and have no love for Egypt. In their eyes, liberalization is only an opportunity that has been granted for plundering, pillaging, and accumulating wealth by draining off national resources and putting them in foreign banks lest they risk confiscation once again.

It is no longer possible to propound Egyptian nationalism in isolation from the current class composition of Egyptian society, because liberalization has created new social groups of a parasitic nature that is detrimental to Egypt, and they are determining Egypt's orientations today.

Fourth, the corrupt aspects of liberalization are not restricted to the parasitic bourgeois groups but have rather planted pockets whose nature is to engender corruption even in the classes which are revolutionary by their nature. These have the effect of diverting people's attention and turning them from the revolutionary struggle on the domestic and class levels both. Therefore the phenomenon of liberalization has constituted the economic buttress of conditions of subordination, politically and militarily.

The phenomenon of the accumulation of capital from Arab oil countries has coincided with the phenomenon of liberalization, constituting an element that attracts various classes of Egyptian people as a way out of economic straits, as an escape from the political oppression that they face in Egypt, or as an enticement for profitable activity for competent unemployed Egyptians. Egypt has experienced a movement of migration to the Arab oil countries which has reached an unprecedented volume on the part of its skilled labor and educated classes. The emigration might have its positive aspects, but it also has negative aspects in that it offers these ways out as individual ones at a time when confronting the manifestations of corruption demands a collective mass movement. Emigration has also manifested itself as an element which alleviates sharp differences in wealth which the phenomenon of liberalization has underscored and an element which has increased the complexity of dealing with these phenomena which ultimately consolidate the conditions of subordination.

Fifth, the social transformations that the phenomenon of liberalization has brought about have highlighted a political system based on formal democracy and a formal party system in order to give the West the impression that Egypt is a modern "civilized" regime which resembles it in its liberalism. However, Egypt does not

deviate from the absolute powers of the decisionmaker, the authoritarian nature of the ruling party which is described in the so-called "nationwide" press as "the party," and the policy of laws which are not honored. The exceptional measures have been codified by an arsenal of laws restricting freedoms, the most serious of which is Law 2 making demonstrating and striking a felony for hard labor for life, the Law on Impropriety which entails political isolation and the holding of trials before a special nonjudiciary court, the Strike Law and, finally, the Press Law which has consecrated a system of media blackouts whose job is to divert and anaesthetize the masses of our people and keep them in ignorance. The government of institutions has ultimately produced institutions which lack the direct power to act in an independent fashion. What are the People's Assembly, and, after its innovation, the Consultative Assembly, or even the Council of Ministers, but formal institutions? The only institution which pursues the process of forming political decisions in Egypt is that of the presidency.

The authorities, with their formal democracy, might succeed in slowing down the masses' movement by dimming their awareness, by scaring and starving people, and by repressing and terrorizing fighting men, not just by imprisoning them but also and basically by prosecuting them in their attempt to make a livelihood. However, this will be of no use in eliminating the causes of the masses' anger. The masses might be passive on general national issues but they are not passive on the issues of their daily lives. Therefore, the authorities have concentrated on separating the political issues from economic and trade union ones. There is no strike that the masses threaten at their worksite that does not prompt the authorities to hasten to respond to their economic demands, in order to keep them from being linked to the more general political issues which are the source of the malady.

Here is where the error in changing the spontaneous movement of the masses without showing necessary appreciation for organized political action lies. Causing the spontaneous movement of the masses to acquire an organized political nature is the essence of what we mean by "building the front," and it is therefore not just an operation imposed from above, restricted to a coalition of conscious political vanguards, or just an operation which arises from below that is dependent on polarizing the masses around the problem they are suffering from every day--in the first place it means linking the one to the other and creating practical solutions to achieve this linkup, it means raising the masses' consciousness from a state of grumbling about particular problems to one of overall political issues, and, ultimately, it means translating the conditions of subordination in its overall dimensions to its particular expressions as manifested in the economic problems facing the masses. Liberalization, with its economic damage and its conditions of subordination, with its political and military dimensions, are only two sides of the same coin. Although the vanguards' and educated persons' approach to understanding the phenomenon in its comprehensive nature lies its political and military aspect, the nonpoliticized masses' approach to realizing it lies its economic aspect, and it is only when the movement of both parties coincide that the circumstances for building the front will be realized.

The National University--through Expenditures

Studies will begin in the coming academic year what has been labelled the "National University." This is the name that was chosen for the university by the expenditures of children of the upper classes. The new university, as has been announced, will offer studies on scientific and practical subjects that, according to the expression used, will be in keeping with development projects. Studies of the humanities in this university will be prohibited.

The item of news was announced by 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, the deputy prime minister for popular development and self-sufficiency in food.

It has been noted that the plan for this university has been hanging for years and that it met intense opposition from all university, academic and ordinary circles. The government was ultimately forced to give up following it through, although it appears that the people who have been planning it are determined to carry it out this time.

11887
CSO: 4504/99

PARTY LEADER ADDRESSES PALESTINIAN, SYRIAN MILITANTS

Paris AL-YASAR AL-'ARABI in Arabic #33-34 July-Aug 81 pp 10, 11

/Article: "The Conference on Solidarity with Syria and the Palestinian Revolution: The Will To Persevere Is the Sharpest Weapon for Crushing the Enemy"/

/Excerpts from text/ The Conference on Solidarity with Syria and the Palestinian Revolution was held in Damascus toward the end of last month by invitation of the World Peace Council.

The conference occurred as an expression of the solidarity of the peace-loving forces in the world, the forces of revolution, all Arab and worldwide national liberation movements, democratic forces in Europe, and countries of the socialist system, with perseverent Syria, the struggle of the Palestinian revolution, and the struggle of the Lebanese national movement against brutal daily "Israeli" bombardment and the aggression by the secessionist forces against the heroic Lebanese people.

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's Statement to the Conference: Our People in Egypt Will Topple the Conspiracy and Return to Their Homeland

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, secretary general of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping, gave a talk at the conference in which he said,

"At the World Peace Council, we stood in unanimity at the presentation of the (Giulio Curi) gold medal to President Hafiz al-Asad in appreciation of Syria's role in struggling and persevering, as represented by its president."

He mentioned, "There is a struggle for peace that has been carried out, perseverance which has taken place, and there is a perseverance which will continue. Therefore we, the proponents of peace, would be happiest if we could give away a peace medal every day and every hour."

He conveyed greetings to the conference from the Egyptian peace forces in general and from a major detachment in it, which has raised the banner of opposing the course of the phoney peace that began on 19 November 1977 and still is raising the banner, with the result that today many banners are being raised along with it. All parties and political forces are standing against the Camp David platform and rejecting it today.

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din pointed out:

"These years our party has offered up 1,118 prisoners whose freedom was shackled for the sake of this noble goal, until the banners of all the Egyptian nationalist, progressive and democratic forces from right to left have been raised and the masks of the government with which it tried to stifle the awareness of our Arab people in Egypt have been stripped away, because our Arab people in Egypt were the first victims of the Camp David agreement and were the people whose independence and sovereignty were violated, whose economy was struck down, sabotaging their welfare, and whose freedoms were restricted. Therefore, we, the vanguard of this people, who bear the historic responsibility, have decided to struggle to change these policies radically and to have Egypt once again become the leader of the Arab course."

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din went on to say:

"While our struggle is against the Camp David platform, and while bringing it down is our main cause in our pursuit of the interests of our Arab people in Egypt, we must, brothers, turn to stand and support all the bulwarks of perseverance and solidarity in our Arab nation. Perseverance and solidarity are not empty words, they are tangible things. Who is it that is persevering today in the face of the Israeli threat? Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement! Therefore we consider that any talk about perseverance and solidarity that does not stand materially and morally now alongside Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement is empty talk.

"I say that everyone who talks about perseverance and solidarity must stand alongside Syria, because it is rejecting Israeli threats. The perseverance of Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement have made the enemy reassess his situation many times over.

"This is the fact, brothers, but another fact which I state to you is that this perseverance and this bulwark are standing beside it in a single trench. Do not forget the Egyptian national movement, which will change the map of the Middle East, because the triumph of the Egyptian national movement will change the map of the Middle East, because it is fighting a vicious enemy which has world imperialism and world Zionism behind it. Brothers: in Egypt our people are struggling and resisting, every minute and every hour, alongside Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement. Let us travel together for the sake of a free Arab nation and for the sake of a real, permanent peace in our region. Peace and God's blessings be upon you."

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PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES RESOLUTIONS, RESULTS OF CONFERENCE

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 18 Nov 80 pp 28-30

/Article: "Michel Kamil at a Press Conference Announces Important Resolutions of First Egyptian Communist Party Conference"/

/Excerpt from text/ In the great Egypt, in the context of Sadatist terror and siege and in spite of the American, Zionist and Egyptian intelligence services' strong sense of smell, the Egyptian Communist Party, in the midst of this atmosphere, held its first conference in 60 years of vanguard national struggle.

At the press conference held in the Hall of Martyrs at the headquarters of the Lebanese Communist Party, the Egyptian Communist Party announced the results and resolutions of the first general conference and presented an integrated program for saving Egypt from al-Sadat's puppet clique, which has alienated the great Egypt from the forward lines of confrontation with the enemy, placing it in the American-Zionist-Arab rightwing reactionary enemy front.

Attending the conference were a number of leaders of the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese national movement, progressive and nationalist personalities, and the comrades and brothers Niqula Shawi, Nayif Hawatimah, Abu Iyad, Tal'at Ya'gub, Fawaz Tarabu'isi, Taysir Khalid, Salah Salah, 'Ali 'Abd-al-Khaliq, 'Arabi 'Awwad, Karim Muruwwah, George Batal, Fu'ad al-Tuhami and the progressive artist 'Adli Fakhri.

The conference was opened by the president of the Lebanese Communist Party, Comrade Niqula Shawi, who stressed that the role and importance of the Egyptian Communist Party lie not only in the historic legacy of its struggle as a vanguard national detachment of Egyptian national action but also in the combative political responsibilities which it has assumed in the current stage in order to confront al-Sadat's betrayal of Egypt's domestic cause and of the Arab national cause, as a betrayal of the glories of the Egyptian revolution of 1919 and an attempt to liquidate 'Abd-al-Nasir's nationalist revolutionary legacy.

2 Years of Preparation

After that, Comrade Michel Kamel, member of the Political Bureau of the Egyptian Communist Party, spoke, saying "In the name of the Egyptian Communist Party, the

party of the Egyptian working class, it gladdens me to give thanks to the leaders and representatives of the Palestinian and nationalist Lebanese organizations that have answered our invitation to take part in this press conference."

After he had described the way the conference was held and the difficult circumstances that surrounded it, he said "We consider the convening of the first general conference of the Egyptian Communist Party to have been an important turning point in its course, because it is a consummation of the ingredients of the party organization and a democratic endorsement of it. The convening of the first conference of our party was preceded by extensive preparatory activities and fruitful discussions which went on for about 2 years and took place in party meetings and on the pages of the party's organization magazine. In the light of the conclusions of this continuing intellectual dialogue, the party's political bureau endorsed the draft party documents which subsequently constituted this conference's agenda. These drafts are:

"1. The party program and bylaws.

"2. The organization report on the achievements of the party and scope for its development.

"3. A report on unity with other marxist detachments.

"4. A report on front activity in the current stage.

"5. Some organizational procedures.

"Our party has been concerned to present the draft programs to the various allied political forces and has presented the report on unity to the other Egyptian marxist detachments.

"The conference adoped a number of general resolutions, such as greetings to the party's martyrs, the launching of an appeal to the marxist detachments to achieve unity in the context of the party, and a call to all national democratic forces in Egypt for the sake of the establishment of a national democratic front. The conference also hailed the establishment of the Egyptian national front and sent letters to national movements in the world, foremost among them the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and a letter of thanks to the party's leadership committee abroad for its role."

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END

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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EXPANSION OF GULF BANKS IN INDIA REPORTED

London 8 DAYS in English No 38, 26 Sep 81 p 41

[Text]

MIDDLE EASTERN, European and American banks are queueing up for licences from India's Central Bank to open branches in India. Bank of Oman and Emirates Commercial Bank are among those which have already secured licences.

India has been restricting the growth of foreign banks in India while aggressively pursuing a policy of overseas expansion for its own nationalised and private banks. By December 1979, it had managed to mobilise $1.9bn in deposits through its 127 overseas branches. Foreign central banks are now demanding reciprocal facilities, and as a result Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Bank of California, Bankers Trust, Chemical Bank, Société Générale and Banque de la Indo-Chine et la Suez have also gained permission to open branches in India.

India is lucrative for foreign bankers — to take just one example, American Express made a profit of $1.5m with its three Indian branches during 1977. The discovery of offshore oil has improved India's international credit rating: Indian bankers can borrow eurodollar funds for as little as 3.8 per cent over Libor.

Middle East banks are looking for investment avenues, moreover. The Bank of Oman, owned by Al Ghuriar group of Dubai, opened its Indian branch in the wake of large-scale investments by the group in western India.

CSO: 4400/15

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NORTH-SOUTH YEMEN TALKS REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 38, 26 Sep 81 pp 6-7

[Article by Deborah Smith: "The Yemens Start To Talk"]

[Text]

THE PROSPECT of a new balance of power along the Red Sea was opened by the visit of South Yemeni President Ali Nasser Mohammed to the North Yemeni capital, Sanaa.

Some Yemeni sources described the visit on 14 September, as merely 'a stopover on President Mohammed's way to the Steadfastness Front summit in Benghazi.' But with his northern counterpart, President Ali Abdullah Saleh, facing a growing military threat from South Yemeni-supported rebels of the National Democratic Front (NDF), the talks between the two must have been more than merely formal.

The meeting was the first intra-Yemeni summit since NDF negotiations with President Saleh's government broke down in mid-1980, a development which prompted the NDF to resume its military activities against the regime.

The discussions between the two presidents also came only a few weeks after President Mohammed joined the Libyan and Ethiopian leaders in a tripartite axis backed by their mutual friend, the Soviet Union. 'Undoubtedly, South Yemen was strengthened by the conclusion of that treaty,' one Arab strategic expert commented. 'Now, they will presumably hope to extend their new influence further north.'

There, in the breathtaking mountains of North Yemen, government forces numbering an estimated 15,000 have been locked into escalating battles with the NDF's estimated 8,000 fighters. The NDF now controls a strip across the south of the country considerably wider than it held during its last uprising, in 1978.

The North Yemeni army has no shortage of equipment, having been extensively supplied by both the Soviets and the Americans over a number of years. Indeed, the government in Sanaa was able to sell quite substantial shipments of Soviet-made equipment to the Iraqis in the early months of the Gulf war, without seriously depleting their own inventories.

These now consist of about 700 tanks, heavy artillery, armoured cars and MiG 17, MiG 21 and American F4 fighters. But some military experts consider that North Yemen lacks the trained manpower needed to operate much of this equipment.

The NDF unites much of North Yemen's very wide spectrum of political opposition, including Nasserists, pro-Syrian Baathists, socialists, marxists and supporters of Colonel Qaddafi. When their 1978 uprising ended after Kuwaiti mediation in early 1979 between the North and South Yemeni governments, they opened discussions with President Saleh to obtain some share in central government power. Those talks broke down in summer 1980, and since then the NDF has re-opened guerrilla actions against President Saleh's army.

The terrain is ideally suited to their tactics. The mountains south of North Yemen's second city of Taizz rise between 5,000 and 12,000 feet and are cut by narrow defiles and steep wadis which make ideal ambush sites for NDF guerrillas who have lived and fought in the area all their lives.

While the military arm of the NDF has become increasingly confident in recent weeks, its 400 hard-core political cadres have been equally successful in mobilising

opinion in the villages. In areas under NDF control, schools, clinics and local courts have brought services to a population which has long felt itself neglected by the government in Sanaa. The NDF can also make political propaganda out of the behaviour of army units who, faced with an elusive quarry, have often searched villages and ransacked houses.

There have also been reports of government forces bombing recalcitrant villages from the air, an unwelcome reminder of both British and Egyptian tactics in the region. With government media making no mention of the fighting whatever, reports such as these often act in the rebels' favour.

The Yale graduate who is now Saleh's prime minister, Dr Abdul Karim al Iryani, is officially optimistic. 'I can assure you there is not a single place in North Yemen, not a road, a valley, a mountain or a village where we can't go,' he says. 'And there has not been a single incident when the security forces have confronted any more than 20 or 30 people.'

But such public confidence is not reflected in private discussions with senior ministers and other members of the North Yemeni administration. They have recognised for some time that unless some steps are taken, the NDF would have to be offered a place in the government — or it might bring down the whole regime.

Arab analysts stress that the key to any form of central government authority in a society still deeply riven by tribalism must, for the present, lie with the army. Saleh's extensive contacts inside the armed forces — which include many of his own relatives — would seem to ensure that this power base will remain relatively safe for some time.

Saleh is clearly well aware of the strategic importance of a country so closely linked at many levels to Saudi Arabia, which is host to an estimated million immigrant Yemeni labourers. He has played the international stage like a master, trading off Soviet and western ambitions in the region for arms and aid. Closer to home, he has tried to steer a difficult middle course between the conservative Saudis and the pro-Soviet regime in the South Yemeni capital of Aden. Now, with the air of political and superpower confrontation becoming thicker throughout the Arabian peninsula and the Red Sea, that middle road may become more and more difficult to tread.

CSO: 4400/15

TRIBAL CHIEFTANS CALL FOR RETURN OF ZAHER SHAH

Paris LE MATIN in French 6 Oct 81 p 11

[Text] The return of the former king of Afghanistan, Zaher Shah, to the political scene was the subject of a message sent from Rome where he has been living since 1973. In it, the former monarch who had ruled his country for forty years declared his solidarity with the Afghan people in their religious and national struggle. He was gratified by the holding of a meeting recently of the Grand Assembly of Tribal Chiefs and chiefs of the resistance groups in a place in Pakistan close to the border. Some of the chiefs belonging to several resistance parties have proposed that Zaher Shah take leadership of the struggle against the Soviet occupation.

It is precisely in this area of Pakistan close to Quetta in Baluchistan where two Afghan MIG fighters have come once again to violate the border and open fire, but without causing any casualties among the population.

CSO: 4619/14

SUCCESSES OF REBEL TACTICS DISCUSSED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 23 Sep 81 p 4

[Article by Ug.: "Meeting of Afghan Resistance Fighters in Quetta"]

[Text] Delhi, 20 September. Last Sunday, Afghan freedom fighters and refugees came together for about a week in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani province of Beluchistan, in order to elect a legislative council. This meeting for election of a Yirga represents another attempt to bring the notoriously disunited resistance forces together under some kind of leadership. So far, all unification attempts have failed on account of the political, ethnic, religious and social differences between the individual resistance groups. Various sources even reported instances of actual fighting within Afghanistan, involving the radical Islamic Hezb-i-Islami and more moderate groups. In view of the remarkably strong interest the Afghan refugees and rebels are taking in the Yirga, it seems safe to conclude that large circles are weary of the internal dissension and recognize the need for a representative body having credibility abroad. The advocates of the Yirga hope that election of a council, which in turn is to appoint some kind of executive, will result in increased support and arms shipments from the Western world and from Islamic countries. Reportedly, the Yirga is backed by ministers of the former Afghan Daud Cabinet and by a number of moderate tribal representatives. The funds required for staging the assembly--which probably will be attended by several thousand persons--reportedly were donated by Afghan tribes from the Herat region.

Quarreling Groups

It remains to be seen whether the Yirga to be elected will be able to nominate representatives agreeable to all and what effect the events in Quetta will produce on the resistance fighters within Afghanistan. The six quarreling groups, which are headquartered in Peshavar, the capital of Pakistan's northwestern border province, and which have arrogated to themselves the role of spokesmen and protagonists of the Afghan resistance movement, do not exercise much control over the events within Afghanistan. The main task of the groups is to organize the supplies--above all the arms supplies--tacitly tolerated by Pakistan. In addition, in the international arena they operate as propaganda institutions. Whereas the more moderate groups are financed by the Gulf states, the Hezb-i-Islami reportedly is supported by Libya, Iran and the Moslem Brotherhood. However, the burden of the actual fighting is carried by the local population, which enters into shifting alliances--depending on the supply promises--with the groups in Peshavar.

In the last few months, the situation in Afghanistan has markedly changed. Whereas in the winter, after the initial euphoria over the successful resistance to the Russian bear, there was a widespread feeling of powerlessness, in the spring the freedom fighters again gained in self-confidence. The main reason for this increase in confidence was the advanced weaponry supplied above all by deserters from the Afghan army, but also the arms shipments from abroad. At present, the morale of the resistance fighters is very high--a fact increasingly apparent to the Russian army and the remaining units of the Afghan military. While the rebels have always been in control of the rural regions, the enemy's armed forces now are barely able to keep open the lines of communication between the cities occupied by them. Thus it now takes a convoy 2 days to get from Kabul to Kandahar and as a rule it is accompanied over the whole distance by two combat helicopters. As it is, the Red Army increasingly relies on its helicopters, which are largely beyond the reach of the freedom fighters, and avoids direct confrontations on the ground. Thus the Red Army shows that it respects the fighting morale, but also the clearly improved tactical skills of the freedom fighters.

Infiltration of the Armed Forces

The Red Army appears to be confronted with the problem of increasing infiltration of the Afghan armed forces. So far, the Afghan army has been notable above all for the desertions: Its strength is assumed to have declined from 80,000 2 years ago to between 20,000 and 30,000; some battalions number no more than 20 soldiers. At present, however, an increasing number of soldiers choose secretly to collaborate with the resistance movement rather than desert. Incidentally, a similar development has been noted in the civilian administration.

Heavy Fighting in Kandahar

Islamabad, 21 September (afp). After extremely heavy fighting with the Soviet occupation forces and the Afghan army, the Islamic guerillas in Afghanistan have again gained control over Kandahar, the provincial capital. However, according to unanimous reports from exiled Afghan resistance groups and Western diplomats in Pakistan, the Soviet troops have been able to hold their positions at the airport and in a number of outlying districts. The fighting, during the inner city was devastated, was still continuing on Monday.

Since the beginning of the year, the city of Kandahar has been the focus of heavy fighting; during these engagements, the Mujahedin repeatedly succeeded in gaining a foothold in the center. In May, Soviet troops had launched an extensive mopping-up operation, during which they subjected the bazaar districts to helicopter bombardment.

Heavy fighting has been reported from western Afghanistan as well. Since the end of August, the Soviet forces have been trying here to capture a number of resistance positions on the Iranian border in the province of Fahrah. The guerillas claim to have successfully defended their positions. Reportedly, a Soviet general was killed in the fighting.

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DRA FOREIGN MINISTER DENOUNCES IMPERIALISM AT UN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 26,27,28,29 Sep 81

[Speech by Shah Mohammad Dost at UN General Assembly]

[26 Sep 81 p 2 Part I]

[Text]

MOSCOW, September 26 (Tass).— Follows the full text of a speech by Shah Mohammad Dost, DRA Foreign Minister, at the UN General Assembly on September 22.

Mr President: On behalf of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, let me sincerely congratulate you on your election to the august post of the President of the General Assembly. We are quite confident that under your able and competent guidance the present 36th session of the General Assembly will make appropriate progress in resolving the vital problems related to the consolidation of world peace and security.

I take this opportunity to point out that relations between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the country you represent are friendly and continue to develop in various fields to the mutual advantage of our two peoples. I would like to assure you, Mr President, that the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will fully cooperate with you and will do its best to help you in discharging your momentous duties.

Let me also express our thanks to Mr Wehmar, the outgoing President of the General Assembly. It was due to his tireless activity and diplomatic skill that the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly made a contribution to the solution of some topical international issues.

The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan heartily congratulates the delegation of the Republic of Vanuatu on the admission of the newly-born state of Venuatu to the United Nations. The accession of the Republic of Vanuatu to independence is one more step towards the complete and final liquidation of the abhorrent colonial system. We wish the people of Vanuatu prosperity and every success in the political, and social and economic development.

DETERIORATION

Mr President: The current session of the General Assembly begins its work at a time when the international situation has visibly deteriorated and when new additional efforts and measures are needed to prevent further worsening of the world climate, stop the drift towards the danger of war and reverse the present perilous course of events.

The origin and the causes of the present aggravation of international tensions are well known to everybody. They are to be found in the reckless war-mongering adventurist policies of the

United States imperialism and Peking's hegemonism.

The events of the last few months have amply and convincingly shown that United States imperialism and Chinese hegemonism put all their stakes on the use of force, and rely on whipping up the arms race and brandishing nuclear weapons. The United States imperialism is trying to drive the peoples of the world into submission by working out plans to deploy their nuclear weapons in various parts of the globe.

The White House and the Pentagon arbitrarily declare regions situated far away from the United States as spheres of their "vital interests" and dispatch to those areas the so-called 'rapid deployment forces'. At an ever increasing pace they are establishing new military bases all over the world.

Particularly dangerous are the United States plans to begin a large scale production of the neutron weapon —the most sophisticated, barbaric and abhorrent means of annihilation of the human race. The Afghan people together with the other peace-loving peoples of the world resolutely condemn these plans, and demand that President R. Reagan reverse his decision. It is our view that this assembly should urgently approve a resolution calling for a ban on the production and deployment of the neutron weapon.

In these grave circumstances, when aggressive imperialist and hegemonist quarters are hurriedly pushing the world to the brink of nuclear holocaust, particularly timely is the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR 'to the parliaments and the peoples of the world' which meets the aspirations of all nations of the globe. This appeal is a clear-cut testimony of the relentless efforts of the Soviet Union at curbing the arms race, disarmament, and at safeguarding peace and security in the world.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is an ancient Asian country and we follow with special concern the latest developments of the Asian continent. The major source of tension in Asia lies in aggressive ambitions of imperialist, zionist and hegemonist forces. These forces are definitely trying to reverse the post-War trends in Asia, crush the will of the Asian nations towards independence, drag them into fratricidal conflicts and wars, grab their natural resources, turn some of the Asian countries into mere pawns in their imperialist and hegemonist games, and make certain countries the springboards of aggression against the peace-loving countries of Asia.

Particularly dangerous for the peoples of Asia are the United States militaristic activities in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf. The Pentagon is hurriedly building here facilities for the 'rapid deployment force' and for permanently stationing in this area at least two aircraft carrier groups. This year alone sevenhundred million dollars have been allocated for the expansion and modernisation of the American naval and air force bases on the island of Diego Garcia. There is evidence that the Pentagon is going to use these bases for stockpiling nuclear weapons including the neutron weapon.

INDIAN OCEAN

It is not surprising that the United States and its allies torpedoed the work of the last session of the United Nations Ad-Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. Apparently, they are against the convocation of a conference to work out an international agreement on turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. It is the firm view of the Afghan delegation that this assembly should take a decision to expedite the convening of such a conference no later than next year. We should not allow the imperialist and hegemonist forces to block the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean.

[Text]

One of the most vital problems to be settled is that of the Middle East. It is high time for this assembly to take effective measures to restore peace in that area, put an end to Israeli aggression against Arab countries, liberate lands illegally occupied by the Zionist aggressor, and restore the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arabs including their right to statehood .

It is now perfectly clear that treacherous Israeli-Egyptian American deals and the separate Israeli-Egyptian 'treaty' did not bring the solution of the Middle East problem an inch nearer. On the contrary, they worsened the situation in that area still further. It is time therefore to go back to a collective search for an all-embracing, just and realistic settlement in the Middle East within the framework of a specially convened international conference. It is imperative that side by side with the other interested parties the Palestine Liberation Organization, as the sole and authentic representative of the Palestinian people, should take part in such a conference.

The recent barbarous Israeli raids against Palestinian civilian targets in Southern Lebanon and Beirut that resulted in 2,567 casualties and destruction of hundreds of Palestinian hospitals, schools and houses, has added a dangerous dimension to the Middle East conflict. The six member-mission of the Non-Aligned coordinating Bureau, of which Afghanistan was a member, visited Lebanon from [illegible] to [illegible]rd August to examine and assess the damage and destruction resulting from Israeli attacks on Beirut and South Lebanon. Report of this mission determines the genocidal nature of these attacks that resulted in the death of hundreds of civilians including the elderly, women and children.

SAFEGUARDS

Effective measures should be taken to prevent further acts of Israeli aggression against the sovereign state of Lebanon, frustrate the Zionist plans to dismember Lebanon, and safeguard its territorial integrity . It is also necessary to prevent any repetition of Israeli aggression and provocations against other Arab countries.

The situation remains tense in the Gulf area as well. This is the result of the United States and other Western countries deploying more naval and air forces there, and of the military conflict between Iraq and Iran which unfortunately still goes on. The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan believes that the situation on the Gulf area can be effectively defused by concluding an international agreement along the lines suggested almost a year ago by the Soviet Union. Such an agreement would safeguard the sovereign rights of the countries of that area and the security of maritime and other communications connecting the region with the rest of the world.

The Iraqi-Iranian war which began a year ago is a sad, unfortunate and deplorable event. It is senseless from the viewpoint of the Iraqi-Iranian national interests but is of great advantage for imperialist quarters. The Democratic republic of Afghanistan is earnestly in favour of the speediest political settlement of the conflict between the two countries and is ready to help this process in whatever possible way.

Turning our eyes to South-East Asia, where due to the hegemonist and great chauvinist ambitions the process of normalization is impeded, we restate our staunch support for the constructive initiatives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,, the People's Republic of Kampuchea and the Lao People's Democratic Republic aimed at turning this area into a zone of peace based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and good neighbourliness.

INTERFERENCE

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is against any debate here on the so-called 'Kampuchean question' aimed at an outright interference in the domestic affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. It is urgent that lawful rights of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in the United Nations should be restored without delay and the agents of the bloody Pol Pot gang thrown out of this assembly. We do not recognize the decisions of the so-called 'Conference on Kampuchea' which was held despite the strong objection of the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan would also like to reiterate its solidarity with the constructive efforts of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea aimed at peaceful democratic runification of the country. We support the just demand of the People's Democratic Republic of Korea for the withdrawal of the foreign troops from South Korea and resolutely condemn the Seoul military regime for repression against the people of South Korea.

We studdied with great interest the latest initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic which advanced the proposal to work out and sign a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in relations among the state of Asia and the Pacific. The practical implementation of that initiative would be a great step forward in normalizing relations in that part of the world.

The imperialist and hegemonist propaganda machine spreads a lot of malicious and slanderous allegations about events in Afghanistan and around it, and tries to portray these events as a threat to peace and stability in South-West Asia. Yet, this is nothing but a dirty trick to divert the attention of the world public opinion from imperialist and hegemonist aggressive schemes in Asia and in other parts of the world. The imperialist media follows the dictum—if you repeat a lie one hundred times sombody may believe it.

But, the sinister attempts to conceal the truth about the Afghan revolution are of no avail; it is impossible to cover the sun with the palm of the hand.

Any unbiased observer visiting Afghanistan these days can see with his own eyes that, despite great difficulties imposed on the Afghan people by the enemies of the Afghan revolution and an undeclared war waged against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan by the imperialist and hegemonist forces and their mercenaries, the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan during a comparatively short period of time have scored great successes along the road of economic, political and social progress.

The overall situation in the country is being consolidated, the organs of people's power are being strengthened, the political and social foundation of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is being expanded and enhanced.

One of the vivid manifestations of this process was the establishment last June of the National Fatherland Front, which was joined by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, trade Unions, farmers' cooperatives, the supreme 'jirgah' of tribes the High Council of Scholars and Clergy, the Democratic Youth Organisation of Afghanistan the Women's Democratic Organization of Afghanistan and some others. One can see that the front represents practically all the classes and strata of the Afghan people supporting the goals of the national democratic Revolution.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has taken effective measures to develop the economy, raise the level of industrial and agricultural production, and improve the living standards of the toiling masses. Despite the eco-

nomic dislocation and disruptions caused by the armed aggression from the outside the plans of economic and social development and the second stage of the land reform are being successfully implemented. We have all the grounds to state from this rostrum that the toiling people of Afghanistan have never lived better than after the April Revolution, they have already begun to reap the fruits of a new just and equitable social system.

EXPLOITERS

These achievements could have been even more impressive but for the continuing armed aggression from the territories of the neighbouring countries, mainly from Pakistan. This armed aggression and other forms of intervention are being stirred up by US imperialist and Chinese hegemonist quarters; mercenaries are being recruited by those who were deprived of their privileges by the April revolution and who took refuge abroad.

Attempts of the imperialist propaganda to describe those people as 'mujahidins', 'freedom fighters', 'rebels', etc are futile .They are nothing but former feudals and their lackeys who like their ancestors sucked the blood of the Afghan people, and lived in luxury dooming the people to misery and deprivation. They do not fight for the freedom of the Afghan people but for the freedom to exploit them, for the restoration of their lost privileges. Therefore, to think or to talk of these counter-revolutionary mercenaries otherwise, means outright hypocrisy; it is an insult to the common sense of the Afghan people.

These bandits dialy invade Afghanistan, disrupt the normal life in the country, kill our people, women and children and the elderly, destroy schools and hospitals, and loot people's and state property. The Afghan army, police and security forces supported by the people deal blow after blow to the bandits, capture and disarm them. Captured and repentent mercenaries regularly appear at the Press conferences held in Kabul for Afghan and foreign journalists.

[28 Sep 81 p 3 Part III]

[Text]

The Afghan army and the people would have wiped out the counter-revolutionary bands long ago had they not been supported by the imperialist and hegemonist quarters as well as by some reactionary Islamic regimes. The counter-revolutionary gangs are paid in US dollars, British pounds, West German marks, Saudi rials, etc. They are armed with American, British, Chinese, West German and Egyptian weapons and trained by American, Chinese, Egyptian and Pakistani instructors. Some Western countries declared the policy of interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan as their official policy.

President Reagan announced last March that his government would henceforth supply the so-called Afghan 'Mujahidins' with weapons and ammunition. The covert CIA operation of support for Afghan counter-revolutionaries which was initiated under President Carter has become an overt policy of the US Government.

The United States intervention in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is growing and intensifying. One can find ample evidence of that even in the American Press.

CONSPIRACY

An article by Pulitzer prize-winner Carl Bernstein in the 17th July 1981 issue of The New Republic sheds some light on the scope of the international imperialist conspiracy against Afghanistan headed by the United States and also involving China, Pakistan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia Bernstein Writes that President Carter ordered the secret supply arms programme launched in December 1980 and that the Reagan administration reviewed the clandestine operation and ordered it to be expanded. 'The CIA has coordinated the operation through counterpart intelligence services in the four other countries and diplomatic channels were not used', reports Bernstein, 'America's Nato allies were neither consulted nor asked to participate'. He said that the operation also involved China's permission of overflights of its territory by the aircraft carrying arms to the 'Afghan resistance fighters'.

'The United States' continued Bernstein 'has provided financial assistance, 20 to 30 million dollars to start with and considerably more since.' He added that the entire operation is now estimated at more than 100 million dollars.

So the major and only reason for the tense situation around Afghanistan is armed aggression from the outside and other forms of interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan fuelled by imperialist and hegemonist quarters. It was this intervention that prompted the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to invite a limited contingent of Soviet troops to help the Afghan army repel the aggression.

Guided by the peaceful principles of its foreign policy and a sincere desire to defuse tension in the area and normalize the relations with the neighbouring countries, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan put forward in May 1980 a realistic programme of political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan which is the result of the imperialist policy of intervention and aggression. Less than a month ago, the Afghan Government came forward with a new initiative and experience accumulated during the contacts with interested parties which had taken place since May 1980.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's statement of August 24 has been distributed as an official document of this assembly and I shall be brief in explaining some of its major ideas.

Reaffirming its readiness to hold direct negotiations with the Governments of Pakistan and Iran to normalize relations with them the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan proposes such negotiations be conducted either on a bilateral basis, which is more preferable and most promising, or, if the Governments of Pakistan and Iran insist, to have trilateral negotiations. The Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan did not object either to these negotiations, whether bi-or trilateral, being attended by the United Nations Secretary-General or his representatives.

We are also of the opinion that reliable international guarantees of agreements reached as a result of such negotiations with regard to the cessation and the non-resumption of armed and other interference in Afghanistan affairs, must be an integral part of a political settlement. We agreed that the discussion pertaining to the working out of such guarantees and determining which countries would be guarantors be started simultaneously with and conducted parallel to bi-or trilateral negotiations among the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.

ACHIEVEMENT

The achievement of a political settlement, including the working out of international guarantees, will respectively give an opportunity to determine by agreement between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the timetable of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The pullout of troops would be contingent on the progress in implementing the reached agreements, it would be conducted, so to say, stage by stage.

Mr President: The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been authorized to start direct bilateral or trilateral negotiations with the delegations of Pakistan and Iran on the basis of the ideas I have just outlined. We are ready to discuss ways and means of a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan here and now, during the current session of the General Assembly. I call upon the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and Iran to get down to the negotiating table and start discussion on the issues of mutual interest without further delay. I also invite, Dr Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, or his representative to be present at these talks.

There have been some references to the proposal of the EEC Council of Ministers concerning the so-called 'international conference on Afghanistan'. This proposal has never been conveyed to us officially but the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has already stated that it is unrealistic and totally unacceptable to Afghanistan. It is unacceptable because it constitutes yet another attempt to violate the sovereign rights of the Afghan people and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to interfere in its domestic affairs. Matters concerning the existing regime in Afghanistan, the composition of its Government, as well as other internal issues are not to be discussed at any international forum. These matters are being solved and will be solved in the future only by the Afghan people but not by anybody else. Besides, nobody has the right to discuss the problems pertaining to the sovereign rights and national interests of Afghanistan, including the situation around the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, without the participation of the legal and authentic representative of the Afghan people, namely, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

MAIN POINTS

Mr President: These are the main points I wanted to make on the problems concerning the maintenance of peace and security in Asia, including the area of South-West Asia, and ways and means of eliminating hotbeds of tension in this part of the globe. We are optimists and we are confident that the will of the peoples, their desire for peace and good neighbourly relations shall eventually prevail over adventurist aggressive ambitions and schemes of imperialism and hegemonism, and Asia will become a continent of peace, tranquillity, and mutually beneficial cooperation.

Now let me dwell upon certain other international issues which are of special concern to the developing countries.

The paramount problem is the problem of curbing the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race which now constitutes a threat to the very existence of the human race. It is totally inadmissible that more than 500 billion dollars are squandered away annually for military purposes while the most acute problems of the developing countries remain unresolved.

There is no more important goal than that of forestalling the nuclear confrontation which may wipe out hundreds of millions of human lives. The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan therefore fully supports the proposal put forward today from this rostrum by Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet

Union, that a declaration should be adopted by this assembly on behalf of all United Nations member-states solemnly proclaiming that states and statesmen who would be the first to use nuclear weapons would commit the gravest crime against humanity.

This is a simple and straitforward idea, appealing to the peoples of all continents and all countries. Adherence to it will be a decisive step in the direction of preventing a nuclear disaster and reliable barrier for those who contemplate such plans .

[29 Sep 81 pp 4,3 Part IV]

[Text]

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan also fully supports the proposal of the Soviet Union to stop the production of the nuclear weapons and reduce the stockpiles of such weapons until their complete destruction. We know that in 1979 this proposal was conveyed to the disarmament Committee but discussion of this vital problem is being blocked by China and some Western countries. We feel that this assembly should call on the Disarmament Committee to expedite the practical discussion of this issue.

Negotiations on some other aspects of checking the nuclear arms race should also be speeded up. We note with great satisfaction the readiness of the Soviet Union to continue talks with the United States on the qualitative and quantitative limitation of strategic nuclear arms. We think that this assembly should urge the United States to take a more positive stand on this vitally important issue.

Afghanistan is in favour of the earliest resumption of talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain on banning nuclear weapons tests. We also support the idea of creating a special working group within the Disarmament Committee to help resolve the problem. The threat of a nuclear holocaust would be somehow lessened if an international convention is signed at strengthening the guarantees of the security of those states which do not have such weapons on their territories.

PROPOSALS

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan welcomes initiatives aimed at preventing the use of outer space for military purposes and promoting the international peaceful cooperation in space. Therefore, we fully support the proposal of the Soviet Union to work out a treaty banning the placement in the outer space of weapons of any kind. such a treaty would be a reliable barrier to the arms race in the outer space, which may have unpredictable consequences.

It is also necessary to expedite the negotiations on a comprehensive agreement banning new kinds and new systems of weapons of mass destruction as well as on agreements and conventions outlawing certain weapons, particularly the neutron, radiological, and chemical weapons.

As a developing country, Afghanistan regrets that until now no progress has been achieved with regard to reaching an agreement on the reduction of military budgets of states. Such an agreement would have released funds so much needed by the developing coun-

tries, particularly the least developed among them, like Afghanistan .

We feel that all these problems and many others can be fruitfully and constructively discussed and resolved at the Second Special United Nations General Assembly Session on Disarmament scheduled for 1982 and the World Conference on Disarmament.

Now that it is generally recognized that the international situation has dangerously deteriorated, it is more important than ever to work out and conclude a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. We call upon the United Nations Sepcial Committee to speed up the work on the relevant draft.

Mr President: The delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is of the opinion that the current session of the United Nations General Assembly has to take most effective measures to eliminate the last vestiges of colonialism, racism and apartheid. All the United Nations member-states should totally and fully comply with the provisions of the plan of action aimed at complete implementation of the declaration of decolonization approved by the 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

This is particularly important since during the last few weeks the world has witnessed insolent, arrogant attempts by certain western countries to revive the worst practices of the colonialist, imperialist diktat and suppression of the peoples fighting for their freedom.

High-handed, bloody tactics of the Pretoria regime which not only brutally suppresses the indigenous population of South Africa and Namibia but commits acts of aggression against independent sovereign states is a clear-cut demonstration of such arrogance and insolence. The outrageous behavior of Pretoria would have been impossible if it had not been supported and armed by certain Western powers, particularly the United States. The Pretoria regime and the so-called 'contact group' of the five Nato countries in violation of the well-known decisions of the United Nations particularly the resolution 435 of the Security Council, are trying hard to install in Namibia a puppet Government and deprive SWAPO of its legitimate role in shaping the future of this territory.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan resolutely condemns these neo-colonialist maneuvers by the Western powers and Pretoria; we come out in favour of real independence for Namibia and transfer of power without any further delay to SWAPO which is the only legitimate authentic representative of the Namibian people, recognized by the United Nations and OAU.

SANCTIONS

Afghanistan supports the demand for the most effective and stringent sanctions against Pretoria as provided for by Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. We are also for strict compliance with the sanctions against the apartheid regime already imposed by the Security Council .We resolutely condemn the armed aggression of Pretoria against Angola and strongly deplore the recent United States veto of the Security Council resolution censoring Pretoria for this aggression. Our solidarity goes with fraternal Angolan people defending their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Afghan delegation voted for the resolutions of the Special session of the United Nations General Assembly on Namibia and comes out in favour of the speediest implementation of these resolutions.

We come out in support of the people of Western Sahara struggling for their self-determination and independence.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan con-

demns the outburst of colonialism in other parts of the world as well. We are against the dismemberment and annexation of the trust territory of Micronesia which was carried out by the United States in total disregard of its duties as the administrative power and in violation of the United Nations Charter.

Afghanistan stands for the preservation of independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, and strict respect to its policy of non-alignment. In our view the real settlement of the question can be achieved only if due account is taken of both communities, and we support the continuation of the relations between them.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan condemns the United States for intervening in the internal affairs of Latin America and Caribbean countries, to its armed provocations against Cuba and Nicaragua, and attempts to destabilize the situation in Grenada. We express our solidarity with the heroic struggle of the people of El Salvador led by the Farabundo Front against the fascist dictatorship. We are on the side of the people of Chile putting up staunch resistance to the military clique.

FOR PEACE

Mr President: Peace and stability in its true meaning would not be achieved without fundamental changes in the existing economic system. These changes result in situation that could furnish more opportunity to the countries whose economies have been deteriorating or on the verge of collapse.

The aim of the new international economic order is to establish a new economic system based on justice and equity so that there would be not much contradiction between the rich and the poor.

The plight of the least developed countries, particularly the land-based countries, is of particular concern to Afghanistan.

The geographical disadvantage of these countries has seriously affected their trade by imposing the additional costs of transport, transit, and retransshipment.

Due to the concerted efforts of the land-locked countries, the United Nations established a special fund for these countries. The main purpose for establishing this special fund was to assist land-locked countries to have higher rate of growth despite their geographical handicaps and particularly to reduce, as much as possible, the excessive and additional transport costs which they face. Unfortunately this fund has not yet become fully operational. It is imperative more than before, to mitigate the ever-increasing economic problems of these countries.

As one of the least developed countries, Afghanistan actively participated in the Paris Conference on the Least Developed Countries held recently.

Unfortunately, the hopes entertained by some of the countries of this group were somehow dashed because the Western capitalist states refused to undertake obligations which would make it possible to fulfill the targets voted by the International Development Strategy for the eighties for the least developed countries.

Afghanistan however welcomes the positive and constructive approach to the problems of the least developed countries taken at the Paris Conference by the Socialist countries. We are also satisfied with the all-round economic and technical cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the countries of the Socialist community, particularly the Soviet Union. This cooperation is based on the principles of complete equality and mutual benefit. It is an important factor contributing to the economic and social progress in Afghanistan.

The conscience of the world, more than ever, calls for action to eliminate poverty, hunger, and under development. Equality can never be claimed while there is hunger beside waste, poverty beside abundance and a difference of opinion on the definition of equity and equality.

Mr President: In the present tense international situation, the United Nations is called upon to play a much more effective role in working out arrangements which could help preserve peace and maintain international security. We feel that the United Nations Charter is not yet fully used in this respect as an instrument of peace. For that reason, Afghanistan supports the Soviet proposal to convene a special session of the Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of states so as to search for ways of improving the world politcal climate.

We feel that it is important to use more effectively and constructively the United Nations Charter in its present form.

In conclusion. Mr President, let me express the hope that the 36th session of the United Nations General Assembly will be a momentous event in the efforts of peace-loving peoples of the world to avert the danger of a nuclear war, and preserve peace for the present and future generations.

Thank you, Mr President.

CSO: 4600/42

DRA READY TO DISCUSS PEACE WITH NEIGHBORS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 28 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial: "DRA Striving for Peace in the Region"]

[Text]

In pursuance of its revolutionary, democratic and peaceful policy, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has always striven to consolidate its relations with neighbouring countries. To achieve this goal, it has time and again put forward comprehensive and all-sided proposals, maintaining not only its crystal-clear stance of peace, but has also sought ways and means of solving problems that may hinder the prospects of peace.

The deterioration of situation and its adverse affect on peace and stability in the region, makes far more urgent the need for a political solution. However, the antagonistic imperialist interventions in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, continuing from the very beginning of the victory of the Saur Revolution in the form of an undeclared war, has not only further accentuated tensions in the region. The interventions have created obstacles on the path of reaching any understanding for normalisation of situation.

The DRA Government has put forward specific proposals on the question of political settlement and has demanded direct negotiations with countries involved in problems of the region. In confirmation of its previous proposals, the DRA Government put forth in its declaration of August 24, 1981, specific and effective proposals for easing the tension in the region. This declaration, while demanding cessation of interventions and the undeclared war of imperialism against Afghanistan carried out from the territory of neighbouring countries of Iran and Pakistan, indicates the good intentions of the people of Afghanistan for consolidating friendly relations and good-neighbourliness and sets out reasonable conditions for the beginning of direct talks towards strengthening of friendly mutual relations

, and ending of any kind of hostilities.

The declaration also assures provision of secure conditions for the return from Pakistan of our compatriots and seeks agreements for development of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan and Afghanistan and Iran based on mutual respect for national sovereignty, good-neighbourliness and non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. The declaration also reflects the interests of Afghanistan in talks to reach an agreement on effective cooperation in the trade, economic, transit and cultural fields, and as a whole it manifests the great readiness of Afghanistan for political settlement of the situation.

The DRA Government's ardent desire for good relations with neighbouring countries and its peaceful intentions were once again demonstrated and stressed at the 36th UN General Assembly session by the DRA Foreign Affairs Minister.

Speaking at the current Assembly session, the DRA Foreign Affairs Minister said: "We are ready to discuss ways and means for a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan during the present session. I am calling on the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries to sit down at the negotiating table and start discussing matters of mutual interest without further delay. I am also inviting UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim or his representative to attend such negotiations".

But, with all this sincere readiness that the DRA Government has displayed officially and repeatedly, the other side not shown any interest in or readiness for efforts for peace and stability in the region. The imperialist intervention is obstructing progress on a peaceful course and does not allow the nations and peoples of the region and the world to enjoy a peaceful life.

The imperialism viciously continues its interferences and desparately and scandalously strives to keep the tensions alive in the interest of achieving its exploitative ends in other parts of the world. Thus, it is necessary that the countries of the region, realising their international position and responsibilities, play an independent role.

With all these peaceful gestures of the DRA Government, now the people of the world are waiting to see the extent to which Pakistan and Iran are ready for direct negotiations for the cause of peace and stability in the region, which is the cherished desire of the DRA Government and people and all the peace-loving people of the world.

CSO: 4600/47

BBC DENOUNCED FOR IMPERIALIST PROPAGANDA

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 23 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial: "The Propaganda War on Afghanistan"]

[Text]

Experience has proved that the gigantic imperialist propaganda machinery has always spread false and baseless canards about countries where its vested interests are endangered and whose people are striving to build a new life, free from exploitation. The revolution in Afghanistan and the fundamental and positive changes taking place in the interest of our people and homeland as well as peace in the region and in the world, too, have provoked a campaign of lies by the Western mass media.

From the very first moment when our people under the leadership of PDPA, become the masters of their own destiny, ousting the tyrants, lackeys and servants of imperialism and reaction so that the toiling masses in this country may progress towards material and moral prosperity, after ages of hardship and misery, the imperialist circles who saw their interests endangered in this region not only began hatching conspiracies against the popular revolution in this country but also launched a virulent propaganda offensive against the revolutionary changes in Afghanistan.

They spread brazen lies about the revolution, but none of these fabrications helped to cover up their base and ominous designs. Their false propaganda has only helped to expose them. Now, the people not only of Afghanistan, but of the entire region recognise these media in their true colours—as instruments of international monopolists.

The BBC, the mouthpiece of British imperialism, has now once again exposed its true nature as a rumour-mongering apparatus of the West and a sentinel of the imperialists interests.

In its last Sunday's progra-

mme, the BBC 'reported' that the Soviet Embassy in Kabul was subjected to a rocket attack. It even claimed that the building of the embassy's trade representative was destroyed in the raid. Afghan counter-revolutionary elements in New Delhi were mentioned as a "source" of these reports.

The BBC authorities, who have burnt their fingers all too often, should know better by now than to rely on these "sources".

The BBC claims to have been broadcasting "independent" views and opinions, yet all its broadcasts are stained with hostility, mischief, provocation and slander against the independent countries of the world, who are striving to build a new life.

The hostile and antagonistic nature of the BBC broadcasting, the mouthpiece of the "free world", is well known to our people as well as the world at large. In the past the falsifications and fabrications of this propaganda machinery of imperialism had been instantly refuted by facts themselves and the BBC has made a laughing-stock of itself time and again.

The BBC's war on Afghanistan is of a piece with its tireless crusade against all nations and peoples, who earn its displeasure by opting for true independence and assert the anti-imperialist imperative of the struggle for peace and progress.

The Soviet embassy in Kabul was not, of course, subjected to any attack. The BBC's dis-information campaign is nothing but a manifestation of the anti-Afghan and anti-Soviet hostility. long adopted by imperialist radios and mass media.

The message broadcast by the BBC is loud and clear for the people: imperialist propaganda against the truth of the revolution is ferocious, but futile.

CSO: 4600/45

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM STRESSED AS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 24 Sep 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Revolution Guarantees Religious Freedom"]

[Text]

When the Saur Revolution entered its new phase on December 27, 1979, the different strata and nationalities of free, independent Afghanistan won popular and democratic liberties and among them, the freedom of religious worship and rites. Now the noble people of our dear country are performing their religious rites in complete and democratic freedom. These freedoms have been embodied in Article 5 of the DRA Fundamental Principles.

In the Fundamental Principles, great attention is focussed on the freedom of religious rites. Article Five reads in part. Respect, observance and preservation of Islam as sacred religion will be ensured in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and freedom of religious rites guaranteed for Moslems..."

In pursuance of this important provision of the provisional constitution of the country, based on the will and expectations of our heroic and epoch-making people, the DRA Government has been striving to provide all needed facilities and conditions for performance of religious rites. The Government has further expanded its activities in safeguarding the religion and protecting the national and religious practices of our people by building mosques and encouraging the clergymen and religious leaders.

After the victory of the new phase of the Saur Revolution, the Muslim people of Afghanistan, freely and without any fear, perform their religious rites. The same is true about the followers of other faiths in the country. The full freedom of religion is illustrated during the week days and on Fridays by the mosques in Kabul as well as in the provincial capitals, crowded with devout people.

During the holy month of Ramadan, added facilities were provided for the people of this country to observe it and keep a fast. Last year, over 4,000

Afghan pilgrims were airlifted to Jedda for 'haj' pilgrimage, though originally the Government wanted 8,000 people to join the pilgrimage, an unprecedented number in the history of 'haj' pilgrimage in the country.

This year, 6,000 Afghans, from the capital and provinces, are to leave for Holy Mecca by air. Though some Governments had created obstacles, DRA Government through the Islamic affairs department made persistent efforts to make the necessary preparations for the travel of the Afghan 'hajis'.

This year, more facilities have been provided for the 'hajis'. For instance, their children are to be looked after at the Watan Nursery, upon the request of the 'hajis', until the end of the 'haj' ceremonies. The 'hajis' are exempted from the guarantees in cash and kind, so that they are not required this year to leave cash or their properties as guarantee.

In the past, the Afghan 'hajis' faced difficulties specially on account of their children. They had either to take their children along, which cost them too much, or leave them uncared for. Now, with the establishment of the Watan Nursery, the the 'hajis' are rid of this worry.

Following the intensive efforts made by the Government as a token of its respect for the religious beliefs of our people, the first batch of the Afghan 'hajis' left for Jedda yesterday by an Ariana Airlines flight. A grand send-off ceremony was held at the Kabul Airport where some 'hajis' expressed gratitude for the attention paid by the party and the Government to provision of all necessary facilities for them.

These are but a few examples of the religious freedom guaranteed to the Afghan Muslim people under the Fundamental Principles. They testify that, contrary to the baseless propaganda of imperialism and its lackeys, the Islam's inviolability is guaranteed in the DRA.

CSO: 4600/46

PLANS TO PROMOTE TOURISM OUTLINED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 27 Sep 81 p 3

[Text]

"International tourists can fully enjoy the natural sceneries and historical relics and places of interest in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as soon as the world devouring imperialism ceases interferences in the internal affairs of the revolution of Afghanistan. It is imperialism that has hampered tourism in Afghanistan, contrary to the lofty aspiration of the World Tourist Organisation, of which Afghanistan remains a staunch member, and against the aspirations for peace, fraternity and friendship with the world nations."

This was stated by Ghulam Rahman Ameri, President of the Afghan Tourist Organisation, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

"In 1979", said Ameri, "the third general assembly of the World Tourist Organisation resolved that member-countries ought to celebrate the international day of tourism every year on September 27 in their respective countries, under the motto 'Tourism and the Quality of Life'. It is a matter of pleasure, that the DRA, as an active member of the organisation, joins in marking this occasion".

"We hope to celebrate the same occasion in the years to come. The occasion will afford us an opportunity to further introduce this industry, which is a new phenomenon in our country, to our compatriots through mass media, screening of films and holding of functions, on the economic, cultural, and social aspects of tourism", he added.

Talking of the advantages of the tourist industry as an instrument of understanding among the world nations in strengthening international peace, he said that, in view of its significance, one of the mottos of international tourism was accepted as "Tourism-passport of peace."

Tourism plays an important role in the economic, cultural, historical and social life of people. That is why all the countries in the world attach great value to this industry especially its economic benefits.

However, the importance of tourism is viewed should be seen first of all in promotion of understanding among the peoples and nations of the world. Building of contacts among peoples and nations contribute considerably to strengthening of the international peace.

Tourism also helps people to regain physical strength exhausted by mental and manual work. Tourism refreshes one's stamina.

Tourism also contributes greatly to development of roads, airports, and restoration of historical relics and treasures.

"Tourism offers an investment with quick returns, unlike in agricultural and industrials sectors. It helps in development of local industries and handicrafts and providing employment in the tourist centres", noted Ameri.

The Afghan Tourist Organisation began operation 23 years ago as a joint stock company, under the Government. In 1975, for the first time the Tourism Law was enforced in the country

and the organisation launched activities, in two different sections, public and commercial.

For the public section, a budget of Afs 12 million was approved. However, the commercial section of the organisation began functioning under the name of Afghan Tour which footed all its bills from its services rendered to the tourists and today, too, it is sustained by its reserved incomes.

Previously the Afghan Tour officials were not paid pension. However, following the Saur Revolution, their pensions were revived.

Following the revolution, especially its new phase, a number of measures were adopted to publicise tourism in the country, and one can cite the correction of brochures, the Kabul, Herat, Balkh, and Bamian tourist guidebooks as well as the Historical Afghanistan Guidebook which was published in 1977.

At present, the organisation faces no problem, but, for the future development of tourism, there will be need for adequate accommodation and means of transportation. Purchase of new equipment is envisaged in the 1361 developmental plan.

The future developmental plans of the ATO include erection of a cable car from the foot of the Asmayee mountain to its peak, which will be in use throughout the year, Ameri disclosed.

The organisation has branch offices at the Hotel Inter-Continental, the Kabul Hotel and the Kabul Airport as well as in Herat, Kamo of Nooristan and Mazare Sharif. The Herat office is built in the Timurid style and fully equipped.

The offices in Mazare Sharif and Kamo of Nooristan as well as the camps in Cheghcharan and Central highway are at the service of the tourists.

The public sector organisation has a great number of employees on its payroll. The Afghan Tour, as a commercial section, has a thriving business, bringing in considerable revenues. Other public sector organisations benefiting, directly or indirectly, from the tourist industry, are the Hotel Enterprise, the Bakhtar Airlines and the Ariana Afghan Airlines.

In the private sector, those engaged in handicrafts, fur coat-making, jewellers, antique dealers, restaurantiers, hoteliers are among the beneficiaries.

The organisation's plans include construction of a restaurant on the Asmayee mountain, 95 per cent work on which is finished— it is hoped to be opened soon. On the international 100-bed hotel in Bamian, 33 per cent work is complete—the work has been stopped by the activities of counter-revolutionary elements. But, it is expected that work will soon be resumed.

The organisation also plans to revive the historical Kabul Covered Bazzar, known in the old days as Char Chata and to build new hotels in Mazare Sharif, Ajar Valley, Nooristan, Cheghcharan and Herat.

CSO: 4600/48

AGRICULTURE TO BE REEVALUATED TO COMBAT NUTRITIONAL PROBLEMS

Algiers EL DJEICH in French No 219, Aug 81 pp 17-18

[Text] Food products, because they are not found equally in all areas and because they are used on a discretionary basis, have become one more weapon in the panoply of elements of domination, more and more destined to support and even to impose one's own conception of international relations and of relations between countries. A frightened world has seen how food blackmail, carried on in the Middle East, could be formidably effective, to the point of changing all the basic assumptions of the problem.

The consequence is that the danger of food dependence and the resulting political alienation has emerged from the land of fancy to become a cruel reality for the Third World. Extortion by the United States, the permanent cynicism of the "Club of Rome," added to the uncertainties of world food production, have disillusioned the developing countries. More and more, these countries are directing their development policies toward taking charge of and satisfying their own needs.

In Algeria the Central Committee of the FLN Party has devoted extended consideration to the satisfaction of national food needs, both at the level of its resolutions related to agriculture or irrigation, as well as during the preparation of the 5-year plan. This particular attention starts from an established fact: leaving aside the international situation, which is particularly vulnerable to food blackmail, the country's needs, which are already enormous, will increase steadily, considering the very high population growth rate.

During the 3-year plan (1967-1969) Algeria imported annually an average of 731 million dinars of foodstuffs. The country imported 925 million dinars of food annually during the first 4-year plan (1970-1973) and 4.049 billion dinars of food annually during the second 4-year plan (1974-1977). With 1970 as 100 the average annual index moved to 127 during the first 4-year plan and to 554 during the second 4-year plan.

Algeria imported annually an average of 618.4 thousand tons of grain during the period from 1967 to 1969; 807.8 thousand tons of grain during the period from 1970 to 1973; and 1.643 million tons of grain during the period from 1974 to 1977. In 1978 Algeria purchased 2.298 million tons of grain, or 3.7 times more than it imported during an average year of the 3-year plan period.

We can see, in the table appearing below, that the food dependence of the country continues to grow. Now this dependence is essentially on certain developed capitalist countries for grains, including the United States, Canada, and Australia, and for milk products on the countries of the EEC.

More and more, according to the Ministry of Commerce (PRESS REVIEW No 3/80), "the United States is strengthening its position in the food trade in Algeria. Whereas, during the first 4-year plan it provided Algeria with 14.21 percent of its food imports, during the second 4-year plan (1974-1977) it provided 24.7 percent of food imports. In terms of the principal strategic production, grains, the United States has a preponderant place. If one adds Canada to the United States, Algeria is dependent for about 80 percent of its imports on the center of world imperialism and on one of its principal statellites."

Is Food Dependence Inevitable?

When we analyze the reasons for food dependence, we are obliged to deal with two fundamental developments: the evolution of social demand for food products, and the manufacture of these products. It is quite clear that the national rate of population growth (3.2 percent, one of the highest in the world) is expressing in the demand for food a rhythm which is a matter of concern in itself. Each year we record about 600,000 births. Given the relationship between the birth and death rates, there are close to an additional 600,000 more older people living each year who also require food.

From the 12,096,347 inhabitants recorded in the census of 1966, the total population went up to 18,250,000 as of 1 January 1978, and the present population is estimated at 20.5 million.

According to the Research Center for Applied Economics (CREA), "this rapidly growing population is also involved in a process of rapid urbanization. The residents of cities represented 33 percent of the total population in 1966 and 41 percent in 1977. In absolute figures the urban population went up from 3.9 million in 1966 to 6.9 million in 1977. This growth implies an increase in commercial agricultural production. Even in the rural areas the number of mouths to feed requires the purchase of basic foods (grain). Already in 1968-69 the study of consumption carried out by the AARDES [Algerian Association for Demographic, Economic and Social Research] showed that the population living in rural districts bought 67 percent of the flour which they consumed. A similar rate was 75 percent for potatoes, 80 percent for vegetables, 66 percent for fruits and 69 percent for meats."

A study carried out by the Research Center for Applied Economics in 1977 among a number of farmers showed that a substantial number of those working on the land at times purchased grains, vegetables, and meat.

This is explained by a distrubing imbalance between agricultural production and food requirements. As can be seen in the table below, the production of the main food products over the past 20 years has only gone up by 2 percent per year, while the population increase has been 3.2 percent, whereas national development planning had fixed for agriculture a growth rate of 7 percent per year.

INDEX OF THE EVOLUTION OF IMPORTS OF PHYSICAL QUANTITIES OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS (1967-69 = 100)

Product	Annual Average For the Period 1966	Annual Average For the Period 1967/69	Annual Average For the Period 1970/73	Annual Average For the Period 1974/77	Annual Average For the Period 1978
Grains	131.5	100	130.6	226.0	371.6
Flour	74.0	100	89.8	1,138.0	2,879.1
Meat	100.0	100	6.7	1,500.0	3,900.0
Dairy products	80.2	100	127.9	1,129.5	158.4
Vegetables	-----	100	175.9	286.5	556.5
Fruits	36.7	100	162.0	225.3	217.7
Coffee, Tea, Spices	62.6	100	89.4	315.7	600.0
Oil Seeds	96.3	100	96.5	313.3	182.4
Oil and Fats	83.0	100	132.8	238.2	286.0
Sugar	88.7	100	113.0	173.9	194.5

INDEX OF PRODUCTION OF PRINCIPAL FOOD PRODUCTS (PERIOD 1954/57 = 100)

	Average 1954/57	Average 1967/69	Average 1970/73	Average 1977
Grains	100	90.6	83.6	82.3
Dried Vegetables	100	51.9	72.1	114.0
Citrus Fruit	100	141.7	141.7	141.0
Nuts	100	99.7	99.7	141.7
Figs	100	74.5	74.5	92.4
Olive Oil	100	80.7	80.7	99.2
Wine	100	49.8	44.0	23.0
Truck Garden Production	100	76.9	87.5	123.0
Potatoes	100	96.4	114.0	200.0

"Regarding output of animal products," notes the magazine of the Ministry of Commerce, "production is difficult to determine because of the lack of complete statistics, but it appears that it is not very satisfactory. The production of milk, which is very poorly understood, has gone up, according to estimates, from 3 billion hectoliters in 1960 to 6.23 billion hectoliters in 1975. However, the production of meat, based on more reliable statistics due to the reports of the state-controlled slaugher facilities, has fallen from 60.2 million tons, the yearly average for the period 1954-1957, to 50 million tons, the yearly average for the period 1974-1975 (chicken meat not included in both these example)."

This weakness in agricultural production is directly linked to the secondary position assigned to agriculture in terms of investments during the preceding plans. Accounting for 11 percent annually of total expenditures during the period from 1966 to 1969, appropriations for agriculture rose to 14 percent per year during the first 4-year plan, then fell to 13 percent during the second 4-year plan. Planned investments by public agricultural enterprises fell from 26 percent (for the period 1967-1969) to 6 percent (for the period 1970 to 1977). Further, agriculture has been penalized in terms of assignment of the labor force (qualified workers and officials), since the labor training program is basically geared toward the non-agricultural sectors of economic activity. Even the school system is much more oriented toward the urban than to the rural model. Finally, the breakdown of national income, in terms of salaries and allowances, notably does not favor agriculture. In all of the last few years we have seen a double exodus of workers: first of all, a rural exodus, with workers from the countryside going into better-paid jobs in industry; then an agricultural exodus, with farmers going into better-paying rural activities, such as the retail trade, skilled and semi-skilled trades, etc.

A Possible Solution: Place a Higher Value on Agriculture

It is beyond argument that the satisfaction of national requirements for food will require placing a higher value on the agricultural sector in the national development strategy, not in opposition to the emphasis on industry already decided on but as a harmonious complement to it. For the rest, it is on the basis of this fundamental evidence that the FLN Party has made its decisions relative to agriculture. By a bold use of land, the development of the irrigation sector, the development of financing and credit institutions, the rationalization of the methods of management, and making the distribution and stocking system more dynamic, it is hoped to accomplish this objective. This means making the agricultural sector fulfill its social function of taking care of consumption needs and, over the long term, accentuating its participation in national savings. Is this possible, considering the constraints and difficulties which this sector has encountered and the demands of a continuously growing population? The future will tell us, and tell us quickly, because economic independence will require this, at least in part.

The rural world is presently undergoing notable changes: restructuring of agricultral enterprises, a decrease in bureaucratic procedures at the distribution level, etc. These changes can and must be the beginning of a re-birth of the countryside. However, this can only happen with the real participation of those who work the land themselves. They must mobilize themselves to make agriculture not a social burden, but a factor for development and progress.

5170
CSO: 4519/1

BRIEFS

PERMANENT LEGAL TIME ESTABLISHED--The Council of Ministers met yesterday at the presidential office under the chairmanship of Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic and the secretary-general of the party. The Council of Ministers approved a draft decree submitted by the prime minister deciding the legal time. Thus legal time in Algeria will correspond to GMT plus 60 minutes throughout the year, as from the publication of the decree in the official gazette, whereas time was changing twice a year. [Text] [LD191440 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 19 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/32

'GAZETTE' DETAILS MUBARAK'S BACKGROUND

Cairo EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 9 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] Vice President, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, who was unanimously nominated for the post of Egyptian President, and who is virtually certain to be assassinated President Sadat's successor in a public referendum next Tuesday, is a military man who has been the late President's right hand in the past few years and who had backed Sadat's domestic and foreign policy. Born in Menufla Governorate, Lower Egypt on May 4, 1928, Mr Mubarak joined the Military Academy on November 1, 1947, after completing his General Secondary school education.

Having successfully completed his military training and studies in the Academy on February 1, 1949, Mr Mubarak joined the Air Academy to further reinforce his military knowledge and training. He graduated at the Academy on March 13, 1950.

Instruction

Mr Mubarak started his official career in the Air Force where he was promoted to various posts. Then he worked as instructor in the Air Academy in February 1952 and filled this post till January 1959.

Mr Mubarak assumed the responsibility of an L-28 squadron leader and Tu 16 air brigade.

He was sent on a number of missions to the Soviet Union to get training on Soviet L28 and Tu 16 jet fighters.

Mr Mubarak conducted his higher studies at Franz Military Academy in the Soviet Union from February 1964 to April 1965, and was later appointed commander of different air bases.

Following the fatal blow dealt to the Air Force in June 1967, Mr Mubarak was appointed as Director General of the Air Academy, on November 11, 1967, and was entrusted with the task of training and preparing competent flight officers to rehabilitate the air forces.

On June 22, 1969, Mr Mubarak was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Forces where he efficiently discharged his duties for four years.

On April 14, 1972, the late President issued a decree appointing Mr Mubarak General Commander of the Air Forces. Since then, Mr Mubarak reorganised the air forces and successfully groomed them for the glorious October 1973 war.

Strikes

Mr Mubarak's efficient planning and execution of the air strikes during the initial hours of the October 1973 war was crucial in dipping the balance of the battle in Egypt's favour and creating unbelievable chaos and disorder among Israelis. Thanks to his careful planning, Mr Mubarak managed to preserve the major part of the air force intact with the majority of Egyptian planes unscathed.

He was promptly promoted to the rank of Lieutenant General on October 6, 1973, that is a few hours after successfully dealing the first Air Force blow.

He was also accorded the highest military order, the Sinai Star order.

Then on April 16, 1975, the late President passed a decision of appointing Mr Mubarak as Vice President of the Republic.

The major diplomatic and political activities since then included visits to most Arab, European and African countries, besides his visits to the United States.

He was also charged with various political missions. He presided over the Egyptian delegation to the conferences convened by the Organisation of African Unity in Kampala and Mauritius.

The late President also entrusted him with intervening to bring to a halt the conflict between Algeria and Morocco on the West Sahara issue. Thanks to his good offices a bloody confrontation between the two Arab countries was overted.

Mr Mubarak was elected Vice Chairman of the National Democratic Party (NDP).

As part of his rigorous training for Egypt's supreme executive post he undertook delicate missions abroad and more often than not took Mr Sadat's place at weekly Cabinet meetings.

As Commander of the Air Force in the years of preparation for the Middle East war of 1973, he gained a reputation for hard work, thoroughness, punctuality and discipline.

Mr Mubarak, proved himself a skillful party manager with a winning style at the annual Congress of the National Democratic Party (NDP) two weeks ago.

His performance showed a new confidence and his nomination as official NDP candidate yesterday was a foregone conclusion.

Diplomats say he was a force behind Mr Sadat's decision last month to crush the growing influence of fundamentalist Islam among the country's young.

His first acts as effective rule of Egypt yesterday were to declare a state of emergency for one year and ban any form of demonstration or mass meeting.

As the negotiator in Egypt's rearmament programme Mr Mubarak made numerous trips to Washington, Western Europe and the Far East.

Close

In Party meetings the Vice-President has backed all Mr Sadat's policies--peace, the close relationship with the United States, vociferous criticism of the Soviet role in the Middle East, free market economics and a multi-party system.

His personality is little-known in the Arab world, except in Sudan, Somalia and Oman, the three Arab states that did not break off relations with Cairo in protest against its peace treaty with Israel.

Wit

Generally portrayed as a taciturn and earnest man, the Vice-President has more always displayed quick wit and his manner with foreign visitors and the press has become more relaxed.

Fellow-officers say he reads widely and voraciously. He plays squash regularly and is in excellent health.

Both he and his wife Suzanne, educated at the American University here, speak good English. Suzanne plays an active role in social work in the Cairo suburb of Boulak. GSS REUTER

CSO: 4500/14

GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN NABAVI ATTACKS BAZARGAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Oct 81 pp 7,8

[Text] Government spokesman Behzad Habavi returned to the attack on former provisional premier Mehdi Bazargan and ex-president Bani-Sadr for allegedly protecting the Mojahedin-e-Khalq when he gave an interview to the ETTELAAT daily in Tehran. Bazargan, although with no access to the media, had apparently circulated a rebuttal of Nabavi's charges against him.

"I have said in one of my interviews that the reason why the monafaqin (hypocrites--the term for the mojahedin and allied leftists used by the regime) have penetrated our organisations is because the provisional government and Bani-Sadr protected them," Nabavi said. "If Mr Bazargan denies this he should send us a message at least condemning the actions of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq.

"We have documents to prove that four days before becoming president Bani-Sadr had spoken to Rajavi, who advised him to hold a demonstration on April 2. In military schools truckloads of arms were being put at the disposal of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq.

"If we are lying Mr Bazargan should come and tell us. I did not want to say that Mr Kashmiri was brought into the P.M.'s office by him (Bazargan). I was merely making an overall comment about events. (Bazargan had apparently resented what he felt was an implication that it was he who brought in Kashmiri, accused of planting the bomb which killed former president Rajai and premier Bahonar, to work again at the premier's office, where he had been employed during the Shah's regime.)

Nabavi used the interview to present a rosy picture of the Islamic regime's achievements in the economic field. He said that despite difficulties created by Bani-Sadr the government had managed to raise the level of industrial production. The government had documents to prove that Bani-Sadr encouraged the United Bus Co (Tehran's city transport) to go on strike. He was inciting workers at the Melli Shoe factory to strike.

Proper distribution of fuel had been organised, Nabavi claimed. Wheat, rice and cotton products were in a good situation. They had solved their import and port problems. As regards fuel we have achieved a great deal, and we have used substitute fuels. In Western Azarbaijan they used coal in schools, and in Kurdistan charcoal.

Asked about rationing Nabavi replied, "In war conditions we have succeeded in rationing bread, meat, chicken, eggs, sugar, rice, soap and many other products. We also control their distribution. In the light of this success we have been attacked--for instance, they say that this is what the communists do and they say "couponisation" equals communism.

"They wanted to destroy our economy with their propaganda. They did not want us to stop inflation. The reason why they attack the Economic Mobilisation Unit (which is supposed to plan economic programmes and control them) is because we have cut off the hands of the middlemen. Those middlemen have lost 23.5 billion tomans worth of profits from selling wheat and rice alone. We have reduced inflation and have kept it at 23.5 percent; this is miraculous considering we are at war."

All this had been achieved, Nabavi said, when Iran was exporting in the first six months of this year only 800,000 barrels of oil per day compared to 2 million barrels previously.

CSO: 4600/50

BAZARGAN DEFENDS MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ IN PARLIAMENT

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 8 Oct 81 pp 1,12

[Text] BEIRUT, Lebanon, (AP). — Iran's former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan Wednesday criticized firing squads executions of Leftist opponents of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's regime but was interrupted and shouted down by fundamentalist members of Parliament, Teheran Radio reported.

The State-run Radio said Bazargan, who was Khomeini's first choice for Prime Minister after the 1979 overthrow of the monarchy, told an open session of the Parliament he was against summary execution of Mujahedeen Khalq guerrillas.

Irate Parliament Members protested Bazargan's defense of opposition groups and several walckd out of the Majlis, the Iranian Parliament, prompting speaker Ali-Akbar Rafsanjani to call a recess, according to the broadcast monitored in Beirut.

When the Majlis reconvened, Rafsanjani said in an address to Parliament Bazargan's stand on "domestic terrorism has been interpreted in a way that exonerated the Mujahedeen Khalq from being American alckies," the Radio said.

The Speaker said Bazargan's speech angered several Deputies and "we had to interrupt the session temporarily to avert disorders," the Radio said.

This was the first public defense of the Mujahedeen Khalq in Parliament since the June 22 ouster of ex-President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr that touched off the organization's current campaign of bombings and assassinations to overthrow Khomeini's regime.

Bazargan, who resigned the Premiership to protest the Nov. 4, 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran by Iranian militant students, had boycotted the Parliament's debate on Bani-Sadr's impeachment last June.

Hashem Sabaghian, a Parliament Member from Bazargan's National Liberation Movement of Iran told the Associated Press the angry Majlis Deputies charged the rostrum as Bazargan criticised the executions and attempted to haul him down.

"But Rafsanjani intervened personally and stopped them," said Sabaghian, who was reached at Bazargan's Teheran office by the Associated Press in Beirut.

During the recess, some of the irate Deputies called in supporters to ring the Majlis building and chant "Death to Bazargan." But by then the former Prime Minister had left and debate was closed, Sabaghian added.

Bazargan had called for an end to the confrontation between the regime and Mujahedeen Khalq in his Majlis speech, saying "whichever side is killed is for the benefit of the infidels," according to Sazaghian

"Neither the clergymen nor the young girls and boys who are killed are lackies of the Americans," Sabaghian quoted Bazargan as telling Parliament. "The young boys and girls involved in the street clashes have not been bred in the bosoms of American families so than we can rightfully call mercenaries. Therefore, why is this bloodletting considered a necessity ?"

It wa sat the point of Bazargan's speech, Sabaghian said, that irate Deputies from the ruling Islamic Republican Party interrupted the ex-Prime Minister.

The Bazargan affair overshadowed renewed violence between Leftist and autonomy-seeking Kurdish guerrillas on the one hand and Khomeini's supporters on the other in several parts of Iran with the State Radio reporting "many" government opponents having been killed and injured.

CSO: 4600/43

BAKHTIAR CALLS FOR UNITY AMONG OPPOSITION GROUPS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Oct 81 pp 3,4

[Text] The renewed violence in Iran has brought new appeals for unity among opposition groups inside and outside of the country in the past week. National Iranian Resistance Movement leader and last prime minister of Iran before the arrival of Khomeyni from Paris, Shapour Bakhtiar, said that in the light of the horrifying events in Iran there was no further excuse for individuals peddling their own particular policies. They must all unite, whatever their views, to deal a death blow to the regime.

"The usurper regime of the communist mullahs...is killing our children in the alleyways, the schools, the houses of cities and villages all over Iran," he said. "In the prisons others face the firing squads. Yet these are the children who are the future of Iran.

"No Iranian in these bloody days has the right to remain silent, no Iranian must remain indifferent to the satanic actions of the Khomeyni regime."

Bakhtiar said the regime was now even getting rid of those who fought with it in the uprising of 1978--"Its trenchmates"--and in the face of these bloodthirsty policies all nationalist forces had a duty to sit down and face reality; they must give up their individual slogans and unite.

How could boring slogans and disruption of unity go on at a crucial time like this, Bakhtiar asked. The regime had reached its weakest point and its "filthy life" was due to the fact that the national forces were disunited. They must come together to deal the final blow to the head of this "bloodthirsty monster."

Another group called the Iranian Liberation Organisation also distributed a statement saying the day of Iran's freedom was at hand if nationalist forces would forget their individual differences.

CSO: 4600/50

TUDEH PARTY FACING CRITICISM FROM NEW MEMBERS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 pp 8-10

[Text] The leadership of Iran's pro-Moscow Communist Party, the Tudeh, is facing mounting criticism from its newest recruits, who are mostly defectors from the Fedayeen-e-Khalq, urban guerrillas (the majority branch) and other leftist organisations. Recently the Tudeh leaders have appointed a Mr. Khosravi (first name not specified) to answer questions collected by organisers of cells from rank and file members.

Questions are mainly in two categories, informants say; firstly, on the leaders' blind support for Khomeini, and secondly, on the lack of a democratic system of communication inside the party.

The first category of questions concern mainly points like the following:

1. How can we justify support for the Khomeini regime, which is killing our own former colleagues in leftist organisation, which are in any case anti-imperialist and as such progressive?

2. Doesn't the party's total support for the mullahs mean that we have to endorse very reactionary laws and practices such as the Qasas (Tribution) Law, the veil for women, executions without trial, purges without compensation, etcetera?

3. We have difficulty in convincing people that the current anti-American campaign by Khomeini is a genuine anti-imperialist effort. People tell us that Khomeini is merely trying to divert attention from the inadequacies and corruption in his own regime.

4. We cannot justify the regime's action in closing down the universities. People tell us this is a move which is more in the interests of the imperialism than anything which the Shah did.

5. We are encountering immense hostility from the people. We see a consistent wave of nationalism which has begun to find expression in support for the industrialisation plans and achievements of the Shah's regime. Workers tell us that whereas the Shah was building a new factory every day Khomeini is closing down one every hour. Now we are importers of consumer goods whereas under the Shah we were exporters of capital goods and technology. People answer our argument that factories and industries depending on imported technology are "imperialistic" by telling us :

that the Tudeh is an instrument of the Soviet Union with the mission to create technological dependence on the USSR, whose technology is inferior.

The second category of questions covers the following areas:

1. The senior staff who run cells have a dictatorial attitude. They attend cells to give us instructions and lecture us on doctrine and ideology. But they do not allow time for discussions. They demand total obedience.

2. On major issues we are all briefed to take a single line of argument approved by the leadership, which reduces us too often to sounding like parrots. The people compare our arguments with facts obtained by listening to foreign radio broadcasts.

3. Our supervisors want us to act as agents for the party to gather information and spy on people.

4. The party's total obedience to the Soviet line is hardly justifiable. We find ourselves working to promote Soviet interests rather than interests of our own country.

In reply to these charges, Khosravi is reported to have said that 25 years of rule by the Shah under direct American supervision had created a corrupt bourgeoisie class in Iran which embraced even the working class. He said that the Iranian proletariat did not identify its own real interests, and must be guided by the intelligentsia. The sad fact that workers listened to foreign broadcasts showed the extent of corruption which the Shah's regime had created.

Khosravi then said that under the Shah the Iranians were encouraged to develop corrupt consumption habits, like Cubans under Batista. Iran has become a backwater of American corruption. Those industries dependent on imported technology were in fact agents of multinational corporations; whether German, French or British, they were all from the same source. Khomeini's harsh and seemingly reactionary rule was beneficial because it was changing the people's consumption habits; it was closing down factories which linked Iran to the West and it was forcing Iranians to adjust their standard of living to a level in line with the rest of the liberated and progressive regimes in Asia, and indeed in the region.

Khosravi said the Tudeh party was very careful not to identify itself with Muslim fundamentalists but Khomeini was personally very valuable to the party because of his systematic anti-Americanism. However, it was wrong to say that his anti-American stance was not genuine. He was using the entire media to create anti-American feelings among Iranians.

Khosravi added that Khomeini was also personally motivated by a revolutionary spirit of an international character. His animosity towards the merchant enterprising class and petit bourgeoisie was in line with the Tudeh party. He was ruthlessly fighting against nationalist groups who were today the strongest barriers to the progressive forces.

Khosravi stressed that the Iranian revolution had terminated American presence in the region. Now, Iran's foreign minister was taking part in the Benghazi Conference

getting his country closer to regimes in South Yemen, Syria and Libya who call for close relations with the USSR.

On such matters as the Qasas Law, which was undeniably reactionary, the Tudeh cadres must try to dissociate the party from the law and even criticise the law. But the Tudeh must not associate itself with petit bourgeoisie groups like that of Bazargan, the National Front and the like.

He said the party was sad that young activists of the Mojahedin were being executed by the regime. However, the Tudeh party had time and again invited Mojahedin to make an alliance which they had refused. He believed the ultimate aim of the Mojahedin was to go it alone; its leaders intended to monopolise power, they did not want to cooperate with other progressive forces. Their attempt to align with Bani-Sadr was wrong. It seemed their leaders were infected with the cult of personality and bourgeois tendencies.

Finally Khosravi said that the comrades must work hard to remove the "misconception" that the Tudeh party was an instrument of Soviet policy. He wanted the comrades to know that there was an identity of view between the Tudeh party and communist parties of progressive nations. This did not mean that Tudeh was a Soviet stooge. He gave assurances that there was no relationship between the Tudeh and the Soviet government or its official organs. The only relationship existing was between Tudeh and other communist parties--a normal phenomenon.

Meanwhile, other party chiefs are telling the young comrades to be on guard against revisionism and bad influences from China or West European communists. Young members of Tudeh are overwhelmingly from families where the father or mother or both were communists in the late 1940s and early 1950s. A typical lecture by a party instructor, as related by a Tudeh member, runs along these lines: "Your elders were activists during the Stalin era on one side and the McCarthyism of the American scene on the other side. That was then called the Cold War. Your elders have not kept abreast of developments in the socialist camp. They are not well-informed of causes for what is called de-Stalinisation or causes of rigt between USSR and China. You should pay attention to recent and enlightened briefings by party comrades and disregard explanations by your parents. Your parents may be good communists but because of their isolation during the dark days of the Shah's rule, their information is out of date."

CSO: 4600/65

MONTAZERI REPORTED PREPARING TO SUCCEED KHOMEYNI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Oct 81 pp 5,6

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeyni has taken further steps to promote Hussain Ali Montazeri as his successor. On Friday, September 25, he officially delegated his authority on approving candidates for the High Council of Judiciary to Montazeri. Thus, Montazeri's image as Khomeyni's heir apparent was given yet another boost.

Meanwhile, Tehran's rumour mill went into action to suggest that Khomeyni was under mental and physical stress, an assumption reinforced by Khomeyni's protracted absence from public engagements. Some rumours late Sunday night persisted that he was in fact seriously ill, but the ayatollah received visitors and made a speech broadcast by the radio on Tuesday morning.

Interest in Khomeyni's health is high because, under the Islamic constitution, his position as the leader is crucial to continued functioning of the administration. Indeed, the constitution, which has been attacked and ever ridiculed by many Iranians ever since it was mooted, vests all authority in the person of Rouhollah Khomeyni. It is he who decides whether the people's will, shown in elections, shall be enforced or not, and whether the elected president or his premier or any other institution should go about their duties or not.

In other words, the constitution places unlimited powers of executive, legislative and judicial nature in the person of Khomeyni, who alone is empowered to confirm or veto all the top appointments. The constitution is vague about succession to Khomeyni.

His successor must be the highest religious authority, who has to be well-versed in current political affairs as well as an authority on modern sciences and knowledge.

The successor is not to be elected, does not have to be an Iranian. He must natural rise to a position of eminence and be acclaimed by public concensus. If no single person qualified as such, the position should be occupied by a group of prominent religious leaders.

The constitution was drawn up specifically to suit Khomeyni. It was drafted and put to a referendum at a time when the entire country was forced into chaos and turmoil because of the hostage issue. Indeed, the constitution was passed at a

time when close to 50 people were executed daily. Many of the people who opposed the constitution thought it a farce. They hoped that once Khomeyni was overthrown and disgraced his constitution would go with him.

Khomeyni and his cohort, however, have survived to this day, contrary to all expectations. And they hope to see the Islamic Republic survive after Khomeyni's demise. That is why the question of his succession is so important to them. Hence, the effort to promote Montazeri.

In fact, it was Khomeyni who personally saw to it that Montazeri was groomed as his successor. That was no easy task. Hundreds of theologians in Iran are senior to Montazeri. Moreover, Montazeri lacks charisma and the kind of imposing personality which is needed for the job.

Despite such shortcomings, Khomeyni has taken every opportunity to promote him as a religious-cum-political leader. His latest move was to delegate him with authority to appoint judges.

Yet Montazeri is essentially a junior cleric. He was hardly known outside his small town of Najafabad and the theological schools in Qom, where he deputized for Khomeyni as a teacher. And unlike Khomeyni, he has no record of political activity except that he spent several months in jail during the former regime.

Montazeri came to public attention in November 1978 when, just released from detention, he went to Paris to meet Khomeyni, then living there and directing the revolution. The BBC reported Montazeri's arrival in Paris. Little was heard of him later until after the revolution--April 1979 when the State radio and television began to publicize him. Even then, his son, known as Ringo, was able to achieve wider publicity because of two hi-jacking operations and similar "headline catching" exploits (the son died in the explosion of IRP headquarters).

In the summer of 1979 Montazeri was elected to the Constituent Assembly, of which he was made the chairman. Khomeyni had personally seen to it that he was elected. Then, in September 1979, a well-known cleric, Mahmud Taleghani, who was Friday prayer leader of Tehran, died and Khomeyni appointed Montazeri to succeed him. That marked the beginning of his rapid rise in the theocracy.

In the spring of 1980, he went to Qom with no official designation. But he began to act as a senior theologian, sending messages and making policy statements on behalf of Khomeyni. He was the prime voice calling on Bani-Sadr to launch an offensive against the Iraqis last winter. The offensive was a disaster and many officers held Montazeri responsible for the debacle. In Tehran's underground literature he is depicted as a simpleton, a stupid village mullah. It is doubtful how he could stand up to the senior theologians of the Shiite hierarchy if he were to succeed Khomeyni.

CSO: 4600/50

EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE DISCUSSED BY OPPOSITION PAPER

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 28 Sep 81 pp 1-2

[Text] Soviet influence is being systematically expanded in the Islamic Republic. If Kremlin leaders are so complacent about the defeats, isolation and further weakening of the Khomeyni regime, it is because they know that in the end the authorities in Tehran will have to turn to them.

In reality, the 28 June explosion at PRI [Islamic Republic Party] headquarters killed nearly 150 personalities and dignitaries, not just 74. The latter figure has been used by the regime for domestic propaganda purposes, because it recalls the number of the Karbala martyrs, whose death has been piously mourned for 1,400 years.

Following that attack, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran offered to provide the Islamic regime security and training assistance. The proposal was rejected at the time.

A second explosion, on 30 August, cost the lives of several other officials: President Rajai, his prime minister, Bahonar, the commander in chief of the police and, rumor in Tehran has it, Fardust the traitor (childhood friend of the shah and a convert to Khomeynism, he has recently been serving as head of SAVAMA and supervised the various intelligence services).

Seized with panic and distress, the Islamic leaders remembered the Soviet offer and looked on it with more interest. This explains both the arrival in Tehran of the ambassador from the Islamic Republic to Moscow and Rafsanjani's "official visit" to North Korea (see IRAN LIBRE No 44). These were not routine movements, nor were the visits merely for the sake of protocol: Important negotiations commenced between Khomeyni and Moscow, and they took place in North Korea, far from the sight of nosy observers. It was precisely these talks which Ambassador Mokri came to set up. And, as usual, to cover its tracks and cover up its collusion with Tehran, Moscow took recourse in one of its oldest strategems: The Soviet mass media kept up a ceaseless barrage last week of vehement attacks on the Tehran regime.

The Soviet Union is no longer content now merely to act through the Tudeh Communist Party in Iran: It wants to send its experts in espionage and counterespionage to our country. In addition, Russian advisers will handle the training and organizing of the Pasdarans who are to carry out this kind of activity.

As the war with Iraq drags on, the USSR also sees the chance to infiltrate into the Armed Forces of Iran by means of arms sales. In reality, the bulk of our American and Western arsenal is now unusable, as a result of lack of maintenance, lack of spare parts or quite simply because it has fallen into the hands of the enemy. This materiel is being replaced, as soon as it is put out of action, by Soviet equipment which comes into the country by the plane-load on 747 jumbo jets. Every week in Tehran, reports indicate, two planes from North Korea and one plane from East Berlin arrive, and other shipments come in from Libya and Syria. Photographs taken at the front attest to the increasingly widespread use of Kalachnikov automatic rifles and Katiosha tanks. Along the same lines, most of the soldiers trained in the West--especially the pilots--have either been eliminated or sent directly to the front.

Iranian nationalists are getting more concerned with every day that passes, for Marxism is advancing with giant strides, and the Islamic Republic is increasingly dependent on economic and political assistance from the Eastern Block, while the West shows nothing but increasing indifference.

Now, in addition to our struggle against Khomeynism, we have to deal with the Soviet superpower. The task is difficult, for the West no longer distinguishes between the anti-Marxists and those so-called Islamic and progressive contenders for power who are in reality nothing but puppets still in the hands of Moscow.

We deduce, from the general attitude taken toward this problem, that the peaceful creation of another Libya or another South Yemen would fully satisfy both the appetite of the Soviets and the despicable cowardliness of the others.

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CSO: 4619/8

PERSIAN GULF ARABS SAID MORE ANXIOUS THAN EVER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 pp 4-6

[Text] Representatives of other member countries of the Gulf Consultative Council as well as some moderate elements in Kuwait are said to be privately expressing reservations over the militant anti-Iranian policy of Kuwait's government and press.

There is now a general feeling that it was the restraining hand of Shaikh Rashid of Dubai which saved the smaller emirates further down the Gulf from what could have been severe retribution at the hands of the Iranian air force and navy in the early days of the war between Iran and Iraq. Shaikh Rashid is said to have warned of the consequences of any strong pro-Iraqi stand or supportive actions for Baghdad, and this nipped in the bud planned moves by the emirates to offer facilities for Iraqi forces or other obvious help.

Two Iraqi warplanes and gun emplacements set up in Ras-al-Khaimaah soon after the start of the war were removed not long afterwards, on the advice of Shaikh Rashid, it is said. He warned that "even the corpse of Iran" could threaten danger to its small neighbours.

The current serious illness of Shaikh Rashid is thus a cause of much concern among moderate Arabs in the Persian Gulf. At the moment it is thought there is some conflict of opinion between the vice president, Shaikh Marwan, who is slated to succeed Rashid in the event of his death, and Shaikh Mohammad, the Dubai emirate's defence minister and son of Rashid, who is with his father in London.

Besides seeing the Iranian air raid on the Kuwaiti installations as a warning by Tehran some Kuwaitis feel that the consequences of a victory for Saddam Hussain could be unfavourable for Kuwait. In that at present unlikely event, they point out, Kuwait might fall an early victim to Iraq's long held desire to snap up Kuwait and its oil for itself.

It is pointed out, an IPS correspondent just back from the Persian Gulf says, that it was only the overnight landing of Iranian marines in Kuwait which is believed to have stymied plans for an Iraqi move into Kuwait five years ago.

Besides the vast amounts of financial and other help given by Kuwait to the Iraqis in recent months there has been vociferous anti-Iranian comment in the Kuwaiti press. Typical was the recent criticism of the Iranian foreign minister Hossain Moussavi for his behaviour at the hardliners' summit in Libya in the Kuwaiti newspaper AL ANBA.

"Why was the Iranian foreign minister invited to an Arab summit which, out of protocol considerations, should not be attended by a delegation headed by a minister, not to mention that this minister represents a country that is occupying Arab lands and waters, and has a black record not much different from that of other invaders, crusaders or Israelis? it asked.

"Even ignoring the reason for his invitation, how about his attendance and his speech that was filled with challenge to whoever has an Arab pulse throbbing. We are surprised that those who stayed silent did so while the Gulf was described as being Persian in sentences that lacked the slightest tinge of respect and courtesy for the conference and hosts.

"The Iranian foreign minister acted in the Tripoli summit as if he was the host in possession of a cause. That is why Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi was exasperated and denounced the minister's reference to the Persian Gulf. Although Col. Gaddafi did not grab him by the scruff of the neck and throw him out, the Iranian minister withdrew from the meeting in protest against the Libyan leader's stance."

IPS' correspondent in the Persian Gulf says Iraq has already received something like $14b. worth of cash, goods and oil from Arab supporters, mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Kuwait is honouring Iraq's pre-war oil contracts, while the money goes to Baghdad. Between 2 and 4 a.m. the road into Iraq from Kuwait's Mina port is one way, with fleets of trucks carrying foods into Iraq, local people said.

While further down the Persian Gulf the majority of Iranians living in the emirates are pro-Shah and photographs of the late Shah and his son are freely on sale in the bazaars, in Kuwait supports of the old regime and Khomeini seems to be evenly balanced. The fact that the Khomeini supporters are much more vociferous means they have the edge in influence. Here Khomeini pictures are most prominently on sale.

Since embassies abroad have been asked by Tehran to try to raise their expenses locally the cost of renewing passports in Kuwait has become expensive. Iranians there told IPS they now have to pay 350 dirhams (nearly £60) for each month of renewal, meaning a year's renewal costs them £700.

Sources at the embassy said that in the past year they had issued 2,000 passports to Palestinians on the orders of the Prime Ministry in Tehran.

Meanwhile, Iranian foreign minister Mir Hussein Moussavi, now in New York to attend the UN General Assembly, has once more denied it was Iranian planes who bombed the Kuwait refinery. He accused the Americans of having encouraged Iraqis to do it in order to promote the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia.

Mohsen Rezai, commander of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, in a Tehran radio interview, echoed the accusation, the aim being, he said, to provoke the anger of Arab brethren.

He also accused France of having restrained Iraq when some time ago Iraq wanted to withdraw her troops west of the Karun river. Rezai did not elaborate.

Rezai said plans were in hand to make Iran the strongest political and military power north of the Persian Gulf. Again he did not reveal any details of the plan.

He announced that families and relatives of Iraqi prisoners of war would be welcome in Iran to see their relatives, but he was sure, he added, that Iraq would not allow the relatives to come.

CSO: 4600/65

ITALY SIGNS $750-MILLION PORT DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 37

[Text] ITALY'S STRUGGLING but tenacious industrialists are busily exploring Iranian import markets. They hope to revive contracts suspended after the fall of the Shah and to wrest new deals out of the hands of their flagging French competitors.

In an encouraging move, the Iranian government and Condotte d'Acqua, the Italian state-owned engineering group, recently signed a $750m port development contract at Bandar Abbas in southern Iran. The project dates back to 1975 when a $1bn contract was signed but later suspended with the onset of the Islamic revolution. Work is expected to resume shortly subject to ratification by Italian and Iranian governments following a successful visit to Tehran by Condotte's newly appointed president, Sergio de Amicis.

The extensive plans for the desert zone of Bandar Abbas include 8km of harbour, 41km of dredging and a quarter of a million square metres of reinforced concrete. The project also incorporates a 90km road and rail network, a desalination plant and a residential quarter.

A spokesman for the Italian foreign trade ministry told *8 Days* that Rome hoped to see exports to Iran rising but noted that many firms were still wary of investing given the continuing uncertainty there. As part of the Italian state enterprise group IRI/Italstat, Condotte was able to obtain insurance for the Iran project from the Italian government agency SACE.

Meanwhile work continues on the Isfahan steel works contract won by Italimpianti, the plant processing subsidiary of Italsider, IRI's steel operating subsiduary. But there have been reports of delayed payments by the Iranians which have highlighted Italian fears that Iran simply may not have the money for new projects.

For their part the Iranian authorities have been courting the Italians. The Iranian energy minister, Hasan Ghafuri-Fard on a visit to Rome in August, called for increased commercial links with Italy and held out the prospect of barter exchange of Iranian oil and Italian technology. The Iranians also guaranteed the safety of Italian workers in Iran should Bani Sadr move to Italy.

The Iranians are apparently ready to overlook Italy's prospering arms trade with Iraq which includes exports of warships and missiles. But one possible source of conflict between the two governments emerged last week when the Iranian embassy in Rome accused Italian police of protecting anti-Khomeini Iranian left-wingers.

CSO: 4600/49

FRENCH BUSINESS AWAITS 'NORMALITY' IN NATION

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 11

[Text]

FRENCH BUSINESS circles have not completely given up the hope of commercial dealings with Iran, in spite of the political instability threatening the Islamic republic and the persistent tension between Paris and Tehran.

French industrialists are pursuing several goals at the same time in Iran. They are aiming, when possible, to finish projects already under way. They also want to be well placed to fight off competition from other industrialised countries if and when the situation in Iran returns to normal. The French believe they have the edge in this respect. Given that most of the Iranian opposition movements have received political asylum in France.

In order to complete projects currently in progress French corporations — like those from a number of other European states — are employing either Iranian personnel or expatriates from countries still maintaining satisfactory relations with the Khomeini regime.

Thus, Cogelex is going ahead with the installation of electrical transformers and the engineering group Sogreah is honouring its contract to supervise the operations. Alsthom-Atlantique, an affiliate of Compagnie Générale d'Electricité (CGE), intends to complete construction of an electrical power plant in Tabriz. The state-controlled automobile manufacturer, Regie Renault, whose 40 per cent share in the Sapa car plant was nationalised, continues to sell the Iranians 5,000 assembly kits a year for its popular T5 model.

Despite the relative optimism among French businessmen, the Islamic revolution has been a severe blow to Coface, the French State Overseas Investment and Trade Guarantee Agency. It has had to write off losses totalling French francs 10bn ($1.67bn), and consequently refuses to cover any business dealings with Tehran. French firms trading with Iran, therefore, usually demand cash payment in advance, through Swiss banks.

Iran was once one of France's best markets in the Middle East, but trade has plummeted in the past few years. In 1980, for instance, Iran was 26th on the list of French clients, with only Ffr3bn ($501m) worth of French imports.

During the first half of this year, Iranian purchases of French goods and produce increased marginally to Ffr1.8bn ($301m), principally the result of increased dealings in agricultural products. The emergency evacuation of the remaining French business personnel in Iran at the beginning of August could mean a dip in sales to Tehran in the second half of 1981.

Iran's main export to France has traditionally been crude oil. In the mid-1970s, Iran provided as much as 10 per cent of French oil needs, but this slipped to a mere 1.34 per cent during the first six months of this year. During this period, Paris purchased 772,168 tonnes of Iranian crude — compared with 174,127 tonnes from Iraq — a drop of 34.7 per cent.

CSO: 4600/49

SADDAM BLASTED ON ANNIVERSARY OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Sep 81 pp 2,3

[Text]

TEHRAN – "Nowadays we come through the first anniversary of the aggressive war launched by the infidel Saddam against the Islamic Republic. This war which was planned by the imperialist powers with the aim of destroying the Islamic revolutions in Iran and Iraq. The aim of this plot is to exhaust the abilities of both Islamic people of Iran and Iraq. That is to limit the Islamic growth which is now prevailing in the two societies.

The big powers, which are launching the war against the Islamic Republic are aiming to weaken it and encircle its effects. They have urged Saddam to perform this task as they did not find anyone of the region rulers more suitable than this pigmy grudging against Islam. So Saddam started the aggressive war with a big effort to occupy a big area of land, discreeting under spark slogans of Arabism and proclaiming some untrue international laws. But he quickly revealed the falsehood of his claims when his Arabism was transformed into Land-to-Land missiles falling on the heads of the Khuzestani Arabs and his progression was changed into fatal cooperation and unity with the agents of the deep rooted colonialism in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Persian Gulf reactionary regimes, Jordan and Morocco and his international laws were altered into breaking the sanctities and honest, and offence against schools, hospitals and houses.

The falling down of the masks from the face of this agent illiterate regime uncovered for the doers the motives for the crimes it committed against our Moslem Hojjatoleslam Sheikh Arif Al-Basri and his four brothers seven years ago. These crimes were only a start for the savage liquidation campaign which it launched against Islam and the religious scholars and combatants of Iraq. This campaign was set up until it reached its climax by executing the religious Marajeh (reference) Imam martyr Sayyed Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and 72 of the best Iraqi religious scholars (the students of martyr reference), and the bases of the Islamic movement such as Sayyed Qasim Shubbar, Sayyed Mubarqa', Sheikh Abdul Jabbar Al-Basri, Sayyed Tahir Al-Haidari, Sheikh Khaza'l Al-Sudani, Sheikh Muhammad Ali Al-Jabiri and others. The regime also persecuted the Mujahedin and liquidated them with bullets and executions after being tortured severely and imprisoned the others in fearful prisons under savage torture.

The crimes of the infidel Saddam happened consequently till they proved to his masters that he is a good agent applying the orders of America and Britain and other atheist powers. Thus, he was given the task to launch the war

against the Islamic Republic of Iran for the sake of weakening it or frustrating it if they could.

But Almighty Allah helps the believers and Allah is with his worshippers who fight for his sake. Allah supports the Islamic Revolution with stability and solidarity. Allah will give the Islam's militants the final triumph as Imam Khomeini said. We are victorious in this war, why not and Almighty Allah says: If you support Allah, Allah supports you and strengthens your feet.

The savage Iraqi regime is nowadays launching the war on two fronts: on the borders with the Iranian Islamic Army with the support of the military line groups of the Islamic movements, and inside Iraq where the Islamic movement launches its holy struggle against this arrogant agent. These two Islamic forces, which are gathered by the unity of aim and route, are standing together under the religious reference (Velayat-e-Faqih) with the leadership of the great nation's Imam Khomeini.

We, the demonstrators, here in Tehran, promise our leader Imam Khomeini and the Iranian and Iraqi people, that we will continue the fight until toppling the arrogant of Baghdad. We keep saying: No, to ceasefire, No, to conciliation, No, to compromise with the aggressor.

Yes, to struggle for Allah's sake, Yes, to martyrdom, Yes, to fight againsst the oppressors, and Yes, to the leadership of Imam Khomeini.

The victory is definitely with us, the promise of Allah and Allah never breaks his promise but most people do not know.

The above statement was issued on the anniversary of the Aggressive War Week imposed by Saddam on the Islamic Republic of Iran by the revolutionary forces of Iraq. They are,

1) Combatant Scholars League in Iraq
2) The Iraqi Combatants Movement
3) The Islamic Al-Da'awa Party
4) Imam's Soldiers Movement

Meanwhile, another Pars report from Islamabad, Pakistan added that a ceremony was held by the Iraqi Moslem Mujahedin in one of the mosques of Islamabad on Thursday on the occasion of the War Week.

In this ceremony, one of the Mujahedin in his speech condemned the actions of Saddam adding that the Iraqi nation would campaign until its last drop of blood in order to overthrow the Ba'athist regime of Saddam and to achieve an Islamic Revolution.

The Provisional Consul of Iran to Karachi, Sadr Lahijani said that "inspite of Saddam's aggression upon Iran, the two Moslem nations of Iran and Iraq are brothers and are fighting together against the U.S. imperialism and internal agents."

Also a Pakistani theologian announced the solidarity of the Pakistani people with the Islamic Revolution and the Moslem nation of Iran and Iraq, and condemned the crimes of the Ba'athist regime of Saddam.

In another development, it was reported that exhibitions of pictures and posters were held in various parts of Pakistan on the occasion of the War Week.

CSO: 4600/44

LEBANESE LEFTIST LEADER CRITICIZES KHOMEYNI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Oct 81 pp 6,7

[Text] Walid Jumblatt, a leftist Lebanese leader, has strongly attacked Ayatollah Khomeyni's interference in Lebanese and Palestinian affairs. In a speech, reported Friday, he called Khomeyni a blood-thirsty bigot who "is a shame for Islam, Iran and the Palestinian cause."

It is not known what caused Jumblatt to come in opposition to Khomeyni. Observers believe he was angry with current warfare between terrorist gangs belonging to Iranian and Iraqi supported factions of Palestinian and Lebanese "guns for hire." Jumblatt's father, the celebrated Druse leader Kemal, was killed by terrorists some years ago.

The young Jumblatt said Khomeyni was a crook who had grabbed power in Iran through a well-planned campaign of terrorism, character assassination and lies, concocted and carried out by an international terrorist mafia.

His attacks on Khomeyni have embarrassed the fundamentalist regime in Tehran, who value their chosen Arab links. Jumblatt is a friend of Yasser Arafat, the PLO leader and one-time frequent traveller to Tehran.

Iranian opposition groups have been criticising the regime recently for its isolation, but the news of Jumblatt's attack on Khomeyni has not yet found its way into Tehran's thriving underground press.

CSO: 4600/50

RUMORS CONCERNING CRASH OF MILITARY PLANE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Oct 81 pp 7-8

[Text] The powerful Tehran rumour mill was at work soon after the C130 plane crash near Tehran last week, which took the lives of the regime's top military brass. The most widespread rumours had it that the plane was deliberately sabotaged by Khomeini's own secret police because he was suddenly alarmed by the efficiency of the army in carrying out the offensive to end the siege of Abadan.

According to this rumour Khomeini was not informed of the army plans to free Abadan. Once he heard the news, the rumour goes on, he was amazed that despite his orders to purge the army and demoralize it, the professional cadres were still capable of outstanding feats.

Those advancing this theory (they do not call it a rumour) maintain that Khomeini still does not trust the army; he wants his own revolutionary guards to get the upper hand. It is also alleged that Khomeini was jealous of the popularity of the army. Moreover, they say, he does not want an early end to the Iraqi war because, after the war, he will have to relax his oppressive rule and get down to some constructive work which he does not like.

There are a number of weaknesses in this theory, however. The main one is that the crash has in fact killed two officers who loyalty to Khomeini was beyond question--General Fallahi and Col. Namjou. Also the deputy commander of the revolutionary guards, Rahim Kolahdooz, was a Khomeini man. The loyalty of Col. Fakouri was in doubt, however.

Bani-Sadr has claimed that Fakouri's loyalty was to him and the Mojahedin. That was why Fakouri was replaced by Namjou as Defence Minister and by Moinipour as Air Force commander after Bani-Sadr's escape from Iran.

A second theory puts the blame on a combination of the Iraqi agents and Mojahedin elements within the air force. Its proposers point to statements by the Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi boasting of contacts within the army and air force. If this theory is accepted then one must discount claims that Fakouri, one of the victims, was a Bani-Sadr loyalist. Unless, of course, one assumes that Fakouri, an air force officer, had managed to fake his own death in the crash, just as Kashmiri did in the bomb explosion at the prime minister's office.

Other rumours blame the Tudeh party, contending that it did it to move closer to power by depriving the regime of its generals and forcing Khomeini to call on its Soviet allies, such as North Korea and South Yemen, for military assistance and instructors.

Whatever the real cause of the crash, one must examine the following facts:

1. Eye-witnesses reported seeing the plane burst into flames in mid air. Newspapers gave a similar account.

2. The crash came amid reports of the discovery of at least two coup attempts. Revolutionary prosecutor general Moussavi-Tabrizi said one coup plot, discovered by his men, involved retired army officers and former officials.

3. The news of the crash was disclosed by the regime 18 hours after it happened, which underlines the regime's deep anxiety.

4. In Falahi the regime has lost a senior officer whose loyalty was tested and who was difficult to replace. His successor, Brig. Gen. Zahir-Nejad, has no experience in joint staff command.

5. Col. Moussa Namjou was an unpopular, ambitious and ruthless officer who was called "more Catholic than the pope."

CSO: 4600/65

PROSECUTOR BLAMES 'FIFTH COLUMN', DENIES CHILD EXECUTIONS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 pp 10-11

[Text] Hojatoleslam Moussavi-Tabriz, the Revolutionary Prosecutor, in an interview with ETTELAAT said, "The street demonstrations in Tehran have proved that we are fighting on two fronts and we have martyrs on two fronts; on these two fronts we grow stronger and more direct."

"While the soldiers of Islam are gaining impressive victories on the war front, the Fifth Column inside wants to weaken the morale of our people," he went on. "But we saw how our people faced them, and we have asked the revolutionary courts to stand against the Fifth Column."

He said the "hypocrites" had attacked an exhibition of photographs showing the war and its martyrs in Mashad. During this attack an 80-year-old man and an 8-year-old child were killed. In another attack on the Revolutionary Guards Mobilization Headquarters in Tabriz an unarmed guard had been killed. Moussavi-Tabriz was asked what he was doing against such attackers. He replied: "We cannot do anything except carry out Islamic laws. These are hostile terrorists and murderers and they burn belongings of Muslim people. Islam says they must be executed. If we can prove that they have arms, we must give verdicts of guilty and execute them unless they stop their activities."

About the number of people killed since June he said: "The martyrs we have given Islam on the war front and the front inside the country far exceed the number executed."

He added: "According to the wishes of the Imam we are allowing the families of the prisoners to visit them inside Evin." Tabrizi was asked about "international pirates" who attacked the properties of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He replied: "Our enemies never give up. We shall lose hope when America stops plotting against us."

About executing children Tabrizi said: "We do not punish anyone under 16. He is not responsible. If they participate in attacks and explosions we keep them in correction houses so that they will lose their weaknesses and return to the arms of the families. In this respect the anti-Islamic mass media have published propaganda that we kill children. This is not true. We keep 12 and 13-year-old children in correction houses.

"Islamic punishment is one dimension, the other dimension is to guide the people and if they will not be guided, then punish them."
CSO: 4600/66

HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS 'APPALLED' BY UN BODY'S INACTION ON NATION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Oct 81 pp 4,5

[Text] Many human rights activists have expressed themselves as "appalled" by the failure of the 26-member U.N. Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, a major human rights body, to condemn the Khomeyni government for its treatment of political opponents.

In recent years the commission has placed even the United States on its blacklist because of its treatment of blacks in jail, a writer in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE pointed out this week. Yet this year, thanks, it is believed, to pressures largely from Pakistan's representative Sharifudin Pirzada, who is minister of law and parliamentary affairs in his country's government, and the Soviet delegate Vsevolod Sofinski, who was expelled from New Zealand, where he was envoy, last year for allegedly financing opposition parties, an effort to indict Iran failed.

The commission did deplore the killing of Bahais, but it refused to firmly condemn wider rights abuses, IPS pointed out in its issue No 39.

The HERALD TRIBUNE quoted Hans Tholen, deputy director of the International Commission of Jurists, which often criticised the late Shah's regime for abuses of human rights, as saying, "Today's mass executions (in Iran) after summary justice are a major abuse of human rights. The UN simply cannot ignore it."

Human rights activists, the paper said, feel that the U.N. must begin to put pressure on Iran if its human rights machinery is to retain credibility. Human rights pressure groups in Geneva have argued for some time that the Iranian government, by the employment of tribunals, is systematically violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Geneva Conventions.

The HERALD TRIBUNE report said that new regulations adopted by the Iranian revolutionary council to tighten up tribunal procedures had left glaring omissions, according to a report by the International Commission of Jurists. No right to confer in private with lawyers before or during the trial, inadequate time to prepare defence, and no right of appeal were all seen by the jurists as violations of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which Iran signed in 1975.

Sources close to the sub-commission said the most likely reason for the failure to condemn Iran was political. Only four members were at the supposedly five-man working group who checked the complaints, and Pirzada and the Russian were able to effectively influence the other two.

Leading Iranian opposition figure Shapour Bakhtiar last week sent a telegram to U.N. Secretary-general Kurt Waldheim protesting about the mass executions in Iran, emphasising how this must exercise world public opinion. Nothing could explain the silence of international bodies in failing to protest against the "floods of blood" in Iran at the present time and condemn the Khomeyni regime, he said.

Princess Ashref, sister of the late Shah, also echoed the sentiments of a majority of Iranians when she attacked human rights organisations over their silence on the slaughter.

In a WASHINGTON POST interview, also given prominence in the INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, she said, "I would like to know where are the human rights lawyers who in my brother's time were making such a fuss over a simple arrest or so-called infringements on freedom of the press and things like that. Where are they? Why are they keeping silent now? I would like to make an appeal to the world, the international community. Why do they remain silent? Where is Amnesty International now?"

The Western press has reported the killings of young people in Iran in recent weeks with virtually no comment. Radio and television news bulletins have frequently ignored the street violence and executions, even though a few sources have continued to provide information and the Tehran government announces its terrifying lists of executions daily.

Western women's organisations have also remained silent about the butchering of dozens of young girls. The Tehran government itself has confirmed many of these deaths, so the consistent excuse of pressmen and human rights bodies of lack of proof, which has so annoyed nationalists facing oppression all over the world in recent years, cannot be used.

Last week, for example, the Tehran daily ETTELAAT gave details of seven women executed for offences against the regime in one morning. The press in the Iranian capital reports other executions of young women almost daily.

CSO: 4600/50

EXECUTIONS OF CLERICS OPPOSED TO KHOMEYNI REPORTED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 1 Oct 81 p 3

[Text] While Ayatollah Khomeyni has remained silent over the past two weeks, his revolutionary authorities have been busy cracking down on independent-minded clergy. At least four clergymen have been executed by firing squads in Tehran and provincial towns. Three were identified as Mohsen Ashouri, Gholam Hossein Hojali and Mohammad Hafezi.

"There must be more than that," sources inside Iran said. "We are not able to verify all the clerics who are being shot by the regime because the revolutionary courts do not publish the names of all the victims who are executed."

Apparently the execution of clerics who do not belong to the Khomeyni camp has been triggered by criticism of the regime by Ayatollahs Shirazi, Zanjani and Qomi. One prominent theologian who is known to oppose the regime, Shaikh Ali Tehrani, is meanwhile missing. This theologian recently forbade his followers to use the title of Ayatollah for him, maintaining that "nowadays every gun slinger carries this meaningless and much abused title."

Recently Tehran radio broadcast a telegram allegedly from Ayatollah Shirazi to Khomeyni offering his condolences on the death of Khomeyni's son-in-law. However, sources in Tehran said that the Islamic Republic's propaganda wing is known for broadcasting fake messages from opposition leaders.

In November 1979, when Tabriz members of the Muslim People's Party had taken the city, the main radio and television network broadcast a message, which it alleged was from Ayatollah Shariatmadari, calling on people to obey Khomeyni. When it was pointed out that the message was faked, the authorities simply apologized but gave no explanation.

Anti-Khomeyni mullahs are protesting at the take-over of all the mosques and religious endowments by revolutionary authorities and "cynical politicisation of religion to achieve personal ends."

One popular theme often played up by independent mullahs is: "Khomeyni abused his religious status to achieve political power and is now using his political position to get religious power." These mullahs maintain that Khomeyni has never hesitated to lie, to cheat, to defame and to kill in pursuit of his political ambitions, and so has breached his vows, so to speak, as a religious leader.

In reply, the Khomeyni camp claim that Khomeyni's clerical opponents are "armchair mullahs who relish their cosy fief and lack commitment to the militancy of early Islam."

The clerical opponents of Khomeyni also have asked him to drop his claim to be the sole spokesman for Islam. They have dismissed as "heretical," Khomeyni's claim that if his regime was overthrown that would mark the end of Islam.

"Islam existed for 1,400 years before Khomeyni and will live on forever," Ali Tehrani has said. "Islam survived the martyrdom of its saints. Who is Khomeyni to link this great faith to his fragile, corrupt and tyrannical rule?"

CSO: 4600/50

BRIEFS

CASTRO ACCUSES U.S.--A spokesman for the Iranian delegation to the inter-parliamentary conference in Cuba told the Tehran daily ETTELAAT that Cuban leader Fidel Castro believed the assassinations and terror of the hyprocrites (Mojahedin) "the so-called leftists and liberals" in Iran, were precisely the intrigues of imperialist America. It was a plot for attacking the Islamic revolution by the CIA and the Great Satan, Castro had added. The spokesman went on, "It is interesting to note that the person who is the focus of leftist revolution in the world and is a great weight among the Marxist revolutionaries, should call these leftists groups, who are pretending to be in fact struggling against imperialism, elements of imperialism and the United States. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 10]

FARMERS ORDERED TO PLANT--Mohammad Salamati, the Minister of Agriculture, has warned all farmers and landowners whose property rights have been cleared, that if they refuse to cultivate their land the ministry will take it over and cultivate it themselves, the daily ETTELAAT said. The government was particularly anxious that farmers should plant their autumn crops and more facilities were being put at their disposal. "We hope that farmers will feel more responsible and will plant more," he said, adding that the final plans for an Islamic land reform were under way. Salamati also claimed that middlemen in the north of Iran had spread rumours that if rice growers did not sell their crops to the government they would not be allowed to harvest them. The government had stated that this was not so. But if the farmer did sell to the government the revolutionary institutions would then put the rice at the disposal of the public at a reduced price. The farmers' action in that case would be very revolutionary and would assist the oppressed and poor. It would also help inflation and repulse the middlemen and counter-revolutionaries. Ninety per cent of Mazandaran's rice had been harvested and the government had bought 20,000 tons so far. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 10]

NATEQ-NOURI REPORTED KILLED--Hojatoleslam Nateq-Nouri, representative and deputy for Ayatollah Khomeini on a number of revolutionary institutions, was killed and not merely injured as an official statement had said, by attackers last week, say a number of eye witnesses in the Iranian capital. Abol Ali Akbari, leader of the revolutionary guards in the town of Mir Javeh in Baluchestan, was assassinated in Firday mosque. The revolutionary guards chief of Khorramabad was among those listed as killed in the plane crash which killed a number of military chiefs last week. Sources in Ahvaz, the capital of Khuzestan, have told phone callers that the plane crashed near Ahvaz and not near Tehran, but there is no evidence other than that of local people that the story is true. Ahvaz has been bombarded daily by the Iraqis since they withdrew from Abadan, the informants in the city say. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 11]

RAJAI WIDOW ELECTED--Mrs. Rajai, widow of the last president, has been elected a member of the Majlis for Tehran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 11]

BALUCHISTAN BORDER PATROL--The border regions of Baluchestan are being patrolled by guards and helicopters which fly over even the three-mile no-man's land stretches to watch for escapees, latest arrivals in Pakistan from Iran by that escape route have been reported. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 11]

BANI-SADR ON ISLANDS--REUTERS reports that Bani-Sadr has told ROSE-EL-YOUSEF, a magazine published in Cairo, that if he should return to power in Iran, he would start negotiations with the Arab countries about the return of the Iranian islands of Greater and Smaller Tumb and Abu-Musa. The ETTELAAT newspaper commented: "It is not necessary to add that by Arabs Bani-Sadr does not mean Libya and Syria, rather, he means the allies of America like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for presently they have claimed the islands." [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 12]

OPPOSITION CRITICIZES UN--Iranian opposition groups have continued their criticisms of the United Nations and other rights bodies in the past week, singling out the failure of the UN's subcommission on rights to condemn Iran for its brutality while naming Venezuela, for example, for one isolated act of callousness which has not been cleared up satisfactorily. Former premier and leader of the National Reconciliation movement, Ali Amini, in a strongly-worded telegram to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, warned that the next Iranian regime may have to "revise its relations with the United Nations." [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 12]

CHARGE FOR RETURN OF EXECUTED--The Mojahedin-e-Khalq chief, Massoud Rajavi, claimed that families of his young supporters who have been executed are being forced to pay 10,000 rials ($125 at the official rate) for each bullet found in the body of their executed or shot sons. One family, he said, had paid the equivalent of $1,900 for the body of their young son. The alternative is that the bodies are not properly buried, he said. Rajavi also reported the hanging of two pregnant women, Shamsi Rahmati and Fatemeh Hossaini, in Evin prison. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 12]

BAKTIAR SCORES UN--Shahpour Bakhtiar, a regular critic of human rights bodies for their failure to try to restrain the Iranian regime, qualified the U.N. sub-commission's decision as a shame. While the Paris-based IRAN-E-AZAD newspaper asked, "How many Iranians must die for their killing to be condemned by U.N. standards?" [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 9 Oct 81 p 12]

CSO: 4600/66

PALESTINIAN ARABS SAID NOT ALL PLO SUPPORTERS

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 21 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Shrag'a Kadari: "The PLO, Israeli Arabs and Israel"]

[Text] The PLO and Arabs from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip form two distinct networks. Although they share a common goal, in reality they have opposing interests. When Israeli Arabs became a separate unit, their lives became separate as well.

In public statements and verbalized longings, there is a single national goal. But the Arabs whose daily lives are entrenched in Israel, those who stayed behind, do not physically, daily, live the "Palestinian revolution." They contribute only marginally to the revolution and its principles. They don't live the war as do their brothers across the border who are organized in terrorist groups. They don't share the sacrifices, nor do they share the same international position. Recognition is reserved for the PLO. Terrorist rings penetrate from the outside. Within Israel, the Arabs are mainly organized by outside agents. The general headquarters are external. Israeli Arabs do not boycott Israel as do the other Arab nations. Why doesn't the Israeli propaganda machine explain this to the world? Israeli Arabs work in Israel and trade with the Jewish populace. They need the services provided by Israel, not just those provided by the military regime. The high court of justice and the hospitals in Israel serve them well. But all the while, they are engaged in terrorism. The riots provoked by the youth are like child's play, imitations of riots in other countries, such as those instigated by the new left, led by Danny the Red several years ago in France. These are minor, however, compared with the conflagrations in England today. They don't reach the proportions of the Irish or Basque underground.

Lip service and taxes on terrorism

Israeli Arabs want to maintain, as much as possible, a stable existence in terms of economics, health and education. Remaining silent serves their purposes. Israel contributes to their advancement and financial betterment. They are building new homes, developing, learning, acquiring modern agricultural capability and a civilization. Their local authority is like the national command of a declared unity. But, they don't cross the borders. The schools and colleges, the coalitons and the students are all vanguards of agitation. Their daily lives need not be disrupted. If not for the PLO, Israel and the Israeli Arabs could lead orderly lives together. Their actions say: "The PLO will fight for us and we will be silent." We will pay lip service and we will pay for terrorism with careful organization, by leading

a terrorist charge, by isolated incidents of murder, by organized murder near Hadassah in Hebron, by attacking a bus or planting explosives in one. College and high school students go abroad to study in universities in Arab countries. They don't enlist in large numbers in terrorist organizations. Only a minority are terrorists. This is no way to run a "Palestinian revolution." The conclusion: It would be desirable for the Arabs within Israel's borders to come to an agreement with Israel, but they fear external forces such as the PLO and the Arab nations. Russia and western Europe also oppose an agreement because they would loss their important position as guardians of the Palestinian people. These patrons from abroad complicate the issue, create false hopes and work against the best interests of the Israeli Arabs. If they were independent, they would seek out an agreement. Since they settled in Israel they have not led an independent existence, neither in peace nor in war. They did not defeat the Crusaders on their own. Nor was it the Palestinaians who built the mosques on the Jewish Temple Mount or at the Cave of Machpelah. Nor did they build the wall around Jerusalem. The Arabs of Israel were never an independent force. They were always under foreign rule. The PLO is slowly taking on the appearance of an outside ruler, even insofar as terrorist acts against their Arab brothers in Israel who have strayed from the terrorist way. But the PLO cannot prevent them from cooperating with the "foreign occupying forces." The PLO is like King Husayn, exhausted as a leader, despite the fact that many of the Arabs at least partially adhere to his policy and retain Jordanian citizenship.

Their feeling are ambivalent. They are drawn toward independence, but they are used to living in a protectorate. Both feelings--one conscious, one subconscious--are prevalent. As previously mentioned, they have no memory of an independent existence, no sovereign roots to long for, no lost hopes for Palestinian grandeur. They have not great past to revive. They have no past. They are a new creation. Many of them came from neighboring countries, from far and near. When the Zionist movement began, the country was torn apart. The Palestinians became a target for hatred. Some slept on the sidewalks because they were homeless. The PLO prevents them from participating in discussions on autonomy. Perhaps they will see independence, however limited. Until the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate for Palestine, designed to aid in the establishment of a Jewish national home, they saw themselves as part of southern Syria, and never dreamed of a Palestinian entity. Zionism was responsible for that. The Jews and those who refuse them autonomy because autonomy would be a direct path to a Palestinian state, stimulated these second toughts. Perhaps...? Would it be worth it? But fear, from within and from external forces, paralyzes their self-awareness and confuses them. In other words, their opposition to a Palestinian state as part of Israel, along side a Jewish state, stems partially from blanket acceptance but also from th fear of what existence will be like as an independent political entity.

Perpetual transition

The establishment of a Palestinian state in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip is a complex arrangement. It would not mean an independent existence. Without continuous economic support there could be no day to day existence. The people could not support themselves. The tens of thousands of workers in Israel would be forced to emigrate--into chaos. The formation of such a state would result in great suffering to the people, perhaps a civil war provoked by the PLO in its desire to control the state and to punish the silence of the people. This silent people is therefore

content to remain subdued, to steadfastly refuse a solution. Perpetual transition is to their own benefit. Over the years, Israeli governments have seen the wandering eyes and the restless glances but not the psychological complications of national proportions. Living in a protectorate is traumatic but independence means the threat of nonexistence. To the Israeli government the external order is decisive. The Arabs were a protectorate during Turkish rule, during the Mandate and during Jordanian sovereignty. The Alignment would treat them like captives and return them to Jordan under the "Jordanian option," without even asking them. The Likud, on the other hand, would double the Protectorate, turning them over to Egypt and Jordan through talks at Camp David, allowing these two countries to determine the terms for Palestinian autonomy. Jordan refuses, which pleases Egypt who can now be their sole patron. In so doing, Israel committed a fatal political and moral blunder. The new government must go back on its plan to bring Egypt into the talks, for Egypt has no power to speak for the Israeli Arabs. Arabs from the Gaza Strip do not have fond memories of their days under the Egyptian government, which was even worse than Jordanian rule. Egypt does not seek to further the best interests of the Palestinians, but rather to prove that despite the peace agreement with Israel, Egypt is still the leader of the Arab world. Discussions of autonomy cannot hinge on Egyptian interests nor on the interests of Israel and the Israeli Arabs. Moreover, Sadat intends to press for PLO participation in the talks.

He would also like to create a rift between Israel and the United States and to upstage the former. He wants to reduce Israel's importance, to undermine Israel's position in the American government, Congress and American public opinion. Indeed, he would like to do the same in Europe. He is violating the spirit of peace and the orientation toward peace. He is neither fair nor honest and therefore undeserving of a place in the joint negotiations for autonomy. Sadat is exploiting Israel's fears and obsessions with peace. And he is not worried about any harm that might result. As far as Israel's future and security, Israel has declared: The time has come for courage and truth in our relations with Egypt.

A new Arab nation, jealous of its brothers in the greater Arab world, will not move Israel from its course toward total liberation. Their brothers have many nations. They will have a nation, too. They had one but they were enslaved. They did not rise immediately to create new leadership, but they learned from world liberation movements. World War I was an opportunity to gain independence through the European powers--Britain, France and the United States. The Arabs of Israel who asked to be freed from the Turkish yoke and to be part of southern Syria, part of the great Syrian nation, did an aboutface with the Balfour Declaration. The Jewish national home awakened in them the desire to have Israel for themselve. The Palestinian movement and revolution sprang from Zionism and the State of Israel. If not for Israel, the Israeli Arabs would be an inseparable part of the Arab people, without an independent existence. After all, they have no distinguishing features.

The lack of Palestinian unity is not just rhetoric. It is expressed in the creation of a nationalist movement with no unity. The Palestinian existence created the PLO. This is its only creation--a terrorist movement with international terrorist connections. Terrorism is the national expression of the Palestinians. Terrorism is an existence, a means toward an end--war against the enemy. Can terrorism win where all the Arab nations have failed in their wars? The Arabs of Judea, Samaria snd the Gaza Strip say that the PLO represents them, that as a unit they are neither ready nor able to perpetrate terrorism, daily, against the masses on a national

scale. The PLO represents them. It would cost them their lives if they denied it. They accept PLO representation because it is a nebulous, noncommittal situation. If a Palestinian state were to be formed, it is doubtful that they would accept the PLO and its leaders as their government.

Destruction as a national mission

In reality, the PLO only represents Arabs outside of Israel's borders. Their problems need to be solved. In Israel's opinion the solution is assimilation with the people of the countries where they reside. They are one people. Yet, the PLO and the Arab counties call for the destruction of Israel and the establishment in its stead of an Arab nation. Destruction is their national mission. Barring destruction, there is always terrorism and murder. Terrorism is not just a weapon for liberation, but also a way of life, a goal in and of itself. It yields benefits that no orderly country can achieve. Terrorism and destruction are like their national flag. The Palestinians do not have a flag of creation, not in Israel and not in any of the Arab nations where they reside. Everywhere they've settled, the Jews have created their own special culture. They take it with them. It is an expression of their unity. This is not true of the Arabs in Palestine. There is no Palestinian culture, despite what they have learned from Zionism. They were the majority in the land and still could not prevent, even using violence and corruption, the spread of the Hebrew settlement and the formation of the State of Israel. Surely this is a sign that assimilation with their Arab brothers, which is not to say religious, cultural or nationalistic conversion, was the solution they chose when they fled from Israel during the war for independence, encouraged by the countries where they now reside. Israel declared a readiness to help resettle them in their new countries. There is no other solution. Autonomy is for those who remained, not those who fled.

The world is aware of this. Those who preach for a Palestinian state know that here is neither room nor justification for its existence. The Arab countries fight with and aid the PLO because they too want todestroy Israel. Since it is not in their power to destroy Israel through war, they are pressuring the world powers to do it for them, politically, militarily and economically. The PLO has taken it upon itself to incite other nations through terrorism, particularly through the terrorism inflicted on the Arab oil countries.

The "Palestinian revolution" has an internal logic and a political one. The internal logic would claim that the Palestinian revolution is destroying the protectorate to create an entity that had no prior existence, to demand a nation of their own. The political logic claims that Israel is on the verge of solidifying its political goals and should therefore be destroyed. No compromise is possible. The existence of the ancient kingdom of Israel, its special culture, the right of return, the actual return and the creation of a strong new state, stand in the way of a new Palestinian existence. Terrorism and wars could not destroy this. Since the war of independence the IDF has defeated all its enemies. Unfortunately, that which was gained through great military resourcefulness has been lost due to the weakness of politicians who have capitulated to the friendly power, the United States. This has been true from the days of Truman to the current Reagan administration, as well as during the terms of Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford and Carter. There is no balance in Israel between politics and defense. Israel should not have retreated from Qunaytirah unless all Jews were allowed to leaveSyria. Israel should not have signed the peace agreement with Egypt unless Jerusalem was recognized as the capital of Israel.

The differences between Zionism (the liberation movement of the people of Israel) and the PLO (the liberation movement of the Palestinians) will not be eliminated by a cease fire in southern Lebanon or through diplomacy. The state demands and requires peace for the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and th Gaza Strip, to be distinguished from the PLO terrorist movement. But the Israeli Arabs also become involved in terrorism and this, too, must be dealt with.

A balance against injustice

The PLO is a minority within the Arab Palestinian population, in Israel and elsewhere. The silent majority is not the PLO. The PLO was only able to recruit 30,000 people to serve in its army. One might assume that not only nationalism contributes to enlistment, but the attraction of terrorism, the romanticism, the adventure sought by the youth. This force is not enough to defeat Israel. The non-enlistment of hundreds of thousands of people proves that the "Palestinian revolution" is not as attractive a force as some would like to think it is, nor does it represent the people. The Palestinians living in Jordan, for example, live in peace and cooperate with the Hashemite rulers. On the other hand, those living in the oil countries must worry constantly about their jobs and their means of support. This leads us to ask why the world rallied so strongly behind the PLO. Perhaps it was to balance the injustice that the civilized world perpetrated against the Palestinians by creating the State of Israel in moments of benevolence--at the end of World War I and again, at the end of World War II. In both world wars, depressed peoples achieved independence. The Arabs gained the most from these moments of kindness. The Palestinians, lacking an identity, gained nothing. We saw an end to the importance of the Jewish people and to the 2000 years of injustices against them, which came to a head with the Holocaust. This was a historical turning point insofar as the relationship of the world toward the Jewish people, once and forever, as well as during the Holocaust itself.

Now the world has come full circle, back to its traditional relationship with the Jews as expressed in non-recognition of Israel by the Vatican. Christianity has not come to terms with the establishment of the State, which is opposed to Christian doctrines. Arab oil and "Christian charity" toward the Palestinians cover up the complex and compound truth of the matter. Giscard d'Estaing, the former French president, prophesied that Israel would disappear within 8 or 9 years. This was the expression of a heartfelt desire and in this he is not alone. The Arabs nuture a similar hope, imersed in oil and deposits. Israel was established with the agreement and assistance of eastern and western Europe. Now these countries feel that Israel must obey them and support their interests. The establishment of a Palestinian state would further their objectives but would cause irreparable harm to Israel.

In this light, the war against the PLO is not superficial. It is deep and fundamental. It is an ideological war against a two-faced, enlightened, backward world and against the Arab nations, who are divided among themselves. The war on the PLO is not just a war against missiles or terrorism, but against the ideological principle with terrorism at its roots.

The withdrawal of the enlightened world is so complete that the PLO has risen to the status of a world terrorist power, to the point of allowing 'Arafat, armed with a gun, to appear on the platform of the annual UN assembly, as a symbol of terrorism and international support for the PLO's ideas. But it was not just terrorism that

helped him rise to this unequaled international position. He is perceived worldwide as the man who will satisfy their unspoken desires. Even neutral Switzerland, who would not aid the Jews fleeing from Hitler, has now shown her face again by allowing the Minister of Foreign Affairs to receive Faruq Qadumi. This is blatant anti-semitism, or perhaps a symoblic reversal from having hosted the first Zionist Congress at which the foundations of the State of Israel were laid according to Hertzel's prophecy.

From desire to fulfillment

Is the PLO in fact interested in the immediate realization of the "Palestinian revolution," in the take-over of Israel? Do they wholeheartedly desire this? It is highly doubtful that they are actually eager to achieve this goal, and not just due to their own inability to do so. As long as the PLO is fighting for the realization of a vision, it is worthy of esteem. Once the state is established, this distinction will cease to exist. The state will be inferior even compared with the other small Arab nations. Disputes within will cause terrible wars like those in Lebanon, both without the magic and wizardry of Lebanese banking, without Christian tradition, witout Lebanese solidarity, still symbolized by the cedars of fame. The symbols of Palestine will be a bandolier and 'Arafat's beard and sunglasses.

We must admit that the PLO is spreading and gaining political territory. Even the veto of the "F-16" was indirectly related to the PLO. The U.S. secretary of state began to entertain the hope that the PLO would recognize Israel, thinking that now it would be easier for them to do so. The spread of the PLO is the fault of Israel's policy which, under pressure from the opposition, has gone from bad to worse. The "Peace Now" movement was an important factor in the consessions Israel made at Camp David, a tragedy for the nation and its future. As it turns out, the movement was ephemeral. It passed away and disappeared into the horizon. Its strength was in the demonstrations it held in the nation's squares and on its streets. But nothing could help it survive in the long run. The government should be as strong politically as it has been militarily. In order to get the PLO down from its high horse, Israel must establish an office of propaganda. Other governments have failed in this regard. But a ministry of propaganda is essential. Past mistakes should not be repeated. A country so bombarded by worldwide communication must strike back with a concentrated force.

9811
CSO: 4323/71

CIVILIAN WEST BANK ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Sep 81 p 23

[Article by Yosef Tzuri'el: "The School Year in the Territories; Israeli Financing and a Jordanian Curriculum"]

[Text] Since July 1967, the educational system in the territories has come a long way-- in primary schools, high schools, teachers' institutes and colleges in Bir-Zayt, Nablus, Bethlehem and Hebron.

In Israel, the prevailing assumption is that in education as in agriculture, keeping "good deeds" separate from politics will yield positive results. Immediately upon the establishment of a military government in the territories, action was taken to improve the educational system. A hasty survey conducted at the beginning of the first academic year under Israeli rule showed that there were 136,821 registered students, 710 schools, 4,240 classrooms and 5,376 teachers.

These data include around two-thirds of the school age population in the territories.

Fourteen years after the Six-Day War, 277,739 students are participating in the educational system on the West Bank. Around 80 percent of them are in government schools. The rest study within the framework of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration or in private schools.

The percentage of students increased 98.6 percent during this period. The number of schools increased 33.9 percent, classrooms by 80 percent and teachers by 72.5 percent. Compared with last year, there was a 4.5 percent increase in the number of students, a 0.8 percent increase in the number of schools, a 4.1 percent increase in classrooms and a 7.1 percent increase in the number of teachers.

Sixty-three nursery schools were opened in the territories, with 8,265 students. This is an educational innovation. During Jordanian rule there were none.

Vocational demand

Demand is the key in vocational education. Over the past few years, new frameworks have been developed for training in the fields of electronics, mechanics, carpentry, technical drawing, plumbing, locksmithy and construction. The most important schools are in Nablus, Dayr Dibnan, Tulkarm and Hebron.

Only one percent of the youth on the West Bank are studying in vocational schools. But there is a new awakening in this area, too, and the reasons have nothing to do with the needs of the region. One reason is the demand for masters of certain trades in Israel. Otherwise, the oil kingdoms draw youths who have specialized in one of these fields.

Most of the budget, which amounts to a quarters of the civil expenditures by the Israeli government, is spent on primary and secondary education. For reasons related to international law, Israel acts as if His Excellency King Husayn still controlled the West Bank. If on the eve of the Six-Day War education was free to all who came, then the military government has continued the same policy. But, they are also working methodically toward providing each child in the territories with at least a basic education. The Jordanian government at the time provided school suppplies which it deemed essential--free. The Israeli government has followed suit. More than 1.2 million books on 98 subjects, among them 8 new texts, were printed this year, all based on the Jordanian curriculum. Toward this end, 8.2 billion shekels were spent. Supplies and equipment valued at 4 million shekels were also purchased for the schools.

The quality of education, from primary schools on up, is a concern of the militay government. Every year, additional training courses are offered to hundreds of teachers, in their own localities and in Israel. Courses are conducted in the natural sciences, social sciences, teaching methods and pysical education.

This year, to vary and enrich the program in Arab schools in Judea and Samaria, training was provided in fine arts and industrial arts at the Israel Museum.

Investment and apathy

Do parents in the territories appreciate the investment in their children? Are the teachers aware of the good intentions of the military government? What do the students think about the program which is constantly in the process of being improved and changed? According to test administered annually by the military government in the framework of parent-teacher and student meetings, the answers are not encouraging. In fact, they are exasperating.

They say in the territories that everything Israel is doing now or might do in the future is designed to strengthen her position in the region.

Fourteen years ago, even 10 years ago, hope prevailed within the military regime. They hoped that what they were doing for the citizens fo the West Bank was a long term investment of sorts.

Today, 528 million shekels ar budgeted for education in the territories alone. But this work is being accomplished in an atmosphere of antagonism, or apathy at best.

9811
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INQUIRY INTO STOCK MARKET FRAUD UNDERWAY

London 8 DAYS in English No 38, 26 Sep 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Annie King-Underwood: "Kuwaiti Shares 'Fraud'"]

[Text]

THE KUWAITI minister of the interior, Sheikh Nawaf al Ahmad, is now personally directing urgent investigations into allegations of a $9m stock market fraud — the first ever to come before Kuwaiti courts. An unnamed Jordanian was arrested two weeks ago, charged with forging records of an investment company and selling fake shares on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange.

The Kuwaiti daily newspaper *Al Siyassah* has since named the arrested man as Fouad Abou Jamous, and the London-based Arabic-language daily *Asharq al Awsat* has identified the company as the Ajman Group, one of only two Gulf companies listed so far on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange.

Stock exchange circles believe that the reason why the minister himself has taken such a close interest in the case is because the accused has alleged that very prominent Kuwaiti businessmen as well as former ministers and members of parliament are involved in the alleged fraud. A Ministry of the Interior spokesman said: 'We are continuing our inquiries and looking into the allegations the accused has made.'

What has come as a surprise to stock dealers is that the market has not been affected greatly. During the last two weeks, since the stock case became known, the market's turnover has remained at its average level for this time of year. But as the ministry has warned businessmen to make close checks on the identity of the people they are dealing with, it has become more difficult to make quick transactions.

As this is the first time such a fraud has been alleged on the Kuwaiti stock market, the authorities as well as stockbrokers have shown great reluctance in publicising the case. 'It will harm everybody,' said one stockbroker. The anxiety among Kuwaiti businessmen is understandable, considering the stringent regulations imposed upon companies who wish to be quoted on the stock exchange. Companies' issued capital should not be less than Kuwaiti Dinars 5m ($17m); each company should have been in existence for at least five years and have been profitable for the last two; existing shareholders must retain at least 40 per cent of the equity for a year after the company has gone public and quoted on the market; all the shareholders in such companies must be Kuwaiti; and the number of shares offered must not be more than 75 per cent of the existing capital.

The Ajman Group was the second Gulf company to be admitted on the Kuwait Stock Exchange since the embargo on fore-

ign companies was lifted last August. The first was the Gulf Agricultural Company. Stockbrokers in Kuwait and in London were unable to predict the likely effect of the case on the prospects of other Gulf companies who wish to be listed on the Kuwait Stock Exchange. As one stockbroker explained, Gulf companies greatly value the Kuwaiti seal of approval which listing implies, and the Kuwaitis try to ensure that any company listed on their stock exchange remains viable. They are ready to help out at the first sign of trouble, as they did in 1977 when a great number of shares were being sold and the central authorities had to intervene and buy shares at the lowest possible price in order to save the stock exchange from collapsing.

Due to the sharp decline in the total turnover, which amounted to KD1.3bn (about $4.5bn) in 1980, on the Kuwait Stock Exchange, measures were announced to allow private or 'closed' companies to go public in order to increase the volume of trading. The 29 per cent decline over the 1979 figures forced the Ministry of Commerce to open up the very tight doors of the stock exchange to a much wider range of companies. The other reason why the Ministry of Commerce took such a step is because a number of prominent Kuwaiti merchants decided to take advantage of the offshore companies' facility offered by Bahrain.

So far this relaxation in allowing more companies to go public has not had a very tangible effect on the market's turnover. 'The ministry has given with one hand and taken with the other, because the conditions to allow a company to go public are so strict that only a handful of companies can fulfil the conditions,' said one stockbroker.

CSO: 4400/15

ECONOMY GROWING MORE DEPENDENT ON OIL SECTOR

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 pp 3-4

[Text]

Although Oman recorded a budget surplus last year for the first time since 1977, government spending rose faster than revenues during 1980. According to figures released by the Central Bank of Oman on economic performance last year, revenues grew by 27 per cent over 1979 to reach Omani Rials 958.8 million ($2,773.5 million), while expenditure rose by 42.2 per cent in the same period, totalling OR 925 million ($2,675.7 million).

Both these levels of income and expenditure were lower than projected by the budget plan for 1980, which had set out revenues of OR 993 million ($2,871.7 million) and outlays of OR 971 million ($2,808.1 million), with a resulting surplus of OR 22 million ($63.6 million). The latter figure was actually exceeded, reaching OR 33.8 million, according to the Central Bank report.

Oil receipts increased by OR 196.5 million ($568.3 million) last year to total OR 831.6 million ($2,405.5 million). The Central Bank figures do not make it clear whether this amount was actually allocated to the budget from the oil sector – and which had been planned at OR 800 million – or whether it was the total revenue from oil, including the 15 per cent set aside for the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF). According to the budget projections, oil revenues were supposed to reach OR 941 million ($2,721.4 million) last year; if the figure provided by the Central Bank is a grand total without deduction for the SGRF, then actual income fell far short of projections.

The Central Bank report shows that the volume of Omani oil exports witnessed a 5.6 per cent drop last year. Exports in 1979 averaged 294,500 b/d, and thus last year's foreign sales would have been around 278,000 b/d. This drop was more than compensated for by an average rise of 84.4 per cent in the price of Omani oil between early 1979 and the end of 1980. From $28.20 per barrel in December 1979, the price of Oman's 35.5° API crude rose to $41 in January 1980, going back to $35.3 per barrel in the second quarter and up again to $36.5 per barrel in the third quarter. By the end of 1980, Oman was obtaining around $38.5 per barrel.

That price has fallen steadily since the beginning of the current year, and was again reduced last week to $34 per barrel, for October to December liftings by Oman's main customer, Japan. As this newsletter reported in its July 27 issue, Oman cut its price to $37.50 per barrel on its second quarter sales, and to at least $36.50 for third quarter exports. Even then, Japanese companies lifting the major part of Oman's oil (accounting for 63.8 per cent of all Omani exports in 1979) were refusing to pay the price, and the Omani authorites had to slash their price further to $35.50 per barrel. Though not a member of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Oman aligns its prices on those charged by OPEC producers, and as such is signalling along with Kuwait (see page 9) the degree of pressure the oil glut is now putting on Middle Eastern producers, who have so far resisted official price reductions.

Although actual spending of OR 925 million last year was below budgeted levels, it constitued a marked rise over the 1979 level of OR 650.4 million ($1,881.4 million). Factors contributing to this increase included a 10 per cent rise in civil servants' salaries, the payment of a housing allowance to all government employees, increased welfare payments and the establishment of new health, education and public services facilities and utilities.

Macro-economic data released by the Central Bank show that Gross Domestic Product last year rose by 53 per cent to OR 1,794.3 million ($5,190.3 million) from the 1979 level of OR 1,174 ($3,395.2 million). The contribution of the oil sector to GDP went from 61.5 per cent of total in 1979 to 69.2 per cent in 1980, an indication of the country's growing dependence on oil. Consumer prices were estimated to have increased by around 10 per cent last year, compared to around 9 per cent the previous year, while the cost of construction industry materials rose by around 13.8 per cent in 1980, up from 5 per cent in 1979.

Oman's balance of payments position improved in 1980, the Central Bank reported. It cited a current account surplus of OR 362 million ($1,049.5 million), just over four times the OR 90 million ($260.3 million) achieved last year.

CSO: 4400/16

INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER OF FINANCE REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 pp 6-7

[Interview with Finance Minister Sheikh Mohamed Aba al-Khail by Randa Takieddine, in Washington, D.C., week of 28 September]

[Text]

Saudi Arabia's Finance Minister Sheikh Mohamed Aba al Khail's long experience of international finance bestows considerable weight on his words during the annual joint meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In an interview last week in Washington, where he was leading the Kingdom's delegation to this year's get-together of international bankers and finance ministers, Sheikh Mohamed gave *An-Nahar Arab Report & Memo*'s Randa Takieddine some telling insights into his country's role inside the World Bank and the IMF. He welcomed President Reagan's emphasis on the importance of private enterprise in international development, but there was one important *caveat*: Saudi Arabia wants private development to supplement foreign aid to poor countries, not to replace this aid. Sheikh Mohamed also pointed to the negative aspects of high interest rates in the US on private investment in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.

The interview follows:

Q: Could you please state Saudi Arabia's position on a number of the issues that are being debated at the IMF and World Bank meeting, notably the new allocation of Special Drawing Rights which was opposed by the US, the American request for stricter IMF loan conditions and the emphasis by the US and other industrialised countries on having the private sector provide developing countries with assistance? Do you think there will be a tendency in the Western world to reduce aid to developing countries?

A: Concerning the new allocation of Special Drawing Rights, the Saudi Kingdom has tried to mediate between the two extreme positions – between those countries which are for a new allocation of SDRs and a renewal of the allocation and those who oppose it. We got in touch with both groups and, among the proposals, was one to renew the allocation of SDRs for one year in order to settle the conflict. But it was impossible to reach a consensus because some countries are opposed to increasing the number of SDRs, arguing that this would lead to an increase in international liquidities and contribute to an increase in inflation. The matter was referred to the Executive Board of Governors, which will discuss it.

As for the principle of conditionality on loans for the developing world, this seems to be a part of the global policy of the US and the Western countries. This was made clear in President Reagan's speech and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan will probably be more explicit today. The US wants to encourage the private sector to help in the development of countries and these should adjust and improve their internal structures. This is indeed very good. We in Saudi Arabia believe strongly in the principle of a free economy provided that what is meant here is that private sector participation is additional to aid given by industrialised countries to the developing countries. This would enhance development efforts and would be positive.

If, however, encouragement of private sector participation in development efforts means replacing or reducing the aid from industrial countries, we do not think that it is an equitable way or a transfer of real resources from rich countries to developing ones.

There are here two issues to consider. One is that many developing countries have a very weak private sector and sometimes it is virtually non-existent and it is impossible to have development if there is no

infrastructure. Secondly, infrastructure cannot be improved and developed without help from the developed countries. So this new element — the private sector's role which the US and other industrial countries want to see in development — should not mean a reduction in aid. But if it is additional to it, it is not bad.

Anyway, this is just a beginning. More contacts will take place in coming months on this issue, starting at the summit meeting in Cancun (on the Brandt Commission report) and then in global negotiations at the UN. We hope that the picture will change. The world has become so interdependent and it is difficult for any country — big or small — to neglect or ignore what happens in other countries.

Q: What is Saudi Arabia's position on high interest rates in the US?
A: We are being hurt to some extent by these high interest rates in the US because they affect the activities of the private sector in Saudi Arabia, reducing investments there and because the high rates reflect on all free currencies, including the Rial. The aim of the Saudi government is to strengthen the private sector and encourage it to play a bigger role in the national economy and high interest rates are an obstacle to the policy of strengthening the private sector.

Q: But isn't it true that the rates have had a positive effect on your investments abroad and surplus funds?
A: Yes, it is profitable for our investments abroad. But it will also doubtless affect private sector activities in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf because many persons in the private sector will be tempted to seek larger profits through deposits in the money market rather than go into investments which need to be managed. So the rates are profitable for depositors, be they individuals or the private sector, but high interest rates certainly have a negative effect on the big efforts that are being made to stimulate private sector activities in investment in development of resources and of resources other than oil.

Q: France's economy has and is still suffering from high interest rates and the strong dollar. It has been reported that President Mitterrand would ask Saudi Arabia to place money in France to back up the French franc. It was also said that he would ask you for payments facilities on the oil France buys from you such as accepting to be paid in francs rather than in dollars. Can you confirm these reports or comment on them?
A: President Mitterrand's visit to Saudi Arabia was political in character.

Q: But surely you cannot dissociate politics from economic relations between the two countries?
A: Saudi Arabia has never in the past sold its oil in other than the official ways and never gave any country or any company special facilities for its oil sales.

Q: There is a debate going on in the US on a return to the gold standard. What would be Saudi Arabia's stand on this?
A: Developments on this issue have not yet reached the stage which requires us to take an official position. The debate is still on in the special Gold Committee in the US. But I do not think a return to the gold standard would be feasible. I do not think it would be possible to implement it.

Q: You had a meeting recently in Kuwait with Gulf finance ministers to discuss what has been called the "development pact." Could you elaborate on this and explain the pact's aim?
A: As you know, the idea of the pact is to reduce the existing gap between levels of development in Arab countries. There are big differences in these levels and they should be reduced because the Arab nation is one geographical and cultural entity. We have a lot in common and those countries which are more developed have to do something to help those which are less developed. The development pact is only the start of this joint effort. The fund allocated for this development commitment by Arab heads of state is $5 billion for five years, subject to increase in the future, and five Arab countries are participating in this financing. It would involve many joint projects. Some of them are prepared with the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development and some with the Economic Committee of the Arab League.

This development programme has been adopted by the ministers of the five Arab countries and, of course, Arab development institutions will participate in some financing of projects. The official UN list of 31 least developed countries includes six Arab countries and the development pact is devoted specifically to these six Arab states.

Q: The big issue before the US Congress is whether Saudi Arabia will get AWACS planes. Opposition seems to

be strong. What will happen if Congress decides that you cannot have them and what will be the effect on Saudi policy towards the US, especially on economic policy?
A: It will definitely be a bad thing if we do not get these AWACS planes. But we in the Kingdom trust the American government and the American people and we are confident they will make a good decision. But if this does not happen, it will provide once again an example among many others of the influence of the Israeli lobby on American decision-making.

Q: Has the issue of whether the PLO is to be invited to attend the IMF meetings as an observer been resolved? What is tne importance of such an issue? Has an observer any role to play?
A: The issue will not be decided this time. We hope it will be resolved. And of course it is important because it would be of great moral significance towards recognition of the Palestinian resistance.

Q: Do you expect oil prices to stabilise on the level of the Saudi oil price or do you expect an increase in the price of oil?
A: It is too early for speculation about this or to speak of expectations.

CSO: 4400/16

BRIEFS

NUMAYRI ON ARAB SADAT CONDOLENCES--Cairo-12 Oct (AFP)--President Ja'far Numayri of Sudan revealed Monday that Arab leaders had secretly contacted Husni Mubarak to convey their condolences over the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. Mr Numayri, in an interview with the Cario daily AL-AKHBAR, said the Arab leaders had asked Mr Mubarak, Egypt's president-designate, not to announce that they had made such contacts. The only Arab nations to send representatives to Mr al-Sadat's funeral on Saturday were Somalia, Sudan and Oman. Other Arab nations stayed away in protest against Mr al-Sadat's moves to achieve peace with Israel. Mr Numayri said he found the attitude of those leaders who conveyed their condolences secretly to be deplorable, and "contrary to Islam and the true Arab nature." "They should be ashamed," he added. "Even a country that has bad relations with Egypt, like Ethiopia, presented its condolences officially." [Text] [NC120004 Paris AFP in English 2321 GMT 11 Oct 81]

NUMAYRI INTERVIEWED BY 'AL-AHRAM'--Cairo, 11 Oct (AFP)--Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri appealed to the United States in a newspaper interview tonight to counter "Soviet aims in Africa." He told the Cario daily AL-AHRAM the Americans could "play a big role in Africa and the Arab world by containing the tide and offensive of a superpower having many aims...." President Numayri said his own experience showed that "the United States never meddles in domestic affairs of other countries. On the contrary, they aid us economically." By contrast, "the Soviet Union is the leading colonial power in the world," he said. "Countries like Libya are entirely in their hands and bombard Sudan daily, even on holidays. "Their objective is first Sudan, but afterward Saudi Arabia and Africa. Al-Qadhdhafi is spending Arab money for those goals." [Text] [NC112230 Paris AFP in English 2221 GMT 11 Oct 81]

NUMAYRI EULOGIZES AL-SADAT--Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri tonight addressed a message over the [Egyptian] television to the Egyptian people in which he eulogized President Anwar al-Sadat and reflected the feelings of the sons of Sudan toward the tremendous tragedy represented in the loss of the departed leader. In his message, the Sudanese president said that he did not come to convey his condolences or sympathies, because he was also wounded and he was a partner in the tragedy. He pointed out that God has willed that the hero should fall on the day of his glory to become immortal for what he achieved when alive and for which he fell a martyr and in order that victorious Egypt could become the Egypt of unity and cohesion. The Sudanese president explained that the unity of the Nile valley between Egypt and Sudan was represented in Anwar al-Sadat's sacrifices and blood and that he was proud of being a Sudanese in Egypt as much as being an Egyptian in Sudan. [Text] [NC092353 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 9 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/31

GASOLINE SELF-SUFFICIENCY REACHED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 pp 4-5

[Text]

The UAE has reached self-sufficiency in production of gasolene thanks to a rapid build-up in output from the new refinery at Ruwais, the UAE's official *WAM* news agency reported last week. The report said gasolene imports, which had been running at more than 115,000 b/d, have been suspended because the Ruwais refinery was now operating at close to its designed capacity of 120,000 b/d.

The breakthrough to self-sufficiency has a political significance far greater than would appear at first sight. In February 1980, there were demonstrations in two of the Emirates over the high cost of imported gasolene, with students demanding action against British Petroleum, Shell and Caltex because they had raised prices. The foreign firms were then responsible for distributing refined products in all of the Emirates except Abu Dhabi, where the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) distributes gasolene from its Umm al-Nar refinery, which produces about 15,000 b/d of gasolene. The need to import gasolene, mainly from Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, meant that drivers in the northern Emirates were being asked to pay higher prices than in Abu Dhabi; the UAE government responded by allocating Dirhams 450 million ($120 million) in subsidies in 1980 to create a unified pricing system in line with Abu Dhabi prices. In addition, the Emirates' General Petroleum Company (EGPC) was set up to replace the foreign distributors (see *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 18 and 25, March 3, and November 10, and December 29, 1980). BP is managing the EGPC.

Self-sufficiency thus removes two small but potentially important elements which could have contributed to disunity in the UAE: resentment in the northern Emirates over the privileged position which the Umm al-Nar refinery gave to Abu Dhabi and, contrariwise, the need to subsidise gasolene prices in the northern Emirates out of the UAE's exchequer, using money that could have been invested elsewhere.

The *WAM* report said output from Ruwais was being shipped by tankers to storage depots at Abu Dhabi, Jebel Ali, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. Filling stations close to the refinery are being supplied by road. ADNOC and EGPC have agreed to colour-code products for reasons of safety and quality control, the report said. Super grade gasolene is to be red, ordinary grade gasolene green and diesel gas oil will be pale yellow.

WAM noted that the UAE would become an exporter of refined products by 1984, when the Ruwais refinery reaches its full planned capacity of 300,000 b/d.

CSO: 4400/16

TRAIN TO LINK ABU DHABI WITH ITS AIRPORT PLANNED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 pp 5,6

[Text]

An expert study for a proposed high-speed 35-kilometre rail link between the city of Abu Dhabi and its international airport has been completed, Dubai's English-language daily *Khaleej Times* reported last week. The planned railway would be built on concrete pillars 15 feet above the ground and trains travelling at 250 kilometres an hour would deliver passengers from the airport to the centre of the city in less than 20 minutes. The rail link is being promoted by the Al-Dhanna Oilfields Services and Trading Company (DOSCO).

The study was undertaken by Reg Gregory, a senior consultant for Transmark, a subsidiary of British Rail. Transmark is also engaged in studies for a rail network in Saudi Arabia. No estimate for the cost of the Abu Dhabi rail project was given, but DOSCO's General Manager, Peter Missen, said early studies indicated it could be built for little more than the cost of a road between the city and the airport but would provide quicker and safer service.

Originally, a monorail was proposed. The idea has now been dropped in favour of a conventional railway. The reason, according to the Transmark study, is that the system "will aim at attracting the majority of air travellers, (and so) it must be reliable. It is therefore important that the selection of technology, while providing advanced performance, will not burden Abu Dhabi with untried equipment or a legacy of difficult maintenance."

The railway would be built on pillars in order to avoid obstructing existing routes and to prevent accidents that could be caused by drifting sands or animals straying on the track. Terminals would be air conditioned and there would be several platforms, including special platforms reserved for the royal family. A royal train is also proposed.

The study proposed powering the train either by electricity through an overhead cable or a third rail or by a gas-turbine locomotive. The report stresses the need for a high standard of comfort aboard the trains and there are suggestions that passengers would be shown a film welcoming them to the UAE. The proposed service would be known as the Airtrain.

The report claims that "the Airtrain will represent a major contribution to, and act as a pace-setter of, the transport system of the UAE and be an example of the foresight of Abu Dhabi. It would be an integral part of the economic growth of the region."

CSO: 4400/16

DUBAI AIRPORT REPORTS INCREASED TRAFFIC

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 40, 5 Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

Dubai International Airport's passenger traffic rose by 7.17 per cent and freight increased in volume by 12 per cent in July and August of this year when compared with the same two months of 1980, the airport's administration announced last week. It issued a report showing that a total of 530,382 passengers used the airport in July and August, giving a daily average of 8,500. Freight averaged 160,643 kilogrammes a day during the same period for a total of 10 million kilos.

The report said there were 147,000 passengers departing from the airport during the two months of this year, an increase of 14 per cent over the number of passengers departing during July and August in 1980; the daily average was 2,733 in July and 2,000 the following month. A total of 147,500 passengers disembarked at Dubai during the same period, 17.5 per cent more than last year.

The increase in the number of transit passengers was, however, much smaller. Transit passengers numbered 232,775 in July and August in 1981, a rise of 2 per cent over last year's figures. The daily average for transit passengers was 3,057 in July and 2,942 in August.

Exports sent by air freight from Dubai amounted to 2,253,000 kilos in July and August of this year, an increase of 2.5 per cent over figures for the same months of 1980. Imports were up by 15 per cent, however, totalling 7,710,000 kilos.

Dubai airport's head of passenger services Mohamed Ismael said that July and August were peak months because of summer holidays and the *Eid al-Fitr* feast at the end of the month of Ramadan. Mr Ismael added that an estimated 12,000 pilgrims from the UAE were making the *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca) this year and that departures began on September 10 and ended on October 2, with an average of three flights a day carrying 530 passengers. Flights bringing pilgrims back from Saudi Arabia would begin on October 15, he said. In addition to pilgrims departing from Dubai, the airport handled an estimated 24,000 pilgrims who transited through the airport, he said.

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END

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2423

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IRAQI OIL MINISTER COMMENTS ON COOPERATION WITH FRANCE

JN032036 Monte Carlo Radio Monte Carlo in Arabic 1720 GMT 3 Oct 81

[Interview with Iraqi Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd al-Karim by Nabil Darwish, Monte Carlo correspondent in Baghdad--recorded; date not given]

[Text] [Question] Your Excellency Iraqi Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd al-Karim. You are heading the Iraqi side to the meetings of the joint Iraqi-French economic committee, which will start today, Saturday. Can you talk to us about the work of the fifth session of this committee?

[Answer] We are pinning great hopes on the work of this committee and hope that this session will further strengthen and widen the spheres of the economic and technical cooperation between France and Iraq, stemming from the joint desire of the two governments and in accordance with the interests of the two friendly peoples.

Arab-French relations go far back. As for the present, Arab-French relations were established on solid pillars by the late general and great French leader de Gaulle, later bolstered by Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing. We are confident that the new French leadership, with which we meet on more than one level, particularly on our socialist course, will definitely contribute to further promoting the spheres of the French-Iraqi cooperation in various fields so that our cooperation may stand as an example for sound and correct cooperation among world states, particularly between an industrial state and a developing state that is anxious to develop and progress.

French-Iraqi relations may stand as a sound example for similar relations between two countries as I mentioned before.

[Question] Mr Minister, due to the circumstances of the ongoing Iraqi-Iranian war, Iraq is no longer the second largest oil exporter to France. Are there any measures for increasing the oil flow to France?

[Answer] I should say that current stage of the world oil market is not normal. This condition is certainly temporary because every now and then we experience similar conditions in which the world market is flooded with an oil surplus. Undoubtedly, this condition has its reasons and justifications. Under such circumstances, it would be very difficult to assess the abilities of oil-producing countries to fulfill their commitments. Iraq, for example, due to the

exceptional circumstances it is experiencing, is not the second largest oil exporter to France. However, this does not cancel Iraq's previous role. Actually, Iraq is ambitious to become the largest oil-exporter to France, particularly in light of the positive and continuously developing relations between the two countries.

[Question] Mr Minister, next to the issue of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the reconstruction of this reactor, what is the biggest and most important issue you are going to discuss at the committee [words indistinct]?

[Answer] In fact, the joint Iraqi-French committee is entrusted with discussing the framework of the joint economic, technical and commercial cooperation. This will certainly lead to broader cohesion and interaction of the interests of the two friendly countries, to the point where we can optimistically say that no matter how hard the tendentious sides and enemies of French-Iraqi friendship try, they will not succeed in undermining this cohesion and cooperation.

We hope that our relations with France will assume greater dimensions in the various economic, commercial and technical fields, not only in the field of nuclear cooperation. We hope that France will be one of the pioneers to play an important role in the Iraqi development process.

[Question] Thank you, Mr Minister.

CSO: 4404/39

IRAQ'S RAMADAN CONFERS WITH VIETNAM'S LE KHAC

JN041240 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 0800 GMT 4 Oct 81

[Text] Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council [RCC] member and first deputy prime minister, last night received Le Khac, Vietnamese foreign trade minister, and his delegation.

Taha Yasin Ramadan expressed pleasure at Vietnam's participation in the new session of the Baghdad International Fair, something which reflects the development of relations between the two friendly countries. He stressed that the exchange of visits between the two countries' officials contributes to promoting relations in various fields.

Ramadan reviewed the dimensions of our holy battle against the Persian aggressors in defense of our just, national and pan-Arab rights. He expressed the Iraqi people's pride in and appreciation of the Vietnamese people's struggle, stressing that the Vietnamese people's victory over U.S. imperialism is a victory for all peoples aspiring to freedom and progress.

Le Khac conveyed to President Saddam Husayn the greetings of Nguyen Huu Tho, vice chairman of the Vietnamese State Council, and his wishes of further progress and prosperity to the Iraqi people. He praised the aid extended to the Vietnamese people by Iraq for the sake of bolstering the march of development in the friendly country.

During the meeting, which was attended by the Vietnamese ambassador in Baghdad, the two sides discussed ways of expanding the relations of cooperation and friendship between the Arab socialist Ba'th Party and the Vietnamese Communist Party to consolidate their joint struggle against imperialism and Zionism. They also discussed the promotion of economic relations between the two friendly countries.

At the end of the meeting, Le Khac gave Ramadan a token gift from the Vietnamese National Assembly as a symbol of the development of relations of friendship between the two countries.

CSO: 4404/39

FATAH OFFICIAL DISCUSSES FIGHT WITH ISRAEL, DIFFERENCES WITH ARABS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1293, 14 Aug 81 pp 20-21

[Interview with Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Palestine National Council's Foreign Affairs Committee and member of the Central Committee of Fatah by 'Adil Malik; date and place not specified: "Khalid al-Hasan Tells AL-HAWADITH about the Battle That Preceded the Last Battle with Israel; the U.S. Key Is Activated by Arab Hands; the Arab Position Is Confined to the Oil Countries"]

> [Text] Fatah is still careful about getting no pressure from any official Arab agency.
> No country has the right to ask the Palestinians to recognize another country.

The voice of Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the National Council and member of the Central Committee of Fatah is one of the candid and clear voices [that is being heard] in the Palestinian Resistance. Like most leaders in the Palestinian struggle movement, he insists on the independence of the Palestinian will and decision-making power, and he condemns every regional attempt to polarize Palestinian action. He considers the current stage of the ongoing battle between Palestinians and the Zionist enemy to be critical, lacking nothing but the Arab earnestness to persuade the West that the solution to the Palestinian problem is actually the key to all the unsolved problems in the Arab area and in the Middle East.

Khalid al-Hasan rejects the principle of "simultaneous mutual recognition" between the liberation organization and the Zionist state. He brings the Arab countries face to face with their historic responsibilities, affirming that if the Arab position were characterized by earnestness and solidarity, the change that has begun taking place in western public opinion in general and in U.S. public opinion in particular will assume new proportions and will do so rapidly.

At any rate, Khalid al-Hasan specifies many points in his interview with AL-HAWADITH, especially when he answers the question whose purpose is to bring about an understanding of the nature of the recent vicious Israeli attack on Lebanon and the escalation of the Palestinian struggle.

[Answer] So that we can understand what is happening at present, what did happen last month or what will happen in the near future in Lebanon, we must shed some light on the reality or the outcome of the struggle in the Middle East and on the position which the Palestinian Revolution has reached on the Arab and international scenes. This way we can understand the motives for the events that occurred recently. We can describe these events as the penultimate battle in this struggle which is related to Palestinian diplomacy worldwide. It is understood that Zionist strategy has been based basically on propaganda that is launched from a land without a people and directed to a people without land. Accordingly, Zionist thought and Zionist leaders understand quite well that when Palestinian people return to the scene of political activity, the Israeli premise in its entirety will collapse. If the Israeli premise does not collapse entirely, the question of the Palestinian people will, at least in front of world public opinion, have the same status as that which the Jewish question had early in World War I. Therefore, Zionist strategy is confined to [the effort to] close the Palestinian file and abolish what is called the Palestinian people so that the world would not begin talking about Palestinian rights. Naturally, the policy that has been supporting Israel, and especially western policy, has been working in this field. This is the secret behind not recognizing the liberation organization or the insistence that it not be recognized as the representative of the Palestinian people. This policy continued from 1948 until 1965 when Fatah began the armed struggle. During that period the Palestinian people have been nonexistent in any international political context--they had no presence in the United Nations or outside the United Nations. The Palestinians became mere refugees whose case was viewed as a case of refugees. Then the matter went as far as contemplating the liquidation of the question of Palestinian refugees, either through settling them or educating them. The agency began dropping from its records every person who earned a university degree, a secondary job or became engaged in free trade. The agency did that to reduce the number of refugees [on its books] so that in time the process would come to an end and no trace would be left of the Palestinian people. Recently when the Palestinian struggle began to escalate and discussions about a Palestinian state began to increase, the Zionist leaders came out with an idea that was supported by the United States. At first, this idea was supported by Europe; now, however, Europe is beginning to change its position. [This idea is] that there cannot be two states between the river and the sea. In other words, if Israel does not take what is left of the West Bank and Gaza, that land is to be returned to Jordan, with Jordan being the state [for the Palestinians]. Then the idea that this state could be the state for Palestinians began [to grow], whether the regime in that state was a royal regime or a republic. What was important, however, was that the capital of this state be Amman; that its name be Jordan; and that it be the state for Palestinians. It is to be noticed that Israelis and others in this area suddenly began believing in unity and rejecting fragmentation: they wanted one state and not two. The reasons for this were quite obvious: they did not want the Palestinian personality to return to the international scene as an independent Palestinian personality so that the rights of the Palestinian people would not return to the international scene as rights over which disputes would occur. In addition,

the fact that the subject would be brought to an end with one state in Jordan meant that the problem of Palestinian refugees could be solved in Jordan, since Jordan had space for a million Palestinian refugees. The remaining refugees would settle where they were residing now. Consequently, the problem would come to an end, and Israel would ensure that the struggle in the area would continue, at least internationally, to be an Arab-Israeli struggle and not a Palestinian-Israeli struggle. This is because from the standpoint of international law at the present stage the continuation of the struggle as an Arab-Israeli struggle, with Israel being a permanent member of the United Nations, makes this struggle a struggle over borders and not a struggle over existence. Thus, in the context of the current international balances of power the question remains in Israel's favor and not in the Arabs' favor. But the Palestinian people--and I can say that their struggle is miraculous from the standpoint of the magnitude of the question they represent and not their quality as human beings--insisted on holding on tenaciously to their affiliation with their homeland and their Arab character in a style that was practical, philosophical and theoretical. The practical style of expressing their affiliation is quite naturally that of struggle. The Palestinian struggle has thus been an expression of Palestinian affiliation with Palestine and with Arabism. The more this affiliation was exposed to danger through extermination actions, the more natural became the growth of these people's will to struggle to hold on to their affiliation and their existence. As a Palestinian and an Arab people they expressed this affiliation in their struggle. This is the secret behind the continuing escalation of the Palestinian people's will to struggle despite the losses that befall them. With this posture they reverse all familiar international traditions because losses usually subdue [people]. However, the more these poeple lose, the more their will to struggle grows.

[Question] What is the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations in view of the Israeli extremist policy after the return of Menahem Begin to power?

[Answer] Begin suffers from the same disease we used to suffer from. His principles are identical to his programs of action and not an indication of them. Accordingly, his ideological position coincides 100 percent with his practical position. Hence, his haughtiness, arrogance and pride assume such sharp proportions because he holds on to these positions of principle in which he has believed ever since he was a little boy. Begin's belief in the subject of Great Israel is based on religion. People say this man is insane. In truth, he is not insane [at all]. He is rather an extremist Zionist. He is a reasonable man, and he is aware of the danger of an internationally recognized Palestinian presence. He also understands the impotent Arab reality that exists at the present time. He knows that in the long-range, time is not in the interests of Israel. Accordingly, he must firmly establish in the shortest possible period of time a new reality that is as solid as possible so that changing that reality would be difficult. Therefore, when Begin carries out these actions, he relies on several matters. He relies, first, on his influence in the Zionist Movement in the United States. Second, he relies on the United States' need for Israel as a military base in its defense plans against the Soviet Union.

Third, he relies on the fact that costs incurred by the United States in protecting Israel are much less than those the United States would incur if it wanted to carry out the Israeli tasks itself. Begin is also relying on the fact that the Arabs cannot do anything at this historic stage because of their negative, defensive state of mind and because of their differences which Kissinger had once described as Israel's Israeli extension. Consequently, the Arabs have done nothing but protest, and as long as no counteraction takes place outside the framework of protests, Begin can proceed with all the changes he wants until those changes represent something new that has no relationship [whatsoever] with the past. He would [thus] confront the whole world with the new reality. Begin's conduct is in this context. He thus has two objectives: the first is "to Judaize" everything inside Palestine as quickly as possible and to use all the means of oppression inside the country to force people to emigrate; the second objective is to strike the PLO so that it would ultimately become subordinate to one of the Arab organizations. This would bring about the demise of the Palestinian question and the Palestinian struggle. We wish that the Arabs who want to control the liberation organization understood the danger of what they were doing to themselves and to the Palestinian question. In their actions they are only realizing Begin's objective and effort to strike the PLO so that he could ultimately abolish the struggle of the political organization for something called the Palestinian people. Consequently, he would [also] abolish the Palestinian question and Palestinian rights. Hence, another western settlement [plan] like Camp David can be set up, and this would close the file on the Palestinian question without achieving Palestinian gains. You may have noticed that peace negotiations were being proposed recently to any country. Such a proposal was made to Syria, to Lebanon, to Saudi Arabia and to every Arab country that has a direct or an indirect relationship with the struggle. Such negotiations would sidestep and abolish the Palestinian factor. One of the problems encountered by this proposal was that of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. Although Palestinians had promised the Lebanese government during the administration of Sa'ib Salam that they would not carry out any actions across the Lebanese borders and although they have kept their pledge, with the exception of the October War of course, Begin used to strike in Lebanon to retaliate against what our people in the occupied land were doing against the occupation. Accordingly, strikes were directed against Lebanon not because the Palestinians had launched actions against Israel from Lebanon, but rather because of the actions of Palestinians inside Israel and inside the occupied land. On the other hand, the independence of Palestinian action is based on two matters. First, the multiplicity of financial resources assures the independence of the Palestinian political decision. Fatah has pursued this multiplicity of resources from the outset, and it is still doing so. Therefore, when one of the Arab leaders tried to restrain Fatah, it did not comply with his conditions, nor was it affected by his [attempts] to restrain it because of the financial independence it had acquired through this multiplicity of financial resources. But the independence of the Palestinian movement is tied to its presence in numerous geographical locations. As long as the Palestinian Movement is to be found nowhere else but in Lebanon, this means that the Palestinian Movement will naturally become subordinate to Lebanon even though it has not been and cannot become

subordinate to Lebanon or to any other country. Therefore, strikes against the Palestinian Resistance have to be carried out in Lebanon so that the Resistance can become subordinate to the other country where it will go when it leaves Lebanon. The Palestinian Resistance would thus lose its independence in the movement. In this case it loses its political independence because if the political situation of the Palestinian question becomes isolated from the Palestinian Movement, it is divested of any value and is accordingly manipulated by the Arab position which would exploit the Palestinian question as it did in the past.

[Question] Is there full awareness of this analysis?

[Answer] There is no doubt that we in Fatah are fully aware of this. Therefore, despite everything that used to be said about us, we were fully determined to maintain our relations with all the Arab countries so that we could preserve the multiplicity of our financial resources and preserve our independence. Therefore, we have always insisted on having a dialogue with Jordan so that we could have a presence in more than one location. We would thus not be downtrodden by any official Arab agency again because we have experienced this for a long time.

[Question] How should the Resistance conduct itself in order to remain an independent movement with regard to attempts by some Arab regimes, which we notice every now and then, to contain the Palestinian Resistance Movement?

[Answer] It seems that this has become [rather] difficult because a few regimes have established organizations that are considered part of their parties. Consequently, these organizations must be tied to the decisions of the state, which is governed by the party. There are other organizations that became connected to these regimes in one way or another. The connection had an ideological premise that made these organizations see their survival as hanging on this connection. This matter requires a kind of coexistence and a kind of special intelligence that would enable us to preserve the Palestinian decision so that Palestinian leaders can maintain the independence of the Palestinian decision. The majority of the Palestinian people reject any form of Arab interference in the Palestinian decision and in the Palestinian will. This is what is giving the Fatah movement extraordinary power in this area; it is this that has so far enabled it to maintain the independence of the Palestinian decision. But we also need more wisdom; we need to understand others more; and we need to have others understand us so that this fear that has prevailed over Palestinian-Arab relations on the popular level can be wiped out. This is due to the sweeping affection that has been protecting the Palestinian Revolution from the regimes. I do believe, however, that we have gone beyond the real point of danger and that every attempt that was made to contain the Palestinians proved to be fruitless, especially after one Arab leader had made every effort to contain the other organizations so he can do away with them or create division on the Palestinian scene. The recent battle united all [the forces] inspite of them. Hence, we cannot imagine that anyone at this stage is capable of appropriating the Palestinian

decision. The problem is that we need to preserve the effectiveness of the Palestinian movement and not the independence of the Palestinian decision. It is this that requires us to have a presence in numerous geographical areas and to have a multiplicity of financial resources so we can preserve this effectiveness.

[Question] What remains is the question about mutual recognition that is constantly being put to Palestinian leaders: who recognizes whom? What is the Palestinian reply to the question about the organization recognizing Israel first?

[Answer] We do in fact notice that the West has nothing to talk about now but the subject of recognition when there is any discussion about the Palestinian subject. Recently [people in the West] began talking about mutual recognition. Our position in this regard is clear: we believe that Palestine belongs to us, and we will never give up our dream of reuniting Palestine. This is as far as principle is concerned. As far as the subject [itself] is concerned, insofar as it is tied to practical application and to the method of this application, we announced at the National Council the need for the establishment of a Palestinian state on the part of the Palestinian land that is liberated. We have always been telling Europeans and others, "You have to recognize the Palestinian people first. When you recognize the Palestinian people, that recognition means that you recognize the rights of the people and the leaders of the people and that you cooperate with them on that basis. You commit yourselves to that. Even though international law has basically recognized the existence of Israel, you are committed by the same principle with regard to the presence of the Palestinian state because it exists in the resolution. Consequently, the Palestinian struggle is seeking the restoration of Palestinian sovereignty to Palestinian land. When we reach this stage and the Palestinian state is established with its elected parliament and its elected government, it will then be possible to discuss many things in accordance with the development of circumstances and the method by which full Palestinian rights can be regained. But a discussion about recognizing Zionist Israel may not take place now because we cannot recognize those whose philosophy is based on taking land and expelling people. This cannot be, and the European and western request for recognizing Israel is inconsistent with democracy and with the right for self-determination. It is also inconsistent with sovereignty. No one has the right to ask us to recognize any country in the world. This subject has nothing to do with other people; it is a subject that pertains to sovereignty and has nothing to do with another power.

[Question] And yet the American role remains the fundamental role in the game [that is being played to achieve] a solution. Do you see specific changes, negative or positive, in the U.S. position?

[Answer] Before I answer the question about changes, I want to say that the basic position or the key [to the problem] is the U.S. position. But I also want to say that the U.S. key cannot be turned in the absence of an Arab hand, that is, in the absence of a clear and an unequivocal Arab

position. And here I would like to propose a few things so that they would be clear to Arab officials. I know almost the vast majority of Arab officials, and I know that their intentions are honest in everything they say. However, honest intentions alone are not enough in international politics. All the westerners I talk with say, "We hear statements of support for you from the Arab countries, but how can we take these statements seriously?" Naturally, there would be no reason for this question if those who were asking were among our friends; but it is because they are always looking for reasons to assume a counter position that they want earnestness. Some of them said about Arab practice, "How can we believe any Arab threat when we find that the volume of Arab investments in our country is increasing along with these threats? One who threatens does not increase his investments!" In other words, everyone is saying, "There is no sign or indication that our interests are in jeopardy." This requires that the Arabs' earnestness be expressed in material terms and not only in verbal terms. The West would thus know that if it does not adopt the Arab point of view, the Arabs will assume a position on western interests. This is the only language that is understood. This is with regard to the subject of the key to the solution. But as far as change is concerned, there is no doubt that U.S. public opinion has changed. We are beginning to see for the first time in editorials of U.S. newspapers a call for a dialogue with the PLO and criticism of the White House because it has been slow in assuming a position on Begin's recent actions, which no one has been able to defend. The most recent occurrence [along those lines] was what was said to Haig when one of the journalists asked him, "Let us suppose that the attacks that took place last month had been reversed and that it was Tel Aviv and not Beirut that was raided and the victims were Israelis and not Lebanese and Palestinians, what would the U.S. position have been?" And here Haig was silent and did not reply.

However, the mere fact that people are asking the U.S. administration such questions is considered the beginning of a change in the centers that have the power to influence public opinion. We also notice from the letters that readers send to editors-in-chief to comment on events, beginning with the bombing of the Iraqi reactor to the events of Beirut, that the human factor is beginning to awaken because people are beginning to know [the truth]. This indicates that the posture of public opinion is related to the facts that the public knows. The more the public knows, the faster it moves. What is important is that U.S. public opinion is beginning to change to our advantage. However, policy does not usually change through these matters. Those in the White House know everything, and those in the Department of State know everything. But we have to continue relaying the facts to people so that the change in public opinion does become a force that can influence the official political position of the U.S. government. This too requires not only truthful and organized information, as well as radical change in the method of information, but it also requires in addition to all this a clear and an earnest Arab position regarding the interes of the west in our country. Otherwise, there is no use.

[Question] Is the Arab position as precarious as the present stage is?

[Answer] To tell you the truth, the Arab position at the present stage is almost confined to the position of the oil countries. Begin would have continued his actions even if the United States had opposed him, as long as U.S. opposition did not amount to coercion. And here we have to observe what Philip Habib did in this crisis. We are noticing that Saudi Arabia played a principal role in stopping the Israeli raids. That is, the position was so critical that Saudi Arabia was forced to apply positive and firm pressure. It put all its weight [behind the situation] until it was able to change it. I am placing only this situation in front of all the Arab countries and in front of Arab officials so they would know that they are capable of taking action if they were to apply pressure. The next stages may change the kind of role [that Arabs will play] but not the role itself so that we can be taken seriously [in a manner] that would enable us to bring about change.

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BRIEFS

PALESTINIAN-ANGOLAN CONTACTS--The secretary general of the Arab People's Congress held a press conference at the Paris Hilton last Tuesday at noon in which he discussed the visit to Angola by "the delegation of the international secretariat for solidarity with the Arab people and with their central question, Palestine." The delegation had gone to Angola at the invitation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola. According to the joint communique one of the most important accomplishments of the visit was the announcement that the Arab-African Conference would be convened to look into the crucial questions that are common to both parties. This would be done to establish "rapprochement and cooperation between the people of Africa and the Arab people in their struggle against imperialist intervention and control." The date for the conference was set for 6 December 1981 in Luanda. The communique affirmed that "the deteriorating and dangerous situation in the Middle East was the result of Camp David." The communique also condemned the new escalation of Israeli Zionist aggression against the people of Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and the Arab homeland; this aggression was supported by the Reagan administration." During the press conference al-Hamidi focused on the campaign that President Reagan's administration was waging against Libya. He said, "The clash between the two countries was inevitable. This was exactly what happened with Egypt early in the revolution when President 'Abd-al-Nasir tried to initiate a dialogue with the United States. But the United States refused that because it does not want to deal with sovereign nations." Then he said, "The U.S. campaign against Libya is setting the stage for aggressive action. There is much evidence [for this]. Among this evidence, or perhaps the most recent evidence of this, was the appointment of Ariel Sharon minister of defense for Israel. Last July the Libyan media announced that there was a plan for Egypt to invade Libya with U.S. and Israeli help. The Libyan media also spoke about Sharon's visit to the Egyptian-Libyan border area. Egypt then denied the news and said, 'What is the relationship between Sharon's agriculture and military action?'" Al-Hamidi said, "This is the new Israeli cabinet, and Sharon is the minister of war in that cabinet." [By Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh] [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 234, 15 Aug 81 p 17] 8592

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NEWSMAN ANALYZES IMPRESSIONS OF TRIP TO WAR ZONE

Successes of Guerrilla Resistance

Paris LE MATIN in French 14 Sep 81 p 12

[Interview with Bernard-Henri Levy, by Jean Bothorel, date and place not specified]

> [Text] Bernard-Henri Levy has just visited Pakistan and Afghanistan. Along with Marek Halter, Renzo Rosselini, and two French technicians, he brought the Afghans the first three transmitters for Radio Free Kabul.[1] On that occasion, and in that connection, he was able to meet refugees, combatants, guerrilla leaders, and leaders of exile political parties. He has confided in these interviews with LE MATIN his thoughts and observations inspired by those meetings and that trip. In this first interview, he describes the manner in which the Afghan resistance is organized. Tomorrow, he will analyze the Soviet presence in Kabul.

[Question] Last month you were in Afghanistan. What impression did you get of the resistance?

[Answer] A disastrous impression. Almost tragic. For I say, without either melodrama or complacency: today, 20 months after the invasion, in the midst of the overpowering indifference of the Western democracies, the resistance forces are close to coming to the end of their rope.

[Question] There is more and more talk of American arms shipments.

[Answer] Well, that is not true. It is increasingly untrue. That is adding impudence to indifference. Irresponsibility to a failure to help people who are in danger. For everyone in the region knows it: the guerrillas to this day have not received a single weapon, a single peashooter, a single cartridge from the West.

[Question] So who is arming them?

[Answer] Chance. Thin air. Or, if you prefer, the armies in the region. There is first of all the Red Army, the customary source of Kalachnikovs, rocket-launchers, sometimes even--but much more infrequently, alas!--RPG-7 machineguns.

Then there is the regular Afghan army, that formidable hodge-podge of deserters which supplies them with lighter arms, mortars, as well as RPK, PK, and PKS machineguns. Thirdly, there is the Pakistani army, or at the very least some of its elements who are not above parting with their excess Lee Enfield 303's and old colonial rifles, for a price to be sure.

There is also the Pakistani contraband market, where one can find practically any weapon in the world, from the 1939 Lebel magazine rifle, to the American M-740 anti-tank weapon, but at prices that are totally beyond the means of the average Mujahedin.

Then there are local munitions manufacturers, such as those at Dara, where one can purchase a Kalachnikov for only Fr 9,000, or a Sten gun for only 1,500, a hunting rifle for 2,000; but you have every chance of seeing it blow up in your hands after a few days of usage.

And, finally, with regard to "foreign aid," as it is called, nothing, I say nothing but a few convoys of AK-47 rifles delivered by Sadat last year; and doubtless also from Sadat, the half-dozen SAM-7's which arrived in Panchir early last summer.

There you have it. That is all. This list, I fear, is exhaustive. Which means all the rest is fantasy. The wild fantasies of journalists. Or deliberate falsification of the truth.

[Question] Are you not a little pessimistic?

[Answer] No. I am trying to be accurate. And above all realistic. For in the final analysis, so-and-so's good wishes matter little. What people always forget to say is that even if the arms were there, even if all the nations in the world were thronging to the gates, even if the resistance parties were rolling in dollars, there would still be a substantial obstacle: getting through Pakistani territory.

[Question] But the border has a reputation for being very "porous."

[Answer] That is another myth. For Islamabad is much too afraid of Soviet reprisals. It lives under the continual threat of separatist movements financed by the Kremlin. I have met with Pakistani officials, and they have told me straight out: impossible, without running major risks, to close our eyes to a blatant traffic....

[Question] In other words, if I am following you, the whole problem of arms for the resistance boils down to a transit problem....

[Answer] No, to a political problem. The key to which is Washington. But also, whether we like it or not, the key is also in our heads. In plain words: when will the American public, the international community, the enlightened self-interest of the West, perhaps, reach a point where Reagan will offer Zia a credible guarantee against any possible Soviet aggression? I have every reason to

believe there is no such guarantee at this time, and so long as there is not one, the resistance will be irretrievably strangled.

[Question] Let us continue to talk about the resistance: listening to you talk, one wonders how, under such conditions, it can even keep the war going.

[Answer] I have asked myself this question too. Today, I have the answer: the Afghans are not fighting a real war, they are fighting a phony war. They are fighting a war of attrition. They are fighting a tame war. Embellished with brief engagements and little skirmishes. Amply provided with ambushes and audacious surprise attacks. But once again we must confront the truth head-on: there are no operations of any great scope, no battles in the ordinary sense of the word.

[Question] You have examples?

[Answer] Better than that, I have a list. The list of their biggest, most spectacular operations in recent months. For example, if you look at the month of August, there is, on the 24th, in Panchir, the destruction in flight of an Mi-24 combat helicopter. And on the 10th, in Jaji, in Faktya province, 25 mortars and two 122 [-mm] artillery pieces were stopped on the main road.

If you take July, in Logar, you have three armored vehicles lying helpless in the cavity dug out under the surface of the asphalt by the Mujahedin of the region. And, on the 27th, on the border, a surprise attack against the border posts of Tchaperi and Danda Patan, which yielded several cases of munitions, about 50 AK-47 rifles, and some 12.7-mm machineguns.

And in June, finally, the record is nothing more, I think, than one MiG-21 shot down, on the 15th, in the little gorge of Torabora, in the heart of the Nigrahar valley. And, about 10 days earlier, at the approach to Kunduz airport, an unusually long skirmish at the end of which the freedom fighters had destroyed an attack tank and three small vehicles. In short, in 3 months--and even if this list cannot, of course, claim to be exhaustive--it all amounts to nothing more than a series of harassments. Continual pressure on the Soviet expeditionary corps. A climate of insecurity intentionally perpetuated in the various provinces. But, I repeat, and it cannot be repeated often enough: in the current condition of their forces, the Afghans cannot take the risk of the smallest frontal attack.

[Question] Is it only a question of "forces" as you say? Or is it not also a question, primarily, of lack of strategic planning and determination?

[Answer] Listen! It is true that all the actions I have just cited are isolated operations. It is certain that nowhere is there any big headquarters or omniscient center for planning and coordinating. This dispersion, this autonomy, this near-haphazardness of blind actions, is in fact one of the things to which the Mudjahedin are most thoroughly committed. But that does not mean that they have abandoned strategic planning: it simply means that, in the concrete realities of the war they are fighting, strictly local strategies are the only ones possible.[2]

[Question] Can you be specific? How are things organized and actually decided?

[Answer] The basic military unit, so to speak, is the valley. As the leader of each valley there is a "commander," who is in charge of several dozen, perhaps a hundred guerrillas. Whether a traditional leader, a former teacher, an officer who has deserted, or a village chief, he is above all distinguished by exceptional bravura. But what is important to note is that even if some of them--such as Amin Wardak in Wardak, Anwar Khan in Nouristan, or Mohammad Assef in the Torabora valley--have acquired almost international notoriety, their authority on the ground is never broader than the territory embraced by one group of villages.

[Question] Nevertheless, this creates serious problems?

[Answer] I agree it is surprising. One is a little perplexed to see a "national liberation war" in which no one ever speaks of the Afghan "nation." We ourselves found it very hard to get our friends from Radio Free Afghanistan to see the political usefulness of broadcasts aimed at Kabul, the capital. But at bottom, everything considered, I think that the Afghans are not completely mistaken when they explain how, in Afghanistan, their strength is in their disunity.

[Question] Is this a paradox?

[Answer] Let us say that the Russians are grinding their teeth over this paradox. This is what generates the formidable resistance by inertia of the entire civilian population. Do you realize that it is in the tribal regions of the south that the resistance is most determined, while by contrast, the detribalized zones in the north seem most permeable to Soviet propaganda?

[Question] What is certain, on the other hand, is that it is difficult to see how the resistance could unite on such a basis.

[Answer] No, that is not so certain either. For what strikes me personally, to the contrary, is that such unity as has been achieved to date is built precisely on such a basis. I am thinking of the unification of the Nouristan command last year. And then, a little later, the unification of the Hazaradjat commands. Even this year, closer and closer contacts between the commands of the two provinces. Better, and more recently still, I am thinking of the ties that now link both of them with the commands in Kunar and the Kandahar region.

[Question] If I understand you, it is unity from the base, rather than from the summit.

[Answer] To some extent it is that. But it is a little more than that. For what, by the same token, undoes that analysis is that very Resistance Party which, everywhere else, is forever claiming hegemony: that never-ceasing National Liberation Front, already filled with being like a state and with the disruptive intentions espoused by most guerrilla wars--those institutions, plans and projects for society which have been dear to the hearts of our Third Worlders since the 1960's, and for which one looks in vain in the war of the Afghan peasants.[3]

[Question] Do the freedom fighters have some idea about the type of society they want to see established after the departure of the Soviets?

[Answer] In a word, no. The very question makes no sense to their minds. If you ask one of them, he will give you a strange look. He will not really understand where you are coming from. He will answer that quite obviously the only kind of society he knows is the one in which he was brought up. In short, the thought will not occur to him of describing to you one of those dazzling "new worlds" which, often to their misfortune, have infatuated so many revolutionaries before him.

[Question] Are you not afraid of idealizing the resistance? And thereby of repeating errors of the past?

[Answer] To the contrary. I would like for people to understand, above all, that this is the first time in a long time that an insurrection of this type presents none of the classical symptoms of the totalitarian virus; that nothing in it bespeaks, at least for the time being, a new "order," a reign of terror, or future despotism; that in the few liberated zones, the first, and quite often the only social innovation is to loosen the hold of the institutions of government and traditional authority. Do you know what the Afghans call the "liberated zones"? The word is very beautiful: they say simply, /"Dja-ke kokoumat nist,"/ which literally means, "places where there is no government."

FOOTNOTES

1. To enable Radio Free Kabul to continue, send your donations to the Committee on Human Rights, 152 Rue du Chateau, 75015 Paris.

2. On this point, and many others, see the absolutely indispensable book by Gerard Chaliand, "Report on the Afghan Resistance," published by Berger-Levrault, 1981.

3. This is the title of an article by Olivier Roy which appeared in the review REVOLTES LOGIQUES, which inspired much of the above.

Problems of Soviet Occupation

Paris LE MATIN in French 15 Sep 81 p 12

[Interview with Bernard Henri-Levy, by Jean Bothorel, date and place not specified]

> [Text] On his return from a visit to Pakistan and Afghanistan, Bernard Henri-Levy yesterday gave LE MATIN a first interview in which he described the way the Afghan resistance is organized. In this second article, he analyzes the Soviet presence in Kabul, and comes to this conclusion: "This is nothing like the American strategy in Vietnam... As opposed to any method of anti-guerrilla warfare known to this day...

this Soviet army is moving in to stay, in a slow and painstaking effort that gambles on the long-term: in short, one based on calculations that could rightfully be described as "dialectical."

[Question] In your opinion, but from the Soviet perspective this time, what is the track record of the Afghanistan intervention?

[Answer] That depends on one's point of view. From a purely military standpoint, it is plain and clear: the Red Army, at this very moment, has failed in Afghanistan.

[Question] Despite the weaknesses and divisions within the resistance?

[Answer] Yes, despite them. Or perhaps, as I suggested yesterday, because of them. A regular army, everyone knows, is powerless to put down a dispersed, amorphous, elusive guerrilla movement.

[Question] The Soviets are occupying the country.

[Answer] They occupy it on paper. They occupy the seven or eight "military districts," which they have abstractly and arbitrarily mapped out. They occupy the garrisons, the cantonments, where their 80,000 soldiers are stationed. Yes, technically they have occupied, and at what cost!, most of the cities, the airports, and the bigger roads. But with regard to everything else--not at all. A scattered, phantom presence. A few collections of mud-walled military huts called "border posts." And immense mountains where I can assure you it is not good to venture if one has the uniform--or the face--of an "accursed chourawi."

[Question] But the press regularly reports on major offensives.

[Answer] They do occur, to be sure. In Kunar, last year. In the Kandahar region, last spring. Near the posts of Asmar and Barikot just a few weeks before we were there. And, just recently, on the borders of the Panchir valley. But these operations, with all they entail in the way of force deployment, instruments of war, and big conventional hardware, are much more unusual than the press tends to think.

[Question] Because they are ineffective?

[Answer] Yes, perhaps. But also, much more simply, because the Soviets are not properly equipped. Imagine their attack tanks at 3,000 meters altitude in the hills of the Hindu Kush! Their Mi-24 combat helicopters whirring over the valleys while the Afghan look-outs, perched on the ridges, shoot at them like rabbits! Even their infantry, trained to fight on the mountaintops alongside their helicopter-carried tanks, like the one at Asmar on 4 July.

[Question] I imagine they also have units specially trained in antiguerrilla warfare?

[Answer] That is of course what one would think. It is only logical, a priori. And yet, would you believe that the answer is no: it was not until last June, after 18 months of semi-victories and semi-reverses, of phony war and trampling underfoot, that the decision was made to send their first--and, to date, their only--antiguerrilla division to Kundunz.

[Question] In other words, the expeditionary force is to your way of thinking poorly adapted to the situation it found on the ground?

[Answer] "Poorly adapted" is an understatement. I would prefer the word "grotesque." Exorbitant. Almost surreal. Do you realize it came with Frog and Scud surface-to-surface missiles? That in the face of a resistance movement armed with knives and old rifles, it saw fit to bring in a virtual panoply of anti-aircraft defenses? That half of its attack tanks are virtually incapable of the most minimal maneuvering outside the garrison zones? And I am not even touching on the morale of the troops, of those MiG pilots who, according to guerrillas in the bush, hardly follow their orders and no longer dare to swoop too low in the valleys; those bewildered soldiers, stupefied with fright, who are sent to scour a mountain with a helicopter at their back; soldiers on leave that one finds in the bazaars swapping their boots, their fur-lined helmets, a jerry-can of gasoline, or even their Kalachnikov, for a little hashish. All the accounts I have collected agree: the splendid Red Army, in its first foray into the outside world since World War II, has not set a brilliant example, either of style, or discipline, or strategic foresight.

[Question] The climate you describe could in some respects perhaps be compared with that which prevailed in American ranks during the latter part of the Vietnam War.

[Answer] Yes, but with one fairly significant exception: I think the Americans in Vietnam were for better or for worse trying to achieve the military pacification of the country. Whereas here it is as if the Soviets are doing everything possible, for reasons still to be explained, to give up on this pacification. They are not really giving battle. They do not directly confront the freedom fighters, face to face.

[Question] Are you serious?

[Answer] I could not be more serious. It is the only possible explanation for all these bizarre and strange actions. It is the only way to explain why such serious people would be satisfied with an 80,000-man expeditionary force when, as all the experts know, it would take at least 500,000. I cannot see why, without that, without this choice, without this decision not to give battle, the strongest army in the world would in the final analysis so easily agree to accept ridicule in the eyes of the world.

Let us assume the contrary, for the sake of argument. Everything indicates the Soviets have pondered the lessons of Vietnam. They have understood the fact that they too would never be able to overcome broad popular resistance purely by military means. So, not being crazy, but in fact rather clever, they looked for--and

found--a much simpler solution, a solution much more economical and likely to succeed, to achieve the same objective.

[Question] And what is that solution?

[Answer] It was the same kind of thinking as that noted in the lamented Comrade Giap's greatest disciple. Specifically, it comes from the famous adage that the guerrilla in the bush is like fish in water. And it says quite simply: instead of wearing oneself out, like those imbecile Americans, going fishing, it is much easier simply to drain the water from the lake, and likewise from the bush.

[Question] Concretely?

[Answer] Concretely, first of all, there are vast efforts to entice people [to support the government]: millions of shawls distributed this year to the Mohmand tribes in the Kunar, the Chinvari in the Nangrahar, the Mangal and Jergi in the Paktya. Or again, on a different level, the efforts made to fashion a new paragovernmental party of which the European press has hardly spoken, which calls itself the National Fatherland Front.

Then, if that is not enough, they move on to intimidation, overflying villages in the Mi-24 helicopters, those "dogs of war" intended to terrorize the population and force them to flee. Or again, the distribution of menacing tracts, as in Kandahar before summer came, which promised the civilian population it would incur the unmitigated wrath of the Soviets if it dared support the "groups of bandits and counter-revolutionaries."

And then, if that is still not enough, the next step is simply to strangle the villages: the wells are poisoned; the canal around which the village life is organized is blocked or diverted; in Panchir, at the narrowest point in the valley, they have even gone so far as to build a great concrete barrier 5 miles wide to isolate it from the rest of the world.

In every case, as you see, the result is the same. It is a question of creating refugees, of turning whole regions into deserts, or cutting the freedom fighters off from their base of support, of putting continual pressure on the Afghan peasants to withdraw their support from the resistance. In short, an indirect strategy which, while carefully avoiding hunting out the guerrillas in the wilderness, concentrates all its efforts on the civilian population.*

[Question] What, then, are the chances for this strategy to succeed?

[Answer] By itself, as such, I do not think it would have any chance of working. But the stroke of genius on the part of the Soviets was having married it to another, even more diabolical, because it seems on the surface to be more "positive": moving little by little to integrate Afghanistan--fundamentally, durably, and structurally--into Soviet territory.

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*On this subject see the remarkable analysis by Jean-Jose Puig, interviewed by Pierre Rigoulet in LES TEMPS MODERNES last June.

Thus, for example, last June the Kabul government--that is to say, the Kremlin,--created a "ministry of tribes and nationalities," whose name alone is enough to indicate both the style and the underlying idea: to apply to the Pachtuns, the Tadjik people of the north, and the communities in Nouristan and Hazardjat, the tried and true Stalinist procedure for dealing with "non-Russian nationalities."

In the same way, during my visit to the region, a big daily newspaper in the capital published a comparative analysis of Afghanistan in the 1980's and the Soviet republics of Central Asia in the 1920's, with--once again--a very clear conclusion: the "Arbabas," or todays Afghans; the powerful "water-masters" of the village are the Uzbek "waterlords" of yesteryear; the "feudal vassals" of Kunar are the exact replica of those of Kazakhstan; all that is needed, in other words, is to dust off the files on the pacification of the Muslim peoples of the USSR.

And this above all is why the Soviets are lavishing their efforts on their money so unstintingly to put the country on the track of modernization. This is why they are working so quickly to finish the six hydro-electric stations in the Kabul region, for example, or the Kalagay dam to be built over the Kunduz. This is why they are working so hard to begin exploitation of the iron reserves at Hajikak, the copper mines at Ainal, the superb canning works put in place by the Bulgarian government, and the flashy new brick-works provided by other "fraternal countries." This is why, finally, they are working so hard to improve the roads, get the factories running again, enlarge the airports of Bagran, Khwaja Rawash, Kandahar, Shindand, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Maimana, and Djelalabad--the least one can say for all these big public works projects is that they do not augur an imminent withdrawal.

[Question] These projects, these plants, were not all started after the invasion.

[Answer] Certainly not. But what is interesting is that they have been maintained. And others, more and more of them, have been added. And in the midst of a war in Afghanistan, in the midst of fire and blood as the expression goes, the Soviets seem to have nothing more urgent to do than to build factories, dig quarries, and build airports.

And here, you will agree, is something quite different from the American strategy in Vietnam. A thousand leagues removed from some banal enterprise of military pacification. The exact opposite of all antiguerrilla warfare methods known to this day. And, what we seem to see there, is an infinitely more cunning army, which is building in concrete, which is working on structure, which is betting on the long-term: in short, its strategy could rightfully be described as "dialectical."

What I mean by that is that probably in the minds of the Soviet leaders--whether consciously or not--is the idea that to subdue Afghanistan, it will have to be given heavy industry. Its agriculture will have to be collectivized. The countryside will have to be urbanized. To the degree possible, it will even have to be given a "turn-key" proletariat. In plain language, this is called Leninism. More precisely, a rather orthodox Marxist approach.

We have been discussing the Soviet strategy in Kabul now for an hour: I think that in truth there is only one Soviet strategy--namely, without beating around the bush, to build socialism there.

9516
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RELIGIOUS MOTIVATION OF HOLY WAR DISCUSSED

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German No 22, 28 Sep 81 p 3

/Report by Correspondent Olaf Ihlau: "A Hydra in the Holy War"/

/Text/ Peshawar, September—His index finger raised high, his voice breaking with emotion, the young guerilla fighter standing on a podium covered with green cloth cries out: Allah is great! A 1000-throated echo of "Allah is great!' resounds through the Mahabab-Khan mosque on whose marble floor the delegates of the five largest Afghan resistance groups are crouched in the intense heat. A handful of guerillas, posted as guards, in the recesses of the mosque, make a show of handling their captured Kalashnikovs. "Afghanistan is the symbol of the revolution of Islam," the speaker shouts into the microphones as the mosque built by extravagant Shah Jahan reverberates with the sounds of enraptured agreement: 'Allah is great!'

21 months after the Soviet military intervention, the fragmented and disunited Afghan resistance groups are making a renewed attempt in their Pakistani exile to join together in a common fighting organization under a joint command. This is their fifth try; but it is also the most likely to succeed.because this time Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has joined in. He is the head of the extreme fundamentalist, tightly organized, battle-tested "Hezbi Islami," which thus far had boycotted all attempts at alliance by insisting on sole representation. Motionless, with an inward, ascetic look about him, the 34 year-old engineer is sitting in the very center of the mosque. Hekmatyar, wearing a brown sheepskin cap, has a long finely chiseled face, framed by a long black beard. His melancholy eyes have a faraway look; they seem not to register the waves of emotion eddying all around him.

Pressure from Mecca

The man with the blue turban next to Hekmatyar also is at pains to put on a dispassionate air. The night before one of Mawlawi Mohammed Nabi Mohammedi's political advisers had thought it "highly unlikely" that he would have his comparatively moderate "Harakat" movement join the new alliance dominated by the fundamentalists. But now, to everyone's surprise, the 60 year-old mullah from Logar province is ready to join in signing the communique on the "Islamic unity of the Afghan religious warriors." Somewhat sheepishly, the adviser now admits that the change of heart was brought on by "outside pressure," pointing to the resolution adopted by the Islamic League at its recent meeting in Mecca which called on the Afghan Mudjaheddin to take "immediate steps to establish unity."

Removing his sand-colored turban and wiping the perspiration off his face, still another guerilla leader takes his place on the floor beside Mohammedi. It is Maulwi Younis Chalis, the head of a "Hezbi Islami" splinter group who has just elicited new waves of applause from the audience with a fiery speech of his own. He is the only partisan chief among the groups operating from Pakistan's Northwest Province who still personally takes part in the battles against the Babrak Kamal government and the Russian occupiers. In his speech, the 61 year-old former teacher Chalis, just returned from Nangarhar province, told the assembled Mudjaheddin: "The Russkis are in hiding and their overlords, the godless devils from the north, are afraid of us. We are advancing on all fronts." With his shaved head and white, shaggy beard, a cartridge belt draped around his chest, Younis Chalis might well have been the model for Charles Miller, the writer, who described the wild animal look of the Pathan warrior thus in his book "Khyber:" "The eyes of a hawk; the nose of a vulture; the mouth of a shark."

Five of the six largest groups among the two dozen Moslem guerilla organizations are represented at the Mahabab-Khan mosque. Among them is the "Jamiat Islami" led by Burhanuddin Rabani, a lawyer, whose fighters are presently bearing the brunt of defending against a renewed Soviet assault in the Panshir valley. Acting against the wishes of their chairman, theologian Sibghatullah Mujadeddi, who is in the United States at present, several prominent members of "Jabha Nejate Milli" have come to the meeting, since they feel they can no longer resist the movement toward unity. The only major group not represented is the "National Islamic Front" led by Sayed Ahmed Gailani, a pro-royalist feudal lord from Jalalabad, who is a Sufi "pir" regarding himself a direct descendant of the prophet Mohammed.

Until now, joint actions by the resistance groups had run afoul of religious and ideological differences, personal rivalries and petty jealousy. Only last March, the "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan," created at the urging of the Moslem League in early 1980 had broken up with a bang and a flood of mutual recrimination. Some of the groups attacked each other like mortal enemies; in some instances, shots were exchanged instead of verbal arguments. Roughly speaking, the Afghan Mudjaheddin were split up into two camps— a religious fundamentalist camp and a more traditionally national camp with a secular cast to it.

The hard core of the fundamentalist bloc is Hekmatyar's "Hezbi Islami" which takes its cue from the Iranian revolution, wishing to establish a "state based on Islam and run by a purely Islamic government." Even in the early seventies, Hekmatyar and Rabani were fighting against the "Westernization" of Afghanistan as well as the growing Soviet influence. In July 1975, they started a revolt in the Panshir valley against the Daud regime which had been a symbol of the land-owning aristocracy and the upper middle classes and which had seized power from Daud's brother-in-law, King Zahir Shah, while the latter was convalescing in Italy two years earlier. The man who had been behind the scenes was the then Pakistani prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He took in Hekmatyar who fled to Peshawar and had provided weapons to the guerillas in order to put pressure on Daud concerning the Pushtunistan issue— which he succeeded in doing. But when Bhutto, Daud and

the Shah of Iran agreed on closer cooperation in 1976, Hekmatyar was forced to take a back seat. Only after Bhutto was deposed in July 1977 and even more so after the Communist coup that removed Daud in April 1978, the stock of "Hezbi Islami" began to climb once again.

The derogatory epithet given to the Moslem fundamentalists by their enemies, the moderate traditionalists, is "akhwanis" —brothers— to allude to their ties to the underground network of the Moslem Brotherhood. Pro-western Gailani, who suffers from a Napoleon complex, is the most influential spokesman of the moderates most of whom have turned their backs on Afghanistan following the loss of their privileges and real property. According to the official biography put out by "Mahaz Inqilab Islami," it was not until May 1979 that Gailani declared a "holy war" against the revolutionary rulers in Kabul "in order to liberate the people from the yoke of the atheistic regime."

"Pir" Gailani is able to draw on powerful sources for funds in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iraq. A trip to Western Europe and America also opened up important government contacts to him last spring. He is furthermore said to be in touch with the 68 year-old former king now living in exile in Rome. But that claim is made by other resistance groups as well, even according to Amin Wakman's rather insignificant "social democratic" party. As for the fundamentalists, Zahir Shah makes them see red; they accuse him of having carried on a suicidal flirtation with the Russians while in power and of having allowed the Afghan communists to rise.

Thus, the first communique issued by the new "alliance" established under the aegis of the fundamentalists contains some anti-royalist, anti-bourgeois language. There are those who would now wish to appear before the world as the "leaders" of Afghanistan once again "who were sitting in their houses safe and sound, drinking alcoholic beverages, promoting prostitution and corruption among the people while the religious warriors were risking their lives and were being chased from their native land." It does not take much imagination to visualize the battles and feuds to the death that these groups would engage in once a power struggle broke out, if the Soviets and their underlings were ever forced to leave Kabul.

Captured Weapons

But things have not progressed to that point, even if the pressure exerted by the Mudjaheddin against the regime of Babrak Kamal did increase further during the summer months. Aside from a lack of ground-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft grenade launchers with which to counter the dreaded Russian helicopter gunships, the rebels appear to have enough weapons. Official word is that their needs are taken care of with Soviet booty or with equipment from the stores of the Afghan government troops, which are said to be in a state of disarray. But that is only half the story. For several months now, more than 200 West German and Italian-built, orange-colored container trucks are constantly shuttling between the port of Karachi and Peshawar along the old Moghul trunk road. Operated by the army-run transport agency "National Logistic Cell" (NLC), they are charged with supplying

the border province with food, but also with the latest weapons which have been brought in with Arab, American and Chinese help. According to reliable sources, Pakistani officers then are responsible for distributing these weapons and shipping them onward to the six major Afghan resistance groups.

Despite all the efforts to attain unity, it has thus far proved impossible to establish a unified command to coordinate the actions of the Afghan rebels. Instead, the Mudjaheddin resemble a hydra in their conduct of the holy war against the Soviets— the advantage being that severing one head cannot put an end to the many-headed opposition movement. The announcement of the new alliance should have little effect on this practice. "Where and when I will commit my 40,000 fighters is something I alone decide," says Younis Chalis at an evening meal of mutton and rice in the garden of his Pathan fort near Peshawar. He has few illusions regarding the effectiveness of the planned "rotating leadership" of the coalition or the resolution of differences. "We want freedom for Afghanistan; Hekmatyar wants to attain power," Chalis says as he and his two sons get ready to march back to the frontier. Terrorist squads belonging to his organization have recently carried out successful attacks in Kabul itself. News of this sort fill him with great satisfaction. "We need more fighters like that," he says with blazing eyes. "Here in Peshawar, there is far too much talk."

9478
CSO: 4620/4

NEW BUDGET DESIGNED TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC ORDER

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Aug 81 p 13

[Interview with Dr Mohammad Taqi Banki, advisory minister and chief of Plan and Budget Organization: "The compiling of the 16 [21 March 82-20 Mar 83] Budget is based on production. Iran is continuously in confrontation with Imperialism."]

[Text] The basic emphasis in preparing the 1361 [21 Mar 82-20 Mar 83] budget is based upon Iran continuously being in confrontation with Imperialism and the steps being taken towards self-sufficiency in all areas.

This issue was announced by Dr Mohammad Taqi Banki, advisory minister and chief of the Plan and Budget Organization.

He first said, "We are determined with reliance on God, and the boundless and infinite power of the people, who raise martyrs and self-sacrificing fighters, to build a complete Islamic society, a society whose relations and organization is based on divine intentions. To establish the economic, administrative and political order in such a manner, so it can be used as an example, and witnessed by other oppressed nations. To move towards such a society we should bear in mind the following few points;

1. Our desired economic and social order must be based on such compilation and strength that no obstacle or barrier prevents us from reaching our exalted goals.

2. In this order the aim is not economic, and the evaluation of affairs should not be based on economic output in such a manner that it surpasses the growth and elevation of the human society.

3. Execution and compilation of this order must be in complete harmony with each other, so that the economic order is in a position to facilitate and accelerate the social movement of our nation towards its ideal ideological thought.

4. The economic relations in this order must be in such a way as to abolish and annihilate human domination of other humans.

5. This order must work in a way that not only suppresses extravagant materialistic desires, which cause human nature to deviate, but which considers human nature to promote further spiritual generosity and forgiveness.

He then added: To reach such a desirable aspiration, we are faced with detestable realities which make our move difficult. He said: From one side we are faced with world Imperialism, which under the leadership of the Great Satan is busy sucking the blood of the oppressed people of the world and from the other side, we have inherited the rootless economic order of the previous regime. This bankrupt economics has the following unique aspects:

1. The country's industries are assembly-oriented and are affiliated, and in fact, facilitate the industrial products of the West.

2. Agriculture and animal husbandry, due to the execution of wrong and traitorous policies have lost their self-sufficiency and have become dependent.

3. The share of development and industrial investment to total net national income, compared with the general services sector is very small and basically is not able to absorb the same amount.

4. The output of the non-productive branches and semi-productive branches, such as construction and city services have risen disproportionately in comparison with the output of productive branches and have caused unreasonable migration and increased those living on the fringe of the city and slums.

5. The decrease of industrial production even considering assembly-oriented production is noticable after the victory of the revolution. The increase in imports, and the flourishing of trade has created middlemen, brokers, and hoarders and resulted in absorbing human resources in ever increasing trade activities. Because of the enormous profit of the trade dealing the interest in productive investment has reached almost zero.

6. Incorrect banking operations and the shift of capital towards non-productive activities has resulted in inflation and financial loss to society and decreased the purchasing power of the oppressed.

7. Lack of a strong and secure foundation whose growth would provide self-sufficiency and industrial independence within 15 years.

He added that we are planning to increase the competency and efficiency of the Plan and Budget Organization through the continuous refinement of human resources, and try to absorb and train the resources of the masses, in order to pursue community planning. With regard to the necessity of preparing and compiling a comprehensive and harmonious plan, contrary to the previous manner, the Plan and Budget Organization, in order to prepare the 1361 [21 Mar 82-20 Mar 83] budget has started the preliminary preparation for composing the budgetary and related circulars, and explanatory reports have been prepared for the Prime Minister's signature.

Dr Banki then added: The main emphasis in preparing the 1361 budged is that Iran is constantly confronting imperialism and is determined to take steps towards self-sufficiency in all aspects, especially in foodstuffs and the defense industry. Also, in preparing the 1361 budget, the basic stress is to change the course of the current budget to the productive and job creating and to convert unproductive activities to productive ones. In steadfast, development and fundamental productive investments, the job creating, high output, and independent investments have priority.

Brother Banki concluded that in preparing and compiling and planning the budget, the participation of active and positive people in all phases has special importance. The fundamental emphasis in regional planning is based on active participation of the masses and efforts will be made to renew and strengthen the provinces plan and budget organizations in order to have minimally qualified and responsible staff. He said, one of the intended plans is to activate supervision in all the projects. This supervision will be carried out by units who are responsible for following up the project.

He then added: The Secretariat of the Economic Council will be revived in order for the experts to study the proposed projects of the economic council closely before hand, so that the project will be rich in its content, and be in accordance with all the country's economic and social problems when presented for approval.

Dr Banki, the advisory minister and chief of the Plan and Budget Organization, in regard to agriculture said: In agriculture our basic reliance is on self-sufficiency in basic products, and in this regard we try to prepare and introduce projects to the farmers and tribes. In connection with the just and timely distribution of needed products, we try to furnish the products needed to the real farmers and cattle raisers.

Finally he said: About commerce and industry, with special stress on articles 44 and 49 of the Constitution, efforts will be made to renew the studies and the plans and projects, and the activities of that ministry, in addition to fulfilling the general basic needs and planning will be based on independence and self-sufficiency. In principal industries, management needs will be strengthened in order to increase output.

9815
CSO: 4640/98

BUDGET APPROVED FOR EILAM PROVINCE

Tehran PARS ASSOCIATES LEGAL INFORMATION SERVICE in English 26 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] The Planning Committee for the Province of Eilam approved a budget of 8 billion and 838 million rials for the current year for the province of Eilam.

At the meeting of the Planning Committee, the total budget for Eilam was declared to be 8,838,512,000 rials. Five billion, 73 million and 512 thousand rials has been allocated to the current budget of the province out of which 2,742,000,000 rials has been allocated to education, 980,000,000 rials for medical treatment and hygiene activities and the remaining 26% for ten executive bodies of the province.

3,765,000,000 rials has been allocated to be spent on development activities out of which 900,000,000 rials is for constructing rural roads, 730,000,000 rials for development and education, 552,000,000 rials for hygiene and medical treatment 400 million rials for development of cities, 230,000,000 rials for rural services, 130,000,000 rials for physical training, 130,000,000 rials for potable water and sewage and 80,000,000 rials for industries.

CSO: 4600/64

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS SLATED FOR KERMANSHAHAN PROVINCE

Tehran PARS ASSOCIATES LEGAL INFORMATION SERVICE in English 26 Sep 81 pp 1-2

[Text] Kermanshah--In a meeting held at the governorate of Kermanshahan the progress of various projects carried out by the government in the province of Kermanshahan was discussed.

Engineer Eshkan, chief of the Plan and Budget Department of the Kermanshahan province disclosed that in the current year plans are implemented with a budget of 5 billion and 106 million rials to develop the province. He then declared the list of credits and types of plans being implemented as follows:

Construction and development of rural roads and bridges, 50 million rials; Kermanshah airport development project, 35 million rials; maintenance and repair of roads, 200 million rials; construction and development of by-roads, 350 million rials; rural technical aids, 250 million rials; development of rural industries, 250 million rials; creating sewage systems for cities, 100 million rials; creating and developing potable water systems in cities, 250 million rials; development of agricultural irrigation, 600 million rials; development of cooperative companies and other farming activities, 125 million rials; agricultural and animal husbandry activities of the province, 500 million rials; creation of agro-industry units, development of agriculture and animal husbandry, 35 million rials; maintenance and appropriation of natural resources, 30 million rials; rural services, 60 million rials; creation of civic amenities, 150 million rials; city transport, 100 million rials; security installations of cities, 500 million rials; sports complexes, 12 million rials; creation of sports stadiums, 75 million rials; scouting buildings, 5 million rials; welfare services, 75 million rials; pipe-laying in villages, 200 million rials; city medical treatment services, 350 million; village medical treatment services, 75 million rials; hygiene services, 125 million rials; improvement of hygiene, medical treatment and nutrition, 750 million rials; creation of schools at various levels and kindergartens, 335 million rials as well as 17 million rials for civil constructions.

CSO: 4600/64

PROFIT RATES PUBLISHED FOR LOCAL MANUFACTURES

Tehran PARS ASSOCIATES LEGAL INFORMATION SERVICE in English 26 Sep 81 pp 3-4

[Text] According to Clause 5 of Paragraph 1 of the minutes of the meeting dated 9/2/60 of the shareholders of the Consumers and Producers Protection Organization the percentage of profit of locally manufactured products shall be as follows until further notice:

Type of Industry	Percentage of Profit
1--Basic human foodstuffs (vegetable oil, sugar, glucose, etc.)	18-20%
2--Canned foodstuffs	15-18%
3--Non-basic human foodstuffs (biscuits, chocolates, etc.)	12-15%
4--Non-basic human foodstuffs (non-alcoholic beverages, etc.)	10%
5--Foodstuffs for cattle and birds	15-18%
6--Pharmaceutical products for human use	15-18%
7--Pharmaceutical products for cattle and birds	15-18%
8--Poisons for pests, chemical fertilizers, sulphates	18-20%
9--Metal hot and cold beams (iron beams for buildings, pipes, bars, etc.)	10%
10--Profile cutting (building profiles, pipes, etc.)	12-14%
11--Electroplating	18-20%
12--Miscellaneous metal products (locks, hinges, razors, nuts and bolts, etc.)	14-16%
13--Metal household equipment (gas stove, heater, water cooler, water heater, gas cylinder, office equipment, etc.)	14-16%
14--Basic electrical household equipment (switches, lamps, fans, refrigerators, etc.)	15-18%
15--Non-basic electrical household equipment (rice cooker, vacuum cleaner, washing machine, etc.)	12-15%
16--Electronic household equipment (radio, TV, tape-recorder, etc.)	14-16%
17--Electric and electronic industries (cable, high-tension transformers, electromotors, communication equipment, etc.	15-17%
18--Measuring equipment (watches, water-meters, electricity meters, scales, etc.)	15-17%
19--Automotives (trucks, vanettes, bus, minibus, bicycles, motor-cycles, rail wagons, etc.)	14-15%
20--Automotives (passenger car)	10-12%

CSO: 4600/64

IMPORTERS WARNED TO REPORT SALE OF IMPORTS

Tehran PARS ASSOCIATES LEGAL INFORMATION SERVICE in English 26 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] The Consumers and Producers Protection Organization in its letter No. 10248 dated 15/6/60 has notified the text of notice No. J-1034 dated 10/6/60 of Public Prosecutor for Guilds Affairs of Tehran, which is reproduced below for the information of our clients:

"All importers are hereby notified that they are under obligation to submit their documents before the sale of the imported goods to the Consumers and Producers Protection Organization and/or Departments General of Commerce in the provinces for the fixing of prices and obtain sales prices.

Importers who violate the above order and fail to produce their papers and documents in due time and before the fixing of price of imported goods proceed with its sale, shall be strictly prosecuted and their Commercial Card shall be cancelled."

CSO: 4600/64

RICE PLAN SEEKS TO INCREASE PRODUCTION, DISTRIBUTION

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 9 Sep 81 p 6

[Text] Concerning the fair distribution of the country's rice production and the circumstances of the purchase of this product from rice growers, a project has been presented by one of the rice experts.

Since the fair distribution and stabilization of the prices of agricultural products, including rice is one of the important economic plans of the country's policy makers, the economic section of KEYHAN has printed this project.

Implementating the Project

The purpose for implementing this project is to curtail the hands of the middleman, usurers, and hoarders in rice dealings, the protection of the products of the rice grower, prevention of delays in supplying and securing rice crops, consumer protection by stabilizing the price of rice, and supervision and control of the purchase and distribution of rice in the country. To achieve this goal, it is essential to have knowledge of the area, to be familiar with rice products and the ways of its preparation and other matters.

Knowledge of the Area

As we know the largest area of rice fields and rice products is first Gilan Province then Mazandaran followed by Gorgan and other areas of the country. The Gilan rice crop has more variety, and is of better quality and is more abundant. For this reason, the Gilan rice must be priced differently. The difference of 10 rials per kilo of first grade Gilan-Mazandran rice is truly an injustice to Gilan farmers since at present time the difference of the price of First Grade Sadri rice of Mazandaran (Mesbah Amol) with first grade Gilan rice (Dom Siah rice of Luseh Kola) is more than 50 rials per kilo in the market. On the other hand, since Gilan has different varieties of rice with different qualities (cooking, size, color, odor, and flavor) and each of these varieties is grown in a specific area, we study the Gilan rice crop from the Mazandaran border and take a brief glance at its final product.

Mazandaran does not have the variety of Gilan rice, and the rice grown in this area is mostly homogeneous and unmixed.

A. Kolachay, Mahmudabad, Rudsar, Tarom and their territories--Most of the rice of these areas are long grain rice (Dom Siah and long grain Sadri). The towns outside of Gilan are mostly the customers of the rice of this area.

B. Langarud, Lahijan and their territories--The rice crop of this area is not as good as that of Rudsar and Kolachay.

C. Astaneh Ashrafiyeh and its territories--The rice of Astaneh Ashrafiyeh is of better quality than Lahijan and Langarud and sometimes is longer and shinier. The famous long rice (Dom Siah) of Gilan (Luseh Kola) is the product of one of the Astaneh villages.

D. Lolan's suburbs--Kuchesfahan, Lasht Nesha' and its surrounding villages--The rice of these areas is worse than the Astaneh rice but better than the Lanhijan and Langarud rice.

E. Rasht, Khoman, Sangar and Shataji and its suburbs which are known as "Movazi" have rice like Kuchesfehan and Lashtnesha. The Shaft crop is approximately like Movazi rice and in some instances a little better.

F. Foman--Foman has two kinds of rice. Southern Foman (meaning the areas of Gasht and Maklavan) has better rice than northern Foman (meaning Koldeh and Gol Afzan).

G. Sum'eh Sara and Tavalom--The rice of this area is the worst and is close to the rice of north Foman.

H. Masal and Shandazman--These are two towns of Sum'eh Sara area, which have better quality rice. The people of northern Foman, Sum'eh Sara, Masal and Shandarman offer their rice crops to the market in the form of unprocessed rice. The local Saturday and Monday bazaar held in Masal and Shandarman are the main centers for the unprocessed rice trade. The buyers of different areas of Gilan purchase this rice, and after polishing the unprocessed rice, mix it with other rice and present it to the market. In recent years the big merchants were not purchasing the unprocessed rice and the purchase was done by wholesale dealers.

I. Tavaleshand Astara--The rice crop of these areas is mainly known as "Hasi rice" which was previously called "Akeleh and Gharibeh." This variety is very good in cooking and flavor, but has few outside customers and mostly is consumed by the locals who are familiar with it.

Collecting and Converting the Unprocessed Rice to Rice

Collecting the rice in the husk is different from collecting rice, and the thrashing of this reice is more difficult. Wheat is pounded in the field and is bagged and delivered to the mill, but the unprocessed rice is delivered from the field to storage areas. When needed, and according to the needs of rice growers, it is pounded and sent to the factory for conversion. The following methods are used for converting unprocessed rice:

1. Sometimes the farmers deliver the unprocessed rice to the factory for converting without drying it. The rice crop prepared in this way is usually wet and its purchase is not to the advantage of the buyer. In addition it is difficult to keep, since after a while the rice molds, becomes stale, and changes color. Its volume and size do not change after cooking either.

2. Sun drying of the unprocessed rice--In the first months of the fall, and on sunny days, the farmer spreads the unprocessed rice in the sun to dry. Of course, the rainy season of Gilan is not suited to this method. The quality of the rice crop prepared this way depends mainly on the time it has been in the sun. Drier rice is better than the wet unprocessed rice.

3. Drying of unprocessed rice in the mill--The rice pounders usually have a bin which dries the unprocessed rice according to the orders of the rice growers, and then it is converted. This drying method is the most common way of drying rice, and the rice produced by this method is called "Dangi." This method is very different and is more expensive.

4. Smoke drying--Smoke-drying is the best way to dry rice. This method is traditional and the smoke-dried rice is called smoked rice and smells smoked. Since the unprocessed rice is dried naturally and gradually for a long time, it increases the resistance of rice to dampness, and this rice can be preserved for years. It even is said that smoked rice could be kept up to five years. The smoked rice does not have customers in some towns due to its smoky odor, and is more liked by Gilan consumers.

Types of Rice:

There are various types of rice which are known to the experts, and to help the buyers we will classify them into several types:

1. The Super Extra Long rice [Dom Siah Ostekhani] of Rudsar, Kolachay and Luseh Kolayeh Astaneh. Sadri rice which has many varieties like Black Tail [Siah Dum], Red Tail [Sorkh Dom], White Tail [Sefid Dom] and Yellow Tail [Zard Dom] and many other names which are classified according to length, shape and the drying method.

2. Long first grade Sadri Rice (Yek Dangi), long second grade Sadri Rice [Do Dangi], long third grade Sadri rice [Seh Dangi]. The price of rice other than "Dangi" rice is 20 rials cheaper per kilo and smoked rice is 20 rials higher per kilo.

3. Unspecified rice. Unspecified rice is usually classified as super and ordinary.

Super "Dangi"

Ordinary "Dangi"

Observance of drying and smoking according to the above, affects tha rice price. The super unspecified rice could be mixed with third grade Sadri according to its color.

4. Hasani rice--Akeleh or Gharib

Super "Hasani Dangi"

Ordinary "Hasani Dangi"

5. Chompa rice which is usually grown in the Sum'eh Sara area, is consumed locally. After the rice is threshed, the remaining rice bits are classified according to

their size, large or small, and their type. This broken rice is consumed also locally. The rice farmer sells the superior rice and buys the broken half-rice for home use. This rice is also used for making rice flour and other foods.

Purchasing Centers:

1. The government announces that the rice can only be purchased from rice growers and mill owners, who convert the unprocessed rice to rice, have produced different kinds of rice according to the production capability of the factory, and are not buying from any other persons. In this way, the government is able to prevent the rice buying and selling at the village levels. Also, in order to prevent the mills from becoming the center of the rice trade, the government investigates the mills' revenues.

2. Since it is probable that rice farmers, under the pretext of converting the unprocessed rice to rice, transport the unprocessed rice inside the area, the supervision rights must be given to the Islamic village council, or the deputy mayor in the village. Each transporter must determine the destination and point of origin certified by the council or deputy mayor and the purpose of the transport must be clear.

3. In addition to the organizations which take part in buying according to their responsibilities, local experts, should take part in purchasing. The farmers themselves are the best rice experts.

4. The basis of rice classification from the point of view of quality should be Rudsar, Astaneh and Tarom rice and the rice of other areas must be compared with them.

5. Since it is intended to make the local mills the center of buying, security should be kept in mind regarding theft and fire.

6. Since the farmers do not have daily sales, the buying commissions could be mobile in order to enable the commissions to travel to more places and relieve the burden of rice transport from the farmers and to preserve local traditions.

7. It is recommended that the commission at most once a week and at least once a month hold rice transactions in one center and inform the people of the program prior to the time through the committies, mosques, and village heads. In case it is necessary to change the program, the change should be announced through the mass media.

8. To study the shipment of rice from the area and to determine the amount of rice for the consumer.

9. Closing the purchasing center should not be announced beforehand, and their devolution must be announced according to the conditions and circumstances of the region.

The Duties of the Experts

1. Observance of local traditions is the key to success. In buying and selling, the weight of an intact burlap bag is one and a half kilos, a patched bag, 2 kilos and a plastic bag one kilo; this must be taken into consideration and charged to the sellers. Although the actual weight of the bags may not be such, the extra weight will cover for the spillage and waste which exists in all trades.

2. Determining the real amount of the crushed rice cannot be achieved except through scientific analysis so that neither the government nor rice farmers have losses. In grading rice, the maximum and minimum grade should be announced in order for the buyer to relate his purchase to the maximum and minimum. For example, even in grading it is not possible to produce unmixed and homogeneous rice and each type of rice is a little different from the other.

3. As mentioned, the homogeneous rice is not obtainable, but homogeneous rice could be prepared for sale. After purchasing rice, pour the same kind on top of the other and let it settle, and then stir with a wooden paddle until the rice is completely mixed and then pack it. This kind of rice is homogeneous. Of course the profit-making vendor mixes all sorts of rice together. The government must ensure that in mixing only the same kind of rice is used. First grade rice should be mixed with first grade rice and second grade rice with second grade rice.

4. Usually among the good quality rice, other mixed rice can be found. This is not done purposely by rice growers, but this happens during the planting and harvesting of the rice. The mixing rice usually is round and noticable and in local terms it is called "Gholveh" or "Dakhl" and the expert can identify them. Unfortunately the mix in the rice (Dakhl) decreases the price of rice and its quality. Strain improvement in the future could decrease the amount of "Dakhl" and "Gholveh."

5. Some of the rice as a result of carelessness, can become scarred, and those who are not knowledgeable cannot notice it. The purchasing expert is well aware that scarred rice is damaged and he must not purchase this rice as it should be graded and priced lower.

6. It is recommended to pack different types of rice, from each province, separately and mark them and keep them in main storage areas.

7. It is recommended that rice should be stored in main storage areas according to the date of purchase in order that the rice bought earliest be released first and thus be less damaged and that the rice bought at the beginning of the harvest does not stay at the bottom of storage area.

8. In packing, it is recommended to use burlap bags, because the burlap bag preserves the rice better and is easier to stack.

9. Since mice damage burlap bags, sanitary spraying and control is necessary.

10. The rice must be allowed to settle for two days and before packing, weighing and marking is done.

Stages of Distribution and Sale

1. As the outlets and centers for the sale of rice are increased and monopoly is minimized, the lines of rice buyers will decrease and so will the chance for bad and anti-revolutionary publicity.

2. The pricing commission must be formed for the sale of rice and the rate of sale must be determined by experts since the rice of some centers is better and has more customers.

3. In order to prevent the merchant from mixing rice for his profit, the rate intervals should not be much different from each other.

4. In traditional purchases, after total expenses, brokers fee, packing, settlement of the rice, and the expense of the sacks are taken care of, one makes less than 5 rials profit. Therefore, the total sale expenses could be arranged in this manner.

5. In importing rice for the small seller, the profit in respect to sales volume should be a good and real profit.

6. Since some of the rice of certain provinces is better and is used in restaurants and hotels and by the rich, the government can add a charge to that rice and not charge the deprived. This can only be done by the experts supervision.

9815
CSO: 4640/98

BRIEFS

TALKS WITH NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL--Baghdad, 13 Oct (INA)--This evening, Tariq 'Aziz, member of the Arab socialist Ba'th Party National Command and official in charge of the Foreign Relations Bureau, discussed with Alejandro Martinez, Nicaraguan foreign trade minister, the cordial relations between the Ba'th Party and the Nicaraguan Sandinist Party [party name as received] and spheres of developing them. The two sides also discussed bilateral relations, their two countries' role within the nonaligned movement and their joint struggle against world imperialism. Tariq 'Aziz also briefed the Nicaraguan delegation on the Iraqi-Persian conflict and Iraq's continuous attempts to settle this conflict in a peaceful and just manner that guarantees Iraq's rights to its lands and waters. [Text] [JN131944 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1830 GMT 13 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/39

DAYAN COMMENTS ON PEACE UNDER MUBARAK

TA161138 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 16 Oct 81 p 2 Political Supplement

[Commentary by Moshe Dayan published the day he died: "The Heirs and the Inheritance"]

[Text] Al-Sadat was murdered and buried. A group of heirs--Husni Mubarak and Kamal Hasan 'Ali, Usamah al-Baz, Abu-Ghazala and others--took his place. This will make sure law and order prevail in Egypt. Mubarak did not assume the presidency in order to fail; he is proficient in the technique of ruling. Nor will the new Egyptian leadership continue to put up with the intrigues of al-Qadhdhafi and, with U.S. aid, will act to silence him.

Mubarak says he will fulfill the peace treaty with Israel. His word should be trusted. I believe that the new Egyptian Government will implement it to the letter. As for its spirit, that already is another question. There are no grounds to believe that any of the "heirs," Mubarak included, would have been supportive of al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, had he consulted them. Neither do they presume to say that had al-Sadat not existed, they would have made peace with Israel. However, there is a great distance between this and annulling the peace treaty, in practice as well as in principle. They cannot afford to do so, even if they wanted to. They can say to their Saudi and Moroccan friends: It is not we who inspired peace with Israel, but as Egypt is committed to it, you cannot ask us to throw it into the trash-bin. We shall fulfill it but will do so according to our own interpretation and goals.

The new situation requires Israel to be ready for peaceful relations with Egypt, based on a minimal degree of closeness and personal involvement. "No war"--yes. The removal of differences--no. This is what we have. "This peace"--can anyone envision another peace in the offing? Or a different kind of peace? Or the possibility of gaining a better [bargain in] peace?

CSO: 4423/10

U.S.-JORDANIAN MIDEAST POLICY DIFFERENCES EXAMINED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 230, 28 Sep-4 Oct 81 p 19

[Article by Fu'ad Na'im: "Amman Is Looking for a Way Out of a Relationship of 'False Hopes.' Washington Ended the European Initiative to Renew Its Pressure on Husayn"]

[Text] The Reagan administration believes that two obstacles are preventing the success of the negotiations on autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza. One is the promise of a European initiative in the Middle East and the other is the refusal of King Husayn and the Palestinians to participate in any such talks.

This analysis is based on the fact that the European initiative has given the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza the hope of transcending the framework of the negotiations called for in the Camp David agreements and has made them [the Palestinians] reject any appeals by others in anticipation of circumstances which are more favorable to a solution. For this reason, the new American administration proceeded to attack any plan for any short-term European initiatives. This has been confirmed by the latest statements of French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson who said that it is up to the countries of the region to adopt the initiative which best suits them. His statements also indicated that the United States may have succeeded in convincing the French president of its views especially since Francois Mitterand has always supported the Camp David agreements. Then came the statement of the European Common Market confirming that any European search for peace in the Middle East would have to take the American point of view into consideration.

This European-American "agreement" gives renewed hope for the success of the autonomy talks. It is a well-known fact that the American administration plans to use all its weight to ensure the success of the talks. In this regard, the problem of Jordan's cooperation has been considered crucial by Washington, especially since the Camp David agreements called for it and since events have demonstrated that autonomy cannot be established without Jordan. It is in this framework that the current conflict between Jordan and the United States has developed.

Last June, when President Reagan told a number of Arab ambassadors that Israel occupies "only 20 to 30 percent of Palestine" he actually meant to put maximum pressure on King Husayn to include Jordan in the Camp David [talks] or the United States would support General Sharon's policy which aims to convert the Hashemite kingdom into a "Palestinian Republic."

For his part, the Jordanian ruler declared that the United States wishes to solve the Palestinian problem at the expense of Jordanian territory. In doing so he was directing an appeal to the world to support his nation and at the same time eliminating all the uncertainties before his trip to Washington next November.

At any rate, Washington still recognizes Sol Linowitz' (former President Carter's envoy to the talks) report which outlines three possibilities for dealing with the issue of the West Bank and Gaza: 1) To maintain the status-quo in the West Bank and Gaza which means continued Israeli military rule of the Arab areas and continuous tension and mutual aggression. 2) To maintain an atmosphere of violence to encourage the Palestinians to retrieve their land by force. This would imply renewed war in the region. 3) To continue to work within the Camp David framework for self-rule, to encourage peace initiatives and to unify the parties which are seeking peace rather than divide them.

The Linowitz report stated that the time had come for a dialog between the United States and Egypt concerning the fate of the occupied territories, but the participation of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza was necessary. The United States, however, felt that those Palestinians were influenced by Jordan, and that is the reason it chose to pressure King Husayn.

Observers note that relations between the United States and Jordan in the last 4 years have been tarnished by "false hopes" which were magnified by Washington in order to pressure the king. The first of these hopes came after Anwar al-Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, which was described by King Husayn as a "courageous act." Washington interpreted that comment as indicating the possibility of Jordan's participation in Camp David.

The second false hope was seen in the diplomatic maneuvers which followed the signing of the Camp David agreements when King Husayn requested clarification from Washington, which was certain that it had convinced him to join the talks.

The third false hope was based on the possibility of Shimon Peres' victory in the Israeli elections and consequently the victory of "his Jordanian option" for the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

The last false hope is the Reagan administration's belief that King Husayn will hasten to join its war [sic] against the Soviet Union as part of Washington's new foreign policy, which gives second priority to the issue of Israel's occupation. Yet, King Husayn not only informed General Haig of his disapproval of this policy but continued to stress that the Soviet Union must participate in any negotiations for any solution to the Middle East question.

CSO: 4404/38

BRIEFS

HAJJ PILGRIMS--The number of foreign pilgrims this year is 879,368. Last year's pilgrims numbered 812,892. Thus there is an increase of 66,476. These statistics were released by the Interior Ministry Under Secretariat for Passport and Civil Affairs. [GF090355 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 7 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/39

ECONOMY MINISTER DISCUSSES INVESTMENT, INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

Tunis DIALOGUE in French No 368, 21 Sep 81 pp 18-25

[Interview with Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, by Raja El Almi and Mohamed Kenine; date and place not specified]

[Text] Our meeting with Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, was not simply limited to the major economic directions to be taken, on the eve of the entry into effect of the sixth national plan. We also raised the principal economic questions of the moment and those which most concern Tunisians. Raised first of all were the results of the recent official visit to Tunisia of Abu Zayd 'Umar Durdah, secretary of economy of Libya. It was provided in the agreement signed by the two countries that Libya, beginning next year, would provide 25 percent of all refined petroleum products imported each year by Tunisia. The resumption of private travel by individuals between the two countries, as well as the desire to follow a complementary economic strategy, constitute the principal themes which stood out in the discussions between the two ministers.

Responding to a question relating to his recent nomination as head of the economic committee of the Party [Destourian Socialist Party], Minister Lasram said: "The president considered that I could be useful as chairman of the economic committee of the Party, as I am responsible for the economy in his government. Our work consists above all in stimulating economic activity and in encouraging the most competent people to take part in considering and proposing action to be taken."

Concerning the salary negotiations under way between the government and its other social partners, Minister Lasram told us that: "These negotiations have worked out properly, on the whole. The more so as the government expressed a desire to have an overall agreement on the different views which we have, in the framework of the next 5 years."

Finally, Minister Lasram informed us of the forthcoming membership of Tunisia in the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries [OAPEC], a membership which was desired by the Arab countries. This would permit Tunisia to benefit from several forms of assistance and to have opened to Tunisian experts very broad possibilities, particularly in the field of research.

[Question] At the time of the last meeting of the National Prices Commission, you stated in particular that: "The rate of price increases during the first 6 months of 1981 was less than that recorded during the corresponding period of 1980." And, in fact, all Tunisians, who have noticed an intensification of the effort to control prices, are aware of the very spectacular measures taken to hold down prices, of the clean-up operation in the sectors on which price control depends, etc. Will this kind of control effort be continued permamently? And if it is pursued with the same intensity, what additional costs will be involved?

[Answer] During the first 8 months of 1981 prices have gone up even so, but to a lesser extent than that recorded during the previous year. That's a good sign. If the rate of increase is maintained at the present level, we will then have one digit inflation. This is rather remarkable if you take into account the fact that Tunisia is linked to the world abroad by unavoidable and organic relationships. Tunisia exports products, but it imports other products also. Therefore, it imports part of the inflation from abroad, and we know the figures regarding this.

On the whole, the performance of the economy is good. It is no less true that the price increases which have appeared on a certain number of products are increases which one could call beneficial. Let us take the example of tomatoes. Tunisia, whichwas a large producer of tomatoes, has become an importer during the last 3 years. We have become an importer, because the prices paid to the farmers were no longer remunerative. As a result of the stagnation of the prices of canned tomatoes, it was no longer remunerative for the industrial firms. If things had remained as they were, it is clear that this year we would not have had much production of tomatoes. It required the joint intervention of the Ministries of Agriculture and of National Economy to convince the farmers, by means of a substantial increase inprices. When the new government was formed, the prices whichstood at 28 millimes for processing of the industrial tomato went up to 35 millimes. That encouraged the farmers. As a result, we have had a good harvest this year, and we will meet our needs and even more than that, since we will have a surplus of 6 to 7,000 tons. In Tunisia we consume 32,000 tons of tomato concentrates and we are gong to produce about 38 to 39,000 tons. There is an area where an increase in prices can be beneficial.

In the medium term we must find a system which makes it possible for us to raise prices to encourage production, to encourage certain groups of our population who are important, who are worthy of the interest of the government, without at the same time hurting the purchasing power of other citizens who consume these products, in a fundamental way. It is a balance which is difficult to find, but this is a realistic policy, without which we would end up with results parallels to those in Eastern Europe. The freezing of prices leads practically to the breakdown of an economy as a whole, with the prejudicial effects which we know. I will give you an example: The freezing of milk prices discourages milk production in a country; therefore, the country becomes more dependent on foreign countries for protein foods.

The freezing of the prices of a whole series of products can eventually discourage production generally throughout agriculture, and also in industry.

It is clear that costs are going up (increase in salaries, increases in costs in the field of energy, due to the general policy of the country). However, I note and I think tht we have achieved a good result on the whole, due to the understanding and the will to produce, to the dynamism of Tunisian agriculture and industry, and also thanks to existing economic controls.

In the latter area I must say that we have established a control system different from that of previous years. We have achieved a general structure for the different sectors which is much more efficient, by putting in place more human resources, by benefitting from the understanding of the other ministries concerned, and by having recourse to substantial financial resources from the Compensation Fund, which has intervened in the case of a certain number of products. The Compensation Fund has also played a role in making timely imports possible in the course of carrying out operations which perhaps have resulted in a worsening of our trade balance, but these should not be exaggerated. The total value of these transactions is small, compared to the overall figures of the foreign trade of Tunisia, which is sufficiently large not to be influenced by the import costs of a few apples or bananas.

[Question] There were no shortages of goods during Ramadan. State intervention in the market therefore did not turn out to be a financial disaster, as certain pessimists predicted.

[Answer] Far from it. Regarding Ramadan, state intervention cost the state budget nothing, from the direct financial point of view. Our needs were covered by domestic production, for the most part. We only intervened in the market during a period prior to the month of Ramadan to arrange for increased stocks of some products. For example, we purchased goods from Tunisian producers and, by agreement with them, we arranged for the stockpiling of a quantity of potatoes and eggs, which we then redistributed at the right time and sold. We have nothing to complain about. In any case, these operations are much more psychological than expensive, and I would like to give you a figure. We calculated that Tunisians consume 150,000 tons of all kinds of fruit. This is not the 1,000 tons of bananas or the 1,500 tons of apples which would change hands no matter what. Each year Tunisia consumes 20,000 tons of potatoes. Consumption is rather substantial, but the 3,000 tons of potatoes which we put on the market do not amount to much. Therefore, this involves essentially a psychological role. By intervening in certain places at certain times we were able to avoid the psychological effects on an increase in prices.

It is the same thing with eggs. The 3.5 million eggs in stock or even the 10 million eggs would not have much influence on the market when we know that the country consumes more than 700 million eggs per year (70 to 80 million tons during Ramadan) [sic: Figures seem confused: With a population of 6 5 million, Tunisian consumption of 700 million eggs per year sounds reasonable; consumption during Ramadan should probably read 70 to 80 million eggs, not tons of eggs].

We acted to break the bottlenecks which might develop in certain sectors where speculative tendencies might appear. We also took action to enact laws and regulations which were considered to be very effective, such as control over refrigeration facilities.

[Question] Therefore, this is a question of organization and control at the same time, and of taking the drama out of the situation.

[Answer] It is first necessary for the people to feel secure and not have the impression that prices are going to increase or that some products will be in short supply. That would push people to rush into the market. The mass of consumers in Tunisia has rather disorderly behavior in this area. There is a phenomenon of acceleration, a phenomenon of price increase. To avoid these phenomena, we preferred to intervene

in the market to take the drama out of problems and so that people would have a feeling of security. This had the effect that, for the first time in the course of Ramadan, Tunisia was properly supplied in the marketplace.

[Question] The present economic policy is characterized by its promotion of voluntary cooperation.

[Answer] That is quite clear. We acted, we are acting in different directions in the Ministry of National Economy to keep in mind interests which may appear contradictory in the short term but which are not so in the long term.

This concerns the interests of the consumers and of the producers. It involves the protection of our energy reserves, in order to raise national production to the maximum. It is also a matter of raising the living level of the Tunisian people. These are factors which in certain cases may appear contradictory but which, over the long term, are certainly coherent between them. This may lead people to imagine that, in certain situations or by making certain interpretations of events which are generally not well-intentioned, there is a certain feeling of improvisation. But who can actually direct an economy by programming 4 or 5 years in advance, given the changes, the shocks that may be suffered, and the effects of the overall situation?

We have several examples of people who have tried to contain an economy within a framework, no longer doing anything to make it budge from its framework. The political judgment has been clear. In the actual world of power, it is not possible to foresee what can happen. What we need is to be sufficiently vigilant so that the shocks which threaten to occur are not experienced at the moment when we least expect them. We also need to be prudent in order not to be surprised by external events which could take place tomorrow and get worse. We see the situation in Europe, in the Western world, in the Third World. This makes us feel more concern than optimism and to take very long term precautions. We are obliged to continue to look to the future of the country, to try to create jobs, to develop the import program of the country so that it will become more independent, both in the field of energy as well as in the economic field. We are obliged to look for a better future for our country, while remaining very prudent in order not to fall into a kind of optimism which could be very dangerous. We must be mistrustful because the effects of these phenomena at times could be less than expected.

[Question] Wouldn't a voluntary and permanent lowering of prices risk having negative repercussions on the development of young Tunisian industry?

[Answer] That is both true and false. It is true because we must not require an industrialist to sell his products at a price below production costs, which are rising. It is false in the sense that most Tunisian industrialists have calculated their cost prices on the basis of production which was not 100 percent from the factory. They counted on the local market, which is a captive market. Since we carry on a rather precise pricing policy in Tunisia, that is to say, a rather firm policy, we push people to achieve greater productivity first, but also to look for unused market possibilities. In other words, we are oriented toward exports. In the industrial area we think that exporting for Tunisian is one of our fundamental obligations, in the sense that it helps to maintain or even improve Tunisian's standard of living. If Tunisia does not export industrial products, if we take into consideration its natural resources which apparently are being rapidly exhausted, petroleum in

particular, Tunisia has only phosphate which it is exploiting to the maximum. Therefore, if Tunisia does not develop a competitive industrial capacity, capable of being exported, it is clear that in a rather short time the country will be in a situation where its capacity for investment and its capacity for development will be reduced. We must not forget that during the last 5 years the increase in the petroleum prices has made up for a lot of things. That means that Tunisia, without having increased its production, has expanded the value of its petroleum production by four, five or six times. This has made it possible to achieve improved performance, but what is important is that the improved performance has been in the framework of the exporting industries: Chemical industry, for example. We must direct ourselves toward exports in the areas of mechanical industry, electrical and electronic production, which are the industries of the future. We can only do these things under certain conditions: To have competitive prices, to improve quality, to produce in accordance with modern standards. If we live in a closed circle, if we continue to benefit from surprises on the local market, the road cannot be very long.

[Question] According to some people, the creation of 320,000 jobs in 5 years (65,000 jobs per year), an objective of the Sixth Plan, would be difficult to achieve. This statement is based on several economic considerations: The enormity of the investment required, the number of new projects involved or to be involved, difficulty conditions for emigration. What are the priority directions envisaged to provide the maximum of new jobs in the course of the next plan?

[Answer] There is something that needs to be said: Our wish is to continue to raise to a maximum Tunisians' standard of living and, at the same time, to create jobs. Unfortunately, in this area it will be necessary to make certain choices: Should we give total priority to jobs or should we give total priority to raising Tunisians' standard of living, and thus of maintaining the pace of raising the standard of living of Tunisians who are working at present.

It is clear that, to the extent that we devote the bulk of our resources to raising the standard of living, we won't have enough resources to create jobs, that is, to encourage savings and investment in order to create jobs.

In this area it is going to be necessary to make choices: Which is the priority of priorities? Is it jobs or raising the standard of living of those who presently have jobs? That is the first problem which it will be quite necessary to decide without, for all of that, lowering the standard of living of those who presently have a job.

It is necessary to assure this social category of the maintenance of its living standard, in order to be able to use all the surpluses of the economy to enable other categories of people presently without jobs to have access to jobs and to the sme livng standard. This will constitute an improvement of the general living standard in Tunisia. It is an important choice.

Regarding emigration, I do not think that it is as difficult as people say. It is difficult, certainly, when it is directed toward the traditional countries to which we have sent workers. However, there are other possibilities. Our problem is not to find jos for emigrants but to create a balance between the needs which are evident in many countries and in particular in fraternal Arab countries, and the technicians and the people whom we are able to train, whom we are capable of preparing to assume a certain number of functions.

Therefore, there is, on the one hand, a problem of balance and on the other hand a problem of means. We should carry on a policy of establishing a presence, since we have attained a certain technological level in different areas. This level if relatively valuable, if you compare it with that achieved by other countries. Many doors are opening, more and more before us. The latest conversations which we have had with different delegations from numerous, fraternal countries, both near and far away, show particular predispositions regarding Tunisian competence, regarding Tunisian work, regarding the general behavior of Tunisians. From this point of view the doors are not closed--far from that.

The third question is jobs. To be precise, the figure of 65,000 jobs is a very substantial figure and one which will require considerable efforts to achieve. This will demand meeting a certain number of conditions.

It is clear that if these conditions, which I have just mentioned in different areas, are brought together; that is, if we succeed in promoting the exports of industrial products, if our companies orient themselves toward foreign markets, if they move beyond domestic protection and direct themselves toward what is called "the high seas" in the economic sphere; if we succeed in achieving the investment programs which we have established for ourselves--and in this area I must say that we have identified enough projects to achieve the objectives which have been set out; if we finally succeed in doing that, why be a pessimist?

Were we sure we would achieve the creation of the 40,000 or 45,000 jobs set out in the Fifth Plan? Nevertheless, we did so. The events we have mentioned, the development of a certain level of production, the expansion of our export receipts, thanks to petroleum and thanks to the factories which we have built, have made possible the simultaneous creation of a very large number of jobs and have provided decisive help in the creation of jobs. Why, then, won't favorable conditions be created tomorrow, thanks to the factors which I have mentioned here and thanks to other, external factors?

[Question] Among the agreeable surprises which we have seen in the last few weeks was the discovery of promising indications of new petroleum and natural gas deposits. Some economists say that is likely to hold off development of a Tunisian petroleum deficit, on the one hand, and to increase our resources on the other hand. What are the new prospects in this regard?

[Answer] On this question it is necessary to be precise. We cannot yet speak of discoveries at this stage. We can only say something which is very important--and I said it in the statement I made after having met with the president to present the situation to him. There are very promising indications which have appeared in geological zones which, up to now, were considered as having no possibility of being producers of petroleum. Now, this kind of geological zone exists in large numbers in Tunisia. We should not know until the months of December or January which are the largest areas among the first possible zones. However, what is very important is that, thanks to these new factors, entire sectors which were considered as definitively out of the running, being unable in any case to contain accumulations of natural gas and petroleum, are now of interest to prospectors once again and are considered as becoming promising sectors in the years to come. This is the most important element. Most of the drilling areas are onshore. Moreover, the evidence of that is very simple: Whereas all of our direction of effort and orientation was toward the seas and toward the offshore areas, 5 or 6 years ago, presently, from the point of view of research, we have seen an actual reversal toward the land, since we are going to have about

two-thirds of the exploratory wells drilled on land and only one-third of the exploratory wells drilled at sea. This is a real change of direction. Because on land every discovery, however slight it might be, is economically viable, since it does not require as substantial investments as those at sea. At present we cannot yet speak of discoveries. However, we have great hopes that we did not have at all just a short time ago.

[Question] Then we do not have any idea of the possibilities for exploitation.

[Answer] Yes we do, since everything which we find on land, and because of the marginal investment involved, can be exploited. The more so as the country is not very large and as natural gas ducts and pipelines exist in these regions and rather close by, and because the port facilities make it possible to ship these products out without very substantial infrastructure investments. Any production of this kind is of interest to the country. What is its importance? If I tried to answer that, practically speaking it would be speculation, pure and simple. In a year from now we will have much more precise data on all of the possibilities which exist in different regions, of which the principal ones are Sfax (the coast and on the borders) and Herid (Chott Herid in the South, which covers the area from the Algerian border region to Al Hamma in Gabes). Those are the regions of particular interest. In any case, the indications should not be taken into account in our calculations.

[Question] Couldn't that serve to introduce new dimensions in the directions of the national plan?

[Answer] For the moment, not at all. In my view that would be a very serious matter. Those are factors which we should never take into account, because technical obstacles could develop at the most unexpected stages, and even at the final stages. We could even find substantial deposits from which it is impossible to "extract" the petroleum. There could be faults within the layer which are found eventually and which show that the deposit is not of the size which we originally thought. Those are factors no one knows. Even the greatest petroleum companies in the world will tell us the behavior of deposits is often impossible to foresee. The "el Borma" field, for example, should have been declining for a very long time. We made investments there. The field has a youth which, I hope, will be a long one. The same is true for the Ashtart field, which was to have an unforeseen additional productive capacity. It is also the case with the natural gas deposits which we are going to begin exploiting. We do not know exactly what it contains. We only know what it will give us in terms of the minimum quantity of petroleum.

[Question] In this sense people are asking about the periodic increases in the price of gasoline and other fuels.

[Answer] The prices in force in Tunisia were those of a country which was a large producer of petroleum. The danger which concerned us the most was that of the day when we would no longer have petroleum products produced within the country. How would it be for an economy which pays for its petroleum products at a price which is one-third their value to have to face the shock which the importation of these products would represent? Raising prices was therefore required. You can't be a responsible official in a country and accustom it to things which may disappear in a rather short space of time, since Tunisia will become a net importer of petroleum in 7 years, if you consider the present prospects. You can't lead a country without deciding anything for a period of 7 years, only to find yourself, from one day to the next, under the obligation to increase the price of cement by 300 percent, to

increase the cost of transportation by 250 percent, etc. The example of Poland is there. For that reason it was necessary to increase progressively the cost of energy, with the effects which we have seen. That is, an increase in the prices of electricity, transportation, cement, steel. The increase in prices in general of all products in which energy enters as a significant factor. It was necessary to increase these prices so that the economy of the country would be in a position tomorrow to face up to the eventual import of petroleum. Because even if we can, by one or two discoveries, put off the end of our petroleum by 5 or 6 years, in any case the need to import petroleum will occur one day or another.

I don't think that Tunisia can meet its petroleum needs indefinitely from domestic production. The same is true for the rest of the petroleum countries, as petroleum is a non-renewable source of energy. It is a matter, therefore, of getting the economy accustomed to a price which is not necessarily the world price, but which aims at staying close to the world price. This action is necessary. We must do it. It would have been easier to put off the end of our estimated reserves and to leave the problem eventually in a few years to other persons to handle. That would have been irresponsible behavior. The fact that certain persons criticize the increase in these prices is also irresponsible behavior. These prices must increase progressively and in a selective way, as we are in the course of doing. We are increasing the prices of certain categories of products. We have left others. We have taken into consideration the position of citizens who are in difficult situations. We have not raised the price of kerosene, with all the perverse effects involved. We have put aside natural gas in tanks.

However, we are obliged to increase the prices of other products. It is not normal to let the few resources which we possess be wasted in this way. That would have been an irresponsible attitude. We could have left for 6 or 7 years a situation which must be resolved now. If the cost of energy had not been increased, we could never have brought out the natural gas in the ground. For example, why should people use the natural gas tomorrow which we have brought out, which will be marketed at a certain price, if they can have fuel oil or gas-oil at a lower price? That is the simplest example. You come to a situation where you cannot place a vlaue on your patrimony. Tunisian natural gas will be sold at around $100 a ton of petroleum equivalent (TEP). If the Tunisian prices are lower than $100 a ton, why should the factories change their equipment to use this gas? Why should all operating companies think of using it? They would prefer to use the same products as at present. The Tunisian economy must prepare itself to live some day without protection.

Our country has so limited a market that it is unable to live as a close system. Tunisia cannot live as an autarkic economy. It imports a certain number of its raw materials and its food, and it is obliged to export a certain number of its products. Sooner or later, we must lift a certain number of barriers such as the control of prices and control over exports in order to free the country. How can you free the econom of a country if it is not at the levl of the other economies which surround it?

[Question] It has been remarked that the level of industrial integration remains relatively low. Have specific solutions been found for this situation?

[Answer] The rate of integration is very high in certain areas and very low in others. On the other hand you can have a product with a very high rate of integration which

does not have the best standards and the best quality, just as you can have a product with a low rate of integration which can be of good quality and which can be very well accepted by the people.

The rate of integration is certainly an important choice on the overall economic level, but it is difficult to apply it in all sectors.

There are sectors where you cannot go beyond a certain rate of integration, considering the phenomena of size which our economy has. Personally, I think that the law passed in 1980, which replaced the law of 1974, is very clear on this point as far as industries are concerned. Our direction is toward encouraging the rate of integration.

On the overall economic level, an economy must have the maximum degree of integration. However, we should not make this into an obligation, unless we cannot achieve the same industrial development. We have promulgated a law which takes these factors of integration into account, which also takes into account the factors of decentralization, and which tries to provide a certain number of changes in the 1974 law. This was a good law, moreover, in the sense that it responded exactly to the needs of the time, since it was enacted to promote all these manufacturing industries established in Tunisia. These industries have contributed to the creation of 20,000 jobs, which is not a negligible factor. We have made changes in this law to encourage that, and we also favor arrangements under which we seek to bring in a certain number of industrialists as partners, in order to achieve what are called compensatory formulas. Events have proved that we were right. For example, we asked a certain number of private companies which sell their products in Tunisia, which up to then only assembled their goods, to provide us with balancing, compensatory formulas. Still by way of example, we signed an agreement with the French firm Peugeot, under which this company, in exchange for a Tunisian market in which it continues to assemble vehicles, has committed itself to proceed industrially with a high level of integration of parts in a sector equivalent to the automobile industry. Under the agreement the parts used would reflect valid conditions of price, quality, and technology. An agreement with General Motors in Kairouan has also been signed, as well as a third agreement with Renault, which will set up a factory at Mateur.

[Question] That is, in regions where such industries did not exist.

[Answer] Which will have the effect of providing a technological stimulus to these regions. This is because it concerns advanced technology. What we are in the course of undertaking in this area I think is applicable to many other areas. I said a moment ago that both such sectors as electricity and electronics, as well as others, can be opened to Tunisians. I think that the quality of Tunisians' technological work could permit the establishment of industries much more developed than those of the 1970's.

This is not a criticism. Quite the contrary, this is a new stage which we are tying to achieve, and it is the second stimuls which we are trying to give our policy. The 1972 law was much criticized at certain times. The 1972 law is an excellent law because it made it possible to export in many area. We are going to use it in these new areas, but it will be a completely different kind of use. It will be a use of the law, very fully integrated in the technologically developed sectors.

[Question] That brings us to speak of the economic role of Tunisia developed by your ministy, and which has identified all the areas where we face problems of jobs as well as economic infrastrucutre. What are the actions already undertaken or to be undertaken in concrete terms to eliminate progressively the flagrant imbalance between the coastal regions and the rest of the country at these levels?

[Answer] Action in terms of our structures and other incentives have been provided for in the framework of the 1980 law. Structural changes have been made in the form of particular action to develop industrial zones in order to try to put in place the infrastructure necessary for the establishment of these industries in regions other than those normally chosen for industrialization (it is necessary for the roads to be equal to the concept; it is necessary for the telephone service to follow, etc.). It is also necessary to create in these regions special interest zones which will give people who have the opportunity to choose other zones to find the propoer conditions for industrial work which is satisfactory, with all that that implies in terms of facilities and the general environment. This is the policy on which the government has decided. I think that you have noted, despite this very short period of time, all the efforts which have been made in terms of roads and a certain number of other areas to permit this policy to succeed. The prime minister and the government have, on numerous occasions, confired this desire to provide the various regions with the means necessary for their development. An economic policy costs a great deal in the short run. In the long run, it is not expensive, because the various regions will make better investments now than when confronted later on with the problem of large-scale sprawl associated with a city like Tunis, Sousse, or Sfax. The political will of the government exists to do that. However, it is necessary to mobilize the maximum of resources to attain these objectives. The visits which certain high officials of friendly countries are making, or rather the statements made on the agreements which have been entered into in terms of investments show this will, since investments are being directed more and more toward the interior of the country.

Regarding incentives, they are very clear.

Presently, we have established several zones which we have classified into categories 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. In regions 3, 4, and 5 we have accorded substantial advantages like total assumption of infrastructure work (cost of the land and all expenses related to the establishment of the undustrial unit). We have provided subsidies for each job created (1,000 dinars per job in the fifth zone). And when the project reaches a point of no-return, we unblock 50 percent of this sum. Beside the cost of infrastructure, these incentives amount to substantial expenditures estimated at 40 million dinars of indirect subsidies since the law went into effect, which will be given in this way so that factories will be established in the interior of the country. This amount is calculated on the general average which we provided for establishment of industry in the interior. We have noted during the past 2 years an increase in the number of industrial projects. Since these measures went into effect, the percentages are less and less unfavorable for these regions by comparison with the coastal regions.

[Question] A look at our trade balance makes it possible for us to note that our exports are concentrated on a few products and above all in several traditional markets. Doesn't the danger in this situation threaten the deterioration of our trade deficit?

[Answer] It is clear that a large part of our foreign trade is covered by four export products: Petroleum, phosphate and related items, textiles, and olive oil. Nor should we forget that we export a multitude of other products. However, we should broaden this range of products. It is for this reason that we spoke a few moments ago of the importance of sectors like the mechanical and metallurgical industries. We still have extensive possibilities for devlopment. We must not remain dependent on a single product. The best proof of this capacity for development is phosphate. We bagan with an inexpensive product, very little appreciated, to reach today two industrial programs which are particularly remarkable: In Gabes and in Sfax, and with a varied range of products. We have reached a position where our production is no longer subject to the fluctuations and phenomena which generally affect the production of a single product, since we produce super-phosphate, phosphoric acid, DAP, MAP, etc. Further, we are in the course of developing in Zarzis a new industrial center which will permit the manufacture of a certain number of products like potash. That will permit us to complete the overall range of our chemical production with the factories at Gabes and Sfax, that is, in the area of fertilizers. In this area a diversification of markets has been achieved. We are not dependent on a single market. We operate more or less everywhere in the world, from Indonesia to Northern Europe.

In other areas, such as textiles, we can achieve diversification in production. The capacity which our textile industry has displayed up to now has resisted the shocks imposed by the European countries.

Regarding present markets, I think that we have an interest in keeping our traditional markets, without forgetting to produce more and to go some distance to sell it.

I don't understand why we should not maintain our position in the European Economic Community, which is our trading partner and our geographic neighbor, even if we go on to seek our other markets for increases in production.

This should not stop us from developing trading relations in particular with the countries of the Arab world. The best example is the effort which we will be able to achieve by means of an agreement, in fact, with Libya. We have achieved remarkable scores in terms of exports and imports. We are going to buy many products from them, and we have already sold them many products. We will sell more to them.

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No. 2424

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30 October 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2424

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MUJAHEDIN WANT SAM-7'S TO STOP HELICOPTER ATTACKS, LOSSES

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 25 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by Aernout van Lynden: "Rebels Against the Russians--12 Weeks With the Afghan Resistance Fighters"]

[Text] In Afghanistan, the resistance is engaging the Soviet forces in heavy fighting. Aernout van Lynden is a Dutch journalist who has spent 12 weeks with the mujahedin in Afghanistan. He conclusion: The rebels cannot win the war.

Finally we had reached the valley. The sunset glow was lying over the steeply rising mountain chains in the west. The men had returned home from the fields. Small columns of smoke were rising above the villages--a sure sign of supper being prepared. We slowed down as we approached the village where we intended to spend the night. A welcome change! We had marched 14 to 16 hours a day, and had done so 4 days in a row, to cross the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. I was finished.

Only 10 days before, in the Pakistani provincial town of Peshawar, where six leading Afghan resistance organizations had established their headquarters, a commander of the strict Islamic Khalis faction of the Hezb-e-Islami had made us the offer to accompany him on his return journey to Afghanistan. I had accepted. Five days later, having meanwhile become familiar with my pseudonym "Nadrang" and the unusual dress, I joined 50 mujahedin--fighters of God--on a sticky brightly painted bus. In 11 hours it took us to the border town of Parachinar. There our track to Afghanistan began.

If one wants to pass the many police stations in Pakistan unmolested, it is advisable to dress in Afghan clothes--wide pajamalike trousers, flowing long shirts, a sleeve-less jacket and a round Nuristani cloth cap. In Afghanistan too it is better not immediately to stand out as a foreigner.

At first glance the green valley with its peaceful villages and the houses with their loam walls did not look at all like the rebel fortress Commander Abdul Haq had told us about. But on the very first day after our arrival I came to know better. Eighty men equipped with the most varied arms had gathered on the village square framed by trees. "We are in luck," said Abdul, showing his excitement. The mujahedin who lived here were about to leave to attack a Soviet transport on the Kabul-Jalabad road. We were to accompany them. Done was the hope for some rest, however brief....

The next day, shortly after noon, the rebels attacked, about 30 kilometers east of Kabul. A couple of Russian armored personnel carriers had become visible in the turn of the road. The guerrillas fired at them from their hiding places with three bazookas. Immediately the machineguns mounted on the vehicles opened fire, firing blindly at the edges of the mountains. There was no escape, however.

A Gruesome Scene

Seconds later, both vehicles lay in the ditch on the side of the road with their wheels pointing upward. One grenade after another was still hitting the wrecks. Dirty black smoke pervaded the gorge. A couple of heavily laden trucks, their engines aflame, came to a rumbling halt.

And then, in a gruesome scene, the Afghans vented all their hate of the Russians who had occupied their country. Two Soviet soldiers who had survived the attack were creeping from one of the armored personnel carriers. One of them, evidently still in shock, climbed up the incline toward the road. No sooner had he reached it than his body was torn apart by machinegun fire. His comrade met with a more horrible end. Two guerrillas, coming out of their hiding places, each lifted up a piece of rock and then, fired up by shouts of "Allah-u-akbar" (God is powerful) by their comrades, had the rocks come down on the skull of the huddled soldier. Not quite 5 minutes had passed since the convoy had turned up, and the rebels had vanished in the mountains again.

This attack and other fighting I witnessed later on the plains north of Kabul showed me that as soon as they have modern weapons the rebels can face successfully the excellently equipped Soviet troops against whom they were helpless a year ago. Most of the guerrillas whom I encountered during my 2 and 1/2 months in Afghanistan were armed with the standard Soviet Kalashnikov AK-47, while last year they still carried old fashioned Lee-Enfield carbines and hunting rifles. Above all, every mujahedin group has one or two Russian launching platforms for antitank grenades. They know how to handle that equipment.

Where do these arms come from? I saw a lot of Kalashnikovs and antitank ammunition, partly still packed in plastic with Chinese and Egyptian labeling, which the mujahedin commanders admitted had been supplied to the rebels in Pakistan. In addition to Chinese and Egyptian arms, the resistance fighters took delivery of some Kalashnikovs, antitank rocket launchers and other weapons of Russian origin which are freely available commercially in Pakistan. But judging by all that I saw and heard, most Soviet arms were conquered in fighting or had been taken by the many thousand deserters from stores of the Afghan Army.

The U.S. journalist Carl Bernstein, who became famous for having uncovered the Watergate scandal, recently wrote in THE NEW REPUBLIC that the CIA was coordinating a five-nation aid program for the Afghan resistance. Primarily it was aiming at procurement of urgently needed SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles. Maybe some sort of air program exists, with Pakistan, the United States, Egypt, China and Saudi Arabia having a hand in it, but it is precisely SAM-7's--and antiaircraft weapons altogether--that the mujahedin lack. During my trips through those areas in which the rebels are best organized and armed, I found no indication, and did not even hear a rumor, of resistance groups having as much as a single piece of launching equipment for antiaircraft missiles.

No Cure Against Helicopters

In order not to repeat the mistake by the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets limit their operations to main roads and large valleys. In the process they predominantly employ armored vehicles and combat helicopters, in which their personnel are exposed to the least danger. During the attack on the Kabul-Jalabad road, it turned out, however, that tanks and armored personnel carriers are no longer invulnerable weapons immune to guerrilla attack. It is only the combat helicopters that are virtually immune. Time and again we witnessed the enormous destructive power of the Mi-24 helicopters equipped with bombs, rockets and three heavy machineguns.

It is the villages that suffer most from them. True, the thick loam walls of the houses prove amazingly solid, but I saw only few villages without craters or ruins.

Disgruntled, the Afghans wonder why no one is helping them out with arms with which they can defend themselves against those miracle flying machines of modern Russian war technology. Western military experts agree that employment of SAM-7's drastically changed the course of the war in Vietnam, and they think that the same thing could happen in Afghanistan.

Incidentally, the control by the Soviets of the main roads and the big valleys is not all that great. During the second week of my stay in Afghanistan I was taken along to the Province of Parvan, to a plain about 60 kilometers north of Kabul. To my surprise we marched to the very center of the plain, no more than 3 to 5 kilometers from Bagram Airport, the second most important Soviet military airport in the country. Here the rebels cannot anywhere flee into nearby mountains if the Soviets launch a surprise attack. But that does not seem to bother the men.

Actually we had started toward Bagram to witness a bigger event—an attack on the neighboring town of Charikar and on the Soviet armored units guarding the Salang road connecting Kabul with the Soviet Union. It did not come to that.

Instead I was able to watch from very close by the cruel fighting that had broken out north of Bagram between various other rebel groups—disputes by rival units which have impeded the resistance against the Marxist regime in Kabul since the beginning of the fighting.

The fighting is taking place primarily between the two parties of the fundamentalists—the other faction of Hezb-e-Islami, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and the Jamiat-e-Islami. Village elders tried to mediate. They were appalled by Muslims fighting Muslims and also afraid that other groups might become involved in the fighting. I witnessed such a mediation meeting in a mosque near the airport.

The day before, fighting had erupted between Hekmatyar and Jamiat. The shooting lasted the whole night. At dawn the Russians attacked. Six helicopters fired with rockets and machineguns on the small town of Mahmoud-e-Rhaqi, and then 10 MIG-21 jets bombed the place for 10 minutes, razing it.

In the afternoon the village elders, old men with long white beards and gaunt faces shuffled into the tree-surrounded year of the mosque. They were followed by younger people, ammunition belts slung over their shoulders, pistols striking against their hips, holding AK-47 automatic rifles. The gathering quickly turned into the kind

of palaver the Afghans seem to be especially fond of. Fifty men were taking at the same time. Only seldom did one or the other commander manage to make himself heard and to make known his opinion. The Jamiat commander stated that he saw no sense in further fighting. The leader of the Hekmatyar, on the other hand, persisted in his aim to drive all Jamiat people from the region. In broken English he told me: "Jamiat no right here; belong to me."

This remark reveals the cause of all these factional fights--personal rivalries between various leaders and local commandants. What is at stake is regional hegemony--to be able to state in the Pakistani border camps and before all the world, "My party is in complete control of the territory."

On the third morning after our arrival in the hills of Paghman, northwest of Kabul, where the rich citizens of the Afghan capital used to have their weekend houses and mansions, rain clouds were hanging heavily over the land. The wind was shaking the open windows. This did not bother the 14 men who were sitting in a large circle on the floor attentively taking their orders from Abdul Haq. Their appearance startled me: they did not look at all like the rebels normally did. Soon I hit on it: the men were wearing their hair cut short and radiated the kind of authority I had not previously seen among Afghans.

A couple of men were about to leave the room when Abdul turned to me and said, "You'll be interested; these are army officers; would you like to ask them something?" Of course I did. I asked when these men had left the army. The reply amazed me: "What do you mean, left? They are officers on active duty."

Exemplary Security

The 14 noticed by doubts. One after the other pulled out his service ID. The ID's were in blue plastic covers. Then the senior officer--a colonel--offered to take me along to Kabul.

Kabul? Surely not. Did that mean that there was no truth to the reports about strict Soviet security controls? And where was I to spend the night there? None of those questions seemed to bother the officers. And the day after, I sat comfortably in the back of a jeep en route to Kabul, with two officers, this time in uniform, occupying the front seats. I spent 6 days in the city. Four committed civil servants provided me with lodging and told me the truth about the urban guerrillas in the capital.

The "urban mujahedin" live a kind of double life. The men I met work in the ministries during the day, but in the afternoon and at night direct all their energy against the government which pays their salaries. This is not without danger. The security measures are strict, with innumerable roadblocks, and there are constant threats of sudden and very thorough searches of houses.

My hosts told me that their efforts were limited to sudden attacks. Organization is tight, security exemplary. No unit has more than eight members, and all have at least two stores of arms. No group knows the real names of the members of other groups.

In all, I spent more than 7 weeks with the mujahedin in Paghman, in close proximity of the communist power center in Afghanistan.

In the past year the resistance movement has managed to keep its own in such a dangerous territory with extreme circumspection. While I was there, all of five Soviet attempts to drive away the rebels failed. At the same time the resistance fighters attacked the Russian guards posted around the capital night after night.

Ten days after having returned from Kabul we started again on our way back to Pakistan. After walking 38 hours for 3 days, we reached the valley where we had started out. I was appalled by what I saw. One morning, we found out eight Russian helicopters had bombed the village a full 6 hours. A total of 22 villagers had died, and 35 had been wounded. Of course such attacks destroy the internal structure of a small rural community. The survivors left their homeland and fled to Pakistan--just as 2 million of their compatriots had done before them.

The mass flight is making the fight of the rebels increasingly difficult. Most refugees are from the eastern provinces which the mujahedin must cross when they return from Pakistan. The villages are vital, providing accomodations and food but, above all, through their inhabitants, information about Russian and Afghan troop movements. One more reason why the Soviets attack these villages. Having recognized the problem, the Khalis party has ordered a group of mujahedin to stay in the hinterland, cultivate the soil and control the area.

Despite all devastations and havoc, despite the hammering air attacks, the morale of the resistance fighters has not been broken. In fact it is improving all the time. Moscow miscalculated when it sent its armed forces into the country to support a government which is largely unpopular. In the 20 months of Russian occupation, the Afghan Army has shrunk from 80,000 to no more than 20,000. This prompted the Karmal government a short time ago to call up all reservists under 35. And the Russians have to send increasing numbers of infantry into the plains. Their losses have increased steadily in the past year. Moreover the remaining 20,000 men of the Afghan Army are being made insecure by officers and comrades maintaining close contact with the rebels. I met 28 officers on active duty who were under the direct command of Abdul Haq. They were seeing to communications and smuggled arms.

Nevertheless there is nothing to indicate that the guerrillas will be able to win this war. Abdul Haq admitted openly: "We are only guerrillas. They are a superpower. We know that. And we also know that the war may last 20 or 30 years. In the meantime we will be able to smash their armor and hold out against infantry attacks. But we have nothing with which to defend ourselves against the helicopters and fighter bombers. Nevertheless we will not give up, for we are fighting for our country and for Islam."

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'ELECTION' WITHOUT 'MARTYRDOM' CONSIDERED IMPOSSIBLE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Oct 81 pp 1,2

[Text] At 6:30 when we went to the polls to vote we thought it was over at first, especially here in the Narmak and Tehran Pars area where there were no longer enough people to require a line.

When we stepped into the House of God, however, we saw a crowd standing in line in the last minutes of daylight on Friday just before the dusk prayer and the blessed call to prayer. We were completely surprised to see the line of voters longer than it was the last time, even though it was 5 p.m. when we came to the same polling place to vote last time and yet the line was shorter.

News and illustrated and non-illustrated reports from other parts of Tehran also reported the same phenomenon and some of them at least relate the same extent of public reception and ardor and joy that [illegible] the last time.

The Imam's words involuntarily come to my mind at this point, when he said "they say so-and-so is consoling the people, but the people are consoling us, I'm not consoling them. The people are consoling us with their meetings, demonstrations, and marches. It is our judgement that this is the case, and that our great masses give us all hope every time with their united presence not only in our marches and funeral processions, but at elections and fateful plebescites as well. To the officials, to the leaders, to themselves, and to the oppressed who are their marching companions on the other side of our borders, they grant assurance, pride, and power.

An important point that can be seen and evaluated especially in these two great and vital elections, the election of the previous president (Raja'i) and the present president is that the propaganda from the united counterrevolutionary front was intense and reached the highest possible levels, so as to create anxiety in the minds of some, and in the minds of some of us there was the fear that, God forbid, all this propaganda, accusations, fabricating of the news, and counterrevolutionary promises and threats might finally have some effect, however small, and cause some people to be cold and indifferent. An important point, however, is that every time election day was near there was an amazing outburst in which the blood of many of our dear ones was spilled.

Of course we know that the Moslem nation of Iran has identified its own path and that of its leader, and they vote on this basis, ridiculing the rumours of cursed,

ousted mercenaries like Bakhtiar, Rajavi, the power seekers, Bani Sadr, Madani, Nazieh, as well as the howling that comes out of their evil radio voiceboxes, and they cover the views expressed by members of the united counterrevolutionary front, which constantly come from the voiceboxes of the Voice of America, the BBC, the radio of the occupying regime, radio Cologne, radio Baghdad, and Oveysi and Bakhtiyar's radio, with derision.

Despite this, it cannot be denied that prior to every important "election" important "martyrdoms" have also taken place. It is as if God the great, God the transformer of circumstances, granted special attention and grace to these wonderful events. It is as if every plebescite and election has the necessary capital, activating power, lustre, nourishment, and blood before it begins. Blood must be spilled at the foot of every election, and we have sacrificed with every change. God does not give his bounty even to his beloved Prophet without slaughtering.

We all remember how, after Bani Sadr, known to the people as "the second Shah," was deposed, even though the faith, recognition of the truth, and revolutionary zeal of the people, especially in those first fateful days, had been proven, some expressed concern that the number of voters in the second election for the second president might not be as high as desired, which is to say more than that of the first election.

This time the desired figure was more than that famous 11 million!

The election of the second president was barely over when suddenly the tragedy of an unprecedented explosion at party headquarters and the merciliess and savage slaughter of 73 oppressed martyrs took place.

This tragedy even shook some of the revolutionary government's opponents, brought some indifferent people out of their so-called neutrality, and changed the atmosphere of society with indescribable swiftness. It was if warm running blood had been poured into a dried-out body. The veins came out of their places like roots, came to life, and fresh blood flowed.

Therefore, a very high price was paid for Raja'i's election. Before this great and historic election a man of Beheshti's great stature was sacrificed as an oppressed martyr. It can be said that what happened after the counting of the votes was his pure blood oozing out drop by drop, as well as that of 73 others. A short time before the tragedy at party headquarters Dr Mostafa Chamran also went the way of the martyr. Dear Khameneh'i also, despite the fact that, happily, he remained alive—and we thank God from the bottom of our hearts for this blessing—went to the edge of martyrdom and back and is thus today a true testimony of "living martyrdom."

As for the third election, Khameneh'i's election last Friday, the same story was repeated again. On the eve of the election, first, as we all know, there was the sickening, bloodcurdling murder of Ayatollah Madani, the devout scholar of Tabriz. Then there was the tragedy of the martyrdom of that vociferous crusader, Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Nezhad in Mashhad, and we were again confronted by a sudden momentous event. The suspicious and mysterious crash of a military airplane and the martyrdom of more than 30 people, including Major General Fallahi, Brigadier

General Namju, Brigadier General Fakuri, brother Kolahduz (deputy commander of the revolutionary guard), brother Jahan Ara (commander of the revolutionary guards of Khorramshahr) was a repetition of the tragic explosion at party headquarters, of course on a different level with different dimensions. The importance of this event will be noticed and emphasized when it is made clear that it took place simultaneously with the timely invasion of Damshan by the combative forces of the army and the revolutionary guards and the intensification of their strikes to regain the occupied portion of Khorramshahr.

Both on the eve of the previous election and on the eve of this election, people may ask, why was it this way? The martyrdom of Beheshti was a great and regrettable loss. The martyrdom of the commanders of the fighting forces is a great and insufferable sorrow, which, God forbid, could possibly turn into a psychological advantage for the enemy and a psychological setback for the forces of Islam. It has not turned out that way, however, and it must not. Rather, it has been just the opposite. It appears that the martyrdom of these people was a necessity. It insured the revolution. It gave the "election" power, greatness, and luminosity. It was an election that vindicated Islam and the most genuine and highest divine values.

The word "election" has its roots in the word "elect," and this very divine blessing is the greatness of human beings. Whatever we are comes from this power of choice. It is through choice that human beings build the world, history, and themselves. It is through choice that every human being can create heaven or hell for himself, both in this world and the next. "Elections" are also a manifestation of this same great blessing and a draught from the same sea. Such an election, then, must be made possible with blood.

God would not have chosen Abraham without the sacrifice of Isma'il. Jesus would not have gone to the heavenly kindgom without going the way of the sacrifice. He would not have chosen John without him being beheaded, nor Zakaria without him being cut in half, nor Mohammed without all his fighting and sacrifice, nor, finally, Hosayn ibn 'Ali (Peace be upon him) without seventy sacrifices.

If you think about Raja'i's election, every vote can be seen as a drop of blood that was spilled at the feet of the "election," just as was done in this election of Khameneh'i, who has placed every cell of his precious being in the position and office of the presidency of the republic. Every ballot cast can be seen as the drops of blood of the "sacrifices of the elction." We are sure that Khameneh'i is immersed with all his being in these same blessed feelings and thus we will never regard the blood of Beheshti, Montazeri, Madani, Hashemi Nezhad, nor the blood of Namju, Fallahi, Kolahduz, and Fakuri as spilled in vain.

O God! At every turn the necessary "sacrifices" have been made for these "elections." The people have voted. You also, accept this sacrifice from our nation. You also, choose us!

9310
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IRAN PLEDGES TO SUPPORT EGYPT IN ESTABLISHING ISLAMIC RULE

Tehran ETTELA'AT INTERNATIONAL in English 14 Oct 81 pp 1-2

[Text]

The man who lived in suspended isolation from reality finally paid dearly for his "heroism in search of peace". With his death a peace agreement signed between a "man" and a "government" is endangered. Yes, Sadat is no more. his funeral took place in complete secrecy in Cairo. Perhaps if such a sending off ceremony had not been organized for him and if three previous U.S. Presidents had not participated in his mourning festivities some people would still doubt his dependence upon the United States.

It is not the first time that a men like Sadat has died in such a tragic way but surely it is the first time in Egypt that the people needed special permission to participate in the funeral of their "Leader".

The number of Arab participants among the world leaders tells us still more. Even those kings and presidents who gave full support for the traitorous projects of Sadat did not dare come to Cairo to pay tribute to the memory of their great ally. Why? This one word question has thousands of reasons and answers and the most important one is that the people are angry with them in the Islamic World.

The death of Sadat is not the simple passing a way of a dictator but it is the death of a current. American, as well as, the Zionist regime had put their greatest hope in him to force history to proceed in their interests. The Tel Aviv regime which is blind to the path of history tried to obtain assurance from Sadat thinking this would secure them in the Arab World. Because all those who follow falsehood are forced to reconsider the situation when it is too late the daily Ma'arie writes "With Sadat's death the one man one state agreement is put to danger again". With Sadat the west had decided to take revenge on Nasser.

Sadat was a man of long term projects and to realize his plans he knocked at every door in the west. He, like the deposed shah alongside whom he is waiting to be forgotten, selected America not as a political alternative for his nation but as a means of remaining in power because he was never a popular based choice.

It is truly unfortunate that men like him do not learn from events happening in other parts of the world. The fate of Nguyen Diem in Vietnam, the sad story of General Park in South Korea the unhappy end of King Faisal in Arabia, the pitiful downfall of the Shah of Iran are stories that Sadat witnessed. It seems that unlike the great leap in science and technology of our contemporary century, and inspite of the fact that the world dominating powers have been repeatedly exposed for their unreliability the political leaders in the Third World especially in the Islamic states have learned no lessons from recent history.

Had not Sadat seen how the three U.S. presidents taking part in his funeral had left their puppets at the crucial moments of their political lives. Then why did he take so many risks? Was he was deceived by his western allies? Were his advisors negligent in fulfilling their duty to guide him properly? Was he obliged to? Surely neither of these. Surely he consciously committed all the unpardonable crimes in his political life.

Sadat was very hypocritical. And so were the men who flattered him. He took great pleasure in appearing on the T.V. He had an unquenchable thirst for fame. And in achieving it he exaggerated so much that instead of being famous he will remain as the most notorious man in recent Egyptian history. Like many of his counterparts he betrayed the convictions of his people. Once in the United State when he was asked if he did not fear the "risks" he took for "peace"? He replied demagogically "I will not die one hour before my God has decided I should die". Inspite of this alleged conviction whenever he decided to move in Cairo his security guards made several circles around him.

Sadat had a devilish skill in discrediting others to his own credit. In order to neutralize the endeavours of the Muslim groups in Egypt he did not even make an exception for the Christian Churches. Very recently he attributed the setting fire to churches in Cairo to the Muslim Brotherhood groups. He also was a man of formalities. Whenever it was needed he arranged a referendum to impose newer and harder restrictions upon the Egyptian people. His last one was the restrictive measures he took in order to ban political activities in the universities and at mosques.

Sadat prepared his plans like a sly fox. And he realized them step by step. His sabotage of the unification scheme with Libya is noteworthy. To get rid of any such plans once and for all first he arrested his political rivals under the banner of "objection to unity with Tripoli". Then he purged the army and put his "own officers" in the key posts. And when every thing was ready he denounced any alignment with Libya.

Notwithstanding, from time to time, in order to distract attention from his dependence towards Western powers he pretended to decide stubbornly in a personal way. Every one remembers his shameful decision to go to Tel Aviv. He ordered his men to spread the rumour that "he did not consult with any of his advisors and his decision to visit Israel was totally personal". But who does not know that such a plan was precisely drawn a long time ago?

Sadat committed the same error as did the deposed shah in alienating his people from their 14 century old Islamic culture. Sadat was not a religious man but he was fully aware of the power Islam held among the Muslim masses. Sadat had witnessed how the most powerful regime in the Middle East was toppled with the cries of Allah-o-Akbar. Although he received the deposed shah in his country, he insisted that his fate could never be the same as that of the deposed Shah. At any rate Sadat is no longer around to serve the ends of world imperialism.

Today Reagan and Begin are very disappointed. Begin knows that sooner or later the great people of Egypt will rise and neutralize all treacherous plots against their best interests. Although we do not believe in miracles except through the prophets we can say that the downfall of Sadat for Egypt is not less than the destruction of Pharoah by Allah's will at the hand of the great prophet Moses (A.S.).

Our Muslim brothers and sisters in Egypt should increase their activities now that the big dictator of that country has been deleted from the political scene. They should take this sign as a blessing and should know that it is only by self reliance that they can get victory. The children of Mohammad Abdoh are now under a great test. They should take the best advantage of this historical opportunity in toppling the hated regime of Sadat and his mercenaries like Hosni Mubarak. When a noble people are put before a great test it can manifest nothing but revolutionary patience and boldness. As Imam Khomeini said in the ratification ceremony of President Khamene'i if the people of Egypt pour into streets and chant down

with America the new ruling clique will leave the political scene to the real leaders of the Muslim people of Egypt. We are sure that the Egyptian people will succeed in their struggle against the world devouring power.

Allah wants to show to the people of Egypt that neither East nor West can be a point of security for the Muslim people. The experience of Russia with Nasser is enough for our brethren in Egypt to be sure that Moscow is no better than Washington. The Iranian people fully understand the difficult situation of the people of Egypt and will remain alongside them with unwavering solidarity. We pray for the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Egypt and we warn the Egyptian strugglers against frustration or dismay. Allah is with those who fight against falsehood and we do believe that Egypt will demonstrate its capacity for assuming the responsibility of a great Islamic Revolution. As the famous Tunisian poet says:

"When a nation has decided to live
Fate cannot but respond to its demands;
And the night cannot but come to an end
And the chains cannot but be broken."

CSO: 4600

FEMALE DEPUTY DISCUSSES KORANIC, REVOLUTIONARY ROLES OF WOMEN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 14 Sep 81 pp 15, 2

[Text] [Interview with A'zam Taleqani, Tehran Majles representative]

I do not know why whenever the conversation turns to women and their duties, everyone expects this discussion to be the result of a historic day or the birth of women leaders in Islam. Perhaps one of the reasons which has prevented us from seeing the role of women in society is this very unfounded point of view. One of the steps towards the womens' rights is this very role of women in society. The women of this country, with their initiative and resistance against the Shah's regime, proved their worthiness and capability throughout the revolution, and they are not in need of any sort of role assignments from others. It seems, however, that after the triumph of the initial phases of the revolution, and now that we are in the rebuilding phase, we are witnessing some carelessness with regard to this. Therefore, at the level of newspapers and newspaper publishing, which truly reflect reality and point out solutions to problems, we have come in confrontation with the issue of women, and the problem of how to shoulder a certain amount of the responsibility of presenting it. As a beginning, we have decided to interview several of society's influential women. As you can see, our present interview is with Ms A'zam Taleqani, Tehran representative in the Majles, in which several questions have been raised about women from the point of view of ideology, society, and politics.

Question: How does the Koran see women? What are the duties that the Koran designates primarily for women?

Ms Taleqani: In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Your question is really twofold, one concerning the Koran's view of women in general, and another what are the duties the Koran designates primarily for women? The Koran presents the woman as a human being beside a man. It does not present the man as one thing and the woman as another, it considers both, from the standpoint of essence, as human beings, and this can be easily seen in the Surah of Women, The Family of 'Imran, and the Clans. It says in the Surah of Women:

"Oh mankind, you spouse has been truly created with you from one single soul. He/she and you have not been created separately from any other thing. You are both from one single soul. Then you as men and women from a single soul have been scattered over the earth." It thus shows that this essence was of one primary substance. It was really a single cell which multipled and generated a man and a woman, and thus two beings who form a single entity were created.

When the Surah of the Clans says: "we offered faith to the sky, the earth, and the mountains, and they all rejected it. Only human beings accepted it," this is talk in general terms, these things are discussed generically. Therefore, prophecy and faith among the people are really to be interpreted as the responsibility of both man and woman. In any case, most verses, in discussing prophecy, responsibility and creation, speak of human beings, and not men or women as such.

In another verse we have it that "We will give a pure life to whoever does good work, whether man or woman," provided, of course, that they are believers.

Therefore, gender is not a factor when it comes to one's Islamic obligation. Both sides must discharge this obligation. The form of the obligation, however, varies in different situations and under various conditions, though the Koran, Islam, a woman, like a man, is considered human, responsible, committed, and faithful.

There is no mention of superiority for either of them. Piety is the only standard for superiority.

In other places where the superiority of men and women over one another is mentioned, greater obligations are designated in some matters. Take finances, for example. Since a man is better able to do society's harsh jobs because of his physical attributes, and to do hard work outside the home, he is better able to pay for things. This is why he takes the responsibility of managing for a woman's material needs.

Therefore, if we hear a Tradition or a story somewhere that wants to attribute overall superiority to man over woman, or woman over man, or to belittle women for example, on the basis of the science of Tradition, we cannot accept the belittlement of woman in relation to man, because every Tradition and story must be based on the Koran, reason, consensus, and the Traditions of the Prophet. If we read something somewhere that does not correspond to the Koran, our reason, our Traditions, and the views of the religious scholars, we do not accept it.

Woman's Obligations in Islamic History

From the day the prophecy of the prophets began and the imams emerged, we see how much greater is the woman's burden of obligation than is man's. How, if we consider the matter of superiority, overall you can see that a woman is a producer. She is a producer of human beings and an economic producer.

At the same time this production must be linked with training and being constructive. Her basic role, then, is really that of fashioning human beings. The work and the prophecy of the prophets took place on this basis. Producing human beings, training human beings, and guiding human beings are not simple tasks, they are the work of the primary teacher of a human being, and a teacher in general. The woman is thus presented as a teacher and an educator, and she must train human beings both from the point of view of the body and of the mind.

For this reason, she must remain detached from the discomforts, the conflicts, the agitation, and the difficulties that afflict the process of training her children, so far as this is possible, in order to give priority to this responsibility, and then, along with this responsibility, she can carry out other obligations.

Apart from obligation, again we see that the faces of women is discussed in the Koran, the faces of positive women, the faces of negative women, the faces of faithful women, even the faces of corrupt women, whom the Koran groups with those who deserve divine punishment.

On the one hand we have Hagar, Asiyeh, and Mary. As you know, Hagar is an emigrant who found the revolution of Abraham, the revolution of unity. The area around Mecca is revitalized because of this person. Therefore, we see that women have a basic role in completing the revolution.

Now that they are asking why women did not become prophets, I can easily show indications from the Koran that women train the prophets. There must be a good reason for that. We see that it is Mary who brought up Jesus. Who is Jesus? Jesus is a prophet. Alongside these positive faces, however, we see negative faces such as that of the wife of Abu Lahab [both Abu Lahab and his wife were among the Prophet's enemies], of whom the Koran says, "And his wife, the wood-carrier, will have upon her neck a halter of palm-fibre." This woman's burden of sorrow is to bring firewood and build fires. She is a firewood carrier, and she stokes the fires of Hell. She wants to whip up flames and cause trouble, and to incite her man against God.

Of course Abu Lahab himself is ready. The two of them together bring wickedness to perfection.

In any case, from the conclusion that can be drawn from history, religious law, the verses of the Koran, a knowledge of human beings and a knowledge of women drawn from the Koran, we see that she is a being that is human, whose burden of responsibility is much heavier than a man's. Her readiness and tolerance in the face of difficulties is greater, and with the greatest possible amount of forbearance under her belt, she rebuilds the system. Therefore, she must not give birth and then step aside. She must give direction to her children, and really, with one hand she must rock the cradle and she must turn the wheels of society with the other.

Question: What, in general, has been the role of women in the course of the world's revolution? Give some historical examples.

A'zam Taleqani: In the history of Islam, in the revolution that Imam Hoseyn started, you see that it is Zeynab who completes this revolution. By the same token, after the Prophet's death, the responsibility of completing the Prophet's mission falls to Fatemeh, because after the Prophet Fatemeh Zahra felt the obligation, because she is not just the Prophet's daughter. Thus she must continue on the path that the Prophet traveled. She must take responsibility and watch the situation with her eyes and ears in order to explain every deviation. It is she who completed the revolution. Then you see that Zeynab completes this revolution. Apart from these responsibilities, other responsibilities also fall on the shoulders of women.

Even in Mottahari's book of stories of the righteous, we read that the Prophet brought 10-11 year-old girls to the field of battle to look after and nurse the wounded. Women played a part in all the wars and raids. If they did not go to the front lines, they were behind the lines. Since their responsibilities are very heavy, they must be protected and preserved. Therefore, they do not go to the front to be more quickly destroyed. They must remain, in order to continue fulfilling their responsibilities.

In order to continue the movement. In the course of other revolutions also, in general, so far as I recall, women have a basic role in the Algerian revolution, in carrying news and weapons, providing facilities and shelter, and other activities. Most important is our comrade-in-arms Jamileh Bu Pasha, with whom I once spoke when she came to Tehran. She said, before we began this revolutionary movement, that is the uprising against French imperialism in Algeria, which also had Islamic roots, the commander of one of the battalions was a woman, who was killed. Women continued fighting later in the same way throughout the Algerian revolution, albeit on every sort of occasion and under all conditions. I do not want to say that we must discard Islamic principles, because these very Islamic principles are the foundation of the revolution. In order to carry on revolutionary tasks we must not discard Islamic principles and then justify it. I cannot accept this. Islamic principles must be preserved in every revolution. The struggle must be carried on with these principles in view. One may not turn away from the principles, because the very turning away from the principles is really a blow to the revolution.

Women also had a great role in the revolutions of Cuba and Vietnam. None of them are on the sidelines. In Cuba, Russia, and in the great French revolution, there are women who had active roles. In Vietnam, which is the most recent of all, many women fought alongside the Viet Cong, and suffered and resisted a great deal. Today they work shoulder to shoulder with the men as insiders in the activities of society. Thus a woman, who is a responsible human being, cannot be dispensed with in any revolution.

Question: To what extent have women been pioneers and innovators in the Islamic revolution of Iran?

A'zam Taleqani: In relation to the Iranian revolution in this past century, there was the Tobacco Rebellion, which was directed against English colonialism. And in reality there is the Razhi proclamation, in which women have a fundamental role, women are active. In the beginning of the Constitutional Revolution women were also active, women were killed, women bore arms, and this movement is a movement which follow the others. Especially in the Iranian revolution that propounds Islamic ideology and mobilizes men in the same way, earlier than that, it also mobilized the women and we see that in the past we had many women imprisoned, and many women tortured. We were not lacking for sisters and mates of all kinds, we had many of them, and then during that year which was the peak of the uprising, these women had a fundamental role up ahead of the men, babes in their arms and on their shoulders, in these marches, in these demonstrations, in giving form to these demonstrations, in giving them greatness, and in encouraging the men.

After the revolution, the women are again in the center of the activity. There are various faces in different places. They have been given room and they are busy working, at everything from working at the front to sewing blankets, procuring food

supplies, and giving their children, loved ones, and husbands to God. In my view, however, with all these examples of those rights that the government ought to find for them at the very least, there is much left undone, and women have not attained their rights completely and as a group, because all women had a role in this revolution and have done all this suffering. Of course, they do not want a reward, but they demand the justice of getting their rights. This must be given to them, because it is their right. Remember the Imam's recommendation that you must give women their rights because women are oppressed in the Iranian family. We are waiting for officials who will address themselves to the anxiety and discomfort of women. Truly, with the suffering that women have endured, they must be given their rights. Women have shown that they are deserving. It remains for these officials, who must now give them their rights. If they do not, they are officials, and they must give an answer. If we want to air grievances in this regard, I have much to say. Where can a woman go who lives 20 or 30 years in her husband's home until he divorces her, and what can she do?

Her children have grown up and have gone away. Now that she is old and needs care, they abandon her. Even if they are ready to give her some money, she cannot have a place with security. When these people are not given an income, what do our courts really do? They punish the man. Or only the man can divorce his wife. I cannot say too much. They may say that Islam has ordered that if a man does not provide his wife with an income, they must be separated. But if a man has money and an income, shouldn't they take some of the money and give it to her? If he does not have it, a job should be created for him. If he has it, then they ought to take some of his money and give it to her. This continual divorce, separation, and scattering of families is not enough. The woman must be protected from the standpoints of material, mental, and emotional matters. This is very important. If the children develop complexes, the next generation will have children, the daughter and the son will marry and the same complex will be reflected in the next family. These are thus matters to which officials must direct their attention. Don't say that these problems are a group of separate problems. These matters are important, because the family is important. Because the family if the real core of society.

Question: Why are our young girls participating in political groups which are active in creating disturbances? Is the participation of young girls in these groups the result of extensive ideological studies or is it purely because of shortcomings in society and family, and is there a strong emotional side to this?

A'zam Taleqani: I think this is a feature of the revolution. When the revolution happened, an environment conducive to the cultivation of capabilities was formed. So far there has been disproportionate development, and something must be done now. On the one hand, the social climate has developed politically. The political growth of society, in comparison with its ideological growth, is more advanced. Meaning, Iranian society has not developed ideologically since the revolution, relative to political development, of course, because political development is much more evolved than is ideological development. That is, orthodox doctrine and political policy have not moved together. Society's political climate, especially for women, is something in which women participate. Girls at the ages of 14, 15, and 16 are automatically going through puberty. It is an empty phase, and they want to destroy what they have obtained up until now, and replace it with a new edifice.

This edifice has and has had a direct relationship with the country's officials and the administrators of every organization and department, and especially teachers and officials in the schools and mothers and fathers, who are very responsible, because if a teacher and a mother and a father can fill this emptiness, there is no need of filling it through others. When this emptiness is not filled, however, someone who realizes that a void exists will fill it. My conscience and my being are much concerned from an Islamic and humanitarian standpoint about why our young people are turning out this way. Why is this blood being spilled on both sides? Notice that these young revolutionary guards are being killed for love, and the same goes for the youths who are caught by them. This is really disturbing, and I find it tormenting. I am expressing my hope for their success everywhere, and I have also told officials that I am ready to do anything I can. In any case I have said many times to the teachers that I have encountered and even when I was an educator myself that we must do something to get these young girls on the right track, because it is mostly young girls who are active in this, and the young men are not involved to this extent. It is these young girls who want to build a new edifice in their own minds. It is here that we must look after them with various tactics, and in this instance the Islamic method is the best method. I am on the side of the school officials, the teachers, the institutions, and the father and mothers. When I have seen that a girl has come home late, instead of the father and mother asking her why she has come home late they whip her. It is not the fault of the father and mother. They must be taught to look always for the cause and to fill this void with the program that officials give them in order that in this way they will not be drawn into deviation. It is very painful to hear that our children are being pulled in this direction. I do not want to reject struggling. The struggle always exists, but bearing arms against whom and against what system? Truly, I say right here, and I want you to write it in the newspaper, these young people are making a mistake. This system is not a system for a person to stand up against with weapons. This is a system that must be criticized, and a struggle must be made against deviation, but we must not take up arms. To take up arms is to fulfill the wishes of the enemies of the revolution. This is truly treason, and the traitor will himself be banished. I say this from a position of compassion and pain. These children are all our children, and before it is too late we must think about what these young men and women are lacking and what they want. That is, we must confront them sincerely and they must say what they have to say. We must guide them, not by telling them that they are counterrevolutionaries and to get back to work. No. Let's find the root of the problem. This is our task. I leave the work of the courts to the courts themselves. Of course they must have a program. These youths must at least be given a period of grace in order to think and come to their senses. When their ties with the organization are cut, they will find themselves alone and only then, they will analyze what they are doing. By the same token, guidance in this matter for the officials of the prisons and the courts is of utmost importance, so that they can be shown the way and they will remember how to think properly. Then we will see that 99 percent of this group will go to the war front and offer themselves to be martyred. I have spoken of this matter to some of the brothers in the Majles. I believe that if I am mistaken I am ready for others to correct me. I will accept it. It is logical, it is Islam, and there is nothing else but this. The Imam affirms all this, they may return, and many of them have returned, and this is the substance of our hope.

Question: This issue shows, then, that they have not done that much ideological study?

A'zam Taleqani: I say they have not entered into ideological study. Many of these people, so far as I am aware, just go into these organizations becuse of political issues. The malfunctions that exist in this system, the confrontations with some officials, and the failure to satisfy the hopes and desires of the young people, have been passed around by word of mouth and laid at the feet of various groups. So far as I am aware, perhaps 90 percent of those who have entered these organizations have no basis in ideology or study. My whole criticism was this. What are these people, who do not know the intellectual basis of this or that group saying? How can they accept it? If they were to tell me now to join a certain group, I would not go very easily. I did not join in the beginning, and will not now. Why won't I go? Because as long as I am not sure of their way of thinking, I will not join. My future positions will be based on the same foundation. If the foundation of your thinking is affected by deviation, the positions you take will be affected by deviation as well. As a result it is possible that you may study the issues intellectually, but analyze them unrealistically, thus, you will end up more confused. Therefore, it someone wants to separate himself from the issues and think realistically, he is a responsible person. I have a message here for these girls, and it is that I am a mother and a person in this society to whom the people have given responsibility. Furthermore, I was also a teacher for several years. I had contact with the young people and I have contact with them now. I want to say, so they will know, that I do not confront issues from the standpoint of love and hate, but from the standpoint of truth and what I have taken from Islam. Let me say to you that the path you have taken against this system, so far as you damage the roots of this system, is a mistake. It will go nowhere, it will dissipate, and you may be sure that if you are alive afterwards you will be sorry, and if you are caught, others will be sorry for you. Come back. I do not negate constructive searching and criticism, but there are different ways to confront matters. It was one thing to take up arms, as you did, against the former regime, but I ask you, is it right to take up arms against the Islamic Republic? In this system, we must bring the forms of deviation to the attention of the officials and discuss problems, but from a position of compassion, interest, commitment to the revolution, and commitment to the Imam, and not from a position where we are studying matters from the point of view of one group of issues, seen only from one side and one dimension. Onesidedness will indeed destroy us. This is my criticism. God willing, if someone has a point to raise against my views, he will be able to convince me. I hope God will guide all of us.

9310
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IMPORTANCE OF NATIONALIZATION OF FOREIGN TRADE STRESSED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 30 Sep 81 p 6

[Text] Statements by the Ministry of Commerce concerning the nationalization of foreign trade during its last press conference awakened the hope in our hearts that the government is absolutely determined to put Article 44 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran into effect.

Just as the (necessary) suspension of implementation of paragraph "J" of the land reform law has prevented the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development from bringing a fundamental change in agriculture to the implementation stage, so has the delay in nationalization of foreign trade brought irreparable damage to the country's economy, because a few big capitalists, of whom the number of those active is very small in comparison with the thousands of small and medium-sized businesses, have played a major role in creating "artificial" inflation through speculation, futures trading, price gouging, colluding with brokers and middlemen, hoarding goods, and finally selling them on the black market. The psychological effects of these measures in creating dissatisfaction with the people and disenchanting them with the fruits of the revolution are much more damaging than the material damage suffered by the toiling and deprived people.

The nationalization of foreign trade, the establishment of true cooperatives and numerous government stores to sell basic goods will put a stop to the artificial growth and abnormal pricing resultant from the failure to eliminate middlemen, major capitalists and speculators from the nation's foreign trade.

In the aforementioned statement the Minister of Commerce has rightly regarded a balance between imports and exports as the basic condition for restoring the health of the country's economy. We must remember that in the former regime, because of adherence to an "open door policy" and the changing of society to a society of consumers, Iran's imports increased deliriously and unreasonably, so that in the year 1356 [21 Mar 1977-20 Mar 1978] this figure exceeded 14 billion dollars while the value of Iran's non-petroleum exports barely reached 600 million dollars. To put it more simply, Iran's trade deficit in that year was about 14.4 billion dollars, and this takes no account of the importation of arms and war materials. Taking these items into account the trade deficit that year drops clear into hell.

Nationalization of foregin trade will play an important part in reducing this imbalance because the government, by applying itself to the matter of foreign trade, will prevent Iran's trading partners from looking at this country as a market for selling their industrial products without feeling any responsibility to buy goods from Iran.

If we study the geographical distribution of Iran's foreign trade carefully, we can easily see that in 1356 Western countries had control of 85 percent of Iran's imports, and another 10 percent of Iran's imports was in the hands of their proteges (South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, the Phillipines, Pakistan, and...).

Japan's Cat Dance!

After the blooming of Iran's splendid Islamic revolution, because of innumerable problems and obstacles in the way of carrying out the government's plans, and also because of preoccupations caused by the imposed war with Iraq, there was no opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in the Islamic Republic of Iran's foreign trade. Although the volume of imports into the country, because of treasury limitations, economizing which restricted imports of unnecessary goods, and some reduction of currency manipulation, was less than 10 billion dollars in 1358 [21 Mar 1979-20 Mar 1980], Western countries kept their share of Iran's foreign trade so that in that year nearly 80 percent of Iran's imports came from these countries. Dependency on a small number of markets for obtaining merchandise made things that much worse when the country was faced with economic sanctions. According to reports from French news agencies, in the second half of the month of Shahrivar [Aug 23-Sep 22] of this year, 13 Japanese companies have announced their intention to refrain from renewing their petroleum contracts--that is, the daily purchase of 230 thousand barrels of oil--with Iran. An interesting point here is that Japan, which is now doing a cat's dance for us to show that it has the proper attitude towards American imperialism because of Saudi Arabian treason and the cunning underselling of oil, was the biggest seller of merchandise to Iran in the year 1980, and, according to the publication MIDEAST MARKET dated 15 June 1981, has exported 1,570 million dollars worth of merchandise to Iran. The government, by proclaiming its control over foreign trade, can easily prohibit the importation of Japanese goods, or give Japanese companies notice that they can only export goods to our country to the extent that they buy equivalent amounts of oil. In this event, the International Trade Organizations and Japanese industries will regret their practice of taking the cream off the top.

Prevention of Illegal Exportation of Currency

According to the views of some insiders in customs, foreign trade was the biggest channel for the illegal exportation of currency, because when the government closed the principal channels of currency exportation, smugglers posing as "merchants" represented goods being ordered as costing more than the actual cost by presenting fabricated statements. Can't the government "control" the price of a few types of goods bought from a few score different markets? What a lot of documents were opened whose goods never came into the country. This is the reason the Central Bank of Iran decided this year to obtain a letter of guarantee from importers in order to license merchandise. When an importer, for example, names a per ton price of 800 dollars for his merchandise instead of 400, he puts half of the converted currency in his own pocket (half for you, half for me, and God

bless the provider!). Many dealers in merchandise, especially in countries whose commerce is not based on the criteria of law and morality, are ready to make up statements to order and to take a percentage based on the importer's illegal profit.

Nationalization of foreign trade is not an unprecedented step. Many countries in the world have adopted this system and have acquired valuable experience. The results of this experience can help officials to carry out the critical responsibilities they have in this sensitive time.

The nationalization of foreign trade, which is the true desire of millions of struggling, oppressed, Moslem Iranians, can remove the major burden of high prices, price gouging, and hoarding, which weighs heavily on the shoulders of society's most oppressed people more than anyone else. It is hoped that the Commerce Commission of the Majles, by being quick to study and approve a bill for nationalizing foreign trade and by pressing on for true implementation of Article 44 of the Constitution, will say Amen for God's sake to this logical request.

9310
CSO: 4640/17

TERMS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH ROMANIA ELABORATED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Oct 81 pp 16,15

[Text] Mohammed Taqi Banki, Consulting Minister and Supervisor of the Planning and Budget Organization, explained all the principal points of the economic cooperation agreement between Iran and Romania in a press conference yesterday morning, and discussed the government's aims with respect to this economic cooperation and its relations with various countries.

Overall Goals

He began by discussing the government's overall goals in its relations with various countries, taking into consideration the priorities in these relationships: At the present time aggressor governments are trying to isolate Iran, and through the use of economic sanctions and pressure, by way of their agents in the area, to bring Iran to a state of submission. Since we are committed, however, in the presence of the blood of our martyrs, we must show the world that we are a nation that will not back down, and that we are committed to securing our own economic growth. On the basis of the slogan 'neither East nor West,' we have designated a group of priorities for purposes of relations with various countries.

The Basis of Cooperation

He added: The basis of our cooperation in relations with various countries, taking priorities into consideration, is firmly grounded in the principle of forming relationships with countries that either accept this revolution or take a positive or neutral position, and we intend to make active contact in such instances.

Romania's Positive Position

Concerning economic cooperation with Romania, Mohammad Taqi Banki said: we view Romania as a country that has taken a positive position with respect to our revolution, and while it had low priority compared to other countries, it expressed a greater desire for cooperation with us, and it was on the basis of the expression of their desire that we allowed an economic group to come to Iran from this country.

The Supervisor of the Planning and Budget Organization added: Actually, this group was invited to Iran with three matters taken into consideration. The first was that they were familiar with the revolutionary aspect of Iran, and the good experience we have gained with respect to it, and we saw how much they were affected.

Imam Khomeyni Port

The second issue was a study of former economic relations between Iran and Romania, with which we have also had notable success. One was that we made arrangements with Romania, in view of the problems we had in Jolfa, to ship goods to us from now on by way of Imam Khomeyni Port, and in this regard we were able to come to mutual agreement.

The Inspection of Merchandise

Also, since merchandise imported from Romania formerly varied from the original samples, this matter was brought to the attention of the group and it was seriously requested that the above merchandise be subject to inspection.

The third issue was the expansion of future programs and the shipping and exporting of non-petroleum goods. We agreed that the level of non-petroleum trade would not exceed 80 million dollars per year.

Implementation of Article 44

He continued: Another point of agreement with this group was the implementation of Article 44 of the Constitution, on the basis of our request of them that henceforce they should have absolutely no dealings with brokers and middlemen, and that they should definitely deal with the purchasing centers of the Ministry of Commerce in order to sell their merchandise, to which they agreed. Concerning the decision on this matter with regard to the rest of the countries, Mohammad Taqi Banki said: We are very serious about implementing Article 44 of the Constitution, we are committed to it, and in our relations with the rest of the countries this will also be taken into consideration.

The Main Points of the Agreement

In continuing his remarks, Mohammad Taqi Banki explained the main points of the economic cooperation agreement between Iran and Romania as follows:

Six commissions were formed by the government with regard to this group. They are the Agriculture, Commerce, Industry, Mining, Road Construction, and Power Commissions. Each was formed under the supervision of an aide from the pertinent ministry for the purpose of defining our needs. These commissions held various meetings, defined needs, and set the agenda of the talks. Later, when the group came to Iran it was arranged that on the first day the group would name the things they are able to offer us so that we would then be able to identify areas of economic cooperation on the basis of their resources and our own needs. This was done and the agreement was set in the following areas.

Petroleum Sales

Concerning petroleum sales it was agreed that the amount sold would increase from 2.5 million tons to 4 million tons in 1982. In this matter they expressed anxiety but we told them we would be able to meet our needs in various areas through the Romanian market, and we were able to reach agreement there. With regard to price, we told them we would not be able to undercut the OPEC price, and they accepted the OPEC price.

Oil Refinement

Mohammed Taqi Banki said that petroleum, gas, and petrochemical projects were discussed. The Romanians expressed an interest in participating in reconstructing and modernizing some of the refineries, and we made a commitment to send the necessary information to the Romanians within 15 days and to send a group of specialists to them to provide details. It was also arranged that the Romanians would send a group of their specialists to Iran within 30 days at most in order to work with us on extracting, producing, and refining. In the matter of refining it was agreed that 30 thousand barrels of oil would be sent to Romania daily for refining and it was agreed that this would end in the first week of October. Furthermore, the Romanians expressed an interest in exporting natural gas. Concerning this the prices and limitations set by Russia were discussed.

Locomotive Purchases

Mohammad Taqi Banki said: In the area of Transportation and Shipping it was specifically arranged that we would buy 50 locomotives from Romania and rent 30. We also came to a mutual understanding on a Romanian proposal with regard to building ports and railroads involving their giving mechanical equipment and management assistance in the carrying out of these projects.

Electricity and Water

The Supervisor of the Planning and Budget Organization continued: In the department of electricity, water, and energy it was arranged that the Romanians would take on commitments in the areas of organizing hydroelectric dam projects, water distribution, building hydroelectric power plants, the purchase of products and goods needed in the distribution of electrical power, and also with regard to training technicians in the planning, organizing, and execution of electrical work. It was stipulated that within 60 days a group of Iranian specialists would go to Romania and study work capacities and their producing institutions.

Fisheries

In the agricultural department agreements were made in the area of fisheries and it was arranged that the Romanians would build refrigerators and fishing ports and we agreed that a group of Romanians would come to Iran before November of 1981 in order to obtain the necessary information. Arrangements were also made for a group of Iranians to go to Romania in connection with livestock purchases. A group of Romanians will also come here in order to increase Iran's agricultural capacity.

9310
CSO: 4640/18

SALE OF ATOMIC FACILITIES DENIED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Aug 81 p 3

[Announcement by Dr Fereydun Sahabi, supervisor of the Atomic Energy Organization]

[Text] The supervisor of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) termed the rumor of the sale of the existing equipment in the Bushehr atomic reactor baseless. Dr Fereydun Sahabi, AEOI supervisor, concerning the sale of the equipment in the Bushehr atomic reactor, stated: The sale of equipment from the Bushehr atomic reactor is a baseless rumor, because the aforementioned reactor as a whole is not at such a stage that its equipment could be sold. That which has been brought up in connection with the shutting down of the Bushehr reactor concerns unnecessary and unuseable equipment which will be sold if a suitable market and purchaser can be found. He added: Of course AEOI has not yet made any definite decision about the sale of this equipment. Sahabi also said: Of course a certain amount of equipment built for the Bushehr reactor is in Europe at the present moment because the contractor has not yet delivered it to Iran. Furthermore, because atomic energy activities in Bushehr connected with the construction of the atomic reactor have been cancelled, and because unfortunately no definite program has been implemented for the utilization of the Bushehr reactor complex and its facilities, AEOI has not simply been content with their maintenance, but has transfered them to various points, including Bushehr Province, in order to implement programs needed by the country. These facilities are used in cooperation with the Reconstruction Crusade. Furthermore, AEOI personnel in Bushehr have on their own initiative taken action to offer services, build spare parts, and to supply the country's existing needs in the area of construction plans and projects, such as making prefabricated parts for the ministry of power and other ministries. At present there are plans underway to convert the Bushehr atomic plant to an industrial training complex for the Fishing Industries Support Staff or for the Institute of Marine Scientific and Technical Training. The aforementioned plans will be put into effect when appropriate. Concerning the activities of the AEOI center in Tehran, Sahabi said: From the revolution's beginning extensive activities and research began in Tehran in keeping with the goals of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Among them one can mention research in the fields of nuclear fundamentals, nuclear technology and the exploration of radioactive substances.

At the same time AEOi has decided to take steps to build small-scale training and research reactors in order to teach the technology for building atomic reactors in the country.

Dr Fereydun Sahabi added: At the present moment Iranian experts have been mobilized in the Technological Research Center in Esfahan to define goals and to prepare plans for AEOI. Our employees are also active in the Tehran AEOI center in the areas of nuclear research, atomic physics, chemistry and problems of safety and protection against radiation so that they can prepare themselves to build reactors in the framework of a scheduled program.

According to a PARS NEWS AGENCY report, the AEOI supervisor, concerning Iran's participation in the Energy Conference in Nairobi, said: AEOI's deputy office received an invitation to participate in the Nairobi conference. There was the possibility for us to show the world the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran's achievements in the energy field by participating in this conference. Unfortunately however, participation in this conference was not possible for various reasons.

9557
CSO: 4640/102

MINISTRY OF LABOR REORGANIZING TO IMPROVE SERVICES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Aug 1981 p 11

[Text] Programs of the ministry of labor and social affiars in six areas will be as follows:

1 - Administrative

Preparation of a new organization plan for the ministry of labor in order to improve delivery of services entrusted to it, based on an avoidance of administrative and personnel expansion by using:

a: Workers in a cooperative and consultative form
b: Cooperation with revolutionary bodies, particularly the Reconstruction Crusade
c: Greater strengthening of the evaluation office for the rapid study of shortages and supervision of work performance

2 - Adjustment of the Labor Market

As long as the issue of private ownership and standards for capital investment remains unclarified, the employment situation will find no release from its current disorganization. The ministry of labor considers it its duty to make the greatest possible persistent efforts in order to eliminate this fundamental problem. Under current conditions, goals include improving the employment situation, support and expansion of production cooperatives, divestment of private ownership, and start-up of idle factories (whose arrogant owners have idled the capital of the Moslem nation by fleeing the country or for other inexcusable reasons). It is thus recommended that the ministry of labor and social affairs improve employment opportunities by regulating the labor market and harmonizing work with manpower estimates in order to guide economic programs, as follows:

a: Creation of a center for manpower statistics and information
b: Expansion of a job-finding network
c: Preparation and regulation of a work identification card
d: Creation of unemployment insurance
e: A plan for a work corps (Sepah-e Kar)
f: Drawing up a program for the transport and transfer of the labor force
g: Increasing employment opportunities for part-time, temporary and seasonal work, particularly in the village agricultural sector by drawing up contracts for work and agricultural work

h: Putting the international labor market in order from the standpoint of educating manpower, dispatching workers abroad, and attracting Iranians committed to the Islamic revolution who are living abroad
i: Preparation of a plan for mobilization and start-up of industries and development plans
j: Creating the capability for complete supervision of the methods of industrial, agricultural, service and development capital investment, and guiding it towards a balance of supply and demand in the labor market
k: Creating the capability for complete supervision of the import of foreign goods in order to protect craftsmen, thus increasing productive centers
l: Studying the revival of small traditional national crafts which are at present in a state of decline

3 - Regulation of Labor Relations

Establishment of an Islamic order in labor relations and the protection of the labor force in order to improve work conditions by means of:

a: Preparation of a law governing work and agricultural work in cooperation with Islamic experts, workers, councils and managers
b: Continuation of the fastest possible formation of Islamic Employee Councils and study aimed at completion of council laws
c: Establishment of a revolutionary order in the workplace by preparing a plan for disciplinary regulations
d: Plan for an increased production bonus
e: Prohibition of profiteering in the work environment, particularly in brick factories
f: Drawing up contracts for work and agricultural work which will bring about a reduction of disputes in the workplace, specify authorities to resolve disputes, and increase workers' maturity in relation to production
g: Planning and implementation of employment classification
h: Creation of bodies to examine the problems of councils and strengthen them for overseeing social problems, such as distribution, monopoly, etc.

4 - Cultural - Expansion and Propagation of Islamic Culture in the Workplace by means of:

a: Creating a mobilization office for the growth if Islamic culture among workers, in cooperation with Islamic societies and councils
b: Creation of suitable facilities for the military training of workers, in cooperation with the Mobilization of the Oppressed, in order to expand and strengthen the twenty-million-strong army

5 - Educational - Improving the Quality of Workmanship and Increasing Effectiveness of Technical and Service Education by means of:

a: A plan for intern-training of inexperienced graduates of universities and higher educational institutions
b: Activation of vocational training centers and starting work-study programs
c: Technology transfer by means of complete supervision of all foreign contracts and the substitution of Iranian experts

d: Preparation of a plan for technical education in deprived regions by means of itinerant teachers
e: Educating workers and mangers conderning labor laws

6 - Welfare - Dissemination of the Cooperative Movement, Provision of Welfare Facilities and Expanding Workers' Participation in Collective Programs by means of:

a: Greatest possible expansion of workers' consumer and housing cooperatives
b: Creating complete supervision over workers' social security insurance
c: Expansion of recreation and exercise for workers

9557
CSO: 4640/102

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE TO CONVERT TO SERVICE CENTERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Aug 1981 p 3

[Text] Agricultural, rural and tribal service centers will be formed simultaneously with the dissolution of all departments of the ministry of agriculture and rural development concerned with agriculture. These centers will give technical, credit, research, support and educational services, and will distribute agricultural organs and commercial services. These service centers will be created in counties during a five-year period, according to current plans.

KEYHAN's economic correspondent reports that Mas'ud Khansari, deputy minister for rural services and land affairs explained the formation and activities of the agricultural, rural and tribal service centers in a press and radio-television interview.

At first pointing to the importance of creating these centers, he said: First of all the goal is that all the capital investment made in the agricultural area be focused on production and on areas where production exists. The service centers will take on this responsibility. In the past the ministry of agriculture operated in such a way that all the capital investment and even agricultural affairs offices were concentrated in the city-region centers. In addition, ministry of agriculture employees had no contact with village farmers. Instead, due to a failure to recognize problems related to farmers and farming, and a failure to observe each area's rural culture, most of the plans and programs related to agriculture met with failure. Since the goal of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to destroy all class structure, in the formation of these centers it is therefore striving to use committed local individuals, and sincere experts who will be able to live in rural conditions and associate on equal terms with villagers.

Khansari added: In accordance with the executive regulations which were approved by the cabinet in Tir [23 June-22 July 1981] of this year, 1600 service centers will be created throughout the country. This will envelop all Irans's villages with technical, credit, research, support, educational and commercial services. On the basis of these regulations, one service center will cover from 10 to 30 villages. Furthermore, upon the creation of these centers, all the bureaus of the ministry of agriculture and rural development concerned with agriculture will be dissolved. These centers will be the replacement for the ministry of agriculture bureaus. In Tehran only one office will remain, not as a center but rather as a staff for policy-making and planning.

He added: In these centers village councils have a great deal of authority, and service center planning will be done on the basis of the needs and problems which the village council proposes. In general, production will be turned over to the farmers themselves, and solely facilities and education will be handled by the ministry of agriculture.

He then pointed to the issue of training and agriculture based on scientific planning, and said: These centers will try to raise unit productivity. As an example, there are at present 6 million hectares under wheat cultivation, and if we raise unit productivity by using experts, we can greatly increase our production. Furthermore, in the area of animal husbandry, if research is done on local stock, a great many problems related to stock-raising will be solved. The deputy minister for rural services also said: Research relating to water and soil, creation of small industries, road-building and all affairs related to agriculture will be carried out in these centers. The regulation of agricultural water programs, a bill relating to which has been brought to the Majles, will also be overseen by these centers. The service centers are responsible for the control of all the water in their jurisdiction by means of dams, canals, wells, etc., and for bringing it to the farmers. This is because at the present moment 60 percent of our water goes to waste and is not used for agriculture. Similarly the creation of small industries in the villages, the distribution of fertilizer, seed and pesticides, making loans and purchasing agricultural products will be among the responsibilites of the agricultural service centers.

He closed by saying: The plan to create agricultural, rural and tribal service centers will be gradually implemented over a five-year period. At the present, 68 rural centers have been created, and the formation of another 200 service centers is part of the current year's program. Furthermore, a bill relating to the cooperation and coordination of 7 ministries in the creation of these centers has been brought to the Majles. This bill defines the duty of each ministry. The Reconstruction Crusade, which is a coordinating and supervisory organization, also has an important role in the service centers.

9557
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FAILURE OF IAEA SAFETY CONTROL IN IRAQ QUESTIONED

Duesseldorf ATOMWIRTSCHAFT ATOMTECHNIK in German Aug-Sep 81 pp 465-466

[Article by H. Gruemm: "Did IAEO Security Inspection fail in Iraq?"]

> [Text] The Israeli air attack on the Tamuz-1 (Osirak) research reactor in Iraq has strongly revived the discussion concerning the potentials and limits of international security inspections as they are carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] within the framework of the Nonproliferation Agreement. The assumption has been put forward that a major reason for the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor was a lack of trust in the effectiveness of the IAEA security inspection process. The assistant general director of the Security Inspection Division of the IAEA has reached certain conclusions on the question of the possibility of producing an atomic weapon with the aid of this reactor and on the effectiveness of the previous and planned inspection measures in the light of subsequent developments.

It has been claimed that Iraq has undertaken a program for producing nuclear weapons using the Tamuz materials test reactor. It is obviously not the function of the Security Inspection Division of the IAEA to speculate on the intentions of a country with fissionable material or installations which is subject to the security inspection process. It must assume from the start relative to all countries and all situations the possibility of diverting fissionable material for military purposes. Accordingly, we have not excluded this possibility in the case of Iraq and have investigated[1] all technical aspects of diverting the material now present in Iraq and that expected there in the future.

The development of an inspection concept for the Tamuz reactor began, as in other cases, a long time before the fuel delivery. It was clear that in the case of a high-power research reactor of the Osiris type two main diversion possibilities have to be countered:

1. The diversion of highly enriched uranium in the fuel elements and

2. The production of plutonium in breeder elements which are made for this particular purpose.

Deviation of Highly Enriched Uranium

We are convinced that the diversion of highly enriched uranium is effectively covered by our standard process for pool-type reactors. Our inspectors were present when fuel was delivered in June 1980. The fuel elements were counted, identified and the actual enrichment of the received uranium determined. Accordingly, an initial inventory of about 12 kg of highly enriched uranium was established. This is clearly less than a "significant quantity"[2] so that the diversion of the available fuel could not lead to an explosive nuclear device.

Keeping in mind the need to employ the limited personnel of the Security Inspection Division as effectively as possible, we decided to conduct two to three inspections per year so long as no additional fuel elements were shipped to Iraq. No additional fuel has, in fact, been delivered to date. This means that no possibility has existed or now exists to produce an explosive nuclear device by diversion of highly enriched uranium. Since the reactor still has not gone into operation, no possibility exists for producing such a device via the alternate path of plutonium generation in breeder elements.

In September 1980 the reactor was the target of an air attack which, however, inflicted little damage. Subsequent military protective measures were instituted which consisted of limiting access to the facilities and a nightly blackout. The second inspection was carried out in January 1981 during the night under wartime conditions. The illumination was adequate except in spaces with large unshuttered windows which could not be blacked out: Here only large flashlights were permitted. Nonetheless, the fuel elements which were stored in a canal under water were satisfactorily identified and counted as was the stored natural and depleted uranium.

For the case of further deliveries of fuel elements from France, it was planned to increase the frequency of inspection so that a discovery time was ensured which was adequate for the quantity of unspent, highly enriched uranium beyond a significant amount. Biweekly inspections were planned. It was also expected that the French experts and technicians who were involved in building the reactor would remain in Iraq for several years as advisors. They would still be responsible for the reactor during the startup period. Only after a period of operation during which the fuel would have become highly radioactive would the reactor have been handed over to the Iraqi Government. Since all of this would have lengthened the time required for the production of a nuclear weapon, the frequency of inspection could probably have been lessened somewhat. During this time, other surveillance methods could have been established. The presence of blind elements would have been ruled out through observation of the Tscherenkow radiation of the reactor core and the spent fuel elements.

For the diversion of a significant quantity, a large part of the fuel elements present in the installation would have to be removed. Without doubt such an obvious measure, which would have made reactor operation impossible, would have been discovered by IAEA inspectors.

The Production of Plutonium

When the IAEA was notified at the end of 1979 that natural and depleted uranium had been sent to Iraq, the presence of this material had to be taken into account in accordance with Article 81 of INFCIRC/153. Correspondingly, calculation of the

plutonium-producing capacity of the reactor was undertaken. It was determined that for the most efficient method, the reflector elements would have to be removed and 15 to 20 breeder elements would have to be installed between the fuel elements. In addition, the cooling conduit in which the reactor core is located would have to be surrounded with external breeder elements. Such breeder elements would presumably require additional cooling which could only be achieved at the cost of an unreliable system.

An additional possibility would be to surround the reactor core with vertical radiation channels which are normally on hand only in small numbers for isotope production. These channels would have to be filled with breeder material. Optimal configurations could result in the production of one to two significant quantities per year. Such production would however require rapid change of fuel elements (several reactor cores per year) which the IAEA would know automatically through its inspections and from information which France would have to report before delivery. The extensive modifications to the reactor which would be required for such plutonium production and which Iraq would have to report to the IAEA beforehand would be very easy to spot by visual inspection and other surveilance methods. Without doubt, delivery would be stopped immediately in such a case. The production of significant quantities of plutonium in such a manner in this reactor would certainly be discovered and thwarted.

It was claimed that a laboratory is located 40 m (the number was later corrected to 4) beneath the reactor. It was allegedly not discovered by the IAEA inspectors and could have been used for secret plutonium production. Obviously meant was the space under the reactor which houses the control-rod drive system. It is shielded above by a thick concrete deck covered by a heavy steel plate; it provides access for maintenance personnel. It is obvious that it is impossible to production plutonium in this space.

A relatively strong neutron beam can be directed into another underground space, a long experimental tunnel. The possibilities of producing plutonium here are, however, significantly lower than in the other arrangements described. Also, the capacity of this tunnel should be determined during verification of the reactor's construction before putting it into operation. If necessary, inspections of the tunnel should be planned.

Considering what has been said in the preceeding paragraphs, it is not necessary to spend any more time answering the charges made in the United States by a former IAEA inspector who himself was not in Iraq. He had to admit that our concept for combating the diversion of highly enriched uranium is effective, but maintained, however, that the inspectors could not have discovered plutonium production efforts. He was careful not to mention the necessary major and easily detectable changes to the reactor configureation and the strong dependence on plutonium production on French fuel delivery. He also forgot to mention that all of the other installations which are not subject to security inspection are useless without plutonium which could be produced only in the Tamuz reactor. He referred to two internally confidential documents which were made public to show that obstacles were present inside the Security Inspection Division which impeded a comprehensive inspection of Tamuz. These documents, however, only reveal the care with which the difficulties and possibilities of alternative security inspection aspects were discussed in the IAEA. He did not mention that the initial decision to investigate the question of plutonium production and to institute countermeasures had already been made at the beginning of 1980.

Security Inspection and What Then?

Getting back to the facts: It can be said that because of the very transparent construction of the reactor and the clear visibility of all significant changes to its configuration, both the diversion of highly enriched uranium and the production of plutonium would be discovered very quickly. This must also have been known to those who were worried by the technical potential of the Tamuz reactor. Thus, was the attack really due to a lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the IAEA security inspection? If correct information were available concerning the potentials of IAEA for detecting violations, why did the attack take place? I do not want to get bogged down in speculations about motives and intentions. A hint can be found in a statement made by the prominent Israeli Physicist Ne'eman in an interview with the Austrian newspaper WOCHENPRESSE. He said: "The mechanism of security inspection is good and reasonable as long as it is respected. The problem is that it can be rendered ineffective by a single party. A country can withdraw from the Nonproliferation Agreement with just 3 months notification according to Article 10."

It appears, thus, that we can draw an important lesson from this grievous event: We should not be concerned about the effectiveness of the security inspection alone. Quick discovery is only one component of prevention. The expected consequences of a discovery--the sanctions to be expected from the UN Security Council--have to represent the primary deterrent. Is the effectiveness of this punitive measure comparable to the effectiveness of the security inspection? This is a serious question which the responsible agencies must come to grips with in a fundamental way.

FOOTNOTES

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1. Iraq belongs to the 111 nations without atomic weapons which are signatories to the Nonproliferation Agreement and which have subjected their installations to the IAEA security inspection process. Of the 12 countries without atomic weapons but with nuclear installations which are not signatories to the agreement, 8 have yielded all important nuclear activities to special security-inspection agreements. Israel, India, Pakistan, and South Africa are the 4 countries besides the recognized atomic-weapon powers which have some installations that are subject to inspection and some that are not. These latter installations are capable of producing fissionable material of weapon quality (ed.).

2. According to IAEA definition, a "significant quantity" is a quantity of a particular fissionable material which (after discounting processing losses) is sufficient to produce an explosive nuclear device.

9160
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AMMAN DAILY CALLS ON EGYPT TO RETURN TO ARAB RANKS

JN080832 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8 Oct 81 pp 1, 17

[Editorial: "In What States Has the Feast Returned?"]

[Text] The Arabs and Muslims are welcoming a new feast [reference to Muslim feast of 'Id al-Adha] and the state of affairs continues unchanged: occupation continues to exist; al-Aqsa is still captive; the invaders continue to gallivant, build and settle in Jerusalem and the Holy Land; and the Arabs are still divided into scores of parts, as if they were not one nation but several nations separated by whims and buffeted by tempests.

When al-Sadat prayed in al-Aqsa 4 years ago, the Arabs and Muslims grieved, for the ruler of the biggest Arab state had surrendered and returned to Jerusalem as a peaceful and forgiving man, not as a reconciling knight. Now that al-Sadat has fallen, will the feast return with a new state of affairs?

There are several facts which impose themselves on the new leaders in Egypt: the Egyptian Arab people are strongly tied to their Arabism and Islam. They reject estrangement from the Arabs and disavowal of their Arabism and Islam. They reject alliance with Israel and the United States and refuse to have Egypt and the Egyptians become tools steered by the Pentagon toward death in battles not their own. Though captive Jerusalem appeals to them for deliverance, they are obstructed from replying.

Only a response to these facts can deliver Egypt from its ordeal and restore it to its status in the heart of Arabism and its international status which it customarily enjoys. Only such a response can enable Egypt to regain its role as the eldest sister around whom the Arabs rally, not an isolated and outcast Egypt that always opens its arms in welcome to any newcomer from Washington or Tel Aviv.

A great deal depends upon Egypt's return to its Arab position, particularly since the new leaders in Egypt are now aware that placating the United States and Israel is more costly to Egypt than angering and challenging them. These new leaders are also aware that Egypt's estrangement from the Arabs robs it of many of its characteristics and impedes its potential. At the same time, this estrangement deprives the Arab ranks of a great potential and robs the Arab chain of a major link that assists its regulation.

Will the feast return with a reforged chain and ranks, a better Arab state of affairs and a ray of hope looming for al-Aqsa and our patient kinfolk? This is what we ask God Almighty and pray for; this is what fills the hearts of those who believe in this nation and have faith in its essence and history. Many happy returns of the day.

CSO: 4404/44

LIBYAN ENVOY DISCUSSES AL-QADHDHAFI INITIATIVE

NC151736 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 15 Oct 81

[Text] Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus this morning met with the secretary of the Libyan Brotherhood Bureau, Salih al-Duruqi, and discussed the nature of the Libyan initiative on the Lebanese issue which was announced by Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. After the meeting al-Duruqi replied to correspondents' questions as follows:

[Begin recording] [al-Duruqi] We discussed the question of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's initiative on a Libyan role to save Lebanon from its ordeal. We discussed the details. We wanted to get the opinion of the minister and the Lebanese authority on this matter.

[Question] What was the minister's opinion in this regard?

[Answer] We know that the Lebanese authority supports any Arab role in the interest of Lebanon and the Arab homeland in general. His excellency the minister welcomed it very much, and gave some guidance on the subject of our contacts. As you know, we have not yet submitted the details of the initiative. We have postponed this until we complete our contacts with all the parties and the legitimate authority.

[Question] Can we know in brief whether the initiative means the dispatch of a Libyan envoy to Lebanon to hold contacts with the parties, or will this take place through your person?

[Answer] It is possible at a later stage that an envoy will come or that a summit meeting will take place. This depends on the opinion of the Lebanese authority and the rest of the parties.

[Question] Is it possible to learn the practical nature of this initiative?

[Answer] The aim, I think, is clear. It is to bring about a decisive end to the Lebanese problem by benefiting from all the previous initiatives. We are seeking to find a concrete solution to the Lebanese problem, which we think affects the whole Arab homeland. Any delay in finding a solution will have a negative effect on all the Arabs.

[Question] Is it possible to learn the Libyan visualization of the solution?

[Answer] As I have already stated, we have not worked out the details.

[Question] Will the contacts you are holding include all the parties in Lebanon?

[Answer] Yes. We are holding contacts and we shall hold contacts with any side that has an opinion which can benefit us in crystallizing the details and the features, which we shall try to carry out with the help of all the parties.

[Question] Are there contacts with the members of the Arab Followup Committee [words indistinct]?

[Answer] Perhaps we told this to his excellency the minister. We consider ourselves in one way or another as members of the Followup Committee, because the Followup Committee stems from an Arab summit conference which was held within the framework of the Arab League. We are members of the league and attended this conference. Therefore, we consider ourselves represented in it. We support any move. The success or failure of the committee does not affect nor does it contradict our initiative.

[Question] Is there a specific date on which the Libyan initiative will begin to take effect?

[Answer] There is no specific date. This depends on the completion of all the contacts and on providing the suitable atmosphere for this. [end recording]

CSO: 4404/44

BRIEFS

WOUNDED TO MOSCOW FOR TREATMENT--Some 45 wounded and disabled members of the Lebanese Nationalist Movement left for Moscow yesterday for treatment in USSR hospitals. The wounded and disabled were transported by a special Soviet airline plane and were accompanied by Dr 'Ali Bazzi. 'Ali Musawi, member of the Nationalist Movement Secretariat, said that a second batch of wounded will leave for Moscow within 15 days. He said that the 7-month visa granted to the wounded people can be renewed depending on their condition. [Unattributed report] [Excerpts] [PM011153 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 25 Sep 81 p 5]

U.S. ARMS CONSIGNMENT ARRIVES--A consignment of U.S. military equipment to the Lebanese Army arrived at Beirut port today. It consists of 44 armored troop carriers with their spare parts. A new consignment of French weapons that includes five armored vehicles will arrive at Beirut port on Tuesday. [Excerpts] [NC181400 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 18 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/44

DOMESTIC AGRICULTURE INSUFFICIENT; SOLUTIONS EXAMINED

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 17 Sep 81 pp 1-3

/Article by Halily Omar and Touhami Azzedine: "Food Production Shortage in Morocco"/

/Text/ We begin today the publication of extracts from a university study by Halily Omar and Touhami Azzeddine. The object of this study is to inform the public about the seriousness of the food situation in Morocco and, on that basis, to draw attention to the seriousness of a problem which, unfortunately, is still present. Following is the first part of this study.

Introduction

The objective of agriculture is to provide the country with food products.

Agriculture has fundamental importance in the national economy. Both from the human as well as the economic point of view, it is an extremely important sector. In effect, the proportion of rural residents in the Moroccan population (65 percent), the proportion of agricultural production in Gross Domestic Product /PIB/ (30 percent), the size of the equipment investments which the state devotes to this vital sector--all of these are so many signs revealing the impact of agriculture on national life.

Morocco, which is continuously stated to be a country with an "agricultural vocation," is importing more and more of the agricultural products it needs for its consumption. This is no longer a matter of secondary products such as cheese but increasingly basic foods in the Moroccan diet such as wheat and meat. We know that wheat is a commodity which plays an important role in "Third World" countries in general and in Morocco more particularly, where the consumption on the average is more than 220 kg per year capita. Morocco, a Third World country, is suffering from all the constraints that pertain to any outward-looking agricultural system: very backward mental attitudes among the farmers, technical solutions to problems, to the detriment of structural solutions, etc.

Such imports weigh heavily on the trade balance, thereby aggravate the trade deficit, and accentuate the economic and political dependence of the country. Agricultural products will now be a political weapon to influence the orientation of the importing countries in a direction favorable to imperialism and neo-colonialism.

In view of the billions invested by our responsible leaders in the agricultural area, we can ask ourselves why Morocco is experiencing a growing food deficit.

The expenditures devoted to agriculture since 1960, the date when a certain consolidation of national independence was abandoned, were essentially earmarked towa d the sector developed by colonialism, "the so-called modern sector," whose production was destined principally for export, whereas the so-called "traditional" sector only benefited from sporadic support.

Since 1960 the liberal economic policy pursued by the government has given priority to the sectors providing an immediate, financial return, a policy which sacrificed the general interest, that of the Moroccan people, by setting aside the development of the cultivation of grain for the benefit of industrial agriculture.

We have been living with the consequences of this policy for several years. Morocco is suffering from a growing and alarming deficit and state intervention involving more and more colossal costs to sustain the domestic market in the face of the dizzying increase in world prices. For example: the price of grains increased by 80 percent between 1969 and 1975. In effect, in the framework of present structures, the increase in our imports is forcing the state to support the cost of such a situation with the Compensation Fund [Caisse de Compensation], which in 1974 absorbed 163 million centimes and about 500 million centimes in 1975. These colossal expenditures, for a country with an agricultural vocation, are being made to the detriment of public investments.

At the beginning of independence Morocco still exported grain, but since 1960 Morocco has become an importer. To absorb this deficit, in 1971 Morocco imported 7 million quintals,and in 1975, some 15 million quintals.

The development of grain prices has an impact on family income and consequently on purchasing power and on the balance of payments. Thus, for 1975 alone, food expenditures reached the level of 250 billion centimes, amounting to more than 70 percent of our total imports.

In view of this situation and at a moment when, on the international level, wheat has become a strategic commodity, our country continues to apply its policy of neglect of our food needs and of agricultural development.

The policy followed up to now by our leaders is a policy of dependence on the capitalist choice for our society. This policy does not respond to the interests of our country but, on the contrary, favors a minority and the sectors linked to the world market.

The reorientation of our agriculture has become an imperious necessity, without which it would be an illusion to speak of agricultural development.

Agricultural development does not only have a technical aspect but above all has a socio-economic aspect.

We cannot resolve our food problem while remaining silent about the problems posed by the conditions of rural life, housing, education, improvement of health services, transportation, and the system of selling the crops. It would be useless to pretend to have real agricultural development without placing it in a broader framework, which must be overall strategy of national development for the whole of the economy and of society.

I. Identification and Consequences of the Food Shortage

What characterizes agricultural production in our country is its inability to provide food for its people. This is seen in the deficit which our country has in terms of the basic food products for its nutrition.

A. Grains

Grains, the basic food of the Moroccan people, cover 80 percent of the cultivated area, and their cultivation is the principal activity of 70 percent of the rural population. Morocco was able to export grain until 1960, but subsequently it recorded an agricultural deficit which has only grown from year to year. Morocco is therefore faced with the need to import grain, as it is doing at present.

Moroccan Grain Imports

Year	Quantity in Tons	Value in Billions of Dirhams
1975	1,392,995	1,020,420
1976	101,228*	725,830
1977 (Jan-Sep)	989,431	499,983

Source: "Listing" of the Office of Exchange Control (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Imports have been accompanied by a dizzying increase in prices and by a state of political and economic dependency, as wheat has become a strategic commodity. In view of a growing demand for wheat, due to population increase, production per capita has continued to decrease:

1934-1941	441 kg per capita
1941-1943	336 kg per capita
1946-1953	338 kg per capita

Production per capita is presently in the order of 300 kg per capita. We note on the other hand that the present harvest (1977) was 45 percent below that of 1976, or between 30 and 32 million quintals.

B. Sugar

Morocco formerly resorted to foreign markets to satisfy its substantial needs for sugar. Since 1963, the date of the establishment of the first national sugar mill, the country has gone into this area with the purpose of achieving self-sufficiency and even becoming an exporter. This has not yet been achieved.

National production of sugar provides a little more than 50 percent of our consumption needs, which places us in a position where we still have to import sugar.

Certainly, since independence we have made some progress, but this policy has lacked firmness since in the Gharbb area the harvest has been much less than the forecasts, in the areas devoted to the cultivation of beets.

Moroccan Sugar Imports

Year	Quantity in Tons	Value in Billions of Dirhams
1975	267,329	971,378
1976	260,991	645,086
1977 (Jan-Sep)	241,096	344,583

Source: "Listing" of the Office of Exchange Control (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

C. Dairy Products

Despite the substantial number of cattle, only a small number of cows produce milk commercially. That is explained by the fact that milk cows, to produce milk in sufficient quantity and of good quality, require temperate surroundings, abundant fodder, and attentive care. We are presently producing a little more than 50 percent of our consumption. Imports during the last few years are summarized in the following table:

Moroccan Imports of Dairy Products

Year	Quantity in Tons	Value in Billions of Dirhams
1975	30,509	124,159
1976	34,992	140,556
1977 (Jan-Sep)	26,719	106,039

The policy adopted to deal with this chronic deficit has involved the import of pure-bred cattle. It should be noted that the production of locally-raised cows remains low, at 635 liters per year (the average production of pure-bred cows is 3,500 liters per year). Domestic production only increased by 4.6 percent from 1971 to 1975.

D. Edible Oils

The stagnation in this branch of agriculture is explained by the import policy followed in the course of the last few years, a policy made possible by the low selling prices followed by the United States. Thus, the leaders of our agricultural sector have changed the food habits of the Moroccan people by replacing consumption of olive oil with vegetable oil. The result of this is that we find ourselves in a state of chronic dependence on foreign countries.

Moroccan Imports of Edible Oils

Year	Quantity in Tons	Value in Billions of Dirhams
1975	160,865	406,027
1976	113,993	215,930
1977 (Jan-Sep)	153,662	399,381

Source: "Listing" of the Office of Exchange Control (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

E. Meat

Following the holiday season of 'Eid al-Kabir in 1976, the prices of meat had almost doubled. A few days after the same feast in 1977 the leaders of the agricultural sector, habous [Islamic religious endowments] and public health officials raised cries of alarm to draw the attention of public opinion to the meat crisis and to urge the reduction of slaughtering, particularly during festivals and slaughter season [moussems], while demanding a respite for the reconstitution of sheep herds.

Our sheep herds have gone down from 17.5 million head in 1971 to 14.2 million head in 1975. The steady decline in the weight of slaughtered animals (112 kg in 1975 compared to 126 kg in 1965 for cattle and 10.6 kg in 1975 compared to 12 kg in 1965 for sheep) clearly shows the consumption of young livestock and above all of young females. The slaughter at the time of 'Eid al-Kabir is enormous: 2 million sheep on a single day, or 50 percent of the annual consumption of Morocco.

To deal with this crisis, our leaders tell us that it will be necessary to reduce slaughtering on the occasion of holidays, mentioning the fact that, for Islam, the sacrifice of a sheep is not a Koranic obligation.

The authorities have always refused to admit that Morocco does not produce enough meat for its needs, but reality is stubborn. This shortage continues to get worse and increases the expenditure of foreign exchange and is a burden on the expenses of the Compensation Fund.

Moroccan Meat Imports

Year	Quantity in Tons	Value in Billions in Dirhams
1975	2,167	7,896
1976	1,494	5,537
1977 (Jan-Sep)	3,592	16,669

Source: "Listing" of the Office of Exchange Control (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

II. Projection of Demand for Food Products

Although we may at times consider that projections belong more properly in the area of "prophecy," these estimates, based on appropriate assumptions, can constitute significant bench-marks for important political decisions. Projections for the middle-range and long-term are made on the basis of several assumptions.

Thus, the rate of growth of requirements for food between 1977 and 1982 is expected to be respectively:

Grains	19.48 percent
Meat	29.95 percent
Dairy Products	23.25 percent
Edible Oils	25.72 percent
Sugar	22.28 percent
Tea	21.39 percent

This gives us a general rate of growth in food requirements on the order of 23.6 percent for the period from 1977 to 1982.

We could not foresee the rate of growth of production relating to these different products, given the problematical character of this sector.

III. Consequences of the Food Deficit

A. Increases in Prices

Following the shortage which developed in the grain supply, prices went up sharply by more than 300 percent. To deal with the petroleum crisis, the developed countries began to brandish the food weapon, thus passing on any increase in the price of petroleum to food products. This state of affairs has had its effect in Morocco in terms of an increase in the cost of living, accompanied by a psychosis of shortages and the development of a black market.

Products of prime necessity thus become impossible to find at times; tea is rarely available, while sweetened bread can only be purchased in the black market.

This psychosis of shortages involves the disappearance of products from the market, the creation of real shortages, and consequently new price increases. Speculators clap their hands and fill their pockets.

This situation leads to progressive pauperization for the masses of the people. Their already meager purchasing power deteriorates even more.

B. State Intervention

We are therefore forced to impose completely unnecessary, high prices which the people have to pay, which costs a great deal in foreign exchange and is a considerable burden on the balance of payments.

In the framework of present structures the state is forced to intervene in this situation by means of the Compensation Fund, so that average public prices for essential products on the domestic market will not exceed the economic capacities of the nation. The cost of such a situation is therefore supported by this Fund, which in 1974 absorbed about 163 billion centimes and about 500 billion in 1975. These colossal expenditures are made to the detriment of public investment.

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CSO: 4519/5

BRIEFS

OIL EXPLORATION LOANS--A group of international banks including the National Bank of Paris, the Arab Investment Bank, and the Moroccan Bank for International Trade, awarded a medium term loan to the Moroccan Petroleum Company to assist it in its oil exploration in Essaouira area. This loan agreement which was signed in Paris, on Thursday, 15 October 81, constitutes an important part of the oil exploration efforts which were, heretofore, financed by Moroccan funds. [Text] [Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 17 October 81 p 1]

CSO: 4504/36

1981 NEWS AGENCY ACT ANNOUNCED

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 23 Sep 81 pp 2-4

[Text] Khartoum, Sept. 23 (SUNA)--President of the Republic Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri issued yesterday a provisional order on the Sudan News Agency Act for 1981.

The Act stipulates the establishment of a public corporation to be called the Sudan News Agency and to possess a permanent and an independent incorporeal character.

The Agency would be under the direct supervision of the President of the Republic or whom he delegates, the Act reads.

The Agency's Headquarters will be in Khartoum but it may establish branches in any region inside Sudan and abroad, as it sees fit.

Whether in its own capacity or by proxy or in conjunction with any local or foreign quarter, the Corporation aims at achieving the following objectives:

1. The gathering of news from inside the country and abroad and disseminating them to the concerned bodies in the State and to the public inside and outside the Sudan.

2. Covering world events and disseminating them inside and outside the country.

3. Collecting world news from agencies, broadcast stations and correspondents and publishing them inside and outside the Sudan.

4. To perform all information tasks or any other related tasks which would help, directly or indirectly in realizing its goals. All this should be done within the framework of the State's general policy regarding the values and genuine traditions of the Sudanese people.

The Act stipulates the establishment of a Board of Directors to be responsible, on behalf of the corporation, for all the legal tasks.

The Board will be set up by a decree from the President of the Republic and would be responsible before him. The Board will be authorised to perform all tasks that would realize the Corporation's objectives.

The endorsement of the annual budget, definition of general principles, for collecting and disseminating news material are among the powers of the Board.

The establishment of training centres for the employees has also been stated. The Board also has the right to delegate its power to the General Manager. The General Manager, whose appointment and allowances would be conducted by the President of the Republic, will be the executive official responsible for running the Corporation according to the policy and directives of the Board.

The employment terms of public corporations will be applied on the Corporation's employees and they will be subject to the regulations of the public service. The President of the Republic will determine the position of each employee in the Corporation. All the rights and commitments of the Sudan News Agency would be retained by the Corporation.

An authoritative source at the Presidency of the Republic said the issuing of the Sudan News Agency Act and that of the National Corporation for Broadcast and Television is part of arrangements aimed at curtailing the Ministry of Culture and Information in accordance with the recommendations of the SSU Central Committee to cope with the implementation of the regional government.

CSO: 4500/17

BRIEFS

BAN ON USURIOUS INTEREST--Khartoum, Sept. 19 (SUNA)--The Sudanese Industrial Bank has taken the necessary legal steps to ban usury interest rates. The action is in line with the new financial policies and will be applied retroactive to last February. Loans endorsed by the Bank during January-July amounted to Ls 842,250, said a reliable source in the Bank. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 19 Sep 81 p 1]

NATIONAL BROADCAST CORPORATION FORMED--Khartoum, Sept. 21 (SUNA)--President of the Republic Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri issued yesterday a provisional order for the establishment of a National Corporation for Broadcast and Television. The order identifies the Corporation as the sole body allowed to perform broadcast and television transmission in the Sudan, with the exception of other bodies allowed by the President of the Republic. According to the Order, the headquarters of the Corporation will be in Khartoum and it has the right to establish branches in any of the country's regions. The order which determined the aims of the corporation, established an administrative council responsible to the Minister of Culture and Information, for running the corporation. It is noteworthy that the SSU Central Committee had recommended the conversion of the Broadcast and Television into a public corporation in its Third Session March 1979. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 21 Sep 81 p 5]

RED SEA MINING--Khartoum, Sept. 22 (SUNA)--The Saudi-Sudanese Joint Authority for the Investment of the Red Sea Wealth will begin before the end of this year experimental mining operations for extracting copper, zinc and silver, Energy and Mining State Minister Yousif Suleiman said yesterday. The corporation will hold a meeting soon after the pilgrimage season to discuss its work programme prior to the beginning of the commercial mining stage which is expected to be completed in 1982 according to the studies conducted, Suleiman added. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 22 Sep 81 p 2]

SUDAN-QATAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT--Khartoum, Sept. 22 (SUNA)--Qatar's Minister for Labour and Social Affairs Sheikh Ali Bin Hamad Al Ansari is due here next Friday at the invitation of Public Service and Administrative Reform Minister. The week-long visit comes within the context of an agreement signed between the two countries last May for the exchange of man power. It is worth noting that President Nimeri approved last week an agreement on the employment of Sudanese in Qatar. The agreement stipulates that contracts should only be done through the concerned authorities. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 22 Sep 81 p 8]

RAILWAY DECENTRALIZATION--Khartoum, Sept. 22 (SUNA)--The Secretary of the SSU Organizations and Political Affairs Department, El Rashid El Tahir Bakr yesterday addressed the meeting of the specialized committees for the decentralization of the Railway Corporation. Bakr, who is also the head of the Higher Committee for the Decentralization of the Railway Corporation, said the execution of the railway decentralization is a national responsibility and its success affects all the country's major questions like production and regional government. Bakr called on all members of the specialized committees to start work for proper and efficient implementation of the decentralization decision. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 22 Sep 81 p 7]

NEW UNIVERSITY FOR DARFUR--Khartoum, Sept. 24 (SUNA)--The Darfur Region Governor and the Secretary General of the National Council for Higher Education yesterday discussed the establishment of Darfur University. The meeting agreed upon the necessity of establishing the university. Darfur Region Governor promised to contribute to the university's finance. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 24 Sep 81 p 1]

JUBA DEVELOPMENT PLANS--Juba, Sept. 24 (SUNA)--A programme for the development of Yei area has been worked out and feasibility studies are being conducted for the establishment of a tea factory at Owanuka, declared Vice-President of the Republic and President of the High Executive Council for the Southern Region Abel Alier. Addressing a mass rally in Yei Tuesday evening, Alier said the Regional Ministry for Agriculture would provide seeds and equipment for the farmers of the area. He indicated the vitality of peace and unity and asked citizens to join their ranks in the struggle against ignorance, poverty and diseases. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 24 Sep 81 p 2]

CSO: 4500/17

'VOL' REPORTS CLASHES IN SYRIAN CITIES

Army Units Patrol Streets

NC081356 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 8 Oct 81

[Text] According to reports received by the Voice of Lebanon, for the past 3 days the city of Aleppo [in Syria] has been witnessing manifestations of indignation against the Syrian Government following the decision to ban the use of veils by women. This decision is considered by religious leaders as an infringement of Islam and its religious teachings. This decision has been met with a wave of explosions and machinegun fire.

On Tuesday, a senior Syrian officer was killed on the Idlib road when the Muslim Brotherhood ambushed a Syrian military vehicle. Posters have been seen in Idlib and other Syrian towns threatening a fate similar to that of President al-Sadat.

This morning, Syrian army units were patroling the streets of Aleppo, Homs, Hamah and Damascus, particularly around the mosques, for fear surprises would take place after the holiday prayers.

According to other information, the city of Hamah is witnessing extreme unrest. The sounds of explosions and gunfire have been heard since early this morning.

At the entrance to the Military Command of the Central Intelligence in Damascus a clash with antipersonnel bombs and handgrenades has taken place between armed men wearing Syrian special units uniforms and the guards of the center. A number of people were killed or wounded.

On Monday, a blue Honda stormed the Soviet experts building in al-Qassa', in Damascus. Soon afterward it exploded, killing and wounding a number of people and causing serious material damage. Experts estimated the power of the explosion at about 30 kilograms of TNT.

Bomb in Bus Station

NC201421 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 20 Oct 81

[Text] Information has reached the Voice of Lebanon saying that a time bomb exploded in a bus station near the public gardens opposite the al-Siyahah [tourist] Hotel in the city of Aleppo yesterday morning. A number of persons were killed

and others wounded. Heavy material damage was also caused by the explosion.

In an ambush set up by the Muslim Brotherhood for a Syrian intelligence patrol in the al-Musharafiyah area, two members of the Intelligence Department were killed and the military vehicle was destroyed. Leaflets appeared in the streets threatening the Soviet experts to leave Syria.

Meanwhile, the city of Aleppo has been kept awake by the sound of machinegun fire and shell explosions.

In Idlib Province, intensified Syrian security patrols were seen particularly on the major roads lest security disturbances should erupt.

In the city of Hamah, the inhabitants prevented the municipality workers from repairing the mosques which were damaged in the recent incidents, insisting that everything should remain as it is as an indication of what the places of worship have been subjected to by the intelligence and special units forces.

In Latakia, houses and shops continue to be raided in the search for Muslim Brotherhood members in the wake of the explosions which occurred in the city.

CSO: 4404/44

SYRIA, PALESTINIANS PROTEST REMOVAL OF CAPUCCI

PM010913 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 28 Sep 81 p 12

[Unattributed report: "Removal of Capucci From Jerusalem Bishopric; Patriarch Hakim Sticks to Decision Despite Strong Syrian and Palestinian Opposition"]

[Excerpts] The decision by the patriarch of Antioch and the rest of the Orient for the Greek Catholic Church, Maximus Hakim, to appoint a new bishop in the place of Bishop Hilarion Capucci yesterday has aroused strong Syrian and Palestinian reactions rejecting the decision.

AL-SAFIR reported yesterday that Patriarch Hakim, contrary to a synod decision in 1977, decided to appoint Father Lutfi al-Laham (Syria) to succeed Bishop Hilarion Capucci, whom Israel banished after he had spent 3 years in jail on charges of involvement with the Palestinian resistance.

It seemed yesterday that Patriarch Hakim was insisting on his decision despite the strong reaction. AP quoted church officials in Damascus as saying that Hakim will go ahead with his decision.

AP also quoted a senior Syrian official, whom it did not name, as saying yesterday that "Syria will fight against this decision to the death."

The official said: "Patriarch Hakim is acting contrary to the will of the synod and the church. No official decision has yet been made regarding this appointment."

Majid Abu Sharar, member of the Fatah Movement Central Committee, said: "We still hope that His Beatitude Patriarch Hakim will consider the importance of the moral and political position Bishop Capucci enjoys not only among the Palestinian Arab people but also among all strugglers against occupation, fascism and world Zionism."

He added: "There is no doubt that the moral and political position Bishop Capucci enjoys requires that he should remain bishop of Jerusalem until the Zionist occupation ends."

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, assistant secretary general of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, said that "the removal of Bishop Capucci from

his position is a gross error because it is a concession to the Israeli occupiers' stand against him and is a step that is totally condemned by our people and our revolution."

Concluding, he said: "We call upon Patriarch Hakim to respect the religious and patriotic feelings of the sons of Jerusalem and the occupied territories, as well as the feelings of the Palestinian revolution's strugglers and all Arab nationalists and to go back on this erroneous step which is a concession to the occupiers' pressure."

CSO: 4404/44

BA'THISTS' EXECUTIONS IN IRAQ CONDEMNED

JN032014 Damascus Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 3 Oct 81

[Text] The National Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has issued the following statement to the masses of our Arab nation:

The National Command announces to the Arab people and to comrade strugglers in every part of the Arab homeland the death of 38 martyrs of our Ba'thist comrades--civilians, military and women--who were executed along with several Iraqi patriotic and progressive strugglers by the fascist rightist regime in Iraq on 26 September 1981.

This massacre, which was committed by the hireling regime of Saddam, is a link in the series of crimes which are continuously committed by this regime against our party's strugglers and all the patriotic and progressive forces in Iraq. This abominable crime is committed to add a new caravan to the caravans of martyrs offered by our party in Iraq along the road of struggle against the fascist and agent authority and to reiterate the black malice being harbored by this regime against the strugglers of our party and the patriotic and progressive forces whose struggle has constituted a definite threat against its presence.

This cowardly and bestial act, which was committed by the rightist and hireling regime against our progressive strugglers, who sacrificed their lives in struggle against imperialism, Zionism reactionary and their agent regimes in the area, led by Saddam Husayn's regime, is a continuation of the agent regime's practices. These practices are represented by the following:

1. Ceaseless liquidation of strugglers who are facing this regime's terrorism and treason against the Iraqi people and the Arab nation's issues.

2. Supporting the Muslim Brotherhood to enable it to kill and commit crimes in Syria, the stronghold of Arab steadfastness and vanguard of the Arab nation in its militant march toward liberation and victory.

3. Liquidating Iraq's strugglers, evicting its sons, plundering its resources and keeping it far from the Arab nation's basic and fateful struggle against Zionism and imperialism.

This directly serves the imperialist and Zionist schemes which are aimed at liquidating the Arab liberation movement and its military forces. It also undoubtedly exposes the role of this regime in implementing these schemes.

O masses of our people in Iraq: The constant terrorism and oppression which is being pursued by the Iraqi regime will never sap the strength of our party's strugglers or that of the struggling masses who have struggled and knew how to face such liquidationist bloody methods with further determination to continue in order to wreck this fascist and hireling regime and set up a national, patriotic and democratic regime that would place Iraq in its natural place in the struggle of the Arab nation against its principal enemies—imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The National Command asserts to the sons of our Arab nation in general and to the sons of our people in Iraq in particular that the criminal hands which committed this abominable massacre and other crimes against our people and strugglers will soon be punished by the masses for their crimes against the homeland, the nation and strugglers in Iraq and in the Arab arena.

Glory and immortality to the innocent martyrs, and shame and ignominy to the killers and criminals!

CSO: 4404/44

SYRIAN, SOVIET YOUTH ORGANIZATIONS ISSUE STATEMENT

JN051847 Damascus Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 5 Oct 81

[Text] The statement issued today on the results of the 9th Friendship Week between the Syrian Revolution Youth and the Soviet All-Union Komsomol asserted that the Syrian-Soviet friendship and cooperation treaty is a basis for developing relations between youth organizations in the two countries.

The two sides strongly condemned the Reagan administration's armament policy and its decision to begin the production of neutron weapons.

They expressed anxiety regarding developments in the Middle East due to the activation of the policy of aggression by U.S. imperialism and Zionism.

The two sides strongly condemned the U.S.-Israeli strategic cooperation agreement. They asserted that a just and comprehensive settlement of the Middle East crisis requires total Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the Palestinian people's national legitimate rights, including their right to establish a national state on its national soil.

The statement praised the role of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in confronting the challenges of imperialism, Zionism and reaction. They also praised Syria's role in strengthening the ranks of the front and its activities.

Both sides expressed satisfaction with the results of the 9th Friendship Week between the Syrian Revolution Youth and the Soviet All-Union Komsomol.

The statement was signed by Comrade Ibrahim Za'rur, member of the command and chairman of the Foreign Relations Office in the Syrian Revolution Youth, and Aleksandr Kolyakin, secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet All-Union Komsomol.

CSO: 4404/44

BRIEFS

COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH SENEGAL—Tunisia's Information Minister Tahar Belkhojda and his Senegalese counterpart Duibo Ka signed on Tuesday in Tunis two cooperation agreements, one between Tunisia and Senegal and the other between TUNIS AFRIQUE PRESSE (TAP) news agency and Senegal's news agency "APS." They also signed an agreement for the twinning of the Tunisian and Senegalese dailies LA PRESSE and LE SOLEIL. Under the cooperation agreement signed between TAP and APS the two news agencies have the mutual right to receive and transmit through the press, radio and TV of the two countries their regular news services. And LE SOLEIL provides for the issue of a quarterly supplement of a page of LA PRESSE and LE SOLEIL, for the mutual exchange of a two week stay for the two newspapers' journalists and for the establishment of a local and regular correspondence between them. Besides a cooperation agreement was signed between the RTT (Tunisian TV broadcasting) and Senegal's TV and radio broadcasting (ORTS). Both sides will also exchange regularly cultural, scientific and technical programmes. [Tunis TAP in English 1407 GMT 21 Oct 81 LD]

CSO: 4500/18

ACCUSATION BY POLISARIO DIPLOMAT REPORTED

FL011659 Bridgetown CANA in English 1655 GMT 21 Oct 81

[Text] St Georges, Grenada, 21 Oct (CANA)—The Cuba-based POLISARIO Front Ambassador to Grenada Bulahe Mohammed Fadel has accused Morocco of waging an unjust and unrelentless war against Western Sahara. He told reporters that the war being waged by Morocco against the POLISARIO Front for the control of Western Sahara could only threaten peace and international security.

Ambassador Mohammed Fadel estimated that the POLISARIO Front was in control of 90 percent of the territory and said "we are demanding the immediate withdrawal of the Moroccan Army and administration." The POLISARIO Front diplomat has also accused King Hassan of Morocco of failing to implement a resolution adopted at the recent heads of government summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Kenya aimed at settling the dispute between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front. He said that King Hassan had agreed at the meeting in Kenya for the establishment of a special committee to draft a referendum which would guarantee the self-determination of the people in Western Sahara. He, however, noted that the king has failed to honor the agreement and continues to maintain an army in Western Sahara in defiance of the agreements reached at the Kenya conference.

Ambassador Mohammed Fadel said that the POLISARIO Front would continue to wage war against Morocco until the Western Sahara achieves its independence, as well as territorial integrity and sovereignty. He said that the POLISARIO Front was not alone in its war of liberation against Morocco but that the legitimacy of its struggle has been recognized by the OAU, the nonaligned movement, the United Nations and other humanitarian and international political organizations. He added that the POLISARIO Front has also been getting recognition from a number of countries in Latin America and the Caribbean including Guyana, Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba, Nicaragua, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Mexico and Panama.

He, however, hoped that the other countries in the Caribbean basin would soon follow the others and recognize the POLISARIO Front as the sole and legitimate representatives of the people of Western Sahara. Ambassador Mohammed Fadel charged that Morocco was in a state of economic chaos and was only bent on continuing its war of aggression against the POLISARIO Front because of its desire to lay claim to the country's natural resources such as iron, petroleum and phosphates as well as its strategic location on the African continent.

The POLISARIO Front diplomat has accused Morocco of attempting to internationalize the conflict in the Western Sahara by alleging that Cuban troops were fighting alongside POLISARIO guerrillas in the war. "It is an attempt through this pretext to call the United States to offer them moral help saying the danger is a confrontation between Morocco and foreign forces in the Western Sahara," he said.

Ambassador Mohammed Fadel claimed that despite the fact that Western Sahara has been declared a war zone by the United Nations, the POLISARIO Front was able to make improvements in the health and educational standards of the country.

He was due to leave here today following a 5-day official visit during which he presented his credentials to Governor General Sir Paul Scoon. Ambassador Mohammed Fadel also held discussions with Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman as well as officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

CSO: 4500/18

REFERENDUM POPULATION BASE SUPPORTED

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 17 Sep 81 pp 1-3

/Article: "Several Documents Corroborate the Demographic Base of the Referendum, Confirming the Moroccan Identity of the Western Sahara"/

/Text/ Our contemporary, AL WAHDA AL KOUBRA (Great Unity), a newspaper appearing in the northern part of the country, published on 1 September 1981 a special supplement containing a document relating to the population census in our Saharan provinces. This supplement takes note of both official and semi-official documents, research, and studies made prior to 1974. These documents confirm the authenticity and correctness of the census made by Spain in 1974.

We recall that this statistical record of the Saharan population was prepared by Spain and deposited with the secretary general of the United Nations. The permanent representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the secretary general of the world organization of the census on 21 August 1974. Spain carried out the census for the purpose of organizing at that time a referendum for its own colonial purposes.

In thanking our contemporary, AL WAHDA AL KOUBRA, for its contribution, we reproduce below the main factors which figure in these documents, namely:

1. Study by the deputy representative for national affairs in the Spanish Residency in Morocco, Thoams Figueras, specialist in African affairs, entitled, "Santa Cruz de Mar, Pequeria, Ifni, Sahara," published in Madrid, 1941. On page 17 it takes note of the following statistics:

--Ouadi Eddahab has an area of 190,000 square kilometers and a population of 23,000 people.

--Saquia El Hamra, 82,000 square kilometers and 11,000 people.

--Tarfaya, 25,600 square kilometers and 6,000 people.

2. Study by the political and military governor for Spanish North Africa (Sahara and Ifni), Col Angel Dominich, entitled, "Algo Sobre Rio de Oro" /Some Notes on Rio de Oro/, published by the Directorate for Morocco and the Colonies in Madrid, 1945. On page 124 it states that Ouadi Eddahab has an area of 185,400 square kilometers and a population of 24,105; Saquia Hamra, 82,000 square kilometers and 11,037 people; Ifni, 1,700 square kilometers and 41,114 people.

3. Study prepared at the request of the Spanish resident general in Morocco, Dr Angel Flores Morales, entitled, "El Sahara Espagnol" /The Spanish Sahara/, published by the Residency General in Madrid in 1946. On page 33 it indicates that the respective populations of Rio de Oro, Saquia Hamra, and Tarfaya are of the order of 26,100, 12,800, and 11,900 people.

4. The memoirs of General Danes, political and military governor of the Sahara from 17 January 1904 to 10 November 1925, entitled: "Memoires: 22 Ans dans le Desert" /Memoirs: 22 Years in the Desert/, published by the Directorate for Morocco and the Colonies in Madrid, 1947. On page 89 it states:

--Ouadi Eddahab: 23,000 people.

--Saquia Hamra: 11,000 people.

--Tarfaya: 6,000 people.

--Ifni: 43,000 people.

5. The "Annuaire Statistique du Sahara Espagnol" /Statistical Yearbook of the Spanish Sahara/, published by the Spanish directorate for North Africa, states on pages 9 and 26 that, on the basis of the 1950 census the three provinces of Tarfaya, Saquia Hamra, and Rio de Oro contain 33,256 Muslims and 1,130 Spaniards.

6. "Le Sahara Espagnol" /The Spanish Sahara/, a book by the deputy director of the Spanish Institute for Political Studies in Madrid, Jose Maria Cordero Tones, published by the Institute in 1962. The author indicates there, on page 143, that, according to the census carried out in 1958 by the Directorate of the Colonies, the population of Ouadi Eddahab and Saquia Hamra included 17,525 Muslims and 1,710 Spaniards.

7. Study by the specialist on African affairs, Professor Mario Miranda, entitled, "L'Espagne dans le Continent Africain" /Spain on the African Continent/, published by the Spanish Institute for African Studies in Madrid in 1963. It is indicated on pages 64 to 67 that Ouadi Eddahab and Saquia Hamra had a population of 19,525 Muslims and 1,710 Spaniards, while Ifni had a population of 42,285 Muslims and 4,618 Spaniards.

8. Study by General Jose D De Vegas, director for Morocco and the colonies, entitled, "Plazas y Provincias Africanas Espanolas" /Spanish African Towns and Provinces/, published by the Spanish Institute for African Studies in Madrid in 1962. On pages 99 and 132 it states:

--Ouadi Eddahab and Saquia Hamra have a population of 23,000 people.

--Ifni has a population of 50,000 people.

9. Study prepared at the request of the Spanish Institute for African Studies by a specialist on African questions, Renee Pelissiere, entitled, "Los Territorios Espanoles de Africa" /The Spanish Territories in Africa/, published by the Institute in 1964. On pages 7, 9, and 10 the population as of 1960 is stated to be:

--Ifni: 48,236 Muslims and 4,759 Spaniards.

10. "La Sanidad en la Provincia del Sahara" /Health Conditions in Sahara Province/, a study published by the Spanish Institute for African Studies in 1969. On page 17 it states:

--Ouadi Eddahab: 33,152 people in 1966.

--Saquia El Hamra: 46,740 people in 1967.

11. "Annuaire Statistique d'Espagne 1970" /Statistical Yearbook of Spain/, published on the basis of the census of the Spanish National Institute of Statistics, published in 1974. On page 406 it states that Ouadi Eddahab and Saquia Hamra have a population of 59,777 Muslims and 16,648 Spaniards.

12. Study awarded the African Prize for literature for 1973, written by Professor Eduardo, "Estudio General del Sahara" /General Study on the Sahara/, and with a foreword by the governor of the Spanish Sahara, General Santiago, published in 1974 by the Spanish Institute for African Studies. On pages 19 and 216 it is indicated that the districts of Dakhla, Laayoune, and Smara had a population of 71,000 Muslims and 30,000 Spaniards.

From all these documents and studies it appears that the population of the provinces of Saquia Hamra and Ouadi Eddahab, according to the different versions and over the years was as follows:

1945	35,142	1960	18,489
1946	34,000	1962	23,000
1946	38,900	1966	38,152
1947	34,000	1967	46,740
1950	33,256	1973	59,777
1958	17,525	1974	71,000

The statistical register of 1974 has confirmed that the population of the provinces of Saquia Hamra and Ouadi Eddahab was 73,497, including 38,336 men and 35,161 women.

Thus, this data confirms the only demographic basis on which the referendum to confirm the Moroccan identity of our Sahara provinces should be carried out. It nullifies the fables made up by our critics.

They provide evidence that the conclusions of the executive committee of the OAU at the Nairobi II conference, dealing with this point, were correct.

5170
CSO: 4519/5

END

JPRS 79358

3 November 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2425

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3 November 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2425

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'KUNA' CITES PLO OFFICIALS' 'AL-RAYAH' INTERVIEW

LD260944 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0835 GMT 26 Sep 81

[Excerpts] Doha, 26 Sep (KUNA)--A senior official of the Fatah Fedayeen movement was quoted here today as saying that there were some points in the Middle East peace plan proposed by the Saudi crown prince and prime minister [title as heard] Amir Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-Aziz, which are not in line with the PLO's political program. Salah Khalaf, member of the movement's Central Committee, said in an interview with AL-RAYAH that the Saudi project needs to be studied and that although this project contains some acceptable points, there are some which are not in line with the PLO's political program.

Salah Khalaf did not mention these points, but it appears that one of the points concerns Amir Fahd's call for the recognition of the right of all states in the Middle East region to live in peace within secure borders, a matter which the Palestinian resistance does not recognize because this would mean the perpetuation of the Israeli presence--something which the resistance has so far refused to recognize.

Officially, the PLO has so far not declared its attitude vis-a-vis the Saudi proposals which were announced last month by Amir Fahd. Salah Khalaf, who is regarded as a hardliner inside the Fatah Central Committee, said that the Saudi initiative needs frank discussion with officials in Riyadh to ensure that it is not a mere press statement by Amir Fahd.

Salah Khalaf described the Soviet Union's proposal to convene an international conference on peace in the Middle East as a general proposal. He said that there is no European initiative that would establish peace in the region.

Salah Khalaf pointed out that there are differences in relations between Syria and the Palestinian resistance. He added that the most important points of difference are the presence in Damascus of Palestinian leader Sabri al-Banna alias Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah some years ago, and Syria's approval of the Arab followup committee's resolutions on Lebanon with regard to prohibiting arms destined for the Palestinian Fedayeen from entering Lebanon. However, Salah Khalaf described these differences as impurities and attributed them to the lack of frankness in facing problems. He said that the Syrians and the resistance agree that they should be in one trench to confront the United States' plans.

The Palestinian official accused Sabri al-Banna of being a great help to Zionists in masking their operations. The PLO has accused al-Banna, on whom a death sentence has been passed in absentia, of organizing several assassination operations against PLO officials abroad and of carrying out operations that aim at misrepresenting the Palestinian struggle to Europe.

CSO: 4404/57

'VOP' CARRIES FILASTIN 'AL-THAWRAH' EDITORIAL

JN041921 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1730 GMT 4 Oct 81

[Filastin AL-THAWRAH 4 October editorial: "Not an Accusation"]

[Excerpts] The Phalangists are making pronouncements and issuing statements denying responsibility for the devastating explosion in the Arab University area. The army's Deuxieme Bureau [Lebanese Military Intelligence] considers the accusation leveled against it to be an emotional reaction resulting from the inability to exercise self-restraint in critical moments. The amirs of the al-Jumayyil clan are making statements on the disorderly security situation in the western region [of Beirut], holding the revolution, the [Lebanese nationalist] movement and the Syrian deterrent forces responsible for this disorder. All these believe that the solution lies in the restoration of the state and legitimacy. The aforementioned speakers make out to the public in the western region that the state rules in the eastern region and not his highness Amir Bashir who visited Washington and was received by Richard Allen, who did not bother to ask himself whether Amir Bashir was speaking on behalf of his emirate or in the name of legitimacy.

The starting point is that there is no state or army in the eastern region. All there is to it is that this amir Bashir imposes his control over the region by armed forces and the state apparatus is subject to his control. It is the state alone which is responsible for its absence in the eastern region. If the state has a recognized army, it is the Arab deterrent forces, which are totally absent from the dominions of Amir Bashir.

The officers of the army of legitimacy make two vows of allegiance, once to the legitimacy of President Sarkis and once secretly to Amir Bashir. Any officer who does not join Bashir's organization is killed. Senior officers who have refused to join have been discharged and some have been liquidated. This is how Amir Bashir tightens his grip over the army.

If there is a lapse in security, and it does exist, naturally, it is due to the wrong-headed illusions we have regarding the Lebanese front's love for Lebanon and Amir Bashir's love for Lebanon. It is through this door that the car bombs, agents and poisonous information enter to reap the fruit of the bombings in Beirut.

Concluding its editorial, Filastin AL-THAWRAH says: The nationalist movement and the resistance do not need more checkpoints but more political clarity. Despite their temporary necessity, checkpoints can be restricted to four or five if we base ourselves on the shouldering of full national responsibility instead of vacillating between the evil of partition and that of illusions regarding legitimacy. We believe that overcoming this vacillation, which has been continuing for 3 years, robs Bashir al-Jumayyil and his front of this slogan which he keeps raising against the nationalist movement while trampling it down in the eastern region.

CSO: 4404/57

BRIEFS

INTER-PALESTINIAN DIFFERENCES--Well-informed Arab sources in Beirut say that sharp differences arose yesterday during a meeting of the higher military council of the terrorist organizations held in Beirut. The sources add that Salah Khalaf, alias Abu Iyad, asked 'Arafat during the meeting to make a statement rejecting the principles of the Saudi project to settle the Middle East crisis. Khalaf's demand was supported by the representatives of two terrorist fronts, namely, the front of George Habash and that of Nayif Hawatimah [PFLP and DFLP respectively]. Observers in Beirut say that there is another cause for the differences between 'Arafat and Salah Khalaf pertaining to personal rivalry between them due to Abu 'Iyad's background of ideological allegiance to Damascus. Recently, Damascus assailed Prince Fahd's project for a Middle East settlement and rejected this project categorically and collectively. Damascus also opposed the move to submit the project before the Arab summit conference which will be held in Fez, Morocco, in 1 month. 'Arafat considered this project as a good basis for settling the crisis in the region and said that his organization's stand on this project would be announced during the forthcoming Arab summit. [Text] [JN191730 Jerusalem Radio in Arabic to the Arab world 1530 GMT 19 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/57

KARMAL DELIVERS SPEECH ON FOOD DAY

LD180942 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 16 Oct 81

[Excerpts] Dear friends and compatriots.

I have the pleasure of saying a few words on the first commemoration of international food day--which is actively marked by most of the world's countries--to the noble people of our beloved country and all the people of the world.

I heartily celebrate the commemoration of this auspicious and humane day with all of our dear compatriots and all the people of the world with hope for the production of sufficient and varied food for every member of humanity--who has a natural and basic right to live--and for the complete elimination of famine, starvation, poverty and malnutrition in the world.

I have a firm belief that until every person, that is every human being in the world, is out of the danger of hunger, famine, malnutrition and poverty, human societies will never have complete economic independence. Unfortunately, under the present world situation every year more than $500 billion is spent on the arms race while poverty, hunger, malnutrition have not been eliminated from our planet. This is cause for many regrets. According to the estimate of the International Agency of Food and Agriculture the elimination of this problem in the world is feasible by spending $135 billion within a 20-year period, that is, until the year 2000. At first glance this figure appears immense. However, if it is compared with the yearly expenditure on the arms race, then the sum of $135 billion over 20 years for the complete elimination of hunger and famine is trivial.

Here is an important question on the history of this issue: What are the reasons and causes for this poverty and shortage of food for the people of our planet at a time when humans travel in outer space? The answer is [word indistinct] clear. The causes and reasons for this are the long centuries of colonization by the imperialists of the world, who savagely exploited the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America and kept them backward, and who have now taken the unholy position of being antipeace, antidetente, antifreedom and independnece, antijustice and who are opposed to the creation of a new economic system and social progress. On the command of the truth of history, these imperialists should restore the damage done in this area.

Compatriots, if the imperialist and reactionary forces, headed by U.S. imperialism, forget the thought of exploitation and colonization of the world and end the arms race and warmongering provocations, and make use of the vast resources--that can be saved in this field--for the progress of agriculture and the production of sufficient and varied food for each individual in the world and accept the new and progressive economic system of developing countries in the world, not only will hunger, famine and poverty be eliminated, but the majority of other problems of humanity will be eliminated from the world. In addition, the present disturbed world of ours will be transformed into a world of peace, sincerity and human prosperity.

However, regrettably, at the present time the majority of developing countries are facing a severe shortage of food. They import food for their oppressed people from other countries under unbearable conditions. Every month and every year that goes by their weak economic situations are getting more severe and eventually becomes a cause for their losing their economic independence.

Our beloved country and our noble people for a long period faced the shortages of food and malnutrition which was due to the colonialist and exploiting policy of the world of imperialism and internal reaction. Under normal conditions each year about 150-200,000 tons of wheat; 30,000 tons of rice; 25,000 tons of vegetable oil; 80,000 tons of sugar and thousands of tons of dairy products such as milk and protein substances, in return for immense foreign currency, were imported to our country; of course, if immediate attention is not paid to it, soon these figures will get larger and eventually its control will be out of our economic ability. Hence, as other developing countries, our people, our party, and our government have an immense obligation to remove, first of all, as soon as possible the shortage of foodstuffs and actively support the new system of agriculture in the framework of the new international economic system, so that our noble people and other persecuted people of the world are saved permanently from hunger, malnutrition and poverty.

At this time, when international food day is commemorated, our duty is heavier and full of responsibility in the field of further production of foodstuffs to (?remedy) the annual shortage of food and elimination of hunger and malnutrition in the country.

The ministries of agriculture and water and power; peasants; farmers; cattle breeders in the country and other organs who are engaged in production, supply, storage and distribution of food, have "serious obligation to remove this shortage of food within the coming 5 years, not only from the country, but to increase the production to the limit so that precautionary storage of foodstuffs is created and thus the probable danger of drought and famine in the country is effectively prevented.

In attainingthis high human objective, no efforts should be spared. The party and our revolutionary government will provide all the assistance and financial cooperation, technical and possible financial aid, to peasants and cattle breeders.

Comrades and friends, allow me to thank friendly and sincerely the International Food and Agriculture Agency, which took an active part in the agricultural and livestock projects of our country and made and is giving disinterested assistance on behalf of our noble people, the PDPA and the Government of the DRA.

As an active and reliable member of the United Nations and the International Food and Agriculture Agency, we deeply support all benevolent and humanitarian activities of the International Food and Agriculture Agency and we express our full solidarity with them.

Similarly we confirm the practical establishment of international precautionary food reserves on the national and regional level, on the basis of the decision of the international food conference--with the cooperation of member countries.

CSO: 4665/5

FUTURE OF EGYPT DISCUSSED

GF101108 Manama GULF MIRROR in English 10-16 Oct 81 p 6

[Editorial: "Egypt's Chance to Chart a New Course"]

[Text] It is too early to assess the repercussions, internally and externally, from President al-Sadat's assassination.

The likely new president, Mr Mubarak, has already reaffirmed his commitment to the late president's policies, which was predictable in the aftermath of the shootings.

In crisis situations--and Egypt has them inside and outside--any new leader will avoid dramatic policy changes until he has wet his feet and established his base. He will also want to ensure next April's final phase of the handover of Israeli-occupied Egyptian territory.

Assuming he gets through this crisis--which is by no means sure, judging by the continuing demonstrations of dissent within--the new president will be under renewed pressure from his Arab neighbors to abandon the divisive and ultimately destructive path his predecessor took to the cost of the Arab world in general and to Egypt itself.

If al-Sadat's intentions were sincere, his judgment was massively at fault. He was monumentally misguided by the United States whose influence bewitched him.

The hope that once al-Sadat led, the others would follow was seen by all but al-Sadat as an invitation to surrender to Zionist aggrandizement.

It was politics at its most simplistic and, for al-Sadat, an impossible contradiction to sustain.

His death, inappropriate as it was by all human values, leaves open the way for a radical change of heart and mind by the new leadership if Egypt is not to become irreversibly isolated overseas and wracked with dissent at home.

CSO: 4400/25

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON MUHAMMAD HUSNI MUBARAK

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 8 Oct 81 p 5

[Text] Muhammad Husni Mubarak was born 4 May 1928 in the village of Kafr al-Musaylihah in Shibin al-Kum [al-Minufiyah Governorate]. His father was an employee of limited income. He received his elementary and secondary education in the schools of Shibin al-Kum. On 1 February 1949 he was graduated from the War College.

In March 1950, Husni Mubarak entered the Air College where he received the baccalaureate in aviation. In the same year he served in fighter aircraft formations. He piloted the British Spitfire and the Italian Fiat and Machi. He was a second lieutenant [at that time] and spent 2 years at al-'Arish Airfield. In 1952, he was appointed to teach at the Air College and continued in that job until 1959. During that period he saw 11 groups of pilots graduated from the college.

Husni, who counts as one of the outstanding officers in the heavy bomber command where he piloted the Ilyushin 28 bomber, trained more than once in the Soviet Union on light and heavy long-range bombers and took advanced studies there at the Frunze Academy.

In mid-1961, Husni Mubarak piloted the TU-16 heavy bomber. In 1968 he took over command of the Air College. In 1968, he was selected as Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force and continued in that position until June 1972. In 1972, Mubarak was appointed commander of the air force and, in the same year, was appointed air force commander and deputy to the minister of war [as given].

He exerted great effort in the Egyptian pilot's mastery of the Mirage and MIG-23 aircraft. He also participated in the planning, training and preparations for the 1973 war. After the war he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general [fariq] in appreciation for his services in this war. Then he received the Military Star of Honor and the Star of Sinai. President Sadat awarded Mubarak the Collar of the Republic in 1975. In the same year he became vice-president. He was also chairman of the committee charged with writing the official history of the 1973 war.

Life has taught him that truth is the shortest path to man's happiness.

Husni married from the Governorate of al-Minya and has two sons, Jamal and 'Ala'.

He is distinguished by a number of characteristics, including a strong personality, an orderly and lucid mind and self-sacrifice in work. He represents the new generation; he is one of the heroes of the October War in which he played an active role. It is exemplified in [his] building the airforce and preparing it for battle prior to the October War. His skill in the [air force] leadership was a cause for the success of the force in carrying out its mission from the first minute of the war in full confidence and bravery.

Husni Mubarak believes there is a mutual approach to military work and political work. Complete discipline is a foundation. Military leadership is a science and an art. Consultation, familiarization with and the study of other views leads to conviction in a matter.

Husni Mubarak believes that democracy is the biggest thing in the life and development of the people. On the basis of this, leadership of the people is an expression of the [will of the] people [even] before becoming an established fact. By it [i.e., democracy], the people are the only center of power [influencing] the pattern, conduct and exercise [of leadership] in all situations. Likewise, he believes that democracy is the application and fruit of freedom which is the foundation. It [i.e., democracy] is the means of combatting corruption and deviation.

Husni Mubarak's preferences in sports are [field] hockey and squash. His hobby is reading Egyptian history.

Since 1975, Husni Mubarak has been sent on numerous missions, as follows:

--Since 1975, he conducted a mediation mission in the dispute between Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania on the future of the Sahara. He represented Egypt in the OAU discussions on Angola.

--He took a number of visits to Arab, African and world countries to explain Egypt's position in the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Camp David Agreement and the peace accords.

--In 1979 he assumed the position of vice-president of the National Democratic Party.

--Husni Mubarak participated in contacts and talks between Egypt and various states of the world in which he made many trips and visits abroad.

--January, 1976: He visited Algeria and Mauritania.

--3 February 1976: He began a trip during which he visited Morocco and Algeria.

--16 November 1976: He visited the Sudan and Iran.

--17 April 1977: Husni Mubarak arrived in Kuwait, coming from Jiddah on a day's visit as part of a trip which included Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, the Sultanate of Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.

--15 September 1977: Husni Mubarak began an African trip during which he visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Somalia, Djibouti, Chad and the Sudan.

--2 September 1977: Husni Mubarak visited Kenya.

--1 December 1977: He began a visit to France and Morocco.

--24 September 1977: Husni Mubarak began a trip during which he visited the Sudan, Chad, Uganda and Somalia.

--In October 1977 he took an Arab trip during which he visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the UAE and also Iran.

--28 January 1978: Husni Mubarak visited Saudi Arabia, Qatar, North and South Yemen, the Sultanate of Oman, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and Iran.

--26 April 1978: He took an African trip during which he visited Central Africa, Chad and the Sudan.

--15 May 1978: He visited the Sudan and Jordan.

--29 July 1978: Husni Mubarak visited Iran and delivered to the Shah a message from President Sadat on the latest developments in the Middle East problem and the results of President Sadat's talks in Vienna, Salzburg and the tri-partite conference in London.

--12 October 1978: Husni Mubarak visited Tehran as part of a trip during which he visited a number of European capitals.

--November 1978: A 5-day trip during which he visited the United States and Spain.

--13 November 1978: Husni Mubarak visited People's China.

--28 October 1978: Husni Mubarak began a trip in which he visited France, England, West Germany, Iran, Yugoslavia, Romania, Austria and Turkey.

--[Date and few words omitted] he visited the Sudan and the Sultanate of Oman.

--In 1979, Husni Mubarak undertook numerous trips during which he visited many countries of the world. During March of that year he visited the Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Yugoslavia. That same month he visited France, Italy, Great Britain, Yugoslavia, West Germany, Austria and Romania.

--19 March 1979: Husni Mubarak visited Great Britain where he had talks with the then Prime Minister Callaghan on the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords.

--June, 1979: Husni Mubarak visited the United States and France.

--14 June 1979: Husni Mubarak visited Great Britain where he had talks with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and delivered to her a letter from President Sadat.

--28 December 1979: Husni Mubarak began a trip in which he visited the Sultanate of Oman, Korea, China, the United States and West Germany.

--29 April 1980: Husni visited Nigeria and attended the international economic conference.

--May 1980: Husni Mubarak visited the United States, West Germany and Great Britain.

--27 May 1980: He visited Great Britain and had talks with Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Minister Carrington.

--16 August 1980: Husni Mubarak began a trip in which he visited West Germany, France, England, Romania, Italy, Austria and the Vatican.

--1 September 1980: Husni Mubarak took a 4-day trip to Great Britain in response to an invitation from the government of Great Britain.

--14 October 1980: Husni Mubarak made a 5-day trip to the United States.

--In November, 1980, Husni Mubarak made another visit to the United States which lasted 6 days.

--8 June 1981: Husni Mubarak visited France.

--27 June 1981: Husni Mubarak visited Kenya to attend the African summit conference.

The latest trip by Husni Mubarak was to the United States at the end of this past September. During it he had talks with President Reagan and Secretary of State Alexander Haig.

CSO: 4504/37

SUZANNE MUBARAK ACTIVE IN SOCIAL WORK

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 9 Oct 81 p 5

[Text] Her desire is a meal and a cup of milk for schoolchildren.

She does not occupy herself with her private life only. Her interests are divided between her husband's many and continuous duties and her children 'Ala' and Jamal and public work.

She has provided a new model for social work in her small community in al-Minya governorate, in the working class Bulaq quarter and in the Misr al-Jadidah quarter which is comprised of middle class groups. Her whole desire is to be able to provide a meal and a cup of milk to schoolchildren in the poor quarters.

She was born in the village of Matay in al-Minya governorate. Her father is Doctor of Medicine Salih Thabit and she has one brother.

She married Husni Mubarak after she received her General Secondary (certificate) from the English school in Misr al-Jadidah.

She devoted herself to her married life and returned to her studies after she had her children 'Ala' and Jamal.

She enrolled in the Social Studies division of the American University and prepared a number of field studies which dealt with citizens' daily problems.

She chose the poor quarters of Cairo for her studies.

She also prepared another study on family planning in the villages and chose for that her village of Matay in al-Minya governorate.

She prepared her senior thesis at the American University on the home conditions of the children of Bulaq and the social services which it is possible to offer them. She was given a grade of "excellent" for the study.

She translated her theoretical studies into practical measures by establishing a full services organization in Bulaq.

The organization offers educational services for students and educational and nutritional services to schoolchildren.

Extending services to the poor quarters, Suzanne Mubarak founded a model nursery in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and a full services office for schoolchildren.

Suzanne Mubarak also heads an organization for cleanliness and services for Misr al-Jadidah quarter, in which the governor of Cairo and the head of the quarter participate.

Suzanne is inclined to simplicity in everything, and green is her favorite color. She is a member of the Sporting Club and prefers swimming.

Her sons 'Ala' and Jamal prefer squash and flying instruction.

CSO: 4504/37

PRIME MINISTER PRESENTS 1982 BUDGET

LD221324 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 22 Oct 81

[Text] According to a report by the Central News Unit, the text of the budget circular for the year starting on 21 March 1982 has been conveyed to all ministries, government departments, government-owned companies, profit-making institutions affiliated with the government and revolutionary organizations by Prime Minister Mahdavi-Kani. Government departments and revolutionary organizations are dutybound to prepare their programs and projects within 1 month in accordance with this circular and by remembering the general and regional policies and priorities of the circular and to send their programs and projects together with their proposed development plans and current budgets to the plans and budget organization to be reviewed.

In the 1982 budget attention has been paid to the continuation of the national policy to economize in all fields, the deployment of national resources for investments in productive, quick-yielding and non-dependent projects which are dependent upon domestic technology and human resources and which have limited foreign exchange needs; attaching importance and priority to the resettlement program of war refugees to the liberated regions or regions which will be recaptured; the reconstruction of productive units and areas which have been damaged during the war; refraining from investment in projects which are inappropriate with the economic conditions of the country; a more just distribution of investments and capital among various regions and different social groups in favor of deprived regions and groups; endeavouring to increase the non-cash [as heard] incomes through the expansion or growth of domestic fiscal resources, such as taxes; increasing the export of carpets, dried fruit and handicraft and preventing the waste of labor resources and other measures which favor the low income and deprived classes.

CSO: 4640/40

REPORT ON FIGHTING IN ABADAN

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 pp 10, 11, 56

[Article by Philip Marfleet]

[Text]

PHILIP MARFLEET reports on the Iranian army's 'human wall' assault on Abadan, the Iraqi counter-offensive, and the welter of claims, counterclaims, sporadic air raids and attempts at destabilisation that followed the two days of fighting.



Iranian losses during Operation Thamen al Aemmah were reported as heavy: arrow shows point of attack

IRAN employed 'a human wall' of troops in its assault on the town of Abadan on 27 September, say observers of the Gulf war. Arab sources report that 3,000 Iranian soldiers were killed, during two days of ferocious fighting.

For Iran, the assault produced 'our greatest victory' — the capture of Abadan after its twelve months in Iraqi hands. But Baghdad has claimed that the Iraqi counter offensive resulted in the death of 2,700 Iranians. An Iraqi military spokesman stated: 'Iraqi forces mowed down the human hordes thrown in by the enemy.' In London the Arabic-language newspaper *Al Arab* said 'extremely reliable Iranian sources' had confirmed that some 3,000 Iranian soldiers were indeed killed in the fighting.

Such casualty figures exceed all those hitherto claimed during the war. Even if claims have been inflated, it seems that recent fighting was of an intensity which recalls the trench warfare in Europe during the first world war.

Observers of the Gulf war have been puzzled by Iran's ability to mount such a forceful assault. They point out that disruption of the country's economic and political life has reached a drastic level, and that Iran's traditional western suppliers have refused to make further shipments of arms. While it is now clear that Iran has received substantial quantities of spares from Israel, and light arms of Russian manufacture from a number of sources, the key to its victory at Abadan may well be in the intensity of an assault based on the country's most plentiful resource — manpower.

In official statements Iraq has admitted that its units have retreated to the west bank of the Karun River, leaving Abadan to the Iranians, while in Tehran Iranian military chiefs described the operation as 'the most successful classic battle since the second world war.' Ayatollah Khomeini sent a message to the forces in Khuzestan congratulating them on 'this great victory' and Tehran Radio called on all Iranians to celebrate in what has become the traditional manner, by climbing to their rooftops to shout 'God is Great'.

Iran claims that Iraqi divisions have been driven out of all areas east of the Karun River along a 60-kilometre line from Darkoveyn in the north to Abadan, and Ahwaz, to the north, had been reopened, said Tehran Radio. 'Now the way is open to retake Khorramshahr,' claimed the broadcast.

Operation 'Thamen al Aemmeh', named after the eighth Shiite Imam, was said by the Iranians to have resulted in the death of 600 Iraqi soldiers, and the capture of a further 3,000. In addition Iran claims to have 'routed' Iraq's 10th Armoured Brigade, and 'smashed' the 44th Infantry and 6th and 8th Armoured Brigades.

In Baghdad an Iraqi spokesman described Tehran's claims as 'lies and imagination'. He explained the change in military dispositions as having been a 'strategic decision'. Iraqi troops had remained east of the Karun for a year, he said, despite repeated Iranian attacks. This had been 'in accordance with the general plan'. The Iraqi general command had now decided, said Baghdad, that it was necessary to 'transfer' units from east to west across the Karun. This was a response to Iranian attacks on Iraqi bridges across the river. Baghdad insisted that the Iraqi army was capable of returning 'to any spot' if its presence became necessary.

An Iraqi in London said that the 'transfer' had been made in order better to safeguard Iraqi territory. 'If we need to reoccupy any areas of strategic value, we will retake them immediately,' he said.

Iran has claimed that thousands of captured Iraqi troops have been transported to the rear of the battlefield area, and then on to holding camps in major cities, with especially large numbers sent to Tehran. Here, London spokesman Hashmi told *8 Days*: 'We discuss with them and tell them the truth about the war.' Many Iraqi prisoners of war, he said, had joined the Iranian forces. Those who refused to do so would be held until they were exchanged for captured Iranians, an arrangement organised by the

Red Cross.

In London an Iranian spokesman stated that the success of the Thamen al Aemmeh operation has resulted in the destruction of all but one of the Iraqi-controlled bridges over the Karun. The remaining crossing was already being utilised by Iranian forces to mount a series of raids into the Iraqi-held area, he said.

Following the Abadan offensive, Iranian planes carried out a series of raids. On 2 October, Tehran Radio claimed, four strategically important power stations in Iraq were seriously damaged. The targets were identified as the Dukan Dam station in northern Iraq, two stations in the southern Umm al Qasr region, and another northeast of Kirkuk. Iraq, however, flatly denied that any such raids had taken place.

On the same day three planes attacked a crude-oil gathering centre in the north of Kuwait. Iran denied any involvement in the raid, and blamed Iraq. But Kuwaiti minister of state for cabinet affairs, Abdelaziz Hussein, described the raid as 'a new link in a chain of acts of aggression against Kuwaiti airspace and targets by the Iranian air force.'

Diplomats in the Gulf described the response as 'moderate', with Kuwait making only token public protests, although going through the motions by withdrawing its ambassador, to Tehran, and summoning the Iranian ambassador in Kuwait to receive a protest note. The Kuwaiti assertion that Iran was responsible for the raid followed statements, believed by Kuwaiti sources to have emanated from Washington, that American Awacs early-warning aircraft over Saudi Arabia tracked the three planes from Iran.

Kuwait received messages of support from a wide range of Arab and African countries — including Syria, a supporter of Iran during the Gulf hostilities. Additional support came from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan.

Diplomatic sources in the Gulf have suggested that the raid was mounted by Iran as a 'warning' to Kuwait that its support for Iraq must cease. Though not formally associated with the Iraqi war effort, Kuwait has channelled large quantities of supplies across its common border with Iraq, which is reported to have asked Arab states for some $14bn in aid to assist an economy which has suffered more deeply than Baghdad had expected from the prolonged conflict. Kuwait has contributed $4bn as its share of the loan package.

From Baghdad, Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan said that the aggression refuted Iranian claims to be 'allies of the Arab nation'. He warned against any threat to 'Arab national rights anywhere in the greater Arab homeland.' Meanwhile another report from Baghdad claimed Iraqi aircraft had inflicted damage on important oil installations in Iran, including the vital Kharg Island outlet, and pipelines northeast of Abadan. Such installations are of vital importance to Iran, whose oil exports have already slipped to an estimated 500,000 barrels a day. The bulk of their oil sites had already been severely damaged early in the war with Iraq.

If such reports are confirmed, they suggest that the Iranian economy will be thrust into fresh difficulties. An observer in Tehran commented: 'If they have got Kharg, we are in very serious trouble.'

Concluding a week of claims and counterclaims, Baghdad accused Syria of allowing Iranian aircraft to use its airports as a springboard for attacks on targets in Iraq. Information Minister Latif Nassif al Jassem said that the presence of Iranian planes in Syria was part of a 'special coordination' between Syria and Iran. Syria responded by denying the 'hysterical' allegations as the product of 'unsound minds'.

It appears that Iraq is also pursuing less orthodox methods in Iran than those in use at the front. Baghdad Radio has announced the formation of an 'Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahwaz'. Ashwaz is a strategic centre of the oil industry in Khuzestan, and is still in Iranian hands. The Iraqi statement claimed that 'eleven Ahwaz strugglers' will lead the Front, which will continue to organise 'the armed struggle for the total liberation of usurped Ahwaz.' In London an official Iranian spokesman told *8 Days* that Iran did not deny the presence of what he called 'enemy groups' in Ahwaz and other Iranian cities. Such groups, he said, 'appear for a few minutes to commit their crimes,' but he maintained there was no continuous fighting in Ahwaz or elsewhere behind the front line. He attributed attacks in Ahwaz and the repeated assassination attempts on leading members of the ruling IRP to the same 'malicious enemy'. Insisting that the Iranian opposition group the Mujaheddin were incapable of carrying out the assassinations without help, he said that they had been trained and assisted 'by Iraq and Israel'.

At a press conference in Baghdad the Ahwaz Liberation Front described the Persian and zionist regimes as 'two sides of the same coin'. It claimed the the existence of camps and bases in Iran from which the Front would fight for 'a progressive and patriotic Arab society in Ahwaz.'

Superficially, there has been little disruption of commercial life in Baghdad. The Baghdad Fair has progressed as usual, with large numbers attending. Among them was British trade secretary John Biffen.

CSO: 4600/70

HOJATOLESLAM ALI KHAMENEI ELECTED NEW PRESIDENT

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 pp 14, 15

[Article by Philip Marfleet]

[Text]

Iran's newly elected president, Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei, was welcomed by the Soviet-run radio station National Voice of Iran as an 'irreconcilable and stubborn struggler against world-devouring US imperialism.' Here PHILIP MARFLEET lists the financial pressures behind Iran's trading links with Eastern bloc states.

WITH THE election of Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei, Iran now has its third president within four months. Khamenei is regarded as a hard-line fundamentalist and a potential successor to Ayatollah Khomeini.

Khamenei's performance over the coming weeks will be of great interest to international observers, in particular those who have suggested that his well-organised elevation to the presidency coincides with a shift in Iranian foreign policy towards Moscow.

Shortly before his ousting from office earlier this year, ex-President Bani Sadr said: 'The Russians don't stand a chance in Iran.' Now, only five months later, western newspapers, like the *Herald Tribune*, are arguing that the ruling mullahs are moving 'toward increasing alignment with Soviet bloc countries'.

Certainly Moscow has given Khamenei the warmest endorsement. The Russian-run National Voice of Iran Radio, broadcasting in Farsi across the Soviet Union border from Baku, in the Caucasus mountains, recommended Khamenei as 'an irreconcilable and stubborn struggler against world-devouring US imperialism' and as 'committed to the revolution's popular and anti-imperialist line'.

Since the fall of the Shah, the Soviet Union has taken great care to react positively to all changes in government and the succession of differing politicians brought to prominence in Tehran. But as the present government slides deeper and deeper into difficulties, Moscow's concern has been expressed more and more fully.

In response to the call by the opposition Mujaheddin group that the presidential election should be boycotted, National Voice of Iran urged that 'the heroic and mojahed nation . . . participate directly' in it. The Mujaheddin — described as 'agents and hirelings of world-devouring America' — were condemned for attempting to promote the 'treacherous and criminal aim' of disrupting the election.

But enthusiasm for the present government and for Khamenei may not mean that the new president is Moscow's man. Rather, the Soviet Union may believe that the time is right to endorse more emphatically a regime which has already felt compelled to turn north towards Moscow. Today denunciations of the Eastern bloc as 'godless' or 'totalitarian' are infrequently heard from Tehran and Iran is developing a much closer trading relationship with the Soviet Union

and its allies. In the first six months of 1981 goods entering Iran through the Soviet Union amounted to more than 20 per cent of total imports, valued at $1.4bn. Over the same period the value of imports through Iran's four Caspian ports increased by 84 per cent.

In August, the undersecretary for economic affairs at the foreign ministry in Tehran, Ahmed Azizi, said that Iran favoured economic ties with the Eastern bloc states because they were 'rational and reasonable'.

It is not that Iran's government prefers such deals. But traditional links with the western countries have been stretched to the limit by the continuing instability in Iran. In many cases ties broken during the revolution have not been repaired. Iran's problem is well illustrated by the visit of a delegation to London in mid-September. Its attempts to persuade Shell and BP to continue to buy Iranian crude oil at the Opec posted prices seem to have been unsuccessful. Shell has decided to end its contract for 100,000 b/d, which runs out in a few months. And the Japanese have already withdrawn from their agreement for 250,000 b/d.

A pointer to future trade agreements are the recently-concluded deals with Yugoslavia and Romania. Last month, Iran's economics and finance minister, Hussein Nabavi, announced that Yugoslavia is to import 1.7m tonnes of Iranian crude oil, while Iran will receive goods under a barter agreement. This was followed on 2 October by the signing of a protocol with Romania providing for 4m tonnes of crude, and $70m of non-oil goods. Iran will receive tractors and locomotives. Payment will be by a mixture of barter and hard currency. These barter agreements reflect Iran's great difficulties in maintaining sales of its high-price oil and in obtaining credit almost anywhere on the western market.

For some time Iran has paid for goods in cash, but the widening trade gap has brought severe pressure on imports, which the Central Bank is struggling to bring under control. Bartering and exchange agreements made directly with the Eastern bloc governments rather than the nervous western multinationals may prove attractive to Tehran, whose range of choices is narrowing fast anyway.

There are dangers in exaggerating the significance of the new trade deals. In 1976 the Shah — himself no friend of Moscow — concluded a five-year agreement with Moscow worth some $3bn. And unconfirmed though widespread reports say the Algiers deal, which freed the American hostages, contained American commitments to increase investment.

Recent diplomatic activity has been especially interesting. On 13 September Tehran Radio reported that Ayatollah Rafsanjani, speaker of the Iranian parliament, the Majlis, had left Iran for North Korea. He was accompanied by the minister of defence. Before leaving, Rafsanjani said that North Korea had shown 'repeated sincerity' toward the Iranian revolution. At the same time Iranian foreign minister, Mir Hussein Mousavi, visited Libya as an observer of the Arab states' Steadfastness Front conference, involving Libya, Algeria, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO.

In Benghazi, Mousavi announced that 'we have come here to pledge our backing and support for all the members of the Steadfastness Front. We also declare we stand by your side against the occupationist Israeli enemy at any time.'

Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, replied warmly: 'We salute the Islamic revolution in Iran.' He called upon the leaders of the Arab countries present to adopt Mousavi's speech as 'an official document' of the Steadfastness Front.

Both visits took Iranian delegations to countries that have emerged over past months as important arms suppliers. The light armaments that Iran needs for the war with Iraq and for its internal security operations have been supplied largely from these sources — themselves large importers of Russian weaponry.

Iran has certainly moved closer to these pro-Russian states and, as if to confirm the trend, Tehran Radio last month announced the arrival in Iran of a South Yemeni delegation to open an embassy in Tehran.

But, like the pattern of trade deals, such moves can be deceptive. Iran's American-built army and airforce still rely for strategic weapons on western suppliers. The now well-documented record of Israeli supplies to Iran has maintained the army's important tank corps with British and American parts. On 3 October the London *Guardian* made new disclosures about 17 flights from Israel to Iran via Cyprus in American planes, and

A fiery orator with an iron constitution

HOJATOLESLAM Ali Khamenei, 41, has risen rapidly to prominence. Originally from Iran's northeastern province, he studied theology in Mashad.

Khamenei was an active opponent of the Shah for many years and helped to found the Islamic Republican Party, which is now in power. He first became a public figure with his appointment as Tehran's Friday prayer leader, succeeding Ayatollahs Taleghani and Montazeri. Montazeri had been groomed as successor to Ayatollah Khomeini, but his lacklustre performances, especially at the microphone, persuaded the IRP to bring forward Khamenei.

The new president is well known for his fiery rhetorical style and makes many of the government's policy statements, especially at Friday prayers.

Khamenei is said to be a supporter of Majlis speaker Ayatollah Rafsanjani, and militantly anti-communist. But his enthusiastic support for the occupation of the American embassy indicates that, like the other leaders of the IRP, he regards the US as Iran's main enemy.

His reputation as being more flexible on the question of relations with eastern bloc countries may stem from the more pragmatic approach illustrated in his rapid rise to power.

Khamenei was seriously injured in an assassination attempt in June, which seems to have cost him the use of one arm. But his rapid recovery from other injuries has assisted his reputation as one of the youngest and toughest of the government figures.

a further 17 flights by Norwegian carriers.

But regular arms supplies are not forthcoming from the West, and Iran is again making do by turning elsewhere. It seems that only by buying in from its newer suppliers, and by making enormous sacrifices on the domestic front to concentrate resources on the war effort have the Iranian forces been able to undertake their recent offensive against Iraq.

Other moves on the diplomatic front have puzzled some observers. Mousavi's visit to the Tripoli summit took him into a meeting with representatives of the PLO. The event almost coincided with PLO representative Hani al Hassan's departure from Tehran and subsequent well-publicised visit to the Mujaheddin leader, Masoud Rajavi, in Paris. This apparently contradictory attitude of the PLO was later said to have been clarified by a statement released in Beirut that 'the PLO will never forget our brothers and sisters of the Mujaheddin'.

Iranians in Tehran and London commented that they did not believe that the underlying link between the PLO and Iran had been disturbed. Though the relationship was strained, they said, the Paris visit and the Beirut statement were 'symbolic gestures'.

Inside Iran, the strongly pro-Moscow Tudeh Party has begun to emerge from years of obscurity to take up a number of positions under the IRP government. Tudeh members are reliably reported from Tehran to be occupying top jobs in the technical field and in the media. While a small and now ageing organisation, its uncritical support for the regime and the professional skills of many of its members make the Tudeh attractive to a government badly lacking skilled personnel and resources.

CSO: 4600/70

IRANIAN CHARGE INTERVIEWED ON DOMESTIC STABILITY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Bangkok SIAM RAT in Thai 7 Sep 81 p 11

[Interview with Iranian Charge d'Affaires Manuchehr Shahinfar in Bangkok; date not given]

> [Text] The situation in Iran remains chaotic, both in terms of the domestic political struggle, which has become increasingly bloody as well as the border war with Iraq, which goes from the offensive to the defensive, with Iran still unable to drive off the Iraqi forces.
>
> Herewith page 11 wishes to publish an interview with the Iranian charge in Thailand, Mr Manuchehr Shahinfar concerning general Iranian policy concerning the status of the Palestinian people and domestic conditions.

Announcement--The crown prince of Saudi Arabia has proposed that the land on the west bank of the Jordan River and that of the Gaza Strip be given to the Palestinians so that they would have their own country. With this, Arabs and all Muslim peoples would be willing to recognize Israel's legitimacy. This proposal would be the abolition of the Palestinian revolutionary movement and would establish Israeli sovereignty over Arab lands it had seized. It would also spread the influence of imperialism, especially that of the United States in that region. This proposal has been completely rejected by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran has submitted a new proposal to set up a united front which would be composed of all Muslims worldwide to combat the Zionists and imperialism. The problems being confronted by the Palestinians are not only problems for the Arab nation, but are those of Muslims throughout the world. No human being in the world can overlook the problems of the Palestinians who have been driven from their homes and from their country. All Muslims are aware of and fear the great menace from Israel. Likewise, no Muslim can fail to understand the matter of qiblah [direction of prayer made from] the sacred territory of Jerusalem. So that this united front may grow expeditiously and attack the Zionist entity and support the policies of the Palestinians, with the assistance of the 100 million Arabs and the other billion [as published] Muslims worldwide to join forces to challenge Israel, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran firmly

believes that the establishment of such a united front is the only way to combat the Zionist entity or imperialism in order to assist in the Palestinian revolution. We firmly believe that the Palestinian problem is an Islamic problem. This is the firm belief and purity of spirit of all Muslims. Therefore, it is necessary and important that this united front be established.

The Israeli Government is of the opinion that it will cooperate with its allies in suppressing the Palestinian revolution. The Islamic Republic of Iran cannot accept this policy. We have been made aware that President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menahem Begin of Israel have made agreements concerning plans that involve the Palestinians. These plans and policies come directly from America which wants to have all its allies stop giving aid to the Palestinians.

Another problem is that the Israeli Government intends to destroy the sacred territory of Jerusalem, in particular at the Al-Aqsa mosque. Its intention is to make the Al-Aqsa mosque into a holy shrine of the Jews.

At the same time, Israel is attempting to project an image to the Muslims of the world in such a manner that the Muslims will see Israel as a legitimate nation which is doing nothing to oppress Muslims, especially the Palestinians who were driven from their land who have joined together to resist the Israeli Government and the burning of the Al-Aqsa mosque which happened previously. This Israeli act caused great discontent among Muslims. A significant objective of Israel in destroying the Al-Aqsa mosque is that it wishes to deflect people's attention by pretending to repair the mosque. In fact, it wants to destroy it and build a sacred shrine for the Jews. The government of Iran truly feels that the actions of Israel are true violations of Islamic principles. From these events, the government of Iran is in agreement with the feelings of all Muslims worldwide and has announced its support, saying that the government of Iran does not accept and does not agree with the actions of Israel and will resist Israeli acts. These illegal Israeli acts are seen by Muslims all over the world and they also state that these are illegal acts which must be rejected and resisted forever.

Question: With Iran's announcement of a policy of joining forces to combat the Zionists, is Iran doing this worldwide? Or is this just being announced in Thailand?

Answer: This is a general announcement. It comes from Iranian embassy representatives to demonstrate that we do not accept Israeli actions. Although the Saudi Government may announce its acceptance of Israeli actions, we are resisting them because we feel that the Israeli Government is illegal because it has driven the Palestinians from their land. This is considered to be a matter of policy of the Iranian Government alone; it is not embassy policy.

Question: Concerning the activities of the PLO, what cooperation and support has the Iranian Government given them in their struggle for self-government?

Answer: The objective of the Iranian Government is to assist in the liberation of the Palestinian people, but the time is not yet ripe because of the situation in Iran now. We are still at war with Iraq. This decreases our assistance to the Palestinians. When we finish the war with Iraq and when we are able to, we will be glad to help the Palestinians in all respects.

Question: Meaning military assistance also?

Answer: We are always happy to help the Palestinians if we are able and have sufficient opportunities. Our people are ready to help them.

Question: What views does Iran have about the prospects of peace in line with the Camp David accords? In Iran's view, can this process bring peace to the Middle East? Aside from Iran's suggestion to join Muslim forces concerning the Palestinian problem, does Iran have any personal views on how to solve this problem? Does Iran have its own formula which would give the Palestinians self-government?

Answer: We have said from the beginning that we do not support the Saudi formula. We have simply announced to the world to recognize and assist the Palestinians by joining together in a united front. This would be a force that would resist Israeli actions. In our view, we have the intention of bringing the Palestinians back to their own land and have them establish their own government.

Question: This Iranian policy seems rather like a dream.

Answer: Although it may seem like a dream, what is most important is that when all Muslims join together, it will become a reality then and there. For instance, the previous Iranian Government was resisted by millions of people. Not long after that, the victory came to those people. It can be seen clearly that this kind of thing is not a dream.

Question: Iran will become a great power if the nation once again becomes calm. When that time comes, do you think that Iran will have an important role in bringing peace to the Middle East by establishing a Palestinian state?

Answer: The Palestinian problem is a problem of all Muslims because the land of Palestine is the central direction of prayer toward God. Also, this land has been sacred for generations. Therefore, if all Muslims join force and unite as one they will be able to do anything. Regardless of whatever difficulties arise now, we should ignore them and strive to move forward, getting together to do this. We firmly believe that this matter will come to pass in the future. This is not an illusion.

Question: Does Iran at this time recognize the existence of the nation of Israel or is Iran's viewpoint like that of the PLO which does not recognize the Palestinian state [as published]?

Answer: We do not recognize the existence of the state of Israel.

Question: With the situation in Iran, if this is viewed from an international perspective, we sense that everybody is concerned as to how the situation will end, because there are just too many killings. With things as they are, it would seem that it is difficult to stop it. We would like to know what the government's standpoint it, especially with the extremely serious terrorist threat. We would like to know to what extent the people support the government.

Answer: The stability of the government of Iran is a stability which comes from the support of the people. The government of Iran itself is trying to implement various policies that are neither leftist nor rightist; it implements a neutral policy in accordance with Islamic tenets. The implementation of these policies has no impact on any country whatsoever. The terrorists in Iran can be divided into two primary groups: one group supports America and the other supports the communists directly. These groups have stolen weapons from armories and have stored them. They use them to inflict terror on the people, making them fearful inside the country. What would be done if these acts were committed in other countries? What would happen is that they would be suppressed totally, but we have not done as others have. We act using Islamic law, we implement policies in accordance with Islamic law. The terrorists are resisting the Islamic government, resisting the people and are killing totally innocent people. It is these killers of the people who are guilty and they must be suppressed. To what degree depends on what they did wrong, and whether they have confessed their guilt and reformed themselves. The government of Iran and in particular Ayatollah Khomeyni have provided complete assistance for this process of reform without rancor, or if there is rancor, it is the least possible. We feel that anyone committing terrorist acts causing hardship for the people should be treated in accordance with Islamic principles.

Question: After the beginning of the Islamic revolution in Iran the United States boycotted Iran, refusing to trade with it. At this time, what countries does Iran trade with? Can Iran produce enough food for its consumption? If not, where do you buy food?

Answer: Before the revolution, Iran's economy was in the clutches of America. No matter what America ordered, the government of Iran had to comply, whether it was oil or anything else. Everything had to be supplied to America. After the revolution, the government of Iran had a policy of supporting neither the left nor the right. In this, we have attempted to prevent ourselves from being the slaves of any imperialist nation, left or right. With this policy, we will have to develop the country ourselves, agriculturally or industrially. We have to try to produce for domestic consumption. We have tried not to buy abroad, especially from the great powers. However, we do have contacts with the Third World. These nations have never been our oppressors nor have they resisted us. We are always glad to recognize and have contact with them. At present, we are developing by outselves without asking for help from anybody.

Question: Does Iran produce enough food for [its] consumption? If not, where does it import from?

Answer: We are able to produce enough of some types of food to meet the needs of the people. We try to import the least possible amount from abroad, but we do have some contacts such as with Thailand. We do buy rice in pretty large amounts.

Question: We have heard that the Soviets have sent food to Iran after the United States halted its trade. To what extent is this true? Are the Soviets still doing this?

Answer: This is not true because Russia has to depend on other countries so why should they send food to Iran?

Question: After the revolution, how did the government change the economic structure in order to give people in general a share in the general wealth?

Answer: Right after the revolution, groups of students went out to help the rural people in several areas, such as by teaching and guiding them in their livelihoods. But later, chaos erupted in the country. This is normal in every country which has just had a revolution. These things generally do not just die down. There have been suppressions and a new form of administration was established. Reaction set in and we had to take care of these things first. Development and encouraging the people had to decrease. The outbreak of war exacerbated the hindrance to development. However, you cannot call Iran an industrialized country, because we have factories and other things, as well as agriculture [as published]. In the future, we believe that the war will end soon. When that day comes, we will set to work developing the country from what is on hand. This will be a progressive and strong development.

Question: Does Iran have production capabilities without having to rely on foreign experts? Does Iran have enough people with knowledge of and ability in production?

Answer: Iran has what it needs, both in personnel and in technology and so we think it is not necessary to ask for foreign help.

Question: When you say that the war will end soon, I would like to know how it will end. Will it be by negotiation or by a military victory against Iraq?

Answer: It is known that we are at war with Iraq which was started by Iraq when it seized Iranian territory. The Iranian people and soldiers have joined forces in resistance with good results: We have been able to regain part of our territory. Part of it is still held by Iraq. Iran still holds to its original position that so long as Iraq does not withdraw from our territory, we will not stop fighting. We believe that with the power of the people and a firm belief, we will be able to drive the Iraqis from Iranian territory before long, but we cannot say for certain when.

Question: Iran is short of weapons, especially spare parts. I would like to know where Iran buys its weapons and spare parts?

Answer: We make most of our weapons ourselves. A small amount is obtained abroad. The weapons we do buy are purchased on the free market and we do not rely on any country. Said another way, we buy almost no weapons from anybody. We believe that faith in our unity is more valuable and useful than any purchased or manufactured weapon in the fight against all our enemies. When Iraq first attacked Iran, Iraq thought that within 1 week it would be able to conquer Iran. But later on, it appeared that Iraq had to suffer great losses of troops and weapons, although at that time Iran did not have enough weapons. We relied on our stronger spirit to enable us to get the advantage over the enemy. Although enemy weapons were better, Iraq still lost in fighting Iran.

Question: How are relations between Thailand and Iran? In what areas do you think that Thailand will be able to cooperate with Iran in view of its assistance to Iran at this time?

Answer: Iran is always happy to have relations with any country it has relations with, who is not an enemy [of Iran] and does not exert pressure on us. We have always had smooth relations with Thailand; we have never had conflicts. At this time, we still have trade contacts with Thailand. For example, we buy rice from Thailand.

CSO: 4207/22

MAJLIS REJECTION OF VELAYATI AS PRIME MINISTER EXAMINED

'AFP' Report

NC221636 Paris AFP in English 1611 GMT 22 Oct 81

[Excerpt] Tehran, 22 Oct (AFP)--In less than 24 hours, two major disagreements in the Islamic Republic have emerged with the parliamentary rejection of the proposed prime minister and a public warning to revolutionary guards.

The Majlis rejection today of 'Ali Akbar Velayati as Iran's next prime minister was surprising, particularly since he was nominated for the post by President 'Ali Khamene'i who also heads the powerful Islamic Republic Party (IRP).

It followed a public statement yesterday by spiritual leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni reproaching revolutionary guards for "disagreements" with Iran's Muslim Shi'ite clery.

The Majlis vote--unprecedented refusal of a [word indistinct] one of Ayatollah Khomeyni's devoted followers--shook the Iranian political world like a thunderbolt.

Both foreign and Iranian diplomats and observers were expected automatic approval of the president's choice. But Mr Velayati, 36, a former pediatrician, failed to win the necessary two-thirds of 97 votes, losing by 80 votes to 74 with 38 abstentions.

The vote triggered a flurry of speculation about the Majlis vote. Mr Velayati, nominated to succeed Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani, is a U.S.-trained pediatrician specializing in infectious diseases and an IRP deputy from Tehran since 1980.

Minister of Islamic Orientation 'Abdol Majidmoadikha told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE today that "by their vote, the Majlis deputies simply recognized that a more competent person could be prime minister".

But no other official or unofficial reasons were given and no word leaked out on the Majlis closed-door debate yesterday on the nomination.

Observers today questioned whether the Majlis might have acted to head off presidential political hegemony. For Mr Velayati's hard-line advocacy of religious fundamentalist policies appeared generally allied with those of Hojjat ol-Eslam Khamene'i.

The candidate campaigned for the centralization of Iran's intelligence network to improve security and the export of the Iranian revolution.

But his insistence on the redistribution of land could have been his downfall. The problem is a burning issue in Iranian politics opposing radicals who insist on drastic land reform and most of the clergy, who advocate moderation on the issue.

Hashemi-Rafsanjani on Rejection

NC222027 Paris AFP in English 2020 GMT 22 Oct 81

[Text] Tehran, 22 Oct (AFP)--The speaker of the Iranian parliament said he regretted the rejection today of 'Ali Akbar Velayati as Iran's next prime minister but said that it pointed to the house's independence in political decisions.

Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that he had supported Mr Velayati in the vote, which the candidate lost by 80 to 78 with 38 abstentions.

"I myself, whom a majority of the deputies approve, supported the candidate," he said.

He noted that Mr Velayati had been nominated by President 'Ali Khamene'i, who was "elected by 95 percent" of Iran's voters and who heads the powerful Islamic Republican Party (IRP).

"Our choice failed, but what happened was interesting," the Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani said of the parliament's unprecedented refusal to approve the candidate of the Islamic leadership.

"We saw the deputies make a completely free choice.

"Our enemies accuse the Majlis of being under the influence of the Islamic Republican Party, but I always said parliament was independent, and that was proven today," Mr Hashemi-Rafsanjani said.

Khamene'i To Announce New Candidate

NC240614 Paris AFP in English 0603 GMT 24 Oct 81

[Text] Tehran, 24 Oct (AFP)--Iranian President 'Ali Khamene'i has announced that he will present a new candidate for premier to the parliament on Sunday, following its rejection on Thursday of his first nominee, 'Ali Akhbar Velayati.

In an interview with the daily ISLAMIC REPUBLIC published today, Mr Khamene'i said: "In any case, we have suffered no damage. I have five other candidates for the post, and on Sunday I will present one of the five to the assembly."

He said the rejection of Mr Velayati should not be looked at as an indication of factional rivalry. "Two deputies with similar viewpoints can always vote differently," he said.

He saluted the vote of the Majlis (parliament), as "one of the most courageous acts of this assembly."

CSO: 4600/73

IRAN, WESTERN FIRMS HOLD 'SECRET' TALKS IN VIENNA

AU221325 Vienna KURIER in German 22 Oct 81 p 3

[Report by Heinz Nussbaumer: "Vienna: Iran and West Struggle Over Billions"]

[Summary] "In strict secrecy the Iranian Khomeyni regime is at present trying in Austria to close the chapter of the economic heritage of the shah era and the hostage affair. A very large delegation from Tehran in Vienna is attempting to meet the demands of Western firms running into the billions. The principal parties concerned, the Iranians and Americans, promised one another to hold this dialogue 10 months ago when the drama surrounding the 51 U.S. hostages was coming to an end."

The struggle over the financial legacy of the former Iranian-Western partnership is taking place at the Iranian Embassy on Jauresgasse in Vienna. Since the beginning of this month, more than 60 high-ranking representatives of all Iranian ministries involved have been negotiating, in various groups, with representatives of European and American business concerns.

The U.S.-Iranian dialogue is coming under pressure because the period on which the two countries had agreed for settling their mutual claims will expire this week. Claims on which no agreement can be reached by this deadline will have to be referred to an international court at the Hague. The Iranians deposited $1 billion in Algeria at the conclusion of the hostage affair, but this amount is far below the total claims of U.S. firms. There is no deposit whatsoever for the claims of European firms. "However, both Americans and Europeans have so far equally displayed readiness in the negotiations to accept tremendous cuts in their claims, obviously in the hope of getting back into business with the Iranians."

The negotiations are also influenced by alarming reports about the condition of the Iranian economy and the limited solvency of the Khomeyni regime. Iranian Government agencies are reportedly trying to raise funds to pay the debts left over from the shah era by selling valuable assets in the West that used to belong to the shah, including very valuable rugs.

A prominent Iranian general was reportedly "temporarily" among the Iranian delegates in Vienna: Obviously Iran is also seeking to establish contacts with private arms dealers in Austria now that the war with its neighbor Iraq has lasted for as long as 13 months. In contrast to the very tough attitude in negotiations with civilian

Western firms, the Iranian leadership is at present apparently ready to pay virtually any price for the urgently needed military supplies.

The delegation from Tehran is to return home from Vienna this weekend. To date--according to information from Western quarters--more than half of the pending claims have been settled out of court.

CSO: 4620/5

UN URGED TO CONTROL HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 p 13

[Article by Liesl Graz]

[Text]

THE international community must stop turning a blind eye to the repression going on 'in the name of Islam' in her country, a long-time Iranian civil-rights activist has told the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva.

Moloud Khanlery, secretary of the Committee for the Defence and Promotion of Human Rights in Iran, told *8 Days* after giving her testimony: 'If you count all those executed in prison, killed in the repressions, in Kurdistan and elsewhere, all the massacres — not counting casualties of the war with Iraq — some 100,000 people have been killed in the last three years. And the whole world remains silent, barely shaking its head!'

The committee was founded in 1975 in Paris by Iranian exiles, to study and denounce the excesses of the Shah's regime, particularly of Savak. Like most Iranian opposition groups, at first it enthusiastically supported the Islamic revolution. But, she said, it 'quickly lost its illusions' and has continued the painstaking task of gathering, filtering and coordinating information.

Khanlery's testimony was a plea to the UN and the international community to stop ignoring what is becoming a genocide. The UN has to date been hesitant to speak out against the events in Iran. Some of this reluctance may stem from political pressures, but more probably it derives from unwillingness to get involved in any controversy with religious undertones.

Last month the Commission heard one of the first attempts to break down these undeniably important psychological and legal barriers from Ahmed Khalifa, a former Egyptian religious affairs minister. Khalifa, who was elected to the UN body in his personal capacity as an expert, begged the world not to confuse what is happening in Iran with the spirit of Islam.

Khalifa condemned the actions of Iran's present leaders as a perversion of Islam, for the sake of personal power-seeking and tyranny. His plea was received with considerable sympathy by other Commission experts, including Muslims from Nigeria, India, Morocco, Sudan and Syria — in private. All of them repeated that such a denunciation of fanaticism was necessary, and could only have been made by an insider, another Muslim. There was no reaction from the Iranian observer sitting on the Commission.

Armed with facts and figures from her years' experience of resistance to successive Iranian governments, Khanlery spoke to *8 Days* in authoritative terms shortly after her deposition to the UN body. She was adamant that human-rights violations in Iran today are far worse than under the Shah.

'There is no comparison! I was opposing the Shah's regime for 25 years, but his government was one of angels if you compare it to the demonic situation of Iran under Khomeini today. You may remember that, when Khomeini was in exile, he accused the Shah of holding and torturing 100,000 prisoners — over more than 20 years. Now the

mullahs themselves have lowered their figures to 4,000.

'In the three and a half years since Khomeini returned to Iran, our committee estimates — and we want to give very conservative estimates, to be very careful not to exaggerate — that some 7,000 Mujaheddin alone are, or have been, imprisoned. The question remains, of course, as to how many of them really are Mujaheddin, but that is impossible to answer now. We estimate about 60,000 persons in all.

'The torture being carried out in gaols and prisons is worse than anything Savak imagined. The invitations to Iranians to denounce suspected 'misdoings' of others, setting parents against children, brother against sister, are unqualifiable . . . (some) 10,000 people have been killed in these three years, and the whole world remains silent, barely shaking its head!'

Turning to the silence with which the international community watches all this, Khanlery ruefully admitted: 'During the reign of the Shah, different humanitarian organisations — Amnesty International, the Red Cross — came to us to help get material. Today our committee goes around knocking on doors, and we have a great deal of difficulty getting anyone to listen to us.'

She added that she wanted to see the UN, if possible 'send a competent commission to Iran to investigate the status of human rights and then report on it . . . but that will be very difficult, if not impossible, because all the doors are closed.' This would at least mean that the international community would realise the 'tragedy that is being committed'.

Meanwhile, the Mujaheddin leader Massoud Rajavi last week announced the setting up of an Iranian government in exile in France. Rajavi and former President Bani Sadr, with whom he fled to France in July, were banned from making political statements. This has since been relaxed in the light of official concern in France at the abuse of human rights in Iran.

The programme announced by Rajavi, the spokesman for the new government and apparently its effective leader, calls for free elections to a constituent assembly, Bani Sadr, who also signed the communique, is named as provisional president, but it seems clear that he has been relegated.

The programme as defined in the communique provides for autonomy for all 'national groups' in the country, and particularly the Kurds; the suppression of the revolutionary committees and tribunals; the abolition of censorship and torture; and the reinstatement of social and political liberties.

CSO: 4600/70

FEUDALISM, LANDLORDS ROLE IN WEST AZERBAYJAN TO BE CURTAILED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 14 Oct 81 p 4

[Text] According to the report of the central news unit in Arumieh, the method of reconstruction of the cleansed areas of West Azerbayjan were discussed at a 12-hour meeting of the officials of this province.

At this meeting, which was held at the West Azerbayjan governor general's office and was attended by officials of the revolutionary organs and administrative entities and by city and district governors, the comprehensive program for the reconstruction of the cleansed areas of this province was prepared, and the priorities for the implementation of this program were established according to needs and possibilities.

On the basis of this report, among the topics and subjects whose rapid implementation was stressed after their discussion and review, were the following: to give interest-free long-term loans to oppressed farmers and villagers and to people who have somehow suffered as a result of involvement and domination by counter-revolution and have in some instances lost their possessions, and also to curtail the power of feudalism and of the landlords who have been mistreating the farmers by taking advantage of the conditions and atmosphere of oppression imposed on the area.

During this lengthy meeting, moreover, the method of providing necessary facilities for farmers to obtain improved fertilizer and seeds, of meeting their general needs and fulfilling needed opportunities in order to hasten the process of rebuilding the cleansed areas, as well as the elimination of difficulties in implementing the reconstruction program were discussed and reviewed and the necessary decisions were made.

CSO: 4640/37

CLANDESTINE REPORTS BALUCHI LEADER'S INTERVIEW

NC221355 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 21 Oct 81

[Text] Head of Baluchi Peshmergas and member of the Commanding Council of the Baluch Unity Front, Amanollah Khan, spoke about the intensification of the Baluchi people's struggles against the clerical regime during an interview with the German-based AKHBAR-E IRAN publication.

At the beginning of the interview Amanollah Khan said that from the start of Khomeyni's oppressive rule the Baluchi people were not prepared to receive this disgraceful rule and that from the very start they began their struggle against this traitorous regime and continued this struggle for honor and dignity against oppression. He said: Time and time again we have made the enemy kneel by carrying out surprise attacks, so much so that now the revolution guards do not dare leave their positions.

In reply to the question on what Khomeyni's regime has done for the Baluchi people, Amanollah Khan replied: Not only has the non-Islamic Khomeyni regime not done anything for the people, but its entire efforts have been toward oppression and pillaging and each day it adds to the people's inconvenience and sufferings.

The AKHBAR-E IRAN correspondent asked: Under the conditions that have been imposed by the present regime, what path has our compatriot Baluchi brothers chosen to solve their problems and what do they think about the future? Amanollah Khan stated: The Baluchi people have determined that they have no alternative but to take up arms and to fight against the agents of Khomeyni's regime. Therefore, all the Baluchi combatants have risen bravely to topple this despotic rule, and they do not hesitate even for a moment in displaying their firm determination and inflicting strong blows on it.

Speaking about the criminal acts of Khomeyni's hirelings, Amanollah Khan said: The Baluchi people remember thousands of cases of savagery by Khomeyni's revolution guards. Recently very quiet demonstrations against Khomeyni's usurping regime took place in Saravan. Suddenly, revolution guards in cars opened machinegun fire on the defenseless people, killed the Baluchi children and crushed several people, including Engineer Rahmani, Khodabandeh and the late Ahmad [name indistinct] under the wheels of their heavy vehicles.

On the present economic, social and agricultural situation in Baluchestan, the leader of the Baluchi Preshmerga said: Today, as a result of Khomeyni's despotic rule,

hunger and poverty are raging in Baluchestan. The people have been completely deprived of calm and security, the economy and (?civic traditions), and arts and culture have been completely annihilated, agriculture has been destoryed, the wells have dried up and the green countryside has been turned into dry and barren deserts.

At the end of this interview Amanollah Khan called on the Baluchi compatriots: The message is one of war and armed struggle. It is a message of death for Khomeyni and his pillaging clique which have disgraced human dignity in this part of the world. The Iranian has not and will not accept the disgrace of servitude. Khomeyni and his corrupt agents have no other place but the burial grounds of history.

CSO: 4640/40

ACTIVITIES OF MINISTERIAL DELEGATION IN INDIA REPORTED

Housing Minister's Press Conference

BK161707 Delhi Domestic Service in English 1530 GMT 16 Oct 81

[Text] An Iranian delegation will soon be visiting India to have discussion on Kudramukh iron ore agreement between the two countries. This was disclosed at a news conference in New Delhi today by Iranian Housing and Urban Development Minister Mohammad Shahab-Gonabadi, who is on a 7-day official visit to this country. He said India being a friendly country, an amicable agreement can be arrived at.

The Iranian minister had an exchange of ideas with ministers of housing, external affairs, planning and industry to further strengthen cooperation between the two countries and also to explore new fields.

Delegation To Visit USSR

BK161718 Hong Kong AFP in English 1320 GMT 16 Oct 81

[Text] New Delhi, 16 Oct (AFP)--A visiting Iranian delegation headed by a cabinet-ranking minister will leave for Moscow tomorrow to seek Soviet help for the reconstruction of war-ravaged Iranian cities, a delegation spokesman said here today.

The delegation en route to the Soviet Union arrived in India on October 9 to explore possibilities of long-term cooperation agreements with India.

This is the first time that an Iranian ministerial delegation will be visiting the Soviet Union since the overthrow of the shah in 1979.

The delegation is led by Mohammad Shahab-Gonabadi, minister for housing and urban development, and includes Mohammad Jafar Alaghehmandan, deputy minister for parliamentary affairs and, Mohammad Ahmad Azizi, deputy minister for finance and administration.

Mr Gonabadi told a press conference that his government had decided to seek Soviet help for war reconstruction "because of the vast Soviet experience of repairing cities after the Second World War."

"We will also explore possibilities of technical cooperation," he said but refused to elaborate.

The delegation called on Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narashimha Rao and ministers of parliamentary affairs, housing, finance and industries.

Mr Gonabadi said the delegation explored the areas for long-term cooperation with India.

"We are very happy to note that there is vast scope for further cooperationbetween India and Iran...we have very friendly relations," he said. He did not elaborate.

He termed his talks with Indian leaders "very successful and fruitful" and said that an Iranian delegation will be arriving shortly to chalk out a new agreement for the multi-million dollar Iran-aided Kudramukh iron ore project in the Karnataka State.

He said he did not discuss the Afghan issue with Indian Foreign Minister Rao nor had he intention of discussing it during his stay in the Soviet Union. The delegation will stay in the Soviet Union for about 10 days, he said.

Construction Aid Materials Sought

BK180754 Delhi Domestic Service in English 0240 GMT 18 Oct 81

[Text] The Iranian Government has sought supplies of building materials from India. It has also requested India to help in construction activities in that country. The request was conveyed by Iranian Housing and Urban Development Minister Mohammad Shahab-Gonabadi during his meeting with Minister for Labor and Industry N.D. Tiwari in New Delhi. Tiwari said that India and Iran have much to offer each other in their efforts to achieve self reliance.

CSO: 4600/73

BRIEFS

VISITING SOVIET DELEGATION--Tehran, 22 Oct (AFP)--Senior Iranian cultural revolution leaders had talks yesterday with a visiting Soviet cultural delegation on its 10th day here, the government party newspaper ISLAMIC REPUBLIC reported today. The talks covered political and social questions relating to Iran, the character of the Islamic revolution, and the style of Islamic University that is being developed in Iran under the cultural revolution. The possibility of exchanging scientific missions and other forms of cooperation in the cultural field were also discussed, the newspaper said. [Text] [NC221240 Paris AFP in English 1227 GMT 22 Oct 81]

MAJLIS DELEGATION IN PRC--Tehran, 24 Oct (PARS)--A mission of the Islamic Consultative Assembly headed by Hojjat ol-Eslam Mohammad Yazdi arrived in Beijing, the People's Republic of China, to participate in the unsponsored Asian conference on population and development. The Iranian mission was welcomed by the undersecretary of the foreign bureau of the parliamentary conference and some other Chinese officials. The Iranian mission on Friday participated in Friday congregational prayers held by Muslim residents of Beijing and then met with prayer leader of the city. In a reception where they discussed the Islamic revolution of Iran and its foreign policy, they also voiced their apprehensions over China's apparent incidental reconciliation with the U.S. At the end of this reception, the Iranian mission expressed their hopes for witnessing the further strengthening of the relations between the two countries. [Text] [LD251006 Tehran PARS in English 0730 GMT 25 Oct 81]

WHEAT PURCHASES--Tehran, 25 Oct (PARS)--About 785,000 tons of wheat have been purchased by the government since the beginning of the purchase season of the current year. This figure shows a rise of 84 percent compared with last year's wheat purchase. This was announced by the Cereal Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. [Text] [GF251640 Tehran PARS in English 1610 GMT 25 Oct 81]

GREETINGS TO PAPANDREOU--Tehran, 26 Oct (PARS)--Prime Minister Mahdavi-Kani of the Islamic Republic of Iran sent a congratulatory message to Andres Papandreou on the occasion of his election as the prime minister of [words indistinct]. In his message the Iranian prime minister expressed the hope for strengthening relations between the two countries in the way of liberating the oppressed (?and destroying) the domination of imperialism over the oppressed countries. [Text] [LD261928 Tehran PARS in English 1730 GMT 26 Oct 81]

GRAIN PURCHASES--According to PARS NEWS AGENCY, the director of the grain department announced yesterday: For the first time, with the help of God and by the efforts of the farmers working for this organization, the grain department has been able to purchase an extra 800,000 tons of wheat from the farmers so far this year. He added: The purchase of this amount of wheat allowed the government to reduce its foreign purchases to 1.4 million tons andto make a foreign exchange saving of 330 billion rials. The director of the grain department said that so far, the level of wheat purchases has increased by 400,000 tons compared to the past year. He added: Despite being involved in the imposed war, the level of wheat purchases in the provinces involved in the war has increased this year, so much so that in Kermanshahan Province where in the past year we bought 8,000 tons, the year the level of our purchases so far has reached 102,000 tons, while in Khuzestan our purchases have been 21,000 tons. In conclusion, he declared that the increase in the amount of wheat purchased in Western Azarbayjan was 7.228 percent [figures as heard] and in Kordestan Province it was 1.354 percent [figure as heard]. [Text] [LD221336 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 22 Oct 81]

FORMATION OF ANTIREGIME GROUP--The Council of Nationalist Journalists has been formed in Iran and it has declared its formation. The center of the council is in Tehran. The Council of Nationalist Jouranlists has announced that it is not aligned to any political party or group and that it is struggling toward the preservation of Iran's independence, cultural identity and territorial integrity as well as toward gaining freedom, democracy and social justice. [Text] [NC221520 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 22 Oct 81]

FIGHTING BETWEEN GUARDS, SOLDIERS--Reports from Kordestan indicate that there has been a clash between Khomeyni's revolution guards and the Iranian armed forces. The clash occurred when both groups were dispatched to crush the Kordish Peshmerga. The guards intervened in the army's affairs and ridiculed officers and NCO's, and this led to the clash. In the clash, which occurred in Mamut Pass, near Sanandaj, 40 guards and soldiers were killed. [Text] [GF261608 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 26 Oct 81]

CSO: 4640/40

CONTRACT FOR NEW RAILWAY PROJECT GOES TO BRITISH

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 pp 38-39

[Text] HENDERSON BUSBY Partnership of Ware, England, has just been awarded another consultancy for a railway project in Iraq — bringing the total it is now working on there up to four.

The latest project is for a line connecting the oil district of Mosul in the north of the country with Zakho, 100 kilometres away on the Turkish border. The new line would presumably feed into the existing network linking Mosul with Baghdad and points south. There is already a line from Mosul which dips into Turkey west of Zakho before travelling along the Syrian-Turkish border towards Aleppo and the Mediterranean. Though the new line will feed only into the road network in Zakho, the plans for its construction point to continued Iraqi awareness of the importance of the overland routes which have been its major link with Europe since the Gulf war closed the port at Basra.

Henderson Busby, which has been designing railways since 1862, is also the consultant on the vastly larger (about $2bn) contract to build a completely new line along the strategic 910km Baghdad-Basra route — this time running considerably east of the existing Baghdad-Basra line by running through Kut (Kut al Imara) and Amarah. HB spokesman David Twigg said he still had no news of which of the 40 companies to have expressed an interest in this project have made it to the short list.

Another British consultancy, British Rail's consulting wing Transmark Limited, has meanwhile put in a bid for a contract to redesign the existing Baghdad-Basra line. That line has already been substantially rebuilt once in recent history, when the Soviets converted it from narrow-gauge to standard-gauge back in 1960.

'Now,' says Transmark's Reginald Gregory, 'the Iraqis want to convert it for use at higher speeds, and presumably with a heavier traffic load.' He is hoping that Transmark has a good chance of winning the contract, especially in the light of British Rail's proven success at home over recent years in upgrading existing track to cope with greater speeds.

But there is still no news of the most controversial Iraqi railway project discussed in recent months — a line to link the Iraqi network with neighbouring Kuwait. Political analysts have always considered that the agreement between the two governments to go ahead with this long-mooted project would signify some kind of *de facto* agreement between them as to the location of their mutual boundary. 'But as of ten days ago, we heard the two governments were still talking about it, and no design contracts have been offered yet,' said Gregory.

CSO: 4400/20

DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REVIEWED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 5 Sep 81 p 7

[Text]

Ta'meem

Roads Directorate in Ta'meem province began work on the 4th bridge in Kirkuk city and two roads linking Abbas sub-district with Fatha and Hawija districts.

These projects are worth ID.14.3 million. The bridge is 310m. long, 24.5m. wide. It is to facilitate traffic inside and outside Kirkuk while the other two roads designed to link farms with marketing centres are 70 km. long.

On the other hand, work is currently underway to pave seven highway and six rural roads sosting ID. 58,550,000 and Kirkuk 3rd bridge worth half a million dinar.

An international company started expanding Kirkuk's poultry farms.

The ID.5,500,000 project aims at raising production capacity of the poultry farms from 70 to 140 million eggs per year.

The project includes constructing of four additional poultry farms consisting of 20 hatcheries for eggs chicken breeding in addition to technical and administrative offices.

The eight poultry farms were built in 1976 at a cost of ID.4 million.

SULAIMANIYA

The Sulaimaniya Irrigation Department executes projects costing ID. 2,952,000 as part of this year's plan.

Of these, projects costing ID. 498,650 have been finished, including improvement and development of irrigation ditches, construction of 13 houses for workers, and building a dam on Klar stream.

Projects being implemented currently include regulating irrigation ditches, building 17 houses for workers and employees, an irrigation building, lining the great Jermeka stream of 420 KM. long, building a bridge and a dam, a sprinkling irrigation project, along with a pumping station and fuel tanks.

They also include warehouses, garages for irrigation departments, another pumping station, four bridges across the Klar irrigation canal.

The Klar project will irrigate 2,500 donums which used to depend on rain water.

During the same period, health projects at a cost of ID.1,248,000 were completed while work continues on projects costing ID. 20,896,000.

These include a 100-deb hospital, six major health centres with 36 houses.

This years projects include a huge hospital, a health institute, a nursing school, a TB hospital, and an emergency ambulance centre, all in Sulaimaniya province.

Further, a hospital will be built in Rania, major health centres with 12 houses for medical employees;

More than 25 houses for medical employees all over the province, in addition to branch health centres in several towns, an insecticide warehouse, a drug warehouse, and a general pharmacy.

Diyala

Diyala province during the past 12 months completed the construction of 38 service projects, costing ID.38 million. The projects were casinos, restaurants, markets, garages, and small bridges.

In addition, ,900KM. of roads were repaved near the front lines and in urban and rural regions.

The Jalawla bridge was built at a cost of ID.4 million. Work will start presently on two bridges in Baquba at a cost of ID.7.5 million, in addition to a number of small bridges all over the province at a cost of ID.8 million.

On the other hand, the agricultural plan's targets have been surpassed by 105% regarding winter crops, and 96% for summer crops.

During the same period, 17,000 land plots were surveyed prior to distribution to citizens.

Many volunteers were trained on combat activities in the ranks of the Popular Army and have taken part in the battle. 8,892 volunteers of both sexes had joined civil defence teams.

Some towns of Diyala province were the target of the first Persian aggression, especially Khanquin, Mandali and Naft-Khana.

Diyala was also the starting point for Iraqi forces' drive which had liberated Zein al-Qaws and Seif Sa'ad.

(Arbil)

Administrative and technical units of Arbil province decided to commission three working teams to level and pave streets of the province's modern villages.

In a meeting chaired by Governor Yahya Mohammed Rashid progress made on projects currently under construction was also reviewed

Arbil province council approved the province's municipalty's budget for 1982 totalling ID.5,668.268.

The municipalty has branches in 7 administrative districts and 16 sub-districts

The council also decided to attach Balk municipality to Diana district municipality.

It was also decided that the Directorate of Municipalities prepare designs and studies for building a spa at the Darmanawa mineral waters spring which is in Majmour district and build a road from the highway to the spring.

Out of a total of 126 projects which President Saddam Hussein had ordered for Arbil province 26 have been completed.

Meanwhile a follow-up committee reviews projects being carried out in modern villages.

The committee in a recent meeting chaired by Governor Yahya Mohammed Rashid decided to hold talks with contractors and the local engineering administration to discuss obstacles faced by them in carrying out their contracts.

The 26 projects mentioned earlier includes school buildings, headquarters for unions, and houses for state employees.

On the other hand, the autonomy Region Works and Housing Administration. Department began building of 108 apartments in Arbil town, an islamic institute with a hostel and a factory for repairing heavy machines in Dohouk province and a National Union of Iraqi Students headquarters in Rania.

CSO: 4400/20

BRIEFS

SAUDI ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA--In its second editorial, HATZOFE comments on the arms race in the Middle East. The paper says that reports have mentioned that Syria will receive espionage planes from the Soviet Union similar to the AWACS and that Saudi Arabia will finance the deal. HATZOFE says: Here we have Soviet-Saudi cooperation rushing to the assistance of Syria, which is one of the most intransigent the countries rejecting the peace process and all agreements for peace with Israel. [sentence as printed] HATZOFE adds: Saudi Arabia's decision to finance the Soviet arms deal with Syria is proof of Saudi Arabia's war intentions and confirms the course of the Saudi Arabia king and his amirs who on the one hand, try to get closer to the United States to obtain AWACS while on the other they concoct war conspiracies with Soviet cooperation. HATZOFE wonders: Will this development open the eyes of the U.S. administration in Washington and does this cooperation among Riyadh, Moscow and Damascus not expose the erroneous claims of those who say that the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia will contribute to safeguarding the security of the United States and of Israel too? HATZOFE concludes: By deciding to equip Saudi Arabia with AWACS, the United States has renewed the arms race in the Middle East, a matter which unquestionably will not help to promote peace. [Text] [JN261125 Jerusalem Radio in Arabic to the Arab world 0530 GMT 26 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/57

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS APPROVES NEW DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 pp 2-3

[Text]

The Jordanian Council of Ministers last week approved Jordan's new 1981-86 development plan. The plan envisages the expenditure of some JD 3,300 million (about $11 billion) over the next five years.

According to Petra, the official news agency, 61 per cent of the total investment is to go to the central government and public institutions, while the private sector will receive 39 per cent. The plan concentrates on investment in commodity producing projects, public and social services, and infrastructure that will increase the economic integration of Jordan with other Arab countries. It foresees an annual economic growth rate of 11 per cent. Under the plan, the government anticipates exploring for natural oil and gas and extracting shale oil to try and reduce the heavy bill Jordan pays for energy imports.

Jordanian officials express moderate satisfaction with the performance of the country's economy under the previous five-year plan (1976-80) which has just ended. Gross domestic product (GDP) based on current wholesale prices rose from JD 269.4 million (JD1 $2.997) in 1975 to JD 762.4 million in 1980, representing an average annual growth rate of about 23 per cent compared to the 12 per cent real growth rate envisaged by the old plan. Gross national product (GNP) climbed at an annual rate of 24.2 per cent during the same period.

Basil Jardaneh, secretary-general of the National Planning Council, found overall investment "very encouraging." Total investment was expected to exceed the 1976-80 target of JD 765 million by as much as 30 per cent, with the surplus coming mainly from private sources.

The 1976-80 plan focused on investment in industry, aiming for an annual growth rate of 26 per cent. However, preliminary estimates put actual growth at about 24 per cent. Three large schemes for the production of potash, phosphates and fertilisers were included in the last plan, but the results have been rather disappointing. Start-up delays have driven up costs by 50 per cent in some cases and production bottlenecks have also taken their toll. In 1980, for example, phosphates production reached only 3.6 million tons compared with a target of 5 million tons. Over the whole period, however, income from the industrial sector rose from JD 46.8 million in 1975 to JD 154 million in 1980.

The indications are that somewhat less priority will be given to industrial development in the new five-year plan. Jordan's planners see five factors affecting the economy which require structural change: domestic revenues contribute too small a share of government finance, the population is drifting from the countryside to the cities, food production is lagging well behind domestic demand, imports of consumer goods are aggravating the trade deficit and credit, interest and investment policies are allowing inflationary spending.

Domestic revenue has risen steadily from JD 107.6 million in 1976 to JD 224.5 million in 1980, but its share of government expenditure has hovered at around 41 per cent. Foreign aid and investment contribute over half of the budget and it is unlikely that the plan will be able to reduce this dependence significantly over the next five years.

Remittances from Jordanians working abroad, mainly in the oil-rich Gulf states, which officially totalled JD 204.8 million in 1980. These help to cover the visible trade deficit (JD 507 million in 1979). However, the absence of 30 per cent of the labour force has led to a shortage of skilled labour at home as well as the presence of over 60,000 mainly unskilled foreign workers in Jordan.

Planners are also concerned about the way in which the inflow of capital is spent. A high proportion goes on luxury consumer goods or is invested in real estate, contributing to the construction boom witnessed around Amman in the past few years. A Jordanian economist believes that interest rates should be raised to discourage

inflationary credit and give preference to investment in something more productive than land purchase and construction, which currently account for 61 per cent of commercial bank credits.

The new plan will emphasise community development in rural areas to stem the flow of people into the cities. It will also try to improve the performance of the agricultural sector, which did poorly in the 1976-80 period. Agriculture's share of GDP fell by nearly 2 per cent to 8.1 per cent in 1979, while the value of agricultural production fell by about 6 per cent to JD 48 million due to the effects of drought. Over the whole period, income from agriculture rose from JD 26 million in 1975 to JD 60 million in 1980.

One of the specific projects envisaged by the plan is one to draw between 160 and 250 million cubic metres of water a year from the Euphrates River. The blueprint calls for the installation of a 650-kilometre long pipeline from the Euphrates in Iraq to Jordan, together with all the necessary pumping stations. The cost is estimated at about JD500 million.

The plan also proposes the construction of a 150 metre high dam on the Yarmouk River for irrigation and drinking water purposes. It is also planned to build a 22 megawatt hydroelectric power station at the dam.

Allocations for both projects have been made, but they require the approval of the authorities in Syria through whose territory the power and water lines will have to pass. If successful, the projects whould help to alleviate the critical water problems facing Jordan, whose population is growing at the rate of 3.5 per cent a year.

In general, the plan lays emphasis on giving attention to the basic needs of the Jordanian citizen and on solving some of the divisions between rich and poor, city and country, that the previous plan with its stress on investment and industrialisation may have exacerbated.

CSO: 4400/19

EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT'S SPEECH REPORTED

LD151208 Kuwait KUNA in English 1054 GMT 15 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM on the speech of the Egyptian president:

"Out of courtesy at least, the first official speech of a new president of Arab Egypt should include a look forward or a (?word) to emphasise Egypt's links with the Arab countries and (an intention) to place these links in the proper frame. But it remains that the heir (President Husni Mubarak) inherited this feeling of superiority over the Arabs, of having the Egyptian leadership right all the way and Arabs as wrong all the time from his predecessor (Anwar al-Sadat).

"The instantaneous conclusion is that Egyptian President Husni Mubarak was not left free to be able to extend the hand to his Arab brothers, as we hoped. The U.S. left the man with no alternative, that is if we suppose he himself really wished to have a free choice.

"Egypt lost this will since the time the hand of Kissinger touched it on the eve of al-Sadat's accession to office. Since then it never let loose (Egypt's) neck. The worst thing committed by this sinful hand was its (?destruction) of the sacredness of the Arab (?line above) anything else.

"Before some time, there was still some avoidance of (?openly) expressing the real feelings held by Arab rulers towards each other. Presently, we are witnessing a horrible kind of frankness with regard to (their) commitment to the American policies. An Arab could not possibly find anything to his advantage in these policies but it seems when they (rulers) started their presumption they based it on the belief that this Arab nation is dead, murdered or has been neutralized and put in seclusion.

CSO: 4400/25

EGYPTIAN SITUATION AFTER AL-SADAT VIEWED

LD141240 Kuwait KUNA in English [no time given] 14 Oct 81

["Extracts" from Kuwaiti newspaper editorials 14 October]

[Text] Kuwait, 14 Oct (KUNA)--AL-ANBA' on the policy of the Sudanese president: It seems that Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri is determined to draw himself to the American stale waters. He called on Washington to arm his forces. Washington promptly agreed and airlifted oppressive weapons. Numayri surely knows that had he requested these arms to fight Israel he wouldn't have received a single bullet and his warehouses wouldn't have contained a single rifle.

"The policy being adopted by President Numayri, in addition to the positive American response (to it) following the American-Israeli strategic alliance, affirm that we have joined the power struggle between the two big camps. The one to pay the price would be the one who stands with the United States in an al-Sadat-like loyalty and discipline.

"We wish that President Numayri realizes what every ruler on earth should realize of the facts, the greatest of which is what he eyewitnessed on October 6. We wish that he and the others understand that the regime, any regime, remains strong as much as it expresses the will, the ambitions and aspirations of the people, and as much as it abides by the principles of freedom, progress and struggle for the liberation of the land and the human being.

"Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union are able to strike at the will of the people or to firmly establish the authority of a ruler when the sultan's throne (his authority) is composed of the spears of the retinue and the intelligence service.

"God is the witness; we wished that Numayri goes where his policy takes him. But it is the will of the people who decide upon the fate of he who assumes the road of the camp, who considers fighting the Arab identity as an aim and who holds tumbling under Washington's feet as his slogan."

AL-WATAN on the new Egyptian president:

"What can Husni Mubarak do on the internal level in Egypt? To answer this question one must consider that the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai will remain the greatest concern of the new Egyptian president. His eyes will be fixed on April 1982 and he will calculate the effect of every move he makes on this awaited date.

"One must also consider that Husni Mubarak does not have a free hand in ruling Egypt. The Americans currently represent a huge weight inside the Egyptian life, policy, economy and security apparatuses. The size of the American authority in Egypt was explicitly indicated in the American press during the last few days. It was also represented in the high-ranking American delegation who participated in al-Sadat's funeral.

"It was obvious from the first moment that the Americans are in support of Husni Mubarak. At the same time there is no political force inside Egypt that is capable of threatening his rule. Such a thing could enable Husni Mubarak to move within the space available for him and in the amount that does not necessarily cause a clash with the Israeli withdrawl date, nor with the American hegemony forced on Egypt since al-Sadat's time.

"Inside Egypt, the constitutional establishments of al-Sadat are extremely lenient; the opposition forces on the other hand can cause trouble but they did not develop enough to be able to rock the foundations of the regime or to make upheavals. In addition, the extremist Islamic groups cannot participate except in the riots that do not threaten the whole regime. As for the army and the security apparatus, which is the power to be reckoned with, they were until recently the responsibility of Husni Mubarak. This has enabled him to guarantee the loyalty of their leadership.

"Since this is the case, the matter is completely dependent on the personality of Husni Mubarak and his personal traits would play a decisive role (in shaping things).

"Incidentally, the Egyptian newspaper AL-AHRAM while reviewing Mubarak's personality Monday said 'he was able to seclude himself from such circumstances of political corruption and manipulation through which the country was passing at some periods of time."

"Another trait that could be counted to work in favour of the new president is that he has no opponents in the Egyptian political circles since he entered the political arena only in 1975."

AL-QABAS' in the same subject:

"Jamal Abd al-Nasir was 'a leader.' Anwar al-Sadat was 'the head of the family.' What would Husni Mubarak turn out to be?

"The traits and qualifications of leadership are born overnight. Besides, we have passed the age of giants and great leaders. In addition, Mubarak himself does not aspire to be one. His ambition was to be the president of the Republic of Egypt. Since he has got what he wanted, he presently looks forward to prove his worthiness of the presidency and his ability to command its steering wheel successfully.

"It is for sure Husni Mubarak will not give himself the title of 'the head of the family' since this is only an imaginary description fit for running the affairs of a family or maybe a small village.

"If Husni Mubarak wishes to be logical with himself and with the Egyptian people he should choose for himself the method of a 'constitutional president of the state' who exercises the presidential authority but at the same time respects the constitution and follows its provisions, implements the principle of the prevalance of law in action not in words, and respects the viewpoints of all the constitutional, partisan and trade union establishments in the state.

"President Husni Mubarak has got an unprecedented chance to gain from the lessons of the period of al-Sadat. With the beginning of a new era, people are usually more prepared to accept change and to react to it.

"If Husni Mubarak is serious in listening to the voice of reason and to adopt the wise policy in order to move with Egypt to the safe side, he has to open the door for a real exercise of democracy is the constitutional fence that protects the regime and not the security apparatus."

KUWAIT TIMES on extremism:

"It hardly needs to be overemphasised that extremism with its concomitant intolerance has been responsible for much bloodshed in several countries, Iran being a most glaring example. Whether it is practiced by so-called Islamic fundamentalists or any force pitched in opposition to it, extremism is an adventure not worth the merchandise.

"In the case of Egypt, while Islamic fundamentalists are blamed for their fanaticism the attitudes on the other side are no more balanced. It is reported, for example, that students with beards are barred, under a government order, from attending classes in the university at Cairo, and so are girls with heuab. Veiled women were scornfully described by the late president al-Sadat as 'moving tents.' This is a manifestation of a form of negative extremism which can only give a lever in the hands of other extremists to exploit popular sentiments without delivering any positive good. The leaders of the new regime in Cairo will do well to take to moderation and tolerance rather than be panicked into more drastic actions."

AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM on the besieged Palestinian figure:

"All of them, from Japan to Washington through Western Europe, want Yasir 'Arafat to recognize Israel so that they (in turn) can recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization. All of them head towards the Arab side whom they suppose is more inclined to making compromises. Their belief is based on experience (which proved) the Arab side is so simple it remains vulnerable to deceit all the time.

"They never head to nor request anything from Israel. [sentence as received] Israel is as it is and as they want it to be: in the same position and with the same power.

"What are the guarantees? And how can this recognition of Israel come about when that country does not provide one clue that it will recognize any of the legal rights of the Palestinian people, not to mention its occupation of other Arab territories in the Golan Heights and Lebanon.

"It is the belief of Israel that it should receive the Palestinian recognition first so that it can start its 'second historic thrust' towards the Euphrates--the Euphrates of oil in this contemporary situation."

CSO: 4400/25

FREEDOM OF EGYPTIAN PRESS URGED

LD151256 Kuwait KUNA in English 1107 GMT 15 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] Kuwait, 15 Oct (KUNA)--The Egyptian press started to beat the drums of hypocrisy for the new Egyptian president. In addition, it has become keen on putting Husni Mubarak in the 'mould' of al-Sadat and on tying him to this mould so as not to allow the new president to even slightly deviate from his (predecessor's) line. The Egyptian press has thus fallen in for two big mistakes.

"The Egyptian press has never witnessed a period of deterioration and decline such as the one it passed through during al-Sadat's time. The highly qualified Egyptian press people were banned from writing and the professional press cadres were ousted from their posts, and the platform was left empty except for hypocrites and profiteers belonging to the regime.

"The former Egyptian president placed at the top a group of hypocrite editors good for nothing except to exaggerate praise and support of the president and place an aura of illusionary leadership around his personality as if he was the messenger of God on earth.

"Meantime the measures to be taken by the new president towards the press will be an important indicator of his style of running the country and in directing the steering wheel of its policy in all fields.

"President Mubarak has but two alternatives: the first is to leave the press situation the way it is and by doing so, (he will allow) the Egyptian press to continue its decline and with it they fall to the abyss of the Egyptian policy. The second alternative is to carry on a purge and reform campaign. This campaign is to be set in four directions: the first would be to release the detained journalists, to reappoint them in their posts and to allow free writing and balanced criticism. The second would be to oust top people in the Egyptian newspapers and magazines and replace them with honest national leadership that is provided with the authority to act and move. The third would be to allow opposition parties to publish their journals to balance the official press without exercising any pressure on them. And fourth would be to introduce a healthy atmosphere for the press whereby journalists would feel free to write.

CSO: 4400/25

BRIEFS

NEW ROLE FOR EGYPT--AL-SIYASAH on a new role for Egypt: "According to some observers, that role would have been better timed if (?it had) occurred after the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. Others believe it is now high time for that role. Some others maintain the Arab world was of al-Sadat's opinion but without al-Sadat. "Now Egypt is without al-Sadat. "He played his part and passed away as a hero in the eyes of Western countries and as a traitor in the eyes of Arabs, some of whom stand neutral in anticipation of the verdict of history. "Egypt is now without al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak is to be the new president. "If Mubarak manages to maintain his country's peace and guard Egypt against the unknown, a new political and economic role will be assumed by that country of the River Nile. "What matters now is that Egypt should be internally stable and the outside pressure against it should be ended with al-Sadat's death. "The Western world should now realize that Egypt would be a regional power capable, at the military and economic levels, of spreading its political views inside the Middle East area. Israel should, meanwhile, give up its endless ambitions, so that it may not kill its people as happened during the days of Hitler." [Text] [LD151228 Kuwait KUNA in English 1111 GMT 15 Oct 81]

CSO: 4400/25

FOREIGN MERCENARIES IN SOUTH LEBANON

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 4

[Article by Jeff Aronson]

[Text] A VERY BORED Tim McGrady passes his days uneventfully in the southern Lebanese town of Marjyoun, drinking cold beer and hoping impatiently for an end to the ceasefire arranged between Israel and the PLO in July.

McGrady, 26 and a US citizen, is a mercenary, a veteran of the Rhodesian and Namibian wars where he fought for the ruling whites. He arrived on 20 August at the headquarters of the Lebanese renegade Major Saad Haddad. In the last few months, ten or so others have joined McGrady at the abandoned schoolhouse in the centre of Marjyoun, which serves as their barracks. At least two Americans, one Canadian, an Englishman and a Frenchman are represented. They are 'soldiers of fortune' who have journeyed to Haddad's South Lebanon for the 'high adventure' of combat.

Haddad has not mounted a formal recruitment drive to attract such people to his side, nor is he able to pay them more than 'beer and cigarette money' — about $125 a month. Growing Shiite participation in Haddad's 1,500-man militia, now reaching upwards of 50 per cent, and the ever-ready support from Israeli troops, makes a serious effort to recruit foreign mercenaries unnecessary. Namibia and El Salvador are in any case more glamorous theatres of violence for the Vietnam veterans and Foreign Legionnaires spoiling for a new fight.

Two of the mercenaries claim that they contacted Haddad on their own initiative. This was confirmed by Frances Rizik, Haddad's unofficially official spokesman, who calls the mercenaries 'volunteers' contacted during his daily rounds on the Israeli side of the border. The Hebrew speaking Rizik explained that the 'volunteers' are 'happy to do their duty' and he hopes that more will come to fight.

McGrady remembers reading in a magazine — one like *Soldier of Fortune* or *Mercenary* — that Haddad could be reached by mail care of the Israeli-operated 'good fence' border crossing at Metulla, Israel. The young American, tired of his 9-to-5 job at a furniture factory, wrote to Haddad, who welcomed his offer.

Tim Guay, a former medic in the Canadian army, heard about Haddad 'on a TV programme of the "700 Club" — a religious thing.' Haddad is a favourite subject of the American 'Bible Belt', where 'born-again' evangelists sing his praises as an embattled defender of Christian civilisation. Guay has been in Marjyoun since 19 May, also, like McGrady, waiting anxiously for the ever-possible breakdown of the seven-week ceasefire.

Both Guay and McGrady explain that with Haddad's 'acceptance' letter in hand, they travelled at their own expense to South Lebanon via Israel's Ben Gurion airport. Clearing Israeli customs as tourists, they proceeded to Metulla where the Israeli army (IDF) permitted them to cross the tightly-controlled border into Haddad's enclave.

One IDF spokesman, asked by *8 Days* to confirm that the men had indeed been allowed to cross the border and to remain in Lebanon, denied official complicity, making the unusual claim that they might have crossed the electronically wired and mined border into Lebanon 'without the knowledge of the Israeli authorities'. 'If they went across the border and not from Beirut,' he continued, 'they had to do it on their own.' To those familiar with the strict control Israel exercises over all movement on its northern border, particularly that of foreigners, such explanations are untenable. A second and more senior IDF spokesman was more circumspect, refusing all substantive comment on the issue.

Western embassy officials expressed pained surprise that their nationals were fighting as mercenaries on Lebanese soil and that Israel had knowingly offered them passage to do so. Taken aback at first, after quick consultations, the US spokesman turned decidedly low-key. He noted that while the embassy was not otherwise aware of the issue, 'it wouldn't surprise anybody. It's hard to get too excited about it.' He added: 'I don't think we'll be bringing it up (with Israel) at this point.'

A Canadian diplomat was more visibly upset. Offering a candid off-the-record assessment, the official said: 'Politically it is a lousy idea — not the kind of contribution a Canadian private, or publicly should be making.' He explained that Canadian law makes it a criminal offence to serve in an army fighting the forces of a state friendly to Canada. He admitted however that the current realities in Lebanon would make prosecution difficult.

CSO: 4400/19

WAR INSURANCE OFFERED

London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 pp 46-47

[Text] SIX Lebanese insurance companies have taken the unprecedented step of offering coverage on homes and cars against war risks in their country. Commercial underwriters have to date been prepared to insure only life and maritime transport against such risks.

According to Lebanese insurance circles, the initiative to provide such a service was taken by the country's leading insurance company. Societe Nationale d'Assurances. SNA decided to pool its resources with five other local companies to introduce this scheme to plug a gap in the insurance market.

Industrial and commercial establishments have had the help of the government in this area since 1977, when it set up the Institute for the Guarantee of Investments to contribute towards their war-risks insurance coverage. Until then, private-sector insurance companies alone had written such cover.

Wakim said that the scheme's pool will operate on the basis of mutuality, and will provide a limited insurance for cars and homes owned by Lebanese citizens. A limit of Leb £30,000 ($6,500), or 80 per cent of the goods' value (whichever is the lower), has been set. Maximum liability for an individual insurance company would thus be just over $1,000 per claim.

The other companies involved in the pool are as follows: Prosperity Insurance Company, Fidelity Insurance & Reinsurance Company, Compagnie d'Assurances et de Reassurances du Liban et du Monde Arabe (Libano-Arabe), Societe Arabo-Europeenne d'Assurances et de Reassurances, and Arab Universal Company Inc and Reins.

However, not all the Lebanese insurance companies are convinced of the scheme's validity. Albert Aqiqi, managing director of Nisr in Beirut, which is not one of the companies in the pool, said: 'The reason for providing such a scheme is to attract other classes of insurance. (It) would act like a window dressing.'

Aqiqi considers it would be catastrophic for the companies in the event of an extended war, such as the one in 1976, or another air attack by the Israelis. He added that his company did not join in because it complies with the Waterborne Agreement of August 1976.

This agreement states that war coverage is written only in terms of the official clauses produced by Lloyds and the Institute of London Underwriters, which restrict it to goods on board a vessel and do provide for war-risks cover for goods on dry land. Insurance circles believe that some of the participating companies had also declared their adherence to the agreement.

This sort of dilemma extends to the insurance companies in the West who have been trying for five years to frame policies covering political risks. A Lloyd's spokesman in London has said that no definite formula has been agreed upon, but a variety of political-risks policies are offered.

Investment Insurance International, a Hogg Robinson subsidiary, specialises in this type of policy. And a company spokesman has told *8 Days* that political risks covers things such as war damage and its effect on trade. They also include the confiscation of assets, inconvertibility of dividends, riot and malicious damage, as well as many versions of interference in free trade up to expropriation.

But, as one insurer in Lebanon commented, political-risks coverge does not help the Lebanese — it only helps western companies with interests in politically unstable countries. The new Lebanese scheme is aimed to help the Lebanese themselves.

CSO: 4400/19

MEA AIRBUS DECISION EMMINENT

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 48

[Article by Lionel Peters]

[Text] MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES (MEA) will soon be making its mind up on whether to go ahead with its plans to order five European Airbuses. The decision has been shelved since April this year when the signing of two syndicated eurocredits planned for 30 April in Paris was suddenly cancelled. Dwindling revenues and continued fighting in Lebanon was MEA's reason for the cancellation. However, MEA has still to inform the banks whether it wants the Airbuses or not. The banks have been surprisingly patient with MEA, reflecting the airline's international reputation. Any banker who has travelled around the Middle East on Middle East Airlines certainly can't doubt that it is the best airline serving the region.

MEA must decide by the end of September or both credits will be cancelled. One banker, closely connected with the loans already thinks that will be the most likely outcome. The terms, particularly on the $70m loan, were very generous to the borrower.

Terms and conditions are as follows: **maturity** 10 years at ½% above London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor). **Lead managers:** Credit Lyonnais (responsible for loan documentation), Intra-Investment Bank Company SAL, Gulf International Bank (responsible for the running of the books), Union de Banques Arabes et Francaises, Arab Bank Investment Company, Banque Libano-Francaise SAL, Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, Chemical Bank, Credit Commercial de France, Midland Bank Limited and Societe Generale.

Managers: Allied Arab Bank, Bank Almashrek SAL, Banque Audi SAL, Byblos Bank SAL, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Arab Investment Company and British Bank of the Middle East. **Participants:** Banque du Credit Populaire, Chase Manhattan Bank, Societe Nouvelle de la Banque de Syrie et du Liban, Arab Libyan Tunisian Bank, Banque G. Trad, Fransa Bank SAL, Societe Generale Libano Europeenne, Universal Bank, Bank Sardar SAL, Rifbank SAL, Swiss Bank Corporation and Credit Libanais SAL. **Fees:** Management fee was ⅜% with commitment fee of ⅜% on the undrawn portion and ¼% on the remainder. Participation fees were ⅛% for $1m, 3/16% for $2m and ¼% for $3m.

As the list of banks suggests, the syndicate is truly international, listing some of the major lending banks in the euromarkets as well as Arab banks from all over the Middle East, including many from Lebanon itself.

The other credit was an export credit for $350m, which is guaranteed by French, West German and British government-backed export credit agencies. Lead managers were Dresdner Bank AG, Credit Lyonnais and Midland Bank Limited — all

experts at European Airbus financing.

One Arab borrower that isn't cancelling any loans but is increasing them is the Saudi Arabian borrower Ali & Fahd Shobokshi Group of Companies. In June, it borrowed $100m in three tranches from a mainly Arab bank syndicate that was lead managed by Al Bahrain Arab African Bank and Saudi National Commercial Bank in Bahrain, which is wholly owned by the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia.

The first tranche of $30m incorporated bid bonds, performance bonds and advance payment guarantees with a guarantee commission of ⅜% for a period of six months: the second was for $50m which was a letter of credit with commission of ¼%, also for six months: the third was a term loan for the remaining $20m at 1¼% over Bahrain Interbank Offered Rate (Bibor) for three years. Now Arab Latin American Bank (Arlabank) in Bahrain has confirmed the completion of another facility for the same borrower, this time for $20m and again in tranches.

Another Saudi Arabian borrower has also recently used the euromarkets. Pool Arabia Limited has borrowed $40.5m from a consortium of international banks lead managed by Citicorp International Bank Limited in London. The terms were seven years at ⅞%. The borrower has two years grace to repay the loan and then it must be repaid in 11 equal six monthly instalments. Pool Arabia will drawdown the loan over 18 months.

CSO: 4400/19

JUSTICE SECRETARY HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE IN KUWAIT

LD191856 Tripoli JANA in English 1412 GMT 19 Oct 81

[Quotation marks as received]

[Text] Kuwait, 19 Oct (JANA)--Mr Muhammad al-Zuwayy, the secretary of the general people's committee for justice, said that Kuwait and the Jamahiriyah's viewpoints concerning the current Arab situation and the latest developments in Egypt, are identical. Both countries strongly condemn the U.S.-imperialist-Zionist attack on Egypt and to completely pull her out of the Arab-Zionist conflict.

Mr al-Zuwayy added in his press conference held in Kuwait yesterday, that U.S. imperialism is now trying to use Egypt as its new strategic base in addition to its main base--Israel--and to strike at any progressive Arab tendency aimed at unifying the Arab nation and exerting national efforts to regain usurped rights.

He added, "We are agreed on the necessity to help Egypt gain her natural position in the Arab nation. This means that the new president should give up all treacherous policies carried out previously by al-Sadat. These policies were aimed at isolating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world and putting her under direct U.S. imperialist domination.

Mr al-Zuwayy said, "During my meeting with the Kuwaiti amir, we both agreed that the Numaryi-Begin meeting which took place after al-Sadat's funeral procession, came as a natural result to the Numayri policies which placed Sudan under imperialist domination just like what al-Sadat had cone."

He added, "The amir of Kuwait responded positively to our view on U.S. provocations against the Libyan people which are aimed at silencing the progressive Arab voice."

On the hysteric provocations of Numayri against Libya, Mr al-Zuwayy said: "There is no problem between the Jamahiriyah and Sudan, it is only Numayri's attempts to impose the murderer Habri on the Chadian people."

He pointed out that the Jamahiriyah considered the Numayri-Begin meeting as high treason and that the Arab nation should strongly oppose it and deal with Numayri in the same way it had previously dealt with al-Sadat.

He added: "We believe that as a result of al-Sadat's execution, Numayri was gripped by hysteria making him lose his senses."

He reminded his audience of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's speech on October 5 in Sebha, one day before al-Sadat's death. In it, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi had said that Numayri is a sick man who is relying on a dead man.

No wonder, he added, that Numayri has been stricken by hysteria: "He is trying all in his power to maintain his regime in Sudan. We challenge him in maintaining his tottering regime."

On the Aden treaty, Mr al-Zuwayy said the treaty is designed to enhance the ability of progressive forces in confronting the savage U.S. imperialist onslaught against the Arab nation, and Zionist infiltration into Africa.

He said only Arab unity can guarantee the liquidation of the U.S. colonialist presence and Zionism. This, he added, is what revolutionaries in the Jamahiriyah are striving for and what the U.S. is seeking to abort by armed force...."

Mr al-Zuwayy added: "It is our right to call on the new regime in Egypt to bury all previous treacherous agreements and treaties and to bring Egypt back to her natural position. It will then be its right to get our support to back it with all our resources." Our call on Egypt to retain her position is clear. We do not want Egypt to come to us as a Trojan horse carrying imperialist-Zionist seeds. Egypt which we are inviting is the Egypt of Arabism and struggle and national liberation.

Mr al-Zuwayy added that the colonialist achievement has resulted in the setting up of a pact which includes Egypt, Sudan, Somalia and Oman. This pact is aimed at the Arab nation and not just only at the steadfastness and confrontation front and the treaty of Aden as some people like to put it.

He added that Aden treaty came to consolidate the capabilities of the progressive forces and to confront the U.S. imperialist attack on the Arab people and also to confront Zionist infiltration in Africa.

He added, "The U.S. does not take anybody as a friend unless he becomes her agent."

He went on to say that the only solution to all the dangers that are facing the Arab nation is Arab unity. This unity means the end of the U.S.-Zionist colonialist presence. This is what revolutionary in the Jamahiriyah are fighting for and the U.S. is trying to abort by force.

He said: "We are a progressive revolutionary force that believes there is no excuse for us not to confront those who oppose our nation and its expectations.... We are ready to die in defence of our nation's honour and its civilizational message that calls for the creation of a new world of peace and love, free of hatred and envy.... This is the message of Islam...."

He added: "American is fighting us with all its political, economic and military capabilities.... It has recently started issuing threats to oil companies not to buy or market Libyan oil and to impose an economic embargo on our country.

This proves that we are a source of worry for America and that we are an obstacle to its designs in the region.... Libyan oil is not, if used alone, an effective weapon against America. But Arab oil is an economic weapon in our possession that we can use in fighting America...."

Mr al-Zuwayy expressed regret that some Arab countries are fighting Libya by proxy for America and Israel. He said this is being done by the freezing of oil prices and creating a glut on the world oil market.

On the attitude of the steadfastness and confrontation front vis-a-vis provocations against the Jamahiriyah, Mr al-Zuwayy said any aggression on Libya is considered an attack on other steadfastness front countries and vice versa. He said he is certain that even other Arab countries will support the Jamahiriyah, because they know that aggression on Libya can only come from the U.S. or one of its hireling puppet regimes.

On calls for inviting the Egypt [as received] to the forthcoming Arab summit conference, Mr al-Zuwayy said Egypt's invitation to the conference, with the country's continued adherence to previous commitments, is unacceptable, because it not only lets down the Arab nation but the Egyptian people also, who totally reject the Camp David accords....

He added: "We trust the Egyptian people who are fired by the spirit of the revolution and positive action, in spite of efforts to belittle their capabilities.... We revolutionaries have good reason to be optimistic in placing our faith in the peops. Victory is always the ally of peoples...."

Regarding unity between the Jamahiriyah and Syria, Mr al-Zuwayy said: "This unity is going ahead as planned and there is complete coordination between us on various issues...."

On ColonelMu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's national call for exerting all Arab efforts, Mr al-Zuwayy said that "We are actively working to put an end to attrition between Morocco and the Polisario Front. The Jamahiriyah did not supply the front with weapons against Morocco. Our Moroccan brothers are aware of that as we have direct contacts with them."

The aim of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's national call to concentrate Arab national resources for our battle against the Zionists and the Americans, he added:

"We have contacted our brothers in Iran and Iraq in order to put an end to their armed confrontation and to solve their differences through peaceful means. This war is a great loss for the Arab nation. We are now trying to stop this attrition and to reach an agreement and national reconciliation."

Finally, Mr al-Zuwayy said that the return of Egypt to the Arab nation will put the fire out. This fire was first started by al-Sadat's capitulation.

He finally expressed confidence that the Egyptian brothers are capable of reintegration with the Arab nation.

CSO: 4500/25

BRIEFS

ANTI-ZIONIST RADIO IN PARIS--Paris--Libya has been taking action to set up an anti-Zionist radio station in Paris with the aim of broadcasting Palestinian and anti-Jewish propaganda. French circles have disclosed that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi had dispatched to Paris an envoy who had proposed to anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli circles to finance a free radio station. The envoy already brought along 200,000 francs. Among others, he contacted those who had waged a struggle for (Robert Poirisson), who claims that the nazi crimes were invented by Zionist propaganda. One of the goals of this radio station will be to jam the Jewish radio station, "Radio J" of the (nouveau Juive). In addition to this radio station, two additional Jewish stations will be opened, one affiliated with the Jewish Socialist Fund, whose president is Guy de Rothschild. [Text] [TA251119 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 25 Oct 81 p 1]

CSO: 4423/23

BRIEFS

OIC PEACE PLAN--Paris, 15 Oct (SPA)--The secretary general of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), Mr Habib Chatti, today reiterated that Crown Prince Fahd's Middle East peace plan could serve as a construction platform for realising comprehensive and just peace in the region. He commended Prince Fahd's eight-point formula and said it could ensure an independent state for the Palestinian peoples with Jerusalem as its capital. Addressing the meetings of the Society of Islam and West here [as received], Mr Chatti hailed the stand of the French president, Mr Francois Mitterrand, calling for recognising the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their right to establish their own state. Reviewing the progress of relations between the Islamic world and the West, Mr Chatti hailed the responsibilities shouldered by the society in depicting a true picture of Islam in the Western world and its successful attempts to defeat the enemy campaigns of discrediting and creating doubts on Islam. [Text] [LD152112 Riyadh SPA in English 1914 GMT 15 Oct 81]

CSO: 4400/25

BRIEFS

PLANS TO INCREASE GNP--Syria plans to increase its GNP by an annual 8.5 per cent during the current Five Year Plan of 1981-1985, to reach $33.7bn in 1985 from $22.4bn in 1980, according to Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al Kasn. Announcing the figures for the current Plan, he noted that the previous plan had achieved an average annual growth rate of six per cent, only half of the targeted rate. In the same 1981-1985 period, imports are scheduled to rise by an annual 3.4 per cent to $5.5bn, and exports are set to increase by 6.5 per cent to $3.8bn. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 35, 5 Sep 81 p 47]

CSO: 4400/19

PAPERS COMMENT ON DETERIORATING ARAB SITUATION

GF151840 Manama GULF NEWS AGENCY in English 1550 GMT 15 Oct 81

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 15 Oct (GNA)--The Amirates Press Thursday accused the United States of pushing Egypt and the Sudan to go to war against Libya and urged the Arab states to move fast to avert the deteriorating situation in North Africa.

The fiery statements from Cairo, Khartoum and Tripoli indicate that the situation is deteriorating in that part of the Arab world and is likely to lead to an armed conflict between the Arab brothers, AL-BAYAN daily said.

"Judging by the reactions of the two superpowers, the game is not confined to the three Arab nations alone but is in settlement of old and future accounts between the two giants at the expense of a dear part of the Arab world," the Gulf paper said editorially.

AL-BAYAN warned that the crisis threatens the very existence of the Arab nation and said that the only logical and sound response is for the Arabs to "hasten to put out the fire before it spreads to other parts" of the Arab world.

AL-WAHDAH daily said that the American designs "to Arabize the conflict in the Middle East are about to succeed" and referred to the armed conflict in Lebanon and the brink of war which Jordan and Syria reached recently as examples of the success of the American designs in the region.

The paper affirmed that "the ugly face of America is behind all disturbances because it is the principal beneficiary, and its eternal adherence to the Zionist state makes it imperative on Washington not to allow the Arabs a chance to catch their breath and take a close look at the dangers which threaten their security."

America might succeed if the Arabs do not hasten to bridge the gap and achieve a minimum level of solidarity before the coming Arab summit is held next month, AL-WAHDAH said editorially.

A third Amirate newspaper, AL-FAJR, described the situation as "very grave" and regretted the heated Arab confrontations at the time when their main cause remained unsettled and Israel pursued its aggressions against the Arabs everywhere.

AL-FAJR said "The developments in the Arab world are a serious escalation of rivalry between the two giants, who are driving us to fight their wars for them" and urged the disputing Arab states to exercise self-restraint and place the higher interests of the Arab nation above all considerations.

AL-ITTIHAD only expressed similar regrets at the imminent war between the Egyptians and Sudanese on the one hand and the Libyans on the other, all of whom are members of the 'Tripoli charter,' which never saw the light of day. The paper accused the United States of engineering the armed conflict between the Arab brothers.

The paper warned that if war broke out in North Africa, it would not be confined to the three Arab states alone but would drag others in.

AL-ITTIHAD appealed to the Arabs to avert the imminent war [words indistinct] by foiling it and [words indistinct] "cowboy" from enjoying the scenes of shells and bloodshed in a dear part of the Arab world.

AL-KHALIJ daily said the invasion of Libya, which Washington and some other Arab capitals talk about, is part of a long range American-Israeli plan to dominate the whole Arab region in the long run and added that the best way to foil these plots is to reject the Camp David agreements in favor of the Arab national goals. The paper said the American designs in the region fall in line with the new American-Israeli military alliance, which primarily aims at suppressing the aspirations of the Arab people, and appealed to the Arab leaders to abandon their "narrow and selfish interests" which induced Washington to involve them in wars.

"Whether Numayri intervenes in Libya militarily or whether a status quo is attained, the winners in both cases are America and Israel and the losers are the Arabs," AL-KHALIJ warned.

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JOINT STATEMENT ON SENEGAL PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO KUWAIT

LD191348 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1000 GMT 19 Oct 81

[Joint statement issued on the occasion of the visit to Kuwait by His Excellency Abdou Diouf, president of the Republic of Senegal]

[Text] In response to an invitation by His Highness the amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, His Excellency Abdou Diouf, president of the Republic of Senegal, paid an official visit to the state of Kuwait 17-19 October 1981.

The president was accompanied by the minister of state for foreign affairs, the minister of economy and finance and a large number of senior officials of the Senegalese Government. His excellency and his accompanying delegation were hospitably welcomed.

This reflects the existing good relations between the two countries and their two friendly peoples and the good fraternal relations which link the two leaders.

Official talks between the two heads of state took place in a cordial atmosphere. A number of senior officials from both sides took part in the talks. The talks dealt with the present international situation and bilateral relations between the Republic of Senegal and the state of Kuwait.

While discussing the existing bilateral relations between their two countries, they noted with satisfaction the increasing development of cooperation between them. They expressed their determination to continue developing these relations in various spheres.

When reviewing the international political situation, the two sides stressed the importance of all states intensifying their efforts to strengthen world peace and world security on the basis of the principles of respecting sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs and settlements of disputes among states by peaceful means.

When they discussed the delicate and dangerous situation in the Middle East, the two sides stressed that just and lasting peace in the region could not be achieved without Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories including Jerusalem, and without the Palestinian people regaining their firm and legitimate national rights including the establishment of their own independent state. The two countries

also stressed their support for Palestine Liberation Organization in its capacity as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The two sides also condemned Israel's practices in the occupied Arab territories, which conflict with human rights, and its attempts to change the population character of these territories.

The two sides called on Iraq and Iran to halt the fighting raging between them and to respond to the efforts made by the Islamic Good Offices Committee, the secretary general of the United Nations Organization and the nonaligned states to establish peace and to end the conflict through negotiations.

The two sides stressed their full support for the African people who are struggling for the liquidation of colonialism and all forms of foreign hegemony and for the rule of racial minorities in order to gain their freedom and independence. In this context, the two sides expressed their wish that the international community exercise the necessary pressure on South Africa in order to ensure the independence of Namibia within the framework of the Security Council's Resolution No 435. They also expressed their full support for the struggle of the people of Namibia under the leadership of their sole legitimate representative, SWAPO.

The two sides called for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. They stressed the need for the full respect for Afghanistan's independence, its sovereignty, its territorial safety and its position as a nonaligned state as well as the need not to interfere in its internal affairs. They also stressed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland and the right of the Afghan people to self-determination without any foreign interference.

The two sides stressed the importance of being committed to the basic principles of the Nonaligned Movement as a basic and important factor for strengthening peace and progress in the world. They also stressed the importance of solidarity and cooperation among the nonaligned states and their rejection to all attempts aimed at splitting the ranks of the nonaligned states. The two sides also stressed their adherence to the resolutions of the Islamic conference.

Within the framework of Arab-African cooperation, the two sides expressed their intention to extend full backing to make a success at all levels to encourage this cooperation. Within the framework of economic cooperation between the two countries, the Kuwaiti Fund will study economic development program to be submitted by the Republic of Senegal.

His Excellency the president of Senegal expressed his profound appreciation for the warm welcome and generous hospitality he and his accompanying delegation received from his highness the amir of Kuwait, the people and the government of sister Kuwait.

His Excellency the president of Senegal extended an invitation to his highness the amir of Kuwait to pay a visit to the Republic of Senegal. He accepted the invitation with gratitude. The date of the visit is yet to be decided.

CSO: 4404/52

BRIEFS

KUWAITI AID TO PAKISTANI VILLAGES--Islamabad, 6 Oct (OPECNA)--Three hundred villages in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan will be provided with electricity under a project financed by the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. The fund's assistance worth U.S.$27 million, will also provide for a water supply project in the same province, according to Radio Pakistan. [Text] [LD091312 Vienna OPECNA in English 1440 GMT 6 Oct 81]

MALIAN ENVOY ARRIVES IN UAE--Boubacar Diallo, Malian labor and civil service minister and envoy of the Malian president, arrived in the UAE today on a visit that will last several days. The Malian envoy is carrying a written message from Malian President Moussa Traore to UAE President His Highness Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al Nuhayyan. The message deals with bilateral relations and Arab-African cooperation. [Text] [GF211249 Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 0930 GMT 21 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/52

REGION'S LEADERS TRY TO CALM LIBYA, SUDAN, EGYPT

PM160653 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Oct 81 pp 1, 11

[ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT report: "Efforts To Prevent War Between Libya, Sudan, Egypt; Numayri: "Al-Qadhdhafi Is an Animal Who Must Be Eliminated by Pushing Him From a Plane or Drowning Him in the Ocean"]

[Excerpt] Gulf Bureau--Presently a number of Gulf countries are exerting intense efforts to prevent the outbreak of war between Sudan and Libya. This comes at a time when Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri is calling for the extermination of Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi.

The Sudanese president has said that Egypt and Sudan have called for a joint plan to thwart the activities of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. He added that the actual implementation of the plan will begin with troops being sent to the borders.

President Numayri, currently visiting Cairo, said in an interview with AFP yesterday that a struggle must be launched inside Libya and the Tripoli regime eliminated.

The Sudanese president stated that "Colonel al-Qadhdhafi must be physically eliminated at any cost even if it means drowning him in the ocean or pushing him out of a plane." He added: "Al-Qadhdhafi is an animal who understands nothing about human behavior and he must be physically eliminated."

Contacts To Calm the Situation

Meanwhile the United Arab Emirates is continuing its contacts with Libya to calm the situation and it has been announced that a telephone conversation has taken place between the amir of Kuwait and Colonel al-Qadhdhafi.

A high-ranking source has indicated that these consultations have intensified during the past week. Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayyan, president of the UAE, has sent a letter to the Libyan president which was carried personally by Shaykh Surur Ibn Muhammad, president of the Royal Court and an intimate aide to Shaykh Zayid. He is sent only on the most important of missions, an indication of the importance of the role being played by the UAE in its present contacts with the Libyan Jamahiriyah.

Yesterday Shaykh Zayid received a letter from Colonel al-Qadhdhafi which was presented to His Highness by Mahmud Mariya, head of the Libyan People's Bureau in Abu Dhabi. Observers confirm that the two letters exchanged between Zayid and al-Qadhdhafi, whose contents have not been disclosed, deal with developments in the region and particularly the situation along Libyan borders and along Chadian-Sudanese borders as well as the possibility that the situation may explode in the midst of efforts by certain international powers to stir up trouble in the region and to exploit the emergency situation resulting from President al-Sadat's assassination.

Some sources do not consider it unlikely that these activities by the UAE have actually been formally sanctioned by the Gulf Cooperation Council, in view of the nature of relations between Abu Dhabi and Tripoli, in order to lessen the atmosphere of tension and anxiety and to settle the crisis politically and diplomatically.

These sources have warned that a flareup between Arabs will certainly be exploited by international parties and would evolve to a dangerous stage contrary to Arab goals and interests, which would only serve foreign interests.

The source indicated that the situation in the region as a whole and the results of UAE efforts in connection with Libya will be main topics of discussion at the Gulf Cooperation Council summit meeting in Riyadh on 10 November in order to form a unified position to be presented at the Arab League summit conference in Fez, Morocco.

CSO: 4504/35

'MONDAY MORNING' INTERVIEW WITH PLO'S KHALAF

NC090255 Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 5-11 Oct 81 pp 30-39

[Article by Lydia Georgi]

[Excerpt] Palestinian leader Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) has warned that the current wave of terrorist bombs in West Beirut may spread to cover East Beirut.

Speaking to MONDAY MORNING Thursday, a few hours after a large explosion near his West Beirut office killed around 80 people and injured over 200, Abu Iyad charged that the bombs were being planted by agents of Israel, who could be members of the rightist Phalangist Party of other Lebanese and Palestinians.

The bombs, he said, may soon begin to be planted in "government vehicles," like garbage trucks, to get around the precautionary measures that were being taken. They may spread into East Beirut and they may also be directed against the Syrian troops of the Arab deterrent forces, he said.

Abu Iyad, member of the Central Committee of the major Palestinian commando group, Fatah, said that Israel had resorted to this method of attack because of international pressure on it to abide by the PLO-Israel cease-fire arranged in July.

Its objective, he said, was to keep the Palestinians busy with security precautions, build up anti-Palestinian sentiment, stoke the fires of inter-Lebanese conflict and precipitate a Palestinian-Syrian conflict.

But he vowed that the agents Israel was using to spread terror would be captured and exposed, and he stressed that there was no chance of 1976-type conflict between Syria and the PLO, despite the presence of minor problems between the PLO and Damascus.

One of those problems, Abu Iyad said, was the presence in Syria of Abu Nidal, the rebel Palestinian leader who broke away from Fatah in 1974, took refuge in Iraq and declared war on the PLO, launching information attacks on the organization and hunting down its representatives in Europe.

Abu Iyad expressed surprise that Damascus had taken Abu Nidal in and was tolerating his publication in Syria of a magazine devoted to attacks on the PLO, but he said the organization would not allow this to come between it and Syria, and was, in fact, looking forward to an improvement in PLO-Syria relations.

Noting that Abu Nidal's attacks on PLO representatives abroad was giving Israeli assassins convenient cover, he said: "When an office chief is killed (in Europe), we don't know who killed him--Israel or Abu Nidal--which is the greatest cover Israel can have. Even the bomb operations here could be attributed to Abu Nidal. I don't believe he's behind them, of course, but they could be blamed on him, for what's the difference between killing an office chief in Europe and killing one in Beirut?"

Abu Nidal and his followers were "wanted" by the PLO, whether they were in Lebanon or elsewhere, Abu Iyad said.

On other subjects:

Abu Iyad revealed that the security measures agreed upon by the PLO, the leftist Lebanese National Movement, the Shi'ite "Amal" Movement and the Arab deterrent forces were scheduled to be completely implemented by 24 October.

He stated that the PLO had received formal assurances from Syria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait--all members of the Arab follow-up committee on Lebanon--that the projected agency to stop the flow of illegal arms to Lebanon would not stop the supply of arms to the Palestinians, since these were covered by formal agreements between the PLO and Lebanon.

He launched a violent attack on British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who in a recent visit to Kuwait attacked the PLO for its "association with terrorism." Expressing disappointment with Kuwait for allowing Thatcher to make such anti-Arab statements on its national soil without responding to them, Abu Iyad described Thatcher as a "CIA agent" and a "terrorist" herself, calling on all Arab countries to "blacklist" her and refuse to receive her until she apologized for her statements.

He criticized the "inconsistency" of French President Francois Mitterrand's statements on Arab and Palestinian affairs, declaring that the French Government's decision to punish French companies which abided by the Arab boycott of Israel was an attack on the PLO. But he expressed confidence that French policy would improve in time.

He said that Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's recently announced Mideast peace plan had some good points and some unacceptable ones. Noting that the way the plan was presented without prior discussion with the Palestinians had tended to create Palestinian-Arab and inter-Palestinian "suspicions," he said the PLO would not give its final view on the matter until it discussed the plan with Fahd and put a number of important questions to him. The most important question, he said, was whether Saudi Arabia was ready to throw its full political and economic weight behind the plan, even if the plan was opposed by the U.S.

He said that PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, in his scheduled 12 October visit to Japan, hoped to gain official Japanese recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians and formal Japanese support of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. 'Arafat is expected to visit North Korea before Japan (6 October), and he is scheduled to go on from Japan to China and Vietnam.

He expressed the hope that the member states of the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front would apply their recent decision to seek a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union in response to the projected strategic alliance between Washington and Tel Aviv. He said that if the Arab steadfastness countries, which were known not to implement some of their previous decisions, implemented this one, the move would be enough to redress the strategic balance in the Middle East and even to persuade all Arab countries to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

He said that the PLO's friendly relations with the Iranian Government were still intact and the organization's efforts to mediate between Iran and Iraq were still going, but the PLO disapproved of both the Iranian opposition's actions and the Iranian Government's reactions.

He confirmed the PLO's opposition to the Greek Catholic Church's recent decision to appoint the Rev Lutfi Lahham archbishop of Jerusalem in place of Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, who has been exiled by the Israeli occupation authorities because of his pro-Palestinian activities. "It's as if those who struggle and support the Palestinian cause and the Palestinian revolution must be punished," he said. "Whoever took that decision is not a friend of the Palestinians."

CSO: 4400/27

ITALIAN INDUSTRY CONTINUES ACTIVITY IN RADICAL STATES

London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 pp 37-38

[Text]

THE RENEWED US pressure on Italy to have it revise its attitude towards radical Arab states like Libya — seen at the UN General Assembly — has not swayed Italian industry from its business-as-usual position. Recent weeks have seen a marked increase in Italian deals and negotiations with Middle East countries, particularly with Libya, Iraq and Iran.

When the joint Libyan-Italian Commission met in Rome for the first time since the Sirte incident — and the subsequent warnings from Colonel Qaddafi to countries hosting US bases — the atmosphere was described as 'decidedly friendly and constructive.' Led by Omar Muntasser, the heavy industry secretary, and Fawzi el Shakshuki, the economy undersecretary, the Libyan delegation discussed both general and specific aspects of bilateral cooperation, including the creation of joint fishing companies, the planned Italy-Libya telephone link, work and social insurance for Italian workers in Libya, and delays in payments to Italian firms.

The two sides also discussed the extensive Italian role in Libya's new Five Year Plan and Colonel Qaddafi's long-planned visit to Italy, for which a final date has still to be fixed.

Official Italian encouragement was seen in the announcement by the state insurance company, Sace, that it was prepared to cover 75 per cent of the investment in a $6m industrial vehicles plant which is to be built near Benghazi by the Calabrese company. This is the first foreign investment it has guaranteed in its three-year life.

Just before the Libyan delegation's arrival, the Italian foreign trade undersecretary, Baldassarre Armato, reached provisional agreement in Tripoli on the construction of a gigantic 500km water pipeline in the Serir region. The $7bn pipeline should be laid by an Italian consortium of public and private firms.

Another deal signed concerns the Worthington Milan project at a new Misurata oil terminal, which a Korean company will build for Tripoli's Brega Petroleum. This project, whose cost was not announced, includes the terminal's stocking system and the supply of $4m worth of plant service equipment (pumps, electrical compressors, generators, fire-fighting gear and so on).

Finally, from Brescia's Omnia Orobica, which is Europe's largest iron rod production centre, Libya ordered 250,000 tonnes of iron rods for concrete. Delivery on the $65m deal will be within weeks.

Italian business with Iraq also had a sudden upsurge last month with a series of contracts signed. Icomsa Engineering of Padua will earn $67m for the construction of three turnkey plants in the next two years, producing structural steelwork (60,000 tonnes per year), frames and locks, and metal panels. All will be located around Baghdad.

A second important Italy-Iraq deal concerns the supply, installation and start-up by Telettra, of the Fiat group, of a telecommunications plant to connect Iraq's main cities. Worth $40m, the project involves two main links, between Baghdad and Mosul, and between Ramadi and Trabil (on the Jordan border). The links will cover over 900km and require the installation of 300 receiver-transmitters and 6,800 multiplex channels. Telettra will also train Iraqi personnel, initially in Italy and later in the field.

The same company is also discussing a $100m communications equipment deal with Libya, and one involving an electronic transit plan with Sudan. Further negotiations on contracts for telecom work are going on with Jordan and Iran.

Discussions with Saudi Arabian officials — another important trade partner, especially with the resumption of oil supplies — took place at Italy's Institute for Foreign Trade, Ice. The Saudis outlined to an audience of Italian businessmen the main features of the current development plan, which involves spending of up to $250bn. Italian participation will be further explored in December, when Ice launches a promotional programme in Jeddah. According to the Saudis, there is scope for an increased Italian presence in both the heavy and light industry sectors, as well as in clothing, optics, graphics and publishing.

A group of Italian firms has been commissioned to do the varnishing of all external facades of Riyadh's new airport next January. The $42m contract, which was signed in Vienna, could soon be supplemented by another $90m worth of work.

Kuwait, which has taken Montedison's agricultural subsidiaries off its boycott list, has awarded Italstrade an $18m contract to construct an elevated highway.

Condotte, the Italian company in charge of building Bandar Abbas's new port — where work was halted by the Iranian authorities after the revolution — has recently renegotiated the whole deal in Tehran. But instead of the initially-planned three docks and a fishing port, the new contract calls only for the construction of two docks.

The deal's cost, however, remains the same at $1bn. The Iranians have asked Condotte to prepare plans for another dock and the fishing port, which will possibly be implemented next year. To complete the rosy picture for Italy, the company was paid its credits for the work already carried out.

CSO: 4500/20

FUNDING FOR ENERGY PROJECTS

LD261234 Vienna OPECNA in English 1515 GMT 23 Oct 81

[Text] Helsinki, 23 Oct (OPECNA)—Energy projects represent 44 percent of total project loans extended to developing countries by the OPEC Fund for International Development.

A paper presented to the current Helsinki seminar on financing of new and renewable energy sources in developing countries by Dr Mehdi Ali, OPEC fund's director for the Asian region, said the fund has given "special consideration" to projects which reduce the need to import energy.

Energy project loans extended by the OPEC fund include those for hydropower in Burma, the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Rwanda and Sri Lanka.

Financing has also been extended for thermal power projects utilizing coal as an energy source. In India, the fund has participated in three central thermal power projects undertaken by the National Thermal Power Corporation: the Ramagundam power stations in the southern region, the Korba station in the west, and the Singrauli station in the north. [Words indistinct] oil and gas projects: the Bombay high offshore development in India (for which the fund extended two loans--U.S.$14 million and $30 million in 1977 and 1981 respectively) and the Bakhrabad-Chittagong gas project.

Both projects include well development and distribution of gas, and aim at providing substitutes for imported fuel and diesel oil.

The OPEC fund also gives priority to rural electrification programs designed to benefit lower-income groups in recipient countries.

Besides direct project lending operations, the OPEC fund finances the energy sector through balance of payments support loans. Almost a quarter of such credit has been utilized for financing oil and gas imports.

The OPEC fund also promotes investments in the energy sector through the local counterpart funds generated under balance of payments loans. Through this mechanism, the fund has supported the financing of 125 [words indistinct] a total of $282.7 million.

The paper states that the OPEC fund also gives grants for technical assistance projects in the energy field, such funds being provided primarily for regional projects.

The fund has given full support to the proposed UNDP Energy Fund to finance oil and gas surveys and technical activities in non-conventional energy.

The paper also states that the fund has extended grants to other inter-governmental organizations: $5 million to OLADE, the Latin American Energy Organization, in support of its extra-budgetary program on alternative sources of energy, and $868,000 approved for four technical assistance projects administered by the UN Interim Fund for Science and Technology.

The projects include a "wood-for-energy" program in Honduras, a bio-gas and solar energy development project in Lesotho and two agricultural research projects in Papua, New Guinea and the Yemen Arab Republic.

The OPEC fund, says the paper, has put "great emphasis" on its direct project lending to the energy sector, increasing its share from 20.5 percent in 1977 to 27.1 percent in 1978, 42.1 percent in 1979 to 63.7 percent in 1980.

CSO: 4400/24

BRIEFS

$25 MILLION TO TURKEY--Vienna, 16 Oct (OPECNA)--A U.S.$25 million agreement was signed in Vienna Friday between Turkey and the OPEC Fund for International Development. Turkey will use the loan to import capital goods, spare parts, equipment for agricultural and industrial production, foodstuffs and consumer goods. The balance of payments support loan, the second extended to Turkey, brings total fund lending to the country to $40 million. The loan bears a 6 percent interest rate, a 5 percent per annum service charge, a 10-year maturity with a 3-year grace period. The agreement was signed at the fund's headquarters by Ecmel Barutcu, Turkish ambassador to Austria and Dr Ibrahim Shihata, director general of the OPEC fund. [Text] [LD201032 Vienna OPECNA in English 1625 GMT 16 Oct 81]

CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN ABU DHABI--Abu Dhabi, 18 Oct (QNA)--It was announced here today that the next OPEC ministerial conference will be held 1 day earlier than previously planned. The meeting will be held in Abu Dhabi on 9 December instead of 10 December. An official source in the UAE Petroleum and Natural Resources Ministry has announced that it has also been decided to hold the OPEC Ministerial Council meeting on 7 December instead of 18 December. [Excerpt] [GF181558 Doha QNA in Arabic 1400 GMT 18 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/52

EYEWITNESS DESCRIBES SOVIET TACTICS IN PANJSHIR OFFENSIVE

Paris LE MATIN in French 28 Sep 81 p 11

/Article by Yves de Chazournes on eyewitness report by Jean-Jose Puig, chairman of the Friends of Afghanistan, P.O. Box 187, 75864 Paris Cedex 18/

/Text/ For the last 3 weeks, 60 kilometers northeast of Kabul, the Soviet-Afghan troops have been conducting one of the most important and most difficult offensives of the war in a valley that they have already tried to take three times: the Panjshir Valley. Jean-Jose Puig, an Afghan specialist, is the first eyewitness to return to this valley. He was still there several days ago under the Soviet bombardments. He tells the story for LE MATIN.

His name is Ahmad Shah Masood. At 26, it is he who commands the Panjshir Valley and the surrounding area, a very important strategic zone that links Kabul to the northern provinces: its string of small villages ringed around the slopes and harboring around 200,000 Tadjiks. Three times already the Red Army has tried to occupy this valley, each time forcing a large numher of its inhabitants to take refuge in the mountains.

Confronting it is Masood, one of the very few war leaders in Afghanistan who has a modern conception of strategy. Masood, a small, good-natured man with the eyes of a mystic, his 2,000 Modjaheddin, and his few thousand other men, who can turn themselves if necessary into so many fighters. Until now, this former student of the Technological Institute of Kabul, then trained, it is said, in Palestinian camps, has always succeeded in turning back the Red Army convoys.

And each time there was confusion in the camp of the Russians, who could do nothing more than save their skin in these valleys, 2,500 meters high, where blue veins of lapis lazuli, those gold-spangled stones which are traded on a large scale in this country, bloom. Masood already explained his tactic last year to Jean-Jose Puig, a Frenchman who fell in love with Afghanistan long before the war.

But in this month of September 1981, things were to turn out differently. and Jean-Jose Puig was there to note it. Here is his account.

"It all starts on Wednesday, 2 September, with intimidation maneuvers by Mig 27's in variable formation (it is the first time I have seen any in Afghanistan) from Anjuman in the north. Coming down the length of the valley at a high altitude, they dive down suddenly and make their jet engines roar. The same thing happens the next day. No bombs are released. During this day of 3 September, Masood receives a secret report from Kabul: a Soviet attack is imminent.

"On the 14th, the hospital set up last May by young French doctors from the International Medical Aid in the second home of an important man of Kabul, is evacuated. Later it will serve as a special bombing target for the Soviet MiG's.

"In the afternoon, helicopters release packets of tracts in the valley. The people are summoned to go behind a white flag at Gulbar (the entrance to the valley, 50 kilometers from the capital) if they wish to avoid bloodshed. I have this tract, in Farsi, in my hands. The inhabitants have a maximum of 3 days to obey it.

"Then, for 48 hours, there is absolute calm. Just a few helicopters that go by at the end of the afternoon.

"But on Sunday the 6th, at dawn, the bombings start. And during the following 5 days, from 0400 to 1400 hours, the heavy bombing does not stop. The Soviet planes release murderous missiles with stabilizing parachutes, and types of multistage bombs that release 50 other, smaller bombs as they explode. I spent part of my days hidden in ditches watching the sky. There were also magnesium bombs which left great burn marks in the fields.

"However, all of this was only a prelude to the action of the armored trucks and Soviet-Afghan troops. An enormous concentration of vehicles and men (approximately 8,000 Soviet and 7,000 Afghan soldiers) are on the move. The aim of the maneuver: to empty the valley and above all to break the pattern of resistance that has been organized there under Masood's momentum. In order to complete this offensive, the Russians are attacking not only the valley but also the mountains to the north and south. Impossible in this case for Masood to launch a counterattack from these mountains. Moreover, part of his troops are being attacked from the rear by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hebdi Islami men. This is the most integrist resistance organization; Masood is linked to a competitive organization, the Jamiat Islami. This is not the first time I have seen proof of collusion between the Soviets and the Hezbi Islami. I will also see the report from one of Masood's commanders announcing both the victorious entry of the Soviets into the valley and the treachery of the Hezbi."

For 10 days there would be deadly confrontations between the Madjaheddin of Panjshir and the Red Army, with Masood's men trying to regain control of the crests, where airborne Soviet troops were dropped. Today, no one knows yet whether the Soviet-Afghan army has

succeeded in taking the Panjshir valley, as it has announced, or whether the Mujahedin have been able to hold fast.

11550
CSO: 4619/7

OFFICIAL DESCRIBES ROLE OF LOCAL COUNCILS

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Oct 81 Morning Edition p 5

[Interview with Kh. A. Abavi, of administration for management and organization of local administration organs, by M. Rostarchuk, date not given]

[Text] Kabul--The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has approved a draft law on local organs of state power and administration. The draft law, published in the newspaper (HEYWAD), was submitted for nationwide discussion on 29 September. A commission has been set up to examine all proposals received from individuals and organizations in the course of this discussion. Your correspondent asked Dr (Khamil Akhmad Abavi), head of the DRA Council of Ministers main administration for the management and organization of the work of local state administration organs, to comment on this extremely important event in the republic's life.

The law, which will be enacted after nationwide discussion, Comrade (Abavi) said, opening our discussion, is of exceptional importance for the future of our revolution and our country. The foundation of a new state apparatus in Afghanistan is being laid. The people have been given an opportunity to participate directly in running the state, an opportunity which they have been denied throughout the centuries of their history.

With the April revolution's triumph, power in our country passed into the working people's hands. Under the guidance of the Afghan people's vanguard--the PDPA--the process of democratizing and ordering our entire country's sociopolitical life has begun.

As you know, back in April 1980 the DRA Revolutionary Council adopted the fundamental principles of the DRA--the country's interim constitution. Chapter 6 of the fundamental principles states that local Jirgahs--local councils empowered to settle all local issues--are to be set up in provinces, cities, superprovinces and districts. A draft law on DRA local organs of power and administration has been formulated accordingly.

The new law on local organs of power will serve as a basis for further democratizing the social system in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. The law will make it possible to create a new type of state apparatus based on the Jirgah councils. That is its fundamentally revolutionary significance.

The new law will be enacted in order to establish the democratic principles of the organization and work of local state power organs, to involve a broad cross-section of working people in the running of state affairs, to extend collective decision-making in the work of local organs of power and administration and to regulate these relations with higher organs of state power, ministries and departments.

Chapter 1 of the new draft law specifies that the local organs of state power in provinces, cities, city districts, subprovinces and rural districts are to be the corresponding Jirgah councils. They will be elected for a 3-year term and will resolve all local issues. The local Jirgahs will operate under the guidance of the revolutionary council and the DRA Government in close collaboration with all the country's progressive patriotic and democratic forces and sociopolitical organizations combined in the national fatherland front.

The draft law states that all DRA citizens aged 18 or over are to have the right to vote people's representatives onto local Jirgahs, any DRA citizen aged 21 or over is eligible for election to a local Jirgah as a people's representative. The draft law states that the power to nominate candidates for election onto local Jirgahs as people's representatives is to be vested in PDPA organizations, the national fatherland front and cooperative and sociopolitical organizations.

The draft law stipulates that local Jirgahs executive organs are to be executive committees comprising a chairman, secretary and members voted onto it from among those Jirgahs' people's representatives. To be a people's representative on a Jirgah, the draft law states, is an honor for a DRA citizen.

The new law, comrade (Abavi) stressed, "will establish people's power in our country for the first time. The days of despotic rule by individuals put in power locally by a state of exploiters will vanish forever, along with the complete domination of rural areas by mullahs, landowners and moneylenders.

I would like to draw particular attention to the fact that the draft law was formulated with due consideration for our people's national and religious traditions. Suffice it to say that both as consultative councils under the jurisdiction of the local authorities and as organs run by tribes, Jirgahs or councils have long existed in our country. This form of organizing local organs of power is therefore not something brought in from outside, and it reflects our people's long-standing aspirations.

The enemies of the republic and of the Afghan people and the counterrevolutionary rabble in hiding in our country and dug in abroad will, of course, mount a malicious campaign discredit to the new draft law on local organs of power. For this reason PDPA committees, our main administration for the management and organization of local organs' work, and the press, radio and television now face the complex and exceptionally crucial task of explaining the new draft law to the masses and explaining how its principles guarantee genuine people's power. My experience of state work indicates that the scope for local self-rule and for all issues of vital concern to villages, districts and subprovinces to be decided at local level provided by the law will elicit a warm response and support among the majority of working people. Working people will become our country's statesmen. Of course, we have a hard road to travel in order to build a new state, comrade (Abavi) said in conclusion, but we are not alone on that road; we have loyal friends and we can draw on the Soviet people's enormous experience. We shall be victorious.

ALGERIA, FRANCE GAS COOPERATION POTENTIAL EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 pp 50-51

[Article by Mary Gearhart]

[Text] FRANCE and Algeria are on the brink of a key new agreement on gas, after an 18-month row over LNG prices and the issue of gas-oil linkage. It is believed that the deal's formalities will be completed before President Chadli Benjedid goes to Paris for talks with President Mitterrand next month.

Both sides appear well satisfied with the progress made so far in negotiations, but remain tight-lipped on details. As an interim price, pending agreement, France had been paying $3.70 per million BTU. This was later raised to $4.20 — with Algeria billing France separately for the difference between this and the $6 it has been seeking.

Sources say the new price may be around $5 per million BTU, and that the 'two-tier' billing system will stop. It is also understood that Algeria will quietly drop its demands for payment of this price-difference backlog.

The same sources stress that the increased price should be seen in the context of new, wide-ranging bilateral trade and technical cooperation, including on nuclear power. Mitterrand's election — which the Algerians were not expecting — and France's pledge to help redress the trade imbalance have paved the way for a political rapprochement and a resurgence in trade.

In the current negotiations, both sides have appointed a 'wise man' to head their teams: for Algeria, Finance Minister Hadj Yala leads off, while Mitterrand's man is Jean-Marcel Jeanneny. These political and government-to-government talks are particularly important, as the legal tangle of the gas contracts can only be solved at this level.

Both the Italians and the Americans agreed that one of the main problems in their negotiations with Algeria was that they had legal contracts — albeit ones unilaterally reneged on by Algeria — which the companies involved had no legal power to overturn. Only their governments could do that, they said.

Wrangles over the price of gas started in spring last year, when Algeria suspended all deliveries to France and El Paso of Houston to force a rethink. Algeria recommended shipments to France three months later. They were initially in limited quantities, later returning to normal levels which were billed on the 'two tier' system now to be dropped.

Before Mitterrand's election, Algeria's good relations with Italy and Belgium were reflected in booming trade. The new gas deal, and the wider commercial package it will form part of, means that some cooperation projects which were half-promised to Italy and Belgium will now probably go to France.

One of Algeria's main grievances with France in the past was the trade imbalance. France sold Algeria more goods than any other country last year — value $2bn, some 60 per cent of which were capital items — whereas the French stood only ninth in Algeria's $11.7bn export tables.

America was easily Algeria's biggest customer, taking nearly half its crude (47.2m tonnes, together with condensate). A US businessman explained that America's worsening relations with Libya favour increased oil exports from Algeria. Relations with the US are increasingly close,

after Algeria's crucial role in the Iran hostages crisis and the US reversal of a long-standing policy, so allowing sales of non-lethal arms (such as C140 troop transporters) to Algeria.

The breakthrough with France has not come a moment too soon for Algerian finances, as the campaign to link the prices of its gas and oil cost the country dearly. Oil production is well down too — officially, it has been cut from 1m to 0.8m b/d in the last four months, but unofficially output is around 0.6m b/d. At $40 per barrel, Algeria's crude is one of Opec's dearest.

To make matters worse, plans to replace fading oil revenues with gas exports are also in trouble. The cancellation of a new LNG plant, which would have been the country's fifth, has put contracts with some Dutch and German firms in jeopardy. And, of course, negotiations with El Paso over the future of its 10.9bn cubic metres LNG contract were broken off last spring.

On the plus side, last April's deal with Distrigas of Belgium, for 5.3bn cu m at $4.80 per million BTU, was a hopeful sign. Algeria also has contracts with British Methane (for a tiny 1.1bn cu m), Trunkline of Houston (4.8bn cu m) and, say diplomats, will soon have one with Spain's Enagas.

Algeria is looking to its massive 3 trillion cu m gas reserves (the world's third largest) to finance economic liftoff. Much will depend on the ability of Sonatrach, the state hydrocarbons concern, to run plant at or near capacity — and to reach agreement on prices with customers.

The Italians, who have put millions into the gas pipeline linking Algeria and Italy via Tunisia, feel they have been sacrificed to France to some extent. 'There is absolutely no question of a deal going through for us until the one with France is signed,' said an Italian businessman in Algiers rather bitterly. While negotiations have reached 'total impasse', the same man said that eventually Algeria and Italy were 'condemned to reach agreement over gas prices' because of the pipeline investment.

The pipeline, built by Italy's Snam, was to have been officially opened by both the countries' presidents later this month, but this has been postponed. Economic relations between the two have also taken a nosedive. 'We were warned by Algeria that commerce will suffer until, or unless, the gas deal goes through' said the Italian businessman.

Politically, the Algerians cannot afford to wait too long to turn gas into cash. The 18m population's expectations were raised when Chadli replaced the austere Houari Boumedienne as president over two years ago. In the past year, much has been spent on consumer goods in an effort to stem unrest. To call for belt-tightening now could prove tricky.

One other problem, which the Algerian authorities failed to appreciate in time, is that linking gas and oil prices only works to your advantage when oil's price is healthy. If it falls, as it has, the policy loses some of its appeal.

This is one reason for Algeria's unwillingness to drop its official $40 crude price, to which gas in linked. Unofficially, it has been selling below $40. The mistaken forecast also explains the political eclipse of the energy minister, Belkacem Nabi, who was replaced in recent oil discussions by the finance minister.

● LEONID KOSTANDOV, a Soviet deputy prime minister, said last week that the controversial plan to supply Western Europe with 40bn tonnes a year of Siberian gas was 'on the way to realisation.'

Following the signing of a protocol concluding the tenth meeting of the Soviet-West German joint economic commission, Kostandov said that — despite continuing negotiations between the Soyuzneft export trade organisation and Ruhrgas of West Germany, over the price for Soviet gas — the Soviet Union would still place large orders for West German equipment.

CSO: 4500/19

BRIEFS

NEW IRON AND STEEL PLANT--The Arab Iron and Steel Company which is building a $300m steel pelletisation plant in Bahrain will award the main construction contract within the next few weeks. The leading contenders are Kobe Steel of Japan and a Japanese-West German consortium, Lurgi-Hitachi, says the general manager of the company, Dr Omar Grine. A $14m deal has already been signed with John Howard of Britain for the construction of a jetty at the site, near the Arab Shipping and Repair Yard. The steel pelletisation plant is expected to produce 4m tonnes of pellets a year. "It is going to take us between six to nine months to work up to that figure," said Dr. Grine. "We expect construction work to begin in January or February of next year." The turnkey contract will also include a 400MW power station and a desalination plant in two units. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 16 Oct 81 p 42]

CSO: 4400/23

EDITORIAL ON TASKS FACING NATION

PM201419 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Oct 81 p 7

[Editorial: "Period of Work and Earnestness"]

[Text] At the first cabinet meeting to be attended by President Husni Mubarak since his inauguration as president of the republic, the president began with his characteristic assertiveness by saying that he meant every word of the speech he gave before the People's Assembly. The minister's first obligation is that each of them must translate the speech into action. This means that we are in a stage aimed at realizing the desires of the late President Anwar al-Sadat. It is a stage based on eliminating the divergence between words and actions.

This unification of word and deed which has emerged as the first and most prominent feature of the stage makes the remaining features of the stage completely clear. It defines the duties and obligations of every official in the country who is in a position of responsibility. It defines the responsibility of the public, which is no less than the responsibility of the leadership. This is a stage of work and earnestness. Its main ingredient, as President Husni Mubarak defined it, is unity of rank, purity of heart and deed, and sincerity of intention and purpose. The worth of work is measured, as the president declared, not in profits taken or benefits gained but in self-sacrifice and devotion. No one is sheltered from the sword of the law.

Within this specific framework the national work will proceed during the coming stage without hesitation or procrastination. The situation is critical but we will not surrender to the distress of the loss of our leader. We will proceed to build our immortal Egypt with love, hope and work.

CSO: 4504/39

EDITORIAL ON YOUTH AND RELIGIOUS RADICAL GROUPS

PM201441 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18 Oct 81 p 7

[Editorial: "Egypt's Youth Are Fine"]

[Text] Egypt's young people are fine and their foundation will remain intact because they know the meaning of commitment and fidelity to Egypt. University studies began yesterday amid an atmosphere of calm, reverence and a concern for knowledge because the young people yearn for the readiness of their country and the security of its future.

There can be no doubt that every young person is a noble patriot deeply disturbed by Egypt's calamities since that reprehensible crime, which leave no doubt as to the bloody goals of radical groups that have considered the universities fair game in recent years when it comes to deceiving minds and exuding poison in the name of religion. At first these groups seem enticing with their appeal to religion, but then they trap their prey, putting them under their control, from which there is no escape. Motivated by pressure, publicity or open threats or having been brainwashed, they execute their covert and overt crimes. Some young people follow blindly and cut their ties with their families, their friends, their society and their country. Terrorist tactics have been well known throughout history. In using religion as an enticement their intention is not to spread religion but to hide behind it and exploit its beneficience while perpetrating the most repulsive crimes and the most heinous acts of terrorism.

Young people will remain fine as long as their faith in God, in themselves and in their country remains intact. The young people will succeed as long as they use their minds to discriminate between truth and falsehood, though falsehood may wear the cloak of truth, and as long as they realize the difference between correct guidance and deception. Even the most repulsive of crimes fails to display the extent of the certain guilt of these who destroy religion and spill blood under the banner of religion.

CSO: 4504/39

'ZIONIST-KHOMEYNI COLLABORATION' DENOUNCED BY PALESTINIANS

London 8 DAYS in English 10 Oct 81 p 33

[Article by Fulvio Grimaldi]

[Text]

THE ITALIAN public, especially the supporters of the left wing, are taking a different attitude on the Iran-Iraq war these days, due to the excesses of the Iranian regime. Public opinion has shifted from initial sympathy with the Iranian revolution towards a more balanced view and, in the case of the Socialist International and the Italian socialist left, firm support for Iraq.

This shift was made clear at a conference organised in Rome by the Iraqi embassy and the Baath Party, on the first anniversary of the outbreak of war. Attended by Palestinians and Iranian opposition leaders, and by the chairman of the Euro-Arab Parliamentary Association, Michele Achilli, the occasion offered the opportunity for further denounciations of the mullahs' regime.

Palestinian speakers decried what they see as growing zionist-Khomeini collaboration. To provide further evidence of this, Iraqi sources produced unpublished details about the Argentinian plane that crashed in the Soviet Union while carrying Israeli arms to Tehran, and declared that further Israeli arms routes to the Khomeini regime had been discovered.

Shipments were made to the Iran's Gulf coast via Belgium and Holland in vessels flying flags of convenience, they claimed. They also cited admissions to the same effect made recently by former President Bani Sadr and borne out by an in-depth enquiry by the American ABC television network. Iraqi speakers also listed the provocations they claim Baghdad and the Arab nation as a whole had suffered at the hands of Tehran and its expansionist and subversive initiatives in the Gulf, before Iraq had decided to strike back 'in defence of the Arab homeland'.

Italian speakers from various parties and organisations saw Iraq as a potential partner for European progressive forces in the non-aligned and developing world. Achilli denounced US plans for military control of the entire Middle East and the supporting role Italy was expected to play.

The debate served to highlight the differences within the Italian Socialist Party, now in a government coalition with the Christian Democrats. While Party leader Bettino Craxi (whom many forecast as Italy's next premier) and Defence Minister Lelio Lagorio share Washington's most hawkish views, the party's rank and file, and its strong left wing openly support the Arabs, non-alignment and nuclear disarmament. Achilli also insisted — in the light of the failure of Camp David — on the need to relaunch the European Middle East initiative, as anticipated by last year's Venice declaration.

Rahmat Gossolvi, an Iranian journalist, denounced what he termed, 'big capital's' intention of letting two important Third World countries bleed, so it can then sell them what is needed for reconstruction. He also accused Europe of not having done enough to combat the 'return of religious cannibalism and the destruction of civilisa-

tion' in Iran. In particular, he attacked Europe's communist parties, especially the powerful Italian one; he compared their ambiguous stance on Iran and the war to Tudeh's 'totally opportunistic' line in Iran.

Various political forces in Italy are demonstrating against the possible expulsion from Italy and return to Iran of four Iranian students opposed to Khomeini, who were arrested after clashes with Khomeini sympathisers at Perugia University for foreigners. Appeals have been launched to have the extradition order reversed, as it would certainly lead to the students' trial and sentencing.

At the end of the conference, Achilli handed out copies of the first issue of a new Italian weekly, North-South Dialogue, which aims at promoting understanding and cooperation between Europe and the developing world. Achilli is the editor-in-chief.

CSO: 4600/72

PROGRESSIVE FRONT DISCUSSES ARAB SITUATION

JN181751 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 18 Oct 81

[Text] The General Secretariat of the Progressive National and Patriotic Front convened this morning under Comrade Na'im Haddad, member of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party's National Command and the front's secretary general.

The committee [as heard] discussed the current situation in the Arab arena following the death of traitor al-Sadat at the hands of the masses of our Arab people in Egypt, the escalation of the struggle of the masses in the fraternal Egypt and these masses: utter rejection of the imperialist and Zionist schemes and the treasonous Camp David accords.

Comrade Na'im Haddad, the front's secretary general, affirmed the support of the masses of our people in Iraq under the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party for the struggle of the masses of our Arab people in Arab Egypt in order to abort the treasonous plot and the policy of settlements and capitulation followed by the traitor al-Sadat; and to form a national front comprising all the honorable and sincere national, pan-Arab and progressive forces and parties for these very purposes.

Comrade Na'im Haddad added that under the 17 July revolution, Iraq now occupies a prominent and advanced Arab and international position, particularly now that events have proved the soundness of its political course, independent trend and principled pan-Arab stand. He asserted that the masses in our struggling state are rallying round the leadership of the revolution and party led by President Saddam Husayn, bolstering the revolution's course and achievements and maintaining the spirit of victory achieved by the glorious battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah and bolstering this spirit with all potentials and resources so that the inevitable victory will be achieved over the racist Persian enemy.

The need to coordinate frontal action within the framework of the just pan-Arab battle being waged by our struggling state against the racist Persian enemy was also discussed at the meeting.

CSO: 4404/51

BRIEFS

OIL AND TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED--Iraq has agreed to maintain oil supplies to the Philippines and give it priority in development contracts, according to Philippine Human Settlements Minister Imelda Marcos. She returned last week from a four-day visit to Iraq where she signed a trade agreement providing for most-favoured nation treatment between the two countries. A joint Iraqi-Filipino commission is to be set up. It will meet yearly to monitor or review the progress of trade between the two countries. The Philippines imports about 15 percent of its oil from Iraq, which hires thousands of labourers from the Philippines for construction projects. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 p 2]

IRAQ, DENMARK SIGN AGREEMENT--Iraq and Denmark yesterday signed joint minutes at the conclusion of the second session of the Iraqi-Danish joint committee for economic, trade and technical cooperation. Mr Hassan Ali, Revolution Command Council member and Minister of Trade and the Danish Trade Minister signed the minutes which stipulate coordinating bilateral cooperation in industry, agriculture, training, technological and economic exchange. The Iraqi Minister affirmed that the minutes will organize trade cooperation for the coming year and effectively contribute to economic, trade, technical cooperation between the two countries. The Danish Minister delivered a speech pointing out that his recent visit to Iraq has afforded him a chance to get acquainted with Iraq's comprehensive progress. He also praised the development of Iraqi industry as represented by things on display at the Industry and Minerals Ministry's pavilion. The Danish Ambassador to Baghdad was present at the signing ceremony. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 3 Oct 81 p 5]

IRAQ, CYPRUS SIGN AGREEMENT--Mr Hassan Ali, member of the Revolution Command Council, Minister of Trade and visiting Cypriot Minister of Trade yesterday signed a trade agreement. The agreement includes provisions for regulating trade between the two countries, and lays down necessary measures for facilitating and expanding trade exchange, and participation in trade fairs held in either country. A joint trade committee, to meet when necessary in Nicosia or Baghdad to study trade exchange, make proposals on ways to expand and trade would be formed, according to the agreement. Mr Hassan Ali said that the agreement would greatly help in organising trade between the two countries. The Cypriot Minister expressed pleasure in signing the agreement, which is the first Cyprus has signed with an Arab country. The agreement would provide the means to deepen bilateral relations, he added. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 3 Oct 81 p 5]

POULTRY PROJECT UNDERWAY--The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform is currently implementing Iraq's third largest poultry project in Duhouk Province at a cost of ID. 23 million. The project covers 12 thousand donums and includes 10 chicken raising fields. It has a capacity of 182 million eggs per year and includes a slaughterhouse of 6,550 chicken per hour, a warehouse in addition to administrative annexes, a water plant and 10 reserve generators. An international company is providing and installing the machines and appliances for the project and has undertaken to maintain them as well as to pave the road which links the project with the highway. The State Establishment for Poultry (north) is carrying out other parts of the project in which 450 technicians, workers and administrators will work. Fifteen technicians have been sent abroad to be trained in administrative techniques. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 12 Aug 81 p 5]

NEW TELEPHONE EXCHANGE OPENED--Mr Sa'doun Gheidan, member of the Revolution Command Council, Minister of Transport and Communications, yesterday opened the Mahmoudiya and Madain districts electronic telephone exchanges of a 1,000 lines capacity each. He also opened the microwave projects linking Baghdad with Mahmoudiya and Madain and linking the internal cable network of the two districts with the wireless and telegraphic communications centres. Mr Gheidan emphasized that these projects were being implemented according to Party directives on providing telephone services for the remotest regions. He pointed out that the importance of this project, costing ID. 30 million, and involving the installation of 92 mobile electronic exchanges of a 1,000 line capacity each, in all districts was to link them with provincial centres and instal internal cable networks to provide telephone linkage to all provinces and foreign countries. Mr Gheidan explained that the current plan calls for installing similar exchanges in Alexandria, Soweira and Dojeil during September, and in Anab, Rawa and Hyt within the next three months. On this occasion, Mr Gheidan made telephone calls to citizens benefitting from the project in Mahmoudiya. Mr Gheidan also visited the internal and international calls departments and acquainted himself with the working conditions. He emphasized that it was important to hold training courses for exchange supervisors, in order to raise their standard and the standard of services to a level consistent with Party leadership aspirations. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 20 Aug 81 p 5]

RAMADAN CONFERS WITH BULGARIA'S CHAKUROV--Baghdad, 15 Oct (INA)--Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council member and first deputy prime minister, received here today Toncho Chakurov, Bulgarian machine building minister. Ramadan expressed Iraq's appreciation of the exemplary relations between the two friendly countries. He also expressed optimism over the continuation and prosperity of these relations in the interest of the two peoples and all humanity. He then reviewed the dimensions of the racist Persian aggression against Iraq, stressing Iraq's readiness to positively respond to all efforts to solve the conflict with Iran peacefully and in a manner that guarantees Iraq's just national and pan-Arab rights. He also asserted that our people are determined to boost the development process while maintaining the spirit of victory. The two sides discussed the developed bilateral cooperation relations and ways of promoting them in the economic and industrial fields to serve their common interests. [Excerpt] [JN151359 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1330 GMT 15 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/51

MOSHE ARENS ON RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

TA171336 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 17 Oct 81

[Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee Professor Moshe Arens interviewed by Arye Haskel and Tzvi Pantanovitz--date and place not given; recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] One of Moshe Dayan's greatest achievements was the key role he played in the Camp David peace process. The prime mover on the Egyptian side was, of course, the late President al-Sadat. Now there is a new president in Egypt, Husni Mubarak, who has declared himself equally committed to peace with Israel. Nevertheless, Mubarak is no al-Sadat and the question remains in the wake of al-Sadat's death where do we go from here. This question was put to the chairman of the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Professor Moshe Arens, in this interview, conducted before Dayan's death.

[Begin recording] [Arens] Well, this is what we are all trying to guess. There must be about 4 million Israelis who are trying to find the answer to exactly that question. I don't think any of us have the answer. We do have the commitment that was made by Mubarak in his talks with Prime Minister Begin as well as in a speech before the Egyptian People's Assembly. By the same token, we know that Mubarak will be under pressure, the very same kind of pressure that al-Sadat was under in his lifetime, to abandon the peace process with Israel. It is very likely that Mubarak, like al-Sadat before him, will try to counter that pressure by applying pressure on Israel.

[Question] In this connection, he has actually said that he and Egypt see the Palestine problem as cardinal and he has called on the United States to put pressure on Israel on this. How well do you think Israel is able to stand up to U.S. pressure?

[Answer] Well, I think that we have a pretty good record in that regard and we have shown that we can be quite stubborn when we think we ought to, when it is important for us. Some people would then call us intransigent but I don't think that you will find too many cases in Israel's history--and certainly not in Israel's recent history--where we have buckled under pressure or we have done things that we have considered to be inimical to Israel's best interest because outside powers or even some of our best friends--like the United States--have tried to pressure us into doing this. I don't think that there is too much a risk that pressure

from the United States, maybe with the encouragement of Mubarak, will bring about compromises or concessions on Israel's part that ordinarily we would not have wanted to make.

[Question] In this connection, a problem has been underscored to suitable extent by Mubarak's minister of state for foreign affairs, Dr Butrus Ghali, who has actually urged the European countries to pressure the United States to apply pressure on Israel. Again, does this tell us anything about the policies of the new administration in Egypt?

[Answer] Well, I think it confirms something that we really could have and should have known even before we had heard anything specific from Husni Mubarak and that is at Mubarak will be under pressure to bring about Egypt's reentry into the heart of the Arab world, to bring about Egypt's resumption of its traditional role as leader of the Arab world and that his reaction to this pressure is to put pressure on Israel to solve the Palestinian problem, in quotation marks, which, of course, is a euphemism for withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines, including Jerusalem. I think th-t that part of the scene we could have predicted. It was part of the relationship with al-Sadat. This was his response to the pressure he was under from outside Egypt and inside Egypt and clearly this is going to be Mubarak's response.

Whether Mubarak will be able--as did al-Sadat--to withstand the pressure, to bend in the peace process with Israel--well, that is something that we do not know for certain. We do know that Mubarak doesn't have the kind of stature in Egypt at the present time that al-Sadat had. In other words, it is going to be more difficult for him. Al-Sadat, after all, as the hero of the Yom Kippur War, had achieved a position in Egyptian and world public opinion that was really quite unique and maybe Mubarak will attain that position as well but it certainly is going to take some time before he does—if he ever does. In the meantime, I think it will be fair to say that it will be more difficult for him to withstand some of the pressure that al-Sadat was able to withstand.

[Question] Do you not think he could mark time for a while, just to feel his way about?

[Answer] Well, I think that it is only logical to assume that under any circumstances he is going to work very hard at trying to keep Israel-Egyptian relationships on an even keel, at the very least, until that date because that is a date on which Israel is committed to withdraw from the Sinai. You may have noticed in Mubarak's speech to the Egyptian Parliament--his (?noble) speech--he spoke very dramatically, with a certain element of pathos, about the Egyptian flag being raised at Sharm al-Shaykh and the Egyptian flag being raised at Rafah and every last square inch of holy Egyptian soil being returned to Egypt in April 1982. So, he has every good reason, of course, for making sure that things stay on an even keel, at least until that date. But, of course, this is not 100 percent certain that he will be successful in doing that because he will be under pressure. We can see that there are opposition groups in Egypt, that there are powers in Egypt and outside Egypt in the Arab world that will try to get him to deviate even before April 1982.

[Question] Do you think he can withstand these pressures?

[Answer] I don't think anybody knows, I don't think that Mubarak himself knows at the present time. As I said, I think he has every reason to make a very strong effort to withstand them, at the very least until April 1982, maybe beyond. But, whether he is able to--I don't think there is a man in the world today that can tell you with certainty what the answer to that is.

[Question] So, if you were prime minister now, what would you advise?

[Answer] You know, of course, it is an entirely different situation after the fact than before, simply because Israel--unlike with Arab countries--is a democracy, is a country with a tradition of democratic institutions and with a tradition of abiding by its international commitments. What, even in Egypt, the tradition is almost the opposite, in the sense that al-Nasir broke international commitments that previous Egyptian rulers had taken upon themselves and al-Sadat broke international commitments that al-Nasir and, in some cases, he himself took upon himself, like the 15-year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. Now, Israel is just the other way around; a country that prides itself on its tradition of abiding by international commitments regardless of whatever change of government we may have, as a result of elections. [End recording]

[Announcer] Interviewing Professor Moshe Arens were Arye Haskel and Tzvi Pantanovitz.

CSO: 4400/27

ARAB RADICAL ACTIVITY REPORTED DECREASING

TA160735 Jerusalem POST in English 16 Oct 81 p 3

[Report by Yo'el Dar]

[Excerpt] Nazareth--Political activity by the country's Arab radical groups has declined in recent months, according to government officials dealing with the Arab minority.

But the officials warned that this decline might only be temporary, and that a resurgence of Arab nationalist activism might take place following the opening of the new university year at the end of this month and or during the municipal elections due to be held in November 1982.

According to the officials, the extremist religious groups with a nationalist message have stopped their activities and the radical tone of the village movement has substantially reduced its propaganda efforts and public meetings. Rakah (the Communist Party) has also toned down its support for the PLO, according to the officials.

The officials attributed this fall-off in extremist activity to the government clampdown in January on the "Nazareth Congress," which was to have declared the Israeli Arabs "an inseparable part of the Palestinian people whose sole representative is the PLO."

Two months later the security services cracked down on the extremist religious groups and arrested dozens of members on suspicion of planning terrorist attacks. In the past few weeks, five young Arabs, three of them students, have been jailed for publicly supporting the PLO.

CSO: 4400/27

NRP REJECTS PROPOSAL TO STOP SINAI EVACUATION

TA160740 Jerusalem POST in English 16 Oct 81 p 2

[Report by political correspodent Mark Segal]

[Text] Tel Aviv—The National Religious Party Knesset faction yesterday threw out a resolution by Gush Emunim patron Deputy Religious Affairs Minister Hayim Druckman to call for a freeze to the Sinai withdrawal. His was the lone voice which questioned the commitment of the new Egyptian regime of President Husni Mubarak to peace with Israel.

The second largest coalition party reconfirmed without a vote its belief in continuing peace with Egypt. Druckman's call to suspend the peace process united the usually quarrelsome NRP ministers. Interior and Religious Affairs Minister Yosef Burg, Education Minister Zvulun Hammer and Deputy Foreign Minister Yehuda Ben-Me'ir spoke in one voice, commending the repeated declarations of President Mubarak about his intention to continue with the late President al-Sadat's peace policies. They pointed to the orderly transfer of power in Egypt as a further guarantee of continuity in Egypt's policies.

The NRP leadership criticized Druckman for raising the proposal, arguing that such a discussion hurt Israel's international standing. The most vehement voice in defence of the peace process was that of Deputy Foreign Minister Ben-Me'ir, who in 1978 voted against the Camp David agreements. He said that Mubarak's repeated assurances indicated that Israel had made peace not with one man as had been hitherto feared, but with a country.

Meanwhile, the mini-crisis in the party over Druckman's demand that Burg let him have the powers of de facto minister, remained near boiling point yesterday. Druckman wants the same status as Deputy Absorption Minister Aharon Uzan who is the de facto boss under an arrangement with Minister of Labour, Social Affairs, and Absorption, Aharon Abu-Hatzeira.

A meeting of Burg and Druckman ended fruitlessly yesterday, it was learned, with the two unable to agree over the deputy minister's demands for extensive powers.

CSO: 4400/27

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR LIKUD-LABOR COALITION

TA270840 Jerusalem POST in English 27 Oct 81 p 3

[Report by political correspondent Mark Segal]

[Text] Nearly 30 percent of the public would favour a government coalition of Likud and Labour minus the religious parties, while one-quarter prefer the present Likud-religious coalition. One-fifth favours a broad coalition containing the Likud, Labour and the religious parties. A much smaller proportion favours a Labour government including the religious and the small centre parties.

The above data emerges from a poll conducted for the JERUSALEM POST by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre among a representative selection of 1,240 adults. The survey was conducted at the start of the month.

Question: Which coalition would best serve the state of Israel?

Likud and religious	24.1
Likud, Labour and religious	22.1
Likud and Labour	29.1
Labour, religious, Shinuy and Telem	13.5
Others	8.5
Undecided	2.7

The first alternative has most support among the 18-30 year-old group, lower economic status, oriental communities, voters for the Likud and the religious parties.

The second choice has strongest support among better-educated, Israelis of western background and voters for the religious parties and Tehiya.

The third choice has strongest backing among the over 50 age group, western communities, secular people, middle and upper status and was most preferred by Labour voters.

CSO: 4400/27

LOW LEVEL OF CURRENCY RESERVES REPORTED

TA211356 Jerusalem POST in English 21 Oct 81 pp 1-2

[Report by economic affairs correspondent Shlomo Ma'oz]

[Excerpt] With the general budget reserve drained to only 462 million Israeli shekels, as compared with the 4.3 billion shekels scheduled, the treasury has recently had to inject a further 2.5 billion shekels siphoned off from reserves earmarked for development and for covering price rises. The general reserve is held to subsidize basic foodstuffs, electricity and fuel.

It was the treasury's use of the general reserve to subsidize these items on the eve of the June general election and immediately afterwards that has been responsible for emptying the coffers.

Thus, by the end of this month, and only 7 months into the year, the treasury will have paid out 8.8 billion shekels on subsidies, 2.8 billion shekels (or 150 percent) more than the sum budgeted for this item for the entire financial year.

The 2.5 billion shekel top-up brings the general reserve back to a level of 2.96 billion shekels.

And with nowhere else from which to take subsidies money, economic circles predict that the government will soon have to raise prices of basic commodities, electricity and fuel to cut back on what subsidies are now costing. But even so, the treasury will have to introduce a supplementary budget before the end of the financial year.

The development reserve has now shrunk to only 886 million shekels while the reserve to cover price rises is totally empty, with the treasury feeling that it will have no need for this item.

Documentation given to the Knesset's Finance Committee shows that the government deficit on accout of fuel subsidies this year totals 2.05 billion shekels with 850 million recently transferred to this item.

In fact, the treasury cancelled the fuel subsidies about 6 weeks ago, but the deficit dates from the period both before and after the elections in which imported fuel was subsidized.

CSO: 4400/27

BRIEFS

TOURISM AGREEMENTS WITH ROMANIA--Tel Aviv--Israel and Romania have signed tourism agreements for next year that are expected to increase the number of Israeli tourists in Romania, Romanian Deputy Tourism Minister (Kosteka Zamau) told Israeli journalists on a 1-week tour of Romania. He said that the number of Israeli tourists to Romania has risen in the past few years from a few thousand a year to 30,000. The new agreements, which include package tours with a large number of agencies, are expected to raise the number of tourists to 35-40,000 a year, he said. [Text] [TA211048 Jerusalem POST in English 21 Oct 81 p 2]

FOREIGN MINISTRY APPOINTMENTS--The Foreign Ministry yesterday announced the appointments of Moshe Gilbo'a--formerly consul general in Atlanta and Chicago--to head the ministry's Diaspora Affairs Department, and of Shamay Kahana, a veteran diplomat whose postings have included ambassador to Romania, to head the International Organizations Department at the Foreign Ministry. [TA060853 Jerusalem POST in English 6 Oct 81 p 3]

YAMIT SETTLERS COUNTER ANTIWITHDRAWAL--The Yamit settlers have yet to reach agreement with the government. This morning a group of them seized the government office in the town. In another development, Yamit settlers have begun organizing against the movement to stop the withdrawal from Sinai. They say the movement is made up of armed extremists who are already disrupting the town's quiet life-stule. Reporter Jack Katzenel asked Ella Weizman of the movement whether there was not a danger that the guns might be used against soldiers during the evacuation. [Begin recording] [Weizman] I cannot be sure of anything because you must understand that people here are in a very, very hard situation--and I am not only talking about people who belong to the movement to stop the withdrawal from Sinai, there are all kinds of groups here pulling to all sorts of directions--and I cannot promise you anything. One thing I can promise you: That the movement to stop the withdrawal from Sinai does definitely not see itself as a military movement. The reason that we are so active today is so as to gain enough pressure and enough power in public opinion as to not ever reach an April 1982 or to have April just another day in the calendar and nothing more, with no conflicts and no fights and no struggles. [End recording] [Text] [TA251854 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 25 Oct 81]

TRADE DEFICIT APPEARS LOWER--Israel's balance of payments has improved slightly over the last several months, leaving a trade deficit of $1.8 billion for the first 8 months of 1981, down from $1.825 billion for the same period last year.

This reflected a slight drop in imports--$5.22 billion instead of $5.33 billion and a slight rise in exports--$3.42 billion instead of $3.406 billion. Central Bureau of Statistics figures show a 54 percent drop in diamond exports compared to last year, with the 1981 amount standing at $415 million as of 31 August. Fuel imports were down by 6 percent to $87 million. But making up for these lower numbers was a total of 130 percent increase in imports of durable goods during the first half of the year. Diamond exports showed a 19 percent drop for the first 8 months of the year. Other industrial exports were up by 8 percent and agriculture exports were 2 percent higher. [Text] [TA251006 Jerusalem POST in English 25 Oct 81 p 3]

NEW TERMS FOR OCCUPIED AREAS--Jerusalem, 27 Oct (AFP)--The Israeli state media will no longer use the terms "West Bank" or "occupied territories" when referring to the land captured by Israel in the 1967 war. Instead they will use the geographical terms "Judea," "Samaria" or "Gaza." A directive from the National Broadcasting Office banned journalists on national radio and television from using the terms owing to their political implications. The decision was taken unanimously in the board's Executive Committee but no opposition Labour Party representatives were present, sources said. However, observers pointed out that the directive aimed at toning down the language of radio and television newsmen, often highly critical of the government, showed up Israeli ambitions of maintaining control over the regions, even at the end of a 5-year transitional period of Palestinian autonomy allowed for under the Camp David arrangements with Egypt. [Text] [NC270936 Paris AFP in English 0913 GMT 27 Oct 81]

CSO: 4400/27

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 225, 24-30 Aug 81 pp 18-21

[Article by Nihad al-Mashnuq: "Blueprints Proliferating While Homeland Is What Is Called for; What Is Jordan Waiting for? Israel Wants It To Be a Substitute Homeland, and the Arabs Act Like Spectators; Reagan Tells Arab Ambassadors, 'Israel Is Occupying 30 Percent of Palestine!' "]

[Text] No other regime in the world resembles the Jordanian regime in the disagreement that exists over the role it is required to play on the Arab scene and internationally. The United States wants it to do what it cannot do; the Soviet Union is approaching it about something it does not own; the PLO sees it as a second refuge for Palestinians; and Israel is declaring it--and this is the reply it repeats to those who ask--a candidate for the Palestinian homeland. Jordan's Arab colleagues, however, act like spectators. How can they be asked to move to the stage?

In the first statement he made after being sworn as president, U.S. President Ronald Reagan said that Muslims and Christians had to stop fighting Jews and that Jordan was the natural homeland for the Palestinians.

King Husayn was not surprised by that statement. He had anticipated during his visit to Washington in 1980 that Arab reasoning in the Middle East crisis would be misunderstood if President Jimmy Carter were not re-elected. This is what did in fact happen. It is true that President Carter was the one who directed the signing of the Camp David accords, which none of the Arabs but Egypt was misled into joining. Nevertheless, at the end of his term he did express in front of a number of Arab officials who met him an apparent willingness to bypass these accords if he were re-elected president of the United States.

A futile dialogue between the Jordanian and American capitals continued until U.S. Secretary of State Gen Alexander Haig came to the area. After tremendous efforts he included Amman on his itinerary.

In Amman it was reported that King Husayn told the U.S. secretary that he used to greet Dr Kissinger in al-'Aqabah as a tourist and that he was not willing to do that any more. "None of Kissinger's plans achieved anything concrete for Jordan. His numerous missions failed to bring about

disengagement in a single meter of land that Israel occupied on the borders in 1967, that is on the West Bank. At the same time disengagement was realized on both the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. How can you make Jordan a candidate for a principal role in the peace process when Jordan has no incentive to play this role? How long do you think I can continue to endure the consequences of my friendship with you? Jordan is tired of the fact that you nominate us for roles when you do not take into consideration the need to consult with us before you determine those roles whose proclamation is quite useless. Jordan may not even be able to carry out these roles."

Gen Haig provided no clear justification for the fact that the U.S. administration had called Jordan a homeland for the Palestinians. Instead, he changed the subject of the discussion and talked about the strategic policy which the new administration was trying to follow in the area under the rubric of fighting Soviet influence. He talked about the role of every country in the area in this war.

Then the Jordanian monarch replied, "Ever since 1976 we have had visits from U.S. emissaries and missions who came to Jordan to find out the facts about the Arab-Israeli dispute. The Arabs believed that most of these emissaries went back to the United States quite convinced of the injustice that befell the Palestinian people. The Arabs believed that the Americans had been convinced that Israeli occupation of Arab territory was illegal and unjustifiable and that a just peace required the withdrawal [of these occupation forces] as well as justice for the Palestinian people. But those emissaries were not able to bring about any substantive change in the U.S. view. We do not agree that fighting Soviet influence is a priority matter. Our primary cause rather is the Arab-Israeli dispute. U.S. disregard of the reality of this dispute strengthens the Soviet influence which you wish to fight in the area."

Gen Haig went back to discuss the strategy of the new U.S. administration in the area. That strategy did not include a clear view of the action the United States would take in the Arab-Israeli dispute even though it wanted its friends in the area to play their part in implementing the first part of the U.S. strategy. The United States insisted that its friends fight Soviet influence after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Tension Mounts

After that visit tension in U.S.-Jordanian relations surfaced publicly. It continued to grow until the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor took place with the ensuing U.S. reactions that were understanding of the Israeli position. Tension then reached its maximum, and the Jordanian Advisory Council issued a statement in which it said that the Arab nation will have to re-evaluate its relations with the United States in light of the unabashed aggression it was practicing directly against the Arab homeland through its protege, Israel. The statement strongly condemned the U.S. position supporting the Zionist attack.

King Husayn, however, sent a handwritten letter to President Reagan asking

whether the United States intended to relinquish its role as a superpower [and allow] Israel to act on its behalf to bring about a special understanding of what constitutes security in the area. In his letter King Husayn said, "The extravagant promises that successive U.S. administrations make without reservations and without hesitation to achieve Israel's military opportunist ambitions have given Israel a new dimension in the area."

The reasons for this Jordanian talk, whose sharp tone was unprecedented in relations between Washington and Amman, were not confined to the Israeli strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, despite the close relations that have existed for almost 3 years between Iraq and Jordan. The reason for the sharp tone was rather what President Reagan said to the Arab ambassadors who met with him after the Israeli raid. Reagan's statements at that meeting are largely responsible for the Jordanian rage which has not yet been allayed.

The ambassadors related that President Reagan had said that Israel occupied no more than 20 or 30 percent of Palestine. The rest of Palestine was in Jordan where Palestinians could lead a noble life in a land considered to be a natural extension of their land. President Reagan added that he could not see how Israel constituted a threat to its neighbors.

There was no longer any point then to continue the process of understanding in relations between Washington and Amman. Tension mounted to the point that King Husayn personally and most Jordanian officials boycotted both official and personal invitations they received from the U.S. embassy in Amman. Statements were issued in Jordanian newspapers calling for a boycott of U.S. goods.

So far the dialogue between the two capitals has proceeded in this manner: Jordan is sharpening its political propaganda, and the United States is continuing to ignore the Jordanian position. U.S. envoy, Philip Habib even visited all the Arab capitals that are concerned with the Middle East crisis, including Cairo, but did not pass by Jordan. King Husayn then went to Saudi Arabia where he met Habib and found out that he had nothing new [to offer].

The poor nature of relations between Washington and Amman, however, did not constitute an adequate plea [for establishing] a special relationship with the Soviet Union while King Husayn was on his recent visit to Moscow. That was his second visit [to that city]. When the time came for writing the joint communique for both the Soviet and Jordanian parties, the Jordanians were surprised by the fact that the Soviets wanted to include in the communique the phrase, "independent Palestinian state" without specifying the geographical location of that state. After 6 hours of debating this point the Jordanians succeeded in adding three [sic] words to this phrase which became "the right of the Palestinian people to have an independent state on their national soil."

King Husayn, nevertheless, went ahead [with his efforts to] strengthen relations with the Soviets. He was the first traditional friend of the

United States in the Middle East to insist that the Soviets play a role in the political settlement of the Middle East crisis. He sent his army chief of staff to Moscow 2 months ago to look into the proposal submitted by Libya to finance a Soviet missiles system for Jordan.

Naturally, a Soviet military option is not a final option for Jordan, but it is a card that King Husayn can hold against the U.S. administration which needs Jordan and yet is ignoring it at the same time. It is known that Jordan does not have much space to maneuver away from the West in general and the United States in particular. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Iraq are providing the larger portion of assistance which Jordan needs every year does not mean that the regime can do without its older traditional political relations in the Arab world.

On the opposite side is the West in general and the United States in particular behaving with the same measure of interest and disregard toward Jordan?

It is evident that King Husayn is not taking into his principal considerations the United States' ability or desire to stand in his way or to harm his regime. He does however see danger in the re-election of Menahem Begin and in the extremist religious makeup of the new government, not only for himself, but also for the Arab world and for U.S. policy in the area as well.

According to information that is being circulated in Arab diplomatic circles, the plan of Ariel Sharon, the new Israeli defense minister, to annex the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel; establish a Palestinian state in Jordan; and change "the treatment" of Palestinians residing in the West Bank and in Gaza is not so much an Israeli plan as much as it is a plan that represents ideas which are being discussed in the circles of the U.S. administration.

These circles add that committees in the U.S. Congress prepared a report about the Arab-Israeli dispute and presented it to President Reagan. This report included Sharon's ideas before these were announced.

A Blueprint for Implementation

Practically speaking, how can such projects be implemented?

There are two theoretical blueprints for these projects. The first one involves eliminating the PLO's military presence in Lebanon. This is what Israel has been trying to do for years with no results. Naturally this would make Jordan the only country with a Palestinian constituency.

Hence comes the Palestinian command's apprehension of a major Israeli military operation in the south. This is what the U.S. Magazine, NEWSWEEK, published. It stated that Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin intended to notify President Reagan that Israel was prepared to occupy Lebanon if that was necessary to drive the Palestinian Resistance away from the

Israeli borders. Begin's assistant told the magazine that his boss will not ask and will not expect Reagan's approval of such an action.

The second blueprint, which is more logical, states that the purpose of what the United States is saying about Jordan and the Israeli plan is to apply pressure on King Husayn to go along with the second part of the Camp David accords after the first part is finalized in April next year with the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai.

These two blueprints, however, do not seem to lend themselves readily to implementation. The U.S. administration still considers King Husayn one of the few Arab leaders who deal with it honestly. At the same time the Soviet threat looms larger and larger. Therefore, a search is underway for a way to hold a dialogue with the liberation organization without impeding the Egyptian portion of the Camp David accords. King Husayn is insisting that there is no conflict with the organization; he affirms that he is cooperating with it and he is calling for recognition of it. In fact, some Jordanian officials are reported to be saying that the only barrier against the "Soviet threat" is the U.S. dialogue with the Palestinians.

These statements may be optimistic, but the seeds planted by such statements have begun sprouting in the circles of the U.S. administration. One is to take into consideration that a long time will have to pass before the harvest can be reaped.

Where does the liberation organization stand on these two blueprints? Mr Yasir 'Arafat avoids talking about Jordan in both his private and public meetings. In fact, he considers the growing crisis in Lebanon and the discussion about Jordan to be smoke screens that hide the victory which the Palestinian Resistance realized in its recent war with Israel in south Lebanon. However, Mr Khalid al-Hasan says that the most that the organization would promise would be special relations between the Palestinian state in the future and Jordan. That is, there would be no discussion about relations before the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza is completed.

But King Husayn, who is to go to Washington next fall to meet President Reagan, is hoping to take along a uniform Arab position with which he can protect himself against U.S. and Israeli plans.

The truth is that the answer on a uniform Arab position is to be found with Lebanese and Palestinian officials who have been looking for such a position for a long period of time.

8592
CSO: 4304/175

GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN OVER PALESTINIAN SETTLEMENT DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 225, 24-30 Aug 81 pp 20-21

[Article: "The Jordanian Option Has Fallen; Long Live Jordan's Option"]

[Text] The "Jordanian options" that are presented by the Israeli leaders to solve the ongoing struggle in the Middle East follow each other, but they are never similar.

After Shimon Perez comes Ariel Sharon, the new Israeli defense minister. He is proposing a new plan for "a Jordanin option" based on affirming the fact that Jordan is the Palestinian state and that there is no need to establish a second Palestinian state.

Within this trend it seems that the proponents of the plan will spare nothing:

--They will attempt to undermine the Hashemite regime by spreading false rumors every now and then about the existence of conspiracies against it.

--They will encourage the return of the armed Palestinian Resistance to Amman, and that would constitute an excuse for striking the regime of King Husayn.

--They will support a "carrot and stick" policy in the occupied Arab lands to establish an independent Palestinian majority that would accept the Camp David plan.

These ideas that Sharon proposed are not new. Their purpose on the one hand is to annex the West Bank and Gaza once and for all to the Hebrew state. On the other hand, their aim is to support the establishment in Jordan of a Palestinian state that would not cause Israel to withdraw [from land it is occupying] or to concede anything. Ever since 1970 the Israeli general had thought that Israel had to help the Palestinian Resistance implement the idea of having a Palestinian state replace the royal regime [in Jordan]. However, the domestic situation in Israel and the over-all given factors of local and international strategies prevented the realization of Sharon's ideas at the time. Where does he stand now on all this?

What are the possibilities that his political theories will be put into practice in Israel, in the Arab world and internationally?

There is a standing bet in the West Bank on the effort to bring in Palestinian figures from the West Bank to participate in the autonomy talks that are expected to resume next fall. Toward this end Minister Sharon decided that he would implement next week a set of decisions whose basic purpose was to limit the overt aspects of the occupation. At the same time he affirmed that the West Bank and Gaza would never be returned to Arab sovereignty. Hence, what he is offering the Palestinians is very meager: they are to go on living as though the occupation did not exist; they are to accept the subjection of daily occupation; and they are to support the Camp David plan which gives the Israeli occupation a de facto legitimacy.

There is nothing so far to indicate that such a policy would succeed. The only difference between this policy and that of Begin's previous government is that this policy is more haughty. We have therefore seen it working against the absolute rejection of West Bank figures to go along.

On the international scene observers in Amman are raising this question: Does the United States approve of the possibility of selecting Jordan "an alternative homeland" for the Palestinians? If Washington did study the plan, does it consider it a tool it can use to apply pressure on King Husayn to force him to accept the role that had been set for him in the Camp David accords? Or are there strategic changes that favor replacing the royal regime with a Palestinian state?

Regardless of the situation the ultimate objective in both cases is to settle the Palestinian problem at the expense of the Jordanian people's future and regime, without taking into consideration the wishes of both nations. It is evident then that ignoring the free political will of the area's nations is still the root of the Middle East problem.

Jordan's basic problem on the local scene lies in its economic and military shortcomings in a military environment that is armed to the hilt. It is this situation that has caused King Husayn to continue to hold on to an indispensable strategic ally. In the last 30 years this ally has been either Britain, the United States or Syria. Today, it is Iraq. The Jordanian monarch's political experience has proven its ability once again in the alliance he formed with Iraq since the Baghdad Summit.

To this effect observers affirm that the geopolitical-economic alliance of Amman and Baghdad helped both countries, especially Jordan, confront the division of the area into two fronts: that of the countries of the Gulf and the front for the countries of Steadfastness and Opposition. The two capitals were either excluded from the two fronts or they themselves decided to stay away.

It may be said that despite the difficulties that the regime in Tehran is experiencing, Iraq and Saudi Arabia are being called upon to become the two most influential powers in the Middle East in the next 5 or 10 years. This

is especially the case for Iraq because of its various demographic and ideological resources. For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Iraq is a principal guarantor of its future.

On the internal Jordanian scene the Israeli minister of defense is counting on the demographic imbalance between the Palestinians and the Jordanians to confirm the accuracy of his theory about establishing a Palestinian state in Jordan. In this case most Palestinians who have Jordanian citizenship belong to a class [that favors] the stability of the present regime. To that effect the fact that King Husayn's regime refused to join the group [of circles] that signed the Camp David accords has created around him significant popular support that became quite evident during the crisis on the Syrian-Jordanian borders.

It remains to be said that the Baghdad Summit did realize a qualitative strategic change for the kingdom. The allies make up a majority of the Arab countries, and they wish to settle the dispute with Israel, but they wish to do so honorably and with sacrifice. This is something that Jordan has worked for alone for a long time.

8592
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FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES U.S. ECONOMIC POLICIES, PLO IMF ROLE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 pp 5-7

[Text]

Few persons can be as well equipped as Kuwait's Finance Minister Abdel Latif al-Hamad to give an overview of the recent meetings in Washington of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. As he told *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*'s Randa Takieddine in an exclusive interview last week, he has been present at these annual get-togethers of international bankers and financial authorities for the past two decades. And, as the man responsible both for safeguarding Kuwait's finances and, as head of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, also responsible for his country's very extensive aid to the Third World, he has an insight into global economic problems that is perhaps unique in the Arab world.

Mr Hamad does not conceal in the interview his disagreement with many aspects of the new economic policies of the Reagan administration, notably on foreign aid, high domestic interest rates and American opposition to the creation of a World Bank energy affiliate. He also sets out the pitfalls that must be avoided if the Arabs are to succeed in winning observer status for the PLO. As Chairman of next year's IMF-World Bank meeting, Mr Hamad will be at the centre of this controversial political issue.

The interview follows.

Q: Is it your understanding from what happened at the meeting that the US has a new policy aiming to reduce official aid and insisting on giving the private sector a more prominent role in development efforts to compensate for this reduction?

A: The insistence of the US on the role of the private sector emanates from the ideological belief of the Reagan administration that everything can be done more efficiently through the private sector. It is very unfortunate that the US administration does not recognise that official development aid (ODA) is equally important to create the environment for private sector participation in developing countries. There are some developing countries that require the most basic of basic infrastructure. Consequently, without this infrastructure and without this basis, there is no way that the private sector can participate in the process of development.

It is very unfortunate that the US should be reconsidering commitments entered into previously on the IDA (the International Development Agency soft-loan affiliate of the World Bank) and other institutions of a similar nature. This, of course, is of less importance from the monetary point of view, though from a symbolic point of view it is extremely important. This is because it does reflect on the nature of the multilateral relationship between donor and recipient countries and it puts other countries in a position where they have to review and reassess their own positions vis-a-vis this institution. This is to the detriment of the development process throughout the world.

I am distressed that this is happening now at a time when there is greater need for ODA flows. I am equally distressed that the distribution of the limited resources of ODA go more in favour of the richer developing countries rather than the poorest. In particular, the US has been focusing a lot of its development assistance specifically on two countries – Israel and Egypt – so this can be viewed as a manifestation of the desire to use development aid for political motives and not for the development process.

Q: Does this then mean that the IMF and the World Bank are institutions which follow indirectly the general line adopted by the US because the US is a major member of these institutions?

A: I would not go as far as that. On the contrary, the outcome of this meeting provided more optimism insofar as the role of these two institutions is concerned than any of the 18 or 19 meetings I have attended over the years. I found this year that the view of the majority of the people to be found in the corridors in Washington was much more favourable to the IMF and the World Bank. There was some air of optimism about the role of these institutions, notwithstanding the difficulties they are facing and will be facing in dealing with countries such as the US and some others.

Q: The proposed creation of a World Bank energy affiliate has aroused controversy and the US is opposing it. Why do you think this is so and what is the opinion of the Arab countries on this question?

A: The US has not really come out flatly and in a final fashion about the energy affiliate. From an ideological point of view, as I have said before, they are more in favour of doing more in the private sector. I don't think their comprehension of the energy affiliate is as great as one might think. Nonetheless, the Arab countries have stated officially that we are in favour of the principle of an energy affiliate. We would like to see an energy affiliate created. But again, it depends on the nature and characteristics of this affiliate.

Q: What is your conception of an energy affiliate?

A: It is difficult to say what the answer might be at this stage. But certainly the situation will be determined later. We would like an affiliate where relationships are established on the basis of a sharing of power between developed and developing countries. It is equally important that donors and recipients have a reasonable say in its management. This is, in general, what I stated in February at a meeting during the consultations over the creation of an affiliate and I think this would generally be the line of approach of the Arab countries.

Q: But there is as yet no final draft showing how such an institution would be set up?

A: Not yet. That is for when the World Bank decides – when the management of the bank decides to go ahead – then we will have to restart consultations.

Q: Turning to the question of observer status for the PLO at the IMF and World Bank meetings. Everybody is predicting that because Abdel Latif al-Hamad will chair next year's meeting, the issue will be resolved in favour of the PLO. What is your answer?

A: Any Chairman of the Board of Governors is responsible for maintaining the legality of the actions of the institutions and for respecting the statutes and the laws of these institutions. To us, this has been the bone of contention with the management of these institutions. Consequently, we are not going to violate a principle for which we have fought over the last three years.

Q: Does the principle concern the statute which states that the Chairman is allowed to invite observers?

A: No. The principle concerns the bylaws of these institutions, which must be respected. We must all adhere to them and respect them. Last year, as you know, the US and a number of other countries twisted these bylaws to arrive at a political decision, the legality of which we challenged on the basis of a quorum and a right to withdraw votes once they have been cast but before the close of the voting period. If we are defeated within the terms of the statutes of the institutions, we just have to accept it. There is nothing we can do about it. But certainly, we are not going to twist these statutes to achieve a political objective. In our mind, it would not serve the cause of the PLO to do so because it could be over-ruled the following year or even during that year. That would be a setback rather than an achievement, so we have to be very careful. Once I am Chairman, I am not Chairman of the Arab group. I am Chairman of the whole meeting. Therefore, I have to act responsibly and to the best of my ability to protect the institutions. At the same time, I will be fully committed to a position of trying to do our best in resolving this problem of the PLO.

Q: Is there a provision in the bylaws which says that the Chairman can invite observers?

A: In fact, the bylaws say that the Chairman invites observers to the annual meeting in consultation with the Executive Board. The way we read this, it is his prerogative to invite whoever he likes. But the US used its muscle on the Board and the Board ruled that there should be no addition to the 1979 list of observers, which excluded the PLO. As a result, the Chairman last year and the Chairman this year decided to invite no observers at all.

I do not know what the position will be when the issue comes before this Board. I will have to decide in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. Who would have thought the situation would change in the Middle East today as it is changing now? It (news of the assassination of President Sadat) is unfolding right in front of us. Therefore, it would be premature to say what the situation might be nine months from now.

Q: Your colleague from Saudi Arabia (Finance Minister Sheikh Mohamed Aba al-Khail) told us earlier that high interest rates in the US were having a negative impact at home (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 5). What do you think of this policy?

A: I agree with him. A regime of high interest rates can have a damaging effect not only on the poor countries, but equally on the rich countries. The industrial countries of Europe are complaining very strongly about this. We find that high interest rates in the US are affecting the stability of our internal markets. It is affecting the relationships within the various currencies and affecting our institutions. Of course, some institutions are going to make more profits than usual. There will be a windfall, but this is not a healthy development. This situation cannot last very long. Otherwise, long-lasting damage will be done.

We recognise, of course, the importance of trying to destroy or to break the back of inflation. That would be the best thing that could ever happen. But the cure should not be overdone. It should be applied at the right time, like medicine.

Q: Will you be reviewing your investment policy in the light of the recent realignment of European currencies – the devaluation of the French Franc and the Italian Lira as well as the revaluation of the German Mark? How will this affect your investments?
A: The changes occurred only two days ago. It is too early to answer your question.

Q: A debate is going on about a return to the gold standard. What do you think of this?
A: The gold standard was not necessarily the actual physical mechanics of it. It was the question of giving confidence and faith – once you crack the mirror of faith, then the crack cannot be undone. You cannot cement it over. That is really what happened. So you can go back to the gold standard, but I don't think you can achieve very much, to say nothing of the complexities and difficulties of this.

Q: The Kuwait Petroleum Company is bidding to take over Santa Fe International, a company with oil drilling, exploration and engineering interests (See article on page 14). Do you wish to pursue this line further in your investment policies?
A: As you know, this is a major operation for our petroleum company. This will bring the KPC up to the level of international oil institutions. It is a major step in the sense that there is complementarity and compatibility between KPC and Santa Fé and this will give them both a chance to broaden the spheres of their activities. It will do a lot of good for both sides. It will do a lot of good for countries where we both have a lot of activities because there is compatibility. I am gratified by what I read in the papers today that this offer has been received very well by the management of Santa Fé and has the support of that management as well as, of course, the management of KPC. This is a situation which is of great value to both of us.

Q: Will you try in future to make deals of this kind? Or do you feel that the US is resistant to such mergers?
A: I don't know. I think the US is becoming more restrictive, more hostile to foreign investors and less welcoming. As far as the rules stand as they do at present, we will continue with our policies. If the rules are changed, then our policies will be reviewed to adapt to the new rules. We do not create the rules in host countries. We are led by them.

Q: Is the Santa Fé deal completed? Has the board accepted it?
A: Yes, the board has accepted it. It (the board) is now talking to various authorities in Washington. The board is supporting the deal very strongly. The directors include former President Gerald Ford and there is no question about its acceptance by management. This is a corporation in which the management is practically everything. Santa Fé becomes a subsidiary of KPC. It is the biggest deal that an Arab country has done in an industrial country. I am very proud as a Kuwaiti and as an Arab that we have been able to move with subtlety and quietness and do it correctly and professionally.

CSO: 4400/21

NEW TRUCK PLANT PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 p 38

[Text]

THE KUWAITI government is trying to increase its 65 per cent share in the National Automotive Manufacturing and Trading Company (NAMTCO), following the latter's announcement that it is setting up the Gulf's first truck assembly plant. According to car manufacturing sources in Kuwait and Germany, it is likely that within the next few months the government will try and buy the privately-owned shares on the Kuwaiti Stock Exchange.

NAMTCO's managing director, Adel al Ateeqy announced recently that the assembly plant will go into operation next September, under license from the West German truck manufacturer Magirus-Deutz AG. The plant will assemble seven different types of trucks — four for military use and three for civilian, with a capacity of between seven and 23 tonnes. The plant will be located in the Shuaiba industrial estate.

A Magirus-Deutz spokesman in Germany said that the estimated total cost of setting up the plant will be about $13m. He added that the West German company had no capital participation in the venture but that it would provide supplies, technical assistance, supervision of production lines and staff training. Arrangements are already being made to send members of the company's staff for training in Magirus-Deutz centres, according to Al Ateeqy.

NAMTCO has increased its capital from $12.8m to $20m to meet the costs of the truck assembly project. The first phase of construction is to be completed within three months.

NAMTCO has been studying the possibility of setting up such a plant since the company was first set up in 1973, says Al Ateeqy. The initial feasibility study was prepared by the British firm Metra Consultants, but the Kuwaiti INCO Engineering was later assigned to prepare the feasibility studies on which the project is now based. The plant is expected to reach its full capacity of 1,000 trucks a year — representing a third of the region's current requirement of 3,000 trucks a year — at the end of 1984. During the first year of production, its capacity will be 300 trucks on a SKD (semi-knocked-down) basis, which means that the skeleton of the vehicle will be imported from Magirus-Deutz and the assembly completed in Shuaiba.

'Initially when NAMTCO was set up it was an open shareholding company, but in 1975 the government made a 65 per cent acquisition,' said Al Ateeqy. The Kuwaiti company is the agent of three major European car manufacturers in Kuwait: BMW, Renault and Magirus-Deutz. At present, it is a major shareholder in a joint venture producing trailers and tank transporters with the French company Lohr and the Industrial Bank of Kuwait. The joint venture — Arab Transport Vehicle and Industrial Company — already produces 1,000 trailers a year.

CSO: 4400/21

BRIEFS

NEW FISHING HARBORS--Kuwait is to build two new fishing harbours at a cost of around $14m. The harbours, which are expected to be ready by end-1983, are to include depots and refrigeration facilities. The formation of a Kuwaiti fish marketing company has been proposed, to eliminate the current domination of the market by middlemen who are taking a 30 percent profit. This would ensure a continuous supply of fish throughout the year by employing full-time fishermen. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 p 40]

CSO: 4400/23

JUSTICE SECRETARY DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH SUDAN

GF191851 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 18 Oct 81 pp 1, 9

[Text] Muhammad Balqasim al-Zawi, Libyan secretary of justice, [name as published] holds Sudan responsible for escalating tension between the two countries. He informed AL-WATAN--after delivering a message from Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to his highness the amir--that Libya does not want to go to war with Sudan, which he said has been escalating tension with his country because of Khartoum's desire to impose former Chadian Defense Minister Hussein Habre on the Chadian people. France previously failed to carry out this task. He denied the existence of any disagreement between Sudan and his country other than the issue of Hussein Habre.

The Libyan official disclosed that prior to 'Id al-Adha, [8 October] Libyan armed forces chased Habre's forces out of three Chadian villages on the border with Sudan. He explained that Habre's forces entered the villages following the Libyan offensive in which warplanes took part. He added that Sudanese soldiers were captured by Libyan forces during this fight.

The Libyan minister said that Libya opposes the Camp David accord and the peace agreement signed by al-Sadat, along with other Arab states that abide by Arab summit resolutions. He added that Libya does not want to become involved in a war with Egypt. He also noted that Libyan popular conferences have tried to prevent any confrontation between the Libyan and Egyptian armies. He also said that a huge project is under way to convert the desert along the border between the two countries into forests as a sign of Libya's good intentions.

Asked about what Kuwait can do to prevent a war from breaking out between Libya and Sudan, the Libyan minister said that Kuwait can do much. It can contact the Sudanese Government and explain the issue to it. It can also join the other states in the region in calling upon Egypt to return to the Arab nation and bury submissive treaties along with al-Sadat. He added that it is the duty of the Arab nation to put all its resources at Egypt's disposal and completely disregard the personality of the Egyptian president. Whether he is 'Abd al-Nasir, al-Sadat or Husni Mubarak, Egypt is the heart of the Arab nation, and this heart must resume beating.

He added that it is not right that the Arab nation continues to watch the United States preying upon Egypt in an attempt to force it [to] proceed along the Camp David march. We must rush toward Egypt to return it to the Arab nation. He said that Libyan conditions for reconciliation with Egypt are that it must abandon Camp David and the peace agreements.

CSO: 4504/35

OIL SECRETARY REVIEWS STATUS OF RESERVES

London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 p 53

[Article by John Leroux]

[Text]

THE WORLD oil glut could seriously hamper Libya's plan to accelerate its drive to uncover huge new reserve basins. Moreover, dwindling petrodollar earnings might delay a $1bn enhanced recovery programme.

Since commercial production started in 1961, Libya has depleted a third of its proven recoverable reserves, now estimated at about 27bn barrels. Although Libyan sources claim that 72-75bn barrels are in place, with Oil Secretary Abdussalam Mohammed Zaqar claiming the much higher figure of well over 120bn — which would thus put Libya in the same category as Iraq and Kuwait — the foreign oil industry has added very little to the country's crude assets so far.

Since Zaqar took over from Eziddin al Mabruk in spring 1980, he has repeatedly stressed the urgency of finding as much oil as the country would actually lift during this decade. 'Otherwise, how can we protect our reserves?' he said to *8 Days*. 'What happened during the 1970s amounted to a complete depletion. I consider it a total failure from all of us, because I am part of it too.

'Oil companies have a share in this failure. Libya produced more than 8bn barrels during that period but discoveries totalled only 3.9bn. And more than 80 per cent really came from the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company (the state-owned Ageco) with the rest from foreign companies. If you compare their production with what they actually found, it is catastrophic. There was a general slackening of exploration programmes. The few companies that did carry out their programmes were unsuccessful.'

What Zaqar really deplores are mounting complaints by oil companies that earnings on Libyan crude are so low that exploration isn't worthwhile. About 35 rigs are working throughout the country, and although Occidental Oil is said to have chopped down its planned exploration programme for 1982, the overall search has not been significantly affected so far. But, according to foreign industry sources operating in the country, if markets don't improve within the next 12-18 months, their exploration drive could slow down even further.

A recent development came when Elf-Aquitaine finally went ahead with its exploration programme on four major tracks: Hamada (6,559 sq km), Es Sider (3,725 sq km), Marsal el Brega South (3,141 sq km) and Sarir West (1,430 sq km) with one offshore block, No. 15 (800 sq km).

Although this go-ahead is part of France's attempts to normalise relations with Libya, it masks a much greater drive to develop what is perceived in Paris as 'politically safer' oil havens in North Africa. In fact, most of Elf-Aquitaine's personnel will concentrate in neighbouring Tunisia and Algeria.

For the time being, the country's leadership is particularly worried about the links established by some foreign companies between current exploration activities and

production or liftings under actual pricing conditions. 'During the last decade, there were good and bad times in terms of profits for oil companies,' says Zaqar. 'Besides, if you are to go into new exploration ventures, you really have to bring in fresh money. Then if you make a find, you will make enough money which shouldn't have anything to do with older fields.

'The other aspect is that some companies lost good opportunities. They used to have acreage or concessions and, just by stubbornness, abandoned them. So we took them back, we drilled and we found hydrocarbon reserves.'

On 5 August, Libya's number two, Major Abdelsalam Jalloud, called all foreign operators to a meeting in Tripoli. 'The call of brother Jalloud to oil companies was when they relaxed liftings and didn't want to fulfil their obligations — even their contract commitments — in the exploration area,' says Zaqar. 'We had already looked at the situation in early 1980 and found no evidence substantiating their loss claims. They were all making money. Now we are still reviewing the situation, and if it shows that they are in the red, that the industry is indeed losing money, we have to find corrective measures. After all, they are in Libya to make profits — but reasonable profits, not exaggerated ones.

'Most of the companies are not meeting their obligations. They should lift whatever they are committed to buy back from Brega (a state-owned marketing arm). They also should lift their share of production because they are currently causing serious storage bottlenecks which, in turn, hampers Brega's ability to produce. A case in point is Oasis, and particularly Marathon.'

Libya is now concentrating on two new pools: Messla between the Sarir field and the Egyptian border, and Western Libya. Under the supervision of Ageco, says Zaqar, 'Not less than ten drilling rigs are working in Messla,' including Soviet platforms. 'Messla is a major field by Libyan and international standards that could yield up to 800,000 b/d. 'We are busy delineating the field before we tie it with Sarir through pipes, that could reach a diameter of up to 42 inches, heading for Ras Lanuf. But that won't be ready before the third quarter of 1982.' For obvious security reasons, the line up to Tobruk may eventually carry water.

'As for Western Libya, where the Agip find is much smaller, the first production stage of 60,000 b/d will be reached before the end of this year.' In the long run, the oil secretariat is studying a $1bn plan to boost the recovery rate of oil reserves by some 25 per cent. The current rate is about 35 per cent and the plan could increase actual recoverable reserves by 7bn barrels.

Gradually, oil companies have been switching from oil to gas injection recovery methods, but the mammoth petrochemical schemes may require all the gas available and put an end to this trend. In 1982, a 3-year pilot scheme will be initiated to test all the existing fields on a case-by-case basis to establish optimum methods of recovery.

CSO: 4500/20

ADEN PFLO RADIO CALLS ON OMANI TROOPS TO MUTINY

EA091340 Aden Voice of PFLO in Arabic 1545 GMT 8 Oct 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] Brother Omanis, soldiers in the army of the agent Qabus: Ask yourselves, in whose ranks are you now serving and what gun are you now carrying? Ask yourselves, brother Omani soldiers, for the sake of whom are you fighting and dying? What should you do?

Look to your right and left. What do you see? American and British camps on your Omani land. The British are commanding you in this agent army. The Jordanians and the Zionists are imposing punishment on your relatives.

Brother Omani soldiers: You are now serving in the ranks of the enemies of your homeland, the enemies of the Omani people. You are serving in the ranks of those fighting against the freedom and independence of Oman. You are standing in one trench with the Americans, the British colonialists, the (?stooges) of King Husayn and the mercenaries of Qabus, whom he has gathered from various parts of the world in order to slaughter your own people.

You are standing alongside all of these, but against whom? Against your relatives, against your people, against your homeland, against your religion.

I call on you, brother soldiers to wake up from your sleep in time to recognize your true enemy. Know, brother soldiers, who they are, and I mean that they are the enemies of the people and the homeland. Know that they have instructed you in many things and told strange stories about the revolution and about the strugglers.

They tell you that the revolution is communist-inspired and that the fighters are terrorists, infidels and apostates. And they tell you, brother soldiers, that you are defending the homeland, that you are fighting for the sake of the people, and that you are defending the true religion.

They might even say that you are defending the sultan. But they will never say that you are defending the British and dying for the Americans.

Know also, brother soldiers, that you enlisted in this army either as hungry people or as deceived recruits. If you entered it as hungry people, then, brother soldiers, do you want to feed your children and family with a morsel of bread dripping with the blood of martyrs from among the sons of your homeland?

If you have been deceived and misled by the falsehoods put out by the cheats and traitors, then it is time you knew the truth, which is near enough to see. You can see it with your own eyes. In front of you are Americans, British and Jordanian agents and mercenary murderers. All of them are in the process of mangling your people and your revolution, like hungry wolves.

Think well, brother soldiers, about your destiny and that of your children and your family. Who knows what calamitous situations you might find yourselves in, when you might be ordered to kill your fathers or your mothers or your brothers or your sons or friends who are dear to you, because they chose the ranks of the people while you were still in the agent army. If he is killed, God forbid, while you are in this army, what will your children say to the sons of their section [as heard] that our father was killed while fighting with the Americans, the British or the mercenaries, that he was fighting the revolution? What a disgrace you would bring to your offspring. It would remain a stigma for the rest of their lives, a living sin.

Brother Omani soldiers: The weapons you are carrying are not those of the people. They do not belong to the homeland. Rather they are the weapons of evil and aggression, guns belonging to the Americans or the British, which you received from one of the colonialists in (al-Ghawarib), from the [word indistinct] camp or in the bases of Salalah or Thamarit.

You are fighting against your own people and killing your own relatives with such weapons. Throw them, brother soldiers, in the faces of the colonialists and their traitorous agents.

If you still insist on remaining in this army, what should you do? Instigate your brother soldiers to rise up against the colonialists and imperialists. They must disobey the orders of the colonialists and traitors; they must not carry them out.

Always listen to the radio of the revolution, and convey its message to (?your brothers in the army).

Brother soldiers: Beware of traitors in this army. May God grant you success. Victory comes always to [words indistinct] their freedom and independence.

Remain well, forever.

CSO: 4404/53

BRIEFS

TELEVISION DEVELOPMENTS--Brother Ali 'Abd al-Razzaq ba Dhid, member of the Central Committee and deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, this morning opened the TV transmission station in al-Dali, which will cover the northern and north western areas of Lahj Governorate and the parts bordering on the northern part of the homeland. The project cost about 500,000 dinars. The power of the station is 1,000 (?watts) [as heard]. It operates vertically [Arabic: amudiyyan] from channel number five. It is worth mentioning that work is underway to install the equipment of the television transmission station in Mukayras with a power of 2,000 watts. It will cover the northern area of Abyan Governorate, some parts of Shabwah Governorate and areas bordering the northern part of the homeland. Work is expected to be completed next December. [Excerpts] [EA221516 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 21 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/53

JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED WITH SENEGAL IN DOHA 22 OCTOBER

GF221314 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1140 GMT 22 Oct 81

[Text] Doha, 22 Oct (GNA)--Qatar and Senegal have stressed their strong belief that just and permanent peace in the Middle East cannot be achieved prior to Israel's complete withdrawal from the Arab territories that were occupied in 1967, including holy Jerusalem. They have also noted that the Palestinian question must be resolved on the basis of recognizing the legitimate and fixed rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish an independent state in their homeland.

In a joint statement issued in Doha today--following Senegalese President Abdou Diouf's 3-day visit to Qatar--the two sides stressed the necessity of the PLO's complete participation in any efforts aimed at resolving the Palestinian question, because the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The Qatari and Senegalese sides denounced Israel's aggressive activities against Lebanon, Israel's continuing attempts to intervene in Lebanon's internal affairs, its savage aggression against innocent civilians and its violations of Lebanon's territorial security. They affirmed the necessity of supporting the efforts made to achieve peace and security in Lebanon. They also stressed the importance of preserving its security, sovereignty, independence and integrity under its legitimate authority.

The Qatari and Senegalese leaders stressed that the security and peace of the Gulf region is the responsibility of the region's states. They also stressed the necessity of keeping the region away from the conflicts of the international superpowers.

The Qatari side explained to the Senegalese side the principal goals of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which reflect the determination of the member nations to bolster cooperation and to reinforce their social and economic foundations in order to achieve prosperity. The Senegalese side expressed support for this positive step and wished the council every success in achieving its goals.

The two sides demanded the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan and nonintervention in its internal affairs. They also stressed the importance of respecting its independence, complete sovereignty and territorial security and the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homes.

The two leaders affirmed their full support for African liberation movements and condemned the policy of racial discrimination. They stressed their commitment to support the struggle of the African nations in order to end all foreign hegemony and to reinforce their struggle to achieve independence and sovereignty.

The two sides expressed support for the Namibian people's struggle under the leadership of their sole, legitimate representative, SWAPO, which is struggling for independence. They also called on the international community to pressure South Africa into granting independence to Namibia in accordance with UN Resolution 425.

The Qatari and Senegalese sides stressed their commitment to the principles of the Nonaligned Movement in order to bolster peace and achieve world progress. They also stressed the great importance of solidarity among these countries and their rejection of any attempt to undermine their solidarity.

The two leaders stressed Qatar and Senegal's commitment to the resolutions of the Islamic conference. They also stressed their willingness to expand joint cooperation that may benefit both countries and peoples.

The Senegalese president invited the Qatari amir to pay an official visit to Senegal. The amir accepted the invitation, and the time of the visit will be determined later.

CSO: 4404/51

INTERIOR MINISTER COMMENTS ON SECURITY, EGYPT

PM161401 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 14 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with Saudi Interior Minister Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz by 'Abdallah Sakr--date and place not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] Your highness, how will you deal with pilgrims who violate the law after they have completed their rituals?

[Answer] These violations must cease. It is the responsibility of every pilgrim to return to his homeland, and all citizens must refrain from hiding violators and providing them with work. The Ministry of the Interior will carry out a campaign to force violators to leave the country, and anyone who facilitates the residence of any pilgrim who remains beyond the pilgrimage period will be punished.

Universal Unified Passport

[Question] The idea of a unified passport. Will that solve the problem?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the idea of a unified passport would aid in identifying the violators and providing rapid information about them. However, not all pilgrims carry this passport, only those from 14 countries.

We hope that in the coming years the unified passport will be common to all pilgrims.

[Question] Your highness, what steps can be taken in coordination with the Islamic countries to instruct pilgrims and to keep them from causing trouble?

[Answer] This is something that is being worked on, and all countries with Saudi embassies and from which pilgrims come have been provided with directives for pilgrims to abide by. This will undoubtedly be repeated in future years at an early enough time so that the pilgrim will be aware of the things which must not occur. We have high hopes that everyone will be able to take care of this matter and that the kingdom will not be forced to resort to measures it does not wish to take with any pilgrim of any nationality.

Hopes for Egypt

[Question] What do you expect will happen now in the region in light of the recent changes in Egypt?

[Answer] This is a matter specifically for the Egyptian people themselves and for the Egyptian Government. This is an internal problem, and it is difficult for me to discuss this matter until there is a complete picture. I do hope, however, that the causes for Egypt's estrangement from the Arab world will disappear.

I hope that we will find Egypt in its rightful place, God willing.

[Question] Your highness, do you expect Egypt to answer the invitation the Arab countries will reportedly send it to attend the upcoming Arab summit conference?

[Answer] I have no knowledge of this.

[Question] Your highness, what is the nature of the security threats confronting the region now, and how can they be combated?

[Answer] There are many security threats, and combating them begins with an understanding of these threats by the people of the region who must depend, after God, on themselves to confront such threats with cooperative, objective efforts. The region must be prepared by all possible means, and this effort must come from the people of the region itself.

[Question] In this regard, is there security cooperation between the Gulf states?

[Answer] Yes. There are ongoing contacts in this regard, and we hope that they will develop further.

Continuing Security Contacts

[Question] Did the Gulf foreign ministers conference in at-Ta'if recommend a specific strategic position in the field of security? What, up until now, has happened in this regard?

[Answer] In reality we, as a security apparatus, have not yet received anything which originated at that conference. However, our contacts are continuing.

[Question] Will the results of these security contacts be ready for the Gulf states summit?

[Answer] We are conducting intense negotiations among the interior ministers of the Gulf states, working toward establishing a security plan in which all of these states participate. God willing, it will be completed and ready for implementation, but it requires the efforts and study of everyone.

CSO: 4404/53

HIRING OF CHINESE LABORERS REPORTED

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 p 40

[Text]

SAUDI ARABIA is about to receive its first batch of migrant labourers from mainland China, and the Hong Kong intermediaries setting up the deal are confident that it will not affect the close diplomatic relationship between the kingdom and Taiwan.

The Chinese workers are being offered by the Fujian province authorities to the Hong Kong firm Zim-Chem, which will endeavour to employ them on construction projects in the Middle East, primarily in Saudi Arabia. The Chinese workers themselves will apparently receive only about 10 per cent of their effective wage, with a further 80 per cent being handed over to the provincial authorities. Even so, this 10 per cent will represent about double their average take-home pay in China.

Chinese workers have been employed in the Middle East before, notably in Iraq, where Japanese companies hired labour gangs for their Basra port project before the outbreak of war sent both the Japanese and their workforce fleeing.

The diplomatic undertones of the deal are significant only in that they could help indirectly to dispel some of the more acid comments about the subsidised South Korean presence in the kingdom in the past. South Korea offers its citizens the option of working overseas or doing military service, both at fairly low rates of pay. It is ironic, in this context, that by far the most successful Taiwanese firm in Saudi Arabia is Retser — the Retired Serviceman's organisation.

Trade between Taiwan and Saudi Arabia increased from $950m in 1978 to $2.2bn in 1980, said Saudi ambassador Assad Abdelaziz al Zuhair, speaking to newsmen in Taipei.

Referring to Taiwan's oil requirements, he said the Saudi government treated this as a top-priority issue. The Taipei government has been importing 140,000 b/d of oil annually from Saudi Arabia, accounting for almost 40 per cent of its oil imports.

Zuhair also referred to the bilateral cooperation achievements of the two countries in the economic, agricultural, fishery, scientific and technological fields. He said that relations would be strengthened further, as the Saudi government planned to set up a centre in Taipei to promote cultural exchanges between the two countries.

CSO: 4400/21

LOCAL FIRMS TO GET PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT

London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 pp 36-37

[Text]

SAUDI GOVERNMENT AGENCIES have now received their second official memorandum this year laying down guidelines to ensure that local contractors get priority treatment in the awarding of government contracts. The aim of the new measures is twofold: to reduce the expatriate workforce and to keep the local firms' order books full.

The attention being paid to this particular objective suggests that the Saudis have a problem on their hands. The first order, issued nine months ago by Crown Prince Fahd, reminded state departments and agencies of the necessity to put contracts out to open tender, and also confined the construction of roads, flyovers and bridges, and small and medium-sized buildings, to Saudi contractors.

This communiqué followed the cancellation of tenders from four prequalified international firms for a National Guard housing programme, on the grounds of pricing collusion, and growing complaints from the Saudi business community that too many jobs were going overseas.

Earlier this year, Crown Prince Fahd set up a ministerial committee for the encouragement of Saudi contractors, which included finance minister, Sheikh Mohammed Abalkhail, the planning minister, Sheikh Hosham Nazer, and Hussain al Mansouri, the minister of communications. By August the committee had drawn up a communiqué containing four recommendations.

Three of these codify existing practices or restate principles which have up to now been overlooked: agencies should do their best to enable Saudi contractors to undertake government projects; projects should be subdivided wherever possible to a manageable size for Saudi firms, and that contract clauses stating that foreign firms cannot sub-contract without prior permission should be strictly enforced.

The fourth recommendation — that non-constructional operations, such as catering, maintenance, operation, employment, and the transport and supply of raw materials should be reserved for Saudi contractors -- is a new proposal, further protecting Saudi businesses.

Saudi ministries have been fairly diligent over the past two years in splitting up projects into smaller job lots. Although this has caused some delay in the award of contracts, in certain cases, for example the new Riyadh university or diplomatic centre, there has been a concomitant reduction in overall costs as well as greater local participation.

One agency that has gone out of its way in giving as much work as possible to local contractors is the Royal Commission for Jubail and Yanbu. Initially the secretary-general, Farouk Akhdar, estimated that 60 per cent of the work at Jubail and Yanbu was being carried out by local firms. According to industry minister Dr Ghazi al Gosaibi, 71 per cent of the two industrial cities' projects are now in the hands of local

contractors, with a further 25 per cent of the work being carried out by joint ventures.

Road building is another area where Saudiisation has been successful. In September Saudi firms won the bulk of contracts for the new Mecca-Medina highway. The Saudi riyals 2.5bn ($750m) road has been split into ten sections — the longest only 75km — and local firms are to handle eight of them.

The Saudi firms involved here are Al Medina Contracting and Trading Company, Al Mabani General Contractors, General Agencies Corporation, a joint venture between Talal Establishment and Abdul Jabbar Establishment, Al Harabi Establishment for Trade and Contracting, and Assakkaf Establishment.

The other two sections of the road have gone to South Korean firms with proven roadbuilding experience in the kingdom. The disadvantage with South Korean firms, however, is that they will bring over their own workforce.

On the face of it the latest Saudi moves to encourage local contractors extend a considerable ring of protection around the kingdom. All trade has to be channelled through Saudi agents or agencies. Government departments are supposed to favour local products as long as they are no more than 10 per cent more expensive than available imports. Now local contractors will receive preferential treatment.

Yet the Saudi market is by no means closed. Foreigners participating in joint ventures in the kingdom will profit from the new measu[illegible] Many others active in the kingdom told *8 Days* that it would be some time yet before Saudi firms could tackle some of the more complicated and profitable projects to be completed during the third five-year plan.

CSO: 4400/21

BRIEFS

PAPER EXPECTS EGYPTIAN-SUDANESE MERGER--Jidda, 15 Oct (QNA)--Quoting observers in the capital [not further identified], a Saudi newspaper said today that Egypt and Sudan will announce a complete merger in the next few months. The Saudi newspaper 'UKAZ says that Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri are currently outlining the format of this agreement, which will be announced after the new Egyptian administration has settled its internal affairs. The newspaper adds that the structure, nature and function of Egyptian institutions will be reviewed to ensure that they conform to the plan for establishing a merger between the two countries. [Text] [GF151249 Doha QNA in Arabic 1050 GMT 15 Oct 81]

SOUTH KOREAN ASSISTANCE--Saudi Arabia and South Korea start a joint research project this month to develop Saudi construction material resources. They will also conduct a study on the use of poultry manure for fertiliser feedstock. Ten South Korean scientists and economists will leave for Saudi Arabia later this month. The programme is part of the implementation of a scientific and technological cooperation agreement. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 41, 17 Oct 81 p 41]

CSO: 4400/23

ENVOY TO ZAIRE ON AL-SADAT DEATH, LIBYAN ROLE

AB151354 Kinshasa Domestic Service in French 1200 GMT 15 Oct 81

[Text] The founding chairman of the MPR, Mobutu Sese Seko, this morning received in audience Mustapha Faruq, Sudanese ambassador to Zaire. At the end of the audience, Mr Faruq replied to questions from the press.

[Begin recording--in English fading into French] [Question] I think Sudan is one of Egypt's closest allies. What do you think the country's future will be after the death of al-Sadat, and the changes that have taken place in Egypt?

[Answer] Well, I am sure of one thing: President al-Sadat has been assassinated. There are people who will take over, and I think the present situation has shown that a new president has already been elected and the old government has continued to function because the system in Egypt is a good system and has been going on for a long time. We in Sudan are supporting Egypt because of the friendly relations between our two countries. Many fields of political and economic cooperation are really beneficial to both of us. Egypt has always been a great ally to us, and it will support Sudan in times of crisis. My president himself has participated in the plebicit as an Egyptian.

[Question] Your excellency, doesn't President Numayri himself fear he will be the victim of the destabilization movement against his regime, as happened in Egypt?

[Answer] Well, you see what happened in Egypt was a coup made by a fanatical group, and our president believes in his people and believes in God, and as such he is sure that nothing is going to happen. Meanwhile we are going to take the necessary measures to ensure our country's security.

[Question] Your excellency, do you think a preventive attack on Libya is possible as President Numayri declared a few days ago?

[Answer] Libya has always been taking provocative actions against our country. They have attacked our eastern border with Chad, but up to now we have been practicing a policy of self-restraint. We are going to take the necessary measures to protect our borders and our people. I have already conveyed to his excellency President Mobutu a verbal message from our president concerning the provocative action made by Libya against our country, and his excellency the president understood the situation. I also conveyed to his excellency our stand concerning the next OAU summit which is supposed to take place in Libya, which Sudan has categorically refused to attend. The president also understood our position. Thank you. [End recording]

CSO: 4519/17

OPPOSITION LEADER CONDEMNS LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN NATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 197, 31 Aug 81 pp 28, 29

[Interview with al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi in London by AL-MADINAH: "I Am Amazed at Development in the Kingdom; the Sudanese-Ethiopian Honeymoon Is Short-Lived;" date not specified]

[Text] A few weeks ago, Field Marshal Ja'far Numayri gave a speech in Khartoum which for the most part consisted of a cheap attack on al-Sharif Husayn al-Hindi, head of the Federal Democratic Party and leader of the Sudanese opposition. However, al-Sharif al-Hindi, with the meaning he represents to the Sudanese people, does not stand alone on the Arab stage. The Sudanese leader has friendships and relationships that call the Arab press out in his wake in the search for the truth and the quest for information, from the Lebanese papers to the Arab papers issued in Cyprus, to their equivalents issued in Paris and London and the Saudi AL-MADINAH AL-MUNAWWARAH, whose correspondent 'Abd-al-Bari 'Atwan met him in the British capital and held the following interview with him.

/Question/ What are your views on the current conditions in the fraternal Sudan?

/Answer/ No one is working in the Sudan, no one is committed to survival, everyone is standing in bread lines and wandering around markets looking for nonexistent goods.

I know a Sudanese government delegation that went on an official mission to an Arab country. The delegation members found jobs, and no one in it went back to home. All development projects have been suspended.

/Question/ Do you expect to see an improvement in these conditions?

/Answer/ We are not proponents of traditional military coups; if we had been proponents of one against this government it would have happened years ago and succeeded. Rather, we believe in democratic action.

/Question/ Why haven't you yet returned to Khartoum, following the signing of the reconciliation agreement with President Numayri, especially since al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, your opposition colleague, has gone back and is now participating in the regime.

/Answer/ al-Sadiq al-Mahdi went back without conditions. We have rejected this reconciliation, which is unwritten and unconditional. The regime signed a reconciliation agreement with us in which we demanded democratic rights and the guarantee of basic freedoms such as the freedom to publish and form /parties/ and independence of the judiciary. We demanded a referendum on the Sudanese people's desire for the form of democratic life, to determine whether it wanted a single party or a number of parties. There was no section in the agreement demanding my return. It was natural that I would return following the agreement. I refused to return and said "We could time the return to the abrogation of the exceptional laws restricting freedoms, which have been said to have been imposed because of specific circumstances and must disappear with the disappearance of these conditions, that is, with the reconciliation." They told me, "Go to the Sudan and these laws will be abrogated as soon as you arrive." I insisted that I would go back as soon as I heard that these laws had been abrogated, in spite of my suspicions that this abrogation might be contested and that these laws could be reimposed overnight.

The circumstances have now changed, and this agreement, that is, the "reconciliation agreement," has been abrogated and is invalid.

There are previous experiences with reconciliation that did not succeed, such as the Jiddah Agreement which was made with President Numayri himself over everything, including the final communique. We said goodbye to him at the airplane agreed that this statement would be announced as soon as he reached Khartoum, but this statement has not yet been announced.

I do not believe that I would be making any changes if I did return. We had hoped for an atmosphere in which we could enjoy consultation in order to save the current situation. We have not been given any such atmosphere. The dispute arose on the authorities' part, not on ours. The laws restricting freedoms have increased.

An Arms Merchant

/Question/ President Numayri, in a speech of his that was published recently, accused you of being an arms merchant. He said that you stole funds from the Sudanese treasury when you were minister of finance before the May Coup. What is your answer to these charges?

/Answer/ I am a man who is not an arms merchant but a man who attracts arms for a cause, and I am an expert in that. I have attracted arms for our forces in Ethiopia and I have attracted them to the desert. I will attract them now. I attract arms from countries but do not possess the resources for buying arms from smugglers.

As for the statement that I stole the Sudan's money and diverted it to my account when I was minister of finance, before the May Coup, that is suspect. Did I know that the coup would take place and therefore stole the Finance Ministry's money? If I did steal it continuously before the coup, wasn't there an accounting agency when there really and truly was a department of finance and a Sudanese Central Bank? Is the money for any ministry given to the minister and deposited in his personal account? It is well known that for me to be able to spend 20 pounds in the Sudan I would need 20 signatures.

If I stole money, then why didn't President Numayri take me to trial, even if in absentia? Why didn't he form an investigating committee? Finally, why did he effect a reconciliation with me? Is it reasonable that President Numayri should sign a reconciliation agreement with an arms merchant and a man who steals money?

I Am Not a Communist

/Question/ Many people believe, on the basis of the charges of the Sudanese government and your foreign connections, that you are a communist. What is the truth of these charges?

/Answer/ This is a false belief. We opposed the regime of President Numayri since the beginning because it was a communist regime, or at least contained a large number of communists, in major positions such as the cabinet and the Revolutionary Command Council.

When we were in the government before May we approved the Islamic constitution, rejected Resolution 242, which was issued by the Security Council, and refused to support 'Abd-al-Nasir's endorsement of this resolution.

We agreed to a reconciliation with President Numayri when the communist coloration disappeared from the government, after his victory over the September communist coup.

/Question/ President Numayri has restored normal relations with Egypt; what in your opinion are the main motives for his embarking on this step?

/Answer/ Relations between Egypt and the Sudan were not cut off. If they were cut off at some point that was on the part of Egypt, not the Sudan. Relations existed and the Sudan's ambassador to Egypt was minister of state for foreign affairs.

President Numayri wants to seek the aid of Egyptian forces to protect him. There now are 100 Egyptian planes in the Sudan and dozens of Egyptian tanks on the borders, on the pretext of protecting the Sudan from foreign invasion. Egypt now controls security in the Sudan. al-Sadat has declared that he is prepared to play the role of policeman in Africa.

There is a mutual defense agreement between Egypt and the Sudan. What happened is that President Numayri requested that it be carried out and agreed to the entry of Egyptian tanks, airplanes and security forces.

/Question/ How would you characterize Ethiopian-Sudanese relations at the present time? It is noted that these relations are marked by tranquility and concord in spite of the great conflict between the two regimes. The Ethiopian regime is marxist and the Sudanese regime is moderate.

/Answer/ There are no good relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan; rather, there is a tactical agreement between two men, one of whom wants to rid himself of the other. All there is to the matter is that the Ethiopian president has problems with Somalia abroad and domestic problems represented by the struggle of the

Eritrean liberation fronts and some tribes opposed to the regime of the dergue; therefore he is compelled to lessen the severity of the pressure on his regime by improving his relations with the Sudan, in the hopes that will result in an end to the flow of arms to the Eritreans over the Sudanese borders.

President Numayri, on the other hand, has wanted to stop the activities of the camps in the north and west which the opposition is carrying out, and Ethiopia is the key to that.

So it is a commercial deal, and this deal will not last. The Ethiopian government is unable to continue, under the pressures on it from the north and the south, and arms are continuing to flow to Eritrean fighters. The border between Ethiopia and the Sudan is 6,000 kilometers long and consists of forests, rivers and overlapping tribes.

If the Americans want bases in the Sudan, these bases will be against Ethiopia and the agreement will collapse. In general, these types of agreements do not affect us.

/Question/ What impressions did you produce from your visit to Saudi Arabia in the last pilgrimage?

/Answer/ I was gladdened by the development that has taken place in Saudi Arabia in recent years. Most honestly and truthfully, because of my knowledge of the country, I was amazed, because I could not recognize its landmarks--unlimited development had occurred there, the economic structures there were completed, and farms were established there. Communications there have been eased in a manner alleviating the intensity of all congestion and the airports and hotels in Jiddah and Medina can absorb any number of people. I am a man with long standing acquaintance with the kingdom and I felt the utmost happiness because in the period of just 6 years all the economic structures have been built, development has occurred and pilgrims are safe and secure.

11887
CSO: 4504/5

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF NATION DESCRIBED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 81, 29 Aug-4 Sep 81 p 31

/Article: "Sudanese Abroad Number a Quarter Million and Their Remittances Total $300 Million"/

/Text/ Two weeks ago the capital of the Sudan, Khartoum, hosted a conference organized by the Socialist Union, the ruling political organization, to discuss the affairs of Sudanese working abroad. Although the conference was aimed at dealing with various aspects of the subject of emigration, the economic aspect nonetheless was dominant. The lowest estimate places the number of Sudanese working abroad at around a quarter million persons with various skills, and for the Sudan (as is the case with all labor-exporting countries) their financial remittances are a good source of the hard currency in which it is deficient. It is believed that $300 million came into the country from these people last year alone.

However, this figure seems modest, because of the expatriates' reluctance to send their money and because of the instability of monetary policies and the unrealistic nature of the official exchange rate of the dollar relative to the open market, where the value is only about half the former, causing the black market in currency to flourish.

In the middle of July, the government officially attempted to rationalize the foreign currency trade and permitted persons and companies to open exchange offices, on condition that they have the necessary capital, ranging from $100,000 to $200,000, and deposit it with the Bank of the Sudan, the central bank, and that the sales prices of the currencies be announced daily.

This step was considered a new indication of the current policy of eliminating government restrictions and of observing a commitment to the true nature of the market.

The general budget, which went into effect last 1 July, constitutes a continuation of this trend, which began 3 years ago when the Sudan accepted the advice of the International Monetary Fund and reviewed its ambitious development programs, devaluing the Sudanese pound by 20 percent, reducing government spending and taking the government out of small money-losing economic activities.

The budget witnessed an upsurge of 70 percent in terms of collections, totalling 1,005,000,000 Sudanese pounds as a result of improved tax collection and the creation of new taxes.

The expenditures column contains disbursements of 1,568,000,000 pounds, 476 million of which go for development, especially in the fields of agriculture and industry, which need to replace the young people in the projects in which they are established. There is the sum of 120.7 million to support electric power projects and construct a new oil refinery in Kusti. Energy expenditures constitute a factor of pressure on spending, since it is expected that the oil bill for this year will come to $500 million, as compared with $368 million last year.

The budget has also been distinguished by the giving of incentives to growers of cotton, the Sudan's main crop, which will be calculated on the basis of the parallel market price, that is, 80 piasters to the dollar, instead of the official price, which is 50 piasters to the dollar; in addition, the joint account of growers and the government will be eliminated and a special account will be opened for each grower.

The second phenomenon is the statement by the minister of finance, Badr-al-Din Sulayman, that the government is determined to seek the aid of foreign experts in running strategic industries such as sugar and textiles, which the Sudan has expanded with the goal of achieving self-sufficiency, then exporting.

The Subject of Debts

Discussion of economic reforms in the Sudan can only be complete after a treatment of the subject of foreign debts, which official figures state came to about $2,114,000,000 from independence in 1956 to December 1979, when the scheduling process started. There is a sum of $897 million which the private sector owes.

The Paris Club, which contains the Sudan's Western creditor countries, managed to schedule $395 million in late 1979, and an agreement for about $430 million is waiting to be signed. Negotiations with the five main banks in charge of the scheduling negotiations will also resume soon. These are the Arab-African International Bank, the Chemical Bank, Citibank, Deutsche Bank and Eubanc. The British Morgan Grenville Bank will also help the government of the Sudan in the negotiations.

The International Monetary Fund seems content with the course of affairs. It offered a loan of $200 million upon acceptance of its scheduling in 1978 and another one for $487 million when the economic policies to alleviate foreign currency restrictions were declared 2 years ago. Negotiations are underway on another $200 million.

This situation seems to have contributed to strengthening the confidence of the foreign private sector, as five foreign banks are to open branches in Khartoum--the Islamic Financing and Development Bank, the Pakistani Habib Bank, the Arab-African Bank, the Pakistan United Bank and the Kuwaiti African Bank.

The Monetary Fund's prescription for putting pressure on spending and removing government interference appears to have been successfully applied, but its inflationary effects and pressure on the economic conditions of the ordinary citizen do not escape the eye.

11887
CSO: 4504/5

SOUTHERN LEADERS IN EXILE CONDEMN GOVERNMENT

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 197, 31 Aug 81 p 29

/Article: "al-Numayri's Regime Is Planning Another Armed Conflict in the South"/

/Text/ In the last 3 months the local government and the regional council in the south have demanded that an oil refinery be built in this region, where there are some oil wells.

One benefit of establishing this project in the south would be to provide work for hundreds of unemployed persons and to provide an opportunity for training and qualifying educated young southerners to fill professional positions in the refinery, and in general help this region develop.

In spite of that, al-Numayri has resorted to unconstitutional powers, deciding that the refinery is to be in Kusti in the northern Sudan. In the southerners' view, this conduct of al-Numayri's reflects his desire to deprive them of the benefits of their own natural resources. al-Numayri has followed his decision with a concentrated air operation to transport troops to the south with the objective of terrorizing and enraging the people there. At the same time, many southern army officers have resigned and others have been transferred to northern areas. Land and air communications between the north and the south have been severed and the government has applied diplomatic pressure on neighboring african countries with the aim of isolating the south, inciting some southern traitors and bribing them to stir up tribal dissension and hatred in the area.

The authorities have also brought an Egyptian army into the north to quiet the forces opposed to al-Numayri there and replace the Sudanese army which has been transferred to the south.

These measures in themselves constitute a blatant violation of what is called the Addis Ababa Agreement and the law on self-government of the regions, which stipulate that the southerners are to constitute a reasonable numerical percentage of the armed forces, in keeping with their population. Here we must add that in the last 10 years the ratio of conscription of people from the south in the domestic army has declined almost to nothing.

One might ask why al-Numayri's regime has decided to apply this policy at the present time. The answer is that there are many reasons but the main ones are as follows:

First, al-Numayri's regime wants to suppress all political resistance in the south to the maldistribution of oil resources and other natural resources recently discovered.

Second, al-Numayri knows that most southern Sudanese are now certain that the Addis Ababa Agreement was only a delusion. Their belief is confirmed by the policy of a total freeze in the economic, social and cultural areas which the south has been suffering from since the signing of the agreement 10 years ago. On top of that, most of the main sections in the agreement, such as the holding of a general referendum in the al-Abyad district, have not been carried out.

Third, the transformation of the increasing hatred in the north of the regime into a form of solidarity by reviving feelings of enmity toward the south.

Fourth, al-Numayri's regime is aimed at supporting and strengthening the embarrassing position of some stooges which it has in the regional government.

If the intention is to gain northern support for the regime, which seems most likely, al-Numayri is mistaken. The fact is that enmity toward the regime has reached the point of no return. Completely the opposite--most of the people in the north are striving for support from the south against this regime, which has been showing no mercy in oppressing them and depriving them of all forms of human dignity over the past 13 years.

We have learned that al-Numayri has proposed an agreement calling for the execution of economic development plans in the south that he promised and put on the shelf in 1975, in exchange for agreement to the construction of the refinery in Kusti, and in addition he has proposed that 1 million pounds sterling be spent on the immediate development of the oil areas in the south.

These political maneuvers reveal that the Khartoum government has in the past frozen the execution of these projects for devious reasons and is now adopting them as a means for haggling over the refinery. It is necessary for us to point out here that the refinery is much too important to be exchanged for these projects, although construction of it will continue to be unlikely. As regards the promise to spend 1 million pounds sterling on oil areas, the fact that must occur to one's mind is that the ownership of the oil lies entirely with the south and that in the event there is solidarity between the north and the south, ownership of it lies with the whole Sudan.

In this stage we, the leaders of the southern Sudan in exile, would like to stress that al-Numayri's regime bears the responsibility for reviving the civil war in the south.

11887
CSO: 4504/5

FRENCH SOCIALISTS REVIEW PROBLEMS IN NATION

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 197, 31 Aug 81 p 30

/Article: "French Document on Africa: The Sudan Will Be Facing Severe Disturbances"/

/Text/ The internal document which the French Socialist Party set out, which AL-DUSTUR has obtained, is directed basically at the French government, sets forth a political strategy regarding African problems, and determines the French position on occurrences in the regions that have been sweapt by disturbances and instability in Africa. The document reviews the policy of the previous French government, which President Giscard D'Estaing had supervised in Africa, stressing that this policy, which had depended on stirring up crises in order to consolidate French interests, resulted in the concentration of Soviet influence in Africa and in significant losses as far as French interests went.

The document states that solving the big problems in the African continent will be extremely difficult and that in any event as long as economic development and political reform programs are not carried out, local disturbances and the lack of security in some African countries--a reference to what is going on in Uganda, the Sudan and Chad--"will constitute a direct threat to all African countries; therefore, France must work as hard as possible to contribute to security and peace on the African continent."

The document refers to the French military presence and military bases and the fact that they are different from defense agreements. It stresses that that presence on most occasions caused domestic disturbances in the African countries. One can conclude, from the contents of the document:

"One must seek military bases separate from other bilateral agreements."

The discussions the French military delegation held in the Sudan at the beginning of this year, during which al-Numayri requested a French military presence in the Sudan, are part of the past and will not lead to any results in the future, especially since the France of Mitterand replied to al-Numayri when he repeated his request that the Sudan obtain French military equipment by saying that the matter would have to entail not just financial guarantees but also internal economic guarantees--something the al-Numayri regime cannot meet at the present time.

France is not expected, at least in the short term, to give any military "aid" to the Sudan; therefore, al-Numayri has had no option but to seek mediation with al-Sadat to obtain American military equipment!

The document adds:

"The situation in the northeast of the African continent is very grave. We warn that the Eritrean issue will continue to be unresolved. The French Socialist Party, which recognizes the ethnic nature of the Eritrean issue and the Eritrean people's right to self-determination, has enduring relations of friendship with the Eritrean Liberation Front and supports its demand for a popular referendum on the right to self-determination. On the other hand, it sustains a dialogue with the Ethiopian government. No matter what the violence of the problems and disturbances the region of the African horn is going through might be, the solution must entail the establishment of an organization of countries that have common borders and make up the horn of Africa, especially Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti."

In conclusion, the document stresses:

"The French Socialist Party believes that the issue of security and peace in Africa is one for the Africans themselves, especially in confronting international pressures and famine, and therefore that France must play the role of preferring a dialogue among the conflicting parties in the African continent."

It remains for us to point out that this 35-page document has attempted to give French diplomacy a "new viewpoint" in the African continent but has not departed from the general principles and premises that are based on domestic French conditions. It has neglected to go into details on al-Numayri's policies, for example, not just with respect to the area of the horn of Africa and the continent of Africa but also with respect to his alliance with al-Sadat, which has been exposed, and the effect of that alliance on the Arab situation. It appears that the document's failure to address itself to this alliance, which also threatens security and peace in Africa, was not the result of premeditation so much as of a choice in setting out African problems from a general point of view and giving preference to emphasis on matters regarding French interests and French-speaking countries in the first place.

11887
CSO: 4504/5

BRIEFS

NUMAYRI INSTRUCTIONS ON CORRUPTION--Khartoum, 19 Oct (SUNA)--President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri has directed the chairman of the administrative inspection organ Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir to commence immediately in practicing his duties and jurisdictions to eliminate negative practices in civil servants. 'Abd al-Qadir briefed the president on the progress of formation of the inspection body when he called on him today. The president directed the chairman of the inspection body to draw out workable and scientific solutions to the defaults in the civil service, like recklessness, corruption and bribery, in the context of the government's keen efforts to alleviate burden and guarantee stable and peaceful life to the people. [Text] [JN191812 Khartoum SUNA in English 1652 GMT 19 Oct 81]

PEOPLE URGED TO REVOLT--O masses of our glorious Arab nation; O masses of Arab people in Sudan: yesterday, the sons of Egypt of Arabism carried out the sentence of the nation and history against traitor al-Sadat, thus eracing the mark of disgrace that has humiliated our Arab nation. The valiant youth who carried out the daring and Fedayeen operation yesterday expressed the conscience of every citizen loyal to the Arab nation, its fate and cultural march from the ocean to the Gulf. Their brave bullets, which ripped apart the body of the traitor, are embued with the determination and persistence of the Arab nation's sons and present and future generations to purge this pure land from the filth of treason and treachery and to defend its fate and that of its future and dignity against treason and the enemies' schemes. The same brave bullets which reverberated in Cairo yesterday, will reverberate with the same strength against the chest of the Numayri regime, which has supported al-Sadat and his treason and pursued al-Sadat's course and imperialist-Zionist alliance. O masses of our Arab people in Egypt; dear listeners; on behalf of our Arab people in Sudan, we tell you that every true and honest Arab struggler pins great hopes on you at these crucial moments of our Arab nation's history. The masses of our people in Sudan who throughout history supported with all potentials the Egyptian people and not their traitors and enemies. [Excerpts] [JN081714 Baghdad Voice of Egypt in Arabic to Arabia 2000 GMT 7 Oct 81]

UGTT-PSD TO PARTICIPATE IN ELECTORAL FRONT

London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 p 21

[Text]

AFTER WEEKS of animated debate at all levels, the administrative commission of the 280,000-strong Tunisian Trade Union Movement, Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), has decided by a majority of 53 per cent to participate in an electoral front with the ruling Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD), in November's legislative elections.

During the two days of intense discussions which preceded the UGTT administrative commission's vote in mid-September, three distinct trends emerged within the higher echelons of UGTT's leadership. A majority of 45 members, out of a total of 84, approved the suggestion of an electoral front with the PSD. This group, which stressed its adherence to the ideology of the Destourian movement in the person of President Habib Bourguiba, included eight members of the UGTT executive bureau and was led by Abdelaziz Bourgou and Khereddine Salhi.

A second group of 26 administrative commission members opted for non-participation of the trade union movement in the elections, because in their opinion this was the best way of guaranteeing the UGTT's freedom of action in coming months. This group was an alliance of supporters of former UGTT secretary general Habib Achour and members of the extreme left. The latter gain much of their support from the traditionally active UGTT branches in the southern Gafsa-Gabes phosphate mining region.

Finally, ten administrative commission members wanted UGTT members to have complete freedom of choice in the matter. The November ballot will be the first in over two decades in which parties other than the PSD will be competing. By seeking to avoid UGTT affiliation to any one party, this particular group hoped for a return to multiparty democracy. The group was spearheaded by the newly elected UGTT secretary-general Taieb Baccouche, and included Houcine Ben Gaddour and Neji Chaari.

'Those who decided to vote for an electoral front with the PSD are fully conscious of the necessity of preserving our autonomy vis a vis the ruling party', Baccouche told *8 Days* in Tunis. 'If the conditions set forth by the UGTT administrative committee are not fully respected, then we simply will not participate in the elections,' he added.

The PSD for its part has proposed the establishment of a national front, including the UGTT and other popular organisations, which would run in the legislative elections. Most UGTT members are opposed to a partnership which in their eyes would link the union to a government programme during the five-year term of the newly elected national assembly. In this respect, the UGTT's means of defending the interests of the Tunisian working class would be severely damaged.

Negotiations to hammer out a compromise between the UGTT-proposed electoral front and the PSD suggestion of a national

front are likely to be extremely arduous, all the more so as President Habib Bourguiba reportedly pushed for the concept of a national front as opposed to the popular front suggested by some of his advisors.

Another UGTT prerequisite for participating with the PSD is the right for its designated candidates to place the union acronym UGTT alongside their names. This is liable to stir up considerable controversy because other organisations participating in the PSD sponsored front, like the women's movement and the employers' association, UTICA, have not demanded this condition. President Bourguiba is likely to oppose this concession.

Beyond these two sticking points, the decision by the UGTT administrative commission to propose an electoral front constitutes a severe setback for secretary-general Baccouche, who believes in maintaining the greatest degree of independence and autonomy for the UGTT. His position could be even further undermined if the talks on the UGTT conditions for electoral participation fail to produce an acceptable compromise and the union leadership nevertheless agrees to an alliance with the PSD.

Some observers feel that by voting for UGTT participation in an electoral front certain elements in the union's administrative commission, in alliance with some PSD hardliners, are trying to discredit Baccouche and his notions of union autonomy. Any sign of the UGTT moving into the PSD orbit would alienate not only union activists but also rank-and-file members and the country's youth.

CSO: 4500/19

U.S. EFFORTS TO INCREASE SHARE OF TUNISIAN MARKET DESCRIBED

London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 p 41

[Article by Howard Schissel]

[Text]

A CONCERTED effort by American business over the past two years to carve out a larger share of the relatively small but growing Tunisian market ($3.4bn in 1980), has not met with the hoped-for success.

Faced with intense competition from entrenched trading partners like France and Italy, as well as the tireless efforts of the Japanese and the West Germans to consolidate their positions, American companies sought US government help, claiming that they could not beat the financial terms offered by the other industrialised nations to potential Tunisian clients.

Therefore, in October 1979 the Export-Import Bank granted a special one-year $100m line of credit providing concessional financing for major public and private sector projects in Tunisia. This was designed to put American bidders on a par with their principal competitors. The French complained, however, that it accorded American exporters an excessive advantage.

Even so, the special line of credit has been extended for an extra year until the end of October 1982, to stimulate American exports to Tunisia. So far, the American credit facility has been tapped only timidly, with some $80m still unused.

Last year, only six per cent of Tunisian imports came from the US, compared with 26 per cent from France, 16 per cent from Italy, and 10 per cent from West Germany. Although US exports to Tunisia grew during the first four months of 1981 to $80.5m — against $59.4m during the same period the previous year — Japan could edge out the US as Tunisia's fourth largest source of imports in 1981.

One drawback for American companies is the extremely limited nature of the products offered for the Tunisian market. Cereals make up about half of US sales, with agricultural equipment, aircraft, oil and gas equipment and clothing making up most of the rest. Around 98 per cent of Tunisian sales to the US is composed of crude oil.

Taxation is an obstacle to US enterprise. In both corporate and personal taxes, American companies bear burdens not shared by other countries. American firms continue to pay much higher profit taxes than do concerns from states having treaties for the avoidance of double taxation. American firms, therefore, increase the cost of their bids to cover this burden and risk becoming uncompetitive. Negotiations to conclude a tax treaty with Tunisia are at an advanced stage, so this difficulty may soon be eased.

Compensation payments made by US companies to their employees to cover Tunisian tax are themselves considered taxable income. Tunisia has agreed that this extra financial burden on American companies should be lightened but no action has yet been taken.

This may be one of the reasons why direct American investment in Tunisia is so limited, especially when compared with French and Italian equity holdings. Since the Tunisian government last year bought out Firestone's share in a tyre plant, Standard Brands is the only US firm to have equity holdings in Tunisia. A local affiliate, operating under the country's offshore

manufacturing law, packages puddings and cake mixes for re-export to the Middle East.

The only other direct US investment is composed of branch offices of companies doing business in both Algeria and Libya. In this category are computer firms like IBM, Burroughs and National Cash Register. In recent years, French firms have made substantial inroads into the Tunisian and regional markets for computers, putting an end to the previous de facto American monopoly in this field.

America stopped being the sole supplier of aircraft to the state airline, Tunis Air, in 1979 when it decided to acquire the European Airbus A300 instead of the new generation of Boeing fuel-efficient jet airliners.

Bank of America and Citibank opened up Offshore Banking Units (OBUs) in Tunis, when the sector was created some years ago, but both have been disappointed by the limited amount of business they have been able to drum up and by restrictions imposed by the Banque Centrale de Tunisie (BCT). Bank of America, in fact, decided to turn its OBU branch in the Tunisian capital into a simple representative office, *8 Days* was told.

One of the shortcomings of American firms doing business in Tunisia is their lack of a coherent long-term strategy. For example, in 1980 three American concerns made the shortlist for a small consultancy contract to expand the El Fouladh integrated steel mill at Menzel Bourguiba, but failed because of their high prices. According to Tunisian officials, the bids submitted by US Steel, H. K. Ferguson and Brown and Root were nearly double those submitted by European competitors.

Although the contract, won by the French company, Société Française d'Études Siderurgiques (Sotresid), was only for $3.6m, the French will have a head start when the Tunisians give the go ahead to a further $100m expansion programme for the steelworks.

In spite of special efforts made by the Tunisian government to encourage American companies, few have made an effective attempt to penetrate the local market. *8 Days* was told that the deadline for bids for Tunisia's sixth cement plant had been extended and American firms who expressed an interest — Allis Chalmers, Morrison-Knudson and Fuller — were allowed to bid in English instead of French. None finally submitted a bid.

Where the Americans are likely to make most progress in Tunisia in the present decade is in oil and gas exploration and development. Recently Houston Oil and Minerals, an affiliate of Tenneco, announced a big offshore oil discovery in the Gulf of Hammamet, and Amoco has discovered oil and gas in the Chott Djerid zone near the frontier with Algeria.

If these discoveries prove to be as important as initial findings indicate, then a series of joint Tunisian-American oil companies are likely to be established to exploit the new fields.

The growth of Tunisia's small refining industry is another sector where American concerns reckon that they have a role to play and can offer a competitive package. Tunisia proposes a $350m extension programme for the Bizerte refinery, whose capacity is to be upgraded from the present 1.5m tonnes a year to 6m tonnes by 1985-86. *8 Days* has learned that several American companies are interested in the project, including McGee, Bechtel and Flour. Nonetheless, competition will be fierce: French, Italian and Japanese firms are also in the running.

Another project likely to attract American interest is the proposed $1bn Arab-financed export refinery on the Mediterranean coast at Cap Sirrat. This is to have a capacity of 10m tonnes. Already the Stanford Research Institute has won a subcontract for the feasibility study from Beicep, a subsidiary of the French Petroleum Institute.

CSO: 4500/19

BRIEFS

TURKEY SIGNS TOURISM AGREEMENT--Turkey and Tunisia have signed a tourism cooperation agreement to cover training, investment, hotel management and holiday visits. The Turkish minister of commerce, Kemal Canturk, added that the two countries will establish a joint marketing firm, and Turkey is also to build factories in Tunisia for the manufacture of cotton yarns and refrigerator compressors. The possibility of building a fertiliser plant in Iskenderun with Kuwaiti participation is also being examined. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 17 Oct 81 p 41]

CSO: 4220/19

PAPERS ON ARAB-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS

GF121255 Abu Dhabi Emirates News Agency in Arabic 0700 GMT 12 Oct 81

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 12 Oct (ENA)--In their editorials today two local papers call for an Arab initiative that would change the face of history and return Egypt to Arab ranks in order to lead the Arab nation's defense battle. The two papers warn against U.S. and Israeli plans to strip Egupt of its affiliation with the Arab nation.

In its editorial entitled "Don't Leave Egypt Alone," AL-WAHDAH says Egypt is waiting for the Arabs. Even if it does not appear to them to be yearning, there is an inherent feeling in it of anxiousness to regain its status among them and have its soil shaded by their flags instead of the flags of the invaders.

The paper stresses that Egypt needs the Arabs more than ever before. It warns that leaving Egypt "undressed," particularly in these circumstances, will intensify its alienation and dedicate its rulers' commitments to what the United States and Zionism are planning for it. They want Egypt to shrink and plan to embroil it in conflicts with its fraternal neighbors in order to serve the interests of the Arab nation's enemies.

AL-FAJR believes that, despite the statements and expectations made in the arena following al-Sadat's death, the situation is still not clear. It is not possible to predict what will happen during the next few months. In similar circumstances policies and expectations have proved completely mistaken.

The paper demands that the new Egyptian administration be given room to breathe so it can assume its responsibilities and recognize the land on which it stands.

The paper stresses that the conflict between the Arab nation and Israel over the restoration of Arab solidarity and the achievement of Arab unity is a bitter conflict that requires strong will and determination. The paper adds that Israel knows this fact well. Thus we see all its officials stressing the necessity of continuing the peace process with Egypt. What Israel fears most is rapprochement between the new Egyptian regime and the Arab states.

The paper concludes its editorial by hoping that Egypt will return to the Arab nation and emphasizing that the Egyptian people themselves are eagerly awaiting the moment of this rapprochement.

CSO: 4404/51

BRIEFS

PAPER REJECTS SUPERPOWER INTERVENTION--Abu Dhabi, 11 Oct (ENA)--The newspaper AL-BAYAN warns against superpower moves to "fish in troubled waters" and against exploiting any internal development in any Arab country to achieve political gains at the expense of Arab independence and freedom. The newspaper expresses surprise over the fact that, despite frank public stands by Arab leaders rejecting any foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the region, its fate and destiny, "the old Western tune on the rapid deployment force has reappeared." The paper says the Western media have used two justifications for all military moves in the region. The first is the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat. The second one was revealed in the statement which U.S. Vice President George Bush made claiming that a small country like Libya is posing a threat not only to Egypt and Israel but also to one of the two superpowers, the United States. Concluding its commentary, AL-BAYAN asserts that, whatever the justifications Western officials use to cover the increased military presence, the Arab nation will not allow anyone to undermine its independence or expose it to danger. [Text] [GF111614 Abu Dhabi Emirates News Agency in Arabic 1356 GMT 11 Oct 81]

AUSTRIA'S KREISKY TO VISIT--Abu Dhabi, 11 Oct (ENA)--Austria's Chancellor Bruno Kreisky will begin a 3-day visit to the UAE 8 December. Contacts between the UAE and the Austrian foreign ministries resulted in setting the time for the visit. The Austrian chancellor was to have visited the UAE in September. He was indisposed and thus the visit was postponed. [Text] [GF111554 Abu Dhabi Emirates News Agency in Arabic 1332 GMT 11 Oct 81]

MINERALS SURVEY CONTRACT AWARDED--UAE Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Dr Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, last week signed a contract with a British company to carry out the third phase of a survey of minerals in the country. The company, Hunting Geophysical and Geology, conducted the first two stages of the survey which resulted in the discovery of large quantities of copper, chromite and other minerals in the northern Emirates. The third stage will concentrate on assessing the quality and quantity of the discoveries together with the feasibility of commercial exploitation. Dr Otaiba said that the government was determined to guage the extent of natural resources in the UAE as these could provide alternative sources of income to oil. They could also provide the raw materials necessary to develop an industrial base in the country. According to the minister, rock wool discovered in abundance in the Emirate of Fujairah will be manufactured and produced to international specifications by the beginning of next year. Hundreds of millions of tons of the substance will be used in the petroleum industry as an insulator against heat and humidity. Dr Otaiba said that rock wool, which is also flame-proof, could replace fibreglass in construction and interior decoration. The third stage of the project will be completed in 14 months at a cost of about Dirhams 6.25 million ($1.7 million). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 p 4]

STEPS TO REGULATE FOREIGN MANPOWER--The UAE Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is currently studying the allocation of collective visas to recruit Arab labourers in order to maintain a balance between local and foreign manpower in the country. Labour and Social Affairs Minister Saif al-Jarwan said last week that he had signed a number of agreements to this end with Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan. A Tunisian attache has already arrived in the UAE to coordinate the flow of Tunisian labourers, and attaches from other countries are expected to follow. The UAE may appoint its own labour attaches in various countries to organise the recruitment of Arab labourers. Mr Jarwan added that his ministry had completed changes in its structure necessitated by a recent expansion of its activities. This expansion included the introduction of rehabilitation centres for old and handicapped people. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 p 4]

NEW CONTAINER REPAIR COMPANY--The Middle East Container Repair Company (MECRC), set up by a syndicate of Dubai businessmen, is now in operation and hopes to win repair and modification orders for containers. Previously these had either to be sent to Europe for repair or were written off by their owners in the Gulf. The company has a repair and fabrication yard near Port Rashid. According to the manager of the company, John Bedingfeld, the scope for container repair work is indicated by the phenomenal increase in container traffic in the Gulf over the past few years. More and more cargo is now coming in containers which are equally vital to Dubai's re-export trade. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 p 42]

SELECTED FOREIGN BANKS TO BE ADMITTED--The UAE is to allow a number of well-known foreign banks to open representative offices in the country, the Dubai-based Khaleej Times reported last week. Several foreign banks have applied to UAE's Central Bank for licenses to open offices in the Emirates. Bank sources said that licences would be granted by the Central Bank without going against its policy of protecting local banks from foreign competition. The main criterion for a licence will be the volume of bilateral trade between the UAE and the bank's headquarters. Priority will go to banks with a high volume of trade with the UAE which do not already have representatives there. Japan's Bank of Tokyo has already received clearance to open an office in Abu Dhabi early next year. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 pp 10-11]

OIL EXPLORATION DEAL SIGNED--Abu Dhabi last week signed an oil concession agreement with Attock, a British oil exploration company. The 35-year concession covers an offshore area of 1,561 square kilometres. The contract stipulates that Attock will pay $3 million as a signing fee, spend $50 million during the first eight years and pay $2 million when and if oil is discovered in commercial quantities. According to UAE Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Dr Mana Saeed al-Otaiba, the agreement completes a series of concessions awarded by Abu Dhabi to various companies in the last two years to search for oil and gas in onshore and offshore areas. In May this year, an agreement was signed with a West German exploration company, Deminex, the first concession awarded to a West German company. Under the agreement with Attock, the Abu Dhabi government retains the right to participate with 60 percent of the capital when it sees fit. The company is also to prospect for drinking water during the same period. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 21, 12 Oct 81 p 9]

CSO: 4400/23

BRIEFS

DELEGATION TO SOMALIA--San'a', 20 Oct (INA)--A YAR delegation headed by Deputy Prime Minister Dr Hasan Makki left San'a' today for Mogadishu on an official visit lasting several days. During this visit, Dr Makki and the accompanying delegation will attend Somalia's National Day celebrations and hold talks with Somali officials on developing bilateral ties between the two countries. [Text] [JN201253 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1120 GMT 20 Oct 81] Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs Dr Hasan Makki returned to San'a' today from Mogadishu after participating, together with the delegation accompanying him, with the fraternal Somali people in the celebrations marking the 12th anniversary of the October revolution. Dr Makki met with President Siad Barre to whom he conveyed the greetings of the brother leader and of the Yemeni people on the occasion of the Somali revolution. Dr Makki last night met with First Vice President Mohamed Ali Samantar and conveyed the greetings of our people and government on this occasion. [Excerpt] [JN221414 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 22 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/53

END

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ADVANTAGES OF NILE VALLEY INTEGRATION DISCUSSED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 19 Aug 81 p 7

[Article by Husayn Abu Zayd al-Muhami: "Integration of Nile Valley to Aid Development and Counter Aggression"]

[Text] The eternal linking of the two halves of the Nile Valley is an endeavor that Providence has ordained as a means of achieving unity of goals and destiny, having previously prepared the historical ties necessary for this project including the eternal Nile itself as well as language, religion, customs, and traditions. All of these are part of a heritage which, through the course of history, has formed the Nile Valley civilization. This civilization is one of the strongest and oldest civilizations, and continues to have a direct influence on contemporary life throughout the entire modern world.

However, praising the glory of the Nile Valley will not benefit the real world at all. Until this praise is transformed into action that will enrich the efforts of the two halves, strengthen their cohesiveness, and intensify their powers to confront the challenges of the era, the feats of history will have no meaning. The forces of interdependence will remain ripe for integration with the passage of time because of the failure to channel these forces in the direction of organic integration to achieve joint goals in various fields of human development. This fact was understood by British colonialism, which used all its weight to block the earnest efforts made by loyal inhabitants of the Nile Valley to originate a formula for cooperation between the two parts of the valley in order to restore the power and glory of the valley and enrich the life of its two parts. Nor did the strategems of colonialism stop at fighting the call to achieve this goal. The colonialists also went so far as to apply the policy known as "divide and rule." Colonialism worked continuously to upset the harmonious relations between the people of the Nile Valley with the aim of replacing fraternity with enmity. However, all these attempts failed because the foundations of the ties between the two peoples of the Nile Valley were stronger than the attempts made by the colonialists and those in their orbit. Nonetheless, strife between those who advocated the preservation of the eternal ties and the enemies of this cause remained inevitable until the 23 July Revolution erupted. From the beginning, the revolution placed prime importance on these ties and created the formula of integration between the people of the two parts of the valley. This concept was the subject of deeprooted disagreement which the colonialists used to destroy any attempt at rapproachement. After the revolution broke out in the northern part of the valley, the 25 May Revolution erupted. The central goal of the two revolutions revolves around extricating the

inhabitant of the Nile Valley in the north and the south from backwardness and preparing him to exercise his responsibility to contribute actively toward the revival of his nation. The unity of the two revolutions and the sincere intentions of their leaders paved the way toward the achievement of the plans of cooperation in a spirit of responsibility and commitment and within the framework of the shared bonds which are deeply rooted in history.

Presidents Ja'far Numayri and Anwar Sadat laid the foundations for the transformation of theory into fact and then into effective and vital practice extending to all levels and dimensions. Practice alone is the standard of fact. The most important manifestation of practice in the realm of fact is the uniting of forces to confront any aggression to which either one of the two parts is exposed. This action is based on the belief that an attack on one of the two parts of the valley is an attack on the other part. This is the sole objective of the noble intentions to defend both parts of the Nile Valley from harm and aggression. It is therefore inconceivable that anyone would wish to attack one of these parts in an attempt to undertake an action with uncalculated consequences.

We are confronted with a world struggle in which each of the two superpowers is competing with all its various means to expand its sphere of influence at the expense of the weak states or those states that do not rely on individual power to enable them to repel attempts to gain supremacy or extend influence by direct or indirect means. This is what the Soviet Union is doing by exploiting Libya's colonel, who has transformed the oil revenues of the Libyan people into an arsenal of weapons with which to threaten the security of neighboring African and Arab states.

If Colonel Qadhdhafi knows his relative strength in relation to any actions that his ambitions have led him to consider with regard to either Egypt or Sudan alone, the cohesiveness of the forces of the two states of the Nile Valley against any aggression will repel the communist menace. Therefore, he had better think carefully before carrying out any reckless step which may lead to a fate he does not envision.

8591
CSO: 4504/105

BRIEFS

SUDANESE-EGYPTIAN BANK--Mr 'Izzat Ghaydan, president of the Federation of Egyptian Chambers of Commerce and head of the Egyptian side in the Joint Sudanese-Egyptian Economic Council, stated that a decision has been made to establish a joint banking venture between Sudan and Egypt to be called the Nile Bank for Commerce and Investment. The purpose of the project is to participate in financing joint projects in the two countries. These projects include the establishment of a joint company for food security and the strengthening of the economic development plan in Sudan and Egypt. The head of the Egyptian side stated that the agreement calls for a bank capital of $20 million with 50 percent of the capital to be paid in advance upon the establishment of the bank. The payment will be divided equally between the Sudanese and Egyptian sides. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 25 Aug 81 p 1] 8591

EGYPT, SUDAN OPEN BORDERS--Ambassador 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khayrat, director of the Sudan Department of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, stated that he will soon make an announcement in both Khartoum and Cairo declaring complete freedom of movement of individuals between Sudan and Egypt with possession of personal identification. This move is considered a necessary step toward the achievement of integration and comes within the framework of the strategy aimed at the elimination of all restrictions to the movement of individuals and capital between the two countries. The director of the Sudan Department added that there will also be an announcement shortly concerning the establishment of a joint Sudanese-Egyptian bank to undertake the financing of joint projects between the two countries. The initial stages of these projects will cost 1 billion pounds. The Egyptian ambassador said that two of the main integration projects to be implemented during the initial stages are the reconstruction of the integration region between the two countries, which includes Northern Province in Sudan and the governorate of Aswan in Egypt, and the coordination of integration of people in the Red Sea region. [Text] [Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 1] 8591

CSO: 4504/105

ALGIERS DEVELOPMENT PLANS OUTLINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Sep 81 pp 1, 3

[Text] Mr Baualem Benhamouda, member, Political Bureau, and minister of the interior, yesterday in his ministry presided over an important working session attended by the wali of Algiers, all of the daira chiefs of the willaya of Algiers, as well as the chairman of the people's council of the city of Algiers.

The purpose of this meeting was to review and speed up the implementation of operations initiated by the Interior Ministry and planned for the willaya of Algiers in the context of local development and the improvement of living conditions for the citizens of the capital.

Among the points brought up, the minister at length emphasized the job that remains to be done in order to guarantee the harmonious development of Algiers and its region and to remove the difficulties encountered by the citizens in their everyday life.

The local communities and the enterprises concerned, in this context, must combine their efforts to make up for the delays which have accumulated so far in school construction, water supply facilities, highways, electrification, transportation, and especially housing.

Looking specifically at housing, the interior minister emphasized that the effective implementation of the programs listed would inevitably help solve the problems encountered by a large number of citizens in this field.

In the matter of real estate reserves he recalled the instructions given by his ministry to the communities to select and make available a minimum of 200 lots per year to the citizens and enterprises; in talking to the daira chiefs, the minister emphasized that this objective must be attained. Under the provisions of the law--he added--it is necessary to prevent red tape which hinders the citizens in gaining access to housing.

Cession of Government Property--Speeding Up Operations

After the census conducted by the communities with respect to slums and poor housing facilities, it is furthermore necessary now to move on to a rational undertaking of removing those dwelling facilities whose existence considerably hinders the

development of our towns and leaves a segment of our citizens in a troubled situation.

Regarding the cession of government property, the minister urged the daira chiefs to speed up even more the census and evaluation operations currently in progress with a view as soon as possible to move on to the final sales phase.

In the matter of distribution, emphasis was placed on projects in progress concerning the registration, study, and implementation phases provided for in the 81 development plans.

We know as a matter of fact that the construction of 32 public community markets, very soon, has been planned in the capital.

An appeal will be made for the supply of steel frames to speed up the construction of these markets.

New Corps of Hygiene and Urban Development Inspectors

The meeting also covered the matter of hygiene and highways.

In the field of hygiene, we know that the Ministry of Interior recently recruited and trained a corps of hygiene and urban development inspectors, charged with watching over the implementation of regulations in this area out in the field.

This corps of inspectors, which became operational a few weeks ago, must play its role in order to put an end to the dumping often observed on public roads and also in the matter of urban growth.

Regarding roads, the minister also emphasized the necessary coordination between the services in order to put an end to the growing deterioration of public roads.

The sidewalk and street repair program and the urban lighting program must also be speeded up. During this working session, emphasis was also placed on the matter of beach restoration, green areas, and playgrounds.

In his guidelines, the minister emphasized that the program now launched must be boosted to permit the largest number of families possible to get the benefit of recreation areas.

Finally, the bus shelter program started last quarter must also be continued more quickly particularly as winter approaches; one out of every two bus shelters must at least be equipped with a phone booth.

The Executive Out in the Field

Regarding the working method, instructions were furthermore given so that, periodically and on the level of the other willayate, all of the directors of the executive branch go out to the dairas in order to study and solve the problems encountered by the communities.

The wali was also asked to convene the daira chiefs at least quarterly and the latter were asked in turn to convene the chairmen of the APC [People's Communal Assembly] to guarantee better coordination and more efficiency in the actions undertaken.

Evaluation and Encouragement

The central authority also periodically demands the evaluation of actions taken in the willayate; the wali was also asked to evaluate the action of the dairas while it is up to the chiefs of the dairas to guage the efforts of the APC [People's Communal Assembly] and their executives.

This evaluation, the minister added, will have the effect of encouraging the worthy individuals and, in coordination with the chain of command the party, to remove all those who, by virtue of inefficiency and incompetence, neglect the interest of the citizen and the mission assigned to them and from whom confidence must therefore be withdrawn.

In closing his remarks, the minister said: "We have the funds, we have the material and the manpower and with an extra effort and good coordination, a good number of problems encountered by the citizens will be solved."

5058
CSO:4519/8

REGIONAL BENEFITS OF CAUSEWAY OUTLINED

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 13 Aug 81 p 19

/Article by Musa'id Ibn Sa'adun Abu Ghazi: "Bahrain's Minister of Development and Industry Yusuf al-Shirawi Says: 'Bahrain Causeway Will Provide Food Security for the Area'"/

/Text/ Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi, Bahrain's minister of development and industry, delivered an address to the Associations of Bahraini Students Studying Abroad organized by the associations' Higher Committee for Summer Activities. In his address, the minister described the causeway as a vital project that will play a decisive role in accelerating and intensifying development, will bring prosperity to the people of Bahrain, and will help facilitate rapid movement among the area states. The project to which the minister was referring is the planned causeway linking Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. This project has been long awaited by the people of Bahrain because it will help achieve a greater level of cohesion and intermingling between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

Yusuf al-Shirawi's address was attended by a large number of students as well as numerous citizens, including Shaykh 'Isa ibn Muhammad al-Khalifah, secretary general of the Higher Council for Youth and Athletics. Mr al-Shirawi began his talk as follows:

"Before we discuss the role of the causeway, we should review the subject of economic development. What are the goals and objectives we are striving to achieve and what are the means we are employing to achieve these goals?

"In answering this question, we would like from the start to avoid getting pushed into a philosophical debate about such things as man, his values, his development, and the honing of his talents. Rather, I look at matters from a practical and simplified standpoint. I would like to tell you what has been going on in our minds from 1966 until the present with regard to development-related fields.

"From that time until the present we have had four basic goals:

"First, the creation of job opportunities for the citizens of Bahrain.

"Second, the diversification of sources of income and the diversification of economic activity in light of the fact that the petroleum we depend on chiefly is a dwindling resource. For this reason, we are getting ready for the post-petroleum age and the diversification of our sources of income.

"Thirdly, raising the material standard of the individual by attempting to reverse the employment situation that prevailed in years past. In the past, the lower and middle classes gave up the leadership and supervisory positions and allowed foreigners to take them over.

"Fourthly, the creation of a source of income in order to meet their obligations. These are the goals that the state has authorized and they remain in effect today.

"The means we have employed to achieve these goals are represented by several steps:

"First, we have done much thinking on industrial growth because of the fact that industry places many demands and requires an abundance of new materials, energy, manpower, and markets, among other things. While we live in a region that provides a cheap source of energy, we do not possess any other resource. But despite the numerous factors that stand in the way of what we are trying to achieve--such as the climate, consumption, the size of the population, raw materials, and our distance from the market--in spite of all these things we have sought to develop industry by selecting a number of industries that have a competitive capability in the world market. We started with the aluminum industry and then moved on to the dry dock, iron pellets, and other industries. We have also endeavored to set up industrial areas in order to establish light industries.

"One thing we have achieved in the area of industry is an increase in the technical standard. Prior to 1964, every job in the industrial sector opened up four other jobs. Now, every job at a high level or with a high degree of specialization opens up ten jobs.

"As for the oil industry, we have established the foundations for this sector through our ownership of the oil field and our participation in the refining operation. Moreover, the petrochemicals industry along with the recently approved project for the conversion of heavy oil into light oil and other projects will open up extensive work opportunities and will provide a large economic return for the state."

Mr al-Shirawi also spoke about Bahrain's experience in the marine and shipping services industry, the transportation industry, well drilling and maintenance, and oil production in marine areas. These fields have been the focus of much attention on the part of this state and have thus opened up major economic horizons. He asserted that the government has encouraged the establishment of equipment maintenance centers in Bahrain as well as centers for transport, communications, ship services, and banking services.

He continued: "After Bahrain has become a world financial center, the government will seek to make the country a center of the same standard for world credit companies. It will also focus considerable attention on the tourist services industry, especially since the prevailing trend among officials in the area states is to focus primarily on domestic tourism for natives of the region."

He also discussed the state's efforts to upgrade the job qualifications of the citizens and create high-level managerial and professional positions for them. Mr al-Shirawi explained the policies that the government has followed over 15 years to achieve the developmental goals without the existence of a causeway. He stated that the causeway has remained a main development goal in the thinking of officials in Bahrain during the past 20 years.

This point led to the subject of the causeway's role in industrial development. Next Mr al-Shirawi began a discussion of this particular point:

"There are some concepts and goals that envision the interlinking of the Gulf states and the Arabian Peninsula with a transportation and communications network, especially in the area of economic integration which we are endeavoring to achieve. We believe that the achievement of these aspirations in a suitable manner depends on the existence of air, marine, and overland communications and transportation facilities. Without the causeway, a major cornerstone of this integrated network in the field of transportation and communications will be missing. Therefore, the establishment of the causeway will provide Bahrain equal opportunities with the remaining area states in this field.

Concerning the benefits that Bahrain will realize after the construction of this causeway, the minister of development and industry mentioned the following points:

Since 1967, Bahrain has been studying many joint industrial projects. Some 200 industrial projects have been investigated, and the majority of these projects have not been implemented because of the size of the market. However, the causeway that will connect Bahrain with a large area will facilitate the establishment of many joint economic, industrial, and commercial projects."

He said that some 60 percent of the high cost of fruits and vegetables is due to the multiplicity and variety of means of transport. He said that the causeway would help to reduce the cost of food projects substantially.

He continued: "In about 15 years, the area of Jubayl in Saudi Arabia will become one of the world's largest industrial areas. We believe that no matter how much Saudi Arabia works to meet the requirements of this industrial area, there will still be extensive opportunities for natives of Bahrain to make up any shortfalls in services that this area may encounter. Moreover, there will be ample opportunities to establish many supporting light industries in Bahrain which will be determined by the needs of the industrial area of Jubayl in Saudi Arabia. There will also be ample employment opportunities for Bahrain citizens.

The linking of Bahrain with the Arabian Peninsula will provide a degree of food security not only for Bahrain but for the entire area. In the last decade, the world suffered from a shortage of energy, and we believe that in the coming decade we will witness a similar shortage not only of energy but of food, as well.

Because the area states are thinking about the provision of food security, they are presently moving toward the construction of centers for the storage of commodities and foodstuffs. This trend has developed because of our conviction that others could use food as a weapon against us by cutting off or threatening to cut off food supplies.

Therefore, the causeway will be an extremely important link in the communications and transportation network. Through its existence we can build food storage centers that will allow us to distribute food at need. Alternatively, food can be stored in a neighboring country and transported to us. In either case, the existence of the causeway will have very great importance."

The causeway will also, in al-Shirawi's words, "play an important role in what is called import volume. It will be possible to reach agreement with neighboring states to combine orders for food products, and by increasing the volume this will help reduce the overall cost, resulting in a decline in the prices of these products and foodstuffs from current levels."

Continuing with his address, the minister of development said: "The states of the Gulf Cooperation Council /GCC/ will begin working to increase the links and interconnections among the citizens of the area and will endeavor to stimulate the level of domestic tourism. The causeway will play an active role in stimulating this activity, which will have a positive impact on the economic and social structure."

Concerning the role of the causeway in education, Yusuf al-Shirawi said: "No matter how much we attempt to expand the establishment of universities or centers of higher education, the area generally cannot fulfill all the requirements in this field. However, the causeway that will link us with our sister state of Saudi Arabia along with all the other Gulf states will link the universities and educational centers with one another in the way we are striving for through integration, cooperation, and coordination. This also applies to medical institutions. The causeway will expand the exchange of services in these two fields."

The Bahraini development and industry minister asserted: "The strong and stable relations that exist between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia will last forever. It is sufficient to say that some 800,000 individuals travel between the two countries each year and that 30 percent of Bahrain's exports go to the kingdom. The causeway will strengthen these relations even further and will give economic activity great impetus and capacity in terms of both quantity and quality."

Commenting on the position of Bahrain's commercial sector following the construction of the causeway, the minister said: "I believe that the businessmen of Bahrain must adapt to the new situation in the future. Some individuals believe that the flow of imports will be from Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, but I feel that the opposite will be true because of the size of the market in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, many products will come into Bahrain via Saudi Arabia.

"This prospect does not frighten me. I believe that the businessmen of Bahrain have the capability to adapt to the new situation. The important factor in my view is the ordinary consumer. The consumer will be in a position to obtain products at a lower price, and I believe that there are many merchants who will reach agreement with their counterparts in the kingdom with respect to prices. This is exactly what occurred in the European Common Market where prices and industries began to adjust according to the market activity of the various EEC states. We will soon venture on the establishment of such a market in this area, God willing, and this step will be backed by the GCC."

Enumerating the distinguishing features of the causeway, Yusuf Ahmad al-Shirawi said: "It will link two population areas with high levels of economic momentum. The importance of this fact will increase when it becomes possible through the existence of the causeway for an individual to travel from the heart of one industrial area to the heart of another industrial area within a quarter of an hour.

"This causeway will provide a particular challenge to the younger generation by opening up extensive employment opportunities and tremendous opportunities for economic activities in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia--or more comprehensively, in all the states of the GCC. Therefore, we must prepare our hearts and minds to take part in and benefit from these tremendous undertakings."

In reply to some questions asked by a number of individuals at the gathering, the minister said: "The commercial sector will not be affected adversely by the construction of the causeway. The Bahraini merchant has altered his way of dealing with consumers, and no businessman will be hurt when he has learned how to adapt himself to the new situation after the causeway is built. In fact, the businessman will be in a position to benefit even more than at present from the greater opportunities that will exist following the causeway's construction."

Concerning the extent of the causeway's impact on the marine environment, the minister remarked: "A study has been conducted on the movements of water and fish, the movement of salinity, and the effect of water and air currents on the marine environment. This study cost 15 million Saudi riyals. There are guarantees that the marine environment will not be damaged in any way."

When asked if the existence of the causeway would give rise to any social evils, the Bahraini minister said that it would not and added: "The people of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia share the same customs, precepts, and values. I do not believe that we will be exposed to the kind of serious social evils that arise when a narrow society is opened up to a broad society. Moreover, Bahrain has its own laws and regulations. Nor am I concerned about the effect of individuals who come to the country temporarily, particularly imported foreign labor. If a change does occur, it will take place gradually and at a rate that the society can accept. The common fear in any society is of a sudden change, and I do not believe that the causeway will lead to such a change in the coming years."

The minister was asked if the citizens in Bahrain would be able to buy products subsidized by the Saudi Arabian government. He replied: "There has been some consideration among officials of the area states--especially since the formation of the GCC--of the idea of gradually standardizing rates for transportation, services, and fuel consumption so that there will not be an imbalance because of the movement of individuals from one area to another. The economic agreement discussed by the finance and national economy ministers of the area states covered these issues."

Asked whether or not the causeway would affect shipping activity, the minister replied: "I believe that after the establishment of the causeway, a Gulf shipping company will be formed. The causeway will not eliminate our need for ocean shipping, as some believe. Now will ocean transport eliminate the need for the causeway, nor will the two of them eliminate the need for air transport."

Responding to a question concerning the imposition of tolls for crossing the causeway, he said: "Tolls will be charged but they will not be high. The toll revenues will be allocated for maintenance and repair of the causeway. In the event that toll revenues do not cover these costs, an agreement will be reached whereby the Bahraini and Saudi governments will provide the necessary funds to make up the deficit.

"There will not be any effects on the ownership of real estate and commercial enterprises after the construction of the causeway because these matters are controlled by local laws. However, I believe that this impact will be controlled by the economic agreement prepared by the ministers of finance and national economy of the area states. Hopefully, the final form of this agreement can be approved by the GCC in its meeting in November, because this agreement will permit freedom of movement of Gulf capital and the unification of customs fees as well as other economic incentives."

In the course of his replies, the minister remarked: "With regard to the question of internal security and Gulf security in general, security will be the same with the existence of the causeway as it is now without the existence of the causeway."



Key:
1. al-Khubar
2. Dhahran
3. Dhahran Airport
4. al-'Aziziyah
5. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
6. al-Manamah
7. Badi'ah
8. Hasarah
9. Na'san
10. Bahrain

8591
CSO: 4304/160

DETAILS OF NEW MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC COOPERATIVES ANNOUNCED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 8 Oct 81 p 15

[Text] Mohammad Mirmohammad-Sadeqi, the minister of labor and social affairs, explained in a press conference the manner of the activities of various cooperatives and also the necessity of creating the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives. He said: With the establishment of the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives, Articles 42, 43, and 44 of the Constitution will be implemented.

He added: One of our present problems is a deficiency in the distribution system, which will not be eliminated unless the form of this system is changed to one of cooperatives.

He added: Presently, 70-80 percent of the inflation in our society is artificial, caused by goods changing hands 7 or 8 times in the distribution stage and reaching the consumer at 3 times their price. Because of the inefficient system, a light bulb which the factory sells for 38 rials reaches the consumer in the marketplace at 150-200 rials.

He said: Most existing cooperatives are basically consumer types. The role that the regime of the Islamic Republic envisions for cooperatives has not yet materialized.

The text of the legislative bill concerning the establishment of the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives is as follows:

Article 1. In order to implement Paragraph 2 of Articles 43 and 44 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic and to centralize and coordinate the cooperative affairs of the country, the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives shall be established to assume the duties explained below:

A. To devise policies, directives, and plans to form and expand cooperative units within the framework of national economic policies.

B. To collect and organize statistics and data and to evaluate plans regarding technical and economic considerations.

C. To undertake the necessary studies for the nationwide expansion of cooperatives.

D. To provide the necessary facilities for the expansion and reconstruction of cooperatives.

E. To devise and implement educational and research programs in areas involving the use of all resources in coordination with ministries and other related organizations.

F. To mobilize and prepare national cooperatives.

G. To cooperate with national and international scientific and technical institutions and join and participate in international organizations and assemblies with considerations for the related laws and regulations.

H. To prepare and devise laws and regulations concerning the management of industries and the production units which are closed down or semi-operational through cooperatives and to establish new cooperatives in the areas of industry and commerce in order to bring production and distribution into the cooperative system and put an end to the middleman.

To protect the cooperatives against government and private sectors and direct the national economy towards a cooperative system.

Article 2. All duties, authorization, and responsibilities of existing cooperative organizations within the country, their employees, credits, properties, and commitments shall be conferred on and transferred to the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives. The transfers must take place within a maximum period of six months.

Note 1. The Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives shall be responsible for preparing equitable financial and employment charters and regulations for the employees of the cooperatives within a maximum period of six months after the ratification of this law and for implementing them after their approval by the Cabinet ministers in cases where legal permission is required and upon ratification by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. Before the ratification of these regulations, the existing regulations of each cooperative may be implemented.

Note 2. The minister of Islamic cooperatives shall be a member of the Economic Council, the Supreme Council of Banks, the Supreme Council of Statistics, nationalized industries, and the organization of small handicraft industries.

Note 3. The Supreme Council of Cooperatives shall consist of a group of ministers from the Ministries of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor and Social Affairs, Economic Affairs and Finance, and Islamic Cooperatives, the deputy and the director of the Organization of Planning and Budget, and the director general of the Central Bank, which will make decisions when necessary. The organization, policies, and duties of the Supreme Council of Cooperatives will follow the charters approved by the Cabinet ministers.

Note 4. Funds for the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives, in the beginning of its activities, will be provided for from the funds for cooperative activities in other organizations and ministries through the Organization of Planning and Budget.

Note 5. The centers for the expansion of production and reconstruction services will come under the auspices of the Ministry of Cooperatives. This Ministry is responsible for changing the law and related charters to reform those centers as cooperatives.

Note 6. The government shall be responsible for arranging that nationalized industries be managed in the form of cooperatives if this does not conflict with Article 44 of the Constitution.

Article 3. The Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives may select its human resources from the existing cooperative sectors of other ministries.

Note [7]. With the declaration by the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives of its readiness to accept the duties of the cooperative units of other ministries, those ministries shall be responsible for shutting down their activities in the area of Islamic cooperatives. No cooperative outside the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Cooperatives may continue its activities unless so approved by the Supreme Council of Cooperatives. The individual duties of national authorities regarding cooperatives shall be conferred upon the minister of cooperatives and all the duties of the authorities upon the Supreme Council of Cooperatives.

This law has been ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly in three Articles and seven Notes.

9593
CSO: 4640/34

POLITICAL, ECONOMIC IMPASSE FORESEEN IN TEHRAN

Persistence of Regime

Zuerich DIE WELTWOCHE in German No 40,30 Sep 81 p 3

[Report by Ulrich Tilgner]

[Text] The victor in next Friday's Iranian presidential election has already been determined: Hojjat ol-eslam 'Ali Khamene'i, former secretary general of the Islamic-Republican Party. Not even the opposition's planned acts of sabotage can change this: they lack cohesion and their ranks have been decimated by cruel executions. But the regime must not count on calm in the near future: on the contrary, severe economic problems create new adversaries.

Tehran--"God is great; this is the month of blood; Khomeyni will fall! Moslems arise; the Mojahedin are being murdered." When several dozen predominantly youthful Mojahedin followers called for Khomeyni's overthrow last Sunday on Tehran's Boulevard of the Revolution, they remained isolated. The mass of passers-by dissolved quickly; most sought refuge in the shops of the main thoroughfare or fled into side streets because the demonstrators were armed and shots in nearby streets were an indication of a forthcoming fight with the revolutionary guards.

Attempts at demonstration during the past few weeks have shown that the revolutionary guards appear no later than 10 minutes after the start of such actions and put a violent end to such rallies by the radical opposition. This is followed by an exchange of fire resulting in injuries and deaths. Last Sunday the Mojahedin militia and the security forces engaged in a two-hour battle. As was to be expected, the opposition had to give in to the superior numbers of the revolutionary forces.

But this is by no means an indication that calm will be restored in the near future inside the only 2 and 1/2 year old republic; the basic problems of the revolution remain unresolved. Apart from the war whose outcome cannot be foreseen even despite recent successes, the country is still faced with an unprecedented economic and financial crisis. Additionally, the wave of executions and terrorism is likely to escalate further.

State Minister Behzad Nabavi openly admitted the worrisome economic situation for the first time last weekend. The Western industrial nations' economic boycott which followed the occupation of the U.S. embassy and the reduction in oil exports were said to have led to a drastic reduction in foreign currency reserves. At present, the latter probably amount to no more than $3 billion, which prompted the government to decree drastic restrictions in imports which had again been rising continuously for several months. And since food imports are still occupying the highest priority, the restrictions are probably directed at raw materials and partially finished products, thus further weakening the country's economy.

At the current 22 percent rate of inflation the Iranian economy is hardly in a position to compete with imported products. Domestic automobile tires for example are nearly 50 percent more expensive than imported ones. And the lack of financing of the current state budget, which until now is financed at approximately 50 percent, will quadruple during the coming winter months due to inflation, according to calculations by foreign economic experts.

Despite all their protestations to the contrary, the government and the parliament do not appear to be in a position to implement the reform programs announced during the days of the revolution. Agrarian reform has been stopped, and even in the future the land holdings of big agrarian owners will be interfered with only in very exceptional cases. The power of influential Iranian major land holders has not been broken to date. This will result in further loss of popularity for the country's government inasmuch as it had always been considered to be a government of the poor and since its most militant adherents came from the suburban slums.

Even if there is a future increase in social problems due to the economic and financial crisis, the past weeks' unrest is still unequivocally based on a political background. The opposition's voice was stilled. Though enormous propaganda efforts have attempted to project the image of a unified nation, the Iranian people is divided. The opposition's right to exist is being officially denied. But the 36 million man security service continuously referred to by all politicians (every Iranian must also function as an agent and defend his government) is now working. In reality, the opposition is being persecuted by a minority and is being excluded from official life. And since radical opponents of the government persist in pursuing their political goals, drastic measures are taken and their physical elimination is being sought.

If one could assume a deterrent effect of capital punishment during the first weeks following Bani-Sadr's firing and the start of the wave of executions, it has not been amply demonstrated that on the contrary the death sentences specifically led to further radicalization of the disputes. And it is especially the opposition's readiness for self sacrifice and combat which attracts followers among the country's youth. A broad spectrum of the population can be attracted by an ideology based on Islam, nationalism and socialism.

Executions are apparently intended not only as a deterrent, but also to weaken [the opposition] and to reduce its numbers. There can be no other explanation of the more than 1,500 death sentences to date against opponents of the government. Executions follow secret trials in which the defendants had been found guilty without benefit of defense counsel.

During such tumultuous times even propagandistically amplified news of victories at the Iranian-Iraqi front cannot serve to reestablish equilibrium. Even the successful battle of 27 September, the greatest victory over the Iraqis to date according to Radio Tehran, and the breaking of the siege of the refinery town of Abadan offer only a temporary distraction from the internal struggles. Many Iranians, be they pro-government or opposed to it, have until now practiced restraint in these controversies only because of the war.

Next Friday's elections will offer an insight as to the support which the country's leadership still enjoys and whether the opposition is still able to disturb the election process to a significant degree. If there are any unresolve question about the election process, this is not the case as to the victor: Ayatollah Khamene'i will become the third president of the Islamic Republic. The 42-year old, who never spends two successive nights in the same place because of threatened assassination attemtps, is the leading candidate and the only candidate. His "competitors" never fail to affirm their intention of voting for him themselves. Only Prime Minister Kani has remained quiet; he may possibly withdraw his candidacy a few hours prior to the election.

Only time will tell whether this will result in real harmony between Kani and Khamene'i. Because in the long run the pressure of the opposition cannot be countered solely with repressive measures; this pressure will have to be dealt with politically. It is open to question whether Khamen'i is ready for this. Doubtless he is the more hard-line and immovable one of the two. He was after all the only member of the revolutionary council during February 1979, in the days of the revolution, to have decisively argued against Bazargan's nomination for prime minister and to have voted against him.

Most importantly, it remains to be seen whether the new man's state of health will permit him to bring all his energies to bear. He is still suffering from the after effects of a bomb blast of 27 June. There is even a chance that his right arm will have to be amputated.

Disunity of Opposition

Zuerich DIE WELTWOCHE in German No 40,30 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] The strongest organization of the outlawed and persecuted opposition is Masud Rajavi's guerilla formation of the Mojahedin-i-Khalq. Ideologically it is based upon the "Towheed" concept, which provides for a unified Islamic community. According to Rajavi (who fled to Paris with Bani-Sadr), the Mojahedin-i-Khalq's ideology provides a certain role for a private economy despite its socialist dogma. In Tehran, the Mojahedin-i-Khalq is said to have succeeded in winning the sympathies of a large number of the influential bazaar merchants and manufacturers. Some members of the high clergy are also said to be close to the Mojahedin-i-Khalq. However, since Bani-Sadr's defection at least 900 members of the group have been executed--at this moment it is impossible to tell how many are still active.

But in Khuzistan the Khomeyni regime is being challenged not by the Mojahedin-i-Khalq, but rather by the so-called minority Fedayeen. The minority Fedayeen

are receiving weapons, financial, manpower and propaganda support primarily from Marxist South Yemen.

The Peykhar organization, which split from the Mojahedin during the revolutionary disorders, is of a Marxist-Leninist orientation.

Tudeh, Iran's communist party, is small in terms of membership, but is being tolerated by Khomeyni unlike other opposition groups. The reason is that Tudeh, probably upon instigation from Moscow, lends considerable support to the Ayatollah's politics.

Challenges to the Khomeyni regime come from various regions by ethnic groups such as Kurds, Iranian Arabs, Azerbaijanis, Beluchis. Their resistance to the Ayatollah is their reaction to the denial of autonomy for their respective regions.

9273
CSO: 4620/3

KURDS ACCUSE TUDEH OF TERRORIST CAMPAIGN

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1298, 18 Sep 81 p 33

[Article: "Khomeyni Charts the Government's Course through His Son, Ahmad; Kurds Accuse Tudeh Party of Explosion, Assassination Operations in Iran"]

[Text] The days in Iran are proving that stepping up opposition operations will not bring about the downfall of the existing regime and that stepping up executions will not make the opposition surrender.

Khomeyni received a delegation from the Iranian Advisory Council in the middle of last week. He warned the delegation that the next explosion would take place in the council itself. He affirmed that "Those who are guarding the place are themselves the ones who are causing the catastrophe." That meeting took place on the 9th day of this month, that is, 3 days before Khomeyni went into seclusion in his home for a period of 2 weeks during which he was not receiving anyone. Seclusion requires solitude. But at this decisive meeting Khomeyni did appeal to the clergy to become more deeply involved in politics. Then he added that he would "use a sword to cut off the heads of all the opposition, especially the heads of Mojahedin-e Khalq." [Members of that party] did not wait long to express their reaction. The program had been set.

At 5 pm that Wednesday, seven demonstrations organized by Mojahedin-e Khalq were launched in Tehran. It was during those demonstrations that the Majahidine distributed the first statement of the National Defense Council which is chaired by Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr and Mas'ud Rajavi. The timing was provocative. At 5 pm people begin heading home; the streets of Tehran fill with cars; and the merchants of the bazaar begin closing their shops. To heighten the challenge, none of the demonstrators wore a mask, and they began to repeat two specific slogans: "the bloody month," and "Khomeyni will fall in the bloody month."

Thus some people explained the expression, the bloody month and the isolation which Khomeyni had chosen by the fact that Mojahedin-e Khalq had realized that "'Ali's day," which al-Qadusi had called for--al-Qadusi was killed on the 5th of this month--after the death of Raja'i and Bahonar, would soon materialize and that the imam had given the order signal for it.

The first reaction to the need for a deeper political involvement by the clergy came from one of the Iranians who in his own words are "awaiting their hour." The Iranian said, "The mullahs are present, and the stench of bribes in state offices where bureaucracy has gained control is filling the air. The only thing which the clergy do to affirm their 'involvement' in politics is to accuse all those who oppose them of corrupting the earth. The penalty for this accusation is death."

But what about security?

At the first meeting held by the Advisory Council with the participation of the members of the new government Rafsanjani said that the council discussed significant security resolutions and approved them. Among those [security matters] were the fact that the Supreme Defense Council would concern itself with general questions but that the executive questions would fall under the jurisdiction of those who are concerned with military affairs. It is known that the Supreme Defense Council is made up of senior Iranian army officers. Thus those who were previously responsible for military security and intelligence were isolated. Rafsanjani did not announce who would take over these matters or how people's lives would be protected. But a few days later a committee of senior clergymen, which included Ayatollah Montazeri, asked the government to expedite the formation of a strong intelligence agency. Montazeri affirmed that he wanted the regime to establish a new ministry called the Ministry of Security and Intelligence.

A few Iranians wondered, "How can officials ask for a ministry of intelligence when they've announced that the government had the support of 35 million Iranians? This request affirms the failure of Khomeyni's appeal in which he had ordered every Iranian to watch his brother or his neighbor."

As a response to the formation of a strong intelligence agency the opposition Voice of Iran Radio announced that the regime had begun using the Revolutionary Guard in forming an intelligence agency. There are members of the Iranian communist Tudeh party in the Revolutionary Guard. Those men had [also] penetrated the ranks of the Islamic Republican party and the Hezbollah party from the outset.

However, events affirm that the government is actually incapable of ensuring security. In a statement he made to the Paris newspaper, LE MONDE, on 8 September, Iranian deputy minister of foreign affairs, Ahmed 'Azizi said, "We are facing a real civil war which is more cruel than the war with Iraq. Our enemies inside the country are not wearing a standard uniform like the regular army. We do not know where the blow is coming from." To reassure those who were fearful Prime Minister Mahdavi-Kani declared, "If we were weak, we would not have had enemies, but we are strong." He made that statement after Khomeyni himself had said upon receiving the new members of his government, "Iran is considered one of the most stable countries."

It seems that the successive speeches that Khomeyni repeated recently have brought him back to his old style of ignoring the event and turning people's attention to events which they should bring about. While the investigation in the death of Beheshti and his aides has not [yet] yielded any results; while the Revolutionary Prosecutor Hojjat al-Islam Qodusi was killed before he undertook the investigation of Raja'i's and Bahonar's death; and while a suitcase containing a fuseless bomb was placed in Khomeyni's room to underscore the fact that the opposition can reach even Khomeyni's home, Khomeyni [himself] saw the first group of Iranian pilgrims off--this year 70,000 will go on the pilgrimage--and told them, "Make use of this holy encounter to bring the problems of the Islamic world to an end through public discourse." In this speech of his he called upon other Muslims to "take advantage of the Iranian Revolution, to eliminate injustice and oppression in their country and to establish Islamic governments" that would join the great revolution of Iran.

An unemployed Iranian said, "The government is now making excuses for the stifling economic crises that we are suffering from. It is protecting us and protecting our lives. When other Islamic revolutions join us, it will turn its attention to saving us materially."

What is the solution [to this dilemma]? The Iranian says, "We don't know. In the past they used to say, 'How many crimes are committed in your name, O freedom!' Today, we have substituted the word, freedom, with the word, revolution. The only thing the government can do is consolidate the chaos. Everybody has weapons. All the opposition parties are found in the same locations in the army, in the administrations, in the streets and among the clergy. The fact that the government is appealing to the opposition to lay down its weapons means nothing.

"At any rate, if everybody does not lay down his weapons and talk, Iran will not be saved without foreign intervention. At that time the greatest crime of all will have been committed in the name of the revolution."

Discussions within Iran about the future of the communist Tudeh party have been resumed. Whereas the Mojahedin-e Khalq declared they were responsible for the assassinations, the Kurdish-Iranian Democratic party [KDP] affirmed that the Tudeh party, whose constituents have extensive connections [in the government], is carrying out these operations "and saving us from our enemies." And while some information states that the present interest of the United States is to ensure a stable and strong government in Iran to guarantee that oil will be pumped and to protect the borders of Iran from its neighbors who are lying in wait, Moscow was satisfied with the comment published in TASS that the Soviet Union began making marginal communications with countries that are friendly to it and to Iran.

But until this moment and despite the activity of the opposition inside the country and the opposition communities abroad, Khomeyni lingers, as a European who lived in Iran a long time says. This European adds, "The opposition can get rid of persons only, but it seems that it is out of touch with the reality of Iran. When Bani-Sadr was the target of a campaign and

when the council announced that a vote would be taken to determine his suitability for the presidency, one of the leaders of the Iranian opposition abroad said, "If Bani-Sadr is assassinated, a civil war will sweep Iran." But the hour for that in Iran has not yet come. The fanatic faith in Iran still exists, as it did even before Islam in the age of Zoroaster. Khomeyni knows how to arouse people's indignation. A year ago, for example, Iranians knew nothing about Raja'i and Bahonar who were brought to prominence by Khomeyni. What liberalism or democratic socialism would govern Iran when half a million persons march in the funeral of two men who were unknown a year ago?"

My partner in the conversation adds, "Even the opposition that was on Khomeyni's side for a few days makes errors in its expectations. Is it true that Khomeyni is a man who does not know what he has to do as Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr said?"

All events indicate the opposite. Those who know Khomeyni know that he does not trust anyone completely. Although he has assigned roles and superficial responsibilities to those who are close to him and in whom he claims to have confidence, he has kept the decision making power himself. From the outset he gave his paternal love to no one but his son, Ahmad, who is the only one charged by Khomeyni with the task of communicating with those who are close and with the opposition as well. Furthermore, Khomeyni continued to play all the roles through his son, Ahmad, even in his isolation. It seems that the communications which Ahmad is conducting suggest that he is not merely a clergyman with a famous name.

8592
CSO: 4604/3

TUDEH PARTY CHARGED WITH INFILTRATION AMONG YOUTH

Tehran AHZAB in Persian 22 Sep 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] PAYAM-E MARDOM, the clandestine student publication of the Tudeh Party, contains all the characteristics of the line of creeping conspiracy. Furthermore, it serves as propaganda for communist heathenism and the Soviet bloc.

Brothers and sisters, the key to identifying the clandestine publications of the Tudeh Party is presented in this article.

The major characteristics of the line of creeping conspiracy, the line of leftist hypocrisy, the line of the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union, which are the keys and criteria by which to to recognize the Soviet and Tudeh publications and minigroups, are summarized as follows:

1. Hypocritical defense of the revolution and the imam

2. Metamorphoses or elimination of the Islamic content of the revolution

3. Direct or indirect propaganda and praise for the Soviet Union and its satelites

4. Instigating discord, creating and escalating differences, magnifying the mistakes and splits, and on the whole, weakening the unity of the Moslem nation of Iran

Another of the Clandestine publications affiliated with the infamous Tudeh Party is PAYAM-E MARDOM, which is published weekly for students.

> This publication, too, like ETTEHAD-E MARDOM, ETTEHAD, and other clandestine publications affiliated with the hated Tudeh Party, follows the same line of "creeping conspiracy against the Islamic Republic of Iran and the sacred foundations of Islam."
>
> It is the same line which caused the prosecutor of the Islamic revolution in the capitol to close down the central organ of the infamous Tudeh Party, NAMEH-YE MARDOM.

The characteristics of this line, the line of creeping conspiracy against the Islamic Republic and the sacred foundations of Islam, have already become clear to all our dear, scrutinizing readers. Merely as a reminder, we will review a few of its major highlights.

> Let the "key" to the recognition of the clandestine publications affiliated with the Tudeh Party be provided for all liberated Moslem brothers and sisters so that even when they see a scrap of paper with these characteristics, they can recognize them and point them out to the people.

1. Hypocritical Defense of the Imam and the Revolution

In this line, which is the line of absolute hypocirsy, there are always pictures and speeches of the leader of the Islamic revolution for the sole purpose of deception.

The reader who turns the pages of such a publication would think that they are Moslems, too.

Not only Moslems, but followers on the path of the leader of the Islamic revolution and followers of his line, since on the surface, there is much praise of Imam Khomeyni, his leadership, and his anti-imperialist people's line.

But all of this is merely fraud and deception, merely to disguise their counterrevolutionary, anti-Islamic face and to attract the attention of the Moslem people through trickery.

Let us remember the statement of the martyred professor, the late Motahhari, God bless him, who had addressed a few Marxist youths as follows:

". . . You do not believe in Ayatollah Khomeyni. When you are by yourselves, you say: We will go along with this man up to a certain point and then we will fight him. Why do you carry his picture in your demonstrations? Why do you lie? The one you believe in is Lenin . . . Why do you carry the picture of our leader?"

Morteza Motahhari, "Piramun-e Enqelab-e Eslami" [On the Parimeters of the Islamic Revolution], p 10.

Study carefully these statements which he made in his speech on 2 Bahman 57 [22 Jan 79], before the victory of the revolution, in the college of theology. They uncover many of the deceptions of the heathen Marxists who pretend to be supporters of the revolution and even of the imam.

In any case, this first important characteristic of the line of creeping conspiracy, the line of leftist hypocrisy, the line of the heathen and heretical Tudeh Party and all their open and clandestine publications is witnessed in PAYAM-E MARDOM.

/That is, PAYAM-E MARDOM prints the imam's picture; quotes the imam's statements; and speaks in support of the revolution, the imam, and the clergy; but all this is to complete and implement the line of creeping conspiracy/ [in boldface]. These are the same Mar ists of whom the late Motahhari speaks. They lie. Not only are they not supporters of the revolution and the imam, but they are by nature anti-Islam and anti-Islamic-revolution and /all their efforts are spent to misdirect the course of the Islamic revolution away from Islam and to metamorphose and distort true Islamic concepts/ [in boldface].

2. The Elimination and Metamorphosis of the Content of the Islamic Revolution

/The second characteristic of the leftist hypocritical line, the line of creeping conspiracy, the line of the Tudeh Party and all the open and clandestine publications affiliated with it, is its very opposition to the nature of the Islamic revolution/ [in boldface]. They constantly try to empty the revolution of its Islamic content, to give godly and religious motivations a materialistic and naturalistic interpretation, and to distort and metamorphose the Islamic spirit of the revolution.

That is why in all the propaganda of the Tudeh Party and their affiliated groups and open and clandestine publications, the only things which have purposefully been omitted, of which there is not a trace, are God, spirituality, and the Islamic spirit. And if there is occasionally talk of Islam and the Prophet, it is metamorphosed and distorted. The explanations are 100 percent materialistic. They speak of certain dimensions of Islam or the personality of its revered Prophet, may God bless him and his family, which are found in ungodly places and personalities as well. There is no truth or spirit in what they write. True Islam, spirituality, and godliness are nowhere to be found.

The fact that the Tudeh Party tries to take Islam out of the revolution can be clearly seen in the analyses of this Party concerning the

Islamic revolution and movement. They have never focused on, in fact, have purposely ignored, the godly emphasis which has been observed from the beginning of the movement until the victory over the overthrown monarchical regime and has been felt even after the victory of the revolution over the various plots of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the united counterrevolutionary front, etc. (Of course, the Soviet Union, which is their master, is without a doubt clear of any conspiracy!)

All this is proof that the Tudeh Party fundamentally opposes Islam and the Islamic revolution. On the surface, though, in talk only, it calls itself a supporter and protector of the Islamic revolution, the imam, etc.

3. Propaganda for the Soviet Union

> Another characteristic of the line of "creeping conspiracy" is the direct and indirect propaganda for the Soviet Union, its allies, and the members of its bloc.

This propaganda is so extensive and well planned that there remains no doubt about the "creeping conspiracy." The pages of the official organ of the Tudeh Party and its other open and clandestine publications are full of direct and indirect propaganda for the Soviet Union and its satelites. This propaganda is often so open and shameful that it would truly pain any liberated Moslem.

After all, it is true that the criminal United States is the great Satan of this beloved Islamic revolution and, as the imam has instructed, "all the shouting we want to do" must "be directed against the United States." But this does not mean that we should forget the crimes of the superpower which is our northern neighbor and the barbaric invasion by its mercenary soldiers of the Islamic country of Afghanistan and /not only fail to condemn it, but even justify it, and then spread propaganda for the Soviet Union, trying to pull the economy, politics, and culture of our Islamic society towards that heathen and aggressive country!/ [in boldface]

4. Creating Discord

Another characteristic of the line of "creeping conspiracy" is creating discord and disunity among the Moslem forces. You may be surprised, but this is the truth, a proven fact. These conspirators speak much of "unity" and waste their breath much about the "united front," but they have always been and are still among the important elements of disunity and discord. A clear example of this act of creating discord, escalating disunity, and widening splits by the Tudeh Party and other Soviet elements in Iran is their division of the authorities and the entire ruling body of the Islamic Republic

into two factions, of which, according to them, one is superficial and the other revolutionary, and so on.

In this connection, we have more to say and much more proof, which we will leave for another time.

> Only a few characteristics of the line of "creeping conspiracy" have been mentioned. Attention to these characteristics is a key to recognizing all the anti-Islamic, counterrevolutionary propaganda of the Tudey Party and their rivals, the agents of the Soviet Union and the United States, in this Islamic society. With this key and yardstick, the open and clandestine publications of the Tudeh Party can be identified. Also, we can identify the minigroups which are directly or indirectly affiliated with the Tudeh Party and are, in fact, created by the Tudeh Party to make Tudeh propaganda in specific guilds and groups or act in accordance with the line of the Tudeh Party and who cooperate with, follow, and support the Tudeh Party while they try to hide their connections and affiliations with it.
>
> PAYAM-E MARDOM, the clandestine publication of the Tudeh Party for students, contains precisely all the above-mentioned characteristics.

It hypocritically prints the pictures and statements of the imam.

Through trickery, it negates the Islamic nature of the revolution or at least tries to ignore it.

It makes propaganda for the Soviet Union and its satelites.

It follows the Tudeh Party line of creating disunity and discord.

And so on.

All of this can be found in the various issues of this publication, and found quite easily.

Additionally, it contains instructions and directives for spreading heathenism, heresy, Marxism, and so-called socialism. And it indirectly teaches evil and recommends such things as immoral and impure books. In certain cases, it tries to drag the students and youth into deviation and incites them to rebellion, etc. In short, PAYAM-E MARDOM works for the precise objectives of the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Union. This can be proven when we take a passing glance at a few issues, paying close attention to how it was established, when it

began its publication, its name changes, addresses, and its owners and finally, by recognizing the "Kanun-e Daneshamuzan-e Iran" [Center for Iranian Students], which is the so-called student group of the Tudeh Party. With the explanations which will be presented to our dear readers in future issues along with undeniable proof and evidence as well as photostats from PAYAM-E MARDOM, we hope that both the honorable executive authorities in the Ministries of Education and Islamic Guidance, the Justice Department, and the revolutionary courts and our dear, young student brothers and sisters, who are the hope for the future of our great Islamic revolution and the new-found Islamic regime, realize the filthy, heathen, Soviet, Tudeh nature of the operations of PAYAM-E MARDOM, the clandestine publication of the Tudeh Party for students, and more than ever before neutralize the creeping conspiracies of these agents of heathenism, heresy, apostacy, and dependency.

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CSO: 4640/29

REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR WARNS ARMED DEMONSTRATORS WILL BE EXECUTED

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 20 Sep 81 pp 12, 10

[Text] Yesterday afternoon, Ayatollah Gilani, the religious judge, and Mr Asadollah Lajevardi, the prosecutor of the Islamic revolution of the capitol, participated in a press and radio-television interview and answered the questions of correspondents. First, our correspondent asked: Following the recent explosions and terrorist acts, the revolutionary Moslem people of Iran, through letters and petitions as well as demonstrations, have demanded more decisive action against the counterrevolution. What steps have been taken by the Prosecutor's Office in response to this demand of the nation thusfar and what program will be followed in the future?

Mr Lajevardi:

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful. The duty of the Prosecutor's Office is to discover and identify the functionary elements who are engaged in conspiracies in the Islamic Republic of Iran. It expends all its efforts to identify and arrest these terrorist elements. Thanks be to God, it has thusfar been very successful. The wish of the people necessitates our positive response to this rightful demand of the people concerning the mercenary pro-American groups who intend to overthrow the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It will identify all these elements and hand them over to the courts of Islamic justice for their punishment. In this regard, a large number of safehouses, leaders and commanders of operations, and group leaders have been identified, captured, and handed over to the courts. The courts have carried out the verdict of Islamic justice concerning them. We hope to uncover this weapon of theirs, which is insignificant, and then hand them over to the court so that the court can carry out its Islamic verdict concerning them. Again, our correspondent asked:

Recently, it has been observed in some parts of Tehran that the hypocrites participate in armed demonstrations. This has caused insecurity throughout the society. What steps have been taken to prevent more strictly and more decisively the actions of these

prevent more strictly and more decisively the actions of these deceived individuals?

Mr Lajevardi: I must openly say to the people of Iran that the revolutionary courts and the Prosecutor's Office are determined to stop any sort of disturbance of the peace and security and to bring back real security. Anyone who would take the smallest armed action will face the most severe punishment.

We have identified and captured the pro-American hypocrites organization which has deceived a number of the children of this country and has put arms in their hands and which carries out demonstrations with firearms and other weapons in the streets. Yesterday, we sent a large number of them to the court, which issued its verdict concerning them. They were sent before the firing squad yesterday.

/I openly warn the parents to watch their children carefully/ [in boldface]. We know that these children have been deceived. When they come to the court, the day after their arrest, they repent their positions. But, such repentance is then no longer useful.

If anyone shoots at a brother revolutionary guard and intends to overthrow the Islamic Republic, there is no turning back for him. He must be executed as a lesson for others. We stand decisively against this kind of counterrevolutionary movement and we will not allow the sudden shaking of the foundation of the Islamic Republic by a number of deceived, ignorant people. It is our Islamic and revolutionary duty to protect the fruits of our revolution and not to give an opportunity to these corrupt, terrorist elements to endanger the Islamic Republic and to disturb the security of the people through their childish games. We hope, God willing, that those others whose hands have not yet been soiled by these crimes will learn a lesson from these executions and realize if they are captured in armed demonstrations, they will have no other punishment but execution.

Question: A number of these hypocrites, when they are captured, find it an opportune time to repent. When they are freed, they commit a crime such as placing bombs in the Islamic Republican Party headquarters, the prime minister's office, or the revolutionary prosecutor's office. What guidelines are there to verify the repentance of these hypocrites which will warrant their freedom? And also, what decisions have you taken to verify more thoroughly their repentances?

Ayatollah Gilani: In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful. Repentance is regarded a necessity in Islam. In the Koran, we have a sura called "Repentance." In 12 places in this sura, repentance is mentioned. The acceptance of repentance and the conditions for repentance have been discussed in terms of both ethics and religious law. Those who are captured and are arraigned by the courts, if they are belligerent, according to the text of the holy

Koran, their repentance is not acceptable after their arrest. If they repent before the Prosecutor's Office or the government arrests them, their repentance will be accepted. But the repentance of belligerent people is unacceptable after their arrest and their punishment will be that which the Koran instructs: killing by the most violent of means, hanging in the most disgraceful manner possible, and the cutting off of their right hands and their left feet. But, for those who have attacked the just government and conspired to overthrow it, the road to repentance is open to them if they have not picked up arms. (Those who carry out armed demonstrations in the streets are considered belligerent.) If they are arrested unarmed, their killing is permissible; however, if they repent and we are certain that they have turned around, their repentance will be accepted. Those who are captured and brought before the court after committing so many crimes and injustices, it would be very difficult to accept their repentance unless the religious judge has become certain.

Oh children, before it is too late and before you are captured, you can turn yourselves in to the proper courts so that your repentance and pleas are accepted, before it is determined whether or not you have really turned around. One of the signs of repentance is to expose the secrets of the organization and their arms centers. If you turn around, I think it would be much easier for you. /Islam permits the capture of those who carry out armed demonstrations in the streets, and right then and there shooting them up against the wall/ [in boldface]. From the standpoint of the principles of religious law, it is unnecessary to bring them to the courts, because they have been belligerent. I am saying this so that they know this is what the Koran and Islam instruct. But, as the Imam has said, they should be handed over to the proper courts. Islam does not allow taking the wounded body of this type of individual to the hospitals, but they must all be killed.

Question: /Recently, some of the supporters of minigroups who were captured in connection with throwing Molotov coctails, etc./ [in boldface] have claimed that if they do not cooperate with their affiliated minigroups, they are threatened with death by those groups. If this is true, could you tell us if these individuals are able to explain their being threatened; are they protected by the Prosecutor's Office; and, also, do you have any guidelines in this regard?

Mr Lajevardi:

We even had a case where one of these gentlemen had repented. When the organization realized that he had repented, they warned him again and the third time they executed him. In our questioning, they often make this claim, saying that if they repent, they will be threatened. These brothers should know that those who repent and return to the

arms of the nation are supported by the population of Iran. If they come back to the arms of the people, the whole Iranian nation will protect them and there would be no need for the Prosecutor's Office to protect them; they will be protected by the pasdaran, the committees, other organizations, as well as the Prosecutor's Office. As the Prosecutor's Office protects and must protect the lives and property of the Iranian people and those brothers who repent, it will use the inexhaustible force of the people to protect them. I should remind those who want to repent and return to the arms of Islam that not much is left of the organization. They should not be afraid. One of the characteristics of terrorists is that when they do something, they achieve a certain amount of false prestige. For instance, you see that in one week, five or six terrorist acts take place. Those who are not in the main stream of events think that these few terrorist acts have been done by a group of several thousand people. But this is not so. An individual takes part in one operation and escapes safely. He then takes part in a second one and then in a third one. We have had cases in which one team has participated in four, five, or six terrorist acts. Presently, they are being questioned. Therefore, it is not true when you think a few terrorist acts or arsons are done by a very extensive organization. No, that is not the case. We have had cases here in which one person has taken part in nine cases of Molotov coctail operations. One of the characteristics of the organization is that they act surreptitiously. This creates a false prestige for them. Those brothers who repent can return to the lap of the people and become part of the 36 million people of Iran who are members of God's Party [Hezbollah]. They should not be in the least frightened. The Prosecutor's Office will protect them seriously and will bring punishment to those who threaten them for their actions.

We ask of these brothers that they inform the Prosecutor's Office if they are threatened and that they provide this Office with information concerning the threatening individuals so that the Prosecutor's Office will be able to capture and punish them.

Question: In connection with the conspiracies which the minigroups are preparing for in some of the cities and whose implementors are being captured, sometimes a number of ordinary people are accused of taking part in the skirmishes and are arrested and then released after a few days. Is there any kind of plan to speed up the release of this kind of person?

Answer: In the course of demonstrations, people will be going about their daily business when suddenly a number of people will begin to demonstrate. Then, when they are pursued, they escape and take advantage of the crowd of people to hide among them. Naturally, the law enforcement forces who want to capture them must arrest all suspicious people in the area. After their arrests, they are then identified at the Prosecutor's Office. If it is made certain for us on the first

day that they were not involved in the demonstrations, they are released immediately.

We request of the people that they clear the scene immediately as soon as they see a demonstration in one corner of the city, so that these people do not have the opportunity to hide among the crowd and then officials can identify these individuals quickly.

[Passage missing] and an innocent person would be arrested along with them and consequently the work of the court will be lighter. This does not mean that the people should clear the scene; but, they should clear a circle around these elements and even if they try to escape and hide in the crowd, the crowd should eject them and point them out to the police.

Question: What is the penalty for those who hide arms in their houses if the weapons are discovered?

Answer: Depending on the circumstances, the motivation, and the intention of the accused, the case will be studied to find out why the weapon was kept. Then the penalty can be determined.

Question: There are a number of hypocrites or minigroups whose hands have not been soiled by anyone's blood and who have not taken part in the fighting. These kinds of individuals wish to repent quietly and do not wish to take part in radio and television interviews. What should these individuals do?

Answer: In order to make certain that they have really repented, we have certain standard guidelines. /I must say openly that a number of people want to take advantage of the repentance issue/ [in boldface]. Say someone has worked against the Islamic Republic and has committed certain crimes. If this person wants to repent by merely saying "I repent" and receive amnesty from the Prosecutor's Office, this kind of repentance cannot be done. They must at least provide the Prosecutor's Office with the information at their disposal and must surely show the weapons they have hidden. We do not insist that they participate in television interviews. The criterion for repentence is that if they know of hidden weapons or safehouses, or if they know a person who has committed terrorism in connection with the organization, they should give the related information to the Prosecutor's Office; otherwise, their repentance will not be accepted.
Question: Television interviews with deceived individuals and minigroups have had significant influence on the society. Will these interviews continue?

Certainly, this will be the case. Those who have been arrested in this connection, whenever they see me, they unanimously request an interview. Presently, there is a large number who insist on volunteering for interviews. Whatever jail we go to, the first

question is: Why have you not come to interview us? Mostly, they have taken advantage of people's children, always taking advantage of their ignorance. The person who attacked the home of Mr Rabbani-Amlashi was asked after his capture what his motive was. Despite the fact that he is 28 years old, he said that he did not have the slightest motivation and did not know why he had done this. He had participated without any reason and no matter how hard he tried, he could not find a motive. You see what elements they take advantage of and how they deceive the innocent children of the people. They took advantage of 14 and 15-year old children as the tools for their crimes and defiled these pure little children.

Mr Lajevardi, concerning the accusations by the mercenary and imperialist radios concerning the operation of the courts, said:

The enemy never sits idly by. The enemy characteristically always uses the weapon of accusations. Lying is quite simple, but proving, providing documented evidence, is very difficult. Also, in connection with the necessity of an extensive purge in the organizations and institutions, he said: Certainly it is so. We are identifying and reconstructing those elements who work against the Islamic Republic in the revolutionary organizations. The identification of the hypocrites is very difficult, but as far as possible, and with the cooperation of the revolutionary people, we continue to identify them. We ask the people to identify the infiltrating individuals to the proper authorities. He added: We will no longer show any mercy to those individuals who infiltrate the revolutionary organizations and their punishment will be the same as the punishment for espionage.

Concerning the announcement to families of the names of those who have been captured immediately after their arrests, Mr Lajevardi said: The counterrevolutionaries try very hard to find out what elements we have arrested. Therefore, we do not feel obliged to announce the names of the captured people. This is for reasons of security and the future actions of the court.

. . . The anti-people fascists never committed as many crimes as these people. What happened to the cries for human rights and why have the liberals not condemned these people, even once, but protest to us whose duty is to bring justice to the people? We who want to uproot terrorism are the target of their protests.

In regard to the question of where the hypocrites organization obtains its income, Mr Lajevardi said: It is clear to all the people that it comes from the great thefts they committed in the beginning of the revolution. When you were engaged in the struggle, they were busy amassing fortunes. They stole quite a lot from the banks; they took gold and jewelry; they plundered huge sums of money, according to documents. What they made in the country was through theft and

plunder. There is no documentation to show that they are fed from outside. Also, concerning the necessity of an intelligence organization, he said: We have not had an intelligence organization in the Islamic Republic. Our intelligence organization consists of the 36 million people of Iran. All these elements were identified for us by the people. This information was incomplete and unsophisticated. Through one person who is identified by the people, we find a group and we capture the commanders and leaders. With the investigations we make, we achieve good results and we have destroyed the hypocrites organization. We still ask the people to provide us with information and to continue to help us.

In response to the last question concerning Sa'adati's participation in the martyrdom of brother Kachu'i, which has been confirmed by the organization, about whether there is any contradiction between this action and the last will and testament of Kachu'i, who condemned the position of the organization and terrorism, Mr Lajevardi said:

Mr Sa'adati is one of the most leftist elements of the hypocrites organization. Before the martyrdom of Kachu'i, he defended his position, or, as he says, he confronted us from a higher position. When Kachu'i was martyred by Afjeh'i, it became clear that Sa'adati was in control of Afjeh'i. We then transferred Sa'adati to an isolation cell, where he found the opportunity to meditate. With the contacts made with him in the isolation cell, he changed all of his previous positions. When it is said that this is not Sa'adati's last will and testament, it is true. Yes, this is not Sa'adati's last will and testament before the martyrdom of Kachu'i [as published].

These contacts resulted in his turning back from many of his former positions.

The realities he wrote about have become clear to him in the course of one month. The contradiction is between Sa'adati's positions before and after Kachu'i's death, because before the martyrdom of Kachu'i, he had contact with the organization through Afjeh'i and was controlled by the organization. The reason for the change in his position and his condemnation of the actions of the organization is that his relationship with the organization had been severed and he was able to think independently. If this is a contradiction, we must realize that it stems from the absurdity of the borrowed ideas of the hypocrites organization.

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NATURE OF POLITICAL ACTIVITIES IN SCHOOLS OUTLINED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Sep 81 p 3

> [Text] Yesterday Ali Akbar Parvaresh, minister of education and training took part in a radio-television conference and answered reporters' questions concerning various matters related to education and training.

The minister of education and training was first asked whether, with the opening of schools a few days away, school books would be available at all educational levels by Mehr first [23 Sep].

Parvaresh said: As far as I have been told elementary school books would be given to the children at the start of the school year and this has been unprecedented in the past 25 years.

There are a total of 510 instructional and visual aid books. Of this 49 are new and the rest are those which have been revised. Effort has been made to replace the dark and ignorant educational system of the shah period with the Islamic system, but basically it has not been changed yet. Of the 49 new categories the distribution of 15 will be delayed. In order to avoid waste of time, effort has been made to have 32 pages of these subjects printed and distributed in educational sectors. The remaining books are to be made ready after work on the 32 pages has been completed.

Political Activities in Schools

The minister of education and training was told that even though educational officials have issued explanations concerning many aspects of political activity in schools, students want the minister to know the limitation of student rights concerning political activity in schools.

The minister of education and training replied: Normally all students must be interested in political activity because involvement in political issues is not separate from Islamic education--and the Imam has many times repeated the words of the late Modarress that 'Our policy is a replica of our religion, our religion an exact replica of our policy'. The Imam himself expounded this view in a more comprehensive term. Religion and policy are therefore inseparable and ideological and educational work in which students believe also include political work. But of course in order to progress in stabilizing the government there must be a reduction in the number of decision centers so that only responsible centers of authority can make decisions. But this does not mean we should lack interest in our own

destiny and what effects us. Therefore, the job of Islamic Councils at the school level is to supervise, just as it is among the objectives of the constitution that all the people should have this general supervision over each other. It follows that the role of students in educational and administrative matters is only a supervisory one, not one of interference, because if they were to interfere in general matters that would increase the number of decision centers and destabilize the government. They should maintain total supervision and put the matter to those responsible if they see any shortage or inadequacy.

Supporters of Factions

Ali Akbar Parvaresh had this to say when asked to comment on reports that the ministry of education and training has prevented registration of supporters of factions: Allow me to give my own overall view of Islamic policy in this regard--a policy which is also in effect in the ministry of education and training. Basically, forces which are revolutionary and faithful to the revolution must in reality decide, supervise and administer; this, whether teacher or student on the educational level or those in responsible positions on other national levels. Other non-revolutionary forces fall into two groups. One group is made up of individuals who are ignorant and uninformed and unfamiliar with the movement of the revolution. As the general Islamic policy requires, these persons must be given guidance. That is, for these forces a guidance and instructional policy will be put into effect. As a part of the government, the ministry of education and training will institute a guidance training program for the uninitiated and the unfamiliar who because of emotional reasons have for a brief period become tools of factions and ignorant and egoist individuals. As for the group of persons who are spiteful and in reality fighting the system, not only is there no place for them in the educational system but as the Holy Koran says they must be dealt with severely. Therefore our attitude toward the uninformed and unitiated is one of explanation and guidance, while it is very ha sh and decisive toward spiteful, arrogant individuals given to creating chaos and tension.

Teacher Shortage

The minister of education and training was asked to comment on the expected shortage of school teachers now that, with the reopening of universities, many university students who had been temproarily teaching in shcools would be returning to college, and whether new graduate teachers would be used to make up the shortage?

The minister of education and training replied: The shortage you mentioned is a fact particularly since a teacher must be ideologically efficient and experienced. Because of this we do have shortages. My predecessors gave high importance to teacher training and worked hard to get the right people into teacher training courses. Last Friday we held an examination for this. A number of other dependable individuals are now teaching and are paid on the basis of teaching assignment or contract. They will be put on the payroll after a probationary period. We hope that with the continuation of this system, to recruit a new generation that will carry on Islamic education.

Hezbollah Rule

The minister of education and training was reminded of a remark he had made during an earlier interview to the effect that he hoped the current school year would be

the year of Hezbollah rule in schools and he was asked what changes this would mean in teaching methods and what programs he had in mind in furthering the activities of this group?

The minister of education and training replied: First of all I would like to say as an introductory remark that the interview was published in headline form and not as a whole, because I had said this year was the year of the Koranic Hezbollah rule. When one speaks of Hezbollah the reference is to the Hezbollah to which the Koran refers. God's first word is that he who has registered in His party must be full of love and dedication toward God and His laws. And so, God forbid, some newspaper readers may have been malicious or mistaken in interpreting the remarks and brought up the issue through letters and phone calls, some of them insulting. Do not assume that when we refer to the year of Hezbollah it means the year of the rule of the 'Zh-2' and of the 'Kalashnykov'. No, it is the year of the rule of Koranic Hezbollah, the year when capabilities are to be developed, the hidden, God-given qualities of a person are to rise in achieving the wishes of the Almighty. In reality it is to be a year of order. When we say Hezbollah we mean the symbol of ideal order, calculated thinking, care, knowledge, information and study. I felt I should speak about this so that, God forbid, this misunderstanding will not be repeated in our dear nation's mind.

Now concerning those dear individuals active in educational affairs. Unfortunately in some places contacts wtth these dear persons have been unpleasant. They thought these have come for spy and control purposes in the schools. This is not so. Those working in training activities have the responsibility of transferring the Islamic educational process to the schools, in cooperating and working with teachers in developing the capabilities of our children. These individuals are not patches of a different fabric. At the same time teachers and students should not look at them as outsiders. All forces should be mobilized so that, God willing, this Islamic educational system replaces the one used during so many years of rule and many parts of which have been cleaned.

Security Needs in Schools

He was asked that in view of the fact that schools will soon open and the possibility of bombs being placed there by Khalq or troublemakers of other factions what steps have been considered to insure security in schools?

Parvaresh replied: Of course it has crossed everyone's mind that these factions which are going through the last moments of their political existence and which the Imam has described as cats that attack a lion might resort to such violence. Such could happen. We have discussed such possibilities with the government and orders have been issued to the minister of interior. The matter has also been discussed by the council which coordinates forces responsible for decisions concerning the work of students. The participants were the Jehad and corps groups, the ministry of education and training and the school mobilization group. They decided on necessary security measures. I would like to say here that the duty of our dear students is carefully and tactfully to prevent ugly and sinister movements before they occur. If the students themselves increase their vigilance, such damage will not take place. Of course I should point out that all the efforts of these groups were intended to cause suspicion and indecision amongst us. The

Holy Koran considers such an attitude as the work of the devil. We should take care that in exercising more care and caution in this matter we are not pulled into such a state of mind. We must therefore exercise caution and tact and let the matter be handled on a broad scale at school level by Hezbollah forces. Thus, God willing, there will be no chance of such ugly occurences. Of course they might gather in their troublemaking hideouts and arrive at decisions and they may even think that by eliminating a few students or teachers they will destroy our system. These are vain thoughts. We believe the Almighty so far has been good to us by exposing many a treacherous plan. Of course this does not mean we should let our guard down.

Education Year in the War Zone

The minister of education and training had this to say about the condition of students and teachers in the war zone: As a result of facilities created for them, many of them have been absorbed in employment and the students are continuing their studies. But we are ashamed that we have not been able to provide work for a number of them who have lost everything because of the imposed war. I must say everything possible has been done even though the result has been inadequate. I hope that with the help of God they will soon be able to return to reconstruct their areas and to renew their endeavors.

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ABU-DIS COLLEGE OF SCIENCES DISCUSSED

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 3

[Interview with Dr Zuhayr al-Karami, scientist and educator, on the occasion of the opening of the Abu-Dis College of Sciences in Jerusalem; date and place not specified]

[Text] Having recently returned to his homeland, Dr Zuhayr al-Karami presided over the opening of the College of Sciences in Abu Dis, which is considered one of the major science projects Dr al-Karami is seeking to achieve in order to fulfill every Palestinian's dream of seeking knowledge right from its sources. It is worthwhile noting that Dr al-Karami is well known in this field; he is a pioneer scientist and a great educator who had a major role in applying many scientific and technological projects. He believes that science and knowledge are the means to mold the contemporary person to move with rapid scientific progress. Dr al-Karami introduces himself as a "traditionalist educator"; he studied at the American University of Beirut and then continued his education at the Royal College of Technology in London.

Dr al-Karami has been seen on numerous occasions on television programs and heard on the air, in addition to [being known for] his widely circulated scientific works.

The opening of the College of Sciences--Jerusalem has been regarded as a major advance to be noted in occupied Palestine's development, because it is an educational institution like the rest of the institutions and universities, yet it is the first of its kind in the region to offer modern programs and methods with regard to specializations, structure, equipment and facilities, curricula, and material and instructional amenities. This is a reality that has been achieved by thoughtful people.

I met Dr al-Karami on numerous occasions at the college where students and researchers congregate, at the Ambassador hotel in Jerusalem where he has taken up temporary residence, and at our house, as he is a colleague of my father's in science as well as is his mentor.

Conversing with him is thrilling, enjoyable and profound, stimulating knowledge and thought and carrying one into boundless and wonderful scientific and intellectual realms. I tried hard to record most of what Dr al-Karami had to say and

to present it to the reader as he so graciously relayed it. A feeling of elation and esteem engulfs me whenever I encounter such a person who gives one the feeling of security and comfort about the future of our nation and who teaches that work and its application come before speeches and commentary.

[Question] What of the importance of science and science education?

[Answer] In my opinion, science education is very important; I believe it is more important now than anything else in the Arab world. By science education I mean science, scientific research, and technology and they are not to be separated from each other. In many Arab universities, we see a clear-cut division between sciences and scientific research and technology, and the latter, in my view, is merely the application of science and scientific research. Science is the basis and scientific research is the essence of science without which science would not exist. If science and the product of scientific research, which is technology, were not applied, there would be no scientific civilization.

I have heard people praise Western civilization so often. In my opinion, this is not the same as modern civilization. Western civilization is founded on a religious, ethnic and technical base, which distinguishes the development of the West, but modern civilization is technological scientific civilization, and it is not Western, but universal civilization. Hence, Japan adopted this civilization and excelled in it; yet it is not Western, but oriental. The Arabs misunderstood the meaning of modern civilization, while the Japanese comprehended it.

Since the awakening and the days of the great Muhammad 'Ali, the Arabs have confused the meanings of liberal Western civilization, particular only to the West, and of the technical scientific civilization. For this reason, they have, since the awakening, concentrated their efforts on the study of the humanities, and there have not been efforts of sufficient number or quality to study sciences and technology. This misinterpretation of the two civilizations is responsible for the Arab nation's seeming modern while it is falling behind in science and technology, which are the backbone of modern civilization. We have poets, literary men and philosophers of world standing, but we are deficient in scientists and technologists. This fact alienates us as a society from the scientific and technological world which we live in.

This is but one aspect of the backwardness we suffer, and it is not owing to our lack of potential, it is just a result of poor guidance and planning. This does not mean we do not need literary people, but all of us must be humane and cultural scientists.

[Question] Do you think the College of Sciences can fill the gap?

[Answer] The purpose of this college is to give guidance to the student in the area of science and scientific research and in their technological application. The material is there and a plan to utilize it is there; it remains to implement it. In my opinion, this is an experiment that ought not be left unfinished.

[Question] And the period of study?

[Answer] Four years.

[Question] Prerequisites for admission?

[Answer] I do not believe a student should be denied admission to the college on the basis of his grades; therefore, the first year should be a probationary period to see his reaction to this philosophy of teaching. The final examinations will be standardized and well-considered, and only those qualified would be eligible to pass on to the second year. I am one of those who believe that mastering the English language is a fundamental prerequisite for higher education. Therefore, there will be a great deal of attention paid to the English language. The college will also have an academic cooperation program with a foreign university which would offer exchange programs in research, administer examinations and cooperate in formulating curricula; thus the present difficulties which are faced in the masters and doctoral degree programs would be smoothed out because they would be shared by the two universities. If we succeed, it is then possible that a student may earn two degrees from two universities: one from here and one from abroad.

[Question] And what financial resources does the college have?

[Answer] The college is being funded by philanthropists from here and from Kuwait, the Islamic conference, Jordan and others. A large part of the [university] buildings were constructed from staff token contributions. Therefore, we do not seek to make a profit. Our fees will be token ones and boarding fees will be below cost.

[Question] What about fields of specialization and future programs?

[Answer] He added: "During the first year, the curriculum shall include the following areas of specialization: mathematics, physics, chemistry and biology. The second year will include geology, astronomy, technology, physics and mathematics. Biochemistry, computer programming, radiology, medical technology, an operating room, nutrition, eugenics, environmental preservation and public health will all be offered in the future."

[Question] And the relationship between the college and other universities?

[Answer] Dr al-Karami reiterated his respect for the other educational institutions and added: "We are one of a group with one aim. We propose to unify higher education in the West Bank and Gaza into a single university with campuses throughout the region, and we accept the college's being within the structure of a unified university system. I hope that the council on higher education will succeed in implementing this policy at some point. 'Educational shops' are not beneficial, but a unified university system with [satellite] campuses will offer an in-depth and solid education."

[Question] And the university administration?

[Answer] Dr al-Karami pointed out that the president of the university is Shaykh Sa'd-al-Din al-'Alami, mufti [muslim religious leader] of Jerusalem and chairman of the West Bank Board of Trustees. Dr al-Karami himself will be the vice president and officer-in-charge.

It is to be noted that Dr al-Karami is readily and rapidly organizing the university affairs for its formal opening on 21 September. The college will then begin its task and we shall see with our eyes what our pen cannot show.

A salutation is in order to all those who work for this nation and this Holy Land.

9770
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OPPOSITION TO SALE OF AWACS AIRPLANES DISCUSSED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 666, 4 Sep 81 pp 20-22

[Article by Yahya 'Izz al-Din Hamzah: "AWACS: The Major Challenge"]

[Text] The rabid campaign that Zionist circles have been waging in Washington ever since the president of the United States notified Congress that the administration intended to sell the AWACS airplanes, for aerial observation and early monitoring, to the kingdom is not new. Preparations for that campaign had been made and the first steps in it had been taken when the preliminary announcement for the deal was made. This campaign is also not the first one on the list of hostile Israeli campaigns against the kingdom and its leadership, especially on the U.S. scene which Israel wants to keep to itself forever. The kingdom's battle with the Zionist lobby over the sale of F-15 airplanes still lingers in one's memory.

The evidence indicates, however, that the battle over AWACS will be more vicious, especially since the centers of Zionist influence were preparing for it for a long time. In addition to publicity campaigns in various U.S. publicity agencies, Israel has enlisted its agents in Congress to influence the representatives in the legislatures for the purpose of blocking the sale. To do so it is using various means, from cajolery and inducement to sending threatening letters to many influential figures in the Senate and House of Representatives. The first fruits of that campaign may very well be that letter which was signed by 233 congressmen in the House of Representatives and by 54 senators in the Senate warning the U.S. administration that it was necessary to withdraw the [proposal for the] sale even before it was to be submitted to Congress. However, this attempt failed, and the deal became a top priority item on the agenda of the next session of Congress which begins on 9 September.

This deal includes five AWACS airplanes. These are modified 707 Boeing airplanes that carry powerful radar devices and complex electronic equipment whose function is to conduct surveillance, observation and investigative operations of all airborne targets flying at high or low altitudes. The airplane represents one of the most modern air defense systems, especially against air raids. Precise surveillance devices on the airplane can cover vast areas of air space, and the advanced computers on board

transmit precise information about the altitude and velocity of the raiding airplanes to receiving stations on the ground. With this information the ground bases can obviate danger well before it happens. The radar devices of these airplanes can observe 400 airplanes simultaneously. The airplane's capabilities vary according to its altitude and the altitude of the targets. However, military experts concur that it is the most modern air surveillance weapon.

Among the information stations on the airplane are screens that show the course of air battles between national and enemy airplanes. An AWACS airplane can fly for 12 hours without having to refuel. Thus we observe that the airplane is suitable for command functions.

In addition to these airplanes the deal includes 20 ground radar stations to receive information and 8 KC-707 airplanes for fueling military airplanes in the air. In addition, the deal includes over 1,000 Sidewinder air to air missiles and additional fuel tanks for the F-15 airplanes which the U.S. administration agreed to sell to the kingdom.

The defensive nature of the deal which was evident to the most naive experts, did not deter Israel from raising this outcry against it and portraying it to U.S. public opinion as an imminent threat to the safety of the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine. The fact is that the only explanation for Israel's attitude lies in its aggressive nature and in its future ambitions. After the Israeli aggression on Iraq and the Zionist regime's military adventures in Lebanon, all of which went unpunished by the Arab countries, by the United States or the United Nations, Israel's leaders want the field to remain open to all the adventures they may think of in the future. The thought of an Arab country acquiring military equipment and technology that could deter Israeli military power is unbearable for Israel's leaders despite the tremendous military arsenal they have which includes nuclear weapons. One of the objectives Israel was seeking from the air raid against Iraq was to deprive the Arab countries of all modern technology and to achieve a kind of technological monopoly that would guarantee for Israel a continuing ability to realize any of the objectives that it finds appropriate in any Arab country.

Discussions in Zionist circles in the United States about the danger of the AWACS airplanes to Israel are ludicrous, implying much disregard for the intelligence of the American citizen and politician. During the previous U.S. administration Israel received all the advanced weapons it had asked for, according to a statement by former Israeli defense minister, Ezer Weizman. Under this administration Israel acquired more F-15 and F-16 airplanes despite its repeated attacks on the Arab countries. Israeli military superiority in the Middle East area is no secret, and the United States' promises to Israel [in this regard] are known and manifest. They were stated unambiguously by assistant to the U.S. secretary of state for security affairs, James L. Buckley on the eve of sending Congress official notification of the deal. Buckley said, "Let me assure you that this administration remains committed to the security of Israel. It will insist that Israel's military superiority over all its potential enemies will continue."

However, this declaration which affirms Washington's bias for the Zionist state, did not satisfy Israel's ambition. The reason for that was simple: Begin's government is dreaming of continuing its efforts to realize the dream of a great Israel with the least possible loss. The fact that an Arab country would own advanced military equipment would impede Israel's efforts to realize that dream or make its realization expensive, rendering the total Zionist plan a losing proposition which Israeli society cannot afford, and Israeli society has been known for being extremely sensitive to human and material losses, especially since Tel Aviv has grown accustomed to easy victories and adventures that are undeterred and go unpunished.

With affected bewilderment Israelis wonder about the objectives, the reasons and the magnitude of the Saudi sale. They do so in a manner designed to create a negative atmosphere in the circles of U.S. public opinion and in official circles as well. [However], no major effort is required to respond to these suspect questions; The answer was explained by the leadership of the kingdom on more than one occasion. The geographic nature of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the fact that its territory is stretched out in the Arabian Peninsula require effective protection, especially this kind of protection. Airborne surveillance devices are necessary because of the nature of the desert stretch, the length of the Saudi borders and the vastness of Saudi air space. If we were to take the small population into consideration and compare it to this vast area, we would conclude that reliance on this modern kind of advanced equipment is necessary and essential.

When His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz was interviewed by the German magazine, DER SPIEGEL, he was questioned about the dangers that the kingdom could face. Prince Fahd said, "The danger can come from anywhere." At a time when matters become imbalanced and adjustments are upset overnight, such a statement becomes indisputable. The world is going through an age of political surprises in the East and in the West, and the Middle East area will be no exception. Anyone who will not be prepared to confront all the circumstances and possibilities will be taken unawares by successive events. In recent years the world has seen political coups which observers have been unable to predict. In fact, we find that some people still do not believe that Beijing has become a U.S. ally and that Cairo has become a strategic ally of Washington and Tel Aviv. Perhaps the most important lessons to be learned from these foregoing surprises and from subsequent ones as well may lie in the fact that political assumptions are always changing under the influence of various factors and that everything must be taken into consideration. Then there is the Soviet threat which is presenting itself in Afghanistan. The Soviets are trying to consolidate their military setup around the area. The Israeli threat is by no means smaller than the Soviet threat, if it is not in fact more immediate and more urgent.

Had Israel proven once that it actually wanted peace, it would have been possible to lend credence to Israeli claims. But the fact is that Israel's policy and its repeated aggressive practices affirm its expansionist ambitions and its colonialist intentions in the Middle East area. Israel's

insistence on rejecting initiatives for a just peace and its sternness and haughtiness give the countries of the area the right to work to protect themselves from the Israeli cancer. No logic can justify the right of an aggressive state to acquire all the modern weapons it needs while countries that are facing the danger of aggression are denied the right to have the capability to defend their sovereignty and their security.

If we were to take into account the special hostility that leaders of the Zionist entity harbor toward the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its Islamic, Arab and international roles--this hostility was reflected in more than one statement made by senior Israeli leaders--the possibility of a Zionist threat becomes imminent.

The kingdom deserves to get this sale from a friendly country like the United States of America due to the honorable role it played regionally and internationally in supporting peace and stability. The kingdom's contributions in this area are numerous. The Saudi government made arduous efforts to spare the bloodshed in Lebanon and to restore peace to that war-torn country. The kingdom [also] took part in the efforts to defuse the explosion in the area which Israel is always trying to keep on the brink of tension.

On the international scene the kingdom has assumed honorable positions that adhere to a rational and a moderate view of energy problems and of problems of the world's economy. Almost all political experts have agreed that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a vital factor of stability sparing no effort or gift that is made for the welfare of the region and of the world. A country that has such an honorable record and whose leaders are so aware of their responsibilities deserves all the support and the backing [that can be mustered].

The United States will have to make a choice between abiding by the principles of equal friendship and yielding to the pressures of Zionist forces which want to have the upper hand in U.S. policy even if that were at the expense of U.S. interests themselves. There is no doubt that the deal represents an actual test of the truthfulness of U.S. intentions and the extent to which the U.S. administration understands the problem of mutual interest. Using the fear of Zionist tyranny as an excuse is unacceptable because the United States which gave Israel the most modern bombers, tanks and missiles did so because it wanted to. The United States can give friendly countries the weapons they need if it actually wants to do that. The kingdom is dealing with the United States and not with Israel, and if Washington fails to meet the defense needs of its friends, its relations with those friends become seriously questionable.

The government of the kingdom has announced repeatedly that it will purchase the weapons that are necessary to defend its sovereignty and its people anywhere else if the U.S. government refuses to meet those needs. His Royal Highness Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the minister of defense said recently, "The kingdom is determined to acquire the weapons it needs from any country that is prepared to meet our needs and has the kinds of

weapons we need." U.S. officials undoubtedly realize that numerous other options are available. However, the numerous interests that tie those two countries together make us hope that the Reagan administration understands the nature of these needs that would "achieve peace and stability for the kingdom and prepare it at the same time to perform its national duty in a context that would enable our commitment to the questions of this nation to meet the responsibilities of defending it." This was explained by the statement of his highness the minister of defense.

Something must be said to those who have been swept by the wave of biased Israeli propaganda and who, therefore, dedicated themselves to the task of casting doubts about every gain the kingdom achieved or tried to achieve. Suspect spokesmen hastily cast doubts about the effectiveness of these advanced weapons and the conditions for delivering them. In their blind impetuosity those people forgot that the mere acquisition of a cannon was considered a gain for the Arab and Islamic force and a provision against its enemies.

If those who specialize in casting doubts about everything that is gained were to take it upon themselves to ask what is the reason for all this Israeli outcry if the sale were not a strong shot in the arm for Arab defense capability, they would not have made accusations that do not serve the interests of the Arab nation and its causes. In recent statements he made His Highness Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz responded to these campaigns. He emphasized the kingdom's concern for its sovereignty when he declared that "Saudi Arabia will purchase weapons and will acquire those weapons without any conditions or obligations."

Nothing can be added to this unequivocal position.

It seems evident that those who foolishly repeated what Zionist publicity agencies in the West have been saying lack knowledge of the secrets of lengthy maneuvers which usually take place when such matters are dealt with. We have confidence in this country's leadership, in its concern for its interests and in its commitment to all the causes of the Arab and Islamic nation.

8592
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ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM REVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 84, 19-25 Sep 81 pp 29-32

[Article by 'Abd-al-Latif al-Furati: "AL-MAJALLAH Reveals the Full Story of the Islamic Movement in Tunisia: When Did It Start? What Is Its Strength? What Are Its Trends? What Is the Government's Posture Toward It?"]

> [Text] The struggle with religious people began when the government suggested that people give up fasting because "it reduces productivity."

President Bourguiba, surrounded by senior statesmen, sat in the front row to listen to a religious lecture that was to be given by Miss Hind Shalabi. It's been an annual custom in Tunisia to have a joyous celebration on the 27th of the holy month of Ramadan, the night on which the Koran was revealed. The celebration is usually set around this religious lecture that is delivered in front of the president by a senior scholar in religion, politics, sociology or economics. However, no matter how diverse the specialties, the center of attention [on that occasion] is the relationship between religion and life--political, social, military or economic. On that night it was the lot of Miss Hind Shalabi, professor of philosophy, to deliver the lecture. It was the first time that a woman was invited to deliver a lecture on that occasion.

Miss Shalabi began delivering her lecture unhurriedly but with extreme self-confidence. President Bourguiba's impatience and displeasure with what she was saying grew with every page she turned. He did not hide his displeasure when the young woman finished delivering her lecture.

This was 6 years ago. What irritated President Bourguiba was the new tone in which the lecture was delivered. In her lecture Miss Shalabi considered the objects of the regime's pride--the liberation of women, the prohibition of polygamy and the regulation of divorce--to be antithetical to religion, and she called for a return to the origins of religion, that is, to the veil, to polygamy, to the freedom of divorce, etc.

This was quite a surprise for President Bourguiba who considers himself the liberator of women. He believes that if there were men who had reluctantly

accepted the 1956 reforms in the Personal Status Law, no woman could denounce them. The major question that was raised then was how can a lecture that was delivered in the presence of the head of state have this content when it is customary to subject such matters to strict clearance and to have everything that is to be presented to the president read and criticized before it is presented to him.

At that time Hind Shalabi was accused of being a reactionary. The newspaper, AL-'AMAL, which is published by the ruling Destourian party, devoted articles and an editorial to criticize her statements.

However, no one at that time was able to discern from Hind Shalabi's statements a specific public opinion that either supported or advocated those ideas.

No one is making a connection today between Hind Shalabi, the author of the notorious lecture which infuriated the head of state, and the growth of the Islamic tendency in Tunisia. However, one cannot help but recognize the fact that Hind Shalabi was consciously or unconsciously expressing a public opinion that did exist in the country even though it had not yet been crystallized. However, that opinion was to gain strength and to find the opportunity to broaden its domain in the political arena.

But a major question is being urgently asked these days: When did the Islamic movement organization get started, and what are its origins and its motives? How did it gain the strength to achieve what it did achieve? What is the full story of the Islamic trend?

AL-MAJALLAH reveals this in the following report.

There is no doubt that an investigator would find it difficult to determine the starting point of this tendency because it maintained absolute secrecy due to two factors.

First, there is the inherent nature of Islamic organizations. The Muslim Brothers in Egypt and in Syria lived underground for a long time. The Islamic Group Organization in Pakistan also lived underground for a long time. Secret methods were always utilized in organizing these organizations: cells were separated from each other; and communications were organized in such a way whereby only a few of the fighters would know each other. What made this situation easy is the fact that Islamic tendencies were not very intent on discussing views. Consequently, they did not need to gather supporters in one place since the whole truth could be found in religion, and truth was not a subject for debate.

Second, these organizations in Egypt, Syria, Pakistan and in other Islamic countries as well were persecuted for a long time, and this forced them to preserve some secrecy out of fear of rulers' tyranny.

When Did It Start?

It is hence difficult for one to determine a clear date for the emergence of the Islamic tendency as a political organization existing and operating

secretly in Tunisia. However, most sources think that the organization came into being in 1970. If this assumption about the date the Islamic organization came into existence--the name, Islamic Community is after the name of the Pakistani organization and not the Muslim Brothers, [an organization] in Egypt or Syria--there are reasons to believe that those who are responsible for the organization took advantage of the opportunity of introducing "democracy" into the country's political life at that time to organize their ranks. They could have perhaps risen to the surface, had it not been for the setback to democratic life which followed the conference of the Destourian party in September 1971.

After the collaborative socialist course of Ahmed Ben Saleh was eliminated in 1969, the government was somewhat shaken. It was several months before it was able to regain its balance, and this led the ruling leaders to look for a method by which they can fully understand the popular masses again. The tool they used was that of democracy and freedom of speech within and without the ruling party.

It is certain that at the time many groups of people who were angry with the regime were able to gather their disparate groups together. Among them were those who believed in a specific view of society that gave the Islamic religion special status. Those who were angry with the government's conduct toward religion were many.

First, there was a number of unofficial clergymen who had refused from the outset the social reforms of 1956. They considered these reforms to be a departure from religion, and they thought the prohibition of polygamy, the restriction of divorce and the emergence of women into public life were deviations from religion.

Second, there are those who thought that substituting astronomical calculations for sighting the new moon to establish the beginning of the months of the lunar calendar, and especially the holy month of Ramadan and the months of the feasts, violated religion and infringed upon it.

Third, there are those who were very hurt and distressed by the fact that in the mid sixties the goveernment had advocated that fasting be abandoned because it reduced productivity.

These [opponents] and others set out in various ways from the very beginning to oppose this or the other decision. Although it was difficult to interfere in personal affairs, that is, to advocate free divorce or polygamy, due to restraining laws in those areas, a strong movement became active against the appeal to give up fasting. An opposition movement also became active against utilizing astronomical calculations in determining the lunar months. These movements took two forms:

First, there were sighting assemblies that were assembled spontaneously in public places, especially on the eve of Ramadan and on the eve of the feast. The beginning of Ramadan or the feast did not often coincide with the officially set date.

Second, people assembled in some mosques for the feast prayer on days other than those that were officially set. People assembled in accordance with the sighting of the new moon or by following what was happening in neighboring countries, especially Tripoli, Cairo and Saudi Arabia.

In some years the matter went as far as clashes with the government, and some of those who took action were suspended. Yet, among those who gained notoriety in these operations, only a few advocates are presently at the forefront of the Islamic tendency today. Some analysts attribute this to the fact that the leaders did not want to surface at that time so as to preserve the organization.

Today, many statements are affirming the fact that the Islamic Tendency has found the opportunity to organize its ranks in the form of an official society that is loyal to the government. This is the Koran Preservation Society whose purpose is to teach the Koran and to spread good conduct among the members of the population.

It seems that the leaders of the Islamic Tendency got to know each other inside the ranks of this society and organized themselves within the society before unifying the structure that holds them.

Whether these statements are true or not, there is no doubt that today many leaders of the Islamic Tendency can be found in the organization for preserving the Koran.

Some people go even further than this. Leftists, [for example], accuse the government of at least being behind the effort to look the other way during the early days of the Islamic organization phenomenon. The purpose of [this benign neglect] was to create a force that would be capable of confronting leftist tendencies, especially in the university and among students.

One of the old trade union leaders among students told us that early in the seventies, and especially after 1974, the government was actively encouraging those who sympathized with the Muslim Brothers. It used them to spearhead the action against leftist students--Marxists and pan-Arab nationalists. Muslim Brothers sympathizers routed strikes and used force to intervene against meetings that were organized by these and other groups. All this was done with the knowledge and consent of the government which did not lift a finger to stop it. The man who holds today an important position in one of the opposition movements adds, "[Members of Muslim organizations] were used against us, and some of them are known to us. They were students at that time, and they used to carry canes and chains against us. Today they hold various positions within the Islamic Tendency Movement."

Is this true? No one knows, but there is nothing curious about the government using one group against another to fight back against university disturbances which rose to a dangerous level in recent years.

Tunisia and Europe

Today, some members of the opposition go so far as to say that the government, represented by the administration of the ruling Destourian

party, encouraged the Islamic Tendency so it could use it to curb the influence of other opposition groups, especially leftists and Marxists.

What is important is that this matter, even if it were true, has assumed proportions that no one expected. The influence of the Islamic Tendency developed considerably and [eventually] took hold of broad sectors of the population. It was able to recruit many powers in a manner that caused the government to lose control of the situation. This had never happened before with any other opposition group.

In 1975 when Hind Shalabi delivered her lecture, what she said appeared to be a crack in a faith that many people believed was unshakable. The prevailing belief was that the Hind Shalabi episode was incidental and that these ideas could not have the support of popular and intellectual circles which had been taught for almost 20 years to separate religion from politics and to deal with events from a "non-Oriental perspective." However, events of subsequent years affirmed the opposite of that belief and showed that religious feelings were still strong and that they had been waiting for someone to stir them up so as to surface and emerge.

In an analysis mentioned to us by an official in the administration of the ruling Destourian party [the following was mentioned]: "Our mistake here lies in the fact that we compared ourselves with Europe. For a long time we had thought that we could follow the course that western Europe followed in separating religion and politics. This is because our clergymen did not exploit the popular classes as was the case with the church before the European revolutions. Moreover, the Islamic religion is characterized by its interest in spiritual and worldly matters. In the Islamic countries it is essential to deal with the Islamic religion as a principal component of the political equation."

But what is truly bewildering is how the Islamic Trend was able to attract a broad base of support in a relatively short period of time. Ten years ago there was nothing, and now the trend has thousands and thousands of supporters and followers who joined its ranks even though its organizational structures are not official and dealing with them is dangerous.

It seems that behind this intense effort to attract support is a number of given factors that may be summarized in the following points:

--First, the ideological vacuum in the Destourian party is a vacuum that must be filled. While Marxist movements attracted some young people, most of the active members of the opposition found what they were looking for in the Islamic Trend.

--Second, the significance of the crises that the country is experiencing. Proponents of the Islamic Trend predominantly believe that solving the country's unemployment problems and confronting the new reality can only be done from an Islamic perspective which finds in the Koran, in the Prophetic tradition and in legally binding precedents spiritual answers to the questions that are being raised.

--Third, despite the superficial cover of the attempt to establish a social order whose components were derived from the West, the roots of society remained embedded in their oriental character. This [oriental] spirit was looking for an opportunity to be set free, and it found it in the Islamic Trend.

However, what really explains this rallying around the Islamic Trend is the smart action of those who have been in charge of it. From the outset this action moved in three directions.

--First, they moved in mosques where supporters were won among worshipers and among those who frequented the mosques. This was done by means of lessons which appeared to be religious but did in fact have a political dimension to them.

--Second, they moved in cultural houses which are scattered throughout the country. Here young people of various classes--workers, civil servants, students, intellectuals and semi-intellectuals--can be swayed.

--Third, the school and the university were the third source for gaining supporters and followers. The Islamic Tendency made a significant effort to recruit followers in the educational establishment. Today, it appears to have won the bet. Last winter when the Islamic Trend wanted to create a crisis in the schools, it was able to do so, and its action paralyzed education for a long period of time. In addition, the Islamic Tendency controls a number of higher institutes and colleges such as the Tunis College of Science, the College of Engineers in Tunis and others.

Three Trends

It may thus be said that today the Islamic Trend is considered one of the strongest [in the country]. This has caused some of its supporters to say, "The only reason why the government today is removing the leaders of the movement from office and harassing its members is to prevent the movement from taking part in the political game and entering the next elections where it can win a large number of votes that would increase its power and set it on course to attain power not too long from now."

However, one cannot discuss the Islamic Trend in Tunisia without also discussing its differences, its divisions and its programs.

It may be said that there are three principal trends within the mainstream of the Islamic Trend.

First, there is the Islamic Tendency Movement [MTI] which is the strongest and the staunchest. Early in June MTI filed an application to obtain a permit to operate as a public party. This organization includes the most sophisticated and the most experienced Islamic leaders as well as those who are most capable of taking action. It is led by Mr Rached Ghannouchi, a secondary school teacher. He is assisted by Mr Abdelfattah Moro who is an

attorney. As far as the number of followers is concerned, this is the strongest of the Islamic organizations. It also has the power to attract more followers both in the capital, Tunis, and in the towns and villages of the country. It is enough for this organization to announce that one of its leaders will give a religious talk, and the mosque or club where the talk is to be given becomes crowded with people. This trend does not have a clear political program, although the prevailing opinion [indicates] that it is a conservative movement. In a document distributed on the occasion of the establishment of their party last June, leaders of that organization said, "The Islamic Tendency Movement does not present itself as the official spokesman for Islam in Tunisia and does not aspire to gain this title one day [in the future]. Although it acknowledges the right of all Tunisians to deal truthfully and responsibly with religion, it thinks it has the right to adopt a view of Islam that is comprehensive enough to constitute the ideological foundation from which various intellectual views and political, economic and social choices would spring. These would define the identity of this movement and control its strategic orientations as well as its circumstantial positions. In this sense the boundaries of the Islamic Tendency Movement would be clearly drawn, its responsibilities would be defined and it would not be obligated to undertake all kinds of actions and assume all kinds of positions that may emerge here and there. Notwithstanding the masks of piety and the banners of Islam carried by those who take these actions and positions, MTI will abide only by those it adopts officially."

The Tendency set down a number of actions for its work:

--It would restore vitality to the mosque as a center of worship and as a center for recruiting the masses. The government rejects this notion on the basis of the fact that the mosque is not to play a political role.

--It would stimulate intellectual and cultural life.

--It would support Arabization efforts along with a liberal attitude toward foreign languages.

--It would reject violence as a tool for change.

--It would reject the principle of autocracy, and it would approve [people's] right to speak freely and to assemble.

--It would create contemporary formulations for the social concepts of Islam.

--It would take the side of the oppressed.

--It would support trade union action.

--It would utilize a comprehensive view of Islam.

--It would liberate the Islamic conscience from its cultural defeatism vis a vis the West.

Second, there is the Advisory Islamic Party which split from the Islamic Tendency in 1980. It is led by Attorney Hassen Ghodbani who faults the Islamic Tendency organization for its opposition to consultation and for falling prey to the personal ambitions [of its leaders] and to a situation where a few are controlling the capabilities of the movement. In general, the intellectual foundations of this movement do not differ from those of the Islamic Tendency, although there is an attempt [in the former] to pay attention to the Arab dimension of the Tunisian citizen and also to impart a clearer socio-economic content to the actions of this faction.

But the leaders of the Islamic Tendency Movement accuse Hassen Ghodbani of being a man of unlimited ambition. They say he was forced to leave the movement and establish a new organization he could lead when his attempt to assume the leadership of the movement failed. Hassen Ghodbani's organization had also filed an application to obtain a party permit.

Third, there is the Progressive Islamic Tendency. This organization, which did not attempt to set itself up as a party, is led by a group of intellectuals who are bi-cultural. They wish to establish an Islamic movement that has a liberal attitude toward western cultures and is revolutionary and progressive. Therefore, one always finds them looking for ways to tie Islam with an individual's daily efforts to make a living and with the problems with which he struggles.

There are other organizations, however, which are thought to be more religious than political, such as the al-Tabligh [Spreading the Word] Organization and the al-Da'wah [Missionary] Organization. Nothing is known about these two organizations.

Except for direct missionary activity in mosques and cultural clubs and the recruitment of students and pupils even in elementary schools, the Islamic Movement did have two newspapers until 1979. One of them was the weekly, AL-MUJTAMA', and the other was the monthly, AL-MA'RIFAH. These two publications, however, were suspended, and those responsible for them were placed on trial for disseminating false news, for attempting to overthrow the regime and for advocating spreading chaos and unrest in the country. Ever since then the Islamic Movement lost a major [source of] support manifested in its newspapers which were never published after that date despite the numerous appeals that were made to the government and the petitions that were signed by thousands of followers.

In view of this situation the Islamic Movement was content with expressing its views in opposition and independent newspapers when these or the others agreed to publish its position statements which were always marked by extreme verbal ardor.

However, the movement was also able to spread its ideas through numerous books it published or imported and through tape recordings as well. Many libraries in the capital, Tunis, and in other cities distributed these books on a large scale.

Although relations between the Islamic Tendency and the government are at their worst today, they have not always been that poor. For a long period of time and until the late seventies it appeared as though the two agencies--the agency of government and that of the Islamic trend--were ignoring each other. While the numbers of bearded men and women in Islamic clothing increased in the streets increased, the government paid no attention to this trend. At the same time, leftist opposition movements, especially the Marxist, were affirming that there was an agreement between the government and the Islamic movement against the leftist party.

Is this true? Did the government actually use the Islamic movement to do away with the left in student circles? This is something that no one can confirm or deny. But it is evident that severe battles used to take place on the university campus between those who were referred to as Muslim Brothers sympathizers and those with leftist inclinations. [It is also evident] that the police agency did not interfere.

Mzali's Sympathy

It may be that 1978, and especially 1979, was the year that saw the beginning of the government's campaign against this Islamic movement. In December 1979 at a constitutional meeting about the followers of this Islamic movement Mohamed Sayah, who was then director of the agency of the ruling Destourian party said, "We will resist those who set out deliberately to spread chaos and unrest under the guise of religion." At that time the 1980 state budgets were being discussed in parliament and a number of representatives, all of whom are members of the ruling Destourian party of course, raised the question of the "developing phenomenon of Muslim Brothers sympathizers." They called for the need to put an end to the chaos that these people were spreading. In fact, two members who are close to Mohamed Sayah tried in the course of discussing the budget of the Ministry of Education, which was then headed by Mr Mohamed Mzali, the current prime minister, to raise doubts about Mr Mzali's sympathy with these movements considering that he had been calling for Arabization and a return to Islamic, Arab origins. At that time Minister Mohamed Mzali's response to his critics was harsh. Those who were close to him [revealed] that he was displeased because Mr Hedi Nouira, who was the prime minister of Tunisia then, did not ward off this attack as required by the principles of government solidarity.

During the 15 months period that followed the formation of Mzali's government and the realization of a true liberalization toward all trends and movements, the Islamic movement, which split into three principal factions, gained considerable freedom of expression but was not allowed to regain its newspapers or publish new ones. Its public positions [since then] have been numerous, and it issued scores of statements while its leaders formed parties and asked the government to license them.

Ever since last June a wide ranging campaign against the Islamic movements began to be mounted, and some supporters have been suspended. In a statement to the press Mohamed Mzali mounted a harsh campaign against the

Islamic movements, holding them responsible for the violent events that the country has been experiencing.

A few weeks later, upon issuing another statement, the Tunisian prime minister appealed to all the political families in the country and to all advocates of democracy to overlook their differences and to form a front to counter tyranny and intolerance.

The Detainees and the Charges

Almost simultaneously and with the government's initiative a campaign was mounted in the country to promote the government's Islamic aspect. Statistics about the number of mosques that were built since independence was printed (2,000 mosques), and the prayer leaders at mosques were invited to a fast-breaking banquet hosted by the prime minister. In the mean time a broad detention campaign began, and it included a large number of the Islamic movement's leaders in the capital and inside the country.

News that had been leaked mentioned the fact that the charges which had been made against those who were arrested in the principal suit that was filed in Tunis's Court of General Sessions consisted of dishonoring the president, forming a secret society and spreading chaos in the country. There was at least one among those who were arrested who stated that the Islamic movement was seeking to change the system of government by force.

It seems that the government has leaned on all the agencies of justice to complete this case quickly and to issue their verdicts by early September at the latest, that is, before schools go back in session. This is out of fear that new disturbances may develop after those that broke out last February. The Islamic movement was accused of organizing and planning these disturbances. It was also accused of organizing the operation to detain the dean of the College of Sciences last April and of planning the street disturbances in the town of Manzil Bourguiba and in the town of Masakin.

On Friday 4 September the leaders and members of the Islamic movement were sentenced by the Tunis Court of General Sessions. The court sentenced those leaders and members to prison terms that varied between 1 and 11 years. Rached Ghanouchi, the leader of the Islamic Tendency was sentenced to 11 years; and Abdelfattah Moro, the secretary general of the movement was sentenced to 10 years. Altogether 107 persons were placed on trial: of these 30 persons have dropped from sight and 16 persons were temporarily released.

Responding to a question about the reasons why the government decided to arrest the leaders of the various Islamic movements at a time when they were not cooperating with each other and when it was inconceivable that the disturbances had been the result of an agreement between those leaders, a government official told AL-MAJALLAH, "The matter has to do with a few accusations that preceded the period during which the group separated. Among these accusations was that of forming a secret organization, structured and prepared to carry out its actions in secret before the split in the group occurred."

Relations with the Outside World

There remains a question that must come to one's mind; it is about whether these movements and tendencies had foreign affiliations.

So far nothing concrete has been established in this regard. It seems that the Islamic Tendency movements benefited from what was written about Islamic organizations in a few countries such as Egypt, Syria and especially Pakistan.

At one time the group wanted to call its movement the Islamic Community after a society of the same name in Pakistan. But it seems that there is neither a direct nor an indirect relationship between the leaders of the movement in Tunisia and the leaders of the community in Pakistan.

Leaders of the Islamic movement deny that they are members of the Muslim Brothers even though they consider Hasan al-Hudaybi, Sayyid Qutb and others to be extraordinary men whose example ought to be followed.

However, no one can state positively that there is more than a limited relationship with Iran's revolution. This, however, does not seem to be the government's opinion which finds the Islamic Movement to be an extension of an organization or of organizations existing abroad. The government thinks that leaders in Tunisia may be receiving instructions from Tehran at present and that they may have close relationships with similar organizations in other countries.

In this regard the newspaper, AL-'AMAL, which speaks for the ruling Destourian party wrote, "Finally we have the full incontrovertible evidence that suspicious terrorist relations were formed in the name of religion and in the name of Islam between extremist groups and a few bloody regimes. Finally, there is no longer room for doubt. A witness from that group has finally testified. After [a period of] silence and covering up the official Iranian newspaper that speaks for Khomeyni and for the Islamic Republic party stated in a lengthy article that 'The Iranian Revolution will be the one to whom thanks will be due for strengthening the Islamic movements. The Tunisian Islamic movement takes its orders from the Iranian Islamic Revolution; it obeys its instructions and it follows in its footsteps.' "

Is this evidence that there is an organic relationship between the two, and is this adequate evidence?

This then is the government's position. What is the position of the various opposition groups on the suspension campaign to which the leaders of the Islamic movement have been subjected? What is the opposition groups' position on the appeal that was made by the head of the government to form a front to oppose the leaders of the Islamic movement?

The various opposition groups sharply criticized what the Islamic Tendency was subjected to, and none of them complied with the prime minister's appeal.

But it is also clear that all the opposition groups think that the Islamic Tendency is dangerous from two points. Therefore, they may secretly support an operation to overthrow it.

1. The strength of the Islamic Movement can grow only at the expense of the various opposition groups since the ruling party is firmly established in the country.

2. Opposition groups have serious doubts about the fact that the Islamic Movement truly accepts the conditions of the democratic game, that is, to circulate power and to have freedom of speech and assembly. The prevailing opinion is that if the Islamic Movement were to come to power, it would silence all its opponents as is the case today in Iran.

The final question[s] that one can ask [are these]: Will the detention and the trial of the leaders of the Islamic Movement solve the problems? Is the country that got rid of all its political prisoners approaching a new period of striking at the right this time when in the past the strikes had been directed at the left?

The restoration of legitimacy to the Tunisian communist party may support this analysis. But the question remains one of balance, and the problem remains tied to what the Islamic Tendency can do. Did the Islamic Tendency which has experience in secret organizations establish alternative leaderships to replace the leaders who have been thrown out of office? In such a case there can be no doubt but that Tunisia is headed for a period of struggle that may last a long time.

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IRAN TO DEMAND $1 BILLION FROM ISRAEL

TA020825 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Oct 81 p 3

[Report by special correspondent]

[Text] Representatives of the National Iranian Oil Company are currently compiling a demand to be submitted to the Israeli Government for the return of money and property which remained in Israel as a result of the common oil businesses. The demand will add up to approximately $1 billion at current rates. The legal advisers of the Iranian company have recently been examining the legal situation in Israel, particularly the question of the identity of the body holding the money against which the demands will be submitted. Apparently, the demand will be submitted to the court of commercial arbitrations in Paris.

Until Khomeyni's revolution in Iran, the National Iranian Oil Company shared 50 percent of the Elat-Ashqelon oil pipeline and several oil tankers. Part of the Iranian demand refers to the return of property invested in the oil pipeline and tankers. Another part of the demand deals with the credit extended by Iran to the company that purchased the oil. The Iranians conceded 90 days of credit for the oil they sold. On the day of the revolution this credit amounted to $350 million. After the revolution, these sums were deposited in the account of the accountant general in the treasury. At today's rates, the value of these sums has almost doubled. It is estimated that the Iranian demand will total approximately $1 billion.

Asked to react on this report, Israeli elements have said that Israel had a counter-demand for huge sums against the Iranian demand. Due to the fact that the Iranian company had committed breach of contract, Israel was forced to purchase oil from other sources and at higher prices. Israel will demand a deduction for the losses it suffered to date in its oil purchases as a result of the breach of contract. In addition, the breach of contract laid idle the pipeline and made it worthless. Israel will contend that the Iranians must cover the entire losses.

The Israeli elements attach great importance to the very presentation of the demand since so far the Iranians have claimed that Israel's partner to the oil businesses was the Iranian shah and his family. Now they will be forced to admit that the partner was the National Iranian Oil Company.

CSO: 4423/12

BRIEFS

SYRIA ACCEPTS DRUZE STUDENTS--The Damascus administration is prepared to increase the number of Druze students from the Golan Heights permitted to study in Syrian universities. This report was reported to Druze sources on the Golan Heights by representatives of the International Red Cross. Syria has also expressed its readiness to purchase apples from the Golan Druze's orchards. Our correspondent in the north, Yoram Hamizrahi has learned from UN sources that Syria similarly intends to populate Al Qunaytirah soon and increase the population in the buffer zone. Our correspondent notes that this is a substantial change in Syria's policy since the Yom Kippur War. [Text] [TA182003 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 18 Oct 81]

WEST BANK FARMERS GET PLO-JORDAN FUNDS--The military government has allowed the farmers' association in the Qalqilyah district to receive its allowance from the joint PLO-Jordanian Committee. As far as is known, this is the first institution in Judaea and Samaria which has been allowed to bring in funds from the joint committee since the government banned the introduction of these funds a few months ago. Our correspondent has been told that Israel has not changed its policy on this matter, but that there were exceptions. [Text] [TA180630 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 18 Oct 81]

CSO: 4423/12

BRIEFS

OIL PAYMENT--The French President's proposal to the Saudis to pay for a part of French oil purchases with French francs instead of American dollars has not yet been answered. However, French sources asserted that the proposal was submitted by Mitterand, and that the final response will have to await the outcome of the discussions that will take place between the financial and currency experts of the two countries. Despite French sources' admission that a positive response to this proposal is difficult, they recognize that its endorsement and subsequent implementation would constitute an innovation in the field of crude oil trade. Moreover, some of these sources noted that Saudi official's satisfaction with Mitterand's Middle East Policy enhances the probability of a favorable response. Other sources affirmed that the possibility of the success of its Saudi proposal has encouraged France to submit a similar proposal to Algeria providing for payment of imported natural gas with French francs instead of American dollars in return for France's promise to assist finance the Algerian plan to revamp its economy. [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 243, 17 Oct 81 p 57]

CSO: 4504/46

ACTIVITY IN NATIONS BANKING SECTOR REVIEWED

Commercial Banks in Bahrain

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 73

[Article: "Arab Banks: Bahrain"]

/Text/ 1920 marked the starting point for banking activity in Bahrain; that was when the Chartered Bank opened a branch there. It was followed by the British Bank of the Middle East in 1944. The banking arena witnessed no further activity, local or non-British, until the Bahrain National Bank was founded in 1957, which affected activity. The number of banks operating in Bahrain (aside from foreign banking units) totals 18, distributed as follows:

Local banks: these number three; they control 42.9 percent of the assets of operating banks, 39.8 percent of their deposits, and 46.9 percent of their loans. In this context, the role of the Bahrain National Bank, the first domestic bank, stands out, through its financial activities for the government, ministries and municipalities. As a result of this, the bank has obtained the following percentage of control: 26 percent of the total assets of operating banks, 39.5 percent of deposits and 45.5 percent of loans.

Arab banks: these also number three; their share of deposits and other banking operations is minor--3.3 percent of the operating assets of the banks, 3.4 percent of their deposits, and 3 percent of their loans.

British banks: British banks enjoy a special situation, as a result of the continued presence of British managers and advisors in many government organizations and offices; although they do not exceed three in number, their share of banking activity is high--29 percent of the total operating assets of banks, 36.8 percent of their deposits and 24.6 percent of their loans.

Other banks: these are broken down as follows: three American banks, two Iranian ones, two Pakistani ones and two banks of miscellaneous nationalities. Their combined shares are as follows: 24.7 percent of the assets, 20 percent of the deposits and 25.5 percent of the loans.

The monetary situation: The private sector lending category experienced a great increase since 1974, since loans jumped from 120 million Bahrainin dinars that year to 268 million in 1976, then reached 440 million in November 1980. Conversely, we find that the term savings deposits category has not experienced a tangible increase! In 1979 these savings came to 235 million dinars, and in November 1980 to about 311 million million dinars. In another area, foreign assets of banks have met with significant fluctuations, dropping 9 percent between July and August 1980.

The increase in loans to the private sector has not been matched by a parallel increase in the volume of deposits, reinforcing the belief that loans have been used to finance investments in hard currency as a result of the high interest rate on the dollar and other foreign currencies.

The liquidity crisis: The monetary category has experienced no perceptible increase but to the contrary disturbing vicissitudes. Liquidity came to 225 million dinars in July 1980, 224 million in September and 216 million in November of the same year.

In another area, we find that foreign bank withdrawals increased without letup from 1976 to the end of 1980; that is, the banks operating in Bahrain increased the volume of their borrowing from other banks to finance investments in the local market, as a result of the liquidity crisis Bahrain is suffering from.

Role of Middleman

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 pp 74, 75

/Text/ Foreign--"offshore"--banking units in Bahrain are a new banking experiment, only 6 years old, in the Arab world. Nonetheless, in the view of observers, it has achieved many of its goals and still enjoys great possibilities for development and expansion. Here is a report reviewing the facts of the experiment.

Since Bahrain started thinking about diversifying its sources of income in the sixties, after its oil reserves began to be depleted, officials began to get the notion of turning Bahrain into an international financial market which would perform services for the countries in the area and would be the link between Western money markets and money markets in the Far East.

When oil prices quintupled in 1973 and 1974, Bahrain found an appropriate chance to realize its dream. It presented a plan that entailed allowing international banks to establish foreign--"offshore"--banking units on Bahraini territory. Bahrain relied on a number of facts in evolving the notion, which it began to carry out in 1975, among them:

First, Bahrain is an oil state and a gulf and Arab country near the sources of cash surplus; it is open to the world and in harmony with its neighbors, enjoying relations of cooperation and fraternity.

Second, Bahrain's is a midway position between the world money markets in the West and the East and it enjoys good means of communication. The midway position and

good communications are favorable for concluding financial transactions in the time period between closing and opening prices in the main hard currency markets in the West and the East, being based on access to both prices at roughly the same time. In addition, work takes place during official off-hours in those countries.

The good system of communications also helps foreign banking units in Bahrain to be in rapid communication with the home center and to adopt appropriate decisions at the appropriate time, as it helps facilitate the affairs of the everyday lives of employees in these units.

Third, the wheels of activity move smoothly in Bahrain, on the official and private levels both, and this is helped by the good educational level of the people of Bahrain and their open attitude toward the world.

Fourth, there are a number of foreign communities in Bahrain which have brought a degree of diversity to the style of life there, providing foreign residents with a suitable social atmosphere.

The emerging local banking system in Bahrain would not have been able to play this big part; it was necessary as an alternative to bring in international banks to open units in Bahrain under specific conditions to play this part, and give them the facilities which would help them to perform it.

The major international banks agreed to open offshore banking units for themselves in Bahrain and they were encouraged to do so by two other factors, in addition to the abovementioned ones:

First, the Lebanese crisis, which has lasted a long time. The banks tried to find a new location for their branches and centers of activity in the Middle East, since they were prospering and had great activity there. They found that Bahrain was seeking them out and that there was a great similarity between the two in terms of work opportunities.

Second, the foreign banks considered that the area where Bahrain was located promised a brilliant future for banking activity because of the tremendous development programs in the gulf area, especially in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The readiness to establish offshore banking units in Bahrain increased under the spur of competition and the effort to grow, seek out liquidity and realize profits, and the number of offshore banking units in Bahrain rose to the current level of 65, with assets of $37 billion at the end of 1980, according to the latest quarterly bulletin of the Bahrain Monetary Authority, marking an increase of 35 percent over 1979. In addition, there are 19 commercial banks, 46 bank representatives' offices, nine investment banks, six offices of financial intermediaries, 29 insurance companies and agencies, three investment firms, 62 exempt financial organizations and 17 exchange organizations.

Offshore banks have not been permitted to deal with the local Bahraini market, in order to protect the local banks and the Banraini dinar, to ease pressure on

monetary conditions domestically and to avoid probable inflationary effects. Bahrain benefited from this system in the following manner:

First, the income accruing to it from annual levies on permits paid by these units to the Bahrain Monetary Authority, which come to about $3 million a year.

Second, the growth of skilled Bahraini banking labor, as a result of the presence of these units in Bahrain; the rate of employment of Bahrainis comes to 70 percent of the total employees in banks of various types. Bahrain is striving by every means to increase this percentage.

Third, foreign banking units have brought high-level diverse banking technicians and experts with them who have bolstered Bahrain's status as an international financial center. The benefits of that have encompassed local banks and laid the foundations for additional expansion and development in the field of financial activities, among them the establishment of a hard currency and financial paper market, formation of an international center for marketing commodities and precious stones, and the establishment of further local or joint Arab banks with international activities.

Fourth, stimulation of the relevant economic sectors such as the housing activity, hotel, tourist and communications sectors, through the advent of this large number of banking units in Bahrain; this is reflected in economic activity in general.

Fifth, Bahrain's openness toward the gulf area in the form of economic and financial relations has encouraged the establishment of a large number of important joint Arab economic and financial projects, such as the International Gulf Bank, the Arab Banking Organization and the newly established Bank of Kuwait and Asia. These organizations manage and circulate Arab money in the international money market themselves, without relying on foreign banks, underlining the role that Bahrain plays as a springboard for Arab money to various areas of the world, in attaining Arab economic and monetary policies and arriving at the best investment of Arab cash surpluses.

Bahrain is thinking about having its domestic banks contribute a greater share to the world money market by using the offshore units as windows. More than that, it is thinking in the long run of having its local or joint banks participate in the same activity that the foreign banking units perform, or at least a large part of it. Last month, the Bahrain National Bank presided over the administration of a $50 million loan to the government of the Phillippines, which was represented by its central bank, giving an indication of this tendency.

The intense receptiveness to offshore bank permits has dropped off lately because of the large number of banks that have been admitted. To accept new applications, the Bahrain Monetary Authority imposes the stipulation that the area to which the bank applying for a permit belongs not currently be represented in the group and that the bank have a good reputation. This measure was adopted after the admission of a number of Japanese, Asian and Latin banks.

The main share of operations lies with the group of American banks, as is observed from Bahrain Monetary Authority statistics which represent the breakdown of the budget categories of these banks by geographical distribution and type of currency.

Oil Reserves Declining

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 75

/Text/ The minister of finance, Mr Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim, has played a prominent role in establishing the foreign bank unit sector since taking over the duties of his position in 1975.

In this regard, the Bahraini minister (age 42) tells the magazine INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS "Bahrain is the only gulf state whose oil reserves are rapidly declining; its current rate of production totals 45,000 barrels a day and is declining at a rate of 6 percent a year. Therefore we have had to rely on ourselves in the region and develop a service industry in Bahrain."

While Minister 'Abd-al-Karim has left the task of setting out the technical and economic bases for the system of foreign banking units to his financial advisors, he himself has made contacts with international and Bahraini bankers to persuade them of the notion and diminish the obstacles in the way of the activity.

The project, in fact, has been a success. Six years after it was launched, one can say that Bahrain has become an advanced financial center in the gulf region, since the number of foreign banking units totals to 65, in addition to traditional banking units, representatives' offices and so forth.

Minister 'Abd-al-Karim, who received a bachelor's degree in economics from Baghdad University in 1965, states that Bahraini banks contributed less than 1 percent of gross national product before the establishment of the foreign banking units but that their share now totals 10 percent, as compared with 26 percent in the case of the oil sector. Bahrainis account for 70 percent of the people working in the banks.

Allen Moore, a Britisher, is considered the most prominent of Minister 'Abd-al-Karim's advisors. Moore says, "The project of foreign banking units and the project of the Bahrain Monetary Authority were among the goals which the Bahraini minister strove to realize in 1975, with the support of the prime minister and senior officials. In the opinion of Minister 'Abd-al-Karim, who held the position of deputy minister of finance before becoming minister, the offshore units would require careful supervision. For example, we are not concerned about having a Swiss bank operating on the territory of Bahrain, but when it is a question of an organization from Hong Kong we must learn what it has done and is doing; we are concerned for Bahrain's reputation and good name."

In addition to his duties as minister of finance and as the founder of the foreign banking unit sector, Minister 'Abd-al-Karim, who comes from an ordinary non-influential family, is concerned to maintain constant contacts with gulf finance

ministers on the joint industrial projects that have been agreed to of our projects that have been proposed. In this regard, he says "We do not use letters as means for communicating among ourselves. Generally we meet directly to solve our problems and use telephone communications constantly."

Bahrain Banking Leaders

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 75

/Text/ Fayiz Abu-al-'Aynayn (The Arab Bank Ltd): Returns from the Improved Dollar Have Exceeded Local Interest Rates

Question: What are the trends in the local interest market? Can the pressure on the local market be relieved without making a change in the interest rate structure?

Answer: Naturally, the structure of interest rates in the local market is influenced by interest rates in the world market. 1980 witnessed record figures for increases in interest rates on the world market on most major currencies. In view of the absence of restrictions on the transfer of local currencies, it was normal that investors would hasten to convert local currencies into foreign currencies, especially American dollars, on which the interest rate reached 20 percent. This was of necessity followed by a change in the structure of the interest rates on local currencies and a rise in these rates. Local currency liquidity was affected as a result of the conversion of local currencies into currencies with a higher yield, especially since the difference in the interest rate between local and other currencies, from the point of view of people investing in these currencies, was greater than the probable difference in the exchange rate upon reconversion of foreign currencies into local ones to meet the people's commitments (if there were any) in local currencies.

In order to avoid the emergence of a shortage in local currency liquidity, the monetary authorities encouraged operating banks not to eliminate any deficit in their local currency financial position (short position) in exchange for increases in their financial position in foreign currencies (long position), without covering the deficiency in their positions in local currencies.

Question: How do you view the actual state and trends of Arab investment in the gulf, especially in the Arab countries?

Answer: The fact that Bahrain enjoys an excellent geographic position among international financial centers has contributed, along with other factors, such as ease of communications and the availability of services, to its rapid growth as a world financial center. Some Arab banks, such as the Arab Banking Organization and the International Bank of the Gulf, have assumed advanced positions among international banks in arranging and managing international loans. Arab banks have come to have an increasing role in financing international and Arab loans and in circulating financial surpluses from countries in the area to borrowing countries.

Question: How do you evaluate the role and development of Bahraini labor in spheres of banking activity?

Answer: The banking sector attaches great importance to the Bank Workers' Training Center which has recently been established. We hope that this center will help create competent local personnel who can bear higher responsibilities in the future; the last 5 years have witnessed a great increase in the number of Bahrainis working in the banking and financial sector. The constant training activities have helped that.

'Abdallah Hasan Abu Hindi (the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait): Traditional Methods Will Not Reduce the Pressure on Interest

Question: What is the actual status of the foreign activity of Arab banks?

Answer: The foreign activity of commercial banks may be broken down into three categories:

First, participation in financial markets through direct loans or participation in joint loans.

Second, the establishment of branches abroad, to enable them to reach foreign markets directly and take part in their activities.

Third, participation in the establishment of financial companies or joint banks abroad. This method, in my opinion, is the best, since the participation is on all levels, especially in capital and management.

Question: What are the trends in the local interest market, either for the public or among banks, in light of the rise in international rates? Is it possible in your opinion to alleviate the pressure on the local market without carrying out a modification on the structure of interest rates?

Answer: It is very difficult to alleviate pressure on the market through traditional means as long as interest rates on the American dollar continue at their high rate. The reason is that the local market is dependent on supply and demand. As a result, large amounts have been converted into American dollars as a result of the attractive interest and the limited nature of investment fields.

Question: How do you evaluate the role and development of Bahraini labor in banking activity areas? What in your opinion are the ingredients for expanding and developing this role?

Answer: Banking capabilities in Bahrain have developed in a tangible fashion in the past 5 years, after Bahrain became an international financial center, thanks to the continuous effort and organization carried out by the Bahrain Monetary Authority in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. Recently the appearance of qualified Bahraini banking staffs who are no less expert than foreign experts in the administration of banks in the country has been observed.

This effort has finally been capped by the establishment of the Institute of Banking Studies; all the banks have taken part in its establishment, along with the Bahrain Monetary Authority, and this has contributed to the development and improvement of competence of the people in the country.

Ya'qub Yusuf Muhammad (National Bank of Bahrain): Toward the Consolidation of the Bahraini Financial Market

Question: How do you evaluate the results of banking activity in 1980, in the context of the growth of deposits, loans, branches and services? What are the preliminary results for 1981?

Answer: Speaking in figures, we will find that the commercial bank budgets recorded an increase over 1979 in 1980. In 1979 these came to about 646 million Bahraini dinars, as compared with 900 million in 1980. Private sector deposits increased by a small percentage in 1980, coming to 364 million dinars (as compared with 361 million in 1979). The meager increase may be attributed to the liquidity drain that resulted from the rise in the interest rates on foreign currency, especially the dollar, and the fact that the monetary authorities stipulated the amount of money that could be exported, in order to prevent inflationary effects.

As regards 1981, I expect an increase in the volume of deposits as a result of the execution of large projects in the country such as the iron and steel production project, the petrochemical plant, the aluminum rolling plant and others, because of the capital set aside for investment in these projects and their entry into the local banking system cycle.

As regards commercial bank loans, these increased to 454 million dinars in 1980 as compared with 395 million in 1979, and it is expected that lending activity in 1981 will also increase as a result of improved economic activity.

As regards the Bahrain National Bank, that is playing a basic role in these fields, since its share totals 30 percent of the overall budgets of commercial banks and 29 percent of the bank credit. It is expected that these shares will increase in the future.

The Bahrain National Bank started to diversify its operations in 1976; whereas it had previously been confined to financing local companies, it started to cover activities of financing joint projects and housing loans and establishing a credit agency which was competent in terms of number and types of employees and types of agents, and this has begun to bear fruit.

Question: What are the trends in the local interest market, both for the public and among the banks, in the light of the rise in world interest rates? In your opinion, is it possible to lessen the pressure on the local market without making a modification in the interest rate structure?

Answer: The interest rates' upward orientation results from the rise in the interest rates on the dollar; this has led to the conversion of large amounts of money to dollar deposits, and the creation of a type of pressure on local liquidity has led to contrary results on economic activity and the cost of goods and services. The Bahrain Monetary Authority has intervened to put a stop to this pressure and has raised the interest rate on the dinar, introducing the "swap" system. The government has increased its deposits in the banks to cope with the liquidity shortage and has given two different rates for deposits, relatively a high one

on negotiable certificates of deposit and a relatively lower one on fixed deposits in Bahraini dinars, in order to encourage transactions in the former type of financial investment.

Question: What is the extent of the development in bank management, in terms both of the techniques used and human banking skills?

Answer: There is no doubt that Bahrain's development as an international financial center has helped accelerate the use of the most modern techniques in the field of bank management and the use of expertise in foreign, "offshore," bank units in this field.

In mid-1980, we made studies in order to choose the best computer system for present and future requirements. In August 1980 the choice fell on the capital bank system, which consists of an integrated program for bank operations and development of a marketing system also. A unit was created for joint loans, which is considered a big leap forward that requires a high level of competence normally not available in commercial banks, permitting an expansion in loans. It performs an intermediary role between the borrower and the financial institutions that are involved in the administration of the loan. This requires negotiating, legal and accounting skills.

The National Bank of Bahrain, through the existence of these facilities, has presided over the management of six joint loans totalling about $200 million in value, and it also participates in the management of a number of other joint loans.

Question: Bahrain has become an international financial center. What are your expectations in this regard? What, in your view, is the role of banks in the new development to make Bahrain an international market for commodities and precious metals?

Answer: I expect that a "consolidation" will occur in the money market in Bahrain with the introduction of new financial services such as the establishment of investment banks and a stock market for dealing in financial paper on an international scale. The first signs of the establishment of an international market for commodities and minerals have appeared, and this is to be considered a service complementary to any money market. In coming years it is expected that all types of financial services required by all international financial centers will grow.

'Abd-al-'Aziz al-A'sar (Abu Dhabi National Bank in Bahrain): The Interest Rate Structure Is Unrealistic

Question: What are the trends in the local interest market, for the public and among the banks, in the light of the rise in world rates? Is it possible in your opinion to alleviate pressures on the local market without carrying out a modification in the interest rate structure?

Answer: The fact that the interest on the American dollar has continued at its high rate for a substantial period has led to a big shift from local savings in certain free world countries to the dollar, causing a drop in the volume of local

liquidity in those countries and leading to a rise in their local interest rates, both for the public and among banks.

As long as interest rates on the dollar are at their high level, it will be very difficult to alleviate pressures on the local market by recognized monetary methods, because the Bahrain market is a free one and is subject to factors of supply and demand that set the appropriate rate at which the supply of and demand for money in the local market meet.

It should be noted that the interest rate structure stipulated by the monetary authorities locally no longer properly reflects the real rates of interest, and this causes some commercial banks, especially those depending on borrowing from other banks to secure their liquidity, to deviate from these rates sometimes.

Question: How do you view the role the Bahrain Monetary Council is playing in putting pressure on the monetary situation? Have the monetary authorities taken specific measures to confront market conditions? What is your evaluation of these measures and their effect on banking activity and the monetary situation in the country?

Answer: I record my appreciation of the role the Bahrain Monetary Authority is playing in controlling the monetary situation in the country. Bahrain is a free money market that is influenced directly by all international economic changes and it is natural that these changes whould be subject to acknowledged market factors. The less the monetary authorities interfere in the local market the better, except to the degree necessary to preserve the stability of local monetary conditions, and one can observe that the local monetary authorities in Bahrain are looking after it well.

These authorities have recently taken some measures which will have the effect of inhibiting some banks' headlong rush after the attractive profits they can realize from the rise in interest rates on the American dollar at the expense of local liquidity. Therefore the Bahrain Monetary Authority has linked the maximum bartering (swapping) facilities that any commercial bank can enjoy with the authority at a low interest rate to the amount of financing the bank requires to cover its liquidity deficit resulting from local commercial lending operations. With regard to the banks that want these kinds of facilities for other purposes, they will be available to them without limit, but at unsubsidized interest rates which are generally equal to the interest rate on the American dollar. The measures presented will have the effect of limiting undesirable investment activities which will have bad effects on the local market and on local liquidity.

Question: What is the actual state of the foreign activity of commercial banks--the establishment of branches abroad or participation in the international money market?

Answer: The actual state of the foreign activity of commercial banks is restricted to participating in the international money market, whether this participation takes the form of lending or borrowing, directly or through participation in joint financing operations. The establishment of branches or offices abroad is

considered a means to enable these banks to engage in their foreign activity at their places of activity or an outlet from which these banks can look out on the international world markets, by which they can make the necessary contacts related to these activities or acquire the necessary data and information for following up on their activity in these areas.

Question: How do you evaluate the role and development of Bahraini labor in the fields of bank activities? What in your opinion are the ingredients for expanding and developing this role?

Answer: It is to be observed that the volume and type of Bahraini labor in the fields of bank activities have greatly developed, especially now that Bahrain has become an international financial center. In my opinion, that is the most important local achievement of the banking system in Bahrain, since one can note that in a brief period Bahraini banking staffs were trained at a high level of expertise and competence which sometimes is not lower than the international levels of traditional banking activities and modern banking techniques.

Dr 'Abd-al-Majid al-'Ani, director general of the International Gulf Bank: Strengthening Arab Banks in the Gulf Depends on Governments

Question: How do you evaluate the results of banking activity in 1980 in the context of the growth of deposits, loans, branches and services? What are the preliminary results for 1981?

Answer: In spite of the condition of international monetary instability and the severe fluctuations in the deposits market in 1980, the International Bank of the Gulf managed to double its assets over their level at the end of 1979, as they reached a total of $2,893,000,000. It also managed to develop its loans to double their level at the end of 1979, as they came to $1.13 billion. Last October, a New York branch was opened to cover its North American activities, and the bank continued with its policy of diversifying the activities it engages in and the services it offers to its agents.

The bank's assets came to $3,391,000,000 in the first quarter of 1981. Loans then came to $1,328,000,000 and the rest was invested in deposits in banks, financial paper and other assets.

Question: What is the state of the foreign activity of commercial banks? Is it aimed at establishing branches abroad or participating in the international money market?

Answer: The state of foreign activity differs from one bank to another, according to the type of activity the bank concentrates on and the development it has attained in the markets. In addition, the market in which the bank operates has an effect on banking activity from the standpoint of the type of activity by which the market is distinguished, the type of development it is going through and the legal and monetary restrictions related to taxes, the transfer of capital and the conduct of banking activities. The International Bank of the Gulf chose the method of establishing branches when it decided to establish the London branch and the New York

branch, as a consequence of its experience with these markets and its study of the various alternatives and options available.

Question: How do you evaluate the role and development of Bahraini labor in the fields of bank activities? What in your opinion are the ingredients for this role and its development?

Answer: What inspires happiness is that in the past few years the volume of Bahraini labor in banking activities has increased and its competence has risen, thanks to domestic training and development programs which the banks are pursuing and fellowships abroad. However, there still is a need to fill higher positions in these banks. I would like to say that among the basic ingredients for expansion and development of this role are the selection of the right candidates and preparation of the appropriate circumstances for training them and developing their competence in banking activities. That is to be considered a basic requirement for the development of competent local experts.

Question: What is the degree of development of banking management, in the context of the technical methods used and in the context of the availability of sufficient staffs?

Answer: The degree of development of banking management is to be measured by the technical methods applied and the staffs that deal with those. There is no doubt that the application of technical methods has made big strides and that the process of developing staffs is progressing well. However, the development must be a continuous process.

Question: How do you regard Arab banks or joint banks abroad? What benefits in your view do they offer to Arab countries, and what is required to consolidate their role?

Answer: We look upon the presence of Arab or joint banks abroad as a serious means for offering commercial and investment banking services to Arab countries and the international banking community. Arab banks can play a prominent role in transferring the surpluses from Arab oil exporting nations to other Arab countries that require the necessary financing. These banks can also finance foreign trade as well as issue guarantees and performance bonds for carrying out projects that have been contracted for in the Arab world. The role of Arab banks operating abroad can be reinforced by assigning them the banking activities that are now being given to foreign international banks, giving them most favored organization or department treatment, and liberating them from legal restrictions, as well as by asserting the freedom of transfer of money among Arab countries.

Question: What in your opinion is the state and the orientation of Arab investment abroad, especially in the Arab countries?

Answer: Arab investment through Arab financial institutions abroad has become active and its effectiveness in the Arab countries has increased through increases in the number of such institutions and increases in Arab financial surpluses.

Question: Do you believe it is possible for the Arab countries to assume greater responsibilities in the context of international lending activity?

Answer: We believe in the ability of Arab banks to perform greater responsibilities in the field of international lending, if they are furnished suitable financing which is in keeping, in its size and time periods, with the loans that institutions and companies in third world nations require.

Question: How do you evaluate the state of Arab banking cooperation, especially in the field of financing activity in the Arab and international contexts?

Answer: The Arab world has witnessed growth in its banking institutions, and these institutions have set out toward international horizons, in terms of their coverage of banking activities, their actual presence through their branches, or contribution to the establishment of joint financial institutions in foreign countries. A good sign is the fact that cooperation in the area of financing exists among Arab financial institutions and is constantly being deepened, and this appears clearly through joint international lending activities, which are considered a major activity of Arab financial institutions.

Iqbal Mamdani, President of the Trans Arab Investment Bank: The Arab Governments Are Entering the International Borrowing Market

Question: How do you evaluate the bank's activity in 1980 and the first half of 1981, with special reference to the deposits of agents and bank investments?

Answer: 1980 was our first year of operations. The bank started building a strong base for its operations by concentrating on two approaches: first, joint loans and guarantees, especially those related to industry and construction, and second, the effort to exploit available opportunities to use our agents. We made loans for more than $100 million last year, including loans for $25 million to the government of Nigeria, over whose management we presided. From the financial standpoint, we are happy with the results we have attained, obtaining a return of 17.5 percent on capital.

We realized a good start in 1981 when working conditions in the gulf and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia improved, resulting in increasing activity for the bank. We hope that 1981 will be another good year and, with the tripling of our capital in the third quarter of 1981, I feel that the bank is playing an important role in creating new opportunities for financing and investment in the service of our agents. Therefore we will open an office for representatives in New York this year.

Question: How can the role that Arab banks play in the field of activity in the international context be expanded?

Answer: The number of Arab banks operating on the international level has grown the last 5 years. It has been customary for businessmen to establish banks to work in the international market. However, it has recently been observed that Arab governments have started establishing giant banks and financial institutions that engage in direct activity in the international market, such as the International Bank

of the Gulf and the Arab Banking Organization. These two organizations have played a big role in this context. What causes the role of these institutions to develop and expand are their knowledge of the local Arab market and its economics and their grasp of the Arab mentality in the business field, and this yields benefits to the Arab economies.

Question: Do you believe that Arab banks are able to bear an increase in international lending and recycling Arab cash surpluses, especially with third world and developing countries?

Answer: Recycling Arab capital started with international non-Arab banks in 1973. The Arab banks have recently begun entering this field by presiding over the administration of loans to developing countries and third world countries in participation with international banks. Recycling is not the easy process it seems to be at first; there are credit risks between lending banks and borrowing nations which must be evaluated, on the basis not just of economic or statistical information but also of a deep knowledge of the political and social circumstances of these countries. Therefore I feel the need for these banks to grasp these issues before starting to think of developing the role of Arab banks so that they can guarantee that the capital they are circulating will be returned to its owners by the third world countries.

Question: Bahrain has become an international financial center. What are your expectations for 1981 and 1982 in this regard?

Answer: I expect that the year 1981 will witness an expansion and development in financial services. There are other investment institutions, such as our institutions in Bahrain, but I consider that the eighties will entail, first, the growth of the local financial paper market in Bahrain, second, a development in means for taking part in financing practical institutions, third, a development toward a market for financial paper, currency and discounting, and, finally and in general, a development in total services bearing on financing. This is necessary to meet the increasing needs of the Arab and international banks operating in the gulf area.

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CSO: 4404/8

BRIEFS

AL-AZHAR MILITARY TRAINING--It has been decided to teach military training in the first three years of the colleges of al-Azhar University, beginning the current school year, instead of just the first year only. This was announced by Staff Maj Gen Fahim Shadid 'Atiyah, Commander of Popular and Military Defense, who added that military training material will be taught during the school year instead of at the summer camps. This is in realization of discipline within the university during studies and will allow the university students to spend the summer vacation as they please. Maj Gen 'Atiyah said that the system of teaching military training in the remaining universities during studies will be applied immediately upon approval of the Supreme Universities' Council. [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Oct 81 p 7]

CSO: 4504/55

SOVIET AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES TECHNICAL COOPERATION

Tehran KAYHAN AIRMAIL EDITION in Persian No 439, 7 Oct 81 p 8

[Text] 1 October. Yesterday before noon, the Soviet ambassador to the Islamic Republic of Iran [IRI] visited the minister of energy, Dr Hasan Ghafuri, in his ministry here and discussed technical cooperation between the two countries.

In this meeting which was held in the presence of Engineer Karachian, managing director of the TAVANIR company, and the managing director of TEKNOPROEKSPRESS, contractor for the Ramin Power Station in Ahvaz, the minister of energy--while explaining the IRI's policy of non-alignment with the superpowers of either East or West, taking steps on the road to economic and technical self-sufficiency for the country, and the struggle against world imperialism under world-devouring United States--called for technical cooperation projects between the two countries within the framework of this policy. The minister of energy also called for resumption and completion of the Ramin Power Station project in Ahvaz by the Russian experts contracting for this project.

On the basis of this report, the Soviet ambassador, while expressing thanks for this meeting, announced his country's readiness to cooperate in the field of water and electrical installations as well as in other scientific and technical cooperation projects; and it was agreed that the work to complete the Ramin Power Station be begun as soon as possible.

CSO: 4640/41

KIMCHE DISCUSSES FORMATION OF NEW FOREIGN MINISTRY DEPARTMENT

TA051633 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 5 Oct 81

[Text] A few days ago, a new department was established in the Foreign Ministry in Jerusalem, and it will deal with disarmament. It will primarily be concerned with promoting the U.S. initiative for creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Our political correspondent, Gad Becker, wished to hear the Foreign Ministry's director general, David Kimche, on whether this notion stands any practical chance at all.

[Begin recording] [Kimche] First of all, we--for one--want to demonstrate how serious we are regarding this issue. If other countries want to pursue a negative policy, this is truly regrettable, but as far as we are concerned, we are serious. This is number one. Secondly, as I said, this is only one issue that will be dealt with by the new department. It will handle a host of other issues as well.

We are on the brink of the 21st century, and we must bear this in mind, looking to the future. This involves, among other things, all sorts of questions like nuclear arms and the like, and these issues necessitate constant political handling.

[Becker] What do you mean?

[Answer] That means that such issues are being raised more and more often at international forums and we had plenty of such examples to cite this year. The Foreign Ministry must know how to react to them and how to treat them.

[Question] In other words, this is one of the lessons of the way Israel--or perhaps its propaganda--handled the affair of the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor?

[Answer] I would not say this is a lesson learned from that bombing. We considered setting up the department even earlier, however, this is definitely an example of treatment.

[Question] Is the department also to handle political campaigns involving nuclear issues?

[Answer] Certainly. [end recording]

CSO: 4423/12

'DAVAR' WARNS OF EXTREMIST ISLAM

TA121337 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 Oct 81 p 11

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "The First Shot in the Next War"]

[Text] The shot that hit President al-Sadat and killed him can be considered the first shot in the next Middle East war, and President al-Sadat can be considered its first victim. I do not mean a war between Israel and Egypt and not even a primarily Israeli-Arab world war. No, these were the bullets fired by the extreme Islamism that felled President al-Sadat, and peace with Israel was not the reason for his murder. Sound proof of this can be found in the fact that the bullets fired by the extreme Islamism are similarly directed against Syrian strongman President al-Asad--the prime Arab patriot who hates Israel and Zionism. Even if President al-Asad has been marred by the armistice and disengagement agreements with Israel, this is not the reason why the lethal bullets of extreme Islamism were and are being directed at him and his regime. The same applies to the Iranian shah, who also "committed a sin" by maintaining contacts with Israel--in deed or in misdeed. He, too, was overthrown and his regime went up in flames, but, again, not for his "Zionist error." This merely added up to the sum total of the shah's sins, in the eyes of his overthrowers who bare the flag of extreme Islamism (if one is to believe the "lies of the imperialistic press," even Khomeyni's faithful--or was it only Bani-Sadr--were not totally cleanhanded when waging a war against Iraq, having been contaminated by negotiations with Israel and its arms).

The chief proponent of extreme Islamism, Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, is the main ally of the Soviet Union and serves as the spearhead of Soviet subversion and expansionism in the Middle East and Africa; not so Khomeyni, who is the blood-stained arch-enemy of all the leftist factions in Iran. This is true for now. This is not so, however, with respect to the "Muslim brotherhood" in Syria, among whose victims can be found Soviet officers and not only members of the Syrian administration. Also different is the situation among the extreme Muslims in Egypt, the ones who most probably killed al-Sadat. There need not necessarily be a unifying, coordinating link between all those outbursts. It is not one mind that activates all those arms, but one heart beats in them all and sets them in motion, and that is the heart of extreme Islamism. The blood flowing in all their veins is the oil, granting them the feeling of both power and disdain toward all those who succumb to the oil power, which nowadays is "Islam's sword."

Reagan's America is bowing before Islam in the shameful "AWACS deal" and is prepared to forsake in the hands of the Islamic rulers its most sophisticated equipment without there being any consideration of military advantage but only because this is what the leaders of Islam and oil want. This is a dictate to the counterfeit leaders presented by the real ones (or so, at least, it seems to be in Muslim eyes). This America is greasing the wheels of the current Islamic revolution. It is pouring oil onto the fire of hatred and scorn toward itself and everything it stands for.

Reagan's America has been telling the rulers of Saudi Arabia that communism and the Soviet Union constitute the main danger to their safety and wellbeing, and those leaders in turn argue that Zionism and Israel are the real dangers. But the truth actually lies neither here nor there. The truth is being imprinted on the map of the area in letters of blood and fire--but the blood of al-Sadat and the shots that were fired at him are not the first script or the last one of this kind. The fact of the matter is that the enemy of safety and wellbeing in the Middle East and the entire world is extreme Islamism whose blood is the oil and whose income and the power moving its various arms is that of terrorism, murder and subversion. The terrorism of extreme Islamism now hit al-Sadat. Earlier it hit the shah of Iran. It similarly undermines the Soviets in Syria, blocking them and jeopardizing their plans in Iran and probably also in Afghanistan, where the Soviet conquest has not yet been completed and where the armed opposition--supported by the United States and perhaps also by Egypt--has not been totally extinguished.

The creation has risen up against one of its creators. The alliance the Iranian shah defined so well when it acted against him and which is the same one that is operating in the Egypt of al-Sadat and his heirs, the one he called "The alliance between the red and the black." This alliance will become in Syria and Afghanistan, and perhaps also in Khomeyni's and the mojahedin e khalq's Iran, and maybe even in the Soviet Union itself--inside its Islamic republics--either tomorrow or the day after, an alliance that could perhaps be termed "the alliance of the white and the black" or the "alliance of the green and the black." One way or the other, it will be an alliance whose flag will not be red.

Extreme Islamism has been violating all the global demarcation lines and the rules of the game separating the East from the West, the North from the South. Extreme Islamism is using the power of oil and terrorism against the West and the East alike. It exploits both the rich North and the poor South. Extreme Islamism is everyone's common enemy--that of the moderate and responsible Islamic leaders, one of whom was President al-Sadat, as is his heir Mubarak. The chief success of extreme Islamism stems from the fact that all its victims try to ignore the danger it presents and avoid calling it the enemy of peace, safety and progress in the entire world and its various subdivisions. President al-Sadat is the most recent victim of that evasion.

Reagan's America, like that of his predecessor Carter, is avoiding looking the enemy in the eye. It adds oil to its fire of contempt and hatred by kowtowing before Saudi Arabia, just as it had earlier ignored the danger of extreme Islamism in Iran and continues to overlook the danger presented by Libya under

al-Qadhdhafi, supported by the Soviets. Not only is the United States turning a blind eye to its real enemy, but it is also avoiding a confrontation with it, running away to imaginary fronts, finding substitutes for its real enemies and the real fronts. Western Europe is also burying its head in the Palestinian-PLO sand. Instead of standing up to extreme Islamism's terrorism (which also hits Syria and the other Soviet satellites which have nothing at all to do with Israel and the Palestinian-PLO issue) it is pushing the Middle East toward another war against Israel. Any support for the establishment of a PLO-headed Palestinian state, in accordance with its conditions, constitutes support for an unavoidable war against Israel because neither the current government of Israel nor a government headed by the alignment or an anti-PLO national coalition government that would be established in time of war would ever surrender to such destructive directives without going to war. Many wars broke out as a result of miscalculation and even from pacifist or humanist intentions of the first order. The question is whether the West European countries will seek the substitute, in the shape of the PLO, as the United States under Reagan is seeking its substitute, Saudi Arabia, for the real confrontation with its true enemy.

The murder of President al-Sadat by extreme Muslims, like the fact that President al-Sadat waged a war against them (apparently tragically too late) only serve to point to the real enemy of peace, security and progress in the Middle East and perhaps even of the entire world at this moment. This is the enemy and this is the major front. It separates Egypt from Libya (and projects southward, to divide between Sudan and Libya). This is similarly the main front where peace between Israel and Egypt will also be decided, as well as that between it and the other Arab countries. No Middle East peace would ever thrive before a clear-cut battle between moderate and extreme Islam is decided, or before Islam's terror and subversion killers--whose main stronghold is in Libya, to which Lebanon serves as their chief training area and whose chief financier is Saudi Arabia (in addition to Libya)--is uprooted. The murder of President al-Sadat could be the first shot in this next war.

The Soviet Union will defend Libya against Egypt, which for this sake will find refuge under a U.S. umbrella (unless President Reagan continues to be evasive and look in the direction of Saudi Arabia while the eye of the storm is in Libya). The second front against extreme Islamism is in its training camp--Lebanon. Here Israel will find itself opposite Syria, which will opt for aiding Libya in order to direct the internal enemy (the Muslim brotherhood) against the common external enemy (Israel). Here, too, there will be no alternative but to have dangerous friction between the two global umbrellas--the Soviet and the American. In these two fronts the real decision about the safety and wellbeing of the entire region, and perhaps even the entire world, will fall.

The crucial question then is whether the United States (and West Europe) or the Soviet Union understand that extreme Islamism is their common enemy (just as Nazi Germany was, at the time) and that the future controlled competition between East and West, North and South has trodden a minefield which neither have control over: that of the murderous and extortionist extreme Islamism, harboring unfathomable hatred and endless contempt for both nations, coupled with absolute conviction that it will conquer over them or will cover the entire universe with blood and fire.

In order to prevent such apocalyptic events, it is necessary to have inter-power rapprochement before another war erupts in the Middle East, or worse, as it nears its end. Such dialogue to restrain extreme Islamism is the only alternative to a third world war that will break out as a result of the bullets fired by extreme Islamism and the accumulation of oil wealth in the hands of the Islamic rulers, who use it to torpedo the economic and social stability both in the West and in the East, in the North as well as in the South.

We in Israel should be concerned with the question of what will precede what: The completion of the pullback from the Sinai or increased war-like tension along the Egyptian (and Sudanese) front with Libya and whether all this will anticipate increased tension along the Lebanese front following the termination of the cease-fire period with the PLO (with the support of Syria and the Soviet Union). Finally, how all this will be linked. This is the subject for real strategic coordination between the United States and Israel and Egypt, rather than busying itself with the surrogate squabbles over the AWACS deal and negotiations with the PLO.

CSO: 4423/12

COMMENTATOR ON NORMALIZATION WITH EGYPT

TA260942 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 26 Oct 81 p 5

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "Normalization on a Side Street"]

[Text] The normalization talks between Israel and Egypt are being conducted on a deadend street, or, at best, on a side street. Unfortunately, they are not proceeding along a main road, nor are they even approaching such a road. Normalization of bilateral relations between Israel and Egypt does not ensure normalization of Israel's overall international standing. So far, not one African country, for example, has renewed its diplomatic relations with Israel. The question arises whether they will do so after April 1982, when the withdrawal from Sinai (which from their point of view is, perhaps, occupied African territory) will be completed. The question also arises whether Egypt will encourage them to take such a step and whether the rest of the Third World countries which have severed relations with Israel--will thus encourage them. This question--and it is not the only one of its kind--is no less important than all the bilateral technical arrangements which are being made for travelers, not to mention the increased profits of the businesses that will be run on both sides of the Israeli-Egyptian border.

The resumption of diplomatic relations with countries that severed their ties with Israel--some of them ever since the 6-Day War, others since the Yom Kippur War--is the positive aspect of normalization where Israel's international standing is concerned. The normalization itself has many negative and dangerous aspects. The chief disappointment in the Camp David accords and in the entire Egyptian-Israeli peace process lies not in the evolving relations between the two countries or in the questions these relations are arousing. The principle disappointment is the fact that Israel has not ceased to be a pariah state in the eyes of the family of nations. And this despite the peace and its price, the painful concessions, the economic burden, the security risks. The question is not just one of honor and good feeling--what is termed either seriously or mockingly the Jewish state's "proud bearing." These continue to be harmed and damaged every day in the international arena in a manner which is, simply, serious and perilous.

Despite the Israeli-Egyptian peace process and the progress in the normalization talks and in the normalization arrangements--which are certainly not to be disparaged--despite the resumption of the autonomy talks, we can see no relaxation, not even a temporary lifting, of the increasingly tight international

siege around Israel. There has been no relaxation in the measures of boycott, isolation, condemnation and even the imposition of symbolic or practical sanctions against Israel on the part of international organizations. This process has its own dynamic, which is culminating in the full diplomatic recognition being accorded to the PLO at this very time.

That recognition is being accorded to the PLO under its own terms. Those terms constitute a rejection of the legitimation of Israel's very existence as a member of the United Nations and the family of nations, with the right to defend itself in accordance with the UN Charter. Thus, a war against Israel is not a war of aggression.

It remains unclear whether the full diplomatic recognition accorded the PLO by the Soviet Union is just in the nature of a signal to the United States, Egypt and Israel that there can be no Middle East peace without the full participation of the Soviet Union and the PLO, or whether it constitutes legitimation for another war against Israel with Soviet support (with the participation of Syria from its slice of Lebanon as a spark and departure point).

What will Egypt's stand be in the face of the PLO's series of accomplishments against Israel? Will it affiliate itself with them? Will it try to torpedo them? In the face of the dynamic of the PLO's strengthening, will Egypt lend a hand to a dynamic of normalizing Israel's standing among the countries of Africa, for example? Egypt's behavior thus far in various international conferences provides contradictory testimony. Sometimes it adds its voice to the campaigns of boycott, condemnation and punishment of Israel, sometimes it dissociates itself from them. The question arises what will happen after the Sinai withdrawal, when Egypt will wish to return to the Arab family and be part and parcel of all that family's anti-Israeli and pro-PLO rituals.

This question must already now be placed on the agenda of the talks between the Egyptian foreign minister and his Israeli hosts. Both he and they must grasp that there can be no bilateral Israeli-Egyptian normalization. Egypt must apply the duty of normalization internationally as well, and particularly in the African arena, where Cairo is one of the main actors. There can be no side-street normalization without normalization on the king's highway of international relations.

This is the connection between the normalization talks and the autonomy negotiations, which are being conducted concurrently. True Israeli-Egyptian normalization must be multilateral, not just bilateral. It must apply also in the international arena, with Egyptian participation. Therefore, there is no escaping the attainment of an automony agreement to which Egypt and the United States will be partners, and which they will view as a sufficient basis for the normalization of Israel's standing in the international sphere. The automony agreement must not only stand on its own, but must serve as a counterweight to the movement to stop the Sinai withdrawal, it must serve to halt the PLO's campaign of achievements, and it must pull the Israeli-Egyptian normalization out of its side street. The broader the automony is, the greater its chances of carrying their weighty burden will be.

POLL ON OPPOSITION TO PLO INCLUSION IN TALKS

TA020743 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Oct 81 p 3

[Pori Public Opinion Poll]

[Text] The percentage of those opposed to including the PLO in the negotiations on the autonomy has dropped. The question posed was: "Would you be for or against including the PLO in the negotiations on the autonomy if the PLO recognized the existence of the State of Israel?" Some 61.3 percent replied in the negative compared to 28.6 percent who replied in the affirmative. This is the lowest percentage of opposition to negotiations with the PLO registered in the last 4 years. The rate of those opposed to including the PLO in the peace negotiations has in the last 4 years varied from 61 to 76 percent. This emerges from a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

Some 3.5 percent are willing to include the PLO in the negotiations on the condition that all acts of terror stop and the Palestinians elect the PLO as their representative in the peace negotiations. Some 6.6 percent do not have an opinion on the matter.

Most of the Israeli public believes that the United States will fulfill its commitment to the effect that it will not negotiate with the PLO so long as the PLO does not recognize Israel's right to exist. However, most of the Israeli public would like Israel not to conduct negotiations with the PLO even if the PLO recognized the existence of Israel.

Another question posed was: "To what extent do you believe that the United States will not conduct negotiations with the PLO until the latter recognizes Israel's right to exist and accepts UN resolutions 242 and 338?" Some 53 percent said they believed the United States would not conduct negotiations with the PLO whereas 36.6 percent said they thought the U.S. would do so. The remaining 10.4 percent said the "did not know" how the United States would behave.

The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 1,200 women and men who were interviewed in the privacy of their homes throughout the country.

CSO: 4423/12

EVACUATION OF YAMIT DISTRICT SAID UNFEASIBLE

TA141138 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Oct 81 p 1

[Report by 'Amos Hadad]

[Text] "The Israeli Government will be unable to return the Yamit district to Egypt in April 1982, as it has undertaken to do, because it is technically impossible to evacuate the settlers by that date." This was stated by the chairman of the Yamit district settlements committee, Yitzhaq Regev.

Regev said the committee had notified the prime minister that under the existing circumstances the settlers were precluded from leaving the Yamit district settlements in 6 months. The government, says Regev, has as yet not finalized with the settlers the evacuation arrangements, for which reason the settlers are unable to plan their departure, since they do not know where to go after the evacuation. "So long as there is no evacuation agreement, the settlers cannot commit themselves to the purchase or lease of homes or do any planning regarding other projects, such as employment, and so forth," Regev said. "A family moving to another home needs months of planning, not to speak of thousands of people being moved from their homes, with all the consequent implications. We can blame only the government for the situation which has arisen, in particular Minister Simha Ehrlich, for not having fulfilled their obligations toward the settlers," the committee chairman said.

Regev said the committee promised at its last meeting with the prime minister several months ago to adopt a line of moderation and refrain from road barricades and from disrupting normalization in Egypt. According to him, the settlers kept their promise, whereas the prime minister did not; and no progress has been made regarding an arrangement with the settlers since then. "We do not want our moderation to be interpreted as weakness, and it seems to us we shall be forced to prove this to the government. If the other side does not keep its promise, we better act the same way," Regev said.

He expressed astonishment at the fact that the government does not negotiate with a moderate body representing the district settlements, and is indirectly supporting extremist elements by not taking any action against them, by disregarding us and not finalizing with us the evacuation arrangements.

CSO: 4423/12

BEGIN INTERVIEWED ON AL-SADAT, EGYPTIAN TIES

TA160823 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 16 Oct 81 pp 1, 26 Political Supplement

[Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin by Shlomo Naqdimon in Begin's office in Jerusalem on 14 October]

[Text] Question: Did you at any time hear President al-Sadat mention the possibility that he might be killed or that he might end his term in office unexpectedly?

Answer: No, never. What I did hear from him was that he intended to retire. He would always add: 'I am not sure, though, that my people would let me do this.' Therefore, I think that even next year--had he remained alive--he would have been elected once again, although pressure would have had to be applied to him. It is clear to me that he still saw an important mission before him, namely to correct the economic and social conditions in Egypt.

These conditions are still difficult, particularly in housing, even though construction has greatly expanded in the last few years--I saw it with my own eyes in my visits to Alexandria and Cairo as well as in the peripheral towns--still one must remember that 1.3 million mouths to feed are added to that society every year. Four years ago, at my first meeting with al-Sadat in Jerusalem he talked about a population growth of 900,000 a year, whereas now people mention the figure of 1.3 million. This is a tremendous growth, and therefore the housing problem is one of the most difficult ones in Egypt, despite the construction momentum that can certainly be said to be great. I got the impression that when thinking about the future, al-Sadat mainly thought about solving the Egyptian people's housing distress.

Besides, he had a vision regarding the Egyptian desert. Al-Sadat always believed that like here in Eretz Yisra'el, through irrigation it will be possible to turn the desert into a blooming garden. Thus he never ceased talking to us--particularly with then agriculture minister and presently Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon--about large-scale irrigation schemes.

Such plans were already worked out, but their implementation was stopped for political reasons. Now, following our last meetings in Ofira and Alexandria, agreement was reached on the speedy resumption of normalization we similarly agreed to make good the irrigation plans we have already. Al-Sadat was very pleased with them.

I could provide a subjective prediction that for the sake of realizing these goals--improving the housing conditions in Egypt and making the deserts bloom--al-Sadat would ultimately have accepted another term in office.

Question: Previously, reports were published that Israel has, by your directive, transferred information to al-Sadat on a possible assassination attempt against his life. Are these reports founded at all?

Answer: We had various pieces of information on assassination plots inside Egypt by the terrorists, and we made no secret of them as far as Egypt was concerned. I cannot say more.

Question: Did President al-Sadat ever tell you that his deputy, Mubarak, will be his heir?

Answer: Al-Sadat would praise Mubarak before me. He would especially repeat the following statement: 'He is a man!' (as Shakespeare wrote in the peak moments of his plays Hamlet and Julius Caesar.) I learned from Mubarak during our latest meeting in Cairo that al-Sadat had told him, at least, about the main gist of the talks we held. Let it be known that al-Sadat was particularly fond of personal, tete-a-tete, talks. Not that he did not hold joint talks with a number of people from both sides, but during my visits, there was not even one visit in which he would not request a personal meeting with me, with only himself and me present in the room. I had grounds to believe that he would not tell his aides about the content of our conversations.

However, a week ago, when I held a personal conversation with Mubarak, he told me that al-Sadat would make it a point to tell him about our exchanges of opinion. I, of course, have nothing against this. After all, Mubarak was his deputy all these years and I heard from al-Sadat's widow and children that he, al-Sadat, had prepared Mubarak for this job--should something happen to him--properly. Nevertheless, one thing al-Sadat and I agreed upon--which I told Mubarak--was not known to Mubarak. Perhaps some slip of the mind was involved here, or perhaps it was President al-Sadat's private decision.

In any event, with your [word indistinct] President Mubarak about this whole thing, and he of course did not cast even a shadow of doubt that what I told him about had actually been agreed upon between President al-Sadat and myself.

Question: With your permission, let us get back to al-Sadat's first visit to Israel in November 1977. Could you recount the first tete-a-tete you held?

Answer: As Yiga'el Yadin related, I really did ask al-Sadat to open the talk because he was the guest. So he replied: 'When I visited Moscow, the Soviets would always tell me: since you are our guest, you are the one who should open.' Naturally, I never knew this was a Soviet custom. (With a smile) my experience in the Soviet Union was not particularly rich with expressions of good behaviour and manners. I simply offered the high-ranking guest, out of good manners, to open the conversation if he wished. However, since he preferred that I should begin it, it presented no problem to me.

I opened it and said: Now we must talk peace. In other words, according to my understanding, on signing a peace treaty. I think this was the first time he had heard such words from an Israeli (one should point out that earlier governments talked about 'ending the state of war' and I had to toil very hard to persuade them that this, in fact, is the content of a peace treaty and that without one it would remain unfinished). This was the main gist of the conversation. But we also prepared a draft peace treaty and the following day, when we were in the car together, I gave it to al-Sadat. He did not react either to the initial proposal or to the draft, and only said: 'We shall discuss it.' I, for my part, added: Under no circumstances will we agree that the Sinai will again be filled with soldiers. In fact, this was the first time the demilitarization cropped up.

Question: There were many ups and downs in your relations with al-Sadat. The first contacts were stiff, then came the slandering and besmirching statements about you in the Egyptian media. When actually did the ice begin to crack and your friendship begin to take shape?

Answer: I have considered the meeting in Alexandria (in December 1977) to be one of the more successful in terms of our personal relations. However, it appeared that his aides and advisers had upturned things, and I can prove this. Today, in view of the terrible tragedy, it would be inadvisable to go back to such negative phenomena. We returned to our good relations at Camp David (in September 1978) and particularly at the meeting in the Egyptian Embassy in Washington (in March 1979), in which he had invited me to visit Cairo. Since then, each meeting drew us closer to one another.

Question: When you met, you would sometimes be seen laying out maps, moving your fingers to various points. You must have discussed issues and concerns Israel and Egypt share. Did you have a common view regarding the dangers lurking to our region from the Soviets?

Answer: The answer is definitely affirmative. However, I should add that after he had explained to me, with the aid of a map, the danger to Egypt from the Soviet satellites surrounding it from many sides, I told him more or less the following: 'Please search your map for a little dot. I assure you you will hardly find it. It is called Israel. Then tell me what the danger illustrated in what you have described to me is?' Al-Sadat replied to this, smiling: 'I understand, I understand.' On this matter of Israel's safety, al-Sadat was so outspoken.

Question: Mr Prime Minister, do you think a day would have come in which Egypt and Israel could have reached a military pact?

Answer: It is hard to talk about a military pact, but I think under certain circumstances it is not inconceivable that we would have reached cooperation in this sphere, too.

Question: How would you address each other?

Answer: For 2 years I would call him: 'Mr President,' and he called me 'Mr Prime Minister.' One day he suggested that we call each other by our personal names, and said explicitly: 'You call me Anwar and I will call you Menahem.'

I replied: You are a president and I am only a prime minister. I will continue to call you 'Mr President,' and as for you, please call me Menahem--particularly as he pronounced it with a distinct Hebrew accent. He totally refused to accept this and said: 'No, you call me Anwar.' Having no choice, I accepted.

Still, in the talks we held up until the meetings in Ofra and Alexandria, I would again often revert back to the official address: 'Mr President.' As one would put it, it was easier for me to address him thus. But in the last two meetings there was no problem. We simply got used to it, he would say 'Menahem' either in addressing me or in mid-sentence, and so I called him by his name, 'Anwar.'

It was only natural that such an address psychologically indicates a degree of closeness. It is utterly human, and I presume both of us had such an experience in life. One ought to bear in mind that among other nations, particularly in Europe, it is a very special event in the lives of two people when they decide to call each other by their given names, and then still they use the respectful 'you' (I mean in those languages where there is a clear distinction between 'you' in the singular and 'you' in the plural, as in the French: 'tu' or 'vous').

Question: Would President al-Sadat let you in on his thoughts and ponderings on other Arab leaders?

Answer: Very often, and with complete candor. Since he is no longer among the living, I am refraining from relating everything he told me about certain Arab leaders and regimes.

Question: Was President al-Sadat interested in the history of the people of Israel?

Answer: Al-Sadat revealed great interest in Jewish history, and was particularly impressed by the story about Rabbi Amnon of Mainz. When we started to talk about Jerusalem, he suggested that I think about the matter and defer this conversation until a later date. I told him it was my duty to reply to him about Jerusalem at once. As proof of this I told him the story of that rabbi, the author of a high holidays prayer. (Rabbi Amnon of Mainz was required to convert and did not reply in the negative immediately; rather, he asked for a postponement. He was subsequently punished for not having unequivocally refused to convert forthwith.) He even told Mr Sol Linowitz this story and, who knows, perhaps also to others? However, Mr Linowitz was moved by the very fact that al-Sadat remembered the story in full and told it to me as though he was telling me something new....

CSO: 4423/12

CONGESTED AIRSPACE AFTER APRIL 1982 FEARED

TA182030 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 18 Oct 81

[Excerpts] A serious amount of air traffic congestion in Israeli airspace might be created in April upon the completion of the pullback from the Sinai. Our correspondent has learned that the airports authority has planned an alternative flight route along the Jordanian border which for the moment would limit the activities of the domestic airlines, who in turn are threatening to stop their activity if the limitations are not removed. Here is a report by our correspondent on aviation, Hanan 'Azran:

[Begin videotape] ['Azran] In April, when the withdrawal from the Sinai is completed and the air force takes over the Negev airspace, Israeli airspace will become substantially more congested. The problem will be where to direct the civilian air route which crosses the Negev. The air force currently demands putting the entire Negev airspace at its disposal, whereas civilian aviation requires an open, unlimited route, because only thus is it possible to maintain regular civilian flights and a reliable flight connection with the country's southern part. The airports authority has proposed an alternative flight route, which would separate the civilian aircraft from the air force planes. Security experts claim that the proximity to the border is not dangerous.

However, the air force demands that civilian air traffic be limited to this route in accordance with its demands.

Yet another problem is how to route the international charter flights which are scheduled to land here in Elat. If the aircraft are directed to the long eastern route, the pressure on the central part of the country's airspace will increase and the charter companies themselves have objected to the addition to the route for financial reasons.

As part of the normalization talks, Israel had proposed a western flight route, going from the Mediterranean Sea to Elat along the new international western border. Aircraft that would arrive using this route would be guided by Egyptian control towers. For the moment, the aviation talks are still in progress, and the question of the western route is still open. The result, 6 months prior to the evacuation, is almost certainly that Israel's airspace has reached a new situation, in which civilian aviation will have to exist closely alongside military activity. The question of the Egev flight routes might also be crucial as regards the development of Elat. The civil air traffic controllers will thus now play a central role in maintaining order in the skies. [end videotape]

CSO: 4423/12

RABIN CALLS FOR AUTONOMY SUMMIT

TA221625 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 22 Oct 81

[Text] Knesset member Yitzhaq Rabin has called for a new signing of the Camp David agreements. Gay Bekher, our correspondent, heard what was said at the Labor Party center's meeting and he reports:

Using hard-hitting words, Knesset member Yitzhaq Rabin attacked the policy of the new U.S. administration under Reagan regarding the Camp David agreements.

[Begin Rabin recording] It is my feeling that the Reagan administration regards the Camp David agreements as an illegitimate child inherited from the Carter administration, and this despite all the verbiage heard, even today, from Washington, generally from low-ranking officials. You ask me what basis I have for saying this? The Reagan administration has not appointed a replacement for Sol Linowitz, it has not appointed a man of senior rank to represent Washington since last January to this very day, at the automony talks. [end recording]

[Bekhor] Accordingly, Rabin proposed that the U.S. commitments that are a part of the Camp David treaty should be pinned down at once. This can be done through a summit conference between the leaders of the United States, Egypt and Israel.

[Begin Rabin recording] I propose that Israel demand the coordination of a tripartite summit meeting at the end of January, and no later than the middle of February 1982, so that before that and as a part of it the following issues can be guaranteed: another signature by Reagan, Mubarak and Begin stipulating that the Camp David agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt are the sole basis for the policy of the three countries toward solving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Let us make them sign. [end recording]

[Bekhor] Let the U.S. president say this authoritatively, legally and diplomatically, in the clearest way--this is what Rabin said. If the proposal for this conference meets with a refusal, he said, Israel should reexamine the situation.

[Begin Rabin recording] Then, if they refuse all of this, Israel must make a reassessment. I repeat and stress: We are committed, we want the continuation of the peace process on the basis of the Camp David agreements, on the basis of the peace treaty with Egypt, but on the basis of mutuality. The test of mutuality comes not after April 1982. It lies in the willingness to hold a summit; that is the test of the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli partnership in order to reach a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. [end recording]

CSO: 4423/12

BRIEFS

HUNGARIAN FISH BREEDING STUDY--Four fishery experts from Hungary have arrived in Israel for a 10-day visit to study fishpond pisciculture innovations, a field that has had impressive achievements in Israel. The main fish bred in the ponds is the carp, from which gefilte fish is made. It has been learned that the Hungarian representatives were instructed, before the departure for Israel, not to visit Jerusalem. The four people came within the framework of a grant from the International Food Organization. [Text] [TA051047 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Oct 81 p 4]

JEWISH MAJORITY ON ANNEXATION--The majority of the Israeli public favors borders which would assure a Jewish majority rather than the annexation of territories. This stance has not changed in the last 10 years. These are the findings of a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute in September 1981 and September 1971 at the request of HA'ARETZ. Some 55.1 percent (50.4 percent in 1971) would rather have peace borders which would guarantee that the State of Israel remains a country where the Jews constitute a majority, "even if its security situation were to worsen," compared with 31.7 percent (35.6 percent in 1971) who would rather have the boundaries extended and include all or a considerable part of the territories conquered in the 6-day war, notwithstanding the fact that "there is a large Arab population there." Some 4.7 percent (1.5 percent in 1971) would rather have other solutions, such as selective annexation according to the rule "maximum territory with minimum Arabs" or borders which would be determined by Israel's security needs. Some 8.5 percent (12.5 percent in 1971) have not formed any opinion on the issue. The poll was conducted on a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed throughout the country. [Text] [TA010939 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Oct 81 p 3]

SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION--In September, 400 Jews left the Soviet Union, of whom 116 arrived in Israel to settle. [Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 6 Oct 81 p 4 TA]

SEPTEMBER EXPORTS--In September net exports totaled $380 million. Of this, about $20 million was earned from agricultural exports and about $360 [million] from industrial exports. These figures do not include diamond exports. This has been reported by the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce on the basis of interim data that do not include exports from Israel to the administered territories. [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Oct 81 p 6 TA]

FORMER MAYOR'S RETURN--The coordinator of activities in the administered areas, Maj Gen Dani Mat, has decided to cancel the deportation order against (Nadim al-Zaro), who was mayor of Ramallah and was deported in October 1969 for engaging in hostile activity. His return to Judaea and Samaria will be conditional on his not engaging in such activity. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari was told that security officials did not oppose the cancellation of the order. In recent years he lived in Jordan and occupied himself solely with his own business affairs. Our correspondent notes that after his deportation Jordan appointed him to a ministerial post. [Text] [TA231221 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 23 Oct 81]

YAMIT DISTRICT OCCUPIED--A group of settlers belonging to the group of opponents of the Sinai evacuation tried last night to establish a new settlement near Moshav Haruvit in the Yamit district. This was learned today by our correspondent Yig'al Goren. The settlers, armed with weapons, broke into a building in Moshav Haruvit and began renovation and fencing-off works. The members of Haruvit called the Ne'ot Sinay police for help, but they referred the plaintiffs to the army. Army forces arrived at the scene and said that they cannot evacuate the squatters since they had not been given instructions on how to act in such cases. An investigation carried out by the IDF in the area revealed that the settlers were not in possession of licenses to carry arms. Nevertheless, their arms were not taken from them and they continue to hold on to the building and the equipment even at this very hour. [Text] [TA231948 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 23 Oct 81]

INCREASED OIL RESERVOIRS--Israel will increase by 70 percent the level of its oil reserves in the next few years and will build storage installations above or below ground as appropriate, according to an internal Energy Ministry document which forecasts the demand for oil byproducts between 1981 and 1990. The forecast was drawn up by the ministry's fuel authority. The planners of the Israeli oil market regard this decade as the "coal decade" because this period will serve as a transition period from use of crude oil as the primary energy source (99 percent of all the sources) to maximum use of coal (between 30 and 40 percent) by the end of the decade. Other substitutes, such as shale oil, solar energy or hydroelectric energy will not amount to more than 3 percent of the predicted energy consumption for the end of the decade, or between 12.2 and 12.8 million tons, compared with 8.3 million tons in 1981. Nuclear energy was not taken into account at all for this decade. In accordance with the basic assumption underlying the prediction for this decade, the internal document states that as a result of the expected demand by 1990, it will be necessary to change the composition of the Israeli reserves and increase the storage capability of these reserves in Israel by 70 percent. Fuel authority director, Shim'on Gilbo'a confirmed the reports that such a document exists, saying that Israel's oil costs for this year will amount to a bit more than $2 billion, which is a lot less than the treasury's beginning-of-the-year estimate. ['Oded Shorer] [Text] [TA251255 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Oct 81 p 11]

YAMIT POLICE FILE CHARGES--Yamit police have made criminal charges against the nine residents of the town who this morning seized some offices and proclaimed themselves to be representing Yamit with the authority of a local council. Police are charging them with trespassing. The police interrogated them and released them on bail. The Gaza district police commander said the police will prosecute the nine within a few days. The affair began this morning when some 80 Yamit residents, most of them businessmen and professionals, seized the office. They held a rally, which they called an election rally, and elected nine persons, headed by David Margalit, to the local council. Margalit said he and the others would return to the offices and hold sessions there even though they know they will again be charged with trespassing. One member of the new council, Yovav Gur-ari, began a sit-down strike today opposite MK Hayim Druckman's house in Yamit. Members of the movement for checking the withdrawal say the fact that he is alone proves that the council does not represent the majority of the Yamit residents. The prime minister's office director, Mati Shmuelevitz, urged Yamit settlers to come to the negotiating table at once. Just demands, he stressed, will receive proper attention. Threats and violent outbreaks will adversely affect persons who are entitled to a decent compensation. The prime minister's office director beleives that [there] is a great deal of vagueness and misleading of persons in Yamit. He was speaking at a news conference in Ofira at which details of the compensation all residents of that town will be receiving were revealed. [Text] [TA251852 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 25 Oct 81]

ORTHODOX W. BANK SETTLEMENT--Po'alei Agudat Yisra'el will this year establish a settlement across the green line in the Latrun area. The name of the new settlement will be Nahali'el. Participating in the project are 60 families from Bene Beraq and Petah Tiqva. [Text] [TA221131 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 22 Oct 81]

EARLY ELECTIONS CONSIDERED--Likud leaders recently held closed informal talks on the possibility of calling a new election. This was revealed in London by Likud MK Mikha'el Reiser, who met in closed session with Herut representatives in Britain. Mr Reiser said that the prime minister and his deputy, David Levy, had beey privy to the contacts. According to MK Reiser, both Begin and Levy, along with many more Likud ministers, look favorably on advancing the elections to a date that the Likud will find suitable. Reiser said contacts on this issue had been told because of the Likud's discomfort at the growing pressures being exerted by Agudat Yisra'el and because of the fear of an unexpected reaction by the NRP and Tami coalition partners. "It is because of this," Mr Reiser explained, "that discussions and talks are being held in the Likud on the possibility of advancing the elections in the event that circumstances do not enable the government to function with its narrow majority." [Yosi Melman] [Text] [TA221052 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Oct 81 p 1]

NEW IDF APPOINTMENTS--Our military correspondent reports that Brig Gen Uri Or will be appointed tomorrow as commander of the central command. He will replace Maj Gen Moshe Levi, who will apparently be appointed later to the post of head of the operation branch and deputy chief of staff. Brig Gen Uri Or is a member of Moshav Kefar Hayyim, he is 41 years old, married and a father of three children. He served in the armored corps from the day of his enlistment up to his present appointment. [Text] [TA222002 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 22 Oct 81]

GENERAL STAFF TO JERUSALEM--Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon has instructed the IDF to prepare for transfer of the general staff to Jerusalem. Our military correspondent, Shemu'el Tal, reports that this is not the first time the subject has been raised, but now clear directives have been issued to the army by the defense minister. Our correspondent remarks that if the plan is indeed implemented the general staff can be transferred to Jerusalem only after several years. The expenses involved will amount to billions of shekels. [Text] [TA161108 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 16 Oct 81]

BEERSHEBA SETTLEMENT--A new settlement is to be established at the Yattir ruins along the Beersheva-'Arad highway. The Jewish agency will start building the settlement in the near future. Our correspondent for settlement affairs, Shalom Oren, reports that two core groups will be settling at new Yattir, one from the farmers' association, the other from Gush Emunim. This is the first attempt to form a settlement with two core groups. Residents have been making their homes recently in four settlements in the southeastern part of Mount Hebron: Lutzifar, Sheqef, Karmel and Ma'on. [Text] [TA191042 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 19 Oct 81]

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JEWS--Approximately one-half of the adult Jewish population believes that Sephardic Jews are discriminated against in Israel; over 25 percent believe this discrimination is stirred--either partly or fully--by Ashkenazi Jews; some 17 percent estimate that the sectarian problem cannot be solved by peaceful means but that it will bring about a violent confrontation between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. These are the most outstanding findings of a special survey on sectarian relations in Israel that will be published in the upcoming edition of the monthly MONITIN. Nevertheless, the survey shows that despite the gloomy view of the sectarian problem, its reasons and the prospects for its solution, the public does not rank it among the first and most acute of Israel's problems. A large majority of the population, over 75 percent, regards constructive and government-inspired plans--such as raising the level of education and improving living conditions in the slums--as the most important way to solve the problem at this time. On behalf of MONITIN the survey was conducted by Eliyahu Hasin with the collaboration of Dr Mina Tzemah, director of the Dahaf Research Institute and Prof Moshe Lisk from the faculty of sociology at Hebrew University. The survey was conducted in the first half of September among 1,250 people who are a representative sample of the adult Jewish popluation of Israel, excluding kibbutz members. [Text] [TA191115 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 19 Oct 81 p 2]

AIRCRAFT INDUSTRIES CRITICIZED--The state comptroller's report on 14 large government companies including the aircraft industries and El Al will soon be published. The state comptroller says that the aircraft industries had invested resources in developing a new combat aircraft before the defense establishment even worked out its requests. He strongly criticized the decision-making process, saying that the more sophisticated this process becomes, the less there is a chance that expensive--perhaps even crucial--mistakes will be made. The state comptroller said that the expected loss from the sale of 97 'Arava aircraft is $51 million by the end of next year, and the loss from the production and sale of 188 Westwind aircraft amounts to approximately $20.5 million. The spokesman for the aircraft industries said that some of the state comptroller's findings on shortcomings have already been corrected, and some of them are in the implementation stages. [Excerpt] [TA110538 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 11 Oct 81]

NEW MOSHAV NEAR HEBRON--Moshav Sheqef will be established on the limits of the green line in the southern part of the Hebron Hills within 1 month. The moshav belongs to the Herut-Betar settlement movement. It will initially include 30 families who will make their living from raising vegetables, grapevines and fruit trees. [Text] [TA280921 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 18 Oct 81]

SINAI WITHDRAWAL--Yamit, 21 Oct--The various committees in Yamit, including the committee of business owners and the committee of owners of rental apartments, today held discussions with representatives of the movement to stop the withdrawal from Sinai, in the wake of reports that the multinational force--which is to be formed in accordance with the Camp David accords--will be temporarily housed in Yamit. A communique issued after their discussions said that "the residents of Yamit will prevent any attempt to move a foreign element into the town, and they leave themselves freedom of action to choose what means to use to block such a move. The representatives of the Yamit residents warn the Israeli government not to assume the heavy responsibility of moving in a foreign element, and not to create facts implying that the Yamit district is already under foreign sovereignty. Any change in the way of life in Yamit which is not according to the desire of the residents will necessarily entangle the country in its relations with foreign countries. The Yamit district will remain under Israeli sovereignty, and as for foreign elements, their place is across the border. [Excerpt] [TA211853 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1815 GMT 21 Oct 81]

WITHDRAWAL ISSUE--Reacting to Mubarak's remarks [about Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai in the YEDI'OT AHARONOT interview] the secretariat of the movement for preventing the withdrawal from the Sinai has stated that the people in Israel fail to understand why peace is conditioned on the uprooting of settlements and the banishment of their inhabitants. Israel has not asked such a price from any Arab, and, the peace treaty notwithstanding, Israel is entitled to urge a gesture on this issue. The movement for preventing the withdrawal from the Sinai also wonders why Egypt makes peace conditional on receiving the narrow strip of the Yamit settlements although it has received thousands of square kilometers back from Israel. [Text] [TA210954 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 21 Oct 81]

COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK--The Communications Ministry has begun activating the communications and telecommunication networks in the new Negev airbases in Ramon and 'Uvda according to IDF instructions. Our correspondent Gadi Sukenik reports that the systems were built without aid from overseas and their installation was completed even before construction work at the airbases was finished. Due to the large-scale development work, some of the settlements in the vicinity of the airbases also benefitted, in that their telephone links have been improved. [Text] [TA211124 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 21 Oct 81]

CSO: 4423/12

ALGERIA PRESENTS ITS CASE ON SETTLEMENT OF PROBLEM

Algiers AL-MUJAHID in Arabic No 1102, 18 Sep 81 pp 1-24

/Article: "Document of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria: Algeria's Contribution to the Search for a Just Solution to the Problem of the Western Sahara, a Memorandum Presented by Algeria to the Executive Committee of the Organization of African Unity,/ Nairobi, August 1981"/

/Text/ The Western Sahara issue has received attention from international and regional organizations and conferences that are held from time to time. On a number of occasions the latter have taken up a discussion of the most fruitful ways of liberating the people of the Sahara and their occupied territories and establishing permanent peace and stability in the region.

Consequent to that, the Western Sahara issue witnessed new developments, especially after the resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity in the capital of Kenya last June calling for a cease fire between the two parties concerned and for the holding of a referendum which will guarantee the people of the Sahara their right to self-determination.

In the context of the earnest efforts and endeavors Algeria has exerted and still is exerting to find a just solution to this issue, with the glimmers of hope that have flickered on the horizon, it presented a document to the executive committee of the organization of African Unity which truthfully expresses the extent to which Algeria has been devoted to ending this dark problem and establishing a permanent peace in the area. This document contains Algeria's viewpoint on this matter. In it, Algeria has stressed the basic characteristics of the referendum it is proposed to hold, as well as the conditions and nature of this referendum, and has spelled out the areas of competence and functions of the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity and the nature of the cease fire between the two parties concerned. Algeria expressed its position toward this point at the fifth session of the competent committee at the meeting it held in the period 9-11 September 1980, which it said "cannot be separated from comprehensive negotiations on all aspects of the organization of the referendum. The experience of the Organization of African Unity has taught us more than amply that appeals for a commitment to a cease fire have been without weight precisely because they have not been accompanied by the same force as the appeals for action to encourage agreement to a comprehensive political solution to the problem." Herewith is the official text of the document:

1. What unfortunately cannot be doubted is the fact that the Morocco-Saharan dispute has had a grave effect on stability in the entire region for 6 years and that it has paralyzed development and cooperation among all countries in this part of Africa. Today a glimmer of hope has appeared, which is faint but is illuminating the way toward a peaceful settlement. This glimmer is "the commitment by His Majesty King Hasan the Second to accept the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara to enable the people in this region to exercise their right to self-determination," as stated in those words in the decree bearing on the issue adopted by the African Summit Conference at Nairobi.

2. Algeria has defined and continues to define its policy on this issue by deriving inspiration from belief in the principles which seem today to have become dominant, following the step that Morocco took toward the African and international community in Nairobi, and from its sincere adherence to these principles. Algeria, which has always declared its readiness to work to achieve a peaceful resolution based on principles common to all, can therefore only welcome this development, and considers it therefore its duty, more than before, to offer its contribution to developing the opportunities for peace which have started to appear.

3. In this spirit, and out of a profound, deeply-felt desire to serve peace, cooperation and brotherhood, Algeria presents this contribution, through which it underlines its total support and sincere cooperation in the execution of the resolution of the 18th session of the Nairobi summit on the Western Sahara, to the committee which the Organization of African Unity has established in this regard, in its apperciation.

4. There is no doubt that this contribution expresses Algeria's perception of all the tangible problems related to the execution of the solution the Organization of African Unity has consecrated, as accepted by the two parties to the dispute, Morocco and the Popular Front for the Liberation of El Sakia El Hamra and Rio De Oro. It is also, however, a contribution that has derived its inspiration in root and branch from the Nairobi resolution itself. Algeria does not exclude any of the provisions of this resolution and does not prefer one provision in it to any other in support of its own options. All the recommendations contained in this contribution have been derived from this resolution in a clear manner which does not require explanation.

5. Algeria considers that the tangible, real execution of the resolution on the Western Sahara which was adopted in Nairobi will require a response in advance to two questions:

A. What is the solution? That is, what is the type of referendum which the African summit conference proposed in Nairobi?

B. By what means will the referendum be held? That is, what is the agency for holding it and what are its areas of competence?

The conditions for holding the proposed referendum become clear only after the search in this resolution itself for clear, precise answers to these two questions:

/Illegible/, therefore the proper actual execution of a peaceful solution derived from the conference of the heads of African states in Nairobi will require deep review of the following points:

First, the basic characteristics of the proposed referendum.

Second, the area of competence and functions of the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity.

Third, the conditions for organizing the proposed referendum.

First: The Basic Characteristics of the Proposed Referendum

7. The gist of the resolution adopted at Nairobi is that the issue involves:

A. A referendum.

B. Self-determination.

C. A public referendum.

D. An orderly referendum.

E. A referendum of the people of the Western Sahara.

F. A referendum organized by the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity.

G. A referendum in participation with the United Nations.

H. A referendum in cooperation with the two parties to the dispute.

8. The 18th summit conference of the Organization of African Unity to discuss the issue of the Western Sahara was distinguished by deep discussions on the organization of the referendum; the conclusion of these discussions was a resolution spelling out the general context of the popular referendum. The full minutes of the discussions which will be placed at the disposal of the executive committee established for this purpose contain the political goals of this effort and the details on the organization of the referendum.

9. This African agency, which is a governmental agency common to the African countries, was established for a specific purpose, which is to achieve the consummation of the resolution adopted. This is the basic purpose for which it was established and, on the basis of the resolution, it will, in its performance of its task, enjoy "cooperation from the parties concerned with it." It has in particular been assigned the task of "preparing the arrangements for a cease fire and all other details related to that and for the organization and holding of the referendum."

In this regard, the committee has been assigned the task of "adopting, in participation with the United Nations, all measures necessary for guaranteeing that the people of the Western Sahara exercise a public orderly referendum on self-determination."

The reference to these basic provisions in the resolution adopted in Nairobi will help one understand the legal nature and the contents of the proposed referendum.

A. The legal nature and contents of the proposed referendum.

10. The expression "referendum" appears in Paragraph Seven of the text of the Nairobi resolution. The annexes made with the objective of giving it a precise description describe the nature of this legal referendum, which is "a public orderly referendum of the people of the Western Sahara for the sake of self-determination."

1. It is a referendum:

11. A "referendum" is a procedure, and nothing more, that is provided to a human society so that it may express freely and unambiguously its deep desire. A referendum is a consultation with this society regarding its intentions, which must not be determined in advance. Consequently, a referendum which must determine the destiny of the Western Sahara must rule out all "political preconditions" which will have the effect of determining its results in advance. Therefore no referendum which attempts in advance to be an affirmation of something which is not established and is aimed at this purpose alone will perform the function of an open and fair "consultation," especially if the policy to be established is rejected by words and arms, as is the case in the Western Sahara.

One does not think of or accept a referendum except with the objective of producing a ruling between two belligerents who have decided to substitute the establishment of peace, as required by the people of the Western Sahara, for combat. Therefore it is not possible to organize a referendum only for the purpose of establishing a policy which has been rejected.

This is all correct, and it is more correct when the matter concerns a referendum on "self-determination."

2. It is a referendum on "self-determination":

12. Self-determination is referred to in the United Nations Charter which, in Articles One and 55, stipulates a basic principle, which is "people have equal rights and equal rights to determine their destinies by themselves." The General Assembly, in "The Declaration Granting Independence to Colonized Countries and Peoples," spelled out the contents of this principle when it declared that "all people have the right freely to determine their destiny" and "by virtue of this right can freely determine their political status and freely strive for their economic, social and cultural development."

13. A referendum on self-determination is, in terms of its own subject, a decisive measure, because it represents a process of popular consultation which has been designed to determine who will hold future sovereignty over a region. Consequently, a referendum on self-determination must basically perforce give a choice between two alternatives at the very least, and the voter can give an affirmative or negative answer to the question presented.

3. The referendum must be "public":

14. The character of "publicness" adhering to a popular referendum gives such a referendum the three following dimensions:

A. In terms of form, the voting can only be public and direct. In fact, General Assembly Resolution 1541 (D-15) for 1960 has imposed the condition that the referendum be conducted in accordance with broad-scale democratic programs that are fairly applied and are based on the principle of a public vote.

B. In terms of voters, all adult persons who have citizenship in the Western Sahara and declare such citizenship will be considered.

C. In terms of place, the popular referendum will take place in the entire region of the Western Sahara.

15. The "public" character of the referendum will require the following practical results:

First, the exclusion of all forms of referendum which are not through direct popular vote (such as those through a society of prominent men, according to "groups," "senior electors" and so forth).

Second, definition of the voters (as specified by the expression "the people" of the Western Sahara) as consisting of all adults who have citizenship in the Western Sahara, even if they are not currently residing in this area. This in particular requires the return of refugees and people in exile to their homeland and the release of all Saharans in prison.

Third, defining the territorial context in which the popular referendum is to be held as the entire region of the Western Sahara, in the borders that existed during the Spanish occupation.

16. The United Nations General Assembly defined this last problem, that is, the problem of the "territorial context," in the context of the right of peoples to determine their destinies, when it declared in Resolution 2625 (D-25 for 1970, which contained "the declaration bearing on the principles of international law," that "the territory of a colony or a territory which does not enjoy autonomy will by virtue of the charter have a separate status distinct from that of the territory of a state which administers that territory. This separate distinctive status as granted by the charter will remain in being until the people of the colony or the region which does not enjoy autonomy exercise their right to determine their destiny."

Basic conclusions derive from this. This national regional base for the referendum in the Western Sahara clearly excludes two suppositions:

On the one hand, the supposition that the holding of a referendum will be limited to a region of the national territory of the Sahara, such as the region called the "useful triangle" which Morocco supervises.

On the other hand, the supposition that a series of separate referenda are to be held on the basis of different geographical bases, such as the holding of separate referenda in all of the adjacent countries where Sahara citizens reside for one reason or another.

Therefore it is totally clear, in the sense of the resolution adopted in Nairobi, that the African summit conference has decided to conduct a public referendum, that is, a referendum organized in the entire national territory of the Western Sahara.

4. The referendum must be "orderly":

17. The reference to the "Orderly character" of the referendum leads us to a number of practical measures which will have the effect of guaranteeing freedom of expression through each voter's desire, a secret vote, and propriety in the entire referendum process.

Therefore this character leads us to international practice in this realm. This exercise has been a subject of reports in the League of Nations and the United /Nations/ and also a subject of a study of precedents which can be used in coming referenda--a study which, as it should, takes into consideration their advantages and particular characteristics--in order to comment on them.

18. The "orderly nature" of the referendum tangibly requires some conditions which will have the effect of guaranteeing that activity proceeds in the best manner. These minimum conditions depend at the same time on:

Organization: the elimination of the Moroccan administration from the entire process from the setting out of election lists to the counting of votes and the announcement of results.

Safety of the voters: the withdrawal of all Moroccan military and quasi-military forces or their neutralization in practice by means of an international peacekeeping force supervising public order and guarding voting places.

Informing the voters: the referendum must be characterized by total fairness and it is necessary to organize a publicity campaign to guarantee full freedom of electoral activity for the national liberation movement representing the people of the Western Sahara, that is, in this case, the Polisario front. In this context it is necessary that the front be guaranteed the freedom to enter and full freedom to move about in the whole territory as well as to use the appropriate means for activity, information and publicity.

5. A referendum of the "people" of the Western Sahara:

19. This means a referendum of the people, the people of the Western Sahara, the natural holder of sovereignty over the territory, and the only body whose right to self-determination is at issue.

When the heads of the African state determined with such precision the demographic entity which must be polled in order to determine the future of the Western Sahara, and preferred to use the notion of "the people" rather than the notion of "residents," "inhabitants," or "citizens," they raised a clear distinction between the national society of the Western Sahara and the Moroccan people, thus indicating the existence of two different nonhomogeneous sovereignties in two geographic contexts.

20. In modern international law, sovereignty in a territory where colonialism has not ended is considered to be vested in the people of that territory and not in the occupying country, whatever it might be. In accordance with United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 1514 (15-D) and 2625 (25-D), which openly and unanimously consecrate this development of international law, all people, even if they are not independent at some stage of their history, possess the characteristics of national sovereignty that accompany their existence as a people, and these are characteristics and characters which can vanish only with the disappearance and destruction of this people itself.

21. This means that when the people of the Western Sahara declare their view in the course of their referendum on self-determination, they will have expressed this with regard to their own sovereignty and will be given independence if they choose independence and choose to exercise their own soverignty, not the sovereignty of the occupying state which will have transferred it to the territory, on their territory.

6. A referendum organized by the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity:

22. The "full powers" which have been delegated to the executive committee (Paragraph Three of the resolution) and the mandate that has been assigned to it, to "proceed, in participation with the United Nations, to adopt all necessary measures" (Paragraph Seven), and the presence of a "peacekeeping force" (Paragraph Six), are the prominent features of the aspects of international law regarding the referendum which the heads of the African states are proposing.

As regards organization of the referendum and the process of holding it, which has been assigned to the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity, in participation with the United Nations, the formulation of the mandate spells out the responsibility for solidarity and close interaction between two personalities of international law (the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity) and thus establishes the international nature of the popular referendum in the Western Sahara.

23. This international nature bears testimony to the fact that the Organization of African Unity's remedy for the problem of the Western Sahara is one that totally

corresponds to modern international law, since the African effort attempts to arrive at a final resolution which will enter totally into the general context specified by the "declaration bearing on the principles of international law that bear on friendly relations and cooperation among nations" which the General Assembly endorsed by Resolution 3625 (D-25) for 1970.

24. As regards mere surveillance over the referendum, the performance by the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations of full supervision over the referendum process in the Western Sahara, meaning the work which these two organizations must carry out, cannot just be a guarantee of initiatives of execution in their absence, behind their backs, which will consequently engender violations of their resolutions and recommendations. In this case, the work that the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations must undertake to perform in close solidarity between themselves cannot be confined merely to approving an existing state of affairs.

Therefore, the Moroccan view, that is, the view of an "affirmation" referendum, in accordance with domestic law, is to be rejected.

B. The Moroccan view of the "affirmation referendum" turns the referendum on self-determination into a referendum on occupation.

25. The King of Morocco, in discussing the issue of the referendum at the 18th summit conference of the Organization of African Unity, stated, in particular, "we have decided to carry out the referendum process. While the Moroccan government has not expressed reservations regarding the resolution issued by the 18th African summit conference on the Western Sahara, it has affirmed, in many public statements, that the expected referendum will be a supervisory 'affirmation referendum.'" This expression alone, taken from the speech by the King of Morocco at Nairobi,is seen to declare a purely Moroccan decision on an interpretation contrary to the nature of the referendum on self-determination and the arrangements for it.

26. The mechanism that Morocco envisions for the proposed referendum, as deduced from various public statements, appears to be as follows:

The Moroccan administration and forces will remain in the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan authorities alone will organize and manage the entire process.

Morocco will accept an agreed upon number of observers belonging to the Organization of African Unity and/or the United Nations to "confirm" that the referendum is proceeding properly.

Morocco alone will take charge of formulating the only question put for referendum, on the proviso that if it contains a hint of an affirmative answer that will be tantamount to a collective ratification of the incorporation of the territory into Morocco.

27. This group of early indications supporting affirmation of the incorporation of the Western Sahara is derived from a technique widely used in the last century

to impose the agreement of inhabitants to changes bearing on the territories, to attain which resort was made to threats of the use of force. This was embodied in military occupation and was known as "the referendum of occupation." This type of referendum, while being held in the context of the domestic law of the occupying country and under its sole responsibility, accepts "international surveillance" when there are expected legal consequences to this type of referendum, as far as international recognition of the new status of the territory being incorporated is concerned.

Consequently, the holding of an occupation referendum in the Western Sahara in the presence of Organization of African Unity and/or United Nations observers who have no influence or power would be aimed at violating the resolution of the African summit conference in Nairobi, distorting the real aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara, and frustrating the long-standing expectations of the African and international community.

28. While Morocco is reviving the technique of the "occupation referendum" in a new manner, in order to make it correspond to today's tastes in service of a cause, it is registering a clear, unfortunate regression as far as the congruence of sincere African views on organization of the referendum concerning the self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara goes--a congruence of views which it has not dissented from.

The 18th summit conference of the Organization of African Unity actually recorded that, in an important paragraph on this subject in the preface to its resolution, in which it stated that the conference:

"Welcomes His Majesty King Hassan the Second's commitment officially to accept the organization of the referendum in the Western Sahara in order to enable the people of this territory to exercise their right to self-determination."

29. The "referendum of occupation," the technique that time has obliterated, by which populations in the 19th century would "agree" to relinquish their territory, is no longer in keeping with this era today, because it does not fulfill the conditions of a referendum on self-determination or its nature in its capacity as a sound means for leading a downtrodden people and breaking the yoke of colonial dominance about its necks.

This "occupation referendum" is not related in any way to "public" or "orderly" "referendums" of "self-determination" which the "executive committee" of the Organization of African Unity is to organize "in cooperation with the two parties to the conflict" and "in participation with the United Nations."

Second: The Area of Competence and the Functions of the Executive Committee

30. The resolution adopted in Nairobi stipulates a commitment to a cease fire and the organization of a referendum on the territory of the Western Sahara. Execution of these provisions has been assigned to a committee composed of seven countries: Tanzania, Sierra Leone, the Sudan, Guinea, Kenya, Mali and Nigeria. The summit

conference resolution precisely stipulates the area of competence and the functions of the committee.

A. The area of competence of the executive committee:

1. The nature of the powers of the executive committee:

31. In accordance with the resolution adopted in Nairobi, the conference of the heads of states and the Organization of African Unity have assigned two types of powers to the executive committee:

In Paragraph Three, the committee has been assigned "full powers" to carry out the specialized committee's recommendation.

In Paragraph Seven, the executive committee has been assigned a "mandate" to adopt all necessary measures to guarantee the performance of a public orderly referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara.

In both cases, those of full powers and the mandate, the conference of the heads of states and governments has delegated its powers to the executive committee. As a result, the resolutions which the executive committee will adopt in the context of its powers will enjoy the same legal weight as the summit resolutions themselves enjoy.

2. The scope of the competence of the executive committee:

a. "Full powers."

32. The area of competence assigned to the executive committee in Paragraph Three of the resolution is almost complete; the conference of the heads of states and governments are supposed to cede the execution of the specialized committee's recommendations to the executive committee.

It is worth pointing out that the full powers delegated to the committee bear on the execution of the recommendation of the fifth session of the specialized committee which, in addition to that, is referred to in the second paragraph of the preface. It is worth pointing out here that this recommendation concerns in particular the need to:

Honor the cease fire by December 1980 at the latest;

Confine the forces of both parties concerned to their own barracks;

Establish a force to maintain the peace;

Have the Organization of African Unity, with the aid of the United Nations, assume the task of organizing and administering the referendum.

33. Perhaps this reference to the Freetown recommendation alone in the Nairobi resolution seems at variance with the overall notion of the resolutions of the

Organization of African Unity and the specialized committee, over which Morocco has protested, adhering, for its part, to the conclusions of the fifth session of the specialized committee; these conclusions appear to Morocco better to support its position because in reality this recommendation proposes the organization of a referendum while keeping Moroccan forces present on Saharan territory.

Nonetheless, it is worth observing that the first paragraph of the text of the Freetown recommendation itself points to the need to organize a fair public referendum in the Western Sahara "in accordance with Resolution 114 issued by the 16th summit conference held in Monrovia. "This resolution insists on the need to organize a referendum which is "public and free," allowing the people of the Western Sahara to "choose" any of the options available to them without pressure.

b. "The Mandate."

34. The power granted to the executive committee by virtue of Paragraph Seven is total and enables the committee to realize the purpose set out for it. However, this power is different from that stipulated in Paragraph Three, which states that the power granted in accordance with the mandate firstly can be abrogated in essence and second is subject to subsequent review by the conference.

3. Scope of application of the power of the committee:

35. Regarding the committee, the tangible difference between Paragraphs Three and Seven of the Nairobi resolution does not in fact concern the scope of the committee's power, which is considered comprehensive and total in either case. The committee is delegated to take all necessary decisions to enable the people of the Western Sahara truly to express their wishes regarding their political future.

Rather, the difference concerns the African summit conference's powers over the executive committee subordinate to it. In the case of Paragraph Three, that is, the practical execution of the Freetown recommendation, which calls for the holding of a referendum and the withdrawal of forces, the summit conference assigns all its powers to the committee. However, as regards the measures required in accordance with Paragraph Seven, in the desire to guarantee that the people of the Western Sahara exercise self-determination through an orderly public referendum, the summit conference reserves the right subsequently to oversee the activity of its committee. For example, if the measures stipulated for establishing the forces (Paragraph Three) are to have a negative effect on the public or orderly character of the referendum (Paragraph Seven), the summit conference can reserve the right to oversee the measures the committee adopts.

36. From a broader perspective, a question presents itself with regard to the conditions under which the powers granted to the executive committee must be exercised, in the view of the conference of heads of states itself on the one hand and the parties concerned on the other.

a. The powers of the committee vis-a-vis the summit conference:

37. As regards the powers granted to the committee in accordance with Paragraph Three, there is no need to state that the committee enjoys all the powers necessary

to give the recommendation of the specialized committee real weight, and there is no need to refer again to the conference of the heads of states. The reliance on this kind of language in Paragraph Three is made clearly, as a result of the need to prevent any future recurrence of the cases that obstructed the activity of the Organization of African Unity and the specialized committee subordinate to it (in order to carry out the recommendation of the second Freetown conference regarding the commitment to a cease fire in December 1980 at the latest). Likewise, the committee has granted it full powers, in the desire to give it unreserved political support, in order to enable it to carry out its mission without waiting for the conference itself to authorize its decrees in practice.

38. In the case of the priority granted to the executive committee in accordance with Paragraph Seven, the conference reserves two options as follows:

A. It can abrogate the mandate it has granted to the executive committee at any time if it is not satisfied with the method by which the committee has carried out its task; this precisely is the essence of any mandate.

B. The results of the committee's mandate must be presented to the conference, which will exercise its subsequent oversight over the activities of the conference; in other words, after the committee has finished organizing and holding the referendum, it must present a report to the African summit conference regarding the results of its mission.

b. The powers of the committee vis-a-vis the parties concerned:

39. It is possible to create two types of solutions to the anticipated problem which will produce totally different results.

The first solution lies in granting the committee the role of arbitration and the function of decisionmaking, allowing it, by its own initiative but in cooperation with the parties concerned, to set forth the necessary provisions for carrying out the cease fire and holding the referendum. The parties concerned will be invited to express their opinions to the executive committee, which will be responsible for taking a final decision. In this event, the committee will exercise all its powers vis-a-vis the parties concerned.

The second solution lies in granting the committee the powers of an intermediary assigned to the task of achieving a rapprochement between the positions of the parties concerned. In this case, the committee must perforce take into account the parties' opinions and try to acquire their agreement to every decision taken. The committee will not be the "master" of the process of a popular referendum in the Western Sahara, nor will it be entitled to the designation of "executive committee," because it will function as an intermediary between the Polisario front and Morocco, whose positions it will assiduously strive to reconcile.

40. In the opinion of the Algerian government, it would be beneficial if the actual text of the Nairobi resolution were not ignored at any stage. This text has "decided" to establish the committee (Paragraph Three) and has explicitly assigned it the task of "preparing" the procedures for a cease fire and referendum,

in cooperation with the two parties to the conflict (Paragraph Five). Thus, this cooperation will be "binding" on Morocco and the Polisario front, so that they may help the committee assume its task as thoroughly as possible; this cooperation on the part of both parties is in fact the opposite of their taking the place of the committee in execution of its duties.

As regards the general conditions for a cease fire, these must be specified by agreement of both parties. It is clear that a cease fire cannot actually take place without their agreement. In this preliminary stage of the struggle in the Western Sahara, the executive committee must effect a reconciliation between the two parties, encourage them to negotiate over an agreement which it will have fashioned, which it will give testimony to and guarantee, and will ultimately be the authority for execution. In subsequent stages of the process, the committee's role will have to be more decisive and it will have to become the "designer" of the referendum.

To this end, the Nairobi resolution has clearly specified the tasks that are to be assigned to the committee.

B. The tasks of the executive committee:

41. The general tasks of the committee appear in the text of the resolution itself. These consist of:

Preparing measures for the cease fire.
Guaranteeing a commitment to the cease fire.
Preparing measures related to organizing the referendum.

Guaranteeing that the people of the Western Sahara exercise self determination through an orderly public referendum.

42. More specifically, without losing sight of the provisions of Paragraph Three of the decree, the executive committee's tasks are the following:

Guaranteeing the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces and administration while specifying the arrangements for that and specifying a schedule for it.

Determining the structure of the temporary administration and assigning a person to take charge of it.

Installing the temporary administration in the territory.

Negotiating with the United Nations on the subject of sending United Nations peacekeeping forces.

Determining the arrangements for organizing participation in the voting, registering voters, determining Sahara citizens, bringing back refugees and exiles, and releasing all prisoners who belong to the Sahara.

Formulating the question or questions which will be presented to the people of the Western Sahara.

Announcing the results of the referendum.

43. The basic advantages of the referendum the summit conference has called for have now become totally clear. The areas of competence and the tasks of the executive committee have been clearly defined, and it is now easy to define the conditions for organizing the referendum. These conditions will logically and inevitably arise from the nature of the autonomy referendum on autonomy and the areas of competence and tasks of the executive committee.

Third: Conditions for Organizing the Referendum

44. The president of the state of Mauritania is to be credited with setting forth the first draft for organizing the referendum in the Western Sahara, having proposed that at the 18th summit conference of the Organization of African Unity at Nairobi.

This draft was the basis for the presentation of a similar proposal the foreign minister of Nigeria offered to the specialized committee concerned with the Western Sahara which had met to formulate the draft resolution of the summit conference in Nairobi.

The Algerian delegation has accepted the Nigerian proposal, which has logically adopted all the conditions that Algeria had hoped would be the subject of a referendum, in order to guarantee the holding of a free, orderly, true referendum in the Western Sahara.

The proposal of Nigeria, following the improvements which Mali introduced into it, constituted the essence of the summary prepared by the chairman of the committee and the foreign minister of Kenya.

45. As a result, the organizational draft bearing on the referendum on self-determination, as prepared by the formulation team belonging to the specialized committee in Nairobi, revolves about the following main outlines of activity:

A. Negotiation over arrangements for the cease fire.
B. The withdrawal of forces
C. The dispatch of a United Nations peacekeeping force to the Western Sahara.
D. The establishment of a temporary neutral administration.
E. The determination of Sahara citizens.
F. The return of Sahara citizens to their territories.
G. The registration of Sahara citizens.
H. The administrative organization of the referendum.

In this regard, the Algerian government points out that this draft to a large degree resembles the one presented by the Kingdom of Morocco to the visiting United Nations delegation in 1975 as a condition for accepting the referendum the United Nations had proposed.

The main thrust of this draft revolved about the following lines of activity:

Withdrawal of the Spanish forces and administration.

The presence of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the territory.

A United Nations administration in the territory.

A 6-month transitional period following the departure of the Spanish forces and administration.

46. The choice of this organizational scheme for carrying out a referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara did not arise haphazardly. It expresses Algeria's sincere desire to follow up on the general lines of the conditions for organizing the referendum, and it has arisen from the discussion at the meeting of the specialized committee, which met in its capacity as a formulating committee at the foreign minister level in Nairobi. There Algeria determined to bring its position in line with that of the committee, in the diesire to have its contribution correspond with the lines the committee had set forth.

A. The Cease Fire

47. Commitment to a cease fire in the Western Sahara has been the object of constant attention on the part of the Organization of African Unity and the specialized committee subordinate to it. The Algerian government considers that it is necessary to consider the lessons of the failure of efforts exerted in the past to achieve a cease fire in the Western Sahara. These lessons will clearly specify the minimum conditions short of which it will not be possible to achieve an actual cease fire, and they show the clear political link between the cease fire and the holding of the referendum. These lessons are wholly clear when one analyzes the three successive approaches the Organization of African Unity followed regarding the issue of cease fire in the Western Sahara. The conditions for the cease fire will also become apparent in a totally natural and logical manner from the Nairobi resolution, the nature of the recommended referendum, and the powers of the executive committee.

1. The Organization of African Unity's three successive approaches regarding the issue of the cease fire in the Western Sahara:

48. At the outset the Organization of African Unity called for a cease fire in order to help the specialized committee in its task, then to "create a suitable atmosphere" and finally "to hold a free, fair referendum."

a. The cease fire "to help the specialized committee."

49. At its first session, held in Khartoum on 30 November and /1/ December 1978, the specialized committee requested "the two parties to the struggle to commit themselves to a full and immediate cease fire in order to enable the committee to carry out the great task assigned to it."

b. The cease fire "to create a suitable atmosphere."

50. At its second session, held in Khartoum on 23 June 1979, the specialized committee authorized a group of recommendations for presentation to the Monrovia

conference, bearing in particular on the preparation of "the suitable atmosphere for the establishment and maintenance of peace in the area through commitment to a general, immediate cease fire." The conference of the heads of states and governments held in Monrovia in the period 17-20 July 1979 approved this recommendation.

c. The cease fire "to hold a free, fair referendum."

51. In its third session held in Monrovia on 4-5 December 1979, the specialized committee called on all parties to the dispute immediately to commit themselves to a cease fire in all sections of the territory of the Western Sahara to make it possible to hold a fair, just referendum.

52. In addition, the specialized committee, in its first and second session, confined itself to concentrating in general form on the principle of the cease fire only as it was related to the issue of the task of the conference, which can proceed in accordance with the cease fire, and the issue of peace in the region, which the cease fire could help establish. However, for the first time, the specialized committee, at its third session, dealt with the problem of the cease fire from the standpoint of the holding of a free, just referendum. This new platform, specifically, which directly links the principle of a cease fire to the general problem of the referendum which must be held in the Western Sahara, dominated the fourth and fifth sessions of the specialized committee.

53. At the fifth session, held in Freetown in the period 9-11 September 1981 /sic/ the committee emphasized the "clear need" to organize a just public referendum in the Western Sahara, urging all parties concerned to commit themselves to a cease fire in early December at the latest.

54. Through this brief description, one can deduce the following conclusions from the Organization of African Unity's treatment of the problem of the cease fire:

a. Until the convening of the third conference of the specialized committee, the calls the Organization of African Unity launched for a cease fire continued to suffer from a major weakness, which lay in the fact that it was in no way presented in a specific context and a clear manner as an inseparable part of the solution to the problem of the Western Sahara. As long as the calls for a cease fire remained connected to obscure notions, such as "the success of the mission of the committee" and the "establishment of peace in the region," the opportunity properly to respond to them remained unattainable because they lacked any substance to support them.

b. The specialized committee assuredly filled this gap in its third session, as it connected the problem of the cease fire directly to the holding of a referendum on self-determination. However, one fact which remains is still that the new platform, even now that it has been corrected in this manner, has not completely covered the subject. When it called for a cease fire, the Organization of African Unity did not deal with the vital aspect of this issue, that is, the aspect related to the arrangements and conditions which one could reasonably define only through negotiation between the two parties to the dispute themselves.

c. Lastly, the specialized committee, while directing an appeal for an immediate cease fire, then, at its fifth session, directing an appeal for a commitment to a cease fire at the beginning of December 1980 at the latest, did not deal with another aspect of this problem, which was the one that arose from the fact that this sort of a cease fire would not be a fait accompli unless a political agreement was reached first on organizing the referendum and, in a more general form, on the nature of the solution that would have to be applied in the Western Sahara.

d. In Nairobi, it was fortunately possible to reach new efforts to deal with these two aspects.

2. The summit conference in Nairobi and the subject of the cease fire in the Western Sahara:

55. The resolution adopted in Nairobi concerned this subject of the cease fire in two paragraphs which it formulated as follows:

Paragraph Four: "It urges the two parties to the dispute immediately to commit themselves to a cease fire, and calls on the executive committee to attend closely to the commitment to the cease fire without delay."

Paragraph Five: "It requests the executive committee to meet before the end of August 1981 and to work in cooperation with the two parties to the dispute to prepare the measures and all other details related to the establishment of the cease fire and the organization and holding of the referendum."

56. In Nairobi the decision arose to remedy the problem of the cease fire in its two basic aspects.

First, by formulating its arrangements and conditions by negotiation between the parties concerned themselves, under the supervision of the executive committee.

Second, by establishing a categorical link between the cease fire and determination of a comprehensive political solution to be carried out in the Western Sahara.

In fact, a new platform did arise from the discussion which went on at the meeting of the competent committee in Nairobi, in its capacity as a foreign minister level working group. That is the platform that underlined the fact that a cease fire could not be carried out unless understood in its function as a supplementary part of the comprehensive political agreement to organize the referendum. The fact is that this requirement can be considered totally logical and realistic in a conspicuous fashion.

3. The specific platform regarding the problem of the cease fire.

a. The Algerian position.

57. Algeria's position on the problem of the cease fire was presented to the fifth session of the specialized committee, at its meeting held in Freetown in the period 9-11 September 1980. On that occasion, Algeria stressed its total

adherence to the notion of a political settlement to the problem of the Western Sahara and clearly declared that it was referring to the parties concerned to negotiate over the cease fire arrangements.

As regards Algeria, no cease fire agreement that may be reached can be separated from comprehensive negotiation over all aspects of the organization of the referendum. The experience of the Organization of African Unity has taught us more than enough that appeals for a commitment to a cease fire have remained ineffective precisely because they were not accompanied by the same force as the appeals to strive to encourage agreement to a comprehensive political solution to the problem.

b. The current position of the Organization of African Unity.

58. The organization plan for the referendum in the Western Sahara which the foreign minister of Nigeria presented to the specialized committee at its meeting held in Nairobi, in its capacity as the team formulating the draft resolution, states that the matter should be referred by the executive committee to the parties concerned themselves to negotiate over the arrangements for the cease fire, including the date for putting it into execution.

The platform enjoyed broad support within the committee, and, from the discussions inside the committee, it became clearly apparent that a commitment to a cease fire could not be separated from negotiation over arrangements for carrying out a referendum but that it is one of the elements that constitute the political agreement that the executive committee will seek to achieve.

59. Derived from this general principle are the following:

1. The arrangements for the cease fire, including the date on which it is to enter into execution, must be negotiated by the parties concerned under the supervision of the executive committee.

2. Negotiations over these arrangements will constitute an inseparable part of negotiations over other aspects of the referendum, especially those related to the withdrawal of the occupation forces and administration.

B. Withdrawal of the Forces

60. In terms of a political settlement to the problem of the Western Sahara through an orderly public referendum over self-determination, the withdrawal of the forces seems to be a basic factor. This arrangement for neutralizing the forces in the territory is a decisive matter in the orderly prosecution of the election processes and the holding of a proper referendum.

The withdrawal of the forces, which will essentially guarantee the evacuation of all occupation forces from the Western Sahara, is a measure aimed at guaranteeing free expression of the citizens' desire and guaranteeing the protection of the voters through the elimination of the danger of direct or indirect pressure by protecting them from fear of reprisal or threats.

To that one should add that Morocco itself is the one that made the withdrawal of forces a preliminary condition for its acceptance of the referendum which the United Nations proposed. This was clearly presented to the visiting United Nations mission in 1975.

1. The legal basis for the withdrawal of the forces from the Western Sahara:

61. The Algerian government would like to refer herebelow to the resolutions calling for the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces and administration.

a. In the context of the United Nations:

62. Two resolutions have been issued by the General Assembly, and one by the Security Council, related to the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the Western Sahara, directly in the case of the two General Assembly resolutions and indirectly in the case of the Security Council resolution.

b. In Resolution 34/37 dated 21 November 1979, the General Assembly requested "the withdrawal of occupation forces" from the territory.

2. In Resolution 35/19 dated 11 November 1980, the General Assembly declared anew "its extreme anxiety over the increasing gravity of the situation resulting from Morocco's continued occupation of the Western Sahara."

3. In Resolution 380 (1975) dated 6 November 1975, the General Assembly requested that "Morocco immediately withdraw all people participating in the march from the territory of the Western Sahara." Naturally the expression "all people participating in the march" includes Moroccan armed forces personnel who were given the designation "under the command of the civilian inhabitants" in the "march" before it went into the Western Sahara.

b. In the context of the Organization of African Unity:

63. The issue of the withdrawal of forces from the Western Sahara was raised on a broad scale in the discussions of the specialized committee meeting in Nairobi, in the committee of the foreign minister level formulating team.

In addition, the condition of the withdrawal of the forces was set forth as one of the basic ingredients in the plan organizing the referendum that took form following the discussions of the specialized committee, and the foreign minister of Kenya made that a basic subject of his final summary.

Thus the specialized committee precisely and clearly determined that the withdrawal of forces from the Western Sahara was a decisive element in the holding of the proposed referendum.

Since the reductions in the units of the Moroccan forces were made for reasons of political expediency, it was necessary that the foreign minister of Kenya stipulate in his summary of the discussions of the working team the condition "withdrawal of

all forces" in its function as an element in the holding of the referendum in the Western Sahara.

2. Algeria's Position

64. Algeria's interest in attaining a real end to colonialism in the Western Sahara and in enabling the Saharan people freely to exercise their right to self-determination without foreign pressure means neutralizing the sources of the dispute in the territory and consequently the withdrawal of all Moroccan forces. From another standpoint that is the objective of the two abovementioned resolutions issued by the General Assembly.

65. National politicians, scholars of politics and jurists are agreed in stressing the need for the withdrawal of forces so that all popular referenda of this type may meet the conditions for holding the referendum in the best manner. Sarah Wambaugh, an expert in this field, has written "The holding of a referendum in a country where the causes of conflict have not been neutralized is to be considered a crime against political science and against the inhabitants of that territory."

66. In another area, the withdrawal of belligerent forces is stipulated by all treaties in most occasions. That is the case with regard to the Versailles Treaty, which stipulated not just the withdrawal of the forces of Germany from the territories of Benstein, Mariborder and Upper Silesia during the holding of a referendum there, but also the withdrawal of the forces of Yugoslavia from the Klagenfurth area and the forces of Czechoslovakia and Poland from the Tischin area. Since Polish forces remained in the Province of Tina and did not withdraw from it, the results of the referendum the treaty had stipulated were not recognized by Lithuania or the League of Nations.

67. "The withdrawal of all forces," in its literal sense, requires the withdrawal of the armed forces of Morocco and the Polisario front from the Western Sahara.

This interpretation, which places the occupiers and the resisters on an equal footing, is to be considered politically corrupt and legally unacceptable. The popular character of the war of liberation which the Polisario front is waging in the Western Sahara makes the fighting man a voter, while the converse is the case. Above and beyond that, there are no precedents for the withdrawal of people fighting in a national liberation movement for the sake of holding a referendum on self-determination.

68. Therefore the government of Algeria considers that the "withdrawal" of all forces from the region does not make any political sense, and moreover entails a practical impossibility, since one cannot create a place where the Organization of African Unity could send the Saharan forces if they withdrew from their own territory. It is impossible to imagine the banishment from their own country of fighting men who are distinguished by being also and above all else the citizens of the Western Sahara.

69. This is correct to the point where the five Western countries' plan for settling the question of Namibia, in a question which is similar to that of the

Western Sahara, /state/that the Swapo forces must not withdraw from the territory. This plan was agreed to by the Security Council in Resolution 435 (1978).

Specifically, the case of Namibia in this regard is unique because the settlement bearing on it anticipates the intervention of the United Nations to supervise a referendum for self-determination for a people who have been waging a war of national liberation and to oversee this referendum. The plan organizes a gradual withdrawal of the forces of South Africa from Namibia (except for a small team composed of 1,500 persons) while, at the same time, with regard to the forces of Swapo, expecting only to confine them to their camps during the electoral process. It is important to refer to this theoretical arrangement for neutralizing the elements of the struggle in Namibia, at least because five Western countries took part in setting it forth and the international community has given agreement to it.

70. For all the abovementioned reasons, the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces from the territory of the Western Sahara seems to be necessary and logical. This represents a demand of the Polisario front which, in addition, stresses that the Moroccan presence in the Western Sahara is illegitimate, that the people of the Sahara are faced with an aggression against their people, and consequently that the Moroccan forces alone are the ones that must withdraw from the entire territory.

71. However, some people have noted that the French armies did not withdraw from Algerian territory before the holding of a referendum on self-determination in 1962. It is the view of the Algerian government that the comparison is unacceptable, because the people holding this view forget a basic point which existed in the case of Algeria but does not exist in the case of the Western Sahara, namely the agreements on the independence of Algeria (the Evian Agreements), which the two belligerents signed before the holding of the referendum, recording a congruence of views between the two parties to the dispute. If that were the situation between Morocco and the Polisario front regarding the basic issues, in particular the future political status of the Western Sahara, there would have been no difficulty in imposing agreement to the continuation of presence of the Moroccan forces in the territory.

72. The Algerian government appreciates the importance and gravity of the withdrawal of all the forces; nor does it ignore that the specialized committee recommended at Freetown that the forces be confined to their barracks instead of being withdrawn.

It also realizes the nature of the anxiety which the Polisario front feels, considering that the withdrawal of the Moroccan forces must be complete, indeed must be completed also by establishing a demilitarized zone within Moroccan territory extending for a distance of 150 kilometers.

Therefore Algeria is extremely anxious that this difficult issue be the subject of a full agreement between Morocco and the Polisario front, provided that each give the other the tangible guarantees that it is waiting for under the close supervision of the executive committee.

73. This is above and beyond the point that if the two belligerents reach a stage where they can discuss the problem of the withdrawal of the forces, that will be

a perceptible sign of progress along the road to the embodiment of the peaceful solution in the Western Sahara; then it will not be ludicrous for someone to consider that the war has almost ended, and the Moroccan military apparatus present in the territory will also be seen to have gone beyond reasonable bounds and its immediate reduction in very noticeable form will be a matter that will impose itself automatically as an inevitable measure. Then, will it not be possible for the executive committee to work, on its own responsibility, to cause all parties to accept the intermediate solution whose main elements will be the tangible withdrawal of the Moroccan forces, accompanied by the retention of part of them in isolated points agreed upon by negotiation?

74. Whatever the situation may be, it is the opinion of the Algerian government that the complete or tangible withdrawal of the forces, accompanied by the retention of part of them in isolated points, would require negotiation between Morocco and the Polisario front under the actual supervision of the executive committee. The clear danger of a military presence which is not agreed to by negotiation but consecrates a fait accompli resulting from "the immediate cease fire" would be tantamount to a consecration of the fragmentation of the political influence of the two parties within the sections remaining under the surveillance of each.

75. The tabulation of the armies of the two belligerent parties in the agreed upon isolated points by negotiation, if it is the subject of a reasonable resolution on the part of the two parties, must in any event, if it is to be palatable, be accompanied by a significant, tangible reduction in the units of the Moroccan forces operating in the Western Sahara in order that a balance of forces may be achieved between the Polisario front and Morocco, ensuring them each the possibility of deterring the other, thanks to the presence of the United Nations peacekeeping force.

c. The United Nations peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara:

76. The African summit conference in Nairobi recommended recourse to a United Nations peacekeeping force. This force will be a basic element in the settlement plan, and it appears that its participation in administering the referendum process in the optimum manner will be of major importance.

1. The following African remedies: a peacekeeping force through the stipulations which the Organization of African Unity has endorsed.

77. A reading of the recommendations related to the peacekeeping force issued by the specialized committee underlines an important change in the African conception of this force on the organizational and functional levels.

a. On the organizational level:

78. In the third session of the specialized committee, the dominant idea was to establish an Organization of African Unity peacekeeping force, while the stipulation authorized in Freetown on 11 September 1980 recommends "a United Nations peacekeeping force." The resolution of the summit conference in Nairobi "requests the United Nations Organization to supply a peacekeeping force in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity."

79. Since the formulation proposed in Monrovia (that of an Organization of African Unity force alone), and the formulation proposed in Freetown (that of United Nations force alone), seem to be precise from the standpoint of form, the formulation authorized in Nairobi (that of the United Nations in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity) requires the following comments:

1. The phrase "in cooperation," while calling for a type of harmonization of action between the two organizations, nonetheless does not give the role of either an importance greater than that of the other.

2. Indeed, the formula which one of the bodies of the Organization of African Unity has set forth indicates the presence of a relationship, in these operations specifically--the relationship between the decisionmaker (the Organization of African Unity) and the executor of the action (the United Nations). This supposition follows from the existence of an Organization of African Unity settlement plan which is applied in conjunction with the United Nations following endorsement of the plan by the latter.

80. Ultimately the point is that the United Nations must be present during the popular referendum through the peacekeeping force. Above and beyond that, the human and material means available to the United Nations are incomparably greater than what is available to the Organization of African Unity. The worldwide organization is essential in the anticipated process in the Western Sahara.

b. On the functional level:

81. The Algerian government notes that the peacekeeping forces have experienced a tangible development in their mandate, from merely "overseeing the cease fire" (the stipulation of Monrovia, third session of the specialized committee) to "actual execution of the cease fire" (the Freetown stipulation). The task assigned to the peacekeeping force shifted to "keeping the peace and security during the organization and holding of the referendum" as stipulated in the resolution approved at the 18th summit conference in Nairobi.

82. Thus it appears obvious that the peacekeeping force, which at the outset was established just as "a separation force" between the military formations of the two belligerent parties, has seen its areas of competence expand to include "the areas of competence of police which in terms of place extend to the entire territory of the Western Sahara and in terms of time extend to the entire process of organizing and administering the referendum." Through this enlargement of the peacekeeping force's mandate appears the condition for the withdrawal of the occupation forces and, in addition to that, is considered an element comprising the plan, or at least for neutralizing the actual parties to the dispute by means of these forces, since these are the result of agreement between the two parties).

2. Algeria's position.

83. Algeria has accepted the successive recommendations of the Organization of African Unity regarding the Western Sahara, as well as the resolution issued at the summit conference in Nairobi. Its position has constantly expressed its

interest in having the people of the Western Sahara exercise their right to self-determination through an orderly public referendum. This demand for a free referendum devoid of foreign pressure under the surveillance of the United Nations presupposes, in terms of its pure logic, the withdrawal of the Moroccan occupation forces from the Western Sahara.

84. In the context of this position, the function of the peacekeeping forces must include areas of competence which extend to police activities in the entire territory of the Western Sahara, including the activities of guarding the Moroccan-Sahara borders and overseeing crossing points on the borders.

85. While an intermediate solution of a certain kind would be based on the significant, tangible withdrawal of the Moroccan forces accompanied by the restricted presence of remaining units as agreed upon by both parties concerned and by the executive committee, it is clear, in the view of the Algerian government, that in this case the peacekeeping force must be delegated broader powers and must consist of units adequate to guarantee the neutralization of the forces remaining in the territory and to assume the tasks of peacekeeping and security in the Western Sahara.

3. The legal and practical aspects of the United Nations peacekeeping force:

86. Since it is a police force for a decisive referendum related to the status of /illegible/ enjoying autonomy, and at the same time is a mediating force between a national liberation movement and an occupied country, the anticipated United Nations peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara is to be considered an institution of a special kind, since it does not resemble any previous United Nations or League of Nations intervention in a popular referendum, especially in view of the working conditions of its task.

a. The legal aspects: the position and precedents.

87. On the basis of a request from a regional organization, the Organization of African Unity, in the context of a popular war of national liberation and the context of sound settlement process, whose constituent elements were proposed by one of the two belligerent parties on an optional basis, the United Nations peacekeeping forces will be summoned to the Western Sahara even if, if the situation so requires, that is without the explicit agreement of the occupying country. From this standpoint, the focus of these forces will lie on the borders of international repressive action.

88. In terms of its mission, the peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara resembles the "allied forces" which the League of Nations relied on to preserve order in the territories where the Treaty of Versailles stipulated referenda were to take place. It also has aspects of similarity with the United Nations team for the stipulated transitional period in the plan to settle the question of Namibia (Security Council Resolution 435).

b. The practical aspects: formation and action.

1. Formation:

89. From the theoretical standpoint, the formation of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Western Sahara must be determined in accordance with a number of criteria, such as:

The population and the area of the land.
The length of the territorial boundaries.
The infrastructure and systems of communications.

The general political conditions for the withdrawal of forces.

The type of mission: separation of forces or performance of the role of policeman to preserve security in the region.

90. By way of comparison, the Algerian government points to the plan for settling the question of Namibia, where the United Nations team for the transitional stage in Namibia will have an estimated military force that consists of 7,500 noncommissioned officers and troops in addition to a civilian surveillance force composed of 1,200 men. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the technical agencies of the Organization of African Unity concerned with the arrangements for holding the referendum in the Western Sahara considered in their first report (Appendix Four, Resolution 99) that it will "perhaps" be sufficient to put fewer than 1,200 civilian observers in the Western Sahara.

91. With regard to the nationality of the units, the Algerian government considers that two suppositions will arise from the withdrawal of the occupation forces, depending on whether the withdrawal is complete or partial. The matter is to be referred back to the executive committee to decide on the situation that will result from that and to create solutions by wisely selecting countries to provide the units.

2. The function of the forces:

92. The Algerian government believes that the peacekeeping force must, in accordance with the mandate granted to it, be at the disposal of the temporary neutral administration of the territory which is assigned the task of holding as thorough a referendum as possible. The complete execution of these tasks will depend on cooperation between the authorities and the force commander. In view of the great number of sources of instructions to be issued to the commander of the force and the probable interventions from the governments of the countries providing the units it is possible that that may lead to confusion in the referendum process. The sad example of the Congo, where the United Nations peacekeeping forces were diverted from their mandate and were fragmented by a spirit of individualism, bears witness to the latent dangers accompanying this type of operation.

D. The Temporary Neutral Administration

93. The president of Mauritania deserves the main credit for proposing the establishment of a temporary neutral administration to take the place of the Moroccan occupation administration. This proposal appears for the first time in the general plans for organizing the referendum in the Western Sahara which the president of Mauritania presented to the conference of the heads of African states and governments held in Nairobi.

94. The minister of foreign affairs of Nigeria, in the specialized committee of the Organization of African Unity, at the summit conference held in Nairobi, and during the discussions that took place on the resolution bearing on the problem of the Western Sahara, formulated recommendations close to those which Mauritania presented. These recommendations were accompanied by his general plan for organizing the referendum proposed to the formulating team. This plan constituted the contents of the summary of the discussions presented by the chairman of the formulating team, that is, the foreign minister of Kenya. This means that the establishment of a temporary neutral administration to take the place of the Moroccan administration was met with a great agreement of views within the specialized committee which was subsequently enlarged to include Kenya and became the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity assigned to organize the referendum on self-determination in the Western Sahara.

95. In brief, the technical agency of the Organization of African Unity that was established after the third session of the specialized committee of the heads of states and governments (Monrovia, 4-5 December 1970), which was assigned the task of thinking about arrangements for holding the referendum in the Western Sahara, also raised the issue of transferring a temporary Western Sahara territory administration to an international authority (Paragraphs A, B, C, and D of this agency's report).

96. This general insistence of the need to establish a temporary neutral administration in the Western Sahara did not come about by chance, since the performance of the decisive role in administering and supervising the referendum would devolve upon this administration. In 1975 Morocco itself, out of strong feelings on this fact, stipulated the withdrawal of the Spanish administration and forces from the territory to the United Nations factfinding mission, as a preliminary condition for accepting the organization of a referendum in the Western Sahara, so that their place could be taken by the United Nations force and an international administration.

a. The options of the Organization of African Unity:

97. The Nairobi summit resolution bearing on the Western Sahara, in the part following its Paragraph Seven, gave "authority to the executive committee to adopt, in participation with the United Nations, all the necessary measures to guarantee the holding of an orderly public referendum on the self-determination of the people of the Western Sahara."

The Algerian government is of the opinion that the spirit and stipulation of this provision direct the activity of the executive committee toward setting up a mixed commission for the temporary administration of the Western Sahara in which the

Organization of African Unity and the United Nations would take part, that the Organization of African Unity would benefit from the expertise and administration that the United Nations has acquired in the field of organizing, overseeing and supervising referenda and would also benefit from the material, financial and human resources the United Nations would provide to carry out projects of this significance, and lastly that the activities which it would carry out would enjoy the moral support and political influence of the worldwide organization.

This mixed structure for the temporary administration receives extensive support from the Organization of African Unity today.

98. In spite of the congruence of views that has been achieved on the basis of the Nairobi resolution, Morocco is distorting the stipulation of Paragraph Seven of the resolution by misinterpreting it. The fact is that all the statements the Moroccan authorities have given since the Nairobi summit reiterate their statement that the task of organizing and administering the referendum will devolve upon the occupation administration and that the role of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity is restricted to supervision and oversight.

It is clear that this resolution leads even it to a unique single option, and that is the option of consolidating and imposing acceptance of the fait accompli.

b. The position of Algeria:

99. At Nairobi, Algeria referred to its acceptance of "the mixed structure composed of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity" for the temporary administration of the Western Sahara. Indeed, it is this kind of structure alone which will provide a guarantee that the referendum process will proceed in accordance with conditions and in a chaste manner, while, on the other hand, providing the material, human and financial means necessary for holding the referendum.

2. The nature of the temporary neutral administration:

100. It is absolutely clear to the Algerian government that a neutral temporary administration for the Western Sahara must function in its capacity as an international executive transitional authority, in which case it must be provided the four following characteristics:

The characteristic of the power carrying out the referendum.
The characteristic of an institution of international law.
The characteristic of an institution enjoying complete executive authority.
A transitional characteristic.

a. The temporary neutral administration: The power carrying out the referendum.

101. The temporary neutral administration of the Western Sahara must enjoy the characteristics of the power organizing the referendum, since it will have to function in its capacity as an agency supervising the organization and holding of the referendum. At the moment when the executive committee completes the arrangements bearing on the organization of the referendum, in cooperation with the two

parties to the struggle, the temporary administration will take over the powers which had been in the hands of the occupation administration. Therefore it will be a duty of the temporary administration subsequently to administer the territory until the referendum process is completed and, in another area, to prepare and hold this referendum.

102. The time has now come to assert the importance of very precisely defining the tasks the local neutral administration will have to carry out:

As regards the executive committee on the one hand.
As regards the occupation administration on the other, on the assumption that this administration will remain in the territory on a "token" basis in exchange for being distanced from the referendum process.

b. The temporary administration: the characteristic of an institution of international law.

103. The temporary administration must function in its capacity as an international power in the Western Sahara. This international character in itself is what at the same time constitutes the primary guarantee of the neutrality of the referendum authority and the order and probity of the referendum operations.

104. The Algerian government is of the opinion that this issue related to the international character or the character of domestic law of the power organizing and administering the referendum represents the first important problem which the executive committee of the Organization of African Unity must resolve. Indeed Morocco, contrary to the general attitude prevalent in the Organization of African Unity and contrary to the spirit and stipulations of the resolution adopted in Nairobi, stresses that this power is subject to domestic law, on the grounds that it is the occupation administration itself that will administer the referendum operations and that the activity of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity will be confined to performing the tasks of administration and supervision.

c. The temporary neutral administration: an institution enjoying complete executive authority:

105. The temporary neutral administration, if it acts in its capacity as an international executive power, will assume the task of applying the resolutions which the executive committee will adopt, carrying out the mandate assigned to it as specified in Paragraph Seven of the Nairobi resolution. According to this paragraph, the conference of the heads of states and governments demands that "the executive committee meet before the end of the month of August 1981 to set forth the arrangements and all other details connected to the establishment of a cease fire, as well as to organizing and holding a referendum in cooperation with the two parties to the dispute."

106. The temporary administration must specifically carry out these "arrangements" and "other details connected to the establishment of a cease fire and the holding of the referendum." In order for it to assume this task, it must be entrusted with

executive powers and must also be granted some of the organizational and legislative powers that it will require, especially with respect to the preservation of order, organization of the referendum activities, promulgation of rules related to voting, preparation of the vote, publication of the official results of the referendum, and so forth.

107. It is important to stress, in general, that the temporary neutral administration derives its powers from the specific mandate that the executive committee has assigned to it. The fact is that it depends on this committee to determine what the structure and composition of the temporary administration will be and to determine most precisely its functions, naturally through an official document which must meet with the agreement of the two parties to the conflict.

d. The temporary neutral administration: a transitional organization:

108. The mandate of a given international administration assuming the mission of the referendum will end with the official publication of the results of the referendum. As regards the Western Sahara, it will be necessary to underline a particular problem, which is related to the transfer of the powers of the international administration.

If one assumes that the referendum will result in the maintenance of the existing situation, the problem of the transfer of the areas of competence will be easy to solve, since the temporary administration will in that case restore all privileges to the Moroccan authorities. However, if one assumes that the referendum will endorse the option of independence, a problem will inevitably arise, and that is ascertaining the body which will be granted the powers of the temporary administration.

This issue must enjoy the attention of the executive committee, which will have the right to determine at the stage of preparation of the referendum that the international administration will transfer its areas of competence to the authorities of the Arab Democratic Republic of the Sahara, in the event the referendum approves the option of independence.

3. Tasks and missions related to the executive committee and the temporary neutral administration:

109. The definition and determination of the tasks related to the executive committee and the international administration of the territory, especially during the stage of the holding of the referendum, are two matters that will be essential to avoid commingling and conflicts of areas of competence which will engender chaos and therefore objections. Therefore it is important to determine in detail the advantages of each of the two organizations.

110. The executive committee must:

Determine the general organizational framework of the referendum, in the preparation stage, in cooperation with the two parties to the conflict.

Supervise the course of the referendum process, during the stage of the holding of the referendum.

111. The temporary international administration must set out the general organizational context of the referendum as the executive committee determines it.

112. More precisely, the executive committee will be delegated the following tasks:

A. Overseeing the withdrawal of the Moroccan administration and forces and determining the measures for that and setting out a schedule for it to that end.

B. Determining the structure, including determining the person responsible for the temporary administration, and establishing the temporary administration in the territory.

C. Contacting the United Nations for the sake of sending a peacekeeping force.

D. Determining the general measures related to the organization of the referendum, especially those related to participation in the vote, the enumeration of the inhabitants of the Sahara, and the return of the refugees.

E. Supervising commitment to the cease fire.

F. Supervising the course of the process of the return of the refugees.

G. Supervising the course of the referendum process.

H. Formulating the answer or answers which will be presented to the inhabitants.

I. Announcing the results of the referendum.

113. The temporary administration in turn will be delegated the following tasks:

A. Guaranteeing order and security in the territory. On this basis, the United Nations peacekeeping forces will be under its control.

B. Replacing occupation administration representatives with representatives of the international administration.

C. Issuing all necessary legislative and organizational measures for the administrative organization of the referendum.

D. Organizing the process of the return of Sahara citizens.

E. Organizing the process of counting Sahara citizens, with the aid of the committee of experts.

F. Establishing regional committees to administer the voting process on the local level.

G. Tallying the votes.

H. Publishing the results of the referendum officially.

4. Organization of the temporary neutral administration:

114. Organization of the referendum administration will occur on three levels:

The level of appointing the authority responsible for the international administration of the referendum in the Western Sahara.

The level of organizing the administration on the domestic level.

The level of organizing the administration on the regional level.

a. Determining the authority responsible for the international administration of the referendum in the Western Sahara.

115. The executive committee of the Organization of African Unity must appoint the administrator or delegate who will be responsible for the international administration in the Western Sahara. The official can be a senior United Nations employee, and this choice will be advantageous in that it will permit the United Nations apparatus to take part in the process of organizing the referendum.

b. Organizing the temporary administration on the domestic level.

116. It follows that the temporary neutral administration on the domestic level will assume the form of an international committee, that it can, by virtue of its mixed structure, be composed equally of member states in the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, and that members of the committee from the United Nations can be appointed through consultations which are made between the United Nations and the executive committee.

c. Organizing the temporary administration on the local level.

117. The committee can establish regional committees to organize and oversee the referendum to the extent necessary, and the formation of the committees can correspond to the traditional administrative subdivision of the Western Sahara.

E. Determining the Identity of Citizens of the Sahara

118. The return of citizens of the Sahara, in addition to their enumeration, raises the problem of identity. Who are citizens of the Sahara? How can this characteristic be determined with the greatest degree of precision and certainty? The answer to these questions will permit the determination of what persons will probably return, on the one hand, and what persons will be invited to vote, that is, what persons will express their opinion on the essential issue, which is the future of the territory, on the other hand. The whole importance of determining identity lies in this second point, at least in this decisive stage, the stage of the referendum.

119. As regards the Western Sahara, the United Nations General Assembly constantly demanded the country performing the administration, that is, Spain, to take measures so that only local residents would take part in the referendum. It was clear that "the genuine Sahara people in the territory" alone would be able to express their views on the future of the Western Sahara.

Later, the General Assembly, especially in its Resolution 31/37, referred to "the people of the Western Sahara."

1. The difficulty of determining identity.

120. This issue is not devoid of difficulties.

a. Some of the residents of the Sahara are nomads. The fact is that the borders established in the Western Sahara were made across the tribes and even the clans that live in adjacent countries, and it is widely reported that persons have numerous identity cards from adjacent countries.

b. The tremendous flow of people from the Sahara toward Algeria as a result of Morocco's occupation of the Western Sahara, in addition to the influx of Moroccan settlers since 1975, have made the issue of determining identity more complicated because of the intermingling of inhabitants, above and beyond the border between Morocco and the Sahara.

c. It is also necessary to take into consideration the important differences that exist between diverse estimates of the people living outside the borders of the territory, since this might distort the results of the referendum and therefore provoke protests.

2. Means for determining the criteria for determining identity.

121. This being the case, it is necessary to arrive at a solution for determining the identity of the people of the Sahara. The Algerian government considers that it would be useful to mention, as regards Spain and the permanent committee of the nomad "group" that emerged spontaneously in December 1975 in Guelta Zemmour, that the criterion that will allow one to ascertain whether a person is originally from the territory lies in his affiliation with a clan group represented in the region. This affiliation will constitute adequate proof and can be confirmed by the members of the group, who will be consulted by the Sheik.

122. In another area, the "group," in returning in November 1974, approved criteria which were followed in granting Sahara identity cards, in accordance with the criteria that the governor general announced on 18 December 1974, considering persons of the Sahara to be:

a. All persons born of a father from the Sahara.

b. Persons born of a mother from the Sahara and a foreign father, when the legislation of the father's country does not require that the children be of the same nationality as the father.

c. Persons born in the territory of foreign parents, on condition that both parents have been born in the territory and have been resident in it when the children were born.

d. Persons born in the territory of two unknown parents, bearing in mind that the foregoing provisions will also apply to this group of persons if their parents' nationality is subsequently discovered.

123. The criteria also stipulate the possibility of choosing nationality in the Sahara in the case of:

1. Persons born in the territory.

2. Persons who while from outside the territory are nonetheless of Saharan parents.

3. Wives of persons from the Sahara who will automatically receive the nationality of their husbands, as the children will receive the nationality of their fathers.

124. The government of Algeria insists that it is important to refer in detail to the main points which can be considered a proper law for Saharan nationality and can basically be used in determining criteria, by the committee assigned to determine the identity of people of the Sahara at the time of their return and tabulation.

3. To whom will the task of determining identity be assigned?

125. In the opinion of the Algerian government, the qualified committee could be composed of the following:

a. Representatives of the temporary administration, who must be chosen most carefully in view of the vital importance of the responsibility they will bear.

b. Representatives of the Polisario front and Morocco, who will attend in the capacity of observers. In general, in case consultations under international authority take place, the representatives of the two parties to the dispute will be withdrawn to avoid the outbreak of clashes.

c. The representatives of Algeria in /sic/ Mauritania, in their capacity as two neighbors who are hosts to citizens of the Sahara.

d. A representative of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees, whose office will provide material and financial aid and technical expertise. In this regard, it is worth pointing out that the United Nations high commissioner for refugees currently takes part in all the activities of affecting a return and therefore of specifying the process of /establishing/ identity. This was the case in Algeria and in Zimbabwe on the eve of their independence.

e. Sheiks, who will be invited in their capacity as experts, as it is necessary that their role be dominant since they represent the memory of the inhabitants of the Sahara. The special tribal organization of these people is the reason why the "elderly" or "wise" men represent the main axis about which life in the Western

Sahara revolves. However, it is still necessary to be careful to take a careful look in choosing them. The fact that the Polisario front knows them well makes its role in this matter important.

126. This committee assigned to determine identities can form branch committees and working teams aimed at intervening when necessary.

4. Where and when will the determination of identity take place?

127. It is essential to ascertain whether the geographical area of this procedure must be confined to the Western Sahara or must transcend its borders to places where there are large concentrations of refugees.

As regards people of the Sahara who live within the territory, the determination of identity will take place in the place of residence during the tabulation or during their registration in the lists of voters.

128. With regard to the people of the Sahara who live outside the territory, one can conceive of three possibilities:

a. One can carry out the determination of identity in the place of residence of the refugees or political exiles. The responsible committee will send teams to the refugee camps, for example. The advantage in this basically lies in avoiding moving inhabitants around, which is not feasible; its disadvantage is that the host countries might provide their own citizens, characterizing them as Saharan refugees.

b. It is possible to carry out a determination of identity at entry points, that is, on the border of the Western Sahara. In this case it may not be possible to avoid shifts of persons which are not feasible.

c. One can carry out a determination of identity outside the borders first, then at entry points. Thus it might result that the teams sent to the camps will determine identities first, and the final stage might take place at the point of entry. The benefits of this procedure are clear; the determination of identity will take place at a greater distance in a temporary fashion then ultimately at a closer distance. This third recommendation is the best, in the view of the Algerian government.

5. The powers of the authority determining the identity.

129. The committee determining the identity must have very broad powers. It would be very beneficial to mention that a review of the referendums which the Versailles Treaty called for in this regard show that the committee has absolute power, especially regarding entry into and departure from the territory.

130. It is necessary that the committee have means for taking quick action, since determination of identity is necessary for setting up final lists of voters. It is necessary that the committee enjoy the power to take preliminary and final decisions. To that one should add that the committee must rule on cases of disputes which citizens present to it before or after the compiling of voter lists and it

must ultimately be able to issue identity cards to all citizens whose identity is determined, especially those who are returning to the Western Sahara via points of entry, so that it will be made possible for them to be recorded in the voter lists.

131. The Algerian government is well aware of the problem of determining the identity of Sahara citizens, and it is aware that that is the most sensitive problem in organizing the referendum in the Western Sahara. This is also an important problem since it affects the return and the voter lists. Therefore in this regard the government of Algeria has requested the executive committee to be particularly concerned to create solutions which will lead as far as possible to making the requisite referendum valid.

F. The Return of Citizens of the Sahara

132. The independence of colonized territories occurs as a result of the political struggle and armed uprisings that the movements of refugees, exiled inhabitants and political prisoners resort to. It is natural that one of the basic conditions that must be provided in holding a public, free referendum is the return of these citizens. This is a condition which must be at the top of the list of demands that national liberation movements raise.

1. The case of the Western Sahara.

133. In the case of the Western Sahara, the return of this group of citizens has always been called for by the parties concerned, including Morocco, to the end of organizing and holding the referendum in the territory. The General Assembly has steadily called for the return of refugees and political exiles in its resolutions.

As regards the Organization of African Unity,the first report of its technical body, which is responsible for studying the measures for holding the referendum in the Western Sahara and was established in accordance with a recommendation by the specialized committee, observed at the second Monrovia conference, "The plan must contain provisions related to the increasing number of political prisoners and the safe voluntary return, in complete security, of original inhabitants to their country, whether they are refugees, political prisoners or persons who are outside their country for any reason."

134. Bringing back citizens of the Sahara is a very sensitive process, in the sense that it is not just a political problem but also a human and social one. It is necessary to organize the immediate return and make adjustments for a new life for thousands of people who have lost all their property and sometimes their families and many of whom are suffering from the hardships of war and exile.

2. The necessary conditions for returning.

135. It is necessary to take suitable measures to overcome final opposition or obstacles to the return.

a. It is necessary to create a climate of total security in the Western Sahara, where the likelihood that people will be exposed to danger and their fear of the

likelihood of reprisals against them will be eliminated. This will require real, effective neutralization of the Moroccan army, the establishment of a transitional administration, and the formation of a neutral peacekeeping force. It is not in the power of the people of the Sahara, weak in terms of numbers, to bear the dangers of being transformed into a totally slave people.

b. The administrative authorities of the territory must carry out general amnesty measures without any conditions in order for all combatants and political leaders in exile or in prison to resume proper political activity, such as the holding of a referendum.

c. The establishment of transport, housing and feeding facilities also seems to be an indispensable matter, since the overwhelming majority of the refugees are destitute and must rely on foreign support for their living, if only for a short period. For that reason, it would be very useful to request the office of the United Nations high commissioner for refugees affairs to offer material and financial aid and technical expertise.

d. Other facilities for supervising the return of Sahara refugees are also necessary. This point was raised at a discussion of the issue of the determination of the identity of the people of the Sahara. The return to the Western Sahara must take place through entry points specified in advance under the supervision of a suitable authority, and this committee must also be able to issue identity cards permitting the people holding them to register their names immediately in the voter lists.

The Algerian government observes in this regard that the original refugee camps existing in Morocco are characterized by a condition which in effect would facilitate the process of bringing back the refugees.

3. Two special cases: the liberation army of the inhabitants of the Sahara and Moroccan civilians.

136. Two specific points require special attention.

a. The war of liberation has led to the emergence of the liberation army of the inhabitants of the Sahara, which contains several thousand young people who are of an age which will allow them to vote, and there must be no problem in determining their identity.

Modern international law considers that it is not fair to deprive army personnel, in their capacity as members of the citizenry, from their basic civil rights as guaranteed them by the constitution. Indeed, this notion becomes especially clear when these armies are popular forces, as is the case in the Western Sahara, and it appears, in any case, that it is very difficult, indeed inconceivable, to deprive the liberation army of the inhabitants of the Sahara from participating in the referendum which is to consecrate their sacrifices.

b. The occupation of the Western Sahara by the Moroccan army was accompanied by the entry into these territories of Moroccan civilians taking the place of European

citizens in commerce and administration. Consequently they must not benefit from the right to vote during the referendum process, and attention must be given to the adoption of measures related to this group of persons in order to avoid the flareup of disputes between them and the original inhabitants.

G. Tabulating the Inhabitants of the Sahara

137. Organizing and carrying out a referendum will require detailed preparation in which the census will constitute a delicate, important stage. It is necessary to arrive at the most precise possible notion regarding the human elements and to determine their classes, origins and ages, in the desire to determine the voters, that is, the persons who will determine the issue of the future of the territory.

In the case of the Western Sahara, the tabulation of the inhabitants acquires further importance, since the process of self-determination itself will take place in accordance with the principle of "one man, one vote," the recommendation of the specialized committee in Khartoum.

1. Deficiencies in the census which the Spanish authorities carried out in 1974.

138. The Algerian government points out that Spain, in an attempt on its part to avoid recognizing the rights of the people of the Sahara to self-determination, refused to conduct the census of that people which the United Nations had called for. When Spain agreed to perform that task in 1974, the tabulation measures took place without care or system, with the result that the census it presented to the United Nations seemed to many countries--even Morocco, which condemned its distorted nature--to be totally unreliable.

139. According to this census, the population in this territory came to 95,109, 73,497 of whom were original inhabitants and 20,126 were Europeans. The population in the towns was no greater than 5,000 except in three cases, and there were two towns where the population was less than 2,000. It is clear that these figures did not include the Spanish forces and that they excluded citizens of the Sahara who lived outside the region, such as political exiles or refugees or people who had other reasons for being away (economic, for example).

140. The fact is that the Spanish authorities acknowledged that the inhabitants of the Western Sahara, in view of their nomadic character, cross the borders to adjacent countries, where they are received by members of their tribes or clans. This population movement back and forth across borders into neighboring countries makes conducting a full tabulation of the population of the Western Sahara an extremely difficult matter.

Stress was also laid on the nomadic character of the people of the Sahara by the International Court of Justice in 1975 and by the United Nations mission which visited the Western Sahara the same year.

141. The Algerian government is certain that the 1974 census which the Spanish authorities conducted was defective and biased, included just a segment of the

inhabitants of the Sahara, and ruled out people who lived in regions remote from colonial administration centers, inside or outside the Western Sahara.

2. The population of the Western Sahara, according to estimates by adjacent countries and estimates by the Polisario front in 1975.

Morocco estimated the number of refugees and people in exile in its southern region at between 30,000 and 35,000 and added that an unspecified number of inhabitants lived in other provinces of the kingdom. The Spanish authorities' estimates showed a figure much below that, between 3,000 and 4,000.

Mauritania presented no figures, as it does not distinguish between Mauritanians and Saharans. The number of the latter in Mauritania, according to Spain, did not exceed 4,000 or 5,000.

The Polisario front informed the United Nations mission which visited the region that the number of inhabitants of the Sahara, people in exile and refugees came to about 50,000. The front also considered that if all the people of the Sahara who had historic ties to the Western Sahara were given an opportunity to belong to the Saharan state, the population in these territories would reach 750,000.

142. This is the basis on which Algeria and Morocco founded their opposition to the conclusions of the census, fundamentally.

Algeria informed the United Nations mission that there were 7,000 refugees from the Western Sahara living just in the area that the delegation visited, while Spain estimated this figure at only a few hundred.

3. The complexity of the current situation.

143. The foregoing will give an idea of the degree of complexity of the matter of performing a census of the inhabitants of the Western Sahara. The executive committee will in particular observe the important differences that basically exist among the various estimates the various parties have made. The census Spain made took only a part of the people of the Sahara into account, since that tabulation was made preparatory to the referendum the United Nations General Assembly requested be carried out; therefore, this tabulation included just the inhabitants of the urban areas. Spain's representative to the United Nations declared before the General Assembly in December 1973 that his government considered that "persons born in the Western Sahara and residing in its territory alone are ones who will take part in the referendum bearing on their future."

144. Algeria's representative observed that this type of platform is unacceptable since "it does not include the people of the Sahara who have been compelled to leave the territory and seek refuge in other areas, especially Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania." Today, the Algerian authorities estimate the number of refugees who have settled in southern Algeria at 150,000. This figure has been officially conveyed to the high commissioner for refugee affairs and has also been announced by the Algerian minister of health, who headed the Algerian delegation to the conference on the arrangement of donations for African refugees held in Geneva in April 1981.

145. The Moroccan authorities, since occupying the Western Sahara in 1975, have declared no figures, since they consider the Saharans to be Moroccan citizens. However, Morocco's agreement to the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara restores full importance to the subject of holding a census of Saharan citizens.

4. Changes in the Moroccan position.

146. Morocco previously declared that the referendum would take place on the basis of the census Spain made in 1974, the relevant documents on which have been deposited with the United Nations. Thus today Morocco supports the census which Spain carried out, while in the recent past it severely criticized it. In addition to that, Morocco has estimated the number of people of the Sahara who have settled in the southern region of the kingdom alone at about 30,000 to 35,000, that is, half the total of the inhabitants the census Spain made "comprised." However, Morocco turned around and subsequently declared during the "Green March" that the people taking part in the march totalled 350,000 and were Saharans returning to their homes.

147. The Moroccan authorities estimated the number of Spanish military forces in the Western Sahara at about 70,000 or 80,000 in 1975. It seems difficult to imagine that the Spanish army was more numerous than the total population included in the census. One can also point out that Morocco today is retaining about 40,000 troops in the Western Sahara. This distribution of forces would not have assumed this dimension had the number of Saharan people been just a few tens of thousands, as it is claiming now.

4. Conclusions.

148. In conclusion, the Algerian government considers that:

a. The problem of tabulating the population is a complex one and agreement on it has not been reached among the parties concerned with and interested in it.

b. The Moroccan occupation of the Western Sahara and the tremendous flow of people of the Sahara into Algeria has increased the complexity of this problem.

c. The Moroccan position on this issue has changed in accordance with changes in circumstances and requirements. It is a position which displays an obvious contradiction.

d. The census Spain held is in any event an old one held 7 years ago--above and beyond the fact that it was deficient and biased. Therefore it is necessary to conduct a real census of the Western Sahara before inviting its people to take part in the referendum.

H. The Administrative Organization of the Referendum in the Western Sahara

149. The detailed technical organization of the referendum which is proposed to be held depends basically, in the opinion of the Algerian government, on the guarantees the executive committee wishes to give.

1. The preliminary options for carrying out the referendum.

a. The subject of the referendum.

150. In the statement he made at the 18th summit conference of the Organization of African Unity, King Hasan declared that Morocco agreed to the organization of a "supervisory referendum" in the Western Sahara. Moroccan officials stated in their declarations on the day following the meeting that it was a matter of holding a "referendum of affirmation" aimed at linking "the Sahara regions" to the "mother country" in a definitive manner.

151. The Moroccan leaders recently declared that they gave agreement to a referendum, not to self-determination, in Nairobi. This disturbing statement is clearly in contradiction with both the spirit and the letter of the Nairobi resolution itself, and is in contradiction with the thinking that refuses to accept a mere means of execution (a referendum is only a technical process of consultation) without agreeing to the principle or final goal it is intended to achieve (self-determination).

152. In reality, once again, by playing with ideas, there is an attempt to stand against the people of the Sahara's exercise of their right to self-determination as constantly reaffirmed by the relevant resolutions of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. A "referendum of affirmation" organized by the occupying country itself under the deficient supervision of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations would be nothing but a "referendum of occupation" which would be aimed at imparting a legitimate formulation to a state of fait accompli (incorporating the Western Sahara, which is itself the subject of the objection and the subject of the referendum).

153. The Algerian government, which, elsewhere besides this document, has demonstrated the distortions and the grave effects that result from that sort of position, adheres for its part to the stipulations of the Nairobi resolution and the intention unanimously expressed by the Organization of African Unity, without ambiguity, defining the subject of the referendum it is proposed to hold.

b. The question which will be put before the voters.

154. Formulating the question which will be put before the voters is of exceptional importance as far as the results of the referendum are concerned, since a specific formulation might most easily lead, more than any others, to the desired results. As regards the anticipated referendum in the Western Sahara, the definition of this question is the task of the executive committee which by virtue of the Nairobi summit conference resolution was requested "to set forth the arrangements" related to the organization of the referendum, in cooperation with the two parties to the dispute.

1. The activities of the Organization of African Unity.

155. It is worth mentioning that the specialized committee of the Organization of African Unity, during its second session in Khartoum in June 1979, specified two options on which the people of the Sahara could express an opinion:

Total independence.

Continuation of the current situation (the expression "the current situation" at this time means partitioning the Sahara territory between Morocco and Mauritania).

This formulation does not take into account the development of the situation in the Western Sahara following the withdrawal of Mauritania.

2. Morocco's position.

156. Morocco has not explicitly expressed an opinion on the type of question which must be presented to the voters, but it appears nonetheless that, in view of the option it has adopted regarding a "domestic consultation of affirmation," it aspires to present a question of this type, and it is clear that a question of this type will not be suitable because it is to be considered to constitute a referendum of affirmation.

3. Algeria's position.

157. The Algerian government observes that the question that ought to be presented arises logically and naturally from the state of war. Why should the people of the Sahara engage in a war of liberation if that is not for the sake of liberating themselves? Since it appears that they are being denied their natural right to independence, the question which must be presented to them must be to determine whether they really aspire to independence. In spite of that, it must be proposed to the people of the Sahara that they directly express their opinion on their aspiration which is the basis of the struggle and the reason for holding the referendum, that is, the aspiration for independence.

c. The referendum authorities.

158. The referendum authorities are the body which will take charge of the responsibility of organizing and conducting the popular vote. Morocco considers that it is its right to prepare and organize the referendum, under the surveillance of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, but this solution is in no way compatible with the option of the Nairobi summit conference, which has given the executive committee the responsibility of appointing an international authority for that process. In addition to that, Morocco is not "a country carrying out the administration," as it claims.

The "Moroccan solution" does not entail the objectivity of a referendum. In any case, Morocco has declared the results in advance: an affirmation of the occupation. It is worth distinguishing here between the current state of the dispute and the referendum held in Algeria in 1962, organized by the country carrying out the administration. In reality, it was a referendum of endorsement. France was prepared to withdraw from Algerian territory, but this is not the situation with regard to Morocco. France only asked the people of Algeria one question: "Do you support independence?"

That is not the situation, either, as far as Morocco goes.

159. A supposition has been made whose gist is that it is possible to assign a temporary neutral administration to conduct the referendum in participation with Morocco and the Polisario front. This solution, which is to be credited with putting Morocco and the Polisario front on an equal footing, has a single disadvantage. It will not of necessity guarantee the probity of the voting processes because it may cause disputes between the parties concerned in the field; in addition to that, Morocco may object to the participation of the Polisario front on an equal footing.

160. The government of Algeria considers that the most feasible solution is the one in accordance with which the task of preparing and organizing the referendum is to be assigned to a temporary neutral administration, so that that will be under its responsibility alone, and not that of the parties concerned, which nonetheless will be given the status of observers. This formulation has a dual advantage--it provides the greatest amount of objectivity in organizing the referendum and the least amount of trouble.

2. Technical organization of the referendum.

a. The technical bodies.

161. The task of the technical organization of the referendum will lie on the shoulders of the authorities responsible for the neutral administration in the domestic context under the aegis and oversight of the temporary neutral administration. On that basis, it will be incumbent on it to oversee the execution of the various stages of preparation and organization of the referendum through the neutral administration in the context of the entire area of the Western Sahara. It will be possible for the people in charge of the neutral administration in the context of the entire region to ask help from a committee of observers from neutral countries to help them in their task of investigating the proper course of the operations in the context of the voting centers (the task of oversight).

b. Preparation operations.

1. The media campaign.

162. The temporary neutral administration must organize a media campaign through the administration of each region and the people in charge of the mission. This campaign will have the goal of informing voters of the purpose and arrangements of the referendum. While preparing and carrying out the media campaign, it will be necessary to take stock of the social and cultural character by which the people of the Sahara, who are basically made up of nomads and refugees, are distinguished, it will be necessary to anticipate the use of the assistance of interpreters, it will be necessary to organize groups of people (according to the general program), and the people in charge of the media campaign in the towns and villages in the territory of the Sahara will have to seek the recourse of the media available (posters, newspapers and so forth).

c. Setting up lists of voters.

163. Special committees must set up lists of voters in the context of voting precincts, in accordance with the new census, and the temporary neutral administration will have to appoint the members of these special committees in the domestic context. These committees will function under the authority of the people in charge of the neutral administration in the context of the regions.

All citizens of the Sahara who have been determined by the new tabulation to have this identity and have reached the voting age the executive committee specifies will be able to participate in the voting.

3. The publicity campaign.

164. The authorities responsible for the temporary neutral administration will determine the practical arrangements for the campaign and will prepare a detailed program for meetings between the representatives of each party and the inhabitants of the Sahara territory (site, time and period).

The commander general of the peacekeeping force will be informed of the detailed program of meetings between the two parties in the desire to take the measures necessary to guarantee order and security during these meetings.

4. Distribution of cards for participating in the referendum.

165. It would be appropriate to grant participation cards to the voters to confirm that only the persons registered in the list of voters will take part in the referendum. These cards will be distributed to the voters by the distribution committees which in reality will be special committees for setting up lists of voters that are given this new function upon completing their original task.

The committees must direct themselves to the voters outside the towns, and the temporary neutral administration must take measures aimed at avoiding the occurrence of any fraud in the elections (reference to the voting center in the card, stamps or signatures on the cards, copies of voter lists, and so on).

166. The number of voting centers will be determined in accordance with the number of registered voters and their geographic distribution. It will be necessary to establish the greatest number of voting centers (one voting center for a reasonable /number/ of voters) in order to encourage a large participation of voters.

In another area, it will be possible to establish mobile voting centers in places where nomadic residents move about, and it will also be possible, in an exceptional fashion, by agreement of the local authorities, to establish voting centers in some host countries to permit Sahara refugees and political exiles who /illegible/ returned to their country in the context of the campaign for a return to perform their electoral duty.

6. /sic/ Date of the referendum.

167. The executive committee, in consultation with the temporary administration, the Polisario front and Morocco, has set the date for the referendum in terms of the time necessary for holding the referendum. It is worth mentioning that in the case of the referendum on self-determination which was held in Algeria, the preparation period which followed the cease fire took 3 months and a half.

c. Organization of the referendum.

1. Practical organization and the course of activity of the voting centers.

Practical organization:

168. The temporary central administration must be careful to adopt the measures to guarantee the proper course of the voting (practical arrangements, necessary documents, the guarantee of the secret nature of the vote).

The course of activity of the voting centers.

169. The voting centers may consist of five members (a head, a main clerk, two assistants and a secretary). The temporary administration in the region will distribute the members of the voting centers and will permit the Polisario front and Morocco to send representatives as observers in the voting centers. At the disposal of the head will be people from the peacekeeping force supervising order to guarantee the necessary order and security for the voters to exercise their right to vote in freedom.

2. Voting activities.

170. The voting process will take place under the responsibility and supervision of the members of the voting center in addition to oversight on the part of the voters themselves.

The voters will not be able to vote until after their identity has been investigated (presentation of participation cards). The voting center must be concerned that all measures are taken to guarantee the probity and secrecy of the vote. On the other hand, the temporary administration will be able to take practical measures to permit its citizens to vote by correspondence or proxy in order to guarantee the participation of Sahara citizens residing in foreign countries (other than countries hosting the Sahara refugees).

3. Practical organization for tallying the votes.

171. Either the authority of the decision (which is appointed by the temporary administration) or the members of the voting center themselves may tally the votes, under the supervision of the voting center. Each center must write up minutes on the voting operations.

d. Collection, publication and declaration of the results.

172. The results that come in from the voting centers will be collected in the voting precincts and will be conveyed to the authorities responsible for the temporary neutral administration in the context of the regions, for conveyance in turn to the temporary international administration which will publicize them.

The executive committee of the Organization of African Unity will officially announce the results at an official session.

e. Contestation of the voting operations.

173. Every voter will have the right to contest the validity of the operations of the voting center. The voters' complaints will be conveyed by people responsible for local administration in the context of the regions to the temporary central administration, which will examine them and if need requires conduct the necessary rectification of the voting processes.

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END

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IRAQ, BRAZIL TO FORM DEVELOPMENT BANK

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 38, 39

[Article by Piers Montondene]

[Text] ONE OF THE FIRST casualties of the Gulf War was trade between Iraq and Brazil, as the Shatt al Arab was effectively closed to traffic. However, in the last nine months efforts by both nations to restore two-way trading links have been successful, and have culminated in the announcement that Iraq and Brazil are to establish a joint trade development bank, to be based in Rio de Janeiro.

The formal agreement will not be signed until a Brazilian delegation arrives in Iraq towards the middle of November. Even then the bank is unlikely to begin operations until mid-1982. Nonetheless, the announcement of the bank's formation, released only days before the first anniversary of the Gulf War, is a good measure of the progress made in restoring commercial activity between the two countries.

At the start of the war in September 1980, Brazil was heavily dependent upon Iraq for its oil supplies — between 40-50 per cent of all imported oil products came from Iraq, or 350,000 b/d out of 700,000 b/d. In spite of a rigorous programme to convert Brazilian cars to run on gasohol — a mixture of petrol and alcohol distilled from locally-grown sugar cane — and a continuing oil exploration drive deep into the Amazon basin, 80 per cent of all Brazil's oil needs were still being supplied by imports.

The reasons for this overwhelming dependence on Iraq went back to 1977. Braspetro (the overseas branch of the Brazilian state oil company, Petrobras) had been providing the Iraqi government with technical expertise in searching for new oil reserves in Iraq. It discovered a major oil formation close to Basra: the Majnoon field, which proved to be one of the largest oil deposits, producing 350,000 b/d.

Under the terms of their bilateral agreement, Brazil had the right to purchase all the crude lifted from Majnoon. This special purchasing arrangement was terminated by mutual agreement in 1980 with a once-off sale of oil to Brazil at substantially below market rates to ease the country's balance of payments problems. From the start of 1980, Brazil was to be supplied with the same quantities of oil as in the past, only no longer on a preferential basis.

Since 1977 Brazil had been balancing its trade with Iraq — in part at least — by arms sales to Baghdad. Brazil's chief arms manufacturer, Engesa, supplied a variety of armoured vehicles and troop transporters until the start of the war. Brazil had also agreed to supply Iraq with nuclear technology.

The impact of the Gulf War was felt in Brazil from the first day: Iraqi oil supplies ceased immediately and a virtual state of emergency was declared. Western bankers, already concerned about the massive external debt which Brazil was running at the time — estimated at $55bn in October 1980 — stopped lending money to Brazilian institutions, fearing that the economy was on the point of collapse; senior Brazilian ministers described the country's predicament as 'very, very difficult.'

A rescue mission was organised by Venezuela to find alternative oil supplies for Brazil, while Iraq attempted to divert its

exports through Lebanon and Syria — successfully. Since the second quarter of 1981, Brazil's trade balance has been in surplus, with an overall break-even being forecast for the year end. In the last week, a new oil find has been reported off the coast of Rio de Janeiro which is expected to raise the country's oil reserves by nearly 10 per cent.

Now trade links with Iraq have been restored sufficiently to warrant the formation of a special trade development bank with an initial capital of $40m. But why start a bank? While Iraq has apparently resumed its position as Brazil's largest single oil supplier, the establishment of a commercial bank was not considered necessary in the last five years.

The answer is the desire for secrecy. At the time of the Tammuz bombing, the Iraqi government was unhappy at the publicity surrounding the nuclear cooperation treaty between the two countries, as well as the reports that Brazilian contractors were working in Iraq on a number of major projects. Brazil has been supplying arms to Iraq for the last five years, moreover, and there was speculation in the western press that Brazil's involvement with Iraq might extend further than trade links.

A specialist organisation run by the two countries will enable Iraq and Brazil to keep their trading operations private and their government-to-government deals under one roof.

CSO: 4400/31

RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA, LIBYA DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 27, 7-13 Sep 81 pp 18-19

[Article by Wadi' Helou: "Unity and Military Coordination Discussions Beset by Obstacles"]

[Text] Arab diplomatic centers in Damascus were puzzled by the absence of a joint communique at the end of the Libyan-Syrian discussions. This conspicuous omission is all the more puzzling in view of the great importance attached to Colonel Qadhdhafi's 3-day visit by the Syrian news media, and amidst rumors that the visit might be followed by a summit meeting of the Steadfast Front upon Qadhdhafi's return to Tripoli, a meeting that would coincide with celebrations commemorating the September Fatih Revolution. Qadhdhafi's Arab tour had taken him to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Syria. The 11-day tour included the Aden Tripartite Conference and coincided with the American-Libyan confrontation over the Gulf of Sirra.

While the Aden 3-nation conference which brought together President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad [al-Hasani], Mengistu Haile-Mariam, and Colonel Qadhdhafi marked one of the major accomplishments of the Libyan president's tour, his visit to Damascus and the ensuing negotiations were of greater importance to Arab diplomatic circles.

In connection with the Summit meeting at Aden, Col Qadhdhafi's action in joining the Yemen-Ethiopia-Soviet Union alliance was clearly seen as his response to America's act of aggression against Libya [the downing of 2 Libyan planes over the Gulf of Sidra]. That incident served to push Qadhdhafi closer to the Soviet axis, and the move was seen as an act of further increasing the ire of the United States.

Arab diplomatic circles claim that Africa, not the Gulf states, is now the focus of attention of the Yemen-Ethiopia-Libya axis. This claim was supported by pointing to Qadhdhafi's stops in the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, as well as to his telegraphed greeting to King Khalid of Saudi Arabia as his [Qadhdhafi's] plane passed through Saudi airspace, all of which were interpreted as Qadhdhafi's way of dispelling Gulf nation fears that his joining the Yemen-Ethiopia alliance might threaten their security. This assurance, Arab diplomatic sources claimed, was made at the behest of the Soviet Union.

According to one rumor in Arab diplomatic circles, former South Yemen President 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, by his own account, was once on the verge of invading North Yemen, and that his decision to go through with the plan was abandoned only after the Soviets summoned him and convinced him of the folly of his plan. According to Mr Ismail,

his plan to invade North Yemen, was ultimately responsible for his removal from office in favor of a leader who would carry on a more realistic policy [as viewed by the Soviets] toward the Gulf nations. In view of this assessment, Africa is now the target of both the Soviets and the regional alliance consisting of Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. It is not far fetched, but rather expected, that this new alliance will soon be knocking on Sudan's doors in response to South Africa's recent attack against Angola.

On the Damascus scene, attention is now pivoted on Libyan-Syrian unity negotiations. When his plane stopped for refueling at Damascus International Airport, where he was welcomed by Prime Minister 'Abd al-Rauf Qasim and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Col Qadhdhafi was careful to request meetings with government and national leaders, as well as with leaders of people's organizations. His request received a positive response and he met with leaders of the Ba'ath Socialist Party in Damascus as well as with representatives of labor unions and people's organizations. In addition, Col Qadhdhafi met with Syrian President al-Assad, PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat and other Palestinian leaders, as well as with representatives of the Lebanese National Movement. At all of these meetings, Col Qadhdhafi emphasized the need for unity.

According to informed sources, the discussions went beyond the Libyan slogan "He who calls for division on party lines is a traitor," a clear reference to obstacles that prevented unity in previous talks. The fundamental issue now appears to hinge on reconciling Libya's Jamahiriyyah [masses-based] government with Syria's party-based government. Qadhdhafi reportedly insisted that power be vested in the people, and that the government be an instrument for implementing the will of the people. It is noteworthy that this was precisely the issue on which earlier unity negotiations had stumbled, and this despite the preparatory work of joint committees, which preceded President al-Assad's last trip to Libya approximately one year ago to take part in the celebration marking the September Fatih Revolution, the occasion on which President Qadhdhafi declared Libya's readiness to unite with Syria.

The lack of agreement on ways to bring about unity, despite agreement in principle on the need for such a union, has not prevented Syria from standing beside Libya in its confrontation with the United States. In fact while Col Qadhdhafi was still in Damascus, the chief of staff of the Syrian army, Gen Hikmat al-Shahabi returned from Tripoli, where he had met with Lt Col Abu Bakr al-Yunis [of Libya] and declared Syria's solidarity with Libya. After a meeting with Col Qadhdhafi in Damascus, Gen al-Shahabi left for Aden to coordinate military planning with South Yemen, one of the members of the Steadfast Front. It is well known that Syria maintains an air force contingent in Libya. It is reported that agreement has been reached to increase the number of Syrian pilots stationed in Libya to counter the threat posed by the massing of Egyptian troops on the Egyptian Libyan border.

The question now is whether the Libyan-Syrian dispute over the means for achieving unity--despite agreement on military coordination--is behind the absence of a joint communique on the Qadhdhafi-al-Assad talks.

Official sources in Syria claim that Libyan-Syrian relations are strong, much stronger, in fact, than could be described in a communique. There is no pressing need for a communique according to these sources. The absence of a communique should not be interpreted as signalling a deep rift between the two countries. Arab diplomatic sources in Damascus simply say that the Syrians and Libyans have agreed to hold more meetings on the unity proposal. They maintian that the existing military coordination plan is an old one and does not require the issuance of a joint communique.

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LIBYAN INITIATIVE STRESSES LEBANESE RECONCILIATION

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 242, 10 Oct 81 p 17

[Text] On 11 June, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi said in his speech on the anniversary of the American evacuation of Wheelus Base, "I shall propose an initiative to restore peace and harmony to Lebanon." This was the first sign of an Arab-Libyan initiative to end the war in Lebanon. On 1 September, the Jamahiriyah's Revolution Day, al-Qadhdhafi reaffirmed the initiative, and he said that the time has come for the Muslim rifle to stop fighting the Christian rifle and for all rifles to be united against the enemy.

Because Colonel Qadhdhafi's words were not just talk, they have been accompanied by energetic political activity during the past few months, in both Arab and Lebanese spheres. According to an informed and reliable Arab source, al-Qadhdhafi conferred with President al-Asad on the initiative each time they met (in Damascus and Tripoli), and al-Qadhdhafi got al-Asad's approval of his initiative. This initiative contains the following broad political lines, without going into details which are still subject to positive changes as the initiative is worked out:

1. Syrian forces participating in the Arab Deterrent Forces will withdraw from the Lebanese cities which they are now in, and security matters there will be handed over to whoever is authorized by the legitimate authorities, normally the Lebanese army.

2. Syria will receive political and military guarantees (through security agreements) of protection, since Lebanon has such strategic importance for Syria and is the crucial buffer through which it is possible to strike Syria.

3. Palestinian resistance forces will withdraw from Lebanese cities and will increase their presence in other appropriate places.

4. The Palestinian resistance will be given political guarantees assuring it freedom of movement, politically, in communications, and militarily, in emergency circumstances. The resistance will also be strengthened with arms (as was the case during the 15-day war) to confront any developments which are hostile to it.

5. Parties having dealings with Israel will break off their relations with it without delay.

6. The Lebanese National Movement will be strengthened as a prelude to a "balanced dialogue" so that "an agreement of the strong, not subject to violation or exploitation" can be reached.

7. A roundtable of all Lebanese forces will be convened for mutual understanding, without intervention by anyone, so that a final agreement can be reached, bringing about peace, stability, and the continued integrity of Lebanon--with regard to land and people--in a different system from the old sectarian system.

After clarifying these broad outlines, Mr Salih (al-Duruqi), head of the People's Bureau, and Mr 'Abd-al-Qadir Ghawqah, member of the People's Bureau (formerly Libyan ambassador to Lebanon for a number of years), were active in explaining the aims of the initiative to all Lebanese parties. Within this framework, they held repeated meetings with all Lebanese forces in the west Beirut area or in the north ([former] President Sulayman Franjiyah). Also, the performance given by the [Libyan] Folkloric Troupe at Casino du Liban last Sunday constituted an important first step in building bridges for dialogue with former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil. A far-reaching political dialogue was to have taken place between (al-Duruqi) and Ghawqah and the leadership of the Lebanese Front by the end of this week.

CSO: 4504/45

REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ISSUES DRAFT LAW ON LOCAL ORGANS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3, 4, 5, 6, Oct 81 pp 2, 3

[Text] Part I

Following is the Decree of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan concerning the draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

Kabul city,

22 September 1981,

The Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, after the assessment of the draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in pursuit of the order of article 37 (paragraph 13) of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan approves that—

I.—The draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in nine chapters and 87 articles, is confirmed in principle and in general, and this draft law is placed before the public for their views through the mass media for further deliberations.

II.—The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council is duty bound to collect and coordinate the peoples views and suggestions concerning this draft law and taking that draft into consideration, prepare the final law of the local organs of state power and administration and submit it for assessment to the session of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Babrak Karmal,

President of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA.

In the name of God, the Compassionate and Most merciful,

The draft law of the local organs of state power and administration of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan,

CHAPTER—I

General Order

Article One:

This law is passed in pursuit of the article 51 of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan toward the realisation of the aims of the national, democratic Saur Revolution, for the following purposes.

I. stability of democratic principles of the organisations and activities of the local organs of state power and administration.

II. To widely attract the toilers toward the state administration and to expand and promote the principle of collective activity in the local organs of the state power and administration.

III. To regulate relations between the local organs of the state power and administration and the higher organs of the state power and administration, the ministries, departments and their related organs.

Article Two:

In pursuit of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, in the provinces, cities, precincts, districts, sub-districts and villages the relevant jirgahs are considered as the local organs of the state power.

Article Three:

The local organs of the state power are formed for a period of four years.

Article Four:

The local organs of the state power on the basis of the authorities embodied in this law will solve all the problems having local importance having in view the interests of the state and citizens residing at their related localities.

Article Five:

The activity of the local organs of the state power will take place under the guidance of the Revolutionary Council, the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the Government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in cooperation with and by relying on all patriotic, progressive and democratic forces and social and political organisations of the country which are united in the National Fatherland Front.

Article Six:

The local organs of the state power will perform their activities on the basis of the following principles:

I. Consistent and unbiased realisation of the policy line of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan toward the consolidation of the gains of the Saur Revolution, implementation of its ideals and aspirations, further strengthening and development of the progressive regime in the country, abolition of the remnants of feudalistic and pre-feudalistic relations, backwardness, unemployment, illiteracy, poverty and disease.

II. Respect and observance of the sacred religion of Islam, all-sided aid to the lawful activity of religious organisations and institutes.

III. Revolutionary and democratic legality of justice, protection of rights and legal interests of the citizens of Afghanistan.

IV. Wide attraction of all strata of toilers including workers, farmers, craftsmen, nomads, intellectuals, women, youth, religious figures, democratic and progressive forces and representatives of all nationalities, peoples and tribes in the running of the affairs of local state organs of the state power.

V. Protection and safeguarding of state, combined, cooperatives, private and personal property.

VI. Giving help to the legal undertakings and activity of the national traders and capital holders.

VII. Serious respect and observance of the historical, national, cultural and religious traditions and customs of the people.

Article Seven:

Any kind of limitation of the participation of the citizens in the activity of the local organs of the state power and administration directly or indirectly with the creation of conditions of privilege and racial, tribal, national or religious supremacy is prohibited.

Article Eight:

The local organs of the state power and administration will perform their activity on the basis of the orders and values of the Fundamental Principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the order of this law and other laws and decrees of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council, resolutions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the decisions of the supreme local organs of the state power and administration. (To be continued).

Part II

CHAPTER — II
METHOD OF FORMATION OF LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

1. Village Jirgah

Article Nine:

In any village having at least fifty families village jirgah (council) can be elected. The villages with less than fifty families would join the bigger neighbouring villages.

The Council's elections can be held in the case of participation of at least half of the village voters.

The number of the people's candidates to be elected in the village council would be determined by the election commission of the village according to law.

2. Sub-district jirgahs:

Article Ten:

The sub-district council is elected by the representatives of the village councils situated within the area of the sub-district. The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the sub-district council would be determined by the election commission of the sub-district according to the law.

3. District Jirgah (Council).

Article Eleven:

The district council would be elected by the representatives of the sub-district councils and the village councils which are under the administrative jurisdiction of the district.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected to the district council will be determined by the election commission of the district according to the law.

4. Precinct Council

Article Twelve:

Where there are precincts in the set-up of a city, a precinct council will be elected for each precinct.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the precinct council would be determined by the elections commission of the precinct according to the law.

5. The city council.

Article Thirteen:

The city council will be elected by the citizens of a city. The elections will be held if at least half of the city voters participate in the elections.

The city council the set up of which envisages the precincts is elected by the representatives of the precinct councils.

The number of the peoples representatives to be elected for the city council would be determined by the city elections commission according to the law.

6. The Provincial Council

Article Fourteen:

The provincial council is elected by the representatives of the districts' and cities' councils of the related province. The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the provincial councils would be determined by the provincial election commissions according to the law.

7. The Kabul Province Council and the Kabul city Council

Article fifteen:

The Kabul province council will be elected by the representatives of the related district councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the Kabul province council would be determined by the provincial election commission according to the law.

The Kabul city council will be elected by the representatives of the related precinct councils.

The number of the people's representatives to be elected for the Kabul city council would be determined by the elections commission of Kabul city according to the law.

Article Sixteen:

Every council would hold its first session within one month after the election date.

CHAPTER — III
THE METHOD OF ELECTING PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES

Article Seventeen:

The date of the elections of local organs of the state power will be fixed by the decree of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan within fourty five days after the termination of the preceding term of authority of the local organs of the state power.

Article Eighteen:

Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who has completed 18 years of age, regardless of any racial, nationality and tribal, relations, language, sex; place of residences, religion and sect, education, ascription, property and social status

will have the right to elect the people's representative to a local council.

Article Nineteen:

Every citizen of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan who has completed 21 years of age, with the observance of the principle embodied in article seven of this law, can be elected as the peoples representative in the local council.

Article Twenty:

The right to recommend the candidates of the people's representatives to the local councils belongs to the organisations of the people's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the National Fatherland Front, and the Cooperatives, social and political organisations.

Article Twentyone:

In order to organise and hold elections for local council and to control the procedures, election commissions, will be established by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council in the provinces, cities, precincts, districts, sub-districts and villages. The members of the election commission will be suggested by the collectives and organisations mentioned in article 20 of this law. The number and composition of the commission will be determined by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Twentytwo:

The election commission should be formed thirty days before the holding of the elections of the local organs of the state power.

Article Twentythree:

The Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan appoints from amongst the members of the election commission, the Chairman, the vice-chairman and the secretary of the commission.

Article Twentyfour:

The election commission will have the following duties:

1. General guidance, preparations and holding of elections of local councils.
2. Registration of the names of the candidates of the people's representatives in the local councils according to the regulations.
3. Study the petitions and complaints of the citizens with regard to the preparatory work and holding of elections.
4. Registration of the names of representatives elected for the local councils and arrangement of related documents.

Article Twentyfive:

The result of the elections will be submitted by the commission to the high commission for approval.

The election commissions of the provinces and the election commission of the Kabul city will present the documents related to the results of the elections to the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for approval.

Article Twentysix:

The complaints concerning the executions of the election commissions will be submitted to the higher commission, which will be considered according to the law.

Article Twentyseven:

The introduction of candidates of the people's re-

en people of Palestine.

He caused the intens fication of the plots, pr vocations and shamele and anti-human-rights a gressions of the Zionis of Israeli against the ter itorial integrity, inde endence and national s vereignty of Lebanon.

He has thrown awa his masks and reveale his shameful anti-Afgha face for all the world t see. He shamelessly adm itted that he has prov ded weapons to counte revolutionary Afghan b nds and continues to d so.

The Government of th DRA has repeatedly ma de it clear that imperial ism headed by unharnes sed and discredited U imperialism, in collusio with the renegade lead ership of China, the mili tarist ruling coterie o Pakistan and traitor Sa dat, are continuing a

Article Thirtyone:

Those persons who have been deprived of political and civil rights, and those who are affected by psychological diseases cannot be elected to the local councils and cannot vote for it. Persons affected by diseases which prevent them from performing their duties cannot be elected to the local councils.

Article Thirtytwo:

Cooperation in the preparations and holding the elections for the local organs of the state power will be undertaken by the general department of the local organs and the state administration.

CHAPTER—IV
DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

Article Thirtythree:

The councils of the provinces, the Kabul city, cities, precincts, districts and subdistricts will have the following duties and authorities:

1. Tho maintain, observe and implement the laws, decrees, resolutions and other regulations and decisions of the higher organs.
2. To maintain and preserve the social order, and to protect the rights and freedoms of the citizens.
3. Cooperation with the the judicial, police and judicial organs in the advancement of their activities.
4. Protection and support of the activities of the heads and elders and all others related to the tribes in the maintaining of peace, fraternity, security, safety, and welfare, and in safeguarding the frontiers of the country.
5. To organise the implementation of social and economic development plans of the state.
6. To approve the annual budget of incomes and expenditures.
7. To guide the private and cottage industries and to help in the activity of the state enterprises situated in their related regions.
8. To take measures towards the promotion of democratic changes in agriculture in the interest of the vast masses of farmers with their all-sided participation, cooperation toward obtaining machine tools, sowing seeds and chemical fertilisers and in selling the agricultural products, protect, encourage and develop the production and consumer cooperatives as well as other forms of cooperatives in agriculture.
9. Cooperation with the state organisations in the task of purchasing crops, products of industrial herbs and other agricultural yields.
10. To solve the disputes emanating from the use of water in accordance with the orders of the law.
11. To supervise the usage of agricultural land, the water resources, forests and other natural assets.
12. Cooperation in the development of the activities of combined and private enterprises and craftsmen and to encourage their voluntary unification with the coperatives.
13. Deliberation and approval of the master plan of the cities and residential towns, to choose the sites for building residential buildings and social establishments, commercial projects and public services and to issue permissions in the field.
14. Construction, protection and maintenance of roads and streets in the related regions.
15. To control the activities of transport organisations and to help toward the development of public transportation.
16. To solve the problems related to the construction, repair and distribution of residential buildings.
17. To control the observance of regulations of hygiene in the commercial establishments and food provisions and public services.
18. To issue trade license and permission letters for the establishment of organisations for public services.
19. To take measures toward the further development and completion of the system of education, abolition of illiteracy, expansion of the network of schools and libraries.
20. To inform the citizens about the most important events in the country and the world.
21. To take measures toward the development of sports and physical fitness, especially the development of various national sports.
22. To take measures towards the development of public health and protection from contagious diseases.

23. To help in the drafting of the draftees for the military service and consolidation of the defence force of the country and, in case of necessity, to take direct part in the defensive measures.

24. To help in the activity of social and political organisations who are united in the National Fatherland Front.

25. To organise the building works of the residential areas, to take measures to prevent natural calamities and to remove their consequences.

26. To protect and repair the mosques, the Takyakhanas, shrines and other holy places and historical and cultural relics.

27. To take measures to protect and maintain the wells, sewers, lakes, the sources of reservoirs of drinking water, to plant trees and take care of them.

28. To organise and encourage voluntary activity of the citizens toward the execution of socially, useful works.

29. To examine and solve the complaints and petitions of the citizens at due time.

30. To help preparation of general statistics among them statistics of manpower, and to take measures to maintain work for the citizens.

31. To collect the taxations according to law.

32. To help in the development of vocational education.

33. To control the prices.

34. To help in the development of communications.

35. To help in the provision of facilities for the nomads, tribes and cattle-breeders in the task of using the grazing areas in a just manner, to help in the development of cattle-breeding and selling of their products, to raise the material welfare and cultural level and to improve the living conditions of nomads, tribes and cattle-raisers.

36. To help the families of those persons who are martyred or crippled in the defence of Saur Revolution or are engaged in the military service.

37. To organise the convention of elections of the local organs of the state power and performance of other authorities according to the law.

Article Thirtyfour:

The village council will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To all-sidedly help in maintaining progressive social and agricultural transformations in the village.

2. To help in the advancement of activity in campaign against illiteracy.

3. To take measures towards establishing schools and improve their activities.

4. To inform the village peoples about the events in the country and the world.

5. To help with the families of the persons who are martyred or crippled in the defence of the Saur Revolution or are serving in the miltairy.

6. To help in the conscription of the draftees for the military service.

7. To take measures toward maintaining the primary materials for the farmers.

8. To take measures toward the building and maintenance of buildings, bridges and dams on stream-waters, wells, sewers and other sources and reservoirs of drinking water.

9. To take measures toward the repair and maintenance of mosques, Takyakhanas, shrines and other holy places and graveyards.

10. To take measures toward the maintenance of roads and in case of necessity, the construction of new roads.

11. To take measures toward the plantation of trees in the related region.

12. To issue permit letters for the opening of shops, cafes and tea-houses.

13. To control the observance of regulations in the public services and commercial organisations.

14. To take measures to prevent contagious diseases,

15. To participate in the preparation of the village development draft plan.

16. To mobilise the farmers toward the performance of socially useful works.

17. To help collection of the taxes according to law.

18. To organise the work of guarding the social order, security and tranquillity in the village area.

19. To help toward the voluntary unification of farmers in the cooperatives.

20. Other duties and authorities anticipated by the law.

CHAPTER—V

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

Article Thirtyfive:

The executive committee of the council belongs to the executive organ of the local

organs of the state power.

Article Thirtysix:

The executive committees of the local councils are formed and approved by the higher executive committees from among the people's representatives who are elected in these councils.

In the executive committees, on the basis of the recommendation of the general department of the Islamic Affairs, the representatives of the ulama and religious figures can be included.

Article Thirtyseven:

The executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will be formed and approved by the council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from amongst the people's representatives who are elected in these councils.

Article Thirtyeight:

The executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will be formed with the following composition:

1—A president,

2—A vice president,

3—A secretary

4—Members from nine nine to eleven persons,

The executive committees of the city councils, precinct councils and districts councils will have the following composition:

1—A president

2—A secretary

3—Five to seven members.

The executive committees of the subdistrict councils will have the following composition:

1—One president

2—One secretary

3—Three to five members.

Article Thirtynine:

The executive committees will be responsible before the related councils and the higher executive committees and will report to them on their activities.

Article Fourty:

The executive committees will continue with their duties until the formation of the new executive committees.

(To be continued).

Part IV

Article Fortyone:

The executive committees will report about their activities to their councils at least once a year.

Article Fortytwo:

The executive committees will have the following duties and powers:

1. To guide the affairs of economic, social and cultural structure in the related area on the basis of the decision of the council and decision of the higher organs of state power and administration.

2. To prepare and convene sessions of the local councils.

3. To lead the activities of the administrative organs under them.

4. To solve the complaints and to justly care for the petitions of the toilers in a definite time and to control the implementation of resolutions in the field.

5. To implement the laws, decrees, decisions and resolutions of the higher organs.

6. To help the people's representatives in the execution of their duties.

7. To perform other duties and authorities according to the law.

Article Fortythree:

The executive committees of the councils of subdistricts, districts, precincts and cities will suggest to the higher organs the award of medals and decorations of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the executive committees of the provincial councils and the Kabul city council will make such suggestions through the higher organs.

Article Fortyfour:

The president of the executive committee of the local council will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To take measures toward the implementation of the resolutions of local council and its executive committee and the resolutions of the higher organs of state power and administration and its supervision.

2. To convene and preside over the sessions of the executive committee.

3. To preside over the sessions of the council excepting the sessions in which the report of the executive committtee is heard.

4. To administer financial affairs according to law and the signing of financial documents.

5. To control distribution of material aids to the needy persons.

6. To appoint and to dismiss the officials and employees of the body of the executive committee in accord with the orders of law.

7. To lead and regulate the activity of the heads of the executive committees under him.

8. To issue orders to the members of the executive committee, heads of the departments and sections and offices under the executive committee concerning the execution of the entrusted duties and its control.

9. To issue orders on other matters within the authority.

10. To give authority to the vice president or, in case of the absence of vice president, to one of the members of the executive committee, in cases of sickness, duty, day off or other reasons.

Article Fortyfive:
The performances of the heads of the executive committee of the councils of provinces and the Kabul city council will be guided and supervised by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan or his deputies or by the chairman of the general department of the local organs of state administration.

Article Fortysix:
The secretary of the executive committee of the local council will be at the same time secretary of the related council.

The secretary of the executive committee will have the following duties and authorities:

1. To arrange documents related to the activity of the local council and its executive committee.

2. To prepare the draft of the work plan of the local council and the executive committee and to propose it for approval.

3. To convene meetings, seminars, conferences and other gatherings toward the raising of the level of activity of the local council and its executive committee.

4. To execute the orders of the president and vice-president of the executive committee.

5. To control the execution of the resolutions of the local councils and their executive committees.

Article Fortyseven:
The resolutions made by the executive committee of the local councils will be signed by the president and secretary of the executive committee.

Article Fortyeight:
The resolutions of the executive committee issued within the limit of authority will be applicable for all the organisations responsible included in the area of ens included in the area of the council.

Article Fortynine:
The resolutions of the executive committee of the local council can be cancelled by the related council or the higher executive committee.

Article Fifty:
The resolutions of the executive committee of the provincial councils and the executive committee of the Kabul city can be cancelled by the related councils or the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Fiftyone :
The meetings of the executive committees can be held when required.

Article Fiftytwo:
The meetings of the executive committee can be held with the presence of two-thirds of its members.

Article Fiftythree:
The decisions of the executive committees will be adopted by a majority of votes of the members present in the meeting.

Article Fiftyfour:
The presidents of the executive committees, vice presidents, secretaries and members of the executive committees will have individual responsibility before the higher executive committees for the activities of the executive committees.

CHAPTER — VI
THE OFFICES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES OF THE LOCAL COUNCILS

Article Fiftyfive:
The councils of provinces, cities, districts and precincts of the Kabul city will establish the related offices, when required, toward the guidance of economic, social, cultural and constructional affairs.

A list of these offices and the method of their establishment will be determined by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Fiftysix:
The regulations of the offices of the executive committees will be approved by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Fiftyseven:
The executive committees of the precincts and subdistrict councils can employ officials and other employees for the accomplishment of duties in the related fields within the limit of the set-up determined by the Council of Ministers of the Democratic Repulic of Afghanistan.

Article Fiftyeight :
The appointment and dismissal of the heads of the offices will be carried out by the executive committees on the basis of the agreement of the upper organs of the state administration according to the law.

Article Fiftynine:
The heads of the offices of the executive committees of the council of provinces, the cities, districts and precincts of the Kabul city, within the limit of their own authorities will issue the required orders toward the execution of the resolution of the councils and the related executive committees and the resolutions and decisions of the higher organs.

Article sixty:
The offices of the executive committees will be under the higher executive committees and organs of the state.

Article Sixtyone:
The heads of offices of the executive committees will have individual responsibility for their undertakings before the executive committees, the Ministries and related offices.

CAHPTER—VII
TO REGULATE THE ACTIVITY OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

Article Sixtytwo:
The local councils will deliberate and solve in their meetings all the issues which the law has placed within the limit of their authority.

Article Sixtythree:
The executive committtee shall call the sessions of the related council at least twice a year.

Article Sixtyfour:
The local councils in their first meeting will choose the commissions of credentials and the said commissions will consider the authorities of the representatives elected in the council.

Article Sixtyfive:
The meetings of the councils can be held with the presence of two thirds of its members.

Article Sixtysix:
The first session of the council will be opened by an elderly representative and will continue under his chairmanship.

The following sessions will be opened by the president of the executive committee and will continue under his chairmanship.

Article Sixtyseven:
During the submission of the executive committee's report to the council session, the sessions will be presided over by an elderly representative.

Article Sixtyeight:
The councils will hold open sessions and in case of necessity they can hold closed-door sessions.

Article Sixtynine:
The council session shall be held according to the approved agenda.

Article Seventy :
The council's resolutions will be made through free voting with the majority of votes of the members present in the session.

Article Seventyone:
The council's resolutions will be made through the council's voting and signed by the secretary of the council.

The resolutions will be recorded according to the law.

Article Seventytwo:
The council's resolution will be cancelled by the higher council in case they are against the law.

The resolutions of the provincial councils and of Kabul city council, in case of being inconsistent with the law, will be cancelled by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Seventythree:

The council in its sessions will solve all the issues within the limit of its power according to the law.

Article Seventyfour:
In the council sessions, persons who are invited by the executive committees and also the responsible officials of the General Department of the local organs of the state administration can attend.

Article Seventyfive:
The procedures of the

council sessions will be recorded, and signed by the president and secretary of the council.

Article Seventysix:

The resolutions of the council will be conveyed within ten days by the executive committees for the information of the related offices, incharges of the affairs and the citizens of the related area.

Article Seventyseven:

In the regions where tribes are residing, the related administrative organisations are to respect their customs and historical traditions.

Article Seventyeight:

The state flag of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan should be hoisted on the building where the local council's sessions are convened during the session and on the headquarters of executive committee permanently according to the law.

CHAPTER—VIII

THE POPULAR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LOCAL ORGANS OF THE STATE POWER

Article Seventynine:

To represent people in the local organs is considered an honourable duty.

Article Eighty:

The authority of the people's representative begins from the date of his election in the council and terminates with the election of the next term of the council.

Article Eightyone:

The people's representative will have the following rights:

1. To take part in the solution of the problems submitted to the session.
2. To propose the issues for deliberation to the council.

Article Eighty-two:

The people's representative will have the following obligations:

1. To consistently cooperate in the implementation of the resolutions of the local council.
2. To honestly fulfill the orders of the local council.
3. To meet regularly with the clients and to report the resolutions of the council to them and to carry out the propagatory works among them.
4. To make efforts to implement the decisions of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistn, the Revolutionary Council and the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Article Eightythree:

The representatives of the people to the local jirgahs will perform honorary duties.

During participation in the meetings of the jirgah, travel allowance and lodging expenses are paid to the representatives of the people to the local jirgahs.

Article Eightyfour:

Whenever the manners of the people's representative in the local council cause damage to the prestige of the people's representation, or if he does not perform his duties in a worthy manner, he will be stripped of his authority by the organ which has elected him.

Article Eightyfive:

The authority of the people's representatives of the local councils will be ended in the case of death or movement to another locality or in the case of lack of possibility to execute it, and another person will be elected in his place according to this law.

CHAPTER—IX
THE FINAL ORDERS

Article Eightysix:

Organisational and methodic help for the local organs of the state power and the arrangement of material provisions of the local organs of the state power and administration will be provided by the general-department of the local organs of state administration.

Article Eightyseven:

The executive committees of the local councils and the offices of the executive committees of the councils of the provinces, cities, districts, and precincts of the Kabul city will have a corporate personality and will possess a stamp inscribed with the insignia of the state of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the name of the executive committee and administration. (Concluded)

CSO: 4000/81

MEASURES FOR RESURGENCE OF INDUSTRIES UNDERTAKEN

Government Plans

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "For Reactivation and Resurgence of Industries"]

[Text]

Development of industries has been a prime objective of the DRA Government. Since the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, constructive measures have been taken to achieve growth of national industries. Appropriate plans have been drawn and implemented to raise the output of industrial plants in the country. Special attention is being paid to reorganization and improvement of the managerial set-up of industrial complexes to ensure efficiency in work and increase in production.

Some of the factories, which were compelled to shutdown due to bad organization and inappropriate management, have been reactivated to avoid loss to national economy. Unlike under the past Governments, the industrial plants in the country now enjoy full support and protection of the DRA Government and every efforts are being made to further develop these plants to the benefit of growth of the national economy.

Added incentives and facilities as well as fringe benefits are now provided for the workers as part of the drive to increase industrial production. Better working conditions, rise in salaries for industrial workers and other privileges introduced by the DRA Government have been very effective in raising the industrial production in the country.

Many major industrial plants in the country have undergone renovation and modernization, a major factor in boosting production recorded by many industrial plants in the country. Plans are also underway to expand the output of some industrial plants, specially those which were on the verge of closure and stagnation.

With the wise and timely action of the DRA Government, not only one of the important industrial plant that is the Kabul Ceramic Factory was saved from total shut down and liquidation, but plans are being drawn up to further develop and expand its production to meet part of the requirements of our people for chinaware. Economic and technical feasibility studies are being made and ways and means sought on how to increase and expand the factory's production.

Another major industrial complex, which the Government plans to expand, is the Jangalak Factories. A Soviet expert team has already begun to prepare technical and economic feasibility studies on expansion of the complex. The expansion and scope of operations of these factories, to be made with the technical and economic assistance

of the friendly country, the Soviet Union, will enable it to enlarge its motor repair and casting shops.

The reconstruction plan of the Jangalak Factories, being completed with the help of Soviet designers, is scheduled to be finished by mid-1982 and the actual reconstruction will be carried in 1983 and 1985, according to a report of the factories' management.

Another major and successful factory, the Aho Shoe Factory, has also reported increase in production due to improved management and hard work of its workers. The Aho management, reporting increase in daily output, adds that at the beginning, the factory produced some 55 pairs of shoes a day. However, after the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the daily output of the factory has reached 155 to 855 pairs of shoes.

These are but a few examples of the success of the wise and principled economic policy of the Government in achieving economic and industrial development.

The increased activities of the Afghan Industrial Bank have also been instrumental in encouraging industrial development and productions. The bank has been providing loans on easy and favourable terms to private and public sectors, helping them develop their plants and achieve rise in their productions.

Recently, the Government launched a work emulation drive in the industrial plants as part of its efforts to further encourage the workers to increase production. The drive has been widely welcomed by all workers and productive firms. It has already scored marked achievements.

It is hoped that, with continued efforts by the Government and the appropriate plans drawn up or to be drawn up, the country will achieve impressive successes in development of national industries to meet the essential needs of the people and save a considerable amount in hard currency.

Loans to Enterprises

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The net profit of the Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan during 1359 amounted to Afs. 38,815,628, showing an increase of some 60 per cent compared to 1358 .The bank's loan towards the end of 1359 amounted to Afs. 639 million which, compared to 1358, shows some 11 per cent increase. In addition to carry-over loans, the bank made some Afs. 420 million new loans in 1359 to industrial organisations in the country.

This was stated by Eng Timor Shah Surkhabi, caretaker president of the bank, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

Talking of the activities of the bank, Surkhabi added: "During 1359, the bank's revenues amounted to Afs. 71,268,690 and its net profit to Afs. 38,-815,628, while these figures in the previous year of 1358 were Afs. 52,578,-458 and Afs. 24,215,040 respectively. Thus, during the 1359 the Bank's revenues shows some 34 per cent increase and that its net profit some 60 per cent, compared to the year 1358".

The bank's activity, in the light of the lofty objectives and useful goals of the liberating Saur Revolution and especially its new phase, has been very satisfactory compared to previous years both in credit and non-credit areas.

In addition to loans carried over from the previous year, some Afs. 420 million of new loans were extended by the bank during 1359 which, in view of number and the volume of the loans extended, shows an increase of some 24 per cent compared to 1358.

The balance of the bank's loans, which were

carried over from 1358 to 1359 amounted to Afs. 574 and in the course of 1359 an additional Afs .420 million new loans were made and Afs. 355 million loans was retrieved during the same period. Thus the balance of loans of the bank towards the end of 1359 amounted to Afs 639, showing an increase of some 11 per cent compared to 1358.

"This figure indicates the interest and confidence of people in investment in accordance with the developmental projects of DRA, as well as the zeal, enthusiaism and untiring efforts of the employees of the bank", noted Surkhabi.

Answering a question, he said: "During 1360 the bank has furnished financial assistance to 107 industrial projects and as envisaged in the five-year financial plan, these loans will cover 137 projects by the end of the current Afghan year and towards the end of 1364 the number of projects to be financed by the bank are anticipated to reach to 254".

LOANS

"The bank extends loan for creation and establishment, expansion and revitlisation of industrial projects, both in public and private sectors and mixed sectors. These loans are made available after technical and economical feasibility studies of a certain project against gurantees", he pointed out.

The minmum duration of the loan can be one year and that maximum more than ten years.

The bank was established in 1972 with a capital of Afs. 240 million to help development and growth of industries in the country as well as granting financial, technical, consultative, administrative and accounting services to industrial enterprises. At the outset 40 per cent of total capital was shared by foreign shareholders and the remaining 60 per cent belonged to local, public, private sectors and individual shareholders. However, since 1976, the Government owns the total capital. The value of shares held by foreign shareholders were paid to them by Da Afghanistan and that of individual and private shareholders were paid by the Finance, Ministry.

Since its inception, the bank has been in the service of national industries. At present the bank has 150 industrial projects, both public and private, as its clients.

"The bank has rendered useful services in development of industrial sectors through providing loans on favourable terms .Following the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the Bank's terms under which loans are extended were reviewed and it has become very easy and favourable", recalled Surkhabi, "so that, in accordance with the DRA Government's objectives, the pace of development of industries in the country is accelerated through use of national capital in the industrial sector".

The bank plans to establish centres of small industries and handicraft in other provinces.

The bank at present has set up a pilot small industries centre and, when such small industries are developed to medium industries, they will be transfeered to other centres such as industrial parks.

"The bank also plans to set up provincial branches shortly for coordination of industries in the country", Surkhabi added.

Increase in Ceramic Production

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The survey and preliminary studies for development of the Kabul Ceramic Factory continues. In pursuance of the policy of the Government in developing productive industries of the country, recently it was resolved to carry out an all-sided study for seeking more effective and better ways and means to increase the production of the factory.

This was said to our reporter by Eng Abdurahman Qazikhani, head of the factory.

Recalling historical background of the factory, Eng Qazikhani said: "The factory was established in 1956 through private investment under the name of Shaker Ceramic Factory. In the early stage of operation the processed raw materials was being imported from Japan, and its primary products included ceramic wares which were of good quality and to the satisfaction of the customers. However, the use of already processed raw materials did not last long as it was becoming too expensive for the owner of the factory to import such raw materials. Thus, the management of the factory decided to make use of the locally available raw materials like ballclay which was found in Takhcha Kahan sale mine field of Taluqan, Kaolin, obtained from Talao Barfak and Feldspath from Dare Noor of Jalalabad."

Due to lack of modern and sophisticated technical facilities, the locally available raw materials were not properly processed within the factory, and this led to the quality of the products becoming inferior and at the same time the cost of production becoming higher than the similar foreign goods imported into the country. Thus, the factory's products lost their marketability and remained unsold at the warehouses. This state of affairs compelled the factory owners to change the system of production and their machinery to produce insulators and shimoot tiles for steam furnace, and coal stoves, instead of china wares. The insulators were used for power lines and that shimoot tiles, for stove and furnaces.

By changing the production line, the factory was able to sustain itself financially. But, unfortunately, this operation also did not last long and finally, in 1966, the factory came to standstill and its shutdown continued until 1974. "The Mines and Industries Ministry decided to reactivate the factory. And, it began a trial run and at the same time the study began on ways and means to increase the production, as part of the policy of the Government's drive to develop the productive industries in the country", said Qazikhani.

The factory was visited personally by the Mines and Industries Minister as well as an authorised expert team of the ministry which made a study of ways to reactivate and further develop the factory. It was also visited by an expert team of the Soviet Union. The team, after a study, presented a detailed report to the authorities of the Ministry.

The preliminary survey, including geological and constructional, is under progress at present and, in the near future, marked changes will be made at the factory with the Soviet assistance, he noted.

The factory was purchased by the ministry at the repeated request of its owner. Now that the factory operates as an industrial state institute, constant efforts are being made to develop the factory and it was decided to secure the Soviet adviser's' help in achieving this end, he said.

Now eight experienced Soviet experts help in further development and expansion of the factory, who have already carried out preliminary studies for its future development. The cooperation of other Government organisation is also sought for completion of the technical and economic feasibility studies. If this proves fruitful and justifies an expansion of the factory, it is possible at the following production capacity:

Production of chinaware up to some 500,000 pieces —141,66 tons. production of insulator up to some 110,000 or 49,50 tons, production of plumbing equipment up to some 5400 pieces or 72 tons which will come to a total of 263.16 tons.

As of now, some of the products of the factory such as insulator and shimoot tiles, are sold to various ministries and government organisations. The chinaware of the factory is sold through cooperative sale outlets at reasonable prices and to Government officials on instalment.

"Due to the increasing demand for chinaware, it is hoped that, in the near future, the production of the factory will be increased and the quality improved to meet international standard", said Qazikhani.

CSO: 4600/75

CONSUMER SUPPLY FACILITIES OPENED

New Bakery for Kabul

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The second bakery of Kabul, commissioned recently, has been completed six months ahead of planned target. This is attributed to the hard work and preservence of the workers and employeess of the Afghan Construction Unit and sincere cooperation of the Soviet engineers and technicians.

With a capacity of producing 72 tons of bread and cookies in 24 hours, the Kabul second bakery will supply 25 per cent of the baked bread required by the Kabul inhabitants.

This was stated by Eng Mohammad Aziz, president of the food procurement and cooperative department, in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

"The completion of the second bakery, equipped with modern facilities, is of vital importance for the people of Afghanistan", he pointed out the new equipment means that most of the mannual works is now replaced by machine work, and the workers only supervise and watch the operations of the machinery.

Due to increassing demand for baked bread the production capacity of the first bakery was raised from 50 tons to 62 tons in 24 hours. Though the final production capacity of the second bakery is 72 tons in 24 hours, in view of the reconstruction and substitution of old with the modern machinery at the first bakery, the total output of the two bakeries will be 72 tons in 24 hours until the end of the current Afghan year.

The construction work on the second bakery began in Saratan 1358 and took two years to be completed. The survey, and design of the building were carried out by Soviet firms. The new bakery covers an area of 7.7 thousand equare metres.

The total expenditures of the second bakery, said Eng Aziz, amounted to over 260 million. "The Afghan personnel, actively participated, with the help and technical assistance of the Soviet Union, in installation of machinery". The bakery employs over 178 workers.

Referring to the future plans of the department, he said: "Presently, work is in progress for construction of a silo in Mazare Sharif with the storage capacity of 20,000 tons, a mill with the capacity of 60 tons in 24 hours and a bakery with the baking capacity of 25 tons in 24 hours. The new project is scheduled to go into operation in the first quarter of the Afghan year 1361".

Similarly, the establishment of a mill in Pule Khumri with the capacity of 200 tons in 24 hours has also been undertaken

and is scheduled to go into operation by the first quarter of Afghan year 1361, thus "removing totally the difficulties in view of the shortage of flour", he added.

Likewise, the construction of a mill with the capacity of 60 tons and a bakery with the capacity of 25 tons are planned in Herat. The survey work, design and the drawing are ready and "soon work will begin for the construction" he said.

The setting up of a rice processing plant and a silo for storage of rice with the storage capacity of 20,000 tons in Baghlan, development of the Pule Khumri silo capacity from 20,000 and the Mazare Sharif silo capacity from 20,000 to 50,000 tons each and installation of a plant to provide for confectionary plants, are also envisaged in the future plans, according to Eng Aziz.

New Sugar Outlets

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

"With the opening up of new sugar sale outlets in various parts of the city, the Kabul citizens' requirement for daily consumption of sugar is fully ensured. The new sale outlets run by the Government are well organised, ensuring normal sale of sugar to consumers".

This was stated by Lemar Ahmad Lemar, president of the petroleum and sugar department , in an interview with the Kabul New Times.

The sale of sugar on commission basis continues from the time the Government Monopoly was established, he recalled. However, in an effort to provide added facilities for the Kabul citizens and to serve them better, the department recently decided to open up a number of new sale outlets in various sections of Kabul. Presently there are some 1,100 shops, along the Government-run sale outlets, where sugar is sold to the public at subsidised price, he pointed out.

If assessed in view of the supply of sugar and size of the population, one can say with certainty that the requirements of inhabitants of Sayyed Noor Mohammad Shah Mena, Rahman Mena and Khairkhana Mena for sugar is fully met through the four sugar sale outlets established by the Government in these areas. Similarly, the inhabitants of Share Nau Microroyan and Mirwais Maidan are meeting a greater part of their sugar requirements from the new sale outlets there, Lemar Ahmad said. There is a plan to open up more of these outlets in other parts of the city so that the consumers can easily and without wasting much time obtain their required amount of sugar.

The working programme of the new sale outlets are organised in such a way that the consumers can receive their quota from 7 in the morning to 6:30 in the evening. Through those new sale outlets, the sugar is directly supplied to the consumers, according to their needs. Earlier many shops sold sugar on commission basis and created difficulties for the consumers through hoarding and were thus able to sell sugar at higher prices.

The Petroleum and Sugar Department, keeping in mind its responsibility, has always tried to import the required amount of sugar in the country and distribute it on a normal way so that no shortage is felt, Lemar said.

In pursuance of this policy, the department has concluded an agreement with the friendly country of the Soviet Union for purchase and import of 100,000 tons of sugar for the current year. Compared to the last year an increase of 30 per cent is taken in consideration in the new agreement.

The delivery of the sugar has already begun without interruption, he added.

Automated System for Coal Railway

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

An automated control system has been installed at the station of Osnova, the main sorting station of the Southern Railway.

This will speed up the passage of trains carrying coal from the Donbass coal fields, ore from the Dniepper valley, and engineering products from Kharkov.

The system replaces a complex of operations which were previously carried out by a large staff of railway operators. Gathering information about the cargoes which have arrived, the computers immediately issue orders for the most rational distribution of the trains. All the necessary information is reproduced on display panels, while machines automatically print and produce all relevant documentation. The electronic dispatcher has reduced the time that rolling stock has to spend in station's yards and 1,500 spare trucks will thus be released for additional loading operations.

(MN)

CSO: 4600/78

CAMPAIGN TO INCREASE AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT ACTIVATED

Government Efforts

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "A Productive Campaign"]

[Text]

Afghanistan is an agricultural country, where the majority of the population is engaged in farming. However, for long years, the farmers in this country tilled their land under the most arduous conditions and with very simple and primitive means, and what they produced could hardly meet the people's daily requirements.

The meagre land productivity caused by social and economic factors, could not sustain the farmers and their families the year round, compelled them to resort to borrowing, especially at the sowing season. The heavy burden forced them to sell their products at low prices in order to repay their debts.

They borrowed money to pay for the improved seeds, chemical fertilisers, and other essentials, but the back-breaking loans never allowed the farmers to improve their miserable economic condition and that of their families. This state of affairs also caused an increasing deficit in the total agricultural production of the country.

With the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, having realised all these difficulties and hardships of the toiling farmers in the country, the DRA Government has undertaken effective and specific plans aimed at helping the farmers, augmenting the land productivity and agricultural output as a whole.

The Government has exerted and is exerting all possible efforts to encourage the toiling peasants to enhance their per unit land productivity by providing technical guidance, improved seeds, chemical fertiliser and modern agricultural tools on most favourable and easy terms.

To help the farmers and enable them to increase the land productivity, the Government decided to reduce the selling price of chemical fertiliser, seeds, and agricultural tools and machinery to farmers. The prices of industrial crops such as cotton to be purchased by the Government, enterprises and companies, have been considerably increased.

As part of the effort to increase the land productivity and help the farmers, the Government has stepped up its activities for further popularisation of use of fertiliser and modern agricultural means. With the enlarged network of sale outlets for fertiliser, improved seeds and other essentials, the Afghan farmers now have an easy access to what is needed for them to increase land productivity.

Among the most constructive and effective plans undertaken by the Government are the campaigns for spring and autumn sowing, which are drawn up on the basis of a resolution of the DRA Council of Ministers. These plans and programmes have already yielded fruitful results, as the experiences of the autumn sowing of 1359 and spring sowing of 1360 show.

The autumn sowing campaign this year has begun on Sunbula 1 and will continue until Jaddi 1. Over 10,000 tons of improved varieties of wheat seeds have been supplied for distribution to Afghan farmers to be used in the autumn sowing of 1360. In the same proportion, other essentials are also made available to the farmers to make use of them for the autumn sowing.

In order to implement the autumn sowing programme, meetings are being held in various provinces to ensure the full and satisfactory fulfilment of the programme.

In Afghanistan, the majority of the farmers are in need of improved seeds, chemical fertiliser, agricultural chemicals, improved irrigation schemes, agricultural tools and better markets for their surplus produce. Yet, individual farmers find it difficult to market their surplus products and secure desirable prices as the farms are located far away from the market places.

Agricultural cooperatives provide a solution to most of these problems. Through the cooperatives, the farmers can easily establish contact with the interested organisations such as the Agricultural Development Bank, the Afghan Chemical Fertiliser Company and the Afghan Seeds Company, in order to meeting their essential needs.

Already, a large number of farmers in the country have been organised in such cooperatives. Now, the toiling farmers in this country find it easier to seek the necessary assistance and continuously augment the land productivity. They can be better helped in successful implementation of spring and autumn sowing through the technical guidance and facilities provided by their respective cooperatives.

With the impressive arrangements and facilities provided for the farmers and on the basis of the experience gained from the successful implementation of the last year's autumn sowing, it is hoped the campaign of 1360 will also prove a success benefiting the farmers as well as improving the overall agricultural production of the country.

Improved Wheat Seed

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

Over 10,000 tons of improved varieties wheat seeds have been supplied for distribution to Afghan farmers by the Improved Seeds Company to be used in the 1360 autum sowing campaign.

In an interview with our reporter, president of the company Mirdad Panjsheri said that the company sold 5,352 tons of the seeds worth Afs 55,000,000 to the farmers all over the country for the spring sowing during 1360. The company also provided over 10,000 tons of the seeds worth Afs. 121,000,000 for sale to the farmers in the current year, which constitutes a total of 15,352 tons worth Afs 180,000,000.

The campaign begins at different times in different regions of the country, but generally it starts in mid-Sunbula and continues till mid-Jadi.

About 5,000 tons of such seeds for spring sowing and 5,000 tons for the autumn sowing have been imported from the USSR as a grant-in-aid. Import of 10,000 tons of the seeds is envisaged from that country in 1361.

He added that, according to the plan, sowing of

2,300 hectares of lands comprising the extension farms of the company in Kandahar, Marja, Helmand and Ghazni has been envisaged for the autumn sowing. "If we estimate the average yield per hectare two tons, approximately 4,000 tons is expected from the above land in 1361.

Panjsheri said that, realizing that improved seeds are the major factor for growth and development of the agricultural production in the sector, the company as a producer of the improved seeds cooperates in devising development plans in agriculture and coordinating the programmes with the concerned departments. Provision of the seeds from various sources according to its planned allocation and putting them at the disposal of the Afghan Fertiliser Company at the appropriate time according to the protocol are the measures adopted.

He stated that, with the victory of the glorious Saur Revolution, especially its new, evolutionary phase, major changes were introduced in all aspects particularly in the production sectors in the country. One of these is RC Decree 8 and its appendix 1. With the completion of land reforms, over 350,000 landless and deserving families will receive land.

Building of new state farms is another step in development of agriculture in the country and boosting agricultural yields.

'In view of the major changes in different fields and the land reforms in the country, our duties have become more and heavier. For better utilisation of the land by the farmers, provision of appropriate improved seeds, chemical fertilisers, pesticides and insecticides and other chemicals is necessary.

Though fertilisers and agricultural machinery and implements are imported from abroad, the improved seeds should be produced in the country".

Considering the present situation of the farms and the demand for distribution and production of the improved seeds, in addition to development of 6,460 hectares of land in the farms of the company, 3,600 hectares of land is envisaged to be allocated for the new extension farms for improved seeds in the Herat, Balkh and Takhar provinces.

Building of such farms will prevent the unnecessary transport expenses. Rice, puddy, maiz, beans, seeds of vegetables and fruit-bearing seedlings will be supplied in the farms.

In reply to a question, Panjsheri said that, at present, sale and distribution of seeds are carried out by the Afghan Fertiliser Company. "If our programme expands, a marketing and distribution section will be required to function in the framework of the Improved Seeds Company".

Moreover, to meet the demand for storage facilities, the company envisages building of godowns with a capacity of 1,000 to 5,000 tons in Kabul, Kunduz, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Herat and Mazare Sharif.

Since the extension of the improved seeds requires specialised vocational knowhow, the company plans to send a number of its technical and vocational cadres to the friendly countries for training.

The president of the company added that the better-yield specifications of the improved seeds are the results of the persistent activities of research institutions and experts. Necessary measures have to be adopted to supply improved seeds according to international standards.

To achieve this, the company has started work on a draft law for improved seeds with the cooperation of the UN experts. The law has been drafted, and will be enforced after finalization.

By enforcement of the law, the improved seeds will be produced and distributed according to international standards all over the country. With the implementation of the law, further facilities will be provided for the farmers.

"To further assist the farmers with improved seeds and for controlling the quality of the seeds, the company envisages construction of well-equipped laboratories in the capital and provinces", he added.

Expanded Raisin Exports

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with A. W. Saighani, president of the Raisin Export Promotion Institute]

[Text]

Some 37.428 tons of raisin worth $ 53,746,608 have been exported abroad during the last six months of the current year.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, president of the raisin export promotion institute Ahmad Wali Saighani said that a 162 per cent increase has been recorded in the volume of raisin export in the last six months of 1360 compared with the previous year. Raisin has been supplied to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain, India, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Holland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Japan. But the major importers of the Afghan raisin are the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Britain and Ireland.

Saighani said that, from among the three kinds of raisin—red, green and black—the red raisin attracted the most purchasers.

Of the total exported, it accounted for 35.182 tons.

The average price of raisin in the free markets was $1,472 and in the barter region $ 1.390. The raisin is exoprted to the European countries via Hairatan port and via Chaman to India and Pakistan.

In reply to a question, Saighani said that, since the institute is a non-profit organisation, it has no direct role in purchase of raisin. It only control and supervises the export of raisin by the export institutions and individual merchants.

Speaking on prospects of the total income of raisin export from the 1360 produce, he said that, due to the price fluctuations in the international market, the total can not be estimated. But due to increase in the raisin production in the producing countries in the current year and limitations of the international markets, a decrease in the price is envisaged.

According to reports from the grape-producing regions in the country and in view of the favourable weather conditions, the current year's grape production will be satisfactory. It can be estimated at between 110 to 120,000 tons.

GRAPES

To guide the producers and boost raisin production in the major grape-producing areas—the Kabul, Parwan, Balkh, Kandahar and Herat provinces—the institute has established experimental farms and is willing to introduce modern methods to the viniculturists. To achieve this goal, the institute envisages a new system of viniculture with the technical cooperation of the concerned authorites of the Agriculture Development Bank, the Agricultural Cooperatives and the general directorates of agriculture.

Experienced experts in the institute are ready to serve the producers. To assist the viniculturists, the institute cooperates in fixing the minimum price of raisin to prevent the malpractices of the middlemen and creating a direct relation between the exporters, producers and other institutions purchasing the raisin at a set price.

Saighani said that the

institute, according to the provisions of its charter is in direct contact with the viniculturists, providing them information on improving the quality of raisin, changing the drying system and proper picking of the raisin. It has also put at the disposal of the viniculturists a publication, 'Guide on picking and drying of grapes', through the provincial agriculture and cooperatives departments which will considerably contribute in improving the quality of raisin.

The institute also supervises the processing and packing of raisins in the raisin-cleaning factories and has issued necessary instructions to them to help improve their performance. To achieve this goal, samples of raisin are checked by the concerned officials before export so that it should be according to the set standard of the institute.

Otherwise, export certificates are not issued and the raisin will be returned to the processing factory. This procedure has proved very usefu he added.

More Use of Fertilizers, Medicines

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 3 Oct 81 p 3

[Interview with G. S. Akbari, president of the Afghan Fertilizer Company]

[Text]

Distribution of 30384 tons of urea fertiliser, 30651 tons of phosphate and agriculture and veterinary medicines worth Afs 20,000,000 has been envisaged in the current year's autumn sowing campaign.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, the president of the Afghan Fertiliser Company, Ghulam Sakhi Akbari, said that to successfully implement the 1360 H. S. autumn sowing programme, the company has made necessary arrangements. According to the plan, the company will provide different kinds of chemical fertiliser, pesticides, insecticides and medicines for animal diseases through its retail selling outlets and the company's agricultural medicines depots to the country's farmers and livestock owners.

The farmers and livestock breeders can obtain different chemical fertiliser, medicines and improved wheat seeds by cash payment or with the cerdit coupons prepared for the farmers through the Agricultural Development Bank branch offices or from the retail selling outlets.

To provide further facilities for the farmers, in addition to 26 agriculture medicines depots, the number of Afghan Fertiliser Company retail selling outlets have been promoted from 1,040 to 1,100.

In reply to a question Akbari said that although the autumn sowing campaign begins early in Sunbula and continues till late Jaddi, until the end of the sowing campaign in the current year a total of 66,212 tons of urea fertiliser worth Afs 529,-696,000,; 40,142 tons of phosphate fertiliser worth Afs 585,670,800, agricultural veterinary medicines and small agricultural equipment worth Afs 48,-000,000 will be distributed.

He noted that since the biginning of the current

year a total of 45,548 tons of fertiliser worth Afs 374,000,000 and agricultural and veterinary medicines worth Afs 33,570,000 has been sold to the farmers and livestock owners.

The Afghan Fertiliser Company will produce 60,000 tons of phosphate and will put it at the disposal of the farmers, he said. It also envisages production of agricultural and veterinary medicines and small agricultural tools worth Afs 90,000,000. The president added that every year 18 to 20 per cent increase is envisaged in selling of fertiliser and agricultural and veterinary medicines. Necessary measure for storage and distribution of these items are also envisaged.

CSO: 4600/76

LIVESTOCK HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS EXPANDED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13, 14 Oct 81 p 3

[13 Oct 81]

[Text]

Afghanistan is a country of about 15.54 million people dependent mainly on 37-million livestock population and land produce to keep its economy on the move. The population of pastoralists, nomads and semi-nomadic tribes (1.65 million Kuchis and 11.10 million rural people) have, over thousands of years, organised their lives in and around their cattle and livestock flock, so much so that their summer and winter habitats depend on the needs of well-being of their stocks. Clothing in this severe climatic condition is also provided by livestock produce, housing (tents and carpets) and their food too (dairy product and meat) come from the animals they own or from the wild animals they hunt.

VITAL

Agriculture thus plays the maojr role in the country's economy. Eightyfive to 90 per cent of the agricultural production accounts for 50 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and supports almost 13 million people living in the rural areas who are exclusively dependent upon it for their livelihood. About 1/3 of this total agricultural produce comes from livestock. Therefore livestock industry in Afghanistan is of vital importance to the national economy, and it is this special man-and-his-domestic-flock relationship that governs the economic and social wellbeing of the rural and pastoral population.

In modern times livestock also contributes to 30 per cent of Afghanistan's exports with the sheep industry alone providing, by value of national livestock production, 90 per cent. The value of recorded exports, excluding substantial non-recorded exports of live sheep for slaughter and wool, are:

Product	1969-70	1973-74
	(In US$ millions	
Karakul pelts	13.1	16.8
Hides, skins	2.3	5.6
Wool	6.7	5.8
Casings	1.0	1.5
Other skins	0.4	1.4
Carpets, rugs	6.2	14.5
	30.0	45.5

Although the livestock number in the country was drastically reduced in 1970-72 years of drought, in 1975 the Ministry of Planning estimated the livestock population to be:

Sheep—14.9 million
Karakul sheep—6.5 m.
Goat—3.2m
Cattle—3.0m
Buffalo—25,000 heads.
Camel—200,000 heads.
Horses—[illegible] heads.
Donkey—1.5 million.
Mule—[illegible] heads.
Poultry—6.3 million

In 1357 H.S., the GDP for agriculture and forestry was 82 billion Afghanis while for the year 1358 it was estimated at

84.0 billion Afghanis. The value of gross agricultural production was 81,487 million Afghanis in 1357 and in 1358 it was estimated at 83,427 million Afghanis. The target for 1359 was 87,082 million Afghanis.

Out of this the total gross products of livestock with comparative prices were: 22,565 million Afghanis in 1357, 23.414 million Afghanis was the 1358 estimate and the target for 1359 was 23,903 million Afghanis.

The number of cows and buffaloes at the end of 1359 was planned as 3820 (per head). The total sheep prpopulation was planned at 19,500 (per head). These are figures related to the private sector while in the public sector, total sheep population was 8,000 (perhead), milch cattle was 500 heads and cows and buffalo was 2,000 (per head), while that of Karakul sheep was also 8,000 (per head). Gross livestock production planned for 1359 was worth 16.9 million afghanis. For 1359 the planned export was worth 187 million dollars of which 30 per cent or more was animal produce.

Out of the total area of 64.90 million hectares of land in the country, only 5.31 million hectares (8.1 per cent) is suited to cultivation, with about 2 per cent of forest land and meadow. Therefore, there is about 85 per cent of land with vegetation growing on it which remains useless unless livestock graze it.

INSUFFICIENT

While the countryside is tailored to grazing, a survey of actual livestock utility shows that in the northern provinces it is the Karakul sheep breed that provide wool while the Arabi variety is used for meat in the villages. In the west sheep production is sedentary, with a few semi-sedentary production in winter bases near a village. The milk yield is higher for goat. In village communities, cattle receive priority allocation of grazing and supplementary feed. Calf crop is 50 per cent and milk production amounts to 400 kgs per lactation. There are very few commercial poultry units near Kabul, in neighbourhood villages there is also a low scavanger yield, and a great scope of improvement exist in this area.

Although 90 per cent of the population of Afghanistan are dependent on livestock in the first two 5-year development plans (1956-1960 and 1961-1966) the main emphasis was laid in transport and communication and in the third 5-year plan, emphasis was on industry and agriculture. Since 1973 there was an annual investment planning that recognized the urgent need to stimulate livestock production but did not provide any capital fund to support the plans of livestock improvement. The need for properly trained personnel at all levels from university graduates to the producers themselves to ensure the survival and improvement of livestock in the country was not sufficiently felt or overlooked. Centralised administration of livestock and veterinary services impedes their extension to the countryside where it is most needed. Livestock services are allocated only about 3 per cent of the total Government budget.

Today, the main constraints against increased livestock industry development and animal productivity are: (a) virtual absence of animal disease control services, particularly of annual vaccination services arising from a lack of qualified staff; regional centres, transport, vaccines and finance.

(b) Low level of animal nutrition, particularly during winter and early spring. Contributing factors are shortage of irrigated land, distribution of rangeland winterpoints for drinking, declining rangeland area and productivity, unavailability of adequate winter feed supply (hay, straw, feed, grain, crop by-products), lack of knowledge required for increased pasture production.

(c) Poor communication. This results in poor distribution and availability of agricultural production inputs, poor marketing with exaggerated seasonal ups and downs in volume and price, livestock weight losses and mortality between production and consumption areas, lack of information and responses to the market demand.

(d) Social constraints of land tenure, land usage and maintenance resulting in, fragmentation of irrigated land, multiple ownership of productive areas, common use and abuse of state grazing, difficulty in obtaining security for credit from the Agricultural Bank.

Facing such heavy odds and harsh physical and seasonal environment, the Af-

ghan farmers and pastoralists are found to be alert to the needs of their flocks and have evolved a viable and sophisticated, indeginous system of husbandry. They also show willingness to spend flock inputs from limited financial resources and make immense efforts to protect and feed their flocks.

As such, it is apparant, farmer-pastoralist responses to any efforts to improve livestock quality and productivity and increase production and marketing facilities is not a constraint in any livestock proejcts in the country.

[14 Oct 81]

[Text]

It is probably a mutualistic relationship that once co-existed between wild canines and flocks of wild sheep and goats over large areas of the eastern hemisphere that were also inhabited by man. This early man, a berry, nut and snail gatherer who developed a liking for meat by sharing, as wolverines and foxes do, in the canine pack's kill.

Once man's taste for flesh was acquired, he found that he too could kill for meat.

In the beginning perhaps, man's inclination was to kill as many as he could whenever he chanced on a wild flock of sheep or goat. But much meat spoiled this way as not all of the kill could be consumed at one go. So he began following the wild flock. Later he learned to domesticate and stock animals, to be killed when the need for food arose. To stock live animals. it became necessary to breed a domestic flock, look after the herds, feed them adequately during sever climatic changes and prevent them from dying of diseases. That is how animal health sciences must have developed. It was in Egypt that veterinary sciences really found foothold Eventually, from studies on animals rose human health services.

The volume of livestock production was expected to be increased in 1359 by 2.1 per cent that is, to the tune of 25.903 million Afghanis. The total gross agricultural product (with comparative prices) of livestock target for the same year was for 63,179 million Afghanis. Of this, total butchered meat would be of 205,000 tons, milk 850,000 tons, sheep wool target was 23.4 thousand tons and 1,400,000 Karakul pelts. However, reference to these target figures show a relatively slow growth for livestock. The actual achievements for the year are not yet available. However, the number of cattle, at the end of the year was expected to be 3,820 heads of cows and buffaloes, 1,176 heads of cows, the total sheeep population was expected to reach 195.000 heads and the Karakul sheep 4700 heads.

In the public sector the gross livestock production target was worth 16.3 million Afghani, the total sheep (including Karakul population) target aws 16,000 heads, milch cattle 500 heads and meat cattle (cows and buffaloes) 2,000 heads.

In distribution of domestic resources, the investment in the agriculture and irrigation sector including livestock was 28 parts compared to the total allocation of 1.7 billion Afghanis. The expenditure target for last year was to the tune of 326.7 million Afghanis.

SERVICES

At present, the Government services the stock raisers and pastoralists through two institutions: Department of Veterinary Services and Department of Animal Husbandry of the Ministry of Agriculture. Staff

complement of the Veterinary Department is 43 Animal Health and Production officers and about 350 auxiliary workers. The Animal Husbandry Department has only 30 Animal Science graduates and about 138 auxiliary workers. Further, the compartmentalisation and centralisation of the two services may lead to further neglect of the rural stock owners and pastoralists,

What is needed most is extension of veterinary services to the provinces by decentralisation and by strengthening of staff, equipment and supplies at the decentralised units. At present, throughout the country there are only 30 veterinary subclinics. Soviet veterinarians man seven of these clinics, the Food and Agricultural Organisation five and the remaining are manned by nonprofessional staff. There are six veterinary diagnostic laboratories in the areas of livestock concentration operated by Soviet veterinarians. The central veterinary diagnostic laboratory and the vaccine production laboratory are run by the FAO. In all these clinics, subclinics and in the provinces, what is most felt is the need for trained Afghan personnel. Afghan graduate veterinarians are also required to man all the future animal health clinics planned by the Government.

An international experts group meeting has not long ago determined that the number of graduate veterinarians required to serve a livestock enterprise in a developing country is—one veterinarian for every 30,000 livestock units.

At least developed country depending primarily on livestock produce, like Afghanistan needs at least 300 veterinarians based on this ratio. At present, there is just one veterinarian for every 166,000 livestock unit in this country. (There are about 80 veterinarians in the country.) The Ministry of Agriculture estimates the need for veterinarians here by 1983 as 612. This profession also needs to be supported by auxiliary staff, partially trained, with about 10 animal health assistants to one veterinarian.

It is clear that there exists a great lack of veterinary manpower in Afghanistan and this ought to be remedied urgently. There is no doubt that increases in number of well traineed veterinarians and their deployment among pastoralists and rural small farmers would contribute greatly to the GNP of the country, as well as to the social and economical well-being of the broad masses of people who own and exploit the livestock wealth in this country.

Twentyfive years ago, a faculty of veterinary science was set up in the Kabul University in an attempt to meet Afghanistan's special need for animal health services. This was the first university level veterinary institution established in the country as a result of the Food and Agricultural Organisation's recommendations to the Afghan Government in 1956 to train Afghan people as veterinarians.

Classes were conducted in the Agricultural Faculty building by two full-time and nine part-time teachers who taught 60 students. The venture was given up in 1963 due to lack of class-room and laboratory space. Twentyfour of the students were sent abroad to complete their studies and now form the core of veterinary services in the country. The others changed to other faculties.

Ten years later, a committee was appointed, and it felt the need for training manpower to take care of the nation's livestock. It was also decided at that time to develop livestock and sheep marketing. In 1974, an IDA-supported livestock development project started. This included financing a four-year fodder production programme and the development of range and technical services.

In the same year, the Faculty of Veterinary Sciences was restarted. This time housed in the Education Faculty, it had 189 students taught by nine full-time teachers and three part-timers. In May 1975, UNDP/FAO assistance to the faculty became operational. At first the faculty was organised lossely into seven departments. A lot of equipment was brought

in and the various laboratories were being built up. By 1979, UNDP assistance to the tune of US $ 2,664,875 was made available with an addition of 4.6 million dollars last year. Since 1979, a team of international experts led by an FAO officer as project manager has also been assisting in the development of the faculty.

It now has six departments, each with an international expert guiding a national team. These are the animal production, preclinical, paraclinical; preventive medicine, clinical studies and veterinary extension departments. There is also a publication unit producing lecture notes in English and Dari to fecilitate teaching and understanding of lessons for the students. An audo-visual unit too aids studends. A student's library with 3000 books and a staff library with 400 books and 25 journals has come up. Microbiology and parasitology laboratories have been put up.

A teaching Veterinary Clinic has started functioning in Darulaman where flock animals can undergo treatment and surgery. A state farm at Benihissar has been made available to the students for practical training.

The faculty now has a new mobile clinic to reach teachers, students, veterinarians to the rural areas, primarily to serve those who cannot come to the Darulaman clinic.

PROGRAMMES

The best graduates are to be recruited as teachers in the future and will receive M.S. level training abroad. The Government's five-year economic development plan also provides for ensuring adequate animal feedstock and pasture improvement, construction of shelters and complete veterinary measures for the winter season. About 30 animal stables, 30 ponds, 30 deep wells and 30 animal feed storages are also to be built. The veterinary sub-clinics will be expanded, two quarentine stations are to be built that will protect 25 million animals by 1983. Poultry and dairy farms are also planned by the state. One animal diseases clinic was inaugurated only last week.

The Government has provided 25 million Afghanis as complementary funds to meet the faculty's day-to-day expenses and the salaries of the national staff .

The Faculty of veterinary Sciences of the Kabul University is a torchbearer in the field and is not only making a significant contribution to creation of urgently needed qualified manpower, but is also a pioneer to other developing nations.

CSO: 4600/77

AGREEMENT OPENS WAY TO HOUSING CONTRACTS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 42, 19 Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

A memorandum of understanding signed in Algiers last week by Britain's Trade Minister Peter Rees opens the way to detailed negotiations between British contractors and the Algerian authorities for 20,000 housing units worth some £ 200 million sterling (about $360 million). The memorandum sets out the British government's understanding with the Algerian Ministry of Housing and contains an annex stating that the Algerian government is seeking negotiated contracts for the housing units and their associated infrastructure. The memorandum was considered to be necessary because the Algerians were reluctant to deal with private firms from Britain without some form of official cover.

The figure of 20,000 units is geared to the capacity of British construction firms to supply Algeria with houses under the terms of Algeria's 1980-84 plan. Similar agreements are expected with other European governments shortly, with Belgium expected to be the next EEC country to follow in Britain's footsteps. The Algerian plan calls for construction of a total of 450,000 new housing units.

Negotiations for final contracts are expected to be tough, with Algeria laying down stringent conditions on prices, credits and delivery dates. Algeria is understood to be seeking block contracts rather than have companies tender on individual housing projects. The British companies at present involved in talks with the Algerian authorities are Cementation, McAlpine, Paulings, Wimpey and consultants W S Atkins.

CSO: 4500/28

CAIRO PAPER DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY

NC280840 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 28 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] In an article entitled "The Autonomy That We Want," the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH reports today that Egypt and Israel have agreed to resume the talks on Palestinian autonomy, with U.S. participation, on 4 November. AL-JUMHURIYAH explains that this agreement signifies that all parties insist on continuing the peace process so that it will fulfill its final objectives.

As Menahem Begin stated, the coming tripartite meeting will focus its attention on the method for holding the elections in the West Bank and Gaza to form an autonomous council. If this goal is attained, it will represent a real change in the situation.

The paper emphasizes that we agree with Begin on the importance of this step. In order that this step can succeed, it is imperative for the Israeli side to show a large measure of understanding and cooperation. AL-JUMHURIYAH asserts that we expect the Israeli side to show a real understanding of the nature of the Palestinian autonomous government as called for in the Camp David accords. The paper notes that the agreement, which the whole world has endorsed and supported, stipulates that authority be transferred from the Israeli military government to the elected Palestinian autonomous government council. It adds that the transfer of authority signifies the transfer of all the powers and jurisdictions formerly enjoyed by the military governor to the elected council, including the legislative, executive and judicial jurisdictions. In the absence of such a sound understanding of the Palestinian autonomy issue, a real change will not occur in the situation--a change about which Menahem Begin is talking.

In concluding its article, the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH affirms that the solution of the Palestine question is the quintessence of the Middle East problem. It adds that in the absence of a real autonomous government for the Palestinians, peace is a remote target.

CSO: 4504/49

'AL-AKHBAR' DISCUSSES PEACE FORCE FOR CHAD

NC280926 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 28 Oct 81

[From the press review]

[Text] The newspaper AL-AKHBAR today comments on the achievement of peace in Chad. It says: The achievement of peace and security in Chad is a matter in which we are very interested for several reasons. First, Chad has a long common border with Sudan and the source of the Nile extends to its well-known lake. Second, Chad is an Islamic state connected to us by ideological and racial ties. Third, Chad belongs to the group of African states that won their independence in the wake of World War II. Therefore, it is imperative that we be concerned about Chad and that we help it protect its independence.

It is imperative that we help Chad so that we can stand by its side to enable it to build itself and to become a base of security and peace, together with the group of African states around it.

The newspaper AL-AKHBAR says: This is the source of Egypt's interest in Chad's affairs and events there. However, in taking this interest we harbor neither designs nor ambitions. This same source spurs the interest taken in Chad by the OAU states and the efforts they are exerting to ensure Chad's independence and the independence of all the African states that face the very dangers posed to Chad.

The OAU states in Chad's area have held several meetings aimed at helping Chad and protecting its independence. It has been natural for Egypt to participate in these meetings and to emphasize its readiness to participate in any action taken to keep peace in Chad.

The paper notes France's official announcement that it has decided to extend its support to the Chadian transitional government. The paper also points to the proposal calling for sending an African peacekeeping force to Chad. It elucidates that the OAU made this proposal and demands that a peacekeeping force be formed for Chad.

AL-AKHBAR adds: It seems that the OAU proposal is now on its way to implementation with serious steps. News agencies have reported that the Nigerian Government has been officially requested to provide Nigerian forces that would play

their role in any force which the OAU might form to keep peace in Chad. A Nigerian spokesman has also announced that four other African states, including Senegal, have received requests in this respect. Furthermore, news agencies have reported from Cairo that Egypt is ready to send forces for this task.

Thus, some six African states have responded to the OAU proposal, guaranteeing its successful implementation. This particularly holds true if we add France to this group in Paris' capacity as extending help within the framework of the African proposal, as a French Foreign Ministry spokesman has stated.

In conclusion, AL-AKHBAR affirms that it is the natural right of any state to ask that it be able to enjoy its independence which it won following a protracted struggle and that it be able to be its own master as far as its domestic affairs are concerned. It is the duty of all free and peace-loving states to help this state achieve this right. This is particularly the duty of the African states connected to such a state with ties of neighborliness, race and common interests. Even more, this is the duty of the United Nations and the very core of its mission. This duty should be discharged to make it possible to eliminate the hotbeds of trouble and to achieve security and peace throughout the world.

CSO: 4504/49

SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY LEADER INTERVIEWED

JN251539 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Interview with Ibrahim Shukri, Egyptian Socialist Labor Party leader, by AL-MUSTAQBAL correspondent Sulayman Nimr, in Cairo--date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] How did you voice your support for nominating Husni Mubarak as president of the republic at the time when he announced that he would continue to pursue President al-Sadat's policy which you opposed.

[Answer] The circumstances and implications which accompanied the assassination of al-Sadat could have caused disturbances and chaos in Egypt with unpredictable results. That is why we in the Socialist Labor Party felt that all the sons of this homeland, irrespective of their political views, had to stick together in order to establish stability as soon as possible. This was our main motive in supporting the nomination of Husni Mubarak. Furthermore, we are confident that President Husni Mubarak will be prepared to tackle the mistakes committed by the previous regime and will study thoroughly the criticism which was leveled against the previous regime by the opposition and the majority of the people. Our support for Husni Mubarak's nomination does not mean that we are giving up our views on al-Sadat's policy.

[Question] But President Mubarak asserted that he would continue to pursue the same policy of President al-Sadat?

[Answer] We understand why he announced that he would pursue President al-Sadat's line. He meant that he would work to attain the same pan-Arab objectives for Egypt, but not necessarily by means of the former president's method. We are certain that President Husni Mubarak's policy will bring about something new. There should be an inevitable change due to the nature of the new developments and because the personality of the new president is different from that of the former one. Since I knew what went on during al-Sadat's era, I can say that President al-Sadat had the first and last word in his decisions.

[Question] Does this mean that you will continue to support President Mubarak and that you will give up your role as an opposition party?

[Answer] Our support for the nomination of President Mubarak does not mean that we will not oppose any of his views or decisions that our party might disapprove

of. We will continue to record our criticism and remarks against any conditions or decisions which we believe are against the interest of the public and do not serve the pan-Arab objectives.

[Question] Do you believe that the Egyptian-Arab relations will be restored in the near future following the departure of President al-Sddat?

[Answer] We must admit that the person who is currently in charge of the Egyptian policy is not al-Sadat. Despite President Mubarak's declaration that he will pursue the broad lines of al-Sadat's policy, he still has a big chance to restore the Arab-Egyptian relations to their normal condition. We believe that one of the gravest results of the Camp David agreements was the division of Arab rank and the creation of a wide gap between Egypt and its Arab sisters. I believe that the situation will be different in the near future. The new circumstances make it feasible now to look for alternative solutions other than those contained in the Camp David agreements with regard to the autonomy issue. We also believe that there were ideas and initiatives concerning the Palestinian people's rights much better than those contained in the Camp David [agreements]. Here I refer to Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz's peace plan which we fully support. There was also the Soviet proposal for holding a conference in which all the parties concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinians, would participate. Such ideas are much better than the formulas contained in the Camp David agreements. It is expected that the new president, Husni Mubarak, will move within the context of these ideas to obtain better results concerning the Palestinian people's rights.

CSO: 4504/49

'AFP' ON NEW EGYPTIAN CIVIL SERVICE WORK CODE

NC261202 Paris AFP in English 1153 GMT 26 Oct 81

[Report by Ahmed Loutfi]

[Text] Cairo, 26 Oct (AFP)--Tens of thousands of Egyptian civil servants have been warned "no more slacking in the office" in a brand new official work code.

The French-language daily LE JOURNAL D'EGYPTE which published the full text of the new draconian code shocked many bureaucrats by noting that: "40 cases of negligence can mean dismissal."

The "negligence" is mainly sleeping on the job, a favourite bureaucratic pastime.

The new code lays down that: "Sleeping in the office will be punishable by the deduction of one half-day's pay, and if it happens three times, the deduction of two days' pay."

Up to now the civil servant could more or less consider that he was unsackable. In fact dismissal was a very rare administrative measure, and usually only for outstanding incompetence or misbehaviour.

But times have changed and the government has decided to clean up what many members of the public considered "a paradise for bureaucrats and a hell for the ordinary man-in-the-street."

The usual advice which greeted a visitor to a ministry was the refrain "Come back tomorrow."

Not only can lazy officials no longer go to sleep in the office, but they are also barred from using the telephone for their own private calls.

If they do so they are given two warnings, and if caught a third time they will be fined two days' salary.

This is a particularly biting deprivation when one considers that many Egyptians have no telephones at home, owing to a lack of available lines, and wait until they reach the office to make their calls.

The use of the office car for private reasons is also banned--another blow at the civil servant's privileged lifestyle--on pain of dismissal.

The new code, issued by the Central Agency for Organisation and Administration, seems to have been drawn up by a strict disciplinarian, as nothing is left to chance.

Even going to the office and leaving must be done through recognised entrances and exits.

Another blow is delivered to the custom of receiving private visitors in office hours which can now be punished by a fine equal to four days' pay for a consistent offender.

If this is implemented, then a whole epoch of Oriental courtesy and tradition will be broken.

Very harsh punishment is levelled at an official who refuses to carry out a set task, or refuses to work overtime to complete it--he faces a loss of 30 days' pay, and even demotion and dismissal.

It's a dog's life--even for the once hallowed scribe.

CSO: 4500/27

BASIC EDUCATION LAW PROMULGATED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette] in Arabic No 34, 20 Aug 81 pp 2147-2164

[Law Number 139 for 1981 Promulgating the Education Law]

[Text] In the name of the people:
The president of the republic:
The People's Assembly has decreed the law whose text follows, and we have promulgated it.

Article One: The provisions of the accompanying Education Law are to be put into operation.

Article Two: The minister of education is to issue the decrees that are necessary to implement this law, while taking into consideration the requirements of developing and modernizing education. Upon the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education may issue temporary orders as these are called for by the system of education, the syllabi, the curricula or the examination procedures. He may issue other orders that are necessary during the period of transition which he determines in a decree he issues.

Article Three: The following laws are hereby repealed:

--Law No 68 for 1968 Regarding Public Education.

--Law No 16 for 1969 Regarding Private Education.

--Law No 75 for 1970 Regarding Technical Education.

Every provision that violates the provisions of the accompanying law is hereby repealed.

Article Four: This law is to be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [The Official Gazette], and it is to be put into effect the day following its publication.

The seal of the state is to be affixed to this law and it is to be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the presidency on 9 Shawwal 1401 (9 August 1981).

Husni Mubarak

The Education Law

Chapter One: Objectives and General Provisions of Education

Article One: The purpose of pre-university education is to mold the emotional, national, intellectual, social, physical, ethical and athletic aspects of a student's cultural, scientific and national character progressively for the purpose of cultivating an Egyptian who believes in God, in his homeland and in the values of good, truth and humanity. The purpose of pre-university education is also to provide that student with an appropriate measure of values and theoretical and practical instruction and fundamentals that would establish his humanity, his dignity and his ability for self-actualization, for making an effective contribution to the operations and activities of production and services or for pursuing higher education for the purpose of developing society and realizing its prosperity and its progress.

Article Two: A Supreme Board of Pre-University Education is to be established and it is to be chaired by the minister of education. This board undertakes the planning activities for this education and devises the plans and programs for it. The board is to include representatives of the sectors of education, the universities, al-Azhar, culture, planning, finance, production, services, manpower and others who are interested in the affairs of education. On the basis of a proposal from the minister of education the president of the republic issues a decree forming this board and defining its areas of jurisdiction.

Upon the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education is to form categorical boards that grow out of that board and have jurisdiction over a stage or a category of pre-university education. Local boards of education and categorical committees that grow out of these local boards are also to be formed. These local boards and their categorical committees are formed by a decree issued by the authorized governor upon the approval of the minister of education.

Article Three: All citizens are entitled to free pre-university education in state schools. Students may not be asked to pay fees for the educational services that are offered to them.

Fees may be collected for additional services rendered to students, for their use of equipment and tools or for use of an educational [service] that precedes basic compulsory education. The minister of education issues a decree setting those fees and the conditions for them.

Article Four: The term of study in pre-university education is as follows:

Nine years for basic compulsory education.

Three years for secondary education (general and technical).

Five years for advanced technical education and for teachers' colleges.

Article Five: After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education issues a decree determining the duration of the academic year, the number of weekly classes in every stage and class, the curriculum, the distribution of lessons to the classes, the determination of courses, the number of students established for each class, the rules of evaluation, examinations, maximum and minimum grades for examination subjects, and the examination dates for the public certificates.

After consulting with the governors and getting the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, the minister of education may add a few courses of study to the curriculum in accordance with the requirements of developing education or in accordance with the needs of local environments.

Article Six: Religious education is a basic subject in all the stages of education. A minimum grade of 50 percent is required to pass religion, but the grade earned in religion is not computed in computing the over-all average.

The Ministry of Education is to organize periodic competitions for those who memorize the Holy Koran, and it is to grant students who excel prizes and incentives in accordance with the rules set by the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Seven: A decree from the authorized governor sets the beginning and ending dates for school in the governorate and the dates for holidays which are required by local conditions. This is to be carried out without violating the provisions of Article Five of this law.

A governor may increase the maximum number of students per class in the various stages of the governorate's schools, if that becomes necessary, provided that the increase does not exceed 10 percent of the number set for the class.

The number of students per class in practical subjects, in drafting and in typing in technical education schools may not exceed 20 students.

Article Eight: After consulting with the authorized governor the minister of education may decide to establish kindergartens that would be affiliated with or attached to government schools. He is to determine their specifications with regard to location, building, capacity, facilities, equipment and sanitary specifications. He is also to determine the rules of instruction, curricula, syllabi, conditions for admission, the supervisory and educational staff and the fees that may be collected in return for enrollment in those institutions.

Article Nine: After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education may decide to establish experimental schools and set the conditions and rules of admission in those schools as well as the rules of study and examination. These schools are to be utilized for putting new educational experiments into practice in preparation for their use in all schools.

The minister may also establish schools to educate and care for gifted students so as to develop and polish their talents. He may also establish special schools to teach and look after the handicapped in a manner that is commensurate with their abilities and their inclinations. The decree establishing such schools is to include the conditions for admission, the study plans, the examination systems and other matters.

Article Ten: The minister of education sets the conditions and criteria for admission in every stage of education, provided that admission in the basic stage of education be based on the age [of the student] on the 1st of October of an academic year. Admission in the secondary stage is based on weighing the applicants on the basis of the two factors of age and the over-all average of grades throughout the governorate.

Article Eleven: Taking into consideration the provisions of the Local Autonomy Law, the central agencies of pre-university education are to undertake the task of devising the general policies of education and the functions of planning, evaluation and general follow-up. The governorates are to undertake the [actual] process of implementing education and follow-up functions locally. They are also to establish, equip and manage the schools that come under their jurisdictions, in accordance with the requirements of the national plan of education and within the set limits of the budget.

A governorate may benefit from citizens' spontaneous efforts to implement the local education plan in accordance with an order issued by the authorized governor after the approval of the minister of education. This order may include the establishment of a local fund to finance spontaneous educational efforts.

Article Twelve: A parent-teacher council is to be formed in every school and in every governorate. Councils for students' associations may [also] be formed. The method of forming these councils and [an outline of] their jurisdictions are to be set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Thirteen: After consulting with the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education is to issue a decree setting the qualifications standards for the faculty, the supervisors and the technical guidance counselors in the various stages of pre-university education.

The minister's decision also determines the methods of evaluating their work and the incentives that are to be granted to them as is appropriate to the nature of every stage of education.

Article Fourteen: Pursuant to the special provisions of this law, the minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, sets the conditions of medical suitability that are necessary for admission in the various stages of education; for the examination procedures in the various stages; the rules of passing; how many times a student can fail and repeat a course; incentives for students; student disciplinary procedures; conditions for canceling an examination or denying students examinations; and re-enrollment rules. This system is to include a mandatory fine of 10 pounds for re-enrolling a student who had been suspended.

Chapter Two

The Stage of Basic Education

Article Fifteen: Basic education is a right for all Egyptian children who reach the age of 6. The state is obliged to provide them with this education, and parents or guardians are to carry this out for a period of 9 academic years. Governors, each within his jurisdiction, are to issue the necessary decrees to regulate and implement mandatory education throughout the governorate as far as parents and guardians are concerned. Governors are also to issue the decrees that are necessary to distribute children to basic education schools in the governorate. In case of vacancies, a child who is 6 months younger than the required age for beginning mandatory education may be admitted to school provided that the set number of students per class is not disrupted.

Article Sixteen: The purpose of basic education is to develop students' capabilities and inclinations, to satisfy their preferences and to provide them with the necessary measure of values, conduct, knowledge and practical and professional skills that are congruent with the conditions of the various environments. Thus those who complete basic education can resume their education at a higher stage or go out into the work world after intense vocational training. The purpose of that is to cultivate the individual so he can become a productive citizen in his environment and in his society.

Article Seventeen: Instruction in basic education is to be organized so as to achieve the following objectives:

--Emphasize religious, national, ethical and athletic education during the various years of study.

--Emphasize the relationship between education and productive work.

--Strengthen the link with the environment on the basis of diversifying practical and professional fields in accordance with the conditions of local environments and the requirements for developing these environments.

--Integrate theoretical and practical aspects in curricula, syllabi and in courses.

--Tie education with the lives of young people and with the reality of the environment in which they live in a manner that would affirm the relationship between education and the practical aspects [of life], provided that the environment and the modes of social and economic activity in that environment are principal sources for knowledge, inquiry and activity in the various subjects of study.

Article Eighteen: A two-part examination is to be given throughout the governorate at the end of the stage of basic education. Students who pass that examination are to be awarded "A Certificate of Completing the Courses of Study in Basic Education." The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree [outlining] the procedure for this examination. Those who complete the mandatory period of basic education and do not take the examination or fail to pass it are granted confirmation from the Department of Education that they completed the mandatory period.

The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree [regulating] transfer examinations, their procedures, the rules of passing and the times one can fail or repeat an examination.

Article Nineteen: If a child does not report to school on schedule or if he misses school without an acceptable excuse for 10 consecutive or non-consecutive days, the princial of the school is to notify his parent or guardian in writing, as the case may be, and said notice is to be signed by the child's parent or guardian. If the child's parent or guardian is not available or if he refuses to accept the written notice, said notice is to be given to the mayor, the police station, police center or police precinct for delivery to the child's parent or guardian. If the child does not come to school within a week of his parent receiving receiving the written notice or if he is absent from school again without an acceptable excuse, his parent or guardian will be considered in violation of the provisions of this law, and the penalties stipulated in Article 21 of this law will be enforced.

Article Twenty: The principals of basic education schools and persons from the supervisory and technical guidance staff in educational precincts who are appointed by the authorized governor have the capacity to act as court officers in enforcing the mandatory education order.

Article Twenty-One: A child's parent or guardian is subject to a fine of 10 pounds, if the child is absent from school or stops attending school without an acceptable excuse, within 1 week of receiving the written notice stipulated in Article Nineteen of this law.

The parent or guardian is subject to repeated fines or repeated violations if the child's absence from school continues or if the child is absent again without an acceptable excuse after his parent or guardian is notified.

Chapter Three

The Stage of Secondary Education

Section One: General Provisions

Article Twenty-Two: The purpose of the stage of secondary education is to prepare students for life and to prepare them as well for higher and university education or for participation in public life. At the same time secondary education stresses the consolidation of religious, ethical and national values.

Article Twenty-Three: The duration of study in the stage of secondary education is 3 academic years. A student who is admitted to the first year of secondary education must have a certificate that he completed his basic education, and he must not be over 18 years old by the 1st of October of the academic year. The minister of education issues the decrees that regulate the cases wherein the age [factor] may be overlooked.

Article Twenty-Four: A student may repeat a class once provided that he does not repeat a class more than twice during the entire stage. Anyone who is suspended from school because he has exhausted the number of failures allowed to him, may apply for the examination of the class he attained, according to the rules which are issued by decree of the minister of education. The student is to pay an examination fee of 5 pounds. If he passes the examination, he is re-registered in the following class after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds.

Article Twenty-Five: A student may be suspended from school if he is absent for more than 15 consecutive days or more than 30 non-consecutive days without a reason that the school's administrative committee can accept. Absence at any time during the school day is considered absence for a whole day.

A student who was suspended in accordance with the provision of the previous paragraph may register again after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds if the school's administrative committee makes such a decision. A student may not re-register more than once in the same academic year and more than twice in the entire stage.

A student must have at least an 85 percent attendance record in order to be admitted to the examination.

Section Two: General Secondary Education

Article Twenty-Six: The course of study in the first year of secondary education is general for all students. In the second and third years students choose their specialties in accordance with the divisions and branches that [are outlined] in a decree issued by the minister of education after consulting with the Supreme Board of Universities.

Article Twenty-Seven: The subjects of study, the syllabi, the courses and the examinations in general secondary education are regulated by decrees issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education. The subjects of study are to include basic subjects for all students and elective subjects the student chooses in accordance with his inclinations and capabilities.

Article Twenty-Eight: A one-time general examination is to be given at the end of the third year of general secondary education. Those who pass that examination are to be granted "a Certificate of Completion of General Secondary Education."

All those who complete the required courses in all the three years of secondary education in a government or a private school supervised by the state may apply for this examination.

Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds. Regulations for this examination, application conditions and maximum and minimum grades for the subjects are [outlined] in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Twenty-Nine: A student may not apply for the examination for completing general secondary education more than three times. The minister of education, in accordance with rules he lays down in this regard, may allow a student to take the examination a fourth time provided that the student pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Section Three: Technical Secondary Education

Article Thirty: The purpose of technical secondary education is to cultivate a class of technicians in industry, agriculture, commerce, administration and services and to develop the technical aptitudes of students.

Students are admitted to the various branches of technical secondary education after acquiring a certificate of completing the stage of basic education in accordance with the conditions and the rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Thirty-One: The specifications of technical schools, their operating plans and their responsibilities are determined by decrees issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education. A farm is to be attached to each agricultural school, and the area of this farm is to be commensurate with the number of students and the kind of study and [number of] departments in that school.

Article Thirty-Two: Each technical school is to have a board of directors in which the concerned sectors of production and services are to be represented. This board assists the principal of the school or its director in managing the school. The authorized governor issues a decree outlining the makeup of this board and determining its jurisdictions.

Article Thirty-Three: The departments of study in the categories of technical secondary education are to be determined in accordance with the requirements of development plans and local conditions.

After the approval of the Supreme Board of Education the minister of education issues decrees [outlining] the subjects of study that are to be included in every group in every one of the categories of technical secondary education and its branches. [The decree also outlines] the method of distributing the subjects of study, the number of lessons allocated to the subjects in the various classes, the necessary courses and textbooks and the evaluation and examination procedures.

Article Thirty-Four: Secondary schools for technical education may undertake production projects that are related to their specialty. These projects are to be financed, managed and audited in accordance with rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education. Authorized local units and production sectors may take advantage of the capabilities of these schools in raising the professional standard of technicians, craftsmen and workers within the environs of the governorate.

Article Thirty-Five: Technical workers in the various sectors of production and services who are not enrolled in a school may apply for the examinations of technical secondary schools. The conditions for applying for said examination and the rules therefor [are to be set] in a decree issued by the minister of education, without violating the provision of Article Thirty of this law.

Article Thirty-Six: A general examination is to be given at the end of the third year of technical secondary education. The examination is to be given in two rounds, and those who pass it are to receive a technical secondary school diploma, according to the 3-year system, defining their area of specialization.

Anyone who has completed the required courses of study in the three years at a government school or at a private school supervised by the state may apply for this examination. Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds.

The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree regulating this examination, the conditions of applying for it and the maximum and minimum grades for the courses of study.

Students may not apply more than three times for the diploma examination. The minister of education, in accordance with rules he sets in this regard, may permit a student to take the examination a fourth time provided that the student in this case pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Article Thirty-Seven: Students taking transfer and general examinations are required to have a minimum attendance record of 75 percent of the over-all lessons that are assigned for vocational training, regardless of the reasons for the absences.

Section Four

Technical Education: the 5-Year System

Article Thirty-Eight: The purpose of technical schools is to prepare individuals for the categories of "chief technician" and "trainer" in the areas of industry, agriculture, trade, administration and services.

Students who have a certificate that they completed basic education in accordance with the conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education are eligible for admission to these schools. The minister of education may set the rules for boarding students in some or all of these schools as well as the fees for room and board in those schools and the rules for exemption from those fees.

Article Thirty-Nine: The departments of technical education, the 5-year system, are set nationwide in accordance with the requirements of development plans. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues decrees defining these departments, the courses of study in each of them, the method of their distribution, the number of lessons designated for them as well as the courses, the necessary textbooks and the evaluation and examination procedures.

Article Forty: Each technical school is to have a board of directors in which the concerned sectors of production and services are to be represented. This board assists the principal or director of the school in managing the school. The minister of education issues a decree forming this board and defining its jurisdictions.

Article Forty-One: Technical schools may undertake production projects that are related to their area of specialization. These projects are financed, managed and audited in accordance with rules set in a decree issued by the minister of education. Authorized local units and production sectors may also take advantage of the capabilities of these schools to raise the professional standards of technicians, craftsmen and workers within the environs of the governorate.

Article Forty-Two: Two rounds of a general examination are given at the end of the fifth year. Students who pass that examination receive an advanced technical studies diploma, the 5-year system, defining the student's area of specialization.

Anyone who completes the required courses of study in the 5 years at a government school or at a private school supervised by the state may apply for the examination. Everyone who applies for this examination is to pay a fee of 2 pounds. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education, issues a decree regulating this examination, the application conditions for that examination, and the maximum and minimum grades for the courses of study.

Students may not apply for the diploma examination more than three times.

The minister of education, in accordance with rules he sets in this regard, may allow a student to take this examination a fourth time provided that the student pay a fee of 50 pounds.

Article Forty-Three: Graduates in the "technician" category and those who have a certificate that they completed general secondary education may complete their education to the level of "chief technician" in accordance with conditions and regulations set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Forty-Four: The provision of Article Twenty-Five of this law regarding absence from school and the provision of Article Thirty-Seven regarding percentage of attendance are to be applied in the case of technical schools, the 5-year system.

Article Forty-Five: A student may repeat a year of study once but not more than three times during the entire period of this stage of education. Anyone who is suspended from school because he has exhausted the times he is allowed to fail an examination may apply once for the examination of the class he had attained, without being enrolled in the school, provided that he pay an examination fee of 5 pounds. If he passes the examination he is registered again in the following class after paying a re-registration fee of 10 pounds.

Article Forty-Six: The faculty and the administrative staff in technical schools, the 5-year system must meet a high standard of qualification and competence in accordance with the rules and conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education. This decree may include provisions for granting incentives to the school's administrative staff and faculty.

Chapter Five

Teachers' Colleges

Article Forty-Seven: Until an adequate number of highly qualified teachers is available to the Ministry of Education to teach in the basic education stage, teachers' colleges are to prepare teachers to teach in the first years of basic education and to provide them with the scientific and professional knowledge as well as the necessary expertise and skills. At the same time these colleges are to be considered centers for educational studies and experimentation in the field of basic education. Such studies and experiments are to be carried out with the cooperation of the colleges of education in the governorate. Teachers' colleges are also one of the ways that lead students to the colleges of education. Graduates of these schools may enroll in the colleges of education in accordance with the rules that are set by the Universities' Law and its executive ordinance.

Article Forty-Eight: The duration of study in these schools is 5 academic years. Those who have a certificate that they completed basic education may be admitted to these schools in accordance with the conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education, who may set the rules for

boarding students in some or in all of these schools as well as the rules for exemption from room and board fees.

Article Forty-Nine: Specialized branches may be established in these schools to prepare specific kinds of teachers. The minister of education, after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education issues a decree regulating the plans and the courses of study, the rules for transfer examinations, the teachers' diploma examination and the maximum and minimum grades for subjects.

A two-round general examination is given at the end of the fifth year. Those who pass the examination receive a teachers' diploma defining their area of specialization.

Article Fifty: A school for the first classes in basic education is to be attached to each teachers' college. That school is to provide practical training for the students at the college.

Article Fifty-One: The faculty in teachers' colleges must be highly qualified in accordance with the rules and conditions set in a decree issued by the minister of education. That decree may include provisions for granting incentives to the faculty.

Article Fifty-Two: A board is to be formed in each governorate to oversee teachers' colleges, to plan an admissions policy, to set the numbers of students that will be admitted and to determine the means by which these colleges can be tied organically to the colleges of education in the governorate. The authorized governor, after the approval of the minister of education, issues a decree forming this board and determining its jurisdictions and its powers.

Article Fifty-Three: The minister of education may decide to set up studies in teachers' colleges to complete the scientific and educational training of teachers and principals of the first grades of basic education or for other purposes of preparation and training in the field of instruction at this stage.

Chapter Six

Private Education with Fees

Article Fifty-Four: Every non-government establishment that is founded principally or secondarily for the purposes of providing pre-university education or vocational and technical preparation is considered a private school. [The following] are not considered private schools:

1. Kindergartens that are under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Affairs.

2. Schools that are established by foreign agencies where education is restricted to non-Egyptians who are the children of those employed in the foreign diplomatic and consular corps and of other foreigners.

3. Cultural centers or institutes that are established by a foreign country or an international agency on the basis of a bilateral cultural agreement with the Arab Republic of Egypt that stipulates special treatment for these centers or institutes.

Article Fifty-Five: Private schools are established to achieve some or all of the following objectives:

--To assist in the area of basic or secondary education (general or technical) in accordance with the plans and courses that are set in comparable government schools.

--To expand in the instruction of foreign languages in addition to the established official courses.

--To offer special courses of instruction in accordance with what is determined by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Fifty-Six: Private schools are subject to supervision by the Ministry of Education and the departments of education in the governorates. They are also subject to the employment and insurance laws about which there are no special stipulations in this law.

Article Fifty-Seven: A private school may not be established or expanded nor may supplementary lessons be set up in it unless a permit to do so is first obtained from the authorized department of education. As far as general secondary education schools are concerned, permits to establish or expand those are issued by the minister of education in the context of the national education policy.

The location, building, facilities and furnishings of the school are to be suitable to the requirements of its educational mission in accordance with the conditions and specifications set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Fifty-Eight: The owner of a private school must meet the following conditions:

--He must be a legal person and a citizen of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

--He must be able to meet the financial obligations of the school and the other conditions that are set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

Schools that are in existence at the time this law is enacted and that are not owned by legal persons are considered authorized to operate [as private schools] for the duration of their owners' lives.

Article Fifty-Nine: An application to establish a private school is to be filed on the special form prepared for that purpose by the departments

of education. The application is to be filed with the department of education in the authorized governorate at least 4 months before school is to begin. The department of education is to look into the application in the light of general educational plans and the needs of the governorate. The department is then to notify the applicant within 30 days of the date the application was filed that his application has been accepted or rejected in principle and the reasons therefor. An application is considered accepted in principle if this period goes by without a reply from the department.

Article Sixty: Taking into consideration the provisions of Article Fifty-Seven of this law, private schools are not to begin their operations before the authorized department of education notifies the applicant that his application has received final approval. After his application is approved in principle, the applicant has to provide the department of education within 15 days of such notice with detailed information about the school that he wishes to establish so that the department can form a technical committee to make the necessary on-site examination. The authorized department of education has to notify the applicant about the suitability of the location, the building, the facilities, the furnishings, the employees' data and other conditions and specifications. Such notice is to be provided within a maximum period of 2 months of the date the applicant provided the department with the detailed data or of the date he completed the shortcomings [of the school] in preparation for another on-site examination within an agreed upon period.

Article Sixty-One: After a school is licensed, none of the following actions may be undertaken except after an approval for such action is secured from the agency that issued the license.

--Changing the data on whose bases the license was issued.

--Changing the rules of the school or its curricula or following other rules in admitting students or in setting due fees.

--Changing the organization of the school from one stage to another or adding new stages to the school.

--Suspending operations at the school or refusing to perform the school's mission.

--Changing the location or transferring ownership of the school.

If violation of any of these obligations by the school is established, the authorized department of education may decide to place the school under financial and administrative supervision. In this case the department of education manages the school until the violation is made to cease.

Article Sixty-Two: Considering the provisions of the education, employment and insurance laws, each school is to draw up its operating bylaws and to determine the tuition fees that are collected from students in each stage separately. The authorized governor issues a decree approving these

bylaws, without violating the provision of Article Sixty-Four of this law.

Article Sixty-Three: Each school is to have its own budget that is to include revenues and expenditures. A school's revenues are to be deposited in a special account in one of the banks or post offices in accordance with the rules and regulations set in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

Article Sixty-Four: Students' tuition fees, school activity fees, cost of textbooks, school bus service and room and board fees are set in a decree issued by the authorized governor in the light of the school's proposed budget and the general rules which are set in a decree issued by the minister of education.

A governor may re-evaluate the tuition fees that students have to pay and that were approved at the time this law was issued in light of the general rules that are set by the minister in this regard.

Article Sixty-Five: The procedure for instruction and examinations in private schools is to be identical to that which is in effect in comparable government schools.

Article Sixty-Six: The authorized departments of education are to oversee all aspects of private schools, just as they oversee government's schools. They are also to oversee admissions and transfer examinations in those schools, approve their results, audit their books and investigate their administration.

Article Sixty-Seven: Each private school is to have a qualified full-time principal and qualified full-time faculty according to the quota determined for comparable government schools. When necessary the authorized department of education may authorize the private school to hire part-time teachers provided that the number of lessons [they teach] in this case not exceed 25 percent of the total number of lessons for a single subject matter or a single class. The minister of education, after consulting with the minister of manpower, is to issue a decree regulating the work relationship between private school employees and the owner of the school.

Article Sixty-Eight: Private schools may hire government school teachers on a loan basis. Conditions and duration of the loan are determined by a decree issued by the minister of education.

Article Sixty-Nine: Free (subsidized) private schools, which were established in accordance with previous laws, are to continue their mission. The necessary capabilities are to be provided for these schools in accordance with the standards set in a decree issued by the minister of education after the approval of the Supreme Board of Education.

8592
CSO: 4504/79

BRIEFS

ELECTRICITY MINISTER TO BONN—Cairo, 25 Oct (MENA)—Engineer Mahir Abazah, minister of electricity and energy, left here before noon today for Bonn with a joint delegation from his ministry and the Foreign Ministry on a six-day visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. The delegation will be signing in Bonn an agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear power in generating electricity between Egypt and the FRG. The Egyptian minister is to head to London after his Bonn visit on November First for a three-day visit during which he will sign a similar agreement for nuclear cooperation between Egypt and the UK. [Text] [NC251022 Cairo MENA in English 1005 GMT 25 Oct 81]

CSO: 4500/27

INTERNAL FOES OF KHOMEYNI DEEMED STRONGER THAN BELIEVED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 231, 5-11 Oct 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Antoine Matta: "The Alternative to Khomeyni: the Army or Tudeh? The Parties to the International Struggle Inside the Country Are Stronger Than the Opposition Abroad"]

[Text] Is the Iranian opposition abroad actually capable of overthrowing the regime of Imam Khomeyni? Does it have the local opportunites and international conditions to seize power?

Opposition circles themselves think that the statements made by opposition leaders abroad and the public acclaim with which they are surrounded do not change the fact that they have no practical, military and political presence on the Iranian scene to enable them to emphasize that they have the power to secure their control over government. According to these circles the operation of last 28 June was not the work of the opposition abroad. This was the operation to which the offices of the Islamic Republic party were subjected; it led to the death of 74 persons, chief among which was party leader Ayatollah Beheshti. The operation of 31 August also was not the work of the opposition abroad; it led to the death of the president, Mohammad Rajai and his prime minister Mohammad Javad Bahonar.

These circles add that the first operation [was carried out] to settle accounts; they say it was a struggle between the factions of the Islamic Republic party, and specifically between the faction of Ayatollah Beheshti and the faction that opposes him and all his renown among Americans, Soviets and Arabs. This faction insinuated that Beheshti was close to the Americans who lost in him, according to an article in THE LOS ANGELES TIMES by William Sullivan, former U.S. ambassador to Tehran, one of their most important supporters in Iran after the Shah's departure.

The second operation, however--and this is still according to these circles--was not carried out by the Majahedin-e Khalq which is led by Mr Mas'ud Rajavi . It was rather carried out by a military group in the Iranian army that began to take action and to make preparations for overthrowing the regime.

No Hope for the Opposition

On the eve of electing a new president for Iran the same circles think there is no hope for any of the opposition leaders to come to power, beginning with former president Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, to Mas'ud Rajavi, Shahpur Bakhtiar, Reza Shah and all the other figures of less renown.

The struggle that is going on at present in Iran is a struggle between the army and the communist Tudeh party.

Shahpur Bakhtiar closed his military office in Paris, and he is coordinating efforts with Empress Farah Diba. When the military coup he had engineered in July 1980 failed about 1 month before the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war, Bakhtiar found himself outside the game of seizing power. As a result of that aborted coup 400 officers were executed; chief among them were Gen Mahdayun and Gen Muhaqqaqi, the leaders of the coup.

Although Reza Shah travels between Cairo, Morocco and Switzerland for recreational purposes without being engaged in any practical activity to speak of, the Free Iran Movement which is led by Princess Azadeh, the daughter of Princess Ashraf, the late Shah's sister, is the more active royalist movement. This movement was responsible for hijacking of the vessel, Tabarzine, across the coast of Spain. This action was coordinated with the Azadegan Movement—the Knights of Freedom—which is led by 80-year-old Gen Aryana whose command post is located in Ankara. The general had met recently with President Anwar al-Sadat. His influence in the army and within the ranks of the Kurds is widespread. However, the activities of these two movements inside Iran are extremely limited.

With regard to the Majahedin-e Khalq [organization] these circles are saying that Mas'ud Rajavi had 6,000 soldiers before Bani Sadr was deposed last 22 June. So far he has lost more than 3,000 men.

The leadership of Majahedin-e Khalq inside the country is controlled by a young 32-year-old attorney called Musa Khiabani . He is the grandson of Shaykh Mohamed Khiabani of Tabriz. This organization is the most militarily active organization inside Iran.

In addition to these movements there are small military organizations, the most important of which are the organization of Iran's Liberation Army, which is headed by Mo'in Zadeh a young general from Tabriz, and the powerful Naqab organization in Baluchistan. The activities of former navy commander, Admiral Ahmad Madani who is stationed in Germany, and those of Mr Hasan Nazih, former director of the Iranian Oil Company are also worth noting.

Opposition circles are also saying that despite efforts that are being made by former Iranian prime minister, Ali Amini and former minister Hushang Nahavandi to reconcile these various opposition movements there is no cooperation or even coordination between them. In fact movements that either support royalty or the republic do not want to cooperate in any way with former president Bani Sadr. They consider him one of the chief elements of the present regime even though he finds himself today in the ranks of the opposition as a result of the fact that he became a victim of the internal struggle over influence between the various factions inside the regime.

These circles add that the next presidential elections will take place under sensitive international conditions that will place the Iranian question outside Iranian hands. Today Khomeyni is isolated locally and internationally more than he has ever been in the past. In fact, he is forced to cooperate more with the Soviet Union and the communist Tudeh party. The evidence for this lies in the fact

that he chose Ayatollah Ali Khameyni, the leader of the Islamic Republic party to be the next president. According to these circles, it is known that Khameyni is very close to the Soviets. His selection accordingly means increased rapprochement with the Soviet [leaning] left inside the country and with Moscow abroad. Hence the West, and that includes the United States, finds it has no choice other than the army as an alternative to Khomeyni.

In case the army comes to power, these circles expect the country's leadership to be in the hands of young officers who are unknown abroad but who have broad influence in the ranks of the military, especially in the land forces and the police. These officers will also get the support of moderate clergymen like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, who is under house arrest in Qom. Ayatollah Shariatmadari is capable of mobilizing half the people of Iran and the entire province of Azerbaijan because he is the more popular leader, the one who is more respected in Iran.

These circles finally affirm that a Soviet blow in Iran today is more likely, since local conditions now are conducive to it; since Moscow has begun facing greater embarrassment in Afghanistan, Poland and Angola; and since a Soviet inspired attempt to overthrow President al-Sadat failed, according to President al-Sadat himself. The question of Iran is no longer the question of the opposition abroad; it has become an international struggle whose parties are inside the country. It will not be long before the consequences of that struggle take shape.

8592
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U. S. SAID TO PURSUE CLOSER TIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

[Article by Russell Warren Howe]

[Text] WITH EGYPT NOW seen as more able to emerge from isolation in the Arab world, and with 'Camp David' due to grind to a halt in six months — when the last of occupied Egypt is scheduled to be returned — State Department policymakers are recommending that Washington respond more positively to signals from Baghdad for a closer US-Iraq understanding.

Basically, Iraq wants 'elbow room' with its superpower arms supplier, the Soviet Union. Jordan, and especially Saudi Arabia, have been urging Washington to take advantage of the opportunity to improve relations with the area's second largest oil producer, which is also the second largest Arab military power after Egypt.

Recommendations along these lines by the US chargé d'affaires in Baghdad, Bill Eagleton, have been stymied so far by the hopes of some Reagan administration policymakers — including Secretary Haig — for a counter-revolution in Iran that would propel that American-armed country back into the 'western camp'.

Even those who counsel full diplomatic relations with Baghdad acknowledge that America's vacillating position on Palestine, and Iraq's military spare-parts dependency on Moscow, will continue to inhibit Washington-Baghdad ties. But State Department specialists see President Saddam Hussein as ready to follow Saudi Arabia in accepting Israel's existence, in return for Israeli withdrawal from its 1967 conquests.

Haig is studying a report recommending enhanced relations with Baghdad. Its main points are:

- Iraq has been stereotyped and misunderstood in the US, largely due to Israeli lobby efforts. But it is a stable country with a well-managed, flourishing economy. Its people's average earnings have quadrupled in 15 years, while prices have only doubled. Baghdad is cautious in diplomacy and strategically positioned, having borders with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Jordan. War with Iran has united most of the population behind Hussein, although the regime is Sunni and faces Iranian-encouraged opposition from Shia — which groups over half the population.

- Iraq's claim to Kuwait, which dates from Ottoman times when it was part of Mesopotamia, could be eliminated if Iraq were brought into the 'Gulf fold'.

- Self-confident and economically self-sufficient, Iraq has been drawing away from Moscow for some time. It now buys only about 60 per cent of its weapons from the Soviet Union, and France — which has sold Baghdad over $3bn worth of arms in the past three years — seems set soon to become its main supplier of state-of-the-art weaponry.

Hussein is angry with Moscow for not giving him the extra supplies necessary to defeat Iran, and opposes the Kremlin for its intervention in Afghanistan and its support of Ethiopia against Somalia. Iraq, was influential in discouraging North Yemen from accepting large-scale Soviet military assistance, making up the difference from its own armoury.

● Iraq will be spending $22.5bn on development this year. Its reserves are up, and it is the 'most lucrative market in the Middle East' and an obvious one for US goods and technology. US exports to Iraq are up 70 per cent this year to $725m. Purchases from the European Community will be over $3bn, and from Japan nearly $2bn, while purchases from the entire Eastern Bloc will only amount to about $700m.

Despite war damage, oil production should be back at 3m b/d within six months of the end of the war with Iran.

The war is stalemated, but a negotiated peace is possible. Iraq is ready to return most occupied territory and submit to international arbitration for the rest, confident that it will be allowed to keep the islands seized by the late Shah and recaptured early in the war. Iraq also wants Iran to grant greater local autonomy to Arabic-speaking, oil-producing Khuzestan. It is not in the US interest for Iran's success in stalemating the wa. ' · contribute to a humiliation of Hussein, since a weakened Iraq might present a continued temptation, with its oilfields, to adventurist regimes in Tehran.

The report stresses that Iraq's leaders, like those of Egypt and the US, oppose religious fundamentalism on the Iranian pattern. President Hussein's second-in-command, Tariq Aziz, is a Christian. Iraq is also a 'moderate' on oil pricing, is on frigid terms with Syria, and represses its Communist Party. It can probably not be denied a nuclear-weapons capability in the long term, and US influence against Iraqi use of 'nukes' to solve regional issues would be greater if relations were friendly.

Although Baghdad would not replace Riyadh as America's key friend in the Gulf, Iraq is a much more important nation than Saudi Arabia, the report points out, and a natural 'leader' in the area. Smaller Gulf states, Kuwait excepted, look to Iraq rather than to under-armed Saudi Arabia for protection against Iran. Iraq is the leader of the present Iraqi-Jordanian-Saudi triumvirate. With Hussein due to host next year's non-aligned conference, and to assume its chairmanship for three years, his influence, and his country's, can only grow, claims the report.

What effect will the report have? Under Nixon and Kissinger, the US often took bold foreign-policy initiatives, notably the opening to China. Carter began boldly — notably in his October 1977 decision to revive the Geneva conference on Middle East peace, in tandem with Moscow. But Brzezinski was less innovative than Kissinger, and more imprisoned in his anti-Soviet rhetoric. Partly for this reason, Carter's objectives lost momentum.

Now, America has an ageing, inactive president — and a secretary of state whose every innovation draws intra-cabinet opposition. So the report is likely to be implemented gingerly, if at all, unless Iraq makes some overt move of its own.

Another problem is that Washington still hopes for a reversal of the situation in Iran, probably through a military coup, or possibly through a return of 'Shah' Cyrus Ali Reza, now in Cairo, as a constitutional monarch. Lobbying for such a development to be taken seriously is conducted by the Shah's twin sister, Princess Ashraf, who lives part of the year in the US, and by her militant daughter Princess Azadeh and General Bharam Aryana, both in Paris. Aryana's group recently hit the front pages by seizing an Iranian missile boat in the Mediterranean. The US appears to have given up hope of a government led by former Premier Shahpour Bakhtiar.

Washington fears that an Iraqi humiliation of Iran may lead to a takeover of power by the leftwing Mujaheddin leader Masoud Rajavi, possibly in a brief and opportunistic alliance with ex-president Abol Hassan Bani Sadr. Washington also fears than an Iraqi victory might lead to the partition of the old Persian empire, with Moscow helping various irredentist regimes.

CSO: 4400/31

MIDEASTERN JEWS SEE DISCRIMINATION, SOCIOECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT Weekend Supplement 17, 24, 31 Jul, 7 Aug 81

[Article by Eli Tavor: "Revolt of the Orientals"]

[17 July 81 pp 1, 2, 30]

[Text] A central myth of the state of Israel was shattered in the elections for the tenth Knesset. It is the myth of the integration of the exiles.

The most significant phenomenon of the elections held on 30 June was what is called "ethnic polarization." It means the division of the electorate, principally between the two largest parties, not on the grounds of ideology, and not even on the grounds of interests, but on the basis of ethnic origin.

In these elections there came to a head the process which began in earlier elections, and which became quite apparent in the elections of May 1977, the elections for the ninth Knesset. In these elections the decisive majority of those who voted for the Likud were of the oriental community. Most of the voters for the Alignment were of the Ashkenazic community.

The distribution of voters according to their ethnic background was a slap in the face to those who claimed that ethnic political voting was a passing phase. This time it became apparent beyond doubt that quite the opposite was true. Ethinc voting is an increasingly serious phenomenon, and is becoming more extreme.

This is a warning for Israeli society. Not because the members of one ethnic group vote in particular for a certain party, while the members of another vote for its rival, and not because political confrontation has become ethnic. Rather, red lights should go on and alarms should sound because what is revealed in the political hostility is testimony to the fact that Israeli society is suffering from a chronic disease, which is developing at an accelerated pace.

If the ethnic polarization found expression only on the political horizon, it would not be so bad, but what has happened is in fact that the electoral system has opened a flood gate, in which polarization had been seething.

The outpouring did not reduce the boiling. The seething continues to go on beneath the surface and threatens to erupt in a destructive manner. The polarization should have been a warning of this. It left the writing on the wall and the writing proclaimed: What in Israel is characterized as the "ethnic problem," the "ethnic gap"

or "polarization" is not flickering out, but on the contrary is boiling at higher temperatures than ever. What once was perceived as the problem of marginal groups or of poor neighborhoods is now spreading all over the fabric of Israeli society.

In other words, in contrast to the accepted assumption of conservative sociologists in Isreal and the political establishment, that the ethnic problem is temporary and passing, which will be healed in the passage of time, the elections for the tenth Knesset indicate a totally different trend.

In the course of 30 years, the political, social, and economic establishment of Israel has tried to minimize the seriousness of the problem. It knew of its existence. It sought solutions, especially when the problem took radical expression in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and riots. But it took comfort in the belief that the problem was one of the "generation of the wilderness," an interim stage, which would be ended with a complete and total integration of the exiles.

This illusion, which is also held by the present establishment along the whole spectrum from the Likud to the Alignment, was the bubble which was burst in the last elections for the tenth Knesset.

The integration of the exiles has become hostility among the exiles, and it threatens to become, if there is no solution, a war between the exiles.

How did the utopia of the integration of the exiles evaporate?

In his book "Ethnic Relations in Israel" the sociologist Yokhanan Peres of the University of Tel Aviv determines: "The series of findings (of research on the ethnic gap in Israel) are most serious, from the point of view of integration of ethnic groups.; it points to a stability in the gap. Israelis generally are informed about inter-ethnic inequalities. But the decisive majority of them believe that the phenomenon is transient, and affects only the transitional generation, and that efforts invested in education, health, welfare, and housing are gradually reducing its scope, The challenge hidden in this data is not that the problem has not yet been solved, but rather that in certain areas in the progress is so slow that the vision of ethnic equality has ceased to be a real goal but is rather an eschatological vision.

"The stubborness of this gap has far reaching ramifications for ethnic relations in Israel. It appears that the tolerance of oriental ethnic group members for ethnic inequality is tending to decline, and their responses in the level of individual and political conduct is becoming sharpened. There are several causes of this process: The risng seniority of oriental ethnic groups, and the increase within them of children born and educated in Israel, reduces the difference between them and the Ashkenazim. The similarity in culture and way of life, and especially the common service in the IDF, constitute a basis for the demand for equality in the distribution of resources.... The strength of the ethnic gap, its appearance in so many spheres, its constancy, and the sharpening reaction to it will continue to occupy a more central place in ethnic relations in Israel."

Yohanan Peres adds in the summary of his research: "The coming together of ideas and values among various ethnic groups has both prospects and dangers. As people become more similar to one another, the demand for equality will be heightened. Success in integration in the spheres of culture and education in particular makes the ethnic gap intolerable.... In the coming years, years of gradual implementation

of the change from a generation of immigrants to a generation of native born Israelis, a choice will be made between complete and total integration and an increasingly intense struggle."

The thesis of Yohanan Peres and other sociologists who deal in research on ethnic relations in Israel is that ethnic alienation is several times stronger among the children of those born in Asian and African countries than among their parents who came to Israel from those countries, particularly because they come into contact with the children of those who come from Europe and America, and study together with them, spend time with them, and serve together with them in the IDF. By virtue of the strategy of integration of exiles, they are more aware than their parents of inequality in all spheres of life in Israel among orientals and Ashkenazim.

Another school of Israeli sociology maintains that the alienation and radicalization in inter-ethnic relations in Israel stem in particular from the fact that the ethnic struggle in Israel has become a class struggle.

Heading this school which developed in the Faculty of Sociology at the University of Haifa, is Dr. Shlomo Savirski. A few months before the elections, Dr. Savirski published a profound and original sociological analysis of oriental and Ashkenazic relations in Israel. His book "Not Failures But Foiled" is the most up-to-date and stunning research of the ethnic problem in Israel, in which the accusing finger is pointed at the true roots of the problem.

Dr. Savirski's research, which was published by Makberot Le-Mekhqar u-Viqoret, is required reading for anyone who studies and is interested in the central problem of Israeli society. In his work, he states:

"In Israel there is a class based division of labor, as in every society having a capitalist means of production, but it is a peculiar class structure, stemming from the peculiar character of Israeli economic development.

"The Israeli bourgeoisie is essentially Ashkenazic, while the Jewish proletariat in Israel is essentially Oriental. The bourgeoisie is essentially Ashkenazic because the Ashkenaxim were the founders of the political Zionist movement; because in the pre-state period it was the Ashkenazim who created the economic, organizational, and political foundation, which they control; because the Ashkenazim directed and regulated the flow of immigration and integrated the immigrants in an accelerated development effort; because this development formed the basis and expanded their dominant position in Israeli society.

"The Jewish proletariat in Israel is Oriental because the Orientals, most of whom emigrated from their countries under conditions of emergency, abandoned their economic foundation in the country of their origin; because the foundation, since they had come within the framework of a national movement of which some of its members had already established a general basis for the whole nation; because the Orientals supplied this economic basis with that thing which it needed most in its development effort--cheap manpower subject to monopolization; because the processes of production in a capitalist system in Israel work in such a manner that the principal alternative facing the second and third generation of Orientals is to be workers on low level bureaucrats, while the administrative and controlling positions are open to the second and third generation of Ashkenazim.

"The Israeli bourgeois is an Ashkenazi because he is for the most part a son of parents who were not bourgeois, and his "goal" or their "goal" as bourgeois became apparent only in the encounter with Oriental workers; he is an Ashkenazi because most of the processes and symbols of bourgeois control--in economic, political, educational, and communications activities--are known to him from birth, from his home, from his family, from his neighborhood; he is an Ashkenazi because he is accustomed to find--and already expects to find--Ashkenazim in positions parallel to his own, and Orientals in positions lower than his own; he is an Ashkenazi because he sees it as his mission to transmit the values of an achievement of oriented-competitive ethic of the West which his parents encountered a generation or so ago, and which he acquired on his own advancement track, to the Orientals--in the army, in schools, and at work, and he views the nonsuccess of Orientals in acquiring that ethic as a justification for their low position, and for his higher position.

"The Israeli Jewish worker is for the most part Oriental because he is the son of parents who for the most part were not workers if they had remained there or had gone to other countries--and therefore he links the fact that he is a worker to the fact that he is an Oriental in Israel.

"He is an Oriental because everywhere he turns, his social conditions is presented as the product of characteristics peculiar to Orientals--a large number of children, low education level, origins in an undeveloped country, and the like. He is an Oriental because he is accustomed to find, and already expects to find, Orientals at levels parallel to his, and Ashkenazim at levels above him; he is an Oriental because in his contacts with the ruling apparatus, he feels a sense of alienation, because he does not find in it any of the sumbols known to him from his home and environment; he is an Oriental because when he does reach positions of seniority, the attitude towards him is not only towards his personality and deeds, but also to him as a representative of his ethnic group.

"The specific development process of Israeli economy and society did not create a general class division, but an ethnic division of labor; therefore, the class struggle is not just a struggle of "workers" in general, but a struggle of Orientals."

The conclusion of Dr. Savirski--that in Israel there has developed a division of labor which is ethnic, in which Orientals fulfill the role of manpower while the Ashkenazim hold the positions of control and administration in all branches of the economy--is based on the analysis of employment distribution in Israel.

This distribution points to the fact that the ethnic division of labor is increasing and becoming more serious. With the passage of years it appears that the rate of advancement among Ashkenazim from the lowest rungs of the employment ladder to its higher rungs is much greater than the rate of advancement among Orientals.

In 1972, 375,000 of all those employed in the economy were natives of Europe and America; 25.8 percent of them were scientific and academic workers, as well as professionals and administrators--the highest rung on the employment ladder; 39.1 percent of those born in Europe and America were on the second rung, that of office, commercial, and service workers; 5.2 percent worked on the third rung--agriculture, and 29.9 percent were industrial trade workers in transport, construction, and unskilled areas--the lowest rung.

In that same year, 316,000 of those employed in the economy were natives of Asia and Africa. Only 9.7 percent of them were on the academic and administrative rung of the ladder; 38.9 percent were commercial and service workers; 7.8 percent worked in agriculture, and 44.9 percent were on the lowest rung of the employment ladder.

With the passage of 5 years, in 1977, there were already 30.9 percent of those born in Europe and America at the highest rung, while the rate of those born in Asia and Africa had risen from 9.7 percent to only 12.9 percent. At the lowest rung, there were employed among those from Europe and America 26.8 percent as compared to 40.9 percent of those coming from Asia and Africa.

This gap in rung of employment is much wider among native Israelis as between those from European-American parents and those from Asian-African parents.

In 1972, 38.7 percent of Ashkenazim born in Israel were at the highest rung, as compared to 9.3 percent of Orientals born in Israel. In 1977, 45.6 percent of native Israeli Ashkenazim were at the highest rung, as compared to 14.6 percent of native Israeli Orientals.

At the lowest rung of the employment ladder, that of industrial and construction workers and unskilled laborers, there were in 1977 only 6.9 percent of all employed Israeli born Ashkenazim, as compared to 37.5 percent of Israeli born orientals.

Dr. Savirski says: "Most of the studies of employment distribution in Israel tend to attribute employment differences (gaps) between Orientals and Ashkenazim to seniority in Israel or to education. The conclusion sought is obvious: If these two variables explan the gap, then the gaps are not linked to structural ethnic differences. Moreover, as seniority in Israel grows, along with possibilities for education, the employment gaps will be reduced.

"It appears to us that work differences are of such a proportion that neither changes in education for the foreseeable future nor seniority in Israel can make significant changes. The race for employment does not change from year to year, and participants who lack resources do not have any prospect of improving their abilities from year to year.

"The data which we have collected shows that to a great extent the Orientals have taken "greater control" of the lower rungs of the employment ladder, while the Ashkenazim control the higher rungs. Changes in educational level in the foreseeable future or during the stay in Israel can bring about only marginal changes in the structure of employment.

"In order to understnad why changes in level of education or duration of stay in Israel will bring about only marginal changes in the structure of employment, two additional factors should be noted: First, control positions, ownership and administration, are for the most part in the hands of Ashkenazim. It is unreasonable to assume that this class will surrender its positions willingly. Secondly, government work patterns which are generally acknowledged to be decisive in the Israeli economy, tend to strengthen the position of the currently preferred classes."

Savirski believes that the gaps in Israeli society are first and foremost the result of the ethnic distribution of labor within it.

The accepted sociological school in Israel, that of the sociologist S. N. Eisenstadt and his students at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, views the solution of the "ethnic problem" in Israel to be "integration throug modernization." It assumes that the ethnic gap in Israel stems from gaps in the level of modernization of the two groups--Oriental and Ashkenazic.

Yet Savirski and followers of the other sociological school reject this assumption. In an article published by Dr. Savirski and the sociologist Sarah Katsir in the periodical of the unit for Bridging Gaps at the Unversity of Haifa, it was argued: "The structure of relations between the two ethnic groups is not passing and temporary. The distribution of labor in time strikes roots.... The approach of "gaps" would argue that the situation is as it was according to the initial data indicating an inferior position for Orientals when they arrived in Israel; when the data improves, then they will be able to rise above their present position and spread out through the whole employment structure."

Opposite the school of "integration through modernization" is the school of "dependence" which argues: "Today, the structure of relations between the two ethnic groups is a structure of dependence; the senior positios in the employment structure, control of capital, control of political institutions, the ability to make decisions which will direct the development of Israeli society as a whole--all of these are essentially in the hands of the Ashkenazim.

"The Orientals, for the most part, are lacking in capital, supply labor at the lowest rungs of the employment ladder, and have relatively little representation in the corridors of political power. It may be said that the central aspects of the lives of most Orientals--scope of employment, quality of employment standard of living, and in a more general way the prospects and directions of their development, depend upon decisions made by organizations and institutions in which the senior positions are held by the Ashkenazim. Their development is a dependent development. It depends upon the development plans of the general society--a society cloaked in the values, aspirations, and patterns of conduct of the Ashkenazim."

"In light of what is said above," say Savirski and Katsir, "we are inclined to doubt the central assumptions of the school of 'integration through modernization' with respect to ethnicity and its future in Israel. As far as that school is concerned, ethnicity is a heritage of the past, which with increasing modernization will gradually disappear.

"The assumption is that ethnicity is a temporary and passing phenomenon. This approach emphasizes the past--from which ethnicity is nourished--and the future, in which it will disappear. Consequently, it ignores the present, which is conceived of as only a transition stage.

"In contrast to this approach, we think that emphasis should be placed on ethnicity especially in the present.... The process of 'modernization' is not totally a transitional phase: 'Modernization' means the development of ethnic division of labor and ecologic divisions.

"It seems to us more correct to speak of ethnicity as a phenomenon rather than a remnant of the past.... In contrast to the school of 'integration through modernization' which believes that Oriental ethnicity is waning, we believe that its fullest expression has not yet been realized."

These words were written many months before the elections for the tenth Knesset. What occurred in those elections strengthened the assumptions of the school of "dependence." The positioning of most Orientals in the camp of one political party which does not consider itself to be a representative of Orientals in particular, was the first public expression of an attempt by the Ashkenazic establishment to defend its position of control and management in Israeli society and economy.

The slogan "Anything but the Likud!" which led many Ashkenazic voters to support the Alignment expressed perhaps, unconsciously, more a fear of an Oriental revolt than of the political conceptions of the Likud.

Even if the ethnic gap in Israel is not just the result of only the ethnic division of labor, nevertheless all of the components of it--the psychological, cultural, social, and economic--stem from the same source.

The original sin, from which the process of ethnic polarization began, occurred during the first years of the state, during the absorption of mass immigration. It was not committed intentionally. It was the result of direct pressures which were dictated by the mass immigration. Within a period of 3 and one-half years, the Jewish population of 700,000 in Israel had to absorb a population of 750,000.

The early streams of immigration were housed in immigrant camps. From there the immigrants were supposed to gradually move to the Jewish population centers in Israel. But when the stream increased, another solution was discovered--the ma'abarot (transit camps).

The ma'abarot, which were first instituted in 1950, were supposed to respond to the negative phenomena of the immigrant camps--a life of rotting and idleness. They were supposed to be stations on the way to permanent housing. Their residents were supposed to receive employment so that they would be able to support themselves and not live on welfare.

By the end of 1950, there were already 123 ma'abarot throughout Israel, with 180,000 new immigrants living in their tents, tin shacks, huts, and canvas huts. Pursuant to the government policy, the ma'abarot were spread out in distant places so as to constitute a basis for the establishment of new settlements. At the height of the period of ma'abarot, their number was 140.

The ma'abarot were not intended particularly for Oriental immigrants. In the first years, there was an almost even balance between European and Afro-Asian immigrants. But the Ashkenazic immigrants succeeded in shortening their stay in the ma'abarot. Family ties, and their acquaintance with the veteran Jewish population, the large majority of which was Ashkenazic, made their absorption into the older population centers easier.

The Oriental immigrants remained in the ma'abarot for a more extended period, sometimes for years. In the middle of the 50's and the earlier years of the 60's, the large waves of immigration came from North Africa, and the number of immigrants from European countries declined. Then the Oriental immigrants constituted the majority of the population of the ma'abarot.

In 1957, when there were still 140,000 people living in 80 ma'abarot, the operation to eliminate the ma'abarot was announced. But the actual elimination stretched over many years. Six years later, in 1963, the then Minister of Housing, Yosef Almogi, proclaimed: "We are approaching the blessed moment when we will be able to proclaim that the period of the ma'abarot in Israel has ended." Two more years passed, and the director general of the Housing Center proclaimed: "The operation to eliminate the ma'abarot has ended." In 1971 there were still tens of thousands of people living in ma'abarot.

David Shalem was born and grew up in ma'abarot. His stay there was indeed due to objective forces. The resources and manpower then available to the country did not make possible the building of housing or new settlements for all residents of ma'abarot within a short period of time. But the results were destructive.

The period of ma'abarot was a traumatic time for all those who were forced to spend an extended period in them, under conditions of deprivation, next to veteran Israelis who lived in real homes. It was there that for the first time was born a justifiable sense of neglect.

In fact, ma'abarot were never eliminated.

Camps of tents and tin huts, which were called ma'abarot, were physically dismantled. Their residents moved into agricultural moshavin which were built for them, or into houses in development cities, or into Arab homes in abandoned Arab towns. Living conditions were improved. The standard of living rose. But the original sin, which was contained in the very establishment of ma'abarot and from which their way of life stemmed, remained.

The "culture of ma'abarot," if one can call it that, was transferred to the settlements to which ma'abarot residents moved. All of the economic, cultural, and social distortions which were the legacy of the residents of ma'abarot were transferred with them to their new homes.

The policy of population dispersal then dictated the establishment of settlements in far flung and desolate places in the country. Almost all of the new towns which were built, all of the border settlements and new moshavim, whose populations were composed of prior ma'abarot residents, were far flung and cut off just like the ma'abarot themselves. Just as the ma'abarot were homogeneous in terms of their population, so were the new settlements. Most of the Oriental immigrants were settled in development towns and new moshavim. The Ashkenazic immigrants flowed to the older population centers.

This phenomenon was called by the sociologists the "ecological gap"--a kind of apartheid in which each ethnic group lived in spearate settlements or neighborhoods.

In the ma'abarot there was a collapse of the community and family frameworks of the Orientals and the whole scale of values and concepts which they brought with them from their lands of origin. Shmuel Vankin, who is 20 years old and a native Israeli, born to parents of the ma'abarot generation, and who now heads the Institute for the Study of Ethnic Gaps in Israel, opened this week at the initiative of the Sephardic World Federation, says: "In the ma'abarot there was a collapse of religious and family authority. All of the old hierarchy of the North African Jews, which had served them as a framework and representative, collapsed and was replaced. The Moroccan Jews, for example, had a religious leadership and a leadership which

represented them to the king. In Israel, the religious leadership became worthless, because religion ceased to be a tool of existence. The family authority also collapsed, mainly because the father ceased to play his role as provider for the family.

"The ethnic group was not able to substitute from within itself the leadership which had existed in the country of its origin. An external leadership was imposed upon it. Their support was provided by an outside-establishment person, usually an Ashkenazi. They did not take an elite economic group, to serve as an intermediary. There was no far-sighted sociological consideration. For what are intermediaries? They are the pipeline linking the sustenance provided by the government and the ethnic group, and they would naturally acquire leadership."

"Another thing which was done was the replacement of one set of educational forms for another set. The earlier set was that of the religious people, rabbis, teachers, cantors, ritual slaughterers. This set was treated like the dust of the earth. The set which was substituted in consisted of people from the Jewish Agency, the bureaucrats, or the young ineffectual teacher. When the substitution was made, the whole scale of values collapsed in several spheres: Religion, family, and sex."

"Thus, for example, there was a challenge to the ideas of the status of women, which in the past had been determined by the status of men. She had been inferior, because he had been superior. Now he was not at all superior. He did not bring home the money to support the family. He became the poor fellow who hangs around the house. He was powerless to impose his authority on his children."

"This led to a complete breakdown of frameworks. You could no longer trust in your father, because he was not someone you knew from the old country. He was a suppressed and depressed person who suffered all day long. In the evening he cried in the corner. You could no longer trust in your mother. She was no longer the woman to whom you could go to cry in time of trouble. She became a woman who went outside to work and yelled at your father, and they quarreled at night. This is what is called a broken family. The effect persists even today. And then, after a man acquired a pattern of conduct from 8 years in a ma'abara, do you think he would change the set once the gates were opened?"

"The trauma of most Orientals are the memories of our childhood," says Asher Edan (30), a native of Moshav Sharsheret in the northern Negev, where his parents were brought from the ma'abara at Lod, having come from Tunis.

Edan, who today is a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Tel Aviv, relates: "in the ma'abarot, our parents came up against the foremen and the bosses, while we had a totally negative encounter with the ways of thought of our parents. When may parents were taken from the ma'abara, they were told they were being taken to Beer Sheba. They took them into the desert. They did not want to get off of the truck. They were surrounded and removed by force in the moshav. In the first years they lived off of a few cows. A kibbutznik from Moshav Sa'ad ran the whole show. In nearby moshavim there were people who told how they had been brought to their moshav, how when they did not want to get off, the driver simply raised the lift on the truck and dumped them on the ground.... This is part of our psychological frustration!"

To the distortions which were transferred from the ma'abarot were added the economic distrortions.

The ma'abarot residents were cheap manpower. They found employment in industrial plants nearby, or in agriculture at nearby kibbutzim and moshavim. The women found work as housekeepers. For those who found no work, the government supplied busy work.

The magic words in those years were "full employment." To prevent unemployment, the government spent large sums to supply work to ma'abarot residents. But it did not supply them with the means of production.

This dependence for employment and economic support on outside factors persisted even after the ma'abarot residents moved to new housing. In development towns, many people worked in agriculture for nearby kibbutzim, or in their factories. In new moshavim, farmers were forced to support their families by doing busy-work supplied by the government.

During the tenure of Pinhas Sapir as finance minister, enormous sums were invested in the building of factories to supply employment for residents of development towns. They did supply work. But the resources flowed to the enterpeneurs and private industrialists, or to large corporations. The Folgat factories of Yisrael Falk in Dimona, or the Carmel factories of Avraham Shapira in a number of development towns, are clear examples of this. The Oriental residents had no ownership in them.

The Orientals were given employment. The resources were given to the Ashkenazim. Thus, was created Oriental dependence upon the Ashkenazim, which exists even today principally in industry, agriculture, and services. Thus the ground was prepared for economic inequality between the ethnic groups.

The original sin which started in the ma'abarot, which were supposed to be a transitional phase on the road to complete integration of the mass immigration of Orientals, was perpetuated and took root and has become a permanent feature of Israeli society.

The political establishment of the country has always known of the dangers inherent in the existence of an ethnic gap. At a convention for North Africans, held in 1972, the Director General of the Histadrut, Yitshaq Ben-Aharon, said: "The guilt is on the leadership of the country, which conducted an economic policy which created poverty and social polarization.... Weak points from the Agency may destroy the country!"

At the same convention Prime Minister Golda Meir said: "The state of Israel cannot exist and carry out its mission if there is an ethnic gap.... Concern to eliminate that gap is not a matter of charity, but rather is incumbent upon the whole country!"

In spite of all the pronouncements, nothing has been repaired. Again, not because of lack of intention and good will, but because of a tragic series of mistakes, and a distorted perception of the problem. This will be dealt within the next article.

[24 Jul 81 p 11]

[Text] Shmuel Vankin warns: "There may arise groups who will want to burn down the homes of Ashkenazim!"

"Sub-culture groups are adopting violence and anarchism as a mode of operation. This has happened in Israel in the past. I have absolutely no doubt that if there is no change in the situation with respect to ethnic polarity in Israel, such a thing could happen. A group of Morrocan immigrants, for example, could attack the home of Ashkenazim and burn them down, just because they are homes of Ashkenazim. Not just because not enough is being done to prevent the development of this sort. Israeli society is not even aware of the existence of this danger."

Asher Edan says: "Perhaps they will not burn the homes of Ashkenazim. But they may select as targets of violence those insitutions which are perceived by Orientals as being representative of Ashkenazim. Habimah House, for example, or the Workers Council building, or Metsudat-Ze'ev. If Orientals despair of any other means of achieving equality, they will have no way of avoiding the path of violence...."

Vankin and Edan are native Israelis, children of parents who came from North Africa. Both of them are young and educated, academics, having broad perspective. Vankin's principal preoccupations are mathematics and physics; Asher Edan is a lecturer in philosophy. Perhaps because their high intellectual level does not fit the stereotype of the Oriental, they are more sensitive to the phychological suffering of their generation--the first generation of Oriental immigrants. Because they are involved in problems of the ethnic gap and because they are part of it, they are aware of the dangers stemming from it.

Asher Edan relates: "Four months ago, at Kfar Yaroq, there was a convention of Oriental intellectuals. There were about 200 students, academics, organized within the framework of a program for public activists, intended to train a young leadership among Oriental ethnics. Most of the speakers at the convention recommended violence as a mode of operation. The organizers were shocked. They did not plan this, and of course they were opposed. But the people burst out with calls for violence...."

Manifestations of violence which appeared in the last elections were not the result of subversion or political plotting. What led to the political violence this time was the accumulated frustration of young Orientals. In the future, such violence could break out in another area. Violence is no longer the mode just of socially marginal groups. It has received legitimization among educated circles of Orientals, at the upper levels of the social class.

Little is said about this openly.

But in candid conversations, without fear of exposure which might have social or economic negative consequences, the same theme is heard repeatedly from Orientals throughout the country in all sectors of Israeli society.

A team of interviewers, some of them sociologists and some of them active in organizations and movements to change the ethnic alignment in Israel, conducted over an extended period, from 1978 to 1981, a series of interviews with about 100 persons, who were defined as the "potential elite" of the Oriental ethnic community. Those interviewed were members of the three largest groups of Oriental origin: Moroccans, Iraqis, and Yemenites. Some of the recorded interviews were published by the sociologist Shlomo Savirski in his book "Not Failures But Foiled," which recently appeared.

In all of the interviews there is a sense of neglect and discrimination expressed by those interviewed. The recurring motif in the interviews is the sense of belonging to a group which is controlled, a sense of economic and cultural subjection, and the recognition that the present situation of the ethnic group in Israeli society is not improving; and that the solution will not come of itself, but that one must work to bring it about.

This is a discussion among middle class persons in Beit Shean, as it is quoted in the book:

Rafael: You remind me of the Wadi Salib incident.

Aharon: Here people recall that incident. One thinks twice before going out to demonstrate, or in direct confrontation against. Example--today we cannot go out in direct confrontation against the kibbutzim.

Menahem: Good, we screwed the leaders of that time....

Aharon: Even today we say t they are bought. Today we say that they do not serve the interest of Beit Shean, as they do serve the interest of the sourrounding area.

Moshe: You only pose problems, but they must be solved...

Menahem: Nu, what do you suggest?

Moshe: What do I suggest? I say to you: I for one do not want there to be a civil war here, I do not want it. And I know, only by one will we succeed....

Menahem: Nu, then why not? Why not?

Moshe: If all of the people would succeed in rising up, and we would do a Wadi Salib ten times, a thousand times, then we would know how to succeed!

Following is part of what was said by Ezra, a native Israeli, of Iraqi parents, and a member of the Workers Committee at a state run factory:

"...There is an ethnic group in this country which has taken total control of this country, and I am not ashamed to say it, and that group is the polish group--people of the first immigration, or the second immigration. If you consider the government offices, and I visit a lot at the offices of the government and the Histadrut, take them one by one--all of them are polish. And one appoints the other to the senior positions. One pulls the other after him. The Orientals, of which I am one, are never included. They do the dirty work.

"He feels this stongly when he goes to an office, and I will give you an example from the university--where he did not go. He saw that the Ashkenazim are accepted immediately, but not him. He was in the paratroopers, he is smart, but wherever he goes they close the door in his face....

"The Histadrut is all polish. No doubt! Who are you talking to? You think there is a dispute between Begin and Mashal? Is that for the outsiders? Between Ehrlich and Mashal? Who is this Ehrlich and who is this Mashal? Like the idiot Moroccans, I say to them: Mashal is polish, idiots. You don't know Begin--he is not a Moroccan. He is polish? If there is one Moroccan, it is David Levy--and they close his mouth! They tell him: 'Shut up. If you don't, you will be kicked out of the cabinet.' He can't do anything. Why did they put David Levy in the government? For the votes! Folks, maybe I have illusions--but this is what I think, and I will die with these thoughts.

"A Sepharadi will never be in power. Never. He is bought and sold. You know what--they say that in Poland the Ashkenazim bowed their heads and went to the slaughter. But, if it had been Sepharadim, I think that they would not only have bowed their heads, they would have put them inside. They are sold people, used to going with their heads bowed, like the blacks in America. The blacks in America today raise their heads. Perhaps there will have to be a revolution here. That's all...."

Gabi, a resident of Kiryat Shmoneh, a hired worker at a kibbutz factory, says:

"I say one thing--I say that the ethnic gap and the discrimination were created by the government. I want to speak right to the heart of the matter. Why do I have to be a wretch, because I live in Kiryat Shmoney? Why does the government build houses in Kiryat Shmoneh for a half a million pounds, and in Tel Aviv for 3 million pounds? Why don't they bring the employment and the higher education to the development regions? Every development region that you hear of is Oriental. Ofakim--a development region, Oriental; Kiryat Gat-- a development region, Oriental; Ma'alot--a development region, Oriental. Let them build the factories we need in Kiryat Shmoneh, in Kiryat Gat, in all of the development areas. Let them bring the higher education, let them build those expensive houses. Let them build the cheap houses in Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and then you will see the gap close!

"But we don't have the education. Every teacher who doesn't have the money to buy an apartment in Tel Aviv comes to a development region. He gets himself to a development region, does good, and gets all kinds of benefits. I, who live in Kiryat Shmoneh, who was born there, I don't get one-fourth of his benefits. Why does it have to be this way?

One thing I do not expect--there will not be a Jewish war in Kiryat Shmoneh, because we are Jews. A Jew will not fight a Jew with weapons, but it could develop into a situation of civil war--a situation of despair, of suicides. Why are there suicides only among Orientals? Why is ther prostitution only among Orientals? Why are there theives only among Orientals?

"My answer is that the government is guilty. The state of Israel, whether it is the Alignment of the Likud, every government creates the ethnic gap and the discrimination. Only they, and they alone! Today I am not only thinking about leaving Kiryat Shmoneh, I am thinking about leaving Israel!"

This is what several of the hundred persons interviewed have to say. Almost all of them express the sense. It stems from accumulated personal and collective experience, covering about 30 years, in which there has been created an almost exact congruence between social status and ethnic background. Social status is for the most part determined by the level of income.

Since 1965, the Central Bureau for Statistics has been conducting ongoing surveys of income. In these surveys, the base index is the average cash income of a household of those born in Europe and America--the Ashkenazim.

In 1965, the average cash income of an Oriental household was only 71.1 percent of the average income of an Ashkenazic household. In 1978, the average income of an Oriental household was 80.3 percent of that of an Ashkenazic household. But while the Orientals who had come to Israel before 1947 had achieved an income of 99 percent of that of Ashkenazim, the income of those who had come after 1961 was only 76.1 percent of the average Ashkenazic income. The income of those who had come from Europe and America after 1961 was 93.5 percent of the average Ashkenazic income.

In a survey of standards of living conducted by the Central Bureau for Statistics in 1975/76, households, and not net income percapita, were studied. The population of the sample was divided into ten groups. The lowest tenth, included families whose average monthly income at that time was 1900 pounds per month. The upper tenth, number 10 (see the accompanying table) included families whose average monthly income was 9500 pounds per month.

The results of the survey clearly demonstrated that Orientals constituted the majority of the lowest tenth with the lowest income (55.5 percent). Their proportion in the upper tenth was limited to 5.7 percent, while Europeans and Americans constituted 76.2 percent of that tenth.

As one approaches the upper tenth, the proportion of Orientals declines.

In every country there are classes who are better off, who have higher incomes, and lower clases, whose income is lower. But when there is an exact congruence between income level and ethnic background, the problem becomes explosive. What has happened in England in recent weeks, where riots have spread like wild fire, is a clear indication of the danger involved in an ethnic gap of this sort.

In Israel, there has not only been an ethnic division of labor, but also an ethnic division of resources.

It was in particular the attempt to aid the hundreds of thousands of immigrants who came in a mass immigration from the Oriental countries, it was in particular the consciousness of the danger of an ethnic-social gap, which expanded, deepened, and paradoxically perpetuated this gap.

The road to the hell of the ethnic gap is paved with good intentions. Every Israeli government has recognized that after the problem of security, this was the most acute problem for Israeli society. They devoted enormous resources to absorb the Oriental immigration and to integrate it into the veteran community in Israel; by supplying employment, housing, welfare, and education so that these immigrants would be led to the goal of western modernization.

In order to supply mass employment, it was necessary to develop a broad economic base of industry, agriculture, and services with the help of government financing. This foundation was established by public bodies, companies, and entrepeneurs, who were already established in the field. These were mostly Ashkanazim. The resources flowed to them so that they would supply places of work. The Orientals received

the employment, the Ashkenazim received the capital, with the help of which they expanded and grew--and they expanded the gap.

Dr. Savirski's study determines the following: "The government cannot do everything by itself. Direct initiatives constitute only a small part of the government's investment. Most of the capital flows to private and public entrepeneurs in Israel. As in most other countries, this means not an infinite number of private entrepeneurs, but a relatively small group which concentrates in its hands control of most of the capital.... The large groups, including various Histadrut enterprises, at the center of which stands Bank Hapoalim; the Bank Leumi group, which is officially under the control of the Jewish Agency; the Bank Discount group, as well as various other groups such as Klal, the Israel Company, and the Sakharov Group. To these groups and the like are directed the financial aid of government investments in development towns. These groups are the owners of the largest enterprises which were set up in the development towns.

"From the foregoing, the principal conclusion regarding the capital investment structure in the development towns is tht the Orientals in those towns have very little control. The plant managers and their senior teams are mostly Ashkenazim, and most of them live in the large cities, or live temporarily in the development towns, and then in special villa neighborhoods.... The patterns of investment and industrialization in the development towns do not work to the advantage of the inhabitants. They give special benefits to the groups which own the plants."

Similar processes have occurred in welfare, education, and housing. Savirski says: "The unequal development in the economic sphere was accompanied by the creation of a large 'social' appartus, whose purpose was to bring Orientals into the circle of lbabor, to establish them within it as reasonable standards and conditions.... This apparatus included many workers, such as vocational teachers, social workers, counselors at labor bureaus and schools, and probation officers and street club leaders. This apparatus was composed essentially of Ashkenazim, with its activity directed principally towards Orientals."

"The growth of the educational system stemmed first and foremost from the growth of the student population. The proportion of Orientals in that growth was much greater, both because of their larger proportion in the mass immigration and because of the greater number of youngsters among them. But in terms of those employed, the expanded educational system supplied many new positions in particular to Ashkenazim."

The Orientals constitute the majority of consumers of welfare services in the country. But, welfare budgets are not transferred directly to the consumers. Educational services are provided by teachers: Health services are provided by nurses and doctors; welfare services are provided by social workers. This is the large apparatus, manned in particular by Ashkenazim. Every increase in the social service budget means an expansion of this apparatus. Every program to renovate neighborhoods means sources of income for the contractors, sociologists, and architects. Social services can solve the social problems of Orientals only through the increase of the profits of the Ashkenazim. Social services, which are supposed to reduce the gaps, contribute to their widening and perpetuation. This is the view of Savirski.

Asher Edan says: "The Chinese legend tells about the very rich man who used to give out free fish to the poor people of his city. They said to him: 'What a good man'. but the poor people of the city said: 'We don't want fish. Give us the net.' This is also the problem of Orientals in Israel. Instead of giving them nets, the government gives them fish. The nets remain in the hands of the Ashkenazim."

[31 Jul 81 p 11]

[Text] Dodo Topaz: "Chakh-chakhim," and the whole country was shocked, especially the Ashkanazic segment of it.

The history of insult, which follows this expression, was the clearest articulation of a bad conscience. "Chah-chahim" (mocking the way North Africans pronounce French) is insulting, racist, and almost as bad as "Frenk" or "schwartze khaye" which preceded it, despicable expressions.

On the other hand, "needing special help" is an academic cultured respectable expression. One does not feel a sense of guilt when he utters it. On the contrary, he is showing understanding, an open mind, a partnership in destiny, and a readiness to help.

But a thousand "chah-chahim" does not equal in negative value one "needing special help." Because "chah-chahim" is at worst an adjective. "Needing special help" is an operative term. It covers the educational oversights of a complete generation.

The term is not an Israeli invention. It exists wherever one ethnic groups seeks to perpetuate its superiority over another ethnic group. In Israel it was adopted by the political and educational system, and perhaps it unconsciously helped the veteran Ashkenazic community perpetuate its superiority over the new immigrants, the Orientals.

Lurking behind the term "needing special help" is a whole social educational philosophy, based on myths which many modern sociologists feel are lacking any basis. This philosophy maintains that in every society, in addition to primary disadvantage, which is from birth, there is secondary disadvantage, which is the result of social or cultural neglect. This disadvantage is the result of environment.

When the secondary disadvantage applies to children of an outer directed nature, who are affected by external conditions of life and are out off from internal factors such as sensitivity or values, the result is those who are characterized as "needing special help." Those needing special help are deficient in their ability to perceive and to abstract, and qualities such as rationalization and responsibility are weak, in comparison to regular children.

Even if this concept is not fundamentally rejected, as it is by many experts throughout the world, its very application in a general way to one population group, in comparson to a neighboring population group, is a type of social distortion. This is what has happened in Israel.

From the day that the social establishment became aware of the existence and seriousness of the problem called the "ethnic gap" it tried to solve it by means of the educational system. In 1968, after 2 years of consideration, the Interparliamentary Committee for Study of the Educational Structure decided upon an educational reform, which was passed by the Knesset.

It was explicitly determined then that the goals of the reform were "raising the level of instruction and educational achievement; reduction of the gap existing between children in the country in the level of education and the prospects of integration into society and a progressing economy."

At that time, in the Ministry of Education and Culture, a committee was set up to carry out the reform, which decided that one of the targets of the reform was: "acceleration of the processes of integration of members of various ethnic communities and classes into society."

Orientals were defined as "needing special help" and the way to raise their educational and cultural level and abilities to adapt to Israeli society was the magic word--integration.

By marking a whole ethnic community with the label "needing special help" it was assumed from the outset that members of that ethnic group were inferior, failures, suffering from secondary disadvantage, having limited ability to perceive, primitive, but not of their own fault but rather because of the environmental conditions under which they were raised.

The identity which was created between the term "needing special help" and the Orientals was a sign of identifying failure, just as the term "ethnic group" was identified only with Orientals. The Ashkenazim, coming from Poland or Germany, are not an ethnic group. This identification mark was angering and destructive. It angered those who were defined as "needing special help" as opposed to those who sought to help them and bring them up to their level, by an absolute denial of their tradition, culture, ideas, and way of life.

It defeated integration, since integration means unification. But unification can only occur between equals. Integration between inferiors and superiors is only a word which covers the desire of one component to swallow up the other component. In this way it creates a negative self image among those who are unjustly characterized as "needing special help."

Today there is almost complete unanimity among educators and sociologists that reject the reform in education, because integration by means of the educational system has failed.

The Public Committee for Study of Reform of the Educational System, which published its report in April 1979, determined among other things: "The second target of the reform--an acceleration of the processes of social integration--was not in practice dealt with, both organizationally as well as pedagogically...."

An inter-university seminar, in which most of the educationists of the country participated, spent 2 years in analyzing integrationist education. In November 1979 its conclusions were published:

"It appears to us, that in spite of the expanded use of the term "integration" it is not possible to find a clear definition or formulation of the goals of integrationist education." This is what the team of Israeli educators determined. "In our opinion, it is possible to deal with integration in the two following ways: As a goal in itself, or as a means of achieving national and educational goals which are defined."

The goals of the approach which viewed integration as a means were: Granting equal opportunity in education, improving the achievement level of students requiring special help and closing the gap between them and others, and improving positions through nurturing sound social relations between various population groups.

In spite of the fact that here and there it was possible to point to certain successes, in general national terms not one of these goals was achieved.

"We found that the almost sole educational solution within the integrationist framework is to divide the class into levels to enable each student to advance according to his ability. But most of the progams and educational materials prepared until now have been directed towards the students in the highest levels, while for the students in the lower levels--who are the ones needing the special attention--very little has been devoted to developing techniques, means of instruction, and special methods of study. The damage which may be caused to the prospects of integration because of this neglect is great, and places in doubt the success of the whole program, and perhaps even its continuation.

"...Not enough has been done to discover the potential which can be gotten from integrationist education. In fact, the term "not enough has been done" is an understatement, and the truth is that those people involved in the issue believe that it is satisfactory to achieve physical integration--seating students who need special help with students who have developed... so as to achieve the expected results. It is necessary to achieve integration but this is not a sufficient condition! Additional conditions must be maintained so that integration will yield positive fruits."

These are the conclusions of the experts who said from the start that integration was necessary.

Instead of integration being a meeting between cultures, of reciprocal enrichment, of mutual encouragement, it has become a tool of oppression and absolute negation of the values, traditions, worldview, and thinking of one ethnic group--that characterized as 'needing special help'. This type of integration cannot succeed.

In spite of the fact that apparently integration did open a way for giving equal educational opportunities--it increased the inequality. The most palpable example of this is perhaps what happens today in academic institutions in Israel.

The proportion of Orientals--native Israelis born to parents from Asia and Africa--among the student population in Israel was for many years extremely small; around 12 percent. In order to encourage interest in instutitions of higher learning and to increase the number of Orientals studying in them, a series of steps were devised to give them preference.

Within the framework of a special program of the Hebrew University--"the Program for Public Activists"--last year about 3000 Oriental students studied at academic institutions. In the coming academic year their number will rise to 4000. The tuition for these students is paid by the Sephardic Community Department of the Zionist Union and the Jewish Agency.

The director general of the department, Eli Artsi (39), born in Morocco, who immigrated to Israel with his parents in 1952, living in the Kastel Ma'abara, sent from there to the boarding school Nitsanim, where he later became the educational director of that institution, relates: "At the beginning the goal of this project was to train cadres of leaders from the Oriental community. We took leaders from the development towns who had already reached senior positions but who lacked formal education, and we sent them to study at the universities at our expense and at the expense of the Department for Rehabilitating Neighborhoods.

"Later, needs dicated a change in the character of the project. We take in students from development towns and poor neighborhoods, who have the congnitive ability to progress but who do not have the ability to finance their education. We push them to continue and complete their academic studies.

"From the moment that a student begins this program, we track him. So that his involvement with the program will be real, he is required to contribute so as to participate in various programs. He does tutoring in development towns. He participates in prisoner rehabilitation programs. There are seminars and study days at which we discuss topics such as political and social problems of the country. We do not want the student to live in a hot house, but to become involved in what is happening on campus, in his town, and neighborhood, as well as in the whole country."

"But," says Eli Artsi, "I don't want this program to exist at all. I weep over it. Because what happens in actuality? A student from the Oriental community comes to register at the university. Lacking the means, he tries to clarify the conditions of study, immediately he is sent to the Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency, which means: All of those state budgets which the university gets are intended only for the Ashkenazic and Arab communities. For the Sephardic community there is a Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency.

"And not only that--for the students which we send, the university collects from us tuition of 120 percent of the regular tuition. Because we are a financing institution. If I were to give the money directly to the students so that they could register and pay the regular tuition, I would be able to increase their number by 20 percent. Because we pay directly to the institution, we pay 120 percent. This is robbery! This must be stopped! I am always complaining to the Agency about it.

"Why does there have to be a Department for Sephardic Communities in the Agency? So that it will be a solution for the Oriental students? This is absurd. This is a national problem, which the state of Israel has to confront, and not just the Agency. Why doesn't the Agency have a Department for Ashkenazim, which would bear the heavy educational burden for those from Europe and America?

"I am rebelling against this absurdity! I see it as part of the general system which was created to give the Sepharadim cover in all of the systems. I am revolted by the name which they have given to the department which I head. First, they create the problem, and later they complain--what do you want? Look you are getting and receiving. This is how they fulfill their obligation.

"When I hear the expression "you and we" or "they and we" I shudder. The leaders of the country do not understand that this seemingly innocent expression contains the seed of fragmentation and even civil war."

Eli Artsi sees the root of the problem in the conception which has been perpetuated since the beginning of the mass immigration from the Oreintal countries.

"No one has yet studied and investigated which communities come to Israel, and which culture is behind them. What is their mentality? They simplify it and say: These people come from Islamic countries which are technologically backward. They make the analogy that technological backwardness means being backward developmentally and culturally. No one here has noted that the culture which is being labeled as backward is the culture of Maimonides, Yehuda Ha-Levi, Haim ben-Atar and others.

"That magnificent culture, which was rooted in the Jewry of North Africa, has lost its originality here. They have asked us to be swallowed up. But they have not given us a substitute. When they saw the results of this approach, it was already too late.

"The same educational-cultural crisis which began in the first years of the stats have persisted until today, and it is leaving its mark in the political sphere. The coming earthquake will be a very sever one.

"I personally have witnessed a new phenomenon recently: Families of Orientals are tying to organize, in groups of 20-25, so as to emigrate from the country as a unified group, More than once I have confronted them and debated and tried to convince them. Because I know that if this process begins--God forbid--no one will be able to stop it."

[7 Aug 81 pp 11, 28]

[Text] The atmosphere in the office of the chairman of the administrative committee of the Broadcasting Authority is tense. The chairman is professor Reuven Yaron. Representatives of a group of intellectuals and humanists of the Oriental community who have met with him spoke in loud voices. They demanded that he cancel the showing of a television series on Zionism called "The Pillar of Fire.' They claim that the series has ignored the contribution of Orientals to Zionism. Their demand was rejected with formal justifications.

When the meeting ended and the representatives of the group remained alone, one of them burst out in a shout. He was the young poet and lyricist, a Yemenite whose family was third generation Israeli. The frustration an despair broke forth without stop.

He called upon his colleagues: "Let's decide now to occupy this television building. Five thousand people! There will be blood, weapons, a few bombs, a few grenades, a few killings, but brutal! Real brutal! By force! This is the only power we have in this country!"

It is doubtful that he really meant the things which he said. There was no echo to them. The series "The Pillar of Fire" was shown without the Orientals storming the Bastille of television. But the fact that this poet and lyricist, who considers himself a humanist, could say such extremist things, indicates the seriousness of the thinking among Oriental humanists. Even if not to the same degree of extremism, this cry characterized the sense of anger shared by writers, lyricists, singers, actors, and communications people among Orientals, who are forced to live in what is an Ashkenazic culture, and to deal with it.

In a series of personal interviews, where identities were not revealed and those interviewed were able to express themselves freely, several of these Oriental humanists gave expression to this sense of cultural seige which they have, in which they believe they live in Israeli society. All of the segments quoted below are taken from those interviews, which are published in the book by the socoiolgist Shlomo Savirski, "...Not Failures, But Foiled."

Uzi, the Yemenite poet and lyricist, who made the call for war against television, said: "If I never experienced exile in the Diaspora, I have felt it here in Israel. I am a Sabra but I feel as though I am in exile. This is a lousy feeling. Sometimes I propose radical solutions, because I have had it, I am no longer patient....

"When you talk about culture, it never has anything to do with the East. In every way, it is an Ashkenazic conception: We must undergo a re-education to know what true culture is--and the true culture is that of Europe. Anything which we brought with us must be destroyed...."

Haim, who is a writer and playwright, born in Morocco, says: "You feel it all along the way, at every step.... You simply feel emasculated, orphaned, isolated, and depressed. You are an undesireable, a stranger, unneeded--uninteresting in your culture. Your music is not their music, your songs are not their songs, and of course your values are not their values....

"All the television heroes are Ashkenazic.... The communications media formulate experience, they create the images, and if you will, they create the psychology of the peole.... The people which is created, or the psychology which is created, the images and the heroes which are created--all of it is Ashkenazic. I am waiting to see when they will create a Moroccan hero, or a Tunisian or Algerian hero.... Sometimes you listen and get the feeling that they are broadcasting with antennae in another country, and you seek shelter in another country. There is no communication...."

Says David Hamo, who in 1977 was the founder of a group at the University of Haifa, called "Yated", which worked towards the goal of establishing an enlightened, just, unalienated society with the values of which all Israeli citizens would be able to identify: "When I see a Naomi Shemer program on television, I call my Ashkenazic wife and say: 'Look, an Ashkenazic television program.' I do not find myself in any of Maomi Shemer's songs. Every holiday eve, every Friday evening, I sit in front of television of the Ashkenazim. An Ashkenazi speaks about my problems in an Ashkenazic context, not that of an Israeli.... Or when there are songs by Naomi Shemer, or "Songs of Grass", I always see very specific faces on the lawn, a very specific experience in which I have no part or interest."

In the heat of the last elections, a new expression came into use: Two cultures, or according to another form: "They-us. One can understand the negativity of the situation from these expressions. It is as though there is a national fault in the existence of two cultures under one nationality, or as though one culture is preferable over another.

Both the determination and the significance attached to it are in error. Central schools in modern sociology not only do not reject cultural diversity in one society, but they affirm societies in which there are various ethnic groups which respect one another and which develop their own special cultural qualities.

The sociologist Yohanan Peres of the University of Tel Aviv, says in his book "Ethnic Relations in Israel": "A pluralistic ideology is based not only on the pursuit of justice, but also on a certain conception of national culture. By vain efforts to achieve acknowledged achievments in society, the minority group member casts off his culture, substitutes and "imitation" for the original, and thus "contributes" to the impoverishment of the sources of cultural creativity.... Only a group having a collective memory formed over generations can serve as a fruitful soil for artistic creativity. Moreover, a homogeneous culture, because of an internal or external crisis, can run into a blind alley, while a pluralistic culture is able to overcome such a situation by forming new foundations from its many sources."

By nature, there should exist in Israel, side by side, two cultures, that of the Orientals and that of the Westerners. Each of them brought its own cultural heritage with it. It is not expressed only through literary or artistic works, but also through a different system of ideas regarding the world view and relations between people, or in a different order of priorities regarding the realization of goals.

But in Israel there are not two equal cultures each nourishing the other. There is a dominant culture and alongside it a dominated culture. Yohanan Peres says: "While the Ashkenazic communities drew together so that by the second generation there was a complete blend, the Oriental communities have been united only in their sense of neglect. The similarity in the ways of life of these communities is recognizable when they are compared, but it does not serve as a basis for collaboration in patterns of culture."

In an article which was published in "Makhbarot Le-Mekhqar u-Vikoret", the sociologist Devorah Bernstein argues that the rejection of a cultural program, or the rejection of the very existence of a culture among the Oriental communities was accompanied by a dehumanization, with the negation of their very existence as human beings. Leaders, sociologists, humanists, and officials viewed the Oriental communities which immigrated to Israel en masse as to people in absolute need of culture, as though they were primitives lacking in the ability to make independent judgment, lacking an identity and maturity. These deficiencies were supposed to be filled, as Ben Gurion claimed in his time, with "a deep and pure love," by the absorbing Ashkenazic culture, which would convert this "human dust into a cultural nation."

As a result, Oriental culture was repressed. Western culture, represented by the Ashkenazim, dominates all spheres of cultural creativity as well as the communications media. Isolated attempts to foster cultural creativity among the Orientals are judged and criticized according to the standards of Western cultural values.

One of the clearest examples of this is the "Festival of Oriental Music," which is held separately from the "Festival of Israeli Music." The Israeli festival, or as it is called "in the style of the Oriental communities," represents a community. Oriental music and song are given expression so that no one will level accusations of intentional discrimination. But they remain not belonging, or at best, they represent at most a sub-culture.

Official statistics confirm the claim. Orientals are not consumers of culture. This leads to the conclusion that they are culturally inferior.

At the beginning of the year, the Central Bureau of Statistics published the results of a survey on the reading and entertainment habits of the adult Jewish population. The survey, which was made between January and May of 1979, at the request of the Ministry of Education and Culture, testifies to substantial differences in the consumption of culture between African-Asians and European-Americans.

Among Orientals, 57.4 percent attended a cultural event outside of their homes at least once a month, as compared to 60.3 percent of Ashkenazim, and 77.7 percent of native Israelis who were the children of native Israelis. While attendance at movies was almost equal between the two groups, light entertainment was attended by only 7.2 percent of Orientals as compared to 15.6 percent of Ashkenazim; only 7.2 percent of Orientals attended the theater, as compared to 15.6 percent of Ashkenazim; 15.9 percent of Orientals visited a museum, as compared to 23 percent of Ashkenazim, and concerts were attended by one 1.3 percent of Orientals, as compared to 9 percent among Ashkenazim.

Even in listening to radio programs and reading the newspapers, the rate is lower among Orientals than among those from Western countries. On the other hand the rate of watching television was almost equal between the two communities.

For example, while 91 percent of those from Western countries read a daily newspaper, among Orientals only 69.6 percent read a daily paper. Among those from Europe and America 62.3 percent read at least one book a month, while among Orientals the rate is only 38.2 percent.

But one cannot conclude from the findings of these surveys the true rate of consumption of culture among Orientals and Ashkenazim. Since in most cases, what is considered is to supply of the dominant culture, the Ashkenazic culture, the surveys at most show the degree of consumption of Ashkenazic cultural products among the consumers of culture who are both Orientals and Ashkenazim. The index of consumption which was measured was for the most part clearly Wester. When one measures consumption of concerts, theater, museums, and even radio, one is talking about cultural products which are controlled by the Ashkenazim.

If there existed in Israel, side by side, two cultures, responding to the specific needs of the various communities; if there existed Oriental theater, concerts of Oriental music, and Oriental radio--it is doubtful if there would be a gap in cultural consumption between Orientals and Ashkenazim.

There is also an economic reason for the present gap in cultural consumption

Since there is a congruence between ethnic origin and level of income, property, and allocation of national resources, it is only natural that there would be a congruence between ethnic origin and cultural consumption. Cultural products are not given away free. They cost money. As available income per capita increases the spending for consumption of culture rises.

So, there exists another official survey which proves that among Orientals, the average expenditure for educational needs and culture is higher than that among Westerners.

In June of this year, the Central Bureau for Statistics published the results of the "Survey of Family Spending" which was conducted in fiscal year 1979-1980. Among other things this survey showed tht the average income of Ashkenazic families--coming from Europe and America--was 8.5 percent higher than the average income of those born in Asia and Africa.

A shocking detail: The survey finds that the income from wages of an Oriental family was greater than that of an Ashkenazic family, but since in the average Ashkenazic family income from capital was almost double that of the average Oriental family, the sum total of all its income exceeded that of the Oriental family.

The survey indicates that while the largest expense of an Ashkenazic family is for housing, the largest expense for an Oriental family was for food. But in the category of spending for education, culture, and entertainment, the spending of an Oriental family was 6.2 percent greater than that of an Ashkenazic family. The highest expense stems, apparently, from the difference in the average number of persons per family. In an Ashkenazic family, the average number of persons is 2.5, while in Oriental families it is four.

The difference in the average number of persons per family explains why the average Oriental family spends about 55 percent more than an Ashkenazic family for educational service. But in the rest of the categories of expenses for education and culture, the differences do not always stem from family size.

Thus, for example, it appears that the average Oriental family spends 67 percent more for cultural and entertainment events, and 23.8 percent more for cultural products and current entertainment thatn the average Ashkenazic family. On the other hand, the average Ashkenazic family spends about 15 percent more on newspapers, books, and writing equipment, and 78 percent more for recreation and trips.

In sum, expenditures for education, culture, and entertainment constitute 7.6 percent of theincome of an Oriental family and only 6 percent of the total income of an Ashkenazic family.

These figures show that when one measures consumption of culture by spending, and not by the number of visits to cultural and entertainment events, or frequency of reading books and newspapers, there are no significant gaps between the two ethnic groups.

The gap exists in supply, not in consumption. The lack of expression for the culture peculiar to Orientals is interpreted among many of them as a negation of their honor and a blurring of their independent identity. When this factor is added to other factors, such as the gap in income and distribution of resources or the imbalance in political representation, it fans the flames of frustration and enmity.

In his research on ethnic relations in Israel, the sociologist Yohanan Peres states: "With the improvement of living conditions, educational possibilities, with vocational training, a whole class of Orientals is forming which is able to hold senior positions in many fields.

"But the thorn is this: With the coming together, the lower classes take over the middle or even upper class characteristics. But their inability to realize in theory and practice the desired way of life creates a sense of being neglected, which in turn causes a series of phenomena: Cheap imitation, flight from reality, and the attempt to take by unorthodox means what is beyond one's reach....

"Indeed, if the ethnic gap is not reduced, the sense of neglect may lead to a destructive outburst."

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SUCCESS OF INTEGRATION ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR 31 Jul 81 p 16

[Article by Yehuda Gotthelf: "Ethnic Integration in Theory and Practice"]

[Text] The storm of the 10th Knesset elections has subsided, and public life has returned to normal. But one cannot ignore the ethnic tension which left its mark on the election system, and which left us years behind in the process of ethnic integration. Have we failed in the principal mission of Zionism? Or is the pessimistic evaluation wrong in that it was only developed to exploit political differences?

Any objective comparison made not in the heat of an election will reveal that among countries of the world which contain ethnic differences, Israel has in a very short time and under emergency conditions achieved an impressive national unity, which other countries have not achieved even after hundreds of years of existence. It is Israel which in one generation increased its population five-fold; which absorbed immigrants from dozens of countries speaking various languages, and which shaped one people speaking one language. India, which gained its independence at about the same time as Israel, today speaks several hundred languages, and only the language of the colonial rulers has become the common language of all Indians. Ireland, which broke away from Britain, did not succeed in reviving its national language, and still the Irish speak English. In the language of Bernard Shaw: "two peoples, whose common language separates them." This is the case in dozens of "developing" countries on various continents, who do not have one common language, but find themselves in the generation of Babel.

In spite of the burden of security and poverty of natural resources, Israel, which numbered only 600,000 at its birth, undertook to assure employment, housing, and education for all those who came to it. The mass immigration occurred in the first years of the state's existence at a time when it lacked means despite the aid from Jews in the diaspora. It is no wonder that the conditions of absorption were such as to cause concern. Lack of administrative experience, which gave rise to a bureaucracy, did not improve the situation.

The truth is that the immigrations from before the establishment of the state did not experience very good integration. In fact, they encountered hostility on the part of the foreign rulers (Turkish and British), and rigidity on the part of

the Jewish community (the old and the new), which did not make easy the integration of the immigrants in work, housing, and social life. Each wave of immigration had to overcome the tendencies of conservatism and egoism of the preceding wave, which looked down upon those who came after it. The Sephardis of the old community did not look with favor on the Ashkenazim. The Russians, the Yemenites, the Poles, the Germans, the Rumanians, and others all served as a target for the arrows of criticism and mockery on the part of the veterans.

Even during the pre-state period there were certain signs of a socio-cultural differentiation. But it was limited. "East" and "West" went their separate ways, and there were only a few exchanges, because there was no contact between them and therefore there was no talk of "ethnic problems." Indeed, the national-historical conception which prevailed in most of conscious society, left no doubt that the differences and contradictions between the immigrants from various countries were commutative. Without exaggerating the "racial purity" of the people of Israel over the generations, in general there was no substantive genetic difference between Jewish groups in the Diaspora, because of the Jewish heritage, common Jewish fate, and the longing of all for redemption. So, the geopolitical and social background of the Diaspora changed from time to time. During a certain period the cultural level of the Islamic countries was higher, and the Jews of those countries in those times were at the pinnacle of Jewish culture and left us an important heritage. At a later period, the center of gravity of civilization shifted to other regions, and the Jews of more enlightened countries became the bearers of spiritual renaissance and the pioneers of the national and social movements of the Jewish people.

In spite of the differences in cultural level of the Jewish groups in the Diaspora, which were influenced by their various environments, our battle for existence and the study of Torah in all of the Diasporas "sharpened" the minds of the children of Israel, and this provided the basis for settlement of the generations in days gone by--on a high shared cultural level for all of the ethnic groups of Israel. The Zionist-socialist conception strengthened faith in this positive process: even if there is still a difference in the conditions of existence (either as a result of historic background or as a result of the pangs of absorption at the beginning of the state) and even if there are differences in class corresponding to a certain degree with the ethnic background (there are extremely wealthy persons among non-Ashkenazim), social progress will reduce these differences to the point of ending them. Thus the Labor Movement believed that the workers of the various ethnic groups would constitute a single working class, and this class would lead to the formation of a single people, a working people.

The progressive process of integration had an effect, for since the 1950's, almost no attempt to form an ethnic party has succeeded. But in the elections for the 10th Knesset we witnessed a sorry attempt to turn back the wheel of development and deepened the rift, both in the religious camp and the labor camp--against an ethnic background. No longer "from class to people" but "from a people to ethnic classes." Is there any justification for this?

The integration of those who came from various Diasporas is still not complete. And the reasons are known. There was "reality of deprivation," the result of hundreds of years of dispersion among peoples of various cultural levels, and it

caused the differences in the "starting points" for various groups of immigrants. For many oriental immigrants, coming to Israel was the first contact with "Western" civilization, with modern technology and political-social relations to which they were unaccustomed. Only 58.5 percent of the immigrants from Asia and Africa knew how to read and write, (in any language) as compared to 95 percent of the immigrants from Europe. The education gap was the principal factor in the employment trade structure of those coming from Asia and Africa; this meant that they were concentrated in agriculture and industrial trades. with relatively low income as compared to the employment of those coming from western countries, where a worker earns a relatively high income.

Castigation (and self-castigation) in this issue is exaggerated, because industrial distribution according to country of origin will only be solved by raising the level of education.

Distorted differences in the level of housing have also developed. Following the formal approach of mechanical equality in the distribution of dwellings, immigrants were granted equal housing, without regard for the differences in the number of persons in families. In time, this distortion was corrected to some extent. But in general, people do not point to achievements, but rather at what has not yet been achieved. Also, changes in authorities, following the "revolution" contributed very little to closing the gap. But the political demagogery of the Likud, which feeds on ethnic rivalries, is not obliged to be precise.

Difficult housing conditions were especially hard on families blessed with many children, who were unable to give proper conditions for development to their offspring, all the more so when parents were unable to help children in their studies. The fact that many of those of the cultural upper classes in the lands of Islam did not accompany the mass immigration, but preferred to go to Western countries, also did not help to even the socio-cultural balance of forces in this developing country.

But even the most ill willed could not prove that in the first decades of the state there was intentional discrimination against ethnic groups. The Compulsory Education Law (1950) was the first step in closing the gap in education. It is worth noting that Israel is the only country of Asia and Africa (except for Japan) which has succeeded in realizing such a law, in both theory and practice. But in poor neighborhoods and development towns there were at first fewer licensed teachers (the number of trained teachers in the mass immigration was very small). In raising cultural quality there is no shortcut, a fortiori that the gap among children begins at a very early age (for years greater attention has been devoted to kindergartens). It is no secret that while children of oriental origin constitute 80 percent of the pupils in first grade, their percentage declines to 19 in universities. Even though there has been progress in this area over the years, things are still not right. Yet there is no doubt that in various spheres--housing, livelihood, etc--the first two decades of government and Histadrut activity have brought about a gradual reduction of the gaps, in comparison to the preceding years.

In the decade preceding the "revolution" of the Likud, the number of persons living below the poverty line was reduced from 20 percent to 6.5 percent. (Since

1977, there has been a turn for the worse.) In 1960 there were 105,000 families living in deficient housing (three or more persons per room). In 1970 their number had declined to 50,000, and in 1977 there were only 23,000 families living three or more persons to a room.

Most strange is the claim that the immigration from the countries of Islam, which came after the creation of the state, bore the principal burden of population dispersal (the creation of development cities), and that this was one of the factors in the gap. So, from the beginning sophisticated industrial plants were not built there. Was there capital and trained workers necessary for this? There are those who have compared the dispersal of population to the cultural and economic development of the western countries at the expense of exploitation of colonial countries! But the analogy does not hold. Even "veteran" settlements were at first far from the "centers." Was it a mistake for the state to seek the development of desolate regions of the country? Kibbutzim and moshavim also bore the burden of dispersal, and their populations are varied ethnically. Tensions have recently surfaced between them and the populations of the development towns. The hatred-jealousy is meaningless. The rise of the standard of living of the kibbutzim is not the result of capital deals and brokering, but of collective labor and creativity. If the kibbutzim had not made these achievements after years of labor, we would have seen in their continued poverty the bankruptcy of Zionism in general, and of labor Zionism in particular. The kibbutz movement is open to members of all ethnic groups who are ready to join it. Can we ignore the fact that it established factories and employed--at first under compulsion--hired workers who did not want to join kibbutz life? (It is to be hoped that the kibbutz will be able to find a solution to the problem by eliminating hired labor, or by sharing responsibility and profits with the hired workers.)

Another complaint which has been heard repeatedly deals with the matter of representation. But it is natural that immigrations which came later would be in a position inferior to that of earlier immigrations which had already established a certain base. In the past, there was a preference for immigrants from Russia and Poland over German immigrants; but over the years the integration process has taken its course. This is also the case for representation of Oriental ethnic groups, which is steadily expanding. Their share in the Labor Party Center has reached 38 percent, and among secretaries of the Workers Councils--65 percent. Mayors of development towns are non-Ashkenazic. There are still some feelings of frustration because of lack of representation in the highest levels of government and the Histadrut (Hevrat Ovdim and Kupat Holim), and the distortion should be corrected at a faster pace.

In social life, a paradoxical phenomenon has appeared more than once: the masses rebel at times which are not especially the lowest in terms of their situation. On the contrary, at times of partial improvement and a lightening of the social burden, the rage of those deprived breaks out with greater force (the subjective sense of deprivation is sometimes greater than the objective deprivation) because the improvement has not been completed or is insufficient. Sometimes the deprived masses ignore the true causes of their deprivation, rebelling against the reformers and being drawn to revolution, or counter-revolution, which nurtures illusions, promises, and seduction.

Those who have engineered the Likud "revolution" have not only not contributed to the continuation of the process of reduction of ethnic-class gaps, but in fact have deepened the social polarity. Nevertheless, they have succeeded in misleading the masses by transferring the political struggle from the social sphere to the arena of national and inter-ethnic group tensions.

7075
CSO: 4323

ASHKENAZI, ORIENTAL CONSUMPTION PATTERNS STUDIED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 31 Jul 81 Economic Supplement p 1

[Article by Yisrael Tomer: Refrigerator and Private Car are Measure of Economic Gap Between Ethnic Groups"]

[Text] It is difficult to measure the sense of ethnic deprivation, as it found emphasized expression in the elections. It is possible to attempt an evaluation of it by standard of living, along the following lines: "Why does Rabinowitz drive a new car with four cylinders, while Rabino is forced to ride a rusty bicycle?" The ownership of a car--or a bicycle--as in the case of other durable goods, can serve as a measure of standard of living.

There are goods, such as an electric refrigerator, television, solar water heater, or electric water heater, and even a sewing machine or washing machine, which are equally owned by everyone. These products are so essential today that ownership of them does not reflect significant gaps in standard of living. In fact they may even testify to the closing of the gap, albeit gradually.

This is not the case with other durable goods, such as a vacuum cleaner, air conditioner, even a telephone, and certainly a private car. To a certain extent, ownership of these goods is a testimony of social class and standard of living.

The Central Bureau for Statistics is publishing additional materials on the survey of family expenditures. The data deals with a period of more than a year ago, but there is no reason to assume that the gap in ownership of durable goods, according to ethnic group, has changed appreciably in the meantime.

A comparison of the data on ownership of expensive durable products among families originating in the West and the East clearly points to significant gaps, which stem from differences in standard of living, as well as differences in life styles.

A number of conclusions are striking:

The ethnic gap is most striking in the ownership of expensive durable goods, such as private cars, a telephone, or vacuum cleaner. The rate of ownership among families originating in western countries is high, between 35 to more than 50 percent, in comparison to families originating in eastern countries.

Only 4.4 percent of families of eastern origin have air conditioners in their apartments, while among Ashkenazim the number is more than 20 percent, or four times as many.

Only one-quarter of families of eastern origin own private cars. In contrast, more than 36 percent of families originating in Europe and America own cars. This gap is even greater in second generation families. Among families born in Israel, whose parents are Ashkenazic, 75 percent own cars, while only 48 percent of Israeli born families whose parents are of eastern origin own cars.

In the case of two durable goods, there is a gap in favor of persons of eastern origin: solar water heaters and stereo systems. The data indicate that close to 53 percent of families of eastern origin have installed solar water heaters as compared to 39 percent among families originating in western countries.

It also appears that 32 percent of families originating in Asia or Africa have stereo systems in their homes, while among those of western origin, only 30 percent or less have purchased such systems.

Another phenomenon worthy of attention is that among young native Israeli families of western background, there are many more stereophonic systems (65 percent of the families own these) while among native families of oriental background, only 45 percent own such systems.

In ownership of other durable goods there is almost no difference in terms of ethnic group; if there is a difference it is of little significance. It is apparent that close to 100 percent of the families in Israel today own refrigerators; about 90 percent own television sets (in the survey it was indicated that 8 percent of the families own color televisions; but since the data was collected, this figure rose to about one-third of all families, but with respect to ethnic distribution there are as yet no figures). Seventy-five to 80 percent of all families own a washing machine.

The following table represents difference in ownership, according to ethnic background, of a number of durable goods. The data, based on findings of the Central Bureau for Statistics, reflect (in percentages) the share of families within that ethnic group, who own one or another product. Ethnic affiliation is determined according to the continent of birth of the family head in relation to the origin of native Israelis which is determined by the place of birth of the father.

Who Owns What? According to Ethnic Origin
(In percentages, of the total number of families of that origin)

	Coming from		Native Israelis	
Type of Goods	East	West	East	West
Ovens (gas-electric)	73	60	83	70
Electric refrigerator	99	99	99	100
Electric blender	51	56	57	74

Washing machine	81	74	88	87
Vacuum cleaner	25	55	22	48
Television set	89	89	88	48
Stereo system	32	30	45	65
Tape recorder	9	14	11	22
Air conditioner	4	20	4	17
Solar water heater	53	39	35	26
Electric water heater	42	53	59	58
Telephone	55	73	48	76
Car	25	36	43	72

7075
CSO: 4323

JORDANIAN VIEWS ON EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI No 227 7-13 Sep 81 p 19

[Article by Fuad Naim: "Cheysson Announces the Death of the European Initiative"]

[Text] "Owing to the existing ties between the Common Market countries and the United States, no European initiative at variance with the Camp David accords is possible at this time. It is better, therefore, that Europe desist from evolving such an initiative." This statement, it seems, is a fair summary of the substance of the discussions that took place last week in Paris and Amman between King Husayn and President Francois Mitterrand on one hand, and between Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson of France and Prime Minister Mudor Marwan and Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim of Jordan on the other.

To underscore this point, Mr Cheysson had previously declared that his government believes that any initiative toward a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East must originate with the countries of the region itself.

It seems clear, therefore, that the French Government intends to sound the death knell of the European initiative. This explains why the Jordanian officials were less than enthusiastic about Foreign Minister Cheysson's view, and why his Jordanian counterpart Marwan al-Qasim found it necessary to tell Mr Cheysson that he [al-Qasim] was still hopeful that France and Europe would play a more effective role in the region. Despite this reserved Jordanian response, however, there are no major differences between the two countries.

While there is no European initiative at this time, however, there are, nevertheless, secret and public French attempts to narrow the gap between the Israeli and American positions on one hand and the Arab countries' position on the other. While Mr Cheysson was careful to specify the points which his country supports, his list did not go beyond the traditional condemnation of forceful occupation of territory and France's belief that every people has the right to self-determination. It is noteworthy that Mr Cheysson's position remained unchanged despite his Jordanian counterparty's attempt to explain that a path toward a just peace could be established by convincing Israel to halt its expansionist policy and reconsidering the unjust and arbitrary laws imposed on the inhabitants of the occupied territory.

The French and Jordanians did agree, however, that the United States must, one way or another, abandon the Camp David accords and settle for a special role as a super-

power alongside the Soviet Union in a UN-sponsored peace effort. The UN resolutions [on the Middle East], both sides agreed, could serve as a foundation for a peaceful settlement in an international conference open to all parties.

In the meantime, as we await the realization of these "grandiose principles," France must, as its foreign minister made clear, continue to seek solutions to local disputes in the region, such as in Lebanon, for example. This attitude leaves observers in Amman puzzled as to whether the West is about to embark on a new attempt to fragment the issue and seek partial and isolated remedies, which, like the Camp David accords, serve only to advance the interests of the Jewish state.

9063
CSO: 4404/23

COUNTRY'S NONALIGNMENT POLICY REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 22, 23

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] KUWAIT'S EMIR, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, has said he is determined 'to persuade my fellow Gulf leaders of our view that diplomatic relations must be established between their nations and the Soviet Union and socialist countries.' The emir, speaking to Kuwaiti newspaper editors on his return from a ten-day tour of Eastern Europe and Turkey, added that by taking this step 'the Cooperation Council declares tothe world that it is a neutral, independent grouping able to guarantee the security of the Gulf and defend its land and sea by itself.'

None of Kuwait's partners in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain — have diplomatic relations with Soviet bloc countries. Sheikh Jaber told the editors that his special adviser, former finance minister Abdel Rahman al Atiqi, will be briefing these states on his tour of Eastern Europe.

So far, the other Gulf states have made no public announcement or signal that they will accept Kuwait's arguments for such links with Moscow. During the last six months, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have shown signs of softening their attitudes to the Soviet Union. Saudi officials have recently been quoted as saying that, if the US does not provide the arms requested, they would be prepared to look to 'any other country for arms supplies.' Some have refused to exclude the Soviet Union as a potential source.

UAE President Sheikh Zayed was one of the regional leaders won over to the Kuwaiti view that the Soviet Union does not constitute a real threat to the area. In an interview published by the Paris-based Arabic language weekly, *Al Mustaqbal*, last June, he declared 'the Soviet Union is not our enemy.'

He added: 'In order to establish relations with the Soviet Union we will listen to the views of both those opposing and those in favour of it, and then we will take a decision. If the argument not to set up relations with the Soviet Union is based on the view that the ideology of Moscow is anti-religion and anti-Islam, we are sure that this can be eroded by time.'

For Kuwait, such statements are an encouraging sign that some Gulf states are setting out a case for non-alignment. Kuwait has always believed that Gulf security is a purely regional matter. It was the only state in the area which supported President Brezhnev's advocacy — in Delhi late last year — of the Gulf as a region free of superpower intervention, be it in the form of military bases or nuclear weapons.

Kuwait had a pivotal role in establishing the GCC: its secretary-general, Abdullah Bishara, was the former Kuwaiti ambassador to the UN. One of the Gulf's most able diplomats, Bishara reflects his government's policy when he talks about the council. 'Those who believe that the GCC was formed to clash with the Red Army are suffering from delusions, and consider the Gulf as part of the western strategy to defend western interests. Those who think that the Red Army is the major threat to the Gulf are also suffering from nightmares and

delusions,' was the view he expressed at the time of his appointment to the post.

As the GCC was being formed last May, the Soviet media attacked it as a covert pro-western military pact. In response to this initial criticism Kuwait sent its foreign minister, Sheikh Sabah al Ahmad al Sabah, to Moscow to try to calm Soviet suspicions.

Kuwait believes that the main threat to the Gulf is Israel, and that any solution to the real core of the Middle East crisis -- the Palestinians — must involve the Soviet Union. The communique at the end of Sheikh Sabah's visit suggested that Kuwait agreed to a Soviet role in negotiations aimed at finding a solution to the main problem in the region.

For the past decade Kuwait has played an energetic balancing game in the diplomacy of the region, and actively supported the Palestinians. This has given it a degree of credibility among the radical Arab states. Kuwait is also fully aware that the individual Gulf states — with the exception of Saudi Arabia — can do very little on their own to change the course of events in the region. Hence came Kuwait's keenness to form the GCC.

Kuwaitis also feel that the security problems of their small state can only be resolved — to a certain extent — within a larger security pact among neighbouring states with similar problems. Kuwait's security forces were reviewed about three months ago, and important changes were made within senior ranks.

Updating Kuwait's military capabilities is important to the government. As one diplomat put it, 'to know that in the long run, as a state on our own, we cannot defend ourselves does not mean that we do not try our best.' In buying arms as well, the Kuwaitis have shown their commitment to balance: last August they turned down an American offer of 60 improved Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and related equipment. Indeed, diversification of arms sources is one of the government's main aims: 'Kuwait will buy arms from any source which will supply the requirements of its military strategies,' said the defence minister, Sheikh Salim al Sabah.

Diplomatic sources in Kuwait believe that, despite the military delegation's visit to Moscow last month, a European country will eventually provide the required arms.

The British prime minister's visit to Kuwait last Sunday could not have been better timed, for Mrs Thatcher might be able to convince the Kuwaitis that British policy in the Middle East has been reasonably consistent during the last two years.

During the rule of the previous French government, Kuwait was keen to increase cooperation with France. But the new French president has not clarified his position vis-a-vis the Middle East crisis, and it is difficult for a country like Kuwait to establish close ties with it, let alone buy arms.

Since Menachem Begin's visit to Washington last month, it appears clear that the greatest danger for the Gulf now is posed by strategic cooperation between the US and Israel. For Kuwait, this was the time to convince its regional allies — especially Saudi Arabia — to steer away from the pro-western and specifically pro-US line. In its editoral of 15 September, the Kuwaiti daily *al Qabas* came to the conclusion that: 'The people of the Gulf have come to realise more and more that it is time for Saudi Arabia to re-examine its cooperation with the US thoroughly, and to establish new relations on a different basis.'

Kuwait is also taking an active role in regional diplomacy. In recent months, together with the UAE, it has attempted to mediate between Oman and South Yemen in their border dispute. Last month, with tacit Saudi support, it brought together North and South Yemeni leaders to discuss the unification issue.

As long as the Iran-Iraq war does not produce a victor and soon ends, as the Kuwaitis hope, without any side being the loser, Kuwait's reputation in the area will be boosted yet again.

CSO: 4400/31

ECONOMIST URGES STRENGTHENING OF CAPITAL MARKETS

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 42, 43

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] THE MIDDLE EAST needs capital markets with financial institutions which can compete with and complement the business undertaken by the international finance markets, says Hikmat Nashashibi, chief executive of the Al Mal group. 'The lack of local institutions has forced Middle East investment to flow towards the international markets,' Nashashibi said, and added: 'For a Middle East capital market to be viable, it has to meet three aspects of loan demand — domestic, regional and international.'

At a recent meeting on Kuwait organised in London by the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce, Nashashibi spoke on developing the Kuwaiti capital markets: 'Let me stress the organic relationship between the local, regional and international activities of the Kuwaiti capital markets. For Kuwait to become an important centre, it has to develop its local markets. These should become capable of accommodating longer-term domestic loan demand, in local and international currencies, and should also offer more financial instruments to the investor, together with adequate secondary markets to trade these instruments. This will allow growth in the local markets and increase their ability to determine prices. Kuwait's international financial role would thereby acquire a stronger and healthier base.'

The role of Middle East capital markets is primarily 'to convert the demand which already exists in the region into the sort of demand that can be met by means of bonds and loans.

The ten-fold increase in Arab-led eurocredits during the first four months of 1981 compared with the same period in 1980 is greatly welcomed, but activities of Arab financial institutions have not increased at the same rate. This can be attributed to a lack of initiative in merchant banking — which is badly needed in the future recycling of Gulf surpluses. Kuwaiti financial institutions went a long way in creating the local bond issuing business, but the number of transactions carried out by Arab financial bodies is still very limited.

Nashashibi believes that 'efficient' Arab participation in all Middle Eastern investments is necessary, and sees the Al Mal group as the embodiment of many of his ideas and theories. He is the architect and co-founder of the company, which is an investment banking group with paid-in capital of $25m. Based in Luxembourg, it has been in operation since June 1981. The company aims to participate in business between Middle East sources of equity and debt finance and the end-users — in the corporate and government sectors of the world's major industrial countries.

Nashashibi believes that in order to develop their domestic and regional industries, Arabs should change the pattern of their investment on the international markets. For him the main aim is that the Arab investor does not remain merely a lender but helps to build a local financial sector. 'In international investment, the Arabs should see that they are more involved, and that the lending made abroad is channelled

through Middle East financial institutions,' he said. Citing Kuwait as an example, he added: 'In as much as Kuwait aims to process oil locally and build up a petrochemical industry instead of exporting it all in the crude form, it likewise aspires to build a financial sector around exporting capital that does more than merely export funds in the raw cash or deposit form.'

The development of a Middle Eastern capital market, Nashashibi believes, hinges on the creation of the necessary financial instruments, institutions and, most important, legislation, which would enable the financial institutions to function properly and in an orderly manner.

● Hikmat Shariff Nashashibi, 38, is a Jordanian who studied at the American University in Beirut. As a student he worked for a Beirut stockbroker and after graduation was appointed head of the foreign trade department of the Kuwaiti chamber of commerce and industry.

Among the posts he has held are that of general manager of the Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC) and investment manager of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. He still acts as an adviser to KIIC and is vice-chairman of the Jordan Securities Corporation.

Nashashibi has carried out a number of studies on Arab investments and Arab capital, for the Arab League, the board of governors of the Arab Central Banks and for UNCTAD and UNIDO. He is the author of three books, two in Arabic and one in English, on Arab capital markets.

CSO: 4400/31

BRIEFS

OIL TANKER PURCHASE--Kuwait Oil Tankers Company (KOTC), the transport branch of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, is to buy $510m worth of new tankers. The tankers are currently under construction in shipyards in Japan, Korea and Taiwan, according to specifications laid down by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organisation, which establishes standards for ballast pollution, safety and maritime training of crews. KOTC, which earlier this year took delivery of two 80,000-tonne crude carriers, is confident that the market for tankers will pick up in the next two years. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 42]

CSO: 4400/31

BRIEFS

SAUDI ARABIA, TUNISIA AGREEMENT--Saudi Arabia and Tunisia have signed a protocol in Tunis covering the development of agricultural cooperation between the two countries. Amongst the fruits of the agreement was a decision by Saudi Arabia to import large quantities of olive oil, Tunisia's principal agricultural export. Tunisia is to send experts on irrigation, sewage and veterinary medicine to Saudi Arabia. The two countries also wish to set up a joint Saudi-Tunisian fishing company and to exchange scientific, technical and agricultural research. They plan to establish a joint institute for land reclamation, and to expand the exchange of technicians. A training programme is to be set up in Tunisia to train Saudi technicians in agricultural production techniques. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 42, 19 Oct 81 p 6]

CSO: 4500/28

DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION EXAMINED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 638, Oct 81 pp 4-7

[Article: "North Yemen: Precariousness of the Situation Increases in Wake of Recent Clashes and FAI* Lure of Talks for the Reunification of Yemen"]

[Text]

Paradoxes, contradictions and the absence of stability have marked the history of North Yemen from the turn of the century and even more so ever since the Revolution of September 26th, 1962 which established the republic. Twenty years later, North Yemen seems likely to be overwhelmed by thorny issues and bloody conflicts which none of its rulers had ever managed to resolve. This situation has been made even more acute and serious by the accelerated process of polarization that the Gulf region and the African Horn have witnessed in the past year.

During the past year, the Arabian Peninsula has witnessed the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, a 6-state Gulf alliance that North Yemen was not invited to join. At the same time, it also witnessed the signing of a cooperation treaty between South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia, and North Yemen was left out in the cold.

With a State that is barely able to exert its power and control over part of the territory, and a geographical location of formidable strategic importance, overlooking the Bab Al Mandeb Strait, the channel through which oil reaches the outside world, while North Yemen up till now has not yet produced itself a single drop of the precious liquid.

Trying to maintain balanced relations with all, Noth Yemen today finds itself in a strange situation: Soviet military experts coexist with US oil experts prospecting for oil (see below), Soviet Migs and US F-5 fly in its skies. It is also a poor country relying for its survival of financial, economic and military assistance from the West, the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and China. It also has to struggle hard to safeguard its neutrality and to promote the reunification of North and South Yemen despite considerable odds and oppositions while at the same time trying to reinforce its own national unity severely shaken by the fact

that a State in the modern sense of the term means next to nothing to the many tribes that constitute its population. Each of these tribes has its own code of values and rules and places it above the national law and constitution and they often establish strong and sound "friendships" and alliance with outsiders - leaders or states - thus enlarging the gap between Sanaa's aspirations and its reality.

Now that the Middle East and the Arab world are on the brink of yet another major change brought about by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's sudden disappearance and by disagreement of a major sides concerned on the Saudi plan, the question is how North Yemen will survive.

The Problems Besides the paradoxes and contradictions underlined above, North Yemen's precarious stability is underlined by the following factors and developments:

1) A party-less democracy: Seeking, above all, to be a democratic state, North Yemen ended up being a "democracy" without any authorized parties. The National Pact which is currently under study will reportedly define the position of the State about parties, but in the opinion of Prime Minister Abdel Karim Al Iryani, who was recently quoted by the Beirut daily AL NAHAR, the present state of social development in North Yemen does not allow for party pluralism. For this reason, political groupings and parties are not allowed to exist and attempts at forming parties or political organizations are severely crushed.

The absence of parties and political organizations is given, by the North Yemeni opposition, as the main reason why the opposition is resorting to military violence and action to achieve its objectives, since the system does not allow for political action.

2) Major reliance on the armed forces: In the past two years, the North Yemeni President, Ali Abdalah Saleh, has both increased the power and armament of the Army and his own control and power inside the Army. According to most observers, the North Yemeni President is relying on the Army to safeguard democracy inside the country and positive neutralism and non-alignment as far as foreign policy is concerned.

3) There have been over the years , frequent skirmishes between the North Yemeni tribes that have different allegiances. Heavy weaponry was used during these clashes, indicating th e extent of outside support the various tribes enjoy. Skirmishes were also reported between the North Yemeni Army and anti-regime tribes. The Army had to resort to the air force against the tribes.

4) Frequent skirmishes between the Army and the leftist National Democratic Front which regroups Marxists and Nasserists and which enjoys the backing of South Yemen, Libya and-more recently - Syria. The influence pf the NDF inside the country and among many tribes, as well as the support it receives from outside has prompted President Saleh to rely on dialogue and compromise with its leaders and members, and this has earned him the disapproval of officers and officials who favoured heavy blows against the opposition. It has also earned him the antagonism of tribes.

5) The NDF enjoys influence and power in two regions, that which lies close to the South Yemeni border and near the border with Saudi Arabia where it is backed by anti-Saudi feeling among certain tribes. The anti-Saudi feeling dates back to the South Arabia war at the end of which Yemen had to give away the regions of Najran and Jizan to Saudi Arabia.

In order to settle the conflict with the NDF and to avoid more bloodshed, President Ali Abdallah Saleh met with the Front's leaders. After the meeting, he pledged to deal with all the country's regions in the same way as far as social and economic development plans were concerned, to promote equal participation of all in power and to adopt a balanced foreign policy.

The pledges displesased Saudi Arabia which intervened and told Sanaa that t would reconsider its relations and support to North Yemen if President Saleh should go ahead with the project of bringing NDF leaders into the government. President Saleh withdrew his pledge and proposed, instead. to appoint NDF leaders and ambassadors and military attachés abroad. The NDF refused and a new crisis broke out. The clashes which erupted last month in the southern and south-eastern regions were a result of these disagreements.

Most of the NDF operations are commando-like attacks against the Army positions and garrisons, ambushes and the planting of mines. Tension is particularly high in the region of Eb .

6) South Yemen: A South Yemeni delegation took part in the September 26th celebrations marking the anniversary of the revolution, but unity talks between the two countries have reached a deadlock.

The South Yemeni and North Yemeni presidents met last month in Taez, in North Yemen and declared that major steps have been achieved towards unity. According to the Beirut daily AL NAHAR, the Taez meeting ended with an agreement on the following points:

- the withdrawal of heavy weaponry and the formation of a committee to be headed by the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. In addition, military manifestations are to be removed from the region where clashes took place with the NDF forces.

- to speed up work of reunification plans so that a special committee may be appointed to examine political reunification.

- to have North Yemeni refugees in South Yemen return to their country and vice versa, with assurances and guarantees, and on condition that they do not get involved in political activities.

- to implement what was agreed upon in June 1980 in regard to prisoners and media warfare.

Sources in Sanaa had considerd that this agreement was a victory for North Yemen because it provided for the "elimination" of the NDF. But, nothign was implemented.

The re-unification with Aden is problematic, in any case. Sanaa is insisted on a unified but non-aligned state while Aden has already chosen its camp. Sanaa is insisting on using the Shária(Islamic law) as a foundation of the unifed state while South Yemen is ruled by a Marxist party. Furthermore, North Yemen is calling for a referendum on the unified state's system, a request that South Yemen could hardly accept in view of the fact that North Yemen has a population of 8.5 million and South Yemen of 1.5.

With unification efforts in a deadlock, increasing tension between the Sanaa regime and the National Democratic Front*, increasing pressure from the outside , the precariousness of the North Yemeni situation is getting every day more acute.

Observers do not foreclose the possibility of a coup d'état that would topple President Ali Abdallah Saleh on the grounds that he is not strong enough to resist mounting pressures from South Yemen and its allies, the Soviet Union and the NDF and may give in to their demands. At the same time, South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia and the Soviet Union fear that President Saleh may not resist pressures made by Saudi Arabia and the United States for action against the NDF and the leftists and for direct control over the Bab Al Mandeb Strait/

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* The NDF regroups the following banned parties: The Yemeni Labour Party; the Democratic People's Union Party; the Democratic Revolutionary Party; the Popular Vanguard Party, as well as branches of the Baathist and Nasserist parties.

— An "Islamic Front" has recently been formed and sometimes takes part in the fighting against the NDF, it regroups the Moslem Brotherhood and other fundamentalist Islamic organizations.

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END

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ARAB AID TO CARIBBEAN STATES ON INCREASE

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 35

[Text]

THE RECENT Opec loans to the Dominican Republic ($10m) and Dominica ($1m) show the extent to which, within Latin American, the Caribbean states are benefiting from the assistance programmes of various Arab-backed development funds.

During the past two years, Opec and the Iraqi Fund for External Development (IFED) disbursed 63.5 per cent of the $113.6m loaned to Latin America to the Caribbean. The loans were either interest-free or carried rates below Libor. Other generous terms included a 15-20 year repayment period and a two- to five-year grace period. Venezuela used its influence to persuade Opec to channel some of its business to Latin America's poorest countries.

Opec loans have never exceeded $10m for any one transaction and have concentrated on short-term problems rather than financing infrastructure projects. This year's loans to Grenada, Dominica and the Dominican Republic were granted to support these countries' balance of payments.

IFED, on the other hand, gives out larger individual loans, particularly for infrastructural projects. The Iraqi Fund granted $43.2m for Jamaica's South Manchester alumina plant and back in 1979 Iraq gave Grenada $185,000 to build the Point Salines international airport. Since 1980 IFED has not signed any new loans for Latin America because of the damage sustained by the Iraqi economy as a result of the Gulf war.

Libya, Algeria and Syria have also been active in the Caribbean. While these countries do not possess specialised agencies to handle development aid, they have already offered Grenada a gift of $10m. Last year Libya granted Jamaica a soft loan of $50m after Kingston's negotiations with the IMF broke down.

These gifts and cheap loans seek to bring Third World oil exporters and importers closer together to deal with the highly industrialised countries. From the Arab viewpoint, they are also a means of increasing international support on issues such as the Middle East conflict or the battle for the Western Sahara. For example, six of the nine Latin American states that have so far recognised the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic are in the Caribbean.

It remains to be seen whether Saudi Arabia's interest in playing a role in the Organisation of American States' Development programmes will draw funds into the Caribbean from either the Saudi Fund for Development or the Islamic Development Bank.

CSO: 4400/28

ARAB INVESTOR PURCHASES CANADIAN SPACE COMPANY

London 8 DAYS in English No 36, 12 Sep 81 p 39

[Article by Peter Ward]

[Text]

ARAB INDUSTRIALIST Saad Gabr has bought the land and property of the Space Research Corporation, 160km east of Montreal, and is considering using the defunct company's facilities for launching space satellites.

Gabr, who recently bought half the Quebec resort settlement of nearby North Hatley and settled there, was blocked from buying the rest of the town's commercial centre by an alarmed citizens group, which feared that the multi-millionaire wanted to turn the town into a private domain.

His purchase, for $1.5m, of 1,700 hectares of the Space Research property, which straddles the Canadian-US border, indicates that Gabr may have deeper plans. Space Research went bankrupt when company executives Gerald Bull and Roger Gregory were sentenced to jail in the US and fined heavily in Canada for selling arms to South Africa. Bull is rated a genius of space technology, and the key elements of his experiments on low-cost satellite launching go with the sale to Gabr.

Also included is a 400mm diameter, 52 metres long cannon capable of launching satellites into space. Bull's development work on the launching of satellites with the huge cannon was financed by both the US and Canadian governments for a time. There are potential applications of this method for both commercial and military use. There has also been widespread speculation in Canada about whether or not Bull's launching technology was passed on to South Africa.

The Space Research property, about half of which is in Canada and half in Vermont, includes administration, shipping, storage and research buildings. The cannon is on the Canadian side, along with two firing ranges which could be used for launches.

Earl Wallick, general manager of Space Technologies Incorporated, the new name of the company Gabr purchased, said satellite launching is under study. Both Canadian and US governments are monitoring activities at the space technology facility, however, and US government sources say no launching or export of satellites would be allowed from the US without special permits from the bureau of political-military affairs.

CSO: 4400/28

SWEDISH, FINNISH FIRMS INCREASE SALES TO ARAB STATES

London 8 DAYS in English No 40, 10 Oct 81 p 39

[Text]

THIS AUTUMN has shown that Sweden and Finland, neighbours with high standards in engineering and a neutral political stance that nonetheless displays sympathy for the Arab cause, have retained their interest in the Middle East, despite a drop in their oil imports and a tendency to explore for new markets in southeast Asia and Latin America. While the giant Kockums ship contract for Saudi Arabia has captured the headlines, a string of smaller deals indicates the overall thrust of the two countries' export efforts.

In Sweden, Asea, the engineering group, has won a $62m turnkey order from Libya's Electrical Construction Company for the design and supply of equipment to be installed in six electric substations. A company official told *8 Days*: 'We have been contracting in several Middle East markets that are building up an infrastructure and need electricity from large power stations.'

According to its latest annual report: 'Asea's order bookings and backlog were adversely affected by the conflict between Iran and Iraq.' But the company has hopes of new deals in the Middle East — 'a very important region'.

The Egyptian Ministry of Construction has placed a $15m order for two light concrete factories from Ytong International of Sweden. The world's largest manufacturer of this material, Ytong is already working on a $7m contract in Egypt. Each plant will produce 150,000 cubic metres a year, with equipment, technological knowhow and training of local personnel supplied by Ytong.

Meanwhile, Egypt's Rural Electrification Authority has turned to Strömberg of Finland for four substations comprising outdoor switchgear truck-out type circuit-breakers developed by the company to facilitate quick deliveries abroad. Strömberg is also to subcontract for the General Enterprises Company of Dubai by installing four substations at Umm al Quwain by next August. The ultimate client is the UAE Ministry of Electricity and Water, which is already using two Strömberg substations.

In Libya the Finnish company Kurikan Puunjalostustehdas has secured an unusual $3m order for pinewood kitchen fittings, bathroom cupboards, wardrobes and folding doors. The contract, won against stiff international competition, could be a springboard for more deals involving the fitting out of hospitals abroad.

Following several similar agreements in the last few years, the national airline Finnair has undertaken to fly two large batches of Muslim pilgrims to Jeddah.

CSO: 4400/28

ARAB BANKS LEAD IN LOAN TO FRANCE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 37, 14 Sep 81 pp 11-12

[Text]

The National Bank of Abu Dhabi is lead managing an issue of $75 million of guaranteed floating rate notes on behalf of France's Crédit Foncier, it was announced in Abu Dhabi last week. The net proceeds of the issue will be used to finance mortgages and guaranteed real estate loans as part of the French government's special housing programme and the notes bear the unconditional guarantee of the government of France.

An application is being made to have the notes listed on the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. The notes mature in 1988 and will be issued at par. They will bear interest, payable semi-annually, of 1/4 of 1 per cent above the arithmetical mean of the six-months London bid and offered rates for dollar deposits quoted by the London offices of five reference banks, with a minimum rate of 5.25 per cent a year. The signing of the subscription agreement is due to take place in Paris on September 18.

The notes may not be offered or sold in France or the US or to nationals of these countries, subject to certain unspecified exceptions. Residents of Britain are also barred from dealing in the notes unless these persons' regular business is buying and selling securities.

Managers of the issue include the Abu Dhabi International Bank Inc, the Alahli Bank of Kuwait, the Arab Bank Investment Company Ltd, Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (BAII), the Gulf International Bank, the Gulf Riaydh Bank, the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company, the Riyadh Bank Ltd, the Saudi International Bank, Al-Bank al-Saudi al-Alami Ltd, and the Union de Banques Arabes et Françaises (UBAF). Non-Arab banks participating in management of the issue include the Banque Nationale de Paris, Goldman Sachs International Corp, Morgan Stanley International and Nomura International Ltd.

CSO: 4400/29

ARAB BANKS ACTIVE IN CREDIT MARKET

London 8 DAYS in English No 34, 29 Aug 81 p 37

[Text] TOTAL volume of all new euromarket syndicated credits raised this year to end-July reached $93bn. according to the Euromoney Syndication Guide. Present estimates suggest a final 12-month volume of up to $150bn. almost half again as much as the previous record year of 1979.

The total has been considerably swelled by the megajumbos arranged for the oil majors and other US companies, several of which have already been drawn down. There are indications there will be more such deals this year, again for merger or acquisition purposes. Because of the megajumbos the big three American banks are now firmly entrenched at the top of the lead manager tables, also compiled by the Guide.

The publication computes its ratings by assigning the full amount of the credit to a sole lead manager. and apportioned amounts if there were several lead managers. On that basis Chase Manhattan Bank, as sole lead manager of several of the megajumbos, surged to the top of the interim table, leading 81 loans for an apportioned total of $16.3bn.

Citicorp, in second place, has lead managed one more deal than Chase, but for a much lower apportioned total of almost $8.8bn. Bank of America, which led the table to end-June after successfully managing the Pemex $4bn bankers acceptance facility, was third with 55 loans for a total of just over $7bn.

Several loans with substantial Arab bank participation have been completed. Al Bahrain Arab African Bank lead managed (and was agent for) a syndicated guarantee facility to the Landoil Resources Corporation of the Philippines for $20m. The guarantee commission was 1 per cent and the maturity four years, with Arab African International Bank and KFTCIC managing the deal. Participants were Arab Solidarity Bank (Bahrain OBU), Bahrain Investment Company, Gulf Bank Kuwait, Kuwaiti French Bank and Saudi European Bank.

The proceeds of the loan were for the issue of bid bonds up to 180 days, advance payment guarantees up to three years, and performance bonds up to four years. The net funds will be used for contracts won by the company in Iraq.

Arab Latin American Bank (Arlabank), which is based in Lima, was lead manager and agent for a $30m credit to Banco Minero del Peru. The terms in this successful syndication were ⅞ per cent above Libor for five years.

Managers in the deal were Arab African International Bank, Bank Ambrosiano Andino, Credit Suisse Euro-Latin American Bank, European Arab Banking Group, International Commercial Bank, Gulf International Bank, KFTCIC, National Bank of North America (the North American lending arm of National Westminster Bank), Toronto-Dominion Bank International and UBAF Arab American Bank.

Participants were Al Saudi Bank and Nederlandsche Middenstandsbank. Commitment fee was ½ per cent and participation fees were 0.4 per cent for $1m, 0.5 for $2m and 0.7 for $3m and manager status. Drawdown is available for

one year and repayment is in eight semi-annual instalments. Proceeds are to be on-lent to mining companies within Peru.

The $250m credit to the National Bank of Yugoslavia has now been signed — with very little publicity — in Belgrade. The loan was divided into two tranches of $100m and $150m, the latter being denominated in Kuwaiti dinars.

The deal included a grace period of three years. KFTCIC, KIC and KIIC were the three lead managers, underwriting respectively $100m and $75m twice. Commitment fee was ½ per cent and managers received ⅛ per cent on underwriting for $10m and 1 per cent on final take.

Two loans arranged by Gulf International Bank are near completion. The club deal to Portland General Electric NV of the US for $25m will be signed soon in Bahrain. This one was arranged at ⅝ per cent above Libor for two years, the providing banks being Gulf International Bank, Arab Bank (Bahrain OBU), Bank Bumiputra Malaysia, KFTCIC, National Bank of Abu Dhabi and Abu Dhabi International Bank.

CSO: 4400/29

BRIEFS

SAUDI, TAIWAN TRADE FIGURES--Trade between Taiwan and Saudi Arabia increased from $950m in 1978 to $2.2bn in 1980, Assad Abdul Aziz al Zuhair, Saudi ambassador to Taiwan, announced on 23 September. He said the Saudi government accorded 'top priority' to Taiwan's oil requirements. Taiwan has been importing 140,000 b/d from Saudi Arabia, 40 percent of its oil imports. Zuhair praised the achievements of the two countries in bilateral cooperation in the economic, agricultural, fishery, scientific and technological fields. He said that relations between the two countries would be strengthened further with the setting up of a Saudi cultural exchange in Taipei. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 43]

CSO: 4400/32

TUNIS-ALGIERS JOINT BANK PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 41

[Article by Howard Schissel: "New Joint Bank for Maghreb"]

[Text] SEPTEMBER was a busy month for senior Tunisian officials as the country expands economic cooperation with its Maghreb neighbours Algeria and Libya.

Early in the month, Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali visited Algiers for talks with President Chadli Benjedid. One result was an ambitious agreement for a joint investment bank — La Banque de Cooperation du Maghreb Arabe (BCMA). Scheduled for opening in January 1982, the bank will be based in Tunis and will have an initial capital of $40m, to be equally divided between the two states. The BCMA will help finance joint industrial and agricultural projects.

In mid-September Tunisia's minister of housing and urban planning, Moncef Belhaj Amor, and his Algerian counterpart Ahmed Ali Ghazali initialled an accord for a joint institute of housing and construction. Tunisian firms will also participate in the construction of a housing complex at Tebessa near the border between the two countries.

This could be the start of a promising relationship. 'Algeria and Tunisia have much in common in the development of their industrial infrastructures and could work profitably together in the elaboration of finished goods needed in both countries,' Azouz Ennifar, director general of the Centre de Promotion des Exportations (Cepex), told *8 Days* in Tunis.

After a number of years of stormy political ties, economic cooperation between Tunisia and Libya reached an all-time low in 1980. Now, however, it appears that fences are being mended, most notably in the economic sector. In mid-September the two countries signed an agreement to establish a joint maritime transport company. Other areas of mutual interest include the petrochemical and chemical fertiliser industries and an increase in the number of skilled Tunisian workers in Libya. Moreover, under the new accord, Libya's and Tunisia's electricity grids are to be linked up, at a cost of Tunisian dinars 40m ($22m).

Tunisian exports to Libya increased dramatically during the first six months of this year. 'We expect Libyan purchases of our manufactured goods and agricultural products to grow by about tenfold in 1981,' Ennifar told *8 Days*. 'A major point in our favour concerning the Libyan market,' added Ennifar, 'is the fact that Tunisian goods can be speedily shipped to Libya, which suffers from the problem of clogged ports.'

The final phase in the hearings on the continental plateau dispute between Tunis and Tripoli opened before the International Court of Justice in the Hague in mid-September. The court will advise on this delicate issue at the beginning of 1982, and the two countries will then have three months to negotiate a settlement. If they don't succeed, the two have agreed in principle to accept the court's ruling.

So far, this dispute has prevented Tunisia from developing the promising Isis offshore field in the Gulf of Gabes. The field is believed to hold reserves of some 104m tonnes. 'We proposed to the Libyans the setting up of a joint company to exploit the hydrocarbon resources of the disputed zone, but an agreement was unable to be worked out,' Tahar Belkhoja, Tunisian minister of information, told *8 Days*. He added: 'We have not given up hope that the improving relations between our two states will finally lead to some form of cooperation in this key domain.'

OIL COUNTRIES INCREASE EUROPEAN DEPOSITS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 41, 12 Oct 81 pp 15-16

[Text]

The oil-exporting countries placed a greater proportion of their investible current account surplus in the West during the first quarter of this year compared to last year. They channeled 90 per cent of their total identified net cash into Western investments, compared to 86 per cent in 1980. This is the trend discernible from the latest figures published by the Bank of England on the deployment of OPEC surpluses, but it is of course too early to tell whether the first quarter has set a pattern for the rest of the year. High dollar prices and good returns on Eurocurrency deposits may mean the continuation of this trend in the remaining quarters of 1981.

Another noticeable trend in this year's surplus deployment is the continued preference for long-term investments and away from holdings with shorter maturities, such as bank deposits (See *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, June 29). During the first quarter of this year, funds deposited in Western banks accounted for 27 per cent of total new funds invested, compared to a ratio of 36 per cent in the last quarter of 1980. All in all, the OPEC surplus countries placed $5.2 billion out of an investible total of $19.1 billion in Western banks. Comparative figures for the last quarter of 1980 are $5.2 billion and $14.5 billion.

The Bank of England figures also show that the proportion of OPEC placements in the West, outside the US and Britain, also fell to 40 per cent in the first quarter from close to 50 per cent, which was the ratio achieved last year. This signals a shift away from the OPEC surplus countries' preference in 1980 for spreading their reserves in other currencies than the dollar and sterling.

The proportion of placements in Britain during the first three months of this year rose, reaching 27 per cent of newly-deployed identified cash surplus, compared to 21 per cent in the last quarter of 1980. The

figure for the whole of last year was 20 per cent. Similarly, placements in the US during the first quarter of 1981 represented 26 per cent of total identified net cash surplus, a rise of 9 per cent over the 1980 fourth quarter proportion of 15 per cent.

There was a marked drop in lending to IMF and the IBRD during the first two quarters of this year, from $1.9 billion in the last quarter of 1980 to $700 million in the first three months of this year, down to $600 million in the second quarter. This pattern is likely, however, to be altered later this year following Saudi Arabia's pledge in March to lend the IMF $10 billion, and maybe $15 billion, over the next three years (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, April 6).

Direct loans to developing countries rose, by contrast, going from $900 million in the last quarter of 1980 to $1.2 billion in the first three months of this year, and to a further $1.3 billion in the second quarter.

The latest figures released by the Bank of England reveal the following changes between the fourth quarter of last year and the first quarter of this year:

- A net increase in Eurocurrency bank deposits in Britain of $1.1 billion during the first quarter, compared with a net increase of $1.8 billion in the last quarter of 1980;
- A net addition of $400 million in American banks compared with a net withdrawal of $1.1 billion in the previous quarter;
- A 36 per cent increase in US treasury note and bond holdings during the first quarter of this year over the $2.2 billion level achieved in the last quarter of 1980;
- A steep decline in bank deposits outside the US and Britain, with a net withdrawal of $100 million compared with deposits of $2.8 billion in the previous three-month period;
- In contrast to that decline in bank deposits, a steep rise in non-bank investments outside the US and Britain reaching a total of $7 billion, or 36 per cent of total identified deployed capital, compared to the 28 per cent ratio achieved in the fourth quarter of 1980.

The surge in non-bank Western investments outside the US and Britain and the upturn in lending to Third World countries, after a two-year pattern of decline, show a shift both in terms of geographical diversification and a switch from massive cash holdings.

CSO: 4400/29

MOUNTING DIFFICULTIES REPORTED FROM WAR SITUATION

Heavy Soviet Casualties

Karachi DAWN in English 22 Oct 81 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Oct 21--In its recent issue the ILLUSTRATED WEEKLY OF INDIA has carried an article captioned "Inside Afghanistan" which says that "Russia has had imperial designs on Afghanistan for more than a century."

The weekly said, the failure to fulfil these colonial ambitions through indirect methods led to direct Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Commenting on the far-reaching adverse impact of the war the article says: "The war has all but ruined and depopulated already underdeveloped country and has cost the USSR heavily in men, money and international prestige."

The article outlines the enormous military losses in equipment and material which the Soviet Union has had to endure in 20 months of fighting, more than 1,600 Russian armoured fighting vehicles have been destroyed. About 150 helicopters and a dozen jet fighters have also been lost.

Speaking about the casualties borne by the 'Red Army,' the article says 'casualties are so high that, according to Mohammad Siddiq Farhang, former Karmal's economic adviser, 'the army has stopped shipping the bodies home to avoid calling attention to the casualties.

It said that wrecked by outrageous Soviet intervention the economy of Afghanistan has been shattered and is beset by an acute state of crisis which is depicted in a report circulated by Karmal regime to the embassies in Kabul which stated that the yearly plan had registered a decline of 33 per cent in anticipated investments in 1979-80 and 20 per cent in 1980-81. The Government has been dipping into its own reserves, believed to be less than 900 million dollars, and desparately need foreign capital, the article added.--APP.

Tidal Waves of Refugees

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Abdullah, Commissioner Afghan Refugees: "Afghan Refugees in NWFP"]

[Text] The population of Afghanistan is estimated at 1.6 million spreading over an area of 25,386 square miles and sharing a border of 1,500 miles with Pakistan.

The first batch of refugees which crossed over to Pakistan was a batch of 1,500 people who escaped in 1976 during Dawood regime. In December 1978, the refugees population shot up to 18,329, afterwards the trickle developed into a torrent and by 30th September 1981, we have 1,887,640 Afghan refugees in the province.

The complication of the refugee population may be of some interest to the refugee watchers. They have come from different provinces of Afghanistan and the main Tribal groupings are Nooristani, Tajiks, Mishwanis, Salarzai, Kohistani, Gujars, Badakhshi, Safi, Ahmedzai, Shinwari, Mamund, Mohmand, Khugiani, Ghiljai, Hazara, Mangal, Jaji, Zadran, Sabri Sulemankhel, Qandaharis, Uzbeks and Turkmans.

Uncertainties

The problems of refugees administration have to be understood in the context of the inherent uncertainties of the Afghan situation as a whole. We are dealing with the unknown and that explains both the intensity and magnitude of the situation which we have to deal with. It is a continuing emergency and should be appreciated as such.

Before November 1980, the Provincial Government dealt with the situation with the existing administrative and physical resources, but when the number of refugees crossed one million persons, it became impossible to look after the refugees problem without having a separate organisation. This organisation has been established which deals with 210 refugee camps with a minimum population of 500 refugees each. Most of the population lives in the camps while some others live in the built-up areas but are duly registered in their respective districts and agencies. The high density areas are Peshawar, Kurram, Bajaur, North Waziristan, Mardan and Kohai. The organisation has three tiers, the village which is known as RTV (Refugees Tented Village), the area consisting of five RTV's or more and the district or the Agency whose limits co-expand with the administrative districts and Agencies of the province. Each RTV contains six sections to deal with its problems and is administered by the Refugees Tented Village Administrator (RTVA). Apart from the administrative structure of the refugees organisation, some voluntary organisations both national and foreign are also working for the welfare of the refugees whose activities are co-ordinated by the Commissionerate Afghan Refugees. The main financial assistance has been provided by the UNHCR whose representatives work in the entire province and coordinate with the functionaries of the Commissionerate at various levels.

An amount of Rs.230,815,849 has been released by the UNHCR during the last two years. The World Food Programme provides the foodstuffs according to the prescribed scales of wheat, sugar, edible oils, dry skimmed milk, etc. Regular coordination meetings are held to streamline the procedure and facilitate the process of relief distribution. Administrative actions are taken whenever genuine complaints are received and such action varies from suspension to registration of criminal cases.

A tentative plan of developmental activities needed to meet the essential requirements of the refugees has been prepared and the main areas of developmental work are health, veterinary, drinking water supply, education and income-generating schemes. The Commissionerate is running 27 mobile health units and 72 static dispensaries under the control and guidance of the Protect Director who is exclusively looking after the medicare of the refugees.

Beside this, nine voluntary organisations are running 24 mobile health units and 40 static dispensaries.

Similarly, 15 mobile units organised by the Animal Husbandry Department are providing necessary veterinary cover to the livestock brought by the refugees with them. Forty two drinking water supply schemes have been taken up out of which 18 have been completed and the work on the rest of the schemes is in progress. These schemes consist of sinking the tube-wells, augmentation of the existing resources and the gravity flow through the nearest available source. The small Industries Department has opened eight carpet weaving centres where the trainees have produced 1,839 sq. feet of carpet. A survey of available skills in the refugee camps has been taken up which will provide necessary information for future planning.

Two hundred primary schools have been established in the camps and more will be opened soon. Apart from this, educational facilities are provided at all levels wherever feasible. Maintenance allowance is being distributed at the rate of Rs.50 per individual for which an amount of Rs.100 million is required on monthly basis in view of the refugees number at present.

Relief items like tents, blankets, quilts, old clothes, shoes, etc., have also been distributed in large quantities in order to provide storage facilities, 67 godowns are being constructed in the province in various districts and agencies. The Government is also planning to supply kerosene oil to the refugees for which a scheme has already been drawn up.

It will be interesting to point out that despite the rising number of the refugees and their camps dotted all over the province, there has been no visible law and order problem which explains the moral involvement of the local population with the cause of the Afghan refugees. The spirit of accommodation can be fully understood in the light of Islamic values whose manifestation in the context of the refugees influx has been a stimulating experience for all those associated with the refugees welfare.

CSO: 4600/89

NEW POLICY TOWARDS FUNDAMENTALISTS

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 22-23

[Article by Mary Gearhart: "Algeria To Curb Extremists"]

[Text] THE ALGERIAN authorities appear to have stepped up the campaign against Muslim fundamentalists by their recent reversing of the policy of not publicising violent incidents involving 'harmful extremists'. Although at the moment the country is calm, the last few months have seen clashes between fundamentalists and the Algerian authorities in Oran, Bel Abbes, Algiers and — the most serious — at the end of last month at Laghouat, a town in the high plateau 350km south of the capital. The clashes have led to hundreds of arrests and at least two deaths.

The socialist government has long taken a serious view of internal groups, on both the left and the right, which it sees as a threat to national unity — and a challenge to the only party permitted, the National Liberation Front (FLN). The authorities have moved against Berber groups in Kabylie, against Communists (although officially their Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste, PAGS, is tolerated and against the religious fundamentalists.

Of the three, the fundamentalists are considered to pose the most serious threat. The government is coping better with the Communists, who complain that they are being picked off one by one and prevented from joining the 'mouvements de masse'. Under Article 120, an Algerian must be an FLN member to join. Some PAGS men have claimed they were members — but were spotted by the FLN's highly efficient intelligence service.

In a communiqué put out from Paris in September, the PAGS threatened for the first time to withdraw support from President Benjedid unless what it called the 'deviationist, opportunist and reformist tendency' was halted. Essentially, the group is convinced that Algeria is moving to the right and is poised to switch arms suppliers from the USSR to the West. Many observers would agree.

By meeting the Berbers' demands for cultural autonomy halfway, the authorities — displaying a surprising degree of moderation and liberalism — have succeeded in neatly outflanking them. The provision of a new chair in many Algerian universities last month for language and dialects, including Berber, undercut many of the demands of this group, which makes up a quarter of the 20m-strong Algerian population. It was this — and refraining from sending in troops to quell a threatened general strike in Kabylie last month — which defused the situation. Hardly anyone obeyed the call to strike, and many dissidents were unhappy that the demands were political rather than cultural. This was in strong contrast to the situation last year, when security forces were sent into Tizi Ouzou, capital of the Kabylie region to the east of Algiers; clashes led to at least two deaths (denied by the authorities) and numerous arrests.

The government insists that if it were to concede all the Berbers' demands it would then have to give in to the Muslim fundamentalists, whom they fear far more. Although, so far, it appears that the latter group's political ambition is limited, the Algerian regime does fear the latent power of the extremists.

In a major change of tactic, the authorities are now publicising violent incidents involving fundamentalists, in order to swing public opinion against 'harmful extremists'. *El Moudjahid*, the semi-official daily, claimed that those involved are 'ignorant adventurers who try to carry out

suspicious designs against the interests of Algeria, the Islamic nation and the path of religion.'

The authorities have some reason for concern. Some of the more violent incidents took place in the tourist resort oasis of El Oued, close to the Tunisian frontier in January 1980. A group of fundamentalists burnt down a hotel, emptied all the bottles of alcoholic beverages they could find and took holiday-makers hostage. Less serious incidents have occurred throughout the country in the past two years. Last month a group of zealots tried to convert the inhabitants of a poor suburb of Algiers, called le Clos Salembier. They were promptly imprisoned by the authorities.

But by far the most serious incident took place in Laghouat on 28 September. A group of Muslim fundamentalists, furious at the arrest of their chief, Said Sayah, for desertion from national service, barricaded themselves in a mosque they had transformed into a fort.

From there they used a loudspeaker to launch an appeal for a Jihad (holy war) against the authorities. After two days of unsuccessful attempts at conciliation by a member of the higher Islamic council, the police attacked. During the fighting, at least one policeman was killed by dagger thrusts and a fundamentalist was killed by the police. Some reports claim two policemen and two fundamentalists were killed.

According to *El Moudjahid*, the group of 'trouble makers' had taken control of the mosque some time previously, after ousting the mullah officially appointed by the minister of religious affairs and replacing him with Said Sayah. It is understood the authorities had wanted to move against the group for sometime. Said Sayah's desertion provided the pretext.

At a meeting held the following week, Minister of Religious Affairs Chibane denounced, in a communiqué, 'all behaviour, resulting in a false understanding of Islam used to spread a false faith. This leads to the setting up of a false leadership and encourages vandals to violate religious sites.' The minister demanded that the Algerian authorities 'put an end to anarchy in mosques and ensure that dignity and respect be accorded all those who work in the religious sector, including imams and muezzins.'

This is the first time that such incidents have been openly discussed in the press. The government is determined to contain and control a movement it sees as harmful to national unity, imprisoning dissidents when it deems it necessary.

CSO: 4500/32

TOWN DEVELOPMENT OUTLINED

Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2836, 13 Oct 81 p 17

[Article by Bachir Sahel]

[Text] El Asnam, October 11—A year after its destruction in an earthquake which killed 3,000 people and made some 400,000 homeless, the town of El Asnam is rising again.

The authorities appear certain to keep their promise to rehouse the 200,000 whose homes were destroyed in the town itself by the end of the year, with at least 75 per cent of the planned 20,000 new prefabricated houses already complete.

However, the situation is not so encouraging in the surrounding countryside, mainly due to the shortage of building materials, the scattered nature of the rural communities and above all the difficulties of meeting the construction standards now enforced by the Government to guard against future earthquakes.

School rebuilding is also behind schedule, and classes for 150,000 local children at the beginning of the new academic year have been held under canvas for the most part.

In spite of these deficiencies the exceptional efforts--material, financial and human--of the authorities since the disaster show the Government's determination to get the town on its feet again. And observers note that the results achieved, though hampered mainly by the lack of skilled workmen, compare very favourably with communities in other countries hit by similar catastrophes.

In the town itself, which was destroyed for the second time in 30 years, the local population is also determined to remain, and activity is thriving. The new mosque, with its zinc dome shining in the sun, is now too small.

For the local governor the main objective, after rehousing of all the homeless and the replacement of communal services, is the launching of a regional economic plan covering more than 120 development projects in the industrial and agricultural sectors. But it still depends on the final shape and siting of the reconstructed town, which will be decided by the Government in Algiers before the end of the year. (A.F.P.)

CSO: 4500/24

REFINANCING OF LOANS REQUESTED

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 p 48

[Article by Lionel Peters: "Sonatrach Returns to Euromarkets"]

[Text] SONATRACH, Algeria's state-owned oil and gas company, has caused a major stir in the euromarkets. The organisation has proposed to the major lending banks that it wants to refinance some of its syndicated loans raised between 1975-1979.

Only one loan has been specified so far: the $500m credit arranged for Sonatrach in October 1979, the last time that Sonatrach used the euromarkets. The terms of the facility were at that time the most favourable Sonatrach had ever been awarded: 10 years at 1 per cent above Libor, as opposed to the 1⅛ per cent margin for previous credits.

Sonatrach wants a substantially finer margin on the refinancing, say a split margin of ½-⅝ per cent above Libor for the remaining eight years of the facility. Bearing in mind that the syndication of the $500m facility was not a success — it required all the expertise of the lead management group (which included Bank of America, Chase Manhattan and Citibank) to sell the deal to the markets. So it is anyone's guess whether Sonatrach will have its wish fulfilled.

At that time, the market believed that Algeria rated a margin of above 1 per cent on its loans. Needless to say Sonatrach was displeased with the terms. It believed that as a state utility of an Opec member it should have commanded a margin nearer ⅞ per cent. Indeed, one of the tender bids for the $500m mandate was from Crédit Lyonnais, who offered to arrange the loan for ⅞ per cent throughout, although the offer was rejected in favour of the Bank of America group.

Dar al Maal al Islami, the bank created to finance development in the Islamic world, has lead managed its first syndicated credit, though to a non-Islamic borrower. The customer is East Germany's Deutsche Aussenhandelsbank, one of the most secretive borrowers using the markets. The $20m facility is repayable over three years at ⅝ above Libor. In a syndicate consisting entirely of Arab banks, Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, National Bank of Kuwait and Arab Bank Limited acted as managers; the participants were Kuwaiti-French Bank Banque Continentale Arabe and Arab Hellenic Bank, with Arab Bank Investment Company as agent.

Middle East Airlines (MEA) has decided to go ahead with its plans to revitalise the airline and buy in the latest European Airbus. Earlier this month in Paris MEA officials met representatives from the banks of two syndicated loans postponed from April this year. The airline is seeking extra funds from the Beirut government to ease its cash flow problems.

Both the syndicated loan of $70m and the export credit of $350m are now likely to go ahead but the facilities may be modified.

Meanwhile, one of the most complicated guarantee facilities has been arranged: $291m for Samho Construction International of South Korea to build new barracks for the Saudi Arabian National Guard at Al Hassa. There are seven tranches in the facility, including performance bonds, advance payment bonds, letters of credit and a medium-term loan, with the maturity ranging between 180 days and 30 months.

The loan was arranged by BA Asia (Bank of America's lending arm in Hong Kong), with Arab African International Bank, Al Baab, Arab Asian Bank, Arab Banking Corporation and Saudi American Bank as co-lead managers, and Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait as the sole manager.

CSO: 4500/33

OIL BARTER PRECEDENT FEARED

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Mary Gearhart: "Oil Barter Precedent Feared"]

[Text]

ALGERIA'S business partners are keeping a careful watch on tough negotiations in which the Algerian government is insisting on changing the terms of a $43.5m agreement with the Japanese automobile firm, Honda.

Because of the continuing oil glut, Algiers is resorting to barter deals, as it did in 1975, to offload oil and continue imports without having to pay hard cash. But unlike Libya, which is pressing for only 30 per cent of import payments to be accepted in oil, Algeria is asking for 100 per cent. Further, it is insisting that the oil it proposes to barter is valued at the official price of $40 a barrel. And the recipients have to undertake to use the oil in their own country instead of trying to sell it on the already-glutted spot market.

The Honda negotiations are seen as a test case. Algiers is clearly seeing what effect its new ploy would have on imports of non-essential consumer goods such as cars. In choosing their ground, the Algerians have been careful to avoid jeopardising the import of vital capital equipment.

Honda has never signed an agreement like this anywhere in the world — and is loath to do so now. The Algerian government's decision to offer oil, and oil alone, in return for Honda's cars was completely unexpected. Honda had concluded an agreement, through another Japanese firm, Nichimen, with the state-owned Algerian mechanical construction company, Sonacome, to supply 15,000 vehicles.

According to Japanese business sources, Honda was about to deliver the vehicles when, on 26 August, it was confronted with the demand for a barter deal. Honda's contract had not yet received the final, formal signature of approval from the Algerian government. Technically, therefore, Algiers did not break the contract by insisting on a change of terms, but western business sources are alarmed at what they consider a breach of ethics.

'To comply with the terms of the contract, Japan had to build the cars and supply them at the required time — before the signature,' said a French businessman who has been watching developments with concern. 'This is well known, a sort of gentlemen's agreement. Algeria has broken this unwritten code. The implications for the rest of us are considerable.'

Another source said that the Honda episode was putting Algeria's credibility at stake. 'So far Algeria has enjoyed an enviable reputation for being a reliable and correct business partner, and for paying on time,' he said. 'But what it is doing now, though not illegal, is highly unethical.' Honda, although the first to be faced with the barter demands, is not the only foreign company to be affected. Italy's Fiat has been asked to do barter deals, and so have French, West German, Belgian and British firms. So far none has agreed, although Algerian officials say Fiat may agree.

Honda was given until 30 September to accept the new deal or scrap the agreement. The firm is continuing to negotiate with Sonatrach, the state-owned hydrocarbons monopoly. Some western diplomatic sources say they are 'optimistic that the Algerians will show flexibility in reaching a

mutually acceptable solution.'

Algeria's new insistence on oil barter deals is clearly part of the country's attempts to shore up its $106bn Five Year Plan despite difficulties stemming from the world oil glut. Oil liftings have fallen from 1m b/d early this year to only 600,000 b/d.

The country has yet to reach agreement on gas prices with most of its clients, although a deal with France is expected soon. The shortfall in both oil and gas has resulted in a liquidity crisis. Officially Algeria is keeping quiet about the severity of the impact, but with its ambitious Five Year Plan for 1980-84 underway and a population of 18m with ever-growing expectations, the consequences are clearly considerable. There is no sign of an end to the oil glut and Algeria is showing no willingness to lower its price of $40 a barrel for crude, along with Libya's the highest in the world. Nigeria, which has similar quality oil, has recently dropped its price to $36 to stave off economic catastrophe. Algeria's strategy instead is to opt for oil barter deals.

While western firms look on in dismay — 'If Japan today, it could be us tomorrow,' said one business source — there is a growing feeling of solidarity among them. But alarm is most keenly felt in Japanese business circles. They see Algeria's demands as possibly setting a dangerous precedent; Japanese industry fears it could now face similar demands from other oil-rich countries in Africa and the Middle East — and Japan needs these markets more than ever.

Africa and the Middle East are seen as offering the greatest potential growth markets for Japan, particularly its car industry. Its domestic market has shrunk with the world recession. The US recently imposed restrictions on imports of Japanese cars until 1984, and similar steps have been taken by Canada and several countries in Western Europe. In the first half of this year, Africa and the Middle East bought 470,000 cars from Japan.

Now, the prospect of barter deals has sent a chill through Japanese industry and these new markets could develop into a headache. 'It was one thing accepting barter deals in the mid-1970s when oil cost $12 a barrel,' said one source. 'But at $40 it's unsaleable. Most of the West has as much oil as it can stockpile. It certainly does not want more.'

The Japanese embassy in Algiers is not yet involved in the negotiations between Honda and Sonatrach and, according to diplomatic sources, will do so only 'if things turn sour. One diplomat said he was hope- . '. 'Algeria has too much to lose.' Japan was taking about 600,000 b/d in condensate from Algeria earlier this year, but unconfirmed sources in Algeria say Japan has now stopped buying since the snag in the Honda deal arose.

CSO: 4500/32

BRIEFS

FUNDAMENTALISTS WARNED--Algiers, October 12—Having countered leftwing extremists in the ruling FLN party and the mass organisations in Algeria, the authorities have now warned off Islamic fundamentalists who might be tempted to exploit to political ends the growing attraction of religion for the country's youth. The violent clash between security forces and armed elements apparently organised in a religious brotherhood at Laghouat, 250 kms (about 160 miles) south of here, at the beginning of the month is an illustration. The situation is Laghouat, which had been developing for nearly a year, appears to have been taken very seriously by the authorities from the moment when it became clear that, after having expelled the town's official imam from a mosque, the activists had set themselves up as an organisation. Head of State Chadli Benjedid gave a clear warning to activists of all sorts who might be tempted to make Algeria "a field of ideological experiment" in a recent speech aimed at Marxists and religious fundamentalists alike. "No-one has the right to monopolise socialist thinking," he said. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2836, 13 Oct 81 p 16]

HOUSING AGREEMENT--The UK government has signed a memorandum of understanding with the Algerian ministry of housing, paving the way for detailed negotiations by British contractors to supply 20,000 housing units worth about $380m. The agreement, signed on 11 October, was described by Peter Rees, the British minister for trade, as 'very significant.' It provides a framework for the commercial negotiations and signifies that if the British companies can agree on terms with Algeria they will win substantial contracts. The companies involved in talks with the Algerian government are Comentation, McAlpine, Paulings, Wimpey and W.S. Atkins, the consultants. The memorandum has an addendum which states that the Algerian government is seeking negotiated contracts for 20,000 housing units and their associated infrastructure. This figure has been geared to the productive capacity of the British contractors to meet Algerian demands within the scope of the 1980-1984 Development Plan. Contractors seeking entrance to the Algerian market had found that the authorities were not anxious to work on the private industrial level without some form of official understanding. The memorandum provides that. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 p 23]

DAM AGREEMENTS--Algeria and the USSR have concluded a protocol on the construction of a dam. This follows a meeting of an Algerian-Russian working party examining hydraulics and land improvement. The working party also examined the prospects of cooperation between Algeria and the Soviet Union in bringing about four other big dams included in the present Algerian Five Year Plan and of other similar projects so as to better master Algerian resources in surface waters. The two sides also examined the conditions under which studies will be carried out on hydraulic development projects, particularly in the areas of Annaba and the South Atlas. They also agreed on a new drilling programme to increase water supply especially in the south. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 43]

CSO: 4500/32

BRIEFS

BRITISH COMPANY WINS CONTRACT--Britain's John Howard and Company has won a contract to provide docking facilities for a 4 million tonne a year iron pelletising plant to be built by the Arab Iron and Steel Company. Howard is to start immediately on the L8 million $15.2 million) contract, which provides for the construction of a deep water jetty and associated civil works. The company will build a 145-metre-long piled jetty approach, a piled jetty head 300 metres long by 35 metres wide and two piled dolphins. These structures will all be decked with reinforced concrete. Ancillary works include the installation of fenders, bollards and similar facilities and some work on the existing rock protection bund. Some 670 tubular steel piles, 800 mm and 100 mm in diameter and up to 30 metres long, will be driven into the sea bed and 34,000 cubic metres of concrete placed. The Arab Iron and Steel Company has engaged the Kuwait Engineering, Operation and Management Company (KENOMAC) as engineer for the project, which is due for completion in 16 months. A turnkey contract for the pelletising plant is expected to be awarded soon, with Japan's Kobe Steel and a Japanese-German consortium made up of of Hitachi and Lurgi-Zosen as the main contenders for the $500 million deal (An-Nahar Arab Arab Report & MEMO, September 28). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 42, 19 Oct 81 p 5]

CSO: 4400/32

OPPOSITION LEADER CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT'S SEARCH OF 'AL-DA'WAH' OFFICES

Cairo AL-I'TISAM in Arabic No 10, 8 Aug 81 pp 10-12

[Article by 'Umar al-Talmasani: "Strange Conduct in the State of Institutions: A Team of Policemen Break into Offices of AL-DA'WAH Magazine, Rifle Papers, Seal Premises with Wax and then Leave as though Nothing Had Happened"]

> [Text] Dawn visitors or police guests visit AL-DA'WAH Magazine without an invitation.
> Why is it that unless the commander orders them to take action the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly take no action when the law is violated and the Constitution is ignored right before their eyes?
> Why doesn't the vice squad take action when television shows the episodes of Nelly and Shuwaykar as well as sex films and dangerous kinds of cancer which are killing all the rudiments of good morals?
> Why don't the police agencies which raided our offices go to the lairs of vice and the dens of crime when they failed to find anything that was banned or prohibited in the offices of AL-DA'WAH?
> With the power and tyranny they gained, they were not able to draw us away from our religion, our values, our faith and our Islam.
> They failed, but our cause lived on.

[Editor's Foreword] Last Wednesday afternoon, 28 Sha'ban 1401 Hegira [1 July 1981] people were taken by surprise in the state of institutions. They were alarmed and horrified [when they learned] that a team of policemen had stormed into the offices of AL-DA'WAH Magazine in Cairo in a visit to the premises at dawn. They had no justification for their action on security grounds and no permit from the prosecutor's office. They began rifling with the magazine's papers, searching its offices and questioning its guards. When they failed to locate any publication or anything that was banned, they returned with a sense of regret and failure.

Such a scene had become customary and well-known in the days of darkness

and gloom, when a tyrant who was called Nasir was Egypt's chief and an unjust man called al-Sha'rawi was in charge of the Ministry of the Interior. But now when the people of Egypt have freedom of speech and the right to express [their thoughts]--and to them [free speech] is more secure and more lasting than a piece of bread, a piece of butter and a slice of meat--what happened last week is considered a blow to the constitution, a violation of the law and a disgrace for the state of institutions.

Amidst a wave of resentment and disapproval AL-I'TISAM turned to the most important man in the offices of AL-DA'WAH. He is the man who carries its banner, who directs its course and leads its young people. He is Mr 'Umar al-Talmasani. We asked him his opinion, and this is what he wrote.

On Wednesday afternoon, 28 Ramadan 1401 Hegira, which coincides with 29 July 1981, policemen stormed into the offices of AL-DA'WAH Magazine. They took some of the newspaper's papers and led its clerks and custodians to the police station in the area after instructing them to take their clothes along because they were going back to their home towns. There was nothing peculiar about what happened; what happened was not peculiar. However, the odd nature of this conduct became evident to me when I compared what had happened with what I hear and read almost every day.

First, we read and hear that the constitution rules and that the law is sovereign,. but we wonder about a constitution under which citizens are treated in a manner that scorns all citizens' rights.

Second, storming into people's homes and offices can only be carried out with a warrant from the prosecutor's office. None of the people whose offices policemen had stormed into were presented with a warrant, if there was one. One wonders about the contempt for a law which the intruders themselves are [supposed] to protect and abide by.

Third, the fact that such a matter took place these days just before the feast may be construed as the policemen's greetings extended to us on the occasion of the feast. It were as though they were telling us, "We are here!" as though we did not know they are here and as though we had not seen such conduct before in our lives. We are the most knowledgeable people about the conduct of policemen, the defenders and protectors of the law. This is because they serve the people. Isn't this what we read and hear?

Fourth, was a report written about the papers that were collected to indicate their importance and the details they comprise? Did anyone who was in the office at that time sign that report? How can it be determined after that what papers were collected? What guarantee is there to provide assurance that no other papers were slipped in [with those that were picked up from the magazine's offices]?

Fifth, why didn't the police put the office under observation before storming into it? Why didn't the police then call a magazine official to watch the inspection and make a list of what was taken in a special report?

Sixth, what are the charges or even the faults that induced such conduct which is constitutionally unacceptable, legally reprehensible and inconsistent with any claims that the law is being respected and the [notion of the] inviolability of homes and offices is being honored?

Seventh, why were the offices of AL-DA'WAH Magazine sealed with wax at 3 pm and then reopened at 9 pm? Was it not enough that policemen conducted an illegal search? Did they have to seal the office with wax too?

Eighth, what is more spurious than all this in a peculiar and mind boggling way is the fact that the existing regime, the parties and all the people inside the country and abroad know that we are the opposition who do not take exception to individuals. We do not make charges without evidence; we do not stir up riots; and we do not provoke demonstrations or marches lest paid agents, people with ulterior motives or opportunists infiltrate those ranks to project an image of Egypt as a country where conditions are unstable and insecure.

Ninth, is it not curious that some officials have sought our aid in preventing disturbances in more than one location? We used to help them not out of loyalty to anyone, but rather because our religion instructed us not to provoke disturbances and clashes. This is because Islam is a religion of charity and peace, and its advocates are advocates of peace and security.

Tenth, those who are involved in this peculiar conduct, don't they know that nothing good could come out of it for themselves, for their religion, their homeland and their citizens?

Eleventh, what is the relationship between confiscating an issue [of a magazine], searching an office and sealing it with wax? Is it a desire to show power and might? Or is it a desire to make a public proclamation against the advocates of Islam to satisfy some hidden need?

If I were to go on relating these violations, I could go on incessantly. But this matter cannot go by without comment, not for the sake of the lesson derived therefrom, not for remembrance, not for singing the praises of the constitution and boasting about the law and not for bemoaning the respect that the protectors of the law have for the law. But we do make a comment for the record to monitor the events that take place under the auspices of the law, which is protected by its guardians and under the auspices of the constitution which is respected by its authors. If we wanted to exploit the situation, the field is wide open for a comment on what happened, but we are too decent to engage in such activity.

Others find in such conduct an ample opportunity to defame, to slander and to bemoan [the loss of] freedoms and the inviolability of homes and individuals' rights. However, we are not good at that. In fact, we neither like such actions nor accept them. Our reactions to such actions are magnanimous; what provokes ordinary people does not provoke us. It is not because our senses are dull that we are not provoked, but rather because we exercise control over our feelings, and this indicates the difference between

those whose intentions are pure and those whose intentions aren't. Others would not have let such conduct go by without seeking defense and protection from the courts. However, we will not resort to such methods because we are not opportunists and we are not fond of clinging to the consequences of facts we know are not unlikely for those who carried them out. We know that we have a small measure of freedom, but this freedom is incomplete. For it is on the basis of these freedoms that much is being committed which creates a big gap between what freedom is and freedom in action. We will not take the matter to court because God Almighty is the only One who can establish the truth between us and them. We will not slander, because it is not in our character to do so. We will not rebuke because we have no right to rebuke anyone. We are certain about where we stand with all the rulers of the Islamic countries. They want blind obedience, and we deny them what they want. They want to have an autocracy and exclusive authority, and we tell them, "No one rules but God."

Let it be known to everyone that we are not people who give in to desire. We do not fear the violence which makes others tremble. We believe that what befell us does not establish that we were mistaken and that if we were mistaken, this would not have befallen us. "God plans all things" [al-Ra'd: 8]. We have a divine calling, and it is the decree of God Almighty to test those who have a calling. We chose our course with open eyes. When we took it upon ourselves to carry the message, we were quite certain about what we would find. We made our choice, and there is no other choice to be made after that. This is because we made an agreement with Him who rules the heavens and the earth. "Allah's reward is better and more lasting" [al-Qassas: 60]. We will proceed on our course, confident in God's promise that "Happy shall be the lot of the righteous" [al-A'raf: 128]. Let those who have power do with us what they will. It makes no difference for us; it will not divert us from the plans we made for ourselves. The road we will travel is rocky, and the seas we will sail are stormy, but we will choose to travel on the rocky road and to sail the stormy seas. It is only God who makes things easy and difficult. Let them proceed as they wish on their course, for God is everywhere around them. We will go on our way. He whom God champions will triumph, even if the world with all its gear were to throw him down; [even then] the world remains defeated and unsuccessful.

What happened was a blessing to us from God Almighty. Some people had been suspicious of our attitude as [members of the] opposition toward the existing regime. Some parties even said that we supported the existing regime, that our support for it was veiled and that there was a "gentleman's" agreement between us and the existing regime. But God Almighty wanted to disprove what they said [and to show] that we were not [the kind of people] they thought we were. Only God Almighty knows that we oppose the existing regime and that we criticize it strongly for hesitating to put into effect in this Muslim country the law of God Almighty. But we express our opposition in an honest, clean, Islamic style. We do not slander, and we do not accuse; we do not defame, and we do not take advantage of opportunities; we do not calumniate and we do not cast doubts. We are purely objective. We have nothing to do with persons or personalities. We discuss an action, not the person who carried out the action. We oppose conduct,

not the person who was engaged in that conduct. We are aware of the fact that this style does not please the regime and does not please its opponents. But when did we take [the pleasure of] either one of them into consideration? It is God alone that we want to please, and we ask God that we remain on the path of righteousness. The most we hope for is that He be pleased with us, even though all people become angry with us.

As the sanctity of the law and the prestige of the constitution are degraded in front of their eyes will the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly take action and denounce this conduct? Or will they listen to the justifications for this conduct if they are made immune to its actions? We are not asking them for anything. However, we are presenting their position to God Almighty and then to the people. We wonder, what will our national newspapers say? Will they defend a right they may squelch one day? Or will they commend the regime for what it did against freedom and against the dignity of citizens? What has happened will not hurt us. Everyone who heard about what happened expressed his regrets. But what happened does hurt what they did. We would not have accepted for them what they have accepted for themselves. But what are we to do when we do everything we can to protect people who do not want to be protected, but who proclaim in public what displeases God Almighty, His prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, and all fair-minded people?

A final warning!

If we had papers, weapons or forbidden objects and if we were afraid of being legally questioned about them, would we have left these objects readily available to everyone in the magazine or in our homes? If we did, we would be stupid, and no one is accusing us of being stupid. It may occur to those who are intelligent that in view of this self-evident fact we may deceive the police who would not think of undertaking an action such as that which they undertook, and we would then leave what the law cautions against where everyone can have access to it. Good Lord! This meaning does not escape anyone who knows that everyone is lying in wait for him indefatigably and persistently. On our part it also saves efforts. It is curious that the morals police sees and hears what is being shown on television and takes no action even though what is being presented through that device is a dangerous cancer that stifles the growth of good morals in the hearts of young people. But the Ministry of Interior is shaken by a mere article that neither reforms nor corrupts, and no one in the state budges when AL-AHRAM newspaper dares to publish cartoons that are sheer heresy and violate the constitution. All people know who is behind this heresy. If officials do not show that they have an interest in this matter that approaches the interest they demonstrated in pursuing the Muslim Brothers by eavesdropping on them and spying on them, this country will not be spared the consequences of dangers that are approaching us every day.

But it seems to us that the state's slogan toward the Muslim Brothers is this: "Any danger other than that posed by the Muslim Brothers is of little consequence." What I fully believe in is that every official in this country is quite confident that the Muslim Brothers are as far as anyone

can be from being someone's clients, conspirators, saboteurs, instigators and provocateurs. Despite all this, investigative and intelligence agencies are focusing all their efforts on the Muslim Brothers. Anyone who thinks that the Muslim Brothers are unaware of this has to correct his understanding [of the situation]. We never deceive anybody. At the same time we have not been and we will not be deceived by any method no matter how it appears to us to be lenient and sympathetic. Such statements may make some people angry. This is their business. We do not control anyone's pleasure or anger. How wonderful it would be if events were to take a downturn and the [regime] were to close, confiscate, arrest, accuse, harrass and put [people] on trial. It would be wonderful if this were to happen. This would be like smelting pure gold and getting rid of all its impurities. We do not wish to encounter difficulties. We ask God Almighty for health. But if [such difficulties] are inevitable, people will know that those who were not driven away from their religion and their efforts by 'Abd-al-Nasir, Hafiz al-Asad and al-Qadhdhafi, will not be dissuaded from promoting their faith by the vehemence of storms, the rage of tempests or the gloom of murky darkness. "Allah has purchased of the faithful their lives and worldly goods and in return has promised them the Garden" [al-Tawbah: 111]. The deal has been struck, and the only thing that remains is to fulfill its terms. We ask God Almighty to show us where He would like us to be. We ask this not out of fearlessness or a show of courage, but rather in consideration and acceptance of God's decree: "You may hate a thing although it is good for you" [al-Baqarah: 216].

The circumstances which Egypt is experiencing these days would forbid such conduct, especially with those who advocate the cause of God. Persistence in increasing their adversaries is not in the interests of those who [advocate the cause of God]. Did intelligent politicians overlook that? The conference of Islamic communities was the first and foremost factor, after the favor of God Almighty, in doing away with the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'. Everybody knows this. They perceived it themselves, even if officials were to deny it. But the bitterness of a threat which is signaled one day from here and another day from there will only be experienced by those who hint at the threat. For God Almighty is omniscient; nothing escapes Him. "Actions as small as a grain of mustard seed shall be weighed out. Our reckoning shall suffice" [al-Anbiya': 47].

We have in our possession published leaflets: some of them are political and some are ideological. Their purpose is to slander the regime, and to infringe upon Islam. The government knows this quite well, and it cannot deny it. If it denies it, people will accuse it of being unaware of what is happening throughout this country. The president announced that some citizens are engaging in conduct that he as a Muslim ruling a Muslim country finds unacceptable. What firm and decisive measures did officials take to drive those who strayed away from their erroneous ways and put the contemptuous in their rightful place? So far, nothing. But AL-DA'WAH Magazine is published, and everything in it is truthful and factual, decent and honest and [suddenly] noses turn red, ears twitch and officials violate the law and the constitution without hesitation. This is where we stand with the government, and this is where the government stands with us. "We shall both be judged by our works" [al-Baqarah: 139].

Taking liberties with people's dignity and violating the sanctity of their homes is a sin forbidden by God. "Believers, do not enter the dwellings of other men until you have asked their owners' permission and wished them peace. That will be best for you. Perchance you will take heed. If you find no one in them, do not go in until you are given leave. If you are refused admission, it is but right that you should go away. Allah has knowledge of all your actions" [al-Nur: 27]. Thus, people denounced an action because it violated the law and the constitution. We denounce it on the strength of what was mentioned in God's Holy Book, the book which laid down for us the course of conduct in this life and in the hereafter. We also think that we are more committed to the constitution than its authors who had determined in its articles that Islamic law wass the principal source of legislation in this Muslim country. Thus our condemnation of this conduct is based first on God's law and, second, on the constitution, which they claim to respect. Which one of the two presents a stronger argument? Which one of them is a more reliable factor? By the way, doesn't the socialist prosecutor get into the act of censuring this conduct on the basis of the Law of Shame or the Law of Values? "Say, 'Each man behaves after his own fashion. But your Lord best knows who is best guided' "[al-Isra': 84]. There is no power or strength save in God. "If anyone thinks that Allah will not give victory to His apostle in this world and in the world to come, let him tie a rope to the ceiling of his house and hang himself. Then let him see if his device has done away with that which has enraged him" [al-Hajj: 15].

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INVESTIGATION INTO TOP ISLAMIC LEADERS SLATED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 21 Sep 81 pp 1, 6

/Article: "Investigation into 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan Today, Shaykh Kishk on Thursday"/

/Text/ Yesterday the socialist public prosecutor's apparatus continued the investigation of people detained in the cases of factional dissension. The investigation, which Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, supervised, took place with the second group, which included 20 persons, headed by Salah 'Ashmawi, owner of the franchise of the Islamic magazine AL-DA'WAH. Investigation of him went on for more than 2 hours, after which it was decided that his investigation would resume next Sunday.

The investigation began when the detainee was questioned about his former political activity. He denied carrying out any political activity, but declared that he had been engaged in religious activity since joining the Society of the Moslem Brothers in 1937. He reviewed the history of the brothers and the brothers' secret Special Organization. He said that he was imprisoned in the period 1948-50 and that he brought before 'Umar al-Talmasani the notion of issuing the magazine AL-DA'WAH in its new form and demands for the application of Islamic law in 1976. 'Umar-al-Talmasani was won over by the idea and established the Islamic Publishing and Distribution Company, which was to finance AL-DA'WAH magazine, 'Umar al- Talmasani was its board chairman, since he was the person who financed it, and he became its editor in chief.

The investigation also involved two Christian religious figures, His Eminence Tadrus, Archbishop of the Orthodox Copts in Port Said, and Aliqs Ibrahim 'Abdu, priest in the Church of Mar Jirjis, al-Jiyushi, Shubra, as well as 18 members and personnel from Islamic groups in Alexandria, al-Minya and Port Said Universities.

The investigations, undertaken by 20 heads of prosecutor's offices in the apparatus, lasted about 4 hours, during which the detainees were confronted with the information available against them on their participation in kindling factional strife through provocation or approval. With regard to the lawyers detained, an investigation took place yesterday into the lawyer Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi on the evidence present against him on his participation in kindling the factional strife, through his relationship and contacts with the communists, which he denied. Attending with him was the lawyer Dr Ibrahim Darwish.

Investigation will also start today into 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan, the lawyer and former Wafdist minister. Attending with him will be the lawyer Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Ghani. The investigation of Ahmad Nasir and Muhammad 'Id, lawyers, will start tomorrow, that of Muhammad Fahim Amin will start Wednesday, and that of Hamid al-Azhari will start Thursday. The investigation of 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji, former head of the Lawyers' Union, will start next Saturday, and attending with him will be the lady lawyer 'Atiyat al-Shafi'i.

The investigation of detained journalists will start tomorrow, Tuesday, when Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq is interrogated.

Investigation will also take place today into a second group of persons who stirred up strife, who are 20 in number.

The fourth group, which will be investigated tomorrow (Tuesday) by the socialist public prosecutor's apparatus, will consist the archpriest Bulus Basili Ghubriyal, priest in the Church of Our Lady the Virgin and head of the al-Karimah Coptic Orthodox Society in Shubra; Mahmud Sayyid Ahmad 'Id, a former deliverer of sermons with the Ministry of Religious Endowments, who is now retired; Mukhtar Muhammad Ahmad Husayn, student in medicine, Cairo, and commander of the Islamic group in medicine in Cairo; Muhammad Naji Muhammad Bayyumi, a student in the Faculty of Fine Arts at Hilwan University and commander of the Islamic group in the faculty; 'Ala'Muhammad Ahmad al-Tijani, student in science at the University of Alexandria and commander of the Islamic group in the faculty; Usamah Sa'd-al-Din 'Ali al-'Iraqi, student in engineering in Alexandria and commander of the Islamic group in the faculty; Muhammad 'Isa Dayf Muhammad, graduate of the Faculty of Education, al-Minya, and member of the leadership of the Islamic group in the faculty; Jamal Hibah 'Ubayd, Muhammad, student of engineering at Port Said and member of the leadership of the Islamic group in the faculty; Muhammad 'Abbas Muhammad Ahmad, student in letters in al-Zaqaziq and member of the Islamic group in al-Isma'iliyah; Ihab Sa'id 'Abd-al-Baqi, student in commerce in Asyut and member of the Society to Command the Proper and Forbid the Reprehensible; 'Ali Jabir Muhammad Darwish, student in science in Cairo and member of the Islamic group in the faculty; 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr Ahmad Saqr, doctor and giver of sermons in the Department of Religious Endowments, Cairo; Wahid 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad, student in letters, Sawhaj; Ahmad Mustafa Mughrabi, student in letters, Sawhaj, and a leader of the Islamic groups in Sawhaj; Tal'at Fahmi 'Abd-al-Fattah Khafaji, student in letters, Cairo, and commander of the Islamic group in the faculty; Mahir Raghib Hanna, a lawyer and provoker of factional strife and religious fanaticism; Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Khashshab, student in letters, Alexandria, a leader of the Islamic group in the faculty and leader of the orientation which is loyal to the Society of Brothers; Tal'at Hafiz 'Abdallah Hasan, a carpenter in the Suez Canal Authority and member of the Islamic societies in al-Isma'iliyah; Muhammad Sa'id al-Sayyid 'Abduh, known as al-Shadhili, student in commerce, al-Zaqazig, a leader of the Islamic group in al-Isma'iliyah; and Sayyid Mahmud Shahin, a student in letters, Alexandria, a member of the Islamic group in the faculty.

The Fifth Group on Wednseday

The fifth group, to be investigated on Wednesday, will consist of Dr Mitwalli Yusuf Shalabi; Hamad Abu-al-Yazid Hayawi; Mustafa 'Abd-al-Baqi Ahmad Hamad;

Midhat Subhi Hasan al-Muqaddam; Ahmad al-Sayyid Ahmad 'Atiyah; Milham Badir Hamad 'Abd-al-Latif; Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad Madi; Mahmud 'Abd-al-Khaliq al-'Aqidi; Aliqs Yusuf As'ad; 'Abd-al-Masih Basit Abu-al-Khayr; Usamah Ahmad Khalifah Ibrahim; Muhammad Sa'id Isma'il; 'Ali Hasan al-Muzayyin; 'Umar Hamdan Ahmad; Hasan Sa'id 'Ali al-Shini; Fahmi Muhammad Muhammad 'Amir; Jamal Muhammad Najib Salim; Hasan al-Mughrabi Karim; 'Ala' Hamid 'Abd-al-Salam; Muhammad al-Sawi Muhammad Makhluf; and Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasaballah.

The Sicth Group on Thursday

The sixth group, on which the investigation will take place on Thursday, will consist of Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid Kishk, Mustafa 'Abd-al-Latif Darwish, Sharif Husayn 'Ala'-al-Din, Sami Fahmi Qutb Rida, 'Ala'-Al-Din Muhammad Mahmud Shawqi, Muhammad al-Sa'id al-Shahhat Salamah, Ahmad Duwaydar Shahhatah Duwaydar, Muhammad Rajab Sa'd al-Fishawi, Zaydan Muhammad Khayr 'Afifi, Muhammad Muhammad Shawqi 'Ali, Usamah Mustafa al-'Ashmawi, Karam 'Abd-al-'Alim Muhammad Hasanayn, Nasr Jindi Sulayman, Rif'at Mahmud Khalifah, 'Abdallah Muhammad Hasanayn al-Shimi, and Ra'fat Muhammad Hasan.

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CRITIC PROBES OFFICIAL EXPLANATIONS OF STRIFE

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic No 2780, 21 Sep 81 p 15

/Article by Salah Hafiz: "Stop--A Question for the Media: Where Are the People Who Are Fabricating the Dissension?"/

/Text/ Our media's position really provokes amazement at this time.

They are really preoccupied with the people exploiting the factional strife in Egypt, but are ignoring the people who are fabricating it!

The people fabricating the dissension, on the Christian side, are of course dominated by people who have made a profession out of recruiting young Christians to travel to Lebanon, training them in combat in the Lebanese Phalange camps, bringing them back to Egypt and smuggling weapons to them. There are funds behind this organized effort whose sources the government knows by name; the reports which the newspaper MAY has published declare that these sources are the World Council of Churches, German intelligence and American intelligence.

However, our media do not seem yet to have received knowledge of this. There is no word of any of this story, nor any followup on the details of it. People have not heard on the radio, read in the papers or seen on television any young Christians who are witnesses to the conspiracy, any pictures or recordings of any of the people in it, or any symposia explaining its dimensions or exposing the interests that lie behind the people financing it.

On the Islamic side, as well, we have not seen any pictures, heard any recordings, or watched any interviews that would expose the people fabricating the dissension, or the effects of their crimes, to use. We have not seen any of the professors that the Islamic groups have dealt with contemptuously under the cupola of the university, any of the students who have been stabbed by their knives, any of the girl students who have jumped out of a window to escape from their Tatarlike onslaughts during a university gathering, or any husbands they have prevented from walking in the street with their wives. The names of all these people exist, and are on record, and one can contact the people to whom they belong.

The media are no longer even opening the old files on these groups' terrorist acts--the file on the slaughter at the Military Secondary School and its victims

or the file on the assassination of Shaykh al-Dhahabi, after his kidnapping and torture; we have not seen the victims' families on television, nor have we heard them on the air, nor have we seen any security officials recounting the details and the background of these crimes and the efforts that have been exerted to contain and control them.

So:

The media have completely ignored the people fabricating the dissension on the Christian and Moslem sides; they have busied themselves completely with the people who have tried to exploit it!

Isn't that a situation that provokes amazement?

It is natural, when a fire breaks out, that we should be concerned first of all with the people who have set it, then after that with the people who have tried to engage in looting while it was going on. The real danger, in any struggle, is the one that makes the bomb and aims the cannon, not the one that yearns to strip the rings and gold watches off the dead after the fighting.

However, our media, it appears, are of the opposite opinion.

Since President al-Sadat took his bold decision to oppose the people who were fabricating and exploiting the strife, these media have been preoccupied with the exploiters, not the fabricators.

I do not deny that much of what these media have presented is striking and important, but it is not worth summing up their attack on factional strife in the country with that.

Likewise, the problem is that none of this is the essence of the issue in the case of Egypt, and in al-Sadat's struggle against factional dissension.

The issue in Egypt now is that this country's peace and future are almost being blown apart by dissension. In this dissension there are well-known parties, well-known leaders, well-known financers, and interests behind the financers that are well known also.

The government performed its duty when it decided to stand up to the danger and arrested about 1,000 people on the charge of fabricating the strife and at least 50 people charged with trying to exploit it.

Why, in the media, are the TV screens, the airwaves and the pages devoted to the people exploiting the strife and not to the people fabricating it?

The future of Egypt is serious and there is nothing funny about it.

The dangers of factional strife increase the closer the date for Israel's evacuation of Sinai comes. The forces that are concerned that Egypt explode internally before this evacuation are very numerous: foremost among them Israel itself, then

the Arab countries that are antagonistic to Camp David, then some anarchistic currents which raise revolutionary banners.

The real danger to Egypt from all these comes from the well-organized forces that are recruiting, massing, paying and perpetrating; the battle now is with these forces in the first place.

And so forth.

Masters of the media, at least act the way the government is acting.

Set aside 1,000 minutes to exposing the people who are fabricating strife in exchange for 50 minutes on exposing the people accused of exploiting it. Set aside 1,000 lines to the former in exchange for 50 lines for the latter!

Fight the people who are pointing the artillery at the heart of Egypt first, then allot the remaining time to the people who are waiting to pick up the pieces!

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SOME RESULTS OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO STRIFE ARE DISCLOSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Sep 81 pp 1, 11

/Article: "Results of Socialist Prosecutor's Investigations Are to Be Presented to the People"/

/Text/ Today the investigations by the socialist public prosecutor's apparatus are to begin on 13 detainees who belong to Islamic groups, to the dissolved Moslem Brothers and to the Repentance and Atonement /Society/. These are Muhammad Muhammad Raja'i, a student in commerce at Bani Suwayf; 'Abd-al-Hakim Ahmad Mustafa, student in agriculture, Cairo; Ahmad Abu-al-Fattuh 'Abd-al-Hadi, a student in medicine, Cairo; Muhammad Zakariya Sha'ban, a graduate of the Faculty of Engineering, University of the Canal; Ihab Ramzi Muhammad Badir, student in the Faculty of Technology in al-Minufiyah; Nash'at Kamal Ibrahim Isma'il, Faculty of Education, Alexandria; Husayn Mahmud Kamil Muhammad, student in agriculture, Cairo (branch of Al-Fayyum); Ibrahim 'Abbas 'Atallah, Faculty of Education, University of Tanta; and, from the Repentance and Atonement Groups, the students Wahid-al-Din Ahmad Sulayman, Muhammad Sa'id Mahdi Ahmad, al-Husayni 'Abdallah Musa Sharaf-al-Din, and 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Rashid Mihammad.

The investigation may or may not be continued tomorrow, in the case of 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji, depending on the state of his health; the socialist public prosecutor excused him alone, among the group of detainees, and permitted his wife and son to visit him. Today the investigation will be completed on 'Umar al-Talmasani, editor in chief of the magazine AL-DA'WAH, Muhammad Fahim, lawyer and former member of the board of the Lawyers' Union, and Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi, a lawyer. Investigation will also start tomorrow into 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hammadah, an engineer belonging to pre-revolutionary parties.

An official source in the socialist public prosecutor's apparatus stated that the investigations were still underway and that their results would be announced to the people as soon as they were completed. The measures of investigation have taken place in the context of legitimacy and within the limits of the law and the constitution, in accordance with the legal organization of Islamic law, which makes the socialist public prosecutor alone, to the exclusion of others, the person competent to investigate various aspects of political responsibility.

One cannot describe the measures that have been taken as exceptional ones, since they have derived their legitimacy from the people's approval of them as

represented by the unanimous results of the referendum. The detainees' destiny will be determined in the light of the investigations that have taken place regarding their activities, and, if the evidence of the investigation regarding any of them determines adequate cause, it will be handed on to the court; if not, it will not be handed over to the court /sic/.

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STATUS OF LATEST PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATIONS INTO STRIFE REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Sep 81 pp 1, 6

/Article: Socialist Prosecutor Continues His Investigations into the People Who Stirred up Strife"/

/Text/ Yesterday the socialist public prosecutor's apparatus began the investigation into 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan, lawyer and former Wafdist minister, in the presence of the lawyer Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Ghani. The investigation, which was supervised by Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, took a number of hours.

The investigation into Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi, the lawyer, on his political history and relations with communist organizations, was completed yesterday. It was decided that the investigation which started the day before yesterday into Salih 'Ashmawi, proprietor of the franchise of the Islamic magazine AL-DA'WAH, would be completed next Saturday, and the socialist public prosecutor allowed him to go to the prison hospital on account of the circumstances of his health, along with 'Umar al-Talmasani.

Yesterday 20 heads of public prosecutor's offices in the agency started investigation into a third group of detainees. They were presented with the available evidence on their participation in kindling factional strife. This group contains 20 people, including Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Khatib, employee in the Ministry of Religious Endowments, who has been engaged in writing and publishing religious books; and Mahmud Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Badawi, first instructor of Arabic language at the al-Saniyah School, who gave sermons in the 'Imad-al-Din Mosque on assignment from the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and against whom the office of the public prosecutor made the charge of working assiduously in sermons to stir up factional strife, attack the regime and criticize the Camp David agreements, as well as birth control, on the basis of investigations by the security office. The investigation also included a number of commanders of Islamic groups in the universities including 'Asim Hasan 'Ali, student in the University of Asyut, whom the investigator, in the presence of his lawyer, Mahmud Tuffahah, confronted with intelligence reports on his resistance to security forces and aggression against the people in it, together with some of his colleagues, on 5 January.

For the first time, the socialist public prosecutor also permitted the detainees to be visited. He agreed to a permit for a visit to 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji, former chief of the Lawyers' Union, by his wife and son, in the cardiac unit in al-Imbabah, where he has been detained. The investigation into the former union chief will take place next Saturday.

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INVESTIGATION OF PEOPLE INVOLVED IN FACTIONAL STRIFE BEGINS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Sep 81 pp 1, 10

/Article: "Investigation of the First Group of People Detained in Factional Events Has Started."/

/Text/ Yesterday the socialist public prosecutor's agency started the investigation of people detained in the events of factional strife. The investigation, which Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, supervised, dealt with the first group of people detained, including 'Umar al-Talmasani, editor in chief of the Islamic magazine AL-DA'WAH; Hilmi al-Jazzar, general commander of the Islamic groups; Archpriest Zakariya Butrus Hanin, priest of the church of Mar Jirjis of the Orthodox Copts in Heliopolis; and Archpriest Athanasios Butrus, priest of the Church of the Angel Michael in al-Matariyah.

The detainees appeared yesterday morning in the headquarters of the socialist prosecutor, where 15 agency members who are heads of public prosecutor's offices began investigating them on matters attributed to them regarding participation in the events of factional strife. Each detainee confronted the evidence present against him on his commission of acts which led to the creation of the factional strife or its escalation in any form, by provocation, actual assistance or approval, through articles, participation in symposis, distribution of pamphlets, or the exploitation of places of worship to give sermons and exhortations to enflame the fire of dissension. The investigators listened to each person's defense.

The investigation continued in the presence of the lawyers, more than 10 of whom appeared with 'Umar al-Talmasani alone. The lawyers praised the method of investigation and declared that the detainees had been granted all their requests in their places of detention.

Counsellor Yusuf Daraz, chairman of the technical bureau of the office of the socialist prosecutor, stated that the detainees had been provided all the guarantees stipulated in the Criminal Procedures Law.

The number of grievances the socialist prosecutor's received from the defense of the detainees came to about 300, in addition to 76 requests to receive medicine, clothes and food.

The investigation of a second group of detainees will start tomorrow. They are Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Khatib, employee in the Ministry of Religious Endowments who is engaged in writing and publishing religious books; Mahmud Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Badawi, a teacher, who is engaged in giving sermons in mosques; Ahmad Mahmud Hanafi, a student in commerce at Alexandria, a group leader; Ahmad Yahya Muhammad Matar, medicine, Alexandria; Hasan al-Barnas Bidar, medicine, Alexandria; Muhammad al-Sayfi, a driver with the Aluminum Company in al-Isma'iliyah; and Tahir Tawfiq, vice principal of the al-Zahra' primary school in al-Minya.

This group also includes Ibrahim Muhammad 'Umar, a student in the Faculty of Commerce and Management Sciences in the University of the Canal, who is the commander of the group; Ahmad Salim Fu'ad Mustafa, a student in Medicine in Cairo; Hajjaj Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani, a student in commerce, Asyut; 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna Mahmud 'Ata, commander of the group in dentistry in Cairo; Aliqs 'Abd-al-Massih Yusuf 'Abd-al-Massih, a priest in the Church of the Angel Michael in a village in the District of Tahta; 'Asim Hasan 'Ali, letters, Sawhaj; al-Shamamisah 'Abd-al-Massih and Rufa'il Ni'matallah of the Church of Kafr Ayyub 'Awad; Mustafa 'Abd-al-Hamid, a student in medicine, Cairo; Hamadayn 'Abd-al-'Ati al-Sabahi; muhammad Khalil, secretary of the Grouping Party; and Jamal As'ad 'Abd-al-Mallak.

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CSO 4504/18

BROTHERHOOD VERSION OF AL-ZAWIYAH AL-HAMRA' RIOT

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 63, Jul 81 pp 20-21

[Article: "Facts We Offer Officials on the Events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' "]

[Text] We are bringing these facts to the attention of state officials and to the attention of the Egyptian people so that they would all realize the real magnitude of the events that took place and [understand] the hidden motives of those who are fomenting sedition. [We are bringing these facts to their attention] so they would know who are the real criminals who are making threats by using the national unity of the Egyptian people, which was for the past 10 years and still is a sword hanging over the necks of Muslims only.

The events began after the evening prayer on Wedensday, 17 June 1981 in front of al-Nasr Mosque. As Muslims were praying, they were surprised when a football hit the worshipers inside the mosque. A few young Christians had been playing football [in the neighborhood]. When the worshipers came out of the mosque and chided the young men, their response was rude and provocative. This moved one of the worshipers to warn his fellows against being dragged into [a confrontation], and he asked them to go away.

However, before the Muslims went away, a shower of bullets was fired at them from the building across the street from the mosque, and one of the worshipers was killed. There was confusion and turmoil, and news of the incident traveled throughout the section of the city. Consequently, some Muslims reacted against Christians.

After the night prayer as the worshipers were leaving the al-Nadhir mosque, which is almost 500 meters from al-Nasr mosque, the Christian Kamil al-Mawwan and his sons fired their automatic guns on the Muslims inside and outside the mosque. They continued shooting until 2 a.m. Thursday, but the shooting did not cease until they were arrested. Other Christians also shot Muslims in the area of al-Jinaynah and Abu Laylah farm.

More than 60 persons were killed or injured since early Thursday morning. Until Thursday morning no Christian had been hurt, and it is known that

bullets had caused all the casualties among Muslims. Records at the hospitals of Ahmad Mahir, Bab al-Shi'riyah, Manshiyah al-Bakri, Heliopolis and al-Zahra' attest to that.

Majdi Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im, one of the injured in al-Nadhir mosque, gave an account of how he was injured.

He said, "When the call to night prayer was announced, I went to al-Nadhir mosque to pray. When I bent over to pick up my shoes [after the prayer], I was hit by a bullet in my stomach. It tore up my intestines, my spleen and settled in my spine."

Those who were injured also relate that the attitudes of Christian physicians in the hospitals to which they had been taken were inhuman. The anesthesiologist at Ahmad Mahir hospital declined to administer anesthesia to one of the wounded so that a quick surgical operation can be performed. The Muslim physician performed the surgery without anesthesia. Another physician also declined to interfere to stop the bleeding of one of the wounded. He ignored him until his wound festered. When the wounded man was transferred to another hospital, the physicians [there] decided that his life could not be saved because it was too late.

Reactions from the Muslim and the Christian communities followed each other all day Thursday and Friday. There were casualties in both communities, and a number of people from both communities was also killed. [Finally], it became possible to bring the area under control, and a few officials assisted by a few Muslim advocates calmed the fury of Muslims in the area and restored stability and peace to the area.

The outcome of this sedition was 96 Muslim casualties; by Friday evening more than 10 of them had died.

Ancient and modern history attest to the tolerance of Islam and to Muslims' good treatment of Christians and others. This is based on the orders of their religion and the advice of their prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation. Muslims have never been advocates of intolerance. They have never initiated sedition. They have rather always been victims of intolerance.

No religious minority in any country in the world enjoys what the Christian minority in Egypt enjoys. The whole world attests to that.

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BROTHERHOOD APPEALS TO CITIZENS

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 63, Jul 81 p 21

[Article: "An Appeal"]

[Text] Today, this dear country is charting its course amidst events that are extremely dangerous for its future. Unless the people of this country can see their way in the light of God's Koran and the tradition of His Prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, only God knows what the consequences will be.

A brief pause in relation to the history of this homeland would provide incontrovertible evidence that Muslims and Christians lived under Islam the most tranquil and the most noble life led by citizens of different faiths.

Events that occurred recently would alarm everyone who is loyal to his country. He would be alarmed by the fact that storms which are neither materially nor morally justified would loom in its clear skies. As long as Islam has provided all the citizens of this country with their full rights for these past hundreds of years, it would be a grave mistake for anyone to try to change this situation as long as Islam remains immutable.

Recent events and the injuries, bloodshed and shootings that accompanied them affected Muslims only. These must be stopped so that an imminent danger can be averted. We are appealing to Muslim and Christian citizens of this nation to appreciate the sensitivity of the circumstances which this country is going through. We are also appealing to the government to adopt promptly all the measures that would restore to everyone a sense of peace through measures that are based on firmness, justice, equality and a consideration of all circumstances so that every citizen can feel secure and safe.

We are making this appeal to all citizens from a position of confidence in God and faith in His endless assistance. We have faith in the ability bestowed by God on His creatures to protect themselves, their funds, their honor and their faith from anyone near or far who tries to undermine them. This is an appeal that does not lack candor, and a hint is enough for free men.

We are asking citizens not to go along with foreign plans that seek to undermine internal security because of unjustified provocations whose early signals appeared in recent events. The events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' were the result of a policy adopted by Patriarch Shenouda. Egypt's president referred to that policy last May. The specific reference he made was to the fact that so far Muslims do not distinguish in their dealings between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. This is something that non-Muslims should be careful about because millions [of pounds] are being funneled from the pockets of their fellow Muslim citizens to the offices of their doctors and to their stores.

We ask God that He bestow upon this country and the various Muslim countries peace and stability and that there be among His men "a nation that shall speak for righteousness, enjoin justice and forbid evil" [The Imrans: 104].

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ARREST OF JOURNALIST CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 63, Jul 81 p 5

[Article: "Will Editors-in-Chief of Newspapers Be Deterred?"]

[Text] The Egyptian media are destructive. They try to spread vileness and corruption among people by means of what they publish, broadcast or show on the television screen. They show immoral material that arouses man's carnal instincts.

Egyptian media have become cancerous, destroying the structure of Egyptian society with no one to resist and prevent them from [their efforts] to destroy, demolish and wreck everything that is good and deep-rooted in our society. It were as though the mind that operated and controlled these agencies were a Jewish mind that is naturally disposed to destruction and devastation.

The al-Azbakiyyah Court of Misdemeanor recently sentenced the editor-in-chief of the newspaper, AL-JUMHURIYAH, Mr Muhsin Muhammad, to a suspended 6 months term at labor and a fine of 20 pounds in the suit that was filed against him by Mr 'Adil Sulayman, the editorial manager of AL-JUMHURIYAH and three attorneys representing society. The charge that was leveled against the editor-in-chief of AL-JUMHURIYAH was that "He persisted in publishing immoral subjects and pictures that were contrary to the values and agreements of journalistic honor and contrary to the Press Union Law No 76 for 1970." Sentence was pronounced by Judge Sayyid 'Uways, chairman of the al-Azbakiyyah Court of Misdemeanor.

Will editors-in-chief of newspapers who persist in publishing such subjects as those which the editor-in-chief of AL-JUMHURIYAH has persisted in publishing be deterred? We hope [this will be the case].

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BIRTH CONTROL PLOT ALLEGED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 62, Jun 81 pp 40-41

[Article by 'Ali al-Qadi: "Is the Population Explosion Real? Birth Control between Islam and Christianity; the Church Forbids the Practice of Birth Control among Christians and Advocates Encouraging It among Muslims"]

[Text] Pope Pius XII declared his opinion plainly: "Christianity supports large families." Clergymen in Free Ireland also announced that birth control was sinful and that it [indicated] selfishness, godlessness and heresy. According to the Cairo newspaper, AKHBAR AL-YAWM of 24 September 1972 Nixon said that abortion was not congruent with religion and civilization.

Along with the serious challenge of the birth control campaign, Muslims are facing the challenge of the emigration and the increasing number of Jews in Palestine. They are facing the challenge of Muslim extermination in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Eritrea and other countries; and they are facing the challenge of the increasing number of Christians in Europe. In the meantime Muslims are practicing birth control in a variety of ways that include incentives or compulsion, as was the case in India in 1976. India then carried out the mandatory sterilization of males in the Islamic provinces, and that aroused the fury of all Muslims there.

Besides, a secret conference for Christians was convened in one of the Islamic countries. The following were among its resolutions:

1. The church absolutely forbids the practice of birth control or family planning, and it considers anyone who engages in such practices to be violating the instructions of the church, forfeiting the mercy of God, a killer of church people and a destroyer of their glory.

2. Family planning and birth control are to be encouraged among Muslims, especially since 65 percent of physicians and those engaged in the delivery of health services are church people.

3. Increasing the number of church people is to be encouraged, and material and moral incentives and aid are to be granted to poor families.

4. People employed in the delivery of health services in government and non-government sectors were instructed to increase their health services to church people and to give them abundant care and effort. This would reduce the number of deaths among them. They were also instructed to do the opposite with Muslims.

5. Early marriages are to be encouraged, and the costs of marriage are to be reduced. This can be done by setting church use fees and fees for marriage ceremonies in the churches [that are located] in the popular sections of the city.

6. The church absolutely forbids Christian landlords from leasing homes, apartments or stores to Muslims. The church regards anyone who does that from now on to have forfeited God's mercy and the protection of the church. Everything must also be done to evict Muslim tenants from the buildings and homes that are owned by church people. The following comment was then made on these resolutions:

"If we carry out this policy, making our effort to encourage our young Christian people to marry and to make it easy for them to do so proportionate to our effort to make marriage difficult for young Muslims and reduce marriage opportunities for them, our action will be effective in the attainment of [our] goal. It is no secret that the purpose of these resolutions is to bring about a decrease in the rate of growth among Muslims and to increase that rate among our young Christian people."

The Opinion of Religion

It is the opinion of Islam that Muslims should multiply so that they could fulfill their mission in this life, considering that they are God's successors on this earth. Muslims were asked to establish and thwart falsehood and populate the earth. They are to populate the earth by working continuously and regularly according to the plan that was devised in the context of Islam's instructions. Muslims are to shun exploitation, usury, theft, bribery and anything that would hamper affection or security in Islamic society. God tells us, "Marry, have children and multiply so I can be proud of you among the nations on the Day of Resurrection." Daily bread is provided to those who work on this earth from God's inexhaustible coffers. God Almighty says, "Our gifts shall never fail" [Sad: 54].

Islamic advocate al-Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali discusses the opinions of those who believe in birth control. He says, "Why is it that the newborn child becomes a mouth to feed and not a worker? Why does he become a consumer and not a producer? Why does he become a burden on life not a helper? Why are future generations disparaged by humanity, and why does their presence become a source of worry and not a source of good news?

If the material and moral efforts that were made by pessimists to kill these lives or to prevent them from being born were spent in correcting social errors and rectifying actual deviations, those efforts would make better sense.

A Muslim who fears God Almighty [in this regard] will find no problems in this life. In this regard God Almighty says, "He that fears Allah, Allah will give him a means of salvation and provide for him whence he does not reckon: Allah is all-sufficient for the man who puts his trust in Him" [al-Talaq: 3].

Economic Resources of the Islamic World

Nevertheless, the economic resources of the Islamic world are tremendous, and they would be sufficient for any increase [in the population] regardless how large that increase was. The only thing that is needed is integration among the Islamic countries so that there would be full planning to guarantee that everything would proceed on a sound basis.

Islamic countries hold the sources of the oil wealth; they produce 70 percent of the world's oil, and they make up 60 percent of international trade.

Islamic countries also produce in Iraq and in Egypt 93 percent of the dates produced world-wide. They produce cotton in Egypt, Sudan and south Bangladesh; and they produce coffee and rice in Pakistan and so on. Unfortunately, integration is lacking even in trade. Exports of Islamic countries to other Islamic countries amount to no more than five percent of their total exports to the entire world. Their imports from each other amount to no more than nine percent of their imports from the whole world.

Therefore, the matter requires that a new policy be devised by loyal people who are to do everything they can to carry it out. It is then that matters will become clear, and Muslims will find themselves sailing to the shore of safety.

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BRIEFS

'UTHMAN PROPERTY SEQUESTERED--Yesterday the property of Rashad 'Uthman, People's Assembly member from the District of Mina' al-Basal, Alexandria, was sequestered in execution of the socialist public prosecutor's decree. This involved three private passenger cars, one of which was a 1981 Mercedes Benz, 13 trucks, tow trucks, and buses, two villas, and four buildings and open space lands ranging from 20 to 500 feddans in area in the sections of al-'Ajami, al-Dukhaylah, al-'Amiriyah and Umm Zaghiyu. A committee of the office of the socialist public prosecutor, under the chairmanship of the counsellor, with three heads of public prosecutor's offices as members, came to Alexandria yesterday and carried out the sequestration of the property of the People's Assembly member, which also included lumber warehouses in al-Wardiyan, Mina' al-Basal, al-Maks, al-Dukhaylah, al-'Amiriyah and the Umm Zaghiyu area on the Cairo-Alexandria desert road, three offices, an import-export firm, and a shipping and unloading firm in the al-Bashbishi Building in al-Manshiyah. Letters were also sent to banks containing the text of the socialist public prosecutor's decree sequestering his funds which were deposited in them. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 3 Sep 81 p 1/ 11887

DETAINEES TO RECEIVE SALARIES--The office of the socialist public prosecutor resumed the political investigation into some persons detained in the recent events, including Muhammad Fahim, a lawyer and former member of the union board, 'Abd-al-'Azim Isma'il al-Mughrabi, lawyer and member of the secretariat general of the Grouping Party, and Dr Jalal Rajab, a lawyer. The office also resumed the investigation into the fifth group which contains 21 persons, including a number of imams in mosques and Christian religious figures, among them Dr Mitwalli Yusuf Shalabi, known as Yusuf Shalabi, dean of the Faculty of the Call to Religion of al-Mansurah, and Aliqs Yusuf As'ad, priest in the Church of Our Lady the Virgin in al-'Umraniyah and editor in chief of the magazine AL-HISAD which the church issues. Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, socialist public prosecutor, ordered that the salaries of detainees who are working in the government or the public sector be disbursed to their families lest any of these families bear the consequences of the acts of

their heads and as a result be deprived of their source of sustenance. The underlying idea in this is that these people's salaries are not to be affected by the detainees' acts because they do not entail the same effects as measures of provisional imprisonment stipulated in the Law on the System of Government Employees and the Law on the System of Public Sector Employees as regards wages. The investigayion into the journalist Samir Tadrus is to be postponed because the representative of the Journalists' Union had not appeared as of today. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Sep 81 pp 1, 19/ 11887

CSO: 4504/18

EXISTING CONDITIONS, CONTRADICTIONS, PRESENT FORCES ANALYZED

Paris REVOLUTION in French No 82, 25 Sep 81 pp 18-21

[Interview with Nuri Albala, Alain Gresh and Francois Ponchelet by Dominique Vidal; date and place not given.]

> [Text] The questions posed by developments in Iran are innumerable. To claim to answer them all is impossible. REVOLUTION has chosen two of the basic ones: What contradictions are at work in Iran, which are becoming sharper? What forces are present? This is what lawyer and specialist on Iran, Nuri Albala; member of the PCF's foreign policy group Alain Gresh, and journalist Francois Ponchelet, who "covered" the Islamic revolution for EUROPE NO 1, discuss below.

Anyone who recalls the extraordinary popular movement which brought down the shah's regime, can only be surprised by the turn events have taken today. From the bloody attempts which are decimating the leadership of the republic and of the Islamic Party to the no less bloody repression imposed, there is a convergence of circumstances which is worrying and confusing even the friends of revolutionary Iran.

Nuri Albala: What we in France have the most difficulty in understanding is that a person can be both revolutionary and religious as far as Islam is concerned. Indeed, this is the nature of the movement which overthrew the shah, the victim not of an armed uprising, but of a combination of popular uprisings.

Let us go back to the beginning. The shah's policy made all the classes and social levels of Iranian society in turn discontented. Its antinational character, subject to foreign domination, caused the reaction it aroused to express itself on a nationalist basis and as a form of cultural affirmation. Therefore, as Islamic, since in Iran any cultural affirmation passes through religion.

To this phenomenon, the source of the major contradiction of the Islamic revolution, is added a circumstantial fact: the repression was such during the shah's period that for lack of parties, unions or authorized associations, the mosque was the only structure and the only place for meeting and organization.

Thus, at the same time an in-depth movement of a country claiming its Islamic culture and a movement led by the mullahs themselves converged. The two movements

seemed to coincide until the day when, with the triumph of the revolution, the time came for political changes. Then the contradictions arose among the various movements, but also among the 200,000 mullahs with diverse social origins and orientations who did not constitute a politically homogenous group.

Francois Ponchelet: During the entire first phase of the revolution, from Tehran's "black Friday" until the fall of the shah, the religious leaders are the catalysts for the discontent. They constitute a means of, a vehicle for, the revolution, and not an end: establishment of a religious power is not the objective of the millions of Iranians who risked their lives to descend into the streets. What they want is to be rid of the Pahlavis.

In the second phase, with the shah's regime overthrown, the convergence of interests gives way to divergence. The religious leaders work to assure their own power, in other words, this type of feudal regime which--since the mullahs are the best organized force--ended up being imposed. The Iranian people have lost an emperor, the shah, and have found a guide, Ayatollah Khomeyni.

Dominique Vidal: Isn't there a contradiction between what you each have just said: one of you speaks of the religious leaders as a heterogenous group, and the other as a type of monolithic coalition?

Alain Gresh: History enables us to settle this question. The Iranian "clergy" has never been united and it has never constituted a homogenous political alternative.

The mullahs, say some, have always been anti-establishment. This is not true. Shortly before the revolution, a "clergy" party was still collaborating with the shah. Similarly, after the October revolution when the Soviet Republic of Guilan was formed in Iran, it was panic stricken mullahs who helped put the Pahlavis on the throne. As in 1953, it was the opposition of a certain number of religious leaders--and particularly the withdrawal of Ayatollah Kashani's support--to Mossadegh which was one of the determining factors in his fall.

Back in 1978, two currents clashed within Iranian Shiism: for one group it was up to the religious leaders to define the law, which emanated from God, and to apply it, while the others limited the role of the "clergy" to a type of impetus, with the State being the business of lay people.

These are contradictions which are expressed on the ideological level--between, for example some of the Mojahedin's ideas and some of Khomeyini's-- but also on the directly political level.

Just as many elements remain true today and allow us to exclude the idea of a "mullaharchy" in the sense of a single power for all the religious groups. Even if it is true that some factions are trying to seize control of State.

Dominique Vidal: But isn't this villent struggle among rival factions hiding--with the media's "assistance"--the attainments of the Islamic revolution?

Francois Ponchelet: The attainments, in any case, must not be sought in the area of freedom. From the moment that opposition newspapers were prohibited and militants

pursued and forced to live in hiding with the constant threat of a speedy trial followed by an even speedier execution, how can we not find that Iran has returned to a regime which respects no liberty?

And the economy? All that I know is that during my last visit, in August 1980, the situation was absolutely catastrophic, with producting running at only 20 or 30 percent of capacity.

Nuri Albala: The fact cannot be denied. Still, the origin of this situation must still be considered.

How can we forget the desire of the countries who traded with the shah of Iran--in other words, basically the United States and the Western world--to throttle the Islamic revolution? From the total halt in shipments, including spare parts for assembly plants, to the freezing of Iranian assets, there was a systematic sabotage. Also, how can we forget the burden of the war with Iraq? These two factors enable us to understand how the Iranian economy, which was not very bright at the end of the shah's reign, was able to collapse.

Thus, here is a regime simultaneously confronted by a catastrophic economic situation, by outside aggression and by outside and inside counter-revolutionary activity and, we will return to this, by the rebellion of several minority groups. How to face it? The desirable solution would have been to bring to the needs of the population the economic, social and political solutions they were expecting. The Islamic revolution attempted to do this, not without some success, particularly in eliminating illiteracy and construction of schools--five times as many as during the shah's period--, establishment of free medical care, nationalization of foreign trade, etc. But it has not been able, for reasons I have mentioned and due to the development of an insidious civil war, to reach the end of the road.

To such an extent, it is through a different means, authoritarian means, that the regime is trying to find a way out of the difficulties assailing it. And this, I must say, does worry me, not only with regard to the liberties and the rights of man, but also for the future of the revolution itself for which democracy, in Iran as elsewhere, is the best defense. The best, but obviously not the most spontaneous: a people which has always, except for a few intervals, lived under the yoke of a dictatorship, does not discover democracy all at once.

Dominique Vidal: Here a discussion could ensue on the relationship between democracy and revolution in the Islamic countries and perhaps, even more generally, in the Third World. As absurd as it seems to me to want to impose on these countries forms of democracy which arose from centuries of struggle and practice by the European people--and consequently to judge them by our standards--, the idea that development of democracy in these countries in their own forms would not be required by the revolutionary process itself also seems dangerous to me. Witness the Islamic revolution.

Alain Gresh: A revolution, however, which allowed the Iranian people to express their aspirations for the first time, braving the police and repression. This unprecedented popular movement was developed within a wide social, political and religious diversity. I mean to say by this that the source of the current

difficulties in Iran is not to be found in some "natural incapacity" on the part of the Third World to conceive of democracy.

Dominique Vidal: This is, however, an idea in vogue in the most diverse areas.

Alain Gresh: I am hesitant in regard to any paternalistic theories of this type. No: it is rather in the struggles taking place in Iran and in what is at stake that the key to the evolution of the Islamic revolution must be sought.

After the victory of the revolution, it was, let us say, a "liberal bourgeois" regime which tried to install itself. With Barzargan, in fact, it was a matter of taking over the basics of the shah's domestic and foreign orientations, but in a more "domocratic" form. Heavy combat ensued between this group and the others, dealing entirely with the goals and the future of the Islamic revolution.

Today, the almost "racist" manner in which the media consider Iran as well as the actual complexity of the situation foster a certain "haziness."[1] Although the current struggles no doubt deal with certain economic, social, political and international stakes, it is difficult for us to grasp the ins and outs.

Except for one, which we must keep in mind. For 30 years, Iran played a decisive role in imperialist strategy on the international scene: as "patrolman" of the area, it was simultaneously an intelligence post, military base and intervention force. The Islamic revolution has put an end to this too, to Washington's detriment. If any Tehran government can easily produce such accomplishments again, the United States and its allies will do anything to recover their bastion, if possible.

Francois Ponchelet: Regarding democracy, it is certain that the first phase of the revolution was a formidable democratic movement, a formidable explosion in which each person finally was able to express himself. And the religious leaders acted to catalyze and to unify the unanimous desire to chase out the shah.

Although the demonstrations since then have remained massive, it seems to me that their character has changed. As the religious leaders were seizing the apparatus of state, it was the mostaz'efin--the deprived people in the poor quarters to whom you give a little money so that they will go march--who took over the inside track in the demonstrations. This was, in particular, the case in the continuous demonstrations in front of the United States embassy which, once heterogenous, became the "property" of these "professional demonstrators."

I was often present: this was no longer spontaneous democracy, but pure and simple manipulation.

Then, what is the purpose of the revolution? I personally see no other explanation than a power struggle. Power for power's sake. Each time we pose this question of purpose, we come across the same phrase of Khomeyni's: "We will win because we are with God and God is with us."

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1. All the more reason to welcome Yan Richard's book "Chiisim, Imam et Revolution," [Shiism, Imam and Revolution] Paris 1981, which is an excellent introduction to Iran today.

Nuri Albala: "Power for power's sake," may be the goal of some Iranian leaders, but certainly not the purpose of the revolution itself.

Francois Ponchelet: I meant the prupose of those currently in power.

Nuri Albala: The difference is important. Why did the Iranians go down into the streets before the revolution and afterwards? Because they had something to say, to demand. And why did they identify, not with one of the important ayatollahs, such as Chariat Madari, with a higher standing in the hierarchy, but with Khomeyni? Because Khomeyni used the slogans that corresponded to what the people themselves wanted to express.

Since then there has been some recouping, indeed some manipulation, no doubt. But, I find it difficult to believe that all of a sudden the day after 11 February 1979, the Iranians began to run into the streets without knowing why. The real problem is to find out whether the claims expressed in this fashion correspond to the orientations of the country's leaders. This is where the risk of side-slipping lies, aggravated by the poor functioning of the democracy.

It is, in fact, not a matter of some "incapacity of the underdeveloped for democracy," but of actual obstacles, some inherited from a past in which democracy has never had a place, other linked to the present, particularly to the rejection of democracy by the most reactionary and demogogic factions, including those within the power structure. This is the gravest danger for the Islamic revolution, all the more so since the claims of the Iranian masses which remain cannot, under these conditions, be truly postponed or truly atisfied.

Dominique Vidal: Can't this major problem, as well as others besides, be expalined by the absence of a great Marxist revolutionary force or a large Communist party in Iran? Doesn't the history of the Tudeh Party, particularly its overwhelming by the shah's repression, explain both the hegemonic Islamic character of the Iranian revolution and its difficulty in implementing a more coherent orientation and program?

Alain Gresh: Actually, the Islamic thrust manifests itself throughout the Arab world and even beyond.

One of the factors in this is indeed the shah's physical liquidation of the Communist Party, as is, more generally, the liquidation of independent democratic forces in most Arab countries. Concurrently, Islam became the only outlet, the only means of expression, even on the simple level of organization.

The other factor is the failure, throughout the Near East, of the attempts to bring in "models," whether they be Western models labeled "liberal," or "socialist" models. Nowhere have the basic problems of the people been solved.

At the same time, a series of contradictions is explained, beginning with the complexity of the religious world, crisscrossed by all the political currents.

Francois Ponchelet: Any political "topology" of Iran must distinguish between the religious groups, themselves divided among all sorts of tendencies found within the

Revolutionary Party of Iran, and the lay groups, liberals such as Bazargan or revolutionaries such as Tudeh.

Alain Gresh: While specifying that a member of the lay group such as Bani Sadr--elected with close to three quarters of the vote--benefitted from wide support among the religious groups and had close relationships with many ayatollahs and mullahs. Just as the Mufahedin, moreover. This shows how difficult it is to separate lay groups and religious groups also.

Dominique Vidal: As we are starting to speak about the forces present in Iran, let us begin with the extreme right. The removal of a star has brought the current fire upon the monarchist opposition.

Nuri Albala: In other words: the supporters of the ex-imperial family and the generals grouped around Oveissy, who made himself famous as the butcher of Tehran.

Francois Ponchelet: It's the "last source."

Dominique Vidal: Next to this group comes Shapour Bakhtiar. How do we define him?

Nuri Albala: Before the revolution he was one of the leaders of the National Front, the bourgeois opposition to the shah, who had agreed to become his last prime minister. He was thus swept out of power with his master, in February 1979 and since then has been organizing a right wing resistance group which does not mean much in Iran.

Dominique Vidal: Next the great interrogation, in other words Bani Sadr, and particularly the Mujahedin with whom he is now linked. Why did these revolutionaries, once at the point of combat with the shah, place themselves at the head of the opposition to Khomeyni, even going so far in order to fight him, as to ally themselves with forces which had every intention, it seemed, of using them as stepping stones?

Nuri Albala: One word, first, on Bani Sadr's ambiguity. Yesterday he presented himself as the trusted man of the religious leaders, even calling himself Khomeyni's spiritual brother; then he wanted to be leader of the liberal current, before making himself the legitimate defender of the law when he was removed.

If he remains representative, it is in fact due to the legitimacy of the vote. And the Mujahedin protected him, made him leave Iran and set him up in Paris in order to profit from his legal authority.

Who are the Mujahedin! At the beginning they were a group stemming from the Iranian Liberation Movement then headed by Bazargan, who were thansformed into guerilla groups and were the spearhead in the struggle against the Pahlavis. In listing the martyrs executed by the shah, at least half of them would be the names of Mujahedin militants.

Their opposition to the current leaders in Tehran is first of all ideological. As Musulmans and progressivists, they differ particularly with Khomeyni on the basic concept of Towhid: the unity which lays the fondation for the designing of a

homogenous society which no conflict of class or interests would divide. The Mujahedin feel that in order to arrive at this unity, it is first desirable to establish social balance which only the class struggle will enable. Without getting involved in the theological debate on the conformity of this concept to Islam, let us say that it incontestably plases the Mujahedin in the most progressive wing of Islam.

For them, the current regime is more and more reactionary, and this is why they have decided to fight it.

Dominique Vidal: The repression unleashed in Tehran is aimed more at the Mujahedin that at the reactionary counter-revolution, from the extreme right to the liberals.

Nuri Albala: It is, in fact, from their ranks that the repression by the Islamic powers is taking the most victims. They were the first to directly attack the regime, and they attacked the base most dangerous to it, that is the name of Islam and the halo of its martyrs. Unquestionably, they are very popular in Iran.

Francois Ponchelet: I can testify that in the large demonstrations in Tehran, the true popular heroes were the Mujahedin. There is no doubt that today, in the clandestine state to which they have been relegated, they constitute a considerable force.

Nuri Albala: They feel it is necessary to unite all forces against Khomeyni's power, which they call reactionary; therefore, to ally themselves with representatives of the bourgeoisie, primarily Bani Sadr. In doing this are they weighing the risk that once these forces have used the Mujahedin to attain their ends, they will thrust them aside in turn?

Francois Ponchelet: What amazes me is that the role of instigator is being played by the Mujahedin and not by the Tudeh Party. When the Iranian Communists are questioned, they reply: of course, many things are not working out in this regime, but its anti-imperialist orientation remains as the essential and is worth letting some mistakes slide. According to them, the interests of the revolution would be as well served ay the mullahs, from the moment they become anti-imperialist, as by a purely revolutionary government.

Nuri Albala: Although I do not share this vision of the Iranian situation, it must be recognized that fighting against this regime--whether everything about it is pleasing or not--comes down to working with the enemies of the revolution. With the pro-imperialist forces, the survivors of Pahlavi power. I am not saying that everyone who is fighting the Khomeyni is reactionary--and certainly the Mujahedin are not --, but I find that they have been led to ally themselves with people who want to kill not only the Islamic power, but the Iranian revolution itself. It is this also--and therefore not just the support that Khomeyni's anti-imperialism merits--which lays the foundation for Tudeh's analysis. The alternatives are: either to support the regime, or to allow the counter-revolution to install itself.

The other important aspect in analyzing Tudeh is that the party considers Tehran's leaders as a heterogenous group: beside elements which are indeed reactionary, it discerns progressivists determined to solve the country's problems. Anti-imperialism

is also the satisfaction of the people's claims, the nationalization of Iran's wealth, its democratic control: just as many attainments to consolidate or to withdraw, which, for the Tudeh party, implies a constructive attitude with regard to power.

Dominique Vidal: The key, therefore, is to evaluate the various currents pervading the religious groups, the orientation predominating in their discussions, and the concrete achievements of power. Tudeh, for example, distinguishes three tendencies: one which is frankly reactionary, another which he calls "realistic" to the extent to which it accepts cooperation with progressive forces, and finally one called "optimistic" which is militating for this. These divisions overlap other analyses which distinguish two major currents, based on their attitudes towards structural reforms. Which brings me to my question: In what way, until now, have these discussions been settled? For example, what is the status of land reform?

Francois Ponchelet: Answering this type of question is made difficult by our lack of information. It must be recognized that there are no longer any French journalists in Iran except for the AFP correspondent and that all requests for visas are systematically rejected. I add that what we do know only concerns Tehran. Between the dominant "anti-Khomeynism" on the one hand, and the impossibility of obtaining information on the other, it is admittedly modest.

Nuri Albala: It is true that the "bad press" that the Islamic revolution has received is not just due to the prejudice of many in the media, but also to the grave mistake committed by the revolutionary leaders in keeping out reporters.

Alain Gresh: Regarding land reform, we know only that it has been the subject of draft legislation. But, has the legislation been adopted? Has it been applied? We have no answer to these questions which, nevertheless, directly concern three-fourths of the Iranian population.

More generally, specific information is rare on the disputes among religious leaders, but the entire history of Iranian Shiism is enough to prove that they exist. Including within the PRI, among its leaders, and within the government.

In fact, while Tudeh is stressing the attainments of the revolution and supporting the power to consolidate them, and the Mujahedin are denouncing the attacks on freedom and want to fight for democracy, I am almost tempted to admit that each is right. The problem--but it is not up to us, in Paris, to solve it--is the balance between the two elements which has to be found for an overall evaluation.

Nothing would be worse, in fact, than to play the game of counter-revolution in the name of democracy. But we also know, as revolutionaries--and not, I repeat, just through "European" attachment to human rights--that whenever a revolution has restrained democracy, flouted freedom and silenced the people's movement, things have ended up turning against it.

Dominique Vidal: There remains one inevitable question on the possible outcome--or outcomes--of the current crisis. Between the opinion on the part of most of the media that the Tehran regime is condemned to death, and Khomeyni's assurance that his government is "the most stable in the world," here, too, a more balanced evaluation must be possible.

Francois Ponchelet: Khomeyin's popular support is difficult to measure when you are not on the spot. At the beginning, during what I call the "period of the revolution," Khomeyni indisputably had more than three-fourths of the population behind him. Even if his prestige has been maintained and the respect he elicited remains, I do not believe that his supply of trust is still as great. Even if a million Iranians have buried Radjai. Again, the mobilization and the spontantity seen at the beginning are lacking.

Alain Gresh: If the regime is still holding, it is in part due to its popular base, particularly to the deprived ones of whom we were speaking. Apart from this, predicting the future based on the current supply of information seems very risky to me.

What do we know, for example, about the attitude of this large force which the army constitutes? Discredited when the shah fell, it has been rehabilitated by Bani Sadr and is now involved on two fronts: against the Kurds and against the Iraqi army.

Nuri Albala: Although it does not seem to me that the army, due to its heterogeneity and the splits it has endured, would play a real role in the future.

Alain Gresh: The second question mark is the minorities. It suffices to say that they constitute more than half of Iran's population, as a measure of the risk, if their demands are not satisfied, of the country's dismantling. Since the revolution they have been met only with a determination to repress them. So much so that following the Kurd's open armed struggle, other minorities, particularly the Baluchis, are beginning to move. According to Tehran, the Baluchis are being manipulated by Washington: whether this is true or not, it will not prevent a serious threat to the future of the Islamic revolution, if there is not a change in attitude.

Dominique Vidal: From listening to you, one would tend to conclude that it is above all on the religious leaders themselves, their debates and the results of these debates, that the outcome depends. Regaining a wider public support, activating the forces of the revolution would depend on the response of Tehran's leaders to a few key questions: democracy, economic and social program, structural reforms, minorities, etc. But, for lack of information, it is better to await these replies than to predict them?

Francois Ponchelet: Absolutely. I add, because you did not mention it, that the future is linked to Khomeyni himself. As the catalyst of the revolution, his authority and his prestige will enable him to limit the opposition. It is afterwards, once the lid of the pot has been removed, that we will really see what is happening inside.

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. p 18. One million Iranians at the funeral of President Rajai and Prime Minister Bahonar.

2. p 19. Nuri Albala - Age 38. Lawyer for the appeals court in Paris. Secretary of the French Association of Democratic Lawyers. Has completed several missions to Iran as an observer for the International Association of Democratic Lawyers. Has worked with Sean McBride on the plans for a commission of inquiry on the crimes of the shah.

   Alain Gresh - Age 33. Director of the Communist Youth Movement. Since 1978, a member of the foreign policy group of the French Communist Party, responsible for the Northern Africa/Mid East sector. Is working on a thesis on the Palestine resistance movement.

   F. Ponchelet - Age 39. Graduate of the Centre de Fromation des Journalistes. Reporter for EUROPE NO 1. Has made a dozen visits to Iran since the beginning of the revolution.

3. p 20. Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahedin, with Bani Sadr.

4. p 21. Is Khomeyni's supply of trust still large?

9693
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DETERIORATION OF SOCIAL ORDER IN TEHRAN REVIEWED

Rome RASSEGNA SINDICALE in Italian No 33, 17 Sep 81 pp 29-31

[Article by Rahmat Khosrovi: "Death Throes of a Regime"]

[Text] On balance the Islamic administration is a disaster. The social, economic and institutional order is nearing final collapse as the Islamic terror slaughters its victims and the purges bring the essential services to a standstill.

We are probably witnessing the death throes of the mullah regime, which is mired down in the most extreme variety of blind political repression but has nothing to offer for the future in the social, economic or cultural sectors. All efforts at mediation attempted by the progressive forces during 2 1/2 years of theocratic government have failed, and the excessive power and fanatical vehemence of a handful of men who have put a muzzle on the revolution in the name of Allah have set Iran on a course leading to a disastrous civil war. Religion--as a support base for the political system--has evolved into a restoration of Islamic primitivism pure and simple. Bani Sadr and Rajavi--two of the most prestigious opposition leaders--are living in exile in Paris and are helping to reorganize the ranks of the opposition to the theocratic regime in Tehran.

On balance the Islamic administration is a disaster, and the social, economic and institutional order is nearing final collapse. The war against the ethnic minorities continues to slaughter its victims and sow destruction; freedom of speech, freedom of association, the freedom to demonstrate are disregarded; and "transgressors" are punished--even including adolescents--with capital punishment. The democratic press has been totally suppressed; the universities have been closed for 2 years; and the Islamic courts have the power of life and death over the individual, who lives or dies at the pleasure and discretion of the mullahs. Every morning the macabre scene is repeated: the military trucks take to the cemetery the bodies of tens of Leftist activists, and democrats, who have been executed by firing squad.

One can die as the result of a secret accusation, or for having shown discourtesy to some obscure religious personage; and a special corps of 20,000 men has now been created and authorized to shoot "suspects" on sight. The people of Iran are living in an inferno that is perhaps comparable only to German Nazism; and the only reason for living--according to the liturgy and dogma of the ayatollahs--is "death, either as a traitor for the opposition or as a martyr for the faithful." The repressive

administration, however, has elicited its own murderous counterstrokes. Hundreds of its leaders--large and small--have already died, engulfed in the vortex of the violence that they themselves designed and executed. The 28 June attack on the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party [PRI] took the life of Ayatollah Beheshti, head of the party and the Number Two man in the government, as well as the lives of 74 other high-ranking party members (the perpetrators of the attack are still unknown, but there are those who allege that it could have been the work of a group within the PRI). Since that date other attacks have taken the lives of key men of the repressive structure--men such as Hassan Ayat, PRI theoretician; Rajai, president of the republic; Bahonar, the head of government; and Ghoddusi, the head of the Islamic courts.

We are perhaps witnessing the beginning of the end, however, and the worst is probably yet to come. Not satisfied with the effect of the tens of daily executions, some of the hard-liners are asking that the figure be raised to the 4,000 of the times of Mohammed. The harshness of the regime is, paradoxically, the tangible sign of its own disintegration. The previous regime, a few months before the end, had likewise carried out shocking massacres. On 8 September 1978--4 months before it collapsed--more than 5,000 were slain during a demonstration in Jaleh Square in Tehran as tens of democratic opponents were being executed at the ill-famed Evin Prison. Nor has anyone forgotten the massacre at the cinema in Abadan in which 700 died.

The orthodox Shiite alternative--which seized power following the revolution--has accordingly failed in every respect, and there are no antidotes to save it. Despite the fact that the spreading civil war, the repression, and the war with Iraq are absorbing everyone's attention, the most substantial threat to the regime comes from the economic situation. The annual rate of inflation is more than 60 percent, and the nation's total production has declined to only 30 percent of what it was under the Shah. According to Bani Sadr the losses resulting from the 444-day kidnaping of the American hostages total $80 billion. Foodstuffs are becoming scarce, and more than 80 percent of the nation's essential goods are imported. Interminable lines form in front of shops that sell the necessities of life, because everything is rationed and subjected to price controls while the black market is prospering. Gasoline now costs 400 lire per liter compared to 120 lire under the Shah but each automobile is entitled to only 1 liter per day, while government officials themselves have organized the black market in motor fuel and are selling gasoline for as much as 1,000 lire per liter. Each person is entitled to from 100 to 120 grams of frozen meat per day and 300 grams of rice, and soap is in fact nowhere to be found.

The situation with respect to sanitation and health care is particularly desperate, and epidemics have afflicted the more depressed regions of the nation. In addition to the shortage of medicine there is a shortage of doctors, who by the thousands have had to leave the country because of the continuing purges and even execution by firing squad of those who oppose the application of Islamic norms to medicine! Iran's financial situation is so disastrous that the government cannot risk meeting its current obligations and for months has not paid broad segments of its own civil service.

The unemployment rate is extremely high: 6 million, compared to 1.3 million under the Shah. To this must be added the 2.5 million refugees from the war zones and the

1.5 million Afghans who have sought shelter in Iran since the Soviet invasion. As a result of the incompetence, disinterest and sabotage; the clerical violence that has been manifested even within the government; and the exasperating slowness of the bureaucracy, the apparatus of state has been shackled. The oil revenues currently received by the national treasury are "small change" compared to those of the past, and Iranian crude often goes unsold on the world markets. The authority of the government is ephemeral, and everything is being entrusted to the firing squads.

The government-sponsored demonstrations on the occasion of the funerals give the appearance of being well attended, but they are command performances enforced by the threat of reprisals against those who do not participate. The repression--and the resultant response by the revolutionary organizations--have sown confusion in the ranks of the regime as fear and distrust spread in high government circles, whose numbers have been depleted to only 20 or 30 percent of their original strength since the attacks began. Mass arrests are being made within the ranks of the army. Since the flight of Bani Sadr and Rajavi a total of 600 personnel have been arrested in the air force alone. The purges in army ranks are continuing despite the fact that the nation is at war; and not a few clashes have taken place between army units and the "pasdaran," the armed branch of integralism.

On the resistance front the opposition is growing in strength, and the leftist revolutionary organizations ranging from the Khalgh Mujahedin (the Islamic Left) to the Fedayan Khalgh and Peykar (both of the Marxist Left) have gone over to the armed resistance. At the same time, however, intense political debates are taking place (through the medium of frequent clandestine documents) concerning the creation of a "Democratic People's Resistance Front." In this connection the Mujahedin and Bani Sadr have launched a political project--the "National Resistance Front"--which has already received broad support but has not yet become a unitary alternative, although it is the one with the best "chance."

Meanwhile, the response of the resistance forces to the Khomeini despotism is going beyond the mere elimination of individual officials of the regime; groups of militants in increasing numbers are improvising "lightning demonstrations" under the protection of armed revolutionary vanguards. Other democratic organizations of the Left that are of an exclusively political character are acting to mobilize public opinion on an increasingly broad scale to prepare it for the future offensives of the revolutionary forces; to combat fear, the principal weapon of integralism; to instill trust; and to inform the public of the widespread support for the resistance throughout the country.

Deprived of its key men, the government leadership is at the present moment suffering a sharp decline in its power and is attempting by any means possible to involve foreign powers, with the dual objective of obtaining public support by playing the role of "victim" while simultaneously (and, it would seem, paradoxically) concluding secret agreements with a view to reinforcing its own power. This overall process is going forward in an obviously very disorganized and distorted manner. We may point out two facts by way of example. Much ado was made over the interference of Israel, as an enemy of Iran, and the Left was accused of collaborating with that country; yet it is now known that the integralists themselves had acquired arms from Israel.

Another curious fact is the support that the Soviets have openly given to integralism while accusing the resistance of terrorism but remaining silent concerning the daily massacres carried out by the regime. No less clamorous is the anti-Americanism practiced by integralism. To quote former president Bani Sadr on this subject: "...Despite the seeming anti-Americanism, the pro-American line is victorious at the top level of the government. It is now a well-known fact that the Americans knocked at everyone's door, and that there were those who accepted the invitation."

In concluding this overview of the combatant forces mention must be made of the collaborationist Left, which comprises the small Tudeh group and the splinter group of the "Fedayan majority." Although these organizations have had their headquarters and newspapers taken away from them (just as the others have), they are continuing their suicidal policy of participation in all the iniquities of the regime. This policy has had its repercussions, however, and schisms have occurred recently within these groups. The group that has detached itself from the Tudeh Party is clandestinely publishing its own newspaper, the MARDOM PROLETARIO [as published], and has asked the Islamic courts to "be able to prove, through authoritative testimony, the involvement of the leadership group of the Tudeh Party--headed by the Kianuri--in certain crimes that have harmed the party members themselves." This news appeared in issue No 753 of the weekly I GIOVANNI D'OGGI [as published]. In short, against the background of the decay brought about by integralism as Iran is caught in the midst of dramatic events, the revolutionary response to the repression is overwhelming. "They must go," is the urgent refrain.

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YAMIT CITIZENS MOBILIZE AGAINST WITHDRAWAL

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Sep 81 p 15

[Article by Amnon Barzilai: "Yamit: Last Days of Pompeii"]

[Text] "Take a bottle. Fill three-fourths of it with benzine. Then take a regular tampon, for the wick. Put half of the tampon into the bottle, and tape it into place." At this point, Yosi Selah leaves off describing how to make a Molotov cocktail. He is interrupted by Yokhai Merhkav, who lives across the street in a workshop that is now idle in the industrial area of Yamit. Merkhav says: "If you make it that way, it will explode in your hand. What you should do is close the bottle with a cork. Then fasten the tampon to the neck of the bottle with insulation tape. Moisten the tampon with spirits. You light it with a lighter and it burns nicely. At Degania they stopped a Syrian tank this way." Rami Bavyof is Selah's partner in the factory for rebuilding compressors in Yamit. Like his friends, he is opposed to withdrawal from Sinai and the evacuation of Yamit. Listening to Yokhai's words, he nods his head in agreement. He likes the way Yokhai, who is from Kibbutz Merkhavya and who came to Yamit 4 years ago to open a business, describes the method of making the Molotov cocktail.

Far from the desolate industrial area of Yamit, at the southern approaches to the city in the desert dunes, at Yamit's delightful swinning pool, Jeffrey--the owner of a food stand at the sports center--labors to meet the demands of his customers. During one of his free moments, he gives expression to his thoughts and plans: "I don't know what the evacuation of Yamit is. They are not going to evacuate me from here. At home, I have an M-16 rifle, 5000 cartridges, and 16 grenades. And that's not all." Jeffrey came 6 years ago from the U.S. and went to Yamit "to realize Zionism." It is said that the evacuation of Yamit will be "the end of Zionism." Jeffrey confirms rumors heard in the city about large quantities of weapons which were brought in recent months to the city. Who brought it? When? How much? Where is it stored? Jeffrey shrugs his shoulders. More he does not know. He can only repeat his earlier statement: "They are not going to evacuate me from Yamit. Let them evacuate the IDF. I am staying."

Seven months before the date of the official withdrawal from the city of dunes and its return to Egypt, there still hovers a great shadow of uncertainty over the 2800 residents of the city. Of 339 families who own apartments in the city and who are entitled to reparations, only 45 families have refused to sign up for the settlement. In the opinion of the head of the team handling this project, Moshe Ninio, these figures prove that the evacuation will "occur peacefully." But Yosi Selah,

chairman of the businessmen's committee, says that these numbers are misleading. "If it was only a problem of 48 families, why haven't the rest left the city? Why are they all staying?"

When darkness falls, the modest business district of Yamit appears abandoned. On the door of the largest store in the city, Home World", is a sign which says that from 30 August the store will be closed until the government decision to evacuate the city is reversed. Even the coffee houses are closed relatively early in the evening. An announcement by the postal branch posted on the bulletin board states that the branch will be closed for 3 days. The management of the supermarket announces to the residents that fresh dairy products will be available only 3 days a week.

Sara Feifel, owner of "Home World", says: "We closed the store because we are tired." Ms Feifel came to Yamit at the end of 1975, with her husband Haim and their two children. They were one of the first 15 families to settle in Yamit. The Feifel family, from Cincinnati, led the first American group which was formed in 1973 prior to its emigration to Israel, to settle Yamit. Haim Feifel earned a living as a cantor in a synagogue in the U.S. When he decided to immigrate to Israel, he changed careers. He went back to the university and studied physical education and rehabilitation counseling. Of the 15 families who formed the group in the U.S. only five remain at Yamit. Since the signing of the Camp David Agreement, ten of those families returned to the U.S. "One morning we got up and discovered that we had no home. I am in a crisis," says Sara Feifel. "We cannot work in the store and watch the business go down little by little. I built a business and I thought it had a future. I asked nothing from the state of Israel. When we came to Yamit, there was nothing but dunes. There was no water, no vegetation, no birds. I did not get a penny from the state. One day my husband went to Tel Aviv, and because "Home World - Yamit" was written on the truck, they threw stones at him. Since then, I decided: I will fight to get as much as I can. If they treat me like that, I will be an extortionist."

Sara Feifel says that the families who returned to the U.S. after the Camp David Agreements did not have the strength to start all over again. For them everything began and ended at Yamit. In discussions which government representatives held with all of the families in Yamit about conditions of evacuation, they proposed paying families from the U.S. a sum of money around $75,000. "That was not enough money to buy an apartment in Israel. But it was a lot of money in the U.S.," says Ms Feifel. For the Americans who had no other family in Israel, it was an offer they could not refuse. They took the money, their children, and their possessions, and they went back to the U.S.

Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, Yamit's rabbi, says: "People were forced to betray their homeland for money." He is one of the extremists in the city against evacuation. Rabbi Ariel ran in the Knesset elections several years ago on the Kakh list of Rabbi Meir Kahana. He is also one of the three members of the Ma'oz secretariat in Yamit, together with Avi Farkhan (Tehiya) and Na'aman Aharon. This group, the number of whose members in the city is not known, has as its goal the stopping of the withdrawal from the city. The methods of this group, which perserves its independence and refuses to be merged into the Movement for Stopping Withdrawal from Sinai, are unknown. "Unfortunately, part of our ammunition will not be known until the last minute. But with the help of God and the Jews, there will be no withdrawal," says

Rabbi Ariel. When he is asked if the Ma'oz people intend to defend the city with arms, he smiles mysteriously. "That is precisely what is difficult for me to say. We are on a tight wire. We will want to avoid bloodshed." Are you threatening mass suicide? he is asked. The rabbi is evasive: "I have reported to you formulae of thinking."

From the entry to the city of Yamit, which like the entry to a military camp has a barrier manned by a reservist, there winds an asphalt road to the sea shore. Over the past few years, Yamit's beach has attracted hundreds of thousands of bathers from all over the country. The water is blue and clean, the sand soft and white. Last Saturday before the end of the summer vacation, there were about 10,000 bathers on the beach. Alongside the road, by the parking lot near the beach, there has grown over recent years a beduin market. Yamit residents have preferred the market for green vegetables over the supermarket. A kilo of grapes from the Gaza Strip here costs five shekels. Even reports of a cholera epidemic in Gaza have not deterred buyers. A kilo of mangos from Moshav Sedot here costs 18 shekels.

The Rawisha family, from Kfar Shaykh Zawid, about 10 kilometers west of Yamit, has set up a market by Yamit to sell jalabiyas and handiwork which they collect from villages in the Sinai and bring from Egypt. A jalabiya sold at the Shaykh Zawid fair costs 80 shekels, and they can sell it here at Yamit for 250 shekels. At the end of the summer vacation, when the crowds at the bazaar have lessened, the family members have time to think about their future, after the evacuation of Yamit. The idea that enchants the oldest brother is to buy to automobiles and work as a taxi driver on the Israel-Egypt border. After some thought, he says: "Perhaps I will get a passport and travel to Amsterdam." Ibrahim, a member of one of the beduin tribes,who is employed as a life saver on the beach, thought of realizing his dream of traveling to Hawaii and engaging in water skiing. The plans which the beduins are making in anticipation of the evacuation of Yamit bring to mind part of the lecture by Arye, who directs the field school at Yamit, about the link of the Arabs here to the place. The residents of Shaykh Zawid are beduins who came from Saudi Arabia to northern Sinai at the end of the last century. They too are not age old residents of the Sinai. One of those listening to his lecture asks: "So why are the Israelis forced to evacuate northern Sinai?"

One of the industrial successes of Yamit is the "Hayashtil" nursery. Vegetable seeds are imbedded in calcor formations. By means of special fertilizers and because of the good climatic conditions, vegetable seedlings grow within a month, and are sold to moshavim in the Salient. This method of growing tomatoes without planting them in soil was developed by Menahem Shmueli, one of the owners of the nursery which developed the method in Florida. Is it not symbolic, that here, in Yamit, tomatoes are raised without roots, with no link to the soil? Shmueli smiles, confused. As of now, there has been no agreement with him regarding evacuation to Israel, except that a parcel will be set aside for him in the industrial area of Ashkelon. Shmueli is one of the settlers who has accepted withdrawal and evacuation, although he voted for Tehiya in the elections. But as a 5-year resident of Yamit he is attuned to the feelings in the city. "Dealing with people is a sensitive problem. They have not handled the settlers well. The government and the media have said: You are diseased, prostitutes. All you are interested in is money. If someone owns a house in Tel Aviv and they want to widen the road, won't he struggle against all of the authorities? Here they want to pave the road of peace over our homes. What does a man say to

himself? You have slandered me. I am already blackened, so let's be bastards to the end." In spite of this, Shmueli believes that the evacuation will be peaceful, "but if the people are aroused and the bitterness of the silent majority is increased, they will join the ideologists, the Ma'oz people, and the Tehiya activists."

Many people have heard this warning before going to Yamit. They have been told: "Don't go to Yamit. You will be forced to change your whole world view." Seven months before the official evacuation, the warning is still there. Yamit, on its enchanting beaches with its desert landscape is a clear tourist attraction which earns thousands of dollars. The cool north wind blows in from the sea in the morning, and in the late day the winds blow from the south, from the desert, and reduce the humidity substantially, in comparison to the high humidity to the north, at Ashkelon.

Now in Yamit they tell about Elon who was "broken" and agreed to sign the evacuation agreement. He took his money and bought an apartment in Jerusalem. Two months after he left, he returned to Yamit with his family, and to those who asked him said that he and his family could not adjust to the quality of life in a big city. This question also troubles Yesi Selah: "What will I do with my kids in Kfar Saba? How will my son get used to looking both ways when he crosses the street?" In Yamit there are no roads between the houses. The only highway in the city girds it like a belt. From this road, are spread parting lots, on the edges of the houses and the city. The city is crisscrossed by long malls, and the only vehicles permitted are bicycles.

The city is remarkably clean, "although this was not always the case," says one of the residents. Some of the people have stopped tending their gardens. Next to the homes which were built by the Housing Ministry and which were not sold because of the signing of the peace treaty, there is desolation. The last neighborhood of cottages were an attraction for thousands of Israelis. Beds, sinks, and refrigerators were put into the empty houses, and they were rented for 56 shekels per bed per night. The vacationers prepared their own meals.

A new wind began to blow in the city 2 months ago. Thirteen families settled in Yamit. The group was led by Rabbi Yesi Entman from Ma'ale Qodumim. He began the activities to prevent withdrawal from Yamit. Meshe Ninie, the chairman of the staff managing the evacuation of Yamit, claims that this act was not "settlement" but that the group had received official permission to reside here because of a housing shortage in settlements in Gush Katif in the Gaza Strip. But it was the official request of the group. In Yamit they say that another five families have come to the city, and they have taken up residence in empty houses. This is how Hanan Perat came to Yamit, and according to Gush Emumim people, the flow has not stopped. Ms Rivka Entman, the rabbi's wife, says: "There are 200 empty apartments in the city, and the answer to evacuation is settlement. We have all kinds of ideas on how to populate and fill the empty apartments , but I will not give details now."

As time passes, new organizations are sprouting in Yamit, opposed to evacuation. Every group has its own methods. Every organization has its own ideas. Even though they have the same goal -- stopping the withdrawal -- some of the people are afraid of the far reaching activities of some of the groups. They say that the force which came from Samaria has nothing to lose. They have houses and jobs in other parts of

the country. On the other hand, the residents of Yamit have a long account with the government. The discussions do not revolve around only the financial compensation for evacuated homes. In contrast to the farmers who live on Meshavim in the Yamit district, there has been no solution or even discussion of the question of compensation for businesses in the city. In the last two years one of the factories enjoyed profits of 12 million shekels. At what rate should its owners be compensated? The owners of one of the largest stores in Yamit, in which they had invested most of their money and time, hired the services of a lawyer and an economist to calculate a demand of 10 million shekels as compensation for their lost business in the city.

Yosi Selah, chairman of the business men's committee in the city, says: "As of today, no one has discussed with us withdrawal with honor. The government has put together a document which is a dictation of withdrawal. If I sign it, it means that I will have to pay the government reparations because I was ready to be evacuated. To what conclusion does all of this lead? Look, in Yamit everyone has a Kalashnikov or an M-16. Anyone who tries to move us by force will get it." His partner, Rami Baviof, is convinced that the government is not interested in evacuation: "I am certain that they want blood. They want a confrontation which will serve as an example to those who will try to sign an agreement to evacuate Judea and Samaria and the Golan Heights. I think that Begin is going for a second Altalena, a civil war." For Simhat Torah celebrations the staff of the Stop the Withdrawal Movement is planning to bring in about 100 thousand people who identify with Yamit against evacuation. One of the staff members says: "This is the way it will be when they come to evacuate us. I would like to see an army succeed in evacuating 100,000 people."

Moshe Ninio is head of the staff handling evacuation. As a Solel-Boneh person who supervised the building of the Eytam Airport. He has lived in Yamit for 6 years, and built himself a magnificent villa under the auspices of the "Build Your Home" program. A year ago he signed the evacuation agreement and was paid the sum of 1.8 million shekels (a basic individual grant of 300,000 shekels is guaranteed to each resident upon evacuation). "If Begin wants to give a gift to Sadat, he can have Yamit evacuated earlier." Ninio believes that the approach of the government is correct with respect to the residents, and that the payment of appropriate reparations will stop any outbreak.

And what will happen to abandoned Yamit? "No, I have no sense that we are giving anything to Egypt," says the agronomist Memahem Shmueli. "The sand will continue to drift here as it has, and nothing will be here. We will dismantle the place and return it to the dunes."

The pleasant, restrained response of a representative of the establishment who has come to terms with reality and accepted it may perhaps be the response of the silent majority of Yamit. But it is not certain whether it will dictate the order of events. A factor to be considered is Gush Emunim. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, of Kiryat Arba, is already "involved in matters." This is what one of the new settlers at Yamit reported. "The most dangerous are the loners, who may do anything, the astronauts", to use a word of Yokhai Merkhav. "They are the ones who will go on a hunger strike till death. With these people, you cannot predict what they will do tomorrow."

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OPPOSITION TO SINAI WITHDRAWAL

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 3 Sep 81 p 4

[Article: "Registration Begins to Oppose Removal of Yamit Settlers"]

[Text] "Do not uproot a planted tree" is the slogan of the mass registration campaign calling upon the government not to remove the settlements in the Yamit region. The campaign will last 8 weeks, with the goal of obtaining one million signatures. This was reported yesterday by people of the staff of the Movement for Stopping Withdrawal, at a press conference held at Sokolov House in Tel Aviv.

Participating in the press conference were Members of Knesset Rabbi Haim Drukman and Hanan Porat, as well as staff members of the Movement for Stopping Withdrawal Yosi Mas, Uri Elitsur, Bentsion Weiner, and Shimon Shabas.

The speakers noted that even before the official opening of the registration campaign, they had already signed up about 80,000 people, including members of Knesset from five factions--Likud, the Alignment, the NRP, Tehiya, and Tami.

In response to a question, the staff chairman, Uri Elitsur, stated: "When we approach a million signatures, we will consider calling for a national referendum on the question of withdrawal."

Later it was reported that surveys of public opinion of the Dakhaf Institute, which had been requested by the Movement for Stopping Withdrawal from Sinai, indicate that 60 percent of the Israeli public are opposed to completing the withdrawal. "These surveys were made before we began to hear in the press and among the public about doubts regarding Egypt's intentions for peace. The assumption is that after April 1982, we will find ourselves without Sinai and without peace."

MK Rabbi Drukman said that the public's identification with the demand to stop the removal of settlements has great importance. "We shall not despair, because we are talking of a just matter; when we give Egypt the whole Sinai, with everything in it, we have the moral right to demand that our settlements not be removed."

MK Hanan Porat emphasized the cost of housing in Yamit, to give expression to our identification with the settlers there.

In response to questions the speakers said that presently an emissary of the movement is in the United States to enlist support from the Jewish communities there as well as to raise funds for further activities here. In the near future, a delegation of movement representatives will leave for the United States and Europe.

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KNESSET OPPOSITION TO CLERICAL ASSAULT MOUNTS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Sep 81 p 14

[Article by Mati Golan: "Who Is Returning Us to the Middle Ages?"]

[Text] Where the general elections and negotiations failed to produce a coalition, the chief rabbinate has succeeded. Its conduct in the affair of the archeological excavations of the City of David has caused the creation of a coalition which was thought impossible: members of the Knesset from the Likud have joined with their colleagues from the Alignment, and members of Shinui with representatives of Tehiya, in order to create a front against the Halakhic assault by the Rabbinic counsel against the laws of the state.

At the moment, the importance and possible ramifications of this coalition are not to be exaggerated. At the moment that these lines are being written--the coalition is being formed from what is traditionally defined as the back benchers in the Knesset, with some of the middle benches. Only one from the upper echelons, the deputy prime minister, Simkha Ehrlich, is numbered among them.

At the same time, it would be a mkstake to dismiss the phenomenon, for two reasons: the first stems from the device which began in the ninth Knesset in the term "back benches." After the fog of distributing honored places in the government and Knesset cleared, it became apparent that many in this group had received positions of deputy ministers or committee chairmen. When one adds up all of the ministers, deputy ministers, and committee chairmen, it becomes clear that not many people remained in the government coalition from among the forward benches who would be able to devote their full time and energy to Knesset work. In these circumstances, the weight and influence of those coming from the back benches rises to a level not known before,

The second reason is found in past experience: one must not forget that most of the Israeli governments which did not complete their legal terms of office did not fall because of political reasons, or social and security matters. They collapsed on religious issues, and following crises with the religious parties.

If this is what happened in the past, in the golden age of religious parties, then this phenomenon takes on a much more realistic significance in the present. After the fiasco in the last elections, it is doubtful if the chief religious party, the NRP, can allow itself to take compromise positions in the issues which are most important in the religious world. The leaders of this party believe that their heavy

loss of seats in the last election stemmed principally from the fact that the community of its potential voters has ceased viewing it as the bearer of the principal banner, and in any case, the exclusive, of religious issues. In order to return to their former glory, and regain their old seats, the leaders of the NRP know that they must prove to that public that they are still irreplacable in protecting the interests which are dear to it. In this matter, the leaders say now that there can be no compromises. The need to prove this is the very soul of the NRP. They do not hesitate to announce that if a real issue to fight for is presented to them, they will not hesitate and may even rejoice to bring down the coalition, and to give the voters the necessary proof of their fidelity.

The City of David affair, combined with the Temple Mount affair, may serve as this issue. But the problem is that these two issues did not come up a year or two after the elections and there is no doubt that then the NRP would have gone "to the end of the road." But two months after the elections is too early. There is the fear that the public, even the religious public, will not look favorably on being troubled to go to the polls again, such a short time after the last stormy campaign. They also do not overlook the achievements which they have made. The NRP and the Agudat Yisrael know that what they received in the coalition agreement they never succeeded in getting before, even when their strength was double. Even if the new elections return them to their former strength, there is no certainty that in a new government they would get what they have in their pockets today.

All of these things are based on logic, and that is their great weakness. For we are talking about politics, which has rules beyond logic. There are opposing interests, and different views of matters, and in the issue under consideration--the wills are also greater. These elements may easily lead to a crisis, and it may drag those who are involved into taking steps and positions which logically should be avoided.

All of this can be sensed in the sharp exchanges between the main factors in the present affair. Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goran threatens Minister of Education and Culture Zevulun Hammer with the issuance of a "writ of refusal" against him. Hammer repeatedly recalls of the laws of the state, and hints at the chief rabbi's ignoral of those laws. Members of Knesset come and do great things:

The Alignment member Yosi Sarid calls upon secular institutions and organizations to issue a "writ of refusal" against Rabbi Goren himself. Ge'ulah Kohen of Tehiya decides that the conduct of Goren constitutes "an affront to religion." Dror Seigerman and Dan Tikhon of the Liberal faction in Knesset decide simply that Rabbi Goren is acting "out of madness remniscent of the medieval Dark Ages."

This is precisely the sort of thing which can inflame passions and cause the whole affair to further deteriorate. And in all of this, Hammer and the NRP stand, between the hammer and the anvil. On the one hand Rabbi Goren strikes at them--and on the other they are unable to withstand attacks by the secularists upon their supreme spiritual authority.

What, then will happen? I dare to guess that a formula will be worked out which will enable all of the parties to back off from the positions which they have taken or into which they were pushed. It is difficult to guess the formula, although we may depend upon Yosef Burg and his colleagues.

What is more interesting is to examine the phenomenon of the MK's of the Liberal Party. Against the background of the field, they sound and appear like fearless fighters. It is clear that in matters of religion, they are more extreme than many of their colleagues in the Labor Party, and no less so than Shulamit Aloni. Like her, they in fact want a separation of religion and state.

Two of the people leading the "liberal revolution" in the Likud are Dror Seigerman and Dan Tikhon. They even go so far as to say that it would be well for the present government to fall, and to use the period before the next elections to pass laws granting equality to all currents of Judaism, and to recognize civil marriage.

Now, it is worth attending to the various ways in which things are being said. They are attacking Rabbi Goren directly, without intermediaries, and in the most open form. but at that point, the direct assault is stopped. When they speak of dismantling the coalition, they adopt an indirect method. The words do not come from their mouths--but from "sources close" which can always be repudiated if the need arises.

The difference in form and style is not surprising. These two young members of Knesset have already learned the lesson. On the day that the new cabinet was presented in Knesset, they threatened that if they did not receive representation on the finance, foreign affairs, and security affairs committees, they would not participate in the vote. The real meaning of the threat was that the new government would not have the necessary majority. Then the two were summoned before Ehrlich, who was working under the aegis of Begin. As experienced veterans, they capitulated, came to the plenary session, and cast their votes for the cabinet.

I have the troublesome feeling that this will be the end of the courageous war currently being conducted by the two. They will make a lot of noise, garner some fat headlines, and in the end capitulate in a small quiet voice. Moreover, their arrows are not even aimed in the right direction. Rabbi Goren's conduct, as revolting as it is, is not the most relevant thing in the issue of religion and state in Israel. In the final analysis, the conduct of the Chief Rabbinate in the City of David affair only expresses an existing situation in Israel: namely that in Israel the laws of the Knesset are not yet controlling. There are secular citizens of the country who are governed by the laws of the Knesset, and there are religious citizens who are exceptions to the rule. Rabbis Goren and Yosef did not create this situation. This is the natural result of the many deals which were made between the religious parties and the secular components of the coalition--including the Liberal Party itself.

On this basis, I would like to ask Seigerman and Tikhon the following question: I would like to know who, in their opinion, is "working out of a madness which is reminiscent of the medieval Dark Ages?" Is it Rabbis Goren and Yosef who, with all of the reservations regarding their conduct, are working on the basis of their faith, or is it those who have returned us to those dark medieval days against their own principles and faith?

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MK SPEISER DISCUSSES FEUDS IN LABOR PARTY

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 21 Aug 81 Weekend Supplement p 4

[Interview with Eliahu Speiser By Yosef Shavit: "We Cannot Leave the Work to the Followers of a Small Vocal Group!" date and place not specified]

[Text] The contest for the chair of secretary general of the Labor Party is entering high gear. The precise time for the elections is yet to be set--but the shocks involved in the struggle for this position are already felt in the field. MK Eliahu Speiser (51), secretary of the Tel Aviv district, today considered one of the strong men of the party, is firm in his decision to run for this position; but the heads of the kibbutz movement will apparently do everything they can to frustrate his election.

This week the MK's of the kibbutzim took a sharp demonstrative step: they condemned the session of the Alignment faction in Knesset, in responding to the expressions regarding them by activists in the Yakhdav group, which is headed by Speiser.

Question: The energetic opposition of people in the kibbutz movement to your candidacy may endanger the integrity of the party. Isn't that too high a price?

Speiser: The Labor Party is a pluralistic and broad party. There are many opinions in it, as well as various groups and people. The common denominator is the majority rule. Shimon Peres, for example, was elected by a majority. Anyone who is not ready to accept the majority rule does not belong in the party. The style of threats and fear mongering will boomerang on those who use it. We cannot leave the 'work' to the members of a small vocal group, which threatens excommunication. The time has come for all to understand that we are living in Israel in the 1980's, in which there is democracy. Anyone who wants to can run in democratic elections. Likewise, the style of trampling personalities must stop. If MK's who came from Morocco had condemned the meetings of the Knesset faction, just as this week members of the kibbutz movement did, all the world would have risen and condemned them. What kind of special immunity do the representatives of the kibbutz enjoy? Is condemnation the appropriate response to a debate within the party? This is how they worked all last year. Whenever they were denied what they asked for, they drew their turning sword.

Question: You speak of a "small vocal group which uses excommunications as a threat." Is that really a correct definition of the kibbutz movement?

Speiser: Not of the movement, but of a few of its leaders. It is an ordinary power group, conducting itself like any other group in a party. The cloak of ideology is only a weapon, and it is completely transparent and empty of any content. I regret that a battle is going on with these people in particular, who represent a relatively small group within the party--about 12 percent of the members. But a battle is a battle. They chose it, they started it, they gave it its character--and in a battle spears and bombs fly.

Question: After all of those tough matters, how will cooperation be possible between you as party secretary--if you are elected--and the leaders of the kibbutz movement?

Speiser: There have been party struggles in the past, and later life returned to normal. It is true for people of the kibbutz movement, that the principles of democracy and majority rule are accepted by them.

Question: What essentially is the basis of the dispute between you and the leaders of the kibbutz movement?

Speiser: I have serious differences of opinion with them regarding their conduct in the party, their exclusiveness, their attempt to take control, and their haughtiness. I emphasize: the dispute is with a number of people--not with the movement, which is an important social body.

More than two years ago, an attempt was made by Musa Kharif and two or three other members of Ikhud Hakevutsot ve-Hakibbutzim to establish an elite group which was called the "Berl House Circle." Their explicit goal was to cut off certain persons from positions of power in the party, to attack its popular image and to make the party have only 60 to 70,000 members, with control of it in their hands. I believe that the basis of their approach was the element of anti-Oriental community. They did not want large segments of the public to be members of the Labor Party. At the same time there was a delay in the establishment of the United Kibbutz Movement (joining Ikhud Hakeviutsot ve-Hakibbutzim with Hakibbutz Hameukhad) because Musa Kharif had subordinated the interests of the kibbutz movement to the interests of the Berl House circle. After the Berl House circle failed and expired, the leadership of the kibbutz movement, headed by Musa Kharif, was harnessed to a struggle to alienate and divide the party anew. In that whole struggle, there was not one shred of ideology.

Question: It is difficult to say that behind the counter-organization of the Yakhdav circle, headed by you, there was an ideological motive.

Speiser: That is not correct. From the beginning it was an ideological dispute on our part regarding party structure. We wanted a popular party, composed of all shades and groups. We also always fought for democracy in the party, and for an end to "deals". Our goals were first and foremost a true integration of all ethnic groups, the maintenance of true social equality, and the preservation of principles in issues of policy and security, as they appear in the party platform. Isn't that ideology?

Question: All that sounds very nice. But in fact the Yakhdav group has become a pressure group, dictating conditions and making appointments.

Speiser: It is impossible for a party not to have sub-groups. An isolated man achieves nothing. He must attract people to his way and opinion, in a group. If in various struggles until now we have succeeded in gaining the support of a majority of members, that is the party opinion. It is a form of legitimate influence.

Question: What is the strength of Yakhdav today?

Speiser: Members of the group are the majority of party activists in the cities, in development areas, in work places, in the Young Guard, Working Youth, and on the moshavim. By my estimate, we are supported by at least two thirds of the party members.

Question: Don't you think that the election of an acting secretary general--as you demand--at a time when the present secretary, Haim Bar-Lev, who has not withdrawn his candidacy, is confined to sickbed, is bad timing?

Speiser: The repeated delay of the elections is an improper act. According to the party constitution, the term of the secretary ended on 1 February of this year--seven months ago. In May, 600 out of 1000 members of the party center filed a written appeal to hold elections, and the party chairman asked that the elections be postponed and held immediately after the Knesset elections. He relayed this in an authorized announcement in the party bureau. In the presence of Haim Bar-Lev and with his knowledge, Shimon Peres said that if it came to a confrontation, he would support me and that he considered me his candidate. Bar-Lev was privy to all of the processes. To the best of my knowledge, he said that whether we were in office or in the opposition, he would not continue to serve as party secretary.

It is improper to use an unfortunate occurance, such as befell Bar-Lev, as a excuse to postpone the elections. He can of course change his position and want a confrontation, but as far as I know, until today he has not announced any such change. I presented my candidacy 9 months ago, when many members had already sewn ministerial cloaks for themselves. The party chairman proposed to me many times a possible cabinet position--and I had to weigh that alternative against the post of secretary general, which was seen then in a different light, when most people thought that we would be returned to office.

Question: At that same time, you said to me that you would prefer the position of secertary general because you did not want to be played with in an unimportant ministerial position. But now, another reality has been created.

Speiser: Then as now I viewed the party as a springboard for change. That, in my opinion is the Archimedes point from which to begin: the party table initiates, plans, and determines policy. Reforms and changes in the party systems, in its structure, and in the Histadrut--these are things which will enable us to return to office, to bring back to us segments of the voting public which were lost, and to give new content to the work of the party.

Question: The position of secretary general had great importance when the number one man in the party was the prime minister. Don't you believe that now, with the existence of the position of party chairman, the secretary general has lost much of his function?

Speiser: Today, the Labor Party needs a secretary general alongside the chairman. One man cannot bear the burden himself. There are things which must be removed from the shoulders of the chairman, so that he can work in those areas where he can produce the best. There is plenty for the secretary general to do: the party needs coordination, reorganization, and the implementation of the many good resolutions which are still on paper, as well as the strengthening of the link with the thousands of activists and volunteers. The party needs rejuvenation, awakening, and an awareness of the new elements in it and around it.

Question: There are those who say that the secretary of the Tel Aviv district is not accomplishing great things there.

Speiser: That is a poisoned arrow in the war against me. The Tel Aviv district is one of the few not plagued with internal disputes--neither between camps nor between ethnic groups. There exists in it an internal unity and recognized leadership, which is respected by all currents and factors found in the district. For the first time, we have come out as the largest district in the Labor Party: we have 40,000 members among those living and working in the city--about one sixth of all those in the country.

Question: Your opponents claim that you are basically an apparatus man who could easily be integrated into another framework. Off the top of your head, what are your principles?

Speiser: The mark of an apparatus man is hackneyed weapons. I have never considered myself part of the apparatus. I have been elected to all of my positions by virtue of struggle and my opinions. Apparatus people are those who are supported by organizations and who have at their disposal economic and financial power. The secretary of the kibbutz movement is an apparatus person, isn't he? The manager of a factory is an apparatus man, isn't he? If these people are apparatus people, then all representatives of the Labor Party are apparatus people. But there is still one difference: some people are elected by individual secret ballot, while others are appointed by committees. I belong to the first group.

Those who oppose me do this because of my opinions, and because they know that those ideas will not merely remain on paper. If I speak of democracy in the party, of the right to challenge, of individual voting--it is a matter of principle and that is what they oppose. The leaders of those who oppose me are those who have positions in the party today, and they are afraid of losing them. If I speak of social equality, of eliminating the social gap, of integration of ethnic groups--that is principle. If I oppose the leftist image of the party and oppose the joining of Shulamit Aloni to the party--that is principle. If I have spoken for three years of the need to formulate a more positive position regarding the religious community and especially the link with the NRP--that it principle.

Question: In the prior Knesset, you gained the reputation of being an apathetic parliamentarian. Some time before the elections, you said to me that you might have to become a committee member, and ascend more frequently to the speaker's podium to demonstrate greater presence at plenary sessions. Are you going to apply that conclusion in the tenth Knesset?

Speiser: In the ninth Knesset I devoted most of my efforts to the party arena, where I see the key to the future. This time I intend to be an active member in the plenary sessions and to be on at least one committee.

Question: All signs indicate that we may expect another Peres-Rabin confrontation. Last time, you encouraged Peres to make his challenge. Will you support such a challenge in the future?

Speiser: Before the confrontation, as long as it was possible to believe in the possibility of a settlement, I supported it. When it was clear that a confrontation was unavoidable, I worked so that Peres would not retreat from it, so that the decision would be made courageously and before the public. Last year, I did all I could to bring about a reapprochement of the two men and to integrate them into the party system. I will continue to work to coordinate relations between Rabin and other party members. I view the unity of the party as an important challenge. As for future confrontations--no one knows what the future holds. Predictions about what will happen before the next Knesset elections are worth no more than onion skin. The present mission is to manage the Alignment in its fullness.

Question: Perhaps the time has arrived to install a new leadership?

Speiser: I think that it is premature to talk of a new leadership, before the next Knesset elections. When they will be held, it will first be necessary to refresh the present leadership to a certain degree, by bringing in a new forces. Each thing in its time...

Question: In the new leadership, authentic representatives of the Oriental community will have to take their place. In your opinion, has the Labor party learned the bitter lesson in this area, from the voting for the tenth Knesset?

Speiser: The lessons have not yet been applied. Such things are not done in a month or two. But the direction is clear: it is necessary to give the existing leaders of the Oriental community abase for action and to enable them to develop. We should give them representational challenges and missions--and not block them. In the development towns and the neighborhoods, we will have to advance a true local leadership, even if it is in dispute or competition with existing activists. The opening of the party gates to new and additional forces is positive. We also have to enable the integration of representatives of the ethnic groups in all of the management of Histadrut factories, and public state owned factories. This is required by reality and we have already almost missed the train.

Question: In your opinion, would it have been possible to prevent what happened this week in the Alignment faction, when a group of MK's from Morocco openly revolted?

Speiser: In my opinion, it is a very serious mistake not to allow the possibility of an MK serving on any committee th t he wishes to. The MK's revolted against a decision and appointment from above. This is a basic problem in the Labor Party: it is no longer possible to dole out sinecures. If an equal opportunity were given to everyone, clashes of this sort could be avoided. Among those who demanded the right to vote for candidates for various committees by secret ballot were many MK's who are not Orientals, including myself.

Question: What place do you see for yourself in the "refreshed leadership" about which you spoke earlier?

Speiser: I am interested in being party secretary for the next 4 years. This is not a momentary and passing position. It is also not a springboard in the event of early elections. If I am elected, I will serve, at least for one full term. Many years are needed to realize the plans and ideas which I have, and to do what must be done. This is my goal. In the very long range, everything is open. The position of secretary is not the end of the road.

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STRUGGLE OVER KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT SEEN IN ALIGNMENT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Aug 81 p 9

[Article by Amnon Rubenstein: "They Are Also Shooting At the Kibbutzim"]

[Text] Until a short time ago, there was at least one clear answer to the difficult, complex, and perplexing question: "What is the difference between the Likud and the Alignment?" It could be said that in one matter--relating to cooperative and kibbutz settlement--there was a substantive difference between the two large blocs, a difference which was significant and one of values. Now, with the chaos in the Labor Party, they are shooting in all directions, they are also shooting at the kibbutzim. And as a result, that difference has been eliminated.

It is not invalid that the kibbutz movement has come under the gun. The movement, which today represents an established and influential segment of the community, which has economic and political muscle, is not immune to criticism. The line of sacred cows has come to an end. I too have something to say in this matter, and like many others of my generation who grew up with the recognition that all other forms of life--except for realization through settlement--were inferior and invalid, I have no axe to grind in dealing with the kibbutz movement. Moreover, when I hear people such as the Deputy Prime Minister David Levy talk about the difficult days in which the members of the mass immigrations --the "human dust" in the language of those days--suffered degradation because of the haughtiness of the members of the working settlements, I cannot but feel how deep the pain is and how bitter its fruits. I myself am embittered and angry at the sight of the kibbutz members who once every 4 years leave their cases in the desert to propogandize on behalf of their party in the city, the town and the moshav. It was difficult to see how the kibbutz members distributed fruit and drinks alongside the roads and in the development towns, and how they painted the letters aleph-mem-tav not only on every possible roadside device, but even on the highway itself--in a methodical, unstoppable, revolting manner.

I have never been able to understand how the kibbutz, the most democratic body in the world, was not forced to lead the battle for intra-party democracy, and how its representatives more than once opposed attempts to expand it. Like others, I am revolted by the attempt to distinguish between "working settlement" and other settlement; the correct distinction is between collective settlement and other settlement. I also do not understand those who claim that "the kibbutz is not what it used to be," that industry has damaged its way of life, that the rise in the standard of living has spoiled the original ideas. Those who maintain this are

essentially arguing against the secret of the libbutz's existence. The kibbutz remained in the community after the establishment of the state because it knew how to adapt its ways to changing reality, and it did not cling to a doctrinaire way of life within external forms and frameworks. The kibbutz succeeded precisely because it had the inner strength to change, and not adhere only to agriculture, by adopting new economic branches, by enabling greater family privacy in rooms, and presently--by gradually shifting to having children live with their parents.

Let us not minimize the ability of the kibbutz movement to preserve the original idea, but clothe it in new forms. This ability is not a point of weakness.

The second connection in which to view the kibbutz relates to the social stratum to which it belongs. The kibbutz belongs to the upper stratum, to the veteran, mostly Ashkenazic, established community, which is--for better or worse--the leading stratum of society. One must view this belonging for both better and worse: there is no reason for comparing the data on kibbutz members--battle deaths or trips abroad--to the national average, but rather to the data of the established stratum in Israel. The kibbutzim parallel the veteran settlements--Afeka and Tsahala, Ahuza and Rehavia.

When people complain about the kibbutzniks--and of course they have the right to do so--one must keep this connection in mind. A lot has been said about the introversion of the kibbutz members in the face of the new reality following the establishment of the state and in the face of the hardship of Jews leaving the Islamic countries; but that introversion was typical of the veteran community in its establishment and various sectors--in the city and village. I can understand and feel instinctive sympathy for these complaints when they are articulated by people who lived through the ma'abarot, the settlers of the Nogev and the Galiles, the people of the development towns. But it is very difficult to acquiesce to this indictment when it comes from that veteran and established sector of which the kibbutz members are partners. And it is particularly difficult to hear this criticism from people of the Likud, which has not done one thing--not in its political establishment, not in the towns and villages which it controls, not through its members, and not through the companies which it manages--to bring about the economic and social integration of the deprived class.

It is a fact that the residents of the established urban regions have been subjected to the goal of integration in the framework of the state educational system--an integration imposed from above--but the kibbutz movement has a demand which at least deserves to be heard. They want to preserve their separate educational framework which is essential to the maintenance of their social framework. In general, if there is any justification for introversion, then it is because it serves some social and ideological goal.

It is also worth measuring the achievements of the kibbutz in two matters which will determine whether the future of Israel will be degeneration or independent existence. The first issue relates to our power to be a society in its own right, living by the labor of its own hands and not at the mercy of outsiders. The kibbutz economy, especially its industrial branch, breaks the archaic distinction between "private initiative" and a public economy. The kibbutz economy integrates the joint ownership of non-private ownership with the activity, imagination, and energy which characterize entrepeneurs. Thus, the achievements of this economy, so impressive in every connection, rising above the landscape of Israeli reality. In a society in which the

principal problem is still productivity, the Kibbutz gives an outstanding lesson in practical Zionism--in its agriculture, its industrial plants, and its contributions to tourism. It is doubtful if there is another sector whose special contribution in this area has been so impressive and so high.

The other issue must preoccupy anyone who wants to see in Israel a country of culture, in a desert of grossness and vulgarity, in circumstances in which the Knesset has become more and more a Jacobin meeting, where whoever shouts or curses more wins greater popularity, and the shouts of "Begin-Begin" still echo in a vacuum. In this the kibbutz remains a small island of culture, the culture of debate, the culture of speech, and just plain culture.

I know that there are a lot of problems in this small island: televisions in rooms hurt social activities; the constant work; the increasing sense of alienation of the kibbutz with respect to the Oriental community; the attrition and emigration; and similar problems. But with all of these problems, the kibbutz still remains a crown without which it would be impossible to describe the face of Israel. Those who are taking shots at the kibbutz are taking shots at us.

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CSO: 4323/73

BRIEFS

MUSLIM SALARY INCREASE--Nazareth--For the first time since the establishment of the state, the Religious Affairs Ministry has equalized the payments and grants of Moslem religious officials with those of Jewish religious court officials in small townships. According to the decision, the payments given to the 200 Moslems will be linked to the cost-of-living. They also will enjoy such benefits as clothing allowances, annual leave and payments for the National Insurance Institute. The Moslem religious officials had complained that the discrimination in payments humiliated them, and they threatened to go on an indefinite strike. The ministry however, turned down their demand for status equal to state employees. The ministry said the Jewish religious court officials are not considered state employees. [By Yoel Dar] [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Sep 81 p 3]

CSO: 4400/28

JALLUD ON IMPORTANCE OF COLLECTIVE PARTICIPATION

Valetta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 3 Oct 81 p 16

[Text] Staff Major Abdussalaam Ahmad Jalloud has stressed that the twelve years of the great Al-Fateh revolutionary awareness of the Libyan Arab society.

In a speech he delivered in Tripoli at the gathering of the engineering college graduates organized on the 20th anniversary of its foundation, he said that during the 12 years of the revolution's age, we have lived a transformation in the political social and financial sectors, and the educated youth have waged and still are waging this transformation which affects man who will take part in building the overall transformation stage.

The young engineers, doctors and the educated are by necessity total drawn to the cause of the revolution. We are not seeking the material transformation in one direction but also the financial, cultural, and moral transformation. The conflict is that of technology, between progress and backwardness, which requires from US, in the Jamahiriya, to revolutionize the educational process and curriculs which confirm the importance of the technology and science as basis.

"We are approaching a new stage, and the engineers should contribute to a major part of it.

"It is the stage of manufacturing machines, and buiding factories, because up till now we still buy turn-key factories. Maj. Jalloud stressed the importance of laying down a sciences plan to convey sciences by establishing research centres or by translating books and develop colleges and institutes. He said that the revolution is the science of changing the society and the educational curricula in order to secure the transformation of our society into an industrialized society. Our revolutionary role, he added, will be efficient when armed with revolution throught, industry and science.

The method of communicating technology and science lies on the should on the shoulders of engineers, intellectuals and doctors."

Staff Major Jalloud called upon the revolution's generation engineers and craftsmen to shoulder the tranformation responsibility by actually participating in different fields of the transformation activities.

Staff Major Jalloud also urged the engineers to free themselves from the complex of government mentality, "because we are in the era of the masses and we should think in revolutionary terms and to practice self supervision concernning the future of the revolution and mankind. Therefore he said the engineers should be aware of the transformation dimension politically, culturally and socially."

He pointed out that imposing political illiteracy is unacceptable because technology needs a high degree of awareness in the revolutionary works either in the political, economic or educational level.

"This is not an individual responsibility but it is a collective one", he added.

CSO: 4500/26

PAKISTANIS REPORTED RECEIVING GUERRILLA TRAINING IN DESERT

Paris AFRICA AFP in English 9 Oct 81 p 17

[Text] Islamabad, October 7--Pakistan has expressed "deep concern" to Libya over reports that thousands of Pakistani ex-servicemen recruited as security guards in Libya were being given "forced guerrilla training" to fight as mercenaries for Libyan leader Moamer Qadhdhafi.

Press reports here said today that the Pakistanis were being trained in the Southern Sahara desert to take part in any "adventures Colonel Qadhdhafi might launch in Africa or the Middle East.

Some 3,000 retired Pakistan Army personnel were employed by Libya through a London-based firm called Al-Murtaza Associates. Their contract, approved by the Pakistan Embassy in Berne, Switzerland, early this year specified that they would not be engaged in military or paramilitary duties but would be employed to protect Libyan vital installations only.

Today's reports said the Libyan authorities had violated the contract and were training the Pakistanis to handle Soviet-supplied arms in desert conditions. The question was said to be affecting relations between Islamabad and Tripoli.

Letters from the Pakistanis to their relatives said they had spent six months in military training and those who refused were tortured, Urdu daily NAWA I WAGT said. Previous reports indicated that some of them were trained for Libyan action in Chad.

Other reports said that late last month more than 100 of the ex-servicemen were flown from Libya to Damascus. They protested the action by staging a sit-in at Damascus airport and demanded to see the Pakistani Ambassador to Syria.

The reports said they feared they were being sent to fight against Israel in Lebanon and wanted to return to Pakistan.

Official sources said that on President Zia-Ul Haq's direct instructions Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Riaz Piracha was in touch with Libyan and Syrian authorities on the issue. Pakistan was still awaiting permission from Tripoli for a high-level ministerial delegation to visit the camps housing the Pakistani emigrants to verify their charges of maltreatment and hardship, the sources said. (A.F.P.)

CSO: 4500/26

GAS PROCESSING PLANT CONTRACT AWARDED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27

[Text]

WORLEY ENGINEERING, the US subsidiary of Britain's William Press & Son, has won a $4 million design, engineering and management contract for a 100 million cubic foot per day gas processing and condensate recovery plant to be built at Benghazi. The new plant will recover and process gas from the Messla field in central Libya. The first phase of the project, which includes detailed engineering, procurement assistance and inspection, should be completed in one year, although no timetable has been fixed for phase two, covering supply of materials, construction management and commissioning. The contract, awarded by the Benghazi-based Arabian Gulf Oil Company, also provides for the training of Libyan operating and maintenance staff for the plant.

In the past, the Libyan Jamahiriya's vast reserves of natural gas were exploited only for export in liquid form. Increasingly, however, efforts are being made to make use of the gas either as a fuel or a raw material for industries. For example, the furnaces at the Misrata steelworks will be fired by natural gas from the Hateiba gas field deep in the Sahara.

Recent weeks have seen two other important developments in the Jamahiriya's oil and gas industry. In July it was reported that the Brega Oil Company had awarded South Korea's Samsung Construction Company a $70.9 million contract to build oil storage tanks and pipelines near Misrata. Work was to start in August, with completion in 20 months. In May it was reported that France's Comsip Entreprise had won a $3.5 million contract for two computerised process control systems for oil pipelines. The first will be installed for the 520 kilometre line from the Missla and Sarir oilfields to the Ran Lanouf petrochemicals complex. The second is for the oil terminal at Tobruk. The supervisory control and data acquisition systems are expected to be operational by mid-1982. Client is the Arabian Gulf Oil Company.

CSO: 4500/26

BENGHAZI PORT CONTRACT AWARDED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27

[Text]

THE YUGOSLAV concern Ivan Milutinovic Inland Waterways Construction and Engineering Enterprise has been awarded a $24 million contract for part of the Benghazi port redevelopment project, the Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported in July. Completion of the contract is scheduled for the end of 1983.

The programme to expand Benghazi port is making good progress, the Jamahiriya news agency reported on 27th March, saying that breakwater No 1 was then 70 per cent completed, the second breakwater was about half finished and that work had begun on the extension of the northern breakwater. Excavation and infill work was also well on schedule, JANA added.

Earlier this year, severe storms in the Mediterranean caused considerable damage to the Jamahiriya's ports and sea walls, but repairs are well under way. In July it was disclosed that, under a $500,000 contract, Britain's Steel Scaffolding & Piling is to supply 1,000 tonnes of sheet steel piling and other steel commodities to repair the storm damage. Delivery was due in late July.

July saw other moves relating to the growing importance to the Jamahiriya of her maritime links. It was disclosed that Marconi International Marine Company, an affiliate of Britain's GEC-Marconi Electronics, is to fit marine communications equipment in three 9,000 dwt general purpose cargo vessels currently being built for Libya's General National Maritime Transport Company. And it was announced that Anglo-European Container Line has been appointed sole UK agent by Italy's Societa Internazionale Spedizioni for a regular service from Britain to Tripoli.

CSO: 4500/26

SOVIET AID FOR STEEL WORKS REPORTED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27

[Text]

PART OF the Libyan-Soviet co-operation agreement recently signed in Moscow by senior Libyan aide Abdel Salam Jalloud provides for the Soviet Union to participate in the second phase of construction of the Jamahiriya's first integrated iron and steel works, currently being established at Misrata, some 150 kilometres east of Tripoli, it was disclosed in July. The co-operation agreement also covers Soviet participation in the development of Libya's oil and gas industries, power stations, water desalination plants and manufacturing projects, including one for the production of drilling equipment.

The Misrata steelworks is a cornerstone of the Jamahiriya's new 1981-85 development plan, which provides for a total expenditure of $62.5 billion. The $3,300 million first phase of the works, scheduled for completion by 1985, will give Libya an annual steelmaking capacity of 1.2 million tonnes. The second phase of the project is expected to cost $1,300 million. For completion by 1991, capacity will be raised to 5 million tonnes. The third and final stage, scheduled for completion by 2005, will give the Misrata works an annual capacity of 7 million tonnes.

The largest single contract so far awarded for the steelworks went to Japan's Kobe Steel, and was valued at $751 million. In June it was reported that Kobe had awarded South Korea's Samsung Construction Company a $130 million subcontract for work at Misrata, and in July came news that Kobe has given a second subcontract to Japan's Taisei Corporation, which will act as engineering and supervision participant between Samsung and Kobe.

CSO: 4500/26

IMPORTATION OF DAIRY CATTLE REPORTED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27

[Text]

ABOUT 2,000 cattle were flown to the Jamahiriya between January and the end of March this year by German Cargo Services, a Lufthansa subsidiary. The cattle were carried on 20 flights to Tripoli and ten to Sebha, in the south west. Libya's agricultural development programme emphasises the production of high protein foods, particularly through a major expansion of agro-industries. Recent weeks have seen the conclusion of a number of major contracts providing for the establishment of agro-industrial projects which will produce milk and milk products.

Perhaps the best-known of the Jamahiriya's agro-industrial schemes is that established at Kufra, deep in the Sahara in the south east, where underground water is used to irrigate cereals, and fodder crops for sheep. On 15th July the Jamahiriya news agency JANA reported that local firms had been contracted to drill ten additional water wells at Kufra, which will take eight months to complete.

In July it was reported that Warsaw-based Polservice Koseki has won a $55 million-plus contract for survey work and mapping in the Jamahiriya, with completion in five years. The Polish firm has already done similar work in Libya, but on a smaller scale. The contract reflects the determination of the Jamahiriya that her rural development programme should be based on the full range of essential data. Earlier this year Finland's Finmap company won a $6.5 million contract to prepare cartographic surveys and draw up a 20 year land use plan for a 700,000 square kilometre area in the south of the Jamahiriya.

CSO: 4500/26

BRIEFS

TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI REDEVELOPMENT--Britain's W S Atkins Group has won an important consultancy contract relating to a scheme to redevelop a 1,457 heccare area in the centre of Tripoli, one of 21 areas scheduled for renewal in the Libyan capital. The UK firm's study is scheduled for completion in 15 months. Benghazi, the Libyan Jamahiriya's second largest city, is also the scene of major urban development schemes, and in August it was reported that two Japanese firms, Yachiyo Engineering Company and Kisho Kurokawa Architects & Associates, will soon complete a final design draft for the city's largest development project to date. The $634.5 million scheme entails the transformation of a 110 hectare coastal strip into a tourism and recreational area. Several hotels with recreational facilities, are to be built, as well as new housing. Construction is due to start next year, and should take five years. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST also reported in August that Japanese firms are preparing bids for the construction of a new town near Benghazi, for which tenders are to be called in the autumn. One of the key urban development projects in Tripoli is the $230 million Nasser Forest scheme for the establishment of a central park and zoo, and in July it was announced that South Korea's Samsung Construction Company will take over as prime contractor for the project at the end of the year. The scheme is expected to take three years to complete. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27]

METHANOL PRODUCTION UP--Production at the Marsa Brega methanol plant totalled 179,686 tonnes in the first half of this year, the JAMAHIRIYA NEWS AGENCY JANA reported on 11th August. This is more than half the 322,233 tonnes produced during the whole of last year, and indicates that the plant is working close to its 1,000 tonnes per day capacity. The success of the plant was underlined in May when JANA reported that it had started operating two shifts per day. The Marsa Brega methanol plant, opened in 1977, is one of the most modern in the world and only the second of its type to have been set up in Africa. Methanol is the main raw material for the manufacture of proteins for animal fodder. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27]

BIRAK AIRPORT EXPANSION--International Airports Authority of India (IAAI) and National Building Construction Corporation, both of New Delhi, have a $41.9 million contract for the building work involved in the second phase of construction of Brak airport, about 600 kilometres south of Tripoli, it was reported in late July. The work will include lengthening the 3,600 metre runway by 1,300 metres and extending the parking apron. IAAI has successfully completed a $26.3 million contract for the first phase of the airport. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27]

JAPANESE VEHICLES DOMINATE MARKET--Japan's Mitsubishi Motor Corporation has started shipping 4,620 cars and 4,500 light trucks to Libya, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC DIGEST reported on 7th August. This year the firm has won orders from the Jamahiriya for 22,120 vehicles, valued at $83.3 million. Earlier, the journal reported that Japan's Sumitomo Corporation has received enquiries about the supply of 30,000 cars and light trucks made by Toyo Kogyo Company. If confirmed, the order would be worth about $131 million and would be the first large Libyan order for vehicles from Sumitomo or Toyo Kogyo, which markets vehicles under the trade name Mazda. Japanese vehicle exports to the Jamahiriya this year are expected to total 64,000, accounting for 60 per cent of all the vehicles imported by Libya. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 16, Sep 81 p 27]

CARDBOARD PLANT--Amid people's celebrations marking the 12th anniversary of the great Al Fateh revolution, the Secretary of the General people's committee for Light Industry has opened a cardboard factory at Azzawiyah. On this occasion, people's celebration was organised where several speeches were delivered praising the revolutionary transformation achieved by the Libyan people under the leadership of the great Al Fateh revolution. Small and medium size carton boxes used for packing industrial and agricultural goods will be manufactured at the new factory. The factory output is 15,000 tons of cardboard per year. It is operated by one shift a day. This new industrial complex is built to fulfill the Jamahiriya's needs of carton boxes. The opening ceremony was attended by the secretary of Azzawiyah people's congress and its secretary of the General People's Committee, the Secretaries of the Basic People's Congress and secretaries of the Municipality Qualitative People's Committee. [Text] [Valetta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 10 Oct 81 p 3]

MISRATAH FISHING PORT--Misratah's new fishing post has been inaugurated. The ceremony was attended by the Secretary of the General People's Committee of Light Industries, the Secretary of the People's Committee of Misrata municipality, the secretaries of the congresses and subcommittees in the municipality of Misratah, large crowds of citizens and a representative of the company which executed the project. The project of Misrata fishing port includes several piers, workshops for the repair and maintenance of boats, several freezers for fish and other public amenities. [Text] [Valetta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 10 Oct 81 p 3]

NEW GHARYAN ROAD--The Secretary of the Central People's Committee has inaugurated the 1223 kilometres Nalot-Jado highway as part of the 12th anniversary of the revolution. The project was the 2nd phase of modern roads in the region which are planned to connect all the Gabal Gharabi area and municipalities from Gharian to Nalot. The communication, sea transport, housing and public service secretaries attended the ceremony together with the regional popular leadership and a huge number of citizens. [Text] [Valetta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 10 Oct 81 p 3]

QASR AHMAD PORT TRAFFIC--Port traffic in Qasr Ahmad in the first half of 1981 reached 447 boats and cargo ships of an estimated total of 655,000 tons. [Text] [Valetta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 10 Oct 81 p 3]

CSO: 4500/26

MOROCCO-USSR TIES JEOPARDIZED

PM020901 Casablanca LE MATIN in French 27 Oct 81 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmed Alaoui: "SAM-6 Missiles Against Moroccan-Soviet Cooperation"]

[Text] As we wrote in a previous article, the Guelta-Zemmur attack constitutes both a military and a political turning point in the Sahara conflict.

On the military plane it is a real turning point in view of the number of troops involved but especially the quality and quantity of sophisticated weapons used, of which the most noteworthy were the SAM-6 missile-launchers.

Following this attack on Guelta-Zemmur His Majesty Hasan II sent several messages, especially to the Saudi, Senegalese and Mauritanian leaders, the leaders of the great powers and the international bodies, in order to draw their attention to the serious turn the conflict is taking following the use of this highly sophisticated weapon.

When he received the USSR's charge d'affaires in Ilfrane yesterday the king drew the Soviet diplomat's attention the damaging consequences which could result from use of sophisticated Soviet-made weapons by the mercenaries against Morocco--a country which maintains friendly relations and cooperation with the USSR. Indeed it will be remembered that as soon as our country gained its independence it recognized the Soviet Union and established the bases of fruitful and diversified cooperation with that country--a cooperation which was crowned by the conclusion of the famous contract of the century relating to the exploitation and sale of Moroccan phosphates to the USSR over several decades.

Unfortunately, however, we observe that since our country completed its territorial integrity a veritable international brigade has been formed against it, using increasingly sophisticated Soviet arms and military equipment in each of its attacks.

The Soviet authorities may well split hairs by saying that all this equipment is not supplied directly to the mercenaries by the USSR, but the fact remains that the sale of such sophisticated equipment is always accompanied by conditions, usually that of not using it against a country which maintains good relations with the Soviet Union. In this instance this applies to Morocco.

It is, nonetheless, paradoxical that raw materials vital to the development of Soviet industry and agriculture can be bought from us on the one hand while on the other hand such deadly and sophisticated equipment as SAM-6 missile launchers can be supplied to our country's enemies.

The time has come for a frank and straight explanation, because Morocco cannot supply raw materials which will be transformed into weapons directed against it, especially since the recent attack on Guelta-Zemmur highlighted the fact that these are weapons requiring non-African technicians and experts which gives the sale and use of these weapons their full political significance.

We maintain good relations with the USSR in the political, economic and commercial spheres and in that of technical cooperation. It is up to the Soviet leaders to preserve and strengthen those relations. They can easily do so, especially by refraining from supplying the enemies of our cause with sophisticated armaments and military equipment which they use in their attacks on Morocco for, we repeat, the SAM-6 are weapons directed not only against Morocco but against Moroccan-Soviet cooperation.

CSO: 4519/31

DLIMI CITED ON GUELTA-ZEMMUR FIGHTING

PM301453 Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Oct 81 p 10

[Dispatch by Roland Delcour: "The 13 October Battle at Guelta-Zemmur"]

[Text] Guelta-Zemmur--On Tuesday, 20 October, 1 week after the POLISARIO's attack, calm has been restored in Guelta-Zemmur. All round the valley, on the floor of which nestle several white-domed buildings dating from the days of Spanish rule, a few burned-out trucks and traces of fire in downtown Guelta-Zemmur are the only signs of the fierce fighting which took place here on Tuesday, 13 October.

The journalists brought in by plane and helicopter were able to see, on the flight, that the defense wall which starts from the north, surrounds Bou-Craa and stretches as far as El-Aiun, is intact. The Moroccan defense points spaced at regular intervals behind the sand rampart are still held by garrisons which even seem to have been reinforced recently.

All reports agree on the events of 13 October. The soldiers in the Guelta-Zemmur garrison, less than 2,000-strong deployed throughout the stony mountains which surround the valley, were completely overwhelmed by the POLISARIO army's surprise attack. It was launched at 0600 hours on Tuesday, 13 October, and was accompanied by the firing of SAM-8 missiles which downed a C-130 airplane carrying out surveillance in the sector, and two Mirage F-1 aircraft (figures supplied to the press by General Dlimi, commander of the southern sector). The assault was carried out by a veritable armored column comprising around 12 Soviet T-54 tanks weighing around 40 tons followed by around 50 armored troop transports.

It is easy to imagine the panic among the Moroccan soldiers deployed in their rocky positions and having only light arms against this tide of steel.

The POLISARIO column, which had come from the north, maneuvered impeccably, surprised the defenders, occupied the city and climbed to the headquarters building overlooking Guelta-Zemmur. The Moroccan soldiers who had not been killed fled into the mountains. The defenders called on the 6th RIM (expansion unknown, possibly mechanized infantry regiment] an elite unit always used in difficult battles and which hurried to the scene from Bou-Craa. It took several hours to oust the POLISARIO armored vehicles which were being harrassed by the Moroccan Air Force.

Since the situation had been reversed as early as Wednesday, 14 October, the POLISARIO left the scene. It withdrew as quickly as it had attacked and the Guelta-Zemmur officers were only able to show the journalists the casings of the 100mm American-made shells fired by the assailants' tanks and the traces of their tracks outside the headquarters building. On the road leading toward Mauritania you can also see the marks left by the tanks used by the POLISARIO which changed from a gang of guerrillas into a conventional army on 13 October.

A Step in the Escalation

General Dlimi stated categorically: "They used 12 T-54s, and 50 armored troop transports. Our reinforcements began to arrive between Tuesday night and Wednesday morning. The SAM-6 missile ramps were hit or lacked munitions. Hence, our air force began to attack their tanks and pursue them as they retreated toward Mauritania. Of course, as the king indicated, our troops did not cross the border but our air force pursued the tanks. We will seek the enemy tanks wherever they are. We must fight the enemy wherever it is. This action by the POLISARIO has created a dangerous situation for the states in the region which do not control their territory.

"We are busy investigating the way in which the POLISARIO was able to launch this offensive, which marks a step in the escalation of the war. They maneuvered their tanks brilliantly. Some of our soldiers maintain they heard whites speaking a foreign language. Although the POLISARIO certainly suffered considerable losses, for which we cannot give a figure since it took care to remove its dead and wounded, we are certain that it will return, using Mauritania again. Mauritania is only 40 km from Guelta-Zemmur and it will serve them as a departure point and refuge again. The POLISARIO's wounded are being treated in Nouakchott. On our side the losses were less than the number of enemy troops used--nearly 3,000 men--might have led us to fear. The escalation in attack concentrated on an single point with new and ultra-modern equipment requires a new effort from the Moroccan Army not only at Guelta-Zemmur but all along the defense wall which was not attacked but may be."

CSO: 4519/31

BRIEFS

MP COMES BACK--Rabat, October 11--One of the Moroccan opposition Socialist Party MP's who said last week they had withdrawn from Parliament because they considered their mandates had expired has reversed his decision, the state radio reported here Saturday. It said the MP was Mohamed Badii, who represented Larache in the north. He had written to the Speaker of Parliament, Dey Ould Sidi Baba, to say he had changed his mind after hearing King Hassan's "brilliant reflections" when he opened the autumn sitting of the House on Friday, the radio said. (In a tough speech devoted entirely to the withdrawal by the Socialists, the King accused them of being "anti-constitutional" and of violating Moroccan law). (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2836, 13 Oct 81 p 16]

STIFFER SENTENCES IMPOSED--Casablanca, October 14--Six Moroccan opposition and trade union leaders were today sent for trial to a higher court after the Casablanca Court of Appeal decided it was not competent to hear the case. The six, including Democratic Labour Confederation Secretary-General Nubir Ammwi and Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) newspaper editor Mustapha Karshawi now face stiffer sentences than the Court of Appeal could have imposed. The accused are on trial for their alleged part in the Casablanca food riots of June 20 which followed a strike call by the union and were put down with severe casualties by the security forces. The Court of Appeal also today drastically increased the sentences against four other people who had been dealt with in another court. The Secretary-General of the Union of Small Traders, Abdellah Mustaghfir, had his six months' suspended sentence changed to 18 months without suspension, and the Secretary-General of the Tobacco Workers' Union had a three months' suspended sentence increased to 12 months in jail. (A.F.P.) [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2837, 16 Oct 81 p 16]

CANADIAN COOPERATION--Ottawa, October 14--Morocco and Canada today signed three cooperation agreements aimed at increasing bilateral economic relations, the Canadian External Affairs Ministry said. Under the agreements, a joint committee on cooperation is to be set up and Ottawa is to contribute 400,000 dollars (some 340,000 U.S. dollars) to a Moroccan agricultural project. In 1979, Canada exported 67.7 million dollars' worth of goods to Morocco and imported 6.7 million dollars' worth of Moroccan goods. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2837, 16 Oct 81 p 17]

CSO: 4500/24

BRIEFS

BANK PROFITS REPORTED--Saudi American Bank, which was formed last year to take over Citibank's Saudi Arabian operations, made net profits of SR109m ($32m) in its first five and a half months ended 30 December 1980. The bank, in which Citibank retains a 40 percent stake and the management contract, increased its loans by 69 percent to SR2.5bn ($735m) between its formation, on 12 July 1980 and the end of the year. Deposits rose by 57 percent to SR4.4bn ($1.29bn). At the end of last year it had assets of SR7.1 bn ($2.1bn) and contra accounts (guarantees and so on) of another SR3.9bn ($1.16bn), giving total balance-sheet footings of SR11bn ($3.2bn). [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 p 42]

ITALIAN COMPANY AWARDED CONTRACT--Laing Wimpey Alireza has been awarded a $100m contract by the Saudi Arabian health ministry to build two 100-bed general hospitals at Al Bukayriyah and Al Midhnap. The projects will be undertaken concurrently and are due for completion within 23 months. John Laing Design Associates will act as architects and structural engineers, while Total Termica and Redi Electric, both of Milan, have been appointed as subcontractors for the main services. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 42]

CSO: 4400/32

SOLAR ENERGY PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 p 55

[Text] TUNISIA is carrying out an experiment in harnessing solar energy in Hammah Biadha, a small village in the Silana district some 150km southwest of Tunis, which may set the groundwork for the improvement in rural living standards throughout the Tunisian hinterland.

After a detailed preliminary study of the village's energy requirements, the state utility company — Société Tunisienne de l'Électricité et du Gaz (STEG) — decided to set up an experimental solar energy complex at Hamman Biadha, with USAID assistance. Photoelectric panels with a capacity of 15kW — enough to satisfy domestic, commercial and official energy needs — were installed. A set of batteries will store solar-generated electricity for use during the non-daylight hours.

So that bad weather will not interrupt the supply of electricity, the batteries are capable of storing enough energy for the village's needs for three days. Since the sun is rarely absent for more than 24 hours, the people of Hamman Biadha are unlikely to face a power shortage.

For the countless villages like Hamman Biadha in Tunisia's neglected central plateau region, solar energy could radically improve living conditions, a factor which could turn out to be highly influential in persuading young people to stay and work on the land instead of drifting to the urban areas in search of employment.

The high cost of connecting small, often remote, villages to the national electricity grid has deprived a large part of Tunisia's rural population of basic amenities. Solar-generated electricity will also be used to upgrade agricultural production, mainly by pumps powering local irrigation systems.

If solar energy is shown by the experiment in Hamman Biadha to be viable, other villages could quickly benefit from a source of energy which is practically limitless. STEG has already selected some 400 villages as likely candidates for future solar power installations. One serious drawback, however, is the relatively high cost of photoelectric cells.

"We hope that in the near future, technological advances will enable the unit price for photoelectric cells to be significantly reduced, a Tunisian official told 8 DAYS. 'It should also not be ruled out that if the solar energy experiment in Tunisia succeeds, we could produce much of our own equipment and even export to other Arab and African states,' he added.

Another aspect of Tunisia's solar energy scheme is the training of engineers and technicians.

CSO: 4500/33

NEW EXPORT DRIVE PLANNED

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 40-41

[Article by Howard Schissel: "Tunisia Geared for New Export Drive"]

[Text]

IN THE 1982-86 development plan, Tunisia is looking to expand its export base. Some 80 per cent of Tunisia's total exports involve just four products — crude oil, phosphates and their derivatives, olive oil and textiles — and this makes it vulnerable to even slight variations in world markets, or changes in trade patterns caused, for example, by an EEC enlarging.

'Manufactured goods have not yet reached a stage where they can play a decisive role in our overseas trade.' Azouz Ennifar, director of Tunisia's Centre de Promotion des Exportations (Cepex), told *8 Days* recently in Tunis. Finished industrial goods, apart from textiles, account for only two per cent of Tunisian sales abroad at present.

Ennifar cites two fundamental causes for this. Firstly, import-substitution was stressed in Tunisia's industrialisation to cover domestic needs. Secondly, he says, industrial output is excessively limited, mainly to consumer goods, construction materials and electrical appliances, and these items present few export opportunities.

A new approach to industrialisation is emerging. 'Today our top priority is to add as much value as possible to our exports,' says Ennifar, pointing to the country's systematic bid to increase the percentage of phosphates exported as phosphoric acid. Likewise, the high price of capital goods imported to build new factories must be balanced by greater foreign currency earnings from Tunisian manufacturers.

The Cepex director feels, however, that Tunisia faces serious problems in marketing, and that few foreign buyers realise what sorts of industrial goods it can provide. 'It is difficult to alter the fixed stereotypes which have Tunisia exporting only olive oil, citrus fruits, tinned foods and textiles,' he regrets. Cepex, for its part, has launched an ambitious marketing programme, both in Tunisia's traditional Western Europe outlets and in the Middle East — and, lately, to sub-Saharan Africa.

'To sell in new markets, Tunisian goods must conform to international requirements, as well as the individual market's demands, Ennifar believes. Thus, Cepex marketing missions to the Middle East closely studied packaging regulations, so that agro-industrial produce could be tailored to local requirements and tastes.

The recent wave of protectionist measures in the EEC has impressed on Tunisian planners the need to widen export markets, particularly for textiles. Principal targets for the latter will be non-EEC European states, such as Switzerland, Austria and Sweden, while North America has not been ignored either. The booming Middle Eastern market for textiles would appear to be an ideal new outlet but, Ennifar points out, Tunisia faces stiff competition there from low-cost Asian producers.

The legacy of colonial rule inhibits Tunisia from bettering economic ties with sub-Saharan Africa. Says Ennifar: 'We have no direct land or air link with the countries south of the Sahara. Even when we establish a trade relationship, we must often go through a middleman in Europe because of the limited nature of our commercial dealings.'

To counter this, Cepex has been sending delgations to trade fairs in francophone Africa. 'We attended the last Lomé (Togo) and Abidjan (Ivory Coast) fairs, and our products made an impression on economic planners from these countries,' comments Ennifar.

The Maghreb could perhaps be Tunisia's best export target. The Cepex director reckons that sales to Libya, for instance, should grow tenfold in 1981 to reach over $200m. 'A major point in our favour in the Libyan market,' he remarks, 'is that our goods can easily and rapidly be shipped in overland, while Libya's ports usually tend to be clogged.'

There is also the possibility of a form of industrial cooperation, with Algeria and Morocco, in semi-finished products. In addition, joint ventures could produce basic capital goods both for the countries themselves and export.

Ennifar is convinced that Tunisian industrialisation will speed up as the world recession causes industries to relocate to zones with lower wage scales. 'Tunisia has a major item to sell — its manpower. Labour costs less in Tunisia than, say, Europe, and our workforce has already a technical sophistication that cannot be easily found in other Third World states, says Ennifar. 'What is more, most foreign industrialists who have opened up plants in Tunisia usually agree that our manpower is easily trainable.'

CSO: 4500/33

DEMOCRATIC PROSPECTS DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 18-20

[Article by Howard Schiesel: "Curtain Up on Tunisia Democracy"]

[Text] TUNISIA'S elections on 1 November will open a dramatic new phase in the country's post-colonial political history. Indeed, for the first time since Tunisia gained independence from France in 1956, political formations other than the ruling Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD) will be able to present officially a list of candidates for the new national assembly.

The hegemony of the PSD over Tunisia's political life is not likely to be seriously threatened by the still-limited electoral strength of the opposition. Nevertheless, the legislative elections — under a multiparty system, albeit a limited one — alter radically the groundrules of Tunisian politics. This occurs at a crucial moment, when the question of 78-year-old President Habib Bourguiba's succession is of more than just academic interest.

The elections reflect the progress achieved by the liberalisation endeavours of Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali. Since he replaced the ailing hardline premier, Hedi Nouira, during the spring of 1980, Mzali has spared little effort to infuse new dynamism into the Tunisian political scene, which, say observers, had been afflicted by 'political hardening of the arteries'.

Mzali came to power backed by a coterie of liberals within the PSD, the influential 'first lady' Wassila Bourguiba, and moderates among the opposition. He took over the reins of government at a time when the country had just experienced two political earthquakes: the 'Black Thursday' workers' uprising of January 1978 which left scores dead, hundreds imprisoned and the once-powerful trade union movement, Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT), decapitated leaderless; and the January 1980 attack by Tunisian dissidents on the southern mining town of Gafsa.

In Mzali's view, Tunisia faced more political explosions, followed by intensified government crackdowns unless urgent steps were taken to broaden Tunisia's democracy. The new premier's first goals were to consolidate his position within the ruling party, isolate PSD hardliners, promote those in favour of liberalisation — in particular the so-called 'Democratic Overture' — and encourage a return to democratic leadership elections in the trade union movement.

By any standards Mzali's achievements have been remarkable. Although he still faces stiff competition from other ambitious PSD political barons, Mzali has imposed his own stamp on Tunisian political life, as well as winning friends both in the Arab world and in France during his visits abroad. Moreover, the leader of the PSD's hardline faction, Mohammed Sayah, has gone into political eclipse, having lost his position as the party's secretary general and having been relegated to the rather minor Ministry of Equipment.

More importantly, under the aegis of Nourredine Hached, son of the UGTT's founder, Ferhat Hached, the union movement has been revitalised. Last April's UGTT congress held much promise, for it indicated that most union members were looking for a new and constructive approach. The election of 37-year-old

Taieb Baccouche, a university lecturer, brought new blood into the UGTT.

After months of patient persuasion by PSD liberals, President Bourguiba, who has the final say on all crucial political matters, gave the green light last spring for multiparty legislative elections. However, the 'Combattant Suprême' insisted that several conditions be tacked on to the pluralistic elections: in particular, that opposition groups must not have ideological ties with foreign states or forces, and they must agree with the basic precepts of the Tunisian constitution.

These provisos were meant mainly to curb the activities of the Islamic fundamentalists. In many ways, the restrictions are purely arbitrary and could easily be employed in the future to clip the wings of the leftwing political movements, especially the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT).

But although all parties agreeing to the basic principles put forward by Bourguiba can participate in the legislative elections, their legal existence afterwards is still not assured. It seems that the government will require opposition parties to win at least five per cent of the vote in order to consider them as representative and then afford them recognition. This measure applies to all the parties, with the exception of the Communist Party, for in the government's eyes the PCT, which was suspended in 1963, simply returns to legality.

While applauding the 'democratic overture', opposition groups have asked for further guarantees. For example, several parties asked for the elections to be delayed until spring 1982, to give them more time to organise after years of semi-clandestine operation. They also demanded assurances about access to the state-controlled media, freedom to publish their journals and distribute electoral propaganda, and neutrality of the state administration to ensure free and fair elections.

With the exception of the Communist Party, parties have requested the elimination of the five per cent clause. When asked by *8 Days* if the barrier of five per cent for post-electoral legality was not arbitrary, the minister of information, Tahar Belkhodja, commented: 'All we are asking is that they can muster some 80,000–90,000 votes, a figure that without being excessive will demonstrate which of the opposition parties have a truly national impact.'

Ahmed Mestiri, leader of the Mouvement des Democrates Socialistes (MDS), told *8 Days*: 'We are encouraged by the democratic overture, but we have stressed in our talks with government officials that they must go further in this direction, notably by the announcing of a general political amnesty.' Mestiri and other opposition heads also condemned the recent trials of activists of the radical Islamic fundamentalist movement.

The electoral system is based on a regional division of the 134 seats within the national assembly. Each party or alliance of parties has the right to present a list of candidates, and parliamentary seats will be awarded according to the number of votes won in each region.

Given the diversity of the opposition and its lack of solid regional roots, only a common front could enable it to carry off more than just a symbolic number of seats in the new parliament. However, hopes for an opposition electoral alliance came to nothing. Says Mestiri: 'It is important that all the political parties can measure their exact impact on the Tunisian electorate.' This attitude has been decried as 'sectarian' by several opposition groups, particularly the Communist Party.

Another big battle in the electoral run-up was over the attitude to be adopted by the UGTT. At the special union congress last April in Gafsa, the UGTT made it clear it intended to pursue autonomy from the ruling PSD and other political groups. Taieb Baccouche, the UGTT's new secretary general, was particularly identified with this approach.

But at the UGTT Executive Commission conference in mid-September, it was decided by a majority of 53 per cent to join forces with the PSD in a 'National Front' for the legislative elections. Baccouche himself, however, campaigned for union activists to be completely free to participate on the electoral lists of their choice.

Placed in a difficult position, Baccouche has decided personally not to appear on the PSD's national front electoral list. But the UGTT's backtracking on the intentions of the Gafsa congress could menace its future unity. If it becomes evident that the union movement is clearly returning to the PSD orbit, a number of the UGTT's most active regional branches, especially the Gafsa-Gabes mining region, could be tempted to set up a rival union organisation.

When the Tunisian electorate goes to the polls, it will have at least five different lists from which to choose. Most observers do not expect the PSD's list to suffer excessively from the competition of the other parties, given the fragmentation of the

opposition and the PSD's longlasting entrenchment in the rural areas as well as its control of the state machinery.

As things now stand, the following parties will be entering the electoral arena:

● **The National Front:** Sponsored by the PSD, it will be the only list to be present in all the electoral districts. Along with PSD activists, this list will include trade union representatives, members from PSD-controlled populist organisations like the National Union of Tunisian women, as well as candidates from the employers' association, Utica, and some independents.

● **Errai-Democratie:** This group already has two members in the Mzali government, Beju Caid Essebsi, minister of foreign affairs, and Sadok ben Jomaa, minister of transport. Errai-Democratie is mainly composed of former PSD members who moved into opposition during the Nouira era. Ideologically, it is not far from the ruling party, but it places more emphasis on respect for political pluralism and human rights. For a while it was allied with Ahmed Mestiri's MSD, but broke off relations when it decided to integrate last year with Mzali's government to push for rapid liberalisation. Other prominent Errai members are Mohammed Salah Belhadj, Hassib ben Ammar and Radia Haddad, Mrs Bourguiba's cousin.

● **Le Mouvement des Democrates Socialistes (MDS):** Headed by a former PSD minister, Ahmed Mestiri, the MDS is a mild social democratic formation. Many diplomats in Tunis reckon that the MDS is perhaps the only opposition party, other than the communists, capable of amassing the five per cent of the votes necessary to be officially recognised — that is, if there are no 'dirty tricks' by local PSD officials. Mestiri has been seeking to encourage the Mzali liberalisation drive from outside, but 'young Turks' within the party are pushing for greater radicalism. Mestiri is looked upon with favour in western diplomatic circles as an authentic liberal with good credentials who could shore up the Mzali liberalisation by rallying to the regime at a crucial moment. Influential MDS members include Mohammed Moadda (who maintains close ties with the activist Gafsa region and with traditional religious leaders and intellectuals), Hammouda ben Salama and Dali Jazi.

● **Le Mouvement d'Unité Populaire (MUP):** MUP places itself to the left of the MDS, but without deserting social democratic political parametres. The desirability of participating in the elections has split the movement. Referred to as MUP 1, and led from exile by a former minister of the economy, Ahmed ben Salah, one faction intransigently refuses to enter into PSD-controlled electoral bouts. Other members of this faction, which has supporters in the West German Socialist Party as well as in the French Socialist Party, include Hassan Zenati and Mohsen Toumi. In the Arab world, MUP 1 has support in Algeria and Iraq.

MUP 2, headed by Mohammed Belhadj Ammor and Mohammed Daouad, has decided to encourage Mzali's liberalisation by fielding candidates. MUP 2's links with the government are reported to be through Sadok ben Jomaa of the Errai group. MUP 2 decries what it terms ben Salah's 'cult of personality'.

● **Le Parti Communiste Tunisien (PCT):** The Communist Party was the first opposition movement to be officially recognised by the head of state. In July Bourguiba received the PCT's secretary general, Mohammed Harmel, on the same day he cracked down on leaders of the Islamic fundamentalist movements. The PCT is a moderate pro-Russian party, whose influence is mainly limited to intellectual circles and student ranks. The government is counting on the Communist Party to act as a vital stabilising force, countering the extreme left parties and serving as unofficial diplomatic link with Moscow as well as pro-Russian Arab and African states.

The biggest uncertainty in Tunisian politics is the influence of the fundamentalist movement. After encouraging it in the late 1960s and early 1970s as a counter to the marxist student movement, the government has recently started to view this current as a marked danger to political stability. Bourguiba, with his modernist options, is reported to have been upset by the activities of the fundamentalists. He has recently outlawed, for instance, the wearing of the hijab, the Islamic veil, by women.

At the beginning of September, in the very midst of the democratic overture, the trial of fundamentalist leaders took place in Tunis. The two heads of the Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), Rached Ghanouchi and Abdel Fateh Mourou, were sentenced respectively to 11 and 10 years in prison.

The elections will probably be the first step towards shaping political life after Bourguiba goes. As long as the present head of state's health remains satisfactory, he is likely to continue to dominate the country's political scene. Nonetheless, the elections will serve as the basis for the outline of new alliances, both within the PSD and between members of the ruling party and moderate opposition forces, laying the foundation for the future of Tunisia's political pluralism.

CSO: 4500/32

BRIEFS

REFINERY PROJECT--Tunisia's refining industry is to be expanded, by upgrading the capacity of the Bizerte refinery from 1.5m tonnes to 6m tonnes a year and the possible building of an Arab-financed 10m tonne-a-year export refinery at Cap Serrat. Companies which have prequalified for the Bizerte expansion scheme will be notified by the government at the beginning of 1982; work could get underway by the end of that year and finished by 1985-1986. At present the refinery cannot meet local needs, currently running at 2.6m tonnes and growing by an average 8-10 per cent a year. Tunisia has had to buy over 1m tonnes of refined products a year, principally from Italy, to supply the local market. Upgrading at Bizerte will cost an estimated $350m. An international financial package is to be arranged, possibly with Arab backing. Several American companies are hoping to win this lucrative contract, including Bechtel, McGee and Flour, but competition from French, Italian and Japanese concerns is liked to be fierce. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 p 54]

NEWSMAN ARRESTED--Paris, October 15--Tunisian journalist Khemais Shamari, an opponent of the Bourguiba regime, has been arrested in Tunis, his lawyer said here Wednesday. Mr Shamari returned to Tunisia in August 1980 after several years' exile in France. He recently published an article criticising what he termed restrictive official measures governing next month's Tunisian legislative elections. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English No 2837, 16 Oct 81 p 16]

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No. 2431

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GULF STATES PROPOSE COUNTERALLIANCE TO LIBYA'S MOVES IN AFRICA

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 227 13 Sep 81 pp 20, 21

/Article by 'Ali Hashim: "The Gulf: The Soviet Element Alone Links Libya to Ethiopia and Yemen; The Gulf Shows Fear over the Tripartite Alliance"/

/Text/ The treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Ethiopia and the Libyan Jamahiriyah has stirred up special interest in the countries of the Arab Gulf. It has revealed the fears of some officials who consider it a new political alliance which, if it did not come about through the will of the Soviets, is at least being guided by the Soviets to their benefit, to establish their presence in the region.

A Gulf official has described the treaty or alliance as coming about as a direct Soviet reply to the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which arose through the will of the people of the region and their officials, without any interference or hints from any entity, Arab or foreign.

The official told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI that nothing links Libya to Ethiopia, for example, except cooperation in carrying out an African policy which has come to be well known, and that nothing links Libya to the Republic of South Yemen except the attempt to carry out a new policy in the region of the Red Sea and the Arab Gulf. Arabhood is a factor that binds, the two republics belong to the Arab League, and they are linked by a specific policy toward the Middle East issue, belonging to the Confrontation and Steadfastness Front, which links Algeria, Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization to them. Also, the Gulf official went on, the new treaty arose for non-Arab ends, since here two Arab countries are in alliance with a country that is at war with another Arab country, Somalia. The declared goals of the treaty have been transcended by goals which the Gulf countries are trying to unearth.

Why Ethiopia?

Observers in the Gulf region pause to consider the introduction of Ethiopia as an ally of two Arab countries, since there are problems and wars between Ethiopia and more than one Arab country. There is the issue of the Ogaden region with Somalia and then the issue of Eritrea and the alliance with it, that is, the haphazard stand against the Arab revolution in Eritrea. Observers wonder about the meaning

behind the establishment of this alliance, now that the Committee on Gulf Cooperation [within the GCC] was established a few months ago and they, in accordance with interpretations by informed Gulf officials, are aspiring to establish a bloc in the region which will link the Soviets and be allied with them if the struggle for influence in the region falters and international forces attempt to create solutions to existing problems, especially the problem of Afghanistan.

The Emirates Deny

The declaration of the agreement was accompanied by more than one event. The first, attributed to the state of the United Arab Emirates, was that it held secret talks with the Soviets aimed at exchanging diplomatic recognition and representation. Abu Dhabi's depty foreign minister, Mr Ya'qub al-Kindi, declared that this item of news was totally untrue and said that talks in this regard did not take place. He also denied the signing of oil agreements on opening commercial offices in the state of the emirates or agreements on the landing of Soviet planes in the state's airports with the Soviets.

The second event was the execution of a cabinet change in the government of Aden and the appointment of Col Salim Muslih Qasim as minister of defense and Lt Col 'Abdallah al-Maqami as minister of the interior.

The third event was the visit that the president of the state of the United Arab Emirates, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Aal Nuhayyan, is to make to the Sultanate of Oman next Monday, 7 September. Shaykh Zayid's visit will end the problems that have existed regarding the issue of the boundaries between the sultanate and the state of the emirates, especially those in the area of Ra's Musandam, which embraces the Strait of Hormuz and the Emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah. The vice president of the state of the emirates, Prime Minister Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, had managed to set forth an agreement on this boundary question in a previous visit.

The Gulf countries that belong to the GCC have not yet expressed direct opinion on the Aden treaty, since the Sultanate of Oman alone has declared that the new agreement is Soviet "marxist" and constitutes a danger to the security and safety of the region. The Omani depty minister of the interior, Mr Yusuf al-'Ilwi 'Abdallah, declared that the sultanate will take steps that will result in facing what he termed the new danger. What Oman and the other countries of the region have not announced is that urgent consultation took place on the sidelines of the al-Ta'if conference which the foreign ministers of the council states held.

Although the meetings were devoted to economic issues, some ministers raised the issue of the Libyan-South Yemeni-Ethiopian alliance. This meeting emphasized that the Soviets' objective in the new treaty was to establish a regional bloc that Moscow would embrace which would function as one of its points of concentration in the area of the Red Sea and the Gulf, that the treaty was not just aimed at confronting American policy but also at warning regimes in the area that it had entered the stage of international conflict and that Moscow was no longer remote from the oil area, that it was Moscow that had exploited its presence in Afghanistan, the collapse of domestic conditions in Iran, and the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran and had exploited all the West's apprehensions that they were no longer remote

from the oil, and that while the United States of America had acquired some facilities in some countries of the area, it, that is, Moscow, was able not just to establish bases for itself but also to establish a regional bloc to maintain them and resist the GCC, which was established only to keep the area apart from international struggles.

The Oil Countries--Where to?

Foreign diplomats have been hesitating to act so far, waiting to gather information on the true nature of events in Aden and the real long-term nature of the new alliance. Moderate countries like Kuwait and the state of the emirates have been requested not to take a position at the present time, in order to look into the information they have received from the Libyan president, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdafi, following his abrupt visit to them after his departure from Aden, while the other countries, including the Sultanate of Oman, have been requested to move rapidly to block off the new treaty. They have said openly that it constitutes a danger to the security of the region and have launched a violent attack against it, attacking the three regimes in the treaty in Aden, Tripoli and Addis Ababa. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has not declared an opinion on the new step, and it is expected that the contacts that had been going on between Riyadh and Aden will now be suspended.

The amazement of the Gulf area arose from Libya's orientation toward the region of the Red Sea and the Arab Gulf, since the regime had previously, as circles in Riyadh say, been preoccupied with numerous problems, starting with the problem of Chad, the air confrontation with the American fleet, and the merger union presented to more than one country extending from Africa to the Arab Gulf. Riyadh is watching things closely, along with the Gulf states, including Qatar and Bahrain, but the Saudis have not been watching long, since they are convinced that the Aden agreement is not aimed at the good or stability of the region. The position might not be declared by the media, since Saudi Arabia generally holds its tongue on its relations and movements; rather, this position might appear through diplomatic movements and resolutions aimed at strengthening the Gulf Security Council and giving it new status in the Arab and International contexts.

11887
CSO: 4404/12

SAUDI PEACE PLAN TO BE ON AGENDA OF ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 83, 12-18 Sep 81 p 20

[Article: "Gulf Cooperation Council Foreign Ministers: Prince Fahd's Proposals Before the Arab Summit"]

[Text] The foreign ministers of the six Gulf Cooperation Council nations, who met in Ta'if from 31 August to 2 September, found themselves facing new developments that had to be dealt with, even if only in a general way.

The South Yemeni-Ethiopian-Libyan pact, and the death of the president and prime minister of Iran, forced them into prolonged debate.

Oman, preoccupied as always with the question of security, and sensitive to Aden's moves, saw in the pact confirmation of her efforts to concentrate on security before talking about economic coordination and integration. Although the Council's secretary general, 'Abdullah Basharah, expressed his uneasiness over the agreement, he also stated that the discussions were delaying the adoption of any unanimous position regarding the agreement. At a conference immediately following completion of the discussions, Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal declared that there was not enough information about the agreement, and that there had been no contacts with any of the signatory nations in order to learn their points of view. Therefore, it was difficult to adopt a position regarding it. However, Omani Foreign Minister Qais al-Zawawi stated that the time for unilateral positions on the part of Oman was over. His statement was evidence of the fact that Oman's security apprehensions had caused her to become the closest of the Gulf states to the former shah's regime, as well as her special relationship wit the United States.

The GCC in its final communique declared "its determination to strengthen political and security coordination among the member states, in order to meet the dangers surrounding the region and to increase the contacts for the purpose of putting an end to these dangers." The council reaffirmed that "Gulf security and stability were both the responsibility of its states alone," and expressed "its opposition to major powers' attempts to interfere in the region's affairs."

Prince Fahd's Proposals

Recent events in Iran, which ended in the death of Muhammad "ali Raja'i and Muhammad Javad Bahonar, have underscored once more Gulf concerns regarding the course of events in Iran. The council's condemnation of Iran's seizure of a ship within

Gulf waters was one expression of these concerns. On the other hand the council again expressed its support for the efforts of the Islamic mediation committee, which is an offshoot of the Islamic conference, and the council's readiness to undertake any role to stop the conflict and restore stability to the region.

Accordingly, the most important point in the communique was the Gulf states' adoption of Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's eight points, which he announced during the first part of lat month, and to work for its inclusion in the agenda of the next Arab summit conference. That is so the plan can be arabicized and become a springboard for a unified Arab strategy.

The communique did not forget to affirm the council nations' support for the Arab issues, although it was again reiterated that the council does not constitute an axis and that its work is not incompatible with the Arab League charter.

The second principal concern of the ministers was to study the economic agreement completed by the ministers of finance and economy during their meeting in Riyadh last June, for the purpose of confirming it and submitting it to the kings and chiefs of state for ratification when they meet next November in Riyadh.

The economic agreement is composed of 25 articles and forms a framework for coordination in all areas pertaining to economic activity, including freedom of trade and movement of capital, lifting restrictions on customs, abolishing bilateral agreements and replacing them with a unified agreement, in addition to coordination of policies concerning wages and employment, abolishing duplication in industrialization, and dealing with the rights of the citizens of the six states on an equal basis. The six council states are dependent on oil as a basic economic source of revenue, and are a community able to produce more than half of OPEC's daily production.

Economic Coordination

Gulf coordination in the economic sphere is nothing new. The formation of the Gulf airline was one of the oldest and most successful of the joint Gulf projects, since it dates back to 1950. Participating in it are Bahrain, in which the firm's headquarters is located, Qatar, where the hotel and helicopter headquarters are, Oman, where the center for light aircraft is located, and Abu Dhabi with the maintenance workshop.

Gulf economic coordination is premised on the fact that oil, which is the basic source of wealth, is at the same time a dwindling asset. There must be planning for whatever follows the oil age, and the six states must pursue a unified economic philosophy that permits the maximum possible freedom for the movement of private capital.

In 1979, coordination began to take on a collective and organized form, when the Gulf states' ministers of planning met and approved the establishment of a permanent secretariat, confirmed a budget for the work, and agreed to periodic meetings. The ministers held their second meeting in Doha the following year, and the council was established this year, in order to put matters into a more comprehensive framework.

Some bold steps were also taken last year, since Saudi Arabia announced that it had scrapped its plans to build an aluminum plant after 5 years of preparations. That was done for the benefit of the existing plant in Bahrain and another plant

expected to be built in Dubai. That was followed by the kingdom's participation in the Bahrain plant, with a 20 percent share. It is expected that the plant's production capacity will be increased from 120,000 tons to 165,000 tons next year. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait have also agreed to jointly build a petrochemical complex to produce methanol and ammonia, at a cost of $185.2 million.

More importantly, Saudi Arabia announced that when the Saudi Company for Basic Industries (SABEK) which is a heavy industry company, offers its shares to the public in the middle of this decade, Gulf citizens will be able to purchase shares exactly as Saudi citizens.

The economic paper also called for coordination of Gulf assistance, which the council states offer either bilaterally or through regional foundations, such as the OPEC Fund for example. The Economic Cooperation and Development Organization estimated that total assistance from the OPEC nations in 1980 was $6,999 billion, of which $6,798 billion was paid out by Arab members of OPEC. Of this amount, $5,580 billion was borne by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.

The industrial committee will meet prior to the meeting of the kings and princes. It will deal with the fundamental question: What comes after the age of oil? The committee will also deal with coordination of efforts to diversify the bases upon which the Gulf economy rests.

7005
CSO: 4404/32

OMAN TAKES HARD LINE ON DUTIES OF NEW COUNCIL

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 237 5 Sep 81 p 15

/Article by Najib 'Abd-al-Hadi: "Oman's Dispute with the Gulf States Presents the Cooperation Council with the threat of Dissolution"/

/Talk/ Talk about the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] remains the preoccupation of the leaders of the gulf states, who are seeking the most successful, secure ways for making this council succeed and enabling it to establish its presence and existence in the Arab and international contexts.

The purpose of the meeting of the Gulf states foreign ministers held in al-Ta'if last Monday was to discuss the executive steps the council has taken, to hear a report prepared by its secretary general, Mr 'Abdallah Bisharah, and to prepare for a meeting of its leaders at their second summit, which is to be held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia next November.

It appears that the foreign ministers found themselves faced with political events that had recently arisen, events that demanded that they add new emergency headings to their agenda, which had been prepared some weeks before their meeting.

Among these headings is a project of Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the Saudi crown prince, which was announced last month. This "project-initiative" ought to have enjoyed the attention of the foreign ministers and to have been abundantly, intensively studied, and therefore the member countries of the council ought to have announced their opinion on it and spelled out their official position on it.

Following what was discussed in al-Ta'if, one can say that the foreign ministers of the Gulf states supported the Saudi project but saw fit not to declare their support at the present time but to leave this task to their leaders, who could express their views and declare their position when they met at their next meeting.

The second heading that was introduced into the agenda of the council of state foreign ministers was the treaty of friendship signed in Aden, which comprised the Democratic Republic of Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia. This issue was raised by the Sultanate of Oman, which expressed its anxiety and dissatisfaction with this treaty, considering that it was directed against the whole council.

It appears that the Sultanate of Oman offered the foreign ministers of the Gulf states its view in writing, demanded that that view be considered in effect a new working paper, and demanded that the member countries study it with exceptional care in order to ascertain the extent of the Soviet danger threatening the security of the sultanate first of all and the security of the Gulf secondly.

The Sultanate of Oman considers that its view of the political situation in the region has not evolved, that what it has said and is saying about the danger latent in the region--represented by the regime in the Democratic Republic of Yemen, which displays enmity toward it--has been confirmed with the signing of the abovementioned treaty, and that this requires serious study on the part of the council states, concentrating on the dimensions of the goals of this treaty from the political and military standpoints, especially since the Soviet Union supports this development and encourages its continuation.

AL-MUSTAQBAL has learned from widely-informed diplomatic and political sources that the friendship treaty signed by Aden, Libya and Ethiopia was not the product of an impulse but rather arose through secret visits made by some political officials in the three countries, involving the three capitals, that had been going for a substantial time.

The secretary general of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Mr 'Abdallah Bisharah, said in his latest press statement that he hoped that the reasons for the differences between the foreign policy of the Sultanate of Oman and the foreign policy that the other Gulf states are pursuing will be eliminated, and pointed out that these reasons are not Arab at all.

He also said "The Sultanate of Oman has its own philosophy of foreign policy and we hope that what has compelled the sultanate to adopt an independent foreign policy approach will disappear."

Some observers who specialize in foreign policy affairs say that the Sultanate of Oman does indeed have its own philosophy of foreign affairs and will not proceed to change this philosophy unless it becomes convinced that the GCC has the ability and effectiveness to fill the security and military vacuum in the region. Therefore it insists that the Council of Cooperation discuss the working paper it presented to the leaders of the gulf states at their first summit, which was held in Abu Dhabi.

It is to be observed that the member states of the council have been anxious to stress that the Omani working paper is still in front of the Gulf state foreign ministers, that they are diligently studying it, and that it will be the focal point of the second summit meeting of gulf state leaders. If the leaders arrive at a formulation that pleases the Sultanate of Oman, the possibility that the sultanate will swerve from its "special philosophy" of foreign policy will be raised. Otherwise, the Sultanate of Oman will hold to its position and "philosophy," and this might have an effect in one form or another on the course of the GCC.

11887
CSO: 4404/12

COMMITTEE APPROVES LAND REFORM PLAN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in Dari 23 Aug 81 pp 1, 2, 3

[Text] Chaired by Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan [PDPA] Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council, the PDPA Central Committee and the DRA Council of Ministers convened before noon yesterday to discuss continuation of the just application fo democratic land reform.

First Babrak Karmal, concerning the importance of democratic land reforms, expressed some scientific and valuable ideas, and said: The most important issue for the national democratic Sawr revolution was the just, democratic solution of the land problem. This solution was administered in conformity with the specific characteristics of our society, keeping in view the religious beliefs, customs and traditions of our people. It was carried out step by step, without haste, with the active cooperation of villagers, landowners and all national, patriotic forces.

In the session there was discussion concerning the practical plans for democratic land reform which were presented to the committee by the ministry of agriculture and land reform. Following complete deliberation, the plan of the Commission of the PDPA Central Committee and the DRA Council of Ministers for continuing application of land reform was unanimously approved.

The approved legislation of the Commission of the PDPA Central Committee and the DRA Council of Ministers for the continuation of land reform application, dated 14 Sonbolah 1360 [5 September 1981] is as follows:

The national democratic Sawr revolution, having an anti-feudalist, anti-imperialist essence, was the beginning of all the basic, fundamental transformations of our dear Afghantistan. The just solution to the land problem by means of a gradual implementation of democratic land reform is one of the most urgent duties of this revolution. This land reform is implemented to benefit the farmers and workers through their direct and active participation with the support of all the national, patriotic forces. The farmers, as the broadest mass in the country, were the main source of support for the Sawr national democratic revolution. In union with the worker class, under the PDPA's leadership, in the framework of a national fatherland front, they can perform a huge role in bringing the revolution to final victory.

The PDPA, the political scout for the worker class and all the country's toilers, despite all the difficulties, has continuously remained the most sincere defender of

the toiling farmers. This fact has been confirmed during its relentless campaigns, such as its practical activities, its organization of propaganda work for the awakening and organizing of the farmers, and its bringing forward the farmers' real desire for land.

In the first days after the revolution's victory, the DRA government proposed the implementation of democratic land reform as the most urgent duty in order to transer social and political power to the country's toiling people and to eliminate feudalism. By the partial application of this reform, a crushing blow was inflicted on the body of feudalism, and land was distributed to a large number of farming families having little or no land. However, due to the shameless interference of counterrevolutionary elements, reactionary and imperialistic intrigues, deviation from the revolutionary law and the committing of mistakes, the continuation of land reform was arrested.

On 30 Jawza 1360 [20 June 1981] the political body of the PDPA Central Committee and the DRA Council of Ministers approved the continuation of the just, democratic land reform, and founded the Commission of the PDPA Central Committee and the DRA Council of Ministers to continue the just, democratic application of land reforms.

The Commission, in this session, in view of the importance of applying democratic land reform in order to provide land for the toiling farmers, and establish the ownership of farmers and landowners, approves the following articles:

1 - The Commission welcomes the decree of the ruling body of the Revolutionary Council, that is Supplement No 1 to DRA Revolutionary Council Decree No 8 concerning land, and declares its complete readiness to apply it.

Provincial Land Reform Examining and Coordinating Commissions and Land Reform Operations Groups are responsible for application of the orders contained in this decree in the course of implementation.

2 - The Commission sanctions the practical plans for the continued just application of democratic land reform in the DRA which have been prepared by the ministry of agriculture and land reform.

3 - The Commission sanctions all the tables, forms, ledgers and other documents which were prepared by the ministry of agriculture and land reform and presented to the Commission.

4 - The ministry of agriculture and land reform is responsible for adopting practical policies in order to implement the aforementioned plan; for beginning primary operation plans, which include evaluation of the previous stage of land reform, in a concentrated fashion in several provinces; and furthermore to administer the operation plan in two districts of each province. The aforementioned plan should be first begun experimentally in the two districts of Kabul Province by 15 Sonbolah 1360 [6 September 1981].

5 - The provincial party committees and provincial governors will be guided so that they can establish Examining and Coordinating Commissions by the end of Sonbolah 1360 [22 September 1981] and notify the ministry of agriculture and land reform of the two districts in each province so that the ministry can evalutate them. This will be done in conformity with the guidance in the legislation approved by the political body of the PDPA Central Committee and the DRA Council of Ministers

concerning the continued just application of land reform dated 30 Jawza 1360 [20 June 1981].

6 - The ministries of agriculture and land reform, and finance are responsible for preparing and presenting to this Commission detailed practical policies for the organization of farmers and agricultural cooperatives, and the granting of financial and technical aid to farmers by 1 'Aqrab 1360 [23 October 1981]. These polities will be prepared with the serious cooperation of the agricultural cooperative central councils, and by means of the Bank for Agricultural Development, the Afghan Chemical Fertilizer and Seed Distribution Organization, the general directorship of agricultural propagation and production, the directorship of agricultural cooperative development and the general directorship for agricultural mechanization.

7 - The ministries of water and electric public utilities, public health, and education, the directorship of village development, and directorship of agricultural cooperative development are responsible for preparing practical plans for carrying out construction and repair work on the irrigation system and construction groundwork in villages, offices and hospitals. These plans must be presented to the Commission for approval by 15 Qaws 1360 [6 Dec 1981].

8 - In order to correct errors of the previous stage of land reform, the ministry of finance is responsible for preparing, according to need, official documents of land ownership and other valuable documents which were planned by the ministry of agriculture and land reform. In accordance with the planned program, the ministry must send these documents to the provincial accounting offices before application of the practical plans, referred to in Article Two of this legislation, commences.

9 - The ministry of justice, in cooperation with the ministries of agriculture and land reform, and water and electric power, is responsible for preparing a plan for a water law and regulations for agricultural water use by 31 Sonbolah 1360 [22 September 1981]. The same ministries are furthermore responsible for preparing amendments to the orders in Decree No 8, Regulations No 1 and 2 of Decree No 8, and amendments to the Law Regulation Land Ownership Affairs by the end of Mizan 1360 [22 October 1981]. All these plans and amendments must be presented to the Commission by the aforementioned dates.

10 - The main plans for the continued just, democratic application of land reform must be administered without delay and without haste, taking into consideration the time-table for the operation plans.

11 - During the implementation of the land reform operation plans, religious beliefs, customs and traditions of our people will be strictly observed.

12 - The Provincial Land Reform Examining and Coordinating Commissions are responsible for organizing Propaganda Committees with the participation of representatives from social organizations, patriotic clergy, elders, tribal leaders and teachers. The Commissions are responsible for organizing propaganda about land reform according to a specific plan, beginning 1 Mizan 1360 [23 September 1981], throughout the country.

13 - The Provincial Land Reform Examining and Coordinating Commissions are responsible for organizing in each district Committees for Land Reform Application, composed of

farmers with little or no land, agricultural workers, landowners and patriotic clergy. These Committees will have an active part in the application of every portion of the program.

14 - Control of the application of this legislation is the responsibility of the Economic Branch of the PDPA Central Committee and the Central Bureau for Administrative Regulation of the DRA Council of Ministers.

9557
CSO: 4665/2

KABYLIA IGNORES CALL FOR GENERAL STRIKE BY BERBER MOVEMENT

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Sep 81 p 4

/Article by Daniel Junqua: "Kabylia Ignored Call for General Strike Issued by 'Movement for the Berber and Democracy'"/

/Text/ Tizi-Ouzou--On Monday, 28 September, Kabylia totally ignored the call for a 24-hour general strike issued by a mysterious "Movement for the Berber and Democracy," which, according to the terms of a leaflet distributed during the past 2 weeks, sought to protest against "the anti-democratic and segregationist policy" of the government. The authors of this leaflet, which was also distributed in Paris, denounced "the detention of militant members of the Berber Cultural Movement, the exclusion of students from the lycees in Bejaia and Tizi-Ouzou, and the suspension from work of sympathizing workers." The strike on 28 September was to be the high point of a one-week school boycott, from 26 September to 2 October.

Contrary to what had happened on 16 April 1980 and 15 March 1981, the people of Tizi-Ouzou continued to go about their occupations. The open stores, the extent of automobile traffic, the activity at work sites, the crowds at the tables of Algerian cafes--everything indicated a normal life. No particular police arrangements were visible, and the square of the Gendarmerie barracks in the center of the city, where reserve forces assemble in case of tension, was empty.

The same impression of relaxation prevailed in neighboring towns, and, in particular, all along the road which leads to Ain-El-Hammam, passing through Larba-Nait-Irathen (the former Fort-National), in a region considered particularly favorable to those opposed to the government. At Dra-Ben-Khedda, the SONITEX textile factory, which employs some 1,500 workers, was operating normally. The crowds of children going to school or coming home from there were a sign that the school strike, apparently, was almost as great a failure as that of the general strike. Only a few lycees and colleges were affected on Saturday morning /26 September/ by movements of protest, but everything seemed to be back to normal by Monday, 28 September.

At least two reasons may explain the slight response found by the organizers of the protest movement. First, the leaders of the Berber Cultural Movement were divided over the timeliness of such an action, and the moderate elements, concerned to limit activity to the cultural field, had refused to associate themselves with it. Then, the supporters of the strike were taken at a disadvantage by the decision of the government to establish in all the large Algerian universities departments to teach the people's languages, thereby giving a large place to the study of Berber (LE MONDE, 27-28 September). After that the climate was more favorable to the resumption of a dialogue than to a clash.

It is believed that the cultural alibi has been smouldering for a long time in certain circles favorable to the government. These circles emphasize that a double demonstration has been made: the lack of an audience for the advocates of the strike movement, and their desire to spread disorder by all means available. New evidence of this is seen in the communique published in Paris by a "Defense Committee of Cultural Rights," which announced that the 10 members of the cultural collective at the University of Algiers, arrested last May (LE MONDE of 4 June) and still not put on trial as of this date, had begun on Saturday [26 September] a one-week's hunger strike at El-Harrach prison near Algiers. This information has been denied by the authorities.

5170
CSO: 4519/11

NEW MEASURES TO CONTROL DEPARTURES OF CITIZENS

Paris LE MONDE in French 29 Sep 81 p 5

/Article by Daniel Junqua: "Measures Taken to 'Guarantee Security and Dignity of Citizens Abroad'"/

/Text/ Algiers--In the course of a recent cabinet meeting the government ordered a series of measures aimed at "guaranteeing the security and the dignity of citizens traveling abroad and preserving the good image of Algeria." The measures will be made public once an inter-ministerial committee created for the purpose will have decided on the measures for its application. The authorities no doubt will act in two directions: to control more strictly departures from the country and to ensure that Algerians leaving for foreign countries will legally have sufficient resources.

One of the first actions of President Chadli Bendjedid in April, 1979, was to cancel a particularly unpopular document: the authorization to leave the country, established in 1967 by President Boumediene. There is no question of placing this document back in effect, although for the last 3 years the increase in the number of departures was such that it raised difficulties with certain countries receiving Algerians, particularly Tunisia, Spain, and France. Air traffic with France increased during the past 2 years by 40 percent, and this tendency does not seem to be slowing down. The Airbuses and the Boeings of Air France and Air Algeria take off daily, jam-packed from an airport which is chronically crowded, although it has been expanded in size.

In 1980 the different French airports received 1.4 million passengers coming from Algeria, the great majority of them Algerians, and in the reverse direction the figure is of the same order, which is explained by the presence in France of an Algerian immigrant community of nearly one million people. Most of the travelers are simply going to visit their families or their friends or to travel as tourists. However, others, less innocently, have the intention of finding a job or of settling more or less definitively in France. The coming of the French Left to power and the decision of the French authorities to regularize the situation of the illegal workers has aroused new interest in emigration from Algeria. The French Consulates receive hundreds of requests in this regard and can only respond in the negative, as the decision to put an end to all emigration was clearly made by the Algerian government since 1973 and by the French government since 1974. There are many people who directly try their luck by passing themselves off as tourists.

An Unsuitable Regulation

The border police must carry out a difficult classification of travelers. Still, recently, about 50 Algerians who tried to enter France through Switzerland were turned back. The French authorities, unwilling to take draconiac measures themselves--establishment of a visa procedure, in addition to its disagreeable and arbitrary character, would risk affecting bilateral relations--no doubt have asked the Algerian government to take action on its own. The subject will apparently be on the agenda for conversations which Minister of the Interior Gaston Deferre will have on 30 September and 1 October in Algiers with his counterpart, Boualem Benhamouda.

The small allocation of foreign exchange--300 Algerian dinars[1] per trip and for each family member--made available to Algerians leaving for foreign countries constitutes another source of difficulty. The amount is insufficient, and the search for foreign exchange has become a national sport. Those who have the good luck to have relatives in France may have recourse to "compensation,"[2] often at heavy cost, since the exchange rate on the black market can reach 3 dinars for 1 franc. However, certain Algerian immigrants in France, tired of receiving in this way people who sometimes claim a distant relationship, refuse to accept them. Entire families may then find themselves out in the street. Young people, without any other alternative, "get along as best they may," the young men by theft, the young women by at times having recourse to the oldest profession in the world.

This behavior, the authorities feel, is of such nature as to damage the image of Algeria. Last summer some 800,000 Algerian tourists went to Tunisia. To save on their precious foreign exchange, young people slept out under the stars, in the middle of the city, on cardboard boxes. Entire families spent several days in their cars. Even better, imaginative heads of family brought their wives and children across the border, or eight or 10 people in all, gave them a sandwich for dinner and, when the night was over, brought them back to Algeria. In this way they kept the foreign exchange they had declared and found themselves ahead by F 3,000 or F 4,000, which let them go--but alone this time--to Spain or France.

The authorities want to put an end to all these practices by revising regulations which are largely outdated. The regulations could be oriented toward a "Tunisian" tape system, consisting in providing only once a year a considerably increased foreign exchange allocation, but which could, in case it is not used, be added to the allocation for the following year. The National Assembly on several occasions has debated the question and has called for measures in this direction. The government feared that their impact on the budget would be too heavy, but fraud is acquiring such proportions that the remedy adopted up to now seems worse than the disease.

The measures for the control and restriction of trips outside the country are more delicate to implement. At the beginning of the year instructions which were reportedly aimed at preventing young girls and women from leaving the country, unless they had an authorization from their fathers or their husbands, aroused very strong protests and were very quickly cancelled.

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[1] 1 dinar = 1.30 French francs

[2] A system which consists in being taken in charge by a family in France, with repayment to be made in Algeria.

However, purely administrative regulations will only have a relative effect as long as the thirst for consumption is not satisfied on the part of a people who go overseas above all to buy goods which they do not find in Algeria. The authorities are perfectly aware of this and are trying to normalize the situation in this sense. The progress made over the last few months is unquestionable, and the shortages which were once a part of the daily scene have become rare. Efforts to stimulate local production and to improve the distribution networks and the quality of the services performed for the public are beginning to bear fruit.

5170
CSO: 4519/11

BRIEFS

FLN DELEGATION MEETS FRENCH COMMUNISTS--An Algerian FLN delegation led by Sliman Hoffman, member of the Central Committee and charged with the foreign relations of the Party, was received at the headquarters of the French Communist Party, L'HUMANITE reported on Tuesday, 29 September. The newspaper states that the two parties "reaffirmed their determination to strengthen their cooperation on all questions of mutual interest," which tends to indicate that the dispute between the FLN and the PAGS (Algerian communists) (LE MONDE, 27-28 September) has not affected their relations. /Text/ /Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Sep 81 p 4/ 5170

CSO: 4519/11

ISLAMIC GROUPS, STUDENTS TARGET OF ILLEGAL ACTIONS BY STATE SECURITY FORCE

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 61 May 81 pp 44-45

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd al-Qaddus: "Correction Movement Needs to Be Revised; Beware, Freedom Is in Danger"]

[Text] There is no doubt that what took place in May 1971 constituted the beginning of a fundamental transformation, considering that thousands of political prisoners, the overwhelming majority of them members of the Islamic groups, were released and that the country experienced a new era of relative freedom after destruction of the regime of terror that had been ruling Egypt. There is also no doubt that the primary beneficiaries of all this were those who had been exposed to repression and torture at the hands of 'Abd al-Nasir.

But after 10 years of the correction movement, we believe that this movement needs another fundamental correction. Freedom is endangered because of police practices, the war against the Islamic groups and the severe shackles imposed on public liberties.

We will discuss each of these negative aspects in some detail.

First, Activity of State Security Intelligence Is Incompatible With Supremacy of Law.

The first slogan raised by the May 1971 correction movement was the slogan of the supremacy of law. But state security intelligence agencies have not respected this slogan over the past 10 years and have continued to act with the mentality of the era of terror.

The proof of what I am saying is the vast number of innocent people arrested by the intelligence agencies and released by the prosecution and the judiciary for a lack of evidence against them. This number has exceeded 1,000 in 10 years.

Let Muslim lawyer 'Abdallah Salim speak to us in the language of figures and facts concerning the state security intelligence agencies' violations of the supremacy of law and their terrorization of the innocent:

1. The first violation of the supremacy of law was committed by state security intelligence forces against the Islamic group known as the Atonement and Migration

Group. In 4 years, beginning in 1972, 300 persons were arrested and were all released.

2. There was the case of the kidnapping and assassination of the late Shaykh al-Zahabi, a former minister of religious trusts. It is to be noted that this case was referred to the military judiciary, though it was outside their jurisdiction. This constituted a return to military trials and a setback for freedom. The number of people charged in this case was 54, and most of them were convicted. This has been the only case in which most of the defendants were convicted. This case was accompanied by another involving affiliation with the Atonement and Migration Group. The number of persons arrested in this case amounted to more than 234. It is noteworthy in this regard that for the first time since the correction movement of May 1971, state security intelligence people arrested a large number of women. The number of female detainees was more than 30.

More than 200 persons, including all the women, were released. The sentences against the others ranged from a 1-year prison term to a 6-month prison term.

3. Prior to the case of the late al-Zahabi, there was another case in 1974, known as the case of the Technical Military [College]. The court released half of the defendants arrested and referred the rest to the court for trial. The total number was 60 persons.

4. The case of the first Struggle Organization of 1978, in which state security intelligence agencies arrested more than 80 persons. This case was referred to the Alexandria military judiciary, which released more than half of the defendants.

Sentence of Not Guilty to All and Condemnation of Intelligence

5. The case of the second Struggle Organization, of 1979, in which the number of detainees totaled 134. They were all released when one of the defendants charged that the case was "rigged" by the Alexandria state security intelligence people and that the district intelligence inspector had asked him to gather his friends and give them the explosives that were seized.

6. Another case that shows the state security intelligence's violation of the supremacy of law is the 1978 case of al-Minya. The intelligence agencies notified the state officials that a student had been arrested carrying 500 pounds, which had been given to him by a foreign state as part payment to instigate riots.

It was proven that this charge was fabricated and false. All those arrested in the case were released (pending investigation of the case). The higher administrative court also instructed that 100 students who had been dismissed from the university on the instigation of the intelligence forces be reinstated and that they be given special examinations.

The second case of al-Minya, in 1980, the intelligence people tried to portray as one sectarian sedition. The intelligence forces arrested city youths indiscriminately, but all the detainees were released.

7. The case of al-Mansurah in 1979, in which the state security intelligence people arrested 13 religious youths on a charge of instigating opposition to the peace treaty with Israel. But nothing was proven against the youths and they were released.

8. The Asyut cases: Since 1978, state security intelligence forces have been trying to attack the city's Muslim youths, and the agencies did rig three cases against them. But all the defendants were released as soon as the investigations were completed. The governor of Asyut played a major role in restraining the city's state security intelligence forces.

9. The case of al-Tahrir [Liberation] Party in 1980, in which 8 people were arrested and released.

Role of Central Security

It is to be noted that the central security agency has also been used to hit at the Muslim youth. In Asyut, for example, this agency intercepted a peaceful demonstration by Muslim youths protesting Egypt's hosting of the former shah, the henchman of Iran. A violent clash erupted in which many people were injured and one person was killed. The Asyut University campus was violated and the security men clashed with the students who were protesting the erection of walls around and inside the campus. In Cairo, central security men entered the school of medicine to provide protection to workers demolishing the mosque in which the Islamic Group performed its religious rites.

General Observations

1. All the cases I have mentioned were accompanied by indiscriminate arrests of hundreds of Muslim youths by state security intelligence. But those youths were released a few days later.

This is why we say and stress that the number of innocent people thrown into jail by state security intelligence, and then released, exceeds 1,000.

2. It is to be noted that the overwhelming majority of those arrested are students in their twenties. It is also to be noted that many of them are high school students, as in the latest case in Alexandria in which 14 students, most of them under 18, were arrested and then released. What is amazing is that the case of the Atonement and Migration Group included a child who was not yet 10. He was arrested by the intelligence people and charged with being the group's courier. The court found him not guilty.

3. The acts of fabricating accusations against the Muslim youth were accompanied by accusations and ridicule levelled by the information media against the Muslim youth.

4. In the cases I have mentioned and in other cases, Muslim youths have accused the intelligence people of subjecting them to torture to force them to make false confessions.

Second, Need to Stop War Against Islamic Groups

Muslim youths will now speak to us about the violent war to which the Islamic groups have been subjected in the past 10 years.

Dr 'Isam [not further identified] says that this was has taken several forms, in addition to arrests and detention by state security intelligence forces. These forms are:

1. Abolition of Islamic groups in the universities and efforts to ban their activities.

2. Preventing the holding of Islamic camps.

To learn what has happened to the correction movement, it is enough to note that the first Islamic students camp was inaugurated by the minister of religious trusts, as the representative of the state. In 1980, central security forces were summoned in more than one place to break up the Islamic camps.

3. Rigging of student elections and striking out the names of candidates affiliated with the Islamic groups: In 1970, more than 70 percent of the candidates of the Islamic groups were struck out. Ten percent of the names struck out were again included after appeals. In 1980, 80 percent of the names of the candidates were struck out and most of the appeals were turned down (these figures pertain to the Cairo University School of Medicine).

4. Amendment of bylaws to paralyze the student union movement: In this respect, brother Khalid, the former chairman of the Union of the Cairo Students of Medicine, says:

In the past, the union chairman could organize a pilgrimage to Mecca costing more than 10,000 pounds and was solely accountable to the state for this pilgrimage. But now, in the wake of amendment of the bylaws, the chairman cannot spend any sum without extreme difficulty. All the projects set up by the Islamic groups, such as the Islamic uniform project, the allocation of special cars for female students, the sale of textbooks to students at low prices and the pilgrimage trips, are all threatened with termination.

The new bylaws have turned the students into a minority in their union, which is now controlled by professors and employees. Moreover, a college dean has the right to repeal any decision adopted by the student union.

Khalid adds: There is no good to be hoped from the paralyzed student unions and I advise my brothers to abstain from participating in the farce that the present unions represent.

Demands of Islamic Groups

Brother 'Abd al-Mun'im [not further identified] lists the demands, all fair and legitimate, of the Islamic groups:

1. Institute all forms of freedom for the Islamic groups.

2. This by necessity entails amendment of the current student bylaws, which paralyze the student movement.

3. Eliminate provocations of Muslim youths. These provocations take numerous forms, the most important being:

A. Violation of the university campus through the holding of lewd parties and the display of communist and licentious books in the fairs held at the universities.

B. Friction with the police and the activities of the state security intelligence forces.

C. Media dissemination of corruption, ridiculing of Islamic groups and distortion of the truth of these groups.

What Then?

The Islamic groups are being exposed to a physical war by the police agencies, to a psychological war by the information media and to a war by the state officials aimed at shackling their activity. If we can destroy these different forms of warfare against the Islamic groups, then the correction movement will have made great strides toward correcting the mistakes.

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'ACTS OF PIRACY' BY POLICE REPORTED; FULL INVESTIGATION DEMANDED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic No 61 May 81 p 17

[Article: "Has the Era of Intelligence Piracy Returned?"]

[Text] Egypt witnessed an era in which the Egyptian citizen was violable and in which this citizen lost security over his life, his honor, his property and his religion. A Muslim man or woman used to be kidnapped from the middle of a public road and would disappear behind the sun, as it was said then.

The security agencies, especially the intelligence agency, played the role of the pirates of that era.

After the death of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, Egypt's tyrant, and after the new slogans of the state, of science and faith--such as the slogans on the supremacy of the law, democracy and a permanent constitution, which states that the Islamic shari'a is the main source of legislation--were raised, the Egyptian citizen came to believe that his life, his property and his honor were safe under the canopy of the law!

But it seems that the security agencies have resumed their acts of piracy against the citizens. At exactly 2130 on Sunday, 12 April 1981, while student Zahir Hasan Yusuf and his colleague, student Wajdi Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Al, were taking a walk, two private cars approached them and a group of armed civilians descended from the cars and asked the students for identification. When the students demanded to know the identity of the civilians, the latter refused and tried to push the two students inside one of the cars by force. But the two students resisted and one of the armed civilians hit student Zahir on his forehead with the butt of his rifle, causing a gaping wound. When the students desisted, they were put in the cars and taken along Salah Salim Road. The men blindfolded the students so that they wouldn't know where they were being taken. The men finally reached a place that the students couldn't recognize. The blindfolds were removed and the students were asked some questions about an officer living in the quarter in which they were taking a walk. When it turned out that the students had no useful information for the men, Zahir was taken to a military hospital where the wound was stiched. At 0330, the two students were released near their homes.

The question that we address to the president of the republic and to the officials of the state of science and faith is:

Have the security agencies renewed their acts of piracy against the citizens or what?

We are not publishing this report simply for the sake of publication; rather we demand an investigation meeting all the requirements of an open inquiry so that the people may see that security and the supremacy of the law are truly enacted.

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PUBLIC URGED TO REJECT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Cairo Al-DA'WAH in Arabic No 60, Apr 81 pp 4-7

[Article by 'Umar al-Talmasani: "Normalization of Relations With Jews Is Evil; Jews Have Invented Means of Deceptive Propaganda and Use Them To Spread Their Poison; Egyptian People Must Boycott Jews in Everything"]

[Text] Muslims implore God to save them from the evil devil time and time again every day and I advise them sincerely and honestly to ask God to protect them from the evil of the noramlization of relations. I am influenced in this not only by human emotions and the Islamic faith; but faith, emotion, reason, logic and reality urge us all to implore God to protect us from this evil. This is why I am presenting the thoughts that have occurred to me regarding the dangers of this normalization. The dangers of normalizing relations between us and Israel include:

First, the normalization of relations and the persistence in this normalization will inevitably lead to a watering down of the serious determination to restore the Mulsims' usurped right in the Palestinian issue, one of the Islamic world's problems.

Second, visitation and mingling are the path to familiarity between those mingling and create a degenerating and lax environment in which the presence of Jews among us and our getting used to seeing them among us in constant dealings will become a habit and our awareness of their crime of usurping our right and of the means they use to Judaize the entire area will die. Judiazation is damaging to the faith and is undoubtedly dangerous to the public interest.

Third, the Jews have been known for their instinctive persistence in spreading degeneration among all peoples of the world so that they may prevail. Normalization is one of the most effective means for them to attain what they want safely and securely.

Fourth, this danger is not confined to Muslim Egypt alone but spreads like an epidemic to all parts of the Islamic world because of Egypt's position in the eyes of all Muslims.

Fifth, Moral corruption is spread amongst us, from cabarets, wine-shops and white slave trade which certainly is endagering all values and principles.

Sixth, the Jews exploit those writers who sell their faith and dignity for a few dirhams. These writers hide behind the curtain of the Muslim names they carry or of freedom of expression to destroy everything good in us. They are armed with money, experience and hypocrisy while the Islamic call is obstructed by all the obstacles that bar its path.

Seventh, the inflitration of trained Jewish experts into all kinds of activities will cause these activities to fall to the abyss through the wickedest, basest and most secretive means.

Eighth, the publication of magazines, papers, books and cassettes under Muslim names: There is nothing more dangerous in influencing and guiding public opinion in a direction the enemies want, according to their whims.

Ninth, it is the Jews who have invented the means of deceptive propaganda and they are most capable of using them to spread their poison among the youth behind the mask of fighting alleged reaction and backwardness and various Islamic traditions.

Tenth, with their moral wickedness, their soft talk, their false and fatal friendship and their outward sacrifices, they win over the hearts of the ignorant and make them easy to exploit for their own purposes and not at all for the interest of the Muslims. They are not unlike a fatal poison hidden in layers of cake.

Eleventh, their skill in using money harms our economy gravely. The normalization has enabled them to infiltrate every sphere unhindered.

Twelfth, igniting the fires of division among the Egyptians themselves and among other Muslims, especially those who have not yet realized the dangers of normalization: Some Egyptians, both technicians and nontechnicians, have begun to host the Jews and to give parties for them. We can imagine how strongly this affects the hearts of the faithful and what degree of condemnation it generates against these turncoats. Thus, hostility erupts between one Egyptian and another and the gap between them widens with time.

Thirteenth, versatility in making usury look attractive by falsifying the various forms of usury: This is the very essence of financial and psychological destruction. Man loves money, especially if it comes through what appears to be a legitimate, but is actually an illicit, way.

Fourteenth, ultimately, with the passage of time and with this normalization taking root, Israel's position in Palestine will come to seem an ordinary one that merits neither condemnation nor any attempts to eliminate it. This will bring consequences that only God knows.

Fiftheenth, does anybody imagine that the Jews can be normal and ordinary in their relations with any non-Jew? Of the followers of all religions, the Jews are the only ones who refuse to have anybody, regardless of his status, convert to their religion. Why do we try to stubbornly oppose the nature of things and the laws of this people's faith? This is an endeavor that can only end in abysmal failure:

"He who asks time to go against its nature asks water to give him fire,"

Sixteenth, normalization will bring us a definite slow death during which we will drink from the cup of humiliation. There is a vast difference between this death and dying or living in honor today.

Seventeenth, a year of the normalization hasn't passed and we now find that Israeli goods have spread through Egyptian markets in a manner that poses the gravest danger to our endeavors to revive Egyptian agriculture, commerce and industry. It is almost impossible for us to compete with the Jews in these spheres because of the ability and skill they possess and of the money that comes to them as free aid from every direction. They can withstand losses for years and until they destroy us economically. The field will be then be open to them and they will make up many fold for what they lose in the competition.

Eighteenth, with this ill-fated normalization, it becomes easy for Israel to infiltrate the sources of secrets, be they military, economic or political. Herein lies the great catastrophe that cannot be averted. They are the masters of intelligence, investigation and the pursuit of secrets in their hiding places. They were actually doing this in the past and they are doing it at present. But this horrible normalization makesavailable to them means that would not otherwise have been available.

Nineteenth, corrupting the big families, especially the families with influence in this country, with the fatal allurements they spread among fathers and sons and husbands and wives. These fathers and sons, husbands and wives become aware of the bitter spread of these allurements only after the catastrophe falls and spreads.

Twenty, there are lots and lots of other things that cannot be investigated and that the law does not allow one to deal with. What is hidden is still worse and "in God's hands shall the matter rest."

What Weapon Is this?

O people, can a just, lasting and comprehensive peace be established only by allowing the usurper to keep what he has plundered? What peace is this, regardless of our circumstances? It is not the Jews who have been able to get this far? The fault lies with us and the failure is our failure. Lack of awareness and indifference have been our lot, and squandering and negligence have been our condition. We have become resigned to no change. The continued existence of our information media as they are and without any change is the evil beyond all evil. Television especially doesn't promise the development of a generation concerned with its usurped rights.

This agency [television], which is steeped in harming the morals and the faith, will not prepare a generation that thinks of restoring all the rights, one after another, usurped from it. This agency, along with the other media that support the normalization catastrophe, will be the greatest help to Israel in realizing all it wants safely and securely and under the protection of the laws implementing the treaty.

The task of honest opposition, which builds and doesn't destroy and which advises and doesn't accuse, has become extremely critical for that sector of public opinion

that hates this normalization. Should this opposition turn a blind eye to this ominous evil? By virtue of its religion, this opposition cannot remain silent, regardless of the consequences. If we remain silent, we betray our manliness and if we speak frankly we anger and embarrass others. These are the two paths and we have no choice in following one of them.

We will denounce, protest and oppose and will raise the generations to fight this normalization. We will teach them to denounce this normalization as we teach them to read and write. We will mold them to denounce the normalization as we will impart to them honorable ethics. We will raise them to fight and detest the normalization as we will raise them to cling to the dictates of their religion and to the bases on which this religion is built. As long as our Islam demands this of us, then obedience to God is above all other obedience as far as we are concerned. Whoever hates this in us, then we can only tell him: "May our God judge rightfully between us and our people."

Opposition and Opposition

Isn't the government in a position to avoid these evil dangers and to restore reassurance to the hearts annoyed and frightened to see the Jews come and go freely in all parts of the country without any checks or controls and to see them disseminate division, sedition and exploitation wherever they go? This is a situation the citizens are not happy about. It is a condition that public interest does not approve and that the Islamic faith, for which we sacrifice in word and deed and with all we possess and all our strength--even if it is little, doesn't permit.

The Egyptian parties have accepted the treaty that has brought about this normalization. Even the parties that have condemned it outwardly, would approve it if given the chance to rule the country. There condemnation is tantamount to selling out the interest of the homeland and the people. Only the Muslim Brotherhood has denounced the treaty that has brought about the normalization from the first day of the initiative, through Camp David and to the treaty itself. The Brotherhood's position remains unchanged and will remain unchanged, God willing. Let none of these parties think that we will support them if they go over to the opposition. There is a vast difference between our opposition and theirs. Our opposition is to the system of government; the opposition of others is to the person of the government. The Muslim Brotherhood is not concerned with the person of the ruler but sleeps and wakes thinking of the form and the constitution of the government, which have not changed or altered throughout the ages.

The germ of this scary epidemic was planted in our peaceful homeland and the government has accepted it and is protecting it with its troops and its might. Parties have been set up on the basis of this epidemic to give it an air of popularity and here the government's role has ended. What is the people's role? We know for certain that the overwhelming majority of the people condemns this horrible and fearful normalization. Demonstrations, slogans, conferences, articles, protests, strikes, sit-in strikes and accusations are all useless trivialities that do not cure the disease, that may be harmful and obstructive and that may even extinguish the fire that consumes the hearts and the souls. O people, there remains only action and serious action that bears fruit and that deals with the disease and destroys it before it kills the wounded and the afflicted.

Boycott the Jews in everything, in every sphere, in every direction and in every thought. Do not like them because they are tyrants, and do not receive them becaus they are corrupters. Make them feel unwanted. They are intruders and exploiters. They have not come to revive a friendship but to destroy homes. Harass them economically and socially. Boycott their goods and buy other kinds of goods, even at the most exorbitant prices and even if of a lesser quality. Teach them a lesson.

No matter how weak their condition seems, the Muslims have in their trust in their God that which will protect them from falling into the abyss of servility and submission. The Jews have come under the canopy of normalization to suck our blood economically, politically, socially and religiously. Teach them that we are above their perverted aspirations and their terrible goals. Dry these springs and prevent them from flowing where the Jews want them to. I do not say that "they will go" when they become certain that they have failed. Never. They will try again and again. But their endeavor will be a waste of time and effort. Meanwhile, God may bring us release from all this, and may he prepare the way for us to overcome our blunder if we cling to Him, work to please Him and hasten to seek His blessing.

The government, according to what we see and to the statements issued, is on the threshold of agricultural and industrial projects. Has this government prepared the means to prevent Israel from infiltrating these projects either to destroy them or to reap their fruits in its twisted and secret ways?

If we, both government and people, fail to prepare seriously to destroy all these goals which Israel has eagerly sought in this normalization--if we, both the government and the people, fail to carry out this duty, then the people will view the government in a way that doesn't please it and the government will view the people in a way that doesn't please them. Will this nation be pleased to see such a relationship of the people toward the government and of the government toward the people?

The president of the Egyptian Arab Republic has said that he is a Muslim and that he rules an Islamic country. This declaration requires from the president much that he is not aware of. With this logic we address the president and with this logic we oppose him.

Islam is unambiguous and obvious in this situation. God has purchased from us our souls, our property, our children and our kinsmen by promising us paradise. This is how we define our position. It is either this world or the hereafter. "He who ploughs for the hereafter, We shall make his crop abundant, and he who wants to plough for this world, we shall give him of the fruits of this world and he shall have no share in the hereafter"--this is an equation in which God's book decides clearly and definitively that "he who wants the passing world, then we shall give quickly in it what we want to whomever we want and we shall then lodge him in hell to suffer its fires condemned and defeated. He who wants the hereafter and seeks it faithfully, then his efforts shall be commended. Both these and those are given by God and God's giving is boundless. See how we have favored some over others. The hereafter is of higher status and is more favorable. Do not set up another god with God, else you shall end up condemned and defeated."

This is the advice of a Muslim who beseeches God to make his advice sincere and free of whims. It is the advice of a Muslim who hopes for good in this world and in the hereafter, who has never harbored evil and who has never slept a night with malice in his heart, even for somebody who has hurt him. It is advice through which he only seeks to please God. It is advice that I will not conceal and the consequences of which I will not think. Islam has taught us that there is no will besides God's will. I urge good works in whatever I can urge and warn of evil deeds in whatever I can think of. God is behind all purposes and goals and "he who does good deeds then he does so for himself, and he who commits evil commits it against himself. God is never unjust to man."

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INDEPENDENT ASSEMBLY MEMBERS MEET WITH MUBARAK

NC281800 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1517 GMT 28 Oct 81

[Text] Cairo, 28 Oct (MENA)-- President Muhammad Husni Mubarak today received in al-'Urubah palace a delegation of the independent members of the people's assembly that included Counselor Mumtaz Nassar, Dr Ibrahim 'Uwwarah and Hamid Karim.

After the meeting Counselor Mumtaz Nassar state that the meeting with President Mubarak today was wide-ranging and dealt with all the subjects and issues of the hour which are of interest to the Egyptians and the country.

He said: We received full support from the president on all the bold national positions concerning justice and law.

Regarding the supremacy of the law, Counselor Nassar siad: President Mubarak affirmed that he will carry out what was contained in his speech to the people's assembly in part and parcel and will fulfill all that he said in it and will achieve full cooperation between the opposition and the majority [party] so that Egypt can be as one man.

Counselor Nassar affirmed that President Mubarak's move, which he referred to in his speech and which he affirmed later--namely, not to attack any Arab state, is an indication of political maturity which prepares the suitable climate for the restoration of Arab solidarity. We advocate a return to Arab solidarity, and this solidarity will be restored by virtue of President Mubarak's efforts, he said.

He said that President Mubarak discussed with them some of the homeland's internal issues. His excellency affirmed to them that regarding the detainees, the investigation will be conducted very quickly through the socialist public prosecuter and that if no evidence is found against any individual, then that person will be released immediately; and if there is evidence about the involvement of any individual, then, that person will be brought to trial; their trial will be public, and they will have all the legal guarantees.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar also said that during the meeting President Husni Mubarak emphasized the supremacy of the law and combatting deviation and indiscipline. He also affirmed that he is determined to eliminate the deviationists and we encourage him and support him in this with all means of support.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar was asked whether he discussed with President Mubarak a new formula for the opposition procedure at the people's assembly in the coming phase. He answered: We asked the president to discuss with us all the topics that concern the homeland and the citizens and to agree on these topics as long "as they serve the national issues"; and when these topics are submitted to the people's assembly, we must all be one hand and one view and that the opposition and the majority participate in the important national and fateful issues on which there must be one view.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar concluded his statement by saying that Egypt must be one man proceeding behind the president and that there should be no majority or opposition to any issue that serves the interests of the masses and the homeland.

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EXPANSION OF RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA DISCUSSED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 24 Sep 81 pp 3, 17

[Excerpts] Several days ago a group composed of officials from the Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of Defense, several Majles representatives and Hojjatoleslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Speaker of the Majles, visited North Korea and Malaysia. Since, in view of the imposed war with Iraq, this visit had special importance, we asked brother Ahmad Tavakolli, Behshahr representative and member of the executive board of the Majles', to tell us about his trip for the information of an alerted nation. We present the text of the talk, with our gratitude, for the perusal of our dear readers.

[Question] What did you bring back from your recent trip to North Korea and your meetings with that country's officials, and what will be the actual effect of this group's trip on the course of our country's future policies with that country and other countries?

[Answer] It is very clear that the oppressive countries and the superpowers will be upset and angry over the fact that the Islamic revolution is making contact with other countries and is able to have relationships with the masses of the people. For this reason they have put all their efforts into depriving and isolating us since the beginning of the revolution. Unfortunately, due to our having had governments whose spirits were not in conformity with the genuine spirit leading the revolution, we have been deliberately unsuccessful in this to a certain extent, because the Imam's and the Islamic nation's idea of exporting the revolution was at variance with the idea held by our foreign ministries which were in power, which were from the National Front, branches of the Freedom Movement, or others. Unfortunately, after the seating of the government of the Revolutionary Council and the ousted Bani-Sadr, the efforts he made to control Iran's foreign policy created a situation where we had no Foreign Ministry until 3 months ago. Some time ago when I myself reviewed the situation in Iran's embassies on behalf of the Article 90 Commission, I saw how much we were being hurt by not having leadership and a Foreign Minister, how nameless we are, and, unfortunately, in some countries, how bad our name is. Granted, conveying messages is the task of all followers of the prophets, but in the past we were not only unsuccessful in this sending of messages, but in protecting the interests of our economy as well, which requires active relationships with other countries. We are establishing relationships with non-Moslem countries on the basis of Islam

and the Koran. The matter is clarified by this verse from the Koran which says "In our foreign relations God does not prohibit us from displaying good will or establishing just relations with those who do not quarrel with our religion, seek to deprive us of our land and resources, or back our enemies." This verse, which is actually reflected in the constitution, allows us to have active and friendly relations with countries that do not have an Islamic system but are ready to establish just relations with us with no imperialistic intent. On the basis of this principle, we have had the responsibility since the beginning of the revolution to establish active relations with all countries of this type, and to give many small countries, even the ones under superpower influence who are not overly obsequious of speech, the understanding that we support their independence and can help them. On the trip to Korea we studiously adhered to the idea that if we were going to establish this relationship we wanted to find a vast area of agreement. North Korea is a Marxist country which has not remained faithful to Marxism. It has adopted an ideology which they themselves characterize as a mixture of Marxism, humanism, and Korean nationalism which is much less inhuman than Marxism and more acceptable for working together, because it is based on freedom and independence for the people in countries. As a result they want to help all independent countries. We felt that there is true sincerity within this desire and that they have no imperialistic designs. We found an independent country there, and we consider the expansion of our relations with that country advantageous to our revolution and disadvantageous to world imperialism, even to Marxism, led by Russia.

Basic Principles of the Discussions

[Question] During the group's trip you probably had discussions with Korean and Malaysian officials. What issues came up in these discussions, and what are the impressions you have as a result of these discussions?

[Answer] Of course it is preferable to keep these two countries separate, because our position is different in each case, as was explained there, because one country is made up of nonbelievers and the other country is a country that at least accepts Islam on the surface and carries out a great many Islamic commands. We are thus dealing with two different forms of government. I will therefore first discuss North Korea, because we discussed matters in all areas with North Korean officials. We presented several principles there, inasmuch as in every relationship we have taken two or three points as basic principles, first that every economic relationship must be aimed at preserving the perpetual independence, the growth of independence, and the growth of the course of economic independence of these countries. Secondly, we must do all we can to see that this relationship is not one-sided, but rather one in which we meet one another's needs economically and otherwise so as not to be forced to turn to non-independent countries in order to obtain what we need. These principles, and another principle I don't recall now, were very acceptable to them, and, according to their beliefs, they have done this so far. The situation is such that we can give what we have to them and they can give what they have to us, and consequently what we need can be obtained through them, for in giving what we give we have no desire to obtain power over them, and in giving what they give, according to what they claim and the feeling that we have about the sincerity of their claim, and the impossibility of it from the standpoint of the policies they have, they also have no desire to obtain power

over us. We can expand these relations in all areas and profit from a great deal of their experience gained in 28 years of war and 35 years of revolution.

Preliminaries for Procuring an Agreement

[Question] Was a door opened for future discussions in North Korea or Malaysia that would lead to increased military and economic cooperation?

[Answer] First, we had a military group with us on the trip, and they followed up on military matters, that is an issue had previously been introduced and was pursued further. No agreement was finalized, of course, but naturally issues were raised which are the preliminaries for any kind of agreement. There were also very productive discussions pertaining to economics in which, of our group, several people from the Foreign Ministry and Mr Hashemi participated, and on their side an aide to the Prime Minister, the speaker of the Majles, and a great many of their economic officials participated and the preliminaries were set down for an economic agreement. The Koreans have worked mostly on self-sufficiency and have been successful. They have used methods in their agriculture which will be very useful for us. Mr Salamati, our Minister of Agriculture, has already visited there. Of their industrial methods--of course their industry is not very advanced, having gone so far as they themselves have been able to take it--we can also make use of some of their experience and some of their machines. Military matters were part of other talks in which we did not participate.

Consequently we can work with them a great deal in the field of agriculture, we can make use of their machines in the field of industry, and we in turn can help them by selling them oil. As for Malaysia, the visit was mostly one of friendship, and no sort of plan had been previously prepared. We also propounded this same principle of ours there, that we are trying to free our own economy, which was severely dependent, to assist with the freedom and independence of other countries, and that we prefer that this giving and taking of assistance be with Islamic countries first, and then with non-Moslem countries that are prepared to establish relations with us based on the principle of mutual respect.

Positions on Iran's Rights in the Imposed War

[Question] Another question was, in the Iranian group's visit to North Korea and Malaysia, to what extent did it discuss Iran's position in the imposed war?

In answer to this question, Mr Tavakolli said: In practice North Korea had taken a position favorable to us, because Iraq had cut its relations with North Korea some time ago because it had been giving aid to us in the war. Of course, considering the fact that our army was mostly equipped with American equipment, this assistance was not very extensive, but it was useful to us in any case. Furthermore, it was not difficult to explain the rightfulness of Iran's position in North Korea. At the same time, one night when we had dinner with Mr Kim Il-song, the leader of North Korea, Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani discussed our position from its anti-imperialist angle, noted that the pretense for the war was unfounded from the beginning, and pointed out how America helps Iraq through Jordan and through Saudi Arabia by sending AWACS. It has also helped by sending Soviet weapons from Egypt to Iraq. Mr Hashemi also mentioned American and Iraqi relations as illustrated

by Brzezinski's meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and stressed the fact that this Iraqi attack began at the very time when America had been frustrated by a failed coup d'etat, direct military intervention in Tabas, and the unsuccessful efforts of counterrevolutionary elements domestically, and all of these things.

Mr Hashemi then explained Iran's position on intervention by Western and Eastern imperialism, and he categorically condemned Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. Kim Il-song, without naming any countries, also condemned military intervention and clearly acknowledged that Iran's position on the imposed war with Iraq is fully justified.

We approached matters from a different angle in Malaysia, because it is a Moslem country that believes in the Koran. Malaysian leaders expressed the hope that mediation groups would be able to prevent the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war. In response to this view Mr Hashemi said that we in turn had a question of our own. It was a question we have asked of many countries. Citing a verse from the Koran, he asked, when two Moslems begin a war, what is the responsibility of a Moslem nation such as yourselves? Is it not your duty to fight the invader?

Therefore, if you believe in the Koran, duty requires that you help us drive Iraq out of our country. If you study the case in international law, international law says that no country has the right to invade another country, and therefore if your position is based on international law, it is also your duty to condemn Iraq, and you have not done this.

[Question] In conclusion, in visiting these two countries, considering the presence of officials from the Ministry of Defense and the Foreign Ministry in the group, were any practical results forthcoming from this journey or not?

Mr Tavakolli answered: In North Korea a transcript of the talks was prepared and signed by both sides saying in what areas we could cooperate economically so that later economic groups from the two countries could meet officially and arrange to sign agreements. We were also given brochures in Malaysia and I was given the task of exchanging views with our brother the Minister of Commerce in Tehran in order that he would have a sufficient amount of information on this. It is necessary to remember that in North Korea and Malaysia we do not have political representation and for this reason it was decided to procure property in these two countries so we can erect buildings and operate embassies.

9310
CSO: 4640/10

FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENTS REVIEWED

Ships Bought from Greece

Tehran BURS in Persian 19 Aug 81 p 3

[Article: "Six Merchant Ships with 35,000 Ton Capacity Bought from Greece"]

[Text] With the purchase of six cargo ships Iran's shipping capacity will increase from 1.7 million tons to 3.5 million tons per year. In an exclusive interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, Dr Mohammad-Taqi Banki, the assistant director of the planning and budget organization, explained the trip of an Iranian delegation to Greece and the reasons for purchasing cargo ships.

He said: After the necessary investigations and having taken into account the yearly import of 10 million tons of goods to the ports of the country, the general headquarters for economic mobilization--which came into existence after the beginning of the war imposed by Iraq on Iran with the aim of mobilizing economic resources in face of the economic blockade and the limitations of war--decided to increase the 1.7 million ton shipping capacity of the Islamic Republic. It was for this purpose that, after the final investigation, an Iranian delegation composed of the executive director of the shipping company, representatives of the ministry for economic and financial affairs, the planning and budget organization and the Bank Markazi of Iran, and three captains--all of whom possessed full power to represent their respective organizations--went to Greece in order to carry out the plan approved by the general headquarters for economic mobilization, a plan which had been proposed by the shipping company of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Concerning the method of purchase of the cargo ships, the assistant director for political affairs of the planning and budget organization, who himself represented his organization in the delegation, said: On this trip the delegation made a cash purchase of six cargo ships that had been built by the Hitachi shipbuilding company of Japan and sold to a Greek company. The total capacity of these ships is 35 thousand tons. With the entrance of these ships into the country's ports, the shipping capacity of the Islamic Republic of Iran will increase from 1.7 million to 3.5 million tons per year.

According to international standards, every country must undertake the transport of one-half its ocean-borne import capacity by itself.

Concerning the date of delivery of the ships he said: The first of these cargo ships is now being delivered in one of the ports of Europe. It is hoped that within 2 1/2 months time the rest of the ships will also be placed at the disposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Mr Banki added: These ships were purchased for a total price of $110 million, ten percent of which was deposited in a bank as a guarantee of the purchase. If the Islamic Republic of Iran should abandon the purchase, the down payment will be placed at the seller's disposal.

Concerning other discussions of the Iranian delegation with officials of the Greek government the assistant director of the planning and budget organization said: During this trip barter transactions between the two countries were discussed. During two meetings with officials of the Greek ministries of commerce, industry and energy, the Iranian delegation proposed that the government of Iran would like to trade with that country by selling the equivalent amount of oil in exchange for receiving a package composed of the presentation of services for and the selling of ships. This proposal was favorably received by the Greek officials and it was concluded that after the final investigation and study of this matter, the necessary decisions will be taken.

Figures for Quarter Imports

Tehran BURS in Persian 9 Sep 81 p 3

[Article: "In the First Four Months of the Current Year, 5.09 Million Tons of Goods with the Value of 412.8 Billion Rials Have Been Imported. Compared to the Corresponding Period, Imports Have Increased 26.4 Percent in Value."]

[Text] The indicator for the figures on imports and exports shows that the value of the goods imported into the country during the first quarter of the current year increased 3.65 times over the corresponding period in the year 1974-1975, while the value of exported goods increased 1.13 times.

According to the report of the PARS NEWS AGENCY, the detailed report for the figures on the country's exports and imports during the first quarter of the year 1981-1982 has been published.

According to this report, the statistics for exchange during the first quarter of the year 1981-1982 demonstrate that the level of imports reached 5.09 million tons of goods. Compared to the 4.57 million tons of the corresponding period last year, these imports have increased by 11.2 percent. The value of the imported goods during this same period reached 412.8 billion rials. In comparison with the amount of 326.5 billion rials for the corresponding period last year, the increase is 26.4 percent. In the period covered by the report the following were among the most active customhouses in the area of the tonnage of licensed goods, since their volume represents 86.4 percent of the total imports of the country during the reported period: The customs of Bandar Khomeyni with the licensing of 1.6 million tons of goods, or 31.4 percent of all imports; the customs of Bandar 'Abbas, with the import of 1.37 million tons of goods, or 26.9 percent of all imports; the customs of Jolfa with the import of 663,000 tons of goods, equivalent to 13 percent of the total; the customs of Tabriz with 260,000 tons or approximately 5.1 percent of the total; the customs of Bandar Bushehr with

202,000 tons or about 4.0 percent of the total; and the customhouse of Bandar Anzali and [the import of] foodstuffs, each with more than 150,000 tons or approximately 3.0 percent of the total. In addition, concerning stocks of goods in warehouses, it is observed that at the end of the above-mentioned period 1,363,954 tons of goods were being kept in the warehouses of the 13 major customhouses of the country. Of this figure, the amount of 308,828 tons or 22.6 percent was in the customs of Bandar 'Abbas, 275,011 tons or 20.2 percent in the customs of Jolfa, 232,574 tons or 17.1 percent in the customs of Tabriz, 137,178 tons or 10.1 percent in the warehouse of the customs of Bushehr and 119,199 tons of goods or 8.7 percent of the total in the warehouse of the customs of [Bandar] Khomeyni.

In the same way, the level of non-petroleum exports of the country during the period reached a total of 91,900 tons with a value of 13.2 billion rials. Relative to the same period last year this represents a 57.8 percent decrease in weight and a 45.0 percent decrease in value. From the standpoint of value, among the main export items in this period were first, hand-woven woolen carpets with a total value of 6.94 billion rials; and then various kinds of skins with a total value of 1.51 billion rials; small, large and green raisins with a value of 946 million rials; whole and shelled pistachios with a value of 577 million rials; various kinds of casings with a value of 443 million rials; and other kinds of metal ores with a value of 426 million rials.

The share of the above-mentioned items relative to the total amount of non-petroleum exports was as follows: Carpets, approximately 52.7 percent of the total value; various kinds of skins, 11.4 percent; raisins, 7.2 percent; pistachios, 4.4 percent; various kinds of casings, 3.4 percent; and other metal ores, 3.3 percent. The changes of the above-mentioned figures in terms of value relative to the corresponding period last year have been calculated respectively as follows: Carpets, 59.6 percent decrease; various kinds of skins, 149.3 percent increase; raisins, 262.5 percent increase; pistachios, 4.2 percent decrease; various kinds of casings, 17.5 percent decrease; and metal ores, 181.4 percent increase.

At the same time, during the period under report, because of special political and climactic conditions, the usual export of a few items was negative. These include cotton and linter, dried apricots, fresh fruits, licorice root, caviar, shrimp, chromite, tiles, ceramics and chinaware, woolen cloth, varieties of thread, cookies and candy, prepackaged and specially prepared medicines, ammonia, oxygen and the rare gases of the metalloids included in row 28.04 of the tariff, laundry detergent and soap, vehicle tires, aluminum ingots, electric iceboxes, coolers, hot water heaters, gas lamps, various kinds of space heaters, electric fans, electric lightbulbs, dry batteries and cattle, sheep and goats.

In this period, the following can be listed as among the most active customhouses in the country from the standpoint of the level of non-petroleum exports in terms of value: The customs of south Tehran, 5.1 billion rials; the customs of Mehrabad, 5.0 billion rials; the customs of Jolfa, 993 million rials; the customs of Bandar 'Abbas, 605 million rials. For during the period being reported, these customhouses encompassed a total of 88.0 percent of the non-petroleum exported goods of the country.

Tobacco Exports to Gulf

Tehran BURS in Persian 9 Sep 81 p 2

[Article: "The Equivalent of 400 Million Rials of Tobacco Has Been Exported to the Countries on the Shore of the Persian Gulf."]

[Text] Iran's tobacco has been recognized as the best in the world. The production of tobacco in the current year will reach the environs of 20,000 tons. Interest-free loans paid out to tobacco farmers have reached about 700 million rials in the current year. With the export of 270 tons of tobacco to the countries of the Persian Gulf region last year, approximately 400 million rials in foreign currency entered the country.

Yesterday in an exclusive interview with the reporters of the PARS NEWS AGENCY Engineer Hoseyn Honarbakhsh, the president of the directing board and the managing director of the Iran Tobacco Company, announced the above matters. At the same time he declared: Before the revolution, the Tobacco Company produced about 12 to 13 billion cigarettes a year in its factories. A part of this production was also made up of domestically assembled Winstons, while the rest of the country's consumption was imported directly from foreign--especially American--companies in the form of already manufactured Winstons. He added: The level of the manufacture of tobacco products within the country had diminished rapidly, such that the level of tobacco production in 1978-1979 reached 8,600 tons. This yield was not even sufficient for the amount consumed by one year's domestic production. The warehouses of the Tobacco Company were severely empty and in need of the purchase of foreign tobacco. Then Honarbakhsh alluded to the activities of the Tobacco Company after the victory of the revolution. He said: After the victory of the authentic Islamic revolution, basic changes were made in the programs of the Tobacco Company so that it could reach the level of self-sufficiency. With the approval of the general assembly of the company these steps were followed through and satisfactory results were achieved. The level of tobacco production, which was about 8,600 tons in 1978-1979, reached 12,066 tons in 1979-1980 and 16,983 tons in 1980-1981. In the year 1981-1982, this level will reach approximately 20,000 tons. In reality, the level of tobacco production will have increased 2 1/2 times. In the case of the planting of tobacco also, the level of yield was between 1000 and 1500 tons. This figure has increased to 6000 tons and as a result the level of production has been multiplied four times. In the case of pipe tobacco also, the level of production has increased a small amount. Then Honarbakhsh said: As a result, the program of reaching the level of self-sufficiency in tobacco will continue, God willing, with constant perseverance. It is hoped that in the coming years also the level of tobacco production will increase and that, with God's help, the possibility of exporting this output will be gained. Honarbakhsh added: Last year 270 tons of tobacco were exported to the countries of the Persian Gulf region. This level of exports took place at a very reasonable price. In this way approximately 400 million rials in foreign exchange entered the country. I am hopeful that with perseverance, this level of exports will increase and that we will reach more markets. Then Honarbakhsh said: Iranian tobacco has been recognized as one of the best in the world. He added: In order to reach the environs of self-sufficiency, the Tobacco Company has undertaken many-sided assistance to farmers, such that their income has

increased remarkably. He said: In 1977-1978 tobacco leaves were purchased from the farmers at the rate of about 150 rials per kilo, but with the approval of the officials the price increased to 235 rials. In the same way the average purchase price of tobacco, which in 1978-1979 was about 85 rials per kilo, increased in 1980-1981 to 129 rials. Honarbakhsh said: In order to assist tobacco farmers more, in 1981-1982 interest-free loans of approximately 700 million rials have been paid out to them. Concurrent with these loans, the technical assistance of the Tobacco Company experts has been increased on a national level; and chemical fertilizers and the necessary pesticides have been turned over to the tobacco farmers on a wide scale. Parallel to this assistance advances have been paid to them.

Then Honarbakhsh said: In 1980-1981 approximately 60 research projects were carried out by the three research centers of the company. Seven of these experimental projects reached definite results and were communicated to the executive units of the company. He added: Last year approximately 5 billion rials were paid to farmers for tobacco and hookah tobacco crops. The net income of farmers in deprived and isolated areas has increased more than three times relative to past years. This amount has been very effective in improving their living conditions and their village economy. Honarbakhsh said: It is necessary to explain that the tobacco bought from farmers is sorted in the factories.

9831
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MULTINATIONALS REACT TO ABROGATION OF ATOM AGREEMENT

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Sep 81 p 13

[Interview with Reza Amrollahi, chief of the Iranian Atomic Power Stations]

[Text] In an interview conducted by the PARS NEWS AGENCY, Reza Amrollahi, chief of the Iranian Atomic Power Stations gave background information concerning the contract for the Bushehr Atomic Power Station, cancellation of the contract, failure to deliver equipment and parts and a claim for damages by the German multinational firm.

He began by referring to the history of the contract for the Bushehr Atomic Power Station and said: The contract for the construction of the plant was signed with the German firm of Fraft Werk-Union, which is a multinational corporation, in 1355 [21 Mar 76-20 Mar 77] but after the revolution studies conducted by University experts and nuclear energy specialists showed that while the formal cost of the project was set at 7.8 billion marks, Iran was also obligated to draw up other side contracts which would involve amounts greatly in excess of that figure.

After due consideration, therefore, and approval of the Revolutionary Council the contract was cancelled because the project cost was not only double or triple the international rates but there were other difficulties such as special linkage concerning fuel supply, undetermined resistance level of the power station against earthquake, the high cost of electicity supplied from the power station and environmental issues. During the Islamic Revolution the contracting firm of Kraft Werk-Union tried to suspend the pact and acted to cancel the contract with Iran, and went to the arbitration tribunal in Paris, demanding the payment of 1.7 billion marks by Iran as damages. Amrollahi added: The tribunal has held sessions so far to look into the dispute between Iran and the contracting firm. The latest session took place last week in Geneva with the main issue on the agenda concerning the power plant's equipment and parts which at present are being held abroad. According to the contract, such equipment and parts should have been delivered to Iran before the revolution. The contracting firm has been responsible for the delay in delivery.

Failure to Deliver Purchased Parts

Moreover, according to technical calculations of experts, the value of equipment purchased by Iran but still with the contractor and not yet delivered is 1.5 to 1.7 billion marks but the contracting firm wants to refund 150 to 160 million marks for them.

The acting chief of atomic power stations added: Of course according to the contract, Iran has no commitment toward the contracting firm unless and until all equipment is unloaded at ports and complete deliveries are made to power stations. On the basis of the reasons mentioned, Iran has asked for a refund of the money it has paid.

Amrollahi concluded by saying: Of course the Atomic Energy Organization has so far tried to make the best use of facilities and machinery available at the power station in Iran. With this in mind, major items have been dispatched to various parts of the country for use in completion and implementation of development projects. This has been done with the copperation of representatives from the ministry of energy, reconstruction crusade and the Atomic Energy Organization.

5854
CSO: 4640/9

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS TO EXAMINE DRAFT OF LAND REFORM BILL

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 9 Sep 81 p 11

[Text] Types of Lands in the Bill

a. Uncultivated and pasture
b. Cultivated by individuals or companies
c. Neglected
d. Tended

The Islamic Land Reform Bill has nine articles, six clauses and one glossary.

For the sake of actualizing the goals and objectives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and carrying out fundamental programs for the well-being of the oppressed members of society, the Islamic Land Reform Bill is one of the most important and vital programs which must be followed through.

The text of this bill, which has already been confirmed by Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Meshkini and the martyr Dr Beheshti, was also approved by the Revolutionary Council in Farvardin 59 [zimar-20 April 1980]. With the addition of three clauses to article 4 of the bill, it has now been presented for approval to the council of ministers so that, after study by the council, it may be presented for final approval to the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

In order to provide further information, the complete text of the bill, along with the changes which have been made in it, is presented exclusively to our dear readers.

In a like manner, from now on because of the importance of solving the problem of land, the economic service of ETTELA'AT newspaper will print the different views of villagers, specialists and agricultural experts concerning the points and aspects of the bill, in the hope that this step may be useful in the course of a careful and many-sided study of the plan.

The Letter of the Minister of Agriculture

The text of the letter of Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development, to the advisory minister for executive affairs for the sake of sending the bill to the Islamic Consultative Assembly is as follows:

The honorable Mr Behzad Nabavi, advisory minister for executive affairs.
For your information:

The legal bill, "Reform of the Legal Bill for Allocating and Reviving Lands in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran," approved on 20/6/58 [16 September 1979] and signed and confirmed by the Ayatollah Dr Mohammad Beheshti, the honorable Ayatollah Montazeri and the honorable Ayatollah Meshkini, and approved by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran in a session dated 26/1/59 [15 April 1980], in practice met with a certain amount of unclarity in regards to determining the value of the investment.

It is now necessary to add three clauses as clauses 4, 5 and 6, under article 4. For this reason, this legal bill, which has had three clauses added to it and has been typed as it was, has been presented for your information in the enclosure. It is requested that you instruct that it be sent to the Islamic Consultative Assembly for ratification.

Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development.

The Text of the Bill

Article 1. The lands covered in this law are of four types:

a. Uncultivated lands and pastures.

b. Lands which have been cultivated by individuals or companies and which a competent Islamic court has decreed should be reclaimed.

c. Neglected lands which had once been tended and which, according to the standards of the previous regime, were considered as the property of individuals or institutions.

d. Tended lands.

Article 2. The lands of paragraph "a" and paragraph "b" are under the control of the Islamic government. The government has the duty, while taking into account the best interests of society and the dimensions of the need and the ability of individuals, to allocate the utilization of these lands to individuals or companies; or, in instances where the best interest of society demands it, to set them apart for public works.

Concerning the lands in paragraph "c", taking into account the rules which will be mentioned concerning the lands of paragraph "d", first the government will give priority to the owners of these lands to develop them, and if they do not take action, it will take the lands under its own control in order to allocate their cultivation and utilization to qualified individuals.

Article 3. Whenever the owner establishes facilities in these types of lands the following steps will be taken:

a. Agricultural facilities: Concerning these facilities, if the owner makes actual use of them, that part which he uses will remain in his control, taking

into account the limits which will be mentioned concerning the lands of paragraph "d". The remainder of the facilities will be put in the control of other farmers. But if he makes no actual use of them, all of them will be put in the control of other farmers. In any case, the price of that which is put in the control of others will be paid to him, after deducting the owner's debts to the public treasury, as well as religious and other dues.

b. Other facilities, which are not directly related to agriculture, such as private homes, nonagricultural technical workshops, animal farms and the like: These types of facilities and their land remain for the locality.

Article 4. Concerning the lands of paragraph "d", if the owner is personally using the land for agriculture, up to three times the size determined by the locality will remain in his control for securing his family's livelihood. If he is not personally using the land for agriculture and he does not have another source of income which is sufficient for providing for himself and his family, only up to twice the mentioned amount will remain in his control. Concerning the remainder, in places where farmers do not own agricultural land and who cannot be made owners of agricultural land except by way of taking the excess land from landowners, the landowner's duty is to allocate the excess land of the mentioned amount to this kind of farmer. If he does not carry out his duty voluntarily, in accordance with the Islamic rules, the land will be taken from him by the order of a judge and placed in the control of needy farmers. The government will pay the price of the investment to the owner, after deducting his debts to the public treasury.

Clause 1. In the case where, in or near the locality, lands of paragraphs "a", "b" and "c" should exist, first these lands will be given to the farmers. If these lands are not sufficient, then it will be done according to paragraph "c".

Clause 2. Lands connected to animal farms for the production of fodder are not included in this article.

Clause 3. Mechanized agricultural units, the division of which would result in a decrease in production, must not be done. It is necessary for them to be allocated to farmers through cooperatives.

Clause 4. Investment, which is the subject of this article consists of the value of all the expenditures which the owner, owners or legal occupants have borne for developing and cultivating the land from the stage of noncultivation to reviving it, with the exception of the value of the facilities, machinery and buildings.

Clause 5. The value of the facilities, machinery and buildings will be evaluated and computed separately.

Clause 6. The rules for determining the price of the investment and computing the value of the facilities, machinery and buildings, the subject of clauses 4 and 5 of this article, will be determined by a board composed of representatives chosen by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the reconstruction crusade and the Ministry of Justice located in the general headquarters

for allocating the land, the subject of article 7 of this law. These rules will be presented to the council of ministers by the minister of agriculture and rural development and after ratification they will be enforced.

Article 5. The board in charge of allocating the land:

The matters mentioned above will be carried out by means of a seven-member board, and no one else will have any right of interference. The composition of the seven-member board: The board will be composed of the following representatives:

1. Two representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture.

2. One representative of the Ministry of State or of the governor-general of the locality.

One representative of the reconstruction crusade.

4. Two representatives of the people of the village confirmed by the representative or the judge.

5. One representative of the religious judge and guardian.

The duties of the seven-member board:

1. Analyzing and settling disputed cases related to the enforcement of this law (in case of disputes, only the view of the representative of the religious judge will be taken into account).

2. Allocation of land, taking into account the articles of this bill.

3. Discerning worthiness, the extent loans should be made use of, and agricultural possibilities during the course of enforcing this law.

Article 6. The rules for allocating land:

In allocating land, preference will be given to villagers without land or with little land, graduates in agriculture, and those interested in agricultural work, in that order.

2. The allocation of the utilization of the land is for a determined period (a number of years), taking into account the particular conditions of the region. In case of a satisfactory operation, the allocation of the land will be extended.

3. The allocation of land may be in the form of a company, a cooperative or an individual, which is the responsibility of the seven-member board.

4. The land must not remain idle without an acceptable excuse.

5. The operation carried out on the land must be of a kind which does not ruin it.

6. Allocated land may not be transferred, unless permission is obtained from the government and the standards contained in the article on transfers are observed.

7. Land cultivation must take into account the needs of society.

Article 7. The responsible party for enforcing this law:

The Ministry of Agriculture has the duty to form a general headquarters in Tehran for enforcing this law. It will be composed of:

1. A fully empowered representative of the religious judge and the religious guardian.

2. A fully empowered representative of the Ministry of Agriculture.

3. A fully empowered representative of the Ministry of Justice.

4. A fully empowered representative of the Ministry of State.

5. A fully empowered representative of the reconstruction crusade.

Article 8. All laws opposed to this law are abrogated.

Article 9. This legal bill supersedes the legal bill for the reform of the legal bill concerning the manner of allocating and reviving lands in the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ratified on 11/12/58 [2 March 1980].

Glossary

1. Neglected lands: Lands which were formerly used but, by reason of abandonment or lack of utilization without an acceptable excuse, have remained unused for 5 consecutive years.

2. Tended lands: Lands which have been revived and continuously unutilized; other than the above lands, lands which in one way or another were nationalized by the former regime (lands which came to be owned by the state for the sake of the environment, hunting preserves and prevention of a bad climate).

3. Uncultivated lands: Unimproved lands which were not formerly revived and utilized and which have remained in a natural state.

4. Fallow lands: Tended lands which are periodically left uncultivated for a specified period according to the practice of the locality.

5. Investment: The developmental cost of the person who has brought the land under cultivation.

9831
CSO: 4640/99

MOJAHEDIN MOCKED FOR RECENT OPERATIONAL TACTICS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 17 Sep 81 pp 1, 19

[Text] Mojahedin-e Khalq has ordered the burning of double-decker buses, considering them symbols of class society!

As our readers know, the new movement of the counterrevolutionary front has entered a new phase in which it divides its supporters who are mostly under 18, into groups of 10 and 20 and sends them to predetermined points in the city.

These aspects--such as point of departure, route, destination as well as procedures for gathering and fleeing are scrutinized and determined beforehand. A number of persons, either on foot or riding, constantly check the route, estimate the distance or the proximity of demonstration headquarters or committees with the places in mind and calculate how best to get them quickly to the scene of riot and disturbance. They familiarize themselves with uncrowded streets and escape routes, a procedure which, particularly after the disgraceful flight of the organization's leaders (Mo'ezzi, Bani-Sadr, and Rajavi) has become a new strategy of its members and supporters.

They arm some of the kids who are in the first rank and must fight at the head of the front, put cocktails, bottles and flammable materials in the pockets of others who are on a somewhat lower level and entice 16 or 17 others with candy to follow their caravan! Thus they carry their stock of arms from fear even though they have already polished up their escape procedure.

They march a short distance and as a good ending they burn whatever they can lay their hands on: shops, Vahed transit buses, Qods Supermarket, people, cars. Then while hammering on doors and walls they put their escape plan into effect and get out of the arena unharmed.

All this is adventure, glory of conquest and Rajavi's Qadesiyyeh ['Waterloo'--reference to a Persian-Arab battle of yore] as it is Saddam's. But why are the Mojahedin'e Kalq doing this? What have they discovered anew and what have they come into?!

First of all it is characteristic of militia to become issue conscience when it is idle and its head begins to work. Contradictions in the theoretic and practical line of Mojahedin-e Khalq are so great that if you stop from using this hammer on

the head of the militia its elephant immediately begins dreaming of India. This is the beginning of difficulties, especially since these days the organization does not have time for ideological work and as the saying goes it has entered a military phase!!

It is therefore necessary not only to keep the militia constantly busy but also to keep the need for variety in mind. The first, the second, the third and the fourth bombs that exploded in this mosque, that office, this room or that street did not produce any result and those 80 percent of the population who are supposedly all for the Mojahedin and Bani-Sadr did not show interest in their heroic actions! Living in group hideouts, crawling in holes, lack of communication combined with constant fear and the daily receipt of news concerning the discovery of group hide-aways, arrests and executions (as retaliatory punishment for murder, declaration of armed war, acts of terror and bombings) gradually embarrasses and tires out supporters, especially supporters of a type of its militia who have been inflated to importance by deception, lies and publicity stunt!

From times past the Mojahedin has taught and practiced the principle that its supporters must always be kept busy in confrontations and if they were no problems at a given moment, situations must be created to keep them involved. They believe this would always cause the individuals to develop through action and contradiction! At the same time this would avoid idleness that could create petty bourgeois tendencies, and give rise to unnecessary and useless questions! (Of course the second reason has been more on their mind.)

So by pulling the militia out of its hole and putting it into streets and thoroughfares, even for a short period, is to keep it busy and create variety in work. This is a ruse to prevent him from poking his nose into the affairs of seniors in the organization and to prevent such and such verbal tendencies to develop in him.

And finally their excellencies have put their heads together with Mo'ezzi and Don Quixote in Kazem Khan's villa and come to the conclusion that 80 percent of the Iranian people 'support us and are dedicated to us.' Eleven million in one bunch belong to the 11-million-dollar man. Of course this figure must have doubled by now. Seven or eight million, too, are supporters of the militia and sympathizers of the organization, and this also has increased two or threefold. Mo'ezzi for sure has millions of followers who are enamored of his cute and favor-seeking doings in flying to safety deposed kings and presidents during two or three successful flights.

In answer to why 80 and 90 percent of the nation stood by while the president was deposed and later took to France along with the head of his vanguard organization, the three brains have come up with the conclusion that a climate of terror was the obstacle in the way! That this climate must be eliminated by arming supporters and pulling them into the streets. The people want to come out and fight to topple the regime but are afraid. They must now see for themselves that we use arms, kill and set fires. Such acts which remind the people of the past and incite them to repeat past struggles can best be carried out by the trained and assinine hole crawling militia. As long as we are sitting here, they should be put to the sword. This will solve our problem as well as theirs!

Now let us see what advantage these gentlemen hope to gain by this means in reaching their objectives.

Mojahedin'e Khalq's first objective may be a resort to expediency. But its second objective is one which is unachievable no matter what support may be sought. The result may even be the opposite. Masses of the people are not the militia who can be caused any suffering and dragged into any cave.

Your small mistake is in mixing the present with the time of the shah and the tactics you put into effect are unfortunately outdated and blunted. You are like the illiterate 'Excellency Sir' in one of the stories of Aziz Yasin where somebody else writes his speeches. Asked to make a speech at a wedding ceremony he pulled out of his pocket an old speech he had read at the opening of a railroad and appealed to the guests, among other things he said, not to litter and damage when trying to get on the train. Realizing his mistake from the amazed look of the guests, he fetched out an even older speech from another pocket and began an eloquent reading of the speech he had made before garbage men and sweepers at the opening of the municipal comfort stations a few months back!!!

Gentlemen, what has come over you? Do you think people are the same as during the shah's regime when vanguard groups used military tactics to promote a climate of fear and encouraged the people to join them. Not to mention the fact that in those days also, you failed and the people actually came out two or three years after your vanguard groups had been defeated and dispersed and had fled the scene. Yes, even today there are those who would put you into the streets and express support. But they are the same people who would sweep you away at the first sound of 'Long Live Khomeyni.' Those who yesterday took to the streets to shout 'Death to the Shah,' 'Greetings to Khomeyni,' were wounded and repeated their acts. They are the same ones who today shout 'Death to hypocrite troublemakers,' 'Death to the U.S.,' and 'Greetings to Khomeyni.' As to your glories, suffice it to say that you have not said 'Death to the U.S.' in a single one of your demonstrations.

What nation do you expect to follow you into the fury of battle because of firecrackers you put into the hands of a bunch of young people with youthful needs and a spirit of adventure? Have you been blind during funeral ceremonies? Can't you see where the deprived masses are?

Of course you are right in one instance. There are the affluent, pleasure-seeking antirevolutionaries, those slapped by the Islamic revolution, those connected with the U.S. and the American way of life who expect you to even out the road for them. But they are the type that seek to rent 10 "ratholes" at the sound of a gun. They are with you so long as they can look and watch from the window.

In the latest writings and analyses in MOJAHED you have tried to prove by the presentation of detailed comments, documents and papers as well as by recourse to historic law and geography and by swearing on the head of Holy 'Abbas that the people are for Bani-Sadr and the irreconcilable enemy of reaction, that the religious establishment is undergoing a major historic test and is fast moving toward being isolated and eventually destroyed! You used to promise that soon the people would hang the heads of religious personalities from atop scaffolds and made similar inciting comments. There can only be two possibilities: either your

assessments have been rubbish or else the people are cowards, and are incapable. You must accept one of these possibilities.

You did not merely speak of dissatisfactions of the people but said they were deeply dissatisfied and deeply angry. You said it is like the shah's time and that the people were ready to rise for Bani-Sadr. "The center of the universe" himself, depending on these words and assessments, made those grandiloquent statements, issued ten orders of resistance and yearned for a cell at Evin or the hot sands of Khuzestan. These assessments resulted in the expectation that the people would rise angrier than before and like you set fire to anything they could lay their hands on. This did not happen. You believe it was not your inaccurate assessments, but the cowardice of the people, which caused lack of results. You use the same reasoning today to justify using arms to eliminate a climate of fear!

You do not know the elementary alphabet of struggle. If there is a climate of fear, you yourselves have created its first stage. The disgraceful running away was an acknowledgment of your inability and lack of will to resist. If you had understood, you would not have run away. A leader does not run!

Today you set fire to Vahed Company transit buses. Setting fire to buses was a mistake even during the shah's time. During these tumultuous times the buses meet the needs of those toiling and average people. Frankly, at first we thought you wanted regular buses because you considered Vahed Company's double-deckers as symbols of class society but we later saw that regular buses were also being burned! Such activities will not gain you even one follower. What will remain for you if the Vahed Company authorities show the buses around the city?

You killed six people at Friday prayers in Tabriz, not to mention that innocent learned old man. Such activities point to your inability and helplessness and are the stain of disgrace on the black record of your organization. Did you expect to break the 'climate of fear' with such acts?

Marching a short distance carrying arms is not such a big thing. University students know this. Despite those patrols, those guards and those SAVAK agents during the shah's time, the students would march long distances, for example attack the Gold City movit theater, and disperse in safety. Yet today very casually you fire on and kill people. Some act against the climate of fear!

Thank God He has bestowed fools upon us as enemies. This government was still thinking about what to do with hideouts and those in hiding when suddenly you yourselves solved the problem by putting your supporters and members in the streets. You are thus exposed and revealed. You give the people and the authorities the best opportunity to converge upon you and arrest you.

There is one solution. You must come out of your hiding and into the streets. The people will surround you, they will use any means for their defense. Fighting will break out and the people will deliver you to the courts. This is a good tactic. It is in fact your assessment and activities which have benefited the people and the government. So much for the genius! What miseries have you not suffered from associating with the "center of the universe"!

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CSO: 46401/1

GOVERNMENT CLOSES SOME CONTRACTING FIRMS

Tehran BURS in Persian 18 Aug 81 p 2

[Text] The Plan and Budget Organization has issued a circular in which it has announced the liquidation of 10 contracting firms because of their particular negative value.

According to the PARS NEWS AGENCY, the Plan and Budget Organization has informed all executive branches of the government by a circular that in the implementation of the law governing the management and ownership of contracting and engineering consultant companies approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council of Iran on 18 Esfand 1358 [8 Mar 80] the following 10 contracting companies which had been placed under government supervision temporarily have been liquidated because of their particular negative value:

1. Atrak Company, Ltd
2. Chakkosh Technical Construction Company, Ltd
3. "Shabat" Construction and Township Building Company, Ltd
4. Hiram Company, Ltd
5. Farkar Company, Ltd
6. Ta'min Construction Company, Ltd
7. Hadish Construction Company, Ltd
8. Atanesh Construction Company, Ltd
9. Precision Construction Company, Ltd
10. Moghan Construction Company, Ltd

As of this date the following conditions must be observed in matters related to the above-mentioned firms:

1. Continuation of work in hand by the companies can be carried on by the companies themselves if confirmed by the executive branch of government concerned and Note 1 of Article 46 of the General Contract Conditions will not be applicable in their case.

2. Executive branches of the government are forbidden to assign any new jobs to the above-mentioned companies.

3. In implementing the goal of equitable distribution and expansion of jobs, the employees of the above-mentioned companies can set up new contracting companies and

participate in government tenders; this, within the framework of the new Regulation 18036 of 20 Tir 1360 [11 Jul 81] approved by the council of ministers governing the competence of contracting, construction, building and equipment companies.

4. In case of the cancellation and termination of the operations of any of the above-mentioned companies there will be nothing to prevent the continuation of jobs from being assigned to contracting firms which have been formed by employees of the firm concerned, within the framework of the new regulation governing the competence of contractors.

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CENTER AUTHORIZED TO MANAGE ELECTRICAL PARTS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Sep 81 p 18

[Interview with S.M. Musavi, managing director of the Center to Provide and Distribute Electrical Parts]

[Text] The Center to Provide and Distribute Electrical Parts has saved 4 billion rials in the past 6 months through better control of invoices and annually an average of $1 billion worth of electrical parts are arriving in the country.

In the near future the center will have full control over the import of batteries, bulbs, wires and fuses.

Seyyed Mohammad Musavi, managing director of the Center to Provide and Distribute Electrical Parts also said that it is 8 months since the center began independent operations.

He added: At first only prices were controlled but with increased personnel in the first three months and better control over invoices we were able to effect a foreign exchange saving of 4 billion rials, a considerable amount.

Musavi said: In addition to controlling invoices the center a present also handles import of electrical parts, especially high-priced items which involve large amounts of foreign exchange.

He then added: The import of electrical parts and supplies constitutes some 11 percent of the country's imports, the import of this category of goods is about one billion dollars a year.

Musavi went on to say: Unfortunately since the center was established merchants have increased imports because they think the government is taking over a business section. They are therefore hoping to make a big profit by a one-time import even though the government take-over of foreign trade will take some 5 years and the government would do this gradually after adequate study.

Musavi then said: The government take-over of foreign trade has had a psychological effect on businessmen and although the shortage of some goods has been evident, one can also notice certain misrepresentations regarding imports.

He added: In this connection we are in direct contact with the Economic Mobilization Staff in order that an import limit be set for the consumers and domestic manufacturers.

Musavi added: At present the import of many luxury and unnecessary electrical parts such as fixtures, fancy car horns and fancy switches and plates. Fortunately most electrical parts are being imported by the government itself: by nationalized industries, the ministry of energy and other government companies and agencies. As a result, companies and agencies which have had long expereince in the import of such goods provide us with information and companies and agencies which are new to the business refer to us for necessary information.

Musavi noted: Through its purchases the center has reached a relative stage of self-sufficiency, such as in telex. At the same time items such as bulbs and batteries which were scarce on the market have been purchased and will arrive in the country in the near future. These two items and others will be distributed to the consumer by the center through the Guild of Electricians and cooperatives. In this way middlemen will be eliminated and the goods will get to consumers at moderate prices.

Musavi said: A major portion of the country's need for batteries, bulbs and wires has arrived and in the near future this center will be the sole importer of batteries, bulbs, wire and fuses--an important step toward nationalizing foreign trade.

Musavi added: The policy of the center regarding these goods is to carry out infrastructural studies in the case of 5 or 6 types of goods and to bring them under government control later. In the case of goods which do not serve a purpose after sale: when monopoly is established this action will be expanded so as to become a government operated trade.

He concluded by saying: The offices of the General Trade Bureau will be asked to help in distributing goods in the provinces. At the same time special importance is attached to the quality of imported electrical goods. In the past this aspect did not receive consideration but because of the safety factor involved in electrical goods, quality control will be one of the important objectives of this center.

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VICE PREMIER DISCUSSES WAR, RELATIONS WITH TURKEY

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 82, 5-11 Sep 81 pp 26, 27

/Article by Qasim al-Samawi: "Taha Yasin Ramadan to AL-MAJALLAH: We Will Never Withdraw from Iran until It Acknowledges Our Rights, Even If This War Lasts 20 Years"/

/Text/ Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, first deputy prime minister of Iraq, stressed in a special interview with AL-MAJALLAH that Iraqi forces would never withdraw from Iranian territory before Iranian recognition of Iraq's legitimate rights, "even if this war lasts 20 years."

Mr Ramadan, who also occupies the position of commander general of the Popular Army, whose training and arming he has personally supervised, and who is now playing a prominent role in the field of combat with Iran alongside the regular army, spoke about a number of issues that are now being raised in the region in this special interview.

Mr Ramadan began the talk by discussing the visit he made recently to Turkey, saying "In the past years our relations with Turkey have gone through good, normal stages, and have been oriented toward the expansion of economic cooperation and the performance of joint activities, including the oil pipeline which extends from Iraq to the Turkish ports. On my latest visit to Turkey I discussed all aspects of cooperation between the two countries. Some people might be amazed that the visit was concerned with the discussion of general, comprehensive matters in a stage such as this, while Iraq is in a state of war, considering that these circumstances might perhaps not serve Iraq in attaining full results; clearly, Iraq and Iran are both neighbors of Turkey's, and, when the latter acts from a position of total neutrality, we cannot blame it, for considerations that are well known. However, we have confidence in the current Turkish government and its understanding of the real nature of the conflict, since it is one of the countries which is aware of this through its membership in the Islamic committee seeking peace. Through its prime minister, it is informed about the details of the situation, and we are confident that it is convinced that Iraq has no designs on Iran or others and is wholly anxious to establish good relationships and cooperation with its neighboring countries and Islamic countries in particular. I can say, overall, that we achieved a minimum of reasonable things during this visit and in some areas realized great progress. Trade, for example, has jumped from about $14 million to more than $100 million. The oil operations and the disappearance of returns on

them have been settled in a natural, satisfactory manner, there is an existing agreement between the two countries, and no violations of it have occurred. There was also discussion about enlarging the oil pipeline and other matters related to that, which will encourage us in the future to expand cooperation in this field. On the issue of the borders, we have no problem with Turkey. A new protocol has been signed and agreement has been positive. There has been complete clarity in drawing up a picture of the border positions of both countries; we have not felt, and they have not felt, that there is any dispute on this point.

Then the signing of a border agreement between Iraq and Turkey at this stage gives practical proof that Iraq wants to stress the ending of all border problems with all neighboring countries, when those countries reach full understanding of its rights. In reality, this issue has not taken much of our time at all."

The Iraqi first deputy prime minister added that in his visit to Turkey a long-standing desire appeared on the part of both parties "to coordinate between specific agencies in supervising the infiltration of saboteurs between both countries." He spoke about the subject of the Euphrates River waters, which Syria and Turkey share with Iraq, and said, "It has been decided that a meeting is to be held in 3 months for a discussion of this issue among the three parties. If Syria does not attend the meeting, we will meet with the Turks and reach agreement on whatever we agree to, and then the results will be presented to the third party. Turkey's position on the subject of the waters of the Euphrates River is positive."

Relations with Libya

We asked Mr Ramadan whether Turkish officials had raised the issue of conducting individual mediation between Iraq and Iran to end the war, and he replied "We did not ask that of them but they said that they would not abstain from performing such a role if they found suitable circumstances for doing so."

We asked Mr Ramadan about the nature of Iraqi-Libyan relations at the present time, especially after the recent visit by Maj 'Abd-al-Salam Jallud to Baghdad and the talk being bruited about on the development of a change in the Libyan position regarding Iraq's war with Iran and its inclination to support the Iraqi position. He replied, "I do not want to comment on this issue except to say that we have not sensed anything new on Libya's part and have not seen a change in its policy toward our war with Iran. Naturally we hope that Libya's position on this issue will change."

And with France

The conversation turned to the future of French-Iraqi relations, especially in the light of the visit by Mr Tariq 'Aziz, the Iraqi deputy prime minister, to Paris and his meeting with President Mitterand. Mr Ramadan said, "The object in Mr 'Aziz's visit to Paris was to discuss overall relations between Iraq and France. We in the command consider that relations with France require complete clarity. We hope that the new administration will have its eyes on the interests of France; we believe that the interests of France lie in full, extensive cooperation with Iraq and with the Arabs, but then the realization of this is up to the French

administration. We side with France in our relations at the level and stage France wishes and do not impose anything on France, but we do believe that France will profit from attention to its Arab and Iraqi relations, because no disruption or lack of commitment has been apparent on the part of the Arabs, or Iraq in particular, in their cooperation with France. We hope that a positive spirit and a sincere desire for such relations will predominate. In past years, clear foundations made themselves apparent in such relations, and they are well known to the new administration. Let us see how far this administration grasps the dimensions of these relations--less, more, or to the same extent, and in a manner that serves the interests of both parties. We do not want France, either, to abandon its independent European role vis-a-vis our central cause, the cause of Palestine."

We asked Mr Ramadan about the nature of the latest visit King Husayn made to Iraq and whether there have been any Jordanian moves regarding the prevailing situation on the Arab stage. He replied, "You know that King Husayn visits Baghdad from time to time to gain information and exchange views, that contacts between President Saddam Husayn and King Husayn have been continuous and that it has become a custom for consultation and discussions to take place between the two leaders in a manner strengthening relations between the two countries, presenting information on the state and course of the war, and in a manner showing concern for the Arab situation. During this visit a discussion took place between me and Mr Mudar Badran, the Jordanian prime minister, on the scope of bilateral cooperation between the two countries, especially in the economic field, and we noted some of the features the forthcoming stage will require, which will be discussed in detail by technicians."

The last question was on the Iraqi-Iranian war, which has lasted about a year. Ramadan said, "Iraq's position on this war has not changed. A cease fire, as far as we are concerned, means negotiation and the attainment of a clear agreement, then, after that, withdrawal to agreed-upon boundaries. There will never be an Iraqi withdrawal before recognition of our legitimate rights, even if the war goes on 20 years."

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INDUSTRY MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON TRADE RELATIONS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 196, 24 Aug 81 pp 26, 27

[Interview with Iraqi Minister of Industry and Minerals Engineer Tahir Tawfiq in Baghdad by 'Abd-al-Wahhab al-Qaysi: "Tahir Tawfiq in Interview With AL-DUSTUR: 'Iraq Can Find a Replacement for France, Can France Find a Replacement for the Arab?'" place and date not specified]

> [Text] Despite the fact that the war is entering its second year, industry and development in Iraq are experiencing a high degree of progress. Iraq has decided to move from superficial interaction with resources toward organic interaction. Although Iraq has dealt with most industrialized states, it has placed special importance on France because of that country's past positions on the Arabs and Iraq. Iraq, which rejects political blackmail and insists on properly defined concepts in its international relations, asserts that it will not be the total loser in any case. AL-DUSTUR carried its questions to Engineer Tahir Tawfiq, minister of industry and minerals, and conducted the following interview with him.

AL-DUSTUR: What is the volume of commercial exchange between Iraq and France and between Iraq and Great Britain and the major industrial states? Do you anticipate a change in the industrial relations between Iraq and France?

Tahir Tawfiq: The volume of commercial exchange with the advanced industrial states currently occupies the top position in the scale of commercial exchange between Iraq and foreign states. This is because of two direct factors. First, Iraq aims at strengthening the concept of the independence of Europe as a whole from the influence of the imperialist policy of the United States. This coincides with Iraq's foreign policy, which is based on a course of complete independence from all blocs and international power centers. Consequently, we support every independent policy aimed at movement out of the orbit and control of these axes and powers.

The second reason is a purely technical one. The development process in Iraq demands the use of advanced and developed technological methods. Moreover, a large scale of development makes it impossible for any single agency to provide all the requirements of development, not to mention the fact that there are typically a limited number of states known for their advancement in a given industry while other states

are more advanced in other fields of industry. Our experience in dealing with states has shown that there is usually an area of specialization in a given industry for which one foreign state is noted above the other states. In our industrial and technical relations, we follow the course that will achieve our interests at the earliest opportunity and with the highest possible technology.

With regard to the level of cooperation with France, it was formerly very large and was growing rapidly. France had a favored position in Iraq and the Arab homeland as a result of the friendly relations established by the Arabs, who will continue to maintain these relations provided they remain consistent with the principle of reciprocity. France's just and noteworthy positions on Arab issues were met with equally noteworthy consideration on the part of the Arabs in economic and industrial relations. On this basis, this special consideration was applied to French companies, which enjoyed special and favorable trade relations even when in competition with other companies. Regarding a change in economic relations with France, this depends entirely on France itself. If France continues to exhibit friendly and amicable relations with Iraq and the Arabs, there will be no negative change in these relations. If there is a change in France's policy which has a negative effect on us as a country that gives precedence to its pan-Arab goals in its dealings with other countries, we will respond to this with measures that are in keeping with the size of the change as it occurs and develops. We can find a replacement for France and the French companies, but it would be exceptionally difficult for France to find a replacement for Iraq in particular and the Arabs in general. Rather than cooperating with French companies, we could find other similar campanies to fill the gap left by the French companies.

At the same time, however, we sincerely hope that friendly relations will continue between us and that France will consider its reputation in Iraq and the Arab homeland. This is the policy which the late President Charles DeGaulle laid the foundations for and the leaders who followed him developed. We are interested in maintaining the bridges that have been opened between us and France. But if France desires another course, then we will respond to this step with a similar step of our own.

As for cooperation with Britain, it was insignificant last year. There has been some progress this year for British companies, which were virtually nonexistent in Iraq's development sector in the past. However, these British companies have obtained electricity projects through competition and they are advanced over many of the European states in this area. The British companies have demonstrated their seriousness and their resources. In addition, economic relations with West Germany are strong and its companies operate in Iraq without hesitation. They have obtained a large volume of work, especially during the past year. In general, the European companies have some sizeable capabilities and we have not experienced any difficulties in our dealings with most of them up to the present from the standpoint of their adherence to technical specifications and compliance with the deadlines set by the contracts without industrial organizations.

AL-DUSTUR: What is your assessment of industrial progress in Iraq and what is Iraq's position relative to the industrialized states? Will Iraq achieve industrial self-sufficiency during the coming years?

Tahir Tawfiq: The industrial progress made in Iraq in comparison to what existed prior to the revolution is clear for anyone to see. The development that has occurred since the revolution has taken two principal forms: First, the entry into new and important industries and, second, the modernization and development of the existing industries. If we wanted to compare the degree of progress, we would find that the volume of investment in just one of the strategic projects equals the entire accumulation of capital in the industrial sector prior to the revolution of 17 July 1968. Allocations in a single year such as last year amounted to seven times the allocations of the industrial sector during the 1965-1969 five-year plan. Allocations in 1980 reached 1.198 billion dinars. Industrial progress extended to fields within the sector such as research and development, training, and job qualification. I can say that the rate of modernization and development of production has increased 85 percent and the rte of modernization and development has reached 100 percent in some of our industries. The fact is that we cannot separate industrial progress from the progress that has occurred in all the other sectors since the revolution.

AL-DUSTUR: Does this mean you are on the way to self-sufficiency?

Tahir Tawfiq: Self-sufficiency has not been realized in industrial production, but this condition does not exist in any state in the world. Nonetheless, we are striving or trying to reach a position that will lead to the breaking up of the industrial monopoly. The questoin of self-sufficiency was raised as a slogan representing, in our estimation, a step against the developing states. The industrialized states have tried to instill and reinforce this concept among the Third World states that are on the road to development in order to draw them into a state in which they are fumbling about with an endless string of industries--industries which are secondary, marginal, and highly divergent. As a result, you will find that the states that have committed themselves to the slogan of self-sufficiency are incapable of achieving this because of a number of considerations, some of which are objective and some of which are subjective. On this basis, they will have lost important years of development that they could have gained had they followed the correct course from the beginning, which is based on matching material and technical resources to the goal. In our experience with industry in Iraq, we fell into this problem in the first years of our industrial activity but we realized this at a fairly advanced time. Therefore,we moved toward the large strategic industries that are the basic pillars of true advancement. Additional strategic industries will be established and Iraq will move out of the ranks of the developing states within a few years.

AL-DUSTUR: What industrial relations exist between Iraq and the Arab states? Are there new joint industrial projects between Iraq and these countries?

Tahir Tawfiq: Industrial relations between Iraq and the Arab countries exist, but our aspirations go beyond the existing ties. Therefore, we are working hard to transform the existing situation into Arab industrial integration. Excellent progress has been made toward this goal. The specialized Arab industrial organizations and the specific Arab federations have been established through joint Arab action, not to mention the bilateral activity between us and the other Arab countries. Moreover, Iraq is a principal partner in joint Arab projects. I don't believe ther is anyjoint Arab project in which Iraq does not play a major role, both from their standpont of planning or originating the project and from the standpont of contributing materially to this capital. This confirms the necessity of our belief in

the creation of a material base for a stable joint Arab economy in order to achieve our major goal of Arab unity. When we are active in the Arab industrial field in order to attain integration, this is nothing unusual because it is a practical translation of our principles in the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and of the goals of the revolution in Iraq.

The doors of Bagdhad are open to any Arab industrial organization or Arab industrial organization or Arab federation whose body or responsible agency decides to move its headquarters ot Baghdad. Baghdad has become a permanent center for Arab industrial activity, especially since Sadat's traitorous visit to Jerusalem. With regard to Iraq's organizational participation, Iraq is a member of the Arab Mineral Wealth Organization, which undertakes the job of coordinating mineral-related activity and operations among the member countries. The land of the Arab countries is well known for the mineral resources it contains in large quantities and excellent qualities. Our contribution to the Arab Mining Company amounts to 20 million Kuwaiti dinars. This makes us the largest contributor to this company, which came into being based on a resolution issued by the Arab Economic Unity Council. As a result of the membership of our country in this company, we participate in a number of Arab mining projects such as the Arab Iron and Steel Company in Bahrain, the Jordanian Fertilizer Industries Company, the National Industrial Building Materials Company in the Yemen Arab Republic, the Tunisian Mines Company, the Jabal Sarwa mines in Morocco, and other companies. We also participate in the Arab Anshiri Samin Mining Company, which is working to reopen and put into operation the Akjoujt mine in Mauritania. Our country has a 25 percent share in the $75-million capital of this company.

I would like to add that because of our belief in the importance of the specific Arab federations and in the necessity of maintaining their activity, Iraq provides a 50-percent share of the budgets of some of these federations. These include the Arab Federation of Engineering Industries, the Arab Federation of Paper Industries, and the Arab Federation of Food Industries. This is a condensed outline of our activity in the field of Arab industrial integration, which we intend to make steadily more comprehensive and developed.

AL-DUSTUR: What is the size of the increase in the investment program and what are the main points of the industrial plan in application under the wartime conditions?

Tahir Tawfiq: Iraq has formulated the investment program and the fiscal budget of the state for the current year while waging a war for the defense of its land and waters and the future of the Arab nation against the racist Persian aggression. The demands of the war are well known, but in spite of this the investment program and the budget have achieved a 29-percent increase over last year. Iraq's allocations as officially announced amount to 5.24 billion dinars for all sectors, including the industrial sector. These allocations came as a great surprise to those who have failed to understand the new Iraq and its resources of leadership under the direction of President Saddam Husayn.

In Iraq, when we formulate a budget and set the allocations for a certain sector, we have studied the matter from all sides with the issue of development and the potentials for implementation constantly in mind. The allocations for the industrial sector for last year were 1.198 billion dinars. I mention this figure to pont out the tremendous jump in allocations for the industrial sector. Similarly,

our allocations for the current year are large and the figures are high, ensuring us extensive resources and flexibility to achieve implementation and move ahead with new projects commensurate with our needs and aspirations.

AL-DUSTUR: What are the main changes in industrial policy due to war conditions?

Tahir Tawfiq: The Persian enemy has not changed anything in our situation. With regard to the industrial policy that was formulated within the plan--on the contrary, we are proceeding exactly according to plan. They bombed our industrial installations with the aim of halting development, but they met with a devastating failure. We have learned important lessons because of the war, including giving special attention to the demands of the projects, expediting some of the projects, and focusing on certain industries. In addition, the building of a reserve was authorized for some industries to remedy bottlenecks in our production of some products as a result of sabotage that has taken place in these industries because of the Persian aggression.

AL-DUSTUR: One question that observers are asking even more than journalists is this: What is the secret of the extensive development that Iraq is experiencing during the war?

Tahir Tawfiq: The secret lies in the extraordinary leadership and guiding intellect that makes Iraq unique. Iraq has been able to invest its financial resources in large-scale development projects based on pan-Arab rather than regional goals. It has included all dimensions of the future in its calculations. It has taken into account not merely the Persian aggression but the aggression plotted by the international power centers which have been terrified by Iraq's progress and forward strides in its march of development and knowledge within a framework of total independence and detachment from all international sides. The Zionist attack against our nuclear installations is the second link in the ongoing pursuit of the objectives of the Persian aggression. The secret also lies in the new Iraqi, the son of the revolution. In the midst of the war, the industrial sector in Iraq achieved an increase of 117 million dinars or $400 million in implementation during the first half of the year in comparison to the same period last year. Similarly, in the area of production, some organizations achieved large increases during these months in comparison with the same period last year while other organizations were able to meet their production schedules while suffering from a shortage of manpower that reached as high as 40 percent of the labor force in some organizations.

The secret may also lie in the stability of our national economy and the soundness of our economic course in general.

8591
CSO: 4304/176

USE OF FOREIGN LABOR SUPPORTED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 2 Sep 81 p 3

[Article: "Contractor al-'Isa Defends Principle of Employing Foreign Labor and Praises Government Incentives Granted to Contractors in This Area!"]

[Text] The issue of foreign labor has been a matter of wide discussion for some time. The Arab Labor Organization, which has its headquarters in Baghdad, has written a number of reports on the threat that non-Arab labor poses to the security of the Gulf states. The reports have also pointed out the social and economic problems that have resulted from the presence of hundreds of thousands of these workers in the Gulf states, which have low populations and different traditions and dustome from those of the incoming non-Arab workers.

The Arab Labor Organization reports accused the Arab contractors who influence the hiring of foreign labor of doing so because of the low cost of hiring foreign laborers--especially workers from the Asian countries such as India, Korea, the Philippines, Ceylon, and others--without concern for the future problems that may arise in their societies due to the existence of these workers.

But what do the Arab contractors themselves say in response to all these accusations?

AL-WATAN met with a prominent contractor in Kuwait, 'Abd-al-Hamid Yusuf al-'Isa. Mr al-'Isa employs hundreds of Arab and foreign workers including 900 workers employed in construction of a low-income housing project in al-Jahara'. We asked him for his opinion on the contents of the Arab Labor Organization reports. He replied: "The foreign workers, particularly the Pakistanis and Indians, cause fewer problems than the Arab workers because they are humble and quiet, they are not insolent, and they carry out all the tasks assigned to them without argument."

In respones to a question focusing on the threat that foreign workers pose to Kuwait's security, Mr al-'Isa said: "The Pakistanis and Indians do not pose any threat to the security of Kuwait. Their worst offenses rarely go beyond making and selling alcoholic beverages. However, the Koreans, Filipinos, and Thai can be considered more ill-tempered since their crimes are characterized by violence and cruelty." Mr al-'Isa explained that the Iranian worker is among the foreign workers characterized by diligence, endurance, and obedience. However, he said that the cost of Iranian labor has risen recently because the Iraqi-Iranian war has reduced the number of Iranian workers in Kuwait at present. Mr al-'Isa denied the existence of official barriers to the importation of foreign workers from abroad.

He said that the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Passports and Residency Department of the Ministry of Interior provide all the desired incentives in this area.

He added: "The official agencies know who the reliable contractors are and distinguish them from those who have turned the importation of labor into a commercial enterprise." He explained that when the companies he owns need workers, they contact individuals called "contractors" who bring labor from abroad at the requesting company's expense, including airfare.

He said that contractors also employ hundreds of the workers presently in Kuwait and contract with them locally.

In reply to a question concerning how the contractors are able to house hundreds of workers when they arrive in one group, he said: "Usually we build special housing for them in outlying areas such as al-Jahrah and al-Salibiyah. This housing is constructed of particle board or bricks."

8591
CSO: 4304/167

PUBLIC HOUSING DISTRIBUTION DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 21 Aug 81 p 2

[Interview with Khalid Mansur, Government Housing Inspector by Salim al-Shimri: "Government Housing Distributed to Citizens, Members of the Miltary, and Policemen; Those Who Rent Out or Add To Their Dwellings Are in Violation of the Law"]

[Text] Khalid Mansur, government housing inspector in the Ministry of Housing, talked to AL-RA'Y al-'AMM about government houses, how they are distributed, and the problems that arise in dealings with the citizens pertaining to them.

At the beginning of the interview, he remarked about the nature of these houses and the terms under which they are turned over for occupancy:

[Mr Mansur] This public housing is Arab housing and the purpose behind its creation is to eliminate the shacks that exist in some areas of Kuwait. A decision has been issued by the Council of Ministers to implement this plan.

Conditions have been established for this housing and our role is to seek to uphold the law. We designate everyone to whom the conditions apply.

This is considered a routine operation to solve the citizen's problems. The phenomenon of shacks has been solved at the present time and this is attributable to the policy of the Ministry of Housing and its cooperation with certain ministries of state.

[Question] What is your comment on the al-Salibiyah houses, which have not yet been turned over for occupancy?

[Answer] These houses come under the cabinet's decision. They will be allocated only to owners of appropriated houses and owners of shacks who work in the Ministries of Interior and Defense. However, the shack problem has ended and thus the remaining houses will be for owners of appropriated houses. However, there are some cases in which other Kuwaiti households are eligible, as in the case of divorcees and orphans. They will be distributed to eligible Kuwaiti citizens. We have offices concerned with control and monitoring of these remaining houses. All of them will be completed soon. There has been nothing new concerning this. As for

the matter of the shacks and the houses belonging to members of the army and the police, those have been completed for 3 months. However, we are still waiting for owners of appropriated houses scattered throughout parts of Kuwait's suburbs.

[Question] Would it be possible to say how many al-Salibiyah houses are left at present?

[Answer] We aren't able to say exactly, but somewhere around 1,200 houses. There could be more or fewer than this. There are some owners of appropriated houses who have not yet come in about the allocation of public housing for them in the al-Salibiyah area. The remaining areas in line for allocation are areas 6 and 7. These houses will be distributed in three groups to Kuwaiti citizens, members of the military, and members of the police.

[Question] Does cooperation exist with the Ministry of [Social] Affairs with regard to recipients of rental allowances?

[Answer] Public housing has been assigned to many recipients of rental allowances and individuals who possess a voucher showing they have applied for a low-income housing unit. But this comes under the decision issued by the cabinet since the discussion concerned public housing and did not deal with low-income housing.

[Question] How are repairs handled?

[Answer] This is monitored and it is an infraction for any citizen to make repairs on the house or add anything that did not exist originally. Any citizen who does so is subject to a violation and is given a warning telling him to remove what he has added to the structure of the house, because in my opinion, these houses are considered to be rented from the government. There are monitoring offices for this purpose. All I want from the citizens is for them to cooperate with us and avoid altering the character of the house. It is by design an Arab house and every citizen should put the Housing Ministry's decisions above everything else. This is for the citizen's benefit.

[Question] What is the nature of the infractions and problems?

[Answer] There are several infractions and difficulties on the part of some citizens. For instance, they may rent the house assigned to them and this violates the regulation and policy of the state and the Housing Ministry. An individual who commits this violation could become subject to punishment and withdrawal of the house assigned to him.

Secondly, some families discard garbage in the streets. There has been no cooperation with the municipality. In the end we find that the area has piled up with filth, although there is an office in the Ministry of Housing and Health which is responsible for consciousness-raising and monitoring.

I might say to the citizen that this house concerns you more than it does any other agency.

All I want to say is that the Ministry of Housing and its employees are fully conscious of the citizens who are renting out their houses. However, we want some sensitivity from them so their feelings won't be in jeopardy.

[Question] Do you have a word to day about public housing?

[Answer] First of all, I want the citizens to cooperate. I hope they will make these houses their homes and not violate the regulations and policy of the Ministry of Housing. This interferes with the established plan. Some citizens are using their houses for improper purposes and we ask them please to refrain from this and consider their houses as fulfilling a need.

8591
CSO: 4304/167

CENTRAL BANK ISSUES OIL REVENUE FIGURES

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 2 Sep 81 p 7

[Article: "Central Bank: Oil Imports Up 20 Percent in First Quarter of This Year"]

[Text] A regular saatistical report issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait yesterday announced that oil revenues during the first quarter of the current year reached around 1.355 billion dinars. This represents a 20 percent increase over the previous quarter. The reason for the rise was the oil price increase based on the decisions of the Bali Conference which met last December.

The report stated that oil revenues underwent a large decline in May, dropping 32 percent from the previous month's level. This was due to a decrease in the quantities of oil produced.

Kuwait has set its average crude oil production at 1.25 million barrels per day. However, the average production level currently stands at 800,000 barrels per day because of conditions in the world oil market. The price of Kuwaiti oil is $35.50 per barrel.

In another area, the report stated that domestic liquidity continued to expand at an accelerated rate during the second quarter of the year. Total liquidity at the end of this period stood at 3.386 billion dinars, representing an increase of 411 million dinars or 35.8 percent. This expansion was noted to a lesser degree in the amount of currency in circulation, which grew by 13 million dinars of 5.3 percent.

The report added that the acceleration in the rate of growth of near-money (the second component of liquid assets) is attributable from another standpoint to foreign currency deposits--which increased by 81 million dinars or 13.9 percent in contrast to a 1.5-percent drop during the previous quarter--and to time deposits, which grew by 17 million dinars of 6.3 percent in contrast to a 1.3-percent increase in the previous quarter.

The report explained that the increase in the currency block resulted from two main factors: first, the fact that the government paid teachers' salaries for May through August via the commercial banks; and second, the fact that this quarter coincided with the end of the fiscal year for the state's general budget. The end of the fiscal year is usually accompanied by an increase in government expenditures which penetrates to the private sector through the banking system. The report indicated that the domestic banks' holdings of Central Bank bonds rose from 1.25 million dinars at the end of March to 151 million dinars at the end of June.

ENVOY IN LEBANON DISCUSSES AL-QADHDHAFI INITIATIVE

NC231000 Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 19025 Oct 81 pp 17-22

[Article by Lydia Georgi]

[Excerpt] The Libyan ambassador in Lebanon has stated that the newly announced Libyan initiative towards a political settlement of the Lebanese crisis has a better chance of success than past initiatives, primarily because "it will take into consideration the factors that led to past failures, the current political atmosphere, and the psychological circumstances of all the Lebanese people's communities."

Salih al-Duruqi whose official title is secretary of the Popular Committee of the Libyan Arab Brotherhood Office (Embassy), told MONDAY MORNING in a private interview last week that the Libyan initiative, which was being launched with the knowledge of Damascus and in consultation with it, was not incompatible with the efforts of the Arab follow-up committee, the Saudi-Kuwaiti-Syrian-Lebanese body formed by an Arab summit to settle the Lebanese crisis.

The committee, he said, represented the Arab league, including Libya, and "it follows that the success of the committee's mission is not incompatible with our initiative--an initiative which we hope will deal with the problem in more depth."

The Libyan initiative was first announced by the Libyan leader, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, in a speech last September 1 marking the 12th anniversary of the revolution that brought him to power.

The "practical steps" to be taken by Libya towards a political settlement in Lebanon and the timing of those steps would be decided in the light of discussions the Libyan Embassy was now having with all major parties in Lebanon, al-Duruqi said.

Those discussions would identify "the common denominator...in the views of all the influential parties," he said, stressing that the talks would not touch on "the firm principles that link Lebanon with its Arab nation--principles which are not open to discussion, regardless of the differences of view on the details."

Asked whether he believed that his government could reconcile the views of such hostile parties as the rightist Phalangist Party and former President Sulayman Franjiyah, al-Duruqi said that Franjiyah's actions were guided by his "national awareness of the dangerous point the Lebanese crisis has reached"--the same "awareness" that prompted the Libyan initiative.

"We have sensed in him (Franjiyah) a strong interest in the success of the Arab role in Lebanon," al-Duruqi added. "At any rate, it is not our task to sponsor reconciliations between any of the groups, but to stop the hemorrhage which has gone beyond Lebanon and begun to pose a threat to the Arab struggle."

Al-Duruqi was asked how Libya hoped to deal with the Shi'ite community in view of the often expressed Shi'ite hostility to Libya after the disappearance of the Shi'ite leader, Imam Musa al-Sadr, in 1978. The Libyan diplomat rejected the question, stating that it was impossible for hostility to exist between the Shi'ite community and the Libyan revolution.

Noting that Libya "does not deal with sects" and "refuses to consecrate sectarianism," al-Duruqi said, "the Shi'ite are part of the Arab nation...and we work for their interests. Most of the people who benefit from the services we offer in various (Lebanese) regions are members of the noble Shi'ite sect, because of their presence in the most needy regions."

He added: "In our continuing contacts, we will request a meeting with the higher Shi'ite Council, with the (Shi'ite) Amal movement, with the (Shi'ite) front for the preservation of the south and with other bodies that can be of benefit to us as we seek to determine the details of our initiative."

Al-Duruqi admitted that Libya had provided funds and arms to "all the Lebanese organizations which announced their commitment to the Arab identity of Lebanon and to the protection of the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon." Despite the fact that the Libyan "Jamahiriyah" valued the security and sovereignty of Lebanon, he said, it had found itself forced to intervene on the side of those parties when it had sensed the danger posed to the Palestinian resistance which was present in Lebanon due to "unavoidable circumstances."

Libya's involvement in the Lebanese conflict, however, did not rule it out as a mediator towards a political settlement, "since we are now certain that all parties have accepted the impossiblity of a military solution and the inability of any party to crush the other," al-Duruqi said.

Noting that Syria and Libya were "bound together by an announcement of union," he stressed that any step taken by either country, including the Libyan initiative in Lebanon, would necessarily serve the national goals the two countries had agreed upon. Col al-Qadhdhafi had informed Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad of his initiative before announcing it last September, and Libya and Syria "are in constant agreement and consultation," he said.

Asked whether the initiative had been officially proposed to the Lebanin Government, al-Duruqi said this would be done shortly, but he noted that he had discussed the matter with Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan in September, and that the prime minister had welcomed the Libyan move and offered advice which might improve its chances of success. (Shortly after this interview was conducted last Wednesday, al-Duruqi visited Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus, discussed the Libyan initiative and told reporters later that Butrus had welcomed it.)

Libya this summer formally offered to provide Lebanon with an air defense network to protect Lebanese territory against Israeli air raids. In his interview with

MONDAY MORNING, al-Duruqi emphasized that the offer still stood, but he added that the actual installation of the defense network depended on a political settlement of the Lebanese crisis, which would involve national accord on the question of the Lebanese army and Lebanon's defense policy.

"Nevertheless," he said, "the Lebanese authorities alone have the right to discuss the timing and manner of imylementation."

In his "acceptance in principle" of the Libyan offer, Premier al-Wazzan said that any weapons offered to Lebanon gratis would be thankfully received on condition that they be in the hands of the Lebanese exclusively. The leftist Lebanese National Movement and al-Wazzan himself have both stated, however, that full use of the Lebanese army for security duties must await a reorganization of the army to make it "more balanced" and acceptable to all parties in Lebanon.

On another subject, al-Duruqi suggested that Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's public assurances that he would continue the policies of his assassinated predecessor, Anwar al-Sadat, should not be taken seriously yet.

"History has taught us that no ruler or leader walks along the path of his predecessor, although he may claim to at the beginning of his regime," he said. "At any rate, the final word will be said by the Egyptian people and armed forces if Mubarak tries to stay on the path of treason.... Egypt will return to the movement of the Arab struggle more quickly than the enemies of the Arab nation imagine."

And when that happened, "There will no longer be what you call 'Egyptian-Libyan relations'; there will be a merger and a fusion of two parts of one land and one people." Al-Duruqi said, adding: "The same applies to Sudan."

CSO: 4300/31

BRIEFS

HUNGARIANS FLYING LIBYAN PLANES--Hungary has recently sent a number of pilots to Libya to operate Soviet-made Libyan air force aircraft, according to a report in the Saudi paper AL-MAJALLAH. According to the paper, the mission of the Hungarian pilots was coordinated with the Soviet tnion. To date it had only been disclosed that Cuban pilots were serving in the Libyan air force. [Text] [TA271108 Tel Aviv YA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Oct 81]

CSO: 4423/25

AFP DESCRIBES MOROCCO'S 'MAGINOT OF SAND'

NC281028 Paris AFP in English 1005 GMT 28 Oct 81

[By Jean-Christophe Mitterrand]

[Text] Smara, Western Sahara, 28 Oct (AFP)--Moroccan troops were today watchful but not on maximum alert along the "Maginot of Sand" defence line protecting what Morocco calls "useful Sahara'--the El Ayn Port, Bu Acraa phosphate mines and Smara Holy City, "gateway" to Sahara's disputed southern and central areas.

Moroccan troops have been battling polisario independence front forces for the past two weeks since a lightning polisario attack against the Moroccan fortress of Guelta Zemmur.

The polisario, which is fighting for the independence of the former Spanish Sahara, claim to have destroyed the "Maginot of Sand," completed last January by Morocco to protect the main towns in northern Sahara.

For the first time this year the Moroccan army has allowed a newsman to travel by road along the entire length of this 450-km (280-mile) defence line, and visit its many strongpoints.

The two-day trip from Tan-Tan in Southern Morocco to El Ayun, via Smara, was made without any military escort, just a guide in an ordinary car.

The "Maginot of Sand" is formed by a rampart of sand about four metres (12 feet) high fashioned by bulldozers.

Strongpoints have been built every five to six kms (two-and-a-half to the three miles), each garrisoned by 300 to 500 troops.

A Moroccan officer noted that the polisario, using mobile hard-hitting commando columns, had frequently attempted to halt construction, and fighting had sometimes been very heavy.

But since the line's completion, he said, the fighting had died down considerably. The last battle of the kind had been on 22 August at Khraybichat, 50 kms (30 miles) north of Smara.

The polisario had tried to infiltrate troops between two of the defence lines' strongpoints, relatively far from each other, after penetrating the protective minefield set all along the defence line.

But Moroccan troops, equipped with radar, had spotted the enemy and called up artillery and a special intervention combat unit.

A polisario political commissar and a "military leader" had been killed, and a vehicle destroyed in the middle of the minefield.

In Smara and other main towns in the area, life is normal and business is flourishing with the presence of so many soldiers.

There is extensive building in El Ayun and whole new residential areas are going up.

On Sundays, local merchants drive down the line in trucks to sell goats and hens while soldiers relax by playing football, often beside an artillery battery.

An officer in Smara explained that Morocco dominated "useful Sahara" with the "Maginot of Sand."

He said: "Polisario can travel all over the rest of the country which is practically uninhabited. It will finally collapse for it does not have limitless resources in men and material."

Meanwhile, 20 Moroccan air force French Mirage-F1 and American F-5 jet fighter-bombers were flying continuous missions against the enemy despite poor weather conditions.

CSO: 4500/29

OFFICIAL INDICATES WILLINGNESS TO LIMIT ACCESS TO FACILITIES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 240, 26 Sep 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyas: "Oman Will Back Away From American Facilities, If the Gulf States Pay $2 Billion"]

[Text] The foreign ministers of the Gulf states have again gathered around the conference table in Ta'if. The six "Gulf knights" have come to understand that accomplishments made in the meetings of the ministerial council of the Gulf Cooperation Council so far have been of great importance, but are still diminished by the lack of discussion regarding political and strategic priorities, i.e., the relationship with the West, and the foreign connections of each of the council nations.

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Kuqaiti foreign minister, opened the conversation by asking Qais al-Zawawi, the foreign minister of Oman, about the matter of U.S. facilities in Oman, and whethr they would increase or diminish the strategic dangers faced by the Arab Gulf nations.

Qais al-Zawawi replied to Shaykh Sabah's questions by saying: "The subject of American facilities in Oman has never been a mystery. The questioning about it continues, and its plusses and minuses are explored. Therefore, the subject of U.S. facilities in Oman must be put in its hisorical framework, so that the reasons and motives for it can be discussed. The American facilities were given after the treaty of friendship and cooperation between South Yemen and the Soviet Union was signed in November 1979. Moreover, the agreement between Musqat and Washington was made after the seizure of the American hostages in Teheran and the American-Iranian crisis of November 1979 which continued throughout 1980. This constituted a threat to the stability of the region. This was also done after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the apread of the Soviet occupaion of that country, and the escalation of the international situation because of it. All these factors made Oman aware that the Soviet presence was encircling it from Afghanistan and the Indian sub-continent, and was threatening to bring down Iran in its grasp. The Soviet danger was even much closer than that, through South Yemen and its treaty with Moscow, which has been reinforced by the Soviet military presence in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, by virtue of its relations with the Ethiopian regime.

"When Oman found itself less than 40 minutes away from Soviet aircraft, whether from Kabul or Addis Ababa, the matter of facilities was broached with the United States.

"Our feelings about Soviet encirclement drawing closer to us caused us to discuss with the United States the matter of giving them military facilities in Oman, in exchange for developing Omani military installations, in terms of airfields and ports, for which Oman does not have the financial capability, so as to put them in a defensive posture, capable of deterring any attack or the possibility of a Soviet attack, either directly or through South Yemen or Ethiopia. This also includes training and arming the Omani armed forces, in a fashion that would be in keeping with the dangerous developments surrounding the region, and in accord with developing the military facilities required to protect the country's security. Washington accepted developing these installations in the required military fashion, in exchange for giving them the right to use them when necessary.

"The American approval must have an official agreement ratified by the Congress, so that the U.S. government can pay the costs of developing and outfitting these facilities, which will amount to $2 billion over 10 years, because Washington cannot spend this amount of money without an official agreement ratified by the U.S. Congress. However, the Gulf states could easily pay out amounts of this size without any written agreements. We in Oman believe that the facilities agreement with the United States is of itself a deterrent against any direct or indirect Soviet adventure."

We Will Cancel the Facilities In Exchange for $2 Billion

At this juncture, Qais al-Zawawi stopped talking for a brief period, and then said in his usual low voice that his country was prepared to gradually abandon the American facilities agreement, if the GCC nations were prepared to pay $2 billion over the next 10 years to develop the same Omani military installations.

At this point, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad became excited and said: "We are prepared to pay this amount in exchange for abolishing these facilities."

Al-Zawawi smiled at Shaykh Sabah's enthusiasm and said: "It is not enough for you alone to be prepared; on the contrary, all the council nations must be prepared."

Shaykh Sabah replied that he was prepared to take the matter on his shoulders. None of the ministers present commented on the Omani proposal, nor on the Kuqaiti reply. The council was content to take note of the Omani position regarding the matter of facilities. However, Shaykh Sabah told al-Zawawi again: "Don't concern yourself with their silence; I will follow up the matter with them." The ministers present did not add anything to the matter.

At that point, Shaykh Sabah asked al-Zawawi: Why not submit the facilities agreement to the council for debate?

Al-Zawawi replied that his country was prepared to file a copy of the facilities agreement with the secretariat general, if all the council nations were ready to file copies of all their agreements with foreign nations in the secretariat general.

Those present were silent, and not one of them said anything. Shaykh Sabah and al-Zawawi considered the matter closed.

Faysal: And the Israeli Danger?

While the Omani paper discussed the GCC's political priorities, the Saudi paper, which was a development of the Omani paper tasked by the last Abu Dhabi conference, also discussed these priorities from various angles. The Saudi paper stressed that if the Soviet Union was a threat to the Gulf, that does not mean that the United States should be brought into the area, because this does not serve the matter. The ministers debated the political priorities at length and studied the situation in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal concentrated on the fact that the Gulf priorities are Arab and Islamic priorities.

Qais al-Zawawi said that the more Gulf self-defense power was increased and established militarily, the more the dependence on Western presence was decreased. However, no matter what happened, that would not decrease the Soviet presence in the region. The conflict between the two superpowers has been imposed on the region. Therefore, no matter what progress is made in the Middle East question, that would not cancel out the American-Soviet struggle over the Arabian Penninsula. The confrontation between Moscow, and those nations allied with it in the region, and the group of Gulf nations would continue.

When the Saudi minister reaffirmed that Israel was the real danger to the region, which does not abolish the Soviet danger but only equals it, the Omani minister raised the subject of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia, recalling what the South Yemeni president, 'Ali Nasr Muhammad, said to the effect that the three nations have the goal of confronting "the increasing military activities of the United States and some other Arab nations in the region." The Omani minister demanded criticism of this treaty, by virtue of the fact that it was a direct threat to the security of the region and an attempt to bring it into the circle of international alliances.

Kuwait objected to the principle of direct criticism, because it would give the impression that the GCC constitutes a military and political bloc hostile to the South Yemeni-Libyan-Ethiopian bloc. Saudi Arabia also had reservations about the Omani request, because that would affect the Gulf, Arab and international actions regarding approval of Prince Fahd's initiative pertaining to the Middle East question. Opening any peripheral battle with any Arab party would lead to a division in the Arab position, when Prince Fahd's plan is proposed within the Arab League framework at the next Arab summit, considering that it is a possible and reasonable basis for an Arab initiative to solve the Middle East question. Therefore, the final joint statement did not refer to this treaty directly, but was content with allusions. Moreover, that was also Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal's position at the press conference that he held at the end of the meetings, when he said, in reply to a question about this tripartite treaty, that the six foreign ministers had discussed it, but that they did not have any detailed or clear information about it. However, he alluded to the fact that this matter was disturbing to many of the Arab states, and must be studied within the framework of the Arab mutual defense agreement.

Perhaps the most important thing disturbing some Arab parties about this treaty is the introduction of a non-Arab state into an agreement between two Arab states, especially since Mengistu has recently begun to attempt to arrange negotiatios with Somalia to solve his pending problem with it. He has also begun to discuss a solution to the Eritream problem, by a rapprochement with Sudanese President Ja'afar

Numayri, and by his agreeing to hold a Sudanese-Egyptian-Ethiopian summit conference to solve the problems of the Nile waters.

Therefore, many observers question the Ethiopian interests in entering into an Arab-Arab alliance. These observers believe that the only explanation is that Moscow pressured Ethiopia to join in this treaty. These observers see a connection between this analysis and Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's visit to Abu Dhabi and Kuwait, coming from Addis Ababa. Informed Gulf sources confirm the al-Qadhdhafi asked both Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan, ruler of the United Arab Emirates, and Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, to give financial and military assistance to Ethiopia, or else Ethiopia "would change the oil into red oil." These sources commented on this report by saying that Ethiopia has been able to solve its economic problems and its problems with Somalia and Eritrea through cooperation and friendship with the Gulf Arabs, not by unjustifiably stirring them up.

Frankness... Frankness

The most important factor of the second day's meetings of the Ta'if conference was the desire of all the GCC's members to develop the council's position regarding the issues, in such a way as to strengthen the feeling of more gain than loss. Accordingly, the positions of most of the nations were calm and flexible, and not rigid or stubborn.

The six Gulf ministers wanted to deal with their Arab brothers outside of the Council on the basis of maintaining a minimum relationship with the nations, so as to keep them in the friends' column and not get them all stirred up. They also wanted to gather together the Arab ranks regardless of the positions of any of the GCC's factions, whether they be negative or positive.

The second day of the 3-day Ta'if conference has passed, and there has been profound political discussion. The frankness among the six Gulf statesmen has become as if it were a normal occurrence which happens in the course of transitory affairs.

The smile on the faces of those sitting around the table have broadened, and they understand that it is the first step along the path to Gulf cooperation, despite the fact that it is the most difficult. The second step is the most dnagerous, as to profits and losses in the changing world of politics.

The path has appeared, as if it were completely insecure.

7005
CSO: 4404/34

NEW POLICIES OF ARAB INVESTMENT AGENCY DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 29, Aug 81 pp 66-67

[Article by Husayb Abu Dhurgham: "Arab Investment Agency in New Steps"]

[Text] The public session of the Arab Investment Agency, held in Riyadh at the end of last June, contained several developments this year that indicate the board of directors' desire to give a new thrust to the agency, which was established in 1975 to be a model for official Arab cooperation in the fields of investment and growth financing. Here is a report which reviews the latest developments regarding the agency's activities, investments and financial results.

For the first time since the founding of the Arab Investment Agency in 1975, this year wil see a distribution of the major part of the net profits for 1980. This amounts to about $20.7 million to the shareholders, 5 percent of the value of the shares. Consequently, as was the custom, there will not be a total transfer of the profits to the legal reserve and general reserve accounts. If it is taken into consideration that the subscribed capital actually amounts to $290.5 million (from the original $300 million), the total profits to be distributed will be a little more than 14.5 million.

Expansion Steps

In a second significant step, the agency has decided to open a foreign banking unit in Bahrain, which will administer a portfolio of investments and carry out various financial operations. It was also decided that the agency will begin new operations, such as confirming letters of guarantee, and financing the contracts of Arab and non-Arab firms that have obtained commitmens to projects in the Arab World and that need financing. This is important with respect to Arab firms, especially since it makes a source of financing available to them which they might not be able to find in foreign banks, and if they did find it, it would be at a higher percentage, in view of the fact that the foreign bank would add a foreign market percent for the risks involved to the general cost of the loan. The cost of the risks of lending money would remain lower in any Arab country in the case of an Arab financing agency, supported by official Arab authorities, The agency's deputy director general, Mr. Jad Suwaydan, says that such financial services as these, in addition to the agency's resolve to carry out primary guarantee activities, and to guarantee completion of important projects, represents an indirect incentive to undertake economic projects in the Arab World, in view of the reduced cost of financing and insuring the covering of the necessary guarantee. These services include governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, as well as joint-stock companies in the private sector.

Balance Between the Profit Motive and Growth Needs

Despite its formation as an investment agency operating in accordance with market considerations, and especially aimed at making profits, the Arab Investment Agency as tried to maintain a kind of balance between commercial considerations and its resupposed role as an instrument for growth and for financing vital projects within the Arab World, whether through making loans at market interest rates, or through direct participation with a specific percentage of the capital. The Arab Investment Agency, therefore, differs from commercial banks in being able to accept a greater share of risks than any commercial bank could accept. On the other hand, it also differs from development funds, particularly the Arab Development Fund, in the fact that the latter makes long-term loans to infrastructure projects, whereas the agency concentrates on production projects, and at times directly participates in them. Consequently, it enters into the project's administration, and within this framework, bears a basic part of the responsibility for directing the project and making it successful.

Distribution of Obligations by Sector and Geographically

The annual report of agency operations for 1979 shows the distribution of financial obligations to all the economic sectors despite a greater concentration on the production sectors. Agricultural industry projects, for example, monopolized about 31.66 percent of the agency's total obligations. The (finishing industries) obtained 13.02 percent, oil and mining 21.06 and banking services, insurance, tourism and others about 25.92 percent. Governmental sectors received about 8.34 percent.

On the geographic level, the largest share of investments went to Sudan (26.67 percent), with the majority of these investments represented by the agency's participation in a sugar company, amounting to $21.76 million (14 percent of the capital). Moreover, the loans granted to the project amount to nearly $48.25 million, which makes the agency's obligations to the sugar company alone the equivalent of 23 percent of the total investments in 1979. In view of the decline in the value of the Sudanese pound since that time, the value of the agency's investment in the sugar company has declined by $4.1 million up to the end of 1979.

Following Sudan in value of investments are Algeria (19.47 percent), Egypt (12.06 percent), Morocco (9.7 percent), Saudi Arabia (7.3 percent), Jordan (6.3 percent), joint companies (5.63 percent), Qatar (4.65 percent) and Tunisia (2.38 percent).

Development of Investments and Profits

The Arab Investment Agency's principal investments were distributed between two main types:

1. Short-term investments, especially comprising financial notes, certificates of deposit and deposits in currencies, as well as some short-term loans.

2. Medium and long-term investments, particularly including participation in projects, and medium and long-term loans.

The development of the agency's general budget should be noted. The tangible development in the sector of direct participation increased in value from $67.9 million in 1979 to $109.8 million in 1980. The initial figures for the first 5 months of 1981 incidate a modest development in these participations, which have increased to $113.4 million. However, loans icreased some 31 percent during this period, after having significantly declined in 1979. The portfolio of financial notes continues without any development worth mentioning, perhaps as a reflection of the sluggishness that dominates the bond market, influenced by rising interest rates of currencies, especially the dollar.

The Arab Investment Agency's net profits have grown uninterruptedly, amounting to $20.7 million in 1980, compared to $11.4 million in 1979 and $7.1 million in 1978. The statement of profits and losses for the years 1978-79 shows that interest on bank deposits and loans comprise the largest part of the agency's revenues (about 98 percent in 1978 and 93 percent in 1979).

Finally, there is a reference to the fact that the agency's board of directors will hold its next meeting in the Jordanian capital during next September. At this meeting it will discuss several important financial and administrative issues.

It remains to be said that the Arab Investment Agency is an outstanding experiment, and that it has specialized standing in the sphere of joint Arab action on the international level. Undoubtedly, it deserves serious and profound appreciation.

7005
CSO: 4404/32

BRIEFS

WIDESPREAD ARRESTS REPORTED--The Committee for Human Rights in Saudi Arabia implored all progressive and honorable forces in the world to join with the Saudi people in opposing the widespread arrest campaign which the Saudi regime is launching against the citizens in various parts of the country to silence opposition. In a statement distributed yesterday the committee announced that "the repressive authorities of the reactionary Sa'ud family regime are carrying out a campaign of widespread arrests in various parts of the country. This is intended to silence the opposition and intimidate our people, who are determined to carry on their difficult struggle to achieve their goals of freedom and democracy." The statement added: "The Committee to Defend Human Rights in Saudi Arabia implores all progressive and honorable forces in the world to raise the flag of solidarity with our people, break through the informational blackout imposed by the Saudi regime and expose its wicked and repressive methods." In its statemtnt the committee distributed the names of some political prisoners in Saudi prisons. They are: Turki Muhammad Ibrahim al-Turki (employee of municipality of Tarwat); Ja'far al-'Askari [ARAMCO employee); Habib Mahdi Habib (student); Shakir Salman, Ahmad Jasim al-Damin, 'Abdallah Ahmad al-'Abid, 'Abdallah Marhun Ya'qub, 'Aziz Qumbar, Fu'ad Muhammad al-Badrani, Habib 'Ali Jabir, Muhammad Sa'id al-Nimr, 'Ali Sa'id al-Nimr, 'Abd-al-Karim Sa'id al-Nimr, Ahmad Muhammad al-Faraj, Sa'ud 'Ali Hamad, 'Ali Salman 'Umar, Ja'far Muhammad Jawad al-Rih and 'Abdallah Husayn Sa'id. The statement explained that there are two persons on the wanted list whose homes were searched, and they are Ja'far Kasib Haydar and Hasan Husayn al-Ibrahim. [Text] [Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 1] 7587

CSO: 4404/6

BRIEFS

REAGAN CONGRATULATED ON AWACS DEAL--Khartoum, 29 Oct (SUNA)--President Numayri today cabled U.S. President Ronald Reagan congratulating him on his administration's success in approving the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia. The following is the text of the cable: Mr Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, the White House, Washington. Mr President, dear friend: This morning we have learned that your administration has succeeded in approving the AWACS deal with fraternal Saudi Arabia. We take this opportunity to stress to you, Mr President, that this step will have a deep positive influence on the existing fraternal relations between the United States and the Arab world. This step also pinpoints your prudent leadership which plays a positive role in establishing peace, justice and stability in the world. On this occasion we send you our warm congratulations and great appreciation for all the efforts you have exerted for the sake of this noble deed which will enable Saudi Arabia to play its role as a leading state in the region. Mr President, please accept our great appreciation. [Signed] Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, president of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan. [Text] [JN291528 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1455 GMT 29 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/57

DUBAI PROJECTS PROMOTE TOURISM

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 4

[Article by Ahmad Salim: "Domestic Tourism in Dubai Being Encouraged; 104 Million Dirhams for Improving Recreational Facilities"]

[Text] An estimated total of 103 million dirhams will be spent to improve recreational parks in Dubai in the hopes of creating a five-year plan within the framework of domestic tourism in Dubai that will reduce the tourist flow abroad.

This plan involves promoting domestic facilities, such as hotels, and opening recreational areas for families, guests, locals and foreigners, motivating them toward the recreation centers and restricted halls which are planned for construction in Dubai.

Implementation of the plan began with the agreement which was reached with a Japanese company to effect a radical change in Mushraf Park. The park will include open rides, restricted halls for families and individuals, the construction of a new restaurant and railway, electric games for children and soung grottoes. Also, the park will be landscaped, the lighting will be redone and drinking water will be provided. The Dubai municipal council earmarked the sum of 21.3 million dirhams in this year's budget for improving Mushraf and al-Safa Parks of which 12 million is for Mushraf Park. It is probable that these appropriations will fall within the estimates of the comprehensive plan given the great attention to creating extensive tourist traffic in Dubai.

Kamal Hamzah, director of Dubai Municipality, formed a health and technical committee comprising Dr. Jalal Bayumi, the municipal doctor who is in charge of the laboratory, and Sa'id Tawfiq, chief of the athletic and recreational section of the municipality, to tour all the hotels in Dubai and their recreational facilities to check out their health and technical conditions and the extent to which their employees are qualified. This committee will hold periodic meetings with the management of the hotels to work out proposals on how to create domestic tourism and will submit its report to the director of the municipality.

Sa'id Tawfiq, the recreation official of the municipality, stated in an interview yesterday that the plan includes a proposal to build a recreation park for families and children in the middle of Dubai in addition to Mushraf and al-Safa

Parks. Initial contracts have been let with three national companies to improve al-Safa Park and to construct rides for children, to add another railway and to provide air-conditioned restricted halls. He said that the plan will include construction of a legally restricted swimming pool for individuals, families and children, this having already been done at Mushraf Park. He said that consideration is being given to making full use of Dubai's natural shores to establish restricted beaches for families and in conformity with the social capabilities of the population so that the families can avoid being harassed by the Asian single men.

Safety and rescue facilities will also be provided at the beaches. Tawfiq added that local investors had begun to lean toward recreational investment and some of them had made requests to construct tourist halls and casinos in Dubai.

8389
CSO: 4304/142

BRIEFS

FIVE-YEAR PLAN CITED--The state's first five-year plan, on which the cabinet was briefed yesterday, is aimed at preserving and properly exploiting its natural resources to achieve social equality and raise the standard of living. The plan is also aimed at avoiding dependence on oil resources and selecting projects that meet a national requirement and strive to diversify sources of income in the country, taking into consideration the population increase which, according to the state's last census in December, 1980, has reached more than 1 million. The UAE news agency has learned that the UAE's first five-year plan has estimated that per capita income in the state will reach 130,000 dirhams a year by 1985, one of the plan's primary goals being a continued increase in the standard of living, both from the standpoint of consumption and services. The five-year plan involves a number of new projects in the areas of oil, agriculture, animal resources, extraction industries, transport and communications, in addition to expansion in the sectors of health and education services. During the cabinet's January, 1979, session, it had approved the proposal of the Ministry of Planning to prepare a medium-range five-year plan. The federation's Supreme Council approved preparation of a comprehensive economic development plan covering the years from January, 1981, and ending in December, 1985. The cabinet is subsequently expected to promulgate a decision to form a supreme ministerial committee for national planning for the UAE. [Text] [Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 2] 8389

DUBAI IMPORT, EXPORT FIGURES--An official source in the bureau of ports and customs in Dubai announced that during the first three months of this year commercial traffic through Dubai's primary outlets showed significant growth as it amounted to 4,381,000,000 dirhams. During that period most imports and exports transited Rashid Port since the total value of goods passing through the port was 3.35 billion dirhams with a total weight of 731,000 tons. The total value of goods transiting Jabal Port was 400 million dirhams with a total weight of 75,000 tons while al-Hamriyah Port had a total of 27.5 million dirhams with a total weight of 22,800 tons and goods worth 33.1 million dirhams and weighing 15,200 tons passed through Khor Dubai. The total value of goods transiting Dubai International Airport during the same period was 570.1 million dirhams with a weight of 8,900 tons. Machinery and means of transportation constituted the largest part of the imports during this period, followed by manufactured and raw materials, animals and foodstuffs and oils. Most of the exports comprised scrap iron, salted fish and dates. [Text] [Dubai AL-BAYAH in Arabic 30 Aug 81 p 2] 8389

INCREASE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION--New statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture show that agricultural, animal and fish production in the UAE rose during the past three years by 80.7 percent to 933.3 million dirhams in 1980. Vegetable production rose from 242.5 million dirhams in 1977 to 497 million in 1980, a rise of 105 percent. There was a 49.6 percent growth in animal production, rising to 333.9 million dirhams in 1980 as compared with 149 million in 1977. At the same time, animal production remained static during those two years at 213.4 million dirhams. The statistics showed that the area of land under cultivation during the past year was broken down as follows among various uses: fruit trees covering 71,000 dunums and representing 30 percent of the total agricultural land. Vegetables covering 46,600 dunums, that is, about 20 percent of the total cultivated land in the country. Groups covering 18,500 dunums, that is, 7.9 percent of the total land being exploited in agriculture. Graizing land covering 98,600 dunums which constitutes 42 percent of total agricultural land. [Text] [Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 29 Aug 81 p 2] 8389

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COMPANY--The Gulf Aircraft Maintenance Company is the name of the new Arab company for aircraft maintenance, which it has been decided to build in Abu Dhabi. It will be the first aircraft maintenance company in the UAE and in the Gulf states, with the exception of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both of whom have hangers and maintenance shops that are still in the developmental stage. The new company is a joint project, with capitalization of 120 million dirhams ($33 million), 60 percent from the government of Abu Dhabi and 40 percent from the Gulf Airlines owned by the governments of Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE. The company project will begin by awarding a contract to one of the consultant organizations to make a technical study and do the designs for the project. Implementation of the project will begin in 1982, to be completed within 3 years. At the end of that time, the company will be able to dispense with the maintenance workshops at Hong Kong airport, and to provide maintenance services for other aircraft in addition to the aircraft of the Gulf Airlines. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 240, 26 Sep 81 p 49] 7005

CSO: 4404/34

BRIEFS

WESTERN SAHARA SOLUTION SOUGHT--The OAU and the Arab League are currently making efforts to put an end to the tension in the Arab Mahgreb. The secretary general of the OAU, Edem Kodjo, is currently undertaking a tour which will take him to Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. The tour began yesterday. Edem Kodjo said in a statement to the Kenya News Agency: What we want to avoid is a situation which, if allowed to continue, may jeopardize the cease-fire in the region. As long as a peaceful solution is not found, there will always be fighting, he added while commenting on the recent fightings in Guelta Zemmur. Meanwhile, the OAU special committee on Western Sahara will meet next month to hear the report of the secretary general of the Pan-African organization. This was made known in a statement issued by the presidency of the OAU. There will also be a summit of the Arab League next month. This was made known by the league's secretary general, who called on the countries bordering Western Sahara to cool their tempers and avoid worsening the Saharan problem. [Text] [AB260930 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 0700 GMT 26 Oct 81]

CSO: 4519/28

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS DISCUSSED

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 18 Aug 81 p 5

[Article by Anwar al-'Anisi: "A Step Along the Path to Advancement and Development of Agriculture in Our Country"]

[Text] Last Sunday the Office of Agriculture in San'a' Province opened a special course on horticulture (grafting and nursery work), sponsored by Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries Dr Ahmad al-Hamdani. The opening of the course was attended by a number of experts and specialists from the Ministry of Agriculture and Mr Yeaman, charge d'affaires, of the U.S. Embassy in San'a'.

This course falls among the efforts and general concerns of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in the field of developing Yemeni agriculture and improving agricultural crops and products. The present course is aimed at training a number of local cadres to advise farmers and train them in grafting, which soon will be done to improve and increase the cultivation of citrus fruits in general in various fields, nurseries and farms. The course lasts until next Sunday, 23 August, and includes a number of theoretical activities and lectures as well as a number of practical applications. This course is also being attended by ten delegates representing a number of provinces and agricultural projects in these provinces.

When asked about the importance of such courses, Dr Ahmad al-Hamdani, Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries, said: "The courses offered by the Ministry of Agriculture were started to give an opportunity, first and foremost, to the employee in the ministry to take advantage of new knowledge and information. A course was held recently in the field of veterinary science, and other sessions have dealt with agricultural guidance, in Ta'izz, and this current session in the field of planting fruit trees, especially citrus fruits. These courses give an opportunity to take advantage of new experience and consequently enable the employee to bring better knowledge and more information to his work. We in the ministry attach great importance to them and support them, and we hope that this course expands and becomes permanent."

We asked Dr al-Hamdani what reasons or needs led him to set up the present course in the field of horticulture and consequently what goals this course could serve.

He replied: "First of all, we want to alert our brother employees as far as possible to the importance of fruit trees, their role in the national economy, and the need

to develop large-scale cultivation of fruit trees in different seasons and limited locations judged by the nature of the climate suitable to each tree.

"This is what is hoped for from this course. However, fruit trees have dimensions of great importance because we could become at least partially self-sufficient in fruit. This is my view of the subject. If the brothers come out of the course with just this little idea, we will have gained something. The purpose is to alert them and create an awareness of the importance of this aspect."

Dr al-Rahmani spoke of the situation of agriculture in general now and the overall picture of the future of agriculture in our country. He said: "I can say that agriculture needs a great deal of encouragement, because in the first Five-Year Plan the state concentrated on the economic structure, supplying well water as far as possible and building small dams. More important than all of this, the ministry often was able to supply improved seeds to the farmers in order to produce larger quantities. The ministry also was able to combat pests and insects which were destroying the crops, and naturally this increased the farmers' production. Many things may be available in the future. For example, there may be better methods of irrigation, because in my view the farmers waste a great deal of water, and the method of water distribution is still primitive. We must stop using these open irrigation ditches from which water evaporates and is lost. We hope that these new methods reach the field of irrigation here.

"There is also another very important field which we hope is included in the next Five-Year Plan in a serious and positive way. We are indeed interested in this subject, that of agricultural marketing, because we cannot have the farms produce a great deal of high-quality products and then find that there is no market for them at home or abroad. It is our great hope that the state, in cooperation with the Ministry of Supply and Trade and the Ministry of Economy and Industry, will aim at the production of certain agricultural goods and establish food factories. This trend does exist, and we in the Ministry of Agriculture are now concentrating on meetings to come up with unified programs. We have had continuous, repeated meetings with the General Federation for Development, the Ministry of Supply, the Ministry of Economy and the Agricultural Credit Bank. God willing, we will emerge with a complete picture and practical programs which we can submit to the Council of Ministers for approval. Then, in light of these programs, we can draw up a clearcut marketing policy. Naturally we will need central markets so that the farmers can get their produce to market.

"The purpose of this is to bring agricultural products to the citizen at very reasonable prices so that no crops will be wasted.

"You will soon hear about this subject, which in my opinion is the subject of the hour. There is also a very important aspect. There are programs in both Ta'izz and Dhamar connected with the subject of loss in storage, because our farmers store their crops by very old methods and lose large quantities of these crops to mice and insects.

"For example, a study was published in Ta'izz in which experts visited several villages over a 2-year period. They found that the loss ranged up to 15 percent of the farms' supply. This in itself is considered wrong because this is the only

product, and consequently it is considered a loss to the national product. Also, in Ibb we found that in some villages the loss of those stored crops reached 21 to 25 percent, and we cannot be satisfied with this. Indeed, the experts have drawn up new designs for barrels to stop such waste. We hope to expand these programs to other areas so that farmers may take advantage of them, and consequently we can preserve what was produced in bad conditions.

"These are our ideas, and it is our great hope that the next Five-Year Plan, with clear and sincere guidance from the president and the prime minister, will confirm that attention to agriculture is basic and necessary. We are communicating this same interest to our fellow employees in the ministry and the agricultural projects. We are concentrating our efforts now in hope of achieving all of these desires and ambitions."

Engineer 'Ali al-Barti, director of the Office of Gardens in the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, says: "The importance of this course lies in the fact that through it we can enlighten the Yemeni farmer and help him to achieve the principle of self-sufficiency in seedings, especially in fruit trees, and consequently we can increase the cultivation of those trees and improve their yield.

"For example, we are purchasing seedlings from other states in hard currency because we feel that we need them to improve and develop our agriculture.

"It is our great hope that the trainees will leave the course with a good advantage which will enable them to achieve the goals set for the course."

7587
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END

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Near East/North Africa Report

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EGYPTIAN SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY ACTIVITIES

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16 November 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2432

EGYPTIAN SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY ACTIVITIES

[This report contains selected items on activities of the Egyptian opposition Socialist Labor Party taken from the Arabic-language weekly AL-SHA'B, organ of the SLP]

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SHUKRI RESPONDS TO AL-SADAT ON DEMOCRACY, EXISTENCE OF OPPOSITION VOICES

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 110, 2 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim Shukri: "People Are Makers of Parties and the Labor Party Leads the Ranks"]

[Text] President al-Sadat opened discussion of democratic practices and the need for the presence of a strong opposition. Regardless of the lengthy dialog in which the president dealt with the Labor Party and its leadership--a dialog that, undoubtedly, was characterized by tense statements and by concentrating on particulars with the aim of undermining the weight of the party and of slighting its leadership--we will not wait to reply because the people have spared us the need for this by doubling sales of AL-SHA'B.

Moreover, support for the Labor Party and the perception of AL-SHA'B as the mouthpiece for all inclinations and factions in the opposition, with its various directions and tendencies, constitutes a reply to the attempts to cast doubt on the Labor Party leadership.

I say this despite the desperate efforts and fearsome pressures to drive a wedge in the party's ranks because this party actually does represent a broad front whose ranks have been opened to a number of honorable patriots, some of whom had been affiliated with the Young Egypt Movement and with the Socialist Party, some with the Muslim Brotherhood movement, some with the new al-Wafd and the new generation that started its political life with the late leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and with the 23 July revolution.

Disregarding Facts

In his statements to the People's Assembly, Maj Gen Nabawi Isma'il, minister of interior, tried to depict events so as to convey certain meanings, even if this meant a failure to be accurate by disregarding some facts and including others. The minister also tried to underline the presence of Khalid Muhyi al-Din at the press conference [as published], saying that Khalid came to represent the communists and that he has made contributions to the party. The minister of interior forgets that Khalid Muhyi al-Din is the secretary of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party, one of the three parties with which the democratic experience started. President al-Sadat boasts of this experience, saying that he sped up the rise of the parties after the emergence of the [political] platforms.

The minister in his statements then intentionally ignored the fact that those present represented factions and currents other than the Egyptian left. The minister failed to mention the presence of Fathi Radwan, the chairman of the National Party existing before the revolution and the current chairman of the Preparatory Committee, and the presence of Mumtaz Nassar, representative of the constituents of the National Front Party. Nabawi then attacked Shaykh Salah Abu-Isma'il, considering that he represents the large masses that demand implementation of the Islamic Shari'a, and failed to note that the shaykh was present.

AL-SHA'B Reflects All Inclinations

We thank God, may He be praised, for His blessing. Whoever scrutinizes this edition of AL-SHA'B will find all the inclinations (excluding the ruling party) are represented in the writers who have expressed their views and are reflected in the paper either in the form of party statements or in the form of articles reflecting the views and inclinations of these parties:

A statement and a reply from the founders of the new al-Wafd.

A statement from the Unionist National Grouping Party.

A statement and a reply from Shaykh Salah Abu-Ismail.

A statement from the Coalition Front.

An article by Fathi Radwan, the chairman of the National Party's Preparatory Committee.

An article by Muhammad 'Abd al-Shafi, representative of the Socialist Liberals.

The statement of the Permanent Congress of the Islamic Call.

AL-SHA'B has gathered the opinions of all these men to convey them to the people, considering that the national papers have closed their doors to all opinions and are monopolized by the ruling party. If these papers publish anything about the opposition generally, and about the Labor Party in particular, what is published is nothing but assults and articles fraught with poison and lies. If somebody tries to tell us: Here you are enjoying freedom of expression and writing whatever you want in your paper, then our answer will be that the freedom of the press advocated by President al-Sadat can only be that as long as we are careful to state things correctly and to maintain the ethics of dialog. This is something that is missing in the statements of some officials.

I know that some writers will scream, saying:

Here is the Labor Party and its leadership cooperating with the reactionaries after having coordinated with the leftists. My answer to all these allegations is that we are a party that has its own program. This is a program that contains the essence of a national experience that started in the 1930's and has gained its positive aspects from its progression, from its participation in the Egyptian

events, including the bright side of the popular struggle before the revolution, from its participation in the positive aspects of the 23 July revolution, from its adherence to the sound essence of the principles of the 15 May revolution and from its vigilant aspiration for a sound and sincere democratic action resulting in the rise of parties and in the presence of opinion and counter opinion.

Similar Demands by Nationalist Forces

Each of these forces that line up to express their opinion through AL-SHA'B represents an independent program, thinking and approach. There may be a slight or a big difference among them but they all cling to their right to free expression and to sound democratic practices and they reject the imposition of shackles on the formation of parties. Moreover, there is consensus among all these forces on the need to unite the Arab ranks in the service of the Egyptian people and the Arab nation. These forces are also in unanimous agreement that the consequences of Camp David have been destructive to the unity of the Arab ranks, even to the unity of the Islamic ranks and to the nonaligned movement. These forces reject the normalization and say that the self-rule agreements have failed to solve the Palestinian issue or the issue of the Arabism of Jerusalem because Israel doesn't actually want to recognize the Palestinian people and their right to their homeland and their state. They further say that the Camp David accords have not realized true or comprehensive peace for the area.

These forces also refuse to have the ruling party in sole control of the information media and of the press and they believe that the parties do not have equal opportunities to engage in their activities. They also see that there are several laws whose compatibility with the constitution is dubious. The Supreme Constitutional Court is currently examining more than one law whose constitutionality has to be decided.

Strong Opposition Comes Not Through Decrees

I say: Now that President al-Sadat has opened the discussion on democratic practices and believes that such practices are realized through the existence of strong and large-scale opposition, we agree with him on this. But we disagree that this goal can be attained through decrees or through arrangements made by the ruling party or by President al-Sadat. We have also heard it said that action is what builds this strong opposition. We agree with the statement that action is what leads us to sound results. Here we are exercising our right to call for the existence of this strong opposition by organizing the ranks, by determining the points of agreement and by making some people stop imagining that casting doubts on and slandering those who disagree with their opinion is the sound path of democratic dialog.

We have grown up on this good earth and our bodies will be buried in it and we have all drunk copiously from the Nile. We find bright spots in the histories of all those who speak up and lead the opposition factions nowadays. Every man makes mistakes and it is untenable that the leaders of the ruling party are a select group of pure people who have monopolized all virtues and who have avoided all mistakes.

The procession is marching forward and we welcome any constructive dialog in which the acknowledged rules are respected.

Let those writers who want to fish for mistakes and who want to flatter those whom they imagine to be in control of all favors and good things--let those writers stop and let them learn that God is the only giver and that He is the one in control of affairs.

God is great, and long live the people.

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AL-WAFD LEADER SIRAJ AL-DIN SCOLDS AL-SADAT FOR ABUSIVE ATTACKS

Cairo AL'SHA'B in Arabic No 110, 2 Jun 81 p 10

[Text of Siraj al-Din letter to President al-Sadat]

[Text] AL-SHA'B has received from Fu'ad Siraj al-Din, chairman of the new al-Wafd Party, the text of the letter which he had sent to President Anwar al-Sadat on 23 May. Following is the text of the letter:

His Excellency President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, president of the Arab Republic of Egypt and chairman of the Democratic National Party,

A good greeting:

Your Excellency has persistently launched a severe attack on al-Wafd and its leaders, headed by Mustafa al-Nahhas, the unforgettable patriotic leader, and on the new al-Wafd from the time of its foundation, up to its dissolution and until today. My person has borne the lion's share of this attack. In this you have used all the information media, including the press, the radio and the television, and the platform of the People's Assembly. Hardly a speech or a statement made by Your Excellency is free of these ferocious assaults and these violent attacks. In these speeches and statements, you have mentioned many incidents that do not agree with the proven historical facts.

These assaults recently have grown noticeably more violent. The assault against Mustafa al-Nahhas, against my person and against the pre-1952 politicians and rulers generally has escalated to the point where it is impossible to remain silent, even though we have committed ourselves to this silence unwillingly since the dissolution of the new al-Wafd in 1978. Regrettably, this escalation in the assault against us has been accompanied by a similar escalation in the use of violent phrases and strong words that exceed every acknowledged tradition in the world of politics. What magnifies the enormity of the matter is that all this is uttered by the head of the state.

You have attributed to us in your numerous and successive speeches and statements many qualities, including, for example, "lowliness, obscenity, poor manners, rudeness" and "flies." Matters have reached the point where you mentioned in your speech at Alexandria University on 16 May that the British used to "beat us with shoes" when Your Excellency said:

"The British ambassador was sitting next to me during the dinner banquet given at the embassy in honor of Prince Philip and I told the ambassador: You are not to blame. This is because if the pasha, the man in high position, the prime minister and the minister come to them like flies under their feet, they should treat them like this.

"One of them says he is a pasha and the son of a pasha. What is this? What is this? The British used to beat them with shoes."

We, Mr President, were not among the men beaten with shoes. Those who fought the British in the 1951 canal battle, who fired bullets at them and who killed dozens of their officers and troops in a national battle to which the whole world attested, cannot be beaten with shoes!

Those who stopped the British ships with force when the ships tried to cross the 'Aqabah Gulf in 1951 so as to preserve Egypt's sovereignty over its territorial waters cannot be truly said to have been beaten with shoes! To familiarize yourself with the historical facts, I wish you would refer to the writings of the university professors you were addressing. In this respect in particular, may I refer you to the book of Dr Hamid Sultan, professor of international law at Cairo University, second edition, 1965.

Perhaps Your Excellency doesn't remember the instance of the British ship Empire Ross which on 11 [month missing] 1951 tried to cross the Gulf of 'Aqabah loaded with oil and heading for the port of Elat. The Egyptian authorities stopped it by force, posted a military guard on board and detained it. Egypt in this incident exercised its right to full sovereignty over its territorial waters. When England protested this measure, Egypt replied strongly, rightfully and with dignity. Then on 29 July 1951, Egypt received an official letter from the British Embassy acknowledging Egypt's right and sovereignty over its territorial waters and pledging to observe the procedures in force when its ships cross Egyptian territorial waters.

Can it be said that those who abrogated the 1936 treaty, defying thousands of troops in the canal base, were beaten with shoes!

Mr President,

These phases are new to the dictionary of Egyptian politics and I hope you will believe me that they leave the worst possible impact on the feelings of the Egyptian people. There is also no doubt that the people are pained most deeply by these incessant attacks on Mustafa al-Nahhas, their departed patriotic leader. Mustafa al-Nahhas' leadership cannot be undermined by this attack, which rather makes it felt more strongly in the hearts and in the souls. Al-Nahhas continued to be the target of constant attack from 1952 until he died on 22 August 1965. The people responded to this attack most strongly and eloquently during al-Nahhas' funeral. His death did not put an end to this attack, which has continued and turned more ferocious since his death and up to the present. The people responded once again to this attack by coming in huge numbers to join the new al-Wafd party when it was founded in 1978. This demand for the party, especially by the youth, was the talk of all of Egypt. Moreover, it upended all the political calculations.

National leadership, Mr President, is imposed by events and bestowed by peoples. History records it and it cannot be given or usurped by articles, by speeches or by the words of an individual, regardless of the position of this individual and even if he is the head of a state. Your denail of Mustafa al-Nahhas' leadership does not diminish its weight and does not erase it from the pages of history or from the hearts of the people.

Mr President,

I beg you to permit me to express my amazement at what was said in your speech of 16 May 1981, namely:

"The British ambassador was sitting next to me during the dinner banquet given at the embassy in honor of Prince Philip and I told the ambassador: you are not to be blamed. This is because if the pashas, the man in high position, the prime minister and the minister come to them like flies under their feet, they should treat them like this."

How could you permit yourself to attack Egypt's former leaders and rulers at the British Embassy, which is considered British territory by international law, and in a conversation with the British ambassador. What makes the matter more amazing is that there was no call or occasion requiring this astonishing slander. A few days ago, you launched a devastating attack on the chairman of the Labor Party on the pretext that in Damascus he had attended a meeting in which Egypt and Egypt's rulers were attacked--something that the chairman has denied. You considered his silence over this attack an unpatriotic act.

Mr President,

You urge the citizens to renounce shameful words and to cling to village ethics. Is it of village ethics to tie your opponent with the strongest shackles and to deny him every means of defending himself at a time when he is attacked with every means of assault! We hope to see this principle--the principle of clinging to village ethics--applied in practice and not just hear it as a mere slogan.

You, Mr President, say that you are the head of the big Egyptian family and that you are the trustee of every citizen's right and dignity. Isn't the right to defense and the right to respond one of the first of these rights?

On this basis, I demand that the pages of the national papers--and your power over them is undeniable--be opened to the publication of this letter. I also hope that we will be given the opportunity to defend ourselves on radio and television and to respond to what is directed at us. This is the sound democratic system followed in all countries of the democratic world and the system we see every day, unless our democracy is of a special kind unique to us among all other democracies. You boasted, Your Excellency, in one of your speeches that democracy among us has exceeded the democracy of England. Is opposing opinion in England denied the media opportunities available to its rulers?

I beseech God to lead your steps on the right path, and please accept my deepest regards.

Cairo, 23 May 1981

Fu'ad Siraj al-Din
Secretary General of the Egyptian al-Wafd
and Chairman of the New al-Wafd

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AUTHORITIES' HANDLING OF AL-ZAWIYAH AL-HAMRA' SECTARIAN CLASHES CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 113, 23 Jun 81 p 1

[Article by Hamid Zaydan: "The Absurd in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'"]

[Text] It was never thought in the stages of Egypt's modern or ancient history that what recently happened in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' could happen.

In every stage of its history, Egypt has been the land of true security and safety. This has not been a political slogan but a reality experienced by all the nation's sects.

A man's religion was never mentioned in a conversation or a dialog and national action was what motivated a man to lead the ranks. It was no coincidence and no premeditated fabrication that the ranks were led in the 1919 revolution by such patriotic figures as Hamad al-Basil, Mustafa al-Nahhas, Makram 'Ubayd, Wisa Wasif, Tawfiq Salib, 'Abd al-Rahman Fahmi and archpriest Sergius.

It was also no coincidence and no premeditated fabrication that the ranks were led by Muslim and Christian troops, officers and volunteers in Egypt's modern wars in defense of Egypt, its soil and its national security and against the colonialist invasion under the flag of Zionism.

Nor was it a coincidence or a premeditated fabrication that Muslims and Christians struggled in the Arab ranks and in the Arab defensive war against the colonialist invasion under the banners of the crusaders. Christianity is innocent of this invasion. Every citizen in Egypt has neighbors, friends and brothers with whom he lives, deals, works and exchanges courtesies without regard as to whether they are Muslims or Christians.

Every citizen eats his neighbor's cookies during this neighbor's holiday, be it al-Fitr, al-Adha or Christmas.

Anything else is alien to us, alien to our society and alien to our life, our thinking and our concepts.

Anything else is an excess and is one-upmanship engaged in at the expense of the teachings of our religion, whether we are Muslims or Christians. Our religion teaches love and tolerance.

Though what happened has already happened, it is our duty to discuss it and to subject it to a frank and bold dialog. The facts must be made available to all citizens so that no party can plot against Egypt's security by casting confusion and doubt. It is not enough for the minister of interior to stand up and offer totals of the dead on both sides as if he were delivering a military communique.

This is a bankrupt approach. We are not two sides. There are those who have acted illegally and they are subject to the law. The law must be applied to all. The fears of any subsidiary or secondary accusation should not control us and make us hesitate in applying the law to any individual or individuals who have erred.

We cannot permit individual acts to be transformed into a sectarian issue. All individuals of every stripe must be subject to the law. Individual actions must not be attributed to various sides and no statement should be issued by the minister of interior on the victims of each side.

The political void characterizing the Egyptian scene because of the unpolitical actions of large numbers of the ruling party leadership and because of the transformation of this party into groups seeking to enhance their personal revenues--this political void has caused the masses to lose their trust in political action.

The confusion created by the articles of some journalists who are competing to attain positions and seats of power comes at the expense of national and pan-Arab positions. All the people read and understand, whereas the competing journalists fail to understand. They deal with issues and positions superficially and they chew their words over and over, thus causing all meaning to be clouded and all issues and positions to be lost. Political phrases lose their content and meaning and the masses lose their trust in everything. Political vacuum prevails and national, pan-Arab, Israeli, capitalist and socialist issues and positions become equal. The vacuum thus spreads in the minds and the absurd occurs in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

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ISRAELI ATTACK ON IRAQI REACTOR EXPOSES DECEPTION OF CAMP DAVID TREATY

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 113, 23 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim Shukri: "Measures in Our Hands To Confront Major Treachery"]

[Text] The Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor has had an effect like that of the explosion of an atomic bomb whose destruction is not confined to the damage caused by the explosion itself but continues, expands and becomes obvious in the surrounding environment. The future consequence will not be, God willing, anything but a catastrophe to Israel, to Zionist ambitions and even to America, which supports Israel, unless America becomes alert to the dangers to which the policy of protecting Israel is dragging it.

I say this even though it seems that the Arab rulers do not realize what this attack has wrought in the hearts of all Arab peoples and even though these rulers have dealt with this attack in the traditional manner of statements of denunciation and condemnation filled with great and caustic words that are no more than mere words that mean nothing because they have been used so frequently.

In Egypt, the impact of the attack on the public conscience has been to expose the true nature of the peace that Israel claims to be helping to build. President al-Sadat has been compelled to say that "the peace process has been shaken and the attack has rebuilt the psychological barrier and reopened old wounds."

May his Excellency the president permit us to say that the time has come for him to acknowledge that Israel has not been serious in seeking a real or lasting peace and that Begin's initiation of this action shortly after the Sharm al-Shaykh meeting was intended, in addition to destroying the nuclear reactor, to harm Egypt's position not only among its Arab brothers but also before the entire world, including the third and major partner [the United States], considering that the U.S. charge d'affaires himself asked Husni Mubarak whether Begin had informed President al-Sadat of the operation of its timing.

Thus, everyone, including the Americans, has reached the point at which it has become conceivable that matters could reach this degree insofar as the relationship between Begin, our friend Begin, and al-Sadat is concerned.

Begin arranged the events with utter malice and slyness and demanded this urgent meeting under the pretext of dealing with the critical situation in Lebanon after a 17-month interruption in such meetings. During this interruption, numerous events and positions had developed and each could have been cause for calling

the meeting. I will note in particular the lapse of the period set for the self-rule negotiations and the total standstill in the negotiations throughout this period. But Begin asked for an urgent meeting when only 3 weeks remained before the Israeli elections. This compelled President al-Sadat to arrange for a meeting with Shimon Peres, the Israeli opposition leader. President al-Sadat wanted to deal with these dirty people fairly.

We thought that President al-Sadat's position toward this act, which he has described as a horrible mistake, would take the form of measures that would convince the world of the seriousness of our wrath and would help others respond to what we demand and declare. At the meeting of African ministers of foreign affairs, Egypt submitted a draft resolution containing several provisions calling for condemnation of Israel, its expansionist policy, its failure to respect UN resolutions, its settlement policy, its decision to annex Jerusalem and its failure to protect civilians in the occupied territories. The provisions also called for immediate Israeli withdrawal, for underlining the rights of the Arab states and of the Palestinian people to full sovereignty over their territories, for underlining the Palestinian people's right to establish a state, for condemning collusion between South Africa and Israel, especially in the nuclear sphere, and for condemning the Israeli raid against the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The draft resolution also urged all countries to refrain from dealing with Israel in the nuclear sphere and called for condemnation of Israel's actions, which pose a threat to the sovereignty and unity of all of Lebanon's territories. We had thought that recalling the Egyptian ambassador [from Israel] and freezing the normalization processes, all of which are measures that we can take, would persuade the others that we were serious in our wrath over what official Egypt has called a horrible mistake and what the people have called a crime that must not go unpunished and for which Israel must pay.

As a result of the Israeli aggression, the situation has become clearer and clearer regarding Israel's exclusive ability to commit aggression without fear of revenge or punishment as long as the Arabs are divided. The Saudi minister of information made a statement in which he said that the "biggest catastrophe afflicting the Arabs has been the neutralization of the Arab Republic of Egypt--a neutralization that has given Israel boundless security. This is why it roams as it wishes. We have to exert every effort to return Egypt to the Arab ranks. We must also familiarize President al-Sadat with the dangers that threaten the Arab nation as a result of his continued adherence to the Camp David treaty." The minister also said: "There is hope of bringing President al-Sadat back to the Arab line because the Egyptian people have never betrayed their nation and because Egypt's departure from the Arab line is a serious responsibility for which history will hold us accountable. This is why Egypt must be brought back to the Arab line."

This statement could constitute the starting point for a dialog on the new situation in the wake of Israel's bragging, its repeated aggression and its attack on the peace process. This statement could also constitute a way toward opening channels for a continued dialog. But regrettably, there is an official--I do not know who he is but he has been described as an official Egyptian spokesman--who has made a comment that is out of touch with the real conditions that undermine all Arabs and all Islamic peoples. This spokesman has reiterated words to the effect that "the Arab rulers are still deceiving themselves."

He is truly an "official" spokesman because the youngest child in Egypt now knows that Israel is the one that has deceived Al-Sadat and that the time has come to put an end to the major deception that Israel wants peace or wants to solve the Palestinian issue. It is no coincidence to whomever wants to understand that the man who created the gap [in the 1973 war], namely General Sharon, was the man behind the idea of striking the Iraqi nuclear reactor and that he is volunteering to become an agricultural adviser--an adviser to be cooperated with, President al-Sadat instructs.

Hasn't President al-Sadat heard of the statement of Rafael Eytan, the Israeli chief of staff, to the effect that "as long as Israel remains in Sinai, the Egyptians will not sabotage the peace process" and that "if Judea and Samarra, meaning the West Bank and Gaza, are returned to the Arabs, Israel will not continue to exist?"

Israel is Israel and the only cure for it is to unite Arab ranks and Arab goals. This is the only reply to its attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. This will not be the last attack. Blood flows daily in southern Lebanon, the threat to strike the Syrian defensive missiles continues to exist and even the threat to strike any nuclear or nonnuclear target that is likely to undermine Israel's security exists. Begin has promised the voters that he is capable of destroying such targets.

Egypt must reexamine the situation, the Arabs must understand this serious stage and America must know that delaying the delivery of aircraft or denouncing Israel without sanctions will not persuade the Arabs or the Muslims that it is not colluding in the aggression that takes place with its weapons.

To those who ask about the alternative, I say that under no circumstances do we condone this prevalent situation which, I say, is not peace but submission to expansionist and criminal Zionist ambitions.

God is great and long live the people.

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MINISTRY OF INTERIOR'S HANDLING OF SECTARIAN INCIDENTS CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 113, 23 Jun 81 p 6

[Article by Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad: "Responsibility of the Minister of Interior for Sectarian Incidents"]

[Text] In response to a familiarization request by one of the ruling party deputies regarding the information Ahmad Firghanli, Asyut deputy and member of the Labor Party Parliamentary Committee, had received about the attempt to assault the National Grouping Party chairman during his visit [presumably to Asyut], Maj Gen Nabawi Isma'il, minister of interior, a month ago, on 23 May 1981 to be exact, rose to demonstrate his power, exceeding the bounds of his position as minister of interior, dealing with issues that had nothing to do with the familiarization request and setting himself up as a teacher to the opposition, as a coach on democracy and as a guide on democratic action, thus forcing the People's Assembly speaker to warn him, in response to a protest by the opposition leader, to confine himself to the contents of the familiarization request.

While the minister of interior strayed from the subject to recount false details and to try to undermine the dignity of honorable patriots--something that prompted us to demand his resignation in the pages of this paper--while doing this, the minister did mention enough facts concerning the familiarization request itself to confirm the truthfulness of everything that Ahmad Firghali had said in good faith on his arrival at the conference site from his last trip. There he saw Khalid Muhyi al-Din and told him what he had heard [paragraph as published]. The eloquent minister then said:

1. The Asyut leadership didn't want Khalid Muhyi al-Din to enter the governorate and he [the minister] begged it to permit Khalid to do so, saying: "There is no need for us to harass him. Let us be civilized." This means that the Asyut executive leaders, who have the final say, wanted to prevent Khalid from entering and wanted to confront him with force and in an uncivilized manner.

2. The mosque imams in al-Qusiyah, who are civil servants and who receive their instructions from the local authority, in their sermons attacked those coming to them [Khalid] and described them as communists and atheists. These descriptions indicate that it is permissible to take away the lives of those so described because they are apostates from Islam.

3. A number of youths, estimated at 20 or 30, actually headed for the meeting site, calling for the downfall of communism and atheism. The security men were compelled to intervene and disperse them. This proves beyond doubt that what did take place and what had been arranged was destined to reach the ears of deputy Ahmad Firghali, had the police not intervened.

If these are the statements of the minister of interior, according to the minutes of the People's Assembly session, then what is it that Ahmad Firghali had learned and had said that is in conflict with the minister's statements--statements published in the daily press and probably broadcast in all parts of the world? They are statements similar to those which deputy Firghali told Khalid Muhyi al-Din in good faith on arriving at the conference site and after the party chairman had delivered his statement without paying attention to all of those present.

The days passed and then came last Saturday, 20 June 1981, when the same minister of interior, Nabawi Isma'il, stood at the People's assembly platform to deliver a statement on the sectarian incidents that had taken place in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' inside the city of Cairo, trying to defend his position as an official in charge of public security and as a government official defending the government against accusations levelled against it and charging it with failure to deal with the events that led to the sectarian clashes, especially since the clashes were not the first of their kind and had been recurring with greater intensity time after time. As the opposition, we can in turn now give him a lesson in safeguarding public security and on the government's duty to wipe out sectarian sedition, but with reliable facts, with national experience and with a sincere goodwill, seeking to serve God and the homeland, without touching on the charges attributed to the detained citizens who are being investigated by the prosecution.

It is an acknowledged fact that the first duty of a security man is to prevent crime before it is committed, so long as there are facts leading to the conclusion that it is likely that a crime will be committed.

The statement of the minister of interior has made it clear that there was a dispute over a plot purchased in the area by a Christian contractor in accordance with a sales contract signed by a Muslim citizen at a time when the Cairo Governorate disputed this citizen's ownership of the plot.

On the day immediately preceding the incidents which took place last Wednesday, Cairo Governorate issued a decision declaring its right to this land and allocating part of it for the construction of a mosque.

The Ministry of Interior should have taken precautions in anticipation of any incident or clash or of anybody exploiting the circumstances on that day to create sedition between the two elements of the nation. This should have been done at a time when we find the Ministry of Interior stationing Chevrolet cars on street corners as constant police points in which police officers and central security men armed to the teeth sit all day and night brandishing the bayonets on their weapons in the face of unarmed and peaceful citizens without justification or cause other than to terrorize the masses and try to strike fear in the hearts of peaceful citizens.

The minister of interior's awareness of this failure is what prompted him to depict the serious incident in the official communique that was issued 24 hours late--a delay for which Ibrahim Sa'dah censured the minister of interior in the latest edition of AKHBAR AL-YASM, which is not an opposition paper--in a manner that conflicts with reality.

The minister wanted to attribute the sedition to a transient incident that could not have been predicted, considering that the communique says at the outset: "At 2000 the night before last, a fight broke out between two neighbors, one Muslim and the other a Christian, in al-Sharabiyah precinct of al-Zawiyah al-Hmara' area. The scope of the fight then expanded...etc." This first and last communique contains no reference whatsoever to the dispute over the land that the Muslims used to hold their prayers.

When the real cause of the sedition spread among the people and when the incident was mentioned in some pamphlets distributed after it had taken place, Minister of Interior Nabawi Isma'il was forced to acknowledge the incident, without dropping the story of a fight between the two neighbors. The minister did so in his statement to the People's Assembly on the morning of 20 June 1981. The shakiness of the minister's review of the incident became apparent when the minister dwelt for a long time on the fight between the two neighbors, as if to depict this fight as the main and sole reason for the incident. But the minister then added: "There is another point, namely, that there exists in a neighboring area a dispute over a plot of land owned by the governorate. This land had been set aside for the construction of a mosque and a fodder plant. A Christian brother purchased this plot of land from a Muslim citizen and acquired a contract to attest to the purchase. This matter aroused the people but the local council settled the matter and the issue came to an end. But within the framework of the campaign of provocation and fighting, the masses proceeded to the home of this Christian who panicked and opened fire with 'his licensed gun,' wounding a number of Muslims. This helped to intensify the situation."

We don't understand how a sectarian clash can result from a licensed weapon left in the hands of one side to a dispute.

Thus, it is obvious that the minister was forced to acknowledge the real dispute that led to the sectarian sedition that took place. This is something the minister tried to conceal from the beginning because it makes him responsible for the failure to take the necessary precautions for what was likely to happen in the light of previous incidents. The minister thus made the real and original cause a subsidiary cause, which helped intensify the situation.

This is not the first time Minister Nabawi Isma'il has resorted to hiding the true causes of incidents. He had previously depicted the causes of the demonstrations in Asyut against the late shah, in which a citizen was killed by gunfire, as emanating from a sectarian dispute, whereas the demonstrations were actually prompted by protests over the hosting of the shah. The minister had also previously attributed the November 1980 incidents at Asyut University to the students' attack against workers building a wall around the university town whereas the real cause was the fact that every wing of the university town was being surrounded by a wall to isolate it from the other wings. This is an

abnormal and provocative action that was adopted after studies had begun and in the presence of the students secretary. I already have criticized this action, in an article published by AL-SHA'B on 9 December 1980.

Failure To Reassure the Masses With Subsequent Communiques

The minister was content with the sole communique he issued a full day after the incidents took place. He did not issue any subsequent communiques referring to the consequences of what had happened on the first day or reassuring the citizens, ascertaining that the situation had settled down or denying the rumors that had spread and had incited both Muslims and Christians.

Moreover, neither the radio nor the television were used to broadcast statements by the religious leader urging calm and tranquillity on the basis of religious dictates of reassuring the people as to the true course of affairs. It is as if these two utilities were founded only to broadcast serials, songs and variety shows and not to perform a role when the country is exposed to a sedition that is about to spread from quarter to quarter and from city to city. As a result of this media blackout, rumors spread, exaggerating the number of those killed and wounded and magnifying the losses resulting from the destruction of shops, the storming of homes and the violation of places of worship and depicting the incidents in a brutal and barbaric manner, which aroused the people's feelings.

Police Position Vis-a Vis Incidents

It seems that the instructions issued from his excellency the minister to the police called for no intervention to stop the firing done by some armed citizens from rooftops, to prevent the destruction of shops or to prevent the storming of houses. Even the armed Muslims and Christians who were at the scene suspect that the police action was negative. This position has led to accusations against the government from both sides.

The issuance of such instructions has been confirmed by what the minister said at the People's Assembly, namely, that "there was self-restraint in the first hours. A central security officer was hit by a bullet in the spinal column and the police could have opened fire and put a stop to the thing in the first moments"--the minister is still speaking. "But to prevent a high number of casualties, we tried to put an end to the rioting with words and persuasion."

This statement is to be severely censured because a riot in which bullets are fired, homes are violated and shops are destroyed cannot be dispersed with words and persuasion. Opening fire was not the only alternative available to the police. Water hoses could have been directed at the crowds and the crowds could have been dispersed with clubs and with bullets fired into the air for intimidation.

The minister claims that the police gained control over the situation as of announcement of the "sole" communique; but then how is it that the number of casualties rose from 31, according to the communique, to 54, according to the statement made by the minister vefore the People's Assembly? We can understand that the number of fatalities may increase as a result of the death of some wounded. But for the number of casualties to increase is proof that other incidents occurred after issuance of the sole communique.

This contradiction and obscurity in the official statements and communiques is liable to cause the masses to lose confidence in information published by the government and to open the way for the spread of and belief in rumors.

Failure of the Government and Ruling Party To Deal With Causes of Sectarian Disputes

Moreover, a most significant criticism levelled against the government and the ruling party is their failure to deal with the causes of the sectarian disputes that exist in the various cities and places where the likelihood of sectarian clashes is present through popular committees, through guidance from religious preachers and through legal settlement of the causes of dispute, before the causes intensify.

We would like to ask: Where are the leaders of the Democratic National Party who failed to appear in the street to control the situation during the al-Zawiyah al-Hmara' incidents? Where is the strong and giant party that is said to enjoy the confidence of 99.9 percent of the people who act according to the instructions of the party's leadership?

Both Muslim and Christian plaintiffs from among the victims of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and its vicinity and from among those who are concerned with the future of this homeland and over what is being hatched secretly against this homeland have resorted to us. But we have not hastened to position ourselves at the site of incidents so that our presence could not be exploited by those who are lurking for the opposition, who fabricate lies to undermine it and who unfairly accuse the opposition of trying to incite further attacks.

But we will not abandon our duty to expose those who are negligent in safeguarding the citizens' security and the country's safety from what is planned against them--those who arm the central security elements to the teeth and deploy them in various parts of the capital unnecessarily and then standby unable to provide security and safety to the citizens performing their prayers, retreating to their homes or safeguarding their property.

8494
CSO: 4504/100

EGYPT URGED TO RETURN TO ARAB RANKS IN WAKE OF ATTACK ON IRAQI REACTOR

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 113, 23 Jun 81 p 7

[Article by Dr Mahmud al-Qadi: "Catastrophe and Camp David Policy"]

[Text] The entire Arab nation and the Egyptian people have been shocked by reports of the destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq. I don't believe that Irsael intended in any way to avert a danger threatening it from this reactor, which was built for peaceful purposes. Israel's clear and frank goal is to make the Arabs know that Israel's hand will reach everywhere and in every place and that it will not allow the Arabs to raise their heads in its face. In my assessment, this aggression is more serious and has deeper effects than the 1967 aggression, which was tantamount to a border war between Israel and several Arab states fronting it. Even though Israel won that war, it was followed by the war of attrition and by the 1973 war. But destruction of the nuclear reactor is tantamount to introducing a new development into the Israeli aggression and to intimidating the Arab nation from one end to the other.

This impudent and flagrant aggression assures us all that our real and fundamental enemy is Israel and that our battle and the battle of the entire nation is against Israel. Moreover, the overwhelming wrath that has swept the Egyptian people assures Israel's friends that Egypt's Arab affiliation is an undeniable and an essential reality that must continue to exist. The Egyptian people felt that their security was in danger when the Iraqi nuclear reactor was hit because any strength gained or progress made by any Arab country is strength and progress for other Arab countries, led by Egypt.

Here, we must wonder: Would Israel have dared to embark on such an act and with such defiance and disregard if Egypt had not departed from the battle in the so-called Camp David accords and the peace procession? And could division in the Arab world have reached its present situation had Egypt remained steadfast in its natural position as leader of the Arab world?

Calls have risen for an Arab summit. But how and on what basis? Could the Camp David foes sit with the Camp David supporters, with those who are devoted in their love for Camp David? Could those who believe that the procession is not a peace procession and that the Camp David path is an evil and misguided path sit with the men champion this procession on whose path the Iraqi nuclear

reactor has been destroyed and during which Jerusalem has been declared the eternal and united capital of Israel? The champion of this procession says that it is as strong as steel and that it will overcome all obstacles. What obstacles? Should we persist even when we are deceived, as has happened to us in Sharm al-Shaykh?

This ill-fated procession is supported only by the bloodthirsty Begin and by the United States, which is plotting against the Arabs, including President al-Sadat.

Under the canopy of this procession, we have departed from the Arab world, which is Egypt's future, security and guarantee, and we have been expelled from the Islamic world.

Under the canopy of this procession, President al-Sadat--the president of Egypt--was invited to an occupied Egyptian territory to meet Begin. He accepted the invitation and went, heaping friendly praise on an international murderer. Israel then committed its cardinal crime of destroying the Iraqi reactor, and people, including the U.S. Embassy, said that Begin must have notified al-Sadat of his intention to commit this aggression. We, for shame, have been trying to vindicate ourselves of this horrible accusation in every statement and every article.

Despite all this, President al-Sadat tells Begin: "Egypt will undertake to entrench the concept of peace in Israel." Excuse us, Mr President, but this is not our job. If you insist, then learn that there is only one way to persuade Israel, namely force--the force, the determination and the struggle that Egypt has always led and that it must continue to lead.

I will now turn to the Arab brothers. Let us not say what the enemies say, namely: "What have the Arabs done?" Yes, they are in a difficult position, but we are in a more difficult position and Israel will not leave us alone. Israel is moving to confront the other Arab states in the absence of the biggest Arab state. Then Egypt's turn will come, and it may come even earlier. Israel is not a peaceful state that we can establish peace with. It is an aggressive state and its goals are endless expansion.

I also call for an Arab summit, which must be held immediately to confront Israel effectively with all the men, weapons, oil and money we possess.

But for Egypt to attend and lead this conference, it must depart from Camp David. It must depart with the will of its great people. Egypt's role is in the forefront of the Arab states. This is how it should be. Hundreds of days may not be enough to erase the destructive consequences, both to Egypt's future and to the future of the rest of the Arab nation, of every day spent in this alleged procession.

8494
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OPPOSITION CONFERENCE ASSESSES ISRAELI, U.S. PLOTS TO HUMILIATE ARABS, EGYPT

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 113, 23 Jun 81 pp 8-9, 15

[Article: "Labor Party Organizes Popular Conference for National Opposition; Ibrahim Shukri: Let United States Know That Its Support for Israel Will Cost It Dearly; All That Ruling Party Does Is Issue Condemnation Statements; Fathi Radwan: Has Our Abasement Reached Point Where We Curry Favors From Those Who Harm Us; Khalid Muhyi al-Din: To Confront Israel, Arabs Have No Alternative To Manufacturing Atomic Weapon; Mumtaz Nassar: Egypt Exposed to Israeli Aggression, as Has Happened in Iraq; Ahmad Firghali: He Who Gives His Life in Defense of His People Fears Only God; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji: We Must Boycott Israel and Whoever Deals With It; Muhammad 'Atiyah Khamis: Israel Is Serious in Striking Every Arab Islamic Land; Kamil Zuhayri: If We Do Not Maintain Our Scientific and Military Capabilities, We Will Be Exposed to War of Annihilation"]

[Text] Leaders of the opposition parties have asked the Egyptian Government to suspend all relations with Israel and to call for an Arab summit to confront Israel's belligerency in the area. They have also urged Iraq and Iran to put an immediate end to the war between them and have urged the Arab states to exert pressure on the United States to end its support of Israel. They have also urged the Islamic states and the nonaligned states to take a serious position against the Israeli terror.

At a crowded popular conference held last Tuesday evening at the headquarters of the Socialist Labor Party, leaders of the Egyptian opposition parties and national forces also urged the Egyptian citizens to boycott Israeli goods and to confront the Israeli propaganda campaigns aimed at sabotaging the Egyptian intellect.

Participating in the conference were: Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party; Fathi Radwan; Khalid Muhyi al-Din; Counselor Mumtaz Nassar; Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad; the members of the Higher Committee of the Socialist Labor Party; the members of the General Secretariat of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping; a number of members of the Coalition; Muhammad 'Atiyah Khamis; Muhammad 'Abd al-Shafi, representative of the Liberal Party; Maj Gen Sa'd Ghannam; Dr Mahmud al-Qadi; Dr Fu'ad Mursi; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji' Kamil al-Zuhayri; Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam al-Zayyat; unionist Ahmad Taha; Dr 'Ismat Sayf al-Dawlah and 'Abd al-'Azim Manaf.

The conference was attended by thousands of citizens, by representatives of the Egyptian press and by correspondents of Arab and foreign newspapers and international television stations.

Starting Point

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, addressed the conference, saying: The party called for this conference in the wake of the Israeli attack against Iraq. With this attack, Israel has shed all masks and has demonstrated the true dimensions of its aggressive expansionist policy.

The world and international organizations have condemned this aggression. We have not called for this conference to add condemnation to the numerous statements of condemnation already issued. We have called this conference so that it may constitute a new starting point for national action at the Egyptian level and the Islamic level.

This call is issued by Egypt's people, and all calls for victory throughout Islamic and Arab history have emanated from Egypt. The October 1973 war is not distant. The October victory marched forward from Egypt after Egypt had rallied all the Arabs around it.

The United States and Zionism then realized that if this Arab strength is united, the history and destiny of the area would be changed. So the two of them have exerted efforts to shatter this unity by creating a rift in the firm Arab edifice.

Sharon, the Israeli minister of agriculture, has been one of the leaders of this policy. He is the one who created the rift during the war and is the one who is creating the rift in peace.

Sharon, whom we receive daily as a dear guest, is the man who threatened to resign from the Israel cabinet if Menachem Begin's government failed to carry out the raid against the Iraqi reactor.

O What Zionist Treachery!

O what Zionist treachery! The raid was scheduled to take place in the wake of President al-Sadat's meeting with Menachem Begin in Sharm al-Shaykh. We knew before this meeting that Israel was hatching something. Israel could not remain idle from now till next April, the date for the Israeli evacuation from the Sinai. It wants to get all it desires in the time remaining. The United States also wants to get all it desires in the time remaining.

Ibrahim Shukri added: President al-Sadat is careful not to anger Israel until it evacuates the Sinai. This means that from now till April, we have to accept and remain silent on everything!

Popular Egypt Is Not Official Egypt

Ibrahim Shukri added: If official Egypt doesn't want to reject these policies, then popular Egypt cannot remain silent, else we will condemn ourselves to remain forever submissive to Israel and its masters.

But all the ruling party wants to do is to issue statements of condemnation and then let Israel invade us economically. Thus, we hear about economic and agricultural projects that Israel wants to set up in southern al-Tahrir Province, in western al-Nubariyah and in other places.

Israelis Danced in Streets

The Socialist Labor Party chairman added: All of Israel's policy and criminal acts point out clearly to anybody with reason that Israel doesn't want peace. Those who danced in Tel Aviv's streets the moment the report on the bombing of the Iraqi reactor was broadcast cannot want peace or be eager for it.

What Peace Is This?

What peace is this about which you talk when the entire area is threatened with the danger of an all-out war. Here is Israel threatening to attack the Syrian missile bases and here it is striking Baghdad, which is far from it, to tell every Arab citizen: Live in humiliation because we have the upper hand over you.

In our youth, we refused to surrender to Great Britain, the greatest empire in history, which had defeated the strongest armies. You young men must not surrender to a usurping meagerly state that lives on U.S. aid and possesses none of the components of a state.

All that the peace treaties were built on has been pulled up by its roots. So why do we cling to these treaties and why do we make them a stumbling block between us and our Arab brothers when we are like the heart to the body of the Arab nation? When the heart stops, the body dies. Egypt, in any case, will not be stronger without the Arabs and the Muslims.

But the ruling party doesn't want to reflect Egypt's wrath and doesn't want to reconsider its policy toward Israel. This is why we have called for this meeting, so that it can make known the Egyptian people's wrath, so that Israel--and the United States behind it--can see the true feelings of the Egyptian people and so that the United States can know that its ceaseless support for Israel will cost it dearly.

Were it not for the U.S. aid for Israel, Israel would not have dared do what it has done. Israel does not dare embark on anything without the prior knowledge or at least the concurrent knowledge of the United States.

Ibrahim Shukri expressed his regret over the Egyptian Government's sale of Egyptian oil to Israel. He said: We cannot accept that this is the oil that Israel uses in its raids against our brothers in Lebanon, Syria and, finally, in Iraq!

Sweeping Wrath

Ibrahim Shukri continued: The resolutions of this conference of ours will be a lantern for the path we will follow. Each of us must express his wrath, even if only with a short letter to the Israeli ambassador or by raising a sign

everywhere the ambassador goes to tell him: Go back to Israel. Each of us must announce these resolutions everywhere: In mosques, in churches, in factories and in government offices. Let us all stand up to whoever wants to humiliate Egypt and the Arabs.

Then Fathi Radwan said: It has become evident to every rational man that the United States is the enemy of the Arab and Islamic world and of the Third World.

The United States fell in the eyes of the entire world when Israel's bombs dropped on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Even though the United States has fallen repeatedly, the Arab world has, for transient considerations, shut its eyes and closed its ears to all the evidence that the United States itself has been offering daily on its aggression against the dignity of the Arab nation generally and of Egypt in particular.

When the United States arranged for Camp David, it knew that a fully liberated Sinai would not be turned over to Egypt's sovereignty and that the Palestinian people's self-rule would not be realized.

When the United States arranged for Camp David, it wanted to tell us: O Arabs, you have been destined to humiliation in your land. There is only one master in this area, namely, the United States, for whom Israel deputizes.

Has our abasement reached the point where we are kicked and our dignity insulted daily and all we do is move closer to and flatter those who harm us?!

Why Weakness and Fear?

Fathi Radwan added: It is up to us. We are the ones who will issue the orders if we believe in the enormous capability our nation enjoys. We are the heart of the world and we live on the land that gave birth to Moses, Jesus and Muhammad, the land of oil and the land of those who made and preserved civilization. So why this weakness and this fear?

In no issue is there an enemy as obvious as the enemy of our nation, namely. the United States. If we don't exert pressure on it with all our forces, then we do not deserve to live, due to all the abasement that has been heaped on us.

It Is Required of Arab Rulers

The Arab rulers must understand that their monies, which flow to the U.S. banks only to be transferred into the hands of the Zionists and then to be turned into weapons in their hands and into bread and butter with which they fill their stomachs--the Arab rulers must understand that these monies must be withdrawn, and without delay.

The Arab rulers must also understand that they must meet immediately, declare their renunciation of Camp David to God and stand in one rank so that they can realize for this faithful nation that which will restore to it its freedom and its dignity.

A voice must resound in the conscience of every Egyptian to say that Camp David has ended forever.

Iran and Iraq must understand that they must stop their fighting immediately, else whoever doesn't want to stop the fighting will become an enemy of the Arabs and of the Muslims.

Let this accursed war stop and let us turn with all our strength to fight our enemy so that our grief may turn to joy, the joy of the strong, and let the banners of freedom fly over our Arab and Islamic nation. How true was Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq, may God be pleased with him, when he said: "Be eager for death and life shall be given to you."

False Propaganda

Khalid Muhyi al-Din, secretary general of the Progressive National Grouping, then said: We have been talking about Camp David for 3 years. In one moment, the mask fell and all the false propaganda that has continued since President al-Sadat's initiative and visit to Jerusalem has been exposed.

All the masks have fallen before the people and three results have been realized:

First, it has become obvious that the Egyptian people, among whom some have wanted to entrench the hatred of Arabs and to install friendship for Israel, have deep faith in their origins and their Arabism.

Fall of Myth

Second, the fall of the myth of peace that has been long propagated and in which it is said that peace is as strong as steel. How can we speak of peace when Iraq, which is not a frontline state, is hit by aircraft so that every Arab citizen feels that he is not far from Israel's arm and that Israel can strike him whenever it wishes, in any manner it wishes and under any pretext?!

If we Arabs accept this principle then we will always live under Israeli domination.

Even though I have been struggling against nuclear weapons for many years, I declare here that to confront Israel, we have no alternative but to have all the Arab countries manufacture atomic weapons so that they do not succumb to Israel's blackmail.

Third, we have been saying for 4 years that the danger threatening us does not come from Israel but from other distant places.

In a single moment, the Egyptian citizen became convinced that the real danger to the Arab nation is Israel, with the United States behind it.

Citizen's Dignity

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar, a People's Assembly member, then said:

Our constitution, which we have taken the oath to uphold, stipulates that Egypt is part of the Arab nation. This is why, when President al-Sadat embarked upon his initiative, I stood in the People's Assembly Foreign Relations Committee and

Permanent Committee to say that this initiative would lead to destructive consequences, including the shattering of Arab solidarity and intransigence by Israel, which becomes arrogant when the Arab ranks become divided.

What we had expected has happened. Our present inclination is toward Arab solidarity and the Egyptian people shoulder a fundamental commitment for Egypt's return to its Arab nation. Let us all stand in one line as we did during the October 1973 war to create an Arab power that will restore the rights of all the Arabs and defend their entity. Like Iraq, we are all targeted and the danger of aggression against us is ever present. He who attacks Iraq today will attack Syria tomorrow and then will attack us.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar added: In confronting these dangers, it is not at all enough to condemn this aggression. We must take measures that demonstrate that the Arab nation is capable of defending its dignity. Therefore, the least we can do is to expel the representative of the racist Israeli Government from Cairo and to withdraw the Egyptian ambassador from Israel.

Egypt shoulders a major commitment in restoring Arab solidarity. An initiative by President al-Sadat to visit the Arab states is a thousand times better than the initiative to visit Jerusalem. I appeal here to all the Arab states to withdraw their monies from the banks of countries that support and back up Israel.

Has Our Will Gone Dead

'Abd al-'Aziz al-Shurbaji, a former president of the Lawyers Union, said: We are the ones who are not fighting and who are not defending our dignity, our freedom and our countries. The issue is not one of agreements. It is our will that has gone dead and is no longer capable of displaying any kind of resistance.

Begin has done nothing other than defend Israel and his hateful racism. But we went to Sharm al-Shaykh without even a simple protest over the holding of a meeting in our occupied land. Our papers, which are published in Cairo, say that the October war is the last war.

So it is we who are in the wrong, and he who remains silent over evil is a mute devil. We must first resist Israel everywhere, in the mosques and in the churches, and we must boycott whatever is Israeli and boycott whoever deals with Israel.

Koranic Facts

Lawyer Muhammad 'Atiyah Khamis chairman of the Our Master Muhammad Youth Organization, then said, God, may He be praised, has instructed us to refer to His venerable book and to the sunna of His prophet if we dispute anything.

There are three facts in God's book. The first is the venerable Koran phrase that says: "You shall find that those who are most hostile to the faithful are the Jews." In view of God's words, we cannot change the enemies that they may become our friends.

The second fact lies in the venerable phrase: "Do not install My enemy and yours (as ruler under God)." Whoever deviates from this instruction shall end with God's wrath upon his head.

The third fact is that God has ordered us in His venerable book to "Struggle for God with your money and your lives. This is better for you, if you know."

The issue between us and Israel is a first-class religious issue. When Jerusalem fell to the hands of the Israeli aggression, Dayan said: The path is now open to us to Yathrub. This means that the path is open to Medina and Mecca.

What happened in Iraq provides a clear signal that they are serious in striking every Arab Islamic land. The flight of their aircraft in Saudi Arabia's skies is not a passing matter and the day may come when they will hit the bright Medina with their bombs. He who has hit Jerusalem with his guns can hit Medina and Mecca with his aircraft and he who relinquishes Baghdad will tomorrow relinquish Cairo and Khartoum.

One Path

There is one path that we must follow and we cannot follow any other. This is the path of right. If we truly want to take vengeance on Israel and to restore our impregnability, then we have only the path of jihad before us because this cannot be realized with submission and subservience.

We must all unite and plan for the jihad because this is the only way to defeat Israel.

To say that they are our brothers is a deviation from God's book. There are no brothers other than our brothers in the Arab and Islamic nation.

They Refused To Listen to Anybody

Kamil Zuhayri, former chairman of the Journalists Union, then said: "The Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor is no more than a link in the chain of successive aggression against us since 1948.

"I warned the national forces in the not so distant past of the consequences of Camp David and of this conditional peace. I told them that they had put around their necks iron shackles plated with gold. But they refused to listen to anybody.

"Our struggle against Israel is constant and ceaseless. Israel is the first to know this truth. Israel's struggle against Arab scientific superiority leads all the struggles it is waging against the Arab nation. We either safeguard our scientists, intellectuals, writers, troops and armies or we will be exposed to a war of annihilation.

"This is the real and serious significance of the Israeli attack against the Iraqi reactor. This attack is part of the attempt to destroy Arab scientific progress so that Israel can remain in the lead and so that it can become a greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates.

"We have to demand a statement of account from those who signed the Camp David accords. We must defend Egypt and its Arabism and protect its Nile and every grain of sand in its land."

Egyptian People Will Not Remain Silent

Lawyer Mahmud al-Mulayji, member of the Socialist Labor Party Higher Committee, had opened the conference with an address in which he said that the Labor Party was honored to invite the leaders of the Egyptian political opposition in this serious phase during which the dignity of the entire Arab nation is violated because the body of the Arab nation has fallen apart with the departure of Egypt from this nation in the wake of the Camp David accords.

Ahmad Firghali member of the Socialist Labor Party Parliamentary Committee, then introduced the speakers, saying: There is no doubt that this night will be recorded by history. This blessed night in which the solidarity of the opposition forces is declared is a night blessed by God and by the deep-rooted people.

We have given our life in defense of the Arab nation and of our Egyptian people and he who gives his life in defense of his people's dignity fears only God.

We have resolved to cling to our principles despite the harm that has afflicted us. How true are God's words in His venerable book: "As for those [words dropped] will go to waste and as for what is beneficial, it will remain in the earth!"

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POPULAR CONFERENCE RESOLUTIONS CALL FOR BOYCOTTING ISRAEL, PRESSURE ON U.S.

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 113, 23 Jun 81 p 9

[Article: "Unified Position by Leaders of Egyptian National Forces To Confront Israeli Attacks Against Arab States; What Is Required of Egyptian Government Is To Suspend All Relations With Israel, of Egyptian People Is To Boycott Israeli Goods and Projects, Iraq and Iran Is To Stop War Between Them Immediately, of Arab States Is To Exert Pressure on United States To End Its Support for Israel, of Islamic World Is To Take Serious Position Toward Israeli Terror"]

[Text] At the conclusion of the [national opposition's popular] conference, Muhammad Hilmi Murad, deputy chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, read the political statement that the representatives of the national and political parties and forces participating in the conference agreed on. Following is the text of the statement:

The popular conference representing the national forces in the Arab Republic of Egypt, held on Tuesday, 16 June 1981, at the headquarters of the Socialist Labor Party in the city of Cairo, declares that Israel's destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor on 7 June 1981 was not the first aggression committed against the Arab and Islamic nation since the conclusion of the Camp David accords, considering that this aggression had been preceded by several forms of Israeli aggression. Israel had previously promulgated a law annexing East Jerusalem and designating Jerusalem as the united capital of Israel. Israel then intensified its attacks against the Arab Palestinians living in the occupied territories by using explosive charges with the aim of assassinating West Bank leaders. Israel also began to open a canal connecting the Dead Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and passing through the Gaza Strip. Israel also escalated its air raids against the Palestinian camps and a number of towns in Lebanon and assassinated Egyptian scientist Dr Yahya al-Mashadd during his visit to the French capital for reasons connected with the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Israel even exploited the Iraq-Iran war to strike this reactor on 27 September 1980, before destroying it recently. Israel has also imposed its custodianship over some sects in Lebanon to give itself a pretext for interfering in Lebanon's affairs, to provoke Syria and to demand that Syria remove the surface-to-air missiles that it has set up on its borders and in Lebanese territory to defend itself against Israeli air raids. Israel has demanded this to clear the way for its aggression and the imposition of its domination without any deterrence.

Moreover, Israel--which boasts arrogantly of its destruction of the nuclear reactor that was built in the suburbs of the Iraqi capital for peaceful nuclear research under the pretext of fears that it would be used to produce an atomic bomb--has a nuclear reactor in Demona, possesses at present nearly 27 atomic bombs, according to reports from U.S. agencies, conducts nuclear tests in cooperation with the racist government of South Africa and refuses to sign the international nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty, whereas the Iraqi reactor is set up in cooperation with France and is under the supervision and inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency and whereas Iraq signed the nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty in 1969.

Israel's flouting of the Arab and Islamic nation and its disregard for the international community has reached the point where Israeli Prime Minister Menachim Begin stated with utter impudence that if it is proven that there is a nuclear reactor in any other Arab state, then Israel will destroy it. If Israel is allowed to roam freely, it is not unlikely that it will try openly to destroy the Pakistani nuclear reactor under the same pretext and without any regard for the values and principles stipulated in international law and in the UN Charter.

What has encouraged Israel to take these treacherous, terrorist and lawless positions is nothing but the division of the Arab ranks and the rift that has developed between Egypt and the other Arab countries in the wake of the conclusion of the Camp David accords and of Israel's continued control of a part of the Sinai so that it can settle its accounts with each Arab state separately and in freedom from Egypt and so that it can become the dominant power with the upper hand throughout the area.

Moreover, the United States is responsible, by virtue of its being the protector of Israel and a full partner in the Camp David accords, for all that has been done and is being done by Israel against the right of the Arab and Islamic peoples. There is no better proof of this than the fact that Israel used U.S. aircraft and the latest types of U.S. weapons in its destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor and in its aggression. Israel uses these aircraft and military equipment with total disregard for the stipulated condition that they be used for defensive purposes only. No serious sanction has been imposed against Israel to deter it from committing repeated aggression and invasion. Here we see the United States being content, despite the enormity of the aggression against the Iraqi reactor, with temporarily delaying the delivery of four military aircraft already due for delivery to Israel and being content with declaring, with total disregard for the feelings and interests of the Arab and Islamic peoples, its intention to use its veto right at the Security Council if the council proposes sanctions against Israel for the aggression it has committed and which poses a threat to world peace if it becomes an action sanctioned at the international level.

What is more, the United States is condemned in the eyes of the Islamic and Arab peoples for having prior knowledge of the aggression that Israel had been planning against the Iraqi reactor, considering that there is a U.S. early warning station in the Sinai to observe the Israeli moves and there are three AWACs operated by the United States on the Saudi borders. The U.S.-made Israeli aircraft passed close to these AWACs and it is impossible that the operation was carried out without being observed and watched by the equipment in these planes.

Conference Resolutions

The popular conference of the Egyptian national forces, held on Tuesday, 16 June 1981, at the headquarters of the Socialist Labor Party in the city of Cairo, declares the following resolutions:

First, the conference appeals to both Iraq and Iran to put an immediate end to their military operations in obedience to the dictates of the venerable Koran and in response to the interest of the Arab and Islamic nation.

Second, now that it has been proven that the Camp David accords have not accomplished the just, comprehensive and lasting peace that their supporters have claimed they are capable of realizing in the area and that these accords have encouraged Israel to intensify its aggression and to impose its control over the area with the aim of humilating the Arab people--now that this has happened, it is no longer acceptable that the ambassador of the terrorist state that is hostile to the Arabs remain in Cairo and that the Egyptian ambassador be left in Israel.

Moreover, the government of Arab Egypt must put an immediate stop to the normalization and to all the relations emanating from this normalization, be they commercial, agricultural or cultural. This government must especially stop the delivery of Egyptian oil shipments to Israel and must abolish the joint agricultural and commercial projects with Israel.

Third, as an inevitable consequence of the aforementioned, the conference stresses that the Egyptian Government must call for the convocation of an Arab summit to deal with the situation arising from Israel's belligerent conduct in the area and to draw up a plan to estore the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, especially their right to set up their independent Arab state on their own land.

Fourth, the conference urges the Arab states to exert pressure on the United States of America to make it stop arming Israel, providing it with economic aid and backing it politically and diplomatically, until Israel abandons its arrogance. Otherwise, the Arab governments must use the weapon of Arab oil and must withdraw Arab monetary assets from U.S. banks.

Fifth, the conference declares that the Islamic and Arab states, in cooperation with the nonaligned countries and the Third World countries, must take a serious position toward the terror in which Israel is engaging and toward Israel's violation of all principles of international law and dictates of the U.N. Charter. Condemnation and denunciation should not suffice and material compensation must be made for the damage Iraq has incurred.

Moreover, deterrent sanctions must be imposed against Israel to stop it where it should be stopped and it must be clearly declared that any country that uses the veto right to obstruct the issuance of resolutions imposing sanctions against Israel shall be considered an open enemy of the entire Arab and Islamic nation.

Sixth, the conference appeals to the masses of the Egyptian people to be, as they usually are, fully alert and vigilant in confronting the Zionist propaganda campaigns that seek to sabotage the Egyptian intellect and to strip it of its national and pan-Arab components. The Egyptian people must boycott all the joint projects with the Zionist enemy and must boycott the goods with which this enemy is trying to flood our markets.

Seventh, the conference urges the Islamic and Arab peoples and all their parties, groupings and organizations, in all parts of the world, to exert all forms of pressure to implement these resolutions.

God is great and long live the Arab and Islamic nation.

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OFFICIAL ASSAULT ON OPPOSITION DENOUNCED AT PARTY WEEKLY SYMPOSIUM

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 114, 30 Jun 81 pp 2, 15

[Article: "Party's Weekly Symposium: Doomed Endeavor To Link al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' with Opposition"]

[Text] Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, Socialist Labor Party chairman, has declared that the people realize, with their good sense, who is responsible for the regrettable incidents that have taken place in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'. Shukri has also said that the Democratic National Party's endeavor to link these regrettable incidents to the opposition is doomed to failure.

Ibrahim Shukri has pointed out that the recent conference of the opposition national political parties and forces, which the party called so that it could take a unified position against the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, has made the ruling party engage in attempts to divert attention from that conference. So there were these incidents and the endeavor to pin responsibility for what happened on the opposition.

Ibrahim Shukri further said that the Socialist Labor Party is fully aware of its duty and its responsibility and that this party is one of the political forces that most strongly appreciates the nation's unity. This party calls for the unity of the Arab ranks and it is most important that it cling to Egypt's unity and that it try to make Egypt's structure firmer, especially since the people's unity in Egypt has always been strong and since this unity has enabled Egypt to stand fast for thousands of years in the face of its enemies. Our country has not known the fanaticism or the sectarian conflicts known to other countries.

What has happened is new and alien to us and we must stop it where it should be stopped. This is our call and this also is what I wrote in AL-SHA'B before we read what President al-Sadat said in his interview with MAY. Therefore, we will try to discuss what they are saying with utter objectivity and to demonstrate to them that their arrows will break on the firm shield of the Labor Party and that the party will march forward on the path that it knows quite well--the path of uniting the people in sound opinion, the path of true words and of following a healthy direction in the interest of Egypt.

People Respond to Party

Shukri added: What I have found everywhere I have gone in Egypt, be it Sawhaj or elsewhere, shows that the Labor Party is the party to which the people respond because we reflect the people's sensitive perception sincerely and objectively.

Side issues or fabricated positions should not preoccupy us and we must continue to reflect the people's causes, to move still closer to the people in the cities, the villages and everywhere and to crystallize the masses' love for our party through the formation of partisan committees everywhere because no part of Egypt's land is the exclusive monopoly of a single party.

We Have Had Enough Slogans

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri then added: The people have had enough slogans and they want real reform. True reform begins when the decisions stop coming from above, when the people's will is not forged in elections and referendums and when counter opinion is heard and is given freedom to express itself and given the same resources monopolized by the ruling party.

Opposing opinion has no goals other than to serve Egypt and Egypt's interest. But the ruling party ignores this fact and refuses to listen to contrary opinion. Even when they are compelled to carry out what we demand, they neglect to give credit where credit is due. An example is the basic education plan that the Ministry of Education will implement as of the coming academic year and according to which the students will be taught some crafts and skills in addition to theoretical studies. The Labor Party program had previously demanded this plan and stated that a student in the fundamental educational phase must be taught a craft from which he can earn a living. The student may then proceed to the various other educational stages in which he wishes to enroll and for which he is qualified. Egypt will thus become a society of producers and not a society of unemployed.

This is what we said more than 2 years ago and they are now implementing it without making it known who advocated this view.

We have also said repeatedly that a solution to the housing problem lies in having the Ministry of Housing mobilize the capabilities of the contracting companies controlled by the public sector to build low-cost and popular housing for the people's masses. Solving the housing problem is the responsibility of the government and not of the private sector.

And now comes the minister of housing to say that he will mobilize the capabilities of the contracting companies controlled by the public sector to build low-cost and popular housing.

Had They Listened to Us!

Thus, the opposition in Egypt doesn't offer offhanded statements but rather thoughtful opinion. Had they listened to us, we would not have reached this situation, conditions would not have deteriorated so badly and our crises would not have worsened in all spheres. When we demand that Egypt return to the Arab ranks to confront Israeli and U.S. ambitions in the area and to solve the Palestinian issue, the ruling National Party acts evasively to avoid reviewing this issue and they counter with abuse and by directing all kinds of accusations against the opposition.

But whatever they say, the path is clear and Egypt's return to the Arab line will protect the security of Egypt itself and the security of the entire Arab area. Hiding the truth will change nothing in the situation.

Concluding his address, Ibrahim Shukri urged the party members to escalate party activity during the blessed month of Ramadan, to advocate the party program and to explain the party positions in the various rural areas and in the cities. Shukri said that the party will take the opportunity of this venerable month to hold a series of successive political and religious symposiums to explain the party views and to strengthen its relations with the masses.

It Is Not Sedition But Negligence and Laxity

Fu'ad Nushi, Socialist Labor Party information secretary, had opened the symposium with an address stressing that what happened in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' is not sedition but negligence and laxity because Nabawi Isma'il, the minister of interior, is preoccupied with issues other than protecting the citizens' security. Moreover, democracy is absent and U.S. and Israeli intelligence agents have infiltrated everywhere while the minister of interior is preoccupied solely with besieging the political opposition parties!

Nushi also pointed out that the minister of interior is also too busy taking part in receiving and seeing off high-ranking state officials and in attending the political conferences of the ruling National Party to pay attention to protecting the citizens' security!

Commenting on another subject, Information Secretary Fu'ad Nushi said that announcement by Dr Subhi 'Abd al-Hakim of the names of the chief editors of the papers [presumably national papers] in implementation of the regulations concerning the press law issued by the Consultative Council is incompatible with what the journalists unanimously agreed upon in their union and with their demand that the Higher Press Council draw up the regulations pertaining to the press law. The announcement is also incompatible with the statements of Dr Subhi 'Abd al-Hakim, who had previously said that the regulations pertaining to the press law are within the jurisdiction of the Higher Press Council and that the regulations laid down by the Consultative Council are temporary. Moreover, the announcement is incompatible with the statements made by Dr Mansur Hasan, minister of state for information, before the Journalists Union election campaign in which the minister declared that the regulations pertaining to the press law will not be implemented without the approval of the journalists. These statements and other inducements were among the factors that led to the victory of colleague Salah Jalal. But when Salah Jalal won the position of journalists' doyen, these statements were forgotten.

The party's information secretary then said that all the names announced are members of the ruling party.

Even though these people are dear to us, the Consultative Council has overlooked the Journalists Union. It was the duty of this council to present the names of the chief editors of the newspapers to the Journalists Union. The press is the biggest information medium in our country.

But the ruling party preferred to violate the constitution and democracy so that the press would not reflect the people's views and so that it would be confined to reflecting the ruling party's view.

Truth of These Incidents

Muhammad Abu al-Fadl al-Jizawi, member of the Labor Party's Higher Committee then delivered an address in which he pointed out that the regrettable incidents that were called sectarian sedition have recurred several times since we started what the National Party government calls the peace with Israel. Moreover, these incidents always happen in the wake of major national events that unite the nation's ranks and that mobilize the popular will. He said that this makes it obvious that the stirring of this sedition seeks to shatter Egypt's unity so that it is unable to take a united stand toward the catastrophes inflicted on us by the Camp David policy and by capitulation to Israel and the United States.

Muhammad Abu al-Fadl al-Jizawi added: It is astonishing that these incidents take place and then a long time passes before the police and central security forces intervene. When the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' incidents broke out, the people wondered: Where are all the cars filled with the central security troops who sit in these cars for long hours waiting for only God knows what?!

An Awakening They Have Tried To Stop

Ibrahim Yunis, member of the Labor Party's Higher Committee, then spoke, pointing out that this sedition had been preceded by a pan-Arab awakening in Egypt in the wake of Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, an awakening embodied in the national conference held at the headquarters of the Labor Party and attended by all leaders of the Egyptian opposition and in the conference held at al-Batal [hero] Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria and attended by no less than 80,000 citizens to discuss the issue of Israel's occupation of al-Aqsa Mosque and the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Moreover, there has been fear that this awakening would expand to include discussion of the exorbitant inflation and corruption that is spreading everywhere. Therefore, something had to be done to stem this awakening.

Ibrahim Yunis added: The government is trying first to besiege the popular awakening in Egypt and then the politicians who lead the movement of the Egyptian man in the street by attacking the Labor Party at times and by accusing the communists and other opposition parties at other times.

Ibrahim Yunis asserted that all these endeavors will fail and that great Egypt will continue to be the country of national unity.

Journalist Ibrahim Yunis then discussed press conditions, saying that the announced names of the chief editors of papers contain no change from the existing reality, so why all this clamor about press changes?

These new appointments to the press positions have nothing to do with the masses or with the journalists. They are appointments made by state agencies.

An example of this is that a colleague of ours who was known to be most enthusiastic for the late leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir recently changed and became most enthusiastic for the normalization of relations with Israel. Then we find that this colleague has now become the chief editor of a weekly magazine!

We should not pay too much attention to these changes because they do not reflect what the people or what the journalists want. A government press can never reflect the people's views.

Israeli Settlements in Our Country

Engineer Muhammad Mahdi, member of the Labor Party's Higher Committee, then spoke, drawing attention to the danger of the Zionist invasion of the cultivable lands in Egypt. He also pointed out the danger of the inflow of Zionist money into Egypt through the foreign land reclamation companies and the danger of President al-Sadat's invitation to Ariel Sharon to reclaim the triangle existing between the governorates of al-Fayyum, al-Jizah and Bani Suwayf, as if Egypt has no expertise whatsoever in land reclamation and even though we are the oldest people in the world at reclaiming land and even though the issue of reclamation is solely one of resources and is no secret.

Muhammad Mahdi then said: I demand that the Labor Party be given 20,000 feddans in this area [the triangle] and that the National Party be given an equal area. Let us all compete in reclaiming these lands instead of allowing Israel to invade our cultivable lands and turn them into Israeli settlements.

Where Are We Heading?

'Abbas al-Misri, a member of the Socialist Labor Party, then said that the future of the Arab area is dark and nobody knows where our Arab nation is heading. He proposed that a delegation be formed of the Egyptian opposition parties, with participation by members of the Democratic National Party, to visit all of the Arab countries to explain the Egyptian people's viewpoint on the importance of the solidarity of the Arab rulers and peoples.

Protecting Regime or Protecting People

Rif'at al-Shahawi, the Socialist Labor Party secretary general, then said: Sectarian sedition is something that Egypt has never known before. National unity has continued to be an immortal reality in Egypt's history. No man can distinguish Muslim from Christian in any village. They all wear the same dress, work in the same places, eat the same food and learn in the same schools.

We still remember the day when Sinut Hanna risked his own life to protect Mustafa al-Nahhas from being stabbed. It wasn't said at the time that a Christian risked his life to redeem a Muslim but that an Egyptian redeemed another Egyptian.

But now, under the canopy of the increased central security forces that are stationed in all of the capital's major streets day and night and in a manner never before known to Egypt since the British colonialists departed--now such

incidents are taking place. Then the minister of interior stands at the People's Assembly to say that the matter is minor and that he is capable of confronting the political forces that want to exploit what has happened. Thus, the minister thinks that his task is to protect the regime and not the people!

What is more, Nabawi Isma'il says that the number of casualties doesn't exceed the number of casualties in a bus accident. God be praised! Aren't those killed in a bus accident citizens who have any value in the minister's eyes? Our press published daily reports about a child who fell in a well in Italy whereas 30 or 40 of our citizens die and our minister of interior takes the matter so lightly!

Ruling Party's domination

Commenting on the announcement of the names of chief editors of the national papers and magazines--an announcement approved by the Consultative Council's General Committee--made by Dr Subhi 'Abd al-Hamid, chairman of the Consultative Council, Rif'at al-Shahawi, Labor Party secretary general, said that when the Democratic National Party set up this council it had no real conception of the powers of this council and knew only that the funds of the Socialist Arab Union and ownership of the press establishments would revert to the council.

This is why the ruling party decided to hold the elections for this council on the basis of total lists so that full control over the council would be guaranteed and, consequently, full control over the information media that address the minds and form the opinions of the masses. This is what has actually happened. Whereas the constitution states that the press is an independent popular authority, in reality the press is an instrument in the hands of the ruling party and the press establishments have turned into propaganda trumpets for this party.

It was the opinion of our party that the political parties should own the press establishments so that each paper would express the opinion of one party or that ownership of the press establishments should actually be in the hands of the people by having the workers of these establishments own one half the stock while the people own the other half and by having the general assembly elect its chairman of the board of directors and its chief editor so that the chief editors would know that they owe their loyalty to the people alone. A chief editor owes his loyalty only to him who appoints him.

But the National Party has forgotten that the people are now alert to every attempt to control their thought and intellect and that there is another paper that reflects the people's view, namely, AL-SHA'B.

Victory for Labor Party

Shaykh Ibrahim al-'Azzazi, People's Assembly member (from the Labor Party), then said: What has happened at the People's Assembly regarding the consumption tax bill is truly a victory for the Labor Party by all criteria. A consumption tax bill was presented to the assembly and Ibrahim Shukri demanded that the bill be

discussed fully because it is connected with various policies that should have been discussed by more than one assembly committee. But Dr Muhammad al-Dakruri, the Plan Committee chairman, objected to the idea and was supported by Fikri Makram 'Ubayd on the pretext that the bill had been subjected to careful study.

But the People's Assembly ultimately agreed with the Socialist Labor Party opinion that the bill be returned to the Plan and Budget Committee, and thus the party's view triumphed.

Shaykh Ibrahim al-'Azzazi then said: Nobody knows exactly where Egypt's national economy is heading. Prices are rising in a staggering way whereas wages are rising only slowly. The price of a kilogram of rice has reached 25 piasters in al-'Azzaziyah village, which is a rice-producing village. Only God knows what this price will reach during the exalted month of Ramadan.

Moreover, Egyptian industry is being subjected to an international plot to weaken and destroy it and then to control it. This industry no longer finds the protection under which it used to live, and foreign goods are now flooding Egyptian markets.

Democracy's Funeral

'Abd al-Sami' Mabruk, member of the People's Assembly (from the Labor Party), then said: We are witnessing the funeral of democracy. The opposition suffers from the ferocious assault launched against it by the ruling party, which has reached the point of baseness.

It is inconceivable that the opposition is persecuted to this degree in any country claiming that its system is a democratic one. Not a single word of truth is said about the opposition even though those in the ruling party have not found a single point of weakness in the opposition. The result has been this unjust campaign of insults and vituperation. This is the real funeral of democracy that we are seeing.

'Abd al-Sami' Mabruk then referred to the law amending the housing law, saying: This law has deviated from one of the bases of constitutional legislation. Legislation must be compatible with the constitution and the constitution states that the citizens are equal in rights, whereas this law discriminates among tenants in the same country. The amendment makes a distinction between housing for the purpose of personal dwelling and housing for other purposes and it has limited the rent for dwelling purposes to seven percent of the cost of a building whereas it has made rent for purposes other than housing subject to supply and demand and has failed to limit the owner to a set rent.

'Abd al-Sami' Mabruk warned of the consequences of this law, observing that they will be serious. The door will be closed in the face of the new generation that wants to rent places in which to engage in its work. How can a young doctor or a young lawyer pay 100 pounds in monthly rent for a clinic or an office?

National Party Playing With Fire

Fikri al-Jazzar, member of the People's Assembly (from the Labor Party), then said: President al-Sadat, in his interview with MAY, accused the opposition of being behind the sectarian sedition and said that the opposition is playing with fire. Let his Excellency the President permit me to say that the Democratic National Party is the one that is playing with fire and that this intellectual terrorism that is being launched against the opposition is futile. The Egyptian people will not permit the return of intellectual terrorism.

Moreover, his Excellency the President also said that the issue of opposition in Egypt must be discussed anew. I say: Let them discuss it as they wish but the opposition will continue to exist as the opponents wish and as the people wish. It is better for Egypt to have legitimate opposition. It is dangerous to be confronted one day with an illegitimate opposition.

Fikri al-Jazzar added: I have read in MAY an interview with Mansur Hasan in which he begins the dialog on the opposition. I would have preferred to see this interview begin with a request for the formation of a committee to manage this dialog.

But for Mansur to begin the dialog in MAY and then for AL-SHA'B to answer him a week later is not the dialog that is needed, especially since we live in the same country.

Fikri al-Jazzar then proposed that the Socialist Labor Party take the initiative to form a committee to manage a dialog on the opposition and its role.

Our Party Is Leader of the March

Sayyid Rustum, People's Assembly member (from the Labor Party), then discussed the Sawhaj conference that the party organized last week, saying that the popular conferences and the political symposiums and meetings held by the Socialist Labor Party delegation, which visited Sawhaj under the leadership of Ibrahim Shukri, show that the Egyptian people view our party as the leader of their march toward democracy and progress and as the party that carries the torch of freedom to light the way for the great people of Egypt.

The warm welcome given by the popular masses to the party delegation was an honor for the entire party and for its honorable positions in defending the Arabism and independence of Egypt in the face of the imperialist, Zionist and U.S. schemes.

Egypt's pulse and aspirations surround our party and we have devoted our lives to realizing these aspirations under the leadership of Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, the brave patriotic struggler.

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GOVERNMENT SCHEMES TO GAIN CONTROL OF LAWYERS UNION COUNCIL ASSAILED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 114, 30 Jun 81 p 6

[Article by Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad: "Government Busy Preparing for Seizure of Lawyers Union"]

[Text] In the previous edition, we criticized Minister of Interior Nabawi Isma'il for the regrettable sectarian incidents that took place in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' quarter due to the failure to take the precautions necessary to prevent what could happen as a consequence of the dispute over a plot of land in the area that a Christian citizen claims belongs to him and that the Cairo Governorate says that it owns and a part of which it had set aside for the construction of a mosque. We also criticized the minister for concealing this fact in the official communique he issued 2 days after the incident, thus allowing exaggerated and inflammatory rumors to spread, for depicting the incident as being caused by a quarrel between two neighbors, one of them a Muslim and the other Christian, and for finally acknowledging the true cause in his statement to the People's Assembly, when this cause had become known to everybody, as a secondary cause leading to the intensification of the situation so that his contradictory actions would not be obvious.

Pamphlet by Cairo Secretariat of Ruling Party Prior to Incidents

Since publication of the previous edition, we have obtained a printed pamphlet dated 15 June 1981--3 days before the incidents--issued by the Cairo Secretariat of the Democratic National Party, which is under the control of Muhammad Rashwan, one of the two deputy speakers of the People's Assembly. The pamphlet is addressed to the people of al-Sharabiyah and al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and is signed by the two People's Assembly members representing the district, by the chairman of the Northern Cairo Local Council and by the [ruling] party's secretary for the district. The pamphlet states clearly the true cause, which is the dispute over the plot of land, and the issuance of a decision by the Cairo Governorate setting aside a part of this land for the construction of a mosque. The pamphlet also says that legal measures will be taken to refer the usurper for investigation and to prevent him from disposing of the plot of land. This page contains a photocopy of the pamphlet.

This pamphlet is positive proof that the ruling party, the security agencies and Cairo Governorate had been aware that a significant dispute existed over the subject plot of land as evidenced by publication of this pamphlet. This is unusual. It was the duty [of the security agencies] to prepare for whatever might develop as a consequence of this dispute, which erupted later at a popular level.

Withdrawal of Licensed Weapons After It Was Too Late

The daily papers also reported that firearms were seized at the site of the incidents, including nearly 75 licensed weapons. Perhaps we should wonder about the soundness of issuing licenses for such weapons in the capital without clear justification and about the failure to withdraw the weapons from the disputing parties after the dispute erupted.

Two days ago, some papers reported that amendments to the law governing the licensing of weapons, which the minister prepared after the latest incidents have been introduced.

All this reminds us of what the chief editor of AL-AHRAM--which is not an opposition paper--said in his comment on the incidents on 22 June 1981, namely, that the recurrence of these incidents and in the dimensions in which they occurred requires a pause and that it is impermissible to let matters go unchecked until "the axe falls." The first duty of the security agencies is to prevent crime before it occurs as long as there is evidence showing that it is likely that a crime will be committed.

Minister of Interior Is Primary a Security Man

The minister of interior is a historical phrase for what is called the minister of internal security in recently emerging countries. His primary task is a "security" task and not a political one. Hence, Nabawi Isma'il was appointed to this position by virtue of his being a police officer.

Therefore, the attempt to justify the instructions given to the policeman present at the site of the riot--in which shots were fired, shops destroyed and homes stormed--to resort to words and persuasion, as the minister of interior has said in his statement before the People's Assembly, is unacceptable. Perhaps we will recall that this is why Maj Gen Sayyid Fahmi, the former minister of interior, was dismissed from his position in the wake of the riots of 18 and 19 January 1977.

As for President Anwar al-Sadat's statements in his interview with MAY in the wake of the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' incidents--that Nabawi Isma'il faced the events as a political official and not as a security man--and the president's statement that he told the minister "you have succeeded as a political official in confronting the saboteurs and the instigators but I want you in the future to settle the matter as of the first minute"--as for these statements, they are similar to what we call in the study of eloquence and expression in the Arabic language "censure that looks like praise."

Was Government Preoccupied With Something Else?

It seems that the government is busy politically and in terms of security at the same time with another internal battle, namely, the battle to seize the Lawyers Union because the ruling party's political leadership is not pleased with the conduct of the elected majority of lawyers in the union council.

The ruling party has tried to convince the public that there is a split among the lawyers in order to create an atmosphere that enables the government to use this split as a pretext to amend the law governing the legal profession as a way of getting rid of the existing union council and replacing it with one controlled by the ruling party.

The movement began with a celebration held by a number of Alexandria lawyers on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of 15 May, to which they invited President al-Sadat, who declared four times in his speech that he was honored to be invited by the lawyers and that "Egypt will never permit anybody to speak in its name except those who represent its people because some members of the Lawyers Union in Cairo have tried to dominate and to speak in the name of Egypt's lawyers."

The government then proceeded to exert ceaseless efforts to attract public-sector lawyers and members of the [central] and local governments' legal administrations by promising to rectify their job conditions, by announcing that the companies law would stipulate that every joint-stock company must have a lawyer and by declaring through a young official that the party's Lawyers Fellowship Fund, which is headed by Vikri Makram 'Ubayd, would support every lawyer with 300 pounds when he gets married, with 400 pounds when he opens a private office and with 100 pounds for the purchase of legal references, in addition to increasing to 10, instead of 4, the number of seats allocated for lawyers representing the government and the public sector in the Lawyers Union Council, giving them pensions from the union fund amounting to 100 pounds on top of their government pension, setting aside an apartment building for young lawyers to open their offices in and promising other material inducements aimed at influencing them to agree to take part in implementing the ruling party's schemes regarding the Lawyers Union.

I have before me a letter addressed from the deputy prime minister and the chairman of the Permanent Council of the Democratic National Party, dated 21 June 1981, to Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid in his capacity as deputy prime minister for economic affairs asking him to contact the lawyers and their leaders in the ministries to attend the [union's] general assembly meeting to be held on the morning of Friday, 26 June 1981, and to make available to them all the facilities enabling them to arrive on time.

It was arranged for those arriving from outside Cairo to stay at the university towns, which is a kind of exploitive government influence in the interest of the ruling party.

Meetings were held among the officials to draw up the "plans to invade" the Lawyers Union by storming the meeting of the union's general assembly, which had been previously postponed for lack of quorum, and by entering the meeting in crowds and in a disorderly manner and issuing a decision withdrawing confidence from the union council.

Tactical Mistakes in Government's Attack Plans

But the leaders of the government attack failed to arrive early so that they could be there at the time set by the union for convocation of the general

assembly. A quorum for the second meeting was reached at 0900 and the assembly discussed its agenda and issued its resolutions, which were signed by members of the present union council, including Istifan Basili, member of the Democratic National Party and the People's Assembly, and Fahmi Nashid, member of the Consultative Council.

The resolutions issued by the Government Assembly [sic] included a resolution, and this is a most important point, withdrawing confidence from the (members and chairman) of the present union council, forgetting that article 10 of law No 61 governing the legal profession stipulates that such a resolution must be issued by an "extraordinary" general assembly summoned in accordance with a justified request signed by at least 300 lawyers entitled to attend the general assembly. For the convocation of such a extraordinary assembly session, it is also required that at least one half of the registered lawyers--more than 10,000--attend. This assembly may not be postponed--article No 6 of the above-mentioned law.

Thus, the issuance of such a resolution from a general assembly that doesn't meet these conditions is null and void.

If the government seeks in this way to create merely an atmosphere for the issuance of legislation to amend the law governing the legal profession simply to realize its goals, then the leaders of the invasion plan have forgotten that the People's Assembly session has not adjourned and that if a decree by law is issued during the assembly's absence on vacation during the month of Ramadan because of a fabricated need, then this decree has to be presented to the assembly within 15 days of its issuance--Article 147 of the constitution.

Is it the intention of the government to ask the People's Assembly after its vacation to discuss the proposed bill seeking to seize the Lawyers Union or will it leave matters in this provocative situation until the People's Assembly reconvenes?

In any case, the government is reassured of an overwhelming majority in the People's Assembly. But it is not at all in the public interest for an existing law to be violated and for the government to invade a professional union to get rid of its executive council, which is elected legally, and for this government to then talk of democracy and the supremacy of law.

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SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY SYMPOSIUM VOICES SUPPORT FOR LAWYERS UNION

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 115, 7 Jul 81 pp 2, 15

[Article by Hibatullah Yusuf and Karim Mahmud: "Socialist Labor Party Devotes Weekly Symposium To Defending Lawyers Union; Statement by Labor Party Denouncing Attack on Union; Ibrahim Shukri: Attack on Lawyers Union Is Childish Game Perpetrated by Irresponsible Leaderships in Ruling Party; Mamduh Qinawi: Let Sedition of Lawyers Union Be Beginning of Major Awakening; Muhammad Fahim: Ruling Party Attacks Lawyers Union for Defending Liberties; Fu'ad Nushi: Government Campaign Against Lawyers Union Will Fail as It Failed Against Journalists and Judges; Ahmad Firghali: People Are Aware of True Patriotic Positions of Lawyers"]

[Text] Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, has declared that what happened at the Lawyers Union is a childish game perpetrated by some leaders of the ruling party who don't know the meaning of responsibility. These are the ones who distort Egypt's reputation abroad with these petty actions. What is meant by this flagrant attack on the union is to divert attention from the military facilities and bases given to the United States and from the normalization of relations that is being currently imposed on the Egyptian people. It is also meant to divert attention from the deteriorating economic conditions and from the isolation that Israel wants to impose on Egypt by pushing it away from its Arab sisters.

The Socialist Labor Party chairman also said: The Lawyers Union did not swerve from the national line when it took part in discussing the fateful and democratic issues. Those who have swerved from the line are irresponsible leaders who with these actions are trying to curry favor with the president of the republic, to cling to their positions or attain higher positions.

This was stated at the Labor Party's weekly symposium held last Tuesday and devoted to discussing the attack perpetrated last week by some of the ruling party leaders against the Lawyers Union. Attending the symposium on behalf of the Lawyers Union and the union council members were Muhammad Fahim Amin and Ahmad Nasir, council members. The symposium was also attended by a large number of lawyers, Labor Party members and citizens; it lasted 3 full hours.

At the outset of his address, Ibrahim welcomed the Lawyers Union delegation, saying: "We devote our weekly meeting today to a momentous event before which every Egyptian thinking of the destiny of this country and of the destiny of

democracy and liberty pauses. I say that we must discuss it because discussion clarifies all aspects. We do not do what others do when they listen to only one opinion without discussion and without dialog and then issue judgments without thinking and without examination. I say that this event is a childish game that the ruling National Party would not have stooped to if it had self-respect. It is a game perpetrated by some leaders of the National Party in an attempt to carry favor with President al-Sadat. With such actions, these leaders harm their party gravely by fabricating things that do not exist.

"It is not true that the honorable lawyers of Egypt have withdrawn their confidence from their union council and from the chairman of their union."

Union Hasn't Swerved From National Line

The Socialist Labor Party leader added: If the Lawyers Union shows, within the framework of its work, interest in its country's fateful issues by discussing and examining these issues, then is this considered a deviation from the national line, as they allege? The lawyers, who are the men and the defenders of the law, stand up to defend the supremacy of the law and demand that public liberties be acknowledged, that special measures and laws be abolished and that sound democracy be established within their union. This cannot be a deviation from the union's work and jurisdiction. I say that what the ruling party has done with this attack on the Lawyers Union is something that cannot serve democracy. From here, from the Socialist Labor Party and from among these crowds I address a greeting to those who stand fast in the Lawyers Union. A greeting to Ahmad al-Khawajah, the lawyers' doyen, a greeting to all members of the union council and a greeting to all the workers who remain vigilant to defend their union and to support their legitimate council, which was elected legally and from which they [the ruling party] are trying to wrest confidence with these childish actions.

Ibrahim Shukri then wondered: Why this strong hostility on the part of the ruling party toward the professional unions in Egypt? Is it because of their patriotic positions and their refusal to march in the government's bandwagon? It is no disgrace at all that the majority of the members of the Lawyers Union Council are among those who have opposed Camp David. It is also no disgrace at all to the journalists that they elected the majority of their council from among the patriotic opposition journalists. It is no disgrace to their club and its executive council and that they elected those who reflect their view and the view of Egypt.

Addressing his words to the leaders of the ruling party, the Labor Party chairman said: If you want true democracy, then why do you harass opposing opinion and why do you assault it so ferociously? I say this to all those leaders in the ruling party who have depicted matters to the president of the republic in a manner that counters the truth.

The truth is that the matter is nothing more than a show perpetrated by leaders who don't know the meaning of responsibility and who want to rise on the shoulders of others.

Playing With Fire

We say that what has been done and what is being done by the leaders of the ruling party is tantamount to playing with fire. Violence can only breed more violence. They imagine that they will impose their will on the masses of lawyers in this way. They are absolutely deluded. Brother Muhammad Fahim has told me that there was a strike today in all of Egypt's courts and [legal] departments in support of the union. This was a great and true referendum in favor of the lawyers' doyen and the legitimate union council. I tell President al-Sadat: If you want to know the truth then you should learn it from what happened today at the courts. There are 100 judiciary circuits and work stopped in 94 of them. The union's statement on the truth of the events that have taken place was deposited in the minutes of these circuits and the lawyers have clung to their doyen and to the members of their union council.

The judges of the remaining six courts were in a hurry and asked that this document [union statement] be left in the court. If you, Mr President, want to know what happened, then ask for an explanation from the minister of justice and ask for the minutes of these sessions so that you can learn that they have not told you the truth.

Concluding his address, Ibrahim Shukri said: I tell the lawyers, their council and their union: Stand fast, defend your union and do not fear all these childish acts and this new method of force and lawlessness. Be confident that these assaults will bring about an inverse result as the ferocious attack on the Labor Party and its leaders on the 14th of last May brought about inverse results and heightened the popularity of the Labor Party and the people's understanding of its positions. I have felt this in all the governorates that I have visited recently.

Unprecedented Attack

Lawyer Mahmud al-Mulayji, member of the party's higher committee, had opened the symposium with a brief address in which he said: What has happened at the Lawyers Union is truly an attack on the lawyers, as Dr 'Asfur has described it. The aggression and the oppression committed against the lawyers is unprecedented. This is why the Socialist Labor Party has decided to devote this symposium to a discussion of this issue.

It Is Necessary To Try Aggressors

Muhammad Abu al-Fadl al-Jizawi, lawyer and member of the party's higher committee, then said: We have read that the president of the republic declared that the Lawyers Union has stood against the law, against the constitution and against the abolition of detention camps. Nobody can believe such words. The Lawyers Union has always stood up to oppression and tyranny and has struggled for implementation of the law and the imposition of legitimacy.

How can the union be against the constitution, against the law and against the abolition of detention camps when it is preoccupied with nothing other than

calling for the supremacy of law and for application of the law, with constantly defending those who are unjustly detained and charged in political cases and with demanding abolition of all the special laws that restrict liberties in Egypt? The law represents the will of the people but special law is a sword hanging over the heads of the citizens.

The true reason for the attack to which the Lawyers Union has been exposed is the union's patriotic positions.

Major Sedition

Lawyer Mamduh Qinawi, Socialist Labor Party secretary in Sawhaj, then spoke, saying: What is happening now is a major sedition sweeping Egypt and a serious epidemic threatening it with destruction. We previously rejected a slogan that we now need to urgently raise, namely, the slogan that Egypt is for the Egyptians. We need to raise it so that no Egyptian may dominate another and so that no Egyptian may view another as being beholden to him.

We work within the framework of legitimacy, and we have said this repeatedly. Even though we seek a change in the balance of the people's forces, we seek it through the constitution.

The issue of democracy has now become, as the Labor Party sees it, the main issue and without it none of the people's problems can be solved. Democracy doesn't mean that we meet and that we be permitted to meet. Democracy means that the people, all the people, be the decision maker and that their word be honored. Democracy means the presence of a balance among the existing political forces. What is happening now is domination by the ruling party of political, partisan and parliamentary life in Egypt.

When we say democracy we must mention consultation and we can find no better consultation than that advocated by Islam. The righteousness of the flock is from the righteousness of the shepherd and vice versa. These are the bases of government in Islam.

State of Separation

Qinawi added: The Lawyers Union has always been a true stronghold for safeguarding the citizens' liberties. The Lawyers Union has also always followed a patriotic line in defending Egypt's causes. This is because defense of public causes is the basis for defending the private liberties of the citizens. This is why this union must be protected from any aggression, and beware the evil of a sedition from which no good is desired.

Not the First Attack

Muhammad Fahim Amin, member of the Lawyers Union Council and of the Permanent Council of the Arab Lawyers Federation, then delivered an address on behalf of the Lawyers Union, saying: The ferocious attack made last week against the Lawyers Union was not the first of its kind. Since the latest union elections--elections that brought into existence the present council--symposiums have been held to confront the so-called law of shame and the Values Court. They [the ruling party] stormed the union hall, beat those present and tried to put an

end to the symposiums. But the symposiums continued. Then came the second ferocious attack in the wake of our return from the Arab Lawyers Federation conference in Rabat. They said that the lawyers had attacked Egypt in Rabat. No, we did not attack Egypt because it is in our hearts and our blood. They then backed down and said that the information supplied to them was faulty. No, the information was not faulty but it had been decided beforehand to get rid of some of the union council members.

Now they have employed a number of nonlawyers or those who have a B.A. degree in law but who are not engaged in the legal profession and a number of lawyers who are members of the ruling party, to storm the Lawyers Union. Musa Sabri then proceeds to write: Give us the name of one nonlawyer. We tell Sabri we have numerous names and numerous documents at our disposal proving the government's intervention, including forged invitations signed by the chairman of a branch union, keeping in mind that the invitations to attend the general assembly are issued by the general union and signed by the chairman of the Lawyers Union. I have with me an invitation addressed to Mrs Rafdah Muhammad Ibrahim who is not a Lawyers Union member. The proof of this [forgery] is that the seal on the invitation is the seal of the Legalists Association, an association that includes those who have a B.A. law degree, who work in the government departments and agencies and who had been ordered to attend the general assembly without being entitled to do so.

Lawyers First To Know the Truth

Muhammad Fahim Amin added: We the lawyers are the first to know the truth because we are the first to read the law. This is why we have always stood with the people to defend their liberties and their right to exercise democracy. This has not pleased the government and hence the attempt to pounce on the union and to impose their will on the masses of lawyers. The government does this while the people moan under the burden of the economic siege imposed on us because the geniuses of the open-door policy and of normalization trade with the Zionists and seek only their personal profit. They suck the blood of our people and laws are exploited to exempt them from taxes and customs while the taxes and customs are raised on the goods of others.

How many laws have been issued recently to serve Zionist interests! What is more serious than this is the investment law through which Israel sneaks to own Egyptian land for 100 years and to build its settlements on it. However, let us warn that Palestine started with one settlement. We fear that Sinai or al-Salihiyah will turn into another Palestine. The slogan of "from the Nile to the Euphrates" is still raised in the Israeli Knesset.

Campaign Doomed to Future Failure

Fu'ad Nushi, Socialist Labor Party information secretary, then said: I can see no reason for the strong hatred which the ruling party harbors for the professional unions and labor unions. This party started its campaign to liquidate patriotism from within the professional unions with its attack against the Journalists Union, and it failed. Ahmad Firghali, Litfi al-Khulia and a number of other nationalists won in the journalists elections. The ruling party then launched its attack against the Judges Club and also failed to impose its

will on the honorable judges of Egypt. And here, finally, comes this criminal attack against the defenders of the law, against the freedom union, against the Lawyers Union. I am confident that this campaign is also doomed to failure.

Journalists' Greeting to Lawyers

Ahmad Firghali, member of the Socialist Labor Party Parliamentary Committee and the Journalists Union Council, then delivered an address saying: In the name of the journalists, I bow my head in respect to the union of steadfastness and freedom, the Lawyers Union.

They speak about the lawyers succeeding in modifying the course of their union. I say yes, there has been a modification but toward the national and pan-Arab course. This is the course that the journalists corrected when they elected the journalists and the nationalists who represent them and that the judges corrected when they dropped the government candidates in their union election and rallied behind their union and its chairman, renewing their confidence in them.

I tell this crowd of lawyers that the Egyptian political scene is healthy and is fully aware of the truth of your courageous position in all that you have done.

Statement to Masses

At the conclusion of the symposium, the Socialist Labor Party, along with representatives of the Lawyers Union who attended the symposium, issued a statement to the masses of the Egyptian people, saying:

The Socialist Labor Party held its weekly symposium at its headquarters, opening its arms to the delegation of the legitimate Lawyers Union Council, which represents Egypt's lawyers, the vanguard of Egypt's honorable men and the stronghold of Egypt's struggle.

The conferees discussed the incidents perpetrated by the ruling party last Friday, 26 June 1981, when it stormed the Lawyers Union premises in an attempt to bury democracy in Egypt and to shatter the unity of its people with utter disregard for the supremacy of law. The ruling party tried to forge the will of the lawyers and the resolutions of the union's legitimate general assembly.

This party supports the chairman and members of the Lawyers Union and resolves:

First, to condemn the childish attack against the union premises by nonlawyers planted by some of the ruling party's agencies.

Second, to condemn the various false resolutions broadcast by the information media and attributed to the Lawyers Union and to condemn the refusal of these information media to publish the actual resolutions issued correctly and in accordance with the law by the legitimate [union] general assembly.

Third, to support the chairman and members of the Lawyers Union in their national, pan-Arab and professional positions, which are based on Article 3 of the law governing the legal profession.

Fourth, to urge the Egyptian people not to be deceived by any resolutions issued by an illegal faction even if such resolutions are made to look real by the information media. They also urge everyone to be vigilant and alert, to confront any attempt to mislead public opinion.

God is great and long live the people.

Cairo, 30 June 1981.

8494
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RULING PARTY ACCUSED OF CORRUPTING POLITICAL LIFE, SILENCING OPPOSITION

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 116, 14 Jul 81 p 6

[Article by Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad: "Aren't These Forms Corrupting Political Life?"]

[Text] Finally, the ruling authority has been forced to expose its face and to intervene openly in the battle it has fabricated by instigating a group of lawyers affiliated with the ruling party and demanding reform of their working conditions and aid in starting their professional life to pounce on the Lawyers Union and to withdraw confidence from the union council, which has been legally elected for a 4-year term of which no more than one-half has now passed. This group has trie to do so with disregard for the procedures stipulated in the union law requiring that a justified request signed by at least 300 lawyers be submitted for the convocation of a "special" general assembly that must be attended by at least one-half the registered lawyers. The ruling authority had previously failed to "confront" the lectures and the educational symposiums held by the union to study the bills connected with the citizens' rights, with public liberties and with the national issues, all of which are the essence of the union's goals by virtue of the profession of its members and the stipulations of its laws. The authority had failed to do so by resorting to demogogic and undemocratic means inherent in creating clamor and fights and in shouting hostile slogans with the aim of breaking up the meetings.

The government has asked that the People's Assembly be summoned from its vacation so that by amending the Lawyers Union law--by virtue of the overwhelming majority it enjoys in the assembly--it can achieve what it has failed to achieve through union procedures stipulated in the current law. It has become evident to the ruling authority that it cannot gather one-half the union members in a special general assembly to dismiss the union council.

Subjugating Legislative Authority

This recall from the vacation the People's Assembly has given itself until the 8th of next month, after the al-Fitr holiday, is in itself considered an abnormal measure intended to hasten dismissal of the Lawyers Union Council because it seems that the government can countenance it no longer.

No matter how hard the government tries to hide the true reason for this urgent recall, which is concealed behind the mask of presenting the consumption tax

bill and the income tax bill, the pretext is superficial and exposed because the issue of the two bills was known at the time the People's Assembly set the dates for its vacation and its reconvening. Nothing has developed since then other than the issue of amending the law governing the legal profession.

This amendment is intended solely to permit the government to pounce on a unionist society regulated by an existing law so that this government may impose the viewpoint of the political party to which it and the overwhelming majority of the People's Assembly belong. Is it the right of the party of the parliamentary majority, under a multi-party system, to use the legislative authority to realize its partisan whims, relying on the majority of votes it enjoys?

Students of legal sciences know that there is a legal theory known as the theory of the misuse of power or the theory of the "misapplication of power." What is meant by this theory is that any outwardly sound action becomes null and void if it is intended to realize a special benefit, a personal interest, a secret objective or any other objective unrelated to the public interest.

On the basis of this theory empowering the administrative judiciary to abolish presidential and administrative decrees that are marred by any flaw and considering that the Supreme Constitutional Court's only jurisdiction is to pass judgment on the unconstitutionality of laws contradicting the text of the constitution, laws cannot be correctly called that, according to the general legal rules, unless they contain certain objective components, mainly that they are intended to realize a public good and are not meant to be used as an instrument of oppression or of harm by those who have the power to issue these laws, even if they are a freely elected parliamentary majority--a condition that constitutional law legalists call "the oppression of the majority."

If a law lacks one of the general conditions required of a law, then it loses its quality as a law and the courts are no longer bound to apply it, even if it meets all the outward and procedural requirements that must be met by all laws and even if it is not in contradiction of a clear provision of the constitution.

This is the case if the public elections that bring the People's Assembly into existence are sound and not flawed by any government intervention. But what can you say when the majority on which such a law relies has come as a result of elections whose soundness is doubted by the testimony of both friend and foe and by evidence registered in the minutes of some of the official election committees and in sentences passed by judicial authority?!

It is regrettable that the minister of interior, who supervised and managed those elections, is still ensconced in his ministerial seat, defying all the democratic values and rules of impartial government. The government still talks about sound democratic practices in the absence of the fundamental grounds for such practices, namely, the reliance of the regime on a popular will expressed in free and impartial elections.

Attempt To Influence Consciences With Material Benefits

What has been done and is being done against the lawyers Union Council is not the only regrettable action. What is seen on the occasion of every professional

or factional election is that the ruling authority tries to influence the voters by waving in front of them promises of material benefits and advantages if the candidate the authority likes wins and that this authority slanders and undermines those with whom it is displeased with all the means and methods at its disposal. The government then speaks of shame and of protecting values from shame.

If we review the so-called national papers on the occasion of each of these elections, we find numerous attractive promises and projects to which the citizens aspire, such as housing, health care, job benefits, professional pensions and other plans.

The judiciary itself, which is an independent authority that we must all be eager to spare partisan maneuvers, has not been spared these methods. We have already referred to the visits of Anwar Abu-Sahli, the former minister of justice, to the courts before the holding of the Judges Club elections and to the minister's statements during the visits--statements that the papers used to publish with the aim of supporting one group against another. What is more, 40,000 pounds were put at the disposal of the former minister as a permanent loan from the budget of the presidential office to dispose of in favor of [certain] judges without any objective controls. This is unreasonable because it undermines the independence of the judiciary and the dignity of the judges. We hope that the present minister of justice has put an end to this practice, especially since it has become evident that these methods failed to achieve their aim.

What is more, the Alexandria University Faculty Club was given a check for 20,000 pounds from the presidential office budget after President al-Sadat met with the university professors and prior to the election of the club's new executive council. This matter is not within the jurisdiction of the presidential office and we do not believe that the office has an allocation for this purpose.

If the Judges Club needs additional aid from the state, then let a financial appropriation be allocated for it from the people's money and in the budget of the ministry concerned, the Ministry of Justice, so that the club may dispose of the money knowingly and in accordance with objective regulations it issues. Similarly, if the clubs of university faculties need financial aid, then this aid must be underlined in the budget of the Ministry of Education in accordance with the financial laws in force.

On the occasion of the incidents at the Lawyers Union, we hear today about periodic meetings between the officials and young lawyers, about the Democratic National Party's Lawyers Fellowship Fund, about grants to be given to young lawyers when they open their offices and when they get married, about the appointment of a lawyer to every investment company and about increased unionist pensions without an increase in the registration fees, whereas there is an inevitable mathematical connection between revenues, subscriptions, insurance benefits and pensions. We also hear about reforms in the working conditions of the lawyers in the government's and public sector's legal administrations and so forth.

We then read a personal slander against the Lawyers Union Council members dealing with their financial spending and their national belief. This slander goes even further to attack whoever supports them in defense of democracy, freedom of expression and unionist liberties. Moreover, a statement written by a brother

lawyer, signed by Muhammad Rashwan, second deputy speaker of the People's Assembly, and published in MAY, organ of the ruling party, falsely accuses AL-SHA'B of using abusive language to describe the group of lawyers who attacked the union. This is something that has not happened.

Involving So-Called National Press in Partisan Conflicts

It has become most obvious that the so-called national papers and the Radio and Television Union, which is considered a national utility, have all been thrown into the battle by the authority so that they can take its side. It is thus becoming more and more certain day after day that MAY is not the only paper that speaks for the ruling Democratic National Party but that all the so-called national papers and the Radio and Television Union are also agencies speaking for this party. They only publish about the other political parties those statements or information that the ruling party provides and that undermine these parties. They refuse to publish whatever we or any other opponents send to them to correct the faulty reports or information they publish. They refuse to publish this material even though the law requires them to do so. Then they speak of freedom of the press and of the supremacy of law!

Moreover, MAY exploits the influence of the ruling party for which it speaks to acquire the largest amount of government and public sector advertising, whereas before the revolution efforts were exerted to distribute such advertisements among the various papers fairly, and this is also what is done in no small number of foreign countries. Meanwhile, AL-SHA'B is denied such advertisements, except for a very few that are permitted so as to deny something that is decided officially and only on condition that the advertisement is published in accordance with prearranged dimensions and photographs, because AL-SHA'B is an opposition paper.

MAY has also exploited its position to have his eminence Dr 'Abd al-Rahim Bisar, the shaykh of al-Azhar, write articles in its supplement AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI [Islamic Banner]. This is incompatible with the status of the shaykh of al-Azhar in his capacity as the highest ulema of the Islamic religion and the symbol of this faith, who must steer clear of the embarrassment of being depicted as a partisan or a supporter of the ruling party.

Various Forms of Corrupting Life

Considering that law No 33 of 1978 pertaining to safeguarding the domestic front and social peace denies whoever caused the corruption of political life before the revolution the exercise of his political rights, and considering that this law even permits the denial to any citizen of his political rights if he now commits any actions liable to corrupt the country's political life, aren't the various forms that we have mentioned likely to cause such corruption? What is the opinion of the socialist public prosecutor, of those who have laid down this law and those who have supported it?

8494
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WEEKLY LABOR PARTY SYMPOSIUM HITS RULING PARTY ATTEMPTS TO STIFLE DEMOCRACY

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 117, 21 Jul 81 p 2

[Article: "Ibrahim Shukri: Some Leaders of Ruling Party Distort Egypt's Image; Ruling Party Seeks To Control Lawyers Union Council; Fu'ad Nushi: Nobody Has the Right To Distribute Accusations Against Opposition; Muhammad Kamal Farraj: Islam Is Both Religion and Government and Is the Only Way Out of Our Current Crisis"]

[Text] Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, has underlined the failure of the Democratic National Party's endeavors to slander the opposition and to turn it into a hanger on which to drape its mistakes and its failure to solve our people's problems. Shukri also stressed that these endeavors will do democracy no good at all and will not solve our problems.

At the weekly symposium held by the party last Tuesday evening, Ibrahim Shukri said that a lot of what some leaders of the ruling National Party do distorts Egypt's image. Instead of portraying Egypt as the country of liberty, democracy, opinion and counter opinion, these leaders commit actions that harm the image of democracy in Egypt. If the opposition criticizes these undemocratic actions, they say that the criticism is levelled against President al-Sadat personally. In this way they hide behind the president in his capacity as chairman of the Democratic National Party because they are incapable of answering the opposition's criticism.

Strange Celebration

The Socialist Labor Party chairman went on to add: The Democratic National Party celebrated its third anniversary last week, imagining that it has completed its structures. They held a celebration that was broadcast by radio and television and in which what is serious mingled with what is funny. What is peculiar to their party was also mixed with what belongs rightfully to the people.

It is not their right to compel the people to see this celebration. They think that this will gain them popularity, but the people know the reality despite all the appearances with which they surrounded their celebration and despite what was published in the papers to say that the Democratic National Party is not strong because President al-Sadat heads it but because it exists among the people.

If it is desired to establish a truly sound democratic life, then the Egyptian citizen must have the full right to choose the party he wants without incurring any harm and President al-Sadat must be content with the presidency of the republic and must leave the party chairmanship to some other member selected by the party so that the various political currents and parties may struggle without pressure and so that the president acts ultimately as the referee among them.

We demanded this in our party's program but some people in the ruling party answered that the president of the republic in other countries has the right to choose and head the party he wants.

But the political conditions and traditions in Egypt are different from those in other countries. We are still close to the era of the totalitarian system under which the president of the republic was the chairman of the only political organization in the country. President al-Sadat himself was the chairman of the Arab Socialist Union.

Hiding Behind the President of the Republic

Ibrahim Shukri added: If the ruling National Party wants to establish a truly sound democratic life, then let it stop hiding behind the president of the republic and let it abolish the restrictions it has imposed on the formation of parties, such as the need to present the names of the founders of a party to the Consultative Assembly so that they may be presented 3 months later to the parties committee. Let the ruling party abolish all the shackles restricting liberties. Some of these shackles include restrictions that are in conflict with democracy and that are imposed by the emergency laws, such as the state security courts and preventive detention. Let the party also stop those actions that are hostile to existing democratic institutions such as the Lawyers Union.

What is surprising is that some of the ruling party's leaders claim that the Lawyers Union Council does not have the right or the jurisdiction to discuss public issues connected with Egypt's destiny, whereas the law governing the union and the union's bylaws state clearly its right to discuss national issues as well as issues concerning the Arab homeland.

It is natural that the lawyers, who are entrusted with defending the people's rights, have the right and the duty to discuss public issues and the citizen's liberties.

Therefore, what is said about the union having exceeded its right is not correct.

What is also surprising is to hear some of the National Party leaders say that it is not the right of the Lawyers Union Council to discuss the peace treaty when a popular referendum was conducted on it.

It is as if the referendums that are held meet the legal guarantees necessary to insure their impartiality and correctness. The courts are still looking into cases brought before them by lawyers from the party on the legality of these referendums. There are numerous legal violations that do not reassure us very much regarding the outcome of these referendums.

But what some members of the Democratic National Party claim against the Lawyers Union Council is intended to form a People's Assembly fact-finding committee and then to refer the issue to the social prosecutor so that he may propose amendments to the law governing the legal profession to avoid what has happened in the future, so that there may be another authority to bring the lawyers to account--an authority other than the one stipulated by the current law--and so as to amend the method by which the union council is formed so that the ruling party can guarantee its control over the new council.

Judges Club Also

Ibrahim Shukri also pointed out that there are views in the Democratic National Party calling for reorganization [i'adat shahr]] of clubs and some other organizations so as to force the Judges Club to reorganize and to change its executive council, whose election was a slap at the former minister of justice.

The opposition leader pointed out that all these tricks cannot form a strong party. A strong party is one that is guided by leaders capable of shouldering responsibility, of discussing issues objectively and of acting in accordance with the constitution and the law.

Tale of Photograph

Fu'ad Nushi, Socialist Labor Party information secretary, then said: Al-SHA'B has published on its front page a photograph of the People's Assembly speaker bowing before the head of the executive authority.

This photograph caused a delay in the printing of AL-SHA'B. We merely copied it from MAY and republished it, and he who transmits atheism is not an atheist. The difficulties were surmounted only after the chief editor of AL-SHA'B announced that we would publish the edition with a blank space where the picture was to appear and let the readers understand what they want. It was only thus that the officials of AL-AHRAM were persuaded to print AL-SHA'B.

This photograph has shown that the legislative authority bows before the executive authority even though the 1971 constitution underlines the independence of the legislative authority from the executive authority.

Attack Against All

The party's information secretary went on to say: How I wish the Democratic National Party chairman, in his address during the celebration of the party's anniversary, had not attacked all the other forces in Egypt. He attacked the imams of mosques and accused them of swerving from the law. He also attacked the Lawyers Union and accused it of deviating from the law. He attacked the various opposition parties as if he were entitled to issue judgments against the other parties and to draw up their policies for them. He even accused the U.S. journalist who had sent a dispatch to the television station for which he works of forgery, falsehood and of implementing a hostile scheme!

Fu'ad Nushi pointed out that the Lawyers Union Council was, for example, accused of being against peace because of its opposition to the two Camp David treaties, whereas Egypt has seen numerous treaties that have been opposed by numerous forces. None of those forces were accused of betraying Egypt or of selling out Egypt.

The 1936 treaty that was concluded by a front consisting of various parties led by Mustafa al-Nahhas, the then prime minister, was opposed by two parties, namely, the original National Party and the Young Egypt Party. Nobody levelled against them such accusations as the ones we hear today. The opposition of those two parties to the treaty continued until Mustafa al-Nahhas stood before the National Assembly in 1951 to say: For the sake of Egypt I signed the 1936 treaty and for the sake of Egypt I now ask you to abrogate it.

In 1954, the late president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir concluded with Britain a treaty for evacuation of the Suez Canal. Numerous forces opposed the treaty, but they were not accused of treason.

In 1957, 'Abd al-Nasir abrogated the treaty in the wake of the tripartite aggression on the canal.

President al-Sadat himself concluded a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971. Numerous forces opposed the provisions of the treaty. Just 1 year later, President al-Sadat abrogated the treaty.

So it is not unusual for political forces to declare their opposition to a treaty. What is surprising is that such forces are accused of treason and of selling out Egypt.

Islam Is Religion and State

Muhammad Kamal Farraj, a lawyer and a party member, then said: We often hear these days that there is no politics in religion and no religion in politics, whereas the venerable Koran, God's prophet--may God's peace and prayers be upon him, the caliphs, the religious legists and the events of history teach us that Islam is both religion and state.

Egypt, which is not ruled by Islam, criticizes the Iranian regime, which rules by Islam. We truly disagree with the Iranian regime in its disposing of its foes without open trials and without giving the defendant the full right to defend himself. But the Iranian regime has succeeded in making every Iranian cling to Islam as religion and state.

On the last day of his life, God's prophet warned us of a day when seditions multiply among the Muslims. When God's prophet was asked what was the way to overcome them, he said: "God's book and the sunna of His prophet."

Therefore, the only way to overcome our crisis lies in God's book and in the sunna of His prophet. Only then will we find the alternatives they are asking us to present to the Camp David treaty.

Will Palestine's Tragedy Be Repeated in Egypt

Former Brig Gen Zakariya al-Wardani, a Labor Party member, then made an address in which he said: The papers have published a bill offering state-owned desert land for sale in public auction. Joint-stock companies have been permitted to own 50,000 feddans of such lands. The bill contains no condition requiring the stockholders in these companies to be Egyptian. Thus, the Jews can form joint-stock companies to buy Egyptian land so that the Palestine tragedy may be repeated.

The matter is not confined to this. In accordance with the provisions of this bill, the state will offer the companies that own the land numerous facilities, including the construction on this land of utilities necessary to cultivate it and the supplying of irrigation water to it.

This means that the Egyptian people will shoulder the expense necessary to cultivate these lands. So why should the lands be sold to foreign companies when the Egyptians are known to be the most skillful people on earth in reclaiming land?

The bill also states that the president of the republic has the right to dispose of the Sinai lands and lands irrigated by rainwater or from ruined wells. Is it wise to give the head of the state the right to sell Sinai land? What will we do if Israeli companies purchase vast areas strategically controlling the Sinai Peninsula so that they can force us to convey to these lands Nile water that will then flow through plastic pipes to the Negev Desert?

Ten Zionist companies can purchase 500,000 feddans in the Sinai so that they can shortly afterwards control the fate of our national security.

Complete Retrogression

Mustafa al-Safafi, a youth from the Labor Party, then said: What is happening to the Lawyers Union is a complete retrogression from democracy, which is less dangerous than the normalization of relations with Israel or the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor.

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RELIGION, POLITICS ANALYZED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 117, 21 Jul 81 pp 16, 12

[Article by Fathi Radwan: "Religion and Politics"]

[Text] There is no doubt that Islam has not laid down for the Islamic government or state limits that outline its detailed characteristics. Rules suitable for it in one country can only produce corruption in another and what sets matters aright at one time twists and troubles them at another.

But it is not true that Islam, in both the venerable Koran and the sunna, has totally ignored, or even partially ignored, the system of government. It states the bases on which Islamic rule is established, the most important being: Justice, consultation and urging Muslims to advise the ruler, to exert efforts to correct him and lead him on the right path, to watch him, to criticize him openly if he disobeys God's order or if he exposes the interest of the public to danger, to censure him, boycott his council and refrain from mingling with evil people and flatterers who get close to him. In this regard, there is ample evidence from the Koran, the sunna, the true history of the successors of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and from the prophet's companions--evidence that fills the pages of Islamic history, even in its darkest eras during which tyranny prevailed and opportunists and those who practice evil deeds for the rulers dominated.

The fact is that I do not intend here to write an article or present a study on Islam and the bases of government on the occasion of what has been published in the papers on this subject or of what has been summed up from the book of Dr 'Abd al-Hamid Mutawalli, the professor of general law at the Police College and then at the Alexandria Law School and the author of numerous books on law and sociology. What I want to deal with here is a thought that is often accompanied by that which erases its truth and that casts upon it shadows that make it seem vague.

I mean by this thought the connection of politics with religion. Some imagine that religion, by virtue of its being a way to know God, to worship God and to discern and abide by the rules of worship so as to purify and elevate the soul and purge and enlighten the heart, does not mix with politics and does not come close to them because politics seek to attain worldly purposes, to acquire the world's goods, to gain supporters and to destroy enemies. But it is proven by

the history of sacred and secular religions that religions have been accompanied and pursued by politics since the start of the call. Religions have devoted the major part of their attention to changing the societies in which they took their first steps. The first thing they tried to change is the system of government in society. This is why the ruling class, the people in power and the decision makers have been the first to oppose, besiege, denounce and ridicule a new religion and probably end up killing it. The venerable Koran recounts what befalls prophets at the outset of their call, in more than one place and more than one form, at the hands of the people in power.

If we start with the oldest sacred religion, namely Judaism, we find God's order to His prophet Moses, telling him, according to what is recounted in the Taha chapter of the Koran, "Go to Pharaoh because he has become a tyrant" and then God's order to Moses and his brother Aaron telling them "Go to Pharaoh because he has become a tyrant."

Religion turns first of all to the head of the existing authority because corruption emanates from this authority and because the authority's corruption emanates from its head.

In its early stages, Judaism was tantamount to a direct struggle between Moses and Aaron on the one hand and Pharaoh on the other. In most of the secular religions, the quality of the supreme ruler and of the worshiped God has been attributed to the person of the king. Al-Qasas chapter of the Koran states that Pharaoh said: "O masses, I know of no god for you other than me."

Even though Jesus Christ avoided clashing with the authority and even though His words "render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's" are widely quoted, Caesar could not let Him persist in His call because Pilate, Caesar's representative, wanted to appease the Jews and their leader Herodias so he succumbed to their clear, definite and repeated demand: "Crucify Him, crucify Him," meaning crucify Jesus the son of Mary, whom God elevated [to heaven]. But the Jews saw that the demand was fulfilled and that Christ was crucified.

This means that the authority grew impatient with the new call and saw that there would be no peace and no security among the people unless it got rid of the new prophet.

The authority continued to fear the unarmed Christians and so it pursued them, threw them to the lions and ridiculed their call, which was spreading and triumphing in implementation of God's words: "We have sent no messenger but to be obeyed on the sufferance of his God."

The matter culminated with Constantine's declaration of Christianity as the religion of the empire. The empire then split into two parts: An eastern part with Byzantium--Constantinople--as its capital and in which religion was merged in the empire and a western part with Rome as its capital. The popes of this part continued to be in conflict with the emperors and the caesars and this conflict took the form of wars from which the Christians suffered the worst misery until a truce was reached between the pope and the church on the one hand and the emperor and the state on the other.

As for Islam, the leaders of Quraysh who were in power and were the masters of Mecca realized that the new religion would topple their rule and eliminate their domination unless they pounced on it. They tried as hard as they could to get rid of Muhammad and his religion. But the word of faith gained the upper hand and the word of the infidel fell into the abyss.

During the first years of the Islamic call, prophet Muhammad, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, decided that it was necessary to send messages to the kings, leaders and princes of the area adjacent to the Arab Peninsula to inform them of the new religion and to urge them to adopt it. This was a must on the one hand and a logical thing on the other because it was impossible to effect the change that Islam sought except by changing the rule prevalent in the area and based on worshiping and deifying the ruler and undermining the importance of people or viewing them as cattle and animals. This is why the new call clashed with the authority and why the long struggle that accompanied Islam at the outset and then the Islamic states until the present erupted between the two sides.

The states, especially in Europe, have remained wary of any open religion or any call that sets religion as custodian or lives under its canopy because states have realized the attraction of religion and its deep influence on the soul. They feared for their lives from the rise of religious associations, which soon begin to play a political role due to the absence of barriers and obstacles between religion and politics and due to religion's connection with politics since the start of religions. It is proven that there has been no successful religious movement that has not been adopted by a political authority. If the authority cannot adopt the movement, then it declares all-out war against it. The Wahhabi movement has been the means of Al Sa'ud and has spread their control over the eastern Arab Peninsula. The Mahdi movement in Sudan started as a movement of dervishes and ended up as a state that Britain was unable to subdue for a long time.

States in the east and the west have to have a connection with the religion prevalent among their people. The king of Britain is the head of the Protestant Church. Even the (internally) secular states, such as France, are protectors of the people's prevalent sect (externally). France is the protector of Catholicism. All the colonialist countries spend money and exert their influence behind the Christian missionary movements and use them to spread their political influence, their trade and their language. Mahatma Gandhi, who was a superb example of religious tolerance, noted that the head of the missionary group in each of India's states was closely connected with the British military ruler and that the two coordinated their plans to perpetuate the submission of the Indians--both Muslims and Hindus--to the king or queen of Britain and emperor of India.

In the wake of World War II, Christian parties spread in Europe, despite Europe's weak faith in religion and Europe's rebellion against it. The major party in Italy, Germany and other countries became the Christian Democratic Party.

From all this, it becomes contrary to the nature of things to imagine that religious associations can be isolated politically and kept from becoming interested in political problems. Religion is by its nature a human movement, as we

have said, whose goal is to reform man's condition, to enhance human societies and purge them of oppression, corruption and exploitation of the weak. Therefore, those in charge of religion will find themselves in the center of political action sooner or later. They may be pushed out of the political arena by law but such an expulsion cannot endure. The day will come when a government will find itself forced to seek the aid of these associations, to ally itself with them or to extend a hand to them in order to attain power.

But there is a big difference between having religious associations engage in the country's general policy and using religion as a means to influence the minds of the naive, to debase public action into charlatanism and deceit and to delude the common people into believing that the heads of religious associations have qualities that help them perform miracles.

I have said repeatedly that atheism among the youth is not so much due to the direct propagation of atheism by people whose hearts have run out of faith in religion as it is due to the failure of the men of religion to fight corruption, especially political corruption, in the country, due to their silence over oppression in its various forms, their appeasement of the government--following its bandwagon, justifying its evil, absolving its (tyranny) and its weakness, its exploitation of the weak, its negligence of the poor and its plundering of public money. Mistrust of the man of religion shakes faith in religion itself. The youth cannot differentiate between religion and its man.

This is why it is our duty to rejoice whenever we see a clergyman sincere in his resolution to fight the various forms of weakness in society, expressing his struggle in courage, firmness and self-denial, in facing danger, in rising above self-interest, in steering clear of personal ambition and in his sound awareness of the connection between pure worship and a clean public life free of blemishes and flaws.

Finally, we admit that Islam has not put the political authority in a rigid frame imposed on people in every age and everywhere. But this is one thing and religion's avoidance of politics, its steering away from politics and its inability to deal with politics is something else.

The first is a correct statement, whereas the second is a false statement.

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EDITORIAL REITERATES LABOR PARTY POSITION ON LAWYERS UNION ISSUE

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 118, 28 Jul 81 p 1

[Editorial: "He Lies Knowingly"]

[Text] Our position toward the Lawyers Union issue is the same as our position toward the issues of freedom, democracy and the supremacy of law in our country.

Freedom, democracy and the supremacy of law are an indivisible whole and a single value that cannot be divided into portions, with the biggest going to the ruling party and the small portions going to the orphans sitting at the table of the wicked.

Participation by the parties with the ruling party in discussing a decision before it is issued and their participation with it in formulating and issuing a decision does not constitute custodianship by the opposition over the strong [ruling] party. Exclusive control of power by the ruling party by virtue of its devastating, sweeping, overwhelming and overpowering (to the end of such descriptions) majority poses to the ruling party the danger of being turned into a single party enjoying the oppression and dictatorship of the majority. This is one of the dangers threatening democracy in the multiparty system.

This has been evident in the ruling party's handling of the Lawyers Union issue.

The ruling party has already waged, either closely or from afar, a number of election battles in a number of professional unions.

Despite the [lack of] all reservations in using government and public sector vehicles, including vehicles of the Arab Contractors Company, to transport voters and despite all the promises made before [the election of] these general assemblies, the final decision still rested with the voters in the general assemblies of the journalists, engineers, agronomists and teachers unions.

Despite our objective, unionist and professional reservation on the appointment of the minister of agriculture as chairman of the Agronomists Union and the deputy minister of education as the chairman of the Teachers Union, the ultimate choice [of union council members] was made by the members of the general assemblies.

But the situation in the Lawyers Union has been different. In the latest general assembly, the ruling party candidate withdrew and the general assembly then proceeded to elect whomever it wanted.

Whatever the ruling party's opinion of the Lawyers Union Council, of any other union, of the chairman of the Lawyers Union or of any other union chairman, this party has no power over them. The only power is in the hands of the general assemblies. Any other step constitutes an aggression against the union's independence, freedom and unity. This is in violation of the constitution, the law, international treaties and the principles and rights of freedom and democracy.

This has been our position toward this issue and this will be our position toward any similar issue in the future.

This has been our position in the People's Assembly. This position has not been undermined by the lies issued within the People's Assembly by a member of the ruling party who took refuge behind his membership in the ruling party and the People's Assembly and behind the protection of the platform, which did not stop him from fabricating lies and issuing them in the face of the opposition leader.

The hardest thing for a man is to lie, knowing that he is lying, and to act ridiculous in a serious situation, knowing that he is acting ridiculous in a serious situation.

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SHUKRI RAPS GOVERNMENT HANDLING OF LAWYERS UNION ISSUE

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 118, 28 Jul 81 p 3

[Article by Eng Ibrahim Shukri: "Difference Between Truth and Slander, Between Objectivity and Revilement"]

[Text] The members of the Labor Party in the People's Assembly have carried out their duty vis-a-vis the Lawyers Union issue with an objectivity based on principles. Their undertaking of this duty has no personal or partisan motives. No member of the Lawyers Union Council is a member of the Labor Party. Neither is this undertaking connected with the exchange of benefits. Somebody with a sick mind has said that we take the side of the legitimate Lawyers Union Council because it purchased 5,000 copies of AL-SHA'B. We previously supported the Journalists Union with all our strength when consideration was being given to turning it into a club. This is not our first stand in support of the professional unions and in support of strengthening them.

But the sick and weak souls who do not understand the meaning of partiality to the truth because it is the truth and partiality to the principles of honesty and ethics because they are the basic qualities that must be present in those engaged in public issues cannot relish such partiality. These sick and weak souls live with the principle of realizing benefits or of exchanging benefits according to the common proverb: "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours."

The truth is that the Lawyers Union issue, from the time it erupted as the result of observations by President al-Sadat, the chairman of the ruling party, on the actions of some members of the Lawyers Union Council until it ended with the issuance of a law by the People's Assembly terminating the council's membership and asking the minister of justice to issue a decree appointing another council, is a great catastrophe in which the ruling party has sunk to the abyss of mistakes because of insincere, and even tendentious, advice given to President al-Sadat.

We cannot imagine that the greatest accomplishment of the 23 July anniversary is the issuance of a law destroying the legitimate structure of the oldest professional union in Egypt--a union elected in accordance with an existing law in an election that involved no contest.

If we review the facts, we would find astounding things. But as the popular saying goes, "a goal is a disease."

26 June [1981] was set as the date for convening the postponed meeting of an ordinary general assembly of the lawyers. A genius idea occurs to the minds of Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, lawyer 'Abdallah 'Ali Hasan and a third person holding an important ministerial position. This idea says that an attack can be arranged against this general assembly with hordes of workers of the legal departments of the public sector companies so that these hordes can withdraw their confidence from the union council and from the chairman of the Lawyers Union even though they all know that a withdrawal of confidence requires a different procedure. Letters are written by Deputy Prime Minister Fikri Makram 'Ubayd to the minister of economy asking him for a specific request, namely, that members of the legal administrations attend this ordinary general assembly and declare no confidence in the union council. Deputy Prime Minister Fikri Makram 'Ubayd has admitted this fact and has justified it as a partisan action. But is partisan action carried out with a letter from the deputy prime minister to the minister of economy asking him to contact the companies or is it carried out by having the ruling party's organizational secretariat issue instructions to the lawyers who are members of the party? They thought that such a demonstration would be enough to topple the union council.

On 27 June, President al-Sadat made a speech in Damanhur saying that confidence had been withdrawn from the Lawyers Union Council. When it became evident that the actions that had been carried out could not have the proper legal effect, the idea of another measure that could settle the insurmountable issue of the Lawyers Union Council, namely, the idea of issuing a law, developed.

Then top-level discussions are held within the political leadership of the ruling party. MAY has published a photograph of these discussions during the entertainment party held at al-Ma'murah on the occasion of the third anniversary of the founding of the ruling party. The photograph shows President al-Sadat sitting on a not very high couch with Vice President Husni Mubarak sitting on his right and the People's Assembly speaker bowing in front of him, with his hands resting on the table. The photograph shows them all busy talking and carries the following caption: "Discussion on Law Governing Legal Profession." The matter is arranged so that it may be completed with lightning speed. An announcement is made that the People's Assembly, which had been given a vacation during the month of Ramadan and whose next meeting was scheduled for 8 August, has been summoned to meet at the request of the deputy prime minister to discuss urgent tax legislation. The announcement specifies three important bills, namely, the consumption tax bill, the income tax bill and the companies bill.

What is surprising is that the assembly held seven meetings in 2 weeks and discussed only one of the urgent bills, the consumption tax bill. Discussion of this bill had been postponed [before the assembly's vacation] for the sake of further study and at the request of Deputy Prime Minister Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din himself, who had agreed to have the bill discussed after the holiday.

It is to be noted that some sort of an argument had broken out between the deputy prime minister and the People's Assembly speaker over the postponement request and that debate on the other bills was delayed till after the holiday.

So what happened and why this hurried summoning of the assembly? But "when the reason becomes known, amazement disappears." The reason was to prepare for the issuance of this law to massacre the Lawyers Union--preparation started with the well-known letter from the president of the republic to the People's Assembly speaker, with the fact-finding committee and with the proposed bill submitted by a star rising in the ranks of the ruling party and falling, at the same time, in the eyes of the people's masses.

The one who has drawn my attention to these expressions is the parliamentary commentator of AKHBAR AL-YAWM, who has said that this star's skill in maneuvering will be beneficial to him as chairman of the [Lawyers] Union club.

Then Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din stands to make an address in which he strays from the facts and from objectivity and describes my statements and my defense of the need to preserve the entity of the Lawyers Union and to try to reform matters, insofar as the ruling party lawyers are concerned, by amending the article governing the special [union] general assembly. The deputy prime minister then describes my statements as the "shedding of false tears" over freedom and democracy. May God forgive and honor him. The deputy prime minister knows perfectly well that I speak only of what I believe in and what I defend sincerely and truthfully and knows that I have never pretended in my life.

He then talked of the Lawyers Union, saying that it had almost become a political party. There is no harm in his imagining such a thing. But then he sunk lower, to say that the union was the local representative of the Arab front rejecting Camp David. While using such a impolite description, the deputy prime minister demands with such great skill that the most accomplished actor would envy him: "Please don't interrupt."

Instead of asking not to be interrupted, I had expected the deputy prime minister to say that he was sorry for this rash expression and to say that what he had meant was that they [Lawyers Union members] had permitted themselves to become an echo of the Rejection Front. But O, Dr Fu'ad, O man of noble descent, have you uttered the words "local representative" to describe the most deep-rooted professional union in Egypt!

Considering that the first deputy prime minister, who represents President al-Sadat in the People's Assembly in the president's capacity as prime minister, had given the go-ahead signal for slander and vituperation, it was natural that lawyer 'Abdallah 'Ali Hasan would proceed to make an address full of fabrications, slander and lies, remote from objectivity and unrelated to the proposal I had submitted for amending one article of the law instead of issuing a law to destroy the Lawyers Union. This lawyer abandoned objective discussion and proceeded to talk about alleged meetings and about invitations from Saudi princes. I stress here that any talk about a meeting between me and Rif'at al-Asad in Damascus or about meetings with Saudi princes, not to mention eating at their tables, is an altogether false fabrication. This is the truth. But I must hasten to say that if I do receive an invitation from a Saudi prince I will be happy to take it up as long as it serves my country's interest. If others rush and boast of meeting Israel's leaders, then it is surprising that it becomes disgraceful for an Egyptian to meet with an Arab as long as such a meeting is not for plotting and harms no national interest.

But the malicious significance behind the talk about eating at the tables of Arab princes is that it means benefiting from those who give these banquets. I hope that lawyer 'Abdallah 'Ali Hasan will ask prominent leaderships in the National Party about this because they can give him good advice on this matter.

Why Withdraw?

The reader may wonder why I and members of the Labor Party withdrew from the session and why I dind't wait to answer the repeated fabrications. I say that our withdrawal was in protest of the platform, which failed to direct the speaking member to be objective and not to try to undermine the dignity of another member or to insult him and level accusations against him. This will not be a revered assembly if we allow every member to make false accusations against his colleagues and depart from the objectivity to which we must all cling. Moreover, I will discuss the matter with lawyers to bring a civil libel suit before the courts against whomever I believe to have taken part in an endeavor to make false accusations against me.

I say with utter sincerity that I would have attached no significance to these matters that pertain to me personally if the dialog, regardless of how heated, had ended up setting matters aright and returning to reason and had there been a change of mind on issuing the law to kill the Lawyers Union with premeditation. This law that has been issued terminates the membership of the legally elected union council and allows confidence to be withdrawn from such a council by a special general assembly that can be assemgled easily by modifying the legal quorum required for its convocation.

But they [the ruling party] did not listen to the voice of reason, as if they had been pushed to realize a certain goal and at a certain time, regardless of the consequences and damage caused by such action in terms of abandoning the spirit of the constitution. There are those who whisper and say that the measures taken against the Lawyers Union and against the imams of mosques at this particular time and before President al-Sadat's trip to the United States echo the Israeli foreign minister's complaint that Egypt has violated the provisions of the treaty by failing to put an end to the campaigns launched by some against the outcome of Camp David or an end to the call to stop the normalization of relations. These whispers also say that official Egypt doesn't want to give Israel any pretext for not implementing any of the treaty's provisions when the two sides meet with the third partner who shoulders an equal responsibility and who, moreover, has pledged to Israel that he will guarantee implementation. It is as if Israel has fulfilled what it had undertaken, as if it has brought the self-rule negotiations to a successful conclusion or as if it has established peace in the area!

President al-Sadat will go to the United States to meet Reagan while smoke is still rising from the Beirut fires, from the oil refinery and from the refugee tents, and even from the Iraqi nuclear reactor. Begin's threats that he will strike anywhere he wishes are still reverberating in the area.

It is not before the statements of Begin and those like him, who have been proven not to want to establish peace, that we take a long pause. The talk

must be addressed directly to the United States. If the United States doesn't feel a real danger to its interests and to its relations with the Arab countries, it will continue to support Begin's intransigence and arrogance.

It is on this premise that we have heard of resolutions adopted by meetings of the Arab countries and on this premise that I have heard numerous opinions emanating from the national leaders of the opposition factions at the political meeting in Alexandria--resolutions and opinions that the U.S. aid to Israel must not continue at the expense of Arab interests and, also, at the expense of Arab interests and, also, at the expense of U.S. interests. As for us, we know the path of the call we have advocated to warn of the dangers of the Zionist economic invasion. The United States must realize quickly the fact that Israel's curse will harm it soon. If the United States thinks that matters will continue to be as they are, then it is deluded. God is great and long live the people.

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UNIVERSITY FACULTIES SUPPORT DISCUSSION OF DEMOCRACY, OPPOSITION'S ROLE

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 120, 11 Aug 81 p 5

[Article: "Resolutions of Second Congress of Egyptian University Faculty Clubs; Stress on Discussing Issue of Democracy and Role of Opposition; Compliance With Boycott of Israeli Universities"]

[Text] The second congress of the faculty clubs of the Egyptian universities has underlined national unity and emphasized the need to discuss the issue of democracy and the role of the opposition. The congress has also reaffirmed its adherence to the resolution of the first congress on boycotting Israeli universities and has declared that Israel would not have carried out its raid against the nuclear reactor if the Mideast balance of power were not absolutely in its favor.

The congress announced this at the meeting held at the headquarters of the Alexandria University Faculty Club. Following are the congress' resolutions and recommendations:

National Issues and Role of Egyptian Universities in Realizing Economic and Social Development

First, the congress underlines the importance of and need for national unity and for renunciation of sectarian conflicts. The congress also believes that this unity among the sons of the deep-rooted Egyptian people, be they Muslims or Christians, is one of the most important mainstays of the safety of this homeland. The conferees underline their regret at their condemnation of the sectarian incidents. Moreover, they urge all Egyptian brothers to cling to unity and solidarity for the sake of the country's progress and safety.

Second, discussing the issue of democracy and the role of opposition in this phase in a manner compatible with realizing the national interest: A memorandum prepared on this issue by Dr Amal 'Uthman, minister of social affairs, has been presented to the Presidential Advisory Council. Another memorandum prepared on the same issue by Dr al-Shafi'i Bashir, member of the council and chairman of al-Mansurah University Faculty Club, was also presented to the chairman of the Presidential Advisory Council on 27 May 1981. In view of the fact that university presidents and chairmen of the university faculty clubs are members of the said council and the fact that the club chairmen reflect the enlightened public opinion of the faculties of the Egyptian universities, the

second general congress recommends that this issue be submitted to broad public discussion by all the clubs so that a thorough investigation of the facts connected with this issue [of democracy and the role of the opposition] can be completed on an objective basis. The congress also recommends that the discussion be conducted in a sound democratic atmosphere that takes into consideration opinion and counteropinoin. The congress further recommends that the study prepared by Dr Amal 'Uthman, the one prepared by Dr al-Shafi'i Bashir and the one being prepared on this issue by the Alexandria University be printed and distributed to all faculty members so that they are subjected to a public discussion to be followed by specific recommendations and resolutions, provided that every club present its conclusions in this regard to the third general congress.

Third, the second general congress reaffirms the resolution issued by the first congress and calling for compliance with a full boycott of Israeli universities in all spheres until venerable Jerusalem is liberated, until the Israeli forces of aggression withdraw from all Egyptian and Arab territories and until the Palestinian issue is settled in a just, comprehensive and lasting manner.

Fourth, Israeli raid on Iraqi nuclear reactor:

The congress believes that Israel would not have carried out this raid if the Mideast balance of power were not absolutely in its favor. Therefore, congress members demand the restoration of Arab solidarity and appeal to officials in all parts of the Arab homeland to renounce their differences and unite their efforts and ranks to confront these aggressions.

Fifth, considering that the Egyptian universities are lighthouses of learning and expertise that must be exploited to enhance the country's development at local and national levels, the second congress recommends the need to have members of the university teaching faculties participate, each in his own field, in the national and local committees and agencies so that they can express their scientific and technical opinions and conduct the studies that guarantee the establishment and implementation of the economic and social development plans and programs on sound foundations.

Sixth, the second general congress calls for providing the opportunity to the members of Egyptian university teaching faculties to express their specialized scientific opinion through the various information media so that advantage may be taken of available knowledge and expertise in solving the issues and problems from which Egyptian society is suffering.

Issues and Problems Pertaining to Affairs of Teaching Faculty Members

First, amending current wage and remuneration scale of the cadre in a manner compatible with the constant rise in inflation and in the cost of living:

1. The congress reaffirms the need to amend the university cadre in the manner demonstrated in the special list for the purpose proposed for implementation as part of the resolutions of the first congress, which was held in al-Mansurah on 6 April 1981, along with amending the beginning salary for the job of instructor

so that it becomes 1,500 Egyptian pounds annually and giving a faculty member a pension of no less than 100 pounds monthly at the time of retirement or in the case of physical disability or early death.

2. The congress believes that the universities must carry out their responsibility in exerting efforts to realize the interests of the teaching faculty members, that they must embrace the issue of improving the cadre and that the council of each university must issue a recommendation to amend the cadre in the manner proposed by the aforementioned first congress. The congress also believes that the university councils must present any better proposals they can think of to amend the university cadre in a manner that realizes justice for the faculty members and lifts from their backs the injustice they suffer in comparison with other civil service workers, such as the judiciary, the public sector, the armed forces, the police and so forth.

3. If the wage and recompense scale--the university cadre--is not completed [amended] by the start of the 1981-82 academic year, every Egyptian university faculty club should summon its members to a general assembly at its headquarters on Monday, 26 October 1981, to adopt a final resolution on the failure to respond to their just demand over which proposals and negotiations have been going on futilely for many years. In such a case, the third general congress should issue a unified resolution by which faculty members, instructors, assistant instructors and tutors shall abide. The third general congress is to be held at the headquarters of the 'Ayn Shams University Club at Qasr al-Za'faran, in al-'Abbasiyah, at 1100 on Monday, 9 November.

Second, dealing with the university housing crisis because of its ill effects on the stability of the life of faculty members:

The congress recommends that each university undertake efforts to facilitate the housing of faculty members, instructors, assistant instructors and tutors within its vicinity by including in its annual budget the funds necessary to build enough housing for them. Moreover, a part of the state-owned lands should be set aside for the construction of this housing. Governorate councils must be contacted to set aside a part of the governorate-built housing for this purpose, taking into consideration the question of setting the rent for such housing at a level compatible with the salaries that faculty members earn so that this rent does not exceed one-quarter of the salary.

Third, providing a proper standard of health services to teaching faculty members, instructors, assistant instructors and tutors and exchanging such services among the universities:

The first congress recommended that the Higher Universities Council establish a mutual system of medical services among all the universities for teaching faculty members and their families. So far, the council has taken no action in this regard. The second congress reaffirms the importance of and the need for each university to shoulder the responsibility of providing medical service to faculty members and their families either by way of a special medical service plan or through the public medical insurance system.

Fourth, the second general congress stresses the need for the decision pertaining to the promotion of a faculty member to go into effect as of the date on which the member submits his research and his production to the scientific committee concerned. The congress also recommends that the decision promoting a faculty member meeting the longevity requirements go into effect as of the date on which he submits his papers to the scientific committee concerned.

Fifth, the congress recommends the importance of exerting efforts to provide proper university [academic] immunity that guarantees for university faculty members the appropriate conditions for performing their academic message, responsibilities, in both teaching and writing, seriously and freely. Therefore, the second general congress demands that full freedom and adequate immunity be guaranteed to faculty members while engaging in their work and expressing their specialized and scientific opinions within the universities, the strongholds of vigilant and enlightened learning and thought.

Issues of University Administration and Problems of University Education

First, because members of the teaching faculties of the Egyptian universities face administrative and financial complications and obstacles that obstruct their educational and job responsibilities and in view of the fact that the university is founded basically on the professor and the student and that the mission of the administrative apparatus is to facilitate and not complicate, the second general congress recommends the need for establishing the post of university vice president for financial and administrative affairs, in addition to the two posts of vice president for student affairs and vice president for higher studies affairs.

Second, the second general congress recommends that faculty members and students of the Egyptian universities adhere to the proper academic conduct that both faculty member and student must follow to preserve their high moral position in society.

Third, private university: The second general congress deems it fit to postpone discussion of this issue and to proceed deliberately in bringing it into the sphere of implementation until studies are prepared to clarify its various aspects so as to realize what is good for the country's interest.

Fourth, the congress urges the need for the faculty members of each university to be represented in that university's council through the participation of a professor from the executive council of each club in the meetings of the university council.

Date and Venue of Third General Congress

The second general congress has decided that the third congress will be held, God willing, at 1100 on Monday, 9 November 1981, at the headquarters of the 'Ayn Shams University Faculty Club located in Qasr al-Za'faran, al-'Abbasiyah quarter, Cairo.

Vice President of Executive Board, Dr Muhammad Ibrahim Ramadan
President of Executive Board, Dr 'Adil Ahmad Hashish
Secretary General of Executive Board, Dr Hasan Abu al-Su'ud 'Ali

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CSO: 4504/100

GOVERNMENT DESERTION OF NONALIGNMENT, ECONOMIC POLICIES CRITICIZED

Cairo AL'SHA'B in Arabic No 121, 18 Aug 81 p 2

[Article: "Socialist Labor Party's Weekly Seminar; Ibrahim Shukri: Deviation From Nonalignment Threatens Egypt's Independence; Persecution of Labor Party Will Strengthen Party and Will Bolster People's Support for It"]

[Text] Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, has declared that President al-Sadat's statements on Egypt's participation in safeguarding U.S. interests in the area constitutes deviation from the policy of nonalignment to which Egypt has been committed. Shukri has also warned that alignment with any of the parties to the international conflict will threaten Egypt's independence and drag it to the sphere of subservience from which it has long struggled to break away.

Eng Ibrahim Shukri said at the party's weekly seminar, held last Tuesday, that previously our policy was aligned with the Soviet Union and that President al-sadat concluded the friendship treaty with the Soviets and then abrogated it and that, therefore, it is not right to now replace that situation with an alliance with the United States.

Regarding the latest Saudi initiative announced by Prince Fahd, the Labor Party chairman voiced his welcome for the initiative to realize a just and comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem, especially since this initiative has gained the trust and approval of the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole legitimate representative, which must play a fundamental role in settling the issue.

The Socialist Labor Party chairman added: While welcoming the Saudi initiative on this basis, we stress that the correct path to attain the Arab right is the solidarity of all the Arab forces. Egypt alone can do nothing and Saudi Arabia alone can do nothing. Thus, the estrangement and conflict among the Arab states do not at all serve our causes.

The starting point for the solidarity of the Arab position lies in our declaring to the world that even though the Camp David treaty has led us to some results insofar as the Sinai is concerned, the second part of the treaty concerning self-rule for the Palestinian people has produced no results.

We can thus unite the ranks to confront the Israeli intransigence that is still supported by the United States. Here is the United States pledging to Israel that it will give the PLO no consideration and will establish no contacts with it, after the United States had begun such contacts through some U.S. officials in the United Nations--contacts which aroused the wrath and anger of Israel and of the Zionist organizations in the United States.

Pressure Instead of Requests

During his visit to the United States, President al-Sadat urged that the United States abandon the promise it has made to Israel that it will not establish contacts with the PLO so that U.S. interests in the area will not be undermined as a result of its total partiality to Israel. But the issue is not just one of asking the United States not to align itself fully with Israel. The question is how to exert pressure on the United States to convince it of this demand. Pressure on the United States will bear no fruit as long as the Arab world is divided and fragmented.

Here is where the importance of the unity and solidarity of the Arab world emerges. Eng Ibrahim Shukri further said: Israel has taken all kinds of security precautions before withdrawing from the Sinai, such as the construction of military bases and airfields at a distance of no more than 60 to 100 kilometers from the Sinai, which is negligible insofar as modern military aircraft are concerned. The Sinai will be nearly demilitarized and will have only joint forces from the United States, Israel and some Latin American countries under the command of a U.S. officer. So Israel has procured all the guarantees that make its withdrawal from the Sinai something that doesn't mean much to it militarily.

Concluding his statement, the Socialist Labor Party chairman asserted that any persecution against our party will give new strength to and bolster the people's support for this party. They [the government] will be the losers ultimately.

Tale of Open-Door Policy Company

Fu'ad Nushi, the party's information secretary, delivered an address in which he said: President al-Sadat has told Egyptian students on scholarships in the United States that the open-door economic policy has achieved success and has strengthened the Egyptian economy. I wish to present to his Excellency the latest edition of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, issued on 10 August, as a gift. The paper contains the budget of one of the investment companies, namely, the Arab Hotels and Tourism Company, which was founded nearly 5 years ago to build modern hotels in Egypt. The company offered its shares in Egyptian markets, Egyptian shareholders purchased them and the company came to enjoy all the advantages and facilities granted by the government to investment companies in accordance with open-door economy laws. But instead of building hotels in Egypt that would benefit the national economy, this company transferred one-half of its capital, amounting to 1 million pounds sterling, to Switzerland and incurred in 1980 losses of nearly .5 million pounds. This means that this company's board of directors, which in accordance with the open-door economy laws does not fall under the control of the government, has smuggled the savings of Egyptians to Switzerland so that they can be invested and develop tourism there. As for Egypt, whence the money emanated, it only reaps losses.

Subservience of Egyptian Economy

Fu'ad Nushi added: This is only one example to remind the officials of the ruling National Party who talk repeatedly of the degree of success realized by the open-door economy policy--a policy that has brought us nothing but the subservience of our national economy to the colonialist Western economy.

Mill of Inflation

Rif'at al-Shahawi, the party's secretary general, then said: What has happened on the soil of this homeland afflicts one with grief and sadness and all the words cannot express the grief that one feels.

Inflation and rising prices crush people daily and merchants no longer have any concern other than to raise prices without any checks or controls while the government information media speak of the prosperity being enjoyed by the country.

The society of the one-half percent that the July revolution came to eliminate has grown to become the society of the 5 percent. Big cars fill the streets of Cairo while the crushed majority cannot find a seat or even a space in which to stand on a bus. Luxury homes are looking for buyers while the overwhelming majority cannot find a simple room in which to dwell.

When we say this, the fat cats scream: You are exploiting the hardship of the masses.

Now that the Sinai oil has been restored to us, now that the Suez Canal has been reopened to pour hundreds of millions of dollars into our coffers, now that the remittances of Egyptians working abroad are flowing into the country and now that foreign aid and loans come in daily to the point where Deputy Prime Minister Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Majid complains of the small portion of the aid and loans being used--now that all this is happening, our situation is worsening daily. If we speak of this situation, they say that the opposition undermines the regime.

The party's secretary general added: The solution to all our hardships and problems lies in one thing that we said on the first day our party was declared, namely, bolstering democracy and making it a reality. Real solutions to problems become clear through opinion and counteropinion.

But those who still believe in the single party cannot imagine the presence of another opinion because they have lived all their life believing in a single party and single opinion.

If there is something of which they boast before the Arab world it is that there is democracy in Egypt, using the presence of the Socialist Labor Party and of AL-SHA'B as proof of the presence of this democracy. Yet, they are annoyed by every word we utter and every opinion we express because they are incapable of countering argument with argument and thought with thought. They imagine that they can thus conceal the pains of this people, forgetting that only democracy is a safe stronghold for both the ruler and the ruled and that the people are the safety valve, the protector and the protection. 'Abd al-Nasir

lived as the leader of Egypt for 18 years during which the imperialist forces plotted against him, launched war against him, blockaded him and tried to assassinate him. But all this was not able to hurt him in the least because he lived for the people and with the people.

Moral and Ethical Liquidation

Fikri al-Jazzar, member of the Labor Party's Parliamentary Committee, then said: We are living today under a crisis of democracy in Egypt. Our party is living these days in a battle to repel this ferocious onslaught by some leaders of the ruling National Party against the Labor Party, now that these leaders have relished the acts of moral and ethical liquidation committed against the Lawyers Union.

Position of Rejection

Sayyid Rustum, member of the Labor Party's Parliamentary Committee, then said that all the political currents in the People's Assembly reject the dismissal of Ahmad Firghali.

What is amazing is that the workers law does not grant anybody, not even the chairman of a board of directors, the right to dismiss a worker from his job. The only authority entitled to the power of dismissal is the judiciary, whereas insofar as the People's Assembly member is concerned, a majority is entitled to cancel his membership!

Where Is Planning

Hamid Zaydan then spoke, saying: With the open-door economic policy, control over economic development has been lost and this development is no longer proceeding according to a definite plan. It is enough for us to look at the housing problem to learn how devoid of planning is the Egyptian economy.

Instead of proceeding to build housing in the desert areas, we use cultivable lands, of which there is a shortage to start with, for the construction of housing.

Religion is Advice

Lawyer Mamduh Qinawi, Socialist Labor Party secretary in Sawhaj, then said: What is currently happening in Egypt is, by all criteria, a deviation from democracy.

We in the Labor Party do not bet on the failure of anybody's policy because every word we say is intended for the good of Egypt and of Egypt's people only and because we do what God's prophet urged us to do when he said that religion is advice. But regrettably, the ruling National Party still refuses to listen to anybody's advice. They have thus doomed their policy to failure because they have deviated from what God orders regarding consultation in government.

We want their [the ruling party's] exclusive monopolization of power in Egypt stopped. They have made matters worse and they now want to speak for Palestine, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab homeland as if they have a divine authorization to speak in the name of the Arab nation and to drag it into the Camp David swamp.

Masses' Right

Ahmad Husayn, secretary of the Labor Party youth in Port Said, then delivered an address greeting Eng Ibrahim Shukri and the part leaders in the name of the Port Said youth. He said: The Port Said masses, which are suffering from the exorbitant inflation, receive our party with welcome because they know that it is the party that defends freedom, democracy and the right of the people's masses to live in prosperity.

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SHUKRI CALLS FIRGHALI'S EXPULSION FROM PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY BLOW TO DEMOCRACY

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 121, 18 Aug 81 p 3

[Article: "Statement From Socialist Labor Party to the People on Democracy's Tribulation in Egypt"]

[Text] The Socialist Labor Party has issued a historic statement on democracy's tribulation in Egpyt on the occasion of the decision to drop the membership of colleague Ahmad Firghali in the People's Assembly. Following is the text of the statement:

Sons of the Egyptian people,

The Socialist Labor Party has always resolved to defend the issue of democracy in Egypt and to expose what is hatched against it by the ruling party.

A few days ago, democracy was exposed to a new and serious tribulation that affects parliamentary and constitutional life to the utmost.

On Wednesday, 12 August 1981, the People's Assembly decided to drop from its membership Ahmad Firghali, journalist and deputy from the Socialist Labor Party representing Asyut District, the first circuit. The People's Assembly has done this in continuation of the ruling Democratic National Party's policy of liquidating the opposition in Egypt.

While warning of the dangers of the ruling party's deviation from the democratic procession charted by the Egyptian constitution on the basis of the multiplicity of political parties and freedom of expression, the Socialist Labor Party declares the following to the Egyptian people.

1. What has been attributed to colleague Ahmad Firghali, namely, that he pointed out what he had heard about the intention of some people to assault the chairman of the opposition Grouping Party during his visit to Asyut Governorate, was neither a fabrication nor a crime.

The minister of interior has acknowledged the truth of the incident and said that the police intervened to stop the attack and that some of the ruling party's leaders opposed the visit in the first place.

Moreover, Ahmad Firghali spoke of this incident in his capacity of a journalist and at a press conference inside the headquarters of the Socialist Labor Party, which enjoys immunity in accordance with the political parties law. Firghali's statements were not made at the People's Assembly or in his capacity as a member of this Assembly that this matter may be presented to the assembly's Ethics Committee.

The ordinary law contains provisions for punishing those who make statements liable to harm the public interest. The government should have resorted to judicial authorities solely entitled to investigate and to mete out punishment if the charge is proven.

2. The Socialist Labor Party regrets that a double standard is used to deal with People's Assembly members. An opposition member is expelled immediately and before he appears in front of the assembly's investigative committees, whereas the ruling party protects its members and rejects the socialist prosecutor's request to simply lift the immunity of one of them so that he may be questioned, even though this member is accused of making millions illicitly. The ruling party, through its majority in the assembly, refuses to even lift the immunity of this member even though the press has demanded repeatedly that he be brought before the courts.

Moreover, the apology submitted by a member of the ruling party who previously occupied the position of deputy prime minister is accepted as soon as this member claims that he has not attacked the former president of the republic and former prime ministers under the reign of President al-Sadat himself.

3. The Socialist Labor Party explains what has happened as part of a plot to wipe out the opposition in the People's Assembly--a plot that started in June 1979 when the party won 35 seats in the People's Assembly despite all the violations committed during the elections.

The ruling party has exerted all kinds of pressure on the Labor Party deputies, thus reducing their number to 12 members at present. However, the Labor Party always believes in the venerable Koran phrase:

"How many times a small faction has defeated a big faction with God's will!"

These pressures, which further upset the basically shaky balance of democracy--shaky as a result of what happened in the latest elections, as all know--are a stab in the heart of democracy and an indication of a return to the single-party system.

4. Ahmad Firghali has rejected all the pressures exerted on him, before and after the incident attributed to him, to resign from the Socialist Labor Party.

The stands for which Firghali has been brought to account are basically his loyalty to the opposition party as a true representative of the Egyptian people's masses.

These stands were evident in his opposition and the opposition of all his brothers, the party members, to all the bills restricting liberties and in their rejection of the Camp David accords and of the policy of normalization between Egypt and Zionist Israel.

Ahmad Firghali also exposed the true intentions of Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman in the book in which 'Uthman attacks the former president of the republic and honorable people. Firghali also demanded that 'Uthman be made to appear before the Ethics Court. This is the straw which broke the camel's back and the real crime for which Firghali has been finally punished by being stripped of his membership in the People's Assembly.

5. Moreover, Ahmad Firghali's defense of the freedom of the press and of journalists when the bill on the "press authority" was discussed also angered the government and the ruling party and so they have been laying for him. Meanwhile, this defense was appreciated by the masses of journalists who gave Firghali their almost unanimous confidence and elected him member of the Journalists Union Council on 6 March 1981.

6. On 20 January 1980, Ahmad Firghali invited the Socialist Labor Party leaders to a popular conference in his district in Asyut, only to have hirelings attack and destroy the conference pavillion even though the conference was being held close to a police station and under the eyes and the ears of the police.

This attack was an indication of the determination of the ruling party, and of the governor of Asyut in particular, to prevent the opposition from meeting with the people's masses there.

7. The scheme to get rid of the opposition deputy assumed a different form in the wake of the press conference held by the Socialist Labor Party on 18 May 1981. The chief editor of one of the so-called national papers was recruited to urge Firghali's expulsion from the People's Assembly under a frank article entitled: "Bring This Deputy to Account."

Pressures then started on members of the ruling party to abide by the party's decision to drop the membership of this honorable opposition member. This pressure continued until the issuance of this decision, which harms Egypt's international reputation and undermines the masses' confidence in parliamentary life and in the seriousness of the government's acceptance of the formula of multiple political parties and free expression.

Masses of the honorable Egyptian people,

Despite all that has happened, the issue is more than the mere expulsion of a member from the People's Assembly. We wish the ruling party had observed the venerable Koran phrase "O ye faithful, be supporters of God and just witnesses and do not let some people's hatred drag you to injustice. Be just because justice is closer to piety and God knows what you do."

It is the issue of whether Egypt's future will be with democracy or without it. Democracy and compliance with the dictates of the constitution are the only means for stability in Egypt and for not exposing Egypt to violence or to a leap into the unknown.

If the ruling party has won a battle at the expense of democracy, then the Socialist Labor Party has gained the sympathy of the masses, their faith in

its sound national line and their support for it in all parts of Egypt. The party has emerged from the battle firmer, stronger and more determined to struggle.

The party will continue to fight the oppression of the partisan majority that is trying to restore the totalitarian system to Egypt.

The Labor Party will continue to be the party of hope, will continue to struggle with the masses and will remain vigilant to solve their problems and realize their aspirations.

God is great and long live the people.

Ibrahim Shukri
Chairman of the Socialist Labor Party

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DETAILS OF PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DEBATE ON FIRGHALI CASE REVIEWED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 121, 18 Aug 81 pp 4-5

[Article: "What the Papers Have Not Published on Historic People's Assembly Session; Final Chapter in Story of Dropping Ahmad Firghali's Membership in People's Assembly; Ibrahim Shukri to Assembly Members: Canceling Ahmad Firghali's Membership Doesn't Serve Democracy and Harms Egypt's Reputation; I Cannot Believe That Contravener's Punishment Is Execution; Ahmad Firghali's Membership Must Not Be Dropped so That Assembly Cannot Be Accused of Double Standards; Counselor Mumtaz Nassar's Defense Before Assembly: Charge Raised Against Ahmad Firghali Is Unjust and What Is Attributed to Him Is Not in Violation of Constitution, Is Not Prohibited by Law and Does Not Constitute Deviation From Assembly's Bylaws; Determination of Crimes and Modification of Punishment Is Within Jurisdiction of Judiciary, Not People's Assembly; Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi: Testimony of Two Prosecution Witnesses Is Contestable: First Witness Is Wrathful and Testimony of Wrathful Is Unacceptable, Second Witness Is Journalist on Probation Who Wants To Be Confirmed and Third Witness Has Supported Ahmad Firghali's Statements"]

[Text] "Fraternal members of the People's Assembly, we will one day depart from this hall, be it after months or years. But every action we take will be attributed to us. If it is a good act, we will be said to have made good and just judgment. If the people's masses view our judgment differently, then we will be always remembered accordingly. I hope you will appreciate this, brothers, and will be truly concerned with Egypt's reputation. Canceling Ahmad Firghali's membership cannot serve democracy or serve Egypt's reputation."

With these clear, truthful and sincere words, Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, tried to warn People's Assembly members of the danger of expelling a colleague of theirs who has commmitted no crime and no action meriting such punishment. He tried to warn them in particular of this step's danger to the future of democracy in Egypt and to prevent an act that undermines Egypt's democratic image in the world.

Despite this, what Eng Ibrahim Shukri and many others beside him had expected did happen and was declared in the People's Assembly. Shukri's words could not find their way to the hearts of the ruling party members, as he has said, and all of them, with the exclusion of Deputy Muhammad 'Atiyah, voted for expelling their colleague, Ahmad Firghali, from assembly membership.

Thus ended the final chapter in this story that had been perpetrated to end the membership of one of the Labor Party's prominent deputies according to a scheme started more than 2 months ago.

The final chapter started with large-scale preparations by the ruling party leadership.

Members of the ruling National Party who did not support the expulsion decision [by the party] were subjected to threats by the party leaders in a ferocious campaign led by Hilmi 'Abd al-Akhir, minister of state for People's Assembly affairs, and by Kamal al-Shadhili, the party's organizational secretary. This campaign continued until the start of the session to discuss this issue.

When the session was convened, Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, and Fikri al-Jazzar, a party member, protested because they had been unable to acquire a copy of the report of the joint committee, formed of the General Committee and the Legislative Committee, which had held more than three meetings, whereas the report had been distributed to the National Party deputies. Dr Sufi Abu-Talib was compelled to apologize when Fikri al-Jazzar raised his hand, holding in it the leaflet that the ruling National Party had distributed before the report asking its members in the People's Assembly to attend the voting session. Dr Abu-Talib then instructed that the report be distributed.

Refusal To Postpone

Then all the efforts exerted failed to postpone discussion of the issue and of the joint committee's report recommending Ahmad Firghali's expulsion until another session so that the member might be able to attend to defend himself after recovering from his illness which--according to the report of the physician treating him and to the testimony of Dr Hamdi al-Sayyid, the doctors' doyen, and of a member of the joint committee--had prevented him from attending so as to avoid any complications.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar demanded postponement in his capacity as the defense counsel assigned by Ahmad Firghali.

Then Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi spoke, pointing out that he had submitted a request by colleague Ahmad Firghali to postpone the discussion session until Firghali's recovery, "but no reference has been made to this request so far."

Finally, counselor Mumtaz Nassar's proposal and Ahmad Firghali's request to postpone the session were put to the vote and the ruling party members turned down the proposal and the request.

Unjust Accusation

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar then began his defense, saying:

The charge made against member Ahmad Firghali by the Ethics Committee, the General Committee and the joint committee is unjust and no justice to the constitution, the law nor the bylaws. It has been said that what is attributed

to Ahmad Firghali is incompatible with the constitution, the law, traditions and ethics. Therefore, I will refer to chapter two of the constitution which pertains to "society's fundamental components." The first section includes the social and moral components and Article 7 states: "Society is built on social solidarity." Has Ahmad Firghali been accused of undermining social solidarity?

Article 8 states: "The state shall guarantee equal opportunities to all citizens." Has Ahmad Firghali violated this principle?

Article 9 states: "Fraternity is the basis of society and religion, ethics and patriotism are its supports. The state shall work to safeguard the genuine character of the Egyptian family and the values and traditions it represents." Does what has been attributed to Ahmad Firghali undermine religion, morals or patriotism. Thus, Ahmad Firghali cannot be questioned in accordance with Articles 7 to 9 in the second chapter of the constitution and there is nothing to make Ahmad Firghali accountable for [violating] any of these provisions.

Counselor Nassar then said: This is insofar as the constitution is concerned. As for the law, I ask: Has what is attributed to Ahmad Firghali contained any disregard for or violation of the law?

Let us start with the penal law. Article 102 of this law has its specific mainstays (and states that general and special criminal premeditation must be present in a crime) and that the element of premeditation and the evidence and proof of this premeditation must be present. What can we say in this respect other than what witness Hasan 'Ashur, a reporter for AL-AHRAM, has said? His statement--verbatim--denies the presence of criminal premeditation in Ahmad Firghali's action by all criteria. The witness says: Ahmad Firghali came and found Khalid Muhyi al-Din in front of him and said what he said in an offhanded manner. The witness did not say that Ahmad Firghali attributed to the government or to any government official the accusation of arranging to assassinate Khalid Muhyi al-Din.

In any case, the authority that determines crimes and their punishment and the authority that examines crimes and has the jurisdiction over them is the judicial authority.

Void Meeting

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar added: There is a fundamental and essential point that I learned and of which I became certain after the presence of the committee, namely, that the meeting of the General Committee was totally void and that whatever has resulted from that meeting is void. The committee's meeting is void by virtue of Article 21 of the [People's Assembly] bylaws, which states: "In every ordinary annual session, the General Committee shall be formed under the chairmansip of the People's Assembly speaker and with the membership of the two deputy speakers, the chairmen of the assembly's committees, representatives of the parliamentary committees of the parties and five members selected by the assembly's bureau. The minister concerned with People's Assembly affairs shall be summoned to attend the meetings of this committee when it examines the issues

demonstrated in Article 23 of these bylaws, except for what is included in paragraph four." If we refer to this paragraph we find that the minister concerned with People's Assembly affairs may not, in accordance with the rules of these bylaws, attend a meeting of the Permanent Committee to which a report is referred by the Ethics Committee. What I have learned is that two ministers, namely, brother Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, deputy prime minister for People's Assembly affairs, and Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, minister of People's Assembly affairs, did attend the Permanent Committee's meeting. This attendance voids the meeting, the minutes of the meeting and whatever resulted from the meeting, in accordance with the law.

Why Don't We Believe?

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar added: Why don't we believe Ahmad Firghali, as we have believed others on other occasions, when he says: I have not intended to insult any official or to attack democracy in our country?

Thus, we accept the explanation given by so and so because he is from the National Party and reject the explanation and the words offered by a member from the Labor Party. Justice requires that equality be established among all individuals in matters pertaining to trials.

We then come to the statements of the minister of interior, which the committee has used as evidence supporting the charge. On the contrary, I find that these statements deny any criminal premeditation on the part of Ahmad Firghali. Assembly minutes No 22, dated 23 May 1981, state verbatim: "During his [Khalid's] presence in al-Qusiyah, a number of mosque imams attacked communism and atheism and said: They--Khalid and his colleagues--have come to us. What do they want from us? Some people, numbering 20 to 30, gathered outside the house in which Khalid and his colleagues were present and shouted for the downfall of communism and atheism. But the security men dispersed them and the matter ended without a single stone being hurled. This happened in al-Qusiyah only. I urged some brothers in Asyut that we should open our hearts to them and should consider them our guests and that there was no need to harass them. They said: Why are these people coming to our homes and what is the reason for his [Khalid's] coming? They also said: Don't we have men against communism? We know what these people do and how they harm the country. We cannot accept this. So I told them: I beg you." His excellency the minister of interior begs these zealots who support harassing Khalid Muhyi al-Din and his companions because these zealots consider them atheists! If the minister of interior, who is responsible for security, says such things then it means that Ahmad Firghali committed no infidelity when he mentioned the rumor of the attack on Khalid Muhyi al-Din.

Serious Issue

Then it was Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi's turn to speak and his words made the hall silent and attentive.

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi began with the venerable Koran phrase "God, gladden my heart, make my affairs easy and untie my tongue's knot that they may understand my words, God is always truthful."

Dr al-Hadidi then said: We are dealing today with a most serious issue, as the brothers before me have said. The seriousness in it is not the crime, the sin or the mishap but in what the measure or the decision will entail for Egypt internally and externally and what it will entail for the National Party and for the other parties and not only for the member concerned. I talked at length to the joint committee but I tell you, brothers, nobody was listening. I talked and appealed to the conscience and the minds. It doesn't worry me if a member is expelled or stays. The assembly as a whole has a set term, whether it is long or short, and in 2 or 3 years or less we will all no longer be members of this assembly. So the issue is not the issue of membership or of a member.

Permit me, brothers, to review some measures briefly. The assembly bureau saw fit to refer the issue to the Ethics Committee. The Ethics Committee studies the issue and summons witnesses to hear their testimony. Before the hearing, I contested the testimony of two witnesses, not out of objection to their person or to defame either but out of compliance with the principle of impartiality and justice. I said that an argument had taken place between one of the witnesses and the members and that perhaps the witness was angry and the testimony of an angry man is not accepted and is excluded because it is subject to suspicion. It would have served justice better to exclude this testimony. The second witness is a minor employee on probation from AKHBAR AL-YAWM whose board of directors is headed by you know who and I know who--a man who has attacked the said member [Firghali], who has incited people against him and who has an obvious opinion on this issue.

This witness is young and still working on probation and waiting to be confirmed. Thus, to protect him, to eliminate suspicion and to establish justice, I requested that this witness be struck from the list. The third witness, also a prosecution witness and not a defense witness, denied beyond all doubt that he, a journalist, had felt that there was a prearrangement for Ahmad Firghali to come to the said conference or to address it. This witness also made an important observation, namely, that courtesy is what made colleague Ahmad Firghali say what he said.

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi added: Some colleagues have spoken at length and have made only a passing mention of the "incident." They don't say what the incident is. Was the incident as it has been presented to the assembly, as described by AL-AKHBAR, or as recounted by the member or by the witnesses? The words are different and the limits are different.

No Crime

Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi further said: Brother Ahmad told the Ethics Committee: I had heard a rumor that an attempt would be made on Khalid Muhyi al-Din's life and repeated it. I am not fragmenting a testimony here and I respect what is said in part and parcel. In this regard, I make conclusions from the testimony of the deputy prime minister and the minister of interior. This is not fragmentation and is not an approach on the basis of the principle of "do not approach prayers [while you are drunk.]" The minister of interior has said in his statement that there was an attempt by a group of people, numbering 20

to 30, who gathered around the house in which Khalid Muhyi al-Din was present, and that nothing happened, thanks to the intervention of the police. Thus, there is a basis fo the "incident" and it is not a fabrication or a lie. Ahmad Firghali's reiteration of the incident is not an ugly crime for which we should meet to condemn its perpetrator in this manner.

Al-Hadidi added: With my respects, the Ethics Committee did not feel that this crime was enough for what is intended for Ahmad Firghali and so it proceeded to create the elements of three crimes, not one.

The first crime: The member insulted the committee, the assembly and the constitution. I am not going to deal here with the issue of notifying or of failure to notify the member to appear before the committee. The issue is simply that the member had been sent a notification, had not received it and yet appeared before the committee because he had learned from another source. Is this considered a violation of the bylaws, disrespect for the committee, contempt for the assembly and an insult to the constitution?

The second incident [crime]: Ahmad Firghali told the Ethics Committee members that he had addressed the conference in his capacity as a journalist. They considered this an insult to the assembly or a second crime against it.

When he asked the members: Why have I been referred to the Ethics Committee when I have attended the bureau's meeting and said all I had to say? This was considered another insult or crime [the third] against the committee, as if the first crime was not enough.

Concluding his address, Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi said: I will not discuss the issue from the legal or procedural aspect but I will ask your conscience and your reason to be the judge and I ask God to be witness to us all, reminding you of His words, may He be praised: "Do not tell a man who (offers you peace, you are not faithful because you will thus gain worldly goals when God wants the hereafter for you)."

Big Crowd

Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, then took the floor to say:

"I speak to you while you are meeting in numbers I have only seen before on occasions attended by the president of the republic, when the hall gets overcrowded. But we are filling the hall today without anybody participating with us. I speak to you knowing that my words may not find their way to your hearts because we have witnessed from the start of the discussion on this issue measures and actions that we have not seen in previous incidents. (Even the rapporteur has said that there is no hurry on the issue) and that it has been going on for more than 2 months. The fact is that this is true. When the issue started, I did not imagine that it would end this way. It started with a question raised by one of the colleagues regarding a certain incident. His excellency the deputy prime minister answered the question. There has been no precedent in which we have cited the statements or conversations made at the headquarters of one of the parties. Witnesses and others are brought in to testify on certain

incidents here and there that have nothing to do with the assembly's work. Moreover, the member to which this statement has been attributed was not part of a parliamentary delegation or even part of the Labor Party's Parliamentary Committee or of a conference held here at the assembly. What was done was a purely partisan activity.

We had another incident in Asyut when I tried to hold a meeting there that we had been permitted to hold by the Bandar Asyut police section. The pavillion for the meeting was right across from the police station, meaning that we were under the protection of the police. Despite this, there was an attack against us, stones were hurled at us and things were broken. The incident was seen by more than one witness whose testimony is irrefutable. We had with us Eng Muhibb Istaynu, who saw the incident and who spent a long night at the general prosecution office investigating the incident. This is why we said at the time that what happened could happen to Khalid Muhyi al-Din in Asyut in particular. It is conceivable that there are those who tried to attack Khalid. Such thinking exists. But nobody has said that the government is the side arranging this attack or that Nabawi Isma'il is the one arranging it. The familiarization request discussed afterwards touched on this issue. Thank God that the attack did not succeed. This might be testimony to the credit of the police. We know the nature of families in Asyut. Regardless of political events, it may so happen that some members of a certain family embrace one party while the other members embrace another. But the issue is not connected with parties alone and could be connected with family feuds.

Eng Ibrahim Shukri added: When I speak of Ahmad Firghali, I don't mean him as a member of the Labor Party because the issue is not one of the addition or loss of a member of the Labor Party. I am talking of all of us as members. There has to be a just criterion for judging matters and affairs and, therefore, a penalty may exist for the [Firghali] affair in the various penalties set by the Ethics Court. There is no doubt that we are engaged in an experiment and in action that is exposed to both right and wrong. We cannot imagine that all our actions are 100 percent right. Moreover, all of the National Party's actions couldn't be 100 percent right. There is (no better) proof than the words that colleague 'Abdallah uttered when we were discussing the lawyers issue and when he brought up matters that had nothing to do with the issue.

So there may be deviation from here or there in practice and there may be mistakes. But as Counselor Mumtaz Nassar has said, I cannot imagine that the penalty for a violation is execution.

The Socialist Labor Party chairman went on to add: We have had precedents in this assembly and you also had some kind of appreciation for the public interest to disregard what was attributed to the member we are talking about.

We had a precedent when we discussed the book of 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman. This discussion turned into talk of the entire world. The rejectionist countries and others made the comment that we in Egypt were distorting the reputation of the late President 'Abd al-Nasir, his financial integrity and the reputation of his children. But when Engineer 'Uthman came to the assembly and said that he

did not mean to slander the late President 'Abd al-Nasir, his financial integrity or his children, the fact-finding committee accepted his statements.

When the socialist prosecutor presented his report on colleague Rashad 'Uthman, a report that contained many things, the assembly's clear and unequivocal view was that we should not lift Rashad's parliamentary immunity but should only allow that he be questioned on what had been attributed to him.

Therefore, there is a criterion that can be used so that this assembly not be accused of using a double standard, of measuring things by two different scales or of imagining matters in two different ways, thus expressing one opinion if an accusation is made against a member of the majority party and a stronger opinion if an accusation is made against a member of the minority party. This is what I have wanted to explain.

Concluding his address, Shukri said: Finally, we will all depart from this hall one day, be it after months or years. But every action we take will be attributed to us. If it is a good act, we will be said to have made good and just judgment. If the people's masses view our judgment differently, then we will always be remembered accordingly. I hope you will appreciate this, brothers, and will be truly concerned with Egypt's reputation. This [action of canceling Firghali's membership] cannot serve democracy or serve Egypt's reputation, which we are actually striving to make a good reputation."

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AL-KHULI SAYS U.S. INTERESTS SERVED BY ISRAELI RAID ON IRAQI REACTOR

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 121, 18 Aug 81 p 11

[Article by Lutfi al-Khuli: "United States Welcomed Israel's Aggressive Scheme; Analytical Reading of Motives Behind Israeli Raid Against Iraqi Nuclear Reactor"]

[Text] In the previous edition of AL-SHA'B, we published the first part of this special study entitled: Analytical Reading of Motives Behind Israeli Raid Against Iraqi Nuclear Reactor. In this edition, we present the second and final part of this study.

It is certain that since the radical conservatives gained control of power in Washington under the leadership of Reagan, they have expressed obvious concern over the rise of the socialists, led by Mitterrand, to power in France. They have stressed openly their objection to and anger over the participation of the French communists in the new French Government and have considered this participation a serious phenomenon that threatens the security of NATO and a precedent that encourages emulation in the other European countries, thus leading to a change detrimental to the United States in the complex relations of power in NATO and in the new game of cold war in which the U.S. White House is engaged with the Soviet Kremlin.

This is why Washington is obsessed by fear of what developments may bring following Mitterrand's election to the future of U.S.-French relations in particular and U.S.-European relations generally and by fear of the extent that France's independence from the U.S. line in the international arena may reach. This is what Mitterrand strongly emphasized during his election campaign when d'Estaing, his predecessor, in the last year of his term had started to back down gradually from the limits set by General de Gaulle and followed by Georges Pompidou after him.

Washington had to seek a means with which to twist Mitterrand's arm before it could get stronger and to give him a warning he could not misread of the need to maintain good conduct and behavior in the Western alliance and in dealing with the U.S. leadership.

It is my conviction that it is within this framework that Washington welcomed Israel's scheme to raid the Iraqi nuclear reactor. This is because the warning in this case is indirect, issued by a side that is tied to Mitterrand and the French socialists by a firm historical friendship, taking place in an area into which U.S. influence has returned and aimed against a rebellious Arab country that possesses great capabilities and that deserves to be disciplined so that it will be an example to the other Arab countries that are rebellious in varying degrees against the domination of the Camp David policy in the area.

Moreover, the raid squeezes Mitterrand, still in the first days of his rule, between the grinding jaws of a sharp crisis, considering his traditional friendship--a friendship fraught with promises--with Israel on the one hand and the vital economic interests, especially oil interests, that France has with the Arabs on the other hand.

In this light, the features of a joint Israeli-U.S. interest behind the raid on the Iraqi reactor become obvious. But a careful reading of the details of the events reveals the presence of independent U.S. interests that are no less important than the joint interest with Israel. There is no doubt that these independent interests were part of the list of inducements that Israel offered Washington to get the latter's approval, or at least its nonobjection.

There is a direct U.S. interest behind the Israeli raid--an interest embodied in the ceaseless U.S. attempts to gain the friendship of Iran or, to be more exact, of the so-called moderate elements in the Islamic revolution, considering that the raid afflicts enormous losses on the "Iraqi enemy" with which Iran is engaged in a difficult war. This is something that creates an opportune atmosphere for the possibilities of rebuilding bridges with Iran, which has a strategic position in the confrontation with the Soviets--a confrontation that tops the list of current international strategic priorities of the United States.

There is another U.S. interest of extreme importance, considering that it [the raid] is connected with the series of successive and uninterrupted acts of aggression against the so-called moderate Arab states, especially the Arab Gulf oil-producing countries. Despite the firm ties of friendship linking them with the United States, these states--proceeding on the basis of the interest of their regimes in perpetuation and stability and on the basis of their own calculations regarding local and Arab conditions--oppose the Camp David policy, agree in this regard with the so-called radical national regimes and refuse to respond favorably to Washington's request for military bases in their territories and waters in which to station its rapid-deployment forces. Moreover, despite their traditional hostility toward the Soviet Union, these states do not, in the wake of Camp David, elevate the Soviet danger, at least in the present phase, to the level of the Israeli danger. Some members of this group (Kuwait and Jordan) have even opened a dialog with and begun extending bridges to Moscow in the wake of its latest initiative for an international guarantee as Gulf security and for an international conference to reach a comprehensive peaceful solution to the Middle East conflict replacing the Camp David solution.

Within this framework, the Israeli raid is carried out against the Iraqi reactor with the most modern and sophisticated weapons in the U.S. arsenal. The raid crosses the skies of Jordan and Saudi Arabia with technological skill and with the aim of performing an indirect terrorist role against the moderate Arab states, especially the oil-producing states, which puts these states face to face with a definite option: Either stay outside Camp David and, consequently, be exposed to the strikes of the long Israeli arm from which the oil sources will not be safe, as has been the case with the Iraqi reactor, or join Camp David in one way or another and accept U.S. military bases to protect them from the "ambitions" of the "hostile" Soviet Union and the "rash acts" of "friendly" Israel.

This bunch of specific U.S. interests is what confirms Washington's responsibility in the Israeli raid against the Iraqi reactor. Without the blessing of the United States, Begin could not have intrinsically and objectively embarked on the raid, which is an adventure immersed in dangers embodied in the immediate and future reactions it creates.

It is my conviction that the attempt to prove Washington's responsibility for the raid by unveiling evidence and proofs of its advance knowledge of the raid, and not by considering its latent interests in the operation, is no more than nonsense or no more than tackling a political-military event with Agatha Christie's detective approach.

Moreover, a reading with the naked eye of the movement of events reveals that the United States itself resorted to more than one method to draw the attention of whomever is concerned to its "fingerprints" on the Israeli raid.

In this regard, we will note, just for the sake of example, three specific incidents:

The U.S. media spoke of an Israeli military mission that, weeks before the raid, had visited the Pentagon and the U.S. military research centers and that had studied with U.S. experts means of hitting a nuclear reactor that was a replica of the Iraqi reactor with certain bombs.

Washington expressed, in its cynical Yankee way, its astonishment over the fact that radar stations set up in the Sinai and operating under its supervision had failed to record the movement of the Israeli aircraft that took part in the raid. Justifying the failure of the AWACs operating in Saudi Arabia, whose range was penetrated by the squadrons of the Israeli raid, to pick up these aircraft on their radar, Washington said that the tail of the AWACs and not their nose was facing the route the raiding aircraft followed.

In his press conference in the wake of destruction of the Iraqi reactor, U.S. President Reagan stressed his regret over the raid in kind words but emphasized that he "understands and appreciates the security reasons and motives that have prompted Israel to stage its precautionary raid." He also stressed that the raid would have no negative impact on U.S. relations with Israel because Israel is a strategic ally.

In view of all this, the impact of the raid on the Iraqi reactor in June 1981 on the Arab conscience has been similar in its dimensions to the impact of the June 1967 war of aggression that was launched with U.S. weapons and with prior and sbusequent U.S. aid. But this impact has come under more serious conditions, considering that the Arab situation has been suffering from a general ebb since the conclusion of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty--which Israel has used against the Arabs--since Egypt's departure from the frontline against Israel and its isolation at the Arab level and since the rise of an opposing Arab front that has a defensive quality and has not been able, despite all the resources at its disposal, to move to any offensive posture because it is divided by the subsidiary conflicts among the Arab countries with their various regimes and inclinations. These conflicts have dominated at the expense of the main conflict with Israel and at the expense of a confrontation of the forces supporting Israel's aggression, led by the United States of America.

But despite this, the raid has had a positive impact, if we may use the expression. It has acted as an electric shock to the Arab reality and has restored to it its minimal balance, which it had almost lost. The shock has also restored to this reality the need for unified action, regardless of inter-Arab differences, in the face of the common national danger. This danger has escalated both qualitatively and quantitatively since Israel has become able, under the canopy of Camp David, to move freely and to strike from Baghdad to Riyadh and from Tripoli to Algiers. This ability has ignited in the Arab conscience a true awakening in regard to dealing with the raid on the reactor. On the one hand, the raid is an alarming aggression similar to the 1967 aggression. But on the other hand, it is the kind of aggression that ignites the fundamental defiance to overcome it, as happened after the 1967 war in the form of the 1973 war--a war that did not realize its objectives because its path was blocked. In the wake of the raid on the Iraqi reactor, the 1973 war must be completed with unconventional means and through the wise collective use of all the military, economic and political capabilities that the Arab nation possesses.

Perhaps what reveals the depth of this awakening is the question marks erupting from all sides of the Arab reality and raised by Arab citizens at various popular and official levels--questions that persistently seek realistic and practical answers.

Examples of these questions are:

Till when will the Israeli aggression continue to be capable of destructive surprise action and of continually expanding its sphere while the Arabs confine themselves to feeble and weak reaction despite the human and material capabilities the Arab nation possesses and which exceed manyfold what Israel possesses and what aid it receives?

Which of the Arab regimes, leaders and policies is responsible for the failure to use these capabilities in unified action?

In the wake of the raid on the reactor, is there in the Arab land from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean a single target that Israel, wearing the armor of Camp David, cannot raid with the sophisticated U.S. weapons at its disposal?

Hasn't it become evident that the relations of friendship binding the United States with the Arab oil-producing countries cannot constitute guaranteed protection for these countries with their moderate policies after what has happened to the Shah of Iran and after it has been proven that the aircraft used to strike the Iraqi reactor were U.S. planes and that they penetrated the Saudi and Jordanian air space despite U.S. ground and air radar stations planted in these countries?

Had the Iraqi reactor been built with Soviet aid, would Israel have had the secret information on its situation and would Israel have had the daring to strike it or is it that the interconnection between the U.S. strategy and the Israeli strategy on the one side and the jumbled cards and channels on the other side between U.S., European and Israeli intelligence provided Israel with the necessary secret information and with the opportunity to strike with relative ease and without any big risk a reactor that was built with the assistance of the French?

In the wake of the Israeli raid, is there safety for any strategic project built in any Arab country with the knowledge of the United States or any West European country for the purposes of economic, technological or military development?

Doesn't the Israeli raid come within the framework of the acts of terror that the United States and the West generally always raise their voices to condemn and to punish? Yet, the United States and the West European countries have undertaken to prevent the Security Council from punishing Israel, which was caught red-handed, in accordance with the UN Charter. Meanwhile, they continue to denounce the national liberation movement of the Palestinian people who have been expelled from their land as a terrorist movement. Doesn't this expose racist practices on the part of the West against the Arabs?

Doesn't this raid, which has taken place under the Camp David canopy, provide the Arabs with an exorbitantly costly experience on the "unity of Arab security" in the face of the comprehensive Israeli danger that is escalating in both quality and quantity? The issue has gone beyond the rights of the Palestinian people to become an issue of "life or death" to the Arab nation and an issue that requires a decision in a short time that doesn't extend beyond the "oil era" that will come to end with the end of the 20th century or the end of the first decade of the 21st century at the most. This decision requires the exploitation of every minute of this time span to build the united intrinsic Arab strength economically, militarily and politically.

It also requires setting a new list of priorities, along with engaging in realistic action to separate the friends from the allies on the basis of the criterion of the position of each of them vis-a-vis the Arab Israeli conflict. This is something whose foundations were actually laid down for the first time in the Arab summit on economic-political strategy held in Amman in 1980.

The large-scale dialog taking place in the Arab world these days on these and other questions generated by the ashes of the Iraqi reactor is touching off in the Arab nation a state of historic defiance against a sick, condemned and rejected situation. Perhaps this condition, which is pregnant with fundamental changes, is the element that slipped from the calculations of those who planned the raid on the nuclear reactor in Baghdad.

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SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY STATEMENT CONDEMNS CONFISCATION OF ITS PAPER

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 123, 1 Sep 81 pp 1, 9

[Article: "Statement From Socialist Labor Party on Confiscation of AL-SHA'B"]

[Text] The Socialist Labor Party has issued the following statement:

The security authorities seized the edition of AL-SHA'B scheduled to appear today, Tuesday, at the printing presses and banned its distribution. These authorities then acquired a warrant from the state security prosecution for the purpose.

Counselor Hamid Zaki, chairman of the South Cairo Lower Court, issued the seizure order in the presence of 'Asim 'Abd al-Hamid Nasr, chairman of the state security prosecution.

The Socialist Labor Party expresses its deep regret at the government authorities' use of this kind of pressure on AL-SHA'B, which has published so far 121 editions in more than 2 years, during which it has adhered to the law and to the constitution and has continued to reflect the people's and the nation's aspirations sincerely, using the honest and truthful word.

If the ruling party has been unable to answer the facts, objective criticism and constructive opinions published by AL-SHA'B despite all the information media and papers at its disposal, then resorting to confiscation and to banning distribution is in conflict with the freedom of expression and of democratic dialog.

Though his excellency the chairman of the Democratic National Party has repeatedly attacked AL-SHA'B and the Socialist Labor Party in his conferences, meetings, statements and speeches, including the speech he delivered in his capacity as president of the republic to the joint session of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Council held on 14 May 1981, AL-SHA'B and the Socialist Labor Party leaders have abided in their replies by objectivity, by care for the public interest and by objective and serious defense of the provisions of the constitution that stress that the state's political system is built on the multiplicity of political parties and that free expression and a free press are among the mainstays of the constitution.

The Socialist Labor Party emphasizes that deviation from these constitutional provisions exposes democracy to danger and that the authority's circumvention of the provisions of the constitution by hiding behind certain procedural legalities exposes it to enormous dangers.

Though the government's campaign against the Socialist Labor Party has assumed various forms recently, such as canceling the membership of one of its leaders in the People's Assembly, harassing its conferences, tapping its private sessions and then confiscating AL-SHA'B, the party warns against indulgence in this trend, which undermines the entire democratic system and its future, and declares that it will continue to protect the march of democracy and defend the people's rights and the opposition's role.

The party will continue to publish AL-SHA'B so that it can reflect its program and principles and the people's freedom, adhering to the law and the constitution despite any pressures the paper may encounter in the future. The party will always remain on the people's side.

God is great and long live the people.

Ibrahim Shukri
Chairman of the Socialist Labor Party

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SHUKRI TRACES REASONS FOR RULING PARTY CAMPAIGN AGAINST LABOR PARTY

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 123, 1 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim Shukri: "We Will Not Be Intimidated or Frightened"]

[Text] Ideas that I want to express are swarming in my mind. I had delayed writing about some of these ideas either because of circumstances dictating a delay or in an attempt to choose an appropriate time. But I find myself compelled today to write on all of them even though the chief editor has asked me to take into consideration the reduction in the number of the paper's pages as a result of confiscation of the previous edition at the request of the government.

This confiscation provides an additional element that imposes itself on this article by virtue of the dictates of the situation. I have no comment on this issue other than to say that with its request, the government committed a grave error against opposition activity and struck this activity in the heart. Counteropinion without an organized means to express it turns the situation into one of superficial practices.

But I will not dwell on discussing confiscation of the previous edition of AL-SHA'B because this confiscation should not be discussed independently of many of the circumstances that characterize political action generally and of recent actions toward the Labor Party in particular.

Insofar as the Labor Party is concerned, the ruling party's actions toward it can only be understood by reviewing the events since the last general elections, held in mid-1979 and from which the Labor Party emerged with 33 seats, plus a seat for an appointed member.

The party won this number of seats despite the ferocity of the attacks and the pressures against the party candidates, especially in the reelections [intikhabat al-i'adah]. That war and those pressures reached the extent of open intervention by a governor, as stated in the report of the appellate judge in the appeal submitted in connection with the elections in Abu Nij District in Asyut.

From the night the results of the elections became know, numerous attempts were male by a number of governors to lure away from the Labor Party a number of members who had run in the elections as Labor Party candidates, who had been

assisted by the party and with some of whom I had personally visited their districts. The governors did actually succeed with three of the elected members on the night the election results were announced. Thus, the number of the party deputies dropped to 30 deputies.

We recorded this in our paper and Mahmud Abu-Wafiyah, may God speed his recovery and return him healthy to his family, wrote an article addressed to President al-Sadat in which he discussed the flaws of the elections that had just taken place. The whole affair, insofar as the statements and the actions speaking of encouraging former members of the People's Assembly to join the Labor Party and so forth, was illogical [as published]. If the matter was insincere, then why all this pressure exerted on Labor Party deputies who were elected on the strength of the party's principles and why this intentional disregard for the position of the Labor Party as the second largest party in the People's Assembly and as the party representing the majority of the opposition and entitled to lead it? This was tantamount to disregarding an obvious fact that in all countries with multi-party systems entails consultation between the ruling party and the opposition and the establishment of rules observed by both the majority and the minority.

What sins could the Labor Party have committed to be treated in this manner?

I raise this question because all that has been cited recently as causes for anger at the Labor Party occurred in the past few months only.

With a little thinking and with a review of the circumstances under which the Labor Party rose, it becomes evident that the fact that the Labor Party won more than 30 seats with many members who have never supported the ruling party and had never before run for election and the fact that the nearly 200 candidates who ran under the principles of the party have been the subject of observation [by the ruling party]--all this has been taken into consideration and has been watched was a sign warning that this party has gone beyond the limits drawn for it in the estimate of some people and a sign that it will not be easy to control this party.

Therefore, let more pressures be exerted on the Labor Party, let there be an explosion with the resignation of Mahmud Abu-Wafiyah [from the Labor Party], let AKHBAR AL-YAWM publishing House pose difficulties for the publication of AL-SHA'B, let there be a fabricated demonstration of resignations [from the Labor Party] on the occasion of Dr Hilmi Murad's accession to the party and let a new crisis confront AL-SHA'B by having AL-AHRAM stop supplying it with the necessary newsprint.

Though all these actions created difficulties and intensified the atmosphere of disagreement between the ruling party and the Labor Party, they enabled the Labor Party to gain many supporters among the people's masses because these actions were accompanied by stands in the People's Assembly by the Labor Party and its members reflecting the image of the opposition as an honorable and loyal opposition that stands firmly for what is in the interest of the people and the Arab nation. Trust in the Labor Party began to grow among all those working in the sphere of politics with its various factions and numerous schools.

This growth was being watched and taken into account and some people started to talk of what they had imagined the Labor Party and its role would be and of how matters have developed. The industrious in the ruling party began to compete in offering ideas to deal with the matter and articles began to appear distorting the image of the Labor Party and depicting it as a party vacillating in its views and positions. But it is easy to refute this claim. The party's opinion reflects a certain position concerning a certain event at a certain time and under certain conditions. All these elements are liable to change and there is nothing totally constant. The question will always be: Does the opinion that the party expresses to reflect a certain position toward a certain event agree with the public interest, the national interest, the Egyptian people's interest and the Arab nation's interest or not?

We have always stressed our sound positions vis-a-vis the issues touching on the citizens' basic liberties during the debates on the bills to codify these rights, during the debate on the law of shame, the press law and the Journalists Union law and during the debate on the national issues concerning the Arab position. We have always clung to the need to exert efforts for unity of the Arab ranks. The climax came when we insisted on not having our relations with Sudan undermined. Later developments came to prove the soundness of our viewpoint. We stood firmly against supplying Nile water to Israel and then came the consensus against this idea of supplying the water. We then exposed all the Zionist actions carried out by Israel to destroy all the bases on which the foundations of full self-rule could be built—a self-rule that must culminate with the establishment of a state acceptable to the Palestinians.

Those Israeli actions demonstrated clearly that Israel doesn't want matters to reach the point where a solution is achieved for the Palestinian issue. Then there was our stand whereby we declared our right to reconsider our conditional positions vis-a-vis the Camp David accords and our declaration of our abandonment of our previous approval [of the accords], our disapproval of the persistent steps for normalization and our insistence that a declaration be made announcing that the accords had failed to reach a solution for the Palestinian issue in the manner and within the time stipulated by the agreements and announcing that a year and a half had passed without our realizing anything.

All these positions and others were in agreement with the view of the majority of the opposition factions, despite the difference in the programs of these factions. Then came other developments, such as the Israeli air raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in the wake of the al-Sadat-Begin meeting in Sharm al-Shaykh and the barbarous raid on Beirut that claimed 1,000 dead and wounded as its victims. The opposition factions considered the ruling party's condemnation of Israel inadequate and met to express this view.

Then came the development concerning the Lawyers Union, which we viewed as of the first moment as an issue of principles and not of persons and in which we expressed the opinion that the solutions to any presumed violations could only come from enacting the spirit of the law, that the correction should take into consideration the union's sound actions and that the issuance of a law terminating the membership of an elected council and union chairman cannot be supported by the Labor Party.

What has the ruling party's position toward the Labor Party been in the recent phase--a phase that some have called the phase of slandering the Labor Party, its members, its leadership and its newspaper and that I call the phase in which the ruling party has been floundering in measures that do not serve democracy and with which this party has been destroying manifestations that can help it say: We are distinguished from the one-party systems and the fascist regimes generally and we believe in the multi-party system? What can we say about dropping the membership of an opposition deputy and about protecting the corruption attributed to a deputy who is a member of the majority party? What can we say about double standards? The membership of one deputy is dropped with the speed of lightning and immunity is not lifted from another member so that justice can take its course until the cup overflows!

Then comes the phase of requesting confiscation of papers. AL-SHA'B is confiscated first and then AL-DA'WAH is confiscated a few days later. Previously, AL-AHALI had been confiscated so frequently that it could no longer afford to be published.

Some colleagues have asked me: Why do you continue to publish AL-SHA'B when the intentions have become obvious? Can you not learn from others? The purpose is to render you unable to continue by saddling you with enormous material losses. You have to reduce the numbers of pages you publish as a compromise. But I tell the colleagues that we will march forward, writing what we believe is right; we will continue to act according to what we view as correct and will continue to say what is in the interest of the people. What the others do is their concern. If they err, their error will be held against them and if they repeat the mistake, then their historical responsibility will be doubled. As long as we can publish the newspaper, we will not stop doing so. The newspaper is still receiving 1,000 pounds [per edition] in newsprint subsidy from the Higher Press Council, even though the loss from confiscation of the previous edition amounted to 8,000 pounds. This is why I hope that the readers will appreciate our being compelled to reduce the number of the paper's pages.

There remains an issue that I have wanted to discuss but that I will delay till the next edition, namely the issue of those writers who shed false tears, saying that we in the Labor Party have lost our identity and our path and that currents representing other parties are controlling us. It is an issue worth discussing because it is connected with a malicious line of thought that is trying to make us believe that there is a danger to us from within. If some writers had any sense of shame, they would hold their peace. There are no forces trying to destroy the Labor Party other than those who are exerting pressure on our members in every governorate in Egypt and those who drop the membership of one of its deputies in the People's Assembly with preparations exceeding in their precision, timing and adherence to instructions the preparations for real battles. The ruling party is the party that has demanded confiscation of AL-SHA'B, organ of the Labor Party, and the one that demanded confiscation of AL-DA'WAH and of AL-AHALI before that.

It is an issue that deserves to be explained and detailed. But I will be content this week with saying that we will not be intimidated and will not be frightened.

God is great and long live the people.

8494
CSO: 4504/100

SOCIALIST LABOR PARTY SEMINAR DENOUNCES CONFISCATION OF ITS ORGAN 'AL-SHA'B'

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic No 123, 1 Sep 81 pp 6-7

[Article: "Labor Party Weekly Seminar; Ibrahim Shukri: Regardless of Hardships, AL'SHA'B Will Continue To Speak for Masses; Confiscation of Previous Edition Caused Ruling Party To Lose Heavily Before the World; Muhammad Hasan Durrah: Partisan Fanaticism Is Saddening; Hamid Zaydan: What Happened to AL-SHA'B Testifies to Its and Labor Party's Success; We Will Always Speak for People in AL-SHA'B; Fu'ad Nushi: Confiscation of AL-SHA'B will Not Stop Labor Party From Marching Forward on Its Path; Fikri al-Jazzar: I Advise Ruling Party To Let Publication of AL-SHA'B Continue; Hamdi Ahmad: Do They Still Speak of Democracy and Freedom After What Happened?"]

[Text] Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Socialist Labor Party, has stated that no matter what difficulties the ruling National Party puts in the path of AL-SHA'B, this paper will not join those who cheer the ruling party and will continue to speak in the name of the people and to express their pains and aspirations objectively, with the truthful word and within the limits of logic, of compliance with legitimacy and with the acknowledged rules insofar as competition among the parties is concerned.

In its weekly seminar, held last Tuesday, the Socialist Labor Party stressed that the demand for confiscation of edition No 122 of AL-SHA'B has caused the ruling National Party to lose a lot of that which it could boast before the world, namely, that there is democracy and political opposition in Egypt and that this opposition has a paper that discusses all issues.

Shukri further said: We in the party and on the paper's editorial staff are extremely careful to abide fully by objectivity but the ruling party has not been able to withstand a single weekly paper that distributes throughout the republic 100,000 copies read by 1 million people. A single copy is read by more than 10 persons in the countryside. So the ruling party confiscated the paper on the day of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's visit to Alexandria so that the paper would disappear on the day of his arrival. The Israeli minister of foreign affairs had protested to the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs over what he called excesses in criticizing the two Camp David accords and the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel, saying that silence should be maintained on such a matter.

Democracy Is Action, Not Mere Slogans

Eng Ibrahim Shukri added: But confiscation of AL-SHA'B will not prevent our party from expressing its opinion on all issues of concern to the people, whether directly or in party seminars, popular conferences and books. If we want democracy not to be a mere slogan but action, and as long as we have chosen the multi-party system, then the parties must have newspapers to reflect their opinion on how to solve the people's accumulated problems. In this case, opposition papers that criticize government policy cannot be accused of criticizing the regime itself. The regime is from the constitution and we safeguard and defend the constitution. But government policy is the ruling party's policy and it is our right and our duty to the people to criticize the faulty actions of this ruling party--actions that reflect government policy. It is not our fault or mistake that the ruling party chairman is the president of the republic and the prime minister. We have repeatedly and clearly demanded that the president of the republic give up chairmanship of the ruling National Party and the premiership so that limits can be established between the cabinet and the presidency and so that the president of the republic can become the judge. But under the current situation, matters are entwined and confused.

The demand for separating the presidency, the political parties and the premiership is not a new one. We stressed it in our program and have emphasized it repeatedly so that partisan and democratic action can succeed.

It is a foregone conclusion that the multiplicity of parties dictates partisan competition. But the ruling party still imagines that the multiplicity of parties is a superficial issue and mouths slogans that are not put into practice. They forget that democracy, the multiplicity of parties and freedom of expression and of counteropinion mean multiplicity of opinions. Otherwise, we are all in one party and obey one partisan leadership.

If they truly want numerous parties, then let them allow the parties the freedom of expression. The ultimate judge of all opinions and programs is the people who select their true representatives to the legislative councils in proper elections meeting guarantees of impartiality.

Fair Rules Are Required for All

The Socialist Labor Party chairman added: When sound and fair rules exist for democracy, all will be assured of their future and of the exercise of their freedom to express truly what they feel, and all of the legal and actual guarantees against any measure violating the constitution and the law will become available. The rules of justice are for all. In a democracy, no double standards are used with two people because one of them is closer to the government or wealthier than the other. This is unlike what the National Party did at the People's Assembly when it was content with the statement of 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, a former deputy prime minister, that he did not intend what he said in his book against the late President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and when this party refused in the People's Assembly to have immunity lifted from one of its members who owns 300 million pounds and about whom the socialist prosecutor has said in a report

submitted to the assembly that there are no clear sources of this man's wealth. But this same party dropped Ahmad Firghali's membership in the People's Assembly just because Firghali had mentioned a certain incident at a press conference held at the Labor Party headquarters.

This is Our Path

Eng Ibrahim Shukri went on to say: We will continue to use the written and the verbal word to express our opinion and this word will turn into an enormous force when each of us learns his rights and rejects any act straying from the law and from the people's interest because "God will change no people until they change what is in their souls." There will always emerge from the seed of this people those who will speak of freedom and democracy. We have no option but to march forward with all our strength, each of us sacrificing all he can, standing in his position with the masses and defending their causes.

We have no option but to be on the side of the people and with the people and to have AL-SHA'B speak for the people.

Battle That People Will Win

Fu'ad Nushi, the information secretary, then said: I do not wish to say that we are mourning freedom and democracy in Egypt because the Egyptian people will continue to have freedom and democracy, whether the rulers like it or not and whether they confiscate AL-SHA'B or let it go free.

The government request for confiscation of AL-SHA'B is just one round. They wished to have AL-SHA'B confiscated on the day of Begin's visit.

I have seen Begin's visit to the tomb of the Egyptian unknown soldier on television. This murder who caused the death of more than 100,000 Egyptians has come today to place a wreath on the tomb of the unknown Egyptian soldier.

I don't know what Begin has written in the visitors' book. Has he written: I, Begin the murderer and Begin who burnt Al-Aqsa Mosque, have come to visit you?

Concluding his address, Fu'ad Nushi emphasized that confiscation of AL-SHA'B will not prevent the Socialist Labor Party from expressing its opinion everywhere and with all legitimate means. We defend and safeguard legitimacy.

Tribulation Is Not for the Paper But for Democracy

Hamid Zaydan, member of the Socialist Labor Party's Higher Committee and chief editor of AL-SHA'B, then took the floor to say: I do not feel at this moment that AL-SHA'B is in tribulation. The tribulation is not for the paper but for democracy. Confiscation of the paper testifies to its success and the success of the Labor Party as a party leading the struggle within the framework of the law and of legitimacy to entrench democracy and to emphasize the people's right to democracy, freedom and social justice.

What has happened confirms the truthfulness of what the paper has written about the importance of defending and safeguarding democracy and of exerting efforts for its application. Defending democracy does not come from empty talk and clamor.

Democracy is the actual exercise of freedom of expression and is respect for opinion and counteropinion.

Opinion is not the exclusive right of one party or one writer and the expression of opinion is not a monopoly. Even though some have attacked us and have used words that we refuse to use, this hasn't angered us. We respect the right of others to express their opinion and they must not be angered when we express ours.

The chief editor of AL-SHA'B added: I now recall the main headline we published in AL-SHA'B a few months ago. We wrote under that headline that AL-SHA'B was threatened with suspension because the AL-AHRAM establishment had warned us that it would not supply us with the newsprint needed for the paper. At the time, they launched against us an unjust attack filling two pages of AL-AHRAM.

When we published that headline, we wanted to bring what was being perpetrated against us to light. AL-SHA'B did not stop struggling, publishing and reaching its readers, who await it every week. Before the newsprint crisis, we encountered another crisis when the ANKBAR AL-YAWM Publishing House stopped printing AL-SHA'B for 3 weeks. At the time, I went to the other press establishments in an endeavor to find one that would agree to print AL-SHA'B. I had thought that my being a press colleague for more than 20 years with the leaders of those establishments would help make them welcome the printing of AL-SHA'B. We announced to the people what they told us. I wrote at the time to say that AL-AHRAM's reply to us was enough to fill four complete editions of AL-SHA'B, that AL-AHRAM was supposed to be a national establishment owned by the Egyptian people, of whom we are a part, and that our party was a legal party like the other party that controls the so-called national press establishment. At that time, some of those colleagues received me but declined to print AL-SHA'B whereas others declined to print it without even receiving me.

Hamid Zaydan added: A daily newspaper published a series of articles attacking us. We were supposed to have the right to reply but these papers know only one opinion, and the Egyptian people are aware of this.

AL-SHA'B reflects the hopes and pains of the masses and, thus, does not manipulate the people's hardships. The people's hardships, as we understand them, are not just hardships pertaining to a loaf of bread, a set or a bus or a seat in a classroom for one of our children. The hardships of the masses lie in the hardships the Egyptian citizen encounters in expressing his opinion. The right of expression is a human right and the right to disagree with an opinion is also a human right.

Democracy doesn't mean that I should always say yes but that I should say yes in the right place and say no in the right place.

History Will Have No Mercy for These

Out of my love for Egypt and for Egypt's people, I appeal to some writers to stop manipulating words and to respect the intellect of the people. History will have no mercy for a writer who one day tried to mislead the people.

We will not abandon our position, will not use their words and will not defend U.S. Mideast policy, or what they call the right of Israel alone, and not of the Palestinian people, to survival. We will not be dazzled by Israel's democracy, will not sabotage the Egyptian people's intellect, will not defend any foreign presence in the Arab area and will always continue to speak for the people and with the people.

Analogy

Artist Hamdi Ahmad, member of the Labor Party Parliamentary Committee, then made an address in which he said: The ruling National Party owns all the press establishments that publish daily newspapers and weekly and monthly magazines. They all sing the praises of the ruling party and its policy and publish for the people no less than 90 million pages reflecting the views and opinions of the ruling party. Yet, they have found it too much for the Socialist Labor Party to have one weekly newspaper of 16 pages. After all this, can there still be talk of democracy, of multiplicity of opinions and of the freedom of expression?!

Step on the Path to Trouble

Fikri al-Jazzar, member of the Labor Party Parliamentary Committee, then said: The government request for confiscation of today's edition of AL-SHA'B is nothing but a step on the path to trouble that God wants us to overcome and vanquish.

AL-SHA'B has been a target from the day they tried to stop it by fabricating the so-called newsprint crisis. When they failed, they tried to stop it with pressures on the party deputies in the People's Assembly to resign from the party. When they failed in this step, colleague Ahmad Firghali was expelled from the assembly so that his expulsion might intimidate a number of the party deputies in the assembly and make them resign from the party. But their third endeavor failed and so they have resorted to the direct method of confiscating the paper.

The advice I wish to offer the chairman of the Democratic National Party is to let AL-SHA'B continue publishing so that it can act as an outlet. I beg him to let AL-SHA'B continue publishing so as to protect the system because we are a part of the system and we defend it. What I mean by the system here is the constitutional republican system and the state's legitimate institutions.

Fikri al-Jazzar then dealt with the U.S. aggression against Libya, saying that all the Arab countries have condemned it because the dogfight between the U.S. and Libyan planes took place over the waters of the Gulf of Sidrah, which is within the territorial borders of the Libyan people. It is not right for Egypt's voice to be alien amidst the Arab consensus condemning the aggression.

Difficult Situations Create Honorable Men

Muhammad al-Sayyid 'Abd al-'Aziz, a member of the party youth, then said: How difficult are the conditions and days we are going through! But these conditions and days create honorable men and true patriotism.

They have tried to disband the Lawyers Union Council but they have not dissolved Egyptian nationalism in the hearts of the lawyers. They then canceled Ahmad Firghali's membership in the People's Assembly. But they have not dropped Firghali from the people's hearts. They then confiscate AL-SHA'B. Now that they have confiscated AL-SHA'B, will the Egyptian people welcome Menachem Begin, the murderer of the Arab people in Palestine and Lebanon? Their endeavors are futile because the people will march forward, regardless of what they do.

What Will History's Sentence Be?

Eng Muhammad Hasan Durrah, Labor Party deputy chairman and member of the party's Parliamentary Committee, then recounted what happened with Ahmad Firghali at the People's Assembly, saying: I was a member of a fact-finding committee investigating an issue with which Firghali's issue cannot be compared, namely, the issue of the book by Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman. As soon as the author came to the committee and denied what had been attributed to him, I said gladly after a long debate, out of my faith in God and in Islam, which instructs us to be just, that our task in the committee was to make the facts clear and that as long as the author has denied that he had intended the late President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir [with his accusations], then the charge against him has ended.

At the People's Assembly session, I was the first to defend 'Uthman. Then there was the issue of another colleague when the socialist prosecutor submitted a report condemning him. Moreover, the Assembly's Legislative Committee also condemned him. Then came the astonishing surprise, whereby the National Party deputies in the People's Assembly refused to lift this member's immunity.

Then followed the issue of Ahmad Firghali. I asked to be given the floor to defend him at the People's Assembly but was not permitted to speak. So I decided to resign from the assembly, but my colleagues in the party insisted on rejecting the resignation. So I said: I cannot agree to be in a place that uses double standards. What will history's sentence on us be?

I was not in an emotional state at the time but my love for my country and for the democratic process required me to take this position, especially when I found that 95 percent of the Democratic National Party deputies rejected dismissal of Ahmad Firghali outside the assembly hall and then saw them enter the hall and vote for his dismissal under the pretext that they are committed to the party's decision. This is in violation of Islam's teachings. A man has the duty to express what he believes. This is why I am still sad for the partisan fanaticism that has ended Ahmad Firghali's membership in the People's Assembly.

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END

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No. 2433

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16 November 1981

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No. 2433

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TWO FRENCH ENGINEERS KIDNAPPED BY IRAQI COMMUNISTS

French Intervention Sought

Paris LE MONDE in French 26 Sep 81 p 40

/AFP despatch/

/Text/ Two French engineers working for SOGREAH, a French firm specializing in dam building and irrigation, together with their Iraqui driver, were kidnapped in Iraq on 22 July by members of the Iraqi Communist Party. The party's Central Military Bureau (PCBMC) disclosed the act in a communique published in Beirut on Thursday 24 September.

In the communique the PCBMC states that the two French engineers, Maurice Harlet, 43, and Guy Maure, 39, were taken hostage between Baghdad and Kirkuk in northern Iraq, that they are "in excellent health and very well treated," and that their families may contact them through the International Red Cross Committee.

The PCBMC, in its communique, asks France to use its "influence with the Iraqi regime to obtain liberation of political prisoners in Iraq." It stresses that release of the engineers will "depend on the efforts made by all concerned to induce the Iraqi regime to accede to our demands."

Upon questioning, a SOGREAH official refused to make any comment.

Publicity Alarms Victims' Families

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Sep 81 p 4

/Despatch by Grenoble correspondent Claude Francillon/

/Text/ The communique by the Iraqi CP's Central Military Bureau, a body not recognized by the Baghdad government, was no surprise to SOGREAH officials, or to representatives of the Grenoble firm's personnel, who since mid-August had known what faction of the Iraqi opposition was behind the kidnapping of two local engineers: Maurice Harlay, 39, and Guy More /sic/, 43 (LE MONDE, 26 September).

Through an unofficial contact established in mid-August with Paris representatives of the Iraqi opposition, the identity of the kidnappers was learned. Three letters, moreover, dated 3 and 9 August and mailed from the Iraqi city of Rizaiyeh on 14 August, reached the hostages' families on the 28th and 29th. The two engineers told in detail of their kidnapping on 28 July as they were carrying out a final mission in the Kirkuk region of northern Iraq, where for 20 years SOGREAH has been working on extensive Euphrates hydro-agricultural installations. They also explained that they were "guests" of the PCBMC, and indicated that they were in a pocket of Iran /sic/ controlled by the Kurds.

In two later letters, dated 6 September and reaching Grenoble 8 days ago, Harlay and More merely gave details as to their state of health, which they described as satisfactory.

At SOGREAH, it is indicated that security problems have existed for several months concerning persons working in Iraq. Prior kidnappings have included Indians, Britons, Lebanese, and West Germans. The latter were taken by the Iranian PDK /Kurdish Democratic Party/ on 8 June, 1981, in the same region as the French engineers. They were freed in late August following transactions, particularly financial, between the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany and the kidnappers. As for the kidnapped Britons, it appears that as of the first of this year they were still being held.

Until publication of the Iraqi Communist Party's communique the management of SOGREAH, representatives of its employee-management committee, and the families of the two engineers all considered that silence and discretion were the surest means of finding a solution to this delicate problem. "The ICP's message henceforth renders this incident much more alarming than we imagined at the outset," said a representative of SOGREAH's personnel.

6145
CSO: 4419/1

FATAH OFFICIAL RECEIVES STRUGGLE ORGANIZATION

NC211037 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 0645 GMT 21 Oct 81

[Text] Last night, Brother Abu Hatim, member of the Revolutionary Council and the official responsible for Fatah foreign relations, received the delegation of the organization of solidarity [as heard] of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America under the organization's president (Melga Hernandez).

The meeting was attended by the Cuban ambassador in Damascus and the Cuban charge d'affaires in Beirut. During the meeting discussions were held on the current political developments, the organization's role of support for the struggle of the three continents' peoples and the relations between the PLO and the organization.

The delegation of the organization of the struggle [as heard] of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America arrived in Beirut yesterday for meetings and discussions with the PLO and the Lebanese national movement aimed at strengthening bilateral relations.

Brother Abu Hatim also met with Hungarian charge d'affaires in Lebanon (Comrade Gyorgy Osko). During the meeting, which was attended by the PLO representative in Hungary, the current situation in the area in light of the present conditions and the strengthening of Hungarian-Palestinian relations, were discussed.

CSO: 4404/87

BRIEFS

JORDANIAN-IRAQI FREIGHT COMPANY--An agreement was signed yesterday in Amman forming a joint Jordanian-Iraqi air freight company with capital of 20 million dinars. The agreement to form the company was signed for the Iraqis by Husayn Hayawi, head of the State Organization for Civil Aviation, and for the Jordanians by Ghazi Rakan, general director of civil aviation. The agreement specifies that the company be an independent corporate entity with financial and administrative independence. The new company will operate on a number of international routes between the Middle East and Europe and the Middle East and Africa and the Americas, in accordance with the shipping rights obtained by the air freight company with the support and aid of the organizing members and their governments. The agreement welcomed the affiliation of any Arab country with this company, which is to be called the Arab Air Freight Company, and left the door open for any Arab national air company to join this company, which is considered a model of Arab cooperation because of the vital and increasing importance of air freight to economic development. [Text] [Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 Aug 81 pp 1, 11] 7587

CSO: 4304/153

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF ISLAMIC MEETING

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Oct 81 p 14

/Text/ Algiers (APS)--The Superior Islamic Council and the leaders of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (leading directors, main and wilaya inspectors) held a joint meeting last Thursday at the Algiers Islamic Cultural Center under the chairmanship of Abderrahmane Chibane, minister of religious affairs.

This meeting was devoted to the discussion of questions about religious life, namely the opening of the school year in institutions for training religious leaders, the mission of the mosque, the role of the imam, continuing education, religious guidance and the teaching of the Koran.

The minister of religious affairs made an orientation speech at the beginning of the meeting in which he emphasized the importance of the items listed on the meeting's agenda and provided explanations about the Islamic sciences sections introduced in some secondary schools and about the government's decision to start an Islamic education branch in certain Algerian universities, while awaiting the opening of the Islamic University, now being completed.

Chibane stressed the regular training of religious leaders with modern techniques and the teaching of the Koran with scientific and audio-visual methods.

The minister of religious affairs then emphasized the cultural, educational and guiding role of the mosque and the imam's responsibility to make the mosque a center of cultural influence and a bond of union of compassion and fraternity.

It is in the light of these principles that the participants began the examination of the items on this meeting's agenda.

The participants thus reviewed the situation which prevails in the religious field in the various wilayas, on the basis of the operations of the main inspectors and those of the wilaya.

After having discussed this situation and proceeded to analyze it, the participants agreed to note the following:

They welcome the initiative taken by some secondary schools to open sections for teaching Islamic sciences and want such endeavors to increase on the basis of needs and opportunities.

They observe with satisfaction and respect the government's decision to open sections for Islamic teaching in universities, while awaiting the completion of the Islamic University.

They encourage the imams and religious leaders to strive to improve the level of their sermons, concentrating on subjects useful to believers in their daily, family and social life and to protect the mosques from the actions and misconduct of some ignorant persons.

They invite persons with educational skills--in agreement with the wilayas' inspectors of religious affairs--to increase in the mosques the courses and scientific lectures which make a useful contribution to the training of religious leaders and the enlightenment of the masses of believers. Such an activity would allow the mosque to become a center of influence for genuine Islamic thought and be a source of support for good moral conduct and serious and productive work.

They emphasize the urgency of recruiting reciters of the Koran and distributing them throughout all the wilayas according to need and in the interest of creating regional balance.

They also encourage the use of modern methods to teach the Koran and inculcate its principles in the minds of the coming generation.

Laghouat: The Islamic Council Reacts

On completing their work, the participants in the meeting submitted two detailed reports on the regrettable incidents which recently took place in the town of Laghouat.

The vice president of the Islamic Superior Council, submitting the first report, referred to the background of these incidents and pointed out the efforts made by the Ministry of Religious Affairs in collaboration with the local authorities to provide the best solution for them. He declared that the main purpose of the instigator of these incidents and his supporters is summarized as follows:

a) To divert young people from their studies in intermediate and secondary education.

b) To persuade citizens to restrict their daily diet to dates and milk alone and to walk barefoot.

c) To induce citizens to refuse to say the prayer behind any iman who would not be theirs. This leads them to attack and drive away the imam appointed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, thus defying the law and the desires of the believers.

A member of the Superior Islamic Council who was ordered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to investigate the matter on the spot indicated that the local authorities handled the situation with the greatest calm. However, we must lament the loss of a policeman treacherously stabbed to death. The victim leaves innocent children without a father.

The participants learned with amazement about this act which is foreign to our traditions and principles of toleration of our religion which forbids all types of aggression and especially when it is directed at believers.

Protect the Security of Mosques

The participants in this meeting have agreed that: those who have committed this heinous crime against religion and the fatherland are only ignorant adventurers who are attempting to carry out some doubtful schemes opposed to our religious faith, the interests of Algeria and the Islamic nation. To do it, they took advantage of the simplicity of some young people as well as their kin and neighbors, all adolescents.

B. They vigorously denounce all behavior based on a misinterpretation of Islam used as a means to spread a false belief, impose a false "leadership," stir up destructive disturbances and desecrate a holy place.

C. They demand that the ministry put an end to all terroristic activity within the abodes of Allah so that the believers can fulfill their religious obligations in all security and quiet and receive Islamic teaching in an atmosphere of serenity and positive influence on one hand and see to it that dignity and respect are guaranteed those who work in the religious sector: preachers, imams and muezzins.

D. They are pleased with the discretion with which the security forces, the local authorities and the community of believers have confronted the behavior of these trouble makers, which has made it possible to avoid even more serious consequences.

E. They honor the memory of the policeman brother who made the supreme sacrifice for his faith and his fatherland. They send their heart-felt condolences to the family of the deceased, his children and his colleagues in national security and ask God the all powerful to grant him his mercy and his family, courage and resignation.

F. They ask the imams and the religious community to permanently guard the security of the abodes of Allah so they may not be subject to despicable actions and to preserve their sacred character and inviolability. They ask the preachers and the imams to intensify their efforts in the field of religious guidance so as to bar the way to ignorant persons.

We pray God to protect the advances of our country towards progress and prosperity in the framework of our Arabo-Islamic orthodoxy.

8490
CSO: 4519/18

NPUG LEADER COMMENTS ON NATIONAL UNITY

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 3

[Article: "Leftist Party Calls for Establishment of National Committee To Defend Liberties; National Unity Conference To Terminate Sectarian Sedition; Khalid Muhi al-Din Says, 'There Was in Fact a Plan To Ruin My Visit to al-Qusiyah' "]

[Text] Khalid Muhi al-Din, the secretary general of the Grouping party announced at the party's political conference, which was held last week, that the next stage will see the opposition become engaged in strong activity. Muhi al-Din said that the methods which the majority party is resorting to for the purpose of liquidating the opposition will increase the opposition's strength and will enhance its role.

The secretary general of the Grouping party affirmed that recent developments of events in the bar association, in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', in Shubra and in the People's Assembly must be utilized to intensify the opposition's activities among the public. This is because it has recently been established that the grassroots want to hear the opinions of the opposition and want to respond to them.

Khalid Muhi al-Din called for the need to expedite the formation of a new committee that would defend liberties on a national scale. This committee would replace the bar association's committee whose activity has been suspended. He said, "Although the National party government has succeeded in dissolving the board of the bar association and has eliminated a strong seat for the opposition, the members of the board of the bar association can join the new committee and take part in the political and professional activity of defending [people's] liberties. They can do so by opposing unfair laws, adopting the causes of democracy and freedom and defending opposition groups."

The secretary general of the Grouping party also called for a national unity conference to be convened to discuss the sectarian crisis and determine how it is to be brought to an end. He called for the formation of a conference steering committee that would contact the various members of the opposition and of the enlightened Muslim and Christian religious

movements. These people would participate in that conference and propose solutions that would confront the phenomenon of religious fanaticism which has become extremely prevalent recently.

He said, "If the government is accusing the opposition of exploiting the sectarian crisis, we are saying that the opposition had no choice but to announce its opinion and to hold the government responsible for those who perpetrated those events.

"On the other hand, this crisis makes it incumbent upon our party to establish a presence and a role that promotes awareness through effective political action."

Khalid Muhi al-Din commented on the People's Assembly resolution to strip Ahmad Farghali [of his membership in the association].

He said, "We reject a policy of intervention in organizations. It is truly shameful that the People's Assembly adopted this resolution even though it did not take the smallest measure with the representative Rashad 'Uthman, a member of the National Democratic party, despite the charges that have been made against him. But a mere word stated at a press conference causes its speaker to be expelled from the board [of the bar association] regardless of the truth or falsehood of this statement. There was in fact a plan to spoil my visit to al-Qusiyah."

He referred to the public sector development bill and described it as an attempt to sell and liquidate the public sector. He said the bill makes action necessary so that all the measures and laws that have been prepared for that purpose can be opposed. He added that there was a severe economic crisis despite the noticeable improvement in the country's financial situation as a result of increased revenues from the Suez Canal and from oil and as a result of Egyptians' savings abroad. However, instead of channeling these increases into real development, they have been channeled into consumption and have also been swallowed up by the food crises which have grown worse in recent days.

8592
CSO: 4504/101

SOCIALIST LIBERALS COMMENT ON RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 159, 10 Aug 81 pp 1, 2

[Editorial by Mustafa Kamil Murad: "The Opposition's Opinion: Obligations and Aid"]

[Text] After meeting President al-Sadat in Washington, President Reagan stated that the United States was committed to helping Egypt. It is the opinion of AL-AHRAR that if this statement is an indication of anything at all, it indicates the following:

First, President al-Sadat's historic visit to the United States was a success, as we expected, especially since this was the first meeting for the two presidents after President Reagan assumed his constitutional powers.

Second, the principle of mutual interests between the two countries has become an actual fact.

Third, President al-Sadat affirmed that the Camp David accords will be put into effect as the practical instrument for establishing peace in the area.

Fourth, the fact that due to Saudi Arabia's efforts the PLO complied with the United States' request to cease fire in Lebanon is a new phenomenon worthy of interest. President al-Sadat referred to it in the speech he delivered to the Council of Foreign Relations in New York.

Fifth, President al-Sadat established himself as the undisputed leader of peace in the area, affirming his willingness to make maximum efforts to achieve a just and comprehensive peace in the area. [He emphasized that] he believed in Egypt's role to protect the peace, to push the wheel of development in the Arab and Islamic region forward and to oppose any aggression that may come from abroad on the countries of the area.

For all this the liberal party expects close cooperation [in the efforts] for peace and development between Egypt and the United States. This requires a new strategy from the United States and from Egypt so that the humane goals which were announced by President al-Sadat and supported by the United States can be achieved.

It is our opinion that this requires the following from the United States:

--Unofficial negotiations with the leaders of the PLO are to begin so that mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel can be established in the context of the Camp David accords.

--The United States is to make further efforts to persuade Israel to sit with the leaders of the PLO and to carry out the Camp David accords. This includes implementing the autonomy and providing U.S. aid to the West Bank and Gaza so that development can be advanced in these areas that have been suffering from poverty for a long time.

--The United States and the Soviet Union are to increase their efforts to rejuvenate the policy of detente so that Syria can be persuaded to participate in the Camp David accords. This would bring about the withdrawal [of Israeli forces] from the Golan in return for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon. It would provide support for the national government in Lebanon and prevent foreign interventions in Lebanon's affairs.

--The United States is to increase its efforts to meet with King Husayn and with the leaders of Kuwait and the Gulf emirates. The presence of Syrian forces in Lebanon is considered a pressure factor on the PLO and on Jordan that threatens them and prevents them from accepting the Camp David accords. Therefore, the most important role the United States can play will be primarily its role with the Soviet Union and with Syria.

--The United States is to increase its efforts to approve a comprehensive aid program for the area, and chiefly for the Arab Republic of Egypt, which is considered the basic foundation of both peace and democracy in this area. Egypt is playing the principal role in bringing about peace to the area and protecting it from any foreign intervention.

AL-AHRAR had previously referred to U.S. aid for Egypt in a previous article. We summarized this aid [as follows]:

Aid from the United States, from Western Europe and from Japan is to be increased from 1.7 billion dollars annually to 4 billion dollars annually for a period of 10 years. This aid is to be distributed as follows:

--1 billion for housing.

--1 billion for utilities.

--2 billion for plant renovation and development.

--500 million [dollars] in ready cash in the form of long term deposits to provide the necessary cash flow to implement the comprehensive development program.

We advise the United States to deliver this aid in the form of "turn key projects" that are carried out by U.S., European and Japanese firms with

100 percent financing by western banks guaranteed by the [respective] government. Egypt is to be obligated to pay back these funds in a period of 40 years, with a grace period of 10 years, at an interest rate of not more than 1 percent.

This is the practical way by which U.S. and western aid for Egypt and for other countries of the area can be implemented, since this way would realize the following benefits:

First, it will increase the western world's exports to Egypt and to the countries of the area.

Second, U.S. and western firms will profit as a result of the implementation of this major program.

Third, the U.S. treasury and the treasuries of western countries will have new sources of revenue as a result of the taxes they will collect from these firms.

Fourth, western technology will be transferred to Egypt and to the countries of the area. Workers and local experts will be employed in these projects, and this will help develop technology and management in Egypt and in the countries of the area.

This is the aid and these are the obligations that AL-AHRAR [thinks are necessary] to achieve a strategy of peace in one of the most important areas of the world--the Arab area. Will President Reagan heed [our advice]?

8592
CSO: 4504/101

SOCIAL LIBERALS EXPRESS OPINIONS ON POLITICAL FREEDOM

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 148, 25 May 81 p 1

[Editorial by Mustafa Kamil Murad: "The Opposition's Opinion: Political Freedoms"]

[Text] The Socialist Liberal party believes in freedom, full freedom, for the country and for the citizen. This is because we are free to express our opinions and proclaim our ideas. We also believe in the socialism that issues from our land, and we are intent on being liberal in our practices so as to support democracy and affirm the gains of the toiling classes of working people.

The program of the Socialist Liberal party is built on firm foundations. The most important of these are:

--Islamic law is the principal source for the constitution and the law.

--Political freedoms are to be revived in an affirmation of freedom of thought, of opinion, of worship and of the right to assemble.

--The president's and the vice president's positions as well as all principal positions in the country are to be filled by [popular] vote.

--The public sector is to be developed and strengthened; its investments are to be concentrated in heavy and strategic industries.

--In the context of the development plan private capital is to be free to make investments in all areas without engaging in exploitation.

--Monopoly is to be rejected; competition between the public and the private sector is to be revived; and individual incentives are to be encouraged.

--Labor and professional associations are to be strengthened and developed so as to give them the right to engage in collective bargaining to set wages and to tie wages to production.

--The rights of workers and farmers are to be affirmed, and the minimum wage is to be increased so as to keep it in step with the rising cost of living.

--The courts are to be independent and to have their own budget. The Supreme Court is to be chaired by a judge who is a member of that court and who is elected [by his colleagues].

--The press is to be free; its leaders are not to be appointed by the executive authority; and the media are to be independent and not subject to the government.

--Ministers are to be politicians. Most of them should be members of the People's Assembly with experience in political activity. They are to have personally experienced and sensed the problems of the public.

The program of the Socialist Liberal party supports the continuing development of the sound application of democratic socialist [ideas]. Such application is based on experience; it is responsive to the demands of the toiling masses; it narrows the differences between classes; and it provides prosperity to the people.

Socialist liberals reject reactionaries in all forms. They emphasize that they are at the forefront of liberal democratic socialist thought which stays in step with domestic and foreign changes. They do not accept backwardness or inertia, and they reject [the notion of] hero worship and the reiteration of slogans.

The Socialist Liberal party relies on political freedoms as a secondary source of authority after Islamic law.

The party believes that these freedoms can only be revived by giving the people the right to select the president and his vice president by popular vote, not by referendum or appointment. The same applies to all the principal positions in the country so that the dangers of appointing people to these positions can be avoided. The legislative authority should be vested in two assemblies so that sound laws can be realized. Freedom to think, freedom of opinion and freedom of worship; respect for all divine religions; and an affirmation of citizens' right to assemble to express their opinions can only come about under the auspices of a democratic dialogue that takes place within the party and with other political parties inside the country and abroad. The press and the media are to be free. The existence of an independent court system over which no one exercises authority protects liberals in their practice of these freedoms and guarantees them safety in expressing their opinions.

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CSO: 4504/101

MUMTAZ NASSAR DISCUSSES BAR ASSOCIATION

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 27 Jul 81 p 4

[Article by Attorney Mumtaz Nassar: "The Fact-Finding Committee and the Bar Association"]

[Text] The president of the People's Assembly received a letter from the president asking the assembly to investigate actions by some members of the board of directors of the bar association. [It was alleged] that the board was forcing the association to become involved in matters which, in the president's opinion, do not come under the scope of proper action for a professional association. In the president's opinion the association had assumed positions that were contrary to public interests and incompatible with the national consensus.

The People's Assembly decided to turn this letter over to its general committee. After the committee discussed the matter, it issued a decision to make a recommendation to the assembly to approve the formation of a fact-finding committee, acting on the basis of the provisions of articles 218 and 219 of the assembly's bylaws.

The assembly approved the formation of this committee with Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, vice president of the assembly, as its chairman and representatives Hafiz Badawi, Albert Barsum Salamah, Mukhtar Hani and Dr Muhammad Kamil Laylah, Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi, Dr Suhayr al-Qalamawi and Dr Mustafa al-Sa'id as members.

This committee did meet several times, and it prepared its report and submitted it to the assembly. The committee concluded in that report that the board of the Bar Association had assumed shameful positions at meetings that took place within the association and abroad; that it had assumed positions which were incompatible with the national political course; and that it had assumed positions that were contrary to the principle of the law's sovereignty. The committee made recommendations in its report, the most important of which was the special recommendation to reconsider the Legal Profession Law No 61 for 1968 so as to make it consistent with the provisions of the 1971 Constitution. [The committee also recommended] that firm and binding controls be established and added to the stipulations of

the Legal Profession Law so that it would govern the association's participation at various international conferences and gatherings and coordinate such participation with the state's public policy.

In this article we express [our] opinion on this report as we did in the People's Assembly. We are saying that this report contradicted itself, violated the provisions of the constitution and was not objective. Its purpose was to embarrass the bar association and to turn it into one of the committees of the National party in a manner that is equally unconstitutional and contrary to actual facts. The People's Assembly has no jurisdiction to investigate the charges agains the board of the bar association. If someone is to be called to account here, the way to go about it is not to turn to the People's Assembly, but rather to the judiciary. The Egyptian constitution is based on the principle of the separation of powers. The legislative authority is entrusted to the People's Assembly which has the right to approve the state's public policy, the public plan for economic and social development and the state's general budget. The People's Assembly also monitors the activities of the executive authority in accordance with the stipulations of Article 86 of the constitution. The judicial authority is independent of the legislative authority, and is entrusted to the various kinds and levels of courts that issue their verdicts in accordance with the law. Judges are independent and are not controlled by anyone but the law in rendering their judgments. No authority may interfere in law suits or in the affairs of justice. All this is in accordance with the stipulations of articles 165 and 166 of the constitution.

A few of our colleagues, who are members of the People's Assembly and the National party and who are also attorneys, replied that the People's Assembly has jurisdiction to investigate what happened in the bar association. They based [their assertion] on Article 131 of the constitution and on articles 218 and 219 of the bylaws.

The fact-finding committee added nothing new to what the members of the National party had already insisted on in their response to our rebuttal. The committee reiterated what those colleagues had said. Our response to the point of view which the committee reached is as follows:

First, Article 131 of the constitution stipulates that "The People's Assembly may form a special committee or assign one of its committees the task of investigating the activities of one of the administrative agencies, public organizations or any executive or administrative agency or any one of the public projects in order to examine the facts and inform the assembly about its investigation of financial or administrative and economic conditions. That special committee may conduct an investigation into any matter that pertains to one of the former activities. To perform its function, the committee may gather the evidence it sees fit to gather and it may ask to hear the testimony of anyone whose testimony it wishes to hear. All executive and administrative agencies are to comply with its request and to place at its disposal for that purpose documents, instruments or other objects the committee may request." This [text] indicates that the article in question confines its discussion to administrative

agencies, public organizations and executive and administrative agencies. They are the only agencies that are within the scope of [the assembly's] constitutional control and fact-finding [efforts]. The bar association is not an executive agency, an administrative agency or a public organization. It is a private association of people of the same profession. It is a popular, legal entity, independent of and different from government and administrative agencies.

Second, members of the National party and the fact-finding committee used articles 218 and 219 of the bylaws to make their point. This argument is groundless because Article 218 of the bylaws discussed the assembly's right to "form a special fact-finding committee to investigate a public matter of special significance or to investigate the affairs of one of the public administrations, organizations, public authorities, units of local government, the public sector or any executive or administrative agency or any one of the projects over which the assembly has jurisdiction. Such a committee can monitor these agencies to find the truth about their status or their financial, administrative, or general economic conditions with regard to the subject or the agency for which the committee was formed. [The committee may also] conduct an investigation into any subject that has to do with one of the former actions and also to ascertain the commitment of any one of the former agencies to the sovereignty of the law, to the plan or to the state's general budget." Article 219 of the bylaws stipulates that a fact-finding committee is to be formed by a decree from the assembly at the request of the general committee or of one of the assembly's other committees or in response to a proposal submitted by at least 20 members of the assembly. The number of members of the fact-finding committee must not be less than 7 and not more than 25.

This indicates that the bylaws reiterated the words of Article 131 of the constitution, but did not add anything new. The bylaws are not to contain matters that are not mentioned in Article 131 of the constitution. The bylaws also cannot differ from the constitutional provision and from the principle of the separation of powers. Therefore, arguing on the basis of the ordinance is ineffective. Hence, this second argument upon which the opinion that differs from ours is based collapses and disintegrates. This is the opinion that was embraced by the fact-finding committee.

Third, the opinion that differs from ours is based on Article 104 of the constitution. If we were to refer to the text of that article, we would find that it states [the following]:

"The People's Assembly is to write its own bylaws to regulate the course of business in the assembly and the methods by which it will perform its functions." This text damages any statement that supports the opinion which differs from ours. There is no point in using it as evidence: it does not serve the opinion that differs from ours, and it does not strengthen it. Thus using that text as the basis for the argument would be ineffective.

Fourth, the fact-finding committee is founded on the 1st paragraph of Article 23 of the bylaws. If we were to refer to this paragraph, we would

find [the stipulation] that the general committee of the People's Assembly specializes in discussing general subjects and important matters about which an exchange of opinion or information with the committee and its members is though to [be beneficial] by the president or the prime minister.

This text cannot be used as an argument since the general subjects and the aforementioned matters which are referred to in the text must be within the assembly's jurisdiction to legislate and to control and must not go beyond that. Otherwise, the matter would involve confusion between the jurisdiction of the powers, and this would differ with the constitution and contradict its provisions.

Fifth, the committee states in its report that following the referendum on the Camp David accords, if the board of the bar association were to hold debates to discuss these accords, such action would be considered damaging to Egypt and a distortion of its positions. This statement contradicts established, actual facts. Any treaty is merely a law and as such is subject to criticism, to being repealed, to being violated and to negative actions. There is nothing to prevent [one of the parties from] calling for an amendment to such a law that would close the loopholes that may be in it. History has taught us that many treaties are concluded and then those who made the treaty ask that it be repealed. There is nothing in that to distort the reputation of one's country. It behooves us to cite two examples from debates that took place at the bar association. The first debate was about the al-Ahram hill. This subject was discussed in an objective matter, and I participated in the debate in my capacity as the representative who questioned the government on this matter which ended by abolishing this project. I also took part in another debate about the waters of the Nile. The debate was full of objective remarks about Egypt's rights to the waters of the Nile, the danger of supplying Israel with water from the Nile and the ensuing harmful effects of that project, if it were to take place, on our country. All these are national debates in which there are no traces of distortion or disparagement. Thus, the statements outlined by the committee in its report on the damaging remarks it attributed to the board of the association are no more than an intrusion by the People's Assembly into problems that are out of its jurisdiction. Such an intrusion infringes upon the principle of separation of powers. The National party's purpose in doing so is to control the bar association and to turn it into one of its committees. God speaks the truth and guides us to the right path.

8592
CSO: 4504/101

BUTRUS GHALI DISCUSSES NEED FOR PALESTINIAN 'CONFIDENCE'

PM031503 Paris LE MATIN in French 29 Oct 81 p 11

[Interview with Egyptian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Ghali by Shalom Cohen, in Egypt: "Near East: France Will Play an Important Role"--date not given]

[Text] Butrus Ghali: Egyptian diplomacy has been very active in its efforts to secure participation by European troops in the multinational force to be deployed on the border between Egypt and Israel. We attach symbolic and political value to this participation: it means that Europe is taking a practical part in the peace process.

LE MATIN: Has France played a particular role in this evolution by Europe?

Butrus Ghali: Over the past few months Europe has made do with a series of declarations. It sent the Gaston Thorn mission and the Dutch foreign minister's mission to ask questions. But in fact nothing practical was done. The talks I had with French External Relations Minister Claude Cheysson suggest that France has played and will play an important role in this process, on the level both of bilateral relations and of the ten's action.

LE MATIN: Do you think that the Palestinians are now prepared to take part in negotiations on autonomy?

Butrus Ghali: If the Palestinians are to take part in these negotiations there must first be some hope that the negotiations can produce results. Measures [should] be taken to change the policy on the West Bank and Gaza. We must try to restore confidence among the Palestinian people. If these measures are adopted, and if the Palestinians feel that they create a new situation, then they may be encouraged to regard the peace process in a positive and not in a negative way, as hitherto. This is obvious. The most important element is not the agreements we may conclude or the texts we may adopt. The most important element is to secure direct or indirect participation by the Palestinians, because if we secure an agreement but that agreement is rejected by the Palestinians, it will no longer have any importance.

LE MATIN: Leonid Brezhnev has just launched a new appeal for an international conference with the participation of the PLO, the Arab countries in the region, Israel, the United States and the USSR. What do you think of that?

Butrus Ghali: If the Israelis accept such an international conference and if the Americans accept that proposal too, we will give very serious consideration to what we should do on the basis of that twofold Israeli and American acceptance.

LE MATIN: Are you worried about Sudan's future?

Butrus Ghali: Sudan's stability is Egypt's stability and similarly Egypt's stability is Sudan's stability. There is a complementarity between the two countries which dates back 5,000 or 6,000 years and which has been one of the bases of our foreign policy for centuries. Therefore, any attack in Sudan will be regarded as an attack on Egypt. Any act of subversion against Sudan is regarded as an act of subversion against Egypt. We are tied by military agreements, first by the Arab Collective Security Pact of 1950 and second by a bilateral agreement. We have perfect, full and complete cooperation between Sudan and Egypt.

CSO: 4519/32

'AL-AKHBAR' REPORTS ON CONFESSIONS OF TERRORISTS

NC030004 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2315 GMT 2 Nov 81

[Text] Cairo, 2 Nov (MENA)--In its issue to be published tomorrow, the newspaper AL-AKHBAR reports that the members of the second group of the terrorist organization who were captured yesterday confessed exciting details about their training plans and all the training places used by the terrorist and sabotage groups. The paper quotes the terrorists as saying that the practical training took place in isolated areas and in certain places in the desert, and the theoretical training took place in old dilapidated houses. The paper says that the terrorists disclosed the addresses of these houses and showed the places of training. The security organs inspected these places on the spot and managed to obtain the finger prints of certain members of the terrorist organization from windows and roofs which were left behind during their training in climbing to escape when necessary.

AL-AKHBAR says that the terrorists admitted that training involved the selection of persons capable of using arms with high competence and acting quickly and without delay or hesitation. There was training in assassination operations of individuals who were either far away or nearby, at distances ranging from 20-200 meters. They also trained on the quick use of grenades as well as marksmanship.

The terrorists admitted that they tried to mislead the security men before the asssassination of the late leader. They later discovered that all their movements had been closely watched. They also confessed that the organization commands planned to launch an operation similar to that of Asyut in al-Minya Governorate. The instructions were to kill the security men deployed in the streets and those in front of important installations and then to launch large-scale sabotage operations throughout the governorate to create the impression among the people and the security organs that the organization's force is capable of moving and carrying out what it wants anywhere any time.

AL-AKHBAR further says that the terrorists disclosed the places where they used to carry out their training in storming operations, escape, throwing grenades and explosives and hitting targets. The security forces went to these places and captured some equipment and arms that the terrorists used. The security organs took the finger prints that the terrorists left on certain hard objects. The fingerprints were proven to be the same as those of the terrorists.

The paper quotes reliable sources as saying that the terrorists' plan that was carried out in Asyut in the dawn of the holy Muslim feast in which scores of officers and soldiers, who watch over the security of the country, were killed, is the same plan that was prepared for the attack on the al-Minya security directorate and the central security forces there as well as the police section adjacent to the security headquarters.

CSO: 4504/58

MUBARAK, SUDAN DELEGATION DISCUSS INTEGRATION

NC030838 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 0610 GMT 3 Nov 81

[From the Press Review]

[Text] On Egyptian-Sudanese integration, the newspaper AL-AKHBAR says that at the meeting yesterday between President Husni Mubarak and a delegation representing the Sudanese people the conversation dealt with Egyptian-Sudanese political and scientific integration.

The Sudanese communications minister, who attended the meeting, said: President Husni Mubarak devotes great attention to the subject of integration. He noted the need for sidestepping routine and rescinding at the earliest possible time the laws that impede the achievement of integration. He said that the Egyptian-Sudanese Economic Council will study this subject so that it will become possible to achieve the aspired integration in the political and economic domains.

AL-AKHBAR points out that the subject of integration ranks foremost in importance as far as Egypt and Sudan are concerned. It is a need dictated by the fact that the same people live all along the Nile River—from its sources in the extreme south to its estuary in the extreme north. There can be no doubt that we have come a long way in achieving political integration, being motivated by the brotherhood and love existing among the people of the Nile Valley in Egypt and Sudan and between the officials of the two sides who are in charge of these people. Only formalities remain for political integration to assume its full dimensions.

However, it is clear that there are numerous Egyptian-Sudanese economic integration projects. The implementation of these projects requires three factors: the first is the scientific and technical power required for conducting studies, for planning and for administering the projects. The second is the manpower which works, produces and yields goods. The third is money which, in fact, is the nerve center of implementation.

Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din and the Sudanese foreign minister have also discussed the boosting of economic integration and the establishment of a joint bank to prepare a study on the economic viability of the projects and to finance the two

countries' joint development projects. Thus, these three factors will have been achieved, making it possible to implement the two countries' projects for economic integration and joint development.

In conclusion, AL-AKHBAR draws attention to the fact that the achievement of Egyptian-Sudanese economic planning will boost political integration and will transform the Nile Valley, including Egypt and Sudan, into one power from its political, social and cultural perspectives. The reason is that economy at this juncture is the maker of the lives of nations and of peoples.

CSO: 4504/58

REPRINT OF INTERVIEW WITH HUSNI MUBARAK IN MAY 1976

Cairo SABAH AL-KHAYR in Arabic No 1345, 15 Oct 81 pp 6-9

[Interview with Husni Mubarak by 'Abd-al-Sattar al-Tawilah in May 1976: "Husni Mubarak Says: 'I Am from Kafr al-Musaylihah, an Egyptian Village; My Father Was an Ordinary Civil Servant Who Had Four Acres of Land; I Belong to the Generation of the 23 July Revolution; I Support Democracy; We Are a Muslim Country, and Islam Is a Plea for Spiritual Faith as Well as a Plea for Social Justice' "]

[Text] When al-Sadat chose Husni Mubarak as his vice president, our colleague, 'Abd-al-Sattar al-Tawilah interviewed him. In the interview Husni Mubarak spoke quite candidly about his life and about his thoughts. News agencies have reprinted this interview in most newspapers of the world.

Today, SABAH AL-KHAYR reprints this interview because of its significance.

Husni Mubarak has not previously been involved in government or in politics. He was not involved with any party, not even with the Arab Socialist Union, because he was an officer in the air force.

He always worked tirelessly; he was devoted to his work, energetic and enthusiastic about his work and his patriotism. He was known for staying away from groups and blocs. In fact, he was known for breaking them up one by one throughout the period during which he was responsible for the air force.

His energy, his loyalty and his enthusiasm have always been his only credentials when he was assigned to any position. Every time such an assignment came, it came as a surprise.

[Answer] It was a surprise when I was appointed air force chief of staff, and it was a surprise when I was told the news that I was appointed air force commander. After that I spent 2 sleepless days and nights thinking and thinking. The entire history of the air force rolled like a motion-picture film in front of my eyes: the 1967 disaster which occurred despite the fearlessness of the pilots and their eagerness to fight. It was a

tremendous responsibility, but after 48 hours of sleeplessness, I got out of my chair and I said in a loud voice, "God is on our side; we can do the job and then some!"

[Question] The greatest test came in the 1973 October War when the Egyptian air force destroyed the myth of the invincible Israeli air force. Was President al-Sadat's choice of you as his vice president a surprise also?

[Answer] Yes, it was a total surprise.

[Question] Before we talk about how the surprise came about, let us go back to recent history. When was the first time you met President Anwar al-Sadat?

[Answer] I got to know the president without meeting him from the literature I read about the history of the National Movement. Like any citizen or officer I knew President al-Sadat from what was written about him or from what he himself had written about his national struggle and the national struggle of his whole generation. But the first time I met the president personally was in Sudan during the events at Aba island in 1970. He was then the vice president and the head of a delegation that was visiting Khartoum. I spent a brief period of time with him, and I was impressed by his candor; he was a very intelligent man and a good listener. Then I met the president several times after that after I was appointed air force chief of staff and then air force commander. I also traveled with him on several trips in this capacity.

[Question] Let us go back to the circumstances under which you were informed that you had been selected vice president.

[Answer] I was summoned to meet the president. I thought at first that it would be an ordinary meeting such as those which always took place. But I asked Lt Gen al-Jamsi at that time whether or not the president wanted something specific so I can have it ready before I meet him. He said, "I don't know. Maybe he just wants to talk over a few things with you."

The president talked with me during the meeting which lasted from 7 o'clock to 11 o'clock in the evening. He invited me for supper and told me that he had to choose a vice president. Then he told me of his decision. I was greatly surprised, and even the president noticed that I was "taken back." He was moved by that and said, "Son, I know that service in the army is less worrisome."

Then, as the spirit of the soldier in a battlefield got the best of me, I said, "Sir, I will serve anywhere Your Excellency thinks I can serve best. I am pleased and honored to be of assistance to you in carrying out your enormous responsibilities."

[Question] How do you perceive the magnitude of your responsibility as vice president?

[Answer] Quite simply, in the past I used to think about and I was responsible for one place only: the air force. But now I have the whole world on my mind and on my shoulders.

[Question] It has been rumored that you were selected vice president at the request of the army after the victory of the October War.

Husni Mubarak laughed.

[Answer] I heard these statements, and I heard a rumor that there was an attempted coup. All this is nonsense. The Egyptian army is devoted to the national struggle and is carrying out this mission in the best possible way. The days of the centers of power have gone forever and will never return anywhere. We are a state of institutions. Each institution and each agency plays its role in the national effort in accordance with the constitution.

Why is it that some people like to complicate matters? The constitution stipulates that a vice president be appointed. The position was vacant, and the president explained in simple terms why he chose me as one of those who helped him direct the October battle.

[Question] All right. When the story about the army requesting that you be appointed vice president was refuted and its absurdity was revealed, some people said that your appointment as vice president, with you being one of the heroes of 6 October, signified that President al-Sadat was closing the book on the 23 July Revolution and opening a new one, that of 6 October. [That was an indication that] it was all over for the 23 July Revolution.

The vice president spread out his arms and turned up his hands and said:

[Answer] You can't be serious! Is there a man of reason who would say that 6 October is separate from 23 July? Is not the leader of the October victory one of those who forged the July Revolution? Who read the first statement of the revolution to the people? Who took his life into his own hands and went to the broadcast building early on that historic day? Was he not the man who led the battle that took the Bar-Lev line by storm? What about me? Am I not, and are not other young people [like me] members of the generation of the 23 July Revolution?

Had it not been for the July Revolution, I and my associates, who are children of simple peasants, would not have been thrust into positions of leadership in various civilian, military and political sectors of the state. Had it not been for the July Revolution, we would not have had that status in the whole world.

Who said that 6 October was a revolution that overshadowed the July Revolution? Six October was a splendid military victory that took place under the leadership of one of the leaders of the July Revolution who shared in the responsibility when the late Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was the leader. Then

he carried out the charge which was entrusted to him despite the burdensome legacy that 'Abd-al-Nasir left after his death.

[Question] Now that we are talking about the July Revolution, what do you think about the campaign against 'Abd-al-Nasir and against the revolution also which some people have launched and are still launching?

[Answer] Show me one revolution in the world that has been free of mistakes and negative occurrences! Tell me of one revolutionary leader in the world who made no mistakes! No one is infallible. The proverb which states that he who takes no action makes no mistakes states the truth. Weren't there mistakes and deviations in the Soviet Revolution? Weren't there negative occurrences in the Chinese Revolution? Both countries have conducted and are conducting corrective movements every day. Do negative events and corrections in any revolution signify that the entire revolution be branded and condemned?

As I said every revolution has victims and mistakes, as all historical evidence indicates. The July Revolution is like all revolutions; why should it differ from this rule?

The real problem lies in the fact that if we were to let any revolution continue in its erroneous ways, it will collapse and eliminate itself by itself. This is the significance behind the Corrective Revolution which President Anwar al-Sadat carried out. He saved the July Revolution and corrected its course. It is enough that the principles of democracy were established.

[Question] What do you think then about statements by rejectionists that the attempts to liquidate the July Revolution are still going on?

[Answer] Rejectionists are always crying out [about everything] like killjoys. In the midst of this outcry I did not hear a single answer to the question that President al-Sadat raised: "Did anyone touch the gains of the socialist July Revolution?" Don't forget that the president, who is one of the leaders of the revolution, took part in producing these gains.

Rejection and doubt will continue to be an existing phenomenon. That phenomenon was there during the days of the late 'Abd-al-Nasir. But this does not matter; we are going on. The political leadership issues decrees every day to affirm its concern not only for the survival of the July Revolution, but also for its development and continuing progress.

[Question] How do you see this development?

[Answer] First, the institutions of democracy have been established, and they are being strengthened. Thus the social and political aspects of freedom have been completed. I believe that you, intellectuals, are the most sensitive people to a healthy, democratic climate which Egypt is experiencing now, [is it not]?

[Question] I can say without exaggeration that the freedom of speech which is being practiced at present has not been practiced in Egypt for the last 30 years. Egypt has never had 6 consecutive years without having any detention camps whatsoever.

[Answer] This is the right of the people, and no one is bestowing this upon the masses. The country is their country, and the national wealth is of their making. Hence the realization of democracy was a development of the 23 July Revolution and a step forward for it.

Despite the difficult economic crisis, the president's recent decrees this year, the year before and before that regarding the cost of living allowance, pensions, insurance coverage, etc....

Is not this the revolution's social indicator? Where does its political leadership stand? Undoubtedly, with the masses.

Moreover, what is the principal function of any political leadership in a country that is facing a national problem? Is it not that of liberating the land and [the people's] will?

Imperialism and Zionism attacked us and defeated us in 1967. President al-Sadat, whose destiny it was to inherit a burdensome legacy after the defeat, achieved victory in the October battle. But liberation has not been completed yet. Our principal mission is to achieve it. God willing, Arab land in Sinai, in the Golan and in the West Bank will be restored to its owners, and the Palestinians will have a homeland and a state.

This is the primary responsibility of the political leadership. It is evident to everyone who can see that the political leadership is closely attending to that responsibility so that this objective can be achieved. This is also the responsibility of all the people.

Is not this a development for the revolution, and does not this push its course forward? National liberation is among the first steps which are necessary to move forward toward bigger and better horizons.

[Question] Speaking of socialist gains, how do you as vice president see socialism?

[Answer] I am first of all the product of the Egyptian village of Kafr al-Musaylihah. My father was an ordinary civil servant who owned four acres of land. I lived with peasants, and I experienced everything which any simple villager suffers from. Hence, ever since my childhood I have been fully convinced that social justice is the right of the people. It is neither bestowed upon them or given to them as charity. This is my first underlying assumption.

I [also] belong to the generation of the 23 July Revolution. My view of socialism is that of the revolution whose principles I responded to quickly at the outset. I believe in those principles, such as the 50 percent

[representation] for workers and farmers and all the social incompatibilities in the context of social peace and others. This socialism is the product of our circumstances, and it is consistent with our traditions and our religion which calls for social justice. It is not an imported socialism. The revolution's socialist inclinations began to appear before we consolidated our relations with the Soviet Union.

[Question] What do you think about the recently introduced tendency regarding the attempt to keep religion out of the plea for social justice and to focus on its punitive aspects?

[Answer] We are an Islamic country, and our faith in God gives us the strength to insist on making the effort to stand up to our enemy and to build our country. Just as Islam is a plea for spiritual faith, it is also a plea for social justice. Islam's socialist tendencies have been recognized by non-Muslim western scholars.

[Question] How were you able to make the transition from being an air force commander, not involved in politics and government, to a vice president who is involved in both every day?

He said as he sipped his coffee:

[Answer] President al-Sadat invited me to all the meetings and all the press conferences. I used to sit and listen. I would take it all in, memorize what I heard, analyze what I memorized and then go back to my office or go home and write down what I heard. Then I would ponder it, think about it and consider all possibilities. Then I found myself obligated to read everything that was written in the newspapers of the world about Egypt and the Arab world and most of what was being written about international politics. I would read about what was broadcast on radio if I did not hear it myself. I reviewed data reports, academic studies, political studies and even [reports on] health and rural education. President al-Sadat used to explain to me the apsects and the history of every problem before and after meetings. I always used to feel that he wanted to give me all his experience. After that I had to give my opinion and to corroborate it with evidence and in detail. Political responsibility is extremely arduous. But thank God, I went through the test, and I succeeded in the first two missions which I had to face alone.

The first one was in Morocco, and the second was in China.

In Morocco I was at first carrying a message from President al-Sadat to King al-Hasan and to President Boumedienne. The president told me, "If the situation requires your mediation, go ahead as you see fit." I read everything about the problem between the two countries before I left. (And here the vice president began to sketch on paper a map of the disputed locations between Morocco and Algeria). I considered the possible replies that I would face, and I prepared my proposals. Then I left, and I found myself acting as mediator, and what we all know happened. Egypt succeeded

in stopping the armed confrontation that was about to take place between the two Arab countries.

In 1 year I learned what would have taken me years of constant study [to learn otherwise]. Al-Sadat put me to work immediately. I do not think that there is any country in the world whose vice president participates in political activity the same way the vice president of Egypt does. This emphasizes the fact that President al-Sadat is determined indeed to establish the state of institutions.

8592
CSO: 4504/53

MINISTERS TO SUBMIT WORK PLANS TO MUBARAK

NC031616 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1505 GMT 3 Nov 81

[Text] Cairo, 3 Nov (MENA)--The cabinet met for 3 1/2 hours under President Muhammad Husni Mubarak today. Muhammad Haqqi, chairman of the information authority and official spokesman, said that Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali reviewed the intensive diplomatic activity which Egypt carried out recently and spoke about his recent visit to Israel, its outcome and the agreements he had reached with the Israeli Government.

Muhammad Haqqi added that Kamal Hasan 'Ali affirmed that all the timetables for the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai will be carried out on schedule and that the Camp David agreements are the basis and the only commitment for accelerating the peace process in the coming period. Kamal Hasan 'Ali also affirmed that the Palestinians' interests will not be jeopardized in any way but that they will take first priority in the talks.

Muhammad Haqqi said that Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il then explained in detail the security situation in the country from June this year until today, indicating that 700 members of the terrorist organization have been arrested so far. Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il affirmed that most of the members of the bloody terrorist organization have been arrested and that the organization's leaders, members, hideouts and arms have been uncovered. Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il also affirmed that there is full spirit of cooperation between the security departments and the citizens.

Muhammad Haqqi noted that Deputy Prime Minister for Financial and Economic Affairs Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid then gave a complete picture of the economic situation in general. President Husni Mubarak then gave his instructions to the ministers, asking each of them to prepare a work plan, supported by a chart, in such a way that each minister will be responsible for his own plan. These plans will be submitted to the president within 10 days.

CSO: 4504/58

'AL-MUSTAQBAL' ON MUBARAK MEETING WITH PRESS

JN010913 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 31 Oct 81 p 26

[Dispatch by Sulayman Nimr]

[Text] Cairo—During a closed meeting with the chief editors of the Egyptian newspapers on Wednesday, 21 October 1981, President Husni Mubarak criticized the Egyptian press handling of several issues.

Informed sources have told AL-MUSTAQBAL that the Egyptian president told the chief editors: I would like to inform you that I do not want you to interfere in my private life, to publish anything about it, to say that I was the hero of the air force in the October War, that my wife is the first lady, that my children are the president's children. I do not want such talk because my private life concerns me alone.

In this closed meeting, to which the Egyptian press made no reference, Egyptian President Mubarak spoke to the press about his domestic and foreign policies and said that efforts must now be exerted to confront the terrorist groups to restore stability to the country as soon as possible.

Well-informed sources in Cairo report that President Mubarak told the press that he will undertake changes in the regime, form a new cabinet and appoint a new prime minister and a vice president in January.

Speaking about Egypt's foreign policy, Mubarak said that he gives priority to the issue of Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai and that he has received reassurances that Israel will withdraw as scheduled.

On Egypt's relations with Arab countries, President Mubarak said: I will not allow any attack against any Arab country. Egypt will not start any aggression against any Arab country. Also, I will not allow propaganda campaigns to be launched against any Arab country. I do not want you to reply to any Arab propaganda campaign. I do not want any attacks against any Arab country. At this point, the chief editor of AL-AKHBAR, Musa Sabri, asked Mubarak: Not even the colonel? Mubarak replies: Yes, not even against the colonel. Musa Sabri replied: But he wants to destroy the country. Mubarak cut short this discussion by telling Musa Sabri: Musa, it seems you only know how to utter slander. I do not wish you to pursue this method. If you do not like it, you can stay at home.

AL-AHRAM chief editor Ibrahim Nafi' asked the president about Egypt's stand on the plans and initiatives being put forth for the settlement of the Middle East issue, such as Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's plan. Mubarak replied: We are pursuing the peace operation in accordance with the Camp David agreements to achieve Israel's withdrawal from the rest of Sinai and to establish self-rule for the Palestinians. We do not oppose any Arab plans or substitutes that may achieve Palestinian rights.

The well-informed sources which reported what took place between President Mubarak and the chief editors told AL-MUSTAQBAL that Mubarak touched on Egyptian-Soviet relations, referred to the cable of congratulations he had received from Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev and to the contents of this cable in which Moscow expressed readiness to respond to Egypt's demands. Mubarak said that this is a positive stand by Moscow and that at present he prefers to have a truce with Moscow, not to attack it and not to escalate tension in their relations. Mubarak said Egypt must be content to reply only to any campaign Moscow might direct against it.

CSO: 4504/58

CABINET ADOPTS BILLS ON DISCIPLINE OFFENSES

NC032021 Cairo MENA in English 1910 GMT 3 Nov 81

[Text] Cairo, 3 Nov (MENA)--If you molest a lady in public by word or act you pay a fine of 10 to 100 Egyptian pounds.

This is one of a long series of bills adopted today by the cabinet under President Husni Mubarak. The bills go to parliament for urgent passage.

The long list of offenses with stiffened penalties is designed to bring discipline into public life.

Other offenses include:

--if you set your dog on somebody else.

--if you pluck flowers from a public park.

--if you throw garbage on the street.

--if you raise noise at your home at night that disturbs your neighbours.

--if you set your radio blaring in your shop or your coffee house.

--if you throw dirt into the Nile.

--if you pick up a quarrel with somebody else.

and, if you decline to give help to somebody in distress, when you are capable of giving such help.

The bills then come to more serious offenses. If a landlord constructs a building in violation of the specifications in his licence, the whole building would be liable to be pulled down if it poses a public risk. The expenses would be incurred by the landlord, apart from a fine and imprisonment.

Another bill provides for the creation of follow-up offices in all ministries, departments, public organizations, governorates and local government units to ensure the proper performance of functions and services on schedule and to point up aspects of failure, particularly in dealings with the public. The offices are to draw up periodic reports on the performance of work, pointing up the shortcomings, and referring these reports to the authorities in charge.

The bills introduce a large number of legal measures designed to speed up disciplinary, prosecution and litigation procedure in respect of the offenses involved.

CSO: 4500/35

BRIEFS

ASSASSINATION LIST--Cairo, 1 Nov (MENA)--The weekly newspaper AL-SIYASI says today that the name of leftist party leader Khalid Muhyi al-Din was on the assassination list of the plotting assassination group. The list also included the names of Labor Party leader Ibrahim Shukri and Liberal Party leader Mustafa Kamil Murad. The paper says that the strange thing is that the leftist party leader had appealed to the Islamic groups for cooperation and coordination between his party and these groups against the government. [Text] [NC010910 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0843 GMT 1 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/58

NEW PRESIDENT UNDER ATTACK FROM UNDERGROUND PRESS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 3, 4

[Article: "Underground Press Launches Fierce Campaign Against New President"]

[Text] The underground press in Iran has started a subtle and seemingly well-planned campaign against Seyed Ali Khamenei, who was last week initiated as the regime's third president. It is widely believed that the campaign is master-minded by nationalist groups, possibly assisted by retired and serving army and air force officers.

Leaflets distributed in Tehran and other major cities describe Khamenei as a "corrupt, bloodthirsty and dishonest" mullah who has amassed vast personal riches and transferred part of his wealth abroad. Some leaflets contain quotations from Khamenei's relatives and former associates, who are said to have revealed hitherto unpublished aspects of his early life.

One quote is from an army officer, identified simply as Major N. H., who claims that Khamenei transferred $2 million from army funds to revolutionary guards deputy chief Kolahduz (recently killed in the air crash) to buy small arms from Lebanese sources in 1979. Khamenei was then an undersecretary at the Ministry of Defence. The officer alleges that Kolanhduz took the cash and deposited it in a French bank, and that no arms were bought.

The leaflets also allege that Khamenei took as his fourth wife the widow of a former general who was executed in 1979. Using his position as undersecretary at the Defence Ministry, Khamenei is reported to have demanded "special favours" from the widows of young officers killed by the regime, in return for giving instructions to pay pensions to them. Many widows who refused to comply with Khamenei's wishes had the pensions of their deceased husbands suspended and even their properties confiscated, it is alleged.

However, the most damaging comments contained--among the leaflets is from Khamenei's brother-in-law, who claims that "Seyed Ali Khamenei lacks the personal integrity to serve as a mullah and has no virtues." This is from a statement which the brother-in-law, Shaikh Ali Tehrani, published in late 1979 when Khamenei was appointed Friday prayer leader of Tehran. In the same statement Tehrani, who is now in hiding, claims that Khamenei was a corrupt mullah who took money from proceeds of donations to Imam Reza's Shrine in Mashad for his own personal use. Tehrani also claims that Khamenei was introduced for the first time to Khomeini in Najaf, Iraq, in 1977. Thus, he can have no claim to fame as a veteran opponent of the Shah.

Before the revolution Khamenei was a modest lawyer, better known as "the fix-it mullah." Soon after the revolution he was placed as the clerics' representative at the Ministry of Defence. He was responsible for ousting Admiral Ahmad Madani as Defence Minister. He is also believed by many people to have had a hand in the killing of Mostafa Chamran, the regime's third Minister of Defence.

It is alleged that his rise to power was engineered by Libyan and Syrian military personnel who were given commanding positions within the army in the summer of 1979. But this allegation has not been confirmed by independent sources. Many army and air force officers suspect that some Libyan and Syrian officers at very high level were involved in the decision-making process within the Iranian army, but they admit they have never personally met those foreign officers.

Observers in Tehran were surprised to see such a well-organised propaganda campaign against Khamenei because they believed the post of presidency was too insignificant to attract such a campaign. In the past neither Rajai nor Bani-Sadr was subject to such attacks by nationalist opposition during their presidency, although both men were often ridiculed as "misfits" and "cranks" before becoming president.

Indeed, the nationalist-centrist forces usually aim their propaganda attacks at Khomeini and Montazeri. They have felt that anybody who is made president must be to much of a lame duck to merit such attacks. But it seems that Khamenei has a great many more enemies among nationalists and the armed forces than either Rajai or Bani-Sadr ever had. But even Khamenei has yet to suffer from the kind of propaganda attacks which the assassinated Islamic Republican Party chief Mohamad Beheshti used to face.

In the leaflets, however, Khamenei is likened to the late Beheshti as the living example of a corrupt, sensuous and arrogant cleric. Pictures of Khamenei in military uniform are also distributed, with captions reading: "He is the same donkey; only his saddle has changed." In the mullah-controlled press, radio and TV Khamenei is called a "living martyr" because he survived a bomb blast on 27 June, one day before his mentor and colleague, Beheshti was killed, together with 75 others in the IRP headquarters blast.

CSO: 4600/97

KHAMENEI, 'DISLIKED' BY ARMY, LOSES COMMANDER APPOINTMENT

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 p 4

[Article: "Khamenei Falls To Get Top Army Job"]

[Text] In a surprise move late last week Ayatollah Khomeini delegated his powers as commander of the armed forces to the new chief of staff, General Zahir-Nejad. In a letter to the general, Khomeini empowered him to exercise the authority of the "leader" in making decisions on running the army "in consultation with the president."

Observers noted that Khomeini has deliberately refrained from appointing Khamenei as commander-in-chief of the army. Instead, he has all but in name made Zahir-Nejad the commander-in-chief, asking him to consult Khamenei. In contrast, Khomeini had made Bani-Sadr commander-in-chief when he became president.

Meanwhile Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani fills in as Khomeini's personal representative on the Defence Council, replacing Col Namju, who died in a recent plane crash.

It seems Khomeini had no choice other than to keep Khamenei away from day-to-day running of the army because as undersecretary of Defence in the past Khamenei had earned the wrath of many army officers. He is widely disliked by the professional military and his direct involvement in the activities of the army could have led to open revolt.

Informed sources believe that the new commander of the ground forces, Col Ali Shirazi, is also detested by the officer corps because he is said to have helped train the revolutionary guards who are rivals to the army.

Funnily enough, the revolutionary guards are losing their strength through a high casualty rate and desertions. Their main task is to fight political dissidents and serve as bodyguards for hundreds of mullahs in the Khomeini camp. Today all ministers, Majlis deputies, Friday prayer leaders and pro-Khomeini mullahs and even prominent non-clerical supporters are each protected by a dozen or so Islamic bodyguards.

CSO: 4600/97

EMIGRE MOJAHEDIN URGE RESIGNATION OF KHOMEYNI REGIME OFFICIALS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 4-6

[Article: "Mojahedin Keep Up The Pressure"]

[Text] Mojahedin-e-Khalq sources in Paris have continued their efforts to arouse world public opinion against the slaughter of their sympathisers during the past week.

In Paris they circulated photographs and a short film, which was shown on French television, of executions of young supporters of the Mojahedin. They accused the Khomeini regime of executing more than 200 young boys and girls. The photographs showed youngsters of between 11-13 years who had allegedly been killed.

The film was taken inside Evin prison with the complicity of sympathisers among guards there. It showed the hanging of a young Mojahedin sympathiser. The Mojahedin spokesman said that 100 other sympathisers were forced to watch the hanging, which was carried out as a salutary warning because they refused to shout, "Death to Rajavi."

The Paris newspaper France-Soir said evidence from Iran itself confirmed the stories of the killings of very young people. It cited another case of a youth named Majid Kashani, in Kazerun in southern Iran, whose mother and sister were summoned to be present at his execution. Confirming this story a Mojahedin spokesman said the hair of Kashani's sister, also accused of being involved in anti-Islamic activities, was shorn off and thrown into his face before he was shot.

Although the Iranian authorities have continued to deny they have killed younger schoolchildren, important officials like prosecutor Asad Lajevardi have pointed out that nine-year-old girls, under interpretation of Islamic laws, can be regarded as adults and be treated as such. In Islam a nine-year-old girl is old enough to marry, it has been pointed out.

Meanwhile, inside Iran, a prominent leftist writer who in the early days of the revolution fully supported Khomeini has appealed to all "true revolutionary people and organisations" to support the National Council of Resistance announced by Mojahedin leader Masoud Rajavi and former president Bani-Sadr in Paris. Haj Seyed Javadi asked Iranians to react positively to the Mojahedin appeal, "for without united action no victory can be achieved for the liberation of Iran from fascist dictatorship."

In Paris a communique issued by three members of the National Front who are now in exile also appealed for a rapid union of all nationalist and patriotic forces. It asked Shapour Bakhtiar, head of the National Iranian Resistance Movement, and Ahmad Madani, former top official of the Khomeini regime now in exile, to come together and open the way for the freeing of Iran from the obscurantist forces who were destroying it. Both Bakhtiar and Madani have been members of the National Front.

Although neither Baktiar nor Madani has reacted to the call some Paris observers predicted that the two men could move closer. But a Mojahedin spokesman ruled out any cooperation with them.

Meanwhile, Hasan Nazih, another former Khomeini official who fled to Europe, has appealed to Iranian diplomats and representatives of Iranian organisations who are abroad to resign in protest against the brutality of the Tehran regime.

The Mojahedin, the latest edition of its clandestinely printed magazine Mojahed, has also warned all senior officials of the regime that they should resign now or suffer the consequences of their cooperation with murderers. It says that with the establishment of the National Council of Resistance the regime in Tehran has lost its constitutional validity. No excuse or pretext would be accepted from high officials of the government, judiciary, legislature or armed forces who did not quit now, the paper said.

Speaking as "the elected president of Iran" Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr also called on all Iranians to turn on the Khomeini regime, which, he said, was in its final days. Rajavi made a similar forecast.

The four Iranian diplomats at the consulate-general in the West German city of Hamburg who resigned last week gave a press conference at the weekend to explain their action.

Consul-general Kamran Malek, his deputy Mehdi Monshi, Hosen Moshari and a woman colleague, Shirin Yasna, have asked for political asylum in Germany after resigning their posts in protest at the Tehran regime's execution of its opponents and other "anti-national" policies. They belonged to no groups, they said, but felt it their national duty to make their protest.

The four said that normally eight members of Khomeini's security, the Savama, worked at the embassy, vetting all visitors and all the work carried out at the consulate. They were in direct contact with the mosque in Hamburg which was the main centre for Savama's work in Germany. They said the secutiry men stopped processing of papers allowing students opposed to the regime to receive money from home and in one case, when a student returned to Iran after his father died, had him arrested while there to prevent his return.

CSO: 4600/97

IRAQ SEEN AS INCREASING PRESSURE ON TEHRAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Iraqis Put New Squeeze on Khuzestan"]

[Text] Reports from Iran during the past week suggest Iraq may be embarking on a new phase of its war against Iran--probably, some observers feel, out of desperation. Some observers see the latest air and ground attacks as a new bid to cause the collapse of the regime in Tehran.

Although there has been no final confirmation, there is some evidence that bombing attacks on the (Gurreh) pumping station which sends oil to the Kharg island terminal have led to a cutting off of the flow to the island, Iran's biggest loading centre.

Other raids have caused further damage to the world's biggest petro-chemicals installation at Bandar Shahpour, at the head of the Persian Gulf, which was three parts completed at the time of the revolution. The Japanese partners in the enterprise recently gave up all attempts for the moment to come to a new agreement with the Iranians on completing the project.

A third report, saying that Iraqi troops have captured the key town of Shoush, known to westerners as Susa, at the northern end of Khuzestan, could mean that land communications between most of Iran and its oil resources have been cut. The road and rail links with the north pass close to Shoush.

All this points to a renewed effort to bring new pressure on Tehran by cutting the regime off from its only economic resource. Indian and East European tankers which have been regularly using Kharg have been diverted to Lavan and Sirri terminals, whose total loading capacity is only 200,000 barrels per day. Until recently experts estimate that Iran has been exporting around 500,000 barrels per day.

There have been new reports of Iraqi air raids on Kharg itself, which has a very big storage capacity and which has until now been well defended by missile systems. Shortage of missiles and other anti-aircraft defences may now have made this and other targets much more vulnerable to the Iraqis, observers say.

Some commentators tied up the attacks on oil installations with the reports that Iran had decided to agree to reduce its oil prices by at least $2 a barrel to $35 to join with other hardline countries in a move to reunite OPEC and restore the strength of the organisation. The cut in price would provide a much expanded market

for Iranian oil, and Baghdad, it is suggested, was trying to cut down Iran's capacity to take advantage of this.

The Tehran government has also recently ordered all its oil company technicians and staff to go to the south or face dismissal from their jobs. In spite of the uncertainty about housing and other matters many have already left. Cutting road and rail links could be another damaging blow to plans to get the oil industry into top working order again, it is pointed out.

The energy correspondent of the Guardian in London summed up the precariousness of Iran's present financial position when he wrote this week: "Hard estimates of Iran's financial position are difficult to come by. The official price of the main oil grade is $37 (£70) a barrel, an unrealistic $5 (£2.70) above the level charged by Saudi Arabia for similar oil. But much of Iran's oil is being sold at an effectively lower price through barter deals as the Tehran government attempts to maintain some kind of cash flow.

"Official Iranian figures last month showed that oil income was running at $550 million (£297) million a month--but in July the country's import bill was $1.3 billion (£702 million). It will be extremely difficult for the regime to stem imports of food, fuel and other essentials as winter approaches.

"With foreign reserves down to about $3 billion (£1.62 billion) or less, Iran may be forced to sell some of its holdings in foreign companies, such as a $6 billion (£3.2 billion) share in Krupps of West Germany, to keep from economic collapse and to avoid a humiliating surrender to Baghdad's terms for peace."

Reports from Tehran hint that the regime has decided to clamp down on imports and face the consequences--again seen as a sign that the financial situation in Tehran is desperate. Rumours have also suggested Tehran has either sold a considerable quantity of gold, possibly through an intermediary country, or is considering a sale.

According to Pakistani president Zia-ul-Haq peace between Iran and Iraq is at present far away. He said this week that the Islamic countries' efforts in this direction were stalemated.

One factor which it is felt may now be encouraging the Iraqis to press on with attempts to bring about the collapse of the Tehran regime is that few international experts see any solution to differences between the two countries on its borders other than that contained in the 1975 treaty which established Iranian rights now disputed by Iraq. It accords in every way with international law, they say.

Thus, some commentators point out, the Iraqi leaders may see only the spectre of humiliation in a peace settlement now. They may prefer to gamble on gaining a breathing space to restore their own strength through reducing Iran to its knees.

CSO: 4600/97

FOREIGN POLICY OF ISLAMIC REPUBLIC DISCUSSED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 19 Oct 81 pp 1, 3

[Text]

WHEN WE joined the vast concourse of world Moslems to perform the Hajj pilgrimage this year, we had the chance to make contact at first hand with groups of our brother Moslems from Syria and Libya and exchange views with them on a number of topics that concerned us mutually.

A point that perplexed us was the resentment these pilgrims, whom we were able to speak to, expressed at the Islamic Republic's build up of good relations with their own governments. The point which surprised us was that these persons looked on their incumbent governments as having established too close ties with Soviet Union and on that score were reckoned by them not to be in line with true Islamic and popular governments.

"The USSR is as much against Islam as the US," they told us. "While being hostile to all US puppet regimes how could the Islamic Republic of Iran possibly have cordial ties with Soviet puppet governments?" they questioned. They took their argument further with us and asked how such an attitude could be reconciled with the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, based on the cardinal principle of: "No East, no West."

We countered their objections saying that it has always been the firm and undeviating policy of the Islamic Republic regime to base relations with other regimes taking into consideration the inalienable popularity of regimes among the masses of their people, and the corollary of their independence both from the USSR and the US.

Again, we assured our brothers that if it was proved that any government was serving the interests of any Superpower, be it either from the East or West, and it stood against Islam and its own people, then the Islamic government of Iran stood ready to sever its political relations with such a regime or regimes.

In a thrust to our defense of the Islamic Republic's policies, shaping our attitudes to foreign governments, we asked our pilgrim brothers to take a look at the way in which Iran had severed ties completely with the regime of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, or that of the Jordanian Shah Hussein, and at our limited contacts with the Saudi regimes. In each case the Islamic Republic of Iran remained aloof from these regimes, because we were not in agreement with their policy trends as far as Islam and its relations to its own people were concerned. The Islamic Republic has expressed itself prepared to extend help to all peoples wherever it becomes necessary.

Nevertheless, the crux of our discussion with our pilgrim brethren are noted here only by way of example of varying attitudes and we do not propose to enter into polemics as to whether the Libyan or Syrian governments are actually being supported by their own people or not. Nor do we propose to determine whether they are Islamic governments or not. Nor again do we wish to go into the question of whether their relations to the Eastern imperialists is the same as the relations of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq and others are to the U.S.

What is most desirable, and that is what we wish to emphasize most pointedly here, is that the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran should endeavor to make a thorough study of the motivations of governments with whom Iran has dealings, to clarify and ascertain what impels them

to take their particular stance. It is possible that the heads of these countries may be US hardline opponents, but what we should study is whether or not their opposition to the US is because of Islam, or because of their relations to Soviet Union.

If it is found that the opposition to the US say is determined merely because of a servile dependence on Russia and does not stem from a desire to promote Islam only, then we cannot and should not espouse warm relations with that particular government or regime. On the contrary we should not only be cautious but move to be practically in a state of war with such a government or regime.

As an addendum to our recommendation we would like to note that it would not simply be enough for the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic to make their investigations and clarifications through diplomatic channels alone. What is needed would be for investigations to be made more directly, by contact with groups representing people within those countries and with people of all classes in those countries themselves. It is only on this basis that a true picture can be formed of the opinions and the will, determined by people's under the governments themselves.

Imam Khomeini, the symbol of true Islam in whom the ideals of the Islamic Republic are enshrined once expressed the view that official and diplomatic tours alone would not suffice and that it was most necessary for contacts to be made with people, who formed the broad base among the nations of the world.

The Islamic Republic's Foreign Ministry should not be heedless of the fact that most governments in today's world are divested from their nations. If we engage in establishing close relations with such governments with no thought for the will of the people under them, then we risk loosing the support of the people in these nations. And there is the further danger that we will finally be encircled by regimes who will end up sacrificing us and true Islamic ideals to the base interests of the West or the East.

Let us remind ourselves here of the theory which states that governments should be viewed only as a bridge of contact with the larger base within the nations, to remind ourselves only because it is an imperialist theory which seeks contact with governments that lack popular support and so to increase their stranglehold on the nations themselves. We know that in the long run that such a ploy is bound to fail. But the lesson for us is that contact with the popular forces and the peoples of the nations themselves can yield us for larger dividends and success in the end.

Iranian officials, it must be stated here, know no other language than that of frankness and truthfulness. Is it then possible to be beguiled by foreign diplomats who resort to the most deceptive tactics? Our foreign officials should have it in mind to be most cautious with such a tribe and not trust them wholly.

We are assured that the revolutionary and committed officials of the Foreign Ministry will never compromise on the principle of "No East, no West, Islamic Republic only," and it will be Islam as a third power which will liberate the deprived from the grip of all imperialists.

by HAJI SEYYED HUSSEIN MUSAVIAN

CSO: 4600/94

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TIES WITH SHAH'S REGIME 'EXPOSED'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Oct 81 p 1

[Article: "Foreign Ministry Exposes Amnesty International Ties With Iran's Former Regime"]

[Text] TEHRAN (Pars) - The full text of a top-secret letter of the ambassador to London of the deposed shah to the then foreign minister in Tehran on a meeting between the ambassador and two officials of the Amnesty International held on March 2, 1978 was released by the Foreign Ministry Thursday night. This document reads as follows:

"(From Parviz Raji, Ambassador)

"To Abbasali Khalatbari, Foreign Affairs Minister.

"Yesterday on my invitation, the secretary general of the Amnesty International, Martin Enelz, and the head of the British Branch of Amnesty International, David Simpson, came to see me. The main points of our discussion were as follows:

"1. I told Mr Enelz that yesterday I received the report of his attorney as presented before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress and said that after our recent contacts we had hoped that the tone of the report would be more desirable than it turned out.

"Besides, I gave Mr Enelz a copy of the decree of the monarchical regime which he had not yet seen. After reading it, he said he accepted the contents of the reports with pleasure and added that it would not have been correct to say that the organization (Amnesty International) had not changed its tone towards Iran. Rather the tone of the organization as reflected in its annual report had changed noticably, he said. To substantiate his statement concerning the change in attitude of the organization towards Iran he referred to page ten of the report of the organization addressed to the U.S. Congress.

"2 Mr Enelz said that the issue of the confederation of Iranian students that was brought up was meaningless and nonsensical. This shows how well SAVAK has infiltrated them. Definitely if SAVAK discontinues its support for them the Confederation would soon disintegrate

"3. I told Mr Enelz that I had two personal questions to ask. One was whether if a person had clarified to him with facts and evidence that the Human Rights situation in Iran had improved drastically would it be political suicide for the organization to praise what had been done in Iran in this respect and whether this would damage the organization's international reputation or not?

He said that doing so would by no means discredit their reputation and whenever a flaw is not brought up this reflected their views. I asked him in his opinion how should one go about mentioning these good points. He said as a private person and my friend he was telling me that the most effective step taken up to now in improving our image was to invite that Belgian journalist to visit our prisons. And he added that of course if the good points of our work were expressed by Lord Chalfon it would have less effect than if it were said by a neutral person. I asked him whether he had any candidate in mind. He said this must be thought about and went on to say that Egypt's current open door policy towards journalists had had positive results."

"I told him the case of Iran differed from that of Egypt., for in Iran there were geo-political considerations. He said Egypt was also a country in a state of war I said maybe Israel is more accommodating than the Soviet Union. Mr Enelz added that another measure that would disarm our critics would be to publish the report of the International Red Cross.

"4. I asked Mr Enelz whether Iran was still among the countries being criticized on Human Rights issues. He said now some other countries, such as South Africa, were higher on the Black list. I asked how about Israel? He said prominent Jewish organizations such as the World

Zionist Congress had always had reasonable and proper relations with these organizations.

"Mr Eban asked about the incidents in Tabriz and Qom. Referring to the statement of (the defunct shah) I explained that these disturbances were the results of the activities of the unholy alliance of black and red reactionaries and then in detail I explained the role of these elements."

At the end of his special report Parviz Raji the Ambassador to London of the monarchical regime wrote that this meeting was held in accordance with the (defunct shah's) policy of keeping in touch with the Amnesty International Organization and that his understandings in general was that the thinking and attitude of the said organization towards Iran had improved relatively.

CSO: 4600/95

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL BLASTED FOR 'NON-CHALANT' ATTITUDES

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Oct 81 pp 3, 2

[Article: "Amnesty International, The So-Called Guardian of Human Rights"]

[Text]

FOLLOWING THE official request of the International Amnesty Organization to visit the prisons in Iran; and after the issuance of an official announcement by the Iranian Foreign Ministry concerning the respective conditions to fulfill this request, the Iranian government is determined to unveil the so-called tireless efforts rendered by the Amnesty Organization to preserve human rights:

Prior to expressing our justifiable comments on the "note worthy" attempts to Amnesty International, we would like to emphasize the fact that this International Organization has always assumed a non-chalant silent policy when confronted with the savage brutalities inflicted upon the revolutionary nations by the autocratic regimes. You are hereby presented with a detailed indifferent attitude of the Amnesty Organization in confrontation with the cruel measures adopted against the Iranian revolutionary Moslems:

On the historical day, Khordad 15th 1342, (June. 5th 1963) the Leader of the Shi'ite Moslem World, Imam Khomeini, protested against the discriminative law of "Capitulation" associated with intensified restrictions on the performance of Islamic rituals. In consequence, the devout Iranian Moslems revolted against the autocratic Pahlavi regime, though, unfortunately, 15,000 Moslems were massacred by the savage guards of the Shah. As usual, the Amnesty Organization remained totally indifferent to this brutal massacre murders. Later, the Shi'ite Leader of the Moslem World, Imam Khomeini, was imprisoned prior to expulsion from Iran. Even when Imam Khomeini was expelled from his country, the Amnesty International maintained its quite.

When the U.S.-oriented tyrannical reign of the Shah had condemned the Iranian freedom fighters to excessive torture and life imprisonment, the Amnesty International patched up a deceptive report denying brutal tortures exercised in the prisons all over Iran. However, when the successive executions and savage tortures were betraved to the revolutionary Iranians, the Amnesty International was obliged to read just its distorted report.

During the despotic reign of the toppled Pahlavi regime, Ayatollah Hussein Qhaffari was arrested by the security guards on charge of delivering a insiduous speech regarding the cruel policies of the Monarch. Ayatollah Qhaffari was martyred in prison under extreme torture and an electric drill was applied to his head. And as usual, the Amnesty International exposed an indifferent attitude towards the murder of a Moslem revolutionary personality.

The late revolutionary Moslem intellectual, Ayatollah Taleqani had been a subject to extensive agonies inflicted by the tyrannical Pahlavi regime and this phony advocates of human rights, the Amnesty Organization, never protested against the brutalities. Furthermore, Ayatollah Sa'di was arrested by SAVAK agents on charges of betraying the pro-Western policies and the brutal discriminations exercised by the corrupt Pahlavi regime and he was later martyred under prolonged torture in jail. The Amnesty International was dumb and mute during the despotic reign of the deposed Shah.

Amidst the dark reign of terror supervised by the ousted monarch, the prominent theologian Ayatollah Montazeri was frequently sentenced to

prolonged imprisonment and long term exiles but the Amnesty International was quite irrespective of the proceedings in the suppressed country. Moreover this International Organization revealed no reaction against the administration of the sophisticated courses of "Torture Techniques" master minded by the sadistic Zionist agents in Iran who provided the savage SAVAK agents with the latest "developments" in the suppression of the revolutionary nations.

After the victorious occupation of the U.S. spy Den by the Moslem Student Followers of the Imam's Line, the Amnesty International brayed that the Islamic Republic of Iran has violated the so-called Human Rights. On Black Friday, Sept. 8th, 1979, the autocratic regime of the deposed Shah martyred at least 5,000 Moslem demonstrators who had justifiably rebelled against tyrant. Even then the Amnesty International neglected this historical massacre.

After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution, Shah's Prime Minister. Hoveyda, along with the Head of SAVAK, Nasiri were set on trial according to the righteous Islamic jurisdiction. Later, on the verdict of the Islamic Revolutionary Court, they were executed. Right after the application of the Islamic verdict, the Amnesty International serverely protested against the justifiable execution of these Imperialist elements. Even the official protest of this International advocate of Human Rights was blared through the world-wide mass media.

The International Amnesty Organization adopted a non-chalant policy in confrontation with the public massacre of the Moslem demonstrators who opposed the aggressive dominant power of the shah. However, the very same Organization was directly involved in contriving numerous conspiracies in Kurdestan, Khuzestan, Baluchestan and even in Tehran to topple the Islamic government through sporadic political turmoil in our revolutionized country. In the course of the political upheaval, instigated by the international conspirators, the out-lawed political factions murdered the sincere Moslem militants who had accomplished sacrificial exploits for the sake of their Islamic country. These savage counter-revolutionaries actually slaughtered and burned the ravaged bodies of the Moslem combatant whose only crime was concerned with preserving their country's independence.

Within the theological perspective, the supreme moment of the Retributive Justice awaits the criminals in the long run. In this respect, when the out-lawed saboteurs and murderers are set on trial in accordance with the Islamic jurisdiction, the International Amnesty laments on their inevitable execution according to the Qoranic decrees. Subsequently, the mournful members of the Amnesty International beg for official permission from the Islamic government to visit the prisons in Iran so as to reassure the welfare of the imprisoned saboteurs who had instigated armed opposition against the Islamic Republic regime.

In the course of a catastrophic bomb blast at the Islamic Republic Party Headquarters in Tehran, at least 72 committed companions of Imam were martyred.

Still the Amnesty International prefered silence to protest, when the respective representatives encountered the massacre of most of the authoritites of the Islamic government. And again during the second disasterous explosion at the Prime Ministry Office in Tehran President Rajai, the Premier Bahonar were martyred; but still the Amnesty International did not even bother to issue a brief condolence message to the mournful Iranian nation.

On the International level, the Amnesty Organization pursued the policy of silence towards the sudden disappearance of the Leader of the Shi'ite Moslems in Lebanon, Imam Musa Sadr. Moreover, the same international advocate of human rights, the so-called Amnesty International remained particularly indifferent to the unjustifiable arrest of Sheikh Koshok, the leader of the Egyptian Moslems who frequently denounced the belligerent policies of the Zionist Israel and encouraged the committed Moslems to unify for the ultimate emancipation of Qods.

Again on 1979, the devout leader of 3 Million Moslems in Yugoslavia was apprehended on charges of praising the revolutionary personality of Imam Khomeini. As usual, the Amnesty International was totally indifferent to this event.

CSO: 4600/96

'EXPORT OF REVOLUTION' THEME CAUSES FRICTION WITH ARABS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 12 Oct 81 pp 8-9

[Article: "Export of Revolution Remains The Aim"]

[Text] Clues to how Ayatollah Khomeini sees his own revolution, and his determination to spread it through propaganda among the masses everywhere, were given in a speech he gave this week to the newly-returned delegation to the recent inter-parliamentary conference in Havana.

He told them, "Our revolution is based upon spirituality and God and those who are with us are those who agree with our line of unity. We must not forget the spiritual line for which we rebelled, the same line of spirituality which, despite our inefficiency in publicising it, has captured the world's attention for our revolution.

"It is this line of spirituality which the aggressors resent. Be aware that wherever the aggressors and governments are against us the people will be with us. We must put people and their thoughts above all else and we must think of the people, not governments; for people and the masses are for the truth, for they have been under the sovereignty of the U.S. and the USSR and they have borne the burden of oppression.

"We have so far been zero as far as propaganda is concerned. In addition to official visits we must go on unofficial ones so that we may wake up the world. If we wish to export the revolution we must do something so that the people take the reins of the government into their own hands, so that the so-called third class people can rule.

"It is only during unofficial visits that you can get in touch with the ordinary man on the street and enlighten him about the fact that he has no burden to bear. It is more interesting among the people and you can carry out your propaganda better."

Something of the naivete of the mullahs' minds can also be gleaned from the remarks of Hojatoleslam Moadikhah, the Minister of Islamic Guidance, when he gave a press conference and mentioned the subject of exporting of the revolution on his return to Tehran from the pilgrimage to Mecca. There he had obviously run afoul of his Saudi hosts' susceptibilities.

He told the newsmen, "Unfortunately, after the success of the revolution some dirty traitorous minds have tried hard to misinterpret the export of Islamic revolution. Therefore some countries believe that the export of revolution means interfering in

the internal affairs of other countries. Once more we announce that we have no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of any country and the governing of those countries is in the hands of their peoples.

"But we have to say that by exporting the revolution we mean to show the true Islam, not the Islam that they have advertised. If this recognition takes place it will be a source of awakening and enlightenment for everyone."

Moadikhah then announced that pilgrims who speak Arabic or learn by language before next year will have priority for the next Haj. He implied that this was aimed at the export of the revolution.

"We wish to see Muslims of the world shouting against their enemies, American and Israel," he said. "We do not think that the Haj has been performed properly, because if it once were so a revolution would take place in the world."

Referring to the letter King Khaled of Saudi Arabia wrote to Khomeini protesting about the behaviour of many of the Iranian pilgrims in Mecca, Moadikhah, who was sent on the pilgrimage to investigate incidents which broke out there between Saudi police and security men and Iranians, said everyone knew the Iranians were not shouting 'Allah is Great, Khomeini is Great.'

"Sadat made the same interpretation last year," he said. "We consider this a misinterpretation of our revolutionary slogans, not a mistake."

Clashes between Saudi police and the Iranians continued right up until the end of the Haj ceremonies. Tehran radio protested that several pilgrims had been injured in the latest clashes with the authorities.

Saudi Arabia denied using violence against any pilgrims. It said a few had been expelled from Mecca and Medina for irreligious behaviour. A spokesman added that the exaggerated reports were propaganda being used for "domestic purposes."

CSO: 4600/97

'AILING ECONOMY' AFFLICTED BY CASH CRISIS

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 18-19

[Text] A SERIOUS CASH crisis is the latest affliction to be visited upon Iran's ailing economy. With imports reaching their highest level since the revolution, and oil income stagnant, the government has announced a crash programme to restrict foreign trade.

Imports for the first seven months of 1981 totalled $7.9bn. During the same period, monthly income from oil sales accumulated at a rate of just $550m. As a response to the large shortfall, Iran's central bank has now ordered a two-week halt in the issuing of all letters of credit, and has imposed further long-term restrictions.

Imports have been averaging $1.1bn a month during 1981, rising to $1.5bn during June and July. The government wants to reduce the total requirement to some $900m a month, and has set a six-month deadline for achieving their target.

With oil production still at a modest 650,000 barrels a day, and no sign of an impending increase, the new measures are seen as the only mechanism which can close the trade gap. But like all recent attempts by Iran's economic planners to achieve short-term results, the latest efforts are certain to run into enormous difficulties.

The central bank has issued two letters enacting its decisions. While the first bans all letters of credit for the period from 15 September to 28 September, the second limits imports of raw materials, armaments, food and capital goods to a bare minimum. Private sector importing of finished goods and 'luxuries' is banned.

In 1979 it was estimated that 87 per cent of all Iran's food requirements were imported. Now, after a year of war and extensive economic dislocation, it seems certain that such dependence has deepened. To cut food imports, in particular, will cause enormous problems on the home market.

In addition, the central bank's drive against imports coincides with the period during which consumer spending is expected to rise. Autumn is the time when Iranians traditionally prepare for their hard winter by stocking up with food, fuel and clothing. Domestic spending and imports would normally increase in volume.

Even without the proposed cuts the Iranian population is under severe pressure. Last year's official inflation figure of 27 per cent is estimated to have increased to at least 40 per cent. Efforts to control inflation and ensure regular food supplies by rationing have merely encouraged a thriving black market.

In Tehran last week, one kilo of meat (one family's ration for a day) was on sale at an official price of 16 toman ($2). The black market price for those unwilling to queue was 100 toman ($12). Chicken at 26 toman ($3.25) per kilo (official price) or 40 toman ($5) per kilo (black market) was less expensive. But for other necessities — such as washing powder at 3 toman (37 cents) or 20 toman ($2.50) on the black market per packet — the mark-up was even higher.

For many Iranians, it seems that the economy is out of control and that the government is incapable of asserting its authority. A number of pressures have paralysed much of the country's internal life. The war with Iraq continues at enormous cost — the monthly bill for imported military supplies is running at some $300m, almost 60 per cent of oil earnings. The economic life of the front line province of Khuzestan has been thrown into chaos, with the continuing threat of Iraqi bombardment making resto-

ration work in the oil fields and industrial centres almost impossible.

Such problems would tax even a well-established government. But repeated assassinations have removed almost the whole leadership of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP) while ministerial reshuffles and a series of elections have disrupted the usual channels of decision-making. Perhaps most seriously, the government's earlier plans for centralised control of trade seem to have ground to a halt. The present group in control of Tehran — led by Ayatollahs Moussavi Ardebili and Madavi Kani — is ideologically committed to a rejection of central planning. As a result, an estimated $8bn worth of foreign trade remains under the control of certain sections of the bazaar, and passes freely through the black market.

For months, the government has been more concerned with security than with planning. Moreover, the measures taken have contributed to economic dislocation and falling production. Constant purges by the Anjoman Islami — the 'Islamic societies' which replaced the post-Shah 'revolutionary committees' — have led to the dismissal of many workers. Management and technical grades have been attacked for being 'overpaid', and shopfloor workers for being 'counter-revolutionary' — and accused of sympathising with opponents of the regime such as the Mujaheddin.

With news of each major assassination, factory mass meetings have been called by the Anjoman Islami to offer prayers and orations for those killed. This, added to the shortages of spare parts and chronic breakdowns in central administration, makes continuous production difficult. In Tehran, a close observer of the industrial scene commented that 'almost no consistent work is being done' in the major factories.

The tense atmosphere in the workplaces and streets is indicative of deepening frustration with the regime's methods. Whether ordinary Iranians will accept the latest widespread restrictions on the import of their day-to-day necessities remains to be seen.

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IRANIAN EXILES TEMPORARILY REASSURED BY CAIRO REGIME

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 16 Oct 81 pp 2, 3

[Text] For Iranian exiles the events in Cairo over the past week were traumatic. Engulfed themselves by a wave of the same combination of mindless religious fanaticism and seemingly nihilistic forces in the West they watched with anguish as their main sympathiser was carried to his grave at a dramatic, unreal ceremony that stifled the agony of the compatriots he loved.

Iranian women could identify with Mrs Sadat as she and her womenfolk appeared without headcover, reflecting their defiance of the anachronistic forces which had destroyed her husband. They could also appreciate the president's widow's sadness that the mass of the Egyptian people with whom her husband was so popular could not be allowed, because of security problems, to demonstrate their grief in a way Sadat himself would have liked.

She must have known that the Western press would seize on the stark ceremony, and the subdued reaction of the public because their normal avenues of expression of their feelings were blocked to them, as a sign that few were mourning his death. The grotesque and callous commentaries of many of the reporters, confirming all the sentiments of the late president in his criticisms of their methods and attitudes at press conferences in the weeks before his death, were strictly true to form.

But these were the comments of the roving reporters, who spend their few days in every corner of the globe and pontificate mindlessly on every matter that they have not even begun to understand. Different were the bitter articles of people like David Hirst, of THE GUARDIAN, whose deep emotional involvement with the Palestinian cause obliterates more objective feelings on such occasions. Only two weeks earlier, he had written an abusive, almost threatening attack on Sadat which even THE GUARDIAN foreign editor, not noticeably a gentleman of unalloyed unbias, had had to accompany with an article by colleages James MacManus which resignedly refuted the worst of Hirst's outburst.

In fact, the comments and editorials by writers like Patrick Seale and others with real knowledge of the Middle East were much more balanced in favour of the important qualities of Sadat and his contribution to breakthrough in the Middle East impasse. The LONDON OBSERVER, often critical of Sadat, headlined its front page story, "Egyptians Bury Man of Peace" and its editorial page, "His Death Must Not Be in Vain."

Seale, in an article on Islamic fundamentalism, wrote, "For the Islamic militants Sadat's peace gamble, seen as brave and imaginative in the West, was so much sand in their mouths. It has been suggested that in Egypt the fundamentalists have swollen to some half a million activists and sympathisers. Whether this figure is accurate or not, they remain a minority trend. The mass of Egyptians leave fanaticism out of their devotions and heartily approve of the end of the war with Israel."

Reading the articles of the "Here for 24 hours" reporters on the other pages of the paper and in other Western journals one would have got the impression they knew better than Seale and other old hands on the Mid-East scene. Simon Winchester wrote in THE SUNDAY TIMES, in an article headed in contradiction to most other headlines "Sadat Buried by His Foreign Friends" "All Egypt, the nation in which by the time of his death he (Sadat) was no longer a hero, remained as steadfastly indifferent to his interment as they had to his passing last Tuesday." He gave the impression that Sadat's compatriots had deliberately stayed away from his funeral rather than being kept away for obvious security reasons.

Though Winchester's piece was a typical example of the aridness of the mentality of so many Western reporters he did give some pleasure to Iranians by referring to the presence of "Reza Pahlavi, the next Shan of Iran," which seemed almost prophetic to them. Although there had been some fears that Sadat's departure might mean a change of attitude to the imperial family's presence in Cairo, the succession of vice-president Hosni Mubarak meant that in the short term at least they will be ensured of security of residence. Morocco or even Jordan are considered as possible alternatives in the event of any decision to leave Cairo for political considerations, exile sources suggested. But eventually, if there is no call to the young Shah to return to Iran in the event of a change of regime, the United States is seen as the logical place for the family to settle, if only because of the need for security and facilities for the younger children's studies.

The now obvious realisation among Americans that Carter and his administration bear at least part of the responsibility for the events in Iran and the subsequent carnage means the public in the United States feels they have a moral obligation to the imperial family, exile sources in Paris contend. There is also now no mood among the general public in any Western country to make any decisions with the feelings of the astonishingly barbaric regime in Tehran in mind.

Iranians throughout the Western world flocked to Egyptian embassies to offer their condolences on the death of Sadat, which to most of them was a severe psychological blow. Sadat's warmth towards not only the imperial family but all the exiles, and his honest condemnation of the Khomeyni regime's brutality while other world leaders kept an embarrassed silence in case their economies were affected by imprudent remarks, earned widespread respect for him amongst Iranians forced to leave their country.

CSO: 4600/92

EXECUTIONS, ARRESTS CONTINUE UNDER KHOMEYNI REGIME

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 16-17

[Article by Philip Marfleet: "Life Under Khomeini: The Crackdown Reaches the Shopfloor"]

[Text] INTERVIEWS and discussions with Iranian shopkeepers and workers in industry, teaching and the civil service have revealed the extent to which the fundamentalists' repressive measures are affecting practically every facet of their daily round.

Constant purges in the country's factories and offices are a source of anxiety for many workers. The Anjoman Islami (Islamic Societies) maintain an unremitting offensive against 'counter-revolutionaries', and workers are regularly searched as they arrive, even as they change. In Tehran factories they are observed throughout working hours, and in some establishments the fundamentalist militants have banned any form of discussion during working time.

There is also a ban on the writing of slogans, and the fundamentalists are on the alert for any sign of the 'subversive' literature of opposition groups like the Mujaheddin. Workers have been followed from the factories, and on at least one occasion shot in the street, after raising suspicions that they had conducted 'illegal' meetings.

Factory workers *8 Days* talked to have been particularly angered by the shopfloor mass meetings at which both management and workforce have been asked to expose opposition 'collaborators'. In a recent announcement the government decreed that all strikers are also to be viewed as 'counter-revolutionaries', and henceforth risk the death penalty.

The purges are not limited to industry. Traditionally, teachers have been permitted to choose their area of work, but for the current academic year they have been allocated schools by the ministry of education, which has also announced that it intends to employ 40,000 extra staff. Many teachers told *8 Days* they felt this was a move to phase out existing staff and replace them with ideologically reliable supporters of the regime.

Meanwhile the Islamic Republican Party is taking its fundamentalist principles into the streets in an ever-more militant form. Enthusiastic hezbollahis stand outside many supermarkets to supervise women shoppers, ensuring that they enter properly attired. Notices tell women shoppers: 'Remember the Islamic headscarf'. Iranians say that those who forget find it well-nigh impossible to get served.

Many Iranians I talked to are particularly upset by the Revolutionary Guards' treatment of women suspected of being opponents of the regime. They said that on more than one occasion Tehrani women have been violently abused in the streets, and had their veils torn from them.

Government employees said they have now been confronted with a further, almost unbelievable restriction. All fair-haired women have been instructed to dye their hair black or dark brown . . .

Iranians who talked to *8 Days* said they resented this supervision of personal appearance and the most mundane daily routines; they said that while they are in favour of an Islamic form of government, they do not want the present rule of the fundamentalist clergy.

The recent restriction closing parks and forbidding mountain climbing and hill walking (which is believed to encourage the assembly of dissidents) is taken by many to be a slightly ridiculous index of the govern-

ment's loss of confidence, and reflects the IRP's own nervousness at the success of the opposition, particularly that of the Mujaheddin. Over the past month the Mujaheddin have abandoned their clandestine methods and openly challenged the Revolutionary Guards.

As part of their campaign during what they have designated 'The Month of Blood', groups of Mujaheddin have started appearing in the streets of Tehran to distribute anti-regime literature. In some of Tehran's busiest shopping centres Mujaheddin women, in their blue headscarves, have assembled suddenly to hand out leaflets denouncing the regime as 'fascist'. Chanting 'Death to Khomeini', they have waited until Revolutionary Guards have arrived and then male Mujaheddin have taken these on in armed warfare.

The Mujhaheddin say their shock tactics are designed to show that the regime is too weak to prevent them mobilising in the streets at will. Their ability to organise these street 'events' and their continued success in penetrating the security screen around top IRP members has resulted in the government undertaking what one Tehrani called 'a real reign of terror'. 'We have been promised street executions, and for the first time people are *really* frightened,' he told *8 Days*.

Large numbers of suspected dissidents are rounded up every day. One visitor to the Evin Prison in Tehran said that its long corridors are lined with blindfolded suspects — men to one side, women to the other. He added that rooms in the prison are filled with sacks of confiscated pamphlets and newspapers.

Attempts to arrest Mujaheddin have led to serious confrontations: in a recent incident, 500 Revolutionary Guards surrounded a Tehran house occupied by a small number of Mujaheddin, and after an unsuccessful siege lasting several hours, the area was cleared and the house demolished by rocket fire. It is believed that of the eight Mujaheddin under seige four were killed, the others arrested, while six Revolutionary Guards died in the action.

Iranians we spoke to said the IRP is becoming increasingly isolated from an angry and frustrated population. There seems to be a widespread, though largely passive, support for the Mujaheddin. While opposition newspapers have long since failed to appear, leaflets are produced regularly. 'We copy out five or six and pass them on,' one Mujaheddin supporter told *8 Days*. 'This is our printing press.'

The Mujaheddin maintain the only alternative news source to the government-controlled media. Twice a day their radio station broadcasts news of opposition activities and calls to organise against the government. It has a large audience.

Attendance at Friday prayers at Tehran University — the traditional assembly point for IRP supporters — has dwindled to some seven or eight thousand. In order to orchestrate the enormous funeral processions which have followed recent assassinations the government has bussed in mourners from all over Iran, claimed several Tehranis we spoke to.

In these circumstances the regime's latest official campaign of repression was widely anticipated. At Friday prayers in Qom recently, prayer leader Ayatollah Janati asked that revolutionary courts 'destroy the opponents of the government — to the last man.' In Tehran, revolutionary court judge Hojatoleslam Mohammadi Gilani has recommended that rebels wounded in street demonstrations be 'finished off'. The official newspaper *Islamic Republic* added that Gilani called for: 'The punishment determined by the Quran, death by the worst means: by hanging, by amputation of the right arm and the left leg.'

Ayatollah Tabrizi, the prosecutor general, has announced that formal hearings against those suspected of participating in armed demonstrations against the regime will no longer be necessary. Two witnesses of any such action will be sufficient for a 'court' to be held on the spot. Revolutionary Guards will then be empowered to carry out executions.

With the government turning the screw against any hint of organised oppostion, and now introducing strict measures against imports of even basic foodstuffs, there is every indications that resentment will continue to grow.

CSO: 4600/90

TERMS FOR AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL VISIT TO IRAN DECLARED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Oct 81 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, (IRNA) – The Foreign Affairs Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued a statement regarding the contrived and artificial protests of the Amnesty International Organization against the Judiciary of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The full text of the statement reads as follow:

"In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

"US-led international imperialism resorts to a number of tricks to support its murderous agents in our country and also to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The principle theme of US propaganda in the past several months had been to convince world public opinion that there is no stability in Iran. The participation of about 17 million people in the recent presidential election, the great victory in the Abadan fronts and the continuous, widespread involvement of millions of people in the scenes have utterly repudiated that theme.

Now the US is propagandizing against the Iranian Judiciary employing a new approach to revive the faultering counterrevolution. In this context the pretentious protests of Amnesty International are to be understood. As the great leader of the Islamic Revolution has said: "The goal of the uproar of this and similar organizations is nothing but to aid their masters."

We are certain of the health of this institution and its Divine authority which is clearly shown by the openness with which the three government branches of our country, enact their duties. We do not see anything wrong if the realities of our Islamic Society are shown to the people of the world. Indeed imperialism tries its best to prevent these realities from being presented to the oppressed of the world.

Regarding the recent request of Amnesty International to review the judicial process in the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to expose the deceitfulness and real nature of these organizations to the world's people, hereby states the following three conditions for the visit of any international mission to study and report on our judiciary.

1. To eliminate any suspicion about any Zionist tendency on the part of this organization, we suggest hereby that the organization condemn explicitely the massacres of Kufr Qasem and Deir Yassin and those in Southern Lebanon carried out by the Israeli warmongers to make known the savage conditions and tortures within the prisons of the regime occupying Qods.

2. TO RULE OUT ANY SUSPICION THAT THIS ORGANIZATION IS ALIGNED WITH US IMPERIALISM, WE CALL ON THIS ORGANIZATION TO CONDEMN US MEDDLING IN THE AFFAIRS OF OTHER NATIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF EGYPT, EL SALVADOR, AND SAUDI ARABIA AND NOT TO EVADE ITS HUMAN OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE ALIBI THAT THE POLITICAL NATURE OF THESE SUBJECTS PUT THEM OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S MISSION AS DEFINED BY ITSELF.

Certainly, the officials of this organization know better than anybody else that US intervention in the affairs of other nations has led to instances of massive bloodletting world-wide., The September 8th Black Friday massacre in which 4,000 people were gunned down by the shah's troops in Shohada (formerly Zhaleh) Square of Tehran is one such instance. Who can deny that crimes perpetrated against political prisoners the part and parcel of the politics and actions of the world powers? The hallowness of (Amnesty International's) avowedly apolitical nature is revealed in its reticence towards the most brutal, and the most bloodthirsty regime of the world, namely the US, simply because the

US ingenuously claims not to have such prisoners.

3. Time and again, this organization has referred to ' 'accept international principles' or 'international law' in its statements. We want the organization to clarify explicitly whether the Islamic legal principle accepted by one billion Moslems, are counted among these 'internationally accepted principles. or if these rely only to the principles of the US and whatever principles which are accepted by the criminal US regime.

The Organization must declare whether it counts the principles of Islamic law as being among those of generally accepted international law and if the people who run the organization and its mission members are familiar with Islamic law and with the elaborate training and time-consuming due process of the Islamic judge and counts or not?

5- It is natural for us to expect any investigation mission to include at least one committed Moslem lawyer who is well grounded in Islamic jurisprudence and its judiciary We would particularly like to recommend scholars like Sheikh Kushk in Egypt or other independent jurisprudents having no leaning towards the US.

6- THE ORGANIZATION MUST PROMISE TO APOLOGIZE FORMALLY TO THE GREAT NATION OF IRAN IF DURING THEIR TRIP TO IRAN THEY FIND THAT THE FORMER STATEMENTS AND ALLEGATIONS OF THEIR ORGANIZATION WERE UNFOUNDED.

A spokesman for International Amnesty announced that the organization would never accept any pre-set conditions and added that such conditions did not accord with its principles. Acceptance of such conditions will destroy the credibility of the organization, the spokesman said.

It must be noticed that while International Amnesty has rejected these conditions, its propaganda against the Islamic Revolution has already deafened the people. In fact as Imam Khomeini said, "the condemnation of Iran and Islam is on top of their agenda."

CSO: 4600/94

KHOMEYNI MINISTER RUMORED AMONG ARRESTED PILGRIMS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 16 Oct 81 pp 4, 5

[Text] The reported arrest in Mecca of Iran's minister for Islamic guidance Ma'edikhah, who was said to have been held as he shouted and distributed leaflets at the Grand Mosque, may have sparked off an angry letter by Saudi King Khaled to Ayatollah Khomeyni, according to some observers of the Iranian scene.

The news that Ma'edikhah was among Iranians arrested for what the Saudi king termed 'improper behaviour' was given by a source close to the Iranian consulate in Jeddah, though the Saudis did not confirm it. Presumably he was released as soon as his identity was discovered, despite the obvious breach of even elementary protocol.

Scores of Iranian pilgrims, who are said to include large numbers of specially instructed revolutionary guards and hezbollahis among their number of 70,000, have been arrested during the pilgrimage. Their presence has given the Saudi authorities a big headache and raised the possibility that Iranians will be barred from the Haj next year.

According to Tehran Radio, the Saudi monarch, in his letter to Khomeyni, accused Iranian pilgrims of unruly and highly improper behaviour during the Haj ceremonies. Reportedly the Iranian pilgrims had used this religious occasion to make political demonstrations and shout slogans such as 'Allahu Akbar, Khomeini Rahbar' (Khomeyni is great leader). To use God's designation for Khomeyni, the Saudi leader was reported to have written, was very improper.

In reply Khomeyni said that everything in Islam must be aimed at achieving political objectives, and that the Haj ceremony was no exception to that rule. Khomeyni also said that the real significance of the Haj was not in its traditional rituals, but its use as a platform to create interest among Muslims in political issues of the day.

The Grand Mosque had been used for religious and political activities in the time of the Prophet, Khomeyni said, and there had been a long tradition of political activity since.

"Why should that be an offence?" Khomeyni demanded. "Why should Saudi police use boots and arms to arrest pilgrims and take them to jail?" He told the Saudi monarch that his servants must have been giving him incorrect reports.

Meanwhile, Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani told deputies on Sunday that the pro-Khomeyni pilgrims had simply shouted slogans against Israel and the United States, and that they had cried, "Allahu Akbar, Khomeyni Rahbar"... (Khomeyni is leader) Rafsanjani added that the message of militant Islam would shake the foundations of the Saudi royal house despite the delivery of U.S.-made AWACS planes.

Many observers believe that Khomeyni and his henchmen are deliberately using the Haj occasion to destabilise Saudi Arabia and its regime.

"Khomeyni himself is not interested in such affairs as Haj or pilgrimage, except for its political opportunities," one Iran watcher told IPS.

"Since his return to Iran nearly three years ago Khomeyni has not yet paid a visit to the holy shrine in Mashad, which is revered by Iranian Shi'ites more than any other and which is close at hand. This shows his lack of interest in matters of purely religious significance. His only interest is in religion as politics; he sees matters of faith as means to achieve political ends."

Another commentator said: "Khomeyni's efforts in cynical politicisation of religion are reaching an absurd point. He could be forgiven if he were to use politics to strengthen religion, but in fact he is using religion to achieve his own political ends."

Many Iranians are angry that they have not been allowed to go on the Haj pilgrimage this year because the regime wanted to allot all available foreign exchange allocated for the pilgrims for their own political mercenaries. "He does not let bonafide pilgrims go to Mecca, but he pays public funds to send mercenaries there to stir up trouble," one enraged Iranian told IPS.

Though Khomeyni may well have created some trouble for the Saudis, at home he is losing more ground, Tehran sources report. He has lost credibility and respect, to the extent that civil servants in government offices and soldiers in the barracks now openly criticise him, they say.

CSO: 4600/92

WEST MISUNDERSTANDS TRUE CHARACTER OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 16 Oct 81 pp 5-7

[By an Iranian writer who questions the source of the fanatics' dynamism and the validity of an Islamic movement]

[Text] How much longer will it be before the West realises the truth about Islamic fundamentalism and the threat it presents to the world order? That was the question which many Middle Easterners who do not view their own Muslim faith with fanaticism were asking last weekend after the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

Sadat was murdered solely because he was serving Western rather than anti-Western interests, it is pointed out. The guiding principle of Islamic fundamentalism is only superficially a return to the Islam of medieval times, or that at present practised in countries where medieval ideas hold sway--the real aim is to destroy the Western world's order, its domination of the Middle East in particular, and its influence throughout the rest of the world.

The West's mistake is in failing to understand the real character of Islamic fundamentalism, believing it is a desire to return to some spiritual paradise where all men were happy. It is identified with the hankerings of so many jaded Westerners for some more primitive, carefree way of life and some spiritual justification for doing away with material things.

Nothing could be more mistaken. Islamic fundamentalism, like the socialist revolutions, is fired by hate. With Muslims this is the hate of colonisers who have followed up their physical domination of the Muslim world with technological and psychological domination. With the working class revolutions the spur was hatred of the ruling classes who had for so long oppressed them. Just as the socialist revolutions obliterated the bourgeois groups who made the domination of the ruling classes possible through their skills and services, so those in the Middle East who serve the West must be wiped out to remove the colonisers' agents.

The socialist revolutions drew their inspiration from Western ideas and were organised by planners with Western culture and minds. The first successful Islamic revolution, that in Iran, was partially carried out by Muslim fanatics,

who were able to understand the minds of the mass of Iranians and rouse the fanaticism that was necessary for the majority of Muslims to go into action in a way Western logic or simple political philosophy could not. But the revolution was planned by Western minds, Marxists and other leftists who, once they acquired the cooperation of the mullahs to reach the people, overthrew the Shah's system with an efficiency and speed which no solely Muslim opposition group could have achieved.

The leftist Mojahedin-e-Khalq activists and their comrades had been hard at work trying to obtain public support for their fight against the Shah for many years, with no success at all. It was only when Khomeyni and his fanatical mullahs moved in that the Iranian public took any notice of the opposition. All earlier political movements in Iran had been confined to skirmishing among the ruling class.

The efforts of Bani-Sadr, Yazdi and his so-called liberal colleagues to organise a Western-style socialist society in Iran never even took off and were doomed to failure from the day the extremist clergy decided they were going to decide the future of the country. They knew Iranians and their thought processes, and Bani-Sadr's long years away had misled him into thinking his people thought differently than they did. He was soon a pathetic, hopeless figure who, neither true Westerner nor genuine Muslim, lost his Western logic under strain and began to pursue suicidal policies that assured his doom.

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East, and then Muslim areas of the Far East, similar uprisings are planned by the fanatics of the left and the Islamic extremists, who have proved in Iran that in the short run, their interests are identical. And as far as the majority of them are concerned, even if only some of them realise it, in the long run, too.

For, as has happened in the West, the young people of the present Islamic world are looking forward ultimately to a secular society, but one free of Western domination. They hope it will be the non-Western world which dominates the West, and Western people can learn just what it is like to spend centuries as the underdogs, humiliated by cultural and social stagnation, shamed by the unthinking arrogance of the newly dominant alien culture and military strength. It is the deep resentment over this that gives the "Islamic revival" its real motivation for the young, not a desire to go back to a society regulated by the Qoran.

Ironically, it was the failure of the Christian West to subdue the Muslims that sparked off the soul searching that led to cultural renaissance in the West. But the Muslims, left at first to themselves, and then conquered and made the dependents of the infidels, were left to stagnate. The alternative to stagnation was adoption of Western ways and abandonment of the tenets of religion, which had not been replaced by more pragmatic philosophies as in the resurgent parts of the world.

The tragedy was that the Qoran was merely one more politico-religious manifesto. Islam's early thinkers were mostly children of older cultures like the Persian and Greek. While the Arab occupation revived Persia's own culture the Arabs

had no true culture of their own. They absorbed as much as they could of others, but as the pressures of those superior cultures grew so the Arabs constantly withdrew into the proscribed world laid down by a book and a prophet who knew nothing of the greater world outside primitive Arabia.

As a philosophical and even practical guide for everyday life that book, like the Bible and similar works, has its values. As a set of regulations for living it is often a preposterous anachronism. It is perhaps the prime condemnation of Islam as a genuine philosophy that its adherents depend almost solely on one book for their inspiration and that primarily Persian and to a lesser degree other cultures have made up most of what is seen as Arab culture today.

The idea that any higher entity would be concerned with how we wash ourselves and what we eat may seem absurd to a rational Western mind. But it is the kind of limitation of thinking that provides fertile ground for those who seek to sow hatred of opposing creeds or ways of life. And that, the enemies of the West have realised, is where their greatest chance today lies.

The West's dependence on oil for its economies, its degeneracy, hastened by the slaughter of the cream of its manhood in wars fought by two successive generations, the confusion of people in Western societies, this exacerbated by second-rate leadership thrown up by obsolete democratic systems--all these factors have given those who look for a completely new order of things a great opportunity. Best of all, the creation of Israel in the heart of the Muslim world, with the failure of the West to prevent the killing and oppression of the Palestinian Arabs, has made a whole generation of young Arabs anxious for vengeance.

And these same forces know that Islam, once its fanaticism has been exhausted and the West has been brought to its knees, will be no match for more pragmatic cultural and social ideas. For the moment that fanaticism is directed to weakening the West, except in Afghanistan, where the West's own cynical fomenting of it in a futile bid to prevent inevitable change ironically only serves to fan the flame of the same dangerous fire throughout the Middle East.

If Western leaders recognise these factors they will at least perhaps be able to make the decline of their liberal societies a less painful process for their citizens than it must be if they don't try to combat something they are helping to make inevitable.

CSO: 4600/92

BAZARGAN SAID TO BE IN HIDING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 16 Oct 81 pp 7-8

[Text] Former prime minister of the provisional government of Iran after the arrival of the Ayatollah Khomeyni, Mehdi Bazargan, was reported to be in hiding after a violent reaction to a speech he made in the Majlis pleading for an end to the executions of young opponents of the government.

The Majlis session broke up in pandemonium after Bazargan's speech, in which he said the bloodshed and intolerance was threatening the future of the Islamic republic. The Speaker stopped his speech, and Islamic extremists formed processions to march on the Majlis in protest and demand the execution of Bazargan himself.

The proceedings had been broadcast live, as usual, over Tehran Radio and the startled public were not surprised that the broadcast was suddenly cut without explanation. Back in the Majlis Speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani angrily told Bazargan his speech was ill-considered and only served American interests.

An unusually strong commentary on Bazargan's remarks from the BBC in London produced a riposte in the Tehran daily ETTELAAT on Sunday.

The paper wrote that Richard Oppenheimer (who works with the BBC's eastern services) had analysed events in the "following manner": "In an unexpected speech broadcast over the government-controlled radio Mr Bazargan warned that a fire had been lit in Iran which threatened the people, government and religion. Bazargan added that not only was nobody trying to halt the events, but people were adding fuel to the fire. This spirit of revenge would cause everyone to lose.

"This strong speech by Bazargan," the commentator continued, "was connected with the executions of hundreds of young people who were supporters of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisation and who have been executed over the past three months."

"Mr Bazargan pointed to the fact that these young boys and girls are either supporters or members of an organization, or neutral or impartial towards political movements, and for this they are sacrificed. All of them, in the streets and revolutionary courts, (sacrificed) because they have criticised the regime. Mr Bazargan said that these people are the precious wealth of this country and our hope for the future.

"Mr Bazargan was met by uproar from the other deputies, but he continued by criticising the fact that these people were linked with America and asking why their blood should be shed. It was unfortunate that by these unjust methods and aggression dissatisfaction was increased, more blood shed and the people were provoked against revolution and religion."

ETTELAAT's comment then went on, "A two-minute speech by Mr Bazargan which led to disturbances in the Majlis gave fodder to the spiteful foreign broadcasters. Among them was the humanitarian and justice-loving Radio London. It appears that this radio has the full text of the speech (only a few lines were read in the Majlis) and can thus make full use of it. By referring to parts of Mr Bazargan's speech they have said the reason for the recent executions of terrorists was merely criticism of the government.

"Mr Bazargan has forgotten how, during the June 20 disaster (when Beheshti and scores of other IRP activists died in a bomb blast) the same girls and boys cut off the heads of revolutionary guards...Mr Bazargan, were not these guards martyred in this manner, were these not the sons of mothers and fathers who were not even allowed to defend themselves? Or to quote you, were they not the wealth of this country, too?

"Were you not critical of these armed groups and did you not call them at one time the enemies of Muslims and Islam? What happened? Why did you change your mind? More important, why have you not voiced your opinion about this hellish organisation, the Mojahedin, and their leaders? Are you not the people's representative? The people who voted for you want to know your opinion about the Mojahedin and their leaders.

"It is interesting that the charred corpses of Rajai and Bahonar and the torn bodies of the poor, innocent 74 martyrs, particularly Beheshti, (the same person whom you attacked) and the scores of guards and mobilisation personnel and ordinary people killed throughout the country are not considered to be our children and the main wealth of the country like those we arrest. We discover explosives in their pockets and the plans of the homes of those they have chosen for killing."

Meanwhile, Amnesty International decided that the deaths of 3,300 Iranians by execution since the revolution and a total of 1,800 in the past four months since the impeachment of former president Bani-Sadr constituted a milestone that could distract it from the hardships being suffered by opponents of regimes in Eastern Europe and South America. It issued a statement conceding that these figures were the minimum killed according to their sources and the figures could be higher. The organisation has telegraphed the Iranian premier asking him to receive a delegation from Amnesty but they have received no reply.

The Amnesty spokesman said the organisation had also heard of the allegation that 12-year-olds were among about 100 school pupils who had been injured in street violence and later killed and buried by the authorities. Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi repeated the allegations to correspondents who phoned him in Paris, saying the reports came from sources in Tehran. The authorities in Iran, however, denied any children of that age had been killed.

The Tehran press, reporting the executions of scores more "hypocrites," as the Mojahedin are called, also reported dozens of incidents throughout the country in which revolutionary guards, other "believers and faithful to the revolution," and clergymen were attacked and in many cases killed. Anumber of adulterers, including a man and a woman in Qom, were executed along with others accused of sodomy and other forms of corruption.

The Tehran regime has issued a new ultimatum to the opposition "small groups," telling them they must surrender and hand in their weapons within two weeks or face the consequences.

CSO: 4600/92

OPEN LETTERS CONTINUE TO DENIGRATE KHOMEYNI

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 16 Oct 81 pp 10-11

[Text] In its issue No. 39, IPS carried a translation of a letter circulated in Tehran by Abbas Fazel Kordestani, a former teacher, who questioned Khomeyni's right to prevent Iranians like Kordestani to stand for elections. IPS has received a second letter circulated by Kordestani which was distributed in Tehran before the October 2 elections. The letter reflects as well as anything general middle class opposition to the Khomeyni rule and their way of thinking. The letter has been printed but is not dated.

Here is the text:

Fellow Countrymen, Fellow Muslims and Non-Muslims,

Once more I find myself driven to write this open letter to you. Naturally, had I been a member of the ruling clan I could have this letter printed in the newspapers or I could go on the air or TV to express my views, which must have been in support of Khomeyni. But lacking such facilities I have to write open letters hoping you will somehow find them and read them.

In my previous open letter I simply stressed that people whose own identity and competence were in doubt had prevented me from standing for the elections on grounds of my lack of competence. I circulated the letter to draw attention to the situation now existing in our country. I then printed my address at the end of my letter. Several days later my neighbors noticed groups of plain clothes detectives coming over to Vossough Crossroad making discreet enquiries about me. So the mullahs were now sending their secret police after me. How exciting, I told myself. Fools they were, because I did not intend to serve as a sitting duck for them. I do not believe in Khomeyni's Islam, nor in his justice. Khomeyni is simply an outlaw, he must not and he cannot claim to represent law in my country.

Now let us see how Khomeyni succeeded in getting to power. Well, he deceived the people; he caught them unawares. No doubt, we the Iranian people share some of the shame which he brought on us. But he really was the greatest imposter of all time.

Khomeyni pretended that he was simply a clergyman whose only interest in life was to safeguard purity of religion. We believed he was an old cleric who had risen in opposition to the Shah on matters of principle. We believed the Shah was guilty of having discarded the 1906 constitution. But we also believed that the Shah was a true patriot who worked hard to industrialise Iran, to put our country on the path of progress and to build a strong defence against our enemies, whose only interest was to weaken Iran so that to be able to take away its riches. Finally, we believed Khomeyni would come home to go to Qom to attend to his religious studies.

In practice we have seen that Khomeyni was a bloodthirsty bigot whose hatred for Iran equalled his greed for power. He abolished our constitution, which we have written with our blood in 1906. He resorted to a campaign of lies and deceits to ruin all those fine institutions which we had created with so much effort and sacrifice during 70 years of constitutional rule. But worse, he began to establish a feeling of guilt and shame in our minds and hearts because we valued our sense of nationhood. The entire efforts and programmes of the Khomeyni Government are to force us to feel ashamed of being Iranian. That is where it hurts. Khomeyni is biting the hand which has fed him. He is either an agent or an enemy. Perhaps he is planted by the Communists or by the Imperialists to destroy Iran. Either way, his mission is nothing but destruction of Iran.

One of his most dangerous weapons is to instill in people's minds that throughout the entire period between 1906 and 1979, nothing worthwhile was done in our country and that whoever lived during this period was either corrupt or ignorant. So, he and his regime concoct rules to deny social rights to anybody who achieved some prominence during this period. I received citations for dedicated work to the cause of education, so I am discredited. Had I been a lazy, cynical and bloodsucking bazaari or mullah I would have been termed as competent. But because I was a useful member of society I am disqualified. This way, all competent Iranians are automatically excluded from social and active life; they are denied the right to contribute to the progress of the country.

Now let us look at the record of the Khomeyni regime since its first days. Khomeyni rode to power and the highest office of a country which had full employment, a thriving economy, a progressive outlook to life and a bright future. Our only shortcoming was the lack of freedom to express our views, or to go onto the streets to shout slogans against the Shah.

But what have we now? Thanks to Khomeyni we have ruined our country, there are three million unemployed, we are experiencing the lowest standard of living in memory and we live in fear of our lives. During the time of the Shah none of our neighbours dared to cast an eye against us but now one of the smallest of our neighbours has occupied our cities, while we chant 'Allahu Akbar, Khomeyni Rahbar.' Khomeyni's record is full of blood and misery for us.

Fellow Iranians: let us admit to our own grave mistake in giving a helping hand to the Iran haters such as Khomeyni, Bani-Sadr, Yazdi, Beheshti, Khamenei and Hashemi-Rafsanjani to come to Iran to ruin our country. Yes, we should have defended the Shah's regime even if we were fed up with his personality cult, because the successor (alternative) was a thousand times worse.

Now, I accuse Khomeyni of high treason, being a foreign agent, having abused his religious position and of equating himself with God. He must be arrested and put on trial. Khomeyni has discarded the country's legal institutions, legal police and army. Instead, he has placed our lives and honour at the disposal of criminals who, masquerading as revolutionary guards, kill people, steal their property and sell our country to foreign powers. These fools have been talking of Kurds as non-Iranian. Let me tell them that we are pure blooded Iranians. We are first Iranians and then Muslims. We take pride in being Iranians while Khomeyni is ashamed of admitting he is an Indian renegade. I will be around to address you again.

'Abbas Fazel Kordestani

CSO: 4600/92

PUBLISHED PRICE INDEX SHOWS FLUCTUATIONS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] According to a report from the PARS News Agency, the office of economic statistics of Bank Markazi issued yesterday a brief report on the price index of consumers goods and services for the last summer month of this year.

According to the PARS News Agency report, the price index of consumer goods and services increased by 2 percent in the urban areas of Iran during the last summer month of this year in comparison with the preceding month.

During this month the prices of all fresh fruits and of some vegetables seasonally decreased. Also, soap prices decreased because of rationing and insecticide prices came down as a result of the relative increase in the supply side of import items.

While the upward climb of most foodstuffs and non-consumable items also continued, the price index of consumer goods and services has increased, on the average, by 25 percent over the same period last year during the first 6 months of this year.

In comparison with the same month last year, this index is registering a 22-percent increase. During this period, prices of fresh fruits have increased 72 percent, of fresh vegetables 50 percent, of various kinds of soap 154 percent, of insecticides 103 percent, of poultry and fish also 27 percent, of dairy products 26 percent, of eggs 10 percent, of rice 29 percent, of lentils 113 percent, of bread 14 percent and of food in restaurants and public eateries 25 percent. As for other categories and types of items, the price index for clothing rose 22 percent, for rugs 40 percent, for steel beams 24 percent, for iron and steel pipes 32 percent, for iron doors and windows 71 percent, for cement 14 percent, for automobiles 25 percent, for toiletries and hygienic supplies 20 percent and for wages of construction workers 16 percent over the price index for the same month of last year.

CSO: 4640/44

BRIEFS

SODAIFI 'REPENTS' ON TV--Iranians were surprised by the appearance on television of former close Bani-Sadr aide Soudabeh Sodaifi "repenting" her sins in giving her support to the ex-president. She was known to be one of Bani-Sadr's most devoted supporters and friends feared she had given in to torture and other pressures. In her broadcast she said Bani-Sadr was a weak president who deserved to be impeached and claimed that exile opposition leader Shahpour Bakhtiar had sent him 12 million francs. French-educated Ms Sodaifi returned to Iran with Bani-Sadr and when he was appointed foreign minister she became a deputy minister with responsibility for relations with liberation organisations. Although a marxist she was dedicated to Iran and all things Iranian, friends say. She was reported arrested after attending a National Front demonstration in Tehran just before Bani-Sadr's escape. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 10-12]

MOBS DESTROY BUSES--Attacks on buses have continued in a number of Iranian cities during the past week. In Shiraz two children were reported to have died when a bus was set on fire. While a spokesman for Tehran's municipal bus company said that 14 of 29 buses set on fire by mobs had been completely destroyed. The remainder had been repaired. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 10-12]

KHALKHALI ANNOUNCES HIT SQUADS--Ayatollah Khalkhali told a foreign news agency this week that he had already dispatched terror squads to France to kill Shapour Bakhtiar, former president Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin chief Massoud Rajavi. They would strike at the right moment, he said. He described former premier Mehdi Bazargan as "disgusting," and not competent to be a member of parliament. He should be impeached, Khalkhali said. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 10-12]

MAZANDARAN TV DAMAGED--Mazandaran has been without television for several days following an attack on the transmitting station at Sari by a gang of armed men who badly damaged the installations. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 10-12]

ATTACKS ON MOJAHEDIN CONTINUE--Tehran radio and government officials have continued their attacks on the Mojahedin during the past week. A radio commentator accused the Mojahedin of complicity with the CIA and said that Rajavi, French president Mitterrand, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdestan and Kurdish religious leader Shaikh Ezzedin Hossaini were all American puppets, while pretending to be against imperialism on the surface. Rajavi had been chosen by the CIA in preference to Bakhtiar, Bani-Sadr and Aryana, the radio said, describing the Mojahedin leader as an "American communist." He was now siding with the former Shah's generals and other

rightists. Yet this was the same Rajavi who had tried to persuade people at the beginning of the hostages incident that the students who took the hostages were close to his organisation. The commentator added that an interesting fact was that all Iranians seemed to be hating Bani-Sadr.

BEN BELLA PRAISES ISLAM--The Islamic revolution which swept Iran was one of the most important, profound, and precious events that has occurred since Islam came to the world, former Algerian revolutionary-turned-Muslim-zealot Ahmad Ben Bella told a Tehran radio correspondent in Jeddah. He said the West had been thinking Islam was finished and dead, but then the Iranian Islamic revolution happened and changed everything. Islam, he said, exercised a divine power over the masses and young people were flocking to Islamic movements against western corrupt practices. Ben Bella urged Iranians to close their ranks. He made no mention at all of Khomeini, whom he formerly regarded as a great revolutionary. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 10-12]

AGREEMENT WITH FRG--The head of the Rehabilitation Organisation in Iran, Dr Kamzi, has announced an agreement with a West German firm for the establishment of four factories for making artificial limbs. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 October 81 pp 10-12]

AIR FORCE PILOTS EXECUTED--Five air force pilots were executed and several other officers arrested at an air base in Iran last week. They were accused of anti-state activities, the press said. Manouchehr Masudi, a close aide of former president Bani-Sadr, was another to face the firing squads this week. The official total number of executions since Bani-Sadr's removal from office reached 1,405 with this latest batch. Amnesty International puts the figure at 1,800, and Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi says the true figure, based on his information, is nearly 3,000. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 October 81 pp 10-12]

CLAIMS TOTAL $750 MILLION--Claims totalling nearly $750 million were filed against Iran on the first day of registration with the U.S.-Iran tribunal at the Hague on Tuesday. The claims will be notified to the Iranian government and other agencies. Claims exceeding $250,000 can be filed with the tribunal up to 19 Jan and hearings will begin in the spring. Many more claims are expected, though it is known Iranian officials have contacted some important companies with claims directly. This may be because the difficult economic situation in Iran means they want to resume business with some of them and are willing to make private agreements. [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 22 Oct 81 pp 10-12]

CSO: 4600/98

POPULAR ARMY, ARMED FORCES CARRY OUT JOINT OPERATION

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 23 Aug 81 p 7

[Text] A combat squad of commandos from the 'Ali Ibn Abi Talib sector of the Popular Army carried out a joint raid on the night of 12-13 August with the brave heroes of our army on the Persian enemy's front lines in the Sar-e Pol-e Zahab sector.

As soon as the enemy soldiers saw the men of our attacking squad they fled, as usual, abandoning their posts. Our men followed the plan of the mission and tightened their grip on the enemy, inflicting heavy losses in men and materiel and returning with no losses to speak of.

The commander of one of the formations in the Sar-e Pol-e Zahab basin praised this bold operation. He told the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY's correspondent in the northern sector that the fact that the commandos of the Popular Army carried out this operation with their brave brethren from our armed forces and accomplished this with no losses proves that our armed forces are fully able to carry out missions, no matter how long the war with our ignorant enemy drags on.

He added that the participation of our comrades in the Popular Army beside our heroes in the army seems to him to be vital proof of the extent of the fateful link in carrying out their duties and fighting missions against our defeated enemy.

Fighter Mundhir Ibrahim, who led the combat squad, confirmed that the Popular Army soldiers carried out the duties assigned to them with precision and confidence in victory.

With reference to the plan of action, Mundhir said that after the duties were distributed among the fighters according to the prescribed plan, the patrol crossed long stretches of enemy territory with a mixture of hills and deep valleys.

He added: "After the order was given to our men to open fire on the enemy positions after we drew near them, the enemy soldiers were thrown into confusion and some of them tried to flee. However, our plan of attacking their line of retreat inflicted heavy losses on them."

After the mission was carried out, the force followed the prescribed plan and brought out all of its members.

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CSO: 4304/153

INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS TOTAL ONE BILLION DINARS

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 29 Aug 81 p 6

[Text] Tahir Tawfiq, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Minister of Industry and Minerals, announced that contracts for industrial projects valued at about 1 billion dollars have been signed during the period of the war which our Persian enemy has forced upon our country.

In a statement to the IRAQI NEWS AGENCY, he said that the industrial development operation is proceeding according to the ministry's programs and its usual plan. These are being carried out in an exceptional manner, so that the percentage of fiscal implementation during the first half of this year showed an increase of 117 million dinars compared to the same period last year.

The member of the Revolutionary Command Council confirmed that the leadership of the party and the revolution at an early date focused on one of the main goals of the aggressive war against our country, which is to stop the development operation which is still proceeding along the path toward achieving a firm economic base on which to rest our independence on all levels. This does not please the major international powers, since they are afraid that the country will progress in its development and planned programs to the point where it will be able to make great and rapid strides to join the ranks of the developed world.

The minister of industry and minerals explained that our country is distinguished by the presence of our fighting President Saddam Husayn and harmonious leadership which has enabled Iraq to employ its financial resources in large development projects springing from national, not regional, goals, putting before it the future in all its dimensions. On this basis our country had anticipated aggression planned by the international power centers which hatched an effort to obstruct Iraqi progress and its steps along its developmental and scientific path. Thus, the Zionist attack on our nuclear installations was the second link, following the Persian aggression which actually began on 4 September 1980. It failed to achieve the goals set for it by the world imperialist and Zionist circles, which brought into being the Zionist existence in the heart of the Arab nation, like one of their claws.

Tahir Tawfiq, a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and Minister of Industry and Minerals, said that the picture of industrial progress in the land of the Euphrates is evident upon simple comparison. For example, the amount invested in one strategic project after the revolution is equivalent to the total accumulation of capital in the industrial sector before the Glorious 17 July Revolution.

Appropriations for the past year were seven times the average appropriation for the industrial sector during the 1965-69 Five-Year Plan. Appropriations for the past year were 2.197 billion dinars. Projects and plans in the field of electrical energy during 1980-81 were equivalent to 180 percent of those completed during the 50 years since electricity was introduced into the country.

He added that industrial progress in Iraq has moved to other fields, such as research and development, training, and modernization and development of production. Of our industries in the various sectors 85 percent have been modernized, and we are moving toward modernizing all of our plants and industries under the slogan of accepting the challenge of the consumer. This slogan refers not only to the volume of goods offered but to giving the citizen adequate opportunity to choose between top-quality products which are readily available at a reasonable price.

Tahir Tawfiq confirmed that our country, since it drew up its investment programs and budget for the current year, has been subjected to a war to defend its land, its waters and the future of the Arab nation against the racist Persian aggression. Its growth by about 39 percent over the past year has proved that it is able to carry out its programs in the joint industrial sector.

As to the new industrial plan, Tahir Tawfiq said: "This year we have given special priority to the construction and electrical power industries because of the importance of these two sectors in development of the various sectors. Appropriations for electricity this year totaled 300 million dinars, and that figure may be raised. A sum slightly less than that allotted to electricity has been appropriated for the construction industries, with the aim of producing more than 35 million tons of cement and 8 billion bricks a year.

With regard to industrial relations and joint projects between Iraq and the Arab countries, Tawfiq said that we would like to have better relations. Thus, we are ready to work toward Arab industrial integration through specialized Arab industrial organizations, specific Arab federations and joint Arab action, in addition to bilateral activity between us and other Arab countries.

He mentioned that the country has opened Baghdad's doors to Arab industrial organizations and specialized federations. Baghdad is now considered an important center of Arab industrial activity because the atmosphere there is conducive to this activity and many federations and specialized Arab organizations are located there.

With regard to Iraqi participation in Arab organizations, Tawfiq said that the country is a member of the Arab Organization for Mineral Resources and has invested 20 million Kuwaiti dinars in the Arab Mining Company. Through this company we are participating in several Arab mining projects, such as the Jordanian Fertilizer Industries Company, the National Company for Industrial Construction Materials in Arab Yemen, Jebal Sarawi Mines in Morocco, the Arab Company for Iron and Steel in Bahrain and the Arab Company for Anshiri (Samin) mines in Mauritania, with about 25 percent of the company's capital.

Our country is also contributing 16 percent of the capital of the Arab Company for Industrial Investments, which is the largest share among the member sister states. We have invested 24 million Bahraini dinars in the Arab Company for Aluminum in Bahrain, which is 20 percent of its capital. In addition, we make up 50 percent of the budgets of some specialized federations, such as the Arab Federation of Engineering Industries, the Arab Federation of Paper Industries and the Arab Federation of Food Industries. This is a condensed picture of our country's participation in the field of Arab industrial integration, which constantly strives to become more comprehensive and advanced in order to strengthen the economic and industrial position of the Arab nation and Iraq. Under the leadership of national liberation hero President Saddam Husayn, we are moving toward the desired goals of unity, freedom and socialism.

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CSO: 4304/153

DETAILS OF IRRIGATION PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 25 Aug 81 p 10

[Article by Hasan al-Shaybani: "Huge Irrigation Projects To Cost More Than 100 Million Dinars"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Our country is now witnessing a widespread agricultural, industrial and cultural revival in spite of the war which is being waged against our people by the evil Persian enemy, in collusion with the Zionist enemy and behind them the forces of evil in the world.

The revolution has given great consideration and importance to the sectors of irrigation and land reclamation, since the revolution has confirmed that agriculture is an inexhaustible resource of the people. This is proven by the numerous projects which have been completed or are now in progress.

The Tigris and Euphrates Organization for Irrigation Projects was created in 1978. Attached to it were the State Institute for Irrigation Projects and the State Institute for General Drainage. Joined to it later was the Department of Supplementary Irrigation, which is considered one of the leading organizations in carrying out a number of projects in this field.

Large and Advanced Projects

In an interview with AL-JUMHURIYAH, 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abdallah Yusuf, head of the organization, spoke about its plan and the projects in which it is involved.

He said: "The organization may complete work on its projects in a direct and basic form or may work through contracts in other fields."

During 1980 the organization made outstanding progress in its accomplishments and work for the state facilities and their projects and in reevaluating the organization's progress from time to time for the purpose of diagnosing the hidden flaws and impediments so that the parties involved in the work could overcome and correct them.

The head of the organization went on to say that among the state institutes connected with the main office of the organization is the State Institute for Irrigation Projects, which is in charge of the following projects:

Lining the main branch of al-Ashaqi stream:

Work on this project, which is being done directly, includes lining it with expandable layers to reduce filtration and water loss because of the nature of its gypsum soil. Part of it was lined with expandable layers 2 millimeters thick and the rest with 1 millimeter thickness and 12 centimeters of concrete. This was completed along its length of 43 kilometers. This is considered to be one of the projects of the development plan.

Lining the Eastern and Western stream beds:

The remaining part of the Eastern stream (20 kilometers) was lined with regular concrete to reduce water loss. Work on this was completed on 3 August 1981.

The Western stream was lined with expandable layers for a distance of 7 kilometers because of the gypsum nature of the soil to reduce water loss. This work was completed in January 1980.

As to the project for the side canal for the Hamrin railroad, the project consists of a 54 kilometer earthen dam and was completed early this year.

Badrah-Jassan Irrigation Project

The purpose of the Badrah-Jassan irrigation project, with a total cost of about 60 million dinars, is to bring fresh water from the Tigris River near the al-Dabuni region to the Badrah-Jassan-Zarabatiyah region for irrigation and drinking purposes. It consists of a main canal 65 kilometers long which draws off 12.4 cubic meters a second by means of five pumping stations, operated by electricity in view of the adverse slope of the land. The total area irrigated by the project will be about 165,000 [masharas]. As a result of the decision to line the main canal with concrete, which made available 3.4 cubic meters a second, it was decided to take advantage of this to establish a state farm at al-Dabuni with an area of 25,000 [masharas]. All stages of the project, with the exception of the pumping stations, have been completed. Stations 2 and 3, which are now under construction, should be finished during 1982, as well as two bridges for cars and a weir across the canal to supply water to the state farm. Work on this will be completed during the first half of 1982 and includes work on irrigation and drainage networks for the state farm and Jassan, irrigating 75,000 [masharas]. The cornerstone was laid and work was begun on this project in April 1981.

Al-'Amarah Irrigation Project

The head of the organization then spoke about the al-'Amarah irrigation project. He said: "In view of the abundance of water for irrigation, the fertility of the soil and the fact that the region is overcrowded with people, especially farmers, it was necessary to build this project at a cost of about 13 million dinars for adequate weirs. The State Institute for Irrigation Projects built the following dams in Maysan Governorate: al-Musharrah, al-Kahla', al-Majaar al-Kabir, al-Majriyah, al-Batrah and al-'Arid. In addition, there are four lower dams: al-Kifah, Abu Sabur, al-'Amah and al-Salih. All have been completed."

Expanding Project for Weirs Along al-Hillah and al-Dagharah

The Tigris and Euphrates State Organization for Irrigation Projects started construction on two weirs on al-Hillah and al-Dagharah Rivers as part of the first stage of the irrigation system project for the two rivers. It includes building seven weirs at a cost of 14 million dinars. The first stage, which is to be completed within 30 months, includes controlling the waters of the rivers, regulating the drawing off of the water to irrigate the agricultural land along the rivers, and building waterways for navigation. The capacity of one of the weirs is 351 cubic meters a second, and the other draws off 55 cubic meters a second.

At the end of last year the organization had worked on construction of a weir on al-Hillah River with the capacity to drain 280 cubic meters a second. The other weirs, which will soon be built, will be distributed among different areas.

The second stage of the project includes work to widen and expand the al-Hillah and al-Dagharah Rivers and build a supporting dam along the sides of the river for a distance of 8 kilometers to stabilize the riverbanks and beautify the city of al-Hillah.

Mandali and Shaykh Lankar Irrigation Project

The total cost of the Mandali project is 11 million dinars. The first stage consists of an earthen canal drawing off 6.4 cubic meters a second. The second stage includes irrigation and drainage networks for 40,000 [masharas]. The work amounts briefly to lining the main Mandali Canal with plates after the completion of the earthworks, leveling them, overhauling the irrigation works and digging side canals so that the villages can make use of the water and water livestock. This work was completed last year.

The Shaykh Lankar irrigation project covers 34,300 masharas irrigated in two stages. The first uses irrigation by natural flow, for 18,900 masharas, and the second stage uses pumping, for 15,400 masharas. The project consists of a main canal and irrigation networks with 30 sources. Work was carried out this year at a cost of about 6 million dinars.

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CSO: 4304/153

'AL-FAJR' EDITOR ON OPPOSITION TO PAPER

TA271901 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 27 Oct 81

[From the Evening Newsreel]

[Text] The editor of the paper AL-FAJR, Hanna Sinyurah, says that all the attempts to silence his paper will fail; he will continue to make his views on the Palestinians heard. Furthermore, the paper will begin to appear seven times a week instead of six, as has been the case to date. Yesterday there was an attempt to set Sinyurah's car on fire. Here is our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria, Arye Gus:

I have no personal enemies, Hanna Sinyurah, the editor of AL-FAJR told me this evening, and so the conclusion from the attempt to set my car on fire is that it was an attempt at political revenge. Sinyurah, the editor in chief of the paper, does not hesitate to point an accusing finger at the village unions in Judaea and Samaria. Recently the paper AL-FAJR, which has an extremist, pro-PLO line, has often attacked the village unions now organizing in the territories, accusing them of collaboration with the [Israeli] military government. In the past, Sinyurah indicated, there were attempts to harm his paper and his editors.

The founder of the AL-FAJR paper, Joe al-Nasr, was kidnapped and disappeared in 1974 and there has been no trace of him. About 1 year ago an explosive charge went off at the paper's doorway, this being after Israeli extremists sent threatening letters in Hebrew. Luckily, the workers had left the place a short time before the explosion.

On the surface, this is a minor event, an attempt to set a car on fire, but people in Judaea and Samaria, as well as in Israel, are convinced that this is one of the first signs of what will in the future be called the wars of autonomy: the internal struggles among the Arab population in the territories as a reaction to the plans for an independent administration. I have been told that there is already ferment among the students and it is not inconceivable that there will be rioting in a short time. There have already been cases of fistfights in the territories between those in the village unions who have the military government's support and their opponents, PLO members.

CSO: 4423/31

PERES WANTS CONTINUED U.S. ROLE IN TALKS

TA290720 Jerusalem POST in English 29 Oct 81 p 2

[Report by Mark Segal]

[Text] Following his latest meeting with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak, Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres yesterday urged the government to do its utmost to keep the U.S. involved in the talks with Egypt.

He was speaking to the JERUSALEM POST about the implications of what he had learned during his visit to Cairo on Sunday at the head of a Labor Party delegation which laid a wreath at Anwar al-Sadat's tomb, paid a condolence visit to his widow Jihan, and held a series of meetings with top Egyptian officials including Mubarak.

In their hour-long talk, Mubarak repeatedly stressed the continuity of his peace policies. Mubarak had told Peres: "Even after April (1982) we won't become enemies."

Until April 1982, the date of the Sinai withdrawal, Peres urged the government to pursue strategic coordination with the U.S. "not against the Soviet Union, but focusing on the Middle East."

The question, Peres said, was whether the automony talks with Egypt would lead to actual implementation, or whether it would only be a declaration of intent. The opposition leader advised urgency on the government because after April, "things will surely get very tough."

Israel must, above all, endeavour to keep the U.S. involved in the autonomy talks, "lest the exclusion of the Americans cause all pressures to be focused on Washington, which will be pressed to squeeze Israel on the Palestinian issue," Peres said.

In his talk with Mubarak, Peres had reminded him of al-Sadat's support of the unity of Jerusalem, and his host said that he concurred with that view.

CSO: 4400/36

APPLICATION OF JORDANIAN LAW IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES ANALYZED

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 16, 17, 21, 24 Aug 81

[Article by Attorney 'Ali Abu Hablah]

[16 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] International and Jordanian Laws: What Must Be Applied and Israeli Changes

The rules of international law were laid down to preserve the laws and pacts that pertain to individuals and governments, especially during wars.

In international law war is still defined in terms that are not specific since it is defined as an armed struggle between two or more countries [whose relationship is] regulated by international law. The purpose of that struggle is said to be that of defending the national interests of the warring countries.

1. War is an international relationship that can only develop between feuding sovereign states. This definition draws a distinction between wars and domestic disturbances and disputes and other uprisings whose outcome is less disastrous than the outcome of war.

2. International law is active in the service of individuals and sees to it that they are not mistreated by countries that go to war and those that defend themselves.

3. Countries often engage in war to realize their national interests. This is what distinguishes traditional war from disciplinary military measures that are carried out by countries under the supervision of international organizations.

It is however most common in our age to think of every case which involves armed conflict as war. In this regard Mr (Queens) states that the UN Charter expanded the meaning of war. Article Two, Paragraph Four of the charter stipulates that countries are to refrain from using force and threats in their international relations. This means that the rules of war apply to all the cases of broad international armed conflict.

Mr (Queens') opinion has been confirmed in international practice. The rules of war were put into practice in the fighting that took place between the Arab countries and the Israeli groups, even before the creation of Israel in 1948. These rules were also applied in Indo-China in the fighting that took place there between France and Vietnam. They were [also] put into practice in the Korean war. This is also what the 1944 Geneva Agreements stipulated. These agreements determined that, regardless of giving the rebels recognition as fighters, the minimum of these rules were to be put into effect in the civil war. U.S. courts also ruled that the situation following the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956 and Egypt's resistance of that attack was not one of a state of war.

[17 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] The Difference between Occupation, Military Invasion and Conquest

Now that we have defined war, we must draw a distinction between invasion, military occupation and conquest. General international law draws a distinction between these cases.

Invasion means the entry of the forces of a country at war into the territory of the enemy. Invasion does not include establishing total control over this territory.

Military occupation involves entering territory that belongs to the enemy and controlling that territory so that matters become settled for the occupier.

Conquest is the annexation of a region belonging to one country to the sovereignty of another country after establishing control over it by controlling the forces of the former country.

General international law provides the rules and regulations for military occupation. These are based on the fact that a state's sovereign rights over a region are not to be transferred to the occupying country. The sovereignty of the former primary state remains [intact] throughout the period of occupation, and the sovereign rights of that state are exercised on its behalf by the occupying country. An occupying country may not legitimize a situation, which is the result of occupation, by means of annexing the region [in question]. This is not permissible as long as a declared state of war exists. The introduction of any changes into the laws that are in effect is also not permissible.

The 1907 The Hague Agreement stipulates that the occupying country is to administer territory under occupation in a non-despotic manner. In undertaking such an administration it is naturally committed to considering what is in its interests, but it is also committed to considering what is in the interests of the occupied territory.

[21 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] Few Rules Pertaining to Occupied Territory

A. The Effect of Occupation on Public Facilities:

The rule is that the authorities of the country which occupied the territory of another country are to keep the administrative and judicial organization of the other region functioning, and they are to get the assistance of those organizations in meeting the services provided by public facilities for the population in the region. Regional courts are to continue their work and are to issue verdicts in the name of their state just as if there had been no occupation. Occupation does not affect sovereignty over the region. Occupation authorities in exceptional cases may set up military courts that specialize in cases pertaining to actions that are committed against the army and against the occupation authorities.

B. The Effect of Occupation on Individuals' Property:

The rule that has been set in Article 46 of the 1907 The Hague Agreement is that of respecting an individual's property. An individual's property is not to be infringed upon, usurped, used or spoiled. However, there are exceptions to this rule.

1. Weapons and military equipment may be confiscated.

3. [sic] The Effect of Occupation on the Property of the State to Which the Region Belongs

A. Buildings continue to be owned by the principal state. Occupation authorities are to have the right to utilize them only, while taking into consideration the rules of utilization of these buildings and provided that they preserve them. There are buildings that may not be touched at all by the occupation authorities, such as hospitals, places of worship, schools and museums.

C. Special Rules of Military Occupation in the 1949 Geneva Agreements.

1. The jurisdictions of the occupation authorities in administering the occupied region are to be restricted.

Article Forty-Nine prohibited the forced transfer of individuals and groups from the occupied territories to the territories of the occupying country or to the territories of another country, whether or not that country was represented [in the agreements]. However, the article allows the evacuation of some areas for military and security considerations.

Article Sixty-Four stipulates that residents of the occupied land may not be forced to serve in the forces of the occupying country. Occupation authorities are to take the necessary measures to respect the lives of the region's residents, their family honor, their rights, their property and

their beliefs. Occupation authorities may not take the measures that are necessary to protect public order. They are to use, as much as that is possible, the laws that are in effect in the occupied region.

Article Sixty-Four of the Geneva agreement keeps the penal code of the occupied lands in effect.

[24 Aug 81 p 3]

[Text] Jordanian Law and the Amendments Introduced into It

In the past installments we reviewed the definition of war and the distinction between invasion, occupation and conquest. In the course of this [discussion] we dealt with the rules of international law to which we resort during wars. We also indicated in the course of this discussion the identity of the law that must be in effect for the occupied areas. According to international law, the occupied territories are subject to the sovereignty of the primary state. Consequently, legislation that was in effect before the occupation is to be applied to the facilities of the occupied region, and to the property and the individuals of the primary state.

That is, the laws that must be in effect in occupied areas in accordance with the rules of international law are the rules and regulations of Jordanian law in sum and in its parts. Occupation authorities may not change, delete or amend any of the rules or regulations of laws that were in effect before the occupation.

However, when we go back to recall the identity of the changes thrust onto Jordanian law by the Israeli authorities since they occupied the West Bank by means of decrees and orders issued by the authorities of the Israeli Defense Army, the tremendous differences between what was in effect then and what is in effect now becomes evident. The desire of Israeli authorities to change and amend the laws to make them consistent with their goals becomes evident.

Several amendments regarding private and public movable and immovable property have been introduced. We will indicate those specifically. [They are]: military order no 59 and the amendments to it; military order no 172 which was issued in 1967; other amendments such as military order no 25; military order no 854 dealing with education; and military order no 825 amending Article 83. These amendments will ultimately alter Jordanian laws to make them primarily consistent with the interests of the government so that they can ultimately bring all public and private institutions [in the occupied country] under the control of the occupation authorities.

8592
CSO: 4304/171

SHARON DISCUSSES U.S. ARMS FOR IRAQ

TA281858 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 28 Oct 81

[Text] As the U.S. Senate begins its debate on the sale of AWACS radar planes to the Saudis, Defense Minister Sharon has sharply attacked the proposed deal. Sharon also disclosed that the United States is sending arms to Iraq. Mark Lavi reports:

Sharon said that the AWACS are a major danger to Israel, because not only can it detect all of Israel's planes and helicopters in the air, it can even see them while they are still on the runway. Sharon speaking at the settlement of Allon Shevut before a mission of Keren Hayesod, united Israel appeals leaders, said the AWACS is part of a bigger problem: that of the supply of sophisticated American arms to the Arab countries. Then he made this disclosure:

[Begin Sharon recording] United States is supplying weapons to Iraq. Who could have imagined that United States would supply weapons to Iraq. So they do it under a cover, so they don't supply directly. They supply it through the Saudis and through the Jordanians, but they have been supplying artillery and ammunition and shells to the Saudis for months and months now and the fact that they are supplying these dangerous weapons to the Arab world, sophisticated, puts us in a very difficult situation. I mean, we understand that United States must supply weapons to the Arabs. We understand that. The question is, why that should be the most sophisticated weapons. [end recording]

[Lavi] Defense Minister Sharon said he hopes the peace agreement will last forever, but, on a realistic plane, if it lasts 10 years it will be an achievement; if it lasts 20 years, it will be a tremendous achievement and 40 years--a dream. Then the defense minister listed four red-line items, circumstances which Israel would not tolerate. First, Israel would not allow an Arab country to produce or possess atomic weapons. This general rule is the meaning of Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June. Sharon went on:

[Begin Sharon recording] If, for instance, one day, the Egyptians will move their troops into the demilitarized zone and it will be a violation, that is something that we will not be able to accept. If the Iraqis will move their troops into Jordan or to Syria, Israel will not be able to accept and we will find ourselves in war immediately, because we are not going to endanger our

future. If Syria will move toward the southern part of Lebanon, we will not be able to accept it and we will find ourselves in war immediately. [end recording]

[Lavi] Defense Minister Sharon said the Palestinian terrorists have already tried attacking Israel through the Sinai and he expects them to make attempts on all of Israel's borders except the north, where they will try to keep the cease-fire. Sharon appealed to his audience, Jewish leaders from Europe and Latin America, as well as South Africa, for more political support. When Israel struggles, he said, you must raise your voices and put pressure on your governments.

CSO: 4400/36

ARMORED COMMANDER INTERVIEWED ON ARMAMENTS, TACTICS

TA281932 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 27 Oct 81

[Interview with armoured corps commander Maj Gen Amnon Reshef by military correspondent Sha'ul Stav on 27 October; place not given]

[Text] [Question] Major General Reshef, an increasingly strengthened enemy armor is facing the Israeli armored corp. The Syrians, the Iraqis and the Libyans have units of T-72 tanks while the Jordanians are going to be equipped with modern British chieftain tanks. How is the IDF armored corps prepared in view of this armament?

[Answer] The Arab armies are being equipped with the best tanks existing in both the Eastern and Western worlds. Naturally, then, due to the economic resources possessed by the Arab armies we will be unable to equip ourselves with similar quantities, sometimes not even with a similar quality. Therefore, we should base our armored system on a certain amount of quality tanks equal to and sometimes surpassing the quality of the most modern tanks--such as the Merkava tank. The major part of the armored corp's fleet will be based on tanks produced in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's. We will improve a considerable number of these tanks so as to make them competitive with the most modern tanks possessed by the Arab armies. As a result, the combination of quality tanks manned by Israeli teams will be able to cope with any threat directed at us.

[Question] How does the cut in defense budget affect the armored corps? What harm does it cause?

[Answer] It is reasonable to assume that the blows dealt will be in three spheres: development, armament and training. As for training, several cuts have been introduced in the training system in recent years and I cannot conceive of any further cuts. As for development--we will have to cancel several programs and spread others over a larger number of years. The same holds true for armaments. We will have to closely examine the armament program, spread it over more years and even cancel part of it.

[Question] The last question refers to the future battlefield. One of the threats to the armored corps in a future war will be the assault helicopters. It is known that the eastern front armies have equipped themselves with such helicopters. How do you view the danger posed to the armored corp by this new tool?

[Answer] As noted, the assault helicopter constitutes a relatively new threat to the armored corps in the future battlefield and we view this accordingly. One should view the challenge not on an individual level but rather on a divisional level, an integrated fight by various theoretical probability of a battle between a tank and a helicopter, the assault helicopter has a number of advantages. However, you should have a comprehensive view of things, of a battlefield which is massive and mobile, a battlefield which has both a rear and a front. I think that in the entirety of the battlefield solutions lie in an integrated battle against assault helicopters. We are training for this integrated battle.

CSO: 4423/31

'AKKO ARAB RESIDENTS FEEL HOUSING, ECONOMIC PRESSURES

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 20-26 Sep 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Awad Abdul Fattah]

[Text] ACRE— The 13,000 Arab residents of this "mixed Arab-Jewish town" on the northern coast of Palestine are facing an acute housing crisis. The combined effect of Israeli government and local municipal neglect, the specific policy of trying to force Arabs out of town and the high natural rate of population increase has resulted in a situation where most locals live in overcrowded and unsanitary conditions.

There is only one solution offered by the authorities: evacuation of the Arab Palestinian residents from Acre's Old City. People who leave are sent to Makr — about 20 km. away— where 20 apartment blocks have been built on land previously taken over by the state of Israel as "absentee property."

In Acre's Old City, families of five to nine members live in decrepit, damp homes. Some have only one room of about 15 square meters which one Western journalist recently called "worse than most of the refugee shelters in the West Bank."

Tens of young couples live at their parents' houses and many others cannot marry because they have no place to live. Hassan Ateyyat, a sanitation worker has been squatting with his wife and five children, in an old, half-ruined synagogue since 1974 after he had to leave his mother's house. Since then he has been pressuring the municipality to find a house for him. Meanwhile, the Israeli Ministry of Religion is trying to get him evicted.

Darwish Turk, who cannot work because of a heart ailment, lives in slum housing with his six member family. "They would never treat Jews like this. They come from all over the world and are given houses immediately without conditions," he told *Al Fajr*.

Deliberate Evacuation

About 100 families are now renting apartments in the new town which has been designated as exclusively Jewish. They are only allowed to move from their original homes in the old city, after selling them to Amidar the Ministry of Housing corporation, and seeing them sealed up. The leases on these new apartments are renewable every ten months, with payment in advance. Tenants are subjected to eviction and constant moves. Families in the Jewish section of town told *Al Fajr* that they have moved between four and six times since quitting the old city. They complain of the worry and tensions at not knowing whether they will still be in the same house in ten months time. Furniture and other personal belongings get damaged by the constant moving.

Mahmoud Abu Shanab, a representative of the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality in the Acre municipality since 1973 told *Al Fajr* that the main plan of the Israeli authorities is to Judaize the town by evacuating the Arabs from the Old City, and transforming it into a tourist centre. "It is one of the aims of Zionism," Mahmoud Abu Shanab says. The new housing project near Makr and the neglect services in the Old City is part of the Israeli plan to make an 'Arab-free' city.

There is strong popular resistance to the evacuation plans. Only about 500 people have been forced out. The rest are determined to stay in Acre.

Those who are refusing to move are demanding either to

have their old houses restored or to rent apartments in the new town.

Orabi Ouf, one of those who moved to Makr returned to Acre. He told *Al Fajr* "The Israelis sponsored the project without consulting local people and without allowing them to object or agree. Orabi did not go to Makr because he wanted to, but because after his marriage, he had no alternative.

Housing Shortage

Some people have been trying for years to get new places in Acre. They have been showing up at the Amidar office twice a week without success. The man in charge of the state's housing company in Acre refused to talk to *Al Fajr* about the conditions of the housing in Acre or the problem the residents face at his office.

A survey conducted in 1975 by Rakah revealed that there were 150 empty housing units in the new city. When Mahmoud Abu Shanab asked the municipality to settle Arabs there, he was told, it would be considered. Since then nothing has been done and Amidar continues to insist that there are not enough housing units. Abu Shanab recalls that in 1978 the head of the municipality said there were thousands of vacant apartments awaiting Jewish immigrants. "This is a racist attitude," commented Abu Shanab. Many houses in the old and new towns have been sealed up since the 1975 survey by Amidar which refuses to give them to those in need. There are also tens of the vacant housing units in Wolfson quarter in new Acre, where the Arabs have constituted the majority of residents.

Wolfson Quarter

The first Arabs moved into the quarter, which consists of several three-storey blocks, in 1965. Before that it was a purely Jewish block.

In 1965, houses in the old city collapsed killing one man, Several neighboring houses started to subside after the cave-in. In the aftermath of the disaster, Rakah led a demonstration in which hundreds of local Palestinians marched to the municipality headquarters demanding "human housing." The demonstration was attacked by the police and scores of people were arrested. These incidents triggered an ongoing publicity campaign against conditions in Acre.

Finally, after conditions in Acre for Palestinians had been discussed in the Knesset, the Israeli authorities gave in and 13 families whose houses were collapsing moved into the Wolfson Quarter. Since then, under pressure from local people the council has permitted over 80 more Palestinian families into the quarter. The quarter which could have been a mixed zone, has witnessed a continued outpouring of Israeli Jewish inhabitants. "Most of the Jewish families here are giving up the quarter out of racist feelings," said Maysara Al-Sayyed, an activist in Abna' al Balad in 'Acre whose family was one of the earliest residents of the quarter.

Acre's Arab population faces a double-pronged oppression. On the one hand they are given inadequate and poorly organised services. On the other, the Islamic *waqf*--historically a major source of funds for has been undermined and virtually given to Zionist agencies by Israeli-appointed trustees.

Most Palestinians currently resident in Acre are not the original citizens of the city. They are refugees from villages forced out of their houses during the first Palestine war in 1948. About a third of them lived between the Haifa Bay and Acre. They were "temporarily" evacuated by the Zionist military forces in 1948 to Acre under the pretext of "protecting them from military manoeuvers." Today large industrial and housing projects have been set up on their land. The Palestinians got no compensation.

The 13,000 Palestinians in Acre get very definite "second-class citizen" treatment at the hands of the Israeli dominated town council. Mahmoud Abu Shanab, a Democratic Front for Peace and Equality councillor on the Acre municipality told *Al Fajr* that the council has consistently and deliberately voted through discriminatory budgets. Thus, services for Palestinian are definitely inferior.

Traditionally, services to the Arab community would be provided by the funds for the Islamic *waqf*. *Waqf* property, bequeathed to the Muslim community for specific purposes, was held in trust for God by *waqf* committees which would distribute funds for special cultural and welfare purposes. Mahmoud Abu Shanab told *Al Fajr* that,"in fact we don't know exactly how much waqf property there is" because the Israeli authorities keep it secret. It is known, however, that the *waqf* holds tens of shops in the Old City; about 350 dunums of land in the northern outskirts of Acre. Today housing units and other civil establishments such as a very modern house for the aged,

have been set up (for the Jewish residents); there are another 350 dunums in Abu Atbi also grabbed by the Israelis; 300 dunums by Napoleon's Hill, east of the city — the site of Zionist immigrant housing projects. At the city entrance, there are another 10 dunums used as a parking lot and Barkley's Bank.

Independent estimates of the value of the above mentioned property runs to millions of shekels. The Arab community sees virtually none of the cash.

Traditionally the *waqf* is managed by trustees named when the deed was drawn up. Committees appointed by qadis (religious judges) and Shari'a Courts. After 1948 *waqf* affairs were handed over to the new Israeli 'Religious Ministry' which then hand picked its own representatives.

Waqf's Workings

Mahmoud Abu Shanab told *Al Fajr* that all seven members of the *waqf* are 'suspect.' "One is a Histadrut clerk, another a government income tax official, a third is a clerk in an Israeli court.

There have been attempts to regain control of the community's property. Boulus Boulus, new resident in Bi'na was involved in an early attempt. He told *Al Fajr* that in 1956 Palestinians from Haifa and Acre appealed in the court for the release of *waqf* property to an elected committee of 'honest' officials. In 1958 a conference of Muslims and Christians, held in Acre, called for the 'liberation of *waqf* property.' Their call fell on deaf ears.

The actual workings of the Islamic *waqf* committee and its deals with the 'Acre Development Company' and Amidar — a Zionist housing corporation, are shrouded in mystery. Repeated attempts to discover what the committee is doing have been thwarted. It is known, however, that the committee has signed over large tracts of land to the development company on 99 year leases.

The only job the committee is publicly seen to execute is to collect rent of some of the shops; paying the salary of one of their colleagues, and spending part of the fees on the mosque and a handful of needy people.

The "Acre Development Company' gets a 40 percent fee fee whenever the tenant of a store leases his shop. Tenants are rumored to pay IS 50 every month to the company. A shop owner, Aziz Hbiesh, commented, "it is ironic that despite the income from *waqf* property, nothing has been done to solve the acute housing problem of Arab residents (see adjacent article)."

The Situation of Education

Arab schools in Acre are also in need of support. The two elementary schools have not changed since the time of the British mandate. One of them consists of scattered rooms in outdated buildings. In 1978, a wall of one of the two schools collapsed, but fortunately no student was injured. Instead of changing the whole building the municipality just rebuilt the wall and students continued to study there.There are also two high schools in Acre for Palestinian students. Outside the Old City, Al-Shamila, and another inside.

Al-Shamila school, which has an industrial training branch, lacks sufficient machines and tools. According to some students, all machines in the school are cast-offs from Jewish schools. Student Khalid Mahmoud told *Al Fajr* that the students sometimes move to the Acre Jewish schools to complete their studies on machines and equipment which their school doesn't have.

Mahmoud Abu Shanab pointed out to *Al Fajr* that there are 2600 Jewish students in Acre in 105 classes. i.e. each class averages 24 students. In the Arab schools, he says , 970 Arab students have 32 classrooms; an each average of 32 students per class.

After persistent demands for new schools, Acre's predominantly Jewish municipality, agreed to build an Arab primary school outside the Old City in 1973. When the first part was completed Arab students moved in. After four months, the municipality transfered them to their old school in the Old City and replaced them with Jewish students. To subdue the anger of the locals, the municipality built further rooms on to the old school. They are described by parents as unfit for study.

There is no kindergarten for the children of the Old City, no municipal sports club or modern youth centre. There is only one sports club which was set up 15 years ago at the personal initiative of a group of young people who finance their activities through donations.

Health

Most of the lanes of the Old City are dirty and full of garbage. The excuse that the municipality gives for the neglect is that there are no modern machines that can go there to clean the lanes and the streets of the Old City. In Jerusalem's Old City such machines exist, however.

Acre residents constantly point out the irony of their poor state while at the same time the Islamic wealth of the city has been looted. One citizen said "How it can be that an alien company controls the property of our community and monopolizes its income? The company doesn't share one percent of the income."

There are still rearguard actions to try to get back *waqf* property, however. Mahmoud Abu Shanab told *Al Fajr* that recently there have been several attempts to form an elected committee of trustees that would represent the majority of the Arab locals and "shame" the appointees into action. Thus far he says, all efforts have been foiled by the Israeli authorities. Today Arab locals are demanding free elections to the committee, and the complete release of all *waqf* property to the control of Moslems. There is determination to use the income for funding social and educational institutions in Acre— institutions badly neglected by the Israelis.

CSO: 4400/37

HIGH COURT JUDGE INTERVIEWED ON OCCUPATION POLICY

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 20-26 Sep 81 pp 10-11

[Text] Q. Judge Cohen, you have been looked to by some Arabs as a 'liberal' during your tenure on the bench of the Israeli High Court. On reflection, what would you consider the most politically significant cases that you have personally dealt with regarding the Arab population? Or those where you had a strong dissently opinion?

A. My strongest dissenting opinion was possibly the case of the expulsion of the mayors, very shortly before my retirement.

Q. What about the al-Ard case (the Palestinian political movement in the 1960's which was banned)?

A. That was the most important from the point of view of constitutional law. It was a case where the election committee of the Knesset did not admit a list of candidates of al-Ard because their program was to destroy the state of Israel. I dissented on the grounds that in order to disqualify a list of candidates from running for the Knesset, they have to have a law. As there was no law forbidding it, I held that anybody has the right to run for the Knesset, even if he wants to destroy the state of Israel.

Q. What about the Tamir law, that was passed last year which states no one can publicly support the PLO or to show sympathies...

A. That's a law making some acts of subversion criminal offenses...

Q. No, this is a law against the public expression of sympathies for the Palestine Liberation Organization. It was criticized as being a violation of free speech because it is only a restriction on the public pronouncement of sympathy.

A. Well, the Israeli legislature is entitled to restrict freedom of speech, too. We do not, as the US does, have a first amendment.

Abolish Defense Regulations

Q. Jews demonstrated against the British Mandate's Defense (Emergency) Regulations after 1945, which is now the basis for security orders in the occupied territories. What is your opinion of these regulations now?

A. They are a very bad piece of legislation, give much too wide powers to the military commanders. And they should be abolished.

Q. What is the criteria by which military orders are judged to be legal or illegal?

A. The law under which they are made. If they are made under the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, then they must be looked to, to see if the commander exceeded his powers or not.

The military commander has also made very many orders under Jordanian law.

Q. When the criteria is called "security" and the Defense (Emergency) Regulations, for example, are used as a basis for the order, what criteria is there for judging whether it is bona fide security or not, even by the Israeli definition?

A. What do you mean criteria? We had one case before the court where the court was not staisfied that the military commander had acted for reasons of security although he so stated. The court held that the security considerations were only a pretext for his real motives. That was one single case where the order of the military governor was made invalid--Elon Moreh.

Q. The criteria is not the same as if the Knesset were legislating then. The military government is making laws, and amendments to laws, by a different criteria.

A. The military government cannot make any laws exceeding its powers, like a minister, for example, who is by law of the Knesset entitled to make rules or regulations. The court will inquire as to whether he exceeded his powers or not.

The Knesset can never exceed its powers because its powers are unlimited. It is sovereign. The military commander is not.

Q. In the preface to The Rule of Law in the Administered Areas, you said that the High Court acts as a restraint on the actions of the military government. In what cases, other than Elon Moreh, have they acted as a restraint.

A. Many cases. In the first case that came before us immediately after the 1967 war was the confiscation of a motor car from a private citizen. The court held that the military commander had not acted in good faith. Not all important cases make headlines.

In the Golan

Q. In the Golan Heights what is the basis of the over 350 military orders that have been issued? The Hague and Geneva conventions, Israel says, are not applicable to the West Bank because Jordanian sovereignty is 'in question."

A. But in fact they are applied.

Q. They are applied--acording to the Israelis. In the Golan, there is no question of Syrian sovereignty...

A. What do you mean, 'there is no question of Syrian sovereignty?' There is exactly the same question as in the West Bank: The Syrians claim sovereignty to them exactly as the Jordanians claim sovereignty to the West Bank.

Q. Do the Israelis claim sovereignty to the Golan Heights?

A. Yes, but their title is not yet established. For the time being, the Golan Heights are under military occupancy only.

Q. So the Golan Heights is part of 'Eretz Israel?'

A. Yes, part of Eretz Israel, but not part of mandatory Israel. For the time being. There is now a very strong movement that to apply the law of Israel to the Golan Heights means to annex the Golan Heights to Israel. But this has not yet been done.

Q. What law now applies to the Golan?

A. Syrian law.

Q. And where can one obtain a set of Israeli military order issued for the Golan Heights?

A. I don't think there are any!

Q. There are over 350 military orders for the Golan.

A. Yes? Well, you write a letter to the military commander and he'll send them to you.

Q. One of the chief complaints is that in the West Bank military orders are not distributed.

A. Yes, that is one of the main complaints of Mr. Shehadeh (in West Bank and the Rule of Law). We reply to that in my book.

Q. You say that the orders are distributed in Arabic and Hebrew for a designated list...

A. The problem is that the shops, the booksellers, refuse to sell them.

Punishing Towns

Q. Do you feel that there are instances of collective punishment being carried out in the occupied territories?

A. Well, in instances where it is carried out it is very bad but the military authorities deny it.

Q. Do you think it is carried out?

A. I don't know. I would never subscribe to any such allegations unless I had proof of it.

Q. So you don't think that house destructions, for example...

A. This is not collective punishment. Collective punishment means to punish a whole village for something which one of the villagers has committed. Well, we had this sort of thing under the British in Palestine here.

Collective punishment was ordered and it was carried out but we abolished it as soon as the Israeli state was established.

Collective Punishment

Q. What about extended curfews that are carried out, that isn't collective punishment?

A. It is not a punishment. It is a pure security measure in order to find out who the people are who are concealing themselves.

Q. In el-Bireh, for example, there was an incident of a stoning of a settlement bus. The main street in el-Bireh was closed for 10 days. In addition, no one from el-Bireh was permitted to cross the bridge into Jordan for a two-week period. I would call that collective punishment. Would you?

A. You can call it that. You can call it any name you want to. But it is not technically collective punishment at all. All these security measures, to my mind very much exaggerated and unnecessary but they are weapons to maintain public security.

Q. What is the difference, then, between a security measure and collective punishment?

A. Punishment is the reaction to a criminal offense in order to punish the wrongdoer. Blowing up a house may be a punishment. They say it is also a security measure. I am ready to concede to you that this is also a punishment but they do not blow up houses collectively. They blow up houses only where some offenses have been committed.

Q. And closing the bridge to certain villages?

A. This is a pure security measure. They do not want people to cross because they suspect them of crossing with some arms. They suspect them rightly or wrongly but this is another question.

Q. Do you think this might be an over-reaction...that the stoning of a settlement bus should stop a whole town from being able to cross into Jordan?

A. Presumably that is not the only incident but I grant that people may be overreacting.

Q. Also this occurred in Beit Sahur. Their development projects were stopped on order of the military government after a women's day rally, attended by West Bank mayors. This is clearly not a security measure.

A. This is not a punishment. But it is a question of semantics, really.

Q. In your preface to the book The Rule of Law in the Administered Areas, you say that the West Bank and the Rule of Law "can in no way be accepted as a correct statement wither of the facts or of the law." Yet the book does not detail any mistakes in the Shehadeh book?

A. Well, our main purpose and I insisted on this, was not to enter into any discussions with Mr. Shehadeh and to point out 'here you are mistaken and there you are mistaken.' Our purpose was to give the legal background to every act which the military authorities have colluded in the exercise of their powers.

Our efforts were to show that all these exercises are allowed under international law. So it doesn't so much matter if this was done or that was done, our main concern was that what is done is being done legally.

Q. Do you think the difference between the two books might be a positive or a negative interpretation of the whole occupation?

A. Well, that lies at the root of it. Not that my interpretation of the occupation is positive--far from it. Of course, our point of view is that the administration, bad as it may be, is perfectly legal, whereas his point of departure is that the military occupation is utterly illegal.

Q. What are the limits to the military government and does security ever override these limits?

A. I think the limits are public security. However it says in the Hague Conventions 'public order' is important.

Q. Who decides if security overrides the limits that should be imposed on the military government?

A. The court.

Peasant Society vs. the Courts

Q. This brings up another question, of land confiscations. Farmers in the West Bank have had their land for centuries, many, many of them without any documentation of ownership. In order to present any land confiscation case to the High Court, of course, they must be considered bona fide owners, under Israeli-made criteria. Land can be declared state land if this ownership is questionable, that is, not documented. The farmers have no right of appeal in these land confiscations, which could potentially extend to over half of the land in the West Bank. Palestinian society was a peasant society. Not many people ran to courts for land deeds.

A. There is no difference whatsoever between the Israeli and Jordanian administrations in this respect. This land would be taken away from them by the Jordanians in exactly the same way as it is taken away now. Anyone who has no title, is not entitled to the land.

Q. Do you think this puts an unfair burden of proof on the farmers?

A. A man who has cultivated his land for the proscriptive period which under Jordanian law is 15 years can obtain title to it. He just has to prove it, they cannot prove it. They haven't done so.

Q. It is an expensive process to prove it.

A. They cannot prove it; It's not true.

Q. What is your opinion of the legal status of the settlements, that all settlements that have been created to date are for reasons of security?

A. This is a question I'm prepared to go into and find out. Wherever a settlement is established on land owned by the settlers or placed at their disposal by the rightful owners, the settlement is perfectly legal.

Q. What is your opinion about the autonomous structures created by settlers: courts and regional councils? Are they under the military government or the Israeli government?

A. It is doubtful whether the courts are legal or not. But otherwise any man, any group of people can organize themselves into associations, whether they call them councils or groups of villages.

Q. What law applies to them?

A. Jordanian.

Q. Does the High Court have any authority over the settlers?

A. Territorial, no. The High Court has jurisdiction over the military commanders in persona. Settlers are not government officials. It is illegal to extend Israeli law to the West Bank.

What Is Security?

Q. Could you compare the extent of civil liberties inside Israel's 1948 borders with that of the territories it occupies?

A. The West Bank is under military occupation. This in itself connotes already a very far-reaching limitation of civil rights.

Q. So you would say that freedoms of speech and assembly are violated--but under the law?

A. Of course, they have to be restricted. This is a territory which is administered by a government that is hostile, or considered hostile, to the population.

Q. What are the rights of the people in the West Bank?

A. They have all the personal rights which anyone else has but these personal rights are subject to security requirements. And there lies the tragedy. Security requirements are paramount.

Q. Already the High Court has said that the military government has used the pretext of security in creating the Elon Moreh settlement for other reasons. Residents of the West Bank say that this happens very, very frequently.

A. That is right.

Q. What would you suggest they do about it?

A. Go to court. Not that they will succeed, but the very fact the court is sitting is a most restraining influence on the military authorities. You can take that from me. They fear nothing more than the High Court.

Right to Strike

Q. Could you describe the right to strike under military occupation?

A. I held in the case of the intervention of the military governor in a strike at Bethlehem hospital, that they was beyond security, beyond the powers of the military governor to interfere.

Q. Is the same true in this year's break-up of the government schools' teachers' strike?

A. If they had gone to court, I would have held they had no right to intervene.

Q. Is it a security issue to censor editorials in the Arabic press? Is this really a security issue?

A. Of course, it is a security issue. It can be sedition. But you can overdue it. If something is written and distributed to the population at large, the authorities should make sure they contain no seditious matter.

Q. What do you mean by sedition?

A. For example, inciting to hatred.

How To Resist

Q. Do you think people under occupation have the right to resist that occupation?

A. Legally, yes. They can resist with legal means, not with terror.

Q. But after Camp David when Palestinians used peaceful means to protest the accords--leafletting, demonstrations--there were mass arrests...

A. It depends on what's written on the leaflet. And I don't think there were ever peaceful demonstrations in the West Bank.

Q. The police use different means to disperse a demonstration of, say, Neturei Karta in Jerusalem and Beduin in the Naqab, where border police use firearms. The Beduin have been the victim of excesses.

A. They may not use weapons, it is a criminal offense if they do.

Q. Do you think gunfire should be used to disperse a demonstration at Bir Zeit or Bethlehem Universities?

A. If I were military commander, you can be sure no. But the difference between the West Bank and Israel, is that there you may, on orders of the military governor but here you may not. Here it is a criminal offense.

Q. Would you give advice to the Palestinians on the West Bank to resist the occupation?

A. Yes, they should get rid of it, but they do not do anything to get rid of it.

CSO: 4400/37

GAZANS VOICE OPINIONS ON AUTONOMY

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 11-17 Oct 81 p 8

[Text] *Attempts have been made by the Israeli authorities to overcome the Palestinian nationalist opposition to enforcement of Camp David-style 'autonomy' on the occupied territories. The Israeli authorities, and their partner, the Egyptian regime, have been working to create 'names' that would participate in the 'autonomy' conspiracy.*

In addition, the Israeli authorities have been pursuing a plan to enforce 'autonomy' on the residents, represented in Gaza by restrictions on civil employees' salaries, and the announcement that Egypt is soliciting officers for a 2,000 man police force, among other measures. But the Palestinians in Gaza, where it has been said 'autonomy' would be instituted before that in the West Bank, continue to proclaim their rejection of the 'autonomy' plans.

Interviews conducted during the past month, translated from Al Fajr *(Arabic daily)*

Woman post-secondary student
Bureij camp

Gaza and the West Bank are Palestinian. 'Autonomy' separates them. The PLO is our representative by choice; we do not want someone chosen by Israel.

•

Haidar Abdel Shafi
Head, Red Crescent Society

'Autonomy' will not pass without the consent of the Palestinian people, and as long as the Palestinians reject 'autonomy' all the steps taken by the Israeli authorities in that direction are a waste of time...Even the 'names' that the Israeli authorities have created and raised to the position of 'leaders' do not possess the majority's consent to participate in such attempts... The weakness of the nationalist movement is a result of the restrictions that the Israeli authorities put on all kinds of public acitivities and institutions, in addition to pushing certain local groups to confront the nationalist institutions... The attempt to divide the Palestinian people has failed and it is the duty of all the Palestinians to confront the 'autonomy' conspiracy.

•

Zuhair Rayyes
Lawyer and Magazine Publisher

I believe that the term 'autonomy' doesn't apply to our situation since we are not part of Israel. In other words, the 'autonomy' principle ignores the fact that the West Bank and Gaza are under occupation... The Israeli authorities claim that 'autonomy' would lead to achieving our national goals, but this is a strange way to do that; the right way is by complete Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories...The Israeli authorities' attempt to liquidate the Palestinian problem by giving limited powers to some 'figures' in the occupied territories while they keep their control over the main positions is 'autonomy' rule.

•

Daoud al-Sayegh
Administrator, Red Crescent Society

The Palestinians in Gaza and everywhere else recognize that the Camp David agreement does not give the Palestinian people any of their right

Saleh Zaqout

The occupation authorities have 'arranged' the situation by preventing any nationalist institution from flourishing in an effort to show that there is no organized opposition to 'autonomy'... When the Camp David agreement was signed, the authorities tried to create a gap between the people of Gaza. They allowed a public meeting

to take place at the YMCA, but this conference condemned the treaty so the authorities were induced to rely on a few unpopular local figures... Imposing 'autonomy' on the West Bank and Gaza would make the Palestinian problem more complicated, for the occupation would stay but with a different face.

•

Abdel Latif Abaid
UNRWA schoolteacher, Shatta camp

The media should carry its responsibility in the fight against 'autonomy'... The authorities' attempt to impose 'autonomy' through their collaborators who will not be able to stand against the will of the Palestinian people for a long time. The Palestinians insist on their just rights among which is the right for an independent state.

Yacoub Mehdi
Gaza merchant

The Camp David champions are trying to use education as a pressure instrument on us to accept 'autonomy'... The Egyptian regime has refused to permit our students to enrol in Egyptian universities. Sadat has demanded to meet with nationalist figures in Gaza to discuss this issue, but they have refused to meet because they know he would try to pressure them to accept 'autonomy'. On the other hand, the Israeli authorities have been increasing the pressures on local residents to make them accept 'autonomy', such as increasing taxes to an unbearable level. Despite all the pressures, the Palestinian people continue to reject 'autonomy' and consider it an enemy to our people's national goals... The role of the nationalist press is to explain the dangers of 'autonomy' if it were to pass.

•

Yusra Barbari
Ittihad al-Nissi
Women's Union

The Palestinian people have rejected 'autonomy' and even though the Palestinian people have been subject to discrimination of all kinds, they continue to reject such attempts.

Ibrahim Abu Duqa
Secretary, Gaza Bar Association

Since the Palestinians were not represented in the Camp David agreement, or subsequent agreements, and since the Palestinians are the most important party to the Middle East problem, nobody has the right to impose any 'solution' on the problem of the Palestinians... Any just solution of the Palestinian problem should take into consideration the rights and national aims of the Palestinian people which are in harmony with the decisions of international organizations.

•

Faris al-Ghoul
Mukhtar, Shatta Camp

Any plan that does not give us our national and legal rights will be rejected. Our goal is to live freely and peacefully like all the nations of the world in our own state.

•

Abdel Wahaab Ghanem
Mukhtar

As long as I live without a national identity, I will reject all plans that fail to give me my national rights.

•

Atiyeh Abeid
Government school teacher

The 'autonomy' scheme is a plan to liquidate the Palestinian problem and to consolidate the occupation... The Palestinian people have rejected this scheme for they realize that it contradicts their national aspirations... (Sadat) will try to direct another conspiracy against the Palestinians by opening the door for Palestinians to emigrate and work in the Sinai.

•

Salman al-Astal
Mayor, Khan Yunis

The Palestinian people have unanimously rejected the Camp David accord and its outcome for it is in contradiction with our national aspirations...The Israeli authorities have been trying to suppress news of the role of the nationalist institutions, but those institutions continue to offer their services and reflect popular stands on all issues.

•

Issam Abu Duqa,
Legal advisor, Khan Yunis municipality

Nobody can ignore the fact that there is a legal representative for the Palestinian people. The Palestinian problem should be dealt with in accordance with this fact.

•

Ziad Sha'ath
Rafah municipal councillor

It is not possible to have two leaderships for one people. There is only one legal and natural representative for the Palestinian people, and we fully support this representative... The rejection of the Camp David accords is unanimous, and nobody can force any scheme on the Palestinian people.

•

Abdallah Abu Jazar
Rafah municipality legal advisor

The Camp David accords

and subsequent related agreements do not meet any of the demands of the Palestinian people.

•

Odeh Abu Adreh
Mukhtar, Rafah

The Israeli occupation is a colonialist one. Therefore, the 'autonomy' scheme is an attempt to consolidate the occupation and then annex the occupied territories.

•

Muhamad Zein el-Din
Medical committee,
Red Crescent Society

The Palestinian people have expressed their views on the Camp David accords by repeated denunciations. This stand stems from our conviction that this treaty does not achieve the least of our legal and natural rights... Sadat, Israel, and the US intend to implement the 'autonomy' scheme by relying on a few unpopular figures. They try to present 'autonomy' as the only way to solve the economic troubles the residents face but in fact the economic grip on the residents would increase because Israel's goal is to evacuate the Palestinians through increased economic pressures... The nationalist movement has been subject to increased Israeli pressures by several means like restricting public meetings and raising the status of collaborators...

•

Shaikh Ismail al-Sawafiri
Lawyer

We reject the Camp David accords and all the Sadat-Israeli agreements that followed... We are struggling for our national and legal rights to have our own identity. The Camp David agreement does not give us the least of our rights.

•

Shehadeh Hamid
Mukhtar

Our people have expressed their rejection of the Camp David agreement in a popular conference held in the YMCA building. This rejection stemmed from our conviction that the Camp David agreement and the 'autonomy' scheme do not serve our national interest, rather they would result in liquidating the Palestinian problem...Any attempt to force 'autonomy' on us would be faced by strong opposition from the Palestinian people.

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LINK BETWEEN AUTONOMY, SINAI WITHDRAWAL DEMANDED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 16 Oct 81 p 6

[Article by Moshe Sharon]

[Text] ANWAR SADAT was ritually executed. His assassins — in the classic, 12th-century meaning of the word — prepared themselves for the former president's murder like priests preparing for a ritual.

The day before, we are told, they fasted, and on the morning of the murder they performed the ritual washing as though they were entering a state of preparation for prayer. For they knew that they might die, and they were preparing themselves to enter paradise. They must have been sure that they were performing a mission that would grant them immediate *shahada*, or martyrdom.

These facts are well known not only to those acquainted with the ideology of the radical Islamic group *at-Takfir wa-al-Hijra* but also to Sadat's heir and his associates. This fact cannot but influence their behaviour in the future. It also has a much wider meaning in the context of the general Middle East scene.

The ritual execution of the president, very similar to the famous assassination operations in the Middle Ages, is a bloody reminder to Arab politicians in general about what strict Moslems consider to be their duty when an Islamic principle is at stake.

In this case, peace with the Jewish infidel — at the expense of the Moslem community and contrary to the most elementary teachings of Islam — is regarded as a major sin, the perpetrator of which cannot but expect to die.

I HAVE NEVER had any doubts that the peace treaty with Israel was a brilliant part of a master-plan that aimed at stripping Israel completely of all its strategic gains in the Six Day War and so making it an easier target, both militarily and politically.

Sadat made it very clear through his various spokesmen that Egypt's first major goal was to get Israel out of Sinai. This territorial gain, which Egypt was unable to achieve even with all the military advantages in 1973, was naturally very important for the late president. He understood that Egypt's position in the Middle East — indeed, in the world — would be quite different if, instead of having Israeli forces on the Suez Canal, the Egyptian army was but a few kilometres from the hearts of both Eilat and Akaba, and within a few hours drive from Beersheba.

He understood, too, that an Israeli precence in Sinai was a major strategic asset for the West and that Israel without Sinai was a burden. And he knew that peace with Israel was the shortest route to the American arsenals and the American purse.

Yet he was not so sure about the internal Arab and Islamic fronts. The opposition on all these fronts was greater than he had anticipated, yet he must have hoped that when his plan became apparent, the opposition would then understand his wise strategy and support him.

AS FAR AS the Arab world is concerned, it was only a matter of time. Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, said a short time before Sadat's murder that after the whole of Sinai was back in Egyptian hands, Egypt's relations with the Arab world would be rapidly restored to normal.

Only a few journalists and politicans in Israel gave this statement the attention it deserved. Only a few connected it with the efforts the Egyptians were making not to arouse any suspicions in Israel, or to endanger the completion of the withdrawal from the rest of Sinai.

At every official meeting with Israelis, the Egyptians sought reassurance that the withdrawal would be completed in time. Meanwhile, they continued soothing Israeli concerns about the fate of the peace treaty after April 1982.

They were ready to concede within the framework of "normalization" on minor matters, but they deliberately did not move forward with the autonomy talks, which they had kept on ice for almost a year.

The Egyptians will have a use for these autonomy negotiations after April 1982. The plan envisaged by the late president was simple: after 1982, when Israel returns to its 1967 borders in the south, Egypt will them put the cards on the "autonomy" table. Nobody can then say that Israel did not know the Egyptian position — that "full" autonomy is the transitional phase before Israel's total withdrawal

from Judea, Samaria and Gaza and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Israel will not be able to accept this Egyptian interpretation. And at that point, Egypt — which has always stressed the link between the peace treaty and autonomy — will feel free to freeze the whole Camp David agreement pending the acceptance of Egypt's interpretation of the treaty and the autonomy plan.

Within days, cooperation with the Arab world will be back to normal and Egypt will be able to resume its position at the head of most of the Arab world.

Sadat needed only another six months, during which he was prepared to swallow anything from the Israeli side, because the reward was great. Yet, if he did correctly evaluate the intensity of the Arab opposition, he did not adequately evaluate the strength of the Islamic opposition.

IN EUROPE, most of the journalists and politicians pointed an accusing finger at Israel after the assassination. They claimed that if Israel had accepted the Egyptian demands over Judea and Samaria, Sadat would not have been killed.

We now know that even if Sadat had secured Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 borders on all fronts, he would nevertheless have been in the same mortal danger, for he had still offended Islamic ideology.

Making peace with the Jews — which means accepting them as equals and recognizing their sovereignty over an area which is regarded as both Arab and Islamic — is a sin. It involves the unjustified ending of *jihad*, when vital Islamic interests are harmed.

Moreover, such a peace agreement with the infidels could have only one meaning for the Moslem opposition, whether in Egypt or elsewhere: a permanent humiliation of Islam.

As far as the Moslem Brotherhood and the more radical Islamic societies in Egypt are concerned, the signing of the peace treaty with the Jews — at a time when they have political independence, rule over Moslems and occupy Islamic territories and holy places — is a major sin which cannot be justified.

The resurgent Islamic movement of repentance in Egypt viewed the late president's political maneuvers as a clear deviation from the right path. In their eyes — and they are many and powerful — Sadat had joined those who have been responsible for the decadence which has befallen Islam. As such he had become a prime target for elimination in the name of Islamic revival, a process which involves returning to the sources and reinstituting pure Islamic law and practice in the true sense of the word.

SADAT WAS well aware of the deep Islamic feelings in the Egyptian society, and particularly of the movement of repentance, which had been steadily growing among the more educated sections of the population.

-- Moreover, he himself was among the major architects of this Islamic revival, a movement he had encouraged and helped. It was under his rule that Islamic education was expanded at all levels in school and it was under his rule that the *shari'a* (Islamic law) was made by special decree to be the main source of state legislation.

It was Sadat who coined political and military achievements in Islamic terms. And it was not just coincidental that the code name for the October war was *Badr* — the name of the place where Mohammed had his first major victory over his infidel opponents in 624 CE.

In the face of the violent Islamic reactions to the peace move, Sadat sought the backing of the respectable Islamic establishment, represented by the University of al-Azhar.

The responsa of the doctors of al-Azhar — a major source of Islamic learning — justified the peace as a legitimate tactical maneuver. Yet, there was no question that it could not deviate from the spirit of the law.

The responsa clearly pointed out, therefore, that the peace process could not be permanent and that the responsibility for taking such an extraordinary move to end the state of war with the infidels lay solely on the shoulders of Sadat as "the commander of an Islamic front."

The more radical Moslem circles never accepted these intellectual exercises. Adhering to the aspiration of purifying Islam, the late Mohammed Anwar as-Sadat was their prime target.

SADAT'S HEIRS have been trying to minimize both the scope and the significance of the Islamic opposition. They will do anything to withstand the pressure in the few months until April 1982, but it is doubtful whether they will succeed. Already, President Mubarak has declared that Egypt's political aims are unchanged: a Palestinian state, including East Jerusalem. And when Mubarak says Egyptian policy will not change he is absolutely right: Egyptian policy during Sadat's presidency was based on the principle of pushing Israel, with the help of the peace treaty, back to the 1967 lines at least, and this policy will continue with vigour after April next year.

There is only one thing Israel can do in this situation: to link a full agreement on the autonomy to the completion of the withdrawal from Sinai. Without such an agreement, which will secure Israel's interests in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, there should be no continuation of the withdrawal from the strategic airbases in Sinai and the rest of the peninsula.

If Israel completes the withdrawal without such an agreement, Egypt, America and Europe will fall like vultures on this country, applying pressure on it to give up its most vital positions.

The author is a senior lecturer in the history of the Islamic Peoples at the Hebrew University.

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PROMISE SEEN IN SAUDI PEACE INITIATIVE

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Oct 81 p 8

[Article by Mordechai Abir: "Riyadh's Radical Departure"]

[Text] IT HAS BEEN reported that West Germany may follow France and declare its support for the Saudi "peace plan" of August 1981. Washington still appears to be loyal to the Camp David accords, but senior administration officials have welcomed Prince Fahd's peace initiative as "a radical departure from Riyadh's traditional stance concerning Israel."

This, and Washington's determination to proceed with the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia, are symptomatic of the new *realpolitik* which is guiding the Middle East policy of the Reagan administration.

Riyadh's contribution to the stabilization of the oil market is highly appreciated by the West. Moreover, its petrodollar reserves, rapidly approaching $150b., and its immense development plans are generating substantial activity in the world economy. Thus, even if OPEC is losing its stranglehold over the oil market and conservation and diversification efforts of the International Energy Agency (IEA) are accelerating the process, Saudi Arabia is regarded an ally rather than a foe.

In fact, its cooperation is considered critical to Western interests until alternative sources of energy replace Middle East oil, and the stability of its regime is of great concern to Washington.

Ironically, the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca at the end of 1979, estimated by many to be the beginning of the end of the Saudi house, actually strengthened Riyadh's government. The ruling classes quickly closed ranks and mercilessly supressed the opposition of the Sunni fundamentalists on the right and of the Arab radicals on the left.

The Carter doctrine of 1980 and Washington's determination thereafter to protect Western interests in the Gulf not only redeemed America's credibility, but also bolstered Riyadh's self-confidence. Infighting in the radical Arab camp, moreover, eroded its power and strengthened Riyadh's position.

Saudi Arabia, it is believed, was even responsible indirectly for the difficulties faced by the Syrian government and the increasing tension between Damascus and Baghdad.

BY MID-1980 it was already apparent that the Saudi regime had weathered the storm. It was initiating policy in OPEC and in the Arab camp rather than following that of the radicals. It covertly supported American efforts to strengthen their defence infrastructure in the Indian Ocean and their proposed plan for a pro-Western Arab defence pact.

This process culminated in September 1980 with the Iran-Iraq war. No longer inhibited by its two large radical neighbours, Riyadh invited American presence on its territory (AWACS) and was instrumental in establishing the Council for Gulf Cooperation, which is in reality a mutual defence pact of the Arab Gulf countries, excluding Iraq, in complete violation of the charter of the Arab League.

Notwithstanding its opposition to the Camp David agreement, Riyadh began to improve its relations with Cairo and espoused the U.S. intention to revive the defunct Cairo-Riyadh axis.

Riyadh's new power and self-confidence were demonstrated during the first stages of the Syrian missile crisis in April 1981 when Riyadh and its allies withdrew their financial support from the Arab intervention force in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia's willingness to cooperate with the mission of U.S. special envoy Phillip Habib concerning this crisis and its later willingness to bring about a ceasefire between the PLO and Israel were a clear indication that Riyadh assumed a new role in the Arab camp.

Prince Fahd's eight point plan for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict (August 1981) incorporated all the maximal demands from Israel and completely ignored its defence requirements. It did not mention Israel by name, nor did it imply recognition by Riyadh if it was to accept the Pax Arabica.

In reality, the same proposals were previously discussed with Western statesmen and were found unacceptable by Israel.

ANALYSTS IN ISRAEL and abroad attributed the Fahd initiative solely to Riyadh's wish to facilitate the sale of the AWACS and to undermine the Camp David Accords. American and European officials claimed, however, that the Saudi proposal was a symptom of

Riyadh's increasing self-confidence and power, influenced by its special relations with Washington and fear of the outcome of another Arab-Israel war.

The fact that Prince Fahd openly proposed a settlement of the conflict with Israel, whatever the conditions, implied a willingness to recognize Israel and was a clear departure from Riyadh's traditional policy.

Even if all this is true, it is clear that Riyadh's ability to negotiate with Jerusalem is conditional on its power and stability. Indeed, despite its resilience in the last two years, the archaic Saudi regime still faces the cardinal problems created by the modernization of a backward society and by the immense asymmetries, which plague most of the Arab oil countries.

Yet, can Israel ignore the fact that, whatever its intention, the Saudi proposal is definitely a departure from Riyadh's previous rejection of Israel's existence? Can it afford to miss an opportunity to involve Riyadh, a pillar of the Arab-Islamic world, in talks concerning the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Moreover, U.S. Defence Secretary Caspar Weinberger recently declared America's determination to protect the Saudi regime against enemies within and without. Not to mention Riyadh's endeavours to gain the support of the new Saudi elite, even if it refuses to share power.

OBVIOUSLY, Saudi Arabia's maximalist demands are unacceptable to Israel. But Jerusalem's policy concerning the territories and the Palestinians is just as objectionable to the Arabs. Both could be considered, therefore, opening gambits for negotiations.

If Riyadh is sincere, this could prove to be a dramatic breakthrough in Arab-Israeli relations. But if it is not, its bluff will be called and Israel's relations with Washington and its image in the eyes of American public opinion will be improved.

Jerusalem's delight with Reagan's statement that Israel is an important strategic asset for America was somewhat premature. It overlooked the fact that, guided by hard-line *realpolitik*, the new administration has other, possibly more important, strategic assets in the region.

It is already clear that the protection of Saudi Arabia's regime and its oil has become Washington's first priority. Even Israel is asked to overlook its long-range defence considerations in order to protect the West's short-range interests. This is why Washington is determined to sell the AWACS to Riyadh despite Israel's objections and the opposition at home.

For this reason — and even more because the Saudi initiative may provide a key to a more meaningful peace with the Arabs — Israel must carefully examine the possibility that Riyadh may have changed its traditional stance concerning the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The author is professor of Middle Eastern Studies at the Hebrew University.

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ARAB EDUCATION LAG REPORTED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Benny Morris]

[Text] About half the teachers employed in Israel's Arab minority elementary schools six years ago were unqualified and 6 to 8 per cent of the fourth-to-sixth graders were unable to read Arabic properly.

These are among the main findings, published last week, of the first comprehensive study of the Israeli Arab elementary school system. Conducted by three Hebrew University Education School researchers, Dr. Yosef Bashi, Dr. Sorel Kahan and Dr. Daniel Davis, the study, based largely on field work, questionnaires and statistics, conducted in 1974/75 and covered 69 schools with 4,683 fourth-, sixth- and eighth-graders.

The researchers suggest that the main reason for the low achievements in the Arab school system at the time of the study was the enormous rate at which it has grown since the establishment of the state, almost triple that of the growth in Jewish school. It also points to disparities in services between Jewish and Arab schools.

In looking at the achievements of Arab primary school pupils, the researchers studied results in Arabic language, nature (science), geography, arithmetic and Hebrew language, and compared them, where possible, with those of the pupils in the Jewish school system.

The researchers found that about 8 per cent of the fourth-graders in Arab schools and some 6 per cent of the sixth-graders could not read fluently.

The study also found that about one third of the fourth-graders were unable to add four numbers (of two or three digits), which was 15 per cent higher than the failure rate among their Jewish peers.

The researchers concluded that the success rate among the Moslem Arab pupils in general arithmetic was comparable to the success rate among Jewish pupils of Sephardi origin. Although the level of the Druse and Christian students was higher than that of their Moslem peers, it was still substantially lower than that of Ashkenazi Jews.

Since 1967, Arab primary-school pupils from third grade on have been learning Hebrew as a "first foreign language," for three hours a week (four, since 1973). It was found that a significant number of fourth-, sixth- and eighth-grade Arab pupils made basic grammatical mistakes and had trouble understanding the simplest Hebrew texts.

In their 485-page study, the researchers point out that the Arab primary-school system, with its 103,000 pupils, 272 schools and some 5,000 teachers, grew between 1960 and 1975 by about 198 per cent, compared with a 60 per cent growth in the Jewish school system. While Israel's Arab minority grew between 1949 and 1975 by 300 per cent, the number of Arab pupils attending primary schools grew in the same period by 1,300 per cent.

The study points to major disparities in teaching levels and facilities between Arab and Jewish schools.

They explain the low quality of the teaching staff (52 per cent of the teachers were unqualified in 1974) as well as the basic deficiencies in school buildings, services and equipment as largely stemming from the enormous growth in the Arab school system.

The researchers found that Arab classrooms averaged 31.2 pupils per classroom compared with 26.6 in the Jewish schools. Only 44 per cent of Arab schools had a medical nurse on the staff, compared with 95 per cent of the Jewish schools.

The researchers also appeared to agree with the criticism that the Arab school curriculum lacked sufficient (or, in some cases, any) content "relevant to the culture and heritage of the Arab people" while, at the same time, including subjects "in a relatively large quantity" with Jewish cultural content.

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DEFERRAL OF YAMIT EVACUATION CRITICIZED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Oct 81 p 10

[Editorial]

[Text]

THE MOVEMENT to stop the withdrawal from Sinai is intensifying its efforts to bring more people into Yamit, and the near-by settlements.

This movement is spearheaded by the Tehiya Party and Gush Emunim, but it is not confined to these groups. For there are sundry individuals, within and outside some of the large political bodies, who sympathize with the goal, even more so after the death of Anwar Sadat.

Tehiya and Gush Emunim do not hide their intentions. Some of their leaders have taken up residence in Yamit and other settlements — and in the case of Talmei Yosef they have squatted in the houses of the settlers who earlier evacuated the site at government behest.

The holiday season has now given them an added opportunity to demonstrate their resolve and the extent of their support. Sympathizers have been encouraged to spend Simhat Tora in Yamit and presumably the aim is for some of them to stay on.

The government has apparently decided to adopt a hands off policy for the time being. Even in the case of the illegal squatters at Talmei Yosef the government has been reluctant to invoke the law.

Obviously Prime Minister Begin would find it embarrassing to be obliged to resort to force to remove Jewish settlers or squatters from the area. This would only serve to dramatize their cause.

Thus, largely at the urgings of Defence Minister Ariel Sharon, the government is watching and waiting. The final date for withdrawal in April 1982 is unchanged. Before that time the legitimate settlers in the area will have to leave, and while there are still snags in the compensation process and great pockets of indignation among the settlers, there is more reason now to believe that this transfer will be conducted smoothly.

Meanwhile, the army will arrive in greater force to prepare for the final withdrawal procedures and the Egyptians too will make their presence felt.

Then, reasons Mr. Sharon, will be the appropriate time to take whatever action is necessary to assure that the area is handed over according to the agreements. Any attempts to pry the Tehiya or Gush people loose before that would only play into their hands and cause unnecessary complications.

There are those, of course, perhaps even inside the government, who fear that allowing the numbers of the anti-withdrawal group to grow in the Yamit area could lead to more violent confrontations when the time for withdrawal is at hand. Better stem the tide now, they argue, than allow it to develop the momentum for a major clash in a few months.

Since it is the army which in the end must bear the responsibility, the defence minister's position must be respected. But it carries a risk, and if the judgment is wrong, April 1982 will be a difficult time indeed.

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MUSLIMS OPPOSE YAFO MOSQUE PROJECT

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 23 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Michal Yudelman]

[Text] TEL AVIV. — A committee headed by kadis from the triangle and the Galilee and by Knesset Member Mohammed Watad (Labour) was set up yesterday to counter plans to turn the Hassan Bek mosque here into a tourist and commercial centre.

The committee has already sent cables to Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the Religious Affairs Ministry and the Interior Ministry protesting the Tel Aviv municipality's intention to allow private entrepreneurs to take over the mosque site.

Other members of the Moslem community in Jaffa threatened to appeal to the UN, the Egyptian Embassy and other Arab states to exert pressure on Israel not to tamper with the mosque.

Political circles expressed concern that the Hassan Bek controversy could not have broken out at a worse time — just when the autonomy talks are beginning at the Tel Aviv Hyatt Hotel — across the road from the mosque.

Abed Kabub, chairman of the Wakf (Moslem religious trust) in Jaffa, has called upon all Israeli Arabs to assemble at the mosque two weeks from today to raise funds for the holy site's renovation.

"The city's plan looks beautiful on paper, but what it really means is that they'll destroy the mosque, leaving a tiny space for prayer, and the rest they will turn into the private business centre of Gershon Peres," Kabub said yesterday.

Gershon "Gigi" Peres is the brother of Labour Party chairman Shimon Peres.

The mosque site was leased to contractor Peres some six years ago by the previous Wakf, which was later dispersed due to irregularities and corruption charges. Kabub, who began serving on the new Wakf three and a half years ago, claims that the contract signed between the old Wakf and Peres was obtained illegally.

The present Wakf asked a court to cancel the validity of the contract 11 months ago. A verdict is still awaited.

Interior Ministry spokesman Yitzhak Agasi said yesterday that reconstruction of the mosque was still a long way off. At this stage it has just passed the local planning committee and has not yet reached the district committee or the interior minister for approval, he said.

Interior Ministry sources said that Interior Minister Yosef Burg does not look favourably upon the prospect of turning the mosque into an "amusement and tourist attraction." It was also learned that the Ministry for Religious Affairs would probably oppose the plans for the mosque.

Tel Aviv Mayor Shlomo Lahat said yesterday that the Hassan Bek mosque has been deserted for some 30 years, and serves as a centre for drug dealers and a garbage dump.

He said the city would not do anything to compromise the holy character of the site, and the the mosque's renovation and reconstruction will make it a more respectable place. "We treat the mosque with more care and respect than do the Moslems," he said.

Asked about the validity of the contract with Peres, Lahat said that as far as the municipality is concerned, Peres has legal control of the site at present, and that the city must deal with his request to build on the site.

City engineer Shmuel Penn said that the original mosque area was only 60 square metres of the overall structure, which was the villa of Hassan Bek. Penn said that the mosque space will be reconstructed. In addition, a domed, 250-square-metre hall will be added to be used by the municipality for public purposes. Also, a bazaar with shops selling souvenirs, books and religious articles will be added, all in oriental design in keeping with the original structure's design.

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ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF PALESTINIAN STATE PREDICTED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Oct 81 p 6

[Report on interview with Ephraim Ahiram by Macabee Dean, date and place not given: "Economics And a Palestinian State"]

[Text] TEL AVIV. — "Thinking about the unthinkable" is sometimes engaged in at the Interdisciplinary Centre for Technological Forecasting at Tel Aviv University. Members sometimes think about what would be the economic consequences of the emergence of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Dr. Ephraim Ahiram, 54, head of the centre's economic section has given the "unthinkable" considerable thought.

"First of all" he stresses, "I don't want to comment on the question whether establishing such a state is desirable or not. That is a political matter. I'm only willing to comment on possible repercussions such a state would have on the economic relations between Israel and what are at present the administered areas."

However, Ahiram does assume that this new country would not be in a state of open war with Israel. It might undoubtedly be under the influence of other Arab countries, specifically that of Jordan, and the present "open borders" policy might be discontinued.

"The first thing the Palestinians would probably do — you have to remember that we futurists deal only with suppositions, and that we have more than one scenario for each possible development — would be to set up their own customs zone. They would charge their own duty on everything that entered the country, and find ways to regulate everything that was exported."

At present, Israel has a kind of custom's union with the administered areas. And the duties on incoming goods in Israel as well as in the areas are high, among the highest in the world. There is no reason why the Palestinians should continue to pay this high duty, and they might either form a custom's union with Jordan, or set up their own unit, with low duties.

The end result will be a great temptation to smuggle goods across the border to Israel. And due to the nature of the border, there is little chance of preventing large-scale smuggling without actually sealing off the border, Ahiram says.

Worse yet, he continues, the smuggling must lead to another type of "union," that of two underworlds. The crooks of Israel and those of the Palestinian state, will join hands. Dr. Ahiram recalls the American-Canadian border during Prohibition in the U.S., and the huge underworld which developed in the U.S.

The second major effect of such a new state will be that on the labour force. "Although the approximately 70,000 Arabs who cross into Israel every day to work constitute only 6 or 7 per cent of the Israeli labour force, they are about 35 per cent of that of the West Bank and Gaza. If these workers for some reason were not allowed to cross over daily, several sections of the Israeli economy would feel the effect strongly," Ahiram says. These include the building trades, not only due to the sudden shortage of hands, but also due to the fact that Israel imports considerable quantities of cement blocks, cut stone and marble from the West Bank, he adds.

Another Israeli industry hard hit would be the labour-intensive parts of the textile industry, where considerable numbers of Arabs are employed. Moreover, many small workshops in the West Bank and Gaza do textile sub-contracting for Israeli firms.

A third area affected will be agriculture, where the Arabs do much of the hard physical work. They also work in other industries, producing grapefruit sections for the canning industries, and they also do a lot of urban sanitation work — cleaning streets, (especially on Saturdays and holidays.)

"If there is a sudden drop in such *Gastarbeiter* (the German word for foreign workers, mainly from Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia), who do the dirty work for the Germans, Israel will be hard hit and there will be an immediate slowdown in output in all these areas."

The immediate solution, Ahiram feels, would be to import *Gastarbeiter* from Turkey and

Greece, and perhaps even from Egypt. "But this will create considerable social problems."

The major long-range solution, Dr. Ahiram says, will be to make those industries more capital-intensive, employing the most up-to-date technology. He rules out the alternative solution, that Israeli Jews, or even Israeli Arabs, would again agree to do hard physical work. "Some might agree, but the salaries they would demand, would be enormous. Technology might be cheaper."

At any rate, the researcher feels that Israel will be able to weather the storm if it gradually loses 6 to 7 per cent of its labour force. If this happens suddenly the situation will be difficult, but not catastrophic.

But what will happen to the West Bank and Gaza Strip, if suddenly one-third of their labour force is thrown out of work? "And it will not only be one third; for those people working in Israel generate jobs for about another 20 per cent or more. Thus, half of all the Palestinians would be jobless.

"Some of these potential jobless may have saved their money and be able to return to their farms. Some might find work in Arab countries, in Jordan or even in the Persian Gulf states. But in the latter countries, the Palestinians are considered 'foreigners' and not especially welcomed.

"The danger is that these jobless may be exploited by their rulers for political purposes and turned against Israel. But inflaming the passions of these workers can be a double-edged sword. They might turn against their rulers and create unrest in the unstable Middle East. The Arab rulers have more to fear from such unrest than the Israelis," Ahiram says.

Stopping trade between Israel and the Palestinian state will also cause problems, but Ahiram feels that these are not very grave. Israel will no longer import cement blocks for instance, but these can be made in Israel. However, the shortage of cut stones and marble will be felt.

As for exports, Ahiram believes that Israel could actually benefit in some respects. "At present, we pay out scarce foreign currency to buy sugar, oil, and flour which we provide to the West Bank. We gain nothing by doing this. However, Israel also exports to the Palestinians a considerable amount of low-grade textiles, cloth, plumbing installations which would be difficult to sell elsewhere. Thus, if this Arab market is closed, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find alternative markets." Israel will also lose its market for cement.

Of enormous importance is the exploitation of the water resources, especially in regard to the West Bank, less so in regard to Gaza.

"We both tap the same above-ground and underground water resources: The underground water resources can be tapped in most cases either in Israel or in the West Bank," Ahiram says.

The problem is that Israel has exploited these resources to the hilt; the Arabs on the West Bank have not made much use of these resources. Although Israel has an excellent claim under international law to these underground resources, it will be very difficult to enforce this claim, if the Arabs on the West Bank decide to begin to pump significantly more quantities of water than they do today.

The end result will be the depletion of these underground reservoirs, and their gradual replenishment not by sweet rain water, but by saline water from the Mediterranean. And since Israel lies much closer to the Mediterranean than the West Bank, the wells in Israel will turn salty at an enormous rate which will eventually spell disaster for both Israel and the West Bank

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MESHEL PLANS FOR HISTADRUT DISCUSSED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 9 Oct 81 p 13

[Text] HISTADRUT Secretary-General Yeroham Meshel is confident that if his reform programme is adopted in the coming four years, not only will Likud talk of its inevitable take-over of the giant Labour Federation be shown to be so much blarney, but the Labour Movement will be strengthened and his successor will ride to victory with an even bigger majority than he himself enjoys.

In his busy office on the fifth floor of the Histadrut Executive, Meshel was happy that he was starting his third term with increased support from the membership. He would not accept defeatist chatter about the Histadrut elections having indicated a decline in Labour votes. He referred to the increased percentage that had accrued to his faction despite the factors operating against Labour. Polling had *not* taken place on a holiday for once, and for the first time Histadrut voters had cast their ballots near their homes and not at work. When I mentioned the sizeable ratio of abstentions, Meshel interjected with: "Who can tell which party lost them? It's anybody's guess." The actual results were what mattered, he stressed.

The Histadrut veteran felt he had won a renewed mandate from the members to pursue a programme of organizational reform aimed at bringing the rank-and-file closer to the Federation.

As he spoke of that programme's expected influence on voting at the next Histadrut polls in 1985, I asked whether he would be a candidate for the secretary-generalship again. "Definitely not, this is my last term," he proclaimed, beaming with pleasure.

"During the election campaign, people kept coming up to me at factory meetings and saying, 'You don't really mean it, you're going to become a cabinet minister'. I never thought of doing such a thing for one moment. I am now entering my third and last term in a fighting mood, intent on pursuing my reform plans. I intend laying the ground during the next four years for my successor.

"And I won't let anyone or anything persuade me otherwise. I shall go at the end of this term, and do my best to help the one who will follow me."

Unable to control my curiosity, I blurted out: "Are you preparing anyone in particular?"

"I will take pride in having someone who grew up inside the Histadrut," he replied, mysteriously. "I can only say it won't be someone brought in from the outside, but a man who has been living the life of the Federation."

Would there be surprises?

"No, no surprises," he emphasized.

RECALLING the recent TV broadcasts from the Histadrut Convention and later from the Histadrut Executive, showing Likud delegates storming the rostrum and using strong-arm tactics to distrust the proceedings, I asked Meshel whether he sensed that the Histadrut was under siege.

"No, I do not see it as a state of siege. True, there is an organized attempt by the Likud faction to pursue obstructionist tactics, but we won't let them get away with it," he replied.

Having been struck by the look of gratification on the face of Deputy Premier David Levy, head of the Histadrut Likud faction, when his supporters almost wrecked the convention, I asked Meshel if he thought Levy had orchestrated the rioting.

"Certainly, he is the one responsible," came the quick answer. "Levy did nothing to stop it."

Meshel differentiated between Likud politicians and those Histadrut members who had voted for the Likud. Contrary to Likud atrocity propaganda, no one was thinking in terms of punishing their voters by dismissing them or any such nonsense, he said. Likud works committee members would be asked to take part in the new Histadrut educational programme like all other trade union cadres.

Meshel stressed that he regards himself as secretary-general of *all* Histadrut members.

He mocked Likud attempts to play down the Labour majority in the Histadrut. "If their majority of 0.8 per cent in the Knesset elections is sufficient to enable them to conduct a fateful discussion on strategic policy with the Americans without even bothering to tell half the Knesset about it, they cannot use the argument that the rules of majority and minority do not hold in the Histadrut. According to David Levy and other Likud spokesmen, there is a difference between the two. In the Knesset, they say, they have the legitimate majority, while in the Histadrut we have what he terms 'a steamroller majority *(rov doress)*,' " Meshel said heatedly.

HOW DOES he intend coping with the coordinated Likud disorder?

"As chairman I will have to be empowered to expel from meetings any delegate who tries to disrupt the proceedings, or tries by force to take over the microphone. It is my impression that this is a clearly worked out Likud plan to undermine our deliberations. I must emphasize that in my view a democratic system that does not take measures to protect itself will be destroyed. As much as I dislike the idea, I will have to enforce order by calling in the ushers to control those who cause a disruption. If we can have orderly debates there will be no need of them."

The Histadrut chief deplores the way the Likud's riotous behaviour is wrecking his organization's image: "All people see on their TV sets are brawls and screams from the Histadrut, and then the camera focuses on Meshel banging his gavel and calling for order."

What particularly upsets him is the influence this conduct has had on the country's youth. His 12-year-old grandson Shai was terribly upset by the TV reports and the Likud-inspired riots at the convention. Shai had accompanied his grandfather to the convention, and as the Likud bullyboys started bashing the Alignment delegates, he turned despairingly to Meshel: "Saba, you are their secretary, aren't you? Is that how *haverim* behave?"

Meshel had endeavoured to explain the violence away as irrelevant, but the youngster remained unconvinced: "You can't allow comrades to behave in such a nasty manner to one another."

Meshel has carried a sense of insult with him since the convention, and it has been reinforced by all the letters he has received from all parts of the country deploring what happened.

"I have tried to explain to the Likud people the damage they are doing to the Histadrut, and some of them agreed with me in private, but as a faction they get their orders from Levy to pursue wrecking tactics. Well, we won't let them destroy what we have built up over the years.

"When I called on Histadrut members to rally to the flag, I really meant it. For I discern a real threat to our democracy, and not only in the Histadrut, in the organized bid to use violence to obstruct the adoption of resolutions by our elected bodies."

Meshel was pleased that at least one Likud leader, Communications Minister Mordechai Zipori, had written to him to apologize — for calling the Histadrut "one big Mafia," and accusing Meshel of "living it up in his penthouse." The latter charge had particularly pained the veteran trade union leader, who takes pride in his old-fashioned, modest life-style.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL then outlined the new courses of expansion the Federation intended taking. He stressed that the resolution adopted at the convention would be allowed to remain mere resolutions. This was particularly the case with the proposal to issue every one of the million-plus Histadrut members with a share in Hevrat Ovdim, the Histadrut holding company. A card bearing the member's name and photo would entitle him or her to discounts at all Histadrut firms and agencies, and give the rank-and-file a feeling of having a stake in the Labour economy.

Focusing on the issue that was used by the Likud to almost break up the convention (the proposal to set up regional labour councils embracing kibbutzim, moshavim, development towns and Arab villages), Meshel explained that the idea behind it had been to bring about coexistence and understanding between the three sectors.

He would not press it through if it would only be a mechanical act — it had to come from the people. "If there is lack of understanding and a sense of alienation between the members of kibbutzim and people in development towns, especially those working in kibbutz-owned regional plants, then it is a failure of Israeli ociety as a whole. We in the Histadrut are trying to do something about it," he declared, claiming that Zionism after all was a continuing effort to unify the people.

Naturally, he will not try to oblige Arab members to abandon their distinct identity, and he favours the efforts of various communal groups to revive their particularistic heritage (such as the Mimouna), but on condition that they all manage to come together to create common patterns of life.

The Histadrut leadership is now concentrating on including the kibbutz-owned regional plants in worker-management and profit-sharing schemes that have proved successful elsewhere in the Labour economy. The operative word henceforth will be *partnership* — the partnership of employed staff from development towns in running these firms. And it would be a rule that these workers will also have a chance to be promoted to executive positions, which until now have been the preserve of kibbutzniks.

All that they had suggested was the creation of a greater local partnership in rural areas so as to eliminate any sense of alienation. However the Likud's fierce opposition to the scheme "causes me to wonder whether it wants to perpetuate this alienation, perhaps in the hope that it can make capital out of the antagonism at election time. Well, we won't let them, because what we have in mind is a true Zionist act," he declared.

"I doubt whether David Levy ever read Lenin's writings, but I am certain that Menachem Begin is familiar with them, especially when he set out the Bolshevik credo: 'The worse things get, the better it is for us.' "

THE NORMALLY SOBER Histadrut chief got quite excited when discussing his scheme for integrating rural and urban Histadrut operations. An attempt would be made to bring the people in development towns closer to kibbutzniks, through socializing and joint cultural activities. In urban districts the scheme would involve an innovative organizational complexity: it is intended to integrate all Histadrut operations under one roof. This would bring the local branches of Bank Hapoalim, the Histadrut pension funds and insurance firms, Kupat Holim dispensaries, Na'amat women and child

welfare and social work, Noar Oved youth activities, Mish'an social welfare agency work, Hapoel sports clubs and so forth into one integrated framework.

Parallel with this would be the greater involvement of Histadrut economic agencies in community work. Bank Hapoalim had already taken the lead, Meshel advised me, speaking of his vision of the local bank manager getting involved in the social problems of the neighbourhood. Emphasis would be on encouraging local leadership, and people would no longer be brought from the outside to run these Histadrut agencies. As a first step, he had altered the name of the Histadrut unit that would be in charge of this scheme — from Department for Neighbourhoods to Department for Integration of Community Activities. The change of name had been adopted at the behest of groups of neighbourhood leaders who had advised him that it would enhance the department's work and the self-image of those involved in it.

The Labour Federation would also embark on an ideological offensive. "Our members must be brought to see the Histadrut not only through the prism of its trade union activities, through wage talks and cost-of-living allowance agreements," he declared. His eyes lit up when he talked of the mass educational drive he was poised to launch through a network of workers' colleges, which would offer ideological insights plus managerial training. "The talented blue collar worker in Histadrut firms won't any longer have to feel that he can never make it up the managerial ladder. I am pleased to report that managers in the Labour sector have accepted this scheme with much enthusiasm. In addition to this the Histadrut will expand and deepen its educational work among committees."

He is also planning a college to be attended by Arab and Jewish workers, where each community would learn from the other. He is alert to the problem of communicating with the younger generation of highly-qualified technologists among Histadrut members. "We have been rather old-fashioned in our contacts with them."

When I quoted the Likud faction head who had promised Meshel, "We'll take over in eight years' time," he replied scoffingly: "You know the saying that since the destruction of the Temple the gift of prophecy has been limited to babes and fools." More seriously, he repeated he was convinced that if the Histadrut got down to implementing the reforms, the Likud would be on the retreat in four years' time.

MESHEL NOTED that the issue of communal tension had not figured in the Histadrut elections; it only entered the Knesset campaign when Begin ignited the spark. In the Histadrut there has been communal integration for some time (his deputy, Israel Kessar, was born in the Yemen; and the majority of the 82 Labour Council secretaries (all but two of them came from the Alignment) are from the Oriental communities).

Indeed, one of the ideas behind his promotion and on-the-job managerial training scheme for Histadrut personnel was to bring about communal integration.

However, the promising trade unionists of Oriental origin he knew would not allow themselves to be picked for jobs simply because of their origin. Yet, he pointed out sarcastically, "Begin causes communal antagonism, and look at all his recent government and state company appointment — Ashkenazim."

THAT BROUGHT us to the premier's unwarranted attack on the Kibbutz Movement in his Rosh Hashana broadcast. Meshel deeply regretted that Israel's sixth prime minister should be the first to dismiss the sterling role played by this pioneering element in the nation's history. "He mocked Manara — has he ever been there? Does he know how harsh their living conditions have been? How much they have suffered from shelling? How they defend our border? Begin failed in national leadership, especially on Rosh Hashana, when we were expecting unifying words from the head of our government."

Does he fear what the Likud government has in store for the Histadrut?

Meshel is aware of plans to hit at the organized bodies of the Labour Movement, but he is convinced that the third Likud finance minister, Yoram Aridor, will sooner or later end up like his two predecessors.

Meshel is disappointed that the prime minister had chosen not to follow up his promise — given prior to his American visit — to call in the Histadrut for a thorough discussion of the country's economic and social situation.

Begin had responded with that promise following a Histadrut memorandum, sent to him on his re-election, seeking a dialogue with the government. Instead of taking the initiative, the government had been "hitch-hiking" on all agreements, including the seasonal cost-of-living payment schemes, reached between the Histadrut and the private sector, led by the Manufacturers Association.

Meshel found it deplorable that the government was trying to dodge its duty, for example in the field of employment, choosing instead to put the onus on the Histadrut sector to provide work in certain parts of the country.

"It has to be clear to the government that it cannot abandon its obligations to the citizens of this country. The Histadrut refuses to solve labour disputes caused by the government, and will not fill the role of information officer and policeman for the government," the Secretary-General declared categorically.

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ARIDOR'S ECONOMIC POLICIES CRITICIZES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Oct 81 p 16

[Text] THE 8.1 per cent rise in September's consumer price index announced yesterday has burst the bubble of Finance Minister Yoram Aridor's attempts to repress inflation. October's price inflation is likely to be similar, if not even higher, and nothing much different can be expected for November.

We are, in short, back to where we were last year, before Mr. Aridor grasped the helm of the economy. This despite his steadfast and solemn persistence in calling his policies "proper," "supply-side oriented," "balanced," and by such-like labels of sham respectability which were understood by few and believed by even fewer.

Nonetheless, Mr. Aridor's policies have kept most people temporarily quite happy, however cynical they may have been about the chances of the dearly bought pecuniary bliss being long-lasting.

The short-lived satisfaction with Mr. Aridor's activities — which did have the long-term result of winning the Knesset elections in June — had a very solid foundation. The Bank of Israel's report on economic developments in recent months shows that, as a result of nominal wage increases and the massive subsidization of consumer goods, real wages in the first half of 1981 went up by 11.5 per cent, with a corresponding rise in private consumption.

It is safe to assume that the mini-boom which Mr. Aridor engineered (but which did not reduce unemployment or revive investment) has made those whose income does not derive from wages, particularly those who live off the vast and growing grey or black economy, even happier than wage-earners.

The latter should soon be the first to realize that their happiness was short-lived. September's price inflation has already wiped out most of the cost-of-living allowance they are due to receive with their October salary. By the end of the year, all the gains in real wages showered upon them since early 1981 are likely to have evaporated.

A policy designed to repress inflation, as a transitional stage in an overall programme of stabilization, has sense to it. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of a stabilization policy that does not include the artificial repression of inflation, as a prelude, unless one would choose the Margaret Thatcher way of mass unemployment.

However, such a policy makes sense only if it is part of an overall, comprehensive and long-term programme. This Mr. Aridor has never had, and still does not have. He seems to have staked his all on one, and only one, factor in the inflationary process — that of expectations. True to an ideology that believes in the power of words, he seems to have thought that if only he could push inflation on a downward course for a time, it would go on falling by its own momentum.

That is much too simple a view of reality. When the repression of inflation is designed so as to boost consumption and vastly swell the public's liquid assets, any effect that such a policy may have on expectations is wasted.

Mr. Aridor is now confronted with a hard choice, his horizon of possible solutions being necessarily limited by political constraints and socio-economic philosophy. He can try, obstinately, to vindicate his policy by continuing to subsidize consumption and prevent social unrest in the development towns, so important to his party, by selectively bailing out ailing enterprises. But even to keep inflation at the September rate, he would have to go on injecting cash into the economy at the rate of some IS2b.-IS3b. a month. The Treasury's actions in recent weeks show that even the finance minister has come to realize that he cannot do that.

His main alternative is to revert, in harsher or milder manner, to the tight-fisted policies of his predecessor, Yigael Hurvitz. The immediate results of such a reversal of direction would be more, not less, price inflation — this time induced on the cost side — and more unemployment. The attempt to evade this choice between the economically unfeasible and the politically embarrassing will probably end up with a few more months of simply trying to muddle through.

That, no doubt, can always work for a time. But it is expensive and it leads nowhere. Right now it looks as if the Likud government, after three finance ministers in its first term, with the first having failed in an exercise of half-baked liberalism, the second having thrown in the towel after losing a fight for fiscal frugality, and the third having gone back to interventionism, must look for a fourth finance minister and a fourth economic outlook. But there do not seem to be enough factions for that anymore.

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EMIGRATION PATTERN OF ARAB COMMUNITY DISCUSSED

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST MAGAZINE in English 25 Sep 81 pp 6-7

[Article by David Richardson: "Well-Worn Paths"]

[Text] THE LONG faces that greeted the election of Salvador Allende as the first Communist president of Chile in 1970 were found not only in the chanceries and copper markets of the world. Eight thousand miles away in the West Bank, Allende's nationalization of banks and the social and economic chaos that plagued his regime caused severe discomfort by upsetting an established pattern of financial aid.

"For the first time ever we were sending remittances to our people in Chile," recalls Farah al-Araj, the mayor of the small Christian town of Beit Jalla a few kilometres south of Jerusalem.

The mayor, whose calling card gives his name as "al-Araj (Larach)", pronounced "laraj" in Spanish, estimates that today only 10 per cent of the native population of his town and of neighbouring Bethlehem remain — the rest have emigrated.

EMIGRATION, particularly of Christians, has been going on for at least three generations in Palestine. Today there is hardly an Arab family that does not have at least one close member abroad — either in the Americas or in one of the surrounding Arab states.

The highly visible building boom in the territories, the expensive cars and the busy summer tourist season are all explained by the vast numbers of former residents who now live abroad, send money back to "the old country" and occasionally visit.

PALESTINIAN emigration, particularly during the period of Israeli administration, is an issue inevitably laced with politics and emotion. The objective academic and statistical difficulties of defining an emigrant (as opposed to a refugee or a resident temporarily abroad), combined with the sensibilities of two peoples claiming rights to the same land, are exploited by those whose interest it is to minimize or exaggerate the dimensions of the issue.

A senior military government official recently went out of his way to warn that comparing the number of residents who had left the territories to those who had entered via the areas' main thoroughfares, the Jordan bridges, was "totally misleading." Such figures could not reflect how many were abroad for study, or for business or other reasons, he insisted.

However, government statisticians feel that these figures can be regarded at least as gross indicators of how many people have left the area. Between the end of 1968 and 1980, 3,277,000 residents of the West Bank and Gaza left via the bridges while 3,148,500 returned; in these admittedly "gross" terms, 128,500 people have left the area permanently.

Ardent Palestinian nationalists see emigration as a conscious policy adopted but not announced by the Israel government and implemented on every level of life by the military government.

"After all, they do not make too much effort to make us stay," was the wry observation of Dr. Bakr Abu Kishk of the Bir Zeit University Research Centre.

"Nothing is really done to prevent Rabbi Meir Kahane (who advocates the forceful expulsion of the Arab population of Eretz Yisrael) from preaching his particular solution to the Palestinian problem," said a young student at the university just a few months before final exams, after which he was off to join his brother who has been living in Boston for eight years.

Only last Friday the joint Jordanian-PLO committee in Amman announced that it would pay second salaries to people employed by the military government after 1967, "in order to prevent their emigration."

PEOPLE have been leaving the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean since the time of the Turks. The final decades of the Ottoman Empire saw severe poverty and persecution in the outlying provinces as the central administration decayed.

In the case of Beit Jalla the first wave of emigration from the town followed the massacre of 35 of its inhabitants by the Egyptian Ibrahim Pasha in 1854.

"One didn't need passports then," Farah al-Araj remembers his father telling him. "The Turkish birth certificate was sufficient and eight to 12 gold coins bought a passage from Jaffa to America."

The Christians of Southern Judea chose Central and South America because the Catholic Church provided at least one element of familiarity in the New World, while they also enjoyed an educational advantage over the mixture of Indians who made up the native population.

On arrival they were dubbed "Turcos" because of the Turkish papers they held, and the name remains today although for some it has a derogatory connotation — not unlike "Mick" or "Yid."

According to al-Araj, 30,000 of his townsmen are now settled in Chile, and a similar number are scattered in Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador (which they are now fleeing) and Mexico.

"There is not a single island in the Caribbean or state in Central or South America that does not have a family from Bethlehem or Beit Jalla," claims Elias Freij, mayor of Bethlehem.

Strangely, emigration from the other Christian town in the area, Beit Sahour, has generally been eastwards to the neighbouring Arab countries; also fewer people have left Beit Sahour than the neighbouring towns, and many of the emigrants eventually return.

WITH A TINGE of superiority, people in Bethlehem and Beit Jalla refer to the different tribal origins of the various populations and point to the stronger influence of the (Catholic) Church in their towns, which are dotted with imposing churches and religious institutions.

Ramallah, once the largest Christian town in the West Bank, came under stronger Protestant and Anglican influence than the triangle of villages south of Jerusalem, and its young people have in general moved to North America — particularly Chicago and the Midwest. In Chicago, there are entire city blocks comprising the homes and retail or wholesale businesses of people who trace their origins back to what is sentimentally described as "the bride of Palestine."

THE MAJOR trends of emigration from the Samarian towns of Kalkilya, Tulkarm, Jenin and Nablus have been to the east, to the Gulf States and to Trans-Jordan. This is particularly true of the families of Nablus, so much so that local chronicler Ihsan el-Nimer called his book on the area *The History of the Region of Nablus and Salt*.

Nablus families have established deep ties on the East Bank, and may be found in the highest ranks of the Hashemite Kingdom's establishment. Suleiman Nabulsi was leader of the Jordanian opposition two decades ago, and Ahmed Toukan, from another prominent Nablus clan, served at various posts in King Hussein's inner circle, including a brief term as prime minister of Jordan. His daughter, the late Queen Alia, was married to Hussein.

EMIGRATION from Hebron was perhaps most noticeably influenced by the turbulent politics of the past 40 years. At first, people from "al-Khalil," as it is known, moved across the Negev and the Sinai to Cairo where they established the famous Cairo market, the Khan al-Khalili, or market of the Hebronites.

After the creation of Israel in 1948 they found their traditional path of emigration blocked from the south and the west, so they moved north to Jerusalem and began replacing the large families who had controlled commercial life in the city before they fled in 1948. Today most of the merchants along Salah a-Din Street in East Jerusalem are originally from Hebron. Hebronites are also to be found in Jericho; more recently, they have been making their way across the Jordan to Amman and the Gulf States.

Emigration from Jerusalem, whose population has always been the best educated and most exposed to European influences, was to Amman and London, a pattern which is maintained today.

THE ARMENIAN community in Jerusalem, which in 1950 numbered some 17,000, is now down to 2,500, according to Albert Aghazarian, who teaches at Bir Zeit University.

Migration from Gaza, particularly since 1948, has always been significantly less than from the West Bank. Gazans are generally not as well educated, and have not come into as much contact with Europeans. In 1948 they became stateless persons, depending on reluctantly granted Egyptian papers if they needed to travel. The Jordanian annexation of the West Bank made movement far easier for those living there, even if they were refugees.

ONCE ESTABLISHED, emigration seems to develop a dynamic of its own. While the poverty and lack of physical safety that originally induced people to leave can be reversed, the ties of young people — particularly to the old country and its social patterns — are eroded by the stories, dreams and possibility of another future.

The stability that accompanied the British occupation of Palestine from 1917 slowed, but did not halt, the flow of young men from Jaffa and Haifa.

The Great Depression of the '30s saw emigration increase again, and although this was offset to some extent by the expansion of the economy which Zionist investment brought with it, the establishment of industry, large-scale agriculture and growth of the British bases worked further to loosen the ties of young people to their villages.

"In a conservative, patriarchal society the most significant move is from the village to the city, which breaks established ties," noted a veteran scholar of the Palestinians. "There is no movement from village to village and in that setting Jerusalem is almost as far away as Baghdad for a resident of a small Palestinian village."

Abdel Khader el-Ismail, an elderly resident of Silwad, recently told me that he used to work at the Haifa refineries prior to 1948, coming back to his village at first once a month and then eventually once every three months.

A refugee from the Ramle area who now lives in the Jelazoun camp recalls how labourers used to camp in the environs of the huge British base at Sarafand.

The unrest which preceded and accompanied the birth of the Jewish state again saw an increase in

emigration (as distinct from the unplanned flight of refugees), particularly of the wealthier and better educated families.

Most researchers agree, however, that the largest wave of emigration followed the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in April 1950. For political reasons the Hashemite regime withheld funds for economic development from the West Bank and this, combined with the influx of refugees, produced severe unemployment which persisted until 1967. A Jordanian census of 1961 showed that 62,900 Jordanian citizens were abroad during that year — 50,300 of them were from the West Bank.

Many of the refugees were housed in camps surrounding the Christian towns in the West Bank and the composition of these towns began to change. Farah al-Araj says that 2,000 Moslem families have settled in his town of 6,000 since 1948; he anticipates that in 20 years they will comprise half its population.

STUDIES produced by the Palestinians themselves indicate that 287,000 people left the West Bank between 1948 and 1967, most of them opting for the East Bank of the Jordan and the Gulf States. Since they were rarely granted citizenship by the Arab states in which they worked, and because they had Jordanian passports, many eventually returned to Jordan "via the back door" as it were, thus boosting their numbers in that country. In 1952, Palestinians made up 31 per cent of the Jordanian population; today they comprise well over 70 per cent and Amman is said to be 80 per cent Palestinian.

The boom in the Israeli economy that followed the 1967 war slowed Palestinian emigration — not to be confused with the immediate flow of refugees prompted by the war — as industry and agriculture absorbed the cheap and semi-skilled labour the Palestinians could offer.

However, as the boom slowed, emigration figures again swung upwards. Hussein's ruthless eradication of the PLO in his country during the "Black September" of 1970 saw people leaving the West Bank for the U.S. and South America via Lod Airport.

Abdel Karim Semara, a sociologist who works as a journalist in East Jerusalem and who has made a study of the migration of his people, was told by travel agents in the capital that until 1973 almost 9,000 people a year left the West Bank this way.

As inflation and recession bit deeper into the Israel economy, and the economies of Jordan and the Gulf States began to enjoy the benefits of substantial oil revenues, emigration increased even more. The establishment and expansion of universities on the West Bank did no more than delay the emigration of young people who found on graduating that there were few opportunities for academics in the territories.

ANY DISCUSSION of emigration inevitably returns to the problem of defining when a person is an emigrant. Many of the young people who leave regard their absence as temporary and say they do not consider themselves emigrants.

According to the military government, very few of those who leave declare that they are emigrating permanently. Passport control officials at the Allenby Bridge confirm this, noting that most who do are women who have married citizens of other countries.

The vast majority of people leave on exit visas — green cards issued by the military government. The green cards are valid for a maximum period of 36 months, after which they have to be renewed either by relatives in the territories or, less commonly, at an Israeli consulate abroad.

Males, particularly those between 16 and 25, may not return during a period of six months, which may be extended. Military officials maintain that this is designed to hinder communications between the terrorist organizations and their operatives inside the territories.

ATTEMPTING to arrive at some estimate of the extent of emigration from the territories, one is confounded by the problems of definition, the unsuitability of the available statistics and the political sensitivities of most of those who are able to provide information and interpretation.

Emigration from the West Bank during the Jordanian period was regarded, obviously as no more than internal migration of the Jordanian population. It has only been since the Israeli occupation in 1967 that the movement of people from the West Bank has taken on political overtones and popularly at least is often lumped together with the issue of the Palestinian refugees.

Researchers resort to extrapolations based on the Jordanian census conducted during the Fifties and Sixties, the Israeli census conducted in the aftermath of the 1967 war, the movement of residents in and out of the country, and employment statistics.

Dr. Abu Kishk, an Israel Arab and former employee of the Agriculture Ministry who has chosen to settle in the West Bank, says that in 1970, 89 per cent of the male population between 25 and 30 were employed either locally or inside Israel. In 1979 this figure dropped to 76 per cent. The only explanation that can be offered is emigration, he maintains.

Others are far more blunt. "He were in their place nor would I," he says, going on to estimate that emigration from the area runs at over 30,000 per annum.

Demographic experts at the Central Bureau of Statistics confirm that the West Bank loses a significant proportion but not all of its natural increase through emigration. In 1978 for instance the population of the West Bank was estimated to be 681,200 on the basis of sophisticated demographic models and showed an increase of 10,300 over the previous year. But recorded births during the same period were 20,500 indicating that more than 10,000 people had left the area. In general the government demographers find that these figures coincide closely with the gross indicators of emigration based on the movement of residents

throught the bridges and other ports of the country.

Military government officials confirm that there is emigration but are unable if not unwilling to say what its dimensions are. Last year alone 24,152 more people left the West Bank than entered it. And while this figure cannot be regarded as an accurate reflection of emigration during that year, when compared with figures for previous years, it becomes clear that there has been a steady increase. In 1975, 2,573 more people left the area and the average outflow for these past six years is 14,500 per year.

During the same period, natural increase in the West Bank averaged above 30,000 per annum; and since 1968 50,000 individuals have been allowed to enter the West Bank under the reunification of families arrangement. (Only 5,500 have been allowed into Gaza during the same period.)

Emigration from the West Bank has traditionally been the business of young and generally single men. But according to al-Araj and several others, families are now also among those who pack up and leave. For instance, there are merchants who resent the gradually imposed Israeli taxation that is being extended to the territories. In Jericho alone three relatively well-established businessmen recently closed down their establishments and moved abroad.

ZIONISM has always had a somewhat ambiguous attitude towards the question of Palestinian emigration, passively welcoming it as perhaps the only solution to the conflict between two peoples demanding the same land, while refraining (for both moral and pragmatic reasons) from actively pursuing it as a policy.

Even such humanist and socialist thinkers as Berl Katznelson concluded that coexistence was impossible and that in the long run an "exchange of populations" was the only feasible solution. "Better a distant neighbour than an enemy close by," he wrote.

Of course there were also streams of Zionist ideology like that of Hashomer Hatzair in the 1930s and Martin Buber's Brit Shalom which favoured absolute parity between Arab and Jew in a bi-national state. But generally it seems it was more a case of "closing one's eyes and hoping it [the problem] or they [the Arabs] would just go away."

Shortly after the Six Day War there was a department in the Prime Minister's Office which established offices in Gaza and even in Nazareth to help local Arabs emigrate, says a former civil servant. Several busloads of people from Gaza were turned back at the Allenby Bridge by the Jordanians, and the department was closed — apparently for fear of international repercussions.

Since then, there have been persistent reports of private efforts by Israelis who have bought property from Palestinians and then helped them leave the country.

The most prominent case was that of Gad Greiver, the Gedera travel agent who claimed that he and a group of associates "had emptied six Arab villages in the West Bank and helped settle the inhabitants in Brazil." The claim was dismissed by government spokesmen.

A young student at Yeshivat Mercaz Harav, the Gush Emunim spiritual centre in Jerusalem, recently told me that he and some friends had helped Arab families leave homes they had sold to Jews in the heart of the Moslem Quarter in the Old City.

Sensitivity to the question of emigration has grown along with the development of Palestinian nationalism. Abu Kishk says that there is an increasingly negative image attaching to those who leave the area, "but it does not have the traitorous connotations of the Hebrew term *yerida*." Most people concur, noting that the economic factors that lie at the root of most emigration are just too real to be ignored.

Nevertheless, a recent meeting of educators in the West Bank debated the issue of increasing funds for university education because "academic degrees are passports to emigration."

THE EMIGRANTS themselves also have an influence on those who have remained behind. Every summer thousands of visitors from the Middle East, Europe and the Americas visit relatives in the West Bank on three-month visitors' permits. These people end up persuading some of the native population to leave with them. And the practice of coming here to find a bride is still common, although with the rapid emancipation of Palestinian women "arranged marriages" are on the decline.

Men with names like "Abu Carlos" and "Abu Juan" in Beit Jala regret that their grandchildren do not speak Arabic; and in Beituniya and Dir Dibwan near Ramallah there are children from North America who were sent here to study Arabic and absorb the history and customs of their people.

Bir Zeit, imitating universities on the other side of the Green Line, encourages students to come from abroad for short programmes designed to enhance their awareness of their origins.

APART FROM the host of obvious demographic implications, Palestinian emigration is also developing significant political dimensions, not only internationally but for those who remain behind as well.

The diminution of the Christian community (from 10 per cent in the '60s to some 4 per cent today) with their professional, commercial and administrative skills, and the emigration of young graduates from the region's universities leave the West Bank poorer and lacking in the skills that even an "autonomous" region would need. Land ownership is changing and there is an accelerating flight of capital as businessmen seek greater profits elsewhere.

The growth of a Palestinian diaspora in the Middle East and elsewhere has also had the paradoxical effect of simultaneously weakening and strengthening the Palestinian national movement.

The Palestinians and their skills comprise an essential element of the economies of many of the Gulf States but they are resented as strangers and regarded as a destabilizing factor. The salaries they earn are tapped for private and

public projects in the territories and the other aspects of the "national struggle."

At the same time their increasing wealth and the roots they establish — particularly in Central and South America — produce an "us and them" mentality. "Most of them pay no more than lip-service to the Palestinian cause,' was the embittered observation of a local nationalist. They have also begun referring to themselves as "of Palestinian *extraction* and not Palestinians."

First and second generation Palestinians are rapidly becoming politically influential in their adopted homes. Many of the newspapers in the Arab world are staffed by Palestinian journalists.

Palestinians publish rabidly anti-communist newspapers in Honduras, while the sons of Palestinian emigrants are to be found at the forefront of the communist backed revolutions in Nicaragua, El Salvador and the Dominican Republic.

Politicians in the Central and South American states on which Israel counts in the hostile international arena have indicated to Israeli diplomats that they have to begin to take into account the feelings of local Palestinian communities.

In many respects Palestinian emigration is a mirror image of Jewish migration and Israeli "yerida." Whatever emerges on the other side of the Green Line — be it an independent state, part of a federated Jordan or a never-to-end autonomous part of Eretz Yisrael, the flight of the Christians and the emigration of the young and the skilled must remain a matter of concern to Israel. For coexistence, in the final analysis, depends on the quality of the people who desire it. □

CSO: 4400/38

WEST BANK GRAPE INDUSTRY THREATENED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 11-17 Oct 81 p 10

[Article by Awad Abdel Fattah]

[Text] As the end of the grape season approaches most of the grapes in the occupied territories are still on the vine, farmers afraid they may have to leave them to rot. West Bank growers are facing economic disaster after the Israeli military banned export of their grapes to Israel and Iraq. Iraq, a major customer for grapes, took none this year. The blow will be particularly hard on the economy of the Hebron district where most grapes on the West Bank are grown.

The marketing season opened normally in August. Most growers had general permits to take agricultural goods into Israel. This year, however, the crop was good and the military government withdrew all permits under intense pressure of the Israeli grape farmers, who wanted to maintain an artificially high price for their own produce. September 22, *Maariv* reported that the Israeli Fruit Council had reappropriated the growers' permit. The explanation was that the appropriation was intended to reduce and prevent "smuggling" of fruit from the occupied territories into areas within the "Green Line." During the summer season, farmers and merchants from the West Bank used the growers' permit which was given to them by the military authorities to transport goods into Israeli markets. As a result, Israeli farmers claimed, great surpluses of fruits caused losses of millions of shekels to them. Since then, the Palestinian farmers, especially those of Hebron, have been forced to send their grapes to Jordan, to the Ramallah wine-factory and to the central Nablus market. Prices plummeted, the highest price being not more than IS 3 per kilo.

Before 1967, the grape producers of the occupied territories exported their grapes to Jordan and to other Arab states. Because of the Gulf war, Iraq is not taking grapes now, and Jordan which has developed its own industry, also wants to protect its own market. Now Jordan is a transit station through which Palestinians export their grapes to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

Direct Action

Before the military authorities banned export to Israel, Israel's producers, mainly Labour Alignment affiliated kibbutzim and moshavim, set-up vigilante squads to take direct action against Arab farmers. In a throwback to the 1930s when squads of Zionist thugs attacked Palestinian-Arab workers and merchants, kibbutz members erected road blocks at Israel's borders and turned back Arab trucks. Some drivers were told that if they returned the vigilantes would pour gasoline over their goods. Abdel Rahman Sultor, one of the biggest farmers in Hebron, was told, at a kibbutz roadblock near Ramle, that they would set his truck on fire if he came back. Another grower, Badran Jaber, described the Israeli actions as 'terrorism.'

Financial Disaster

According to farmers, every kilo of grapes costs about IS 3 to produce. The present market price of IS 2-5 therefore only just covers costs. In Israel today's price is around IS 9-10 per kilo.

Abdel Hamed from Hebron told *Al Fajr* that he is going to lose thousands of dinars this year. Mahmoud Jaber, another farmer, has been offered JD 25,000 for his crop. Before the military ban he was negotiating a price of JD 44,000.

As a solution to the crisis farmers are producing much more *dibs* (grape molasses) — a traditional ,but not yet universally available, sweet. Ramallah's wine industry cannot absorb much more of the grapes than they already do.

While no producer talks of a "death-blow" to the industry, the latest Israeli move, coming in the contect of increasing manipulation of the occupied territories market must make many producers think seriously before investing in next year's production costs. Badran Jaber, a house-arrestee who works as a correspondent for PPS as well as growing grapes, told *Al Fajr* that an "independent market under an independent authority" is the only long-term solution.

CSO: 4400/37

BRIEFS

YAMIT EVACUATION--In a ministerial consultation chaired by the prime minister it was agreed that the evacuation of the Yamit strip would take place close to the transfer of the area to Egypt in April 1982. Our political correspondent reports that this was proposed by Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon and the proposal was adopted by the prime minister and his fellow ministers. In the meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich said that the government should not try to take over one building after the other in the Yamit strip and reach a situation where fighting takes place over one house and another, as was the case in the battle over Leningrad in World War II, as Ehrlich phrased it. It is better to hold off the evaluation until the area is handed over to Egypt and then to conduct a one-time evacuation. [Text] [TA290533 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 29 Oct 81]

DRUCKMAN RESIGNATION--The deputy religious affairs minister, Hayim Druckman, this evening sent a letter of resignation to religious affairs minister, Dr Burg. Our party affairs correspondent Amnon Nadav notes that this in fact puts an end to the recent efforts made by faction leaders in the NRP to find a compromise to prevent the resignation. [Excerpt] [TA291801 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 29 Oct 81]

ABNA'-AL-BALAD ORGANIZES CAMP--Abna al-Balad in Lydda announced this week that they will be organising the town's first voluntary work camp between September 24 and 29. During the camp volunteers will clean up Lydda's Christian cemetery, clean and fence the Moslems' cemetery, and fence one of the town's shrines. Shrines commemorating wilis (holy men) have been destroyed by the "Lod (the Hebrew name for Lydda) and Ramle Development Company." Although court ordered the company to rebuild the shrine, nothing has been done about it. In a leaflet announcing the camp Abna'al Balad pointed out that there are many other projects which need to be tackled in the town. They wrote that although the Christian cemetery has been partially cleared, there are still many things to do. The Moslem's cemetery, the leaflet said, has almost become a dump. In announcing the camp Abna'al Balad said that it will be the first step towards developing the town. They are quick to point out that they don't mean the same kind of development as the Development Company who, say representatives of the movement, "have concentrated on erasing any evidence on Arab presence in the town." Muhammed Burghal, secretary of Abna'al Balad in Lydda, told AL FAJR, that they will welcome volunteers from other parts of Palestine or abroad and will need about 300 to complete the projects. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 13-19 Sep 81 p 5]

NEW SOLEL BONE AFFILIATES--Beersheba (Itim).--The Histadrut-owned Solel Boneh building company is due to open an office in Egypt. The Egyptian government has already authorized the operations of the Egyptian Solel Boneh affiliate, company managers said in a recent meeting in Arad. Solel Boneh is also due to form another affiliate company in Nigeria. The foreign operations branch of Solel Boneh now has a turnover of $550 million a year and operates in 14 countries. [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 6 Oct 81 p 2]

LABOR PARTY BUREAU ELECTIONS--For the first time since the establishment of the state, two members of the minorities have been elected to the Labor Party's bureau. In last night's elections in Nazareth for the Arab district of the party, Shawqi Khuri, head of the Fassuta Local Council, was chosen. In Nahariya, where elections were held for the Druze District, Yusif (Qara) of Daliyat al-Karmel was elected. The head of the party's Arab department, Ra'anan Kohen, said that Jamil (Shalhouf) of Haifa would be co-opted to the party's internal court, and that from now on Arabs and Druze would be elected to all labour's governing bodies. [Text] [TA290722 Jerusalem POST in English 29 Oct 81 p 2]

HOUSING MINISTRY TO E. JERUSALEM--The offices of the Housing Ministry are expected to be moved to new premises in East Jerusalem within a month. A QOL YISRA'EL reporter says that other cabinet ministers have expressed the wish to transfer their ministries to the new complex, including the ministers of energy, industry and commerce and Ya'aqov Meridor, who is in charge of the economic ministries. At present, only minister without portfolio Yitzhaq Moda'i has taken up office in East Jerusalem. [Text] [TA281859 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 28 Oct 81]

ELECTRIC GRID--The municipality yesterday condemned what it called the pressure put on West Bank villages by the military government to refrain from joining the electric grid sponsored by the municipality. The large generator bought by the municipality with aid from external Arab sources has been competing lately with the Israeli grid, which supplies most of the West Bank. Several villages in the Nabulus area have recently hooked up to the Nabulus grid. The competing grid reportedly was established to prevent villages from being dependent on Israeli supplied electricity. [Text] [TA290721 Jerusalem POST in English 29 Oct 81 p 3]

CSO: 4400/36

CROWN PRINCE EXPLAINS HUSAYN'S PEACE PLAN

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 3-5

[Article by John Leroux: "Hassan's New Peace Plan"]

[Text] 'WITH POLARISATION, the identity of the Middle East is at stake. But we must absolutely preserve that identity by trying to restore a full consensus at the November Arab summit in Morocco.'

Coming from such a moderate and pro-western Arab leader as Jordan's 34-year-old Crown Prince Hassan, King Hussein's brother and economic supremo, those words show the depth of Arab resentment over the new US-Israeli strategic cooperation. And streng hints last week that Saudi Arabia was resisting fresh US attempts to win Riyadh's commitment to a military agreement, in order to ease the safe passage of the Awacs deal through Congress, only added to the growing strain.

There are now 45,000 Americans in Saudi Arabia — as many as lived in Iran under the Shah but this time among a population only one-seventh the size. The figure includes 1,000 military advisers.

'With the Baghdad pact and Cento experiences behind us, there is a sense of deja vu. Why should we re-invite the same concept again? It will fail for the third time,' Crown Prince Hassan told *8 Days* in an exclusive interview in Amman. (The Baghdad Pact was signed in 1955 between Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, the US and Great Britain. After Iraq withdrew in 1959, it was replaced by the Central Treaty Organisation (Cento), which remained in existence until 1979.)

Indeed, 'polarisation' is not merely a diplomatic choice of words to rebuff the American sidetracking of the central issue of Palestine, but helps to underscore the mounting fear of a final fragmenting of the Arab world following the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

This concern is underlined by the debate now going on within the PLO. On one side stand the hard line militant organisations which are adamantly against any call for Arab solidarity. For instance, Ali Eshak, spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), told *8 Days* in Beirut: 'We favour a sorting-out process at this stage, an operation by which the US pressure will eventually force everyone to take a clear-cut side.' Reflecting the way thoughts are turning among members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the left wing of the PLO, Eshak added that his group is 'calling instead for a material alliance with the socialist bloc.' 'For instance,' said Eshak, 'Syria has not yet taken a clear position against a complete American settlement plan, but we hope that this process of polarisation will help Damascus to take that decision.' This was a clear reference to current strains in Palestinian-Syrian relations in Lebanon.

Yet Al Fatah thinks otherwise. As a top-level official put it to *8 Days*: 'Why should we sanction a polarisation process? It's much better keeping Saudi Arabia in the hot seat to work for us. Whatever might be said about the kingdom, it does carry increasing weight both in regional and international diplomacy. This is why we didn't denounce Crown Prince Fahd's peace plan when it was announced in August. Sure, the plan doesn't even meet our minimum goals, but it would have been reckless to say no and antagonise the whole of Saudi Arabia.

'The US-Israeli strategic cooperation doesn't really affect the regional military balance as such,' added the spokesman. 'Its

significance is really two-fold. On the one hand, it shatters the illusion nourished by the so-called moderate states that a distinction should be drawn between American and Israeli foreign policies. In the wake of the Israeli raid on Iraq's nuclear reactors in June, it has become clear that both are intimately linked'.

But the other far-reaching aspect — which transcends the imminent Israeli invasion of South Lebanon in the view of the spokesman — is that Palestinians and the frontline states have ceased to be the exclusive targets for Israel. 'Now everybody is in the same boat,' he feels. 'This is why Sheikh Zayed, president of the United Arab Emirates, is already committed to set up diplomatic relations with Moscow — he told us so — while the ruler of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber, embarked on a tour of Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary last month.'

Crown Prince Hassan shares a similar view: 'The US-Israeli agreement is not a question of Israel saying to the West: "I want to be deputy sheriff." Instead, what the present Israeli leadership wants is to further its ends by using violence. The whole idea back in the US may be to contain Israel by using its military capability for the western nations' end. But it would be highly dangerous,' Hassan continued, 'to see the West withdraw from the area in favour of Israel with the latter's continued policy of violence, which only serves to force greater radicalism. Look at the recent tripartite treaty signed between South Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya. The competition between East and West is already in the making.'

Plans for strategic cooperation between Israel and America didn't really come as a surprise to Hassan. Since April, he has been carefully studying the proposal for a new Israeli national security package as outlined by a number of sources, including Shai Feldman, a researcher associated with the Tel Aviv University Centre for Strategic Studies. The package offered four elements to 'compensate' Israel for a withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 'A new role for Israel in the western alliance system; security arrangements in the West Bank for the post-withdrawal era; an international economic effort to maximise both West Bank economic development and its interdependence with the economies of Israel and the more pro-western Arab states; and an explicit nuclear deterrence posture.

'To the Arab public,' says the crown prince, 'the only other power that can counter-balance such an Israeli-perceived Western/Israeli axis is, ominously, the Soviet Union.'

What Jordan suggests the Arab leaders should adopt is a five-point approach framed last April by King Hussein for consideration at the forthcoming Arab Summit:

- The Gulf will be declared a 'neutral zone' by the superpowers, with iron-clad guarantees of non-interference
- The defence of the Gulf will be left to the states of the region. This will not only avoid polarisation of the region into hostile camps or blocs, but will discourage surrogates of the superpowers from 'queering the pitch', as it were
- The Gulf states, in their turn, will guarantee an uninterrupted oil supply to all customers
- To avoid the possibility of an oil embargo or the use of oil as a strategic economic weapon, the superpowers — and particularly the US — will concentrate their undoubted power and influence to ensure an early and honourable settlement of the Palestine problem
- Finally, the Gulf states should be encouraged to join a collective security arrangement which would call for assistance from a super or 'medium' power, if the need so arose.

Crown Prince Hassan feels that a solution to the Palestine problem, which could lead to Gulf cooperation with the West in ensuring the safety of the oilfields and of the sea passage from and to the Gulf, could be achieved by reconvening a Geneva-type conference with Palestinian participation, by formally ending the Camp David process in April 1982 with the Israeli evacuation of the Sinai, by curtailing the superpowers' arms race and by helping Washington to bridge a 'widening credibility gap'.

CSO: 4400/35

LIBYA, LEBANON FRONT RAPPROCHEMENT DISCUSSED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 10 Oct 81 pp 9-10

[Text] Last Saturday, prominent leaders of the Lebanese Front alliance attended an evening of songs, dances and poetry--a cultural soirée--at the theatre of the Casino du Liban, in Maameltein, near Jounieh. The event in itself would have hardly been worth mentioning in the press--except in the social pages--had the group which performed not been Libyan.

The event made headlines and front pages and prompted Lebanese Front president Camille Chamoun, who attended the evening along with Lebanese Forces' commander Bechir Gemayel, to declare that no political conclusions were to be drawn from the fact.

But political conclusions were drawn and the main one was that to put a Libyan team on stage in a region under Lebanese Front control must have taken quite a lot of behind-the-scenes efforts and talks.

It all started over a month ago, when Libyan leader Colonel Moammar Qadhafi announced that he had an initiative for the settlement of the Lebanese crisis. Whereupon the Lebanese Front invited him to come and see for himself the reality of the Lebanese situation.

Contacts between the two sides were conducted through the Libyan representative in Beirut, Abdel Kader Ghouqa.

Questions were bound to be raised for Libya is an ally of Syria and also a member of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front which is headed by Syria. For this reason, observers stated that the Libyan intervention on the Lebanese scene must necessarily have taken place in coordination with Syria.

The contacts between the Lebanese Front and Libya were a source of concern, however, to the members of the quadripartite Arab Follow-up Committee particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. They wondered whether the Libyan move was not the prelude to a freezing of the AFC.

Indirect contacts between Libya and the Lebanese Front began several months ago but it was not until Libyan leader Colonel Moammar Qadhafi's recent visit to

Damascus that the contacts took a more serious turn. Observers believe the Libyan leader explained what he had in mind for Lebanon to Syrian President Hafez Al Assad and received the latter's approval.

Since that visit, the Libyan representative to Beirut, Mr Ghouqa has met with Lebanese Forces commander Bechir Gemayel three times and with Lebanese Front president Camille Chamoun two times. Talks centered on the Libyan initiative for Lebanon whose details have remained undisclosed.

If certain sides fear that the Libyan initiative may come at the expense of the other Arab efforts that are being done for the settlement of the Lebanese crisis, other sides believe there are no grounds for such fears, for the following reasons:

1) the fact that before establishing contacts with Libya, the Lebanese Front had first consulted the other main sides concerned with the situation in Lebanon. On the other hand, contacts between the Front and Libya help settle the thorny issue of collaboration with Israel.

2) the fact that the Lebanese Front has clearly asserted that if any direct contacts and relations are to be established with any exterior side, it will insist the Lebanese State be a partner in the matter so that it may reap the benefits.

3) the fact that there is hardly any hope of success for any unilateral and individual initiate in Lebanon, Libyan or otherwise.

CSO: 4400/35

ARCHBISHOP KHOURI SCORES HADDAD, PRAISES PALESTINIANS

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 p 21

[Article by Philip Marflett: "Lebanon's Bishop Hits at Haddad"]

[Text]

BULOS KHOURI, Greek Orthodox archbishop of all South Lebanon, is a leading representative of Lebanon's 500,000-strong Catholic and Orthodox Christian communities and an outspoken critic of both the Lebanese right and Israel. As Israeli planes again attacked the port city of Sidon, Archbishop Khouri explained the ideas which have made him a controversial figure in Lebanon.

'Much of my see is now under the control of Saad Haddad. But thousands have left "his" area, and now like me they live in self-imposed exile. I would not dissuade any of them from following my example. I chose this kind of life because I am against fascism.

'Haddad likes to pretend that he represents us Christians in the south of Lebanon, but nothing is further from the truth. He represents only Israel — which has given him guns and money. I do not intend by my presence in "his" area to give any credibility at all to the idea that he is a "Christian leader". I refuse to help this man to appear legitimate.

'The capital of my see was Marjayoun. Now it is Haddad's capital. But great numbers of us have left, and now we live in places like Sidon. It is true that we live like paupers, but better to do this than live under Israel's control and allow ourselves to be the instrument of Begin.

'As part of our protest I have withdrawn all but two of our priests from Marjayoun. Those remain only to christen the children and to officiate at weddings and burials. Our whole administration has been transferred here.'

Khouri is 85 years old, and carries all the authority of the patriarch. But he speaks of earthly matters in an intensely informed and passionate way. 'As long ago as 1919 I preached my first sermon calling for all Arabs to unite against zionism. Not because I have any feelings against Jewish people, but because this zionist movement was always connected with the interests of the powerful countries of the West. It has never been in the interests of the Arab people.

'I am sorry to have to tell you that even 60 years ago I was right. Talking to Israel today is quite useless. I admire the determination of the Palestinians — without their intransigence all the Arab states would be kneeling before Israel. And to kneel and pray is not enough.

'This may surprise you — because I am an old man and an archbishop — but I must tell you that it is necessary always to struggle.'

With his support for the Palestinians and for the overwhelmingly-Muslim Lebanese National Movement, Khouri has become an enormously popular figure in Sidon. He delighted a demonstration in the city by announcing that 'Christians are Palestinians'. He explains that all Christians should support the Palestinian cause because the Palestinians have led the fight against a regime in Israel which he believes to be 'fundamentally evil'.

'After a lifetime of watching events I am brought to the conclusion that the intentions of the western countries — especially the United States — are quite cynical. They

want power in the area, they want oil, and damn those of us who get in the way.

'The Americans and their friends in Israel also think that we are fools. How dare Philip Habib ask the Syrians to withdraw their missiles from Bekaa? Israel bombs and attacks us and then asks us to step aside so that they may strike at us again!

'Meanwhile, for six years now we have been refugees and no-one has cared. Every time that Israel attacks, more are made homeless. Philip Habib is still hurrying from one capital to another, but I have not noticed him coming to see us.

'The world should know that we Christians are not all black reactionaries, and we are not friends of Israel. This is certainly true of my congregation — we would have stayed in Marjayoun if we supported Begin and Haddad. It is also true — though they are afraid to say it — that many of the Maronite church are as frightened of Gemayel's fascist movement as they are of the devil.

'In April, Begin said that he supported the Kataeb, and that he even thought about invading Lebanon "to save the Christians". He does *not* protect the Christians. Too many Christian houses have been destroyed.

'Christians are not all friends of Israel. There is a great shame among many Christians that we are identified with Israel. We did not ask for Begin's help, and we reject the hand he "offers" us.'

CSO: 4400/35

MEA FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 8 Oct 81 p 37

[Article: "Fighting Hits MEA Traffic"]

[Text] MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES, Lebanon's flag carrier and a surviving national symbol of success, has been severely affected by the violence and bouts of fighting that have beset the country since April.

Passenger traffic on MEA, the largest employer outside the public sector, has fallen by an average of some 32 per cent in the seven months to July compared with the same period of 1980. The company has estimated monthly losses at L£12m ($2.5m). Asaad Nasr, the company's chairman, pointed out that there are some reserves, amassed in more profitable years, but has also warned that these are limited. Losses for 1981 are expected to go up to L£71m ($15m).

Employees have already been asked to forgo their annual bonus of one month's pay. Nasr and other MEA representatives have repeatedly said that the option of laying off a large part of the airline's 5,000 or so staff would be considered if the government did not come to its rescue.

Selim Salam, the managing director, has said MEA was trying to raise a L£50m ($10.6m) soft loan to use in the next three years. The Lebanese government has indicated that it was willing to provide funds, but airline officials claim that diplomatic lobbying is what is needed.

Both Nasr and Salam believe that MEA's salvation lies in expanding its existing routes to create more work for its qualified crews. Expansion plans include new services to New York, via Paris and to the Far East. Salam says that both should start by the end of 1981. However, MEA's flights to the UK have been reduced from 14 to seven and a further reduction to four flights is feared.

Following the fighting in 1975-1976, the airline's problems were solved by the leasing of three of its Boeing 747s to Saudia Airlines. The three-year lease which expired last May covered the airline's salaries and provided work for MEA crews, giving the company time to reassemble its potential after the civil war.

It is those three aircraft, said to be MEA's most fuel-efficient, which are envisioned for use on new routes. A decision to purchase five wide-bodied European-manufactured A310 Airbuses at $350m has been postponed. The final signing of the contract, initialled last November, has been deferred until the board of directors meets on 25 September.

The rise in the value of the US dollar from L£3.50 to close to L£4.77 last month, together with MEA's other budgetary difficulties have forced the delay.

CSO: 4400/35

DRAFT BUDGET FOR 1982 APPROVED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 26 Oct 81 pp 4-5

[Text]

Lebanon's Council of Ministers has approved the draft budget for the fiscal year 1982. Total allocations under the draft bill, as yet unratified by the country's unicameral parliament, amount to LL 7.154 billion ($1 = LL 4.51), of which LL 5.945 billion are for the state budget and the rest for supplementary budgets, namely the Grain and Sugar Beet Bureau, the National Lottery, and the General Directorate for Posts, Telegraph and Telephone.

Allocations are broken down into three categories: recurrent expenditure, which amounts to LL 4.13[illegible] million, compared to LL 3.393 million under this year's budget; short-term investment and equipment expenditure (under section 2-a), which amounts to LL 1.276 billion compared to LL 1.095 million under this year's budget; and long-term development expenditure (under section 2-b) of LL 534.3 million. Under this year's budget, no allocations were made for development expenditure, but disbursements on such projects were made in the course of the fiscal year.

Major allocations will go to defence in line with the state's efforts to re-requip the army. These amount to LL 1.245 billion. Under this year's budget, allocations for the Defence Ministry totalled LL 1.058 billion. Education will also receive a sizeable allocation of LL 1.003 billion, as against LL 712.087 million this year. Transport and public works are to get LL 981.171 million compared to LL 489.075 million this year.

Receipts from direct taxes are estimated at LL 1.196 billion, while indirect taxes will bring in revenues of LL 726.7 million. Revenue from state property and investments are projected at only LL 23 million, while miscellaneous revenues are expected to reach LL 1.078 billion.

The state's lack of control over many revenue-generating sectors will this year again force the government to resort to borrowing to bridge a projected deficit of LL 2.921 billion, a figure which represents extraordinary credits still to be arranged. This covers the settlement of LL 481.72 million in outstanding debts carried forward from this year's budget.

Allocations Under the State Budget For 1982 (in Lebanese Pounds)

	Part I	Part II (A)	Part II (B)	Total
Presidency of the Republic	2,828,800	175,000	–	3,003,800
Parliament	23,047,400	80,000	–	23,127,400
Premiership	118,451,800	12,875,000	–	131,326,800
Ministry of Justice	52,241,800	–	–	52,241,800
Ministry of Foreign Affairs	84,463,700	–	–	84,463,700
Ministry of Interior	266,491,200	46,275,000	50,000,000	362,766,200
Ministry of Finance	82,774,600	4,870,000	–	87,644,600
Ministry of Defence	769,014,500	391,700,000	85,000,000	1,245,714,500
Ministry of Education and Fine Arts	931,131,600	11,025,000	61,000,000	1,003,156,600
Ministry of Public Health	176,283,100	15,645,000	–	191,928,100
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs	95,676,400	49,962,000	–	145,638,400
Ministry of Information	28,792,300	1,000,000	20,000,000	49,792,300
Ministry of Public Works and Communication	71,726,700	591,100,000	318,345,000	981,171,700
Ministry of Agriculure	16,692,400	52,771,000	–	69,463,400
Ministry of Economy and Trade	147,258,000	155,000	–	147,413,000
Ministry of Posts, Telegraph and Telephone	34,787,200	1,450,000	–	36,237,200
Ministry of Water and Electric Power	12,589,500	81,512,000	–	95,101,500
Ministry of Tourism	33,293,300	12,302,500	–	45,595,800
Ministry of Industry and Oil	3,053,700	665,000	–	3,718,700
Ministry of Housing and Cooperations	6,383,500	1,887,500	–	8,271,000
Loans Outstanding	481,728,000	–	–	481,728,000
Budgetary Reserves	695,495,500	–	–	695,495,500
Total	4,134,205,000	1,276,450,000	5,343,450,000	5,945,000,000

Projected State Revenue Under the 1982 Draft Budget (In Lebanese Pounds)

	Part I	Part II	Total
First section:			
Part I			
Direct Taxes and other Duties:	1,196,100,000	–	1,196,100,000
Second section:			
Indirect Taxes and Duties:	726,700,000	–	726,700,000
Third section:			
Revenue from State Property and Investments:	23,000,000	–	23,000,000
Fourth section:			
Other Receipts:	1,078,200,000	–	1,078,200,000

Fifth section:			
Drawings on Reserves	n.a.	–	n.a.
Part II			
Extraordinary Revenues	–	2,921,000,000	2,921,000,000
Total Revenue	**3,024,000,000**	**2,921,000,000**	**5,945,000,000**

CSO: 4400/35

BRIEFS

FUEL PRICES RISE--The price of fuel in Lebanon rose steeply last week as increases of between 36 and 100 per cent went into effect. New prices announced by Industry and Petroleum Minister Mohammed Youssef Beydoun on October 17 sent shock waves through the Lebanese economy. Fuel prices had for long been kept abnormally low by government subsidies which have led to a massive deficit for the country's autonomous fuel office. This had been due to reach LL 1.8 billion (about $400 million) by the end of this year. Although the precise timing of the increases came as a surprise to some, it was hardly an unexpected move. Low fuel prices, while they have helped keep down the cost of living index, were becoming an intolerable burden for Lebanon's depleted exchequer and had led to widespread abuses. According to one estimate, up to 20 per cent of the fuel imported into Lebanon has been smuggled out of the country to take advantage of the higher prices prevalent in neighbouring states. Prices have increased as follows: gasolene by 36.4 per cent; household kerosene by 100 per cent; heating oil by 57.2 per cent, fuel oil by 77 per cent; jet fuel by 90.3 per cent. These increases will hit everyone in Lebanon, from consumers of local produce to manufacturers. Next week, AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO will examine one important aspect of the price increases in an interview with George Carayan, Industrial Advisor to Middle East Airlines' Chairman Asad Nasr, concerning the import of the new fuel costs on operations by MEA, an airline already badly hit by financial losses. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 26 Oct 81 p 5]

FRUIT EXPORTS DECREASE--Lebanon exported a total of 172,520 tons of fruit in the first six months of this year, compared with a total of 188,168 tons in the corresponding period last year; a fall of 8.3 per cent, according to statistics released by the Lebanese Fruit Bureau. Syria, which has for many years topped the list of customers for Lebanese fruit, accounted for almost 50 per cent of total exports. The Lebanese Fruit Bureau figures show that 91 per cent of Lebanon's fruit exports go to five Arab countries. In the first six months of this year, Syria took 84,662 tons, Saudi Arabia 39,074 tons, Kuwait 19,980 tons, Iraq 8,017 tons and Jordan 5,038 tons. Apples and citrus fruit are the main fruits exported by Lebanon. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 26 Oct 81 p 5]

CSO: 4400/35

BRIEFS

DROUGHT REMEDIES SOUGHT--As part of the efforts to end the drought crisis in the Azki district and help the inhabitants to overcome the crisis, the government provided one-quarter of a million riyals in order to repair aqueducts and a number of wells in the district. This is what Shaykh Abdallah Bin Khalfan al-Siyabi, the governor of Azki, stated in an interview with 'UMAN. His excellency said that 76,450 riyals were earmarked to repair the aqueducts on which the district depends for agricultural irrigation. He indicated that restoration includes removal of deposits from the springs and rebuilding of canals used in water distribution. He also said that the restoration process will alleviate the acuteness of the crisis from which the inhabitants suffer. Concerning the general growth witnessed in the district, he said that Azki district, like other districts, has received its share of numerous services. The governor said that the beginning of school and the return of students to their classes was a welcome sight and contributed to the revival of activities in the district. He also said that the government's assistance to the inhabitants contributed to a large extent to the development of the district. It also leads to new housing developments which made the urban areas much larger. [Text] [Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 3] 9786

PORT IMPROVEMENTS UNDERWAY--'UMAN's learned from official sources at the department of port services that work on container loading facility is progressing, and the station is expected to be in operation next November. The same sources added that once work is completed at the station, the port will see considerable change in efficiency and capacity to receive ocean liners carrying containers. Upon touring the port's anchorages, which were packed with huge ships, the reporter noticed the absence of piled goods, a reflection of efficiency in loading and unloading. She also noticed the presence of a huge ocean liner by the name ("Wiskendre Beni") carrying approximately 1,442 containers. When questioned about the liner in the port, the official sources said that for the first time since its construction, the port receives this kind of vessel which is 745 feet long, 31.5 feet deep, weighs 26,757 tons, and carries 1,442 containers. The official sources stated that the port will be receiving similar ships once work on the container loading facilities has been completed. Then they added that the officials of the company owning the above mentioned liner expressed their admiration for port efficiency and praised the available services. The developments in the port will help stimulate trade. [Text] [Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 6 Sep 81 p 3] 9786

FERTILIZER MANUFACTURING FACILITY--Preparations are underway to found the first Jordanian corporation in Amman for manufacturing organic and chemical fertilizers. His excellency Muhammad al-Zubayr, minister of trade and industry issued a decision regarding the founding of that corporation. His action is a part of the ministry's plan to carry out important industrial projects. The corporation will build, operate, and administer a project for making organic and chemical fertilizers from garbage, wastes, and other chemicals which are necessary for fertilizer production, and undertaking all the work related to that industry including the import of raw materials, tools, equipment, machines. It will also undertake the activities of trade agencies which are related to the activities of the corporation. The corporation capital has been set at one million Omani riyals. This capital is divided into 100,000 shares at a value of 10 riyals each. Subscription is taking place and will be in effect until the end of this month (September). All the corporation shares are nominal. Its ownership is limited to Omani citizens and companies that are wholly owned by Omanis. Non-Omanis cannot own shares either in their names or through Omani citizens. The corporation headquarters will be in Muscat, and may be transferred to any other place in the sultanate. The board of directors may establish branches or representatives or proxies in any place in the country or abroad. It is expected that the corporation will start manufacturing organic and chemical fertilizers within 18 months from the end of this month, right after the subscription procedure is over and after the charter of the corporation has been approved. [Text] [Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 15 Sep 81 p 3] 9786

CSO: 4404/16

PROGRESS ON KABIR AL-SHIMALI DAM NOTED

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 10 Sep 81 p 2

[Text]

DAMASCUS, (ST) — The Director-General of the General Establishment of Major Projects (GEMP), Mr. Adnan Ibrahim, paid a visit to the Kabeer al-Shimali river Dam, southeast Lattakia recently. The project is for irrigating 14,000 hectares around Lattakia, providing drinking water and preventing floods.

The main part of the project, the dehydration of its bed has been completed by the GEMP.the bed will be connected with the channel being implemented by the General Company for Irrigation Construction (GCIC). The dehydration work was completed with locally made vertical pumps installations and know-how, with a high degree of efficiency. The GCIC has completed the greater part of the work on the channel, and will complete the rest by the end of 1982. The GEMP has also carried out the major part of earth filling, which will form the body of the dam.

The project site is located 25 kilometres northeast Lattakia. It includes irrigation and drainage networks for reclaimed lands, which will be cultivated with fruit trees and vegetables. It will also supply water to 34 villages having 40,000 inhabitants.

The work on the dam, which is the second most important in Syria, after that of the Euphrates, started in 1978, and is expected to be completed by the end of 1984.

The lake formed by the dam will be 9 kilometres long. The dam's area is 8 square kilometres. Its storage capacity is 210 million cubic metres of water. The body of the dam is constituted of earth and humus. It will have two outlets on both sides and a special irrigation outlet with 7-kilometre channel.

The completed part of the project constitutes 95 percent of earth-removing works, 70 percent of the digging works for the irrigation outlet and channel and all the expansion and transfer of the river bed to its eastern bank. Removed earth of the two outlets, so far, amounted to 200,000 cubic metres. This is in addition to filling and removing earth, construction of roads and workshops for temporary period during the work.

CSO: 4400/34

EFFORTS TO DEVELOP TRANSPORT SECTOR DISCUSSED

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 10 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] The transport sector is considered one of the most important of services sector in any country. Owing to this fact, transport facilities in Syria have been given special priority.

Since 1974 when the Ministry of Transport was established, it has drawn up plans to develop and organize means of transportation by devoting attention to all three means of transport: air, land and sea.

In the course of the implementation of its plans and programmes, the Ministry of Transport aims to utilize all its possible potentials. The Ministry also worked out a plan to carry out transport projects, included in the fourth and fifth 5-year plans.

In the field of railways, the Ministry of Transport exerted efforts to ensure the best services to passengers whose number totalled 1.5 million in 1980. The amount of goods, transported through the railways, has increased from 2 million tonnes in 1979, to 2.5 million in 1980. It is anticipated that this figure will gradually increase in response to the urgent need to use railways together with the other means of transport for the transportation of goods and passengers.

The Ministry is working hard to construct new railways and of improved quality to meet the increasing need for transportation, particularly following the general development of the various sectors in Syria. When development projects are completed, the total length of Syrian railways will be 2,466 kms. Among Syria's most important railway projects are:

— The railway between Lattakia and Qamishli. The length of this project is 750 kms. It was constructed at a cost of LS 208 million. It was put into operation early this year. This project links the north-east part of Syria with the port of Lattakia.

— The railway line which links Homs with Damascus. The cost of this project is estimated at about LS 363 million. It is expected that the 207 kms-long railway will be completed by the end of 1983.

— The railway which links Homs with the phosphate mines via the village of Mhinz. The total length of this railway line is 165 kms. It is now going through the final stage of construction. This LS 172 million railway line will carry phosphate from the interior of Syria to the Tartous port through the city of Homs.

— Another important railway project currently being carried out aims to operate the Aleppo-Hama-Homs railway line. The cost of this 230 kms project is estimated at LS 211 million. The Syrian Construction Work Company, one of the public sector companies, has been entrusted with the execution of this project.

In addition to the foregoing projects, there is a number of railway projects in the east and north governorates of the country. Some of these minor projects have been completed and some are still under construction.

The Ministry of Transport is considering the possibility of constructing three railway lines to link Deir ez-Zour with Abu Kamal, Lattakia with Tartous and Palmyra with Deir ez-Zour.

The Ministry of Transport has also signed contracts with some foreign companies to import railway carriages and other transport vehicles to carry goods, cereals, phosphate and cement from the places of production to the areas of consumption or exportation. It has also held training courses for employees working in the railway service and developed its employment system.

With regards to the Hijaz railway which links Syria with Saudi Arabia through Jordan, a report on the economic importance of this project was discussed by the conference of Arab Transport Ministers which was held recently in Riyadh. The governments concerned decided to give it priority over the local projects of each of the countries concerned.

Ports and harbours have likewise been given much attention by the Ministry of Transport in order to develop them and to find solutions for the problems impeding their efficiency.

The Lattakia harbour has been supplied with modern machinery including lorries, tractors, pilot vessels and cranes. 206 ships in 1980 anchored in Lattakia. Three million tonnes of goods were carried through the harbour of which 2.5 million tonnes were imported goods. Several construction projects are being carried out at the Lattakia harbour. They include an LS 4 million project to improve passenger quays and another project to build more warehouses.

In regard to the Tartous port, the General Company of Major Projects is now constructing pavements and yards and setting up service buildings. A total of LS 328 million has been allocated for the carrying out of these projects. More than five million tonnes of goods were carried through the Tartous port of which 1.5 tonnes were exported goods. The Ministry of Transport plans to enlarge and develop the Tartous port to make it capable of receiving large ships.

Moreover, a number of ports are being built for picnic and fishing purposes. These include the one which will be established in Lattakia on an area of 12 hectares. This port is due to be put into operation soon. Two other similar ports are under construction in Banias and Jeblah. The projected port of Jeblah, however, will also be used for commercial purposes. These two ports are scheduled to be completed in 1982.

The Syrian Navigation Company will purchase four ships in addition to the three ships it now owns.

This foregoing survey of Syria's achievements in the field of transport is an example of the rapid development taking place in Syria in all fields of life.

CSO: 4400/34

BRIEFS

SOVIET LOAN FOR RAILWAYS--Damascus, (ST)--The Syrian government has recently ratified the economic agreement between Syria and the Soviet Union. The agreement was signed in Moscow on May 14, 1981. According to the agreement, the Soviet Union is to offer Syria a 10-year loan of 40 million rubles for the financing of the following projects: 1. building a 150 km railway between Deir ez-Zour and Abu Kamal; 2. building a 90 km railway between Tartous and Lattakia, and a 10 km minor railway leading to the Tartous Cement Factory; 3. preparing a study for governmental farms projects at the Euphrates' center which will cover an area of 4,000 hectares; 4. preparing a study for the economic and technical feasibility of the use of hydro-electric resources; and 5. constructing vocational training centers and a technical institute. According to the agreement, Syria will pay back its debt in its products. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 10 Sep 81 p 2]

INDUSTRIAL EXHIBIT IN LIBYA--Damascus, (ST)--The Syrian industrial exhibition in Libya has been very successful. Sales at it amounted to $50 million and contracts signed there are expected to total $500 million, according to the Minister of Industry, Dr. Hussein Qadi. The exhibition was opened on September 20. Libya, which has 3 million inhabitants, besides a number of foreign employees and workers, is an important market. It is also a centre for third-country trade, because of its exports to many African countries. The exhibition was held during the anniversary of the Libyan Revolution. It was organized in cooperation with Libyan officials who helped to make it a success. Libyan people and firms were encouraged to sign contracts for imports from Syria. The popularity of Syrian goods proved their high quality and the skill of Syrian craftsmanship. Exhibitors also had the chance top acquaint themselves with the requirements of Libyan markets and coordinate with trade firms there for meeting their requirements. Dr. Qadi said that the most important products displayed were textiles, carpets, refrigerators, various metal products and handcraft items. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 28 Sep 81 p 2]

TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH LIBYA--Tripoli, (SANA)--A commercial cooperation agreement has been signed here between Syria and Libya within the framework of strengthening bilateral economic and commercial relations which was stressed by the Syrian and Libyan Ministers of Industry following their recent meeting in Damascus. The agreement includes the following points according to which commercial exchange and economic cooperation are to be made: 1. The Syrian side is to provide a list of its various products, and to specify the quantities which can be exported

to Libya. The Libyan side shall specify its requirements of these products according to Libya's 1982 budget. 2. The Syrian side is to carry out a study on the possibility of developing its products, to meet the requirements of Libyan markets of various goods. The Libyan side will grant Syrian products priority of import over other Arab goods. 3. A joint follow-up committee will be set up. It will hold regular meetings in the capitals of the two countries. It will submit reports to the Syrian Minister of Industry and the Libyan Secretary of Economy. 4. The two sides will increase direct relations between firms of the two countries, and seek to sign long-term contracts. It was also agreed that representatives of firms from both countries would meet in the near future in Damascus to make practical arrangements for signing trade contracts. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 5 Oct 81 p 2]

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END

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KUWAIT DAILY REFUTES IRANIAN CLAIMS ON TRAINING IRAQIS

GF031614 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 3 Nov 81 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "Tehran's Confused Insinuations"]

[Excerpt] One no longer wonders about what Tehran does. Regrettably, its attitude does not stem from a responsible state. Thus, we were not astonished that its official news agency has published a report that conceals intrigue and lacks the simplest elements of logic. The article claims that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are offering military training for Iraqi youths in order to protect the ruling regime in Iraq. The article continues its unfounded claims by saying that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia finance the training of Iraqi youths and provide them with wealth and arms in special training camps....etc. It is obvious that whoever listens to this realizes--in advance--that this statement is weak, noisy and meaningless. Iraq can train its own youths, establish training camps for them on its own soil and provide them with trainers without asking for such help from its brothers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

This attitude, recently reached by Tehran, discloses the situation Iran has reached particularly in its shaky position toward Iraq and toward its continuing war against it. As a result of disability the Iranian imagination invents tales and stories in order to justify its previous and upcoming aggressions against Kuwait by claiming that Kuwait offers military aid to Iraq. However, Tehran knows well that Iraq is not in need of such aid and that it is capable of fulfilling the confrontation that has been imposed on it.

Iran wants to justify its rejection of all initiatives proposed by the region's states and by the general Islamic move in order to put an end to this war and restore peace in the region by respecting rights and sovereignty and by non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states.

CSO: 4404/93

ARIG TO UNDERWRITE ITS FUTURE

London 8 DAYS in English No 42, 24 Oct 81 pp 4-5

[Article by Nigel Ash]

[Text]

THE Arab Insurance Group (ARIG), capital $3bn, was launched last week in Bahrain to a mixture of enthusiasm and guarded comment. The enthusiasm came from the three equal shareholders in the project, Libya, Kuwait and the UAE, who have so far paid up $150m of the mammoth share capital. The reservations came from members of Lloyd's of London, to whose hegemony of the insurance world ARIG will pose a further challenge.

Lloyd's committee chairman Peter Green was guest of honour at the three-day inauguration ceremony in Manama, for which ARIG had flown in favoured journalists and guests from the international reinsurance community at a rumoured cost of Bahraini dinars 2.5m ($6.6m).

Green made the point that competition was welcome but went on to warn: 'In England we have a proverb which we all learn at our mother's knee and it is that one shouldn't run before one has learnt to walk. There are too many cases of people who have tried it and fallen flat on their faces.' The remark, made during a speech at an ARIG cocktail party, did not go down well. Some ARIG supporters believed that when Green went on to congratulate ARIG on placing 30 per cent of their reinsurance so far on the Lloyd's market, he was going too far. The attitude among leading Lloyd's underwriters and brokers, who were also guests at the launch, was less aggressive.

It was pointed out, however, that when fully capitalised, ARIG would have nearly three-quarters the capacity of Lloyd's, and twenty times that of New York. British and, to a lesser extent, US insurance men, used for so long to having underwriting virtually to themselves, find such potential penetration hard to conceive.

But ARIG's Kuwaiti chairman Fawzi Musaad al Saleh, who has wide business interests apart from the new insurance giant, appeared not in the least put out by the reservations of the insurance establishment: 'Perhaps Mr Green's children didn't learn to walk before they were eight months old,' he told *8 Days*, 'but mine were walking after three months.'

Though ARIG intends to start dealing as a reinsurers, dealing specifically with international treaty and facultative (individual risk) business, the plan is to launch underwriting of direct insurance as soon as is 'sensible'. This will be done through a network of group companies, joint ventures and branch offices or agencies throughout the world. *8 Days* has learnt that ARIG will soon be opening a London contact office at Plantation House, in the City.

The company actually started operations last July. At that time, chairman Al Saleh said he expected gross premium income to be $50m by October 1982. However ARIG say the group's performance in its first three months of operation suggests that the figure will be nearer $100m.

The exact dimension of that performance remains somewhat obscure. ARIG representatives would not be specific except to say that the company had picked up a number of deals, including one with the Kuwaiti-based United Arab Shipping Company (UASC). Unofficial sources put their premium income thus far at $17.5m, though a director of the company insisted to *8 Days* that they were already short of the

$50m target set for this time next year. This disparity in figures probably represents the difference between written and accounted premium income.

One of the big problems that ARIG now faces is amassing the right insurance talent to compete in what has for some years now been a depressed and relatively cut-throat market. Farook Khwaja, their leading underwriter, told *8 Days* that the company had ten underwriters, all expatriates, none of whom had less than 20 years' experience.

ARIG intends to train their own people, but for the meantime it is admitted that they must rely on imported help. Throughout the three-day inauguration, rumours were rife that one medium-size London underwriters was about to be bought by ARIG, but both ARIG and representatives of the London firm concerned refused to comment. While such a take-over would certainly be useful to the Arab company, it is not urgent, given the company's intention to stick to reinsurance for the immediate future.

One thing ARIG does need though is a general manager. It is understood that the board feel the post should be filled by an Arab and there are a number of people qualified for the job. It is not known what difficulties have so far prevented an appointment.

CSO: 4400/33

HUNGARY SEEKS UAE TRADE

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 24 Oct 81 p 18

[Article by Yusuf Urdoh]

[Text]

HUNGARY expects to boost its exports to the UAE from 3.5 million dollars last year to five million dollars in the current year, which will be a 30 per cent increase.

Managing director-cum-vice president of the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, Professor Tamas Beck, told Khaleej Times there was good scope for his country to improve trade links with the Middle East.

Prof. Beck, who is also the general manager of a major textile company in his country, Budaflax, which exports 50 per cent of its products met Said bin Ahmed Otaiba, president of both Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the UAE Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FCCI) besides top officials from these two organisations.

Trade links

He explained that their trade links with Kuwait were strong and was making a remarkable progress. The direct air route, which has been connecting the two states in the last three years," had helped the trade.

He said such facilities would no doubt have helped their nations' trade with other Gulf countries. They could compete in many areas.

To illustrate the point, he spelled out that they had some remarkable advantages in the fields of irrigation, railways, electronic and electric equipment, power stations and sub-power stations, fertilizers, pesticides and autobuses.

He said that they had a huge transport company, which operates a very large fleet of heavy duty vehicles to the Middle East plus a large number of ships which shuttled between East Europe and this part of the world.

"Hence, when it comes to transport we have no problems other than those facing all the European countries," he commented.

He added that it was not their aim to widen only their markets in the Middle East but they were intent to strengthen their links with the world as a whole.

"Well right now, we are coming from Bangkok where we held a huge exhibition for the products of 21 Hungarian companies," said Prof. Beck.

New drive

He pointed out that the new drive by the Hungarian business community was the result of a fresh government policy which gave more prerogatives to the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce.

"Only last January the Chamber of Commerce was reorganised. Men who are actually involved in different aspects of the country's business activities were given the responsibility of running the organisation. This brought with it a high degree of efficiency," he emphasised.

For instance, he went on, the new president was and still is the president the company which produces aluminium in the country. He added that the same thing was true of all the vice-presidents and other top office bearers.

Referring to the current unrest in Poland, Prof. Beck said it had no influence on business relations between his country and this trouble-torn East European nation. He claimed that Poland had fulfilled all its commitments to the other Comecon nations this year.

Hungary earns dollars five billion from its exports to dollar areas. However, it is the fifth East European exporter to Abu Dhabi after Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Poland. The total East European imports to Abu Dhabi last year was Dh 97,770,606.

CSO: 4400/41

BRIEFS

CHADIAN DELEGATION MEETS SAUDI OFFICIAL--Riyadh, 21 Oct (SPA)--The Foreign Ministry under secretary for political affairs, Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman Mansuri, today received a delegation from Chad comprising Minister of State for Interior and Security Mahamat Abba Said; Labor Minister Tchori Affono and roving ambassador in the Middle East Abdullah Adam. They were accompanied by the Chad charge d'affaires in the kingdom, Musa Nana. The delegation handed Shaykh Mansuri a letter from the Chad president to his majesty the king. The delegation explained the development of the situation in Chad. Bilateral relations were also reviewed. [Text] [LD211448 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1145 GMT 21 Oct 81]

KHALID CONGRATULATES BREZHNEV--His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz sent congratulatory cables to His Excellency President Leonid Brezhnev, chairman of USSR Presidium, and His Excellency President Houphouet-Boigny, the president of the Ivory Coast, on the occasion of their countries' national days. The cables expressed his majesty's congratulations to the two leaders and his wishes for continued progress and success for the peoples of the two countries. [Text] [LD071730 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 7 Nov 81]

SAUDI OFFICIAL MEETS COSTA RICAN DELEGATION--Foreign Ministry Under Secretary for Political Affairs Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman Mansuri met today with a Costa Rican delegation that includes Foreign Minister Bernd Niehaus, Energy Minister Fernando Altmann and Costa Rican Ambassador to the Kingdom Miguel Yamuni Tabush. During the meeting the situation in Central America and the situation in the Middle East were discussed. The two sides also discussed Saudi Arabia's peace plan, which was welcomed by the Costa Rican delegation, as well as economic relations between the two countries and means of expanding them. [Text] [GF071932 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 7 Nov 81]

BRAZILIAN ENERGY MINISTER IN SAUDI ARABIA--Cesar Cals de Oliveira, the Brazilian minister of mines and energy, arrived in Riyadh tonight on a 3-day visit to Saudi Arabia. During the visit he will hold talks with Shaykh Zaki Ahmad Yamani, the Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral affairs, on cooperation in the petroleum field. The Brazilian mines and energy minister stated that his visit comes within the framework of the exchange of visits between the officials of the two countries to enhance and bolster bilateral relations. [Text] [GF071920 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 7 Nov 81] Brazilian Mines and Energy Minister Cesar Cals de Oliveira left Riyadh this afternoon after a 1-day visit to the kingdom. During this visit he held talks with Petroleum and Mineral Affairs Minister Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani on oil cooperation. [Text] [GF081932 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 8 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/94

IRAQI LOANS TO JORDAN

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 27 Oct 81 pp 1, 8

[Text]

Amman, Monday

The Iraqi Fund for external Development will extend loans to Jordan to finance development projects according to an agreement signed yesterday by the two countries.

The agreement was signed by visiting Iraqi First Deputy Premier and member of the Revolution Command Council, Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan, and by the Jordanian Prime Minister, Mr Mudhar Badran.

Speaking on the occasion Mr. Ramadhan had words of thanks for the hospitality with which he was received.

Commenting on bilateral relations, he said that for a long time relations between the two countries had been characterised by cooperation and coordination in all fields, adding that this was in line with directives of President Saddam Hussein emanating from the belief in Arab unity.

The First Deputy Premier went on referring to rising level of cooperation between Iraq and Jordan, which had encompassed new fields particularly in economic coordination.

Mr Ramadhan described his talks with Jordanian officials as "successfull and fruitfull" and to have lead to the endorsement of a comprehensive cooperation framework.

The Jordanian Premier on the other hand speaking on the occasion stressed that meetings between the two sides emphasised the wish to develop cooperation and were aimed at economic integration and Arab unity.

At another level, minutes of the meetings of the Iraqi-Jordanian Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation were signed yesterday by the Iraqi Minister of Trade and member of the Revolution Command Council, Mr Hassan Ali and by his Jordanian counterpart, Mr Waleed Anfour.

Accoding to the minutes, three committees will be set up to follow up trade exchange between the two countries, in addition to industrial and mineral, transport and housing cooperation. Another committee would look after technical and scientific coperation.

A new joint Iraqi-Jordanian company was also formed yesterday. The company, the Iraqi-Jordanian company of industry was signed by Mr Mohammed Tahir al-Hayali, chairman of the Iraqi Establishment for food Industries and by the Deputy Jordanian Industry Minister, Mr Mohammed Salih al-Hourani.

CSO: 4400/43

BRIEFS

IRAQIS RELEASED BY SYRIANS--Beirut, 2 Nov (INA)--The Syrian deterrent forces today detained eight Iraqi Embassy employees on the road to Beirut International Airport. They were on their way to the airport accompanied by a car of the Lebanese internal security forces to bid farewell to a colleague. During their detention, the embassy employees were beaten by elements of the Syrian deterrent forces. Iraqi Ambassador to Lebanon 'Abd al-Razzaq Muhammad contacted Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis, Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus on this subject, after which the detainees were released. The Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was fired upon on 21 October from a nearby Syrian deterrent forces checkpoint. [Text] [JN021859 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1850 GMT 2 Nov 81]

PDRY CHAIRMAN VISITS KUWAIT--'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the YSP Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers, will arrive in Kuwait tomorrow, Sunday, on a 2-day visit during which he will hold talks with his highness the amir on bilateral relations and current Arab issues. The talks are being held before the Gulf Cooperation Council summit that will be held on 10 November and before the Fes Arab summit that will be held on 25 November. During these summits, various Arab and international issues will be reviewed. AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM has learned that during the PDRY chairman's visit, Kuwait will discuss the outcome of the efforts the government has made to overcome the difficulties obstructing good relations between Oman and the PDRY. Kuwait will also raise the issue of the role that Kuwait can play in normalizing relations between the Sultanate of Oman and the PDRY. Reliable sources say that there is an interest in keeping the region free from all international conflicts so that appropriate measures can be taken for the extensive work required for the welfare of this region, its development and prosperity. Meanwhile, reliable sources have said that contacts have been made among the Gulf states to assess the current stand, particularly after the U.S. Senate's approval of the AWACS deal to Saudi Arabia. Official sources have considered this approval an Arab victory over the Zionist lobby in Washington. [Excerpt] [GF311707 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 31 Oct 81 p 3]

KHALID RECEIVES ALGERIAN PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE--His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz received today (al-Khaybra) al-Ibrahimi and 'Abd al-Hamid al-Mihari, members of the ruling party in Algeria. They conveyed a message from Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid to His Majesty King Khalid. The meeting was attended by His Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, His Highness 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd

al-'Aziz, Defense and Aviation Minister His Highness Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Foreign Minister His Highness Sa'ud al-Faysal and the king's adviser Rashad Far'un. [Excerpt] [GF021939 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 2 Nov 81]

YAR MESSAGE TO BAHRAINI AMIR--Bahraini Amir His Highness Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman al Khalifah has received a message from his brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. The message, which was conveyed by brother 'Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud, Consultative Council member, to Shaykh 'Isa in Manama today, is related to relations between the two fraternal states and issues pertaining to the forthcoming Arab summit conference. Dr 'Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud said that the current Arab and international developments were also reviewed during the meeting. [Text] [JN091746 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 9 Nov 81]

'ARAFAT-SAUDI OFFICIALS MEETING--Riyadh, 4 Nov (SPA)--Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, has made it clear that the Saudi peace plan includes new and constructive principles. 'Arafat, in an interview with today's AL-JAZIRAH described his meeting with His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, his Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, crown prince and chairman of the Council of Ministers, and senior officials in Saudi Arabia as an important meeting which stressed the firm stand of the Saudi Government and people in supporting the case of the Palestine people in their just struggle. The meeting stressed the continuation of this support and backing until the flag of our nation is hoisted above Jerusalem. Regarding the AWACS deal for Saudi Arabia, 'Arafat expressed his hope that the Americans will understand that their Arab interests are more important than their interests with the Zionist entity. [Text] [LD041124 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1004 GMT 4 Nov 81]

LIBYAN SUB TO PLO--Mid-East reports, circulating in Egypt, Oman and Saudi Arabia, claim that Libya's President Muammar Qadhdhafi has purchased and is outfitting a submarine for PLO terrorists. The vessel, it is reported, was built in West Germany, carries a crew of 35 and was purchased through Turkey. No official confirmation of this report can be obtained, but it is recalled that PLO propagandists have repeatedly threatened that when the time was ripe, they would sink a tanker. This, it is stated, could be Qadhdhafi's revenge for the shooting down of two of his fighters by US F-14 Tomcats over the Mediterranean. The submarine is thought to be a Type 209, built by Howaldswerke, of Kiel, and is armed with eight 21-inch torpedo tubes, with an underwater speed of 22 knots. The type is considered ideal for limited operations in the relatively shallow waters of the Mediterranean. The threat of a PLO-owned submarine is being taken seriously in view of Pres Qadhdhafi's previous threats to attack civilian targets. When a party of wealthy European and American Jews chartered the British luxury liner Queen Elizabeth 2 for a cruise to commemorate the founding of the State of Israel, the giant ship had to be escorted by NATO naval frigates. This was after thinly-veiled threats from Qadhdhafi that the ship, laden with Zionists who had contributed generously to Israeli causes, would never make it past Libya to its destination of Haifa, at the eastern end of the Mediterranean. [By Aida Parker] [Text] [Johannesburg THE CITIZEN in English 14 Oct 81 p 8]

LIBYA FAVORS SYRIAN PRODUCTS--Tripoli, (SANA)--The Libyan Secretary of Economy, Mr Abu Zaid Doura, received here on Monday the Syrian Minister of Industry, Mr Hussein al-Qadi, and discussed promotion of their trade relations and exchange of industrial products. The Libyan Secretary promised to give preference to Syrian industrial products in the import programme of Libya. The Syrian Minister visited in the afternoon the Secretariat for Heavy Industries and discussed with the Libyan officials there the coordination of industrial cooperation between the two countries. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 22 Sep 81 p 2]

IRAQI, JORDANIAN TRANSPORT FIRM--Amman--The governments of Jordan and Iraq yesterday formed a transport company to step up the Iraqi use of Jordan's bustling port at Aqaba on the Red Sea. The company was formed following talks between Jordan's King Hussein and an Iraqi delegation led by First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan. After Iranian planes bombed Iraqi ports in the Shatt Al-Arab, King Hussein threw open his harbour at Aqaba to receive goods bound for Iraq. Spokesman for the two delegations said the transport company owns 750 trucks and should put another 450 into operation by sometime next month. The Iraqi deputy premier also discussed trade and economic relations and the general situation in the Middle East with King Hussein and later with Jordanian Premier Mudar Badran. [Text] [Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 26 Oct 81 p 22]

CSO: 4400/41

OIL SLUMP BITES DEEPER INTO OPEC

London 8 DAYS in English No 39, 3 Oct 81 pp 55-56

[Text]

PLUNGING DEMAND for Opec oil is hitting the exporters' group harder than even its most inveterate western foes imagined a few months ago.

Estimates of how much oil the 13 Opec members are actually producing vary considerably, although there is no doubt that output is well below last year's 27m barrels a day. In a buyers' market, sellers are naturally cautious about giving away their true position. Oil industry sources said, however, that the Opec total last month was probably running at between 20.1m and 20.3m barrels daily, and according to the Paris-based Arab Centre for Petroleum Studies it went even lower mid-month, to 19.15m b/d.

Oil Minister Subruto of Indonesia, Opec's current president, blamed the slump in demand for Opec oil in part on factors that will have a permanent effect — the use of more coal and other alternatives to oil by the West, and the introduction of fuel-efficient homes, cars and machines.

However, Subruto, speaking at an oil seminar in Oxford, UK, did not rule out the possibility of a quick turnabout in the oil market, although he acknowledged that world demand would probably not rise as fast in the 1980s as was previously predicted.

Temporary factors were also depressing demand, Subruto said. Aside from world recession and consumers' short-term reaction to high prices, he listed two other such factors — high interest rates and the oil market's peculiar psychology.

High US interest rates, which have been buoying the US dollar on world currency markets, have added at least 10 per cent to the cost of crude imports in many countries outside the US, forcing up pump prices and keeping down petrol consumption: Opec crude oil is priced in dollars.

High interest rates also make it more costly to store oil. Companies usually build up their stocks ahead of the winter, when cold snaps can cause sudden peaks in consumption, but this year companies are running them down from record levels.

Oil industry sources report that a possible 1.25m b/d are now flowing out of stocks, when companies would normally be building them up by at least 2m b/d. The companies feel free to run stocks down in the expectation that a tight market will not develop, and that the price will not rise. It makes sense to hold oil when prices are rising to reap lucrative stock profits.

On this aspect of market psychology, Subruto said: 'Things could turn around quickly. Expectations can just as likely speed up a reversal in the oil market when prices and production stabilise within Opec.' Western industry sources question this. 'You have to be careful about whistling in the wind,' an official with one major company said.

But officials at the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), which groups 21 western oil consuming nations, say they think the fall in demand for Opec oil should bottom out this winter. That does not mean prices will climb. But the risk of Opec falling apart in a desperate scramble among the 13 members to undercut one another will

recede as demand creeps up.

Even now, all the exporters — other than Iraq and Iran — could probably sell as much oil as they needed to, were it not for the pricing and production policies of Saudi Arabia, the biggest exporter. Western bankers calculate that the Saudis could meet revenue needs producing only about two-thirds of their present 9m b/d.

But the Saudis, determined to enforce their moderate pricing ideas on Opec hawks, say no major reduction in their output can be expected until Opec realigns prices at a level closer to their own rate of $32 a barrel, Opec's lowest.

There is also growing support, apparently, for Saudi Oil Minister Sheikh Yamani's underlying view that, once realigned, Opec prices should be frozen until the end of 1982 and then raised only gradually — a strategy designed to tempt the consumer back to oil.

Industry executives tend to agree, but raise the question of what might happen to Opec if Iraq and Iran stop fighting and try to boost war-restricted exports before demand has recovered sufficiently. Between them they could produce at least 3m b/d more than at present.

CSO: 4400/33

EXILE GROUP DESCRIBES ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INVASION

Lahore DAILY NAWA-I-WAQT in English 16 Oct 81 p 8

[Article by the Association for Information and Documentation of Afghanistan]

[Text]

The following article was prepared by the Association for Information and Documentation of Afghanistan. The association is a news service recently established by Afghan exiles, with offices in Paris and Peshawar, Pakistan.

The disastrous impact of the Soviet presence on Afghanistan's economy leads an ambiguous flavor to some of the Kremlin's latest declarations on the situation.

For example, in its response to the holding of a Peoples' Tribunal on Afghanistan in Stockholm in May (document submitted by a Soviet embassy in Western Europe to the tribunal), the Soviet government pointed out that before the April 1978 "revolution," the country stagnated in conditions of serious underdevelopment: "One of the poorest and least developed states in the world. In 1977 per capita income was only $162. ... 89% of the population was rural .... Despite favorable conditions for the development of agriculture, stockbreeding and mining industries in Afghanistan, the greater part of its needs in foodstuffs and consumer goods had to be imported...."

By first putting the whole debate on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan on an economic plane, the Soviet Union would like to justify its intervention there. Indefensible in terms of international law, highly objectionable in terms of human suffering, the Soviet invasion could somehow find a sort of post facto legitimacy in terms of future economic benefits to be bestowed on the occupied land.

A diplomat from the Afghan Democratic Republic's embassy in Paris apparently agreed with the Soviet point of view in a press conference held on June 30, 1981: "We should like to emphasize, as the leaders of our country have often declared, that our recent economic progress has been due to the brotherly and disinterested help of the Soviet Union, which is now the determining factor in the economic development of our country." Sadly enough, the reality of the economic situation is a bit more complicated than that.

To begin with, any analysis of preoccupation Afghan economic life demands somewhat more sophistication. Actually, as a traditional agrarian and pastoral society, rural Afghanistan had worked out a balanced way of life in a specific geographical environment (arid and mountainous) many centuries ago.

Hierarchically organized, Afghan peasants maintained an extensive and delicate network of irrigation canals which enabled them to achieve self-sufficiency in food: The staple crop was wheat, while extensive sheep herding allowed maximum exploitation of the semi-desert steppes. Infant mortality was assuredly severe, but this checked population growth and limited pressure on available irrigated land. Traditional Afghanistan consequently avoided overpopulation and was free of famines and of the sort of abject misery of the Indian kind – the disastrous drought of 1973 being an exception.

Economic Transformations

To borrow an expression used by French geographer P. Gentelle (in his article in Temps Modernes, July/August 1980), Afghanistan was not "underdeveloped," but "nondeveloped": Economic transformations had not yet dislocated rural society and sent displaced peasants to dwell in slums around burgeoning industrial centers, as in so many Third World countries. The Afghan countryside before the Soviet occupation did not yet fit into such commonly accepted categories as "poverty" and "proletarianization."

Economic transformations, however, had become inevitable by the late 1960s. New roads linked Afghanistan with the rest of the world, while the country became progressively integrated into the international market. Such changes were bound to disturb the traditional social order. However, as it tentatively entered the path of modernization, (starting in 1953 but especially since 1963), Afghanistan did enjoy a number of natural resources, which were its own to use as it saw fit: These included notably natural gas and exploitable minerals.

What is extremely serious about the present situation is the new, unbalanced relationship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union now confiscates the country's resources and denies Afghanistan the right to use its own natural wealth, according to its own economic and social goals.

With the loss of political sovereignty comes a new kind of economy, the neocolonial type. Afghan "progress" or economic development is henceforth subordinated to specific Soviet needs. As a vassal state, Afghanistan's economic survival will have to depend on the requirements and fluctuations of Soviet priorities.

By paralyzing preoccupation Afghan economic activity and through rigid integration of Afghanistan into Soviet economic networks, the Soviet Union has virtually subjected the country – especially in the three key fields of energy, trade and transport.

It has already been years since the Soviet Union became our sole customer for Afghan natural gas, which is piped directly into Soviet Central Asia. Since the occupation, the Soviet Union no longer pays for this gas: instead, it deducts the gas's estimated value from the increasingly heavy debt owed by the Afghan government to the Soviet Union.

This debt essentially represents the costs of the Soviet Union's own military occupation of Afghanistan, which is charged to the Kabul government. The debt now amounts to about $3 billion. Even if this debt were no longer increased (which is impossible), it would take Afghanistan 10 years to discharge it according to the present flow of its gas to the Soviet Union.

Even this calculation is warped, because in any case the Soviet Union shows no sign of putting an end to its military occupation with

its attendant costs. Furthermore nobody really knows how much Afghan natural gas daily leaves the country except for Soviet technicians, who enjoy sole access to gas meters. Afghan officials are barred from the meters. Finally, in mid-1980s the Soviet Union priced Afghan natural gas at the rate of $83 per 1000 cubic meters, which is only half current world rates. In other words, Afghans are condemned to pay back a debt subject to constant inflation, with a natural resource whose price is constantly controlled and deflated by the creditor himself.

The hemorrhage of natural gas has forced industries in the Afghan North, such as the Mazar-e Sharif fertilizer and electric plants built for gas consumption, to switch to coal. However, owing to the success of the resistance forces in controlling many of the countryside, it has become difficult, not to say impossible, for these plants to enjoy access to coal. This has caused economic activity in Northern Afghanistan to plummet.

CSO: 4600/86

TOTAL ELECTRIFICATION BY 1990 SET AS GOAL

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 918, 25 Sep-1 Oct 81 pp 15-17

[Article by Y Sassi: "Increasing the Efforts"]

[Text] Discussing the problems of the general electrification of the country involves above all establishing for this operation the multiple dimensions involved and the weight of the impact which is simultaneously sociological, economic and cultural. The list of the things done and the blessings brought by electricity in effect is so long that it would be ambitious and difficult to make it complete. From the point of view of home lighting up to the functioning of industrial complexes, including the classic framework of family and national celebrations, the contribution of electricity is more than important. It almost makes it possible to give this kind of energy, on the same basis as air and water, the status of a vital element.

As a tool for development, it is also a valued advantage for the improvement of the living conditions of the masses. In terms of the plans for urban and rural development prevalent in the countries of the Third World, an Algerian sociologist has declared in particular that, "The fact of colonialism and then the mechanisms ....of dependence on other countries constitute the historical and ideological framework within which the communications networks are woven, the urban structures are prepared....the economic decisions are definitively made, and the constraints are measured which determine the 'choices' to be made in terms of urban and rural development."

For our country the choice is clear: in addition to the social objectives it is a question of carrying out properly a program of development which is independent and balanced between sectors and regions. Thus the general electrification of the country--far from being subordinated to the pursuit of profit, as in other countries--is conceived of as a social operation which should not be slowed down by considerations of pure profitability. The immediate objective for 1990 should in principle be the general electrification of the country.

The Context of the New Dimensions

The instrument for achievement of this objective is the National Electricity and Gas Company.

Shortly after independence the status of the electrification of the country reflected an unbalanced distribution, the logical consequence of the preceding policy of providing electricity. A privilege of the well-off--even if they lived in very isolated areas--the electricity network was of benefit to nearly 1,000 farms belonging to large landonwers, whereas only 450 towns and cities were connected to the system. The small amount of customers served (landowners, villages, and sections of cities mostly inhabited by French people), flagrantly distorted numerically in comparison with the number of electrical installations in place.

Coinciding with the reorganization of the national economy, the policy followed during the first few years of independence brought practically no change. On the contrary, a substantial decline in electricity consumption in homes and industries was to result from the departure of the French en masse: respectively, home consumption was down by 33 percent and industrial consumption was down by 20 percent between 1961 and 1963. A timid increase between 1965 and 1970 only resulted in providing electricity to 74 new villages and about 15,000 homes.

The strengthening of the monopoly on electricity production, the reworking of the old legislation pertaining to the EGA [Algerian Electricity and Gas Company], and its adaptation to the status of an instrument of development, as assigned to SONELGAZ [National Electricity and Gas Company]--there was a whole series of factors which would make it possible, beginning in 1969, to bring this national enterprise into the planned industrialization effort. The total installed capacity would be tripled in the decade from 1969 to 1979. Some 1,540 localities would be connected, for a total of 300,000 new subscribers. The rate of national electrification thus went up from 47 percent in 1969 to 63 percent in 1980.

It was in this context of rearranging the framework that the directors of SONELGAZ placed the idea of rural electrification. The efforts made in this direction, prior to independence, were only limited, short-term in scope, and only concerned a minority of privileged people. Elsewhere, the urban/rural division only corresponded to a concern with analysis and not in any precise way to a specific, geographic division. Without denying the need for the electrification of the countryside, there has therefore been a real ascending curve of regional development, a policy for the general electrification of the country which has been in effect since 1975. Socio-economic rationality required the development of a national electrification plan. Therefore, since 1975 a campaign for listing all of the regions to be provided with electricity has been underway. The PNE, the National Electrification Plan, approved by the government in March 1978, underlined the fact that the increasingly substantial efforts made were to be directed toward the least favored regions of the country.

Referring again to the objective of the total electrification of the country, as set down by the National Charter, the goal established is a rate of national electrification of 98 percent (in terms of the number of electricity subscribers as a percentage of the number of family units).

Setting Priorities for Actions Taken

In the first place, this involved the determination to establish a balance between provinces and then between districts, which would direct the choices to be made toward the least favored regions. The second main line of policy adopted is that of electrification for the mass of the people. Using "the principle of the bunch of grapes," a clean sweep was begun: all localities affected must be provided with electricity as the campaign develops, in order to avoid subsequent cost over-runs. Then priority was given to the main municipal centers, to socialist villages, and to the service of points for pumping drinking water or irrigation for land development. In this direction the criteria permitting the establishment of priorities among the projected action programs were developed. In terms of the pace of electrification of the country, a new stage was begun. However, this speeding-up process must be sustained, because the task remaining is very large and of vital importance. In January 1979, 909,000 family units in 11,000 population centers still remained to be hooked up. As 62 percent of this population is concentrated in about 2,500 centers, the relatively small scale as well as the geographic distribution of the other localities nevertheless have some impact on the rate of advance and the cost of the work to be undertaken. Thus, 53 percent of the population and 24 percent of the remaining centers will involve a small number of hookups, of between 50 and 100 each, respectively. In this connection the case of Setif province has been mentioned where, out of 1,072 "villages" remaining to be electrified up to the present, there are 496 centers which do not have even 50 inhabitants each.

Where does the electricity come from? Is production sufficient in terms of the substantial total consumption envisaged? This second question immediately led to some responses in numbers which exclude any foreseeable limit in this direction, among those responding to our questions. Our country has about 30 percent reserve production capacity. Moreover, the future needs of domestic consumption are relatively less than those of present industrial usage. The principal centers of present production, thermal generators, are concentrated on the coastal fringe of the country: North Algiers, Bougarik, Annaba, Oran, etc. These plants produce electricity principally by burning natural gas, with the use of fuel oil principally to be found in the South, where hydroelectric power is only used on a backup basis. Electricity transmission takes place on 60, 90, or 220 kilovolt high tension lines (kilovolt equals 1,000 volts) which are directed toward the major points of consumption, where a first stage of transformation makes it possible to develop a charge of 30,000 volts, or 19,000 volts for urban networks. Here, after transmission of electrical current through a final MT/BT (medium tension to low tension) transformer, the distribution network extending to the subscriber begins. A final touch needs to be added to this descriptive summary: the devotion to duty of the SONELGAZ personnel, for whom this work has its dangers.

During the past year the total effort made by the state has been particularly high: 620 million DA [Algerian dinars], compared to 480 million DA and 240 million DA in 1980 and 1979, respectively. On the basis of the needs of the provinces and the objectives of the National Electrification Plan, the levels of planned construction are determined, permitting the calculation of the financial proposals

required, which are submitted by SONELGAZ to the supervisory ministry. Of course, projected construction follows the principles set forth by the plan, particularly the principles of regional balance and mass-scale electrification. Between 1980 and 1982 the rate of electrification of the province of Adrar should go up from 46 percent to 66 percent (with an average annual extension of 170 kilometers in the medium tension and low tension network), while the rate for Annaba province will go up less perceptibly, with an average annual extension of 40 kilometers in the network. To cite another example, that of Setif province, the construction planned for is in the order of 300 kilometers of extension in the network per year.

Quite often unknown to the public is a very important point: the choice of the localities to be provided within the framework of the financial appropriation earmarked for the province is in no way within the competence of SONELGAZ, which is limited to performing the roles of construction instrument and technical consultant. Although technical and economic guidelines are provided by SONELGAZ, the decision, within the framework of the decentralization of power, is the sole responsibility of the local authorities. It is true that collaboration between the two authorities is required for the rapid and coherent progress of the National Electrification Plan.

A new momentum in the pace of construction has been recorded since the launching of this plan. Whereas the work done in 1978 permitted the construction of 1,500 kilometers of medium tension and low tension lines, the results have more than doubled by now to reach the level of 4,000 kilometers. This figure is expected to increase to 6,000 kilometers by the end of 1983. In many areas the efforts deployed have been substantial. For the implementation of the National Electrification Plan a Directorate of Electrification has been established, employing about 4,500 agents. Further, the expansion of this office into five regions of the country with a broad grant of autonomy will make it possible for each regional administrator to control all of the operations from the study stage until the construction activity, including transportation and supplies.

Another positive point: 80 percent of the material used is produced domestically. This point, valid as it is in terms of cost, should be tempered by the fact that imported items involve the products of the highest technology. Thus, transformers and insulators always come from abroad. Replacement of these items by SONELEC production is planned, which will make possible an almost total reliance on domestic manufacturing, but at a date still undetermined. Present SONELEC production relative to conductors and metal or reinforced concrete supports is carried on by SN-Metal [National Metal Construction Company] and ONAMHYD [National Hydroelectric Materials Office], while the relatively small number of wooden supports are imported.

Thus, substantial human, material and financial resources have been earmarked for the achievement of the National Electrification Plan whose cost has been estimated at 12 billion DA and whose completion should take place by 1990. For the first 3 years of the 5-year plan alone, it is estimated that expenditures will reach the impressive figure of 1 billion DA. The objective in sight (between 95 and 98 percent electrification) is considered to be equivalent to total electrification. There are very few countries which have achieved it.

Nevertheless, beyond the percentages, there will be less than one million people (nomads and isolated residents) who will not have electricity, even at the conclusion of this plan. In effect, it happens that the cost per kilometer of the network amounts to and is even in excess of 150,000 DA. In considering the range of possible solutions we have raised with the responsible authorities we have met the question of solar energy. However, the project for use of this form of energy has not yet reached the point of maturity, while the field of research remains characterized by a wide diversity of possibilities. Leaving aside eventual uses for heating or pumping water, solar energy does not seem to be a viable solution, according to the technical advice available, the more so as it would involve prohibitive costs in terms of the advantages derived. Other possible solutions include the fact that many rural people continue to use wind energy (with marginal results) and electrical generators whose cost varies between 40,000 and 50,000 DA. Going beyond the subject of electrification, in our view this is a matter of raising in a general way the problem of the kind of existence or the style and the living conditions of these marginal populations. In the last analysis would the solutions of regrouping and resettling them not also be considered?

To return to our original point, it should be underlined that our country has an electrification rate (63 percent at the end of 1980) whose level seems reasonable enough, compared to that of other developing countries. However, our development ambitions imply and provide for increasing our efforts even further, and the present pace of achievement of the National Electrification Plan aims at reaching our goal by the end of the 1980's. This effort involves in large part the achievement of the objectives of regional development and balance which have been reaffirmed and underlined by our political leadership.

5170
CSO: 4519/16

BRIEFS

NEW AMBASSADORS--Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah, Bahraini foreign affairs minister, today received the credentials of 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rifa'i, the new Syrian ambassador to Bahrain. He also received the credentials of Nurver Nures, the new Turkish ambassador, and (Berti Ribani), the new Finnish ambassador to Bahrain. [Doha Qatari News Agency in Arabic 1900 GMT 31 Oct 81]

SOMALI OFFICIAL CONVEYS MESSAGE--Manama, 30 Oct (GNA)--Shaykh 'Isa ibn Salman al Khalifah, amir of Bahrain, today received Somali Foreign Minister Abdurahman Jama Barre, who is currently visiting Bahrain. Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah attended the meeting. In a statement following the meeting, the Somali minister said that he had conveyed a message from Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre to the amir of Bahrain on current Arab and African developments and bilateral relations. He said that they discussed the current Arab situation, recent developments regarding the situation in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa and bilateral relations. The Somali foreign minister asserted that Somalia's policy regarding a solution to the Horn of Africa issue is based on granting the people of the Ogaden their right to self-determination. He said that Somalia seeks a just and peaceful solution to this issue. The Somali minister said that they also discussed the Middle East question and Somalia's firm stand on this matter--a stand that is based on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. He praised the stand of the amir of Bahrain and said: His Highness' stand and views are in full agreement with the contents of the message. [Text] [GF300916 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0745 GMT 30 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/94

SADAT'S ASSASSINATION ASCRIBED TO U.S.-MUBARAK COLLUSION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 11 Oct 81 p 12

[Article by Seyyed 'Ataollah Mohajerani]

[Text] The death of Sadat does not appear to be a simple matter. It is obvious that when a man first heard of the death of Egypt's Pharoah, his heart filled with joy and hope blossomed there. On the one hand, a person heard that Sadat was shot when he was at the height of his vanity, drunk with power and covered with slime (!), while his various kinds of fighter planes filled the low skies of Egypt, while he stood shoulder to shoulder with Alfred Atherton, the U.S. ambassador, and U.S. generals were ranked behind him. Thus the spider's web, which is the frailest home, fell into pieces despite all his great calculations. The Egyptian people spilled into the streets stamping their feet and clapping their hands, and drivers turned on their headlights and honked their horns. Thus the United States has apparently lost another case and is stunned.

However, on the other hand, this was the same day (Tuesday, 14 Mehr) [6 October 1981] that news agencies spoke about Sadat's probable emergency successor before Sadat's accidental (!) death. On Tuesday, 14 Mehr [6 October 1981] the KEYHAN's last page in its Black Humor column said: "The United States chose Sadat's probable successor."

News from the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-NAHAR was quoted: "The United States government construes Husni Mubarak, Sadat's deputy, as his successor, and this theory is supported by Husni Mubarak's unexpected visit with Reagan, and the unanticipated warm reception he received from U.S. officials during his three-day stay in Washington." Therefore reports from the aforementioned sources confirmed the United States' interest in viewing Mubarak as Sadat's probable successor in emergency situations.

Husni Mubarak met with top-ranking U.S. officials, and on returning to Egypt said: "My discussions with Ronald Reagan, the president, and other high-level U.S. officials were devoted to the issues of the necessity of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, the urgency of military aid to Sudan, the Soviet Union's grab for the Middle East and Africa, and the right to self-determination of Palestinians residing in regions ceded to Israel."

Prior to the trip of the probable and emergency (!) successor to Sadat, quasi-criticism of Sadat was made in some newspapers which were "a sign so that he would not get lost."

AL-MAJALLAH, printed in London, wrote: "Egypt is also facing serious economic problems in addition to the complicated political problems which have reached their peak following the movements of Egypt's ruler towards Zionism and U.S. imperialism. The policy of normalizing relations between Egypt and the regime occupying Jerusalem has created a deep gap between most of the Egyptian people and the influential minority class. In addition to the aforementioned problems, Egypt is vexed with another problem which is returning to that country the Arab identity which puppet Sadat destroyed." The International Press Society also expressed anxiety over the restriction of the freedom of publication in Egypt. Peter Galinz, director of the society, expressed concern in a message sent to Sadat concerning both the unemployment and emigration of Egyptian correspondents.

Taken one by one, these signs are like aspirin, one of which can even soothe a man's headache, but when lined up together and 10 taken at once, might kill a man (!). Now you line up these signs and other indicators together, and add that when after Sadat's death the Egyptian people moved towards the embassy of the regime occupying Jerusalem, they found the streets leading to the embassy closed off, and that Husni Mubarak chaired a cabinet meeting in the dark atmosphere immediately after Sadat's death.

If we choose to be optimistic and to believe the best, the questionable trip of Husni Mubarak and Reagan's and his portentous speeches remain unexplained. And if we term the death of Sadat a U.S. plot, the idea is hard to digest and falls on deaf ears. After all, how is it possible that the United States could shoot its dearly loved, spoiled simian child? What is the heart of the matter?

Without any doubt the U.S. strategy is the greatest possible safeguarding of its interests and the neutralization or destruction of all the factors confronting or resisting it. These days the Americans have buckled on the sword and let the hawks take flight. Alexander Haig, the former NATO commander, has pivoted his diplomacy on the military domination and influence of the United States, and Reagan is attached to his military budget more than anything else. In the throes of such a flight, the bunker of resistance and struggle against the U.S. aggression and world-devouring is the Iranian Islamic revolution.

The wonder is that the Americans insist on raising the issue of Palestine and the regime occupying Jerusalem as the fundamental Middle Eastern issue in order to let the Islamic revolution of Iran fall into abeyance. It is interesting that in "King Fahed's" proposal, the third article concerning fundamental problems says that the United States should accept the Palestinian problem as the primary issue in the Middle East. It is also surprising that some Palestinian friends consider the Iraq-Iran war as a deviation from the fundamental struggle of the Palestinians against occupied Jerusalem!

It is not surprising that the United States does not see our revolution. The United States is a bat, and like a nocturnal creature that vilifies the sun, it vilifies the sun of the world. "Whose two eyes are blind, dark and bad." (Mulavi)

On the one hand the United States wants to expard its influence and power in the region, and on the other hand is planning to confine and hush up our Islamic revolution. The important and hope-inspiring issue is that the Iranian Islamic revolution is basically a cultural revolution whose essence is the transformation of mankind and

guiding it towards its divine nature. This revolution is aware of man inasmuch as he is human. Of course the stormy waves of the revolution will easily stir up the far shores of countries enshrouded in night. Today the transformation in the depths of the Sudan, Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and...is clearly evident.

Since this movement derives from Islam's Abrahimic culture, as much as the agents of repression are materialistic and military, the enemy is grinding water in his mortar and ruining the pestle.

Kim Il-song, the leader of North Korea, said to our great brother Hashemi Rafsanjani: "We are fighting with the hands and feet of the United States, and you are fighting its heart." Without doubt the shout of "God is great" depresses the carefree heart of the United States.

One brother who has recently come from the United States said: "Americans have developed an allergy to "God is great." When they hear "God is great," they grind their teeth, and their teeth chatter. When in the Interparliamentary Conference the Iranian delegation's shout of "God is great," shook the conference and shattered the air, the Canadian representative said: "'It is horrifying!'"...In confrontation with "God is great," the U.S. secretary of defense says: "If an event similar to the Iranian Islamic revolution occurred in Saudi Arabia, due to this country's significance and the necessity of the government's survival, aid will be given to the Al-Saud regime in any shape Saudi Arabia wants and that the interests of the West demand." Reagan, despite the fact that he is told not to talk too much, says: "The United States will not permit Saudi Arabia to become like Iran."

In Sudan, after the uprising of the deprived Moslem people of Darfur province ended in bloodshed last January, following the people's steadfastness and the removal of the imposed governor, despite the continuous aid of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, $300 million aid from Saudi Arabia, $50 million aid from Reagan, and the presence of nearly 100,000 Egyptian intelligence and military officials in that country, the waves of "God is great" shattered the dividing walls, and the hearts of the deprived Sudanese people beat for the Islamic revolution and the imam. In its turn the government fell into such disgrace and deadlock that Nimeri all at once dissolved the People's National Assembly, and halved the present number of respresentatives in the parliament in anticipation of the coming elections.

In Tunisia, the leaders of the Islamic Movement, Rashid Ghanush and 'Abdufattah are tried, and in court let loose shouts of "God is great." Bourguiba nervously sets about strengthening the communists and outlaws the veil and...In Egypt girls put on the Islamic veil and the wave of arrests and imprisonment begins. The aware and enlightened blind clergyman, Sheykh Kushuk, sets about explaining things in the Friday prayer, and speaks to the Egyptian people about the Iranian Islamic revolution, the imam and "God is great," and is taken to prison.

In face of the fierce hail of the anthem of monotheism which has shaken the framework of the despotic governments, the Americans are struggling desperately and Sadat, like a pet baboon, takes refuge under the wing of his clown handler, and in his public disgrace shows himself as a friend of the United States. Egypt becomes so close to the United States, and after Camp David becomes so entangled in Israel that "Egyptisrael" comes into existence. What is interesting is that, to Sadat's misfortune, the closer he came to imperialism and Zionism and the more he planned the cultural and national values of Egypt, the brighter and more attractive the visage of the Iranian Islamic revolution becomes in Egypt.

The father of the liberals [Bazargan] once said: "The Shah is the leader of Iran's revolution (!), the negative leader of the revolution. Each revolution has a positive leader and a negative leader (!)". In the darkness of Sadat's corrupt visage, the Egyptian people discover and sense greater light, glory and freedom. The Americans believe that all the danger lies here. The situation soured to the extent that the Khan [the United States] understood that Sadat had become so Americanized that he had become the catalyst of the Egyptian Islamic revolution.

Sadat's presence speeded the blossoming of the Islamic revoltuion. These days the United States is searching for persons who in speech hold the most leftist positions in order to deceive the people, and in action hold the most rightist positions in support of U.S. interests.

Tossing off leftist songs and moving to the right like Saddam the American, like the hypocrite Rajavi...: in this manner, a fresh plot developed by the United States is exposed to public view. Incidentally, Husni Mubarak immediately after meeting with Reagan announces his positions and speaks about: 1-The necessity of selling the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia; 2-The urgent need for military aid to the Sudan; 3-The Soviet Union's grab for the Middle East and Africa and: 4-The right of self-determination of Palestinians living in Israeli-occupied territories. In reality the above four issues are elements composing the U.S. strategy in the region. Meaning that the United States has opened up a new front, and wishes to fight on the new cultural (?) front with our revolution. There are other instances of this in the past. When AL-MAJALLAH writes: "Egypt in addition to economic problems is vexed with another problem and that is returning this country's Arab identity which puppet Sudat has not [sic] destroyed." An Arab identity is a question mark, for is it not a wall opposing the Islamic identity and the cultural revolution?

Sadat became a victim of U.S.-style cultural resistance and is now but a nightmare. Again, if this deduction is correct, this will once again move the Egyptian people, and blossoms of hope will bloom in their souls. The United States has fallen into a futile role which is doomed to destruction. It resembles that person who planted narcissus flowers in order to forget his memory of his mistress's eyes, and busied himself with his flowers. Then: "The narcissus buds bloomed fully, What sorrow! He saw they were his lover's eyes."

What a shame that a comparison for the United States must be drawn from mud and slime. Let us just say that that which they feared and dreaded has befallen them. The Americans want to extinguish the lightning lamp of "God is great," they want to build a wall, and there is no denying that Sadat was a good for nothing brick who had putrefied and decomposed. One becomes a pharoah whom the Americans make a wax figure of their interests. The actions of the enemies of God, particularly those of the Great Satan, resemble a mirage that the thirsty man imagines to be water. These actions are also like the darkness in the depth of the ocean whose face has been covered by dark waves upon dark waves, with a low sky in the midst of all this darkness and corruption, covered over the voluptuously thick black clouds: in the midst of this, who can see the dark hand of Sadat and Reagan? If there is light in the world, it is the divine drunkenness; may the lamp of the lightning of "God is great" burn forever bright.

9597
CSO: 4640/26

AWACS SALE TO SAUDI ARABIA CRITIQUED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] The U.S. Government has recommended that Saudi Arabia purchase five more AWACS (spy planes) like the four AWACS already sold to them. The Saudi Government is supposed to pay $8.5 billion to the U.S. Government for their value. It is obvious that the purchase of other military equipment in order to raise the operational capacity of the aforementioned AWACS has also been advised in that same memo of recommendation by the Great Satan, and the Saudi Arabian Government has purchased it.

The AWACS are in reality the United States' old Boeing 707 which is now called a spy plane by equipping it with electronic facilities as a means of controlling air events within a radius of 400 to 550 kilometers. It is obvious that the flight speed of these planes, for the above reason, cannot be more than 750 kilometers per hour.

What can the reason for the purchase of such planes by the Saudi Arabian Government be? Is it that only a great oil income can persuade a government to purchase equipment that perhaps is completely useless to it? The fundamental reason must be looked for in the footnote to Uncle Sam's (the Great Satan) memo of recommendation to our neighbor Saudi Arabia.

After the glorious revolution of the Iranian nation under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, the occurrence of similar revolutions in other countries in the region, particularly monarchial countries, became probable on various grounds. The probability of such an occurrence, along with the preservation of Saudi Arabia's oil wells which nourish the industry and economy of the United States, could be the reason for this action. This is particularly true after the Iran-Iraq war, when the oil sales of these two countries during wartime reached a minimum as a result of damage arising from bombing of oil facilities.

It is certain that the AWACS planes cannot have a great effect on preventing a revolutionary occurrence. However, according to the U.S. recommendation, they might be able to warn the Saudi's sovereign government of the possibility of an attack or blowing up of Saudi Arabia's oil wells. This issue possesses an extremely great importance for the Saudi Arabian oil government. After the first verbal ultimatum of political personages concerning the blowing up of oil wells

in the Persian Gulf, the prevention of such explosions became necessary and urgent in accordance with the Great Satan's advice.

The matter does not end here since the U.S. Government has sent U.S. advisors special to these planes to Saudi Arabia to operate and maintain them. Only these advisors are capable of operating the planes and interpreting the information acquired. It is obvious that in these conditions, spying on other countries on the Persian Gulf littoral could be among the most important duties of the Great Satan's puppets.

Of course Israel and the regime occupying Jerusalem agreed to all these intentions, since a short time ago the U.S. Government took a group of Israeli Air Force experts for a 9-hour flight in order to show them the limitations and potentialities of this aircraft. Among the limitations, a view was expressed that due to the AWACS's slow speed, they could easily be hunted by the jets of the regime occupying Jerusalem if they came close to Israeli soil. Certainly other secret matters were exchanged of which the Saudi Arabian monarchy will not be informed; whatever they may be, they will be kept between the Great Satan and the regime occupying Jerusalem.

The interference of the Zionists and the Israeli Government does not stop here. We must instead search for the deep roots of Zionist interference in the U.S. Congress and government. The Congress is really the national consultative assembly composed of representatives of the U.S. people from the various states. The representatives' duties are the examination of bills and political, economic, financial and budget matters, or to say it otherwise, fundamental decision-making concerning the American nation's destiny in the state-federal framework.

If a person is going to be capable of being elected as a state representative to the Congress, he must possess great fame in the state from the financial aspect (either wealth or connections with large companies). Failing this, an individual possessing greater wealth will be elected as the congressional representative. In these conditions, it is totally clear how the Zionists, who have the entire U.S. financial (banks, the stock exchange and so forth), propaganda and educational systems in their hands, can have a fundamental and determining role in the congressional elections.

It is for this reason that whenever the Israeli Government wishes to reject or approve a proposal (even a proposal of the U.S. president) in the U.S. Congress, this is accomplished with just a sign. As examples we can take the rejection of airplane sales to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and the approval of military equipment sales to Israel and other friends. Since the U.S. Government must gain a majority of votes in the two houses (Congress and Senate) for all decisions of this sort, the new secret sale of U.S. AWACS to Saudi Arabia's government might thus be defeated by new rumors from U.S. congressional representatives.

A number of U.S. congressional representatives reason that it is extremely difficult for them to accept the speech that Zeki Yamani, the Saudi Arabian minister of petroleum, made once in the spring of this year. In this speech he said that the fundamental enemy of Saudi Arabia is the Israeli Government, not the Soviet Russians. Thus what greater proof is necessary for the rejection of the proposed

sale of complex electronic military equipment to Saudi Arabia? Particularly in light of the rumors of opposition heard in the corners of Saudi Arabia, since it is possible that one day the AWACS will fall into that land's revolutionaries as did Iran's Phantoms.

Now all the decision-making is in the hands of the U.S. Congress' representatives who are the puppets of U.S. Zionists, and not in the hands of the U.S. president or representatives of the U.S. Government.

9557
CSO: 4640/28

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON VISIT TO LIBYA

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Sep 81 p 12

[Text] Engineer Mir Hosseyn Musavi, foreign minister, participated in an exclusive interview with JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI's correspondent, and answered questions concerning his recent trip to Libya and the achievements of this trip.

Our correspondent began by raising a question concerning the Islamic Front against the Zionists, and the proposal of such a front in the Conference of Arab Steadfastness Front Leaders during his recent trip to Libya. Engineer Musavi stated in response:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. We carried a plan and principles with us concerning an Islamic Front. Of course this was not an organized plan, but rather was principles on the basis of which we believed that this front must be organized. Because the Libyan government had previously expressed an interest in this area, they has also prepared a plan which had several principles and held a somewhat organized aspect. Their plan could be studied. Naturally there were differences, but these differences did not seem to be such that the two governments of Iran and Libya could not pursue the issue.

The issue of an Islamic Front was raised extensively at the conference (I say extensively because I raised the issue in the speech that I made, and I also did some groundwork at the 'Omar Mokhtar commemmoration ceremony). Beyond this, the issue was also raised in the private sessions, and was also brought up by Libya in the secret sessions of the Steadfastness Front.

Libya's Basic Agreement with Islamic Front Plan

The extensive raising of the Islamic Front issue caused a favorable atmosphere to be created there, and the issue was pursued with seriousness. Several countries (I do not want to say all) agreed with the plan in a preliminary fashion.

The Libyan government agreed with the plan in a fundamental way. It was determined that all those countries that accepted the issue in a preliminary manner will put it under study. However, Iran and Libya will seriously pursue the issue during their future meetings. Prior to these meetings, they will begin to expand the plan on the basis of the plans they have defined, and we will do the same in Iran. Meaning we will expand the plan. I think that this groundwork will definitely help us to make very rapid steps towards the Islamic Front. By the word 'rapid' I do not mean

to be understood that in order for this matter to be achieved as soon as possible, we will sacrifice principles. However, in the introduction to this plan, whose principles we shall announce in two or three days, we stated that if one country becomes a forerunner in the front's formation, and has sincerely cooperated with several liberation organizations, and has gotten organized, then the primary nucleus of this front has come into existence, and naturally it can grow. We stated in the introduction at the same time that the announcement of the Islamic Front is in itself a form of action. It is like a seed that you sow. Due to the favorable field which exists among all the world's Moslems, this seed grows, sprouts, gets big and bears fruit in places where man had no expectation it would do so. Of course in the few months since this issue was proposed we have tested this issue. Bringing up this slogan has made many fields of connections available. It has given our foreign policy vis-a-vis Islamic countries a direction to the extent that it is clear to us in what direction we are moving. Having a direction, having a goal, moving toward a defined goal greatly affects our kinds of activity in the foreign ministry. God willing, with the all-out support that it will receive, this plan will succeed and move forward in the future.

Cooperation with the Steadfastness Front

Our correspondent asked: What continued cooperation do you see with the Steadfastness Front? The foreign minister replied: Of course you know that we were officially invited by Libya as an observer. When the conference officially opened, Qadhdhafi made a speech. We were the first speaker after that. Then the secret session began in which only leaders were present. Just as we have announced many times, we will support the struggle that the Steadfastness Front has against Zionism and imperialism. This trip enabled us to meet one by one with the leaders of these countries. In the private session these brothers invited us to travel to their countries (Syria, South Yemen and Algeria). Thus the foundation of cooperation with these countries of the Steadfastness Front was built, meaning the ground was prepared.

Some News Agencies Spread Lies

Our correspondent asked Engineer Musavi: Some news agencies reported that Qadhdhafi spoke in the midst of your speech, and interrupted it. Please explain this event." Engineer Musavi responded by stating: This is a pure lie, and the matter was absolutely not like this. Out talk was complete and was carried out in a proper situation. Afterwards in the sessions we had, even before the private session was convened, Hafez Al-Assad praised that speech in a news correspondents meeting (meaning he praised our clear position-taking, the talk that we made, and the analysis we gave in this area). There were prolonged periods when the Steadfastness Front had no meetings. These recent sessions were opened with a special splendor, and with the presence of correspondents and various delegations, etc., and it is natural that the country holding the conference should make the opening speech. Qadhdhafi made this speech (and I see that unfortunately this speech was not reported in Iran), large portions of which concerned defending Iran's Islamic revolution, showing the truthfulness of the revolution, and furthermore glorifying Islam's martyrs. I take this to mean that our logic is a transparent, natural logic, and that all the world's oppressed understand this powerful logic, and that this logic is known and understood all over the globe. The speech after this was to be given by us, and we

immediately began our speech after Qadhdhafi had spoken. The speech was fully completed and was then translated into Arabic. When the speech was completed, the official order of business was that I and all the delegations should leave the session because it would be secret and restricted to the leaders of the Steadfastness Front Leaders Conference. After our speeches were finished, and we had said "The Future Is Certain" and finished the last of our speech with this Koranic verse, our delegation naturally rose. Qadhdhafi gestured that he wanted to say something. This speech, whose text was printed in ALFAJR AL-JADID (Libyan newspaper) and by news agencies, once again contained glorification of the Islamic revolution of Iran, and thanked us for our speech. But he did raise two or three points. One of these was a wish that Iraq could have been there and that we could have heard its speeches. The tone of this speech was more in defense of us meaning that it did not have the attitude of justifying Iraq. Then he was upset over the expression the 'Persian Gulf" which we had alternatively termed the Gulf or the Persian Gulf (Persian Gulf was used twice). The reason for this is natural because it was a 100 percent Arab conference, and there is such a sensitivity existing there. Whether because of this sensitivity or something else, he stated that it would have been good if you (we) had not used this expression. This is a phrase connected with the former regime, and when you do this, you give an excuse for "Iraq's aggression." If this is looked at carefully, there is an implicit condemnation of Iraq. Qadhdhafi said a few sentences in this area, and then immediately added that he proposed that the speech of Iran's foreign minister be considered an official document of the Steadfastness Front and be recorded. This meant that its contents (which included an attack on Iraq, the precise analysis that we gave of the functioning of imperialism and Zionism in the region, and the statements about the truthfulness of our revolution) were adopted as an official document of this front and were implicitly supported.

Naturally, in that situation, when those remarks were finished, we had to rise. We rose and all the rest, even the delegations and the correspondents came out of the hall so that the delegations of the Steadfastness Front could begin their secret session among themselves. It was at this time that the news was broadcast. The intention behind the broadcast of this news is completely clear, which was to take away the chance for our repeated meetings and closeness with friendly countries, and probably to create conflict. Since if a misunderstanding has been created, a strong blow could have been struck against the future relations of Moslem countries in the region. Thus it was natural that this propaganda and lie-spreading should have started. One agency in particular said that I had said that the war was one between Arabs and Persians. This is a pure lie. We do not even say this inside our own country whose people are Iranians. Still less would we say that this was a war between Arabs and Iranians in an Arab country in the midst of an Arab conference. It is clear that this news was complete nonsense. Or they said that Qadhdhafi interrupted our remarks, which is also a lie, and a devilish lie. I must say that my speech was fully completed without pause. In addition, I was reading two or three paragraphs, and then they were translated paragraph by paragraph. The translator translated this, and the speech was completely finished. This was another lie that the news agencies spread. On the next day when we had meetings with leaders, the news agencies saw that not only were relations continuing, but were doing so in a special way (for example, private sessions, intimate meetings and such like), and they realized that they had made a big mistake in making such a big lie. The news agencies immediately cut out and eliminated this news. However, the news apparently got out late and was brought up again, which is why the subject had the form it did.

Discussions with Libyan Leaders

Concerning his talks with Libyan leaders, Engineer Musavi stated: We had numerous sessions with Libyan leaders, including Qadhdhafi, several with Jalud, and one or two with the foreign minister and with officials of their revolutionary congresses. In all these meetings, in proportion, we examined relations between our and Libya's government and arrived at an agreement. Areas for expansion of these relations were set up, and we raised our viewpoints concerning regional issues, including Israel, the United States, Afghanistan and the like. In some places these views were shared, and naturally in some places there were disagreements, but they were accompanied by a complete and brotherly understanding. I think that a very good, stable and strong area for the continuation of these connections was created, on the basis of which we can form our relations with Libya and move forward. Among the special matters which were examined in these talks were means of organizing the Islamic Front. This was discussed several times, and God willing other issues in this area will be broached in the future.

The foreign minister, concerning his meetings with leaders belonging to the Steadfastness Front, said: We had encounters and talks with these leaders at the 'Omar Mokhtar memorial service and at other places. As I pointed out, we had a quasi-private session with these leaders. This session was before the official announcement of the declaration. As I sensed Mo'ammar Qadhdhafi had arranged it, the cameramen and correspondents were at the front when Hafez Al-Assad began to speak. His speech defended and praised the Iranian revolution. Then the private session began. There were only leaders in it, and it was convened for Iran's sake. All the leaders defended and praised Iran's Islamic revolution. The leadership of the imam was spoken about in some detail. Then questions were raised about Iranian issues, regional issues and our viewpoint concerning them. There were questions and answers about them, and my explanations were such that the session was relatively lengthy. Then the session ended and we came out. Just as I pointed out, it was in this session that the brothers expressed a desire that I should travel to their countries (Syria, Algeria and South Yemen) for more elaborate and extensive discussions.

Our correspondent asked: "When will your trip to these countries take place?" He stated in reply: I think we will travel at the first opportunity. This is because on these trips points of view are usually expressed concerning shared issues. Shared points cause sound relations to be laid down, and thoughts are exchanged concerning disagreements.

Thus thoughts are brought closer to each other. Naturally this type of encounter can help Moslem countries come closer to each other, and can help our overall policy which is the creation of an Islamic Front across the globe.

9597
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PROSECUTOR-GENERAL COMMENTS ON UNREST, 'RIOTS' IN SCHOOLS

Teheran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Sep 81 p 14

[Text] Hojatoleslam Rahani Amlashi, Prosecutor General of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in a special interview with our reporter, answered his questions about recent assisinations and different small groups of hypocrites.

The first question of our reporter was about Mas'ud Kashmiri and the explosion in the prime minister's office. The prosecutor general answered:

"Kashmiri was an influential person in the prime minister's office. He was previously working in other places and different fields of a revolutionary nature until finally he reached the prime minister's office and the secretary of the security council, and he was in charge of other important jobs. On the day of the explosion, he had left a briefcase containing the explosives near the desk of Martyr Raja'i and Martyr Bahomar. The participation of Kashmiri in such a meeting was ordinary and he had left the prime minister's office a few minutes earlier. Meanwhile, Kashmiri's wife has escaped." Accepting the Repetance of Hypocrits it was asked: "A number of supporters or members of Mojahedin-e Khalq have telephoned the newspaper and are saying: Before they were infavor of Mojahedin-e Khalq and had been involved in activities with them too, but their hands are not bloody and they have not participated in anyway in sabotage or in setting fire and have quit altogether political activities which favor that organization. On the other hand, they are not willing to participate in radio or television interviews or write letters of repetancy. What rules do the country's authorities have in mind for these individuals?"

The Prosecutor General answered: "Those who are not willing to participate in interviews or write repentant letters have not yet repented; the one who is repentant and delivered from bad deeds means he has realized those activities deviated and were wrong and has reverted. Having realized his mistakes he must declare it. That is called political repentance and political repentance must be exposed to public opinion and it must be clear to the people that a person who has been a deviator up to now, has been reformed. If they want to do it secretly then it is quite clear that by claiming to be reformed they want to escape from legal punishment, and are sticking to their past thoughts and opposing Islam and Moslems.

Those from these groups who have reverted from deviation and repented have to prove it to the authorities and for the time being the only way to prove it, is to be interviewed on TV and proclaim it to the people that they repented and give their information to the responsible authorities and prevent the people from committing

these devious deeds. If this occurs, then the judicial authorities will be convinced that they have repented and have surrendered, but if they are not willing to give interviews and do not admit they have deviated and are not willing to insult the authorities of that organization in spite of noticing how they trick the people and how they draw a peaceful country to corruption and how they propagate terrorism in the country, we cannot believe they have repented."

Other Groups

It was asked: "Those who were active a year or a year and a half ago and have given up all the activities; is it necessary for them to introduce themselves or to write a repentant letter?"

Hojjafoleslam Rabani Amlashi answered: "Those, like the others, if they are repentant should prove to the judicial authorities that they have repented and give their information and tell the people that they have made mistakes in the past. If they prove it and surrender, they are free, but if this matter is not proved, even if they stop their intense activities for a few days, we can't stop and wait until they start again, and then start action. The judicial power is responsible, in addition to eliminating corruption, for making efforts to prevent the origin of corruption and its existance."

Malicous Behavior and False Reports

It was asked of the prosecutor-general: What if based on malice or a dispute, someone makes a false report to the responsible authorities and causes the arrest of an innocent person? What steps have been taken by the judicial authorities in connection with this matter?"

He answered: "Of course it is possible, but what can be done? In such a sensitive time when the destiny of our nation is being forged, we see a group of terrorists standing everywhere and they are willing to do everything. In such a situation the whole world and our nation might give the right for judicial authorities to be alert. If an innocent person remains in prison one month or two months more or less, or a few days, for the clearance of his situation, isn't it better or should the blood of 70 or 80 thousand martyrs be trampled? There is no doubt we have to respect the blood of martyrs in order to protect and guard this country and to block the passage of foreign agents to this country; we have to bear these entanglements. Those who have such difficulties, if they are concerned Muslims and are interested in the destiny of this country without regard, must not be annoyed about these matters. These mistakes exist in every day life and have existed in our own private lives and in our society. These problems might happen unintentionally to any human being, and is not the fault of the authorities! The officials do not base their findings upon a neighbor's reports one hundred percent. They go and investigate. If they find the report true, they hold the arrested, if it was false and a mistake they set him free and this is unavoidable. They must remain there, until the officials conduct the investigation, what else can be done? Is there any other way except this? If there is any better way then say it and we will do it."

The Increase in Investigators

It was asked: "Can't the plaintiffs case be studied sooner by increasing the number of investigators?"

The Prosecutor-General said: "That's right, if its possible to increase the number of investigators we don't deny the possibilities we have; of course you know we have inherited a Satanic government. In the past, the trained investigators and judges who could serve in the revolutionary courts were not prepared enough, and we are not quite prepared for this job. For the time being we don't have enough investigators and inspectors in the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor's offices, but those we have, always use any opportunity they have to meet the people's demands immediately and God forbid that no innocent remain in prison. Of course, you must be reminded that the claims are seldom the reality. I have seen many parents, many families, and many friends claim that such and such arrested person is innocent, but when we contacted the public prosecutor's office, it became clear that the accused had confessed that such a book or arms have been his, but family and friends are usually more Catholic than the Pope. I don't say that an innocent is never arrested but the percentage is very low."

Riots in Schools

The next question was: "These days the members of small anti-regime groups are trying in any way possible to engage the schools in riots and close them down. How can the country's judicial system confront them?"

Hojatoleslam Rahani Amlashi answered in regard to this question: "First, their effort in the face of the nation is a vain effort. They wanted to organize marches in the streets. They were thinking that they will be able to organize a one million or two or three million person march. For a few days they came out and they realized that their numbers didn't exceed more than twenty or thirty whom they brought from their hideouts. They came in the streets and shouted a few slogans and realized that even two people from the outside didn't join them. According to them, they thought they could organize a vast demonstration. They came and comprehended that the people really don't want them. They are beseiged by their own limitations. Their numbers don't exceed more than those limited few from the underground, hideouts and their communes and it is possible that many of those have been entrapped and want to leave the group, but if caught they have to face revolutionary execution and really, some of them are faced with this obstacle. If they remain, they don't know what to do, to leave is not possible, maybe impossible for many of them to do. In any case, they can never be able to close the schools, to engage the schools in strikes. The march of the first of September showed the people that these are our children and Islam's children. These are the pro-government and Islam partisans. How could one resist them? The judicial power will face them severly and without pity. To pity them means to have mercy for a sharp-toothed tiger, it means to fight against the oppressed and long suffering nation which is delivered from the chain of depotism. This act means to close your eyes to the blood of 70 thousand martyrs and we will never give permission to have mercy on them. We face them decisively."

It was asked: "The Prosecutor-General has announced that he has executed few of those who had a part in the incident of 7 July and meanwhile Takmil Homayun, Entezaryun, and Bani-Sadr have been among those who participated in this heart-rendering event. Will you give further explanation about this incident?"

The Prosecutor-General of the Republic of Iran answered: "I don't have enough information but according to the information collected from Entezaryun, it indicated that they have been involved. We knew beforehand that Bani-Sadr was such a fierce

wolf and is not afraid of anything. It is not unexpected to me that Bani-Sadr has been involved in such a monsterous catastrophe. He is exactly like the Shah was, seeking position and power, like the Shah who was saying one million people should be killed. Some have quoted him that half of this country be demolished but I remain, we knew Bani-Sadr as such. We were aware of such a feeling in him, even when he was talking firm and decisive, we knew he didn't have the nation. It was with such a feeling for him, that I was saying that he has the backing and encouragement from somewhere and he definitely had a great deal of assurance. Those days, I didn't know the source of this encouragement and its circumstances, but later it became evident that they had influential agents in these centers, and they were assured that they could eliminate us with these influential agents. They were imagining that with the elimination of seventy or more persons in the party and a few others in the prime minister's office and a few in the Revolutionary Public Prosecutor's office, that the country would collapse and vanish and they would rule a devastated country. They didn't know that if they martyrize any number of authorities, we have the nation, we have this rising heroic nation and as long as this rising heroic nation exists it is impossible for foreign puppets to rule this country. This is a vain and false thought."

9815
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CONSTRUCTION CRUSADE REPORTS PROGRESS DURING WAR

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 19 Oct 81 p 8

[Text]

In the Name of God, the Protector of the Oppressed

The Construction Jihad is one of those foundations which have emanated from the midst of the people in the course of the Islamic Revolution and it has played a remarkable role alongside other organs and foundations in advancing the sublime goals of this revolution.

It has rendered many services in various fields in both cities and villages. The people and the government should assist this ever-advancing foundation so that it will be able to increase its activities. We see it suitable in this connection to present a report of the year-long services of the Construction Jihad of Abadan and tell a part of the story of the self-sacrifice and devotion of those Muslim committed youths who while believing in the Islamic Revolution have fulfilled their duty towards this revolution and are working day and night under the rain of the enemy's mortar shells and bullets, in sweltering weather over 40 deg. Centigrade hot, without feeling the least pain and with special faith and enthusiasm. The following report is a summary of the activities of these crusaders of Islam.

Road Construction Committee

Following the outbreak of the war imposed on Iran by the Iraqi regime and the movement of the technical equipment and facilities of the Construction Jihad to the war fronts, the activities of this committee returned in villages and instead the Construction Jihad was entrusted with the execution of engineering and technical operations in the war zones.

The activities which have so far been carried out by the Road Construction Committee of the Construction Jihad of Abadan are as follows:

1. The digging of trenches and the embankment of earth for artillery and mortar stations along the entire fronts of Abadan and Khorramshahr.

2. The digging of a 4 kilometer-long and 5 meter-wide moat between Abadan and Khorramshahr, at the time of the enemy's occupation of Khorramshahr.

3. The laying of a 28 kilometer long connecting road.

4. Construction of trenches and embankments for the movement of infantry forces and their equipment.

5. The laying of roads under the rain of the enemy's bullets and mortar shells.

6. Construction of the Martyr Shahshahani Road with the cooperation of the Construction Jihad of Isfahan, the Construction Jihad of Fars and the Engineering Unit of the IRGC.

7. Driving vehicles out of the marshy roads of Abadan and Khorramshahr (some 50 vehicles everyday). During these operations, many heavy machines of this committee broke down.

8. The levelling and repair of 5 kilometers of roads.

9. Repair of a kilometer of a road in the Kutsheikh front and a kilometer of road in the Mared front.

10 Embankment of 5 kilometers of roads and the ballasting of another 1.5 kilometers of roads in the fronts.

11 Coperating with the Engineering Unit of the IRGC and other government foundations in constructing roads through supplying them with technical facilities.

Electricity Supply and Upgrading

1. The wiring and repairs of some offices, foundations and hospitals.

2. Cooperation with the repair shops for repairing vehicles in the fronts.

3. Repairs of high voltage networks in the Khosrow Abad Road, Tankefa, the 12th Station, Ta'yyeb Square, the 7th Station, and Jamshid Abad.

4. Construction of an 11,000 voltage network.

5. Cooperation in unloading raw materials, oil, and fuel from the Abadan Refinery.

6. Supply of fuel to rural homes, armed forces and some government institutions as well as the fuel needed by villagers for their motor pumps in the Abadan region, up to a few months after the beginning of the war.

7. Active cooperation in constructing the Chaideh Terminal.

8. Active cooperation with the Electricity Department of Abadan.

9. Active cooperation in clearing goods from customs in Abadan and Khorramshahr.

Rural Cooperative Committee

Before the outbreak of the war, this committee used to supply provisions to villagers. Even for five and a half months after the war this committee was carrying out this job in spite of the extraordinary gathering of the war-stricken people of Khuninshahr and the villagers of border regions, in regions which are rather far from the range of the enemy's fire.

Although this committee did not have sufficient power and facilities before the war and the refugee problem also aggravated the existing problems and shortages, it managed to supply the fuel consumed by houses and the motor pumps of villagers.

But due to the prolongation of the war and the necessity of providing the urgent and fundamental needs of the fronts and also the formation of a headquarters particularly responsible for the issues of the war zones, the member brothers of this committee thought it better to exert all their efforts in making individual and group bunkers of concrete and also shelters throughout the city. They are still busy building more trenches and shelters which have played an important role in securing the lives of our dear warriors.

Agricultural Committee

In spite of the many problems which have been brought about as a result of the imposed war and the lack of sufficient facilities, this committee has tried its best in fulfilling the needs of villagers and on the whole it has rendered the following services:

1. The supply and dispatch of fertilizers, seeds insecticide and motor pumps to farmers and also the dusting of crops with pesticides.

2. Collection and purchase of livestock from villagers and forming a number of cattle breeding complexes in order to support the country's animal husbandry.

3. Transportation of cattle from the war zone to the safe regions outside Abadan.

4. The supply of livestock feed to villagers.

5. Examination and treatment of wounded cattle.

Transportation Committee

1. Entrustment of 150 vehicles to the Army and other foundations through the kTransportation Committee of the Construction Jihad of Abadan.

2. Transportation of provisions from Chu'ideh to the city and fronts.

3. Conveyance of furniture from damaged houses to safe places and the transportation of the citizens of Abadan out of the city.

4. Transportation of flour from mills to the bakeries of the city which are still operating.

5. The carrying of equipment from banks, post offices and all government offices to safe regions.

6. Transportation of the villagers' farm produce out of Abadan.

7. Transportation of jet fuel from Abadan to safe places.

8. Transportation of computers and telex machines from the Abadan Airport.

9. The complete unloading of fuels (including gasoline and oil) from the Abadan refinery and taking them to regions where they are used. The carrying of the technical and heavy equipment of the refinery out of Abadan.

10 The clearing of the Abadan Customs which was carried out firstly to prevent the recurrence of the Khuninshahr Customs calamity, secondly, due to the urgent need of the military forces for spare parts in order to repair their vehicles in the fronts, thirdly, to prevent the profiteering of the owners of the goods who would have undoubtedly moved their goods from the customs and presented them to the free market at unreasonable prices and this movement would have caused an increase in the level of prices which would have entailed many problems for the war-stricken, and fifthly, in order to avoid the burning of goods in the customs and the port which would most probably be destroyed by fire, otherwise.

11 The carrying away of broken and damaged vehicles from the city and its suburbs.

12 Transportation of electricity generators from Chu'ideh to the city.

13 The carrying of prefabricated trenches to various fronts.

14 Transportation of the goods possessed by the National Oil Company from Khuninshahr to Chu'ideh.

15 The carrying of the fuel needed by the poultry farmers in the Minu Island and the 12th Station of Abadan.

Water Supply Committee

In the early days of the imposed war, due to the unexpectedness of the war and the comprehensive participation of popular forces the task of supplying the fronts was mostly put on the shoulders of the people and some organizations emanated from the midst of these people under duress.

In order to fulfill the fronts' urgent need for water and the establishment of water supply facilities, this committee had to gather tank trucks from all over the city for supplying water to the fronts of Khuninshahr.

After the enemy laid siege to Khuninshahr, this committee's work was multiplied and in spite of lacking necessary facilities, it exerted its utmost effort in providing water for the fronts of Abadan and Khuninshahr, bakeries, bathhouses and even some offices (at the beginning of the war) and after a while, when the Water Department of Abadan resumed supplying water to the city, this committee provided water to the villagers and remote places and even to the livestock gathered from the whole region in ranches.

Due to the enemy's bombardment of Abadan in the course of the war the urban water network was cut off in some parts of the city. But this committee compensated for the shortage by installing 20 water reservoirs at the IRGC garrison, the premises of Construction Jihad, the Office of the Red Crescent Society, the Coastal Guards Garrison and the Training Garrison of the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and also by laying pipes and fixing the

valves of tanks which were sent to the fronts.

Meanwhile, 4 water tanks, each with a capacity of 22,000 liters were sent to the villages around Abadan and the city's damaged bathhouses were repaired and supplied with new pipe. Among the other activities of this committee are: the installation of several water coolers in hospitals and other foundations, construction of several bathrooms for the foundations and the supply of pipes to several bakeries which were damaged by the enemy's bombardments.

In addition, this committee was supplying gasoline to all foundations, government offices, and some military forces for a few months after the outbreak of the war.

It is noteworthy to say that only 12 persons are working in this committee.

Building Committee and Welding Group

The Building Committee has managed to carry out the following activities with the cooperation of a welding group:

1. Fabrication of 230 stationary and movable water reservoirs with capacities ranging from a few hundred liters to several thousand liters.

2. The construction of a bathhouse in the Minuhi region, near Abadan, and also a cooperative in the Bahmanshir Village, with the cooperation of brothers working in the office of the governor of Arvandkenar.

3. Cooperation in producing and repairing doors, windows, stairs, barrels, water reservoirs and fencing the buildings of the military forces, revolutionary foundations and other government offices all over the city of Abadan.

4. Construction of several buildings of the Construction Jihad and active cooperation in clearing the customs and refinery of Abadan.

5. The equipping of military and public vehicles with security bars.

Health Group

This group has embarked on carrying out the following activities with the cooperation of several sisters and brothers as well as a physician:

1. Formation of relief teams consisting of volunteer sisters and brothers for emergency cases.

2. The holding of classes to instruct the people in first aid.

3. Dispatch of medical teams to villages which have treated more than 23,300 patients.

4. Disinfection of villagers' houses and trenches in the city and on the fronts.

5. Taking those patients who needed to be hospitalized to the city and returning them to their villages after revoery.

6. Treatment of the member brothers of various organs and foundations particularly in the early days after the war.

7. Collection of scarce provisions for the cattle.

8. The re-opening of several rural clinics which had been closed after the war.

9. Distribution of chlorine to some villages.

10 Distribution of milk and nursery bottles throughout the city and a number of villages around Abadan.

Explanation: The responsibility of constructing individual and group bunkers was assigned to the Building Committee after the Cooperative Committee. This committee constructed 12 group bunkers and delivered them to the army.

Cultural Committee

1. The showing of films in various parts of the city, everyday.

2. The staging of plays and holding exhibits of books, posters, photos and tapes.

3. The printing of special materials and forms for the army and other military organs.

4. The printing and reproduction of posters of the martyrs and a publication entitled "Message from the Front".

5. Photographing and filming of the fronts and also various parts of the city.

6. The holding of congregations for offering the "Komeil" prayers.

7. Photographing and filming of the fronts and also various parts of the city.

8. The holding of congregations for offering the "Komeil" prayers.

Repair Shop of the Construction Jihad of Abadan

The services of this unit are as follows

1 The repair of approximately 50 vehicles.

2 Repairs of some arms of the army

3 Repairs of the entire pool of the vehicles belonging to the Army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and other government organs and offices and even the civilians who were going to leave Abadan.

4. The supply of the whole spare parts of vehicles by the Army. IRGC and other government organs in the Abadan front.

5. Fabrication of some arms and instruments severely needed in the fronts.

6. Repairs of damaged war spoils captured from the enemy

7. The invention of silencers and also apparatus for increasing the range of machine guns.

In addition all these activities were carried out despite the lack of skilled manpower and spare parts.

Miscellaneous Activities Of the Jihad

1. Active participation of the members of the Construction Jihad of Abadan in the operations of the Mobilized Forces and also the security forces. During these operations, 14 brothers of the Construction Jihad were martyred and two others were taken captive by the enemy.

2. Distribution of 150,000 sacks for making trenches in the city, border lines and the fronts.

3. Establishment of a gas station to supply fuel to military vehicles; which was later closed due to the self-sufficiency of the army and other organs in this regard.

The number of the martyrs, wounded and the captives of the Construction Jihad up to the Last Sept. 16 is as follows:

Martyrs: 14; Wounded: 10; Captive: 11.

CSO: 4600/87

STATE RAILROAD REPORTS ON TRANSPORT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 26 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] NEWS SERVICE-From the beginning of the imposed war until now, the State Railroad of Iran has dispatched a total of 1,584 trains carrying military equipment and personnel to the various fronts.

An Iranian State Railway public relations spokesman made this announcement during an interview yesterday with JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI NEWS SERVICE reporter, and added: Approximately 350,000 army, Mobilization and Guards personnel have been transported and about one million tons of military equipment have been carried by box car.

Most of this activity was in the first six months of the war, which continued through the first half of Shahrivar [6 September 1980]. These activities took place at a time when Iran's railroad was in difficult straits from the standpoint of hauling power [engines] in the wake of the economic blockade. But by the efforts of concerned, committed and patriotic officials, those trains were dispatched, and in the end the army's satisfaction was secured.

At the same time, the transportation of needed goods, fuel in particular, and passengers can be added to the above activities.

Iran's railroad carried out its duties in the center and districts in these days by forming a mobilization staff which worked around the clock. It would be appropriate to mention the activity and effort of the southern railway district employees in forming trains and accepting them from the center under very difficult wartime conditions. Railroad personnel in the south, like other Ahwaz citizens, despite the savage bombardments of the Iraqi Ba'th government and the cowardly attacks of the Ba'thist army's artillery which regularly reached their place of work, continued their self-sacrificing activity and thus brought great pride to the railroad community.

2 - 303,293 railway ties and 1,036 boxcars were sent from various railroad districts to the war fronts to be used by the army and guards.

3 - Repair of the communications lines and signals and eliminating the continuous damage in the Khuzestan war zones in order to establish communications, which are considered a basic factor in the speed of train traffic in the war areas.

4 - Sending 75 vehicles to various war fronts, and dispatching volunteer railway vehicle drivers to various fronts.

5 - Constructing 18 kilometers of one-way road between Mahshahr and Abadan.

6 - Dispatch of two 10-ton water truchs, one loader, one grader, two bulldozers and one 10-ton compressor to be used for road-building in Mahshahr.

7 - Transportation of army and guard personnel from the Central Railroad Building to respective bases.

8 - Oganizing three intensive training programs and sending 123 persons to the front by means of the Islamic Republic Revolution Guards stationed on the railroad.

9 - Cooperation with an unorganized Guard engineer unit by sending mechanics to Ahwaz.

10 - Hauling 79,600 tons of stone in 1,420 cars from Andishmak to Ahwaz to be used by the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Damage Inflicted by the Enemy

1 - A total of 193 kilometers of railway track was destroyed or damaged, 123 kilometers of which was main line and 70 secondary line.

2 - During the war, many residential and office buildings in war districts like Ahwaz and Khuninshahr, various buildings at stations between Ahwaz and Khuninshahr, and the Do Kuheh station were damaged to various degrees.

3 - On the Ahwaz-Khuninshahr line, 15 bridges existed. Due to the lack of accurate information it is imagined that most of them were heavily damaged.

4 - Communication devices and signals were damaged at some points, and at some other points which were exposed to heavy, direct attacks were completely destroyed.

5 - A number of the railway's moving stock, such as various frieght and passenger cars and diesel engines which were stationed in the war zones, were damaged, but the total number was small.

6 - During the course of the war 14 persons from the railroad whom were dispatched to the various war fronts by the army, Guards and Mobilization attained martyrdom.

7 - In the bombardments of Ahwaz and Khuninshahr, in particular the railway facilities, a total of 18 railway employees and their families were martyred.

The Iranian Railroad in very sincere cooperation with the Red Crescent and the Reconstruction Crusade used 5 hospital cars to assist the wounded in the Khuzestan region. These cars had a total of 100 beds and were equipped with an operating room and other necessary medical equipment. These cars were sent a total of 15 times to the war districts of Khuzestan. In these cars a total of about 1,000 wounded or sick persons were treated or sent to treatment centers by doctors from the Red Crescent and the Reconstruction Crusade. One can also add 15 surgical operations to these figures.

In conclusion, one can also point out that 27 war victim railroad families were given housing in suitable areas.

9557
CSO: 4640/22

RAMADAN REITERATES COUNTRY'S RIGHTS IN WAR WITH IRAN

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 28 Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan, member of Revolution Command Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Popular Army said traitors to the Arab Nation, who have sided with the Persian enemy, despite the enemy's covetous intentions and aggressions on Iraq, will end up like Sadat, traitor to the Arab nation.

Addressing another contingent of the Popular Army fighters from al-Karkh and al-Rasafa sector, Baghdad, on its way to join the battle front Mr Ramadhan added that Iraqi forces, backed by the Popular Army were now more capable and determinate, after 14 months of fighting to confront the Persian enemy and those who side with him, namely Imperialists and zionists.

The war fought by Iraqi people, he continued was imposed by the Persian enemy to undermine Iraq's sovereignty and independence and the dignity of the Arab nation.

"He reiterated that Iraqi forces would continue fighting the enemy until they recognise Iraq's legitimate sovereignty over land and territorial waters.

A number of high ranking officers of the Popular Army were present at the farewell ceremony.

CSO: 4400/43

INCREASED TRADE TIES WITH SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SOUGHT

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 28 Oct 81 p 1

[Text]

Multilateral cooperation between Iraq and the Council of Economic Cooperation of Socialist countries was discussed here yesterday by the joint committee representing the two sides.

Delegates of the member countries of (USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Cuba, Romania, Poland and Czechoslovakia), and their Ambassadors to Iraq attended the sixth session meetings of the committee which were chaired by Iraq's representative and Chairman of the Committee Mr Mehdi Muhsin Auda, Trade Undersecretary. Economic experts representing the two sides also took part in the discussions covering economic, scientific and technical cooperation.

The committee will consider the development of cooperation in various fields covering oil and gas industries, agriculture and irrigation, industry and power generation, trade and transport, and technical, scientific cooperation.

The final recommendations and conclusions of meetings by five technical sub-committees examining further development of cooperation in these fields will be put before the committee.

In an opening address to the committee, the Iraqi delegate affirmed "Iraq's wish to develop economic and trade relations with friendly countries including the socialist states".

He added that Iraq worked for establishing strong and firm long-term relations with these countries which would serve mutual interests and common objectives.

He also affirmed the failure of the Persian war of aggression to halt or obstruct the progress of Iraq's large development programmes.

The German delegate in the committee, on the other hand, speaking on behalf of other member countries, expressed his appreciation of Iraq's efforts to provide the best circumstances for the success of the current session.

CSO: 4400/43

ID 240 MILLION IN BAGHDAD DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 24 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Akram Dhannoun]

[Text]

Development projects worth more than ID 240 millions have been undertaken by Amanat Al-Asima (the mayoralty of Baghdad) during the current year.

These related to services, tourism development and construction of residential blocks including an ID 40-million project for construction of residential blocks making up 2000 units at Saydiya area, south west of Baghdad.

Amanat Al-Asima is now implementing modern buildings at Haifa street costing ID 18 millions, schools, kindergartens, parking places at Kadhimiya and Kasra-w-Atash areas.

More buildings of multistorey parking lots at Rasafi square, Bab Al Shaqi and Saadoun street, each with capacity to receive 600 cars.

A monument for the unknown soldier is now under construction at Zawra park on the western part of Baghdad. The new headquarters of Amanat Al-Asima which will house all departments of the Amanat are being constructed at Khullani square.

The projects being implemented by Amant Al-Asima include the construction of modern market places: five such market places, each occupying an area of 12,000 sq. meters, are now under construction. The area of each market place is surrounded by gardens and parking spaces. The five market-places are scheduled to be completed before the end of the year.

The Amanat is currently constructing a number of huge flyovers and uplifted freeways and bridges over congestion areas of the capital, as well as pedestrians passovers and tunnels. Several of these projects are expected to be completed before the end of current 1981.

Among other projects are these relating to improvement of the water supply in the capital. Amanat Al Asima has signed several contracts with international firms for implementaion of, among others, the Karkh water supply project, a big project regarded as very vital in a major part of the city.

Other projects include the replacement of the entire piping network of the Baghdad city water supply system and the construction of 16 water storage tanks to be added to the existing four tanks.

Feasibility studies are now ready for the construction of 40 modern market places in different parts of the city, particularly those areas with high population density. A large market place at Zayouna and the complete reconstruction of the famous old Baghdadi market are projects scheduled to be started shortly.

CSO: 4400/43

RAILWAY PROJECTS DISCUSSED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 26 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Akram Dhannoun]

[Text]

Important railway projects are now under execution with the aim of assuring effective links between various Iraqi cities, towns and villages.

Electrically and magnetically operated trains will be introduced for the first time in the country to provide transport services for passengers and cargo side by side with existing standard modern trains.

The Chairman of the State Organization for Railways (SOR), Mr. Tareq Tawfeeq, told the Baghdad Observer reporter that several such projects were now in the execution stage and feasibility studies for other projects had just been comleted. They would be announced for tendering soon.

Among these projects is the one-billion dinar Akashat railway project considered one of the significant strategic railroads in the country as it is designed to provide a direct servicing line between the phosphate mines of Akashat and Baghdad via Ramadi, Haditha and Qaim. The chemical fertilizers complex is situated there.

A two-track standard guage line now links Baghdad to Ramadi. The new single-track line will run from Ramadi to link other points. The designs made it possible for future expansions as well as for operating electric locomotives.

The line's specifications will enable the state organization to operate passenger trains between Baghdad and Ramadi with an hourly speed of 250 kilometres and cargo trains with 160 kilometres per hour. The project involving improvements of the first line and the Akashat line is now being executed by a Brazilian company.

Another vital project which is under execution by an Indian company is a semi-circular railway line linking Musayyab, about 80 kms to the south of Baghdad, with Samawa passing through the provinces of Kerbala and Najaf.

The two projects, in the words of the SOR chairman, "are characterised by high international standard specifications, with high cargo capacity fir for tran-

sportation of various goods and raw materials between quarries, mines etc, processing centres and marketing centres. These specifications also enable us to employ the most up to date rail transport units and locomotives".

Mr. Tawfeeq added that high speed locomotives, passenger coaches and cargo containers of the latest types would then be operated to make the railway transport favourite means of transport for the socialist and private sectors as regards speed and low costs and high tonnage capability unrivalled by other means of transport.

Other projects already approved are: the Baghdad-Kirkuk-Arbil- Mosul- Zakho (two-track line), Kirkuk-Baiji to provide phosphate transport services from Mishraq to Qaim and Ramadi-Kerbala line. Other projects include Baghdad-Maqal (Basrah) line running parallel to the Euphrates river and another aiming to link Marbed station (Basrah) with Kuwait. The last project which will secure a modern railway link, linking Mediterranean ports with the Arab Gulf ports will have a great strategic significance and economic and social advantages.

There are other railway projects whose feasibility studies and engineering documents were recently completed. The SOR is expected to announce them for tendering shortly. These include the Baghdad-Kut-Amara-Basrah and Kut-Nasiriya-Basrah as well as a project for modernisation and development of the central railway station to enable it receive as many as 120 trains each day.

Future plans of the SOR are for the operation of high speed trains such as the TGV locomotives whose maximum speed is 300 kilometres per hour and the magnetic locomotives with 500 km speed per hour. The plans include a major scheme for electronic controlled railway signal system and a list of other projects befitting the great development upsurge now taking place in the country.

Mr. Tawfeeq said that extensive expansion and modernisation work was going on over the three main railway lines running between Baghdad-Basrah, Baghdad-Mosul and Baghdad-Arbil which are passing through most of the Iraqi provinces. The expansions and modernisations aimed at improving existing transport capacities and improvement of services to passengers.

According to the SOR chairman, more modern locomotives, passenger coaches, cargo containers would soon be imported. A contract was recently concluded for the importation of 1300 cargo containers and another contract was also signed to import 82 electric-cum-diesel operated locomotives. The coming few days, a contract will be signed for the supply of 224 modern passenger coaches.

CSO: 4400/43

BRIEFS

IRAN'S ARAB SUPPORTERS WARNED--Baghdad, 27 Oct (INA)--Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan today emphasised that the Iraqi Army was now more determined and capable to confront the racist Persian enemy and those Arab, imperialist and Zionist traitors who back the enemy. Addressing a new batch of Iraqi popular army units (para-military) before leaving to the warfront today, Mr Yasin said the traitors of the Arab nation who back the racist Persian enemy will meet the same end as that of the nation's traitor Anwar al-Sadat. He reaffirmed that Iraq's war against Iran was a war of justice, as the Persian enemy had commited aggression against the sovereignty, dignity and independence of Iraq which was fighting on behalf of the entire Arab nation. Mr Ramadan saluted the popular army fighters and their role in backing and supporting the Iraqi Armed Forces in its almost 14-month old war. [Text] [JN271517 Baghdad INA in English 1500 GMT 27 Oct 81]

OIL MINISTER'S STATEMENT ON OPEC--Baghdad, 31 Oct (INA)--Iraqi Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd al-Karim returned home late last night from Geneva, where he attended a successful OPEC meeting that yielded a price agreement of $34 per barrel for the first time in 2 years. Mr 'Abd al-Karim, who is a member of Iraq's highest executive body the Revolution Command Council (RCC), described the Geneva consensus as important and daring and said price unification was one of the most serious problems which faced the 13-member organization because of the chaotic situation prevailing over world oil markets. The Geneva meeting had agreed on restoring price unification of $34 per barrel as from tomorrow till the end of 1982, he added. The $34 price applies to the Saudi Arabian market crude of 34 point gravity, but the sweeter North African crudes of even lighter quality will be priced higher by $2 to $4 per barrel. Mr 'Abd al-Karim expressed hope that OPEC will undertake a similar step to cope with the existing oil glut in world markets which still threatens the pricing structure and OPEC's future. He also called upon OPEC's large producing countries to reconsider their current production levels in order to regain the balance of supply and demand in oil markets. The Iraqi oil minister said the Ministerial Committee, set up by the Geneva emergency meeting, had met on Friday to outline a strategic plan on the prospects of the oil industry, whether by adopting a long-term pricing policy or by discussing relations between industrialised and developing nations in general, for the sake of ensuring the required prerequisites of setting up the new international economic order that guarantees equity and equality among all concerned parties. [Text] [JN311140 Baghdad INA in English 1045 GMT 31 Oct 81]

CSO: 4400/40

LOSS OF STRATEGIC STATUS IN UNITED STATES REPORTED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Aug 81 p 7

[Article by Dr Gabi Shefer]

[Text] With astounding alacrity, Israel is losing her principal "strategic property" in the United States. After a violent election campaign in Israel, after the Iraqi nuclear reactor episode and the bombing of Beirut, and in view of the coalition negotiations and the formation of the government, large groups of American Jews are turning their backs on Mr Begin and the Israeli Government. The attempts of various speakers and observers to minimize the problem by saying that American Jews are quite capable of distinguishing between Israel and its government are just foolishness and hot air. It is clear that in its change of attitude to the government, this Jewish community is turning its back on Israel as a whole.

In this state of international isolation, and given the growing Arab influence in the United States and the makeup of the Reagan government, this development is intolerable in the short term from an economic and political point of view. But no less significant is the fact that the growing estrangement between Israel and large groups of Jews in the United States will have far-reaching national and political significance over the long haul. If we are to judge by the latest political and military course of Mr Begin and the Israeli Government, it would seem that they are not aware of this new situation or ignore it; or it may even be that their political understanding is so dull that there is no prospect that they will attempt to do something about the deterioration until there is a complete collapse.

Only someone who is not satisfied with organized gatherings or with conversations with established wealthy personages in Washington, New York or Los Angeles could understand the real change that is taking place. Like the writer of these lines, one has to visit the various Jewish communities on the east coast, the west coast and the "sun belt" and to listen carefully to the new voices and tones that are emerging. Only someone whose ears are well atuned to reactions in these places would be able to appreciate the considerable erosion that has been going on for some time in the attitude of these communities towards Israel--in their consciousness and to an increasing degree in their actions.

In this connection, one of the great mysteries is the degree of sensitivity and understanding which the embassy in Washington accords these developments (as well as the "experts" on the subject in both the coalition and the opposition). If

any one of them has sensed this erosion and reported it, then his words have not reached the proper ears or the reports are falling on deaf ears.

There is no doubt that several hard and fast and yet erroneous ideas are current in Israel about American Jewry. One aspect of this is the claim that if Israel is dependent on the U.S. Government, she is nonetheless not dependent on American Jewry. According to this approach, American Jewry still has emotional, ideological and practical need of Israel. Because of this dependency of the American Jewish community on Israel, its loyalty and its willingness to aid the government in its policy is assured. But there is no foundation whatsoever for this.

The second view has to do with the structure of the political power of the American Jewish community and the possibilities of drafting it for political purposes connected with Israel. Again without any basis, many in Israel suppose that: American Jewry is a homogeneous body; the leaders of the big Jewish organizations for any purpose connected with Israel; these leaders would want to aid Israel and defend her when called upon by her to do so (in this connection it seems to me that Mr Begin is in for an unpleasant surprise when he comes to the United States).

Quite a number of things have to be clarified. First, the Israeli dependence on the American government means also, and perhaps primarily, a political dependence on American Jewry. By the same token American Jewry is not dependent on Israel, but rather Israel is dependent on American Jewry to satisfy several of her most basic needs. Even if American Jewry musters out of its own resources only in the neighborhood of $300 million for Israel, the $2.2 billion that Israel receives from the American government is in decisive measure the result of Jewish pressures on the government, both overt and covert.

It is doubtful whether we would receive such significant sums without the support of American Jewry. Furthermore, even if the important decisions concerning arms supplies to Israel and its neighbors are accepted by the White House, the most important factor in the considerations of the President is still the position of the Jews in the various election districts. The present administration is displaying great political sophistication and attention to popular support for issues and policy. One can be sure that this administration will look long and hard at the changes taking place in attitudes and inclinations of the Jewish community.

Reaction to Government Policy

Second, far-reaching demographic changes have taken place in the American diaspora. These changes are of the greatest significance for the relationship between Israel and this Jewish community. One of these changes is connected to the mixed marriages which are increasing and causing a numerical decline in the community. The second change is the abandonment of the big cities and the establishment of new Jewish communities in smaller towns. The third change has to do with the rise of new generations of members and leaders in the communities who were not involved in the holocaust experience and the establishment of Israel and whose idenitification is conditioned by Israeli actions and shortcomings.

These accumulating changes find their expression in a new orientation of the Jewish community (in itself very capable): The main concern of the community will be the solution of its own problems. The result of all this is that interest in Israel is decreasing and concern with internal communal processes is growing.

Thus for example, for the first time in 30 years the main theme in the charities' solicitation campaign next year will be the condition of U.S. Jewry and not the problems of Israel.

The reason for the rapid erosion that has been occurring of late is not the demographic and social process alone. The most important immediate cause is the policy of the Israeli Government over the last 4 years. Large identifiable groups (like the reform and conservative streams, many free professionals and the academic community) have been alienated by Israel in reaction to the policy of the Israeli Government and its delcarations in these internal areas: scheming against the reform stream, the growing religious compulsion in Israel, chauvinistic education and the reduction in aid to the depressed strata of Israeli society.

But the policy, declarations and deeds which cause sharp reactions and an unwillingness to identify with Israel and support her are in the area of foreign policy and defense. Large groups among American Jews reject the government's policy towards the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza, they oppose the [West Bank] settlements, they were astounded by the destruction of the Iraqi reactor and by what they perceived to be crude lies on the part of the prime minister (regarding what Saddam Husayn had said and the reality of the device under the heart of the reactor), and finally they were struck hard by the bombing (and its timing) in Beirut.

'Eliahu Salfter wrote that the image of Israel is now one of an "insane country" from a strategic point of view. An "insane policy" in a strategic sense is sometimes the result of rational consideration, which, perhaps, is something that we occasionally practice. But in the U.S. Jewish communities a different image of Israel has been created, in a governmental wrapper an not a national one. The image of Israel as a country of fools and charlatans is becoming more and more widespread. In relations between two parts of the Jewish people there is no greater danger than this kind of relationship which calls into question all the bases for cooperation and mutual aid. No historical, philosophical or psychological explanations which try to prove the strength of the bonds between Israel and American Jewry will help change these positions as long as this lethal image persists and the rift between Israel and American Jewry widens.

9794
CSO: 4323/74

CHANGE IN SADAT POSITION PREDICTED AFTER SINAI RETURN

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Aug 81 p 2

[Article by Dr H. Rosenbloom]

[Excerpts] There was a time...yes, there was a time when Arafat took a most radical stand toward us, when Saudi Prince Rahd was a bit more moderate toward us, while Sadat was more restrained and pleasant toward us than Arafat and Fahd combined. Since then 2 or 3 years have passed and the positions of the three of them toward Israel have become much more identical. And it has gone precisely toward the spirit of Arafat: The three of them are for the return of absolutely all the territories to the Arabs, the three of them are for the return of Jerusalem to the Arabs, the three of them are for Israel's recognition of the PLO, the three of them are for PLO participation in talks with us, and the three of them are for the dismantling of Israeli settlements in the territories. And if all of this is now, before the return of the rest of Sinai to Cairo--what will it be next April, after the return? It would seem to us that with the present Egyptian interest first of all in having us complete our evacuation of the Sinai that Sadat would now affect a certain disavowal of the PLO. But look what is happening: In America Sadat concentrated all his strength and energy in pointing up the urgency of the PLO problem and even in Egypt he did not conceal his position in his talks with Menahem Begin in insisting on his right to emphasize his fundamentally positive position toward the PLO in a joint press conference with his Israeli guests, even if he toned down his words more diplomatically this time. This should teach us to what extent Sadat's political strength has risen and to what extent Begin's political position has declined. The welcoming ceremonies for the Israelis were nice and friendly, but there was nothing in them to change the basic nature of Egyptian relations toward us, which has not softened at all even if we take into account the lukewarm formula of the decision to "renew the autonomy talks" which did not obligate Sadat to anything really specific. Since these points were not missed by Begin and his three companions, they decided to present from their side at Alexandria only secondary claims void of decisive importance such as the exchange of youth delegations between our countries, a bid for a somewhat greater development of cultural relations between them, for encouraging more mutual cooperation in agricultural areas, tourism, etc. All of them words whose purport, apparently, was to enable Begin, after returning home, to claim that "nevertheless we achieved something there." The only think not clear is why we had to launch such a heavy trial balloon to reap such a poor harvest.

9794
CSO: 4323/74

ARTICLE NOTES SADAT ACHIEVEMENT OF ARAB GOALS

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 21 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Paul Edelberg]

[Text] Sadat and the Saudis. "Poor Menahem has his own problems. After all, I got back 90 percent of the Sinai and the Alma oilfield, but what has Menachem gotten? A piece of paper...." (Anwar Sadat in an interview in the New York TIMES on the 19th of October, 1980).

Even before Anwar Sadat arrived in Jerusalem in November of 1980, the author of these lines warned the Israeli Government that the Egyptian tyrant did not come to Israel to make peace but to take the first step towards the piecemeal destruction of the State of Israel. Since then I have written a book and a number of articles in which I have made use of primary and secondary sources in order to prove my point. In my lectures throughout the United States I have defended these points.

On several occasions I was asked: If Sadat is implementing the Islamic goal of destroying Israel, then why is there such great Islamic hostility towards Sadat and towards the agreement that Sadat signed with Israel in March, 1979? Doesn't this hostility on the part of people who are almost desirous of war against him prove the rectitude of Sadat's intentions?

Theatrics

Unfortunately it does not prove anything. There are many reasons why Sadat's actions arouse outbreaks of hatred on the part of his Muslim brothers. Insofar as the Islamic regimes are autocratic, it is not at all difficult to stage this kind of vocal chorus. Someone comes, comes into contact with or meets the heads of Islam and arranges it. There is no tangle of conflicting interests here (including also serious journalists) as in the West. Dictators are infamous for this in order to have their cake and eat it, too. One day they set the pot aboil and the next day they let it cool.

This is rather interesting. Despite the fact that the Arab states have exacerbated their relations with Egypt, they have not cut back their economic investments in the land of the Nile. In fact, Egypt continues to train soldiers from the rejectionist states. At the same time, their condemnation of Sadat has immeasurably increased the confidence in him among the democratic countries and he manages to obtain from the West, and especially from the United States, billions of dollars in military and economic aid.

After very expensive and unsuccessful wars against Israel, the Islamic leaders can see what every other observer sees. Without losing a single soldier, Sadat is getting back the Sinai, including the Israeli airbases which were built with such sophistication as well as the developed sources of oil. In fact he is exploiting Israel's "special relationships" with the United States; he is maneuvering Washington to apply pressure on Israel to give up its control of Judea and Samaria, to divide Israel and to truin its economy.

Thus, by just lifting a finger--on the pretext that it is because of Israel's stubborness, as the American media will claim--Sadat is able to annul everything that he "sacrificed" for the Sinai. [For example] the investment of $15 billion in building a broad base for economic potential. He could close the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping (a right that Israel has no less than other countries in accordance with international law). He could deflect the oil that he gets and sells to Israel, in another direction. And, of course, he could cut the ties with Israel about which Sadat said, as attributed to the late Yig'al Alon, that they are "something temporary," something that "will disappear" when the peace process is completed. Saudi Arabia is now taking the next step towards the completion of this process.

Time is on the side of opportunism.

Even though the attacks on Sadat by Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries have strengthened the Egyptian ruler's currency in the West, no one should conclude that there is any kind of conspiracy here. We must not forget the innumerable internal quarrels among the Arabs, the narrowness of vision of men who envy Sadat his position as the most esteemed Arab leader. In the face of this enmity, even those leaders who display understanding of Sadat's strategy are ready to take advantage of his consistent inconsistency which results from his current position and to enlist support for themselves and against Egypt, whose position as traditional leader of the Muslim world is so strong as to be almost incontestable. But at the same time we should not conclude that people like these are [not] capable of overcoming such feelings when they have a common goal: here the oil cartel, there the Hussein-Arafat agreement despite the civil war in Jordan in 1970. This also explains Saudi Arabia's progress in Sadat's footsteps, even when the latter harshly attacks his critics. Time is on the side of opportunism.

Now when Israel is about 8 months before total withdrawal from Sinai, Saudi Arabia, which finances the PLO, offers to recognize the State of Israel. With nothing to offer Israel but a piece of paper, Saudi Arabia demands: (a) total withdrawal to the borders of the 1949 armistice agreement; (b) the return of East Jerusalem; (c) the establishment of a Palestinian state; (d) the return of the Arab refugees or the payment of compensation to those that left Israel after the 1948 war. This peace strategem should be equated to that published in articles by a confidant of Sadat's, 'AL-QUDS, in the paper 'AL-AHRAM on 14 November, 1975: Israel is going through a process of decline or "withering." This withering will not cease even if she withdraws to the borders of 1967, and even if she should recognize the rights of the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza; and even if she should recognize the PLO (all of this from the recognition that would come)--because the Arab world has the power to unite Washington and Moscow in a single position. This decline is likely to bring Israel face to face with the 1948 Security Council resolution calling upon her to return Arab lands to their owners or to pay damages. The

Arabs, of course, reject any damage payment and insist that they get their lands. That is that. They press Israel to return to the partition boundaries of 1947.

Just last month the Israeli Government protested against 'Al-AHRAM for characterizing all of the State of Israel as "captured territory." Thus it is no wonder that the Egyptian tourist map refers to Israel as "Palestine" and does not recognize Tel Aviv and Haifa at all.

Tactics are of Moscow Origin

Now, when the Americans forced a one-sided cease-fire on Israel with the PLO in Lebanon, the latter continues to acquire Soviet weaponry while the United States delayed the F15's and F16's--and Saudi Arabia finds a convenient hour to exploit Sadat's peace strategy. With the PLO in the background and a Palestinian state in the foreground, the Saudis can maneuver even more than Sadat. By exploiting U.S. and Western dependence on Saudi oil. In fact, this strategy of using the United States to chop up Israel has its source, as Sadat himself noted:

"In Moscow they know the facts no less than I. The Soviets told Nasir on several occasions, [as] when he met with them after the catastrophe of 1967: 'Go speak with the Americans.' During the four times that I have gone to Moscow as president, they have regularly told me: 'Go, open up a dialogue and talk with the Americans.' The United States holds all the cards in this game."

The cards, of course, are hdiden in American military and economic aid to Israel. The Saudis, who finance the most poisonous anti-Jewish propaganda in the Middle East, are now trying to get into the game. They offer Israel "recognition."

In their desperate desire to be accepted by their neighbors, certain insecure Israelis who see with their hearts--reacted immediately in a positive way to the Saudi proposal without examining its content. In so doing they prove their lack of courage and a nauseating naivete with regard to Islam: they refuse to take seriously the unrelenting hostility and camouflaged animosity of Islam to the Jewish people. The correct answer to the Saudis, the Middle Eastern publishers and distributors of "Mein Kampf," should be this: we do not ask for or even want your recognition, just as we do not ask for the recognition of the PLO, your terrorist spearhead.

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BEGIN SEEN EVADING RESPONSIBILITY FOR SINAI WITHDRAWAL

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Aug 81 p 7

[Editorial: "An Attempt To Dictate History"]

[Text] One of the most difficult and certainly one of the most troubling tasks facing the government in the coming year is the evacuation of the remainder of the Sinai and the settlements in the Rafiah salient. Were Mr Begin to lessen somewhat the weight of responsibility for the evacuation and to divide up the burden, even more than a little, it would be understandable. But the prime minister has chosen, and at his own initiative, completely to shake off the yoke by changing the facts retroactively--and this cannot be ignored.

In Friday's edition of MA'ARIV a curious exchange of letters was published between one of the chief rabbis, Rabbi Shlomo Goren, and the Israeli prime minister. The Rabbi was very upset that he had been cited as an authority for the claim that the Sinai is not included in the Biblical borders of the land of Israel and therefore can be given up. Rabbi Goren acknowledges that Sinai is not the land of Israel, but maintains that the Rafiah salient is the land of Israel in every sense of the term--and cites as authorities the Rabbi Saadia Gaon [a 10th century Jewish philosopher], the author of "Knop and Flower" [a 13th century geography of the land of Israel of Estory ha'Farhi] and others. To that, the prime minister responds that it was not he who gave up the salient at Camp David but rather the Knesset and at the instance of the "wretched course of the Alignment."

It is proper to note here that while the rabbi is talking about territorial sovereignty over the Rafiah salient, the prime minister responds, without answering that point, about leaving the settlements in place, and without foreign sovereignty, Mr Begin did not fight at Camp David for sovereignty, but, as he testified about himself, for leaving the settlements in Egyptian sovereign territory under the protection of a Jewish defense force. That is to say, even his response to the rabbi is not in the form of a question--which says something about the prime minister's style in clarifying things as they are.

But the essential question is whether he and his friends at Camp David, or the government under his leadership, the Knesset (in which Mr Begin's government had a majority of 74 of the 120 seats) for the Alignment with its 32 member faction, were responsible for the evacuation of the settlements? The prime minister says now: The Alignment is responsible, but the news clippings show otherwise. In

his Knesset speech of 25 September 1978 in which be brought the good "tidings of the establishment of peace with the strongest and largest of the Arab countries," Mr Begin sought the ratification by the Knesset of the Camp David accords through polemics with, among others, "those who claimed that we gave them (the settlements of the salient) up" already at the time of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Mr Begin said that there was nothing to this claim and continued "but the following choice is before you today: To accept the decision...or no negotiations will begin on a peace treaty and all the things that were agreed to at Camp David will be null and void. This is the choice, these are the two possibilities, and there is no third. And I declare here, with an aching heart but with a clear conscience that I recommend choosing the possibility that we chose yesterday in the government session because this is the road that leads to peace. This is the supreme national interest, even for my settler friends and acquaintances."

Thus in that speech the prime minister determined that the question was as follows: Peace or the settlements of the salient, and that he and no one else recommended the road that leads to peace, and he added further than this was the supreme national interest. From that line of reasoning it follows unavoidably that the road that leads to peace is the road that he agreed upon at Camp David: he and not the government, not the Knesset and certainly not the Alignment. But these things were said when Mr Begin sought to convince people that he was bringing the good tidings of peace and now he is trying to wriggle out of his personal responsibility which requires from him the price he had agreed to pay for peace.

There are examples in history of other countries where people responsible for necessary but unpleasant actions tried to pass the buck to their opponents. But in fact there is an unpleasant tendency: It gets published. Israel's side of the Camp David accords was summarized by Mr Begin and his assistants who were with him. The achievement, like the price--the evacuation of Sinai including the salient--is Mr Begin's. An attempt to stuff the public with actions and then place the responsibility for evacuation on others will not succeed: even Mr Begin is not stronger than historical truth.

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EGYPT ACCUSED OF EXCESSIVE ARMS BUILDUP

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Aug 81 p 17

[Article by Joseph Alper]

[Text] The question that they don't ask Sadat is: Why the increasing arms buildup of the Egyptian Army?

In advance of the talks of the prime minister and the defense minister with the Egyptian leaders, the analysts debated the question: Which topics would merit the attention of the discussants and be brought up? Would the Egyptians press Begin and Sharon for additional concessions at the last stage of the withdrawal from Sinai, or would the Israeli side succeed in focusing the talks on matters on autonomy and normalization? It seems that even when the meeting in Alexandria is over, the journalistic and academic analysis will still concentrate on these questions and their implications. It is also reasonable to suppose--and these words were written before the results of the talks were known--that additional and varied topics concerning Israeli-Egyptian relations were discussed.

But one topic can be singled out with a fair degree of certainty as not having been brought up and not discussed. Since there was a kind of taboo, an unspoken agreement to leave it be. This is the question of the continuing buildup of the Egyptian Army.

It should be said at the very beginning: Egypt is in no way hiding its intentions and actions on the matter. Indeed, in the distant past, at the time of the negotiation of the Camp David accords, Egypt promised endlessly in a reassuring tone that the era of peace would permit them finally to decrease their enormous army and dedicate themselves to economic development. But at the same time the Egyptians are working ceaselessly in the propaganda sphere to impress on the consciousness of their new arms suppliers--the American government--that there is another reason which justifies and obligates the arming and redevelopment of the Egyptian Army: the Soviet danger.

This Egyptian propaganda line has been familiar to us for some time. In fact in February of this year the Egyptian chief of staff explained that "Egypt faces many dangers, from the west, from the south and from other directions. The source of most of the dangers is the comprehensive Soviet scheme for supremacy over the region.... We have sought an increase in American military aid...since we play a central role in the Middle East." Another characteristic example of these

pronouncements: A few days ago, on August 18, the new Egyptian foreign minister, Kam'al Hasan 'Ali, described the new cooperation agreement between Libya, South Yemen, and Ethiopia as "serious testimony to the Soviet intention to flank the area...." President Sadat also frequently expresses concern about what is happening around him in Africa--and in his opinion it matters little if the encroachments are Soviet, Cuban (in Ethiopia) or Libyan (in Chad). The possibility of a radical leftist encroachment against the Gulf states also worries Sadat, and we are already accustomed to the sound of his chivalrous offer to place Egypt at the disposal of the "rescuers" of Saudi Arabia if and when the flood should hit it.

There are two interesting viewpoints on the Egyptian propaganda campaign on the matter of the need to reinforce the Egyptian Army in order to meet the Soviet danger: On the one side, the United States--which recognizes the truth of the Egyptian claims--responds favorably to the Egyptian arms requests. Since she knows that she herself will achieve a rapid intervention capability in the area only 3 years hence ("the Rapid Deployment Force"), and that the states of the area will not tolerate Israeli intervention on any pretext, the United States is supplying Egypt F-16 planes, M-60 tanks, antitank and antiaircraft missiles and a rich bounty of other advanced equipment for her eight divisions in large quantities and on generous credit terms in order that she, Egypt, "watch over the area." And the hand is still extended; the Egyptian defense minister, Abu Ghazala, returned from Washington at the beginning of August and brought back news of the firming up of a new 5-year plan that will start next year, the purpose of which is to assure the continuation of regular supplies of American equipment to the Egyptian Army.

But on the other side, the dangers which Egypt sees as a result of radical encroachment in the area do not stand in any direct relation to the scope of the buildup of the Egyptian Army. For Egypt has made peace with Israel; the Sudan, her neighbor to the south, is her ally; only the Libyans on the west do not get along with the Egyptians, but there is no serious military observer in the area who would attribute to Qadhdhafi's Libyans the ability or intention of attacking Egypt. To annoy and to encroach--yes, but to attack, no. For Qadhdhafi has easier prey in Africa; he has already invaded Chad and, as is well known, he does not conceal his desire to expand his influence over additional weak neighboring states like Niger, Mali, Mauritania and even the Sudan.

It should be possible, at least, to expect Egypt to use her mighty army against a "danger" like Libya, that is to say--to stop speaking so high and mighty and begin to act, at least a little, in order to increase belief in the claims that she makes for justifying American military aid. The question arises, not for Sadat but for ourselves: if President Sadat cannot restrain a small group of Libyans in Chad, then why is he really building his efficient modern army?

Whoever examines this question honestly--even someone who believes heart and soul in the truthfulness of the peace with Egypt--must admit that the Egyptian military buildup is not intended first and foremost against Libya, or Ethiopia, or even to save the Gulf from an Arab-style Khomeyni. This buildup is intended at least to maintain the Egyptian position as the most important force in the Arab world. The minimal operational options that it buys for Egypt--like the typing up of IDF forces in the Negev in the event of an Israeli-Syrian war in the north--are hardly a riddle to any military planner. Therefore it is amazing that our politicians avoid the issue. For we, too, have something to say about the matter both in talks with the Egyptians and in presenting our security needs to the United States. It

is wrong that rules of etiquette, or fear of the evil eye, or any other reason whatever should prevent us from asking the Egyptians and the Americans: What is the reason for this military buildup?

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CHIEF RABBI GOREN DISCUSSES RELIGION-STATE CONTROVERSY

Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 28 Sep 81 p 5

[Interview with Israel's Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren by Moshe Ishon and Yehoshua' Shemesh; date and place not specified]

[Text] "This is not a confrontation, it is a struggle for the truth, the truth of the Torah," says Israel's Chief Rabbi Sholomo Goren in answer to those who argue that he has caused a serious confrontation between religious and secular Jews because of his stand on the excavations in the City of David. "When it comes to the truth one must take a clear stand, even if some see it as a confrontation," the chief rabbi points out. He goes on to say that the confrontation between religious and secular Jews is artificial. "There is no confrontation," the chief rabbi reiterates. He maintains that most Jews in Israel show respect for tradition. He believes many side with the chief rabbinate, not only in regard to the digs in the City of David, but also in matters of Jewish identity in the State of Israel. If there is any confrontation, he adds, it has to do with those who quote Ben-Gurion's slogan regarding Israel as a state of law and not a state of halacha (religious law). This is not what Ben-Gurion meant. Israel's first prime minister was a great supporter of religious law in matters of marriage and divorce, dietary laws and the Sabbath, all of which he considered essential for preserving the Jewish character of the state. Hence the argument that Ben-Gurion saw Israel as a state of law rather than a state of halacha is unfounded. The truth is, Rabbi Gorin stresses, that some of the laws of Israel are derived from the halacha. Moreover, halacha means law, as it is written in the Torah, "For it is a law unto Israel, a statute for the Lord of Jacob." The chief rabbi does not look kindly on anyone who tries to replace the halacha with secular laws which make Israel lose its unique identity. "Take away the halacha and you no longer have Israel," he once declared. Does the halacha have any status? This is the struggle which takes place these days between the chief rabbinate and the secular authorities. The struggle is over the identity of Israel—will it continue to be a Jewish state or will become a secular state? Hence the chief rabbi's strong stand on the issue of the excavations in the City of David, which touches on the very soul of the Jewish state.

We met the chief rabbi in his home pouring over books on his work desk, preparing a halachic answer to a question dealing with easying the burden of the individual. "When it comes to the question of saving lives, or personal matters such as allowing a woman whose husband disappeared to remarry, or allowing those who are halachically unfit to marry to be able to enter into a marriage union, etc., I guide myself according to the attribute of mercy. But when it comes to matters which touch on the

very existence of the Jewish people and the State of Israel, I have to act according to the attribute of justice, so that the halacha may not be done away with." This in essence is the chief rabbi's credo, as it has been since he became chief rabbi for Israel, or even going back to the pre-state days. This is his personal belief which has guided him in the controversy over the excavations in the city of David. "Rabbi Goren has not changed," he says with a smile. "I have not changed in any way since my days in the IDF. I am the same Rabbi Goren. The anti-religious war has intensified. This is the real change and with the Almighty's help we will win."

Question: How do you see the status of religious Jewry in Israel in the year 1981?

Rabbi Goren: I am sorry to say that we have witnessed this year a most serious polarization between the two Jewish views, the one which believes in a state guided by the Torah and the halacha and the one which prefers a secular state devoid of any religious values. This polarization does not center on any one issue, but rather manifests itself in many of the political, religious and educational activities in Israel during the past year.

This is a strange phenomenon, considering the fact that both here and abroad a growing number of Jews are returning to the sources of faith and Jewish law. This trend is no longer a short-lived episode, but rather a strong ongoing movement which has affected the entire secular population, even the anti-religious part, like the three kibbutz movements. I have no rational explanation for this trend. It may be divinely ordained. But if we were to look at it logically, we could find the reason for it in the fact that all other philosophical, sociological and other kinds of ideologies are bankrupt, and there is a vacuum among people, especially the youth. Surveys have shown that those who come back to religion are mostly the young. There have been many attempts to fill this vacuum with pagan mystical theories which have never proven themselves. Since Marxism and socialism have also failed, many have reached the conclusion they can only trust their Heavenly Father, and that the Torah is the only eternal source of light which can solve the problems of the young even in the most scientifically advanced age.

Question: Does this movement back to religion indicate a fulfilment of the prophecy of Amos, "I will cause hunger in the land, not hunger for bread or thirst for water but to hear the words of the Lord?"

Rabbi Goren: I am not sure. Perhaps it is the fulfillment of the vision of Isaiah, "For I will pour water on the thirsty and a stream on the land, I will pour my spirit on your seed and my blessing on your descendants." This, in any case, is the vision of the prophets of Israel regarding the universal return to God.

Yet, this welcome return to religion is only one side of the coin. The other side is the growing enmity of the secular community. We saw it this year. While I see this as coming from a small vocal minority, which has no leg to stand on other than its war against the religion of Israel, this small group has influenced many other people by distorting the image of militant religious Zionism.

Question: Could it be that the return to religion has caused alarm among certain segments of the secular community, and has made their attitude more extreme?

Rabbi Goren: I don't believe that this is what bothers them. It is rather truth itself that they are afraid of. They are afraid to face this truth. They know they will not be able to hold out much longer against the Torah, which was given by God whose word is truth. The late Chief Rabbi Kuk has written that death is a lie. A lie has no basis in reality, it has no right to exist. Truth lives forever, and the word of our God will endure. Our sages have taught that "Jacob our father did not die," since Jacob is the source of truth, as it is written, "You give truth to Jacob." Death has no dominion over him. This is why they look for preventive measures. They are trying to avoid coming to grips with the truth of Israel's Torah.

Question: Yet the secular community keeps insisting that the religious community is trying to violate the status quo?

Rabbi Goren: I do not know what the status quo is, and I have never accepted it. If we look back to the beginning of the state we will see that there has never been a status quo in religious matters. If we take the establishment of the state as our point of departure, why is it that at that time the marriage and divorce law, which is the most fundamental religious law in the state, was passed, as well as the rabbinical court law, etc.? David Ben-Gurion had said that as long as he was prime minister, and as long as his party was in power, he would not allow (politics) to split the nation, and that civil marriage will destroy our people. This was the main reason for his bringing this law before the Knesset.

Question: In general, were the changes in the status quo favorable to orthodox Jewry?

Rabbi Goren: In regard to certain laws there was an improvement. Practically speaking, there is a process of furthering religion in the state by making the laws of the Torah a more integral part of life and by protecting the halacha. And yet the political philosophy and the religious ideology of the state and the population are in a state of decline. All gains in religious matters are met with protest on the part of the vocal minority, which encourages the anti-religious attitude in the state, as if to say, Beware of the Orthodox, oh Israel.

Question: Is that true?

Rabbi Goren: No, I think it is just the opposite. When people ask me where does the separation between religion and state exist--here or in the U.S., I say that it exists here to a much greater degree. In the U.S. the separation is on paper only. Here it actually exists. In the U.S. you can read on every dollar bill the motto In God We Trust. Perhaps our shekel is so devaluated because there is no fear of God on it. The U.S. Senate and Congress do not start a session without an opening prayer by a clergyperson. I myself was once honored with such an opening prayer, which lasted for 10 minutes, and which was recorded in the official publication of the Congress, following which the official business was conducted. When a new president is sworn in, most of the time is devoted to prayers by representatives of the various religions. Presidential speeches are full of religious allusions. American radio and television broadcast services from churches and synagogues. By law, all U.S. military installations must provide worship facilities for Protestants, Catholics and Jews. The houses of worship are paid for by the defense budget, and the prayer books are provided by the state. The status of the clergy in the U.S. is the most advanced in the world. The clergy enjoy many privileges, they even have reserved parking places. Religion is treated with respect.

Question: What about here, would you say religion in Israel is looked down upon?

Rabbi Goren: Here there is no respect for religion and no respect for people. Not only religion is looked down upon, but also people. There is disregard for values in many circles. There is no respect for the elderly, no respect for parents and teachers, no courtesy. There is no teaching of values, of respecting people, including those who preserve the Torah. Compare the decorum at a weeding ceremony in the U.S. to the rowdiness here in every religious ceremony.

Question: Isn't the spiritual leadership to blame for not having succeeded in endearing itself to the public at large?

Rabbi Goren: The spiritual leadership can only do its job when it is given the tools, the means, the opportunity and the authority to do it.

Question: Isn't the rabbinate backed by the law?

Rabbi Goren: The rabbinate is not backed by the law as the standard bearer of Torah. In the new chief rabbinate law which was passed a year ago, it stated at first in section one that the chief rabbinate is the supreme religious authority in the state. When the bill reached the Knesset this section was struck out. If a rabbi tries to prove that he is not someone's employee, he is taken to task.

This turned out to be true in the recent excavations in the City of David. What is more self evident than the fact that the chief rabbinate must decide what place is a Jewish cemetery? Even if the chief rabbinate is left with no authority, this last matter should still remain in its hands. It is interesting to note that in the entire coalition agreement of the present government, which includes 83 sections, the chief rabbinate is mentioned in only one place, in Section 45. What does it say? "The religious law of not digging up and searching in graves will be kept... in every license granted for excavations by the authorities it will clarify whether there are grave sites in the area, in which case the excavation will stop in order to consult the chief rabbinate on the matter." It seems as if the spirit of prophecy had descended upon the lawmakers before the incident at the City of David took place.

Getting to the point, what could be worse than plundering graves and taking out thousands of bones, including the soldiers of Bar Kokhva, and not burying them. Hundreds of skeletons were discovered in the Judean Desert, including 50 of Bar Kokhva's warriors, which have never been given proper burial and are now scattered in universities and research institutes. There is no respect for the Torah or for people, dead or alive, including the sacred heroes of 'En Gdi who fought in Bar Kokhva's army. The recent events have made me realize that the compromising attitude of religious Zionism has not paid off.

Question: Yet there are those who argue that it is the lack of compromise on the part of the religious community that causes the polarization.

Rabbi Goren: We have made a historical mistake by not causing the polarization 34 years ago. Compromise means retreat from our vital spiritual position. It means that the majority will swallow us up and do away with our spiritual values. I am in favor of fighting against such laws as the law of return. I am sure that the

recent clash will be beneficial for the Jewish people, the Torah, and the state. We have kept quiet until now. There were undercurrents, and we have kept them from bursting out. This time they did burst. This affair will lead to a religious, public and political clarification--where do we stand, what is the place and the status of religious Zionism, if enmity against us is so strong. We have to fight with all our might for the status of the Torah in the Land of Israel. For decades we have fought for the unity of the people, the Torah and the state. We have agreed to give up organic parts of the sacred Land of Israel and dismantle settlements and return them to Egypt. To this day we have not fought for the unity of the people in terms of the law of return and conversion according to the halacha. Now the fight is for the integrity of the Torah. We must not desist from this fight.

Question: Some say that for years you have been a bridge among the various segments of the population and you were a peace maker, and that now you have taken an extreme stand. Is this true?

Rabbi Goren: Anyone who says that in the past it was a compromiser does not know what he is saying. I have banged on Ben-Gurion's desk many times and insisted on what I knew was right, and I gained his respect. But when it comes to women who want to remarry after their husband has disappeared, or men who are not fit to marry according to the halacha, or women with family problems, I do everything I can to solve their problems. I resort to the divine attribute of mercy. When the problem is personal, when someone is in trouble, I do everything I can to find a solution. Rabbi Soloveichik once told me that his grandfather, Rabbi Hayim of Brisk used to "pull stones out of the floor" when it came to dealing with solving a problem of an illegitimate person, in order to save the unfortunate person. My nature does not allow me to see people suffer, and I do everything I can to help them. But under no circumstances will I agree to violate the halacha becuase someone wants to plunder graves or to practice on dead bodies or to take skeletons out of their graves. I am the last person in the world who will forgive those who have taken the bones of Bar Kokhva's soldiers and thousands of other Jewish bones out of their graves and have scattered them all over the world. I will fight it with all my might.

We should take notice how our sages of blessed memory dealt with this sensitive issue. Our sources do not dwell on commemorating wars, but when it comes to graves of martyrs, they have instituted two memorials: (a) The day the heroes of Betar were buried they enacted in Yavneh the blessing "The good God who does good" in the prayer after the meal, which is the fourth blessing to this day, and (b) the Mishnah in Ta'anit states that the 15th of Av and Yom Kippur were the happiest days in the Jewish calendar, a time when the daughters of Jerusalem would dance in the vineyards. One of the six reasons for the feast of the 15th of Av in the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmuds, is that the fallen soldiers of Betar were buried on that day. I could not understand the analogy between the 15th of Av and Yom Kippur, what was it that made the 15th of Av as important as Yom Kippur? This latest incident helped me understand it. I maintain that when Israel's heroes are not given a proper burial the day of atonement does not atone for Israel. In II Samuel 21 it is written: "There was famine in the time of David for 3 years, year after year, and David prayed to God, and God said, it is because of Saul and his bloody house, because they have killed the Gibeonites." The Talmud explains in Yvamot 78b: "It was because Saul was not properly mourned." What it actually means is that he was not properly buried as it is written in Pirke d'Rabi Eliezer and in Scripture. The same chapter in II Samuel states that

David took the bones of Saul and of Jonathan his son from the people of Yavesh Gilead who had stolen them from Bet Shen, "and he took the bones of Saul and the bones of Jonathan his son and buried them in the land of Benjamin in Tzelah, in the sepulchre of Kish his father. And they did all that the king had commanded and God forgave the land thereafter." This means that God did not forgive the land as long as they did not bury the bones.

In the cave of the scrolls in the Judean Desert where the 50 skeletons of the Bar Kokhva warriors were found, a Bar Kokhva archive was found as well. One of the letters in the archive states that Uar Kokhva ordered a shipment of the four kinds of ritual trees from En Gedi to Betar so that the soldiers may keep the holiday. As mentioned before, one of the reasons for the feast of the 15th of Av was that the soldiers of Betar were buried on that day, which is why the blessing of "The good God who does good" was designated for the prayer after the meal. And what happens in our time? The holy bones of Bar Kokhva's soldiers are taken out of their graves and scattered all over the country!

Question: And yet, in the case of the City of David, you have been labelled a radical. Is that true?

Rabbi Goren: My teacher Rabbi Iser Zalman Meltzer of blessed memory once told me, that in the Volozin academy there was once a secular philosopher from an assimilated family, who became a religious fanatic. They asked him why he was so fanatic, when even the great Maimonides has taught us to look for the golden mean, the middle way. He said, what is the golden mean? When one knows where the original road is, one knows where left and right are, and where the middle is. But when the original road has been obliterated and a new road has been paved, far from the original one, there is no longer a golden mean.

What kind of radical are they talking about? What are we fighting for? That graves should not be desecrated and plundered? I am not fighting that anyone should put on phylacteries, or go to the synagogue, or eat kosher food. This is one's private domain. The fight is over a patently halachic question, and we should keep quiet? Why are they making so much noise and fighting so vehemently?

Question: The fight over the City of David affair may be your greatest public war. What conclusions have you arrived at because of it?

Rabbi Goren: This incident has taught me something. Because we had to interfere with one archeologist in a case involving three-quarters of a dunam, the entire archeological and scientific community was mobilized against us. There were a few exceptions. There were those who refused to sign the manifesto. But most of the academic community did join in, because they were afraid their bluff might be called. I am sorry to say some religious scholars also joined the group, including Professor Auerbach, whose involvement was invalid from the beginning, both academically and religiously. This affair showed that some religious Jews have no religious pride, do not think for themselves, and take no pride in representing the Torah.

I am fully in favor of confrontation when it comes to the laws of the Torah, because it is so vital to us. The course of events has made this a test case for Orthodoxy.

All legal rulings will be short-lived, but the ruling of the halacha, in any matter whatsoever, will last forever, and its educational impact will continue to grow, teaching the people to respect the Torah and its representatives, as the great Maimonides has stated, that one can only respect the Torah by keeping its laws.

Question: But is it right to harm the unity of the people on account of the ruins of the City of David?

Rabbi Goren: Israel's unity is only good when it is held together by the Torah. But when the intention is to destroy the Torah and the religion there is no unity, and it is written, "Do not consider unity to be that which the people call unity," which is explained in the Talmud, Sanhedrin 26a.

Question: We are told that Rabbi Kuk, whom you strive to follow, has always tried to bring about reconciliation and avoid confrontation.

Rabbi Goren: I doubt whether there are too many people today who knew Rabbi Kuk, except for his son, as I did. I often ask myself what Rabbi Kuk would have done if he were in my shoes. Before I was elected chief rabbi I went to the graves of Rabbi Kuk and my father-in-law, the Nazir, and promised that I would not occupy the Rabbi's seat without pledging to keep his legacy and be a faithful guardian of the office. And so whenever I have to reach an important decision I ask myself what would he have done. I have no doubt in my mind he would have strongly protested an assault on an ancient cemetery, plundering graves, and scattering the bones of Bar Kokhva's warriors.

It is a mistake to think that Rabbi Kuk always looked for reconciliation and peace at all cost. In the Stavsky case, for example, he was at odds with many people. The same was true in the case of the elections to the Jerusalem city council, and in many other cases. Looking back 46 years later, I can safely say that whenever he had to fight for something he did not hesitate to do so. It is written in Talmud Megilah 31b, "If the old tell you to destroy and the young tell you to build, then destroy, because the destruction of the old is building, and the building of the young is destruction."

Question: Nevertheless, how do we achieve unity?

Rabbi Goren: To unify the extremes we need a strong spiritual bridge. It has to stand on the strong pillars of holiness, purity, values, manners, love of Israel, Torah and respect for people. One cannot build a bridge on paper which has no value, in disregard to respect for man and Torah. One cannot build on shaky ruins. One must build a mighty bridge, prepare the ground for it, make sure it has strong foundations, and a soul. A structure without a soul cannot last. The soul, the spirit, must be infused in the foundations. The struggle for the integrity of the Torah must be done with total dedication. As it states in Talmud Shabbat, those commandments for which Israel was prepared to die have lasted, while the others have not. The light of the Torah arises from this confrontation, from our dedication to the Torah, and this light can penetrate the deepest and farthest recesses of the soul.

Question: Those who are against the confrontation quote the verse, "Its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace."

Rabbi Goren: Failing to stand up for the Torah is neither a way nor pleasantness. "Ways of pleasantness" does not mean desisting from fighting, bending our head and foregoing the Torah. "Ways of pleasantness means, for example, if you ask someone to put on phylacteries, you do not force him to do it. But here they deprive the dead of resting in peace in their grave, disturbing their eternal rest, violating their domain, mocking God.

I must go back to the reasons for the Holiday of the 15th of Av. One of the six reasons as mentioned in Yrushalmi Ta'anit chapter 4 halacha 7, is that on that day Hoshea ben Elah removed the barriers which Jeroboam son of Nevat had put on the highways to keep the people from going on a pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and permitted them to go. Rabbi Kahana asked Rav, why was Hoshea, who did such a favor to the people, so severely punished, as it is written, "Shalmaneser, king of Assyria, went up against him, and Hoshea became his slave" (II Kings 16:3)? Rav replied, because he took off the yoke and put it on others, that is to say, he did not say the people had to go, but only were permitted to go. Thus he gave them a choice.

When it comes to a public matter we must fight to make the Torah the basis for our life. This is why I said in the beginning that the compromising attitude of religious Zionism did not work. The religious community does not tolerate compromises, nor does the secular community respect them.

Question: Is this the way to reach the non-religious?

Rabbi Goren: The fight over the City of David affair has made me aware of yet another phenomenon--abysmal ignorance among Jews, including religious Jews. This is the root of all evil. Many are unfamiliar with the basics of the halacha and the meaning of a ruling. They have no concept of what it is all about.

I once heard Professor Klausner tell a story about what ignorance can cause. When the Germans invaded Poland in World War I, they found a Jewish dayan (judge) who, on a Friday, was repairing the string which was tied around the Jewish neighborhood to mark the boundaries of the Sabbath, known as eruv. The Germans took him for a spy. When he told them what it was, they consulted their Jewish chaplain, who was a liberal rabbi, ignorant of that custom. Consequently they put that judge on trial and executed him. Professor Klausner used this story to show how dangerous ignorance can be.

Ignorance is our worst enemy. Raising our educational standards will solve many of our problems.

Still, I have not lost my love for all Jews. Which is not to say we must not fight for the integrity of the Torah. Our sages have taught that a fight for the sake of heaven increases love in Israel, as it is written in Talmud Kiddushin, "if the father and his son, the rabbi and his student who study Torah together become enemies, they remain there until they become friends, since it ends in love."

Question: What do you expect from the new Jewish year, 5742?

Rabbi Goren: I believe that the new year may be a turning point in deepening religious awareness among our people, in increasing mutual understanding and respect

for the Torah and the religion of Israel. I don't know if this is a realistic assessment or my own wishful hope. I pray that we will help one another and strengthen one another. The coming year is fraught with dangers, what with returning the entire Sinai to Egypt, tearing out parts of Israel. I doubt whether this will strengthen the peace with Egypt in the long run, and it will certainly not strengthen the peace among Jews.

We need divine mercy, and we pray for a good year, a year of material and spiritual blessings. May we see many more Jews arriving from the Soviet Union and from the rest of the world, may we unite the Jewish people by means of the Torah, so that the light of Torah will improve them, as it is written in Sifre d've Rav, "When Israel is united here below His Holy Name is praised on high, and it is written, and there was a king in Jeshurun. When? When the heads of the people gather." Rashi adds, "When you join together as one in peace, He is your king."

9565
CSO: 4423/18

OFFICIALS CRITICAL OF NUMBER OF U.S. POLICIES

GF291159 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 29 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] Kuwait—"Reagan's statement at the IMF meeting calling for the market place to take care of the Third World countries' problems carries two fallacies. First that the poorest of nations do not have a place to have a market and second the private sector in the newly industrialized countries would not go into countries that do not have basic infrastructures on which to build," Finance and Planning Minister 'Abd al-Latif Yusuf al-Hamad told a seminar here Tuesday.

The seminar, held at the premises of Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, also grouped under under secretary at the Information Ministry Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Sabah and other top Kuwaiti officials in addition to an American delegation representing private business and newsmen.

Mr al-Hamad called on the U.S. not to extinguish the marshall plan spirit of the post-World War II era.

He expressed deep distress over the new trend in the U.S. policy calling for limiting foreign aid and described such a policy as discouraging to even other members of the "club donors," such as West Germany and Japan.

The information under secretary opened the seminar with an introductory word presenting the Kuwaiti officials to the American delegation and then giving the floor to Finance Minister al-Hamad.

The minister then welcomed questions or commentaries from the American delegation saying that he preferred dialogue to ready-made material and typewritten answers.

Mr al-Hamad said that Official Development Aid (ODA) should precede the private sector's contribution in developing countries. "For the ODA provides for the establishment of infrastructure projects without which no private capital would venture to establish any project in such a country," he added.

The minister chided the U.S. for retracting former promises in a 3-year international aid plan saying that "they have to be renegotiated" and added that such a retreat distorts the image of the U.S. in the world.

A member of the delegation asked Mr al-Hamad why doesn't he convey the same message to the Soviet Union. The minister replied that "we do not talk with the Eastern bloc on the subject because on ideology grounds they do not accept it."

In reply to a remark on Kuwait's view towards the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Mr al-Hamad said that Kuwait "objects to foreign domination of any country whether it be Afghanistan or Palestine."

The minister then attacked the American rapid deployment force for including Kuwait in its line of operations.

Shaykh Nasir accused the U.S. of pushing the Afghans into the Soviet hand by denying them aid when they most needed it.

In reply to another question Shaykh Nasir explained the Kuwait is committed to the Baghdad summit conference banning all contacts with the Egyptian regime as long as it does not give up Camp David accords.

Talking of OPEC prices, Mr al-Hamad agreed with one of the member's remarks that it had soared since 1973, but he said there are two sides to every coin. If the prices had not gone so high there would have been no search for an energy alternative. The North Sea would not have been a reality, he said.

The 2-day program of the American delegation who arrived here Monday began with a reception given by deputy premier, Foreign Minister and acting Information Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad at the Kuwait Hilton.

Shaykh al-Sabah delivered a speech in which he focussed on the lack of American knowledge towards various Arab problems. This state of ignorance hinders the promotion of American-Arab relationa and cooperation, Shaykh al-Sabah said.

The deputy premier stated that "Arabs have the right to insist that the United States adopt a more just and balanced position especially in its treatment of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."

The American delegation left Kuwait Tuesday to continue their tour which is expected to take them to Saudi Arabia, Oman and Egypt.

CSO: 4400/40

MINISTER COMMENTS ON OPEC PRICES, SANTA FE PURCHASE

LD041140 Kuwait KUNA in English 1023 GMT 4 Nov 81

[Text] Kuwait, 4 Nov (KUNA)--Oil Minister Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah predicted that "demand on OPEC oil will improve and increase enough to allow the different OPEC countries to gain an adequate amount of exports share which in itself will alleviate the burden and pressure to decrease prices," according to a Kuwaiti newspaper Wednesday.

In an interview with AL-WATAN, Shaykh al-Khalifah expressed relief that the decision on the unification of the oil price arrived at by the latest extraordinary meeting in Geneva of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 29 October "provided us with some kind of stability until next year," he said.

On his view of the problems facing the OPEC, Shaykh al-Khalifah indicated: "The great problem faced by the organization was the circumstances themselves. We have proved our ability to counter them."

"The great hike in prices in the previous period led to a great decrease in demand also, which in turn caused a competition among the OPEC countries to conquer the markets," he explained, adding that "this has created an atmosphere whereby no agreement could be reached and where additional decrease (in prices) were introduced through different barter deals, a thing that caused the absence of trust among all the countries."

The Kuwaiti oil minister pointed out the long term OPEC strategy aims at "flexibility and to once in a while review demand on the OPEC oil and prices in a manner that guarantees the OPEC won't continue to lose the international markets and (that allows it) to be more flexible in relation to the demand expectations."

Shaykh al-Khalifah was interviewed while en route to Washington. His trip to the U.S. comes in relation to the latest venture by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation to acquire the American Santa Fe Company.

Commenting on the investment policy of Kuwait Petroleum, he indicated the corporation is a commercial establishment that should venture into realms it deems profitable.

"We all know that refineries outside Kuwait are not profitable. But the fields of exploration and the different exploration services such as digging and survey are economically lucrative," Shaykh al-Khalifah noted.

He pointed out the high level attained by Santa Fe in the fields of exploration services and engineering. "When we think of expanding our investment base in the Third World, we do that through a company with fame and high efficiency. Everywhere, the first question asked in the field of exploration is about the technical partner," Shaykh al-Khalifah pointed out.

An announcement was made 5 October by Kuwait Petroleum stating the corporation reached an agreement with Santa Fe Company to acquire all the company shares for U.S.$2.5 billion. According to the agreement, Santa Fe would become a subsidiary of Kuwait Petroleum Corporation.

CSO: 4400/40

INVESTORS INCREASE SHARE OF LOCAL MARKET

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 21 Oct 81 p 11

[Text]

LONDON: A flowering of private sector manufacturing ventures is the best proof that Kuwaiti investors are beginning to have confidence in the home market. Faisal Al-Marzouk, the Deputy chairman of the Commercial Bank of Kuwait, sees a parallel with the resilience of Lebanon. "We are living in a war zone. The region is now used to bombings and war. Now people are not so afraid they are bringing their money back. Look at the Lebanese economy: it can still function despite all the problems," the London Times reported.

Now that it is clear the Iran-Iraq war is a private slugging match between two heavyweights, Kuwait's proximity to the Iran-Iraq war has, if anything, resulted in a fresh flush of confidence. Shuwaikh port is working at full capacity with more than three million tons of cargo unloaded in the first six months of 1981. The reason is not difficult to deduce — cargo is moving northwards to Iraq because of the congestion and increased risks attached to freighting direct to Iraq.

Base

By September 1982 production of trucks should begin at the National Automobile and Trading Company factory in Kuwait now under construction. It is a joint venture with Magirus-Deutz of West Germany and just another sign of the broadening of the economy's base away from dependence on crude oil production and hydrocarbons-related industries. What is most encouraging to government planners is the presence of private investors in the line up.

Traditionally the government programme has concentrated on refining and petro-chemicals. Kuwait's experience has in many ways led the way in the Gulf and is now being used to advantage by pan-Gulf ventures such as the Gulf Petrochemicals Industries Company (GPIC) plant proposed for Bahrain in which Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are joining together to make ammonia and methanol. At home the petrochemical industry is still being developed with Petrochemical Industries Company (PIC) currently out to tender for a fourth ammonia line. This contract, for a 1,000 ton-day plant, is being competed for by Technipetrol of Italy, Creusot-Loire and Heurtey Petrochem of France, and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Chiyoda Chemical Engineering & Construction of Japan.

The emergence of a sophisticated industrial base is expressed more by the medium and small contract awards than by the large government-financed projects. The Kuwait Chemical Manufac-

turing Company (KCMC) has recently awarded a 4m dinar ($14.3m) contract to Switzerland's Bertrams for a synthetic resins plant. The 16,500 tons a year plant will produce feedstock for paint, varnish, adhesive and glass-fibre industries in Kuwait and other Gulf countries, using a process licensed by The Netherlands' Synres International which will also offer technical assistance. Here a local company is involved as a consultant. Kuwait Engineering Operation & Management Company (Kenomac) which has worked in North Yemen will supervise construction.

Private

The strength of the Kuwaiti private sector lies most clearly in manufacturing and contracting work for the construction industry. Kuwait's Kirby Building Systems makes pre-engineered steel buildings at the Shuaiba industrial area south of Kuwait city. Established only five years ago the factory has now completed more than 4,000 buildings in the Middle East. At present rates of production it can manage 40 a month. The 1980 turnover was more than 20m dinars ($71.7m). The Kuwait factory's sign can be seen as far afield as Abu Dhabi lower down the Gulf where Kirby has done work for the state-owned Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC). The export orientation of Kirby can be seen most spectacularly in the $14m job it has done for Misr Bank near Alexandria in Egypt. Formerly owned by the American oil firm Kirby Exploration, Kirby is now owned by Al Ghanim Industries, a leading Kuwaiti business house.

Kuwait can be expected to take in services in its drive to diversify. Abdel-Latif Yousef Al-Hamad, the Finance & Planning Minister, said in August that he believed the services sector had the greatest potential.

Contracts

The minister's faith in the local economy has been expressed in a 1981-82 budget where electricity and water take the biggest share of actual expenditure. Heavy demand from industry, which appears to be capable of absorbing every gallon of water and kilowatt of electricity produced surplus to domestic requirements for air conditioning, has brought a ready response from government. There are fewer complaints from industry about government tardiness in supplying services than in many other Gulf states.

Maintenance and replacement contracts are an area in which the Government hopes that local companies will play a more active role. Refurbishment of government buildings is now generally accepted as the sort of work to be awarded to local companies even where contracts total $5m or more. When it comes to bigger contract such as the replacement of roads then contractors such as Kharafi International Contractors Group of Fiafi Trading & Contracting can expect a relatively easy race where foreign contractors probably will fail even to prequalify.

A local company recently achieved a notable success as a manufacturer by winning a $18m contract to supply furniture for a large ministries complex. Abdel-Aziz Al-Usaimi furniture factory beat companies from France, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the United States and Britain in an open tender which 10 years ago would almost certainly have gone to a foreign company.

The deterrent to such investment in the 1970s was always that locally-made products could not compete on price or in quality with the imported item. Such arguments are heard less and less as local companies seek out new technology and apply it to manufacturing ventures at home in Kuwait. If there is any message it must be that diversification of the economy will mean more and more contracts going local.

CSO: 4400/41

BRIEFS

LOAN TO GULF CEMENT COMPANY--The Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait has announced the signing of letters of guarantee worth around Yen 5 billion between the Gulf Cement Co. and a consortium of five banks and financial institutions led by the Al-Ahli Bank of Kuwait, according to a report from KUNA, the official Kuwaiti news agency, last week. Under the agreement, which was signed at Al-Ahli Bank's head office, the bank will undertake to issue the letters of guarantee on behalf of the other institutions participating in the deal. These are the Arab African International Bank, the National Bank of Kuwait, the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company and the Industrial Bank of Kuwait, which is to act as agent. According to Al-Ahli Bank, the loan raised from the issue of letters of guarantee, totalling Yen 5.087 billion (about $22.2 million), is to enable the Gulf Cement Co. to purchase two Japanese-built ships to transport cement. The ships will be paid for in eight half-yearly installments. The first payment will be made six months after the ships have been handed over. The Gulf Cement Co. has already taken delivery of one of the vessels, the Shaam, and delivery of the second, the Dahan, is scheduled for October 28. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 43, 26 Oct 81 p 4]

CSO: 4400/41

MINISTER CALLS FOR COUNTERING SOVIET THREAT

GF071425 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1200 GMT 7 Nov 81

[Text] Doha, 7 Nov (GNA)--Omani Information and Youth Affairs Minister 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rawwas has called on Arab countries to develop "the Gulf's intrinsic strength to counter Soviet efforts to encircle the strategic Gulf region."

In a statement to the Qatari newspaper AR-RAYAH published today, the Omani minister expressed his country's fear over the possibility that the PDRY might become a "new Hanoi that would be a source of trouble in the Arabian peninsula." Yet, he said: "Oman will do all that it can to prevent the region from becoming a new Saigon."

On the treaty signed by the PDRY, Libya and Ethiopia last August, he said: "There are indications that the Soviet Union is trying to encircle the region and that the natural countermeasure to such treaties lies in developing the Gulf's intrinsic strength." He described the Gulf Cooperation Council as "the rock against which all foreign ambitions will be foiled."

On the exercises U.S. forces will carry out with Omani forces next Monday, he said they are aimed at telling others that Oman is not without friends. These exercises are part of an Omani-U.S. agreement on facilities to introduce Oman to a means of communications with the United States in case of danger. They will also help it assess its ground potential.

The minister added: "These exercises are not more dangerous" than those exercises Soviet troops carried out in conjunction with Syrian troops in the summer or the Soviet fleet's exercises in the PDRY.

The Omani minister expressed his country's support for Saudi Arabia's peace plan in the Middle East. He said: "This plan is a turning point for Arab policy to achieve the minimum degree of Arab solidarity."

CSO: 4404/93

BRITISH PRESENCE, INFLUENCE CRITICIZED

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 14 Aug 81 p 1

[Article: "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman Criticizes Qabus' Venturing to Appoint a British Military Commander in His Army"]

[Text] The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman [PFLO] has again urged the Arab countries to take harsh measures against the Qabus regime which has committed another act of betrayal over and above earlier national and pan-Arab betrayals and sacrifices of national sovereignty.

This emerged in a press release by the front's official spokesman concerning the appointment of Timothy Creasey, former commander of British ground forces, as chief of the general staff of the Omani armed forces.

The official spokesman recalled the grave situation which had resulted in Oman because of the extensive imperialist military presence that had arisen from the betrayals of the lackey Qabus regime.

He stated that this major military presence of American and British imperialism in Oman posed a threat not only to the Omani people and its national wealth but was a direct threat to the entire area.

The official spokesman pointed out that Qabus had asked Britain to extend the stay of British forces in the Sultanate, having made this request to Lord Carrington, the foreign minister, during his visit to Muscat and his meeting with the lackey, Qabus.

He also indicated that Oman had proposed that it be supplied with various military equipment, including a second squadron of Jaguar aircraft in addition of the first squadron which it has obtained.

The official spokesman stated that it had come as no surprise that Qabus should name a British commander as chief of staff of his army since the commander of the police was British and the chief of General Intelligence was also British; even the person in charge of prisons was a Britisher named (Craven) who used to deal in hogs in East Africa and was now in charge of all jails in Oman.

In closing, the official spokesman urged all peace-loving peoples to condemn and criticize the lackey Muscat regime and to stand beside the Omani people in order for it to achieve its just goals of freedom and independence.

8389
CSO: 4404/17

WATER, ELECTRICITY RATES IN DHOFAR CAUSE CONCERN

Aden SAWT AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 6 Sep 81 p 2

[Article: "Water, Electricity...and Mr Brown"]

[Text] There has been an alarming rise in the cost of water and electricity in the southern region of Oman (Dhofar) and people are now experiencing a major crisis because of the continued rise in prices for essential consumer goods since the merchants are setting prices as they wish--dictated by their greedy interests. With regard to water and electricity under the aegis of the al-Qabus regime which the British labeled "the era of prosperity," this issue has its own story. As we said, there has been an exorbitant rise in the cost of water and electricity and this has caused most people to resort to turning their lights off early at night to avoid an electricity bill that would take the major part of a family's funds. Given this increase in the water and electricity rates, the citizens wrote a petition to the governor of Dhofar (who resides in Salalah) and asked to meet with him to present their concerns and problems. After much difficulty, the governor agreed to meet with a group of the petitioners and scheduled a day and time for them to come to meet with him. The citizens went to the governor's office and he took the initiative by saying, "Why do you insist on asking to meet with me? I am very busy, there are many problems and I don't any additional problems." They replied, "If you can't resolve our problems, then we ask your pardon and we will leave. We wish you well." The governor told them, "You must understand that I am the governor of Dhofar and am responsible for everything in this region (Dhofar). His Majesty, may God prolong his life, has given me his full confidence and has granted me full powers to act as I see fit for the benefit of the people and the homeland." The citizens were delighted with what the governor had to say and this encouraged them to begin to talk about their living conditions, the alarming rise in prices and the merchants; fixing of prices. They then turned to the subject of the water and electricity rates and asked the government to lower the prices. The governor put one hand on his chin, adjusted his turban with the other, fixed his gaze on the ceiling of the assembly room, turned red and said, "With regard to the subject of water, we will look into your request and, God willing, I will do everything I can to accomplish this. With regard to electricity, this is not within my jurisdiction." The citizens broke in to ask, "In whose jurisdiction is it? You are the governor of the area and, according to what you said, you have full powers from the Sultan and the Sultan has given you his trust." He replied hoarsely with a nonplussed look, "You will have to pardon me. Some issues should be directed to the appropriate offices." When they pressed him with questions to identify these offices, he said, and I quote, "Go to Mr Brown, the commander of intelligence, since electricity and its rates are within his jurisdiction. Is it understood?"

8389
CSO: 4404/17

BRIEFS

OFFICIAL APPOINTMENTS--Muscat, 29 Oct (GNA)--Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id of Oman today issued decrees appointing al-Mu'tasim ibn Humud al-Busa'idi--who is currently Defense Ministry under secretary--minister of state and Hasan Ihsan Nasib Defense Ministry under secretary, in addition to his post as assistant chief of staff of the armed forces. [Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0620 GMT 30 Oct 81]

OIL MINISTER ON MINERAL PRODUCTION--His Excellency Sa'id Ahmad al-Shanfari, minister of petroleum and minerals, has stressed that the Sultanate will maintain its rate of oil production of 320,000 barrels daily during the current 5-year plan. In a statement to UMAN, today he said: The Sultanate is maintaining its oil production until 1985 because it does not have any marketing problems [words indistinct]. He added: The price of Oman's oil is at present $34 per barrel. He said oil is subject to supply and demand and is liable to a rise or reduction in price. [Sentence indistinct on copper production] The minister said next October the Sultanate will begin producing chrome. He expressed the hope that mineral production will allow the Sultanate to diversify its sources of national income in accordance with the August directives of His Majesty Sultan Qabus ibn Sa'id, may God protect him. [Text] [EA291452 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 28 Oct 81]

TRADE AGREEMENT WITH AUSTRALIA--Minister of Trade and Industry Muhammad al-Zubayr returned home this morning following a 1-week visit to Australia during which he signed a trade and economic and technical cooperation agreement between the two countries on behalf of his majesty's government. The agreement was signed for Australia by John Anthony, deputy prime minister and minister of trade and resources. The agreement provides for trade cooperation so it can be developed and expanded to benefit both countries. The agreement also encourages and simplifies cooperation among corporations and trade institutions in both countries. The two countries have agreed to develop economic and technical cooperation, particularly in the fields of agriculture, fisheries, livestock, irrigation, rationing water consumption, power generation, engineering works, mineral exploration and industrialization. [Text] [GF251205 Salalah Domestic Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 25 Oct 81]

USSR MONITORING TELEPHONE CALLS--An Omani minister has revealed that the Soviet Union is using listening devices to monitor telephone conversations between the Sultanate of Oman and other countries. Accordingly, instructions have been issued not to discuss important matters and sensitive issues on the telephone. Also communications should be made through coded messages, the postal system or diplomatic pouches. [Text] [GF261749 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 24-30 Oct 81 p 10]

WATER PROJECTS CITED--Oman's water supplies are adequate for its present needs but new sources have to be found to meet requirements of future development of agriculture and industry. The ancient falaj system and hand-dug wells are still the main sources of water supply in the rural area. Several projects to improve water supplies and develop new resources are being undertaken by the Water Resources Council. The Council's main function is to coordinate exploitation of water resources to ensure that a balance is kept between supply and demand. Last year saw the completion of three small concrete reservoirs and distribution extensions to increase water supplies in the capital area. New wellfields, with supporting services, were established in Sur, Buraimi and Sohar to meet higher demand by 1985. Hydrogeological investigations are being carried out at present to find a new source for the important inland town of Nizawa. Under study is development of a reservoir at Wadi Dayqah, some 90 km from the capital area. Indications are that the reservoir could supply some 45,000 cubic metres per day for the capital area by the mid-eighties. A second desalination plant is planned for the Al Gubrah complex to meet an anticipated growth in demand in Seeb, Azaiba and Rusayl, which is scheduled for industrial development. The government is also planning to instal several smaller desalination units like the one on Masirah island which produces about 120,000 gallons a day. The existing water scheme in other towns and villages is under review to establish the need for improved supplies and to determine appropriate water resource locations. It is anticipated that schemes of selected communities will be implemented as a rolling programme during the coming five-year plan. The council is studying two other methods of increasing water supplies. One method is to build re-charge dams to trap rain water which now runs to waste down both sides of the main mountain ranges, extending along much of the length of the country. The other is to tap deep aquifers by digging wells down to depths of 300-450 metres. [Text] [Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES SUPPLEMENT in English 27 Oct 81 p 3]

CSO: 4400/41

CHAIRMAN DISCUSSES YEMEN UNIFICATION

EA292016 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 29 Oct 81

[Text] Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the YSP Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and of the Council of Ministers, has stressed that the new unified Yemeni state will certainly express the interests of the majority of the Yemeni people and will eliminate the divisive factors created by the colonialists and invaders and their local agents.

(?In an interview with AL-THALITH ASHAR MIN YUNYU) published in San'a', he (?stated that) this new state will reflect the Yemenis' eagerness to build a single state that includes every inch of our national soil. In it, all democratic liberties will be provided to the citizens and their mass organizations. Under its prosperity and happiness will be achieved for every citizen, free from oppression and exploitation.

The brother secretary general recalled what had been approved in the agreements concerning the restoration of Yemeni unity. He said: In light of the agreements and statements signed between the two parts and the results of the work of the unity committees, our people no longer need us to start afresh and start from scratch with ideas on the reunification of the homeland. Instead they expect us to work concretely toward cooperation and coordination along the road of reunifying the homeland, which we are determined to do. We are exerting efforts with brother President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih toward this goal.

In reply to a question about doubts caused by the attitude of the southern part of the homeland on the (?question) of the Islamic religion as the basic source of legislation, Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad said: Our stand on religion cannot be kept within the limits of formalities which strip it of its progressive humanitarian content and deflect it from the path of the struggle against the enemies of humanity. Therefore the basis of the correct religion lies in the extent of practical commitment to its militant values and its human ideals, and not by verbal manipulation of it.

In this connection, the brother secretary general added: In our Islamic reality, there are different types of Muslims who are united by one religion, Islam, but who differ in practice. There are those who brag about Islam and their piety while they glorify America and utilize resources in its service [word indistinct]

in the service of the Zionist entity which is hostile to the interests of our Arab and Islamic peoples. There are armed masses who passionately love freedom and reject imperialist hegemony over their resources and who resist its aggressive designs.

During his interview with the newspaper AL-THALITH ASHAR MIN YUNYU, Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad explained that we in the southern part understand that religion came to serve man and to liberate him from all forms of oppression, exploitation and backwardness. He went on: Our measures and legislation, which conform to the principles and aims of the 26 September and 14 October revolutions rest on this basis. We have stressed in the constitution that the Islamic religion is the religion of the state. We are in no need of those who indulge in outbidding over our Islam and the soundness of religious values in our country.

CSO: 4404/94

BRIEFS

LAW PASSED TO ATTRACT INVESTMENT--Brother 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, secretary general of the Central Committee, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers, the day before yesterday promulgated the law for encouraging investments, which stipulates further facilities and privileges for the investment of Yemeni, Arab and other foreign capital. The law is considered to be one of the most beneficial laws for investment promulgated in the last few years in the developing countries. It is the best of all those laws in view of the high level of stability enjoyed by the PDRY and the availability of economic resources for the success of invested capital. Yemeni, Arab and other foreign capital will find not only the maximum facilities and objective guarantees for the investor but also a high level of economic and political stability in Democratic Yemen, which has given priority to this law. Investors can understand this priority by making a comparative study of this law and other laws promulgated in recent years in many developing countries. [Words indistinct] in basic need of such political and economic stability that will give them confidence in the success of their investment project. [Excerpt] [EA242116 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 24 Oct 81]

CHAIRMAN CABLES BREZHNEV--'Ali Nasir Muhammad has sent a congratulatory cable to Leonid Brezhnev which reads, in part: "The relations of friendship and cooperation between our country and the USSR have constituted a source of strength for the struggle of our party and people towards the goals of the Yemeni revolution and in the building of a new (?state). We also highly appreciate the USSR's support for the just struggle being waged by our Arab peoples against imperialism and Zionism and in defense of their legitimate national rights, the most important of which is the right of the Palestinian Arab people, led by the PLO, to return to their homeland and build an independent state. Our celebration of this glorious anniversary is dear to our hearts and arouses in us intense feelings of gratification at the stage reached by the militant relations between our parties, peoples and countries which are based on the treaty of friendship and cooperation. We are confident that these relations will be further entrenched and developed to serve the noble principles and aims for which we are struggling under the guidance of the ideas of scientific socialism and proletarian internationalism. From the bottom of my heart, I personally wish you long health and happiness and success in your duties, the party in the friendly USSR further victories on the road of developing socialism and Soviet-Yemeni friendship continued progress and prosperity." [Summary] [EA071528 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 7 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/94

U.S. SAID TO INCITE EGYPT TO ATTACK LIBYA

GF100837 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 9 Nov 81 p 1

[Untitled editorial]

[Text] A witness from its own household has made the admission. This witness is very close to the U.S. State Department, CIA circles and the White House. In brief, the witness is close to U.S. decisionmakers. This witness is the U.S. newspaper, THE WASHINGTON POST, which is often described as "widely influential."

As for the testimony, which is very near to an admission, it is the primary evidence, in the opinion of lawyers. The testimony is that the United States has instigated, and is instigating, Egypt to commit aggression and to enter a war with Libya. For this purpose it gave Egypt an "assurance of protection" against any Soviet intervention. What attracts attention is that THE WASHINGTON POST says that "Washington's decision was probably conveyed to Husni Mubarak during his visit to the U.S. capital before al-Sadat's assassination."

When we examine the report we recall that it comes at a time when Egyptian President Husni Mubarak has repeatedly and openly affirmed that he will not attack any Arab country. In the past month he said--more than once to quote him: "We refused to enter war with Israel and wanted peace, how then will we mediate to enter a war with our neighboring Arab brothers?"

We have our own criticism of the Egyptian president's words on peace with Israel and we also have our own definite and clear stand on Camp David and its repercussions. Yet, we have not ignored the words on reconciliation with Arab brothers which President Mubarak has repeated, saying that there will be no war with Libya and that Egyptian forces on the frontiers with it have been withdrawn.

Is it mere coincidence that makes THE WASHINGTON POST report on the U.S. instigation of Egypt against Libya when the Egyptian president announced yesterday that Egypt will not be a puppet in the hands of any superpower? This is the path which Egypt abandoned when it began to talk about independence from Soviet influence only to find itself in the U.S. grip.

We sincerely hope that the Egyptian leadership will understand the meaning of the report by the U.S. newspaper, taking into consideration that this report is not directed at Egypt and its leadership only, but also at every country which

allows its policies to be controlled by any superpower, whether this superpower is from the East or from the West. The reason is that these superpowers seek only to promote their own interests and nothing else. To this end they do not shrink from starting wars and sowing seeds of discord, even among brothers.

We are not among those who say that all our problems and disputes have been created by the superpowers. Yet, we are among those who believe that these superpowers do not hesitate for a moment to exploit any dispute or to start any war that might insure their influence and guarantee the perpetuation of their presence in this region where the people understand all too well the grave dimensions of the "game of nations."

CSO: 4404/93

OIL MINISTER ASSESSES OPEC PRICE STRATEGY

GF040857 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0610 GMT 4 Nov 81

[Text] Abu Dhabi, 4 Nov (GNA)--Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, the UAE petroleum and natural resources ministers, returned home this morning after attending the emergency meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC, in Geneva last week.

Upon return Dr 'Utaybah stated: The decision that OPEC has arrived at on the unification of crude oil prices at $34 per barrel is considered one of the most important decisions taken by the organization since its establishment, especially since the decision has come at a time when the oil market is characterized by slackness and confusion. The price decision will bring about some stability to the oil market and some assurance to both producers and consumers alike.

The minister asserted that this decision would open a broad vista for other decisions on laying down a long-term strategy for OPEC. He also said this decision will underline future petroleum policies, whether in regard to the oil market or to OPEC's relations with developing countries on the one hand and the industrial countries on the other.

Furthermore, Dr 'Utaybah said the determination of such a strategy will help set a fixed program for the OPEC countries on offering economic subsidies to developing countries. He noted that the Abu Dhabi conference to be held 9 December is expected to make a number of decisions that will support the Geneva prices unification decision and contribute to laying down features of OPEC's long-term strategy.

CSO: 4404/93

ABU DHABI EMPLOYMENT FIGURES

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 24 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

THE number of employees in 32 local departments of the Abu Dhabi emirate's government at the end of September was 23,133.

A statistical report issued by the administration and organisation department said that the number of Arab employees rose to 13,805, which was 59.66 per cent of the total number of employees in the emirate.

This increase in the number of Arab employees is the result of the government's Arabisation policy, giving preference to nationals and other Arabs in making appointments.

The number of national employees among the Arabs is 3,896, which is 16.81 per cent of the total number of employees in the emirate. Among them 58 occupy top posts.

Of the total number of employees, 16,871 are working in five local departments which are: Abu Dhabi and Al Ain municipalities (8,032) water and electricity departments (7,623) and the marine ports department (1,216).

The rest of the employees, numbering 6,262, are working in 27 local departments.

The administration and organisation department completed appointment procedures for 173 new employees and terminated the services of 191.

CSO: 4400/41

BRIEFS

NEW AMBASSADORS--'Ali 'Abdallah Rashid, UAE foreign affairs minister today received the credentials of Kai Helmer Helenius, nonresident Finnish ambassador; Leonidas Vrailis, nonresident Greek ambassador; Eduard Seger Bernard Beelaerts van Bloklan, nonresident Netherlands ambassador; Thord Bengston, nonresident Swedish ambassador; and Frantz Benaventura Howitz, nonresident Danish ambassador to UAE. [Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1233 GMT 31 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/93

BRIEFS

LEADER MEETS OPPOSITION IN SYRIA—Damascus, 1 Nov (KUNA)--It was disclosed here today that during the visit of YAR President Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih to Syria, he met for the first time in 3 years with the opposition to his regime. An official source from the Yemeni National Movement, which is opposed to the regime in San'a, told JUNA that President Salih who returned home today, "showed his willingness during the meeting to allow the members of the national movement to return home and participate in the government." The source said that "it was also agreed to continue the dialogue and the meetings between the regime and the movement's leadership in order to overcome the obstacles hindering Yemeni political accord." It was announced that certain demands by the movement still pose an obstacle to accord. Some of these demands concern domestic policy, and are connected with the release of political prisoners and democratic freedoms. Others, concerning foreign policy, demand commitment to positive neutrality and nonalignment. The source added that the movement responded to Colonel Salih's request for such a meeting in an attempt to spare the blood of Yemeni citizens and that it is prepared to continue the dialogue and meetings with the regime for the same purpose. [Text] [LD011558 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1428 GMT 1 Nov 81]

PEACE, SOLIDARITY SECRETARIAT MEETS—At its first meeting under Brother Muhammad Lutfi al-Sabahi, the general secretariat of the Yemeni Peace and Solidarity Council discussed a number of issues related to defining the tasks and duties of the secretariat in order to draw up its bylaws. Tasks were distributed among the secretariat members. Brother Ahmad Luqman was assigned the duties of the secretary general and Brother Ahmad Muhammad al-Iryani the duties of assistant secretary general. After the meeting, Brother Ahmad Luqman told the SABA' News Agency that the council will devote its work to the aims for which it was formed, particularly current issues, solidarity in the world and efforts exerted by forces calling for peace to preserve world security and peace and to stand by the side of peoples fighting for freedom, independence and self-determination. He affirmed the council's appreciation for the political line which was drawn up by our political leadership and to which our country is committed in dealing with Arab and international issues, in its commitment to the policy of nonalignment, positive neutrality, and to opposing international alliances and military blocs. [Text] [JN242009 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 24 Oct 81]

NEW AMBASSADORS—The following ambassadors presented their credentials to YAR President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih on 24 October 1981: David Eugine Zweifel,

ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary of the United States of America; (Geoge Hiba), nonresident ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary of Malta; (Yasrim Muhammad Sidqi), ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary of Somalia; (Arbek Kohi), nonresident ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary of Australia; Ahmed Ould Muhamed Salah, nonresident ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary of Mauritania; Pedro Paulo de Morais Alves Machado, nonresident ambassador extraordinarie and plenipotentiary of Portugal; and (Badel Sprio Yerovitch), nonresident ambassador extraordinaire and plenipotentiary of Yugoslavia. [JN242106 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 24 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/94 END

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19 November 1981

Near East/N th Africa Report

No. 2435

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No. 2435

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STUDY CONSIDERS ESTABLISHMENT OF LUBRICATING OIL PLANT

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 7

[Article: "Study of Construction of Joint Arab Lubricating Oil Project; Kuwait Second Choice as Site for the Project Based on Returns"]

[Text] The general secretariat of OAPEC has prepared a cost-benefit study on the construction of a joint Arab lubricating oil project. The results of the study indicate that regional demand during the period 1984-1985 will justify an annual production of 200,000 tons of oil which could be doubled in subsequent years. This is in addition to national projects or projects that may be established in cooperation with non-Arab agencies. The Arab Petroleum Investments Company evaluated the market opportunities and confirmed the results of the preliminary OAPEC study. In 1979, it authorized the American company (Lumas) to prepare a technical economic study evaluating opportunities for the establishment of a joint Arab regional project to produce lubricating oils. This study addressed the following:

--The best mixture for moderate- and high-viscosity basic oil products.

--the appropriate feed stock for long-term supply.

--The appropriate technology for processing operations.

A study was conducted by the Arab Petroleum Investments Company and OAPEC to select a site for the plant following a survey of raw materials and the state of the market. It was decided that the study would consider the following alternatives:

Contentment with a 200,000-ton-per-year complex in one of the OAPEC member states.

--Construction of a new complex with an initial annual capacity of 200,000 tons which would be increased to 300,000 tons per year at a subsequent time. Alternatively, a second plant with a 200,000-ton annual capacity could be built at another site.

As a result of arguments and positions put forward by a number of OAPEC member states, the Arab Petroleum Investments Company was limited in its study to the selection of six sites. Consequently, it made modifications in the study to take into account the following sites for the production and refining of crude oil:

1. Kirkuk crude in the Baniyas refinery in Saudi Arabia.

2. Kuwait crude in Kuwait.

3. Light Arab crude in the Yanbu' refinery in Saudi Arabia.

4. Algerian mixed crude in the Algiers refinery.

5. Mirban, Zakum, and Umm Shayf mixed crude in the al-Ruways refinery in the UAE.

6. Dukham crude in the Umm Sa'id refinery in Qatar.

The evaluation of the project sites was based on the proximity of the site to refineries and the availability of land at the sites. In addition, the feed stock of the lubricating oil plants would be based on the crude being refined at each refinery with particular attention to the crude's superior suitability for the production of lubricating oils with acceptable efficiency and quality.

The chief goal of the study is the complete classification of each of the crudes at its site taking into account the appropriate economic and geographical factors. The comparative economic analysis was prepared on the basis of the dividend on the total capital--i.e., 100 percent--without considering fees or taxes. Two independent factors were viewed as affecting the profitability of the first project: the characteristics of the crude and the impact of the site. These two factors were given the major share of the attention in the study.

The Arab Petroleum Investments Company felt that a national basis should be established by which to compare the various crudes at their sites. This led to the selection of standards for the various products so that each product would be compatible with the characteristics of the refined crude at any given site. The purpose behind this was to prevent the application of a single standard for all six crudes since this could lead to the approval of some of the crudes and not others.

As a result of the talks between the consulting firm and the Arab Petroleum Investments Company, it was decided to carefully examine all the plans in order to set the best possible standard for products from each crude. Thus, a number of superior standards were taken into consideration.

Summary of the Results

The results of the analysis led to the following ranking of the studied sites in order of preference:

Site	Maximum Return to Fixed Costs
Yanbu' (Saudi Arabia)	13.2 percent
Kuwait	11.3 percent
Baniyas (Syria)	10.4 percent
Algiers (Algeria)	9.8 percent

al-Ruways (UAE	7.2 percent
Umm Sa'id (Qatar)	4.8 percent

In this analysis, all costs and prices were calculated on the basis of an annual inflation rate of 10 percent during the first 15 years after the start of operation. It is important to realize that the economic analyses given above do not necessarily indicate the actual profitability of the project in any absolute sense. Rather, they indicate the relative merits of establishing these installations in each of the OAPEC countries. In addition, they indicate the size of the concessions which could be offered at each site in order to achieve the most favorable fixed costs.

8591
CSO: 4304/108

BRIEFS

SYRIAN-KUWAITI TRADE STRENGTHENED--The Kuwaiti ambassador to Syria, 'Abd-al-Raziq al'Kandari met yesterday with Syrian Minister of Transport Muharram Tayyarah in Damascus. Kuwaiti Embassy sources stated that discussions during the meeting focused on means of strengthening cooperation between the two countries, especially in the field of air transport. Kuewait and Syria are expected to sign the implementation schedule for the air transport cooperation agreement that has been concluded between the two countries. Kuwaiti Ambassador 'Abd-al-Raziq al'Kandari will sign on behalf of the Kuwaiti Government and Civil Aviation Director Major General Ahmad 'Antar will sign on behalf of the Syrian Government. According to this schedule, the Kuwaiti and Syrian aviation organizations will operate five weekly flights apiece. Ambassador al-Kandari also met with Syrian Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade Dr Muhammad al-Atrash. The two officials reviewed economic cooperation relations between the two countries. Embassy sources said that Mr al-Kandari and Minister al-Atrash discussed the basic elements that ensure the facilitation of commercial exchange and talked about ways to surmount some obstacles that hinder it. Mr al-Kandari's meeting with the minister of economy coincides with current talks between a Kuwaiti economic delegation and officials in the Syrian Ministry of Economy. The aim of these talks is to attain the exemption of a number of products produced domestically in each of the two countries from customs fees. [Text] [Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 28 Aug 81 p 4] 8591

CSO: 4304/168

MINISTERIAL OFFICIALS DISCUSS LAND REFORMS

Kabul ANIS in Dari 14 Oct 81 p 1

[Text] Kabul, 14 October. In order to adopt effective measures to continue application of democratic land reforms in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a meeting, chaired by Fazlurrahim Mo'mand, minister of agriculture and land reform, was held yesterday afternoon in that ministry, and matters pertaining to the Third Operations Plan were discussed.

These matters, including organizing farmers and landowners into agricultural cooperatives, extending material and technical aid to them, providing the necessary facilities, and adoption of security measures for the implementation of this plan, which were approved, will be carried out beginning 21 March 1982.

In addition to the deputy minister of agriculture, this meeting was attended by the director general of the agricultural development and production; the heads of agriculture and land reform; representatives of the ministries of the interior, national defense, and transportation; head of the Agricultural Development Bank; and the chief of the Improved Seed Company

CSO: 4665/6

SOVIET DEBACLE SEEN POSSIBLE IN AFGHAN WAR

Windhoek ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 15, 16 Oct 81

[Article by Heinz Gstrein: "Already Lost for Moscow?"]

[15 Oct 81 p 6]

/Text/ Our Cairo correspondent Heinz Gstrein, who reports on political conditions in the Mediterranean area and in the Near and Middle East, has been on many an adventurous and extremely dangerous assignment. This time, he visited the Afghan freedom fighters in the last few days. In his exciting, three-part report, he gives a striking description of lesser known aspects of conditions in Afghanistan as it suffers under the conflict between East and West.

In the Middle East, Afghanistan occupies an important strategic position. It is by no means immaterial who controls the country. Will the Kremlin be able to hold on to the regime in Kabul it supports and to its occupation troops much longer ?

His hair blowing proudly, Sardar Gulzade Sartur is marching along the paved road that leads straight into the heart of Kabul from the Bagrami mountains. Here, during the past few days, his 12 fighting groups have given the Russians and the Afghan Partsham communists an idea of what it means to be afraid. First, they busted a fort, which is part of the Soviet ring of fortifications that has been solely responsible for protecting the Afghan capital from falling. Their further path is strewn with burnt-out personnel carriers and trucks and then there is evidence of another partisan victory during the night: the still smoking ruins of the People's Democratic Party headquarters for South Kabul.

Large Sections of Kabul Controlled by Guerillas

Here, the unit turns right, making its way along sandy paths into the suburbs. Two Russian helicopter gunships buzz down low over their heads. Everyone waits for the commander to give the order to take cover. But Sartur keeps right on marching and nonchalantly lights a cigarette. He knows full well that the "birds of death," which normally inspire much fear among his Mujahedin, have used up all their ammunition. Now they just want to make it back to Kabul airport and then drown their sorrow about the Red Army's lack of success in Afghanistan in vodka until daybreak.

Through the late afternoon and the entire night, the Afghan freedom fighters are in charge in most of Kabul. Woe to the "shurevi" (which translates into "Soviet types") that venture out into the streets at these times. Thus, the nightly curfew which formerly was marked by fear of the Soviet tanks has turned into its opposite.

In the byways of the suburbs, Sartur and his men are hailed as heroes and liberators by the light of the streetlamps which Moscow's erstwhile viceroy Babrak Karmal put up. After the many cheers have died down, this most audacious fighter of the pro-Western and religiously tolerant Harakat-e Inquilab-e Islami Afghanistan sits down to a festive supper with his staff.

Murat, too, has joined them. He is the 17 year-old chief of the urban guerillas in the administrative center of Kabul, which the Soviets still hold. His dainty lady's pistol has cost many an officer his life already and some Afghan militiamen, too, who try to clear Kabul's streets during the night of the handbills calling for a free Afghanistan. During the day, however, Murat acts the part of a good student, even of a party youth functionary who does not miss a single meeting of the "people's democrats."

Sartur turns on the evening news on the television. With a somber expression, the announcer reads off a "last" appeal to the Mujahedin to lay down their arms. The response from those present is raucous laughter.

For evening prayers, all the fighting groups gather in a large mosque by the Kabul river. Now they have their anti-tank grenades, machine guns and mortars with them. An ancient maulana with a flowing white beard intones the prayer calling for final victory over the Russians. Then, the area controlled by the partisans is totally blacked out. From the command post atop an unfinished new building the lights of the inner city seem close enough to touch while Russian searchlights are scanning the other mountain slopes around Kabul where other groups of partisans —above all the Hizb Islami and Jamijat— have not yet gotten so close to the capital.

One-Week Trek Strenuous

The trek from Peshawar took one whole week. Because the partisans no longer take any foreign journalists along ever since strict controls were instituted along the Pakistani border and because a TV team they had taken along collapsed halfway to their destination, the only way to get to Kabul is to join up as a mujahed oneself. Only the group leader knows one's true identity; but he cannot help much, if one has to climb steep mountain passes at 4,000 meters at top speed.

The last stretch on the Kurram, one manages panting and on all fours. On the second crossing, fear and the threat of a Soviet fighter-bomber nearby helps one make it. When one reaches the third and highest pass, one would actually be in better shape and more accustomed to the thin air, if it were not for the sore throat and the stomachache that have set in. The simple truth is that a non-Afghan has a hard time coping with the extremes in temperature and the lack of sanitation at the handful of tea houses along the path used by most freedom fighters which leads from Taramangal all the way to Herat on the Soviet border. When the no-man's land

finally ends, when the domain of the local Harakat chieftain Sufi Haksar begins after crossing the Little Kabul valley and we are quartered quite comfortably in fortress-like farmhouses and fed roast lamb and buttermilk, one is far too sick to enjoy it properly.

Impotent Soviet Arms

With one's last remaining ounce of strength, one manages the climb to the administrative center of the southeastern part of Kabul province which was not liberated until this summer. It is located in a narrow gorge above the "valley of weeping trees." Russian bombs and the terrible "Plamja" shells that scatter razor blades and iron nails on impact have cut down the fruit trees or hurt them so badly that the sap is still running. When the Mujahedin held fast just the same, the Soviets used chemical weapons on them. But this attempt to smoke out the mountain fastness was unsuccessful as well.

Up there, a former government official from Jelalabad, as throughgoing as any German, is busy collecting the Ushr tax and registering each bond purchase or other contribution to the holy war for subsequent restitution in peacetime. He also acts as the local judge and keeps book on all Harakat members in the area. Many high-ranking officers of the government army and leading officials of the puppet regime in Kabul are on their side and they are registered in voluminous party records complete with photograph, pledge of allegiance and signature.

As If the Russians Did Not Exist

From up there, one can see all the way down to the ministry of justice in Kabul, the dar ul-man. Here, in late 1979, Hafizullah Amin met his gruesome end after his 3-month reign of terror. But if he thought that this was the very best the partisans had to offer to this reporter, he was in for still another exciting surprise.

On the second day, a courier arrives at the mountain post carrying orders from Sufi Haksar's sardar, Sartur, saying that all available men should move on to Kabul itself. The way there had just been opened up. At a turn in the valley leading to the capital, the young commander checked out the recruits from Peshawar and then had them march off at brisk speed. Further down, two requisitioned taxicabs with Kabul license plates were waiting for the whole group. And then they took off at a fast clip, as if there had never been any Russians in Kabul.

[16 Oct 81 pp 10, 11]

/Text/ As we have since learned, Mr Gstrein suffered a complete physical collapse upon his return from Afghanistan and was admitted to an Austrian hospital for treatment.

Muhammad Daud Shah, the sardar of the Afghan partisans in the Logar valley which runs southwest toward Ghazni and Kandahar, is quite different from Sartur, the Russian nemesis of Kabul. Long-haired, moustachioed and graceful, he looks more like one of the Three Musketeers than the field commander of the absolute ruler of a local chieftain, "Malik" Shaista Gul. He has a word of friendly greeting for the new fighting unit. "You boys do not look particularly fit," he says, "but then the Soviets do not show their faces much around here anyway."

The Partisans' Camp

All this takes place in completely open terrain, just a few kilometers from the as yet unbroken ring of fortifications around Kabul. The mujahedin are in control of all through traffic along the paved highway and do not let the dug-in tanks impress them.

The newly arrived group of fighters is given the proud name of "the thunderers" and is then loaded onto a captured Russian bus. Here in the Logar valley, the entire resistance is motorized. The black market in the capital supplies them with gasoline aplenty, although there is a shortage which even affects the Russians.

On the next morning, rubble must be cleared in the mountain village of Alparan which was hit by close to 500 bombs over the last few days. That is not a good omen, although the commander of the joint forces of Harakat, Jamiajat and National Front assembled here may be convinced that the enemy will not show his face.

Soviet Offensive with 100 Tanks

In the midst of clearing the rubble, there is still another air raid. Women and children run for cover in the fields shrieking. A peasant rushes back at the last moment to pick up his most valuable possession, a transistor radio. But the MIG's just zoom past the valley in the direction of the fortifications. A very few minutes later, an almost endless column of tanks begins pouring out of them. There must be almost 100 T-64's and T-72's that threaten to flatten the whole Logar valley. At first, there are no helicopters flying air cover; the tanks seem to feel quite safe without them.

Now, Daud Shah gives proof of how brave and able he is. The bus goes roaring down to the road at breakneck speed. Once there, the sardar himself places the anti-tank mines into the holes dug into the asphalt beforehand.

In the bushes to the right and at the drainage ditch to the left, the men go into position with their anti-tank grenades. Meantime, halfway up the mountain, a partisan battery consisting of three captured field howitzers opens fire on the enemy.

The lead tank goes up in flames almost immediately. "This is how Moscow will burn," they all yell excitedly and come leaping out from cover. One greybeard simply sticks his grenade right into the muzzle of a T-72's gun; the tank breaks apart even before the stunned crew has fired a shot. The third tank suffers a damaged undercarriage from an exploding mine and is pushed by those behind into the fiery furnace of the two that are already burning.

Soviet Strategic Position All Wrong

A thick, tall column of smoke rises from the Logar valley into the dark-blue autumn sky. The Soviets move off to the west into sandy terrain although six helicopters have arrived meanwhile to provide air cover. They bomb the villages along the road and rake them with their "dashaka" machineguns; but none of this can alter th[illegible] that the strategic situation is completely reserved as against a year ago. Today, [illegible]shedin are in control of the main roads and even the tank columns of the [illegible] use the partisans' trails off to the side.

For a moment, it looks as if the Russi[illegible]ing three columns for a flanking attack on the valley. But no sooner have [illegible] than five more tanks are hit. Just then, Daud's adjutant, who had merely [illegible] in taking vast quantities of snuff thus far, brings down a low-flying helicopter with an anti-tank grenade. Like angry hornets, the other helicopters come buzzing down. But the tanks take flight, seeking a safe haven in the upper camp in the direction of Kulangar.

At Muhammad's agha, the great victory over the still burning "comrades" is celebrated. To be sure, the partisans have brilliantly repulsed a main thrust of the Soviet fall offensive. On the other hand, there is not that much reason for celebrating. Eight tanks were destroyed; but another 90 remained to the rear. The very next day would show that other side of the picture.

9478
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EDITORIAL SEES NO ROOM FOR POLITICAL MOVEMENTS BESIDES FLN

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 918, 25 Sep - 1 Oct 81 pp 4,5

[Editorial: "Time for Revolutionary Firmness"]

[Text] In a relatively short time Algeria has gone through decisive stages in the building of the nation and in the progressive construction of a socialist society founded on the principles of our Arab-Islamic civilization and the immutable values of our revolution.

In all areas a considerable effort has been accomplished in the areas of economic, social, and cultural development. In accordance with the objectives established in the fundamental documents of the revolution, and more particularly those set out by the National Charter, everything has been done to put its contents in concrete form and to ensure its achievement. This has notably involved the restoration and construction of a popular, democratic, and substantial state, ruled by laws and based on morality, a state which would be able to survive governments and men, through the consolidation of national independence; the recovery of our national wealth; its use to achieve development oriented toward the satisfaction of the needs of the country and of the people, such as the rehabilitation of our collective existence in terms of our identity as well as our historic personality and equally by attachment to the great ideals and just causes of the peoples who are fighting for their liberation and independence; and finally our determination to be and to remain a truly independent and really non-aligned country. These are the foundations of our political philosophy. That has been, is now, and will remain our attitude toward the socialist construction of the country and of our society, action defined by the FLN [National Liberation Front] Party and based on the consent and the free, conscious adherence of the masses of the people.

Everything which has been achieved and everything which is being undertaken today, both at the domestic as well as the international level, has its basis in the principles which we have just recalled in very summary fashion. And it is in this way that our country has recorded, year by year, multiple victories on all the fronts of the battle for development, as it has encountered the obstacles and difficulties inherent in our errors and in an international situation which has not always been favorable to the countries of the Third World.

Since 1979 and following the death of President Houari Boumediene, in the course of revolutionary continuity our country went through a stage of major importance.

With the holding of the Fourth Congress of the Party, the country was provided with an elected political leadership, personified by the Central Committee, one of whose first duties consisted of completing the political institutions of the country.

Under the leadership of this political directorate and under the guidance and orientation of the secretary general of the Party and the president, who symbolizes the unity of power, all national problems have been and continue to be the object of attentive examination. Many important decisions have been made, aiming above all at giving back to the Party the place and the role assigned to it by the National Charter and the Constitution, in the direction, orientation, stimulation, and control, both of the social forces of the revolution as well as of all national activities.

The extraordinary congress of the Party, held in June 1980, in accordance with the resolutions of the Fourth Congress, made it possible to evaluate the achievements of the past decade, to identify shortcomings, weaknesses, and errors committed in certain areas, while at the same time it set out the major directions of the actions to be taken in the framework of the five-year plan and of the forthcoming decade. The Party organizations, such as the executive power, have worked without a letup, each within the limits of its field of action, in achieving the decisions of the Congresses and the recommendations of the Central Committee.

All the efforts undertaken by the Party, the members, the workers, and the peasants up to now have turned out, in general, to have been positive. Whether this concerns the economic sector, and particularly the productive sector; whether it concerns the educational and training sector; whether it concerns the social sector, there has been a greater awareness of the Party members and of the workers, a restructuring and a more efficient organization of our institutions and of our productive apparatus, a greater firmness in management, and the beginning of a process of improvement in all areas. This process has not spared either the small or the great, neither the weak nor the strong, in whatever position he may be found. These efforts have favored a greater cohesion of Party members and of the working masses behind the Party and its political leadership, and a more responsible kind of mobilization in action which has consequently permitted a greater effort, an increase in production and a qualitative improvement which we can observe with satisfaction, for example at the level of agriculture and education.

However, we are not unaware of the fact, and we reject any kind of demagogy in this respect, that there remains much to do in all sectors. There are still obstacles, some of them objective and others, subjective, which we will have to overcome; there are still errors to correct; gaps to fill; kinds of behavior to bypass and eliminate. The difficulties which we encounter are not peculiar to Algeria alone.

The building of a powerful state, of a prosperous country, of a society liberated from all the forms of exploitation and of alienation will not be achieved with the wave of a magic wand, nor by demagogy or political jobbery. Today, we are looking in all directions and observing things serenely and honestly. Countries much more powerful than Algeria are also acquainted, independently of the political and socio-economic systems guiding them, with rather serious difficulties. In 2 decades of independence Algeria, as admitted even by the enemies of yesterday and the adversaries of today, has recorded titanic achievements.

However, even so, are we not today witnesses to certain movements which reflect political unawareness, moral and revolutionary irresponsibility, and an antipatriotic spirit which generally ends with what we all know?

Certain small groups and certain men only representing, in the best of cases, themselves, could not and cannot accommodate themselves to an Algeria which advances freely, independently of the powers and blocs, like ideologies foreign to that of the FLN Party, which was written with the blood of our martyrs and constantly has been enriched by the creative genius of our people and the effort of Party members viscerally attached to the nationalism by which the Algerian people have been and remain shaped.

Each time our political leadership considers important questions involving the future of the country and the revolution, each time that difficulties emerge in terms of applying certain decisions, each time that certain social conflicts have exploded here and there or marginal problems have been raised, we still find these elements, these small groups, and these men. We find them again, either as fomenters of troubles or as detractors who do not hestitate to use either weapons of misrepresentation or those of blackmail and threats.

Draping themselves in multicolored political movements, as versatile as they are infantile, camouflaging themselves behind slogans with well known sounds and whose origin and ultimate end are known, they would like to spread doubt and confusion, to create a climate of permanent tension, with the principal objectives of worsening the internal situation and accomplishing the destabilization of the regime. Such an attitude is a part of the strategy of internal and external reactionaries and of international imperialism, under whatever form it may present itself.

Faced with such activity, diametrically opposed to the ideology of the FLN Party and the philosophy of the revolution, going against the interests of the nation and the masses of the people, we come to the moment when responsibilities must be fixed and assumed. In the course of the last few years, in a spirit of generosity and out of a constant wish not to exclude any man of good will committed to act in the framework of the fundamental choices made by the country and of the objectives already set out, our political leadership has continued to hope to see these elements renounce their errors to follow along the single path which the people described with the adoption of the National Charter and which was reaffirmed by the congresses of the Party. A waste of time.

Who are these small groups and these men, and what do they represent? What popular support do they enjoy to be able and to wish to grant or withdraw confidence in our political leadership? The time for clarification of this matter has come. And as the process of cleansing the system has been well and truly begun, the process of firmness and of a real political cleavage must be broadened and deepened.

In this country the FLN, which, with the glorious ALN [National Liberation Army], led the liberation struggle and has guided the revolution and the socialist construction of the country since independence, imposes itself today as the single party of the vanguard, assuming the leadership of the destinies of the revolution and of the people. Neither today nor tomorrow will any person or any force be able to question it. There has not been and there will not be in this country any place

for other movements or other political currents outside the FLN. The leaders and the members of the FLN will henceforth no longer hesitate to oppose the enemies of the country, the adversaries of the revolution, the detractors of the regime, by all possible means. This applies even to those who have succeeded in infiltrating themselves into our institutions and our organizations. When it is a matter of the supreme interest of the country and of the people, the FLN Party, which assumes the historic responsibility of completing the struggle of building the nation and achieving the great ideals and objectives of the revolution, has the duty, if this should be necessary, to use revolutionary firmness.

5170
CSO: 4519/15

DECREE CHANGING NAME OF EL ASMAN WILAYA TO ECH CHELIFF

Algiers JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALGERIENNE DEMOCRATIQUE ET POPULAIRE in French No 22, 2 Jun 81 pp 523,524

[Decree No 81-106 of 26 May 1981 on Changing the Names of El Asnam Wilaya, Daira, and Commune]

[Text] The president of the republic,

On the basis of the report of the Ministry of Interior,

Considering the Constitution and particularly its Articles 111-10 and 152;

Considering Ordinance No 67-24 of 18 January 1967, as amended, concerning the communal code;

Considering Ordinance No 69-38 of 23 May 1969, as amended, concerning the wilaya code;

Considering Ordinance No 74-69 of 2 July 1974 regarding the rearrangement of the territorial organization of the wilayas and particularly its Article 6;

Considering Decree No 62-105 of 5 April 1963 concerning public honors;

Considering Decree No 74-125 of 12 July 1974 establishing the territorial limits and the make-up of El Asnam wilaya;

Considering Decree No 77-40 of 19 February 1977 concerning the names of certain public places and buildings;

Decrees:

Article 1. The wilaya, daira, and commune known as "El Asnam: will henceforth bear the name of: "Ech Cheliff."

Article 2. The present decree will be published in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria.

Chadli BENDJEDID

5170
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POSSIBLE ECONOMIC, POLITICAL CHANGES AFTER AL-SADAT DISCUSSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 13, 15, 16 Oct 81

[Series of articles by Eric Rouleau: "The System Has Also Died"]

[13 Oct 81 pp 1, 4]

[Text] Cairo--"The regime which emerged from the 1952 revolution was buried on the same day as Sadat." These views, held by an official figure who has been assigned to important activity in the next few days, as well as by a leader of the opposition, virtually in the same terms, reflect a rather widespread feeling in Egyptian political circles.

In effect, President Sadat was the last to hold power among the "free officers" who overthrew the monarchy nearly 30 years ago. All the other "historic leaders" are dead or have been driven from power. Some of them are presently found in the ranks of the opposition. Hosni Mubarak, who will be proclaimed president on Wednesday, 14 October, has made his career in the armed forces, apparently by disinteresting himself from political affairs. All of those, both military and civilian, who will be assigned to positions of responsibility, particularly Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, favored candidate to be prime minister, do not belong to the "old guard" of the revolution. Some of them do not hide their aversion to the Nasser tradition of which Sadat, moreover, had partially disposed.

Government information media, following President Mubarak, proclaim that the policy of the late chief of state will be continued. However, no one doubts that profound changes will come, sooner or later, if only to attenuate the effects of the political, economic, and social crisis which feed popular discontent. The reaction of the people to the death of the late leader only surprised those who believed in the immense popularity of the "hero of war and of peace." Certainly, it appears that the Egyptians were shocked by the 6 October attack which cost Sadat his life, the first chief of state to be assassinated in the valley of the Nile.

However, contrary to expectation, they did not express either anger, sorrow, or satisfaction. Daily life has gone on with the greatest serenity, even with an apparent general indifference.

An expansive, sentimental, even warm people, the Egyptians had given free expression to their sorrow only a few minutes after the announcement of the death, in September, 1970, of the first rais [leader], Gamal Abdel Nasser. They went out into the streets

spontaneously to express their despair. The funeral ceremonies provided an occasion for indescribable scenes of general sorrow, which those who saw them are not ready to forget. No incident disturbed the day of mourning. However, the loser of the 1967 war had many enemies, among others the Muslim brotherhood; then the millions of people who participated in the funeral procession overwhelmed the security forces, and the security measures taken in conformity with martial law then in effect were revealed to be totally inoperative. It is true that the leaders at the time did not try to stop the people from showing their feelings.

A Limited Conspiracy

By proclaiming the state of urgency for a period of one year, by prohibiting any assembly of more than five persons, by organizing strictly official and almost family style funeral ceremonies, in a section of the city empty of people and cut off from the rest of the capital, the new authorities perhaps displayed an exaggerated mistrust of the people. In any case the authorities implicitly admitted that they did not consider themselves in a position to control popular reactions, both before as well as during the funeral. The Egyptians, who followed the ceremony on TV, had the painful impression that the chief of state was being buried furtively. Even the commentary of the TV announcer was characterized by a cold and solemn form of speech.

Confidence was regained progressively in official circles, which had intitially feared that the assassination of Sadat was the prelude to disturbances and perhaps even to a coup d'etat. However, the preliminary inquiry established the fact that the conspiracy was limited to killing the chief of state. The persons responsible for the assassination no doubt had accomplices, but they were reportedly limited in extent and reportedly did not involve the higher echelons of the armed forces.

The attack made by Muslim commandos against strategic buildings in Asyut in the same way reflected a suicidal character. The security forces--including the elite troops sent to the scene--were considerably superior to the attackers, amounting to about 200, who had no popular support. Some of the people even turned over to the authorities some terrorists who had tried to take refuge in private homes. It is true that clashes were bloody: 27 dead, including 21 police, if one accepts tha official figures--more than 100, according to other sources. It is also true that the security sweep of the city indicates for the moment that the armed uprising does not threaten to spread.

In the leaders' view the danger is elsewhere. Incapable of arousing a popular uprising, the Muslim militants could be tempted to begin a campaign of systematic terrorism against the leaders of the country, whose protection has been strenghtened. Helmeted soldiers, armed with submachine guns, have been posted around their residences and in front of official buildings. Curiously, the measures of repression already taken for the moment only involve progressive circles. About 60 leftist activists have been arrested in the past 2 days, whereas President Sadat had indicated, in the course of a recent speech, that the security services had made a list of about 7,000 Muslim activists in possession of a substantial quantity of modern weapons. However, it is reported that Mubarak has the intention to act against them after his investiture as president and, in due course, the appointment of a new government. Contrary to Sadat, who until the last few months displayed a certain complacency toward Islamic organizations, Mubarak has never felt the slight-

est sympathy for those whom his predecessor had used to neutralize the non-religious opposition. In any case, the successor to Sadat can only be pitiless toward those who would try to destabilize his regime.

A Repressive Arsenal

Mubarek is not without advantages in carrying out his program. He has inherited an impressive arsenal of repressive laws. One of these laws permits him to intern opponents without trial and for an indefinite period. His legitimacy as a future chief of state is not in question, since it is based on the text of the Constitution. Even better, no one is challenging his succession to power, a privileged situation which his predecessor did not have at the time of his own accession to the presidency. Furthermore, he benefits from a favorable predisposition on the part of public opinion: his name has never been associated with the corruption scandals which spattered mud on other members of Sadat's entourage. Provided with an exceptional capacity for work, meticulous in his examination of paperwork, he is known for his poise, his sense of organization, and his firmness, qualities which he acquired in positions of command in the armed forces. "If Sadat was a politician in field marshal's uniform, Mubarek is a general in a civilian suit," one of his close associates told us. According to the latter, the future president will be surrounded by military officers more than his predecessor was. They have his confidence, and he feels at ease with them.

A Narrow Margin for Maneuver

Nevertheless, his room for maneuver seems to be singularly small. If his temperament and above all the overall situation should normally lead him to explore new paths to take, for the moment he is condemned to follow the path traced by Sadat. He will not be able to attack economic privileges, to reduce the gap between the wealthy and the poor, without depriving the regime of its political and social base. As a convinced supporter of free enterprise, or infitah, he will not be able to obtain the support, either, of the opponents of "unrestricted capitalism," of those who favor the return to the directed economy which Nasser practiced.

It is above all in foreign policy, the "reserved domain" of the chief of state, that Mubarak will have difficulty innovating. The isolation of Egypt on the international scene was illustrated at Sadat's funeral by the relatively small number of countries represented, 35 in all, of which three were members of the Arab League (out of 24) and a little more than one-tenth of the governments of the Third World. By the number and level of its delegations, the West seemed in a much better position than the neighbors and the "natural" friends of Egypt.

Whatever the wish of Mubarak to change this image, his adherence to the Camp David accords, in particular to its Palestinian section, will not permit him to broaden his international audience. His efforts to move closer to Saudi Arabia, particularly by supporting the sale to that country of American AWACS aircraft, will have no effect unless he abstains from giving his support to the "autonomy" which Israel intends to grant to the people of the West Bank of the Jordan and of the Gaza Strip. It is only with difficulty that he can still support the Saudi peace plan, which has been categorically rejected by the Jerusalem government. In effect, the future president cannot allow himself to irritate Prime Minister Begin. He would risk not getting back next April that portion of the Sinai Peninsula which remains under

Israeli occupation. An eventual failure of the negotiations on the future of the Palestinians, which should resume on 25 October, would plunge Egypt into a dangerous crisis.

It is said that Mubarak is counting on the United States to moderate the demands of the Israeli government. However, nothing says that President Reagan wishes to be or can be firmer toward Prime Minister Begin than President Carter was before him in the course of the Camp David negotiations.

[15 Oct 81 p 3]

[Text] No one doubted it: Mubarak has been designated president of Egypt by the "near unanimity" of the votes cast in the referendum on Tuesday, 13 October. The first editions of the newspapers, which appeared late in the evening, more than 12 hours before the announcement of the results, indicated that voting "broke all records." In a number of polling places, 100 percent of the registered voters reportedly voted "yes," which means that none of them was prevented by any reason from going to the polling place.

No opposition was able to show itself. The majority of the parties, organizations, and associations had been reduced to silence by the dismissal or arrest of their leaders a few days before the assassination of Sadat. In any case the information media are not accessible to nonconformist views. The Progressive Assembly of Khali Muhyi-al-Din had to content itself with distributing to the representatives of the international press a mimeographed manifesto in which it supported a "no" vote in the referendum, explaining that it could not endorse the actions of a man who stood for the policy of the late president. Even the opposition Socialist Labor Party was unable to make known to public opinion that it provided critical support to Mubarak. On the other hand great publicity was given to the favorable vote, and rather unaccustomed support, of General Nimeiri, the Sudanese chief of state, who has dual nationality.

It was during an extraordinary session of Parliament on Wednesday [14 October], with representatives of high civilian, military, and religious authorities attending, that Sadat's successor took his oath of office in these terms: "I swear before Almighty God to preserve the republican system, the Constitution, and the laws, to defend resolutely the interests of the people, as well as the independence and the territorial integrity of the fatherland." The chief of state then made a speech in which he outlined the policy he planned to apply.

It is still not known this Wednesday morning [14 October] if the government, required to resign according to the Constitution, will continue in office or not, as such. The desire of the chief of state, in any case, is to project the image of continuity for those overseas who fear a change of direction. In the first place he needed to reassure the Israelis on his determination to respect the Camp David accords to the letter and, on the other hand, to reaffirm Egypt's choice to maintain itself in the American current in the Near East. By conviction and by necessity Mubarak has to maintain privileged relationships with Washington and Jerusalem, at least until April, the date by which the Israelis should completely evacuate the Sinai Peninsula. The inconvenient aspect of continuity is that the Cairo government will have to avoid adhering to other peace projects, such as that presented by Saudi Arabia, which would meet with the opposition of Egypt's Israeli partner.

On the domestic scene the principal concern of the leaders, if not the only one, is to ensure the security and the stability of the country. Certainly, they are not really threatened: the armed forces remain, until proved to the contrary, loyal to the established government. The Islamic organizations, despite the assassination of Sadat and the bloody uprising at Asyut, are too fragmented and divided to be in a position by themselves of destroying the established institutions. The fact that they have not succeeded in arousing the slightest popular movement indicates that their audience remains relatively modest. Whatever their political sympathies, the Eghptians by nature are opposed to violence, as shown by a number of comments picked up in the course of meetings today [14 October].

A Discreet Purge of the Armed Forces

However, the authorities fear a joining together of the opposition groups. While a discreet purge of the armed forces is going on, preventive arrests are taking place in all circles--from the extreme Left to the extreme Right. In the city of Cairo alone about 100 members or sympathizers with the clandestine communist party and the Progressive Assembly have been arrested. However, the repressive action taken affects above all the activists, real or alleged, of the Islamic organizations. If public rumors are to be believed, several hundred of them reportedly have been put in jail.

On the other hand, no one has heard of the arrest of supporters of General Shazli. In the general law, the former chief of staff, now a refugee in Tripoli, has no organization worthy of the name, and his influence is considered to be virtually nil. The support which he has in Libya does not seem to concern the leaders, who do not believe that Colonel Qadhdhafi has the intention of attacking Egypt or the Sudan.

In support of this view it is stated that the Libyan Army, already involved in Chad, is much too small to become involved with the Egyptian and Sudanese forces which, by virtue of the military alliance which links the two countries, would respond jointly to aggression directed against either one or the other. By all appearances the statements made by General Nimeiri, who has been in Ciaro since the funeral of President Sadat, are not taken seriously here and are even considered rather embarrassing (see our late editions of 14 October). The views of the Sudanese chief of state on the imminence of a Libyan invasion, the power which he attributes to Qadhdhafi to overthrow the governments in Khartoum and Cairo by subversion, the appeals which he has made in favor of a preventive war against Libya, are reported briefly by the Cairo newspapers on the inside pages and between quotation marks, which say a great deal about the reservations of the Egyptian leaders.

The latter visibly do not want, at any price, to involve their army in adventures with an uncertain outcome, at a time when they must, as a matter of priority, consolidate their domestic front. That does not mean that the Egyptians are insensitive to the dangerous situation in which the Sudanese government finds itself. Assailed by domestic problems, particularly in the economic and social fields, the Sudanese government is reportedly threatened with falling, according to American journalists who are coming back from Khartoum. Agriculture, for example, threatened to such a point that the production of cotton, the principal export commodity, is no more than half what it was 5 years ago. Famine, unemployment, inflation, and corruption contribute to inflate popular discontent dangerously. It is rather these factors than Libyan military pressures which led General Nimeiri to carry out, since

the beginning of this month, some 10,000 arrests of opposition members, or those suspected as such, among the Sudanese and the unemployed immigrants.

Unless he is able to resolve the economic and social ills of the country, General Nimeiri, as much as the Egyptian leaders, puts his hopes in American military aid. The eventual fall of the Khartoum regime would not fail to have very serious repercussions on the stability of the Egyptian Republic which, for evident geopolitical reasons, depends on the stability of its southern neighbor.

[16 Oct 81 p 7]

[Text] Continuity or immobility? The brutal death of Anwar al-Sadat, it seems, has congealed Egypt. His successors, in the name of fidelity, proclaim their determination piously to maintain the regime which he left to them. His successor as president continued in office on Thursday, 15 October, the cabinet which had submitted its resignation, as the Constitution requires. Hosni Mubarak has charged the cabinet with continuing the task which the late president had confided to it.

The path chosen by the latter, both in foreign as well as domestic affairs, will remain unchanged, the new president states with insistence. Mubarak will have in his hands the wise powers of his predecessor. Having also refrained from appointing a prime minister, he will simultaneously exercise the functions of chief of state and of government, the supreme command of the armed forces, and the post of secretary general of the Democratic National Party, which holds a large majority in Parliament. The absolute control which he will henceforth exercise over the legislative and executive branches; over the whole state apparatus and consequently the mass media; the advantage which his election ot the presidency with more than 98 percent of the votes, whether they were real or not, should normally have led him to apply a new face to the Egyptian Republic.

Camp David Applied to the Letter

Hosni Mubarak has decided otherwise. That at least is what emerges from the speech which he made Wednesday [14 October] in Parliament on the occasion of his investiture in office. As well as the economic system, the institutions of government, according to him, are functioning perfectly. "The dignity of the citizen, the freedom of opinion and expression, the rule of law, equal for everyone, will be guaranteed as they were previously," he stated by way of illustrating the "democracy" established by Anwar al-Sadat. Therefore, he will reportedly have no intention of abolishing any of the repressive laws--and they are numerous--which were enacted over the years. In the same way he proclaims economic liberalism, or "infittah" introduced after the death of Nasser. Even more, he "will broaden and consolidate" a system which "liberates the creative capacities of the individual" and which "will encourage Arab and foreign capital even more to participate in the development of the country in projects which have been given priority." The Egyptian bourgeoisie therefore has nothing to fear from the successor to Sadat, who had "liberated" it from the directed economy which held sway under Nasser.

The foreign powers, with Israel and the United States in the Lead, have no reason to be disturbed over the death of the "champion of peace." Egypt, the new president stated in a categorical tone, will scrupulously respect its international commitments. Egypt will apply to the letter the Camp David accords and its peace treaty with

Israel, the foundations of the peace reached with the Jewish state, and that situation will apply "before as well as after the total evacuation of the Sinai Peninsula." The United States, Mubarak added, will continue "to assume fully its role as a full partner" in the peace process. The latter will be continued harmoniously since, he stated, "We have received formal assurances that the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the Sinai will be completed as provided for by 25 April 1982 at the latest."

Regarding the Palestinians, the new president reiterated the view of his predecessor: Egypt has no intention of speaking in their name and even less of resolving their conflict with Israel. Egypt will continue the negotiations on the autonomy of the people of the West Bank and of the Gaza Strip, in order "to create a climate propitious to the self-determination of the Palestinians," who alone are in a position to express themselves on their own future.

Mubarak, contrary to Sadat, has avoided any arguments on this matter. He has avoided crossing swords with the PLO, the USSR, or the other Arab countries, including Libya, which accuse Egypt of having "betrayed" the Palestinian cause. For that matter he has not outlined a desire to improve relations with "fraternal" countries.

In the course of the interview he gave us, the minister of state charged with foreign affairs, Butrus Ghali, explained matters in these terms: "We will make no gestures toward the Arab world. It is the latter which needs us, and not the contrary. Three million of our citizens, emigrants, workers, technicians, and government officials are presently contributing to propelling the economy and administration of our neighbors. Our receipts, particularly from petroleum, free us from depending on their aid. If they want to break their isolation, they have only to come to us and accept the policy we have defined in sovereign terms. We will welcome them like prodigal children. Regarding the PLO, it has only to assume its proper responsibilities." Butrus Ghali refused to comment on the latest statements of Yasir Arafat, according to which his organization supports the Saudi peace plan and "peaceful coexistence" with the state of Israel.

On the whole the speech of President Mubarak has made a good impression. Some "small phrases" made with evident sincerity aroused the enthusiasm of the members of Parliament. The latter applauded him vigorously when he stated that he would bring an end to corruption, nepotism, and the preoccupation with business, which contributed not a little to popular discontent under the reign of the late President Sadat. The accent he put on the "productive" character he intends to stamp on "infitah" leads one to think he does not confound economic liberalism and "unrestrained capitalism," which his predecessor had favored.

One of the most significant passages in his speech concerns the lay opposition, to whom he "held out the hand of reconciliation." "We are all the sons of the same nation, the heir of a prestigious history, united for better or worse," he declared, before adding, "Every Etyptian should rise above differences and dislikes, hatreds and bitterness, to contribute to the well-being of all of the national community." For his part, he stated, he would make no distinction between supporters and adversaries, all Egyptians of good will being equal in his eyes.

Is this appeal to national unity only a form of rhetoric, aimed at calming things down, or does it mean a beginning which could lead to a compromise? Is Mubarak going to engage in a real dialogue with the critics of the regime? If that is the case, he should liberate the leaders of the opposition arrested on 3 September and

change the policy he has just presented. That would then be "dynamic continuity," another formula used in his speech.

Mubarak, on the contrary, has adopted a tone of extreme firmness regarding the Islamic activists responsible for the terrorism which cost the life of former President Sadat. Without designating them by name, he committed himself to "strike pitilessly at those who play with fire," in accordance with the laws in force and the legislation on the state of urgency which Parliament hastened to approve. "None of those who entered on the path of crime and treason will escape punishment," he stated. A decree promulgated a few hours earlier provided for heavy sentences of forced labor for those who would shelter terrorists, who would help them in any way, or who would fail to denounce to the police any person suspected not only of "threatening security," but also of "damaging national unity." This last provision could be applied to lay opposition elements innocent of any act of terrorism.

The Egyptian Left--notably those supporting the tradition of Nasser--has reacted unfavorably to the decision of the government to receive the two American AWACS aircraft which, in their eyes, increases the dependence of the country on the United States while strengthening the military presence of "American imperialism" in the region. This action, the pregressives say, is not justified in any way, since it would be nonsense to think that the very small Libyan Army could invade Egypt or the Sudan. The minister of state, Butrus Ghali, agrees with this but justifies the presence of the AWACS aircraft in Egyptian air space by commenting, "Symbols, you know, are not useless.... In the case in point the aircraft will at least have the merit of discouraging any inclination toward subversion.

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VARIOUS ASPECTS OF NASIRIST OPPOSITION TO AL-SADAT REVIEWED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 75, 18-24 Jul 81 pp 30-32

/Article by 'Imad-al-Din Adib: "A Special Comprehensive Investigation That Tells the Story of the Opposition in Egypt: Final Instalment--How Does al-Sadat Deal with the Nasirists?"

/Text/ Who are the Nasirists? What remains of 'Abd-al-Nasir's achievements in Egypt? Is there actually a strong political current that calls itself "Nasirist" in the detachments of the Egyptian opposition?

It is clear that President al-Sadat does not want to recognize this current, because recognizing its existence means recognizing the contradiction between the late president's regime and that of the present one. Therefore President al-Sadat does not call them Nasirists; rather, he calls them "people who don the shirt of 'Abd-al-Nasir with financing from Moscow and Col al-Qadhdhafi."

While one senior observer of Nasirist thinking in Egypt during the life of the late president and after his death, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, recently admitted the mistakes of the Nasirist experiment, Haykal also says that Nasirism, and 'Abd-al-Nasir's generation, "are the strongest unorganized current on the Egyptian streets today."

Although President al-Sadat does not want this current to grow, proceeding from the premise that it appears to be in contradiction with the philosophy of the current regime, "because there is no president today except the president of the day, not the president of yesterday," President al-Sadat twice intervened to stop obvious attacks on President 'Abd-al-Nasir and his family, /once/ when Mr Jalal al-Hammist produced his book "A Dialogue behind the Walls" and then when Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman wrote his book "My Experience." Both books talked about financial violations committed by the late president and his family but their veracity has not been proved.

One informed source says that al-Sadat does not want to establish the tradition of attacking leaders who have died in Egypt.

It is apparent that those who are called Nasirists compose three distinct wings:

The current of the Nasirist left which is assembled under the banner of the Grouping Party. This is the one which, in its interpretations of the charter, approaches Marxist interpretations, with some specific differences with marxism itself. It also believes that the road to political action can be traveled through the current experiment of parties, under the banner of a coalition or a grouping, like the National Progressive Unionist Grouping they belong to.

The Nasirist left current which refuses to join the Grouping Party, believing that the Nasirist current must have its own special Nasirist party based on the thinking of the National Charter and the 30 March Declaration. This current has broad bases among the young, the educated generation and young people in the universities.

An intangible current which benefited from the experiment of 'Abd-al-Nasir, consisting of small peasants who acquired land, skilled workers, low-echelon bureaucrats and some people in the armed forces. All of these people were influenced by the experiment and the personality of President 'Abd-al-Nasir for reasons of interests or sympathy, but do not pursue organized political activities.

What active Nasirists themselves assert is that as soon as President al-Sadat announced the establishment of parties in 1976, a broad segment of people from these currents decided to form a bloc and present an application to found a party, but President al-Sadat rejected the idea completely, on grounds that he rejected the presence of an independent current calling itself Nasirist. He stated "If they want to play a political role they will have to join Khalid Muhyi-al-Din's party."

One of the most conspicuous things that could be said about them is that they are well-known Nasirist leaders--'Abd-al-Salam al-Zayyat, Sabri Mubdi, Kamal Ahmad, Ahmad Farghali, Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, 'Abdallah Imam, Hasanayn Karum, Muhammad Salmawi, Amin Huwaydi, Sha'rawi Jum'ah and Sami Sharaf. However, the "15 May Group," which President al-Sadat did away with, cannot exercise any political role, in accordance with the 1978 referendum on the protection of the domestic front, because they, as the referendum considers, corrupted political life.

Among the most prominent young Nasirist leaders is Sadiq Sabahi, chairman of the Federation of Students of Cairo University in 1974 and 1975, a graduate in the media, who has not received a journalistic position in any official press organization because of his political position and was arrested at the end of 1980 for a number of weeks on the charge of establishing a Nasirist organization--the first time a citizen had been arrested on that kind of charge in Egypt.

Sabahi says "Nasirism is a revolutionary theory for changing the Arab situation, including Egypt." I asked Sabahi, "Are the slogans of Nasirism from the days of 'Abd-al-Nasir in step with the current period?" He said,"'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment was connected to national and domestic values, liberation, socialism, social justice and the victory of the rights of the poor."

I asked him, "Are these slogans still exposed to danger nowadays?" He replied, "Certainly, these slogans are faced with danger in Egypt now."

On the numbers of Nasirists on the Egyptian streets, Sabahi said, "There is a broad distribution of Nasirists in the broad sense of the word, that is, people who worked closely with Nasir's experiment, or with him as a historic symbol. In the events of 18 and 19 January 1977, some pictures and cries were raised for 'Abd-al-Nasir." He went on, "However, in the government institutions their presence is almost nonexistent. There is not a single Nasirist member in the People's Assembly." Concerning the errors of the Nasirist experiment, he said, "'Abd-al-Nasir died while his goals and his experiment were still pending. We are not against the goals, but we must evaluate the positive and negative aspects of his experiment. The mistake of 'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment was his failure to establish a popular organization in the proper manner. One can attribute this mistake to the fact that 'Abd-al-Nasir built his organization while he was at the peak of power."

Sabahi (who speaks for a large current of young Nasirists who have not joined the Nasirist wing of the leftist National Progressive grouping) believes "our only place is in establishing an independent Nasirist organization."

While Nasirism, in the time of 'Abd-al-Nasir, faced the problem of establishing a popular organization and of becoming acquainted with the pulse of the Egyptian man on the street, this problem has increased in severity and difficulty, now that "the leader" has been gone more than 11 years.

This is the challenge facing Nasirism and the Nasirists.

Household Opposition

"There are people who are in opposition from their homes." Thus an American professor of political science began addressing me. The people who are in opposition from their homes are those who do not go down into the Egyptian streets. These people, in Egypt, are concentrated in a front of old politicians who lost their official 23 July 1952 positions, having been a basic part of the political regime, through resignation or dismissal.

You can set them down in a list: members of the former Revolutionary Command Council, some former ministers, members of the secret vanguard organization in 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, al-Sadat's men whom he dismissed.

Those who resigned are few in number. Heading them are Mr Isma'il Fahmi and Mr Ibrahim Kamil.

In the past 3 years they have often signed statements of opposition to Camp David, the peace agreement or the piping of Nile water to Israel. Mr Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil has kept silent since he resigned in opposition to the results produced by the Camp David agreements. Isma'il Fahmi remains one of the few voices that have made a sharp turn away from their previous positions in the regime. His voice of opposition has become loud. He has started writing his weekly article in the newspaper AL-SHA'B. Fahmi, engineer of the policy of Egyptian-American rapprochement, has become the prime critic of America's policy in Egypt and the region.

Fahmi believes "America has not understood the region; therefore it must pay the price for its mistakes."

The remaining opposition is the household opposition, which follows a policy of "give us a statement of rejection for us to sign." It is an aristocratic opposition which has not descended to the Egyptian streets to address the people on them, does not know what the man in the street wants, but is an opposition composed of intellectuals with large incomes.

The only winning card in this opposition's hand is that it is an opposition of "stars and famous people," meaning names like Kamal-al-Din Husayn, 'Abd-al-Latif Bughdadi, 'Aziz Sidqi or Sidqi Sulayman. These are names that are well known on the Egyptian streets; they are like international movie stars who the producer knows have ceased to be good at acting but whose help he needs in the promotion process.

A question: will the objective circumstances arise in which the popular opposition will seek the help of one of them, in order to benefit from his status as a star?

Mansur Hasan

Who is Mansur Hasan?

Some people talk about this man in Egypt with the greatest amazement, since he represents the current of "enlightenment" in the regime in Egypt. One person close to him says, "Mansur Hassan's crisis lies not in the fact that he is minister for presidency affairs, or minister of culture and media affairs, but in the fact that he must be a democratic facade for a political regime facing difficulties with its democratic experiment."

Mansur Hasan's role, as far as the opposition goes, was and still is that of the last and only bridge of contact with President al-Sadat.

Thus Mansur Hasan's continued performance of his role has become based on an internally contradictory equation: "The president is happy with him when he is able to reduce the status of his opposition, and the opposition is happy when he is able to seize rights for it from the political regime."

Complicating Mansur Hasan's task is the fact that he is fighting the group of al-Sadat's men from within. This group is extensive and does not believe in any dialogue with the opposition, but believes that the best method for governing is "to control and dominate the behavior of the opposition at any price."

But is Mansur Hasan himself in the opposition?

Within himself, he knows the mistakes of the regime and thus can solve them. But at the same time he is "pragmatic," believing in what is realistic and believing that it is better to make change from inside power than to have it done from outside, since historic circumstances in Egypt do not permit the risk of mounting opposition from outside.

So what does this rich young man, graduate of British schools and American colleges, do?

Mansur has managed to establish an institute to form young ruling party staffs who are quietly being trained to be reared as the closest thing to a vanguard organization or select group of ruling party leaders, able to deal with the masses with awareness and understanding.

One opposition leader says that Mansur Hasan's real place is not at the seat of power but at the seat of opposition and that he has chosen the wrong seat. Many people who know the inner workings of the power game in Egypt know that the likelihood that Mansur Hasan's current will win a victory in imposing a current of political liberalism is slight.

The Current of Self-Denial

There is a current of self-denial in Egyptian political life which rejects and withdraws from everything in power or opposition, adopting the slogan of despair--"nothing is important." This current is in retreat from the official left, the opposition Labor Party, the Moslem Brothers, the Nasirists, the independents and the men of the household opposition because it simply believes that they are not part of an opposition.

This current exists inside all the detachments of the Egyptian opposition. The rejectionist current demands that these groups move toward the man in the street to take him by the hand and change the shape of the regime.

These currents' excuses come from the leaders of all opposition groups, from the Brothers to the communists: "We must not solicit a clash with the security forces, because the authorities are stronger than we are."

The rejectionist current says: "The authorities are always stronger. The authorities can be weakened only by being resisted. Rights are seized only by fighting for them. Change comes only through fighting reserves, not through material reserves in banks."

Complicating the situation is the fact that the opposition leaders in all opposition detachments are from the old guard who had a relationship with the experience of 23 July, or who had links to it in one way or another.

Where, then, does the Egyptian man in the street lie in all this? The Egyptian man in the street has his own law on following up, observing, feeling pain, showing patience and waiting for the momentum of events and positions to get to the point where the moment comes which is unexpected and unawaited by everyone, when he goes out into the street to say his piece. However, the Egyptian man in the street nowadays is following the men in power and the men in opposition with great astonishment, amazement and biting Egyptian sarcasm. The man in the street does not believe any of the regime's promises or the opposition's criticisms.

If the goal of the regime, any regime, in attaining stability is to move the political man in the street to its advantage, and if the goal of the opposition, any opposition, is to move the man in the political street to its advantage against the regime, it is clear that the regime and the opposition in Egypt are both suffering from a dual crisis of different dimensions. Neither of them is able to move the man in the street to its advantage. The majority of the current of intellectuals, in the form of writers, journalists and artists, stands in an unenviable position; this current has either to emerge as one which justifies the position of the ruling authorities and tries to sell it to public opinion, or to philosophize about the negativism and sterility of the opposition in moving the man in the street to its advantage under the slogan of "realizing the historic circumstance, grasping capabilities, and failing to clash with the authorities lest we lose our legitimacy." The latter segment of this current stands in a position of exile--in foreign exile, working in Arab or European capitals, or in domestic exile, that is, living in Egypt in a state of intellectual bewilderment, unable to undertake any creative intellectual or artistic activity.

So where does all this lead the political experiment in Egypt?

Like modern French movies, with the most likely ending "open and subject to any eventuality?"

What this report confirms is that change is coming--change in the sense that Egypt will regain its "missing personality," as leader of the movement of development, liberation and Arab nationalism in the Arab and Third World, whether this change is within the regime or outside it. But where, when, how and at what price?

These questions will be decided by two factors:

1. The form in which the regime and the opposition shed their crisis of being unable to understand the pulse of the Egyptian man in the street.

2. When the Egyptian man in the street ceases his peculiar policy of following up on events from the position of observing what is going on now and what can happen in the future.

However, change is coming--there is no way out of it.

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ACTIVITIES OF VARIOUS HARD-LINE ISLAMIC GROUPS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 9

/Article: "Activities of the Dissolved Religious Groups: The Group for Promotion of Virtue Struck at Citizens in Hulwan"/

/Text/ The activities of the Group for the Promotion of Virtue, which was formed by Shaykh Yusuf Sadiq al-Badri, who engages in giving sermons, are concentrated in the Suq al-Akhirah Mosque in 'Ayn Hulwan, whose personnel were chosen from among extremist youths.

It was formed by Shaykh Yusuf al-Badri, who engages in giving sermons in the Suq al-Akhirah Mosque in 'Ayn Hulwan, and it chose its personnel from extremist young people.

It concentrates its thinking in confronting everything that the members of the society consider to be in violation of God's law and the sayings and doings of the prophet--purely from their viewpoint--in a style that relies on the commission of violence and on the methods they specify, among the most conspicuous of which are meddling with citizens and residents and attacking them physically on public thoroughfares or in their gathering places.

Among the most conspicuous events and incidents that the chief and personnel of the group committed recently were:

Acting provocatively with citizens who frequent the parks in Hulwan, striking them and asking them to leave. When they did not respond to them, they set upon them with blows. On 30 July 1981 members of the group and citizens threw rocks back and forth at one another as a consequence of citizens' reaction against the attempt to compel them to leave the park and interfere in their personal freedom in this manner.

Following techniques of provocation, casting doubt, causing trouble and incitement in sermons and gatherings which take place in the Suq al-Akhirah Mosque, attempting to storm the masses in parades and demonstrations after repeating all types of slogans on events of a factional nature, such as the events in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', and, in the name of the society, distributing opposition pamphlets which contain notions and ideas on these tendencies.

Preparing a declaration titled "The Islamic Society To Purify Food and Drugs," which contains an appeal to Moslems to boycott certain food and drugs the government produces, on the pretext that pork is involved in their preparation.

Following an investigation into the leadership personnel of this group based on permission from the office of the public prosecutor, a large amount of various publications was discovered in their possession provoking the masses to act against the regime or carry out acts of violence and destruction, in order to exploit factional disputes. In addition, some Islamic Liberation Party publications were discovered; that party is known for following techniques of violence and establishing a position for itself outside the country. Numerous attempts on its part to infiltrate into the country had previously been discovered.

The Principles of Taha al-Samawi's Group and the Ideas It Calls for

Renouncing the society, rulers and ruled alike, on grounds that it is an infidel, pre-Islamic society which must be eliminated.

Committing oneself to the principle of blind obedience to the commander of the group under all the circumstances the group passes through.

Pledging fealty to the commander of the group as a necessary condition for joining it, considering the group to be the only /proper/ one, and not obeying anyone outside it, on grounds that he is an infidel who must not be obeyed.

Rejecting terrestrial laws and the system of adjudication before the courts, on grounds that they are pre-Islamic and govern in contradiction to God's revelations.

Committing oneself to the sayings and doings of the commander of the group and not committing oneself to any of the four creeds of interpretation.

Prohibiting working in the government and the public sector and prohibiting earning money from this work.

Prohibiting the establishment of graves and mausoleums and working to eliminate them.

Prohibiting prayer in the mosques which the government establishes, prohibiting following the imams in prayer in these mosques, and working to erect special mosques for the group in which to pray.

The Renunciation and Atonement Group

The activities of the adherents of the group are concentrated in most governates, especially the Governorates of Cairo, al-Jizah, al-Sharqiyah, al-Daqahliyah, al-Fayyum, al-Isma'iliyah, al-Minya, al-Gharbiyah, Alexandria, Port Said and Shubra al-Khaymah.

The growth, thinking, and development of movement of the group:

This group was formed by Shukri Ahmad Mustafa, who was previously arrested with members of the Society of the Brothers in 1965, in the wake of his release in 1971, when he tried to propagate extremist religious ideas among his relatives and people he mixed with in the Governorate of Asyut. He actually managed to win some of them over. In this stage, his movement was restricted to the intellectual arena.

Radical development in Shukri Ahmad Mustafa's thinking and action, and in the group that he managed to win over to his thinking, appeared in 1973 when the cornerstone of the Repentance and Atonement Group was laid as an extremist religious organization concentrating on the two following focal points:

A. The Intellectual Focus

A group of religious notions crystallized in Shukri Ahmad Mustafa's mind, revolving about in the firmament of al-Qutb's extremist thinking, alongside additional ideas which he innovated. His religious concepts concentrate on the following pillars:

Sovereignty: in its meaning which is based on ruling by what God has revealed and rejecting terrestrial laws.

Pre-Islamic society: considering that contemporary societies live in the pre-Islamic era, the al-Jahiliyah, and therefore are infidel societies in terms of rulers and ruled.

Organization: this is represented by the need to establish a Moslem group confronting pre-Islamic society and imposing Islamic rule.

Withdrawal: separating the Islamic group from pre-Islamic society.

Violence: belief in the inevitability of a clash with and elimination of infidel society.

Atonement: alienating oneself of necessity from existing society and seeking refuge in hills and caves in order to form the core of an Islamic society and begin positive movement to confront existing society.

Islamic conception: this is founded on the belief that existing societies will collapse and that Islam will be reborn at the hands of the devout elite that is represented by his society by the edge of the sword.

Pausing and examining: refusing to settle on having a man satisfy the five pillars of Islam in order to be Moslem, and the inevitability of avoiding sin, lest he be considered a heathen.

B. The Focus of Action

Proceeding from this thinking, he created an organizational structure for the society, appointing himself its general commander, with the members of the groups committed to moving from inside this structure.

The society rented some apartments as secret headquarters in which to hold their organizational meetings.

Movement to mobilize and attract the greatest possible number of young personnel, to form a base embracing the thinking of the society and believing in the organization's principles.

Training members of the organization in the use of arms.

Working to arm the organization by buying weapons.

Pursuing the technique of violence and intellectual and physical terror, in accordance with a scheme the commander of the organization set out.

The methods of confrontation and the measures adopted by the group developed with the development of its activity and the increase in its movement, as follows:

In 1973, members of the organization were arrested in a cave in Jabal al-Minya, and some primitive weapons in their possession were seized. An investigation of them was made under the auspices of the state security prosecutor's office in Higher State Security Case 618 for 1973. The case was suspended as it was considered best not to hand the defendants over for trial. They were released in early 1974.

In 1976, physical liquidation groups that were drawn up from members of the organization were organized and carried out a number of operations, represented by aggression against some members who had split off in the Turah Cement and al-Mansurah areas (Rif'at Abu Dallal and 'Imad Abu Dallal) and Alexandria ('Abd-al-Salam Mustafa 'Isa). An investigation was made of them in Higher State Security Court Case 984 for 1976, and they were given suspended sentences until completion of the investigation into Military Security Case 6 for 1977.

In 1977, the members of the organization kidnapped and killed the late Shaykh Muhammad al-Dhahabi. The members of the organization were seized in Military State Security Case 6 for 1977, and the remaining members of the group were arrested in Military State Security Case 7 for 1977. The death sentence was handed down against the commander of the organization, Shukri Ahmad Mustafa, and four leaders. In addition, there were some other sentences which ranged from hard labor for life to 3 years' imprisonment for the other defendants.

The Islamic Groups

The Islamic groups: their members' activity has been extensive in two areas inside and outside the societies, and includes the following forms:

Holding Marches

Members of the Islamic society have held marches inside their faculties and have tried to bring them out onto the public streets. The security forces opposed them and prevented them from doing so (the Alexandria group). The Islamic group in

Cairo University also organized a march in which it repeated some religious slogans and shouted cries of hostility against the university administration, demanding that periodic examinations in the faculties be prohibited.

Some members of the Islamic group in the University of Asyut held a march in which they repeated Islamic cries in protest against the submission of some of their colleagues to disciplinary councils for violations they committed against the university regulations such as aggression against their student colleagues.

The Method of Violence

Some personnel in the Islamic group have pursued the technique of violence in their activity, in the following fashion:

Assaulting their fellow students, in the Universities of Alexandria, Cairo, al-Minya, Asyut and Hulwan.

Using knives and sharp instruments in some acts of aggression inside and outside the university and committing aggression against university security men belonging to the university, in the Universities of Alexandria, al-Minya and Asyut.

Declarations and Wall Posters

The personnel in the Islamic groups in the Universities of Alexandria, Cairo, al-Minya and Asyut worked diligently to issue declarations and put up wall posters, including the following:

Distributing a declaration titled "Bullets Also in the University of Asyut," which contained a summary of events in the University of Asyut and provoked students to move to back their colleagues in the University of Asyut by making exaggerated and provocative statements and false publicity.

Attacking the Christian religion.

Attacking the political leadership in the country on the charge that it had ignored Arab causes.

Condemning the notion of establishing a complex of religions.

Attacking the normalization of relations.

Pointing out that the Islamic groups in al-Minya faced repression by officials.

Demanding that the university security force be eliminated.

Preventing the Holding of Gatherings in the University

Members of the Islamic group in various universities tried to prevent the holding of recreational and cultural gatherings inside the university, as follows:

Protesting the holding of a celebration organized by a family in the Faculty of Commerce at al-Zaqaziq University.

In addition, 150 members of the Islamic groups in the University of al-Minya gathered at the Faculty of Education building adjacent to the university theater to prevent the holding of a performance organized by a student family.

Provoking Students Not To Take Food in the University Villages

Some members of the Islamic group provoked students residing in the University villages not to consume imported chicken, on the charge that it was slaughtered in an improper manner. This was in the Universities of Alexandria, Cairo, and the Canal (Suez).

Violations against Christians

Calling for holy war to establish an Islamic state, and considering the failure to commit oneself to it to be heresy.

Reliance in interpretation on /words missing/ or their professors or the attempt to shut down classes.

Condemning the war between Iran and Iraq.

Condemning the piping of Nile water to Israel.

The violations on the part of Christians are focussed on:

The determination by some churches to ring their bells and hold religious services at the same time as the holding of prayers in mosques, especially the Friday prayer.

Attempts to take over land owned by the government and other parties in order to erect places of worship, carry out modifications on them or perform religious services without permit.

The performance by some Christian students of aggression against their colleagues.

Performance of proselytization activities, secretly or openly, issuing numerous pamphlets that contain distorted verses and preparation of tape recordings containing stories aimed at proselytization.

Using the two Christian newspapers WATANI and AL-KARAZAH for provocative goals by publishing articles referring to the oppression of Copts and the fanaticism of Moslems and disseminating factional and fanatical allegations.

Contacting Christian personnel abroad and supplying them with incorrect data and incidents for publication abroad, defaming Egypt's reputation, and dealing with and internally propagating publications received from them.

Attempting to import a factional coloring to ordinary individual disputes and incidents, working to escalate and exploit them, and propagating rumors in order to increase the severity of tension among the Moslem and Christian people of Egypt.

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LEFTIST JOURNAL REVIEWS CAREERS OF THREE DETAINEES

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 23 Sep 81 p 11

/Article by 'Abd-al-Qadir Yasin: "Three Examples of Detentions by al-Sadat's regime"/

/Text/ In the following lines, 'Abd-al-Qadir Yasin will try to introduce three personalities of different natures whom President Anwar al-Sadat has put in prison in his campaign that has resulted in the arrest of hundreds of Egyptian opposition leaders and staffs.

Ahmad Taha

I still remember your slender dark frame, looking as if it had come out from under the hammer and anvil of time.

I met you for the first time in the al-Mahariq Prison in the Oases of al-Kharijah, in the Western Desert of Egypt--at the end of August 1960, to be precise; the day after the assassination of Hazza' al-Majali. As soon as I lay eyes upon you, a picture of Mahatma Gandhi leapt to my imagination. However, you had no spinning wheel or spindle; where could you get a spinning wheel or spindle, having been put in prison for years, taking three meals at one "crack," waiting the arrival of the three meals the next day, all this at the expense of your health and the reserves of flesh and blood in your body, making you look like mere skin on bone?

That day, we went to the military prison in al-'Abbasiyah, one of the outskirts of Cairo, where stands the unit of Arab blood and destiny, the prison where history books had long informed us Sa'd Zaghlul spent a few weeks--by orders of the British occupation authorities, of course.

In spite of your worn-out body and ailing heart, you had long taken part in soccer matches held between teams in the blocks of the mournful prison.

Perhaps you were the first person whose life was summarized on a Central Intelligence card, as you liked to call the forms you filled out on the biographies of comrades.

Excuse me if the card is lost; it remained in Gaza with other comrades' cards. However, the information remains in my memory.

I learned from you, that you failed to complete your education and joined the well-known Egyptian communist organization "Egyptian National Liberation Movement" in 1944, before reaching 20 years of age. You continued to march with that organization until it merged into another communist organization, Iskra, and the new organization bore the name of "Democratic National Liberation Movement"--known, however, by its acronym Haditu.

At the same time, you became immersed in the trade union movement, since you worked in the Telecommunications Department. You were prominent in trade union and political activity alike. This brought you membership in Haditu's central committee and from there in the concentration camps of Mahmud Fahmi al-Nugrashi, prime minister of Egypt in the late forties--concentration camps that devoured Egyptian communists and democrats on the pretext of protecting the Egyptian army's rear in its military invasion of Palestine. It was necessary to detain and imprison you at that time, so that the conspiracy could be consummated in silence.

From concentration camp, you emerged into a political battle that you did not care at all about, since the remaining members of Haditu's central committee held a meeting in which they assigned themselves various sectors. Your share was the sector of workers and the trade union movement, along with your comrade Muhammad Shata. In just 2 years the size of Haditu leapt from eight central committee members, the total that met when they were released, to about 8,000 members in early 1952, disseminated among circles of workers, students, intellectuals and the army.

Taha and his comrades made use of the liberal atmosphere that surrounded the country in the era of the Wafd government. The trade union movement also made use of the fierce national uprising in the wake of al-Nahhas' fall 1951, declaration of the abrogation of the 1936 treaty with Britain, reawakening the movement of the masses and unleashing a real guerrilla war against the British forces stationed in the Suez Canal. The position of the king and his regime lay at the mercy of the devil, and their awesome image began to collapse, following the scandal of the affairs of this king, who had colluded with Britain. Because of the liberalism and national resurgence, the trade union movement managed to prepare to announce a general federation of workers for the nation of Egypt. However, the king second-guessed the Egyptian national movement with the Cairo five of 26 January 1952, using this fire as an excuse to proclaim martial law and arrest active elements from the far right to the far left, in a manner we have been reminded of by the blow al-Sadat recently delivered against domestic opposition forces.

The founding conference of the general federation of workers for the nation of Egypt was to meet that day. However, the king's blow thwarted all preparations--preparations Taha and his comrades had moved toward through his position as secretary general of this federation's preparatory committee.

Naturally, Taha would be put in prison. However, the night Faruq brought his curtain down over Egypt did not last more than 6 months, since a constellation of Egyptian nationalist officers and soldiers shredded this curtain at dawn on 23 July of that year in a military coup which rapidly turned into a people's revolution.

The revolution did not forget that Ahmad Taha was the brother of a member of the Free Officers' Movement, the late 'Abd-al-Qadir Taha, who had previously been

assassinated by Faruq's Iron Guard, in which Anwar al-Sadat had worked for a number of years!

A few weeks after the revolution burst forth, most of the detainees were released. The release included Ahmad Taha, who had become a member of Haditu's political bureau. After the honeymoon between Haditu and the Revolutionary Command Council, animosity and conflict took the place of concord and alliance between them. Taha was put in prison with the other members of Haditu's central committee. The court ruled that he was to be imprisoned for 8 full-month years. (Although the prison year is just 9 months, the tyrant Isma'il Sidqi excluded communists from this reduction, and kept the 12-month year in the case of communists in prison; Sidqi's law is still in effect to this day in Egypt.

Taha wasted no time. In prison in al-Mahariq, he proceeded to read and drink deeply of marxist culture, cutting it with the sword of /illegible/.

There came the summer of 1955, when 'Abd-al-Nasir began to implant the /illegible/ of progressive transformation in his foreign policy, breaking the arms monopoly by concluding the arms transaction with the socialist camp, then launching his major blows against the international monopolies when he nationalized the Suez Canal (July 1956). That is the nationalization which the governments of Britain and France used as justification to launch their aggression against Egypt in the fall of 1956, after prompting Israel to attack Egypt a few days before; there then occurred the tripartite aggression and its well-known defeat.

However, the communist-Nasirist alliance did not last long. It was damaged by the mere declaration of the Egyptian-Syrian union (February 1958), when the communists demanded that Syrian democracy be applied to Egypt while the Nasirists demanded that Syria be subject to the situation prevalent in Egypt, to dissolution of all political parties, which would be replaced by the "National Federation," the confiscation of newspapers, and retention of the government papers. Then came the 14 July 1958 democratic revolution in Iraq, pouring oil on the fire of the communist-Nasirist dispute and pushing this peripheral dispute to the surface. The years 1959, 1960 and 1961 witnessed grievous struggles between the two parties which resulted in the delivery of harsh blows against both.

Naturally, the prisons and concentration camps of Egypt and Syria became filled with communists, and the regime acquired the ill repute that Nuri al-Sa'id had previously earned in Iraq in the early fifties. Egyptian security agencies started to demand that everyone whose prison term was ending denounce communism, and when these agencies failed to force someone to do so they would settle for a commitment from him not to engage in politics. When the turn of the subject of this article fell due, in 1962, he of course did not desecrate his fighting legacy, and rejected both options together, prompting the security agencies to move him from prison to concentration camp. The camps entailed great losses of privileges which people in prisons had enjoyed, privileges no one notices unless he is deprived of them. When Taha was moved to a concentration camp he lost his shoes, engaged in hard labor in the mountains from 0800 hours in the morning to 1400 hours in the afternoon every day, and was prevented from reading letters from his wife and children as stipulated by a republican decree issued in 1957.

After he left prison, our subject came to Cairo, his bony frame covered with a little skin; he met his wife, who had reached old age early, and his children, who had long suffered from the loss of their father and the joy of childhood. However, what consoled him was the fact that what he had struggled and sacrificed to bring about had begun to happen, at the hands of the late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir: a limit of 50 feddans was imposed on ownership of farmland, the public sector became the dominant feature of the economy, there were not insubstantial economic and political gains for workers and peasants. It is true that this positive aspect was lacking in permanence because of the absence of political democracy and emphasis on the individual formulator of political decisions, not on a political organization, and lastly on reliance on creating enthusiasm by the various media rather than mobilizing, enlightening and organizing the masses of the people.

Four months after the release of the communists, 'Abd-al-Nasir made fundamental changes in the editorial boards of Egyptian newspapers. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din assumed the chairmanship of the board of the Akhbar al-Yawm Publishing House, as well as the position of editor in chief of the weekly /sic/ paper that bears the same name; along with Muhyi-al-Din a constellation of communist journalists came in, including Ahmad Taha, Rif'at Sa'id, 'Ali al-Shalaqani, Widad 'Aziz, William Ishaq, Nabil Zaki, Sa'd al-Ta'ih, Salah Hafiz, Sa'id 'Arif, Samir Tadrus, Mustafa Tibah, Majdi Fahmi and Muhammad Sid Ahmad. The communists dominated the daily newspaper AL-AKHBAR, the weekly magazine AKHIR SA'AH and the monthly KITAB AL-YAWM, all periodicals issued by AKHBAR AL-YAWM.

Ahmad Taha got in contact with the fledgling Federation of Workers of Palestine and took it by the hand in its early stages alongside its secretary general, Husni Salih al-Khafash. I still remember Taha asking me about sources and books on the Palestinian working class, at the end of 1968, and, when I replied that we did not have any such books, answering me most tersely, "Aren't you ashamed?" I took the rebuke and concealed my embarrassment, but replied to this combative intellectual provocation by starting to prepare a book on the history of our working class which came out last year.

The conference of the Federation of Palestinian Workers was held in the summer of 1969 and produced a new workers' union leadership. Ahmad Taha left his position (I do not know if he was dismissed), then al-Khafash was dismissed and was dealt with rather disloyally, being compelled to work as a functionary in the Federation of Arab Workers. Taha moved on to a new combative position in the Shubra section, nominating himself in the same year for the National Assembly from that district. He won his seat and was re-elected to the 1971 and 1979 sessions, winning with an overwhelming majority; the security agencies failed to falsify the elections in his district.

In 1978, Taha joined the Wafd, the most popular party, one with a deep-rooted national legacy. Our subject was among the 15 delegates who opposed the two Camp David agreements, gaining al-Sadat's persecution. At the time (1979) the elections were being falsified against these delegates, four of whom were expelled from the People's Assembly--Shaykh 'Ashur,Abu-al-'Izz al-Hariri, 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan and Kamal-al-Din Husayn. Taha received a felony charge which the Egyptian security agencies trumped up against him in an attempt to besmirch his reputation, and the

elections took place while Taha was in prison. Nonetheless, he won, although the Egyptian government refused to accept the results. After the elections were over he was released, the public prosecutor's office dropped the charges against him, and he hastened to file a case against al-Sadat's government, claiming entitlement to the People's Assembly seat for the district of Shubra. On 23 August 1980, Taha sent a copy of the judgment handed down by the court of cassation to the office of the chairman of the People's Assembly, which ruled that Taha had won the 1979 parliamentary election.

When he returned recently from the Soviet Union, where an operation had been performed on his exhausted heart, al-Sadat's myrmidons were waiting for him, and today he stands proud, with his comrades of all Egyptian patriotic tendencies, behind bars, scaring al-Sadat, for history stands by his side.

Fathi Radwan

From under the cloak of "total independence or violent death" emerged Fathi Radwan, a rigid patriotic uncompromising fighting man. Our subject was known as a member of the radical wing within the National Party Mustafa Kamil founded in Egypt at the start of this century. It goes without saying that the National Party was the proponent of the ironclad slogan mentioned above.

The young lawyer Fathi Radwan felt that the leader of the party, Hafiz Ramadan, had led the party and its goals astray in the late forties and turned it into a mere minority party with no concern except to oppose the Wafd, the party of the majority of the people with the result that the leader of the party became paralyzed by the hostility of the palace and the British occupying force, to the point where the National Party, in the hands of Hafiz Ramadan, had become just a pale imitation of the Constitutional Liberal and Sa'dist Parties which were clients of the palace and willing accomplices of the British occupying forces.

The new National Party emerged and restored to the party its youth and traditional enthusiasm. Fathi Radwan and Dr Nur-al-Din Tarraf were at the head of the fledgling party. The newspaper AL-LIWA' AL-JADID contributed to demolishing the edifice of the corrupt royal regime along with its fraternal revolutionary papers AL-MALAYIN, AL-ISHTIRAKI and AL-MU'ARIDAH. These papers benefited from the liberal climate that the last Wafd Party cabinet (1950-52) spread about; we can read articles and editorials by Radwan that were worthy of a man who had given his life to the nation and had dedicated himself to his country's cause.

The Cairo fire (26 January 1952), which King Faruq had arranged, at night, was a rare pretext for thwarting the fledgling national movement and distorting the stage of glorious liberalism. Fathi Radwan was put in prison along with others because of the verdict that the criminal court issued, whose committee was headed by Counsellor Tantawi, who was notorious for his tyranny and subservience to instructions from the palace. I still remember how Tantawi would sarcastically receive the arguments of all the defendants' lawyers, saying, "your efforts are appreciated, sir!" I can almost see him telling the lawyer concerned that the verdict had been issued in advance, before the proceedings and the arguments.

A death sentence was issued against a constellation of Egypt's men, among them Fathi Radwan; however, the night of martial law decrees did not last long, for the dawn of the 23 July 1952 revolution ended it, and Fathi Radwan was immediately moved, by airplane, from prison to the chair of the Egyptian Ministry of National Guidance.

Radwan was loyal to the July revolution, because he found that his principles and goals had been realized in it and by it.

Radwan continued to stick by 'Abd-al-Nasir, from struggle to struggle, from victory to victory, from the attainment of political independence for the Sudan to the endorsement of agrarian reform in Egypt, the evacuation of British forces from Egyptian territory and the breaking of the arms monopoly with the consummation of the first arms transaction with the socialist camp, to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the destruction of the forces of the tripartite aggression (the British, French and Israelis), the attainment of Egyptian-Syrian union, and the great nationalizations of capitalist power. Then suddenly there occurred the catastrophe of the secession (28 September 1961), and the first modern Arab experiment in union was obliterated. With the secession, the dialogue in Egypt erupted in anger, "after the sweetness was gone and the thinking came," and the politicians began to make their contributions on the reasons for this setback. Radwan was among those who said that the absence of democratic freedom was the main reason why the secessionist movement succeeded in killing this experiment in unity.

Radwan was logical with himself and with his comrade of the journey, resigned the position of minister and kept silent, out of respect for the years that he had spent with the immortal leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. His silence departed him only in recent years: although the June 1967 setback and the victory of the counter-revolution at al-Sadat's hands did not bring him out of his silence, we find that the national treason that al-Sadat perpetrated did, and he resumed unsheathing the same pen that he had previously unsheathed against Faruq in the last 2 years of his rule.

Radwan used the last page of AL-SHA'B, the weekly paper of the opposition Socialist Labor Party, as the trench from which he condemned al-Sadat and his regime every week and praised everyone who caused al-Sadat discomfort, such as Col al-Qadhdhafi and Imam Khomeyni.

About a year ago, al-Sadat launched a verbal attack on Fathi Radwan, stating that he had become senile. Radwan answered the Egyptian president on the pages of AL-SHA'B by stating that he had thought of bringing the president before the Court of Impropriety but demurred at the last moment.

Some weeks ago Radwan stood up, gave a speech at a Labor Party celebration and promised to form a new party which would engage in real opposition, that is, stating that he did not see anything that slaked his thirst or reached the level he aspired to in the Labor Party opposition.

When al-Sadat, in his notorious speech this 5 September, said that that man had been misled for 69 years, he erred twice: first, by refusing to realize that it

was he, al-Sadat, who had turned against himself, turning 180 degrees from his political positions in the forties while Fathi Radwan continued to hold to his positions, and second (which is a fine point), by forgetting Radwan's real age, which was 70 years and 2 months, not 69.

Today, now that Fathi Radwan stands behind bars, whole generations that have long been crying out for Egypt and have judged without asking for booty are standing alongside him.

Fu'ad Mursi

In 1925 Fu'ad Mursi was born of a father who operated a locomotive. It was perhaps from him that he learned promptness in appointments, perhaps also from the skippers of boats and fishermen where he was born, in Alexandria.

At any school Fu'ad Mursi attended, he would get the top grades. In secondary school he headed a economic and political society he had established with some secondary students, titled "the new generation." This society adopted Ataturk's principles of extremist nationalism!

The society's activities clashed with the fledgling marxist organizations; it was natural that the Ataturk Society should clash with these organizations because of differences and incompatibilities in their theoretical premises.

The chairman of the "new generation" wished to learn about marxist thought so that he could combat it powerfully and refute it. He agreed to read marxist books, then finished most of the ones available and ended up by abandoning Ataturk's ideas and embracing marxism. Most of the members of the "new generation," including the late Egyptian journalist Ibrahim 'Amir, followed in his footsteps.

Our subject received a bachelor's in law from the University of Alexandria when he was still 20. Because of his excellent performance, he received a scholarship to study at the French Sorbonne University, where he received a Doctorat D'Etat in economics in 1948.

He returned to Egypt, which was raging with revolution; society had entered a real crisis because of the inflammation of the domestic cause and the outbreak of the Palestine war. The Egyptian communist movement was not able to keep itself apart from this crisis and became engulfed in a parallel crisis.

Communists from numerous organizations rallied around Fu'ad Mursi, who had returned from Paris with the expertise of the French Communist Party; Fu'ad, with his lifetime freinds Mustafa Tibah and Dawud 'Aziz, started to prepare to announce the Egyptian Communist Party. Fu'ad issued his first theoretical pamphlet in December 1949 titled "Development of Capitalism and the Struggle of the Classes in Egypt," which reviewed Egyptian capitalism and its crisis, showing the brilliant future that awaited the Egyptian working class if it measured up to its combative tasks.

The Egyptian Communist Party was established at the beginning of 1950, and its activity was distinguished by great attention to the ideological aspects. It

issued its secret monthly paper RAYAT AL-SHA'B, for which the party was known, even bearing its name. In 1953 and 1954 it also issued an underground intellectual magazine, AL-THIQAFAH AL-WATANIYAH, on whose editorial board worked Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah, Dawud 'Aziz, and Salah 'Abd-al-Sabbur.

Fu'ad Mursi took a movement name, "Khalid." He issued a number of theoretical pamphlets of which perhaps the most important were "The History of Egypt," "On Organization," and "On Muhammad Khalid's Book 'From Here We Will Begin'"--not to mention his famous analysis of the July 1952 revolution.

The Egyptian security agencies were at a loss over the identity of Khalid to the point where Karim Thabit, King Faruq's press secretary in his final days, stated in his memoirs in 1955 that Faruq believed that Taha Husayn was the secretary general of the Egyptian Communist Party, perhaps because Fu'ad Mursi had an elegant grasp of the Arabic language which was reasoned at the same time; his writing was the product of a broad French cultural training and great grasps of the Arab legacy, possessing clear enlightenment and depth.

This confusion on the party of King Faruq and his security agencies reveals the extent of the Egyptian Communist Party organization's tenacity and its concern with secrecy at a time when the Egyptian communist movement was suffering from open activities of its secret organizations.

In everyday life, Fu'ad Mursi was an instructor of economics at Alexandria University, until the end of 1958, when he was imprisoned on New Year's Eve.

Because the fragmentation of the Egyptian communist movement was one of the most conspicuous causes of its crisis, Khalid worked actively to preserve the unity of this movement. The Egyptian Communist Party united with the United Egyptian Communist Party in the summer of 1957, and these two parties then united with the Egyptian Workers' and Peasants Communist Party on 8 January 1958. Only then did the Egyptian security agencies learn who Khalid was, because the attainment of unity in the communist movement caused Egyptian communists to discuss the affairs of their union and the names of their new leaders in the coffee houses and the streets, especially during the honeymoon that dominated their relations with the Nasirist regime, which made them the prisoners of right-wing extremism, theoretically, politically and organizationally. This right-wing tendency expressed itself in a relative subservience to Nasirism and the surfacing of the secret organizations.

From early 1959 to 4 April 1964, Fu'ad Mursi remained a prisoner, going from the Citadel Prison and Abu Za'bal Prison to the prison in the oases, where he was sent for the 10 years to which a military court had sentenced him.

In prison, Fu'ad Mursi embarked on a bitter struggle against the two extremisms of the right and the left alike; these were the two tendencies that gained prominence in the ranks of the communists while Fu'ad Mursi and his comrades preserved their correct political orientation. The leftwing extremists considered that 'Abd-al-Nasir represented the right wing of the national bourgeoisie, which was allied with monopolies and oligopolies, while the rightwing orientation considered that there was a socialist group that was lurking within the Nasirist regime, headed by 'Abd-al-Nasir himself, and that there were in diverse countries of the Arab nation

equivalents of this socialist group, such as the People's Party in Aden, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the National Union of Popular Powers in Morocco. Fu'ad Mursi and his comrades held to their firm position on 'Abd-al-Nasir, viewing him as a representative of the domestic bourgeoisie.

Fu'ad Mursu did not spend his time futilely in prison; rather, he devoted himself assiduously to the book "Das Kapital," he and the comrade of his youth, Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah. No sooner had they made a translation of about half of this book than the security agencies swooped down and confiscated the original and the material that had been translated.

Fu'ad Mursi continued to give lectures on marxist theory and the political situation both. He presented a series of lectures simplifying "Das Kapital" and discredited the thinking of the "Socialist group."

When the imprisonment of the Egyptian communists dragged on, as 'Abd-al-Nasir was carrying out important progressive measures in Egyptian society, Fu'ad Mursi and some of his comrades ventured to send a letter to 'Abd-al-Nasir asking him to send their families to live with them in their abominable desert prison. The letter from Fu'ad and his friends was logical; their presence in prison was devoid of logic.

The causes of dissension between 'Abd-al-Nasir and the communists then began to disappear and he abruptly issued his historic decree releasing all the communists, including the prisoners who had not completed their prison terms. All the communist prisoners were released on medical grounds. However, a vicious struggle was waiting for them outside, for 'Abd-al-Nasir told them they had to dissolve their organizations and started to exert pressure on them, leaving most of them without work. Some communists started exerting pressures to have their organizations dissolved if 'Abd-al-Nasir would permit them to enter the Socialist Union and steer the country toward socialism.

I remember that Fu'ad Mursi told one of his comrades who was demanding the dissolution of the party: "In 1957 you asked me to unite with the United /Party/ and I agreed, because it was a step forward. You asked me to unite with the Workers' and Peasants' Party and again I agreed, because the union was again a step forward. Now you are asking me to dissolve the party, but I am refusing, because dissolution would be the equivalent of big steps backward that I cannot take."

The blunder of the dissolution of the Egyptian Communist Party then occurred in spring 1965; on top of pressures from the Nasirist regime and some party members, there were more vicious, severe pressures; most members of the party were without work and needed to be "naturalized" again, after having been absent more than 5 years from a society in which tremendous developments had occurred in the economic, social and political fields alike. Besides the long period in prison and the concomitant ideological struggles had eroded the trust among communists, as a result of which the party leaders failed to fill the party organizations for the period of a whole year, making the dissolution of the party seem like a necessary blunder.

Eight months after the dissolution of the party, Fu'ad Mursi was still without work, along with a substantial number of communists, and the Socialist Union

command, in particular 'Ali Sabri, opposed the inclusion of marxists in the union's organizations, prompting Fu'ad Mursi to ask permission to travel abroad in search of a livelihood.

When the presidential decree was issued appointing him chairman of the board of the Egypt Automobile Trading Company and he took a seat in the People's Assembly (1968-1971)--while he, and all the communists and marxists, failed to reach higher positions in the Socialist Union--our subject devoted himself assiduously to writing for the Egyptian intellectual magazines AL-KATIB and AL-TALI'AH. He also issued the two books "The Inevitability of the Socialist Solution" and "Karl Marx's Das Kapital." When 'Abd-al-Nasir departed (28 September 1970), the Nasirist left, represented by Sha'rawi Jum'ah and 'Ali Sabri basically, started coordinating with the marxists through Fu'ad Mursi, who insisted that this coordination not begin until all Egyptian communists and marxists were freed, and this happened.

The new president Anwar al-Sadat issued a decree appointing Fu'ad Mursi chairman of the board of the Industrial Bank. Our subject remained in this position until after al-Sadat succeeded in carrying out his counterrevolutionary coup in May 1971, at which time al-Sadat issued his decree, as chairman of the Socialist Union, appointing Fu'ad Mursi secretary of the National Action Charter. In January 1972 Fu'ad Mursi became minister of supply and internal trade, which he remained until March 1973, when he departed with the resignation of the entire membership of 'Aziz Sidqi's cabinet, after it had been exposed to various pressures and vexations from reactionary tendencies in al-Sadat's regime.

At that point Fu'ad Mursi stayed home and worked diligently on his important pioneering work "This Is Economic Liberalization," two printings of which have been issued so far. In it, he exposed al-Sadat's orientation, which bore the name of the policy of economic liberalization. He now has written a study on the Egyptian and Israeli economies that was consigned to the Center of Arab Unity Studies in Beirut more than a year ago; he had expected that it would be issued last summer.

Dr Fu'ad Mursi is one of the most conspicuous leaders of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party in Egypt, which includes Marxists, nationalists, Nasirists, liberals and enlightened religious persons. Mursi is also one of the most prominent leaders of the Arab enlightenment movement which calls for a coalition of marxism, nationalism, liberalism and religious tendencies. He is also one of the most prominent personalities in the Solidarity delegation to hail the emergence of FATH.

When you sit down with Fu'ad Mursi, you feel the extent of the depth of Egypts reliance on 5,000 years of civilization and culture. This encyclopedic intellectual and heroic fighting man almost embodies the culture and civilization of 'Um al-Dunya.

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NEW LAW FOR EGYPTIAN BAR UNDER STUDY

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 23 Oct 81 p 12

[Text] Dr Jamal al-'Utayfi, head of the Egyptian Bar Association, stated that he brought with him [the texts of] laws and codes of conduct for the legal professions in England, America and France. This is in order to benefit from them in drafting the new lawyers' law. Dr al-'Utayfi had visited the three states during a trip for [medical] treatment which was immediately cut short following the death of President al-Sadat. During the trip he made a number of contacts with the heads of bar associations and legal associations there in order to strengthen cooperation with the Egyptian Bar and to acquaint himself with bar associations' rules, regulations and laws which might benefit Egypt.

CSO: 4504/59

BRIEFS

SHAYKH KISHK TAPES--Yesterday 13 of Shaykh Kishk's tapes were confiscated because a censor's permit had not been received from the noble al-Azhar or the Department of Censorship of Artistic Works, in accordance with the law. In addition, 60,000 tapes were seized that violated terms for artistic works. Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, the deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, assigned tax, duties and artistic works investigators to make continuous raids on companies and shops committing violations of Law 354 for 1954 protecting authorship rights. Yesterday, in a raid in which Col Ahmad Halawan, Col Nabil 'Abdallah, Lt Col Taha 'Abd-al-Latif, Lt Col Sulayman Anwar and Maj Baha' Abu Talib took part, under the supervision of Maj Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, director of the department, an investigation was made of the Najmat al-'Atabah Company and its annexes, owned by Muhammad 'Azzuz, after permission was issued by Muhammad al-Fiqi, director of the public prosecutor's office in al-Muski. Thirteen tape cassettes of Shaykh Kishk's were discovered that had no censor's permits from the noble al-Azhar, and about 60,000 tapes were seized that had been copied in violation of the conditions on artistic works. /Text/ /Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 1/ 11887

CSO: 4504/24

OFFICIAL SOURCE DISCUSSES 'U.S. PLOTS IN BLACK CONTINENT'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 28 Sep 81 p 12

[Text] The epoch of colonial policies on the African continent has passed, and neo-colonialism's methods are condemned to decline due to the growth of awareness and the struggles of the oppressed nations of this region. However, world imperialism, led by the criminal United States, is still involved in two ways in crushing liberation movements on the African continent and obtaining channels of influences in order to continue plundering the continent's natural resources and exploiting the African people. One of these ways is the equipping of puppet regimes, such as the racist government of South Africa, and persuading them to agress against other countries, such as Angola; the other way is the dispatch of intelligence and espionage groups in order to overthrow national and independent governments.

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), which must be called the step-brother of the U.S. intelligence and espionage organization, the CIA, has the mission of obtaining cultural information and preparing the ground for imperialist coup d'etat's in Africa. However, the nature of this agency is so hateful that even U.S. government academics evade cooperating with it. The following report which was printed in the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR indicates the desperate efforts of the DIA to renew its power over Africa, and also testifies to the fact that these shortsighted efforts have no effect in an age of national awakening, the appearance and growth of liberation movements and revolutions, and the epoch of imperialism's sunset.

One of the government's intelligence establishments, renouncing the great keenness it has usually shown for secrecy, is trying to establish relations with a university which has founded special departments concerning the politics, problems and peoples of Africa.

These efforts have stirred up violent criticism from a group of university scholars, since they fear they will lose their credibility by being charged with "cooperation with the government," and also jeopardize their commitments to university research.

According to information received, the DIA has decided to pay $500,000 to each center that will show cooperation in raising the knowledge and awareness of "intelligence analysts."

African affairs experts have not condemned the DIA's proposal out of hostility or spite. They are convinced that these kinds of links will distort the university's goals in the African studies field. They say: African leaders still react dubiously and suspiciously to the "covert gathering of intelligence" in their countries, and if they become aware of the existence of links between educational institutions and espionage centers, it is possible that they will close their borders to U.S. researchers.

Following the investigations that were made of African studies centers at important U.S. universities, it became clear that not one of them, either officially or unofficially, had submitted to cooperation with the DIA.

One of the country's most outstanding experts, who wished to keep his identity a secret, said: "Any kind of connection with the DIA is exposed to doubt and suspicion."

Study of Conditions in Several Critical Countries

The DIA, which was founded in 1971 in order to unify the intelligence efforts of the Defense Department, wishes to send a group of its analysts to an "accredited African studies center" for training in African languages and basic study of conditions in "several critical countries."

One source in the program of "Studies relating to African affairs" at Indiana University pointed out that DIA has a special interest in being informed about three regions, South Africa, the Horn of Africa and Nigeria. According to reports received, the DIA has established the learning of Amharic, the official language of Ethiopia, and Hausa, a language common in northern Nigeria and other west African countries, in its educational program for analysts.

Walter Langanger, acting chief of education for DIA, "inspected" the program of studies related to African affairs at Indiana University last June in order to encourage the university to accept DIA's proposal. Information received documents that he openly and honestly proposed a relationship between DIA and the university during this visit!

During a telephone interview, Langanger denied DIA's determination to conclude a formal contract with African affairs centers. He claimed that he is trying to convince scholars to place themselves at these centers' disposal in order to conduct necessary research.

The African affairs studies program pursued at Indiana University is one of the largest and most extensive programs in the United States. According to statements of a university spokesman, officials explicitly and frankly rejected any kind of connection with DIA.

Members of Indiana University, like their colleagues in other centers investigating African affairs, are worried that their academic integrity will be greatly damaged through a connection with the DIA.

In the opinion of one university source: "From the university's point of view, even the appearance of such a connection is extremely dangerous, and probably there

is no place for such a proposal in an African studies-related program" Centers which were contacted by the MONITOR said that if a contract of cooperation were to be signed with the DIA, their methods of communication and information exchange with African scholars would be impaired.

A student who wished to remain unidentified stated in a critical tone: "Not one of us will obtain a travel visa to African countries in order to carry out our legal research."

Africa Remembers the CIA's Plots

The DIA is completely known in Africa, and the people of the black continent view all the U.S. intelligence organizations with cynicism and suspicion. Africans have not forgotten the plot to kill Patrice Lumumba, prime minister of the Congo, which was planned by the CIA, and have not erased the memory of that organization's role in the overthrow of Kwami Nkrumah, the Nigerian strongman.

In addition, a number of African affairs experts have doubts about the DIA's honesty. DIA analysts definitely need to travel to African countries being studied during their training period at the university. In the view of university members, it is possible that these analysts will also gather intelligence while continuing their research.

One student at the most famous African studies program says: "That which frightens me is that perhaps (!) DIA intends (by attracting cooperation from a university) to obtain a ready and waiting justification for the covert gathering of intelligence from Africa."

Langanger terms any probability of DIA's abuse of its connection with a university as "absurd and meaningless," and says: "Cooperation will take place on the basis of mutual trust."

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks in their book entitled "The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence" write: "Although the DIA is considered almost a rival of the CIA, other than guiding the public system of military attaches appointed to work in U.S. embassies overseas, it intervenes less than the CIA in intelligence gathering."

Brand of Espionage on Academics' Foreheads

A great many African affairs specialists believe that if one of their colleagues accepts DIA's proposal, the reputation of all African scholars will be stained. In this connection, one scholar, while pointing to the fact that in the third world people still consider U.S. travelers to be CIA spies, states that "in that case all of us would be branded as spies."

Another person knowledgable about African affairs adds that the establishment of a connection with the DIA by any center involved in African issues will disturb all U.S. African affairs experts. However, it is possible that DIA's proposal will be attractive to a center facing financial difficulties. According to what one African experts informed about the details of DIA's proposal says, DIA is ready to pay the expenses of university research and the tuition of outstanding students,

and to supply on credit the costs of language-training books. In addition to this Langanger has announced that all the material that will be furnished by the university to DIA can be printed and published, and that no restrictions will be applied in this matter. These temptations did not seduce Michigan State University and its African affairs department. In a speech the university president, David Wiley, denied any kind of connection with domestic and foreign espionage organizations, whether in the past or the present.

Based on his contacts with other African studies centers in the country, Wiley believes that no centers in the United States have accepted either financial help or the DIA's and other intelligence organization's proposals.

Reagan's View of Africa

The disinclination of centers investigating African issues to cooperate with the DIA seems to have ironical twists and turns. A large number of U.S. scholars believe that the Reagan administration, like former U.S. governments, looks at Africa from the angle of competition between east and west, and disregards its political, social and economic complications.

Although it is possible that the DIA really needs awareness of African issues, in the view of one reputable U.S. African expert, it has chosen a very naive way to establish connections with African study centers. The aforementioned African specialist declared that DIA's method of contact with universities was ill-considered and inexperienced!

Langanger is evidently unaware of the wave of sharp criticism which has risen in the wake of DIA's proposal. He says: "More than half of the African specialist centers had a positive way of thinking. Universities know that their moral (!) duty is to make their learning available to others, and this is a good sign to me." (Quoted from: The Foreign Press Study Bulletin of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance)

9557
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DEBATE CONTINUES OVER THREAT FROM PRO-MOSCOW TUDEH

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Oct 81 pp 8-10

[Text] Iranian politicians in exile continue to warn of the increasing threat of Soviet domination of Iran resulting from the pro-Moscow communist Tudeh party's steady infiltration of the administration in the Islamic republic. Latest to return to the theme is Hushang Nahavandi, a former minister under the late Shah.

Nahavandi, who escaped from Iran to be active with the opposition in exile, says in a booklet published by the French Institute of International Relations that the present Soviet policy appears to be supportive of the Islamic republic in the knowledge that its weakness and the anarchy at present widespread in Iran serves the short, middle and long-term interests of the Soviet Union.

The Tudeh party clings to Soviet policy and is the "transmission shaft" for Soviet influence in the mullahs' regime, he says.

"The Soviet Union and its allies have succeeded in replacing the West in many areas of economic and cultural life...in the media and in some heavy industries like oil and petrochemicals which are all under the control of Soviet agents now," he writes.

According to Nahavandi most of the former Tudeh members who had left the party during the years when it failed to achieve any significant role in Iran have now rejoined it. But so far it had failed to restore its previous penetration among the working class. Thus its policy now was to support the Islamic fundamentalists while it concentrated on trying to expand its penetration as deep as possible.

The Tudeh, Nahavandi says, effectively bars any union of the forces of the left and similarly it will not cooperate with moderate opponents of the regime. Its main aim is to prevent any anti-Soviet regime being given a chance to come to power, while at the same time working to encourage the disintegration of the present regime.

With the help of others like the Palestinians it was hoping to make Iran a centre for the destabilisation of pro-Western governments in the region.

Iranian observers in general feel Western assessments of Tudeh's present role fail to appreciate the significance of the party activists' infiltration of key administrative and media posts, and the influence that the more sophisticated party members have in a situation where practical brains are few and far between in governmental affairs.

In a recent article in the Washington-based International Affairs, a leading commentator on Soviet foreign policy Alvin Z. Rubinstein wrote, "The Tudeh has no doubt infiltrated government ministries, the media and social institutions...But Tudeh is not now a critical factor in Iran's internal factional struggles; it seems content to watch the collapse of president Bani-Sadr, an open and bitter opponent, and with him the prospects for moderate, centrist, democratically oriented groups; and it awaits the next stage in the dialectical development of the revolution, whose polarisation the communists believe will enhance their political fortunes."

The Tudeh is active, well-organised and capable of providing tactical leadership but its present aim is more to sustain anti-Americanism and prevent an opening to the West than to seize power, Rubinstein says. This echoed the sentiments of its Moscow masters. "As Brezhnev noted on Feb 23, 1981, in his report to the 26th congress of the CPSU, the most salient consideration shaping Soviet policy toward Iran is Tehran's anti-American and anti-Western orientation," Rubinstein says.

Rubinstein continues that Khomeini's seeming indulgence for the orthodox communists can be explained by a number of considerations; their support for him when he was in exile, at which time they regularly broadcast his declarations recorded in Iraq over Radio Iran Courier, operating out of East Germany, their strident and invidious anti-Americanism; their acceptance of the Islamic republic; their link to the Soviet Union, for whom he feels ideological antipathy but whose open antagonism he prefers not to trigger; their relative weakness among the leftists, which made it easier to isolate them from other radical groups and enlist their cooperation--witness the Tudeh's acquiescence to Khomeini's decision in early 1980 to close Tehran University, which was traditionally a recruiting ground for communists; and finally, their lack of power, for unlike the other radical groups, Tudeh maintains no armed military wing which could frighten the regime.

Rubinstein thinks that the containment of the communists is a secondary concern compared to the ethnic strife that has compounded the military ineffectiveness of the government since the Iraqi invasion. Moscow watches the growing assertiveness of Iran's leading ethnic minorities but refrains from encouraging separatism as it did in 1945-46, when it established puppet Kurdish and Azerbaijanian republics in the areas of northern Iran controlled by the Red Army.

"The Soviet government officially denies involvement in the Kurdish uprising that has been going on since the summer of 1979, or in any of the other outbreaks of ethnic unrest, but its insistence that it follows a policy of non-involvement is difficult to accept, given Moscow's historic interest in dominating northern Iran," Rubinstein writes. "The Soviet Union maintains a close watch on events and media coverage of them is extensive.

"No doubt Iran's ethnic cauldron would be simmering even if there were no Soviet inputs. Weakness at the centre has traditionally emboldened autonomist and separatist ambitions among the minorities on the periphery of the Iranian empire. And it is also true that if it chose, the Soviet Union could trigger a civil war by shipping large amounts of arms to insurgent groups. That it has not yet done so suggests a desire to preserve a united Iran, at least for the time being. If, as seems likely, modest amounts of arms are being sent covertly, to Kurdistan for example, the purpose may be more to warn the government than to topple it.

"Of all the Iranian minorities, the Kurds are portrayed the most sympathetically by Soviet writers who deplore the 'artificial separation' of Kurds living in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, and the hindering of their aspirations for freedom and independence. Moscow criticised the Islamic Council that met in Tehran on August 21, 1979, for banning the Kurdish Democratic Party, which has had close ties with the Tudeh; and it re-established links with the Peshmerga, the forces formerly led by Mustafa Barzani, Kurdish leader who fought the Iraqi Baathists for many years in a vain attempt to compel Kurdish autonomy. The government in Tehran, unable to maintain effective military control of Kurdistan and unwilling to grant an autonomy acceptable to the Kurds, maintains an uneasy presence, combatting Iraqi efforts to encourage rebellion and endeavouring to discourage greater Soviet interference.

"Tehran also has reason to be concerned over the situation in Azerbaijan, where the Muslim People's Republican Party of Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, the spiritual head of Iran's Turkic-speaking Azerbaijani minority, has been outlawed by Khomeini. Shariatmadari's acceptance of genteel house detention in Qom has defused the problem, but only temporarily: Khomeini's unwillingness to consider some type of federalism as a solution to the ethnic unrest, when coupled with the widespread sectarian violence, could exacerbate Iran's political disintegration and tempt Moscow to a more venturesome course."

Rubinstein comes to the conclusion that Soviet influence on the policies of the Khomeini regime has been minimal. With the exception of the restoration of the Tudeh's rights to engage in political activity, following the brief crackdown on it in late summer of 1979, on no issue of consequence--political, economic, or diplomatic--has Iran shifted to a position more congenial to the Soviet Union out of an interest in placating its powerful neighbour, even though Iran is now weaker and more vulnerable than at any time since the turn of the century, he says. In a situation of enormous complexity and unpredictability, the Kremlin's restraint is linked to its anticipation that the collapse of Khomeini's Shi'ite millenarianism could well bring communism to Iran, and its wish not to provoke the United States by further Soviet expansion in the area.

"With the worsening of Iran's internal condition, Moscow seems wedded to a watch-and-wait attitude, satisfied to see the hardline Islamic fundamentalists, operating through the Islamic Republican Party, humble the moderates of the Centre. Even though the mullahs are anti-communist, their dissemination of a virulent anti-Americanism makes them natural allies of the Soviet-dominated Tudeh Party," Rubinstein wrote.

"Moscow observed with pleasure as Prime Minister Rajai, the IRP's leading spokesman in the government, disposed of the nettling Ghotbzadeh in September 1980 and mounted a campaign that whittled down the prestige and power of President Bani-Sadr. In June 1981, eighteen months after having been elected by an overwhelming majority of the electorate; Bani-Sadr lost Khomeini's support and was hounded from office, a victim of religious fanaticism and the men around Khomeini whose vision of an 'Islamic Republic' smacks of the Inquisition and whose Shi'ite-first outlook sculpted the constitution that was ratified in a national referendum held on December 2-3, 1979. The removal of Bani-Sadr and men like him, known for their secular and pro-Western outlook, strengthens the counsels of patience and prudence in the Kremlin.

"Viewed in the perspective of the brief period since Khomeini came to power, the upheaval in Iran, unfinished and erratic, promises to bring yet additional advantages to the Soviet Union, whose proximity, power, and compliant proxy in the Tudeh Party seems an irresistible formula for future political gains. But for the moment, Moscow is very much an outsider in Tehran."

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IRAN-IRAQ WAR ANNIVERSARY LAUDED AS 'HEROIC RESISTANCE'

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Sep 81 pp 1, 10

[Text] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Now exactly one year has passed since Saddam's aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and one year of a revolutionary and uprisen nation's struggle against a tyrannical and mercenary regime. A year in which our revolution and uncompromising nation reached a higher temper in the oven of war and continued conflict with the infidel, and displayed its praiseworthy devotion and self-sacrifice.

Along the way, although for a time there was fear that the resistance and continuity of this revolution would become fragile, flabby and deviant due to several positions being held by compromisers and the West's stooges, it became as hard as steel. Its stabilization preserved it from damage in the face of all calamities, and it is now continuing its pride-inspiring path. Those things which befell our nation during one year of war were in turn the greatest calamities and hardships that a nation and revolution can endure and still remain standing. At the same time, this year is an indicator of the will and staunchness of a nation in trying to achieve its aims and goals. Perhaps in history no revolutions and nations can be found which were confronted with all these calamities at one time, and yet ultimately continued their path more determinedly and proudly than before without any dimunition.

On the anniversary of one year of truth's relentless struggle against falseness, it is appropriate to review the resistance of our awakened nation in order to pay an insignificant portion of our debt to its history-making will.

Saddam's imposed war began at a time when deposed Bani-Sadr was pursuing his political games in order to expel the imam's line and the fundamentalist clergy from the political scene. Bani-Sadr had been given the mission of overthrowing the Islamic Republic by the imperialists. While Saddam's army was butchering our deprived and innocent brothers and sisters in Qasr-e Shirin and the villages in the country's western region, Bani-Sadr, in Shohada Square on the anniversary of the epic 8 September, was provoking the people against the judicial and legislative powers and the true ideological government that was in the process of formation, instead of mobilizing them to confront the imminent war. While he was turning the sharp point of his attacks against the best children of this nation, the Islamic Republic's army and our armed forces were fixed in the very worst conditions. The army during this period lacked the necessary harmony and power for battle formation due to a lack of regular exercise and maneuvers, and its equipment was mainly in

need of repair and inspection due to a lack of use. Our military formations on the border points were the weakest formations that an army could have. Against 14 Iraqi divisions, the greatest portion of which was positioned on the border points, we had only 4 divisions, and those were without sufficient command, equipment or harmony.

On the one hand, war was near, and on the other the United States was thinking about preparations for an international battle in its search for an excuse to aggress against Iran so that perhaps the 52 hostages of the Moslem Student Followers of the Imam's Line could be freed. Side by side with this were the waves breaking from the Bani-Sadr incident. Although he was very insistent that with repulsive pomposity he should everywhere be called commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he repetitively peddled his baseless speech from city to city on 8 September 1980.

Now, after the passage of a year, it is easy to understand which role in which extensive and calculated plot against the Islamic republic the deposed Bani-Sadr was performing when he began his attack against all the achievements of the blood of martyrs by his riot-inciting in Shohada Square. While he was threatening to reveal names and promising punishment and reward, his and Saddam's masters had come to their final decision-making. His masters were sitting behind their work-desks in Washington and London and...and were enthusiastically applauding him. It was by Bani-Sadr's words that Saddam understood that the imperialists and their helpers had given him the green light for an attack on Iran. Saddam understood that tomorrow, the day of attack, all the imperialist media would call Iraq's action justified, and not only would not condemn the aggression, but the prevalent atmosphere would become such that everyone would praise him. He saw the delusion of his domination over the Arabs achieved with this war, and he was certain that all the aged shieks would be pushed aside, along with their traditional Arab headdress, and that they would prostrate themselves before him. Yes, Saddam in his own reckoning had arrived at the conclusion that the Iranian army did not have the power to confront and resist him, and that by the time they had gotten themselves in shape, it would be too late. The superpowers and their helpers were also supporting him directly and indirectly. Bani-Sadr as well was acquainted with his servant's duties.

It was on the basis of such a reckoning that Saddam fantasized that in the course of seven days Iran would be finished, and that he would achieve all his hopes and desires. Thus he issued the order to attack.

Saddam, who himself is the successor to a government that came to power by a coup d'etat, and who has built his government by relying on a family and his mercenary army, had neglected one factor in his calculation. He did not know the level of resistance of a nation that had risen up, a nation that believed in and relied on Islam.

On 22 September 1980 he did not know what "tomorrow" of epics was waiting. He did not know that the arabs of Khuzestan, molotov cocktail in hand, were waiting for the Iraqi tanks, and were shouting: "Oh mercenaries, where are you?" When both the young and old of this nation went to welcome the nine-meter rockets with clenched fists, determined to show the world how blood would triumph over the sword, Saddam must have fallen back to thinking of his own survival. But then there was no path of retreat.

He must have understood that instant that a long and agonizing death was lying in ambush for him on his path through a nearby defile.

It is now one year that has passed in our nation's glorious battle against the aggression of Iraq and imperialism. A year has passed and Islamic Iran is standing in resistance in order to prove the rightfulness of Islam and to become the standard-bearer of a struggle whose soldiers have taken aim against tyranny across the globe. Now that one year has passed, let the world know that even if this war lasts twenty years, we have resisted and have triumphed. There is absolutely no doubt about it.

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BANKI REVEALS PROGRAM OF SUPREME ECONOMIC COUNCIL

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Oct 81 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN (Pars) -- The Minister of State and head of the Plan and Budget Organization, Mohammad Taqi Banki recently attended in an exclusive interview with Persian daily Ettela'at and talked about the general duties of the Supreme Economic Council, members of this council; proposals, submitted to the council and its future policy, evaluation of different stages of the 1361-budget and existing bottlenecks for this issue.

Concerning the members of the Supreme Economic Council, Banki stated that "according to the regulations of the Plan and Budget Organization, the Supreme Economic Council is the highest positioned decision making body in regard to the economical affairs of the country, hence it has wide range responsibilities.

"This council, headed by the Prime Minister, consists of the ministers of Financial Affairs and Economic, Labor and Social Welfare, Agriculture, Mines and Industries, Commerce, Oil as well as the head of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI). and the Head of the Plan and Budget Organization who is in fact the chairman of the council".

When asked to outline the duties of the council, Banki replied "taking into account the heavy responsibility of the council, the general duties of the council can be classified as follows: specifications of general objectives of the development plans of the country; consideration of the social and economical policies for debating the plans in the cabinet sessions, commenting on the development projects for evaluation in the cabinet sessions; specification of policies for regulation of budget; evaluation of the general budget for cabinet; review; making decisions concerning plans for the implementation of plans which the executive bodies find obstructed; approval of principles, policies and regulations, related to allocating of loans from the treasury of the Development Financial Aids to the state institutions, companies, municipalities and other public sectors according to the decision of Financial Affairs and Economic Ministry and the Plan and Budget Organization, ratification of principles, policies and regulations related to allocation of loans and foreign credits which are to be suggested and regulated by a committee comprising the representatives of the Ministries of Financial Affairs, Plan and Budget Organization and the CBI and consideration and commenting on the regulations and procedures, related to the implementation of the regulations of 5-year development projects planned by the Plan and Budget Organization."

In response to the question concerning the capacity of the Supreme Economic Council in the execution of its duties and its effects on the trend of the economical system of the country, he stated that

"the council is the most prominent factor which effects the trend of the economical system of the country. The aim behind the establishment of the council was to review and evaluate plans before they are submitted to the government or discussed by the Islamic Consultative Council (Majlis)".

Dr. Banki was asked about the proposals suggested to the Council and how far did it agree to the said. He replied "we offered the council a framework for its function which is based on four clauses.

1- The Council should review the plans submitted for its approval on the basis of the economic principles specified in the Islamic Constitution.

3- The structure of the economical policy of the country should be determined by the council.

3- Specification of the objectives and economical development of the country. For instance the Council is subjected to determining whether the economic development should be made in the agriculture or industrial sector.

4- Specification of general policies and development of different concerned offices.

Later Dr. Banki, concerning the 1361-budget, declared that "simultaneous with the [illegible] of economical affairs of the country, the budget of this year is under a very close scrutiny and is taking most of the time of the council. At present, we have studied the different aspects which have also been ratified but the priorities of the budget, will be announced in the near future.

He continued "the council has agreed with the classification of the budget and if reviewed in accordance to the classification, it may be submitted to the Majlis sooner than Bahman 5th".

Then he focused on the trip to Czechoslovakia by an Iranian delegation and said that "in connection with economical affairs of the country, a delegation was dispatched to that country and we hope for a favorable result out of this visit".

At the end of his interview, the State Minister talked about the existing bottle-necks in regulating of the budget of 1361, saying that "generally, the structure and the texture of our administrative offices are not in a sound condition and in the most cases they plunder the wealth of the people. They are considered as one of the counterrevolutionary factors which must be discovered and be removed from our economical system. We have no other problem and to remove these bottlenecks we need time and devotion".

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SPLIT AMONG CLERGY, REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS SEEN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Oct 81 pp 1-3

[Article: "Mullah-Revolutionary Guards Rift Crucial Threat to Regime"]

[Text] Is a power vacuum steadily opening up in Iran? The question was being asked among Iranian expatriates this week as signs appeared of large-scale disaffection among the revolutionary guards, which have been the principal prop of the Khomeini regime, and Khomeini also launched what seemed to be a final desperate move to silence his clerical opposition for good by changing the centuries-old power structure of the Shi'ite system.

The failure of the guards to deal as brutally as the fundamentalist mullahs required with protesting youngsters from the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and other leftist groups during recent street violence, together with the continuing toll of Khomeini-camp clerics up and down the country, has brought about a crisis which threatens the future of the regime.

Addressing a deputation of revolutionary guards and their commander at his residence Ayatollah Khomeini cautioned them against a rift between the revolutionary guards and the clergymen as well as against divisions among the guards themselves. He also told them to treat the people kindly and identify vicious elements within their ranks and report them to their superiors.

Finally, Khomeini said that the Commander of the Revolutionary Guards Mohsen Rezai, who was present at the meeting, should contact the office of Ayatollah Montazeri to arrange for a mechanism to heal the rift between the guards and the clerics Khomeini said: ..."The whole of Iran is a big political organ. When counter-revolutionaries and foreigners saw that they could not penetrate your unity with an armed attack, they took action by trying to influence you so that you would rot from within.

"Today the honour of the revolutionary guards is a must for everyone especially yourselves. You must try to establish conformity of ideas between the guards and the Imam Jomehs (of different towns). The difference of opinion between the Imam Jomehs and the guards is no ordinary thing and some people are doing this to weaken the guards and the religious leaders. They are doing this in a very special way. You must send people to the towns to see that if differences between guards and leaders exist, how they can be overcome. Your training is very important and you must pay attention that the people chosen for this are quite known, otherwise we might be confronted with prejudice. You must pay attention that Islam is the same

Islam that religious leaders have preserved since the beginning of Islam. That is, try not to separate your Islam from that of the religious leaders.

"The other problem is the export of our revolution. I have often said that we do not want to fight with anyone. Today our revolution has been exported. Everywhere there is the name of Islam and the oppressed have their eyes on Islam. We must introduce Islam with correct propaganda. When the nations recognize Islam they will undoubtedly accept it and we want nothing except the victory of Islamic laws in the world. I advise you to keep your respect and honour among the people. You young people tend to be rough, you must tone down your tempers so that you do not commit acts against the general direction of policies laid down for the guards. For a closer relation between guards and the religious leaders ask Mr Montazeri for assistance. He is in Qom. Publicise for the sake of God..."

Clearly there is a serious quarrel between some of the mullahs of the Khomeini camp and the so-called revolutionary institutions, especially the revolutionary guards. The regime has tried for a long time to hush it up; but the quarrel has now, it, seems, got out of hand. So Khomeini has been forced to intervene personally and appoint his heir-apparent, Montazeri, to mediate between the quarrelling factions.

Sources inside Iran have been aware of sharp exchanges between local commanders of guards and the Friday prayer leaders in a number of towns, including Shiraz, Isfahan and Rasht, on the Caspian Sea. In Shiraz, sources inside Iran have told IPS, two senior members of the revolutionary guards recently kept Ayatollah Dastghaib under house arrest, apparently with the full cooperation of Dastghaib's own personal body-guards.

Dastghaib is Khomeini's personal representative in Shiraz and also leads Friday prayers. He remained under house arrest for several days before Mohsen Rezai flew to Shiraz to negotiate his release. Reportedly, he was forced to pay a large sum of money to his captors to buy his release. Understandably, the incident was hushed up.

In Isfahan, the chief cleric, Ayatollah Khademi, who is a close associate of Khomeini, has had to form a bodyguard of his own armed relatives because he does not trust guards assigned to him by the local committee. He has become a target for assassination by the guards; several months ago he fled the city, fearing for his life. He returned to Isfahan after receiving Khomeini's personal assurances for his safety.

In Rasht, Khomeini's representative, Ayatollah Ehsan Bakhshi, escaped an attempt on his life recently. The clergy-controlled media blamed the Mojahedin. But well-informed sources said there was a shoot-out between his personal bodyguards and revolutionary guards.

The main cause of friction between the Khomeini-appointed mullahs and the revolutionary corpsmen is the fact that the mullahs keep most of the booty they receive from convicted persons seeking clemency, or from other sources, for themselves. The guards argue that they should get the lion's share of the booty because they endanger their lives. These mullahs who act as Khomeini's personal representatives have access to enormous amounts of money, including allocations from the National Budget, for which they do not have to provide records of how it has been spent.

They also take possession of houses, valuables, money and other property confiscated from ordinary citizens who are unfortunate enough to be branded as enemies of Islam. All the confiscated goods are regarded as "war booty," which must be divided between the "warriors" and the Caliph or "Imam." It is differences arising from division of the booty which often causes quarrels among the mullahs, guards, and staff of the revolutionary committees and courts.

The mercenary zeal of the guards has often been such that, as on one occasion during the summer of 1980, the recently assassinated revolutionary prosecutor-general Ali Qodussi complained in a live television interview that the guards only reported for duty when there was an order for confiscation of somebody's house or valuables.

During the first month of the war with Iraq some of the guards did, however, show exceptional bravery in combat. But they soon left the real fighting to the professional soldiers and returned to their original task of acting as members of the internal security force for the regime or bodyguards for mullahs.

In his speech Khomeini also said that the guardsmen must show kindness to people. He was replying to widespread charges of atrocities committed by the guards, who enter people's houses at will and confiscate valuables, stop motorists for questioning or searches of their vehicles, and resort to extortion from shopkeepers.

Khomeini and his comrades-in-arms were hoping to strengthen the powers of the revolutionary guards to such an extent that they might eventually take the place of the regular army. They had plans on paper to set up armoured divisions and even an air force attached to the revolutionary corps. But in practice, the corps remain a collection of private armies gathered around various mullahs or warlords. Hanging judge Sadegh Khalkhali, for example, has one of the strongest bands of revolutionary guards. These are very much dedicated to their chief because he lets them loot the "counter-revolutionaries" at will.

Revolutionary guards are paid between 30,000 and 50,000 rials ($400 to $700 at the official rate) per month. Their salary is thus higher than junior officers in the army. The mullahs have never given an exact figure of how many revolutionary guards are in service. Independent estimates vary from a peak of 80,000 to a low of 30,000. Since their inception about 5,000 of them have been killed, the majority in the war with Iraq.

One important factor in the growing rift between the guards and their extremist bosses is the spreading awareness among the guards that they no longer enjoy any great esteem in the public's mind. The torture and other mishandling of prisoners in the jails, brutality in the streets and the confiscating and stealing of property are all blamed on them, and there is an, albeit naive, tendency among them now to blame the mullahs for driving them to what are now seen as unreasonable lengths in their treatment of the public.

"The name pasdar (revolutionary guard) has developed much of the same opprobrium to Iranians as that of SAVAK did in the Shah's time," one Iranian told IPS. "After the hate that was whipped up against SAVAK it's perhaps no wonder the guards are beginning to worry about their image."

While the guards' loss of prestige must concern Khomeini if, in fact, he did see them as the future single state security arm, for Montazeri, who has to purge unreliable elements, there must be a personal relish in the opportunity he is given to clamp down on Mojahedin sympathisers. For he has blamed the Mojahedin for the bomb blast at the IRP headquarters in which his own son, Mohammad (Ringo) Montazeri, died and he has a score to settle.

The fact that Mojahedin sympathisers exist among the pasdars or have deliberately infiltrated them is demonstrated by the photographs, pieces of film and other evidence smuggled from prisons in Iran and sent out to opposition groups in Europe. The Mojahedin-e-Khalq magazine, Mojahed, also recently recounted the story of Kazem Afjehi, who, it said, had infiltrated the guards at Evin prison and helped get rid of a notorious guard named Kuchui.

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MOVE TO CENTRALIZE DECISION MAKING IN MAJLIS EXAMINED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Oct 81 pp 4-6

[Text] An exchange of letters between Majlis speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khomeini (see IPS issues Nos 42 and 43) in which Khomeini delegated his powers as "Faghih" (all powerful spiritual leader) to the Majlis, has now created a great deal of anxiety among theologians, even those who have until now supported Khomeini and his brand of Islamic government.

When the letters were published by the media in Tehran on Oct 11, many people were baffled by their ambiguity. A number of observers realised that Khomeini and his henchmen were up to something devious, but they did not know what. Now they see that the whole scenario was concocted by Khomeini and his gang members to basically change the whole system of Shia jurisprudence--a system which has evolved through centuries of experience and profound deliberations.

During the past week or so, the media in Tehran have carried letters and cables by "clergymen" in the provinces supporting the move to authorise the Majlis to decide on "secondary matters of Islamic jurisprudence." These letters of support are signed by hardline clergymen sent by Khomeini to provincial centres as his representatives. They are Khomeini's own gang members, and are not regarded as independent, senior theologians. But the operation is designed to give credibility to a well-planned move to centralise the decision-making process in theological matters at the Majlis.

This will mark a departure from the established Shi'ite tradition which opposes centralisation of the "church." According to Shi'ite traditions, the faithful are either personally well-versed in theological matters, in which case they would follow their own understanding of the rules on "secondary matters," or they need guidance. Those who need guidance are free to choose a senior theologian from among the ulema. The senior theologians make rulings on "secondary matters," the idea being that primary matters are well defined and unchanged.

Secondary matters usually concern adaptation of newly developed social phenomena on basic religious matters. For instance, the invention of radio was a new development; those among the faithful who were in doubt as to whether it was proper to buy a set or not sought guidance from the theologians of their choice. Others who had no doubt acted on their own understanding.

Primary matters are rulings based on Qoranic instructions as well as sunnat, hadith and khabar, which were accepted by the bulk of the ulema before the "gates of innovation" were closed in the 9th century A.D. Since then the Sunnite Muslims have effectively disqualified their caliphs from enjoying the qualifications of being infallible. Thus, the caliphs, who were theoretically successors to the Prophet, were barred from making any kind of religious rules. They were authorised to sit in consultation with the ulema to engage in interpretation of holy texts and sunnat to guide the faithful on new develoments. Such sittings constituted a religious concensus known as "Ijma." But members of Ijma were barred from any kind of "Ijtihad," for fear of heresy. They were, therefore, required to find an analogy in the sunnat whenever they made a new ruling. This was known as "Qiyas." Thus, since the 9th century A.D. (2nd century A.H.) the science of "Usul" was based on the Qoran, Sunnat, Ijma and Qiyas. Qiyas had thus replaced Ijtihad; in other words, the door for Ijithad was closed to Sunni Muslims. Attempts to revive the practice of Ijtihad in the late 19th century in Egypt and Turkey met with failure.

The Shi'ite "church" originally accepted the four principal elements of Usul; namely, Qoran, Sunnat, Ijma and Ijtihad. But they parted ways when the Sunnis decided to replace Ijtihad by Qiyas. Instead, the Shias ruled that the fourth element should be the individual's right to use his wisdom, or Aql.

Thus, the Shias introduced a great measure of individual liberty on religious rulings. This was particularly vital to the survival of the faith, whose adherents were dispersed all over the then known world under varying natural, political and social conditions.

Thanks to this liberty, the Shi'ite establishment maintained its vitality throughout the centuries and developed into a decentralised and yet coherent entity. And the Shi'ite theologians managed to remain above day-to-day politics, reserving to themselves the privilege of being the authority of the last resort. It was this characteristic which allowed the Shi'ite establishment to live in peace with the strong waves of modernism and secularism which swept Iran at the turn of the century, culminating in the Constitutional Revolution of 1906.

One theologian who tried to oppose the constitutional movement, Shaikh Fazlollah Noori, was arrested in 1906 and hanged after being found guilt of "corruption on earth" the following year--the only instance before the Khomeini era of such a sentence being passed.

Noori (then the title of Ayatollah was not yet coined) is now hailed as a hero by the Khomeini regime and his grandson, Noureddin Kia-Noori, is the First Secretary of the Moscow-backed Tudeh party.

Now Khomeini has decided to do away with the time-honoured Shia tradition of decentralisation and individual liberty to use wisdom by giving the Majlis the sole right to rule on secondary matters of faith. This must pose a great danger to the established faith.

If Khomeini succeeds in this project, he will be able to put an end to the tradition of individual liberty to choose Marja Taghlid--that is, individual Shias will be barred from choosing a theologian of their own choice to follow. They will be

required to follow the rulings of the Majlis not only on political matters but on matters of faith. This is contrary to principles of the faith which stipulate there is no coercion in faith.

Many Iranians now fear that through this scheme Khomeini and his henchmen will be able to introduce Marxist ideas and practices beneath a religious cover. This is a genuine fear because the Khomeini clique dominating the Majlis are either themselves deeply affected by Marxism or are opportunists who often try to be more radical than their arch enemies, the Mojahedin.

Leaflets distributed in Tehran last week accused Khomeini of destroying the last bastion against communism which is the Shi-ite "church."

"By deceit, treacher and genocide, you inflicted heavy blows to the institutions of monarchy and nationalism," one leaflet addressed to Khomeini said. "Now you have tried to destroy the foundations of faith through your inside agents, who wear turbans but are atheists and communists."

Meanwhile, it was reported that thousands of letters have been sent to Ayatollahs Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi protesting at their support for the presidential elections and drawing their attention to the new move to centralise theological affairs in the Majlis, "which is dominated by corrupt, bloodthirsty and non-believing elements."

CSO: 4600/101

MORE IRANIAN DIPLOMATS RESIGN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Oct 81 pp 6-7

[Text] The Islamic Foreign Ministry in Tehran sent a circular to all its embassies and diplomats abroad ordering them to supply information, including names and addresses, on all Bahais, counter-revolutionaries and "so-called students" residing in the areas of their missions.

A photocopy of the circular, signed by Javad Mansouri, deputy minister for cultural affairs at the ministry, has been received by IPS' Paris diplomatic correspondent. A source close to the Paris embassy of the Islamic republic who asked not to be identified confirmed the existence of such a circular.

The circular also orders that there should be no revalidating of passports of the groups mentioned.

The circular is among many other measures on Iranian diplomats which have led to an accelerating rate of resignations among career diplomats at embassies abroad in recent weeks. According to informed sources in Tehran a total of 35 have given up their posts and sought political asylum from host countries so far. Two other non-career diplomats have also quit. Most of those who have resigned from their posts have done so at great risk to members of their families still living in Iran as well as considerable financial loss. Yet they say they were unable to continue serving under a regime which had no respect for even the most elementary norms of decent behaviour in the international field.

They generally specify their charges as follows:

1. The Mullahs' regime has turned all its legations abroad into nests of espionage, as they used to call the U.S. Embassy. All staff are required to spy on Iranians living abroad, engage in propaganda activities and often take part in things like beating up other Iranians.

2. All staff are required to cooperate with intelligence cadres of Libyan, Algerian, North Yemeni and other so-called hardline countries' embassies. Most of these countries are ruled by regimes who also frequently ignore international law.

3. The regime has purged, dismissed and pensioned off almost 60 percent of the administrative and diplomatic staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, any official with more than 14 years of service has been forced out and replaced by

unqualified, inexperienced and ignorant people who have been brought to the diplomatic service not on their merit or qualifications but because they are related to this or that mullah, or are members of the regime's spying apparatus. Diplomatic jobs are also given to students and other supporters of Khomeini as reward for services rendered, such as organising demonstrations or engaging in underhand jobs for the regime.

At one time, the present Iranian charge d'affaires in Pakistan was a maintenance worker repairing coolers. The job was a reward for his efforts in mobilising thousands of residents of South Tehran to take part in demonstrations for the regime. A well-known adventurist mullah, Nategh-Nouri, and a notorious turbanned gun-slinger named Hadi Ghaffari are said to be the managers of intelligence operations abroad for the mullahs, using diplomatic immunity as a cover. These two mullahs appoint their own aides as top officials in Iranian diplomatic missions abroad.

The defectors have also said that the Iranian Embassy in London houses some of the most notorious gun slingers of the Khomeini regime. The diplomats say many staff attached to the embassy in the British capital are former agitators who have been deported from the U.S. in the past for breaches of the peace. Now they have been brought back to London under new passports with diplomatic cover. In Paris, Bonn, West Berlin and Stockholm, too, most of the so-called accredited diplomats are former gang leaders of South Tehran who allied themselves with the Islamic Republican Party, the defecting diplomats say.

The hanging judge Sadegh Khalkhali is also keen on getting a foothold for himself in the embassies abroad. He has claimed that he has sent his gunmen to France to kill Bani-Sadr, Rajai and Shahpour Bakhtiar, and he has also claimed to the press that he has already placed some of his killers in diplomatic missions.

What has astonished the resigning diplomats is the way Western governments have tolerated acts of international terrorism by Khomeini, they say. One of them told IPS that during the Shah's reign Western journalists as well as human rights activists were magnifying often minor incidents, but now major crimes have been committed by the Khomeini regime and the same journalists have either ignored them or worse, tried to justify Khomeini's atrocities on grounds that he believes in what he is doing and that he has the support of the people.

CSO: 4600/101

'BROAD COALITION' PLAN RAISES EXILE OPPOSITION HOPES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 29 Oct 81 pp 11-12

[Text] A broad coalition, in which Shapour Bakhtiar and his National Iranian Resistance Movement, veteran statesman Ali Amini, Ahmad Madani, Hassan Nazih and other prominent opposition figures and groups are said to have expressed their willingness to find ways of working together to topple Khomeini and his regime, is seen by some observers to be the first positive step towards a concerted opposition movement so far.

Sources close to some of the people who have been taking part in discussions in which Ayatollah Mehdi Rohani, the senior Shi'ite cleric in Europe, has played a central role, say that it is hoped that General Bahram Aryana and other senior military officers who are associated with the monarchist cause may also join.

Each group which joined the coalition would retain its own identity and ideology and the second task, after the toppling of Khomeini, would be to ensure a free vote by all Iranians on the system under which they wish to be governed, whether it was monarchy or a republic, a source said.

After this the groups would split up and go their own way for political purposes, the sources said.

Immediate reaction among the exile Iranian community in Europe was a cautious feeling of relief that the political groups had realised concerted action was an imperative need. "If this gets off the ground it seems to represent a common sense approach to the matter that Iranians, whatever their views, can only support," said one veteran diplomat.

Meanwhile Seyed Mehdi Pirasteh, a former interior minister and diplomat, is reported to have been drumming up support for a National Iranian Liberation Organisation which is also trying to unite the opposition movements against Khomeini. He is said to have gathered over 1,000 signatures in support of his efforts.

CSO: 4600/101

MOTHER PRAISED FOR READINESS TO SHOOT HER SON

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 13 Oct 81 p 15

[Text] In a message sent to the mother of Reza Khorsandi, glorifying this heroic and courageous Muslim woman, Mother Tariqoleslam issued warnings to all alert mothers.

The text of the message is as follows:

In the name of God, the Determiner

Greetings to you, oh heroic mother, oh courageous heroine of the Muslims. Greetings to you who have followed the way of the prophet Noah and abandoned your offspring who has risen against the Islamic Republic, and even proclaimed your readiness to fire the first bullet at his heart, which is indeed the heart of an enemy of Islam and the nation. Yes, Islam always glorifies you heroic women, and on resurrection day God will name you as exemplars for those who do not fulfill their Islamic duty and for whom their maternal emotions are obstacles to their Islamic obligations.

One of the messages that the Imam conveyed while I had the glorious honor of being in his presence was that all mothers must continue in this way and that emotions must not be an obstacle to the discharge of Islamic revolutionary obligations. You, oh Mother Khorsandi, are a mother who has fulfilled this obligation which Islam and the Imam have placed upon all our shoulders, and you have abandoned your deviating offspring to God.

A matter that I must now stress to all mothers is the matter of taking a warning from past programs. The hypocrisy with which the Mojahedin have infected our young people must be a warning to us not to place our faith in other groups without investigation, because they may also impart this hypocrisy and contagion as did the Mojahedin. Among these groups are the Moslem Resistance Movement and the line of HAFTEH NAMEH-YE OMMAT. All mothers and fathers must be alert and vigilant so their offsprings will not be caught up in these activities and this line.

Two of the Imam's 72 companions at the Karbala of 28 June 1981, Mohammad Montazeri and Akbar Azheh'i, were very aware of this line. Hojjatoleslam Azheh'i even brought this up on a television program and took their deviationist line of the past to task, saying that these people have the same deviationist line of the

Mojahedin but they have not yet become visible to our society. We must not drop our guard with respect to them. We must be careful that our children do not fall into this dark trap.

Of course it must be noted now that this group now presents itself as a supporter of the Islamic Republic and the Imam. They say "we consider liberalism, meaning Bani-Sadr and Bazargan" as our number one enemy, and reaction, "meaning Beheshti, Rafsanjani, and Khameneh'i" as the number two enemy. Thus we must be very vigilant.

I will now mention some of their past positions so that mothers and fathers can have some awareness of their programs. One example is the message of 4 April 1979 from the Mojahedin to the Moslem Resistance Movement which was sent to them because they announced their cooperation with the Mojahedin.

A second example is the presentation of corporate candidates from them, the Mojahedin, Jama, and Sash. Among those whose candidacy they advanced for the elections to the Assembly of Experts on 18 July 1979 is Dr Lahiji, and everyone knows about the documents disclosed by the Students Following the Imam's Line showing his connections with the spy nest.

A third example is their position with respect to the "American" newspaper AYANDEGAN, which was closed by the Islamic Revolutionary Court. They, along with the Mojahedin, Sash, and Jama, condemned this measure by the Revolutionary Court. It must be noted that Radio Israel and America condemned the closure of the newspaper AYANDEGAN.

A fourth example is not voting for the Constitution. On the eve of the referendum on the Constitution their hypocritical leader Dr Payman said 'we will not vote for the Constitution, but we will vote for the Imam.' Again it must be noted that the Imam said concerning the Constitution that it contains not a single word against Islam, and he had previously said that 'if there should be one word in it against Islam I will not vote for it.'

A fifth example is the letter they sent to the clerical members of the Majles which addressed them in abusive terms.

A sixth example is their failure to adopt a position on that Soviet spy Sa'adati's execution. They did not condemn him in any way.

In general, there is their unwillingness to appear on television and announce their deviationist ideological positions and many other objections. It is thus incumbent upon all mothers and fathers to look out for their children so they do not get involved with this sort of hypocritical and counterrevolutionary group. Oh heroic mother, again I send you praises from afar and I stress that we must not allow the same calamity that the hypocrites brought upon our youth, destroying their world here and in the hereafter, to begin again under a new name. We must stand against these treasonous plots until the last drop of blood, and not allow our youth, whom we have brought up for years and years with such difficulty, to be suddenly stolen by them and dragged down into the service of the superpowers.

Peace and the mercy and blessings of God be upon you. Mother Tariqoleslam.

9310
CSO: 4640/31

PAST YEAR'S ECONOMIC PROGRESS REVIEWED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 2 Sep 81 p 5

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd Naji: "The Iraqi Economy: A Year of War and Development; The Challenges Imposed on The Economy Released Creative and Productive Energies and Abilities; Centers of Vital Confrontation in the Economy Have Experienced a Significant Revival and Greater Growth During Wartime; The Iraqi Administration Confirmed Practical Abilities in Planning The War and Development Successfully and With Balance"]

[Text] Whenever challenges raise the intelligence to the level of conscious response, momentum from the positive achievements inevitably spreads over the plane of reality. When a balanced social, political, and economic system provides the elements of objective response, the challenges create new and progressive values which are added to a series of qualitative and quantitative gains in support of the system and its cause.

Such a future awaits the Arab nation of Iraq as it emerges from a year of war against the enemies of the Arab nation on its eastern flank. During this year of war, the will of the Arab and his noble response to all the challenges that confronted him were clearly demonstrated.

Indeed, the imperialist, Zionist, and racist forces have long aimed at thwarting Iraq's cultural revival, fearing that its radiance and revolutionary stance might gain stature in the Arab homeland. For this reason, one of the primary targets of the war was the economic and social development whose features have begun to emerge with increasing clarity.

The Iraqi economy and its progressive achievements and the Iraqi move toward development came under attack. However, the Iraqi economy responded to the challenge with tremendous vitality, confirming the vitality of economic planning and the sound economic program as conceived by the Iraqi administration. In order to document the capabilities of the Iraqi economy to respond to the challenges during the year of war, one must examine the achievements attained by the sectors of the Iraqi economy during the war period. In this way, one may arrive at a definite conclusion which will clarify the directions and future horizons of this economy. Using this approach, perhaps it is important to examine what has been achieved in the economic sectors and what will be achieved subsequently in order to clarify the picture.

Development of the economic sectors: The economic sectors have achieved substantial developments that have attracted the attention of observers and economic analysts throughout the world. It could not have been imagined that high production levels could be maintained with a large percentage of the work force absent from production centers in order to fight on the various fronts. However, it would appear that the challenges that confronted Iraq released the energies and the creative and productive capabilities of the masses.

Some observers believed that the war problems would preclude the availability of the raw materials necessary for various kinds of production. This is an accepted fact in traditional conceptions. However, Iraq has demonstrated that this problem is easily overcome through conscientious and careful planning with regard to development requirements in spite of war conditions.

It was also believed that the society would be plunged into a state of frustration and exasperation as the war dragged on, producing a negative impact on production and development projects. However, all these predictions failed to materialize in the Iraqi experience because of the practical policy pursued by the political administration. The political leaders were able to achieve the optimum mobilization of human and natural resources based on a balance between the war and development.

The economic sectors engaged in substantial and tireless activity during the war years and made important strides toward the building of the future. At this point, we might mention just a few of the most important achievements.

The industrial sector: Investment allocations for the industrial sector were 6.2 percent higher in 1981 than in 1980. This provides substantial proof of the increased attention that has been focused on the industrial sector as an important pioneer sector in Iraqi development. The industrial organizations responded to the state's directives by increasing production. During the first 6 months of the year, the State Organization for Engineering Industries achieved a production increase of 26 percent over the same period last year according to data presented in the expanded conference of the Ministry held early in August.

Announcements of various industrial projects have followed regularly depite the burdens the war has imposed on development. Of the many projects that have been announced, perhaps the most important are the following: a number of disinfectant materials projects at a cost of approximately 200 million Iraqi dinars ($670 million), a cement project at a cost of around 70.4 million dinars ($240 million), a huge project for the construction of an automobile complex in al-Suwayrah, and a brick manufacturing project at a cost of some 44 million dinars ($145 million).

Aside from these new projects, the projects established before the war have continued to produce at advanced levels.

The housing, building, and construction sector: The projects of the housing, building and construction sector continued to carry out their developmental programs. The foreign companies that left Iraq at the beginning of the war returned to continue their operations in this sector, and high rates of plan completion were observed in this field of activity. For example, the prefabricated construction administration in Karbala' implemented 81 percent of its production plan for the

first half of this year with the assembly of 264 dwellings out of a planned 324 units. During the 7 April celebrations this year, contracts were signed for the implementation of an industrial city in Basrah and the construction of some 16 agricultural colleges. Iraq has allocated around $3.4 billion (1 billion Iraqi dinars) for housing projects during the current year.

Particular importance was given to the projects of the autonomous region and the southern and central governorates in an effort to achieve regional balance in development projects.

The services sector: Iraqi planning focused attention on the development of services projects. Some 650 million dinars ($2.1 billion) was allocated for sewer system projects in the city of Baghdad. Work on these projects was accelerated and Korean, Japanese, and other companies are now working to complete them. Some 42 million dinars was allocated for completion of health, cultural, and educational projects in the Governorate of al-Anbar. Iraq set aside financial allocations for the health sector which exceeded last year's allocations by 54 percent. Similarly, allocations for education were increased 17 percent over last year and allocations for the information sector were increased by 26 percent over last year.

Economic observers may note the extent to which services projects have expanded in the various governorates and the degree of vitality in the work of these sectors in spite of war conditions.

The transportation and communications sector: The transportation and communications sector has not lagged behind the other sectors that have received considerable attention despite war conditions. Observers studied the announcement concerning the implementation of the Baghdad Metro project at a cost of $1 billion. They also noted Iraq's enthusiasm for the implementation of the railway project connecting Iraq and the Gulf states. Iraqis succeeded in completing a number of modern roads both within the country and in the liberated areas regained by Iraq in its war with Iran. These roads totaled over 30,000 kilometers.

Construction is currently in progress on 517 kilometers of modern roadway in the governorate of Basrah at a cost of 48 million dinars. This project includes the al-Zubayr-Safwan road linking Basrah with Kuwait. In addition, Iraq has signed a contract with a French railway company for a $3.4-billion railroad project as well as another contract to expand the Hayfa Street project in Baghdad at a cost of around 21 million Iraqi dinars. Baghdad is endeavoring to develop public transportation through the addition of modern buses. Purchase agreements for buses have been concluded with West Germany, Japan, and Hungary.

The agricultural sector: Iraq's concern for agricultural development projects has not diminished. Investment allocations for these projects during the current year exceeded the 1980 allocations by 34.9 percent. After the war had been in progress for 5 months, Iraq concluded a $1.5-billion contract with several European companies for the construction of the Mosul dam. There are also additional projects for the construction of other dams including the al-Rutbah and Hamrin dams. Attention was also focused on development of the agricultural sector through the provision of the necessary requirements for its advancement. Thus, the al-Rutbah dam in the Hawran Valley was opened at the beginning of August. The responsible agencies jointly

studied ways of developing the contemporary villages. Also, Iraq increased the loans granted to farmers to aid them with agricultural operations, not to mention the provision of agricultural guidance and consultation.

Foreign trade: The directions of foreign trade during the time of war were in keeping with the demands and needs of the Iraqi services and economic sectors. Foreign trade met these needs without any bottlenecks in distribution or in the time required for the arrival of materials and products. The foreign trade budget reached around $19 billion during 1981, representing a 35.8-percent increase over 1980.

Iraqi planning did not neglect the strategic importance of providing necessary goods to the Iraqi citizen. In fact, the same applies to most luxury goods. Analysts have noted how the Iraqis have not even neglected to import children's toys in order to create a balance between the waging of the war and the building of the new man.

These few examples of the accomplishments in various economic sectors represent a small part of the whole reality in Iraq at the present time. Iraq has created a unique experiment in building for the future under the hard conditions and burdens of the national confrontation with the enemy of the [Arab] nation.

When the Zionist enemy bombed the nuclear reactor in Iraq in the midst of Iraq's preoccupation with its conflict with Iran, imperialist, Zionist, and racist circles calculated that this blow along with the tremendous added burdens of the conflict would produce a severe breakdown in the Iraqi mood and the Iraqi Arab mentality. They felt that this breakdown would send the vital centers of confrontation of political, economic, and social administration into a state of paralysis or despair which would affect the vital drives toward the building of the nation and resistance.

However, the traditional calculations failed once again to gauge the extent of Iraq's response to the challenge. The centers of confrontation pursued their course with even greater determination to resist. The Iraqi worker's desire to increase production has not weakened. Nor has there been a weakening in the will of the Iraqi administration to plan for additional production in all vital facilities involved in building Iraq's economic and social systems.

Thus, the Iraqi Arab man has risen to an advanced level of responsiveness in repudiation of a state of weakness. He has developed the facilities of the state and its economy to an advanced state of development and growth despite the harshness of the conditions imposed on it.

Iraq has not forgotten its aid to the developing states despite the burdens of the national conflict. Its aid payments to Third World countries have continued, thus confirming the earnestness of Iraq's position on Third World issues and its distinctive role in relation to these issues. The aid payments to these countries have continued to occupy a special status in its scale of priorities.

Thus, the Iraqi economy after a year of war provides an earnest model for the active Arab economy which supports human experience with new precepts and affirms to the world the Arabs' ability to respond to all challenges imposed upon them by the enemies of the Arab nation.

8591
CSO: 4303/168

FLAWS IN CEASE-FIRE WITH LEBANON POINTED OUT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Jul 81 p 6

/Article: "A Fragile and Dangerous Agreement"/

/Text/ With all the relief and respite that the cease-fire agreement has brought to the residents of Galilee settlements, the serious flaws in this agreement must be pointed out. Its lack of clarity is the first: No one knows to whom it applies or does not apply and what activities are permitted or prohibited within its framework.

The terrorists hastened to give it an interpretation that is difficult to accept: It prohibits the firing of Katyushas and guns on Israeli territory, but not on the Christian enclave in Southern Lebanon. On Saturday this interpretation was even translated into action. The several Katyusha salvos that fell in settlements in the enclave confronted the militias of Major Haddad with a difficult dilemma: Are they obliged to observe the cease-fire and not to react while their settlements are not protected against attacks?

And how is Israel to act in case the terrorists prepare an infiltration into our territory from land or sea? Will it be permitted to attack the departure base, or will this be considered a violation of the cease-fire?

Indeed, Jerusalem has clarified that we reserve ourselves the right to act against the terrorists' hostile deployment and organization. But is this also acceptable to Washington?

The fact that the terrorists will be able to recover from the serious blows they suffered in the last 2 weeks, to repair their damaged base and to organize themselves for renewed hostile activities will be one of the unfortunate results of the cease-fire.

It is difficult to judge if, indeed, they were close to destruction, as military circles are inclined to believe. The fact that Yasir Arafat had expressed readiness to cease fire even before Philip Habib left for his mission indicates that the terrorists' situation was difficult during the last few days. They were saved from additional blows and they can take advantage of the cease-fire to bring new artillery weapons, to prepare a stock of ammunition and to wait for an opportunity. Their advantage is that they have radical organizations, on which it will be possible to place the responsibility for every violation.

It seems that we will pay the highest price on the political front: The agreement gave terrorist organizations the status of a party to war and a party to negotiations. Despite all the elements of mediation that operated here--the United States, the United Nations and the Saudis--and despite Israel's forceful demand that there be no negotiations with the PLO, it, not the fiction called the Government of Lebanon, is a partner to this agreement.

11,439
CSO: 4323/53

ASPECTS OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH DESCRIBED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 pp 12-13 (Weekend Supplement)

/Article by 'Ami Biberman: "Don't Climb a High Tree"/

/Text/ One day former Minister of Agriculture Qadish Luz, of blessed memory, visited the Volcani Center (Station for Agricultural Research at that time). His hosts at the plantation department wanted to surprise him with a new Israeli product and served him a cup of coffee from the fruits of their plantations. The minister was excited to hear the news that coffee was being grown in Israel and asked with amazement: "How are your crops?" Prof Yitzhaq Arnon, director of the institute at that time, remarked wittily: "You have just drunk the entire crop of the State of Israel for this year..."

Since that cup of coffee Israeli agriculture has traversed a long path. A great deal of work has been invested in the adoption and cultivation of additional exotic plants, but experience has demonstrated that not every plant that can be grown in Israel is bound to occupy a place in agriculture and coffee is a good example of this. Its crops in Israel are low and its fruits do not ripen at the same time, but gradually. It needs many harvests and the investment of expensive work-days in harvesting. The shortage of manpower has long been the Achilles' heel of Israeli agriculture and, according to the forecast, will continue to worsen even more in the year 2000. Right now citrus growers have difficulty finding workers for the citrus fruit harvest and everyone knows that most of those now engaged in this work are Arabs from the areas. The day when this manpower is no longer available to citrus growers is not far off. Therefore, today a great deal of work is done on researching the possibility of development of a low plant, so that it would be possible to pick its fruits mechanically, or at least without the need for ladders and other hoisting equipment, whose operation is slow and inconvenient. The successes of the workers of the agricultural research administration in Bet Dagan point to a revolutionary, new approach to fruit growing in the year 2000. There will be no high trees rich in foliage planted at big distances from each other, but a field plantation, where trees will be planted very densely. As a result of the competition among trees for living space, their boughs will be reduced and, in fact, they will be bushes. They will be not much taller than people. Such peaches, as well as nectarines, have already been developed and soon we will also see such innovations in the citrus branch. A reduction in the size of citrus fruits will be made possible not only by crowding trees and limiting their root space. Researchers at the departments of citrus trees and virology in Bet Dagan have found

that certain citrus trees infected with the exocortis virus are shorter than non-infected trees. At the same time, their crops are not lower and they even bear fruit earlier than other trees. This finding points to the possibility of infecting trees with a virus as one of the initiated means of developing a short tree.

Simultaneously with the work on reducing the sizes of trees done by physiologists and geneticists agricultural engineers work on the development of auxiliary equipment that will replace manual labor in harvest work. The first combine of its kind in the world for harvesting peaches planted by the field-plantation method was developed at the Institute for Agricultural Engineering in Bet Dagan. This combine operates successfully and heralds an era during which innovative harvesting machines will replace the labor of thousands of workers. The peach combine cuts the boughs of a tree at a height of about 10 cm above the ground. The tree is brought to the shaking out system located in the upper part of the combine. The fruit is separated from the tree and is concentrated in containers, while the cut tree is ejected from the rear. Right now the combine harvests about 4 donums per hour and replaces dozens of workers. The stump, which made up the lower part of the tree trunk, will produce new branches in summer and the tree will again bear fruit the following spring. The method of growing peaches on a dense plantation, which contains about 1,000 trees per donum, has already been tested for several years. This method is also suitable for small family farms. The fruit will be picked from the low tree manually and the pruning will also be done with small equipment, but harvest work will be easier for them and labor capacity will increase several times because of the small size of the tree. The problem of blows and blemishes will continue to occupy engineers in the next few years.

Vegetarian devourers of fruits and others who desire to diversify their menu with new exotic fruits can now find heretofore unknown varieties in fancy shops. These varieties are grown in acclimatization gardens in Bet Dagan and from there they are distributed to farmers. In the future mango, lichi, "fijoya," actinidia, macadamia nuts, papaya, carambola, anona, "longen" and others will be found in fruit shops and markets in greater quantitites than can be seen even now, although not on a mass scale. The chance to discover an unknown dainty fruit, or a cross between existing fruits, is quite slim. Nor should we expect the cultivation of "square fruits that will fit well in a box," which is the foolish belief of those that expect science to find solutions for everything. Familiar nuts, which every Israeli likes, such as pistachios, walnuts and hazelnuts, need special climatic conditions. It is always better to import them. On the other hand, it can be expected to a large degree of certainty that the diversification and quality of the common varieties will be improved considerably.

It is very important to know that, in order to develop a high-quality fruit or vegetable, it is not enough to cultivate an improved variety. It is necessary to invest a great deal of work in the development of a system of land cultivation with proper fertilization. In economical and efficient irrigation, in the protection of plants against pests and diseases, in the solution of fruit picking problems and in the harvesting, transportation and prolongation of the shelf life of fruits Israel now holds one of the first places in the world in scientific and technological innovation in agricultural fields and this should ensure its superiority over potential competitors.

Express for the New Variety

One of the fields in which a very valuable change is expected is the field of seedling preparation by means of a tissue culture. This method is based on a discovery that is not new, according to which it is possible to take a group of cells from a certain plant, to plant them in a test tube or in a bottle under sterile conditions on a food base containing minerals, sugars and other materials vital for the development of the tissue and after several weeks to obtain a plant containing all the organs existing in an ordinary plant. This method makes it possible to produce within a few months hundreds of thousands of seedlings identical in their characteristics to the mother plant. This means that, if a plant with positive characteristics is discovered, theoretically it is possible to reproduce and transform it into an outstanding plant within 1 year. If we wanted to reproduce it by means of seeds or shoots, as is customary today, we would be forced to wait many years for the creation of the proper number of seedlings. The important advantages of this method include the possibility of obtaining seedlings free of pests, whose crops will exceed the crops of infected seedlings by dozens of percent.

What about the vegetable varieties that we will be able to eat in the year 2000? Will the scientist succeed in creating plants that do not exist in nature; for example, a cross between a tomato and a potato?

Indeed, important breakthroughs in the field of joining single cells of different varieties and creating a supranatural laboratory plant have been made in Israel and throughout the world in the last few years. Scientists are capable of removing the cell membrane from a single cell, joining it with a single cell of another variety and transmitting desirable characteristics from one plant to another. Scientists in Germany succeeded in crossing a potato with a tomato in this way and in obtaining a cross plant--pomato. This cross plant contained a combination of the characteristics of both its parents, but agriculturally it had no value and did not bear fruit, as did its parents separately. This does not mean that what nature does not create is of no use. Conversely, such crossing (intercellular joining) will be of agricultural benefit in the future, mainly because of the possibility of lending desirable characteristics to plants of certain varieties, characteristics not present in them, but existing in plants of another variety. The transmission of characteristics from one variety to another in a directed way is one of the activities of genetic engineering. There is a great deal of interest in this field of activity in Israel and throughout the world. A team of geneticists in Bet Dagan is engaged in new developments in the area of transmission of desirable characteristics from one variety to another.

Crossing will not replace the large-scale improvement work on the creation of choice cross varieties resistant to diseases, drought, salinity and so forth. Therefore, vegetables and fruits of a better quality than that of existing varieties are expected in the year 2000. The subject of quality, which has not received proper attention thus far, will become much more important than it has been up to now. Quality varieties will increase the farmer's income and will prolong the marketing season.

For Cure and Ornament

The importance of medicinal plants has increased in the last few years. The world has realized that medications based on synthetic chemical materials do not bring relief to every affliction and often cause undesirable side effects. On the other hand, natural materials produced from plants can cure and alleviate patients' condition without causing damage or other disturbances. In the past a large number of medicinal plants and spices were brought to Europe and America from the Orient and the population of those plants was nonuniform and of an unsatisfactory quality. In the last few years developed countries have begun to be interested in medicinal plants and spices and to grow them in agriculture. The main way of utilizing plant components is by means of extraction. For example, morphine, which relieves pain, is produced from the poppy plant. Scopolamine, which forms the basis for tranquilizers, is produced from the duboisia or datura plant, whereas digoxin and digitoxin present in medications for heart patients are produced from the foxglove plant.

The proportion of medicinal plants, mainly spices and fragrant plants, in Israeli agriculture will continue to increase. Leaf spices--medicinal sage, oregano and marjoram--are now grown on commercial areas on a number of farms. Fragrant plants for the production of ethereal oil will grow on vast areas and, apparently, the Galilee will be Israel's main perfumery region because of the suitability of the plants for its climate and conditions. Ethereal oil will be produced from lavender and nettle-leaved sage. An enterprise for the extraction of ethereal oil from such plants as nettle-leaved sage, geranium, basil and fennel now operates in Miluot in the Western Galilee. The scale is still small. As the cultivation becomes established and expands, perfume production will intensify. The production of various perfume products is anticipated in the year 2000. This will be one of the valise exports--small-volume and low-weight products that can be carried in a valise and their price is invaluable.

The flower branch has developed at a rapid rate in Israel in the last 15 years. Its products are on every table in West European countries during winter months. The flowers that decorate the apartment of the average Israeli are mostly export surpluses--roses, dwarf carnations, gladiolas, statice, gypsophila, gerbera and other cut flowers. Recently, many flower growers have reached a critical stage. This situation calls for a change in the approach to the future of the flower branch in Israel. The concept now guiding research and development workers in the branch of ornamental plants and flowers is to place emphasis on the varieties growing in the field (not in a hothouse), which can be grown without investments in structures and heating. The development of cheap marketing opportunities by ships instead of airplanes is also considered. Much attention is paid to the cultivation of flowers in problematical regions, such as mountains and the Jordan Valley. The flowers whose cultivation was or is to be completed in the next few years include various narcissus varieties, anemones and gladiolas--mainly dwarf and delicate varieties that do not upset the vase. Work is done on the adoption and cultivation of sunflowers (suitable for the Jordan Valley),"anigozantus"--a flower brought from Australia recently--lilies, dwarf carnation varieties, gerbera, thick-calyx hibiscus, hippeastrum and so forth. Before the end of this century the selection of varieties and species will be diversified by a large number of new types and towards the year 2000 there will be spectacular flowers on the market--most of them cross varieties of presently existing species, but, in part, also plants brought to Israel from remote places, as well as original products--fruits of crossing and genetic engineering.

It should be noted that the branch of potted and indoor plants will also be greatly diversified. Whereas today many of the indoor plants offered for sale in nurseries are imported from Holland or other countries, the proportion of the plants cultivated in Israel, which will survive more successfully than imported plants, will increase in the future.

The State of Israel spends an amount exceeding 400 million dollars on the purchase of fodder seeds and imported meat. This is the biggest item of expenditure in the area of food. The main objective of agricultural research on animals now and in the next few years is to reduce fodder export and to increase the production of local meat.

The research system is examining various byproducts of agriculture and industry, such as substitute food for seeds. The examined substitutes include straw that underwent various treatments, stubble and cotton byproducts, disinfected poultry manure, sludge of barn manure after its exploitation for methane production, sludge that accumulates in the process of purification of municipal sewage, cheese water created in dairies, peels and waste of the food industry, sea weeds, phosphates and so forth. Since the problem is investigated on a large scale, it is anticipated that the proportion of cheap substitutes in the general food ration of animals will increase in 10 to 20 years.

Of course, significant progress is expected in each of the animal breeding branches. We will mention only some of these achievements. The milk that will be produced in the future will be cleaner and better than the milk produced now, mainly because of the steps taken to stop the use of sprays against ticks and of antibiotics whose remainders are found in milk, contaminating it. There is already a significant improvement in the quality of milk, as compared with its quality in the last few years, and it is expected that the improvement will continue in the future.

The supply of meat from local sources will also be diversified. An increase in the supply of mutton is expected owing to the success in raising the number of offspring delivered by ewes of breeds prevalent in Israel. The production of less fat oxen is expected as a result of proper diet. Delicacies and fancy products made of turkey and poultry meat will be developed. The supply of fish and various sea fruits will increase. A growth in the supply of the meat of "berber" (waterfowl resembling ducks), mallards (cross between ducks and pekings), ducks and geese is expected. The efficiency and saving of the food of all farm animals will rise, as compared with the present situation, and they will lead to improved products and to an increase in the profitability of farmers.

Against the Wooing of Insects

Those who are not close to agriculture need a great deal of imagination to appreciate the efforts made by farmers to protect their products from pests and diseases. Modern agriculture annually spends millions of shekels on sprays and pulverizers. Along with the usefulness and blessing that these treatments provide for the protection of products, they are fraught with many dangers. They indiscriminately kill various creatures living in the area and thus upset the biological balance existing there. They endanger persons consuming treated agricultural products. They are liable to cause genetic changes in insects and animals absorbing

these poisons in their bodies. For these reasons sophisticated control agents, without the use of strong preparations, or, if there is no choice, with a controlled use of selective chemical preparations affecting only a specific pest, not other insects, are now sought in Israel and throughout the world. Pheromones are promising substitutes for pest control. The advances made in these materials up to now give hope that the day when they will constitute a useful method of controlling many pest varieties is not far off.

Pheromones are smelling substances present in many species of animals, including insects. Pheromones include sex pheromones, which serve as a means of creating communication between males and females for the purpose of producing a new generation. How does this happen? When the insect reaches sexual maturity, the female secretes a smelling substance--pheromone--which is absorbed by the smelling organs of the mate. The male is attracted to the smell from quite a long distance--up to 100 meters and more--for the purpose of mating. Man interferes here and tries to spoil the romance between these sexes. Through diligent research scientists succeeded in decoding the chemical structure of the pheromone in many insects. From there the road to the production of such a synthetic pheromone in a laboratory is not far off. The synthethic pheromone is absorbed in a dispenser made of a substance spreading the smell slowly over a period of several months. The same dispenser serves as a bait for males. It is hung inside a trap placed in the field or plantation. The smell that escapes from the dispenser is much stronger than the smell emitted by a single female and, therefore, the males from the entire area will converge and fall into the trap, or will stick to the wet glue spread on it and find their death in it.

Pheromone traps can perform two main tasks. They can be used for guarding, that is, detecting the appearance of pests in the area even before the farmer's eye notices it. In this case they serve as a sophisticated detector of the need for directed spraying against these insects. But they can also serve as a means of excess trapping, which decreases the males and thus reduces the creation of a new generation of caterpillars gnawing at products and making them unfit for marketing. In many cases the decrease in the pest population will eliminate the need for spraying.

Pheromones are likely to perform an additional function in pest control. Spraying them by means of tiny capsules whose diameter is about one-thousandth of a milimeter, or the scattering of dispensers in a sufficiently dense manner, will saturate the air with the pheromone of the damaging sex. In such a case the communication between males and females will be disrupted, because the former will not find their way to their mates. This method of application is not yet practised, but is at the stage of research and development and scientists pin their hopes on it, hoping that it will be more effective than the method of excess trapping.

Quite a large team of entomologists (pest researchers) at the agricultural research administration in Bet Dagan are engaged in the identification, development and application of pheromones. There are already practical successes in this field. For example, the citrus flower moth is one of the worst pests of lemons. This pest is successfully controlled by the above-described method. About 10,000 donums of orange groves contain pheromone traps and in 80 percent of them there is no need for any spraying against the pest. The exact identification of the true pheromone and, mainly, how to apply it in the field--this is what now delays the development of the method of controlling additional pests. Most probably, these problems will find their solution in the next few years.

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OCEAN WAVE ENERGY PROJECT PROPOSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 9 Aug 81 p 6

/Article by Avraham Peleg: "A 'Wave Engine' Field in the Sea Will Supply all the Electricity for Israel"/

/Text/ If the State of Israel allocates an area about 10 km long and 100 meters wide on the sea shore, it will be able to produce all the electricity it now needs... from wave energy. We refer to the invention of Mr Yedidya Solel, who developed an installation producing electricity from sea wave energy.

About over a year ago MA'ARIV reported on the invention of Mr Solel, an industrialist from Tel Aviv. The model was even tested in the sea of Tel Aviv, but the matter did not advance technologically. This May Mr Solel exhibited a model of his invention at an international technological fair of inventors--Expo '81--held in New York. Mr Solel receive the gold prize of Expo '81 for his invention.

Upon his return to Israel he redoubled his efforts to realize his invention. Engineer David Lauden joined him for this purpose. Mr Lauden, a construction engineer, became very interested in Mr Solel's wave engine.

The wave engine invented by Yedidya Solel is based on an installation with arms, at the end of which there are floats. In contrast to many other installations for the use of sea energy in the world, which are immersed in water, the installation itself is above the waves and only the floats float on the water. The ascending and descending motion of the floats is transmitted by means of levers to the wave, which translates reciprocating motion into rotary motion moving electricity producing generators.

The created energy can also be stored in the form of dense air pressure (which, upon its release, will move the generator) or of transfer of water to pools at a big height (the falling of water on the generator will create electricity).

Mr Solel and Mr Lauden explain that the uniqueness of the installation they are developing lies in the fact that it does not use the energy created from the horizontal motion of the waves, but from their vertical motion. With every motion of the wave's ascent the float rises and is again immersed by the force of gravitation. The infinite motion of the waves, which cause the ascent (and descent) of hundreds and thousands of floats, creates mechanical energy translated into electrical energy.

The two developers requested an opinion and data from research institutions in Israel in connection with the sea wave potential. Thus far they received data from the Meteorological and Sea and Lake Research Institute. According to the data obtained, the typical wave on the Mediterranean coast in Israel is about 1.10 meters high and the wave frequency is 10 waves per minute. According to the developers' estimates, on the average, it is possible to annually produce 3.5 kw of electricity per square meter of the sea.

According to the inventors, an efficient wave engine should be at least 50 meters long and contain about 100 floats. A total of 3,300 such installations (50 meters in width) will reach a length of about 18 km. However, with a double width, that is, 100 meters, the length will be reduced to one-half, that is, 9 km. A strip of such a wave engine length, theoretically, will be able to replace all the present electric power stations in Israel, which supply about 2,200 megawatts of electricity (!).

According to the developers, the cost of construction of a wave engine field in the sea is now estimated at 660 million dollars--the same amount of money as that spent by the electric company on fuel last year.

Patents for Mr Yedidya Solel's wave engine were registered in Israel and in the United States. When he was in the United States, groups of investors from Atlantic City and Los Angeles were interested in his invention. The first group represented Moslem capital and Mr Solel was asked: "Does this matter to you?"

Mr Solel, as well as Mr Lauden, believes that the invention is now at the research stage. The two developers want to conduct a series of tests at the installations of the Technion and at a later stage to build a prototype 50 meters long with an investment of 200,000 dollars. They asked the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure for assistance to advance this matter and hope that with the help of Israeli money and research they will be able to realize their dream: To produce electricity from sea water...

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PLANS TO BUILD GULF POSTAL HQ IN RIYADH DISCUSSED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 22 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Turki al-'Ayyar: "Gulf Postal Commission Building to Go Up in Riyadh's Diplomatic Quarter; Unification of Systems and Procedures and an Improvement in Postal Services in the Gulf States"]

[Text] Professor 'Ali Shaykh Jamalullayl, secretary general of the Gulf Postal Commission, revealed to AL-RIYAD that on Saturday there will be a meeting of a committee examining ideas pertaining to studies submitted by consulting firms for the Gulf Postal Commission Building. This building will be 3,000 square meters in area and will take 3 years to complete.

Professor Jamalullayl said that the mission of this committee is to study plans that the commission has prepared on the building's requirements over a period of up to 15 years. He said that the committee was formed as a way of implementing the resolutions of the extraordinary conference which was held in Abha. He also said that the commission has taken a positive step to facilitate the mission of the committee by writing to several consulting companies and advertising in all the local newspapers about these studies through which it hoped to give every consulting office or company an opportunity to present studies and models for the project, after they were provided with plans. "Several exhibits were presented to us by consulting firms and offices and they will be put before the committee today. The committee will then discuss these studies and will decide accordingly." He said that these studies will show estimated costs of the project so that they may be put before the next executive session to be held in April 1982 in the Sultanate of Oman. This session will have the full authority to authorize the costs of erecting the building and to inform the commission's member states that every state must lend its share in order for the task to be carried out. 'Ali Shaykh said that among the resolutions implemented after the extraordinary conference at Abha was the introduction of some amendments to the administrative and financial statutes pertaining to the basic structure of the commission. Among these was changing the titles of the secretary general and the assistant secretary general.

All these rules will be reprinted and distributed to the member states to ratify, and amendments will be drawn up according to an additional protocol appended to the constitution of the commission.

Likewise, the Gulf States Postal Services agreement, which the conference authorized--as well as its communiques--will be printed in bound volumes for the member states for their ratification.

He said that this is important in order to unify the postal regulations and procedures among the Gulf states because they cover many things in the area of postal services, and their application will take precedence in the Gulf.

With respect to the exemption of stamp fees for pilgrims, Dr 'Ali Shaykh said: "The agreement stipulates exempting letters and postcards that do not exceed 20 kilograms from the extra air rates in the member states statutes. This will have an impact on the exchange of letters between the Gulf states. The conference looked at improving postal service in the Gulf littoral region to a greater degree than it did on the matter of fees, because the Gulf states are in real need of improving postal services and not exempting fees. In this regard there are studies based on the application of the 'data-post system' and 'express postal service.' Kuwait and Saudi Arabia intend to apply these."

There are training courses for employees of the commission from various regions of the member Gulf states to be held in the Netherlands in order to study this system and the evolving postal systems for a period of 2 months. Right now training has been completed for 14 trainees about to finish the course. The date for sending new trainees for the next course has not yet been set. As to the reason for sending the trainees to Holland in particular, Dr Jamalullayl said: "A research department is considering this question. It has at its disposal the facilities and possibilities relevant to the matter. All the nations of the world constitute training states in this field."

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VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DESERT CONFLICT EXAMINED

Madrid EL PAIS SEMANAL in Spanish No 238, 1 Nov 81 pp 58-63

[Article by Antonio Redondo: "The Long Desert Battle"]

[Text] The war in the Western Sahara between the Polisario Front and Morocco entered a new phase in the summer of 1981 with Hassan II's acceptance of a referendum to decide the fate of the disputed territory. Morocco is thus agreeing to one of the grievances that the Polisario Front has voiced since the very outset of the conflict. Nevertheless, the two belligerants continue to hold fundamentally different ideas about how the referendum should be held. All indications are that the negotiations will be long and difficult. Meanwhile, the war wears on.

To those who are not familiar with it, to those who were not born there, the desert is an enormous empty space. A traveler's first sensation is a loneliness as intense, perhaps, as a shipwrecked person would experience in the middle of the ocean. Nature is hostile; the traveler has no protection against the burning sun or the wind-swept sand that sticks to one's body and dries one's throat.

At first glance, there is no sign of life in the desert, just sand and rock for kilometers on end. People do live there, however. They used to be nomads, hunters or merchants; now they are guerrillas of the Sahara Liberation Army of the Polisario Front.

The desert is a haven to the guerrillas. They know inaccessible places to hide, places where the lay of the land enables them to store gasoline or where they can dig a well to find water, that precious and rare commodity.

The desert holds no secrets for the guerrillas; they know it like the palm of their hand. They are able to recognize paths by examining ground that all looks the same to us and when night falls, by studying the stars.

We can thus see why the desert has ceased to be the theater of operations in the war. It was in the beginning, when the Moroccan Army stationed detachments and outposts in the interior of the Western Sahara, but their lack of familiarity with the land, their inability to adapt to desert life and the distance from their bases made them easy prey for the Polisario guerrillas.

Today there are no longer any Moroccan troops in the desert, except for the prisoners, though they are no longer in Saharan territory, but rather in camps in Tinduf, near where the Saharan refugees live.

A person arriving in the desert for the first time finds it odd to see the ground criss-crossed with tire tracks, as if heavily traveled roads were heading off in every direction. This is, in fact, the case, proof that there is a war going on in the desert. The herdsmen used to initially smooth over the tracks left by the Polisario's men so that the Moroccan Army couldn't follow them. Today, such precaution is useless. That is why the sand is criss-crossed in all directions by the Polisario's vehicles.

We traveled in one of them, a land rover, from Tinduf to the Atlantic, a round trip of more than 2,000 kilometers. There were no highways or roads, and our driver's familiarity with the land was our only compass.

He drove stealthily and with incredible skill. Without headlights, the vehicle shot through the desert night at 100 kilometers an hour. Precaution is in order because the Moroccan Air Force is constantly flying over the desert in search of signs of life from the Polisario Front.

From time to time on our trip we heard the noise of a plane somewhere above us, but it never came into sight. Moroccan fighter pilots do not often risk low-level flight ever since they realized that at 2,000 meters the Polisario's weapons have almost deadly aim. Of the 22 F-5's that the Moroccan Air Force used to have, half have been downed in the desert and their pilots captured, if not killed.

The twisted shapes of the downed planes dot our route, as if to show that the brave and well-trained Saharan guerrillas are capable of besting the sophisticated technology of the Mirage and Phantom jets that the Moroccan Army utilizes. Thus, our guide slows the land rover down so that we can examine in detail the wreckage of a plane in our path, unless he has altered our course just so that we could see it.

From time to time we also see the wreckage of Moroccan vehicles and tanks, which have been there for years. Because of their inability to control the desert, Morocco altered its strategy and switched to aircraft.

The Polisario's control of the land was evident throughout our trip. The land rover had apparently complete freedom of movement. At times we came unexpectedly upon a detachment of Saharan soldiers, who seemed to emerge from the depths of the desert. They exchanged information with our guides, who kept to or modified our route, giving us no clue to interpreting their movements other than a terse "For security reasons."

As the 6-year long war has dragged on, the Sahara Liberation Army, the armed wing of the Polisario Front, has become the master of the desert. Morocco, the Polisario's only enemy since it signed a peace with Mauritania in 1979,

has acknowleged this because it has limited its defense of the Western Sahara territory to a so-called "useful triangle," where the main population centers (Al Aaiun, the capital, with 50,000 inhabitants, and Smara) are located, in addition to the phosphates, the keynote of the war for Morocco and the powers aiding it.

To protect it, the Moroccan Army has decided to construct a barrier beginning at the ridges of the Djebel Ouarkzik in Moroccan territory and extending southward into the Western Sahara to encompass the phosphate mines of Bu Craa and the aforementioned cities.

To the Polisario, however, the construction of the barrier is not a decisive factor in the development of the conflict. It feels that it will be about as effective as the Maginot Line was in World War II, although once the barrier is up, the Sahara Liberation Army will have to acquire heavy weapons, which no one seems able to provide at present.

In the meantime, guerrilla harassment is preventing the mining of phosphates and the normalization of life in the area's richest and relatively most populated districts, the ones in the useful triangle.

At the same time, attacks on southern Morocco are aimed at cutting off the supply lines of the Saharan zone controlled by Morocco. To this end, the Polisario has accomplices among the civilian population (as highlighted by the Tan-Tan incident in 1979), which is largely of Saharan origin.

Thus, the Moroccan Army is being forced to stretch its lines to the maximum. The Polisario is trying to take advantage of this to cut across them and prevent Morocco from effectively compensating for the attrition of manpower and materials that it is suffering.

The proclamation of the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] on 27 February 1976 showed the Polisario Front's determination to give the Saharan people their own political and administrative organization, as well as the decision to carry the struggle for independence to a conclusion. This is the reason for the institutional split that the Polisario Front has undergone. When it was created in 1973, it was called the Sahara Liberation Army, and it has been in charge of the armed struggle ever since pursuant to the 1975 Madrid accords, Spain renounced (inexplicably and without explanation) its commitments as a decolonizing power.

Since 1976 the Polisario Front has been the organizational framework of the SDAR and the motor of a process that seeks to make the Saharan people a nation, a nation without its own territory as yet, inasmuch as Moroccan troops expelled the people from their homeland.

Until the Spanish colonziers established boundaries in the territory as a political unit, the Western Sahara was a borderless zone traversed by nomadic tribes that traded with the towns of northern Morocco and the southern towns

of what is today Mauritania. Each person felt a strong identification with his tribe, and among the tribes there were bonds of solidarity and mutual aid in opposing outside enemies, a sort of confederation in which each tribe had practically total independence.

All of the tribes together had a population of a few thousand. Such a scant population amid the 266,000 square kilometers of the Western Sahara is explained by the hostility of the environment. Nature provides few opportunities for man there. The war has made things even worse. Now only soldiers traverse the desert.

During the first few months of 1976, a great many inhabitants of the northwestern zone, the most heavily populated, fled into the desert. They were fleeing from the Moroccan troops, who were imprisoning anyone who did not approve of their presence there. This happened just when the Saharans believed that they were on the verge of proclaiming their independence.

Many of them joined the ranks of the Polisario. It had set up a Liberation Army around the 2,000 soldiers who had made up the nomadic troops that Spain had organized. Their numbers quickly swelled to 6,000 with the volunteers fleeing from the occupied zones.

As soon as the Saharan independence war began, the traditional routine took hold: the repression that foreign occupation immediately entails was followed by reprisals. Each guerrilla action by the Polisario was countered in the Moroccan-occupied zone with the arrest and jailing of relatives of the guerrillas. So then, soon after the war began, part of the civilian population started escaping as well. It was a brutal exodus, under a burning, blinding sun by day and a bone-chilling dampness by night, often on foot, without provisions and without any help from nature, because water and food are tragically scarce here.

The Polisario Front's strategy had to consider the need to shelter the civilians escaping from the occupiers and give them a reason for living. The first few refugee camps in the interior of the Western Sahara, in Guelta-Zemmur and Oum-Dreiga, were just the first stage in the exodus of an entire people. The Moroccan Air Force attacks on the camps (using napalm and white phosphorus) forced the Polisario Front to consider the need to exile the entire civilian population.

Exile has been the only alternative to the threat of the Saharan people's genocide. Three camps housing more than 100,000 Saharans have been in operation near Tinduf, in Algerian territory, since 1976. Recourse to the hospitality of another country has been the short-term solution to a burning problem. For that very reason, however, it keeps alive the memory of a lost home, separation from loved ones, nostalgia for the western land, where, moreover, living conditions are less harsh than in Tinduf.

The Algerian desert does not offer the humidity that the ocean generates in the lands of the Western Sahara and that permits a steppe-like vegetation on which the nomadic herds can graze. Nor does Tinduf have a layer of ground water feeding the wells that are relatively common in the Saharan territory. Furthermore, the refugees have been able to bring along only their personal belongings, and not even them sometimes.

Getting the civilian population settled in the Tinduf camps has entailed countless problems, the main one being the lack of resources to meet their most immediate needs: food and medicine.

At the same time that the Polisario Front is requesting international aid, it has set in motion a mechanism to channel it. In particular, however, it has begun to build a State that can organize the Saharan population above and beyond the current emergency situation in which it finds itself. An incipient government is trying to insure minimum living conditions and provide the population with a national awareness. Thus, the efforts of the new Saharan State are aimed mainly at health and education.

For the first time, the Saharans in the Tinduf camps have medical care, in the form of three hospitals and several outpatient clinics, in a bid to erase the consequences of malnutrition and, in many cases, treks through the desert that have left indelible marks on the exiles. Attempts are also being made to practice preventive medicine so as to improve the population's general state of health and eradicate endemic diseases, such as tuberculosis, and to raise the birth rate, which means that particular care is accorded to mothers and children. Hence, the best equipped services are pediatrics, gynecology and obstetrics.

Another leading concern has been the startup of a school system. The first objective is to teach the entire population to read and write. Though not achieving results as spectacular as the Cubans and Nicaraguans have (we have to bear in mind that war is still the most immediate reality for the Saharan people), the Polisario Front has seen to it that 70 percent of the population can read and write in 1981.

Schools offer not only instruction; they also inculcate in children the values of the new Saharan nation: discipline, dedication and love for the Saharan homeland. This is the way to overcome the tribal mentality that many of the refugees brought with them and to create a society so compact that it does not permit the slightest dissent.

Winning the war and creating a nation, the objectives of the Polisario Front, mean that civilian life has to be organized in a paramilitary fashion. Discipline and the involvement of all in camp activities are considered essential.

The camp constitutes the framework for the lives of the refugee population. In addition to meeting the needs of daily life, the Front tries to organize the return home or rather, the hope of a return. A camp resident must not only take part in the organization of daily life; he must also get involved in

the battle against nostalgia, against flagging spirits, against despair. He must believe in what he does every day, knowing that he is thus helping to win a war that is going to drag on for a long time yet.

Civilian life is a function of the war. As a representative of the Polisario says: "The battle is also being fought in the camps, not with guns but with daily work, not against the Moroccans but against despondency." In this battle the soldiers have been replaced by the women.

In the camps (where there are few men because most of them are waging war in the desert), the women, organized in the Union of Polisario Front Women, are in charge of organizing supplies, foodstuffs, handicraft work and the production of clothing and household utensils. They work in the health care centers and schools, taking the place of the fighting men. Moreover, of course, they have ceased obeying the orders of fathers or husbands, thus shattering a deeply rooted tradition. Their relationships with men are increasingly as between equals, parallel to their growing involvement in every facet of Saharan life, even the war. All young women receive military training, and many of them have already been at the "front."

At age 14, when schooling is completed, all men and women enroll in the Polisario Front's Liberation Army. But they are not enough. Many more than the 12,000 soldiers that the Saharan Army now has, in round numbers, will be needed to decide the outcome of the war.

The Polisario's strategy so far has been based on the mobility of the nomads and the surprise factor. Barreling down at an enemy position in a jeep going 100 kilometers an hour is a way to pin the Moroccans down and prevent them from controlling the territory. Dislodging them from their bases is an undertaking that requires additional equipment.

From 1980 to 1981 it looked like the Polisario could give the war a new twist. The first battle that took place in the southern part of Morocco, in the Ouarkzik, in the spring of 1980, resulted in major losses for Hassan's army and in the capture of considerable spoils (SK-105 battle tanks, French and South African AML-90 tanks, rifles, guns, vehicles...), enough, as a Polisario leader said, "to outfit an entire army," the Polisario army, of course, which asserts that its best supplier of weapons is the Moroccan Army.

Two months after the first battle, the Polisario Front attacked again, with superior forces, but this time it had to retreat in the face of a considerably bolstered Moroccan military machine. Since then, combat has been reduced to harassment activities: ambush and sabotage, whose short-term effectiveness is very limited.

The Polisario Front controls 80 or 90 percent of the territory, but this enormous stretch of land is really little more than a rear guard from which attacks can be organized and in which war materiel can be stored and troops trained.

In order to dislodge the Moroccan troops from the zones they occupy, the Polisario Front would have to shift from a guerrilla to a conventional war, and it has neither the manpower nor the weapons to do this.

But neither does Morocco have the means to control the entire Western Sahara. Its retreat to the "useful triangle" resolves nothing either, inasmuch as the Polisario Front wants to expel the Moroccans completely from the territory.

Thus, militarily speaking, the continuation of the war hinges on the aid that the two foes receive. Meanwhile, the Polisario Front's standing in the diplomatic field is growing stronger with each day. At present, more than 40 countries recognize the SDAR, and the imminence of an OAU resolution denouncing Morocco has forced King Hassan to agree to a referendum.

It has taken 6 years of war to achieve this result, which, in principle, brings the Polisario Front and Morocco closer together. There is a long way to go yet, however, before an agreement is reached on the conditions for the referendum.

In the meantime, there is the problem of population statistics. The 1974 Spanish census recorded a total of 70,000 inhabitants (this is the number that Morocco uses), whereas the Polisario says that there are a half million Saharans, an enormous discrepancy.

The Polisario is demanding that the exiled Saharans, including the more than 100 000 living in the Tinduf camps, be allowed to return to their homeland for the referendum. It is also calling for the withdrawal of Moroccan troops from the occupied lands in the Western Sahara, so that the Saharans who remained there can freely express their will, as well as the departure of Moroccan settlers, to whom the Rabat government portrayed the Western Sahara as a new promised land.

It seems unlikely that Morocco and the Polisario Front will come to terms when the time comes to determine the conditions for holding the referendum. Until Morocco agrees to sit down at the bargaining table with the Polisario Front, war will continue to ravage the Western Sahara and a people will have to endure exile.

8743
CSO: 4548/1

BRIEFS

RETURN OF EXILED OFFICIALS--Northern Yemen has lately been going through a period it has been waiting for for several years. Several leaders who had great political power have begun to return to the country in response to an appeal made by Yemeni President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. Among those who have returned so far are Judge 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Aryani, who had been living in Latakia since he decided to go into exile 6 years ago, and Field Marshal 'Abdallah al-Sallal, who had been living in Alexandria. But other Yemeni political figures are still living in exile and have not yet decided to return. Among these are Mr Ahmad Muhammad Nu'man, a former member of the Republican Assembly, who is living in Cairo with his grandchildren from the late Muhammad Nu'man, who was assassinated in Beirut and who was formerly minister of foreign affairs. The return of certain political leaders is being mentioned while the confrontation between the regime and certain tribal leaders continues. By far the most important of these tribes is the Bakil tribe whose leader is said to have fled to southern Yemen last week. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 243, 17 Oct 81 p 20] 9123

CSO: 4404/69

END

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No. 2436

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ROMANIA, PLO REPORTEDLY HELD SECRET CONTACTS

TA031220 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Nov 81 p 7

[Report by 'Oded Granot]

[Text] Secret contacts have recently been held between Romania and the PLO as part of a new Romanian initiative aimed at persuading the terrorists to allow Palestinian representatives to participate in the autonomy talks. This has been reported by Arab sources.

The report, which has so far not been confirmed by other sources, which appeared in the Kuwaiti weekly AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM, reports that a few days ago Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu met with the chairman of the "Palestinian National Council," Khalid (Fahum). Ceausescu reportedly tried to persuade him to have the [word indistinct] allow Judaea, Samaria and Gaza Strip mayors participate in the autonomy talks being conducted between Egypt, Israel and the United States.

Basing its report on information from Palestinian sources, the weekly reported that the Romanian leader has made it clear that in his view there is a chance that the autonomy talks might develop into a framework of an independent Palestinian state and it would therefore be important to incorporate Palestinians from the territories, identified as PLO supporters, in those talks.

The Romanian leader has "been very active" in holding meetings with Palestinian leaders visiting Romania.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian sources cited in the Kuwaiti weekly are reported to have said that Bucharest had encouraged the PLO to simultaneously support Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's plan for an arrangement in the Middle East claiming that the terrorists' support for the plan would pave the road for "a U.S.-Palestinian dialogue." Thus the number of countries that have granted the terrorist organizations diplomatic recognition would also increase.

The sources did not mention Khalid (Fahum's) reaction to President Ceausescu's suggestion, nor did they say whether the Romanian initiative was part of a political process that had been coordinated with other countries.

CSO: 4423/33

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH GDR--Algiers, 24 Oct (APS)--A protocol agreement was signed here Thursday between Algeria and the German Democratic Republic in the field of technical and scientific cooperation. Another contract was also signed in the Ministry of Agriculture between National Office of Agricultural Equipment (ONAMA) and its East German counterpart. Mr Erhard Schultz, GDR's vice-minister of agriculture said about the protocol agreement it opens the way to a long-term development in the field of agriculture and agricultural equipment. The two contracts ONAMA signed with its East German counterpart predict the purchase of 1,680 tractors from D.D.R. [as printed] [Text] [LD250800 Algiers APS in English 1139 GMT 24 Oct 81 LD]

CSO: 4500/37

GUIDANCE MINISTER COMPLAINS OF WESTERN MEDIA

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Oct 81 p 1, 3

[Text] TEHRAN, (Pars) - In the wake of recent propaganda attacks on the Islamic Republic of Iran the minister of Islamic Guidance, Hojjatoleslam Abodolmajid Ma'adikhah, addressed a letter to the information ministers of the member-states of the Non-Aligned Movement in order to expose the specious nature of these attacks. At the same time Minister Ma'adikhah enclosed a list of terrorist incidents by counterrevolutionaries in Iran generally not known outside of Iran in order to futher substantiate the biased nature of news imperialism.

"In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful.

"Your eminence:

"As you know the Islamic Revolution of Iran has triumphed as a divine revolution by priority to spirituality and attempting to return man to his God-given identity and origin....

"This revolution according to its divine essence and on the basis of the guidance of its eternal book, the Qoran, has constantly maintained the highest values for mankind to such an extent that it considers killing an innocent man equivalent to killing all the people of the world.

It is precisely at this point that the roots of the present confrontations and difficulties of this revolution have to be sought in its God-given and humane essence as opposed to the ungodly and inhumane character of its principal enemy, the United States and its allies.

"The greatest danger that imperialism has been faced with as a result of the Islamic Revolution is not the fact that it has lost its interests in the Iranian oil resources or has been prevented from destroying industry or agriculture in Iran, or even that its foreign advisers have been expelled, but is rather the fact that the revolution has presented the world with a set of sublime and pure values for liberating mankind from oppression. It is precisely for this reason that imperialism is making every efforts to distort and present an unreal image of this revolution and has thus embarked on its most extensive international plots through rumourmongers and the Zionist news agencies, by distorting the news and disseminating falsehoods.

Recently this plot has focused on distorting the truth about our people's just confrontation with the internal agents of great satan, the corrupt and terrorists.

"Compared to the Islamic Revolution of Iran, few revolutions in the world have been so benevolent and forgiving towards their enemies...

"In few revolutions have the counterrevolutionaries so ferociously and savagely assassinated innocent people in the streets and public forum, great scholars and representatives of the people. Even infants are not spared from their cruelty. We believe that all this brutality and savagery of the internal and external enemies of this revolution are due to the fact that the continuation of this revolution endangers the entire existance of the world's super criminals.

Considering the great responsibility that we feel, these actions do not frighten us and, being aware of our enemy's anti-humanitarian nature, we do not expect anything else.

"We are certain that you are not unaware of the fabricated nature of the news and propaganda system of international imperialism under American leadership and the philosophy behind it. Have you taken steps to expose it?

"Have you thought of any solution to save the oppressed countries from the domination of the Western mass media that attempt to repress the facts about authentic revolutions according to imperialism's whims? In that case inform us as well, so that we may support and accompany you.

"Do you not believe that the Iranian revolution in spite of the greatness of its dimensions has had the lowest number of counterrevolutionaries executed in spite of which it has been the target of the most extensive and at the same time, the most ugly slanders? The imperialistic mass media had spread the greatest and most unprecedented propaganda on an international level in the manner of a sympathetic nanny. If this is your belief what have you done to clarify the truth?

"God Almighty, the oppressed people whose liberation from the most complicated forms of slavery, we seek and future history which is unfolding of at astonishing rate, shall be the witnesses of our actions and the just judges. 9

CSO: 4600/104

ISLAM WOULD RULE ENTIRE WORLD SHOULD MOSLEMS 'RISE EN MASSE'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 25 Oct 81 p 1

[Commentary by Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian: "Why Only Iran?"]

[Text]

ONE of the most valuable lessons we learned in the course of Hajj rituals in our meetings with people of all nationalities and politico-religious personalities from different countries was that "now people expect everything from Iran alone!!"

It would appear that today all the world's Moslems expect Iran to fight back all conspiracies of Eastern and Western imperialists, to topple the US and USSR with all their satanic power, to win the imposed war and to do away with Saddam's regime, to establish radio stations in all languages and to . . . . In short, I must say that the world's Moslems expect Islamic Iran to revenge all exploitative and treacherous acts done to the oppressed throughout history.

What is to be said is that the Moslem nation of Iran has risen for the oblitration of tyranny throughout the world and will not seize its struggle until a global Islamic government is established.

To topple the ex-shah, the symbol of American dictatorship, the Iranians dedicated over 70,000 martyrs and 100,000 crippled fighters and after his toppling when the time came for standing face to face with the US, they have sacrificed thousands of martyrs and crippled for the cause of Islam.

And, it has been for the first time in the history of world's revolution that both people and their leaders have been martyred for the same goal.

This nation has presented its greatest political and Islamic personalities such as Beheshti, Motahari, Rajai and Bahonar for the sake of its revolution. It has also sacrificed thousands of its children in the battlefronts and as a result of the internal conspiracies of Monafeqin (hypocrites) in order to preserve its Islamic Revolution.

Regardless of victory or defeat, this nation considers its combat and resistance as Godly duties and it will remain faithful to fulfil its commitments until the last drop of blood in the veins of such fighters.

But the question we would like to set forth before world's Moslems, is that are the Iranians the only Moslem people? Should the Jehad against infidelity (the US and Russia) and hypocricy be considered as the exclusive duty of Iranian Moslems? Are the hands of the Eastern-Western exploiters cut from the other Islamic countries? Are there now real Islamologists and successors of the Holy Prophet ruling over them? Were hundreds of the Qoranic verses regarding Jehad against disbelievers and hypocrites sent down to the Holy Prophet and the Iranian Moslems alone? Aren't there any other infidel and Monafeq in other Islamic lands?

The world's Moslems should know that though the Iranian Moslem nation is active according to Divine obligation and also has sacrificed lives and properties to this end. But the Iranian nation is just one nation while the enemies of Islam are almost all the government of the world!

It is true that the Iran's Moslem nation has taken the responsibility of leading the uprising of the world Moslems, but each leadership needs a nation and the Iranian Moslems, therefore, need all the world nations as one whole nation.

If the world's Moslems would rise to liberate themselves from the domination of the Superpowers and establish a real Islamic government, the exploiters could not then engineer all kinds of plots against Iranian Moslems. If the Superpowers were engaged in some critical situation in other lands, the Iranian nation could easily accomplish all the goals of the oppressed.

Our last word is that if all of the world's Moslems feel committed before Islam and be ready to strive and sacrifice for its goals and rise enmasse, in a day's time all the enemies of Islam such as the US, USSR, Israel and . . . would be sent to the dustbin of history and the liberating Islam will rule all-over the world.

CSO: 4600/107

PARTICIPATION OF CLERGY IN POLITICS EMPHASIZED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Oct 81 p 1

[Commentary by Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian: "Clergy and Politics"]

[Text] An African brother once told me that the cause of all the misfortunes of the world's Moslems are their clergy, while the reason for your victory and materializing of Islam in Iran was also your clerics.

He added that through separating religion from politics, the clergy was the main factor in creating misfortunes for the Moslems around the world and that he had actually experienced it in his land.

He believed that such clergymen had left the fate of the Moslems in the hands of the Eastern-Western superpowers while they believed it sufficed to talk only on how to perform religious rituals etc.

"Iran's Islamic Revolution" he said "proved that the main elements for your victory were also your clerics. But it is not clear to us how it happened so and how are Iranian affairs are now run. He also asked us how it was possible to have so many clergymen in our Islamic Consultative Assembly and how they could decide on all those various political, administrative and governmental issues?

In reply we explained the issues to him and our other brothers should also know that:

The Iranian clergy has seriously entered the arena of Jihad and Islamic politics through its unceasing campaign against the tyrant and puppet regimes of the Superpowers in the last 100 years.

Imam Khomeini's thesis is that "our religion is our very politics and our politics is our very religion." This thesis has practically been put into practice by Seyyed Jamal Asadabadi almost hundred years ago and it has today reached a 100 percent positive result with Imam Khomeini.

The Iranian clergy have realized the practices of the Prophet of Islam (SAW) and are following in his line. Hazrat Mohammad (SAW) spent most of his time in the battlefronts against infidelity and hypocricy and for the establishment of Islamic government and the social issues of the Moslems, while paying attention to worship in Islam a primary duty.

The prophet of Islam (SAW) never sat in the mosque so that the Abu-Sofians could do whatever they wanted and let the Superpowers of East (old Iran) and West (old Rome) do as they wanted. In every day congregational prayers in the Mosque of Hazrat Mohammad (SAW) people attended prayers in well-formed lines and after that the Mujahedins of Islam were present at the Mosque in well-informed and determined lines for the Jihad (waging the Holy war in the cause of Islam.)

Anyhow, the Islamic clergy in Iran with their struggles throughout the centuries, have become experts in the Islamic content in every respect of the country's affairs. Our Parliament is formed of clergymen, economists, Socialists, mathematicians and....

And the oppressed martyr, Ayatollah Behshti, a symbol of Islamic clergy in Iran, in addition to his mastery on Islamic jurisprudence, was also in full command of the four languages, English, Arabic German and Farsi. On political affairs, he was a very knowledgeable man as well as an efficient and prudent and at the same time he was an efficient economist. No intellectual in the world could be like him.

However, Islamic clergymen should avoid looking on Islam from only one dimension and they must enter into Islamic politics in the same way that the Holy Prophet of Islam did. They must cut the hands of the Usurpers from political power and they form an Islamic government. And they must strive to become competent and efficient elements on all political and administrative affairs of the government.

Our last word is that until such time as governments are not formed by Islamic jurisprudence and policies not determined by them, any hope for implementing Islamic principles, or striving for justice and the liberation of the oppressed will be in vain.

CSO: 4600/106

ISLAMIC PLAN FOR ECONOMY, TRADE OUTLINED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Oct 81 p 6

[Text] The most important goals of the nationalization of foreign trade are to secure the economic independence of the country, accelerate national economic growth, prevent the escape and plunder of capital, regulate the general level of prices, and secure revenues for the government.

The following plan for foreign and domestic national trade has been founded on the basis of the objectives and principles of an Islamic economy. In Part One, the present structure of foreign and domestic trade within and outside the country is presented. In Part Two, the principles of the organization and connections of the plan are stated. In Part Three, the difficulties and operational stages are studied. It is hoped that this plan, which is only general, will be noted by the proper authorities. What you read below has been taken from EQTESAD-E ESLAMI, No 4:

Part One

1. The nationalization of foreign trade has many objectives, the most important of which are:

A. Securing the country's economic independence.

B. Accelerating the country's economic growth.

C. Preventing foreign plunderers from transferring capital and national resources abroad.

D. Regulating the general level of prices and the just distribution of wealth.

E. Securing governmental revenues.

2. The import structure of the domestic sector consists of the following groups:

A. Importers who are familiar with foreign markets, prices, customs issues, currency and banking affairs, transportation, insurance, and the release of merchandise [from customs] and who are responsible for determining the market, kind of merchandise, prices, purchasing, transportation, and release of commodities.

B. Major merchants who, with their familiarity with the domestic market, determine the kind and amount of imported goods and commodities to be purchased and put the information at the disposal of the first group.

C. The major distributors in cities in various fields who are responsible for receiving goods from the major merchants for distribution among the retailers.

D. Small distributors or retailers, who receive the goods from the above group and sell them to the consumers.

Obviously, concerning certain goods and commodities, especially industrial and investment goods and commodities, the form of the various groups might not be complete as mentioned. In certain cases, two or even the first three groups might be combined. Occasionally, even, a consumer which is also a production or assembly unit may take over the purchase and consumption of the goods directly.

3. The structure of imports in the foreign sector usually consists of the following groups:

A. Producers who, for the most part, only produce and leave the export of their goods to other groups.

B. Export agents of the producers, which may be representatives of the producer or independent export companies.

C. Regional export agents, who are responsible for determining the sale policies, prices, and general conditions which are selected by the previous group.

D. Special export agents of each country who are given the responsibility by the previous group to negotiate, determine prices and kinds of commodities, conditions set on banking affairs, transportation, and the signing of contracts.

Obviously, in this case too, for certain goods and commodities, in accordance with the policies or resources of the producers, the first

two or three groups or the last three groups might be combined and the producers might directly deal with the importer, the merchant, or the industrial or governmental consumer.

4. Noting the makeup of the groups concerned with the import affairs of the domestic and foreign sectors, one can see how high the cost to the consumer may increase. In the economy of an Islamic society, there is no room for such middlemen. Efforts must be made, as much as possible, to purchase goods directly from the producers or their authorized representatives and put them at the disposal of the ultimate consumers or their representatives.

5. The ultimate consumers of imported goods and commodities consist of the following groups:

A. Families who are the consumers of foodstuff, perishable and durable consumer goods and commodities, and hygiene and medical goods and commodities.

B. Producers who are consumers of raw materials and intermediary industrial, agricultural, animal husbandry, and construction goods.

6. The export structure in the domestic sector consists of the following groups:

A. Small dealers and middlemen who purchase agricultural, animal husbandry, handicraft industrial products and carpets from villages and small workshops.

B. Major dealers and middlemen in the cities who purchase the above-mentioned goods from the first group or directly from the producers.

C. Exporting merchants or producers of some of the consumer goods who are responsible for exporting foodstuff, animal products, handicrafts, carpets, and perishable and durable consumer goods.

Obviously, in cases concerning some goods or commodities, two or three groups may be combined.

7. The export structure in the foreign sector consists of the following groups:

A. Major Iranian or foreign importers.

B. Major distributors.

C. Retailers.

Obviously, again, in the case of some goods or commodities, such as carpets, agricultural raw materials, and animal products, two or

three groups may be combined. The importer and the ultimate consumer of some industrial and agricultural raw materials may even be the same.

8. Exports are the most important channel of transferring capital abroad. The importing power of any country depends on its exporting power. If monetary resources obtained through exports do not return to the country as imports, economic poverty and stagnation will result.

9. Considering the makeup of the export groups in both the domestic and foreign sectors, one can see that the actual money received by the producer makes up a rather insignificant part of the final selling price and the major portion goes to domestic and foreign middlemen. In the economy of an Islamic society, there is no room for these middlemen. The government must receive the materials and goods directly from the producers or their representatives and, as far as possible, put them at the disposal of the ultimate consumers abroad directly. The increased share received by domestic producers will provide the necessary motivation for the production of export goods.

Part Two

10. With the establishment of "distribution and consumption cooperative companies" and "distribution and production cooperative companies" in every city, guild, and area and with the nationwide formation of "cooperative unions" in consumer and production areas, in addition to the elimination of all the different middlemen in the areas of production, distribution, and consumption, certain equipped distribution units will be created directly which will be able to determine the annual needs of their members from the standpoints of the kind and amount of goods and commodities as well as other particulars and put them at the disposal of the Ministry of Commerce.

11. In the consumer sector consisting of families which usually consume foodstuff and perishable and durable goods, the "cooperative organization of cities and villages" may carry out the duty of the distribution and consumption cooperative union nationwide. Of course, the distribution network of cities and villages must expand greatly.

12. In the production sector, every special production area must first take steps to create distribution and production cooperative units in that special field. For instance, the following unions might be named.

A cooperative union for the production and distribution of agricultural goods and products.

A cooperative union for the production and distribution of animal husbandry goods and commodities.

A cooperative union for the production and distribution of construction goods and commodities.

A cooperative union for the production and distribution of metal products and the like.

13. The major duty of these unions concerning imports is to determine the annual needs in terms of goods and commodities of all the cooperative companies which are members of the union. These estimates will be put at the disposal of the Ministry of Commerce in the form of requests for the purchase of import goods and commodities. In exports, the above-mentioned unions will purchase all the exportable goods and commodities of their member cooperative companies and submit the proposals for their sale to the Ministry of Commerce.

14. The net profit of the cooperative companies may be determined at a maximum of five percent and the net profit of cooperative unions at a maximum of two percent.

15. Specialized "import groups" and "export groups" will be formed in the Ministry of Commerce to carry out import and export duties. These groups may be formed in accordance with the classifications of the Brussels customs tarrif of goods and commodities. In certain cases, two or three parts of this classification may be combined or one part may be divided into two or three groups. All imported and exported goods and commodities may be officially classified on the basis of the Brussels customs tarrif which was ratified on 1350/3/30 [24 May 71] in 21 parts and 19 chapters, which the government of Iran also follows in regards to the regulations and statistics on its foreign trade.

The 21 main parts of the trade classification of goods and commodities of the above-mentioned customs tarrif are as follows.

Part 1. Livestock and animal products

Part 2. [Vegetable] products

Part 3. Edible fats and oils

Part 4. Food industry products

Part 5. Mineral products

Part 6. The products of chemical and related industries

Part 7. Plastic materials and related and similar goods

Part 8. Hide and leather goods and commodities

Part 9. Wooden goods and commodities and similar products

Part 10. Paper and related and similar goods and products

Part 11. Textile fibers and related goods and products

Part 12. Shoes, umbrellas, and similar goods

Part 13. Stone and cement products and similar goods and commodities

Part 14. Pearls and similar precious goods and products

Part 15. Ordinary metals and related products

Part 16. Machinery and mechanical and electrical equipment

Part 17. Vehicles and parts

Part 18. Photography and cinema goods and commodities

Part 19. Arms and ammunition

Part 20. Various miscellaneous objects and commodities (consumer)

Part 21. Art objects, collections, and antiques

The import and export groups may be formed on the basis of the above classification with regards to volume, marketing difficulties, and the amount and kind of goods and commodities.

16. The import or export groups in the Ministry of Commerce may consist of the following members.

1. The director of the group (the senior commerce specialist)

2. Commerce specialist

3. Commerce specialist

17. Each one of these groups must be specialized in one particular area of import or export goods and commodities from the standpoints of production markets, consumer markets, production costs, wholesale and retail prices, domestic and international transportation costs, insurance, domestic and international trade regulations, currency and banking regulations, establishing credit, the transfer of currency and release of goods from customs. As mentioned, these groups must be classified according to kind of commercial goods and commodities and not on the basis of country or geographical region, because a

particular commodity might possible be produced and offered in various parts of the world with similar or different characteristics and prices and it is necessary for the decision maker to be aware of all these conditions.

18. The Ministry of Commerce will receive the [information concerning the] import needs or the specifications on export goods directly from the consumption or production cooperative unions and will put the information at the disposal of the appropriate import or export groups. The import or export group, with consideration for governmental trade policies, the national plan for economic growth, and national foreign policy, will determine the best suppliers of the imported goods and commodities or the best purchaser of export goods and commodities. This shall be done through direct contacts by these groups with the foreign producers or their official export agents and also the major purchasers of Iranian export goods. To facilitate this work, the embassies and consulates of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in foreign countries may collect information concerning the specifications of the [goods] of the buyers or suppliers and the kind and price of their goods and commodities. This information will be given to the Ministry of Commerce and ultimately to the import and export groups.

19. Before any final transactions by the above-mentioned groups, the results of their investigations will be taken to the "purchasing and selling commission" or the commission of transactions for a final decision and approval. The members of the commission are appointed by the minister of commerce. Their major duties are:

A. To approve the kind, amount, price, and source of purchase of the imported goods and commodities.

B. To approve the kind, amount, price, and destination of the sale of exported materials and goods.

C. To approve the sale price of imported goods and commodities to cooperative unions.

D. To approve the purchasing price of export materials and goods from the cooperative unions.

The above very important duties play an essential role in determining the level of domestic prices, the rate of domestic inflation, the rate of governmental revenues and expenditures in the area of commerce, encouraging or discouraging imports or exports, encouraging or stopping domestic growth of production and goods, increasing or decreasing domestic or foreign consumer goods and commodities, and also distributing the wealth among the different economic and social groups. The plans for economic growth in different production and consumption sectors, the economic and political independence of the

country, and the distribution of income and wealth among the various domestic groups and domestic and foreign groups [as published] will be immediately and strongly affected by the various changes in the above policies. Hence, the government must clarify in detail its essential guidelines and policies in all the above cases and put them at the disposal of the Ministry of Commerce.

20. The members of the purchasing and selling commission may be made up of nine senior experts of whom four are presented by the Ministries of Agriculture, Finance and Economic Affairs, Industries and Mines, and Housing and Development.

21. Upon the approval of the purchasing and selling commission, the import and export groups will take steps to establish credit for imports or request the establishment of bank credits for export from the buyer in accordance with the regulations on governmental transactions and they will transport or deliver the materials and goods in accordance with the credit conditions ratified by the above Commission.

22. Imported materials and goods shall be distributed, after their release, among the cooperative unions on the basis of prices set by the purchasing and selling commission. In certain cases, the release of some of the goods and commodities may be conferred on the cooperative unions. The export materials and goods must be purchased by foreign buyers from the cooperative unions on the basis of prices approved by the purchasing and selling commission and put at the disposal of the Ministry before the establishment of bank credit. Essentially, it would be better for the Ministry of Commerce to announce beforehand its export policies concerning the kind, amount, and price of goods and commodities and take steps to purchase and deliver them as soon as the cooperative unions present them. These goods and commodities may be offered again in certain cases in the domestic market in order to regulate the level of prices or eliminate shortages.

23. Since the import and export of goods is the prerogative of the government and their prices, as mentioned, are determined by the purchasing and selling commission of the Ministry of Commerce, the extensive customs organization which evaluates, collects customs duties, and handles financial affairs, and which can become a source of corruption, may be completely eliminated. The government revenues from the import and export of goods and commodities will result from the policies and actions of the purchasing and selling commission. These revenues may be kept in an account opened for this purpose. All monetary transactions of the government involving imports and exports should be handled through this account.

24. Obviously, the government may, in many cases, exchange goods with countries upon determining the purchase price of imports and the selling price of exports in rials. Meanwhile, foreign trade must be primarily directed towards expanding import sources and, secondly, towards dealing with the developing countries of the Third World.

25. The nationwide distribution of imported goods and commodities or the collection of export goods and commodities, as mentioned, is the responsibility of the private sector through the network of cooperative unions and companies. The role of the government is only to import or export the goods and commodities and determine their distribution prices. In order to prevent real or artificial shortages and to prevent the black market, the government must create many storages and store an abundance of goods and commodities.

26. The organizational plan concerning the above items is summarized in detail in the attached chart.

Part Three

27. The issues specified above consist of the guidelines and organization of the foreign and domestic trade of the government sector and the private sector at such a stage when the above plan has been fully implemented and all the difficulties in the operational stages have been eliminated. But, achieving that stage will not be without its difficulties and restrictions, the most important of which are:

A. The existence of importing and exporting groups, major merchants, wholesalers, and retailers in every commodity group on the national level.

B. The lack of distribution, consumption, and production cooperative companies and unions.

C. The lack of expert import and export groups and the lack of expertise.

The existing people in the cadre of the Ministry of Commerce in carrying out the above-mentioned duties and responsibilities [as published].

D. The lack of a purchasing and selling commission.

E. The lack of a general governmental policy regarding economic growth, importing and exporting, the general level of prices, the rate of inflation, etc.

Should the government make an immediate decision concerning Paragraphs D and E above, the difficulties and restrictions of

Paragraphs A, B, and C above would still impede the rapid and immediate implementation of the plan.

28. The individuals and groups cited in Paragraph A, Item 27, not only refuse to cooperate with the government and the Ministry of Commerce, but create obstacles to the plan's successful implementation. It is said that by putting an end to their hold over imports and exports, not only will a belligerent faction be created, but smuggling operations and the black market will increase. In regards to these groups, it must be noted that except for the retailers and major distributors, who can gradually be absorbed by the cooperative companies and unions, the number of these individuals hardly reaches 2,000. Therefore, the issue of unemployment will not be a major problem for them, who mostly enjoy sufficient financial power. And as for smuggling and the black market, it must be noted that these issues have existed in other countries which have taken steps towards nationalizing foreign trade and saving domestic trade from the hands of middlemen and dealers, however gradually, through government control and the elimination of their main source of income, which is mostly currency obtained through exports. Through imposing strong penalties as well as the government offering an abundance of inexpensive goods and commodities, these factors and difficulties have been eliminated. In any case, the engagement in smuggling of a small group cannot prevent the implementation of the general policies of a country.

29. By solving the difficulties caused by Paragraph A, Item 27, in the above manner, the real and practical restrictions will only be those of Paragraphs B and C of the above-mentioned item. The creation of cooperative companies and unions and the formation of import and export groups with the above-mentioned information and expertise requires detailed planning, the complete implementation of which will take at least one to two years. The preparation and implementation of this plan may be conferred on the Ministry of Commerce, which, in addition to forming and training the Ministry's import and export groups, will establish distribution, consumption, or production companies and unions in every place and guild with the cooperation of other ministries and government and private organizations.

30. Noting the time, expertise, training, and organizational restrictions mentioned in the above item, we are forced to speak of the gradual implementation of the plan to nationalize foreign and domestic trade. In other countries, too, this has been done gradually. Noting the ultimate goals before us and noting the above restrictions, it seems better to start with goods and commodities for which where there exists more preparedness and resources. For instance, (as the government has previously announced) [as published].

A first step might be taken in the area of foodstuff and consumer goods (for families), for which there is more expertise and preparedness in the Ministry of Commerce and the cooperative organization of cities and villages, which have the ability to determine the kind and amount of their purchase and distribution.

Then, we can immediately work on the next area of goods and commodities for which there is the most preparedness and resources in comparison with other goods and commodities. In this way, with the gradual formation of import and export groups and their training in all areas of goods and commodities and with the gradual establishment of cooperative companies and unions in the area of goods and commodities, the job can be accomplished to its final stage.

31. The gradual implementation of the nationalization of foreign and domestic trade reduces the dangers mentioned in Item 28 to a great extent. In otherwords, without creating the danger of sudden shortages of imported goods and commodities in the country, the persons of the groups cited in Paragraph A of Item 27 will have the opportunity to conform the implementation of their plan with the new conditions and with this opportunity, they can begin to select new professional fields. As mentioned, retailers can begin work in the sale network of the cooperative companies and wholesalers in the cooperative unions. In the course of regulating the plan to transfer these individuals, the Ministry of Commerce can benefit from their expertise and experiences in the cooperative companies and unions.

32. The next important point is how to control imports and exports in the course of the implementary stages of the plan. In the case of imported goods, it may be decided that the establishment of any kind of credit for the import of goods and commodities before the formation of the groups and the cooperative companies and unions be subject to the approval of the "purchasing and selling commission" mentioned above of the Ministry of Commerce. This commission will study the import requests from the standpoints of kind, price, amount, and source, noting the issues discussed previously, and will either approve or reject them according to the policies of the government. With exports, the export of carpets may be conferred upon the "Iranian Carpet Company" until the formation of cooperative companies and unions of the producers of carpets. The Iranian Carpet Company can either purchase the export carpets directly and export them, or set their export prices and by obtaining monetary agreements issue permits for their export. In the case of other export items, since they do not make up a major portion and are generally goods which can be consumed domestically, their export can be postponed until the formation of cooperative companies and unions. In the case of pressure in this area, the export of these goods may also be studied and either approved or rejected by the purchasing and selling commission on the basis of the kind, price, amount, and destination.

33. Obviously, the issues raised above form a general plan and only essential, major issues have been studied and considered. Therefore, dozens of foreseeable and unforseeable problems and difficulties must all be analyzed and eliminated in the course of the implementation of the plan with considerations for the essential and ultimate goals of the plan and the Islamic economy.

Oh faithful, help yourself and God will help you and strengthen your steps.

Abolqasem Dabirian-Tehrani



The Plan for Organizations and the Relations of National Foreign and Domestic Trade

Key:

1. Cooperative Company
2. Cooperative Union
3. Ministry of Commerce
4. Purchasing and Selling Commission
5. Export Group
6. Import Group
7. Foreign Buyers
8. Foreign Producers or Suppliers

9593
CSO: 4640/30

FUTURE ECONOMY OF COUNTRY TO BE BASED ON COOPERATIVES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 27 Oct 81 p 11

[Text] The government must directly take steps to import goods.

The local cooperatives for consumption which stem from the mosques are the most reliable distribution system at the present time.

We do not have a free economy in the sense that anyone can do whatever he wants.

Previously established cooperatives need basic revision.

The interview with brother Hasan Ja'fari, the deputy commerce minister for domestic trade, which you read below, was done by the correspondent of the internal publication TA'AVON, one of the publications of the central organization of national cooperatives. In this interview, difficulties in the national economy, cooperatives in Islam, and the solution to the problem of distribution are discussed. Since the views of brother Hasan Ja'fari may reflect the ideological line governing the Ministry of Commerce concerning the solution to the problem of distribution, we will read together a summary of this interview.

Trade and Distribution

[Question] Much of the economic difficulties lie in the areas of trade and distribution. In your view, what solutions can be offered to ensure that the trade and distribution of domestically produced and imported goods are carried out so as to eliminate the present middlemen and merchants?

Ja'fari: This question has two basic parts: one concerning foreign trade and the other, the issue of domestic trade. As for foreign

trade, the Constitution has clarified what must be done. Foreign trade must be nationalized. In this part, in regards to our monetary limitations, on the whole, we must follow a line (which we are presently following) of nationalizing foreign trade. In other words, the government must take direct steps to import goods.

But, in the areas of domestic trade or distribution, the government need not enter into action in that form to such an extent. Depending on the particular existing economic conditions, the government must only supervise distribution. That is, we do not have and cannot have a free economy in the sense that anyone can do whatever he wants. But, within the framework of Islamic standards and with the supervision of the government, that is, with the government as a supervisor, we will be able to, God willing, improve the conditions of domestic distribution. Now, this condition of domestic distribution depends partly on those who work in the private sector, who do their work freely, and partly on the cooperatives. In my opinion, the latter plays the most essential role.

> [Question] In your opinion, can the present cooperatives for distribution and consumption, in their present form, play an essential and useful role in eliminating the economic difficulties?

Ja'fari: Cooperatives for distribution, which usually concern the guilds, have not, unfortunately, been created in the desired form or with that motivation. Some of them are leftover from the past and need basic reform. The distribution cooperatives are acceptable themselves, but when they have been reformed. And, concerning cooperatives for consumption, they exist in general forms: First, those cooperatives such as the Ettehadiyyeh-ye Emkan [Resource Union] and Ettehadiyyeh-ye Markazi-ye Ta'avoni-ye Keshvar [Central Union of National Cooperatives] and so on. Then, those cooperatives which were established as local cooperatives for consumption. The government, resource, or military cooperatives and other cooperatives were established before and, like the distribution cooperatives, in my opinion, need basic revision. But the cooperatives which were established after the revolution, the local cooperatives for consumption, can, for different reasons, better carry out the duties which have been assigned to the distribution sector since the revolution. And the reasons are many.

> [Question] Do the cooperatives, especially cooperatives for consumption, operate on the basis of Islamic economic standards or not and what are the reasons?

Ja'fari: Of course, some of them operate on this basis, that is, among them, there are cooperatives for distribution which operate in accordance with Islamic standards. Precisely those items which we

see on the market with controlled prices that have not been manipulated or overly inflated are the result of the cooperatives which maintain the prices. But in most instances, unfortunately, this is not the case. The reasons are as I mentioned earlier: because they were created before and they did not have the desired motivation which, from the standpoint of cooperatives, would be in harmony with the conditions of the revolution. They require reform and must be reformed. We are presently making an effort in this regard to rapidly aid the brothers in the central organization of cooperatives to make reforms. God willing, we will reform them to the best of our ability very soon and place them in a just Islamic distribution system.

[Question] What should the relationship between cooperation and cooperatives be?

Ja'fari: The truth is, the presence of the government and government aid to the cooperatives in some cases cannot be negated. On the other hand, if the government were to be totally in charge of the cooperatives, or in other words, the cooperatives were to rely heavily on the government or belong to the government, these cooperatives could not solve their own problems. Therefore, to answer more openly, the problem is that cooperatives require the assistance of the people in solving their own problems and the government can play a helping role. But, if the government were to directly involve itself, to be in charge completely and create governmental cooperatives, then, this would be uncharacteristic of cooperatives. But, in some places, cooperatives need financial help. They need a place to go to city halls and banks [as published]. And the government helps them in their business. But, in the long run, they must stand on their own feet and the people must manage their own affairs.

[Question] What thesis does Islam offer concerning cooperatives and what is the socio-economic philosophy concerning cooperatives in Islam?

Ja'fari: Perhaps it can be stated clearly that cooperatives in the form that exists in Islam have not been presented in any other school of thought.

The clear reason is that in different economic systems, cooperatives are not allowed to flourish. That is, it has been a phenomenon that would not fit completely, as it must, in these systems. But, in Islam, cooperatives, in a broad sense, exist in all areas, which cannot be enumerated. And cooperatives exist in the specific economic sense as well in the form of local cooperatives for consumption which stem from the mosques, are supervised by the mosques, and which assist the people. They have been formed with shares invested by the people and can serve as examples of Islamic economic

cooperatives, which have already shown themselves to be one of our most reliable systems of distribution at the present time.

[Question] What is meant by general cooperatives and the production and distribution economy mentioned in the Constitution?

Ja'fari: It seems that that part of the general cooperative concerns the first part of the previous question, which I explained. That is, in Islam, a cooperative, in its general form concerns all areas and in the next part, an economy based on cooperatives for production and distribution. That is, the basis of our economy in the future, God willing, will be cooperatives. That is, a great part of our economy will be cooperative. That is, it will be the economy of the people themselves, people who have gathered to form the cooperatives. Their activity is in production, which concerns the most essential kind of cooperatives, which must be discussed and worked on more. And then, distribution must be worked on. Perhaps what is meant by distribution in the Constitution covers consumption as well. That is, they come together themselves, produce goods and distribute them themselves. More work than in any other area must be done in cooperatives for production. Especially the central organization of cooperatives and related organizations must spend more time and energy in this area. Specifically because if there is a cure for our economy, the source is production and we must solve our production problems in any way possible. One of the solutions is in the form of cooperatives for production, which can work very successfully within the framework of Islamic guidelines.

Another issue that comes to mind is that in the future, as it has been foreseen in the Constitution, we will have an economy of Islamic cooperatives. It is a great duty to have the greater part of our economy based on cooperatives. It is a great duty which will be placed on the shoulders of organizations working in cooperative areas. And the necessary manpower and planning must be provided, which is being provided, as some of us who are involved know. And these will prepare the necessary bases and grounds for creating such an Islamic cooperative economy. This is no small responsibility for our brothers who work in these areas. We hope that within the framework of Islamic guidelines, through understanding cooperatives in Islam, finding Islamic guidelines for cooperatives, and implementing them, we will be able to show in practice that what has been mentioned in the Constitution as a cooperative economy is implementable in our country, especially to other Islamic countries and all countries of the world which want to follow these guidelines. And, God willing, our brothers will be successful.

9593
CSO: 4640/42

NEWSPAPER RESPONDS TO SYRIAN EMBASSY LETTER OF PROTEST

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 31 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

WITH REGARD TO inaccurate information published in the TEHRAN TIMES newspaper about Syria, a reply is being provided by the Syrian Embassy in Tehran.

When the new management of the TEHRAN TIMES accepted the responsibility of this paper a few months ago, they announced that they are determined to spread the Islamic teachings and operate the daily as the real voice of the Islamic Revolution. We were among those who considered this as a good omen and expressed our hopes for their success.

But unfortunately within the last few months it is observed that this daily or it is better to say that some of the members on the management, whenever they can, in editorials signed by Mousavian or Jama-at Ol-Moslemin or without any endorsement and by relying on mischievous news released by Zionistic news agencies, are trying to harm the close relations between Iran and Syria, in this way they are expressing their disenchantment over such friendly ties.

They are not happy with the relations of Revolution with its closest allies. And recently, these people unable to tolerate the growing relations between Syria and Iran, have clearly shown their hatred on these relations. They also expect rom the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran to spoil these relations.

Following is the short description taken out from the TIMES which are enough to prove their hatred.

This newspaper on 19-10-1981 in its editorial section published an article, signed by Haj Mousavian, in which it was said that in his meeting with Syrian Moslem brothers during the Hajj (Pilgrimage) ceremonies, the Syrian Moslem brothers expressed their dissatisfaction on the close relations of the Islamic Republic of Iran with unpopular and Soviet affiliated government of Syria.

Brother Mousavian, after his meeting with Syrian Moslem brothers promised them the termination of relations between Syria and Iran if their claims were proven true. Then brother Mousavian openly avoided the Foreign Ministry of Iran from its expansion of relation with a government such as Syrian government,. There were also some other issues published in this article of which repeatation is only a waste of time.

But we ask from the writer of this article who are those you met in Saudi Arabia?

And how is it possible that you defend their position and publish their views while requesting the Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran to sever its relation with Syria so quickly?

Is it possible that, for example, a Syrian reporter, after meeting with a few opposers of the Islamic regime of Iran, while claiming that they support Islam, support their position and publish their claims in Syrian papers?

This is only a part of the fact that is being published in the respectful newspaper of the TEHRAN TIMES and we leave the judgement to you.

Besides, the just stand and the support Syria enjoys from the Islamic Revolution of Iran helps us to ignore such issues and prevents us from getting enraged over them. And we are sure that what has been published in this newspaper cannot reflect the stand and opinion of the Islamic Revolution as well as the line of Imam.

WE recently received a letter from the Syrian Embassy in Tehran protesting our articles of "A look at the Foreign Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran" which appeared in our Monday, Oct. 19, 81 issue. The letter says in part:

Of course the above is not the full text of the Syrian Embassy's letter but since our editorial has been the main object of their protest, we, therefore

quoted the concerned part only.

In connection, with our editorial the embassy has claimed that "Brother Musavian has promised his brothers that if their claims are proven true the Iranian-Syrian relations will be severed."

In other part of their letter the Syrian embassy has asked us to substantiate our reason for defending so hastily the stand of those we met in Mecca and Medina and for asking the Iranian Foreign Ministry to sever ties with Syria.

However, our defending stand of the opponents of Syrian government , it must be observed that after quoting their views we have explicitly said .. "and we do not propose to enter in the polemics as to whether the Libyan and Syrian governments are actually being supported by their people or not. Nor do we propose to determine whether they are Islamic governments or not. Nor again do we wish to go into the question of whether their relations with the Eastern Imperialists are the same as the relations that of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and others with the US."

Concerning the issue of breaking relations with Syrian government , it should be noted that we did not have any notion as such and we only expressed one of the principles of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy that : "..... It has always been the firm and undeviating policy of the Islamic Republic regime to base its relations with other regimes taking into consideration inalienable popularity of regimes among the masses of their people, and the corollary of their independence both from the USSR and US."

And in another part of the same editorial we wrote" .... If it were proved that any government was serving the interests of a Superpower, be it either from the East or West, and it stood against Islam and its own people then Islamic Republic of Iran stood ready to severe its political relations with such a regime or regimes

We had also added that We asked our pilgrim brothers to take a look at the way in which Iran had severed ties completely with the regime of Anwar Sadat in Egypt, or that of the Jordanian Shah Hussein or at our limited contacts with the Saudi regime "

And "The Islamic Republic has time and again expressed itself prepared to extend help to all people wherever it becomes necessary

Hence, our call for severing ties was only in the context of what has already been mentioned above, and we do not think we have committed anything wrong by stating so.

We believe it to be a 100 per cent truthful concept and similarly the officials of the islamic government and the Iranian Moslem nation believe it in too.

We have not asked the Foreign Ministry to sever ties with Syria but what we asked them was:

(a) Relations should be established through sounding out views held by the common people of that country and not limit it to diplomatic levels. They must send delegations among the masses of that country to investigate and realise the stand of that government.

(b) They must establish relations with any government according to views and wills of the nations, and they should evaluate each government through the popularity it enjoys with the masses.

Regrettably, the Syrian Embassy in Tehran has claimed that "the views published in the said editorials cannot reflect the stand of the Islamic Revolution and the Imam's line."

We hereby ask them to refer to the statements made by the Imam so that they can get better acquainted with the position of the Islamic Revolution which in itself is the Imam's line and not so hastily condemn the children of the Revolution and followers of Imam.

Imam Khomeini in his address made on October 14, 1981 had said; "We should think of the peoples and not the government. Besides official delegations to foreign countries, non-official delegations should also be sent so as to awaken the world." And also note his remark, which is known to every one which says that most of the governments are far apart from their nations."

In the end we would like to suggest the embassy even if the Syrian mass media, or all the newsagencies including western and eastern, were to exercise our policy and interview the Iranian counter-revolutionaries and later mingle with the masses and investigate the depth of the popularity enjoyed by the leadership, government, Majlis, . . . , we would still never feel bad about it because in that way all our government's and people's claims would be proven to the hilt.

Wa's Salaam
Editorial board of
TEHRAN TIMES

CSO: 4600/105

LIST OF 'MOJAHEDIN' TERRORIST ACTIVITIES PUBLISHED

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 29 Oct 81 p 2

[Article: "Spectacular Achievements Against the Masses!"]

[Text]

The following is a partial list of counterrevolutionary activities submitted by Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah.

. Some of the Major Terrorist Activities of the Counterrevolutionaries and Munafiqeen in the Iranian Year 1360 (1981).

March 30 — The assassination attempt on Ayatollah Rabani Shirazi, one of the members of the Guardian Council.

April 4 — The religious judge of Shahreza escaped an assassination attempt.

April 5 — One of Isfahan's ulema was assassinated.

April 6 — The Commander of the Central Province Committee was attacked by armed men.

April 26 — An explosion of the counterrevolutionary hypocrites left 7 martyrs and 45 injured in Kerman's Azadi Square.

May 6 — The body of a Bandar Abbas police officer was riddled by 19 terrorists' bullets.

June 8 — The Shomal Textile Factory was set ablaze by counterrevolutionaries and millions of rials in damages were sustained.

June 21 — The Deputy of Educational Affairs of the Saqez Educational Department was assassinated.

June 24 — A bomb explosion in Qom's railway station resulted in the martyrdom of 6 and the injury of more than 50.

June 27 — The hypocrites attempted an assassination on the life of Tehran's Friday Congregational Prayers leader, Mr. Khamenei, in the Abuzar Masjid after noon prayer that resulted in the paralysis of his right hand.

June 28 — The explosion of a bomb which was planted by the hypocrites in the Central Headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party Headquarters in Tehran resulted in the martyrdom of 74 of the Imam's best aides, including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Dr. Beheshti, ministers and representatives of the Majlis.

July 2 — Muhammad Katchui, a warden of Evin Prison, was martyred by a hypocrite who was goaded and guided by Muhammad Reza Saadati.

July 6 — The Governor-General and a Deputy-Governor of Gilan were bullet-riddled by the hypocrites and martyred.

July 10 — Mulla Ali Jalilzadeh, one of the committed ulema of Sanandaj and his son were martyred in an armed onslaught by the hypocrites.

July 11 — Two of the ulema were assassinated in Sanandaj.

JUly 14 — An unsuccessful attempted assassination of the Revolutionary Prosecutor and a religious judge of Sari.

July 15 — Four million tomans of the Public Treasury were turned to ashes in the burning of the Reconstruction Jihad warehouse in Tehran.

July 21 — The Chief of the Divan-Dareh Department of Education wa assassinated in his home.

July 23 — A hand grenade was thrown at the Blood Transfusion Organization.

July 23 — Attempted assassination on the Iqlid people's candidate in the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

July 24 — American agents martyred 13 Islamic Revolutionary Guardsmen on Presidential Election day.

July 25 — The assassination of Hojjatoleslam Beheshti, the Chief of Isfahan's Islamic Revolutionary Court and the candidate for a seat in the Islamic Consultative Assembly along with his 11-year-old nephew.

July 25 — The inspector of the 13th District Committee was assassinated.

July 25 — The doctor in charge of the Guardian Corps First Aid Team was martyred by the agents of the U.S.

July 26 — The Forqan group martyred two police constables.

July 26 — The hypocrites martyred a reporter of Kayhan International and a member of Martyr Moffateh's Committee.

July 26 — An unsuccessful assassination attempt was made on the life of Gilan's provisional Governor-General.

July 27 — The brother-in-law of a Karaj representative to the Islamic Consultative Assembly was assassinated.

July 27 — A grenade thrown into the house of the Governor of the city of Rezvan injuring him and his wife and his 12-year-old sister.

July 27 — A bomb explosion at Tehran's Enghelab Square resulted in the injury of several passersby.

July 27 — The Director of Works and Deputy of the Nowroozmehr Dam, near Bukan, were martyred.

July 28 — A hand grenade was thrown into a girls' high school in Tehran Pars.

July 28 — An assassination attempt on the life of Kermanshah's Friday Congregational Prayers leader was made.

July 28 — The armed attack on the house of Hojjatoleslam Mashah, a prominent figure at Qom's theological center.

July 29 — Five Revolutionary Guards were assassinated in Tehran.

July 29 — Hojjatoleslam Kamiab, the Mashad Deputy to the Islamic Consultative Assembly was martyred by the hypocrites.

July 30 — The acting Islamic Revolutionary Prosecutor of Tabriz was assassinated by the hypocrites.

CSO: 4600/103

CHIEF PROSECUTOR DEFENDS 'CAPITAL PUNISHMENT'

Tehran KAHYAN INTERNATIONAL in English 27 Oct 81 p 1

[Report on TV interview with Chief Justice Ardebili on 25 Oct 81: "Foreign Reports on Justice in Iran Exaggerated and Sensationalistic"]

[Text] TEHRAN, Oct. 26 (Pars) — Foreign reports on executions in Iran are both exaggerated and sensationalistic, stated Chief Justice Ardebili on Sunday. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Islamic Republic of Iran further said that such reports were obscurantist although the motivations behind them were not, all the same.

Ardebili said that those who were opposed to capital punishment in general had nothing interesting to say in his view since Islamic principles had decreed such punishments and besides, he added, all attempts to abolish capital punishment had proven the invalidity of this approach despite the claims of the abolitionists that doing away with the capital punishment would be progressive and would bear good social results.

The Chief Justice said that others who objected to executions in Iran accepted capital punishment in principle but claimed that punishments in Iran were not proportionate to the offences. He commented that this was at least a factual disagreement. The Chief Justice rejected completely the claims of others who claimed that due process was not being observed in trials in Iran involving capital cases.

In another part of Chief Justice Ardebili's interview televised last night he said that foreign critics of the judicial system in Iran were making exaggerated claims about the number of executions in spite of the fact that records on these executions were made public and thus their exaggerations could not be factually supported. He said that whereas only 500 convicts had been executed claims were made that up to 5,000 persons were executed.

Ardebili said one could not ignore the context in which all this was occurring. On the one hand, he said, Iran was the target of propaganda attacks by powers seeking to intervene in Iran's affairs and were only using the alleged abuses as pretexts for further attacking Iran. On the other hand he said the ferocity of the attacks of the internal seditionists was such that the number of executions was entirely appropriate and proportionate to the crimes being committed against public peace and security inside Iran.

Ardebili stressed that the quantitative figures given by Iranian authorities were absolutely correct and said that those concerned about justice and due process should read the files on those condemned in order to fill in a qualitative understanding of the enormous crimes the condemned had committed without which they could not understand the reasons for the executions. Ardebili said that some complaints of abuses, such as alleged instances of violation of due process or cases of innocent persons having suffered wrongs, were being investigated.

Chief Justice Ardebili said: "I do not want to claim that there have been no cases of violations among all these trials and court cases."

He went on to add that the propaganda campaign against the judicial system was contrived for purely political ends since these critics could'nt care less about the lives of Iranian citizens. Speaking about the formation of special administrative courts, which is pending approval of a bill presently before the Islamic Consultative Assembly, Ardebili said that if such courts operated in conjunction with an effective inspection bureau whose juriadiction would cover all organs and institutions of the country, including the prime ministry, the presidency, the judiciary and the inspection bureau itself, most administrative problems would be solved.

At the end of this interview Chief Justice Ardebili said that honorable, competent, responsible and committed judges are serving in the Justice Ministry who had heard and ruled on some 1,800,000 cases filled during the preceding Iranian year.

CSO: 4600/102

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR ON AWACS DEAL

TA301915 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1820 GMT 30 Oct 81

[Interview with Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir by Yoram Ronen in the television studio; time not given--videotaped]

[Text] [Question] Mr Shamir, following the approval of the AWACS deal the fear expressed in Jerusalem and in Washington is that this precedes a full or a partial U.S. recognition of the Saudi peace plan, the main points of which we have just heard on television again. Are there any grounds for this fear?

[Answer] There are fears since the present U.S. administration attaches excessive importance to that plan, which I do not know whether it could be called one at all. This is, on the whole, a collection of views picked from a selection of the most anti-Israeli resolutions adopted by the United Nations or by Arab League conventions. The plan contains several clauses, and each I would say is tantamount to a poisonous dagger directed at the heart of Israel, at Israel's existence. Is there anything missing in it? No, it has a withdrawal to the 1949 borders which do not exist anymore, Arab sovereignty over Jerusalem, the return of the 1949 refugees, the establishment of a Palestinian state, everything that will render Israel's survival impossible.

[Question] Can such a grave plan then be accepted by the U.S. administration? The U.S. secretary of state, after all, said yesterday that certain parts of the plan seem reasonable to him.

[Answer] This is very surprising. One can come up with some explanation here. There is one clause in this plan which is very vague and very evasively formulated, on recognizing the right of all regional countries to exist securely. Israel's name is not mentioned. There is no mention of the word peace in this entire Saudi document. There is no mention of negotiations either. We do not think that the U.S. administration can conceive of the possibility that Israel will ever accept such proposals or ever view them as a basis for negotiations at all.

[Question] Does the U.S. administration then not recognize that the acceptance of such a program, fully or partially, practically means a withdrawal from the Camp David agreements?

[Answer] Well, the Egyptian foreign minister said here that the sole practical plan for peace existing in the region today is the Camp David one and whoever raises other plans is, in fact, weakening and undermining the Camp David accords for the implementation and completion of which we are continually toiling.

[Question] Do you not see then signs indicating that the U.S. administration is somewhat starting to withdraw from the Camp David accords?

[Answer] I did say there are fears and worrisome signs. On the other hand though, we hear the U.S. President's clear declarations which reaffirm the commitment of the United States and of the U.S. President to Israel's security and which speak of the need to take care that Israel's military and technological advantages are maintained. We cannot but listen to these remarks which are in themselves encouraging. However, there have always been ups and downs in the dialogue between the United States and us. It never went completely smoothly. Ever since the early days of the present administration it was clearly noticeable that one of the major problems we would have to challenge is the excess importance the administration attaches to Saudi positions.

[Question] Mr Shamir, do you not think that the danger inherent in this excess importance, the pro-Saudi orientation, is that Saudi Arabia will ultimately gain a prime status in the Middle East, more than any other regional country?

[Answer] We will have to challenge this and I think there is still hope here. If we listen, if we analyze the remarks made in the U.S. Senate during the last debate on this double [hakefula] deal, the clear impression is that it was not the thesis that Saudi Arabia is a moderate and peace-seeking country in the region that had the upper hand. This was finely put by one of the senators who finally changed his position but had, nevertheless, said: I know Saudi Arabia is not moderate. It is as moderate as 'Arafat. These remarks reflect the situation indeed. Many others who voted for the president's stand said so clearly, stated they did not accept this thesis. Therefore, I believe there is hope and there are grounds to assume that this policy--if anybody thinks about it--will not be implemented in our region.

[Question] Mr Shamir, do we intend to demand compensation for the approval of the AWACS deal? Do we expect the Americans to offer us a financial, political or security compensation?

[Answer] We do not talk of compensation here. However, it is possible to assume that following the president's declaration, following the remarks in his last letter to the prime minister--to the effect that he recognizes the need for Israel to have military and technological advantages and that he reaffirms the commitment to Israel's security--that the U.S. administration will have to give this a practical expression in strengthening Israel in such a way as to provide an answer to the challenge we will face when this deal is implemented.

[Question] In other words, do we anticipate additional U.S. security aid to Israel?

[Answer] We hope that we are entering a stage of security cooperation with the United States. In the framework of this cooperation I assume we will have to increase our power to the point where we will be able to face these new challenges.

[Question] In this context I would like to ask, Mr Shamir, the AWACS deal has often been associated with Israeli-U.S. strategic cooperation. Among other things President Reagan and Prime Minister Begin talked of an invitation to the defense minister to visit the United States in November to discuss the implementation of this agreement. So far the invitation has not been extended. Are there any delays here?

[Answer] Well, this is not a question of dates. We hope that this promise of cooperation will be kept and implemented.

[Question] In view of the AWACS deal, do you think there should be a reassessment of our relations with the United States?

[Answer] This is not a question of reassessment. I have said that all along, there have always been arguments and differences with the United States. This is understandable since there are different interests involved. Nevertheless, for all the struggles and amidst the arguments we ultimately reach cooperation which in turn helps Israel to strengthen and progress still further.

[Question] In conclusion, Mr Shamir, what in your opinion is the next stage in the Israeli-U.S. dialogue? Will it be the strategic cooperation agreement which will get underway now?

[Answer] This will surely be one of the most vital and important things.

[Question] Will this be implemented within the coming weeks, in your opinion?

[Answer] I cannot set a time. This is not a matter of weeks. It is not a matter of months either. At any rate it has to be started.

[Question] I understand this depends mainly on the Americans. The ball is in their court.

[Answer] There are two partners involved here, of course.

[Ronen] Thank you Mr Foreign Minister.

CSO: 4423/33

'MA'ARIV DISCUSSES U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS

TA301234 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Oct 81 pp 17, 25

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "By the Time You Get Something From the Saudis, the Soviets and the Syrians Will Be Stewing Something Up in Lebanon, Israel Warned the United States"]

[Excerpt] The problem is not only the AWACS deal and the offensive equipment included in the Saudi deal. The problem goes much deeper: Is Saudi Arabia the end-all and be-all of U.S. assets in the region, as one might surmise from the arguments put forward by the administration during the struggle to put the deal through; and what can Israel expect of this administration in regard to the PLO, in regard to a desirable settlement in Lebanon, in regard to implementation of the Camp David accords, and in regard to the negation of the Saudi "peace plan?"

In their last conversation in the White House, President Reagan tried to soften Begin's opposition to the deal with Saudi Arabia and in the process said to him: Why be so scared, since this deal is not going to be put into effect for another 5 years?

Begin's reply was: I do not know how things are going to be in 5 years' time. Certainly I will not be prime minister in 5 years' time, but I am obliged to safeguard the life of my country and a country cannot live on borrowed time....

When Begin took leave of Reagan, he had apparently no substantive reason to think that this friendly administration would be like its predecessor on basic issues. Does he still have that conviction only weeks after his visit to Washington?

Begin has not disclosed his views on the matter, but it would not seem far-fetched to assume that he, too, has begun to entertain doubts. Too many seemingly unconnected minor happenings have occurred in recent days to exclude the thought that what is going on here and now in the Reagan administration is not haphazard....

In the communique issued by the cabinet after its last meeting, as per the text proposed by the prime minister, the deal with Saudi Arabia is called the "double arms deal." This is in order to draw attention to what the administration systematically and astonishingly fails to say--namely, that here we have not only the five surveillance planes but also outright offensive weapons (plus equipment enabling Saudi aircraft to reach Israel without having to refuel en route). This wording was by way of dropping a further hint that the prime minister, under constraint to display restraint, could not express his displeasure otherwise than by this play on words: "The double arms deal"--meaning double-talk, the mouth at variance with the heart....

And whoever this week followed the by no means haphazard series of events, could not but be impressed by the evident "double dealing" in word and deed.

In the cabinet communique--the first version--the prime minister saw fit to include part of the message sent him by President Reagan on 22 October, a few days before the Senate vote. Begin picked these two passages: "Whatever the differences of opinion between us, I can only reiterate that the United States remains completely committed to the security of Israel and that we expect a fruitful outcome of our ongoing discussions on strategic cooperation."

In a preceding passage the president states (the prime minister "renounced" this passage, perhaps on account of its personal tone): "We enjoyed your appraisals"--thus writes Reagan--"on a wide range of topics facing us, and I am confident that we now have a better understanding of matters common to us."

Well, the note per se is positive and "very friendly." But what does it actually mean? Again another "coincidence": On the 28th of this month, on the very morning of the day set for the Senate vote, U.S. counsellor Robert McFarlane was due to arrive here to discuss the "implementation of strategic cooperation" with the prime minister and others concerned. Two days earlier, Israel was informed that McFarlane was postponing his visit (a "2 to 3-week postponement" was not mentioned). Why? The official explanation was for "personal reasons." The true explanation we could gather from the response offered to the Foreign Ministry by U.S. ambassador in Israel Samuel Lewis, namely that the advance publicity on the visit of the U.S. envoy was not to the latter's liking. It was as if to imply an understanding that his coming should be kept secret, away from the limelight, and the news-leakage of his coming infringed upon this understanding.

Does advance publicity warrant postponement of a visit announced to the prime minister and reported by him to the cabinet, a visit relevant to the president's note stating the expectation of a "fruitful outcome to our ongoing discussions on strategic cooperation?"

Why these "double deals?"--it is being asked here--with Saudi Arabia openly, above-board for all to see; and with Israel hush-hush, in utter secrecy? It certainly stands to reason that the topics under discussion should be kept secret by their very nature, but why conceal a visit by an official U.S. dignitary who comes to Israel for talks on matters of common concern to the two countries? And did not Reagan himself publicly declare that Israel is not only a "friend and ally" of the United States but also its "partner," so why did McFarlane put off his visit?

During the prime minister's Washington visit it was agreed that in November (more precisely, at the beginning of November) Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon would be going to Washington for talks with his counterpart, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, on matters directly related to strategic cooperation between the two countries. What is more, on the agenda was the drafting of what was termed an agreed memorandum of understanding on strategy. Why has thus far no invitation come for Minister Sharon to visit Washington? Both the fixing of a date for such a visit and the talks McFarlane was to have conducted here would have made it clear that the United States means what it says and is serious in its stated intentions.

All these things occurred while President Reagan was not at all sure of victory, when all the polls foresaw defeat for him. And evidence of this uncertainty is to be found in the "personal" visit Ambassador Lewis paid, at his own request, to the prime minister on Thursday of last week, 22 October (by chance this coincided with the day on which the date for the president's note was set).... As far as is known, even though the ambassador professed to have come in a "personal" way and not on anyone's initiative, the conversation did dwell on the AWACS deal. It is a fair guess that Lewis expected Begin to soften his stand and thereby put out signals to Israel's friends in the United States, both in the Jewish community and in the Senate. The fact that on the day following this meeting the prime minister, in an interview given to the WASHINGTON POST, lashed out at the "double deal," goes to show that he was not won over by the personal arguments put forward by the amiable and friendly ambassador. It suffices to quote Begin's dictum, "if you, the Americans, had struck a similar deal with Denmark, you would not hear a word from me," to get the hang of what Begin said in response to the ambassador's initiative.

There is practically no doubt that the "obsession" of this administration vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia will make its impact on contacts between Washington and Jerusalem in the near future, and already there is evidence of this. For example, the U.S. secretary of state, Alexander Haig, admits that in truth, when this administration took office, it did not much like the Camp David accords and that the administration now sees the need to bring Saudi Arabia into the peace process; what this means is that Israel must brace itself for the imminent discovery by the administration of "positive points" in the eight-point plan of Prince Fahd, despite the fact that here is a plan which poses as a pre-condition, a sine qua non, the establishment of a Palestinian state.

A couple of days ago Ambassador 'Evron had a conversation with Secretary of State Haig. It is reasonable to assume that he too heard some echo to the thoughts attributed to Haig concerning the character and role of Saudi Arabia and likewise, the "unattractiveness" of the Camp David accords which this administration has inherited from its predecessor. Meanwhile, we read that President Reagan, too, has discovered in the Saudi plan something that is not there--recognition of Israel...and readiness for peace. Not only that, but he is quoted by the news agencies as saying--after the Senate vote on the AWACS--that "The Saudi proposal is praiseworthy." The Saudi proposal calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital.

To go by Haig's pronouncements in a closed forum: the Reagan administration does not accept the Camp David accords because it believes in them, but simply because it inherited them. Thus, Haig's testimony.

Haig was asked, en passant, why the administration was fighting so strenuously to push through the AWACS deal likewise inherited from the previous administration, while not feeling obliged to adhere with equal enthusiasm to the Camp David inheritance. He had no answer to this.

Maybe that is why Haig withheld support for the idea that the autonomy talks be conducted on the ministerial level. When Israel and Egypt suggested he go to Cairo in a few days' time for autonomy talks on the ministerial level, calculated to give the negotiations a real push forward, he replied that he would be busy in Washington preparing for King Husayn's visit. But Haig did not try to set another date, convenient for him, for holding ministerial-level talks, nor did he appoint a senior emissary on the Sol Linowitz-level; instead, he intends to send one of his aides, Mr Viliotes.

There is no choice but to grant President Reagan renewed credit and believe that such indeed is the will of his administration: to discuss in broad scope the strategic problems of the region. Thus far, however, Israel has witnessed worrisom developments. For example, the administration affirms its concern at what are seen as imminent developments in Lebanon. The Americans reckon that the Russians are "cooking up" something there. In any case, it is obvious to them that the Russians will not allow the Syrians to leave Lebanon, for Moscow means to govern there through the intermediary of the Syrians and the PLO, of course. If the Russians so wish, things will stay quiet. Or, by the same token, the sector [word indistinct] on Israel will be "heated up" as they contrived to do before the cease-fire. Is this not a topic pertaining to the broad range of subjects which the United States should discuss with Israel? The plain fact is that the Americans have not raised it in any dialog with Israel on "strategic cooperation."

Some while ago Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Interestingly, nowhere in their wide-ranging conversation was there are reference made to the Middle East. It may be assumed that this weird omission kindled a red light in the administration: Why, they said, this only goes to show that Moscow wants to lull us while it is concocting something--maybe in Lebanon...?

If the concept of a strategic dialog has any meaning, here is a topic pertaining to such a dialog but instead, all that the Americans saw fit to say to Israel when the Lebanese-Syrian topic was broached was that Israel should exercise "tolerance."

Israel saw fit the other day to observe at a high-level encounter in Washington that Israel's strategic importance is enhanced now that Greece intends to secede from NATO. Well, the Americans listened and did not dispute this appraisal, but no dialog ensued, be it on a "broad scale" or a restricted scale. Israel merely heard from authoritative sources in Washington that the United States intends to assume a "low profile" in the Greek affair and that was that....

Consider another issue still: Israel complained that a situation was emerging where Israel's position was getting increasingly inferior since Iraq, for instance, was already receiving arms both from the Soviet Union and the United States. The problem is not only military. The stronger the Arab countries become and the more confidence they gain in their power, the less inducement they will have to make peace. Now, does this issue not call for in-depth discussions?

The political quarter that heard this from an authoritative Israeli representative might have agreed to this logic, but this political quarter had nothing logical to say and, as a matter of fact, offered no reply at all....

The problem, therefore, is not just AWACS. Israel has learned from an authoritative administration source that when the heads of the U.S. delegation met with their European colleagues at the Cancun conference in Mexico, they heard at least two West European foreign ministers say that they do not believe in autonomy and that, in their view, the Camp David accords will wither away of their own accord. No impression was gleaned that the Americans tried to contest this view, albeit neither did they say they accept it in so many words.

Washington has also lost its logic: Why should the Arabs give up their demands of Israel, when they can be against it, demand the establishment of a Palestinian state governed by the PLO and at the same time enjoy U.S. support? And this pertains not only to Saudi Arabia. One has to be incurably naive not to believe that the current orchestration on the theme of the PLO and a Palestinian state (Nixon wants such a state, but he would have it "demilitarized...") is spontaneous. "All of a sudden," of their own accord, THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE WASHINGTON POST, Professor Brzezinski, Carter and Nixon have all together, all at once, "discovered" the PLO and come to the conclusion that one will have to talk to it, "if," of course, it recognizes Israel. Well, it transpires that the PLO has already been talked to--among others by Sir Brzezinski--without its having recognized Israel. What guarantee is there that he who has capitulated to Saudi Arabia in the AWACS affair will not yield to so modest a request from Riyadh as to go and talk to the PLO, on the "peace process," naturally....

The signs are that if Washington tries to pursue this path, with the same dubious craftiness that characterized the Carter administration on this score, it will meet with sharp opposition. The U.S. media may not love Menahem Begin or Arik Sharon, but the administration personnel will have to speak to them and them alone. They can supply many dollars worth of weapons to Saudi Arabia or Iraq without heeding Israel's opposition. However, to reach a "political settlement," like it or not, they must look to Israel which isn't that pitiful after all.

In a conversation with a U.S. administration official in Washington, an Israeli representative said: What are you heading for? You are wooing Saudi Arabia and meanwhile you are losing Greece. Moreover, before you get anything out of the cheeky Saudis, as you yourselves admit, the Russians and the Syrians will have cooked up something in Lebanon. That being so, what is so clever about acting in a way that will lead to the isolation of Israel?

That in effect is the question to which the United States has as yet given no answer. President Reagan's letter, which came during the cabinet meeting, is more positive than his previous letter a week ago (which, for some reasons, was held up at the sender's end some 3 weeks...), and is seen as a tranquilizer after the approval of the AWACS deal. This letter, however, does not at present offer promise of a genuine and trustworthy policy toward Israel.

The administration's victory is not really all that impressive. What is impressive is the abundant proof offered by this administration, for all to see, that the United States is addicted to Riyadh's considerations and not vice versa.

If there is any real substance to the note which President Reagan hastened to send Begin, that is something we shall not know until, in the due course of events, the Saudis raise their new demands--this time in the political sphere. Reagan's enthusiasm for the Saudi eight-point plan is not a harbinger of good.

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'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTS ON PALESTINIAN STATE IN JORDAN

TA301036 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Oct 81 p 13

[Poles commentary: "A Palestinian State A La Shamir"]

[Excerpt] Anyone who says today that Israel can permit itself to show difference over the question of who is to rule Jordan--that is, across the Jordan River--is in fact declaring that Israel is prepared to accept Yasir 'Arafat's rule there. What is the basis for this approach? Does Mr Yitzhaq Shamir really believe that the PLO will give up the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip if Israel is prepared to recognize its rule over the eastern bank of the Jordan? And is there no reason to fear that, in the event of a PLO revolution succeeding in Jordan, the regime that will be established there on the ruins of the monarchistic rule will try even harder to "liberate" the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza from an Israeli rule and arouse irredentist ferment among the Arabs of Israel inside the green line, too?

Should we believe that national responsibility for Jordan, if it is laid upon the terrorist organizations, will completely change their terrorist habits? Will organizations that have been fostered for years by the Soviet Union really fit in a pro-Western lineup such as that which the United States is working hard to establish in the Middle East and, in the framework of this lineup, cooperate with Israel? Should we not assume that the Kingdom of Jordan under PLO rule will invite advisers from the communist bloc countries to its regular army, whose officer corps will be recruited from the PLO organizations' commanders?

If we object to a Palestinian state that would come between us and Jordan, for the reason that it would be another base for Soviet activity throughout the area, then we would be faced with many times that danger if the PLO is permitted to take over the reins of power in such a large country as Jordan, in which it is unnecessary to build national arrangements since they exist.

It is irresponsible to recommend an anti-Hashemite line in order to answer the propaganda of the supporters of the PLO in the UN General Assembly and Western capitals. When our foreign minister declares that Israel is indifferent as to the identity of the rule in Jordan, Israel is authorizing the PLO as a political factor worthy of heading a Palestinian state, more than everything Brezhnev, Carrington, Mr Papandreau and others have done up to now. It is most dangerous

to affirm in principle the concept of a Palestinian state, even if such a defendant already exists in Jordan. Nobody will "buy" dialectic-geographical jugglery from us and it is not to be assumed that the U.S. leadership will regard the expulsion of King Husayn with equanimity.

The problem of the political future of the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip has come up on the agenda of the international argument. We will not be able to repel the pressure of the questions aimed at us by the fact of our encouraging the overthrow of the regime in Amman. In contrast to this, we can point to the Camp David agreements, which recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and their just needs. This has been agreed upon between Israel and Egypt, with the support of the United States; the fact that these agreements postpone the permanent solution for 5 years should not make matters difficult for our publicity, if we are clever enough to present this postponement as a prize for safeguarding peace in the area.

The difficulties piling up on our way to explaining the Camp David agreements are well known, but we cannot get out of them by providing legitimization for the PLO to make a revolution in Jordan.

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COMMENTATOR DISCUSSES AUTONOMY TALKS PROBLEMS

TA021126 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Nov 81 p 5

[Commentary by Shmu'el Segev: "Coup de Grace to the Autonomy Negotiations"]

[Text] The assumption by Professor Menahem Milson of the post of head of the civilian administration in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza District is praiseworthy from every point of view. Despite the growing recognition of the PLO's political standing, and despite the support being voiced in the United States and Europe for the "Saudi plan," this well-known Orientalist has chosen to employ his personal experience and his scientific prestige toward promotion of the autonomy plan, whose prospects for success were never too bright anyway.

Professor Milson's appointment is designed to create a distinction between military responsibility and the civilian positions, and to encourage the integration of local Palestinians into the autonomy talks in the future. But this separation of powers is too little, too late.

Following a break of 16 months, Israel and Egypt have agreed to resume the autonomy talks in the hope of concluding the negotiations before the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai next April. The increased personal weight of Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon within the Israeli political team has reinforced this hope, and has led to the appointment of Professor Milson to head the civilian administration in the territories.

The assassination of President al-Sadat; the decision by the Soviet Union, Malaysia and Greece to accord full diplomatic recognition to the PLO; and the support the United States has hinted it will extend to the Saudi Crown Prince's "eight-point plan"--all these have seemingly intertwined to torpedo the complicated task of the Israeli scholar. When the PLO is reaping success in the international sphere and is rapidly approaching the stage at which the leadership of the Algerian rebels stood on the eve of the opening of the talks between them and President De Gaulle (the Evian talks) in the spring of 1962, will any Palestinian dare publicly to condemn Yasir 'Arafat and lend a hand to Professor Milson in the crystallization of his "moderate" policy in the territories?

Moreover, ever since President al-Sadat's murder new winds have begun to blow on the banks of the Nile. Under the guise of a "government of continuation," President Mubarak is trying to improve his relations with the Arab world, and

implicit Egyptian support for the Saudi peace plan is evident. If to this we add the call of former Presidents Ford and Carter for U.S. recognition of the PLO, and the revelations of Professor Brzezinski about his meeting with Yasir 'Arafat in Algeria, the reasons for the reservations in the territories about public cooperation with Israel become self-evident.

But the coup de grace to Professor Milson's efforts was delivered in the past few days precisely by the Reagan administration.

The public praise uttered by the U.S. President and his secretary of state for the Saudi "peace plan" is tantamount to implicit recognition of the PLO, and has scuttled in advance of any prospect of success the autonomy talks had. Naturally, U.S. officials dispute this view, arguing that the Saudi plan does not contradict the Camp David accords, and in fact constitutes recognition of Israel's existence. This may be the case, but the Saudi plan goes far beyond the Camp David agreements and calls for the creation of an independent Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital; it also demands that the Palestinian refugees be given the right to choose between returning to their homes inside the green line, or receiving compensation for the property they left behind in Israel. Under these circumstances, is there any Palestinian leader in the territories who will agree to cooperate with Professor Milson--if the United States is now ready to give the Palestinians far more than Israel is?

The Israeli Government's outcry against the erosion in the Reagan administration's position and against its support for the Saudi plan is of course timely. But the U.S. damage has already been done; it is doubtful whether Begin's letter to Reagan can undo it.

Despite the poor formulation by former Prime Minister Rabin, the Israeli Government would do well to adopt his idea and seek the holding of an Israel-Egyptian-U.S. summit meeting to express renewed support for the Camp David accords. There is no political logic to doing away with the agreements--even if President al-Sadat was assassinated, and even if President Reagan took over from President Carter--but there was and is sense to give renewed validity to the agreements.

If the United States, Egypt and Israel are, in fact, interested in implementing the autonomy plan, then the three of them must dispel the doubts created by the recent U.S. pronouncements in order to convince the residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza that it would be fruitless for them to pin their hopes on the PLO or on the Saudi peace plan.

CSO: 4423/33

BRIEFS

W. BANK UNREST--It is estimated in the defense establishment that the recent events in Judaea and Samaria are ephemeral. Today military governors have acted among the mayors and education leaders there in order to calm the tempers in Judaea and Samaria. The curfew was lifted from the old city of Hebron this morning. Our correspondent Rafiq Halabi is reporting. [Begin videotape] The soldiers who reinforced the border police units in Judaea and Samaria did no report particularly irregular events in the region. In Hebron students threw stones at the building of the rural association which is headed by Mustafa Dudin who leads the moderate camp in the area. The soldiers dispersed them. Dudin is guarded by a special force following reports of threats to his life. A sit-down strike was staged in the Bethlehem municipal building by 100 students. The strikers agitated against the leaders of the rural association who, in their opinion, will put up with the civilian administration. On the surface of things it all seems calm but there is no doubt that the civilian administration idea has confused the system. In the meantime no change has been effected in the structure of the military authorities so that only in the future, when the civilian administration's machinery works, will the interaction between the two camps--the administration on the one hand and the local population on the other--become clear. [end videotape] [Excerpts] [TA032037 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 3 Nov 81]

BIRTHRATE DECREASE--The Israeli birth rate will be very low this year--the lowest since the state was established. This was reported by the director of the Central Bureau of Statistics, Dr Moshe Siqron. This year only 11,000 people will immigrate to Israel, whereas more than 20,000 will emigrate from it. Last year, more people left the country than entered for the first time in 28 years. It is estimated that since the state was created, 300,000 Israelis have left it. At the same time, the fertility rate has also gone down and there were less marriages and more divorces. By the end of the year 3,976,000 persons will reside in the country, even though the forecast had predicted 4 million. [Text] [TA041331 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 4 Nov 81]

HEBRON HILLS SETTLEMENTS--Beersheba, 2 Nov--A regional settlement of 400 families will soon be established in the Yattir Bloc in the southern slopes of the Hebron Hills. It will be established by the agriculturalists union and is part of the plan which involves the establishment of six settlements in the area. It has been reported from the agriculturalists union that the approval for the

establishment of the settlement was given by the chairman of the ministerial committee on settlement affairs, Simha Ehrlich, and the Jewish agency's land settlement department. The nucleus that will reside in the settlement has been in existence since 1979 and currently numbers approximately 100 families which plan to establish light industry there as well as science-based industry and recreational facilities. The nucleus will set up temporary camp in (Ardon) in the Yattir forest and the establishment of a permanent settlement will be carried out simultaneously. The director of the agriculturalists union settlement department, Mr Mikha Golan, has reported that the union plans to establish two to three settlements in the Yattir bloc and the 'Arad Valley. Ten other settlements are also planned or in existence, in the Galilee, the Golan Heights and around Nahal 'Iron. [Text] [TA021953 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1650 GMT 2 Nov 81]

NO AIRCRAFT ENGINE MODIFICATION--At this stage, despite the difficulties that have cropped up in the negotiations with the U.S. company, Pratt and Whitney, which manufactures the Lavi aircraft engine, there is no intention of again modifying it. Some months ago it was decided that a Pratt and Whitney-made engine will be mounted on the aircraft and not a General Electric one. A change of that decision resulted in an unnecessary expenditure of some $7 million. The Defense Ministry is interested in having Pratt and Whitney invest in the Bet Shemesh engine plant, where the Lavi engine will be manufactured. The negotiations with that company have run into some difficulties because of the latter's fear of making large investments in an Israeli plant. The company managers similarly fear possible reactions in Arab countries that purchase goods it produces. Senior Pratt and Whitney representatives have recently visited Israel and the president of the company will soon arrive here to continue the discussions. [Arye Egozi] [Text] [TA031226 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 3 Nov 81 p 7]

MONEY PRINTED--The government printed 1.34 billion shekels last month, an amount similar to what was printed 2 months ago. Since the start of the fiscal year, the government has [word indistinct] 11.86 billion shekels into the economy. The currency reserves increased somewhat last month following a decline in recent months. The country's foreign currency reserves now total $2.837 billion. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 1 Nov 81 TA]

EXPORTS DOWN--Since the start of the year there has been an increase of less than 2 percent in exports, which is to say a real-term decline of about 10 percent. The largest decrease was in the export of clothing, textiles and diamonds. In contrast, there was a significant growth in exports in the metals, electronics and minerals branches. These data were issued today by the Ministry of Industry and Commerce. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 1 Nov 81 TA]

ANTI-WITHDRAWAL GROUP--A branch of the movement to halt the withdrawal in Sinai has been established at Ofira, following a visit there last week by MK Ge'ula Kohen. This reporter has learned that 20 Ofira residents have so far signed up

as members of the movement. This branch will work in cooperation with the movement's main headquarters, located in Moshav Sadot in the Yamit District. The chairman of the Ofira resident's committee, Ya'acov Barlevy, said in reaction that this matter did not bother him or the majority of Ofira's residents, who will leave in April 1982, as planned. [Eytan Rabin] [Text] [TA020725 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Nov 81 p 2]

SINAI FORCE CAMPS--The U.S. companies constructing the camps for the Sinai multinational force will employ 498 Israeli workers. At first they wanted to bring 900 Thais to do that job. As a result of pressure by the employment service, backed by Histadrut Secretary General MK Yeruham Meshel, it was finally agreed to employ 498 Israelis, of whom 326 be employed in Etan and 172 in Ofira. The employment service is preparing to recruit the workers from the Negev development towns. So far it has succeeded in enlisting only 208 workers and it looks as though it will have difficulty in meeting with employment quota. The main difficulty is in finding manpower to work in Ofira. Employment service director general Barukh Haqlay has asked the U.S. companies to build living facilities for the workers in Ofira, hoping he would thus be able to fill the remaining vacancies. The foreign contractors have made it clear that if the employment service does not supply the required number of employees, they will immediately bring in 150 workers from Thailand in the first stage. [Text] [TA031502 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Nov 81 p 8]

LABOR, MAPAM RECONCILED--Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres says differences with alignment partner MAPAM have been laid to rest. Peres met MAPAM leader Victor Shem-tov in Tel Aviv following this week's vote in the Knesset, in which MAPAM broke ranks and proposed sending a joint mission with the Likud to the United States to argue against the Saudi peace plan. It was agreed that the incident was exceptional and not characteristic of the long-time partnership between Labor and the smaller, leftwing MAPAM. Labor Party leaders emphasize that in the future alignment decisions will be binding on MAPAM. [Text] [TA050718 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 5 Nov 81]

CSO: 4400/44

INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, PROBLEMS OF 1980'S DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 66

[Article: "Hikmat al-Nashashibi, director general of Kuwaiti International Investment Company: 'Arabs Will Turn To Direct Lending So Let Us Prepare Capabilities and Expertise'"]

[Text] Arab investments, the challenges of the 1980's and the role of Arab financial institutions are the focus of the following interview conducted by AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL with Hikmat al-Nashashibi.

Al-Nashashibi says that the accumulation rate of the financial surpluses of the major Arab oil exporting countries requires the formulation of comprehensive plans and strategies for the investment process to insure its effectiveness and vitality. The countries with surpluses must remain in constant contact with the various developments occurring within these vast accumulated resources. These resources vary from time to time in terms of the ideal outlet they make available, in terms of the location and form of this outlet and in terms of its maturation time and other aspects. All these contain a number of complex economic and non-economic considerations which must be taken into account to reach the correct investment decision. Moreover, the formulation of plans and strategies for the Arab investments abroad requires the investors to keep in regular touch with the broad dimensions of the international investment arena. When selecting a specific investment in a certain sector and a certain country, the investors may overlook another investment in another place, in a different form and with a different maturation period--all of which could have an impact on the investment decision taken.

Al-Nashashibi points out that the future trends indicate clearly that the monies of the [oil] producers will accumulate rapidly because it is expected that the OPEC surpluses, estimated at $168 billion at the end of 1978, will exceed $300 billion by the end of 1980, $450 billion by the end of 1982 and $550 billion by the end of 1985. The major part of these accumulated surpluses will belong to the Arab oil exporting countries. Moreover, this rate of surplus accumulation will push the issue of planning Arab foreign investments in the 1980's to a high place on the ladder of priorities concerning the short, medium and long-term plans which are of high importance to the future of the Arab world.

Al-Nashashibi asserts that this will be the result of not only the accumulated Arab financial surpluses but also a direct result of the fundamental changes in the international borrowing markets, keeping in mind that these markets did absorb the major part of Arab foreign investments in the 1970's.

But despite the difficulties and pressures arising from time to time, the international markets succeeded in the period from 1973-79 in realizing a major accomplishment, namely in recycling oil surpluses efficiently and in acting as middlemen in financing the deficits in the balances of payment of both advanced and developing countries in a manner exceeding all expectations. During the 1973-79 period, these markets were able to loan a net sum of $640 billion to numerous borrowers. Developing non-OPEC members acquired $150 billion from this sum.

1980's

Al-Nashashibi further says that it seems that the 1980's will not have the long-lasting momentum of the 1970's. It seems in this regard that the international lending markets will not be able in the 1980's to absorb the oil financial surpluses at the rates and in the dimensions prevalent in the 1970's. The international banks have approached the maximum permissible limit in expanding their borrowing purses in accordance with the sound banking tradition. This raises the question of whether the capacity of these banks will absorb future loans at the rates prevalent previously. Moreover, the capital of these banks is currently subjected to constant pressure when compared with the size of their operations. Therefore, it is logical to speculate that a large part of the accumulated surpluses will be invested directly by the oil exporters outside the system of the international financial market.

Kuwaiti International as Example

There is no better indication that the Arab financial institutions have begun to undertake direct lending operations than the results realized by the Kuwaiti International Investment Company last year and in the preceding years. The company's net profit amounted to 5.1 million Kuwaiti dinars at the end of 1980 compared to 4 million dinars at the end of 1979, i.e., with an increase of 25 percent. Moreover, the company's general budget has grown to 142 million dinars and the shareholders' net rights have amounted to 37 million Kuwaiti dinars.

These positive results have been realized despite the sharp fluctuations experienced by the local and international lending markets and by the interest rates and currency prices.

In this respect, the company has realized accomplishments embodied in its management of 36 international bond issues with a total value of $2.4 billion.

This is actually a record figure when compared with the company's accomplishments in this sphere in the preceding years. It is also a record figure when we learn that the volume of all the various bond issues offered in the international bond market did not exceed $24 billion in 1980.

Al-Nashashibi adds: "One of the fundamental services which the Kuwaiti International Investment Company has been eager to offer since 1976 is that of managing investment purses on behalf of the clients."

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INVESTMENT FIRM OUTLINES POLICIES, ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 pp 62-63

[Article: "Samir Khanshat, director of Investments at al-Shariqah Group: 'We Are Trying to Wrench Arab Investors Away From Swiss and U.S. Banks'"]

[Text] When al-Shariqah Group was founded in 1976, its founders, led by Shaykh Nasir Sabah al-Ahmad, never thought that it would constitute a turning point in the activities of companies in Kuwait. Only a few years after its foundation, the number of Gulf companies, i.e. companies founded by Kuwaitis, Gulf citizens and other Arabs, have reached 20. Al-Shariqah Group Company was the first. Here is an interview with Samir Khanshat, the company's director of investments, on the Arab investment activity in the Gulf and in the world.

Khanshat has said that this year, the group will bolster its activity and its investment in the Gulf and world markets through three means:

"First, persuade Kuwaiti and Gulf investors who entrust international banks, especially Swiss and U.S. banks, to manage the investment of their monies of our ability to perform this function in a better way and take them away from these banks. This is why we have opened a major investment office in London. This office is tantamount to a small investment bourse specialized in operating outside the Arab countries for Kuwaiti and Arab clients. The group will offer the services offered by the foreign investment banks and firms which manage the monies of Arab investors.

Second, bolster our investment presence by engaging in direct investment inside and outside the Arab countries, whether in terms of our own monies or of the monies of our clients. We will invest these monies either according to the wishes and instructions of our clients or according to our investment method and strategy.

Third, enter the Gulf money market as a financial consultant offering financial advice and planning to our clients, both individuals and firms, lending them money, building their relations with others or performing the role of middleman by arranging loans for them from local or foreign sources.

Khanshat has also pointed out that al-Shariqah Group's inclination to sell expertise enables the company to avoid "putting all the eggs in one basket," namely the basket of investments. This requires us to devote attention to individuals and to Arab capital owners, especially Kuwaiti capital owners.

International Investment

Regarding the inclination to invest internationally, the director of investments in al-Shariqah Group has said: "There are difficulties facing investors in all parts of the world generally. The international economic conditions dictate investment diversification so as to spread the risks from which nobody, regardless of how competent, is safe. This requires the investor to enter other and new spheres. Because of the fluctuations in the international economic situation, the investor is required to adopt a flexible investment policy that enables him to benefit from the high interest rate on the dollar, the rising real estate and land prices and from other spheres that realize a balance. So, should the interest rate drop, it would be possible to benefit from bonds and from real estate investment, for example. Should one sector experience a decline, then this can be made up for from a leap in another sector. This is an approach whereby we do not put 'all the eggs in one basket.'"

Far East

Regarding the official and private Kuwaiti turn toward the Far East, Khanshat said: "This inclination is taking the form of direct investment in production projects through the purchase of shares and through partnership in such projects."

Khanshat also said: "What distinguishes the Asian countries is that their economy is a free economy, and this provides the freedom needed by investors, whereas the investment conditions in Europe have changed and have become extremely difficult. The laws are complex, the taxes are rising, labor is expensive, labor laws are strict and have no mercy for the investor and the laws protecting the employees increase the burden to the foreign projects and plants set up in Europe.

"As for the Far East, economic growth has reached the phase where industry needs investments in order to meet the international demand at a cost lower than that of Europe and the United States and to enter international competition." But Khanshat adds: "However, we feel that the advantages we are getting in the Asian countries are on their way to disappearing because the costs of investment in these countries are rising daily."

At Arab and Local Levels

Khanshat said: "We are cautious in getting involved in speculation against the other Gulf companies engaged in activities similar to ours. The Gulf investment companies must increase their investments in the Gulf area. Despite the presence of risks to investments in most of the Arab countries, there are, however, big opportunities, especially in the Arab Maghreb countries. Distribution of investment among the Arab countries may be a solution that will reduce these risks."

Khanshat further added: "We manage our investments by ourselves, thus overstepping middlemen, because our expertise has reached a high international level only three of the eight employees we have in our London office are British whereas most of these employees are supposed to be British, considering that they are more capable than others of understanding the London market."

Khanshat has also expressed the belief that investing in long-term securities is not beneficial and that it is better for Arabs to invest in technology and in transferring it to Kuwait and the Arab world.

Khanshat also said that the Gulf governments are now dealing with private and semi-private national firms to do their investment for them. We hope to realize this at the level of both governments and individuals to curtail the major role of foreign banks in the investment and reinvestment of Arab money.

He added that the Kuwaiti banks are preoccupied with improving their commercial operations and services and expanding their activities in Kuwait, London, the Far East and, finally, the United States. Meanwhile, these banks shun any investment role, thus leaving the arena free for the Swiss and U.S. banks.

The director of investments in al-Shariqah Group has said that the company's offices in the world, which are linked by computer, will play a prominent role in enabling us to "pull the rug" out from under the feet of the foreigners so that our investment department may turn into something very similar to an international bank that gives us the opportunity to enter into investment operations that are faster than those of foreign banks.

Stocks

Concerning investment in stocks, Khanshat has said that the stock market is currently going through a phase of stagnation. But fortunately, our investments in stocks are few, especially when compared with the investments of the other Gulf and Kuwaiti firms.

Regarding industrial investment inside and outside Kuwait, Khanshat said: "Our investment purse contains various projects, including, for example, a company [plant] for construction materials in Oman. We are currently studying a plan to set up a company for lumber industries in Kuwait and other projects in the Arab countries."

Speaking of the inclination toward direct investment, Khanshat said: "It is important inside and outside the Arab countries because it is long-term investment, especially in industries and projects where we do not expect a quick profit when we set up such industries or projects. If our ownership of the percentage of such a plant or project is high, then we participate in the board of directors and in making the firm's policy, such as in the case of the batteries plant in Jordan and the tiles plant in Sharjah. Moreover, we are participants in several banks."

Khanshat further said that the 1979 profits amounted to $14.5 million whereas the 1980 profits amounted to $19.5 million. This represents an increase of 34 percent in the profits.

The profit of the Group's stocks amounted in 1980 to 23 percent of the paid capital. Moreover, we distributed 10 percent in grant stocks and 7.5 percent in cash profits.

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BENEFITS OF ISLAMIC SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 pp 60-61

[Interview With Ahmad Bazi' al-Yasin, hairman of Kuwaiti Financing House Company by Al-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL: "It Is Possible To Do Away With Usurious Banking System; We Are Inclined to Open Branches Abroad; We Deal With Usurious Banks, But in Accordance With Islamic Method"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The Kuwaiti Financing House Company, a bank founded in 1977 to operate in accordance with the Islamic Shari'a, is an experiment that has drawn the attention of the Kuwaiti and Arab banking circles since it was initiated.

AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL has had this interview with Ahmad Bazi' al-Yasin, the chairman of the company's Board of Directors and its appointed member, who has reviewed the experiment, its particulars and its accomplishments.

[Question] After 3 years since the start of the Kuwaiti Financing House's operations, can the experiment be evaluated despite its newness?

[Answer] The past 4 years were supposed to be a phase of foundation during which the establishment is not held accountable for results. But we have realized unexpected success since the start of operations. This is due to the desire of the Muslim Kuwaiti public to avoid dealing with usurious banks.

In the first 4 months, the Financing House opened 5,000 accounts with deposits amounting to 21 million Kuwaiti dinars. The total budget amounted to 26.7 million dinars at the end of 1978, to 81.5 million dinars at the end of 1979 and to 180.7 million dinars at the end of 1980.

The monies invested by the Financing House have amounted to the following: 90.6 million dinars in 1978; 62.5 million in 1978 [presumably meaning 1979] and 137.2 million in 1980.

[Question] How does the Financing House Operate?

[Answer] The Financing House conducts all banking operations, with the exception of lending and borrowing because it doesn't deal in interest. The depositors' relationship with the bank is the relationship of a commercial partner who shares both profit and loss with the partner.

We follow two ways of investment: First, direct investment and, second, investment with others in specific and well-defined projects that are of general social benefit. This condition is fundamental.

[Question] What is the aspect of similarity between the investment banks in the industrial countries and the Islamic banks?

[Answer] There is similarity insofar as a large part of the banking operations is concerned. As for the difference, it lies in the fact that the investment banks and firms invest their monies in stocks and collect interest for their investment whereas the Islamic banks focus on direct investment and partnership. There are two observations: First, an Islamic bank is founded on the spirit of solidiarity between itself and the depositors on the one hand and itself and the partners on the other. Second, an Islamic bank engages in specific and clearcut investment operations, contrary to the investment banks and firms which measure matters by usury and interest rates. It is of no concern to them where the monies are invested, whether in nightclubs, alcohol distilleries or in the production of destructive weapons, as long as the capital and the interest are guaranteed.

[Question] Do you intend to open branches abroad?

[Answer] We look forward to opening branches abroad, considering that the sphere of investment in the Kuwaiti market is very limited. However, the Financing House is still in the initial stages of development. At the start, it is better for us to establish ourselves firmly in the local market, despite the strong demand and the constant increase in the bank's resources.

[Question] Can you give us some details on how the depositors' monies are invested?

[Answer] The bank [House] invests its monies in profitable projects which have a social dimension, such as real estate and housing projects. It also deals in commodity trading, including cars. Moreover, we participate in some industrial projects.

We have laid down an investment rule. We invest 70 percent of the resources in short-term investments and 30 percent in medium- and long-range investments. We invest 60 percent of the saving deposits and retain 40 percent of them for liquidity. We also invest 80 percent of the 1-year deposit accounts, retaining the rest for liquidity, and 90 percent of the deposit accounts for an indefinite term, retaining the remaining 10 percent for liquidity.

[Question] What is the profit rate for deposits in 1980 and in the preceding years and have these rates been better than the local and international interest rates?

[Answer] In 1980, the average profit for the saving accounts amounted to 6.75 percent, for the 1-year deposit accounts to 9 percent and for the long-term deposit accounts 10 and 1/8 percent. As I have already pointed out, the obvious difference in the profit rates is the result of the duration of the deposits. The longer the duration of the deposit, the bigger the investment opportunity we get and the bigger the profit grows.

[Question] You have said that the Financing House doesn't borrow or lend. What, then, is the resale [al-murabahah] system?

[Answer] The Financing House advances no loans to individuals or organizations unless they are charity loans, i.e. loans for the purpose of assistance. This is out of the question at present due to the House's level. As for the resale system, it is one of the well-known Islamic systems and is based fundamentally on importing the commodity [by the House] and selling it to the client at a profit rate set by the client in advance. The client then repays the value of the commodity to the House within a period of no more than 6 months.

[Question] Is the Islamic banking system fit to be an alternative to the current banking system or does it complement the current system?

[Answer] The Islamic banking system is a good alternative to the usurious banking system. Contrary to what some people believe, the world can do away with the latter system and turn toward the Islamic banking system which has achieved unparalleled success in numerous Muslim countries. It is my opinion that the adoption of this system will lead to eliminating economic chaos in the world.

[Question] Does the Financing House deal with the other Kuwaiti banks?

[Answer] It is regrettable that usurious banks are the rule in all parts of the world and Islamic banks are the exception. Until Islamic banks spread in the various countries, we are compelled to deal with the usurious banks, but in accordance with our Islamic method. I would like to point out that major international banks have studied our system and have shown understanding toward it. I would also like to point out that Pakistan has made all its banks operate in accordance with the Islamic Shari'a.

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BRIEFS

PILOTS TRAIN IN FRANCE--Another group of Libyan pilots and technicians has arrived in France in the last few days for advanced training on the Mirage-5 aircraft. The members of the group have been housed in the city of Bayonne, in the southwestern part of the country. Last night a report was made about a group of approximately 60 Libyan pilots and technicians who are staying in Biarritz, getting advanced courses in the main Dassault plant. These reports have received no official confirmation from Paris. Political circles in the French capital this evening told our correspondent that if it transpires that the reports are accurate Mitterrand's socialist government will be very much ill at ease, as it is demanding that the Libyan leader remove his forces from Chad. Paris had, however, already announced in the past that it would continue to honor the commitments undertaken by all the previous governments, even though some delays may occur in the dispatches to Libya. [Text] [TA012026 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 200 [as printed] GMT 1 Nov 81]

PAKISTANIS RETURN FROM SYRIA--Islamabad, October 18--Libya has brought back from Damascus some 150 Pakistanis who were allegedly press-ganged and sent to fight Israelis in Lebanon, a Foreign Office spokesman said here today. Following protests by Islamabad at the treatment of Pakistani nationals working in Libya, a high-powered Pakistani delegation is now expected to visit Tripoli next month to investigate, the spokesman added. (A.F.P.) [Text] [Paris AFRICA AFP in English 20 Oct 81 p 18]

CSO: 4500/36

BRIEFS

FINANCIAL COOPERATION WITH FRG--A financial agreement was signed in Bonn on 6 Oct 81 by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr Berndt von Staden, and the Moroccan Ambassador in Bonn, Mr Abdelhakim Iraqi. This agreement allocates a loan of 75 million DM for agriculturel projects in Morocco, and 10 million DM for the technical cooperation between the two countries. Furthermore, to alleviate the detrimental effects of the 1980-81 drought in Morocco, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany will provide the Moroccan government with 6,000 tons of wheat. [Text] [Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE 16 Oct 81 p 1]

CSO: 4519/35

DEBATE HELD ON SECURITY MEASURES

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 1 Oct 81 pp 5-6

[Text] Khartoum, Oct 1 (SUNA)--The Society of Law, University of Khartoum, organized here Tuesday evening a debate on the recent measures taken against vagrants and tramps in Khartoum Province.

A number of lawyers took part along with the Deputy Chief of the State Security.

Advocate Taha Ibrahim said the measures were governed by a number of codes, the Constitution, the Criminal Procedures Act, the State Security Act and the Police Act.

He said the measures could not be described as legal in view of Article 41 of the Constitution.

Deputy Chief of the State Security Kamal Hassan said the measures were dictated by the fact that the Capital has been overcrowded with vagrants and refugees who had deserted their camps. He said the armed crime was another cause of the measures besides trafficking in arms and unlicenced buildings.

Hassan said the detainees were given appropriate medical care and that tens of them were allowed to go to the hospitals. He said the measures were taken according to the State Security Act and that the detainees would be given jobs at the development projects.

Out of the 17,617 detainees only 5,600 have remained in custody, he further proclaimed.

He described the campaign as a success and that there was a remarkable drop in crime rate.

Hassan also confirmed that the law and the Constitution were observed.

Advocate Mustafa Abdel Gadir criticized the measures and said reference should always be made to the Constitution.

Ustaza Asma Mahmoud Mohamed Taha said the measures were dictated by the prevailing conditions and the need to guard the nation against the communist moves around us.

The opposition is unrealistic when it criticizes the current measures and this opposition's sole aim is to jump to power, Asma said.

Advocate Ali Osman Mohamed Taha said the Government has the right to apply the laws and that it should at the same time respect the humanity of citizens.

He indicated the decline of production and described it as a shame.

Advocate Abdalla Salih described the measures as illegal and unconstitutional and said the security forces could have monitered aliens and vagrants without the need to make arrests.

CSO: 4500/36

ILLEGAL ARMS DEALERS ARRESTED

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 28 Sep 81 p 1

[Text] Khartoum, Sep 28 (SUNA)--Unlicensed firearms were seized and arms dealers were arrested by security authorities here last week.

Small arms were captured while being moved by cabs, pickups or trucks at different places within the three-town capital and at highway check-points.

The arms were seized during the current campaign aimed at clearing capital from vagrants, pedlars and jobless persons.

The most recent catch was made last Thursday in Omdurman suburb of Um Badda where nine G-3 rifles, five Klashinkov, 545 G-3 bullets and 1,655 Klashenkov bullets were found in a taxi and a pickup. Owners who were arrested later told interrogators that they bought the arms from the eastern Sudanese border.

The captured arms totalled 22 G-3 rifles, 12 Klashinkovs, two sub-machine guns and two pistols plus a considerable quantity of ammunition.

The Defence Minister General Abdel Magid Hamid Khalil has promised financial reward to any civilian who informs the authorities of illegal arms or arms dealers.

A reward of 1,000 Sudanese pounds was distributed to the owner, driver and assistant driver of a truck found earlier this month loaded with firearms destined for sale in western Sudan.

The owners of truck-load also said they brought the arms from eastern Sudan.

CSO: 4500/36

BRIEFS

YOUTH LEADER IN PRC--Khartoum, Oct 22 (SUNA)--Assistant Secretary-General of the Sudan Youth Association 'Awad Rahama was back here yesterday after concluding a two-week visit to the People's Republic of China. During his visit to China, which was in response to an invitation by the League of Chinese Communist Youths, he discussed with Chinese Communist Party officials means of promoting cooperation between the political organizations in the two countries. He said the Chinese officials had voiced their appreciation for President Nimeri's leading role to realize solidarity between the Third World peoples. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 22 Oct 81 p 2]

ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS--Khartoum--The Public Corporation for Roads and Bridges has finalized the pavement of some 35 kilometres of the Dibeibat-El Obeid road project, Kordofan Region, SUNA learnt. The second phase of the 100-Km-road project is expected to be completed by 1983. The Dutch Government is contributing towards the financing of the project's cost amounting to L.s 8,000,000. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 11 Oct 81 p 6]

BRIDGE PLANNED--Tenders for the construction of Bussari bridge will be opened during next month. The bridge will have a vital economic importance because it links the provinces of Bahr El Ghazal and Eastern Equatoria. The bridge is financed at 2 1/2 million Dutch marks extended by the German Federal Republic. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 10 Oct 81 p 7]

TAX ON EMIGRE WORKERS--Khartoum, Oct. 1 (SUNA)--An income tax, equivalent to the Sudanese employees wage taxes, will be imposed on Sudanese Government employees seconded to work abroad, stated a provisional order issued by President Nimeri yesterday. The order, which is an amendment of the Income Tax Act 1981, also imposed a 10% income tax on Sudanese expatriates. It is noteworthy that the amendment came in response to the desire of the Sudanese nationals working abroad, as expressed during the recent expatriates conference, to take part in achieving development and prosperity of the country. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 1 Oct 81 p 5]

PRICE COURTS BEGIN WORK--Khartoum, Sep 29 (SUNA)--Prices' courts began dispatching duties here yesterday. Khartoum 2 court sentences a confectioner for three months imprisonment and a fine of LS100 for not posting the prices' list. A bread seller was fined LS50 for selling bread at more than the legal price. The court was chaired by Col. El Amin El Zubeir El Tahir. Khartoum souk's court fined a shop owner, who had not posted the prices' list, LS50 or one month imprisonment. The court sent a bread seller to jail for six months because he was selling bread at more than the legal price. The court was chaired by Col. Mohd. Awad Mustafa. Khartoum North court suspended sentences on two cases on weight violation. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Sep 81 p 5] Khartoum, Oct. 2 (SUNA)--Prices courts here yesterday issued hard sentences of imprisonment, fines and flogging. SUNA toured the courts and followed up the various cases of law breaking. A shop-keeper was sentenced for three months for selling a tin of powdered milk at 210 p.t., which was above the legal price. Another shop-keeper was sentenced for three months because he had not posted the prices list. A soft drinks seller was flogged 25 lashes for selling a glass of grape juice at 15 p.t. Several other persons received sentences varying from six-month imprisonment to 25 lashes for other similar violations while others were fined between L.S.100 to L.S.50. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Sep 81 p 5]

PRC TRADE OFFICIAL VISITS--Khartoum, Sep 29 (SUNA)--Transport Minister Mustafa Osman Hassan met here yesterday with the visiting People's China External Economic Relations Deputy Minister and the accompanying delegation. Hassan briefed the delegation on his ministry's activity. On the other hand, the delegation expressed its appreciation for the great role played by the Ministry in the field of transport in the Sudan. The delegation further expressed the readiness of the People's China government to extend all possible assistance to the transport sector in the Sudan. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Sep 81 p 3]

COOPERATION WITH PRC--Khartoum, Sep 29 (SUNA)--Health Minister Khalid Hassan Abbas received yesterday the visiting People's China External Economic Relations Deputy Minister. The meeting tackled bilateral relations and issues related to health cooperation between the two countries. The Minister hailed People's China's assistance to the Sudan in the various spheres. The meeting was attended by H.E. the Ambassador of People's China to Khartoum. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Sep 81 p 3-4]

CSO: 4500/36 END

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LIBYA, ETHIOPIA, PDRY PACT SEEN AS REACTION TO GCC

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 226 31 Aug 6 Sep 81 pp 18-19

[Article by Nuhad al-Mashnuq: "The Aden Summit Meeting Is for Those Excluded by the GCC"]

[Excerpt] The Soviets Are Assembling Their Cards in the Red Sea Area.

A Summit Meeting for the Steadfastness Countries in Libya, Even If Algeria Does Not Come.

Arab diplomatic sources say that President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Washington publicly assumed the nature of discussions concerning the Middle East crisis and the Palstinian autonomy talks, but that the visit was actually mostly for the purpose of discussing the Libyan situation and how to work toward achieving the down fall of Col Qadhdhafi, the Libyan head of state.

Faced with this situation, what could Col Qadhdhafi do? 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, head of state of South Yemen, did not wait for [improvement in] the atmosphere [among the Arab countries] before starting to work on the holding of the Aden summit meeting. He clearly began to prepare for it a long time ago. He did not do this on the basis of Soviet advice or approval from the Soviet leaders, but rather on the basis of a request made by the chief Soviet leaders during the Soviet Communist Party's 26th Congress which was attended by the South Yemeni head of state. This is what Eastern-bloc diplomatic sources in Beirut say. Since the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which includes six Gulf nations and excludes the two Yemens and Iraq, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad has been working on the creation of a new political and geographical equation. He signed a mutual friendship treaty with Ethiopia last February and has sought out his comrades in the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in order to discuss his plan with them.

Alliance of the Excluded

The reactions to the plan were not negative, although the Steadfastness nations, with the exception of Libya, were not invited to this meeting. The subject of discussion was the Red Sea area, although the GCC nations found, in their unity, support for them and their policy toward the Western nations. What is wrong with such nations, which have been excluded on the basis of their friendship with the Soviet Union, forming a political bloc which both strengthens and supports them?

Aden worked on the preparation of a draft agreement for political, economic, and military cooperation between the three countries. The most important thing in the political part of the draft agreement is that it emphasizes the rejection by these countries of the presence of American military bases in the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa, demonstrates that these three nations are against the reactionary political, military and security alliances in Africa and the Arab world, and intensifies these countries' alliance with the progressive and socialist countries of the world.

In the economic realm, the draft agreement calls for mutual material aid among the three countries so that they can carry out their plans having to do with development. Naturally Libya has already begun to immediately grant aid to the other two countries.

As for the military and security realm, the agreement calls for cooperation in all rspects against the activities of imperialist, Zionist, and reactionary circles.

There is no doubt that the most important part of this agreement between these three countries was not made public. However, a glance at the map shows that they constitute a triangle, the sides of which surround the coastlines of Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, the Sudan, Egypt, and Somalia.

Ethiopia's Role

This does not mean that the nations which are located within the sides of this triangle--especially Saudi Arabia--are being endangered by this alliance. However, the exploitation of weak spots is something which is legitimate in the field of political action. Those associated with the summit meeting believe that the Sudan, North Yemen, and Somalia are weak spots which can be exploited if others contemplate action against one of the nations which took part in the summit meeting.

Eastern-bloc diplomatic circles in Beirut say that one of the results of the Aden summit meeting has been a commitment by Mengistu, the Ethiopian head of state, to move militarily against the Sudan if the Sudan tries to undertake any action against Libya. Thus the leader of Libya has made part of his border secure after relations between Ethiopia and the Sudan had been undergoing a positive development due to the Sudan's role in the Eritrean question. If it had not been for 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's efforts, this positive devlopment in [Ethiopian-Sudanese] relations would have had a negative effect on Ethiopian-Libyan relations. This is why they say that the Aden summit meeting has achieved a strategic polarization with regard to the Red Sa area, and what is needed is to transfer this example to other areas in the Arab world.

Leftist Palestinian sources assure us that, in principle, the summit meeting of the Steadfastness and Confrontation states will be held in Libya after the 1 September celebrations which all will be attending, even though the Algerian president, Chadli Bendjedid, might not come.

9468
CSO: 4504/8

ARAB STEEL PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 44-45

[Text] AS MORE and more Arab states accord priority to building up indigenous iron and steel industries to lessen their dependence on imports necessary to industrial development, the Algiers-based Arab Iron and Steel Metallurgical Institute (IASM) is playing an increasingly important role.

It has already established an iron, steel and metallurgical documentation centre and is setting up an iron and steel data bank for the Arab world. The final stage of its plan is to open a technical and economic studies department capable of providing Arab states with the latest technical data and market analyses.

'We were surprised to learn that information on the metal industry in the Arab world simply did not circulate from one country to another, so that economic planners in Algeria, for instance, were practically in the dark about the plans of their colleagues in Saudi Arabia,' Djaffar Salah, IASM's director, told *8 Days*.

The importance to Arab countries of developing their iron and steel industries was underlined at a conference in Doha in spring, sponsored by the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultation (GOIC). It reviewed progress over the past two decades, laid plans for growth during the 1980s and laid down the principles of a common strategy for broadening inter-state cooperation.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and Qatar took part in the conference. All seven have made substantial progress in developing their capacity for producing iron and steel, but are still falling short of the region's rapidly climbing demand. Their combined production capacity is estimated at present at about 1.25m tonnes per year (t/y), while imports of steel products has been averaging 5m t/y over the past three years. The gap between local production and demand is likely to widen as the pace of Middle East development quickens.

Recognising that only a concerted effort to upgrade Gulf steel production infrastructure during the current decade could prevent the growth of costly imports, the Doha conference recommended that the seven states should strive to produce at least 60 per cent of their projected 10m t/y needs by 1990. Although the will to develop regional cooperation was evident, it seems that the 60 per cent target remains out of reach.

The problems facing the aspiring Gulf iron and steel manufacturers also affect other Middle Eastern states such as Syria, Jordan and Egypt, as well as North African countries such as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Under the supervision of the Algerian ministry of heavy industry, IASM is helping to solve one of the most important of these problems, exchange of information.

'Since our documentation service started functioning some years back, we have a much clearer picture of what is really going on in different Arab countries,' says Salah. The institute is now in regular contact with most steel producing factories in the Arab world, keeping close tabs on current operations as well as future projects.

Salah believes that building up a powerful Arab metallurgical industry is absolutely essential. 'In the not too distant past, Arab economic planners were not agreed on the fact that heavy industry — like iron and steel factories — was the essential building block necessary for the construction of an integrated and rational industrial infrastructure,' he says. 'Now, however, a general

consensus has started to emerge, and even Gulf economic experts feel that dependence on imported metal products could constitute a [illegible]ious brake on development prospects.'

'Without a doubt,' says Salah, 'during the first phase of iron and steel production in the industrialising Arab world, costs are liable to be higher than in the industrialised world. It is not likely that Algeria's El Hadjar steelworks, for example, could produce a tonne of steel as economically as Nippon Steel or US Steel. But we must not lose sight of the fact that a number of factors, which can be gradually overcome, condition the high-cost production structure in Arab and Third World countries. Factories in these countries must often pay inflated bills for imported technology and expatriate personnel.'

The IASM director, nonetheless, is optimistic about the future. 'Let's not forget that industrialisation is a long-term affair, and as Arab producers achieve a better mastery over the industrial cycle of iron and steel, their costs will be considerably trimmed. I would even say that given the escalating cost of ocean transport, domestically produced metal products in the Arab world will be increasingly competitive with foreign production by the end of the century.'

Salah is very sceptical about the effects of the transfer of technology from western steelmakers to the Arab world. 'These companies are interested in maintaining their monopoly over key production processes, and talk of effective technology transfer rarely is translated into reality,' Salah says.

He believes that only by training Arab personnel in iron and steel production techniques can extensive dependence on foreign firms be limited. He points out that the Tunisian steelworks in the northern part of the country at Menzel Bourguiba is now entirely staffed by Tunisian workers, technicians and engineers.

Salah thinks that Algerian experience in industrialisation could help other Arab countries avoid some of the shortcomings of cooperation with western firms. Instead of turnkey factories, Algeria imposes 'product in hand' contracts which oblige foreign companies to train local personnel and ensure that the plant functions according to specifications before pulling out.

'The Arab world could even become a net exporter of steel products by the end of the century, especially to sub-Saharan Africa,' says Salah. Already Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt are exporting — even to Western Europe — a number of steel products. With cheaper Arab labour this trend could be amplified.

Salah is firmly convinced that expansion will be the watchword for Arab iron and steel ventures in the next two decades. He listed a number of new schemes planned in the Gulf:

- **Bahrain:** a 25,000 t/y bar plant to convert scrap metal is now under construction.
- **Kuwait:** a feasibility study for a 100,000 t/y bar rolling mill has been completed by the Kuwaiti Industrial Bank, and awaits the go-ahead from the government.
- **Oman:** the sultanate is expected to approve an iron and steel plant with a production capacity of 400,000 t/y of sponge iron, of which 150,000 t/y would be earmarked for the manufacture of rolled products such as bars. A feasibility study is thought to have impressed the Omani government.
- **UAE:** Abu Dhabi has commissioned a feasibility study for a 500,000–900,000 t/y iron and steel complex, producing sponge

Installed raw steel production capacities and planned ones for 1990 (thousand tons)

country	installed capacities (1980)	capacities being installed	capacities to install	total capacity (1990)	%
Saudi Arabia	140	800	940	940	21.4
Bahrain	—	25	—	25	0.5
United Arab Emirates	111	840	—	951	21.8
Iraq	460	—	1,000	1,460	33.2
Kuwait	116	—	100	216	4.9
Oman	—	—	400	400	9.1
Qatar	400	—	—	400	9.1
Total Arab Gulf	1,227	1,665	2,440	4,392	100

iron, some of which is to be exported to India, with the rest being used as throughput for planned electric steelmaking furnaces. In addition, Abu Dhabi is considering the construction of a 40,000 t/y steel tube plant.

● **Saudi Arabia:** by far the most ambitious regional project is the Jubail steelworks, under the aegis of the Saudi Iron and Steel Company. The initial production target calls for 850,000 t/y of billets to supply downstream rolling mills. Facilities will include two direct iron ore reduction modules for producing sponge iron, a gas desulphurisation plant, a pelletisation mill and a 400,000-tonne ore storage yard. Total investment is put at Saudi riyals 2bn ($585m).

CSO: 4500/41

MINISTER OF EDUCATION INTERVIEWED ON BASIC INSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Algiers EL DJEICH in French No 220, Sep 81 pp 7-9

[Interview with Mohamed Cherif Kherroubi, minister of education and basic instruction; date and place not given]

[Text] Basic instruction, now in its second year, is one of the most important decisions concerning education made by the political leaders.

Given the importance of this institution, Mohamed Cherif Kherroubi, member of the Central Committee and minister of education and basic instruction, was interviewed.

The interview dealt with methods of applying this new system of education, its goals and prospects and the means used.

Basic instruction was not instituted in order to provide a solution to the problem of bilingualism, but in addition, to extend compulsory education from six to nine consecutive years and thereby create, based on an analysis of the negative points of the old system, a balance between educational systems, the demands of development and the country's real conditions.

We are convinced that this new orientation will enable us to kill two birds with one stone: By taking advantage of the resource which our young people signify, we shall correct the country's lack of skilled technical workers and put an end to the educational "waste" that fills our streets every year.

[Question] Mr Minister, basic instruction was instituted in order to solve the problem of bilingualism in education. How is its application progressing and what problems have you encountered?

[Answer] Basic instruction was not instituted solely for the purpose of solving this problem of bilingualism, but also of solving the problems of the young people who leave school at age 14. Compulsory education was six years. Basic instruction now puts it at nine and thereby provides an overall solution: unification of education, extension of schooling and the abolition of the image that idle young people filling the streets created. As education gave them little, they could not fit into active life. On the other hand, after the nine years provided by the basic education, our young people will be old enough and have a solid enough base to permit them either to continue their studies or fit into active life. They will be old enough and have solid knowledge.

With respect to problems, they do exist, but this is completely natural in the case of any change, whether in education or other sectors.

In decreeing the establishment and application of basic instruction, the Central Committee was quite aware of the problems that would arise: first of all, the problem of the school infrastructure, especially since the extension of schooling to nine years demanded further development; second, the retraining of teachers for the new model and new methodology.

For this first year of basic instruction, we proceeded to retrain all the first-year teachers. With respect to inspectors and advisers, whose number has considerably increased (over 1,200), we organized two seminars for them during the year.

We can therefore say that basic education has yielded a new boost and breathed new life into the Ministry of Education and Basic Instruction.

[Question] There can be no doubt that with the application of basic instruction, needs for school facilities, books and personnel will be greater than ever. What have you planned in order to meet these needs?

[Answer] Actually, I have already answered the first part of the question on the infrastructure, but I should like to pose a question also: Is basic instruction in general necessary or not?

In my opinion, it is necessary and we are forced to opt for it if we want to avoid losing in the future that asset which our young people represent. These young people who do not finish school are in the streets, where in one or two years they lose what they have learned because their basic training is not solid enough. Furthermore, as a result of their age, they cannot get jobs or enter the professional training centers.

Between now and 1984, we shall have hundreds of thousands of children in the streets and it is absurd that the education we provide should run counter to the demands of national development. Consequently, basic instruction is a need, whether we like it or not, and we must face up to it if we truly want the democratization of education. We are aware of everything that has to do with the field of education directly or indirectly, and all factors are taken into consideration in the 5-year plan. Concerning the construction of new schools, we have to continue the operation even if we have to use prefabricated buildings. Last year's experience, although for a relatively short period of time, was thoroughly satisfactory.

Concerning textbooks, we have already proceeded to change the content and methodology of the first-year books. Those for the second year have just been finished and will be distributed immediately. The third-year books are being prepared and we are taking the new methods into consideration, methods that we have applied to all subjects taught (languages, figuring) and to the aspect of the psychic and physical development of the child.

Moreover, we are mastering the training of teachers, and in some subjects, it has gone from one to two years, which will make it possible for future teachers to

better assimilate the new methodology. In keeping with the new orientation, all governmental organs are fully convinced of the need to work to attract and encourage young people and cadres and consequently, thank heaven, the problem of the lack of teachers will no longer be posed, especially with the large number of high school graduates who will enter the training institutes every year. This year, we trained nearly 13,000. Moreover, we shall have the aid of the young people called up for National Service, who, as soon as they have finished their military instruction, will go into teaching. This contribution will be especially beneficial for the poor wilayate [governorates] in the south and on the high plateaux.

[Question] Will the assignment of young people called up for National Service begin this year?

[Answer] Yes, and that will take place gradually. We have concluded an agreement with the High Commission for National Service: A teacher called up for National Service will be directly assigned to education following his military training.

In this way, they will perhaps be able to train new teachers themselves.

[Question] With the application of the basic instruction, it is expected that in the future, there will be the problem of girls in technical education and their active life subsequently. How do you view this problem?

[Answer] The problem does not actually exist insofar as we already have several professional training centers reserved for girls and the results are substantial. However, the most important point for us is that every boy and girl will acquire, during their nine years of education, the main bases of their chosen technical training, whether it be carpentry, electricity, or whatever.

After that, and in keeping with the program of professional training applied, they will be guided, depending on their inclinations and aptitudes, either toward technical secondary education or professional training. There, they will receive a higher-level education than at present.

Naturally, there will be training centers and technical centers where the specific areas of specializations of girls will be taken into account.

[Question] The orientation has been the center of your concern this year. How are preparations going and how will that orientation take place?

[Answer] From the standpoint of the basic instruction, the academic orientation is the structuring of the democratization of education -- that is, the democratic organization of education by giving democratization its true meaning. Over the course of his nine years, the student serves the apprenticeship of the trade he has chosen for two or three hours a week. For that purpose, every school will have a small workshop. Throughout the nine years, the student is regularly followed through an annual activity record which will subsequently make it possible to analyze his aptitudes and inclinations: theoretical or practical studies, electricity, design or carpentry. In the light of that record, he is guided, after the first nine years, either toward general secondary education, which prepares

him to enter the university, or toward the technical lycees from which he will graduate with a diploma orienting him toward the technical and scientific schools or the industrial establishments. Finally, the last outlet are the professional training centers. This is the real structuring of the democratization of education, based on the desires and aptitudes of each pupil.

After these different phases, it is absolutely necessary to create a bond and establish coordination between the different institutions so as to enable deserving students graduating from the training centers to enter the institutions of higher learning and to organize sessions for graduates working in the factories, which will allow them to go to the university. Only in this way will we truly succeed in democratizing education in keeping with the country's conditions. The method we are now using is not democratic at all and I would even say quite frankly that it borders on anarchy. Everyone wants to go to the university. We do not need them. Between now and 1984, we shall have 1 million pupils in the intermediate level of education. Will all of them go on to secondary schools? Will all of that number then go on to the university? If democratization of education is to follow the inclinations and competency of every child, it must also meet the country's needs.

In that way, every student will find a field for his ambition. A student working in the fields or factories and who is excellent and demonstrates his competency will see the doors of the universities and higher institutes open before him.

[Question] Mr Minister, the point concerning orientation is very important. Our view is that of all wali [provincial governors] at their last meeting, to the effect that their governorates are short of skilled workers in technical fields. The future application of this point will therefore respond to their needs.

[Answer] Actually, we are now seeing congestion in some disciplines. For example, there are thousands of jurists, just as there are in the literary disciplines. What are we to do with them? We can therefore say that there is no academic orientation. At a time when we have 4 million children in basic instruction, some 70,000 to 75,000 in higher education, professional training has but 30,000. The rest fill the streets. There is therefore no balance, no harmony. This is not normal.

[Question] In our opinion, Mr Minister, the orientation and distribution of pupils among the different outlets demands a certain coordination with the other ministries involved.

[Answer] That is true. And there are now coordinating commissions between us and the offices of secretary of state for professional training and secondary and technical education. It is necessary to coordinate our efforts in order to plan school programs, needs for professional training and the requirements of general secondary or technical education.

[Question] The problem of methodology and the content of schoolbooks has existed for a long time. A large number of books do not reflect true conditions in Algeria. What do you think of this, Mr Minister?

[Answer] In the new methods that we have introduced, we consider the scientific aspect and the pedagogical aspect and we thereby facilitate the task of the teacher and the pupil. The books must be clear, precise and written in the national language, a language that is not foreign to the child. We have also done away with all that was superfluous, things that only burdened the program from the pedagogical standpoint. Concerning the subject of figuring, it is absurd that children should should continue to count in the traditional way using his fingers or sticks, without using his head.

We have therefore adopted a method that requires the child to use his mental faculties from the very first year of basic instruction. This method is useful for the development of his faculties and accustoms him to reflexion and deduction.

By giving a certain balance to the academic programs, we have given the scientific and expressive aspects their true value. For example, we have introduced a new pedagogical and scientific method in the study of history. The old programs have been done away with because they granted little importance to certain important points of our history. We have also given civic instruction a pedagogical aspect that will enable the child to better understand the attachment to the Arab-Muslim personality.

The same is true of national education in general. We tend to simplify the country's charters in order to give every child a true national education. When he takes up the study of the history of civilization and the experiences of others, he will do so with a true national personality taking the country's circumstances into account.

[Question] Since you speak of the Algerian personality, I believe that the fundamental school can consolidate one of its main component parts, to wit, the national language and the elimination of bilingualism.

[Answer] The problem with bilingualism is that when man invents, he does not invent with his language, and the man who does not invent with his language never does more than imitate.

That is one thing. Furthermore, with the application of basic instruction, we restore trust between the child and his national language and he can study sciences, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and so on, in his language.

Some have said in the past that these subjects could not be taught in Arabic. Today they all are and with a new method, just as with all other subjects. The apprenticeship of foreign languages is also accomplished with a new functional Algerian method.

A language is not learned out of a love for it, but for the benefit one can derive from it. By adding one or two foreign languages to the knowledge of each child, we balance education and prepare a new generation, a generation open to a strong personality, impregnanted with national values, capable of deriving the best from other civilizations and enriching them at the same time. That is the distant goal of basic education.

[Question] A final word?

[Answer] Basic instruction is for everyone because as I have already said, it alone can reflect all problems and all the contradictions which our young people experience. It alone makes it possible to make use of that true resource that is being lost in the streets. Consequently, everyone must make his own contribution. I should like to take advantage of this opportunity to tell parents that basic education is in the interest of their children. It assures them of nine years of school, raises the level of education and also makes it possible to acquire a strong national personality. For its success, we need the aid of all parents. They must trust the ministry, the government and the political leaders who have decided upon this policy, a wise policy capable of solving all their problems.

I would also like to thank teachers and training personnel who have made considerable efforts this year. Our education has now reached a stage where it can create a true education revolution alone, without any foreign aid.

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CSO: 4519/21

BRIEFS

ROMANIAN DELEGATION VISITS--A delegation from Romanian radio and television recently paid a working and friendly visit to Algeria during which it conducted a series of talks with national radio and television officials on cooperation between the two establishments. The two sides agreed to exchange radio and television programs between the two countries and to carry out research in the political, economic and cultural life in the two countries. The Romanian radio and television delegation was received by Algerian Minister of Information and Culture Boualem Bessaiah, in the presence of 'Abd al-Rahman Laghouat, the director general of Algerian Radio and Television. [Text] [LD270146 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 26 Oct 81]

CSO: 4504/61

HISTORY OF PAST DECADE IN PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Aug 81 p 6

/Article by 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Ali: "What Does the First Study on the Achievements of the People's Assembly During 10 Rich Years Say?"/

/Text/ The first scientific study on the People's Assembly activity in the course of 10 years rich with activity and achievement reveals that fiscal policy had an effect on social policy, and that although the peace process cut off Arab aid, international aid nonetheless covered this aspect. A transformation in general ideological attitudes also occurred with the demand that the private sector take more extensive part in confronting the basic problems of society, that the policy of economic liberalization be pursued, and that the multi-party system be adopted. This was reflected in the view the government and the members of the People's Assembly had on social reality, as influenced by the housing problem in the first place, in a manner whose effects were consequently reflected on young people hoping to get married. The members of parliament hoped to put a stop to the migration of skilled labor abroad, due to the country's need for them to deal with the deterioration that had afflicted public utilities and was an inevitable consequence of the socialization of education -- which was a main cause of the scarcity of skilled manpower.

Three researchers, Dr 'Ali Laylah, Mrs Ulfat Husayn Agha and Mrs Najwa Husayn Khalil, carried out this study on three stages in the period 1970-1980.

The First Stage: from 1970 to 1973

The study stressed that this period was marked by numerous political changes which occurred among members of the ruling elite. The effect of this was to have repercussions on influential sociopolitical leaders with long-range objectives. This is made clear by the number of cabinets that came to power in this period. With the successive cabinet changes in this period, we find that the average life of cabinets filling the rudder of affairs came to about 8 months -- an extremely short period which is not of much use in carrying out social policies with long-range strategic goals. The basic goals whose slogans are raised by each ministry also vary, and this underlines the lack of continuity in the social policy that each cabinet commits itself to. That is reflected in the fact that the same problems appeared in all these cabinets' statements, but in a more complicated fashion the more we advanced in time.

As a result of all that, these cabinets generally constituted new beginnings which promised great hopes, but the achievements were generally scanty, in view of the time

period [required] for social change.

The Effect of Money

In addition, this period was distinguished by an instability in ideological orientation. The effect of this was reflected on social policy; while the main goal of each cabinet used to be to bring about a socialist transformation, this evolved into different goals represented by the attainment of local development, economic liberalization, agricultural development basically to cope with industrial development, and comprehensive planning.

In addition to that, successive cabinets during this period concentrated on coping with the revenue deficit involved in the financing of basic development plan projects or their projects. The main reason, in this state, might have been the war and war preparations before 1973; because of its limited resources, the government relied on Arab aid to support certain development plan projects, and reliance was placed on foreign aid to support other projects in a subsequent stage.

The financial dimension had an extreme effect on Egyptian social policy. The peace process led to the cutoff of Arab aid from Egypt and therefore in some development projects reliance was placed on international aid. Consequently, the international dimension came to be imposed by events, and this generally had an effect on the social policy followed to develop and advance society; this policy focussed on resolving problems of education, housing, labor and insurance and rebuilding Egyptian man.

Among the discussions that went on in the People's Assembly on these problems, the study emphasized that the problem of education received 35 percent of the attention, housing 19 percent, and labor 16 percent, followed by insurance.

The study specified that the most important feature in this period was a modest shift in the nature of the ideological orientation which appeared ultimately to stress the importance of private projects and professionals and of inviting foreign and Arab capital to take part in coping with such basic problems as housing. Interest in luxury housing was conspicuous.

The approach to the problems that plagued the situation in Egypt was distinguished by superficiality in reviewing problems and a failure to try to review them scientifically in terms of their size and the possibility that they might grow and to adopt a suitable strategy to cope with them and define their causes and current and probable effects; the review of problems stopped at the level of subjective impressions which were not supported by scientific data. The emphasis on liberating Arab territories in their entirety and intensifying efforts for the military struggle was also clearly apparent.

The Second Stage: From 1974 to 1977

This period reflected specific features such as the establishment and implantation of the economic liberalization policy and the shift from the single party to the multi-political party system. This in turn created an effect on the vision the government and the members of the People's Assembly had of Egyptian social conditions with their ongoing social problems. We find that it represented a social policy whose features were distinct from the previous stage, especially since the government had

gone through the military struggle and achieved victory in it during that stage, then ended up with the declaration of the peace initiative and the raising of social slogans to solve the problems of Egyptian society and bring about welfare.

In this period, the order of concern with social problems and issues changed. Whereas the attention had been more toward education as a social problem, the housing problem came to have priority and to be the most pressing problem, imposing itself on the discussion that went on in the assembly, of which it accounted for about 33 percent. It was also observed that awareness and attention to the limits and causes of the housing problem increased, in light of the serious social effects it possessed. Alongside this, there emerged attention to the collapse of housing and the deterioration of utilities, along with the relationship between landlord and tenant, the rights of tenants of dwellings that were about to collapse and the emergence of the problem of key money and advance rent payments. A tendency which arose from this problem also emerged: this was the declaration that the housing problem had become a problem threatening people's security, threatening public health, indeed threatening morality. The government's statement before the assembly in November 1976 stressed that key money and apartment prices rose the more the housing and building materials shortage became aggravated.

Opposition to Emigration

The labor question received 15 percent of the members' attention. The members' treatment of the problem was on a par with the solutions presented, since the problem had become understood during the first stage. The problem was described in terms of agricultural and skilled labor and its shortage and high wages, alongside government policy, which laid emphasis on encouraging the emigration of workers abroad and the continuous training of new technical staffs which would meet the deficit. However, the opposition attacked this policy and demanded that the emigration of technical workers abroad be limited since the country needed them.

The Third Stage: From 1978 to 1980

In this period, the country passed through a historic turning point toward the establishment of peace in the Middle East. This period witnessed the signing of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel and slogans were raised on the promotion of peace, welfare and democracy. During this period, the National Democratic Party was also formed, under the chairmanship of President Anwar al-Sadat.

In this period the government programs concentrated on adherence to the principles of the 23 July and 15 May revolutions, on commitment to democratic socialism as an economic and political basis for the regime, on bringing about a sound balance between the interests of the individual and the interests of the group on the one hand and the material and spiritual needs of man on the other, and then on the call for adherence to the multi-party system as an expression of democracy and consultation and establishment of political activity founded on an objective opposition committed to social peace and national unity as a necessary element in the exercise of democratic rule.

As regards issues of concern, the housing problem headed the list of social issues. The government presented a true picture of the size of the problem, declaring that its policy would be based on encouraging the private and cooperative sectors and

removing all restrictions on their activity so that they could bear the main burden in solving this problem, while providing construction materials through production and import. In this period the government did not emphasize common housing.

The subject of the private sector's role in solving the housing problem stirred numerous discussions and contradictory views. Some members doubted this sector's ability to play an effective role in eliminating the housing shortage, proceeding from the premise that the public sector, in spite of its ongoing contributions, had not solved the problem because the issue of housing was much too great and the private sector was only a group of individuals who had some savings and wanted to invest them to make a profit.

The Peace Stage

In another area, the problem of determining rents on real property built in haste during that period stood out. Views on this approach differed. There were people who saw fit to refuse to continue lowering the rental value of properties, proceeding from the premise that the notion of justice was to preserve the national wealth in the building sector, especially since the owners of buildings had neglected them after their rental value had ceased to represent an income worth preserving. The argument of people who were in favor of continuing to lower the rental value on properties was founded on the point that increasing rental values would constitute a burden on tenants at a time when prices were increasing not just for owners but also for everyone living on Egyptian territory.

The solutions proposed for solving the housing problem took the greatest share of the members' discussions, coming to 45 percent /of the total/ in comparison with /talk about/ the limits and causes of the problem, the social effects arising from it, and the obstacles in the way of an effective housing policy.

In this period the opposition (the Labor Party) recommended that the housing problem be solved by establishing simple housing models consisting of a single room and bathroom for a family starting out in life, then two rooms for a family whose size grew beyond that, /assuming that/ a single room would be better than tents or graves. All public sector companies would have to mobilize their efforts to provide one-or two-room low-cost and ordinary housing and not high-rise buildings that people with limited incomes could not live in.

The policy of deeding apartments also stirred up lengthy discussion because it was necessary to think about citizens who were not able to make down payments or subsequent payments on deeds. The materials for luxury housing were also to be imported from abroad and local building materials were not to be used /in it/. The rental on ordinary housing was to be reasonable and the government was to take over and mobilize all the public sector's government construction capabilities on its behalf.

Compulsory Education

In another area, the issue of education enjoyed the concern of the government and People's Assembly members during this period in its statements. The government stressed that it was trying to stem sources of illiteracy by enrolling all children of compulsory ages and linking education to production needs, the attainment of

welfare and the opening of higher education for outstanding graduates of technical secondary schools and technical training institutes.

The conclusions of the analysis of People's Assembly activities during this period revealed an obvious change in the nature of ideological orientation from that which had prevailed in the first stage of the research, once the importance of building a socialist society as an extension of the period before 15 May 1971 had become obvious and the need for economic liberalization and the role of the private sector in solving many social problems such as the problem of housing had become prominent, along with a clear orientation toward the stage of peace, the takeoff toward establishment of welfare, and the takeoff toward confrontating crushing social problems in a decisive manner that did not contradict the comprehensive policy the transition toward a peacetime economy required. The role of a strong objective opposition that could offer proof and evidence of the failure of certain government approaches to solving crushing social problems and would ultimately refuse to vote on the side of the government program because in its view it would not solve the masses' problems also became prominent.

11887
CSO: 4504/20

PAPER OFFERS PREVIEW OF LATEST CABINET SHUFFLE

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 1

/Article: "A Limited Cabinet Shuffle Is To Be Announced before Monday"/

/Text/ A change was to have been made in some cabinet posts and positions of governorates on a limited scale, at the end of this month, after conclusion of the sessions of the general national conference of the National Party.

It was then decided that the limited change would be made before the convening of the party's conference next Monday so that the party conference could meet and the people to whom the new positions were assigned could take part in it.

It is expected that the shift will be declared soon, before the conference convenes.

Cabinet Posts to the Two People's Assembly Vice Chairmen

So far it seems probable that cabinet posts will be assigned to Muhammad Rashwan and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan, the two vice chairmen of the People's Assembly.

That was decided on grounds that they should engage in executive responsibilities now that they have acquired political and legislative expertise in parliament, especially in the factfinding committees that most thoroughly pursued their activity concerning numerous general problems that the People's Assembly was to submit to the factfinding committees under the chairmanship of both.

A New Vice Chairman of the People's Assembly

In commitment to the foregoing thought, which is that party staffs should be trained in various types of responsibility, it was decided that a current cabinet member should be assigned parliamentary responsibility in the People's Assembly, and the party leaders recommended him for the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly. This nomination will be presented to the parliamentary board of the National Democratic Party, as will the nomination of the second vice chairman of the People's Assembly, who will represent the workers and peasants.

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AL-SADAT DISCUSSES RECENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cairo MAY in Arabic No 31, 28 Sep 81 pp 3,5

/Report on interview of Anwar al-Sadat by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "Public Opinion Inquires and al-Sadat Responds"; date and place not specified/

/Text/ The subject of Arab newspapers that have no concern but to make a mountain out of a molehill, as people say, is a very strange one! There is no Arab newspaper that has not devoted its pages to publishing its fantasies, which it calls news, concerning the comprehensive cabinet reshuffle it alleges President Anwar al-Sadat intends to declare in a few days.

Many months ago Arab newspapers were following up on this fantasy and prominently displaying their expectations of it every day, as if it was a real fact!

How many reasons have these papers advanced to justify the new cabinet reshuffle! Some people stressed that President al-Sadat was not happy with the current cabinet, because it did not realize its goals, and others asserted that the goal in the change was to replace the cabinet with another one headed by a strong man who could govern the country by iron and fire, lest any one raise his voice and say "no!"

The Arab newspapers are living under the illusion that Egypt is in a state of being threatened with a blow up at any moment. Nothing these papers publish goes beyond some lies revolving about a single narrow focus; they talk about attempts to overthrow the regime, sometimes by force, sometimes by peace, sometimes by bombs that explode, by which thousands of people fall as victims, sometimes by bombs whose identity and location are discovered a few seconds before they explode, and by acts of repression and terror that never stop or end.

Egyptians read these papers and wonder where that Egypt they write about, and whose events they talk about, is to be found. The Egyptian reader imagines that he is the last to know what is going on in his country. He does not hear about a single coup attempt except from what he reads in these newspapers. He does not hear about the explosion of a single bomb in the area of Cairo he lives in, as the newspapers specify, and whose victim he has been. The Egyptian papers do not mention a word about the bombs it was possible to defuse and keep from exploding a few seconds before they were timed to go off!

The Arab newspapers have not contented themselves with what they have written on the new cabinet. They have asserted that President al-Sadat will order the dissolution

and reconstitution of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly! Not just that -- indeed, these papers have ventured to predict what the names of the members of the new cabinet will be. What is funny is that these newspapers differ among themselves, their news conflicts, and their expectations are remote from one another. One paper published the statement that Nabawi Isma'il is to be the new prime minister, and another paper, issued on the same day, came out and asserted that President Anwar al-Sadat would form a cabinet and would assign the premiership to Mansur Hasan and that Nabawi Isma'il would go out of it! Then a third paper eliminated Nabawi Isma'il and Mansur Hasan from the new cabinet and anticipated that the former would assume the chairmanship of the People's Assembly while the latter would be given the position of second vice president! A fourth paper, more generous than those three, ventured to stress that President al-Sadat would relinquish the chairmanship of the National Party to Mansur Hasan!

The only thing that has preoccupied Arab papers in recent days concerns what they call the struggle for power in Egypt. They have asserted that the new cabinet formation would eliminate everyone who had participated in this alleged struggle!

The Egyptian newspapers, for their part, published information about the cabinet reshuffle but were specific and said that it, that is, the modification, would be extremely limited; then they were clearer and stressed that it would involve only three ministers!

The Arab newspapers seized at this explanation, which had turned their expectations on their heads, and said that President al-Sadat would assign the cabinet to Mansur Hasan on grounds that he was the closest of all to the president's heart and mind, specifically in the period that has most recently passed!

Then the very limited ministerial change was announced.

It brought in the three new ministers -- Muhammad Rashwan, Mukhtar Hani and Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan. One minister left, Mansur Hasan; he was nominated for the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly!

All the expectations of the Arab newspapers were dashed.

Rather than being embarrassed about their news, which had turned out not to be true, or their expectations, which were not realized, we were surprised to see the newspapers exploiting Mansur Hasan's situation and his departure from the cabinet in the oddest and worst manner.

These papers unanimously declared that Mansur Hasan had recently been transformed from the person closest to the heart and mind of President al-Sadat to the most intense critic and opponent of his recent policies! Mansur Hasan, whom they had previously asserted would head the next Egyptian cabinet, has now in their view become an opponent and protestor, because of President al-Sadat's excessive confidence in him, -- a man rejecting the latest measures to which the people agreed by an overwhelming majority!

The young official who was close to the head of state in the past few years and enjoyed his complete affection, enthusiasm and guidance, has now, by their pens, been

transformed in their papers into another person whom Mansur Hasan himself does not recognize!

Once again, they have given their horses free rein.

They have published the statement that the "isolation" of Mansur Hasan took place because of his opposition to the policy of repressing and striking out at the opposition. They really did! And after the discovery of his firm bonds with the leaders of the Moslem Brothers!

The wierdest thing they had to say about Mansur Hasan was published in the newspaper AL-SAFIR, issued in Lebanon with the money of the wretched people of Libya. It said that the reason for the "isolation" may be sought in the good relations that he had with a correspondent with the French newspaper LE MONDE and an American television correspondent, who were recently thrown out of Egypt!

Another paper wrote that Mansur Hasan's banishment came as a result of his dealing lightly, as minister of information, with journalists who were opposed to the regime and criticized the policy of the Egyptian government at home and abroad! The same paper went on to say that Mansur Hasan has been rebuked for advocating liberalism and not being sufficiently decisive in the Ministry of Information or the Ministry of Culture!

Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet has been the talk of Egyptian public opinion. It is true that public opinion did not attribute the departure of the young minister from the cabinet to the reasons bruited about by hostile Arab papers; however, which is also true, public opinion did not know the reason behind Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet.

I brought Egyptian public opinion's queries before President Anwar al-Sadat.

I asked:

"People are wondering, Mr. President, about the reason for Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet; in other words, was the sole purpose of the latest ministerial change to expel Mansur Hasan from the cabinet?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"The fact is that I heard this question the first time going about on the tongues of my children at home. My children read the news in the papers like any ordinary citizen. They are not very interested in politics, and I am very happy about that. I have not wanted anyone in my home to be active in politics. Preoccupation with politics, as I have learned, is a very oppressive and difficult process. Fortunately, my children are not interested in politics and none of them have thought of being involved with it.

"When the cabinet change was published in the papers, the children came and asked me the same question you are asking now. Mansur Hasan was the only person who had left the cabinet. Can you imagine that the goal in that change was to remove Mansur!

"My children's interest in this subject, in spite of their lack of interest in political matters, as I have said, might be attributable to their personal acquaintance with Mansur Hasan. He is related to my family by marriage and our relations are not those of close collaborators -- they are family relations at the same time."

I told the president,

"Public opinion has not commented on the cabinet change and has not paid attention to the shifts of governors. All it is concerned with is to know the reason for Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet! That is a question that has been repeated by people who are preoccupied with politics and by people who are not, at the same time."

President al-Sadat replied,

"Perhaps the reason for that interest may in general be attributed to the great amount written about this ministerial change before it was announced. People wrote and made predictions about it at length, giving public opinion the impression that the change would be comprehensive and fundamental. When the change was declared, public opinion was surprised to find that it was extremely limited and minor. It was previously published in MAY that the change would be very limited, but some people continued to imagine that the change would involve a large number of ministries and ministers."

I asked the president,

"What is the reason for this very limited change?"

The president replied,

"I do not embark on any decision or action unless I have purpose behind it. The change that occurred was very limited, but in it one can observe an emphasis on the People's Assembly and the National Democratic Party. There are three deputies in the People's Assembly who shone brilliantly under the cupola, and I chose them to work in the cabinet. These were Muhammad Rashwan, Mukhtar Hani and Muhammad Radwan. Rashwan and Hani have become ministers of state for People's Assembly and Consultative Assembly affairs, and Radwan is minister of culture.

"This shows that I want to train leaders by changing positions. A person who is trained in the People's Assembly will move to the cabinet. A person who is in the cabinet will go back to the party or the People's Assembly. And so on.

"Through this system, I am rearing the staffs we need. Naturally I do that only with the personnel that function actively and of whom we can say 'they have the political touch.' By those I mean people who have chosen political activity themselves and were not coerced into it.

"Such 'staffs' must shift from the cabinet to the party and the assembly. This is an integrated interconnected activity. This is the prime objective in the latest change. The second objective is to devote interest to and concentrate on the activity of the party and the activity of the People's Assembly."

I asked President al-Sadat:

"What is Mansur Hasan's position on this process, Mr President?"

The president replied,

"I am anxious to have public opinion understand that I do not surprise people with things they might not agree to. For example, if I choose someone for a certain position, I summon this person and announce this choice to him. If he agrees, then he takes the position, and if he refuses I look for someone else. Everyone who has dealt with me knows this about me. It has not happened that anyone has been surprised by having news of his appointment published in the papers before I broached this appointment to him first.

"The Sunday before last I was in 'Abidin Palace to receive the credentials of a number of new ambassadors to Cairo. Mansur Hasan was with me. I told him, "I will make a minor change in the cabinet. The emphasis in the coming stage will be on the party and the People's Assembly. For this reason you will leave the cabinet and work as a vice chairman of the People's Assembly, because the two vice chairmen will enter the cabinet.

"This discussion between me and Mansur Hasan did not take more that what I just told you. This is what I always do with people who are in the position of a son toward me, like Mansur. When I talk to him about some subject I do not weigh every word I say to him. But when I talk with someone else with whom I do not have the relationship of a father to a son, I greatly weigh what I say to him, paying attention to his natural human reactions.

"Here I go back to the problem I am suffering from concerning the understanding and practice of democracy in our country. What really distresses me is that 99 percent of people active in politics nowadays fail to grasp the obvious principles for understanding and practicing democracy. What is amazing is that the Egyptian people, 70 percent of whom are said to be illiterate, can be considered among the smartest people in the world. These people have not misunderstood me once. There is not a decision I have taken that held the world in perplexity that the Egyptian people did not immediately understand and properly analyze, at a time when the people around me failed to understand it and collapsed, one after the other.

"The important thing is that my children came to me and asked me if the purpose in the cabinet change was to remove Mansur Hasan from the cabinet. The same question is being repeated by the man in the street everywhere. As I said, I do not weigh every word and every act while I am dealing with someone whom I consider just like one of my children -- and Mansur is one of them. Mansur Hassan came to meet me last Thursday here at the Barrages, and we found it necessary to discuss this subject which is being repeatedly discussed by public opinion in Egypt.

"Mansur told me, 'You previously broached this subject to me at 'Abidin Palace, and I did not object. I will work in any position you choose for me. I feel that my place is for you to decide as I am a son of yours, and the relationship between us is not just one of work but is also one between father and son. However, I tell you truthfully that I was hurt a little in front of people. The whole country has been

talking about the cabinet change that removed me alone from the cabinet, as if the change the whole country had been talking about for a long time was announced only to remove me alone.'

"I told Mansur, 'By God, you have the right, Mansur my son. This talk I have heard in the exact same words from my children before you came here. You are completely right about that, but my excuse is that I do not weigh everything with my children or people who are very close to me. Pherhaps this is the reason some people consider that I am very hard with people who are close to me.' This is a fact. With my children, and people who are close to me, I deal without weighing things carefully. I have become completely tired of these calculations in my work and my contacts."

President al-Sadat continued to talk, saying,

"I go back to the exercise of the policy of democracy in Egypt, and say that his practice has become corrupted to the point where it is necessary to draw attention to it and work to change it. The simplest obvious points about political activity that are recognized everywhere in the civilized world are not being honored in our country. They must be carefully set down and we must issue a law making respect for them mandatory.

"I complain bitterly about the touchiness that some people are suffering from. These certain people place their dignity above their own skin and deal with life and engage in politics by their own personal standards. This plainly means a lack of political maturity.

"Then came the old political parties, which strove to implant these wrongful standards which emphasize the lack of political maturity we are complaining about.

"I personally suffered from this situation for the first time when I was a member of the Revolutionary Command Council. After the 23 July 1952 revolution, all the members of the Revolutionary Command Council entered the cabinet except one, and that was me. Everyone became a minister and assumed a cabinet position except me. I went for 13 months bearing the rank of Lt Col Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat and receiving the salary of a lieutenant colonel. I did not protest and did not feel that I had been dealt with disdainfully.

"In September 1954, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir decided to form a cabinet and told me, 'You have to enter the cabinet with us -- it's not reasonable, Anwar, for you alone to stay out of it!" I told him, "You know, Jamal, I am not concerned with this subject. My standards are different, as you know."

"The prevailing standard at that time was that a member of the Revolutionary Command Council who did not go into the cabinet was considered less important than one who did. This standard often provoked the anger of a number of Revolutionary Command Council members who had not entered the cabinet at the outset. They faced problems in their homes and among their friends which ended only when they later did enter the cabinet.

"I alone remained outside the cabinet until September 1954, when Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir insisted that I go into the cabinet in which all members of the Revolutionary Command Council had gone before me.

"In 1956 the Revolutionary Command Council was terminated, after Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir was elected president. My agreement with Jamal was that I would remove myself from the cabinet as soon as the Revolutionary Command Council was terminated, and Jamal was elected the first president of Egypt.

"On 23 July 1956, we celebrated Revolution Day at the Officers' Club and Jamal gave us the medal of the Nile, the highest decoration in Egypt, which is given to heads of state; thus ended the Revolutionary Command Council. Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir assumed the presidency. Jamal began to draw up his new cabinet, and did not include me in it, which is what I has asked of him. If we go back to the issue of AKHBAR AL-YAWM in which the news of the formation of the new cabinet was published, we will find on the headlines "'Three people have left.' I was the first of these three.

"'Three people have come in.' The names of the new ministers were given.

"This headline was published in a really provocative manner. Some people imagined that the persons who had been left out in the reshuffle were the subject of disapproval, for example, or were incompetent, or these people volunteered other reasons. This is the erroneous behavior I talked to you about."

I told the president,

"People did not know that it was you who asked 'Abd-al-Nasir not to include you in the reshuffle. Some people thought that you were surprised by your departure and consequently these people expected what they felt like expecting."

President al-Sadat said:

"The important thing is that I personally am not concerned and I do pay heed to what is said and bandied about. I had previously agreed to that arrangement with Jamal. Throughout my life, I have believed in a truth which is that the position never causes the person who occupies it to grow in size. I am just Anwa al-Sadat. No position will elevate me, and keeping me from a position will not diminish me.

"In the period I spent outside the cabinet after the revolution took place, I was talking with Jamal and told him, 'I consider myself a minister, a prime minister, because you yourself are a minister and prime minister, we are all part of the Revolutionary Command Council, and each of us represents the others. When you are elected president I will feel as if I am president just like you.'

"That was always my conviction, and these were my standards as far as positions went.

"Unfortunately, I have not encountered anyone who shared this conviction and these standards with me to this day, except for one person, Dr Mustafa Khalil. I swear that Mustafa Khalil went into the cabinet, then left it, and was not affected, embarrassed or shaken. He has an inner confidence in his abilities and that is greater than anything else. When he left the cabinet, his inner sense did not change at all. He continued to have confidence in his abilities and in himself. It is not the position that made him great or small."

I asked President al-Sadat:

"What did you tell Mr Mansur Hasan, Mr President, when he told you that he felt hurt at leaving the cabinet in the latest changes?"

The president replied,

"I admit that I actually did hurt Mansur. Of course I did not do so on purpose. I did not for a moment imagine that Mansur would not appreciate what I had arranged for him. When he came to meet me last Thursday I assured him of this and repeated to him that the emphasis would be on the party and the People's Assembly in the coming stage. When I nominated him as vice chairman of the People's Assembly, that was not to diminish his stature or hurt him, as some people imagined -- it was to get him to help me in what I wanted to concentrate on from now on out.

"I told Mansur 'I had supposed that in regard to you I had the right of a father who chooses for his son what he considers is suitable for him and sees to be in his interests. You say that you feel that you have been hurt. I agree with you on that now, and my excuse is that my standards differ greatly from those of other people.'

"This reminds me of what happened in 1957 when they called us to establish the National Assembly, and we all went to Burj al-'Arab to discuss the selection of candidates. We had the right to object, which was natural, considering that we had to provide insurance for the revolution in its early years. I remember that we were laughing about the reports that intelligence sent us on people who were nominated for membership in the assembly. For example, they wrote a report on one person saying 'He is very well-educated but does not know how to read and write.' In Borj al-'Arab, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir told me, 'Be prepared, Anwar -- I have chosen you for the chairmanship of the assembly.' I did not object. Jamal chose me for that job in the belief that I was qualified for it. We all complement one another everywhere, but the real goal is for us all to cooperate and each work in the position the president sees fit to assign to him.

"We returned to Cairo.

"The inauguration of the People's Assembly was to take place in 2 days' time.

'Abd-al-Nasir was very anxious to know the details behind the details, and he demanded that we go to the National Assembly so that he could see what would happen on inauguration day, on the spot.

"He summoned us to his house in Manshiyat al-Bakri and told us, 'It is true that the Revolutionary Command Council has been terminated and that the people have chosen me to be president. Egypt is now to be governed by an ordinary constitutional system of government, but that does not prevent us from meeting together or prevent me from familiarizing myself with each of your opinions.

"Jamal then continued his conversation by saying,

"'You have come together today to prepare for the inauguration of the National Assembly tomorrow. In my opinion, we can agree that the person directly in the Revolutionary Command Council after me is the one who will chair the National Assembly, and I therefore consider that this position should go to 'Abd-al-Latif Bughdadi.'

"Bughdadi was the person directly after Jamal; he had precedence over Zakariya Muhyi-al-Din and had considerable precedence over 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir.

"After Jamal had expressed his opinion, he looked at me and asked me, 'What is your opinion, Anwar?' If I had exhibited the same touchiness that other people do, I would have been angry. Jamal had previously chosen me for this job, and suddenly he decided to give it to someone else. There must have been a consideration that Jamal found to be in the public interest and consequently I had no objection at all to his view. I told him, 'If it is in the general interest, I am in favor of it, Jamal.'

"As I had agreed, so did everyone.

"'Abd-al-Nasir then shifted to another matter bearing on the choice of two vice chairmen for the National Assembly. Jamal chose the late Fu'ad Jalal as the first vice chairman and asked us to choose the second vice chairman along with him. It was obvious that the old politicians who had not been corrupted, had not been included under the isolation decree and had won assembly elections had formed a bloc to win the seat of the vice-chairman of the assembly. It was Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's opinion that we should confront this bloc, that the second vice chairman should be one of us and that we should not leave that position to some old politician who might not be compatible with us.

"The vice chairman's position is very important. When the chairman of the assembly is absent for any reason, the vice chairman takes his place, engages in his functions and acts as National Assembly chairman. The prime minister, all the ministers and all the people's representatives sit before him.

"Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir added that he had offered the position of assembly vice chairman to Dr Nur-al-Din Tarraf. Dr Tarraf was a star at that time, having been a National Party deputy in parliament before the revolution. However, he declined the position.

"He also offered it to Fathi Radwan, who also refused it. This refusal may be attributed to the fact that the two of them considered that this position was a reduction in their status. These are the same old worn out standards that I am suffering from and from whose touchy points I hope we can all save ourselves.

"Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir ended by saying, 'In my opinion, fellows, the issue is very serious and we have to face it. Therefore I consider that we should choose one of our number to be a vice chairman of the National Assembly. I recommend so-and-so, who is a member of the Revolutionary Command Council and still is alive.'

"We were in agreement with Jamal's view.

"The meeting ended and Jamal and Bughdadi agreed to meet in his office and go together to the National Assembly to do a 'rehearsal' of what was to happen the next day in its inaugural session.

"We left Jamal's house and the member we had chosen for the position of vice chairman of the assembly got into the car with me. As soon as the car started I was surprised to hear this colleague tell me, 'Oh what bad luck, Anwar!' I looked at him in amazement, and he continued talking, saying, 'I cannot agree to be vice chairman of the National Assembly. People will interpret it the wrong way.'

"I told him, 'Why don't you complain to 'Abd-al-Nasir?' He did not answer. However, he did ask me to intervene quickly and get him out of this predicament, especially since the inaugural session was to be the next day.

"I promised him that I would look for a solution.

"As soon as I got home I called Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir on the telephone. I was told that he was sleeping. I asked for 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir and told him what our colleague had told me and asked him to act quickly, as soon as Jamal woke up from his nap.

"I went into my office in the apartment where I was living in the al-Rawdah section and started to read something. Then at dusk the telephone rang and Jamal was on the line, asking me to meet him in his office, where he was sitting with Bughdadi.

"I left my house and went to 'Abd-al-Nasir's office.

"It was a short distance away and I was in 'Abd-al-Nasir's office in a few minutes. 'Abd-al-Latif Bughdadi was with him. I asked Jamal,

"'Did you see the rehearsal, Jamal?'

"He answered, 'No, actually not yet, Anwar, there is an important matter I would like to talk to you about.'

"'Well, Jamal?'

"He said, 'For heaven's sake, Anwar, our colleague so-and-so has refused to take the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly.'

"I know. I was the one who informed 'Abd-al-Hakim of this fact so that he would pass it on to you.'

"Bughdadi was sitting there, in great agitation. Some people had told him that the persons who had refused to accept the vice chairmanship of the assembly had done so because they refused to work under him. For this reason distress and agitation were apparent on his face and he did not join in the conversation with us at the outset.

"I told Jamal,

"'Offer the position to someone else.'

"'I raised the matter again with Nur-al-Din Tarraf and Fathi Radwan, and they still refused.'

"What do you intend to do, Jamal?"

"'My view is that you yourself should agree to be an assembly vice chairman, Anwar. You are not a member of the cabinet, but you are a member of the National Assembly and you represent one of the 60 closed districts whose representatives we have chosen. I consider that you must agree to be a vice chairman of the assembly.'

"Once again what had happened at 'Abd-al-Nasir's house that day was repeated. The first time, he offered me chairmanship of the National Assembly, then changed his mind, hoping to set forth a gradition where the position of the chairman of the assembly would be given to the second man in the Revolutionary Command Council, and I agreed without the least hesitation or touchiness. The second time, Jamal thought it would be in the general interest for me to work as vice chairman of the same assembly for which he had previously nominated me as chairman, and I did not object, or feel that I was hurt or that my dignity had been slighted.

"Jamal quickly looked over at Bughdadi, who was sitting in front of him, and asked him,

"'Didn't I tell you, 'Abd-al-Latif, that Anwar's calculations are different from those of other people?'

"It was clear that 'Abd-al-Nasir had recommended my name to 'Abd-al-Latif before he got in touch with me by telephone. 'Abd-al-Latif said that Tarraf had refused, Fathi Radwan had refused, and so-and-so had refused, so was it reasonable that Anwar should accept? However, Jamal assured him that Anwar viewed things in another, different way, and was the most self-effacing person he knew in terms of positions and seats.

"He often declined executive jobs because he believed that the position of minister at that time was no more than a general directorship for employee relations!

"The meeting did not take more than a few minutes. We left the office for the National Assembly to see the 'rehearsal' of what was going to happen at the first inaugural session the next day.

"At that session, the measures for nominating the chairman and two vice chairmen of the assembly were put in movement. The representatives chose Bughadi as chairman and Fu'ad Jalal and me as the two vice chairmen.

"My work began most actively and with absorption.

"I felt no touchiness about accepting the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly, though I am one of the nine who made the 23 July Revolution; the reason for that, as I said, was that I did not connect my own worth to the position I occupied or the chair I was sitting in. And what is wrong with being vice chairman of the National Assembly? The vice chairman stands in for the chairman when he is absent. I had agreed to be a National Assembly member for a district; what is the difference between being an assembly member and the vice chairman of that assembly? I remained vice chairman of the National Assembly until Egypt and Syria were united; then the assembly was dissolved and reconstituted. Then I ran as a candidate for assembly chairman, and the representatives chose me. I was then chosen chairman of the new National Assembly in 1964; it did not complete its term, because of the war."

I told President al-Sadat,

"I believe that few people who are engaged in political activity look at this matter the way you do. Perhaps this is the reason why some people have not put a favorable interpretation on Mansur Hasan's departure from the cabinet and his nomination as

a vice chairman of the People's Assembly."

The president said,

"This is the misfortune that I am suffering from. I have tried a great deal, with the people who worked with me, to persuade them that there should be no touchiness about jobs. Positions do not create political staffs, and chairs do not increase the importance of the people who sit on them. It is wrong for a person to link his worth and his weight to the position he occupies or to the chair he sits on. I have told this to everyone who worked, and works, with me, with the aim of removing the people who have been steeped in this erroneous conduct, which spread and took root many years ago.

"Most unfortunately, some people continue to imagine that a minister of state stands at a lower rank than a minister with portfolio. The ministers are very concerned about these formalities. I remember that I sent for one of them to offer him an appointment as minister, and was surprised when he protested and told me you appointed so-and-so to the position of deputy prime minister but I am not less than him, I worked as a minister previously!'

"My answer was to remove him from the cabinet.

"I also remember that I was once compelled to hold the first session of a new Council of Ministers in the town of East al-Qantarah. I chose this place specifically so that the cabinet members could see the extent of the destruction and devastation in this town as a result of the war. I told the ministers, 'These are the ruins of the battles we fought in the past. We must get rid of them and rebuild and reconstruct instead of destroying and devastating. This is the goal in forming the cabinet. I wanted to assure you of this here, in this place, having learnt that some of you met in one of your homes and discussed at length the difference between ministers with portfolio and ministers of state and between ministers and deputy ministers, which is something I totally reject.

"I related my experience with positions and how we were one of the nine who made the revolution but that in spite of that I did not feel the least touchiness or wounded pride in accepting the position of vice chairman of the People's Assembly for many years!

"I told them that I was in need of assistants who were concerned with the essence, not with appearances. Everyone sitting down with me at this table, from the prime minister to the deputy prime ministers, ministers with portfolio, ministers of state and deputy ministers, I consider on the same executive and leadership level. When we take the votes of cabinet members on a given matter, there is no difference between the vote of the prime minister and the vote of a deputy minister."

I told President al-Sadat:

"Some people do not easily agree to be assigned positions that are below the ones they previously occupied. These people's thinking is that a person should be promoted to a higher position, not demoted to a lower one."

The president replied,

"Exactly. This is the erroneous behavior I wish would vanish from our minds and hearts. In countries with a deep-rooted democracy, this kind of erroneous notion does not exist at all. Sometimes a prime minister resigns in one of those countries because he has a political or party commitment, but he finds no embarrassment in accepting the position of minister in a cabinet formed for the purpose of coping with an important national political position. There are prime ministers at the highest level who have nonetheless agreed to work as ministers without portfolio in subsequent cabinets, indeed have agreed to subordinate in these cabinets to people whom they had supervised and who had been directors of their offices!

"In these cases, a former prime minister should not be assigned a major cabinet post such as minister of the interior or minister of finance; rather, he should be honored by having a ministry of state assigned to him. The meaning of a minister of state is that he is not committed to a given ministry but is engaged in everything and speaks his opinions on every subject.

"These notions that are recognized in all civilized democratic countries are unacceptable to this day in our own. A minister of state is nothing! A minister must have a ministry, or must be a deputy prime minister if possible -- or a prime minister if given the chance!"

I asked the president,

"By what, Mr President, do you explain the spread of these notions among intellectuals and politicians in particular?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"My only explanation is that our politicians suffer from a vacuum. Some people say that young people are in a vacuum. I say that the politicians' vacuum is much more pronounced than that of the young people. Why? Because the most basic rules of the exercise of democracy among politicians in mature societies do not exist among us here. As I said, positions do not make sagacious politicians. Capable politicians are ones who make something out of their positions.

"The same thing is to be said about the failure of people who call themselves the opposition here in exercising democracy.

"Earlier, I related that I stopped off in Britain during my latest trip to the United States of America. In London I met with Michael Foot and Callaghan. Michael Foot is the new Labor Party leader and Callaghan is a former prime minister and a man of enormous political stature. Of course deep inside himself he has a great deal against Mrs Thatcher, the current prime minister. He came to meet me and asked me 'What is my government's position toward you? In my opinion, my country's position probably consists of these four points -- one, two, three, four. What do you think?'

"I told him, 'The four points you mentioned are exactly what we are thinking about, but there is a fifth point and a sixth point to fully round out the picture.

"Michael Foot, the opposition leader, came and asked the same question as Callaghan, and completely agreed with me that Mrs Thatcher's cabinet's position toward us was sound.

"Neither of them came to meet me to speak against the British government in my presence. I didn't hear a single word from former Prime Minister Callaghan against the current prime minister, Mrs Thatcher, in spite of the great differences between them.

"I find the same thing in the United States of America.

"We previously followed the harsh publicity campaigns between Carter and his adversary Reagan during the latest election campaign. Each of them said things about the other that one's intelligence could not grasp. As soon as the elections were over and Reagan won, everything that stood between the two men came to an end, to the point where I went to meet Carter in my latest visit to America and did not hear a single word from him against Reagan. Rather, to the contrary, he told me 'If you want anything that you see fit to tell me, I am fully prepared to go to Reagan at the White House and tell it to him.'

"When Carter made a visit to China at the beginning of this month, he made statements in Peking, but he committed himself to the line and policies which President Reagan had previously declared. He did not hurt Reagan, he did not defame him, he did not oppose his policies.

"This is the true exercise of opposition in politically civilized countries, not the sterile, improper exercise that some people here who call themselves the opposition have pursued.

"We can cast a glance at the style of conduct in Israel, for example. When Israel struck at the Iraqi nuclear reactor, that was a reckless act that Egypt attacked in the most violent possible manner. When they asked Begin about his decision to strike at the reactor, he said that he had previously informed the leader of the opposition about this action, and the opposition leader, Perez, actually did stand up and confirm that Begin had informed him of the operation of striking at the reactor before it was carried out. Perez added that he contacted Begin and declared his rejection of the operation.

"This happened many months before the strike against the Iraqi reactor. In spite of that, Perez did not say a word to anyone on that subject; they considered it a national secret which absolutely could not be divulged. Perez did not think about exploiting the situation in order to defame Begin in front of the whole world in the election campaign, which he lost.

"The question now is, Can I do here in Egypt as is done in Israel and trust any of the people who call themselves the opposition, tell him a national secret and demand that he keep it secret?

"No, no I can't!

"It is certain that this national secret will have begun to go about on every tongue in an hour and that the international news agencies will have passed it on to all areas of the world!

For this reason I absolutely do not trust those people who provoke quarrels with democracy and call themselves the opposition!

"The story of Mansur Hasan has given me a chance to let off a little steam and talk about what I am suffering from and hope to rid myself of."

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CSO: 4504/20

OUTLINES OF ISLAMIC PROPAGATION PLAN REVEALED BY MA'ADIKHA

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Nov 81 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN, (Pars) – After sessions with Islamic propagating institutions and after devoting almost 500 hours on studies on methods of propagation, " I have finally prepared a plan for establishing a coordinated propagation system and a strategy for activities of revolutionary and governmental organs," Hojjatoleslam Maadikhah, the Minister of Islamic Gudiance said yesterday.

He added that the plan would face no legal difficulties because preliminary executive measures had been taken in regard to the plan.

Maadikhah said that it was impossible to limit the Islamic and Revolutionary propaganda within a governmental and official framework. He added that in the new plan, propagation was not solely left to one organ or ministry.

The Islamic Guidance Minister stated that he would disclose details of this new plan after its approval by the Majlis. "But stated in broad outline I can say that there will be a central authority for determining general policies on propagation and this body will supervise their execution." However the minister said, the state's policies on propagation will be directed by the leader and executive authorities will manage their own responsibilities.

"A supreme Propagation Council comprising of the ministers of Islamic Guidance and Foreign Affairs, together with 5 more members who are to be chosen by the leader, and or the leadership council, will also be formed which shall supervise ways of expending the States ' propagation budget," Maadikah said.

"It has been proposed ", continued Maadikhah "that the total amount of the propagation budget be centralized in one organ, which will furnish the propagating institutions with their required budgets through the Supreme Propagation Council, after their propagation programs are approved. Thus through consolidating the efforts taken by various organs redundancies, waste of effort and finances will be avoided," he said explaining the need for the new Council.

Hojjatoleslam Maadikhah also added that with regard to the significance of propagation and the need felt for coordination and supervision, the Supreme Council of Propagation and Coordinating Council of Propagation were already active with 6 members, all of whom had been approved by the Imam. "

Asked of the number of organs that would be included in the plan, Maadikhah said that all organs and institutions that used the State's general budget for propagation such as the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, the Cultural Departments of the Foreign Ministry, Construction Crusade, IRGC and the Islamic Propagation Organization would be covered by the plan and that these organs were obliged to cooperate with the council according to the new plan while the cooperation of other political and para-political organs rely on their own discretion, though it would also be compulsory for them to be guided in certain circumstances.

He was then asked to explain the manners in which the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic could cooperate in the plan while it was an independent organization and run by its own Supervisory Council.

The Islamic Guidance Minister said in reply that "the main principles of the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic relies on keeping to the genuine path of politico-ideological principles of the Revolution."

"But as I said it is only a general concept while the Supreme Council of Propagations is endowed through law with specific means to see that this principle is observed," he said . The Supervisory Council will continue as before but at the same time co , the same time cooperation can also be achieved he added. The Majlis has the authority to oblige all propagating organs and institution to cooperate according to the manner forseen in the plan," he also said.

When asked how much time he thought was needed for the plan to be ultimately approved, the Islamic Guidance Minister, replied that with a view to the efforts taken by Majlis deputies for coordinating the state's propagations, he expected the plan to be approved when the next year's propagating budget is finally passed.

CSO: 4600/113

ECONOMIC SCIENTIFIC TALKS OPEN WITH BULGARIA

JN091441 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1225 GMT 9 Nov 81

[Excerpts] Baghdad, 9 Nov (INA)--Iraqi-Bulgarian talks on economic, technical and scientific cooperation began here today.

The Iraqi side to the talks is headed by Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council [RCC] member and first deputy prime minister, while the Bulgarian side is headed by Todor Bozhinov, first deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

The Iraqi delegation comprises Hasan 'Ali, RCC member and minister of industry; 'Amir Mahdi, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform and head of the Iraqi delegation on the Iraqi-Bulgarian Joint Committee, and experts.

The Bulgarian delegation comprises Khristo Iliev Khristov, minister of foreign trade and head of the Bulgarian delegation on the Iraqi-Bulgarian Joint Committee; Alexander Petkov, chairman of the Executive Committee of the National and Industrial Union Central Council and minister of agriculture [title as received]; and experts.

At the beginning of the talks, Taha Yasin Ramadan welcomed the Bulgarian delegation and praised the progress achieved in the Iraqi-Bulgarian relations thanks to the leadership of President Saddam Husayn and chairman of the State Council Todor Zhivkov.

RCC member and Deputy Premier Ramadan called on the technical committees to formulate new and developed formulas for joint cooperation. He stressed that Iraq, while waging a battle against the racist Persians for the second year, continues to increase its strength, firmness and development in all spheres, whether in the military and development spheres or in the foreign relations.

Ramadan praised the Bulgarian people's positive stand on the Iraqi-Iranian conflict which commensurates with the magnitude of the event and confirms the strong relations between the two friendly countries.

In a reply speech, Bozhinov reiterated Bulgaria's support for Iraq's endeavors to solve the Iraqi-Iranian conflict through peaceful means and its stand against the Camp David policy and world Zionism. He said: We are pleased at Iraq's stability, development and progress despite the war circumstances. This clearly shows the

wisdom of its leadership. He expressed his confidence that the current meetings will attain fruitful results in the interest of the two friendly peoples.

Afterward, the meetings of the 13th session of the Iraqi-Bulgarian Joint Committee for Scientific, Technical and Economic Cooperation began. The Iraqi side to the meetings was headed by 'Amir Mahdi Salih, minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, and the Bulgarian side by Khristo Iliev Khristov, minister of foreign trade.

The two sides discussed the trade plan between Iraq and Bulgaria for the year 1982 and the projects which have so far been implemented in the fields of agriculture, irrigation, scientific and technical cooperation. They also discussed the problems that faced the implementation process. The following six committees have stemmed from the meetings: committee for trade, finance, planning and industry; committee for constructions; committee for technical and scientific cooperation; committee for agriculture and irrigation; committee for transport and tourism and committee for secretaryship. The committees will draw up the joint plans for cooperation between Iraq and Bulgaria in 1982.

CSO: 4404/92

PAPER VIEWS AGREEMENTS WITH TURKEY

JN271513 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1600 GMT 26 Oct 81

[Text] Dear listeners, the paper SAWT AL-AKRAD, organ of the Central Committee of the Democratic Kurdish Party in Syria, has published the following important article:

A disgraceful collusion has been perpetrated against the Kurdish Liberation Movement. Reports say that secret agreements have been reached between the dictatorial Iraqi and Turkish regimes allowing the forces of each regime to penetrate as far as 20 kilometers inside the territories of the other to pursue the militant Kurds. These agreements were reached following several visits to Turkey by the Iraqi regime's foreign minister, during which he held talks with the fascist generals and discussed joint cooperation between the regimes to face the burgeoning Kurdish Liberation Movement.

The Kurdish Nationalist Movement is accustomed to such steps and, therefore, is not surprised at these new agreements which are resurrecting the buried articles of the Baghdad Pact. The two regimes have frequently disagreed on numerous issues, yet they agree on one joint objective: to strike at the liberation movements in the region, particularly the Kurdish Nationalist Movement.

These regimes are linked together by several common factors, such as.

1. Their racist nature and their criminal and bloody history of maltreatment of the Kurdish people, who are being subjected to continued massacres and annihilation such as those of [words indistinct] and Qal'at Dizah, resulting in thousands of martyrs.

2. The escalating Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iraq and Turkey at the side of the struggle of the progressive movements of the Iraqi and Turkish peoples, which is scaring the two racist regimes.

3. The fact that the regimes are under the umbrellas of U.S. imperialism, which is supporting them and cooperating with them in order to eliminate the various nationalist liberation movements which constitute an important tributary of the world revolution against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

This brings to mind U.S. imperialism's role in the plotting against the Nationalist Kurdish Movement in Iraq during the signing of the treacherous 6 March agreement between the defunct shah and Saddam Husayn.

These joint plots against the Kurdish Nationalist Movement and the liberation movement of the region's peoples are natural results of the course taken by the dictatorial racist regimes backed and encouraged by U.S. imperialism.

In return, the various peoples of the region, including the Kurdish people, are requested to unite their struggle and strengthen their solidarity with the world powers of liberation, progress and socialism, particularly the Soviet Union, against the joint enemy, which is imperialism, Zionism and other racist reactionary regimes.

CSO: 4404/92

BRIEFS

LIBERATION FRONT RECEIVES SUPPORT MESSAGES--Arab student organizations in Yugoslavia and the Public Health Trade Union in Djibouti have hailed the emergence of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz. In a message to the front, the Arab student organizations have declared their support for the front in its armed struggle against the racist Persians to liberate the usurped lands. The message stresses that the creation of the front is a decisive response to the Persian domination that stands against Saddam's soldiers, who are defending the eastern flank of the Arab homeland to establish legitimate Arab rights. In a similar message, the Public Health Trade Union in Djibouti has stressed that the charter of the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz will liberate the Arab people of Ahvaz from the persecution of the racist Persians. The trade union has wished the front success in its struggle. [Text] [GF261414 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 26 Oct 81]

ARABS ABLE TO FACE ISRAELIS--Amman--The Jordanian weekly newspaper AKHBAR AL-USBU' has affirmed that Iraq's war on the eastern flank of the Arab homeland has proved that the Arabs are capable of facing the Zionist enemy in a protracted war. In its latest edition, the paper said that Iraqi forces enjoy combat efficiency superior to that of the Iranian forces. It said that the Iraqi forces had seized two strategic positions in the Shush area during the past days, crushing the Iranian aggressors. The paper adds that the Iraqi Army enjoys military superiority and high spirits and is the master of initiatives in the war against Iran. [Text] [JN311800 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 31 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/92

BRIEFS

REPEAL ON PRESS LAW DEFERRED--In its session yesterday, the National Assembly deferred a decision on the report of the Committee for Educational, Cultural and Guidance Affairs. The report calls for repealing Article 35-BIS of the Press and Publications Law. Twenty-nine deputies voted in support of the committee's report, while 24 abstained. It was decided to vote on the report in another session without further discussion. During yesterday's session, the government asked for a 2-week postponement of the issue so the article can be debated. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, deputy prime minister, foreign minister and acting information minister, said that Article 35-BIS was initiated so that the Kuwaiti press would not be exploited and that the article is not opposed to the freedom of speech. [Text] [GF300926 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 28 Oct 81 p 1]

MILITARY APPOINTMENTS--An ordinance has been issued appointing Maj Gen ('Abd al-Latif Faysal al-Suwayni) adviser at the Amiri court. Another ordinance promotes Brig Gen (Yuzuf Badr al-Khrasi) to the rank of major general and appoints him under secretary at the Ministry of the Interior. [Text] [LD160500 Kuwait Domestic Service in Arabic 1000 GMT 15 Oct 81]

ENVOY TO SWEDEN--Ghazi al-Rayyis, Kuwaiti ambassador to Sweden, has presented his credentials to King Gustaf of Sweden. Al-Rayyis had held the position of Kuwaiti diplomatic chief of mission in Great Britain. [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 3]

CSO: 4404/92

FORMER PRESIDENT ANSWERS REAGAN ON LEBANESE CRISIS

PM020907 Beirut AN-NAHAR in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Criticizing Reagan's Statement, Sham'un Says: 'What Must Be Remedied Is Lebanese Crisis; Problem Lies in Presence of Foreign Occupation'"]

[Text] [Former] President Camille Sham'un yesterday drew the attention of U.S. President Ronald Reagan to the fact that "the crisis which must be remedied is the Lebanese crisis and not the crisis of the south." He emphasized that the problem lies in "the presence of foreign occupation." He urged the government to present at the forthcoming summit conference "clear-cut demands for the evacuation of the armed foreigners, be they Syrian forces or others."

Commenting on U.S. President Ronald Reagan's statement on the Middle East situation, Sham'un said: "It is my conviction that President Reagan's statement on the Middle East issue and the dangers surrounding the region is so exaggerated that I, who am aware of what is happening in the Middle East, do not share his view on the existence of this imminent danger. In any case, I hope that nothing will happen that will expose peace to danger. The danger could arise as a result of the existing dispute between Egypt and Sudan on the one side and Libya on the other.

"As for the section of the statement on this part of the Middle East--Lebanon--I fear that President Reagan's geographical knowledge may be restricted to South Lebanon and does not extend to all Lebanese territory. The crisis which must be tackled is the Lebanese crisis and not the crisis of South Lebanon, where a cease-fire prevails and which does not constitute any danger as long as the two sides maintain the cease-fire.

"Our problem is the Lebanese crisis and the presence of foreign occupation of Lebanese territories. It is this crisis which must be dealt with. Therefore, Mr Reagan must see things as we see them if he really wishes to remedy the Lebanese crisis.

"Meanwhile, as it is preparing for the Fez [Arab summit] conference, the Lebanese Government must not deal with the issue of the south as an alternative to dealing with the Lebanese crisis. The government must present a bold view and clear-cut demands for the evacuation of the armed foreigners, be they Syrian forces or others, from the Lebanese territories so that Lebanon will revert to being what it was and should be--a sovereign independent state on the same level as the rest of the Arab states which are to participate in the conference, especially since the president of the Lebanese Republic will be opening the conference. Lebanon's sovereignty must be complete."

CSO: 4404/97

MADY INTERVIEW ON LEBANESE, ARAB LOBBIES

NC301030 Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 26 Oct-1 Nov 81 pp 18-22

[Article by Lydia Georgi]

[Text] Alfred Mady, the representative of the rightist "Lebanese forces" in North America, last week denied reports of cooperation between the Israeli and rightist Lebanese lobbies in Washington, describing them as "rumos put out by the Arab lobby there."

In an interview with MONDAY MORNING during a brief visit to Beirut, Mady said: "I think we're finished with this business (of alleged connections between Israel and the rightst Lebanese), even here in Lebanon. I don't think we have any direct contacts with the Zionist groups. These were rumors put out by the Arab lobby there (in Washington). The only way they could think of to fight the Lebanese lobby were these rumors, claiming that any victory we achieve in the U.S. was achieved by the Zionist movements. That is absolutely false. Every one of our successes was achieved by Lebanese and American-Lebanese efforts."

He added: "Because the Zionists fight the Syrians and we fight the Syrians, the two lobbies may sometimes appear to be taking similar positions, but that is mere coincidence."

Mady, who is also the executive director of the rightist Lebanese Information and Research Center in Washington (an office started and financed by the Lebanese forces), described his group's relationc with other Arab and Arab-American organizations in the U.S. as "conflicting."

"The Arab-Lebanese conflicts that you see in Lebanon are reflected in the U.S.," he said. "We don't have any relations with the Arabs there, but we fight a lot indirectly--not because we don't like them, but because their position is hostile to the Lebanese cause. While we try to inform the people there about what is going on in Lebanon exactly, they do the opposite. While our main cause is the Lebanese cause, theirs is the Palestinian cause--or so they claim, at least, although they may not mean it. We start from different premises."

Where Lebanon was concerned, the Arab and Arab-American groups in the U.S. "are usually very late in adopting positions when major developments occur," Mady said.

"They wait and see how a certain position might affect their interests with this or that Arab country," he explained. "When Zahlah was shelled, for instance, and when the troubles broke out in Tripoli, they hesitated. They were afraid of what the Syrians would do. They usually avoid specific issues and concentrate on general principles, because...who are the Arabs, after all? Should the 'Arab lobby' work for the Saudis or the Libyans? For Egypt or Syria or Iraq? They have a problem when it comes to specific issues. We don't. We know our position and do not hesitate to make it known."

In fact, Mady said, there was no such thing as an Arab lobby in the U.S.

"Take the National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), which claims to be an Arab lobby. The trouble with these people is that they are not really interested in lobbying. Most of them are doing what they do because they have financial interests in the Arab world. This group is only trying to make money out of the Arabs, and I think the Arab embassies are becoming more and more aware of this."

Arab divisions and lack of commitment among the Arab-American groups in the U.S. are two of the reasons for the Arab lobby's failure in Washington, according to Mady.

The third reason, as he sees it, is that "90 percent of the two million Americans of Middle Eastern descent are Lebanese-Americans. The so-called NAAA claims to represent part of the Lebanese-American community, but the fact is that it does not, and it is because the majority of the Arab-American votes come from the Lebanese-Americans that we are successful and the NAAA is not.

"This fact was explained to an Arab leader, an Arab prince, on the hill (in Congress). He remarked that the Arabs were spending a great deal of money and getting nothing in return in terms of support for Arab issues. He was told: 'In the U.S., most of the voters of Middle Eastern origin are Lebanese, and since your position in Lebanon is against the Lebanese, those voters are not backing you. Unless you have the votes, no amount of money that you spend can produce anything.'"

The majority of the predominant Lebanese-American community in the United States was staying clear of all specific Arab issues, including the hot issue of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, Mady told me.

"The Arabs," he said, "cannot expect help from the Lebanese abroad as long as they are helping kill the Lebanese in Lebanon. Unless they adopt clear positions in favor of Lebanon, they can expect nothing from the American Lebanese. We're willing to help the Arabs abroad if they're willing to help us in Lebanon, if they adopt clear positions on our problem in Lebanon. Until then, the Lebanese will continue to take no position on Arab issues."

Mady suggested that it might not be long before the Arab and rightist Lebanese lobbies in Washington began to cooperate.

"I think the NAAA and the Arab embassies are beginning to come around to our point of view," he said, "our point of view being that the Middle Eastern and Lebanese crisis can be separated a bit, in order to settle the Lebanese conflict first and

then see what we can do about the Middle Eastern conflict. They are all coming around to this position now, and I think we may in the future have a kind of relationship with them in which we agree on certain topics and issues."

Asked if his group and the Lebanese Embassy in Washington saw eye to eye on the major issues, Mady said there was no conflict between him and the embassy--simply because the embassy usually adopted no position at all.

"The problem is not in the embassy itself. Some of the people staffing it are capable of doing the right thing. The problem is with the Lebanese system as a whole. It's outdated. It's not aggressive. Lebanon's foreign policy is shy. The foreign minister (Fuad Butrus), for whom I have a lot of respect, is a very aggressive person, but below the level of the foreign minister himself, total shyness is the policy.

"Privately, we agree with the embassy on some things and disagree on others, but we never clash because the embassy never declares a position publicly."

In contrast, he said, the Lebanese forces have a clear "foreign policy," and that policy "is aimed basically at trying to get the foreign people out of our country so that we can have a good democracy with equal rights for everyone, to enable us to rebuild our country later.

"This is what we are trying to sell the people and government of the U.S."

The "selling" is being done by the Lebanese Information and Research Center in Washington--an office staffed by eight people--in cooperation with an unspecified number of Lebanese-American "social organizations" which were already in existence when the Lebanese forces opened their Washington office in July 1978.

"Shaykh Bashir (al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese forces) and myself decided to start opening offices when we made our first trip to the U.S. toward the end of 1977," Mady said. "We made that decision because we had discovered the real potential of the Lebanese people, and because we had learned that if we wanted anything done to extricate our cause from the hands of the various powers in the region, we had to do it ourselves, since our government was not really capable of presenting our case as it should be presented."

The Lebanese Forces Office, which is registered with the U.S. Government as a foreign agent, has been cooperating with various Lebanese-American organizations, including the American-Lebanese League (ALL), to present the Lebanese case as it sees it to Congress, the State Department, the Pentagon, the White House, different lobbying groups, the churches, the unions, the universities and the media.

"One of our goals," Mady said, "is to educate the public, especially our own people in America--almost two million American Lebanese who must be given the right information about their country of origin."

Mady said that the Lebanese forces were now, "for the first time in history," making use of the tremendous potential of the Lebanese emigrants in the U.S.

"Lebanon has for 45 years been trying to abuse our emigrants," he said. "The Lebanese Government, the Lebanese leaders, the Lebanese people are all responsible for this. All they wanted from the emigrants was money. As for us, we don't want their money; we don't want them to come to Lebanon and build things here--not yet, anyway. What we want from them is their time. They can be a powerful worldwide lobbying group, and they can help save Lebanon."

As an example of Lebanon's past dealings with its emigrants, Mady drew attention to the World Lebanese Cultural Union (WLCU), an organization which claims to represent Lebanese emigrants around the world.

"This organization was first conceived by Pierre al-Jumayyil (leader of the rightist Phalangist Party)," Mady said. "After a while, he thought it would be a good idea to hand it over to the government, so he did. As a result, it is now a useless organization."

The WLCU, which is attached to the Lebanese Foreign Ministry, is still operating. It held its annual conference in Canada last week.

Mady conceded that the Lebanese-American community was not a monolith with identical views, capable of moving as one united force.

Inter-Lebanese differences in Lebanon, he said, were reflected in the Lebanese-American community to a certain extent, but those differences were much more muted in America--thanks in part to "the way we have handled these matters."

Bashir al-Jumayyil's visit to the U.S. earlier this year, Mady added, did more than gain the Lebanese forces additional understanding from the U.S. Government and media; it breathed new life into the Lebanese-American community, increasing its motivation to work for Lebanon.

The same was true of the subsequent visit to the U.S. by Maronite patriarch Antonius Butrus Khuraysh, "who put in a new spirit among all the Maronites there, especially those who were hesitant, who were not clear about the Lebanese cause. After the patriarch's visit, these are all coming back to work for the Lebanese cause."

To keep all levels of the American Government and people informed about Lebanon, Mady said, his office and the organizations that cooperate with it undertake the following activities:

--They publish LEBANON NEWS, a monthly four-page bulletin which may soon begin to be published on a fortnightly basis.

--They have started a news phone line, making it possible for anyone interested in the latest news from Lebanon to get it by dialing a number on the phone.

--They have started "operation roots," encouraging Lebanese-Americans and Americans interested in Lebanon to come to Lebanon for brief summer visits.

--They are issuing occasional background papers, usually every 2 or 3 months, each concentrating on a specific subject and distributed to "key people in the U.S."

--They undertake personal-contact campaigns.

The Lebanese forces, which also have offices in France, Italy, West Germany and Switzerland, were planning to step up their efforts in the Anglo-Saxon countries by opening an office in England and four new offices in the U.S. "over the next few years," Mady said.

He believes that the Reagan administration's attitude towards Lebanon is a great improvement over the attitude of the Carter administration--primarily because Reagan knows that Lebanon is important in three of his top-priority concerns.

"President Reagan's first concern is to stop Soviet penetration of the Middle East, and if Lebanon is lost to the Soviet Union or a Soviet proxy, a direct threat will be posed to the Gulf.

"His second concern is economic, and the free world has over the past 7 years discovered that Lebanon is the only country they can use as their base of operations in the Middle East, and that the Lebanese people's brains and talents are important to them in these operations.

"His third concern is to contain international terrorism, and we all know that international terrorists are being trained in Lebanon.

"So on all three counts, the U.S. has a strong motivation to settle the Lebanese problem."

This motivation, Mady said, was behind the dispatch of President Reagan's special envoy, Philip Habib, to the area and the American push for peace in Lebanon.

"We hope," he said, "that this political process will succeed in bringing peace to Lebanon and prompting the withdrawal of the Syrians from Lebanon so that we can have free presidential elections in 1982.

"So far, the process is continuing. Reagan has told his cabinet, and Haig has told his people, 'Go solve the Lebanese problem.' They are now trying all kinds of possible solutions.

"If this process does not succeed, I think the U.S. will have to think of a different position."

He added: "Don't forget that the Reagan administration does not really have a policy on this part of the world yet, beyond its policies on Egypt, Sudan and Libya. For the rest, American policy is being formulated on the ground. A final policy, a clear policy, will emerge between now and the new year."

CSO: 4400/45

MOVES ON INTERNAL SECURITY FRONT REPORTED

PM090929 Beirut AS-SAFIR in Arabic 3 Nov 81 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Deterrent Forces Begin Implementing Security Measures in Beirut and Suburb; Demonstrations Banned and Arms and Licenses Confiscated; Contacts for Completing Evacuation of Barracks; Sabbagh: 'This Accomplishment Is Expression of Unified Stand to Control Security and Resolve Living Problems"]

[Excerpts] Early this morning the Arab Deterrent Forces began to implement the security measures announced by the Coordination Committee and the Higher Security Committee to control the security situation in Beirut and the southern suburb.

The deterrent forces set up several roadblocks in various areas in al-Mazra'ah, Tallat al-Khayyat and al-Awza'i, on the airport road and the UNESCO-Cola Road and in al-Rawshah and the southern suburb in addition to the fixed barriers in the various areas.

The deterrent forces also operated patrols in the internal areas and quarters. The patrols have seen to it that all armed manifestations are banned and that the heavy weapons are withdrawn from party barracks inside the capital. They also confiscated a large number of individual light arms, both licensed and unlicensed, from civilian cars, detained those who possessed these arms, took statements from them and rendered the licenses they carried null and void. They also arrested a number of these persons for investigation and closed some party centers.

At the Political Council

At 1000 some members of the secretariat of the Security Council of the National Movement--Dr Samir Sabbah, Hikmat al-'Id, Mahmud 'Abd al-Khaliq and Abu al-Izz--and two representatives of the popular and national forces in the secretariat--Ma'an Bashshur and Bashir al-Harbali--met with journalists at the Central Political Council headquarters.

During the meeting Sabbagh discussed the new measures. He said: The National Movement began to feel some time ago that the security situation in the national areas was deteriorating for political and personal reasons. As a result of the political developments, the deterrent forces abandoned their security role on the grounds that their presence and deployment were for military purposes and that they were supposed to have been quickly replaced by internal security forces to

carry out the required security task. However, some government machineries wanted security indiscipline to continue to prevail in the national areas so that this would have an adverse effect on the people's relationship with the National Movement.

He added: This security gap made us sense the negative effects it was having on our political plans to confront the schemes of the "Lebanese Front" and Israel. We therefore decided to take an interest in the situation and to adopt measures to activate the forces which are supposed to maintain security.

Security Tour

Afterward, the journalists accompanied the members of the Security Council Secretariat to the party barracks and the barriers of the deterrent forces which were implementing the decision to ban armed manifestations.

It was confirmed during the tour that the barracks of the National Syrian Social Party in al-Rawshah and the Socialist Progressive Party in al-Manarah Corniche were devoid of any armed manifestation and that only some men in civilian clothes remained there. They have also been stripped of fortification and sand barricades.

As for the "Arab Cavaliers Forces" camp, which belongs to the Arab Democratic Party in the area of the military beach, the men there were removing the sand barricades from the main entrance but vehicles and forces were still in the camp. The situation was the same in the barracks of the Arab socialist union--the Nasirite Organization--in 'Ayn al-Muraysah, which the members of the secretariat and journalists did not enter. The men who were guarding the barracks said that "it has been decided to do away with the current main center of the union and to turn the barracks into a main center and that the barracks has been cleared of arms.

It is worth mentioning in this respect that contacts are continuing to eliminate all the obstacles impeding the removal of armed manifestations from all the barracks.

In 'Ayn al-Muraysah as far as the Zuqaq al-Balat area (the patriarchate) it was observed that the position of the independent Nasirites Movement--al-Murabaitun--has been stripped of all armed manifestations and men and has been closed down completely. The same applied to the barracks of the "Movement of the Supporters of the Revolution" in al-Basta.

The Southern Suburb

In the southern suburb deterrent forces patrols and men manning the barriers were actively implementing the new measures. Armed manifestations have disappeared from the streets and from outside the party centers and the barracks of (Rawdat al-Shahidayn and al-Raduf) which belong to Amal Movement.

CSO: 4404/97

TIES WITH GREECE STRONG, DESPITE SURFACE DIFFERENCES

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 82 5-11 Sep 81 pp 27-28

[Article by (Jirar Kasturyadis), AL-MAJALLAH's correspondent in Athens: "Strange Relations Between Libya and Greece"]

[Text] During the last few years Libya has developed close relations with Greece, its neighbor to the north. Libyan ties with Greece, which have become vary strong and far-advanced, have caused observers in Athens to inquire as to the reason for Col Qadhdhafi's interest in this small county, whose population is no more than 10 million, and his support for the "Libyan lobby" in Athens, which is a very influential financial and political troup of people who have far-ranging political ambitions. AL-MAJALLAH has chosen to open the dossier of Greek-Libyan relations, and it is a dossier which contains provocative and important information which occasionally goes beyond the scope of the two countries involved.

From the very first moment a person gets the impression that Greek-Libyan relations are somewhat strange. Usually relations between the two countries have been excellent, although they were not always as cordial. There have been many developments, both positive and negative, in relations between the two countries, but they have never reached the stage requiring severing the last remaining basic link which has always kept the two countries together. In other words, they have been the type of relations that one could expect between members of a family rather than relations between two countries which are governed by completely different tuypes of political systems. Libya's system is that of the "Libyan Jamahiriyah," whereas Kostandinos Karamanlis's Greek republic is a member both of NATO and of the EEC. Nevertheless, is we look closely at these two countries we will see that Greek-Libyan relations possess a logic of their own and are based on the two countries' need for each other for various reasons.

As proof of this one can cite a typical incident, which occurred not long ago and which can shed some light on the situation which exists between the two countries. Last 22 February a Libyan pilot defected with his Mig-23 airplane and flew to Greece. He landed on the island of Crete, which is directly across from the Libyan city of Benghazi on the shore of the Mediterranean, and he asked for political asylum.

This incident constituted an embarrassment for the Greek authorities, particularly because many Libyan air force pilots were in Greece and were being trained to fly Mirage planes (which both the Greek and Libyan air forces have). Furthermore, many Libyan naval cadets were studying in the Greek Naval Academy, and hundreds of [Libyan] students were receiving their education in Greek universities.

Libya immediately demanded the return of the plan along with its pilot. At the same time, the NATO countries insisted on being allowed to examine the Mig plane since it was believed that this plane was a brand-new Soviet model.

Greece came to be in a very embarrassing position, because it was torn between its allegiance to NATO and its close friendship with Libya. At first Greece tried to avoid revealing the identity of the airplane. However, as soon as the news became known, Libya was permitted to recover the plane but the pilot was handed over to a representative of the UN's high commissioner for refugee affairs in Athens. The Greek authorities refused to return the pilot to Libya because it was certain that he would be executed there. Finally he was sent to the U.S. after being given political asylum. The Libyans got angry and immediately stopped their shipments of oil to Greece. A few days thereafter a Libyan destroyer blocked the path of a Greek fishing vessel and brought it to the port of Benghazi. This chain of events, according to all normal international standards, would certainly serve to endanger relations between the two countries. However, this did not happen. The Libyan officers peacefully continued to receive their training in Greece.

Furthermore, one week later oil began to be shipped to Greece again, and the Greek fishing vessel was released after Mr Ahmad Shahati, who is in charge of foreign affairs in the Libyan government and thus in charge of the "people's bureaus" (Libyan embassies) abroad, visited Athens where he stated in a press conference that bilateral relations between the two countries were "excellent."

Mr. Shahati then became a regular visitor to Athens and was the chief guest at the conference in Athens which was held by the Council for International Solidarity with the Arab Nations. The main topic dealt with by the council was the Palestine question.

The "Libyan Lobby"

The Libyan pilot's escape to Greece, and other similar previous incidents when armed Libyan vessels seized Greek vessels, and later on released them, conclusively demonstrate the close special relationship which exists between Athens and Tripoli. They also provide proof of the degree of influence which the "Libyan lobby" has in Greece.

Greek-Libyan ties are far older than the 1 September Revolution which was mounted by Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. In fact they are rooted deep in history. Nevertheless, these relations soon became a great deal stronger and firmer due to the Vardinogiannis brothers. They are members of one of the large land-owning families on the island of Crete--families which also own an oil refinery (which refines Libyan crude oil), a shipping company, and many other companies.

The "Libyan lobby" in Greece, therefore, is represented by a Mr Pavlos Vardinogiannis. He is one of three brothers, is a member of the Greek parliament, and is a personal friend of Col Qadhdhafi. He was also chosen as president of the Arab-Greek Friendship Association (which does not enjoy the esteem of all of the Arab groups in Athens). Furthermore, he is known for his great amibtion to become a minister in the next Greek government.

At the same time, Pavlos Vardinogiannis is a close friend of the Greek foreign minister, Kostandinos Mitsotakis, who represents Crete in the present government. Together the two men formed the Independent Greek Party, which is one of the groups

belonging to the country's ruling New Democracy majority. Having such friends, Libya was able to establish firm relations with Greece. Greece has benefited from this relationship since it imports from Libya about 10 percent of its annual petroleum needs--about 2 million tons. Most of these Libyan crude oil shipments are transported via Greek transport vessels. Furthermore, Greek companies, especially construction and development companies, have been awarded hundreds of millions of dollars worth of contracts [by Libya], including contracts involving military installations.

Strategic Reasons for the Open-Door Policy

It is believed that there are strategic reasons for Libya conducting an open-door policy with regard to Greece and the other countries of the Mediterranean. The best friends which Libya has in Greece are from the island of Crete where Libya has been engaging in investments on a broad scale. Thus by means of establishing firm relations with Greece and Crete, which is the location of the largest American base in the Mediterranean, Libya is endeavoring to obtain a "guarantee" that this base will not be used against it. This is particularly important for Libya because it is very afraid that it will be attacked by the U.S. In particular Col Qadhdhafi appears to be convinced that someday Egypt and the U.S. will mount a joint attack on his country. The Libyan-U.S. aerial confrontation over the Gulf of Sidra, and developments which accompanied it, have shown that there is justification for the Libyan leader's fears. This aerial confrontation having taken place, it seems clear that Greek-Libyan relations will acquire even greater importance.

Greece--a country which closely follows events in the Middle East--for its part, has made it clear to the Libyan authorities that it will not allow its territory to be used as a base for attack against Libya or against any part of the Middle East, nor will it allow the U.S. Rapid Deployment Forces to be stationed there. In the long run Libyan also has the objective of "freeing the Mediterranean basin of all imperialist bases" (NATO bases). This is a policy which Libya forcefully and actively pursued with Malta until Malta closed down its British naval base there. In addition to this, Libya is continuing to give successful support to forces in Greece which are opposed to the NATO alliance. This policy is also supported by the Soviet Union which maintains close relations with Libya. The third well-founded reason for Tripoli consolidating its ties with Greece is the fact that Libya is geographically isolated. With the exception of Chad, Libya regards all of its neighbors suspiciously. In addition to this, Libya would like to keep at least one extra window open through which it could look out on the Mediterranean basin.

Libyan Radio Station

Libya is also endeavoring to set up, either on the island of Crete or in the Greek part of Cyprus, a radio station which beams its broadcasts to the Middle East. This would replace the station which they used to have which was shut down by Malta after Malta's conflict with Libya concerning oil-drilling rights. But so far Libya has not gotten permission to set up such a radio station. Liyba's activities in Greece have caused resentment on the part of some of the other Arab countries, particularly Iraq. Reports have mentioned that Libya, at one stage, asked Greece to supply Iran with American military equipment and spare parts when the Gulf war began, but that Greece rejected this request.

Iraq, in turn, has mounted diplomatic efforts to consolidate its relations with Cyprus and with Greece. It has increased the number of its diplomatic personnel in both of these countries, has organized a number of exhibits [there], and has asked the Greeks to participate in its development plans in order to entice them away from Qadhdhafi--their "sole friend." Although the pro-Libyans in Greece either have sensitive positions in the government or occupy positions which are close to the government and to influential circles, the Iraqis right now are almost openly actively supporting the opposition Greek Socialist Party which is led by Dr Andreas Papandreou. He is the probable winner in the coming elections which will be held in Greece next November.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF SIDRA INCIDENT EXPLORED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis: "An Attempt to Resist Drawing Historical Parallels"]

[Text] Who among us talks about Sarajevo? Who among us has ever visited Bosnia? Is there anyone who talks about the Austrian archduke who was assassinated by that militant anarchist who lit the fire which began World War I? Perhaps nobody ever mentions this.

But there might be those among us who talk about the Suez War and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, and who talk about the swell of Arab vigor which transformed defeat into victory. A quarter of a century has gone by since the Suez War took place, but memories of it are still fresh in our minds.

In 1914 Sarajevo was one of the provinces of Bosnia which was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The capital of this empire was Vienna, and at that time it included Hungary, the capital of which is Budapest. This empire was the home of the Blue Danube, the music of Strauss, and dreamlike waltz melodies.

In 1956 Suez was a province in Egypt. It was the name of a small village on the bank of the canal which was the lifeline for Europe and for its remaining colonies throughout Africa and Asia. Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir was the beginning of the Arabs' dreams of liberation from imperialism and of achieving some degree of unity and dignity. At that time the music of the tune "By God, destiny is my weapon" filled the ears of the Arabs with delight.

In 1914 the velvety world of Europe collapsed due to the one bullet which was shot in Sarajevo, and the doors were opened to the holocaust of World War I which nobody now either remembers or wants to talk about.

In 1956 the colonial world of Europe collapsed and this end up, for the Arabs, the doors to the tide of liberation and independence which the Western countries today would like to close once again. One must resist drawing historical parallels in order that the Libyan-American confrontation over the Gulf of Sidra last week not confuse us concerning what is possible and what is impossible. It is possible that the Gulf of Sidra incident could be another Suez War, but it is impossible that this incident could be another Sarajevo.

Until 1914 very few people had ever heard of Bosnia, Sarajevo, or even the archduke of Austria. In 1981 few people in the world had heard of the Gulf of Sidra in Libya or had heard of the colonel [as published], although they had heard of Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, one of the world's big mouths and the object of concern on the part of world leaders, and they had also heard of President Ronald Reagan, who in the past was a movie actor in Grade B films and who is presently the President of the U.S. Since it is necessary for us to resist the temptation to draw historical parallels, we should not attach a great deal of importance to what Col Qadhdhafi said after the two Libyan planes were shot down last week, which was: "I will defend the Gulf of Sidra even if this leads to a third world war."

It is true that the colonel did say this, but it is not true that the colonel wants a third world war. Nobody wants a third world war.

Therefore, the American and Western onslaught must be controlled so that it does not bring back the scenario of the beginning of World War I and the Suez War.

The aroma of "another Suez War" has already begun to reach the noses of both European and American circles.

During the first few days of the Suez War, Britain, France, and along with them all of the other colonial powers, procalimed that the war was being waged in order to guarantee the security of a waterway which, if closed, would threaten the whole industrial world with danger. But what these countries wanted was the head of the man who ruled the banks of the Suez Canal. Imperialist Europe told the world that Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir wanted to build an expansionist empire at the expense of Europe's interests and for the benefit of the USSR and the communist world.

Today Washington is striking up the same tune. The U.S. is saying that the Gulf of Sidra is an international body of water and that the man who rules over this gulf wants to build an expansionist Soviet empire which threatens U.S. interests. The fact is that the U.S. only wants to have his head when it describes him as being "the most dangerous man in the world."

'Abd al-Nasir was not Hitler, as Anthony Eden, the British prime minister, described him at that time, nor is Qadhdhafi the 'Abd al-Nasir of today. 'Adb al-Nasir ruled a nation of 40 million people in a land possessing infinite significance in terms of civilization, history, and the Arab world. He appeared under historical circumstances characterized by given factors which are lacking today. Qadhdhafi, though, rules a vast and rich country, with a population of no more than 3 million, under historical circumstances which are different from the cirsumstances of 'Abd al-Nasir in his time. However, the accusation being made is the same one, and it is feared that the result will turn out to be the same.

Perhaps Col Qadhdhafi's basic trait is that he dares to say things which any other leader today would be afraid to say openly. In his frankness there is a great deal of spontaneity and Bedouin temperament which Reagan and his administration in Washington do not find their liking.

But to what degree is it possible to resist drawing historical parallels? Only to a certain degree. Otherwise, why is the U.S. engaging in all of this talk about laws of the seas and territorial water boundaries in order to provide a smoke screen for its obvious action of military provocation against a nation which is small,

no matter how much it tries to expand beyond its borders by means its ideas, money, and weapons? Why was the U.S. engaging in military maneuvers in disputed waters if it wanted to avoid a clash with Libya rather than attempt to bring about this clash? It is true that the author of the Green Book has few friends either in the Arab world or in the rest of the world. It is also true that his greatest "crime" in the eyes of the West is that he has given aid to all of the lost causes in the world--from the IRA to Idi Amin. But it should be said in the colonel's behalf that the "lost" causes, which he has supported, have always been the causes of helpless nations rebelling against their colonial masters and striving toward the attainment of a better life. Perhaps such nations have not achieved any of this, but the colonel has helped them achieve some of the standing of glory which fate has not generously bestowed upon them.

It is also true that the U.S., by be means of its military confrontation with Libya, is utilizing all of the risks involved in this confrontation to flex its muscles in its confrontation with the Soviet Union. This is because another of the colonel's "crimes" has been that he has bought an arsenal of advanced Soviet weapons in order to provide his country with the strength and long arm needed for him to protect his interests. As far as the U.S. is concerned, this is something which is forbidden. It was forbidden in the days of 'Abd al-Nasir, and it is forbidden in the days of Qadhdhafi. What has Qadhdhafi lost as a result of his two planes being shot down? Nothing. [What has he gained?] Perhaps the support of all Arabs--including all those who love him and all those who hate him. He has mobilized all of the Arab hatred for the U.S. and the Western world. For the time being he has shown the invalidity of any justification which says that the danger of the Soviet Union is the danger which threatens the Arabs and Muslims from all sides. He has shown that the real danger is the danger coming from the U.S. and Israel, and that it is the U.S. which is always on the attack. People have already forgotten the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and events in Poland, and they no longer remember Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

What has Reagan gained? Nothing. He has gained nothing as far as the Arabs, Europeans, or even Western nations are concerned. Whoever did not like Qadhdhafi before now has started to like him, and whoever hesitated to accept Reagan's leadership of the Western camp is now more sceptical than ever. What has he gained? Has he shown that the U.S. is capable of backing up its words with its muscles? What does this mean?

It means that we have a confrontation of giants with small nations--a confrontation which could lead to what happened after Sarajevo. Let us deal somewhat with this historical parallel in an attempt on our part to put the latest actions on the part of the Libyans in a proper perspective.

During the aerial clash between the U.S. and Libya, Col Qadhdhafi was in Aden where he was signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with both Ethiopia and South Yemen. The common denominator among Aden, Tripoli, and Addis Ababa is that their regimes maintain close relations with the Soviet Union and that the three countries sense that they are somewhat isolated in the midst of the open territories and bodies of water which surround them. South Yemen's relations with the nations of the Arabian Peninsula are relations which are at best cautious, if not hostile. Ethiopia's relations with the nations in the Horn of Africa are relations which are characterized by tension and military confrontations. Libya's relations with the nations of North Africa are cool relations, if not mostly bad relations. The relations

of all three nations with the Arab world, Africa, and Asia are relations which are, for the most part, unhealthy. But the thing which links these nations to each other is the fact that they all have direct ties with Moscow. Furthermore, they control three sensitive strategic locations which are of utmost importance as far as the policy of the Soviet Union is concerned. Also, the three nations constitute a real line of confrontation for the policy of the U.S. and the Western nations as far as fundamental geographical conflicts are concerned. Reagan, with his policy of flexing his military muscles, has managed to achieve things for Libya which Libya might have found difficult to achieve otherwise. As a result, Libya has obtained complete Arab support for its policy of confrontation with the U.S., and has managed to convince all sceptics that the U.S. only wants to keep the Arabs in an inferior position and wants to open up, for its allies in South Yemen and Ethiopia, Arab doors that had been previously slammed in their faces.

Therefore the most important condemnation issued concerning the action of shooting down the two Libyan planes was the statement made by the secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], 'Abdallah Bisharah. He said: "We consider the action engaged in by the U.S. to be a political attack which is strongly condemned by the GCC. It was a provocative trap set up by the U.S. for Libya to fall into, and it was an action like those of the pirates of the Middle Ages on the high seas." The GCC embraces the six nations of the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, both of which maintain no diplomatic or friendly relations with Libya.

Qadhdhafi also succeeded in persuading Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, president of the UAE, during his visit with him last week, to have the UAE represent Libya's interests in the U.S. This represents the strongest endorsement so far, by a Gulf nation, of Libya's position.

Qadhdhafi also discussed two other important points with Shaykh Zayid:

1. The resumption of UAE economic and financial aid, and increasing such aid, to South Yemen.

2. The urgent necessity [for the UAE] to quickly establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union if the UAE wants to keep the GCC from having to pursue a policy of complete allegiance to, and alignment with, one particular bloc of nations.

During his short visit to Kuwait, Col Qadhdhafi also brought up the subject of Kuwaiti economic and financial aid to Aden and the political positions taken by the GCC.

The reason for the Libyan leader bringing up the subject of economic aid to South Yemen--in view of the fact that Kuwait and the UAE are the only two nations which provide aid to South Yemen--was his fear that the future policy of the GCC would be to halt this aid and that both the UAE and Kuwait would consequently be forced to go along with this policy.

Qadhdhafi also had another reason for bringing up the subject of establishing diplomatic relations with Moscow. The reason was that the knew Shaykh Zayid's opinion concerning this subject, which he had previously stated in an interview with AL-MUSTAQBAL, and he knew the opinion of Kuwait, which has already had relations with Moscow for 10 years and which supported his initiative. He was also afraid that

the other four nations in the GCC would prevent the possibility of establishing these relations with Moscow unless the establishment of such relations was accomplished quickly enough so that later on it would be difficult to undo such an action. So that we should not once again be inclined to draw historical parallels, [we should know that] Reagan has already succeeded in achieving for Qadhdhafi, in Libya's Gulf of Sidra, what Anthony Eden succeeded in achieving for 'Abd al-Nasir at Egypt's Suez Canal. The crisis is still in its initial stage, and although people might have forgotten Sarajevo they still talk about the woes of World War I. And although they might have forgotten Anthony Eden, they still talk about Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and the glories of the Suez War--with all of their assets and liabilities. These people are often seeing this historical parallel in their dreams, and they are afraid of it!

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BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PHILIPPINES--Doha, 10 Nov (GNA)--A statement issued here today says that the state of Qatar and the Philippines have decided to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level. The statement, which was issued by the Qatari Foreign Ministry, says that the establishment of such relations comes within the framework of bolstering relations between the two countries in all fields. [Text] [GF101250 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 1130 GMT 10 Nov 81]

AMBASSADOR TO DENMARK--Sharidah Jibran al-Ka'bi, Qatar's ambassador to Great Britain, submitted his credentials today to the Danish queen as Qatar's nonresident ambassador to Denmark. Al-Ka'bi submitted his credentials as Qatar's nonresident ambassador to Norway on 29 September 1981. [Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0540 GMT 14 Oct 81]

CSO: 4404/92

DAILY ON CONDITIONS FOR ACCEPTING PEACE

JN060634 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0430 GMT 6 Nov 81

[Report from the press review]

[Text] In a commentary entitled "Those Searching for Peace," Tishrin says: Any peace plan in the region that does not achieve justice cannot achieve peace, only ignominious capitulation. Any peace that does not place the Palestinian people's rights at the top of priorities and does not reflect our Palestinian Arab people's desire to return to their land and establish an independent state on their national soil is no more than a big plot against this people and all our Arab people.

Syria's enemies have carried out a large-scale campaign against it, accusing it of being opposed to world peace and peace in the region in particular. If those enemies portray capitulation as peace, Syria is proud to oppose such a peace and will work to prevent its establishment with all available means.

However, the enemies of Syria and the Arab nation know full well that Syria is seeking to establish a real and just peace, one which differs essentially and completely from the alleged peace they are talking about and want to implement in the region by force and coercion.

Tishrin adds: We in Syria, as President Hafiz al-Asad stated, are advocates of peace and will remain so. Indeed, we shall defend peace. However, we reject capitulation because our dignity, honor and pan-Arab identity reject such capitulation. Thus, any plan that does not safeguard dignity, honor and identity will be rejected by Syria and the Arab people represented by Syria. As is known, Syria will remain the steadfast rock on which all liquidatory solutions will flounder. At the same time, it will continue to work to establish peace and to exert efforts to strengthen itself since no peace can be achieved without Arab strength.

CSO: 4404/97

REFORM OF BANKING SYSTEM ENVISAGED

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 46-47

[Text] TUNISIA'S next Five Year Development Plan (1982–1986) is expected to liberalise the country's rigid financial legislation significantly. These reforms could, in turn, encourage the expansion of the Tunisian banking system and revitalise the stock market.

At present, the Banque Centrale de Tunisie (BCT) imposes a strict control over the ten deposit and two investment banks, two development finance companies and the national savings fund. This excessive centralisation has the negative effect of limiting the initiative of bank managers, who often have a better working knowledge of local conditions and needs than bureaucrats in the BCT's office in Tunis.

Tunisian businessmen frequently complain of the delays and red tape involved in procuring credit facilities from banks. Over-centralisation has even worse effects in rural areas, where the 45 mutual credit banks are severely handicapped by existing laws. A freer hand to provide loans to farmers would boost agricultural productivity, as it would facilitate the introduction of modern machinery.

All medium- and short-term credit over Tunisian dinars 50,000 ($100,000) must first be approved by the central bank. Tunisian banking sources told *8 Days* that they expected local banks to be granted greater leeway for their operations, with less interference by the BCT, in the near future.

A serious obstacle to successful business dealings is the fact that local banks are not allowed directly to carry out foreign currency dealings. The BCT also imposes restrictions on the choice of overseas correspondents. What is more, Tunisian banks tend to be undercapitalised.

The offshore banking sector, established in 1976, has been in the doldrums. Only four banks — Citibank, Bank of America, the Abu Dhabi National Bank and the Paris-based Union Tunisienne des Banques (UTB) — opened up Offshore Banking Units (OBUs), and the high hopes placed on this sector have largely come to nothing. For instance, Citibank has downgraded its unit to a representative office. One problem for the OBUs is the tight margins available to Tunisia on the eurodollar market — now only ⅜ per cent above Libor.

Zaine Bach-Hamba of UTB told *8 Days*: 'The OBUs must envisage their presence in Tunisia in the long term. It is certain that if they came believing it would be easy to spin quick and large profits, they are bound to be disappointed.' Asked why a Tunisian bank had opened up an OBU in the country, Bach-Hamba commented: 'We see our role as helping to structure the market. Of course, we aren't in the market to make a killing, and we are satisfied with dealings which the other OBUs might consider too modest to handle.'

Reform of the banking system will, it is hoped, encourage Arab states to set up joint investment banks with Tunisia. So far, such ventures have been launched with France and Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and, most recently, Algeria. These banks will play a pivotal role in financing large investment schemes during the 1982–1986 plan.

A stock exchange was created in February 1969 to organise and manage a stock market, but activity has been severely restricted, with a limited number of shares — 21m — available for trading. It is estimated, moreover, that only 500,000 shares are actually subject to transactions, as the state controls, either directly or indirectly, about 80 per cent of all shares, and institutional investors some 15 per cent. These

two rarely deal through public operations in the stock market, preferring more discreet agreements.

With such a limited stock portfolio available, it is no wonder that Tunisian and foreign investors are unenthusiastic about playing the Tunis stock market. The value of transactions in 1980 was only TD20.8m ($41m). In fact, two-thirds of Tunisian enterprises have fewer than 20 stockholders; and only one Tunisian in 400 owns stock.

8 Days has learnt that a confidential study to reform the stock market has been carried out. One of the suggestions is that the state divest itself of shares worth about TD50m ($100m). While creating a wider stock trading base, this measure would not entail a return of certain companies to the private sector, as the state would retain majority control.

The proceeds from the sale of this stock would enable the state either to diversify its holdings into other corporations or launch new ones. Another recommendation involves the establishment of a special agency, along the lines of the Moroccan government's Société Nationale d'Investissement au Maroc, to manage the state's equity holdings.

To entice domestic investors as well as foreign ones, it will be necessary to improve the working of the stock market. In particular, a more attractive dividend policy and more extensive and regular financial data are necessary. Moreover, shares will have to be denominated in smaller units, if the more modest Tunisian investor is to be attracted to the stock market.

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END

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Internal Conflict, Religious Disturbances Under al-Sadat

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2438

INTERNAL CONFLICT, RELIGIOUS DISTURBANCES UNDER AL-SADAT

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EDITOR GIVES REASONS FOR EMERGENCY PARLIAMENTARY MEETING

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 30 Aug 81 p 1

[Article: "The Meaning behind the Emergency Meeting of Parliament"]

[Text] Emergency meetings of parliament generally take place in decisive historic stages, with the aim of reviewing issues of utmost importance.

The emergency meeting which parliament will hold next Saturday to listen to President Anwar al-Sadat's statement is the fifth emergency meeting to be held by the president's invitation since the issuance of the permanent constitution in 1971.

The first emergency meeting parliament held in response to the president's invitation was on 15 August 1972 to discuss the Law on the Protection of National Unity and the Law on the Protection of the Public Wealth.

The second meeting was held on 16 October 1973, in the wake of the great October victory.

The third emergency meeting was held on 6 October 1974 in honor of the leaders and members of the armed forces.

In the fourth emergency meeting, which took place on 2 October 1978, the president described the results of the Camp David talks and presented the peace agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.

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PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY CHIEF DISCUSSES MOTIVES, NATURE OF LATEST STEPS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 12 Sep 81 pp 3, 15

/Article by 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Dib: "Conversation of the Hour with the Chairman of the People's Assembly: al-Sadat Has Refused To Use His Right To Declare a State of Emergency"/

/Text/ The location of this conversation has been changed, and its date has been postponed:

It was to have taken place in his office in the People's Assembly, but was held in a number of places -- on a mat in the garden of his home in his village; in his car, as it was traveling from his village to the Center of Tamiyah on the day of the referendum; in the garden of the town mayor, in the home of one of his Christian friends in Tamiyah, in the presence of the overseer of the church; and in a room almost bare of furniture in his home in the village.

As for the date, this conversation was to have taken place after the conclusion of the successful People's Assembly session, which enacted much successful legislation, but it did not occur till yesterday.

It was the events that imposed themselves on the discussion and posed the questions and answers.

The discussion that took place was totally different from the conversation that had started, but it was an important one covering an important occasion.

The conversation with Dr Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the People's Assembly, came after the people had said their say, which has become binding on all organizations and agencies.

I asked the Chairman of the People's Assembly:

"The president used the powers given him in Article 74 of the constitution. Is there anything in his conduct which is prejudicial to the course of democracy?" Dr Sufi Abu Talib replied, "I would like to say, first, that the president has accustomed us to refusing to take essential, critical measures until getting a clear view and giving deep thought, deriving inspiration from the people's need for such decisions. His decisions always emerge as an expression of the pulse and feeling of the masses, and therefore he receives nearly complete support from all citizens."

"It has been revealed that the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' were not an individual episode but were a scheme aimed at ruining the structure of the national unity which has been an example of peaceful coexistence, indeed of fraternity, among Moslems and Christians in Egypt through the various ages of history. It is no secret to us all that the only way to shake the stability of Egypt is to fragment the domestic front, especially the national unity. Here, the goals of the people who wish Egypt ill abroad coincide with the goals of unjust groups domestically - people who are seeking a political role for themselves or aspire to realize a personal desire or to settle accounts, and have perpetrated the incidents and kindled the flames of factional strife."

Protection of Unity

The chairman of the People's Assembly fell silent a moment, then went on:

"Since the head of the state, who is the president, is responsible, under the constitution, in accordance with the stipulations of Article 73 of the constitution, vigilantly to uphold the sovereignty of the people, respect for the constitution, and the sovereignty of the law, to protect national unity and socialist achievements, and to observe the separation of powers in order to guarantee that they play their part in national action:

"It is therefore incumbent upon the president to exercise his constitutional powers in putting limits to the factional strife which has come close to weakening national unity.

"The president had two choices as stipulated by the constitution. The first is, in his capacity as head of the executive power, to use his powers as stipulated in Article 148 of the constitution, which give him the right to declare a state of emergency. He must present this declaration to the People's Assembly. This choice gives the president the right to adopt all exceptional measures in a specific period during the state of emergency, without having his decisions and the measures he adopts subject to oversight. This choice will bring us back to the situation we suffered from grievously before 1971, when people were arrested and their relatives did not know where they had gone or when they would be released, and when property was sequestered, indeed expropriated, without limits.

"The second choice is to use the powers stipulated in Article 74 of the constitution by taking rapid measures to face dangers and present the situation to the public in a public referendum. Since democracy and freedom are among the most prominent characteristics of the May revolution, the president preferred to use the powers set forth in Article 74, in his confidence that he had the people's support for the adoption of such measures. The referendum underlined this notion."

The People's Assembly chairman raised a question himself, asking:

"Some people might wonder -- and some lawyers who belong to the Society of Democratic Lawyers for the Defense of Human Rights actually did ask me, at their meeting with me last Wednesday - if there is anything in the exercise of powers stipulated in Article 74 that infringes on the pursuit of democracy. Some of them repeated an expression which they attributed to some opposition forces in Egypt, to the effect that that is a retrogression from the principles of democracy that

the May revolution has adopted. I told them that Article 74 was taken from Article 16 of the French constitution and that President DeGaulle used them during the events in Algeria; how could President DeGaulle pursue a non-democratic course? Was there anything in his use of the powers stipulated in Article 16 that struck at democracy in France? The answer all of them gave was that there was absolutely nothing in that that struck at democracy, but rather that it corrected the exercise of democracy, because the balance between the freedom of the individual on the one hand and the safety of the country on the other had been disrupted.

"I followed up on that by saying that we were faced with a grave danger, a situation which demanded balance between the freedom of certain individuals and the safety of the country and protection from the danger that threatened national unity. Any wise person would prefer the safety of the country to the freedom of a few individuals."

To Confront the Danger

Once again he raised a question himself, saying,

"They also asked me, what is the difference between the measures that are taken in applying a state of emergency and the ones taken to confront the sudden danger in a situation?

"I replied that the essential difference between the two methods is the fact that the rapid measures taken to confront the danger are a temporary thing which can be renewed and end when the state of danger ends; the only element that has a say on this matter is the people, who express their opinion through the referendum. It is not permissible to resort to it again unless -- God forbid -- this danger reappears. For this reason it is an exceptional measure for confronting a danger that threatens national unity or the safety of the country, and the democratic process continues to proceed along its natural course.

"Out of the president's desire that the measures he takes not go beyond the limits of correcting the exercise of democracy, he issued a republican decree, Decree 154 for 1981, permitting the presentation of grievances against measures taken in accordance with Article 74 of the constitution.

"It is well known that the measures taken in accordance with Article 74 of the constitution, whatever their essence might be, whatever their nature might be, are sovereign acts which are not subject to surveillance by the People's Assembly, are not subject to surveillance by the judiciary, and may not be contested. Permitting the presentation of grievances on decrees of this kind gives citizens a sure guarantee that their freedom will not be infringed and that their property will not be violated. This guarantee consists of three grades: the first [is to present grievances] to the socialist prosecutor, the second is to present them to the court of values, and the third is to present them to the appeals court of values."

The Course of Democracy

"If we accept the fact that imminent danger requires the adoption of rapid measures and that the president has clearly declared his intention not to infringe the

course of democracy, some people wonder why the presentation of grievances doesn't take place before ordinary judiciary bodies -- the administrative judiciary in the case of government employees or the ordinary judiciary in the case of others."

Dr Sufi Abu Talib replied by saying:

"These people state that the measures taken to confront the danger are not ordinary ones, in view of the circumstances of the case in which they were issured. The ordinary judiciary, be it the general judiciary or the Council of State, will evaluate the situation and discuss the measure if it involves ordinary circumstances. If the situation is as the investigation describes it, political in character in the first instance, that will require that the investigation also be political, and the verdict on the grievance will show the significance of the political facts of the situation. It is no secret that there is a difference between political investigations, administrative investigations and criminal investigations; similarly, there are political accountability, administrative accountability and criminal accountability.

"It is the motives which actually inspired the commission of the act and the circumstances in which it occurred that determine the difference among them. If many acts are subjected to ordinary criteria, the investigator may not be able to ascertain the real motives or dimensions of the effects which have resulted from the act committed.

"For example:

"There might be a newspaper article which shows nothing out of the ordinary in the opinion of an ordinary person or an ordinary investigator. However, in the opinion of an investigator who is politically sophisticated, it might reveal extremely harmful effects in forming public opinion, spreading about dissension, or inciting groups against one another.

The Party Opposition

"It was logical that as long as the investigation had a political character, accountability should be political in character. The bodies the law has assigned to investigate and determine accountability regarding this sort of act are the socialist prosecutor and the court of values. This court has a number of public personalities in addition to judges from the appeals and reversal courts, who are in the majority, and their role, according to their specializations, is to determine whether it is possible to make the charges on a political, social or economic basis, in the light of the values and circumstances of society, regarding the acts being investigated or being held to account."

"A question: some opposition leaders say that President al-Sadat has eliminated the party opposition and eliminated the democratic party system through these measures."

Dr Sufi Abu Talib replied by saying,

"According to the lists that have been published on the people to be detained and

the papers whose circulation has been suspended, the general criterion is to detain people who took part directly or indirectly in the factional strife, when serious proof of such participation has been established. These people have been covered by the measures that were taken. People whose participation has not been proved have not been covered by these measures. The measures cover some people who belong to the opposition and some rejectionists who have not been granted the character of opposition. They also cover people who do not belong to the opposition or the rejectionists. No consideration is given to political coloration in the case of the people to whom the measures have been applied. This notion is reaffirmed by the fact that some prominent opposition leaders have not been covered by these measures.

"Here we must for democracy's sake reach agreement on the meaning of opposition and the role of the opposition."

Dr Sufi Abu Talib concentrated on this point, saying:

"We must reach understanding on the meaning of a parliamentary democracy based on a pluralism of parties. Parliamentary party democracy is based on a majority which is in charge of governing and a minority which is in the opposition. The nature of affairs leads the two to exchange their places in government, according to the results produced by the elections. Therefore opposition is an inseparable part of the regime. Therefore the majority in England is called the government of her majesty the queen, and the opposition is called the opposition of her majesty the queen.

"Political opposition in Egypt, and the circumstances in which it has arisen, have caused some people to suffer confusion on the difference between resistance and opposition and the difference between criticism and vindictiveness! Resistance means hostility to the existing system as stipulated in the constitution and law and the adoption of all means for destroying it, even through violence. Therefore all countries consider resistance to the system to be a crime punishable by law.

"Opposition does not seek to destroy the house under whose roof it lives. It tries to disclose errors which distort its proper functioning or recommend the best means for arriving at the goals of society. In both cases it adheres to the democratic method, that is, expressing its opinions through legitimate channels, which do not include the resort to violence.

"The notions have become confused among us, because we have [experienced democracy] for just 30 years and there is a whole generation that has lived through the circumstances of the 30 years that have occurred in Egypt [illegible] economically, socially, politically and even culturally.

The Political Map

"The current political map shows that there are people who were living before the July 1952 revolution and had a prominent role in it, there are people who managed to reconcile themselves to the current regime, and there are people who have retained the ideas, the methods and the customs they held before 1952, want to bring society back to the pre-1952 regime, and do not think there is a chance they can exploit to reach this goal.

"The second group are people who have been given the label of 'power centers', people who have reconciled themselves to the current regime and people who are retaining their old ideas and seize every opportunity to strike out at the current regime in order to return to the authoritarian pre-1971 regime.

"The third group is people who reject the July and May Revolutions and refer to the current regime as [the product of] a coup and not a revolution. They justify their notion on grounds that the optimum means for reforming society [illegible] quoted from communist thinking which they [illegible].

They Want To Emulate Khomeyni

"The fourth group rejects the July and May Revolutions. The Moslems in this group describe society as remote from Islam. Islam in their view is the values and systems that prevailed in the first Moslem century, specifically in the era of the upright caliphs. Regimes different from that they describe as non-Islamic -- indeed, they go all the way and describe society as heathen. The societies of renunciation, penance and holy war killed Shaykh al-Dhahabi and do not hesitate to exploit dissension. They refuse to interact with the existing society, in order to evade passing problems, and will return us to the olden times. They want society to emulate that of Khomeyni.

"They have not drawn enlightenment from what is going on in Iran.

"As for the Copts in this group, they raise a naive question: now that 14 centuries of coexistence between Moslems and Christians have elapsed, and Islam has molded all Egypt's population into a single crucible of civilization, which Christians and Jews helped build alongside the Moslems, which is based on tolerance, equality of rights and obligations, and respect for all divine religions, after 14 centuries they raise the question: to whom does the land of Egypt belong?

"They ignore the fact that it belongs to all Egyptians, whatever the religion to which they belong might be. They have turned the church away from its role, since the church is based on the statement of Jesus, on whom be peace: Render unto Caesar what is Caesar's and render unto God what is God's -- meaning that the role of the church is restricted to spiritual and moral guidance and that the church does not enter into the political, social and economic organization of the state. The tragedies that befell Europe in the Middle Ages had as one of their main reasons interference by the church in the activities of the state, in violation of the dictates of the true teachings of Christ.

"The ambitious [illegible] that gave the Christian leaders in Egypt wanted to link the church to the political affairs of the state and thus played an abundant part in fuelling and kindling factional strife. They want the factionalism that is present in Lebanon, and have not drawn enlightenment from what is going on in Iran.

"These abovementioned groups fall within the category of resistance and are as remote as they can be from opposition. All the referenda which have taken place in Egypt since the May Revolution, and the basic values stipulated in the constitution and the laws, are opposed to guidance by the ideas that these groups are calling for in the context of Islamic law and to the grievous error to which the minority party or opposition succumbs when it allows any of these elements from these groups to

infiltrate its ranks, hiding behind freedom of opinion and democracy to spread and propagate their ideas.

Frankly and Boldly

"The basis, according to these referendums and the laws, is that the fundamental values on which the July and May Revolutions were founded in the context of Arab Islamic traditions are the intellectual source of our legislation and the conduct of the members of society. Anyone violating them violates what the overwhelming majority of society has endorsed.

"It is to be noted that some opposition newspapers give scope to people who would destroy the July and May Revolutions or hide behind religion in order to destroy the values we have endorsed. It is the duty of the opposition not to allow any of these ideas or anyone who propagates them to fall under their protection."

"Question: does democracy allow rules to be set on people's behavior and opinions in order to keep the views of these abovementioned groups from influencing society?"

Dr Sufi Abu Talib replied,

"We must face the actual state of affairs frankly and boldly. It is very easy to shift from a democratic regime to an authoritarian one, and it is very difficult to shift properly from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, and this is our situation. Without going back over the lessons of history, we can content ourselves with what we observe now in the world and the effects that have been created by sudden shifts from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. Before us we have /the examples of/ Spain and Portugal. This is what the president once defined as a leap into the unknown. We are passing through a transitional stage through which we hope to support political, social and economic stability. The European countries and the countries of North America bore sufferings which lasted almost 2 centuries, from the time of the French revolution, the English revolution and the American revolution, until they attained the social, political and economic stability they are blessed with now. There is no room for comparison with the scope of democratic practice in these countries, although we have had to be guided by the experiences they have gone through and the results they have reached. Once these countries had been blessed by this stability, no restrictions were placed on freedom of expression or the political views that politicians were propagating. We find a royalist party in republican France just as we find a republican party in monarchical England and find communist parties in capitalist countries, as is the case in America, France and Britain.

"As for the situation here, as a result of the circumstances we have gone through, since the life span of democracy here, in European terms, is less than 60 years, and in many periods we suffered from a suspension of the exercise of democracy, we have contented ourselves in this stage with a group of rules regarding the exercise of democracy which the constitution has stipulated and the law has stipulated, foremost among them that the principles of Islamic law, social peace and national unity will not be violated and the socialist achievements and the principles of democratic socialism will not be infringed.

"No one who wishes to engage in party activity or political activity must violate

these principles or values. The rejectionists from the four abovementioned groups are undoubtedly propagating ideas and values which are contrary to these principles. Democracy will not be harmed by the imposition of these rules as long as they are in agreement with the circumstances of society. Here is West Germany, which there is no doubt lies in the roster, indeed at the top of the list of, democratic countries, setting forth rules on the exercise of political and party activity so that it can keep society from reverting to Nazi ideas or falling prey to Communist thinking."

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PRESIDENTIAL DECREE ISSUED CALLING FOR POPULAR REFERENDUM

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH /The Official Gazette/ in Arabic #368 5 Sep 81 pp 2-5

/Decree: "Decree of the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt No 498 for the Year 1981 Summoning the Voters To Vote on a Referendum on Measures and Principles To Protect National Unity and Social Peace"/

/Text/ The president:

Having read Articles 73 and 74 of the constitution;

Law 73 for 1956 regulating the exercise of political rights; and the laws amending that:

Has decreed:

Article One. The voters whose names are registered in the voter lists in application of the provisions of the abovementioned Law 73 for 1956 are summoned to meet at the site of the relevant branch referendum committees to express their opinions in the referendum on measures and principles to protect national unity and social peace as stated in the declaration by the president to the Egyptian people on 5 September 1981 accompanying this decree.

Article Two. The abovementioned referendum process will take place on Thursday 10 September 1981, from 0800 hours in the morning to 1700 hours in the evening, in the manner stipulated in the law regulating the exercise of political rights.

Article Three. The minister of the interior must carry out this decree.

Article Four. This decree will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH.

Issued at the Office of the Presidency on 5 September 1981.

/Signed/ Anwar al-Sadat.

Declaration by the President to the Egyptian People

For a fairly long period, in numerous stages, some destructive groups have tried to create factional strife among the members of the homeland and have worked earnestly to eliminate its national unity, exploiting certain misleading slogans

and illegitimate moral and material means to obstruct the people's progress along the road to development, prosperity and democracy in order to attain their ends.

The government has confronted all this by ordinary measures at times, by advice at other times, and by guidance and orientation at times. Recently, in particular, grave events have taken place which have faced the national unity, social peace and safety of the domestic front with grave danger.

However, this devious group has continued in its course, has disdained all values and laws, has deviated from the straight path, and has pursued the course of violence, terror, bloodshed, and threats against the peaceful. Some people have also exploited these events and have determined to escalate them, and this has made it necessary to adopt rapid, immediate measures to confront this danger which has threatened national unity and the peace of the nation, proceeding from our constitutional responsibility that is derived from the provisions of Article 73 of the constitution.

In carrying out the powers granted to us by virtue of Article 74 of the constitution, which stipulates that, if a danger occurs which threatens national unity or the safety of the nation or obstructs the government institutions' performance of their constitutional role, the president may adopt rapid measures to cope with this danger, present a declaration to the people and hold a referendum on the measures he has taken within 60 days of taking them:

We have decreed:

First:

1. The exploitation of religion to attain political or party ends is prohibited and the use of exploitation of places of worship for this purpose or to infringe national unity, social peace or the safety of the nation is prohibited: there is no politics in religion, and there is no religion in politics.

2. The detention of certain persons, where there is serious evidence that they have perpetrated, taken part in, approved or exploited in any form whatever the events which have threatened national unity, social peace or the safety of the nation.

(Decree of the President 493 for 1981.)

3. Retention of the property of certain bodies, organizations, groups and societies which have engaged in activity or acts which have threatened national unity, social peace or the safety of the nation.

(Decree of the President 495 for 1981.)

4. The dissolution of some notorious societies, in accordance with the provisions of Law 32 for 1964 regarding special societies and organizations which engage in activities which threaten national unity, social peace or the safety of the nation.

(Decree of the President 492 for 1981.)

5. Elimination of permits granted for the issuance of certain newspapers and publications and retention of their property and locations.

(Decree of the President 494 for 1981.)

6. The transfer of certain faculty members of universities or higher institutes, where there is serious evidence that they have engaged in activities which have a deleterious effect in forming public opinion or raising the young people or have threatened national unity, social peace or the safety of the nation, to positions specified by the minister of state for education and scientific research or the minister concerned with the affairs of al-Azhar, according to the case, by agreement with the competent ministers.

(Decree of the President 490 for 1981.)

7. The transfer of certain journalists and other people working in nationwide press organizations and certain people working in the Radio and Television Federation, where there is serious evidence that they have engaged in activities that have a deleterious effect in forming public opinion or threatened national unity, social peace or the safety of the nation, to the Information Department or other government bodies to be stipulated by the prime minister.

(Decree of the President 489 for 1981.)

8. Abrogation of the Decree of the President 2782 for 1971 appointing His Holiness Shannudah the Pope of Alexandria and Patriarich of the Missionary Province of St Mark and formation of a committee of five bishops to perform the papal mission.

(Decree of the President 491 for 1981.)

Second:

The constitutional institutions must, each within its field of competence, adopt the necessary measures in this regard.

Third:

In application of the provisions of Article 74 of the constitution, I am presenting this declaration to the people in order that they may vote by referendum on the measures that have been adopted which it contains.

Fourth:

The referendum on the measures that have been taken which this declaration contains will take place on Thursday 10 September 1981.

/Signed/ Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat The President

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REFERENDUM BALLOT REPRODUCED IN PRESS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 1

[Referendum ballot]

[Text] [Main heading] Arab Republic of Egypt

[Legend under picture] Are you in agreement with the measures and principles of national unity and social peace?

[Above right hand circle] In agreement

[Above left-hand circle] Not in agreement

بطاقة ابداء الرأي التي اعدتها وزارة الداخلية لاستفتاء يوم الخميس القادم .. وقد رسمت عليها صورة تعبر عن الوحدة الوطنية والتآخي بين المسلم والمسيحي

Voting ballot prepared by the Ministry of the Interior for the referendum next Thursday. On it has been drawn a picture portraying national unity and fraternity between Moslems and Copts.

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CONSTITUTION STIPULATIONS ON PRESIDENT'S EMERGENCY POWERS REVIEWED

Cairo Government Printing Organization in Arabic 11 Sep 1971

/Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt/

/Excerpt from text/ Section Five

The System of Government

Chapter One

The Head of State

Article 73. The head of the state is the president. He will watch vigilantly over the assertion of the sovereignty of the people, respect for the constitution and the sovereignty of the law, and the protection of national unity and socialist achievements. He will observe the separation of the powers to guarantee that they perform their role in national action.

Article 74. The president, if a danger arises that threatens national unity or the safety of the country or obstructs the performance by the institutions of the state of their constitutional role, may adopt rapid measures to confront this danger and present a declaration to the people. A referendum will be held on the measures he has taken within 60 days of their adoption.

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PUBLIC PROSECUTOR DEVOTES SELF FULL TIME TO RELIGIOUS DISTURBANCES

Cairo MAY in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 7

/Article by 'Isam Hashish: "The Socialist Public Prosecutor Is Devoting Himself Full Time to Investigating the Instigators of Factional Strife"/

/Text/ It has been decided that all non-urgent investigations the agency of the socialist public prosecutor is engaged in will be suspended and that it will engage in the study of papers on people charged with the events of factional strife full time.

MAY has learned that the investigations will start in the next few days. Yesterday the ninth floor of the Ministry of Justice building on Lazughli /Street/ was vacated and assigned to the agency of the socialist public prosecutor, who will occupy the eighth floor. It has learned that the socialist public prosecutor has requested that the agency be reinforced by a further number of members of judiciary bodies in order to conduct the investigations rapidly. The Supreme Council of Judiciary Authorities will review the socialist prosecutor's request for reinforcement of the agency at its next meeting. Last week, the council gave its agreement to the appointment of eight public prosecutor's office heads to work in the socialist public prosecutor's agency, and the public prosecutor will start his investigation as soon as reports on the accusations regarding each of the persons accused of stirring up factional strife arrive, in the next few days.

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SOCIALIST PROSECUTOR RECEIVES INCRIMINATING TAPE RECORDINGS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 17 Sep 81 p 1

[Article by 'Isam Hashish: "State Security Prosecutors Office Sends Socialist Prosecutor Tape Transcripts"]

[Text] Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, has decided to start investigating the people detained during the events of factional strife next Saturday. The investigation will take place in the headquarters of the socialist prosecutor's agency.

Thirty assistant socialist prosecutors have been delegated to conduct the investigations in order to complete them and carry them out quickly. A new floor over the headquarters of the socialist prosecutor's agency has also been set aside for the investigations.

Yesterday the socialist prosecutor received a report from the Office of State Security Investigation requesting an investigation into the persons detained. Accompanying the report were items of evidence, documents and recordings bearing on all the accused, revealing the role of each in the recent events and the factional strife. Today and tomorrow the tape recordings bearing the threads of the conspiracy will be played back.

Counsellor Yusuf Deraz, chairman of the technical office of the socialist prosecutor, said that there were specific charges against each of the detained persons.

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SOCIALIST PROSECUTOR DISCUSSES INVESTIGATION STRATEGY

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Sep 81 p 3

[Article by Muhammad al-Sharbini: "The Socialist Public Prosecutor to AL-SIYASI: Political Investigation Means Discussing the Detainees' Views with Them"]

[Text] The socialist public prosecutor's agency will start the investigations into the detained persons, who are 1,536 in number, in the next few days.

Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, stated "These investigations are political, not criminal or judiciary, in nature. They entail a discussion with detainees about their political views and notions and a full file on their political careers."

He said, "Some of the persons whose names have been announced in accordance with the lists will be investigated, and they have been arrested pending investigation by the Office of the State Security Prosecutor. The other detainees will be investigated politically by the agency of the socialist public prosecutor and a complete paper or political dossier is now being prepared on each detained person."

AL-SIYASI asked the socialist public prosecutor about the nature of the political investigation and the difference between that and a criminal investigation.

Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali replied,

"In political investigations, a discussion is held with detainees on all the political views they held since they began to be active in politics; that is, they are a complete evaluation of the person' entire political career. This is taking place for the first time in Egypt, by virtue of the Procedures Law, and is being carried out by the agency of the socialist public prosecutor.

"Criminal investigations are investigations into the judiciary charges levelled against the accused. They are conducted by the Office of the State Security Prosecutor and are judiciary investigations that follow the Law on Judiciary Procedures. To put it in greater detail fashion, that means that the accused has perpetrated a crime considered as a crime by the Law on Punishments, which puts his liberty and property at risk and entails a penalty ranging from a fine to imprisonment or even execution."

AL-SIYASI asked "What are the detainees' guarantees in political investigations?"

The public prosecutor said, "Anyone has the right to be accompanied by one or more lawyers to defend him and he also has the right to protest against the investigation that was made on him. The committee will then listen to the statements of the person lodging the protest, after which the committee will endorse the decrees it decides to issue in its memoranda."

AL-SIYASI asked, "Does this mean that there is a difference between the detention and arrest of a given person?"

The socialist public prosecutor replied,

"Detention is a political measure and arrest is a criminal measure. Detained persons are put in one place, arrested persons in another place."

AL-SIYASI asked, "What about political interrogation?"

The socialist prosecutor, Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, replied,

"That is called for when a person prejudices his commitments to society and does not honor society's basic values.

"The Law on the Protection of Values from Impropriety shows their dimensions and the acts whose commission makes up this interrogation."

AL-SIYASI asked, "What measures does society adopt through the Law on the Protection of Values from Impropriety against persons who do not honor the values of society and prejudice their commitments toward it in the political sense?"

The socialist public prosecutor replied, "There are a number of measures, most conspicuously:

"Deprivation of candidacy or appointment to the chairmanships of public companies, authorities, general federations,clubs and press organizations.

"Deprivation of administration of our membership in the establishment of political parties.

"Deprivation of the occupation of positions that have an effect on the formation of public opinion."

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NATURE, PROCESS OF POLITICAL INVESTIGATION EXPLORED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 4

/Article by Nadiyah al-'Asqalani: "Members of the Judiciary Proceed With Political Investigations"/

/Text/ What are political investigations? Do they differ from investigations before the office of the public prosecutor, or do they have a special character and specific procedures which differ from measures of investigation before the office of the public prosecutor and the courts? Do political defendants enjoy the same guarantees that ordinary defendants enjoy?

These questions were the focus of a conversation with members of the judiciary and the chairman of the Higher Court of Values, who occupies the position of vice chairman of the court of cessation.

Ahmad Shaybah al-Hamad, chairman of the Higher Court of Values, said "Political investigations concern crimes that infringe on national unity and the government system. The socialist public prosecutor is in charge of political investigations in his capacity as a representative of society. During investigation and trial, the suspect has all the guarantees included in the Criminal Procedures Law, in the sense that a lawyer may attend the investigation and trial with the defendants.

If there is sufficient proof of the existence of bases for the crime as stipulated in the Law on the Protection of Values from Impropriety, the Law on the Protection of National Unity, and Law 34 for 1971 bearing on the organization of sequestration guaranteeing the safety of the people, he will be handed over to the Court of Values for trial.

"The Court of Values is committed to taking the trial measures stipulated in the Criminal Procedures Law. The Law on Civil Litigation and the decrees issued by the Court of Values may be contested before the Higher Court of Values.

"The Higher Court of Values is in charge of listening to witnesses in cases and performs different forms of contestation, if any contestation of the procedures of the investigation exists.

"The higher court is concerned with temporarily suspending the execution of verdicts issued by the preliminary court, until judgment is made on the contestation presented to it.

"It is also concerned with reviewing contestations which the socialist public prosecutor presents to it. In this case, the court can amend the verdict in favor of the person who has been sentenced. The law requires that a lawyer be in attendance with the person being handed over to trial."

Political Crimes

In the realm of discussing the nature of political crime, he said, "The Law on National Unity, in its first article, stipulates that the protection of national unity is the duty of every citizen and that all institutions of the government and mass organizations must strive to support and maintain it.

"In application of the provisions of this law, national unity means unity based on respect for the system of government and basic values as defined by the constitution. It is an alliance of the forces of the people, equal opportunity, equality of rights and obligations among citizens and freedom of opinion and belief in a manner which does not infringe the freedoms of others or the basic values of society.

"Article Six states that anyone who incites some group in the alliance or group of people, calumnies it, or stirs up dissent among groups by one of the means of publicity stipulated in the Law on Punishments, Article 171, will be punished by imprisonment, if this incitement has had the effect of harming national unity."

Tendentious Rumors

"Article Five of the Law on National Unity stipulates that anyone deliberately broadcasting false or tendentious rumors or statements with the purpose of harming national unity among the forces or groups of the people will be punished by imprisonment and a fine of 50 to 200 pounds."

The chairman of the Higher Court of Values added, "The sovereignty of the law dictates that priority be given to events in the national struggle and the struggle for liberation and that preference be given to the comprehensive national interest over the special interests of all forces, groups or social classes."

Members of the Judiciary Take Charge of the Political Investigation

Raja' al-Arabi, attorney for the Higher Office of the State Security Public Prosecutor, said, "My conception of political investigation is that it is not criminal and not administrative, is related to political activity and political life, and does not constitute a criminal or administrative felony. An activity can be political but at the same time constitute a criminal or administrative felony. Political investigation is assumed by members of the judiciary, and political crimes are defined in the Law on the Protection of Values from Impropriety (95 for 1980) and the Law 33 for 1978 on Social Peace regarding the protection of the domestic front and social peace.

"In regard to the Law on Parties, anyone committing the following acts is subject to political questioning:

"Appealing for the rejection of divine laws.

"Inciting youths and young people to deviate through alienation from religious values and loyalty to the nation.

"Spreading or broadcasting false news or provocative propaganda if that took place abroad, if that has had the effect of harming the national interest of the country.

"Acts which the following laws brand as crimes:

"The Law on the Protection of the Domestic Front.

"The president's decree on assembly.

"Law 40 for 1977 on the organization of political parties.

"Law 33 for 1978 on the Protection of the Domestic Front."

A member of the judiciary, in response to the various aspects of comparison between political and ordinary crimes, said:

"Political crimes are acts which when perpetrated are not crimes according to the Law on Punishments but are crimes in the Law on National Unity and the Law on the Protection of Values from Impropriety.

"The Law on Punishments treats acts as crimes where there is categorical proof, and doubt is interpreted in favor of the accused.

"Political crimes entail serious proof, circumstantial evidence and doubts. The punishments for political crimes differ from those for other ones. Political crimes might reveal other crimes which are punishable by the Law on Punishments, in which cases the political investigation is handed over to the office of the public prosecutor for investigation into the criminal aspect."

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NEWSPAPER DIVULGES DETAILS OF RASHAD 'UTHMAN ARREST

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 5 Sep 81 p 14

/Article by Muhammad Shakir: "AKHBAR AL-YAWM, Minute by Minute with the Committees sequestering Rashad 'Uthman's Funds"/

/Text/ What were the circumstances of the decree by Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, preventing Rashad 'Uthman, member of the People's Assembly, from disposing of his funds and his property?

How did the committees act? How were they able, in 6 hours, to complete the procedures for sequestering his property?

AKHBAR AL-YAWM is presenting the full story on the measures which were taken to carry out the socialist public prosecutor's decree.

The measures began with a telephone conversation made by Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, to Maj Gen Fawzi Mu'adh, director of security, Alexandria, and Maj Gen Mahmud Marzuq, informing both that Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, had issued a decree sequestering the funds of Rashad 'Uthman, that he had decided to form a judiciary committee from the office of the socialist public prosecutor, under the chairmanship of the judiciary counsellor, to supervise execution of the measures of the sequestration decree, and that he demanded that the members of the police cooperate with him in carrying out his mission.

There was more than one reason for seeking the aid of the members of the police in supervising the operation:

First, it was observed, during the examination of the lumber warehouses the People's Assembly member owns in West Alexandria, when the office of the public prosecutor was conducting an investigation into the case of Mahir 'Uthman's sister, that he had recourse to large numbers of guards armed with weapons inside and outside the lumber warehouses. This required security in ensuring the operation against any irresponsible conduct on the part of any of his helpers.

The second reason, which was the most important one, was that during the investigations which Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, supervised, the People's Assembly member Rashad listed his place of residence as an address in al-Zamalik and, when the situation required that he be summoned during the

investigation period to make some statements, it was apparent that this address was not correct but that it was the address of a building that was being demolished. The situation required that the socialist public prosecutor demand that the official agencies inform him of the address he resided in. The agencies in fact replied that he resided in a villa in Garden City, Cairo, and not in al-Zamalik.

What Happened Tuesday Night

Last Tuesday night, at 1900 hours, a committee met in Alexandria made up of Counsellor 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Buhayri, head of the office of public prosecutor in the office of the socialist public prosecutor, Counsellor Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid, Mahrus 'Abd-al-Sami', and their aides. In the possession of each was an envelope /sealed/ in red wax. They went to the Alexandria Security Department building on Isma'il Muhanna Street and met there with Maj Gen Mu'adh, director of Alexandria security, and Maj Gen Faruq Sadiq, deputy director of security. A closed meeting that lasted a full hour was held, as a result of which it was decided to seek the assistance of the senior officers in the department, Brig Gen Halim Ghazi and Cols Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah and Muhammad al-Dassuqi. The situation was as follows:

Maj Gen Faruq Sadiq, deputy director of Alexandria security, asked Counsellor 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Buhayri, head of the office of public prosecutor in the office of the socialist public prosecutor, to finish geographically classifying the property of the People's Assembly member that appeared in the sequestration decree and to carry out the decree at the same time. Zero hour was 2200 hours in the evening. Accordingly, the classification was completed and the men in charge of each of the precincts in whose jurisdiction Rashad 'Uthman's properties were located were summoned to cope with all anticipated probabilities.

After a discussion took place on the plan of operation, Counsellor 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Buhayri decided to form the committees, each of which was to be headed by a man from the socialist public prosecutor's agency and to contain two intelligence officers, a regular army officer and a secret police force as members. The basic goal was to secure the operation.

I Am Waiting for You

What, however, happened in Rashad 'Uthman's office when the members of the board of the office of the socialist public prosecutor came upon him? Counsellor 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Buhayri came upon the People's Assembly member and found him sitting at his desk.

The member of the office of the socialist public prosecutor read the decree to him, based on the contents of the Laws on the Protection of the Domestic Front and the Guarantee of the Safety of the People.

Rashad 'Uthman answered by saying, "I have been waiting for you since yesterday." While sitting at his desk he turned to open the drawers of the desk, repeating quietly, "Here, take a look." At that point one of the policemen told the People's Assembly member that the sequestration decree meant that the member of the judiciary would embark on his responsibilities and that no one was to dictate to him how he was to carry out his work. Rashad 'Uthman stood up over the desk and left it to the agency of the socialist public prosecutor to start working. The socialistic

public prosecutor's men turned to a small safe alongside his desk and asked him for the keys to it. He handed them over and the men from the judiciary opened it and made an inventory of its contents. It appeared that there were 3,000 pounds in it. They then turned after that to a large safe, and he told them "It is an electronic safe and I do not have the keys to it. The key is with the cashier and I do not know how it opens." The socialist public prosecutor's men immediately decided to put on red wax and ordered that his office be sequestered and its contents and documents noted down in a ledger in the presence of the People's Assembly member. At the same time, other committees engaged in their activity; a committee headed for his offices in Ahmad 'Urabi Street in the al-Bashbishi building, where he had bought two apartments that were to be the site of a new office he had intended to furnish; indeed, he had furnished one apartment, and had started decoration work in the other. He had bought the al-Naduri mansion in the Glym section and had bought another one in Mushdi. The residents were informed of the decree of the socialist public prosecutor, which was that all business was to go through them, and the tenants were so informed.

28 Items of Real Property in Alexandria

It appeared that Rashad 'Uthman owned 28 items of real property in Alexandria in the form of buildings and plots of land. It also appeared from the documents that he owned two companies, one for imports and commerce, the second for shipping and unloading. In the process of taking the inventory, the socialist public prosecutor's men recalled that there were cars, and it was decided that Brig Gen 'Adil al-Sawwah, Alexandria traffic director, would be informed of the license numbers of the cars he owned, which were three private cars, two buses and 13 trucks, and that he would be prohibited from dealing with them, lest he dispose of them.

With regard to the banks, the Credit Bank, Citibank and the Bank of Cairo were notified of the public prosecutor's decree in order to sequester his funds in the bank accounts. His properties are currently being tabulated. Other committees embarked on their responsibilities with respect to the lumber warehouses immediately, and all the lumber in them was sequestered.

Thanks to the Police from the Public Prosecutor

Maj Gen Fawzi Mu'adh, director of security, and Maj Gen Fa'ruq Sadiq, deputy director of security, received a letter from Counsellor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, thanking them for the exceptional efforts they had exerted in carrying out the decree by exemplary methods in record time. The committees are also continuing to work, and their work will be completed next Tuesday, preparatory to the issuance of a decree on the plan of action for managing these companies after the sequestration process is completed.

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BRIEFS

NEW BENEFITS FOR NEWSMEN--The Council of the Journalists' Union, under the chairmanship of Mr. Salah Jalal, has decided to amend the table of journalists' wages and raises, adjusting raises to 6 pounds per month for the first 4 years, 8 pounds for the following 4 years, 10 pounds for the following 3 years, 12 pounds for the next 3 years, 14 pounds for the next 2 years, and 16 pounds for the next 2 years, after which annual raises will be 18 pounds. The council agreed to raise the ratio of the expense allowance to 40 percent and to reorganize the conditions of journalists who were in service when the new bill was issued. The council reviewed the cases of journalists who had been detained and the contacts the union chief had made with senior officials to guarantee their legal rights. It was decided to appoint the lawyers Messrs Ahmad Shinan and Majdi Sharaf to attend the investigations and defend these journalists. It had been decided to continue contacts to provide health and social care for journalists who had been detained, and medicine has been sent to people who need it. The union has sent a letter to the socialist public prosecutor to carry out the Law on Punishments in order to enable its council members to attend the investigation into the journalists who have been detained. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 6/

HUMANE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES--An official source asserted to AL-SIYASI that all the persons who have been detained have received humane treatment which is entirely different from the treatment that arrested persons received before the corrective revolution. In addition, the desire of some detained persons for food and other personal requirements has been met. It has been decided to permit any of them to accompany their lawyers when summoned for investigation before the agency of the socialist public prosecutor. /Text/ /Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Sep 81 p 1/

HAYKAL REQUESTS EVIAN WATER--Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal has presented the office of the socialist public prosecutor with a request that he be permitted to purchase French Evian mineral water. This is the strangest request that the office has received from detainees so far. Haykal justified his request by the fact that he does not drink ordinary water, because it is harmful to his health, and that he has become accustomed to drinking Evian. /Text/ /Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 17 Sep 81 p 1/

CSO: 4504/107

OFFICIAL DECREE LISTS NAMES OF 1,536 PERSONS DETAINED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 36, 3 Sep 81 pp 24-80

[Text] [In accordance with Decree No 493 of 1981, signed by President Anwar al-Sadat on 2 September 1981, the following persons have been detained:]

1. Kamal Ahmad 'Abd-al-Muhsin
2. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Mahmud Hasan
3. Hasan Jawdah 'Abd-al-Hafiz
4. Yusuf Sadiq al-Badri
5. 'Abdallah Shawqi al-Hajjaj
6. Ahmad Muhammad Ya'qub
7. 'Ali Imam Hasan
8. Mukhtar Abu-Quffah 'Abd-al-Qadir
9. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Hamid Mustafa
10. Fu'ad Mahmud Kamil
11. Sayyid Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir
12. Ibrahim 'Abduh Sulayman
13. Salah Muhammad Ibrahim
14. 'Ala'-al-Din 'Abbas Fawzi
15. Rafi' Mustafa Sayyid Ahmad
16. Mutawalli Yusuf Shalabi [aka] Ra'uf Shalabi
17. 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-'Aziz Kishk
18. 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr Ahmad Saqr
19. Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad Madi
20. Muhammad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Badawi
21. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Hadi al-Khubayri
22. Mahmud Sayyid Ahmad 'Id
23. Safinaz Kazim Isfahani
24. Salah al-Sayyid Mutawalli 'Isa
25. Samir Amin Tadrus
26. 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Id Mannaf Muhammad [aka] 'Abd-al-'Azim Manaff
27. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal
28. Ahmad Mahmud Abu-Hassanin
29. Muhammad Kamal al-Sananiri
30. Jamal Fawzi 'Abd-al-Barr
31. Mustafa Mashhur Mashhur
32. Muhammad 'Abdullah al-Khatib
33. Jabir Rizq al-Fuli
34. Husayn Ahmad 'Isa 'Ashur
35. Hasan Ahmad 'Isa 'Ashur
36. Salih Mustafa 'Ashmawi

37. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qaddus Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus
38. Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim al-'Assal
39. 'Abd-al-'Al Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Al al-Jabiri
40. 'Abdallah Muhammad Ahmad Salim
41. Muhammad Muhammad al-Mismari
42. Muhammad Shams-al-Din al-Shinnawi
43. 'Abdallah Rashwan Mahmud
44. Yusuf Kamal Muhammad Yusuf Qan'ar
45. Lashin 'Ali 'Abdallah Abu-Shanab
46. Ibrahim Khalil al-Za'farani
47. Khalid 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Za'farani
48. Mahmud Muhammad al-Na'mani
49. Ibrahim al-Dasuqi Ibrahim
50. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Salam al-Mahlawi
51. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Halwaji
52. Muhammad Hasan Muhammad al-Karimi
53. 'Ali Hasan al-Mazin
54. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Maqsud 'Abd-al-Rahim
55. Muhammad Hasan 'Uways Yahya
56. Muhammad Ahmad al-Nusayri
57. Taha Sayyid Ahmad Ghurab
58. Muhammad Muhammad Hasan al-Sharif
59. 'Umar Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman
60. Sayyid 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-'Azim
61. 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Abdallah
62. Tahir Tawfiq Abu-al-Hamad
63. Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Habib
64. Muhammad Ahmad al-'Utayfi
65. Sayyid al-Mulaththam Rashwan
66. Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Uways
67. Hafiz 'Ali Salamah
68. Yusuf 'Abd-Rabbuh Muhammad Husaanayn
69. Al-Sayyid Mahmud al-Khatib
70. Mahmud Imam Muhammad Sa'd
71. Majdi Fathi Khayrallah
72. Zayn al-'Abidin Muhammad Abu al-Sa'ud
73. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Latif Darwish
74. Husni Ahmad Mahmud
75. Fathi Mahmud 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shafi'i
76. Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd-al-Ilah
77. 'Id 'Abd-al-Jalil Badr
78. Ahmad Fu'ad Ibrahim al-Samman
79. Muhammad Muhammad Abu-al-Dahab
80. Al-Sa'id 'Ali Hasan Abu 'Abduh
81. 'Adil Muhammad 'Abd-al-Baqi
82. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Wahhab Mujahid
83. Mamduh Muhammad Rashad
84. Yusri Muhammad 'Ali Harb
85. Muhammad Mahir Farhat
86. Al-Sayyid Mahir Farhat
87. Zaghlul Muhammad al-'Azari

88. Zayn al-'Abidin Zari' Hasan
89. Sa'd Muhammad 'Ali Khidr
90. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mahmud Ahmad 'Ali
91. Salah Mahmud 'Aliwah
92. Ghadban 'Ali Sayyid [aka] Rajab
93. Mahmud 'Abd-al-Fattah Ibrahim
94. Nabil Muhammad 'Uthman
95. Ahmad 'Atiyah Dahi
96. Hani Hashim 'Uthman
97. Tharwat Mahmud Ahmad
98. Muhammad al-Sayyid Shahin
99. Himam 'Abduh 'Abd-al-Rahman
100. Jamal Khafaji 'Abd-al-Rasul
101. Zakariya 'Izz-al-Din Bahlul
102. Ahmad 'Uthman 'Ali 'Uthman
103. Muhammad Yasin Himam
104. Majid Muhammad Ahmad al-'Utayfi
105. Muhammad 'Abduh Salim
106. 'Abdullah Ahmad 'Abd-al-Warith
107. Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hafiz
108. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Rahim
109. Ashraf Sa'd Ahmad Hilal
110. Muhammad Diya' Sayyid Salim
111. Walid Ahmad Muhammad
112. 'Abd-al-Nasir Idris Muhammad
113. Muntasir Mahmud Bayyumi
114. Ibrahim Zakariya Muhammad
115. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Baqi Muhammad
116. Salih Shammatah 'Abd-al-Baqi
117. Husayn Mahmud Kamil
118. 'Abd-al-Rahman Ahmad Ramadan
119. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hakim Siraj-al-Din
120. 'Abd-al-Salam 'Ali Muhammad al-Minyawi
121. 'Abd-al-Mun-im Abu-al-Fattuh 'Abd-al-Hadi
122. Khalid Muhammad Bakri 'Abd-al-Hamid
123. Mahmud Muhammad Kamal al-Za'imi
124. Husayn Muhammad Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq
125. Muhammad Sayf-al-Islam
126. Sani Isma'il Sani
127. 'Abd-al-Basir Hamid Muhammad Mas'ud
128. Wajdi 'Abd-al-Hamid Ghunaym
129. 'Isam-al-Din Muhammad al-'Uryan
130. Fasih Imam 'Abd-al-Halim Hasan Musa
131. Hilmi al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jazzar
132. Muhyi-al-Din Ahmad 'Isa Muhsib
133. Ahmad 'Ali Farraj
134. 'Ata Husayn Abu-al-Sa'ud
135. 'Atif Mustafa Yusuf
136. Yahya Muhammad Yusuf
137. Muhammad 'Ali Farraj
138. Rabi' 'Abd-al-Salam 'Abd-al-'Aziz

139. Shahindah 'Abd-al-Hamid Muqallad
140. Mahmud 'Ali 'Abd-al-Halim
141. Fu'ad Mahmud Hanafi [aka] Fu'ad al-Dawlibi
142. Najih Ibrahim 'Abdallah
143. 'Abd-al-Ilah Hasan Muhammad 'Atiyah
144. Ramzi Farhat Muhammad 'Ali
145. Nasr Salih Muhammad Tulbah
146. Mahmud Mustafa Mahmud Huballah
147. Al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali Harkan
148. Jamal Hamid 'Ali
149. 'Abd-al-Halim al-Sayyid Hasan
150. Ilhami Husayn Muhammad Husayn al-Salamuni
151. Abu-Bakr 'Uthman Hasan
152. Ahmad 'Umar 'Abd-al-Halim Muslim
153. Faridah 'Abd-al-Mu'min al-Naqqash
154. Ahmad Abu-al-Futuh 'Abd-al-Hadi
155. 'Abdullah Muhammad Husayn al-Manisi
156. Ahmad Salim Fu'ad Mustafa
157. Sharif Husayn Diya' Ayyub
158. 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad 'Afifi
159. Hasan Hasan 'Ali al-Shabini
160. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Baqi Ahmad Muhammad Salamah
161. Muhammad Hazim 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shakhs
162. Dr. Muhammad Hilmi Murad
163. Hamid Zaydan Hamid Ghunaym
164. Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrahim Yunis
165. Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl al-Jizawi
166. Muhammad Kamal-al-Din Farraj
167. Ahmad Farghali Mustafa
168. Fu'ad Nashi Husayn Nashi
169. Abu-al-'Izz Hasan al-Hariri
170. Ahmad Lutfi al-Khuli
171. 'Abd-al-Ghaffar Ibrahim Husayn Ahmad Shukr
172. 'Abd-al-'Azim Isma'il al-Maghribi
173. Qabbari 'Abdullah 'Abd-al-Halim
174. Muhammad Khalil Khalil Ibrahim
175. Muhammad Mustafa Bakri
176. Dr. 'Ali Taha Nawiji
177. Milad Mikha'il Hanna
178. Jalal Muhammad Rajab
179. Sabir Muhammad Basyuni Hashim
180. Mustafa Muhammad 'Asi
181. Ismat Sayf-al-Dawlah 'Abbas
182. Dr. Mahmud Ahmad al-Qadi
183. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam al-Zayyat
184. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Muhammad Hammudah
185. Mu'ishtar Muhammad Ahmad Husayn
186. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna Mahmud
187. Hasan Wahbah Hasan Wahbah
188. Usamah Ahmad Khalifah Ibrahim
189. 'Ali Jabir Muhammad Darwish
190. Zaydan Muhammad Khayrallah

191. Tal'at Fahmi 'Abd-al-Fattah
192. Haytham Zakariya 'Abd-al-Hamid Rashid
193. Muhammad Diya'-al-Din Sayyid Salim Sharshar
194. Mahmud Hasan al-Rawi 'Uthman
195. 'Abd-al-Halim Ahmad Muhammad Mustafa
196. Bahir 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Uthman Mu'awwad
197. Mahmud al-Faruq Anwar Mahmud
198. Salih Mahmud 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasan
199. Muhyi-al-Din Mustafa 'Uthman
200. 'Abd-al-Jawad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Jawad
201. Jamal 'Abd-al-Zahir Muhammad Mustafa
202. Aminah Hanim Ibrahim Rashid
203. Muhammad Yusuf Yusuf
204. Hamdi Taha 'Abd-al-'Alim
205. Muhammad Muhammad Raja'i
206. Majdi Muhammad Ahmad Kamal
207. Ahmad Yusuf Muhammad Hamdallah
208. Muhammad Sayyid Isma'il
209. Karam 'Abd-al-Latif Muhammad Hasanayn
210. Usamah 'Abd-al-Latif Khatir
211. Akmal Muhammad Fu'ad
212. 'Ala'-al-Din Muhammad Mahmud Dasuqi
213. 'Atif Ibrahim Muhammad
214. 'Abd-al-Nasir Fawzi 'Ali
215. Muhammad Mustafa Muhammad al-Dabisi
216. Yusri 'Abd-al-Rahman Hasan Muhammad
217. Nabil Muhammad Jalal-al-Din Badr
218. Salah Faris al-Sayyid Sulayman
219. Midhat Subhi al-Muqaddam
220. Muhammad Naji Muhammad Bayyumi
221. 'Awad al-Sayyid 'Awad Hijazi
222. Mahmud Sami 'Ali Wasil
223. Khalid Fawzi Raslan Saqr
224. Ahmad Muhammad Fadil
225. Samih Sa'id Hasan al-Sab'
226. Hasan al-Burnus Hasan Budar
227. Muhammad Faraj Fadl
228. Ahmad Yahya Matar
229. Hamdi Abu-al-Yazid al-Hayawi
230. Ahmad al-Sayyid Hatiyah
231. 'Ala' Muhammad 'Awad al-Badawi
232. Samir Muhammad Matar
233. Muhammad Ahmad al-Sayyid 'Uthman
234. 'Ala' Ahmad al-Tijani
235. 'Amr Muhammad Hasan 'Azzam
236. Usamah Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi
237. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Ali Bayyumi
238. Milhim Badir 'Abd-al-Latif
239. Fahmi Muhammad Muhammad 'Amir
240. Samir Mahmud Muhammad Shahin

241. Sami Fathi Qutb Nassar
242. 'Ala' Hamid 'Abd-al-Salam
243. Ahmad al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Khashshab
244. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Hamzawi
245. Hanafi Mahmud Hanafi
246. Husayn Ibrahim 'Ali al-Sayyid
247. Majdi Muhsim Rajab Wardah
248. Husam-al-Din Ahmad al-Khashshab
249. Ahmad Mustafa Sa'd Nafi'
250. Sa'd Sa'd Sayyid Ahmad al-Shami
251. Tal'at Muhammad Fahmi Khalifah
252. Nash'at Kamal Ibrahim Isma'il
253. Zaynuhum al-Sayyid al-Dasuqi
254. Islam Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi
255. Ayman Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi
256. Khalid 'Abd-al-Hamid Mursi
257. Mustafa 'Abd-al-Wahhab Nida'
258. Hasan Gharib Khalil Fiddah
259. Ayhab Ramzi Muhammad Badir
260. Kamal Sayyid Ahmad Fudah Zalat
261. Hasan al-Banna Mahmud 'Ali
262. Ibrahim 'Abbas 'Atallah
263. 'Ala' Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi Jabr
264. Tariq Ibrahim al-Mulla
265. Hisham Muhammad al-Sayyid 'Amir
266. Sulayman Ahmad 'Isa Dahruj
267. Sami 'Afifi Muhammad Ibrahim
268. Husam-al-Din 'Abd-al-Muhsin Shahin
269. Ra'fat Muhammad Hasan Darwish
270. Mustafa al-Qutb al-'Arab al-Imam
271. Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim 'Amr
272. Al-Sayyid 'Ali Ahmad al-'Azabi
273. Jamal Haybah 'Ubayd Muhammad
274. Ahmad Muhammad 'Abdullah Saqr
275. Muhammad Rajab Rajab al-Qashawi
276. Muhammad Zakariya Sha'ban
277. Mahmud 'Abd-al-Haqq al-'Alida
278. 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Abd-al-Mabda 'Ajjur
279. Khalid 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan Muhammad
280. Majdi Mahmud 'Abd-al-Ghani
281. Muhammad 'Isa Dayfallah
282. Abu-al-'Ala Madi Abu al-'Ala
283. Majdi Husayn 'Ali al-Tawil
284. Tal'at Fu'ad Muhammad Qasim
285. Muhammad Anwar Ahmad al-Sanadiqi
286. Ibrahim Muhammad Shahhatah
287. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Ali Mustafa
288. Mustafa Hasan Abu-Sharif
289. Sayyid Husayn Abu-al-Layl
290. 'Abd-al-Halim Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Ghani

291. Muhammad al-Khamis Hanafi 'Abd-al-Hakim
292. 'Ali Muhammad Muhammad 'Ali al-Dinari
293. 'Ali Muhammad al-Shadhili Ahmad
294. Mahmud Faraj Dasuqi
295. Usamah Ibrahim Hafiz
296. 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid Muhammad
297. Muhammad al-Sawi Muhammad Makhluf
298. 'Ala'-al-Din Ahmad 'Atiyah
299. Hamdi 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-'Azim
300. Muhammad 'Isam-al-Din Hasan Muhammad Darbalah
301. Ahmad Badri Muhammad Nayil
302. Rif'at Mahmud Khalifah
303. Ahmad Sabir 'Abd-al-Ilah
304. Safwat 'Abd-al-'Alim Hafiz
305. 'Asim Hasan 'Ali
306. Wahid 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad
307. 'Umar 'Umran Ahmad
308. Hajjaj Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghani
309. Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa
310. Ihab Sa'id 'Abd-al-Baqi
311. Jamal Muhammad Najib Salim
312. Murad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Ghaffar
313. Muhammad 'Isam Hasan 'Abd-al-Hafiz al-Sirna
314. Karam Muhammad Zahdi Sulayman
315. 'Isa Musa Jad al-Mawla
316. Ahmad Mustafa Maghribi
317. Isma'il 'Abd-al-Hamid Salim
318. Salah-al-Din 'Abd-al-Hakim Muhammad
319. Mahmud 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Rahim
320. Jamal Muhammad 'Atallah
321. Sa'd 'Abd-al-Latif Khalaf
322. Usamah Mustafa Muhammad 'Ashawi
323. Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasaballah
324. 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Ushri Hasan
325. Fathi 'Abd-al-Salam al-Sayyid Mubarak
326. Mahmud Qasim Nasir Sulayman
327. Wahid-al-Din Ahmad Sulayman
328. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Na'im 'Abd-al-Rahim
329. Wafiq Hasan Kamil Shafiq
330. Muhammad Bashshari Muhammad
331. Ahmad Taha Ahmad
332. Mahmud Hasan Zaynuhum
333. 'Abd-al-Hadi 'Ali Nasir
334. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad Abu-al-Futuh
335. 'Adil 'Abd-al-Maqsud 'Id
336. Ahmad Husayn Nasir
337. Muhammad Riyad 'Abbas 'Asfur
338. Muhammad Salah-al-Din Hasan Farraj
339. Muhammad Sabri Mabda
340. Hamid Radwan al-Azhari

341. Samih Muhammad Ma'ruf 'Ashur
342. Muhammad Fahim Amin
343. Muhammad Isma'il 'Id
344. Ibrahim Mustafa Tal'at
345. Muhammad Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din
346. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad al-Shurbaji
347. 'Abd-al-Fattah Hasan Muhammad
348. Kamal Ahmad Muhammad
349. Kamal Rifa'i Abu-'Aytah
350. Muhammad 'Awad Shafiq
351. 'Abd-al-Samad 'Abd-al-Jawad al-Sharqawi
352. Hamdin 'Abd-al-'Ati al-Sabahi
353. Hishmat Khalifah Ahmad
354. Rajab Mukhtar 'Umar Madkur
355. Ahmad al-Maghazi 'Abd-al-Halim 'Abd-al-Rahman Sa'id
356. Wahid 'Abd-al-Fattah Sayyid Ahmad
357. 'Abd-al-Fattah Qasim Nasir
358. Sa'id Yunis Ibrahim Sharkas
359. Hamdi 'Abd-al-Baqi 'Umar
360. Muhammad Ahmad Abu-al-'Ala 'Abd-al-Rahman
361. Kamal Farraj Yahya Ahmad
362. Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Badi' Muhammad Saqr
363. Mahmud Fahmi 'Abd-al-Salam Ghanim
364. Tal'at 'Abd-al-Hamid Musa Muhammad
365. Abu Bakr 'Ali al-Jamal
366. Al-Sayyid Sabah Sulayman 'Umar
367. 'Uthman Khalid Ibrahim al-Samman
368. Tal'at Sabah Sulayman 'Umar
369. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Badr Muwafi al-'Azab
370. 'Abd-al-Fattah Husayn Karim
371. Ibrahim Sayyid Faraj Muhammad
372. Ahmad Muhammad Musa Ahmad
373. Anwar Muhammad 'Abbas
374. Fawzi al-Sa'id al-Sa'id al-Zayyat
375. Hamdi Muhammad Hijazi Ibrahim
376. Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hayy 'Abd-al-'Aziz Abu Hamad (Palestinian)
377. Mahmud Muhammad Hijazi Ibrahim
378. Musa Husayn Mutawalli Sayyid Ahmad
379. Lutfi Shafiq al-Sayyid Bayyumi
380. Al-Sayyid 'Uthman Sa'id Faysal
381. Ahmad 'Ali Ibrahim al-Makhzanji
382. Mahmud Zaki Muhammad
383. Muhammad 'Atif 'Ali al-Sayyid Jad
384. Islam Muhammad 'Atif 'Ali al-Sayyid Jad
385. Muhammad Ahmad Mahmud Shabbanah
386. 'Abd-al-Fattah Yasin 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad
387. 'Abd-al-Hadi 'Abd-al-Mun'im Badr
388. Hamid Sa'id 'Abd-al-Muttalib
389. 'Umar Tawfiq Ibrahim
390. 'Abd-al-Fattah Mukhtar 'Umar Madkur

391. Al-Sayyid Hasan Barakat
392. Muhammad al-Amin 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Sayyid
393. Taha al-Samawi [aka] 'Abdallah
394. Usamah Fakhri
395. Mahmud 'Amir Ibrahim
396. Jamal Shukri Sa'd
397. Samih 'Abd-al-Rashid al-Qusi
398. Ibrahim Mahmud Hanafi
399. Jamal 'Ali al-Sawi
400. Ibrahim 'Ali Ahmad
401. 'Awad Sayyid 'Awad Makkawi
402. Sa'd 'Ali Rashwan
403. Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir 'Abd-al-Salah
404. 'Isam al-Sayyid Muhammad Nasr
405. Salih Ahmad Muhammad al-Wardani
406. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Basit Mahmud
407. Rajab 'Abd-al-'Aziz Salim
408. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Malik Muhammad Mahmud
409. Muhammad Salah 'Abd-al-Radi
410. Muhammad Nabil 'Ali Yusuf
411. Ibrahim Muhammad al-Dasuqi Lutfi
412. Samir al-Dasuqi al-'Azab
413. 'Uthman 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Sayyid Khalifah
414. Muhammad Salah al-Din Muhammad 'Uthman
415. Al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sayyid Amin
416. Sabir 'Ali Muhammad 'Abbas
417. Al-Sayyid Mahmud Muhammad Bahnasi
418. Fathi 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Sayyid Fudah
419. Faruq Khalil Ibrahim Khalil
420. Husayn al-Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Hadiyah
421. Ahmad al-Sayyid Muhammad Hadiyah
422. Ibrahim Haybah Ibrahim 'Asi
423. Al-Sayyid Muhammad Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Dib
424. Jamal 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahdi
425. 'Abd-al-Rasul Muhammad Khalid
426. Tawfiq Muhammad Tawfiq 'Alwan
427. Ahmad Tal'at Ahmad Lashin
428. Mahmud Majdi Muhammad 'Abduh Badr
429. Ahmad Tariq Tal-at Muhibb
430. Tamjid Muhammad Tawfiq 'Alwan
431. Munir Ahmad Muhammad al-Sayyid
432. Ahmad Mustafa Ahmad
433. Mahmud 'Abduh 'Isa
434. Hisham Shafiq Hilmi
435. Al-Husayni 'Abdullah Musa Sharaf
436. Sa'id 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sayyid Khattab
437. Zakariya 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Amir Barakat
438. Fathi 'Abdullah Ahmad 'Ali
439. Mansur Jabr al-'Awf
440. Jad Ahmad Jad Badr

441. Mustafa Fathi Ahmad al-'Attar
442. Jalal 'Ali Ghunaym
443. 'Abd-al-Sadir al-Bandari Sha'ban
444. Ahmad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Latif
445. Muhammad Ahmad Salim
446. Majdi Muhammad Hasan
447. Muhammad Mahmud Rabi' 'Awad
448. Kamal Muhammad al-Hadidi
449. Ahmad Wahbah al-Dasuqi
450. 'Abd'al-Raziq Muhammad Husayn al-Hafnawi
451. Muhammad Khadri 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Ashmawi
452. Al-Mu'tazz Billah al-Sayyid Sulayman Sha'ban
453. 'Isam Suwaydan Sa'd al-Kharibi
454. Ibrahim al-Sa'id Muhammad 'Abdullah
455. 'Adli Ibrahim Isma'il
456. Mamduh Ayyub Muhammad Mansur
457. 'Abd-al-Nabi Salamah 'Abd-al-Nabi
458. Sa'd-al-Din al-Sa'id Muhammad Sanad
459. Jamal Ahmad Mustafa Muhammad al-Sharqawi
460. Salah 'Ali Muhammad Khalil
461. Al-Shahhat 'Abd-al-Qadir al-Dassuqi
462. Al-Sa'id al-Sayyid 'Abduh Ibrahim
463. Al-Sa'id 'Abdullah Ibrahim Khalil
464. Jamil Fathi Sayyid Ibrahim
465. 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Atiyah Tawfiq Muhammad
466. Muhammad al-Baz Habib
467. 'Abd-al-Majid Muhammad al-'Adili Jad
468. Fathi Muhammad Abu al-Hasan
469. Jamil Zaki 'Abd-al-'Aziz
470. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Ahmad al-Sharqawi
471. Muhammad Shahhatah al-Mursi 'Ali 'Awsh
472. 'Izzat al-Sa'id al-Mursi 'Ali
473. Ahmad Muhammad 'Awadallah
474. Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-'Aziz Sunnah
475. Shahtah Fathi al-Sayyid
476. Faraj Muhammad Faraj
477. 'Atiyah Muhammad 'Atiyah
478. Mahmud Mustafa 'Abd-al-'Al 'Arafah
479. 'Uthman al-Sayyid Hilal Isma'il
480. Muhammad Farhat Mahmud Qasim
481. Al-Sawwah Fathi Muhammad al-Sawwah
482. Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Na'im al-Nadi
483. Hasan al-Jamil Muhammad al-Sawwah
484. Muhammad Rida 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Umar Samrah
485. Mustafa Sa'd Nasr al-Kafifi
486. 'Atif Ibrahim Ahmad Mutawalli
487. 'Abd-al-Jawad Muhammad Hasan Abu-Hashish
488. Yahya 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Uthman
489. Ibrahim Muhammad Jabr al-Sa'idi
490. Ahmad Ibrahim Salim

491. Hasan Sa'id Tarabiyah
492. 'Adil Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Rahman
493. 'Ali al-Sharbini al-'Itafi
494. Muhammad 'Ali Ghali
495. Muhammad Muhammad Abu-al-Futuh
496. 'Abd-al-Rahman Hasan 'Amir Abu-al-Khayr
497. Jamal-al-Din Mahmud Yusuf al-Dahshan
498. Muhammad Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz [aka] al-Hadi
499. Muhammad Sa'id Mahdi Ahmad
500. Sa'id 'Abd-al-Sami' Hashim
501. 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Rashid Muhammad Qandil
502. Nasr al-Sayyid Husayn al-'Afifi
503. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hasan 'Ali al-'Afifi
504. Usamah al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Halim Qandil
505. Sabri Muhammad 'Ali Mustafa
506. Ahmad 'Uthman al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Karim
507. Ahmad Muhammad al-Hadi Karam
508. Muslim Hasanayn 'Ali al-Banna
509. 'Atiyah Shawqi Muhammad Khalil
510. Muhammad Amin 'Abd-al-Salam Salam
511. Jamal 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Isma'il
512. Amin Zaki 'Abd-al-Qadir Salim
513. Nabil Amin Husayn 'Isa
514. 'Abd-al-Salam Ibrahim Ibrahim
515. Shawqi Ahmand Muhammad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Karim
516. Fu'ad 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Dayim
517. Sa'id 'Ali Isma'il
518. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-Sayyid
519. 'Atiyah 'Abd-al-Karim Muhammad Mubarak
520. Sami Muhammad Hashim 'Abd-al-'Ati
521. Fathi Muhammad 'Abd 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad
522. Ibrahim Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad
523. 'Atiyah 'Abdullah Ahmad Jad
524. 'Abd-al-Nasir 'Abd-al-Fattah Khamis
525. Jabir Mustafa al-Rifa'i
526. Ahmad 'Id Muhammad Hashish
527. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Salam Mustafa al-Qashlan
528. Muhammad Bustami al-Maliji
529. Ahmad Muhammad al-Marhumi
530. 'Abd-al-Rahim Sadiq Qinawi
531. Muhammad Hilmi al-Sayyid 'Isa
532. Muhammad Sulayman Salih
533. Ibrahim Muhammad 'Afifi
534. Muhammad Taha 'Abd-al-Hadi Bahij
535. Sa'd Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din
536. Hamid Hamid 'Ata
537. 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Dasuqi Sa'd
538. Ibrahim 'Amir al-Shinnawi
539. Muhammad Ibrahim Abu al-Naja
540. Rida 'Abd-al-'Alim Jawdah

541. Ihab al-Sayyid Jawdah
542. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahim Kamal
543. Mas'ad Muhammad al-Zarqa
544. 'Abd-al-Latif Taha Bahij
545. Zakariya Ibrahim Darwish
546. Jamal Hasan Muhammad al-Sahrajti
547. 'Abd-al-'Ati al-Sayyid al-Tukhi
548. Muhammad Mustafa Ma'tuq
549. Nabil Muhammad Nashshar
550. Ra'fit 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Umar
551. Ahmad 'Ashur al-Sayyid Durrah
552. Taha 'Id Ramadan
553. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Azim Amin [aka] Aba-'Abd-al-Rahman
554. Najib 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il
555. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il
556. Amal 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il
557. Isma'il Hamid Isma'il
558. 'Ali Hamid Isma'il
559. Ramadan 'Abd-al-Karim 'Abd-al-Fattah
560. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir Isma'il
561. Anwar Hasan Ahmad
562. Muhammad al-Mursi Muhammad Abu-al-'Izz
563. Ahmad al-Mursi Abu al-'Izz
564. Fadil Ahmad Muhammad 'Umar Abu-al'Izz
565. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Majid Isma'il [aka] Muhammad
566. Majdi Ahmad Abu Hasayn
567. Ibrahim Salah Balah
568. 'Abduh 'Abduh Rumah
569. Mahrus Taha Abu-al-'Izz
570. 'Ali 'Ali al-Tawil
571. Muhammad Taha Basal
572. Tawfiq Tawfiq al-Kashif
573. Ahmad Amin al-Balamuni
574. 'Isam Mustafa 'Urabi
575. Majdi 'Abduh al-Dab'
576. 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Izz-al-Din Yasin [aka] Jawdah
577. Sayyid Abu-al-Majd Salim
578. Muhammad al-Sayyid Mustafa Ahmad al-Mishwadi
579. Anwar Tawfiq Ghanim
580. 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Latif
581. 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Latif
582. Rajab Muhammad Badr Salah
583. Muhammad Mahmud Mutawalli Mahmud
584. Al-Sayyid al-Sayyid Ahmad al-Buhayri
585. Mustafa al-Qayati 'Abd-al-Halim al-Jamal
586. 'Izz al-Din Mustafa al-Qayati al-Jamal
587. 'Antar Ramzi 'Abd-al-Latif
588. Hasan Muhammad Musa
589. 'Adil Muhammad Musa
590. Sayyid 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Jazzar

591. 'Abd-al-Nabi 'Abd-al-Raziq 'Abd-al-Latif
592. Nasr Hasan 'Abd-al-Mawjud [aka] Majdi
593. 'Isam Hasan Abu-'Umayrah
594. Samir Fadl al-Qitt
595. Jamal 'Abd-al-Karim Nasr al-Sisi
596. Muhsin Ahmad al-Mazz Khayrallah
597. Ihsan 'Abd-al-Halim 'Abd-al-Tawwab
598. Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd-al-Jawad
599. Sabir Ahmad Muhammad Sayyid
600. Jum'ah 'Atris Mahyub
601. Rabi' 'Id 'Abd-al-Jawad
602. Ahmad Salah 'Id Rubi
603. 'Arif Batran Hasan Batran
604. Salah 'Abd-al Halim 'Abd-al-Tawwab
605. Jalal Sultan Rajab al-Ghaliz
606. Sha'ban 'Abdullah Muhammad Ahmad 'Uthman
607. Balidi 'Abdullah Muhammad Ahmad 'Uthman
608. Ramadan 'Abdullah Muhammad Ahmad
609. Ramadan Ibrahim Farghali
610. 'Abd-al-Ma'bud Hasan al-Sayyid 'Amir
611. Kamal Mahmud Ahmad Tayi'
612. Muhammad Yusuf Sa'id 'Ali al-Jirjawi
613. Muhammad Mahmud Abu Shindi
614. Samir Mahmud Ahmad Tayi'
615. Muhammad Ahmad Anwar Salih 'Ali
616. Mustafa Husayn Ahmad Fuli
617. 'Abd-al-Hadi Hasan Salamah
618. Mamduh 'Isa 'Abd-al-Latif
619. 'Isam-al-Din Sayyid 'Abd-al-Nabi
620. Farid 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Sami' al-Jindi
621. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Latif Rifa'i
622. 'Imad-al-Din Sayyid 'Abd-al-Nabi 'Amir
623. Midhat Murad Hasan al-Jindi
624. Ahmad 'Uthman Hasan
625. Ahmad Zaki Ibrahim
626. Isma'il 'Abd-al-Halim Diyab
627. Mustafa Ahmad Khamis al-'Arabi
628. Hasan 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad Mahmud
629. Al-Sayyid Hasan 'Abd-al-'Ati
630. Hasan Ahmad Muhammad Hasan
631. 'Izz-al-Din Sayyid 'Abd-al-Nabi 'Amir
632. 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Lutfi 'Abbudah
633. Mustafa Ahmad Nur-al-Din
634. Muhammad Hashim Muhammad al-Sayyid
635. 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali Ahmad al-Sharif
636. Khayri Muhammad 'Abdallah
637. Rashad Mahmud Farraj Hamid
638. Hammadah 'Ali Hanafi 'Ali
639. Muhammad Muhammad Shawqi
640. Muhammad Salim al-Farmawi

641. Muhammad Jawdah Sulayman
642. Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Alim 'Abd-al-Salam al-Khuli
643. Sami Ibrahim Hasaballah
644. Muhammad Khalifah Muhammad 'Uthman
645. Jamal-al-Din Ibrahim Muhammad
646. 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Antar 'Abd-al-Rahman
647. Hanafi Mahmud Sayf
648. 'Izz-al-Din 'Uthman Hasan
649. Salah Ansari Muhammad
650. 'Uways Yasin 'Awad
651. Jamal 'Abd-al-'Azim Darwish
652. Muhammad 'Ali Ibrahim Hammad
653. Faruq Husayn 'Ali Muhammad
654. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Latif 'Uthman
655. Al-Husafi 'Abd-al-Mun'im Sayfallah
656. Muhammad Fathi Mahmud Jawdah 'Abd-al-Rahman
657. Muhammad Abu Talib Khidr
658. 'Izzat 'Abd-al-Karim 'Abd-al-Malik
659. Jamal Sayyid Fuli Zanati
660. 'Abd-al-Mu'min 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Abdallah
661. Qinawi Ahmad 'Abd-al-Mun'im
662. Mahrus Ibrahim Muhammad al-Shalabi
663. Mursi Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Hadi
664. Hasan Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Ati
665. Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abbas
666. Ahmad Muhammad al-Amir Hasan
667. Sayyid Bakri 'Abd-al-Wahid
668. Fathallah Sayyid Ahmad Zayid
669. Ra'fat Muhammad Yusuf al-Sayyid al-Shami
670. Ibrahim Hasan Muhammad Shitat
671. 'Abduh Muhammad al-Sayfi
672. Ibrahim Hasan Hasan al-'Arabi
673. Muhammad al-Mudaththir Muhammad Hasan
674. 'Abd-al-'Al al-Sayyid Ibrahim Habbush
675. Ibrahim al-Sayyid Ibrahim Habbush
676. Nassar Ahmad Ibrahim al-Sayyid
677. Ahmad Salim 'Azab
678. 'Abd-al-'Al Baz 'Abd-Rabbuh 'Arafah
679. Sabri Mahmud Ibrahim
680. Hamzah Ibrahim al-Sanafini
681. Muhammad al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Rahman Najjar
682. Ahmad Muhammad Hasan 'Abdallah
683. Hammadah Ibrahim Hammadah
684. Muhammad Fu'ad Zakariya Khalil Ibrahim al-Murr
685. Mahmud 'Awad 'Ali Abu-al-Ma'ati Busaylah
686. Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman Khalifah
687. Hasan 'Abd-al-Rahman Mahmud Sabi'
688. Sayyid Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Al al-Layy
689. Salah-al-Din 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Dawi
690. Musa Ahmad Musa al-Fakhkhar

691. Muhammad Abu-al-Hasan Salit
692. 'Abd-al-Hamid Ahmad 'Umar Abu-Khushum
693. Muhammad Rajab Hasan Muhammad
694. Jamal al-Nubi al-Sawi Muhammad
695. Muhammad Hilmi Ahmad Abu-Zayd
696. Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Ati al-Barawi
697. 'Abd-al-Nasir Muhammad Fathi
698. Hashim Sayyid Khalaf
699. Ahmad Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Azim Hijazi
700. 'Izzat Husayn Muhammad Husayn al-Salamuni
701. Ahmad Muhammad al-'Antari
702. Ahmad Ibrahim Abu-al-Naja
703. 'Abd-al-Hadi Taha Bahij
704. Ahmad Muhammad Salih
705. Hasan al-Sayyid Muhammad Ahmad Hadiyah
706. Usamah 'Abd-al-Latif al-Qusi
707. Ahmad Taha Musa Hamad
708. Ahmad Yusuf Sa'id al-Jirjawi
709. Hasan Ramadan Qabis Ahmad
710. Hasan Ahmad Sayyid Sa'id
711. Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Muhsin Husayn
712. 'Abdallah Mahmud Muslim
713. Ahmad Ibrahim Jum'ah Hasab al-Nabi
714. 'Atif Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Jawad
715. 'Abdallah Hafiz Mansur
716. Muhammad Zaki 'Abd-al-'Aziz
717. Mahmud Mustafa Hasan al-Ridi
718. Jamal 'Alam-al-Din 'Abd-al-Hakim
719. Usamah Muhammad al-Alfi
720. Fathi Muhammad Sayyid Abu-Zayd
721. Muhammad Muhammad 'Aql
722. Mustafa Ahmad Ibrahim Samrah
723. Tharwat Ahmad Murad Abu-Sa'dah
724. 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Sha'ir
725. Muhammad Abu-Zayd Abu-Shadi
726. Muhammad Mustafa 'Ali
727. Rajab Rashad 'Uthman
728. Sa'id Muhammad Ahmad
729. Sayyid Hasan Yusuf
730. Ahmad al-Sayyid Mustafa al-Masri
731. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Uthman al-Jindi
732. Muhammad Ahmad Abu-Salamah
733. Mahir 'Abd-al-Fattah Bakr
734. Muhammad Rashad Ruzin
735. Hasan Sa'd 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Awad
736. Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad Salih al-Banna
737. Murad Muhammad Mahmud 'Abdallah
738. Ibrahim Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah Ibrahim
739. Hilmi Muhammad Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mughith
740. 'Abd-al-Basit Muhammad Mahmud Sahlul

741. Ahmad Rudaywi Khalifah
742. Muhammad Jabir Muhammad Husayn
743. Jamal 'Abd-al-Rahman Ahmad Radwan
744. Muntasir 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Uthman Bahnasawi
745. Muhammad Murad Mus'ud Barghut [aka] Muhammad Najib
746. Ahmad Jabir Muhammad Husayn
747. Hasan 'Ali Ahmad Muhammad Salim
748. Kamal 'Ali Ahmad Muhammad Salim
749. 'Ali Tufan Muhammad
750. 'Ali Ahmad 'Ali Rashid
751. 'Ali Muhammad Rifa'i
752. 'Abd-al-Masih Yusuf 'Abd-al-Masih
753. Sabri Fu'ad Muhammad Qasim
754. Salah Tawfiq Ibrahim Yusuf
755. Shukri Mahmud 'Ali Taful
756. Ahmad Mahmud Muhammad Ahmad al-Banna
757. Mahmud 'Abd-al-Hafiz al-Asyuti
758. Husayn 'Abd-al-Ghani al-Kiki
759. Muhammad Ahmad Shawqi al-Islamuli
760. 'Adli Mahmud Ahmad al-Kiki
761. Jamal Mahmud Ahmad al-Kiki
762. Ibrahim 'Amir Sulayman
763. Rif'at 'Abd-al-Ghani Mahmud al-Kiki
764. Hamdi 'Abd-al-Ghani Mahmud al-Kiki
765. Hammadah Sulhi Sa'dawi
766. Salah Muhammad 'Ali Sharif
767. Hasan Mahmud Muhammad Ahmad al-Banna
768. Mahir Abu-al-Fadl Muhammad
769. Hammadah Fathi Mustafa Muqallad
770. Yusuf Hafiz 'Abd-al-Na'im
771. Salim 'Abd-al-Wahid Muhammad
772. Sayyid al-Dayikh Hassanin
773. Ibrahim Shanudah Bisharah
774. Abu-al-Hamad 'Ali Adam
775. Muhammad Muhammad Ahmad Muharib
776. Jamal 'Izz-al-Din Jad-al-Karim
777. Muhammad Husayn 'Abd-al-Halim Mahmud
778. Farraj al-Rawi Muhammad al-Samman
779. Husayn 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad Radwan
780. Jamal'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad Radwan
781. 'Abd-al-Hamid Jad Ahmad Mansur
782. 'Abduh Yusuf Muhammad Ahmad
783. Muhammad Ahmad Imbabi
784. Nabil Ahmad Muhammad Hasan
785. Muhammad Ahmad Hasan Zaydan
786. Mahmud Qutah 'Abdallah
787. 'Abd-al-Hamid Dardir 'Abdallah
788. 'Abd-al-Latif 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan Makki
789. Sayyid 'Abd-al-Sattar Ibrahim 'Uthman
790. Murad Muhammad Ahmad

791. Sharif Zaki Wahbatallah Mahmud
792. Muhammad Husayn Muhammad Husayn
793. 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad Jad 'Uthman
794. Hilmi Imam Hasan Jawdah
795. Muhammad Muhammad Mahmud Ahmad
796. 'Adil Abu-Bakr Ahmad Muhammad
797. Sa'id Abu-al-Yazid 'Abd-al-Hadi
798. Ahmad Sanad 'Abdallah
799. 'Atif Abu-al-Qasim Muhammad Ahmad
800. Kamal Ahmad Jad 'Isa
801. 'Abd-al-Mawjud Tawfiq Dardir
802. Hasan Ibrahim Hasan Ahmad
803. 'Abd-al-Rahim Tahir Ibrahim Khalil [aka] 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Tahir
804. Karamallah Mustafa Karamallah
805. 'Abdallah Hasan Ahmad 'Abd-al-Mun'im
806. Husayn Jad Ahmad Muhammad [aka] 'Abd al-Shafi
807. Ahmad Ramadan Amin Mustafa
808. Jamal 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad al-Samman
809. Abu-al-Hajjaj Sa'd Mahmud 'Ali Mustafa
810. Majdi 'Abd-al-Mutajalli 'Abdallah Muhammad
811. Badri Makhluf 'Abd-al-Rahim
812. Al-Samman 'Abidin al-Samman
813. Muhammad 'Abidin al-Samman Muhammad
814. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Sami' Hasan
815. 'Abd-al-Ghani 'Abd-al-Sami' Abu-Zayd
816. Ahmad Damrani Dardir
817. Mahmud Rashid Bakri
818. 'Abd-al-Hasib Yasin
819. 'Abd-al-Hafiz Mahmud Muhammad Musa
820. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hakim Muhammad Salim
821. Jamal-al-Din Ahmad Mahmud 'Uthman al-'Askari
822. Ahmad Sadiq 'Abd-al-Rahman
823. Mahmud Hamdi Ahmad 'Allami
824. 'Abd-al-Basit 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibrahim
825. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Mahmud 'Abdallah
826. Jalal Ahmad Jalal
827. Fathi 'Abd-al-Raziq 'Abd-al-Latif
828. Hasan Husayn Muhammad Ahmad
829. Mustafa al-Sayyid Muhammad Nadim
830. Mahmud Muhammad Hasan Mubarak
831. Muhammad Zaki Musa
832. Muhammad Kamil Jawdah
833. Muhammad Hasan Ibrahim Faraj
834. 'Antar Husayn 'Abd-al-Hafiz Fadlallah
835. 'Abd-al-Nasir Muhammad Fathi
836. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Baqi 'Abd-al-Majid Bakir
837. 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Antar 'Abd-al-Rahman
838. Hamdi Yusuf 'Ali Muhammad
839. Al-Anba Binyamin *
840. Al-Anba Bashwi *

841. Al-Anba Tadrus *
842. Al-Anba Wisa *
843. 'Abd-al-Masih Basit Abu-al-Khayr
844. Fu'ad Yusuf 'Abd-al-Malik
845. Hikmat Farid Basiliyus
846. Al-Anba Yamwa al-Anba Bishwi *
847. 'Adil 'Azir Basturus
848. Al-Anba Bayman *
849. Wilson Falta'us Aqladiyus
850. Al-Qummus Tadrus Malti *
851. Al-Qiss Zakariya Butrus Hunayn *
852. Al-Qiss Filibus Rifqi 'Abd-al-Malik *
853. Hilmi Hanna al-Jawhari
854. Al-Qiss Luqa Khalaf Sidarus *
855. Nasri Qiryaqus Jirjis
856. Al-Qummus Bulus Basili Ghabriyal *
857. Al-Qiss Ibrahim 'Abduh *
858. Wasfi Ramzi Athanasiyus
859. Farid Shafiq Sawirus
860. Nasr Jundi Sulayman
861. Al-Qiss Bishwi Yasi *
862. Al-Qiss Yusuf As'ad *
863. Mahir Raghib Hanna
864. Al-Qiss Sarabamun 'Abduh Risq *
865. Al-Shammas 'Abd-al-Masih Rufa'il Ni'matallah *
866. Rida Hamdi Husayn
867. Al-Qummus Basiliyus al-Qummus Sidrak *
868. Al-Qummus Samu'il Thabit *
869. Al-Qiss Athanathiyus Butrus *
870. 'Adil Wadi' Yusuf
871. 'Zair Sarufim
872. Nadir Fathi 'Atiyah
873. Georges Zakhari 'Abd-al-Shahid
874. Philip Labib Iskandar
875. Butrus Thabit
876. Kamil Shukri Basl
877. Amir Khalaf Shukr
878. Nura Najib Salib
879. Samir 'Abd-al-Sayyid
880. Louis Hanna Rizq
881. Shanuda Jibra'il Shanudah
882. Milad Jibra'il Shaudah
883. Radi Matta 'Abd-al-Masih
884. Jirjis Mas'ad Jirjis
885. Wadi' Ibrahim Ghattas
886. 'Iyad Hanna Malak
887. Ramadan Sayyidhum Sayfayn
888. 'Adil Amin Qaldus
889. Yusuf Farid Murad
890. Munir Jirjis Mitri

891. Ratib Tawfiq Qaldus
892. Tal'at 'Abdallah Hirmina
893. Tharwat 'Ajib Zakariya
894. Mas'ad 'Abdallah Hanin
895. 'Atiyatallah 'Abudah Shanudah
896. Zaki Abu-al-Yamin Mina
897. Na'im Ibrahim Mu'awwad
898. Safwat 'Abduh Abadir
899. Mahir Nasif Jirjis
900. Shafiq Iskandar Hanna
901. Nazih al-Qiss Butrus *
902. Bulus Faraj Bulus
903. Hamdi Sadiq al-Ya'qubi
904. 'Umar 'Abd-al-Salam Sa'id
905. Muhammad Muhammad Fayiq
906. Farid 'Abd-al-Karim Basyuni
907. Muhammad Nasr-al-Din al-Sayyid
908. Jamal-al-Din Ibrahim 'Ubayd
909. Jamal Ahmad Husayn
910. Muhammad Mahmud Ibrahim Mahjub
911. Fu'ad Fawzi Sa'd Jirjis
912. Muhammad Fathi Radwan
913. Safwat 'Abdallah Jad
914. Khayri Ahmad Salih
915. Muhammad Hamid al-Shabarji
916. Shakir Sa'id Nasr
917. Jamal Shakir Sa'id Nasr
918. Anis 'Abdallah Sa'id
919. Fawzi Anis 'Abdallah
920. Sa'id 'Abd-al-Malak Sa'id [aka] Abu Sabir
921. Tawfiq Hannawi Faraj
922. Kamil Marzuq Sam'an
923. 'Atiyah Kamil Marzuq
924. Shukri Khalil 'Isa
925. Sa'id Subhi Sawirus
926. Fawzi Nasif Shahhatah
927. Nawwar Zakhari Busrah
928. Khalid Ahmad Isma'il
929. Ahmad Zaki Ahmad
930. Husayn Mustafa Hasan
931. Ahmad Mutawalli Muhammad
932. 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Abd-al-Fattah Ghunaym
933. 'Ala' Shawqi 'Abd-al-Jawad
934. Ahmad Ahmad Muhammad Hasan
935. 'Abdallah al-Sayyid Mutawalli
936. Muhammad Mustafa 'Abd-al-Sattar
937. 'Atiyah 'Abd-al-Latif Yusuf
938. Muhammad Abu-Dayf Muhammad Shahhatah
939. 'Awadallah Khalaf Jurays
940. Husayn Isma'il Muhammad

941. Muhammad Muhammad Basyuni
942. 'Aziz Musihah Salib
943. Mahmud Taha Rifa'i
944. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Shahhatah Hasan
945. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Na'im Haddad
946. Nasir Mustafa Bastawi
947. Khayr-al-Din Abu-al-Dahab Ahmad 'Ali
948. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Ali
949. Rizq Yahya Rizq
950. 'Arafat Ibrahim 'Id
951. Rajab Mahmud Ibrahim
952. Salah Lawz Bishay
953. Samir Mikha'il Fam
954. Ishaq Fathi Sam'an
955. Husni Rizq al-Rummadi
956. Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Jalil Hasan Shahhat
957. Sa'id Hasan Husayn
958. Samih Sabir Muhammad al-Rayyis
959. Sha'ban Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim
960. Ibrahim Sha'ban Muhammad
961. Majdi Muhammad Farghali
962. Sabir Fathi 'Abd-al-Majid
963. Salim Ramadan Ahmad
964. Mahmud Hasan 'Abd-al-Radi
965. 'Ammar 'Abd-al-Ghaffar Ahmad
966. Salah Jamal 'Abd-al-Maqsud
967. 'Ali Muhammad 'Awad
968. Usamah Mahmud al-Ramlawi
969. Samir 'Ali Hasan al-Sharqawi
970. Nasr 'Ali Husayn Za'tuq
971. 'Adil 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Abd-al-Hamid
972. 'Adil 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Abd-al-Majid
973. 'Atif al-Shimi Isma'il
974. 'Antar Kamil 'Ali al-Dawwi
975. Samir Mahdi 'Ali [aka] Samir Shihah
976. Ahmad Hasan 'Abd-al-Karim
977. Ibrahim Sa'id Hamid
978. 'Ali Muhammad Ahmad Abu-'Alaywah
979. Al-Sayyid Dasuqi Dasuqi [aka] Sayyid Sittutah
980. Muhammad Sayyid Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman
981. 'Uthman 'Abbas 'Uthman [aka] Sa'id Barradah
982. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ilah Hasan [aka] Muhammad 'Abdallah
983. Hamdi al-Azb Ahmad
984. 'Abduh Hasan Ahmad Tawfiq [aka] al-Waradani
985. Sabr Mahmud Isma'il
986. Rashad 'Id Jabali
987. Sayyid Qanawi Hashish
988. 'Abd-al-Halim Shihab Madani
989. Hashim Qalladah Mikha'il
990. 'Id Sa'id Muhammad Hasan [aka] 'Id Wizzah

991. Muhammad Mahmud Yusuf Kafafi
992. Ma'ruf Hasan 'Abd-al-Mun'im
993. Mustafa Muhammad 'Ali Mahmud [aka] Hasan
994. Rabi' 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-'Aziz
995. 'Izzat Mustafa 'Ali
996. Muhsin Mustafa Badawi
997. Fadil Muhammad Fadil
998. Hasan Ibrahim Salih
999. Salah Hamid Muhammad 'Abid
1000. Fu'ad 'Abd-al-Baqi Musa
1001. Sa'd 'Abd-al-Mu'ti Ibrahim
1002. 'Abduh Shahhatah al-Sayyid
1003. 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Sabur
1004. Shafi'i 'Abdallah al-Sawi [aka] Ramadan
1005. Sabri Dasuqi 'Abd-al-Rahim
1006. Hanafi al-Sayyid Khilaf [aka] Bilyah
1007. 'Awad Muhammad Ziyadah
1008. Sayyid 'Abd-al-Mun'im Amin Talabah
1009. 'Ali al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali
1010. Isma'il 'Abd-al-Salam Muhammad
1011. Zaynuhum Zaghlul Jawdah
1012. Sayyid Sa'id Abu-al-'Unayn
1013. Fathi Muhammad Ibrahim
1014. Abu-Sari' Muhammad Abu-Sari'
1015. Ramadan Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali [aka] Filfil
1016. Salah 'Izzat Muhammad Hamid
1017. Sa'id Muhammad 'Ali [aka] al-Amrikani
1018. Sayyid Ahmad Murad
1019. 'Umar Muhammad 'Umar al-Nabrawi
1020. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Ramadan Ahmad [aka] Muhsin Abu-'Umayrah
1021. Muhsin Hasan Ahmad 'Ali [aka] Muhsin al-'Adawi
1022. 'Atif 'Ali Ahmad al-Kayyal
1023. Tariq Mamduh Isma'il
1024. Mahmud Hanafi al-Jammal
1025. Wafiq Husayn 'Ali Tharwat
1026. Ahmad 'Ali Ahmad Siraj-al-Din [aka] Sukkar
1027. Sayf Nasim Amin
1028. 'Uryan Khalafallah Bahr
1029. Subhi Tawfiq Faraj
1030. Faruq al-Husayni Tasfiq
1031. 'Imad 'Abdallah Amin
1032. 'Ala'-al-Din Yusuf 'Abd-al-Maqsud
1033. Mamduh Ba'zaq Muhammad Darwish
1034. Mustafa 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mustafa [aka] al-Hawi
1035. Ahmad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Salam
1036. Hajjaj Zakariya Salih
1037. Hasan Rajab Isma'il
1038. Kamal Fu'ad 'Azb
1039. Hasan Zaki 'Abd-al-Rahim
1040. Hammud Bakhit Hammudah

1041. 'Adil Hamid Mustafa
1042. 'Id Qarni Thabit
1043. 'Adil Ahmad Sa'id
1044. Damyan 'Iyad Damyan
1045. Ramadan Kilani 'Afifi
1046. Hasan Muhammad Ahmad Mahmud
1047. Salih Ahmad Muhammad 'Ali
1048. Hasan Muhammad al-Sayyid
1049. Hilmi 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Abd-al-Rasul
1050. Muhammad Mutawalli Muhammad
1051. Qattan Zuhni Qattan
1052. Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrahim
1053. Amir Hasan 'Ali 'Abd-al-Mun'im
1054. Sayyid 'Abd-al-Khaliq Hasan
1055. Shahhat Sayyid Muhammad Salim
1056. Mahmud Amin 'Abdallah
1057. Sayyid Muhammad 'Alaywah
1058. Faruq Hasan Bayyumi
1059. 'Ali al-Kawmi 'Ali
1060. Mahmud 'Ali 'Abd-al-Zahir
1061. 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahman
1062. Sha'ban Abu-Dayf Abu-Laylah
1063. Muhammad Isma'il Hawwash
1064. 'Abd-al-'Al 'Abd-al-Mawla Muhammad
1065. Farid Ahmad Taha
1066. Hasan al-Sayyid Darwish [aka] Hasan Shatta
1067. Sa'id Muhammad Mahmud
1068. Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mursi
1069. Muhammad Ahmad 'Isa
1070. Fawzi Majalli 'Abd-al-Malak
1071. Ramadan Muhammad Hasan
1072. Ahmad al-Sayyid Husayn
1073. Mursi Zaydan Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim
1074. Al-Sayyid 'Atiyah Ahmad al-Nuwayshi
1075. Al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali 'Awad
1076. Al-Sayyid "Abbas Mursi
1077. Husni Mahmud Muhammad Ibrahim
1078. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Muttalib al-Sayyid 'Antar
1079. Ashraf Isma'il 'Abd-al-'Aziz
1080. 'Ali Ahmad 'Ali al-Atrash
1081. Fathi Haridi Ibrahim Abu-Sannah
1082. Sabir al-Sayyid Mahmud 'Ali
1083. Muhammad Ahmad Ibrahim Sa'dah
1084. Mustafa 'Abduh Zahran
1085. Khalaf 'Abd-al-Rahim Muhammad
1086. Ahmad Muhammad al-Qadi al-Batsh
1087. Mahir Muhammad al-Sayyid 'Ali
1088. Ramadan al-Sayyid 'Umar
1089. 'Adil al-Sayyid al-Sayyid Muhammad
1090. Ahmad Zaghlul Ahmad

1091. Ashraf Muhammad 'Ali al-Sayyid
1092. Ramadan al-Sayyid Mursi
1093. Majdi Fadil Mahmud
1094. 'Abd-al-'Al 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Dib
1095. Ibrahim Husayn Mahmud
1096. Muhammad 'Ali al-Basyuni
1097. 'Abd-al-Fattah Ibrahim 'Ali Sulayman
1098. 'Arifah Muhammad Zayid
1099. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Rajab Mustafa
1100. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Mun'im Sulayman
1101. 'Abd-al-Salam Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam
1102. Jabir Bayyumi Muhammad 'Abduh
1103. Na'im Fu'ad Badrus
1104. Yusuf al-Sayyid Yusuf
1105. Fawzi Thabit Ahmad al-Khuli
1106. Majdi 'Abd-al-Hafiz 'Abd-al-Rahman
1107. Muhammad Qutb 'Ali al-'Asi
1108. Hasan 'Abd-al-Mawjud Tantawi
1109. Usamah 'Abd-al-Raziq Ahmad Khalaf
1110. Sa'id 'Abd-al-Mawla 'Abd-al-Hamid
1111. Al-Sayyid Khalil Hasan al-Imam
1112. Sha'ban Muhammad Ibrahim
1113. Hammad Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hafiz
1114. Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Radi
1115. Muhammad Mustafa Badran
1116. 'Ali al-Sayyid Basyuni
1117. Mahmud Ahmad 'Awadallah
1118. Hasan Sa'id Ibrahim
1119. Fathi Sadiq Ahmad Ibrahim
1120. 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad 'Abd-al-Ghaffar
1121. Jamal-al-Din 'Abbas Haydar
1122. Farid Isma'il Muhammad [aka] Isma'il Akliki
1123. Mahmud Ahmad Diyab
1124. Bakri 'Uthman Sayyid Ghanim
1125. Sayyid Mabruk Yusuf
1126. Ahmad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Jawad
1127. Hasan Mustafa Husayn
1128. Musa 'Abd-al-Sattar Ahmad
1129. 'Abd-al-Ma'bud Dasuqi 'Aqrab
1130. 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Sayyid 'Umar
1131. Ibrahim 'Abduh Muhammad
1132. Qanawi Yunis Ahmad
1133. 'Abd-al-Basit Muhammad Abu-al-Tuyur
1134. Sa'id Bakr 'Ali Bakr
1135. Hisham 'Abd-al-Mun'im Isma'il
1136. Badr Ibrahim Husayn al-Hashshash
1137. Abu-al-'Alamayn Hasan Abu-al-'Alamayn
1138. 'Abd-al-Razq Ahmad Jad-al-Haqq Najib
1139. Zaydan Muhammad Ibrahim Madani
1140. 'Ali Muhammad 'Ali [aka] Bibuh

1141. Mursi Ahmad al-Hamzawi
1142. Muhammad al-Suwayfi Muhammad Zayid
1143. Ahmad Muhammad Zayid al-'Absi
1144. Rabi' Muslim Salim 'Uryan
1145. Mahrus Ahmad Ibrahim
1146. Khalifah 'Abd-al-Rahman Salih
1147. Hasan 'Abd-al-Karim Sulayman
1148. Jum'ah Bayyumi Shadhili
1149. Muhammad Thabit Rizq Nasrallah
1150. Jalal Ibrahim 'Atris
1151. Sulayman 'Abd-al-Muhsin Sa'udi
1152. Fadl Fahim Harb 'Atiyah
1153. Muhammad 'Abbud al-Hukm
1154. Barakat Sadiq Hasan Sa'd [aka] al-Daks
1155. Muhammad Kamil Mahmud Radwan
1156. Najah Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid Nada
1157. Rashad al-Sayyid Ramadan
1158. Hanafi Ahmad Radwan
1159. Mamduh 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Abd-al-Rahman
1160. Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Maqsud Ibrahim Shahhatah
1161. Salah-al-Din 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Imarah [aka] Salah al-Sul
1162. Sayyid Mamduh Ibrahim al-Marakbi
1163. Mustafa Fathi Mustafa al-Iskandarani
1164. 'Adil Khalil Husayn Hajjaj [aka] Sa'id al-Shanshuri
1165. Sa'id 'Atiyah Ibrahim
1166. Marzuq Isma'il Farraj
1167. Muhammad Fathi Yusuf Nasr [aka] Hashishah
1168. Majdi Najib Fanus [aka] Mikha'il
1169. Kamil Mahmud Qasim [aka] Kamil al-Sa'idi
1170. Hassan Bayyumi Hassan
1171. Fathi 'Abdallah Zahran
1172. Al-Sayyid al-Sayyid Ahmad Halawah
1173. Sa'd Gharib Qutb
1174. Gharib Muhammad Mursi Bakr
1175. Muhammad Fathi 'Abd-al-Hamid Bayyumi
1176. Kamal 'Abd-al-Majid Ahmad
1177. Muhammad Muhammad Husayn al-'Abbasi
1178. Tariq Muhammad 'Abd-al-Khaliq
1179. 'Abd-al-Khaliq Muhammad 'Abd-al-Khaliq
1180. Murid Sarufim
1181. Ibrahim Sa'id 'Ali 'Id
1182. Muhammad Ahmad Muhammad al-Faramawi
1183. 'Ali Mas'ud Sulayman
1184. Muhammad Muhammad Sulayman
1185. Nazih Nushi Rashid
1186. 'Adil Muhammad Tayi'
1187. Sami 'Abd-al-Wahid Shalabi
1188. Simsim Kamal al-Sayyid
1189. Muhammad Muhammad Jad
1190. Hazim Hamid 'Atwah

1191. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Maqsud 'Afifi
1192. 'Ali Abu Talib Mutawalli
1193. Shawqi 'Abd-al-Hafiz Muhammad
1194. 'Abd-al-Hafiz Hafiz Muhammad
1195. Ibrahim al-Sayyid Mahabah
1196. Samir al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Awwad
1197. Ibrahim 'Aziz Shafiq
1198. Salah al-Sayyid Ahmad Halawah
1199. Ayman Hasan Mahmud
1200. Muhammad Hasan 'Abd-al-Jalil
1201. Hisham Muslih 'Abd-al-Halim
1202. Salih Kamal Ibrahim
1203. Lutfi 'Ali Shu'ayb
1204. Hasan Sa'd Mas'ud
1205. 'Ala'-al-Din Ahmad 'Abd-al-Mawla
1206. 'Abd-al-Fattah Muhammad al-Badri
1207. Ra'fat Ibrahim Muhammad
1208. Hilmi 'Ali Qartam
1209. 'Ali al-Mahjar 'Abd-al-Sattar
1210. Al-Saghir al-Mahjar 'Abd-al-Qadir
1211. Muhammad Mahmud al-Basyuni
1212. Lutfi 'Abd-al-'Aziz Imam
1213. Muhammad Nash'at 'Abd-al-Hafiz al-Surt
1214. Mamduh Muhammad 'Abbas
1215. Muhsin 'Uthman al-Banna
1216. Jamal Zaki Sharif Yusuf
1217. Samir Mahmud Hilal
1218. 'Adil Mahmud 'Abduh al-'Attalah
1219. Muhammad Hilmi al-Sha'rawi
1220. Dr. Latifah al-Zayyat
1221. Dr. Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah
1222. Muhammad Hasan Mahmud Hasan
1223. Dr. 'Awatif Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman
1224. Dr. Khalil Hasan Khalil
1225. Faruq 'Ali Thabit
1226. Dr. Muhammad Kamal 'Atiyah al-Abrashi
1227. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Awdah
1228. Rushdi Sa'id Faraj
1229. Dr. Fu'ad Mursi al-Haddad
1230. Dr. Muhammad Ahmad Khalafallah
1231. Dr. 'Abd-al-'Azim 'Abdallah Abu-al-'Ata
1232. Nazmi Fahim Sulayman
1233. Nasim Salib 'Abd-al-Shahid
1234. Nadir 'Abd-al-Qadr Sa'id
1235. 'Adil Ibrahim Muhammad Zaki
1236. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Askar
1237. Muhammad Sabri 'Abd-Rabbuh Taha
1238. Mamduh 'Abd-al-Fattah Fu'ad
1239. Sulayman Mahmud Sulayman
1240. Fathi Ahmad Husayn

1241. Yasir Tawfiq 'Ali 'Abduh
1242. Muhammad Ahmad Bayyud
1243. Muhammad Muhammad Wahbah
1244. Muhammad Kamil al-Tabi'i Jum'ah
1245. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi Muhammad 'Abd-al-Maqsud
1246. Muhammad al-Khidr Ibrahim Ahmad Barbur
1247. Kamal Zaki Muhammad Abu-al-Hawl
1248. Salah 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad
1249. 'Abd-al-Khaliq Muhammad Ahmad
1250. Rashad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahim
1251. Mahmud Basyuni Muhammad
1252. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hamid Shahhatah
1253. Ra'fat 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ahmad Jad
1254. Yusuf 'Isa 'Abd-al-Tawwab Mukhaymar
1255. Subhi Muhammad al-Sanusi
1256. 'Ali Kamil 'Ali
1257. Ashraf Husni 'Ali
1258. Dahi 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Afifi
1259. 'Abd-al-Latif Faruq 'Abd-al-Qadir
1260. Isma'il Muhammad al-Sayyid Khaffaji
1261. Khayri Muslih Husayn
1262. Sabah Yusuf Ahmad
1263. Sayyidah Abu-al-Hadid Khalil
1264. Nadiyah Sayyid 'Abd-al-Salam
1265. Huda 'Id Taha
1266. Muhammad Badawi al-Badawi
1267. Kamal Muhammad al-Dibawi
1268. Muhammad Yusuf 'Abd-al-'Azim
1269. Sami Muhammad Mahmud
1270. Ibrahim Hasan 'Umar
1271. Radi Ahmad Mahmud
1272. Mahmud Hamdi Mahmud
1273. Khalid al-Ra'i Shabak al-Ra'i
1274. Majdi Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Aziz
1275. 'Isam Mahmud Mustafa
1276. Yahya 'Abd-al-Samad 'Abd-al-Baqi
1277. Muhammad Tawfiq 'Ali
1278. Muhammad Lashin Ahmad
1279. 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Abd-al-'Alim Ahmad
1280. Hasan Sabir Fahmi
1281. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir 'Uways
1282. Hisam-al-Din 'Abd-al-Latif Tal'at
1283. Muhammad Ibrahim Hasan
1284. Majid 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Abd-al-Hamid
1285. Muhammad Zaki al-'Azb
1286. 'Abd-al-Fattah Raghib Fawwaz
1287. 'Ali al-Sayyid Musa
1288. 'Abd-al-Latif al-Mursi 'Abd-al-Latif
1289. Al-Sayyid 'Adil Ahmad 'Isa
1290. Hamdi Subhi Hasan

1291. Sahrif Bahjat Ahmad
1292. Khalid Rashad Zahrani
1293. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Nasr al-Shaykh
1294. Usamah Mahmud 'Abd-al-Raziq
1295. Muhammad Ahmad Mustafa
1296. Samir Shahhatah 'Abduh
1297. 'Isam Muhammad 'Abdallah
1298. Muhammad 'Awad 'Ata al-Qaddus
1299. Sa'd Mustafa Mas'ad al-Najjar
1300. Salih al-Shahhat Salih
1301. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Rashad
1302. Majdi Ahmad 'Ali Musa
1303. Hamid Fahmi Hamid Rashwan
1304. Usamah Hasan Ahmad Kamil
1305. Yasir Bayyumi Muhammad
1306. Majdi bin-Salih bin-Qasim
1307. Murad 'Ali Mahmud
1308. 'Abd-al-Hadi Hasan Taha Husayn
1309. Isma'il Thabit Husayn
1310. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Haqq Dasuqi
1311. Madhat Mahmud Khalifah
1312. Majdi Mustafa Ramadan
1313. 'Isam Ibrahim Himam
1314. 'Adil 'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad
1315. Mu'awwad Muhammad Mu'awwad
1316. Ahmad Muhammad Taha
1317. Muhammad Ghanim Ahmad
1318. Sa'id Sadiq 'Abd-al-Mu'ti
1319. Muhammad Salih al-Nawawi
1320. Sa'id Muhammad Ahmad Da'bas
1321. Nasr Mustafa 'Ali 'Abd-al-Karim
1322. Rida Khadr Suwaylam
1323. Salamah Zahran Muhammad
1324. 'Atif Muhammad Hasan
1325. Ra'fat 'Abdallah al-Sayyid
1326. Majdi Hamdi 'Abd-al-Salam
1327. Ashraf Yahya 'Abd-al-Rahman
1328. Sami Abu Zayd 'Abd-al-'Aziz
1329. Mamduh Jum'ah Farhat
1330. Majdi al-Sayyid Sharif
1331. 'Isam 'Ali al-Sayyid
1332. Al-Sayyid Wa'il 'Abd-al-'Aziz
1333. Muhammad Ibrahim Muslim
1334. Muhammad Ashraf Mahmud 'Azb
1335. 'Adil Muhammad 'Abdallah
1336. 'Abd-al-Jawad Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Jawad
1337. Muhammad al-Sayyid Salamah
1338. Ahmad Riyad Darwish
1339. Usamah Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Azim Hamzah
1340. 'Umar Ahmad Fathi al-'Ayyat

1341. Ibrahim Mustafa Ibrahim
1342. Ahmad Imam 'Ali 'Abd-al-Hamid
1343. Tharwat Fathi Kamil
1344. Mahmud Muhammad al-Bakri
1345. Ashraf Faruq Mahmud Ibrahim
1346. Mahmud Muhammad Isma'il
1347. 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Abd-al-'Al Hamid
1348. Kamal Matrahana
1349. 'Adil Wahbah Asanasiyus
1350. Murqus Hakim Murqus
1351. Ishaq Kirillus Maqar
1352. Fa'iq Hasan Hubaysh [aka] al-'Arabi
1353. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Fattah 'Abbas 'Amir
1354. Majdi Muhammad Siyam
1355. 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Amir 'Abd-al-Malik
1356. Amin Hamid al-Amin
1357. Ibrahim Hamid 'Abd-al-Ghani
1358. Muhammad Muhammad Arkamah
1359. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im
1360. Hamid Muhammad Hamid Yasin
1361. Ashraf 'Abd-al-Maqsud 'Abd-al-Rahim
1362. Ahmad Muhammad 'Ubayd 'Abdallah
1363. 'Abd-al-'Azim Muhammad al-Sayyid
1364. Hasan Muhammad Muhammad al-Karimi
1365. Muhammad Kamal Shahin
1366. Diya' Ibrahim Ibrahim Abu-al-Naja
1367. Mahmud Muhammad al-Badri
1368. Mahmud Muhammad Husayn 'Ali
1369. Khalid 'Abd-al-Mun'im Hajjaj
1370. Mursi Ahmad al-Sayyid al-Mursi
1371. Salim 'Id Salim 'Abd-al-Hadi
1372. Karam Ahmad Ibrahim 'Imarah
1373. 'Abd-al-Rahman Fikri Mahmud al-Sharif
1374. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim 'Abd-al-Majid al-Jundi
1375. Muhammad Mahmud Sha'lan
1376. Amin Isma'il al-Safti
1377. Muhammad Hasan Ahmad al-Namli
1378. Ahmad Kamil 'Ibadi
1379. Ibrahim Ni'man Muhammad al-Sa'dani
1380. Khalid Muhammad 'Atiyah 'Allam
1381. Wasim Isma'il Muhammad
1382. Ibrahim al-Sayyid Ahmad Khaffajah
1383. Muhammad Sayf-al-Din Ahmad 'Atiyah
1384. Hasan Hassan Ibrahim Taha
1385. 'Atiyah Muhammad Ahmad Hassan
1386. Rida Muhammad Hilmi
1387. Hamdi Muhammad Hasan
1388. 'Abd-al-Latif Muhammad Khalifah al-Sharif
1389. Muhammad al-Sayyid Jad Muhammad
1390. Mustafa Hasan Mahmud Hasan

1391. Mahmud 'Adil 'Abd-al-Wadud al-Sayyid
1392. Hamdi al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Sammak
1393. Ahmad Mahmud Hasan 'Isa
1394. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Jayyid Muhammad Ahmad
1395. Muhammad Nasr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Muhammad Hasan
1396. 'Id al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Hamid
1397. 'Abd-al-Salam Baz Isma'il
1398. Ashraf 'Abd-al-Hamid Khalil Muhammad
1399. 'Abd-al-Hamid Isma'il 'Abd-al-Halim Ahmad
1400. Ibrahim Muhammad Ibrahim al-Tayfi
1401. Al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Hadi Muhammad
1402. Hasan Kamil 'Ali
1403. Majdi 'Abd-al-'Alim Badawi
1404. Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibrahim Sultan
1405. Hamdi Ibrahim Alham
1406. Ibrahim al-Sayyid Darbalah
1407. Nasim Fakhri 'Awad
1408. Dawud Bulus Nawfilus
1409. Yusuf Kamil Ghabriyal
1410. Nabil Rasmi Askarus
1411. 'Abduh Dawud 'Awad
1412. Wajdi Fathi Fanus
1413. Ikram Bulus Ghabriyal
1414. Ibrahim 'Abbas Muhammad
1415. Al-Sayyid 'Uthman al-Sayyid 'Atiyah
1416. Samir Muhammad 'Ali Sirri
1417. Sulayman al-Shimi
1418. 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad 'Umar
1419. Sayyid Hassanin 'Id
1420. 'Abdallah Sa'd al-Shuri
1421. Abu-al-'Ala 'Abd-al-Majid al-Sayyid Qarni
1422. 'Antar 'Abd-al-Rahman Qutb Sulayman
1423. Louis Zaki Jad Jirjis
1424. Zakariya Farraj Ahmad
1425. Ahmad Salim Mahmud
1426. Tal'at Fu'ad Hasan
1427. 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Aziz Abu-al-Majd
1428. Sayyid Farid
1429. Amin Muhammad Rustum
1430. Ibrahim Taha Qashur
1431. Ramadan 'Abd-al-Rahman Salim
1432. Fadil Ishaq Ghabriyal
1433. Tariq 'Abbas Muhammad
1434. 'Azmi Yusuf Sulayman
1435. Majalli 'Aziz Majalli
1436. 'Awad Nasif 'Awad
1437. Jirjis Jawdah Hunayn
1438. Ghabriyal Danis Ghabriyal
1439. 'Umar 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Talmasani
1440. Ibrahim Ibrahim Sharaf

1441. Jirjis 'Iyad Shukr
1442. Sa'd Tawfiq Hanna
1443. Latif Fahim Jirjis
1444. Ashraf Khalil Ahmad
1445. Jamal As'ad 'Abd-al-Malak
1446. Tariq Muhammad al-Sayyid
1447. Muhammad Kamal-al-Din 'Abd-al-Mawla
1448. Mahjub Muhammad Musa
1449. Salah-al-Din Muhammad Hilmi
1450. Ahmad Jalal Muhammad
1451. Muhammad 'Umar 'Abdallah
1452. Jirjis 'Abd-al-Masih Rizqallah
1453. Mamduh 'Abdallah Muhammad
1454. Tal'at Hafiz 'Abdallah
1455. Muhammad Muhammad Muhammad al-Sayfi
1456. Muhammad Sa'd al-Sayyid 'Abduh
1457. Ahmad Muhammad Dahman
1458. Muhammad Sa'id Shahhat
1459. Hasan al-Maghribi Karim 'Ali
1460. Muhammad 'Abbas Muhammad
1461. Muhammad Ahmad Mahmud Nassar
1462. Hasan Shawqi Muhammad 'Adil
1463. 'Ali 'Abd-al-Ra'uf 'Abd-al-Nabi [aka] Rajab
1464. Mahmud Muhammad Farghali
1465. 'Atif al-Sayyid Isma'il
1466. Ahmad Mahmud Ahmad [aka] Ahmad al-'Ajayibi
1467. 'Ala' Jamal-al-Din Khalil
1468. 'Atiyah Jamil Ibrahim Abu-Qutah
1469. Hamid 'Abd-al-'Al Ibrahim al-Sayyid
1470. 'Abd-al-Nasir Muhammad Faraj
1471. Muhsin Muhammad Ahmad al-Zayyat
1472. Fathi Jalal al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Rahman
1473. Ahmad Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Al [aka] Jamal
1474. Al-Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad Abu-al-Fadl
1475. Muhammad 'Utayfi Ahmad [aka] 'Abd-al-Wahhab
1476. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Raziq Ahmad
1477. Muhammad Farraj Ahmad [aka] Zakariya
1478. 'Izz-al-Din Muhammad 'Uthman
1479. 'Ali Ahmad 'Abd-al-Na'im
1480. Hasan Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Shimi
1481. Hani Ahmad 'Ali 'Abidin [aka] Tito
1482. Muhammad Muhammad Imbabi [aka] al-Amir
1483. 'Ali Mutawalli 'Ali Salim
1484. Yunis 'Abd-al-'Alim Yunis
1485. Sayyid Husayn Ahmad Ramih
1486. Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd-al-Baqi [aka] Jarihi
1487. Usamah Muhammad Fandi
1488. Rushdi Mikha'il al-Sisi
1489. Ahmad 'Atallah al-Saruji
1490. Muhammad Isma'il Ibrahim Abu-Sudayrah
1491. Muhammad Mukhtar Ahmad
1492. Sayyid Muhammad Farraj
1493. Mahmud Bar'i Mahmud

1494. Muhammad Muhammad Mahmud [aka] Muhammad Najib
1495. Ahmad 'Abd-al-Sadiq Khalaf
1496. Al-Anba Fam *
1497. Salih 'Abd-al-Shahid 'Abd-al-Shahidi
1498. Ya'qub 'Atallah Jadallah
1499. Afrayim Mikha'il Jirjis
1500. Al-Qiss Maksimus Ghabriyal Mashriqi *
1501. Bashati Maqar Khalil
1502. 'Atiyah Khamis Sam'an
1503. Nadir Aliksan Dawud
1504. Qaddas Fakhri al-Qummus Qaldas *
1505. Nasri Bakhit 'Atiyah
1506. Tamir Faraj Abadir
1507. Al-Qummus Bishwi Lam'i 'Abduh *
1508. Majdi Yasin Armaniyus
1509. Ambin Hanna Labib
1510. Thabit Bishay Jirjis
1511. Al-Qiss Tirithlut Milad Bisharah *
1512. Al-Qiss 'Abd-al-Malak Fahim Riyad *
1513. William Labib Rizq
1514. Nabil 'Atallah
1515. Naji 'Azir Malikah
1516. Wajih Adib Shanudah
1517. Samir Labib Fari'ah
1518. Antuniyus Habib Mikha'il
1519. Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman
1520. Luqa 'Aziz Sayfayn
1521. Afrayim Darbas Hirmina
1522. Al-Usquf Armaniyus *
1523. 'Izzat Husayn Muhammad [aka] Nimr
1524. Sabri 'Aziz Tumas
1525. Nushi Zaki Mikha'il
1526. Faraj al-Dib Khalil
1527. Musa 'Isa Musa
1528. Yusuf Mufid Mansi
1529. Filimun Sam'an Jurjus
1530. Nushi Shanudah Aqladiyus al-Rahib
1531. Munir Milad Qust
1532. Na'im Kamil 'Ajayibi
1533. Mahrus Sidrak Iskandar
1534. Amir As'ad al-Qummus
1535. 'Abd-al-Ra'uf Amir al-Jaysh
1536. Nawal al-Sayyid al-Sa'dawi

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*indicates a clerical title in the Coptic Church
Al-Anba : precedes the names of metropolitans, bishops, patriarchs and saints
Al-Usquf : bishop
Al-Qummus : archpriest
Al-Qiss : priest
Al-Shammas : deacon

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ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONS IN STIRRING UP STRIFE REVIEWED

Cairo MAY in Arabic 14 Sep 81 p 3

[Article: "How Did the Islamic Groups Exploit the Technique of Provocation during the Incidents of Dissension?"]

[Text] What is the line the leaders and personnel of the Islamic groups and the Moslem Brothers have pursued in stirring up the flames of factional strife?

What are the excesses committed by Moslem fanatics that have contributed to intensifying the situation?

On 24 June 1981 an Islamic conference was held in the Mosque of al-Rahman in al-Minya in which an Islamic group leader discussed the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' in a provocative manner. In exchange, the head of the Group of Youths of Our Lord Muhammad asserted that some Islamic leaders had cooperated with the minister of the interior to the end of repressing the events in al-Sharabiyah.

On 28 June 1981 the imam of the Suez Mosque in Sawhaj talked provocatively about the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

In the town of al-Mahmudiyah a religious symposium was held on 9 July 1981 attended by Moslem Brother personnel and leaders and Islamic societies, in which an instructor at al-Azhar University spoke against the government.

In Mit Ghamr a religious symposium was held on 11 July 1981, attended by Moslem Brother elements, in which the Brother Yusri Muhammad Mani alleged that the political leaders have resorted to terrifying the people through hunger in order to push the peace process through.

On the same date, 11 July 1981, Islamic groups held a symposium in the Mosque of Salah-al-Din in Cairo in which a leading member of the Moslem Brothers, Mustafa Mashhur, declared that the circumstances to which the call to Islam was now being exposed resembled [those during] the outburst of Islam and stressed that the Group of the Brothers was aimed at establishing world Islamic internationalism but no ambition to rule.

On the same date, a religious symposium was held in al-Fayyum in which Taha al-Sahhari, who leads an extremist religious group, demanded that people not deal with Christians and stressed that Moslems' apathy toward their religion had given the Christians an

opportunity to commit aggression in the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' area.

Two days before that, on 9 July 1981, Adam Salih, a proponent of the al-Salafiyah Movement, at a symposium in the al-Bashir Mosque in Cairo, attributed the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' to Christian resentment and claimed that the National Unity Law had been set forth to protect Christians. al-Sa'id 'Ali, a proponent of the al-Salafiyah Movement, stressed in the Salah-al-Din Mosque in Port Said that Islamic rule by a ruler who prevented the application of God's law was a punishable act and when the ruler sat down with Jews and Christians that meant subservience to them.

On 16 July 1981 the Group of the Brothers held an Islamic conference in the al-Nur Mosque to celebrate the anniversary of the Badr raid, attended by elements from the Brothers and the Islamic groups. 'Umar al-Talmasani called upon young people to stay close together and stated that their conviction should be that death was preferable to a wretched life!

The following day, the Society of the Brothers held a celebration in al-Pasha Square in Cairo in which 'Umar al-Talmasani criticized both parties in the Lawyers' Federation crisis, reiterating that God wanted oppressors to oppress one another.

On 17 July 1981, the Islamic Group in al-Fayyum held a religious symposium in which Hilmi al-Jazzar, one of the leaders of the Islamic groups, demanded that the Moslems rally around the proselytizers!

In the town of Saqaltah in Sawhaj an Islamic group held a symposium on 16 July 1981 in which a leader of the group attributed apostasy to Jews and Christians and urged that they be fought if they did not pay the non-Moslem head tax.

Throughout the blessed month of Ramadan, people in charge of the Brothers' magazine AL-DA'WAH conducted a campaign to distribute medals and prayer schedules bearing the symbol of the group and its slogan at these symposia.

Friday Sermons in the Recent Period

Friday sermons also have involved deliberate provocations and attempts to attack the government and stir up dissension:

On 10 July 1981:

At the Salah-al-Din Mosque in al-Manyal, 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr warned against the tide of proselytization and claimed that corruption and bribery had become widespread in al-Azhar.

In the al-Ikhshid Mosque, Muhammad Hadi claimed that the People's Assembly was procrastinating in applying Islamic law.

At the Mosque of the Upright Caliphs, Suleyman Rabi' attacked the fact that Egypt Air Company was continuing to sell liquor.

The imam of the Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria discussed the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' events in a provocative manner, and, following the prayer, the lawyer and Brother

'Abdallah Rashwan criticized current conditions.

In the al-Sa'udi Mosque in al-Mansurah, Muhammad al-Sharif discussed the al-Sharabiyah incidents in a provocative manner and claimed that the failure to remove immunity from Rashad 'Uthman, member of the People's Assembly, could be attributed to support for him from an official.

In some mosques in al-Minya, a statement was distributed that was issued by the Islamic groups claiming that Shaykh Sulayman Rabi', dean of the Faculty of Principles of Religion, chairman of the Society of Upright Caliphs in Heliopolis, and an element sympathizing with the Brothers, had issued a religious ruling prohibiting dealings with Christians.

Friday 17 July 1981:

The person giving the sermon at the Mosque of al-Nathir warned against dealing with Christians, claiming, that they have been accumulating weapons in order to strike out at Moslems through their wealth. The imam of the 'Ayn-al-Hayat Mosque in Cairo criticized the investigation that had been made into him under the authority of the Ministry of Religious Endowments by asking why people with black turbans hadn't been held to account or investigated.

In the al-Salam Mosque in al-Isma'iliyah, Muhammad 'Abdallah 'Uways urged that people not deal with Christians and that the Prayer of the Departed be held for what he described as the Moslem martyrs of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' who had passed away as a result of the perfidy of the Crusaders.

In the Mosque of the Society of Islamic Law in Asyut, Najih Ibrahim, leader of the Islamic society in Asyut, demanded that people not deal with Christians.

Friday 24 July 1981

In the al-Nur Mosque in al-'Abbasiyah, Mitwalli Yusuf Shalabi criticized the position of the Ministries of Religious Endowments and Internal Affairs of preventing the shaykh of the Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria from speaking in mosques.

In the Mosque of Islamic Youth, Muhammad Ahmad Badawi criticized the media and the programs they presented and demanded that they be reformed and that Islamic law be applied.

In the Salah-al-Din Mosque in al-Manyal, 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr stressed that Jerusalem would never return to its owners through negotiation, urged officials to deal lightly with and pardon the shaykh of the Ibrahim Mosque in Alexandria, and called on the Moslems to stand beside him.

In the al-Tawhid Mosque in Im'babah, Kamil Muhammad 'Inan attacked birth control programs by claiming that they were in violation of Islam, criticized the profligate parties held by the Office of the President and demanded that the money spent at those parties be directed to the people.

In the Zawiyat 'Amr ibn-al-'As Mosque in Port Said, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Halluji stressed that the government is now one of apostasy and rejection of Islam, weakening

the Moslems, and gave as proof of that the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and the blood of Moslems that was shed in them. In the Zawiyah 'Izzat Mosque in Faqus, Ibrahim al-'Izbi claimed that the Christians in Egypt were training in weapons at Wadi al-Natrun and the oases and that the government was helping them in this in order to destroy Islam.

The Behavior of Fanatic Christians

There has been irresponsible conduct on the part of fanatic Christians which has helped escalate the incidents, including:

Officials of the Coptic Archdiocese in the town of Isna have started to turn a building which was in trust on behalf of the archdiocese into a rest house to house nuns without permit, and this has provoked the condemnation of Moslems.

In the section of Isfun al-Mata'inah in the District of Isna, Christians have observed religious rituals in a building set aside for funeral observances, with the objective of turning it into a church without permit.

The performance of repairs and the erection of some installation in the Coptic Orthodox churches of Mar Jirjis and the Virgin in the village of Tukh, without permit.

The observance of religious rituals in the room of a Christian compatriot in the village of al-Kawail, Sawhaj, without permit.

The representative of the Coptic Orthodox archdiocese in al-Isma'iliyah was issued directives to some Christian religious figures to follow up on sermons delivered in mosques that involve attacks on Christians and to demand that officials take measures regarding them.

The observance of religious rituals in the Coptic Orthodox Society of Good Will in Mustarud, without permit.

The existence of a state of discontent among Christian doctors in the Itay al-Barud Public Hospital because of a complaint presented by a Moslem doctor against two Christian doctors accusing them of causing the death of a Moslem child in the course of an operation. The Office of the Public Prosecutor decided to release the two doctors and guarantee their positions.

A struggle over a plot of land in the Abu-al-Matamir area between a Moslem doctor and a Christian woman, as the result of the decision of the committee formed to investigate the dispute, which ruled that the plot of land comprised part of the doctor's property, especially since a church had been erected without permit on the plot of land, which belonged to the Patrierchate of Alexandria.

Officials in the Mar Jirjis church took over a plot of land adjacent to the church, preparing to carry out some expansions on it. The land that was violated is adjacent to a 6,500-meter area that the local council in Cairo had agreed to allocate for construction of a religious institute, and meetings were held with leaders of the people to calm the situation between Moslems and Christians in the area.

In Port Said, some Christian youths obtained contributions from residents who had retail shops, in accordance with receipts issued by the Society of the Renaissance of Coptic Youth. In the section of Nahiya in the District of Maghaghah, the Christians proceeded to sing religious hymns in the benevolent society during the call to evening prayer.

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STUDENTS IN UNIVERSITIES PROTEST RELIGIOUS PRESSURE GROUPS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 14 Sep 81 p 3

[Article: "Secrets of the True Role of the Islamic Societies in the Universities!"]

[Text] It is certain that no one is opposed to religion or freedom of worship.

It is certain that religion belongs to God but that the nation belongs to everyone, as President al-Sadat has said, directing his words to the university students: worship your lord as you wish but do not sell your will and say "heard and obeyed" to every object or society that exploits you; hearing and obeying belong to glorious almighty God.

The Islamic groups in the Egyptian universities have committed acts which have gone beyond the proper bounds.

The university records clearly show numerous incidents in Cairo University, for example, which reveal the extent of the extremism these groups have reached in a single academic year, the one that has just passed.

Last 19 March, these societies, in the Faculty of Education at al-Fayyum, obstructed a group of students taking part in competition for the most excellent student, while the bus carrying them entered the faculty courtyard, and attacked them with physical blows. Two days before that, these societies opposed a theatrical group at the Faculty of Agriculture in al-Fayyum, during the rehearsal for a play, broke into the hall, attacked members of the group and expelled the rest of the students. University regulations did not permit intervention by leaders of the Islamic groups in the university, but on last 4 March they gathered together in a demonstration inside the Faculty of Engineering, opposing the holding of monthly examinations and the recording of student attendance and absences.

In the Faculty of Commerce at Bani Suwayf, the leaders of these groups issued a command prohibiting male students from mixing with female students or standing together inside the university compound, holding up banners declaring "It is prohibited for male students to mix with female students" and declaring that they would give people who allowed themselves to be enticed into failing to honor this order a grace period of 1 week -- after which they actually did physically attack some students who were so bold as to talk with female students inside the university compound.

In the Faculty of Letters, the faculty student federation declared that it was going to show a movie, "al-Aqmar," in the faculty. The leaders of the Islamic societies raised a resistance and the dean of the faculty met with them to hear their view, which was that the movie contained scenes that they rejected, and informed them that he agreed to have one of them sit beside the projector during the showing of the movie and that they would delete the scenes he objected to. In spite of that, and in spite of their agreement, they gathered together and broke into the auditorium in which the movie was to be shown, carrying heavy clubs, whips and sharp instruments to punish the students who had been sitting in the faculty amphitheater awaiting the showing of the movie. This punishment resulted in injuries to students, including a wound on the arm of the federation head and a concussion for another student. In fact, extremist acts subsequently reached the point where showing of the movie "Rabi'ah al-'Adawiyah" was rejected in the Teachers College on the charge that there were some songs in it!

These groups did not even permit students, or even teaching assistants, to engage in athletic activity. Last 12 January Muhammad Ghunaym, a leader of these groups, blocked a female teaching assistant in the Faculty of Medicine who was about to practice on the tennis court in the company of her mother, and the incident resulted in her being chased away and being kept from practicing.

Even tours were suspended, after the incident of the trip to the al-Khayriyah Barrages last 18 December that had been arranged by the student committee at the University Village, when a group of members of Islamic societies opposed them, having discovered that some of the students had dared to sing and clap their hands during the trip, which ended at the police station in the al-Khayriyah Barrages! In addition, there were two incidents of attacks on a hostel which resulted in injury to two female students, Mirvat 'Abdallah and Sihr Mahmud of the Media Faculty.

It is strange that even cultural activity was banned under terrorism by these groups last 29 December, when the Faculty of Economics and Political Science decided to hold a book exhibit on its premises and, after the exhibit had been prepared, the Islamic groups protested on grounds that it contained books which were to be rejected. The dean of the faculty met with them and decided to form a committee, before the exhibit opened, which undertook to review and sort through the books exhibited and to remove the books they considered it appropriate to remove. However, they met and proceeded to smash up the exhibit completely and attack the students who had thought of going to visit it.

The story of the 3-day occupation of the University Village in itself reveals the extent of the extremist thinking and behavior of these groups, whose leaders prevented people working in the university village administration from going into their offices and appointed a group of students at the door to the village in their place and appointed one of the societies' students from the Faculty of Medicine, Mahmud al'Jawhari, as director of the University Village. The latter in fact did take over the office of the director of the village and appointed some students and other people who belonged to the society to positions of director of housing, the director of nutrition, and the director of legal affairs. They took over the operation of housing students in the Islamic groups and demanded that the university president's advisor for university village affairs and the expelled village director be dismissed. The occupation lasted 3 whole days and ended with the loss of all the

documents and equipment belonging to the village administration, as well as with the acceptance by the university administration of their demands, in order to end the 72-hour occupation of the university villages.

During, before and after this occupation, the problem of the imposition of their control over the village was constantly at issue. Daily there were dozens of incidents of breaking into students' rooms to compel them to perform the dawn prayer or refuse to accept the food the village offered because it was made out of processed fat, which they complained had some pig fat in it, and they insisted on preparing the food without that fat!

What Does the Broad Base of University Students Say?

Although the universities were in holiday at the end of the academic year, numbers of students began to visit their faculties in anticipation of seeing new features of university activity which they had been prohibited from in previous years, as soon as the decrees to protect national unity were declared. What do these students say?

The student Tariq Sa'd 'Ali of the Faculty of Science, Chemistry Department, Cairo university, says, "We had been waiting for President al-Sadat's decree so that life in the university would resume as all university students had been waiting for it. The Islamic groups had been mixing religion with politics, making life in the university unstable, and the Islamic groups' insistence on getting the students to elect them took place without our knowing anything about the people who had nominated themselves for election. In spite of that, the Islamic groups have not offered us, as students, anything new. All they have offered us is politics and extremism. Therefore the president's decree came at the proper time!"

The student Muhammad Muhammad Abu-al-Futuh of the Faculty of Science, in the second year in Cairo University's Chemistry Department, says, "Through religious fanaticism within the university, religion itself is almost being lost. The Islamic groups' considering people who do not go to the mosque as atheists has been a bitter thing for us as Moslems. The Islamic groups' demand that when the call to prayer comes we must leave our lectures or work and perform the prayer -- it is not reasonable that we should abandon a doctor in a lecture to pray, although we could have joined the prayer. The discrimination in treatment between us and our brother Islamic group members was /like that between/ Moslems and atheists, even though the other party is Moslem. Political publications have proliferated and religious publications aimed at enlightenment have declined. The Islamic groups' expenditures on political publications have been greater than their expenditures on problems of students in the faculties and various activities. In fact, we have been waiting for President Anwar al-Sadat's decree so that we could lead a family life removed from fanaticism and extremism."

The student Muhammad Sa'd Muhammad, a student in the Faculty of Law in Cairo University, second year, says that he is more than in agreement with every decree President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat has declared: "The Islamic groups within the university belittle the students. Their compelling the students to pray and leave lectures has shown a lack of understanding and has arisen out of fanaticism. The answer to that on the students' part has been to refuse even to go to the mosque. In general, had it not been for the president's decree, we might have reached the

stage that Iran and other countries have reached. The president's decree is 100 percent correct." He added, "All the declarations which the Islamic groups made are lacking single item of proof and as long as there is no proof there is no dispute over the issue." The student said, "The president's decision to pardon wayward students is a merciful one for them all; he has given them a second chance. How can there be progress if we are to uplift Egypt's status and uplift our country in the context of religious and political extremism? The president's decree came at the right time."

The female student Nasrah Sayyid Muhammad, of the Faculty of Commerce at Cairo University, said that this was her first year in the university, that she had heard about what the Islamic groups were doing, that she had wanted to see what they were seeking through these acts of theirs, and that when she learned of what President al-Sadat had said she believed what had been said about the Islamic groups and life in the university, which had become abnormal. She agrees with the president's decree as long as unstable conditions exist within the university: "We have come to the university to learn, study, gain an education and create a spirit of warmth and mutual understanding among ourselves as students, but as far as politics goes there is no room for that inside the university. Fanaticism is something which harms us as Moslems and Christians. We want to pray, but there is no place for politics, violence and fanaticism among us as students."

Majidah 'Abd-al-'Alim in the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University, first year, said, "Yes to religion within the university, to the study of religion and to our love of religion, but no to politics and fanaticism within the university. The university is not a place for political issues or problems."

A student in the Faculty of Commerce at the University of Cairo, who refused to mention his name, said, "The matter is now in the hands of a just father, and we all know the extent of his love for Egypt and his feeling for the Egyptian people. At the beginning, the Islamic groups were concerned with religion alone, and had no fanaticism on the outside, but, with the passage of time, they began to involve themselves on many problems and points in which they have no right to interfere, and, through this interference, have established an unfavorable position for themselves among students. Even in the student elections they compelled students to give agreement to all members of the Islamic groups and did not give agreement to any other member outside the Islamic groups, saying that anyone outside the Islamic groups was an atheist. They were always reading the Koran every morning before lectures and talking to us as if we were infidels and not Moslems. The president's decree will make us Moslems and Christians living in a single house as brothers, each of us will have his religion and will worship God as he wishes, and thus it will make us feel secure in our academic and fraternal lives so that we can feel that the university is another home that we live in and not a place for strife and fanaticism. The president's decree restored university life to us once again after we had lost it over the years that have passed."

Another student, in the Faculty of Antiquities in Cairo University, said "The Moslems and Christians live under a single banner, which is the banner of Egypt, and the land is the land of Egypt. Islam and Christianity are two of God's religions, and each of us may worhip God. However, for either of them to act and place himself in a position remote from his brother with whom he lives on the same

land is something society rejects, the conduct of all these people is in the interests of no one and if they are harmed, Egypt will be harmed. Through the decree the president has issued, we can live as we had lived before. It is not the time for fanaticism and dissension. It is the time for the future and for progress and time for solving the country's problems. We agree that there should be a mosque inside the university and that we should pray and worship God, but we do not want the mosque to become a place where we are cursed, when we used to receive religious guidance from it. The university is a place where the people of Egypt meet to study and spread the spirit of brotherhood among students so that we can benefit our country by our ideas and not harm Egypt with them. The president's decree has saved Egypt, Moslems and Christians alike, from a civil war that would have broken out because of fanaticism."

Muhammad Fu'ad, of the Faculty of Commerce, Cairo University, said "The decree will restore stability to the university and we all feel, as students, that we are in a sacred place where we study knowledge far removed from politics, concerning which no student knows anything. Everything that is said about politics within the university comes from the Islamic groups and it does not have a single source; it all consists of notions on the part of some vindictive, opportunistic groups, and none of the students in the Islamic groups can get anything by these methods unless there are some other people behind them who are feeding the young people with these methods and their naive ideas and principles in order to instill corruption, hatred and dissension among the people in Egypt's universitins to the abyss. The president's decree dissolving all the Islamic societies and groups has come at a time when Egypt needed it. Everyone hopes to worship God in the proper manner, but not to utter curses, lies and fanaticism. Finally, we say once again that we are Moslems and that religion is innocent of every tongue that utters what is not right, that we worship God as he wishes, and that we are all thinking about the problems of Egypt, but in a spirit free of fanaticism. Egypt is in the most intense need of us young people so that we can raise its name on high and with pride among the countries of the world. We are in agreement with the president's decree, with the utmost warmth and affection, so that the spirit of love may return to us and the spirit of hatred and vindictiveness may be removed from us."

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ALEXANDRIA PROSECUTOR INVESTIGATES ISLAMIC GROUP ACTIVITIES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 10

/Article: "Investigation into Members of Islamic Groups That Met and Distributed Pamphlets in Alexandria"/

/Text/ The Office of the East Alexandria Public Prosecutor has been conducting its investigation into the 21 persons and members of Islamic groups in the city that security officials seized, discovering in their possession publications and pamphlets attacking and ridiculing the regime, calling for the incitement of factional dissension in the country, and attacking the peace treaty, as well as the 33 persons who had assembled before the Mosque of the Commander Ibrahim at the al-Raml Station, attacking security officials when they prevented them from holding a meeting to condemn the regime.

Security officials arrested 21 persons who belonged to Islamic groups in Alexandria and discovered large amounts of publications and pamphlets in their homes calling for vilification of the regime, demanding that it be changed, condemning the peace treaty and normalization of relations with Israel, calling for the incitement of factional strife and spreading about false information on incidents of religious strife. Some of these publications were written by hand and the rest were printed. There were a number of detailed memoranda on the activity of every group, its formation, its commander, and the role of each proselytization and media committee, camp, group coordinating committee and publication and declaration printing committee in it, binding every member of the group to commit himself loyally and sincerely to the principles of the group, to detachment and to patience, as well as committees to prepare people giving sermons at public symposia and to send out delegations of people giving sermons inside and outside Alexandria.

Among the people arrested were Khalid al-Za'farani, owner of a bookshop; Sani Isma'il Sani, an engineer in a contracting firm; Ibrahim al-Za'farani; Ahmad Yahya Matar, a student in the final year of medical school; Usamah Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi; al-'Iraqi Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi; Ahmad Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi; Ahmad 'Abd-al-Jawad 'Abd-al-Karim, a law student; Ayman al-Mughrabi, a pharmacy student; Mu'min Fadil Karim of the Faculty of Letters; Awwad Yusuf'Ali; and 'Umar 'Azzam, an engineering student.

The investigation was undertaken by 10 attorneys in the Office of the East Alexandria Public Prosecutor under the supervision of Counsellor Sami al-Bariri,

attorney general with the East Alexandria public prosecutor's offices. They were charged with the possession of publications that embraced the propagation of resistance to and vilification of the basic principles on which the system of government was founded, preaching against the alliance of the forces of the people, provoking factional strife, and disseminating false declarations which had the effect of offending public security and inflicting harm on the public interest.

The Office of the Public Prosecutor also continued its investigation into 33 people who proceeded to gather in front of the Mosque of the Commander Ibrahim at the al-Raml Station and attacked security officials when they tried to prevent them from holding a meeting in the mosque to discuss seizing Shaykh al-Mahallawi, the imam of the mosque, and some political issues and events of factional strife. It raised the charge of gathering, resisting the authorities and affronting national unity against them. The Office of the Public Prosecutor ordered the 4-day imprisonment of all the people arrested during the investigation, and continued its investigation.

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NEW LIGHT SHED ON ORGANIZATION LEADERS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 3

/Article: "The Commanders of the Islamic Groups -- Who Are They and How Do They Think?"/

/Text/ Of them, President al-Sadat has said, "They are destroying young people's minds, and I am fearful for my children the students."

They are people who call themselves "commanders of the Islamic groups." Islam is as innocent of them as the fox was of the blood of Jacob's son.

Most unfortunately, they have tremendous power over the young people who have been influenced by them and who have been attracted to them in the name of religion. Their power even exceeds that of fathers and mothers.

Indeed, their interpretation of religion, in the view of their subjects, is more correct and valid than the interpretations of scholars, jurists and memorable men of the Islamic religion.

Of them, President al-Sadat has said, "The events prove the extent of the corrupting influence that these groups have exerted on young people's minds."

What do you know about the views of these Islamic groups? Who are they? What are they doing? How far has their activity inside and outside the universities gone?

Dr Hilmi al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jazzar

He is 26 and is the general commander of the Islamic societies. He was born in Sirs al-Layyan, Governorate of al-Minufiyah, and is a doctor of distinction at the Umm al-Misriyin Hospital in the Governorate of al-Jizah.

He was a commander of an Islamic group at Cairo University when he was a student and now is the general commander of the Islamic societies.

He takes part in the symposia, conferences and camps the Islamic group holds, gives Friday prayer sermons at certain local mosques, gives religious instruction and, in his discussions during this instruction, concentrates on the following points:

1. Alleging that the People's Assembly is of no effect in solving the problems of

the masses.

2. Describing the two Camp David agreements as a setback resembling the June setback and demanding that it be abrogated and that the measures of normalizing relations be stopped.

3. Referring to the need to establish Islam by the sword and the holy book.

4. Explaining the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and stating that he witnessed Christians firing on Moslems and that the statement by the deputy prime minister and the minister of the interior in this regard was false.

Dr 'Isam-al-Din Muhammad Hasan al-'Iryan

He was born in the section of Nahiya, Imbabah District, Governorate of al-Jizah, is 27, is an independent doctor and works as an editor for the magazine AL-DA'WAH. He is married to the sister of Salah-al-Din Fadl, a politician who had previously been charged in the Military Technical College case and the recent holy war case.

He is an active leader in the Islamic groups. He prepares and supervises the convening of the Monday classes which the group holds at the Salah-al-Din Mosque in al-Manyal every week.

He watches over the attendance of meetings of heads of Islamic groups and bodies in his capacity as a representative of the Islamic groups.

He has worked perseverently in giving Friday prayer sermons at the al-Rahman Mosque in Garden City (locally), and also in giving religious classes in the Salah-al-Din Mosque in al-Manyal and attending symposia the Islamic groups give in various governorates, concentrating in his talks on the following points:

1. Attacking officials in the university on the charges that they have opposed elements of the Islamic groups.

2. Attacking the security forces and alleging that they have opposed the call to religion.

3. Condemning the Camp David agreements, alleging that they have failed, that they have brought shame on government officials and that Egypt has lost its influence in the Arab environment as a result of this treaty.

4. Planning movements inside and outside the universities and issuing orders for the commanders of Islamic groups to execute.

Dr 'Abd-al-Mun'im Abu-al-Fattuh 'Abd-al-Hadi

He was born in Misr al-Qadimah on 15 October 1951.

He is a leader of the Islamic group in Cairo.

He has assiduously given talks at symposia the Islamic groups hold in various governorates. He criticizes the media on the charge that they take part in

corrupting the morals of young people and that Moslems are now being oppressed by government officials, and stresses that government officials are determined to assign Sharon, the Israeli minister of agriculture, the task of reclaiming desert lands in the country, that there are plots being woven against Islam, and that the Moslems must strengthen bonds among themselves to confront these schemes, while attacking Christians and claiming that they are behind the failure to apply Islamic law in the People's Assembly.

Wajdi 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad Ghunaym

He was born in Sawhaj on 8 February 1951, lives in Damanhur, is an employee of the Damanhur Department of Electricity and has been delegated to work in the Institute of Reading of the al-Azhar region in Damanhur.

He gives speeches at symposia held by the Islamic societies in various governorates, in which he concentrates on the following:

1. The government security intelligence agency is agreeing to give Christians but not Moslems permits to bear arms.

2. The security agencies are aware of the stockpiling of arms in monasteries and churches but are not strong enough to cope with that.

3. He attacks his eminence the sheikh of al-Azhar for agreeing to cooperate with Christians and to take part in celebrating their holidays.

4. He condemns the president's agreement to the construction of 50 churches a year.

5. He attacks the notion of establishing a complex for religions in Sinai, on the charge that that is in violation of Islamic law.

6. He condemns the president's previous declaration that there is no religion in politics and no politics in religion.

7. He prohibits prayers in mosques where there are mausoleums, except in the Mosque of the Prophet, on whom be God's prayers and peace.

8. He prohibits listening to songs and music.

9. He prohibits smoking and shaking hands with women.

10. He attacks the family planning project, claiming that it is a Crusader scheme to destroy Islam, demands that one not commit himself to it and attacks the new Personal Status Law and the Law on Impropriety.

11. He demands that Moslems not eat imported meat and poultry, on the charge that it is slaughtered in a manner contrary to Islamic law.

12. He claims that the government has become a state of male and female performers.

Dr Mahmud Mustafa Mahmud Hubballah

He was born in Dessuq, Governorate of Kafr al-Shaykh, on 8 May 1949 and is a doctor at the Sawhaj Instructional Hospital.

He gives speeches at religious gatherings held by the Islamic group in the Governorates of al-Minya, Asyut and Sawhaj where techniques of provocation are devised. In his discussions he emphasizes the following points:

Claiming that the president is intending to concentrate, through his speeches, on discussing projects for self-sufficiency in food with the goal of alienating the masses from the basic problems that exist in the society.

That officials in the country are precipitously rushing to embrace the United States of America now, as they had previously rushed precipitously into the embrace of the Soviet Union.

Claiming that Jews are now occupying the Governorate of al-Buhayrah.

Attacking the president and claiming that he was cooperating with the enemies of Islam.

Attacking Jews and Christians, attacking the family planning project, claiming that that is a Zionist-Christian plot to weaken Islam, and condemning the declaration the president previously made to the effect that there is no religion in politics and no politics in religion.

Khalid 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Umar al-Za'farani

He was born in Kafr al-Shaykh 23 July 1952. He works as an employee in the private sector al-Andalus Trading and Contracting Company in Alexandria.

He was a member of the Society of Atonement and Reclusion when it was first formed but then split off from it. He is a leader of the Islamic group in Alexandria. He sometimes makes statements at the Fajr-al-Islam Mosque in Alexandria, in which he concentrates on the following:

Bringing up the factional incidents that occurred in the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' area.

Attacking some religious leaders in the country and accusing them of carrying out schemes that are harmful to the country.

Planning certain disturbances in the city of Alexandria and attacking citizens.

He was previously arrested in case 618 for 1973, the number of the investigations by the Office of the Higher State Security Prosecutor into the "Atonement and Reclusion /Society/." He was also arrested in Higher State Security Case 520 for 1975 on the extremist "Yahya Hashim" organization.

al-Sayyid 'Abd-al-Wahhab 'Abd-al-'Azim

He was born in Maghaghah, Governorate of al-Minya, on 30 October 1961. He was an

orphan in the village of De'rut, Maghaghah District, in the Governorate of al-Minya, and a student in the Faculty of Science at al-Minya.

He is a leader of the Islamic group in the University of al-Minya.

He has repeatedly given Friday prayer sermons in local mosques in the city of al'Minya, in which he has concentrated on the following:

1. Condemning the family planning project.

2. Alleging that corruption is widespread throughout the country.

3. Condemning the regime on the charge that it does not commit itself to God's revelations.

4. Condemning the Egyptian media.

5. Condemning officials in the University of al-Minya for taking measures to dismiss some members of the Islamic group.

Mahmud 'Ali 'Abd-al-Hakim

He was born in al-Minya on 15 June 1930 and lives in Samalut al-Balad, District of Samalut, Governorate of al-Minya. He is the vice principal of Samalut coeducational primary school in Samalut.

He is one of the persons that have been ceaselessly programming means of provocation while giving speeches at meetings, conferences and Islamic camps held by the Islamic societies in al-Minya, and in his talks he stresses the following points:

1. The allegation that there is a plot to eliminate Islam.

2. The allegation that the United States of America is ridiculing the Arab countries and siding with Israel.

3. Attacks against the Sudanese government for its position on the Society of Brothers there.

4. Demands that young Moslems propagate consciousness of Islam.

5. Attacks on officials on the allegation that they are reluctant to apply Islamic law.

6. Attacks on the media on the claim that they are participating in corrupting the morals of the young.

Ramzi Farhan Muhammad 'Ali

He was born in Bani Arzah, District of Abnub, on 9 December 1954 and lives in Manfalut as an employee in the Asyut Court of Appeals. He is one of the elements that program violent methods in the course of their activity. He was previously arraigned in Administrative Case 1,944, Manfalut, 1980, concerning a breakin by

some Islamic group personnel into the Manfalut Sporting Club to prevent the showing of a movie, which is still pending. He was also arraigned in Administrative Case 804, Manfalut, which involved a gathering by some members of the Islamic group in Manfalut. "The case has not been definitely disposed of."

al-Sayyid Muhammad 'Ali Markan

He was born in al-Maraghah, Sawhaj, on 18 January 1950 and resides there as a welder.

He is the commander of the Islamic group in al-Maraghah.

He supervises the holding of religious symposia for leadership personnel in the Islamic group.

He was previously accused in temporary administrative case 439 for 1981 in al-Maraghah for leading some Islamic group personnel in establishing a mosque on state-owned land next to a church in order to provoke factional conflicts with Christian inhabitants and for resisting the authorities when the police took action against this activity. The case is still pending.

Nasr Salih Muhammad Talbah

He was born in Bulaq, Cairo, on 10 November 1949 and lives in Manfalut. He is an employee of the Education Department in Manfalut.

He is a member of the Islamic group.

He was previously accused in Administrative Case 1,014, Manfalut, for 1980 concerning an attack he and others made on the Manfalut Club to prevent the showing of a movie.

Ilhami Husayn Husayn Muhammad Husayn al-Sulamuni

He was born in Salamun, District of Tama, on 22 February 1953, and lives there as a teacher in the Salah Salim Preparatory School in Tama.

He is a leader of the Islamic group in Tama. He supervises the religious gatherings the Islamic Society holds and has worked zealously in giving speeches in some gatherings, in which he emphasizes the levelling of criticism against the existing regime, attacks Christians and criticises some conditions in the government.

He was previously arraigned in Misdemeanor case 4,108 for 1980 in Tama for destroying the walls surrounding the Abu Lamin Monastery in the Salamun area, along with some other persons.

'Abd-al-Halim al-Sayyid Hasan

He was born in Salamun, District of Tama, Governorate of Sawhaj, on 11 September 1950. He is a teacher in Tahta Secondary Agricultural School and lives in the Salamun area, Tama District.

He is a leadership element in the Islamic groups in the center of Tema, Sawhaj.

He has been active in giving speeches at religious meetings and conferences in which he concentrates on the following points: attacking officials in the government and stirring up factional chauvinism.

Jamal Hamid 'Ali

He was born in al-Saline on 17 January 1956 and lives there. He is a legal affairs investigator in the Education Department of al-Saline.

He is a leading member of the Islamic group in al-Saline.

He has been busy giving talks at religious symposia, in which he concentrates on the following points:

Directing criticism against officials in the government.

Attacking Christians.

God does not accept the activities of hypocrites and rulers who have swerved from his path and have spread about corruption on earth [sic]. He attacks the president, on the charge that he is not ruling in accordance with God's revelations. He condemns the positions of officials in establishing tourist projects on the Red Sea coast.

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MAGAZINE PROVIDES INFORMATION ON ISLAMIC GROUP COMMANDERS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic #2970 11 Sep 81 pp 10, 11, 65

[Article: "The Commanders of the Islamic Groups in the Universities"]

[Text] In each faculty the Islamic groups have installed a commander who is in charge of thinking for them. The commander in the Islamic groups prohibits the eating of imported food, prompts his subjects to oppose girls, prevents or obstructs student parties, interprets the verses of the holy Koran in its coercive sense and opposes scholars.

AL-MUSAWWAR is devoting itself exclusively to publishing [information] the conduct of 28 commanders in our Egyptian universities and is presenting the secrets of their oppressive thinking.

Dr Hilmi al-Jazzar

Secretary general of the Islamic groups

He was born in Sirs al-Layyan, Governorate of al-Minufiyah, on 2 August 1935. He is a doctor of distinction in Umm al-Misriyin Hospital in the Governorate of al-Jizah and resides in the doctors' housing in the hospital.

Aspects of Activities

He was a commander of the Islamic group in Cairo University when he was a student and is now the general commander of the Islamic groups throughout the republic.

He takes part in the symposia, conferences and camps which the Islamic group holds and today gives Friday prayer sermons in some local mosques and gives religious courses. In his conversations in them, he concentrates on the following points:

Claiming that there is no effectiveness to the People's Assembly in solving the problems of the masses.

Describing the two Camp David treaties as a setback resembling the June setback, demanding that they be abrogated and that the measures of normalizing relations be stopped.

Referring to the need to establish Islam through the sword and the holy book.

Attacking the members of Christian sects.

Describing the events in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and stating that he witnessed Christians firing on Moslems and that the declaration by the deputy prime minister and the minister of the interior in this regard was incorrect.

The [fact that the] loss of Jerusalem may be attributed to the extension of a treasonous hand which signed the peace treaties with Israel.

Condemning the security agencies, claiming that they are fighting against the call to Islam.

Condemning and attacking the media.

Planning all problems, acts of provocation and clases which take place inside and outside the universities.

He was involved in provocative movements and activities during the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and supervised the preparation of provocative publications which were distributed and spread about on a broad scale in Cairo and some governorates during these events.

He played the main part in coordinating the Islamic groups with the Group of Moslem Brothers.

Sermonizers Who Are Not Entitled to Pulpits in Mosques

Hafiz 'Ali Salamah

He is the head of the Islamic Guidance Society in Suez and man in charge of the al-Nur Mosque in Cairo.

A [Moslem] Brother who has previously been arrested.

He takes charge of giving sermons at the local Mosque of the Martyrs in Suez. He pursues a provocative style, concentrating on the following in his sermons.

Demanding that Moslems not stand silently by in the face of the arrest of Shaykh al-Mahallawi.

Attacking the peace agreement and describing it as a treaty of capitulation.

Claiming that there are American military bases in the country aimed at striking out at the Islamic movement.

Claiming that the measures taken against Shaykh al-Mahallawi were by arrangement with American intelligence.

Stirring up factionalism, attacking Christians, claiming that the government was encouraging missionary activity at a time when it was obstructing Islamic activity, and demanding that Moslems boycott Christians.

Claiming that there is no democracy in the country.

Mitwalli Yusuf Shalabi

He is on loan to teach in Qatar and constantly visits the country to attend religious meetings and give courses at certain local mosques.

A former [Moslem] Brother.

Well known for foolhardiness, excitability, fanaticism and the provocation of students.

He takes charge of giving sermons at the local al-Nur Mosque in al-'Abbasiyah and sometimes at the local Martyrs' Mosque in Suez. In his speeches and courses, he pursues a provocative style concentrating on the following points:

Resistance to any measure the Ministry of Religious Endowments takes to prevent political independence in the pulpit and incitement of people at prayer to oppose these resolutions.

Propagation of rumors in a recent Friday sermon to the effect that the young people in the Islamic groups forcibly carried off one of the imams in a mosque in Alexandria and compelled him to give a sermon, though Central Security vehicles had surrounded the mosque to seize him, and that the government cannot influence any Christian fanatic.

Encouragement of young people to resist the authorities by force, even if that reaches the point of resisting the Central Security forces, and encouragement of young Moslems to be in a state of permanent holy war.

Attacks against the peace agreement, demanding that the Egyptian people boycott the people of Israel economically, culturally and socially.

The allegation that the laws on al-Azhar were purchased in 1960 in exchange for having Moslem scholars obtain positions in the government.

Attacks against the birth control and insurance company savings programs.

Propagation of the rumor that there is a plot to assassinate one of his colleagues who is a head of a religious group and that a sniper has been appointed to assassinate him.

Provocation of religious fanaticism and attacks against other religions.

The allegation that the statements issued by officials on the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' events are not correct, in order to spread dissension among groups of people at prayer, and exaggerated description of these events in order to increase the severity of tension in the region.

Husayn Mahmud Kamil Muhammad, Agriculture in al-Fayyum

He was born on 17 January 1958 in the village of Abu Kasah, in the District of Ibshaway, and is a student in the Faculty of Agriculture in al-Fayyum.

He is the commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He and other members of the group in the faculty lead the following activity:

Attempts to provoke students to engage in mob activities as a manifestation of opposition to the peace agreement.

Resistance to male and female students in their university life and attempts to take over faculty auditoriums.

Muhammad Sayyid Isma'il, Medicine, 'Ayn Shams University

He was born on 12 September 1957.

He is a student in the Faculty of Medicine, 'Ayn Shams University.

He is commander of the Islamic group at the Faculty of Medicine in 'Ayn Shams University.

He and other members of the group lead the following activity:

Attempts to segregate male and female students and oppose the holding of mixed excursions.

Participation in conferences organized by Islamic groups, which are pervaded by attacks against the policies of the regime.

Organization of conferences in the courtyard of the university sanctuary and the suspension of courses.

Opposition to various facets of student activity that some university families hold.

Usamah Ahmad Khalifah Ibrahim, Pharmacy, Cairo

He was born on 25 November 1958 in Qina and is a student in the Faculty of Pharmacy, Cairo.

Manifestations of his activity:

He is commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Medicine at Cairo [University].

He took part with other members of the Islamic group in the following movements:

Gathering in the attempt to prevent student activity organized by a student family.

Attacking the faculty administration and attempting to take over the faculty mosque.

'Atif Ibrahim Muhammad, Education, 'Ayn Shams

Born on 28 August 1957, a student in the Faculty of Education at 'Ayn Shams University.

He and other members of the group have led opposition to student activity in the university and he has incited his colleagues to meet in front of the faculty theater, repeating certain slogans.

Tal'at Fahmi 'Abd-al-Fattah, Letters, Cairo

He was born on 22 December 1957.

He is a student in the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University.

He is commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

He and other members of the Islamic group in the faculty have led the following activity:

Attempts to take over some buildings in the faculty on the claim of turning them into places for female students and places of worship, although there is a mosque in the faculty, and to hold a march inside the faculty, repeating some cries in order to realize their goal.

Writing and hanging wall publications containing opposition articles.

Performance of a march inside the university compound to protest the student elections and the new bylaws and to demand that they be boycotted.

Resistance to student activity by force, injuring some students and causing damage to Auditorium 78 in the faculty.

Distribution of statements inciting hatred of the regime and provoking resistance to officials.

Fahmi Muhammad Muhammad 'Amir, Letters, Alexandria

He was born on 20 October 1958 in Alexandria.

He is a student in the Faculty of Letters, Alexandria University.

He is the commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Letters.

He and other members of the Islamic group in the faculty carried out the following activity:

Attempted to take over the faculty facilities in order to take them as a headquarters for the Islamic group.

Appealed for an end to studies, gathering in the faculty courtyard and giving statements involving condemnation of the regime.

Protesting against female student participation in student activity in university families.

Muhammad Rajab al-Qashawi, Engineering, Port Said

He was born on 3 August 1958 in Port Said.

He is a student in the Faculty of Engineering in Port Said, the University of the Canal.

He is commander of the Islamic group in the faculty and member of the republic-wide Consultative Council of Islamic Groups.

He embraces the Moslem Brothers' thinking and is in contact with elements of the Brothers in Port Said.

He has taken part with other members of the Islamic group in Port Said in the following movements:

Holding conferences in Port Said mosques in which statements were made involving an attack against the existing regime and the political leadership.

Editing and hanging up opposition wall publications.

'Ala'-al-Din Muhammad Mahmud Dassuqi, Commerce, 'Ayn Shams

Born on 12 December 1957.

A student in the Faculty of Commerce at 'Ayn Shams University.

Commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Commerce at 'Ayn Shams University.

He and other members of the Islamic group have led:

The editing and hanging up of wall publications containing opposition articles.

The condemnation of divine religions and opposition to Christian students.

'Ala' Ahmad al-Tijani, Science, Alexandria

He was born on 28 September 1960.

A student in the Faculty of Science, Alexandria University.

Commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He and other members of the Islamic group in the faculty lead the following movement:

Organization of marches, the recitation of cries hostile to the faculty administration, and the suspension of studies.

The attempt to commit aggression against security personnel in the faculty when they prevent them from hanging wall articles that contain provocativa statements of opposition without obtaining permission from the faculty administration.

The attachment of wall publications containing articles of opposition. The measures taken in his regard: he was handed over to the disciplinary council for the first episode and it decided to suspend him for a period of 3 weeks.

Hasan Ghurayyib Khalil Faddah, Veterinary Medicine, al-Zaqaziq

He was born on 26 June 1958, Minya al-Qamh.

He is a student in the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine in the University of al-Zaqaziq.

He is commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine.

He has edited and hung wall publications containing certain articles in opposition to the regime, the university administration and economic conditions in the country.

Ibrahim Ahmad Ibrahim 'Amr, Commerce, University of the Canal

He was born on 23 June 1960 in Cairo.

Student in the Faculty of Commerce, Port Said, University of the Canal.

He is commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Commerce, Port Said.

He has ceaselessly been making statements to faculty students involving opposition to the existing regime and attacking the peace agreement.

He, with other members of the Islamic group, has taken part in the following movements:

Editing and hanging up opposition wall publications.

Protesting against the appointment of imams to mosques in Port Said by the Ministry of Religious Endowments.

Muhammad Muhammad Raja'i, Commerce, Bani Suwayf

He was born on 16 April 1957.

He is a student in the Faculty of Commerce, Bani Suwayf, Cairo University.

He is commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He and other members of the Islamic group in the faculty have led the following activities:

Writing articles against the policy of the regime.

Organizing symposis through which they condemn the regime and attack the peace treaty.

Distributing publications to students casting aspersion on divine religions.

Jostling and attacking students.

Islam Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi, Agriculture, Alexandria

He was born on 25 July 1957.

He is the commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He and others have led the following activity:

Provoking students against the faculty administration and attacking the new student bylaws.

Writing and hanging publications on walls that contain articles opposed to the regime and the university administration.

Muhammad Naji Muhammad Bayyumi, Faculty of Fine Arts, Alexandria

He was born on 27 April 1959, Naj' Hammadi.

He is a student in the Faculty of Fine Arts in Alexandria -- Hilwan University.

He is commander of the Islamic group at the Faculty of Fine Arts in Alexandria -- Hilwan University.

He took part along with other members of the Islamic group in the following movements:

Holding religious symposia in the faculty auditoriums, in which statements were made that contained condemnations of the policies of the existing regime.

Provoking students in the faculty to assemble to condemn the faculty administration for prohibiting students from wearing gowns during their classes.

Hasan Wahbah Hasan Wahbah, Veterinary Medicine, Cairo University

He was born on 24 May 1953 in Cairo.

He is a student in the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine at Cairo University.

Aspects of his activity:

He is commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He and other members of the Islamic group wrote wall publications containing articles condemning the regime's policies and attacking the admission of the late Shah of Iran into the country.

'Abd-al-Rahman al-Banna Mahmud, Dentistry, Cairo

Born on 13 February 1953.

A student in the faculty of Dentistry, Cairo.

Commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Dentistry, Cairo.

He is linked with [Moslem] Brother activity and has taken very active part in meetings tinged with opposition to government policy.

Has written and hung up opposition wall publications.

Samih Sa'id Hasan al-Saba', Medicine, Alexandria

He was born on 16 August 1960 in Alexandria and is a student in the Faculty of Medicine, Alexandria University.

He is commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Medicine.

He and other members of the Islamic group lead the following activity:

Holding conferences in the faculty courtyard and causing the suspension of studies.

Distributing a publication containing comments on some events in the faculty in order to stir up students.

Ahmad al-Sayyid Hutaybah, Dentistry, Alexandria

He was born on 1 May 1958, Alexandria, and is a student in the Faculty of Dentistry, Alexandria.

He is commander of the Islamic Group in the Faculty of Dentistry, Alexandria.

He has worked assiduously to assemble students in the university village for people from the Governorate of Matruh and has made statements entailing provocation and incitement of them against the policies of the regime.

Ibrahim 'Abbas 'Atallah, Education, Kafr al-Shaykh

Born on 29 May 1960 in Dassuq.

A student in the Faculty of Education, Kafr al-Shaykh, University of Tanta.

Commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Education, Kafr al-Shaykh.

He and others led the following movements:

Inciting students to abstain from eating imported meat and frozen poultry.

Organizing symposis convened by some Brother elements and undertaking to criticize and attack government policy.

Trying to prevent student activity organized by the Family of Egypt in the Faculty of Education and assaulting an electrician with his knife while he was installing some equipment for one of this family's gatherings.

Measures taken regarding him:

He was charged, in misdemeanor case 478 for 1980, Kafr al-Shaykh police station, of acts attributed to him in the disturbances in the faculty, and the office of the public prosecutor decided to release him on a bail of 20 pounds.

He was brought before the disciplinary council and a decree was issued dismissing him from the faculty for a period of 3 months.

Mustafa Muhammad Hamzawi, Commerce, Alexandria

He was born on 28 December 1957; student in the Faculty of Commerce, University of Alexandria.

Commander of the Islamic society in the faculty.

He has worked tirelessly to prepare wall publications which the group issues inside the university that include attacks on the political leaders and officials in the government, on the charge that there are matters which distort Islam.

He has been active in attending Islamic camps prepared by the group and giving provocative religious courses and talks on various occasions, through which he has attacked the political leadership.

Ihab Ramzi Muhammad Badir, Engineering, Shabin al-Kawm

Born on 18 November 1957 in the section of Batitah, District of al-Mahallah al-Kubra.

Student in the Faculty of Engineering.

Commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Engineering, Shabin al-Kawm.

He and other members of the Islamic group have led the following movement:

Writing and hanging up wall publications containing opposition articles.

Organizing symposia and lectures in the faculty to cast doubts on the government's policies, stir up students, call on them to hold marches, incite them against the university administration and propagate rumors regarding economic conditions in the country.

'Amr Muhammad Hasan 'Azzam, Commander of Alexandria University

He was born on 25 June 1958 in Alexandria.

He is a student in the Faculty of Engineering, Alexandria University.

He and other members of the Islamic group in the university have led the following movement:

Organizing a march against the Faculty of Science administration for handling some of his colleagues over to investigation in the faculty in March 1980 because of acts of aggression attributed to them.

Speaking in the auditoriums and attacking divine religions.

Organizing marches in the faculty to protest the university administration's decrees to organize the course of student federation elections in the month of December.

Usamah Sa'd-al-Din al-'Iraqi, Engineering, Alexandria

He was born on 14 February 1955, al-Daqahliyah, and is a student in the Faculty of Engineering, University of Alexandria.

Manifestations of his activity:

Commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He and other members of the Islamic group have led the following activity:

Writing wall publications containing articles attacking the university administration for issuing a decree organizing the student elections.

Organizing marches in the faculty courtyard to protest against faculty administration decrees taken with respect to some members of the society who had committed acts of aggression.

Trying to provoke persons at prayer on 17 July 1981 in the Mosque of the Commander Ibrahim, in the wake of the Ministry of Religious Endowment's transfer of the imam of the mosque, and assembling in the mosque.

Majdi Muhsin Rajab Wardah, Law, Alexandria

He was born on 29 March 1959.

Student in the Faculty of Law, Alexandria University.

Commander of the Islamic group in the Faculty of Law, Alexandria University, and a person who embraces al-Salafiyah thinking.

He and other members of the Islamic group in the university have led the following movement:

Distributing and publishing statements opposed to university students.

Trying to stir students up against the existing regime.

Putting a stop to parties given by certain student families in the university.

Giving provocative statements in opposition to faculty students and condemning the media and political conditions in the country.

Segregating male and female students in the auditoriums and cafeterias.

Scuffling with and threatening faculty security superintendents.

Giving provocative Friday sermons in some local mosques.

He had previously attacked some students for their refusal to carry out his orders not to sit with female students.

Haytham Zakariya 'Abd-al-Hamid Rashid, Commerce, Cairo

Born on 20 July 1960.

Student in the Faculty of Commerce, Cairo University.

Commander of the Islamic group, Faculty of Commerce, Cairo.

He and other members of the university group have led the following movement:

Writing and hanging up wall publications containing opposition articles.

Preventing members of a university family from conducting student activities.

Calling on some [Moslem] Brother elements in the opposition to give lectures and symposia in the faculty in an attempt to raise doubts and provocation.

Opposing Christian students and the Christian religion.

Giving talks and lectures condemning the current regime in the country.

Ahmad Badri Muhammad Nayil, Letters, Sawhaj

Born on 1 September 1960 in Idfu, Aswan.

A student in the Faculty of Letters, Sawhaj.

He took part with other members of the Islamic group in Sawhaj in the following movements:

Breaking into the university village, attacking some Christian citizens on the evening of Shamm al-Nasim, April 1981, and scuffling with security men who had intervened to settle the situation.

Writing and hanging up opposition articles in the courtyard of the university branch in Sawhaj.

Attacking university security personnel when they had terminated the residence of some students who had been dismissed from the university village.

Measures taken in regard to him:

The university disciplinary council decided to dismiss him for the academic year 1981-82 for participating in the disturbances in the university.

He was accused along with others in administrative case 1006 for 1981 of attacking the security personnel in the university in July 1981 and was released on bond of his place of residence.

Ra'fat Muhammad Hasan Darwish, Mining Engineering, Suez

He was born on 15 January 1959 in Fuwwah, Kafral-Shaykh.

A student in the Faculty of Petroleum and Mining Engineering in Suez, University of the Canal.

Commander of the Islamic group in the faculty.

He took part with other members of the Islamic group in Suez in the following movements:

Holding an Islamic conference in a mosque in Suez, in which he made statements that included an attack on the current regime. Gathering in the faculty courtyard and repeating opposition cries in an attempt to stop a party honoring professors and final year students.

Jamal Muhammad Bakhit Salim, Faculty of Education, Asyut

Born on 19 December 1959, Abnuo.

Student in the Faculty of Education, Asyut, and commander of the Islamic group there.

He has been very active in attacking students.

He has also used the Education Faculty microphone to give a religious talk and provoke students in the faculty. When the faculty dean warned him, he did not comply with his command, and insulted him in an undignified manner. A decree has already been issued by the faculty disciplinary council dismissing him for the academic year 1980-81.

He was charged in misdemeanor case 3535, Precinct One, Asyut, for striking out a student.

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BRIEFS

UNIVERSITY COMMANDERS ARRESTED--AL-AKHBAR has learned that everyone known as group commander of one of the Islamic groups throughout the republic has been detained as well. /Excerpt from text/

/Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 4 Sep 81 p 1/

CSO: 4504/107

MEASURES FOR CRACKING DOWN ON RELIGIOUS GROUPS DISCUSSED

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 5 Sep 81 p 1

[Article: "When Will It Be Proper Legally To Dissolve the 1,500 Religious Societies in Egypt?"]

[Text] There are 9,500 religious, cultural, scientific and social societies in Egypt, 1,500 of which are Islamic and Christian religious societies. There are conditions which must be met for establishing and announcing religious societies. These societies must play a basic part in the field of social care, and there must be an urgent need for their establishment. Holding these societies is a right guaranteed by the constitution to every Egyptian citizen, but with conditions. A society will be considered null and void if it violates public order and morality. The Department of Social Affairs has the right to dissolve the board of directors of a society in special cases; if it is proved that a society has violated the law, the ministry will send it a warning to cease its violations within 15 days. In the event it does not comply, its board of directors must be dissolved and a temporary board will be formed for a period of 1 year, which can be extended to 3 years.

The board of directors of a society will be dissolved if it is proved that it fails to achieve its objectives, has committed a grave violation of the law, or has violated public order and morality.

The conditions under which the Ministry of [Social] Affairs has the right to dissolve a society or its board of directors are:

If its inability to achieve the goals for which it was established is proved.

If it disburses its funds in a manner other than those specified in accordance with its goals.

If it fails to hold its general assembly 2 years in a row.

If it commits a serious violation of the law or violates public order and morality.

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UNIONIST GROUPING PAMPHLETS SEIZED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Sep 81 p 1

/Article: "Seizure of Provocative Pamphlets in Grouping Party Headquarters"/

/Text/ The security agencies seized a large number of publications in the Grouping Party building inciting the masses and directing false rumors that have the effect of damaging the country's security. The printing and copying equipment used was also seized and confiscated.

The state security investigators presented Counsellor Raja' al-'Arabi, general attorney for the Officer of the Higher State Security Prosecutor, with a report stating that the Grouping Party had issued a number of successive publications the last 2 days containing an invitation to the masses to rebel against the government's decrees concerning the arrest of persons who have been busily stirring up dissension, stirring up the masses, and calling on them to stand up to the government to abrogate these decrees and release persons who had been arrested.

The public attorney 'Asim 'Abd-al-Hamid, head of the Office of the Public Prosecutor, has been delegated to investigate the Grouping Party's headquarters on al-Antikkhanah and 26 July Streets in Cairo and to seize publications, written materials, printing machinery and equipment, copying machines, and equipment used for printing and publishing.

The head of the Office of the Public Prosecutor accompanied a police force to the two headquarters of the two parties and a large number of pamphlets that had been readied for distribution were seized, as was a further quantity that was in the process of being printed along with written materials and statements inciting the masses to overthrow the regime.

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WRITER EXAMINES RELATIONS BETWEEN SECULAR LEFT, RELIGIOUS RIGHT

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 30 Aug 81 p 7

/Article by Muhammad Sa'd: "Has the Honeymoon Ended between the Left and the Religious Groups?"/

/Text/ In party circles they say that the short honeymoon between the party of the left and the Islamic groups has ended. Is that true?

This honeymoon began some months ago, with veiled overtures that turned into overt ones at meetings and discussions of the party of the left, starting with an invitation to embark on a dialogue with the Islamic groups and going on to participation in independent theorizing about Islam and then to praise of the struggle of Shaykh Hasan al-Banna.

It was, in their view, a successful attempt to attract the Islamic left and bring it into the embrace of leftist currents.

Until the honeymoon ended.

In the past weeks, in the wake of the factional events, a covert struggle between the party of the left and the Islamic groups has become prominent.

In more than one statement, the Islamic groups have attacked Communist schemes in the region and have described marxists as enemies of Islam whose goal is to distort the picture of all Islamic groupings.

The party of the left severely criticized the latest statement issued by the Islamic groups on their position vis-a-vis the factional events committed in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and the Church of Good Will in Shubra. It described that as a fanatic, nonobjective statement which entailed immediate provocation.

In its response to the Islamic groups' statement, the Grouping Party declared that it differed with them on some issues, such as the position on the Zionist state, on grounds that its inhabitants were Jews, and defended the Soviet Union, the first country to recognize Israel.

Matters did not stop at the exchange of ideological accusations but went beyond that to indications of the role of both in feeding the currents of fanaticism.

We find the Grouping Party accompanying its response to the Islamic groups' statement with an incident attributed to the members of one of the Islamic groups in Hilwan, to the effect that a large number of these members, armed with heavy clubs, attacked and struck citizens, resulting in death and injury to some of them.

These are the details of the incident as declared by the party of the left, and we have no comment on them!

It remains for us to say that some people still doubt that the honeymoon between the left and the religious elements has ended and describe what is happening between them as a tentative maneuver!

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SCHIZOPHRENIA OF LEFT ON RELIGIOUS TURBULENCE CONDEMNED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Sep 81 p 6

/Article: "The So-Called Religious Committee of the Party of the Left: an Islamic Facade for an Atheistic Party"/

/Text/ In his latest speech, President Anwar al-Sadat referred to "the story behind the religious committee" which the party of the left, some of whose leaders were implicated in the incidents of factional dissension, has originated.

What is the story behind this committee?

What are its stands vis-a-vis issues and events in the Islamic world?

A number of party members who have taken upon themselves the task of convincing their party's leadership of the importance of establishing a wing for the Islamic left within party ranks have called for the establishment of a religious affairs secretariat within the party of the left. Foremost proponents of this idea have been Dr Muhammed Ahmad Khalafallah, Dr Hasan Hanafi and Shaykh Mustafa 'Asi.

The leadership of the left has spelled out the new committee's task as a number of goals that will serve the interests of the party in the first place. These are:

Innovating a religious facade for the party which will free it from the change that it is atheistic, communistic and hostile to divine religions.

Attracting new elements under the title of "the Islamic left."

Overcoming the problem of declining membership which the party is suffering from.

Creating bridges for cooperation with opposition currents that express their reservations over the subject of coordinating with the party of the left.

Although this committee has failed to perform its mission, it has continued to play a feeble, unsuccessful proselytizing role in transparent ways, twisting matters to ill effect, so that the religious picture of the party remains as it has been.

It is strange that this committee's religious philosophy is not far removed from the Soviet Communist Party's philosophy on Islamic issues and events. This is

confirmed by the extreme interest by which the party received the statement of the 26th conference of the Soviet Communist Party's sections bearing on its position on Islam; the committee worked hard to study Brezhnev's statement on religious revolutions, giving as an example Iran, and the Soviets' readiness to support all other movements possessing a character of liberation and progress.

There then occurred the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; Moslems were killed and revolutionaries were persecuted, but the leftwing party has declared its support for it and has risen up to defend the policy of colonialistic intervention.

The religious committee has refused to let religious occasions go by without celebrating and holding conferences, symposia and celebrations on the holidays of the birthday of the prophet and the hegira - celebrations which suddenly turn into political invective and the levelling of charges and rumors, so that as the celebration goes on it turns into an artistic free-for-all where the political songs of their singer, Shaykh Imam 'Isa, are greeted by the cries of young people who through the singing have forgotten the sacred nature of the religious occasion -- as well as cries of approval from young girls who are smoking!

When the factional events took place in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and Shubra, the party greeted this situation with provocative, hostile pamphlets that did not remedy the situation so much as inflame it. The religious philosophers of the party enlightened us with strange interpretations and explanations of what took place, sometimes saying that economic liberalization was the cause, sometimes saying that the government was deficient in playing its part. The party then urged the various opposition currents to hold a national unity conference to deal with the issue of strife, not just by boycotting the government but also by opposing it, on grounds that it was responsible for what had happened.

Shaykh Mustafa 'Asi, secretary of the committee and member of the central secretariat of the Grouping Party, whose name appeared in the list of people detained on the decrees of national unity, was removed from his position as the giver of sermons and exhortations in the al-Nasr Mosque in al-Mansura by the Ministry of Religious Endowments some months ago because he had strenuously engaged in stirring up strife and disturbance.

Is the party of the left still in need of this committee, now that its role has been laid bare?

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SOVIET ROLE IN STIRRING UP STRIFE DETAILED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 15 Sep 81 pp 9, 12

/Article by 'Isam Hashish: "Egyptian Intelligence Uncovers Two Conspiracies To Strike out at National Unity and Stability in Egypt by Tape and Photographs"/

/Excerpt from text/ The case was an undercover conflict between Soviet and Egyptian intelligence. Each was operating in quiet and silence, in the conviction that the other knew nothing about its movements.

However, the outlines of this story will bring features of great amazement to the face of the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Cairo, one of the persons implicated in this case. Only through these outlines will one learn that Egyptian intelligence men have been watching his movements and behavior since 1975.

A Young Egyptian Reveals the Plot

The hero in this story is an Egyptian student who loved his country and traveled for its sake to seek an education in the Soviet Union and obtain a doctorate in sanitary engineering. There Soviet intelligence hunted him down and kept after him with threats and pressure. On one side of the scale they placed his acquisition of a doctorate after 4 years of research and study and on the other they placed his cooperation with them and his provision of aid in all the information they needed. He gave his agreement; he would obtain the doctorate and would be one of their men. However, the situation changed. After he turned into a testing ground for their experiments and they had gained trust in him, they left him to go to Cairo, and there another role, that of Egyptian intelligence, began. He stated everything and left the rest of the game to the Egyptian intelligence men; the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy is reading this now, for the first time, though he was one of the people arranging the events.

The name is Rizq Murqus Rizq, a Christian Egyptian citizen born in Alexandria in 1935. He worked as in instructor in the Sanitary Engineering Department of the Engineering Faculty at Alexandria University.

The events in the story go far back. The threads of the story began to be woven 10 years ago when Rizq Murzus waved his family goodbye with both hands on board a ship en route to the Soviet Union, finally about to realize the dream of his life and acquire a doctorate in sanitary engineering.

The Soviet Intelligence Game:

In Moscow, after 4 years of study and research, on 1 April 1975 specifically, the men of Soviet intelligence started their devious role of entangling the Egyptian student.

Yuri Alexeyev, assistant director of the institute in which the Egyptian student was studying, sat in his office with another person by his side. He summoned the student Rizq, who came in with his many papers on his thesis, which was nearing completion, in his hand. Introductions were made between Rizq Murqus, the Egyptian student, and Victor Demetrievitch, a journalist from PRAVDA. The assistant director asked Murqus to perform a service for him. He requested that he do a journalistic paper on the Middle East for his friend. The Egyptian student naively accepted and expressed his readiness to cooperate. Then some idle conversation took place. The journalist asked him about Palestinian guerrilla organizations, when they originated their number and the most popular organizations, on grounds that Rizq had studied the Palestine cause and the history of the Arab nation. The discussion extended to the Kurds, the Druzes, communist influence in Iraq and the plan to establish a Palestinian state on the /West/ Bank, all questions which could have been conventional but were raised for a specific goal.

The journalist was to discover Rizq's abilities, information and breadth of knowledge.

The Press Is a Cover for Espionage

The meeting ended and Rizq prepared the article and handed it over to the journalist. Days passed, and then the journalist got in touch with Rizq again. There was no intermediary to handle this meeting; it went on as if between two friends. The journalist said that he had obtained some money from his paper in exchange for publishing the article on the Middle East and he wanted to share it with his friend. Rizq adamantly refused. The journalist thanked him and asked him if he could follow up by turning to him for information he could help him with on Egypt and the Middle East. The Egyptian student agreed.

The meetings continued; there were eight of them between Victor Demetrievitch and Rizq Murqus; in Salonikia Park in Moscow, discussions took place between the two and started to revolve about a smaller area. Demetrievitch started to ask him about President al-Sadat, his orientation to the West and the extent to which the people were happy with this. Were there opposition groups? Rizq responded in general terms -- not knowing much, since he had been outside Egypt for years. However, doubts began to plague him. He tried to get out of the meetings, but the journalist pursued him and insisted. Doubts grew in the mind of Rizq, who was compelled to refuse adamantly to meet. On the other hand, he was occupied with his thesis and in preparing to defend it.

Postponement of the Thesis

The siege began from another angle. The date for defense of the thesis was postponed. His professors and supervisors started to ignore him. By August 1975 Murqus began to feel that the matter was deliberate. Then suddenly the journalist appeared again. This time he visited Rizq in his residence at 0700 hours in the

morning and asked him "Why don't you want to meet me?" Rizq replied bluntly and boldly in the manner of one who has no expertise, "Because I feel that you belong to intelligence and are behind the postponement of my thesis."

The Threads of the Attempt Are Revealed

The maneuvers moved over to a new stage. The journalist frankly told him that he was a member of intelligence, that he only wanted world peace and the destruction of reactionary forces, and that socialists had to cooperate for the sake of this lofty goal.

Rizq thought, reached a decision in his own mind and agreed, but expressed his fears about Egyptian intelligence, which was well known for its strength and contacts, fearing that his situation would become known. The journalist reassured him that Soviet intelligence was also strong and that no power could touch him as long as he was under its protection.

Agreement at a Higher Level

The agreement started to circulate at a higher level. They now agreed on how contact would take place between them in Egypt or abroad, how they could acquire information, how they could confirm it, and the nature of the information desired. The meetings shifted from Salonkia Park to another area, with space and some walls. The journalist wanted to exert his power over Rizq. He gave him a feeling of being involved in secret activity without intermediaries. Afterward, their meetings took place in the 4th floor of the Budapest Hotel on Petrovsky Street, Room 442. The journalist started to test him. He asked for information about his Egyptian colleagues. Russian intelligence had had information on all of them in advance, but they were testing him and observing how serious he was. Rizq passed all the tests.

At this point Victor declared that Rizq's thesis would be defended at the end of October. It was defended, and he passed with distinction. The final stages of the tactics began: Rizq was to set off in a few days.

How Would the Contacts Take Place?

Agreement was reached on arrangements for having meetings between the two of them after Rizq reached Alexandria. The agreement stipulated the first Tuesday of each month as a meeting date, the telephone would ring at Rizq's home at 2000 hours. The provisions of the arrangement were:

"Good evening, I am your student Yusri -- do you have any objection to our meeting at such and such a time?" Rizq would reply "Not at all, there are no objections, you are welcome."

The next day Rizq would go to the Playboy Casino in San Stefano at 0950 hours. He was to wear a suit and have a white handkerchief folded in a triangle in his upper pocket and an Arabic magazine in his left pocket. These were just identification signs. Rizq would sit down and order something to drink.

Before 1010 hours an emissary of Soviet intelligence would come to him and the

following conversation would take place between them:

"Your face is familiar to me. We met before this in Syria in 1968, in the Green Valley Restaurant."

"Heavens, no, I wasn't in Syria then, I was in Beirut."

At that point the introduction would end and the message would be given. If the emissary did not arrive by 1010 hours he would have to leave.

Rizq Reveals the Plot

Rizq returned to Alexandria on 30 November. The following day he was elsewhere, divulging all his information.

Three years elapsed, in which no contact with Rizq took place.

At this point an Egyptian intelligence official explained to AL-AKHBAR an important distinction between an active agent and a quiescent one. The former is one who is assigned missions and carries them out at once, while the latter is recruited, sent to the requisite places, and remains in an ordinary state until a subsequent time, no matter how long that may be, and is ready to receive information and orders and carry them out at once.

Rizq was of the latter type. Three years went by before they contacted him. They had recruited him and became confident of him, and then the time came to use him. One day when he was leaving the university he met two people who told him "We are friends of Victor's and want to complete the mission that started in Moscow."

The two were officers in Soviet intelligence. The first was Anatoly Bakunim, third secretary in the Soviet Embassy in Cairo, who had arrived in Cairo on 1 July /text ends at this point/.

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ARTICLE ACCUSES NEW WAFD OF SECRET SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 15 Sep 81 p 9

/Article: "When the Dissolved Wafd Party Tried To Provoke Civil War in Egypt!"/

/Text/ This is not the first case the leaders of the dissolved Wafd Party have involved themselves in, nor is it the last. After their spirits became filled with vengeance and hatred, they kindled fire in all of society's values and infiltrated themselves by the basest of means in order to reach the masses, exploiting the masses' sufferings and kindling resentment, strife and revolution in their hearts also.

Their hopes of causing destruction brought them to the point of calling on people to bear arms, even at the risk of civil war. Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din felt no concern or anxiety for the security and safety of the people of Egypt, while bluntly preaching, in these words, "We will face severity with severity and will resist the club by the club and the knife by the knife, even if that leads to civil war." This is his statement, in his voice, on the recordings made of him after the Office of the Higher State Security Prosecutor gave its agreement /to this procedure/.

Gathering Opposition Forces

General Intelligence reports which followed up on the case confirm that it was not important whether Moslems, Christians or Communists joined them -- the important thing /to them/ was that all opposition forces join together and act in tentative harmony in order to carry out their goals of overthrowing the regime at any cost in the name of the people of Egypt, even if the people paid the price for this with their lives and the lives of their children.

The Soviet Union Sketches the Outlines of Dissent

The Soviet Union was sketching the outlines and strategies in the background, leaving it to those people to carry them out. The reports confirm this: the Soviet Union did not prepare its traditional role of raising the red flag before attacking; it knew that the Egyptian people who abused their religion. Rather, it started with a new approach, which would bring it to its ultimate goal of overthrowing the regime in Egypt, after it had become the obstacle to the infiltration of Soviet influence in the Middle East against which all attacks it had tried to launch were dashed. The approach this time was religion, factional strife, since

that was the easiest way to cause blood to flow and turn Egypt into a boiling volcano which would quiet down, finding only here a foothold for itself on Egyptian territory.

A New Party of Opposition Forces

The reports state that after it dissolved itself, the Wafd Party began to have another idea, to establish a new party, and that became its biggest goal; this time, however, it would be a secret party to which Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din gave the name "The Party of Deliverance." Opposition forces started to gather under the new banner, preparing publications, mounting podiums, giving sermons and stirring up the masses. On top of all that, General Intelligence was standing watching what went on, out of concern for Egypt and the people of Egypt, until the moment arrived when the time came to end the conspiracy.

All the leaders who had stood behind the banner assumed a new role. They distanced themselves from leftism and communism, and no longer advocated them in their conversations. Most right-wing forces joined them, as a facade behind which they could hide their real orientations, and began operating in secret.

Publications in the People's And Consultative Assemblies

General Intelligence received permission from the public prosecutor's office to follow up on the movements of these vindictive persons. In the course of the followup, it became apparent that most of the meetings took place in the city of Alexandria and functioned in an unlawful manner, with the aim of getting the domestic front in movement. These persons prepared opposition publications to send to members of the People's Assembly and the Consultative Assembly, some in their handwriting, all with the aim of crystalizing and exploiting problems in order to attract new elements in the form of university youths, workers and intellectuals.

The planning by Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din and Dr Mahmud al-Qadi was for the new party to strive to form party member committees and establish a major printing and publishing house to facilitate the issuance of publications and pamphlets, with the understanding that the people providing cover for the house would be unknown and have no political history, in order to ward off suspicion.

Organization Campaigns abroad

The party had delegates who traveled abroad, such as Ibrahim Tal'at (Alexandria) who traveled to Syria, then France, attacking the regime and its officials in the course of conferences, radio interviews, and articles in newspapers and magazines, as well as other delegates who got in touch with foreign embassies and gave them opposition publications and pamphlets. When their movement started to assume broad dimensions, following the recent detention procedures, General Intelligence arrested some people who had not been detained after they had concentrated their activities on expanding the scope of the structure of the new party, the Party of Deliverance. Among these were the lawyer, Zaghlul 'Abd-al-Latif Bisherah, the lawyer, Fahmi al-Nahhas, and Ibrahim Sulayman 'Ashur.

Among the documents in the case were pamphlets, some of which were actually prepared and distributed, and tape recordings of conversations and meetings.

Tape Recordings of the Conspirators

This statement was in the words of Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din: "We will cause a civil war, facing severity with severity and opposing the club with the club and the knife with the knife.."

This was stated, in the voice of Fahmi al-Nahhas: "We will stand against Anwar al-Sadat with all our power in all areas, in full daylight. I have printed pamphlets and sold them to some imams in al-Azhar in Cairo and Alexandria and am intending to print every day."

The voice of Dr Mahmud al-Qadi said, before the meeting of the general assembly of the Engineer's Union, "All right, here we are, now printing a brochure of 30 or 40 pages, and we can distribute it to the engineers before the assembly meets." al-Qadi said, in a meeting with members of the dissolved Wafd Party, "Reviving the party and bringing it back again is the only weapon by which the authorities can be fought."

In this way, all those opponents who have made Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din's home in Alexandria a center for their meetings have combined vengeance with a desire to destroy the regime. They have damaged the appreciation for and understanding of democracy and opposition, and their selfishness has prompted them to try to reach the seats of government and regain the limelight at any price, even through civil war and involvement with foreign countries. However, General Intelligence acted at the right time to head off their activities, after having followed up on the conspiracies and dissensions for years until the time came to do away with them.

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SOCIALIST LIBERAL PARTY SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT MEASURES

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 13 Sep 81 p 7

/Article by Muhammad Sa'd: "Mustafa Kamil Murad Asserts That Removal of Extremist Elements Is Essential for Supporting National Unity"/

/Text/ The Socialist Liberal Party has declared its support for the national unity decrees President al-Sadat announced to contain the factional incidents and clean up political activity.

The party asserted that the measures and decrees the political leadership has taken are in no way prejudicial to the course of democracy and do not entail any regression.

The secretariat general of the Liberal Party held two meetings last week to study President al-Sadat's statement and define the party's position regarding the decrees and other measures.

At the emergency meeting the secretariat general held last Sunday morning, the party command pointed out that the freedom which the May Revolution had implanted and democratic practices over the past 10 years can no longer be infringed and that the problems of democracy, no matter how great they may be, are not equal to the evil of going back for a day to the system of a single party and single thought that Egypt suffered from.

The Liberal Party supported President al-Sadat's declaration that there are no politics in religion and there is no religion in politics, because the commingling of religion and politics leads to contradictory results. It asserted that open opposition is the sound means for political action and encouraged the whole nation to join ranks and draw together in order to stand up to any violations, acts of impetuosity or unwise conduct.

At the second meeting the party held last Wednesday evening, the secretariat general discussed the report the party representatives were to present to the parliamentary committee assigned to study President al-Sadat's statement, as well as the study which the party's council of specific committees has prepared on the decrees and measures bearing on national unity.

In another area, three Liberal Party leaders took part in the activities of the parliamentary committee formed out of the People's and Consultative Assemblies to

study the president's statement; these were Mustafa Kamil Murad and Riyad Mu'awwad of the Consultative Assembly committee and Ulfat Kamil of the People's Assembly committee.

The Liberal Party chairman pointed out that the removal of extremist elements of the right and the left is essential for supporting national unity and the course of democracy and increasing production and that the elimination of these elements from their places must also extend to include government agencies and the public sector, since there still are some elements occupying important positions that pose an insurmountable obstacle to the policy of economic liberalization and the development of the government system and the public sector in order to perform their mission in the context of the principles of the May Revolution.

Mustafa Kamil Murad added, "President al-Sadat, in his speech, resolved a political matter which has a high degree of importance, declaring that there are no politics in religion and there is no religion in politics. This is a great step which we fully support, because politics are an action and a practice, and anyone who wants to enter politics has the door to the parliamentary assemblies, local councils and political parties wide open before him."

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COPTS OF NEAR EAST ISSUE STATEMENTS CONDEMNING GOVERNMENT ACTIONS

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 8 Sep 81 p 10

/Article: "Statement by the Coptic Bodies in the Near East: al-Sadat Is Requested To Abrogate All Laws Giving Egypt a Religious, Racist Coloration"/

/Text/ The Coptic boards in the Near East issued a statement yesterday requesting Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat to abrogate all the old and new constitutional laws that give the Egyptian nation a religious, racist coloration stating that otherwise "there will be neither national unity nor social peace in Egypt; rather, the temple will be brought down on the people in it."

Here is the text of the statement:

The Coptic bodies in the Near East held a meeting in which they studied the case of the banishment of Pope Shannudah the Third, and made the following declaration:

1. The banishment of Pope Shannudah the Third, the pope of Alexandria and the patriarch of the missionary province of Saint Mark in Egypt, Ethiopia and the diaspora, aimed at turning him into a broken staff in order to satisfy the resentful Islamic man on the street and to terrorize the Coptic people in accordance with the principle "Strike at the shepherd and the flock will scatter," will increase the intensity of the conflagration in Egypt. al-Sadat does not know the strength of the relationship that binds the Coptic nation to his holiness on the throne of the prophet Saint Mark. In the past, the Christian emperor Marcianus tried to banish the national pope Discorus, appointing the puppet patriarch Protorius in his place in 457, but the Coptic people launched a national revolution in which there were hundreds of thousands of victims and the puppet patriarch was killed in order to extirpate all aspects of foreign domination.

2. The president of the republic of Egypt does not have the right to banish the pope of Alexandria, because the pope is elected by the Coptic people and is chosen by the vote of the holy organization; he is not a goverment appointed functionary.

3. Any Coptic bishop daring to violate the consensus of the nation will be banished by his people and his church.

al-Sadat, in the wake of the aggression of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and Shubra, has promised to devote himself assiduously to preparing decrees to restore national unity. We have waited for him to feel a responsible national awareness of the dangers of the

distorted thinking by which he has treated the Coptic question and to venture on a bold practical solution to realize Coptic demands, foremost the abrogation of the constitutional stipulations that give the government a religious, racist coloration, pull out the roots of dissension, and put an end to the seeds of hatred, vengeance and historic mutual fear between the Coptic and Moslem peoples.

Unfortunately, he has devised a conspiracy to dilute the Coptic question and confuse it with all his political and personal quarrels with the right, the left, the Nasirists, some of the paramount sheiks of the Islamic groups which have flourished by his hand, and /most/ members of the /Society of Moslem/ Brothers, /but not all/ because the governor of Asyut and his likes have remained al-Sadat's brothers.

He spoke for 3 hours about the evils of some of his enemies the paramount sheiks, and finally, in a few minutes, declared the banishment of his holiness the pope, concluding "God cause us to triumph over the people of infidels."

The Law on National Unity was issued and the factional disputes took deeper roots in 1972, following the al-Khanikah aggression.

In 1980, in the wake of incidents in the universities, he devised a conspiracy to change the constitution and the stipulation that Islamic law is the main source of legislation; the bonds of national unity were severed and Egypt came to al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

Now, in the wake of the aggression of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and Shubra, al-Sadat has declared the banishment of his holiness Pope Shannudah the Third.

The statement accused al-Sadat of "breaking up the national unity that had been agreed on between the two elements of the nation of Egypt during the 1919 revolution, whose slogan was 'long live the crescent beside the cross.'"

The Coptic Demands

The great national suffering which the Coptic people are undergoing today now that the treasonous apostasy of their partner in the national unity has been laid bare is a historic lesson which will always be taken into consideration. Therefore if national unity is to be re-established, it will never be on the basis of verbal promises such as were made in 1919 but on practical guarantees which can preserve the religious, ethnic and civil rights of the Coptic nation. On these grounds, we demand that our intelligent Moslem brethren in Egypt take the initiative to realize the following legitimate Coptic demands:

1. Abrogating all old and new constitutional laws which impart a racist, religious coloration to the Egyptian state.

2. Recognizing the Coptic ethnic group, as the fraternal country of Iraq recognizes the Assyrian and Kurdish ethnic groups.

3. Agreeing to the formation of a Coptic political party.

4. Agreeing to the holding of public elections through lists or finite precincts.

5. Agreeing to the establishment of a Coptic university to be financed by public taxation, as is the case with al-Azhar University.

6. Restoring power to the national councils in full.

7. Eliminating censorship over Coptic publications and assigning a Coptic radio station, as is the case with the broadcasting of the Koran and the Voice of the Arabs.

8. Agreeing to the laws on personal states for Christians presented by the Christian groups in Egypt.

9. Returning property and endowments to Coptic churches, monasteries, schools and hospitals which were confiscated on behalf of the Ministry of Islamic Religious Endowments.

10. Announcing the real population of the Coptic people.

Unless these legitimate demands are met, there will never be national unity or social peace in Egypt; rather, the temple will be brought down on the people in it, in accordance with the Egyptian saying "spirit, there is no spirit after you."

Greetings to his holiness the great Pope Shannudah the Third.

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BRIEF BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF COPTIC BISHOPS GIVEN

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 7

/Article by Violette Zaki and Sami Kamil: "Who Are the Committee of Bishop Members Who Are Assuming the Tasks of the Papacy?"/

/Text/ Who are the members of the five-man committee which, with the issuance of President al-Sadat's decree, is to assume the tasks of the papacy following the abrogation of the decree installing Pope Shannudah? AL-AKHBAR presents their biographies. They are all men to whose knowledge and great status testimony has been given.

His Eminence Maximus

He is the Archbishop of al-Qalyubiyah and Quwaysina. He is roughly /illegible/years old. He was a candidate for the papal elections in 1959. He has a bachelor's degree in theology and was a monk in the al-Muharriq Monastery of Asyut. He is a scholar of the Coptic language and theological studies. He has written materials in the Coptic language. He has taught in the clergy and the Institute of Coptic Studies.

His Eminence Athanasios

He is the Archbishop of Bani Suwayf and al-Bahansa, and is about 60 years old. He was born in al-Mahallah al-Kubra, was a monk in the Monastery of al-Sarayan, and was a trustee of the monastery. He worked as an English instructor before becoming a monk and was a secretary of the Holy Society until 1971. He worked as a professor in the Clerical College before assuming the mission of bishop in 1962. He has written materials interpreting the Bible and is a member of the World Council of Churches and the Council of Churches of the Middle East.

His Eminence Yohannes

He is the Bishop of al-Gharbiyah and has been the current secretary of the Holy Society since 1971. He is about 58. He was a monk in the al-Sarayan Monastery in Wadi al-Natrun. Before becoming a monk, he worked as a history instructor in secondary schools. He acquired a bachelor's degree in literature. He is a professor of church history in the Clerical College and has a number of works on the history of the church and spiritual values, including "The Garden of the Spirit" and "The History of the Era of the Prophets." He is a member of the Council of Churches

of the Middle East.

His Eminence Gregorius

He is the Bishop of Coptic Culture and Scholarly Research. He is the chairman of the Institute of Coptic Studies and a professor at the Clerical College. He is 62 and acquired a bachelor's degree in literature at the University of Cairo, then a master's degree, and acquired a doctorate from Manchester University in England. He was a monk in the al-Muharriq Monastery of Asyut. He became bishop in the Institute of Pope Kyrillos the Sixth in 1966. He has written numerous works on theology. He is a member of the Theological Studies /Board/ in the World Council of Churches and the Council of Churches of the Middle East. He is a member of the National Council of Culture, a specialized ethnic council.

His Eminence Samuel

He is the Bishop of Public and Social Services. Aged 61, he was a monk in al-Sarayan Monastery in Wadi al-Natrun. He obtained a bachelor's degree in law from Cairo University, a bachelor's degree in education and psychology, a bachelor's degree in theology, and a master's degree in education from Princeton University in New Jersey, the United States of America. He was appointed bishop in 1962 and before that was a secretary to Pope Kyrillos the Sixth. He is an instructor in the Clerical Faculty, where he teaches pastoral theology. He is an instructor in the Institute of Coptic Studies' Department of Social Studies, and is a member of the National Council of Services. He is a member of the World Council of Churches, a head of the Councils of Churches of the Middle East and a member of the Cultural Council of the Council of Churches of Africa.

The Orthodox Faith Society in Asyut Is Added to the List of Dissolved Societies

AL-AKHBAR has learned that it has been decided to add the Orthodox Society of the Fruit of the Faith in Asyut to the list of religious societies whose permits it has been decided to abrogate in accordance with Decree of the President 492 for 1981.

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PAPER GIVES LIST OF TEACHERS TRANSFERRED FOR PARTICIPATION IN STRIFE

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 14 Sep 81 p 3

/Article: "Faculty Members Transferred to Other Bodies"/

/Text/ Radio stations in the rejection states seized upon the fact that the names of university professors transferred to other bodies had not been published in the decrees protecting national unity, and some of them declared that the number of persons transferred exceeded 1,000. The rejection radio stations supported their claims by information the nationwide papers had by chance published last Wednesday, to the effect that the faculties were being reinforced by the appointment of 750 people with doctorates as new instructors in the universities and by the promotion of a large number of lecturers.

The rejection radio stations said that the goal of the new appointments and promotions was to fill the gap that the transfer of hundreds of university professors would leave.

AL-AHRAR is presenting the names of faculty members transferred to other bodies, who number 64, specifically. Their names were set down in an official list accompanying Decree of the President 490 for 1981, which AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH published in its Issue 36 of 3 September 1981. These are the names:

1. Dr Ibrahim Saqr 'Ali Hasan, professor of political science at the Faculty of Economics, Cairo University.

2. Shadiyah al-Shishini Sa'd, instructor in the Department of Chemical Engineering, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University

3. Dr Aminah Hanim Rashid, instructor of the French language at the Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

4. Dr Ahmad 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Amir, assistant professor in the Department of Mathematics of the Faculty of Science, Cairo University.

5. Dr Sa'id Salah-al-Din al-Nisha'i, assistant professor of chemical engineering in the Faculty of Engineering, University of Cairo.

6. Dr Hasan Hanafi Husayn, assistant professor of philosophy in the Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

7. Dr Mukhtar Muhammad al-Tuhami, professor of journalism at the Media Faculty, Cairo University.

8. Dr 'Amr Muhyi-al-Din, assistant professor of economics, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University.

9. Dr 'Awatif Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman, assistant professor in the Department of Journalism, Media Faculty, Cairo University.

10. Dr Yahya 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jamal, professor of public law in the Faculty of Law, Cairo University (former minister for Council of Minister affairs).

11. Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Talimah, assistant professor of Arabic literature, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

12. Eng Ahmad Hasan al-Ahwani, instructor in the Department of Chemistry, Faculty of Engineering, Cairo University.

13. Dr al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Bahrawi, assistant professor of the Arabic language, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

14. Dr Nasr Hamid Rizq, assistant professor of the Arabic language, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

15. Dr Jabir Ahmad al-Sa'id 'Asfur, assistant professor of the Arabic language, Faculty of Letters, University of Cairo.

16. Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Muhsin Taha Badr, assistant professor of Arabic literature, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

17. Dr Mahmud 'Atif 'Ali Muhammad al-Banna, professor of public law, Faculty of Law, Cairo University.

18. Dr Salah 'Abbas 'Abd-al-Sami' Mahyub.

19. Dr Mustafa Zahir Sulayman, assistant professor in the Faculty of Science, University of Cairo.

20. Dr Sabri al-Mitwalli al-Mitwalli, assistant professor in the Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

21. Dr Muhammad Kamal 'Atiyah al-Abrashi, assistant professor in the Faculty of Dentistry, Cairo University.

22. Dr Fu'ad Fawzi Sa'd Jirjis, assistant professor of botany in the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University.

23. Dr 'Asim 'Abd-al-Fattah Fahim, assistant professor in the Faculty of Science, Cairo University.

24. Dr Muhammad Muhammad Ibrahim Sharif, assistant professor in the Biology Department, Faculty of Science, Cairo University.

25. Dr Shukri Mahmud 'Arafah, assistant professor of surgery, Faculty of Medicine, Cairo University.

26. Dr Mahmud Muhammad al-Saqa, professor of philosophy of law, Faculty of Law, Cairo University.

27. Dr Nu'man Muhammad Khalil Jum'ah, professor of civil law, Faculty of Law, Cairo University.

28. Dr 'Abd-al-Hamid Muhammad Kamal Hashish, chairman of the Department of Civil Law, Faculty of Law, Cairo University.

29. Dr Muhammad Hamid Duwaydar, assistant professor in the Faculty of Law, Alexandria University.

30. Dr Hasan Abu-al-Sa'ud 'Ali, assistant professor in the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Alexandria.

31. Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Mun'im Kharbush, professor in the Faculty of Science, University of Alexandria.

32. Dr Muhammad 'Ismat Zayn-al-Din, professor in the Faculty of Engineering, University of Alexandria.

33. Dr 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Siyakhi, professor in the Faculty of Letters, Alexandria.

34. Dr Abu-al-Hasan Qutb 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mahmud, assistant professor, Faculty of Letters, Alexandria University.

35. Dr 'Ali Rif'at 'Abd-al-Hamid Hamdi, assistant professor, University of Alexandria.

36. Dr Ahmad Sabri 'Abd-al-Ghaffar, professor in the Faculty of Agriculture, University of Alexandria.

37. Dr Sami 'Abd-al-Mun'im Muhammad Tamimah, assistant professor, Alexandria University.

38. Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Sid Ahmad, assistant professor, Alexandria University.

39. Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Wudud Khalil, assistant professor, Alexandria University.

40. Dr Hilmi Muhammad Sadiq Hathut, assistant professor, University of Alexandria.

41. Dr Muhammad Ashraf Bayyumi, assistant professor, Faculty of Science, University of Alexandria.

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61. Dr Dassuqi Hasan al-Sayyid Shamlul, professor of Arabic language, Faculty of Letters, Cairo University.

62. Dr Muhammad Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, professor, al-Azhar University.

63. Dr Mitwalli Yusuf Shalabi, known as Ra'uf Shalabi, professor of belief and spiritualism, Faculty of Religious Principles, al-Azhar University.

64. Dr Khayri al-Ashwah, professor, al-Azhar University.

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EDITORIAL CALLS FOR SEPARATION OF STATE FROM RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Cairo MAY in Arabic 31 Aug 81 p 7

/Editorial: "Religion and Politics"/

/Text/ Since the dawn of history, religion has been, and remains, a basic source of inspiration and legislation and a profound factor for influencing the formation of societies through the principles it implants, the values it establishes, the solutions it presents, the conduct it requires of people and societies, and the rewards and punishments it codifies in the world and the hereafter.

No one here or elsewhere in the world, even in the communist countries, which do not recognize religions, has the capacity to act in violation of this reality.

However, the mistake begins when the confusion arises between religion and politics, or between religion and the natural sciences, religion and the art of modern management, religion and space sciences, religion and technology, or other arts and sciences which entail mistakes and proper actions and differ from age to age and society to society, and whose laws and methods change with the changes in circumstances and conditions.

Moslem thinkers have not yet reached agreement whether Islam recommends any specific system of government. Indeed, the general principles which appear in Islam can embrace the different forms of regime which Arab and Islamic history have witnessed in their stages of progress and decline. This has not prevented the emergence of regimes in which rivers of blood have flowed in the name of Islam or on the pretext of defending it in the times of decline and dissension that the Arabs and the Moslems have gone through.

In other words, politics or the art of government is no longer a religious matter and never was such at any time. Rather, politics were and remained a field for the struggle of ideas, individual judgments and various practical applications in dealing with everyday current problems in the life of societies, deriving inspiration from the principles and legislation of religion without constituting religion in themselves.

This fine dividing line which is absent from the minds of many people is the cause of many manifestations of confusion and dissension to which we are exposed, and the extent to which they entail grievous consequences has been shown by current experience in Iran.

Some people believe that religion means the imposition by force of religious occasions and observances, which in their essence are the relationship between the individual and his lord, on all the members of society, whether they embrace them or not.

Some people believe that religion means returning society to circumstances and conditions which the movement of history has transcended, in which the elements of scientific, technological, and social change have created radical changes that cannot be ignored.

Some people believe that religion means a reversion to old forms of behavior, styles and values that dominated a society at a certain stage of its development.

Some people believe that religion means imposing their political conceptions, special convictions or views, which accept mistakes and proper actions in dealing with daily internal problems, the problems of the world, or relations with other countries, on other people through the mentality of provocation and disruption, the exploitation of religious feelings among naive people, the distressed and the downtrodden, or the exploitation of young people's feelings of frustration and despair regarding various factors of deficiencies here or there.

Finally, some people believe that religion means the renunciation of everyone who differs from them in opinions, rejects their narrow notions of religious fanaticism, or permits himself freedom to think, discuss and give and take.

It is all these plagues which have done what they have to the experiment of the Islamic revolution in Iran, turning Iran, thanks to what is called the "Hezbollah," into mutually combative Islamic groups and factions, each one claiming to speak in the name of Islam and each one accusing the other of deviation and sedition. The reason for that is obvious and simple: that is that people who use religion to reach power have lacked and still do lack political abilities, technical and administrative qualifications and specific ideas of what government must concern itself with. Religious jurisprudence is not all it takes to assume positions of leadership in governing modern societies. Political practices must be remote from speculation with religious feelings, and proficiency in the sciences of religion must be devoted to nurturing the religious spirit, not to forming religious parties.

The most dangerous thing to which the notion of mixing religion and politics might lead is for religious groups to be transformed into religious parties. When this door is opened wide, the demon will emerge from the bottle so that feelings of religious and factional fanaticism may wreak corruption on the earth.

This is what we must not permit.

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ORIGINS OF FACTIONAL STRIFE PROBED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 7

/Editorial by Rajab al-Banna: "Where Did the Dissension Come to Us from?"/

/Text/ People who know Egypt for its long history, and know its successive generations of people, realize for a certainty that the Egyptian personality is a whole which cannot be fragmented, because it is incapable of being fragmented. In all the eras of history, the Egyptian personality has been a single unit: you are an Egyptian, and that is all anyone needs to know after that, be you Moslem or Copt, be you pale or dark, be you descended from tribes of the Arabian Peninsula or from Central Asia: you are Egyptian, that is sufficient, and nothing else after that is important, because Egypt has not known discrimination among its people based on their origins, color or religion.

Egyptian tolerance is vast enough to accommodate all the secondary disputes that generally exist among brothers. This is the Egyptian genius. Where did the successive acts of dissension that we call "factional strife" come to us from? Why has it been appearing now, specifically, and not before now or later? Why is it appearing in this form and in this manner, although the Egyptian people have never known this style of violence, even in expressing their differences, no matter how intense they might be?

On the issue of religion, Egyptians see no difference between mosque and church. To them, they are both "houses of God," and to them they both have the same equal degree of holiness.

In belief, Moslems and Christians see one another as devout people who worship and turn toward God. Moslems are commanded by their lord to love Christians.

"You will find that those who are closest in affection to those who believe are the ones who say 'I am a Christian.'" This is a statement of God and whoever violates it deviates from his lord's command.

Christians are commanded to love everyone and everything and accommodate it with their love, even their enemies and those who revile them. Both, Moslems and Christians, dip from a single spring, which is inexhaustible -- the spring of love and tolerance.

On the issue of history, Moslems and Christians both feel that this is their country

and that they have the full rights of citizens and have full obligations of citizens in it. They have both embarked on their nation's struggles, shoulder to shoulder. The enemy's bullets have never discriminated between Moslems and Christians. They have both lived with their brother in safekeeping, in a single home, half of whose inhabitants are Moslems and half of whose inhabitants are Copts, and neither of them have felt alienation or remoteness. The children play together on the same street and no one is concerned to know who is Moslem and who is Christian. In the schools, they sit down at the same bench.

In sorrow and in joy, you find them always together, in a single spirit, a single being.

European specialists in social studies are amazed that the customs and traditions governing Egyptian conduct and thinking are the same, and that there is no more difference between Moslems and Christians than that between the people from Upper and Lower Egypt, for example, or certain individual differences which confirm rather than deny the rule. The rule is that Egypt is a tremendous melting pot which has forged everyone into a single mold and made everyone into a single entity, giving everyone a single spirit. Everyone on the land of Egypt is Egyptian in flesh, blood, history and spirit. He is Egyptian before all else, and is Egyptian after all else. The greater the Moslem's understanding of his religion becomes, the more his love of his Coptic brother grows, and the more the Copt's understanding of his religion increases, the greater becomes his love of his brother Moslem.

This is Egypt. This is the Egyptian personality. Where did the dissension come to us from?

It is not in the Egyptian's nature to resort to contemptible conspiracies. Thus this dissension, and its sisters, is not Egyptian but is something that has come to us by chance, a strange thing that is not in harmony with being, history or nature.

Why choose a church as a location for a plot, and choose timing which coincides with President al-Sadat's visit to Washington? Dissension always appears through such timing, and Moslem and Christian victims who embrace one another die every time.

Why does it appear every time Egypt comes close to ridding itself of its problems and is on the verge of devoting itself with all its powers to construction and attaining the dream of welfare?

We realize, naturally, that we are living in a world of extreme complexity. We realize that we have enemies whose goal is to make the Egyptian social entity burst apart and to turn its cohesive unity into fragments. We also realize that the arts of destruction from within and the recruitment of agents has developed and become more attractive and glamorous with the use of money, psychological or ideological means, or all of them. This requires that we exhibit an unusual awareness and the ability to distinguish in the things said to us between what is meant for God's sake and what is meant for the sake of the devil.

While it is certain that this dissension and its antecedents do not represent a phenomenon that can be observed and before which one can pause at length, because they have become part of the features of the historic road we are traveling on, they nonetheless are not negligible; they are a sudden, strange occurrence. However, like

the devil, who instilled evil in our lord Adam and made him go out of paradise, because we do not want to lose our paradise, in which we are living together, it is our duty to prosecute everyone who provokes the emotions of people toward dissension, fuels it, exploits it or tries to escalate it, so that we can seize in our hands the threads that link them to the people who are provoking them, and so that we can arrive at the "original motive force" behind this crime.

Egypt remains above dissension.

Egyptians remain stronger than any conspiracy.

Religion remains too pure and clean to be polluted by people who wish to turn it into a weapon of hatrad and vengenance, for it is in truth a weapon of love, life and progress.

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WRITER CRITICIZES RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 2 Sep 81 p 7

/Article by Tal'at Yunan: "Dotting the I's: Factionalism and Fanaticism Are Aggression against God and the Nation"/

/Text/ President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat is returning to the people in a joint conference of the People's and Consultative Assemblies next Saturday, in a meeting with the masses. The hearts of 44 million Egyptians will be watching him closely as he with his historic courage and heroism leads one of his new triumphant, victorious battles against factionalism and fanaticism.

He is demonstrating his ability and wisdom as a leader and commander, and, first and last, as a man devoted to God and the nation, because Egypt, through its entire history, has believed in God but has not been fanatic about religion. It has had beliefs and not factionalism, it has had brothers and not enemies, it has had love and not hatred or loathing, it has had faith and not atheism.

In it, Moslems and Copts have lived for thousands of years, in mutual affection and embrace. The Moslems have had their mosques and the Copts have had their churches. They all declare "God is one." They are all for Egypt, and Egypt is for them all.

The drive toward fanaticism and factionalism is coming into Egypt from outside the borders. The people making it are not Moslems or Copts, indeed are not Egyptians. They are enemies of Islam, enemies of Christianity, and enemies of Egypt.

For this is an evil attempt to kill all Egypt, destroy its people, eradicate its history and eliminate its civilization and its reputation in the world.

While it has been an obligation of the army's to protect the nation's borders, it is the obligation of the people today to protect the heart and unity of the nation and its traditions, which know only love and tolerance and respect every creed and religion!

The question today is, how did what happened happen, and why?

The war of 6 October and 10 Ramadan united all Egyptians in love and war. The cry "God is great" is the cry of Moslems and Christians together and it shook the enemy's most powerful fortress, the Bar-Lev Line, as they ransomed the grains of sand with the grains of their hearts, shedding the purest of blood in the field. Those

Egyptians who died as martyrs and were Moslems surrendered themselves to God as pure souls, or who were Christians surrendered themselves to the nation as chaste persons; thus they all passed on as immortal martyrs. God has joined together the fraternal brothers, the Moslems and the Christians, in life and death, the nation has embraced them in the folds of its grave!

This eternal unity of the institution which will not accept fragmentation has joined us together in peace and in war and is embraced and agreed over the cry "God is great," as well as joining us together in the sacred enthusiasm which will not accept a slackening of fraternity between the patriarchate and the Mosque of al-Azhar, and in the sacrifice of the purest blood!

It has created the greatest revolution "of faith," whose title has been President Anwar al-Sadat and whose pillar and structure have been the entire Egyptian people. It is the revolution of the great intellectual transformation, from socialist or marxist atheism to religion, and people in all Egypt have come to seek deep within themselves the truth and to insist on adherence to what God has revealed in all his divine books, accepting mosques and churches, until they all, in spite of their great numbers, have started overflowing with the people in them, as a reaction to what was called "a wave of atheism and anarchism" and a manifestation of all the people's return to God.

It happened that the people gave President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat the designation "the devout president" and his era the designation "the government of faith." The first picture that was published of the president and chief of state showed him in a robe with prayer beads on the prayer rug.

The people of Egypt all insisted on giving the devout president, wherever he went, a single gift, God's book (the holy Koran). The permanent constitution has stipulated a state religion and freedom of belief together, and the devout president has established an eternal symbol of the everlasting spiritual embrace between the crescent of Islam, the cross of Christianity and the star of David of Judaism, within a single complex of divine religions. This is truly to be considered a tremendous revolutionary and evolutionary leap which is bringing modern man from the materialistic mentality to the spiritual mentality, because no genuine Egyptian corrective revolution can deny religious loyalty to Islam, Christianity and the /other/ divine religions. Religious loyalty is absolutely not in contradiction with national loyalty, but indeed complements it. Thus the revolution of faith has turned the unity of the nation into an actual fact, not a moral symbol or emotional point, because the people returning to God have believed unanimously that spiritual values are the most fruitful and permanent. The sole meaning of their adherence to their religions has been respect for the other religions, since they revere all the prophets and condemn the use of the designation "infidel" for people who believe in the existence of God, whatever their religion might be.

This great transformation has been as remote as possible from politics and all political appeals, whatever they may have been. It has been the result of the feelings of the devout Egyptian people that alienation from God was the cause of all the defeats which led the greatest striking force in the Middle East to destruction in a few hours and brought us to political, social and economic deterioration!

Naturally, this sort of historic phenomenon has the effect of distressing everyone

who wants the Egyptian people to be won over to and to accept defeat, be he from the fossilized right or the adventurous left. The goal of them all is to have us falter in our crusade and falter in our unity -- especially those who have been attired in the robes of an agitated marxism that is unable to touch the true pulse of the Egyptian masses, but are anxious to renounce all religious and spiritual values because to them religion is the opium of the people!

Thus all these people, the stupid right and the red left, have made a number of attempts to strike out at national unity with stones, bring us back to the stone age, and dig a pit of factional fire by committing aggression against churches and opposing Islamic sentiments, or trying through false publications or poisonous rumors to revive the religious wars whose time has passed and whose victors and vanquished were buried centuries ago. However, mass awareness and rapid political and official intervention have caused these attempts to collapse before their evil could spread and their danger could become commonplace. Here Moslems rose up to protect churches and Christians rose up to protect mosques, all embracing one another throughout history on the land of the great single home of the great single family.

It was unfortunate that religious currents passed without sound guidance and that they were surrounded by exaggeration and the attempt to assert religious affiliation through token demonstrations. At some points, the matter extended to some religious leaders and at others to turning young people, in the name of religion, into a hostile force whose activity was restricted to critizing conditions in their country, and holding faith in the immunity and immortality of these leaders and their rejection of self-criticism, on grounds that they were vengeful and irritated by real discussion:

Some of these leaders have become implicated in hostile political activity, and suspicious figures have appeared on the surface, inside and outside Egypt, who are trafficking in religion and speaking in the name of the leaders of religion!

Egypt will never be able to be quiet over the decline of some people who cloak themselves in religion while embracing factional provocation in a manner that has gained acceptance, depicting individual events as if they were factional aggression although it would have been good policy to put all matters in their proper perspective and confine them to the context of presenting them to officials but not bringing them before the religious podium, the political man in the street or, sometimes, expatriates!

It was necessary to pause to take stock, because Egypt, for a long time, has separated religion from politics, preventing men of religion from engaging in politics and dissolving all religious parties and factional organizations because it was the nation of freedom of belief that embraced the positive nature of feelings before the constitution stipulated "religion belongs to God and the nation belongs to all."

It is necessary for our devout leader and self-denying president, Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, who expressed the July revolution and caused the May revolution to burst forth, to put a decisive end, through radical solution, not just temporary palliatives, to those people who confuse the domain of God with the domain of the earth, because fanaticism and factionalism are hostility toward God and the nation, and there is no safety or mandate for people who blaspheme their country.

Our duty, after the president has declared his decrees to protect the mosque and the church, so that they may together remain a source of spiritual illumination, is to strive together in an earnest holy struggle against factionalism and fanaticism and to cooperate to save our nation from the enemies of the nation and religion, forming close ranks and drawing swords from our faith. Let them form an alliance with the devil; they will never overcome us as long as God is our ally and as long as our love of our nation is noble, chaste and pure.

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TOP EDITOR CRITICIZES AMERICAN PRESS STAND ON LOCAL CRACKDOWN

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 12 Sep 81 p 1

/Editorial by Ibrahim Nafi': "Response to a Remark by the NEW YORK TIMES"/

/Text/ President al-Sadat was completely clear in his talk to the people and in his talk to foreign correspondents. However, the attack some Western papers mounted on the facts of what has happened in Egypt calls for a reflective pause. Here, it is enough to comment on the editorial in the NEW YORK TIMES titled "Remark on a Difficult Time in Egypt."

It is not enough to say that it is the personal feelings or friendships behind this "remark" that are affecting us now; rather, it is necessary also to stress a number of facts that this and other newspapers are ignoring:

Foremost among these is the fact that President al-Sadat's regime is not a "client of the West's"--rather, Egypt has been in the vanguard of the policy of nonalignment and positive neutrality. This has been summarized in its simple slogan: "Friendship with all, and, if a dispute occurs, on the basis of principles alone."

Therefore, Egypt in its foreign policy has not been slow to condemn America's negative behavior regarding South Africa's aggression against Angola and continued occupation of Namibia. Egyptian foreign policy's condemnation of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, a Moslem country, has proceeded from the same premise.

Egypt has frankly declared to the Soviets and the Americans that any interference in its domestic affairs will be rejected in its totality and its details.

The firm relationship between Egypt and the United States is not one of "alignment" but is an expression of Egyptian national interests, which are linked to a number of positive American stands such as the cleaning up of the canal, the role of full partner in the peace treaty, and economic and military aid to raise the standard of living of the Egyptian people and develop their armed forces.

It is strange that Egypt should need confirmation from the newspapers of the West that its "domestic affairs" are to be considered fundamental to the realization of national sovereignty and that the commander's responsibility, in these affairs, is to his people alone.

President al-Sadat, in spite of that, alongside his responsibility to the Egyptian

people, accepts a special responsibility toward world public opinion, which supported him in his peace initiatives, on condition that that not conflict with any dangers infringing on his people, first and last.

While Egypt has been waiting for an apology for articles written by foreign journalists, such as that by David Hirst on 1 January 1973 whose gist was that collapse is imminent in Egypt, here he is repeating the same talk and the same line in 1981.

Egypt has presented all the facts to the foreign correspondents, and hopes that the campaign of distorting the truth of what has happened will not continue. Here it is sufficient to glance at the figures on people put in detention:

Of these, about 300 have past records.

There are no more than about 30 old or new political personalities who took part directly or indirectly in or instigated the escalation of the factional strife. The rest are all religious extremists.

Egypt views the portrayal by some foreign correspondents of what is happening here, and what might on the other hand actually happen in Israel or the United States itself, with astonishment.

There are extremist religious groups in Israel like the Gush Emonim about which such a commotion is not raised.

There is an Israeli obstinacy on the autonomy negotiations which is providing the Arab opposition with "an instrument that supports them in their opposition," in the words of the NEW YORK TIMES.

There is the American leniency, which the NEW YORK TIMES acknowledges, toward Israel's conduct regarding the comprehensive peace process, such as the obstruction of the negotiations on full autonomy for the Palestinians, which after all is the heart of the matter, as well as the issue of Jerusalem and the issue of the settlements; one must consider that there are no problems regarding peace between Egypt and Israel and consequently a final withdrawal from Sinai.

Egypt has clearly stressed its desire for democracy and, in the light of the results of the investigation, a popular charter society will meet containing all representatives of the Egyptian people to set forth a "new charter" spelling out a proper method for the political exercise of democracy.

There remains our support for the conclusion which the NEW YORK TIMES editorial reached when it said "President al-Sadat, in spite of what has happened, remains a bold statesman and an intelligent, balanced leader. If we have exceeded the limits in criticism, the current misfortunes he is passing through deserve to have people devote proper understanding to it." This is all Egypt is asking -- just proper understanding!

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END

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REPORT ON JORDANIAN BRIGADE SUFFERING IN NORTHERN IRAQ

JN121215 Jerusalem AT-TALI'AH in Arabic 12 Nov 81 pp 1, 11

[Text] News reports received from Amman and Baghdad have stressed that Jordanian military units were sent to Iraq after the visit to Baghdad by the Jordanian regime's leaders in the wake of the great defeat and losses inflicted on the Iraqi army in the battle to break its siege on the Iranian city of Abadan and in its withdrawal to the west bank of Karun River.

News reports say that Jordan had previously called for volunteers including retired military personnel, for service in the Iraqi army and other units such as the medical service. The sending of combat units to make up for the Iraqi army's impaired ability to confront the raging revolution in Iraq's Kurdistan is a new development. Arrivals from Amman and Baghdad said that the forces of the communist partisans and the Kurdish Peshmerga had inflicted heavy losses on a Jordanian brigade as it was carrying out search operations in Kurdistan against the revolutionaries. These losses amounted to hundreds of dead and wounded, in addition to hundreds captured, whose leaders were put on trial by the partisans.

Reports say that the Jordanian brigade's losses are basically attributed to its commanders' ignorance of the real situation in Kurdistan and the nature of the region, in addition to their adoption of a method different from that of the Iraqi forces, which confine their presence to the tops of mountains and move in large columns at specific times and only along main streets to avoid clashing with the large and effective revolutionary forces.

Jordanian authorities are still keeping this matter secret for fear of the impact news of these large losses will have on the situation in Jordan despite the elapse of 3 weeks after the brigade's tragedy.

CSO: 4404/108

OPEC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 14, 15 Oct 81

[14 Oct 81 p 14]

[Text] The decline in petroleum demand would appear to be the result of the impact of numerous factors, including in particular:

--The generalized slowdown in the economic growth of the industrialized countries, whose average rate of expansion of gross national product should stabilize barely above 1.5 percent per year for the next 10 years;

--The success of policies of economizing on energy achieved in the home-use and industrial sectors by the governments of the Western countries;

--The increased importance attached to coal and the establishment of nuclear electricity generating plants--in various forms and at various intervals, but which are nonetheless beginning to make their effects felt--and in a much more timid way the limited impact of "new forms of energy" at present;

--The appearance on the petroleum market of new producers that are not members of OPEC, such as Mexico, the North Sea area, Egypt, and Malaysia. The discoveries of oil in these areas should strengthen in the future the already noticeable decline in imports from the OPEC countries.

The Western media have expressed total satisfaction. They have hastened to conclude that "the cards have changed hands," and that the domination of the oil market by the producing countries is completely over. In short, the time for revenge is at hand.

Certainly, we are far from the energy crisis and the gloomy prospects which were a matter of general agreement hardly 2 years ago.

What miracle has happened, then, to modify the world energy situation so fundamentally in such a short time.

In reality, this pessimism regarding demand--which unfortunately certain members of OPEC have accepted so quickly, giving it more authenticity--is only aimed at confusing the facts of the problem.

However, the view that there has been a structural decline in petroleum demand deserves to be taken up and analyzed, even if the forecasts on which this alleged decline is based are strewn with objections. It is nonetheless true that, beyond the monetary pressures on the market and prices, the OPEC countries have political and strategic interests involved.

The Market Crisis Before 1980

The bulk of the studies on long term supply and demand published before 1980 were of the view that the increase in demand for energy during the 1980's and 1990's would inevitably create severe pressure on petroleum supplies, which could seriously disturb the pursuit of economic growth in the industrialized countries.

The impact of this pressure, which might develop after 1983, according to some sources, and by 1990 at the latest, according to others, would lead to a grave energy crisis and, as a consequence, would push prices to very high levels.

In this context it was considered that massive recourse to petroleum from OPEC countries would remain unavoidable and that petroleum would remain the leading form of energy (one-third of the energy consumption of the Western world in the year 2000).

FORECASTS CONCERNING THE OPEC ZONE FOR 1985

Source of Forecast	Level of Demand for OPEC Petroleum in Millions of Barrels Per Day
EEC [European Economic Community]	38.0
U. S. Department of Energy (1979)	36.0
IEA [International Energy Agency] (1978)	42.9
PIVING [not otherwise identified] (1978)	36.6
EXXON (1978)	40.0
Congressional Research Service, U. S. Congress (1977)	42.9
WAES [not otherwise identified]	45.0

The estimated productive capacity of the OPEC zone for 1985 would be about 35 million barrels per day, and any substantial increase above this figure is conceivable only with difficulty. The OPEC zone would therefore not be in a position to satisfy needs of this size.

An increase in petroleum prices seemed inevitable. This conclusion, shared by all of the studies, resulted from the tendency toward an increase in demand and the leveling off of production.

According to these same studies many factors would contribute to increasing the demand for petroleum:

1) Non-petroleum-based energy is not immediately available. Between 6 and 10 years would be needed to complete construction of a project for the production of energy;

2) The cost of equipment for the production of non-petroleum-based energy is generally higher than that for conventional petroleum equipment;

3) The developing countries, where housing is often dispersed over a wide area and where there is no natural gas or electrical network, will largely use petroleum. Their consumption should increase a great deal to satisfy the needs of a regularly growing population.

4) With the exception of natural gas, all non-petroleum-based energy requires long and costly adaptation;

5) Finally, in case of an unforeseen increase in requirements caused by economic recovery in the industrialized countries, petroleum is the only form of energy available in instantaneous fashion and in a relatively sufficient quantity.

As against this prospect for an increase in demand, production threatened to level out or even decrease.

The principal question which then dominated all these forecasts was knowing how far petroleum prices could increase and when they would reach their maximum level.

In these same forecasts petroleum prices of $50, $60, and even $100 per barrel were regarded by some of them as highly probable, before massive investments in the production of new forms of energy could be carried out.

Taking into account the very long period of time before these new sources of energy would begin to make their weight felt on the world market (estimated by specialists at 50 years, or the normal cycle required for the transition from one dominant energy source to another), the next 2 or 3 decades would be a very difficult period from the point of view of energy supply.

Even in time, it was estimated, when this evolution would have taken shape, crude oil would continue to benefit from a substantial market and supplementary premiums by reason of its use as a source of petrochemicals, which could only be substituted for with difficulty.

Those were the dominant ideas which made it possible to think that the role of extracted petroleum in the OPEC countries would still be, and for a long time, decisive in the long term energy balance.

Demand for OPEC Petroleum in Recent Forecasts

The new forecasts of the long term energy situation are giving space to new suppositions incompatible with the considerations which prevailed before 1980. These studies have given consideration in particular to the following ideas:

--The rate of economic growth in the industrialized countries should slow down substantially in the course of the next 2 decades, and that cannot be due solely to traditional cyclical factors;

--The relationship between economic growth and energy consumption is undergoing profound change, in the sense that positive growth in economic activity could henceforth occur at the same time as a much weaker growth and even a negative development in energy demand.

--In the industrialized countries a general tendency toward a change in the composition of the types of economic activity is emerging progressively in the fabric of the national economies. This change could influence the level of energy consumption.

--The rate of non-OPEC production should increase over the medium term, which accompanied by a decline in overall demand, will probably lead to a reduction in the contribution made by OPEC petroleum to the market.

--The physical constraints on the production of OPEC crude oil, presumed to be very important in the older forecasts, no longer seem to have the same relevance.

--A decisive acceleration in the development of substitute forms of energy in all of the industrialized countries.

These factors, taken together, have led some observers to conclude that "the energy crisis" will not be as severe as it had been imagined and that there is even a serious doubt that it will occur.

A comparison between the newer and the older forecasts shows that the forecasts concerning the levels of world energy demand, world petroleum production, and the petroleum production "required" of OPEC in 1985 and 1990 have been noticeably adjusted to lower levels during the last 2 years. It is forecast that the export demand for OPEC petroleum will decrease by 25 percent in 1985 and by 33 percent--or by one-third --by 1990, while requirements for petroleum imports by a country like the United States will decline by half, compared to the initial forecasts.

This comparison also makes it possible to note a reduction in the contribution of petroleum to total energy consumption, by reason of the substitution of other sources of energy and above all because of a substantial reduction in the contribution of OPEC to total petroleum production, linked to a greater availability of non-OPEC sources of supply.

[15 Oct 81 p 7]

An Artificial Surplus of Short Duration

[Text] These forecasts deserve to be examined carefully. We analyze below the behavior of the three factors which are the most often mentioned to justify the evolution toward a decline in demand. These concern:

--The level of economic activity;

--Economies achieved in the use of energy;

--The recourse to substitute sources of energy.

A Growing Level of Economic Activity

The level of economic activity is one of the principal determinants of the level of energy consumption.

The habit has developed, especially in forecasts of energy consumption, of reducing throught on economic growth to the single standard constituted by the economies of the industrialized countries.

To be complete, it is necessary to examine the prospects for economic growth in all regional groups of countries taking part in the world economy, and first of all within the member countries of OPEC, whose economic and demographic dynamism will soon make them important consumers of energy resources. Their demand for primary energy has already tripled in the course of the past decade. A more detailed analysis of these latter tendencies and of the development plans projected for the future indicates that their rates of growth will continue to be high.

The objectives already known in terms of the construction of petrochemical plants and of refineries for local requirements and for export needs will involve a growing use of hydrocarbons. In terms of volume the available estimates place local demand in the OPEC countries in 1985, 1990, and 2000 at 4, 5, 6, and 12 million barrels per day, respectively [sic; only three years are given, while four levels of local demand are given], for an annual growth during the period in the order of 9 percent per year.

The same tendency in economic growth is expected in the other groups of under-developed countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. This growth, dominated by intensive industrial development, will certainly be translated into increased demand for petroleum, as alternative energy sources to petroleum (nuclear energy, coal) are difficult to foresee for financial and technological reasons.

Certainly, in the industrialized countries of the OECD, a noticeable decline in the prospects for economic growth over the middle term is generally forecast. However, these forecasts are not unanimous either regarding the duration of the decline nor on the level of the recession in these countries.

According to certain sources, an average annual growth of 2 to 3 percent per year could be reached in the course of the next 5 to 7 years in the OECD countries as a whole, which is incompatible with the thesis of stagnation and even of regression in the rates of growth advanced in all studies undertaken recently.

These rates of growth constitute a minimum, in the absence of which an expansion in the unemployment rate would make the social balance very problematical.

The resumption of economic activity which would follow these growth rates would sustain much more substantial demand for energy than is generally forecast.

Energy Savings

Two kinds of energy savings are mentioned in these studies:

--Energy savings which would involve "less consumption" per unit of marginal GNP.

This is based on the dissociation which would appear between economic growth and the increase in energy consumption. In short, this idea signifies that the relationship between the two variables--economic growth and the increase in energy consumption (the energy coefficient)--is no longer either proportionate or stable.

Thus, contrary to past development, when the principal variable influencing energy demand was GNP, which was reflected by very high energy consumption, more and more the behavior of the energy coefficient indicates a much smaller energy component. Quite clearly, the increase in prices, by constraining consumers to follow an active policy of energy conservation and by ending the constraints which used to weigh on the development of new forms of energy, is responsible for this change.

Consequently, the petroleum price has become a strategic determinant of demand, which could oscillate toward an increase or toward a decrease, depending on the system of proposed prices.

In reality the level of energy demand is pre-determined in large measure by the existing technical system. Unless there is a decisive change in the latter, which is hardly likely by the end of the next 2 decades, the level of energy demand cannot drop below a level which the specialists estimate at 10 percent at most of present consumption. The efficiency of conservation measures undertaken in the last few years has been achieved in large part because of higher taxation of energy consumption, which could not be continued without danger of disarranging the economic and social mechanisms of production. If their application was easy at the beginning, they will begin to encounter, in the course of their development, social and technical obstacles which will mark their limits. To tell the truth, the majority of the serious forecasts (of the study of the IIASA [International Institute for the Analysis of Applied Systems]) are based on stable or larger energy coefficients.

--Energy savings which would be the result of a kind of specific economic restructuring in the industrialized countries. According to these studies, the high level of industrial maturity achieved in the developed Western countries leads to a sectoral rearrangement within the local economy, dominated by the expansion of the services sector (considered to consume less energy), at the expense of the productive sectors, essentially agriculture and industry. This change in the type of economic activity would have positive economic implications over the long term for energy consumption. A progressive reduction of the latter is expected, along with the consolidation of this tendency.

This reasoning requires at least two remarks:

--On the one hand the degree of intensity in the use of energy by the new lines of economic activity by comparison with the older lines is far from evident;

--On the other hand this new economic balance to the benefit of the services sector is not without serious economic and social risks. Its role will have an impact on the present inflation, which no industrialized country has escaped, although some of them (those whose services sector is less developed) have been less affected than others. Moreover, its development could not be seriously envisaged on the scale predicted, without a decisive increase in labor productivity. In present circumstances of actual stagnation, nothing makes it possible to predict this development.

To all intents and purposes a massive transfer of productive activity toward areas outside the OECD countries, through a new kind of international division of labor, could, in effect, give the services sector a new thrust in the Western countries. However, this prospect is unlikely in a decade or two and, for all of that, is much debated in the industrialized countries themselves.

--Recourse to substitute sources of energy. According to these studies, the overall demand for OPEC petroleum will be noticeably affected by substitutes, beginning with coal and primary electricity (generated by nuclear plants), and, toward the end of the century, by other substitutes, beginning with other sources of energy (especially synthetic petroleum).

It is predicted that the role of coal in total primary energy by 1985 will reach the level of 19 percent (or the same level as in 1980), that it will increase to 21 percent in 1990 and to 23.7 percent by the year 2000.

Moreover, it is predicted that 75 percent of the electricity by the year 2000 will come from coal and nuclear energy.

The Role of Synthetic Products

The increase in the role of synthetic petroleum and gas (compared to their present, very marginal levels) will supposedly reach a level of 4 to 11 percent of world petroleum production by the years 1990 and 2000, respectively.

There is no doubt that these programs represent very ambitious objectives. However, it is possible to have grave doubts about their credibility.

In order to make these substitute sources of energy available within the terms and periods of time forecast, it will be necessary, not only to conquer the technological, social, and ecological obstacles involved, which have hampered their development in the past (only 40 percent of the nuclear program provided for in all of the OECD countries between 1974 and 1980 has been achieved), but also to be able to be in a position to mobilize the enormous credits necessary for their financing.

Just to take up the case of synthetic petroleum (the only alternative energy source really equivalent to crude oil in its "major" uses), it is estiamted that $2 to $3 billion (in terms of 1980 dollars) would be needed to construct a synthetic petroleum plant capable of producing 50,000 barrels per day, or 2.5 million tons per year in petroleum equivalent. A supply on the world scale of 7 million barrels per day by the year 2000 would require financing in the order of $400 to $500 billion. That is to say that the commercial competitiveness of these energy sources is far from being certain in the next 15 to 20 years. Inflation and the high cost of credit, the accumulation of prohibitive regulations, and technological difficulties do not by themselves explain the delays that have occurred in the achievement of programs for the development of alternative energies. In fact it is the low cost, in real terms, of crude oil which has been the decisive element in the stabilization of the relative contributions of the various energy sources during recent years. A recent study on the future of the world energy system, carried out by the International Institute for the Analysis of Applied Systems (IIASA), ended with this same conclusion. In this imposing study, whose object was to analyze the world economy as a whole and bearing

on the very long term (1980-2030), the IIASA (which should not be suspected of partiality, as it is exclusively composed of high-ranking scientists from all regions of the world) concluded that the only substitute for petroleum in the next 25 to 30 years is petroleum itself.

Regarding prices, according to the same institute, these should continue their regular growth over the course of the next 2 decades, under the effects of two tendencies: an increase in energy demand, itself linked to a very rapid growth in world population, on the one hand, and the absence of a really competitive new energy source, on the other hand.

To these economic arguments are added technical and political motivations which could strongly moderate petroleum supply.

The decline of petroleum reserves discovered each year throughout the world over the past 20 years or so does not make it possible to hope for a growth in world productive capacities of much more than 1 percent per year, in the absence of discoveries --considered unlikely--of a series of very large deposits comparable to those found in the Middle East between 1945 and 1960 .

Reducing Production

Parallel to these developments, the governments of the producing countries which are members of OPEC have been urged to reduce the rate of exploitation of their petroleum deposits in order to adjust the rate to needs which are often moderate, to avoid social disturbances and pressure on very limited construction capacities, and to save fossil resource capital which increases in value each year while inflation eats away the value of the money paid for petroleum and the financial surpluses accumulated by certain producing countries.

A policy of limitation of petroleum production to the level of consumption could be adopted. Such a policy could be particularly attractive to the states with the lowest population which are large producers, like those of the Arabian Peninsula. In these countries a substantial part of production should be considered "undesirable." Hence, a permanent temptation to accompany any decline in world demand with a reduction of production, to prevent a lowering of the prices.

Beyond their allegedly scientific character, the alarmist forecasts in vogue today should be interpreted for what they are, a supplementary instrument of pressure at the service of a strategy whose objective is the reduction of petroleum prices.

It is significant that the flowering of these forecasts coincides with the preparation, within OPEC, of the first elements of a long term strategy for production and sales with a view to the protection of the petroleum price from monetary erosion and inflation and the improvement of OPEC's purchasing power in real terms.

The artificial surplus of petroleum, created by the present overproduction by Saudi Arabia, which constitutes the point of departure and the justification for all the forecasts of a decline in demand, is too problematical to justify long term deductions to be made. In effect, however long it takes until Saudi Arabia ends by accepting the evidence that its present policy is causing serious damage to the producing countries and when it adopts the measures required by reducing its production and by raising its prices toward levels in harmony with the prices charged by the other producing countries, the market situation will become less artificial, and the petroleum surplus will disappear.

The principle of a respite on the prices front, in the name of which Saudi Arabia has been conducting this policy for 2 years, is without foundation with regard to the impact of previous readjustments of petroleum prices on inflation in the industrialized countries and on the real evolution of their purchasing power. It is well established now that the readjustments of petroleum prices in the past--as attested by the official reports of the OECD, the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and the World Bank--only played a marginal role in an inflation which is reaching an average level of 15 percent per year. Without going into the traditional battle of indices and figures, it should be recalled that, according to the index of export prices of OECD itself (which in large part underestimates the inflation in the prices of imported goods and services), the index of the petroleum price has gone from $3.03 in 1974 to $14.73 per barrel in 1980 (in current dollar terms the price has gone up from $3.03 to $34 per barrel during this period). This indicates, despite the reservations noted, the extent of erosion of the purchasing power of petroleum prices (according to the OPEC index, the price went up from $3.03 in 1973 to $4.89 per barrel in 1980). The question of the defense of the purchasing power of a barrel of petroleum therefore remains a permanent objective in the face of the galloping inflation in the prices of imported goods. The partial and temporary recovery of purchasing power in 1973, 1974, and 1979-1980 was of short duration and was followed by longer periods of decline between 1975 and 1978. The readjustments in the prices which took place in 1979-1980 certainly gave the producing countries a temporary advantage, but the latter has been very rapidly eaten away following the freezing of the prices decided on by the last ordinary meeting of the OPEC countries. For the rest, the increase in prices to the consumers is not the fault (it should be recalled) of the producing countries.

Who Profits from the Crisis

The evolution between 1973 and 1978 of price composition at the pump of an OPEC standard barrel of petroleum products in Western Europe makes it possible to note a very clear improvement in the receipts of the consuming countries and the achievement of a very consistent profit margin by the petroleum companies.

Thus, in 1978 the sales price of a standard barrel of petroleum products in Western Europe was $33.80 per barrel. Out of this total the governments of the European consuming countries took $13.40 per barrel, whereas the producing countries received $13.00 per barrel. The former increased their receipts per barrel of OPEC products by 70.7 percent between 1974 and 1978, whereas the latter only increased their receipts by 23.3 percent.

The sales price only increased by 49.9 percent in the course of the period under consideration, or $11.25 per barrel. According to a study made by the Shell Company, this increase was 49.3 percent attributable to the governments of the consuming countries and 21.2 percent to the governments of the producing countries. The refining and distribution companies had 18.2 percent and 8.9 percent of the increase, respectively.

The evolution of the petroleum industry which has taken place over the last few years raises in an urgent way the imperative need for regulation of the market by an adequate production policy. Any discussion on the levels of production over the medium term should proceed first from taking into account the vital interests of the member countries.

Having done this, the OPEC countries would cease to be residual sources of supply as a function of market fluctuations only. This policy would bring about more favorable conditions for making the consuming countries appreciate that any supplementary pressure on finite reserves must result in equivalent concessions on their part. Over the short term a policy of systematic adaptation of production to demand is essential. The experience of the last few months has demonstrated that this operation posed no major problem in technical terms.

One should not conclude here without recalling that, for many years the OPEC conferences have been the occasion for denouncing the waste which the policy of "everything by oil" involves. The conferences have continued to call for a policy of conservation which has become all the more urgent since the ratio of proved reserves to production shows a clear tendency toward the exhaustion of the OPEC countries' reserves. This ratio (expressed in terms of production years) was at the level of 85 years in 1957. In 1981 it was no more than 44 years, after having declined to 61 years in 1960 and 48 years in 1970. At the present rate of petroleum extraction, the tendency toward decline should accelerate, to reach 32 years in 1990 and less than 20 years by the year 2000.

It is in the latter framework that it is necessary to place the view that one can take of the decline in petroleum demand forecast in the consuming countries. If this were the case, this decline would constitute a first, decisive step on the path of conserving the value of the world energy patrimony, and that could only make us rejoice. However, that is unfortunately not the dominant concern of some of our partners in the industrialized countries, whose principal objective remains the effective devaluation of petroleum prices. The refusal to advance durable solutions to the problems of prices and their cyclical freezing at insufficient levels which no economic argument justifies can only end in much sharper increases in price. New "petroleum shocks" are included in this logic of denial of the fundamental interests of the producing countries.

5170
CSO: 4519/24

VOCATIONAL TRAINING, INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS EXAMINED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 919, 2-8 Oct 81 pp 9-18

[Article by Kamal Zemouri]

> [Text] One of contemporary Algeria's most crucial problems is youth, particularly the segment aged 14-17 who cannot find their niche, who idly await their tour of national service, which will rescue them from their general apathy. The reasons why this precious national resource is being wasted are well known: the country's academic and vocational training establishment is not able to keep up with the country's demographic growth. Some time ago the deficit was in teaching personnel; today, it is more in infrastructure. Teacher training, fortunately, has finally gotten up to speed, particularly with respect to elementary, middle, secondary and technical education. Nevertheless, there is a weak point in our armor, and that is in vocational training, even though this type of schooling is more and more becoming part of the mainstream. In this field, however, the shortage is considerable, and one finds it at all levels. As the short history of vocational training in Algeria will make apparent, it is still in an embryonic state. Despite its recent institutional expansion, vocational training is still far from being able to meet the demand--both economic and social--for training. Now that the cause is understood, ambitious and laudable efforts are under way. The system is in the process of adapting itself to today's requirements, and also to the future's, which means first priority will be given to economic demand, and second to social demand.

Before 1962 and during the post-independence period in Algeria, vocational training played an extremely marginal role, and was confined to accelerated vocational training (FPA) activities, which were on a limited scale quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically. FPA was basically a training service intended to provide the colonial economy in a very short time and at very low cost with a "core" of qualified lower-level personnel, primarily in the fields of construction, bridge-building and roadwork and basic maintenance. We do not have precise figures on FPA's output, but it was negligible. The legacy from the time of independence, then, was from every point of view extremely modest.

To give the devil his due: it is necessary to train professionals. Algeria has an urgent need for them. The planners, in the preamble to the first quadrennial plan, set out this need clearly. Moreover, 1969, the year when the first national development plan was launched, was to coincide with the first efforts to promote vocational training in Algeria. That anemic structure must be transformed into a revitalized and revalorized institution.

Among the first measures taken can be pointed out the recruitment of training personnel and Algerian management "to enable FPA and other institutions to participate in the national task of raising the general educational level of the citizens." A whole gamut of activities "set off" in the field. The two imperatives of quality and rapidity had to be reconciled: two needs which we will be able to combine. Beginning with that basic idea, two types of training were considered: the first--long-term--is technical education in the traditional academic system. The other was a reinvigorated vocational training, which went through a number of changes of direction, including:

--Some branches of vocational training, especially public works and construction, would be redesigned to benefit other sectors where at the time the pressure was greater.

--The linkage between training and users, or between training and development, was achieved through agreements defining the rights and obligations of each partner.

--The existing system was designed to have excess capacity, in order to resorb academic drop-outs. However, it became increasingly apparent that vocational training was not being carried out on a scale adequate even to meet the economic demand, much less the social.

The gap to be filled, resulting from the country's insufficient vocational training capacity, would have repercussions on the capacity and maintenance of industrial plants. In the ministry of industry, in 1975, only 1,426 employees were in training at the centers under the sponsorship of state-owned companies. However, more and more production units were established around the country, and this could help fill the national shortage of qualified and expert manpower. Efforts were made here and there, in agriculture and the steel industry. Nevertheless, these efforts were not enough, in the face of needs which escalated vertiginously from one year to the next.

Also deserving of mention in our little history is the quite positive experiment of the Technology Institutes, which proved to more of a palliative than a comprehensive solution. The concept was original, but its circumstantial aspect limited its objectives, which were the production of the mid- and upper-level cadres called for by the plan. In that particular context the dynamic relationship between training and development had a brief, glorious moment, only to sink into oblivion, the victim of antagonisms and inconsistencies.

The second quadrennial plan was to be no more generous than the first in regard to vocational training, which still remained the poor cousins of the national academic and training system. On the other hand, the contradictions became even more exacerbated, and new constraints were added to the old. It must be borne in mind that the industrial options of the day did not encourage the training of people in the manual trades.

The gap continued to grow between the academic system, which was introducing innovations on a wide front, and vocational training, which was stagnating and still tainted with the obsolete concepts of the FPA. The overall record of development would highlight the serious shortage of vocational training and underline the consequences of that gap. Thus, on the eve of the 5-year plan, which was to be focused on the development of small and medium-sized industries, vocational training was put in the hands of a secretary of state [a cabinet-level official]. Really, it was high time. The economic need for vocational training reinforced the social necessity. The National Charter, as the written expression of the people's will, did not merely enunciate worn-out principles; it went further, by proposing a program: "vocational training carried out on a vast scale in the country, and action to continuously raise the qualification level of the workers, to enable them over time to become better and better adapted to the demands of modern technology." Elsewhere it said, "neither the needed training for the qualified manpower that is indispensable to the management of big industries, nor creative iniatitive and innovative boldness, nor the entrepreneurial spirit can flourish unless such opportunities are created by the progress of the industrial revolution itself." And the Charter announced the launching of an ambitious worker training program on a scale to provide the labor market with a minimum of 100,000 skilled workers per year.

Another document discusses vocational training, namely the General Labor Statute [SGT], which introduced some new methodological elements. Article 171 of the SGT stipulates that "training provides for the social and occupational advancement of the worker, and assures the economic development of the country. Therefore such activity must be elaborated and implemented with the participation of the workers." Article 178 of the SGT states that "the employing agency may require workers whose qualifications or skills permit, to contribute actively to training and refresher activities he undertakes."

To exhume another text, the "education and training" resolution adopted at the conclusion of the Fourth Congress of the FLN [National Liberation Front] Party diagnosed and proposed a comprehensive remedy which showed a complete understanding of the situation. Thus, the objectives of the quadrennial plan are perceived as an "overall concept for a training institution integrated into the sectors of general and technical education, university education and vocational training which would be the point of departure for a radical reform putting an end to the contradictions, conflicting goals, and poor planning which have become sources of waste and inefficiency." The resolution nicely summarizes the situation which had prevailed until then, the consequences of which we are still paying for. To look at the record is to compare the realities to the ideal. In the case which concerns us, what is important is to understand the relationships that link the three following factors:

1) the nation's training capability (all institutions combined); 2) the overall demand; and 3) the degree to which the nation's potential is being channeled to meet the unfilled needs. The study of these parameters is the foundation for the whole national vocational training strategy.

Radical Solutions

The 5-year plan was to create a very large demand for medium and upper-level cadres and above all--for the small and medium-sized industries--to give impetus to the building of a labor force still seriously deficient. At present, therefore, we find

ourselves not, as we were some time ago, at an impasse, but rather at a turning point, with respect to vocational training. We can even say that the critical decision has already been made. And of course we find ourselves once more confronted with cold and pitiless statistics: the manpower deficit now predicted for the 5-year planning period breaks down this way: 43 percent for industrial workers, 72 percent for technicians and 85 percent for highly skilled technicians.

So necessity forces us to adopt radical solutions, such as the mobilization into the national effort of all human and material potential, all the skilled personnel that are needed, wherever they may be found.

The numbers can also help us assess the progress of vocational training. In 1962, there are a grand total of 5,000 training positions, which did not begin to correspond to the needs of the country, either in terms of quality, or the location of centers, or the substance of the programs. The efforts put forth during the triennial plan, and later the first quadrennial plan, gave the system larger scope. By the end of 1973, the overall productive capacity of the system was 9,000, which was encouraging but still inadequate in terms of the ever-growing need.

The second quadrennial plan embraced even larger needs, and in its preamble it described vocational training as "the basic instrument for satisfying the demand for skilled manpower." As a crowning indignity, that demand had to be met by manpower that was imported at a very high cost and paid for in precious foreign currency. Implementation followed the decision without further delay. Results were not long in coming. The number of training positions went to 17,000 and later to 26,000. To accomplish this, doubled training shifts were set up, on the model of the double sittings in primary school. The expansion of capacity also shows how the system became more aligned with the country's economic and technological demands. Thus, we will see the appearance of technical-industrial chains. The sectors of mechanical engineering and metalwork will show a growth rate in excess of 100 percent.

Demand never stops ballooning. The relative shortage of vocational training is most keenly felt at the level of school dropouts. In 1981, the gap between supply and demand persists. Over and above the chronic shortfalls, certain dangerous contradictions can be noted. We have a tendency to train more technicians than skilled workers: this results in under-utilization of the cadres, who are confined to less exalted tasks in the absence of qualified manpower.

The national vocational training policy has the heavy responsibility now of putting an end to the dysfunctions which were responsible for the disorder that impeded vocational training and the various development plans. We still recall the disparity that prevailed then and which resulted, among other things, in:

--a variety of different pedagogical programs, going from excessively specialized training to overly general, and not conducive to rapid preparation for employment.

--a diversity of pedagogical methods, going from traditional to modern, some of which are still in an experimental stage in the industrialized countries.

--extremely varied study conditions and training time, even in some cases for the same kind of training.

--extremely diverse standards for the levels, status, and general outline of the training.

--finally, training costs that varied according to the wildest whims of the institutions providing it.

The new initiative falls like a guillotine blade on the incoherence which characterized the sector. Things are much clearer. Better yet, now there is only one state institution responsible for carrying out this difficult mission. Some time ago, (see REVOLUTION AFRICAINE of February 1981) Mr Mohammed Nabi, secretary of state for vocational training, confided to us that three parameters define the problem with precision: its scope, its diversity and its urgency. The task, he said, is to figure out "how to transform a congeries of disparate training resources into one coherent system with clear objectives and an effective organization, and to standardize the conditions and modalities of training."

The answers to those questions can be seen today in light of the coordination of activities, the ambitious projects written into the 4-year plan, the impetus given to training in industry and the innovative system called apprenticeship (see separate articles). By the end of the quadrennial plan, vocational training will without a doubt be in a position to fulfill its economic and social contracts.

Key: 1. Number of Training Positions
2. (5-Year Plan Targets)
3. Number of Vocational Training Centers
4. *urgent need



3 NOMBRE DE CENTRES DE FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE



Branches professionnelles 1	13 Fin 1973	14 Fin 1977	15 Fin 1979
BTP 2	208	320	310
Métaux 3	105	227	362
Electricité-électronique 4	57	79	74
Textile-confection 5	30	41	66
Machinisme-agricole 6	6	27	23
Emplois de bureaux 7	55	110	148
Chimie 8	3	10	13
Industrie graphique 9	3	3	6
Divers 10	22	21	6
Entretien électro-mécanique 11	29	29	43
TOTAL 12	513	867	1051

Increase in Vocational Training Capacity (by occupational category) During the Second Quadrennial Plan

Key:
1. Occupational Category
2. Construction and public works
3. Metalwork
4. Electrical and electronics
5. Textiles-clothing manufacture
6. Agricultural engineering
7. Office workers
8. Chemicals
9. Graphics industries
10. Miscellaneous
11. Maintenance of electrical machinery
12. Total
13. End of 1973
14. End of 1977
15. End of 1979

9516
CSO: 4519/25

SAUDI DAILY INTERVIEWS FOREIGN MINISTER

GF081020 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0730 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Text] Dammam, 8 Nov (GNA)--Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah has expressed the hope that all Arab states will support the Saudi peace initiative and that Israel will submit to world pressure and implement the ideas included in the peace plan in order to achieve peace and stability in the region and in order to grant the Palestinian people their legitimate rights.

In a statement made to the Saudi newspaper AL-YAWM today, the Bahraini minister said that the next Gulf summit conference will be a step toward bolstering cooperation among the peoples of the region and toward transferring the Gulf region from the stage of laying foundations and proposals to the stage of implementation.

Shaykh Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah denied that the Gulf summit conference will discuss establishing relations with the eastern bloc states. He also stressed that Gulf security is now the responsibility of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which must arrive at a joint cooperation plan in this field.

He added that the principle of defense should be collective because none of the region's states can achieve it singularly. He explained that the method of achieving this is left for the military personnel to decide because it is a technical issue.

The Bahraini foreign minister denied that there is a plan to add new states to the GCC. Commenting on this issue he said that a possibility of expansion does exist but expansion right now, while the council is still not fully established, is premature. He also stressed the GCC states' anxiousness to resolve the Omani-PDRY dispute and put an end to the Iraqi-Iranian war because only the enemies benefit from these conflicts.

The Bahraini foreign minister praised his country's relations with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and said: Our friends are the friends of the kingdom and our enemies are her enemies too.

He expressed his country's satisfaction over the approval of the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia and stressed that the kingdom's military strength is a reinforcement to the Gulf and the Arab nation.

CSO: 4404/110

KHOMEYNI REPORTEDLY LOOKING FOR SOLUTION TO WAR WITH IRAQ

LD011812 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1611 GMT 1 Nov 81

[Text] Tehran, 1 Nov (TANJUG)--Iran's religious leader, Khomeyni, has ordered the military and political leaders to look into possibilities for either a military or a political solution for the armed conflict with Iraq, unconfirmed information says.

In unofficial talks, however, Iran's official figures still reject any possibility for a peaceful settlement of the conflict since, being prepared for victory, their people could hardly consent to any compromise. Publicly, it is still claimed that the war would end soon in victory for Iran as Iran counts on its superiority in manpower. Priests appeal to the young to get enlisted for war and, for the time being, in addition to the two classes serving their military terms, another four classes who served their terms before have been mobilized.

Judging by everything, many worries--the latest fuel shortage among them--are pressing down heavily on Iran at present. In Tehran and in other cities as well, eyewitnesses say the crisis in petrol and other fuel supplies is harder than at the war start. The fuel shortage is seen as a consequence of successful Iraqi air raids on Iran's oil installations as well as of Iran's being compelled to raise its oil exports at the expense of oil consumption at home. Strikes in oil refineries are also a cause of this shortage, it is heard here.

Habib Chatti, secretary general of the Islamic conference, is informally claimed to have offered 10,000 million dollars in the name of Saudi Arabia in compensation for war damage to Iranian foreign minister (now premier) Musavi. This damage runs considerably higher, according to Iranian estimates, between 50,000 and 55,000 million dollars.

CSO: 4600/114

MILITARY SAID UNHAPPY OVER CHOICE OF NEW PREMIER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 4-5

[Text] Iran's top military brass are reported to be uneasy at the choice of Mir Hossain Mussavi as prime minister because he is held by them responsible for the regime's very poor performance in foreign relations. The military have a direct interest in the regime's foreign policy because it has a direct bearing on the mullahs' ability to buy arms from reliable suppliers. As it is, over the last three months that Mussavi has been running Iran's Foreign Ministry, the country has been steadily forced into international isolation.

Ironically, during the same period, many people point out, the Iraqis whom Iran is fighting expanded their international relations, established more respectability and managed to grab the presidency of the U.N. General Assembly for their envoy to the world body. As a result of such diplomatic inroads the Iraqis have been able to obtain sophisticated military hardware from France, West Germany, Britain and even the United States via Jordan, some military sources have been pointing out. According to some reports the Soviets have also resumed shipment of arms to Iraq despite their new moves to get closer to Khomeini.

All these new developments are a source of anxiety to the Iranian military, who see their own stock of arms diminishing rapidly with no replacements available.

Indeed, the mullahs' policy of arms purchases is being taken as a yardstick of the regime's inefficiency and, worse still, corruption. According to reports in the British press the Khomeini regime is sending buyers who are so inexperienced that "they break all the rules and endanger others." The daily Guardian reported that "legitimate arms dealers and more experienced among the less orthodox dealers are now steering clear of dealing with Iran." Even an attempt by Libya to use former CIA agent Edwin Wilson, who runs a military hardware supply service to get aircraft parts for Iran fell through, the Guardian pointed out.

Meanwhile, three diplomats sent by the regime to buy military hardware in London were involved in dubious contacts which have resulted in criminal proceedings. As a result the three diplomats failed to accomplish their mission.

These instances, the military feel, are typical of the way the mullahs are handling the country's vital job of arms purchases, and the new premier is seen as directly responsible. He had assured the government that he would get help

from Libya's Gaddafi. Instead he upset the Libyan leader and other Arabs by his tactlessness. Annoying the military, too, is the fact that the mullahs do not include army officers in missions sent abroad for arms purchases. They usually send ignorant relatives of top mullahs instead.

As foreign minister, Mussavi has spent more time and energy on imaginary schemes to liberate Palestine, to fight imperialism and to sponsor terrorist groups abroad than in serving Iran's genuine interests, the critics point out. His record, compared with the highly significant achievements of his Iraqi rival Sadoun Hammadi, is pathetic, they feel. Yet now he has been rewarded for his failures by being promoted to the premiership.

The military is also suspicious of the new president Khamenei, who as deputy defence minister was responsible for weakening of the army and the execution of scores of officers and other ranks. Realising this, Khomeini last month delegated more powers to the new chief of staff, General Zahir-Nejad, and politely barred Khamenei from interfering in army affairs.

CSO: 4600/118

INSIDE OPPOSITION GROUPS ADOPT NEW TACTICS AGAINST REGIME

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 p 5

[Text] Armed opposition forces inside Iran seem to have adopted a new tactic in their continued campaign against the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. Rather than directing their guns at prominent figures of the regime they are now eliminating middle rank functionaries, especially ideological commissars, informers and the so-called rally organisers.

Last week unidentified gunmen stopped the director of the Ideological Office in East Azarbaijan and killed him, together with two of his armed companions. The victim, identified as Javad Hossainkhah, was driving from Tehran to Tabriz. His car was chased by a jeep near Takestan, and forced to stop. Hosseinkhah and his companions were unable to use their guns. Their attackers ordered them out of their vehicle, took them to a quiet spot nearby and shot them. Their bodies were found later.

Shortly afterwards came the assassination of a hardline supporter of the regime in the headmaster of the secondary school in Tavalesh. His name has not been given. Two other new recruits to the staff of the Qazvin Secondary School named Azizi and Eshavari were also killed by unknown gunmen. Leaflets distributed at the scene claimed that the killings were intended to serve notice to so-called teachers who had been infiltrated by the regime.

In Tehran a city bus driver said to be a leading member of the hezbollahis--members of the fanatical "Party of God"--and also an informer, was shot dead. The shops of two South Tehran mobsters, identified as Hassan Mardani and Gholam Hossain Seyyed-Hossaini, were set on fire. They were alleged to be both informers and organisers of mobs to take part in pro-regime rallies and Friday prayer gatherings.

Similarly, in Kermanshah, Mashad, Tabriz and Isfahan well-known supporters of Khomeini who act as informers and mob organisers have been attacked by the opponents of the regime or their houses and shops set on fire.

Analysts in Tehran believe that the opposition's new tactic in switching from high ranking officials to the middle rank supporters of the regime is intended to weaken the pillars on which the regime's strength lies. Gunning down of middle rank supporters of Khomeini is also a less risky operation because, unlike

the prominent mullahs, the second rank ones are not protected by a dozen or so bodyguards and they do not move about in bulletproof cars. Because of the nature of their work the middle rankers are also readily approachable.

Yet they perform a highly vital service to the regime, both in its spying network as well as in herding crowds to swell the attendance at Friday prayers or funeral processions. The Khomeini regime is highly sensitive to the size of the turnout at these public functions because it owed its initial success in ousting the Shah, and later in intimidating other rivals, by relying on well-organised rallies. Even today when a major decision is to be taken which may bring about popular outcry, the method used is to send a crowd in front of the Majlis to demand that that particular decision be adopted. Then the Majlis brands the rally as "the popular will" and subsequently agrees to the demands.

Now, by turning their guns against rally organisers the opponents of the regime expect to deny the mullahs that particular advantage.

Analysts believe the opposition elements who initially took such a heavy toll of the lives of the regime's leadership and who are now eliminating middle rank supporters of the mullahs belong to a highly efficient and professional organisation. They may well be members of a centrist group, and not members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, they suggest.

CSO: 4600/118

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ REPRIMANDED FOR PLOTS, ASSASSINATIONS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 3 Oct 81 pp 1, 11

[Text] On the eve of the elections, Rajavi--this fugitive from the wrath of the people--called upon supporters of his anti-peoples' organization to plot against these elections as extensively as possible. He was hoping that with this anti-people request's appearance in the imperialist, fear-generating press, the turnout for the elections of millions of revolution-loving masses would be reduced, and that 3 million votes would be realized. However, the "people," even more full of love than before, took up the standard for their relentless struggle against the world-devourers, and fearlessly, paying no heed to the hypocrites' "heroic"! protection of them, sent their true defenders to the barricades of the defense of the interests of the deprived. The people's active and zealous turnout shows once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the world's most stable countries, decisively carries on with its revolution while struggling against internal and external plots. This stability, whose only guarantor is the people's unsparing protection of the revolution, has always been a thorn in the side of America and its cohorts, and they have wanted to refute it on every pretext so as to always have a justification for plotting against the Islamic Republic. Yet the people have always shamed these pretexts, while blackening the faces of those who have buried their heads in the sand and shamelessly equated the killing of innocent people with defense of the people.

These same people, on the day the leader of their clan despicably fled to Paris with Bani-Sadr hiding in the airplane's restroom; stupidly said that in another week the people would bring him back with greetings, praise, whistles and cheers and make him Prime Minister. In the course of filling the shoes of Bakhtiar, Oveysi, Amini, Ariana, and others, the "people"! who are their supporters came together and tried as much as they were able to martyr the nation's officials in order that perhaps the way would be opened for them to come here, but the nation's closing more tightly of ranks in its enmity of them showed them who their true enemies are. Yesterday they mobilized in order to break the ranks of the people.

Who did the purposeless agents of the central cadres abroad martyr in the streets, supporters of dependent capitalism, or representatives of the nation's capitalists?

If their enemies are these people, then why are they hiding from the wrath of the people? Why don't they demonstrate once in Shush Square, Nazi Abad, or the Seh Rah-e Azari? Is it not because there are more people in these areas?

Ask them what class Raja'i came from. At what luxury-laden table did he sit? Don't they know how he lived and what long years he suffered in prison? Ask them how much wealth the martyred Beheshti had, and who swallowed the poison of accusation to obtain a moment's ease for the people in the villages. How many times did Hasheminezhad go to prison, and how many times did those connected with the Mojahedin betray him?

Ask them who the people voted for in the elections, and why?

Who among your comrades-in-arms are enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and what is the American connection with your enmity with the Islamic Republic? Who were you supporting and who were you attacking in your disruption of the elections? Did you get the message in Paris? What percentage of the people in the poor neighborhoods participated in the elections, and how many of the people in the wealthy neighborhoods? What about the villagers?

They know all the answers to these questions. If they didn't know they wouldn't just demonstrate in front of the classy boutiques.

Oh you who have never been able to get the people to turn out whenever you have come out of your fearsome houses against the people who have firmly dedicated their pain, suffering, and deprivation against the superpowers, and even America's henchmen who are your leaders have not been able to disperse the people. Open your eyes and see how the people, in defiance of all your scientific analyses, have solidly participated in the elections and given expression to their rancour against the dastradly assassination of their dear ones.

Those who have thus far been martyred at your treasonous hands were the true supporters of these people and spokesmen for their deprivations. This is why the nation employed them, and you treasonously martyred them. Oh deceived ones! Just once, ask your leaders what is the social class of those they call thugs, Partisans of God, and Phalangists, and how is it that this time the thugs are not capitalists? Ask the leader of your group to plan a demonstration once in the poor neighborhoods so that his voice can reach the ears of the poor people. The deprived ones have certainly heard your entire pitch, and yet you demonstrate in order to bring out the capitalists in the upper part of the city! Are you afraid those calloused hands will tear you to pieces?

Truly, what percentage of the membership of the organization is composed of people who have tasted hunger? On what side of town are your homes? Ask your team leader sometime why all the team leaders' houses are located in places where there are no poor people within forty lots in four directions. Ask them what neighborhoods the team leaders' houses were in for the armed groups and organizations before the revolution, and where the organization's slogans were most often heard, and for which group of people these slogans were most interesting.

You who have taken daggers in hand to kill the people's dear ones, what people are you defending? The people are those who turned out 100 percent for the elections in the Southern part of the city and the villages, and this firmly establishes their strength of purpose in defending the revolution.

9310
CSO: 4640/32

IRANIANS' RESENTMENT TURNS AGAINST LEFTIST LEADERS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 6-8

[Text] A steadily growing feeling of resentment against the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and its allied leftist group leaders over their responsibility for sending so many young people onto the streets to be slaughtered by Khomeini's thugs is reported from Tehran. The public's first reaction when the wave of murders began three months ago was one of severe shock. There was severe criticism even of Khomeini, who was openly called "the most bloodthirsty tyrant Iran has ever seen."

"But with Bani-Sadr and Rajavi in the safety of Paris while their misled and openhearted supporters were being killed like flies, it was only natural that with their initial fury dissipated people should begin to blame Rajavi and his colleagues for leaving their supporters to face the music," a Tehran observer pointed out. "The two fugitives in Paris were likened to commanders who had deserted their men in the battle."

As the mullahs intensified their bloody campaign of murder and execution the popular backlash against the Mojahedin leaders grew. Iranians who invariably believe that there must be a sinister hand behind any event even suggested that Khomeini and his henchmen were right in accusing the Mojahedin leaders of being American agents. "Apparently, this is a clever device through which the Americans are eliminating the true leftists by using the mullahs," was a theory constantly aired.

Other Iranians who also look for hidden hands behind every political move suggested that the wave of the murders had something to do with the Russians and the Tudeh. They maintained that the Tudeh party, which follows the Moscow line so faithfully, had triggered the recent showdown between the Mojahedin and the Khomeini group in an effort to break up the country's largest leftist organisation. In doing this, the theory went on, the Tudeh would weaken and effectively eliminate a heretical rival, and thus would emerge as the sole standard-bearer of the left.

Advocates of this theory held that the Russians had two political surrogates in Iran. The first, known to everyone, was the Tudeh party, which because of its record of blind obedience to Moscow, was very much discredited in the country. The second was, they argue, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, which had a kind of national and religious cover and because of that could attract many genuine leftists who had no love for Moscow.

The advocates of this theory argue that the enormous funds at the disposal of the Mojahedin and their outside contacts prove the point that they were supported by a foreign power. And the fact that they only attacked the U.S. and even tried to hand over U.S. Embassy documents to Russian agents showed their real orientation.

They claim that after the quarrel between Bani-Sadr and the hardliners came into the open Moscow tried to persuade the Mojahedin leadership to maintain neutrality and keep some place on the Iranian political scene. But either because of the personal ambitions of its leaders, or other factors, the organisation decided to throw in its lot with Bani-Sadr.

Factors which might have encouraged the Mojahedin to join Bani-Sadr, it is suggested, were:

1. The Tudeh leadership was possibly worried that their party might once again be sacrificed by Moscow if the Soviets decided to put its chips on the Mojahedin number. So they pushed Rajavi into Bani-Sadr's arms to obviate this.

2. It is also possible that the Tudeh leadership managed to convince their Soviet overlords that the excesses of the Khomeini regime had turned the popular tide in favour of a secular system in preference to a religious one; thus, a pure socialist-Leninist set-up was preferable to an Islamic marxist one.

3. Finally, it was suggested that independent factions within the Mojahedin decided to make a clean break from Khomeini and the Russians, and so they saw in Bani-Sadr and his foreign backers, presumably the European left, a good vehicle on which to ride to an independent course.

What is certain is that all the leading players in the political scene, such as the Tudeh, Mojahedin, the Islamic Republic party, the independent leftists including the National Democratic Front, and finally the remainder of the supporters of Bazargan and the National Front, are peripheral groups. Certainly none of them could claim with any confidence they would win a free election, nor form a strong government, Iranian observers contend. Indeed, many people believe that after the overthrow of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the only form of credible government which Iran has witnessed was that of Bazargan's provisional administration in 1979; that government's popularity began to wane after only one month in office, when the atrocities of the revolutionary courts and their refusal to give a fair and open trial to the leading figures of the monarchical regime became clear. Later, the high-handed manner in which the referendum of April 1, 1979 was conducted effectively put an end to the solid public backing for Bazargan, too.

Thus, from a strictly political viewpoint, the bloody fight between the mullahs and the Mojahedin is a factional war between two extremist and by now unrepresentative groups, many Iranian observers point out.

It is inevitable too, that people will note that the victims of today were themselves the killers of yesterday. Now that the dust has settled over the early period of the revolution people can look back to the events of February 1979 and see that it was the combined forces of the Mojahedin and Fedayeen-e-Khalq

which raided army barracks soon after the then chief of staff General Gharabaghi called the army off the streets and back to their barracks. On those fateful days of February 10 and 11, 1979 many unarmed soldiers and officers were mercilessly killed by Mojahedin and Fedayeen gunmen.

The same groups were also responsible for helping the young and socially frustrated mullahs to set up Islamic tribunals to dispense summary justice. Not that the mullahs needed much encouragement to resort to violence. But the Mojahedin and their allies provided the mullahs with their technical support and taught them how to be ruthless. The Mojahedin's record, therefore, leaves their main activists with little popular sympathy. Added to that is the group's ambiguous political platform. According to most political analysts in Iran with whom it is possible to keep in touch, the Mojahedin have always said "what they are not, but they are yet to say what they are."

"They say they are not marxists," one analyst points out. "They also say that they are not theocrats. They are neither liberals, nor nationalists, because in early 1979 they openly attacked the National Front and other followers of the well-known nationalist leader, the late Dr Mossadegh. But when you ask them about their political, social and economic programmes they usually dodge the issue and resort to bland and generalised statements."

In today's political climate in Iran two other factors work against the Mojahedin. One is the obscure background of their leaders. Two of their best-known figures--Massoud Rajavi and Moussa Khiabani--were not even born when Iranians nationalised their oil industry. It has taken a bloody revolution and a massive dose of economic chaos and misery for Iranians for them to appreciate the value of "the devil they knew." Indeed, the inexperienced ministers of the successive cabinets after the revolution have left a feeling among Iranians that an obscure young man like Rajavi is hardly a better bet than the untested Velayati or Mir-Hossain Mussavi.

Also haunting the minds of much of the professional and clerical classes is the ferocity with which members and supporters of the Mojahedin and fedayeen, as well as the Tudeh party, whipped up campaigns against all moderate officials in the administration and industry to force them from their jobs after the revolution. They were to blame for destroying the lives of thousands of ordinary officials, it is alleged, and it was they who at that time invoked Islam as their reason.

Thus, along with the callous way the Mojahedin leaders sent young people onto the streets to get killed, many people look at their earlier ruthlessness and wonder what sort of life the Mojahedin might provide if they did take power for a period in Iran. Would it be more murder, purges, confiscations and hardship? Few people would give a firm negative on that, independent observers feel.

CSO: 4600/118

OPPOSITION GROUPS' COALITION REPORTED PROGRESSING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 1-3

[Text] Reports from a number of exile opposition groups in Paris have hinted that current moves to form a loose coalition among them to present a united front with the aim of getting rid of the Khomeini regime in Iran have been progressing satisfactorily.

Efforts were continuing to bring in prominent military names who have both following among officers who are still in Iran and whose inclusion could influence opposition forces inside the country to take new heart and consider action.

There are already signs in Iran that nationalist groups now see the urgency of all opponents of the regime working together before it is too late. Open letters from professional and other groups now circulating in Tehran are pushing this theme vigorously. There is also a strong feeling among observers watching the exile groups that they themselves now feel there is sufficient animosity to the mullah's administration among both military and civilian groups inside Iran to encourage some concerted action.

Additionally the shows of open disgust from a number of foreign governments, as well as the world public at large, over the course of events in Iran have provided new incentives to come together to try to salvage something from the wreck of their country. Fears that Western governments would stamp on any embryonic united opposition front because of their commercial hopes in Iran have dissipated with the signs of a spreading realisation among the industrial countries that unless some change occurs in Iran shortly it "won't be worth a penny to any would-be trader," as one exile put it.

First reports on the new coalition plan said Shahpour Bakhtiar, who heads the most powerful opposition group, the National Iranian Resistance Movement, veteran statesman Ali Amini, who has been working to build up a united front for many months, Admiral Ahmad Madani, and Hassan Nazih, both officials who worked initially for the post-Shah regime and have been sent as anti-monarchist, and several other opposition figures had agreed to work together without sacrificing their own freedom of action.

Reports that overtures were being made to have monarchist leaders join them have since been confirmed by sources close to the groups. Reservations expressed at the outset by Madani over the inclusion of a man like General Gholam Ali Oveissi, the Shah's former strongman, who rightly or wrongly has been blamed for some of the violence in Tehran during the unrest there, are said to have been overruled.

Amini is said to have expressed the view that the people of Iran are so desperate to return to some semblance of normal life, and restore some sanity to their existence, that they are no longer concerned over who comes to save them. Others are said to have supported this view. Oveissi is known to enjoy a strong following among some sections of the military and many exiles.

Some observers also saw the silence of the new Shah on the anniversary of his accession to the throne as a possible reflection of a desire on his and his advisers' part to play as diplomatic a role while the coalition negotiations are going on as possible. "If he does see his role as a constitutional one it stands to sense that while the politicians are negotiating he should be seen as awaiting their recommendations without trying to influence them at this stage," a veteran Iranian official commented to IPS. "Especially when the tide is steadily turning in the favour of monarchy once more."

Observers say the noticeable mellowing of former republicans in their attitude to the monarchy in recent weeks reflects their awareness that insistence of any particular system of government or ideology can only be disruptive rather than help unite Iranians to save their country.

The philosophy of the new coalition is that the groups all work together to topple Khomeini, then guarantee a free plebiscite among Iranians to decide the system under which they want to live. Afterwards, the groups will go their own ways and conduct their political campaigns within the system people decide upon, and under the general principles of the 1907 constitution. That constitution does provide for a mechanism for change in the system, Iranian experts say.

Another factor cited by some observers as bringing about a more practical attitude to the centrist forces are the signs that rightist forces are steadily organising and drawing growing support. There is a natural fear among republicans, the commentators say, that if some effective political organisation to "supervise" the move to topple Khomeini and any return to Iran by exile forces is not set up, then more extremist rightists could impose another oppressive regime and thus spark off new strife.

Some sources close to the new coalition activities say the question of approaching Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi and former president Bani-Sadr to join them had been discussed. But this could not be confirmed.

There are now signs of a growing movement inside Iran to organise popular opposition to Khomeini's rule into an institutional framework. Reports indicate that a number of civil servants, oil company employees, educationalists, lawyers, physicians and businessmen are at work trying to shape up a massive resistance movement.

One indicator of such a move has come in the form of an announcement by the hitherto unknown group calling itself the Association of the Civil Servants of Iran. In a leaflet the founders of the association have announced their readiness to provide civilian back-up to any military move to topple the present-day rulers of Iran.

The association has called on all the Iranians to be ready to play their due role in the movement, which it says is bound to put an end to the rule of the mullahs. However, it has cautioned the people not to take rash decisions, not to endanger lives unnecessarily and not to act alone. It believes that all the opposition groups at home and abroad, military and civilian, must narrow down their objection to the single act of saving the homeland.

The association has specifically called on all opposition groups to leave aside ideological differences, party loyalties and sectarian considerations in favour of the all important task of saving the national identity and territorial integrity of Iran.

It warns various political and ideological groups that what is in danger is the very existence of Iran, "our very nationhood and our Iranian identity, because the present-day usurpers of power in Iran are blatantly and shamelessly bent on destruction of everything which has an Iranian identity."

The association goes on to state: "Nothing else is in immediate danger; neither Islam, any particular ideology, nor any kind of regional rights. We stress that what is in real danger is the very basis of our nationhood. If we lose that we will lose everything else. There will be no use for any ideology, faith or creed if we lose our homeland and identity."

It stresses that only Khomeini is gaining from the present obsession of "certain political groups in the opposition camp with ideological considerations or personal ambitions." It sets out its plan for unity of all opposition groups as follows:

1. Regard Khomeini and his regime as an army of occupation who must be evicted from Iran by a well-planned military operation.

2. Organise civilian back-up to make the liberation move as smooth and as bloodless and painless as possible, because during the past few years too much Iranian blood has been spilled and too much pain suffered.

3. All Iranians have a right and duty to participate in the war of liberation but there must be a clear-cut command structure with the military wing in the lead.

4. Avoid popularist slogans, especially those which--while desirable under ideal conditions--are meaningless at present.

5. Always remember that our immediate task is to evict an occupation army so as to reinstate national and constitutional institutions which have been destroyed or usurped by the army of occupation.

CSO: 4600/118

OPPOSITION SUPPORT OF MILITARY REVIEWED

NC301846 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 30 Oct 81

[Text] The morale of Iran's soldiers has always been high, which is something that cannot be (?ignored). After 3 1/2 years of treason, Khomeyni and his associates are (?still) trying to (?weaken) the army. After all the executions of the brave men of the armed forces, gendarmerie and police force and after all the pressure imposed on the armed forces (?as a result of which) many personnel had to leave the country, (?we continue) to see that wherever an Iranian soldier is, he feels the pains suffered by his homeland with all his being and conveys the feeling of patriotism (?to the people around him). [passage indistinct] This feeling of responsibility, this continuous thought about the destiny of Iran and of Iranians is (?a flame burning) within the soldiers and something that has been displayed time and again (?on various occasions and places).

(?The feeling of patriotism is so strong in the soldiers) that the calamity stricken people of Iran have attached all their hopes to this devoted force. With each passing day, the Iranian people's expectations on the Iranian army increase. And with each day, the burden on the shoulders of the military personnel becomes heavier. Their duty becomes (?more important) and their mission more (?specific). The truth is that the Iranian armed forces and military personnel--from ordinary soldiers, gendarmes and policemen up to the higher ranks--have never had a confrontation with the Iranian people. From the very first days of their service, they have used their weapons to confront foreign enemies and to preserve Iran's territorial integrity. The two things of importance to them are the preservation of Iranian thought and keeping Iran (?safe) from foreign aggression.

From the very start, Khomeyni and his associates regarded the Iranian army as a force confronting them. They knew that if they did not destroy the organizational (?bases) of the army and did not weaken the patriotic (?feeling) and dignity of the soldiers it would be impossible to place the army at their own disposal.

(?From the very first days), the first step taken was to mislead a number of military commanders with the help of Huyser's sinister mission and, by using the hireling Palestinians and the pro-Palestinian Mojahedin, they pillaged the garrisons as best they could. Khomeyni [word indistinct] in the sense that

in the beginning he praised and eulogized the armed forces and he ordered his devotees to place flowers in the barrels of the soldiers' guns during demonstrations. When (?he achieved what he wanted, he approached) the soldiers in the name of Islam and (?by infiltrating the army with his officials) and revolution guards, he tried to place religious (?beliefs) within the army vis-a-vis the firm determination of patriotic commanders.

The tragedy brought about by Khomeyni (?was very clearly) aimed at the officers and NCO's of the armed forces. (?However) he could not pass (?certain limits).

The second stage of Khomeyni's deceit became obvious when the patriotic Kurdish, Torkaman and Baluchi rose to confront the religious dictatorship of the (?Shi'ite bigots). By sending the armed forces to fight the Kurds, Khomeyni was trying to hit two birds with one stone. In other words, he intended to destroy the Kurds and to decrease, as much as possible, the popularity of an army that had never raised a weapon against a compatriot. Both of these plots failed because the Kurds alertly refrained from confronting the armed forces and [words indistinct] treated their military captives very respectfully and the armed forces treated the Kurds with the highest spirit of patriotism, so much so that Khomeyni was enraged and Khalkhali was sent on a mission to massacre the Kurdish captives. At any rate, Khomeyni's plans failed and Khalkhali's massacres only increased national and world aversion toward Khomeyni.

At this stage in Iran's history no one is as heavily burdened with treason as Bani-Sadr. He, too, was confronted with the healthy morale of the armed forces personnel and with the depth of their patriotism.

The third stage of Khomeyni's deceit in the armed forces was implemented during the war with Iraq. Khomeyni tried, by using (?the wretched) Bani-Sadr, to belittle the commanders. He appointed Bani-Sadr commander in chief to tell the armed forces personnel that "the post to which all of you attach such great importance can be filled by any ruffian if I wish." But we all know that Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr were both defeated at this stage too, so much so that today when reviewing the Iran-Iraq war, everyone praises the armed forces and its personnel and denounces Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr.

The Iranian armed forces have special characteristics, the first of which is their patriotism and the fact that they are nationalists, either knowingly or unknowingly, The second is that the army has gained great experience from the incidents and the historic experience of the past 3 years and has (?displayed) an extremely [word indistinct] and praiseworthy behavior. The third is that it believes in its military (?know-how). The fourth is that the army is disgusted with the fundamentalist nature and bigotry of the regime. And finally, the army is composed of constructive men and not destructive and fatalist elements. It is because of these inherent (?values) that the Iranian armed forces have stayed completely (?untouched) and each and every one of its personnel is (?worthy of praise).

(?Iran's salvation) depends on the heavy mission that all (?army) personnel shoulder. There is no doubt that with the first opportunity all of them will unite to save Iran in a humanitarian but powerful way. Today, the military

in Iran and abroad are all thinking of the homeland's salvation. This is why they enjoy the support of all the groups opposed to Khomeyni and his destructive regime. Iranians respect and attach hopes to the armed forces and will never forget that in these past 3 years of calamity, the armed forces have truly struggled and showed (?their devotion) both at home and abroad.

Neither intrigues by the left nor deceit by the clergy can mislead our armed forces. The armed forces is a manifestation of patriotism that is aware of its mission [word indistinct]. The armed forces [words indistinct] and do not harass compatriots. The armed forces have shown that they are the spirit of Iran.

CSO: 4640/48

MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE SECTORS OF ECONOMY

Electricity Output

Tehran BURS in Persian 13 Sep 81 p 7

[Text] The Ministry of Energy announced its most important activities concerning electricity and energy in the course of the past year as follows:

Electricity Affairs

The main goal of the Ministry of Energy in the area of electricity is to produce electricity for various uses throughout the country. Obviously, the electrical industry made some progress in the past, but this progress was achieved at a very high cost and the expansion and rate of production were coupled with faulty policies (which were a part of the general policies of the country). Presently, the policy of the Ministry of Energy is primarily focussed on the quantitative expansion of this industry. For instance, providing power for 5 million consumers with probable power outages (a total of 5 days per year) and providing power for 4 million consumers with probable power outages (a total of 2 days per year) will be given priority. In addition to accomplishing the main goal and the quantitative expansion of the network, especially in villages and agricultural and industrial regions, difficulty lies in the demand for electricity for the coming years, which requires that steps be taken from now for more production (qualitative expansion). For this purpose, as well as to take the place of the nuclear power plants, which for political, economic, [technical], and security reasons have been eliminated from the program, the Ministry of Energy has prepared an expansive plan to establish hydroelectric and steam power plants. Hydroelectric power plants, which from every standpoint are the most valuable power plants, are being studied by the specialists of this Ministry. At the present time, with the cooperation of the universities, they are studying appropriate places to build dams. Also, the necessary planning for steam power plants (with a 5,000 megawatt capacity), which are necessary because of the increased electrical consumption and the elimination of the nuclear power plants, has begun.

Another goal of the Ministry of Energy is to create self-sufficiency in the electricity industry in order to free this industry from dependency, which concerns, directly or indirectly, all the industrial and agricultural institutions as well as the daily life of the people.

A brief summary of the activities and the steps taken regarding electrical power follows.

A. Installed Power

At the end of 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81], the installed electrical power in the power stations managed by the Ministry of Energy reached 9,553 kilowatts, which shows an increase of 1,622 kilowatts (20.5 percent) compared to the end of the previous year (7,931 kilowatts).

B. Production of Electrical Energy

Between 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, the electrical energy produced by power facilities managed by the Ministry of Energy reached 19,869 million kilowatt hours, which shows an increase of 428 million kilowatt hours (2.2 percent) compared to the previous year (19,441 million kilowatt hours). Of the total electricity produced between 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, about 13,143 million kilowatt hours were produced by Tavanir Company, 1,107 million kilowatt hours by regional electricity companies, and 5,619 million kilowatt hours by the country's hydroelectric power stations. The electricity produced by hydroelectric stations (4,042 million kilowatt hours) of Tavanir Company was transmitted and sold to various parts of the country.

C. Electrical Outreach to Villages

Before the revolution, the number of villages with electricity was 4,186 throughout the country, which, compared to the total number of Iranian villages (66,000 villages), was insignificant and its annual expansion was quite poor (an average of 200 villages per year).

After the Islamic revolution, this important matter was noted and especially emphasized. After studies were made, a comprehensive plan to bring electricity to the villages was ratified. With this plan, an average of 2,000 villages will be electrified annually, which shows the comprehensiveness of the plan and the persistence of the authorities from the very beginning of their work.

During this same year, the regional electric companies continued their efforts in this regard. During this time, the regional electric company of Isfahan brought electricity to 279 villages, the regional electric company of Mazandaran to 267 villages, and the regional electric company of Gilan to 53 villages.

D. The Expansion of Power Stations

1. Work on the construction of [Naka] power stations, including 4 units of 440 megawatts each, of which 2 units are operational and a third is being tested before becoming temporarily operational.

2. Work on the construction of a 320 megawatt power station in Isfahan, which was completed this year and will become operational in 1360 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82].

3. Work on the installation of a large, 800 megawatt power station in Isfahan, the first unit of which will begin operation in Dey '61 [22 Dec 82-20 Jan 83].

4. Work on the construction of a 1,280 megawatt power station in Bandar 'Abbas, of which [3]20 megawatts were operational in the spring of 1980, and the installation of the second and third units are being completed.

5. Work on the construction of the gas power station of Orumiyeh, with a 60 megawatt capacity, which will be operational in the spring of 1981.

6. Work on the construction of the thermodynamic power station of Tus-Mashhad. During the year in question, most of the activities concentrated on building facilities and lodging for the employees. The main work on the power station itself will be followed up during the next year.

7. Work on the construction of a new power station in Tabriz, of which 2 units of 387 Megawatts each are being installed by Tavanir experts and technicians since the dismissal of foreign contractors.

8. Work on the construction of the 1,360 megawatt Ramin power station in Ahvaz, of which a 315 megawatt unit was operational in the fall.

9. Constructing a power station in south Tehran.

This power station will be built to handle the future needs of the nationwide network with a 1,500 megawatt capacity in the vicinity of Tehran.

10. Work on the construction of the reserve pump power station of Siah Bisheh, which will store the energy produced by the thermodynamic power station as a backup during times of heavy load demand.

11. Several diesel power stations of small capacity in different cities have been or are being installed by regional electric companies.

E. The Expansion of Distribution Lines and Stations

1. The completion of the 230 kilovolt Tehran-Isfahan lines between 21 Apr-21 May 80 and the completion of the preliminary operations for the temporary operation of the 230 kilovolt Tehran-Isfahan and Ziaran stations.

2. The necessary steps for the completion of the Najafabad-steel mill power transmitting lines and operations concerning the 230 kilovolt input of the steel mill, which became temporarily operational in the spring.

3. The transmitting lines of the 400 kilovolt Isfahan-Arak-Tehran project have been completed except for parts of the south Rudshur line.

4. The 230 kilovolt Naka-Sari-Kaghazsazi-Qayemshahr unit, in consultation with the Tavanir Company, is being built.

5. The margin of the operations of the second Tehran-Manjil circuit [as published].

6. Work on the preparation and installation of equipment to bring electricity to the national defense industries in Isfahan was begun temporarily in Khordad [22 May-21 Jun].

7. The 400 kilovolt eastern lines of Naka-Tehran, which became operational in Esfand [20 Feb-20 Mar].

8. The 400 kilovolt western lines of Neka-Tehran, which have made 20 percent progress and the operations of the project are continuing.

9. The 400 kilovolt project of Ziaran-Tabriz, which had made five percent progress at the end of winter.

10. The Tabriz-Mahabad-Orumiyeh lines, which have made five percent progress.

11. The 63 kilovolt Gilan lines project, which will be created to strengthen the connection between central and eastern Gilan.

12. The 66 kilovolt Fars lines project. The goal of this project is to transmit electricity from the natural gas power station of Shiraz to a number of cities of this province. Activities in all areas of the project continue.

13. The stations of the project for the expansion of the 132 kilovolt Azarbaijan electrical unit, all of the lines of which have been completed and have made 50 percent progress during this year.

14. The project of the 400 kilovolt transmitting line of Shiraz-Fasa-Sirjan.

The project is in progress and its goal is to connect the two main lines of (Tehran-Isfahan-Bandar 'Abbas) and (Ahvaz-Omidiyeh-Shiraz).

15. The comprehensive distribution project for Tehran.

This project is very actively being implemented and its goal is to cover the city of Tehran and its close suburbs.

16. The 63 kilovolt transmitting lines project of Khorasan, which made very good progress during the year in question.

Animal Husbandry

Tehran BURS in Persian 14 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] According to a PARS NEWS AGENCY report, the seminar on studying the resources for national self-sufficiency in animal husbandry products, which began on 23 Aug, completed its work with the issuance of a resolution.

The text of this resolution, consisting of 10 articles, is as follows:

1. Speedy determination of ownership on the basis of Islamic guidelines.

2. Considering the importance of the role of studying and treating animals and poultry in order to attain self-sufficiency, the veterenarian organization is to prepare a plan for providing and justly distributing vital medicine and to establish centers for the production of needed vaccines, under the supervision of the Razi institution of Hesarak.

3. In order to better control the diseases that humans and animals share in common, and to support the producers of the company for Iranian dairy industries, steps must be taken to create the necessary centers to collect the milk produced by small cattle raisers.

4. To provide and distribute thoroughbred hybrid milk cows needed by cattle raisers who meet the requirements, the organization of animal husbandry must take advantage of all the resources for raising hybrid thoroughbred cattle.

5. Considering the necessity of improving the condition of fishermen and the vital need to protect and preserve the acquatic resources as well as accelerate the construction of the southern shores, fisherman service centers must be established by the northern fishery company

to devise the necessary regulations to preserve water resources and to increase the stock of fish in water reservoirs, lakes, and behind dams. Also, a council made up of the members of the general assemblies and the general directors of the northern and southern fisheries must be formed and the authority of the general assemblies and the board of directors of the two fisheries must be conferred on the above-mentioned council.

6. Believing in the major share of the tribes in the production of non-dependent animal husbandry products and the particular social life of this stratum of our fellow citizens, it is necessary that the affairs of tribes be centered in one unit. Also, since the tribes make up a significant percentage of the national population, from now on, the nation's population must be divided under the headings of urban, rural, and tribal.

7. In order to coordinate the development of planting feed, a headquarters consisting of the regional representatives of the offices of forests and pastures, animal husbandry, agriculture, research, sowing, and industries of the foundation of the oppressed, the reconstruction crusade and the land distribution boards in the regional office of agricultural affairs is to be established and given the necessary responsibilities.

8. Considering the special importance of corn in feeding humans, animals, and poultry, encouragement should be given to the planting of this grain.

9. The affairs of the preservation, correct operation, reformation, and revitalization of pastures, with the technical supervision of the national organization of forests and pastures, are to be implemented through pasture upkeep projects through self-help and the direct participation of rural and tribal cattle raisers as well as the establishment of rural and tribal Islamic cooperative councils.

10. In order to precisely and completely implement the above items, it is necessary to establish centers for rural services, to combine and reconstruct organizations in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, to train the existing cadre, to make organizational plans based on accurate statistical information to ensure cooperation and coordination between all the organizations in implementing the items of the resolution, to provide the required funds for implementing the related plans, and to eliminate troublesome financial and other regulations. Also, the animal husbandry unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs will be responsible for the implementation of the items of the resolution.

Tehran Water Works

Tehran BURS in Persian 22 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] The Ministry of Energy announced the activities of the Tehran regional water organization as follows.

1. Operations

Untreated Water

The untreated water to be purified from the water resources, including the Jajrud and Karaj rivers and the semi-deep wells, is transferred through the water works facilities to the water treatment facilities of Tehran. From 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, about 222.52 million cubic meters of untreated water was transported from the above-mentioned sources to Tehran and 38.29 million cubic meters of it were used for planting forests in the east and west of Tehran and for the industrial factories around Tehran as well as for washing pipelines. The remaining 404.23 million cubic meters were sent to the Tehran treatment facilities. Treatment facilities used 7.14 cubic meters and 397.09 cubic meters, after treatment, were put at the disposal of 565,614 Tehran consumers.

Laboratories

The laboratories, through checking samples and making various biological, bacteriological, and chemical tests, control the water from its source to its ultimate delivery to the consumer. If the water is polluted or impure, they determine the reasons and eliminate them. During the year in question, 10,574 tests were carried out on water samples in various laboratories of the organization as follows:

Chemistry laboratory, 906 samples

Bacteriology laboratory, 6,333 samples

Biology laboratory, 2,438 samples

Laboratory for the study of water resources, 563 samples

Sewage laboratory, 188 samples

Karaj Drinking Water

In 1342 [21 Mar 63-20 Mar 64], the Tehran regional water organization began to implement the first stage of the plan to install drinking water pipelines for the city of Karaj. In 1344 [21 Mar 65-20 Mar 66], in accordance with an agreement, the operation of the water facilities of the city of Karaj was conferred on the Tehran regional water

organization. From 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, 3,614,599 cubic meters of treated water was put at the disposal of the consumers.

3. Development Projects

Project for Building Lar Dam

Operations of the implementation of this project until the end of winter, 1980, has been as follows.

Building the dam and tunnel of Lar and related facilities, 92 percent progress.

The tunnel to reach the Lavarak power station, 45 percent progress.

Installation of the Kalan power station generator, 75 percent progress.

Project for the Irrigation of Dasht-e Qazvin

The goal of this plan is to provide the necessary water for the region of Dasht-e Qazvin, including that required for agriculture, industry, and drinking. During this year, the activities in all areas of this project have continued in a remarkable manner.

Project for the Irrigation Network of Varamin and Garmsar

The percentage of accomplishments at the end of winter, 1980, are as follows:

Building a diverting dyke and the first section of the Varamin irrigation network, 60 percent.

The main building of the Varamin network, 51 percent.

Section three of the Varamin irrigation network, nine percent.

Building the Tehran-Varamin canal, 75 percent.

Digging operational wells, 75 percent.

Building the diverting dyke and irrigation network of Garmsar, 65 percent.

Project for Studying the Building of the Saveh Dam

The goals of this study project are to irrigate, build dams and water resources for the Saveh region, to make use of surface and underground waters, to build dams on the Forqan and Mazlaqan rivers in order to collect the flood waters, and to prepare an irrigation project which

would benefit agriculture, in addition to producing electrical power up to about 10 megawatts.

The studies for the first and second stages have been completed and from 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, the consulting engineers were selected and the necessary contracts have been signed and exchanged.

Poject to Study the Reservoir Dam of Taleqan and the Long-Term Plan for Tehran Water

Excavation and exploratory operations restarted from 22 May 80 and on 8 Mar 81 became temporarily operational.

Mapping and sample taking operations have continued in the course of the past year.

The Project to Build the Sewage System for the City of Tehran

Restudying the project for the network and the sewage treatment facilities of Zargandeh and Qeytariyeh by consulting engineers.

Preparations for the project to create the network and the sewage treatment center of Gisha as well as the sewage pipelines of Shahrara and emptying the water works wells with two muck vacuuming tankers.

The continuation of the covered Yakhchiabad canal to a length of 840 meters.

Mapping the bed of Firuzabad River and 43 side streets of Gisha region and the mapping for the project of Qeytariyeh and Gisha streets.

9593
CSO: 4640/12

REPORTER IN TEHRAN LOOKS AT EVIN PRISON, EXECUTIONS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 18 Oct 81 p 6

> [Text] A few dozen kilomerers south of Tehran lies the enormous cemetery of Behesht Zahre. In the cemetery of the martyrs are all thos who died as heroes of the Islamic republic. There are the tombstones of Aytollah Taleghani and Ayatollah Beheshti, President Raja'i, Prime Minister Bahonar and Commander-in-chief Fallahi.

But only a few hundred meters away is a place no true Islamic revolutionary will visit. There "the condemned" have been thrown into their mass graves. They are young people of the leftist-Muslim Mojahedin organization who after their executions rapidly have been brought to Behesht Zahre. The few tombstones which were erected by relatives have been crushed by the revolutionary guard.

The Mojahedin youths do, however, profess themselves to Islam and have, therefore, earlier barely been allowed burial at Behesht Zahre. Executed marxists have been thrown into mass graves in secret places. According to reliable sources, executed Mojahedin adherents are no longer brought to Behesht Zahre, and the parents are no longer told where their children are buried.

At Behesht Zahre hardly anyone condescends to glance at the littered cemetery of the Mojahedin youths. The tombstones have been crushed to pebbles, which have been scattered over the whole area. Parents naturally do not know exactly where their children are buried, and those who visit are harassed by young revolutionary guards.

Before President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr fled to France, the Mojahedin was not officially prohibited, and it even happened that members were buried in the cemetery of the martyrs. But the stones have now been removed and so have probably also the bodies.

Relatives Wait

Practically all executions in Tehran take place at Evin prison. Outside, people gather every day to gain some information, if possible, about their relatives. But information is only given when the execution has already taken place.

"It has also become usual to allow the condemned to call his relatives a short moment before the execution to tell them that he or she is about to be shot," says a well informed source.

At best, the relatives are also told where the body will be brought. The return of bodies is now a rarity. The bodies are instead transported in trucks and in buses with the curtains drawn to the secret burial places.

Bill for the Execution

After a while it often happens that the relatives receive a bill for the ammunition used at the execution. It can involve unreasonable amounts of up to the equivalent of 4,000 Finnish marks. Parents can also be requested to pay for their children's stay at Evin prison.

Information about what happens inside the walls of Evin prison is scarce. The few people who are released will, from fear of reprisals, not talk about their experiences. It is, however, commonly known in Tehran that torture occurs.

Evin prison is now completely overcrowded, even the washrooms are used as cells.

The officials do not try to cover up that youngsters are executed. The religious head of Evin prison has said that he himself has condemned 14-year-olds to death.

"But generally we do not execute children," Chief Public Prosecutor Musavi Arbedili recently explained.

"Instead we have them classified as insane," he said.

No Iranian boy or girl over 16 years of age can, however, criticize the regime without risking execution. They are considered adults and fully capable to answer for their own actions.

But not even executed members of the leftist-Muslim Mojahedin will in the future be buried in sanctified earth. They will probably be thrown into a mass grave which their parents will never be able to find.

9843
CSO: 3109/21

ECONOMIC DISASTER LOOMS CLOSER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 9-10

[Text] Signs that Iranians face a winter of discontent, with drastic fuel and food shortages, became clearer this week.

Oil sources said there were signs Iran was struggling to keep its oil exports up to between 300,000 and 400,000 barrels a day following the damage inflicted by Iraqi bombing raids on the Gurreh station which pumps the crude across to the country's main terminal at Kharg island.

And a government announcement over Tehran radio on Tuesday morning ordered that the capital's petrol stations should suspend all sales. A government spokesman tried to explain this by saying that other Central province towns had had their ration of petrol increased, so Tehran's deliveries were late coming in.

Both Iran's two main meat suppliers, new Zealand and Australia, are no longer delivering following non-payment of outstanding bills. New Zealand is owed, it is claimed, $30 million. Last year New Zealand supplied 30,000 tons of lamb worth 70 million NZ dollars. Tehran has begun talks with Turkey to increase lamb imports from there, meanwhile hinting that the shortage is due to butchers selling more than the ration to some customers, leaving none for some cardholders.

The Italian firm of Condotte d'Acqua is also said to have withdrawn from the Bandar Abbas port development project, for which agreement on resumption of work was finalised not long ago. Sources say Iran has not come up with the $30 million it was due to pay the Italian company.

The Japanese Mitsui group have already warned that their withdrawal from the 3.6 million joint venture petro-chemicals project at Bandar Shahpur was also imminent if Iran did not put up additional cash. Sources say the decision has now been made. Economic sources say that this could only mean that Japanese experts and officials agreed the project could not be saved.

Problems over currency transfers are also believed behind the decision of the Spanish airline Iberia to halt its flights to Tehran, and Lufthansa to reduce its service to a single flight weekly. Air France cut off its own flights in August.

Even when Iran was exporting 500,000 barrels of oil a day in September the income from it was only around $550 million a month, sufficient to cover only about 40 percent of the officially estimated monthly import bill of $1.3 billion.

Economic sources calculate that Iran's foreign exchange reserves are now below the $3 billion level--some say they are no more than $2 billion already. This would mean Iran has imports coverage for only two months more.

Shortages of foodstuffs are already leading to long queues at shops in the cities of Iran. In spite of widespread claims of bumper rice and wheat harvests rice is hardly to be found in the shops and bread prices have soared. In Tehran the popular lavash bread now costs 20 rials, compared to 5 rials not long ago. When it can be found, rice costs 360 rials a kilo (nearly five dollars at the official rate of exchange).

People contacted by phone also reported they were paying 120 rials for a single egg. There were long waits for chicken available at very high prices, too.

The Ministry of Agriculture said this week that the bumper wheat crop meant Iran would buy 1.4 million tons less from abroad during the current year. It also announced that private enterprise was being called in to help unload ships which have been waiting for up to 50 days to get into Bandar Abbas. This would save extra payment for waiting time, and help to speed up distribution. Until now all the signs had suggested the regime planned to nationalise all its trucking firms.

Government spokesman Behzad Nabavi tried to explain the rice shortage in a recent interview with the Ettelaat daily in Tehran. He said this was the first time the government had bought rice and "money reached the centres slowly so that buying slowed down." They hoped to overcome that problem soon.

"Our other problem was that as soon as we announced that we planned to buy rice and cut the flow of rice from the Caspian provinces (where it is grown) those who had rice left over from last year immediately hoarded it away," Nabavi said. "These ungodly people, whom Mr Rafsanjani calls economic terrorists, immediately raised the price of their rice and since the government had not made any rice available on the market they were able to sell the rice at an exorbitant price."

Rice rationing, Nabavi explained, meant that each province had a share, not each individual, and so each province was responsible for distributing its own share to cooperatives and small shopkeepers.

Nabavi said the government was controlling the distribution and sale of rice for the public good and promised the best quality rice would soon be available at 210 rials a kilo. The government would also pay higher prices for lower grade rice to encourage more planting of the lower quality product since there was only limited land available for the first grade crop. He also contended that by the time rice reached the shops in Iran under the old system 200 people had had a cut out of it and 20 million tomans worth of profit were made.

CSO: 4600/118

NEW SPLIT IN KURDISH RANKS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 10-11

[Text] The dictatorial, strongly communistic line of Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran leader Abdolrahman Ghassemloo has led to a split in his party ranks, according to Kurdish sources in Paris.

Ghassemloo's decision to embrace the cause of former president Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi and to join their National Resistance Council has brought protests that Bani-Sadr was the man who launched the war against the Kurds when president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Following the disclosure of Ghassemloo's pledge to Bani-Sadr, a number of leading figures in the party have resigned and formed their own breakaway party under the same name.

The dissident group wants the party to play more national a role and they accuse Ghassemloo of deliberately limiting his activities to Kurdistan when there should be wider concern for the national situation. They also accuse him of pursuing a strict communist line, along with treating his opponents with brutal justice similar to that of Khomeini.

Pro-Ghassemloo sources in Paris were not contactable to confirm news of this split.

Meanwhile, continued heavy fighting is reported between various Kurdish forces and revolutionary guards in areas near the Turkish and Iraqi borders. Reports suggest the guards are trying to cut off arms supply routes to the Kurdish areas. Significantly, official reports from Tehran on the fighting to not mention the army, only the guards, for the first time.

Tehran claims that the guards have cleared 31 villages of "outlawed armed groups," a term usually applied to the Kurdish and other guerrillas. Boukan, Marivan, Bahen, Naghadeh, and the Mahabad areas have seen the fiercest clashes. Heavy casualties are reported on both sides from Ravansar; while in Kurdish attacks on revolutionary guards headquarters and other key points in Mahabad a number of guards were killed. Later the guards claimed to have executed four captured attackers.

Tehran radio has also accused Kurds of burning to death captured officials and guards.

CSO: 4600/118

FUTURE OF MULTIMILLION-DOLLAR PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX UNCERTAIN

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 24 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] The 3.6-billion dollar Iran-Japan petrochemical complex on the Persian Gulf that has remained incomplete on account of the Iran Islamic revolution and of the war in the Persian Gulf, is now bringing relations between the countries to the danger point.

The Japanese Mitsui group, the largest Japanese investor in the complex--which is the largest Japanese commercial venture in a foreign country--has said that it is ready to withdraw within the next 10-day period.

Sources at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is seriously concerned about the impact of Mitsui's withdrawal from this project on the relations between Japan and Iran, a country that for a time used to fill the major part of Japan's oil needs."

The Mitsui group says that in case Iran does not agree to provide another 652 million dollars for the completion of the project, it will withdraw from the petrochemical venture at the port of Imam Khomeyni.

A Mitsui spokesman stated to REUTER: "We cannot wait indefinitely, and it is possible that within the next 10 days we shall withdraw from the project, unless Iran should give a serious response to our proposal (which was presented last April)." Mitsui's withdrawal from the petrochemical project--which is 85 percent completed--is not a sudden shock for the Japanese. Informed sources said that many Japanese bankers and investors support Mitsui's withdrawal from the venture because of the Islamic revolution in 1979 and especially the bombing of the complex by the Iraqi air force. The last Iraqi attack on Monday, during which a bomb damaged the power lines between the two complexes, was the cause for Mitsui's issuing its final statement.

Relations between Iran and Japan are already at a low point. Last year, Japan applied economic sanctions against Iran over the issue of the U.S. hostages in Iran, and is now importing an insignificant amount of oil from Iran.

Mitsui says that if it withdraws from this project, which has the backing of both the Japanese and Iranian governments, according to the insurance act on Japanese government exports, it will request an indemnification of 870 million dollars from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Mitsui has invested an amount of 300 billion yen (1.3 billion dollars) and starting next month, when the due date

arrives, payments on heavy interest and on the principal will begin to accumulate. The petrochemical project was started in 1971, when 5 Japanese firms, among them the Mitsui company and the Petrochemical Mitsui company--an Iran-Japan firm--formed a joint investment partnership on a fifty-fifty basis.

Construction activities have thus far cost 1.17 billion dollars. Construction work on the project, which was supposed to produce 350,000 tons of ethylene per year, did not start until 1976, and at that time, the increase in the price of oil resulted in a large-scale rise of expenses.

In 1978 Takeo Fukuda, the then prime minister of Japan, visited Tehran to strengthen the already close relations between Japan and Iran and to firm up Iran's oil exports to Japan. One year later, the shah was overthrown and the government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni inherited the half-finished complex. The chaos that occurred as a result of the Islamic revolution stopped all construction work at the Imam Khomeyni port, and with the exception of a short period in the middle of 1980, construction activities did not take off again.

Last September, the first Iraqi air attack caused damages amounting to 800 million dollars to the petrochemical complex. Mitsui says that Japanese workers will not get back to their jobs as long as the war continues.

Iranian authorities say that perhaps they will have recourse to East European countries to complete the project. Although Mitsui says that the Japanese government, which is a financial backer of the project, respects Mitsui's decision to withdraw from it, informed sources state that Mitsui's request for indemnification on loss of exports may meet with difficulties. They add that it is possible that Mitsui may be faced with a court claim by Iran in the event Iran takes legal action against Mitsui for non-fulfillment of its obligations in accordance with a 30-year agreement.

While Mitsui is talking about withdrawing from the venture at the port of Imam Khomeyni, another large Japanese company, Mitsubishi, together with the Dow Chemical firm and Saudi Arabia are investing capital in the construction of a huge petrochemical complex at Al-Jabil. Analysts say that this plan is important, because within the last 10 years, Saudi Arabia has replaced Iran as the largest provider of oil to Japan.

CSO: 4640/47

SKIRMISHES BETWEEN IRANIAN PILGRIMS, SAUDI POLICE REPORTED

Anti-Zionist March in Mecca

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Oct 81 p 15

[Text] Mecca, PARS NEWS AGENCY. Yesterday, at 4 pm at the invitation of the responsible officials and the pilgrims to the House of God a magnificent march took place from the great square of "Mo'abedeh" in the city of Mecca to the House of God. In it nearly one million Muslims from around the world participated, and the length of the lines of march reached several kilometers.

According to this report the self-sacrificers of the Islamic revolution were riding bicycles in front of the demonstrators. They carried flags of the Islamic Republic of Iran, placards in Arabic and pictures of Imam Khomeyni. In this march, the Muslims of the countries of Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey and several African countries were present. They played an active role in the matter of keeping discipline and encouraging the people situated at the sides of the street and watching the magnificent march. According to the report, a group of Muslims from Kuwait shouted slogans in Arabic to the following effect:

"Military aggression against Kuwaiti soil was accomplished by America and its lackeys, not by Iran." In the same way, the slogans repeated in Arabic during these demonstrations were as follows: "America is the enemy of the Muslims," "Death to Israel," "God is great."

This march continued until 7 pm Mecca time yesterday. It was stopped several times by police and security agents of the Saudi regime, who were stationed at various places in the streets. But the unanimous roaring of the Muslims of the world prevented the stopping of this tremendous movement and the marchers continued their demonstrations.

The Death of an Iranian Pilgrim

Mecca. While driving in one of the crowded streets of Mecca a Saudi officer struck an Iranian pilgrim named Qebleh-'Ali Hatemi, who died after being taken to the hospital. According to the report, the Saudi government, which has repeatedly criticized Iranian pilgrims in the news media and accused them of disorderliness and failure to observe the law, has itself ignored this matter and until now has not taken any steps to detain the accused.

Financial Aid

Mecca. The Organization for the Hajj and Pilgrimage situated in Mecca has announced: Those pilgrims who have recently had their money stolen or who have lost it will be paid the sum necessary for the purchase of a sheep for sacrifice.

Interview with the Minister of Guidance

Mecca. Yesterday morning after entering Mecca, in an interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, Mr Ma'adikhah, the minister of Islamic guidance, announced the viewpoints of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the problems and difficulties of the Iranian pilgrims and the restraints brought into existence for them by the Saudi government.

Concerning the political positions of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he said: Certainly the political positions of the government of Arabia do not coincide with those of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the decision in this respect is related to the Foreign Ministry.

Concerning the behavior of the government officials of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the Iranian pilgrims, he said: Of course this kind of behavior cannot be unaffected by Arabia's political positions. Naturally Arabia's behavior with the Iranian pilgrims does not follow a desirable or ideal form. But it must be said that they are imposing restraints more than the amount that we had thought, and this problem is in need of profound study. He continued: The Arabian officials imagine that since the key to the Sacred House of God is in their hands, all Muslims must imitate them, but this is an undue expectation. However, if we should want to come to the Hijaz in other than the season of the hajj, then we must follow international regulations. But the question of the hajj does not fit into these sterile international regulations; and the Kaaba, according to the clear text of the Koran, belongs to all Muslims, even if the worst relationships prevail between us and Arabia.

In another part of the interview Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah said: Amir Nayif and other Arab officials emphasize that the hajj is a place solely for humility and worship, and only this idea is taken into account by them. Of course, with respect and while accepting the question of worship in every instance, it is still not necessary for all Muslims to think like them. We consider the holiness of the hajj a volcano against world-wide arrogance and a death to America and Israel. We believe that were a reasonable hajj to take place on the part of the Muslims, Israel would no longer remain; and were the Muslims to perform the pilgrimage in a manner which would satisfy the Prophet, this shameful stain of the occupation of dear Jerusalem would be cleansed from the Muslims' robes.

In another part of his words he said: On the basis of the way of thinking which rules Arabia, if a single "Death to Israel" should be said out loud, they intervene. In many cases it has been observed that they have insulted and arrested an Iranian pilgrim for possessing a few coins on the back of which is the picture of Jerusalem. I am sorry that the Arab officials do not encounter cases realistically and that they want everyone to think like them. Of course, since according to the Koranic verse the hajj is not the place of dispute and conflict, this problem must be solved after the rites of the hajj.

At the end the minister of Islamic guidance hoped that the Muslims would be wary of becoming the puppets of imperialism and make the most of these ceremonies.

The Surrounding of the House of the Kaaba

Mecca. Last night, as a result of the mourning ceremonies of the Iranian pilgrims to the House of God in the courtyard of the Kaaba, which led to their being joined by one-third of the pilgrims from other countries, the agents of the special police of the Sausi kingdom surrounded the house of the Kaaba.

According to the report of the PARS NEWS AGENCY, in spite of a divine custom that the pilgrims enter the house of the Kaaba without shoes and barefoot, the government agents of the Sausi kingdom established themselves within the courtyard of God's House wearing boots, helmets and masks in order to prevent the mourning ceremonies of the Iranian pilgrims in this sacred place.

According to his same report, by reason of the great coming and going and the crowding of Iranian and foreign pilgrims, the general headquarters of the Imam's representatives was also put under the control of the agents of the security police. Yesterday the agents of the Saudi kingdom rented a room in the general headquarters for the sake of this task and moved into it.

The transport of the great load of Iranian and foreign pilgrims to the House of God is the responsibility of buses which were rented by the Iranian government at great expense and which take all the pilgrims from place to place free of charge.

At the outset it was agreed that in exchange for free service the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran would display the flag of Iran and the picture of the Imam on the buses; and to ease the activities of the pilgrims, Iranian assistants would be employed to help the drivers. But it did not take long before the government of the Arabian kingdom could no longer tolerate the display of the flag of the Iranian government, so it ordered that the flags of Iran be removed from the buses. In this connection three Iranian assistants were arrested and imprisoned.

According to another report, on Friday the imams of the mosques of Mecca and Medina counseled the Muslims in their sermons to refrain from making use of the ceremonies of the hajj for worldly and political ends. While asking the pilgrims to perform the hajj like the Prophet, they asked them to be aware and to avoid performing acts which would invalidate the pilgrimage. The imams of the mosques, who are appointed by the Saudi kingdom, claimed in addressing the pilgrims that paying attention to political and worldly affairs and mixing religious slogans with political matters are actions which strike a blow at the good name of the Islamic community in its most sacred land and cause this divinely instituted duty to deviate from its proper course. As a result, Muslims would return to their homelands carrying a burden of sin. The Friday imam of the Mosque of the Prophet also said to the pilgrims: Pay attention only to the works which Abraham accomplished during the pilgrimage. He also advised the pilgrims not to distribute political announcements.

Letter of Protest to Interior Minister

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Oct 81 p 15

[Text] Glorious Mecca. According to the report of the reporter of the PARS NEWS AGENCY sent to Glorious Mecca, after entering Mecca Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah, the minister of Islamic guidance, issued an announcement in answer to the declarations of the Minister of the Interior of Saudi Arabia. The complete text of the announcement is as follows:

In His name -- exalted is He!

His honor Amir Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud, president of the Supreme Council of the Hajj and interior minister of Saudi Arabia!

Pursuant to announcements of the Ministry of the Interior in which were observed certain subject matters:

As the minister of Islamic guidance and the president of the Supreme Council of the Hajj of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I have met with certain obscurities. As a result I am forced to present certain questions as follows:

Is it possible for there to be Muslims in Iran and other countries of the world who might come to conclusions concerning the hajj and the duties of the pilgrims different from your statements?

It is conceivable for a large group of Muslims to believe that the hajj also possesses, in addition to the humility and worship in the sense that you have taken into account, important social aspects -- just as can be deduced from such blessed verses as "God has appointed the Kaaba, the Sacred House, as an uprising for men"?

Do you not think that great numbers of Muslims, with inspiration from Koranic verses and the Sunnah of the Prophet, might consider, along with the slogan "God is greatest," the cries "Death to Israel," "Death to Israel-nourishing America" and "Death to the anti-Islamic superpowers" their religious duty and God-given responsibility in the hajj? And that the rites of the hajj, from the "sacred robe" to "throwing the pebbles" and other acts might remind them of their duties, which are precisely the rejection of the followers of Satan? In your view is it correct for Muslims who like yourself do not think about the hajj to be forced to put aside all of their beliefs without any objections and to abandon their religious duties? But Noble Mecca belongs to all Muslims and is not the fief of a special group, just as the Lord of the world's inhabitants declares: "[The Holy Mosque that We have appointed equal unto men,] alike him who dwells therein and the nomad."

Mr Amir Nayif! You have accused the revolutionary Muslim nation of Iran in your declaration. It is necessary for me to emphasize once again that during this year's hajj the most difficult constraints were placed by your officials upon this nation which carries on its shoulders in front of all Islamic movements the flag of the struggle with unbelief and world-wide arrogance and which has become surrounded by the plots of East and West. But in order to perform the divinely-instituted duty, all of these constraints have been borne, to the extent that, right now, according

to the statements of the responsible officials of the hajj, a number of brothers are in prison on various pretexts. Some of them have suffered losses for the crime of carrying a few one-rial coins upon which is impressed the picture of dear Jerusalem, and some of them have been deprived of performing their religious duty, the hajj. Mr Amir Nayif! The revolutionary Muslims of Iran, like all the revolutionary Muslims of the world, consider shouting against the pillaging arrogant ones one of the greatest acts of worship. They consider the hajj, at the same time that it is an act of worship, the basis for struggle with unbelief, idolatry and injustice; and they do not think that this struggle contradicts humility. It will not be possible to struggle against their beliefs with force forever.

At this point I do not mean to deal with this problem any further, since we are in the atmosphere of the hajj, and "There is no disputing during the hajj." With the above allusions I felt that it was my duty at least to defend the nation of Iran. In conclusion I propose that the government of Saudi Arabia allow the viewpoints of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance concerning the hajj, along with detailed arguments, to be presented in the publications and the radio and television of your country.

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also willing to publish your viewpoints concerning the hajj and its publications and its radio-television without cutting even a single word.

In the same way we are prepared to sit with you in free discussion in this area, at any time you consider proper, so that the public opinions of the Muslims of the world may find the opportunity to judge us impartially.

9831
CSO: 4640/23

PURGES, EXECUTIONS IN ARMY DISCUSSED

NC291510 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 28 Oct 81

[Text] Several more patriots have been executed and many other military personnel have been thrown into the regime's dungeons. Sheykh Reyshahri has once again uncovered a wave of dismissals and purges in the Iranian armed forces. Sheykh Reyshahri has said that purges have started and that the dossiers of hundreds of military personnel are being studied by the "Islamic military courts."

This is neither the first nor the last blow being inflicted on the already disintegrated Iranian armed forces. In the turbulent days when the propagandists of the Islamic Republic had started the sinister slogan of "an army so impotent" they were actually revealing their filthy intentions to destroy the indivisible Iranian army. In the days of terror when the most outstanding commanders and soldiers of the Iranian armed forces were executed [words indistinct] (?in Tehran), the enemies of Iran were uncovering their treacherous plan to destroy the powerful Iranian army. In the flaming days of (?July) 1980, when patriotic officers, NCO's and other military personnel were being executed or thrown into Khomeyni's dungeons on charges of attempting a coup, the enemies of Iran were showing signs of their hostility against the zealous Iranian army. Throughout the entire period when personnel of the armed forces which was against the regime of mullahs and reactionaries and when (?heroes) of Iran and (?descendants) of Kaveh the ironmonger [a hero in Persian mythology] were being hunted down and hundreds were being dismissed and "purged," the only objective was to destroy the main weapon in the hands of the Iranian people and the manifestation of national dignity and the guardians of Iran's sovereignty and independence. In doing so, each and every one of the persons reared by Khomeyni and his masters (?played his part) in a great treason. From the satanic imam to the slain Beheshti, from Ebrahim Yazdi to Bani-Sadr, and all the toadie who played or are playing a role in destroying Iran, each inflicted a blow on the power of the Iranian armed forces so that they could weaken it as much as possible and so that the most determining factor for the salvation of the enslaved homeland would be finally removed.

Now the treacherous regime wants to (?clandestinely) put an end to the war with Iraq. It no longer needs the armed forces. Therefore, it is better to immediately start breaking the remaining links in the strong chain of the armed forces in order to prevent it from rising to destroy the domestic enemies once (?it has

peace of mind) from the foreign enemy. So, it is better to recommence, as soon as possible, the play of purges, to execute, imprison and dismiss. But how long can this (?wretched) play continue? Can many thousands of officers, NCO's and other personnel of the armed forces be purged and dismissed? Can the dismissal of (?groups and groups) force the thousands of military personnel to obey, stay quiet and calm? What an empty thought!

Even if the regime finds new excuses each day to implement its treacherous plans and to "purge" hundreds of army personnel each day, the Iranian armed forces will still continue to live. It will breathe until the day it stifles the traitors. The Iranian armed forces, as weak and disintegrated as it is now, continues to live and to be awake. It is supported by millions of (?Iranian patriots) and enemy-breakers--a young and alert force that is shouting "goodbye Islamic Republic!"

CSO: 4640/49

REPORT ON EXECUTIONS, DOMESTIC UNREST

NC291718 Paris AFP in English 1700 GMT 29 Oct 81

[Text] Tehran, 29 Oct (AFP)--A further 41 executions were announced here today, with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper reporting 22 armed opponents of the regime and two "corruptors" executed yesterday and the revolutionary prosecutor revealing 19 other executions, but giving no dates.

The newspaper, organ of the ruling paper, said six leftist people's Mojahedin were executed in Tehran's Evin prison.

The state news agency PARS added that one man, identified as Mehdi Ta'fari, was found guilty of participating in the bombing of the Islamic Republic party headquarters last June, which left 74 dead. The remaining executions took place in various provincial towns.

The 19 were executed in the Gulf town of Busheir, at Nahavand in the western province of Hamadan, and at Ghaem Shahr, in Mazandaran Province, Iranian television reported, quoting the revolutionary prosecutor.

Violence was reported elsewhere in Iran yesterday.

An unidentified motorcyclist fired shots at the home of Iranian executive affairs minister Behzad Nabavi, then escaped through the return fire of revolutionary guards, Azadegan newspaper reported, adding that the minister was not hit.

At Qasvin, 300 km (200 miles) west of here, a clash between bodyguards of religious official Hojjat Ol-Eslam Lashekari and Mojahedin reportedly resulted in one dead and two injured.

Also the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper reported that Mojahedin fired at four school children in a store in the city of Bojnurd, killing one and injuring two.

In central Tehran a grenade was thrown at the car of a Hezbollahi (fundamentalist), while in the western city of Kermanshah a grenade explosion caused heavy damage to the home of religious official Hojjat Ol-Eslam Reza Kazemi, but no casualties, the paper reported.

CSO: 4600/114

BRIEFS

TEA PRODUCTION--Tehran, 28 Oct (PARS News Agency)--The production of tea rose 15 percent in this Iranian year compared to the same period last year, and an amount totalling 10 billion rials has been paid to the farmers, according to 'Ali Sa'id-lu, the head of the state-owned tea organization of the country. Sa'id-lu, who was speaking at news conference, said that in this Iranian year 32,000 hectares were under tea plantation and about 26,000 farmers are in the tea production business. Concerning the reasons for this increase, he said that wages had been increased in the tea factories, price of tea leaves increased, more chemical fertilizers were distributed, more loans were extended to farmers and there was more money given to the factory owners for equipment and expansion. In relation to the amount and distribution of the imported tea, he said that the importation of tea must be approved by the tea organization of the country according to its quality and quantity, and this organization has taken over the distribution of imported tea for supporting domestic production. Therefore, the price of tea has decreased. [Text] [GF281558 Tehran PARS in English 1525 GMT 28 Oct 81]

LABOR-INTENSIVE PROJECTS--Tehran, 28 Oct (OPECNA)--Economic independence and the basic needs of the people are stressed by the provisions of Iran's national budget for 1982-83. Mohammad Taqi Banki, minister of state in charge of the Plan and Budget Organization, told a press conference Saturday that emphasis would be placed on projects giving quicker returns and the expansion of labor-intensive industries. Governmental institutions and executive organizations would work toward filling gaps in domestic production by expanding small units more suited to the economic conditions of the country, Banki said. Banki also referred to the potential of the country's dams, saying that about 500,000 hectares had been added to land already under cultivation by the expansion of irrigation canals. [Text] [LD281206 Vienna OPECNA in English 1057 GMT 28 Oct 81]

NEW DEPUTY MINISTER--According to a report by the Central News Unit, the secretariat of the Supreme Judicial Council announced that the bill on the state inspection organization, approved on 11 October by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, was conveyed to the government. With the implementation of this bill the former state inspection organization will be disbanded and a new organization with legal powers will be formed and will start to function. On this occasion, the Supreme Judicial Council appointed Mr Seyyed Mostafa Mohaqqeq-Damad as deputy justice minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran and chief of the inspection organization. [Excerpt] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 25 Oct 81 LD]

BAZAARIS REPORTEDLY ARRESTED--A report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent states that Khomeyni's revolution guards have recently started arresting Tehran bazaaris. According to the report, in the past 2 days 15 famous Tehran merchants have been arrested on charges of cooperating with opponents of Khomeyni's regime. It is said that during the next few days a larger number of Tehran bazaaris will be arrested and imprisoned on charges of cooperating with the Mojahedin-e Khalq. [Text] [NC291704 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 29 Oct 81]

PRAISE FOR KHOMEYNI--A Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that during a recent private meeting of the Tudeh Party, Manuchehr Behzadi--famous member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party--stated that the services offered by Khomeyni for the propagation of the Tudeh Party's objectives and extremely noteworthy and praiseworthy. Member of the Tudeh Party Central Committee Manuchehr Behzadi said: Khomeyni brought to fruition our party's long-term 20-year program within a 3-month period. Therefore, he is respected by us from all aspects. Our correspondent has added that in the same meeting Manuchehr Behzadi said in connection with Iran's future condition: If we gain power after Khomeyni, about 2 million who are potential enemies of the Tudeh Party should be destroyed so that there will be no obstacle facing us in the continuation of the political life of the Tudeh Party. [Text] [NC301343 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 29 Oct 81]

ARDAKAN FRIDAY IMAM--In accordance with a decree issued by Imam Khomeyni's office, Aqa Bozorg Bonyadi has been appointed Ardakan Friday Imam. [GF291721 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1500 GMT 29 Oct 81 GF]

MOTOR OIL ALLOCATION--In a recent meeting of provincial officials, an official from the Khuzestan governor general's office announced that each farm machine has been allocated 33 liters of engine oil for every 1,000 liters of fuel that are used. [GF281352 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 27 Oct 81 GF]

CSO: 4640/49

OPPOSITION LEADER CALLS ON ARMY TO DEFECT

JN082050 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1630 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Appeal by Staff Maj Gen Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib, commander in chief of the Iraqi Revolution Forces, to the Iraqi armed forces to "leave their units and join the ranks of the Iraqi Revolution Forces"--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate: O you who believe, if you help Allah, he will help you and make firm your feet. [Koranic verse]

My brothers and sons officers, NCO's and soldiers of the valiant Iraqi armed forces: (?Inspired by the teachings) of the revolution, form Iraq's liberate land and from the stronghold of revolutionaries and heroic strugglers I greet you with greetings of arms and the revolution. In this appeal, I call on you in my name and on behalf of the Iraqi revolutionaries and strugglers--Arabs and Kurds; ethnic groups; movements and parties; religious, patriotic and nationalist figures--[words indistinct] our country which is suffering at the hands of the tribal and fascist authorities; to carry out your patriotic duty alongside your brother revolutionaries to overthrow the dictatorship and end the injustice, oppression and humiliation which our people are suffering at the hands of Saddam at-Tikriti [words indistinct] and his hirelings; to erect a democratic system that gives freedom to all the members of the people and brings about genuine autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan; and to build a strong homeland that can defend the nation's dignity and holy places.

My brothers and sons officers, NCO's and soldiers of the brave Iraqi army: The only way to put an end to this dirty [Iraqi-Iranian] war and deliver the people and army from it is to join the ranks of the Iraqi revolution that is raging on every single inch of cherished Iraqi soil and by [words indistinct] your brother revolutionaries in order to end the war and deliver the people from Saddam's injustice and tyranny. [words indistinct] The revolution cries out to you to assume your heroic role in the ranks of the strugglers and Mujahidin, both Arabs and Kurds, to overthrow the regime of the tyrant. The Iraqi army's real battle is not against [words indistinct] but against Israel, world imperialism and [words indistinct].

CSO: 4404/108

OFFICIAL REBUKES BRIGHT STAR MANEUVERS

JN151609 Baghdad INA in English 1540 GMT 15 Nov 81

[Text] Baghdad, 15 Nov (INA)--A high ranking Iraqi official described U.S. military exercises, Bright Star 82, as the peak of the policy of intimidating the Arabs whether being moderates or progressives. Secretary general of the Revolution Command Council, the highest legislative body, Tariq Hamad al-'Abdallah in an article published in AL-THAWRAH daily Sunday said the U.S. is practicing the iron rod policy against the Arabs.

The U.S. military exercises fall within the framework of the semi-war policy adopted by America towards the Arab region and are merely a show of force to intimidate and frighten the Arab people, he explained.

Mr al-'Abdallah said the U.S.A. endeavours in increase [as printed] tension and accelerate the plans set for its rapid deployment force within the semi-war strategy which calls for a military build up aimed at confronting the possibility of any national uprising that might take place and disturb the balance of U.S. interests in the region.

He stressed the fact that the Middle East region saw a great deal of American explicit interference since U.S. failure in Vietnam and Southeast Asia in general. The U.S. semi-war strategy, he said, is based on three principles: consolidating of the Zionist entity in the Arab region by any means, keeping the Arab region as a source for cheap energy and to drag the region into the U.S. sphere as part of the process of undermining the non-aligned principles and breaching national sovereignty, he added.

Any attempt to include an Arab party into the big powers rivalry to side with any of them means a call for the other power to interfere, thus the international situation will be more deteriorated and trends of dependency are created in the Arab region, Mr al-'Abdallah said.

Detailing further aims behind the U.S. exercises, he said the U.S. wanted to imply to the Arabs that Israel's security is a part of America's national security... it is unacceptable to oppose the Camp David accords..Arabs have to stand idle vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war.

The U.S. wants to say to the Arabs, he added, increase your oil production; but not the prices...nourish us so that we may send you our jets, armies and fleets as quick as possible to defend you against a don quixote fear.

CSO: 4400/47

BACKGROUND OF CABINET MINISTERS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Aug 81 pp 18-19

Menahem Begin -- Prime Minister

[Article by Ilan Kefir]

[Text] For 29 years Menahem Begin would deliver the second speech on the day of the presentation of the new cabinet--the speech of the opposition. Yesterday for the second time in his life, Begin delivered the opening address. He presented to the Knesset his new Cabinet which he had formed after 21 days of exhausting coalition negotiations which left more than a little bitterness.

Menahem Begin, 68, reached this moment after an enervating, extremely bitter, and stubbornly-fought election campaign. His election victory was a personal achievement. The Likud's election battle was first and foremost a one-man campaign by a man who stood virtually alone in the glare of the spotlights. Western diplomats who observed him in the election campaign described him as the best competitor today in any political arena in the free world.

Begin's main accomplishment in the election campaign was his success in convincing many that the "bunglings" of his outgoing Cabinet were a non-recurring, transitory phenomenon and that the galloping inflation is also a temporary phenomenon with which his next Cabinet will be able to cope successfully.

Yesterday he stood on the dais of the Knesset as the leader of the 48-member ruling party and a coalition government dependent upon a majority of one member of Knesset. The Menahem Begin of yesterday was different than the man who announced about one-half year ago the advancement of the election as an honorable way out designed to prevent his going to the president. At that time the achievement of the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt was swallowed up by 150 percent inflation and the shattered relations between Cabinet ministers.

From an almost hopeless situation when many were predicting the end of the political road for him and at a time when the members of his party were behaving as if their ship were sinking, Begin succeeded in reviving and breathing new fighting spirit into his camp.

His personal biography is replete with struggles, hardships, a war for political existence, more than a few disappointments, and anguish. For 29 years during which he was defeated in eight election campaigns, Menahem Begin displayed remarkable survivability.

He was born in Brisk to a Zionist family. His father, Ze'ev, was the secretary of the community in the city. In his childhood he was a member of Hashomer Hatza'ir, however this was a passing episode and he joined Betar. In his twenties he completed law school at Warsaw University.

At 18 he began Zionist activity and was selected as a Betar representative in Poland. Seven years later he was appointed the representative of the movement in Poland after having served as the Betar representative in Czechoslovakia.

With the Nazi conquest of Poland he fled from Warsaw to Vilna. Most of his family who remained in Poland were killed in the Holocaust.

In September 1940 he was arrested by the Soviet authorities for Zionist activity and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment at hard labor. He described the period of his incarceration and exile which lasted more than a year in his book "Lailot Levanim" [White Nights].

In 1942 he immigrated to the Land of Israel as a volunteer in the army of the Polish General Anders. A year later he took command of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi, and in 1944 he announced a revolt against Britain. During the entire period of the struggle against the British, which lasted 4 years, Begin was sought by the British who put a price of 5,000 pounds sterling on his head.

After the establishment of the state, Begin founded the Herut Movement against the background of a troubled relationship with the ruling party, Mapai, and its leader, Ben-Gurion, because of [Operation] Season and the Altalena affair.

Ben-Gurion coined the expression "without Herut and Maqi [acronym for the Israeli Communist Party]", but the taboo was broken when Begin joined the government of national unity headed by Levi Eshkol on the eve of the Six-Day War.

In 1977 the upheaval occurred which brought Begin to the seat of leadership. Last month Begin succeeded in keeping the seat.

Ariel Sharon--Minister of Defense

[Article by Ya'aqov Erez]

[Text] This morning when Ariel Sharon, 53, reviews the IDF honor guard, composed of representatives of the arms and services, in the Ministry of Defense square, it will be for him not only a moment of the realization of aspirations but also a novelty in a long road of military and security activity which he set out upon when he enlisted in the army in the War of Independence and became a commander who made a deep impression on the IDF combat tactics.

Sharon's record is marked by milestones which influenced not only the units which he commanded but also the entire IDF. From the time when he was the commander of Unit 101 and later a paratroopers unit, Sharon distinguished himself with the originality of his military thinking, his combat tactics, and the manner in which he led his forces. Among his milestones are wars and periods of confrontation. In the Six-Day War he was a division commander and launched a daring strike in the Egyptians' rear at Umm Qatf. When he was commanding general of the Southern

Command during the War of Attrition, the Gaza Strip was cleaned out of terrorists and attacks were carried out against the Egyptian side of the Canal. In the Yom Kippur War when he was a major general in the reserves, he commanded the division which was the first to cross the Canal and caused the turning point in the war.

Arik Sharon is considered an outstanding field commander, a combat tactician, one who knows how to achieve his objectives by the concentration of effort and the application of the principle of surprise. These qualities have helped him on more than one occasion in his military career. However, in public life he has not always been successful in applying his military doctrines.

Prior to the previous election Sharon headed the Shlomzion list which won only two seats in the Knesset. Afterwards he joined the Likud and was appointed the minister of agriculture where he concentrated his maximum effort in Judea and Samaria. He established there an extensive system of settlements, however, he angered many farmers who criticized his method of operating as minister of agriculture.

In the Ministry of Defense Sharon is treading on firm ground. Here he will be aided by his military knowledge and experience in defense matters, which are far greater than that of any other minister in Menahem Begin's Cabinet. In his new position he is faced with difficult tasks. On the one hand, completing the evacuation of the Sinai, including the settlements of Pithat Rafish, and on the other hand, the terrorist threats in the north, the Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and the possibility that the eastern front will be reestablished. On the one hand, his past promises to bring about changes in the IDF without hurting its military strength. The essentials of Arik Sharon's policy are still unknown. Today in his meetings with the senior cadre of the civilian system and the general staff, he will present the tasks toward which he wants to move the defense system as the eighth minister who has headed it.

Yoram Aridor--Minister of Finance

[Article by Shraga Maqel]

[Text] It is difficult to compare the meteoric rise of Yoram Aridor to another case in the political arena. In a few months he went from an obscure deputy minister in the Office of the Prime Minister to the man who did more than anyone else for the rejuvenation of the Likud and its victory in the election, as the minister of finance whose policy gained the sympathy of broad sections of the public despite its being criticized by many.

Public opinion polls forecast a very gloomy future for the Likud government at the beginning of 1981. Yitzhaq Moda'i decided at that time to leave the Ministry of Communications. Prime Minister Menahem Begin gave the position to the deputy in his office who had already become accustomed to filling vacant positions. Aridor once filled no less than five portfolios: Justice, Transportation, Labor and Social Betterment, and Communications were all entrusted to him with the rise of the Likud to power until the DMC ministers joined the government. Whoever followed Aridor closely could already at that time detect his qualities in that to everyone's great surprise all five ministries were directed properly.

However, Aridor waited more than 3 years before his talents were actually discovered. Immediately upon entering the Ministry of Communications he announced the introduction

of color television broadcasts, and the public opinion polls immediately began to improve from the viewpoint of the Likud. Then Minister of Finance Yigael Hurwitz left the Cabinet because of its decision to increase the salaries of the teachers, and Yoram Aridor was again called to the flag. Then the great upheaval began. Elimination of the property tax, reduction of income tax, and reduction of sales taxes on automobiles and television sets. The atmosphere among the public changed as if by a magic want the atmosphere in the state, and the closer it came to election day the more the Likud improved its position in the eyes of the voter, until the victory on 31 June.

At a relatively young age, 48, Yoram Aridor sits solidly in the position of minister of finance and conducts the coalition negotiations on behalf of the prime minister.

This success was preceded by years of activity in the Herut Movement. Aridor has a social attitude (he supports full cost-of-living increase payments and income tax relief). He headed the "Blue-White [group] in the Histadrut. He first entered the Knesset in 1969, and 10 years later he was elected chairman of the secretariat of the Herut Movement.

He calls his policy a "correct economy" and at times a "policy of the mind and the heart." Even his opponents do not deny his ability for analysis and quick thinking. He is an economist and a lawyer by education. He maintains that the policy which he adopted before the election will be continued in the future. Indeed, this policy has so far been significantly successful in reducing inflation. Economists today have differences of opinion regarding the policy. Some contend that the massive printing of money which he has used to subsidize the food commodities will take its toll and it is therefore necessary to to take sharp restraining measures. Others praise him for having brought calm to the economy, and in their opinion, more moderate measures in the area of credit and the reduction of government spending will be sufficient.

He is married and has three children.

Simha Ehrlich--Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture

[Article by Aharon Periel]

[Text] Simha Ehrlich began his agricultural career in Israel 45 years ago. At that time. when he immigrated to Israel in 1936, he worked as a farm worker in the groves of Nes Ziyyona. Today he has "closed" the circle, with a small difference: Then [text missing] of Agriculture in addition to his position as deputy prime minister.

Simha Ehrlich was born in Poland in 1915. During the course of time he established an optical business. He has held various public positions in the Liberal Party, the "heir" of the General Zionists, first on the municipal level in Tel Aviv and afterwards on the national level as party chairman, after he was elected to this post in May 1980.

During the period of 1955-1969 Ehrlich was the head of the Gahal faction in the Tel Aviv municipal council, head of the water and lighting enterprises, head of the Department of Sanitation and Control, and head of the Bureau of Municipal Companies. He also served as deputy mayor during 1961-1965.

He has been a member of Knesset since 1969, serving as a member of the Interior Committee (Seventh Knesset) and a member of the Finance Committee (Seventh and Eighth Knessets). After the Likud came to power, Ehrlich served as the finance minister in the Begin government during 1977-1979.

Ehrlich, a resident of Tel Aviv, has a son and a daughter, and his main hobbies are opera and theater.

Simha Ehrlich is known as a man "with whom one can work," who is prepared to delegate authority, and as one who seeks to work through cooperation. His intimate friends promised yesterday that he will not act impetuously even though as minister of agriculture, he wants to apply liberal ideas such as free competition and providing opportunity to free initiative. His friends assure that "everything that Mr Ehrlich does will be in cooperation and coordination with the settlement movements and the farmers' organizations."

Yitzhaq Shamir--Minister of Foreign Affairs

[Article by Ilan Kefir]

[Text] This morning Yitzhaq Shamir begins his second term as the minister of foreign affairs against the background of serious political problems:

*The deployment of the terrorists in Lebanon and their being equipped while taking advantage of the cease-fire which, according to Israel, constitutes a violation of the agreement.

*The suspension of the F-16 aircraft by the American administration.

*The autonomy negotiations and the continuation of the peace process with Egypt.

*The increasing isolation of Israel in the international community and the damage to its image in public opinion in the United States.

Shamir worked for many years in security activity in the Irgun Tzvai Leumi and the Lohamei Herut Yisrael, an organization in which he was the operations officer and responsible for special actions in Europe.

During the years of the struggle against the British foreign rule, he was arrested twice and in both cases managed to escape. The second time, in 1946, he came on a daring operation to Djibouti where he received political asylum.

After the establishment of the state, Yitzhaq Shamir was given a senior operational assignment in the Mosad which he completed in 1965.

In 1970 he joined the Herut Movement, and in 1973 he was elected to the Knesset and served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

In 1977 he was appointed speaker of the Knesset and in March 1980, after the resignation of Mashe Dayan, he became the foreign minister.

Within the framework of his position, Minister Shamir went abroad for diplomatic talks and met with heads of state, including the leades of the American administration. Shamir was the first Israeli dignitary to meet with the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, after his election.

He is 66, married and has three children.

Ya'aqov Meridor--Chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Economic Affairs

[Article by Shraga Maqel]

[Text] Ya'aqov Meridor, 68, will be forced to work hard during this term of the government in order to make people forget his hard "fall" in the revelation of the new way to produce energy. However, this will not be his only problem. It is still not clear how he will function as the chairman of the ministerial committee on the economy opposite Minister of Finance Yoram Aridor has had no intention of conceding any economic authority.

Ya'aqov Meridor's colorful image combines biographic details which could suffice foe several persons: underground fighter, politician, and businessman who made many millions but also lost millions.

The beginning was in Poland: studies in a heder of the Mizrahi and a Hebrew gymnasium. Meridor was 16 at the time of the 1929 pogroms. He joined Betar and immigrated to Israel in 1932. Here he became the deputy to David Raziel in the Irgun Tzvai Leumi. Together with him, in 1940 he went to Iraq on a secret mission. After Raziel was killed in the bombing of a German aircraft, Meridor became the leader of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi and remained in that position until he turned over the command to Menahem Begin in 1942. His underground activity did not cease even when he was caught by the British and exiled to Africa. He recounts his exciting deeds in the camps of Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, and Ethiopia in his book "Arukah Haderekh Leherut" (The Road to Freedom Is Long).

Meriodor represented the Herut Movement, of which he was one of the founders, for about 20 years, however his activity in the Knesset did not excite him and he turned to the business world.

In the mid-fifties Meridor used his contacts in East Africa and established Incoda, a canned meat enterprise, in Eritrea for the purpose of selling his product in Israel, however the business failed, and the government had to acquire it in order to save it.

After his venture into fishing in the Red Sea failed, in the early sixties Meridor, together with his friend Captain Mila Brenner, established the Fruit Shipping Company. In less than 10 years this company became an amazing international success story when without significant venture capital and without real experience, it controlled a giant fleet and business estimated at almost a billion dollars. However, the success story was disrupted after the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent world oil crisis which damaged the shipping world. After months of litigation and effort to stay afloat, Meridor and Brenner were forced to sell the fleet at a loss in order to pay off the company's debts.

His close friends describe him as uneducated but imaginative, a man with personal charisma who abounds in great ideas but is not always careful about all the minor details.

One of his daughters is married to the businessman and former member of Knesset Yosef Kremerman, and the other, Miqa, is married to singer Yigael Bashan.

Back in 1977 Menahem Begin had requested Meridor to return to political activity and to "run" together with him, but Meridor refused. In 1981 Begin again asked the man whom he refers to as "my commander and friend," and this time Meridor acceded to his request.

Hayim Corfu--Minister of Transport

[Article by Shraga Maqel]

[Text] Hayim Corfu put in 4 years of work as chairman of the coalition leadership in the Ninth Knesset. Confronted with a diminishing coalition majority, splits, and rebellions of factions, he endeavored to assure victories in the votes.

Corfu is used to supporting his leader, Menahem Begin, in that for the 20 years that he headed a branch of the Herut Movement in Jerusalem, he backed him in all the political storms which plagued the Movement. Begin did not remain obligated. When Jayim Landau finally informed him that he did not want to continue as minister of transport, Begin decided to give the position to Corfu.

Corfu, a sixth generation sabra, was a yeshiva student in his youth. It was only later that he "fell into bad ways." He left the yeshiva, completed law school at Hebrew Unitersity, and even played soccer for Betar in Jerusalem and Netanya.

During the underground days, Hayim Corfu was a member of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi headquarters in Jerusalem from 1943, and he served as an expert in minelaying. In 1944 he was arrested by the British and remained in prison until 1948 in Latrun and 'Akko and later in Sudan, Kenya, and Eritrea (from where he escaped but was recaptured). Together with Meridor and Tzipori, Corfu completes the trio of "Kenya exile" ministers in the new government.

With the establishment of the Herut Movement in 1948, Corfu worked in the Jerusalem branch which he headed until 1977 when he was chosen to be the chairman of the coalition leadership. In this Knesset he was also a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In the two previous Knessets Corfu was a member of the Finance Committee.

As the minister of transport Hayim Corfu, 60, married and the father of two daughters, considers himself as having several major goals: renewal of the campaign against traffic accidents which are claiming victims day and night; improvement of public contact with the Bureaus of Licensing and Public Transport; and in the longer range, preparation for the development of airports and seaports.

His first battle in his new position is already "assured": El Al flights on the Sabbath. There was no avoiding the forcing of the suspension of the flights--Hayim Corfu will act in accordance with the decision. Nonetheless, he believes that El Al is in good hands; and if it continues in the way it began, it can even achieve a condition of profitability.

Mordekhai Tzipori--Minister of Communications

[Article by Ya'aqov Erez]

[Text] In his farewell remarks to the senior personnel of the Ministry of Defense, Mordekhai Tzipori mentioned two achievements which he considers to be supremely important: broadening the authorities of the civilian control system and increasing defense production and export. Tzipori devoted a special effort to these two areas in his 4 years as deputy minister of defense.

Mordekhai Tzipori is a firm believer in the selected echelon's control of the defense system, and he especially emphasizes the subordination of the military level to those of the civilian sector who are placed in charge of it. The deputy minister who "moved up a grade" and has now been appointed the minister of communications will try to apply these principles also in his new position.

He does not shrink from working in an inferior position. There is no doubt that for him, serving as a minister in the government of Menahem Begin--even as minister of communications, a post which he was not looking for--is the realization of a dream. Even if he is not the most fortunate of all the appointees in the government, he managed to keep himself in the line.

He wants to be involved with defense matters also in the future. He has been promised that in a few months the Ministry of Police will be reestablished and that he will be appointed the minister of police. In this position, Tzipori, 57, intends to make full use of the considerable experience which he has acquired in 43 years of defense service. He wants to continue as a member of the Ministerial Committee on Defense. Matters in this spirit have already been concluded with the prime minister. In the ministerial committee, he will seek to exert an influence--so he promised in his farewell remarks to the senior personnel in the Ministry of Defense--on the substantive matters that come up there for discussion.

A veteran of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi who because of his underground activity was arrested twice and exiled to Sudan, Eritrea, and Kenya, he began his career in the IDF in the Artillery, in a heavy mortar unit. He later served in the Infantry and at the end of the Kadesh campaign, he transferred to the Armor. In the Six-Day War he served as commander of the armored brigade in Major General Sharon's division. Afterwards, he was the commander of the Armor School, the executive officer of the Armored Corps, Commander of the Command and Staff College, and Assistant to the Chief of the Operations Branch. After his separation from the IDF, he joined the Herut Movement, and with the upheaval in June 1977, he returned to the defense system.

Yitzhaq Moda'i--Minister Without Portfolio

[Article by Oded Shorer]

[Text] Yitzhaq Moda'i, 55, who directed the oil exploration branch as his private domain and organized a revolution on the map of the government companies subordinate to the Ministry of Energy, left the ministry this week claiming that this position is not appropriate for his status in the Liberal Party. Yitzhaq Moda'i has reawakened the dispute surrounding his character--that human relations is not his forte.

The variety of opinions about him is surprising. An Israeli from a good family background, who took advantage of the "golden spoon" with which he was born, he is a member of one of the older families of Tel Aviv. He has studied in Israel and abroad and has earned an abundance of degrees, including chemical engineer and a master's degree in law and economics.

His military career included, among other things, service as a military attache in London. He was released from the IDF with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In the sixties he joined the Liberal Party and proved to be a sheep among wolves. After many struggles from which he emerged the loser, he learned his political lesson and at the last convention of the Liberals, he proved to be an outstanding political butcher who has gained many sympathizers by means of countless appointments in the government companies subordinate to his ministry.

His service as minister of energy began on the right foot with the discovery of oil in the Alma field at the end of 1977. Throughout his period of service, he saw himself as fulfilling a mission in Israel's struggle for economic independence.

As such, he went abroad on more than one occasion on ministry business, in a search for sources of oil, he signed contracts for the supply of oil, and he even involved Israel in several troublesome affairs in his attempts to find investors for oil exploration in Israel and to join in oil exploration in foreign countries.

With his support the oil exploration branch was reorganized in a more effective form, and an effort was made to attract foreign professional parties who contributed from their rich knowledge. In contrast to this, he failed in other areas which required courageous decisions to which he was certainly accustomed in his position as director general of the Revlon Cosmetics Company.

Despite the warnings of his advisors in the Ministry of Energy, Minister Moda'i viewed the transition to the generation of electricity from coal as a problem-free process and ignored the human aspects involved in unloading coal in an overburdened port. His compromise position on an issue so important to the economic independence of the State of Israel led to the government's hasty decision regarding the unloading of the coal for a power plant in Hadera at the site of the plant and to the waste of hundreds of millions of dollars of the Treasury.

Moda'i managed to convince the government of the necessity of an agreement with Egypt on the supply of oil before the return of the oil field in the Gulf of Suez to the Egyptians. Had it not been for his stubborn stand on this issue, Prime Minister Menahem Begin would have signed the peace agreement without any agreement on assuring a supply of oil for Israel.

As minister he has on more than one occasion issued confusing statements and become involved in pointless disputes with his fellow Cabinet members, after which Minister Simha Ehrlich suggested that he go for a psychiatric examination. Now his activity will be concluded in the Office of the Prime Minister as a minister without portfolio, activity which will certainly not overcrowd his daily schedule. How will the implementer adjust to a position without real content? This will become evident in the coming months.

Gideon Patt--Minister of Industry and Commerce

[Article by Yitzhaq Dayish]

[Text] During the period of his service in the outgoing government, Minister Gideon Patt was noted for his colorful language which from time to time managed to "anger" many people. For example, in reacting to a leak by a senior official, he said, "Every dog has his day."

When he was appointed minister of industry, commerce, and tourism in January 1979, the Herut people in the Likud demanded that Yoram Airdor, who was then a minister without portfolio in the Office of the Prime Minister, be appointed the deputy minister of industry, commerce, and tourism. However, Patt declared, "I have enough Yorams in the ministry" (the director general is Yoram Ziv and the deputy director general is Yoram Balizovski).

Patt is one of the young members of the Cabinet, being 48. He was born in Jerusalem, graduated from the Ma'ala School, and served in the IDF as a member of Nahal. After his separation from the IDF, he served in 1952-1953 as the secretary of the ten minister of transport, Yosef Sapir, of blessed memory, and the director of his office. Afterwards, he filled a long list of positions in the Zionist Organization of America and was also a delegate to the Zionist Congresses. He studied economics and international trade at a university in New York. When Yosef Sapir, of blessed memory, was appointed minister (1967-1969), Patt served as his assistant.

In 1970 he was elected a member of the Knesset from the Liberals in the Gahal. In the Knesset he served as a member of the Finance Committee and the Economic Committee. With the establishment of the Likud government in July 1977, he was appointed minister of construction and housing. He worked to calm the apartments market by putting apartments up for sale in the early stages of construction.

With the departure of Yigael Hurwitz from the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism, Gideon Patt was appointed his replacement. He points to important achievements in export and industry. "Between the times," that is between the Knesset elections and the formation of the new government, he assured the approval of a major program to establish a new granary in Ashdod which would preclude the danger of a shortage of bread and food for animals in the event of a disaster. One must also cite the consumer protection law which was approved during the period of his service.

In the tourism "kingdom," despite its having lost the status of a special ministry and becoming an administration in Industry, Commerce, and Tourism, Patt was regarded one who represents it well. He worked especially for the benefit of tourism in Elat and was regarded there with special esteem. However, it is precisely from this branch of his ministry that he is now separated.

Yitzhaq Berman--Minister of Energy

[Article by Oded Shorer]

[Text] The solid and respected image of the only bachelor in the Cabinet, Minister of Energy Yitzhaq Berman, "conceals" a colorful biography full of contradictions.

Yitzhaq Berman, 68, is the son of a rabbi who was one of the leaders of the Mizrahi. He abandoned religious observances in his youth, graduated from the Mizrahi Teachers Seminary, turned to Betar and then to the Irgun Tzvai Leumi, was a member of the Intelligence Department of the Irgun, was an officer in the British intelligence service which concentrated on acts of sabotage and espionage in the Balkans during World War II, and is a successful lawyer.

With the rise of the state, he served in the IDF, and after he was released, he turned to business. For 4 years he filled various positions, including the general manager of the first automobile enterprise in Israel, Kaiser-Frazer, in Haifa.

In 1954 he opened a law office which became very prosperous. When he was selected speaker of the Knesset in March 1980, he was forced to divest himself of his share of the firm and as such lost a high annual income.

His moderate image and his relatively late entrance into political life (64) helped him maintain neutrality in the Liberal Party and so made him a natural candidate for the position of speaker of the Knesset.

After his selection as speaker of the Knesset, he aspired to raise the prestige and increase the effectiveness of the legislative body. He suggested among other things that marginal issues and proposals be moved to the agenda of the committees and not be considered in plenary sessions, that a way be found to permit the speaker of the Knesset not to participate in the voting, and that an Ethics Committee be established to consider complaints against members of the Knesset.

With the end of the Ninth Knesset, he announced that he would no longer vie for the position of speaker of the Knesset, and as such, he became the Liberal Party's candidate for a ministerial position. Because of Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i's refusal to serve as minister of energy, Yitzhaq Berman, the man who directed British intelligence operations in World War II and was not accepted for service in the Intelligence Corps of the IDF because of his Irgun Tavai Leumi past, became the minister in charge of directing the state's secret policy in the world oil market.

Avraham Sharir--Minister of Tourism

[Article by Yehoshua Kahana]

[Text] Four years after the Likud government ordered the disestablishment of the Ministry of Tourism and its attachment, as an administration, to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the ministry was reestablished under Minister Avraham Sharir.

Is Sharir fit to be minister of tourism? Time will tell. As of now, he can point to his closeness to the subject in that in November 1977 he demanded that the then Minister of Transport and Communications Meir 'Amit drastically reduce the air fares to Elat and Sharm ash-Shaykh in order to encourage Israeli tourism to these places. In March 1978 he worked for the construction of a casino in Elat in order to attract, according to him, wealthy tourists who would bring hundreds of millions of pounds annually into the Treasury.

The new minister who reflects in his statements private initiative and the idea of gambling as a source of income from tourism grew up in the working-class neighborhood of Morokhov, was educated in the Hanoar Haoved [Working Youth] Movement, and studied in the Tichon Hadash School, the school of many who set the tone in the Israeli leftist camp. Avraham Sharir is trying to remove the "stain": "From my early youth I was a member of the General Zionists Party, and I was attracted to its liberal ideology."

His initial activity in the party was in the early fifties when he was the secretary of the parliamentary faction while studying law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. His close relations with Simha Ehrlich bore fruit in 1964 when he was sent to the United States as a representative of the [Jewish] Agency's Economic Department which was then under the control of the Liberals. Upon his return to Israel after 3 years, he was appointed secretary of the Coordinating Committee of the Economic Organizations in which the Liberal Party had substantial influence.

His big moment came in 1974 when he was called back to Israel by Simha Ehrlich to serve as secretary of the Liberal Party.

The basic surface work in the Liberal Party jumped Sharir, who was a virtually anonymous activist, to fifth place in the Party's list of candidates for Ninth Knesset and to twelfth place in the Likud list.

Avraham Sharir, father of four who lives in the Neve Avivim section of north Tel Aviv, continued to consolidate his position in the Party. In the Tenth Knesset he served as chairman of the Likud faction and as a member of the Finance Committee.

Moshe Nissim--Minister of Justice

[Article by Tzvi Singer]

[Text] Minister of Justice Moshe Nissim, one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, assumed his position in the Ministry of Justice in the previous term, after a lengthy period in which he served as a minister without portfolio and worked in coordinating actions between the Cabinet and the Knesset and in handling ad hoc "burning" issues. With the resignation of the previous minister of justice, Shmuel Tamir, Nissim was appointed as his successor.

Law and justice were not strange to him. He studied law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and after he was graduated as a lawyer, he opened a private office. Nissim was the youngest member of Knesset ever elected. He entered the Fourth Knesset at the age of 24.

Until the Likud came to power, Moshe Nissim was a member of the Education and Culture Committee, the Public Services Committee, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Law, Constitution, and Justice Committee, and others.

He served as chairman of the Likud faction in the Eighth Knesset.

Nissim has published many articles on legal matters in the daily newspapers and in legal publications.

He has not served long in the Ministry of Justice, but his influence is already being felt in the ministry. One of the first tasks which he took upon himself was the continuation of his involvement in the enactment of legislation for the protection of privacy, a law which he considers to be very important.

Moshe Nissim is 46, married, and the father of three children.

Eliezer Shostak--Minister of Health

[Article by Yeshayahu Avi'am]

[Text] When the Health portfolio was offered 4 years ago to MK Eliezer Shostak, he had concerns about assuming the burden of directing a ministry at the age of 66. Today, 4 years later, he does not hesitate. In truth, he was the most certain minister in the second Begin government. Mr Shostak feels that in the first term, with the exception of several disappointments including the passing of a national health insurance law, he was successful in his position.

Eliezer Shostak, who will be 70 in 2 months, is a veteran parliamentarian. He has been a member of the Knesset since the Second Knesset when he was elected from the Herut Movement. He was defeated in the election for the First Knesset when he was on the list of the Revisionist Party.

Since then the minister of health has experienced several party crises. In 1967, together with Shmuel Tamir, he left the Herut Movement and established the Free Center. A few years later there was a split in the Free Center, and Shostak established the Independent Center which joined the Likud when the latter was formed in 1973. Afterward, together with Yigael Hurwitz, he formed the La'am Movement (this movement consisted of the Independent Center, Rafi, and people from the Greater Land of Israel). This movement also split. Today, Shostak and his friends are a group, La'am, in the Likud.

Eliezer Shostak was born in 1911 in Wladimirice, Poland. In 1929 he joined the Betar Movement. When he was given permission to immigrate to Israel in 1933, he married his girlfriend Mina. However, at the time of the Arlosoroff trial, members of Betar were denied immigration permits, and the immigration permit was not given to him until 1935.

Upon his arrival in Israel, he began to work in a Betar group in Herzliyya and later in the representation and leadership of Betar. He was one of the activists in the National Labor Federation which had just been formed and was appointed to serve as its secretary in Tel Aviv. A few years later he was appointed the general secretary of the National Labor Federation. He headed it for about 40 years, and he resigned from the position 4 years ago when he was appointed minister of health.

Zevulun Hammer--Minister of Education and Culture

[Article by Yosef Waxman]

[Text] MK Zevulun Hammer, who served in the outgoing Cabinet as the minister of education and culture, continues to work in this field which he loves and to which he devoted most of his time, energy, and ability in the outgoing Cabinet.

Zevulun Hammer is one of the youngest ministers in the new Cabinet. He was born 45 years ago in Haifa, studied at the religious high school Yavneh in his native city, and afterward was graduated from Bar Ilan University with his first degree in Judaic Studies and Education.

In his youth Zevulun Hammer was active in the Bnai Akiva Movement, and afterward he served as chairman of the Students Federation in Bar Ilan, as a member of the presidium of the Students Association, and in this capacity, he was responsible for the World Organization of Jewish Students.

He began his political and party activity as chairman of the Youth and Young Generation Authority of the NRP. He was one of the outstanding individuals among the NRP young guard which he formed into a group within the party which he headed. In NRP circles Zevulun Hammer is today considered also the eventual successor of Dr Burg, as leader of the party.

He was elected to the Seventh Knesset and served as deputy minister of education and culture. On the Eighth Knesset he was a member of the Education and Culture Comm ttee and the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and later served for a short time as minister of social betterment. His hope was to become the minister of education and culture--and he indeed realized it in the Likud Cabinet 4 years ago.

Yosef Burg--Minister of Interior, Police, and Religious Affairs

[Article by Yosef Waxman]

[Text] The minister of interior, police, and religious affairs is the senior member of Knesset and the senior member of the Cabinet. Dr Yosef Burg has been a member of the governments of Israel virtually continuously since 1951.

Dr Yosef Burg was born in 1909 in Dresden, Germany and immigrated to Israel in 1939 after a long period of studies during the course of which he received a PhD and rabbinical ordination. After his arrival, he served as a teacher in the Herzliyya gymnasium, however he soon became involved in political activity as a direct continuation of such activity in the diaspora. He represented the Mizrahi Movement in the Zionist Ececutive Committee and in the national institutions. After the establishment of the state, he was elected a member of the First Knesset in which he was selected as deputy speaker of the Knesset.

In 1951 he was appointed minister of health and after a year, minister of posts. He held this position for 6 years, and from there he went to the Ministry of Social Welfare and held this position for 11 years. In 1970 he was appointed minister of interior and in the outgoing Knesset, the Ministry of Police was attached to his ministry.

Now, as was stated, he will also serve as the minister of religious affairs and he will concurrently continue to serve as chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Autonomy Negotiations which is actually the main issue in which he has been involved for the past 2 years.

His abundant activity in governmental positions has not prevented Dr Burg from fulfilling his duties as the leader of the NRP, as the world president of Mizrahi, a member of the Board of Trustees of Bar Ilan University, and many other positions. In addition, he is one of the most sought after speakers by the fund-raising campaigns throughout the world and is regarded as an outstanding fundraiser for the [text missing] regarded as an outstanding fundraiser for the state.

Aharon Abu-Hatzeira--Minister of Labor, Social Betterment, and Absorption

[Article by Tali Bashan]

[Text] The capacity of Minister of Labor, Social Betterment, and Absorption Aharon Abu-Hatzeira is astounding. During the process of one term he managed to be the youngest minister in history, to be in the center of an unprecedented public storm and to emerge from it "standing tall" to a political struggle which virtually split the people, to strike a blow at his previous party, the NRP, to make his new faction, Tami, the steelyard in the new coalition, and to give himself new positions of power.

Aharon Abu-Hatzeira comes from a prestigious and large family of rabbis from Arford, Morocco (family prestige which has had great significance throughout his political career). He was born in Morocco and immigrated to Israel at the age of 11. After completing his schooling at the ueshiva high school of Kefar Haro'e, he worked as a history teacher in a high school in Ramla. When he joined the NRP, he became its candidate for mayor of Ramla. He served two terms in this position.

The turning point in his status came after an "upheaval" in which Yitzhaq Rafael was shunted aside by his associates in the NRP--the Lamifne faction and the party's Young Guard. At that time Abu-Hatzeira gained a new position of power in the party, and at the distribution of the portfolios in the fresh coalition of 1977, he demanded and even received a ministerial position. This is how Abu-Hatzeira, the nephew of the sainted Baba Sali and the son of Rabbi Abu-Hatzeira, of blessed memory, became a minister at 39.

A short time after he took office he encountered problems in the management of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In the wake of severe disagreements on the method of managing the ministry and the degree of centralization which the minister took, the then director general of the ministry, Yisrael Lipal (a member of Yosef Burg's camp), resigned. Also, disclosures of irregularities in management began to slowly "trickle out," and criticism was heard of the allocation of funds to yeshivas and rabbis and about the existence of fictitious yeshivas receiving funds from the ministry.

The rest is known. The disclosures and the suspicions raised led to a thorough investigation which concluded with Abu-Hatzeira being brought to trial. "They are spilling my blood," the minister exclaimed at the time. He managed to maintain his composure throughout his trial which ended with his acquittal.

Some say that he destroyed the Ministry of Religious Affairs and left it completely paralyzed. He himself, in his lowkeyed manner, carefully paves his political road and says on the eve of his second trial, "Several months ago I decided to give up political activity, but I do not want to give this pleasure to those who want to see me leave."

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APPOINTMENT OF SHARON ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Aug 81 p 11

[Article by Yoel Marcus: "A God Who Disappoints or a Devil Who Surprises?"]

[Text] Ariel Sharon's appointment to the post of defense minister will undoubtedly steal the show from the new government to be established today. There is some question as to whether this was a controversial appointment to such a sensitive post, one that affects the well being and physical health of the nation. The debate which occupies every citizen in the nation is not connected with Sharon's military expertise (few question that at all) but rather with his personality. As we know, the attitude towards his personality is ambivalent or polar, not unlike the one experienced by Moshe Dayan during his entire political career. No one is indifferent to Sharon. You either hate him and are suspicious of him or you respect and exalt him.

His close friends speak of him in Messianic terms and see him as a kind of savior for Israel. "He already saved you once (in the Yom Kippur War) and he will save you next time again," was the way one of his friends once put it to his opponents. In their eyes, his anticipated appointment as defense minister goes together with the salvation of the country. The same irrationality which characterizes his admirers also describes his opponents. Their major complaint is that he is a "dangerous man," an "opportunist," and that his main concern is Sharon. These opponents speak of him in terms of dictatorship, tanks, concentration camps and the like.

It is almost certain that there is no more validity to these fears than there is to the praises circulating about Sharon. The fact that in his youth he was a member of MAPAI and, according to Yomani Sharet, afraid of the fact that too many officers were joining the Unity of Labor Party, and that now he is the spearhead of Israel's settlement front, does not make him any more of an opportunist than many MAPAI people who today are members of the Labor Party and who think like him. He has expressed himself sharply about the media whose role in making him a national hero is unquestionable. "We have a unique democracy in which the most severe accusations leveled at the government come from television, and not a single newspaper supports the government," he once said in a newspaper interview. But his criticism does not really deviate from the generally accepted pattern of the Likud ministers who lay all the defects and omissions of the government at the feet of the media.

Sharon himself has expressed his opinion more than once about his public image. In a conversation I had with him when he stood at the head of the "Shalomtzion" list in 1977, he said on this subject, "They say of me that I am a warmonger. Far from

it. By my nature, I am an easy going man and not at all despotic, far from the qualities of a dictator that people attach to me." Even if we assume that we should not accept too easily the baker's testimony about his own dough, we can still assume that there is a lot of exaggeration in the notion that by handing over the defense portfolio to Sharon, he will be given dictatorial powers which could endanger the democracy.

He himself once reacted to the horror stories going on around him in an interview with MA'ARIV. "It would be impossible to carry out any campaign in Israel which was not completely subordinate to the law. In my opinion, this is unequivocal." It is also true that we have far too highly developed a system of "checks and balances," not only within the structure of the government but also in the internal structure of every citizen of the state, for us to fear that any defense minister could control this nation with tanks and prison camps. The only one who really has to fear Sharon's appointment to this key position is, perhaps, King Hussayn whom Sharon described as a foreign body in the region who is trying to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian State. We will come back to this in the second part of this article.

Whoever examines what Sharon has been saying for the past 5 years will find--for better or worse--a certain consistency in his approach to problems of security and problems of organizing the defense system as well as in his approach to the future of the settlements. Of all the people in the world, he was the one who strongly supported civilian control of the army. More than 4 years ago, he was already talking about "massive waste" and a "careless attitude towards money" in the defense establishment. Already then, he spoke of the need for a 20 percent reduction in the "inflated army command." He spoke of a lack of order and of the need for reorganization.

From the perspective of his military outlook, he is against the recent tendency to go for "quantity" instead of "quality." the IDF needs to return to the approach of quality which used to characterize it (that is also the reason that he opposed the absorption of marginal youth into the army. "This is an army and not a melting pot or a school." Meanwhile, I am told, he has changed his attitude on the subject, mainly because he is worried about the direction of the development of social divisions within the country). He has always been sensitive to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and to any kind of military preparations taking place on Israel's borders. His reactions to the decision to bomb Lebanon and later towards the cease fire attest to the fact that he is opposed to the strategic outlook which is likely to lead to a war whose consequences are a waste. A course like the one taken in Lebanon would not have happened under Sharon. The move would either have been more basic and comprehensive ("like in Gaza," says one of his friends) or it would not have taken place in the same place at the same time in relation to the same target.

Although his assistants assure us that Sharon will enter his office on tiptoes, and that perhaps a good deal of time will pass before he makes any kind of declarations ("unless the situation requires it"), we can assume that it will not be long before his imprint will be felt within the defense establishment, whether from an organizational point of view or with respect to the conception and suggestions which will be presented to the government for approval. Sharon, however, who has been working hard for weeks on a draft of an outline of his direction as defense minister, is likely to want to leave his mark on the peace process as well, a subject which will be central to political activity in the months and years to come. And in this area, too, there is a marked consistency in his statements.

The point of departure of his approach is very reminiscent of Moshe Dayan's namely, that there are no sacred historical boundaries. The people of Israel have rights "over" the land of Israèl, whereas the Arabs have rights "in" Israel. There is, in his past statements, some deviation from the ideological position of Gush Emunim. "I don't agree with them on several issues, but one must accept them and work with them and keep them moderate. Like Dayan, he says, "It is unlikely that there will be a place in Israel where Jews will not be able to live." In contrast to the approaches of the Alignment and Likud, Sharon has said several times that peace without a solution to the Palestinian problem will keep us continually in our present situation. He has said more than once that we must arrive at a dialogue with the Palestinians and even with the PLO. "It is not important to whom we speak but about what." And his "what" is that a "second Palestinian State" should not be established.

According to him, a Palestinian State already exists--namely, Jordan--and the solution lies in the formation of a federation or confederation ("I am not afraid of these concepts," he once said) between the Palestinian State whose capitol is Rabat-Ammon and Israel and the residents of Judaea and Samaria. He is against too much U.S. involvement in the autonomy talks and believes that, in the final analysis, no true peace agreement can be achieved without Soviet cooperation. His statements indicate that security considerations are more important to him than adherence to ideology in so far as some possible order is concerned on the West Bank, an approach that smacks of pragmatism.

Last year, Sharon was prepared to move down to deputy minister as long as he would be appointed to defense. It is not surprising, then, that his anticipated appointment is the realization of a dream he does not want to see destroyed. His friends say that Sharon as defense minister is likely to do some surprising things--not in the sense that he will shake up the defense establishment in ways that some feel will not hurt it, but as the man who will bring about talks with the Palestinians. How he will do this--is he likely to propose to the Palestinians and the PLO a joint effort to bring about Husayn's downfall--that remains to be seen. In theory at least, there is no question that assured talks with the Palestinians by a man who stands at the head of the Israel front certainly contains elements of surprise. It is too early to say who will be most surprised--his friends, his opponents or Sharon himself.

Either way, he has wanted this position too much, and for too long has thought about what he would do with it, for him not to take advantage of the chance to prove himself. After the first 100 days of grace, we will be able to look back to determine if Sharon is the god who deceives, the Satan who surprises or simply mediocre like all the Likud ministers.

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COMMENTARY ON DAVID LEVI

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Aug 81 p 8

[Article by Gid'on Allon: "Absorption As a Secondary Matter"]

[Text] On Thursday morning, when Menahem Begin and the members of his government stood in the president's hall waiting to be presented to President Yitzhak Navon, Minister David Levi was among them. He had a reason for being pleased with himself. He had won (once again) in the struggle and had strengthened his position within the government. In place of the absorption portfolio which had been taken from him, he had been appointed deputy prime minister, chairman of the Ministers Committee on matters of social betterment and responsible for the housing plan--all this apart from his job as Housing Minister. Now that the transfer of the office of absorption has become definite, we can summarize his 4 years in this position.

Whoever has followed David Levi's progress since he joined Menahem Begin's first government in June 1977 as Absorption Minister, cannot help but admit that this position served him as a jumping off place for the advancement of his political career and for the strengthening of his position within the Herut movement and the government. During the first months of his tenure, he was full of ideas. He initiated a quiet revolution in the distribution of housing to immigrants. He supported the establishment of an authority for immigration and absorption which would work with the government and the Jewish Agency with him serving as its chairman. He developed a government program for the encouragement of those who left the country during the 30th anniversary of Israel (this was a complete failure). He committed himself to work towards encouraging immigration from the developed nations (particularly France) and to reduce the extent of defection (which did not bear fruit). But at the beginning of 1979, when he was appointed as Minister of Construction and Housing (instead of Gid'on Fass), in addition to his job as Minister of Immigrant Absorption, he began to relate to the subjects of immigration and absorption as to a secondary matter. He spent less time on the difficult problems of immigrants and delegated those to the director-general of his office, Azriel Waldeman, but he fought hard against every effort on the part of the Jewish Agency to do away with the Absorption Ministry and to transfer the dealings on the subjects of immigration and absorption into its hands. In the course of this struggle, he demonstrated his power and influence within the Herut movement. Furthermore, in June of 1979 he forced Prime Minister Menahem Begin to change his mind about doing away with the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. At the same time, he launched a sharp critique on the prime minister and argued that the government could not divest itself of responsibility for action within the realm of absorption.

Employees in the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption pointed out that David Levi did not concern himself much with the absorption of immigrants once he was appointed Minister of Construction and Housing. He devoted all his time and energy to two main areas: the Ministry of Housing and the consolidation of his political power within the Herut movement. At the same time, he struggled with the Likud position in the Histadrut and established an image as the true representative of the Eastern community and of the lower classes, as someone who watched over the needs of low income people and who did battle in the government against the elimination of subsidies for basic necessities.

David Levi did not contribute anything to increasing the awareness of the government to the problems of immigration and absorption. This area was at the bottom of the list of priorities of the previous government. It did not carry on a single serious discussion about the severe drop in immigration, about the problem of the defection of Soviet immigrants to Vienna, and on the emigration of thousands of Israeli youths from the country each year.

Even when he established an institution for coordination between the government and the Zionist Federation, a special committee to consolidate practical suggestions to reduce emigration, David Levi did nothing to facilitate its discussions even though he was a member of the committee along with Deputy Prime Minister Simha Erlich. Neither did he take any action after the publication of the findings of the public opinion poll (conducted at the initiative of the Ministry of Absorption) about the positions of the Israeli public on the subject of immigration and absorption which indicated a significant worsening in the attitudes of the Israeli public towards the immigrants and a severe estrangement between the old-timers in Israel (especially the educated) and the immigrants.

David Levi was also not bothered by the fact that immigration to Israel had decreased noticeably. The fact that since the beginning of the year (January to July) there were only 6300 new immigrants and that seven absorption centers had closed while the others handled only 50 percent of the usual traffic did not arouse any response from the man who was responsible for dealing with the issue of immigration and absorption.

The appointment of Abu Hatzeira over the issue of absorption in the new government alongside his major responsibility as Minister of Labor and Social Betterment suggests that the new minister is also likely to relate to the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption as to an incidental matter.

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MOSHE QATZAV, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR URBAN RENEWAL

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 p 25

[Interview by Talila Ben Zakai: "MK Moshe Qatzav: The Purity of Politics"]

[Text] Tuesday afternoon in the Knesset. MK Moshe Qatzav, deputy minister for urban renewal, has difficulty responding to the confusing situation he has been put into as a result of the composition of the government.

Earlier he was told that he would be appointed as deputy minister in the office of the prime minister, and he was pleased. Later it was decided that the project would be transferred to the Ministry of Housing and Construction in order to expand the part suggested for David Levi, and MK Qatzav agreed.

Meanwhile, David Levi played at being "angry" and left the game. Then they started over and returned MK Qatzav to his original post, namely, in the prime minister's office. For a full day he was in a state of anticipation. Next, Minister Levi became reconciled and became deputy prime minister. The result of all this is that MK Qatzav will serve as deputy to the minister who is deputy prime minister or something like that.

It appears that he is prepared for any arrangement. At any rate, in talking with me he seemed content and did not complain that the game going on over his head was upsetting him. No, he completely understands the situation. And, while he is aware of the bad impression which the extensive negotiations make on the public, he does not see in this situation in which small parties squeeze (appointments or changes in approach) and the party is squeezed enough reason to stop and say "no more" and to go back again to the voters. "It is not that one must maintain party rule at any cost. There is a limit to this too," he says and adds, "but the situation is not serious enough to warrant such an extreme step and such things happen."

Born in Iran (and chairman of the organization of Iranian immigrants in Israel), resident of Qiryat Malahi and chairman of the council (he plans to leave that post soon), 36 years old (married more than 5 years), MK Moshe Qatzav numbers among the young members in the 10th Knesset. "Most of them are from Likud," he says. "The young Alignment people are at least 40." But age apparently does not matter, and he sounds today like the old-timers who speak about every subject without saying anything new. "We are a reflection of the public;" "the patterns of the government are in the process of being crystallized;" "politics can be pure if everyone stays away from negative examples;" "I myself have not been involved in any illegal methods. I haven't even used my elbows, and my career has not been tainted."

To those youths who are sitting at home criticizing the political system, he proposes, "Get involved, enter the arena and be different from the old guard, and then, within a few years, everything will change."

The personal history of Deputy Minister Moshe Qatzav is a nice story of immigration--absorption--development and personal advancement.

He grew up in the transit camp of Qastina (the eldest of the 7 children in the Qatzav family). First, he lived in a tent, later in a bunk. And when the camp became a development town, the family got a real dwelling, a two room apartment--48 mm. square with running water, hook-up for electricity and utilities inside the apartment.

He completed elementary school in Qiryat-Malahi, high school in Ben-Shemen and Beer Tuviya. He finished his academic studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem where he also served as chairman of the student council of Gahal.

Since then, his path has been tied to the Herut movement and to a political career, as chairman of the local council at Qiryat Malahi since 1974 ("my most important accomplishment--the satisfaction of the residents with the town"), and since 1977 a member of the Knesset ("during my first term I was amazed at the complete dependence on the part of those elected on the media which determine the rules of the game").

During the past 4 years, he has served in two public posts. This has been hard, he says, but it has been very important. As a member of the Knesset, it is very important for him not to be too cut off from the people. And as head of the council, it is nice that he can bypass bureaucratic procedures and push for issues from a higher level.

Moshe Qatzav Deputy Minister

"This time" MK Qatzav, who is an avid stamp collector, says, "there are already council heads in the Knesset, and I think that this is very good." He himself intends to leave and to devote himself to the Knesset and to his new post as deputy minister for urban renewal. The subject is especially close to him. "It is still too soon to outline in detail my plans, but what I can say is that I would like to function in such a way that in 10 years, we will not have to go back and do any more renewal. I expect also that the young generation growing up in these reconstructed areas will be able to handle whatever problems arise on their own." And if he does not succeed in achieving these objectives, he feels it will not be because of conditions and institutions but because of his own limitations.

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MIRYAM GLAZER, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR EDUCATION, CULTURE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 p 25

[Interview by Talila Ben Zakai: "From the Fortress to the Knesset"]

[Text] At the beginning of the week, it appeared that the government (ministers and deputy ministers) would be composed only of men. And now--surprise. MK Miryam Glazer has been summoned to the post of Deputy Minister of Education and Culture. Now it can be said that 50 percent of the female members of Eikud in the Knesset have gotten select posts.

She does not yet know her way around the workings of the Knesset (nor the MKs' dining room), and even the ushers still have a hard time identifying her. A new face in the 10th Knesset. A student who "skipped" two grades at once--from her life in education to the Knesset and from there directly to the post of Deputy Minister.

It was not a complete surprise. The fact is that as early as the 7th Knesset, she was invited to join, but her children were still small and she did not feel ready for the job. Now with the encouragement of her husband and the agreement of the children (the oldest is married), she agreed to the invitation. She does not hide her excitement about the honor bestowed on her, but she admits that the opening ceremony at the Knesset was disappointing. "I was hoping for a more sensitive ceremony," says the MK who as a school director had lots of experience with setting up festive ceremonies.

"I will do my best," she says again but has trouble at this stage saying anything more concrete. The prime minister suggested the position ("he was my son's godfather'). She does not know the minister of education personally, and, although it is clear that the appointment was made with his approval, he has not yet invited her nor has she sought him out, and she has no idea what he intends for her or how the system of work relations between them will be set up.

But these unknowns do not cloud over, at this first stage, the excitement of this dizzying pace of personal advancement which goes along with the anxiety about being able to fit into a system which demands that you not always say what you think and that you not always fight for what you believe in, but that you quickly develop a control mechanism which forces you to weigh every word and every hand raising against party and coalition considerations. And for her, all this is new.

Miryam (at home it is T'assa) was born in Yemen in 1929. When she was 5 years old, her family migrated to Israel and joined her grandfather (who had come in 1882) in Tel Aviv's Neve-Tsedek. She went from the local elementary school (where the "actors' theater" now stands) to the seminary "Talpiyot" ("I left because I refused to tell on girls who belonged to dissident organizations") and Levinsky ("they threw me out on the grounds that I had missed too much school"). Then she began her career as an uncertified teacher and only later completed her exams and received her teaching certificate (she later completed her education at the university).

Now she is leaving teaching at the seminary as well as at the school in the youth farm of Beitar (sports and youth organization) named after Johanna Jabotinski in Beer Ya'acov, in which she served intermittently as teacher and headmistress since 1951.

"I went there for a year," she says, "and stayed for 30!" (with some breaks). There she married Haim Glazer (who came after her to run the farmstead). Their children were born there (25, 22, and 18). About 10 years ago, her husband left to attend to private business and the family moved to Holon. She continued to direct the school as an "outside resident." And from there, without any intermediate steps of public or political posts, she was established in the Knesset.

"I am used to learning new subjects slowly and thoroughly," says the teacher from the "fortress" (abbreviation for Jabotinski residence), who believes in the need to strengthen the ideological side of education and to emphasize the strengthening of national attitudes.

Miryam Glazer, Deputy Minister of Education and Culture

As a teacher and educator she can only be very critical of the manner of expression and the conduct of many Knesset members. "It is not enough to be chosen. One must behave as one who is chosen," she says, and promises that in this area she will not hesitate to continue to be a teacher and to call for order.

As for the rest--education, integration, reports, briefings, study programs and so forth--she is still keeping silent.

And yes, as for culture, it is apparently for her (as well as for the Minister himself) only an addendum to the main subject--education.

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MINISTER EXPLAINS GCC ECONOMIC AGREEMENT

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[Text] Kuwait, 12 Nov (KUNA)--The Kuwait Finance and Planning Minister 'Abd al-Latif al-Hamad said the economic unity agreement, which the heads of the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states signed in Riyadh last night, will provide a comprehensive framework for economic relations among the council members.

In a statement to KUNA, al-Hamad said the ministers in the economic, financial and planning sectors will meet shortly to lay down the bases for economic cooperation among Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

The agreement binds the six member-states in a parallel and complementary manner and automatically dissolves all bilateral agreements between the Gulf states while at the same time catering for the needs of the states which did not have such bilateral agreements, he said.

The economic unity agreement lays down the basic principles for economic relations among the six GCC member-states and regulates and fosters these relations with a view to achieving closer cooperation among their harmonious economies, al-Hamad added. The Kuwaiti minister said the agreement will lead to removal of inconsistency among the six Gulf states and formulates and coordinates the economies of these states and helps in creating the best integration amongst them.

The six-chapter agreement includes clauses which place a maximum of coordination in the economic, financial and monetary dealings among the Gulf states and calls for unification of commercial and industrial legislations and customs regulations.

The chapters of the agreement define the bases of trade exchange, tax levying and the encouragement of national products. It calls for equal treatment of the Gulf citizens in the movement of manpower, ownership of land and assets and the transfer of capital and economic activities.

The agreement calls for coordination of oil industry policies including refining, marketing, pricing and exploitation of natural gas and development of energy resources.

Cooperation in tapping scopes of joint technical endeavour with a view to establishing a firm Gulf base dependent on encouragement of research, applied sciences and technology are also included in the agreement.

Coordination of financial, monetary and banking policies and cooperation among the monetary agencies and central banks including unification of the currency constitute an integral part of the economic unity agreement.

CSO: 4400/50

GOALS OF BRIGHT STAR MANEUVERS CRITICIZED

GF091835 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 8 Nov 81 p 22

[From "Scenes" column by chief editor Jasim al-Mutawwa']

[Text] Observers say that the goals of the bright star maneuvers which the United States will carry out together with four Arab countries lie in the U.S. Government's desire to show its commitment to protect its friends and interests in the Middle East. The truth is that the maneuvers are designed to protect its interests and not its friends. Indications are that, despite close friendship with the United States, its friends began to fall one after another without any U.S. move to rescue them. The United States is concerned, before anything else, with protecting its interests because there is absolutely no such thing as "friend" in U.S. policy. The Arab countries that will participate in these maneuvers fully realize that their goal is the protection of U.S. interests.

We do not know why these four Arab countries insist on participating with the United States in these maneuvers, which will be interference [words indistinct] sister countries in the council in a difficult position as they try to find an explanation for Omani policy following the optimism that prevailed at the conclusion of latest meeting of the CGG foreign ministers in At-Ta'if.

In addition the U.S. maneuvers come at a critical time when the Arab nation is preparing for two summits. The first is for the Arab Gulf countries and the second is for all the Arab countries. How will these two summits deal with the U.S. maneuvers over Arab territories and shores--maneuvers which had been announced to be designed for U.S. interference in the area? Will the Gulf summit discuss the maneuvers to be carried out in the water of its countries? Will it announce its opinion frankly and loudly so that it will be heard in Oman? Oman indicated, just as the other Gulf countries did, that the security and protection of the Gulf is the responsibility of its countries--and as we know the United States is not one of the Gulf countries.

We, the people, do not know what is being planned against us, but we fully realize that it is not in our favor since our interests contradict completely U.S. interests. As long as the United States protects its interests, it will be threatening our interests. Will those who help the United States protect its interests one day defend our interests?

CSO: 4404/108

BRIEFS

PUBLICATIONS, RALLIES LAWS--Kuwait, 9 Nov (KUNA)--In a statement to the newspaper AL-WATAN, published today, member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly Muhammad al-Barrak has stated that he and the other 15 assembly members who abstained from voting against the abrogation of Article 35 of the Publications Law, thereby supporting the government, will oppose the new law on publications and have already notified the government of their firm stand in support of retaining Article 35. As to the law on public assemblies and rallies, he said, he supports the deputies who favor retaining the law with the introduction of some amendments. But, he said, I say to the press that the well-known Kuwaiti proverb says: either hand over the fleece, or you will have to hand over the fleece and the lamb. [Text] [LD091202 Kuwait KUNA Diplomatic Information Service in Arabic 0950 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/108

'VOAH' ATTACKS U.S. 'PLOTS' AGAINST AL-QADHDHAFI

LD070028 Tripoli Voice of the Arab Homeland in Arabic 1815 GMT 6 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] The challenge between the masses and revolutionary forces of our Arab nation, on the one hand, and the imperialist West headed by the United States, on the other, is both old and new at one and the same time. This is caused by many things which can be summed up briefly in one statement: The imperialist West insists on interfering in our nation's life in order to dominate its territories, exhaust its wealth, enslave its masses by using all means beginning with treachery and deception and ending with plotting, collusion and the use of force--a matter which our Arab masses have rejected and opposed in various ways and which they oppose and reject at present with all the force they can muster.

On 17 June this year, the DAILY NEWS quoted U.S. sources as saying that the Reagan administration was plotting to topple al-Qadhdhafi through some Arab countries friendly to the United States. This is the new scenario to which the Reagan administration has resorted after it failed to harm the revolution or find a trojan war which would realize its dream of toppling the revolution from within.

In view of this, the Reagan administration embarked on the current attempt, invented by its petrified mentality, to differentiate between the revolution and its commander, the brother al-Qadhdhafi, as though the conflict was solely between him and the United States. However, despite the fact that he is the commander of the revolution al-Qadhdhafi is, after all, only one of the masses of the struggling Arab nation and one of the free revolutionaries who have rejected the life of humiliation for their nation and dedicated themselves to securing an honorable life for their nation. Al-Qadhdhafi is only the symbol of the revolution and the cause of freedom not only in the Arab world but throughout the world.

The U.S. attempt to differentiate between the revolution and the commander is a naive one which cannot deceive our Libyan Arab people and our Arab nation. Yet, the United States persists with its deception, resorting at one time to using poison, a byproduct of the U.S. terrorist mentality and Reagan's talent.

This has been revealed by the WASHINGTON POST. Since then, the world has been scoffing at the revelations made by the WASHINGTON POST. But the reply of the revolution and its commander to these threats and aggressive attempts was that the commander does not fear death and that the Arab nation with its revolutionary living forces and the Libyan people do not fear the United States.

The unmasking of this U.S. farce and the revolutionary reply to it, as happened at the Gulf of Sidra, have failed to deter the United States, which embarked on a new attempt even more abominable than its previous attempts: to intercept the commander's plane in a terrorist act of piracy, using its bases all over Europe for the purpose. But as it failed in this too, it embarked on yet another attempt which was exposed by the news agencies and Arab and foreign press and radios this week: to launch an offensive against the life of the commander of the revolution from 10 to 15 November, dates which coincide with the provocative military maneuvers which the United States forces in Egypt will be staging.

Quoting U.S. diplomatic sources, these papers say that the plan is primarily directed against Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. It is to be achieved through striking at all the places he is believed to frequent. According to confirmed information carried by the world news agencies during the past few days, the operation shall be preceded by camouflaging measures such as strategic B-52 bombers striking at some area inside the Jamahiriyah. Speaking of the details of this criminal operation, the information media say that the U.S. CIA has been monitoring the movements of brother Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and the places he frequents for months on orders from the Pentagon, as he is supposed to be the primary objective of a U.S. operation to be carried out shortly.

But we say to the U.S. that Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, the symbol of the revolution, can only be reached by the United States over our dead bodies. This is a decision taken not only by our Libyan Arab people but also by the masses and living revolutionary forces of our Arab nation from the ocean to the gulf. This is because we know that our problem with the United States is one of our freedom and the freedom of our homeland and our right to a free and honourable life. It is not one between the United States and Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi personally. As al-Qadhdhafi is the symbol of all these objectives and as he is the commander of this revolution, it will be difficult for the United States to harm this continuous symbol of the revolution and its masses, who will achieve their objectives of freedom and complete emanicipation and the expulsion of U.S. imperialism from every inch of the Arab land.

CSO: 4504/66

BRIEFS

POLISARIO DELEGATION--Tripoli, 11 Nov (JANA)--Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagia Hamra and Rio de Oro--POLISARIO--and his delegation, has arrived in Tripoli yesterday. In a statement at [as received] his arrival he condemned the U.S. manoeuvres due to be conducted along the Egyptian-Libyan borders jointly with Egyptian, Sudanese, Somali and Omani forces. Mr Abdelaziz also praised in his statement the role of the great al-Fateh revolution in confronting the imperialist hostile schemes against the Arab nation. [Text] [LD111122 Tripoli JANA in English 0935 GMT 11 Nov 81]

BRIGHT STAR DANGER--Paris, 13 Nov (AFP)--American-Egyptian military manoeuvres "on Libya's borders "constitute a prelude to a military intervention in Libya," [quotation marks as received] said Hafiana, secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) here, said today. The manoeuvres, which began on Saturday in Egypt and will involve Sudan, Somalia and Oman, are a direct threat to Libya, Mr. Hafiana said. "The American invasion of the four Arab countries" is part of "global American strategy" against Libya and to prepare for "direct action" against his country, he said. If attacked Libya "will use all means available to defend its integrity," he said. He also reiterated Libyan denial that his country was involved in an assassination attempt against acting American ambassador to France Christian Chapman here yesterday. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig has said that Libya could have been involved in the shooting attack. But Mr. Hafiana said that the American accusations were aimed at "creating conditions of an aggression against Libya" and were part of "a global strategy by the United States to destabilize the regime of Colonel (Mu'amar) al-Qadhdhafi." [Text] [NC131652 Paris AFP in English 1629 GMT 13 Nov 81]

ENVOY MEET GREEK OFFICIAL--Athens, 14 Nov (JANA)--The secretary of the People's Committee for the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Greece held a meeting yesterday with the Greek foreign minister. The meeting discussed aspects of bilateral relations and issues of common interests to the two countries. [Text] [LD141000 Tripoli JANA in English 0915 GMT 14 Nov 81]

PFLP CABLE--PFLP secretary general George Habash has sent a cable to the brother leader [Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi] in which he strongly denounced the U.S. maneuvers and aggressive provocations in the Arab area and its attack on the Arab steadfastness and confrontation forces with the aim of subjecting the whole area to the imperialist-reactionary influence. In his cable, George Habash declared that the PFLP is prepared to fight side-by-side with the people of the Jamahiriyah in the forward trenches in defense of the honor and dignity of the Arab nation and to protect its glory and its liberation and progressive objectives. [Text] [NC160700 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 16 Nov 81]

MENGISTU SUPPORT CABLE--The brother leader of the revolution has received a cable from Mr Mengistu Haile Mariam, chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of the Socialist Republic of Ethiopia, in which he strongly denounced the U.S. maneuvers in the Arab area and affirmed the Ethiopian people's support for the Libyan Arab people in their confrontation of the imperialist's aggressive designs. He pointed out that these maneuvers are not only directed against the Libyan Arab people, the Ethiopian people and the Yemeni people, but that they are also against all the progressive and peace-loving states and against all the liberation movements in the area. The brother leader of the revolution also received a cable from the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in which it affirmed its support for the Jamahiriyah people and its readiness to fight along side them to protect and safeguard the firm nationalist and revolutionary position of the great 1 September revolution vis-a-vis all the plots being hatched by imperialism and its agents in the area. [Text] [NC130945 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0900 GMT 13 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/66

OMAN FRONT RADIO SCORES MUSCAT CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

EA061314 Aden Voice of PFLO in Arabic 1545 GMT 5 Nov 81

[Excerpt] The United States and the remaining imperialist forces in the world have begun to adopt a line different to that followed in past years, so that they can at least preserve their remaining agents and hirelings in this or that area.

At the present time, particularly after the killing of the traitor Anwar al-Sadat, calls are heard from this or that quarter saying that the United States and its allies should continue backing the regimes that support them in the Arab region, without those regimes remaining obviously under the umbrella of their protection in the eyes of their peoples.

On this basis, the United States has advised its agents in the region to carry out formal measures in the near future, such as the establishment of consultative assemblies with very limited powers and which, in the final analysis, are only formalities, of no consequence in the fundamental issues of the people, that is they are facades for (?beautifying) the existing regimes and a negation of the expression of democracy.

What the agent regime in Muscat has announced in this respect is proof of the adherence by that regime to the advice of its American and British masters. We will not be surprised if, in the near future the Qabus regime in Muscat presents us with a dramatic event connected with the military bases and facilities which he granted under the 4 July agreement because, if such event occurs, it will be part of the American imperialist design for the region which aims at creating regional alternatives for preserving the imperialist interests in this area.

The voices that have for some time been calling for the creation of a joint local military force are nothing but reliable alternatives for replacing the Americans and the British in the Arabian Gulf area. [sentence as heard] Among the first tasks of this military force would be to serve the imperialist interests in this area. Its work would include the suppression of the nationalist and democratic forces existing in this vital area and which express the interests of the peoples of the area.

CSO: 4404/108

PFLO RADIO SAYS BRIGHT STAR EXERCISES 'DEMEAN' OMAN

EA072010 Aden Voice of PFLO in Arabic 1545 GMT 7 Nov 81

[Text] News agencies have been reporting that American military exercises will be carried out throughout this month in some Arab countries. According to U.S. (?expectations), these exercises, in which the Sultanate of Oman is to participate, will cover Masirah Island and the beaches on the mainland opposite. [Words indistinct]

Eighteen hundred U.S. Marines will take part in these naval exercises. Qabus' regime asked the United States to reduce the number of marines to 1,000 so that the regime in Muscat would not be embarrassed in front of the other Arab regimes. This report was carried by American agencies.

We have explained before that Qabus' puppet regime, by signing a military pact with the United States on 4 July last year, pawned Oman, its people and territory to U.S. circles in Washington. This means that Qabus has distanced himself from the goal of preserving Oman's freedom, independence and honor. We have also explained that Qabus and his regime did not plan the exercises and had no say in them. Qabus did not know about the exercises until it was decided to carry them out. This was natural, of course, because the relationship is between a hirer and a hireling. This is how America treats its agents whenever it signs military pacts with them to acquire military facilities and bases.

Qabus is now asking the U.S. administration to reduce the size of its forces taking part in the exercises, allegedly because he does not want to be embarrassed in front of other Arab regimes. The question is: Will the embarrassment about which the agent regime is talking be avoided by the reduction of the American forces participating in the exercises in Omani territory? This is inverted logic on the part of the regime. [Sentence indistinct].

Even just 10 American or other foreign soldiers carrying out actions on Omani territory with the consent of the existing regime must be regarded as an act of betrayal against the masses of Oman. For this reason, the conducting of military exercises by the Americans, irrespective of whether there are 1,000 or more, must be regarded as an act of treachery against the Omani people. The condemnation of this treachery will not lessen simply because Qabus has asked his new American masters to reduce the number of those taking part in the exercises.

This request of Qabus reported by the news agencies, makes it clear that the pact of 4 July 1980 between the Sultanate and the United States has made the United States an overlord determining the fate of our Omani people, while the agent regime has been turned into a satellite of American imperialism in the Gulf and peninsula.

The fact that the United States has agreed to reduce the extent of the planned military exercises in Oman means nothing since the exercises will still be carried out, and that is the crux of the matter. Qabus has truly demeaned the independence and dignity of Oman.

CSO: 4404/111

BRIEFS

U.S. MANEUVERS CONDEMNED--Arab national liberation movements and progressive parties represented in Aden have condemned U.S. aggressive military maneuvers which pose a threat to the security and interests of the Arab peoples and all the peoples of the region. In a statement issued today, they declared their solidarity with and support for Democratic Yemen, Libya, Socialist Ethiopia, the Omani, Somali and Egyptian peoples and the Sudanese Communist Party, led by their progressive forces. They pointed out that the situation in the Arab region is at its most delicate and dangerous stage with the conflict between American imperialism and Arab reaction on the one hand and the progressive groups of the Arab National Liberation Movement on the other. They stressed the great danger to our Arab peoples and all the peoples of the region caused by the aggressive policy of the American imperialists and their collusion with Arab reactionary forces. [Text] [EA121246 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 11 Nov 81]

TRADE UNIONS SUPPORT CUBA--The secretariat of the Confederation of Trade Unions of the republic has strongly condemned the threats and aggressive acts by American imperialism directed against the revolution and people in Cuba and which aim at harming the independence of the revolution of the heroic Cuban people. This came in a solidarity cable sent by Brother Sultan al-Dawsh, member of the Central Committee and secretary general of the Confederation of Trade Unions, to Comrade Roberto Veiga, secretary general of the Confederation of Workers of Socialist Cuba. It declared the trade union's (?absolute) and unqualified support for the revolution and people. It said: The Yemeni working class and its trade union movement declare their readiness to defend the revolution and independence of the Cuban people against the aggression of American imperialism and its threats. The cable asked all the forces of progress, democracy and peace in the world to stand against this aggressive policy of the United States and with the struggle of the friendly Cuban people to preserve their sovereignty and independence. The secretariat of the General Union of Women of the PDRY today also condemned American imperialist provocation against the Cuban revolution. In a cable of support it sent to the Cuban Women's Union, the secretariat expressed its full solidarity with the struggling people of Cuba. The cable hailed the just steadfastness of the Cuban people against these provocations. It asked the world public opinion to condemn these aggressive acts and put an end to them. [Text] [EA112038 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 11 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/110

BRIEFS

STAND AGAINST U.S.--Doha, 7 Nov (QNA)--The Qatari newspaper AL-RAYAH has called on the Arab countries to take a decisive stand on the repeated trickery of the United States regarding its intention to create the reality of the just Arab cause and the legitimate Arab objectives, while commenting on the statement that His Majesty King Husayn, the Jordanian monarch, made during his visit to Washington, in which he warned of a reckless hostile Israeli action against Jordan and Lebanon that would spark a war in the region. AL-RAYAH explains: King Husayn went to Washington with the hope of finding new American trends that he could convey to Arab leaders during their upcoming summit in Morocco. At the same time he wanted to convince Washington to answer Jordan's military needs for advanced weapons to confront the expected Israeli attack. The paper deduces: The Jordanian monarch's announcement, in the capital of the American nation, that his country will buy advanced weapons from the Soviet Union clearly shows that he did not [word indistinct] what he had expected from the Americans. It also affirms that the Arab-Israeli conflict has fallen to the bottom of the list of U.S. priorities. AL-RAYAH concludes: So long as the message is clear and America does not want to understand it, it is the Arab's duty to confront whoever does not understand their problems and take a decisive stand that would put an end to trickery and procrastination. [Text] [GF071750 Doha QNA in Arabic 1057 GMT 7 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/108

MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON PEACE PLAN

JN101107 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 10 Nov 81 p 15

[Dispatch by AL-DUSTUR correspondent Ahmad 'Ali]

[Excerpts] Baghdad--Saudi Information Minister Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani has said that the Saudi peace plan is the outcome of the resolutions previously adopted by the Arab summit conference and the United Nations. He said that Saudi Arabia had not consulted anyone about this plan because it is not yet binding, but that it does consist of constructive ideas for those who want to make a step forward toward peace. He went on to say that the plan defines exactly what the Arabs want from the world and it has received positive reaction from many fair people in the world and from the Arab homeland as well as the PLO.

Mr Yamani said this in an exclusive statement to AL-DUSTUR during his visit to Baghdad last week.

Asked about the latest Saudi peace proposals on the Middle East problem, Dr Yamani said: In fact, the Saudi peace plan, which was announced by His Highness Prince Fahd, is the outcome of the resolutions previously adopted by the Arab summit conferences and the United Nations. Saudi Arabia announced this plan out of its awareness of the dimensions of its responsibilities but did not consult anyone about it because this plan is not yet binding and merely consists of constructive ideas for everyone who wants to make a sincere step toward a just peace.

He went on to say: We have accustomed the world to hearing only what we did not want. We never used logic and reason to explain what we wanted. The Saudi peace plan defines exactly what we want from the world. We want it to understand our fateful issue and realize that we have basic rights that have been violated and that there are people unjustly displaced from their homeland.

The Saudi information minister added: Israel's rejection of the Saudi peace plan was not a surprise to us but a confirmation of its desire and policy to impose capitulation and not peace. It is our duty at this stage to cooperate in order to further expose the Zionist plot, particularly as we see the beginning of a positive transformation in the world toward understanding our fateful issues. We must not expect a prompt and complete positive understanding, but we must continue to win further understanding and awareness of the dimensions of the Zionist plot, whose victims are the Palestinian people, who have been suffering from displacement and loss throughout the past few years.

He went on to say: Saudi Arabia has prepared a working paper about this plan to be submitted to the forthcoming Arab summit. He added: We were delighted by the positive reactions to the ideas contained in the Saudi plan by many fair people in the world and by many quarters inside our Arab homeland, particularly the PLO, represented by its chairman, Yasir 'Arafat, and his brothers in the resistance movement, whom we expect will adopt this plan and consider it a sound basis for movement in international fields and in gaining further support and effort for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state for the Palestinians on their territory and homeland as well as for the restoration of the occupied Arab territory, including Jerusalem. There is no doubt that the Palestinian brothers' attainment of their basic legitimate rights will enable them to gain more positive results and a greater ability to express themselves, exercise these legitimate rights of which they have been deprived and put an end to the Palestinian people's state of displacement and loss.

CSO: 4404/110

DEPUTY PREMIER PREVIEWS ARAB SUMMIT IN FES

LD071332 Riyadh SPA in English 1200 GMT 7 Nov 81

[Text] Riyadh, 7 Nov (SPA)--Second deputy premier and commander of National Guard, Prince 'Abdallah 'Ibn Abd al-Aziz has said the Saudi Arabian peace plan for establishing just and durable peace in the Middle East would ensure the Arab nation's rights and secure means of stability in the region.

In an interview with 'UKAZ newspaper, Prince 'Abdallah reaffirmed that Saudi Arabia is fully aware of its Arab and Islamic duties. "The eight-point blueprint introduced by Crown Prince Fahd is basically derived from the absolute faith in the right of the Arab nation, to lead an honourable life without any bargains on its legitimate rights," Prince 'Abdallah added.

Prince 'Abdallah said the Arab and Islamic nation should find out a right path from the available choices, in order to devise a unified stand, characterising reason, patience and farsightedness and omitting reactions, as it would pave way for the realisation of their best interests.

"The Arab and Islamic nation should be aware of its enemies in the next stage, so as to take a clear and sound stand, devoid of any aims, except the dignity and high place for the whole Islamic nation among the world-body," he added.

"Time is ripe to face ourselves with the reality and pledge not to commit the mistakes of the past and march forward with the pure noble Arab nature to achieve our aims and goals," Prince 'Abdallah said.

He noted the kingdom has been giving prime concern to Arab solidarity and strategic unanimity, that could determine the moves of every nation within the framework of this unity. "Absence of such a strategy will pave way for policies of trial and errors," (?he said).

"The forthcoming Arab summit in Fes (Morocco) calls for a greater degree of frankness and clarity based on the confidence for devising action, on the problem and introducing viewpoints in a sincere brotherly spirit that could totally remove obstacles in the way of a unified Arab action," Prince 'Abdallah said.

He said a unified Arab action will create a favourable climate for a joint Arab and Islamic moves that could serve the prime goals and interests of the whole Islamic nation.

CSO: 4400/48

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED BY BEIRUT TV ON PEACE PLAN

LD082320 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 2200 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Text] Beirut, 8 Nov (SPA)--His Royal Highness, Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal has stated that the first and the last word regarding the peace plan which the kingdom has presented will be from the Palestinians and the Arab countries during the 12th Arab summit in Morocco.

In a statement made to Lebanese television tonight, he said that the Gulf Cooperation Council supported the plan at its meeting in al-Ta'if and decided to put it before the Arab summit for discussion, scrutiny, and to arrive at a decision. He added that he has not observed any reservations among Arab states; on the contrary, he observed that there is increasing support for reaching a unified Arab stance toward the issue. If there are some states which have not yet expressed opinion, it is because they are waiting for (?the matter) to be decided at the summit and not by the information media. His royal highness expressed the hope that the Saudi peace plan would enjoy Arab unanimity at the conference.

The minister spoke about yesterday's meeting in Beirut of the Arab Follow-up Committee at ministerial level and he stressed that the Lebanese issue is one priority which the Arab world must tackle. He said that the Arab Follow-up Committee, thanks to efforts from all sides, reached agreement on the main elements which will pave and open the road for national accord. He added that yesterday the committee also reached agreement concerning the Supervision Commission. This [word garbled] important and fundamental door will open the road for national accord. He expressed pleasure that the cease-fire in Lebanon is continuing to hold, a matter which indicates all parties' awareness of the critical stage which requires self discipline. He also expressed hope that the parties concerned would accept and cooperate with what the committee achieved yesterday regarding the opening of passageways between the areas of Beirut. He stressed that this will create grounds for harmony.

The foreign minister stressed the kingdom's concern for Lebanon's interests at all levels, and said that the kingdom's participation in attempting to resolve the Lebanese problem is part of the joint Arab action. He added that the kingdom, through its participation in the Follow-up Committee, bears its responsibilities in full with regard to both the work of the committee or anything concerning other Arab actions so as to make available the suitable circumstances for national

concord. His Highness Prince Saud al-Faysal called upon the Lebanese to shoulder their responsibilities as there is a limit to Arab action toward Lebanon and any such action cannot be a substitute for Lebanese action. The minister referred to the efforts which the kingdom had exerted so as to achieve a cease-fire in the south of Lebanon, and said that this action showed the pivotal nature of the Palestinian issue and the importance of contacts with the PLO. He called on the United States in particular to appreciate the role of the organization and to contact it with regard to resolving the Palestinian issue.

CSO: 4404/110

NEW RULES RECOMMENDED CONCERNING GOVERNMENT-SUBSIDIZED STUDENTS ABROAD

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 10 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Hamad al-'Askari: "Fahd Agrees to the Decisions Made by the Committee for Government-Subsidized Students Abroad: Standardization of Stipend Payments in Saudi Riyals In Order to Bring About Equality"]

[Text] Payment of 50,000 Riyals to Each University Graduate Who Works for the Government. The Annual Total in Allowances Is 11,700 Riyals for Students in the First Category, and 9,200 Riyals for the Second Category.

Study Concerning Opening Saudi Schools for the Children of Government-Subsidized Students Abroad, and Organization of Special Study Programs for Them After They Return.

The decision of the committee which was formed to study the situation of government-subsidized students abroad include consolidation of the agency in the education offices which supervises them. This however does not apply to military students who are engaging in military studeis and taking military courses. It was decided to restrict government-subsidized education abroad to graduate level education, excluding students who are below this level. It was also decided not to send any government-subsidized student abroad before he has worked for the government for 2 years, and that after such a 2-year period it should be the job of the educational attache to get him accepted into a university. Another of the decisions was one which provides for the standardization of salary payments to employees who are government-subsidized students abroad. It was decided that all such employees, in all government bodies, should receive half of their salaries.

These were among the recommendations of the committee which were approved by His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, heir to the throne and deputy prime minister. The committee issued these recommendations after holding several meetings uder the chairmanship of His Royal Highness Prince Sultan ibn'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation. The members of the committee included His Royla Highness Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, deputy commander of the National Guard; His Royal Highness Prince Salman ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Riyadh; His Royal Highness Prince Turki al-Faysal, chief of General Intelligence; his excellency the minister of higher education; and his excellency the minister of education.

The minutes of the committee meetings include the following recommendations:

1. Social and Administrative Problems

The committee feels that it is possible to attribute many of the problems, which are faced by government-subsidized students abroad, to the sudden changes in environment and culture which they encounter, and the committee feels that in order to put a halt to these problems it would be well to take the following steps:

A. Preparation of awareness programs by the office which deals with government-subsidized education abroad, together with experts from universities and the informational media. These awareness programs would be in the form of short courses which would give to the students going abroad some idea about the type of society which they will be going to in order to lessen the element of surprise which they might be subjected to.

B. Preparation of booklets and pamphlets which would help the students going abroad to learn about the social, economic, and legal situation of those countries in addition to some of the main issues which concern the lives of students there and which they can expect to be exposed to.

C. Students going abroad are attached to their homeland, always feel a link to it, and wish to keep up with events there and with the achievements which are taking place in their homeland. Because of this, it is necessary for the Ministry of Information to have each student abroad subscribe to a newspaper or magazine of his choice which would then be sent directly to his address via the press organizations.

D. As much as possible, one should benefit from the presence of official representatives [in the foreign countries] who meet with the students, examine their situation, and study their problems. This should be done in coordination with the education offices which, in turn, assume the task of making preparations for such meetings with the students.

In order that the students be carefully kept track of, it is necessary to fix the responsibility [for doing this job] by unifying the supervisory and stipend-paying agency in the Office for Government-Subsidized Education Abroad in the Ministry of Higher Education. This should apply to all government-subsidized students abroad with the exception of military people who are engaging in military studies and training. All government bodies which have government-subsidized students abroad should transfer the funds necessary for their students from their accounts to the account of the Ministry of Higher Education at the beginning of each fiscal year. Furthermore, the above-mentioned Office should keep these government bodies informed concerning their students abroad, and should do so in the form of periodic reports.

2. Principle of Government-Subsidized Education Abroad

In view of the fact that most of the problems of government-subsidized students abroad usually occur among younger students who have usually been sent to study at a level lower than that of graduate level education, and since universities in Saudi Arabia have the capability of providing all university courses, the committee recommends the following:

A. Restricting government-subsidized education abroad to graduate level education and not sending any students abroad to engage in studies below this level, whether the ones being sent are students or government employees.

B. Not sending any students abroad before they have worked for the government for at least 2 years. This condition should be adhered to except in exceptional cases. And in such exceptional cases the matter should be studied by the minister of higher education and the head of the Civil Service Bureau, and should require the approval of the Higher Commission.

C. Not sending any student abroad until the educational attache in the government body which will be sending him obtains admission for him to the university which he will be attending. Also, this university should be an acceptable university.

D. The universities, together with the government bodies which have the need, should make a study of this need and set up appropriate programs and courses of study which would make it unnecessary to send students abroad, particularly in the field of university studies.

3. Salaries, Stipend Payments, and Allowances

The committee also made a study of the salaries, stipend payments, and allowances which are being paid out to government-subsidized students abroad, and came to the following conclusion:

A. Salaries: A great many of the government-subsidized students abroad are basically government employees and receive their employees' salaries in addition to their stipends as students. The amount of the salaries paid out to these students at the present time differs from one government body to another. Some of the government bodies pay out the entire salary, whereas most of the government bodies pay only half of the salary. In view of this fact, and in order to adhere to the principle of equality, [all] government employees who are sent abroad to study should receive half of their salary.

B. The committee recommends that the stipend payments be established in terms of Saudi riyals in order to achieve equality in stipend payments without increasing them. This should be done in accordance with the following:

a. The countries which the students are sent to should be divided into two categories according to their economic situations. The first category should include the United States, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Japan, and China. The second category should include other Arab and Muslim countries as well as the other countries.

b. Stipends of students in countries in the first category should be set at 2,600 Saudi riyals, and the stipends of students in countries in the second category should be set at 1,600 Saudi riyals.

c. Students in countries in the first category should receive a one-time annual payment of 1,200 riyals for this purpose. These payments should be made only for the fixed period of government-subsidized study abroad and should not be paid for any period which exceeds this uniform established period of study.

d. Students in countries in the first category should receive a clothing allowance of 4,000 riyals, and students in countries in the second category should receive a clothing allowance of 2,000 riyals. These should be annual one-time payments, and they should not be paid out for any years in excess of the years which have been established for study abroad and which are the same for everyone.

e. For students in countries of both categories a sum of 3,000 riyals should be paid out to students in advanced applied studies as an allowance for buying scientific equipment and implements. This payment should be paid out one time for every stage of scientific education.

f. The sum of 3,000 riyals should be paid out one time for every stage of scientific education as an allowance for students of high theoretical studies to buy source materials.

g. Every student abroad should receive an annual payment of 3,000 riyals as an allowance for the typing of papers and reports.

h. An incentive payment should be made to each student for every academic semester which he studies. But the academic load which each student has should be 15 semester hours in universities which follow the two-semester system and 18 semester hours in universities which follow the three-semester system. This applies to the undergraduate level. As for the graduate level, the student must take at least 12 semester hours in universities which follow two-semester system and 15 semester hours in universities which follow the three-semester system.

i. The stipend payments should be paid out at the rate of full salary for students who have achieved a grade [average] of 4 points our of a possible 4, and should be paid out at a rate of half salary to students who have achieved a grade [average] of 3 points out of a possible 4. This should apply to the undergraduate level. Stipend payments should be paid out at the rate of full salary to graduate-level students who have shown their excellence by achieving a grade [average] of 3.5 points out of a possible 4. Incentive payments should be paid out to students who have not changed their field of specialization and whose university is one which is of a high level and which has been recommended by the Saudi education offices and universities

j. Bachelor students should receive 4,00 riyals and married students, whose wives live with them, should receive 8,000 riyals every year as an allowance for medical expenses, and the Saudi government should assume the expenses of any surgical operations.

k. Married students whose wives live with them should receive a monthly payment equal to 50 percent of their stipends. This should be paid out as long as their wives live with them in the countries where they are studying. Furthermore, a sum of money equivalent to 25 percent [of their stipend payments] should be paid out for each child of theirs living with them. However, the total of such payments should not exceed 50 percent of their stipend payments.

4. These rules should, without exception, apply to all government ministries and departments and public establishments. They should supersede all previous decisions or orders which conflict with them.

5. The committee feels that all government-subsidized students abroad should enjoy the benefits of this fiscal system. But students who have already started their study programs should not be affected. They should continue to receive their money in accordance with the benefits of systems of payment which precede any decisions taken on the basis of these recommendations in addition to the benefits of this system.

6. General Recommendations

Students abroad encounter difficulties when faced with the problem of educating their children in accordance with the educational programs followed in Saudi Arabia. There are no schools abroad which follow curricula similar to those in Saudi Arabia, and this forces the students to either leave their children behind or to tutor them. In order to solve this problem the committee recommends the following:

A. The Ministry of Education and General Superintendency for the Education of Girls, in conjunction with the education offices, should be entrusted with the task of preparing studies which would result in an integrated plan to open schools for both the children of government-subsidized students abroad and the children of Saudi officials and those who are members of families of Muslim and Arab communities abroad.

B. The Ministry of Education and General Superintendency for the Education of Girls should undertake to create special educational programs for the children of government-subsidized students who have been abroad and who are returning. The task of such educational programs would be to qualify them for, and facilitate their reentry into, the normal educational program.

C. Most government-subsidized students abroad face the problem of finding housing when they have graduated. However, this problem is not solely one encountered by these students who have been abroad. It is also encountered to the same degree by those who have studied in universities in Saudi Arabia. As a means of solving this problem, some government agencies give housing or housing allowances to those who work for them. In view of this problem, the committee recommends that a sum of 50,000 riyals be paid to each graduate who becomes part of the government work force, on the condition that he was a regular full-time student and not just a part-time student.

D. The Civil Service Bureau should be entrusted with the task of making a study of the principle of having the government subsidize students who study at universities inside Saudi Arabia, especially when they are students who are pursuing graduate studies.

9486
CSO: 4304/143

TASK, OBJECTIVE OF INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSED

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 24, 9 Oct 81 p 18

[Article by Habib Rahaman: "Keeping Pace With Administrative Needs"]

[Text]

AMONG THE MANY institutions set up by Saudi Arabia to lift performances in government offices, the Institute of Public Administration is doing a pioneer service. Training and retraining public servants are a continuing process to meet the challenges of industrial and technological advancements, on the one hand, and on the other, to keep pace with the progress made in social, behavioral and administrative research.

Muhammad Al Ateiq, acting director of the institute, Jeddah branch, defined a multitude of functions for the institute. One is to set up and execute educational and training programs for civil servants; a second, to conduct research in cooperation with government authorities; a third, to collect, classify and catalogue government administrative documents of the Kingdom. The institute's main office is in Riyadh and has a branch in Dammam.

The acting director also cited: holding conferences on development administration to be attended by top-level civil servants; calling for Arab regional and international conferences in the Kingdom and participating in similar conferences abroad; publishing research data and exchanging such within the Kingdom and with Arab and other countries. Also important is encouraging scientific administrative research by offering leave time and remuneration; offering educational and training scholarships in various fields of administrative affairs; and accepting training from Arab countries as well as benefiting from technical and material assistance offered by international agencies and private institutions.

The institute, an autonomous body of the government, was constituted through a royal degree in 1961. Its affairs are managed by a board of directors constituting the minister of finance and national economy as its president, the deputy minister of education, the vice rector of the University of Riyadh, the vice president of the Civil Service Bureau, and the director general of the institute. The noteworthy factor of the institute is that it does not charge any fees from the trainees, and its financial obligations are met through the grants of the government

Muhammad Al Ateiq said the institute has nine main departments, through which it imparts the required training. The department of in-service training is responsible for designing, organizing and executing training programs for different government employees who have already put in at least one year of service with the government and are exposed empirically to the problems of management. Programs have been held in the following areas: management, operations and management, personnel administration, financial

administration, planning and development, statistics, school administration, higher secretaryship, material administration, office work, typing (Arabic and English), and computers.

The department of pre-service training was created after the institute found that completely "ready trained and ready to work" persons cannot be generally found to fill vacant posts. Under this scheme, specialized education in various administrative and allied field is given to meet the manpower requirements of the government in the coming years. For these programs, fresh graduates are taken from high schools and universities, depending upon the level of future responsibilities of the trainees, for the training in various programs according to the interest and aptitude of the employees. Studies in legal affairs, finance, administration, customs, statistics, hospital administration, and citizenship all have been undertaken. A computer training program has also been added this year. The department of executive development organizes programs for top-level officers of the government. The objective of the program is to keep them abreast of the latest developments in their fields. Under the department of special programs, training for various governmental agencies whose needs are not met through the other programs is organized. Sometimes, the training needs are typical of an agency or a group of agencies warranting an exclusive special training.

The aim of the English language department is to develop in the selected government employees a degree of proficiency in English through an intensive or semi-intensive programs, so trainees are able to perform their professional duties more efficiently and more effectively. The department of library and documentation collects books, periodicals, pamphlets, and all kinds of reports. Files of all newspapers and magazines published in Saudi Arabia are maintained. There is a special section for educational films. Microfilms of selected newspaper and periodicals are also available. The reference section of the library has the latest editions of encyclopedias, bibliographies, indices, almanacs, and atlases. Presently, the library holds over 50,000 volumes,mostly in Arabic and English, and receives more than 300 journals and periodicals. It also publishes a quarterly bulletin. Al Ateiq said that the department of consultations helps public agencies in solving their administrative, organizational and procedural problems. It conducts studies on specific problems and gives its recommendations. So far, it has conducted more than 300 studies.

Research is undertaken by its own department, too. It also cooperates with the concerned officials in the government agencies in directing and supervising their studies. Al Ateiq said that the institute's educational technology center produces and maintains audiovisual materials such as motion picture films, videotapes, slides and slide tapes, and other media which help promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the training. It also maintains a well-equipped auditorium and conference halls with facilities for simultaneous translations. The secretariat for administrative reforms' main function is to coordinate the work relating to the High Committee for Administrative Reforms and the Staff Committee for Administrative Reforms. It prepares agendas and drafts the minutes of meetings of the two committees.

CSO: 4400/46

RESULTS OF SURVEY MADE AMONG FEMALE LITERACY STUDENTS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Aug 81 Supplement p 9

[Article by Susan Mustafa: "The Effect of Anti-Illiteracy Programs on the Saudi Home"]

> [Text] The Anti-Illiteracy Campaign Is Moving in Two Directions: Expansion of Elementary Education, and Concentration on Adult Education. How Do Women and Mothers Utilize Their Education in Their Dealings With Others?

What do 200 illiterate women have to say about the effect which the elimination of illiteracy has had on both their private and public lives?

Have they changed their ways of dealing with their husbands, children, and neighbors? What changes have taken place in their homes and in their management of the household in accordance with available resources? What means have they followed to solve both their general and personal problems? Have they changed their ways of utilizing their spare time?

The answers to these questions are given in a scientific study which was done concerning the effect which the elimination of illiteracy has had on Saudi women in both their private and public lives. The research study was carried out by the [female] students of the Higher Institute of Social Service in Riyadh.

Scope of the Problem

Statistical estimates tell us that the rate of illiteracy in Saudi Arabia is between 70 and 75 percent, and that it is more widespread among older men, women, people in rural areas, and among the Bedouins who constantly migrate from place to place. In keeping with the overall advancement which is taking place in all areas of the country and which requires that human resources be appropriately trained in order to take over the reins of this movement of progress, legislation was enacted concerning the elimination of illiteracy and concerning adult education in Saudi Arabia on 9 Jumada II 1932 A.J., and a time-frame of not more than 20 years was set for the elimination of illiteracy and ridding the country of its effects. In order to arrive at an integral statistical picture concerning the efforts which have been made during the last 5 years to educate women and concerning the effect which this has had on their lives, the researchers undertook a comparative investigative study involving both literate and illiterate women.

A Campaign in Two Directions

During the last 10 years, from 1385 A.H. to 1935 A.H. [as published], the campaign to eliminate illiteracy in Saudi Arabia has been moving in two directions. The first direction has been that of increasing facilities for elementary education in order to uproot illiteracy among the very young, and the second direction has been that of concentrated efforts made to bring literacy to adults. In addition to the Ministry of Education, [other bodies participating in the anti-illiteracy campaign have been] the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Public Security Policy Directorate, the General Superintendency for the Education of Girls, and national organizations.

During this period the number of adult education centers rose from 393 to 1,425. Also, the number of literacy students increased three-fold during this period, reaching a total of approximately 100,000 men and women.

The adult education system consists of a stage lasting 16 months during which time illiteracy is eliminated, followed by another stage of equal length which is devoted to further education. When a literacy student completes the first stage of elimination of illiteracy, his reading level is equal to that of a fourth-grade elementary school pupil.

Elimination of Illiteracy Among Women in Saudi Arabia

The 20-year plan for elimination of illiteracy contains three stages, which are: preparation, trial testing, and complete implementation--which means eliminating all remaining pockets of illiteracy.

The General Superintendency for the Education of Girls began by opening five schools for the elimination of illiteracy in the year 1392-93 A.H. Then the number of these schools gradually increased until, 3 years later, every town or village covered by the plan had one or more schoos for the elimination of illiteracy. In the third year of the program, the total number of these schools went up to 322, and the number of literacy classes was about three times as large as the number of such classes during the previous 2 years. One result of this was a tremendous increase in the number of female literacy students.

It should be noted here that the efforts made to eliminate illiteracy have not been restricted to quantity, but have also been directed toward qualitative development. Efforts are constantly being made to improve the anti-illiteracy programs as far as the courses, planning, and school books are concerned, so that the programs are appropriate for women, respond to the needs of their daily lives, and incorporate the possibility of these women to make a conscious contribution toward the development of society. There are also programs which are being prepared for educating women in matters regarding motherhood, children, the family, principles of sanitation, and household management. Since the Superintendency realizes the importance of eliminating illiteracy among women, it participates in all conferences [dealing with this matter] which are held. It has participated in both the international UNESCO conferences and the Arab UNESCO conferences.

Development of the Courses

When the literacy schools for women were opened, they had no special course. They proceeded in accordance with the literacy and adult education course which the Ministry of Education had set up--and which was basically set up for male literacy students. But then in 1397 A.H. a special course for women was set up in order to enable them to educate the young. In other words, courses were developed which were appropriate for women's mission in life and for their own particular cultural realms.

The Second Five-Year Plan

When the second five-year plan began, it contained particular objectives with regard to the elimination of illiteracy. These objectives indluded the following:

1. Increasing the number of anti-illiteracy centers in order to include, as students, the largest possible number of illiterate women. At the end of the second five-year plan, there were 1,312 literacy schools.

2. Increasing the number of literacy classes. By the end of the second five-year plan the number of such classes went up from 963 to 13,125.

3. Decreasing the number of students in each class so that there would be no more than 30 students in each one.

4. Providing educational opportunities for eliminating illiteracy in rural areas.

5. Increasing the total number of [female] literacy students. At the end of the second five-year plan the number of such students totalled 393,751.

6. Increasing the number of newly-recruited [female] students.

7. Striving to choose a particular type of [female] teacher to work in the anti-illiteracy program. This was to be achieved by training such teachers in educational methods appropriate for the type of students they would have.

8. Providing the necessary academic requirements to complete the educational process.

9. Use of various types of informational media in these centers. Here we should point out that the anti-illiteracy centers have also opened their doors to women who are not Saudis. At the end of the second five-year plan, the number of [non-Saudi] Arab female students was more than 2,500, and the number of [non-Arab] foreign female students was nearly 1,500.

Integration of Efforts

In addition to what has already been mentioned, the Ministry of Social Affairs has opened literacy classes for women in its Centers of Development and Social Service. These classes use the courses set up by the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry provides them with the necessary technical assistance.

There are also private national associations for the teaching and education of women, and these associations are found in Saudi Arabia's large cities. Of course, these efforts hav also resulted in a large increase in the number of female literacy students.

The Field Study

With this as a theoretical scientific background for the research topic, the scholars began the second part of their undertaking, which was the field study. The study was conducted with a sample population of 200 female students in the anti-illiteracy schools run by the General Superintendency for the Education of Girls. Also, another comparable sample population of 50 illiterate women was chosen. This was done in order to discover the effect which the elimination of illiteracy had had on both their public and private lives, and to find out if there was any difference between what educated women and illiterate women do in their daily lives.

Surprising Results

By comparing the results of the social status of both the literacy students and the illiterate women, surprising results were arrived at, and they were different from what the researchers had expected. In fact, they were precisely the opposite of what they had expected. They found out the following:

1. Size of the family: The female literacy students live in an extended family which includes grandparents, children, husbands and wives, and the children of those of the men who are married, together with their wives. But we find that the illiterate women live in families which include only husbands and children. It was found that women in extended families saw the children going through the various stages of education and that this was an incentive for them to become educated.

2. Educational status: The percentage of illiterate people in the families of the female literacy students was not more than 15 percent, whereas this percentage in the families of illiterate women was 64 percent. This confirms the previous result arrived at.

3. Children: The literacy students have no children younger than 10 years of age. The illiterate women, though, have children who are not old enough to go to school and who therefore take up their time, not giving them a chance to take advantage of opportunities for education.

4. Husbands: The husbands of the literacy students are usually merchants and men who engage in the free professions, and their work requires them to be gone from home for long periods of time. The number of working hours which these husbands spend away from home varies from 6 to 9 hours, and this gives their wives an opportunity to study. But in the case of the husbands of the illiterate women, their working hours total no more than 7 hours.

Comparative Study

Then the researchers compared the answers of the literacy students with those of the illiterate women in five particular realms in order to find out what the effect of education has been on their private and public lives.

Household Development

Concerning household development, the researchers found that 40.5 percent of the literacy students had moved to better living areas, 91 percent of them had changed their household furniture, and 44 percent of them were unhappy with their housing and were thinking about moving to another place. Sometimes they mentioned that the reason for this was that the living conditions were not sanitary. What this means is that they had acquired particular standards for their homes and wanted to put them into practice. In addition to this, it was found that literacy students utilized their resources in a more progressive fashion. They allocate a monthly sum for the renovation of household supplies and goods, and they save part of the income in the form of jewelry. Although this means freezing a part of the household income, through education they can learn to switch over from doing this to investing their financial surplus.

On the other hand, none of the illiterate women had changed their place of residence, although 36 percent of the illiterate women in the sample population had renovated their household furniture. Although one-third of those in the sample population complained about cramped living quarters or high rents, none of them had found a way to solve these problems. In addition to this, it was found that they spend all of their family income on food, clothing, education, and entertaining guests--and on this latter activity they spend large sums of money.

Manner of Dealing With Others

The study showed that the literacy students had eight different ways in which they felt they had to interact with their husbands, and that they had learned about these ways from five sources. The illiterate women, though, knew only two ways of doing their marital duties, and had learned them from three sources.

As for dealing with the children, the study showed that there were seven areas involving child care and five methods of accomplishing this child care. This was the result of the answers given by the literacy students. But the illiterate women said that they were involved in only four areas of child care and that this was accomplished by three methods. They did not feel that it was necessary to supervise their children when they played, and they did not know the benefit of taking the children for a walk in the fresh air.

The results also showed a difference when it came to dealing with neighbors. The literacy students said that they had five different ways of trying to be a good neighbor, and that they had learned these things from five different sources. The illiterate women, on the other hand, knew of only three such methods and had learned them from only two sources.

Application of Religious Knowledge

In spite of the religious atmosphere which is especially prevalent in Saudi society, it was shown that education had its effect in increasing and intensifying knowledge of religion. This was clearly shown by the percentages of the sources from which the women in the two sample groups acquired their information when interacting with their husbands, children, and neighbors. It turned out that 25 percent of the illiterate woemn acquired their information from their knowledge of religion, whereas this percentage among the literacy students was 48 percent. As for knowledge

about religious observances and teachings, the literacy students had much more knowledge concerning these matters. Their knowledge was measured at 92 percent, whereas this knowledge among the illiterate women was only 49 percent.

Use of Spare Time

The literacy students knew the value of taking walks with the children and the effect that such walks had on integration of the family and on promoting mutual understanding between the generations and bringing them closer. This is something that not even one of the illiterate women knew. They also had learned how to organize their spare time every day so that it would be divided between the household, caring for the children, and educating and furthering [themselves].

Scientific Approach

It was also shown that learning gave the literacy students educational awareness concerning how to solve their problems in all realms, and that they resort to a scientific approach when doing so. And the more educated the person was, the less that person resorted to a non-scientific approach.

For Educated Women Only

The researchers directed a number of particular questions to the educated women alone in order to find out what problems they encountered of an educational, economic, and social nature, and how they were able to deal with and solve these problems. Concerning educational problems, the respondents confirmed that there were five of them, namely: lack of ability to learn, fear of or embarrassment about making mistakes, lack of time, how the teachers dealt with them, and inappropriate study topics. They also mentioned ten reasons for failing in their school work, including: neglect, laziness, lack of concentration, not being able to study full-time, and a poor memory. They suggested seven ways of dealing with these problems, including: paying more attention, organizing one's time, going to school longer, and the use of more audio-visual aids.

What this shows is that they were able to identify the reasons and were able to suggest solutions.

As for economic problems, those who had acquired education were able to switch from one job to another which paid more and was less strenuous. Also, some of them had been able to acquire a new type of job. In both cases they strove to earn more money and to balance the household budget in a more comprehensive fashion. As for social problems, 22 percent of the respondents said that they faced the problem of the husband having a previous wife. Four-fifths of this 22 percent were able to keep their husbands, and their husbands did not marry again after marrying them. In the case of the illiterate women, 20 percent of them married husbands who had previous wives. However, only half of the women in this 20 percent were able to keep their husbands.

Clear Effect of Education

1. Improving their household situation as well as their income situation, either by budgeting the money for spending and saving or by increasing the income through getting a job or by changing from one job to another.

2. Finding numerous ways of exercising their duties as a spouse, and the same was true with regard to care of the children.

3. Increasing their knowledge of their religion and applying this knowledge well since they understood the importance of it.

4. Learning the value of time and how to make use of it by organizing their spare time and utilizing it in different realms.

5. The use, by a large percentage of the literacy students, of a scientific approach toward solving their problems.

Important Recommendations

As a conclusion to the scientific results which the researchers arrived at, they presented a number of important recommendations which we should take up. They included the following: The concept of eliminating illiteracy traditionally relies on teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic to illiterate adults. In this sense, it is an educational process more than it is a social process since the elimination of illiteracy leads to the opening of broader horizons of knowledge to an individual. However, it would be better to expand the objectives and programs of this approach of teaching adults so that it would include the following:

The social aspect: The anit-illiteracy programs should try to educate their [female] students so that they will be enlightened and able to keep pace with the modern development within whose framework society is moving toward a better life.

The intellectual and psychological aspect: This aspect grants these students the opportunity to develop and grow within their society. Perhaps these students are unable to benefit from modern changes because they are unable to understand them in an enlightened manner.

Therefore, the anit-illiteracy programs should be oriented toward having their students acquire new intellectual skills, values, and directions which complement their personalities. They should provide them with new means of fulfilling their lives, should enable them to better understand life, and should enable them to continually utilize what they have learned from their self-development and from the development of their society. They should become able to make sound judgments concerning the events in their lives and should be able to participate, in a positive and effective way, in the solving of the social problems which confront them.

Being Part of a Group

Elimination of illiteracy is traditionally done by means of a particular school book. But in the opinion of the literacy students, it would be better if the program, for its educational material and in order to move toward achieving its objectives, would rely on the long experience which the literacy students have had in their own lives. The programs should use this experience as a basis for their teaching. This should be done so that such adult education will fulfill the needs of the individual students and satisfy their aspirations for a better life--and at the same time develop their knowledge so that it can keep pace with modern changes.

The Importance of Further Study

The researchers emphasize the necessity of keeping track of those students who fail to attend class, of helping them to solve the problems which prevent them from pursuing their sutdies, and of enabling them to maintain the level of knowledge which they have achieved. This requires that the class hours be well chosen after ascertaining the preferences of the students who will be taking part in the literacy courses, and this should be done before the classes begin. This also requires being fully aware of the objectives of the program of study and linking the program to the everyday needs of the students. This should be done because adult education should always be based on a realistic premise which impels the student to assess her current status and to see what benefit will be gained from the educational experience in terms of improving her status. It is also necessary to have the successful graduates continue their studies, and this should be done by opening the doors of evening classes to them in all of the other educational and vocational levels. For example, they should be able to take classes in order to become lab assistants and nurses. All of this should be done in order to prevent them from once again reverting to their former status of being illiterates.

Using Informational Media

Efforts should be made to utilize informational media in awareness campaigns concerning the elimination of illiteracy. At the same time, careful selection should be made of successful programs and methods which are appropriate for the person requesting the informational media, and this should be done by means of indirect notification.

Methods of Learning

A student needs correct orientation and needs to be trained how to listen to and follow the lessons. She also needs to have the freedom to express her ideas and feelings and to engage in discussion without any feeling of fear or embarrassment. The students should also get acquainted with and get used to each other. Likewise they should participate in the teaching process. And they should work toward mastering the course. In addition to all of this, the students' general social motives should be linked to their own particular motives, and if this takes place then the school can thereby help them to formulate their own motives for learning.

Previous and Future Research Studies

At the end of their research study, the scholars were careful to mention previous studies that had been made. One such study was a field study concerning the degree to which literacy students had benefited from anti-illiteracy programs in the year 1397 A.H. This study was conducted by a group of students from the Institute, and their sample population consisted of 90 literacy students. They were asked the following questions: Why are you taking the course? Do you intend to continue with it? Do you study diligently for the course? What is your opinion about what you are studying and about how useful the course is? What is your opinion about the teaching method of the course? What are the greatest difficulties that you are facing? What are your suggestions concerning this?

The respondents answered that they were taking the course because they personally wanted to, and they wished to continue with it. They answered that they had

benefited from the courses that were being taught, and they agreed that there were several difficulties which they faced, mainly the difficulty of the courses. They said that they did not have enough time to study, and that too much study was required each day.

Concerning future research studies, the literacy students suggested the possibility of using this study as an aid when conducting other research studies that would be more comprehensive and would include sample populations from among literacy students in classes in cities, rural areas, and desert areas in all regions of the country. On the basis of such studies one could gain an overall picture which would be helpful in the planning of literacy courses for women.

9468
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PLANS FOR NEW RAILROAD LINE REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 3

[Article: "A Railroad Line Connecting Mecca with Medina Is in the Fourth Five-Year Plan; the Riyadh Customs Station Is Ready to Unload 2,000 Containers a Month; the Fixing of Fees for Transporting Containers from al-Dammam to Riyadh"]

[Text] Al-Ta'if, Saudi News Agency--Yesterday there was a meeting of the board of directors of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization, chaired by His Excellency Dr Ghazi al-Qusaybi, minister of industry and electricity and deputy minister of communications. Those present at the meeting were the members of the board of directors.

After the meeting, Shaykh Faysal al-Shahil, the director-general of the Organization, told the press that the broad discussed the subject of setting rates for the transport of containers from the port of al-Dammam to the customs station in Riyadh. He said that the purpose of this discussion was to determine some of the fees and rates connected with this activity. He said that the board made sure that these fees and rates would be reasonable so that they would not be a burden to consumers and, at the same time, would not be competitive with those charged by truckers. He said that the board approved what was submitted to it concerning this matter. Shaykh al-Shahil indicated that there were companies which had gotten in touch with the Government Railroad Organization concerning the use of railroad cars to transport dry cement from al-Dammam to Riyadh, and that particular rates had been approved for transporting these materials. He also indicated that the board had approved the Organization's budget for the year 1402-03 A.H. He added that the board had approved the promotion of some of the Organization's employees and that it had granted the Organization's director-general some emergency powers.

Concerning a question dealing with the possibility of having a railroad line connecting Riyadh with the Hijaz, al-Shahil said that the third five-year plan included a comprehensive study of the railroad lines in all of the regions of Saudi Arabia as well as a study of their economic feasibility and which priority was to be given to which line or to which area, depending on the results of the study. As for linking Saudi Arabia by rail with some of its neighboring Arab countries, he said that this subject was currently under study.

He pointed out that the government of Kuwait had suggested the construction of a railroad line which would connect it with Saudi Arabia. He said: "We suggested to our fellow-Arabs in Kuwait that the plan be postponed until Kuwait is linked [by rail]

with Iraq so that there would be greater benefit in having a railroad line between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. [The possibility of constructing] this railroad line is currently under study." The director-general of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization denied that the customs station in Riyadh was suffering from any congestion. He said: "So far we have not felt any pressure, but there is an increasing amount of activity. The first month that the station was open it unloaded 150 containers, and the third month after it was opened this figure totaled 980 containers." He assured us that the station was prepared to unload approximately 2,000 containers per month. "If we see that there is too much pressure on the station, then we will construct new railroad lines since we are prepared to do this in terms of what we have in the way of financial allocations, equipment, and job slots."

Concerning the railroad line which would connect the holy places of pilgrimage with each other, al-Shahil said that this subject had already been discussed in the first two meeting organized by the Ministry of Planning in Riyadh and in Jiddah. He pointed out that the two meetings had approved a working paper which had been submitted by the Saudi Government Railroad Organization. This working paper had stated that the construction of railroad lines should not be restricted to the holy places of pilgrimage and Jiddah, but should connect all of the holy pilgrimage places, including Medina. In addition to this, the working paper also said that there should be transportation of goods along with a customs station, [meaning that] the goods should be shipped from Jiddag and processed by customs in Mecca as is done in the station which is in Riyadh. It is expected that this railroad line will be built during the fourth five-year plan. He expressed his satisfaction concerning the level of efficiency and expertise in their jobs which Saudi personnel working in the Railroad Organization have achieved. He pointed out that the Railroad Organziation had established a vocational training center in order to create a new generation [of employees] who would have the skills necessary to do jobs connected wiht the railroad system. Concerning the importation of new trains, the director-general of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization said that many of the air-conditioned trains had been renovated and that they were faster than the old trains. He also said that modern methods of microfilming had been introduced into the work of the Organization, and that the Organization intended to introduce the use of computers--in cooperation with the University of Petroleum and Minerals.

9468
CSO: 4304/143

FIVE PORTS HANDLE INCREASING IMPORTS

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 24, 9 Oct 81 pp 15-17

[Article by Ahmad Kamal Khusro: "Five Ports Handle SR 100bn in Imports"]

[Text] IMPORTS NOW valued at more than SR100 billion a year and vital to the Kingdom's development, continue to flow into Saudi ports. Dr. Fayez I. Badr, chairman of the Saudi Ports Authority (SPA) said in 1976 SPA's five major ports handled about 10 million tons of cargo. In 1980 the figure rose to 28.8 million tons, a remarkable increase of 188 per cent.

The chairman, reviewing progress of the ports during the last year, said the allocation for seaports in the Third Development Plan is almost SR24 billion and is a testimony to "the success which has been achieved in the four years since the creation of the Ports Authority in September 1976."

He pointed out the authority has been able to introduce modern management techniques, large-scale investments in basic berth capacity and sophisticated cargo-handling equipment. "Significant milestones passed during the year include the publication of unified and consolidated rules for the ports, the preparation of unified tariffs and greatly improved safety measures for personnel and cargo," said Badr. "In the future, the completion of the hydrographic survey of the Kingdom's Red Sea Coast and the provision of ship repair yards at Jeddah and Dammam will be of immeasurable value to those who navigate in the Red Sea."

Badr cited the increasing role of ports, noting "ports will become our new pipelines carrying raw materials and manufactured goods to and from the Kingdom. The Kingdom's commitment to free trade combined with its ever increasing import requirements mean that in the next five years we expect at least a further 50 per cent increase in cargo passing through the ports."

In its annual report for 1980, SPA said that compared with 1979, the total volume of cargo discharged rose by more than 3 million tons to 27.5 million tons, an increase of 13 per cent. There was a noted improvement in the performance of the ports of Jubail, Jizan and Yanbu, whose development as modern ports started only recently. Cargo discharge at Jubail increased by 58 per cent from just under 1 million tons in 1979 to over 1.5 million tons last year. Jizan port and Yanbu Commercial Port discharged 1.5 million and 1.3 million tons respectively, increases of 42 per cent and 24 per cent over 1979. The Kingdom's largest port, Jeddah Islamic Port maintained its pre-eminent position. About 14 million tons of cargo, representing 51 per cent of the Kingdom's seaborne imports came through this port, an increase of 11 per cent from last year. At King Abdul Aziz Port, Dammam, discharge increased by 5 per cent to 9.2 million tons.

Reflecting the Kingdom's continuing development plans, construction materials formed the major part of seaborne imports, amounting to 17 million tons,

an increase of 13 per cent over 1979. Within this group of commodities, imports of bulk cement rose by 43 per cent to 9.2 million tons. The much less efficient import of bagged cement declined by 52 per cent to 1.5 million tons, showing the market's support of the SPA's decision to provide efficient and cost-saving specialist bulk cement facilities.

Foodstuff imports during last year rose by more than 12 per cent to 5.9 million tons. Imports through Jeddah port alone amounted to 4.4 million tons, representing an increase of 21 per cent over last year. The number of livestock handled at Jeddah rose by 19 per cent to nearly 3 million head, and the port maintained its position as the world's largest livestock handling port.

The trend toward containerization of exports to the Kingdom continued steadily during last year, the report said. Nearly 820,000 TEUs were handled compared with 714,000 TEUs in 1979, showing an increase of 15 per cent. This increase helped both Jeddah and Dammam ports to enhance their position among the 50 most important container ports of the world.

Since this trend toward containerization is to gather speed in the coming years, the Ports Authority is providing better facilities to handle container cargo. About 35 per cent of all general cargo arriving in Jeddah is now containerized. To keep pace with rapidly changing patterns of cargo structure, container freight stations are being developed in Dammam and Jeddah. These stations will start operation in 1982, reducing the proportion of bulk cargo and raising productivity still further.

Refrigerated cargo represented nearly 15 per cent of all food imports in 1979 and 1980, the discharge itself being affected by the lack of cold stores in the Jeddah area. In view of the climate conditions and the importance of this cargo, berths 13 and 14 are being developed as a multipurpose food and fruit terminal. Vessels carrying chilled cargo generally will be allocated there. This new terminal, scheduled for completion in 1983, will have fully computerized discharge and delivery procedures.

According to the report, plans are ready for a livestock terminal which will facilitate more efficient discharge, care and delivery of animals. A new multipurpose terminal will be built in the northwest area of the port. The new berths at this terminal will provide productive facilities for dealing with timber, steel and vehicles. Another passenger terminal will be developed in the northwest area to provide improved services to pilgrims.

During 1980 six new berths have been brought into operation, increasing the number of berths available from 37 to 43. Other construction to date includes a 1.5-km causeway and the formation of a 11-hectare island. The steel skeleton of the 12,000-sq.-meter workshop and storage facility is largely completed, as is work on main buildings.

Installation of overhead cranes will start shortly. Construction of mooring dolphins in depths of up to 30 meters has begun. All work continues without any disruption in the Jeddah port's normal operations. The shipyard's two floating docks with lifting capacities of 16,000 and 11,000 tons will be capable of accommodating vessels of 45,000 and 16,000 deadweight tons respectively and will provide much needed facilities for all vessels using the Red Sea.

CSO: 4400/46

BRIEFS

NEW SCHOOLS IN WESTERN PROVINCE--Al-Ta'if, Saudi News Agency--At the present time the Department of Education in the Western Province is preparing to open 43 new schools, of various educational levels, in the Western Province for the new school year of 1401-02 A.H. This was announced by Dr 'Abdallah Muhammad al-Zayd, director-general of education in Western Province. He indicated that these schools include the following: 3 secondary schools in Jiddah and environs; 7 secondary schools in villages of the city of al-Ta'if, which are: Tur'ah Thagif, Huda, Sawa Bani Harith, Busal, al-Sayl al-Kabir, Qaya Bani Harith, and ('Mba Shibh); 3 fully-constituted intermediate schools in Jiddah and environs; 1 intermediate school in Mecca; and 5 intermediate schools in villages of the city of al-Ta'if, of which 3 are in Bani Malik, 1 is in (Mishqfan), and 1 is in Jalil. Dr al-Zayd said that, of the new elementary schools in the Western Province, 10 will be in Mecca, 6 will be in Jiddah, and 8 will be in al-Ta'if. He affirmed that the Department of Education in the Western Province is continuing its work of providing furnishings for these schools and preparing them to be ready to receive their pupils at the beginning of the new school year. This is so that these schools will achieve their objective of receiving their new pupils at all educational levels in the cities and villages of the Western Province. [Text] [Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 23 Aug 81 p 2] 9468

AGREEMENT WITH U.S. OIL FIRMS--Riyadh, 9 Nov (SPA)--The governor of the General Establishment of Petroleum and Minerals (PETROMIN), Dr Abdalhaid Tahir, signed today with both Chevron and Texaco international companies, the final agreement for the construction of a lubrication oils refinery at al-Jubayil, in partnership with the two mentioned companies. The cost of the project is nearly $1 billion. The refinery will produce 12,000 barrels per day, and this refinery will actively contribute to the comprehensive plans for the development of the oil industry in the kingdom. [Text] [LD091657 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1440 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/110

BRIEFS

TUNISIAN AMBASSADOR--Khartoum, [no day] Nov (SUNA)--President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri confirmed Sudan's endeavours to consolidate the bases of Arabs co-operation and the reject of differences for the solidification of solidarity. President Numayri who received today the credentials of the Tunisian ambassador to Khartoum said that the conformity in the two countries policies in the Arab and African spheres which were based on international pacts and the principles of noninterference in other countries' affairs meets with strong support. He said Sudan and Tunisia's loyalty to the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) constitutes a heavy task of bolstering Afro-Arab cooperation for the benefit of Arab and African nations. The Tunisian new ambassador ('Abd al-Hamid al-Shaykh) said in the reception ceremony that the two countries wise policies which reject extremism and nonplanning had helped in strengthening cooperation and understanding between leaders in Tunisia and Sudan in different issues of concern to Arab and African nations. This political orientation of the two countries had its positive impact in supporting Arab situation and its dimensions far from nonmeasured and non-rationalized reactions said (al-Shaykh) who confirmed President Habib Bourguiba's concern over the support of brotherhood and constructive co-operation between the two brother peoples. [Text] [JN071811 Khartoum SUNA in English 1750 GMT 7 Nov 81]

MESSAGE FROM NUMAYRI--Khartoum, 15 Nov (SUNA)--Ahmed Bensouda, adviser to Moroccan King Hussan II, arrived in Khartoum last night with a message from his majesty to President Numayri. In a statement on arrival, Bensouda said that his visit comes within the framework of a tour of five Arab countries during which he will deliver messages from King Hassan II to the leaders of these countries. He added that he began his tour with Sudan in view of the personal relations he has with Sudanese officials. Referring to the forthcoming Arab summit in Fes, the Moroccan official said that the Rabat summit conference in 1974 was a decisive turning point which had placed the Palestinian cause on a clear course and that the Fes summit conference would be a decisive factor bringing the Palestinian cause closer to a solution. For this reason, the Moroccan king has sent messages to Arab leaders to attend the summit to become acquainted with each other's viewpoints, from which a working paper may be created. The Moroccan official's tour also includes Somalia, Djibouti, the YAR and the PDRY. [Text] [JN151130 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1030 GMT 15 Nov 81]

MESSAGE FROM MITTERRAND--Khartoum, 7 Nov (SUNA)--President Numayri today received an oral message from French President Francois Mitterrand on bilateral relations, means of further promoting them and consultation on several issues, particularly African ones and the importance of exchanging viewpoints in order to serve coordination between the two countries. The message was conveyed to the president by Foreign Minister Muhammad Mirghani Mubarak, who returned from Paris last night after participating in the recent French-African summit conference. [Text] [JN071459 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1430 GMT 7 Nov 81]

ADDITIONAL SSU DUTIES--Khartoum, 9 Nov (SUNA)--President Numayri, chairman of the Sudanese Socialist Union [SSU], today issued a decree appointing Kamil Mahjub as the assistant secretary of the SSU presidential and organizational department, in addition to his duties as secretary of the SSU Organizational Committee. [Text] [JN091509 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1435 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/66

TUNIS/SOVIET COOPERATION

[Editorial Report] PM091521 Tunis L'ACTION in French 27-31 October and 1 November carries on pages 6, 4 and 4 respectively unattributed reports totalling 1,700 words on a visit to Tunisia by Serafim Ivanov, collegium member of the Soviet ministry of land reclamation and water resources. L'ACTION of 27 October reports a 26 October meeting between Ivanov and Tunisian Minister of Public Works Mohamd Sayah at which Ivanov reportedly expressed "his government's desire to extend and strengthen cooperation with Tunisia, particularly in the sphere of water resources, which is vital for agricultural development." The 30 October edition of L'ACTION reports on another meeting between Sayah and Ivanov on 29 October at which they reviewed past cooperation in the sphere of water resources and examined ways of extending it in the framework of Tunisia's sixth development plan. Ivanov reportedly expressed his government's desire for a "major program of cooperation for the future." The 1 November edition of L'ACTION reports a meeting on 31 October between Ivanov and Tunisian President Bourguiba, after which Ivanov issued a statement to the TAP Agency describing the meeting as "very useful and fruitful" and saying it "will contribute to extending the spheres of cooperation between Tunisia and the Soviet Union."

CSO: 4519/37

ARMS DEAL REVEALED

[Editorial Report] PM091410 Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Nov 81 p 10 unattributed report: "Tunisia Has Bought Three Missile-Launching Patrol Boats From France." Tunisia has bought from France three missile-launching patrol boats, building of which will begin next year at the Normandy naval shipyards at Cherbourg. This is revealed by the Flottes de Combat 1982 [1982 battle fleets] yearbook, which has just been published. With a displacement of 425 tons fully laden, these ships, capable of a speed of more than 36 knots (approximately 65 kph) thanks to four 15,000-horsepower diesel engines, will be equipped with eight MM-40 surface-to-surface missiles and three anti-aircraft guns of 76MM and 40MM. The MM-40 missile has a range of 60km. According to Flottes de Comate 1982 the contract between Tunisia and France was actually concluded in June 1981. It will be recalled that Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Defense Minister Charles Hernu visited Tunis, the former in July 1981, the latter in August 1981, to guarantee the continuity of Franco-Tunisian relations and France's aid in the modernization of the Tunisian armed forces' equipment.

CSO: 4519/37

PRESIDENT'S THANK-YOU CABLES TO SAUDI KING, PRINCE

JN082135 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Text] The brother leader Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic and commander in chief of the armed forces, sent the following cable to King Khalid upon leaving Riyadh Airport:

His Majesty Brother Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud, Riyadh. As the members of my delegation and I leave fraternal Saudi Arabia, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the great hospitality accorded us during our stay in the kingdom. I hope that our meetings and consultations will be repeated in interest of both fraternal countries and all Arab and Islamic issues.

While repeating my profound thanks and appreciation to your majesty all the brother officials, I wish your majesty continued good health and happiness and the fraternal Saudi people continued progress and prosperity under your faithful leadership.

[Signed] Your brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, YAR president and commander in chief of the armed forces.

President Salih also sent the following cable to Saudi Crown Prince Fahd:

His Royal Highness Brother Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, crown prince and first deputy premier, Riyadh. On my own behalf and on behalf of the members of my delegation, I would like to express our profound thanks and appreciation for the fraternal hospitality which you and all the brother officials accorded us during our stay to the kingdom. We pray to God Almighty to make all our meetings successful in the interest of both countries and the Arab and Islamic nations.

I wish your highness continued good health and happiness.

[Signed] Your brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, YAR president and commander in chief of the armed forces.

CSO: 4404/110 END

JPRS 79522

25 November 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2441

LIBYA: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DECRIED BY EXPATRIATE

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25 November 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2441

LIBYA: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DECRIED BY EXPATRIATE

London HUQUQ AL-INSAN WA AL-HURRIYAT AL-ASASIYAH FI DIKTATURIAT AL-QADHDHAFI ["Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in Qadhdhafi's Dictatorship"] in Arabic Jul 81 pp 3-37

[Report by Mahmud Nafi': "Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in al-Qadhdhafi's Dictatorship" with Foreword by Libyan National Grouping, 40 pages]

[Text] Foreword

The late Mahmud 'Abd-al-Salam Nafi' was planning to publish a book in three volumes on "Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in al-Qadhdhafi's Dictatorship." AL-JIHAD used to publish what he wrote on the subject in installments. This book includes these installments as well as other articles hitherto unpublished.

It is evident to every Libyan citizen and to everyone who has been observing al-Qadhdhafi's dictatorship that human rights violations in Libya ever since the late Mahmud Nafi' wrote these articles have increased and that basic freedoms are being increasingly repressed and stifled.

The physical elimination of Libyans living abroad has become a principle of al-Qadhdhafi's criminal conduct. The late Nafi' was one of its first victims. This principle of conduct was emphasized by al-Qadhdhafi himself in his speeches and statements. It was also confirmed at the third meeting of the revolutionary committees and firmly established at the fourth meeting of the revolutionary committees on 1-3 March 1981. Scores of Libyan citizens have become victims of this uncivilized, and offensive principle that al-Qadhdhafi and his henchmen put into practice.

We believe [in the Koranic verse which states] that "Say: 'Nothing will befall us except what Allah has ordained' "[al-Tawbah: 51]. And we believe [in the following Koranic verse]: "You must not think that those who were slain in the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive, and well provided for by their Lord" [Al 'Imran: 169]. Armed with these noble verses [of the Koran] we will defy all obstacles and overcome all difficulties. We will not be humiliated, and we will not grieve. When a believer goes to work, the rocks in the harshest of mountains will yield green plants.

Al-Qadhdhafi and his henchmen mastered their murderous practices and devised new methods for killing people. Their crimes actually became unique. They poisoned children by slipping poison in peanuts, as was the case with two Libyan children, a brother and a sister, in Portsmouth, England. The children were seven and eight years old, and their only crime was the fact that their father resided outside Libya. Then knives and daggers became the method of killing, and one stab to a victim was no longer sufficient. A victim had to be stabbed scores of times in a savage gang-style frenzy of murder and his body was mutilated. This affirms the brutality, the degeneracy and the nefariousness of the criminals and their leader, al-Qadhdhafi, who is neither deterred nor restrained by religion, conscience or morals.

The tyrant continued to master the methods of his crime and his malice which comprised even the remains of those who had died and those he had murdered abroad. He showed the deep resentment he harbored for them when he ordered that they not be buried in Libya. Bodies were returned from the airport. The bodies of those who had been buried in their country, Libya, were exhumed under orders from al-Qadhdhafi and thrown into the sea outside Libyan territorial waters in accordance with al-Qadhdhafi's conditions. His henchmen exhumed the bodies and threw them into the sea. This was done in front of television cameras, and the operation was shown on television as though it were a successful national liberation operation. Al-Qadhdhafi did not realize then that he had sunk to a new despicable low. Is there anything more uncivilized than such conduct? The tyrant reached the utmost in savagery and malice and thereby achieved a record in a new area of the shameful activities in which he is engaged.

Al-Qadhdhafi did not have the opportunity either to reject or to exhume the body of the late Nafi' who was buried in dignity by Libyans and Egyptians in hospitable Egypt, which we can only thank. We are grateful to Egypt, [the country] which acted in accordance wich its Arab and Islamic principles.

The Libyan National Grouping

> On 23 April 1980 the late Mahmud Nafi' wrote a eulogy for the late Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan who was murdered by the treacherous hand of al-Qadhdhafi in front of the London Mosque as he left it after the Friday prayer. This is the text of the eulogy.

The Late Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan

Friday, 11 April was a gloomy day. It was the day the Libyan Muslim, Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan, was assassinated in the courtyard of the mosque in London's Regent Park after the Muslims had concluded their prayers.

The murderers confessed immediately that they were al-Qadhdhafi's soldiers who had come to London specifically to kill a few Libyans. They acknowledged that the victim was one of those they had come to kill.

The series of physical eliminations inside the country and the assassinations that occurred abroad during the month of April will make the month of April known in the history of our country as execution month, ever since al-Qadhdhafi seized power by force in Libya. April will be known as the month of physical eliminations and nefarious assassinations.

Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan was a Muslim in the full sense of the word. He was a Muslim in his purity, in his loyalty and in his moral character. He was a Muslim in word and deed. His Islam was marked by the spirit of the age and by a sense of cultural openness.

Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan came from a well-known family in Tripoli, the ibn Ramadan family. His father went to Egypt when the country was ruled by Italians and returned to Libya in 1953. Muhammad was eight years old then. His father lived with his sister in the old city, and Muhammad attended Libyan schools and Tripoli Secondary School. He appeared to be very fond of Islamic studies, and he began to write during the third preparatory grade. He took an active part in writing newsletters, and he became a prominent announcer on Libyan radio. He left school to work full time as an announcer on Libyan radio. In 1965 he was summoned by Sadiq Khashkhushah, who was then director of investigations, and he was questioned about his activities. His services then became unsatisfactory, so he joined the British Broadcasting Corporation, the BBC, in London where he worked for 4 years. In 1970 his contract [with the BBC] expired, but he continued to work from abroad for the BBC as an announcer and a program host.

In 1971 he joined the University of Rabat in Morocco as a part-time student. He would travel to Rabat to take the examination, and [he continued to do that] until he received his degree in law.

Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan became interested in the 1969 coup in Libya, and the change gave him an incentive to visit the country. In 1970 he visited Libya for 1 week and returned to announce that military rule had begun in Libya and that a gruesome era was awaiting our people. He did not stop voicing this opinion.

Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan was not a fanatic man. He was rather confident of his ability to take part in a discussion or a dialogue and, therefore, he used to follow the news of the country on a daily basis and to meet and become acquainted with everyone. He even made the acquaintance of al-Qadhdhafi's cousin, Sayyid Qadhdhaf al-Damm when [the latter] was military attache in London. It was said then that Qadhdhaf al-Damm had delivered messages to al-Qadhdhafi and that tempting offers had arrived from al-Qadhdhafi to Ramadan. Among those offers were one to let Ramadan take over Libyan radio and another to let him take over the radio broadcast in Malta. However, Muhammad was careful not to let himself slide into serving the regime, for his mission [as he saw it] was to make the acquaintance of the regime's key figures and inner circle without becoming involved with them in any cooperative effort that would serve the interests of the regime.

Muhammad lived in poverty and died in poverty. He was extremely devoted to the noble concepts of his Islamic faith, to his peace of mind and to the sacrifices he made to promote truth. In those respects he was a wealthy man.

He used to boast of his opposition to military rule anywhere in our Islamic world, and he also used to boast of his hostility to those who exploited religion to sustain their government. He was a revolutionary Muslim, but the time he spent on branding the Libyan regime was only marginal. Islam was his cause, and his opinion of the Libyan regime or his criticism of it was made in the context of discussions about military Fascists who are enemies of freedom and of Islam.

He was always eager to know who was the opposition that was publishing AL-JIHAD. He was hoping to make their acquaintance so he can engage them in a discussion and perhaps contribute to the newspaper, but circumstances did not make that possible. Muhammad was a true patriot and a constant champion of truth and goodness.

Muhammad had a sense of humor. He would occasionally tell jokes, and he liked to use the title, "Afandi," in addressing his dear friends. He liked to read, and he wrote continuously. He wrote to newspapers from Kuwait to Morocco to comment on their articles. He spent most of his limited funds to buy paper, newspapers and magazines.

He published three books, [which included] articles and replies to a few Arab writers. He opposed military rule everywhere.

Our pledge to the late Ramadan and to those who lost their lives before him and to those who will lose their lives after him is that we will continue to fight with all the methods and means [at our disposal] against the brutal, terrorist regime of al-Qadhdhafi. We will not rest until he is overthrown and a sound free regime is established.

It may be that the closing remarks which the late Ramadan will like the most in concluding his eulogy are the words of God Almighty:

"You must not think that those who were slain in the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive and well provided for by their Lord" [Al Imran: 169]. God the Mighty speaks the truth. (23 April 1980).

> Before Ramadan's eulogy, which was written by Nafi', appeared on the pages of AL-JIHAD on 1 May, al-Qadhdhafi's treacherous hand had broken into the office of the late Mahmud Nafi' on 25 April 1980 and unjustly and aggressively murdered him. AL-JIHAD eulogized him in the same issue in which his eulogy of the late Ramadan appeared. This is the text of AL-JIHAD's eulogy.

The Late Mahmud Nafi': in God's Care

To the spirit of our brother Mahmud Nafi' who wrote the eulogy for his

associate, the late Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan, 2 days before he died: Mahmud Nafi' died on 25 April 1980 before the eulogy was published. Al-Qadhdhafi's henchmen shot him in his office.

It is not easy to write about Mahmud Nafi' now. We don't know what to write now and what to leave for [other] appropriate times. Brother Mahmud began the actual struggle against al-Qadhdhafi's regime of terror several years ago. He was extremely active, wrote prolifically and worked tirelessly. He never hesitated to make a financial or any other contribution that he was asked to make. He used to make all these numerous contributions quietly and persistently despite everything he used to hear from some people. God only knows how many hardships, dangers and troubles he endured from numerous sources. None of this, however, reduced his energy or his faith in the need to continue making every effort and every attempt to overthrow al-Qadhdhafi's regime of terror.

A few weeks before he died, Brother Mahmud asked that in case he is assassinated, he wished to have what he wrote published in a book. He repeated his wish 2 days before he died. Mahmud used to write in AL-JIHAD a series entitled "Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in al-Qadhdhafi's Dictatorship." He wrote many articles for this series, but only a few of them were published in AL-JIHAD. We will continue to publish these and other articles he wrote. He was also preparing a book on conditions in Libya in al-Qadhdhafi's era of terror. AL-JIHAD published several articles he wrote about the tyranny of al-Qadhdhafi's regime. The last one of these articles was the one published in the last issue: "The Truth about the Recent Arrests in Libya." AL-JIHAD is also publishing in this issue some of what he wrote.

The late Mahmud Nafi' took it upon himself to play an important and a dangerous multi-faceted role. He played that role in an inimitable fashion.

We cannot give Mahmud his due, and our consolation now is that he is with his omniscient Creator.

The criminals, and chief among them is al-Qadhdhafi, have murdered Mahmud Nafi'. They murdered others before him, and they will murder others in the future. The killer, al-Qadhdhafi, thought that by killing Libyan citizens, he could silence the people of Libya who are calling for freedom and justice. Not a single free voice will be silenced. In fact, all the free voices will be heard in unison. They will speak together in solidarity [and call for] the elimination of al-Qadhdhafi's terror, crime and tyranny.

We have suffered a major, grave loss in losing Mahmud. We pledge to continue the course of struggle, freedom and self-sacrifice.

AL-JIHAD

> The late Nafi' had previously written an article about the crimes al-Qadhdhafi committed in April. That article was published in the same issue in which his eulogy of Ramadan and the article that was written to eulogize him were published.

April, a Month of Bloodshed and Martyrs

In April 1977 the Fascist al-Qadhdhafi began to glower more clearly. He executed Libyan citizens--students, officers and simple citizens; some were shot and some were hanged.

In April 1980 another wave of bloodshed began inside the country and abroad.

It began under the slogan or the cover of "fighting bribery among the pillars of the regime." The Fascist then went about eliminating officers, intellectuals and former party members who had left political activity and gone to build for themselves a quiet life away from any [political] posture. But al-Qadhdhafi was promoting the slogan of he who is not with us is against us. That is, he who did not spend his time applauding him and cheering for him was his enemy.

In the decrees he issued in February 1980 al-Qadhdhafi announced under the cover of the so-called revolutionary committees the onset of a stage of eliminating Libyans abroad.

Thus once again it was not enough to be abroad and not to be working against him, but the fact of one's mere presence abroad was [construed as] disobedience to him and an expression of one's hostility to his regime. The mere fact that a Libyan had settled abroad was considered by al-Qadhdhafi to be a declaration of hostility by that person. Therefore, all such people were to be eliminated, and the first to go would be those who were more accessible, the more famous ones and those who were better known to people.

Thus the suicide squad began traveling 1 week before the resolutions of the revolutionary committees were announced. It arrived in London, Paris, Geneva, Athens, Beirut, Bonn, Madrid and in the United States.

If Libyans living abroad were to be eliminated regardless of their attitude toward the regime, there was no longer any alternative but to sacrifice time and money to oppose the existing regime as long as that regime did not hesitate to murder anyone who was living abroad regardless of his position.

Salim al-Ratimi, a merchant who was not involved in politics, was assassinated; 'Abd-al-Jalil 'Arif, a merchant who was not politically involved, was assassinated; Muhammad Mustafa Ramadan, who gave his time to the cause of Islam in exile and who had left Libya many years before al-Qadhdhafi had come to power, was assassinated.

Other people have been assassinated [also], and other assassination attempts are in the offing.

Inside the country al-Qadhdhafi eliminated those who refused to cooperate with the regime even though they were devoted to their families, their businesses and their trade. Others were taken to detention camps--there are 4,000 detainees--for no reason other than that they did not applaud the regime and cheer for it in processions.

Libyans abroad are being called upon to stand together, shoulder to shoulder and to work together and make financial contributions in order to expand the opposition so it can include all Libyan nationals abroad and become influential, effective and strong.

Our homeless people abroad will remain homeless, and they will live under the threat of assassination and elimination every day unless they join forces and work together and not rely on the unilateral solutions that each person may devise apart from others.

We must all understand and become aware of the fact that al-Qadhdhafi and his henchmen make no distinction between those who are working actively [against him] and those who are not. As long as they live abroad, all Libyans have been classified as enemies, and they have all been marked for assassination.

Mahmud Nafi'

> This is another article the late Mahmud Nafi' wrote about al-Qadhdhafi's revolutionary committees and dictatorial governments. He wrote the article before his assassination.

Revolutionary Committees and Dictatorial Governments Have the Same Style

Whenever the colonel wants to sing his own praises and express his wishes and his admiration for himself, he would use terms [that would convey] humility.

Al-Qadhdhafi replaces his name with terms [such as] the Libyan people, the First of September Revolution or the masses. Anyone who has examined his speeches and his statements would find that he glorifies himself in most cases by using those terms.

In the speech he made on 2 March 1980 on the anniversary of what he called the creation of al-Jamahiriyah and the declaration of "the people's power," which took place on that date in 1977 in a remote village in Fazan that used to be called al-Qara but which he called al-Qahirah, one finds that he glorifies himself by using those terms that have been mentioned. However, the Libyan people do not claim for themselves what al-Qadhdhafi is trying to attribute to them. The Libyan people did not call their country al-Jamahiriyah. Even the puppets of the so-called People's Congress agreed unanimously to retain the name, the Libyan Arab Republic. But at the last moment and after the voting was completed, the colonel suggested the name and asked that [the change] be approved--without having the members go back to their principal congresses. He usually insists that they go back to their principal congresses when anyone else dares to make a suggestion. Naturally, his suggestion was approved.

The slogan of "Power, Wealth and Arms for the People," was not devised by the people, but it was rather decreed and distorted by al-Qadhdhafi.

All the other slogans and frameworks he created--the popular committees and the revolutionary committees--are his accomplishments and his brainchildren. The people claim no credit for them. Al-Jamahiriyah was not established by the people or by the masses, nor did they create what he falsely named the establishment of the people's power.

This vainglory which comes through loudly and clearly in al-Qadhdhafi's voice and which resounds from his broadcasts is for his benefit alone. Our people, however, are resentful, and disgusted with his tyrannical vanities.

Al-Qadhdhafi's address, however, did not lack assertions that there were among the Libyan people those who deserved to be physically eliminated and repressed. He was not able to refute the terror that was oppressing our people. He stated in his address, "What is happening in Libya these days is being carried out by the popular masses by means of the revolutionary committees which they created."

And here we ask, did the people even once or under false pretenses take part in choosing the revolutionary committees?

Do the Libyan people even know the names of those specters? How were they chosen? Who are they?

Al-Qadhdhafi is describing what is happening today as the work of the popular masses which is carried out by the revolutionary committees that were created by the popular masses. Everybody knows that the people do not know who are the members of the revolutionary committees. They make up more accurately a secret movement of intelligence [personnel], soldiers and tribesmen.

Al-Qadhdhafi describes the actions of the revolutionary committees, which are under way these days, as "actions that translate these revolutionary concepts. They are a practical expression of the use of these powers which the government had and which the masses now have. The masses are using those powers to practice dictatorship against their enemies. Today, those people against whom the Libyan people are practicing dictatorship are those who tried to exploit the powers of their positions unfairly, exploitatively and arbitrarily."

Al-Qadhdhafi goes on to indicate that the dictatorial practices of the revolutionary committees are like those of a dictatorial regime, except that the dictatorial practices of the revolutionary committees are carried out in the interests of the people. "A dictatorship opresses the masses, the workers and the students. Dictatorial governments use the same tools and the same powers which the revolutionary committees use in their practices against the enemies of the people. These governments use those tools and powers to hurt the people and to practice dictatorship."

Mahmud Nafi'

Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in al-Qadhdhafi's Dictatorship

This report offers a quick survey and a brief review of human rights violations in al-Qadhdhafi's al-Jamahiriyah. Al-Qadhdhafi has been ruling Libya since 1 September 1969. It was then that the people woke up to [the sounds of] military music and the proclamation of a republic which had followed an announcement that the royal regime had been overthrown. The first and last king of that royal regime was King Muhammad Idris al-Mahdi al-Sanusi who was crowned king of the country when Libya's independence was proclaimed on 24 December 1952.

Regardless of the political aspects and secrets that accompanied this event or led to it, al-Qadhdhafi, who was appointed chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council and promoted from first lieutenant to colonel on the eighth day of the revolution, is the one who continued to rule the country until this day. His autocratic control of the government is increasing daily. This [situation] has led to a lengthy and horrible series of acts of violence, oppression, repression, imprisonment and execution that are being carried out against citizens. This includes al-Qadhdhafi's colleagues who took part in the coup with him as well as civilians who were led to jail under different circumstances and detained for many years. They were all tried by special military courts, and tyrannical measures were taken against them in violation of the simplest legal principles and guarantees.

We are not concerned at present with a political opinion of al-Qadhdhafi's regime as much as we are trying to conduct a detached and fair investigation of the position of al-Qadhdhafi's regime on the universal declaration of human rights and of basic and political freedoms for citizens. We are supporting our report with documents issued by al-Qadhdhafi's regime. These documents consist of the following:

First, the statements al-Qadhdhafi made in numerous speeches and in his statements to newspapers and broadcasts.

Second, al-Qadhdhafi's laws and decrees which indicate a blatant violation of the Libyan citizen's basic human rights.

Third, the practices of al-Qadhdhafi and his regime against the citizens when his statements, his speeches, his laws and his decrees are put into practice.

Since this report will be backed up by the three aforementioned references, it has thus avoided as much as possible [basing its statements on] political opinion. The report adheres to objectivity and respects the spirit of scientific inquiry with regard to human rights. In this regard it is serving the interests of historical truths.

In the past, during 18 years of the royal regime the Libyan people have not had to face a wave of violence, repression, emergency courts and executions such as that which they are facing at present. Regardless of the government's political form there was one constitution which provided

guarantees for citizens, such as the right to trial in a common court. No one was taken to court, and throughout that administration, not a single civilian or military emergency court was convened.

No one was arrested by any means other than those of the common public prosecution. At that time there weren't many judicial agencies: common and emergency; political and non-political.

No one has ever established that the royal regime tortured any citizen, unless we were to consider in that regard a brawl between an officer and a prisoner due to some friction between them or to personal attack.

No one's home was broken into to be searched unless a warrant from the public prosecutor's office had been obtained and all the legal measures in effect had been taken.

No one was ever accused or condemned except in accordance with the uniform penal code whose provisions comprise all violations and whose purpose is not particulary to protect the regime or fight its opponents.

None of this means that there were no excesses. Nor does this mean that the former administration was perfect or ideal.

One of the most significant errors of the former administration may be its failure to provide an opportunity for the sound development and growth of a political, democratic and organizational awareness among citizens. Not only did the former administration fail to provide such an opportunity, it also impeded that process of development and growth. This created a tremendous political and organizational vacuum in the country and prevented the emergence of firmly established institutions and organized movements. Thus the entire system collapsed when the 1969 coup took place.

Although the establishment of political parties was not prohibited by laws, political parties and organizations did not exist publicly because the opportunity for their establishment and their development was not available. The establishment of any political or commercial office required a permit from the government, and no permit had hitherto been granted for the establishment of a political party by any one of the successive governments in that era. Thus, citizens who were taken to court during the 18 years of the royal administration because they were accused of forming parties--the Socialist Arab Ba'th party in 1961 and the Arab Nationalists in 1967--were accused by the public prosecutor's office of forming parties that had not been officially licensed. They were tried under the same statute under which anyone who would open an office or a store without a permit from the responsible authorities would be tried.

Although parties were not allowed to exist and, consequently, there were no organized opposition parties, the administration did not allow and did not try to form its own party that would have sole control over the government or force itself upon the people. There was, however, a parliament to which citizens nominated themselves on an individual basis. The parliament had

legislative powers: it could enact laws after debating them and voting over them. The parliament also had the right to withdraw confidence from the prime minister and from the Council of Ministers.

The judicial authority was independent in accordance with the constitution. It managed its own affairs through its own higher council, the Supreme Court Council. There was also a supreme court which considered suits filed by persons against any violation of the constitution. The supreme court had the right to rule that laws, statutes and administrative orders were unconstitutional if they violated the constitution or the rights guaranteed therein.

The political analysis of the reasons for that administration's severe shortcomings in not allowing the creation of parties and in [tolerating] other excesses may go on at some length, but we are not engaged in a process of presenting a political critique of this administration or of al-Qadhdhafi's regime as much as we are concerned with an analysis of the constitutional and legal reality and the violations of the principles of human rights that are being committed by al-Qadhdhafi's regime, his constitution, his laws and his practices.

It is also not the purpose of this article to make a comparison between two regimes. This article rather introduces us to the life which the Libyan citizen lived by [describing to us] the constitutional and legal form and substance [of that time] so we can compare them with those of the present. Briefly, there was a constitution which provided basic rights for citizens and [stipulated] the form of the state and its regime which was based on the independence of the legislative authority as vested in a bicameral parliament; of the executive authority, vested in the Council of ministers that would answer to the house of representatives which had the right to debate, endorse and decree laws, the state's budget and foreign and domestic policy; and of the judicial authority which monitored the application of the constitution and ensured that the laws, administrative decrees and measures conformed to the letter and the spirit of the constitution.

This was the form of the royal administration--we wish to repeat that this administration was not perfect either in form or in practice--on 1 September 1969 when junior officers in the armed forces carried out their coup. The names of the members of the Revolutionary Command Council were announced 2 months later. There were 12 officers in the council: the chairman, First Lt Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and 11 captains and first lieutenants.

There was tremendous support for this coup and a general agreement that change was necessary. A state of neglect had been prevailing in the country especially recently. Libya had also not made adequate progress. In fact, the steps that had been taken to catch up with the times were few and had been made reluctantly. Elections on an individual basis [continued]; the shortcomings of some elections [lingered]; the establishment of parties was not allowed; and licensing for newspapers was restricted to a few trusted individuals or to those who were known to senior officials. A few newspaper licenses were revoked, in accordance with legal measures. The right of a

license holder to appeal an administrative decision that revoked his license was left unchanged, but the Supreme Court which considered his appeal usually ruled in favor of newspaper publishers. Citizens grew tired of the old worn-out faces that had no new ideas to offer. The regime had not forged ahead energetically to assimilate the changes that had come over society. A broad class of university graduates had emerged, and that group of people did not have enough opportunities to take their rightful place [in society] especially with regard to having more freedom to express themselves politically by forming parties and organizations that would give shape to this change and by having a press that had more freedom to depict all this. All these matters were behind the preliminary support that citizens gave the 1969 coup. They were hoping for a better future in which the errors and excesses of the past would be avoided, a future that would lead to a freer and a happier life.

Once more, we are not engaged in a process of evaluating the excesses and the errors of the past administration. These have already been mentioned and they led the people to support the coup. In addition, there were [other] factors: a desire for change, fear, greed, neglect, and the lack of the people's experience with military government. However, the previous account remains useful for any introduction to a discussion of the background of the Libyan citizen and society and the climate that was prevalent in Libya before al-Qadhdhafi's military movement [came to power].

Al-Qadhdhafi's Regime

The support which many of the people gave the coup was used by those who were in charge of the movement to make them more vain and more precipitous in having the destiny of the people determined by the Revolutionary Command Council. This was the military council which was proclaimed on the radio 2 months after the coup.

Despite the existence of this council, no one but al-Qadhdhafi had the right to make a statement or a proclamation or to define a domestic or foreign position.

One of the first actions which may be considered a preliminary step to the imposition of a political form on the country was that "dialogue" which was organized in May 1970 under the name, "A Debate on Revolutionary Thought." More than 300 intellectuals and educated persons were invited to participate in that debate which was headed by al-Qadhdhafi. Many people expressed their opinions on the country's government and its future during that debate.

It later became evident that al-Qadhdafi had convened this debate to "trap" intellectuals, find out their opinions, pigeonhole them and deal with them on that basis. Actually many people who expressed opinions that al-Qadhdhafi did not like were later subjected to imprisonment and persecution.

Ever since that debate the lines and the form of that government which

al-Qadhdhafi intended to impose [on the people] became clearer. It was during the debate on revolutionary thought al-Qadhdhafi cried out, "It is our opinion that we do not need to proclaim a constitution. We can make a constitutional proclamation to indicate the fact that there is a Revolutionary Command Council which is empowered by the people to govern the country."

The Revolutionary Command Council had issued a constitutional proclamation giving itself all the legislative, executive and judicial powers. We will deal with this matter subsequently in the second part of this report which deals with legislation.

With regard to al-Qadhdhafi's position on the basic rights which the people had been yearning for and expecting, al-Qadhdhafi announced [the following] in his address on 19 September 1969 in al-Shuhada' [Martyrs'] Square in Tripoli:

"Brothers, after today there are to be no parties. Oh, brothers, the national unity that brings the Libyan people together cannot under any circumstances be subject to fragmentation and to partisanship. After today, there are to be no parties. Under no circumstances whatsoever can the door be opened to parties, under no circumstances whatsoever."

It is evident here that al-Qadhdhafi's emphasis on this matter, a few days after the coup, was designed to prepare the conditions and the climate for the imposition of a military government that was a far cry from a democracy, especially after it became evident that the reason behind the people's support for the coup was their desire to establish a sound political life and to bring an end to all the obstacles that used to exist for organized political action and for the freedom of opinion. Al-Qadhdhafi's emphasis on preventing organized political action precluded the possibility that any political movement or political organization may emerge to which people can make an effective contribution for the purpose of enriching political life [in the country] and developing it toward something better. Al-Qadhdhafi thereby also placed all the controls in his own hands.

It seems that al-Qadhdhafi had made this plan with deliberation so as to escalate the hostility and the attack against any organized political action as the premise groups of people would adopt to express their opinion freely. Therefore, he focused in most of his speeches on repeating his condemnation of parties. In order to discourage any constructive dialogue that might lead to a view of the form the regime might assume, he issued before the debate on revolutionary thought was convened an open threat to those who were to participate in it. This threat was made when the Revolutionary Command Council issued its decree regarding "protecting the revolution." We will review this decree in the second part of this report.

The decree incriminated anyone who engaged in "provocative publicity against the regime;" "aroused hatred and disunity among the classes of the people;" "spread rumors or stories about the political or economic condition in the country;" "spread rumors;" or "took part in a demonstration or a strike."

Al-Qadhdhafi's regime was extremely tyrannical. It launched vicious, successive attacks against parties and against any organized political action before it confronted any party, group or organization, regardless of its size. The regime was setting up the rules and the foundations for establishing its total control on the country's capabilities by means of the fiery speeches that al-Qadhdhafi gave and the threats and promises that he made. These were followed by laws and decrees that established as law what was stated in those speeches. All this was taking place despite the fact that no political party had emerged and no organized political action, no matter how insignificant, had surfaced. All this was done despite the support that was shown by most intellectuals who had political opinions. Al-Qadhdhafi's objective in launching those successive, vicious attacks was to establish the total alienation of those people from the masses and to bar them from any role that would allow them to participate in building the state on new democratic foundations. Al-Qadhdhafi's position, as it turned out later, was an indication of his dissatisfaction with intellectuals and his hatred for them. It also paved the way for the persecution to which they were later subjected by al-Qadhdhafi's regime.

Al-Qadhdhafi soon universalized and wrote into law his thoughts and opinions on the form of the political regime. He summarized those thoughts and opinions in the constitutional proclamation which was an expression of his speeches and his views. He gave the Revolutionary Command Council, that is, himself, all legislative, executive and judicial powers without providing for any supervision over these absolute powers. He had the right to enact laws and decrees and to execute them as he saw fit. He was the one to form special boards of inquiry and emergency courts, and he would so so without legal controls to guide him or guarantees for those who would stand accused in front of these bodies. Soon after that a series of laws and decrees began piling up, day after day.

Al-Qadhdhafi issued a decree forming a public prosecution office which has the functions of investigating any case or any person who may be turned over to it by the Revolutionary Command Council. No common legal measures are to be observed in an investigation or in anyone's detention. This prosecution office is still in existence today.

Al-Qadhdhafi also issued a decree forming the People's Court. It was chaired by a member of the Revolutionary Command Council. An army officer and a police officer were members. At first the court also included a member of the judiciary and a clergyman, but both were later removed from the court.

This People's Court is not subject to any law. It can hear any case against any citizen or citizens brought to it by the prosecution office. It makes the judgement whether the charge that's been made is a crime or not, and it has the power to determine any penalty it deems appropriate. Despite all these unreasonable and abnormal power; despite the fact that al-Qadhdhafi chooses its members--and at the outset most of them were military men but then later all of them were military men who had absolutely nothing to do with the law and made no distinction between a military function and the

neutrality and propriety of a judicial function; despite the fact that al-Qadhdhafi controls who is taken to court and what charges are to be brought against him through his control of the public prosecution office; despite all this and as an indication of his unruly desire to control and dominate, al-Qadhdhafi was not satisfied with all this. He retained the power to confirm the verdicts of the People's Court and the right to amend those verdicts by increasing or reducing the sentences. Despite all previous precautions, all of which would inflict heavy penalties on defendants, al-Qadhdhafi feared that the People's Court may sentence a defendant to a penalty that he would consider inadequate. Therefore, he took the precaution of retaining the power to confirm the verdicts of the court. This confirmation was not to be ceremonial. He has never reduced a sentence issued by the People's Court. In fact, his decisions have always been to confirm those sentences or at most to increase the penalty, as we shall see later.

Furthermore, al-Qadhdhafi declared at the first convention of the united free officers that he had made a mistake by not changing some of the sentences to execution. In practical terms, that declaration was significant since al-Qadhdhafi had already eliminated those he wanted to get rid of, and the sentences were of no significance in view of what he himself thought even if these sentences had been handed down by a sham court that was totally subject to him.

Al-Qadhdhafi's Statements

Al-Qadhdhafi's laws and his outrageous decrees were issued while he was making plans to persecute every person or persons who would think of opposing him, of assuming an independent position or of subscribing to an opinion that differed from what he was saying and from the ideas he was repeating to outline the form of the new regime that he wanted to impose because it was suitable to his ambitions. On several occasions he arrested a few citizens and accused them of engaging in party activity. In 1972 at a press conference held at the University of Libya before the enactment of the law that made membership in a party a crime he stated the following. What he said that day along with his speeches and statements were included in a volume published in 1973 by Libya's Ministry of Information as Volume One.

[He was asked]: "You said that anyone who joins a party is a traitor. What do you mean by this statement? Does this mean that the thinking process is to be confined and restricted to one mold only? Please explain this statement."

[Al-Qadhdhafi replied], "Of course, there are to be no parties after today. This is indisputable. At any rate the answer to that question has been clear ever since the day we proclaimed that slogan. But it seems that the person who asked the question belonged to a party for some time and wants to be sure. Now that the revolution has been realized, and all the slogans have been put into effect and implemented, there is no longer any purpose for any party. This means that [anyone who forms a party] is dissatisfied

with the regime. This is because when a person becomes involved with a party and proclaims its slogans, his action means that these slogans which are proclaimed by the revolution are inconsistent with his slogans and that he wants to overthrow the new regime. The revolution cannot permit any attempt to overthrow it. It will come down harshly and mercilessly on those who make such an attempt. What do the parties want to accomplish other than freedom, socialism and unity?"

At the same press conference he said, "We do not want parties, and we said anyone who joins a party is a traitor. We do not want someone to form a party for communists, someone else to form a party for nationalists and another to form a party for patriots."

In his statement to university students he said, "If you were to form a party and to become active in it after the revolution, your action means that you are dissatisfied with the revolution and are working against it. This is considered treason. Anyone who works against the revolution of the Libyan people is considered a traitor. Anyone who secretly or openly joins a party after the revolution is considered a traitor. This is as far as the Libyan Arab Republic is concerned. As far as the other Arab countries are concerned, they are free to do as they wish."

In the course of promoting his political party al-Qadhdhafi cautioned that the only organization through which citizens can be politically active or practice their political rights is that of his Socialist Union party.

He said, "Brothers, with the establishment of the Arab Socialist Union in the Libyan Arab Republic, the people have finally eliminated any divisiveness in their ranks. They have thus finally eliminated the swindlers and the pseudo philosphers who are afflicted with the disease of advocating parties. They are advocates of division, and they import childish theories from abroad. Today, by joining the Arab Socialist Union the Libyan people are proving that this nation has actually applied the slogan that this nation coined after the revolution: no parties after today, and anyone who joins a party is a traitor. There are to be no parties within the Socialist Union which brings together farmers, workers, intellectuals, revolutionaries, national capitalists and soldiers.

"Brothers, it is the nation which is the party of significance, and there are to be no parties within the ranks of the nation. There is no place for intellectuals who want to form their own party, and there is no place for any swindler to come and talk down to a class of people and form a party for himself."

Al-Qadhdhafi praised his own party when he said at a press conference in Tripoli on 13 Rabi' al-Awwal 1393 Hegira, "The Socialist Union is the ideal framework. It is the best organization that includes all the forces of the working people."

Soon, however, al-Qadhdhafi destroyed the Socialist Union. Among the reasons for this action was the fact that this formula had failed to win the

confidence of the masses. Perhaps more importantly was al-Qadhdhafi's fear of any lingering organization, notwithstanding the fact that that organization was subordinate to him and subject to his will.

It was after the failure and the collapse of the Socialist Union that the trilogy of his Green Book appeared. In that book he stipulated that he who joined a party was a traitor and that a party system, whether one or several parties were involved, constituted a clear case of dictatorship. The Socialist Union which al-Qadhdhafi had promoted extensively, praised lavishly and considered the ideal framework came to an end, and the people's committees emerged. These were later curbed even though they were almost totally subject to al-Qadhdhafi and even though they were considered in the Green Book the foundation of democracy and its final, radical and only solution. Al-Qadhdhafi then came up with the revolutionary committees which are not to be found in the Green Book, and he announced that they were to direct and guide the actions of the people's committees and their applications of the substance of his opinions on democracy, on the economy and on society.

But al-Qadhdhafi's campaign against parties and against the freedom to engage in political activity continued.

"There are to be no parties, no splitting [of the people] and no division [among them]. It is for this reason that membership in parties is considered high treason because it undermines national unity, and we must be careful about the natural national unity of the homogeneous Libyan people."

What one notices here is that these are the statements that al-Qadhdhafi made in 1972 before his opinions on democracy, popular committees and then revolutionary committees were published. It was these opinions that led to discord, disunity, disintegration and persecution. Al-Qadhdhafi stated afterwards that 'Abd-al-Nasir's error lay in the fact that he did not break up the struggle and that he tried to preserve what he called national unity and protect it within the organization of the Socialist Union. Therefore, Nasirism came to an end with his death.

Al-Qadhdhafi also said, "Brothers, we do not need communism because we are more advanced than the communists. We do not need an Islamic party because we are an Islamic nation. The Arab nation carries some weight on the Earth."

In the course of an interview he had with the correspondent of the Beirut magazine, AL-MISA', al-Qadhdhafi said the following:

The correspondent [asked], "What about the decision that has to do with considering a member of a party a traitor?"

Al-Qadhdhafi interrupted me, "What about it?"

I (the correspondent) said, "This is a serious matter. We can understand that you in the Revolutionary Command Council can be opposed to party affiliations, knowing that you took over power as politicians more than as

military men. Now, however, the Revolutionary Command Council is announcing that every party member is a traitor, and it goes so far as to say that any political group that opposes the revolution is considered treacherous! Don't you think that this is a form of intellectual terrorism?"

Al-Qadhdhafi replied, "It was parties that fragmented [the unity of] Muslims. Had it not been for parties the great civil strife could have ended. Maybe after 100 years we will need parties, but at this stage we need 100 years without parties."

I, (the correspondent) said, "Let us assume that you arrested a Libyan and accused him of establishing a party or working with a party. Will you enforce the death sentence against him?"

Al-Qadhdhafi replied. "Yes, this was a warning I issued for the first time. Any member of a party to whom the incriminating articles of party affiliation apply--those articles that were issued by the Revolutionary Command Council--will be executed."

This interview was published in the first volume of the colonel's speeches, statements and interviews until 1973. The volume was published by Libya's Ministry of Information.

The Zawarah Speech and the Five Points

Following Israel's criminal act of shooting down a civilian Libyan airplane over Sinai, al-Qadhdhafi reacted harshly to the victims and the innocent citizens who were hurt by Israel's horrifying crimes instead of retaliating against Israel which had committed the crime. He did that to cover up his shameful failure to react appropriately to that crime in which close to 100 Libyan citizens lost their lives and to terrorize the citizens who had asked the government to take appropriate measures against such action instead of making speeches and issuing statements. Citizens had demonstrated and burned the building of the Socialist Union in Benghazi after seeing the bodies of about 50 Libyan citizens, who were victims of the airplane incident, brought to Benghazi Airport. He quickly proclaimed what came to be known the Zawarah address on 12 Rabi' al-Awwal 1393 Hegira (April 1973). In that bloody address he outlined a new stage of viciousness and revealed more clearly the violent, repressive intentions [he was harboring]. In the Zawarah address al-Qadhdhafi proclaimed what have come to be known as the five points. These are:

Repealing the Laws

First, all laws are to be repealed as of the date of the address. Al-Qadhdhafi thus gave himself total freedom to execute, imprison and detain anyone he wishes without the need for laws and controls and trials and measures. Even the harsh laws and decrees that he had issued and imposed on the people according to his wishes--and they were all cruel and harsh--had given him absolute powers and made him prosecutor, judge and executioner without giving defendants any guarantees. Even these laws no

longer satisfied his wrath or his propensity to be repressive and cruel. In the Zawarah address al-Qadhdhafi had said, "First of all, all laws that are in effect at present are to be repealed, and the penalties and measures are to be carried out immed.ately."

Detaining Intellectuals

Second, all intellectuals who are educated, whose ideas and opinions are not congruent with those of al-Qadhdhafi and his orders are to be eliminated, arrested and done away with. This point was one of al-Qadhdhafi's most important objectives in the Zawarah address. He found an opportunity to get rid of any possibility that there be an enlightened voice, opinion, or idea that was not automatically subservient and subject to him. He accused intellectuals of everything from being agents to treason, subjugation and atheism to pave the way for their elimination. In the Zawarah address in April 1973 al-Qadhdhafi had said, "The country must be purged of all those who are sick. Anyone who is heard talking about communism, Marxism or atheism will be put in jail. I will issue an order to the minister of the interior to purge any group of those sick people. If I find anyone from the Muslim Brothers or from the Islamic Liberation party, we will put him in jail. Anyone who advocates western thought or capitalism is sick, and will be imprisoned."

One day after the Zawarah address al-Qadhdhafi reiterated what he had said.

"Members of parties will be arrested because the Muslim Brothers do not represent Islam. Likewise, the Islamic Liberation party does not represent Islam, but rather reactionaries. Communists are agents, and all members of parties have connections with circles of western or communist colonialism. Accordingly, I declared that they must be removed. Those who have partisan inclinations or objectives and who are members of parties must be put in jail so they can pay the price of their crime. After that, we will begin treating them: those who go back to their senses will be released from jail and watched until they walk the straight path, but those who are hopeless cases will be punished mercilessly."

Al-Qadhdhafi held a press conference in Tripoli on 13 May 1973, 1 month after the Zawarah address.

At that press conference al-Qadhdhafi affirmed, "The Muslim Brothers and the communists are not advocates of an ideology; they are agents. They are people who get their orders from communist embassies and who give information to communist embassies. They receive money and orders from communist embassies, just like the agents of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. These are the communists. The Muslim Brothers receive the same instructions from western embassies and from people living in Europe."

Burning Books

Third, all books that do not conform to al-Qadhdhafi's ideas are to be burned.

"I will burn and tear up all books that are imported and misleading. I will launch a revolution against libraries and universities and everything in print. We will burn all misleading ideas so that all the sickly, the feeble-minded and the beatles can be removed. These are sick people who contracted the disease from the misleading reactionary books of the east and the west, from eastern and western communism and from capitalism. We will burn these books, and we will also burn those who will stand by them."

In the same Zawarah address al-Qadhdhafi said, "O people [of Libya], destroy all the bookstores and the libraries from which the stench of imported ideas, reactionary ideas, capitalist ideas and communist, Jewish ideas emanates."

Terrorizing Civil Servants

Fourth, administrations are to be taken over and civil servants are to be attacked, fired and replaced by those who took over the administrations with al-Qadhdhafi's permission and at his instigation. Al-Qadhdhafi took advantage of the chaos he created and got rid of many of the people he did not want because, in his judgment, they were not carrying out his tyrannical, illegal orders as promptly as he wanted them to, without having discussions or raising questions about their legality. Thus the unruly mobs which al-Qadhdhafi let loose on government administrations, organizations and agencies spread corruption throughout these agencies, striking down, removing from office and imprisoning whomever they chose and then appointing in their place whomever they chose, or rather those ignorant uneducated persons that al-Qadhdhafi chose. They fired university professors, and they even revoked the doctorate degrees of some people whom they labeled "illiterate." Al-Qadhdhafi appointed a male nurse director of a hospital; a janitor, principal of a school. It was in this precipitous, loathsome manner that matters went on in the aftermath of al-Qadhdhafi's Zawarah address.

Al-Qadhdhafi thereby brought about what he had wanted: using people against each other and sowing dissension among them. This was something which political parties and organizations, which al-Qadhdhafi had harshly attacked and denied them permits, would not have thought of doing. Thus the process of stifling political liberties and opposition opinions in the context of [attacking] political parties was not intended to bring about "national unity," "prevent dissension within the same society" or "preserve social peace," as al-Qadhdhafi used to say when he strongly forbad the existence of any political organization. It has been established that these three slogans do not represent his real objective. For he has no concern for society, for its unity and for its cohesiveness. Quite the contrary, his real objective was and still is to sow dissension and hostility among citizens; to create hatred, rancor and disunity among them; and to forestall any cooperation or coordination among them so that he would have a free hand in exercising power and control while citizens remain preoccupied in their own disputes.

Announcements about the people's committees' meetings and adjournments as

well as their decisions to fire and hurt people and to appoint administration chiefs and civil servants were made in an unruly, provocative, precipitous manner that did not follow any democratic method. Instead, these decisions followed a method of contention, expulsion and attack. No election was held, nor was there a selection process. Decisions were endorsed and announced without the knowledge of the group that made and sent them. The popular committees were not defined; their members were not known; nor did they follow any clearly defined bylaws. Al-Qadhdhafi endorsed those decisions that suited him, and those decisions were announced and carried out. The decisions that did not appeal to him were ignored and forgotten. However, nobody knew who these people's committees were that made those decisions, and nobody knew who were their members. Such obscure, ambiguous and ill-defined matters allowed al-Qadhdhafi a greater opportunity to do what he wished and to carry out whatever he wanted.

Ever since those moments al-Qadhdhafi has intensified his blatant attacks on political freedoms or rather on basic freedoms.

"Anyone who wants to go ahead with us is welcome, but anyone who stays away will be trampled underfoot." [He said that in] the Zawarah address.

"Walk all over any bourgeois bureaucrat; destroy him and get rid of him forever." [He said that in] an address in Tripoli, 1 day after the Zawarah address.

"There are those who have a doctorate but who are considered illiterate."

"Students can now remove the dean of a college from his position. If the people's committees in any city now wish to remove the chief or the governor from his office, all the laws that stand in their way are suspended. They can remove him; they can put him in prison; they can put him in prison and appoint another chief or another governor."

That statement was made at the press conference held in Tripoli on 10 Rabi' al-Aakhar 1393 Hegira, 13 May 1973 A.D.

Terrorizing Citizens

Fifth, weapons were distributed to a few select individuals in general to strike even more terror in citizens' hearts and also to create another armed power to face the armed forces so as to restrain them.

"I will give weapons to all those who believe in the revolution of the 1st of September, but the weapons will be turned on anyone who is against the people's revolution."

Immediately after al-Qadhdhafi's address in Zawarah an intense campaign of public intelligence was launched against all known intellectuals, writers and men of letters in Libya. They were all arrested [at their places of work] in broadcasting [stations], newspaper [offices] and in

their [own] offices. Some of them were older men who were taken away from their mosques and their homes. This was the campaign that included almost 1,000 persons. It was the broadest campaign of arrests after the arrest of Lt Col Musa Ahmad, Lt Col Adam al-Rawwaz and their group of military men. Another group that was called the Fazzan conspiracy group was arrested. Among that group were 'Abd-al-Mawli Daghman, Ma'tuq Adam, Bur Hayl, Nijm and others. We will refer to this in detail [below].

This broad campaign of arrests scared even the civilian leaders of the Socialist Union who found that the people's committees had not left anyone immune to attack, defamation and public denunciation. They found that the revolutionary committees were competing with the Socialist Union in many of its activities. They may have feared that the wave of arbitrary arrests would include them too. Dissatisfaction among the people grew, and the conduct of the popular committees was timidly brought up for discussion in the meeting halls of the Socialist Union congress. This caused al-Qadhdhafi to express his opinion on this campaign. He did that at the general congress on 9 November 1974.

Al-Qadhdhafi then said, "A final observation on [the questions] raised by a number of members who spoke about the police and a few other matters. We have detained some people; they are a small group of Muslim Brothers whose confessions were broadcast on television. We have also detained a few communists and a few people from a group who call themselves the Islamic Liberation army. That group is a very small group. You have all seen their confessions on television. The fact is that after the revolution, and specifically at the Tripoli conference, as far as I remember, between 1969 and 1970, I announced that he who joins a party is a traitor. We were going to forgive and forget the past, and anyone who had formed a party in the past would be praised for his effort and not condemned because he made an effort to save Libya either through Islam or through communism. But after our victory, thanks to God, we said that we wanted to establish an alliance with each other and anyone who would join a party would be a traitor. There is no need for us to divide ourselves into factions and schools. Some people complied with this appeal. Among them was a group of young people of the Ba'th party whom I knew. I could have drawn up lists of their names and of the names of others who were members of parties before the revolution because I've been with that crowd and I tried to find out who their leaders were. They cannot hide themselves from me. The least that we can do is to take their leaders into custody so that we can find out who are the people who make up the rest of the membership. I know much more [about them] than the investigative authorities know. There are people who belong to some party organizations who are not under arrest and who have had no restrictions imposed on them by the Ministry of the Interior. But I know who they are, and the investigation office does not.

"There is also another group with which I am personally familiar. They complied with the appeal and they were convinced [by our argument]. This indicates that they were truthful in their first actions to save the country. But when they realized that the country had been saved, they joined the revolution. I personally have considerable appreciation for them because they are committed.

"Maj al-Khawildi al-Hamidi now has documented evidence about a communist group [of people] who were originally Arab nationalists. They became communists after the command turned communist. Al-Hamidi has authentic and very serious documented evidence that I myself have examined and ascertained. [Among this evidence are] fallacious analyses of the social structure, of the bourgeoisie, and of where aristocracy, feudalism and militarism can be found. These analyses are intended to mislead people. They are nonsense. Then these people conclude that they must destroy the existing society so they can build a society of dictatorship which must do away with the remaining classes. This means that all our efforts would be wasted--those efforts through which we had tried to create a society of homogeneous groups that can solve their problems by themselves peacefully, narrow the differences between people peacefully and recognize the natural differences that God created among people. Had it not been for these differences and these distinctions, life would have ceased."

--A footnote: These opinions are no longer espoused by al-Qadhdhafi after his Third Theory, especially the economic part [of it].

"These groups say that strife is the reason for development, and they say they want an end to the strife. All right, if strife ends, that means that development will cease. I am not talking with them from a dialectal perspective, even though it is possible to refute easily every one of their statements. However, I am saying that their analyses are dangerous; that their analyses have led them to conspire; to collect weapons; to form secret cells; and to refer to each other by numbers [such as] number 15 and 16."

--A footnote: At their trial these groups were not accused of conspiring against the regime or of having weapons, nor was this established. They were accused of violating the law that made membership in a party a crime.

"Of course this is not the time for that. We will not allow it. No country in the world would allow its regime to be subjected to an undercover conspiracy. Such persons are real criminals, at least from my point of view. And I am in power because this power was seized by means of the revolution. A person who wants to do the same is considered opposed to the revolution, and we have to get rid of him. Anyone who stands in the revolution's way, whether he does so on the eve of the 1st of September, on the 8th or on the 90th eve of the revolution must be removed by the revolution. Now when we arrest someone who is against the revolution, he is treated in the same manner that the one who was arrested one evening in 1969, in 1970 or in 1980 was treated. There is no difference between them. You must understand this. Did anyone object to us when we arrested the army officers who were in power on the eve of the revolution? Did anyone say that what we did was a crime, that it was against freedom and that it was a case of dictatorship? No one said that. The outbreak of a revolution requires the removal of those who were previously in control. When we arrest anyone who stands in the revolution's way now, [our actions] are not to be considered anti-freedom or dictatorial or anything. We form alliances on the course of the revolution so we can solve our problems. [Sometimes] we scold and we challenge each other, but we do so within [a framework of] agreement, and we do so in public.

"A person who stands up in a mosque or on a street and arouses sectarianism, factionalism or partisanship or raises doubts about the revolution will be taken into custody. No country in the world would allow something like that."

--A footnote: The public prosecution did not accuse the defendants of partisanship in front of the People's Court which considers cases of instigating sectarianism or factionalism. They were accused and convicted of nothing more than forming a party, regardless of its purpose or its style. This is in accordance with the law that considers affiliation with a party a crime. A party does not have to have sectarian purposes or believe in violence as a means [for achieving one or another of its objectives] in order for membership in it to be a crime. Any association or party that is formed, regardless of its form, its objective or its style is considered criminal.

"The prophet did not allow this. The prophet demolished a mosque, and people then said we will face the Ka'bah and we will operate one minaret whose call to prayer we will follow. When they were questioned [about what they said], they replied, 'We are free to see Islam in a way other than that in which you see it.' We will build a mosque here, and we will talk with people about this matter in the same way you do in the revolution. Then someone else would come and say I want to launch a revolution! The fact that the prophet tore down a mosque is a legally binding precedent and not just a prophetic tradition. The Sunna is what the prophet actually did and is a legally binding precedent. The destruction of that mosque was a legally binding precedent which we are following."

After his theory was published in his Green Book al-Qadhdhafi announced that the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, was merely a messenger and that we did not have to follow his statements or his example, nor was it our duty to do either. He announced the repeal of the noble Prophetic Tradition in its entirety and said that no attention should be paid to it. He also declared that the Holy Koran concerned itself with matters of the hereafter and dealt very little with matters of this life, such as marriage and divorce. This is according to al-Qadhdhafi's curious thinking. See his well-known deviant address whose text is published in the Libyan newspaper, AL-FAJR AL-JADID, 30 Rajab 1398 Hegira, 5 July 1978.

"Sooner or later we will destroy any cell that anyone builds. The truth is that this group whose analyses I read is a very dangerous group."

--A footnote: Al-Qadhdhafi was referring to the analyses that he claimed were written by a partisan group and that he alone had read. No one knows where these documents were published, but it is likely that they consist of a sheaf of handwritten papers found in the possession of one of those who had been arrested. They were probably a summary of a few books as was mentioned in the public prosecution's statements at the trial which did not establish that any group printed or distributed any leaflet. Furthermore, no weapons and conspiracy were mentioned in any indictment.

Al-Qadhdhafi continued his speech and said, "When we announced that anyone who joins a party is a traitor, we gave party members an adequate period of time to turn away from those parties. Some did and some didn't. Finally, we enacted a law that made membership in a party a crime, and we announced a 30-day period of grace for people to renounce their party affiliations. Those people did not come forward.

"We did not do them an injustice; they did themselves an injustice. Whether they are your children, your brothers or your fathers, they did themselves an injustice. This is how we must judge them as long as the law gave them an opportunity [to relent]. The law is made for everyone and applies to anyone who engages in such an action which we accepted as an alternative. If one did not know about the law, that is his business. I will not drag people from their homes and put the law in front of them and tell them this [or that] is forbidden. If a person chooses to ignore a law, that is his choice. He is the one who places himself in prison. In fact, they were the ones who led themselves into arrest; no one led them to prison. Why aren't the people who are here under arrest, and why are those others under arrest? Because they are the ones who accepted this for themselves. They did what we told them was forbidden. Those people have a serious case, and our party affiliation law will be applied to them.

"The point we want to make out of all this is that when the common courts, the prosecution and the police questioned them on the common case, the measures [that were followed] were not proper in accordance with the laws. Although they are members of parties and all the documented evidence against them is unequivocal--statements in their own handwriting and recordings of their voices--the measures by which this evidence was seized were not proper.

"An example of that was stated yesterday by 'Umar al-Hamidi, who, I believe, is a graduate of the College of Law. He said that evidence gathered illegally is not valid evidence. This is a principle of jurisprudence in the law. So although the fact that the criminals committed the crime is established, because the measures that were followed with them were not legal, the common courts may yet find them innocent [and acquit them]. I met with the judges and they proposed this matter to me, saying that we had to establish a state security prosecution and state security courts. Nothing may happen to those who were tried by a common court even though we know they are members of parties and the law that considers membership in parties a crime applies to them. However, the measures that are in front of us violate our laws. [They advised me] to enact a special law to allow us to do these things.

"But I consider state security, state security prosecution and the armed police aspects of terrorism. We began to have a sense of our freedom, and we cannot walk on the right side simply because there is an armed individual who tells us to walk on the right side. We want this terrorist phenomenon to come to an end. The truth is that I still refuse enacting a state security law and creating a state security prosecution and a state security court. I approve only of the People's Court which will continue with us as long as there are questions that require consideration."

--A footnote: Nevertheless, a law establishing a state security prosecution was enacted. It was later called al-Jamahiriyah State Prosecution. The law eliminated all guarantees for citizens. None of its measures or actions for arresting people, searching them or for determining the length of their detention was subject to appeal.

"This is a people's court and not a military court. It is made up of all classes of people."

A footnote: This is not true. The presiding judge on the court is an officer in the army, and so is one of the members of the court. The third member of the court is a police officer. The clergyman and the judge [who sat on the court] were disqualified in all the cases that were brought to court concerning parties and students.

"The People's Court handles cases that pertain to Islamic law, civilian law and positive law. It has a military man and a policeman. It is in fact a people's court, and its deliberations are democratic. It does not have traitors and conspirators as is the case in the Arab countries in front of al-Mandawi's court.

"I think that having special courts and arming the police are tools of repression that convey a form of terror. We rebelled against tools of repression, and the judges agreed with me that special courts and the armed police were tools of repression. [They told me] 'If you do not want these, you must change the criminal procedures law and the civilian penal code.' Therefore, we must make amendments in the procedures law and in the penal code."

A footnote: Numerous intelligence departments and their branches abound in al-Qadhdhafi's terrorist regime in his Jamahiriyah. There are many other special agencies of repression, and these are under the direct command of al-Qadhdhafi's relatives, and among them is Khalifah Ahnish. All of these agencies are killing, imprisoning and torturing citizens without any regard for the law or for human principles.

"The penal code [must stipulate] that any crime committed in society, whether it is a political crime that affects the security of the state or the security of a family, must be looked into by the prosecution, by the court, or by the indictment chamber and our courts. There is no reason for having a common court and an emergency court. This means [that we have] a stable situation." What we are now faced with is correcting this situation [for] those people. If the measures are followed correctly, their destiny will most certainly be execution. That is, they would be executed if the measures of arresting them, searching and imprisoning them had been carried out according to legal principles, but this did not happen. I can of course at any moment turn them over to the People's Court, and, according to the law of the People's Court, I can turn over any case to the People's Court, and the People's Court will issue a death sentence in accordance with that law because execution will be the fate of anyone who forms a party. This is because the People's Court does not apply the law of criminal procedures.

If we were to hold a special military court, they will be executed. If we were to hold a special court, they will still be executed. But as long as these are the procedures, that is, as long as these procedures are erroneous procedures in the eyes of the common courts, these people will be kept somewhere until they get well. This may last 10, 20 or 50 years, each one according to his inclinations."

A footnote: These opinions summarize al-Qadhdhafi's positions on human rights and on his lack of respect for them. A citizen who is innocent in the eyes of the law may still be placed in prison for several years.

"From a legal standpoint, a special court could have been convened, and it could have issued a death sentence. This can happen. But we are facing a situation of this kind with worthless procedures and with people who are implicated. However, I know who they are."

A footnote: The judge himself who is supposed to be above reproach and neutral is subject only to the law and to his conscience. He may not issue a verdict on the basis of personal imformation gathered about the defendant outside the courtroom. But al-Qadhdhafi, who is the adversary, is satisfied with the knowledge that the defendants are traitors! In his opinion, this is the most important piece of evidence, and there is no need after that for further evidence or for any other law. He actually put these strange opinions of his into practice; they are a far cry from law and justice. He applied these opinions to many citizens, and they were placed in prison for many years simply because al-Qadhdhafi thought they should be imprisoned, without any evidence. In fact, some of them were executed because al-Qadhdhafi wanted them executed without any other evidence to warrant that, as we will refer to [below].

"I would not allow them to go out into society again, because we placed our confidence in them before, and we gave them responsibilities. We issued a decree of the Revolutionary Command Council inviting some of them to take part in the constituent committees of the Socialist Union [and] in the alliance agencies. Some people were honest in forming these alliances but [others] were secretly conspiring [against us]. Their contacts with foreign countries were evident. To be a communist means that one's capital is Moscow, one's country is Russia and one's party is the communist party, whether that person is in America, Africa or Asia. Thus the matter about these people must be clear. Amnesty International wrote to me and told me that the Libyan Arab Republic was the only Arab country that was not blacklisted [for human rights violations]."

A footnote: To be honest we must provide an explanation from Amnesty International which absolutely denied having declared that Libya under al-Qadhdhafi's administration had not been blacklisted. Amnesty International also denied that it had praised al-Qadhdhafi's theory. What happened was that the committee's reports on Libya before the revolution hardly mentioned Libya among the countries whose governments deliberately violated human rights. [However], not a single annual report of the reports prepared by the committee [after the revolution] failed to mention al-Qadhdhafi's regime and his position on [human] rights and freedoms as well as his violations of those rights and freedoms.

It is possible to request all the annual reports that have been issued by this international committee ever since the end of the first year of al-Qadhdhafi's regime and until the last report that was issued in 1979. Not a single report failed to condemn al-Qadhdhafi's regime because of the executions, the serious violations, the arbitrary imprisonment and the numerous arrests that have been practiced every day for 10 years. We will deal with these practices against citizens, as groups and as individuals, in the special chapter on practices.

"This is particularly because Libya is a democratic country that does not practice terrorism and repression. Mansur al-Kikhiya was attending the conference, and he was pleased when he gave me the book. He told me, 'Look, because of the grace of God the Libyan Arab Republic after the revolution has become the only country to be removed from the black list. The rest of the Arab countries are all on the black list because they practice tyranny and terror and repress freedoms.'

"Amnesty International told me in a letter that the Libyan Arab Republic was a clean country, and those who wrote the letter talked about the Third Universal Theory, about Islam and about the appeal for freedom for nations. We were advised not to become perverted--and this is the main point--for we heard that there were people under arrest, and we ask that they be pardoned. I wrote them a letter because I am naturally concerned about our international position.

"This point must be clear, regardless of their being our children or our brothers; this is another matter. Western colonialism has taken the Muslim Brothers under its wing because they are opposed to the 23 July Revolution. Since we are an extension of the 23 July Revolution, we have become a party to the case. Here in the Libyan Arab Republic there is a group of Muslim Brothers in jail. We had a conflict with them."

These are selections from al-Qadhdhafi's address which he delivered on the eve of his national congress on 9 November 1974. We printed these extended selections because they provide a clear indication of the backwardness and brutality of al-Qadhdhafi's concepts of human rights and basic human freedoms.

His address was connected with other measures. A new, independent, emergency prosecution [office] was formed in addition to the public prosecution office which is under the command of the Revolutionary Command Council. This new prosecution office was called the Security Prosecution of the Republic. It is now called the Security Prosecution of al-Jamahiriyah despite the apparent unwillingness to accept this suggestion which makes it unlikely that the regime's opponents would stand trial in the common courts.

Before too long al-Qadhdhafi amended the section in the penal code that deals with crimes against the regime. He increased the severity of the penalties in the manner that will be shown in detail in the section of this report which deals with anti-human rights legislation.

Al-Qadhdhafi also recently abolished the position of public prosecutor and public defender. The reason for that was that those who served in those positions observed the law to a certain extent and used it as their frame of reference. They had released a few prisoners who had served the full term to which they had been sentenced by al-Qadhdhafi's courts. But al-Qadhdhafi became extremely upset over this matter. He abolished both positions and returned the former prisoners to jail without any legal or moral basis. He also turned over the functions of these positions to his people's and revolutionary committees which are unruly, mob-like and ignorant. These committees carry out whatever al-Qadhdhafi orders.

Al-Qadhdhafi made a decision that has not been announced, but that he nevertheless carried out: he terminated the role of the Socialist Union. This is because al-Qadhdhafi does not want and does not trust any organization, even if it is under his command. It is also because the Socialist Union failed to win the confidence of the masses. The evidence for that was in the tumultuous demonstrations by the people to express their opposition to the regime's highhanded practices against them while al-Qadhdhafi assumed a posture of languor and indolence in front of the enemy after Israel shot down the civilian Libyan airplane and killed about 100 Libyan citizens. The masses burned the buildings of the Socialist Union, and al-Qadhdhafi came up with a new stratagem to distract the people. [He created] the People's Committees and a council which he called the General People's Congress. It is made up of mayors and of the chairmen of the people's committees and trade unions. The congress has close to 1,500 members who are not elected by means of a secret, organized ballot. The members of the People's Congress are rather announced by various means to ensure that al-Qadhdhafi can always easily choose whom he wants and drop [from membership] anyone he did not want so as to make the congress a subservient puppet subject to his command. This congress meets once a year for almost 3 days at the invitation of al-Qadhdhafi. It is supposed to discuss and determine Libya's affairs in these 3 days!

The enthusiasm al-Qadhdhafi had demonstrated for the Socialist Union, declaring it an ideal framework [for democracy] and a unique experience in the world, and his warnings of imprisonment to any opponent or adversary were put to use again in implementing his new stratagem [of the people's committees]. He threatened opponents with prison and with the harshest of penalties. In his address to that congress on 14 January 1976 he said, "Our regime is the latest experiment in democracy. The revolution will resist all [forms of] folly and chaos."

Al-Qadhdhafi warned everyone against deviating from the new framework which he had proclaimed and formed.

"Such deviation will be considered a violation of the law and an infringement on the regime, on society and on democracy. It would also be a destruction of life."

His address was published on Thursday, 15/1/1976 in the Libyan government's newspaper, AL-JIHAD.

Al-Qadhdhafi did not forget to warn students that demonstrations were forbidden and that anyone who expressed opposition "will be forcefully opposed and his right to go to court and seek restitution will be lost because he violated the law and went along with the law of the jungle and the law of violence. Students who go out into the street and demonstrate must be put on trial."

And so it is that the shabby organizations which only al-Qadhdhafi establishes one after the other according to his interests remain the ideal organizations [representing] the best of democracy despite the fact that they mutually contradict each other. Any opposition to these various organizations that have succeeded each other is always punishable by imprisonment and execution. Al-Qadhdhafi wants the citizen's mind to be a blank page on which he would write every day whatever his fancies and his ambitions might dictate. Then he would come on the following day and wipe out the statements whose authenticity he had affirmed the previous day. In this place he would transcribe new whims and ambitions whose content differed from those of the ones he had written first, even though they may have the same objectives of establishing al-Qadhdhafi's control over the people and their wealth.

And so every day al-Qadhdhafi would wipe out what he wrote on the previous day. All the citizen would have to do is become a submissive, mute tool, with no opinion about what is engraved in his mind. Any desire to question these opinions or to discuss them would subject this citizen to a severe penalty that may go as far as execution.

In the course of al-Qadhdhafi's explanation of his extraordinarily cruel opinion on the fact that a citizen who violates the law loses his right to take his case to court, he said, "If he is attacked, if his home is broken into or if his wife is raped, the revolution will not protect him because he becomes a non-person." This opinion is undoubtedly [an example of] the worst kind of terrorism and dictatorship. There is nothing like it in any country in the world. It is totally antithetical to one of the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also contravenes the simplest principles of justice and law. In addition, it runs counter to Islamic law and to other laws as well. It represents the state's destruction of a citizen's right to life and to freedom as well as his family's right to the same with impunity. It sheds his blood, violates his honor and wastes his money with impunity, and it encourages every other individual to ignore the inviolability of this citizen's life, freedom and funds. It is difficult for a balanced human mind to come up with such a punishment, and all this is because a citizen merely wanted to use the mind that God had given him.

Only 3 days after the address in which al-Qadhdhafi expressed that barbaric opinion, the General People's Congress, which al-Qadhdhafi claimed was the highest form of democracy, revealed its nature and its identity and affirmed the fact that it was a mere puppet which al-Qadhdhafi manipulated as he wished. This congress issued a resolution that will disgrace and dishonor its history and the history of al-Qadhdhafi as well.

The resolution stated, "The Congress resolves that the people's democratic experiment which the Libyan Arab Republic is experiencing is capable of solving the problems of the individual and of the community. Society will not accept any departures from this experiment because these would be departures from the will and the authority of the people. Such departures must be resisted and crushed without leniency. An individual or a group that chooses a course other than this sound, democratic course which the people have accepted loses his right to litigation. People who make that choice are the ones who chose the only method with which one can deal with them. They took the struggle out of its democratic context and used a method that is not proper."

See the resolutions of the General People's Congress, 5-18 [sic] January 1976. The booklet is published by the Ministry of Information in Tripoli.

The tyrant al-Qadhdhafi did not stop at shedding the blood, the freedom and the possessions of those who oppsed him and their families. Some time before announcing this brutality of his, he had affirmed that anyone who did not join his people's congresses and the Socialist Union will have no civil rights and will become a non-person. He will be considered missing and non-existent. He also described those who are not registered, if those people did exist, as insane.

"A person who is not registered in the Constituent People's Congress is a non-person. He is missing; he does not exist. He has no civil rights if he is not registered with us. He is considered missing and a non-person. I do not believe that there can be a citizen who is in this situation unless he is insane."

This statement is from al-Qadhdhafi's explanation of the new amendment to the charter of the Arab Socialist Union, 27 April 1975. This explanation was published on page 5 of the Libyan government's newspaper, AL-JIHAD, 17 Rabi' al-Thani, 1395 Hegira, 29 April, 1975 A.D.

Al-Qadhdhafi continued to praise the General People's Congress just as he used to praise the Socialist Union which had met its fate. He considered every other experience and every other demand worthless and reactionary. In his address on 15 January 1976, he said [the following] about freedom of opinion and speech.

"The appeal for a so-called freedom of speech is a reactionary, backward appeal. It is a statement that democratic experiences have transcended. In our practice the people are governing themselves and determining their own destiny; we are practicing this not just talking about it. Anyone who talks about freedom of speech is a reactionary because we have gone beyond this statement by establishing and practicing a democracy of the people that is genuine."

But while al-Qadhdhafi considers his regime to be beyond [discussions about] freedom of speech and engaged in practicing it, he says in the same address, "The statements of a teacher, a group of teachers, a school, an

institute or a college can only be heard through their union. No petition is to be accepted from anyone unless that petition is filed through that person's union."

He says, "Statements by an attorney or by attorneys can only be heard through their association. Nothing any student will say will be heeded unless he says it through the Students' Association. Otherwise, [what he says] would be considered destructive to democracy."

The upshot of this is that the citizen is deprived of any intellectual freedom because al-Qadhdhafi can easily control the professional associations and their leaders. Al-Qadhdhafi had also dealt a blow to the Students' Association and imprisoned and tortured its members and other students. Then he executed students in Benghazi University and killed other students. He mistreated professional associations and sent his henchmen who beat up the president of the Libyan Bar Association and burned his office. Al-Qadhdhafi then abolished the legal profession altogether.

The term, "statements," which is used here naturally refers to opinion. However, al-Qadhdhafi considers any opinion other than his to be mere talk.

What al-Qadhdhafi says about his regime is not confined to the regime's suitability to the society he is ruling. Just as he praised the Socialist Union as the sole democratic framework, he states that his political system, the system of the People's Congress, which is the alternative to the Socialist Union, "is the only road to a genuine democracy of the people. The Libyan Arab Republic has thus come up with a practical solution to the problem of democracy and not just a theoretical solution to that problem for all the societies in the world."

As is customary with the so-called General People's Congress, which is always proving itself to be al-Qadhdhafi's submissive tool despite the latter's claims that the congress is the highest power in the country and the highest form of democracy, the congress issued resolutions in which it concurred with everything that al-Qadhdhafi had mentioned in his address of 15 January 1976 and in the addresses that preceded it as well.

"Through their general congress our great people resolve their total commitment, which stems from their free will, to consider the address delivered by the leader of the revolution on the sixth anniversary of the 1st of September Revolution to be the framework for our social change. We are reaffirming our allegiance to the leader of the revolution, [our] brother, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, and we consider this allegiance to be the practical foundation for realizing our goals for freedom, socialism and unity."

The congress also decided the following to implement al-Qadhdhafi's address of 15 January 1976.

A. The duties of unions, associations, leagues and societies are purely professional.

B. The leaders of unions, associations, leagues and societies are the only legal representatives of their members and the only ones who can speak for their professional interests, their causes and their problems.

C. Political activity can only be practiced through the constituent people's congresses and the general congress of the people.

D. No person can join associations, trade unions, leagues and professional societies unless he is a member of one of the constituent people's congresses.

Thus the General People's Congress has established that it is as far as it can be from being able to express the opinions of its members freely or express the opinions of the masses. It proved that it was no more than a puppet which al-Qadhdhafi manipulates as he wishes: it says what he tells it to say and concurs with what he dictates.

The practices and laws that restrain and confine all forms of individual and collective freedom were revealed after less than 2 years in the preparations that were made for his new political system, as manifested in the people's committees which are an alternative to the various forms of the Socialist Union. Following [a situation] in which citizens were forced to register with the Socialist Union, the situation became worse with the people's committees in control of the Libyan mainstream. These are superficial committees made up of a few proteges of the regime and the remaining beneficiaries of the Socialist Union, assisted by investigations and intelligence officers.

These committees created a stifling, gloomy and a tense atmosphere in Libya, spreading a wave of terror, fear and suppression. There were numerous transgressions and several clashes, and all forms of freedom of opinion and thought, even marginal discussions in closed places and family gatherings were outlawed. The rabble prevailed in the country, and the law no longer commanded respect or sway.

There were several provocations and attacks against university students in 1976. The students broke out in wide-ranging demonstrations in Tripoli and Benghazi in which even the army intervened to suppress. People took part in the largest and broadest gathering during which they expressed their utmost rancor and opposition to the regime which relies on terrorizing them daily and suppressing all forms of freedom and human dignity. It was then, in Benghazi that an armed raid operation was carried out. In Tripoli 'Abd-al-Salam Jalud, firing his gun, raided the campus of the university with a group of soldiers who fired their machine guns as they rushed into the campus.

Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi delivered a well-known bloodthirsty address at the University of Benghazi. In that address he expressed his strong hatred and resentment for the student public. Ever since that day, 7 April has been considered a historical day: after that day people were killed, and the government revealed its terrorist practices as it did in the aftermath of

the 1973 demonstrations after the Libyan civilian airplane was shot down over Sinai by Israel. It was after that that al-Qadhdhafi delivered his historic Zawarah address or the five points in which he threatened the masses with murder, execution and imprisonment. Al-Qadhdhafi deals with any demonstrations, movements, popular desires or expressions, even if they were peaceful and calm, by doling out more harsh measures, oppressive actions, arbitrary measures, violent statements, cruel laws and arrests.

Al-Qadhdhafi handled the 1973 Benghazi demonstrations by delivering the Zawarah address in which he prodded his people's committees to consider the laws in a state of suspension and to act with citizens on that basis: they can kill, imprison and arrest citizens and burn their books. All this was carried out in a mob-like manner that resembled insanity. Some people were killed; books were burned; and hundreds of intellectuals were thrown in jail without any charge and subjected to various forms of torture. The people's committees gave themselves the right to appropriate the people's liberties, their homes and their personal property.

Al-Qadhdhafi used the same method to remedy the situation after the students' demonstrations in the University of Benghazi and in the University of Tripoli. On 7 April 1976 he delivered an address at the University of Benghazi, and that address was followed by executions, arrests, repression and terror.

In his address of 7 april 1976, which was published on the following day in the government newspaper, AL-JIHAD, al-Qadhdhafi told the faculty and the students of Benghazi University, "It is unacceptable to me to have the society where I and my children live ruled by a party or a group of parties." This statement is from al-Qadhdhafi's address to the faculty and students of Benghazi University on 7 Rabi' al-Akhar 1396 Hegira, 7 April 1976 A.D. The address was published the following day on page 2 of the government newspaper, AL-JIHAD.

Thus, university professors and students who become involved in a mere discussion about party affiliation expose themselves to punishment without trial. Al-Qadhhdafi himself suspended his own law.

"The parliamentary experience is nothing at all. It is an operation of deception; it is nonsense. The walls of the university were not built so you can tread over them in the darkness [of ignorance]. The university is rather a hallow place, where you have to tread in the light [of knowledge]. How can a university student write on the walls of the university the way a small child would? The small child who writes on the wall in your home is punished for his action. Anyone who writes on the walls of the university deserves to be punished too because this is folly. I said that democracy lies in government by the people, not in people expressing themselves. Freedom of speech is not democracy." (Ibid)

The walls of the university are inviolable, but the university itself, its mission, its professors and its students are not as important as the walls.

Al-Qadhdhafi added, "A naive student says that we are a military movement. We want to clean your rotting brains. Do you know what the word military [means]? Democracy is in my blood more than it is in yours. You who talk about these things, if you were ruling the people, you would have turned their life into an unbearable hell. What then is this nonsense that you are saying about the military? This student does not deserve to be a student in the university, and he does not deserve to be among us as of this moment. It is the people who are paying for the university out of their budget. If you want the university to be free and the press to be free and the radio to be free, that's fine; pay up. The cost of this university campus is 50 million. Pay the cost of the books and the lectures. Go collect these funds and see the naivete [for yourselves]. We are exposing the naive mentalities that deserve to be crushed and that have no place in our midst in the university or elsewhere. I am still talking about the majority, this existing passive majority which is incapable of getting even with its enemies." (Ibid)

Anyone who expresses an opinion that does not meet with al-Qadhdhafi's approval, even if he is a university professor, has a rotten mind and deserves to be crushed. Al-Qadhdhafi does not want a free university, a free press or a free broadcast [service], and the students have to pay 50 million out of their own pockets if they want the university to be free. Is al-Qadhdhafi paying for the university out of his own private funds so as to determine what he thinks is fit for the university?

Al-Qadhdhafi continued his address, "I am definitely tired. I am especially tired of the university, of the books, of the words that are in [those books] and the association that you formed. If the enemy of the revolution is the one who is leading the students, then you must be a nation of sheep. You should understand where you are now and why you oppose [something]. You are putting into practice things that are quite old and reactionary. I read what you wrote, and these [articles] unfortunately advocate, I mean, indicate illiteracy, naivete superficiality, a lack of knowledge and a lack of awareness of where one's interests lie." (Ibid).

This makes it evident that al-Qadhdhafi does not tolerate another opinion that differs from his own. A person who subscribes to another opinion is a sheep. Because articles written by university professors and students do not glorify al-Qadhdhafi, those people are in his opinion illiterate. He said that much in his address.

"I read the publications that are written by some small fry here at the university. The time has come to cut their hands and chop off their heads. I can have a number of people who are enemies of the revolution executed now because I know I am right. If you want to destroy your interests and the iterests of your families, persist in this whim of yours. Anyone who expresses opposition must be trampled underfoot by the Libyan people. To those who said that 15 students died, [let me tell them], let us assume that they did die; who took them out of the university and into the street? The one who went to Tobruq and told students to demonstrate is known. In whose interests does this idiot think these demonstrations are taking

place? The one who went to (Daranah) and prodded [the students] to demonstrate [is also known]. When you cheer in a demonstration against the revolution, you are thereby supporting the Zionist enemy; you are standing alongside the U.S. enemy; and you are supporting reactionaries. You would be putting yourself at the service of Jews and Christians." (Ibid)

Thus in one paragraph al-Qadhdhafi made harsh statements that hurt university professors and students and threatened to cut their hands and chop off their heads. He called them small fry and advocated that they be trampled underfoot and executed. He accused them of being stupid and of working for colonialism, reactionaries and Jews. All this [invective] was due to the fact that students published a leaflet after university students were shot to death by [members of] al-Qadhdhafi's regime.

Al-Qadhdhafi went on to say, "I do not know what a person who opposes the regime seeks and wants. If one were to think of a university student opposing the revolution, such opposition would be an indication of ignorance and backwardness. The tables are turned: those who are here in the university are illiterate, and those who are outside the university are the ones who are educated and cultured. The revolutionary program is in your interests. It is better for you than if we were to force a party on you. Tomorrow we will form a workers' party; we will force it on you; and it will become a dictatorship. It is best for you to be in a people's committee. It is better for you than having us force on you some agency that would act with you in a highhanded manner." (Ibid).

Al-Qadhdhafi continues to affirm that everyone who opposes [the regime] is ignorant, backward and illiterate, even if he were a university professor. His logic states, "Either you let me govern you in my own way or I turn on you someone who will be even more highhanded with you than I am."

Al-Qadhdhafi went on to say, "Here at the university writing on the walls is absolutely forbidden. Writing on the wall means that a policeman must come into the university with a cane in his hand. He would hit you on the fingers and pull your ear as though you were a child. It is forbidden to write and hang posters and leaflets on the walls; it is offensive." (Ibid).

Anyone who writes or hangs posters on the walls of the university is to be punished, unless the statements he writes or the posters he hangs on the walls of the university and elsewhere are filled with expressions that glorify al-Qadhdhafi and contain expressions from his Green Book.

Al-Qadhdhafi added, "What is happening now is that revolutionary committees are being formed in every college. These committees are conducting a purge of the students and the faculty. If students want this to be carried out peacefully, it will be; if not, it will be done with bloodshed. Revolutionary committees must be formed everywhere; their function is to purge the student body and the faculty.

"Those who ran away in fear are the enemies of the revolution. They cannot enter the university, and they have no place there. If there are members

of the faculty who are opposed to the revolution, they must be eliminated. Why does a policeman go inside the university to arrest you? He does that because you do not know how to conduct yourself because you are not free. You are rather a slave to your own delusions. Go to your masters, the enemies of the nation." (Ibid).

And here too al-Qadhdhafi hurls more abuse and vilification on university professors and students. Some of those who walked out of the university and marched in the demonstrations were killed. Some of those who stayed behind were expelled by the university or by the revolutionary committees. Those who left the university were considered enemies of the revolution and expelled from it. The university can hold only those who sing the praises of al-Qadhdhafi, glorify him and cheer for him.

A footnote: Wearing his military uniform al-Qadhdhafi rushed into the [lecture] hall along with a large group of military men. The gun he was carrying was visible. All during the hysterical address he delivered, al-Qadhdhafi brandished the cane he was holding in his hand while the military men who were around him kept their fingers on the triggers of their guns. No university official was allowed to stand next to al-Qadhdhafi or behind him. This was an expression of his fear, his dislike and his resentment for university students and faculty.

This uncivilized address was followed by a vicious, hate campaign against the student movement and against culture in general. Al-Qadhdhafi even said in the national congress of his party during a discussion about the people's committees and how they are chosen, "Don't be fooled by a person with a doctorate or an educated person who looks down on you. Trample such people underfoot and crush them." After that a reign of terror spread among the ranks of the people and among those who are educated as well. Most intellectuals, however, were imprisoned; hundreds of them were taken in custody.

Al-Qadhdhafi proclaimed and put into practice mandatory military training without enacting a mandatory conscription law. He used this mandatory training as a means of taming students and intellectuals, to even the score with them and to get rid of all those who can use their knowledge and their thoughts to raise a few questions. Al-Qadhdhafi devoted his efforts to his campaign of bloodthirsty speeches so as to strike more terror and fear in people's hearts.

Thus despite claims that ideal democracy was being practiced--and this is the democracy that al-Qadhdhafi had promised, the democracy that transcended and went beyond freedom of speech--that democracy did not tolerate the students' demonstrations which broke out 5 months after al-Qadhdhafi delivered his address in the universities of Tripoli and Benghazi. Many students lost their lives in these demonstrations. They were killed by the bullets of the tyrannical authority. The Libyan student communities abroad were sympathetic, and there were sit-ins in embassies in every country where Libyan students were. Al-Qadhdhafi delivered his address on 7 April 1976, and numerous selections of it have been published. A picture of the

ideal democracy in practice was unveiled and revealed, and a sense of total sadness, pain and misery prevailed throughout the country due to these bloodthirsty practices. However, al-Qadhdhafi whose method has always been offensive and not defensive, using expressions which emphasize crushing, executing and eliminating people, continued his campaign to protect his regime in the name of protecting the revolution. On 19 April 1976 every careful observer was assured of the identity of al-Qadhdhafi's democracy whose foundations he had established at the General People's Congress in January 1976. He said then, "We are the revolution. I want to emphasize this constantly and all the time. We are the revolution. Almost all the Arab revolutions today have been eliminated and have turned into police regimes whose only concern is to fight the masses and to confirm a dictatorial government."

Al-Qadhdhafi then turns to criticize parliamentary, democratic experiments and says, "The fact that no nation in the world has received a real form of power, as is the case in the Libyan Arab Republic, indicates that people are not free. When a party receives power on behalf of the people, such power is false. It involves deceiving the people and [imposing] a dictatorial government on them. All the people are subject to that government while the party rules."

Al-Qadhdhafi then goes back to the attitude of the student movement and says, "Thank God, they were a small, handful of students whose posture was rightist. Their rightist posture proved that they had no interest in the revolution and that they were against the cause of liberating the Arab land of Palestine. They proved that they were enemies of Islam, enemies of the cultural awakening, enemies of farmers, enemies of workers, enemies of the Libyan people, enemies of progress and enemies of Islam. Accordingly, they do in fact deserve to be crushed." This is from al-Qadhdhafi's address on 19 April 1976 which he delivered in Wadi Zamzam.

Thus, students' demonstrations and their opposition to al-Qadhdhafi's shameful violations of basic rights and freedoms in society were turned into non-existent and unfounded charges against them. Major charges were made against them in offensive terms that were actually ridiculous. Because those students carried out demonstrations that were not instigated by the government and were not approved by it beforehand, they have become enemies of everything: of the masses, of Arab unity, of the liberation of Palestine, Islam, civilization, farmers, workers and once again enemies of the Arab nation and of Islamic progress. Al-Qadhdhafi then concludes his [litany] of false charges by saying that the students have actually been convicted, incriminated and crushed.

Al-Qadhdhafi affirmed his lack of respect for his superficial courts and his special emergency courts even before the detained students were taken to court. He issued his verdicts on the detained students before they were put on trial. "The enemies of the revolution have actually been eliminated. The court will issue the death sentence against them, and they will hang from the door of a church. The people have passed judgment everywhere. The people are asking for their execution. We have discovered that the plot

which prodded the students was a foreign, colonialist, outside plot." This is from al-Qadhdhafi's address on 19 April 1976.

Thus any form of opposition, even peaceful opposition in democratic regimes, are construed in al-Qadhdhafi's regime as treason; and those who voice such opposition are considered enemies of everything, instigators prodded by an outside, colonialist plot and traitors.

The students to whom al-Qadhdhafi referred in his address were actually sentenced to death, and the sentence was carried out in the same place that was referred to above. Their bodies remained hanging for a whole day, and they were shown to television viewers.

Al-Qadhdhafi then began to turn into a theoretician, a philosopher and then a prophet when he issued his Third Universal Theory in the Green Book. His opinions became not only absolutely indisputable, but they were also read in the same way the Koran was read on radio and television. Selections from his Green Book were relayed every day in Libyan newspapers, and he began to surround himself and his ideas with an aura of divinity and sanctity. Not only has a discussion of those ideas become a crime, but not reading them, not being guided by them, not believing in them and not yielding to them has also become a crime.

Al-Qadhdhafi's Green Book itself may clearly express his blatant violations of basic freedoms. Al-Qadhdhafi divides his book into three sections. In one section he defines his notion of democracy; in the second section he defines his economic "theory;" and in the third part he [defines] social relations. In the first part al-Qadhdhafi violates all the internationally recognized basic freedoms such as the right to speak freely and to have one's opinion, [the right] to demonstrate and [to hold a] political assembly, and the right to exercise freedom of religion and freedom of the press. Al-Qadhdhafi considers all these [rights and freedoms] to have run their course and their tools to be dictatorial and reactionary.

If one can describe al-Qadhdhafi's statements and addresses, one can say that they are always emphasizing the justification of any measure that would thwart freedoms and allow his government anything for the purpose of concentrating all the means and methods of direct and violent control in its hands. However, the Green Book era, or the era of the masses as he likes to describe it, reveals to the inquirer other facts and other angles that round out al-Qadhdhafi's personality. Al-Qadhdhafi has a blind bias for all his opinions which he imposes on people with violence. He tolerates neither a discussion of those opinions nor an opposing opinion. He uses all the methods of the media and tremendous sums of money as well to promote those ideas which constitute comprehensive intellectual terrorism. This blind intellectual fanaticism which al-Qadhdhafi manifests for his opinions indicates narrow horizons, ignorance of the interrelationship between [the branches of] human knowledge, short-sightedness and hostility to individual effort. It is an indication of al-Qadhdhafi's inability to face up to the search for knowledge which can radiate the cultural glow for the development of humanity.

Al-Qadhdhafi lavishes random praise on "his theory" in the course of expounding that theory in the Green Book where no traces of humility can be found. As has already been stated, the Green Book is a required textbook in all the stages of education. It is also recited in the same way the Koran is recited at the beginning and at the end of radio and television broadcasts and before any news bulletin is read. Selections from the Green Book are printed in prominent positions every day on every page of the official newspapers. In fact, all the state's dispatches have selections from the Green Book: "the committees are everywhere;" and "there can be no democracy without people's congresses." This preoccupation with himself is a narcissistic phenomenon that does not respect the cultures, the efforts, opinions or the knowledge of others. Accordingly, it presents a sarcastic portrait of a distorted, adolescent, fanatic mind; it does not extend the horizons of knowledge, nor does it advance any new thought that would impose itself or forge its course by using logic, argument and dialogue.

"It is best to embrace the Green Book; otherwise a red book will be forced on you." This is one of the statements that al-Qadhdhafi made to clergymen and prayer leaders when he met with them in Tripoli in March 1978.

Despite all appearances to the contrary, al-Qadhdhafi lacks confidence in himself. He has a restless, disturbed personality. The circumstances of his birth and the life he lived after his peers moved ahead of him made him somewhat bitter and rancorous, and these feelings affected the course of his life. He tried to overcome them by assuming command and presiding over his classmates who were at least 5 years younger than he was. Because he was older than they were, he began forcing himself and all his opinions on them. He grew up in this atmosphere that led him to attain his ambitions in the military organization.

Since coming to power involved some intelligence, al-Qadhdhafi was taken by unlimited self-admiration. In the first part of the Green Book he says of his opinion of democracy, "No one represents the people; representation is deception." He says, "The party is the dictatorship of the age; it is the modern, democratic method of government." About parties he says, "The purpose of parties is to impose the power of their beliefs on society as a whole; their objective is power [which they seek] in the name of carrying out their programs."

A footnote: This statement may have been one of the means by which al-Qadhdhafi attained power under the guise of saving the Arab nation and implementing a development program. Al-Qadhdhafi increased the fragmentation of the Arab countries, and the development programs of the previous age were better than those of al-Qadhdhafi. Al-Qadhdhafi's foolish ambitions led to the development of hostility between Libya and most of its neighboring and non-neighboring Arab countries.

If we were to review al-Qadhdhafi's ideas in the course of reviewing his violations of basic and political human rights, we would find [the following]:

1. He is opposed to parliamentary and legislative bodies that are elected by means of a free secret ballot, regardless of the soundness and integrity of the method used and the neutrality of the results. This is because al-Qadhdhafi objects to the substance, the identity and the power of a parliamentary body and not to its form or to a few of its flaws which can be remedied. His objection to secret balloting also is due to the fact that forgery [under those circumstances] would be difficult and so would total control of its outcome.

2. He despises partisanship and parties because in his opinion they constitute a contemporary dictatorship.

3. He rejects the principle of a popular referendum regardless of the guarantees, the conditions and the precautions.

4. He does not recognize freedom of the press.

Having destroyed these foundations, al-Qadhdhafi said that in his opinion the way out lay in the establishment of people's committees which would elect their representatives to the People's Congress. A representative of a people's committee would not have the right to make a single statement that he was not told to make by the committee that sent him to the People's Congress. He would not have the right to raise questions or to discuss any new points. The method of selecting this representative must not be secret. This would make it easy for al-Qadhdhafi and his group to control the selection of those representatives, and this is what usually happens. Furthermore, the revolutionary committees--which are non-existent in the Green Book, which contains the radical and the final solution to all the problems of the human race--are the committees that advise and guide the masses in selecting their proper representative to the congress. This is from al-Qadhdhafi's address to the revolutionary committees in December 1978.

Al-Qadhdhafi knows that today [the task of] abolishing a parliamentary body, overruling the representatives of the people and having all the people come together in the old style of the Greeks to govern themselves has become impossible. "It is indisputable and incontestable that direct democracy, if it becomes a reality, is the ideal method. But no matter how small the population is, the people cannot be brought together at once to discuss, consider and decide their policy. Therefore, nations have turned away from direct democracy and replaced it with numerous theories of government such as parliamentary bodies and party blocs." This is from the first chapter of the Green Book on solving the problem of democracy.

Al-Qadhdhafi is thereby acknowledging the fact that direct government for all the people is merely a glorious idea that is quite far from the world of reality. What then is the solution?

Al-Qadhdhafi does not offer a solution, but he begins his answer by endorsing a decisive government as though that endorsement were a resolution of the military Revolutionary Command Council which has already produced the

charter and decreed the Socialist Union. Al-Qadhdhafi says, "The Green Book promises to guide all nations to the path of direct democracy according to a wonderful and a practical system." This is from the first chapter of the Green Book.

Al-Qadhdhafi thus did not begin to explain his alternative theory after having attacked parliament, parties, the free press, a referendum and free secret elections. Instead, he began by approving an ultimate [form of] government before presenting his theory. He may have done that to arouse interest, and he may have done that to arouse fear also, especially since al-Qadhdhafi acknowledges that direct democracy is impossible. "Whereas no two sane people disagree on the notion that direct democracy is the ideal democracy, although its application is impossible, and whereas the Third Universal Theory offers us a realistic experience of direct democracy, then the problem of direct democracy in the world has been solved." Even after this absolute judgment which comes in al-Qadhdhafi's theory book two pages before the end of the book, al-Qadhdhafi does not reveal this extraordinary theory which he--in all humility--describes by using all the adjectives that Muslims use to describe the Holy Koran, the last book to be considered [the source of] guidance for all humanity just as the noble prophet is the last of God's messengers. Al-Qadhdhafi used all these adjectives to describe the Green Book, "the guide for humanity." Al-Qadhdhafi, "the revolutionary thinker" and the "teacher commander" presents his theory in the last two pages of his book. Afterwards the theory became a decree according to which the country has been governed. "There is only one method and one theory for democracy. It lies in the people's congresses and in the people's committees." (Ibid)

"First, the people are to be divided into constituent people's congresses, and each congress is to select a committee to lead it. The regional non-constituent people's congresses are formed from all the committees. Then the masses of these constituent people's congresses choose administrative people's committees to replace government administrations. All the facilities of society would thus be run by people's committees, and the people's committees that run these facilities become responsible for them in front of the constituent people's congresses which dictate policy to them and monitor their implementation of this policy."

Al-Qadhdhafi's review of democracy in his book comes to an end. He has considered these few lines to be the greatest idea in history since the French Revolution--[he said that in] his address to clergymen in March 1978. He considered his words to be the guiding light for humanity, and the "ultimate" solution for democracy in the world. "The problem of running the government is thereby evidently solved; the tools of dictatorship are brought to an end; the people become the means of government; and the riddle of democracy in the world is thereby solved." (Ibid) Afterwards al-Qadhdhafi turned from being a mere guardian of democracy--which is the description that was given to 'Abd-al-Nasir--to a philosopher making fun of 'Abd-al-Nasir himself. "It is the state of alliance in society that brought about the end of Nasirism with the death of 'Abd-al-Nasir."

The constitutional proclamation expired and another proclamation was made in its place on 2 March 1977. It was called by al-Qadhdhafi "the Proclamation of Establishing the People's Power." He put his theory into practice, not through upgrading the congresses by secret balloting but rather by calling for persons whose "revolutionary" attributes can be trusted. Those people would choose their counterparts in every region, and what later came to be called the General People's Congress was formed. It announced the establishment of the people's power and "affirmed the course of the advancing revolution under the leadership of the revolutionary leader and the teacher commander, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi." (From the Proclamation of the People's Power, 2 March 1977).

The congress adopted a resolution to put into practice the opinion presented by al-Qadhdhafi in his book which claims to have solved the problem of democracy in the world and changed the name of the country to that of Jamahiriyah. We will deal with this event in the third part of this report, the part on practices.

The third resolution or the third proclamation of the People's Congress at its meeting of 2 March 1977 was "the resolution of the General People's Congress to select the revolutionary thinker and the teacher commander, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi secretary general of the People's Congress." (from the Libyan newspaper, AL-FAJR AL-JADID [The new Dawn], 3 March 1977).

The fourth resolution was that of appointing members of the General People's Congress. After the congress decided to elect al-Qadhdhafi secretary general of the congress, it decided to elect members for this secretariat which was to consist of the remaining members of the Revolutionary Command Council: Jalud, al-Khuwayldi, al-Kharubi and Yunis.

Al-Qadhdhafi proceeded on this course that he had chosen--a twisted and a temperamental method of political action, unrestricted by regulatory measures or regulatory laws that would restrict his measures or his conduct or stop him at some point. Any studious researcher would discover under scrutiny that this theory, which al-Qadhdhafi has presented, is not the outcome of thought, but it is rather the product of his need for evasive theories, laced with terror, about the causes that call for democrcy. These causes have often placed him on a collision course with the masses and with students.

Al-Qadhdhafi's criticism of parliament is not new; he criticized it even before he brought forth his theory in 1977. By referring to the method he used and the statements he made before he advanced his theory, it becomes evident that he did not think of setting up any parliamentary elections, regardless of their form, even among the members of the Socialist Union as 'Abd-al-Nasir used to do.

Al-Qadhdhafi's hostility to parties is also well known and has been reviewed. The review spans his 1969 Tripoli address and the law that was issued in 1972. We have already referred to that law, and we will review its articles in the second part of this report.

With regard to freedom of the press, al-Qadhdhafi abolished the national press and established the Government Press Organization. We touched upon his address to students on 7 April 1976.

Regarding the referendum, he does not want nor does he think of letting himself be tested in front of the people, even if that were under the supervision of his officers. Perhaps this is because he either despises or fears the opinion of the people.

Thus the theory was formulated to establish a set method and an existing policy; it was not the result of a theoretical and an intellectual effort. The best indication of this lies in al-Qadhdhafi's sarcastic remarks with which he concludes his theory. These remarks will help those who are deceived by hollow words. "This is true democracy in theory. In practice, it is always the powerful who rule." (The Green Book, Part One).

This is the brief and terse conclusion of al-Qadhdhafi's statements which we tried to list here so they can serve as a reference for those who are seeking power [and who wish] to find out the extent of the violations of al-Qadhdhafi's government of the simplest rules of human rights and basic freedoms in Libya.

In this chapter of the report and through what has been reviewed we wish to emphasize the following:

First, al-Qadhdhafi's hostility for freedoms began on 1 September 1969, the date that brought him to power by military means.

Second, al-Qadhdhafi has declared his hostility to basic and political freedoms in the speeches which have been reviewed, from September 1969 until this date. Accordingly, his theory in his Green Book serves his policy of controlling, terrorizing, dominating and repressing people. He abolished human and individual rights to establish party organizations and to exercise freedom in individual or collective political belief, violating thereby the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Third, al-Qadhdahfi's domestic and foreign policy has been temperamental. Inside the country he established the Socialist Union, adopted the charter, the people's committees, the five points of the Zawarah address and then the Green Book and the revolutionary committees. All this, however, intensified his hostility to basic and political freedoms, to the formation and organization of political organizations, to peaceful political opposition, parliament, careful control by the people and to a binding constitution. [It has also intensified his hostility to] a judicial authority and to other guarantees against a ruler violating the rights of a society and of individuals, dominating them and using them as tools which he would create and terminate at will. Al-Qadhdhafi's foreign policy, despite daily shifts and position changes--from an advocate of unity to an advocate of regionalism, of tribalism and narrow family interests; from a U.S. supporter to an enemy of the Russians and an opponent of the liberation organization; from a partner in a relationship of unity with Egypt to blatant hostility

toward Egypt whether it fought or not--did not change, and his hostility to democracy and to the course of basic freedoms remained unchanged. This is the only stance among al-Qadhdhafi's vacillations in thought, policy and institutions that has remained firm. Its extremism, fanaticism and terror increase every day. It is a posture characterized by the repression of individuals and groups [as is evident] in his speeches, statements, theories, laws, decrees, legislation and daily practices against our people, as we will see in the two following parts of this report.

Mu'ammar's statements, laws and practices in the 10 years of his reign intensify the terror, repression, wholesale killing and the psychological destruction of society every day. They strip the citizens of their spirit of national ambition, and they reinforce his autocracy and his domination.

If there is any freedom for al-Qadhdhafi to talk about, it is his absolute freedom to thwart the rights of Libyan citizens and to violate their basic and political freedoms.

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END

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REPORT ON ARAB ECONOMY RELEASED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 2

[Article: "Arab Economic Progress In 1980; the Oil-Producing Countries Account For 82 Percent Of Arab GNP and Have a $105 Billion Surplus"]

[Text] According to a recent report released by the Secretariat General of the Council of Arab Economic Unity the overall balance of trade of the Arab countries showed a $90 billion surplus in 1980, compared with $56 billion in 1979 and $22 billion in 1978.

Most of the surplus is concentrated in the Arab oil-producing countries which in 1980 had an estimated $105 billion surplus, compared with $66.6 billion in 1979.

The balance of trade deficit of the [non]-oil-producing Arab countries amounted to about $15 billion in 1980, compared with $10.6 billion in 1979.

The report indicated that the relative weight of the GNP's of the oil-producing Arab countries to the GNP of the Arab Nation as a whole rose from 71.6 percent in 1978 to about 76 percent in 1979, and to approximately 82 percent in 1980. This growth reflects the emergence of the Arab oil countries as an important influence in Arab and international affairs.

Trade

The report reviewed the Arab trade situation and noted the decreasing proportion of inter-Arab trade as a part of total foreign trade with the non-Arab world. This reflects the tenuousness of inter-Arab economic ties.

According to the statistics the value of Arab exports to Arab countries was only 6 percent of total exports in 1980.

Oil revenues comprised about 88 percent of the value of Arab exports in 1980.

Agricultural Production

The report confirmed that Arab agricultural production has decreased in comparison with world production levels. Arab grain yields has fallen to 1.1 tons per hectare while the average world yield is 1.9 tons per hectare.

With regard to wheat, average yield in the Arab World is 1 ton per hectare while the average worldwide yield is 1.7 tons.

The report gave an estimated Arab shortfall of all grains amounting to about 13.6 million tons, mostly wheat, in 1980. This shortfall is expected to amount to about 19.2 million tons by the year 2000.

Industry

The report noted that consumer industries comprised more than 50 percent of all Arab manufacturing industries, while intermediate industries make up 25 to 30 percent. Production industries make up only 5 to 15 percent.

The Arab share of worldwide industrial output is only 0.5 percent, while industrial goods account for 65 percent of all Arab imports.

9123
CSO: 4404/63

DETAILS OF 5-YEAR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN REVEALED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by 'Ali Ibrahim: "An Open Discussion About a Secret Arab Economic Document, Part 2, Grain Elevators To Stockpile Imported Grain; $1.5 Billion In Military Industries"]

[Text] A joint Arab contracting organization is needed to implement $9.1 billion in construction.

A projected $6.3 billion first Arab economic plan to achieve food security.

According to recent statistics the amount of assistance and loans provided by the well-to-do Arab countries to the developing countries during the 1970's was about $30 billion.

During an interview with AL-BAYAN held in Tunis Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Zalzalah, deputy secretary general of the Arab League for economic affairs, said that this fact shows that the proposed investments for the first 5-year plan for joint Arab economic work, 1981-1985, which amount to $21.5 billion--of which only $12 billion is actually needed for financing--do not constitute an overly ambitious, impractical or unrealistic figure.

The proposed plan, the first part of which AL-BAYAN published in a previous installment, concentrates on projects for Arab food security and establishing as strategic stockpile of food in view of the dangerous situation currently facing the Arab countries in their dependence on foreign countries to ensure food, and the threat this poses even to their freedom and political independence.

The plan gives top priority to the military industries insofar as proposed industrialization projects are concerned. In today's installment the distribution of the plan's investments by sector and country is given.

The final estimated distribution of the plan's investments is as follows:

$6.3 billion--29 percent of the total--for food security.

$7.3 billion--34 percent--for industrialization, including food industries related to achieving food security.

$8 billion for the various other sectors.

Investments in Industry

The investments allocated for industry include $1 billion for geological and mineral surveys; $605 million for mining industries; $167.6 million for food industries; $445 million for chemical industries; $200 million for petroleum industries; $294 million for non-mineral raw materials industries; $2.938 billion for mineral and technological industries; $120 million for electronics industries; $1.5 billion for military industries; $190.4 million for industrial research and training.

Transport, Communications and Stockpiling

Investments of $5,933,600,000 have been allocated for the transport, communications and stockpiling sector. About 30 percent will be used toward the achievement of food security by establishing warehouses to hold Arab food stockpiles.

This sector has projects which include $2.181 billion--36.8 percent--for land transport; $950 million--16 percent--for railroads; $389 million--6.6 percent--for maritime transport; $500 million--8.4 percent--for air transport; $150 million--2.5 percent--for wire and wireless communications; $1.763,600,000--29.7 percent--for warehouses for strategic food stockpiling; $139 [sic] for research.

Services

Ten percent of the plan's investments--$2.358 billion--has been allocated for the services sector. Within this sector 80.3 percent of the investments will be for basic education projects and projects for eliminating illiteracy; $49.1 million will go for establishing a Palestinian university;, and $290 million will be spent on health services.

Water and Electricity

Investments in the area of water and electricity amount to $1,010,200,000, which is 4.1 percent of the plan's total. Of this, $200 million will go towards building an electric generating station in Democratic Yemen and linking it with northern Yemen. The remainder will be allocated towards linking the electricity networks among neighboring countries in the Arabian Peninsula and in North Africa.

It will be seen that the proposed plan allocates a greater share--11 percent--to industrialization than the amount originally allocated in the proposal submitted to the ministers of foreign affairs and economy in 1980. This is to better serve the goals of scientific research and technological development.

The Military Industries

The proposed plan makes note of compliance with the terms of a document on strategy for joint Arab economic activity. The military industries have been given top priority for industrialization, followed by industries peripheral to the military, and by the rest of the primary and technological industries requiring industrialization, including the transport industry.

The plan affirms the importance of the agricultural industries in view of their connection with food security. It also affirms the importance of the building materials and construction industries by virtue of their connection with implementation of the projects required for development.

The plan makes note of the fact that local plans are mostly concerned with the petrochemical and building materials industries. Therefore it emphasizes strengthening the other sectors, beginning with mining, to broaden the resources base.

The transport, communications and stockpiling sector owes its high share to the goal that has been set for building grain elevators capacious enough to ensure a strategic stockpiling of the principal grains, particularly wheat and corn, in view of the fact that this stockpile will form the primary basis for Arab food security.

The proposed plan included the construction sector within those sectors devoted to the production of commodities, and which also include agriculture, industry and electricity.

An Arab Contracting Organization

The proposal affirms that a joint Arab effort to invest a total of $21.5 billion requires the establishment of a joint Arab contracting organization to implement the projects. It noted that one of the most important advantages of the completeness of the planning was that the size and scope of the construction work has become clear.

For example, of the $6 billion to be invested in the transport, communications and stockpiling sector, $4 billion will go towards construction work, primarily in building roads and bridges.

According to estimates given in the plan, the construction sector--which, the plan emphasizes, is number one as far as production goes, since it is responsible for implementing investments which in time will exceed $9.1 billion--will, during the 5 years of the plan, purchase $5.5 billion worth of Arab products for its construction needs.

Therefore the plan calls for the establishment of a pan-Arab contracting organization which will require an investment of $488 million. The plan also calls for establishing joint Arab consulting agencies.

Some of the plan's studies also showed the need for establishing a joint Arab company to market the products of the technological industries in the Arab countries. This will require an estimated investment of $10 million in view of the limited market for Arab technological products which in many cases leads to unutilized production potential.

Food Security

The plan is particularly concerned with food security and Arab agricultural development. It noted that the Arab World has vast expanses of arable land--about 236 million hectares--of which only one-fifth--46.4 million hectares--is being put

to use. It noted that it is possible to increase the area under cultivation fourfold, by 190 million hectares.

The plan also made note of the fact that 20 percent of the cultivated land can be made to increase its yield because it depends on permanent water sources. The other 80 percent is dependent on rain, and thus has low yields and high transport [costs].

With regard to water, 475.7 billion cubic meters could be utilized annually, but only 297.5 billion actually are.

What Is Required For Implementation

In its conclusion, the plan states several points which must be taken into account before it can be implemented. These are as follows:

That the matter of strengthening the resources of the pan-Arab and local finance organizations be considered to ensure the requisite investments.

That an initial agreement be made for dividing the additional allocations among those organizations.

That an agreement be reached on unified principles with regard to the terms for financing every kind of project to make financing accessible to the borrower nations.

In view of the fact that the amount allocated for local plans by the nations with a deficit may exceed local cash resources in the initial phase of the plan, consideration must be made for strengthening the ability of the financing agencies responsible for supporting the balance of payments of the Arab countries to cover the sum of $2 billion, in addition to the allocations necessary for the local plans themselves.

The plan contains proposals that can be included within the Decade for Arab Development which will be financed by five Arab Gulf States: the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Iraq.

Implementation requires devising annual programs of implementation to mobilize resources, and a rigorous system for annual planning and follow-up.

9123
CSO: 4404/63

'BAKHTAR' HITS 'DEUTSHE WELLE' APPOINTMENT OF AMIN ASSOCIATE

LD122122 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0442 GMT 12 Nov 81

[Text] Kabul, 11 Nov (BAKHTAR)--The recent appointment of Qudos Tandar, a close associate of Hafizollah Amin, as the head of radio broadcasts of Deutsche Welle is yet another proof of the fact that the position of Amin's tyrannical regime and true continuing support to Afghan counter-revolution are parts of a single imperialist plot to overthrow the revolutionary power in the DRA, writes a political observer of BAKHTAR news agency.

The commentary notes that the significance of this appointment is more than that of a routine appointment of some [word indistinct]. Firstly, the post of the in-charge of radio broadcasts in Deutsche Welle is an official government post in the Federal Republic of Germany while the said person was sometimes ago a high-ranking official in the government of Amin and also one of his close associates.

Secondly, as disclosed by the general head of the external services of Deutsche Welle radio, verifications had been obtained prior to Qudos Tandar's appointment, from the middle eastern radio programme service, the intelligence service of the FRG and the officials of the Embassy of FRG in Kabul.

Waht was so attractive here in this man who wore the appearance of an overzealous revolutionary that caused Deutsche Welle to see eye to eye with him? The commentary provides an answer to this question by quoting Qodos Tandar himself.

Speaking to the reactionary daily RHEINISCHER MERCUR, he said: "I am a fit man for this job because after the victory of the April revolution Deutsche Welle recommended to me to go to Afghanistan.... Later after the new phase of the revolution it assisted me in fleeing from Afghanistan. I can prove these assertions with documents." This shows (?how) a man is sent immediately after the revolution to Afghanistan, finds a place in a sensitive spot in the social circles of Hafizollah Amin and on completion of his mission is called back again to his imperialist shelter.

The commentator observes that appointment of this accomplice of Amin to this responsible post in the Deutsche Welle radio which broadcasts day in and day out falsehoods against all progressive states including revolutionary Afghanistan prove that the essence of the misdeeds of Amin and his clique (?was) akin to the present-day actions of counter-revolutionaries pitted against the DRA. Both originated from the same source, that is the CIA and other such devilish apparatuses of imperialism.

CSO: 4600/121

AFGHAN PAPER ON CIA PLOTS

LD180941 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0418 GMT 18 Nov 81

[Text] Kabul, 17 Nov (BAKHTAR)--The DAILY HEWAD, in an editorial captioned, "The CIA Intervention in Our Country is Doomed to Failure," writes:

"The people of Afghanistan forming a united and monolithic force are standing in the fortress on [word indistinct] the homeland and national democratic revolution all [word indistinct] one voice and loudly condemn the CIA intervention in the internal affairs of our country."

The paper says "our people have a firm and unshakable belief that with the victory of the April revolution especially its new revolutionary phase the destiny of our people and our homeland has passed over to the millions of the toiling masses of the society who are the real masters and owners of the country. Now Afghanistan is put on the path of progress and development and we are building with the help and cooperation of each other a society where there would be no exploitation, no poverty and deprivations or oppression and repression."

But, the world devouring imperialism which is basically opposed to the welfare and well-being of the masses is afraid of progress and the rising power of the masses. It is because, under such conditions they can no longer exploit and plunder the wealth of these countries, they oppose any progressive changes and social revolutions and want to create obstacles in the way of progress and developments which endanger their interests.

This explains the reasons why the national and democratic April revolution which transferred the powers of the toiling people of Afghanistan ran into strong opposition from these imperialist circles and reactionary quarters supported by the American imperialism.

The paper continues: "As the power of the people is invincible and nothing can resist the will of the nation and prevent realising the aims of the people. Thus, each time that the world devouring American imperialism has endeavoured to encroach upon the inalienable rights of the people of Afghanistan, through the use of hirelings, it has not only failed in realising its dirty aims and designs, but, it has exposed its vicious schemes and interventionist plans against Afghanistan which are contrary to the United Nations charter and run counter to all international laws.

Citing the example the paper points out to the recent exposure of the disgraceful acts of CIA against revolution in Afghanistan which was brought to light a few days ago as a result of the confessions made by a sold-out agent of imperialism which was published in the mass media of the country.

By recruiting these sold out agents, the imperialists on one hand intend to wage a slanderous campaign against the DRA Government and against our tested friends and want to tarnish their image among the people, and on the other hand to collect informations which serve the interests of the enemy of the revolution and use it against our people and our lawful government when occasion arises.

The paper concludes by saying, that as our revolution is irreversible and its social bases are strengthening day by day, the internal and external enemies will never be able to translate their dirty aims into practice against Afghanistan as today the people, party and the state being all united work and struggle for achieving a definite aim.

CSO: 4600/121

KARACHI COMMENTATOR ON SOLUTION FOR AFGHAN ISSUE

BK080724 Karachi Domestic Service in English 1715 GMT 7 Nov 81

[M. A. Qadri commentary]

[Text] Horrifying news continues to come from Afghanistan where resistance from scantily armed but stouthearted freedom fighters is being met with ferocious reprisals by Karmal forces backed to the hilt by the sophisticated Soviet weapons and advisers. The latest in the series is that the Soviet airplanes and six helicopter gunships bombed five villages in Hera Province causing severe damage to the villages and killing or injuring a number of innocent people. Apparently this was in retaliation of an earlier attack by Muslim Mujahideens against the forces in the area in which 2 Soviet tanks were destroyed and 22 of Russian armymen were killed and 3 Mujahideens lost their lives. And this is not one solitary instance. In recent weeks Soviet forces have also indulged in heavy bombing in areas around other provincial headquarters like Qandahar, Qonduz, Faryab and places in Paktia Province. Bombing also occurred in areas around the capital Kabul. Very obviously the indiscriminate bombings seem to be aimed at totally wiping out the freedom fighters around these provincial headquarters.

According to reports Soviet advisers fear that with the advent of winter the freedom fighters would encircle these cities and set up their operations. True, the ferocious bombing will perhaps inflict some damage to the lives and property of Afghans; true, these will in all likelihood become still more intensified in the weeks and months ahead in a desperate bid to cow down and silence the nationalist opposition. But do the Russians, who have inducted a huge army to prop up puppet regime set up by them in Afghanistan, or the puppet Karmal administration honestly feel that they will never be able to put down resistance by the people determined to remain free? Can they ever hope to achieve any measure of success, howsoever crude and cruel the methods they may employ?

The Karmal regime and the Kremlin would be, therefore, well advised to crease to be curt in the matter and do what Pakistan and most other well-meaning nations of the world have been advising them to do so. The first steps should be that the Soviet troops effect a total unconditional withdrawal from the soil of Afghanistan. Simultaneously the Afghans should be (?obliged) for their birthright to choose the form of government and the way of life they like. Also guaranteed should be the right of the refugees now sheltering in Pakistan in millions to go back to their homes in honor and dignity. This will pave the way to a political settlement which on their admission is what the Russians as well as the Karmal regime seems to be seeking.

The sooner they perceive the realities of the situation and act accordingly, the better it would be for themselves and also for all concerned with the preservation of peace in the region and the world as a whole. It is regrettable that they should ignore the snowballing opposition to whatever the Karmal regime, supported by Soviet troops, has been and is doing in Afghanistan. Do not they get the message, that is coming to them in loud and clear terms, that the conscience of the world will not and never tolerate penetration at the fag-end of the 20th [century] of deeds that used to be frowned upon even in the 18th century? No wonder even a small state like Maldives (?agrees) with the view in the matter held by Pakistan and would like the Afghan people's problem to be settled in a manner as suggested by Pakistan. No wonder the Iranians insist on total withdrawal of Russian troops as a precondition to any political settlement that might follow.

What excuse if any can the Russians give to arguing that they are agreeing to do so if their apprehension of being replaces by troops of the west is met with an arrangement that would allow only an Islamic peace force to fill in the gap until final solution. The Iranian suggestion should induce rethinking among the Russians.

CSO: 4600/121

BRIEFS

MUSAVI ON AFGHAN PEACE FORCE--Tehran, 10 Nov (AFP)--An Iranian plan on Afghanistan, unveiled last month, calls for replacement of Soviet troops with an Islamic peacekeeping force and election of a constituent assembly made up of "the independent Afghan clergy and experts," Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmad Azizi said today. The plan, elaborated last month by then-Foreign Minister Mir Hoseyn Musavi, who is now prime minister, would have "a council of 30 religious fighters from the Muslim world" elect the constituent assembly, Mr Azizi said at a news conference. The peacekeeping force would include troops from Iran, Pakistan and "another country that has expressed its open opposition to world imperialism led by America and zionism," Mr Azizi added. Two principles must be satisfied for such a plan to succeed, Mr Azizi said. First, the Soviet forces must withdraw unconditionally from Afghanistan, and second, the Afghan people must have the right to determine their future. The constituent assembly would have four main tasks: to nominate a council to command the Islamic force and the Afghan army; to organize general elections for a national assembly; to form a revolutionary council for Afghanistan's executive affairs; to ensure the application of laws during a transitory period. [Text] [NC101300 Paris AFP in English 1248 GMT 10 Nov 81]

SOLDIERS DEFECT TO PAKISTAN--Peshawar, 11 Nov (PARS)--About 21 Afghani soldiers accompanying a brigadier commander have sought refuge in Pakistan from the excessive violence they have suffered from the Afghani regime. This is the largest group of Afghani military personnel which has so far defected to Pakistan. According to reliable sources the same group carried out a large quantity of military weapons and ammunition. According to the same report, the brigadier commander has said he and his accompanies [as received] could not contenance the outrageous violence of the Babrak Karmal Government which they said was but the servant of the U.S.S.R. and therefore they had fled Afghanistan. [Text] [LD111140 Tehran PARS in English 1030 GMT 11 Nov 81]

ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES USED AGAINST REBELS--Peshawar, Pakistan, 12 Nov (AFP)--Large numbers of anti-personnel mines have been dropped from helicopters on the paths that Afghan insurgents use on their way to Pakistan, Afghan rebel sources said here today. They said that the mines had been spotted in the Afghan provinces of Lowgar, Paktia, Nangarhar and Konarha, the latter three mountain areas bordering on Pakistan. Such mines, the sources said, had already been used against insurgents in the summer of 1980. No bigger than the palm of a hand, they have enough explosive to sever limbs of those stepping on them. In Peshawar hospital at the time, more than 70 victims had to undergo amputations. Last year's mines, the rebel sources said, were round, while this year's are oval and have fins. They look like fish and can be

spotted more easily than the former type, one resistance leader reported. He said however that he had heard of only one victim during a two-day trek through one of the mined areas. [Text] [BK130225 Hong Kong AFP in English 0126 GMT 13 Nov 81]

AUTUMN SOWING--Kabul, 4 Nov (BAKHTAR)--Autumn sowing in the DRA continues in full swing. From the beginning of the campaign, on 6 September until the 22d of October 1981, considerable quantities of fertilizers and improved seeds, worth over AFS. Nineteen million have been distributed to the members of the agricultural cooperatives as well as to the individual farmers in Nangarhar Province. This year the autumn campaign indicates an increase of 75 percent in the amount of fertilizer and a rise of 3 percent in the quantity of the improved seeds compared iwth the corresponding period of the last year. Insecticides worth more than AFS 300,000 have also been distributed to the farmers and live-stock breeders of that province. [Text] [LD050632 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0432 GMT 5 Nov 81]

CITRUS FRUITS INTO USSR--Kabul, 8 Nov (BAKHTAR)--The harvesting of citrus fruits has begun in the Nangarhar Valley farm development project since last week. The yield is predicted to be about 8,500 tons, which accords with the pre-set up plan. Six thousand tons of the product will be exported to the Soviet Union, at a price of 1,907,000 dollars on the basis of an agreement concluded between the two countries. [Text] [Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0438 GMT 9 Nov 81 LD]

USSR JUSTICE MINISTRY OFFICIAL--Aleksandr Y. Sukharev, USSR first deputy minister of justice, who visited Kabul on an official and friendly visit at the invitation of the ministry of justice, left for home today. He was seen off at Kabul international airport by the vice president of the Supreme Court and acting deputy minister of justice, high-ranking officials in the justice ministry and a number of the Soviet Embassy personnel. [Text] [LD042054 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1600 GMT 4-10 Nov 81]

SECURITY FORCES CAPTURE 'TERRORISTS'--The security force recently captured another group of [word indistinct] extremist terrorists with organizational documents, typewriters and duplicating machines, Chinese weapons, antitank shells and rockets; Egyptian and Pakistani machineguns and pistols; Egyptian-made bombs and chemical weapons. This counterrevolutionary group was captured along with ringleaders of high-standing and they admitted their crime. This group for a long time--under the name of Pykar, in collaboration and joint work with [word indistinct] extremists--was misusing the sacred name of Islam and was creating barriers for our national government. By terrorists actions it disrupted the peaceful and calm life of our people; at last they were captured with all of their organizational documents and their so-called leadership. [Announcement by the Afghan Security Forces--date not given] [Text] [LD051610 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1430 GMT 5 Nov 81]

NEW AMBASSADOR--Mohammad Shafi, Afghanistan's ambassador-designate to the GDR, left today for Berlin to assume his duties. [LD090200 Kabum Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 8 Nov 81]

KONARHA ELDERS SUPPORT GOVERNMENT--The deputy minister of the DRA ministry of nationalities and tribes has met with representatives and elders of the various regions of (Dorta), Worcadal, Gambir, Dioz, Krong and Kermole, in Konarha Province and described to them the revolutionary plans of the government under the leadership of Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council. A number of elders of the tribes of those regions namely Mawlawi Mohammed Qabel, Wakil Gholam Hasan, Malek 'Abdol Qadir and Gholam Faruq, expressed every cooperation with the government on behalf of the people and made the following resolutions: We shall not allow rebels in our area; we shall cooperate with our government in maintaining security; we take responsibility for safeguarding roads ourselves. [Text] [LD101634 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1430 GMT 10 Nov 81]

CSO: 4695/1

SETTLEMENT QUESTIONS, ARAB-ISRAELI STRUGGLE DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 5, 6, 7, 8 Sep 81

[Interview with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal by Dr Majdi Hamad; in Cairo; date not specified; previously published in AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI]

[5 Sep 81 p 11]

[Text] Neutralizing America Is a Warlike Phrase

In its recent September issue AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI published a lengthy interview with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the former editor-in-chief of AL-AHRAM and a personal friend of President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. The interview was conducted by Dr Majdi Hamad, representative of Arab unity studies in Cairo. In the aftermath of news that Haykal is being questioned following his arrest in Egypt by al-Sadat's regime AL-SAFIR begins publishing the interviews today; they will be published in four installments.

Here is the first installment.

[Question] I believe that the July Revolution in Egypt preceded the emergence of two principal approaches to Israel on the Arab scene. The first one of them was that which was led by 'Abd-al-Nasir. That approach preferred to concentrate the attack in the Arab region, on Britian first and then on the United States. The nation's effort would then be devoted to the confrontation with Israel after genuine Arab independence is realized. The second approach was that which was led by Nuri al-Sa'id in Iraq who called for the importance of "cooperating" with the west, and especially with the United States, against the Soviet Union, in the hope that such cooperation would bring about some cooperation between the west and the Arab countries against Israel.

I also believe that a few of those who opposed from the outset the phrase, "neutralizing the United States," did so because they thought it would take us once again to the same position we were in before the outbreak of the 23 July Revolution.

We may now actually notice that the real focus of the confrontation, between Egypt and Israel at least, had shifted moments before the Egyptian-Israeli settlement. In fact, "the nature of the struggle" itself had changed. Israel, one of the parties to the confrontation, had been within the framework of "the world's colonialist entity," and the other party, the Arabs, was affiliated with the World Liberation Movement against colonialist domination. Now, however, the two parties are pursuing the struggle together and are striving for a settlement within the framework of the "world-wide capitalist movement."

A warning was also issued at that time that the price of separating Israel and the United States--although in sum this line of logic cannot be faulted--may involve giving up Egypt's traditional allies, the companions of the 23 July Revolution, in the Arab homeland and Egypt's friends on the international scene, especially the Soviet Union.

Can you think of any other way a settlement can be achieved based on the notion of "neutralizing the United States" which can confront all these anticipated effects?

[Answer] I believe that this question is based on assumptions I did not make when I brought up for general discussion the notion of "neutralizing the United States." You are here talking about the emergence of two main approaches to Israel in the Arab area. The first one was led by Nuri al-Sa'id, and the second was led by Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. I believe that accurate definitions here are very important. Nuri al-Sa'id was not cooperating with the west, and 'Abd-al-Nasir's case cannot easily be described as a case of "hostility" to the west. However, the situation can be described as follows:

--Nuri al-Sa'id was not calling for cooperation with the west; he was asking the Arab nation to join the western camp. This meant that he wanted the Arab nation to become an integrated part of the west and to merge with it.

--'Abd-al-Nasir, however, used to declare his hostility to the western phenomenon of colonialism, but he absolutely did not declare his hostility to the west. In fact, he had no objections to "cooperation" with the west.

The foregoing formulation of the question signifies that the only options that are available are those of hostility or subordination and that in their relations with the west, other countries would either have to rally around subordination or assume the posture of an enemy. I do believe, however, that there is another way other than this polarization. This other way is the one that 'Abd-al-Nasir utilized. It is the way of the independent movement or the movement that acts from a position of independence.

Therefore, when I brought up for public discussion the notion of "neutralizing the United States," I was actually referring to some of the experiences of the Arab struggle before the 23 July Revolution. To elaborate on that, [let me say that] 'Abd-al-Nasir had followed this course in the past and had achieved his objective. 'Abd-al-Nasir had proposed the principle

of cooperating with the United States immediately after the revolution. He had utilized the United States in the process of getting the British out of Egypt. At that time the United States was the principal advocate for a policy of alliances, but, it did not join the Baghdad Pact, at least not publicly, because 'Abd-al-Nasir had concentrated his efforts on the United States. He had done so especially by using Saudi Arabia whose historical struggles with the Hashemite family and importance for the United States enabled it to place restrictions on U.S. action. Thus, the United States did not join the alliances that were formed. This was always a source of irritation in the west, because the United States had been an advocate of alliances, but had joined none of them after they were formed. This was simply due to the fact that 'Abd-al-Nasir succeeded in the battle of partially neutralizing the United States, as far as pacts were concerned.

Defining concepts is likewise extremely important in this regard. I was basically referring to the concept of "neutralizing" and not to that of "neutrality."

Neutrality is a posture chosen voluntarily by a state. The United States will not choose a neutral position between the Arabs and Israel because it takes sides with Israel.

Neutralizing a country, however, is a process by which a country imposes a posture on other countries above and beyond the matter of a mere choice. It prescribes that posture as a matter of necessity.

I believe that the problem of some sectors in the Arab homeland manifests itself in a fondness for oversimplification and for the dichotomous logic of seeing things in terms of black and white or in terms of either hostility or subordination. A few Arab theoreticians are still inclined to reject the independent position or the independent movement which is the essence of the non-alignment [policy]. This means that one does not have a pre-determined position that is included in another's position or that takes sides with it. In each case one abides by one's principles.

It was from this posture, for example, that 'Abd-al-Nasir stood against the United States in Santo Domingo, in Chile, in Cuba, etc.

It was from the same posture that he opposed Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. This posture then is not a predetermined one, but [it is rather a posture that is based] on firm principles, and it is in the light of those principles that we can take independent action.

Furthermore, we must take the nature of the current world order into consideration. Under this order, unless countries take charge of their crises and try to solve them by taking independent action, these crises will become subject to international polarization. Thus if a country definitely assumes a cooperative posture with the Soviet Union and a hostile posture toward the United States, such a stance signifies that its crisis is "out of its hands." This crisis then becomes related to the polarization and the strife between the two superpowers, and that country loses control over its

own crisis. However, what is important here is [to determine] how independent, balanced action with the two superpowers can be achieved.

Let us go back once again to the experiences of national struggle. This time [the experiences] are from Vietnam. A few Arab thinkers claim that the people of Vietnam provided a model for resisting U.S. colonialism. The Vietnamese people, however, believe that in their dealings with the United States they put into practice the notion of "neutralization."

The objective of the Vietnamese people was to unify [their country] and overthrow Thieu's regime in the south. The only way they could manage to overthrow Thieu's regime was to "neutralize the United States." Thus, they began taking action along this road. The outcome of the action they took may be summarized by saying that the basic demand of the Vietnamese Revolution was achieved. That consisted of placing restrictions on the use of U.S. force and also on the U.S. Congress. The Vietnamese people let their tragedy speak for itself, and they presented their case on the largest scale in U.S. society. They also made themselves accessible to all the agencies of the media, and they were thus able to achieve their objective through various methods.

The first of these objectives was that of correcting the U.S. strategic idea with regard to U.S. presence [in] the Pacific Ocean. And here we mention the roles played by U.S. leaders such as Fulbright and Walter Lippmann who declared that the security of the United States could not be achieved by a military presence of any kind on the shores of Asia. [They said] that the most the United States could allow itself was to stand facing the shores of Asia. This is because the United States in Asia was not a "land country" but rather a "sea and air country."

The second one of these objectives was that of mobilizing public opinion in the United States itself against the war. This would result from the outcome of the broad debate over U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and it would be in addition to the effect of world public opinion.

The Vietnamese people thus succeeded in placing restrictions inside the United States itself on the possibility that the United States may escalate the violence beyond a certain limit. Therefore, if we were to imagine that the United States deliberately escalated the violence beyond that limit and placed its forces in a battle of victory or defeat and not in a political battle, the picture of the war in Vietnam would have been different. However, the revolutionary Vietnamese command succeeded in its battle "to neutralize the United States." It placed restrictions that in most cases came from within U.S. society, on the possibility that the United States may intervene or become involved militarily in Vietnam.

This means that the outcome of the Vietnam war was determined first inside the United States and then afterwards in Vietnam. This is due to the Vietnamese Revolution's awareness of what it wanted.

--It defined its principal enemy as the Thieu regime since it was considered the obstacle to Vietnamese unity. The principal problem here was

manifested in the fact that this regime, for numerous reasons that have to do with its erroneous views, with strategy or with dread, invited the intervention by the United States and the broad scale war.

--The Vietnamese Revolution then defined its principal objective as "neutralizing the United States." This meant that it would try to place restrictions inside the United States on the possibility that U.S. military intervention in the war in Vietnam would continue or escalate. As has been stated, this was carried out by influencing U.S. public opinion. [The campaign to influence public opinion] was accompanied by the admirable steadfastness of the Vietnamese people and a tremendous amount of sacrifices. People spoke up in the United States, and there were, for example, the hearing committees which were chaired by Fulbright and the [articles] that Lippmann wrote. These were decisive in bringing about this change in public opinion.

--After that the leadership of the Vietnamese Revolution had to convince the United States in practical terms that the United States could not hope to achieve a military victory by means of its troops which were on the coast of Asia in the heart of Vietnam. The model [action] for achieving that was the attack on Tibet. That attack was a limited military operation whose costs were extremely high from a military standpoint. What is significant is that its objective was not to achieve a military victory but rather to prove to the political leaders in th United States, to the U.S. Congress and to the press and public opinion in the United States that the Vietnamese Revolution can exist inside Saigon, even at a very high human cost. They thus achieved a significant political objective and persuaded the United States that the Thieu regime had disintegrated from the inside and that the United States would not be able to prevent its complete overthrow.

--After all that the leadership of the Vietnamese Revolution turned to negotiations with the United States until a specific agreement between both parties was reached. It is important to note here that the leadership of the revolution did everything in its power to facilitate the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam because the set objective was to get this U.S. military force out of Vietnam and ultimately not to have a confrontation with it. This leadership complied with Kissinger's request and did not launch a major attack against South Vietnam immediately after the disengagement and the departure of the U.S. forces. However, some time later the attack by General Giap was carried out and South Vietnam was overrun.

This experience from Vietnam in "neutralizing the United States" is in fact exactly what I had in mind in the course of the Arab-Israeli struggle.

I said more than once that there is a big difference between neutrality and neutralization. The United States cannot be neutral. I would imagine that the primary objective of neutralizing the United States would be the attempt to keep its harmful and violent influence away from the strife and struggle in the Arab area and away from our battle with Israel. Although

this process is extremely difficult, there is no alternative to it, [and it is to be attempted] with all the means available for applying pressure on the United States.

As I have already indicated we too faced the same experience before the Vietnamese Revolution. In fact, our experience was on a small scale, and it happened in the midst of the battle over the Baghdad Pact. The leadership of the Egyptian Revolution was able, through the royal family in Saudi Arabia and through the oil countries that were then merely emirates still looking for their identity, to prevent the United States from joining the Baghdad Pact even though it was the one that had come up with the idea. This was not because the Egyptian leadership had set out to fight the United States, but rather because it exercised on the United States modes of pressure and influence until it was able to place restrictions on its conduct regarding this matter.

In this sense I believe that the objective of "neutralizing the United States" in our struggle with Israel is still proper and a attainable. One must notice that there is a major difference between neutralizing the United States and succumbing to it. The objective of neutralizing the United States is [to establish] an independent policy whose objective is to utilize all political and economic means--and sometimes violence if that is necessary--to restrict the power of U.S. support for Israel and to make the costs of that support extremely high. This would force the United States to reduce its ties with Israel--and I am not saying break its ties with Israel, for this is something the United States cannot and will not do, and we cannot bring it about either. In fact, I believe that some of this has taken place and is actually taking place unintentionally as far as the United States is concerned. It has also taken place to a large extent as far as Western Europe is concerned.

--A partial neutralization of the United States, especially in the period that preceded the "initiative," was actually achieved. During that period the Arab homeland began to collect its will and to get a handle on its problems through numerous means. Among these are the role of oil and of Arab funds. Furthermore, traditional friendships were utilized to apply pressure on the United States. As a result of all that a new group of variables began to present themselves. Among those, for example are [the following]:

--Israel actually wanted to go to the Geneva Conference. The whole world was waiting for this conference to convene. Even former U.S. President Carter thought that the Palestinians had to be represented at the Geneva Conference.

--The United States began to see that Israel was hurting its interests, in the strict sense of the term, especially in the Arab oil areas. Hence, after his meetings with a number of Arab leaders, President Carter began talking about the need to have a homeland for the Palestinians. This was between April and June of 1977.

--As far as western Europe is concerned, I believe that we have actually succeeded in neutralizing western Europe, at least with regard to the Palestinian people. Let us look at the attitude of Israel's traditional allies today, especially West Germany and France.

I believe that 'Abd-al-Nasir did in fact succeed in "neutralizing France" in the period that followed the June 1967 war. De Gaulle's position during that period was not clear. Nevertheless, 'Abd-al-Nasir started out by saying that even if De Gaulle's position was unclear, even if there were grey areas in it, and even if these grey areas do not reflect whole political truths, we would have to make up a clear position for De Gaulle. That would be tantamount to a bridge to western Europe that would enable us to go out of the confines of polarization. At the outset France's role regarding the Arab-Israeli struggle began as mere "nods" from De Gaulle. We in Egypt overestimated these nods at that time. In time, however, the number of these nods increased and led to a shift not only in France's position, but also in the position of western Europe. There was at least some sympathy now. In other countries a discussion about the need for taking Palestinian rights into consideration began.

Therefore I believe that there are still areas which are open for independent action on our part, especially with the United States, either through political pressure, economic pressure or, if we can do it, by force. We can thus force the United States to reduce its commitments to Israel, or we can at least make sure that the United States does not back Israel all the way.

Those who are saying that our battle with Israel is a battle with the United States are, on the one hand, burdening us with a bigger battle than we can fight. On the other hand, the solution for such a problem requires that we rely fully and without reservations on the other superpower in the world, the Soviet Union. This means that we would be putting our crisis in a pile of cases that are being disputed by the two superpowers and making that crisis subject to a comprehensive settlement between them. The starting point in the idea of "neutralizing the United States" is manifested in the fact that we would assume control of our own crisis and deal with the two superpowers. One of them is actually assuming the posture of a friend, and we must keep it as a friend. And the other one actually assumed the posture of an enemy, and we have to dislodge it from its position as the enemy to a less hostile position. For example we have to make it shift to an antagonist posture and then make it shift again to an adversary posture, and so on.

The foregoing signifies that we must see the numerous grey areas in the U.S. position. U.S. interests and Israeli interests may actually be congruous, but they are not identical. Therefore, we have to determine the "extent of the incompatibility" between them. We have to move in on the United States and to intensify this incompatibility, not so as to separate Israel from the United States, because this is impossible, but rather to reduce the United States' willingness to go with Israel all the way.

I totally reject and oppose the notion of "exclusiveness" which some people in the Arab homeland are promoting. This notion would have us deal with

one international party only on the basis of the premise that one of the two superpowers must be a friend, and the other must be an antagonist. If we were to allow our crisis to become so polarized under the current world order, we would be relegating it to a distant fate in the balances between the two superpowers whose actions we do not control. However, if we were to assume control over our crisis, we would have to deal with the two parties on whom the present world order depends. This is especially true of a sensitive area like the Arab area which is geographically very close to the Soviet Union and economically in the heart of western Europe and the west. In view of this situation there must be numerous shades of light and grey in our international action, and we must stay away from the dichotomous logic of black and white.

I find myself here compelled to recall the experiences of the July Revolution once again. Some people in the Arab homeland sometimes attribute to the July Revolution actions that it did not do. Others cling to its most recent position or to one of its positions and state that this was the position of the July Revolution. In this instance I accept the judgment of the July Revolution and its leader, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

As I have already mentioned 'Abd-al-Nasir set out to use the United States to oppose the British occupation. We must acknowledge that a large part of the pressure that was applied to Britian to terminate its occupation [of Egypt] came from the United States. In addition, there was the Egyptian Resistance, the canal and the emergence of the national regime in revolutionary Egypt as well as the actions of the Arab homeland around Egypt. 'Abd-al-Nasir had also neutralized the United States somewhat in the battle over the Baghdad Pact.

Then came another period around the early sixties during which the United States resorted to the use of extreme violence in the 1967 aggression. The United States was most certainly a party to the aggression. 'Abd-al-Nasir was therefore inclined to intensify to the utmost his campaign against the United States. He even tried at some point to present the United States and Israel as one and the same thing. But this was done in the context of a specific political action. Afterwards 'Abd-al-Nasir began to classify matters and to determine the shades and areas of grey. When he visited Moscow secretly in January 1970, his objective was to shift the battle from a local balance to a universal balance. This was due to the fact that the local balance of power--with the military support that Israel was receiving from the United States--had shifted in Israel's favor, and this shift was giving Israel greater freedom of action from a military standpoint. The Soviet Union was well aware of 'Abd-al-Nasir's objective and, therefore, accepted his point of view and adopted a set of "top priority strategic resolutions" regarding the form and magnitude of Soviet military aid to Egypt. But there were three conditions.

The first was that the Soviet Union would inform the United States of its resolutions.

The second was that we had to resume the dialogue with the United States.

And the third was that we were not to begin fighting any armed battles with Israel while Soviet experts were in Egypt. Brezhnev's condition here was absolute when he turned to 'Abd-al-Nasir and said, "Mr President, Soviet experts must return to their country at least 6 months before a decision to become engaged in a battle with Israel is made."

All these conditions are understandable because relations between the two superpowers cannot tolerate misrepresentation. Also the utilization of any one of the two superpowers must be carefully, clearly and unequivocally calculated. It was evident to both 'Abd-al-Nasir and the Soviet leadership that Soviet presence in Egypt would make the United States sense some danger. It would therefore begin a process of applying pressure to get the Soviet experts out of Egypt, and it would offer something to get them out.

The Soviet Union came to Egypt after these strategic decisions were made with the knowledge that 'Abd-al-Nasir was engaged in a maneuver with the United States. It came to Egypt with the knowledge that 'Abd-al-Nasir was upgrading the crisis from a local crisis to a universal one. It was therefore asking that this maneuver be carefully calculated so that it would not be embarrassed by some miscalculation.

Let us consider here the sequence of events in that period.

--The Soviet Union informed the United States.

--Then Joseph Sisco came to Egypt.

--After that 'Abd-al-Nasir sent his appeal to Nixon on 1 May.

--Nixon's reply came in the form of the Rogers' initiative.

--'Abd-al-Nasir then accepted the Rogers' initiative while we were attending the Tripoli meetings.

--When 'Abd-al-Nasir went after that to the Soviet Union, he had actually accepted the initiative. When Brezhnev asked him, "How can you accept this initiative with the U.S. flag on it?" meaning that the initiative should have been the product of both superpowers and not just one of them, 'Abd-al-Nasir replied that he had accepted the initiative "because it carried the U.S. flag." His objective in fact was to neutralize the United States in one form or another.

[6 Sep 81 p 14]

[Text] The "Metal Fatigue" Phenomenon in the Arab Nation

The second installment of the interview with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal which AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI Magazine published follows.

[Question] But the group that criticized from the outset the notion of "neutralizing the United States" was expressing as a part of its views the opinion that pursuit of this course would have only "one outcome" and that that would be to succumb to the United States. Don't you think that this is what has actually happened now?

[Answer] This is not true at all. Let me draw a simple analogy here. If I were to tell you that the road that would take you to your destination would require you to cross a certain street, and if while you were crossing that street you were struck by a car, would you tell me that I misled you because you had been struck by a car?

I reject the notion which states that all of history consists of conspiracies even though it is also true that a set of factors did help the expansion which occurred in the opposite direction. But I believe that the objective of "neutralizing the United States" will remain relevant as long as the Arab-Israeli struggle continues and as long as the Arab area remains an area of contention between the two superpowers.

And here we must understand that the nature of international politics and the strategy of managing struggles require each party to make an effort to minimize the costs of the struggle on the one hand and to maximize its gains on the other. This is exactly what the United States did when it found a certain climate in the area after the October 1973 war and even before that date.

On the one hand, it was a climate of Arab conflicts.

On the other hand, it was a climate in which the Arab bourgeoisie was growing.

And, thirdly, it was a climate in which the Soviet Union was wavering.

It was in this climate that the United States began intensifying its efforts to maximize profits and minimize losses. It was in the same climate that Anwar al-Sadat began making his decisive strategic choice. But this is another matter that has nothing to do with the notion of neutralizing the United States.

What happened was tantamount to a shift that was produced by a variety of regional and world-wide circumstances, but primarily by a variety of social circumstances within the Arab homeland. These circumstances manifested themselves in what happened after the 1973 October war when the power of the Arab bourgeoisie and the power of traditional Arab sectors grew to the point that they had the ability to "come up with" a tremendous amount of petro-dollars to cover up and even completely inundate all the conflicts that prevailed in the Arab homeland. If the flood of black gold did cover up these conflicts, this was not related to the notion of neutralizing the United States.

I caution here against the danger of confusing symptoms with causes, coincidences, incidents and facts and against the attempt to derive a cer-

tain "mode" from this mishmash. I believe that historical incidents show that there is not a single dynamic process [in operation], but that there are rather several dynamic processes operating simultaneously. The relationship between them may not be evident, but if a variety of dynamic processes were to converge so as to lead one to succumb to the United States, we ought to reinforce these dynamic processes and analyze them. We would then find them to be unrelated to the notion of neutralizing the United States.

Let me tell you quite clearly that the Egyptian leadership was not striving "to neutralize the United States." The disaster that actually took place was the fact that it was the Soviet Union that was neutralized. All the powers of pressure were applied to get the Soviet Union politically and militarily out [of the area]. Certain powers in the Arab homeland and a new set of factors on the Arab scene helped accomplish this. Chief among those new factors was the increasing growth of the Arab bourgeoisie's powers of corruption.

[Question] This is exactly what I was trying to get to. I was trying to determine the point at which the error began. What I mean is that if the principle of neutralizing the United States is not fundamentally rejected and if it is in agreement with the current principles of international policy, where then did the error in applying this principle begin, the error that ultimately led [us] to succumb to the United States?

[Answer] When you talk about "an error," you imply that the error began at a certain point as one proceeded on the course of "neutralizing the United States." I do not believe this is a sound portrayal of the situation because there was not one course, that of neutralizing the United States, which we were pursuing. Accordingly, we cannot look for the point at which the deviation began, that deviation which led us to succumb to the United States. I believe that there was a variety of routes or courses that ran parallel to the course of neutralizing the United States. These courses were not related, at least not directly, to the course of neutralizing the United States. It is possible here to list the following:

First, there was a course of social conflicts in the Arab homeland. In the context of this course there were notable developments among which, for example, were [the following]:

1. Broad sectors [of the population] yearned for a kind of dream democracy.

2. There was a return to liberal ideas which sought to assert themselves for reasons that had to do with the failure in the socialist bloc.

3. A variety of values from consumer societies began invading the Arab homeland.

4. Numerous sectors in the Arab homeland now had the power "to buy" all this: they had the power to talk about liberal societies, to prescribe new modes of consumption and to change the value systems.

This course was not related to that of neutralizing the United States.

Second, the course of Arab-Soviet relations. And here emerges the sharp crisis which the Soviet Union faced after Arab victory in the 1973 October war was achieved with the help of Soviet weapons.

This course was not related to that of neutralizing the United States.

We ought to consider these three courses--the course of neutralizing the United States, that of social development in the Arab homeland and that of relations with the Soviet Union--on the basis of the fact that they are parallel, even though there is a definite relationship between them. This is simply due to the fact that no battle or strife is determined by one course. All battles are complex, and all strife consists of a variety of interrelated, separate, parallel and unrelated courses, etc.

Therefore if you are wondering about "the point at which the error began" and if you are trying to locate where that point occurred on the course of neutralizing the United States because we are seeing today that the United States is being succumbed to these days, I would have to disagree with you. The error occurred on "another course" that is not related to that of neutralizing the United States. It is basically related to the nature of the social choices that are prevalent today in the Arab homeland. Today the forces that are capable of making effective social choices in the Arab homeland are no longer those of the workers, farmers or revolutionaries. The power to make choices has shifted from one side to another.

[Question] But weren't all these parallel courses evident when the notion of neutralizing the United States was proposed?

[Answer] Let us assume that they were evident at the time. However, I do assume that in every policy when each choice is defined, one usually finds a variety of risks. One may find oneself compelled to accept certain risks provided that these are calculated risks. Therefore I repeat, if we assume that the courses were evident, management of the strife would still depend on you.

For example, if we were to focus on the course of neutralizing the United States while keeping an eye on the other parallel courses, and then if we were to try to utilize Saudi Arabia's power in the process of neutralizing the United States--as the Egyptian leadership did after the July Revolution in the battle over the Baghdad Pact--it would be possible to achieve practical results along this course.

But what happened was something else. A variety of circumstances and developments emerged in the Arab homeland, and these gave Saudi Arabia the opportunity to use others and to utilize their capabilities along all these parallel lines, instead of others using Saudi Arabia and its capabilities.

The power of oil and petro-dollars gave certain social forces in the Arab homeland, and chiefly Saudi Arabia, the power to utilize the national

forces which had utilized Saudi Arabia in the past to neutralize the United States. However, the picture has changed because of weakness, because of the leaders' inability and because of the tremendous overflow of black gold.

[Question] How in your opinion did the responsible leaders of the Arab nation become so divided on the method of dealing with the Zionist entity that all the components of the Arab view of the Arab-Israeli struggle are almost being dismissed?

If we are saying that something good may come out of the harm that befell us, it may appear now that the harm which befell the Arabs and their causes as a result of Egypt's departure from the Arab rank is so great that this adage in our case can be refuted. In your opinion why didn't Egypt's departure or its expulsion from the Arab ranks lead to the required awakening of the other Arabs? Why haven't those Arabs discovered yet the proper method for bringing Egypt back? Why haven't they even discovered a sound method for stopping the Arab position from faltering on more than one scene of confrontation with Israel and with other than Israel?

[Answer] Let me first refer to the business about something good may come out of something harmful. There is no doubt that if you were now to consider briefly what was happening throughout the Arab region, you would imagine that there was no hope in anything. But I believe that there are numerous benefits from the setback that we are experiencing now. The basis of this lies in the fact that among 'Abd-al-Nasir's accomplishments and also among the problems that he left behind is the fact that he made strategic choices that were far more advanced than the awareness of the masses was at that time. His leadership of those masses had pulled them behind him. Therefore, the doubts and the gaps lingered. Some people asked, for example, "Is Egypt Arab or not? What does Egypt have to do with Israel?" These questions have now been exaggerated. 'Abd-al-Nasir made his choices on the basis of the power of his leadership. These were truthful choices that were historically correct. But what happened is that 'Abd-al-Nasir made choices, carried them through and the masses followed him. But the masses followed "him" and not "his choices." On the margin of this picture the masses fought for these choices not because they were convinced [of their validity] but because 'Abd-al-Nasir was. Inasmuch as 'Abd-al-Nasir expressed the hopes of these masses, they backed up his movement and accepted his choices, but they still had some questions.

During the setback that we are now experiencing we must notice that besides its risks--and its risks are undoubtedly extremely difficult--there are [nevertheless] positive, "beneficial" signs. Increasingly numerous sectors of the Egyptian masses are beginning to examine themselves. I believe that what we failed to affirm to these masses by persuasive means, will actually be affirmed by the circumstances we are experiencing today, under the influence of the existing conflict in the substance of their choices. We may [even] say under the influence of [the notion that]:

"If God wanted to promote a lost virtue, He would give the envious a wagging tongue;

"If a fire had not burned around that branch, its fragrance would never have been known."

Today, numerous sectors in Egypt are questioning the feasibility of "peace" with Israel--this phrase that has been on the horizon for 3 years and was supported by the masses because there was a deficiency in their consciousness. A variety of illusions have crept into this deficiency, especially in 'Abd-al-Nasir's absence. There are also questions about the feasibility of the open-door policy. This policy was tried, and the doors were opened wide, but where are the results? There are also questions about what happened after Egypt was isolated from the Arab world. There are questions about how such an isolation can take place when Egypt has close to 2 million [of its citizens] working in the Arab homeland. There are real Egyptian interests in the Arab homeland, not to mention the linguistic, cultural, historical and religious ties and relations between the peoples of a single nation. These ties and relations existed in the past and will exist in the future. Therefore I am saying that despite everything around us now, some good may come out of this harm.

As to why Egypt's expulsion or its departure from the Arab rank did not lead to the required awakening of the other Arabs, I believe that this fact can be explained by several factors.

First, the Arab national objective is no longer determined by the effect of new and revived shocks and choices in the Arab region, especially on the part of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

Second, as a result of numerous factors the Arab nation appears to have been afflicted with a phenomenon [that is analogous to] that of metal fatigue.

Third, the makeup of the regimes that govern in the Arab countries is reflected on the inclinations of the Arab classes that are governed.

Fourth, the nature of the Egyptian role in the Arab homeland, at least since the early part of this century, has been a mixture of a modernizing role and a unifying role.

In my opinion these four factors are responsible for the fact that the required awakening among Arab leaders did not materialize. What is important is that we consider the interreaction and interrelationship between these factors because they do in fact exist. Let us consider what each one of these factors means.

First, the loss of the national Arab objective.

Let me first remind you that the notion of Arab nationalism was still a scheme. Ever since the beginning of the present century the Arab homeland had three basic choices that were available to it.

1. There was the idea of the succession or the Islamic League.

2. There was the idea of Arabism or the Arab League.

3. There was the idea of independent nationalism for each one of the countries.

The contest between these choices was not settled once and for all by setting alternatives for each one of them. Hence, the notion of nationalism was proposed as one among other alternatives. As I said, it was still a scheme. Then came the shock of the different route which the Egyptian leadership chose to pursue since 1974. In fact, to be fair, this shock began with the Israeli attack in 1967. To elaborate on this, [let me say that] the 1967 shock made it incumbent on the masses to question everything because the circumstances of a shock usually raise a few questions.

Thus, in the climate of 1967 the notion of nationalism was discussed and questioned; the social idea was discussed and questioned; and the notion of non-alignment was discussed and questioned.

This meant that there were in fact discussions and questions about everything since the shock of 1967. It was in the midst of the fog, the investigations and the inquiries that the first disengagement [agreement] of 1974 came about. I consider this the beginning of everything that is happening now. It was here that all the trends began to manifest themselves because the Egyptian leadership had chosen a different road. What is important is that when the 1967 shock came about and when the shock of the different road that the Egyptian leadership took was felt, the idea of nationalism was still alive and well.

Consider the Arab homeland after 1974 and see how the active forces are conducting themselves in it. Five years ago I wrote a series of articles about the "Saudi era." Some people were surprised then, but let them look today, 5 years after these articles were written. Are we not in fact living today in the wake of the "Saudi era?" There is a very simple reason for that: the notion of "revolution" has been dismissed or shelved, and the notion of "wealth" is the notion that is prevailing today. A discussion about wealth means a direct discussion about Saudi Arabia.

And here we notice that Saudi Arabia did not adopt the notion of nationalism, but instead set out to make another choice that was much more difficult than that of nationalism. It did not even go back to the idea of the succession or the Islamic League because even when the Ottoman Empire was calling for an Islamic league, what it had in mind was the Middle East area. Saudi Arabia, however, was talking about the idea of "religion" as a whole. Thus we find ourselves with this idea facing numerous risks. Among them are [the following]:

--We are falling in a bottomless ocean, and we don't even have the oars that can help us cross that ocean [to safety].

When we talk about the Islamic world or Islamic unity we are leaving behind our entity which is defined and going to another that is not.

--I cannot see on the horizon the possibility for common security or for a common market between the Arab area and Indonesia or Malaysia.

If the discussion about the scheme of pan-Arab nationalism were a dream, it is an achievable dream for two principal considerations.

First, there is a real, practical foundation for this plan which manifests itself in the same language, the same culture, the same geography and the same history. Besides, the possibility for a first-rate economic unity and security unity does exist.

Second, in addition to the fact that this plan has a real, practical foundation, it represents a specific objective. That objective is attainable, and with our effort we can promote it.

Inasmuch as a discussion of the Islamic idea led us into areas that were way above our heads because they were beyond our power; because they did not represent a specific objective; and because they did not have a real, practical foundation, the emphasis on the Islamic idea has diffused Arab power.

Therefore I admit that I cannot understand all this emphasis that is being placed on the idea of "Islamic action" and I cannot understand the activity that we are seeing in the Islamic world. Briefly, this Saudi choice means that what is "most important" will not be emphasized so that "what is important" can be. In the final analysis this means that Arab energies will be wasted in a number of secondary areas.

Let us recall here the experience of the 23 July Revolution. 'Abd-al-Nasir did in fact speak about the idea of the three circles: the Arab circle, the Islamic circle and the African circle. But the principal circle there was the Arab circle. That was the one in which the Arabs would be able to come into their own. The remaining circles were supporting circles. It is true that we have interests and responsibilities in the African circles, and it is true that we have interests and ties with the Islamic world, but all this comes in the context of moral responsibilities and moral support. The Arab homeland, however, is the area where the Arabs can come into their own. Therefore, talking about another outside circle having precedence over the Arab circle is a basic error because it means shifting what is primary and what is secondary and vice versa.

Second, the metal fatigue phenomenon in the Arab nation.

I believe that at a certain stage of their historical development nations may suffer from what is called the metal fatigue phenomenon. I believe that this diagnosis applies now to the Arab nation. What is implied by this phenomenon? First, in order to understand its significance with regard to what has happened and what is happening in the Arab nation, [let me say that] sometimes an accident happens to an airplane and it's said that there can only be one reason for that accident. They call that metal fatigue. In this case it is not easy either to see or to observe how metal

becomes fatigued. But something suddenly disturbs the makeup and the composition of the metal, and then at a certain instant and under a certain pressure, the metal cracks and the accident occurs.

It seems to me that this idea can be used to explain in part the situation which we are trying to grasp. I believe that the Arab nation has been afflicted with some kind of "metal fatigue" because of the long period of struggle that it has experienced and the "revolutionary tension" that usually accompanies such a struggle. Besides, the Arab nation has had different shocks, such as the 1967 shock, the departure of 'Abd-al-Nasir from the scene, the shock of the leadership's "different choice" and other various different shocks as well.

Aside from everything that has been said, the Arab nation--in the absence of leaders that can direct and unify it--found itself faced with a situation that was unclear, uncohesive and undefined, both as far as its direction and its identity were concerned. It [sometimes] seems to me that we need to define our identity.

Third, the makeup of the Arab regimes that are in power and the classes that are governed.

It's been said, along with what has already been stated, that the Arab nation has become a model of what the dominant forces of the world are seeking in other areas. The Arab area has almost become a "marketplace" for them.

In the first part of this interview I referred to the kind of elite groups that surround those who are in power in the Arab homeland. In most of the Arab countries these elite groups are made up of a group of oil company representatives, weapons merchants and foreign intelligence. Along with them would be people who are related to those in power in one way or another. Those people are also related to international oil and weapons companies and to international agencies as well.

Let us consider the Arab homeland from the inside. We will find that each country is being subjected to an unlimited amount of obfuscation. Each country is isolated from its neighbor, and each country is concentrating all the means of control [it has at its disposal] on its masses. Each country is using television, radio and the press to control the masses. What these agencies [of the media] cannot do, the agencies of repression and security do. Consequently, because the masses do not wish to have a confrontation with the agencies of repression, they have become "hooked" on television and radio programs which have a numbing effect on them. It's as though they were in a daze. These masses who were to be kept out of the picture chose instead to remain in their daze. This is because if they were to be forced out of the picture, they would have to have a conflict with the agencies of repression. Their "daze" is a kind of escape.

I am prepared to understand something like this happening in the United States because U.S. society is compartmentalized; that is, it is a society

of small units. The U.S. citizen spends half his day working and then rushes home where he has all the luxuries [of modern life]. He closes the door to his home where he remains until the following day. It is in his home that the U.S. citizen spends the rest of his day "glued" in front of the television and the video [screen].

We now have all these phenomena without any of the justifications for them and without the industrial base that created them and made them tolerable in the United States--although I happen to believe that these phenomena are absolutely intolerable. Thus there are now in the Arab homeland crowds of people who are lost. Ultimately, if one were to look for them, one would not be able to find them.

Lenin said, "Those who are responsible for political action have to go to the masses in the places where they live and work." Yesterday one could find large crowds of people in the factories, in the universities and in the streets and one could have mobilized these crowds. Today, however, one cannot go to those places and find the crowds because they are not there any more. Today, the crowds are scattered; they are basically preoccupied with the football games and with the television serials.

Let us shift to another circle and let us ask [the following question]: What are the means that would help these masses acquire a sense of what is around them today? Is it not curious that the Arab homeland in its entirety is receiving its political directions, its news and its information--not to mention its restricted press, its penetrated television and its food problems--basically from three [sic] foreign stations? These are:

1. The British Broadcasting station. [The BBC] is funded directly by British intelligence. The British Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives the directions for the programs, but the appropriations come from intelligence.

2. The Voice of America, and it needs no identification.

Are not these the forces that are directing all Arab public opinion? This means that this public opinion has no confidence in what is around it. This public is leading a life style of consumerism which is very alien to its stage of development. Even when the people have a moment of truth, they turn to these agencies to receive their news and information.

If we were to consider all the rising regimes in the Third World today, [we would find that], on the one hand, they were based on local repressive regimes and, on the other hand, on an elite that is related to the repressive regimes. Thirdly, we would find them based on regimes that are immoderate or repressive inside the country.

This is more true of the Arab homeland than elsewhere. I am not worried, for example, because we are not building heavy industries or new dams in Egypt, but I am extremely worried basically about something much more serious than that. I am worried about the set of values that were planted in the fifties and the sixties. These have been inundated by a sweeping wave whose purpose is to drown them altogether.

[7 Sep 81 p 11]

[Text] No Imminent Settlement with Israel Is Possible

This is the third installment of the interview with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal which AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI Magazine published.

Fourth, the Nature of Egypt's Role in the Arab Homeland

I believe that as we look for a way to make up for Egypt's departure or expulsion [from the Arab rank] we must define the nature, the history and the function of Egypt's role in the Arab homeland.

And here we can observe that ever since the beginning of the present century, the Arab homeland has turned to Egypt, even before 'Abd-al-Nasir and even before it assumed its nationalistic trend. And here we can also notice that Egypt, through its philosophers, its literary figures, its poets, its writers, its singers, its composers and its actors, played a leading cultural role. In fact, Egypt has always played two principal roles in the area. The first was that of overseer of the modernization process, and the second was that of unifier.

When this key role--the role of modernizer and that of unifier--disappears, no one imagines that a replacement can be easily found. Historical experiences do not indicate that there can be an automatic replacement for such cases. This is because the process which we are facing is neither chemical nor mechanical.

Furthermore, the country that was playing these two roles is one third of the Arab nation. Because of its location in the center of the Arab nation, it is one third of that nation. It is the country that was modernizing and unifying the Arab world. If this role follows that country outside the Arab ranks, one is then faced with a real problem and one then needs a long time to make arrangements for replacements.

However, we ought to become aware of another error which I noticed in our views and in the views of others. Some of us here in Egypt say that we are the leaders of the Arab homeland and that without Egypt the Arab homeland is without leadership. This is a mistake because this line of thought confuses the notion of leadership with that of the presidency, even though I concede that there is no presidency in political action.

One can become a leader through other people's recognition of one's leadership, and not as a result of one's own claim. At the same time, one can become a president or a king by virtue of the constitution.

Therefore, there is no leadership in the history of nations, and there is no nation that has been in a position of leadership throughout its history. A nation can become a leader inasmuch as it speaks for others. If it loses its ability to speak for others, it immediately loses its ability or its right to lead because, briefly, a leader is he whose concerns go beyond his

personal interests to express the interests of others. If a person can speak for an entire country, he can lead that country. Leadership ends when a leader loses his ability to speak for others. The same principle applies to countries. In this case the loss of the ability to speak for others keeps a country within its natural proportions or restores it to its natural proportions. Leadership then is not a visible process, and it is related to the performance of a specific role.

Hence arises the difficult problem of the replacement. In the first part of this interview I referred to the fact that there is a possible replacement in the Arab area but that we must take into consideration the fact that we are talking from the standpoint of geopolitical factors. From this standpoint we are saying that Syria and Iraq are possible replacements. But even as we say that we have a basic reservation. This replacement process is not automatic; it is a geopolitical alternative, and it has been presented. But this does not mean that it is automatic and that it has begun performing its role. It will perform its role only after it passes, after it mobilizes [forces] and after it polarizes [others], and not before.

I do not want to say that the picture is very grim, but it is evident to us that the period during which the Arab homeland has depended on Egypt, ever since the early part of this century, amounts to 70 years, whereas the period of time which the Arab homeland has found itself without Egypt--since the initiative and perhaps since Camp David--comes to 3 or 4 years. This is because there were some sectors after the initiative that still entertained hopes on the basis of what had happened. They based these hopes on the belief that the initiative itself may have been too daring, but Anwar al-Sadat's address to the Knesset at least was within Arab commitments. After the Camp David accords, however, they discovered that the situation was quite different.

What is important is that Egypt, on whom the Arabs had relied for 70 years, can be neither recovered nor replaced in 3 years. Furthermore, Arab reliance on Egypt goes back a long time; it even antedates the Ottoman invasion, when during a period of Arab fragmentation Egypt undertook the responsibility of the Crusades as an Arab or an Arab-Islamic responsibility. What is important [here] is that Egypt assumed a responsibility that was much greater than its borders. After the establishment of the Ottoman Empire Egypt continued to play a certain cultural role. It even played a certain legal role, with regard to interpretations, analyses and individual interpretations of religion. Although the entire age was one of decline, Egypt did play a role at a time where there were no entities in the Arab homeland. Saudi Arabia, for example, was merely the Emirate of al-Hijaz, and it used to rely on the kingdom of Egypt. Therefore, I believe that the matter will need more time than we believe.

After reviewing these four factors which explain why the "required awakening" in the Arab homeland did not occur, it is of interest to me to caution that, despite the phenomena that we are seeing now, things have a power unto themselves. When one has certain capabilities, these capabilities will prescribe a certain kind of influence. Some of this influence goes beyond the scope of one's plans. Let us cite a few examples.

--There is, for example, the role of Arab wealth which was unsought by its owners. This wealth gave the Arab homeland a kind of power. Even if this power is somewhat tainted today by the manner in which Arab wealth is used, the feeling that there is a certain capability still lingers.

The whole world, for example, was affected by the October war, or at least by the scene in the first few days of that war, and by the role of oil, the Arab unity and the coordinated Arab effort that accompanied that war. Miracles appeared in that historic moment which even Gen (Andre Bouvier) described as representing a message to the future, in spite of everything that happened afterwards. [He described that moment] as a message addressed to the future; it meant that the Arabs were capable: they were capable technologically; they were capable financially; and they were capable politically and militarily. One day they will be capable. This message is in itself an important message. Therefore, if one were to look today at the newspapers of the world, one would find that there is some kind of interest in the Arab homeland. There may not be enough respect, but there is at least a measure of dread.

--There is, for example, the role played by the Arab oil surplus funds in the Arab oil countries and even in the Arab countries that do not produce oil. These surplus funds have led to a kind of forced development that may not have been deliberate. This development followed the expansion in education, in the construction of roads and communications systems and in the construction of hospitals. This development also helped countries embark on programs "to catch up with technology."

If one were to consider the number of Arab students in foreign universities today, one would be facing a capability of some consequence. It is true that some of those will be influenced by foreign values and some of them will be lured by brain drain operations. But if one were to consider the number of those students and if political boundaries were lifted from the map, one would find that they constitute a capability of some significance.

Tied to this also on a technological level is the fact that these funds gave some of us the capability to purchase technology and gave rise to an awareness of technology as well.

Let me pause here as we talk about technology and Arab development and ponder the operation of the Iraqi nuclear reactor which Israel destroyed.

Israel attacked and launched a war in 1967 because an Egyptian infantry soldier had entered Sinai, and it had tried to prevent him from doing his duty.

Today by bombing the Iraqi reactor Israel tried to prevent an Arab scientist from conducting research in the nuclear field. The fact is that I believe that what is more important than the nuclear reactor itself is the nuclear college which is located next to it. It has the capability of teaching 600 young Arab men nuclear technology. This is the capability that Israel will always try to thwart.

Therefore, I think that one should have known that Israel would bomb that reactor and any Arab reactor in fact because we ought to know that Israel would not allow us to advance technologically, [that is], if we enable Israel to prevent us. When Gen (Bouvier) said that what happened in the 1973 October war was tantamount to a message addressed to the future, I was immediately reminded of the choices that 'Abd-al-Nasir set out to take in this technological area. When 'Abd-al-Nasir tried to go into the field of manufacturing missiles, airplanes and the technology of nuclear reactors, he would always say that he was not interested in the nuclear bomb or in missiles. He was primarily interested in having Arab cadres that were competent in the technology of missiles, in the technology of airplanes and in nuclear technology because we could not afford to lag behind in this area. Then 'Abd-al-Nasir was gone.

Today, someone else is here to carry out [what 'Abd-al-Nasir had started]. And here we must call attention to the fact that there is a technological power thrust in the Arab area, and there is sometimes a responsible awareness of the requirements of technology. The simplest example of this is the fact that Saddam Husayn--whether or not one agrees with him on other matters--has promised to establish a nuclear college that can educate 600 young Arab men, to make this college available to the Arab homeland and to bring together all Arab cadres [who specialize] in nuclear science. This is a positive action. I believe that an Arab nuclear project must be a national project in which all Arabs would participate. However, in the absence of "all Arabs," we must appreciate the efforts of any Arab country that attempts this by itself.

The final point [I want to make] about the matter of bombing the Iraqi reactor is my observation that people are somewhat "dazzled" by the precision and execution of the Israelis. Actually, I do not think that what happened was in any way miraculous. For when a certain command concentrates on a specific and a limited objective; when it devotes all its capabilities to achieve that objective--conducting daily exercises on how that objective can be achieved--when that objective becomes the objective of the state and the people, even if they do not know it, the accurate implementation of that task is by no means astounding, especially when the preparation, the mobilization, the concentration and the training for it lasts close to a year and a half.

I believe quite the opposite that we in Egypt--and also in Syria--did realize a miracle in the 1973 October war. This is not due to the fact that we are in an age of miracles, but rather because from 1967 till 1973 the capabilities of the Egyptian people have all been devoted to [the objective of] crossing that difficult water barrier and conquering all the fortifications and barriers behind it. Therefore, the whole world was astounded on 6 October 1973 because on the morning of that day there were five Egyptian divisions on the western bank of the Suez Canal. On the morning of the following day the five divisions were on the eastern bank of the canal, and the Bar-Lev line had fallen. Therefore, I firmly believe that the crossing, as a limited objective; the plan to achieve that objective; and the achievement of that objective were much more astounding than the operation of

bombing the Iraqi reactor. The only value of the reactor bombing operation lies in the fact that Israel assumed the initiative. This is what we must focus on because when we in Egypt and in Syria took the initiative and decided to cross [the canal], we succeeded.

Therefore I say that regardless of everything that is negative in the Arab world today, there are "positive" resources in store. At a certain moment this quantity of resources will assume a discretionary quality. However, no one can say precisely when this will happen.

But I can affirm here the importance of the growing awareness in Egypt and the vigilance that is taking place in Egypt about everything that has happened and is happening. I can also refer to the same phenomenon in the entire Arab homeland. Let us consider, for example, the statement that is prevalent today about the fact that Egypt's departure [from the Arab ranks] represents a major loss for the Arab nation. This statement is extremely important because for a long time Egypt's role had been taken for granted in what was occasionally an unjustifiable and a provocative manner. When Israel, for example, turned its aggressive operations against Egypt and assassinated a number of German missiles scientists who were in Egypt, the Arabs did not pay enough attention to that. Even when Egypt announced its missiles construction program and actually launched a number of its missiles in the skies of Cairo, some people in the Arab homeland unfortunately believed that the operation was merely ceremonial. When Egypt entered into the field of nuclear reactors and tried to pave the way to the formation of an Arab cadre of nuclear scientists, the Arabs did not become aware of this at the time.

But consider today what happened after Israel bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor. I believe that Egypt and the entire Arab homeland are becoming aware of what is happening, and I believe that there is an increasing awareness which has not been evident before. There is also a sense of the present, the past and the future and an awareness of the connection between them. Therefore I am saying that numerous signs throughout the Arab homeland indicate that there are positive resources in store and that these will ultimately lead to the creation of a substantive change.

[Question] What in your opinion are the components of the imminent settlement with Israel, and how can it be achieved?

[Answer] Let me tell you very briefly and clearly that first, no solution with Israel is possible or imminent. In this regard, I concur with Ben Gurion when he said, "There is one piece of land which cannot be divided. It will either belong to the Israelis or to the Palestinians. There can be no compromise over this matter." Several months ago Arthur Miller was here in Cairo. He sat with me in front of Prince Sadr al-Din Khan and asked me the same question, "What is your opinion of the solution to the struggle with Israel?" He found my reply surprising. I told him, "Unfortunately, I find myself very much inclined to agree with Ben Gurion's words. There is one piece of land which cannot be divided and cannot have two owners. It can either belong to the Israelis or to the Palestinians."

As far as I am concerned, I would say that it belongs to the Palestinians, and it cannot belong to anyone else. I think that in some cases we become "timid" when we express ourselves and do not make our true beliefs known. I imagine that at least we ought to be able to tell each other what we believe; it is not necessary to say it to the whole world. On this basis I would say that we ought to realize that there is no imminent peace with Israel and that there is no peace at all.

When the Egyptian leadership chose this settlement with Israel, it defended its choice on grounds of realism beyond which there can be nothing else. But I find myself not quite convinced by this realism because it can lead us very far away from history and from reality. I believe there are two positions and that both are wrong.

--To speak about reality and forget historical fact [is wrong].

--To speak about historical fact and forget reality [is also wrong].

Thus we ought not to speak about reality and ignore historical fact. In our case the historical fact was stated by Ben Gurion. We were not the ones who said that this land cannot be divided. What is curious is that we cannot see in front of us what Menahem Begin sees. A short time ago Begin met a European friend of his, the same man I recently met in London. During the lengthy conversation that took place between the two men, one of the phenomena that Begin focused on most, as I found out from my European friend, was that of Israeli youth who had lost their vision of the Zionist dream.

I therefore believe that no matter what we do, Israel will not agree to peace with us. It cannot endure peace. It cannot endure peace, and it cannot endure war forever. Accordingly, everything it is doing now with Egypt boils down to being a "daily scheme."

Zionist elements came into Palestine under the momentum of a certain idea. Numerous forces in the world helped them until they established a state. Then they discovered that that state cannot exist within the boundaries established by the UN partitioning resolution. Therefore, they took land beyond the 1948 borders, that is the truce lines. However, they were not able to live within those borders, so they expanded to the 1967 borders. At the height of their victory in 1967 it was evident to them that their victory was a hollow victory.

I believe, therefore, that Israel discovered the real crisis of its existence after its aggression in June 1967. The Israeli military had then achieved the utmost that could be achieved in military victories. However, Israelis discovered that states are not formed by military [might]. A nation-state must have certain components in order to exist. In Israel these components do not exist: there is no nation-state where 90 languages are spoken; there is no nation state which consists in fact of 50 nations and 50 nationalities. If Israel is trying to make up for that by spreading the Zionist dream and the idea of the melting pot, [it will find that] this

melting pot needs a social, educational, cultural and political framework, and none of this exists.

I will not talk to you about emigration from Israel which now exceeds immigration to Israel. But there is another more indicative phenomenon, and I will rely on the verdict of statistics which are available from the offices of the state of New York. Among the matters that these statistics indicate is that more than half a million Israelis obtained work permits and settled in New York. This means that the dream has been lost. Israel may from time to time engage in spectacular actions such as bombing Lebanon, raiding Damascus or bombing the Iraqi reactor, but the response to all this is simple: not even the strike of 1967 achieved for Israel what it had been seeking.

Let us consider the matter from another perspective. What can Egypt realistically offer Israel more than it has already offered it? I do not believe that there is more to be offered. But even that, which was a great deal, cannot give Israel a minimum measure of reassurance.

I claim even more than that. Even if all the countries were to recognize it, Israel will find itself compelled to set up a barbed wire fence around itself so it would not blend and fade in its surroundings. Israel is being threatened: first, inside the country the Israelis are being attenuated by the Palestinian Arabs; and second, the Arab world around them is threatening [to dilute their power]. Is it not strange that a country like Israel is still unable to determine what it will do with the land? Israel wants the land for security reasons, but it fears being consumed by it. The Israelis will never be able to decide on that matter because they do not have a nation-state.

A number of Israeli leaders are perceiving this crisis and refer to it. I recently saw a book by Herzog, director of Israeli intelligence and former Israeli ambassador to the United Nations in which he raises poignant questions about the future of Israel. I believe that these questions are now being raised vehemently inside Israel.

Regardless of what the Israelis themselves are saying, we must at least understand and define what we want. I cannot imagine that peace with Israel is possible. However, this does not mean that there will be an immediate war with Israel and that it will last forever.

And here I will go back to 'Abd-al-Nasir's strategy, and I believe it was correct. That strategy manifested itself in ignoring this situation. We know that Israel will always try to force itself on the situation from time to time. Therefore, we must always be prepared. This means that we are not required to settle or solve Israel's situation today in any way, but we are required to know that there can be no solution "with Israel." This does not mean that the alternative is immediate war. The Israelis are trying to gain time, but they do not know why. We, however, know why we are trying to gain time. The purpose of 'Abd-al-Nasir's strategy in gaining time was to build and develop the Arab nation, to impart a qualitative value to it and to sit and wait. Waiting can indeed become a general national and pan-Arab policy.

Is it not strange, for example, that the United States of America, after Chiang Kai Chek's regime collapsed in China, continued for almost one quarter of a century to deny the existence of the People's Republic of China? For the United States "all" of China consisted of that terrain which was limited to Taiwan. This means that some nations will occasionally ignore facts, even the facts of geography, at certain moments [in their history].

Why aren't we trying to concentrate on building the components of our own Arab power, since there is no imminent peace with Israel?

I wonder, does anyone believe that Israel will give up Jerusalem?

Does anyone believe that Israel will get out of the West Bank?

I recall that when 'Abd-al-Nasir accepted Resolution 242 and called us for a meeting to discuss the matter, some of us were worried about the articles of the resolution. 'Abd-al-Nasir told those people, "We will fight to have this resolution implemented." And this was true.

When I told Arthur Miller that and when I told him that I concurred with Ben Gurion and Menahem Begin and [thought] that Israel would not willingly give up Jerusalem or the West Bank, Miller's amazement was evident in his reply: "Are you talking about war?"

Then he went on to add, "You are then talking about a nuclear war!"

This is logical and understandable. If this land cannot be divided and if it can belong either to the Israelis or the Palestinians, then one of them must give it up. But which one? The party that can claim geography and history will control the land. Therefore, I believe that ultimately the Arab homeland surrounding Israel will hold sway, and this land will belong to no one other than the Arab. This means that Israel cannot force its wishes on the Arab homeland forever.

Ultimately, there is the danger of war, and this war can lead us to "the moment of nuclear truth." I am not saying that nuclear weapons would be used, but [I am saying that] unless there is an "Arab nuclear deterrent," we will simply find that an Israeli nuclear "weapon of extortion" will be used to impose Israel's wishes on us by striking nuclear terror in people's hearts.

I do not think that a settlement with Israel is possible or imminent.

I do, however, think that there is a possible Arab strategy and an imminent Arab strategy. If we were to achieve some settlement one of these days--although this settlement will be extremely lengthy and I think it will be one-sided, that is, it will be guaranteed by an Arab strategy--Israel will always try to provoke us and drag us into a conflict with it so it can dissipate our strength. But Israel must not succeed in this endeavor, and we ought to be prepared.

We should refer here to the experience of China and the United States, from another angle this time. When the United States used to resort to numerous means to provoke China in an attempt to drag it into a confrontation, China used to do no more than issue these well-known "warnings." China would not be moved because it was concerned with the process of building the country and building the components of its own strength--chief among which was the nuclear bomb--so it can realize its basic security guarantees. Therefore, it was not provoked.

[8 Sep 81 p 11]

[Text] Conditions for Overcoming the Camp David Incident

This is the fourth and the final installment of the interview with Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, which was in the new issue of AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-'ARABI Magazine.

[Question] The recent Arab Summit Conference in Amman confirmed that the Arab countries which attended the conference affirmed that Resolution 242 was no longer suitable as the basis for solving the crisis in the Middle East. The conference also absolutely rejected the Camp David accords and the outcome of these accords.

What do you believe is the alternative to the directions which the Egyptian leadership is taking? And here we also ask how can the Camp David "incident" and the treaty be made to yield to supreme Arab interests?

What alternatives do Syria and the PLO have?

[Answer] First of all, as far as Egypt is concerned, I do not believe that the Camp David incident can be made to yield to supreme Arab interests. And here I go back once again to the notion of reality versus history and the conflict between them. I maintain that reality does not conflict with history and that history does not deny facts or reality.

The problem of the Camp David accords and their outcome is the fact that in the view of their proponents, the accords represent a realistic view which states that this is what is possible. I think that this is not enough. One cannot squander the past, the future, the possibilities and capabilities of history as well as the short and long term considerations of power on the grounds of realism. Therefore, the accords are intractable.

Let me ask, what do the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty mean? Their significance may be summarized in two basic points.

First, Sinai, with certain security conditions. Sinai was never a problem because Israel had no historical or religious claims to Sinai; it was only asking for security guarantees. Israel has taken 10 times more guarantees than it had been asking for. Accordingly, it met its objectives and then some.

Second, an ambiguous agreement that is called Palestinian autonomy. That agreement is meaningless and will not be implemented by anyone. I pray God that Egypt will not try to implement it.

[Question] If we accept in general [the notion] that "the incident" cannot be invalidated, a thinking man would continue to play his role whether he is faced with a negative incident or a positive one. If we look at the situation from this perspective, how can this incident be harnessed to serve the goals of Arab nationalism?

[Answer] This is true, but if you confront me with an incident that conflicts with history, I cannot take it into consideration. I would have to circumvent it because I cannot comprehend it as a historical incident. It is an incident that occurred in history, but nothing can be built on it. It is an incident one can circumvent but cannot build on. This is true of all incidents that conflict with history. However, they must be overcome. But [if you ask me] how did this happen, this is another matter.

[Question] This other matter is in fact the substance of my question. How can this incident be overcome?

[Answer] I think that in order to circumvent this incident, we must make the Arab homeland a capable power again, a power whose countries can think together and take action together.

But I admit that in the absence of Egypt this is the situation that we are facing. Let us go back once again to the notion of "metal fatigue." I actually believe that the Arab nation--for numerous economic, social, security, political, promotional and international, etc. reasons--is in a state of "metal fatigue." Although there are numerous positive phenomena and signs in the Arab homeland, there does not seem to be anyone who can overcome the state of "metal fatigue" at the present time. Would it have been possible for Israel, as it experienced the critical throes of looking for its identity and all the problems from which it is suffering to achieve all this? Would it have been possible for Israel to achieve "peace" with Egypt, its largest [Arab] neighbor? This is indeed greater than a dream. [It would not have been possible] had not the Arabs been in the state they are in.

Therefore if you are asking me about what is "possible" in this regard, my response would be as follows: the Arab homeland must be capable of overcoming the present moment, but, unfortunately, it cannot. It cannot do that, and the matter is not only related to Egypt's departure or its ouster [from Arab ranks]. However, let us consider the remaining forces that are active in the Arab homeland.

--Saudi Arabia has focused its strategic choice on an Islamic direction.

--Iraq and Syria, between the two of them, could have replaced Egypt as a base. However, Iraq is preoccupied with its war with Iran.

--The Arab Maghreb is far away.

Accordingly, there is nothing in front of you, in front of others and in front of me--and we are all in a position to think and not in a position of power, that is, we have ideas only and no information--but to sit and think, analyze and encourage the accumulation of resources while we wait for the day in which this store of resources will turn into a new creative force that would assume a discretionary power which can produce its effects.

When and where [would this happen]? Actually I don't know, but what I am talking about is the logic of historical development. Naturally, this does not mean that there are surprises or that we will wait for coincidences to occur. What is actually happening is that there are new positive factors on the Arab scene. As a result of their interaction and their quantitative fermentation, these factors will some day lead to a substantive change.

[Question] Let me refer to another point that has to do with what is happening between Egypt and Israel. Some of us think that behind the Arabs' rejection of a settlement lies a certain fear that Israel would control the entire area because it is technologically advanced and because of the evident inequality between it and the Arab countries in this area. In addition, it is an extension of a world-wide system of domination and exploitation that is led by the United States.

In case of a settlement, do you believe that there is actual danger that Israel will sweep the Arab area?

[Answer] The matter of Israel sweeping the Arab area deserves some thought. I firmly believe that Israel cannot sweep anything, not even technologically.

Tell me, what is the technological miracle in Israel? The principal part of its weaponry--its airplanes--is imported from abroad. Israel is indisputably an advance country, but its level of progress is not higher than that of the countries of eastern Europe. However, ultimately, what is the economic foundation of that progress? What is [its] social and political foundation?

Tell me, what is the average per capita income in Israel? It is about 1,000 dollars a year, isn't it? But what is each individual's share of foreign aid and contributions?

There is indeed more progress in Israel than there is in the Arab homeland. But Israel is not advanced [in everything] absolutely. Its progress is limited. Even the matter of the nuclear bomb which the Israelis have been able to achieve does not at all represent a technological miracle.

India, for example, which is a Third World country has a nuclear bomb.

Part of the Israeli nuclear bomb was stolen and not imported.

Israel has ready-made scientists, and it has the capability of bringing advanced scientists. Israel, for example, had the capability of bringing Edward (Miller) to Israel for 1 year. He is the father of the hydrogen bomb. Egypt or Iraq, however, cannot get him for 1 week.

Therefore I also reject the claim that Egypt will be swept economically by Israel. This will not happen unless we allow it to happen. Let us ask, what can Egypt import from Israel? Israel's exports consist basically of citrus fruits, cut diamonds, [the products of] chemical industries and weapons. What will we import from Israel? Israel does not have raw materials.

Let us also consider the matter of agricultural land. I wonder about the agricultural miracle that Israel achieved. It is true that the Israelis applied modern methods of irrigation to the land, but I claim that the reclamation of the agricultural land in al-Tahrir Province by the 23 July Revolution is no less miraculous than all the reclamation which took place in Israel.

Tell me, what is this "civilization" that Israel can bring or represent? What is the story that is being promoted about Israel being the harbinger of civilization? I can understand, for example, the claim that major colonialist countries made about what they called the white man's burden in Africa. But can Israel claim to carry the white man's burden in the Arab region? Will Israel assume the responsibility of civilizing Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc.?

Israel itself is made up of 3 million Jews. About 2 million of them are eastern Jews. And here we ask what will be the difference between the Iraqi Jew, the Egyptian Jew or the Moroccan Jew, who immigrated to Israel, and the non-Jewish Iraqi, Egyptian or Moroccan citizen? [The former] will remain an Iraqi Jew, an Egyptian Jew or a Moroccan Jew. He may be more aware than the non-Jewish Iraqi, Egyptian or Moroccan. But that will be the only difference: no more and no less. With regard to the rest of Israel's population, and they are about 1 million who came from eastern Europe, they operate to a certain extent on a more scientific system. What is important is that when they came to the area and attacked us, Arab societies were still primitive and tribal. Hence the gap between us and them began to appear evident, but this gap is now being breached in any case.

I believe above all that, on the one hand, we must describe the state, the entity and the aspirations of the state of Israel; on the other hand, we must describe our objectives. People in Israel are declaring a number of things they will not do.

--They will not return to the pre-5 June 1967 borders.

--They will not return east Jerusalem to the Arabs.

--They will not return the West Bank and Gaza to Arab sovereignty.

--They will not recognize the PLO, etc.

But what are we saying in return? I can understand that there be a certain "logic" behind the claim that is being made in Israel about a security zone and having a historical claim to the area, no matter how false that claim is. Therefore, I believe that we need "to rationalize" what we want, at least among ourselves. We are demanding rights that were taken from us by force. This is true, but this is not enough. It is also not enough to add to that that Israel is a bridgehead and that it is a so-called state. All this is not enough even though it is true. We have to determine precisely the magnitude and the nature of the Israeli challenge, and we have to estimate its duration and its capacity. After that we are to determine what our strategy will be to meet this challenge.

Second, with regard to Syria and the PLO:

Let me tell you unequivocally that unfortunately there can be no strategy by virtue of logic in Egypt's absence, on the one hand, and in the absence of an alternative power base on the other. However, there can only be tactics, and tactics without a strategy are no more than evasive action taken merely for the sake of survival, no more and no less.

Consequently, the matter for Syria and for the PLO may be summarized as follows: in the absence of an Arab strategy and in the absence of capable power bases, Syria and the PLO cannot have a strategy; they can only engage in tactics whose only purpose is survival.

Let us consider the subject of the PLO in particular. The organization did not have a strategy at any time in the past. But it could not have helped that because the Palestinian Revolution does not have access to the land of its homeland, and all its people are under Israeli occupation. Therefore, it is living in a state of siege.

--The siege of Arab disputes.

--The siege of Arab agreements.

--The siege of Arab conflicts.

The leaders of this revolution undoubtedly have their excuse. This situation in whose grip they find themselves does not diminish their worth. Quite the contrary, I believe that they are facing the most difficult situation a national revolution had to confront. The Palestinian Revolution is compelled to maneuver, to take action and to protect itself in a siege of agreements and disputes between local and international powers.

In the absence of an Arab strategy and in the absence of alternative Arab power bases, Syria does not have many choices. It can only engage in evasive maneuvers to avoid a worse situation and to survive.

We are waiting for the action of history, and I hope we are waiting for Godot. I am referring to Samuel Becket.

8592
CSO: 4504/102

CLANDESTINE ON EX-KHOMEYNI SUPPORTER REMARKS

NC051610 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 4 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Oh people of Iran! The crimes of Khomeyni's regime have surpassed the limits of savagery and barbarianism. Oh nation of Iran: the group killings and inhuman tortures by the founders of the Islamic Republic and (?of the) murderers in Iran are unprecedented in any era in any place of the world--both in the dark days of repression in the middle ages and in the death camps of Hitler's Germany.

Oh compatriots! The savage behavior of the bloodthirsty Tehran leaders with the people of our country is a behavior not shown by any occupation force toward people in occupied territories. These are facts known by everyone. But one more person to unveil these crimes is Mr 'Ali Reza'i, a person whose wife and children and he himself were considered as symbols and heroes of the Islamic Republic.

Mr Reza'i, who has fled to Paris, spoke to France-Soir about the horrific crimes being committed by Khomeyni's hellish regime every day and hour. The information given by Mr Reza' is not new or complete, as he--because of his closeness with the Mojahedine-e Khalq and the clerical regime's anger over this--had been in hiding for some time. Nevertheless, his remarks give a small picture of what is happening to the suffering Iranian people in the oppressive atmosphere of the Islamic Republic and open the eyes of each and every Iranian and (?freedom-seeker).

We want to believe that the reason that made Mr Resa'i open his mouth to speak of the realities was not merely the fact that he was threatened and harassed by his former friends who had deprived him of the opportunity to (?live) and act in Iran. Like millions of Iranians and millions of freedom-seekers of the world, we want to accept that if in the past Mr Reza'i and people who thought like him approved, for any reason, the crimes--committed by Khomeyni's Islamic Republic from the very first day of its inception and which intensified with each passing day, now that these crimes have reached such a degree of savagery--are opening the eyes and awakening the conscience of Khomeyni's former friends and of the once eulogized heroes of the Islamic Republic.

We hope that Mr Reza'i is saying these things not for political reasons and differences of views, but for humanitarian reasons. There may have been many who, for a long time, did not see the hidden nature of Khomeyni and of his followers and could not see their criminal plots to overthrow those with rational thought and to destroy

Iran; people who, despite the warning cries of alert combatants, continued to encourage Khomeyni. But those who do not speak up now that the satan in (?human disguise)--who promised the rule of justice and a free society but instead took the scythe of death into his hand and started cutting down men, women, the old, the young and children who did not submit to his wants--has been disgraced, now those who do not reveal these crimes will be committing an unforgivable sin. They will be considered as partners in the regime's crimes and will be punished for this.

It is very painful for Mr Reza'i to confess that he has lost four young and zealous children in a path that has led to the establishment of the most despotic regime recorded by history. Despite all the propaganda by the murderous clergymen, it is very (?interesting) to hear him say that if in the past a few hundred were executed--during the era of Khomeyni's rule of Islam thousands and thousands have fallen victime to his bloodthirsty executioners.

Mr Reza'i is not the first person to reveal part of the unbelievable crimes committed by the clerical regime, and he won't be the last to do so. Anyone who is around the traitors and murderers ruling Iran and who has the least bit of humanity and respect, anyone who has not sold his soul and conscience to the devil is dutybound not to close his eyes to the crimes witnessed each day and should try to reveal them. If he does not, he will be a partner in the crimes of Khomeyni's antipopular regime.

CSO: 4640/51

CLANDESTINE ON WHY IRAN COMMUNISTS OPPOSE NRMI

NC141651 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 14 Nov 81

[Station talk]

[Text] In our previous programs we discussed in detail the various (?objectives of the communists) in our homeland and clarified that the difference between these groups is only in the endorsement of or opposition to Khomeyni's regime and that this too is expedient and (?something which their master wants). Apart from this, the views of the communist groups and parties in Iran, such as the Tudeh Party, the Feda'iyan-e Khalq, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Peykar group and the Komeleh and a number of the groups on all domestic and foreign matters are the same, and all of them express the same opinion which their social-imperialist master expresses. A look at the publications of these groups and a comparison of articles with the propaganda policy of the mass media of Soviet social-imperialism proves ORU point. One of the points on which all the communist groups agree is the opposition of all of them to the national resistance movement of Iran [NRMI] and with its leader, Shapur Bakhtiar.

Looking at the reasons for the opposition by the communist groups to the NRMI reveals, to a large extent, the anti-Iranian nature of these groups. What are we saying which is opposed by the communists? We oppose any type of imperialism, namely western imperialism led by the United States and eastern social-imperialism led by the Soviet Union. We say that Iran should be independent and not aligned to any one of the two superpowers--the United States or the Soviet Union. But the communist groups oppose this opinion of ours, because they consider only the United States to be imperialists and they say that "we should unite with the Soviet Union to fight against U.S. imperialism." We leave the judgment of these two differing opinions to you, our dear listeners.

The other reason why the communists oppose us is that we say that, in Iran's future rule, all political parties and groups, including the communists and even our own opponents, should be free to express their views. We say that the press should be free and that there should be (?no repression). But the communists, who are affiliated to the foreigner and who know that in a free atmosphere and a democratic society they can never gain the rule, want freedom only for those who agree with them. In other words, they believe in the same freedom which the clergy believe in.

Another point on which the foreign affiliated communists disagree with the NRMI is our stress on the preservation of the Iranian identity and our support for Iranian

culture. This, of course, is not (?favorable) to those people who want to lead Iran to the society of nations living behind the iron curtain.

In (?their enmity) with the NRMI, the united forces of communism have not refrained, nor do they refrain, from aiming any kinds of insults. For instance, despite our emphasis on (?the establishment) of social justice in Iran and Dr Shapur Bakhtiar's emphasis on his belief in socialism and democracy, they say that the NRMI wants the return of the elements of the past regime's corruption and of the capitalists of the (?country's industries). While, despite our opposition to any type of imperialist domination in the region and our emphasis on the preservation of Iran's independence vis-a-vis eastern and western imperialism headed by the Soviet Union and the United States, the communist gentlemen accuse us of supporting the United States.

Another one of the fabrications [words indistinct] by the communists concerning the NRMI is that they tell their supporters that the NRMI is pursuing a (?chauvinistic) policy and opposes the autonomy of the Iranian people. We have repeatedly said and point out again that not only do we not oppose the autonomy of all Iranian (?races) that have [word indistinct] specialties, but we consider this the right of all of the people of Iran. (?Decreasing the role) of the central government in the affairs of provinces and districts and the transferring of these affairs to the people of the various parts of the country are among the points in the NRMI program. Now, how the NRMI and its leader Shapur Bakhtiar can oppose the autonomy of the (?Iranian races) is a question the answer to which the communists probably know.

CSO: 4640/51

CLANDESTINE ON PRO-MOSCOW GROUPS' 'SHAM WAR'

NC121634 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 12 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary: "The Sham War Between the Tudeh Party and Other Pro-Moscow Groups"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted including indistinct portion] some time ago we spoke to our dear listeners about the Sham War between the Tudeh Party and other pro-Moscow communist groups and we clarified that the Russians are not counting only on the Tudeh Party in their wish to infiltrate our country. The Tudeh Party has been kept only to mislead ordinary people and to keep hidden the aligned characteristic of the other communist groups. In other words, other pro-Soviet groups (?are feigning a duel) with the Tudeh Party to hide their own affiliation with the Soviet Union from the people, while the aims of all of them are the same--to take our Iran behind the iron curtain.

As an example, ask the leaders of the Tudeh Party, Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP], the Peykar group, the Komeleh and the Feda'iyan'e Khalq what they think about the Soviet agression in Afghanistan and about the military occupation of this nonaligned country by the Red Army. All of these gentlemen, who pretend to have great differences, will say that the Red Army has gone to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan people themselves to defend Babrak Karmal's auspicious revolution against imperialist attacks. Of course, none of them say anything about how Barbrak Karmal came to power and about the fact that 3 days after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, this traitor was brought [words indistinct] to Kabul. Nor do they explain which one of Afghanistan's neighbors--Iran or Pakistan--was the imperialist power that intended to attack Afghanistan. If we ask the leaders of the Tudeh Party, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the KDP, the Feda'iyan-e Khalq, the Peykar group and the Komeleh what they think about the Afghan Mujahedin who are fighting in bare feet and with a (?piece of dried bread as nourishment) against the occupiers of their homeland, all of them will reply in unison that the Afghan Mujahedin are a group of brigands who have been armed by U.S. and Chinese imperialism in order to threaten Babrak Karmal's revolution.

Under the label of fighting against U.S. imperialism for almost (?3) years now the Red Army has been downing napalm bombs on the heads of these barefoot people and is burning their villages. If the members of the Tudeh Party do not understand what this type of crushing means, the leaders of the KDP and Komeleh should be able to understand it because they have seen the bombing of villages in Kordestan by Khomeyni's clique. The same calamity that was brought on the Kurdish compatriots is being brought by the Russians on the people of Afghanistan but on a [word indistinct] scale. So, how can the leaders of the KDP and the Komeleh join in unison with the Tudeh

Party and radio Moscow and call the Afghan Mujahedin "brigands" and (?condemn) their national struggle? This is a (?raffling) question.

Let us leave the Afghan problem about which some of the clergymen have been talking like radio Moscow during recent months. We ask the leaders of the Tudeh Party, the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the KDP, the Komeleh, the Peykar group and the Feda'iyan about their opinion on the workers' insurrection in Poland and about the free unions there. These gentlemen have previously given us their opinion in their publications, organs and radios. Their answer is the same as that given by radio Moscow. To "defend workers and toilers," it is their opinion that the insurrection of the Polish workers and unions against the oppression of the Communist Party is a plot hatched by western imperialism, as everywhere else all the workers in communist countries are living in paradise--of course behind the iron curtain!

Finally, we ask the leaders of all the communist parties in Iran and all those who believe in Marxism-Leninism and Islamic-Marxism, and who are doing their best to show that they have great differences among them, what they think about the life of the people in the Asian colonies of the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, all of them will speak like radio Moscow about the fruits that the Great October Revolution has brought to the people of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and for the persophones in [words indistinct], Bokhara and Tadzhikstan. We are not (?assuming) this. They have previously said so and have written it in their publications.

(?The only point on which these gentlemen pretend to differ) is the endorsement of rejection of Ayatollah Khomeyni's Islamic Republic. (?Moscow) has ordered the Tudeh Party and the Feda'iyan to endorse it and the others to oppose it--and this sham war of course (?only services the interests) of Soviet social-imperialisms, if we (?look beyond these orders to endorse or oppose) [words indistinct].

What is important to them is to deceive the people, to draw them behind the iron curtain and to open the way for the great bear toward the Persian Gulf. Of no importance whatsoever for these [words indistinct] are freedom, democracy, our (?national identity), national sovereignty and cultural identity. The united (?forces) of communism are (?exercising demagogy) and are exploiting all the weak points of our kept-in-ignorance society (?in order to further their objectives). We will continue this discussion in our future talks.

CSO: 4640/52

MKO TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST GOVERNMENT FORCES REVIEWED

Assassinations Listed

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 4 Nov 81 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, Nov. 3 (Kayhan Int'l) — These are the "popular" activities of a group which under the guise of supporting the masses, have gathered a number of youths around themselves, and stain every day their hands with the blood of the bravest and dearest children of these heroic masses:

Massacre of Revolutionary Guards Members of the Basij (mobilized forces) and the Revolutionary Committees:

The Munafiqeen assume the killing of the Guards, members of the Basij and Revolutioary committees, as a religious duty and attack them even during sleep. For example the MKO's terrorists recently attacked 14 member guards of the Basij in Gha'em Shahr (Northern Iran) and opened fire on them when they were asleep, and as a result 8 of the guards were wounded and 6 were martyred.

From June 15 up to Sept. 27, 91 Revolutionary Guards and members of the Basij and Islamic Revolutionary Committee were martyred by the counterrevolutionary groups. The following is part of the chronology of their crimes in this connection.

1. In an armed raid in Tehran the MKO members martyred 14 Revolutionary Guards.
2. In an attack launched by the Munafiqeen upon Revolutioary Guards on July 24, twelve members of the IRGC and Basij were martyred.
3. In a brutal armed attack carried out by the Munafiqeen on the 8th Committee of Tehran, a worker who was also a member of the Basij was martyred (Ettela'at, July 26).
4. Three members of the Basij were martyred by the Munafiqeen on Aug. 18.
5. A Revolutionary Guard called Ebrahim Afshari, who had just returned from the war front to visit his family was martyred in Shahrara, Tehran.
6. Two Guards were shot dead by the MKO's terrorists, riding a motorcycle (Ettela'at, Aug. 31).
7. The Munafiqeen martyred a member of the Basij with grenade, in Langerud (Kayhan, Sept. 1)
8. A bomb explosion at the Training Center of the IRGC in Mashad (Northeastern Iran) took the lives of two Revolutionary Guards
9 A Revolutionary Guard was martyred in Tehran by the Munafiqeen on Sept. 29.

D The Assassination of the Army Personnel by the Munafiqeen.

1. An army officer called Kiomars Karami was assassinated in Tehran by the MKO's terrorists on Sept. 11.
2. A non-commissioned officer called Mehdi Shaghaghian was martyred in Shiraz on Sept. 9 by the Munafiqeen.
3. The MKO's terrorists martyred an army non-commissioned officer in Tehran on Sept. 9.

Massacre of the Members of Construction Jihad, Revolutionary Courts, the Martyr Foundation and Other Revolutionary Organs:

From June 15 up to Sept. 27, 14 members of the revolutionary foundations of the country were martyred by the Munafiqeen.

1. The MKO's terrorists martyred an official of Tehran's Martyr Foundation, called Mazandarani, on June 21.
2. The Munafiqeen martyred two members of the Construction Jihad in Sanandaj (Western Iran) on July 16.
3. The Deputy Prosecutor General of the Islamic Revolutionary Court of Tabriz was assassinated and martyred by the Munafiqeen (Ettela'at, July 30).
4. The Head of the Martyr Foundation of Behbahan, Hojjatoleslam Bekhradian, was assassinated by the MKO's terrorists on Aug. 3.
5. The Imam's representative in the Construction Jihad of the Anzali Port (Northern Iran) was martyred by the counterrevolutionary Munafiqeen on Sept. 1.
6. A member of the Construction Jihed of Bojnurd Township was attacked and martyred by the Munafiqeen (Ettela'at, Sept. 9).

Bombings Reported

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 5 Nov 81 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN, Nov. 4 (Kayhan Int'l.) — In previous issues you read the statistics of the "popular" massacres of people by the Munafiqeen (members of the MIO).

In this issue and in the next one which will be the last part of this series, you will be familiarized with another part of the hysteric activities of these "partisans" of the masses.

During their "historic" and "heroic" operations the Munafiqeen succeeded in destroying many buildings of the "reactionaries" such as mosques, bookshops, hospitals, pharmacies, blood transfusion centers, the building of the martyr foundation and the war victims as well as the houses and shops of ordinary people. They managed to burn a large number of "reactionary" books such as the Quran and Nahjul Balagha as well as numerous "Falangist" agents including suckling babies and ...!

Now let us review the fifth part of the bulletin of services of the partisans of the masses. Again it is mentioned that these figures are incomplete and restricted to three months (June 15 to Sept. 27) therefore they do not encompass the whole of the crimes committed by the Munafiqeen. However, the volume of their crimes after that period has not been less than their "popular" services during those three months.

E. The massacre of the officials and statesmen of the Islamic Republic of Iran: The outstanding example of these massacre is the calamity of bombing the IRP office in Tehran which ended in the martyrdom of 73 aides of the Imam including Ayatollah Behshti.

The bombing of the Prime Ministry office which took the lives of our president and prime minister and the assassination of the pious scholar, Ayatollah Madani, are among the other conspicuous crimes of the MKO in this connection.

From June 15 up to Sept. 27, over 92 state officials were martyred by the Munafiqeen.

They think that by assassinating the dignitaries they can undermine the pillars of the Islamic Republic. However, they are blind to the fact that with the martyrdom of Islamic personalities, their red line does not end but the number of their followers will increase and their way will further be perpetuated.

F. Hurting and Beating Innocent People: As a result of their armed attacks and bombing the Munafiqeen, these false "friends" of the masses wounded and hurt a total number of 498 Muslim people, from June 15 to Sept. 27.

Examples of such bombings are the explosion at the railroad station of Qom, the explosion at a shopping mall in Kermanshah and bombing on Pasteur street which left 84 injured.

G- Raiding Private and Public places:

In pursuing their struggle against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Munafiqeen have not refrained from any inhuman action.

It is not known that for serving which masses they set fire to the houses of innocent people!? Or in Compliance with which creed do they set ablaze the mosques, the places of worship? Do they receive any benefit from these actions other than the contentment of their foreign masters and the rage and hatred of the Muslim people of Iran?

From June 15 upto Sept. 27, the Munafiqeen carried out 146 raids on the public and private places and property examples of which are as follows:

1. Bomb explosion at the railroad station of Qom on June 23 which resulted in severe human and material casualties.

2. The explosion of a concussion bomb at the Swiss Air Office in Tehran on June 28.

3. Setting fire to the library of the Al-Hadi mosque in Tehran as a result of which numerous copies of Quran and Nahjul Balagha were burned (Kayhan, July 9).

4. Apart from the building of the "Vahdat" Islamic Center was set on fire by the counterrevolutionary Munafiqeen (Ettela'at, July 11).

5. The bookshop of Imam Reza Mosque was set ablaze by the MKO's terrorists (Kayhan July 15).

6. A concussion grenade was hurled at the building of the Pars News Agency by the counterrevolutionary Munafiqeen (Ettela'at, July 16).

7. For the second time the Munafiqeen set fire to the library of the Al-Hadi Mosque with a Molotov cocktail on July 14.

8. The mercenaries of the U.S., while supported by the German Police, raided the Hamburg Mosque and tore copies of Quran (Ettela'at, July 21).

9. An automobile belonging to the martyr foundation of Lahijan (Northern Iran) was set ablaze by the Munafiqeen (Ettela'at, July 25).

10. A bomb explosion in front of a hospital in Shiraz (Ettela'at, July 25).

11. A grenade was thrown at the building of the Blood Transfusion Organization in Tehran (Ettela'at, July 25)

12. A pipe bomb was hurled into a girls' high school in Tehran and caused some damage (Ettela'at, July 28)

13. A bomb explosion at a military hospital left damages. (Kayhna, July 26).

14. The counterrevolutionaries bombed the Sahebul Zaman Mosque in Tehran (Kayhan, JULY 27).

15. A shop on the Jomhuri street in Tehran was set afire by the Munafiqeen (Ettela'at Aug. 5).

16. The counterrevolutionaries set fire to the shop of a man called Ali Akbar Pahlevani (Ettela'at, Aug. 8).

17. The Munafiqeen set 5 shops ablaze in Sari (Ettela'at, Aug. 10).

18. A molotov Cocktail, hurled by the Munafiqeen at a pharmacy in Mashad, caused some damages (Kayhan, Aug. 23).

19. Due to the Munafiqeen's attack on a beverage- producing factory in Orumieh, various parts of this factory were damaged (Kayhan, Aug. 24).

20. The counterrevolutionaries set fire to a carpet shop in Shiravan (Ettela'at, Aug. 24).

CSO: 4600/117

FUNDAMENTALIST DYNAMISM, STRATEGY EVALUATED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 42,16 Oct 81 pp 5-7

[Text] By an Iranian writer who questions the source of the fanatics' dynamism and the validity of an Islamic movement.

How much longer will it be before the West realises the truth about Islamic fundamentalism and the threat it presents to the world order? That was the question which many Middle Easterners who do not view their own Muslim faith with fanaticism were asking last weekend after the assassination of Anwar Sadat.

Sadat was murdered solely because he was serving Western rather than anti-Western interests, it is pointed out. The guiding principle of Islamic fundamentalism is only superficially a return to the Islam of medieval times or that at present practised in countries where medieval ideas hold sway--the real aim is to destroy the Western world's order, its domination of the Middle East in particular, and its influence throughout the rest of the world.

The West's mistake is in failing to understand the real character of Islamic fundamentalism, believing it is a desire to return to some spiritual paradise where all men were happy. It is identified with the hankerings of so many jaded Westerners for some more primitive, carefree way of life and some spiritual justification for doing away with material things.

Nothing could be more mistaken. Islamic fundamentalism, like the socialist revolutions, is fired by hate. With Muslims this is the hate of colonisers who have followed up their physical domination of the Muslim world with technological and psychological domination. With the working class revolutions the spur was hatred of the ruling classes who had for so long oppressed them. Just as the socialist revolutions obliterated the bourgeois groups who made the domination of the ruling classes possible through their skills and services, so those in the Middle East who serve the West must be wiped out to remove the colonisers' agents.

The socialist revolutions drew their inspiration from Western ideas and were organised by planners with Western culture and minds. The first successful Islamic revolution, that in Iran, was partially carried out by Muslim fanatics, who were able to understand the minds of the mass of Iranians and rouse the fanaticism that was necessary for the majority of Muslims to go into action in a way Western logic or simple political philosophy could not. But the revolution was planned by Western minds, marxists and other leftists who, once they acquired the cooperation of the

mullahs to reach the people, overthrew the Shah's system with an efficiency and speed which no solely Muslim opposition group could have achieved.

The leftist Mojahedin-e-Khalq activists and their comrades had been hard at work trying to obtain public support for their fight against the Shah for many years, with no success at all. It was only when Khomeini and his fanatical mullahs moved in that the Iranian public took any notice of the opposition. All earlier political movements in Iran had been confined to skirmishing among the ruling class.

The efforts of Bani-Sadr, Yazdi and his so-called liberal colleagues to organize a Western-style socialist society in Iran never even took off and were doomed to failure from the day the extremist clergy decided they were going to decide the future of the country. They knew Iranians and their thought processes, and Bani-Sadr's long years away had misled him into thinking his people thought differently than they did. He was soon a pathetic, hopeless figure who, neither true Westerner nor genuine Muslim, lost his Western logic under strain and began to pursue suicidal policies that assured his doom.

In Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other parts of the Middle East, and then Muslim areas of the Far East, similar uprisings are planned by the fanatics of the left and the Islamic extremists, who have proved in Iran that in the short run, their interests are identical. And as far as the majority of them are concerned, even if only some of them realise it, in the long run, too.

For, as has happened in the West, the young people of the present Islamic world are looking forward ultimately to a secular society, but one free of Western domination. They hope it will be the non-Western world which dominates the West, and Western people can learn just what it is like to spend centuries as the underdogs, humiliated by cultural and social stagnation, shamed by the unthinking arrogance of the newly dominant alien culture and military strength. It is the deep resentment over this that gives the "Islamic revival" its real motivation for the young, not a desire to go back to a society regulated by the Qoran.

Ironically, it was the failure of the Christian West to subdue the Muslims that sparked off the soul searching that led to cultural renaissance in the West. But the Muslims, left at first to themselves, and then conquered and made the dependents of the infidels, were left to stagnate. The alternative to stagnation was adoption of Western ways and abandonment of the tenets of religion, which had not been replaced by more pragmatic philosphies as in the resurgent parts of the world.

The tragedy was that the Qoran was merely one more politico-religious manifesto. Islam's early thinkers were mostly children of older cultures like the Persian and Greek. While the Arab occupation revived Persia's own culture the Arabs had no true culture of their own. They absorbed as much as they could of others, but as the pressures of those superior cultures grew so the Arabs constantly withdrew into the proscribed world laid down by a book and a prophet who knew nothing of the greater world outside primitive Arabia.

As a philosophical and even practical guide for everyday life that book, like the Bible and similar works, has its values. As a set of regulations for living it is often a preposterous anachronism. It is perhaps the prime condemnation of Islam as a genuine philosophy that its adherents depend almost solely on one book for their

inspiration and that primarily Persian and to a lesser degree other cultures have made up most of what is seen as Arab culture today.

The idea that any higher entity would be concerned with how we wash ourselves and what we eat may seem absurd to a rational Western mind. But it is the kind of limitation of thinking that provides fertile ground for those who seek to sew hatred of opposing creeds or ways of life. And that, the enemies of the West have realised, is where their greatest chance today lies.

The West's dependence on oil for its economies, its degeneracy, hastened by the slaughter of the cream of its manhood in wars fought by two successive generations, the confusion of people in Western societies, this exacerbated by second-rate leadership thrown up by obsolete democratic systems--all these factors have given those who look for a completely new order of things a great opportunity. Best of all, the creation of Israel in the heart of the Muslim world, with the failure of the West to prevent he killing and oppression of the Palestinian Arabs, has made a whole generation of young Arabs anxious for vengeance.

And these same forces know that Islam, once its fanaticism has been exhausted and the West has been brought to its knees, will be no match for more pragmatic cultural and social ideas. For the moment that fanaticism is directed to weakening the West, except in Afghanistan, where the West's own cynical fomenting of it in a futile bid to prevent inevitable change ironically only serves to fan the flame of the same dangerous fire throughout the Middle East.

If Western leaders recognise these factors they will at least perhaps be able to make the decline of their liberal societies a less painful process for their citizens than it must be if they don't try to combat something they are helping to make inevitable.

CSO: 4600/112

IRANIAN MEDIA REACTION TO 'BRIGHT STAR' MANEUVERS

[Editorial Report] GF161105 Iranian regional radio stations covered by Gulf Bureau--Ahvaz, Mashhad and Shiraz Domestic Services--have not been to carry any reports concerning the bright star military maneuvers or commentaries on the subject with one exception: During its 1500 GMT newscast on 14 November, Shiraz Domestic Service carried a report on remarks made by the Estahbanat Friday Imam during prayers on 13 November. The Imam denounced the maneuvers saying, "They cannot terrorize Muslims."

Tehran International Service in Urdu at 1415 GMT on 7 November cited an AP dispatch designating the maneuvers an "exercise symbolizing support for U.S. agents and U.S. interests." A foreign ministry statement reported by PARS was carried on the 10 November URDU broadcast and a commentary on 11 November mainly dealing with the multinational forces proposed for Sinai also made several references to the rapid deployment force and "U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf, which are parts of U.S. policy of hegemony." On 12 November an unattributed commentary on the maneuvers was carried in Urdu discussing the extent of the operation and citing "revolutionary struggle by the Muslims of participating countries inspired by the Iranian revolution" as one of the reasons. The commentary also referred to the foreign ministry statement on bright star. A factual report on the arrival of military equipment in Alexandria was also included in the 12 November Urdu program. The station has not made any further mention of the exercises to date.

Zahedan International Service in Urdu at 1530 GMT on 11 November carried its first report noting the arrival of U.S. equipment in Alexandria to be used in bright star, which is a "joint exercise of the United States and its henchmen." The program also included a commentary on Egyptian President Mubarak's views on Saudi Prince Fahd's eight-point plan outlined in an interview with a Kuwaiti paper and U.S. naval exercises off the Egyptian shores. A commentary was carried during the 12 November broadcast discussing U.S. policy and reaction to "the success of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. The United States aims to prevent Islamic revolutions in the region," it noted. The last reference to the maneuvers was a factual report in the 14 November broadcast on arrival of U.S. arms in Egypt.

Tehran International Service in Arabic began to carry reports and commentaries on the bright star maneuvers on 7 November. During its 0700 GMT newscast on that day, the station quoted a Libyan official as criticizing U.S.-Sudanese maneuvers along the Sudan-Chad border. At 0900 and 1100 GMT it quoted an AP report that the U.S. exercises in Egypt, Sudan, Oman and Somalia are the biggest ever of their kind in the Middle East.

During its 0400 GMT newscast on 8 November, Tehran Arabic quoted Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi as calling on the Arabs to protest the U.S. forces. At 1730 GMT it quoted the English language newspaper Kuwait TIMES as warning that the U.S. military exercises would make the area subject to the conflicts of the superpowers. It added that this situation will not serve the interests of the countries in the area but that they would safeguard U.S. interests in Egypt and the region.

On 9 November Tehran Arabic quoted news agencies on the arrival of U.S. troops in Egypt. During its 0900, 1100 and 1230 GMT newscasts. The radio reported that more U.S. troops have arrived in Egypt to participate in the maneuvers. The radio noted that the bright star exercises involve about 4,000 U.S. military personnel.

During its newscasts on 10 November, Tehran's Arabic service continued to report on the maneuvers. At 0400, 0700 and 2000 GMT, the radio quoted news agencies on the arrival of U.S. troops in Egypt. At 0700 GMT the station reported that Libyans had demonstrated to protest the exercises. At 0900 GMT the station carried the Iranian foreign ministry statement denouncing bright star (LD101014). At 1100, 1230 and 1430 GMT the radio carried the full text of the foreign ministry statement on the exercises. It also carried a report on Iranian cabinet's meeting (LD101154) in which various issues, including the bright star exercises, were discussed.

In its 0400 GMT newscast on 11 November, the station quoted news agency reports on the arrival of 4,000 U.S. paratroopers in Egypt. The station did not carry any further reports that day.

On 12 November the station reported that the PDRY issued a statement condemning the U.S. exercises. This report was carried at 1100, 1230 and 1430 GMT. At 2000 GMT it reported that Iranian revolutionary organizations and institutions issued statements condemning the U.S. maneuvers in the region (GF130712).

At 0400 GMT on 13 November, Tehran Arabic repeated the report on the condemnation of U.S. maneuvers in the region by revolutionary organizations. At 1730 GMT the radio quoted the Syrian newspaper al-Ba'th as saying that the bright star exercises are meant to occupy the area and that they would "turn the region into a hell."

On 14 November the station again quoted al-Ba'th during its 0400 newscast. In its 2000 GMT newscast, the radio quoted Prime Minister Musavi's interview on the maneuvers. (LD142050).

On 15 November the radio reported that the Libyan oil workers union had issued a statement denouncing the U.S. maneuvers. The report was carried during the 1100 GMT newscast. The radio did not carry further reports during later newscasts. At 1730 GMT on the same day, however, Tehran Arabic carried an unattributed commentary (FG151335) assailing the maneuvers and regretting that the current decade will be characterized in history as one of "surrender and defeat." The radio pointed out that the "reckless maneuvers" that began on 14 November "mark the beginning of a new kind of colonialism and new alliances in the region."

CSO: 4600/120

BRIEFS

COURT ARRESTS LOCAL 'KHANS'--Bandar 'Abras--The Bandar 'Abbas Islamic revolution court has arrested a number of local Khans and has asked people with complaints or information to come forward. The Bandar 'Abbas Islamic revolution court has issued the following statement in connection with the arrests: Honorable residents of Rudan, Hajji Abad, Minab and surrounding areas: as our great Imam has ordered, the Bandar 'Abbas Islamic revolution court has taken steps to eradicate and destroy the Khans and the Khan system which dominates certain rural areas in the province. Those arrested were Mir Fathollah Sadiq Rudani, known as Shadid Khan, Hosyen Ettehadizadeh, Mohammad Reza Haqiqi, 'Abdollah Khan Mehrani and 'Abdol Hoseyn Khan Atabeg. Anyone with a complaint or information regarding the aforementioned persons may give this to the Bandar 'Abbas Islamic revolution court branch 4 between 8 and 18 Aban 1360 [30 October and 9 November]. [Central News Service Report: "Five Khans of Bandar 'Abbas Arrested"] [Text] [PM091457 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Nov 81 p 14]

BORDER TRANSIT VISAS REFUSED--According to the Central News Unit, the Public Relations Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the following announcement. According to information received, the Pakistani Government has recently stopped issuing transit visas on the Iran-Pakistan border, and does not issue visas under any circumstances. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs those who wish to leave via the Iran-Pakistan border that they should obtain visas for Pakistan before leaving the country, so that they do not encounter difficulties at the border. [Text] [LD051114 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 5 Nov 81]

CLANDESTINE QUOTES EXILE PAPER--The London-based Iran POST has revealed that the clerical regime has started guerrilla and terrorist training of more than 2,000 of its men in the Chehel Derakht [as heard--presumably Chehel Dockhtaran] garrison in Shahrud. Iran POST writes that the training of this group is undertaken by a number of Syrian, Palestinian and Libyan experts in terrorist activities and guerrilla warfare. [Text] [NC061240 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 5 Nov 81]

KDP UNITY WITH RAJAVI, BANI-SADR--In a letter, the text of which was published by (Sa'id Badal) in Paris, secretary general of the Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP] 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu has announced the KDP's adherence to the resistance council of Abolhasan Bani-Sadr and Mas'ud Rajavi. This decision by 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu has perplexed political sources, since, when Abolhasan Bani-Sadr was the President of Khomeyni's regime, the KDP repeatedly condemned him for bombing (?areas) in Kordestan and called him the person responsible for the killing of thousands of Kurds. This decision by Qasemlu will definitely meet with the strong and negative reaction of

several combatant Kurdish organizations that are fighting against Khomeyni's regime and will isolate him further. [Text] [NC071411 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 7 Nov 81]

BAZARGAN ALLY IN EVIN PRISON--It has been said in Tehran that 'Ali Ardalan, [name indistinct] deputy in the Mullah's Islamic assembly and who is a very close ally of Mehdi Bazargan, has been in Evin Prison in Tehran for over 2 months. Ardalan, who was the finance minister in the first government appointed by Khomeyni, is the only minister from Bazargan's interim government to have been jailed. Circles close to Ardalan's family say that he is kept in adverse conditions and that his physical condition is extremely poor. [Text] [GF080630 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 8 Nov 81]

TUDEH PARTY HEAD REPORTED--Following a number of contradictory reports concerning an attempt on the life of Tudeh Party Secretary General Nureddin Kianuri published recently, it has been reported in Frankfurt that he has been transported to Europe for medical care. Our correspondent's report indicates that Kianuri's exact location is not clear. However, there is a strong possibility that he has been taken to the GDR via a European country. According to one intelligence officer of the regime of Mullahs, Kianuri was the subject of an assassination attempt about 2 weeks ago, which left him gravely wounded. Even though Tudeh Party officials have maintained complete silence on the subject, Kianuri's absence during the past 17 days from party sessions lends credibility to the reported assassination attempt. [Text] [GF080639 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 0330 GMT 8 Nov 81]

COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY BASE IN GORGAN DISCOVERED--The central new unit reports that the public relations office of the central headquarters of the Islamic revolution guards corps announced that on Friday, 6 November, the guards brothers in Gorgan discovered an operational and supply center of Ranjbaran, a blasphemous grouplet. Reports received indicate that in this operation one of the counterrevolutionaries was killed, two were wounded and two others were arrested. The same report says that 18 G3 firearms, a box of grenades, three colts, 5,000 rounds of G3 ammunition, a number of tear-gas bombs, a radio set and a large quantity of ammunition, clothing and documents on plans to attack the guards corps base and other places were discovered. [Text] [LD091300 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 9 Nov 81]

VISITING IRANIANS' EXIT DENIAL--In its latest issue the ETTELA'AT newspaper has listed the conditions for leaving the country, thus confirming the intensification of the regime's oppressive policies of oppression in denying the people free travel abroad. By virtue of the new regulations, people will be unable to leave the country even for urgent medical reasons. According to the voice of Iran correspondent's report, the clerical regime has decided against granting Iranians, residing in 11 foreign countries who travel to Iran for a short period, permission to leave the country. Quoting offiical sources of the clerical foreign ministry, the voice of Iran correspondent has reported that the 11 countries in question are as follows: Kuwait, Dubayy, Pakistan, Iraq, France, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Italy and Bahrain. According to this report, even the return of Iranians with official permanent residence permits in those countries, and who have been given permission to return by Khomeyni's embassies in these countries, will be denied. [Text] [NC101456 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Nov 81]

EXECUTION OF MONARCHISTS IN IRAN--A voice of Iran correspondent reports from Isfahan that last week 11 further monarchists, who are struggling for the establishment of legal constitutional monarchy system in our country, were executed by Khomeyni's savage hirelings in Isfahan. Our correspondent adds that the fundamentalist Tehran leaders--who are terrified with the daily-increasing expansion of the struggles of the large number of supporters of the constitution and constitutional monarchy--send several of them every (?few days) to the firing squads but they refrain from publishing reports on the execution of monarchists so as to avoid both drawing the people's attention to this and turning public opinion against these undeniable realities. [Text] [NC101438 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CAUSE OF C-130 CRASH--On the 40th day after a number of the armed forces' commanders and a group of the regime's lackeys were killed in a crash of an armed forces C-130 transport plane, it was heard in Tehran that a soldier on board the aircraft was responsible for the explosion. Our correspondent, quoting a very well-informed source, reports that a soldier of the Iranian army who was carrying a number of grenades set off the grenades near the cockpit, which caused the C-130 to crash and 5 armed forces and revolution guard commanders and over 100 others to be killed. The brave Iranian soldier was sacrificed. The regime's authorities have not yet announced the cause of the crash. [Text] [GF090938 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 9 Nov 81]

NEW MOVEMENT FORMED--The organization of Azarbayjanis living abroad has announced its formation in a statement, which also says that the only way for Iran to be liberated is the quick overthrow of the usurper and illegal regime of Khomeyni and its replacement by a constitutional monarchy. In its first announcement the organization states: it is now clear to everyone that the cruel and arbitrary regime of the so-called Islamic Republic can give nothing to Iran except a divided homeland, civil war, destruction of Iranian standing and honor abroad, misery, backwardness and destruction of the basis of the nation's economy, culture and civilization. The first statement of the organization of Azarbayjanis living abroad stresses that under such circumstances the duty of all patriotic Iranian women and men is to rise in order to overthrow this decadent regime and wrest Iran out of the claws of the enemies and the murderers by igniting the flame of resistance. The statement adds that in the battle for the liberation of the homeland all patriotic individuals and organizations of the great Iranian nation will do all that they can. However, the zealots of Azarbayjan, who during the course of history have been the guardians of this holy land and the guardians of independence and the national integrity of Iran, feel a deeper duty toward their self-sacrificing forefathers and the future generations of the homeland. The statement also stresses that the great and holy and important document of our nation, the constitution of Iran, is the result of the sacrifice of Iranian people and especially the zealous women and men of Azarbayjan. In its first statement, the new nationalist movement has also announced its aims, which include emphasis on the overthrow of the criminal usurper regime of Khomeyni and its replacement by a government of law and order and on the basis a constitutional monarachy, which is the only way for Iran to be liberated. [Text] [GF090744 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 9 Nov 81]

EVIN PRISON VISITED--PARS news agency reports that Mr Musaviardebili, head of the country's supreme court, went to Evin Prison this morning and inspected the various sections of the prison. According to this report, the head of the country's supreme court, held talks with Mr Lajevardi, chief revolution prosecutor of Tehran, and met and held talks with the guards stationed at Evin Prison. [Text] [LD101232 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 10 Nov 81]

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR OFFICIAL APPOINTED--In his exalted name. Brother Engineer Mir-Salim, in accordance with this order you are hereby appointed to the post of deputy minister and political and social undersecretary at the ministry of interior. In view of the importance of the country's security, in addition to political and social affairs please take steps to establish the position of deputy minister of law enforcement. The supervision of this deputy ministry will also be entrusted to your excellency. I hope that by the grace of God and under the leadership of the Imam of the Islamic nation, you will be successful and will be supported in serving the honorable Iranian nation. With greetings and thanks, Seyyed Kamaloddin Musavi, minister of interior. [Order issued by the Iranian minister of interior concerning the appointment of Mir-Salim as deputy minister and political and social undersecretary at the ministry of interior--date not specified] [Text] [LD101946 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 10 Nov 81]

BANI-SADR, RAJAVI MONEY TRANSFER--More details have been published on how foreign exchange was transferred abroad by Bani-Sadr and Rajavi from the country. It was revealed in Paris that Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, the regime's fugitive president, has transferred 130 million francs from the huge amounts he has taken from Iran to the branch of Societe General Bank of France in the Paris suburb where he lives. Abolhasan Bani-Sadr and Mas'ud Rajavi, the fugitive leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, are now living in a large villa in Auvers-sur-oise near Paris. According to this report, the amount of 100 million [as heard] francs is only part of the large amounts which Bani-Sadr transferred abroad during his presidency and through his friend 'Ali Reza Nowbari, the dismissed Central Bank of Iran Governor. This report states that Mas'ud Rajavi has transferred millions of tumans in foreign exchange to French and Swiss banks. These amounts were robbed, in the first days of Khomeyni's revolution, from the Pahlavi foundation offices and from a company called Khalij-e Markazi in Tehran by a number of Mojahedin-e Khalq members and were then transferred abroad in the form of foreign exchange. In addition, guerrillas of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization robbed millions of rials in several bank robberies in Tehran and other parts of the country. These amounts have been turned into dollars, pounds and francs and transferred abroad by Mas'ud Rajavi. The report concludes by saying that Bani-Sadr and Rajavi furnish the heavy and costly expenditures of their propaganda from these monies that have been plundered from the Iranian nation. [Text] [NC111534 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1805 GMT 10 Nov 81]

FUNERAL FOR AYATOLLAH TABATABA'I--Tehran, 16 Nov (PARS News Agency)--The funeral of the late Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hussein Tabataba'i was held in the Holy City of Qom today. Ayatollah Tabataba'i died on Sunday as a result of uremia and lung infection at the age of 78. A day of national mourning was announced today on this occasion. A number of leading religious figures including Ayatollah Golpaygani, Ayatollah Najafi Mara'shi, Ayatollah Hussein 'Ali Montazeri as well as a number of officials attended the ceremony. The body of the late Ayatollah was burried beside the Holy Shrine of Hazrate Masuma the sister of the 8th Imam of the household of the prophet, Imam Reza in an atmosphere of grief, a special prayer was led by Ayatollah Golpaygani. Meanwhile, a mourning ceremony was held in Tehran's Martyr Motahhari college today to commemorate the third day of the [word indistinct] of the outstanding Quranic exegetist, the late Ayatollah Allameh Tabataba'i. A large group of Muslim and revolutionary people of Tehran participated in the glorious ceremony held on behalf of Imam Khomeyni to honor of al-Mizan, a comprehensive commentary on the Quran. Ayatollah Khazali, a member of the council of guardians praised the services of the great philosopher in training Islamic scholars such as martyrs Motahhari, Beheshti, Qoddus' and Bahonar as well as other great religious scholars who are now serving in the society. [Text] [LD181100 Tehran PARS in English 0900 GMT 17 Nov 81]

VINOGRADOV GIVEN TV TIME--The Soviet ambassador, Vladimir Vinogradov, was given an hour's time on state run television in Iran last weekend, with all his statements being given in translation. He pledged full Soviet support for the regime. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 12]

KHOMEYNI ACTIVIST SHOT--Ghazanfar Khavand, a so-called student and leading activist for the Khomeini regime in Italy, has been shot during a visit he was paying to Tehran. His body was among those people killed in street battles in Tehran which were taken to the cemetery one day last week. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 12]

MAJLIS AUTHORITY QUESTIONED--The proposed Anavin Sanavieh (Secondary Matters) clause which is designed to allow the Majlis to decide on certain matters originally the responsibility only of the Shi'ite clergy, can be a first step in "communising" Iran, a leading Shi'ite cleric in Iran, Ayatollah Qomi-Tabatabai, said this week. Another leading religious figure, this time in Paris, in Ayatollah Mehdi Rouhani, has also warned of the danger to Iranians' freedom which the proposed new clause poses. Qomi, a constant critic of Khomeini, warned that ratification of the clause by the Majlis could mean that property could be taken away from people even though this was not allowed under Qoranic interpretations. The new clause would allow the Majlis to vote the confiscation of property on a force majeure basis, that is make it acceptable in reigning circumstances. "Already Khomeini's loudspeakers have started all over Iran explaining the needs for such a decision and preparing the people for it," he warned. "This is a most dangerous threat to people's freedom." Rouhani warned that under the new provision the regime could take over what it wanted. That meant it would be easy for any person who owned one or more properties to have all but a single one taken away from him. "If this is passed by the Majlis it could open the way for the sovietisation of Iran," Rouhani said. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 11]

MODERATES THREATENED WITH ROLL CALL--In a move which observers say is aimed at so-called moderate opponents of the fundamentalist majority in the Majlis the Iranian parliament has recommended that all deputies who are absent from sessions for 100 consecutive hours or 250 hours non-consecutively should be asked to resign. All elderly or sick members who are unable to attend parliament for four consecutive months should also be asked to quit. The moderate members frequently boycott sessions to express their disagreement with measures and methods of the majority. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 11]

TEHRAN GOVERNOR 'FIRED'--The governor of Tehran, Mostafa Neshat, has been fired for "irresponsible" remarks on the fuel situation in Tehran. He told the press recently that Tehran would have no fuel shortages during the coming winter. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 11]

ARAFAT WELCOME--Observers noted that remarks reported by Tehran radio as having been made by PLO chief Yasser Arafat to a delegation from the Iranian foreign ministry led by undersecretary Shaikholeslam, were "bland and reflected no special enthusiasm." This was seen as confirmation that the coolness between

Arafat and the Tehran regime continues and that Arafat made no effort with the visitors to alleviate it. Shaikholeslam and his team visited Syria and Lebanon and Tehran radio has continued to recount his criticism of Saudi Prince Fahd's peace plan, together with attacks on the AWAC sale and on the plan to introduce foreign peace-keeping troops to Sinai. Arafat has publicly welcomed the Fahd peace plan. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 12]

MERCHANTS ARRESTED--At least 15 merchants from the Tehran bazaar have been arrested on charges of having contributed to Mojahedin-e-Khalq funds. But some observers said that evidence suggested they were, in fact, from the nationalist-centrist supporting groups. The government has recently stepped up its campaign against traders in the bazaar, whom it blames for rising prices. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 12]

IRANIAN STUDENTS AVOID RETURN--Perugia, Italy, 6 Nov (AFP)--One hundred sixteen Iranian students have gone on a hunger strike here to press demands for enrollment at Perugia University and thereby avoid return to Iran. The students appealed to Pope John Paul II and Italian President Sandro Pertini for backing "to save their lives." Iranian student leader Firus Valizadeh told the Rome-based daily LA REPUBLICA that the demonstrators would follow the example of Bobby Sands, the first Irish hunger striker to die at Belfast's Maze prison. Several Iranian students began their hunger strike 17 days ago and were already seriously ill, Mr Valizadeh said. The students demanded that Perugia University hold new entrance exams for foreign students unable to sit for sessions already held. [Text] [NC061506 Paris AFP in English 1502 GMT 6 Nov 81]

COMPANIES DEALING WITH IRAN CAUTIONED--Paris, 8 Nov (AFP)--Ex-Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr today cautioned foreign governments and companies that doing business with Iran's Islamic revolutionary government would be at their own financial and political risk. A statement by the Iranian National Resistance Council (INRC), issued here by Mr Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin leader Mas'ud Rajavi, cited what it termed the "extreme gravity" of Iran's economic situation and monetary reserves, as well as "the growing unification of the democratic opposition forces." The fall of "this anti-people's regime is certain," said the statement. "In the current situation of the petroleum market, purchases of petroleum from the Khomeyni regime or the signing of any commercial contracts are considered political decisions," the statement said. The statement said the Iranian Government's ability to meet contract payments was "highly doubtful" and that the "Iranian people decline any responsibility for financial commitments between the Khomeyni regime and other governments or foreign companies." Mr Bani-Sadr and Mr Rajavi are living in exile in a Paris suburb. [Text] [NC081923 Paris AFP in English 1912 GMT 8 Nov 81]

TEACHERS EXECUTED--Tehran, 8 Nov (AFP)--Three teachers, accused of belonging to the underground left-wing people's Mojahedin organisation, were executed and another 107 Mojahedin were arrested in Tehran during the past month, the newspaper Keyhan reported today. The newspaper gave no dates, but said the three teachers had been found in possession of explosives including thousands of bullets, colt pistols, radios and grenades. Keyhan added that two Mojahedin arms caches had been discovered by revolutionary guards in Tehran, one of which contained plans of the homes of government authorities. In one of the operations, Javad Zargaran, a former candidate in legislative elections in Ahwaz, Khuzistan, had been arrested, it said. Iranian television today announced that 19 persons belonging to, or supporting, the Mojahedin had been shot in Mashhad and Khorasan in northeastern Iran. It gave no dates for the executions. [Text] [NC018713 Paris AFP in English 1704 GMT 8 Nov 81]

TRIBESMEN RETURN FROM IRAQ--Tehran, 15 Nov (PARS)--A group of armed tribesmen who left Iran for Iraq last year returned to Iran today and were warmly received by the people and Ayatollah Ashrafi Esfahani (the Friday prayers leader of the city of Kermanshah), near the Dalahu front. Upon their arrival, the group of 750 tirbesmen carried a banner of the Islamic Republic of Iran and portraits of Imam Khomeyni, the tribesmen said after having learned of Saddam's crimes against the Islamic Republic of Iran and after they had come to know of the legitimacy of the demands of the Iranian people, they decided to return to Iran. They returned in small groups during the past two weeks giving up their weapons including RPG-7's and Kalashnikovs on their arrival. In a simple ceremony upon their arrival in Dalahu front, the Ayatollah assured them that they were now under the protection of Islam. During the ceremonies the group also sang a solidarity song and declared their readiness to fight against the invading troops alongside the Iranian combatants. A member of the group said that many of the dissident Iranians and counterrevolutionaries who had left Iran in the wake of the Islamic Revolution [words indistinct] generals of the past regime [word indistinct] in Iraq were gradually coming in contact with the realities of life in Iran and [?Iraq that) they were on their way back to the Islamic Republic of Iran. He said that the Ba'thist regime in Iraq provided arms and facilities to (?dissident) Iranians who have fled to Iraq, and encouraged them to fight against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Meanwhile the Fedayeen of Imam Khomeyni have reportedly erected an encampment for the arriving tribesmen near the front. [Text] [LD161052 Tehran PARS in English 1853 GMT 15 Nov 81]

PAPER URGES AGRICULTURAL REFORM PROGRAM--Tehran, 15 Nov (AFP)--Land grants to farmers is the only means of avoiding a rural exodus that is choking cities and threatening the government's plans for agricultural self-sufficiency in Iran, the newspaper Islamic Republic said today. "Tehran now has seven million residents, compared to four million before the revolution," the newspaper reported. "The provincial cities and capitals also have seen their populations swell," it said. "The only solution is to give land to farmers," the newspaper added. "If the farmer has land and is assured that the fruit of his labor will belong to him, he will no longer be tempted to rush to the cities." Islamic Republic, which is the organ of the ruling Islamic Republic party, said this theory could become reality "if the Agrarian reform approved by the revolutionary council were applied without infraction." [Text] [NC151024 Paris AFP in English 1011 GMT 15 Nov 81]

POLITICAL PRISONERS REPORTED--Tehran, 15 Nov (AFP)--Between 6,000 and 7,000 political prisoners are held in Iran, Islamic revolutionary prosecutor Hojjat Ol-eslam Musavi Tabrizi said today in what was thought to be the first official estimate of detainees since the revolution began in 1979. Hojjat Ol-eslam Tabrizi, speaking at a news conference, said the number of political prisoners amounted to about one third of the number of common-law prisoners. The revolutionary prosecutor also said 90 percent of the members of the leftist people's Mojahedin organization have been arrested. Authorities captured about 30 leaders of the movement last week, he added. [Text] [NC151051 Paris AFP in English 1041 GMT 15 Nov 81]

WHEAT PURCHASES FROM FARMERS--Tehran, 16 Nov (PARS News Agency)--The managing director of Central Organization for Rural Cooperation, Hasan Motavallizadeh, today announced that over 850,000 tons of wheat had been purchased from farmers since the beginning of the year which amount would surpass 1 million tons by the end of the year. Motavallizadeh, speaking to PARS, said that some 3,005 cooperatives existed throughout the country covering 50,459 villages. He added that some of these cooperatives had been merged to establish cooperative associations which had replaced the wholesalers and thus now played an important role in the distribution of agricultural

product. So far, he said, 150 cooperative associations had been established out of the merger of 2,947 cooperatives with a total capital of 6,211,865,055 rials. Speaking about loans given by the rural cooperatives, Motavallizadeh said that 50 billion rials in loans had been granted so far, the short-term loans with the cooperation of the agricultural bank and the mid-and the long-term loans directly by the bank itself. He also mentioned that some 80,000 tons of rice had been purchased from rice cultivators and which figure was predicted to reach 300,000 tons by the end of the current year (21 March 1982). [Text] [GF161706 Tehran PARS in English 1605 GMT 16 Nov 81]

FRG CRITICISM PROTESTED--The Iranian ambassador in Bonn, Mehdi Navab, has protested over remarks by the West German Minister of Justice condemning the executions in Iran and the attitude of parents who handed over their children for punishment. The envoy said the Minister had no right to express opinions about these matters. The Australian minister of foreign affairs is also reported to have criticised the human rights situation in Iran. [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 5 Nov 81 p 12]

CSO: 4600/120

NEW DEPUTY MINISTERS PROFILED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 12 Aug 81 p 20

/Article by Yehoshua Bitzur/

/Text/ Aharon Uzan--Deputy Minister of Absorption

We asked MK Aharon Uzan what qualified him for the position of deputy minister of absorption. His firm response: "I was a new immigrant."

He immigrated to Israel from Muknin, Tunisia a year after the establishment of the state. A year later he settled in the cooperative settlement of Gilat near Be'er Sheva where he has lived to this very day with his wife and three children. One of his sons was killed in the War of Attrition.

Uzan, 57, has travelled a complicated and convoluted road. He was first a work steward and then the secretary and treasurer of his settlement. He established the procurement organization of the Negev settlements and their entire network of economic institutions. After his star rose in the settlements movement, in which he became the general secretary, he was taken from the back ranks to the Sixth Knesset. As the representative of the settlements movement, he was appointed the deputy of the then Minister of Agriculture Hayim Gevati, of the kibbutz movement. This was during the Eshkol and Golda Meir governments.

In the Eighth Knesset Uzan was already the minister of agriculture and communications in his own right. He prepared the development plans for the agricultural export. The large export of flowers and vegetables to the countries of Western Europe began in his term of office. In the meantime he was also selected for all the institutions of the Labor Party, and until recently he was a member of its bureau and secretariat.

In recent years he began extensive activity in the World Sephardic Federation, and he was elected its president in Israel. He is a confidant of multimillionaire Nissim Gaon who serves as the world president of this federation.

A "black cat" passed between Aharon Uzan and his associates in the Labor Party, and before the elections to the 10th Knesset, he officially left the party and joined Aharon Abu-Hatzeira in establishing the Tami movement and received a place on its list. At the same time he continued to serve as chairman of the Council of the Settlements Movement and its restricted secretariat.

He has turned over the management of the family household in Gilat to his son, and he will now go to Jerusalem. Let us hope that there will be many "customers" in the Ministry of Absorption.

Yehuda Ben-Meir--Deputy Foreign Minister

[Article by Ilan Kefir]

Deputy Foreign Minister Dr Yehuda Ben-Meir has come to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in one of the most difficult low points in the status of Israel in the world in general and in public opinion in the United States in particular.

As a renowned expert in social psychology, Dr Ben-Meir is likely to make a significant contribution to the explanation of the background of the events which aroused public opinion against Israel. In his new position he will be one of those who set the tone in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will work alongside Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and Director General David Kimhi.

The appointment of Ben-Meir to the position of deputy prime minister is a reflection of his growing strength in the NRP as a representative of the Young Turks together with his friend and associate, Minister of Education Zevulun Hammer. For a long time Ben-Meir was regarded as a "rebel" against the political establishment and the veteran leadership of his party. Now he has joined the governmental establishment in a position which is likely to be a springboard for him to a ministerial position.

Dr Yehuda Ben-Meir is 42 and a native of the United States. In his youth he immigrated with his parents to Israel. At the end of his military service he went to study in the United States, receiving his BA at Yeshiva University and his doctorate with distinction in social psychology at the prestigious Columbia University. During this time he married Devora, now the mother of four children.

On his return to Israel he became a research officer in the IDF and afterward a lecturer in psychology and the head of the Psychology Seminar at Bar Ilan University. He became active in the NRP youth groups and was appointed chairman of the Youth Bureau.

In 1971 he was elected for the first time to the Knesset and in 1973 for the second time. He was a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee until the end of the Ninth Knesset.

Miriam Glazer-Tasa--Deputy Minister of Education

[Article by Yosef Waxman]

"I was suddenly called to the prime minister. I had no idea as to the reason. To my surprise he informed me that I will be appointed the deputy minister of education and culture," related MK Miriam Glazer-Tasa.

She was born in Yemen, immigrated with her parents in 1934, and settled in the Neveh Tsedek development where her grandfather and uncles, who had immigrated 100

years ago, lived. She studied in the girls school in the development and afterward completed the Talpiot gymnasium. She continued her studies in the Levinsky Teachers Seminary in Tel Aviv.

Her studies in the seminary were terminated after a year because the principal decided to expel her because of her activity in the Irgun Tzvai Leumi. "I was on the beach at Kefar Vitkin when the Altalena arrived there. This became known to the principal and he said to me: 'You will not be a teacher in Israel,'" she related. After many years she returned as a teacher in the seminary from which she was expelled.

She began her practical educational work in 1951 when she was offered a job which entailed working in the absorption and education of immigrant children at the Johanna Jabotinsky youth farm in Be'er Ya'akov, an institution which she has been serving to the present as the school principal. Until a few years ago her husband was the director of the entire institution.

MK Miriam Glazer-Tasa received her BA in Bible and history at the Hebrew University and her MA in the United States. She takes most pride in the many students who after completing their studies in the Be'er Ya'akov institution are using vocations which they learned in the institution: jet aircraft mechanics, air force ground equipment personnel, hospital nurses, and settlement members.

Although she was a member of the Herut Movement's Executive, she refused to join the list for the elections to the Ninth Knesset. Before the last election the pressures on her increased, and when she agreed, she was given a real place and a list of Herut candidates for the 10th Knesset.

Pesah Gruper--Deputy Minister of Agriculture

[Article by Aharon Periel]

Deputy Minister of Agriculture Pesah (Pacy) Gruper, 57, has been a farmer and worker of the land since his early youth. At a certain stage in his farming career, he decided to become a communal worker. "If a farmer continues to be a farmer, his mind becomes closed, and I decided that my mind would not be closed," he explained.

Gruper, who was born in the Neveh Tsedek development in Tel Aviv in 1924, began his public career as a member of the 'Atlit Council. Afterward, he became head of the Council, and in this position he established a special record: In his term as head of the Council, he was removed three times, but he defeated his successors four times.

Gruper was elected to the Eighth Knesset, and during the first 2 years, he uncharacteristically did not speak and did not shout, and even the train attendants did not recognize him. During the next 2 years, Gruper worked "like a bulldozer." To his merit it can be said that while he was one of the heads of the farm lobby in the Knesset, he worked on many farming and settlement issues without party bias even though he represents private farming.

He uses colorful and sharp language, and even in public he does not always restrain his language. His conduct is unruly, and he frequently tells stories laced with jokes. Gruper creates a "presence," and it is impossible to ignore him, for better or for worse.

On his appointment as deputy minister of agriculture, Gruper said: "this has been my ambition every year. I will give my soul to farming and the farmers. There is so much to do that I wish they would give me another day during the 24 hours."

As a farmer in 'Atlit, Gruper is now growing wine grapes, field crops, and fruits. He is married, the father of three children, and is active in public institutions and various farm organizations beside his current activity as a member of Knesset and as chairman of the Agricultural Department of the Likud.

Mikhael Deqel--Deputy Minister of Agriculture

[Article by Aharon Periel]

Deputy Minister of Agriculture Mikhael Deqel, who will be in charge of settlement matters, went through many "cycles" until he received this appointment.

Deqel (formerly Dikesel), 55, a member of the Nordiya settlement, was born in Pinsk and received a religious education in his childhood. He joined the Betar Movement in his native city, and in this way acquired a national Zionist awareness.

During World War II he was exiled with his family to Siberia, and in the forests of the north he was employed as a woodcutter until he was conscripted at the age of 17 into the Red Army.

After World War II he underwent farm training in Poland, and he worked there in the smuggling of Jews into the Land of Israel and in the publication of an underground newspaper called TEGER. He was one of the organizers of the voyage of the Altalena.

In 1949 he immigrated to Israel without an education and without a vocation. He joined the collective settlement Nordiya. During the course of the years he acquired a higher education and even completed his studies at Tel Aviv University with an MA in political science.

Deqel was elected to the Ninth Knesset as a member of the Likud. He was active in the Ninth Knesset in agricultural and social issues. He serves as a member of the leadership of the Herut Movement and as chairman of the Organization Branch in the movement.

Deqel now faces a great challenge: to cope with the settlement problem, the distress of the workers collective settlements, and the new settlements on the other side of the green line. In early 1980 Deqel called for the end of the establishment of new farming settlements and the establishment only of industrial settlements because hundreds of workers settlements are now in financial and organizational distress. The question is if he will continue to advocate this policy in his new position.

Hayim Drukman--Deputy Minister of Religious Affairs

[Article by Yehoshua Bitzur]

The direction of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in practice will now be entrusted to a Torah personality who is regarded as one of the outstanding leaders of the knitted skullcap generation of which national-religious Jewry is proud. MK Rabbi Hayim Drukman is a Yeshiva teacher in Merkaz Shapira in the south and is regarded as one of the teachers of the youth of the Hesder Yeshivas [a religious school in which the students spend part of their time in study and part of their time in military service].

Despite his patriarchal appearance, he is only about 48, but he has already managed to acquire a reputation as an educator and one who decides questions of halakah. He was born in Poland and immigrated to Israel at the height of World War II. After arriving in Israel he studied Torah in the Merkaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem which is the hotbed of the Gush Emunim youth and the religious group which advocates the completeness of the Land of Israel. His wife is a physician, and they have nine children.

He is a brilliant representative of the national trend emphasized in the NRP. In this respect he is much more to the right than the activist party youth.

Rabbi Drukman was called to the political arena in 1977 elections, and he was given second place on the list. For the party he was a showcase of a spiritual image. However, he soon was revealed as a rigid political force who stubbornly maintains his hawkish and extremist views. When the NRP appeared to him to be too dovish, he considered leaving it in order to join the Tehiyah Movement.

Also before the last elections, he threatened to leave and form an independent list if the hawkish representation was not increased in the NRP list. They eventually reached a compromise with him. The NRP house is in a dilapidated condition, but the party has not abandoned any positions and perhaps has added to them here and there. In this way Rabbi Drukman also succeeded in gaining a position of authority.

Ben-Tzion Rubin--Deputy Minister of Labor and Social Betterment

[Article by Yehoshua Bitzur]

MK Ben-Tzion Rubin has been a witness to the vicissitudes of political fate. When the results of the election became known after the closing of the polls, everyone thought that he was on the "outside." It turned out that he was on the "inside" and very "strong"--the deputy minister of labor and social betterment.

MK Rubin, 42, was born in Tripoli, Libya and immigrated to Israel in 1949. He is married, the father of four children, and lives in Netanya where he served as deputy mayor from the NRP. When he was elected to the previous Knesset, not much was heard about him. He was a representative of the Lamifne faction where Dr Burg overshadowed everyone.

Ben-Tzion Rubin began to stand out precisely at the end of the Ninth Knesset when he became the "chief of staff" for Minister of Religious Affairs Aharon Abu-Hatzeira in the internal struggles of the NRP and in the minister's legal battles. For this reason he was not given a safe place in the NRP list for the 10th Knesset. It was only natural that he left the NRP together with Abu-Hatzeira and established with him the Tami Movement. It was only toward the end of counting the votes that it became evident that Tami had won a third seat, and Rubin returned to the Knesset.

In the exhaustive coalition negotiations in which the prices went up continuously, Tami succeeded in obtaining senior positions for three members of the faction. In this way Ben-Tzion Rubin also gained a piece of authority. This understandably did not arouse much enthusiasm among the former NRP associates.

Moshe Katzav--Deputy Minister in Charge of the Residential Developments Project

[Article by Ezra Yanuv]

Moshe Katzav, deputy minister for the rehabilitation of residential developments, was at one time the youngest head of a council in the country when in 1969 he was elected to this position in Qiryat Mal'akhi. Katzav, a native of Iran, is 35 years old, a member of Knesset for his second term and the head of this council for about 10 years.

He immigrated to Israel at the age of 6, the oldest in a family of eight boys and girls, all of whom like him are living in the development town of Qiryat Mal'akhi. The family first lived in the transient camp of Kefar Ahim (Qastina). He is married and the father of five children.

There is a strong connection between Katzav's life story and the history of Qiryat Mal'akhi. He changed himself and he changed the place, and there is no dispute on this. It is remembered when the dark-eyed and black-haired youth, who still had not completed his studies as a student of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in economics and history, was a writer for the HERUT newspaper and led the small Herut faction which was set up in the Mapai development town. The chairman of the Herut students cell in Jerusalem was known in the town of his residence for his smile and his readiness to lend a helping hand to everyone who came to him. He has always had an attentive ear. As a quiet person who does not lash out verbally, he did not create enemies even when he defeated the Mapai in the town.

In 1970 at the age of 25, he was already active in the high-ranking institutions of the Herut Movement, the leadership, and the secretariat, and, together with Ezer Weizman and Judge Binyamin Halevi, he was added to the executive of the movement in a special position. His election to the Knesset in 1977 was taken for granted, and even this time it was not in doubt. In the previous Knesset he was a member of the Interior Committee and the Education Committee, he was a member of the delegation to the European Parliament in Strasbourg, was invited by the American government to the United States as a guest of the State Department, and it was only natural that before Khomeini took power in Iran that he was sent by the Jewish Agency to persuade the Jews of Iran to come to Israel.

He is a member of the Board of Trustees of Ben-Gurion University in the Negev and the chairman of the umbrella organization of native Iranians in Israel. In anticipation of his appointment as deputy minister for residential development, he announced that he would resign as head of the council of Qiryat Mal'akhi. Of the nine members of the council of Qiryat Mal'akhi, six are from his faction, the Likud. The administration is stable and the development continues. His deputy Y. Vanuno will serve as head of council. Now Katzav will work as the righthand man for Minister David Levi. Katzav says: "I will devote myself to the rehabilitation of the residential developments. This is an extremely important matter. As one who grew up in a residential development town, I will know how to act."

Dov Shilanski--Deputy Minister in the Office of the Prime Minister

[Article by Yehoshua Bitzur]

He is the "diligent one" of the Knesset. MK Dov Shilanski has spent more hours during a 24-hour period in the Knesset building than anyone else. This diligence was certainly one of the factors which motivated Prime Minister Menahem Begin to decide to appoint him deputy minister in the Office of the Prime Minister, and he will work primarily in coordinating actions between the government and the Knesset.

Dov Shilanski, 57, married and the father of two children, is a survivor of the Holocaust and the concentration camps. He is one of the last survivors who are stringent to this very day about not maintaining any contact with Germany or its representatives. He has written a novel called "Musselman" [a term applied to concentration camp inmates who had lost all hope of survival and waited for death] on the Holocaust, which has been translated into English.

Shilanski immigrated to Israel at the time of the establishment of the state, and in its early years, he was a member of extremist groups until he was imprisoned for illegal activity against the reparations agreement with Germany. Since then he has been very active for prison inmates. He wrote a book "Bakeleh Ha'ivri" [In a Jewish Prison], the diary of a political prisoner. Afterwards he studied law in the Tel Aviv branch of the Hebrew University and opened a law office.

He was first elected to the previous Knesset and was noted for his tireless parliamentary work on the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee and the Interior Committee. He introduced many draft laws and worked hard for the common people who came to him for assistance. Shilanski is one of the activists in the Herut Movement; however he has always remained faithful to Menahem Begin even when he disagreed with is withdrawal policy in the Sinai. It is for this reason that he has now earned an appropriate reciprocation. He was very surprised when he was elected in the Herut executive to be among the movement's first seven candidates for the Knesset. This was the springboard which elevated him to the position of deputy minister.

David Shiffman--Deputy Minister of Transport

[Article by Avraham Rotem]

Deputy Minister of Transport David Shiffman is also deputy mayor of Tel Aviv, and the chairman of the board of directors of Elon Lines. He was also chairman of the

board of directors of the Electric Company until he resigned last month from this position before his election to the Knesset. In the Liberal Party he was chairman of the executive and in the past, he was chairman of the Tel Aviv branch.

In 1973 when the Likud won the mayoralty, Shiffman was appointed to be the deputy of Shlomo Lahat. He carried out major development projects in traffic and construction which came under his supervision as chief of the Engineering Administration and the Municipal Traffic Branch. In this way he accrued considerable experience in everything connected with problems of traffic and transport. At one time he served in the military police, and he was released in 1954 with the rank of major.

David Shiffman, 57, and his twin brother Mordekhai (an advertising and public relations man) are married to two twin sisters. He has three grandchildren from his two daughters.

He studied at the Teachers Seminary in Jerusalem, and he was one of the first graduates of the Bnai Akiva yeshiva in Kefar Haro'e.

Shiffman, a member of a religious family in Poland, immigrated to Israel when he was 6 months old, and he grew up in Kefar Hasidim. His father, a member of Hapo'el Hamizrahi, was one of the settlement's founders. Shiffman is an observant Jew to this very day, he prays, does not ride on the Sabbath, and observes the dietary laws, even though he removed the skull cap after his military service.

He began his public activity as chairman of the Merchants Association in Tel Aviv while he was the owner of a furniture and hospital equipment supply company.

Shiffman believes that one of the main courses of action in the campaign against traffic accidents is the improvement of the road base. In this direction he has also worked in Tel Aviv for widening the roads and building bridges, elite roads, expressways, subterranean crossovers, and a system of computer-controlled traffic lights.

He is proud of the rebuilding of Dizengoff Square. In his new position he will possibly be able to complete the new central station in Tel Aviv and the expressway along the Elon River. In defense matters he is a hawk.

5830
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IMPACT OF KNESSET FINANCE COMMITTEE ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Sep 81 p 9

[Article by Eliezer Levene: "The Melamed Interception"]

[Text] The most important man today, and apparently for the foreseeable future, in Israeli economics and politics is MK Avraham Melamed of the NRP. Anyone who thinks that the fate and future of the present government is in the hands of one minister or another, or in the hands of the party leaders, is wrong. Melamed walks about the corridors of the Knesset with a playful look on his face, and he has reason to be happy.

The balance of forces which led to the last elections dictated, more or less, a balance of forces in the Knesset committees. But while the discussions and resolutions of 9 of the 10 committees are purely academic in significance, the finance committee's work is the bottom line. Hundreds of laws, both primary and secondary, require the approval of this committee. Without its approval, the state budget has no force, not to mention changes in the tax rates, the appointment of the state comptroller, approval of loans to failing industries, etc.

There are 21 seats on the Knesset finance committee: MK Shlomo Lorentz, of Agudat Yisrael, who has been reselected as chairman; MK Avraham Shapira, of Agudat Yisrael, an important industrialist; and MK Eliezer Avitavi, of the NRP.

But while these three members, acting on behalf of Likud, will apparently act as good boys (after all Likud can always recall their positions), this is not the case regarding the representative by right, and not by grace, of the NRP--Avraham Melamed. He is already known as the "bad boy" of the coalition. More than once he has voted against the position of the government, or at least has abstained, in the Finance Committee. The rules of coalition discipline are less rigid than those of the Knesset. In fact, neither the faction nor the coalition leadership can do anything to a Knesset member who challenges them. Even the traditional sanction of replacing the objectionable member of Knesset would not be appropriate today for the NRP, because there is simply no one to replace him with. Of six Knesset members, two are ministers (Burg and Hammer), two are deputy ministers (Drukman and Ben-Meir), and one is of course a member of the finance committee (Avitavi). Melamed can therefore do what he wants and vote according to his conscience and according to his economic philosophy, without worrying about political considerations. His position is secure, and no one can hurt him.

In the balance of power of 10 against 10, Melamed's vote is decisive. It is no wonder that Likud, which remembers the troubles which Melamed brought on it in the last session, demanded a majority of two in the committee, so as not to depend on Melamed's vote. Members of the Alignment, who understood well which way the wind was blowing, demanded the appointment of their senior representative (Adi Amorai) to the regular acting position of committee chairman. It is said that the real intention was not to gain the appointment, but to foil Likud's intentions in the numbers game. So, after exhausting negotiations, both sides gave up their demands: the Alignment gave up its demand for the chairman, and Likud was forced to give up its demand for a majority of two. Thus Melamed returned and fortified his position as the decisive man on the committee--to the open joy of the Alignment people.

The committee had just convened when MK Melamed fired his first warning shots. The coalition did not have a majority to raise auto insurance rates starting on 1 September. Not that the Alignment and Melamed are opposed to a rise, but it was a warning shot. The coalition also ran into problems in raising the electricity rates, and in raising communications tariffs. And this is only the beginning.

The Likud made another tactical error: the Alignment people carefully appointed acting committee members to sit in their absence from the country. So, for example, it was decided that MK Micah Kharish would replace Amorai, who is going on a 10-day mission to Europe. For each member there is a permanent substitute, so that the Alignment can always make a full appearance. The Likud coordinator on the committee, Yigael Kohen-Orgad, is less experienced than his Alignment colleagues, and has not yet appointed substitutes. So, the coalition may discover in the near future that it cannot get through the committee the necessary resolutions for the implementation of the economic program of the government. Today, the Likud people prefer not to think about what will happen in February and March when the time comes to discuss the state budget, without which there can be no government.

7075
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FUTURE OF HERUT LEADERSHIP DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Sep 81 p 9

[Article by Amnon Barzilai: "The Victory Which Paralyzed Herut"]

[Text] Two weeks ago Ezer Weitzman made a telephone call to Arye Karmer, the new chairman of the Tel Aviv area secretariat of Herut. "I want to turn in my membership card," Weitzman said to Karmer, but Karmer responded negatively: "You are not leaving the movement. Your activity in the Herut movement has only been temporarily suspended. You do not have to turn in your membership card." This short conversation which took place a few days before Weitzman's departure to the United States ended on Weitzman's note that when he returned, the "matter would be closed."

But Weitzman's shadow, which a year and a half ago spread from his tenure as defense minister, and which cut off his links with the Herut movement, continues to hover at Metsudat-Ze'ev. New persons have moved up to the head of the movement's list. New deployments have developed within the Herut faction in the Knesset and in the party center. The pressure cooker of the Herut movement is filled to the bursting point, with potential camps, factions, and forces having contradictory goals and interests. As long as the movement leader Menahem Begin continues to hold the reins of the government and the movement, his movement will continue "to stew in its own juices."

As more than 4 years ago, now too the power brokers at Metsudat Ze'ev are searching to get a handle on the health condition of the prime minister. This activity, which is not open and about which people do not talk, is being carried out on "a small burner," in anticipation of the unavoidable moment when Begin will announce his departure from political life. Then, the lid will be blown off the pressure cooker, and the forces within will break out to deploy for the decisive battle between them.

It is generally accepted at Metsudat Ze'ev that three people brought victory to the Likud. Begin, who assembled hundreds of thousands of voters in large city parks, and who succeeded in inflaming the masses to return to the rock from which they were hewn; Yoram Aridor, who succeeded in dictating an economic policy which served his party in the elections; and Ariel Sharon, who in the "We Are on the Map" campaign showed to the hundreds of thousands of citizens who were brought to the West Bank that the Likud had established dozens of settlements in Judea and Samaria. Another person who indirectly influenced the success of the Likud was David Levy, who took on the slogans of the "strong man" in the Histadrut elections.

But except for agreement regarding the position of Menahem Begin, which is authoritative and extraordinary, no one in the Herut movement today is able to point to the person who will inherit the leader--whether it will be one of those mentioned above, or someone else. In spite of the years and the approach of the "target date" which was set by Begin, no one can figure out who will step into Begin's shoes. And the movement chairman has given no sign of his intention to say who will be the man that he prefers....

And so, 3 months after the election victory, and the personal achievements in which some can take pride, it seems as though the population of the upper echelons of Herut has expanded. In the absence of one prominent leader who can replace Begin, there is a line of people, most of whom apparently long to inherit Begin. The heir who seems right for the moment, is one of the following--not necessarily in this order: Ya'aqov Meridor, Yitshaq Shamir, Ariel Sharon, Yoram Aridor, David Levy, Moshe Arens. Developments of the past week in Tel Aviv have added additional names to the picture. In spite of Weitzman's telephone call, changes in the movement's leadership in Tel Aviv point to the possibility that in the future the ground may be prepared for Weitzman's return to the leadership of Herut.

This past week 5 years came to an end during which Prof Moshe Arens "ruled" the Tel Aviv region of the Herut movement. Arens reached this position after the fall of Yosef Kramerman, one of the sacrifices of the Talkhi fund affair. But Arens did not extract the political advantages of his new position. Prof Arens, who gained a reputation for himself as the chairman of the Knesset Committee on Foreign and Defense Affairs, did not exploit the political position which he had won. His hawkish group, which includes MK's Yigael Kohen-Orgad, David Stern, and Yosef Rom, which viewed Weitzman and the Camp David agreements as a serious danger, did not succeed in building itself as a significant political power.

With the departure of Prof Arens from the leadership of the Tel Aviv region, Ya'aqov Meridor won the title of Minister of Economic Affairs. Or-Gad, who was afraid to confront him, won the consolation prize--"acting chairman of the region." But the series of people who reached the upper echelons of the region included the following names: Karmer--chairman of the secretariat; Eytan Grifal--chairman of the directors. The presidium of the Tel Aviv region includes the following: Meridor, Arens, Kramerman, Aridor, MK Micah Reiser, Mikhael Kleiner, and MK Eytan Livni. The common denominator of all of them, except for Arens and Livni, is the sentiment for Ezer Weitzman.

The victory of Likud at the polls to some extent upset the processes, and perhaps even decelerated them. Failure at the polls could have accelerated the departure of Begin, and it certainly would have influenced activity at the party center. Today, the institutions of the party are somewhat paralyzed. Yoram Aridor still holds the title of chairman of the secretariat (parallel to the secretary general of the Labor Party), which he won before being appointed finance minister.

It is doubtful whether Aridor will be able to act effectively in his political role. Intra-party struggles have shown that there is a great mutual neutralization. Except for the appointment of ministers, an authority which is exclusively in the hands of Begin, even the "heir" will be unable to achieve by himself in the party. One of the struggles in the Herut Knesset faction was over the leadership of the Knesset Committee between MK's Eytan Livni and Roni Milo. Ministers

Shamir and Levy worked on behalf of Milo. Arik Sharon, Meridor, Arens, and Aridor established a momentary front in support of Livni, who won the post. In particular, Yitshaq Shamir and Roni Milo worked on behalf of the appointment of David Levy as deputy prime minister, to placate him after he was removed from the Ministry of Absorption. The rest of the ministers were more or less apathetic to the fate of their colleagues.

The position of David Levy--whose title of deputy prime minister had not yet been confirmed by the Knesset--is not clear to all members of the party. He was strong when he was in the "blue-white" faction in the Histadrut. He himself determined who would be the Herut candidates for the executive committee of the Histadrut. David Levy also apparently improved his public position when he compared himself to those Knesset candidates who were of Oriental origin, who had been proposed by the Alignment. David Levy was and remains the authentic leader, who grew naturally and achieved a key position in his party. But the man at the center of the party, who has a large army of soldiers, remains without support in the Knesset faction. Among the 24 Herut members of Knesset, there is not one who is considered David Levy's "man." MK Reiser said that in the internal elections for the Knesset list, "David Levy did not deliver the goods," and he did not work on his behalf. Reiser, David Levy's only man in the Knesset, joined forces with Yoram Aridor.

But the real danger for David Levy is coming from the development towns. Two new MK's--David Magen from Kiryat Gat and Meir Shitrit from Yavne--are hot on the heels of David Levy. At this point they are not threatening his position. But the appearance of other ethnics at high positions on the list casts a shadow on the future of David Levy, not because of their origin but because of their great similarity to David Levy. They, like him (as well as Deputy Minister Moshe Ketsev), are authentic products of the development towns in which they grew up. Magen, Shitrit, and Ketsev prove to all that David Levy is not one of a kind. The advantage which he enjoys over them today stems from his organized political power within the party. His problem is that these are three ambitious men of the younger generation, having formal academic training (Magen is also a senior officer in the IDF).

Another man whose position was weakened was Ya'aqov Meridor. Before the elections he was mentioned as a possible "heir." His announcements of his discovery of means of producing or conserving energy made him appear unreliable in his party. Also his appointment of Foreign Minister Yitshaq Shamir are somewhat in decline, especially because of Ariel Sharon, who is getting stronger in the movement as defense minister. Since the election he has not served as a member of the Shlomtzion movement. After the May 1977 elections, Sharon was concerned with manning positions with activists from his faction. This time, people in the Herut movement are convinced that Sharon has done his homework, and will not discriminate against Herut activists. The Arens group would apparently prefer the candidacy of Sharon over the candidacy of Meridor or Shamir, if there is a war of succession. This is especially because of his ideological background and hawkish stance.

These deployments have proven themselves for the time being in the small power struggles within and without the Knesset. A member of the Herut movement is not ready to risk prophesying how the forces will come down at the hour of test, when it will be necessary to choose the "heir."

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SINAI INTERNATIONAL FORCE SEEN AS NO GUARANTEE OF PEACE WITH EGYPT

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 31 Jul 81 p 14

[Article by Mota Gur: "New International Brigade; International Force Alone Will Not Insure Peace With Egypt"]

[Text] The Knesset this week approved the procedure for forming the international force in the Sinai and its operation. The new international brigade will comprise 2,500 soldiers, about half of them Americans.

The Egyptian army has hundreds of thousands of soldiers, equipped with both Russian and Western advanced weapon systems for air, land and sea; the might of the IDF is also well known. So it is no surprise if one concludes that the international force has no military value whatsoever if one of the parties--Israel or Egypt--decides, for its own reasons, to activate its forces toward or inside the Sinai.

The insignificance of this force becomes obvious in the recent shootings on the Lebanese border, which took place despite the presence of several thousand UN troops. On the other hand, if a political-military agreement between Israel and Syria had been signed in 1976, when Syria entered Lebanon, or in 1978, after the Litani operation, the northern border could have been kept calm with a much smaller force or even without one. The power of any international force, then, depends on the willingness of the main parties to honor their agreement and not use military force to solve their problems.

The prime minister and his colleagues are mistaken, and they mislead the public, when they present the peace treaty with Egypt as the sole basis for our ability to act in the north without mobilizing the reserves. During the decade following the Suez War, from 1956 to 1967, the Egyptian border was completely quiet. Despite campaigns and air battles between us and our neighbors to the east, and despite the fact that we did not have a peace treaty with Egypt, Egyptian President Gamal Abd al-Nasir did not use force. The IDF did not mobilize its units and was free to act. Also, in the years 1970-73 the IDF acted against the Syrians and against the terrorists in Syria and Lebanon without beefing up its forces in the south against possible Egyptian reaction.

These facts do not detract from the importance of the peace treaty with Egypt. On the contrary, they indicate that it is not an international force, but rather

an Egyptian decision to respect the agreement and not sacrifice it in case of hostilities between Israel and its other neighbors, that will prevent Egyptian action against us. Such Egyptian behavior will persist for a long time given two conditions: the continuation of the peace process and the preservation of our military might, both in conventional terms and in keeping with the coming nuclear age.

The American presence undoubtedly adds political weight to the presence of the international force, but its importance should not be overrated. Legally, if the Egyptians annul the peace treaty, the international force will also be annulled. Politically and militarily, we have seen in the past that the United States is not interested in getting implicated in foreign wars, and one should not assume that it will instruct its 1,000 soldiers in the Sinai to resist either an Egyptian or Israeli takeover of the Sinai.

Can this American presence serve as a guarantee for peace in the Middle East just as the presence of 300,000 American soldiers in Europe serves as a guarantee for Western Europe against Soviet threat? Such an analogy is misleading in more ways than one, especially since the Americans are in an adversary relation with the Soviets, while in the Sinai they are mediators who want to please both sides.

Just as during the years 1948-56 our Arab neighbors talked about a "second round" against Israel, and just as in 1956-67 Egyptian President Nasir talked about war against Israel, when the time is right and the preparations are completed, there will be voices heard in Egypt, from the government as well as the opposition, to the effect that there cannot be real and full peace with Israel until Israel withdraws to the 1967 borders and political independence is given to the Palestinian Arabs. The Egyptians continue to refuse to give their peace treaty with us precedence over inter-Arab defense treaties, and they have not gone back on their word during the peace negotiations, namely, that in their eyes a war by any Arab state to regain its occupied lands is justified and justifies their own direct military intervention. Even if Egypt does not engage in any hostilities toward us for a long time, which I believe will be the case, we cannot lie beneath our vines and fig trees and rely on American guarantees and an international force.

On the other hand, we can insure the peace by keeping Egypt on the side of negotiations rather than confrontation and by keeping the United States on our side in helping us build our military and economic might without getting it into too much trouble with its Arab allies.

This calls for a patient and responsible policy that is carefully weighed and not ruled by rash decisions and passing fancies. We must study in depth all the lessons of Camp David and the formation of the international force in order to build a firm foundation for the future and avoid unexpected traumas.

9565
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STRATEGIC STUDY PROPOSES DIRECT CONTACTS WITH SAUDI ARABIA

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 14 Aug 81 Weekend Supplement p 2

[Article by Eli'ezer Strauch: "What Was Neglected in Our Policy Vis-a-Vis Saudi Arabia? Israel Is Not Prepared to Deal With the Sophisticated Saudi System of International Relations; Our Policymakers Are Yet To Be Convinced Saudi Arabia Is Becoming Dominant Factor in Our Region; Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies Produces Comprehensive Study on Subject; Study's Author, Uzi Arad, Proposes Direct Talks With Saudis; Is Rejection of Saudi Peace Plan Without Making Counter-offer for Talks Without Preconditions a Missed Opportunity for Such Talks?"]

[Text] What is Saudi Arabia? It is a family of princes who control oil, desert and slaves.

This derogatory definition, which was recently voiced by Prime Minister Menachem Begin, seems to sum up past and present Israeli public statements vis-a-vis the growing influence of the desert kingdom in the international arena.

It appears that the more we detract from Saudi Arabia's importance in the hope of influencing at least public opinion if not policymakers in the United States and in the West, the more successful the Saudi princes are in the propaganda war. Clearly, by making a so-called peace proposal, which according to some was meant to be rejected by Israel, Prince Fahd was able to force us to take a stand that is frowned on in the West while putting him in a favorable light, at a time when U.S. policy in the region is being formulated, especially in relation to the sale of AWACS and other sophisticated weapons to the Saudis.

In any case, it is clear that in addition to the Saudi advantage of controlling the world economy through oil and the investment of surplus petrodollars, they also benefit from the good advice of top consultants whom they hire from the ranks of veteran U.S. foreign service and intelligence personnel and their colleagues from other Western countries.

Suffice it to mention only a small part of this well-oiled, mystery-shrouded battery of consultants, as revealed last September in the weekly EIGHT DAYS (published in London with funds from Persian Gulf oil emirates). According to this report, a private intelligence agency was set up in 1978 under the guise of an international consulting firm named GISE (Group for International Study and Evaluation), which serves no other customers except the Saudi court. Through this

agency, the Saudis can elicit the services of American experts who avoid registering as foreign agents as required by U.S. law.

Our Information Deficiency

The most outstanding consultant working for this agency (whose fees often total $60,000 per year) is veteran diplomat Robert Ellsworth, former U.S. ambassador to NATO, who lives in Washington and has good government connections.

Other consultants are John Gunther, former director of the Middle East division of the International Monetary Fund, and Marjorie Dean, editor of the financial report of the weekly ECONOMIST. Many veteran CIA people also help the Saudis through this agency.

In any case, it seems that Israel is not prepared to deal with the sophisticated Saudi operation in the international arena, for the simple reason that our foreign policymakers are yet to be convinced that Saudi Arabia is becoming a more and more dominant factor in our region that must be dealt with in a more sophisticated way.

Our deficiency in this area is underlined by a study commissioned by the Tel Aviv University Center for Strategic Studies. The author, Dr Uzi Arad, a Middle East scholar, writes: "Israel's policy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia has thus far failed, not because of what was done but because of what was neglected. The grimmest fact is that no comprehensive action has been initiated--nor has there been any public or strategic discussion of such action--to stop the Saudi advance toward a position of all-out confrontation."

The report based on the findings of this study was written 2 years ago, but there has not been any substantive change since then.

What, then, has been neglected in the Israeli policy vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia? The author writes: "Israeli analyses of developments in the region fail to deal with Saudi Arabia as a source of an independent policy, a country with its own political ambitions, an active factor, rather than a mere influence on Egypt, Syria, or the Palestinians, which contradicts the Saudi image in the West."

The study points out the weakness of Israeli information directed to the West, which is based on the argument that there is no connection between the Arab-Israeli conflict and oil. This argument is unacceptable in the West. Moreover, it has often caused Israeli information sources to sound contradictory. They have tried to present the Arab oil countries as a paper tiger in order to downgrade their image, and at the same time they decried Arab blackmail and the danger of Arab military power. The study considers it a gross error to look down on the Saudis and to engage in wishful thinking about internal security problems in the desert kingdom. This, according to the author, diverts attention from the main problem and prevents Israel from obtaining an accurate and balanced assessment of the growing strength of Saudi Arabia in the region, which may be the most revolutionary development in the area over the past decade.

The study indicates that attempts at direct talks between Israel and Saudi Arabia--if indeed there have been any, as reported in the world press--have been unsuccessful. Events show a slow yet dangerous process of deterioration in Israeli-Saudi relations.

Dr Arad notes the implications of this process of deterioration for our relations with the United States. He reminds us that back in 1968 Israel maneuvered itself into a crossfire when it objected to a package deal for selling American weapons to Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Israel.

During that confrontation, Israel and Saudi Arabia stood on opposite sides of the fence. Israel lost out. It suffered a defeat in Congress, a traditional friend of Israel. It also experienced a decline in the influence of the "Jewish lobby." The lesson, according to the author, was clear: "It was a most serious mistake to force the United States to decide between its interest in Israel and in Saudi Arabia."

The author foresees many dangers, both political and military, in Saudi Arabia becoming a confrontation state vis-a-vis Israel. Despite rash statements by Israeli political and military leaders, Saudi Arabia has yet to become a full-fledged confrontation state, since it still has its own motives and goals, which override the Arab-Israeli conflict on its strategic agenda.

Dr Arad maintains that Israel's foremost strategic objective vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia should be to prevent Saudi Arabia from becoming a threat to Israel, despite its growing strength in the region and in the world. He adds that this cannot be guaranteed, but it certainly has to be worked on.

Opposing Normalization

What is needed? The author is not against an Israeli information effort in regard to Saudi Arabia but favors it only as a secondary step, designed to create an option for normalization, which will bring an end to hostile propaganda.

The author advocates direct talks with the Saudis by identifying mutual interests that will help the Saudis understand the Israelis. But he cautions against unrealistic expectations, such as an alliance of pro-Western nations, in keeping with the saying, best is the enemy of good.

In any case, the question remains--did we miss an important opportunity for direct talks with the Saudis, which are at least as much in our interest as in anyone else's, by failing to come up with a counteroffer to Fahd's peace plan, namely, for talks without preconditions?

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CONTROLLING GOLAN HEIGHTS TERMED NECESSARY TO COUNTRY'S SECURITY

Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew No 279-280, May-Jun 81 pp 55-56

[Article by Colonel Eli: "Military and Security Significance of Golan"]

[Text] Golan Heights--Vital Area

A "vital area" in military terms is an area the control of which is necessary for a military operation. In this respect, the Golan Heights are extremely vital, from both the national-strategic and tactical point of view, since the topography of the area--an elevation that controls both east and west--makes it imperative to keep it for both defensive and offensive purposes.

Advanced Technology Versus Topography

Those who deal with security from a general perspective sometimes underestimate the controlling topography. They point to impressive technological advances that can "help hit a target anywhere by pressing a button." There is no greater mistake. Now, more than ever before, one can close technological gaps by buying weapons, which are sold to the highest bidder. Military advantage is put into effect by correct use of means, especially proper topographical maneuvering. The new technological and electronic devices can help reach distant targets, but the main limitation is the visibility of the target. Hence, there is no substitute for topography when it comes to observation and fire control.

Topography As Military Component

Forces and land are not interchangeable. They complement each other in building might. The IDF fights as an army of the few against the many and does not have the luxury of not making use of all the components of the battlefield, which go beyond the ratio of forces. The experience of the Yom Kippur War showed that a small force that was positioned at Har Hermonit prevented a Syrian breakthrough and turned the area into a slaughterhouse. One must not detract from the bravery of the soldiers, yet the topography and the superiority of the terrain enabled the Israeli soldier to be at his best.

Disproportion Between Relinquishing Territory and Control

From a military standpoint, it is extremely difficult to accept any territorial compromise in the Golan Heights, since the military significance of giving up

2 percent of the land means giving up 100 percent of control. The importance of a vital area is seen in a mound, hilltop or mountaintop. Giving up a few square yards can mean total relinquishment of military control. Since the IDF is deployed in a minimal defense line, any concession, even the smallest, diminishes its military capability.

To Prevent Surprise Attack and Increase Alert

To prevent a tactical surprise, it is necessary to face the Syrians in a state of constant alert, monitoring their every move. There are indeed many electronic means one can use for warning purposes, but there is no substitute for conventional ground observation. Advanced radar and electronic observation and listening devices work better when there is a line of sight between the observation post and the target. One could substitute satellites and aircraft, but their cost is high and they are limited in terms of the weight of equipment they can carry, anti-aircraft protection, and so on. Even superpowers like the United States and the Soviet Union strive to control ground as close as possible to the battleground in order to place warning devices.

Keeping IDF forces on the ridges gives them a dual advantage. It enables them to maintain a warning system, and it gives them a firm base to prevent surprise attack. It not only gives them the upperhand but also makes it hard for the Syrians to obtain information and to have westward fire control.

The following topographic examples clearly show the significance of observation and two-way control.

Put in Neutral and Go

Even experienced armies find it hard to seal off their borders in the face of a surprise attack, at least in the early stages. The Syrians may go after limited objectives at the start of the war to gain territory. By sending large forces along several axes, they may be able to advance westward.

Strategic depth, albeit limited, enables one to mount a counterattack. By leaving the present line, the IDF would enable the Syrians to advance toward the axes going down the western slopes, where they can go down in neutral. During the Yom Kippur War, the Syrian forces were able to advance and come down the axes, despite the strategic depth, but it is doubtful whether the IDF could have fought back, stopped the enemy and push on eastward if it had not controlled the present line.

Defense Problems

There are two basic prerequisites for defending an area: the stopping line (that line which is determined by the defender as necessary for defending the area) is located behind the front line and controls the area, and the front line, which is also a stopping line so that the battle for defending the area takes place in enemy territory.

The Golan is too narrow to launch a strategic-depth battle, which limits the maneuverability of the reserves in the area between the purple line, or the ridges,

and the starting point of the axes going down to the Hula and Jordan valleys. Yet this area still permits the concentration of forces and their movement from one axis to another in the battleground, provided armored forces are engaging the enemy and stop its westward advance.

With the Syrians controlling the ridges, this is not possible.

Upper Galillee, Unthreatened

A look at this sector shows that from the slopes of the Golan Heights the settlements in the Hula Valley are within downward firing range.

Any Syrian presence in Lebanon puts the area under the threat of encirclement, both in terms of firing range and mobility. Any concession in the area helps the Syrian advance and reduces the area they have to fight for. One should take into account the short distances even under the present conditions: 13 km from the purple line to Kfar Szold; 13 km from the purple line to 'En Gev; 23 km from the purple line to Gadot.

Even a 2-km concession radically changes the present situation. Har Hermonit, 2 km from the purple line, controls the northern Golan and the westward slopes. Tel Avital, 2 km from the purple line, is close to the central axes in the Golan and controls the area to the west (see Upper Golan sector). The Ramat Mashimim area, 6-7 km between Wadi Haroqed and the steep western slopes, is a key area that enables forces to be sent southward to the Jordan Valley.

Demilitarization--A Step Backward

The demilitarization of the area forces the IDF to recapture vital areas during war. The desire to recapture territory is two-sided, and the one who wins the race is in control. To give up territory in order to recapture it is foolish, for if the area is needed for defense one shouldn't give it up just to face the necessity later on of retaking it.

Insuring the Water Sources--Protecting a Vital Installation

Israel's water sources are in the northern Golan. Insuring the water supply calls for physical protection. This cannot be achieved without territorial superiority. Hence, control of Mount Hermon is vital. It is not only the eyes and the ears of the country but also the head.

The Psychological Factor

One should not overlook the psychological factor. When the Syrians control points overlooking the northern settlements, they can see their targets clearly, and those targets appear within reach. The sight of flourishing settlements at their feet can entice them to start shooting or to engage in other hostile action.

Agreement or Escalation

It appears that despite their interference in Lebanon, the Syrians have been avoiding direct confrontation with Israel. This shows that they see their present

position as vulnerable, and therefore they do not encourage the PLO to operate out of their territory, as they did when they controlled the Golan Heights. The cease-fire agreement is based on the premise that it does not pay for either side to start shooting, and thus any change in the present status quo may invite hostilities. The Syrian fortifications in the Golan prior to 1967 clearly show the importance they impute to the heights, when everything lies in the palm of their hand.

The Syrian army is more advanced and experienced than ever before. It is an army preparing for offensive action. In this light, the IDF should make the most of its advantage in occupying the present line.



(1) Upper Golan Section

(2) Gonen
(3) Revaya
(4) West-Neph Road
(5) Har Avital
(6) Purple line
(7) Kuneitra
(8) Um Butra
(9) Syria



(1) Har Hermonit-Kfar Szold Section

(2) Kfar Szold
(3) Oil Axis
(4) Saqin
(5) Har Hermonit
(6) Purple line
(7) Har Arinvoh
(8) Tell al-Shuhuq
(9) Ma'as
(10) Syria



(1) Tell al-Faras - Jordan Section

(2)	Jordan	(6)	Rafid
(3)	Yehudia - Kataybah	(7)	Qunqus
(4)	Ta'aria	(8)	Purple line
(5)	Tel al-Faras	(9)	Syria

9565
CSO: 4323/52

MAPAM CRITICIZES HAWKISH TREND IN LABOR ALIGNMENT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Sep 81 p 26

[Article by Moshe Maisels: "Four (Red) Flags and Three Percent (of the Population)"]

[Text] At the opening of the Mapam Council this week, one of the council members turned to the chairman and asked why the podium was decorated with 10 national flags, but only four red flags.

The chairman, MK Elazar Granot, appeared a bit perplexed, and turned himself to view the flags. Then he answered: "I am pleased with the comment. It is true."

There was in this a kind of revelation of thoughts and fears which haunt the Mapam people during discussion of the lessons of the results of the last Knesset elections. The comments of the Mapam leaders, MK Viktor Shem-Tov and Haike Grossman, at the council regarding the situation which had developed in the Labor Party after the elections and the deep concern regarding that situation testified to an increase in the tensions between the two Alignment partners.

The Mapam leaders fear that the Labor Party leaders are reading the "map" which was created following the elections differently and in a distorted fashion--something which carries the danger of a split in the Alignment. They fear that in the sharp struggle within the Labor Party, between the dovish-socialist faction and that faction which they define as "statist, activist in defense affairs and liberal in economic affairs" the latter faction may well come out on top. While Mapam demands that one of the lessons of the election results is that there should be a new emphasis on socialist ideology, the values of the labor movement, and the difference between it and the Likud, to bring the working public back home--the lesson for the Labor Party has on the contrary been a turn to the center, and a blurring of the differences between it and the Likud, as well as a hiding of the red flag, the socialist ideology, and the values of the labor movement.

The election results--the failure to replace the regime--renewed within the leadership of the Labor Party the struggle over party line and ways of action, for the future. In opposition to the thesis of the doves (including among others MK Abba Eban, MK Yeruham Mashal, MK Uzi Baram, MK Micah Kharish, MK Ora Namir, MK Menahem Hakohen and Naftali Blumenthal, as well as members of Ikhud Hakvutsat ve-Hakibbutzim, members of the Young Guard, etc), which follows a line which is

moderate in political and defense matters, and which is faithful to socialist doctrine, there is another faction whose strength is increasing, which views the character and substance of the Labor Party as being social democratic, a kind of left-center bloc, and this is of particular concern to Mapam. Within this faction are in particular the Yakhdav group, headed by MK Eliahu Speiser, hawks such as MK Shlomo Hillel, most of the representatives of the Oriental community, leaders of the moshav movement, etc.

While the doves view the non-success of the Labor Party to replace the current regime in the elections as the result of a blurring of the socialist position of the party as well as the values of the labor movement, the "social democratic faction" sees the oversight in the election campaign as being a lack of appeal to the center. Leaders of this faction, and primarily MK Eliahu Speiser (who is a candidate for the position of secretary general of the party), claim that in the political sphere there was in the election campaign a leftward attraction in expressions of spokesmen of the party, in the direction of the Sheli platform, to the extent that the public was unable to distinguish between the platform which was accepted by the majority, and the opinions of individuals expressed during the campaign.

The "social democratic faction" also claims that the Labor Party ignored the dialogue with the NRP, and thus pushed it into the arms of the Likud. It supported anti-religious legislation in the Knesset--in such matters as army service, the employment of religious workers on the Sabbath, the attitude toward the Reform movement, and the prior determination that the Ministry of Education would never be given to a religious representative, etc. It is the opinion of the leaders of this faction that the lessons of the election are that one can never submit to dictates by the religious groups, but that at the same time one cannot adopt an attitude of "to hell with them," and that there must be a renewed dialogue with the younger leadership of the NRP.

Mapam is concerned that the Labor Party will become a party of the center "with a bit of the flavor of the kibbutz movement" in alliance with the religious groups. The secretary general of the Mapam party, Viktor Shem-Tov defined the signs of these developments as "arousing confusion, and sometimes causing concern and revulsion." He claimed in the Mapam council that today "one hears anti-kibbutz sounds in the Labor Party, anti-dove noises, and anti-secularist voices. The atmosphere is permeated by an extreme ethnic approach, and one gets the impression that the party is falling apart."

What concerns Mapam is the decentralizing method of the "social democratic faction" which seeks a change in the internal election method by means of election of more representatives of the districts and Orientals to the party institutions. Mapam fears that this public is more hawkish and more traditional. Also of concern to Mapam is the "orientation" of the public which is centrist, and the lower middle class such as tradesmen and small businessmen, which during the election supported the Likud.

The Mapam leaders bitterly ask: What is this talk that the kibbutz movement constitutes only 3 percent of the people? MK Eliahu Speiser, champion of the social-democratic faction, claims: "The kibbutz movement has a preferred position in the

party, and no one challenges it. The partnership with the kibbutz movement is assured in the future, and if there are differences of opinion--they are only with a few people in the movement."

The leaders of Mapam claim that they have no intention of intervening in the decision regarding who shall be the secretary of the Labor Party. But the secretary general of Mapam, Viktor Shem-Tov, stated in the council that in the opinion of Mapam, Haim Bar-Lev represents the values of the labor movement, and that it cannot be apathetic regarding the question of who will replace Bar-Lev.

MK Eliahu Speiser claims: "Even before the first confrontation between Peres and Rabin, Mapam claimed that it had no intention of intervening in the confrontation, but on the other hand it publicly rejected Peres...." He adds that any drift to the left, which is the way of Mapam, will reduce the electoral prospects of the Labor Party, and this is neither its way nor its platform. "The slogans of Mapam will not bring back the workers who voted for Likud into the bosom of the Labor Party, because they are more hawkish and traditional."

Mapam gives its blessing to the position of MK Mota Gur, because we can negotiate with a Palestinian who recognizes our right to exist and who forswears terror. Thus they approach the Yariv-Shem Tov formula, which is accepted by Mapam. But what concerns the Mapam leaders is the response of the hawkish camp of the Labor Party, which completely rejects the position of MK Gur with the claim that this position is opposed to the party platform, it legitimizes the PLO, and it opens the way to the establishment of a Palestinian state. They are also concerned about attacks on the doves of the Labor Party on the question of links with the Palestinians, when they vote on the "evasive response" of Peres or the "analytical response" of Rabin to the proposal of Mota Gur. On the other hand, the hawkish camp rejects the position of Yosi Sarid, because his "orientation" converts the Labor Party into a kind of "Likud B." In such a case, the voter would prefer to vote directly for the Likud.

Mapam is also not happy with the positions of the Labor Party regarding strategic cooperation with the U.S. With few exceptions, the party leaders have criticized the agreement, especially the interpretations given to it by the prime minister--but the Labor Party has rejected Mapam's demand that it call for a special discussion of the matter in Knesset, claiming that it is still not a sure thing, and that it would be better to wait until the end of the AWACS affair.

The struggle between the socialists and the social democrats of the Labor Party expanded into a struggle between the two partners in the Alignment. In Mapam there were already some voices saying that under the present circumstances it would be better to begin discussions on the dismantling of the Alignment, but the leaders of Mapam rejected this call by those "who hasten to hitch a ride on the serious division which has been visited on the Labor Party and who call for its dismantlement." They claim that this would only serve the purposes of Likud. The Mapam leaders are of the opinion that at this juncture it is best for Mapam to follow closely what is happening in the Labor Party, while supporting the dovish-socialist faction, in the hope that it will ultimately come out on top in the internal struggle.

The leaders of the hawkish faction in the Labor Party claim, on the other hand, that the mark of "Likud B" has been imprinted by party members. They claim that there is no point to this type of talk, which is only used to strengthen leftist theses in matters of foreign and security affairs. It is no longer possible to be satisfied with an "ideological supermarket" but rather, the time has come to make a decision, proceed on its basis, and speak clearly.

This "clear language" is revolting to Mapam. They are afraid of the inclination of some of the Labor Party leaders (such as MK Peres, MK Gad Ya'aqovi, and MK Moshe Shahal) to bring back MK Moshe Dayan and the Telem people into the party. Is the lesson which the Labor Party wants to learn from the election results that Moshe Dayan should be brought back to the ranks of the party? The same Dayan who participated in the Begin government and proclaimed that Begin was closer to him than Meir Ya'ari? These are questions posed by the Mapam secretary general Viktor Shem-Tov.

Haika Grossman has already announced that Mapam has drawn two red lines for the continued existence of the Alignment: no establishment of a national unity government, and no participation of Telem as a unit within the Alignment. But according to Viktor Shem-Tov, the Labor Party has not yet given up thoughts of this sort.

7075
CSO: 4423/20

GAZA STRIP AUTONOMY POSITION ASSESSED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Sep 81 p 9

[Article by Dani Tzidqoni]

[Text] Is the Gaza Strip Ready for Autonomy? Just now Brig Gen Joseph Lunz is coming on board as the tenth IDF governor of the Gaza Strip. Which goes to show you that in just a few more years the period of our rule in the Gaza will be equal to that of the Egyptians, and the military regime, which is a temporary means of rule, could become a permanent framework if autonomy is not achieved and if some other solution is not found which would make possible an IDF pullout from the Gaza Strip. The list of military governors, which began with the Six-Day War, is long and interesting. The first governor was General Moshe Goren. His replacement was Col 'Aviv Garzilai, may he rest in peace. After him came Lt Gen Mote Gur, Brig Gen Menahem (Man) 'Aviram, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Pundaq, Gen Abraham 'Orli, Brig Gen David Mimun, Brig Gen Joseph Qastel, and Brig Gen Yitzhaq Segev, who is just now completing his tenure.

It might be possible to survey the history of Gaza since 1967 according to the periods of rule of the above-mentioned commanders. Each of them had to confront, apart from basic problems, problems of the time which were the fruit of changing conditions. We will not deal here with a historical survey of the military regime in the Gaza Strip from Goren to Segev. But the completion of Segev's period of service demands specific treatment.

Indeed it is hard to understand why the 43-year old Segev was transferred from his position just after the new defenee minister Sharon adopted new principles for the military regime in the territories, which Segev had favored and according to which he had tried to act in the period in which Israel had "frozen" her political activity in the territories. Sharon is now trying to overcome this gap in the talks that he is now conducting with Palestinian leaders in the territories in advance of the resumption of the autonomy talks. We used to call Segev's policy in the Gaza Strip the "understanding hand" policy or the "wise hand" policy, and we presented it as something more sophisticated and efficient from the point of view of Israel's interests and its war against the PLO than the policy of the "hard hand" which was operated primarily on the West Bank, in our estimation--at the political and military inspiration of the chief of staff. It seems that it would not be an altogether incorrect estimation if we were to say that in Sharon's tenure, the chief of staff will lose, except for regular defense issues, the influence that he enjoyed in days of the previous Minister of Defense Begin over the military regime in the

territories and over the attitude of the regime toward its Arab inhabitants, and in that there is nothing to be sorry about!

The freeze in the political discussion with the inhabitants of the territories began, in fact, with the resignation of Dayan from the Foreign Ministry, after which Weizmann lost his stability in regard to the political line to take towards the territories. The tenure of Segev, who is a Middle East scholar with a Master's degree from Tel Aviv University, and who had served earlier as governor of El Arish, is a period which was measured not only by his success in preventing the PLO in escalating the relations of the Gaza Strip with Israel and the disruption of normal life in the area, but also by his contribution to the "ripening" of the Gaza Strip in the political programs of the State of Israel as a part of the autonomy deal.

In the 2 years of Segev's tenure, the Gaza Strip was influenced by the political process that began to be achieved in an intensive way between Israel and Egypt. Changes occurred principally in two major areas: in renewing the bonds with Egypt and in a positive attitude toward the political process as a means of solving the Palestinian problem. The bond with Egypt, which was weakened at a certain stage following the ascendancy of the PLO, draws its strength from the ties that developed between Egypt and the Gaza Strip from 1948 until the Six-Day War. The inhabitants of Gaza lived in the bosom of the senior Arab state, which led not only in nurturing Arab culture but also in nurturing the idea of Arab nationhood and was involved more than any other Arab state in the struggle for Palestine.

The signing of the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt led to a renewal of the bond with Egypt and hurt the orientation towards Jordan, headed, as we know, by Rashad al-Shawwa.

The fruits of normalization in Gaza are now very real, and prime among them is the regular territorial tie between them which did not exist before as it exists now since the opening of the Sinai Fields terminal. This tie will be tightened even more with the transfer of the terminal, in about 7 months, to Rafiah, when Egypt will approach to within 40 kilometers of Gaza.

Tens of thousands of Gaza residents began to move along the narrow coastal highway of Sinai south to Egypt, and their number last year reached 120,000. This mass movement goes on despite PLO pressures against it. It should be remembered that this mass movement was also aided by the conduct of mail and telephone service between them. The Gazans today are in the Egyptian "picture" not by watching Egyptian television or listening to Cairo radio but by travel and thanks to daily reading of the Egyptian press which streams regularly into the newspaper kiosks of the area's cities. It should also be remembered that tens of thousands of Gazans received their education in Egypt and remember her fondly. The connection is not only cultural, tourist, social and familial, but it has also taken on an economic form which is expressed in commerce and investments. Last year Gazans invested about 200,000,000 (that they earned in Israel?) in Egypt. For this purpose special offices were opened in the area, and they create the right ties for purposes of investment in Egypt, where bureaucracy and payoffs are among the signs of its economy.

There are those who think that this "experience" was fertile ground for the flowering of another attitude among residents of the area toward the conflict, who are inclined more now to see the solution precisely in the political plane and not in violent

confrontation. Since the political option of Camp David is "autonomy," which is the solution suggested by the government, it is proper that the government should nurture, by means of the military regime and through suitable activity on the part of the political echelon, the "experience" described above, which, because of the Arab terror campaign, has not yet been given public expression in the direction of autonomy. On the matter of autonomy, the situation in the Gaza Strip is different from that on the West Bank because of the Gaza bond to Egypt and the West Bank bond to Jordan and the PLO. In Gaza the situation is easier because of the lack of friction with religious-nationalist settlements and land and water questions as they exist on the West Bank.

In the Gaza Strip there has been a basis for autonomy even since the Egyptian period which has been pressed during the Israeli administration, which administers its civilian and national services in the area by means of departments which remained from the Egyptian period, headed by Gazans, just as its workers are Arabs. Israeli supervision is achieved by Israeli staff officers, who represent in these departments the Israeli mother offices and the area headquarters.

Another reason why the Gaza Strip may merit "autonomy" is the integrative web of relationships that it has developed with Israel in the economic realm which has created in the area a large stratum of people interested in continuing the coexistence with Israel. But there is a problem. These pro-autonomy changes in attitude which exist among broad strata of residents in the Strip have not yet received political expression. Thus far there has evolved on the part of the local leadership of the area no attempt at integration or readiness for integration in the autonomy negotiations. (Two that tried, Ahaykh Hashim Huzandar and the deputy chief of the council of Jibeliyah Mr Abu Wardab, paid for it with their lives.

It may be that the principal reason for this is the lack of clarity that surrounds the autonomy program, which in fact is not clear even to many Israelis. The attitude toward the political process in Gaza also suffers because of its political structure which lacks a democratic tradition of party activity, elections, etc. Here the PLO influence is decisive in stopping the Gazan leadership from joining the process which it is battling against, by means such as the allocations of the joint PLO-Jordanian commission to institutions in the territories, the purpose of which is the encouragement of political elements.which identify with the PLO and oppose the political process, as well as by what we call "Arab terrorist acts," which are directed against what the PLO calls "fellow travelers," to which category, unfortunately, belong some Israeli journalists who identify people who prefer talking to us to terror as "fellow travelers."

Segev completed his mission in Gaza at precisely the time when the defense minister published his emphasis towards Israeli policy in the territories, which Segev had followed even earlier. These "emphases" aroused expectations among the Gazan leaders of complementary steps in the political area, especially in the realm of the essence of autonomy and what would come after it. Gaza, thus, is "conditionally ripe" for autonomy. The matter depends in large measure on the government, whether it will take steps which will enable moderate and pragmatic circles to be integrated in the political process which at this stage is contrary to the PLO.

9794
CSO: 4423/21

LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLICY IN TERRITORIES ANALYZED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Sep 81 p 28

[Article by Ze'ev Segal]

[Text] A group of jurists has published a comprehensive research study--in response to the research of Arab jurists--which sheds light on the principles of international law and its application in the territories. The study reveals that there is no military regime in the entire world comparable to that of Israel in preserving both the spirit and the letter of the law.

In a lecture before an international gathering of Jewish jurists who arrived in Jerusalem from 15 countries, minister of Justice Moshe Nissim said: "It can be said without hesitation that the essential rights of man are preserved in the occupied territories by the State of Israel in an unprecedented fashion in comparison with any other military regime anywhere."

It was not in vain that these words were spoken a month ago in an explanation of the legal foundation for the military grip in the occupied territories. If in the past Israel's military hold on the territories was attacked by political bodies, jurists from various countries have joined in, who have attempted to show, on the pretext of objectivity, that Israel does not carry out the principles of international justice which apply to a military regime in an "occupied territory."

A comprehensive study written by Israeli jurists was distributed world-wide to debunk this fabrication. In the preface to the study, jurist Haim Cohen wrote; "There is no denying that in the history of military regimes in occupied territories throughout the entire world, there is no clearer example of the preservation of human rights than their preservation by the State of Israel."

In the context of publications both abroad and in Israel on the subject of the methods of a military regime--it is doubtful if the public in Israel itself knows the basic principles which mold the action of the Israeli military regime. A study of the basic approach of Israeli governments from 1967 to the present shows that the practical view adopted binds Israel to the precepts of international law, even when Israel claims in the international arena that the international laws of conquest do not apply in Judea and Samaria, since at the time of the IDF's entry to the area there was no soverignty whose hold on the territory merited general international recognition.

The Geneva and Hague Conventions

A short time after the end of the Six-Day War, the legal advisor to the Israeli government Me'ir Shamgar proclaimed that the state would consider itself obligated to act according to the principles of the Geneva pact of 1949 on the matter of the defense of civilians in wartime, and according to the Hague Convention of 1907 on the matter of warfare on land. In discussions that took place before the High Court of Justice, it was clear that the actions of the military regime in the territories were checked in ac ordance with the precepts of international law, and that in case of violation of the instructions of customary military law, it would be possible to bring suit against the military regime before the Israeli court.

The approach of the Government of Israel creates an unprecedented precedent in what has been accepted in international law concerning the regulation of the rights of citizens, inhabitants of an "occupied territory," vis-a-vis the authority of the power holding the territory as a result of war. The government was the party which decided in 1967 not to claim an absence of authority on the part of the High Court of Justice to hear the appeals of inhabitants of the occupied territories. In the absence of such a claim--the result of which would be hard to predict in the absence of precedent--the Israeli court proceeds on the assumption that it has standing on the subjects of those functions of the military regime which belong to the executive authority of the state. It was the application of this authority which enabled the High Court of Justice to render its famous decision on the matter of the settlement at Alon Moreh (High Court of Justice 390/79), by which the respondents--the Government of Israel, the defense minister, the military commander of the Judea-Samaria area and the military commander of the sub-district of Shechem--were ordered to remove from the lands of the appellants, Arab residents of the village of Rujayb, "every structure that was erected thereupon and every object that was brought thereto."

The Needs of an "Army of Occupation"

The court based its decision on an examination of the actions of the military regime in light of the precepts of international law as they were fixed in the Hague Convention, which recognized the concept of the holding of real estate for the needs of an "army of occupation." The court determined that the "needs of an army of occupation" do not include those needs which are required "to guarantee public order and security," which is the primary function of the army according to the Hague Convention.

Since in this case there did not exist clear "military needs" in this sense, the order for the confiscation of real estate that was issued by elements of the military government, was vacated. This decision of the High Court of Justice, composed of five judges, contained a basic point of view": not only a comprehensive check of the activity of the military regime in the light of international law, but also a readiness on the part of the court to examine in depth the question of whether in fact there existed those "military needs" which the military regime claimed.

The decision makes clear that the military regime is in fact "the servant of two masters." Every one of its administrative actions would be tested before the High Court of Justice against two criteria: accord with international law as it applies

in the occupied territories, and accord with Israeli internal justice (the municipal law code) which applies in Israel. The military regime is one of many state authorities and is bound by the rules of Israeli law. In this connection it is clear that the "military regime is not its own master but carries out a policy outlined for it by the government, as the court made clear earlier in its decision on the matter of the settlement at Beth-El (High Court of Justice 606/78).

On the matter of 'Alon Moreh the court made clear its thinking through its president Moshe Landau on the matter of the military regime. The government is the supreme body that determines the policy of the military regime. The government is the supreme body that determines the policy of the military regime. As long as the government does not say something about a particular topic concerning the activity of the regime in the territories, the chief of staff is obliged to carry out the instructions of the minister of defense; but when a topic is brought before the government, its decision is binding upon the chief of staff (and through him upon the various bodies of the military regime), even if the decision is one about which the minister of defense held the minority opinion in the government.

The granting of the opportunity to the residents of the occupied territories to appeal to the highest court in Israel--assures them not only a judge (High Court of Justice), but also a legal code (the rules of administrative law which apply in the State of Israel in addition to the international rules of law). These rules, which were developed in essence through the rulings of the High Court of Justice, imposed several obligations on the authorities: to act within the framework of their authority, reasonably, honestly, fairly and without harmful discrimination.

Both Law and a Judge

Thus the rulings of the High Court of Justice stand guard over the existence of the basic democratic principles in the territories such as freedom of expression, freedom of employment, freedom of association, etc. To the extent that these freedoms are limited in Israel itself they are also limited in hhe occupied territories, whether by force of legislation that existed in them before the entry of the IDF or by force of special orders that were issued by the military regime.

The basic authority for the limiting of freedoms (which is occasionally an issue for public debate) is recognized by international law. Thus, for example, this law recognizes the right of a military regime to forbid public gatherings and political meetings. The Israeli regime does not go the route of absolute prohibition; rather its approach is to require those who request to assemble to obtain a permit from the military regime (in Israel, too, those who ask to demonstrate must obtain a permit from the police). The policy of the government to forbid or to allow changes in accordance with conditions and the views of the bodies of government, but it is clear that in the final analysis, their decision is subject to review by the High Court of Justice.

The review authority of the High Court of Justice, however, was asserted in a similar connection having to do with freedom of expression and the dissemination of information in the occupied territories. The military regime decided to prohibit the distribution in the territories of a paper which appeared in the State of Israel. In a ruling on this matter (High Court of Justice 619/78), the court construed

that in accordance with international law, the military regime was obligated to "take all measure in its power to guarantee as fully as possible order and public life," as stated in the Hague Convention.

It is this obligation which grants the regime the power to forbid political activity and to limit publication, and international law does agree that an "occupying state" does have such power. But the decision of the military regime was upheld only after it passed the "combined test" of international law and Israeli law. The court was convinced that the military regime had properly balanced the relevant interests; the assurance of security and public order as against the high social value of "freedom of expression."

10 Percent of Appeals to the High Court of Justice are from the Territories

These proceedings demonstrate the high degree of popularity of appeals by the residents of the occupied territories to the High Court of Justice. It should therefore come as no surprise that these appeals today constitute about 10 percent of all appeals submitted to the High Court of Justice. In the year 1979-80 residents of the territories submitted 91 appeals to the High Court of Justice. In five cases the appellants won an aboslute decision against the regime, in 28 cases the government achieved a compromise with the appellant or decided to acknowledge the appeal without a court order. In 42 cases, decisions were rendered in favor of the regime, and in six cases the appellants decided to withdraw their appeal (at the time of publication of the jurists' report, ten cases were still in litigation).

The appeals touched a wide spectrum of topics: taxation, land disputes, detentions, etc. One of the noteworthy decisions was the determination by the High Court of Justice not to recognize the decision on the purchase of the Jerusalem Electric Company as far as Judea and Samaria were concerned (High Court of Justice 351/80). Another ruling vacated the decision of the commander of the Judea and Samaria district which rejected the request of a husband to be reunited with his wife as not in accord with judicial decision.

The question is still uncertain as to what legislation the regime has the power to enact. The basic norm, upon which the structure of Israeli rule in the occupied territories was established, is the rule of a military regime without application of Israeli law which implies Israeli sovereignty. The matter was well clarified in Judea and Samaria by a manifesto issued by the military commander on 7 June, 1967, upon the entry of the IDF into the area.

When is there "Need for Change"?

This manifesto established that "the law which existed in the area would remain in force as long as it does not contradict this manifesto or any other manifesto or order that would be given, and with changes resulting by the establishment of IDF rule in the area." Since that time, more than 900 orders have been issued in Judea and Samaria, of which 120 led to amendment of the local legislation. A weighty question is what are the changes in legislation that the military regime is authorized to make under international law.

The Hague regulations set forth the obligatory principle by which existing laws in an "occupied territory" are to be honored except if there "exists a categorical

obstacle" to doing so. In order to respond to the question that we have just raised, we must first explain the rest iction by which it is possible to estimate when a necessity for change in legislation has been created, and that is the recognition of the duty of the military regime to assure "public order and security."

The basic question was discussed in the High Court of Justice as long ago as 10 years back (High Court of Justice 337/71). In that instance the military governor issued a legislative instruction establishing an arbitration procedure for labor matters which did not exist according to Jordanian law. The opinion of the High Court majority emphasized that "life does not stand still," and that the military regime acted legally in establishing that change since it was clear that its objective was to fulfill its obligation to attend to the welfare of the population.

The minority opinion held that the military regime should not act to administer new arrangements that appear and that it is only authorized to maintain arrangements that existed in the past and to innovate only where absolutely necessary. From the decision of the High Court of Justice that was rendered at the beginning of this year on the question of the purchase of the East Jerusalem Electric Comapny (High Court of Justice that was rendered at the beginning of this year on the question of the purchase of the East Jerusalem Electric Company (High Court of Justice 351/80), it turns out that the regime would exceed its authority if it were to make long range changes because a military regime is by its very nature temporary and its principal task is the maintenance of security and public order.

Nevertheless, the basic approach of the High Court of Justice affirms the actions of the military regime, which has done much in the area of legislation in that which it felt desirable for the welfare of the residents, in accordance with changes in legislation that were accepted in the State of Israel in recent years. Thus an order was enacted in Judea and Samaria according to which no-fault compensation would be awarded to a person injured in a traffic accident; auto insurance and a fund for victims of hit-and-run accidents were established; the principle began to be applied in the area which was established in Israeli legislation concerning the obligatory use of seat belts in inter-urban sectors; compensation was established for job related accidents and this workman's compensation became obligatory for the employer.

In so doing the State of Israel acted not only in accord with current practice in international law but also according to an ethical conception of military rule which attempts to act in the best interests of the residents of the "occupied territories." Even if one does not agree with all the actions of the military regime (and some of those actions have, over the years, drawn heavy criticism from the High Court of Justice), it would seem that these aspects of Israeli activity in the territories deserve some small illumination more than other aspects.

The illumination of the judicial underpinnings to military control in the occupied territories can be summed up in an interesting fact: the "integrated test" that has now begun to apply to actions of the military regime in the occupied territories results in the fact that not every action which would be considered legal in Israel would be considered so in the occupied territories. Since the military regime is subject both to international law and to Israeli law, it follows that its freedom of action is even more limited that of the government of Israel which is beholden only to the Knesset.

The High Court of Justice is the focal point for supervision over the military regime and its approaches and stance assure, in large measure, the existence of the "rule of law" even under special conditions and at a time when everyone is talking about "difficult instances." The fact that suggestions for legislation which would nullify the authority of the High Court of Justice over the territories were rejected almost without discussion is testimony to the honor of Israeli society.

The judge Haim Cohen writes at the opening of the jurists' report: "I am not happy with certain aspects of the military regime; not every one of us with current basic conceptions on the matter of security needs. But as long as the military bears the responsibility for security, and as long as the territories are subject to terrorist actions, these conceptions have to apply."

In referring to the decision of the High Court of Justice (on the matter of 'Alon Moreh) in which the court nullified the view of the [military] authority on the question of "military need," the judge stresses the principle which concerns the "rule of law" in the territories: "there is no doubt that the very existence of the High Court of Justice and its activity in this connection as a watchdog have contributed to the degree of self-restraint of the military commanders in the area."

There is no doubt that this part of the activity of the High Court of Justice is of unique importance today, in considering the scope of this activity, which is controversial in almost every aspect.

9794
CSO: 4423/21

DIALOGUE WITH 'ARAFAT SEEN AS NECESSARY EVIL

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 11 Sep 81 p 14

[Article by Mote Gur: "Israel and the PLO"]

[Text] What more needs to happen for all of us to appreciate that radicalism in word and deed leads to results opposite to those expected, for a perfect example lies prostrate at our feet: in order to arouse among the people mass hysteria, which is a mixture of fear and strength, Mr Begin inflamed passions in Israel and Lebanon and instructed the IDF, in the first months of this year, to increase its activities against the terrorists above and beyond what was accepted all these years "in order to strike first and hit them before they hit us." In similar fashion the government hinted to the Christians that they could renew their action against the Syrians and could expect our assistance. But when the Syrians reacted in full force --and they are capable of doing so with merciless cruelty--the prime minister screamed Holocaust!--he would send our planes into action against them.

Today, just a few months after those unnecessary occurrences, we can summarize the results:
--Syrian missiles are set up in Lebanon;
--We have gone through the trauma of the northern settlements;
--The Christians have announced that they will sever relations with us;
--The Government of Israel agreed to a direct cease fire with the PLO under the signature of Yasir Arafat--while he clings to the Palestinian charter with all his might and to terrorist actions against Israel and denies our right to exist;
--The terrorists are fortifying themselves in Lebanon and increasing their strength--both military and political--and we are prevented from acting against them;
--President al-Sadat saw in this agreement an "opening of hope" for a direct agreement between Israel and the PLO and made a declaration to that affect before his people and the world;
--The French foreign minister met openly and as a clear snub to Israel with Yasir Arafat, and despite the fact that Israel is about to welcome him here in Israel--despite that and despite his declarations that he and France see the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people, even if "of course"--not the only one. That is how far radicalism has brought us!

Since when does Israel have the right to tell other peoples who their representatives are? Would we allow foreigners to become involved in our internal democratic processes, and would we dare to intervene in what is done under the mask of Egyptian

"democracy," which has forged a peace treaty with us and which is likely tomorrow, in the same democratic process of detentions and compulsion, to abandon it? Or perhaps someone has thought about returning to the debate of the early seventies about the existence of non-existence of a Palestinian entity, after Begin's government recognized, in the Camp David accords, the legitimate rights of the Palestinians? What interests us, and what must interest us, is one thing alone--the attitude toward us in ideology and in practice.

When I believed, in the years 1970-75 that al-Sadat seriously intended peace and was ready to meet him with certain concessions in Sinai--I was called by many a "dove" and "naive": could we possibly see a real peace maker with Israel in a man who had once supported the Nazis and who had forced the Yom Kippur war on us? Not many years passed and only because of this political and verbal radicalism we were forced to give up the entire Sinai without even a symbolic change of security border! On the day that al-Sadat surprised the radicals and decided to put us to the test--full peace with full concessions--they were astonished and gave in, some willingly and some as if possessed of the devil. In the coming months we are about to pay the final price for the false flag of radicalism--the evacuation of all the settlements in the Sinai while al-Sadat, and he alone, remains king of the peace and carries his good news.

Yasir Arafat is an international terrorist and his hands drip innocent blood. I have not the slightest doubt about that, and as many times as I have tried to get him for it, I would support similar attempts in the future if he should continue his methods of terror and murder. To my great sorrow, his compatriots do not see him that way, nor do the large majority of the world's peoples and leaders.

In their opinion, he is the leader of a national liberation movement, and he employs methods identical to those of these movements throughout the world--in Africa, in Asia, in South America and in Europe (Ireland). In all these places peaceful citizens murder and are murdered--day and night--at home, in restaurants, on the street, in trains and in movie theaters. Even if this is not our way, and it is superfluous to emphasize how much it contradicts our every ethical conception as human beings and Jews, we cannot ignore the fact that things like these exist and, to a large degree, even merit recognition, understanding and symtathy.

Another sad fact is that the Arabs in Judea, Samaria and Gaza have not yet produced a leadership that is ready to replace the PLO and deal with Israel over their political future. In contrast to many radicals in our midst who speak mainly with themselves and their ilk, I have talked a great deal with the leaders in the territories. Both people who are identified with the PLO and people who oppose it are in agreement in their recognition that Israel will have to test the future of Israel-Arab coexistence with the PLO as well--if not only with the PLO. On the other hand not a few of them recognize that Israel would not be able to do this without PLO recognition of Israel. There is not anyone who sees the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with open eyes who is not aware that the quarrel is so deeply problematic as to be almost beyond solution. The conclusion to be drawn from this could go in either of two directions: either complete severence or an attempt at negotiation.

In its ideological platform the Labor party prefers negotiation and has even opened and expanded possible avenues of approach to it. Since we recognize the difficulties

resulting from the existing conflict, we have started with an explanation of our stand, which appears in detailed unequivocal paragraphs in which the central idea on the question of the Palestinians is based on the following fundamentals:

--An obligation to the Camp David accords;
--Renunciation of the policy of "not one step" in Judea, Samaria and Gaza;
--A peace agreement with Jordan based on territorial compromise;
--Palestinian self-identification will receive its expression in a Jordanian-Palestinian state;
--Renunciation of an additional Palestinian state in the territory between Israel and Jordan;
--All the Jordanian-Palestinian territory west of the Jordan would be demilitarized and no foreign army would cross the Jordan westward;
--This demilitarization would not prevent agreed upon security arrangements involving an Israeli presence: the platform details territories that would remain under Israeli sovereignty: the Jordan Valley, the Jerusalem environs and Gush 'Etzion and the southern part of the Gaza Strip, and leaves an opening for mutual discussion on additional territories as required by an agreement that would be reached with Jordan.

As to the human character of the relations between Israel and the Palestinians and Jordan, and with the intent of opening prospects for negotiation, the platform explicitly sets up an expanded framework for Palestinian representation: in accordance with its desire to put an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict, the Labor party would be ready, as in the past, to enter into talks with Palestinian people and organizations (in addition to agreed upon representatives from the territories), who would recognize Israel and renounce the use of terror. The peace between Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian state would be based upon mutual respect of sovereignty, structure and internal regime! This paragraph is intended to respond to the question raised in discussions: the possibility that the PLO leadership would be the one chosen to stand at the head of the Jordanian-Palestiaian state. Our answer is that we would not interfere with that!

In order to remove any doubt concerning this question, we explicitly affirm that: the PLO, which denies Israel's right to exist, and any other organization founded on the "Palestinian Charter" or which uses terror, is not a negotiating partner for peace. And we continue: it is necessary to increase political and ideological activity on public opinion, governments, parliaments and international organizations against the granting of legitimacy to terrorist and sabotage organizations and against the appeasement of their murderous activity.

But, unlike radical bodies, the Labor party believes that it is impossible to speak about negation without leaving an opening for something positive. Therefore we emphasize our absolute renunciation of the PLO, its way of doing things and its leaders--and we will continue to act against them and to fight them as much as we are able in the accepted military and political ways. But we leave every Palestinian Arab a way out of his radical dilemma, and this includes the PLO: to renounce the Palestinian Charter which seeks the destruction of Israel; to desist from acts of terror and to recognize the State of Israel and its right of sovereign existence as an independent Jewish state founded on the law of return and the right of immigration to it by every Jew in the world!

A PLO which would do this would not be the PLO of today—neither in form nor in content. This is also the only possible way for us to contend with the PLO, which does exist on the international political arena: we leave the door open, and it is up to the PLO to decide whether to come in. His refusal will assist us in showing him to the world for what he is and will enable us to act against him so long as that is necessary for our existence and security.

9794
CSO: 4423/21

BRIEFS

STUDY OF PEACE PROCESS--Professor 'Itamar Rabinowitz, in a conference at the "Peace Institute," declares: "The peace with Egypt has sharpened the Israeli-Arab conflict." "The agreement between Israel and Egypt has brought about a sharpening of the Israeli-Arab conflict, even though it has also had a softening and moderating influence"--declared Professor 'Itamar Rabinowitz yesterday in a discussion held on the third anniversary of the Camp David accords, which was held under the auspices of the Institute for Peace in the Middle East. Professor Rabinowitz, head of the Shiloah Institute, explained that the sharpening occurred because the conflict was focused on more immediate issues which sharpened the Israel-Palestine war and worsened relations in the territories. From the standpoint of cooperation between the three components of the Camp David accords--the U.S., Israel and Egypt--these were three disappointing years; no axis was created for progress. Rivalry was created between Egypt and Israel because Egypt is working to replace Israel as "property" of the U.S., and the signing of the agreement was an important step in the Egyptian strategy towards the U.S.. As to relations between Israel and Egypt, Professor Rabinowitz said: "A kind of consultation and dialog were created as well as exchanges of visits among the leadership, and up till now the tradition of maintaining the technical existence of the agreements is good." However in many other aspects, the results are disappointing. The question mark of April, 1982 seems to hover over everything. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Sep 81 p 3] 9794

GAZA AUTONOMY STAND--In the Gaza Strip they do not understand the meaning of the change in the structure of the regime. Confusion, uncertainty and curiosity to learn the significance of the separation of authorities in the military regime are rampant among officers of the military regime in Gaza and its civilian workers as well as among Arab workers and the public in the area. Israeli functionaries in the regime said that they had received no guidance and the program was a mystery to them. The replacements now being carried out in the military regime's top brass in the Gaza Strip are contributing to this lack of clarity. The area's Arabs believe that it is Sharon's intention to lead Gaza into a one-sided autonomy, all Dayan; since there is a ready basis for it there as a result from the new policy which Sharon announced about a month ago. The day before yesterday Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa met with the Egyptian charge d'affairs in the American foreign office. It was reported that al-Shawwa told him that Israel and the U.S. erred in agreeing to Sadat's original demands, which follow from the need of both of them to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people and self-determination. Shawwah, who according to the same sources did not mention the PLO, said that if Israel and the U.S. would adopt this approach, it is possible that the Palestinians would not oppose autonomy. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Sep 81 p 2] 9794

CSO: 4424/21

OTRAG LEAVES LIBYA, FUTURE UNCERTAIN

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 2 Nov 81 pp 74, 76, 78

[Article: "Extravagances with Qaddafi"]

[Text] On the heels of violent internal dispute the Munich rocket construction firm Otrag has left Libya.

The countdown went off without a hitch. Right on schedule, at 11:20 am local time on 1 March 1981, the 12-meter long rocket left the launching pad at the oasis of Sebha, 800 kilometers south of the Libyan capital of Tripoli, and rose skyward.

The launch was extravagantly hailed by officials of the "Orbital Transport and Rocket Ltd" of Munich as "one more important step along the way toward commercial use of the Otrag carrier rocket system for transporting satellites and cargo vehicles in space."

But those who financed the desert undertaking were none too happy.

The successful launch made the 1,500 or so "silent partners" who had invested some DM 170 million in the tax shelter company since 1974 quite uneasy. They thought Otrag's Libyan adventure a bit too daring.

Libya's neighbors were afraid the Germans might be constructing rockets —possibly to be equipped with nuclear warheads— for Muammar Qaddafi, Libya's eccentric head of state.

The Egyptian foreign minister, Kamal Hassan Ali, lodged a protest with the FRG, calling it "a serious threat to peace."

Once again, the firm was under suspicion of not merely being a harmless "moving and storage company in space" but a clandestine military operation. Once before, in 1979, Otrag had had to vacate a large test area in Zaire.

At that time, Soviet chief of state Leonid Brezhnev raised the possibility that the Germans might be engaged in testing military rockets there. Both chancellor Helmut Schmidt and the then French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing prevailed upon Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko to cancel Otrag's lease.

The rocket firm's financiers were annoyed to find that Otrag's founder, Lutz Kayser, had once more chosen a questionable partner to link up with. "These extravagances with Qaddafi were never discussed with us beforehand," says Arno Gerisch, an adviser of Carl.E. Press, a Frankfurt moving firm executive and Otrag shareholder.

Following the Libyan desert launch, the Otrag partners called for Kayser's resignation. In late September, he was forced to relinquish his 74 percent share in the company, which is tied to the silent partnership group, and turn it over to the partners' advisory board by whom it would be held in escrow. Frank Wukasch, the technical head of Otrag, and Otrag's business manager, Helmut Billen, both resigned in proceedings before the registry court and were subsequently installed as the "emergency board" of the stock company. After that, Kayser was out at Otrag.

Not only the "escapades in Libya," as Gerisch calls them, had taken the financiers' breath away. They were even more upset when they took a look at the books. The rocket firm was just about to take a nosedive. Otrag had outstanding debts amounting to about DM 500 million— a tidy sum for an enterprise employing no more than three dozen people at last count.

Kayser had always been one to throw around with millions. By the end of 1978, after three successful launches, development costs had already reached DM 465 million. Of this sum, DM 190 million went to Zaire for leasing the proving grounds in the province of Shaba.

As early as at the end of 1974, Kayser already took godd care of his own interests, selling his "inventor's rights, patents and know-how" to the company for DM 150 million.

That was a great deal of money for an idea that did not even originate with Kayser. The principle of the rocket type which Kayser used to attract investors had been worked out by German space pioneer Johann Winkler in the late twenties: a basic element consisting of two liquid propulsion tubes would be built up into carrier rockets of any size whatever and the projectile's flight would be controlled by regulating the thrust of the individual elements.

Technically, the system is obsolete because the Kayser rocket's payload to dead weight ratio becomes more unfavorable the larger the rocket gets— the bundled tube elements growing heavier and heavier.

Nonetheless, Kayser took the money— and not only for rights to the basic principle. It did not bother him that many of the inventions he sold to Otrag turned out to be useless. The guidance system he called ingeniously simple —windshield wiper motors were to be used to regulate the thrust of the tubes— was a particularly conspicuous failure.

Thus far, Kayser has collected some 15 million in cash; the remainder of the rights fees were to be paid out to him in annual instalments.

Now, however, Kayser will have to do without at least a part of the millions still outstanding. The advisory board and the board of directors of the debt-ridden firm came up with a "stabilization settlement." The creditors agreed to relinquish 70 percent of their claims. The firm can now enter the sum of DM 350 million in the books as a "stabilization profit."

Kayser did not come out of this settlement unscathed. Still, after the partial relinquishment of claims, he will still be entitled to some DM 40 million— provided Otrag ever becomes solvent again.

Zaire alone refused to play along in the Otrag bailout; it still has a claim for DM 70 million in leasing fees for the test area pending. Negotiations aimed at reducing the claim are to take place in early November.

The Otrag financiers will still have to throw good money after bad; millions more are needed to provide the funds for the "stabilization settlement."

But those that are being hit are by no means paupers. Some of the silent partners are quizmaster Wim Thoelke; Stuttgart publisher Ernst Klett and the estate of Willy Kaus, the one-time owner of the Metzeler tire company.

In all, another DM 13.5 million were pumped into the ailing firm this year; but the partners had no choice. If the tax shelter undertaking had gone bankrupt, the tax authorities would have slapped fines amounting to millions on the shareholders. The tax savings so far, which permitted the high-earning Otrag shareholders to finance Kayser's rocket experiments, would have been due in case of bankruptcy and the shareholders would have been liable.

Last month, the firm put "circular letter 11.1981" which contained some "good news" for the silent partners. "The continued existence of Otrag is assured," it said.

But compared to Kayser's extravagant predictions of "overall sales amounting to DM 30 billion over the next two decades" the continued existence of the firm has a somewhat more modest look about it. The super-rocket which was to lift satellites into space no longer has a chance. The rocket with four propulsion elements, tested in Libya, now is to be placed on the market as a high-altitude research rocket for scientific purposes.

But there is no launch site for it as yet. The new head of Otrag, Wukasch, does not want to risk further experiments in Qaddafi's backyard. The Otrag has already left the desert site. At present, the Otrag management and Brazil are discussing the possibility of testing the rockets there.

But in these talks it is turning out to be a serious handicap that Otrag has the reputation of being in the arms business. It also now appears that Kayser's activities in Libya were by no means as harmless as he always made them out to be. "What he did in Libya," Wukasch now admits, "could not be tolerated by the board of directors of a German corporation."

Several features of the rocket model testfired in Libya seem to point to less than peaceful uses. The newest version was said to have been equipped with swing wings and control jets. This would provide for more accurate target guidance— a superfluous device for use on a simple research rocket.

After departing from the German tax shelter enterprise, Kayser could feel free to continue working on the rocket, without political qualms and at Qaddafi's expense— but not without risk to himself. The Israelis would not be likely to stand by and let the German rocket expert work away for long.

9478
CSO: 3103/79

BRIEFS

ATTACK ON SOVIETS--Soviets assigned to Syria continue to be targets for assassination attempts. A booby trapped car in Homs exploded in the courtyard of a building occupied by Soviet advisers. [Text] [Paris LE POINT 9 Nov 81 p 70]

CSO: 4419/4

STRATEGY BEHIND WESTERN SAHARA FIGHTING

London WEST AFRICA in English No 3352, 26 Oct 81 p 2489

[Article by Alex Rondos]

[Text] WITH ITS ATTACK on Guelta Zemmour, the largest engagement against Moroccan forces for some time, the Polisario Front has let Morocco off a decidedly unpleasant hook. Coming as it does at a time when there were some signs of a move towards peace in the region, the scale of the attack suggests a willful break by the Sahrawi from the OAU-guided path to peace. It has also shattered the returning tranquility in the relations between Mauritania and Morocco.

Guelta Zemmour is close to the frontier with Mauritania and on the major road to El Aiun. To have captured this garrison would have seriously affected the strength of the Moroccan lines of defence set up earlier in the year, behind which is contained the politically and economically most useful part of the West Sahara. In the event, the Moroccans have recaptured the garrison, but not before having two aircraft destroyed by SAM missiles, provided — as Moroccan officials will eagerly point out — by some foreign power. Perhaps, with events in Egypt and Sudan in mind, Rabat thought it opportune to play up the fact that surface-to-air missiles were now being used in the conflict. Equally important has been the subsequent tension between Rabat and Nouackchott.

The Moroccan Air Force attacked Polisario Front positions in Mauritania, as the guerilla columns withdrew. General Ahmed Dlimi, the Moroccan commander in the Western Sahara, explained that orders had been given that the army should not cross the frontier, though obviously this did not apply to Mauritania. A message from King Hassan to Col. Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, the Mauritanian Head of State, said that the attack "by an armed battalion equipped with heavy and extremely sophisticated weapons . . . would have been able to reach Geulta Zemmour only by moving directly from Mauritanian territory." He even specified the village El-Aidiet, just 10 kilometres inside the frontier. The Moroccan claim was that 12 Soviet T54 tanks and 50 armoured troop carriers were involved in the attack. Journalists who have visited the scene are inclined to agree with these claims.

Although the tone of the note was not as aggressive as it might have been and the army was ordered not to cross the frontier, the King warned that this did not mean that Morocco will "remain with arms folded in the event of a fresh attack." The Mauritanian Government has rejected the allegation of involvement, which will have done considerable damage to the re-establishment of improved relations between the two countries. Ever since the signing of the peace agreement between Mauritania and the Polisario Front in Algiers in August, 1979, Mauritania has struggled to keep an independent line in the conflict and to cope with its internal political and financial problems. However, relations with Morocco reached their lowest point in March this year when the responsibility for an attempted coup in Nouackchott was claimed by a Moroccan-based group.

Since the June summit of the OAU in Nairobi, when King Hassan, with a characteristic display of diplomatic gymnastics, produced not only a rapprochement with

Libya (which kept Tripoli's sniping at bay) but also a proposal for a ceasefire and referendum in the Western Sahara, attention has focused on the OAU's attempts to reach a compromise procedure for the ceasefire and referendum.

King Hassan's proposal in Nairobi was vague, but enough to impress delegates as to his goodwill. In late August, the OAU committee responsible for the implementation of the ceasefire and referendum (comprised of Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Tanzania) met to decide the procedure. It was at this stage that divergences emerged (although Morocco, at the time, did not disapprove of the proposals). The Nairobi solution included a preference for a referendum on self-determination which contradicted the Moroccan desire for a consultative referendum. The OAU Committee, whose exact extent of authority in the matter is not entirely clear, also decided that it would be responsible for organising the elections; again, contrary to Rabat's wish that Morocco be responsible for the task. The proposal that a peace-keeping force should be comprised of OAU or even UN forces seemed acceptable just as the proposal that any intermediary administration in the Western Sahara should co-operate closely with the Moroccan officials was a sop to the Moroccans. However unpalatable the OAU suggestions might have been, Rabat was caught by its initial gesture of goodwill and held its peace.

Though no timetable was set for the referendum or even the ceasefire, the initial exchanges in the campaign had already begun. Morocco accused Algeria and the Polisario Front of grossly exaggerating the number of Sahrawi refugees in the camps in southern Algeria. Morocco says there are some 75,000 refugees, while the Polisario Front say there are at least ten times as many. Polisario has accused the Moroccans of transferring several hundred families from Southern Morocco into Western Sahara in order to strengthen the electorate for the referendum.

Whatever the disagreements, the public impression was one of a qualified desire on all sides to arrive at some solution. So, why then the escalation of the conflict? These have been difficult times for the Polisario. At the OAU they failed to gain recognition. One of their main arms suppliers, Libya, came to an agreement with Morocco just before the summit. Subsequently, Morocco refused to enter into direct negotiations with the Polisario Front over the ceasefire.

Behind the facade of public diplomatic support for the Polisario Front, Algeria is more concerned with stability in the region. Indeed, President Chadli Benjedid has even spoken of this in public. King Hassan has always played on the Algerian weakness by offering them a free port on the Atlantic Coast and the freedom to have gas pipelines to link up their natural gas resource through such an outlet. Behind the scenes, secret negotiations continue between Algeria and Morocco. It has been reported reliably that Algeria has intervened over the shipment of arms to the Polisario Front.

For the Polisario, if the diplomatic manoeuvrings are proving unfruitful, then the alternative is a military solution. Though the sophistication of the arms employed in the latest attack by the Polisario Front is a novel feature, it has to be asked for how long will Algeria continue to support the Polisario, especially at a time when the Moroccans seem well dug in and Algiers no longer displays the militarism of Boumédienne. There have been reports of meetings between King Hassan and Libyan envoys — which are no secret — in which it has been suggested that Libya would accept the possibility of Saharan autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty.

Moroccan prevarication over the referendum and the vaguest chance that, one way or another, the result of the referendum might disappoint the Sahrawi leaders, combined with the constant concern for a military breakthrough, have prompted the latest action. It has been suggested that there are two ways of looking at the Polisario strategy; either the Guelta Zemmour attack is a "final fling" or it is part of a long term strategy dependent upon foreign support and designed to bleed Morocco into submission.

For Morocco, the attack appears to be conveniently timed. The OAU deliberations were coming to embarassing conclusions. Internal opposition to the occupation of the Western Sahara is minimal though the economy is in dire straits. The occasion could, however, be turned to Morocco's benefit. The prolongation of the war — which is suggested by the latest events — will permit the continuation of negotiations with Algeria. Certainly, while Libya is associated with the Polisario Front, and there is evidence of arms as sophisticated as SAM missiles, the US will be loath to avoid helping an old friend.

Whatever the justice of the Polisario struggle, it has had to suffer some disappointments recently which it has tried to reverse in the last couple of weeks, militarily. The failure of military action leaves them open to only one path; a negotiated solution which will be dependent upon the current strategic and political whim of the protector, Algeria.

CSO: 4500/40

EFFECTS OF DESERT BATTLE EXAMINED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 43, 26 Oct 81 pp 6-7

[Text]

The Saharan sands have not yet settled over last week's battle at Guelte Zemmour. The Polisario Front's siege of the Moroccan army's Western Saharan stronghold has nonetheless probably marked a watershed in the six-year war over the phosphate-rich territory. If Morocco's King Hassan II in is correct in alleging that Soviet Sam-6 missiles used to shoot down a Moroccan Hercules C-130 "flying command post" and a Mirage F-1 fighter-bomber on October 13 were supplied by Algeria and Libya and manned by Cuban or East German technicians, then it may represent a significant broadening of the conflict with potentially serious international repercussions.

Even if there was no Cuban or East German involvement, much that has already happened serves to justify this fear. King Hassan claimed that the Polisario attack violates the OAU's Organisation of African Unity's resolution on a settlement in the Sahara (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, July 6) and restores Morocco's "complete freedom of action." And he sent the Moroccan air force in "hot pursuit" of the quick-moving guerillas to attack their positions in Mauritania. Mauritanian President Mohamed Khoura Ould Haidalla has denied that the Polisario used Mauritanian territory as a base from which to attack Guelte Zemmour, which is 40 kilometres from the Mauritanian border. The Mauritanian leader accused King Hassan of "seeking to justify agression against our country," adding that the Mauritanian army would "defend the integrity of our territory" in the event of Moroccan intervention.

Both Algeria and the Polisario have denied foreign (including Algerian) involvement at Guelte Zemmour and have accused King Hassan of trying to entangle the great powers in a local conflict at a time of heightened Soviet-American tensions by blowing out of proportion "just another episode" in the Saharan conflict. Polisario has also charged that King Hassan is seeking US intervention, which may be corroborated by a report by the Moroccan News Agency *MAP* from Washington that delivery of 100 M 60 tanks, originally due in 1983, would be advanced to an earlier date. The announcement was made on October 16, while former US President Nixon was visiting King Hassan in Morocco. Mr Nixon called for increased US military aid "to defend the country's territorial integrity. It appears unlikely however, even in the tense period following the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat and the machinations, real or imagined, of Libya's President Qadhafi in Chad and Sudan, that the US will risk jeopardizing its improving relations with Algeria by any involvement in the Saharan conflict other than as a supplier of arms to Morocco. Algeria is furthermore an important trading partner of the US.

The most immediate and visible outcome of Guelte Zemmour will most likely be on the diplomatic front. The "biggest battle of the Saharan war" should suffice to hamstring the already-bogged-down efforts of the OAU to bring about a peaceful resolution of the conflict by a referendum among the Sahrawis on their future status. The OAU had resolved at its Nairobi summit in June to begin work on organising referendum which would give the inhabitants of the Western Sahara the opportunity to decide whether they wish to be independent or united with Morocco. Both King Hassan and Polisario, along with Algeria, had agreed with the idea, and until last week, the Western Sahara was relatively peaceful.

The referendum, however, has since become mired in the problem of estimating the Sahrawi population, that is, determining who would be allowed to vote. The Moroccans and Polisario have widely divergent views on this issue, and there has been no reliable census since Spain relinquished its Saharan colonies of the nomadic and refugee poulation, which shift back and forth over

the borders of the Western Sahara into Algeria and Mauritania. Another problem which may have helped to bury the referendum and provoke the Polisario attack on Guelte Zemmour is the chicken-or-egg-first deadlock over recognition and negotiation: since agreeing to the OAU proposal, Algeria and Polisario have insisted that direct negotiations, a ceasefire and withdrawal of Moroccan troops must precede the voting. Morocco has called this view "obstructionist," accusing Algeria of trying to torpedo the OAU peace-making efforts. Rabat has refused to negotiate with the guerillas and withdraw its troops prior to a ceasefire and a referendum, since such actions would be construed as recognition of Polisario. The attack on Guelte Zemmour may have been mounted by Polisario as a last-ditch effort to force King Hassan to negotiate with them and to obtain recognition prior to the vote.

If such is the case, whether or not Guelte Zemmour signals a return to protracted military conflict depends largely on King Hassan. It is possible that there is something to the Polisario claim that King Hassan wants to abandon the Nairobi accords and relinquish his commitment to the referendum in order to shore up national unity. Moroccans of all persuasions support the integration of Western Sahara into Morocco. Last month, the leader of the Moroccan socialist opposition party (Union Socialiste des Forces Poulaires-USFP) was jailed for criticising the government's support of the OAU referendum on the grounds that it "threatened the integrity of our country". In this connexion, it may well be that it was the June 22 food riots in Casablanca which forced Hassan to announce to the OAU that he would be in favour of a Western Saharan self-determination referendum. The riots drove home the close relation between a $1 million per day war and domestic discontent over rising food prices. Agreeing to the referendum bought King Hassan valuable time, which is now at his disposal. As a result of the Polisario attack on Guelte Zemmour, King Hassan can claim to have given peace a chance and turn to his people for renewed support for the Saharan war. At the same time, an intensification of the war may muster up the national sentiments needed to mend the tattered fabric of domestic Moroccan politics.

Guelte Zemmour and its repercussions will also have important consequences for inter-Arab relations, with a renewed cold war between Morocco on the one hand and Algeria and Mauritania on the other. Secretary General of the Arab League Chedli Klibi expressed his "profound concern" right at the outset of the attack, and is reported to be seeking to ensure that the Arab Summit Conference due to take place next month in Fez does so "in a cordial atmosphere". But whether the latest fighting means that leaders from Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya will not show up in Fez remains to be seen, as does the outcome of the conference for the Western Sahara.

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No. 2443

Proceedings of Tudeh Party 17th Plenum

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2443

PROCEEDINGS OF TUDEH PARTY 17TH PLENUM

[This report contains proceedings from the 17th Plenum of the Tudeh Party, held in Tehran, Iran, for the first time since 1949, when the party was banned by the Shah]

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POLITBURO REPORT TO 17TH PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF TUDEH PARTY OF IRAN

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 11 Apr 81 pp 3-10

["The Politburo Report to the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran"]

[Text] Dear Comrades,

The Politburo of the Central Committee has commissioned me to report its activities to the Central Committee between the time periods of the 16th and 17th plenums, as well as its proposals for the future work of the Party.

This report consists of two parts. In the first part, the present situation in the country as well as that of the world are briefly analyzed. In the second part, the activities of the leadership of the Party during the period between the two plenums are reported to the comrades.

Based on the guidelines of the 16th Plenum, the Politburo has prepared a new Party plan for the present evolutionary stage of the Iranian society, to be discussed and approved by the Plenum.

Part I

A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION OF IRAN AND THE WORLD

A. THE INTERNAL SITUATION OF IRAN:

The most important characteristic of the present internal political situation is that the Iranian revolution--in the wake of its very significant accomplishments in the destiny-making battle against world imperialism headed by the United States and against domestic counter-revolution--is now going through one of its most difficult stages of stabilization, strengthening and expansion. The united front of the plundering forces of imperialism, world-wide, evil reaction, and domestic counter-revolution, which were shattered by the victory of the Iranian revolution, are by no means willing to accept the stabilization, strengthening and expansion of this revolution as an irreversible change. They have employed all their infernal forces to overthrow this revolution and take Iran and the region back to the era of

unquestionable domination by imperialism. As we know, within the past two years, a number of imperialistic conspiracies of various colors were devised and executed which, one after another, were scandalously defeated by the brave resistance of the Iranian people and the genuine forces of the revolution.

At this very moment, our fight continues with great violence to shatter the sixth conspiracy of imperialism disguised as the imposed war of aggression of the traitor Saddam and his cohorts on our country. In fact, this conspiracy was basically defeated in the early days. Its goal was nothing short of the overthrow of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its replacement with an imperialist puppet regime, which is to say, the gang of Ashraf, Oveysi, Bakhtiar, and their parasites. This plan was organized with the direct participation of American, British, and French imperialism and their allies, with the cooperation of the most reactionary governments of the region including Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Oman, and the Arab Sheykdoms of the Persian Gulf. And the gang of Saddam and counter-revolutionaries in Iran were commissioned to carry it out.

The brave, heroic resistance of the Iranian revolutionary forces defeated this conspiracy in the early days [of its implementation]. But it is sure that even this defeat will not stop the enemies of the Iranian revolution from continuing to conspire for the overthrow the regime of the Islamic Republic. At this moment--in addition to the continuing agression of Iraq whose main goal is apparently to increase the hardships caused by the war and to weaken our newly founded republic against the imperialistic and counter-revolutionary conspiracies--the seventh conspiracy of the domestic counter-revolutionary forces, imperialism, and world-wide reaction, as well as other conspiracies, are in the making.

The main goal of the conspiracy which is already taking place is to turn large masses of the people away from the revolution and sow the seeds of enmity and dissention among the revolutionary forces. Should they succeed, they intend to impose civil war on the Iranian revolution.

The criminal government of Reagan does not hide this objective as it prepares itself to reap the benefits of such a possibility.

Alexander Haig, the U.S. Secretary of State, with the shamelessness characteristic of imperialists, has said:

> In the event of a civil war in Iran, the United States will have the opportunity to give emergency aid to the side it favors. The formation of a rapid deployment force and all the preparations around Iran made by the United States are the result of this probable plan. (KEYHAN, 17 Esfand 59 [Mar 81])

But with the spread of the revolutionary movement of our country, especially after the occupation of the U.S. conspiracy center in Tehran, and with the increased recognition of the masses of our people of the real enemies of the revolution, if the active operators of the revolution are able to mobilize all the people's forces to confront this conspiracy, we can be hopeful that this conspiracy will also end in an infamous defeat for the conspirators and their road rollers.

GAINS OF IRANIAN REVOLUTION

The united front of subversion tries to suggest through its propaganda that the Iranian revolution has failed, has been fruitless, and even it has made the condition of the people worse than it was during the domination of the Pahlavi era with its SAVAK regime. But, hard realities which are still alive and cannot be forgotten prove the opposite of this poisonous and misleading propaganda. In spite of all the pressures and the plots of the imperialists and the domestic counter-revolutionry forces; in spite of the impeding role of the "step-by-step liberal" government which had been penetrated by the agents of imperialism; in spite of the efforts of the monarchists and constitutionalists (the National Front, the Freedom Movement [Nehzat-e Azadi]), and in spite of those political and religious forces and personalities who have tried to confine the revolution within a framework which would safeguard the profit-seeking interests of the large capitalists and landowners, the Iranian revolution has been able:

--to send the hated, oppressive monarchical regime into the trashcan of history;

--to stop the criminal Pahlavi regime and a significant segment of the servants of and dependants on large capitalists and landowners, who were the main source of support for that regime, from plundering the political, economic, and cultural life of Iran;

--to overthrow the rule of the criminal SAVAK and to free thousands of political prisoners;

--to punish a significant portion of the criminals who were captured by the revolutionary forces, despite the efforts of the followers of the "step-by-step" policy to let them escape;

--to return a significant portion of the wealth plundered by these and other escaped criminals which was left in Iran--and this includes nearly 70 percent of the industrial units of the private sector and all the banks--to the hands of the plundered masses;

--to end the plundering and oppresive domination of the imperialists headed by U.S. imperialism, and to open the way for the establishment of a true independence in the political, economic, military, and cultural life of the country;

--to tear to shreds the infamous neo-colonialist agreement between Iran and the United States and release Iran from the imperialist CENTO military agreement in order to join the non-aligned countries;

--to send home tens of thousands of American, British, French, German, and Japanese leeches and spies who had taken over all of the vital arteries of our country, sucking the blood of the people and plundering our national wealth;

--to close down the military bases of American imperialism and to free the Iranian army from the absolute domination of U.S. masters;

--to remove the infamous scar of being the gendarme of the region from the image of our country and transform it to a cradle of revolution and one of the strongholds of the fight against world imperialism and regional reaction;

to blow up through the historical endeavor of the Students Following the Line of the Imam the "headquarters for the subversion of the Iranian revolution," that is, the U.S. spy nest in Tehran; to remove the mask of world-devouring American imperialism and its puppets, mercenaries, compromisers, and submissive elements who had infiltrated into the sensitive positions and the revolutionary government; and to put aside the "step-by-step" government which followed a policy leading to the mutilation of the Iranian revolution;

--to take a first step, in spite of all the disruptions and extensive instigations of counter-revolutionary and submissive elements, in following a foreign policy which well safeguard the interests and independence of the country;

--to sever diplomatic relations with the main, number-one enemy of the Iranian people, the United States and its direct puppets: Israel, Egypt, South Africa, and the monarchical puppet and affiliated governments of Jordan and Maghreb, and on the other hand, to establish strong ties of friendship and cooperation with combatant countries which support the resistance front of Moslem and progressive Arab countries, and to take steps to normalize relations with some of the other countries in the camp of worldwide anti-imperialism;

--to create revolutionary units in order to safeguard and preserve the gains of the revolution, and to carry on a continuous struggle against the counter-revolutionary plots and conspiracies;

--to prepare the constitutional law which, in spite of all its shortcomings, contains many positive points, and to establish a governmental units based on its principles;

--to purge the government offices, the cultural institutions, and the armed forces of a significant percentage of SAVAK agents, the mercenaries of the overthrown regime, and those affiliated with the imperialist espionage organizations;

--to take certain steps in resolving some of the most important and urgent social problems such as putting an end to the plundering domination of feudal and semi-feudal large landowners and to stop the plunder of large merchants by nationalizing the foreign trade and establishing governmental control over domestic distribution.

After all these gains, the claim that the Iranian revolution has failed and has accomplished nothing, is either based on ill will or mere blindness and deafness.

The historical importance of these gains becomes more significant when we consider the difficult conditions under which they have been achieved. The fact is that the truly faithful forces of the revolution have attained these goals by fighting three hostile, opposite and obstructive factors.

These three factors are:

--The efforts exerted by the enemy to end the revolution in failure.

--The efforts of the well-to-do classes and exploiters to hinder the progress of the revolution.

--The negative consequences of mistakes, absolutism, thirst for power, monopolism, and self-centeredness among the ranks of the revolutionary forces, which are the result of the stance and the class-oriented viewpoints of these forces.

The experience of the past two years provides much evidence that each one of these three factors have in turn inflicted painful blows on the stabilization, strengthening and expansion of the revolution. The present complicated, difficult situation is the result of the combined effect of these destructive factors.

1. THE GOAL AND THE OPERATIONAL METHODS OF THE ENEMIES OF THE REVOLUTION. The sworn, irreconcilable enemies of the Iranian revolution are as follows:

The imperialists and world-wide reaction, especially the regional reaction headed by the rabid, aggressive, criminal imperialism of the United States and all the supporters and those who still remain of the overthrown Pahlavi regime, that is, the large capitalists and landowners, usurers and speculators, SAVAK agents, and the local servants of that regime in the army, police, gendarmerie, and government institutions, all the plunderers and autocrats in the cities and villages, some of whom have fled and are involved in conspiracies from abroad, and others who remain in the country and who would not hesitate to commit any crime.

The goal of these enemies of the revolution has been clear from the days when the revolutionary movement of the Iranian people was reaching its peak. In short, their goal has been to bring defeat to this revolution at any price and at any stage possible, thereby returning the country to its former self, as in Indonesia, Chile, and Egypt.

The documents published so far and the events of the past two years support the fact that the enemies of the Iranian revolution, headed by American imperialism, have not even spared one moment in preparing and employing everything at their disposal to bring the Iranian revolution to a decisive defeat.

According to the evaluation of the Tudeh Party of Iran, thus far seven conspiracies of subversion to defeat the Iranian revolution have been planned and executed by imperialists and reactionary forces of the region as follows:

First, the conspiracy of a military coup before 22 Bahman [11 Feb];

Second, the conspiracy to deviate the revolution with the help of the government of the liberals;

Third, the conspiracy to exert pressure through the economic embargo following the occupation of the American spy nest, and in conjunction with this, another effort to deviate the Iranian revolution during the last months of 1358 [1979-80] by taking advantage of the events in Afghanistan;

Fourth, the invasion at Tabas and the accompanying coup plot;

Fifth, the Nozheh coup;

Sixth, Iraq's invasion of Iran;

Seventh, creation of disturbances throughout Iran during the months of Bahman [Jan-Feb] and Esfand [Feb-Mar].

The aim of all these conspiracies, in particular the American-Saddam conspiracy of the military invasion of Iran, has been and is to prevent the stabilization and strengthening of the Islamic Republic, and to weaken the country economically and socially to the point of collapse of the revolutionary regime, all of which has been an attempt to pave the way for the transfer of power into the hands of the counter-revolutionary functionaries.

There is not even the slightest doubt that these efforts will continue more violently and extensively in the future. If American imperialism has not yet, after 20 years, given up the economic embargo of Cuba, as well as all sorts of military intrigues just short of an invasion of that country, and has not given up the idea of overthrowing the revolutionary regime of Cuba, it is clear that as far as Iran is concerned, as Imam Khomeyni has rightly stated, we will be enemies of the United States for the rest of our lives. The economic, political and military strategic importance of our country is so vital to the transgressive domination plans of worldwide imperialism that the victory of our glorious revolution has caused much sleeplessness to the prime enemy of deprived people all over the world. The Iranian revolution, like a devastating earthquake throughout the world and particularly in the Middle and Near East, and the Persian Gulf, has destroyed not only one of the major imperialist bases of plunder and transgression, but it has violently shaken and made vulnerable many of the other bases. With this great effect throughout the world and especially in the region, it is quite understandable that the rage of imperialism and worldwide reaction, headed by American imperialism and directed against the Iranian revolution, cannot be cooled and the Iranian revolution will, in the future as in the past, face continuously and unceasingly its harshest criminal comspiracies.

2. THE OBSTACLES TO THE REVOLUTION Consist, first of all, of the liberal capitalists and the well-to-do classes who enjoyed various material privileges during the reign of the tyrant.

The fact is that these social classes, during the reign of the affilated regime of Pahlavi, participated within a certain framework in fighting to end despotism and limiting the uncontrolled plundering of the country by imperialist monopolies and the affiliated ruling classes. The reason is quite obvious. The rulers during the tyrannical regime--that is, imperialist monopolies, the Pahlavi family, and the ruling classes consisting of large landowners, capitalists, and corrupt thieves in the government administration, army, police, and SAVAK--so openly plundered our national wealth and the fruits of the labor of tens of millions of the working masses, and the producing force of the society, that there was relatively little left for the profit-seeking accumulators of wealth, and the middle class capitalists. This class had no dispute with the imperialist plundering, affiliated capitalism, or the Aryamehr [Pahlavi] regime. They accepted the shah, as well as the constitutional monarchy and maintaining relations with the imperialist world. These gentlemen only wanted a larger portion of the vast profits.

The efforts of this class and its affiliated organizations and political personalities have continuously, from the beginning of the revolutionary movement, been to prevent the revolution from rooting and spreading and to limit it in such a way as to safeguard the maximum profit for the Iranian capitalist liberals. The obvious stances

of the National Front, the Freedom Movement [Nehzat-e Azadi] and the political organizations affiliated with the liberal bourgeoisie during the heightening of the revolutionary movement, and their disagreement with the decisive, anti-imperialist, anti-plundering orientation of Imam Khomeyni, which was supported by the people, best represents the true political nature of this bourgeois class.

Taking into consideration the characteristics of this class, it is quite clear that they only conditionally supported the revolution. Undoubtedly, if the revolution were victorious and not confined such that the liberals desired, they would use all their forces to slow down the development of the revolution, and if they were able to, they would return it to the limitations they desired.

Because of this particular hypocritical outlook, the 16th plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran in its political analysis concerning its future policy arrived at the conclusion that:

> ". . . Now the question is: How long will the unity displayed by the revolutionary movement of Iran during the overthrow of the regime last, and what will be the position of various classes and factions in the course of future events?
>
> ". . . What is certain is that the working class along with the toilers of cities and villages will struggle with all their might to attain all the goals of the national democratic revolution and will consistently retain their revolutionary stance to the end . . . .
>
> "Obviously, the liberal capitalism, which has supported the movement thusfar, will be trying to confine the movement within its own limited class interests, and will strive to weaken its humane and popular aspects. The experience of all revolutions has shown that with the expansion of a revolutionary movement in the direction of the needs of the deprived classes of the society, the liberal capitalists have turned away from the revolution and have reconciled with the remainder of counter-revolutionary forces, in order to suppress the popular movement of the toilers. It should be expected that within the revolutionary movement of our fatherland, too, such a phenomenon should develop. Even before the victory of the revolution, voices of discontent could be heard from this class concerning the progressive views of Ayatollah Khomeyni on the economic system of the Islamic Republic, and this discontent is increasing daily. This faction tries to confine the revolution to a referendum for a republic, to have elections for the Consultative Assembly, and to safeguard certain democratic freedoms, but to continue the previous calamitous economic policies of capitalism."

Thus was the evaluation of the Tudeh Party of Iran in the early days of the victory of the revolution. And the experiences of the past two years have revealed the unquestionable accuracy of this evaluation to the largest segments of the deprived masses of our society and particularly to a large segment of the revolutionary forces

who did not agree with our evaluation at that time. Only one example of this development in understanding [our evaluation] will illustrate this great change. Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, the minister of the interior, in his sermon for the Friday prayer service on 24 Bahman 1359 [13 Feb 81] gave the following evaluation in connection with the role of this class:

> Before the revolution, many were with us, but afterwards they separated from us. Many of the merchants, too, changed their ways and having taken advantage of the situation, pocketed large profits. These individuals . . . create discontent among the people and harm the revolution.

The Iranian liberal bourgeoisie, by employing all its political and economic forces during the past two years and particularly during the eight months of the "step-by-step" government which was almost totally controlled by the political representatives of this class, tried to prevent the spread of the revolution and its anti-imperialist and anti-popular stance, which would totally dispel any kind of imperialistic domination over the political, military, economic and cultural affairs of our country and would limit the plunder of the deprived people in the society by the landowners and capitalist classes. The main policy of the liberals consisted of the absolute preservation of the previous capitalist system and extensive land ownership in Iran and the maintenance of a unilateral political, economic, military, and cultural relationship with worldwide imperialism headed by the United States, with certain modifications. And if the previous relationship with the United States was to be temporarily suspended, the relationships with Western Europe and Japan were to be strengthened.

Obviously, this policy is a "minimum" response to the wishes of the United States and its collaborators in Iran, since the United States correctly views this policy as a steam roller for the return to the previous relationship, which is, the establishment of the infernal domination of imperialism over all aspects of our country's social life.

3. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MISTAKES, ABSOLUTISM, THIRST FOR POWER, MONOPOLISM, AND SELF-CENTEREDNESS AMONG THE RANKS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY FORCES.

Undoubtedly, these negative, in many instances very negative, consequences, although they cannot all be considered conscious enmity with the revolution, slow down like painful obstacles the expansion of the glorious revolution of our country, and in practice help imperialism and counter-revolution and offer the opportunity to the wounded liberal bourgeoisie to take advantage of the situation for harming the revolution.

These characteristics are not exclusive to one side; they are found both on the "left" and on the right; and their source, both on the "left" and the right, is the petit bourgeoisie.

On the right, these characteristics can be witnessed in aggressive, fascist groups, roughnecks and their operators. The course of action which has created a favorable atmosphere today for the unknown counter-revolutionary and SAVAK elements who are now turning against those who were instrumental in creating them was the result of the monopolization of power aimed at the suppression of any view other than the narrow views of those who initiated it.

The spread of this course of action causes, on the one hand, the narrow-minded elements to restrict the stage for the united front of the true forces of the revolution and to set aside the valuable units who can actively and constructively take part in a common battle to achieve the most major goals of all the deprived classes of the society, and on the other hand, it opens the way for opportunists and hostile elements who can soon disguise themselves through means of trickery and hypocrisy in order to infiltrate the ranks of the monopolizers of power. Historical experience has shown that monopolistic groups soon become the race-course for hostile elements.

On the "left," monopolism, absolutism and self-centeredness can be seen among those leftist groups whose members, similar to the rightist monopolists and sectarians are, on the whole, sincere in their orientation, but because of the same deviant characteristics are, in practice, subject to incorrect orientation, regarding the necessities of the revolution at this historical moment. In this connection, too, riot-creating, destructive actions--i.e. exercising pressure and resorting to violence in order to impose the narrow-minded views of a group on others--have replaced the creative revolutionary approach. We can see that these courses of action, precisely like the deviant suppressive attitude of the rightists, have given rise to the violent deviation of the leftists, meaning, a sort of Maoist "cultural revolution" tendencies, which will end in the barbaric policies of Pol Pots.

Sectarianism among the ruling authorities has caused, on the one hand, mistakes and extremism which have resulted in irreparable damages to the constructive forces of the revolution, and on the other, the loss of valuable possibilities and opportunities in many instances. On the "left," sectarianism and self-centeredness have caused destruction and disunity. Consequently, as a result of their inclinations, the most favorable circumstances have been created for the activities of the enemies of the revolution and the profiteering of conciliatory and submissive liberals.

Attention to these three factors highlights the historical importance and value of the gains of the revolution.

This in itself indicates the great popular power of the revolution which, in spite of all these negative factors, has been able to substantially increase its gains, which include uprooting the imperialist domination, struggling to uproot the traces of despotic monarchy, attempting to limit the opportunity for plunder by the big landowners and capitalists, and securing freedom and better living conditions for the deprived classes of the society.

THE RULE AFTER THE VICTORY OF THE REVOLUTION

The most important results of the victory of the glorious revolution of Iran were the destruction of the plundering domination of imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism over our country and the overthrow of the regime of the despotic monarchy which was, in fact, nothing more than the crystalization of the rule of the big landowners and capitalists headed by the Pahlavi family, affiliated with worldwide imperialism.

With the overthrow of this regime, the way was paved for the rise to power of an anti-imperialistic and anti-despotic front which included great numbers of workers, peasants, craftsmen, shopkeepers, intellectuals and liberal capitalists. Within this front were various political inclinations from the supporters of Islam to the

followers of scientific socialism. THE MOST DISTINGUISHED RELIGIO-POLITICAL AND SOCIAL PERSONALITY OF OUR SOCIETY IN THE RECENT YEARS, IMAM KHOMEYNI, who has enjoyed the confidence of the vast strata of the masses of people through his continuous, uncompromising struggle against the affiliated, despotic regime of monarchy and imperialist domination headed by U.S. imperialism, was confirmed by the people as the leader of the new revolutionary rule.

With the historical victory of the revolutionary forces over the remnants of the obstinate counter-revolutionary forces on 22 Bahman [11 Feb], a new governmental system, an offspring of the revolution in the form of a transitional government, and the revolutionary institutions, i.e. the Revolutionary Council, the committees, and the revolutionary courts which served as the cradle of the Revolutionary Guards Corps--were established.

The social class of this new rule was, in its early stages, totally anti-imperialistic and anti-dictatorial. For precisely this reason and from the first days of the establishment of the new rule two completely distinct trends were projected within the movement, as follows:

On the one hand, there was the transitional government which was almost totally in the hands of the political representatives of Iran's liberal bourgeoisie, and on the other, there was the popular faction of the ruling body which was trusted and confirmed by the anti-imperialistic, anti-despotic front of the people--that is, forces who, in addition to the overthrow of the dictatorship, demanded an over-all independence and social changes in the interest of the deprived classes. A battle to determine the direction of the revolution started between these two trends and was intensified day after day.

In the first stage, this competition within the relying body was concentrated, for the most part, on the issue of the relationship of the Iranian revolution with world imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism. The liberal flank, that is, the representative government of the liberal bourgeoisie and those liberals who had occupied their place within the units of the revolution had adopted an attitude comprising reconciliation with U.S. imperialism, the preservation of the capitalist system and big land ownership, compromise with affiliated capitalists and big landowners, an attempt to return the escaped landowners and capitalists, amnesty for arrested criminals, securing "liberal freedoms" for those affiliated with imperialism, taking an adverse and irreconcilable stance against the followers of scientific socialism in Iran and socialist countries, and thereby open enmity with the national liberation movements, especially the resistance front of the Arab peoples against U.S. imperialism and international Zionism.

Opposite this liberal flank was the political trend of the popular flank of the ruling body which, although it was not in any way united and homogeneous, advocated the following policy: irreconcilability with the United States; uprooting of imperialist domination, especially that of U.S. imperialism; punishing of traitors and the main devoted servants of the overthrown regime; confiscation of the wealth of fugitive traitors; and limiting the plunder of crooks for the sake of the deprived classes of the society.

Concerning a policy to deal with the followers of scientific socialism, socialist countries, and liberation movements, there existed and still exists serious descrepancies between these two flanks emanating from their different stances on relations with world imperialism.

The height of the conflict between these two trends came in Aban 1358 [Oct-Nov 1979] when, on the one hand, the liberal flank was preparing to collude with U.S. imperialism to the extent of visiting and consulting with Brzezinski, the operator of all the conspiracies against Iran, and on the other, the forces of the anti-imperialist popular flank of the revolution neutralized the collusion by occupying the main headquarters of counterrevolution and conspiracy, i.e. the U.S. spy nest, and thus dismissed the government of the liberals. From this date on, the ruling body of the Islamic Republic was re-established in a new form, which, for the most part, represents the popular flank of the revolutionary forces.

The dismissal of the government representing liberal capitalism did not mean that the liberals were discharged from all the organizations of the ruling body. On the contrary, for a long time they retained their very important and effective role in the Revolutionary Council, and, until the formation of the new government in Shahrivar 1359 [Aug-Sep 80], they controlled, more or less, all the ministries.

Hence, until the formation of the institutions of the Islamic Republic, that is, the opening of the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the appointment of the government and the Supreme Judicial Council, there was a dual ruling body and a liberal policy of compromising with U.S. imperialism dominating the actions of the government and particularly its foreign minister. It is only with the new government that one can say the rule of the popular flank over that of the liberal flank has been established on a relatively strong base.

THE MAKEUP OF THE RULING BODY IN THE NEW STAGE

1. From the Standpoint of Its [Social] Class Base

The present elements of the ruling body of the country, on the whole, consist of: legal institutions, including the leadership, the president, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the Supreme Judicial Council of State, the cabinet, the Council of the Guardians of the Constitution, the pasdaran [the Revolutionary Guards] and the revolutionary courts, the revolutionary committees, the reconstruction crusade, the Mostaz'afin [underprivileged] Foundation, etc. These institutions are, on the whole, a mixture of the spectrum of representatives of the people as well as the liberal bourgeoisie. But the qualitative difference between the present ruling apparatus and that prior to the establishment of legal institutions lies in the specific gravity of various flanks in the overall makeup of the ruling body. During the reign of the provisional government, the operational period of the Revolutionary Council, and the previous government, the representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie weighed heavier in the government apparatus, but this weight has now been significantly reduced. The makeup of the majority in the Consultative Assembly and in the present government shows that the various classes of the people's representatives form a larger percentage of the legitimate ruling body. And the policies adopted by this ruling body in all areas--internal, economic, and also foreign policy--illustrates the fact that the liberal capitalists, who work with all their forces for reconciliation with U.S. imperailism, and who oppose any kind of limitation on the plunder by the big landowners and capitalists, have been weakened and have lost their paralyzing influence to a certain extent.

Within the revolutionary institutions--that is, the revolutionary courts, the revolutionary committees, and the pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards]--the division of power

is, again, beneficial to the representatives and those connected with the popular flank. Of course, this does not mean that those connected with liberal capitalism, big landowners, and even elements affiliated with organized counterrevolution have been totally uprooted and eliminated from these institutions. On the contrary, and unfortunately, the fact which has frequently been pointed out by Imam Khomeyni must be accepted, which is that these counterrevolutionary, reconciliatory elements have penetrated all the institutions, and through hypocrisy, trickery, and pretentions to religious extremism, are operating against every legal wish of the masses and every liberal, progressive idea, by fomenting discontent, chaos, and instability among the people.

It is the duty of all the true forces of revolution to support, with all their energy, the anti-imperialistic, popular and liberal trends of the influential forces of the present ruling body, to expose the supporters of conservatism and backwardness, and save the true forces of the revolution from being irreparably damaged by such trends and inclinations.

2. FROM A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POINT OF VIEW

From this point of view, in the present effective policy-making ruling body, that is, the majority of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the government, the Supreme Judicial Council, the revolutionary courts, the committees, and the Revolutionary Guards Corps, there are three distinct trends which can be described as MONOPOLISM, REALISM, and CLEAR-SIGHTEDNESS.

The monopolist flank of the ruling body which can be characterized as sectarian extremism, refusing to recognize the rights of anyone with a different point of view--even the right to defend the country, the right to choose one's profession, and unfortunately not too rarely, the right to live--is still powerful, and by creating an atmosphere of pressure has an impact on all the actions of the ruling body by its damaging stances which result in the weakening of the resistance front vis-a-vis the enemies of the revolution.

A clear instance of the attitude of this flank is seen in the attack of the pressure groups on the activities centers of the Tudeh Party of Iran, a party whose every effort supports the revolution and the Islamic Republic. The inability of the influential authorities of the ruling body to deal with the illegal actions of this group is relected in the pressures put on our Party for more than eight months now, [during which time] they have refrained from giving back our party headquarters, despite the fact that such pressures are against the Constitutional laws which have been accepted by the ruling body.

But what can be regarded as a hopeful sign is that in the course of dealing with the various difficulties of everyday life, in confronting the conspiracies of the foreign and domestic enemies of the revolution, realism and clear-sightedness in all areas is becoming more wide-spread among the ruling body, in spite of the disruptions of liberal capitalists and the increasing problems resulting from the fundamental changes in the politically, economically, and culturally affiliated regime of the "Aryamehr" [ex-Shah's title] era.

The speed of this growth is still slow, but we can hope that life, the great teacher, will increase speed.

Undoubtedly, the continuous struggle of the great masses of the toilers of our country to stabilize, strengthen, and expand the Iranian revolution--which secures all the economic, political, and cultural rights of these masses--and, as an inseparable part of this struggle, a major effort to break down all the conspiracies of the enemies of Iran's revolution headed by U.S. imperialism, will strengthen the trends of realism and clear-sightedness in the ruling body of Iran.

THE PRESENT STATE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY BATTLEFIELD

A historic struggle is now being fought on several fronts and with ever-increasing intensity by the genuine, anti-imperialist, popular forces of the revolution. In this connection it must be noted that the composition of the popular forces fighting on all these fronts lacks homogeneity and this has produced complications and confusions so typical of the glorious revolution in our homeland.

There is no doubt that the hardest and most fateful battle is now being waged by genuine anti-imperialist forces against the strategems and multifarious plots of the enemies of the Iranian revolution, who include the imperialists, international reaction and local counterrevolutionaries led by U.S. imperialism. This battle is being fought with unprecedented ferocity in all aspects of social life and in the politico-military, economic and cultural fields, where international imperialism and its supporters in Iran have exerted all their hellish strength in attempts to defer the Iranian revolution and restore past conditions.

There are four fronts participating actively in the revolution: The "subversion front," the "compromise and surrender front," the "resistance front" and the "middle-of-the-road forces."

The subversion front, which operates under the direct leadership of U.S. imperialism, is engaged in the implementation of three simultaneous plans. These have a single aim, although the methods used to realize them differ. The three plans consist first of the overthrow of the present government abd its replacement with a middle-of-the-road government similar to the "step-by-step" provisional government, on which will secure and guarantee America's "vital interests" in Iran and the regionè second, the plan is to prepare for a counterrevolutionary coup, involving first the exacerbation of the internal situation and the undermining of the stability of the Islamic Republic, thus leading to violent moves on the part of counterrevolutionaries aided by the intervention of counterrevolutionary forces abroad and reactionary regional governments who have sided with the enemies of the Iranian revolution.

According to unimpeachable reports, the governments of Egypt, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Pakistan are involved in this plan, in association with counterrevolutionaries led by Ashraf, Oveysi and Bakhtiar, whose headquarters in London, Paris and Washington, the capital cities of the leading imperialist countries, are now the scene of feverish activity.

Third, there is the final plan involving direct intervention by imperialism. American imperialism has created a big military force in the region. In fact there has been no such concentration of forces by imperialism since World War II. At present over 60 American, French and British warships and tens of thousands of

aggressive American troops are carrying out a series of maneuvers very close to Iranian territory in company with large subservient military forces under the command of imperialism, so that if other imperialist plans to overthrow the Islamic Republic of Iran should fail, they can go into action directly.

It would be wrong to suppose that the U.S. has learned a lesson from its bitter experience of aggression in Vietnam, or that because of the presence of the Soviet Union situated to the north of Iran it will not embark on such a dangerous adventure. One of the peculiarities of U.S. foreign policy since World War II has been precisely this sort of adventurism, which is divorced from any "sound political logic."

Time and time again the Tudeh Party of Iran has warned against the pursuit of such adventures by the domineering foreign policy of imperialism, in particular the rabid and aggressive form of American imperialism, and historical events have confirmed the accuracy of these warnings with mathematical precision. One factor which actively encourages the United States to pursue such adventures is undoubtedly the existence of an intensely hostile stance towards the socialist world and the Soviet Union in particular not only by the remnants of the reactionary ruling class, that is, the plunderers, the big landowners and capitalists and "aryamehr" [shah's title] counterrevolutionaries but also by an important section of the present government.

The bitter experience of 28 Mordad [pro-shah coup in 1953] showed that the pursuit of a hostile policy toward forces supporting scientific socialism in Iran and abroad can lead to an imperialist and reactionary coup or at least open the door to a "middle-of-the-road and reasonable" government which, to quote American sources, will guarantee to maintain U.S. interests in the region.

The United States is exploiting the Afghanistan experience, an area where a considerable section of the effective forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran have become embroiled in the subversive plans of American imperialism, yet instead of doing something to neutralize this threatening imperialist plot hatched by the U.S., Pakistan and China, the success of which could greatly threaten the Islamic Republic of Iran directly, it continues to support it in practice.

For this reason the U.S. is spreading deceitful propaganda, blowing up "the communist threat," the "threat of Soviet attack," the "threat of a Tudeh Party coup," so that, just as happened in the weeks before 28 Mordad, the ground might be prepared for its conspiracy.

The identifiable forces of the "subverion front" consist locally of remnants of the supporters of the toppled regime, that is, the big landowners, the subservient, big capitalists, the supporters and lackeys of that regime, including the Savak agents and their ilk, in government organizations and in the armed forces, and the thugs and club-wielders, heroin peddlers, thieves and smugglers who have always worked for Savak. To these forces may be added America's political fifth column operating in the form of the minuscule quasi-fascist, pseudo-leftist, Chinese-American groups, such as "Ranjbar," the "Peykaris," the "Ettehadiyeh-ye Komunisti," the "Komeleh," the Qasemlu wing of the KDP of Iran and counterrevolutionary groups In Kordestan, Baluchestan and elsewhere. The actions of these groups since their inception have always been directed towards sowing discord among the genuine forces

of the revolution and creating unrest as a prelude to counterrevolutionary activity, a phenomenon which is not confined to the Iranian revolution and Iranian society but is international. A clear, simple definition of this would be "American-left," while its role is exactly that of "American-Islam." If it succeeds in seizing power, it will repeat the criminal policies of the Pol Pot regime and Hafizollah Amin in Cambodia and Afghanistan, in order to create an attitude of despair among the people towards true communism, and if they cannot do this they will hinder the expansion and undermine the solidarity of the revolutionary movement, after which they will thwart and smash the revolution itself.

The role of these criminals was most evident in Chile and Portugal, and they are now making the revolution in our homeland their stamping ground.

FORCES OF THE 'COMPROMISE AND SURRENDER FRONT'

The class of liberal capitalists, intellectuals, affluent salary-earners and the elite of the "Aryamehr" society and, politically speaking, all westernized members of our society for whom the country was merely a source of huge incomes to be spent in Paris, London and Washington, have come together to join these forces, whose ultimate aim is not, however, exactly the same as the subversion front. They do not want a revival of the "Aryamehr" regime in all its dimensions. They want to expel the radical and persistently anti-imperialist people's forces from the government and to come to terms with the American-led imperialists and provide guarantees for imperialism's vital interests, namely the preservation in Iran of a capitalist system dependent on the imperialist world, the continuation of Iran's military dependence on the U.S. and the west, the adoption of a local policy openly at war with communism and the Soviet Union, cooperation with other reactionary countries of the region, refusal to cooperate with progressive Arab [and other] countries and to support national liberation movements, particularly that of the Palestinian people. In short, these forces wish to see the imposition of a regime similar to that of Turkey before the military coup, or Greece, Spain or Portugal, that is, a regime which is outwardly democratic but at the same time bound by a thousand links to the imperialist camp. In their readiness for compromise and retreat, these forces will even go as far as to accept a "constitutional monarchy."

Now that most of them have been dismissed from office, their most urgent and pressing aim coincides with the aim of the "subversion front," i.e. counterrevolution and imperialism. Both these fronts are exerting all their efforts in attempts to overthrow the present government and replace it with a "middle-of-the-road, moderate and reasonable" government, advocated by Reagan's gang as the protector of America's vital interests in Iran and the region--we repeat, "the protector of America's vital interests in Iran and in the region--and they hope that with such a government coming to power the closely-knit relations of the past could be renewed.

Organizations which can be identified in this camp consist of the "national front," the groups and minuscule groupings associated with it, the "freedom movement," the president-people coordination office and also smaller groups such as the "Jama" and similar organizations which obey this front while claiming to be independent and to hold views of their own.

The political representatives of the "compromise and surrender front" are not homogeneous but are drawn from a motley spectrum ranging from Amir-Entezam Hazih, Maraghe'i and some other ignominious dependents of imperialism to such liberal personages like engineer Bazargan and other dyed-in-the-wool liberals resembling him, who "sincerely" and "faithfully" defend capitalism, and whose tempers flare at the mere mention of worker, peasant, artisan, toiler, and the rights of these working people, and on this basis they "sincerely" and "faithfully" fall into the trap of the exposed and unexposed Amir-Entezams, and are being controlled by them.

RESISTANCE FRONT FORCES

The great army of this front is composed of the vast majority of workers, peasants and the toiling classes of tradesmen, craftsmen and intellectuals, the brave fighters of the anti-imperialist and anti-despotic front,whether in the guards corps, the mobilization organization for the underprivileged, the reconstruction crusade volunteers and the genuine forces supporting the revolution, whether religious or political.

The resistance front forces are drawn from a broad and motley spectrum, but it has one common viewpoint and approach in its actions, which involve ceaseless and irreconcilable struggle towards ending the tyrannical and plundering domination of imperialism and "aryamehr" counterrevolution. This spectrum, which has incurred the severest hatred of the imperialistic and counterrevolution camp, compromisers and defeatists, ranges on the one hand from the most sectarian religious elements to genuine followers of scientific socialism. Between the two extremes, the struggle is being fought by large numbers of religious fighters following the Imam Khomeyni's line and also by other truly popular, anti-imperialist and progressive forces.

The sad truth must be mentioned that lack of experience, narrow-mindedness and monopolism on the part of the sectarian forces has caused the front not to succeed in using all of its forces. This situation, at such a difficult juncture in the Iranian revolution's historic battle against the enemies and the compromisers, has inflicted irreparable harm on the revolution. This narrow-mindedness has enabled enemy elements pretending to be Muslims to place their lackeys inside many of the revolutionary institutions, and once installed in sensitive positions, to sow the seeds of discord.

This is dear to the hearts of the enemies of the Iranian revolution, like the compromisers and the defeatists, and they have launched an extensive campaign which aims to intensify this harmful phenomenon. All enemy radio propaganda, such as that of VOA, the BBC, Radio Israel, and the radios of Cairo, Baghdad, Bakhtiar and Oveysi, as well as newspapers associated with compromising and defeatist liberal groups in Iran, has as its basic policy the enlargement of split within the resistance front forces.

In the fateful battle now underway between the supporters and enemies of the Iranian revolution, the revolutionary forces can, as in the past, rely on unstinting and all-round support from the entire forces of anti-imperialist front all over the world, including the family of socialist states, the revolutionary workers movement in developed capitalist countries, and the genuine national liberation movements, as well as countries where these forces are in control of governmental powers.

Our own revolution has received valuable assistance from unstinting support given hitherto, whether during the period of the historic battle to topple the monarchical regime, the battle for the stabilization and consolidation of the Islamic Republic, or the struggle wages against the multifarious plots by American imperialism and its accomplices, particularly during the economic blockade. And this support will undoubtedly continue in the future in all its dimensions as before.

THE 'MIDDLE-OF-THE-ROAD' FORCES

Alongside the three main camps on the battle arena in our country there are other moderate forces consisting of organizations, groups and social and political figures, who manifest a dual identity: on the one hand, they declare their policy to be contained within a framework of relentless and irreconcilable stances against imperialism, yet in practice they operate alongside compromising and defeatist forces and even, in some instances, with the subversive forces.

The middle-of-the-Road forces which do not, definitely, fit into the above three political camps consist of:

The Mojahedin-e Khalq, the minority group of the Cherikha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq, and similar leftist minigroups such as the "Rah-e Kargar" [the workers' road] Of course, the stances of these moderate groups lack uniformity and, although they are comparatively close to each other, particularly in the field of political action, serious differences exist between them. These groups have, in the main, adopted stances which are anti-imperialist and against despotism, and support the people's demands, but, in practice, in the accurate assessment of the moment, they are subjected to a serious swing to the left and, as a consequence of the adoption of this leftist stance, which has led them to take measures aimed at weakening and overthrow of the present ruling power, i.e. the majority in the Majlis and the present government, they are in practical terms on the same side as the liberals and those forces which seek the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. The analysis which these forces present of their adopted stance is that apparently the chief danger threatening the fate of the Iranian revolution comes not from imperialism in the first place or from liberal capitalism, as the steamroller for the return [of imperialism]. They argue that by depriving the present ruling power (i.e. the Majlis majority and the government) of the power to govern, the most important stumbling-block in the path of the expansion and promotion of the revolution will have been eliminated, and consequently, ruling power will fall into the hands of the "radical, revolutionary forces" (meaning themselves).

As we know, the experience of many revolutions, and that of Portugal as a recent case, shows quite clearly the painful consequences that can befall a revolution as a result of such fanciful and adventurous assessments. We must add, of course, that heavy responsibility in this regard must fall on extremist, monopolist forces of the right, who have used measures aimed against freedom and intensified strife and disunity among the genuine forces supporting our homeland's popular, anti-imperialist revolution.

Our party continues to hold the view that all this is based on the fact that these forces have swung to the left, and this has resulted in the flights of fancy, visible in their assessments of the realities. So long as these evaluations are

maintained, we shall strive to rescue genuine revolutionary forces, whose rightful place is on the people's united front, from this wayward path.

As we know, within the Feda'i-ye Khalq Guerrillas, who held similar evaluations until recently, a serious development took place towards gaining a scientific understanding of the realities, and the majority of supporters of this organization overcame their past errors. It is our hope that the future developments and experiences of our movement will help other young forces which continue to follow incorrect stances.

In this connection, we must also examine the stances of a group of politican figures, especially those Majlis deputies who, in spite of the fact that as a whole they support Imam Khomeyni's line and that their position is anti-imperialist and popular, nevertheless side in their confrontation with the present government of the Islamic Republic with the liberals in many instances, while on major issues affecting the revolution's fate--in the case of their stance against imperialism and the need for fundamental changes in the interests of the deprived classes of the society--they clearly oppose the liberals.

In our view, responsibility for the emergence of this phenomenon lies chiefly with the monopolist elements in the spectrum of the present government's supporters. The policy of this group, which is in no way prepared to tolerate any sort of opposition to its political and social stances, even for cooperation on a single front, is most effective in "expelling" many individuals who have independent ideas or who make independent judgments.

Without doubt, these monopolist attitudes constitute one of the chief and most dangerous obstacles to the most important and pressing imperatives of the revolution, i.e. the unity of all forces supporting the stabilization, consolidation and expansion of the revolution in adopting anti-imperialist stances.

Flagrant aggression practiced by pressure groups against the democratic rights provided by the constitution has been a major factor in the intensification of this phenomenon.

IN THE ARENA FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF DEMOCRATIC FREEDOMS

The claim by counterrevolutionary and imperialist propaganda organs and by compromisers and defeatists that there has been no visible change in Iran as regards limitations on freedom, and that one despotism has been overthrown and replaced by another is nothing more than a nasty, unwarranted and demagogic lie. In fact, one of the main achievements of our glorious revolution has been the defeat of the awful nightmare of Savak repression, and official recognition of individual and social freedoms. However, of course it cannot be said that the freedoms gained and secured in our revolutionary society are as reasonable and logical as those which ought to be secured, guaranteed and stabilized following a popular and anti-imperialist revolution.

In the political arena, there are variations in the scope and meaning of freedom as understood by the different elements which make up the vast spectrum of forces participating in our country's revolution. In pursuit of its class stance, each

group wants for itself unrestricted freedom, but seeks to impose and tighten restrictions on other classes in proportion to the extent that it is at odds with them.

Rightist sectarians of the ruling-class front enjoy positions of absolute freedom, unfettered by any constitutional restrictions, and in deed and word as well as in their publications those who call themselves the protectors and guardians of the constitution of the Islamic Republic permit themselves to trample on the individual and social freedoms provided by the constitution, to attack rallies, lectures and offices and burn down shops selling the books of any organization which does not agree totally with their views, to injure people and to enlist the aid of their members in the revolutionary institutions to compile dossiers on them, and to incite ignorant people against them. These groups, which support mob rule, and those who, in the words of the ETTELA'AT editorial (Feb. 1980) viewed their first "brilliant deeds" with an approving eye, provided the best possible facilities for counterrevolution and professional adventurers. They forgot that it is as easy as pie for counterrevolutionaries to buy over a few hundred desperate smugglers and heroin-peddling lackeys, to place them in the ranks of the Hezbollah, and to incite ignorant and fanatical youths.

The supporters of the Islamic Republic have thus provided counterrevolution with the finest weapons available to subversive forces for the purpose of weakening the Islamic Republic in the wake of renewed social unrest and civil war, in order to prepare the ground for a counterrevolutionary coup, and they have enabled the compromisers and defeatists to exploit these events for demagogic purposes, by pretending to be supporters of law and freedom, and to attract a wide section of the people, who naturally and justifiably demand peace and order and the rule of law.

For itself, counterrevolution demands the total freedom of the period of the "step-by-step" government, but seeks to restrict freedom for the most relentlessly anti-imperialist and anti-despotic forces. Counterrevolution is not content with such newspapers as RANJBAR, 'ADALAT and others, but also demands the right of publication for AYANDEGAN, BAMDAD and TEHRAN-E MOSAVVAR, Etc., and it demands freedom for demonstrations of Savak agents, and for the national democratic front, supporters of Nazih, Matin-Daftari and Moqaddam. Maraghe'i, for the Muslim people's republican party and for similar minigroups, while demanding the closure of such relentlessly revolutionary organizations as the Tudeh party of Iran.

Counterrevolution complains loudly of lack of freedom, although it enjoys comparatively wider freedoms [than others]. Under the wing of rightist sectarians, counter revolutionaries freely mount attacks on opposition demonstrations using stones, clubs and firearms, and set fire to bookshops in the name of the Hezbollah [God's party] they raid and plunder the clubs and headquarters of parties and anti-imperialist groups and, with the protection of liberals and by exploiting rightist club-wielders, they audaciously attack rallies and even centers of the Islamic republican party, the most important political organization, a governmental coalition with the majority of the Islamic consultative assembly.

Counterrevolution demands that this "freedom" for subversive purposes be legalized.

It may thus be seen, that the actions of a section of extremist sectarian forces, in spite of its selflessness and stances on the battlefield aimed at uprooting imperialist domination, and securing, in practice, individual and social freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, resemble those of the revolution's enemies in trampling on those very freedoms which are vital to the strengthening of the Islamic Republic regime.

It is, unfortunately, one of the harmful "characteristics" of the present stage of the Iranian revolution.

The spectrum of compromisers and defeatist forces also demand these freedoms within the same framework. The head of the provisional government, engineer Bazargan, whose policy was a crystalization of the demands of liberal-capitalism in Iran, during the early days of the revolution, when total freedom had been secured for TEHRAN-E MOSAVVAR, AYANDEGAN and the SAVAK agents, frequently invoked the black law of 1310 [1931] passed by Reza Khan against the Iranian Tudeh party, thus recognizing that enactment as lawful.

This is the best example of the freedom of which the liberals boast.

Protected by the total freedom given to counterrevolution, and paralyzing the relentless revolutionary forces and restricting them by using a Reza Khan law, the compromisers are best able to play their historical role, i.e. the role of a steamroller, in order to pave the way for a return to imperialist subservience.

Against these three are ranged the realistic and clear-sighted forces of supporters of the Imam's line and the sound forces and followers of scientific socialism, who are demanding the implementation of all the provisions of the constitution, including the securing and guarantee of freedom for all the forces which seek to stabilize, consolidate and expand our country's glorious revolution. In other words, the uprooting of imperialist domination and the prevention of a return of the plunderers, restraint of the ruling class which supports the [former] satanic regime, i.e. the big landowners and subservient capitalists, the implementation of basic changes in the interests of the deprived members of the society and, in short, to secure the full political, military, economic and cultural independence of our homeland, supported by the immortal power of the deprived masses. In other words, freedom to promote the revolution and not to overthrow it, freedom for social progress not regression, freedom to help along the path to and sacrifice for the sake of revolution, not for sabotage, conspiracy and the imposition of another form of strangulation.

The tens of millions of toiling workers, peasants, artisans and intellectuals are the firm supporters of this [kind of] freedom, and they are fighting incessantly for it.

The foregoing is a summarized account of the three main characteristics of the present political scene of our society.

THE ARENA OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES

The third goal of the glorious revolution of our homeland, for the success of which tens of thousands of the deprived members of the society in the cities and the

dispossessed people of the countryside sacrificed their lives, and hundreds of thousands ruined their health, was to remove the socio-economic system bequeathed by the despotic monarchical regime supported by the big landowners and capitalists, and replace it with a just system in which national assets and the fruits of labor are used to improve living conditions among the slum-dwellers and toilers in urban and rural areas.

In this arena, tens of millions of workers, peasants, artisans, small traders and hard-working intellectuals are ranged on one side, against the big landowners, property tycoons, merchants, capitalists, a large gang of land-hungry plunderers, speculators, brokers, forward purchasers, wholesalers and middlemen, on the other.

In spite of valuable services rendered by institutions inspired by the revolution, such as the crusade for reconstruction, and the seven-man boards responsible for effecting land reforms to benefit the landless peasants and small holders. It is regrettably still true that a considerable section of the political forces which are actively and unceasingly engaged in the fight to secure national independence is not yet convinced of the undeniable and unbreakable link between the road to uprooting imperialist domination and tyrannical plunder and the implementation of fundamental changes in the country's economic system, in the interests of the deprived members of society, and to restrict the depredations of plunderers and profiteers. The enemies of the Iranian revolution and the liberal capitalist forces of compromisers and defeatists, who are the irreconcilable and implacable enemies of this revolutionary policy in Iran, have exerted all their might in efforts to slow down the advance along these lines, and their most important weapons are sabotage in the public sector of the economy, widespread, provocative propaganda and demagogy, with which they oppose those making relentless efforts to effect fundamental changes in the interests of the deprived members of society. They even go as far as to slap the lable of "communist" and "anti-religious" on such measures as sugar rationing in wartime, thus trying to incite the ignorant religious masses against such measures. The unprecedented mobilization of the big landowners, who by supporting the liberal capitalists' arsenals and propaganda organs and also by supporting the section of the clergy associated with large-scale land holdings and capitalism, [in attacks] on land reform, which aims to eliminate the remnants of feudalism in the Iranian rural areas, indicates the extent to which the subversion forces and liberal compromisers, and a section of the clergy associated with colonizers, have joined forces, and have gone into action in a deliberate alliance.

Most regrettably, it must be said that sectarian monopolists and deliberate action on the part of counterrevolutionary elements who, by growing beards and holding prayer-beads, have joined the ranks of the Muslim revolutionary fighters, when many of the genuine fighters are losing their lives on the battlefields, and are infiltrating sensitive governmental posts at an ever-increasing rate, creating conditions enabling them to frustrate the government's positive measures, allowing the liberals to claim that they alone can keep the wheels of the economy and the machinery of government moving.

The foregoing is a summary of the state of the political forces within the country.

CONCLUSION

In general, the main results of the struggle [achieved] during the first two years of the revolution could be described as follows:

1--Considerable deepening and intensification of the seriousness of the revolution as regards its main policy directions, i.e. in the battle for ending imperialist domination and fundamental changes in the interests of the underprivileged.

2--The growth and legal stabilization of forms of "shovra" [council or soviets administration, in the social and economic life of urban and rural toilers, within a clearly-defined framework in the executive organs of government and the armed forces--although this positive process has met with certain obstacles from the outset, and remains incomplete.

3--The emergence and growth of embryos of political realism among an important section of the genuine forces of the revolution in the fields of:

--Gaining acquaintance with the great hardships confronting the stability, consolidation and expansion process of the revolutions;

--Partial identification of the revolution's true supporters within the society, and its true friends in the international political arena;

--More profound knowledge of imperialism, its diverse conspiracies and its facilities;

--Identification of the half-way friends of the revolution, who include the liberal capitalists and their political representatives.

4--The "legalized" desertion by the compromisers and defeatists, i.e. the liberal capitalists and all their associates, from the revolution, and their tendency to cooperate with the revolution's enemies.

5--An increase in the various hardships which obstruct the revolution's stabilization, consolidation and expansion. These include:

--Hardships arising from visible factors, such as the imperialist economic blockade, socio-economic changes, counter-revolutionary sabotage, and the obstructive role of liberal capitalism, the consequences of the adventurous methods used by left-inclined groups and, finally, the consequences of the imposed imperialist Saddam-American war on our homeland.

--Hardships arising from certain abstract factors, the main one being the present government's ineptitude when faced with the necessity of making quick and decisive resolutions against profiteering by the liberal capitalists and remnants of the "Aryamehr" ruling class, i.e. the big commercial capitalists and landowners, to which this important factor may be added.

--The consequences of monopoly-seeking by extremist forces in the management of the economy, resulting in the removal of an important section of genuine pro-revolution forces from the reconstruction program, thus clearing the field for

sabotage by adventurous elements and counter-revolutionary agents, to sow disunity and strife; and, finally, the consequences of inexperience and egotism among the administrators of the Islamic Republic and the lack of attention to constructive proposals [for the revolution] coming from sympathetic forces.

The harmful results of the actions of forces referred to in this report as "middle-of-the-road" [are obvious]. Regrettably these forces, instead of concentrating their attention on adopting a fundamental policy for the revolution at this time, i.e. the struggle against imperialist conspiracies and plots, rendering valuable service to the people's glorious revolution in our homeland, refraining from sectarianism and left-leaning monopolism, and employing revolutionary confrontation based on creative insight, realism and clear-sightedness to differentiate the revolution's friends from its foes, they provide grist to the mill of the revolution's enemies through the incorrect policies and actions they adopt.

We thus witness the fact today, that the Iranian revolution, having experienced a series of remarkable historic victories, is beset on one side with many hardships, and on the other with an ever-increasing number of plots hatched by [its] enemies, in addition to which it has not succeeded in evolving decisive methods with which to mobilize all the faculties it possesses, in order to smash enemy plots and surmount hardships.

It is obvious that increased hardships will enervate and deplete the revolutionary forces and pave the way for the success of enemy plots.

This is the main cause of concern occupying the minds of all genuine and well-informed forces of the Iranian revolution. This concern becomes more alarming when the present turmoil in Iran is seen in the context of present-day world events, which indicate that the aggressive, imperialist and international reactionary circles led by rabid American imperialism is enlarging the scope of plots, political provocations, and aggressive military interventions for the purpose of crushing national liberation movements. It is a great error to separate what is happening in Iran from events taking shape in the world at large. For this reason, it is necessary to review the international scene, [as well].

B. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE WORLD TODAY

Undoubtedly, the determining direction and basis for the changes in the political situation in the world is developing to the advantage of the camp of worldwide anti-imperialism and to the disadvantage of imperialism, to the advantage of the progress of socialism and the disadvantage of monopolistic capitalistic rule, to the advantage of the deprived masses of the developing nations and the disadvantage of neo-colonialism. This historical battle which began with the great October Revolution, the first determining, irreversible victory of working power over capital, during its short historical period of 63 years, has been able to change radically the image of the world, and to provide conditions, with an ever-increasing velocity, for the victory of other deprived masses. A comparison of changes alone in the world during the three decades of '50s, '60s, and '70s after World War II, clearly shows this increasing velocity.

It would be enough to view only the great historical achievements of the past ten years. Even a brief study shows that the struggle of the deprived masses in the three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has not only quantitatively but also qualitatively evolved in the direction of perfection. With the great victory of the people of Viet Nam over the criminal aggression of U.S. imperialism, as a result of which for the first time in its two-hundred-year history the snout of this criminal superpower was rubbed into the ground, great changes have begun throughout the world in the interest of the deprived masses. In the period between the defeat of the American aggression in Viet Nam up to this date, we have witnessed that the plunderous domination of neo-colonialism has been eliminated in more than 12 countries of the most important regions of the world. In South Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Benin, Afghanistan, Iran, Nicaragua, and Zimbabwe, the victorious anti-imperialistic, popular revolutions have overthrown the evil, reactionary, dependent regimes of neo-colonialism. In the absolute majority of these counties the persistent revolutionary forces took over the leadership of the revolution and secured the development of their country directed towards socialism. In three European countries, Spain, Portugal, and Greece, fascist regimes were overthrown. These are the most significant victories of the deprived masses achieved in their battle waged against world-devouring imperialism and its dependent reaction.

In the battle between these two world systems, i.e.e socialism and imperialism, the balance of power has shifted significantly to the advantage of socialism because of the great, ever-ongoing economic, cultural, and social developments in Socialist countries, and because of the intensification of various fundamental crises in imperialist countries.

In 1980, which was the last year of the Soviet Union's five-year plan, industrial production in that country went beyond the 20 percent increase in industrial production of the entire world, while its population is less than 6 percent of the population of the world. The superiority of the socialist system becomes more obvious when we take into consideration the fact that industrial production in that country in 1913, that is, the highest level of production before the October Revolution, was only 3 percent of world industrial production. In agricultural production as well, despite the fact that during 3 of the 5-years plan weather conditions have been most unfavorable for agriculture, the average grain production has reached an unprecedented annual amount of 205 million tons. During this plan, the actual average of the per capita income of the Soviet people increased by 17 percent. More than 50 million Soviet people moved into 12 million newly-constructed residential units. At the end of this plan, the number of physicians in the Soviet Union exceeded 1 million. Now, there are 37 doctors for every 10 thousand Soviet people, the highest figure in the world. All these great victories have been achieved even though 20 of the 64 years since the October Revolution were wasted on civil war, foreign military intervention, World War [II], and the reconstruction of what was ruined because of these wars.

This rapid growth and immediate expansion will continue also in the future. For instance, according to the forecast of the five-year plan for 1980-85, the national income of the Soviet Union will increase by 18-20 percent, industries by 26-28 percent, and agriculture by 12-14 percent. The average grain production will reach 238-243 million tons per year, and more than 50 million Soviet people will be housed in 12 million newly-constructed residential units.

Of course, the loudspeakers of world capitalism, who are staring enviously and begrudgingly at these achievements, use every propaganda means available to them throughout the world, including the American-made CIA newspapers in Iran, to distort these obvious facts. Along with these loudspeakers are those unenlightened individuals who are entrapped by these distortions and close their eyes to the truth. In addition to these loudspeakers, there exist also inwardly blind people who fall into the trap of these distortions, or pretend not to see these facts. But in spite of this wretched attempt by world capitalism, and in spite of the regressive efforts of the inwardly blind elements, this is an era of the final collapse of the plunderous system of capitalism and the irreversible victory of socialism throughout the world, and no lie, trickery, conspiracy, crime and vileness of world imperialism and counterrevolution will be able to change this trend of the history.

But, in imperialist countries, the problems which are the outcome of the economic crisis of 1974-75, having not yet been resolved, a new era of crisis has begun. Since the middle of 1979, economic activities in major imperialist countries have been on a decline. In the second half of 1980, in 24 developed capitalist countries social production has decreased by 1 percent. This crisis started in the United States, then spread to England, Canada, and finally to the most stable imperialist country, i.e. the Federal Republic of Germany. In the economy of the United States the forecase is that this year domestic production will decrease by about 3 percent.

At the present time, there are more than 20 million unemployed people in the developed capitalist countries. All indications show that this huge army of the unemployed will grow even larger this year.

On the basis of these great developments on the two great world battlefields, the efforts of the peace-supporting forces have succeeded significantly in quelling disturbances. Thus, this factor which provides the opportunity to aggressive imperialist forces to interfere in the internal affairs of nations was limited to a great extent. We should note one historical fact, that under the conditions of the decade of the 1960s, i.e. the unsuccessful military invasion of Viet Nam by the United States, in spite of the flood of protest from all over the world, the United States was able, for the purpose of suppressing the liberation movement of Viet Nam, to dispatch to that country the largest number of troops in its own history--that is, an army of 600,000 well-equipped soldiers exceeding the number of military forces sent to Europe during World War II--and to drop on Viet Nam three times the amount of bombs used in World War II. After a few years, because of the significant changes which occurred throughout the world, the United States lost its courage to carry out such interference in Iran and Nicaragua, and was unable to confront the revolutions of these countries in its usual manners. This comparison also shows that the change in the proportion of forces in favor of socialism and anti-imperialistic liberation movements, and as a result, the progress of the peacekeeping policy has provided great new potential for the success of the movements of the deprived nations. It is under such favorable historical conditions and with the friendship and cooperation of national liberation forces and the great, undefeated power of socialist countries that small countries, who have recently been able to free themselves from the domination of worldwide imperialism, are able to continue their growth and evolution even under the difficult conditions of economic embargo and the all-out pressure of worldwide imperialism. The revolutionary Cuba of today is still under the economic embargo of imperialist countries after 20 years; heroic Viet Nam and its struggling

neighbors Laos and Cambodia, or the Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia, which are pressured from all sides and even despite the militarily aggressive interference of imperialistic and affiliated reactionary forces are the clear example of reality in our age. Today, 20 out of 110 developing countries with a population of more than 150 million people have chosen the socialist direction for the evolution of their social future. Although the revolutionary socio-economic and cultural quality of these countries are at various stages of growth, they have all gained and are gaining valuable experience in the major issues regarding means of development and solutions to their social and economic problems.

The historical s'gnificance of this change in the proportion of forces in the world becomes more obvious when we consider that these notable and destiny-making changes have taken place under such adverse conditions, while the most populated country in the world, the People's Republic of China, has in the past 10 years dangerously regressed in its stance and has openly betrayed the universal camp of anti-imperialism. In order to suppress the national liberation movements and to encourage the imperialistic military aggression against socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, China has accepted an infamous compromise with the darkest imperialistic forces, i.e. the United States and fascist, racist governments such as Israel, South Africa and Chile. And, in order to prove its irreversible "sincerity" in this treason, China has imposed the greatest political, military, and economic pressure on the Soviet Union to the north, and Viet Nam, Laos, and Cambodia to the south.

These victories and especially the acceleration of the changes in the last 10 years have been achieved in the bloody struggle of the uprisen masses and progressive forces of the world against worldwide reaction headed by U.S. imperialism.

The imperialists and reactionaries stand against this great current with all their might. They do not even relinquish an inch of what they have taken forcefully, without a fight. Worldwide imperialism and affiliated reaction are trying to retrieve what they have lost by taking advantage of every political, economic and military means and using every criminal, deceitful policy. Or at least they try to prevent the stabilization, strengthening and expansion of the new revolutionary, anti-imperialistic, popular systems, and in this way decrease the ever-increasing speed of changes in the world which are to their detriment.

The important peculiarity of world politics at the present moment is exactly this miserable imperialistic attempt. The criminal imperialism of the United States in the frontlines of worldwide imperialism, i.e. that of Western Europe, Japan, and other reactionary countries, has at the present moment set the following as its most important strategic objectives:

--to end peacekeeping and calm by escalating political disturbances and returning the world to the cold war and the arms race era, and in this way, by forcing heavy military budgets on socialist countries, to slow down the rapid development of those countries as far as possible;

--to obstruct the progress and success of the national liberation movements and, if possible, to cause the victorious movements to fail and to thereby regain their previous position;

--to keep the developing countries within the capitalist system and prevent, with all their might, their inclination to follow a path towards a non-capitalistic development and adoption of a socialist orientation.

--to beseige the foreign and world policy of these countries within the framework of their own world policy, and thus prevent them from approaching and establishing relations and cooperation with socialist stakes and other liberated, independent countries;

--to prevent these counties from having a free, independent economy, and to keep them dependent on imperialist markets.

In order to achieve these objectives in their infernal plan, the imperialists have employed all their political, economic, military, propaganda, and ideological forces.

Now it is certain that the entire region of the developing countries is an operational arena for these imperialist policies. It would be sufficient to only note the imperialist's actions, especially the role of its world gendarme--U.S. imperialism throughout the world, in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, in South East Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America. Among these, the Persian Gulf is of primary significance, because of its unique strategic importance, both economically and militarily and because of the occurance of the great revolutionary explosion in that region.

We have now witnessed for two years all the imperialist plots and conspiracies in this region, and we can see how all the visible and invisible hands of black imperialist and reactionary forces are working to defeat the two anti-imperialist, popular revolutions of the region--the Iranian and the Afghan revolutions, or at least they hope to transform these revolutions from within, and drag them to compromise and submission, that is, to that very prison of dependence on world capitalism.

We are now witness to the fact that U.S. imperialism and its associates have concentrated large quantities of military equipment and huge numbers of armed forces in the Persian Gulf area. Through their daily instigations and military maneuvers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Jordan they disturb the political atmosphere of the region, preparing it for the open invasion of Iran by the United States.

Worldwide imperialism headed by the United States is heavily preparing to crush the Iranian revolution. The coup in Turkey, encouraging Iraq for an open invasion of Iran, the effort to put together a regional military pact between the countries of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman against Iran, the effort to arm Pakistan and the reactionary Arab regimes of the region, strengthening of the military bases and the creation of new bases surrounding Iran, the emergency military aid of $500 million to Pakistan along with a $2.5 billion loan from the World Bank to that country, and the open arming of the criminal Afghan gangs in Pakistan which are managed by the deposed Shah of Afghanistan, Bakhtiars and Oveysis of Afghanistan, and under the direct supervision of the CIA, are all preparations for the creation of a reactionary iron ring around Iran.

Diego Garcia is changing into the largest American military base in the world, and the 200,000-man army of the "rapid deployment" force has been ordered to confine its mission only to the Persian Gulf region. England is prepared to put its large

military base in Cyprus at the disposal of this aggressive army. Neogtiations are taking place between the United States and Egypt and the United States and Pakistan for the establishment of two new U.S. military bases in those countries. The above are all but part of the infernal imperialist plan headed by U.S. imperialism directed against the revolutions of Iran and Afghanistan which, according to Brzezinski have disturbed the "balance" of power in the region.

Another part of this plan is the effort of all the organizations affiliated with U.S. imperialism and aided by the compromisers and submissive elements to carry out in Iran the "guidelines" of Brezezinski in clouding the relationship between Iran and the Soviet Union.

At present, more than 60 American, French, and British warships manned with tens of thousands of American soldiers especially trained for battle in the climatic conditions of Iran are prepared for invasion along with the obediently ready-to-act, affiliated armies of Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Oman, Turkey, and Pakistan, showing off and calling out challenges all the time.

In South East Asia, the U.S. imperialism and its associates, i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, with the aid of the Chinese traitors, have surrounded Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and with their constant aggression on the northern and eastern borders across China and Thailand, they are trying to prevent the newly-liberated masses of these colonial-stricken countries from reconstructing their homelands. The same is true of the criminal actions of the imperialists in Black Africa, in the region of the Arab countries, and in Latin America. We are witnessing the best example of this criminal policy in El Salvador. And we see how ruthlessly the hired butchers of Washington have made freedom fighters for independence of this small nation the target of machine-guns and napalm bombs.

One of the other schemes of the imperialist circles to continue their domination over the developing countries and the deprived masses is to take advantage of every possibility for fomenting regional wars, racial, religious, and tribal conflicts, etc. The historical motto of colonialism, "Set the masses against each other and then rule them," is today used by neo-colonialism on a larger scale. Neo-colonialism knows that the consequence of such quarrels, especially if they develop into destructive wars, will in any event weaken the anti-imperialistic forces and strengthen the position of the dominators. Fratricidal wars between the masses who are tied in the chains of imperialism cannot end but in making these chains heavier.

Imperialism and worldwide reaction are systems which are condemned to die, and like wounded beasts are defending their criminal lives with their very teeth and claws. But the great forces of the deprived people and the working masses throughout the world who were put in motion with the great socialist October Revolution are undefeatable. This huge flood, which in a short period of time has destroyed a significant portion of the thousands-of-years-old palaces of the oppressive regimes of the plundering classes, is becoming day after day, more concrete, more united, and more powerful. The masses recognize the enemy much better, calculate more accurately the ways to overpower him and proceed towards their final victory with stronger and faster steps. The people throughout the world are realizing every day that imperialism and wordwide reaction, on the threshold of the historical destruction of its plundering criminal system, is ready for any new crime no matter how unimaginable to the human mind. Not surprisingly, one of those filthy germs and mercenaries of imperialism, who took part in the 18 Tir [9 July] coup attempt, confessed that

the operators of the coup intended to impose their evil system on the Iranian people at any price, and if necessary, even to spill the blood of ten million Iranians.

The people of the world have not forgotten that World War II, which was instigated by bloodthirsty imperialism for the purpose of destroying the first and only socialist country in the world, left 50 million casualties and more than this number of invalids. The people of the world are discovering more and more everyday that the tragedy of the atomic war, being planned by the imperialists, will destroy hundreds of millions of people in the first hour of the war.

It is this increasing realization of the fact which strengthens the camp of the strugglers to secure world peace and the active supporters of the prevention of an atomic war.

The supporters of social change to the advantage of the working masses throughout the world are coming every day to realize more and more the importance of waging struggle for peace, of which the major element is to fight for the prevention of imperialist plots to escalate the disturbances in the political atmosphere of the world and participate in this struggle. The still enslaved masses of the deprived countries are coming to know every day that the best and most proper conditions for their victory in breaking the chains of slavery is the existence of peace in the political atmosphere of the world.

It is a fact that the greatest wave of victory of the national liberation movements in the 1970s was concurrent with the least chaotic post-World War II political period. The less chaotic the political environment of the world, the more the chances for the victory of the people over the plundering pressures of neo-colonialism increase. For exactly this reason, the world-devouring imperialists, especially the imperialistic military-economic monopolies, is greatly horrified by the lack of chaotic atmosphere and the existence of international peace and of the progress of worldwide supporters of peace, who are using all of their infernal energy of propaganda against world peace. The statement of Dulles, the great Satan of the imperialistic, aggressive policies of the United States in the 1950s, concerning the necessity of a "cold war," is the best illustration of this self-explanatory fact. Dulles openly and shamelessly stated:

> "In order to force [a] country to carry on its shoulders the heavy burden of maintaining a strong army, it is necessary that we create an atmosphere of excitement similar to that of the psychological wartime situation. It is necessary [for us] to create the supposition that apparently the country is subject to foreign threat."

This statement best represents the imperialistic propaganda fuss which, under the guise of the "communist danger" and "Soviet danger," imposes annually hundreds of billions of dollars in military expenditures on the people of the world. Simultaneously, these imposed heavy expenses which are one of the greatest sources of the plundering monopolies of the military-industrial setups of Western countries, contribute to the dominance of black reaction and the unending dependence of developing countries on imperialistic monopolies.

In the summer of 1979, that is, during the period when the foreign policy of U.S. imperialism began perceptibly to accelerate the intensification of disturbances throughout the world, the U.S. secretary of defense explained this policy with astonishing clarity in one brief sentence. In an interview with U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Mr Brown declared:

"I think that we are being cured of the wounds of the excessive anti-war sentiments inflicted by the Vietnam war."

This clear statement by a professional belligerent aggressor, the same person who was the major operator of the attack at Tabas and the Novzheh coup in our country, as well as hundreds of similar conspiracies throughout the world, indicates how "anti-war sentiments," like a painful wound, were felt and are being felt by the plunderous imperialists.

Precisely for this reason, our people know that the preservation of world peace; efforts to stabilize, strengthen, and expand the gains of the efforts to keep the peace; struggle to strike imperialism and reaction by securing the victory of the national liberation movements which follow the path of freedom, independence, and social progress in the deprived countries; struggle to uproot any political, military, economic, and cultural dependence on imperialism; and ending any manifestation of reaction, all in all, are wounds inflicted on the plundering system of condemned-to-death imperialism, and neo-colonialism, [which is] the final external manifestation [of the former].

But our era is the era of the victorious progress for the universal front of anti-imperialist forces. Our era is one of the ever increasing blooming of the economy and culture in socialist and liberated countries, which have chosen the non-capitalistic or socialist orientation leading towards development. It is an era of more expanded and deeper victory for the national liberation movements, with an obvious goal of ending any domination and aggression of worldwide neo-colonialist imperialism. Our era is an era in which the superiority of worldwide suppressive military power of imperialism has ended, and the dominating advantures of imperialist circles are being most severely punished more than ever in regions such as Vietnam, Black Africa, Iran, and Afghanistan. The era of the parading of plundering colonialists has long passed and with every new day the parading possibilities of these forces are becoming more and more limited.

The praiseworthy heroic struggle for independence, freedom, and social progress in Iran has turned a new brilliant leaf in the glorious history of the battle of the deprived peoples of the world against colonialism, exploitation and backwardness. We, the Tudeh strugglers, are proud to have actively taken part in this historical heroism of the peoples of our country, and have always proceeded on the frontlines of this historical battle.

TWO IMPORTANT EVENTS IN WORLD POLITICS

In connection with all these world issues it would be appropriate to pay special attention to two important events of recent times. One is the presidential elections in the United States, and another is the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. With these two events, the reality and the nature of two systems and two contradictory encounters on the arena of world politics was presented to the people of the world in a dazzling light.

The presidential elections in the United States, in which the representative of the policy of war, aggression, racial discrimination, and the plunder of the national wealth of billions of people of the "Third World" countries entered the White House with little more than 26 percent of the votes of the American people, was an outspoken fact, indicating that world inspiration, headed by U.S. imperialism, has faced

backbreaking problems which are the result of various political, economic, social, and cultural crises, and that its only hope is to obstruct the great flood of history which has shaken the foundations of the oppressive, plundering monopolies of capitalism and is destroying a portion of it every day, by escalating international crises, by resorting to the policies of the "cold war" period, by aggressive military actions, by creating regional wars in order to deviate public opinion, by the expansion of the arms race, and by strengthening the reactionary forces throughout the world.

On the other side, the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union once again confirmed this reality, with an unshakable strength, that the new socialist system, which is the grave-digger of monopolistic capitalism, is proceeding bloomingly every day with firmer paces, and no crisis threatens it. The society of the socialist countries has become the determining force of the future evolution of our world, a guarding, protective force for universal peace, an obstructive force to imperialist aggression, and a great supportive force for the peoples who have risen for independence, freedom, and social progress.

In the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union the economic, social, and cultural development plan was approved for the next 5 and 10 years. This plan shows that in the future too, the growth, expansion, and development of the Soviet socialist society will continue uninterrupted and without any crisis. The superiority of the socialist system over the decadent capitalist system will once again be clearly shown to the peoples of the world.

It is exactly in comparison with the reassuring plan that the stagnant economic system and the social, cultural, and spiritual relations of the declining capitalist societies are clearly seen for what they are. The United States, Western Europe, Japan, and other countries affiliated with worldwide imperialism have nothing to offer for the future of their societies but various crises. Moral and spiritual degeneration in these countries is increasing with a tremendous speed, and is spreading like plague. In the United States, the "leader" of worldwide imperialism, the rate of "inflation" in drugs, burglary, crime, prostitution and the efforts for Mafia domination of government institutions is increasing with a greater speed than economic inflation and unemployment.

In regards to the national liberation movements and the anti-imperialistic resistance in the "Third World" also these two events were the manifestation of two opposing encounters. The U.S. president, immediately after "ascending" the throne of command, used the most obscene insults, called these movements and any type of resistance against imperialism, anywhere in the world, "terrorism" and shamelessly declared war on all of them, including the Iranian and Afghan revolutions, the Palestinian movement, and the uprising in El Salvador. In the meantime, he declared his unsparing support for the Zionists of Israel, the racists of South Africa, the fascists of Chile, and all the reactionary regimes of the world.

But in the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union we face quite a different position. In this Congress, the leaders of the Soviet Union once again decisively emphasized their unsparing and all-round support of all the national liberation movements seeking independence, freedom, and social progress.

We also face two quite opposite approaches concerning the vital issue of world-peace and the decrease of crisis. In order to obstruct the tension-easing efforts, the U.S. president is initiating a new "cold war" period, by preparing the most criminal weapon for the collective annihilation of the people of the world. That is, he includes the production of the neutron bomb in his governmental program, and plans to cover Western Europe with a network of deadly atomic missiles.

But, on the opposite side, the leadership of the Soviet Union, in supporting and strengthening tension-easing policies, and the stance of the people of the world opposing the threat of nuclear war, offered such new proposals that they were not even expected by the West. In accordance with these proposals, the non-nuclear region would extend from Western Europe through all of the European section of the Soviet Union up to the borders of Ural.

As regards the Iranian revolution, the position of the U.S. president and the leader of the Soviet Union are significantly expressive of the two opposing world camps. One is the world camp of imperialist aggression and crime headed by U.S. imperialism and the other, the socialist camp, which seeks peace, friendship, and social progress for all the peoples [of the world].

The U.S. president, who called the students following the line of the Imam criminals and murderers, on 19 Jan 81 (29 Dey 1359) evaluates the Islamic Republic of Iran as follows:

"Before everything else it must be made clear whether a government exists in Iran. I personally doubt it. I wish the intellectuals and competent politicians would take over the government in Iran. Then, yes, I think there would exist a legitimate reason for us to establish relations with Iran. . . I doubt that Ayatollah Khomeyni could still be called the man in charge of [that] government. . . ."

Again, in another speech, he states:

"I doubt that a government exists in Iran. Establishing relations with Iran will only be possible when moderate elements take over."

These are the assessments of the Iranian revolution by the actor of Hollywood's "violent" movies!

Opposite this evaluation is the position of the Soviet leader in his report to the 26th Congress. Leonid Brezhnev, in his evaluation of the Iranian revolution, states:

> "The Iranian revolution was a very important international event in recent years, which has its own characteristics. The Iranian revolution, despite all its complications and contradictions, is a revolution basically of an anti-imperialistic nature, even though internal and external reaction tries to change the nature of this revolution. The people of Iran follow their own particular way to attain freedom and prosperity. We sincerely wish the Iranian people success, and are prepared to expand our friendly relations with Iran on the principles of equal rights and, naturally through reciprocal efforts."

Apparently the case needs no explanation or interpretation. It shows which power is the irreconcilable sworn enemy, and which gives its unsparing support to the glorious revolution of our fatherland.

PART II

THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE 16TH AND 17TH PLENUMS

As evaluated in the report of the Executive Board to the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee, the period between the 15th and 16th plenums was one of the most tumultuous in our country. Now, two years have elapsed from that date, and it could be stated that this evaluation is still valid for the last two years in all its dimensions. The fact is that we are going through the most turbulent period of our ancient history. We are witnessing an old system collapsing, as in an earthquake, and the embryo of a new one being created and coming to life. We are witnessing the creation of a system based on national independence, freedom, and social progress, while a battle between the old and the new is being waged in all the arenas of social life.

As a consequence of the victory of our glorious revolution and after 30 years of deprivation and suppression, the Tudeh Party of Iran has once again found the opportunity to begin its free, legal activities. The activities of the new era of the Party began under very difficult circumstances. Today, we can say that given the exceptionally difficult conditions, the struggle of the Tudeh strugglers in this 2 years has in fact been one of the brightest parts of our 40-year history of struggle and the more than 70-year-old history of the struggles of the followers of scientific socialism, and has been a credit to the conscious strugglers of Iran's working class.

The Politbureau used all its power to carry out all the guidelines set by the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee. The following are the brief results of this effort, presented to the plenum for deliberation.

1. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

The activities of the new era of our Party started in a very unfavorable atmosphere. This atmosphere was not the creation of the moment. In fact, it was the result of all the factors which had affected the minds of our people during the past 30 years, consisting of the creation of negative, sceptic, unfriendly prejudgments, and even hostile attitude towards the socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, towards Marxism-Leninism as a new world outlook, and consequently, towards our Party. This atmosphere was the result of the following factors:

--the misguiding effects of 60 years of poisonous propaganda by the dependent and subservient regime of big landowners and capitalists headed by the corrupt, treacherous Pahlavi family. This regime which considered our popular movement its greatest historical enemy did not hesitate at any time in this long period of time to use any criminal means in its power to slander, suppress, and uproot

this movement, especially during the 25 years after 28 Mordad [19 Aug 53] when it obtained absolute power with the aid of the infernal SAVAK, at a time when its endeavors reached their peak in all areas.

--the misleading effect of the nationalists who were affiliated with national capitalism, that is, the remnants of the National Front who turned their backs on the policies of Mosaddeq, and in order to defend their beloved capitalism, compromised with American imperialism and the regime of the Shah. In order to hide their infamous submissive compromise and by using the free platform that the SAVAK-dominated regime was putting at its disposal, this group tried to cover up its great responsibility in the defeat of the national and anti-imperialist movement of the years 1328-32 [1949-53]. In the meantime, it was trying to exonerate the United States as the major criminal enemy of the independence and freedom of our country by putting all the blame for the defeat of 28 Mordad on the group which, except for its mistakes during the first years of Dr Mosaddeq's activities, was the most active and most effective supporter of Dr Mosaddeq's anti-imperialist stance during the most crucial and sensitive period, between 30 Tir 1331 [21 Jul 52] and 28 Mordad 1332 [19 Aug 53]. For this reason, this group became the target of the most violent political pressures of the subservient regime of the operators of the coup, after the defeat of 28 Mordad. It is enough to mention, that after 28 Mordad, over 4,000 members of the Tudeh Party of Iran were arrested, of whom many were executed and the rest were held in SAVAK prisons anywhere from several to more than 10 years. But the number of those imprisoned and convicted from the National Front did not exceed the number of the fingers on one hand.

--the existence of an extremely belligerent dualism, that is, belligerency against communism from the standpoint of religious prejudice and belligerency against communism from the standpoint of capitalism manifesting itself as the belligerency against communism of the Westernized groups, trained in the United States and Western Europe, and another group simply the belligerency against communism of the well-to-do classes of the middle-class and small capitalists of the Iranian society.

--the influence of Maoism and deviant pseudo-Maoist ideologies in a significant segment of the anti-imperialistic, struggling young generation which has spread an anti-Soviet sickness-like belligerency, and with this outlook, stands against the Tudeh Party of Iran, which has revealed its ties to true international ideologies. The principle-based struggle of our party with the deviant, incorrect ideologies of these groups had reached a level of irreconcilable enmity during the peak of the present revolutionary movement.

--It must be added that the role of the traitors and apostates of the popular movement, whether those who showed weakness during the oppression and yielded to the enemy, or those who fell into the cesspool of Maoism and are today at the head of counterrevolutionary forces, had much influence in creating an unfavorable atmosphere for the Party.

--To all these unjust factors must be added another factor, which is the result of the mistakes of our Party between 1329-31 [1950-52], i.e. at the onset of our

national movement to nationalize the oil industry, as well as the weakness of some of the leaders and responsibles of the Party after 28 Mordad [19 Aug 53], and the shortcomings and defeats in the efforts of our Party during the gloomy period of oppression until 1351 [1972-73], including the success of SAVAK in dominating a segment of the secret organization of the Party during that period.

Under such unfavorable conditions our Party began its new era of overt and legal activities. Today there are few who would doubt the significant success of our Party despite these and other new difficulties which have appeared during the past two years.

In this arena of activity, the leadership of the Party has made an effort to devise correct guidelines which correspond with the reality of the revolution of our country and which are firmly based on principles, and at the same time to implement with absolute moderation its program of political action. The 16th Plenum had adopted the main direction of the political activities of the Party as follows:

> The first and foremost important duty of our Party in this area (of political activities), is to make an effort in an all-out cooperation with all the true revolutionary forces of our people--the most important of all, with the forces which are under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeyni--to strengthen the young tree of victory which has been achieved with the blood of tens of thousands of heroes, and to make this shoot grow deeper and more fruitful.
>
> We must try with all our energy to make irreversible this great historical success which undoubtedly is of great universal significance. On this path, we must relearn again and again from the contemporary history of the revolutionary movement of Iran, from the Constitutional Revolution up to this date, as well as from the revolutionary movements of other peoples, from those who have already planted the banner of victory in their countries and those who have been unsuccessful.

By fully supporting and accurately following, and scientifically evaluating the reality of the Iranian revolution, the leadership of the Party has concluded that it should support the line of Imam Khomeyni. We have recognized the following five major determining elements of this policy, and the events of the past two years have shown that we have not been mistaken in our judgments. These five elements are:

1. A decisive, unshakable policy aimed at ending the total political, military, economic and cultural worldwide imperialist domination, headed by American imperialism;

2. A decisive policy to uproot the despotic monarchical regime, and destroy the bases of its possible return;

3. A policy to secure individual and social rights and freedoms for the pro-revolutionary forces, who have always been deprived of freedom, that is, the deprived people of cities and villages, the ghetto dwellers and the downtrodden;

4. A policy recognizing the necessity of fundamental changes in the plundering economic and social system, in the interest of those plundered and to the detriment of the plunderers and the thieves of the national wealth and the wages of the urban and rural toilers;

5. Constant reliance on the necessity of the unity of all the genuine forces of the people, to attain the four objectives mentioned above.

The Tudeh Party of Iran had long before the victory of the revolution concluded, that this line of action reflects many of the vital needs of the toilers of our country, and decided to support its success with all its power.

In this manner, the struggle for the progress towards these goals and the struggle to bring about unity of action by supporting the formation of a people's united front was crystallized as the main line of political activity for the Party. On the basis of this orientation, the Party had made an overall effort to create an atmosphere of understanding and cooperation with other true pro-revolution forces who act, for the most part, for the attainment of these objectives, including the forces which are struggling under the banner of Islam as followers of Imam Khomeyni, or other forces whose stance is either revolutionary nationalism or are true supporters of scientific socialism.

Today, we are witness to the fact that in this connection, despite all the difficulties emanating from the unfavorable prejudgments about proceeding towards such goals, despite the plots of the various enemies of the revolution--that is, SAVAK, "Aryamehr" [former regime] counterrevolutionaries, the remnants of the plunderous ruling-classes, and the fifth column of imperialism manifested in the pseudo-leftist U.S. groups (PEYKAR and RANJBAR)--and despite the monopolism and self-centeredness of groups and influential personalities among the ranks of the revolutionary forces, our untiring efforts for unity of action have progressed significantly.

It would be enough to look at our Party's proposed program for a united people's front. We can readily see that many of the objectives of this program have already been achieved or are being achieved, and that some of the others which reflect the needs of tens of millions of the toilers masses have become the slogans and demands of the largest spectrum of the pro-revolutionary forces.

On the basis of this political stance, the Tudeh Party of Iran participated in the referendum to overthrow the decadent monarchical regime and in the establishment of the Islamic Republic. It participated in the elections of the Assembly of Experts and offered clear, distinct proposals for the completion of the compiled draft of the Constitution. And, finally, holding to its critical and reforming views, it endorsed the newly prepared Constitution, which had been compiled by the Assembly of Experts.

Despite the propaganda fuss created and fanned by the opponents and enemies of our Party against this political party-line, today, after the elapse of two years from the revolution, the accuracy and infallibility of this policy has convinced many of those who were condemning us for a long time, and has helped to heighten the political prestige of our Party in Iranian society. One of the most successful parts of the Party's political struggle was the exposure of the compromising and submissive nature of the liberal bourgeoisie, which, under the mask of Islam and a lame, conditional, limited participation in the struggle of the people against "despotism"--and only against despotism--had gained an important position in the leadership of the country after the revolution. Through these positions, the "step-by-step" transitional government, the liberal bourgeoisie tried to divert the revolution from its original goals, and redirect it towards the blind alley of compromise, not only with worldwide imperialism but with the leftovers of the "Aryamehr" regime, i.e. the runaway, plundering capitalists and landowners.

This struggle, as the ratified report of the 16th Plenum of the Party shows, began from the very first days of the revolution. For a long time, our Party was alone in this struggle, but the passage of time, the experiences of the true pro-revolutionary forces in the course of the struggle, the compromising, submissive stance of liberal capitalism, the increasing difficulties emanating from the termite-like economic policies of liberal capitalism in the overall economy of the country, the need to fight to end the access of these compromisers to the positions of ruling and economic power have become the most vital slogan of the entire spectrum of the revolutionary forces.

It was in accordance with this very orientation that the leadership of the Party evaluated the brave action of the students following the line of the Imam from the first moment as a profound revolutionary move in intensifying the fight against U.S. imperialism--the number one enemy of our glorious revolution--and as a struggle against the compromisers and submissive elements, who had even gone so far as to initiate a collusion with Brzezinski, the most vindictive conspirator against the revolution of Iran. The Party supported that action all along, and it continued its support of the students even when they were attacked by the imperialists, counterrevolutionaries, and the compromisers who were ousted from governmental power.

The exposing documents discovered at the American spy nest, i.e. the headquarters for the preparation of a counterrevolutionary coup to overthrow the regime of the Islamic Republic, have proved the unparalleled accuracy of our Party's views concerning the extent of subversive conspiracies of the imperialists, counterrevolutionaries, and the deceitful role of liberal capitalism in paving the way for the return to imperialist dependency.

For precisely this reason, these disclosures were on the one hand widely supported by the masses of socially deprived and, on the other, openly opposed and countered by anti-popular forces.

Our Party has the right to be proud of its great share in this struggle.

The third part of the very important political activity of the Party has been our continuous, uncompromising struggle against the counterrevolutionary conspiracies and the efforts to equip the struggling forces of the people to confront and crush these conspiracies.

The members and supporters of our Party--with their untiring day and night efforts on this battlefield in which on many occasions they endangered their lives, and in spite of the very limited possibilities and all the difficulties created by monopolistic forces and club-wielders on the right and on the "left"--were able to give valuable assistance to the revolutionary institutions in the discovery and neutralizing of the most dangerous conspiracies of the enemies of the revolution. We have performed and still are performing our revolutionary duty in this connection, and attach importance to its positive results rather than using it for propaganda purposes. We must repeat the fact that some of the political personalities and occasionally political organs, in spite of their complete awareness of our Party's unsparing support of the revolution, by mischievously repeating the accusations of SAVAK agents, and the submissive, Americanized Maoists, try to cast doubt upon the sincerity of our Party in this struggle. But we, the strugglers following scientific socialism, have endured a life of continual accusations and slanders along with more than 130 years of direct experience of struggle on the gallows, under torture, and living in horrible prisons. We know through historical experience that lies, accusations, and slander, even if they have been designed to deceive the public, will finally be notoriously disgraced in the face of history. It is this unshakable confidence that makes tempered steel out of the strugglers for the freedom of the workers' class.

Within the framework of the struggle to expose the variously colored imperialistic and counterrevolutionary conspiracies, we must point out the struggle of our Party to expose the true face of the American "left"--that is, the small Maoist, pseudo-Maoist, and Trotskist groups. The success of our Party in this regard is undoubtedly significant. Today, "Maoist" in the vocabulary of a large spectrum of the forces true to the revolution is attributed to the U.S. fifth column, and treacherous to the glorious revolution of our country. It is so infamous that the Maoists do not have the courage to admit that they are Maoists. They introduce themselves with grandiloquence and deceptive names.

One of the praiseworthy aspects of the political activities of our Party during recent times is its active participation in the popular resistance against the criminal U.S.-Saddam military aggression against our fatherland. In the early months of the victory of the revolution we exposed and warned against the conspiracy which finally was put into action in Shahrivar 1359 [Aug-Sep 80] as Iraq's military aggression. Most unfortunately, the responsible authorities did not apparently pay the slightest attention to our Party's warnings. Future history will reveal what hands in sensitive positions prevented the attention being paid to these warnings, all of which prepared the background for the early successes of this aggression.

In any case, our Party, with its correct evaluation of this conspiracy and aggression, recognized it as an imperialistic counterrevolutionary conspiracy to overthrow the Islamic Republic, and from the first moment stood beside the other

true fighters of the revolution, on the frontlines of resistance to crush this aggression, by using all its resources for this cause.

This destiny-making battle presently continues. The aggression of Iraq has once more confirmed the evaluation of the Tudeh Party of Iran concerning the true pro-revolutionary forces and exposed the ugly face of the deceptive forces. It is strange, that the political organizations of liberal capitalism, such as the Office of Cooperation of the People with the President, the Freedom Movement, and the National Front, cannot even present the Iranian people with one martyr, while they organize demonstrations against the present government with tens of thousands of people in Tehran and the provinces following the orders of Reagan. The same is true of the ignominious situation of the insignificant ultra-revolutionary American "left," such as "Ranjbaran," "Peykar" and their associates.

The fourth part of the political activities of our Party consists of the constructive efforts to help resolve the difficulties and social problems. Our Party, from the very first day of the renewal of its legal, overt activity has avoided all kinds of "negativism" and by offering clear, constructive proposals in all areas, has contributed its historical share to the revolution.

The proposals of the Tudeh Party of Iran for solving the crucial social problems (such as land reform, saving the country's economy from crisis, unemployment, the nationality problem, particularly the Kurdestan issue, education, the cultural revolution, etc.), like our Party's views on foreign policy and safeguarding social freedoms, are still valid as the most clear and constructive proposals which correspond accurately to the realities of our fatherland, to the contents and major and fundamental orientations of our glorious revolution, and which reflect the requirements of tens of millions of the masses of the cities and villages.

The true value of these constructive proposals will be more clearly revealed when the opponents and the enemies of our popular movement devote hundreds of pages of their publications to insults and slanders directed at our Party, but are unable to logically prove their doubts about the correctness of our Party's proposals, even in one instance.

On the other hand, the events of the past two years have shown that lack of attention on the part of the influential government authorities to these proposals has always been coupled with the escalation of difficulties and complications. We hope that with the experience of the past and with the critical assessment of the errors committed by the administrative authorities of the Islamic Republic, the abstract approaches which are the greatest threat to the stabilization and the strengthening of the revolution, are replaced with realism and clear-sightedness.

These were briefly the efforts of the leadership of the Party in the political field. The Politburo is of the opinion, that these efforts have fully corresponded to the guidelines of the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee, and that the positive results of these actions have confirmed the correctness of those guidelines.

2. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELD OF ORGANIZATIONAL AFFAIRS

The first duty on organizational affairs assigned to the Executive Committee by the 16th Plenum was to rapidly move the leadership of the Party to Iran, since it had for the most part been in a state of emigration. This guideline was carried out immediately after the plenum. Despite the difficulties created by the liberal government for the return of the members of the main leadership of the Party, who were mostly convicted by the criminal courts of the SAVAK-dominated regime, these comrades were able to return home and pursue their political activities within the country.

The main leadership of the Party was completed [as an organ] with some of the comrades who had been struggling within the country during the years of strangulation, and who had become like tempered steel in the dungeons of SAVAK, and were deeply respected and loved not only by the supporters of our Party but also by the ideological opponents of our Party. The combination of these two elements of the experienced activists of the Party created a strong foundation for the unity, solidarity and growth of the prestige of the Party leadership.

The guidelines of the 16th Plenum of the Central Committee concerning the creation of a general united organization, the admission of new members, and attention to the probable dangers of the victory of anti-freedom forces--be extremists or counterrevolutionaries--were all implemented with due consideration given to the existing visible conditions, means and numerous difficulties.

The leadership of the Party has tried always to find and overcome its mistakes and shortcomings in all fields by self-criticism.

3. THE PARTY'S ACTIVITIES IN THE AREAS OF DUTIES CONNECTED WITH PROPAGATION, PROPAGANDA, AND TEACHINGS

On the whole, despite the limited human and technical resources available to the Party, and considering the various difficulties created by pressures exerted on our Party to shut down its free and open activities--once in 1358 [1979-80) and once after the attacks of the "club-wielders" on the Party offices in Tehran and other cities in Tir 1359 [Jun-Jul 80], which, unfortunately, still continue--the activities and accomplishments of the Party are worthy of attention. In this period the Tudeh Party of Iran has been able to carry out its significant activities by publishing scientific and political, as well as politico-analytical and expository publications.

From the viewpoint of securing financial resources, as well as distribution of these publications among consumers and among the supporters of the Party, the Party's central organization received much more assistance than expected. This devotedly gracious aid is only a small part of the heroic struggle of the Tudeh fighters in the two-year period since the victory of the revolution.

One of the most significant successes of the Party in this area is the publication of MARDOM and the monthly DONYA. This newspaper and the monthly publication have rightly taken their place at the forefront of today's publications in their

political, cultural, and social contents, in their profound understanding and stance on political lines, in their ideological positions, and in their correct evaluations.

4. THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PARTY IN AREAS RELATED TO THE MASSES

In this field, the work of the Party has been and still is confronted with various difficulties, the major decisive portion of which emanates from the peculiarities of the Iranian revolution. These difficulties have existed and still exist as a major hindrance to the organizing of the deprived laboring strata in the arenas of the guild and syndicate activities of workers, farmers, and other toilers, as well as the struggle for women's rights and the rights of the young people and students. In this fight, on the whole, we are confronted with monopolism and the dual organizational struggle of the right and the "left."

On the right we are confronted with the monopolistic religious groups, who are supported by the institutions of governmental authority and who refuse any guild-related cooperation with the other toilers who do not approve of their monopolistic attitude. This causes instability in the voluntary and free unity of all the toilers regardless of their ideological position, religious affinities, etc., and sows the seeds of disunity and dissension among them. On the other side of this monopolism of the right, in areas of popular activities, we are confronted with a policy of dissension adopted by left-inclined elements, such as the MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ, and ramifications of FEDA'I-YE KHALQ organizations, who are following another type of "monopolism," and who would only agree to the unity of a people's organization if they were to control its leadership. And if they happen to be in the minority, they split and try to break apart that organization.

Alongside these two types of monopolism, or more precisely, due to the existence of these two monopolistic trends, the fifth column of the enemy of the revolution, that is, counterrevolutionary elements--SAVAK agents who pretend to be religious or pseudo-leftists, aided by dependent, American-made "leftist" elements--work to escalate disunity and chaos in the industrial units.

Most unfortunately, the toilers of our country, despite having various problems in their struggle to obtain their legitimate demands, and feeling the necessity for their own independent guilds, have been unable, in most cases, to overcome these three artificial obstacles, all of which work against the interests of the socially deprived, i.e. the urban and rural toilers.

The efforts of the Tudeh Party of Iran in affairs related to the masses have aimed, within the franework of its resources and through explanations and expository actions, to assist the Iranian toilers in all social sectors, including the farmers, workers, government and services-related employees, toilers of production and distribution units, young people, women, students, educators, artists, writers and intellectuals, to overcome these problems and to establish their own independent organizations.

In this framework, we must point out the noted efforts of the Party's women in intensifying women's activities to gain women's social rights, as well as the efforts of the Party's youth in the expansion of the activities of the Youth Organization and the Organization of Democratic Students which joined the Youth Organization of the Tudeh of Iran last year, and also the efforts of our Party's activists among the farmers.

THANKS TO THE TUDEH STRUGGLERS

One of the brightest characteristics of the Party's activities in the period following the victory of the revolution is the unprecedented revolutionary enthusiasm among the Tudeh strugglers on all levels of Party activities, beginning from the supporters and the regular members of the Party up to the higher authorities. In order to spread the Party's views in the society, the Tudeh strugglers have displayed and continue to display unusual selflessness and initiative efforts in financing and collecting aid for the Party and with their very lives in protecting and preserving the gains of the revolution and the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the war fronts. Undoubtedly, this selfless effort of all the members of the Party is one of the major determining factors in all the successes of our Party.

Our Party has never before in its 40-year history enjoyed such ideological and organizational unity and such a sound internal party atmosphere. We must protect, as a precious belonging, these great historical gains of our Party's struggle and increase its quality daily.

The successes of our Party have been more in some and less in some other fields. In this regard, we must consider as one of the negative factors the unprecedented hostile atmosphere that the enemies of the revolution as well as those "friends" who consider our Party to be their rival, are escalating against our Party.

We must hope that the progress in the stabilization, strengthening, and expansion of the revolution, the necessity of confronting the problems emanating from the spread of the historical struggle against counterrevolutionary elements, the necessity of strengthening the unity and the unity of action of all the true pro-revolutionary forces in this struggle, and the growth in the recognition of the realities based on valuable experiences of the revolutionary battle will pave the way for the victory of the toilers over their problems.

Dear Comrades, this was the report on the activities of the Politburo of the Central Committee during the past two years.

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RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE TUDEH PARTY 17TH PLENUM

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 13 Apr 81 p 4

[Text] The 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran convened in Tehran in an atmosphere of sincere friendship and under conditions of political, ideological and organizational unity and solidarity. The plenum discussed and studied the report of the Politburo concerning the analysis of conditions prevailing in the country and the world, and the party's new program. The plenum finds it necessary, at the close of its work, to set forth the following points as fundamental conclusions:

1. The 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran greets the eternal memory of all martyrs, irrespective of their alignment to various institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran or revolutionary events and groups of different political and ideological beliefs, and bows its head in respect, glorification and gratitude for their self-sacrifice. During the revolution, as well as the war against aggression, the heroic people of Iran added a golden page to their ancient record--something which can be considered as unparalleled in our country's history--under the prudent, decisive and unshakeable leadership of Imam Khomeyni. We believe that a people possessing such a spirit of sacrifice and perseverence will be able to withstand the difficulties of completing the revolutionary evolution and renovating the society, and will also be able to carry out its difficult responsibilities. We are rightly proud to belong to such a people and such a country.

2. The plenum once again expresses the Party's support of the just defense against the aggression of the criminal regime of Saddam, and conveys its sympathy and fervent greetings to the families of those martyred, disabled, and made homeless by the war. The plenum sends its greetings to the people of Khuzestan and the Western areas of the country, who have been subjected to savage aggression, destruction and other hardships, and praises the bravery and endurance of our beloved countrymen residing in war-damaged areas. The plenum is grateful to the progressive Iraqi forces who condemn Saddam's aggression. The plenum cherishes the hope that our country will achieve a decisive victory in the just fight against aggression and calls upon all progressive forces in the world and all institutions supporting peace, democracy and the rights of the masses to extend material and moral support to Iran in the war imposed upon it by imperialism and the Saddam regime.

3. As set forth in comprehensive and substantiated manner in the report of the Politburo, the anti-imperialist and popular revolution of our country, which succeeded in the overthrow of the decrepit regime of the despotic monarchy, the establishment of the Islamic Republic and in striking telling blows against the bases of domination of the plundering and tyrannical world-imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism, is now going through sensitive and difficult times because of the continuous intrigues of imperialism headed by world-devouring U.S. imperialism and domestic anti-revolution.

The revolution is now engaged in a vital struggle with imperialism and the aggressor Saddam regime on the one hand, and with the variously-colored forces of anti-revolution and/or the forces of compromise with imperialism, on the other, in order to open the way to advance toward strengthening and deepening the revolution. The forces of anti-revolution and compromise are trying to transform the revolution from within through the use of various means and masks. Despite numerous difficulties, the revolution has succeeded, by relying on the people of cities and villages, and by benefitting from the support of all progressive forces of the world, to protect its gains, set up governmental and revolutionary institutions, and to void the intrigues and devilish plans of imperialism and Zionism one after another.

The Tudeh Party of Iran has had an active and effective participation in the great revolutionary struggle of the Iranian people, in supporting the anti-imperialist and popular stand of Imam Khomeyni and the followers of his path, and in facing the forces of anti-revolution and in exposing anti-revolutionary intrigues. The members of the Party, with total sincerity, dedication and perseverence, have not and do not spare anything, on this road, not even their lives. The plenum considers the policy adopted by the Party in supporting the anti-imperialist and popular line of Imam Khomeyni as a stand of principle, and considers as correct the Party's persistent confrontation with imperialism, Zionism and anti-revolution as well as its struggle against liberalism, sectarianism and monopolism. The plenum considers as methodical and correct the Party's attitude based on unity and criticism endowed with our country's revolutionary democracy, which with a revolutionary Islamic viewpoint has played an important role in the revolution and now stands in resistance against the foreign and domestic enemies of our country and of the revolution and requires that the future Politburo use every effort and initiative in continuing this policy. The Politburo of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran and other party organs under its leadership, have been able, during the revolution and the years which followed--with frankness and initiative yet persistence and firmness--to hold the correct positions in defending the revolution even as imperialism, reaction as well as conservative and compromising forces were subjecting the Party to slanderous assaults, nerve warfare and all-out attacks, and to carry out its difficult responsibilities on the political, organizational and ideological levels. The plenum expresses its reaffirmation and appreciation in this regard and considers essential the continuation of this path and procedure.

4. The plenum studied and approved the draft of the new program of the party. The question of ways of economic, social, political and cultural development of the country after this revolution, and the reconstruction of our society according to the interests of the people in a way that would insure the independence

of the country and the growth, development, well-being and progress of its people, is the central issue for the revolution. The plenum considers that during the period between two plenums our party has made extensive efforts in this regard and has outlined in its new program the most logical ways to progress in various fields. The Party must try to bring about the utmost realization of this program which has been drawn up according to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The plenum assigns the Politburo elected at this meeting the responsibility of completing and publishing the project according to the discussions held at the plenum and to transmit the elaborated views of the Party regarding various aspects of the program to the responsible organs of the Islamic Republic, and, as in the past, to defend democratic freedoms and social justice with full strength, by all means and in a practical manner.

5. World-devouring imperialism is endeavoring, with every devilish intrigues, to convert the Middle East into a dangerous inferno of war and provocation, so that it can protect its plundering positions there. Imperialism, headed by the United States, seeks to eliminate the results of those tension-reducing efforts which the anti-imperialist forces of the world, headed by socialist countries, have forced it to accept. Imperialism and its stooges seek to topple the revolutionary regime of our country. In such circumstances, the sacred duty of leading the thoughts and acts of the Party of the working class toward new successes, the duty of stabilizing, strengthening and deepening the gains of the revolution is facing all of the Party and its leadership. The plenum wishes the Party and its leadership success in this momentous task, and hopes that the Iranian Revolution will achieve final victory. This will be a great event in the history of the captive peoples and a major contribution that our people make to the general evolution of the history of our times. The members of the Tudeh Party of Iran, wherever they may be, must continue as before with the same spirit of self-sacrifice, permanence, logical patience and methodical self-possession to try to be worthy of the fame and traditions of our country's revolutionary movement, as vanguards of the movement, and to strengthen and reinforce the Party's rank and file especially by recruiting as many more workers and toilers as possible.

6. The plenum is deeply grateful to all international revolutionary, labor and progressive parties and organizations throughout the world which have defended and supported our revolution through various means against the incessant intrigues of imperialism and anti-revolution. It is only through such solidarity and joint efforts that the peoples of the world can remove the blood-sucking ogre of imperialism from the road of history and to open the way toward brighter horizons of the liberation of humanity.

7. The plenum fervently sends greetings to the brave fighters of liberation movements of the world, including the freedom-fighters of Palestine, El Salvador and Namibia, and to the noble people of Iraq who are fighting against the Saddam regime, and wishes them success in their rightful and just struggle.

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PROGRAM OF TUDEH PARTY OF IRAN FOR CONSOLIDATION OF REVOLUTION

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 12 Apr 81 pp 3-6

[Text] The life and heroic battle of the Iranian toilers' masses has, within a short period of time, reaffirmed the correctness of the evaluation in the program ratified by the 15th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran [TPI].

This program which offered an overall realistic analysis of the situation of Iran and the world based on a scientific approach of Marxist-Leninist ideology showed that the way to securing the independence, freedom, and the progress of the Iranian society began with the overthrow of the regime of dependent despotic monarchy and the forced plundering rule of the treacherous regime of big landowners and capitalists, which was headed by the corrupt Pahlavi family and was dependent on imperialism.

With the victory of the glorious revolution of our fatherland which was achieved through the sacrifices of tens of millions of workers, farmers, craftsmen, and revolutionary toiling intellectuals, in other words, the deprived section of the society, a large portion of the objectives of the program of the party, which were mentioned as the most urgent goals of the revolution, have been achieved. The regime of dependent despotic monarchy was overthrown; SAVAK was dissolved; a large number of the operators of the detested regime and loyal servants of worldwide imperialism were driven out of the country, and a number of the mercenaries were captured by the revolutionary forces and punished for their crimes and treason; a large portion of the wealth plundered by these mercenaries was retrieved by the people, the Islamic Republic of Iran was established; devastating blows were inflicted on the political, economic military, and cultural dependence of the country and on the plunderous, corrupt, and decayed system of worldwide imperialism; Iran quit the CENTO and this treaty has been thrown into the trashcan; tens of thousands of American and West European advisers were expelled from the country; and an end was put to the enslaving military treaties, purchase of arms and spare parts, and to the U.S. espionage bases.

All of these gains were mentioned point by point in the program of the TPI as the urgent demands of the Iranian revolution. With these changes, the Iranian revolution has moved to a new stage with more extensive duties.

The TPI, the new-level party of the Iranian workers' class, which has chosen the Marxist-Leninist outlook as its guideline for action, is trying to study the issues of the Iranian revolution in the light of this scientific and revolutionary outlook, which is of an anti-imperialistic and popular nature, attempting to work out its program on the basis of this study, and then present it to all the toilers.

The ultimate goal of the TPI is the establishment of socialism and its blooming evolution. In other words, to secure the materialization of a social system in which the principle of ending the exploitation of individual by individual (which has been and is the basis of all plunderous and oppressive regimes from the era of slavery to imperialism, i.e. the final stage of capitalist evolution); to break the chains of subservience and slavery of the toiling masses to the plundering capital, and to create a society of true human freedom--not only for the oppressive classes as in class-societies, but for the tens of millions of deprived masses.

The efforts of the TPI are directed towards the creation of such a humanely superior society, in which all capabilities of its individuals are given equal opportunity for an overall, free growth toward promoting public welfare, culture, and morality.

On the basis of this scientific outlook, the TPI tries all the time to support the actually existing revolutionary movement of the country; in other words, it follows a policy at every stage and at every moment that would help strengthen the people's front against the front of the enemies of the people. The TPI believes that the revolution is the fruit of the actions of the masses, and that as long as the masses are not prepared for revolutionary changes, pseudo-revolutionary exaggerations and resorting to conspiratorial actions under the pretext of revolutionary wrath, no matter how sincere, can result in nothing but the defeat, disappointment, and weakening of the true forces of the revolution.

In the opinion of our party, the issues facing the revolutionary classes and strata of our country today, i.e., the workers, farmers, craftsmen, and hard-working intellectuals, are as follows:

1. To work with all their energy to consolidate, strengthen, and make irreversible the gains of the Iranian revolution; to neutralize through their conscientious struggle the subversive plots of the sworn enemies of the revolution, i.e., worldwide imperialism, worldwide and domestic reaction, headed by U.S. imperialism; and to prevent the submissive compromisers from taking deceitful advantage of weaknesses, shortcomings, mistakes and inefficiencies to deceive the masses, to turn them away from the revolution, and to pave the way for the return of dependence on imperialism.

2. To work towards the fulfillment of all the duties of the national democratic revolution, and to prepare the way for the elevation of the revolution of the level of socialist orientation.

All the efforts of the enemies of the revolution, i.e. the world-devouring imperialism, worldwide reaction, and counterrevolution headed by U.S. imperialism, move in the exact opposite direction of these urgent duties of the revolutionary forces.

The enemies of the Iranian revolution try to make impossible any consolidation and strengthening of the revolution of our fatherland, and in doing so they would not hesitate to resort to any crime. The most important and most practical indirect means the enemies of the Iranian revolution have is to disintegrate the revolutionary forces, to set them against one another, and hence to weaken the front of the revolutionary forces. The Iranian people have now witnessed for more than 2 years this practice of the enemies of the revolution, i.e. the universal and domestic enemies of their fatherland's independence, freedom, and social progress.

I. CONSOLIDATING, STRENGTHENING, AND MAKING IRREVERSIBLE THE GAINS OF THE REVOLUTION

The single most certain way to consolidate and strengthen the revolution is to equip the popular forces to preserve and protect it. The revolution achieved victory through the display of the greatest revolutionary self-sacrifice by tens of millions of urban and rural workers of Iran. Through this struggle they hoped that by overthrowing the criminal, plundering regime of "Aryamehr," the loyal servant of worldwide imperialism, the foundations of this system throughout the country (that is, despotic monarchy on a political level and large land ownership and capitalism on an economic level) would also be destroyed and would break apart the centuries-old enslaving chains of dependence on colonialism, and neo-colonialism.

Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, has many times pointed out the fact that the Iranian revolution has been a revolution of the ghetto-dwellers and the deprived people, and that the palace-dwellers and the privileged classes and strata of the "Aryamehr" society have had no part in it.

It is only possible to consolidate, strengthen, protect, and preserve the gains of this revolution and neutralize the grudging conspiracies of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution and the plots of the submissive elements and compromisers--that is, the plundering capitalists and landowners who use thousands of tricks to divert the revolution from its course--by equipping these tens of millions of toiling masses. This operation is only possible if we move towards those goals for which tens of thousands of these masses were killed and hundreds of thousands crippled--in other words, fundamental changes needed to put an end to their various political, cultural, and economic deprivations.

Repeating unsupported slogans can only keep the masses in temporary expectation and hope. But the masses will finally turn away from these slogans. They will either continue on their own way or they will fall into the traps of those dangerous demagogues of the public who have won the "slogan"-chanting competition. This is a fact unquestionably proven in all the revolutions of the world with no exception, particularly in those of the past few decades.

Tens of millions of the urban and rural deprived masses (i.e. workers, farmers, craftsmen, and the hard-working intellectuals of our homeland)--the great majority who fought under the banner of Islam and those secular forces who took part in the destiny-making battle--both expected from the revolution:

A. To send the regime of despotic monarchy (which from the onset of colonial domination in the world has consistently been the most important tool for the suppression of nations and for keeping the door open for the unchecked plunder of worldwide or domestic plunderers) to the trashcan of history;

B. To end the domination of world-devouring imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism--which, with the help of the Pahlavi family and its classbase (dependent capitalists and big landowners) controlled all the vital arteries of our nation politically, economically, culturally, and in the armed forces--and to secure the overall independence of our homeland;

C. To overthrow the regime of political strangulation, which was the main tool of the domination by foreign and domestic plunderers, and to secure social freedoms for the [socially] deprived and those who struggle for the deprived in order to enable them to fight to end their deprivation;

D. To begin a revolutionary movement for fundamental changes to end the unbearable deprivation emanating from the dependent, plundering, autocratic, criminal regime--that is, all those political, economic, cultural, national, intellectual, ideological deprivations--and to pave the way for safeguarding social justice, the essential, determining core of which is to end the exploitation of individual by individual.

These are the goals for the attainment of which millions of the toiling masses of our homeland, ghetto-dwellers, the barefooted, and the hungry, have fought in this universal historical battle.

These are the goals, part of which our glorious revolution has achieved, and part of which it must still achieve.

The gains of the revolution in regards to these four principle goals are undoubtedly significant and noteworthy, but, unfortunately, it must be said that they are not alike. While great success has been achieved in the overthrow of the regime of despotic monarchy, in limiting the domination of the plundering, domineering imperialists, and in the eradication of the major operators of the dependent regime, no important step has been taken to secure true freedom for the socially deprived--freedom from economic plundering and exploitation as well as fundamental changes to the advantage of the socially deprived to bridle the remnants of plunderers of the overthrown regime. Capitalists and big landowners still control the most vital arteries of the economic life of the people of our fatherland and like leeches suck the blood of tens of millions of the plundered workers. This situation is the source of the greatest threat to the revolution. Large masses of the people, who have been and are still prepared for all kinds of sacrifices for the victory of the revolution, want the revolutionary government, the government

which they have brought to power by spilling their blood, to take serious steps to prevent this plunder and to secure real freedom for the farmers in order to obtain their rights from the big landowners and for the workers to do the same from the capitalists.

THE PEOPLE'S UNITED FRONT--COUNCIL FOR NATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

The consolidation and expansion of the gains of the revolution can only be secured by preparing the masses to defend these gains and to obtain their rights from the plunderers. And the mobilization of the masses is only possible with a movement towards the unity and cooperation of all popular forces, regardless of any political or ideological differences, in a united front in which, on the one hand, they stand firmly and with all their power against the political, economic, military and cultural plots, conspiracies and aggressions of the enemies of the revolution, especially those headed by U.S. imperialism, and on the other hand, use all their power to struggle for the elimination of the principal bases of counterrevolution and imperialism, hiding behind the battlefront throughout Iranian society--that is, big land ownership, capitalism, and all the political or pseudoreligious activities affiliated with them.

Such a union can be lasting, stable and effective when it rises from within the ranks of the people and becomes tempered in the course of struggle towards these revolutionary goals.

Establishing the foundations of such a union will only be possible through the overall strengthening of popular general councils, which would include all the people, except the political and economic dependents and loyal servants of counterrevolution, and would be free of any sort of monopolization by one group or another.

In order to begin such a process, the TPI proposes the immediate formation of a council for national understanding to investigate the creation of a union of all the people. This council will include all political groups, parties and political personalities who sincerely accept the common principles of the protection and preservation of the revolution. These are the principles that have been reflected in Imam Khomeyni's political and social guidelines and were confirmed by tens of millions of the socially deprived masses.

With such a council or congress for national understanding, we can establish the foundations for an all-encompassing popular united front, a united front of the true forces of the revolution, or a united front of the people.

II. THE EXPANSION AND DEEPENING OF THE REVOLUTION AND THE BLOOMING OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

If the popular revolution of Iran should stop in its evolution and expansion, it would be condemned to destruction and regression. Based on this certainty, it is the duty of all truly supportive forces of this popular revolution to employ all in their power to spread it in all aspects--political, economic, cultural, social, and defense--and to make every effort and self-sacrifice along this path.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is undoubtedly the most important gain of the glorious revolution of our fatherland, a revolution judged by Imam Khomeyni to be the result of the countless self-sacrifices of the ghetto-dwellers, the barefooted, and the urban poor, despite various shortcomings and inefficiencies, it does reflect an important portion of the wishes of the people. Eliminating the shortcomings and inefficiencies, and enforcing the guidances of the Constitution which benefit the people can, on the one hand, block the return of the previous plundering, domineering, dependent regime and, on the other, pave the way for progress towards a popular regime in the country. On the basis of this evaluation, the party, while holding to its critical views, confirmed of this Constitution and employed all in its power to implement it.

The TPI believes in the possibility of the society's movement towards securing social justice, equality, and progress within the framework of this Constitution. It offers the following program for this movement, i.e. to spread the Iranian revolution, and is prepared to cooperate truthfully with all the popular forces of the society regardless of philosophical or social differences to achieve these objectives.

A. COMPLETE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE

1. Protecting the territorial integrity of Iran is the most important safeguard for the national unity of all the peoples of our fatherland, who have during the course of many centuries lived together, suffered together, and given their lives together to protect the independence of our common homeland. The TPI condemns any separatism under any name and any pretext, and believes that the Iranian people can obtain their legitimate rights in the best way in all aspects of social life, within the framework of this great national unity.

2. Our progress and social evolution rest in the consolidation of political independence, which was achieved after the revolution, and in expanding the great historical gains into the fields of economy, culture and defense in such a way that all the roads will be closed to the return of neocolonialist domination hiding behind a hypocritical mask of deceit.

3. Eradication of all dependencies, especially economic dependencies left over from the sinister overthrown regime, and freeing our defense forces from absolute dependence for arms on U.S. imperialism and Western Europe are essential to securing national independence.

4. Ensuring Iran's national security and international prestige is basic to the neutralization of all the plots and conspiracies by worldwide imperialism headed by the imperialism of the United States (which will never reconcile itself with the Iranian revolution) against our revolution, national independence and freedom of our fatherland.

B. STRENGTHENING THE COUNTRY'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Imperialism and worldwide reaction--particularly regional reaction which was inflicted a painful blow by the Iranian revolution--will never give up their conspiracies to bring failure to this revolution. The defeated counterrevolution of Iran and the regional reactionary forces, under the command of world imperialism, are always prepared for any criminal conspiracy against the revolution of Iran. Only through increasing the country's defense capabilities and safeguarding its complete internal security could all kinds of conspiracy be blocked.

To defend the revolution, it is necessary for the armed forces to be prepared for defense against any kind of aggression both qualitatively and quantitatively. The quality of the armed forces depends on its unfaltering loyalty on all levels to the goals and objectives of the revolution, and on having at their disposal the modern weapons and the technical ability to use them along with combat readiness. In order to achieve this quality we must:

1. create the basis of a popular and revolutionary army by implementing fundamental changes in the internal system of the army and pave the way to the political growth and social comprehension of the cadres of the armed forces by securing the rights of all its personnel in the political developments of our country;

2. purge the military command and other armed forces of the loyal servants of the overthrown regime;

3. uproot any dependence on imperialism which is the principal, irreconcilable enemy of the Iranian revolution;

4. use every possible means to have a self-sufficient army;

5. provide arms which cannot be produced in the country only when no political or economic conditions are attached, and based on the best, most inexpensive, unconditional bids;

6. strengthen the revolutionary guards corps in all its aspects, including training, arms, equipment, modern light and heavy weapons and organizational improvement as well, so that it can take its proper place in defending the revolution.

C. INDEPENDENT, ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY

Safeguarding national independence and security, and proper conditions for the prosperity of the country's economy is impossible without an independent, active foreign policy which would properly respond to the needs of the Iranian revolution. The foreign policy of Iran during the overthrown regime of monarchy was a subjugated dependent on the aggressive policy of worldwide imperialism. This policy must be changed from the roots up, and Iran's foreign policy should be based on the following principles:

1. the establishment of friendly relations with all those countries of the world which officially recognize our country's independence, and are prepared to support the efforts of our people to consolidate this independence;

2. efforts to be exerted by Iran to actively participate in the movement of the nonaligned countries;

3. Iran's support of the principles of peaceful coexistence and defense of peace;

4. Iran's persistent refusal to participate in any kind of aggressive imperialistic military or paramilitary treaty;

5. political efforts to free the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman from any interference by alien forces;

6. opposition to and active political struggle to prevent the conclusion of aggressive military agreements in the region of the Persian Gulf and the Sea of Oman engineered by the imperialists;

7. efforts to sign a collective security treaty in the Middle East, Near East, and throughout Asia;

8. overall support for national liberation movements in colonialized countries, especially for the movement of the Palestinian people, to crush the military domination of imperialism in the region of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

D. CONSOLIDATION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF FREEDOM AND SAFEGUARDING THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIETY

The blooming of the newly-founded Islamic Republic of Iran is only possible with the free, active participation of all the people's forces--the masses of tens of millions of workers, farmers, craftsmen, and hard-working intellectuals--in determining the destiny of the country. Any attempt to force sectarian and narrow-minded views will slow down, even cripple, the progress of the society.

1. It is possible to secure popular rights and freedoms only when all the social, political and guild-related popular and progressive organizations are given the unrestricted, nondiscriminating opportunity for free and equal activity in publicizing and promoting their views, when no room is given to any sort of monopolism, exertion of pressure, imposition of views, or discrimination by any authority or individual, and when every violation of individual or social rights of individuals and organizations by anyone is subjected to legal prosecution.

2. The Constitution of the Islamic Republic--which is one of the great gains of the glorious revolution of our homeland and for this reason has been confirmed by the TPI--has created an appropriate framework for securing and safeguarding these freedoms. But this Constitution is not devoid of certain

deficiencies and shortcomings. In order to eliminate these defects, this Constitution must be amended to secure the political, economic and social rights of the deprived masses and to make impossible any violation of these rights.

3. Within the framework of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic and its amendments, certain freedoms should be secured and any violation of these freedoms must be subject to legal prosecution, including freedom of thought, religion, expression of views [orally] and in writing, the press, social gatherings, parties, trade-unions, residence, travel, choice of profession, workers' right to strike, defense in the courts, and individual immunities.

4. The articles of the Constitution dealing with the formation of councils (the organs to exercise local administration on levels ranging from villages to provinces) must be fully implemented.

5. In addition to the deprivations suffered by others, the women of our homeland--who have had a great share in the victory of the revolution and are now equally as heroic as men in guarding the revolution--most unfortunately, are bearing the brunt of a series of additional social deprivations because they are "feminine." Although women are praised highly in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, in practice these deprivations not only have not been eliminated, but the pressures have increased as a result of the actions of "sectarian" and "regressive" elements. The truth is that the women of our country still form the deprived half of our society. But the blooming of our country depends on securing complete equality with men for women in all the fields of the social life.

E. THE NATIONALITY ISSUE

Our country is a multinational one in which different peoples and nationalities with different languages, cultures, customs, and religious beliefs have molded together in the course of a long history to make a single nation. They have given their lives for this country and have contributed a valuable culture to the world. In this single nation, it is necessary to safeguard national unity, protect independence and territorial integrity, and ensure voluntary union without the domination of one nationality over another. To endorse any kind of restriction on, discrimination against, or humiliation of national minorities by majorities of the country is treasonous to national unity and independence. It will provide the opportunity for the enemies of the revolution and our people to sow the seeds of discord and to destroy the unity and interdependence of the people, to pit them against each other, thus weakening the newly founded republic of Iran, and pave the way for the revival of their oppressive domination.

For this reason, the recognition by the revolution of the right to administrative and cultural autonomy (or self-rule) and the elimination of backwardness--resulting from the reactionary policies of the overthrown regime--for all the non-Persian nationalities are some of the fundamental bases of national unity and among the most important safeguards of the country's independence

and territorial integrity. This is the only possible solution to the nationality problem--which is to say, to put an end to one of the most painful deprivations of the plundering capitalist society. The past 100-year history of Iran indicates that deadly silence can be imposed through military suppression for a period of time. But under these circumstances, not even one step forward can be taken towards the unity of the people.

Religious minorities residing in Iran, whose rights have officially been recognized in the Constitution must live in complete security under the protection of the Islamic Republic and must be free to use their own language and expand their own culture and national traditions.

F. STRENGTHENING THE COUNCIL SYSTEM AS THE BEST WAY TO SECURE THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE IN DETERMINING THEIR OWN DESTINY

In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the article concerning the system of government, we read:

"The Constitution is a safeguard to negate any mental or social despotism or economic monopoly, and it will work to break from the despotic system by placing the destiny of the people in their own hands."

The only way to truly implement this principle is to consolidate a system of councils on all levels and in all dimensions. By establishing such a system, masses of tens of millions of toilers will take their destiny into their own hands and will safeguard the security of the society in the best possible way.

Councils in the villages, factories, workshops, schools and offices to participate in management and program planning; executive councils in villages, districts, cities, townships, provinces, and regions inhabited by national minorities; and the Islamic Consultative Assembly as well, are all bases of true democracy for the people and will create the best organization for the people to participate in the management of the affairs of the country.

G. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRY'S ECONOMY

The economy of our country during the several decades of the domination of imperialism and its Iranian partners--the Phalavi family, big landowners and dependent capitalists--has distinctly evolved towards securing the interests of the privileged minority and maximum plundering of the country by imperialist monopolies and their partners in Iran and has been dependent on the economy of the imperialist world. The consequence of such a treacherous policy is what we are witnessing today.

In terms of natural resources, our country is among the richest in the world. It would be sufficient to point out in this regard that despite the oil resources being plundered by the blood-thirsty imperialist consortium, only in the 5 years prior to the revolution we received more than $100 billion, a sum which was only a small portion of the value of the plundered oil. This is only a small item of our great national wealth that can be used for economic growth.

In terms of national culture, ability, creativity and perseverance, the people of our country have no shortcomings in comparison with those of other nations. Our country has human resources and natural wealth, large arable lands, great resources for animal husbandry, in short, all the factors necessary for economic growth. But we see that as a result of the forceful domination of plunderous imperialism and its loyal servants, today our homeland is holding its hand out to imperialist markets for even needles, nails, bread, meat, cheese, and thousands of other small and large items.

What we are witnessing today is the result of 60 years of domination by the regime of big landowners and capitalists dependent on worldwide imperialism. The only way to escape this miserable situation is to put an end to the semi-feudalistic economy and dependent capitalism. The history of all those "third world" countries who have followed the ominous path of capitalistic growth and the history of our own country clearly prove the futility and inability of this road to growth in overcoming historical backwardness. The only way to destroy the roots of the misfortunes that dominate our present society is to follow a noncapitalistic path to growth--that is, to found a popular economy aimed at establishing social justice and ending the plundering domination of big landowners and capitalists and their cohorts, on the one hand, and spreading and developing the overall economy of the country to achieve maximum self-sufficiency and social well-being, on the other.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has laid a significant cornerstone for the foundation f such an economic orientation. We must build a popular, progressive economy on this foundation. As a move in this direction, the TPI finds necessary:

1. THE ISSUE OF THE OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTION EQUIPMENT AND THE WAY TO GROWTH

The most important issue concerning the orientation of the economy of the country is determining the exact way to economic and social growth and to set the standards for the ownership of the means for industrial production, agriculture, land, and residential units. The Constitution has foreseen the three sectors--governmental, cooperative, and private--of the economy of the country and, to a certain extent, the functions of these sectors have been outlined.

The TPI believes that the blooming of the country's economy and securing social justice can only be achieved through the uninterrupted growth of the governmental and cooperative sectors of the economy and through limiting the activities of the private sector in auxiliary areas through moderate and small investments under the complete control of the government. This governmental control must include accumulation and increase of investments and the profit margins of these investments. Any other solution which would not limit the accumulation of capital and profit margins will pave the way for the return of the domination of plundering capitalism. Presently, capitalist trade operations and, to a certain extent, dependent capitalism in real estate and housing have threatened all the people, which has necessitated an overall struggle to uproot this plundering domination and has raised the issue of limiting capital investments in these areas by the largest strata of Iranian society.

The noncapitalist way to growth depends on limiting the field of capitalist activities in the private sector, and controlling the profit margins, on the one hand, and on the other, on the overall economic expansion of the governmental and cooperative sectors in industrial production, production of light industrial and agricultural goods, and the distribution of consumer goods.

2. THE OVERALL EXPANSION OF GOVERNMENTAL AND COOPERATIVE SECTORS

The one safeguard for orientation in a popular economy is the overall expansion of the governmental and cooperative sectors in all areas of the economy, i.e. industries, agriculture, and services. Only through the overall expansion of the governmental sector can we bring under control the private sector--which is always trying to expand and revive the plundering capitalist system--and redirect the total economy of the country towards satisfying the demands of the masses of tens of millions of urban and rural toilers, and the overall progress of the country towards complete economic independence.

Only through the expansion of the governmental and the cooperative sectors can the economy be managed according to a program, without which economic independence cannot be achieved.

The expansion of the cooperative sector will secure the opportunity of the large segment of the people, especially the toilers, to participate in determining their own destiny, and will provide them with the opportunity to free themselves both in production and in acquiring their means of living from the plundering claws of big landowners and capitalists. The expansion of the cooperative sector is one of the bases for the economic freedom of the toilers, which in turn is one of the bases of political and social freedom.

3. SCIENTIFIC PLANNING FOR THE ECONOMY COMPLEX

In our time, with the extensive growth in forces and resources for production, the increase in the everyday needs of the people, and the expansion of various connections with the outside world, the economy of the country has become a very intricate complex. Under such conditions, the coordination of all the effective constituent factors in this complex have become particularly important. The increase in various crises and the rise in the rate of various incurable diseases in the capitalist societies reaffirm the necessity and the importance of scientific planning to manage the economy of the country. Especially in the course of the future economic evolution of our country, which will begin to undergo a very difficult and complicated period of change, such scientific planning will play a determining role. In our world today, valuable experiences in planning economic programs based on scientific knowledge and specific goals have been achieved, which must be used in planning programs for the economic development of the country.

4. IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURAL AND ANIMAL HUSBANDRY ECONOMY

To create a sound and popular agricultural and animal husbandry economy in the interest of the peasants, the following steps must be taken:

a. The remnants of the feudalistic economy, which still exist in the form of the owners of large tracts of arable land, must be eliminated. The truth is that even after 2 years since the victory of the revolution, this major support-base of the overthrown regime, which squeezes more than 10 percent of the people in its claws, is still intact. Big landowners have retained their economic and political power in the countryside, and are still the most dangerous base of support for counterrevolution.

On the threshold of the victory of the revolution, more than 50 percent of the country's best arable land, and a larger percentage of water, agricultural equipment, and cattle, were under the control of the big landowners. And most unfortunately, no significant change has occurred as yet. The statistics of the Islamic Republic show that at the present time more than 50 percent of the Iranian rural population consists of landless farmers. Consequently, several millions of Iranian villagers have either no land or very little land for farming.

The latest statistics of the Islamic Republic indicate that of the 164 million hectares of land, only less than 10 million hectares are being cultivated, of which 6.3 hectares are used in dry farming and only 3.7 million hectares in irrigated farming.

The population of the toiling Iranian farmers amounts to 18 million, which is made up of approximately 3.5 million families. Hence, if all the arable lands were divided equally among the families, each five-member family would receive only 1 hectare of irrigated land and 1.7 hectares of dry farming land.

There are about 26 billion square meters of water available for agriculture. This amount can be used to irrigate about 4 million hectares of land.

These statistics show how necessary and urgent it is to find a solution to the land reform issue to satisfy the minimum subsistence of the poverty-stricken toiling villagers, who are the most deprived strata of our society.

These statistics also illustrate that the solution to the problem of increasing the arable land and provision of water through even ordinary scientific and technical means has become one of the most urgent issues of the economic foundations of our country.

The revolutionary decision of the Revolutionary Council concerning land reform, which was taken after the discharge of the bourgeois liberal government, was an important step toward eradicating this counterrevolutionary base. Most unfortunately, reaction, personified in the form of big landowners, capitalists, and a segment of the clergy dependent on them (the royal preachers), has been able to prevent the enforcement of this popular decision which benefits the deprived villagers by resorting to every means, especially taking advantage of the difficulties resulting from the imposed U.S.-Saddam war. The TPI finds necessary and demands the implementation of these reforms as a fundamental step in bringing about radical changes in the economic system of the country.

b. To form and strengthen, on an all-out scale, the farmers' agricultural production cooperatives on a voluntary basis is the second essential step in putting an end fo the misery existing in the Iranian villages.

Merely by giving land without helping to bring about the organization and cooperation of the farmers and without financial assistance for obtaining sufficient water, agricultural instruments, seeds, fertilizers, and insecticides, the agricultural economy cannot be saved from the present impasse. It is impossible to raise agricultural production without the use of scientific and technical methods (i.e. without employing agricultural machines, chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and new advanced agricultural methods). And within the framework of small, single-family agricultural units the use of such methods is also impossible. Only by forming production and various other cooperatives (such as credit, sales, and consumer cooperatives) to support the toiling farmers, and by providing them with the necessary agricultural insurances can we approach the goals of the revolution in agricultural areas.

c. Buying the surpluses of agricultural production from the farmers and from the agricultural production cooperatives by the government, and eliminating speculators, middle-men, "wholesale merchants," and those who work for them.

d. Basing the price of the purchase of agricultural products on precise economic assessment, such as weather and production conditions, in such a way that unfavorable atmospheric conditions for agriculture would not disasterously pressure the weak rural and the cooperative economy.

e. Using financial resources to employ the latest scientific and technical findings to provide new water resources and prevent the waste of available water. Using subterranean water resources and desalinating salt-water for use in cultivating certain agricultural products. This is another vital step for the agricultural development of our country.

f. The creation of centers for agricultural machinery, repair shops--in general, moving towards the mechanization of all segments of agricultural production in order to effectively help rural economy--conservation in the work force, raising agricultural yields, and, in later stages, helping the cooperative economy are of vital importance in achieving self-sufficiency.

g. The TPI believes that simultaneously with the full-scale strengthening of agricultural cooperatives in all areas (production, provision of raw materials, sale of surpluses), to a degree embracing the major part of rural economy, special attention must be paid to the governmental segment of the agricultural economy, both in farming and animal husbandry. The maintenance and development of large agricultural and industrial units, like Dasht-e Moghan, the lands in the vicinity of the Dez Dam and the establishment of similar units in other parts of the country should be of high priority in the government program.

h. One of the country's greatest shortcomings is in the domestic production of meat, chicken, fish, dairy products, eggs, etc. In order to overcome

these shortcomings and to prevent the loss of large sums of our oil revenues spent on these items while importing from other countries, the three fundamental segments of raising and keeping domestic animals--traditional natural (tribal), single farm family, and industrial breeding--must, through precise planning, be strengthened and developed in cooperatives and large governmental units. Only through developing the raising of animals can we achieve self-sufficiency in all these areas.

i. The tribes of the country make up a mass population of several million, who play an undeniable role in the country's animal husbandry and agricultural resources. It is an important revolutionary duty to study and identify their particular problems and find clear solutions while taking into account all their particular economic cultural, traditional, and political concerns. We must provide this nearly 6 million people with the fruits of civilization, development, and scientific and technological findings. But even before that, they should be provided with the most primary living conditions worthy of the revolutionary era. Without haste and simple-mindedness, we must prepare the ground for the continual growth of tribal production and for overcoming backwardness; we must value the role of the tribes in providing the country with many of its economic needs and we must improve this role both qualitatively and quantitatively.

j. Our forests are a great and valuable source of wealth. If they are cared for and preserved, they will provide us with unending useful benefits. We must do our utmost to preserve and develop the forests, transform forestry into an active and effective institution in our national economy, prevent any uncontrolled plunder of the forests and the cutting of trees, and devise a detailed scientific program for responsible use of the forests as a self-perpetuating resource.

k. The creation of a basic change in the agricultural loan and credit system is another important and necessary step. In other words, at present, loans are to be given collectively (to cooperatives or village councils), on the spot, under supervision, at proper times and in sufficient amounts to be effective in production. The agricultural cooperative bank can plan an important, effective role in revitalizing our agriculture, in improving the living and working conditions of the farmers, and in strengthening the real units of rural cooperative institutions in the villages.

l. Rural construction, renovation of the villages, and building rural roads are among the issues which have a direct and immediate impact on the revitalization of our economy. The existing situation is so tragic and the standards so low that without a change at least in housing conditions, improvement of the villages--putting an end to the horrible educational and health conditions--as well as a minimum improvement in the living environment and the creation of secondary roads, there is no hope for serious, fundamental change in the agricultural economy. To achieve these objectives urgently, cooperation and coordination between the revolutionary institutions and corresponding governmental establishments following a definite program and time table will be required.

m. The creation of an agricultural planning system on short-, medium- and long-term bases in various fields with regards to the priorities and the requirements of the revitalization and growth of a healthy, independent agricultural economy with regards to variety in production and with regards to the roles and the share of the three sectors--governmental, cooperative, and private--must certainly be put into action in order to achieve the planned goals of the revolution.

5. INDUSTRY AND MINES

The process of industrializing the country during the domination of the dependent monarchy was only carried out with adopting a direction to secure the maximum profit for the capitalist monopolies of the imperialist countries and the dependent plundering capitalist class of Iran, and it is sick from top to bottom. Such was the objective of uncontrolled expansion of assembly industries, which make up the major part of the country's industry. Today, when our country is trying to break the chains of economic dependence, we feel the painful consequences down to our very bones.

The only way to secure the economic independence of our homeland (which is the basis for securing independence in other fields) begins with the overall development of heavy industry and making the most of the natural wealth and resources of the country. The significance of this approach is exemplified in the most positive role of the only important industrial units created in the country, such as the steel-mill industrial complex at Esfahan, the machine-tools factories of Arak and Tabriz, and the tractor factory, all of which were built with the technical and economic cooperation of socialist countries, and some of which were mutilated as a result of neocolonialist policies.

On the basis of the above, the TPI believes that the process of industrialization of the country must begin with giving priority to heavy industries, all of which will be concentrated in the governmental sector based on a precise scientific program. Any deviation from this only orientation directed toward economic development will endanger the economic independence of the country, and will pave the way for the return of dependence on the imperialist world.

With even limited oil and natural gas exports, our country has the necessary capital for creating heavy industries while simultaneously taking care of the people's daily living needs. We are able to build the basic structure of the Iranian economy by employing all the resources in the world which are favorable and appropriate to the Iranian revolution, especially the favorable possibilities that socialist countries and other countries, which are free from imperialist domination, can provide for the Iranian revolution.

The national wealth of our country enables us to develop light industries along with heavy industries--particularly metallurgy, petrochemistry, and machine-tools manufacturing--and to expand light industries, i.e. by manufacturing consumer goods, and to rapidly move towards self-sufficiency.

Regarding the expansion of economic activities utilizing the natural wealth, especially oil, natural gas, and other mineral deposits, the TPI believes that this wealth belongs to the future generations of our homeland as well, and that the value of these materials will increase every day. Mines must only be exploited to fulfill our needs for investment in heavy industries and attaining self-sufficiency. Any use of these resources to make unnecessary luxury items is an act of treachery to the future generations of our people. Maximum conservation in this area is a great national duty.

6. FOREIGN TRADE

Worldwide experiences and the experiences of the past 60 years in our country confirm the fact that foreign trade is one of the major channels of the domination of imperialist monopolies over the country's economy, one of the channels that enables the joint plunder of foreign and domestic plunderers and the unobstructed drain of the most significant part of the national wealth and the fruit of the labor of workers.

On the basis of precisely this understanding, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic considers the nationalization of foreign trade as one of the important economic principles.

The complete enforcement of this principle of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic is one of the most important demands of the Iranian people in securing economic independence.

The TPI believes that this principle must be enforced in the shortest possible time and in all its dimensions. The TPI is of the opinion that with nationalized foreign trade, all economic transactions with the outside world must be based on the following:

a. For imports: quality of merchandise and a reasonable price, with no political ties or conditions whatsoever.

b. For exports: a reasonable price, accepting no imposed ties or conditions whatsoever.

7. DOMESTIC TRADE AND DISTRIBUTION OF GOODS

Domestic trade and the distribution of general consumer goods are of utmost importance to the economy of the country and are determining factors in the economic complex. Before the revolution, this segment was almost totally monopolized by capitalists and petit bourgeois merchants. It was controlled by big capitalists who were dependent on the regime of absolute monarchy and on imperialism, and enabled the unrestricted plunder of the fruits of the labor of tens of millions of urban and rural toilers. And since the revolution, except for some very limited steps (such as the distribution of sugar), not only has no significant change occurred in this situation and no effective action been taken to limit unnecessary imports, but lack of control of and restriction on big merchants--that is, the operators of the bazaars, dealers, and middle-men--robbing the people through raising the prices of everyday

consumer goods has taken on dangerous and threatening proportions. Most unfortunately, the government of the Islamic Republic has thus far only given advice and preached, thinking that in this way they can change the nature of these leech-like thieves. Obviously, this method only serves to make the uninformed people hopeful for a short time, and to pacify them.

The fact is, taking advantage of the economy by the capitalists whose existence is threatened, not only invites plunder but is used as a political lever to spread discontent among the people and to turn them away from the revolution.

The victory of the popular revolution in this battlefield is possible only when:

1. the provisions apparatus--that is, the purchase of major manufactured goods from factories, workshops, and small manufacturers--is taken away from big capitalists and transferred to the governmental sector and large cooperatives;

2. all middle-men, both in the areas of provisions and distribution, are eliminated and the centers for the wholesale of provisions are connected directly with the lower ring of distribution, that is, with retailers, distribution cooperatives, and the network of government stores;

3. the creation, parallel to the small distribution network, of an extensive and all-encompassing governmental cooperative distribution network, which is the sole factor in the stabilization of prices and fighting inflation and speculators.

8. SERVICES

As we are witness, services, with their many branches are expanding daily in our ever-growing society and are already an important factor in the economy, which affects the daily lives of the largest strata of the society. Until now, this sector has grown within the framework of the unbridled, uncontrolled developed economy and has gradually become an uncontrollable part of the economy.

Public well-being demands that in this sector just regulations and proportions between the services performed and wages received be established to secure the needs of the people. The only possible way to achieve these goals is to create a governmental network of services to stabilize and set wages and an all-encompassing cooperative for this sector. At the same time, these cooperatives will help to effectively provide the provisions needed by the services sector.

H. SOCIAL REFORMS

1. JUST DISTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL INCOME

The just distribution of national income which has been anticipated in the Constitution is one of the most important duties of the people's revolutionary government.

The rule of the monarchical regime of the big landowners and dependent capitalists was based on the plunder of the national wealth and the deadly subjugation of the tens of millions of toiling masses by the ruling class. The ultimate victory of the revolution depends on the overthrow and uprooting of this plundering system and the establishment of a just system for the distribution of the national income in its place. Achieving this lofty goal can only be possible when:

a reasonable balance is established in accordance with the conditions and resources and taking into consideration scientific standards and calculations--between the part of the national income set aside to help raise the level of the society's economy, and the part to be set aside for consumption, which will be divided scientifically and reasonably into two parts, that for public use and that for private use;

based on the national income as well as the requirements for economic growth, a just balance and proportion is established between minimum and maximum incomes not only in the governmental and cooperative sectors but also in the private sector;

accurate taxation laws are enforced decisively and continuously in order to regulate the just distribution of income and as a preventive measure against the unjust accumulation of wealth. The government's budget must not be an instrument for the revival of the distribution of the national wealth to the advantage of the plunderers but a means to redistribute the wealth to the advantage of the toiling people.

2. WORK, WAGES, SALARIES

In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the question of providing jobs and the tools of work for all individuals of the society who have the preparedness and ability to work has been considered as a principle.

It is certain that given the continual growth of the country's population, limited job opportunities in villages, and the continual migration to the cities, the population of the cities and subsequent demands for jobs will increase daily; hence, what has become an extremely difficult problem for the government today will become more difficult day after day. Thus, it is the duty of the people's revolutionary government to implement the following:

a. providing jobs for these millions of masses;

b. expanding the expertise of workers with the increase in technical resources and job training;

c. minimum wages and salaries dependent on urgent needs and appropriate to the working and geographic conditions, and which fluctuate to prevent any undesirable effects on the lives of the workers due to the fluctuating economy, as well as living allowance to workers and employees with large families, depending on family size;

d. progressive labor laws based on the rightful demands of the workers;

e. safeguarding retirement salaries for all urban and rural laborers;

f. reducing the maximum working hours per week, depending on the progress and development of the country's economy, immediate reduction of the work hours of heavy labor (such as working in mines, at furnaces in steel mills, and the like), and of jobs hazardous to health (such as sanitary institutions, chemical plants, etc), and equal annual leave for workers and employees;

g. official recognition of the collective contracts for the workers of industrial and agricultural units;

h. enforcing the principle of equal wages and salaries for equal work for female workers;

i. the creation of an overall network of nurseries and kindergartens to assist working women providing the opportunity for the social training of youngsters in preschool years, and the establishment of maternity wards for several villages in the proximity of each other, in order to aid the villagers.

3. PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL INSURANCE

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic has provided for free public health and social insurances for all the people.

But the reality in our society is that our national health services are in a very backward state. Only the well-to-do and wealthy social strata are able to use these services. Only with a true revolution can an end be put to this painful backwardness. For this, it is necessary to:

a. nationalize all areas of the health services sector, and to have the government undertake the responsibility for health services and their just implementation in cities and villages;

b. take steps to eliminate the great shortcomings in the health services area by expanding medical schools and sanitary colleges, and by creating a network of schools to train medics, admitting local students for training in medical and health-care based on local needs and requirements;

c. move towards the elimination of this painful backwardness by creating throughout the country and for all the people a large network of dispensaries, hospitals, maternity wards, and recuperation facilities;

d. create a complete network of mobile laboratories and dispensaries for places with small, scattered populations;

e. provide special establishments for the handicapped, the aged, and patients who are incurably ill;

f. eliminate the shortcomings concerning social insurances, with its very limited provisions made in the laws of the country that by no means respond to the vital needs of the toilers of our country. This can be done by devising and implementing a progressive and full-scale social insurances law to

benefit the urban and rural toilers, laws that respond to all the treatment and health services requirements, in unemployment, in illness, infirmity, old age and inability to work.

4. THE SOLUTION TO THE HOUSING PROBLEM

One of the greatest difficulties of the tens of millions of the deprived masses of our society is the problem of housing, which is at the same time one of the uncontrolled areas plundered by "build and sell" and rent-sharking capitalists. During the 50-year rule of the previous regime land sharks, headed by the Pahlavi family, stole billions and billions of rials of the national wealth, the national income, and the fruits of the labor of toilers by artifically raising the price of land in the cities, either transferring the money abroad or reinvesting it internally to replunder the country. During that period of the plundering regime, all building activities were devoted to the creation of palaces, large and small, for the plunderers and their operators, and in creating urban establishments for the urban rich, the wealthy, well-to-do strata of the society. But no changes were made in the miserable housing conditions of millions and millions of urban and rural toilers. There are still millions of people living in ghettos and ghetto-like places resembling Zurabad, Hasirabad, and Halabiabad, or in damp clay houses in villages.

Most unfortunately, the fact must be mentioned that since the victory of the revolution even considering the existing resources, no effective action has been taken to solve the problem of housing through the just distribution of existing residential buildings. In Tehran alone, there are more than 100 thousand spacious, empty, unused residential units belonging to large leech-like "speculating" owners while thousands of toiling families are looking for houses and millions of the socially deprived live miserably in holes they call houses and rooms.

The solution to the housing problem is one of the most important duties of the people's government. It must be viewed as one of the most important economic concerns of the people's lives and be concentrated on as a major determining issue in the governmental and cooperative sectors. Only through the preparation and implementation of a comprehensive, long-term program can we overcome this social problem, and only through the overall development of the activities of the governmental and cooperative sectors in low-priced housing for toilers can we control the private sector, which is active in building houses, and use its resources within the framework of a general planning.

Assistance to builders of private homes as well can only yield positive results if it is within the framework of such a general planning, which would make reasonable use of building materials, manpower, and city planning requirements.

5. EDUCATION

One of the most painful and enraging legacies of the dependent, colonialized regime of the Pahlavi family is the backwardness in public education. Still more than 60 percent of our people are illiterate. Of village women, who make up more than 30 percent of our population, more than 95 percent are illiterate.

Vocational, high-school, and higher education, too, are similarly backward when compared to the ever-increasing needs of Iranian society. It would be sufficient only to compare the number of students enrolled in medical schools in 1358 [1979-80] with the number required to meet the needs of our society.

In order to eliminate this shortcoming, a great struggle should be started. The efforts of the government of the Islamic Republic in building schools in the villages, closing down "privileged" schools, and teaching the illiterate are commendable, but these drops cannot quench the educational thirst of our society. These objectives can only be actually achieved when:

a. the completion and expansion of the educational network throughout the country--with priority given to the backward regions--are considered among the most important and urgent duties of the revolutionary government;

b. eight years of compulsory education is provided for all children of cities and villages alike;

c. in non-Persian regions, native languages are taught in keeping with existing possibilities;

d. a large network for vocational training is created throughout the country to afford all the young people the opportunity for vocational training;

e. the network of high schools is expanded to fulfill the needs of the country;

f. the institutions of higher education are expanded both qualitatively and quantitatively, especially in technical, scientific, and medical fields, devising and implementing a program for self-sufficiency in these fields at the earliest opportunity;

g. the creation of an academy of sciences of Iran, the establishment of a large network of scientific and technical research centers, and taking total advantage of the findings of science and technology accomplished throughout the world.

6. SOCIAL CULTURE

Cultural gains are among the most valuable fruits of the historical struggles of the masses, peoples and nations in the course of their movement towards progress and human civilization.

The people of our homeland are proud to have been, in the course of their long history, in the forefront of the peoples who have created the world's culture and enjoy a rich treasure of national culture.

The great duty of the revolutionary and progressive forces of the society is to hold dear this rich popular and national culture of the people in all its colorful, beautiful, fabulous and valuable dimensions, and to help its advancement more than ever before, and with all their energy.

One of the most painful consequences of the criminal domination of the regime of dependent monarchy in the past century has been the free access given to the domination of colonialist culture in our country, and the efforts of the treacherous ruling classes to abandon our national culture into oblivion. For this reason, the cultural revolution--a decisive fight against illiteracy and semi-literacy, purging the society and the cultural atmosphere of the country of various colonialistic and imperialistic cultural weeds--is one of the most important duties of the glorious revolution of our fatherland. We must ensure that the fight of decolonization of the cultural atmosphere not be accompanied by various maladies of deculturalization on a large scale, and the domination of regressive ideologies. This danger actually and undoubtedly exists, and we are presently witnessing its unpleasant consequences in our society.

It is true that the national culture of the peoples of our country has historical ties with the cultures of many of Iran's neighbors, but this does not mean that we should negate the distinct historical personalities and identities of the national cultures of the peoples living in Iran in all areas including literature, music, theater, painting, etc., and try to bury them in the bed of the general culture of other peoples. The motto of all true revolutionary forces must be: let us dry up the roots of colonialistic, imperialistic culture in the cultural atmosphere of our country, and prepare the ground for the unprecedented development and growth of our national culture, that is, the cultural treasure of all the brother peoples of our country, i.e. the Persians, the Azarbayjan is, the Kurds, Baluchis, Arabs, and Turkomans.

The TPI considers any attempt to imprison the national culture as a sign of cultural backwardness, and believes that such backwardness can only give rise to the growth of regressive inclinations, and will have painful consequences for the social progress of our homeland.

7. THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The overall advancement of the social life of our homeland in all areas is impossible without taking advantage of the findings of science and technology. The era of paying backbreaking prices for these findings as imported goods must be brought to an end. This is only possible when progress in these areas becomes one of the most important points of the program of social development, and all the enslaving chains of regression and fogyism are torn from the limbs of the overall growth of science and technology.

The TPI believes that the academy of sciences--which includes natural, social, medical, and agricultural sciences and the humanities, etc--as well as scientific and technical research centers in all important technical fields should be established, and sufficient resources for their expansion be provided.

8. SPORTS

In civilized, developed societies of today sports have become not only one of the most important means of public health but also one of the most important means of nurturing humanitarianism as well as entertainment and relaxation after hard work. Sports are vital for the physical well-being and moral soundness of the youths.

The TPI believes that sports should become a general pasttime of the young and the old, and that providing the means and the opportunity for this pasttime should be a duty of high priority for all executive organizations and social institutions from village councils to the central government of the Islamic Republic. Sports must be freed from their present narrow framework and should be made available to the general public in schools, factories, government institutions, townships, and villages.

9. TOTAL TRAINING OF THE YOUTH

In order that the children and the young people of our country become prepared to carry out their historical duties in the future, attention must be paid to providing opportunities for their overall development. The experiences of developed countries have shown that in addition to organized education in schools, the creation of a large network of sports, research, artistic, scientific, and technical establishments and organizations contribute greatly to the free, voluntary activities of the youth.

The TPI believes that the establishment of youth clubs which would provide the young people with all the necessary facilities is one of the urgent duties of the government and all popular social institutions.

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The TPI thus presents its program, which expresses the national and democratic wishes of the masses of tens of millions of the deprived and toiling people of the cities and villages of our society at the present historical stage. The struggle to achieve the goals of this program is the duty of every patriotic Iranian who supports all-round social progress.

The TPI calls on all its members, the supporters of the party, all the progressive strata and classes of the society, especially the workers and their allies--farmers, craftsmen, hard-working intellectuals, and all the Iranian people--to exert efforts to implement this program which is the only way to secure the freedom and prosperity of the Iranian people, and a guide for proceeding towards the overall development of our country.

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TUDEH PARTY 17TH PLENUM CONSIDERED 'HISTORIC EVENT'

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 18 Apr 81 pp 3, 6

> [Text] The 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran, which was held this month in Tehran and of which ratified documents as well as the announcement were published in NAMEH-YE MARDOM, is a historical event for our Party. We have not used the term "historical" as an adjective for this event incidentally or rhetorically. In fact, the work of the 17th Plenum, its role in the life of our Party, and the documents prepared will undoubtedly be recorded in the history of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the modern party of the working class, as the manifestation of a distinct stage in the evolution of the Party, the beginning of a new stage, and a guideline on the difficult winding and glorious road that our Party has left behind.

Our ancient country is presently going through a stormy, era-forming stage. During this most sensitive, vital period, our Party has been able to, despite problems and unfavorable conditions, to play its proud role in defending the revolution and strengthening the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in the hard struggle to deepen the revolution and to solve the vital problems of its destiny, which moves along an anti-imperialistic, popular anti-exploitation, democratic, goal. The 17th Plenum was a significant manifestation of the place, role, and mission of the Tudeh Party of Iran in the process of the great revolution of Iran.

The report of the Central Committee's Politburo concerning the activities of the Party since the 16th Plenum (Esfand 57 [Feb-Mar 79])--immediately after the revolution until today--and the program of the Tudeh Party of Iran which contains the essence of our views and proposals for the protection and preservation of the revolution as well as its overall deepening and expansion are examples of scientific and realistic analysis, political depth and foresight, dignity and farsightedness in action, revolutionary zeal and social courage, all of which have characterized our Party during this period of time.

ANALYSIS OF PAST EVENTS

The 17th Plenum was able to respond to our vital needs and concrete demands during this destiny-making period in the history of the revolution and our country. It was able to carry out meritoriously the great duties which were assigned to the leadership

of the Party and were to be discussed and decided upon in a gathering of the principal and consultant members of the Central Committee with a number of responsible and cadre-members of the Party present, i.e., the plenary session.

The overall analysis of the situation in the country and the process of the Iranian revolution, with all its complications and numerous peculiarities, and an investigation of the Party's activities in various fields, an important undertaking, was concluded based on the Politburo's report. This analysis became the cornerstone of our future activities. The Tudeh Party of Iran's forty years of experience and struggle in defending the independence, freedom and progress of Iran and the interests of the toilers of our country, and the unfaltering loyalty to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism was the strong foundation upon which our Party was able to devise and carry out the correct class policy of stabilization, strengthening, and expansion of the anti-imperialistic and popular revolution, and of the stabilization and strengthening of the organizations of the Tudeh Party of Iran, as well as improving its activities in the course of the ebbs and flows of the last two years, in the heart of the great complications of the Iranian revolution, and faced with all those peculiarities which would negate any kind of simplistic, mechanical copying. It was also as a logical consequence of this policy that the 17th Plenum was able to successfully complete its work of adding up, evaluating, and analyzing the many experiences of this two-year period.

The comrades who were present at the 17th Plenum, the original and consultant members of the Central Committee, as well as the responsible comrades and the cadres, were inspired by the lives, struggle, and the courage of those comrades alongside and with whom they had started on this difficult, heroic path. The comrades at the plenum emphatically agreed that the memory of those comrades shed a light of confidence, hope, courage, and intelligence over the work of the plenum. It was not merely a ceremonial act when the 17th Plenum began its work with a moment of silence as a sign of deep respect for those comrades who were not among us anymore, but whose memories and the fruits of whose efforts and devotion remain forever--those who passed away, those who were martyred, those who were killed in the battlefield of imposed war their exemplary lives, battles, and the message that they will forever give to the Tudeh members--as they will make us more decisive in continuing along the path to the stabilization, strengthening and deepening of the revolution, will help us think more clearly, and will fill our hearts with more enthusiasm.

THE FUTURE PROGRAM AND LINE

Furthermore, the 17th Plenum is also of historical importance because it opened the way for the future activities of the Party. We are at the threshhold of a qualitative change to deepen the revolution, and we must bring our policy and our activities to a level appropriate to this stage. Our previous party program which was ratified at the 15th Plenum in 1354 [1975-76] centered around the axis of a struggle to overthrow the dependent monarchy and the creation of a republic based upon the foundations of defending the interests of the toiling masses and upon independence and freedom. At this moment, when the Iranian peoples under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni have created a proud historical epic through a glorious revolution in a persistent bloody battle, that program can no longer respond to this new stage in the evolution of the revolution. Life itself has presented us with the necessity of devising a new program. The 17th Plenum ratified the Party's program for the future social forces

whose goal is the overall stabilization, strengthening and expansion of the anti-imperialistic and popular revolution. This program is now the basis for the action of all the party comrades and all the friends and supporters of the Party, and is presented to all the true revolutionaries and all interested in the destiny of our revolutionary country for their judgments. This document clarifies the future direction of the Party and is based on the experiences of the past as well as an accurate clear analysis of the present situation.

Our views and proposals for the strengthening and expansion of the gains of the revolution, and for making the revolutionary process irreversible, that is, the way to confirm the gains of our great revolution as well as its decisive and final victory, are expressed in this document. Also, the document contains a clear,concise, accurate summary of what, in our opinion, must be done in various political, economic, social and cultural fields in the future. This, in fact, shows the way for the future growth or our country towards the expansion and deepening of the revolution.

The 17th Plenum, in accordance with its new duties, has decided that [the number of] the principal and consultant members of the Central Committee should be completed. Also, the members of the Politburo, the Board of Secretaries, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee were elected. The implementation of the resolutions of the 17th Plenum is now the responsibility of this leadership, which must display its competence at this sensitive, vital stage of the evolution of the revolution and the Party.

All of these considerations concerning the future activities and guidelines for those activities,--in reality the sign of a new beginning--show another aspect of the historical significance of the 17th Plenum.

WORLDWIDE CREDIBILITY

The credibility and prestige that the Tudeh Party of Iran enjoys in the great fraternal family of parties is not without reason and it has not been achieved easily. The 17th Plenum, as a manifestation of the new stage in the life of our Party, once again reaffirms this highly respected and valuable position among the communist and workers' parties of the world. The work and the documents of the 17th Plenum, as well as its encounter with its mission of the Party towards the Iranian masses and the destiny of the revolution, strengthen our ideological ties and interdependence with all the toilers of the world, all anti-imperialistic forces, all progressive groups, and all national liberation movements. Our Party is loyal to the teachings of Marxism-Leninism and the principles of proletarian internationalism, which today have become the guiding force of a number of counties, are playing a decisive or important role in the national liberation movements of numerous countries, and are the main trend of workers' movements in many countries. In this connection also the 17th Plenum announced its unshakable attitude towards its proper historical position.

It is by no means incidental that all decisions of the 17th Plenum were taken unanimously. The general resolutions of the 17th Plenum, the messages and the report of the Politburo were ratified unanimously. The number of principal and consultant members was completed by unanimous vote. The First Secretary of the Party's Central Committee was elected unanimously. In the 17th Plenum fruitful discussions took place and various views on the completion and ammendment of the documents were either

expressed orally or presented in writing. Each time, at the conclusion of the discussions, the votes and decisions were unanimous. This in itself reflects the political, organizational and ideological unity which distinctly characterizes the Party at the present stage, both in the leadership and within the Party in general.

The work of the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee has showed everyone that unanimity of views in the Party of the working class is neither, by any means, instructed or mechanical, nor is it the result of blind discipline or obeying orders, as imperialist propaganda claims. It is the outcome and the reflection of the nature of the Party as the conscious, pioneering force of the working class. Backed by united ideological and one and only organizational principles, following a vital, sound policy, and with persistent and truthful efforts, unanimity is achieved quite naturally.

Such unanimity of opinions and votes is in itself another great success which will be registerd in the reportcard of the 17th Plenum. Our Party has gone through difficult and complicated periods as regards this issue. Now, in contrast to the past, we are able to understand the difficult, long, complicated but fruitful road to maturity and observance of principles that our Party and its leadership have traveled and, we are able to consciously comprehend (and make this comprehension the basis of our policies and activities in the future) that such unanimity of views and atmosphere of sincere comradeship and friendly cooperation can only be attained in a healthy and natural way as a result of the political, organizational and ideological unity of the Party.

This concept is of critical and decisive importance in the life of every working class party. Precisely for this reason, one must pay maximum attention to the 17th Plenum in order to understand its importance and historical role in the life of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the modern party of the working class of our homeland.

Both the general resolutions of the 17th Plenum and the communique of the secretariat of the Central Committee for the formation of the plenum rightly speak of "political, organizational and ideological unity" in the leadership and throughout the Party. This essential unity, which is unprecedented in the 40-year history of the Party, reveals another aspect of the historical significance of the 17th Plenum.

POLITICAL UNITY

We might add that the Tudeh Party of Iran has matured to the point of having a single, concrete, political interpretation and a single point of view. Sometimes, even our friends are surprised that not only the members but also the sympathizers and friends of the Party are acquainted and agree with the writings and political interpretations and orientation of the Party. They all state the same thing, and they are astonishingly united in their thoughts, views and analyses. This unity is not easily achieved within a party. It is the result of a long process of maturity, passing through the stages of childhood and immaturity, and overcoming haste and superficiality. The sources of the present political unity in our Party are the foundations of scientific socialism, our rich experience of 40 years, our ability to make use of these experiences, and the creative application of this ideology. This significant political unity which, friends and enemies agree, is unmatched by any other political party or organization, has made the Tudeh Party of Iran able--as a united body and as a conscious, organized pioneering force of the working class and all toilers--to

participate in the scenes of intricate battles and difficult conditions of our revolution and, with the power of this political unity, to play a significant qualitative role in the evolutionary process of the revolution.

The members of our party have come from different social classes and levels; they belong to different nationalities of our country; they have been reared in families with different religious beliefs and traditions; they have different occupations and different levels of education; they live in different provinces, and they have various partisan background. But all of them, men and women, young and old, city-dwellers and villagers, despite the variety and differences resulting from the above factors, have a single political stance, express one party line, one interpretation, one conclusion, one program, and one political view. This unity in majority, this oneness in variety is the source of the strict, conscious discipline and the breeding-ground for that amazing, pride-creating unity of action which is one of the distinguishing features of the Tudeh Party of Iran. The members of our Party function effectively with a concrete goal in the great army of the Iranian revolution, with revolutionary zeal and dignity, with wisdom and exemplary generosity, with clear logic and perseverence in the face of difficulties, with complete attention to revolutionary moral and spiritual values and standards in their lives and behavior, every day in the heat of quickly changing events, with a united political stance. This great gain must be preserved as dearly as the pupils of our eyes. This unprecedented political unity is the fruit of active and conscientious participation of the party members in the political life of the country and the internal life of the Party. It is the fruit of a strong and ever-increasing tie of the Tudeh members with the masses. It it the result of not being drowned in the whirlpool of minor and misdirected issues. It is the result of being kneaded with the needs of the toilers of cities and villages. It is the fruit of avoiding any kind of group prejudices, self-centeredness, and spinning [a web] around themselves. It is the result of rejecting any separation from the masses and their basic national and class interests, and any abstractionism and separation from the actual evolutionary process of the revolution.

The leadership of the Party devises the united policy of the Party on the basis of scientific teachings and past experience by relying on the daily activities and struggles of its members in all areas, and by generalizing the obtained results thereby. In fact, this powerful, sound body of the Party is based on the complete and mutual ties between all its organs and members who create, form, and devise the policies of the Party through experience and action, directed by practical guidance, i.e. scientific socialism. And efforts should be made to have the leadership devise it more conscientiously and more actively than ever before. Political unity is based on strong foundations and undoubtedly it will become stronger, given the theoretical and revolutionary party-line and its ratification by the 17th Plenum.

The present political unity is a great achievement for the Tudeh Party of Iran and a great success for the Party not only in comparison with other political organizations, but also in the history of the party of the Iranian working class. Its existence is a historical success and its preservation and strengthening is the great duty of all the Tudeh members as well as all the true followers of scientific socialism, who are interested in the stability, solidarity and evolution of the party of the Iranian working class.

ORGANIZATIONAL UNITY

The Tudeh Party of Iran, in the wake of the victory of the February revolution, has ended a very difficult period of a quarter of a century in its life, a period which was full of hardships for us from an organizational standpoint. The self-interested, dependent regime of the cursed shah had inflicted devastating blows on the organizational body of the Tudeh Party of Iran. The major objective of the regime of violence, oppression and governmental terrorism--first, the military government and then the royal SAVAK--was the destruction of our Party's organizations. The 25 years between the coup and the revolution were years of the slaughter of a number of the most distinguished leaders, cadres, and members of the Tudeh Party of Iran, the years of beastly tortures aimed at the physical annihilation of the Tudeh members, and long years of imprisonment, confinement and exile. The United States had commissioned its puppet regime not only to declare the Party of the Iranian working class illegal, but to abolish and annihilate it completely. The enemy used every infernal means of murder, strangulation, perversion, disappointment and submission, but did not succeed, and it was certain that it would not. Our Party, like the legendary phoenix, once again pushed aside the 25-year-old ashes and ignited the embers that had never died and could not die.

The two years between the 16th and 17th plenums were years of organizational revival and, in some cases, revitalization of the organizational existence of the Party. Our overcoming organizational disunity, decentralization, and disharmony--in the form of separate groups and local and regional organizations, which were characteristic of the past--and the creation of a smooth-operating, harmonized party organization which would respond to our needs after the revolution, in a period of overt, all-out activity under contradictory and difficult conditions prevailing at present, has been a great success achieved within these two years.

The 17th Plenum became the bright manifestation of this qualitative creation and evolution. Our Party is now totally united and harmonious on all organizational levels. Everyone talks about our organizational formation and unity, which is a powerful weapon that the Tudeh members have gained. The great events of the past two years, our basic, correct, revolutionary policies, and our strong ideological foundation were the reasons for the Tudeh Party of Iran to be proud of its organizational unity at the convention of the 17th Plenum of its Central Committee. The Tudeh members who had spent half their glorious lives in the prisons of the cursed shah and were freed after the revolution; the Tudeh members who joined the Party in prisons; the Tudeh members who were bravely active in secret, underground organizations independently; the aged Tudeh members who, despite all the difficulties and obstacles, had remained loyal to the Party to the last cell of their bodies; the Tudeh members who had joined the Party in the course of the bloody combat and difficult battles of the revolution; the Tudeh members who earlier formed the group which branched out from the Feda'i-yl Khalq guerrilla organization and who had chosen the correct line years before the victory of the revolution; the young Tudeh members who became experienced during the past two years in defending the revolution and in confronting false or deviant views; the Tudeh members in foreign countries who realized that the Tudeh Party of Iran was right, who matured in the course of serious struggles, especially against Maoism, and as a result of struggling against the previous regime were forced to live in exile; and the Tudeh members who returned from political asylum--all of them now form the Tudeh's united column.

The 17th Plenum when evaluating the organizational states of the Party, the latter was no longer a simple collection of all those Tudeh members who had joined the organization through different ways and at different times. The Party had already attained a higher qualitative organizational level, and had secured its organizational unity. This is a valuable gain. This great union and astonishing welding together is the fruit of our scientific teachings, political unity, our correct and realistic analysis, and a sign of the correctness of our path. Different streams which come from various life-giving springs have now formed a single life-creating river and have become a force of change. The organizational unity of our Party has become an important factor in the future evolution of our Party's life, which in turn helps the political and ideological unity of the Party. In the future, too, we must try with all our energy to preserve and safeguard the Party's organizational unity and protect it as though it were our very precious eyesight.

IDEOLOGICAL UNITY

The ideological base and doctrinal foundation of the Tudeh Party of Iran is the scientific teachings of Marxism-Leninism. For many years American imperialism, this cruel enemy of our fatherland and our people, and the Pahlavi court, its various "ideologues," and all those dependent on it, sharply attacked not only our organization but the ideological foundation of our Party. From left to right, through distortion and falsification, they tried to weaken and destroy us also by that means. They took the utmost advantage of Maoism and all its varieties--which had grown like mushroom because of the atmosphere of terror and oppression, and which was both covertly and overtly supported by the previous regime, as well as the imperialistic and Chinese propaganda apparatus and espionage organizations--and penetrated the minds as weeds in a field. The regime of the cursed shah wished to sterilize, stupefy, prostitute, or deviate the minds. And in order to prevent the potential and active revolutionary strugglers--especially the youth--from following the right road of class and popular battle, it encouraged them to take the mistaken, pseudo-leftist, pseudo-revolutionary path. This situation required an intense and overall ideological battle, and the confrontation with the large spectrum of deviant views demanded proper ideological strength and unity. Furthermore, some of the Islamic thinkers, too, unfortunately, sought their antagonist only in Marxism. Although, undoubtedly, exchanges of views, doctrinal and ideological debates are beneficial, fruitful, necessary, and unavoidable, singling out Marxism for attack and ignoring the principal enemy which in this case, as well, is imperialistic ideology, created a peculiar situation. Some of the Islamic scholars only chose to confront the teachings of scientific socialism. And in this, too, unfortunately, they used what the imperialistic propagandists and bourgeois daydreamers had said as grounds for their judgments and yardstick for evaluation of Marxism. Thus, they rejected Marxism as if true Islam, under the banner of which the Iranian revolution was launched, and which was the legacy of Mohammad, 'Ali, and Abuzar, and a leader such as Imam Khomeyni, has had no enemies, such as the Omayyed-style, tyrannical, pro-American Islam, and a variety of capitalist, dominating, hypocritical, imperialistic ideologies.

The reason for the sincere support of the true followers of scientific socialism for the anti-imperialistic people's line of Imam Khomeyni, and the efforts to find a common language with the struggling Moslems following the line of the imam, who are the disciples of the anti-imperialistic, popular, anti-subjugational path, was to defend the reality of Marxism and the truth of its teachings and demonstrate its

revolutionary and evolutionary essence. And battling all sorts of anti-Marxist deviations which were carried out in the name of Marxism was a vitally important duty during the course of which the Tudeh Party of Iran strengthened and tempered its ideological unity. Today we can use what we have acquired in the years immediately before and after the revolution as a sure basis for our future ideological progress.

Under our revolutionary complicated, changing conditions, the Tudeh Party of Iran, the present generation of Tudeh members, showed that they are the worthy inheritors of Heydars, Arzanis, and Ruzbehs, and they are able to defend the originality and purity of their scientific teachings. They are able not only to use these teachings creatively under the particular conditions of Iran, but by generalizing the valuable experiences which they have gained in their distinguished lives and in the process of the peculiarities and the complications of the revolution, they are able to enrich those teachings as much as possible and help to elaborate some of its concepts.

The ideological unity of our Party at the time when the 17th Plenum was held is so strong that not only in comparison with other political organizations but even in the history of our own Party it can be considered an important achievement. And it is the duty of all Tudeh members to protect it as they would do for their precious eyesight,because without it the political unity and the organizational unity of our Party would be impossible. And it is also true that without them, this unity will not take root.

Political unity, organizational unity, and ideological unity are not three separate, independent concepts. They are so interrelated that they form one single concept. Hence, we are correct to speak of the political, organizational and ideological unity of the Party. This is another aspect of the historical importance of the 17th Plenum which sets for the Party the very important duty of preserving and strengthening it.

> The outcome of the work of the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran is now before us in the forms of Resolutions, Messages, Party Program, the Report of the Politburo, and other documents.
>
> Great duties and heavy responsibilities are also before us.
>
> We must perform our duty well in this new and sensitive stage of the history of Iran, the revolution, and the Party.
>
> Series of struggles are before us.

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TUDEH PARTY 17TH PLENUM MESSAGE TO PARTY MEMBERS

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 13 Apr 81 p 3

[Text] Dear Comrades and friends!

The 17th Plemun of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran which has been held during our country's sensitive historic circumstances--under conditions of the expanding and deepening of the Revolution on one side, and the unprecedented intensity of the intrigues of its foreign and domestic enemies led by the world-devouring US imperialism on the other-considers it duty to send its warmest greetings to all comrades, supporters and friends of the Party in various parts of our ancient and extensive country which has been the birthplace and nurturing ground for diverse peoples and the scene of their epic battles. During the Revolution and in the period which followed, you were able to play a worthy and effective role--a role which even the sworn enemies of the Party cannot dispute--by marching in the first ranks of the heroic people of Iran and by supporting the methodical policy of the Party and the anti-imperialistic and popular line of Imam Khomeyni [adopted] in the Revolution. As with the blood of other martyrs, the soil of our country has been painted with the blood of Tudeh martyrs shed in the battlegrounds of the Revolution and on the battlefields of the righteous war against the aggressive regime of Saddam; and the Tudeh members have proved and are proving over and over the highest level of political awareness and ability for self-sacrifice. It is not without reason that members, supporters and friends of the Party--men and women, young and old, urban, rural dwellers and tribesmen--on the one hand, are accorded the ever-increasing affection and trust of the real friends of the Revolution, while, on the other hand, bring upon themselves the beastly wrath of the enemies of the Revolution.

Endurance, self-possession, clear logic, wisdom as well as realistic and scientific comprehension, patience in adversity, avoidance of the use of illogical and unethical methods, perseverence in battle to the point of ignoring danger to one's life, more than ever are becoming the basic characteristics of the Tudeh members who wish to become super human beings, who give priority to the highest spiritual human qualities over calculated personal egoisms.

Dear Comrades and friends! As you see in the various documents of the Plenum, our Revolution, our people, our homeland and our Party are entering a sensitive phase in which all perseverent and genuine forces of the Revolution supporting the Imam's stand must succeed in strengthening and deepening the revolution by relying on the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and by aborting variously-colored plots

of imperialism, regional reaction and Iranian anti-revolutionary forces within and outside Iran. At this stage the Party calls on all its members, supporters and friends to be vigilant and ready for struggle and perseverence in continuing to proceed forward.

The Plenum considers it its duty to sincreely thank all dear comrades, supporters and friends of the Party who have not spared the least effort in their various activities to strengthen the Party and the common cause of the Revolution. The elevation and liberation of any people are linked to the existence of such women and men, girls and boys who consider the concerns of society and the public to be above personal affairs.

The Plenum honors the memory of the Party's martyrs and sends its warm greetings to the survivors of these heros of the movement of workers and toilers of Iran.

We hope all followers of scientific socialism in our country can overcome their dissensions and disputes so that increased steadfastness and pride of the new-level Party of the working class can be achieved in the best manner and the shortest time.

We hope followers of the scientific socialism, side by side with the followers of the perceptibility of revolutionary Islam as well as all other forces who are concerned about the Revolution, the independence, freedom and progress of Iran, will succeed in creating a united peoples' front against the enemies of independence, freedom, progress and social justice.

The continuous plots of imperailism and its domestic agents against the forces of Revolution are warning signals. We do not have the right to let down our revolutionary vigilance for a moment. Yet despite all these complications we look to the future with hope because there are favorable conditions in Iran and the world for the achievement of the noble aims of the revolutionary and heroic people of Iran; and with the victorious and rapid progress of the collective front against world imperialism, these conditions become more favorable each day.

Dear Comrades and friends! Once again accept our warm and sincere greetings.

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TUDEH PARTY 17TH PLENUM MESSAGE TO ALL ORGANIZATIONS

Tehran MARDOM in Persian 13 Apr 81 p 3

[Text] Dear friends! The splendid Bahman [February] Revolution, under the farsighted and persistent leadership of Imam Khomeyni, and with the self-sacrificing and total participation of tens of millions of the masses of our country was victorious against the sinister Pahlavi regime and its imperialist masters, headed by the United States, the great Satan, and is now in its third year [of existence] after neutralizing various plots by imperialism, the anti-revolution and forces of compromise. But the Revolution is still on the road and has yet to reach its definite and final stability and strength. With the United States in the forefront, world imperialism, along with all reactionary forces of the region, all domestic and foreign anti-revolutionary forces--by using the liberal capitalist forces of compromise, and by taking advantage of the self-serving or erroneous methods of some individuals and groups within the revolutionary camp--is trying to destroy the Iranian Revolution either through transformations from within or by overthrow, thus repeating a much more sinister tragedy in Iran than that of 28 Mordad [Mosaddeq's overthrow] and to bring to nought the results of the great movement to which the people have given so much.

During the past regime, imperialism plundered the huge oil resources of Iran and imposed billions [of dollars] of military equipment in return for a large share of our oil revenues, it took advantage of the 'open door' policy to fill our country's huge market with its consumer goods, and at the same time it made the despotic shah's monarchic regime its gendarme of the region against the people of Iran and progressive movements and systems and a close collaborator of Zionism. Now it is highly angered over Iran's Revolution and, as is its nature and has demonstrated many a time in history, it will not turn away from any conspiracy, deceit and criminal act to regain its lost positions in our country.

The defeat of past plots of various hues never made U.S. imperialism understand that it must face the Iranian people and the Iranian Revolution on a footing of equal rights. On the contrary, US imperialism, and its other Western allies as well as Zionism, superiority-seeking China and reactionary governments of the region, have increased their efforts tenfold to gradually weaken and isolate the Revolution and its leadership through economic encirclement, creation of dissension, suspicion and discord among revolutionary forces and through the use of terror, unrest, rumor-mongering, slander and all other weapons they have in their devilish armory, aimed at paving the way for their sinister aims.

Only and only unity of action by all revolutionary forces, organizations and revolutionary institutions under the wise, experienced and resistant leadership of Imam Khomeyni can bring to the desired conclusion the great work which was started: that is, to establish an independent, uncommitted, free Iran, a country endowed with justice in this ancient land, and to convert our country to a base of peace and stability in the Middle East and in the world as well. That which is truly a source of worry to all friends of the Revolution in our country, is the success of the visible and invisible agents of imperialism in creating dissension and discord in the ranks of the revolutionary forces, organizations and institutions in setting them against each other-occurences which unfortunately can be seen in various parts of the country. The reactionary forces of our society, such as big landowners and capitalists, encouraged and supported by imperialism and Zionism, and by using the forces of Iran's liberal bourgeoisie, are trying their utmost to make a reality of the wishes which Reagan, the US president, has expressed about our country.

With a feeling of deep responsibility, the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran expresses deep concern over this situation and invites all genuine revolutionary forces, institutions and organizations, governmental or non-governmental, whatever their beliefs and viewooints, to rally around the experienced leadership of Imam Khomeyni, and to refrain strictly from wasting their strength and weakening each other by various means.

Whether during the period of the overthrow of the despotic monarchy, or in the fight against imperialism and anti-revolution, or in the present war against the aggressor Saddam, the Iranian Revolution has suffered tens of thousands in killed, wounded and disabled, and hundreds of thousands in refugees. This unprecedented revolution of our history has paid a high price for liberating our people; and weakening or harming it is a big sin. This Revolution was a revolution of the toiling masses of Iran, and ghetto-dwellers gave their lives for it. Its social results must be beneficial to millions of masses of workers and peasants.

We believe in democratic freedoms and the need to insure the legal means of existence and activity for all genuine popular and revolutionary forces, organizations and institutions (as specified in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic) but at the same time we believe that the question of defending the Revolution and securing its victory, as well as insuring the legitimate rights of urban and rural toilers is a matter of common interest for the people, with no individual having the right, because of harmful aims and miscalculations or narrow-minded monopolistic views, to damage this common and sacred cause. Such attitudes which in reality facilitate the work of the criminal enemy of the Revolution must be strictly avoided before it is too late.

The 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh party of Iran hopes that genuine revolutionary forces, institutions and organizations can overcome difficulties by mobilizing all their strength, and benefiting from support of the anti-imperialist and popular policy of Imam Khomeyni within the framework of respect for the Constitution of the Islamic Republic--thereby taking the Revolution to the stage of strength and depth so that the hands of big landowners can be removed from lands which rightfully belong to the toiling Iranian farmers, putting an end to feudalism in Iran once and for all. And by removing from the nation's overall economy the plundering hands of leech-type big capitalists and their agents, to open the way for an all-out blooming of the economy in meeting the rightful needs of tens of millions of the

deprived urban and rural masses, in practice to nationalize foreign trade (in accordance with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic), so that the toiling people of the cities and villages can be freed from strangling inflation and the economic difficulties caused by this boundless plunder. Foreign policy should be non-committed, realistic and wise, distinguishing friends and enemies or our Revolution from each other, while domestic policy should respect freedoms specified in the Constitution without leanings toward any monopolistic and sectarian attitudes, thus to ensure the national rights of the peoples living on Iranian soil.

Our Revolution which relied on the unity and widespread movement of the urban and rural toiling masses from the very start, now more than ever needs these two basic and indictative characteristics.

The 17th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party of Iran takes the opportunity to send its warmest greetings to Imam Khomeyni, the leader and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to all genuine revolutionary forces, organizations and institutions (whether governmental or social) and wishes them success in enhancing the progress of the sacred cause of the people of Iran.

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ARAB LOANS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES CITED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 29 Oct 81 p 11

[Text]

KUWAIT — The Arab funds for development provided loans totalling $1117 million during the first half of this year to needy nations in the Arab world, Africa, Asia and Latin America, an official report said.

In the first quarter of 1981, 41 loan agreements were concluded with 30 developing countries totalling $579.08 million in addition to eight technical assistance loans costing $2.97 million, the report added.

Over 69 per cent of the allocations were approved for infrastructural projects while the remainder of the appropriations were made to improve the balance of payments, financing foreign trade operations and to the agro-industrial sectors.

During the second quarter of the year, Asian countries received $ 253.36 million compared to $208.9 during the first quarter.

Arabs' share in the second quarters decreased from $263.07 millions in the first quarter to $125.86 during the period April-June.

The share of African countries increased from $66.01 millions in the first quarter to $189 million in the second, the report added. A $10 million loan was made to a Latin American country during the first half of the year.

PROJECTS

During the first quarter of 1981, Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (Adfaed) concluded loan agreements totalling ($25.39 million) for financing electricity projects in South Yemen and Niger, the development of an airport in Rawanda and a Sudanese cotton industry.

The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (Abeda) finalised two agreements totalling $20 million during the second quarter of the year.

Abeda funds were utilised in an airport project for Congo and a chemical industry for Senegal.

In the first quarter of 1981 the bank concluded a $9 million agreement to finance a road project for Cameron and a feasibility study of a Senegalese animal project.

The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (Afesd) concluded three agreements during the second quarter of 1981 totalling $24.85 million compared to four agreements ($62.26 millions) in the first quarters.

The funds were used in financing communications, sewage, electricity, fishing and water projects in various parts of the Arab world.

STUDY

During the first half of the year Afesd also provided technical assistance for a number of projects including a study on the future of development in the Arab world.

During the first quarter of the year, the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) concluded agreements for loans totalling $203.18 million (157.18 Islamic dinar units).

Nine IDB loans to six Arab states were mostly used in financing foreign trade operations while seven credits were made to four Asian countries, the report added.

The Islamic bank had also made four loans to three African states in addition to $600,000 in the form of technical assistance to Djibouti.

Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) concluded loan agreements totalling $266.08 million (KD 74.95) during the second quarter of 1981, the report said.

The figure compares to a total of $70.30 million (KD 19.42 million) in the first quarter.

Over $130 million were allocated for energy projects in addition to $32.30 million for Arab and $25.42 million for African states.

The Saudi Fund for Development (SFD) increased its loan commitment from $112.14 million in the first quarter to $157.65 in the second.

The funds were utilised in financing water, sewage, irrigation and rural development projects, mostly in Asian countries.

Opec's special fund provided loans totalling $112.14 million in the first quarter compared to 157.65 in the second, the report added.

The greater part of the fund was used in improving the balance of payments in Asian, African, Latin American and Arab States.

CSO: 4400/53

MARITIME FRAUD LINKED TO GULF WAR

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 pp 11,12

[Text]

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reports an upsurge in marine fraud sparked off by the Iran-Iraq war. Ships bound for the Gulf have been diverted from their official routes to other ports in the area and the cargoes have found their way to Iran or Iraq by illegal means.

An official of the London-based Bureau told *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO* that at least one case a week was coming to light involving false letters of credit being cashed by the consignors before the goods are shipped to the Gulf.

Another problem directly linked to the war is that of cargoes disappearing as a result of overcrowded ports. There may, in fact, be no actual deceit involved, but ports such as Aqaba are not geared to handle the enormous volume of transit traffic it currently receives and mistakes occur which result in the loss of cargoes.

Efforts to combat marine fraud in Lebanon are still coming up against problems as the various interested parties find new ways to get around the latest measures brought in to tackle fraud, the IMB says.

Arab efforts to improve coastal monitoring have not yet come to fruition; meanwhile two high-powered boats used by the Lebanese Army appear to have been taken over by the right-wing Phalangist militia group.

As import taxes are totally ignored, a thriving contraband business is being carried on in Beirut. One customer recently ordered a printing press from West Germany and this was delivered within a week complete with guarantee. The IMB has also noted reports of a couple of 10,000-ton "floating warehouses" in the eastern Mediterranean, on which goods are stored after being hijacked to order. The ships avoid the major shipping lanes and can provide anything from heavy construction equipment to the latest colour television set at a knock-down price of £20 (about $37).

The Lebanese Embassy in London, however, believes that the situation has improved. A spokesman commented: "We are doing our best and are confident that we are containing the situation."

The Lebanese government has recently strengthened regulations covering oil supplies to ships in an attempt to curb smuggling. Ships taking on gas oil or fuel oil will have to have a licence issued by the Lebanese Shipowners' Association confirming the vessel's identity. Fuel supplies will have to be registered on a special document.

These matters will have to be discussed in further detail in London from November 9-20 when the 12th session of the General Assembly of the Inter-governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) meets in London to draw up and pass various resolutions to further combat marine fraud, barratry and piracy.

CSO: 4400/49

BRIEFS

KUWAIT LOAN TO IRAQ--Kuwait agreed in principle last week to lend Iraq $7 billion, according to the president of the Kuwaiti Parliament's Financial and Economic Committee, Jassem al-Khorafi. Mr al-Khorafi said the Kuwaiti Parliament will soon consider a draft bill on the loan, which was requested by Iraq. Kuwait lent Iraq $2 billion in April as part of a $14 billion package Iraq had sought from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE to help repair damages suffered in its 13-month-old war with Iran. The April loan was repayable over 10 years without interest or commission. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 p 3]

IRAQI LOANS TO YAR--Baghdad--Two loan agreements have been signed between Iraq and North Yemen. Under the first agreement the Iraqi Fund will finance the construction of three medical centres in 'Aab' governorate in North Yemen. The second is for 100 hospital beds in the same government. [Text] [Doha GULF TIMES in English 6 Oct 81 p 11]

CSO: 4400/53

ADVANCES REPORTED IN VARIOUS PUBLIC SERVICES

Cartography Project

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

In a developing country such as Afghanistan the success of development projects depends often on the availability of suitable mapping. Due to the efforts of the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Department, assisted by the United Nation, projects ranging from agriculture to communications, and geology to archaeology have all benefitted from improved mapping.

This assistance, has continued since the early 1960's. The present phase of the UNDP-financed project is planned to terminate at the end of 1981. From 1976 to the end of 1981, UNDP will contribute nearly $1.2 million to the project. There are now four UN experts working at the Department and the workshop in Khair Khana: a geodesist (who is also the Team Leader), a photgrammetrist, a cartographer, and an instrument mechanics expert. In addition, on short-term contracts, a printing specialist, and two instrument constructors, are also engaged.

At present, the Project has directed its activities to those which can be carried out in the relevant branches of the Department and to training of national staff. One important activity now being carried on is that of improving the basic geodetic frame for Afghanistan; through hiring of equipment at a cost of approximately $100,000, tracking of the Doppler satellite at eight different points of the country by different Afghan crews, and then computing the results; a new high precision system of basic points will be established in Afghanistan. These points will create a very precise frame which will give the possibility of uniform mapping of the country.

In photogrammetry, the Department has become one of the most developed organizations in the region. Topographic maps, due to modern photogrammetric equipment, and modern methods implemented with the assistance of the UNDP photogrammetric expert, can be produced.

The workshop at Khair Khana now houses approximately $200,000 worth of equipment supplied by UNDP. One of the tasks of the instructment mechanics expert is to train national staff in the many precise uses of this complex equipment.

The Institute now hopes to install its own minicomputer system by December 1981, and training of national staff, which to present has been limited to theory and pocket computers, must be expanded and the real data

processing by means of computer implemented.

Future activities and ways of achieving them will be determined in a review of the project which will take place shortly. One way of assisting the Afghan Geodesy and Cartography Head Office in the future may be by a twinning arrangement with an equivalent organization, which would ensure continued technical assistance. Whatever form future assistance takes, efficient mapping of Afghanistan will lead to efficient development in the years to come.

Commercial Loans

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

Banke Millie Afghan made a total profit of Afs. 281 million during the Afghan year 1359, which compared to the year 1358 shows 96 per cent increase, an unprecedented figure in the history of the Bank, Mohammad Akram Khalil, Executive President of the Bank told a reporter of the Kabul New Times in an interview recently.

The accounts and deposits of the people with the bank, including savings, deposits and current accounts has been considerably increased during the same year compared to the last two years. About Afs. 2758.22 million was held in these accounts in 1359 and in 1358 it was Afs. 2267.56 million. There has thus been an increase of 31.8 per cent in saving accounts, 18.7 per cent in profit-bearing deposits accounts, 71.8 per cent in non-profit bearing deposit accounts and 13.9 per cent in the current accounts.

Answering a question Khalil said: Granting of loans and credits is part of the active transactions of the bank, like other commercial banks of the country through sale of afghanis and hard currency loans. The total volume of loans in afghanis covering loans for carpets and karakul skin exporters, barter, credit, shares and miscellaneous and amounted to Afs. 563.81 in 1359.

The volume of hard currency loans including dollars, pound sterling and DM after conversion into afghani amounted to Afs. 1140.68 million during the same year.

As far as passive activities of the bank is concerned, noted Khalil, efforts will be made to attract more capital through various possible means and provision of facilities. Likewise, in active transactions, efforts will be made to see that the bank plays a major role in further financing of commercial items. Of course, the scope of activity of the bank will be determined by the credit plan of the respective year.

Assessing the balance sheet of 1359 of the bank, Khalil said: The balance sheet of the bank in 1359 is an indication of the fact that the total benefit would have amounted to Afs. 311.74 million if the incomes of the affiliated organisations of the bank had reached the figure of Afs. 48 million like last year. However, with a decline of Afs. 30 million in affiliated incomes the total profit of the bank amounted to Afs. 281.01. On the contrary the foreign based affiliated incomes of the bank in 1359, compared to previous years, shows a considerable increase. The incomes of Afghan American Trading Company in 1357 was for instance Afs. 13.20 million and in 1358 it was Afs. 25.54 million and in 1359 it was increased to Afs. 31.85 million. A glance at the incomes of other foreign branches of the

bank shows the accelerated operations of these branches.

There has not been any marked change in depreciation, salaries, advertisements and publicity, maintaining cost of computer etc. However there has been a sharper increase in the expenditure column in view of rise of interests paid to clients. In 1359 the figure standing for interest paid amounted to Afs. 106,90, while in 1357 it was Afs. 86.79 million. The rise in interest as far as expenditures is concerned is attributed to increase in volumes of saving and interest-bearing deposit accounts, which again manifests the success of the bank, he declared.

The executive president of the bank said that after the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the confidence of people in the bank has increased greatly and they now feel secure enough to deposit their money in the bank.

The coming of increasing number of people to the banks is a sign for the confidence as well as the added facilities provided for them.

In the past, each bank in the country drew individual plan on the basis of which they regulated their activities. However, now a credit plan, based on the new banking system has been introduced in the country. It is followed by all banks in the country, said Khalil. Banke Millie Afghan also pursues this credit plan and tries to implement it totally. The bank also translates into action the credit guidance and consultative views of the Finance Ministry, to render more effective services, he added.

Kabul Sewage System

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 26 Oct 81 p 8

[Text]

"Preliminary work for the Kabul city sewage, covering three residential projects and the central part of the city, seeking ways and means of financing the project and its design were among the important topics discussed at the first meeting of the technical consultative board of the Kabul city held recently. After scrutiny and deliberations on these issues, the participants at the meeting took effective and useful decisions."

Stating this in an interview with our reporter, Eng Sediq Ebadi, president of the planning department of the Kabul Municipality, elaborated on the need for formation, the strength and methods of work of the Kabul City Technical Consultative Board in coordinating the work for expansion and balanced development of the city.

He said: "The board is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Public Works, Communications, National Defence, and Water and Power, Mines and Industries, Education, Agriculture and Land Reforms, and Transport and Tourism, the State Planning Committee and the cartography department". The first meeting of the board was held under the chairmanship of Eng Adeena Sangeen, the Mayor of Kabul.

Subjects discussed at the first meeting included organisation and assessment of a regulation governing the

Kabul Master Plan, the project for determining the site for first stage of residential services and other constructions during the five years, issues relating to designing of the purification plant and, most important of all, the first stage of the sewage system for three residential projects and the central part of the city.

In its first meeting, the board also approved its provisional charter which, after the due legal process, has been made effective and is being enforced. The charter calls for monthly meetings of the board under the chairmanship of the Kabul Mayor.

It provides for consultation on: Problems related to implementation of the Kabul Master Plan, consultations on design and determination of the site for construction of the projects by various plants, on solving problems in relation to construction and engineering networks drawn up by Government organisations, and in relation to sites where valuable Government projects are planned to be built.

"The objective of formation of the board", said Eng Ebadi, "is to coordinate the work of interested organisations in solving the problems concerning the implementation of the Master Plan as far as determining the site of construction, kind of design, industrial and residential construction, ensuring greenery and engineering grids etc is concerned."

"The Master Plan is designed and drawn up for all-sided development and expansion of the city and ensuring the welfare and comfort of nearly two million people. This great plan was legalised in 1978 and its implementation began in the following year", noted Eng Ebadi.

"On the basis of the endorsement of the DRA Government, the implementation of the Master Plan began for the first time in 1979 with the construction and asphalting of roads and distribution of plots for residential quarters in Khushal Khan Mena, Khairkhana Mena, Third Parwan, Rahman Mena, and Wazir Abad Mena as part of the work of the Kabul Municipality. All this work continues regularly and in accordance with the Master Plan", he said.

In accordance with the Master Plan, the Third Parwan, Karte Ariana and Wazirabad are earmarked as residential areas and, for many years, a great number of citizens have built themselves houses, as defined in the detailed plans. However the table of subterranean water in these areas is so high that, during the first months of the year, it submerges the roads, bridges and culverts and even the residential houses, directly threatening the residents.

"Similarly, those of our compatriots who have received plots for housing in these areas cannot build themselves houses due to accumulation of water on the plots", he noted.

"This problem has been there for many years and the residents have repeatedly voiced their complaints, which unfortunately in the past went unheeded, with no action taken to solve this problem", he recalled.

"Under the present conditions when the Government organisations deem it their duty and obligation, in accordance with the policy and directives of the party and Government, to be sincerely responsive and at the service of the people, and strive to solve the people's problems and meet their needs, the Municipality as an organ directly responsible for construction and daily life of the people, put forward a proposal in this regard which was approved by the authoritative sources", he added.

An agreement was signed with the Water and Power Ministry on drawing up an designing a canal in Wazirabad.

"With the construction of the canal and channelling of water which, during the winter and spring causes, heavy financial damages to the residents every year, and threatens their lives due to humidity, life for the people in the four residential projects will become more comfortable", he pointed out.

The 18-km long canal begins from Karte Ariana and enters the Third Parwan residential area and there crosses from the middle part of Wazirabad and Khairkhana residential areas into Lagons area earmarked for

city sewage and, running from the vicinity of the Kabul International Airport, it enters an area behind the industrial plants in Pule Charkhi. And finally it is to be linked with Kabul river.

The depth of the digging is estimated at 450 cubic metres. In addition. to design and mapping expenses, the total spending on the the canal is to reach some two million Afghanis.

The starting point of the canal will be 11 meters wide and, in some areas, the length will reach 25 metres. The completion of the canal will greatly help the first stage of the planned sewage.

The residential projects of the Housing Cooperative in third Parwan. and apartment houses belonging to the National Defence Ministry are scheduled to be completed soon. Work has begun on the Shahrara residential project, making all the more necessary the construction of the first stage of sewage system for the residential projects. The Municipality hopes that the interested organisations will pay due attention to this project.

"The water for the city is supplied by the water supply and sewage department of the Public Works Ministry and it is hoped that, with the completion of Afshar pottable water project, the needs of residents of Khairkhana Mena and Wazirabad for this essential is totally met", Eng Ebadi noted.

"The first stage of the Kabul sewage for three residential projects and central part of city drew greater attention of the members of the board and views were exchanged on possibilities of financing of the project and its design", he recalled.

"It was thus resolved that the project requires more careful research and study. It ought to be determined whether a technical or a natural purification system is more useful and economic. And it was decided that, in the future meetings, specific proposals should be prepared on these alternatives".

On the basis of Article 8 of the regulation governing the board, the following, after voting, were elected and appointed as members of the leading body:

—Eng Adena Sangeen, Kabul Mayor, Chairman,

—Hamid Barna, Technical Vice-President of Kabul Municipality as member and secretary,

—Daoud Saroosh, president of the City Projects Institute, member,

—Abdul Satar Ureya, president of the water supply and sewage department, member,

mber, and Eng Abdul Satar Safi, president of the Kabul electricity department, member.

Loans for Housing

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 28 Oct 81 p 8

[Text]

The Mortgage and Construction Financing Bank has so far extended 1239 loans to workers, employees, officials, military officers and retired officials, who have met the conditions for benefitting from such loans, for construction, completion and repair of houses located in one of the housing projects of Kabul.

Faiz Mohammad, president of the bank talked to the Kabul New Times reporter on terms of the loans, the volume of loans, and the number of recipients in 1359 as well as on the method of activity of the bank in serving the homeless people in the country.

He said: "The bank's loans, ranging from Afs. 30,000 to Afs. 50,000, are paid to the applicants after due legal procedure and, after the needs and requirements of the recipient are found to be compatible with the conditions under which loans are extended.

The loans are meant to help the workers, employees, officials, military officers and retired civil servants to construct and complete their half-finished houses to become owner of a house—an important contribution towards implementation of the housing projects in the city."

The workers, officials, military officers and retired civil servants whose period of services in Government organisations is at least 10 years and have a plot of land in one of the housing projects in the city are entitled to the loans provided they have already begun the construction work on the plot.

To make sure that the loans are repaid on a regular basis, the bank seeks to obtain a verification from the concerned Government departments about the official engagement of an applicant and as well as a commitment about the monthly payment of the instalment and transferring it to the bank account. The applicants are required to have served their military service.

Before agreeing to loans for applicants, the bank makes all necessary inquiries about them, as part of the precautionary measures to make sure that the loans are paid on time and without any hitches. The recipients are required to present proof of the ownership of the half finished houses in one of the housing projects. Before making a final decision, the bank also ascertains if the applicant is really in need of such loan.

Towards the end of 1358, the total amount of loans not repaid or settled amounted to Afs 87.82 million and, by the end of 1359 it stood at Afs 104.75 million, which shows an increase of Afs 16.93 million or 19.27 per cent.

At present, the total number of recipients who have utilised the loans, the period set for repayment of whose loans has not expired or, in other words, who have not settled their accounts is more than 5,000. In the course of 1359, loans was extended to 881 applicants and in 1359 to 1239—an increase of 358 recepients or 40.63 per cent.

The bank is a specialised one and the scope of its activities is confined to extension of loans for construction of houses, completion of half-finished and repair of houses belonging to workers and civil servants. The loans bear a low-interest compared to those of other banks in the country.

Unlike in the case of other banks, the loans extended by this bank are long-term and repaid in monthly instalments, deducted from the monthly salaries of the recepients.

The bank charges an eight per cent interest on its loans while the interest charged by other banks is 12 per cent.

The net profit of the bank in 1359, compared to 1358, was 46.89 per cent more, and this rise is attributable to the increasing credit activities of the bank and banking services and partly also to improved and sound management.

The profit recorded during the 1359, one year after the new phase of the revolution, was considerable not only compared to 1358 but to the four preceding years.

The bank was established in 1947 under the name of Construction Fund with Afs 30 million. In 1954, its name was changed into Mortgage and Construction Bank and its capital was raised to Afs 60 million. In 1976, when the banks in the country were nationalised, the permissible capital of the bank was set at Afs 200 million. However, its paid capital now is Afs 100 million.

Technical Standards

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 31 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

The Norms and Standards Department was established for the first time in 1973 within the framework of the Mines and Industries Ministry. The department has carried out a series of studies and research on problems caused by lack of standardisation in various fields of life especially the sectors of industries, trade, services, and agriculture. Despite problem of shortage of experienced cadres and financial difficulties, the department has carried out, with the assistance of scientific and research institutes, a series of major tasks.

These include setting up of 23 standards and standard recommendation forms for textiles manufactured in public and private sectors, standards for raisins and the hygienic standard for fruit processing plants in the recommendation forms, standard specifications for the Ghor Cement Plant, determination of the norm for expenditure of fuel for vehicles and various machinery, publication of 13,000 copies of procedures for sorting ginned cotton for cotton-growers and gin and press plants, determination of the norms and standards for a number of products such as sample standard of cotton boxes. The department has also conducted a series of courses and seminars and determined a series of norms for various sections with the cooperation of interested organisations.

The performance of the department is better organised in the light of the Saur Revolution, its new phase in particular, and positive steps have been taken towards determining the norms and standards for products. For instance, it has determining the norms for 674 kinds of transportation vehicles and 108 kinds of machinery, held seminars and training courses for cotton sorters in the cotton-growing provinces, reintroduced the subject of standardisation principles and control of quality of products at the Polytechnic Institute, and introduces the subject for senior students at the vocational schools and technicums in the current Afghan year with the help of the vocational education department of the Higher and Vocational Education Ministry.

Stating all this in an interview with the Kabul New Tiems, Eng Taj Mohammad Yarmand, director-general of the department, added: "The standard in its scientific form was introduced at the start of 20th century when the first norms and standard institute was established in Britain in 1906. Presently there are thousands of national, regional and international standards being enforced throughout the world in various sections of life especially in industries and technology."

In Afghanistan, the standard in its local form has a history of 5,00 years and its relics can be seen at the Kabul Museum, excavations of Hadda, Tela Tapa, Ai-Khanum and in the historical structures such as Congregational Mosques of Herat, Bost Arch and Ghaz-

ni minarets. However, practice of standardisation in its modern form began in our country in 1974. And, with the victory of the Revolution, especially its new phase, the concerned authorities are paying more attention to popularisation of standardisation.

On the basis of its charter, the department is assigned to prepare standards for the products, materials, the methods and systems, taking into view the international progress and the conditions and requirements of the country, and strive for their popularisation and enforcement at the national level.

The development and popularisation of norms and standards requires a long time as it poses complicated scientific, technical and economic problems. What accelerate the process of development and popularisation of standardisation in a country are education, publications, and scientific research as well as practical experiences, said Eng Yarmand.

Notwithstanding the numerous difficulties, the department has achieved some successes in its work under the guidance of the interested authorities and cooperation of scientific and industrial institutes. In this connection, familiarisation of students with principles of standardization and quality of products is noteworthy. Some 2,500 students, who have graduated until this current Afghan year from Polytechnic Institute, College of Economy, and vocational schools, are estimated to have learned the subject with the cooperation of the ministry. Similarly, through seminars and courses, some 43 personnel have been trained in the field until 1360.

The number of skilled employees, who have enriched their knowledge in the field through participation in seminars and international training, programmes reach 14.

The problems of quality are manifold and each one has to be tackled in view of its economic importance and the possibilities and means available. For instance, determining the sortment and standard of cotton with scientific and technical methods to raise the quality of cotton, sound guidance of newly established institutions and enterprises in production of such products as shoe cream, soaps, and pressure-cookers by laboratory analysis as well as technical specifications for interested organisations are among the problems to be tackled.

"By further equipping the norms and standard sections and staffing them with experienced and highly educated personnel and availability of equipment for assessment and quality-testing with the cooperation of the concerned organisations, those standards will be enforced which have a high economic priority and whose enforcement is in the interest of the toiling people of Afghanistan", said Eng Yarmand.

In the first stage, the activities of the department will be focussed on provision, compilation and determination of locally manufactured products and exportable goods as well as on chalking out scientific quality control methods aimed at restricting the import of inferior quality goods.

Eng Yarmand recalled that, on October 14, 1970 for the first time the World Standard Day was marked, when Faruk Sunder served as the President of the International Standard Organisation (ISO), to draw wider attention to the activities of standardisation, generally, and world standardisation in particular. Since then, every year, the day is being marked by members of the ISO.

The ISO is entrusted with development of standards in all technological fields except electro-technical looked after by the IFC, an affiliate, of the ISO. The ISO was established in 1947 following the Second World War on the basis of the International Standardisation Association (ISA), which was established in 1926 for engineering activities.

The ISO has some 90 members. Its main tasks are drawing up of drafts of international standards and international recommendations and approval of interntional standards. It also carries out scientific research and training programmes for the benefit of member institutes.

CSO: 4600/116

ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORTED IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Loans to Cooperatives

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 29 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Agriculture Posted for Major Advance"]

[Text]

Afghanistan has rich natural resources and favourable climatic conditions for growing crops and breeding livestocks. Eighty-five per cent of the country's manpower is engaged, directly and indirectly, in farming and livestocking. Thus, the agricultural and livestock products and by-products constitutes one of the prominent sources of the national income, making agriculture the major economic sector in Afghanistan.

The DRA Government, in pursuance of its progressive policy, has undertaken, planned programmes aimed at enhancing the agricultural output in the interest of the vast masses of the farming population in the country and with the active participation of farmers.

As part of its efforts for development of agriculture, the Government is providing bank credits to farmers for purchase of tools and machinery, improved seeds and chemical fertilisers, to help them increase their land productivity. Increasing numbers of farmers are organised in agricultural cooperatives. By joining the cooperatives the farmers and livestockers can utilise the considerable facilities available for better production methods.

The farmers can obtain a better price for their products sold through the cooperatives. Through them, again they can obtain required loans on time and on favourable terms. They can also get inputs of a high quality at reasonable prices.

Individual farmers find it difficult to market their surplus produce and get desirable prices as farms are located far away from the market places. There is a lack of motorable roads in some areas and irregularity in transportation, as well as a lack of storage—and finally of marketing knowledge on the part of farmers. These are factors that reduce the income of the peasants.

The cooperatives provide a solution to most of these problems and help put an end to the illegal practices of middlemen who can thrive only at the farmers' cost.

Through the cooperatives, the farmers can easily establish contacts with the interested organisations such as the Agricultural Development Bank, the Afghan Chemical Fertilizer Company and the Afghan Seeds Company which provide the essential inputs for farmers and contribute to popularisation of mechanised farming in the country, to replace the old and

primitive methods of farming.

Other major steps taken by the Government to raise the farming produce in the country are launching of spring and autumn sowing campaigns and increased distribution of improved seeds to farmers to help these campaigns.

As a result of efforts made by the Government and the wise plans drawn to augment agricultural output in the country, as well as the untiring efforts of the farmers and livestockers with the help of material and technical assistance of the Government, the overall agricultural yield as well as the livestock produce is reported to have increased compared to the last year.

The Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms, in an interview on agricultural production and development as well as the future plans of the Government, has termed the over-all farm production in the country as "satisfactory". According to him, the total output of crops this year will reach 4.5 million tons, out of which wheat will account for 2.85 to 2.9 million tons. He also expects the raw cotton production will increase by 15,000 tons and that of sugar-beet by 10,000 tons —or by 23 and 28 per cent respectively—compared to last year.

Similarly, some two per cent increase is expected in livestock production.

Now that the land reforms programme is being implemented with the massive participation of farmers on the basis of just and democratic land and water distribution to the benefit of the toiling peasants in this country, it is hoped that the farmers will do more and make the maximum use of all facilities provided to them by the Government to raise their production and thus play a major role in the overall development of of the national economy and improvement of their people's living standards.

Increased Cotton Production

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 31 Oct 81 p 2

[Editorial: "Cotton Output Reflects Overall Farm Growth"]

[Text]

The DRA Government, as the true protector of the rights and interests of peasants and the farming population in the country, is exerting revolutionary efforts to secure a decent life for the toiling masses. For the prosperity of peasants and in an effort to help them increase their land productivity, the Government is providing gigantic assistance to farmers.

Following the Saur Revolution, and its new phase in particular, there has been a marked increase in distribution of improved seeds, chemical fertilisers and agricultural tools which has enabled the farmers to augment the per unit productivity of their lands.

As part of efforts to develop agriculture, where some 85 per cent of the country's manpower is engaged, the Government has undertaken all-sided and comprehensive programmes. Through interested and concerned organisations, it has increased technical and financial assistance to the farmers as well as provided them with technical guidance.

The Agricultural Development Bank, the Afghan Chemical Fertiliser Company, the Afghan Seeds Company have increased the scope of their activities in providing the farmers with easy-term credit, provisions of agri-

cultural tools, improved seeds and fertilisers as part of the plans to develop agricultural production in the country and at the same time achieve the aim of popularising mechanised farming in the country.

The Agriculture Extension Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reforms has also intensified its activities to provide necessary guidance for the farmers to help them increase their land productivity by acquiring new and modern knowledge and methods of farming.

These are but a few examples of the Government's plans and its massive efforts to help the farmers in the country and to fullfil the tasks set by itself for further development of agriculture.

As a result of all these comprehensive and constructive plans as well as the hard and concerted work put in by the Afghan peasants and stock-breeders, the overall agricultural yield and livestock output have registered increases over the figures of the last year as was revealed by the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms.

Among other things, the harvest of cotton, an important industrial, crop in the country, is also expected to surpass the last year's figure by 15,000 tons and the sugar output by 10,000 tons.

As reported the other day, only in the course of the last Afghan month of Mizan, 628 tons of cotton, worth Afs. 11,000,000 have been purchased by the Spinzar Company, a major buyer of cotton in the country, from cotton-growers in several northern provinces.

The projected increase in cotton output is particularly welcome news, for it constitutes not only an important raw material for the growing number of textile mills in the country, but also, stands prominent among the export items of Afghanistan.

Large areas in Afghanistan are under cotton cultivation. The cotton-growers are provided all necessary technical and financial help to encourage them to bring more and more land under cotton cultivation. In order to enable the cotton growers to raise their production and cultivate more lands, the Government has raised the purchase price of this important industrial crop.

The Norms and Standard Department of the Ministry of Mines and Industries has also taken measures relating to sortment and standardisation of cotton, which will prove useful to the growers to sell their produce at much higher price to the consumers.

With the added facilities as well as technical and financial assistance provided by the Government, it is hoped that the cotton growers, and the sugar beet cultivators, will be able to produce more.

It is also hoped that the overall development of agriculture in the country will be accelerated as result of continued and large-scale assistance provided to farmers by the Government.

More Wool Exports

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 31 Oct 81 p 3

[Text]

"An amount of 12,000 tons of unwashed wool at an estimated value of Afs 60 million has been purchased from various sources by the state and private sectors during the first six months of the current Afghan year and were readied for export."

Stating this in an interview with the Kabul Times, Dr Mohammad Zahir Barez, general president of the wool enterprise department of the Commerce Ministry said: "Generally the campaign for the purchase of wool in the country starts from the month of Hamal and continued till the beginning of the month of Sonbula", though the campaign period has ended.

Detailed information the enterprise has received from the main wool producing centres, reveals that another amount of 15,000 tons of unwashed wool worth Afs. 750 million could be collected from these areas. And, relying on these informations the enterprise, it has intensified its efforts to collect more wool and ready it for export to the foreign markets.

In response to a question, Dr Barez stressed that the main sources for the purchase of wool in the country include the Kandahar, Herat and Balkh provinces. Usually, the wool purchased from the stockbreeders and in the markets of these province are in the form of unwashed wool, which is being sent to the washing plant of the enterprise and then exported to the potential foreign markets. The wool so far purchased by the enterprise are of the kinds of karakul wool, white sheep wool, and coloured wool. The three kinds of wool exported are in demand in the foreign markets, but the white sheep wool is in greater demand in the foreign markets, he said.

The department, he added, was established for the purpose of promoting the production and export of this important item of export. The idea behind the enterprise was also to strengthen the economy of the wool producers and market their produce on time and earn them reasonable price for their production. As a state trading firm, this enterprise has the responsibility of controlling and supervising the collection and export of wool in the country, both in the private and state sectors. And, as a matter of fact, since the establishment of this enterprise, not only have greater facility been provided for the wool producers and their economy boosted, but the production and export of wool also been further promoted earning greater income for the producers and the state respectively.

The enterprise is three years old. Over the three years since the establishment of the enterprise, the export of wool in comprison to 1356 has increase by 100 per cent. In accordance with the plan, greater amounts of wool are to be readied, standardised and exported to the foreign markets and sold at reasonable prices. Likewise, the enterprise plans, for further promoting the process of collection and purchase of wool from the local sources, to open its branches in the Ghazni and Kunduz provinces as well. The enterprise hopes that, with the help of these branches, it would be in a position to collect and purchase greater amounts of wool.

From the beginning of the current year's campaign till now, around 2,500 tons of wool have been processed and exported to the Soviet Union, Dr Barez said.

Successes of Land Reforms

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 1 Nov 81 p 8

[Interview with Fazlur Rahim Momand, minister of agriculture and land reforms, by Bakhtar]

[Text]

"As a result of hard and concerted work of the Afghan peasants and live stock breeders, and due to the material and technical assistance provided to them by the Government of the DRA, overall agricultural yields and the output of the livestock products have registered an increase over last year", Fazlur Rahim Momand, Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms told Bakhtar in an interview.

Evaluating the autumn harvesting which is nearing 'completion, the Minister said that the grain production this year amounts to 4.5 million tons, and in it, wheat yield alone reaches to 2.8-2.9 million tons. It is expected that the cotton harvest will surpass last year's figure by 15,000 tons and sugar beet will exceed by 10,000 tons, that is, by 23 and 28 per cent respectively.

He predicted a two per cent increase in the livestock output, both in the numbers of cattle heads and poultry and in the quantity of animal proteins.

Pointing out to the development of agriculture and cattle breeding in Afghanistan, the Minister likened them to the problems faced by every other developing country.

DEVELOPMENT

The ever increasing need for the development of industries demands improved supply of agricultural raw materials. The export of traditional items like cotton, karakul skin,, wool, carpets and fruits must also be developed he said.

Momand said that for increasing agricultural production, modernization of the infrastructure of the socio-economic relationships, and among them the elimination of the remnants of fedual and pre-feudal systems, and turning the primitive form of agriculture into a modern and mechanised one through scientific methods of using chemical fertilizer, providing and distributing improved seeds and fighting pests and plant and veterinary diseases was necessary.

The minister of agriculture referred to the enormous aid that the DRA is receiving from the Soviet Union in the form of improved seeds, chemical fertilizers, machineries and equipment for mechanisation of agriculture, insecticides, pesticidis for use against plant diseases, and advisors for training of personnel and other necessary facilities.

He also referred to the four mechanised agricultural stations that have been set-up with the economic and technical assistance provided by the Soviet Union.

Emphasising the vital role of public sectors in the future development of agriculture in the country, he said that the establishment of state farms occupies an important place in our agricultural activities, particularly for the production of cotton, sugar beet, vegetables, reproduction of improved seeds, production of meat, butter, egg and other farm items.

Work on the setting-up of new agricultural cooperatives and the strengthening and consolidation of the existing cooperative which are becoming more and more popular among the people will continue.

In reply to a question as to what measures have been adopted to continue further implementation of the present stage of the democratic land reforms in the country, he said that at present, in accordance with the decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the PDPA and the Council of Ministers of the DRA, the evaluation of the results of the first stage of the implementation of land-reforms on the basis of the study of land in the country, distribution of material and financial assistance to the farmers and agricultural cooperatives, and effective regulation of the system of land ownership including the distribution of the land and related items will continue.

He said that the programme of land reforms, with the active participation of the vast masses of peasants, based on the just and democratic distribution of land and water to the peasants which would be to their interests will continue to be put into practice.

CSO: 4600/115

BRIEFS

SOVIET JUSTICE MINISTER--This afternoon Nezamuddin Tahzib, president of the Supreme Court, met Aleksandr Yakovlevich Sukharev, first deputy justice minister of the USSR, at the headquarters of the Supreme Court. They discussed subjects of common interest. The vice president, members of the High Judicial Council and heads of the central departments of the Supreme Court also attended the meeting. [Text] [LD010620 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 31 Oct 81 LD]

GOSR RECEPTION--The 64th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution was marked this evening by a gala and a glorious reception in the USSR Embassy in Kabul. The reception was attended by the members of the Politburo, PDPA Central Committee, Presidium, DRA Revolutionary Council and Council of Ministers, a number of high-ranking officials [words indistinct] government employees, ambassadors and charges d'affaires in Kabul. The reception was held in an atmosphere of sincerity, cordiality, friendship and warm enthusiasm. [Text] [LD080630 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 6 Nov 81]

INDIAN ENVOY--DRA Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mohammad Dost gave a farewell luncheon today in Kabul in honor of the Indian ambassador and representative extraordinary, J. Teja, whose term of duty is ended in the DRA. The luncheon was attended by a number of high-ranking officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the dean of the diplomatic corps and some ambassadors and charges d'affaires of some friendly countries in Kabul. Foreign Minister Shan Mohammad Dost and the Indian ambassador both spoke at the luncheon about the long-standing friendly and fraternal relations existing between Afghanistan and India. [Text] [LD111532 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari and Pashto 1430 GMT 11 Nov 81]
Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the PDPA Central Committee and president of the DRA Revolutionary Council, this morning received J. K. Teja, Indian ambassador in Kabul, at the revolutionary council headquarters for a farewell meeting. J. K. Teja's term of office as his country's ambassador to Afghanistan has recently been completed. [Text] [LD180640 Kabul Domestic Service in Dari 1600 GMT 17 Nov 81 LD]

NEW INDIAN AMBASSADOR--Kabul, 16 Nov (BAKHTAR)--Babrak Karmal, president of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA, has approved the accreditation of [name indistinct] Dikshet as the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Indian Republic to the DRA. [Text] [LD180640 Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0418 GMT 17 Nov 81 LD]

'BAKHTAR'-'MONTSAME' COOPERATION AGREEMENT--A cooperation agreement between the DRA's BAKHTAR News Agency and the MONTSAME News Agency of the Mongolian People's Republic was concluded today in Kabul. The agreement was signed by the deputy director of the BAKHTAR agency and deputy chairman of the State Committee for Broadcasting, information and television of the People's Republic of Mongolia. The signing ceremony was attended by the deputy minister for publication of the Ministry of Information and Culture and the Mongolian ambassador in Kabul. Under the contract exchange of news, bulletins, news publications and photographs aiming at informing the toiling masses about the achievements and structures of these countries will be carried out and fruitful cooperation will be implemented in the area of exchanging experiences of correspondents. [Text] [LD180640 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 17 Nov 81 LD]

MEETING WITH USSR OFFICIAL--Kabul, 16 Nov (BAKHTAR)--Dr Sayed Amir Shah Zara, vice president of the Peace, Solidarity and Friendship Organization of the DRA, met Yevgeniy Ivanov, the visiting vice chairman of the Union of the Soviet Societies for Friendship With the Foreign Countries today and held talks on the issues of mutual interest. [Text] [Kabul BAKHTAR in English 0415 GMT 17 Nov 81 LD]

SOVIET ACTIONS--London, 31 Oct (AFGHAN NEWS PRESS)--Since Soviet troops arrived in Afghanistan, some 280 mosques have either been destroyed or damaged in the three northern provinces alone. According to the agency, in the provinces of Qonduz, Baghlan and Samangan, through which the highway from Shir Khan port on the Oxus passes and which the Soviet Army has been using, along with the road through Herat, the Soviets have destroyed or damaged mosques all along the route. The Soviets believe the mosques serve as hiding places for the Mujahidin. The Soviets have destroyed about 100 mosques on the stretch of road between Shir Khan through Pol-e Khomri to Baghlan. On the road between Pol-e Khomri and Samangan 180 mosques have been destroyed. In the village of 'Aliabad in Qonduz Province the Soviets killed 37 persons, including the famous mullah Maulana Shirin, when they were standing at prayers. Maulana Shirin was such a prominent clergyman that even Radio Kabul had to announce his death although it was careful not to mention the cause of it. Mr Sargardan, who was the only man to escape death in the incident and is at present commanding Mujahidin in a sector of Baghlan Province, said that for him there was no choice left but to begin fighting after that incident. Narrating the incident, Mr Sargardan told the AFGHAN AGENCY reporter that it was afternoon prayer time when Soviet tanks were heard approaching. There was a hail of bullets and rockets. The mosque became one heap of human blood and flesh and he was wounded. The villagers came to the spot after a while but he was the only one left alive. [Excerpts] [GF041830 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 1 Nov 81 p 1]

PLIGHT OF KARMAL GOVERNMENT--Rawalpindi, 1 Nov--A former high-ranking official of Afghanistan, Mohammad Yusaf Farzand, has stated that the Karmal administration is in a state of siege. Its power extends to 10 km [around Kabul] during the day and to only 6 km at night. In fact, there is no government in Afghanistan. Mohammad Yusaf, who was an adviser in the Afghan Ministry of Finance, in an interview said that government officials cannot move from one place to another without a military escort. On the other hand, the Mujahidin move freely through the country. The Karmal administration has no support from the people. Not one percent of the government officials supports the Karmal administration. Government officials are secretly connected with the Mujahidin. Mohammad Yusaf said that the Karmal administration fully realizes that it cannot remain in power without the help of outside military help. Therefore, it favors keeping foreign forces in the country. [Text] [GF061838 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 2 Nov 81 pp 1, 6]

MUJAHIDIN ACTIVITIES--Peshawar, 2 Nov (PPI)--The Soviet High Command is reequipping its forces against the Mujahidin for a winter offensive, says a HEZB-E ESLAMI source. According to this source, a convoy of 800 Soviet military vehicles was ambushed by the Mujahidin on the road between Kabul and Lowgar last week. The Mujahidin blocked the road in several places and created difficulties for the Soviets. In one attack the Mujahidin destroyed 17 tanks and armored vehicles. A report from Paktia says that another convoy of 200 military vehicles including tanks and armored cars which was moving from Ghazni through Paktia Province was ambushed by the Mujahidin in the Soltani region at (Kharera). Fifteen tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed. On another occasion when 35 Soviet helicopter gunships assisted by jets bombarded a hill at (Shoikamar) to support Soviet troops moving between (Mathro) and Soltani, the Mujahidin blocked the road, but the Soviet troops changed plans and moved toward the (Chaharbaran) region. On 23 October, the Mujahidin mined the road to (Chaharbaran) and blew up two tanks. A bitter fight ensued and 35 helicopter gunships and jets strafed Mujahidin positions. The battle began at 0700 and lasted until 1800. In the battle the Mujahidin killed many Soviet soldiers and in the end only 12 tanks reached the (Tabut) area. The Mujahidin destroyed 4 tanks in this battle, set on fire another 5 and killed more than 50 Soviet soldiers. [Text] [GF061859 Karachi MASHRIQ in Urdu 2 Nov 81 p 1]

CSO: 4656/1

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES GULF DEFENSE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 232, 15-19 Oct 81 pp 20-21

[Interview with al-Shaykh Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa, Foreign Minister of Bahrain by Rafiq Khalil Ma'luf; in New York; date not given: "Foreign Minister of Bahrain Says, 'We Are Making Preparations To Defend the Gulf; War in Lebanon Is Threatening Others' "]

[Text] Al-Shaykh Muhammad Mubarak Al Khalifa, Bahrain's minister of foreign affairs and the head of his country's delegation to the UN General Assembly spoke with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in New York about Arab conditions. He spoke about matters that concern the Gulf: the war between Iraq and Iran, the Lebanese crisis and the Palestinian question. The text of the interview follows:

[Question] There is considerable discussion in the United States about a strategy in the Middle East. What is your view of this idea?

[Answer] First, there is an Arab strategy that pertains to the Arab nation as a whole. This is the strategy that was in the Common Arab Defense Pact which comprises all the Arab countries. As is the case in the Gulf region, the Arab countries deal and interact with each other through a council of cooperation. This cooperation is regional, and it takes place in an Arab context in order to devise a strategy to defend the area. That strategy is an Arab strategy and it serves the interests of the Arab nation and the regional areas. We believe that this strategy must keep its distance from the two superpowers in their struggle over centers of influence.

I believe that there is an Arab strategy and not a strategy that is affiliated with a group or with one of the superpowers. This is my understanding of strategy, and this is our understanding of our strategy.

[Question] What do you think about the alliance policy and the attempt by both the Soviet Union and the United States to establish facilities and centers of influence in the Middle East area? What is your view of these actions?

[Answer] The statement that was issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] of the Gulf Countries emphasized that the area must keep its distance from the

struggle and that the people of the werea are the ones who were responsible for its defense.

[Question] What do you think about the AWACS deal and the strong opposition it is facing in the United States?

[Answer] The AWACS deal concerns the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in particular. This is due to Saudi Arabia's geographic location and the vast area of land that requires this kind of modern equipment. I believe that any Arab country has the right to acquire advanced weapons to defend itself. This deal should pass or should be approved in favor of Saudi Arabia and all the countries of the Gulf.

[Question] What is your view of the situation in the Gulf at the present time? Has tension increased due to the continued Iraqi-Iranian struggle and to the fact that most countries of the world look upon this area as [the world's] principal source of energy? Do you have the feeling that danger is imminent?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the importance of the Gulf area to the world is increasing every day. The Gulf area has become one of the most significant and sensitive areas in the world due to the essential oil resources which God has bestowed on it; these resources are essential to the development of societies particularly in the west and in many countries of the Third World. We also believe that the security of this area is the responsibility of its people. Therefore, we thought of establishing a council of cooperation so that this action can be collective instead of unilateral. Yes, we must make preparations. Our area, like any other area in the world, may face dangers and threats. What is most important is that we make preparations. We are proceeding in that direction, and we are developing the frameworks and the capabilities that can defend this area. Defense must stem from the faith of people and of society. We are therefore unifying the ranks and establishing this cooperation in order to move this area away from the international struggle.

[Question] Some people feel that Israel threatens not only the confrontation countries, but that its conduct--bombing the Iraqi nuclear reactor and its strong opposition to the sale of AWACS--indicates that it harbors hostile intentions toward the countries of the Gulf. Do you have this feeling?

[Answer] We are always saying at all levels that the Israeli expansionist policy is threatening the Arab nation in general and not, as is being said, only the countries that are close to it. This has recently been established by the terrorist operation, which Israel carried out against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and by the threats that are made every day by Israeli officials. Therefore, we believe that Israel's policy is an expansionist policy that threatens not only the Middle East, but also peace and security in the world. This is because Israel's ambitions are unlimited. Unless this policy is curbed, the Middle East area will continue to be a volatile area.

[Question] What is your view of the Arab situation?

[Answer] The Arab situation is not what we would wish it to be. There are differences, and these differences are now threatening the Arab nation itself. It is the weakness of the Arab nation as well as its differences that are making it possible for the enemy to expand. I believe that we are now engaged in communicating with each other in preparation for the next Arab summit. There will be bilateral communications between the countries to reduce this tension and to restore the Arab rank to its former state. The unity of the Arab rank is the only strong weapon that the Arab nation has. Without it we will remain as weak and as fragmented as we are [now].

[Question] What is your view of the Lebanese situation, and are you trying to offer assistance?

[Answer] Lebanon is part of the Arab nation, and it interacts with it. However, Arab differences are reflected here and there. It is unfortunate that these differences are reflected in Lebanon more than they are in any other Arab area. However, Lebanon itself is partly responsible for what is happening. I believe that there are two sides in this matter: an Arab side and a Lebanese side. If Arab cooperation and intra-Lebanese cooperation are not proportionate, we cannot achieve the solution that is required. It is essential that Arab and Lebanese efforts be intensified, for if these efforts achieve the level [of agreement] that is required, it will then be possible to stop the bloodshed and the destruction which are breaking all our hearts. Lebanon has paid too much. I believe that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are playing a positive and an effective role in this regard. In a spirit of affection, brotherhood and responsibility I would like to say that there must be a strong posture of solidarity in Lebanon. We in the Gulf countries are doing everything we can to stop the bloodshed because what is happening in Lebanon is not confined to Lebanon. The fire which is burning in Lebanon may destroy others. Accordingly, the two parallel courses of Arab action and Lebanese action to which I referred are proceeding together. There is no doubt that Arab differences were the principal cause of that situation, but we must avoid talking about the past, and we must work for the future.

[Question] What do you think about the effect which the failure of the AWACS deal would have on Arab-American relations and on Saudi-U.S. relations?

[Answer] I believe that if the United States does not comply with the Arab countries' request for weapons to defend their land, the effect of that will be significant and meaningful. We believe that the matter of AWACS will have a major effect if the deal is not approved. But we will wait before we pass judgment on the matter.

[Question] It seems that attempts are being made to put the Palestinian question on the back burner and to go ahead with the subject of strategic consensus. What is your view of this matter, and what is your evaluation of this situation?

[Answer] I believe that the Palestinian question now is in a position unlike that in which it has been for the past 10 years. It has become evident that the substance of the struggle in the area is the need to solve the question of the Palestinian people. [It has become evident that] without such a solution, there can be no real strategy to keep the Middle East area away from the struggle.

The cease fire that happened in south Lebanon recently was an event in which Palestinians and Israelis took part for the first time. Palestinians now have a political and a military role which is recognized by the world. I mean the Palestinian question has become a recognized fact, and it has emerged in an unprecedented fashion. I believe that today all the powers in the world are focusing on a solution to that problem more than they ever did in the past. We, the Arabs, have to strive to bring about the withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Arab lands and [to establish] the right of the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny, including their right to establish their independent state.

The Palestinian question is a question of time. I believe it is a fundamental question which cannot be ignored because this would mean that the attainment of a comprehensive solution in the area was being ignored.

In this context, countries that have been helping Israel are to stop supplying it with weapons and giving it economic aid so that Israel would reconsider its actions because its conduct is not even like that of the superpowers. Never in history has a country behaved the way Israel has been behaving.

8592
CSO: 4404/64

NEED FOR CLOSE COOPERATION EMPHASIZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 233, 20-26 Oct 81 pp 27-28

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "The Assassination Increased Enthusiasm for Cooperation; the New Egyptian Regime Is a Temporary Extension of Its Predecessor"]

[Text] Anwar Muhammad al-Sadat died, but Arabism is not dead.

This is what a Gulf official told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI when he heard the news that the Egyptian president had been assassinated.

The brevity of that simple sentence epitomizes many things. However, the simplification does not solve the problem; in fact, it increases its mystery and its complexity not only as far as the Middle East question as a whole is concerned, but also at least as far as the situation in the Arabian Gulf is concerned.

The problem of the Arabian Gulf is a problem. Its condition is that of an area which is being courted by the whole world and at the same time looked at wrathfully as though it were responsible for the inflation, for the high prices, for the decline of the economy, for the famine, for the tragedies and even for the cholera.

The situation of the Gulf is such that if there were a storm in Poland, the Gulf would tremble.

If there were tension in Afghanistan, it would shudder.

If President Reagan becomes tense and if Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's nerves are strained, the Gulf exclaims, "Good heavens!"

In other words the Gulf now feels that it is the target of all the maneuvers and dialogues that take place in the world, not because it is powerful and awesome, but rather because it is a storehouse of the energy which the world needs. Without this energy there can be no industry, no progress and no civilization would develop. Quite simply, the problem of the Gulf lies in the fact that it has become the key to everything. Everyone wants to have this key in his pocket and to use it whenever he wishes.

The Gulf and the Cause

Even though the Gulf itself is a problem, it is to a large extent related to the greater problem, that is, the question of the Middle East.

On the major question the Gulf neither jests nor indulges. It has offered and is offering everything it can materially and morally offer. It is using its clout internationally in the interests of the cause, and it is using energy, which is oil, to serve the cause.

When al-Sadat embarked on a course that contradicted the beliefs and convictions of the Arabs, the Arabs of the Gulf stood against him but maintained their strong relations with the Egyptian people and with the Egyptian institutions that were not totally related to the Egyptian regime and its men.

The Sultanate of Oman was [the only country in the Gulf] that maintained its relations with Egypt's president, with Egypt's regime and with the Egyptian people, saying that Egypt had taken a step to regain its land and to regain the rights and the sovereignty of the Palestinian people on their land. When this step fails, the situation will be dealt with then on the basis of circumstances at that time. Oman asked the Arabs who boycotted and opposed Egypt to come up with an alternative, affirming that ultimately it would support any Arab consensus and a clear, objective Arab plan that would yield positive results, even if this step involved embarking on a real and not a verbal war.

Only once did the sultanate assume a firm position vis a vis al-Sadat's regime. That was when Israel declared that Jerusalem was a unified city and the capital of Israel. A year ago Oman issued a statement warning that it would assume a negative position on the Camp David accords if Israel did not retract that step which it had taken.

Therefore, with the exception of the sultanate's position, the position of the Arab Gulf on the question remains clear. It is a position that is trying to close the case in a manner that would preserve Arab rights; it is devoting its capabilities and its diplomacy to the interests of the cause. Even the invitation that PLO Chairman, Mr Yasir 'Arafat received to visit Japan was made as a result of an initiative by one of the Arab emirates, and it was arranged by Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Dr Mani' ibn Sa'id al-'Utayba.

Anwar al-Sadat is dead. With his assassination an era comes to an end. As far as the Gulf is concerned, what is the next era?

The commentaries that came from the Gulf countries about what happened denounced the assassination incident itself but not the end of the Camp David period to which these countries were fundamentally opposed.

What is disturbing the Gulf countries in particular is the violence involved in devising or changing stages, policies and positions. For this

reason, what happened and what may happen in Egypt is beginning to attract the attention of Gulf countries. It is causing Gulf officials to become tense out of fear that the area may become unsettled and that it may experience difficult periods of tension and instability that would affect their area as well. This area, that is the oil area, is a sensitive area that would not withstand shocks or hot winds.

Therefore, some time before the assassination the countries of the Arabian Gulf had one option: to find a just solution. This was summarized in the plan of Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and first deputy prime minister.

The Saudi peace plan focused primarily on the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and did not involve itself in the intricacies of eastern or western international struggles.

All the countries of the Gulf adopted Prince Fahd's plan and decided to bring it up for discussion at the Fez Summit Conference in Morocco next month. With an Arab consensus the plan would eventually become an initiative that the countries of the European Common Market would adopt and thrust onto both the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

The recent events in Egypt occurred after the proposal was made.

Anwar al-Sadat was assassinated, and Husni Mubarak became the new president. The Gulf countries' insistence on their plan grew after what happened in Egypt. Following the meeting of the ministerial council of the Gulf Cooperation Council in al-Ta'if 2 months ago Prince Fahd's plan became a Gulf plan; it was no longer either Prince Fahd's or Saudi Arabia's plan.

Diplomatic circles in the Gulf are now convinced that the new regime in Egypt, despite its declaration that it was an extension of the former regime, will neither be similar to that regime nor represent an extension of its policy except for a period of time. This is the period in which the final Israeli withdrawal from Sinai will be achieved in April 1982.

The Battle of Diplomacy and Oil

The restoration of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine requires major effort and involvement in a vicious battle behind which the Arabs would place all their clout. Numerous judgments have been and are being made on this battle. The most recent such judgments in the Gulf was one which stated that the Arabs have waged more than one battle but have not achieved anything. The time has come to use diplomacy and oil as weapons and to stay away from succumbing to this or the other country so that we would not have fragmentation [among the Arabs], turning the battle to one of loyalties and alliances and thereby wasting the effort. If diplomacy and oil are reinforced by moral and material support, it is inevitable that they will accomplish something.

Accordingly, the Gulf decision is to polarize the largest number of countries in the world that have clout so that in time this or the other superpower can be induced to produce results.

There is one effort, and Gulf officials say it is simple and may appear childish at the outset. However, they are convinced that this effort will not hurt. In fact, in their opinion, it would bring all the Arabs together. If there is an Arab official who has other proposals, he should come forward with them or put them to use, for they may provide a solution.

Those officials add that not a single eastern or western country has so far stated that the Gulf countries' proposal is wrong. No country has opposed it either secretly or publicly. Even Arab countries themselves--the moderate ones and the strict ones--have supported the Gulf effort or at least proclaimed that it was appropriate as a beginning, [even though they acknowledged that] there was a need to "tighten it" in some places.

Self Security

So far this is the position of the Gulf countries. In the aftermath of the events in Egypt and the effects these events have on the question of the Middle East, the situation in the Gulf area itself remains the same.

Gulf officials feel now, more than they did before, that the destiny and the future of the area are tied only to the will of its people.

Those officials had begun making preparations for the security of the Gulf by relying on a country and its capabilities. [Recent] events have increased their conviction that they must become more rigorous in establishing the security zone away from struggles and alliances. The Riyadh Summit on the 10th of next month will be decisive. The plan is now ready, and it bears the imprint of Saudi Arabia, of the Sultanate of Oman and of Kuwait. It also has the approval of the three other countries that are members of the council. These are the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.

The Gulf is now concerned about protecting itself and about participating extensively, or rather taking the initiative, in solving the major problem [of the Middle East], which in its opinion is the powder keg that may explode at any moment.

8592
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GOVERNMENT PLANS TO IMPROVE ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE

Spare Parts for Tractors

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 27 Sep 81 p 9

[Text] Predictions are that in the current year 20,000 tractors will be distributed among farmers throughout the country. Farmers in our country will not have any difficulty getting spare parts next year. The imposed war has made it necessary and possible for us to produce all wheat harvesting machines for dry farming areas by means of Iranian industry. Mahmud Jamali, Head of the Agricultural Machinery Distribution Center, in an exclusive interview yesterday with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, while announcing these matters, said that statistics which have come to hand show that despite economic restrictions that have existed in various parts of the country, in 1980-1981 around 13,517 tractors were distributed among farmers throughout the country. In the year 1358 [21 Mar 1979-20 Mar 1980] this figure was around 12,000 tractors, and in 1978-1979 the figure was around 7,700. He added that predictions are that in the current year 20,000 tractors will be distributed in the country, because statistics show that during the first 4 months of this year [21 Mar-21 Jul 1981] 6,800 tractors came on the market. Jamali said that in addition to procuring tractors for farmers, on the basis of planning that is underway the Agricultural Machinery Center will also procure their spare parts. Not only will we have no limitations in the procurement of tractor spare parts, but spare parts will also be procured for machinery such as combines and others. He added: In the current year there was not the slightest problem with harvesting, because around 300 combines carried out the harvest throughout the country. Even in the war zones this important task was carried out despite bullets and mortars.

He said: Combines were under government control this year and were not sold to anyone. Their usage was under the complete control of the Reconstruction Crusade, the seven-person councils, and the rural cooperatives and they carried out the harvest in places where the farmers had fled. He said: In the procurement of agricultural machinery 2,000 tillers were sent last year to the country's northern provinces. It is our aim to increase this figure to 10,000 this year. Around 5,000 agricultural machines of this type will be built inside the country and the rest will be imported from Japan. Jamali then said: At the beginning of the imposed war we resolved in our planning for achieving self-sufficiency to build machinery that requires less technology. On this basis equipment like ploughshares has been placed in the direct custody of this center, so that in the current year 7,000 ploughshares were purchased domestically. An Iranian company has also

contracted to build 10,000 3 to 5-ton trailers [sic] this year. This center has also signed a contract for construction within the country of 2,000 manure spreaders and 1,500 bulldozer blades. Referring to the important role played by the procurement of spare parts in Iranian agriculture, Jamali then said: Only 8 million dollars in spare parts for Romanian tractors was foreseen for the past 2 years, while this figure has increased several times over the next 3 years. He gave assurances to our dear farmers that in the coming year there will be no problem with respect to the procurement of spare parts. He said that around 4 million pounds of spare parts have been imported for Massey Ferguson tractors. In general the imposed war has forced us to think of spare parts every time we conclude a contract, and while concluding these contracts to take steps in the direction of self-sufficiency with respect to agricultural machinery. With the money that the government has made available to the center, the cash flow in the water pump and agricultural machinery factories has increased so that they have not had to close down. The imposed war has also forced us to take effective steps in the training of manpower. For this purpose, trainees have gone to Romania and West Germany for further training and to acquire specialized knowledge. Technicians from the Massey Ferguson Company have also held classes in Iran. Jamali said: I must mention that this war has forced us to develop the capacity to manufacture 100 percent of the wheat harvesting machinery used in dry farming areas in Iran. Jamali said: This center's work is based on the policy of neither East nor West, so that even now the machinery needed for harvesting wheat in dry farming areas and the machinery needed for next year's rice cultivation has already been foreseen. Assistance has also been obtained from revolutionary organs and groups in the matter of training. Among these groups and organizations are the Reconstruction Crusade, the seven-person councils, and the rural cooperatives. A group has gone to Austria, West Germany, and Italy for the purpose of technical training. A high-level machinery committee has studied the issues in order to get a factory started in Tabriz, and it will make a decision on the quality, kind, and quantity of the equipment. In conclusion he said: So far this center has received the request of 36,000 farmers for agricultural machinery. It is our view that this figure is incorrect. This number of petitioners is being studied by the Reconstruction Crusade and the seven-person council.

Rehabilitation of Former Kurdish Stronghold

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] Urmia--KEYHAN Service--A group composed of administrative officials and West Azarbaijan military commanders, during a trip to the liberated city of Bowkan, studied the issues and needs of this area and made decisions on various matters.

Mojtaba Hashemi, aide to the Governor-General of West Azarbaijan, who was with this group, said in a talk upon his return to Urmia: The present atmosphere in the city of Bowkan is ready to accept all the policies and procedures of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

He added: In its present situation Bowkan is in need of reconstruction. With this intent, following the installation of military outposts and checkpoints in order to safeguard the aims of the Islamic Republic of Iran and also the establishment of a lieutenant governor and a mayor, the preliminaries for which have

been accomplished, all government organizations have been reopened and will begin their work in this city.

The West Azarbaijan governor-general's aide then said: A decision will be made in the future on the installation of a police headquarters to secure the city.

He also said the government has opened a separate account for the reconstruction of Kordestan. In order to carry out reconstruction plans, considering that there is only a short time remaining in the area's work season, the best possible effort will be made to repair and restore part of the destruction caused by the idol-worshippers and the counterrevolutionaries. A complete reconstruction program will be undertaken in the implementation of long-term and far-reaching plans, which need precise planning and the expenditure of sufficient time.

Concerning the manner in which the people of Bowkan received the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran after entry into the city, Hashemi said: In the several instances in which we talked with the people of Bowkan they said they had been prepared with expectation and longing to receive and accept the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. An old man even cried and said "how happy I am to see the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the area at last instead of infidel forces."

During his remarks the West Azarbaijan governor-general's aide pointed out that preparations have begun for reconstruction of hospitals, treatment clinics, organizations for teaching and training and other government organizations, and for the restoration of damages caused by the presence of counterrevolutionaries in the area.

He added: Upon inspection of Bowkan's health facilities and schools, we saw that their equipment, especially in the Bowkan health clinic's operating room, had been stolen by counterrevolutionaries, and immediate steps must be taken for their reconstruction.

Concerning Bowkan's present situation, Hashemi said: Revolutionary forces, composed of the army, the revolutionary guard, and the mobilization staff, have taken control of the city upon becoming established there. They have alertly placed all counterrevolutionary movements in the area under surveillance. After entry of the warriors of Islam into Bowkan and the clearing of the area, now the counterrevolution's organizations and installations in the Bowkan area have been destroyed. Renewed formation of counterrevolutionary forces will be prevented with the continuation of purging operations, and there will be no opportunity for them to build nests of corruption.

Concerning the matter of procuring supplies for the people of Bowkan, the West Azarbaijan governor-general's aide said: The Commander of Mian Dow Ab has to a certain extent procured general foodstuffs and other needs of the people of Bowkan such as flour and fuel. God willing, and with the establishment of full security, this assistance will continue in the area.

Colonel Azadi Talab, West Azarbaijan Regional Gendarmerie Commander, who was also with the group, said in a talk: Gendarmerie outposts and checkpoints will soon

be set up at sensitive points in this area to provide security and peace for the villagers around Bowkan. Counterrevolutionaries will no longer have the courage to make trouble for the area's noble Kurds.

He said: All the forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are at the disposal of the oppressed people and tormented Kurdish brothers and sisters. They have no other desire but to serve the oppressed people.

At the conclusion of its inspection of the city of Bowkan this group returned to Urmia yesterday evening.

A Message From the Imam's Representative in the Western Part of the Country to the People of Kordestan

Hojjatoleslam Musa Musavi, the Imam's representative in the Western part of the country, also sent a message to the Muslim people of Kordestan on the occasion of the liberation of the city of Bowkan. The text of the message is as follows:

In the name of God. God will not allow infidels to bring harm to believers.

Respected Muslim people of Kordcstan, brothers and sisters of Bowkan, American groups, acting on the orders of their world-devouring bosses, capitalizing on the unawareness arising from the oppression of the masses, and in the shadow of liberal rule, have kept this region embroiled in turmoil, corruption, and increasing deprivation for more than 2 years, to the benefit of East and West colonialism and despite past oppression, but through the will of God, their oppression and obvious corruption, their direct complicity with the American hireling Saddam, and their despicable American and counterrevolutionary face has been shown to the Kurdish Muslim masses. Now, with the help of God, your sincere cooperation, and the unsparing efforts of the fighters of the army, the revolutionary guards, and Kurdish Muslim martyrs, their last strongholds in Bowkan have fallen to the Islamic front. While congratulating the Imam of the nation, the brave fighters, and you, the Muslim people of Bowkan on this great victory, I expect all of you, in the form of fervent service, because of the martyrs' Islamic commitment and solemn sanguin prophecy, after exposing to the satanic face of these traitors to Islam and the Kurdish people, to overthrow the real agents of the counterrevolutionary movements in the area more than before through your full presence in the field, and to help your Islamic, revolutionary, people's government completely clear the area of the contamination of self-prostituting foreigner-worshippers and to help with the area's material and qualitative reconstruction. You may be sure that those deprived deceived people who now penitently take refuge in Islam are forgiven by order of the Imam and will benefit from the revolution's magnanimity. In conclusion, I am desirous of the alleviation of the area's difficulties and the full occupation of Islamic land in the presence of God Almighty.

Peace be upon you and the mercy and blessings of God.

The Reconstruction Crusade of the city of Bowkan also renewed its activities in this area after a hiatus of 2 and 1/2 years. These activities have begun following the liberation of the city of Bowkan by the brave fighters of Iran.

"Bozorgi," an official of the Kordestan Province Reconstruction Crusade, while announcing this, said: The Reconstruction Crusade has decided to rebuild its installations in this deprived city and to undertake the restoration of losses and deficiencies brought on by anti-people's groups. Accordingly, a place for the Reconstruction Crusade was immediately selected, and this city's Reconstruction Crusade was set up with the sending of a number of self-sacrificing members of the Mahmud Abad Reconstruction Crusade and three vehicles to Bowkan.

The official of the Kordestan Reconstruction Crusade added: Bowkan was one of the first cities in the Kurdish areas where the Reconstruction Crusade began working after the triumph of the revolution, but only a few months after their work began American groups gradually penetrated Kurdish areas and prevented the continuation of the Crusade's work. He added: Now that the revolutionary fighters have again taken this city out of the clutches of the imperialist hirelings, once again the headquarters of submissive groups like the Democrats have been converted and will be converted to places belonging to the Reconstruction Crusade and other peoples' and revolutionary organizations.

In this same connection an announcement from the Reconstruction Crusade to the People of Bowkan was issued.

The text of the announcement is as follows:

In the name of the Almighty--Moslem, suffering people of the city of Bowkan, during these 2 years you have lived under the domination, pressure, and suffocation of counterrevolutionary groups and you have not been able to do agricultural, development, and reconstruction work, but now, as in the past, the Reconstruction Crusade, with all its ability, will be ready to cooperate and struggle with you brothers and sisters in the reconstruction of the area. Return to your work and go back to your normal lives. You may be sure that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran will help you, as in the past. It will put an end to your shortages and decisively confront counterrevolutionary agents.

An Attack on the Bowkan Revolutionary Guard Headquarters

The headquarters of the brothers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards of Bowkan was attacked night before last with RPG-7's and hand grenades by American hirelings of the disbanded Democrat and Kumeleh parties.

PARS reported that this attack was repulsed by fierce return fire from revolutionary guard brothers and the counterrevolutionaries were forced to retreat after giving up a number of dead and wounded casualties.

According to this report, no injury of any kind was inflicted upon the brothers in the revolutionary guard.

According to the same report, the day before yesterday one concrete-piercing shell and five single-barrelled weapons were found and confiscated by the brothers in the revolutionary guard.

Seven-Year Water Program

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 12 Oct 81 p 13

[Text] Three-hundred million tumans credit has been designated for small-scale government programs.

Engineer Ma'sumi, general manager of water planning of the ministry of power, in an exclusive interview with PARS, talked about the priorities of the water distribution plans, the overall plans of this ministry, and the limitations of water sources.

He began by discussing the resources and limitations of the country's water reserves, saying: Expansion of industry and agriculture, population increases, and increases in the urban standard of living have increased the country's need for water and the use of water reserves. He stressed that the country's greatest need is to obtain water for agriculture for the purpose of attaining self-sufficiency in food production and the production of other needs for the people. Ma'sumi added: Water for agriculture, comprises 90 to 95 percent of the water consumed by the country. The country's water sources consist of runoff water in surface and underground channels, which are always interrelated.

He added: Studies show that the volume of water runoff in the country averages 400 billion square meters annually. Of course this figure fluctuates between 200 and 600 billion square meters and it is irregularly distributed in time and space. The general manager of water planning then said concerning priorities for water distribution: In general 73 percent of the area of the country faces severe water shortages, and the principal factor in agricultural, industrial, and housing shortages arises from these very shortages.

In this regard all the water distribution planning for areas with little water receives top priority at the Ministry of Power. This ministry tries to create every kind of facility for water distribution for these areas. These measures include the construction of runoff tunnels and canals, dams for reservoirs, transporting water from major rivers, and other things which have special importance.

Concerning this ministry's overall plans, the general manager of water planning for the Ministry of Power said: The Ministry of Power has a seven-year water procurement plan, which started about a year ago, and for which 17 billion rials' worth of credit has been projected for this year. This program is mostly directed towards creating small water reservoirs, redirecting river water to the land by way of irrigation channels, construction of streams and channels, and covering canals to prevent water waste. He also added: For small government plans around 300 million tumans in credit has been projected which will be divided among 11 regional water organizations.

In conclusion, Mohandes Ma'sumi said: At the present time the construction of some dams is being completed and they will probably be ready for use by the end of the current year. Also the construction of semi-completed dams will be finished in the future with the help of the Sabir Company, which is one of the companies affiliated with the Ministry of Power.

9310
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TEHRAN RESTORES ORDER IN FORMER KURDISH STRONGHOLD

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 25 Oct 81 p 14

[Text] With the establishment of the rule of the Islamic Republic in the western regions, a deep gap has been created among armed groups.

In the joint session of Kumeleh leaders, 60 persons of the armed elements of this minigroup were purged.

Six occupants of an automobile were killed upon hitting a mine.

The people of a village killed three counterrevolutionaries in an attack on the stronghold of the [Kurdish] Democratic Party.

Counterrevolutionaries injured 21 persons with hand grenades thrown into a group of people of Baneh.

The victims of the recent skirmishes in Bukan will be compensated for their losses.

The people of Uramanat marched in support of the revolution.

With the liberation of Bukan by the revolutionary forces, the police department of Bukan was once again established in this city after two and a half years.

Reports from the western part of the country indicate that after the establishment of the rule of the Islamic Republic of Iran in these regions, a deep gap was created among counterrevolutionary minigroups. These differences have resulted in the purge of 60 persons of the "Kumeleh" elements.

These reports also mention the attack of the people of a village on the stronghold of the abolished [Kurdish] Democratic Party during which three members of this party were killed by the villagers.

Also, four passengers of a minibus carrying villagers were martyred when the bus hit a mine and in a similar accident, two military brothers attained the high rank of martyr.

This report also states: Counterrevolutionary elements threw grenades into a group of people of Baneh injuring 21 passersby.

/Kermanshah, KEYHAN correspondent/ [in boldface]--With the establishment of the rule of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the western regions of the country, a deep gap has been created among the counterrevolutionary forces affiliated with the Kumeleh minigroup. As the public relations office of the revolution guards of Marivan reports: In a joint session of the leaders of the outlawed Kumeleh Party around Marivan, this difference escalated until one group was disarmed by another. Sixty persons, of whom 15 reside in Marivan, were purged. This report adds: Last week, 12 persons of the deceived individuals affiliated with the outlawed [Kurdish] Democratic and Kumeleh Parties turned themselves in to the Kamyaran guards and after repenting their past actions, were given amnesty.

Another report states: At 9:30 on Thursday, 30 Mehr [22 Oct], the people of the village of Gelin in the region of Zhavrud attacked the stronghold of the outlawed [Kurdish] Democratic Party in that village and killed three members. This report also states: These skirmishes continued until 5 am last Friday, yesterday.

The revolution guards of Kamyaran also report: As a result of a minibus carrying the people of the village of Takht-e Zangi destined for Kamyaran hitting a strong mine set by the pro-American minigroups, four of the passengers of the minibus were piteously martyred and seven persons were injured. The injured were transported by the patrol group of the revolution guards to Kamyaran, where they were treated. This report adds: On the same day, two anti-tank mines were discovered by the brothers of the revolution guards and were disarmed. Also, last Friday afternoon, when a jeep carrying four military brothers hit an anti-tank mine at the beginning of Radio Mahabad Street, two of the brothers were martyred. The Islamic revolution guard corps of Mahabad confirmed this report and added: In this explosion, military brothers Hasan Qaribi, a student of the cadre, and Reza Peymani, a conscripted soldier, attained the honor of martyrdom and two others, 'Abdollah Safari and Mohammad Seyfollahi, were injured.

Throwing Grenades among the People

A report from Sanandaj states: A grenade was thrown among the people of Baneh by the counterrevolutionaries of this city as a result of which 21 passersby were injured. Four of the injured were taken by helicopter to Saqqez because of severe injuries. At 4 pm Thursday, 22 Oct, a hand grenade was thrown among the people by the counterrevolutionaries on Imam Khomeyni Street in Baneh, which resulted in injury to 21 passersby. According to this report, the injured were immediately transported to the hospital of the city and treated. Also, four of the injured in this incident were dispatched to Saqqez by helicopter because of severe injuries.

The Islamic revolution guard corps of the province of Kurdistan confirmed the report and said: Those responsible for this incident are being pursued by law enforcement authorities.

Establishment of the Police Department in Bukan

Following the liberation of Bukan from the counterrevolutionaries, the police department of Bukan was reopened last Saturday, after two and a half years of domination by the mercenary elements of outlawed minigroups, with ceremonies in which the supervisor of the police department of the Islamic Republic of Iran and a number of military and law enforcement authorities of western Azarbaijan Province participated.

Around 2 pm last Saturday, Colonel Hejazi, supervisor of the police department of the Islamic Republic of Iran, accompanied by one of the law enforcement deputies of the national police department, the chief of police of western Azarbaijan Province, and the commander of the gendarmerie of western Azarbaijan region, entered Bukan to reopen the police department of the city.

During the reopening of the Bukan police department, the supervisor of the national police department, in a gathering of the committed Moslems of Bukan and police department personnel, addressed the top officers of the police department as the first representatives of the national police department in Bukan and said: As the representatives of the police department of the country, you must demonstrate the highest of Islamic conduct in your relations with the people in order to make the revolution understood in the best possible manner in this region which has, for so many years, been under the oppression and tyranny of the previous regime and afterwards, for two and a half years, under the pressure and oppression of political minigroups.

Colonel Hejazi, in another part of his speech, referred to the increased cooperation, more than ever before, between the armed forces and said: You, police brothers, must show the utmost cooperation and coordination with the other armed forces of the Islamic

Republic of Iran in order to respond to the wishes of the oppressed Moslem people of Bukan.

The supervisor of the national police department of the Islamic Republic of Iran then participated in a gathering of the various classes of people of Bukan in the bazaar mosque of the city and, in a speech, referred to several verses of the Koran and the history of Kurdistan from ancient times up to the present and asked them to cooperate very sincerely with the police brothers and other combating forces of Islam, including the military, the gendarmerie, and the revolution guard corps. He asked them to drive away the counterrevolution in order to establish the government of God's justice and the decrees of the Koran in that city.

Colonel Hejazi and those accompanying him left Bukan for Orumiyeh at 4:30 pm that same day.

It must be pointed out that the other institutions and administration organizations of the city of Bukan will begin work one after another and will begin to offer services to the liberated people of this city.

Compensation for the Damages of the People of Bukan

In addition, Asadollah Tabe', the city governor of Miando'ab and supervisor of the district governor's office of Bukan, in a telephone conversation with the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY in Orumiyeh, emphasized compensation for the damages to the victims of the recent skirmishes of Bukan and said: With the liberation of the city of Bukan from the hands of the outlawed armed elements, the situation in the city is presently quite normal and all the shops have resumed their activities. Also, with the cooperation and initiative of the brothers in the reconstruction crusade, most government offices have resumed their activities. The imam's relief committee, the Foundation of the Oppressed, and the revolution prosecutor's office are handling the affairs of the people.

He said: Even though all the needs of the people of Bukan, including foodstuff and fuel, have been provided, food ration coupons will be distributed in this city. Also, a committee is studying the damages inflicted on the people of Bukan during the recent skirmishes. After these investigations are completed, steps will be taken to make repairs.

The March of the People of Uramanat

Following the recent victory of the combatants of Islam in Uramanat and Marivan, last Friday morning, the people of Uramanat marched carrying placards and pictures of the great leader of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni, Dr Beheshti, Dr Bahonar, and martyr Raja'i and shouted

harsh slogans against the occupying regime of Qods, the United States, and the minigroup Rozgari.

According to a PARS NEWS AGENCY report, the marchers then gathered in front of the public relations office of the guard corps of Uraman. The head of public relations of the Marivan guard corps and one of the clerics spoke about the nature of the Rozgari minigroup and the fugitive Sheykh Osman Naqshbandi.

In this gathering, a song was sung by a group of Marivan students. At the end, a resolution was issued and read and the marchers went off for the Friday prayers. In the unity-creating and enemy-breaking Friday prayers of Marivan, which were held with the participation of a large group of people, one of the revolution guard brothers, named Mehrshad, spoke about the martyrdom of Haj Mostafa Khomeyni. The Friday prayer leader of Marivan also spoke and offered the congratulations and condolences of himself and the people of Marivan to the imam of the people on the occasion of the martyrdom of Haj Mostafa Khomeyni.

Twelve members of the outlawed [Kurdish] Democratic and Kumeleh Parties turned themselves in to the guard corps of Kamyaran in the course of last week, expressed repentence for their past actions, and received amnesty.

Memorial Ceremony for Martyr Ayatollah Seyyed Mostafa Khomeyni in Oshnuyeh

The people of Oshnuyeh held a memorial service on the occasion of the anniversary of the martyrdom of Ayatollah Haj Seyyed Mostafa Khomeyni, the brave, revered son of Imam Khomeyni. The city governor of Naqdeh also participated in the ceremony praising this martyr, which was held in the bazaar mosque of Oshnuyeh. Also, the Friday prayer in Oshnuyeh was led by Magistrate Khezri. In his prayer sermon, he said: The counterrevolution will never achieve its filthy goals through terrorism, because Islam will never retreat from terrorism.

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MINISTER OF HEALTH DISCUSSES VARIOUS ISSUES

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 1 Oct 81 p 10

[Text] Dr Hadi Manafi, minister of Health, took part in an exclusive interview with JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI and answered its questions.

Dr Manafi began by discussing steps taken to eliminate unfair distribution of doctors in Iran.

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. The roots of the matter of unfair distribution of doctors must be studied. We know that doctors have not been distributed justly. Our statistics show that there is a doctor for every 700 persons in Tehran, while there is one for every 2,000 persons in Yazd, and one for every 15,000 persons in Kohkiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad, just as there is one physician for every 34,000 people in more deprived places. The reason for this is the attraction that more comfortable conditions hold for physicians, which is natural. Everyone is in a place where they are more comfortable and where there are more facilities, and they want to live there. Formerly, all the resources were concentrated in Tehran, and everyone was naturally drawn to Tehran. The good life was in Tehran, and physicians naturally settled in Tehran also and practiced medicine there. Therefore it is our goal to give priority to the deprived areas as much as we can and attract the physicians towards the deprived areas. This will be accomplished in several ways. One is that the attraction of private medical practice in Tehran must be reduced. For this reason, the doctor's fees which are paid will be of some help, because in the past doctors were able to have an income without accounting for it, but after this they will not be able to have an income without accounting for it. Therefore, medicine, like other fields, must henceforth be controlled, so as to eliminate extortion. This task must be pursued vigorously. A law has been drawn up, fees have been set, and a law on infractions is on its way to the Majlis. When this law on violations is passed, then those who are violators according to that law will be confronted. Therefore there will be no more exorbitant incomes. When this activity, which of course is only the work of a small number of physicians, is stopped, then that appeal of private practice will be reduced. On the other hand we are also in the process of trying to make the employment of doctors by the government more appealing, and we are upgrading the capacity and quality of the Ministry of Health's hospitals. Of course we must also change this attitude of ours. In the beginning we said that government hospitals would not work, but today we see that the government hospitals have better and more facilities than many private hospitals, and they really are more effective, but we still have the attitude that they are of

no value because they are government hospitals. As we have seen, if we dispensed expensive medicine at a government treatment center to someone, he would take it behind that very treatment center, throw it away and leave. That same medicine sold for even higher price when it was wrapped in gold foil. However, since it was in bulk form, in 500 and 1,000-unit boxes, placed in an envelope and handed to the patient, and the patient did not pay for it because it was from a government agency, and he had no faith in government establishments at that time, he would throw it away. Therefore we must change this attitude, when this situation appears. Many physicians come to the big cities. When they cannot obtain those large incomes they will naturally be drawn to smaller places. We must, however, provide the amenities of life in other areas so they can go there. We know that up until today the people have deprived our country of the basic resources. Furthermore the government has fully committed itself to reaching out to the deprived areas and is applying pressure to bring prosperity to the deprived areas first, and to take all health and educational facilities to those places that have nothing of this nature, so that, God willing, we will be able to persuade both physicians and urbanites who are trying to come to Tehran to give up that idea and to go to smaller places to live.

Absolutely No Mercy Must Be Shown to Smugglers

The Minister of Health then discussed measures taken to uproot addiction.

The law gave addicts a 6-month period of grace within which to cure themselves. None of them turned themselves in, however. They went into hiding, obtained drugs illicitly, and continued with their addictions. We equipped the hospitals on the basis of statistics we had and we thought that all of them would turn themselves in, but, they did not. Now that the grace period has passed, addiction is a crime. An addict is a criminal. This is not the fault of the government, it is the fault of the addict who continues with his addiction. The government is guilty of only one thing here, and that is not fetching them and imprisoning them. Of course eventually it will do this, and God willing, later it will increase its ability to do this, so that addicts will be treated like criminals. They will be arrested and kept in prison so long as the law allows, and they will be treated according to the law. From the point of view of treatment, we are obligated to help by seeing that their condition does not deteriorate, since there is no specific technique to cure addiction as such. The matter of treating addiction involves depriving the addict of narcotics for a specified period. The symptoms of addiction will disappear as a result of not consuming narcotics, but what prevents an addict from quitting is not having a sound personality and a proper will. Just as he initially became addicted, after quitting he will again go back to that substance. We must, however, make it clear to addicts and our society that this is an inhuman act and that whoever does it is a person without a proper personality and will. We must strengthen ourselves, our children, and our society so we will not be drawn to narcotics, because someone who turns to narcotics and becomes an addict, besides being useless and even detrimental to this country and to his own environment, becomes a parasite in that society as well.

To what extent, therefore, can society tolerate that parasite? Ultimately, if that parasite is not cured, he must somehow be removed from society. He must either be imprisoned or kept under control. On the other hand, narcotics must be

fought vigorously, so that if someone smuggles narcotics he will be vigorously fought. Absolutely no mercy must be shown to them, because they are people who destroy human societies. They must be pulled out by the roots so that addiction disappears.

Implementation of the New Plan for Distributing Medicine

Concerning the history of implementation of the new (generic) medicine distribution plan, the Minister of Health said:

The generic plan is now being implemented, but it is not a matter of removing the old system and supplanting it all at once with this plan and saying now the generic plan is in effect and that's it. Supposing we have 13 kinds of ampicillin in Iran. The basic ingredient of these 13 kinds of ampicillin is ampicillin, but it was found in one place under the name Penbritin, in another as Pantraksil [sic], and Ampicine [sic] in another in various guises. Now, however, it is only imported and distributed under the name ampicillin. In reality those 13 kinds are changed to one kind, but there are still some of those other drugs being sold on the market along with ampicillin. Gradually, as we are able to respond fully to needs, licenses for those drugs will be revoked, and after a specified period of time we will not have anything on the market other than ampicillin. The same goes for other drugs, meaning we will import and distribute by the generic name. Now we have 50 percent of our consumption, and when we have reached 100 percent of our consumption we will have revoked all the previous licenses. Within 2 years we will have a generic system throughout the country, which will cover over 90 percent of all medicines and we will have no shortages of needed medicines.

Concerning the use of hospitals to train medical students, Dr Manafi then said: The Ministry of Health has around 35,000 hospital beds throughout the country and there are about 10,000 hospital beds in the medical schools, which give a total of 45,000 hospital beds. It has thus been estimated that if we use all the country's resources for training physicians, instead of delivering only 700 or 800 physicians per year to society, we will be able to multiply this figure several times over. Naturally we can train many physicians. As a result, after a certain period we estimate that if we can train about 4,000 doctors every year we will have one physician for every 1,000 people in the country after 15 years. Today we are short 20,000 physicians. Allowing for growth in society, we will need 30,000 or 35,000 physicians in the next 15 years. Taking this situation into account, it has been decided that the Ministry of Health's hospitals will both teach and administer treatment. The same is true of the university, and again this relates to the Cultural Revolution Staff's plan along the same lines, which is to utilize medical facilities throughout the country both for treatment and teaching. There is no separation between teaching areas and treatment areas. In all our operations, wherever we administer treatment we will also teach in order that these medical deficiencies and shortages are rectified.

Ayatollah Khameneh'i's General Condition

Ayatollah Khameneh'i is doing well. His hand is now receiving physical therapy. He may need an operation, and this will be done at the appropriate time if needed.

Our reporter then asked about the new plan that has been introduced in some cities. The Minister of Health said: The plan our brothers in Esfahan have produced deals with the regulation of dental and other fees. We have the same thing also, but we are waiting for guidelines on violations to be put into effect. Of course we study all views from every source. In general we do the best thing or we combine various ideas and do what works best, which is the way this plan was put into effect in Esfahan and Shiraz. Of course these things are easier in small places. The Friday Imam, the Islamic groups, and the doctors themselves sit down and make decisions together. When they come to a conclusion they announce the fees and put them into effect. In the Majlis, however, a law has been passed that requires the Ministry of Health to set the fees for medical services, which the Ministry of Health has done, but we have not announced it pending passage of a law on violations, since we view violation of this as a crime and this should be enacted legally. Until it is enacted, if someone wants to violate this and the government has no answer, then our work is effectively nullified. Therefore it is better if we announce the fees for medical services when the guidelines for violations are announced.

Measures for the Health of Pilgrims

Concerning measures taken to look after pilgrims to Mecca by the Ministry of Health, Dr Manafi said: Every year every 100-person caravan takes a doctor with it. This year we took the war situation into consideration and the fact that we have great need of physicians in Iran. We realized that if we want to do that more than 700 physicians would have to leave Iran. Therefore we put doctors in various treatment clinics for them. There was one treatment clinic for every 10 caravans working continuously there. We did not allow 700 physicians to leave Iran for this task. We hope that they will be able to provide good service there, and we will not be left shorthanded here. Concerning hygiene, there are hygiene teams which are controlling the hygiene situation and the sanitary conditions in the caravans, and the Red Crescent also has its own special desert hospital. In general we had only one difficulty, and that was that Saudi Arabia did not clear the medicines we brought from here. They were extremely difficult about medicines. Of course we had 1 or 2 days of trouble with medicine there, and then they cleared them. God willing these troubles are now over and our pilgrims will return to the country having performed the Pilgrimage acceptably, in one piece, and good health.

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GOVERNOR-GENERAL INTERVIEWED ON SITUATION OF BALUCHESTAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 11 Oct 81 p 4

[Interview with Dr Mohammadi]

[Text] Zahedan--ETTELA'AT correspondent--Dr Mohammadi, governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan explained various issues in the province and development plans under implementation in an exclusive interview with ETTELA'AT's correspondent.

While emphasizing the point that counterrevolutionaries have strived and will strive to create turmoil in the province, and that the dear brothers and sisters of the province must vigilantly strangle each counterrevolutionary movement in its infancy, concerning the necessity of eliminating the deprivation in this province, said: Martyred brother Raja'i proposed a plan to eliminate deprivation in the backward provinces such as Sistan va Baluchestan. A budget of 2.5 billion tumans, separate from the province's annual development budgets, was proposed to the martyr Raja'i's cabinet. After complete study, the proposal was approved, and an amount equal to 500 million tumans was placed at the disposal of the governor-general and the Department of Agriculture of Sistan va Baluchestan in order to start activities.

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan added: Of course the governor-general's office must adapt itself to this broad activity and must create a new developmental organization in order to absorb this budget. Our developmental department was strengthened by the selection of an effective developmental deputy and the invitation of a number of committed experts from the governor-general's office. Thus it will be able to have the requisite supervision and management over project implementation.

In order to attract experts to this province, a plan called "three weeks, one week" was proposed, which we hope will be approved.

The Bank-e Mashin Alat-e Sangin [Heavy Machinery Bank] was created in order to eliminate the shortage of heavy machinery. Actions were also taken to supply building materials, and orders were also placed abroad which will soon be delivered. Also, we will try to create a bank called the "Construction Materials Bank."

Three Types of Developmental Plans

He then said: We have three types of plans: A plan related to raising production and self-sufficiency, one related to the increase in mercantile activities, and one related to the creation of security.

We have allocated the amount of 900 million tumans for agricultural expansion in connection with the development and self-sufficiency plan. The main executor of this plan is the Department of Agriculture. The major portion of the plan for attaining agricultural self-sufficiency is concentrated in Sistan and Iranshahr. In Sistan, the main parts of the plan are the dredging of streams, building irrigation canals, stabilizing shifting desert sand, and raising the productivity of agricultural land. In Iranshahr, the plan involves the expansion of land under cultivation, creation of new date palm groves, the improvement of seed and saplings and the education of farmers. It also involves industries associated with agriculture, such as disinfectant and date-packaging factories, which will soon go into operation.

Third is the raising of the production of fish and so-called "white protein." To this end, refrigerating plants in Konarak and Chabahar have been put into operation, and at the present between 30 and 70 tons of fish are purchased daily from the fisheries. We hope that this figure will soon come to 150 tons of fish. We will also give fishermen more work equipment, and purchase fish from them at a more suitable price.

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan then spoke about the issue of "trade," and during a detailed speech, said: By putting the ports of Konarak and Chabahar into operation, this province will soon have a first-place role in trade. In 2 years, perhaps about 1,000 trucks of goods will be carried from these harbors daily. To this end a ship anchorage has been transferred from Bandar 'Abbas to Chabahar, and a company has also announced its readiness to begin to unload between 1,000 and 5,000 tons of cargo daily with a system of "double work."

Founding "Iran Bandar"

He then said: A contract has been signed with the "Piruz Company" in order to found "Iran Bandar." This company is committed to preparing this anchorage for operation in Konarak within a period of 20 months. This anchorage will be able to handle ships of 25,000 tons. Similarly, a 300 million tuman contract has been signed with the "Bahambar Company" for the construction of a jetty in Chabahar. This jetty can be a commercial and fishing wharf. This company is also committed to delivering jetties for commercial and fishing harbors in Chabahar and Konarak within 20 months.

Dr Mohammadi then spoke about the issue of creating security, and said: In order to accomplish this, studies are being made about better control of the borders. Among plans being studied are roads on the border strips, coastal roads, creating new guardstations and observation towers on the border strip and also strengthening the gendarmarie.

Then, concerning preventing counterrevolutionaries and elements associated with the former regime from coming and going across the border with Pakistan, as well

as the traffic of international, professional smugglers across the border, he said: In this area it has been determined that the gendarmarie will be rebuilt and equipped. Some time ago I myself traveled to Pakistan and discussions were held towards having the two governments, Iran and Pakistan, jointly control the borders. These actions will be pursued.

Road Construction

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan then pointed to the matter of roads and road construction, and said: Unfortunately, due to the great distance between cities and villages and between stone mines and these points, the lack of sufficient road-building equipment and the lack of companies prepared to carry out large projects, we are faced with very serious difficulties in this respect. However, the government of the Islamic republic has taken effective steps in this direction: The Khash-Saravan road is under construction by two or three companies, and the paving of this road has also begun. About 40 kilometers of asphalt paving has been laid. As far as the Zahedan-Zabol road is concerned, a contract has been signed with the "Paris Company." Previously a Greek company was supposed to complete this road. Furthermore, a major portion of the road-bed preparation on the Zahedan-Mir Javeh road has been accomplished. In addition to this, surveying for the creation of a rail line between Kerman and Zahedan has begun. It is hoped that the construction work on this rail line will begin in the next 2 months. The Reconstruction Crusade has done work in this area, but still none of it is sufficient.

Purging of Bureaus

Dr Mohammadi then spoke about the purging of offices in Sistan va Baluchestan, and said: We are waiting for the bill for reconstruction and improvement of the bureaus. This bill has not yet been approved by the Council of Guardians. When its approval is announced, we will go to work in this area. Of course we have made those persons ready for service whom we determined were corrupt in the past, or who lack the ability to adapt themselves to the needs of the revolution. The bill for the reconstruction of the labor force will clarify their situation.

He added: We have adopted a policy of reward and punishment in this area. If a person is suitable and can fulfill managerial responsibilities well, his educational documents and previous work experience are of secondary importance.

Of course removing persons incompatible with the revolution is faster than replacing them with committed persons. To solve this problem the government must permit us to attract effective and constructive forces.

Plot to Create Discord Between Shiites and Sunnis

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan then pointed to the Taif Conference, which was a U.S. plot to create discord between Shiite and Sunni, and said: This is a cowardly plot. They say that we do not use indigenous (Sunni) people in the bureaus. We are striving very hard to employ indigenous persons. Anywhere that we are introduced to indigenous persons possessing the qualifications and standards acceptable to the government of the Islamic republic, you then see that we even

request them to come and take responsibility for the people's destiny in administrative, developmental and service affairs. These days, government, administrative and police responsibility, which is a form of worship and a religious duty, no longer means that material standards should dominate. Rather the basic goal is performing religiously sanctioned and revolutionary service. Wages are gotten for living and for serving the people. If persons accept these standards and want to work to serve the masses and the oppressed people, official's office doors are open to them.

He added: In the offices of the governor-general, the governors and Lt. governors, indigenous persons are used as much as possible. The majority of our lieutenant governors are indigenous, and the mayors as well. But in light of the deprivation of this province under the former regime, and its cultural deprivation and poverty, you can attest that the indigenous forces unfortunately do not possess those specialties and qualifications that are needed to implement developmental and administrative plans. Therefore non-indigenous experts have come to help their Sistani and Baluchi brothers. The indigenous forces are being educated and will be able to replace the non-indigenous persons in the future. This matter requires time. The government is also making an effort in this direction. Also, when there is a situation of equal qualifications, the indigenous person has preference.

Obstruction by Tribal Chiefs and Counterrevolutionaries

Dr Mohammadi confirmed the fact that in some of the rural cooperative companies, persons affiliated with the counterrevolution and the tribal chiefs are not distributing the goods of these companies fairly. They thus create artificial shortages and claim they are the result of the government's functioning. Dr Mohammadi said: Unfortunately, due to a lack of change in the laws and standards governing rural cooperative unions, no notable steps have yet been taken towards the definite solution of this problem. Efforts only have been made to change personnel and to make some tactical moves to lessen the influence of the tribal chiefs and stooges of the counterrevolution in these unions.

For example, it was decided to carry out elections of store and union officials, which were formerly held under the influence of the tribal chiefs, in the mosques and Friday prayers in the presence of pious persons, government officials, the Reconstruction Crusade and the clergy. However, a fundamental change must be made, and I strongly request officials of the State Rural Cooperative Organization to take serious actions to eliminate these insufficiencies and weaknesses in the organization of the rural cooperative companies and unions.

The 'Afghan' Problem

Following this, the issue of the presence of Afghans in the region was raised. A group of these Afghans have created discontent on the part of the government and the people, and have set about smuggling drugs and goods needed by the people. They are increasing the discomfort of the people. Furthermore, the existence of a group of counterrevolutionaries supported by the executed Sadat, Soltan Qabus, King Khaled and the United States among these immigrant Afghan brothers and sisters necessarily transforms some of them into a potential danger for the Iranian Islamic revolution. The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan said: The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran supports the struggles of the

Afghan Mojahedin on the basis of the principle of "neither East nor West." Whatever help comes from the Islamic Republic of Iran, whether financial or spiritual, the Afghan Mojahedin will not be neglected. However, the existence of some suspicious and corrupt elements among these immigrants must be eliminated. This means that not only we but rather the Afghan brothers themselves must not permit persons wearing the clothes of expelled Afghans to carry out illegal activities, such as drug smuggling, theft and so on. Therefore the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, while accepting the principle that the Afghan brothers must be helped, will in no way waive its sovereignty over its own decisions in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Afghan brothers here are subject to the laws of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus I request the Afghan brothers to help solve the Afghan refugee problem by showing the necessary cooperation with the decisions the government has made and the actions it is taking. We believe that the Afghans must be divided into different categories. One group is persons who can crusade and make war, and they must be helped and guided so that they can go and fight with the aggressors. There is no necessity for them to leave their homes and flee from the holy war. The second group is persons for whom the possibility of the holy war does not exist, such as sick and aged people, women, children and families that cannot go and fight. The government of the Islamic Republic, out of the affection and brotherly love that it has due to a common religion, considers it its duty to accept this group. Camps for them are in the process of formation, and we will guide them to these camps. We hope that these camps will be ready in the next 2 months. We will receive them in these camps in a very respectful and Islamic manner.

The third group is persons who have come to Iran under the banner of being Afghan refugees or warriors and are committing abuses, doing indecent things and disturbing the peace. We are going to deal with them in a serious and decisive way. We will either punish them according to the laws of the government of the Islamic Republic, or we will expell them across Iran's borders.

In any case, the government is very seriously determined in this case, and we hope that the Sistani, Baluchi and Afghan brothers and sisters will cooperate with us in implementing this plan so that we can succeed in carrying it out. If, God forbid, any friction appears in connection with the problems they have created, it will in reality be at the desire of the East and West. It will strike blows against the indefatigable struggle of the Afghan brothers, and will also inflict blows on the government of the Islamic Republic.

Rebels, Nobles and Monarchists

Our correspondent then raised the issue of the rebels, monarchist tribal chiefs and drug smugglers. In addition to previous brigandage and martyring a large number of brothers from the Gendarmarie and two health employees from Mohit-e Khash, a while ago they martyred seven of our self-sacrificing Guards brothers on the Zabol road. It is said that fugitive monarchists and expelled Savakists situated in Pakistan have recently joined with the rebels and tribal chiefs in this movement. Our correspondent asked: What programs are you currently implementing for the decisive suppression of the counterrevolutionaries and preservation of the region's security?

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan stated in reply: Of course this movement which we see coming from the rebels, tribal chiefs and corrupt smugglers (who are in reality the same loyal and true helpers of the Idol, since the Shah was the head of all these people) is a desperate movement. We should not give much value to these movements. They are such cowards and chicken-hearted that they make use of the darkness of the night and the emptiness of the roads. They martyr everyone, be he a gendarme, a guard, a health employee or a pedestrian. This is exactly the same movement that the United States' other stooges, meaning the hypocrites [Mojahedin-e Khalq] are carrying out, with the difference that fortunately the hypocrites have no influence here. The United States spreads its poison by means of its practical allies. But because these dregs have no base of support among the people, they are obliged to flee across the borders or to very distant spots. At the present moment the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has absolute authority in Sistan and Baluchestan. However, due to the borders being open and Pakistan's lack of control, and furthermore the border regions of Afghanistan being open, they flee to those sides of the borders and thus escape the claws of Islamic justice. The preservation of security in this case depends on the greatest possible control of the borders and the strengthening of the committed Gendarmarie forces. We must create such security on the border fringes and give such complete cover to the borders that they will not be able to easily escape from the claws of Islamic justice after striking a blow. We hope that with the complete implementation of this plan, the problem posed by these rebels will also be solved. I am confident that their movement is even more worthless than that of the hypocrites. But since the Great Satan does not want to be so easily pushed into the dirt, it resorts to any device.

U.S. Plots

Dr Mohammadi then added: The United States once wanted to sow discord between the Sunnis and the Shiites with something called the Taif Conference and the Kissinger Plan. At another time, it brought the hypocrites into motion under the banner of a monotheistic classless society. Today it thinks that it is possible, in the name of the monarchists, to once again gather and put into motion all those corrupt persons who enjoyed security in the shelter of the Idol's government. Of course this movement is empty and without effect, and Baluchi and Sistani, Shiite and Sunni citizens have vigilantly confronted this matter. You yourself have witnessed that Sunni and Shiite, Persian and Baluchi unitedly participated in the funeral of those martyrs. They also condemned the barbaric and inhuman operations of these persons.

What is important is that the Sistani and Baluchi brothers and sisters remain vigilant, recognize this sort of plot, and neutralize it. They must know that whoever, on whatever pretext, wishes to carry out a plan to create insecurity, they are certainly inspired by the Great Satan (the United States). We must be attentive and see what the goal of the revolution's enemy is. If the goal is inspiring strike and creating insecurity and discord, it is certain that it is to the nation's harm and that it must be decisively confronted. They have been unable to find a base of support among the people during the past 3 years, and we must not permit them to find one.

Cultural and Economic Poverty

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan, concerning difficulties existing in the path of implementing revolutionary plans, and the people's duty vis-a-vis the government, said: As far as the people's participation in implementing government programs is concerned, we are unfortunately confronted with many more problems in this province. Since this deprived and tyrannized nation was not permitted to develop culturally during the several centuries of British and U.S. colonialism nor afterwards under the tyranny and oppression of the shah's despotic system, not only does economic poverty exist, but cultural poverty as well. The consequence of this cultural poverty is that the presence of these persons on the scene and their participation in their own destiny is made many times more difficult. Similarly, the responsibility of officials is also many times heavier. In order to eliminate this cultural poverty, we have requested and are again requesting the committed clergy and our Sunni and Shiite brothers to do some propaganda work in order to guide the deprived people of the region, particularly in the villages, towards greater participation in the government's work.

Secondly, by expanding the mass communications network and the mass media such as radio and television, we have strived and will strive so that the people have the greatest possible access to these two means of mass communication. In this way we can really raise the cultural level of the society. The third thing which we are soon about to do is to increase the scale and coordination of publications put out by revolutionary organs, public relations offices and Islamic societies. By coordinating all these cultural organs, we can take steps to publish a newspaper throughout the province. By publishing this newspaper, we will be able to explain all the problems to the people, and also raise the society's cultural level. The illiteracy rate in this province is truly staggering. A great many people, due to traditional prejudices, even refrain from sending their children to school. A campaign must be made against this idea. Islam has made a lot of effort and done much to encourage the increase of literacy. We are hopeful that we will be able to greatly raise the society's cultural level by creating schools and employing committed teachers. Thus the people themselves will participate in developmental activities and take their destiny into their hands as in other places.

Message to the Province's People

The governor-general of Sistan va Baluchestan concluded with a message to the province's people, and said: In the period of nearly one and a half years that I have been serving in this province, I have seen such purity and sincerity in the Sistani and Baluchi people that I am confident that, in light of their strong religious beliefs and their readiness to accept genuine, Islamic words and actions, they will never permit the counterrevolution to stir this province into riot.

Furthermore I ask the people to pay more attention to the behavior and contacts of their children and not permit them to go about unsupervised. Also these dear children should beware of falling into the trap of the hypocrites and counterrevolutionaries, and also strive to raise their cultural level so that we can attain self-sufficiency. In conclusion, I once again ask the dear Sistani and Baluchi people to remain vigilantly on the scene and to strangle any counterrevolutionary movement in its infancy.

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RESISTANCE ACTIVITIES ON TURKISH BORDER DESCRIBED

Buenos Aires LA NACION in Spanish 14, 15 Oct 81

[Article by Thierry Desfardens: "Iranian Resistance Is Organizing"]

[14 Oct 81 Part I] Guerrilla Forces

> [Text] I have just spent 2 weeks with members of the Iranian resistence who are now making plans to scale the mountains along the Turkish border. One thing is certain, these people are starting to organize very seriously and, what is even more important, appear to be at the point of forgetting personal or ideological differences which have hindered them for months. I met a colonel who is very close to Shapur Bakhtiar, a former fighter pilot loyal to the young shah, a colonel who swears only by General Ariana, a few prominent Kurds, students a bit behind in their studies and more or less from the left--in a word the whole spectrum, or almost all of it, of the factions opposed to Khomeini, which seem ready to work together from now on.

Paris--The objective of the operation was for me to enter Iran clandestinely and to travel from mountain to mountain. Viewed from Paris everything seemed very simple. I had been warned that there would be several days of hiking through the mountains and I was advised to buy a knapsack, a sleeping bag and some good shoes. The idea of losing a few pounds and to step on Iranian soil once more in spite of the ayatollah's probibition pleased me. Dressed as a backpacker I arrived in Ankara. The first surprise, and this was a dandy, my "contact" was at the airport and in his outstretched arms he even carried an immense sign bearing my name in Gothic letters. Without any doubt, on that day I was the least discreet "clandestine person" in the airport in Ankara. A brand new air-conditioned Mercedes with a chauffeur awaited us. My contact insisted on introducing himself. This good looking young man, wearing a tweed jacket, open shirt, a silk handerchief and a Cartier watch was a former captain of the imperial army.

His Majesty's Emissaries

During the conversation I soon learned that he had served much more in the Niavaran palace than in the remote garrisons. At the present time he had his "base" in

Istambul where he was in charge of the transportation to Iran of the emissaries of "His Majesty" (the young Shah Reza II) or "His Excellency" (Shapur Bakhtiar). The chauffeur placed a cassette in the car. It was Bakhtiar who spoke. The captain opened his portfolio (made of crocodile) and showed me a recent photograph of Reza II. I was clearly in the hands of a democratic-monarchical organization. The captain left me at the Hotel Buyuk, the Ankara palace where a room had been reserved for me. He would come by 2 hours later "with friends."

Two hours later, with rigorously military precision, three men were waiting for me in the lobby of the hotel. The captain introduced me to his two friends, Colonels A and M.

The Western Front

We settled ourselves in the bar of the hotel between a group of American tourists and a Lufthansa crew. The colonel had a proud look. He undisputedly was a man of action. At least 1.90 meters high, shoulders as wide as a wardrobe, the neck of a bull and a shaven head. M with his small moustache, looked more like a captain of the Hussars. In the time of the shah the colonel had been in command of the Sanandaj brigade; now he is in command ot the entire "western front." His brother, a former major of the imperial army is, on the other hand, "over there" with a battalion of 300 men who control the Mahabad hills.

Without any discretion whatsoever, the colonel opened on the table a military staff map and explained the situation to me. Khomeini's men more or less occupy the large cities. Tabriz, of course, but also Shapur, Urmia and Mahabad. All the rest of the country is in the hands of the "democrats" who, besides, can move freely in the big cities during the night.

Tens of Thousands of Armed Men

[Question] How many armed men do you have on the entire western front?

[Answer] Tens of thousands of men. First there are the Kurds of Ghassamlou, that is, 30,000 perfectly organized "pechmergas" [Revolutionary fighters] plus 50,000 armed civilians. At the present time there are in addition thousands upon thousands of former military men of the imperial army who are forming groups and training. In reality we could take almost all the cities of the west tomorrow.

Militarily it would not present a problem. We are like fish in water there. But it would be a mistake. Khomeini would immediately send his aviation to bomb those cities and there would be many civilian victims. No, our strategy is simple. We are organizing everywhere, in the whole western region, but also in Beluchistan, in all the provinces of the country and in Teheran.

A Gigantic Insurrection

We have, of course, many friends in the army and they too are waiting. On "D-Day" we want to unleash a gigantic insurrection everywhere at the same time. In Teheran, in all the provinces and inside the army itself. Then Khomeini will not be able to do anything more.

[Question] How soon do you intend to start this insurrection?

[Answer] Time is of the essence. If we are not able to do anything within 2 months then we will have to wait until next year because winter will paralyze us. But at the present time we still have political problems. There are those like Ghassamlou, who prefer Bani-Sadr and have already forgotten that this Bani-Sadr was the creation of Khomeini. And there are the others, among the Kurds (and we desperately need the Kurds since they control the pass), who reproach Bakhtiar for his centralist aims. But all that will be worked out.

A Perfect Organization

M came to the hotel the next day to get me. Several hours later we arrived in Van, the last big Turkish city before the border, one of the capitals of Turkish Kurdistan. About 1,800 meters in altitude, the high mountains, the multi-colored dresses of women and the thick moustaches of the proud warriors start appearing. Everything was perfectly crganized. A relief car was waiting for us. We stopped in the very middle of the city, at a hardware store of friends. There were other men, former officers of the shah. Tea, yogurt, honey. We started out again right away.

We had to travel for 4 hours to go from Van to Yuksekova. A fabulous landscape, with 3,000 meter passes, tremendous precipices, interminable defiles, Every once in a while we saw huge herds of sheep with their shephards and their large dogs which, barking all the while, attacked the car and pursued it in an endless, breathless race.

Strange Tourists

Sometimes, after a pass or a curve a Turkish control agent appeared. "Passport. Tourist? OK." This calmed me. The Turks don't make any problems for themselves with "the tourists" who head straight for an Iranian border which is practically closed. They know very well who they are dealing with but they shut their eyes. Ankara is now helping everyone, because that brings in a lot of money. Soviet arms that go to Iraq pass through Turkey; the arms which supply the Iranian resistance also pass through here. There is a sort of tacit agreement. If Ankara blocks the opposition's supply the Kurds (Turkish or Iranian) would immediately blockade Khomeini's access to the outside. It is give-and take.

[15 Oct 81 p 9 Part II] Kurdish Opposition

[Text] A Foreboding Village

Paris. Yuksekova by night. A foreboding village. A shadowy main avenue, a service station, a slightly deteriorated headquarters, furtive silhouettes. The automobile stops. M asks me not to move and not to let myself be seen. A few minutes of waiting. Another car parks beside ours. They transfer my knapsack from one truck to another. They signal me to jump into the other car. And once more the highway. This time we travel with the headlights out. And then, suddenly, we leave the highway.

It is almost a mule path, with a steep grade. We climb the mountain that serves as a border with Iran. Fortunately, the night is clear. The climb never ends. M

suddenly appears to be more tense. In a hushed voice he tells me that Iran is less than 200 meters away, precisely at the summit which is silhouetted against the sky. And behind an enormous rock we come to a large lighted farmhouse. The auto stops and we get out.

The Chief

It is freezing cold, the silence is striking, the altitude slightly oppressing. A man waits for us at the door of the house. I see women behind him who become excited. "Good day, good day. May God protect you." We enter. We go up a rickety wood stairway. The grain loft is a large room covered by rugs. On the wall a photograph of Shapur Bakhtiar. There are five men, seated on the floor, drinking tea from small glasses. They get up. All embrace one another. Interminable shows of courtesy. One can immediately locate "the chief," an old man wearing a cap, with gold teeth and an impeccable thick moustache. Beside him is his son--there is a striking resemblence. The others must be in-laws, they are more respectful and remain almost withdrawn. It is they, on the other hand, who hurry to carry my knapsack and to offer offer me scalding tea, yogurt, honey and olives.

The Faces Darken

Everyone sits on the floor again. The courtesies continue for about one more hour. And then M, who has translated the entire conversation for me, finally broaches the subject which interests us. And suddenly the faces darken. M continues telling me everything. Since the day before yesterday everything has gone to pieces. The Kurds are killing each other on the other side of the border. Saunar Mamedi, the chief of the famous Chkak tribe is in open warfare with Ghassamlou. Ghassamlou attacked and Saunar asked Khomeini for help. Khomeini immediately sent his troops. Ghassamlou had to evacuate the whole border area and fall back to the south of Mahabad, near Nouwawan. Since yesterday the border is thus in the hands of Khomeini and his "pasdarans" [Revolutionary Guards] and all this because of traitorous Kurds who for reasons of personal rivalry did not hesitate to ally themselves with Khomeini.

Kurdish Politics

M takes the blow seriously. He realizes that not only is our trip seriously compromised but also that these Kurdish complications are going to cause considerable trouble once again for Iranian resistance. Our hosts sadly shake their heads interminatly. They too are Kurds. The tea becomes bitter and the yogurt seems rancid.

M.explains to me the convolutions of Kurdish politics in recent times. In 1980 the Fourth Congress of the Kurdish Democratic Party [PDK] decided to adopt a policy of "relative cooperation" with the regime of the ayatollah who, due to the difficulties he was having, appeared willing to grant certain benefits to the Kurds. Ghassamlou had been reelected secretary general of the PDK and a central committee of 25 members was elected.

Tribal Complications

A few weeks later, 7 of the 25 central committee members were beginning to disagree with Ghassamlou because they reproached him for not showing himself to be

sufficiently cooperative with Khomeini. At least that was the official reason. In reality what was involved once again were triple complications: Ghani Boulourian (27 years in prison in Iran during the shah's rule) chief of the seven opponents, rejected Ghassamlou's "dictatorship," which was becoming harsher and harsher, and accused him also of being too far to the "left."

This first split was almost without consequences. Unfortunately, a few weeks ago three other members of the PDK's central committee also became dissidents. Well now, these three members of the central committee were important since they were the heads of the Chkak, Harki and Bahzadeh tribes, the tribes that control the Iranian-Turkish border itself, and who--this aggravates things even more--are allies of the Barzani, the Iraqi tribe which controls what is called "the three frontiers," that is, the mountains which sit astride Iran, Iraq and Turkey.

The Seven Plus Three

This time Ghassamlou could no longer tolerate the dissidence. He sent his "peshmergas." There was war. The seven plus three brusquely joined Khomeini. The "pasdarans" arrived and the peshmergas withdrew toward the east and the border was closed. All this had just happened. Our host had not yet had time to advise Ankara.

M added, "The same thing always happens with the Kurds. It will take us weeks of negotiations and a lot of money to reopen the pass. We can no longer do anything before the coming of winter."

They prepared two blankets for us. M talked to me all night long. The world did not know anything about it but things were going well for the Iranian democrats. There were more and more adherents in Iran itself; where no one could put up with the dictatorship of the mullahs, the crazyness of the ayatollah and the breakdown of the economy. The West was making one more mistake when it imagined that Bani-Sadr, who was largely responsible for all this chaos, for the executions, might some day be the ideal man. No. According to him there were only two possible solutions left: either a victory by the communist Tudeh party, which for months has been infiltrating the Khomeini government with cells while playing the role of complete collaboration between Marxism and the Koran, and is now organizing without any doubt, the attacks on the religious heads so as to create a vacuum around Khomeini; or, as a second alternative, this general uprising which the democrats are preparing and a return to a reasonable monarchy with Bakhtiar as prime minister, free elections, and finally, a real chance for Iran.

A Dramatic Turn

Next day we left for Van. I met numerous members of the resistance there. They were all talking about the dramatic change in the Kurds. A colonel close to Ariana told me that the Azadegan movement also has its own guerrilla group but more toward the north, in Azerbaidjan. A middle-class man had just arrived from Urmia. His English was perfect. When I asked him why he had fled, he first answered me that life was no longer possible "over there" because 1 liter of gasoline that cost 2.5 rials in 1980 now cost 15 rials, because rice went up in price in 15 months from 30 to 280 rials, a kilo of sugar from 29 to 350 rials.

Later he confessed to me that the pasdarans had arrested him because in a raid on his home they had found a bottle of whiskey. He received 80 lashes.

A Mock Execution

Then they covered his eyes, tied his hands, and led him before a firing squad under the pretext that he was helping the PDK. It was a mock execution. "They like to do this to destroy people's nerves. But to get free one just has to pay." Therefore the man had paid. Like everybody else.

I met an enormous number of people over a period of several days. Van has become the rearguard of the Iranian resistance. The most disparate rumors are circulating. An Iranian army battalion had joined the resistance with its arms and equipment. An air force colonel had refused to bomb Ghassamlou's men and had gone to Iraq. We also learned of the attacks on the president of the republic and his prime minister. It was a party. "You can see that he doesn't have long to go. Who carried out the coup? His friends? No, it was the Tudeh, but when they liquidate our enemies they are playing on our side."

The Shortlived Republic of Kurdistan

Among these military men, among these realists, these democrats, I finally met Ali Qazi, the son of Mohamed Qazi who, in 1945 was the first and only president of the shortlived Republic of Kurdistan and was hanged on the main square of Mahabad by the shah. After having been for a long time a diplomat for his father's executioner Ali Qazi is now returning to his homeland to lead his own resistance movement. He promised to get me across. Therefore a new trip to the border, Unfortunately this contact was also no good. A few hundred feet from the border in the company of my colleague Georges Menager from PARIS MATCH I fell into the company of a...smuggler.

Only One Thing Is Certain

At the end of the world, in an adobe hut, three girls were smoking American cigarettes. There were also several sofas covered with imitation panther, mirrors, a large amount of beer and tires. We soon realized that things could get very bad. Our man was too interested in our watches, our radio, our passports. In Van they had told us about certain false guides who robbed and then shot Iranians who were attempting to flee the country. We had fallen into the hands of one of them. However, after having paid a small ransom we managed to leave on good terms by telling them that we were going to get more silver in Van. It was our good luck that he believed us.

The expedition had once again failed. But one thing is certain: the Iranian resistance is organizing.

9204
CSO: 4748/9

BRIEFS

TURKISH TRADE DELEGATION--A Turkish commercial delegation arrived yesterday in Orumiyah City in western Azarbayjan Province on a 2-day visit to Iran. Upon arrival the delegation held talks with the mayor and officials of the western Azarbayjan City on the trade exchange between border cities of the two countries. The delegation is composed of a number of assistants from the Turkish ministries of commerce and transportation. [Text] [GF170906 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 17 Nov 81]

NEW AMBASSADOR TO VATICAN--Pope Paul II has received the credentials of Hadi Khosroshahi, the new Iranian ambassador to the Vatican. [GF181745 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1430 GMT 18 Nov 81 GF]

MESSAGE TO POPE--In a message from Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic, to Pope Paul II, his eminence has emphasized that humanity does not expect religious men to confine themselves to moral issues and worship, but it expects them to pay attention to social ills and confront international arrogance. The message was delivered to Pope Paul II by Seyed Hadi Khosrowshahi, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic to the Vatican who explained to his holiness the devisible stand of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Iraq's aggression, the Palestinian cause and the principle of neither East nor West, which the government of the Islamic Republic adheres to. In his reply, the Pope wished the Imam good health and the Iranian people--including the Catholic sect in Iran--prosperity and happiness. He also condemned war and terrorism and asserted Iran's sovereignty. During the meeting, Khosrowshahi submitted his credentials to the pope in a special ceremony. [Text] [GF190920 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0400 GMT 19 Nov 81]

KHOMEYNI SAID TO BE FREEMASON--According to documents captured in Iran by Iraqi troops--the authenticity of which, according to the Iraqis, has been confirmed in London--Ayatollah Khomeyni has reportedly belonged to the Masonic Lodge of Iran for 20 years. Thirty other names of Iranian religious dignitaries also reportedly appeared on the role of this "Islamic lodge." [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French No 477, 9 Nov 81 p 70]

CSO: 4619/22

NA'IM HADDAD ADDRESSES NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 9 Nov 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] Mr Na'eem Haddad, Speaker of the National Assembly, yesterday inaugurated the Assembly's winter session.

Three newly-elected Members were sworn in during the session.

The Assembly stood for one minute in silence in memory of the soldiers who met martyrdom in the war against the Persian enemy.

The Speaker in his inaugurate speech expressed hope and confidence that the session would complete the efforts exerted during previous sessions and would also deepen the Assembly's democratic practices.

He highly praised the great care and attention paid by President Saddam Hussein to the Assembly to enable it assume a leading role in the society.

Mr Haddad said the Assembly successfully carried out its duties in an excellent manner during the past years and exercised its legislative and other powers efficiently and as duty bound under the law.

On the role played the Assembly in Arab and international arenas, he added the Assembly played an outstanding role in both Arab Parliamentary Union and Inter-Parliamentary Union and currently it has established bilateral relations with most parliaments in the world.

"Although the achievement of past years was magnificent, there was still a long path before the Assembly in serving the people and consolidating the democratic base of 17th July Revolution", he said.

With regard to the Arab and international situation he added that the session was being held under critical Arab and world conditions, full of challanges and dangerous escalation of tension between the supper powers.

As for the situation in the Arab Homeland he said the Arab arena witnessed deteriorating situation at a time when the strategic alliance between imperialist and Zionist forces has been consolidated to control the Arab Homeland through their navies and rapid Deployment Force.

"All this strategy" he continued "is being prepared to liquidate the Palestinian issue, undermine the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine and induce other parties to join Camp David Accords".

On Lebanon, he said "The Palestinian resistance and th national forces in Lebanon face similarr liquidation schemes carried out by Zionist invasion of the south Lebanon".

"The suspicious role played by the Syrian regime and its forces in Lebanon has also weakened the Palestinian resistance, military and politically", he added.

"The greater part of this conspiracy", he said "is carried out by the Persian regime which is backed by the Zionist Entity, America and some Arab parties. They want to distract Iraq's attention from liberating Palestine and mobilize the Arab masses to foil all imperialist schemes", Mr. Hadd-

ad said.

"When the Persian regime persists in continuing its aggressive war against Iraq its aim is to distract Iraq's attention from Pan-Arab tasks", he said.

Mr Hadad reiterated that the Iranian regime was helped by Zionists and imperialists to wage an aggressive war against Iraq with a view to disrupting its development programmes and stopping Iraq from effectively contributing to Arab and international issues. "All these schemes have failed so far", he said.

With regard to the Zionist and Persian collaboration in the field of armament, he affirmed that such collaboration takes place with the blessing of the United States of America. "The Zionist Entity and the Persian regime have also collaborated in raiding Tamuz nuclear reactor", he said.

He added the same collaboration was also underway between the rulers in Tehran and the those in Damascus "who are pushing the former to prolong the war and refuse all international and regional efforts to end the conflict peacefully", he said.

"However", he said "the war has taught Iraq and the Arab Nation valuable lessons, namely that the Arab nation is capable of confronting the Zionist enemy in a long war for which all human, military, political and economic potentials can be mobilized until the liberation of Palestine and all the usurped Arab lands are completed".

He added the war has also proved the closing of ranks of Iraqi people and their rallying behind the leadership of the Ba'th Party headed by President Saddam Hussein.

Mr Haddad confirmed that despite the war conditions Iraq was determined to realize increasing pace of development and consolidating the base of its national economy.

"In acordance with the directives of President Saddam Hussein, the national development plan includes a numbr of indications underlying the fact that Iraq was determined to execute its development plans and proceed along the path of social and economic progress to raise the living and cultural standards of its people", he said.

"The leadership of the Party and the Revolution", he said, "has exerted concreted efforts to ensure victory on both the home front and the war".

He added, Iraq has strategic potentials to meet all challenges and emergencies. The soundness of its economy is another indication that the leadership of the Party and the Revolution has taken into account all aspects of life.

"While in Iraq an upsurge in development is taking place and national unity is becoming more and more consolidated, the enemy, for its past, is in a chaotic situation with increased deterioration in its poitical, social, and economic conditions, lack of national untiy and escalaton of Iranian peoples' struggle against Khomeini's terror", he pointed out.

"Nonetheless", he said "Iraq has not forgotten its responsibilities towards its people and the peoples of the region. It still is ready to resolve the conflict peacefully and enter into direct negotiations with despite the enemy's intransigence and persistence to pursue aggression and frustrate peaceful moves".

"The Arab masses look foward to Iraq, expressing their attachment to the right national path pursued by it to foil imperialist and Zionist plans", he added.

"The steadfastness of the Arab people of Palestine in the occupied lands was another indication that the Arab people are determined to met all challenges", he said, adding that the killing of traitor Anwar Sadat was yet another proof that Arab people reject Camp David Accords and back the Palestinian issues and other Arab issues".

CSO: 4400/53

RAMADAN ADDRESSES OPENING OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 9 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] On behalf of President Saddam Hussein, Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan, Revolution Command Council Member and First Deputy Premier, yesterday morning opened the 2nd scientific conference on administrative sciences in the Arab Homeland.

Addressing the conference Mr Ramadhan referred to the significance of holding the conference in Baghdad at a time when Iraq was ushering in a new stage of the Arab nation's way of life.

Since the conference was being held in Iraq, Mr Ramadhan pointed out, Iraq's victories over the Persian enemy would be another factor of ensuring the success of the conference. This will be so because Iraq's victory has strengthened its position which will be an object of study and debate by the conference", Mr. Ramadhan said.

He also indicated the importance of serious and consistent work to develop the system of administrative practices in the light of the new revolutionary democratic experiment in Iraq.

He expressed confidence that the conference would be more effective in leading to the increase of development returns in the Arab Homeland and the expansion of cooperation among Arab establishments concerned with development of administrative systems.

Later Dr Mohammad al-Tawil, chairman of the executive council of the Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences, called on the conference to exert all possible efforts to meet the increased requirements of developing the administrative practices in the Arab Homeland in accordance with the much needed joint strategy and programmes to create more effective systems for administrative planning.

He referred to the significance of convening the conference in Iraq which necessarily followed from Iraq's advanced status in the field of administrative systems. He affirmed that the Iraqi National Centre for Consultations and Administrative development, was considered as one of the pinoneering bodies for developing the administrative systems in the Arab Homeland.

The opening session was attended by a number of Ministers and specialists in administrative fields.

The conference elected Dr Taha Ibrahim al-Abdullah, Iraqi Planning Minister as chairman of the conference and Mr Mazin al-Shukir, Tunisian Minister in charge of Administrative Reform, Mr Sa'eed al-Ghaith,, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs in the United Arab Emirates, as vice-presidents.

Dr al-Abdullah thanked the conferees for electing him chairman of the conference.

The administrative reprt of the Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences was read which reviewed the overall national issues in the Arab countries in general and the development of administrative systems in particular.

It also referred to the most important achievements of economic and social development and the directions of administrative development in Arab Homeland in the light of the regional

reports submitted to the organization and the researches and consultations completed since the first conference in 1978.

It also contained the guidelines for the integration of administrative systems in the Arab Homeland.

The 4-day conference will debate the reports submitted by a number of Arab countries on their administrative activities. It will also discuss the startegy of developing administrative practices in Arab Homeland and cooperation among Arab counries in all fields which would ultimately serve the objectives of the development of administrative systems. It will also help promote joint Arab action through the exchange of expertise, information and visits of teachers to arrive at an Arab theory on administration taking into account the nationalist characteristics of the Arab society.

CSO: 4400/53

NEW REGULATIONS AID PRIVATE SECTOR PARTICIPATION

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 3 Nov 81 p 5

[Article by L. Y. Barkko: "Private Sector Invited to Invest in New Industries"]

[Text] The Ministry of Industry and Minerals announced that this year's plan regulating projects which could be undertaken by the private sector has been amended to enable it enter, for the first time, into new industrial spheres.

The announcement was in line with President Saddam Hussein's directives calling for a larger participation by private enterprises in development plans.

President Hussein has repeatedly pressed this point. Chairing a Cabinet meeting on September 21 he said adequate development required a programmed participation of private enterprise.

Despite war circumstances, Iraq has poured more than three billion dollars into industry during the current year. This explains the soundness of Iraqi economy.

989 industrial projects have been carried out by the private sector. These include, tile, brick and cement block factories, to meet the rapidly increasing demand for construction materials.

By the end of its Five-Year Development Plan Iraq hopes to produce 25 million tons of cement and eight billion bricks.

The upsurge in development activities can be measured by the total yearly cement consumption which in Iraq is the highest in the world in per capita terms.

To increase private enterprise contribution to the production of construction materials, the Industrial Development Bank has been granting loans equalling 60 per cent of the total cost of such projects.

During the first four months of the war, the Bank's loans went up by a record 100 per cent from the same period last year.

An innovative combination of both private and socialist sectors in underway and the Iraqi leadership views private enterprise as complementary and basic to the functioning of the socialist sector.

CSO: 4400/53

BRIEFS

SOUTH KOREAN ROAD CONTRACT--The South Korean company Hyundai Construction has won a $369 million contract with Iraq to build an expressway between Rutba in Western Iraq and the Jordanian border, according to a REUTERS report from Seoul last week. The project for the State organisation for Roads and Bridges is due for completion by September 1984. The Korean company is also negotiating with Iraq's State Organisation for Housing for a $400 million deal to build 2,800 housing units in Samara. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 44, 2 Nov 81 p 12]

INCREASED AUSTRALIAN IMPORTS--Australia is expecting a boost to its trade with Iraq. Minister of Housing and Construction D. T. McVeigh said during a recent visit to Baghdad that in addition to primary products, Iraq was keen to increase its imports from Australia of such items as agricultural machinery, veterinary products, air coolers and medical products. The minister added that Australia's exports to Iraq had grown five-fold over the past four years. During the last financial year, exports to Iraq were worth $259.7 m. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 p 41]

TANZANIAN TRADE INCREASE--Dar Es Salaam--Iraq is interested in buying a number of agricultural and forest products from Tanzania, Tanzanian Minister for Trade Ali McHumo said here on his return from Iraq. The Minister, who represented his country at the Iraq International Trade Fair, said that the two countries have agreed to strengthen trade cooperation and increase the exchange of trade delegations. "We have invited the Iraqi Trade Minister, Hassan Ali, to visit Tanzania for further consultations and exchange of views," said the Tanzanian Minister. Speaking on the volume of trade between the two countries, he said there had not been much trade, especially after the breakout of the war between Iraq and Iran. He explained that Iraq had been finding it difficult to carry out normal trade with other countries due to the war. According to trade sources here, Iraq could be a market for such goods as leather, tinned meat, tinned fruits and juices, timber, tea and beans. At present Tanzania sells to Iraq cloves, coffee and sisal. [Text] [Doha GULF TIMES in English 6 Oct 81 p 9]

CSO: 4400/53

DEVELOPMENT ISSUES IN ARAB TOWNS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4, 7, 9, 10 Sep 81

[Articles by Mordechai Barkai]

[4 Sep 81 pp 15, 23]

[Text] According to statements made by the Alignment's secretary for Arab affairs immediately following the elections, Israeli Arabs have proven that they are in favor of co-existence and assimilation. This is certainly encouraging in and of itself. But if one were to doubt the validity of this determination, it would be due to the fact that this evaluation and others related to election results in the Arab sector are made by Arab specialists, not election analysts. The analyses that reached interested parties within the Jewish sector this time, as was the case 33 years ago, were from mediator-commentators.

Although the Jews, who are perhaps unwilling experts on the Palestinian problem, continue to demand that a position be taken relative to the future of the territories, they behave as if they were exempt from worrying about the Arab existence in the Galilee, the triangle, the depths of the Negev or even down the block, in cities such as Acre or Ramallah, places that are undeniably your country and mine--and theirs.

This is their country, too. But with the exception of certain defined groups in certain defined areas and situations--students on campuses, workers and employees in certain industrial sectors, crowds and clerks on both sides of cashiers' windows, even certain geographic neighborhoods--Israeli Arabs are not a regular part of the Israeli Jewish awareness. They appear mainly in the headlines, in articles about unusual events: enemy organizations, blood wars between the peoples of Kfar Yasif and Julis, the murder of Knesset member Shaykh Abu Rabi'a against a background of political bickering. These irregularities are presented along with analyses by specialists, not because the issues themselves are complex, but rather because the events relate to people who are so close and yet, in reality, so far.

This alienation is a one-way street. The Jews in general know very little about the Arab population. The Arabs on the other hand know a good deal more about the Jewish population and what's happening within it. Everyone below the age of 45 speaks Hebrew, watches Hebrew television and listens to Hebrew radio. A

significant portion of the Arab work force is employed in the Israeli economy. This one-sided, one-way acquaintance is due to the fact that information about the Jewish population is plentiful and basic. The Jewish part of Israel is well known to the Arab population. The Israelis expose their strengths and weaknesses to the Arabs, in more detail and depth than most people realize.

All that has been written thus far is no more than an aside, but it serves as background to the attempt being made to understand some of that which is happening in Israeli Arab villages today, in the summer of 1981. We say villages in particular because despite the elite position of Nazareth and despite the urban standing of Shefar'am, and despite the fact that there are concentrations of Bedouins in the Negev, in the North and in the Arab quarters of integrated cities, it is the village that represents the essential character of the Arab society, even today. There, in the villages, the really important developments are taking place.

Two weeks ago, in Acre, a group of 10 elected Arab officials gathered to publicly express their disagreements with the policy of the National Board of Arab Council Leaders in Israel. The head of the Bedouin village of Sha'ab, the council leader from Fassuta, and council heads from Gush-Halav, Makr, Fraydis, Majd El-Karum, Abu-Sanan and others, accused the Board of being a puppet manipulated by Rakah and other extremist groups. Five days earlier, in Nazareth, the Board had discussed a list of fiscal demands for the government. They had also discussed a strike by the local Arab councils and the discontinuation of services, if the demands were not met. The 10 leaders complained that they had been threatened in Nazareth because they disagreed with Rakah policy. They demanded that the Board discuss municipal issues only and that it should cooperate in every way with the central government in Tel Aviv. Four days after their public appearance in Acre, the chairman of the Board, Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, who is also mayor of Shefar'am, met with the Acre group. According to one report he promised to be more responsive to complaints and to work hand-in-hand with the local government. However, according to another report, he was very hard on them. In any event, the local government did organize a meeting between the Ministry of the Interior and the heads of the Arab councils.

No solutions were worked out, but at least the situation was brought to light.

The Arab settlements are demanding funds for their empty coffers. They are demanding basic changes in the structure of the regular budget and development budgets. They are demanding equality with the Jewish settlements. They are demanding all this with urgency. The purpose is not to establish new services or implement new projects for developments, but, in the words of Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, to prevent the deterioration of existing services and to pay teachers' salaries. Budget allocations in the Arab sector, according to the officials' complaints, are lower than those in the Jewish sector by a 4:1 ratio. The regular budget of the Jewish settlements is established based on the rate of 5,000 shekels per capita while in the Arab sector the calculation is based on 1.500 shekels per capita. The development budget for the Arab councils amounts to 65 shekels per person.--"Less than nothing! Zero!" Another complaint is related to the inequities in the allocation of funds among Arab settlements. Why does

a village with 9,000 inhabitants receive 12 million lira when the village of Jatt, with only 4,300 residents, receives 60 million?

The local government, which conducted its own studies on the financial situation of the councils in the Arab sector, found that--setting mismanagement and ignorance aside--there was some justification to these claims at least in two areas: among Jewish municipalities the number of workers in municipal positions was similar, 2.5 times higher that that of the Arab municipalities. Further, when the Ministry of the Interior makes budgetary decisions for the Jewish municipalities, it takes the overall budget into consideration, whereas with the Arab municipalities, every item is considered separately.

The truth is that here is a real annual increase in the budgets of the Arab settlements at a rate which exceeds that of the Jewish settlements. But the gap is so large--as the local government will admit--that one can only dream of eliminating it. More realistically, one can only hope, under the best of circumstances, to reduce it. The natural increase in the Arab population (4.1 percent annually, as compared with 1.7 percent in the Jewish sector) is the main cause of the problem.

The shortage of classrooms is the most painful. Children study in dilapidated structures and most localities rent rooms from private individuals, rooms that were not deemed suitable for any other purpose, not even for storage. Some are damp and musty, some are oppressively hot. The state inspection codes which set standards for square footage per student and adequate ventilation are like a bad joke in rented rooms such as these. Last year, the shortage amounted to 1,400 rooms (based on 35 students to a room!). Government funds barely cover the cost of adding 100 rooms each year. This rate doesn't even allow for the maintenance of the current level.

The reason for this distress--in the opinion of council head Mohammad Ebri--lies in the fact that the local Arab councils became independent municipalities only 20 years ago. At that time, his village in the western Galilee was in reality cut off from the outside world. The first road, an access road, was paved in 1961. It was only in 1965 that they hooked up to water lines. And they waited for electricity until 1973. The first telephones were installed in 1975. The first local council--as was true for other Arab villages--did not really grasp the essence of its role and shied away from accepting loans (!). They appear to have ignored debts which would eventually mean the eviction of residents from their land. Mohammad Ebri dreams about building an industrial area in cooperation with the neighboring villages of Dayr-Hana and Sakhnin. But he doesn't know where they'll get the financial backing required to do so.

Does this mean that the Arab settlements are sinking into poverty? Not necessarily. The situation of the local councils is distinct from that of the individual residents.

[7 Sep 81 pp 5, 7]

[Text] Even in Shefar'am, where the danger exists that services may fall apart completely due to lack of funds, the situation of the residents themselves is "Not bad, thank God, not bad." Most are well established people, from middle class families--Christians, Muslims, and Druze living in separate but close quarters. There are no significant economic differences among them, no tension. Recently, the Ministry of the Interior approved an additional 8,000 dunams to be added to the town's land area. This is a positive step but it is already clear that it is not enough. A much larger addition will be required. According to projections, the town will have 60,000 residents by the year 2000. Most of this increase will come not from natural growth but from immigration, especially from Bedouin concentrations in northern Israel. Indeed, Shefar'am holds a strong attraction, first because of its location in the middle of the geographic-economic triangle of Acre-Haifa-Nazareth, and second, because of its reputation as a town which absorbs immigrants and treats them in a humane and friendly manner so that in a short time they are part of the local population.

The movement to build up the Arab settlements has been increasingly active over the last 15 years or more. Private homes with unique designs are being built--not housing projects--some of them quite ostentatious and luxurious, in the style of the villas on the hills around Mount Carmel. They are crowding out the old stone and mortar houses from generations long gone. What's more, they're obscuring the characteristic traits of the Arab village. On the outskirts of some settlements, street after street of new homes are being built, well-planned and according to a clear blueprint. In other areas, houses seem to spring up at random, sometimes alongside a cultivated plot of land, sometimes in an olive grove, facing different directions and attesting to a lack of planning and/or precision.

This private building movement is not connected with or accompanied by the development of public areas or public improvements. This is another indication of the gap between the financial situation of the local councils and that of the local residents as individuals. When the settlement was smaller--as the head of 'Arab's council, Mohammad Ebri, nostalgically recalls--and residents knew each other better, community commitment was greater. People were more concerned about the cleanliness of their surroundings. Today, there is a local council, thank God, and the residents prefer to let the council do the work. But the council is struggling to maintain services, among them sanitation and cleaning. If there was money, they would lay sidewalks. But with no money, there are no sidewalks. The shoulders of the asphalt roads are strips of ash piled with garbage. Without paved shoulders, a mechanical street sweeper cannot be used.

In all of 'Araba, with its 9,000 inhabitants, there is one soccer field (and it does not belong to the municipality, it is rented). It is also the only green spot is town and even there, the neglected grass is yellowing. The Arab settlements in the triangle and in the Galilee have been blessed for the most part with an outstanding view, and the people have been blessed with a feeling for beauty and form. But this demand for aesthetics is expressed inside their homes, for the individual's benefit. The collective does not gain by it.

In all of Shefar'am there is no public park, not even an oasis of greenery, just as there is no real movie theater. It would not be worthwhile to build one, so they say, nor worth the cost of upkeep. There are no sports facilities, no public meeting rooms where the young people can get together in the evening for a good time. For such activities, the youth go to Qiriyat At'a or other qiriyot on the gulf, or to Haifa. Youth facilities are for boys, not for girls.

Sayid Salim Shalah is a senior in high school. He took me to the foot of the citadel in the heart of Shefar'am where he showed me the beautiful arched entrances leading to the great halls constructed by the Ottomans on foundations laid by the Crusaders. He and his friends, so he said, asked the town council to fix up one of these halls for them, halls where generations of garbage has accumulated, halls that no one is using for anything. They wanted a club: "Yes, a disco--why not?" They were answered with, "No funds." Sayid Salim was not convinced. He and his friends claim that the proceeds from the two local soccer teams (Hapo'el Shefar'am made it to the top league this year) would have sufficed for a start "if they really wanted it." I asked the mayor, Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, why he didn't try to get the money together, from loans or grants, from rich Arabs in America or the oil countries, to subsidize special projects. The major didn't like my question. He explained, "Nazareth tried to get funds from abroad and failed. You can see what happened on the West Bank. Until recently, towns on the West Bank could solicit funds from the Arab world, as much as they wanted. But now, the Israeli government interferes and causes delays."

How many of these troubles are a result of the network of relations between the local Arab communities and the central government of Israel--and how many have placed their fate in the hands of the local leaders? In other words: Does Jatt have a secret that was used to get five times the budget of a village twice its size?

In Jatt, there is no sign of the dilapidated school rooms present in most Arab sectors. Six years ago, the last rented room was abandoned and today, children of all ages, from kindergarden to the upper high school grades, study in well equipped rooms, in designated buildings which are properly maintained. And they're still building. One of the two elementary schools won the President's Award this year.

In Jatt, tax collection rates are as high as 100 percent. On 1 April of this year, the residents finished paying off 30,000 shekels in debts to the local council and in the first month of the new fiscal year, 45 percent of the taxes levied had been collected. Jat had enforced linkages and interest on late payment of debts before these policies were enacted into law. There is undoubtedly a connection here.

In Jatt the employment picture is the diametric opposite of that in other villages. In many or most areas, agricultural jobs are declining and the lion's share of the labor force goes to work on the outside "from Eilat to Qiryat Shemona." In Jatt, however, only 15 percent of the workers go elsewhere for employment. The rest earn their living within the village, the large majority in agriculture, of all things, in intensive agriculture in greenhouses which

yields an especially good return. "Blue collar," non-professional work is dominated by workers from the occupied territories who are far greater in number than the few from Jatt who work outside their village. The jobs they fill are much in demand within the various branches of industry in 'Afula and Netanya.

In Jatt the birth rate accounts for a 2.5 percent annual increase in the population, compared with a 4.1 percent average in the Arab sector as a whole. In 1967 there were 147 babies born in Jatt. A decade later, in 1977, only 116 babies were born. This surprised many, perhaps, but was nonetheless considered an achievement in family planning (average: 5 persons), and was attributed to the large number and influence of teachers in the village.

In addition to the regular services, the residents of Jatt can take advantage of some unusual benefits such as the sports facilities--soccer, basketball and tennis--which are lit, well-kept and surrounded by bleachers. There is also a special budget for events and parties held in the village cultural center.

In Jatt, there is a unique public park, encircling the "Hill of Education" and encompassing the sports facilities.

All this is enumerated and presented by Mayor Ahmad Abu-Isba', who speaks "Kaduri brand Hebrew." It was at the Kaduri Agricultural School that he acquired his profession as a teacher of nature and agriculture. And it was there, as far as one can tell, that he developed a love for trees and all things green. Ten years ago, with his own hands, he began planting for the park on the hill of the old graveyard. He brought each plant, one by one, from nurseries all over the country. Now the trees stand taller than a man and continue to be well cared for. On the park's summit is a colorful boat with two slides on either side. The idea belonged to an artist from 'En-Hod whom Abu-'Esb'a met in Lod. He ordered a set of the equipment as the focus of the children's play area on the Hill of Education. The hill can be reached via an access road which leads into town. The avenues in town are lined with fig trees. And there will be an amphitheater, and public gardens, and ...

The mayor of Jatt is not bashful. He's 45 years old and 22 of those (with the exception of one term) he spent as head of the local council or as an active member on it. "The secret? It's simple: I know my job. I also know the job of the treasurer and all the other key officers in the local government. I know exactly what we should be getting and I get it." What, for example, has he gotten? He has convinced the Ministry of the Interior to establish the council budgets, not based on last year's budget, nor on population, but based on need. He is on excellent terms with the establishment. He can go to the national insurance offices and say, "You have to find a position here for one of my boys." He can go to the police and tell the station commander, "Release that youth. I, as head of the local council, will be responsible for his behavior." He is not only the head of the council in Jatt, he is also a member of the central management committee for the local government, a member of the Board of Arab Settlements, and he's on the professional councils of both groups. Today, he is no less involved in enterprises related to the entire Arab sector than he is involved in his own village.

And because he is at the head of the organizational committee, and because he was appointed with a group of "positive" council heads ("and don't think that means I'm in someone's pocket"), a positive attitude exists on the part of the residents toward the council, its activities and its dealings with the establishment and the Jewish settlements in the region. How is this expressed? "In the last Knesset elections, the Rakah 'front' received 25 percent of the vote, as compared with 65 percent in the preceding election. Today, there are no Rakah supporters in the municipality.

[9 Sep 81 p 11]

[Text] He who thinks he knows what a wedding is like in an Arab village should not be too sure of himself. He may not be up-to-date on the details, at least as far as Salah Diyab's "Muntaza."

The background of this phenomenon can be explained more or less as follows: In the years of economic prosperity which began around 15 years ago, Arab women found that when it came time to marry off their sons and daughters, although they wanted a big wedding, they cringed at the thought of how much work would be involved in the preparation. They looked to the Jewish mothers to see how they did it and ... they discovered the banquet hall.

Banquet halls in Haifa or Naharia, in Acre or in Netanya were undoubtedly expensive, but that was not the problem. There was the problem of the city ordinances that required the orchestra to stop playing at 11:00, at which time the real fun was just beginning. The aforementioned Mr Diyab drew the proper conclusions and came up with the idea of garden restaurants, like the well known "Montaza" in Ramallah. In order to completely avoid the problem of closing time, he built it at the crossroads between two villages in a location which does not fall under any city ordinances.

In the course of time the garden restaurant was subject to the same phenomenon as any new fashion: it was not only popular among Arab families planning weddings, it was also discovered by Jews who started holding their weddings and Bar Mitzvahs there. Christians started celebrating baptismals there and the graduating class from the police academy in Shefar'am started using it for their ceremonies.

S'alah Diyab, as everyone knows, is already planning to expand the "Montaza" into a country club, to add a stable, maybe even tennis courts. It all depends of course on his continued success. In the meantime, the restaurant continues to fulfill its original function. Arab weddings take place nightly, in the best Muslim tradition, but paid in cash and not in time and effort.

This symbolizes the changes that have occurred in the Arab village, although it is not the most characteristic. Far more indicative are the large modern buildings, the hundreds of new consumer goods that have appeared on the market, western dress and a revolution in public health and medical services (without a doubt attributable to the Histadrut clinics).

When the first local councils were established 20 some odd years ago, it was only natural--according to the way of looking at things at the time--that the government would be in the hands of the clan leaders. They had always filled key positions, and if some of them were per chance illiterate, it didn't necessarily matter. Today the last vestiges of the clan system are fading and disappearing. More typically, elected officials are young local politicians (the average age is 35)--young and educated. This is a far more significant indicator of change.

But, it is hard to imagine a more drastic change than that which has begun to effect the status of women, married and unmarried alike, in the social structure of the Arab village. And more changes are yet to come.

Nellie Karkabi talks about one of the latest developments in this process--the extent to which women were involved in the election campaigns and their results. "... In Nazareth and in Shefar'am, in Tamra and in Acre, in Kfar Qar'a and in 'Ar'ara, as well as in a score of other places, women worked for compting parties. Within Rakah this was not an entirely new phenomenon, nor within Mapam. But it was new for the Labor Party." It was not a representative of the party activists who went about waving the flag from town to town, but local cadres of women who rose and worked in their villages. "They spoke at meetings in homes, they spoke out of a conviction that they would get results. They didn't work blindly. We were very critical of the Alignment. But we knew how to be perceptive without causing harm. We understood the demands of the campaign period ..."

Nellie Karkabi, a college graduate born in Nazareth and residing in Shefar'am, is the wife of a school principal and a member of the center for Working Women and Volunteers in Israel. She speaks about the tremendous improvement in the status of women--often in the home she is now a full partner in terms of parental responsibilities and her opinions are respected even if she doesn't work. Of course, there has been an enormous change in the attitude toward daughters within the family. Even in the villages, far fewer families hesitate to send their daughters to co-ed classrooms in high schools. Often a father can be heard saying: "My son doesn't want to study? So what. He can go to work at some job. And if my daughter is the one that wants to study at the university, let her study. Why not?" The result is that in Shefar'am, a significant percentage of the teachers are local, educated women. The same is true for the social workers, the nurses and supervisors at local clinics, and the tellers in both local banks. Young educated girls who did not find employment in Shefar'am work in Haifa and in the qiriyot as clerks and secretaries (for Jewish employers and, by the way, mostly under inferior conditions).

What Nellie Karkabi and other members of the Working Women and Volunteers in other areas are trying to do is encourage women who did not finish high school or university, and therefore sit at home, to go out and get industrial jobs. They need this encouragement and so do their families. The advancement of the educated woman is assured, more or less. But the immediate goal is the advancement of those women who did not study in high schools or universities--from being idle to working in a factory, thereby allowing these women to gain financial security, social status and self-esteem.

Nellie Karkabi tells both the educated women and the factory workers to beware because they're treading on thin ice: "You can't imitate Jewish women. You can't behave like them. What is acceptable for them is not acceptable among us. And despite everything, a woman who tries to do so will prevent other women from having the opportunity to leave the home."

Progress has begun. One can still remember a time when parents would not allow their daughters to study in co-ed high school classes. Today this is universally accepted, or almost. Further, young women travel from their villages to universities in Haifa and return home on buses, at night. But these same young women cannot invite a male co-student into their homes. And if this same male student really did want to visit the girl, he would have to be her brother's friend or he'd have to come up with a very good excuse. And if he does come armed with a notebook that he's returning to her, and if he sits in the living room with her parents, and if neighbors come in, the girl cannot introduce him as her friend. Nor would the mother ever dream of saying: "Meet my daughter's friend."

"I'm a university graduate myself," says Nellie Karkabi, "and I work in Tel Aviv for the Working Women and Volunteers in Israel. I visit other villages, drive a car and travel abroad. But when my own daughter entered high school, I had a long talk with her about what you do and don't do. I promised her that she, too, with age, would be free."

When Nellie was elected as the first Arab woman to Working Women and Volunteers in Israel, it was a big event. Her youngest son asked her if now she was "better then dad," who was only a school principal. She responded withe the utmost sincerity: "Me? Better than your dad? Never in this world."

This year, as we've mentioned, women participated actively in the election campaign. At the close of the elections, they were complimented by male colleagues, each in her own section. "But we had to put out 200 percent in order to achieve the same recognition as the men. In order to get the women's vote, the names of active women party members were placed on the list, but not in realistic positions. "They gave in--You know how it is, the women always give in ..." Yes, they are already active. But they do not yet really participate in local politics, insofar as power, investment or authority. The example of Violet Hori in Kfar Yasif is an excellent one, and for the time being, a solitary example within the Arab sector. Is this not a challenge?

Mrs Karkabi answers: "Yes, that is a challenge. But I'll tell you candidly, it is not the number one challenge. There are other more important and more urgent matters that preoccupy me."

There are certainly negative aspects associated with the processes of change, modernization and urbanization. Not just in the cities but in the villages, even the smaller among them, there are marginal youth. There is attrition in the schools, theft, breaking and entering, vandalism and wanton violence. There is the sale and use of drugs, economic regression, unemployment, neglect of the elderly, substandard housing, and chronic, untreated illness.

These problems are particularly acute in integrated cities. But according to statistics from 1978 (and there have been no significant changes since then) "The Arab society is still doing very well." Not only in the villages but in the cities, too, crime among Arabs is lower than among Jews. This is true even in a place like Nazareth, at least in comparison to near-by Jewish cities like 'Afula and Bet-She'an, Tiberias and Migdal-Ha'emek.

Change is unavoidable, but the more it comes to the forefront, the greater the opposition from conservative forces. The small size of the criminal element in the Arab sector--the smaller the settlement and the more rural, the smaller this minority--is not the result of police action but rather a function of social sanctions which are often stronger. Another factor working against the increased negative aftergrowths of change is the almost total absence of emigration. Workers from the Arab sector find jobs all over the State of Israel. Students attend universities in all the Jewish cities. But at the end of the week or the season, they all go home. They do not relocate. There is no emigration, no exodus from the village to the cities, no emigration abroad. He who was born in a given village in the eastern Galilee or in the Ayron Valley, has every chance, when the time comes, of meeting his creator in the exact same spot.

Only the old people do not have some level of proficiency in Hebrew. Those whose contacts with Jews are very frequent have completely adapted to the use of Hebrew. But this is far from implying that they have assimilated. Their ties with the Arabic language have not weakened, nor with tradition, and at its root, religion and folklore. They have just become more introverted.

Nellie Karkabi spends most of the week in Tel Aviv where she speaks Hebrew. But, "I return to my Arab home," and the Hebrew, along with a certain style of speech and behavior, remain on the other side of the threshold. The same rule applies to her son, who is studying medicine at the university where he speaks Hebrew. A Jewish girl from Hedeira who came to visit said that the Karkabi's run was "exactly the same as the one in our house." Maybe the rug, but not the food. "I cook traditional Arab foods. We don't eat sandwiches." In the kitchen nothing has changed, just as respect for the father has remained a constant.

"To the contrary," says the head of the Department of Education in Shefar'am, Majid Haj. "As a minority group, we are more aware of the need to conserve things as they were, for fear that we will lose what we have."

[10 Sep 81 p 9]

[Text] Other than the revolution in health care--which began over a decade ago and is attributable to the establishment of clinics--to the outside observer, education appears to be the uncontested greatest success of the Arab sector in Israel.

In the western Galilee, the town of 'Araba with 9,000 residents, has 3,000 students in elementary school, 600 in high school. With all its problems, the school is surrounded by construction.

In the triangle, the town of Jatt, with 4,300 residents, has around 1,500 students in the educational system.

Also in the triangle is Kafr-Kasim with 6,800 residents, and 50 permanent municipal employees, 44 of whom work in the educational system, about half above the elementary level, and another 5 in the youth center.

More than one-third of the population--children and youth--are studying. The lion's share of the budget goes to education. In the afternoon the streets are filled with students returning from school. Jewish settlements of parallel size might be jealous of the existence of a high school in this Arab village and of the high rate of attendance. True, it is partly due to demographic differences. But so what?

"There is no doubt," says Majid Haj, director of the Department of Education in Shefar'am, with grave doubt, "that the absolute number of students and the percentage of educated citizens are both impressive. This is part of the modernization process in this sector. But when you examine the content and essence, you discover things which need to be changed."

Majid Haj, who is certified in sociology and Hebrew literature, says that Arab education, impressive in its numbers, is at least 10 years behind the educational level in the Jewish sector, partly "because the starting point was so much lower," but also for other reasons. The lag is mainly in the vocational-technological area--it comprises only 10 percent of the education above the elementary level in the Arab sector, as compared with 45 percent in the Jewish sector. As for content, "Reforms were imposed on Arab schools where no foundation had really existed. Sociology, for example, was added to the curriculum required for matriculation, but without preparing text books, without training teachers, and even without a qualified director. Language and history teachers are handling it, using books mechanically translated from Hebrew or English. The results of learning by blind repetition are well known."

The principal of the high school in Jatt says that the text books for Arabic literature were written by Jewish teachers and administrators, and then approved by the Ministry of Education. New developments in Arabic literature are not even mentioned, nor is there any coverage of new world literature in Arabic translation. He compares this, without even realizing the harsh irony, with what happened to literature and history books in Germany (!) during the entire generation following World War II: a period of 20 years was rooted out as if it had never existed.

Majid Haj talks about long term investments in winterizing rented school rooms--in some the teacher is physically unable to reach the student. At the director's initiative, reciprocal visits were arranged between students from Shefar'am and Qiryat Bialik. Haj doesn't know what the visits did for the youth from Qiryat Bialik, but he knows what they did for the Arab children. "Their response was: 'It was good to see the difference'--and from that time on they've been concentrating on the difference. They saw the Jewish students' environment, the conditions under which they study. They saw a group that they could compare

themselves with, as opposed to the eternal comparisons with the way things were in the Arab settlements a generation ago, or comparisons with what other Arab countries have or don't have." They could see what Qiryat Bialik has today. No explanation, even historical, is adequate justification. In his opinion, it is not sufficient to explain miscarriages, they must be rectified. The Arab students, like like students everywhere, develop in school their notions about the rest of the world. They see the gap and the gap fosters jealousy.

It's not just a question of the gap. Israeli Jews coming into actual contact with Israeli Arabs for the first time are surprised at their Hebrew fluency. Why should they be surprised when Hebrew is taught from the third grade on in the Arab sector. Haj is not surprised by their surprise, nor by the fact that Jews assume that Hebrew will suffice in their contacts with the other half. He asked if when I come to Arab village I don't expect as a matter of course to be able to conduct an interview in Hebrew. He asked if this was not flagrant asymmetry.

He pointed out a study by the sociologist Yohanan Peres, which found that in the Arab curriculum 40 percent of the history lessons are devoted to the history of Zionism and the Jewish settlement of Israel, while only 1 percent of the Jewish students' curriculum deals with Arab history. To Haj this exemplifies "the tyranny of the majority" as defined by de Tocqueville. The majority looks down upon the minority, has no need for them.

The result is "enduring estrangement." The Arab students have a richer, more detailed understanding of Jewish society and their willingness to approach fellow Jewish students is greater. The Jewish student gleans his knowledge of Arab society not from school but from sources which are far less reliable. This is expressed in the stereotypes they espouse (10 percent of the Jews surveyed agreed with the opinion that Arabs would never reach the level of the Jews). This asymmetry, this imbalance, is, according to the head of the school system in Shefar'am, the Jews' loss.

It's hard to disagree with that, just as it's very hard to judge what this has to do with political moods in the Arab sector.

In the first part of this series I described a meeting of 10 Arab local council leaders who expressed opposition to the body they themselves were members of, the National Board of Arab Settlements. The immediate cause was to present the urgent financial demands of the councils. Also to be decided was the extent of cooperation with the local central government (yes or no) and the strength of the protest to be mounted (to strike or not to strike). But the real background was the split within the Board. The dissidents (as they were dubbed by the Jewish press) accused the Board of being a puppet in the hands of Rakah and other extremists. Rakah supporters (the most important among them the mayor of Nazareth, Tawfiq Ziyad) protested against the activities of the 10 leaders and demanded action against them. Among the moderates, including the current head of the Board (Ibrahim Nimr Husayn, mayor of Shefar'am), were those who claimed that the splinter group was simply attempting to manipulate the agency for Arab affairs.

This background has been brought out in an effort to find answers to questions like the one about "political moods" above, questions of opposition, power, models and trends within the Arab community.

There are those who remember that the Board of Arab Settlements was established in 1974, if not at the initiative of then with the after the fact blessing of the man who was at the time the highest appointed official in charge of Arab affairs. Moise Han'a, from Kfar Rama, and a Rakah Knesset member at the time, was chosen to head the Board. It quickly became apparent that the radical majority on the Board (9 out of 15 at that time) was pressuring him to initiate not municipal actions, but "national" political ones. The Earth Day demonstrations of March 1966 were discussed, although not decided, by the Board. The government refused to recognize the Board but was willing to negotiate with the local elected officials in the Arab sector--either on an individual basis or within the framework of the local central government. People like Tawfiq Ziyad of Nazareth and others of that class knew how to exploit both fronts: to agitate the Board into political, radical, anti-Israeli activity, and to bring the local central government to light as an example of "honesty and moderation."

Meanwhile, Moise Han'a resigned and in his stead Ibrahim Minr Husayn was elected as head of the Board of Arab Settlements. He was seen as a moderate. But, simultaneously, another phenomenon was developing which peaked around the elections for the tenth Knesset. This was the still fresh episode of veteran communist, businessman Dr Emile Tumeh's attempt to unite all the radical Arab groups and bodies in Israel under one roof: "the front" led by Rakah, "the Village Sons," the "Al Nehda" group from Taiyiba, the student's "National Progressive Movement" (some of its members were arrested and found guilty of terrorist activities for the "Popular Democratic Front" of Ahmad Jubril), and the "Academic Union" of Nazareth--nine groups in all. All the slogans and plans of operation were symbolic: "The 5th of June Paper" (the day the Six-Day War began), the call for the wording "national covenant" (based on "Palestinian covenant"), the meeting of a "congress" in Shefar'am (reminiscent of the Zionist Congress in Basel where the Jewish state was established), and the establishment of a "National Coordinating Committee" (based on the steering committee in the territories).

The first blow was dealt to this organization last December when the minister of defense, Menahem Begin, enforced emergency regulations from the Mandate period--for the first time since the "Al Ard" group was dispersed at the beginning of the 1960's--and declared the meeting of the "congress" to be an illegal activity. The second blow came 4 months later when--according to the same regulation--Begin declared that the "Coordinating Committee" was also illegal.

The effectiveness of these harsh actions in the Arab sector, accompanied by similar policies in the territories and stepped-up military activities against the terrorists in Lebanon, remains to be seen. Some are convinced that the restrictions provided an excuse for certain members of the proposed umbrella organization, such as the "Academic Union," to get off the band wagon.

There is no dispute, however, on one decisive fact: Rakah, which had gained almost 1.5 percent in the Histadrut elections, was badly hurt in the Knesset elections. Compared to the 10 percent it had gained in each of the previous campaigns, Rakah lost 26 percent in this last election. In the Arab sector, support declined from 50 percent to 37 percent, and the Alignment showed an impressive increase in support.

Rakah's decline in the Arab sector, despite direct aid from the PLO, was also explained by different people in different ways. The main reason proferred was disappointment with Rakah's municipal activities in Nazareth, under Tawfiq Ziyad, who was more involved in politics than in municipal problems. Fear of the party's radical propensities was also mentioned as a factor, since there was talk of abandoning "moderation."

If you listen to young Israeli Arabs today and compare what they's saying now to the way they were talking a few years ago, you will find that their audacity is greater, their style far more harsh, and their desire to make a positive impression on the Israeli sector has all but disappeared. However, the same could be said about their counterparts in the Jewish sector, and not only in the context of election campaigns. One must differentiate between what is said to the establishment, against the councils or specific government activities, and what is said against the State of Israel and the fact of its existence.

Pessimists within the Jewish ranks project increased polarization, a deterioration in the relations between majority and minority groups, and a confusion of the struggle for citizens' rights with the nationalist struggle. They view with increasing concern the rising Arab birth rate, 2.5 times higher than the birth rate for the Jewish population ("At this rate, by the year 2000 they'll be able to place 12 people in the Knesset and if they manage to form a united party, they'll be entitled to two seats on the foreign affairs and security committee.") The pessimists are therefore sure that the Arab sector will always demand special attention, a distinct 'policy' and a separate apparatus, like the agency for Arab affairs.

The head of the Histadrut's Arab division, Ya'akov Cohen, on the other hand, is convinced that institutional integration is the only way to cultivate better relations between the two sectors. Any organization established to meet the needs of only one of the nationalities will be radical. There's no getting around that. He therefore opposes the existence of the Board of Arab Settlements, even if its head is a moderate, constructive person. In 1959, he recalls, the Histadrut argued the issue of accepting Arab members. People like Shaul Avigor warned: "You will create a tragedy. Our Zionist image will be destroyed." Ya'akov Cohen and Reuven Barakat argued the opposing viewpoint, saying: "We are the founders. We are the majority. We will continue to set the tone. There is nothing to fear." Today, Arabs make up 10 percent of the Histadrut membership and are represented by three members on the central committee who "feel at home."

A similar debate was launched 15 years ago regarding the acceptance of Arabs in Jewish youth groups. Cohen believes that they can be provided with alternatives

to the Zionist slogans: instead of "work and defense," let them use "community work," for example. In the agricultural center there was also a heated discussion. I claimed that it would be better to argue, even fight over water allocations and budgets than to see splinter Arab organizations forming and issuing declarations about suppression and a Palestinian state. He also recalls that on the Alignment's platform committee, Mota Gur argued vociferously with Arab members about sensitive issues like military allowances, which are paid only to Jewish families with children in the army.

There was agreement on some subjects, no agreement on others--but the integration of Arab members on the list was an unprecedented success.

Polarization? Majid Haj denies the concept. "There's Palestinization. We are not cut off from the West Bank and Lebanon. But there is also Israelization. What you see is the process of politization, which only belies a desire to integrate. The results of the last elections attest to this."

A young Arabist warns against drawing conclusions based on the tenth Knesset elections. He advises to wait until the local elections of 1982. By then the situation will be much more clear.

9811
CSO: 4423/13

PAPER EXCORIATES NEW PRESS LAW

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 5 Nov 81 p 1

[Editorial by Fahd al-Masa'id: "Who Will Bury the Corpse of Journalism?"]

[Text] In short we say that the rope has drawn near the throat of journalism... and with terse brevity we call out that we are on the verge of announcing the death of journalism. We find outselves suddenly, surprisingly in the presence of the "corpse" and we can find no one who would usher this corpse to freedom's graveyard.

The new press and publications law is tantamount to a rope despite its leniency, a "leniency" which is more painful and more torturous than barbed wire.

We have been spared repeatedly of Article 35 only to find its apparition looming over the horizon baring its fangs to sink them in our necks and extending its sharp talons to tear open our breasts.

The few positive aspects of the law are not even worth mentioning when compared with the innumerable and incalculable negative aspects. Every article of the law is vague as was the famous security council resolution which stood for more than 14 years with no diplomatic scholar to explain and define it.

Every clause of the law carries in its words and expressions a thousand and one meanings which would allow the government agency concerned to undertake closings on a daily basis of newspapers where they would certainly find tens of reasons to support suspension.

For example, the law forbids attacking any state that has established diplomatic relations with Kuwait. This unfortunately means that we could not criticize America or attack England. With this regulation the government has only left us Israel and South Africa.

The new law will transform the press into official newspapers without officially doing so because the controls that we wanted have come as fetters to bind free thought before binding the hand and to imprison opinions before imprisoning the editor-in-chief. This is a much higher price to pay than the 100 or 500 [dinar fine] called for in one of the law's articles.

It is certain that the law was not drawn up on the spur of the moment for there is not one loophole in it through which the press can escape to save itself. If in the past the government considered itself a 60-percent partner in the press, with this law it has come to dominate the press entirely without compensation and to impose its control over the press without an official resolution.

Is it desired by this law that we be left with the choice between two evils, either a slow death with poison or a quick death in front of the firing squad?

This is a question which we unfortunately do not have an answer for, yet this is the painful reality.

We now place this law before His Highness who has announced more than once his support for the Kuwaiti press. Will he accept this law?

Will he accept snuffing out the flame that has participated in lighting the way, not only for Kuwait, but for the entire Arab world?

What we say here to His Highness we say as well to the Crown Prince.

CSO: 4404/115

BRIEFS

USSR EXHIBITION SPACE—Kuwait and the USSR have signed a protocol for the establishment of a permanent space exhibition in Kuwait. Under the protocol the USSR will sell Kuwait space equipment and vehicles from its space research operations. The equipment and its placing in the scientific section of the Kuwait Museum of Science are estimated to cost $225,000. However, the USSR has offered to cut the cost by half 'in appreciation of Kuwait and its policy, which aims at the expansion of cooperation between the two countries in all cultural and scientific fields, as well as in response to the feelings of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Kuwait.' Kuwait is the first country outside the Eastern bloc to receive such exhibits on a permanent basis. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 p 41]

CSO: 4400/49

ISRAELIS, PALESTINIANS BUILDING UP IN SOUTH

London 8 DAYS in English 31 Oct 81 p 19

[Text] ON OPPOSITE SIDES of the narrow United nations' buffer zone in Southern Lebanon, Palestinian and Israeli soldiers are building earthworks and digging in for the winter. Neither side appears ready to break the three-month-old ceasefire and precipitate the kind of massive attacks the Israelis staged for two bloody weeks in mid-July when more than 400 Lebanese and Palestinians, and seven Israelis, died in the cross-border shelling and Israel's air and sea raids.

The UN soldiers watching the new fortifications from their observation posts say that each side seems to be gearing up its defences in case the other launches a big assault. A Palestinian officer in Tyre, the coastal stronghold of the PLO and its Lebanese leftist allies from the National Movement, confirmed that they were fortifying key sites north of the Litani River just above the buffer zone patrolled by troops from the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (Unifil).

The PLO captain — who requested anonymity for security reasons — also said that they had replenished their arsenals in case of a new Israeli offensive. 'We have many more Katyushas since July,' he said, an assertion supported by other people in South Lebanon.

One UN officer speculated that one reason for the new Israeli earthworks was the heavy rocket barrages the Palestinians could mount. 'I think the Israelis were a little surprised by the fire power they (the PLO and National Movement) used last summer,' he said, pointing out that one PLO position poured out 130 shells in just five minutes last July.

The Israelis are concentrating on throwing up new earthworks in the enclave of their Lebanese ally, renegade army major Saad Haddad. Outside Marjayoun, the 'capital' of Haddad's self-proclaimed 'republic of free Lebanon,' the Israelis are building an earthen wall reinforced by concrete, according to UN officers who suggested it might be designed to serve as a shield for tanks. Marjayoun, the northernmost town in Haddad's enclave, is one corner of the triangle of artillery flashpoints in the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation area.

Another significant Israeli fortification has been spotted by observers south of Unifil's Dutch battalion nearer the Mediterranean. The work in progress suggests to some UN officers that the Israelis are building an underground operations post which could serve as a command centre.

The officers say current Israeli work in the enclave seems to be limited to revetments. The UN soldiers, who monitor activities in the enclave from half a dozen observer posts inside Major Haddad's territory, as well as from Unifil posts in the buffer zone to the north, say they have detected no movement of Israeli artillery or tanks into the enclave. 'They pulled out their guns in August,' one UN man said, and others concurred.

Some South Lebanon watchers, however, see an Israeli arms pullout — or buildup — in the enclave as more an acdemic point than a significant one. Major Haddad's militia is still operating there, with its Israeli advisers and Israeli-supplied arms. Futhermore, the enclave's northernmost boundary is only 8km from the Israeli border.

Palestinian fears of a new Israeli attack after the 24 July ceasefire have changed from fears of an outright invasion, following this autumn's spate of bombings which have

claimed more than 150 lives in Palestinian and leftist controlled areas.

The most deadly, on 1 October, killed nearly 100 people and devastated the narrow Beirut street which is the nerve centre of the PLO's bureaucracy. The first, on 17 September, killed at least 25 people in an explosion at the Sidon headquarters of the PLO and National Movement.

A legion of Palestinians and leftists have publicly blamed Israel or its 'agents in Lebanon' for the bombings. PLO Security Chief Salah Khalaf, better known as Abu Iyad, recently suggested that Israel had resorted to this type of terrorism because international pressure made the Israelis reluctant to break the 24 July ceasefire overtly. They had therefore resorted to furtive bombings.

While a shadowy group called 'the Front for the Liberation of Lebanon from Foreigners' has claimed responsibility for the blasts in several anonymous telephone calls, the PLO maintains that the front is pure fiction and a cover for Israeli agents operating in Lebanon.

However, observers point out that the PLO has taken no retaliatory actions against Israel for the bombings — and that there are others whose grudges against the PLO could have motivated the bombings, including groups in Lebanon as well as some outside the country such as the Palestinian radicals of Damascus-based Sabri Banna.

Regardless of who is behind the bombings, the mood in Palestinian-controlled areas is tense, especially in the 'Tyre pocket' 19km north of Israel. The guerrillas manning checkpoints along the roads are even jumpier and more thorough in their car searches than they were during and immediately after the July offensive.

CSO: 4400/52

INVESTMENT INSURANCE INCREASING

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 2 Nov 81 pp 5-6

[Article by Dr Paul Huygelen, development consultant: "Investment Insurance: The Beginnings of a Success Story"]

[Text]

Lebanon's National Investment Guarantee Corporation (NIGC) is beginning to come into its own as an element which is helping to generate new investment. An analysis last week of the policies underwritten by NIGC up to the end of last month showed that 108 companies are now covering investments in this country against war risks through the NIGC, with the risks including warlike operations of the type that continue to bedevil the Lebanese economy.

This is a remarkable development. Eighteen months ago and three years after NIGC was set up by Legislative Decree No 3 of 1977, only 17 policies had been underwritten and a mere 20 other applications were under review; the value of the investments covered by the spring of 1980 was some LL 75 million ($1 = LL 4.68); the present figure is LL 433 million.

The object of the NIGC is to guarantee, for a premium, new investments made after the effective date of Legislative Decree No 3, ie January 19, 1977. The term guarantee is used to distinguish NIGC's coverage of specific political risks from the insurance of commercial risks handled by private insurance companies in Lebanon. NIGC is an autonomous public body set up to cover damage caused by the turmoil that has occurred in Lebanon in the wake of the traumatic experience of many business concerns during the 1975/76 war.

NIGC was not created to cover such political risks as expropriation, nationalisation, and inconvertibility of currency. American companies investing in Lebanon can, however, cover these additional political risks through the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) since February 1981 (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 16). Actually these risks are minimal in Lebanon at this stage.

Investments as described in the Decree are understood to comprise all fixed assets of commercial and industrial undertakings as well as those of social, health, and cultural establishments or of international or foreign diplomatic missions.

Protection of new investments is available on an equal footing to Lebanese and foreigners alike. It is not surprising therefore that the first policyholder was the British Bank of the Middle East, followed by other foreign concerns such as Proctor and Gamble, Honeywell Bull and the Moscow Narodny Bank. NIGC coverage is not available for housing, though it might be possible to cover new premises owned by embassies. At present, however, embassies have not approached NIGC, nor have other establishments such as the American University of Beirut. But the largest single group of policyholders are hospitals: four of them in Beirut and three in the Beqaa recently took out coverage for new equipment or modernisation projects.

Fixed assets covered by NIGC comprise not only such tangible elements as factory buildings, machinery and equipment, but also engineering studies related to new investments and, broadly speaking, all capitalised investments. However, licenses, patents and good will are not covered. Inventories, stock-in-trade, raw materials and supplies are also excluded from NIGC's coverage against war risks and warlike operations. Nevertheless, there are some specific exceptions for "strategic" parts such as spares for computers and spares for commercial aircraft. Additions to the list of strategic parts are negotiable.

Among the first local companies to take out coverage were a household gas bottling company, whose maxi-

mum stock level of new empty steel butane bottles proved acceptable under the term fixed assets, a producer of louvres, blinds and protective doors, and Middle East Airlines for spare parts for its Boeing aircraft. The list has since grown much longer. Indeed, the majority of the 108 current policy holders are local companies, notably the new Sohat mineral water bottling plant, investments of Coral Oil Company, the major expansion of Light Metal Products SAL for production lines to manufacture 12-ounce cans for beer and soft drinks, flour mills, confectionery manufacturers, etc. The new tower of The Arab Libyan Tunisian Bank SAL, the new Pepsi-Cola plant, the Sibline cement plan, and modernisations at the Chekka cement works (a new kiln), are other major investments that might have awaited rosier days in Lebanon if NIGC coverage had not been available.

While the existence and implementation of Decree No 3 of 1977 have had but a limited effect on bringing in new investments by foreign companies, it has greatly facilitated new investments by foreign entities already in the country. Moreover, it has encouraged other companies which were planning to move abroad to remain in the country. A case in point is that of a Lebanese manufacturer of artificial marble, produced under Italian license. He was planning to transfer his operation to Jordan but, thanks to the availability of NIGC coverage, remained in the Beqaa.

Several hospitals, wary of importing expensive advanced radiological equipment and other equipment, nevertheless went ahead after taking out NIGC coverage. Under NIGC coverage, all equipment is covered as from the moment it arrives at the Lebanese port or airport.

NIGC's success has reached the stage that several banks in Beirut decline long term loans for industrial expansion schemes unless the interested party agrees to contract a NIGC policy.

The annual premium is required to be set at the beginning of the year by governmental decree at the suggestion of the Minister of Finance. The minister is NIGC's sponsor and he acts after obtaining the opinion of the NIGC Board. By law, however, the premium shall not exceed 2 per mil of the guaranteed amount. Hence, up to the present the premium has been set year after year at 2 per mil. In view of double-edged inflation – imported inflation on equipment and inflation generated locally on real estate and buildings – consideration is being given by NIGC to adjust every six months, the value of guaranteed investments to enable those covered to continue to be insured for a sum closer to the replacement value of the item covered.

NIGC has had only one claim up to now. It occurred in the early summer of 1981 when a confectioner's plant in Zahle sustained LL 212,000 of insured damage during artillery exchanges between militias and Syrian Army. Under its policies NIGC is required to compensate those losses exceeding 5 per cent of the aggregate amount covered. If the NIGC policy covers only part of the value of the insured asset, the policyholder shall be considered self-insured for the remaining part and, consequently, has to assume a prorated part of the damage.

As more and more local and foreign companies become aware of the coverage available under NIGC policies, there is no doubt that new investments will increase as, indeed, has been proven by the substantial increase in policyholders over the past few months.

CSO: 4400/52

MEA CONSULTANT INTERVIEWED ON AIRLINE'S TROUBLES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 2 Nov 81 pp 6-8

[Interview with George Carayan, industrial adviser to MEA's Chairman Asad Nasr, by Bisharah Barudi; date and place not given]

[Text]

World airlines have been sustaining huge losses in the past two years and airline representatives have been hearing bleak forecasts for the near future at a meeting in Cannes last week of the International Air Transport Association (IATA). Lebanon's Middle East Airlines is no exception to the general rule and, in addition, has had to cope with other difficulties such as the closure for three years earlier this year of Beirut International Airport because its runways were being shelled. MEA's shareholders last week approved a move to raise the company's capital from LL 100 million ($1 = LL 4.68) to LL 150 million to strengthen the company's financial base. But MEA faces yet another challenge: on October 19, the Lebanese government almost doubled the price of jet fuel. The move comes at a time when MEA confronts a crucial decision on replacing its present fleet of aircraft with European Airbuses.

The increase in jet fuel prices will almost certainly lead to higher fares and freight charges, according to MEA's George Carayan in an interview with *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO's* Bisharah Barudi. Mr Carayan, who is Industrial Adviser to MEA's Chairman Asad Nasr, sets out how the airline plans to meet the multiple challenges it now faces. The interview follows:

Q: How much will the latest increase in the price of jet fuel add to MEA's operating costs?

A: The cost per 100 gallons of jet fuel at the refinery was LL 200.24, not including the cost of transport. With this new law, it has gone up to LL 493.23, an increase of about 90 per cent. To this price, we normally add something like 15 to 18 per cent for the cost of transport and drivers' fees. Basically, this means a difference for us of between 18 million and LL 20 million between October 19, when the decree came into effect, and the end of this year. The fuel bill will increase by that much.

For 1982, our fuel bill will increase to between LL 90 million and LL 100 million. We are doing things about this. We are contacting the authorities to find a way to recover some of the additional cost. But if we do succeed, whatever we do will only be a partial success and, obviously, we will not be able to get back all of the increase in our costs.

Q: I take that to mean that you were not warned in advance of plans to raise the price of jet fuel?

A: No. Except for what could be gathered from the newspapers, it was a complete surprise. But there was no indication of what the authorities were planning. Otherwise, we would have discussed it with them. I don't think any of us was aware of the extent of the increase, even though one or two of us had received indications that the authorities might review prices. As I said, this is such a big problem for us that I am sure we would have discussed it beforehand at our meetings (if we had known about it) in order to determine what effect it would have just as we have done since the decree was promulgated.

Q: How will the extra cost of jet fuel affect your operations? Will you keep operating at the present level or would you cancel some flights, reduce the frequency of some services and reconsider some others?

A: Not really. We will still be operating on the same routes, although it might affect one or two of our weak sectors. We review the profitability of the sectors every three months in order to know whether they pay their variable costs. We categorise our sectors into those that cover variable costs only and those which cover

variable costs plus other costs. One or two sectors which are today marginal could become completely uneconomic. The only way that we can recover some of this extra cost is to pass it on to the passengers.

Q: That was going to be my next question. How will the new fuel costs affect fares? Aren't you bound by IATA fare scales?
A: I think we are allowed to increase fares because of currency problems. So I am sure this would come into that category of fare increase.

Q: In the past, when you calculated your fares and notified IATA or when IATA decided what fares should be, did you make a provision for a possible increase in the price of jet fuel to world levels in view of the fact that jet fuel prices in Lebanon were well below those of other countries so that a future increase would be approved by IATA?
A: In fact, it is the airlines belonging to IATA which decided on fare increases following the increases in the price of OPEC oil. There is no need for IATA to be told what the cost differential is in Beirut because a decision to raise air fares to and from Beirut would involve all airlines serving Beirut and it is not an MEA decision. We have an association of carriers using Beirut which will analyse the situation. MEA will probably sponsor the increase in fares and the association and all the airlines operating to Beirut will agree on them. Then the fares will be published and IATA will accept them.

Q: When jet fuel prices were relatively cheap in Beirut, were the airlines taking advantage of this?
A: We all have fuel management control by which the airlines decide where to lift their fuel on the basis of their contracts with the fuel companies. An arrangement that MEA might have with Mobil may not be the same as that of British Airways with the same company. If, because of the price structure, it pays British Airways to pick up its fuel at Timbuctoo, it will do so. But it may not pay MEA to do the same.

Q: This is therefore a problem for your planning department?
A: Absolutely.

Q: Could the planning department improve the profitability of some routes by linking them?
A: I don't think you can overcome the problem by linking two marginal sectors. Normally, you link a strong station or sector with a weak sector. When you link two weak sectors you increase the unprofitability.

Q: Could you specify how much the increase in fares will be?
A: Well, obviously, we must try to pass on as much as we can of the increase in fuel prices to passengers. The actual increase will be calculated as a percentage of an average fare. Whether the full percentage is passed on is a matter of commercial policy, which is the domain of our commercial or marketing department. It will assess whether the market can absorb at one go the percentage that is derived from the increase in the price of fuel. On an issue like this, we normally bring in the Chairman after it has been thoroughly thrashed out by executives and the Chairman makes the final decision.

Q: Is it now true that you have a fairly strong position as the only Lebanese passenger airline?
A: For the time being, we do have a captive market. As you know, we are one of the few airlines operating into Beirut and we have joint operations with practically all the European carriers. We have them with Alitalia, Swissair, Lufthansa and Iberia and we are now negotiating to cover the London route with British Airways. We have all of the Gulf routes with Gulf Air. We also have joint operations to Athens with Olympic Airways based on a pooling formula in which they share costs and revenues. So, because of these arrangements, we do have a captive market. But we still have to convince our partners about the decisions we take because these affect them in the long run.

Q: You mentioned joint operations with British Airways to London. There have been difficulties over traffic rights to London. What has been done about this?
A: We still have a problem there. We think the negotiations will take place on a governmental level before the end of the year. The two airlines are studying various possibilities and the one that seems most attractive is a joint operation with MEA making a daily flight in accordance with a formula that would satisfy both British Airways and the British authorities.

Q: There has been talk of a merger between MEA and Trans Mediterranean Airways. Will the increase in fuel costs promote such a merger?
A: First of all, you must ask yourself whether it is a good thing to merge two companies that are both losing money – and here you have differing opinions. Is a merger the answer or would it further complicate the problem?

We are in constant touch with TMA and we are investigating various ways and means of cooperating with them which may or may not lead to a merger. Up until now, we have not found an ideal formula for both sides although each is trying very hard. There always seems to be something that one or the other does not like very much. It is finding a way to preserve the identities of both companies and preserving their traffic rights that is causing the most difficulty.

Q: Would they lose rights if they merge?
A: Traffic rights are not something that belong to a state. They have to be granted by another state. If, for instance, Britain does not want to grant us traffic rights, there is nothing we can do. True, Lebanon can reciprocate. But limits on traffic rights are not a question for which the companies are responsible. This is a matter for governments.

It is very difficult to merge two airlines. You have manpower problems and a duplication of effort. True, there are a lot of savings that can be made. But because labour is becoming our most expensive commodity – just about as expensive as fuel – you are really burdening the merged organisation with a tremendous manpower load, virtually an army.

Q: Is there more over-staffing at TMA than at MEA?
A: It is difficult to say whether there is over-staffing or not. We are introducing work measurement to find out where we are over-staffed. This is gradually producing results and showing us where we have more staff than is required. Then we can transfer staff from one section to another and train them. But it is a long process.

Q: What about your plans to renew MEA's fleet of aircraft? Will the higher fuel costs affect these plans?
A: The fuel price increase will expedite a decision (on renewing the fleet) because the new aircraft, the Airbus, has a much lower fuel consumption than the aircraft of the present fleet and therefore a decision to go ahead is now more attractive. All airlines need such aircraft to combat fuel price increases.

There is no problem about financing the Airbus deal. The arrangements that were made when a decision was taken on the Airbus are still in force. Because of the situation in Lebanon and the world-wide recession, what we are trying to do is to reinforce our financial position in order to go ahead with the Airbus deal. But the Airbus offer is there for us to accept.

We have said: "Wait a minute." We want to find ways of becoming stronger financially so that we can take up the Airbuses in a more happy frame of mind than that in which we find ourselves right now because of our losses. As you know, Intra has agreed to increase our capital by LL 50 million. This is a good way of showing the banks of the confidence our shareholders have in MEA. And there are one or two other steps which are being taken which we hope will enable us to confirm our Airbus order, which is due at the end of this month (October).

CSO: 4400/52

BRIEFS

MEA SIGNS AIRBUS DEAL--Middle East Airlines has signed a $350 million contract for five wide-bodied European-built Airbus airliners, with an option on 14 others. The contract was signed by MEA Chairman Assad Nasr and Airbus Industrie General Manager Roger Beteille in Paris on October 30. The Beirut-based airline will equip the Airbuses with Pratt and Whitney engines. The deal includes spare engines and spare parts. Delivery will begin in the spring of 1984. The aircraft, which will seat 207 persons, including 24 first-class and 183 economy class passengers, will be more economical in terms of fuel costs than the Boeing 707s which form the bulk of MEA's present fleet. The signing of the deal was originally due to take place earlier this year, but was postponed as a result of the losses inflicted on the airline by security problems in Lebanon (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, May 11, October 10). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 9 Nov 81 p 4]

CSO: 4400/52

BRIEFS

U.S. THREAT--Addis Ababa, 16 Nov (JANA)--The Political Committee of the tripartite friendship and cooperation treaty between Ethiopia, Democratic Yemen and the Jamahiriyah will start its meeting here today. The three countries are represented in the committee by the secretary of the People's Committee of the foreign liaison bureau from the Jamahiriyah and the two ministers of foreign affairs for both Democratic Yemen and Ethiopia. The meeting is aimed at discussing the threats of the U.S. military manoeuvres currently taking place in the Arab region. Mr al-'Ubaydi, the Libyan foreign liaison secretary, said at his arrival in Addis Ababa, that the U.S.A. is trying to draw the attention of threats that do not exist in the region, in order to gain control over the Arab region and Africa, and to achieve its colonialist goals. He added if there is any threat to peace in the region, then its coming from America which undermines people's freedom. [Text] [LD161512 Tripoli JANA in English 1418 GMT 16 Nov 81]

OMAN MESSAGE TO CONGRESS--Tripoli, 16 Nov (JAMAHIRIYAH NEWS AGENCY)--The permanent secretariat of the Arab People's Congress received a cable from the Central Executive Committee of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman on the occasion of the emergency session of the Arab People's Congress. The text is as follows: "The emergency session of the Arab People's Congress in the Jamahiriyah is being held at a time when the Arab nation is witnessing a conflict between the revolutionary forces on the one hand and imperialist, Zionist and reactionary regimes in Sudan, Solamia and Oman on the other hand. The imperialist onslaught is gathering special momentum in the region with U.S. military manoeuvres operating freely in the region.... The U.S.A. is determined to subjugate the Arab nation and impose its hegemony on its resources. Furthermore, these military exercises, in addition to constituting a direct threat to progressive Arab regimes on whose borders the manoeuvres are taking place, threaten security and stability in the region. They represent an act of invasion against these countries and a prelude to actual occupation of Arab oil fields, especially those in the Arab Gulf Region and the Arab Peninsula. The Arab masses who reject subjugation and capitulationist settlements outlined by al-Sadat draw attention to your conference to urge you to take a staunch stand against the attack and to abort all capitulationist settlements in the Arab region." [Text] [LD160954 Tripoli JANA in English 0852 GMT 16 Nov 81]

TURKISH, YEMENI OFFICIALS--This evening the leader of the revolution received Turkish deputy prime minister, Turgut Ozal. The leader this evening also received Dr Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud, the personal envoy of YAR President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. [Text] [LD172336 Tripoli Voice of Arab Homeland in Arabic 2300 GMT 17 Nov 81]

TALKS WITH SAINT LUCIA--The brother secretary of the People's Committee for the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison today received Peter Josie, foreign minister of the state of Saint Lucia, who arrived in Tripoli last night. During the meeting they discussed bilateral relations and the means of developing them. [Text] [LD111554 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 1330 GMT 11 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/77

BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCTION LEVELS--Omani Oil and Minerals Minister Said Ahmed al-Shanfari has announced that the Sultanate of Oman will maintain its current level of oil production, which stands at 320,000 b/d, until the end of the present 1980-85 five year development plan. Mr Shanfari was quoted by the Muscat-based newspaper OMAN as saying that the strategic position adopted by the Sultanate would facilitate the marketing of its oil and permit the production of crude to be kept at its present level. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 p 11]

CSO: 4400/49

JAPANESE, FRENCH, SOUTH KOREAN FIRMS WIN DESALINATION CONTRACTS

Doha GULF TIMES in English 4 Nov 81 p 9

[Text]

Doha: Four international firms have been awarded contracts to complete the final extension to the Ras Abu Fontas desalination plant.

South Korea's Daelim Industrial Company has been given a QR210m contract to build reservoirs, a sweetwater intake and a pump house. The work is expected to be completed by the end of 1983.

A Japanese company Kubota will provide seawater pumps and associated equipment. It will also supply 16km water pipeline from Ras Abu Fontas to Doha, to be installed by Daelim.

A French firm Alsthom Atlantique will supply four 65-MW gas turbines to be delivered next year.

The contract for switchgear transformers and cables has gone to Pirelli Construction Company, a subsidiary of Britainn's Pirelli General Cable Works.

The contracts follow award of the main Ras Abu Fontas desalination contract worth QR450m to a Japanese company Sumitomo Heavy Industries in last August for supply of four waste-heat boilers and desalination units.

The plant has now eight units, producing a maximum 32m gallons of fresh water a day. After its extension the maximum capacity will be 48m gallons a day.

The expanded plant will be able to meet the state's water requirement up to 1986-87.

CSO: 4400/53

NEW REGULATIONS FOR IRRIGATED FARMING

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 25 Oct 81 pp 9-10

[Text] Khartoum, Oct 25 (SUNA)--Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources Minister Dr. Omer El Amin yesterday held a plenary meeting with the leaderships of farmers unions, directors of agricultural corporations and the technical committee for the application of the new relations of production in the irrigated sector. The meeting was also attended by the SSU Secretary of the Farmers Committee Abd El Galil Hassan Abd El Galeel. The minister explained the methods to be followed in applying the new relations of production in the irrigated projects as decreed by the president on June 1980. The decree abolishes the systems of partnership and joint account to be replaced by the individual account system.

The Minister said the implementation of the Presidential decree authorizes the state to collect fees in exchange of land rent and irrigation. The state will offer services and agricultural loans to the farmers but the cost will be deducted from the value of the produce leaving the net return to the farmer.

The Minister said the technical committee has estimated the cost of irrigation, management, equipment and interest on capital in the irrigated projects at L.s 87 million per year according to the prices in 1979-80. He added that the study by the technical committee showed that the state should collect fees on land rent and on irrigation in order to redeem this cost.

He said the Ministerial Committee decided to collect fees on pumps irrigated projects at 25% rate above the fees on Gezira Scheme. By so doing the state will bear a deficit of L.s 37 million. He added that the application of the individual account in the present conditions will result in a deficit of L.s 72 million. He explained that the state would bear the deficit with the aim of creating production incentives but the fees will be revised every two years.

The Minister assured that the application of the new relations of production is a correction of the course of the agricultural sector.

A meeting will be held next week after the farmers leaderships discuss the issue with their bases.

CSO: 4500/47

BRIEFS

EXPLOITATION OF SECURITY CAMPAIGN--Khartoum, Oct 23 (SUNA)--A spokesman of the High Committee for the clearance of the Capital from vagrants and illegal immigrants announced that some loose individuals had exploited the recent campaigns to harass and intimidate citizens and specially merchants. A reliable source told SUNA that to prevent such behaviour it has been decided that every person or merchant must ask his approacher for his identification and write down the information contained. The source added that the misbehaviour of some loose individuals if left unchecked would jeopardize the great positive efforts made by the regular forces. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 23 Oct 81 p 9]

WORKERS PROTEST REJECTIONIST STANCE--Khartoum, Oct 25 (SUNA)--The delegation of the Sudan Workers Trade Unions Federation (SWTUF) walked out from the Arab Workers Association meeting in Aden, South Yemen in protest against the Arab rejectionist association's stance. Those associations blamed the SWTUF for its contacts with the Egyptian Workers Union and for offering condolences on late President Sadat's death. Workers associations in the rejectionist countries brought nominal associations into the meeting calling them "workers associations in-exile" in Jordan, North Yemen, Bahrain, Oman and Eritria, according to SWTUF's Foreign Affairs Secretary, Tag El Sir Abdoun. He said delegates from Morocco, Somalia, Mauritania, Tunisia, Djibouti and Egypt were not represented. SWTUF is currently contacting some Arab workers associations to set up another body keeping it away from rejectionist pressure and aimed at serving Arab workers, he added. The SWTUF delegation arrived here yesterday from Aden, South Yemen, where the Arab workers association conference is being held. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 25 Oct 81 p 7]

JOINT SAUDI AGRICULTURAL PROJECT--Khartoum, Oct 29 (SUNA)--Central Region's Governor, inaugurates next Satuday, on behalf of President Nimeri, the project of Ed Damazin Company for Agricultural and Animal Production. The project is a Saudi-Sudanese joint venture and is expected to play a vital role in increasing the country's and the region's economic resources and will provide good job opportunities. The project has an area of 500,000 feddans licenced for investment at Jebel Um Dom, south of Damazin. Some 240,000 feddans were cultivated this year with cotton, sorghum and sesame and a high output has been scored. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Oct 81 p 2]

BUS PURCHASE FROM SPAIN--Khartoum, Oct 29 (SUNA)--An agreement has been signed here yesterday between the Finance and National Planning Ministry and a Spanish car industry firm. The agreement provided for the purchase of 150 buses in addition to spare parts and other equipment to the value of $12.5 million. The agreement comes in the context of the loan extended from Spain to the government of Sudan. The Finance Under Secretary Osman El Shikh signed for the ministry and the firm's exportation director signed for the other side. The Kordofan Trading and Engineering Company will carry the task of executing this agreement. The director-general of Kordafan company said that the first batch of these buses that reach 30 buses will arrive here next March. The rest will be concluded during a five-month time from the date of the agreement signing. The 50-passenger-load buses will work in Khartoum province as well as in other regions, he added. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 29 Oct 81 p 6]

CSO: 4500/47

MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS DISCUSSES THWARTING U.S. PLANS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 19 Aug 81 p 13

[Report on Interview with Faruq al-Shar', minister of State for Foreign Affairs by Khalil al-Taqiy; in Damascus; date of interview not specified: "Syria's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Discusses Five Conditions To Thwart U.S., Israeli Plans in Lebanon; European Initiative Is Delusion, Presents Danger to U.S. Oil"]

[Text] In an interview with AL-QABAS Syria's minister of state for foreign affairs, Mr Faruq al-Shar' defined five basic measures that must be put into practice to confront the U.S.-Israeli plot in Lebanon. Al-Shar' said that the purpose of that plot was to liquidate the Palestinian Resistance, to engulf what can be engulfed in Lebanon and to impair Syria's steadfastness.

Regarding the objectives of the continued Israeli attack on Lebanon, al-Shar' added, "There are two points worth noting when one is engaged in any discussion about any Israeli military step after the Camp David accords."

"The first is the U.S. temporary success in taking Egypt out of the Arab-Israeli struggle by means of Israeli force and al-Sadat's submission. In other words, the U.S. administration is saying that since Israel was able to force al-Sadat's regime to capitulate, will it be difficult to force Lebanon to do the same?

"The second point is this: the racist and intricate relationship between the United States and Israel, according to which the Israeli soldier dies instead of the American soldier in order to execute the American plot and protect U.S. interests, must be countered not only by U.S. military and economic support for Israel, but also by U.S. acceptance of the fact that the United States is serving the goals of the expansionist and colonizing Zionist movement. At this stage these goals may be defined in the following points:

"1. Liquidating the Palestinian Resistance as a source of constant worry for Israel, and considering the Palestine Liberation Organization a terrorist organization that must be liquidated.

"2. Engulfing what can be engulfed in Lebanon, beginning with south Lebanon and avoiding at the same time keeping the heavily populated areas in the south, contrary to what happened in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank.

"3. Impairing Syria's steadfastness and making it appear as though it were directly responsible for abandoning the protection of south Lebanon, despite the fact that the Arab deterrent forces are to be found only in al-Biqa', and this is in accordance with the wishes of the legitimate government in Lebanon.

"These Israeli-U.S. attempts are being made at a time when Syria has accomplished an honorable standing in its opposition to the imperialist, Zionist plot."

Five Measures for Opposition

In the course of his discussion Mr Faruq al-Shar' set forth the measures by which these objectives can be impeded.

He said, "The Israeli-U.S. plot in Lebanon requires the execution of five principal measures.

"1. More cohesion between the Palestinian Resistance, the Lebanese National Movement and Syria and as much coordination and deliberation between them as possible.

"2. Obviating the Zionist plot in Lebanon, whose roots go back to the early fifties immediately after Israel came into being, is an Arab responsibility. It is to be obviated with all the magnitude and capabilities of the Arab nation. It is not only a Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese responsibility.

"3. Confronting the problem of some Lebanese forces dealing with Israel and settling that problem in favor of unifying Lebanon's territory and its people.

"4. Supporting the Lebanese National Movement's progressive programs of struggle and showing it as the body that truly expresses the hopes and the future of the Lebanese people.

"5. Unifying the factions of the Resistance within a single strategic objective for liberation is essential. Tactical steps are not to prevail over this objective because undue emphasis on these tactics causes more loss than it causes profit and could replace the strategic objective."

Evaluating the French Position in the Socialist Administration

Regarding the French position after the socialist faction assumed the top positions of power in France, he said, "It is premature to rely on a final evaluation of the new French position now that the socialists have taken over the government in France, especially since anyone who has been

following the statements made by French socialist officials would perceive a clear contradiction in their policy. On the one hand they presented a major challenge to the U.S. administration in two fundamental matters.

"1. The communists' participation in the government, and this participation means that all U.S. statements made from Truman's administration and until Reagan's administration are invalidated.

"2. The French criticized U.S. economic policy bitterly, and they held Ronald Reagan's administration in particular responsible for the unemployment, the inflation and the economic slump in western Europe. This criticism was more bitter than the French criticism that was heard during the administration of the late President Charles De Gaulle, considering the brief period of time during which the socialists have been in power.

"On the other hand, however, the French socialists announced through President Francois Mitterand and his minister of foreign affairs, Claude Cheysson that they considered the Camp David accords a step forward toward a comprehensive settlement and that the destruction of these accords can only come from those who believe that the solution will come about as a result of an all-out war."

Mr Faruq al-Shar' added, "In our view Camp David is one of the agreements that, on the one hand, provides the most encouragement for the course of war and, on the other, firmly establishes the capitalist regime.

"The area has not experienced tension and volatility of such proportions as those it has been experiencing since the Camp David accords were signed. The world did not go back to the cold war until after the Camp David accords were signed. A rightist expansion of that magnitude did not take place in Israel and in Egypt until after the Camp David accords were signed.

"As far as western Europe is concerned, U.S. economic control [of Europe], which the socialists of France are rejecting, can be achieved by the catalytic effects of the Camp David accords.

"A mere quick overview of the economies of western Europe would indicate quite clearly that since Camp David unemployment has been getting worse and growth rates have been declining more than they were before the Camp David accords.

"Finally, Camp David, which means that the United States will have access, free of competition to the resources of the Arab homeland, will most certainly not serve the interests of an independent European economy; [it will not ensure] the independence which the socialists of France are seeking.

"One of the United States' primary motivations for signing the Camp David accords and refusing the participation of any other international parties concerned about peace was to keep the Middle East area a permanent seat of tension and a factor in upsetting the international balance [of power] on the one hand. On the other hand, the United States wants to control oil

exports to the industrial countries and to steer them in a manner that is consistent with the U.S. economy, at the expense of the European economy.

Three Maps for the Middle East

Mr al-Shar' said the following about Arab and international reality:

"As a matter of fact there is more than one map for the area. There is an American map whose lines have been drawn and whose objectives and tools were revealed in the Camp David accords. This map is not new as some people believe it is. Its early lines appeared when oil was discovered in the Arabian Peninsula and U.S. corporations acquired the first concession in 1933. This concession remains in effect till 1999. Most U.S. administrations that came into office since World War II have also played a principal role in realizing the Camp David map. The Truman administration outmaneuvered Britain and applied pressure to it to allow Jews to immigrate to Palestine and to give them the right to own property there. In Eisenhower's administration, during the tri-partite aggression against Egypt in 1956, the Americans discovered Israel's military importance and the extent to which it would comply with their wishes. In Johnson's administration the Americans tested Israel's strength in June 1967. Under Kissinger they put the diplomacy of power into practice and achieved the Sinai agreement in 1975. In Carter's administration they utilized the power of diplomacy to get al-Sadat to Jerusalem, to Camp David and then to the [rose] garden in the White House to announce proudly his capitulation in front of Begin, Carter and the whole world.

"If we wanted to sum up the American map of the area in one sentence, we would say that it represents a U.S. attempt to control singlehandedly the resources of the Arab world and to dominate its general strategic location as well by means of subjugating one Arab regime after the other. This would be done by Israel which has the most advanced U.S. weapons and is the most extreme country in its belief in racism and Nazism.

Mr Faruq al-Shar' added, "To make up for that there is an Arab map whose boundaries are those of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and the factions of the Arab Liberation Movement. It has a broad popular base in the Arab homeland, the support of liberation movements in the Third World and the backing of the socialist camp, especially the Soviet Union. It is also joined in solidarity by the progressive labor unions in the west and by all those who love peace and freedom in the world. This front, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front is placing itself in the trenches opposite imperialism and Zionism. Its view of the future of the area contradicts that which appears in the Camp David map.

"There is also another map which is not as clear as the two former maps. Those who drew that map cannot accept the Camp David map which depicts their land, their resources and their dignity as targets of Zionists and racists. This is because the Zionists and racists view them as Red Indians, relics of the Middle Ages and, according to Menahem Begin, they are thought to have one of the most backward regimes in the world. On the other hand,

the people who drew this map do not want to break their ties with the United States."

Regarding the struggle among the three contradictory maps, Mr al-Shar' said, "The Reagan administration will continue to stick by Camp David, but it will not be able to reap its rewards. The proposition that the United States should have no rivals in the area has been rejected among Arabs and in the international community even before U.S. allies in the western industrial countries rejected it. U.S. allies in western industrial countries realized that the unrivaled presence of the United States in the area would affect their own economic interests before affecting the interests of the Soviets.

"World War I and World War II broke out between competing capitalist regimes and not between regimes with conflicting ideologies. Furthermore, we are saying that the question of Israel's survival with its racist and Nazi tendencies is a question that is not to be confronted by the Arabs only. It must be confronted by the whole world because of the dangers that could ensue [and affect] the Arabs and the world. Hitler's racism and Nazism brought ideological enemies together to resist this Nazi threat.

"All attempts emerging in the area to embark on a struggle lie basically in the possibility of winning over the party [that drew] the third map, by virtue of U.S. oil interests on the Arab scene. Since the United States is producing no results in its efforts to persuade these regimes to form an alliance with Israel, it is trying very hard to establish a direct alliance between it and these regimes under the slogan of resisting the communist threat and ignoring the Zionist threat.

"If ideologically contradictory regimes formed an alliance during World War II to oppose Hitler's Nazi expansion, it goes without saying and it would be more realistic for different Arab regimes to form an alliance against a racist Zionist expansion. All U.S. attempts seeking to alienate the Arabs from their friends, the Soviets, would consequently fail, and those involved in this U.S. plot would pay a high price."

Conditions for Thwarting the U.S. Plot

Mr al-Shar' defined the conditions that are required to thwart and to do away with the U.S. strategy.

"What is required first before any other consideration is made is further Arab solidarity against the Zionist threat, which is the real and basic threat to all the Arab countries, regardless of these countries' being confrontation or support countries and regardless of their being progressive or conservative.

"What is required second is more cooperation from the socialist camp, and especially the Soviet Union. The delusion that is being promoted by the United States that the Soviet Union is making preparations to invade the oil wells must be dispelled. At the same time, it is the United States

that is waiting for opportunities to execute this invasion. The example we use [to back up this statement] lies in the rapid deployment forces. It is known that the Soviet Union has large reserves of oil in its territory and that it exports some of this oil. A simple comparison between Arab oil reserves at [current] high pumping rates and planned Soviet consumption of oil affirms that Arab oil will be depleted years before Soviet oil is.

"All the information that is being promoted by the Central Intelligence Agency about the Soviet Union's need for oil in the mid-eighties is misleading, and its purpose is to emphasize the "Soviet threat."

The European Initiative

Regarding the European initiative al-Shar' said, "The European position is linked with the position of conservative countries. On the one hand, Europeans are apprehensive about the United States' absolute singlehandedness in the Middle East area because European industry in this case would be at the mercy of Americans. To put it more clearly, if U.S. unilateral control in the area succeeds, Europeans expect their exports to be restricted in accordance with the needs of U.S. industry. Americans would not have to resort then to negotiations or agreements to limit the quantities of oil exported to western Europe and Japan. On the other hand, Europeans do not want to thwart U.S. efforts or expose them to a serious setback in the area because they realize the negative consequences that are possible if these efforts should fail. Hence we find that the Europeans are faced with two difficult choices. They are not behind Camp David 100 percent, nor are they against it. And here we must mention that the Arab position will have an extremely significant negative or positive impact on the U.S. position.

"A careful, meticulous reading of Europe's Venice Declaration proves this. On the one hand, Europeans recognize the existence of the PLO, and they recognize the right of the Arab people of Palestine to determine their destiny. On the other hand, we find them refusing to give the PLO full recognition. Europeans are placing restrictions on their understanding of the right of self-determination. Therefore, we are not expecting a European initiative with clear goals and principles any time soon.

Commenting on statements which Menahem Begin, the prime minister of Israel made after the victory of the Likud bloc in Israel's recent elections in which he announced that he was not prepared to give up the occupied Golan Heights, Mr Faruq al-Shar' said, "We must recall what Begin himself said after his party won the ninth elections in [the history of] the Knesset in 1977. He announced then that he was prepared to return Sinai and the Golan in accordance with bilateral agreements. At that time our immediate response in Syria was Jerusalem must be returned before the Golan Heights. It was natural for Begin after his recent victory in the elections, and after the Syrian Arab rejection of unilateral or bilateral solutions to announce that he would not return the Golan, not even with a bilateral agreement. This was an expression of the despair and the failure to draw Syria into the U.S.-Israeli settlement, especially after President Hafiz al-Asad announced at the 15th session of the Palestine National Council that Palestine is to be regained before the Golan."

PARATROOPERS' TRAINING COURSE DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 5 Oct 81 p 5

[Article by Ahmad Qardan: "AL-BA'TH Looks Into the Graduation of the Third Paratroop Class of 7500 Youth; 73 Days Required in the Heroes' Factories for Paratroop Training"]

[Text] In view of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party's interest in and the concern of the secretary general, President Hafiz al-Asad for the Revolutionary Youth Federation, and because of his desire to educate them intellectually and physically, paratroop jumping courses were established.

For that purpose, five camps were equipped. The Al-Mazhah al-Khalil paratrooping camp for youth, named after a martyr paratrooper, and four others were prepared to receive the young comrades. They were also equipped with everything required for military training and preparing them intellectually, politically, socially and culturally. That requires a large number of special rooms, training areas, landing areas, paved roads, as well as barracks equipped with means of ensuring mental and physical rest for the course personnel. In addition, highly-skilled and knowledgeable officers were assigned to draw up plans and programs to prepare them, through serious, resolute and continuous training, to plunge into every battle required of them and to qualify them to stand up against the foes of the party, the revolution and the nation.

Undoubtedly, behind every action is a goal. If the action is significant, then certainly the goal will be even more significant. A few days ago we saw a multitude of young Ba'thist men and women venturing upon significant actions, whose goal was to add another brilliant page to the brilliant achievements of the Revolutionary Youth Organization. They are joined by 7500 other young men and women who are aware of their nation's decisive issues and battles, believe in the immortal message of the Ba'th Party, and are anxious to liberate the Arab will and restore the Arab Nation's former culture and glory.

This glorious work was achieved thanks to the great interest and tireless work of the glorious party leadership, its secretary general, Comrade Hafiz al-Asad, and the leadership of the Revolutionary Youth Federation who prepared them mentally and polished them through strenuous military courses and training in various types of light and heavy weapons. The youth was given guidance through lectures in all social, cultural, political and military fields by trained comrades and experts, who spared no effort to provide the Arab nation with a generation fully aware of the goals of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party.

Behind the activities that we saw on Youth Day, 1 October 1981, when the young men and women comrades displayed their physical capabilities and their resolute countenances, one could evidence a lot of self-confidence and iron wills, a complete understanding of the Arab nation's causes, and a determination to achieve its goals to liberate the land and achieve a unified socialist Arab society, free from backwardness and imperialism.

The Course Taught Me a Great Deal

In our meeting with a young paratrooper, Comrade Usamah Mustafa Rajub, from the Idlib branch, he said: "I volunteered for the course. This course taught me a lot about things I was ignorant of, especially in military, social and political fields. The spirit of cooperation was instilled in us, and love of country was taught to us, along with the way to bear difficulties through strict training. How I wish that this course was longer, so that I could make more than the five parachute jumps that I did make. Despite that, we have become qualified to fulfill any mission in defense of the nation's honor and the accomplishments of the revolution and the party, thanks to the instructors' interest in preparing us."

We then met with a young woman paratrooper, Lama Rifa't al-Asad. She said: "The Arab youth group has undergone a great experience. It is also excellent in all its phases and goals."

Comrade Lama referred to the course's importance. "It was a combination of military and physical training and intellectual, mind-building national education, so that at the end of the course, a well-rounded person would graduate, with a good knowledge of doctrine and with a healthy, strong physique."

Comrade Lama added: "This course trained us, through instructors who made fantastic efforts, in various types of heavy and light weapons. We gained a lot of expertise in driving various combat vehicles and had difficult training in ground parachute jumping, preparatory to the commando course and the actual jump by parachute from the most modern military aircraft that had a minimum speed of 500 km per hour.

"I call on all youth groups in the Arab nation, especially the young women comrades, to take these training courses, because they enhance the woman's position and contribute to liberating her from the darkness of the past."

Comrade Lina Mahfuz is from the Damascus branch, the al-Mazra'ah league. She said: "I was nominated by the al-Mazra'ah league at my own desire and with the encouragement of my family and friends. I joined the course on 19 July 1981. From the first day, without relaxation or deviation, we began our training in close combat and close order drills, stripping down various weapons and firing them, and setting ambushes for the enemy, in addition to difficult ground training in parachute jumping and tactics. We also received valuable lectures in cultural, social, military and political subjects, qualifying us to take part side by side with the men in defense of the country and its honor, and to safeguard the gains of the party and revolution."

She added: "I am very pleased today, because I have fulfilled my wish for a sixth jump, with full field dress and live ammunition, in front of the leader of our destiny and the symbol of our people's unity, Comrade President Hafiz al-Asad."

We Trained a Minimum of 12 Hours a Day

The young comrade paratrooper, Samir Dhahir, from the Idlib youth branch, the city league, said: "I am extremely pleased that I took this course, especially parachute jumping, which we did with confidence and bravery and without fear, because we had trained, during the short time we were in the course, in all types of parachute jumps and in the strenuous and difficult ground movements, without deviation or relaxation. Each day we trained for 12 hours or more, apart from the day and night marches and the diversified lectures which instilled in us affection for the country and defense of the homeland."

The Course Made Me a New Person

A young woman paratrooper, Comrade Raja' Ahmad Zammam, from the Homs branch, the Tishrin league, said: "I was nominated by the league, and I am grateful to my family who praised my idea of taking the paratrooper course, because these courses deepen the spirit of cooperation and love of country, and foster a commitment to the goals and principles of the glorious party and to achieving unity and socialism. Indeed, the training we had throughout the 73 days, in various kinds of arms and the educational lectures, changed me to a person capable of confronting all the traitors, plotters and persons who violate the security and peace of the country and the goals of the party and revolution."

We spoke with Comrade Muhammad Hasan Jabur, one of the youngest comrades who took the course. "I am 14 years old, in the ninth grade of al-Shaghur school in Damascus. I asked to be nominated, because of my desire to join. I joined the course with my comrades. We had training in various types of light and heavy weapons, and I was taught to drive some combat vehicles, hand-to-hand combat and mine-laying.

"I am now ready for any emergency, like any Ba'thist soldier, to defend the gains and accomplishments of the revolution, and to stand fast against the agents and traitors who want only evil for our country."

Young paratrooper Comrade Haytham Muhammad Ka'di, from the Jablah league, discussed the course and its goals. He said: "These courses are necessary for the country's youth because of the physical training we received, as well as the military and intellectual preparation that will undoubtedly qualify us to fearlessly confront the nation's enemies and that will create a generation conscious of and fully understands our glorious party's goals, under the leadership of its secretary general, Comrade Hafiz al-Asad."

Next, a young woman paratrooper, Comrade Siham Tawfan, from the Tartus branch, stressed the need to offer these courses to all the school youth groups and to make them compulsory as any other subject in the curriculum, because of their positive contribution to education, physical fitness, military, political and social education, creating high morale and self-confidence. She also thanked the instructors for the great efforts they made during the difficult training in various kinds of light and heavy weapons, in parachute jumping, and for the emphasis on discipline and order.

Comrade Wafa' Muhsin al-Mahmud of the Hama branch said: "I joined the course impulsively, as a comrade eager to defend the country and our party's goals. This course increased our experience in many fields, and gave us a spirit of love and cooperation among all comrades. Difficulties can be overcome when we cooperate together. This course also raises the morale of Arab women, by giving them endurance and courage, and by teaching them to bear unflinchingly all the strenuous training that we received without fear or boredom of the training in weapons, ground parachute and the actual jump from the most modern, large and high-speed aircraft."

A young woman paratrooper, Comrade Hind Sa'd from Tartus said: "I am less fortunate than my comrades, because I did not take part in the practical demonstration which was held on 1 October, in the presence of our leader, President Hafiz al-Asad. Our number was very large, amounting to about 7500 paratroopers, which required a large number of aircrafts. Despite that, I am proud of what we have gained from the training in arms and vehicles, and the lectures we received, which helped us overcome much of our ignorance of their activities and subjects, and which also instilled in us love for the nation and our leader."

7005
CSO: 4404/74

GOVERNMENT STUDIES POTENTIAL STOCK, BOND MARKET

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 p 12

[Text]

The UAE government is studying the feasibility of setting up a bond market and a stock exchange in Abu Dhabi, according to Jouan Salim, Undersecretary of the UAE Ministry of Finance. Mr Salim told the Dubai daily *Khaleej Times* in an interview last week that the government wanted to expand the UAE's financial market, which is at present very small. "We feel the capital market in the UAE is second to oil in importance," he said. "There are many positive and favourable factors which can help us improve it."

Mr Salim said the UAE government had been offering banks and other financial institutions attractive incentives because "we are keen to improve the efficiency of our banking system. We hope to become another important financial centre in the Gulf, in addition to Bahrain." Banks and finance houses should take "aggressive steps" to enter financial markets, he added.

Mr Salim said the recent introduction of Certificates of Deposit (CDs) had been a step in the right direction and CDs were being purchased large numbers of small investors in the UAE. "By having such issues," he declared, "we can attract small investors to channel their savings through commercial banks in a more profitable way, instead of simply opening deposit accounts ... which they earn very low interest."

Development of the CD as an instrument of investment was being watched with interest by the government, according to Mr Salim. Its performance would be the key to future financial market ventures that could pave the way for still more sophisticated opportunities for investors. "We hope that in future more commercial paper and floating rate notes will enter the market," Mr Salim said. "This could be followed by the establishment of bond and stock exchange markets in the UAE."

Among the possibilities under study, Mr Salim said, was the creation of a market in securities issued by companies not listed on the stock exchange because this would both enhance the efficiency of the market and provide other ways of attracting the savings of UAE nationals. This was the only way to minimise hoarding of cash and other misuses of money, he said.

Mr Salim claimed that the UAE was in a strong position as a potential financial market by virtue of its geographical location, excellent means of communication and immense financial liquidity. Besides, he added, it was not difficult to mobilise the required skill and manpower. "Hence, we don't see any reason why our financial market should be inferior to those in other countries... If we properly make use of the favourable factors, in addition to our oil, we can develop an important financial market in the UAE."

CSO: 4400/49

PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION EXTENDED 5 YEARS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 29 Oct 81 p 1

[Text]

AL AIN (WAM): The Supreme Council decided to extend the present provisional Constitution of the UAE by another five years from December 2, 1981.

The Council, consisting of Rulers of the seven emirates met at Al Maqam Palace here, with His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, presiding. It decided to amend Article 144 of the provisional constitution to extend its life. The provisional constitution came into force December 2, 1971.

The Supreme Council agreed to consider other amendments to the constitution later, taking into account the interests of the federation and the national aspirations.

Following the Rulers' meeting, President Sheikh Zayed issued a Federal decree, summoning the Federal National Council to meet in an emergency sitting on Tuesday, November 3, to complete the constitutional procedures in this regard.

The Supreme Council also discussed several internal and external issues.

Following is the text of the President decree:

"We, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates; after taking cognisance of Articles 78 and 144 of the provisional Constitution and what has been submitted by the Council of Ministers and approved by the Cabinet.

Hereby issue the following decree:

Article 1

The Federal National Council be summoned to convene on Tuesday, Moharam 1402 Hijri, cor. November 3, 1981 in an emergency sitting to consider the draft amendment to the Constitution placed before FNC by the Federal Supreme Council. The sitting shall conclude as soon as the said draft amendment it considered.

Article 2

The Prime Minister shall implement this decree, which should be published in the official gazette.

Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan
President of the United Arab Emirates.

Issued by us at the Presidential palace in Abu Dhabi on 30 Zul Haja 1401 H., cor. October 28, 1981."

The meeting was attended by Sharjah Ruler His Highness Sheikh Sultan bin Mohamed Al Qassimi; Ras Al Khaimah Ruler His Highness Sheikh Saqr bin Mohamed Al Qassimi; Ajman Ruler His Highness Sheikh Humaid bin Rashid Al Nuaimi Umm Al Quwain Ruler His Highness Sheikh Rashid bin Ahmed Al Mualla; Fujeirah Ruler His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Mohamed Al Sharqi; and Dubai Crown Prince and Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid.

Ras Al Khaimah Crown Prince and Deputy Ruler Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr Al Qassimi; Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohamed, Finance and Industry Minister Hamdan bin Rashid; and Minister of State for Supreme Council Affairs Abdul Aziz bin Humaid Al Qassimi participated in the meeting.

CSO: 4400/51

FIGURES SHOW JAPAN FOREMOST SOURCE OF IMPORTS, FOLLOWED BY UNITED STATES

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 15 Sep 81 p 2

/Article: "Dubai's Imports for 5 Months Total 8,436 Billion Dirhams"/

/Text/ There has been a noticeable rise in Dubai's imports during the first 5 months of this year compared with the same period last year. They totaled 8.436 billion dirhams at the end of May 1981, having been 7.890 billion dirhams at the end of May 1980, a rise of 6.9 percent.

The latest figures of the Department of Ports and Customs in Dubai show that industrial goods lead imports, totaling 3.247 billion dirhams from the beginning of the year to the end of May, that is, 38.5 percent of total imports during this period.

In second place are automobiles and transport equipment with a total value of 2.215 billion dirhams, that is, 26.3 percent.

Foodstuffs occupy third place with a total value of 1.333 billion dirhams, 15.8 percent of the total.

Raw materials and chemicals come at the end of the list of imports with a value of about 276 million dirhams for an insignificant 3.3 percent of the total.

With regard to the sources of these imports, we find Japan holding an uncontested lead with total exports of 1.742 billion dirhams, that is, about 21 percent of Dubai's total imports during the first 5 months of this year.

The United States is in second place with a total share of 1.044 billion dirhams or about 12 percent.

The United Kingdom takes third place with a 922 million dirham share, that is about 11 percent.

Bahrain occupies fourth place with a 569 million dirham share of Dubai's imports, about 7 percent, mostly petroleum byproducts.

Fifth place is held by West Germany with 375 million dirhams, that is, 4.4 percent.

Singapore comes next with a share amounting to 371 million dirhams or 4.3 percent.

Dubai gets the rest of its imports from 100 other countries spread throughout the various continents of the world.

8389
CSO: 4404/65

HUNGARIAN ALUMINUM SALE UNDERSCORES POSSIBLE FUTURE COOPERATION

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 3 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] ABU DHABI (EN): Trial orders for 300 tons of Hungarian aluminium products worth of 750,000 dollars have been placed by merchants in Dubai and Abu Dhabi with the Budapest-based Hungarian Aluminium Corporation.

This was disclosed here by the managing director of the corporation Ferenc Kaszas who was among the five-member Hungarian aluminium delegation which ended a six-day visit to the UAE yesterday.

The aluminium goods for which orders have been placed include circles, coils, extrusion billets besides anodised aluminium products, Kaszas told the Emirates News before leaving for Kuwait yesterday.

Kaszas said the delegation's visit to the UAE had three aims: (1) to look into the possibility of establishing joint venture and to find out how Hungary could cooperate in the development of aluminium industry in this country; (2) to take part in projects of higher grade of vertical structure; (3) to offer to supply customers here with extruded billets for architectural purposes and for doors and windows production.

During the Dubai visit the delegation visited the Dubai aluminium smelter and two other companies dealing in aluminium products.

Kaszas said the delegation told to the Dubai parties, which he did not name, that Hungary would be interested in organizing joint ventures, either based on production from its semi-finished products or assembling prefabricated finished products, in this country.

In Abu Dhabi, also, the delegation had "very interesting" discussions with one large company, which Kaszas would not identify for erecting a workshop or factory to produce doors and windows in a Third World country.

As a result of his visit here, another big company has asked the experts from the Hungarian Aluminium Corporation to make a feasibility study and conduct market research within this year for selling Hungarian finished products with joint participation besides studying the possibility of erecting a factory for assembling Hungarian prefabricated elements in Abu Dhabi.

Meanwhile secretary of the Arab-Hungarian Chamber of Commerce Gabor Vida, who was in the Hungarian delegation said he had renewed the invitation to president of Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry Saeed Ahmed Al Otaiba by the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce vice-president Tamas Beck to visit Hungary at the head of a trade delegation.

Vida said his chamber's objective was the same as any other chamber in the world and that is to promote trade relations and to send businessmen into each other's country to consolidate trade and industry.

Giving his impressions of the six-day tour of the UAE, Vida told the Emirates News that the delegation found that the Gulf area was "very important."

"The Gulf is the most important market for us and particularly for our aluminium industry," Vida said. It was for this reason the chamber decided to send this "specialised mission" dealing with the aluminium industry.

The visit has enabled the delegation to sell different kinds of aluminium products. On its return home the delegation would be examining ways and means of how the corporation could join the two existing aluminium smelters based in Dubai and Bahrain.

Vida disclosed that the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce is keen on opening a representative office of the Chamber in the UAE. He said a request has been made to the concerned authorities and the Hungarian Ambassador to Kuwait Erno Horvath is likely to follow it up during his visit here.

"A permanent Hungarian presence for trade promotion in these markets is very important for us," Vida declared.

CSO: 4400/51

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 29 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim Ahmed: "Inadequate Staff, Data Blamed for UAE Chambers' Problems"]

[Text]

ABU DHABI (Ittihad): Chambers of Commerce and Industry in the country face serveral problems which prevent them from carrying out their responsibilities efficiently. The lack of accurate statistics on economic activities, the heavy burden on the boards of directors and the shortage in national technical cadres are some of the problems for which solutions are under way.

Director-General of Sharjah Chamber of Commerce and Industry Abdul Razak Al Hajiri believes that chambers of commerce should play a significant role in preserving the interests of its members and promoting cooperation between the private business community and the government.

Al Hajiri said that the chambers can be deemed successful if they succeed in attracting investors to contribute in industrial projects. But, this, he said, necessitates overcoming all problems which hinder the achievement of this goal.

He thinks that chambers have another significant role in solving the problems of their own members through arbitration panels instead of resort to litigation.

Nazar Sardast, Director-General of Dubai Chamber of Commerce, said that the chambers by their very structure represent commercial, industrial and economic interests of their members and provide consultancy for them but still they do not enjoy exectuve powers. Despite this fact, some members expect all their problems to be solved by the chambers.

Sadrast said that the federal law on commercial registration made it obligatory only for traders to prove their membership in a chamber of commerce. But this does not apply to industrialists whose activities are very important to the chamber, particularly when a study is to be conducted or data on them. Such problem of membership can be solved by introducing some amendments in the law.

The increasing responsibility of the members of board of directors is yet another problem and their participation in the meetings of several committees deprive them from effective participation, he said.

The non-Arab members and the big number of foreign workers constitute a special problem to Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry. This compels the chamber to use both Arabic and English and, sometimes even Asian languages in its correspondence and transactions, Sardast added.

The shortage of administrative staff of chambers cast a heavy pressure on the present chambers' employees particularly in regard to the issuing of certificates of origin, the endorsement of invoices, besides the registration of members and daily routine work, he said.

But Hassan bin Idris, Chief of the Foreign Relations Section in Sharjah Chamber of Commerce, said that lack of accurate data was the main problem of these chambers. And he thinks that any shortage of information is a big obstacle.

According to Al Hajiri of Sharjah Chamber, the problems are being sorted out and solutions are in the offing. Some steps in this regard will be taken by the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, with the assistance of legislative and administrative institutions in the country, he added.

He believes that economic research, the boosting of communication between chambers and their members, the strengthening of cooperation between local, Gulf and Arab chambers, the determination of the targets of all projects, the provision of adequate technical staff and funds would help chambers implement their objectives.

CSO: 4400/51

BRIEFS

ALIEN LABOR REGULATIONS--Abu Dhabi (AL BAYAN)--The Ministries of Interior and Labour and Social Affairs are discussing the new procedures concerning security and organisation of foreign labour in the country. A reliable source told AL BAYAN that these procedures were discussed at the last meeting of the two ministries' officials which was attended by Labour and Social Affairs Minister Saif Al Jarwan and Minister of State for Interior Affairs Hamouda bin Ali. The proposed procedures make it obligatory for every labourer to obtain a written agreement from his sponsor for submission to the concerned authorities for permission to leave the country. The source disclosed that this issue was referred to a joint committee set up by the two ministries. The committee is expected to hold its first meeting next week for discussing the proposed procedures besides a number of issues including coordination between the two ministries concerning the tracing of absconded workers. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 29 Oct 81 p 3]

OIL EXTRACTION RESEARCH CORPORATION--Abu Dhabi (WAM)--Yesterday's meeting of the Executive Council has approved a draft law for the establishment of Abu Dhabi National Corporation for Oil Extraction Research. The Corporation will carry out research in the field of oil extraction technology in order to adopt more developed techniques in the extraction of oil in the areas allocated for the operations of Abu Dhabi Company for Onshore Oil Operations (ADCO). The Executive Council also agreed to establish a department at Zayed Port to operate the containers terminal there. The Council also approved to nominate specialised consultant companies to study the road traffic problems in Al Ain city and advise on the proper solutions and the problems likely to occur in the future. Further, the council approved construction of labourers' quarters at Al Mahir, Khazna and Al Arabe regions as well as the establishment of an agricultural guiding centre at Al Khazna. The meeting was held under its chairman Crown Prince Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 2 Nov 81 p 1]

FOREIGN WORKERS OUTNUMBER UAE WORKERS--Statistics in the UAE show that none of its nationals work in the mineral industry which absorbs 208 workers, including five of Arab nationalities and 203 of foreign nationalities. The same figures show that there is a total of 445 UAE workers in the oil extraction and refining sector compared with 2,487 Arabs anp 64 foreigners. Compared with this small proportion of UAE citizens in these sectors, they are overwhelmingly present in the maritime operations sector which absorbs 138 citizens, 33 Arab nationals and 27 foreign nationals. An overall look at all industrial sectors, including water and electricity, shows a total of 918 UAE workers as compared with 3,269 Arab nationals and 3,010 foreign nationals. /Text/ /Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 242, 10 Oct 81 pp 47-48/ 8389

END

CSO: 4404/65

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2 December 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2445

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2 December 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2445

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MASSIVE NEW GULF INSURANCE, REINSURANCE VENTURE FORMED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 21, 24 Oct 81

/Article by 'Ali Ibrahim: "The Story of the Birth of the First Arab Insurance Leviathan"/

/21 Oct 81 p 3/

/Text/ Any company that wants to engage in economic activity can enter the market for the first time in two ways: either by infiltrating quietly and without commotion and implanting its presence step by step, or by invading the market in the midst of a commotion that stirs up great clamor, meaning, at the same time, that the entry will be strong from the beginning.

The Arab Insurance Group chose the latter way to begin its activity, in the midst of a massive Arab and international insurance display in Bahrain last Saturday and Sunday, on the occasion of the official inauguration of its activity, in the presence of more than 700 heads of insurance companies, major investors and journalists from various areas of the world. The emirates were represented there by a delegation headed by Shaykh Hamdan ibn Rashid, minister of finance and industry, the contained Ahmad al-Tayir, assistant deputy minister of finance and the vice chairman of the group, and Ahmad Lutfi, manager of public relations in the ministry.

The story of the group began, specifically, in April 1980, when circles in international insurance organizations greeted the news of the signing by Libya, the emirates and Kuwait of a contract to establish a massive insurance and reinsurance organization under the name of the Arab Insurance Group with great amazement.

The source of the amazement was the immensity of the group's authorized capital, which was $3 billion, representing 20 times the amount of insurance shares in the New York insurance exchange and more than six times the shares of the international Lloyd's organization which is more than 300 years old.

At that time, circles in international insurance organizations raised questions on the degree of seriousness of the people who were planning to establish the group, especially since they were doing so at a time when the market was suffering from recession and a price war.

However, when the group started its forward progress, international insurance organizations came to sense the seriousness of the project, and the group, as western sources said at the inauguration celebration, proved that it was more advanced than the international bodies had expected and that it could challenge the most massive international insurance groups because of its immense financial resources.

AL-BAYAN's participation in the inaugural ceremony displays gave it an opportunity to get close to the manner of thinking of the people who established the group and its officials in order to observe its procedures, projects and goals.

Fawzi Musa'id al-Salih, chairman of the board of the group, concentrated on three points:

First, the group is established on purely economic foundations and has no political goals among its objectives, nor will it receive any political support, although its founders consist of three governments.

If a country leaves the group, its stock will be offered for sale in accordance with the recognized rules of the market.

The second point is that the group will begin its activity in a relaxed atmosphere, in the sense that it will not rush after markets in search of rapid profits, but will enter a market only after thorough study and after guaranteeing that its expertise on that market is complete and the ingredients for success are assured. Sources among the delegations said that this policy is supported by the group's massive capital, which gives it strong financing powers and financial stability for a long period.

An International Body

The third point the group's board chairman stressed is that in spite of the group's Arab nationality it will operate in international markets as an international insurance organization according to economic criteria without preferring one market over another.

Fawzi Musa'id al-Salih did not ignore the importance of the Arab and Gulf insurance market. He said that in the projects and investments in the area the volume of risk requiring insurance came to about $20 billion. Although the group chairman pointed out that 80 percent of its activities in the past 2 months since it started its activities came from outside the Middle East, Western insurance company sources have pointed out that the group is situated in the most rapidly growing insurance market in the world.

The Arab insurance market began to develop following the oil price increases in the early seventies. Estimates indicate an average increase in insurance instalment income of 20 percent a year between 1975 and 1978.

Doubling of Activity

The group chairman also pointed out that the volume of the activity since the group started its work last 1 July exceeded expectations to the point where the anticipated volume of insurance instalments up to October 1982, which was $50 million, doubled to $100 million.

We Have Not Come out against Anyone!

Fawzi Musa'id al-Salih also emphasized that the group has not come out against anyone. Its desire to establish a truce with the international groups in the initial period has been apparent, and it was apparent to AL-BAYAN, when he said "We do not want to provoke anyone now, until we get beyond the starting period. The market has room for everyone."

This desire was also apparent as regards the group's position on the fact that Lloyd's recently raised the war risk insurance rates in the region. He said, "We can help in this area by reaching understanding with the international firms. Naturally our presence in the region will help establish a kind of confidence among them concerning the circumstances and conditions in the region.

Why 3 Billion?

But why the sum of 3 billion in capital? 'Abd-al-Latif Kanafani, a major official in the group and its official spokesman, said, in a meeting with AL-BAYAN, "We all know that reinsurance activities are concentrated on trust, in the sense that many companies begin their early years in this field just to get the confidence of agents, and, because the process takes years, we need great financial resources in order to achieve fiscal stability. In addition, its immense capital creates the requisite trust because it means that the group will be able to bear massive risks, even if losses occur.

"It is true that the paid up capital so far totals $150 million out of a total of $3 billion in authorized capital, but this sum is now adequate to cover the company's activities. As soon as the need to increase the capital paid in is felt, the subscribers will be called upon to increase their shares."

Concentration on Reinsurance

The group will concentrate its activities on reinsurance processes. Its board chairman says that also among its objectives is to help developing countries acquire sound expertise and understanding in the insurance field.

For this purpose, a site of 10,000 square meters has been set aside to establish the Arab Insurance Institute in the al-Hawrah area of Bahrain.

He added that the group is concerned with preserving its Arab personality and giving people from the Arab countries an opportunity to develop their abilities and qualifications in this area. A number of Arab delegates have actually been sent to insurance colleges and institutes throughout the world and there will soon be an expansion in this program whereby the group will offer 40 study grants a year.

Why Bahrain?

Why the choice of Bahrain as a center for the pursuit of the group's activities?

'Abd-al-Latif Musa'id al-Salih said that in addition to the commercial renown Bahrain has enjoyed since ancient times, it has succeeded in consolidating its position on grounds that it is an international financial center where all the necessary facilities and means for effectively pursuing commercial and banking activity are available.

Political Events

He answered a question on the effect the political events in the region, especially the Iraq-Iran war, had on the group's activities by saying, "As long as we have a telex and means of communication, nothing will obstruct us."

Other questions remain on the activity of the group through which, with the official announcement of its inauguration, the Arab world is entering the world of international insurance; those we will leave to the next instalment.

/24 Oct 81 p 3/

/Text/ Although the official inauguration of the Arab Insurance Group in Bahrain last week is to be considered a major Arab economic event in every sense of the word, the group's officials insist that the group is not just a new addition to existing Arab economic organizations--it is a massive addition to the world insurance market.

Fawzi Musa'id al-Salih, chairman of the group, insisted, in the first segment of this report, on imparting this character to the group, stressing that it would not discriminate between one group or another in its dealings.

This casts great challenges and burdens on the group in the initial period of its activity, especially since it is occurring in circumstances of intense competition among international groups, some of which have existed for 300 years, and a state of recession in the market.

Fawzi Musa'id al-Salih stressed "The group realizes that it is venturing on its activities at a time when there is surplus insurance capability in the market, although it is certain that the insurance world will benefit from the reliable resources the group will provide for reinsuring increasing risks of a complex nature that are expected to become ordinary and familiar in the last two decades of the 20th century.

"In addition to the increased risks and responsibilities derived from oil production in offshore areas and from the field of aviation, there now are dangers of greater scope that the insurance companies are covering, in new fields such as satellites and space exploration.

We Will Not Outstrip Our Expertise

"The group is determined to develop itself rapidly in order to become one of the greatest insurance organizations in the world, insuring various types of risks; however, we will always be concerned to carry out our activities in a context where we have expertise and will not fail to penetrate new markets and fields when our expertise permits us to do so."

He said, "At the outset, the group will engage in reinsurance activities only, but it is determined to enter the insurance market directly when it acquires an adequate amount of expertise, and we will always be anxious to avoid outstripping the expertise we have acquired."

Circumstances of the Market

Two points in the group chairman's conversation are noteworthy: emphasis on knowing the circumstances of the market at present and an emphasis on not outstripping expertise.

The circumstances of the market, as statistics show, reveal that this century has witnessed great change and expansion in supply in the field of insurance. At the start of the 19th century, there were only 30 insurance companies, 14 of which were British, while there are now more than 10,000 groups of international insurance companies, in addition to their branches, which come to 30,000.

At the start of the seventies, there were about 196 groups specializing in reinsurance; the number by 1979 had risen to 240.

Surplus

In spite of the presence of surplus insurance capacity in the world, insurance organizations have been compelled to reduce installment prices to the lowest possible degree, although these instalments consist of a percentage of the value insured. These organizations have proceeded to rely on high interest rates to enable themselves to cope with insurance requirements and realize profits.

Expertise in this area is also needed because the insurance industry has come to depend on very high information-gathering and analyzing technology and on determining the degree of risk and ascertaining the nature of the market before embarking on it, lest its losses be exorbitant.

An 18-Month Program

But how will the group cope with all this?

'Abd-al-Latif Kanafani, a group official and its official spokesman, said "The group has a plan for an 18-month program for entering world markets. This includes travel and contact with international companies, since this type of work requires personal meetings.

"Also in the context of this program, numerous representatives' offices will be opened in the United States, Western European capitals and important financial capitals so that we will be close to the markets."

'Abd-al-Latif Kanafani went on, "We will concentrate on reinsurance. Of course we are aware of the circumstances of the competition, but this is a healthy climate. In accordance with the directives of the board chairman, we will be working in a relaxed atmosphere so that we can acquire expertise, and we are not rushing our affairs. Of course, we started out with a goal, but what I mean is that we will not be rushing our affairs lest we go into markets on which we do not have adequate information.

Two Types of Investment

"What about the group's investment policy?

"There are two types of investment we are intending to carry out. The first is long-term investment, which involves training the human element; this will benefit Arab companies and insurance sectors in the developing countries.

"The second area is short-term investment. In this field, we will concentrate on investing the surplus of our operations in high-level investment activities in the international market, so that these can be shifted immediately into liquid capital anytime we want if we need it.

"Will the group engage in activities of investing in projects?

"We are not an investment company, and, as I have pointed out, we will resort to types of investment that will not freeze our funds, in the sense that we will be able to acquire liquidity at any time."

Faruq Kawija, a technical director of the group, stated that the group would engage in contractual and optional reinsurance activities.

The first type is one in which more than one body takes part by virtue of agreements; the second takes place optionally.

With regard to recourse to middlemen, he stressed that the group would resort to them as every international group does, since they are of course important.

Why the Group Now?

But why was the Arab Insurance Group established at this time?

'Abd-al-Wahhab /sic/ Kanafani picked up the thread of the conversation, stating that in 1979 the feeling of the importance of establishing this sort of group in the Arab area arose; after the economic organizations in the area had evolved, it was necessary in turn that a group be established that could engage in reinsurance activity.

On the policy of employment in the group, he pointed out that there would be about 100 employees in the group at the end of the year.

Maximum Limits

As regards the existence of maximum limits on reinsurance activities the group carries out, Faruq Kawija said that those came to about $25 million per operation and that they varied according to the nature of each operation. That does not mean that the group does not agree to operations involving higher figures; that depends, rather, on the operation itself.

After ascertaining the ideas of group officials, it remains for us to learn the reactions of Arab and Western insurance sources.

At the press conference held during the celebrations, an Arab journalist expressed a wise observation, asking whether the group would pursue the same methods as international groups in collecting information, which in some cases depend on intelligence agencies.

That reflects the extent of the effort and the means the international groups resort to in collecting their information.

'Abd-al-Latif Kanafani asserted that the group would pursue the most modern methods of gathering economic analyses and data by legitimate means, in accordance with recognized rules.

A Show of Force

The Western reactions were characterized by receptivity mixed with a certain show of force. Peter Green, head of the British Lloyd's group, said that Lloyd's welcomed the Arab Insurance Group as a new force in the world of insurance and welcomed cooperation with it in the field of training its staffs. He added that he welcomed the statement by the group's head that it would not outstrip its own expertise and go into international markets without sufficient experience.

Lionel G Jones, chairman of the Panatlantic Insurance Group and chairman of the federation of members of the New York exchange, said that the group had great opportunities, with its massive capital, but that capital was not everything.

This all shows the extent of the competition and the challenges the group is expected to face at the start of its activity.

However, in conclusion, it is necessary to record the group's enthusiastic policy, which it intends to carry out in the first years of its activity, in the objective of forming a serious basis for its transactions.

We must not expect enormous activities from it at the beginning, since it is not expected immediately to dominate a major share of market transactions; rather, the group intends to let its transactions evolve as it acquires the necessary expertise.

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CSO: 4404/79

ROME MEETING HELD TO SUPPORT PALESTINIAN WRITERS

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 9 Oct 81 p 2

[Article: "International Conference for Solidarity with Palestinian Journalists and Writers Inaugurated"]

[Text] The International Conference for Solidarity with Arab Writers and Journalists was inaugurated last Wednesday morning in Rome, the capital of Italy. The conference was made possible with the cooperation of the Arab-Italian Friendship Society.

After a statement by (Ivuli), the president of the Arab-Italian Friendship Society, welcoming and thanking those attending the conference, the conference began its agenda with a speech by the president of the Arab Journalists' Union, Sa'd Qasim Hamadi. Mr Hamadi emphasized at the outset of his speech that the Arabs got rid of al-Sadat who had sacrificed the dignity of the Arab nation and made it possible for world imperialism to persecute the Palestinians.

Hamadi added, "We are beginning the agenda of our conference with the dawn of a new age after the death of al-Sadat. We are meeting here to affirm our support and our solidarity with the Palestinian people so they can live in freedom. [We are meeting here in the hope] that the dawn of freedom may shine on the holy land and bring with it a just peace."

Hamadi added, "Arab writers and journalists have resolved to complete their course in this direction, keeping their hands on their weapons so they can defend their dignity and have a country. We are affirming that Palestine belongs to the Palestinians, and we are assuring the Palestinians who lost their lives in battle that their blood will embrace the new civilization, a civilization of equality and coexistence among nations."

Hamadi concluded his speech by saying, "We are holding our conference at a time when conspiracies against the Palestinian people and the Arab nation are increasing." He was referring in this regard to the recent raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor. He affirmed that Zionism did not want the Arab nation to achieve progress in any area, and he called upon the conference to assemble all the capabilities of journalists in the world in order to contribute to the liberation of Palestine.

After that Yasir 'Abd-Rabbih, PLO information official spoke. On behalf of the PLO he thanked those attending the conference for attending the conference and participating in it, and he said, "The importance of the conference stems from the fact that it contributes to the escalation of our struggle against Zionism which is trying by all means to reinforce its occupation of the occupied land at the expense of the Palestinians. Zionism is always trying to destroy Palestinian culture and the Palestinian identity."

'Abd-Rabbih added, "Since the 1967 war Zionism has been trying to confirm its occupation of Palestinian territory just as it has also been trying to persecute those with a Palestinian identity in Palestinian territory.

"The Israelis, according to their plans for the next 10 years, are trying to wear down the Palestinian identity and are using all means to do so." He referred to the siege and the imprisonment which Zionism has been practicing against the Palestinian press and Palestinian journalists, and he also referred to the fact that the Israelis were shelling Palestinian schools for the purpose of destroying Palestinian culture.

After that Juliano Silrestri member of the Italian parliament and president of the Arab-Italian Friendship Society spoke. In his speech he insisted on the solidarity between the Friendship Society and the Palestinian people, the Palestinian writers and Palestinian journalists. He emphasized that [the latter] were struggling against all kinds of persecution to live in dignity and for freedom.

Lebanon's minister of information and tourism, Marwan Hamadah spoke. He said, "European public opinion is no longer ignorant as it was in the past of the dimensions of the Palestinian tragedy, since Israelis are still practicing their expansionist policy against any Palestinian presence, even in the area of Palestinian writers and journalists."

Marwan Hamadah added, "Zionism intends to obliterate Palestinian presence." He said, "The fact that Israelis have not been able to achieve this is due to Palestinian journalists and writers who were able to uncover these plans."

Marwan Hamadah concluded his speech by saying that the Lebanese were declaring their solidarity with the Palestinians. "The blood of Palestinians killed in action is mixed with the blood of Lebanese citizens who lost their lives for the sacred cause of Palestine, which has become an inseparable part of our history."

Brother Yasir 'Arafat sent a cable to the conference on behalf of the PLO. He thanked those attending the conference for participating in it, and he assured them that the Palestinian Revolution would continue on its course to liberate Palestine. [He assured them that the Palestinian Revolution] will fight Zionism and imperialism and that it will escalate the struggle especially against the recent strategic alliance between the United States and the Zionists.

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MAGAZINE PROVIDES ILLUSTRATED NARRATIVE OF NEW PRESIDENT'S CAREER

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 16 Oct 81 pp 75-81

/Article: "Husni Mubarak: A Personal Portrait"/

/Excerpt] Here is the man.

And here are his methods--a military man who reached his civilian positions through personal ability alone. There was nobody with influence in the family he was descended from.

Because he is a pilot, he does not know how to stop in one place and it is impossible for him to turn back. The man had 14 classes of pilot cadets graduate under his supervision.

The important lesson he has learned in the 53 years of his life is that truth is the shortest way to human happiness and that the straight path is the shortest distance between any two points in the world today.

Everyone has his distinguishing features. This man's features are a strong personality, a clear, well-organized mind and an ability to immerse himself in his work. He is realistic, logical, cool-headed, organized and precise in his appointments to the degree that people set the clocks by him in the Air College. The man's experience is broad. By the end of October 1980 he had made 25 trips abroad in which he made 120 visits to 40 countries. Some of them he visited more than once on serious, delicate missions. The longest trip took 3 weeks, in which he visited North Korea, the People's Republic of China and America. The biggest and most trying of his trips was when he visited 17 countries in just 15 days.

Let us start his life's story from the beginning.

In a Village in the Egyptian Countryside

Kafr al-Musaylihah is a small village near the town of Shabin al-Kawm, the capital of al-Minufiyah; just 1 kilometer used to separate it from the town. Now Kafr al-Musaylihah is part of the town, a small district in it with an area of 550 feddans, its population totalling 10,000. Its most important feature is the high rate of education on the one hand, and the fact that its streets are almost straight, not like the streets in other villages of the Egyptian countryside. The high rate of

education in that village prompted many of its people, among them 'Abd-al-'Aziz Fahmi and 15 professors who are in Egyptian universities now, to go out into the world and play many important roles. This current academic year 150 students from the village are studying in universities. The village has produced 10 counsellors. It used to be a village in al-Minufiyah, then a decree was issued making it a section of the town of Shabin al-Kawm.

Kafr al-Musaylihah has three schools, two primary and one preparatory, and a health unit. By its own efforts, a religious institute was built in the village where English is taught. In the village there are a young persons' club, group consumer cooperative society, and an electric plant which supplies four other villages. The odd thing is that there is not a single coffee-house in the village. There are five mosques in the village, including the Mosque of 'Abd-al-'Aziz Fahmi, which is of historic value. Out of the five mosques, one that belongs to the Ministry of religious Endowments and the rest are private. Very few inhabitants of the village are engaged in farming; education and white collar work are more important than farming in the opinion of inhabitants of the village.

Kafr al-Musaylihah was the stage that witnessed Husni Mubarak's arrival in this world.

That Day in May 1928

The day was 4 May 1928. Muhammad Husni was born then. His father was Mr al-Sayyid Ibrahim Mubarak. His family went back to Sidi Mubarak, founder of the well-known mausoleum in Zawiyat al-Bahr in the Governorate of al-Buhayrah, which visitors from all areas go to to bless. People also state that Sidi Mubarak was a disciple of the holy man Sidi Ahmad al-Badawi, who is buried in his mausoleum in Tanta.

For more than 300 years, the family moved back and forth, going to its town, al-Musaylihah in the District of Shabin al-Kawm, then leaving the town with some inhabitants of al-Musaylihah about 200 years ago and settling on the banks of the Lake of al-Shabin, which is the place that is now known by the name of the village of Kafr al-Musaylihah. Among those who left al-Musaylihah and settled in the village was Husni Mubarak's great grandfather. Kafr al-Musaylihah is known among the people of al-Musaylihah as Kafr Paris, because the illiteracy rate there is absolutely nonexistent; there is not a single illiterate person in it. Husni Mubarak's father worked as an official in the Tanta court before the court of Shabin al-Kawm was established. Because he was a government employee, he lived in al-Quwaysina for a period of time, up to 1936, then was transferred to Ashmun, and finally Shabin al-Kawm harbor. The man was transferred to retirement in June 1960. At the time he was transferred to retirement, his job was inspector in the Ministry of Justice. He passed away in the year of his retirement.

His father was an only child who had no brothers. Nonetheless, he sired five children, four boys and a girl. The children were Samiyah, Sami, Husni, Fawzi and 'Isam. 'Isam is now working in a bank. Sami returned to Egypt after an absence abroad that lasted 25 years and is self-employed. Samiyah is married to an agricultural engineer, al-Sayyid 'Izb, in the agricultural department in Takh, and lives in the town of Tukh in the Governorate of al-Qalyubiyah.

Childhood is the first source of one's credentials; it leaves its marks on a man's personality throughout his entire life. Husni Mubarak joined the Kafr al-Musaylihah elementary school, then the al-Masa'i /al-Mashkurah/ secondary school in Shabin al-Kawm. Since the family was living in Kafr al-Musaylihah, the secondary school was in Shabin al-Kawm, the distance between the village and the town was 1.5 kilometers, and the child was from a middle class family, the only solution was for him to go from the village to the town every day--a trip made once in the morning and once again in the afternoon every day for the sake of the quest of knowledge.

The Love of Flying in God's High Skies

In November 1947, the world was opening its eyes, the post-World War Two world was coming into being, and the young man Husni Mubarak joined the War College, saying goodbye to life in the village and the small town and to the trip from the village to the town and back again every day. He set out for the War College. Those who had lived with him when he was a child in the village say that he was a serious child, a youngster who absorbed all the subjects of our world with a certain degree of seriousness. It appears that the trip every day from Kafr al-Musaylihah and the return had engendered in him the power to endure, a feeling for the rough life, reverence for work, and self-reliance, all of which are characteristics that qualify the person who possesses them to turn toward military studies specifically. Husni Mubarak graduated in February 1949 with the rank of second lieutenant. His life's journey could have taken him at that point on a conventional path--second lieutenant, then an ordinary officer in the armed forces, advancing in rank and ordinary grades. However, it is certain that some side events in a person's life are influential and have an effect not just in forming the present but also in setting out the shape of tomorrow as well and determining the features of the distant future. What happened is that while Husni Mubarak was taking examinations to graduate in the War College, he applied for admission to the Air College and actually took physical and medical fitness tests, then was admitted to this faculty, from which he graduated in March 1950.

Military aviation has a history in Egypt. The history goes back to the formation of the first Egyptian squadron on 2 November 1932. That is Aviation Day in Egypt.

He graduated as a combat pilot from the Air Faculty.

How expansive That World Seems

Up to the moment of graduation from the Air College, the scope in which he moved about was limited. However, graduation delivered him to a wide, hospitable, expansive world. He discovered that it was a world without other limits as well. In the period in which he was functioning in the world as a pilot, a fighter in the Egyptian armed forces, his journey to discover the world took place on two bases, the first, study fellowships to study, understand and absorb, and the second, military excursions, primarily to carry out military missions. The former was in the direction of the Soviet Union and the latter was in the direction of Asia, then fraternal Arab countries. Since this type of excursion took place at an early stage of his life, it left clear marks on his consciousness later. Let us start with the trips on study fellowships, which were to the Soviet Union. On

the first fellowship he acquired training in Ilyushin-28 bombers and worked in a bomber squadron. Then he assumed the command of a bomber squadron. On the second and third tours he studied heavy bombers and engaged in higher studies in the Frunze Academy. He acquired a War Staff certificate, then after that traveled twice to the Soviet Union in 1972, once with President Anwar al-Sadat. He stayed for a while there after his return to complete the military side of the discussions. Once again he traveled on a mission to negotiate military matters and issues between the two countries. Of these trips, he says:

"I engaged in my studies there and was not involved in anything else except studies. I went from the training academy to my place of residence, and from the residence to the training academy--that was all. Most of my dealings were with the Egyptians in our embassy and I had no other contacts. That was the case when I was in Moscow, and it also was the case when I was in the Frunze Academy."

The other missions during the period of military activity were to Arab countries. He took part in the war in Yemen, went to Iraq, traveled to the Sudan and took part himself in the military activity that occurred to save the revolution in the Sudan.

After that he traveled to many countries in the world, once he had become a public personality whom everyone was closely watching. However, the basic advantage to these early excursions was that he saw the world himself, through his own circumstances, and that all these trips were for a goal which was close to the heart and agreeable to the spirit. The features of these excursions were simple. The things people do in the early years of their lives are not forgotten; their tastes and flavors remain forever in one's life, and the faces of the ordinary people that one meets in the simplicity of those days of remoteness from fame and public roles remain vivid in one's memory, living, moving, interacting, coming and going. In all the following years, forgetfulness fails to obliterate the features of these vital, pulsating memories, though it is true that he traveled to many countries in the world after that, met the leaders and rulers of the world of today, and dealt with them from close at hand.

Half a Lifetime with Comrades in Arms

Husni Mubarak spent 26 years of his life under arms. If we add another 6 months to those, that would make exactly half of his lifetime now. He has spent half a lifetime, with all its moments, seconds, minutes and days, as a fighter pilot far removed from the luxury and softness of civilian life in a wholly rough, decisive military atmosphere. In this atmosphere the pages of his military file also seem filled with missions. He was chosen to work as an instructor in the Air College, then assumed a position in the War College staff and became the assistant head of instructors there, and, following his return to Egypt from his first study mission, took over the command of the Cairo West base. He was selected to teach aviation in the Air College while he held the rank of captain, although instructions stipulate that an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel must do this job; he performed this job in view of his competence and his ability, the discrepancy in rank notwithstanding. In November 1967 he took over the position of director of the Air College and was appointed chief of staff of the air force on 23 June 1969. He continued to occupy this position until President al-Sadat's decree was issued on

23 April 1972 appointing him commander of the air force, and on 29 May 1972 a decree was issued appointing Maj Gen Husni Mubarak deputy minister of war in addition to his job as commander general of the air force. In February 1974 he was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and on 15 April 1975 he was appointed vice president and started a new chapter in the story of his life, in which he would play a completely new role on his country's political stage.

He had met President al-Sadat twice. The first occasion was in the distant past, before the revolution, in al-'Arish. The second meeting laid fertile ground for a real acquaintance between them. That was in the Island of Aba in the Sudan, during the problem the island faced. The meetings became numerous and repeated themselves often after that during the period of preparation for the October war. Husni Mubarak was one of a group of senior commanders who were close to President al-Sadat in those decisive days before, during and after the October War. The minutes of the meetings held to prepare for the October war bear witness to the role Husni Mubarak played in that war.

Of this period, his comrades in arms say:

Husni Mubarak was always the talk of his service and the talk of the people who knew him. They saw him living with his command every hour of the day and night. He did not sleep one night at home for a period of 3 months after the fighting ended. The men in his service were accustomed to "setting" their watch by the approach of his car to the entrance to his command. He would enter this door every day before the war in the morning at 0745 hours and he knew the names of all the men in the service. Indeed, he knew them personally. He memorized their children's names and ages. He is decisive and firm, but he also is an excellent friend who opens his heart to every pilot in his service and tries to solve their problems with them. He shone as a pilot after each war we entered. He flew for 6 whole hours and returned after the fighting to the airfield, waited until the plane was resupplied with bombs and fuel, then resumed flying. He was an excellent instructor in the Air College, then a brilliant commander in the college, playing squash during the lunch hour to keep up his physical fitness. He is always anxious to keep his information fresh, reads a lot and talks little. His interests in reading are many. He reads about all periods of Egyptian history.

From the June Defeat to the October Awakening

In 1967 Israel managed to give the Egyptian air force a blow which dealt it many heavy losses. However, what happened is that the June war turned into a point of departure for the construction of the modern Egyptian air force and when the 6 October 1973 war came,the Egyptian people's memory became a treasury full of heroes and rare stories of self-sacrifice. On the role the air played in this war, Husni Mubarak says,

"On 6 October 1973 we made the main air strike with a very large number of airplanes. That was at zero hour. In that concentrated strike we smashed the enemy's air strips, command centers, jamming centers and missile sites.

"We skirmished with the enemy in seven very violent battles in the first 6 days of the war. One of the battles lasted 50 minutes--normally air battles do not

take more than 10 or 15 minutes. Our air sorties to help the armies and strike at the enemy's reserves came to 2,500 in 7 days.

"The Egyptian pilots achieved records for takeoffs with fighters. They smashed the previous figures, when takeoffs would take place between 2.5 and 3 minutes."

Giving the other side of the picture, an Israeli armor officer described the results of the aerial bombing of his formation by Egyptian fighters to us, stating "Bombs rained down from every direction, and I heard our soldiers' voices crying 'they are Egyptian planes!' At that point I jumped out of my armored vehicle in a state of near dizziness and at the same time the first bombs from the Egyptian airplanes were falling here and there to the ground. I felt a severe inflammation in every part of my body and rushed headlong toward the /Canal/ bank. I saw four MiG aircraft swooping down over our heads and immediately observed bombs falling and missiles pouring down on the site. When I got to the bank I saw that it was a slaughter."

It is certain that the splendid performance the air force displayed in the war of liberation had the major influence in the advent of Husni Mubarak to the realm of political activity after that. He won the confidence of the president in the October struggle, and at the same time won the confidence and respect of all.

In September 1976 it was declared that Husni Mubarak was busy writing his memoirs on the role of Egyptian aviation in the October war. These memoirs dealt with the harsh continuous preparations to train pilots, the re-establishment of the system of airports after June 1967 and the operations that the aviation performed during the war of attrition. In these memoirs, he recites the details of the first air strike in October. These memoirs, which have not yet been published, come to 500 full pages.

Close Friends and Relatives Talk about Him

Let us leave the public role and try to get close to ordinary people. This time we will approach him through the ordinary people who have met him and who have had contact, closeness and encounters with him in periods of his life. The voices and memories of other people reconstruct the life of the man as it seems to the eyes of these others.

He is now head of a family. His children are 'Ala', a university student, and Jamal, a student in the secondary stage. The comrade of his life, Mme Suzanne, is from a family in al-Minya. She was born in the village of Matay in the Governorate of al-Minya in Upper Egypt. Her father is Dr Salih Thabit, a doctor, and she has one brother. She married after acquiring a general secondary certificate from the English School in Heliopolis. At the outset she devoted herself entirely to her family life, and bore 'Ala' and Jamal. After that she studied in the department of sociology at the American University and carried out many studies on the social situation in Egypt. She did a field study on family planning problems in the village of Matay in al-Minya Governorate. Her research for the university degree was on the environmental circumstances of children in Bulaq, an ordinary section of Cairo, and the social services that could be provided for them. She

received a degree with distinction for this research and is now doing higher studies at the American University in Cairo.

Let us start the journey with the voices of others concerning him.

'Abd-al-Majid 'Atiyah, an Arabic language teacher who taught the student Husni Mubarak at the al-Masa'i secondary school in Shabin al-Kawm, says, "He was distinct from his other colleagues in class in that he did his work quietly. It was his proclivity for sports that caused him subsequently to turn to military life." The Arabic language teacher says that Husni Mubarak's father, may God have mercy on him, asked him to persuade Husni, after he received the diploma from secondary school, to go to the teachers' college to become a teacher. The teacher tried, but Husni insisted on going to the War College, and all efforts to persuade him to go to teacher's college failed. His insistence on going to the War College was out of the ordinary, and his father respected his insistence.

Let us leave the teacher and approach his colleagues in studies and the camaradie of the studies. He engendered a certain amount of human warmth in his relationships. Muhammad Hathut, a colleague of Husni Mubaraks' in his studies who now works as the director of the office of the deputy minister of education in the Governorate of al-Minufiyah, says that the start of their friendship was when Muhammad Ja'far, the instructor of the Arabic language in the school at that time, died: "That teacher was from the village of Kafr al-Musaylihah, and in spite of his youth Husni stayed with me the whole day until we offered condolences to the teacher's family."

Muhammad Hathut says, "Husni Mubarak was known among his colleagues for his intense commitment, in addition to his great excellence in Arabic language and history. He was an athlete and played some sports like field hockey, squash and ping pong. He was captain of the hockey team in high school."

Among the happy memories of youth, it is related of the student Husni Mubarak that he formed a financial cooperative group with his colleagues. Everyone would pay 5 piasters a month and every contributor would receive it in turn. This was a type of cooperation to help poor colleagues buy what they needed.

Eng Hasan, Husni Mubarak's first cousin, says of him that he was devoted to his family and to the people of his village. He visits this village on many religious occasions, holidays and national days. He is said to have an enormous capacity for work. He can work 20 out of 24 hours. Athletics constitute an important part of his everyday attention and he cannot spend a day without engaging in sports.

Political Interests Came Early

Eng Sulayman Faraj Sulayman says "Husni Mubarak had an interest in politics very early. He was a member of the political committee in the school and had an intense interest in the events taking place in the country." He was with him in the al-Masa'i al-Mashkurah School in the period 1942-1947, and, although he was not more than 14, he was the safety valve in that committee.

He says that he did not feel any surprise when Husni Mubarak chose the War College. All preparations had led to that. A young person who is described as being extremely precise about appointments and very punctilious in his conduct is bound to enroll in the War College.

The mother of Hajj Muhammad 'Ali al-Sayyid 'Abdallah, vice principal of the secondary girls' school in Shabin al-Kawm, was Husni Mubarak's father's first cousin. Of him, he says "I was his colleague in the school days. His most important characteristic was his devotion to principles, his adherence to those principles, and his refusal to deviate from them." He says that one of his earliest characteristics was his refusal to be deferential, even to the people closest to him. He relates a specific incident about that: "I had a brother who acquired a bachelor's degree in social services and was a soldier in the army," he said. "He was in Suez. I went to Husni Mubarak and asked him to have him transferred to someplace pleasant in the country. However, he refused and told me, 'He must be treated just like every other draftee in the army.'"

Muhammad Musa Mubarak, his father's first cousin, relates a story about him, saying "He entered primary school at age 8. He stood out among the people in the town for his tranquility, silence, and diligence and firmness in dealing with things. When he came home from school he would greet the men. He was good at listening to older people in the family. He spoke only if asked to. He wore gowns like all the children in the village and often went to the 'Abd-al-'Aziz Mosque, where he performed all prayers on time."

Musa Mubarak says that the family offered two martyrs in the October war, Rabi' Muhammad Mubarak and Sa'id Ahmed Mubarak, who received the military badge of the republic.

The Children of Kafr al-Musaylihah and the Planes in the Air

It is a spectacle that is repeated often in Kafr al-Musaylihah, and one which has been occurring since Husni Mubarak graduated from the Air College and found work as a combat pilot. The children in that small village do not know the difference between fighter planes and civilian aircraft and do not know the distance between civilian and military aircraft, for they look with a rare degree of enthusiasm at every plane flying in the sky; airplanes sow dreams in people's spirits and draw a picture of a remote country where no one has traveled in people's minds.

Finally, one of the people of the village became a pilot, flying an airplane that drinks from the heart of the sky perfumed with the scent of eucalyptus and pierces the clouds that look like carded cotton. The children stand and, whenever an airplane passes by, the picture of Husni, the son of the village, leaps to mind; for this reason when they observe an airplane they point their little fingers to the sky and their little throats call out with the voices of pristine innocence; they say:

"Husni! Husni!"

They raise their voices and try to overcome the noise issuing from the plane. They try to have a link with the son of their village, who went forth from here one day, but it is certain that our children will grow up and that accurate knowledge of this world will take the place of childish amazement. They will know that the young man who was a pilot has now become Egypt's fourth president and the man responsible for leading the land, all that is in it and all the people on it.



/P78/ /Caption/ A snapshot of the village of Kafr al-Musaylihah from which Mr Husni Mubarak came.

السيد حسني مبارك والسيدة حرمه مع ولديهما في منتصف السبعينات

[p 80] [Caption]Mr Husni Mubarak and his wife with their two sons in the mid-seventies.

VARIOUS ATTRIBUTES OF MUBARAK'S PERSONALITY DESCRIBED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 16 Oct 81 p 96

/Article by Mamduh Mihran: "Simplicity and Decisiveness: Two Aspects of the New President's Personality"/

/Text/ Many of his political characteristics have come to prominence through his experience in the National Democratic Party, clearly showing that he possesses mature political thinking and that he is good at listening to everything around him. He conducts discussions quietly and with deliberation. He gives others every opportunity to state their opinions, spreading an atmosphere of familiarity, affection and brotherliness about himself. Everyone engaged in activity with him in the National Democratic Party has managed to learn all these aspects that have been latent in Husni Mubarak and to cooperate with him on their basis. However, the most prominent features of Husni Mubarak's responsibility in the party, as all party leaders who have been in contact with him unanimously agree, are simplicity and decisiveness.

Al-Sadat chose Husni Mubarak not just to be vice president--when he selected him he also put him in the position of his successor, and declared as much from the first moment.

Therefore, President al-Sadat transcended the powers that the constitution directly gives the vice president, which are to take his place when he is absent, and proceeded to train and prepare him for this day.

Therefore Husni Mubarak enters his new responsibility today not from a void but from the standpoint of long experience which has been acquired over 6 long years in which the late president had him take part in every decision he adopted and every step he took.

President al-Sadat did not content himself just with training his vice president in the field of foreign political activity or the field of domestic political activity--he chose him, rather, to be with him when he decided to establish the National Democratic Party and made him vice chairman of the party, although there was no reason stipulating that the vice president had to be party vice chairman.

Al-Sadat's objective in this step was to have his vice president become immersed in political activity with the masses through the National Democratic Party,

and he chose him as secretary general of the party and member of the political bureau.

In this period, Husni Mubarak himself took charge of daily activity in the party through his meetings with the secretariat general of the party, his almost daily meetings with the board committee of the secretariat general, and his meetings with the party secretaries in the governorates or the party's parliamentary committee which would often meet under his chairmanship to discuss various public issues and drafts of important laws.

The late President Anwar al-Sadat would hold a weekly meeting, the Thursday meeting, which would be attended by National Party leaders from various governorates, levels and institutions.

Husni Mubarak chaired most of these meetings when President al-Sadat was not able to attend them.

President al-Sadat gave him the opportunity to meet directly with the broad masses on various party levels, listen to them, talk to them and feel their pulse in order to grasp their aspirations and hopes and draw from them as a source for every decision and inspiration for every idea.

Husni Mubarak actually has made field trips to many governorates on the republic and has been in contact with all party leaders of various levels.

During the long voyage that Husni Mubarak has had with the National Democratic Party, these qualities which everyone who followed him from close at hand through his party work could sense without trouble or effort have come to prominence.

Daily Meetings

He opened his office in the party and was anxious to be there constantly, at the disposal of everyone who asked to meet with him--not just People's Assembly and Consultative Assembly members, members of the party's central command, ministers, or party leaders in the governorates, but also any citizen who wanted to meet the vice president with regard to any matter.

His frequent contact with the party leaders was his way of getting to know them all personally by name and the position, responsibility and role of each in addition. He often held them to account on the job. Wherever he met any of them he would ask him, "What have you done on such and such a matter" or "why have you fallen short in carrying out what so-and-so asked of you here regarding such-and-such?"

He did not forget his job directives that he would issue to various leaders. It happened more than once that he would issue directives at a meeting with some leaders and would understand that that was just talk, but the leader to whom the instruction was issued would be taken by surprise when he met him again and asked him "What happened with the subject I talked to you about when I met you at the meeting held on such-and-such an occasion?"

When he attended any of the meetings that were held under his supervision he would insist on shaking the hand of everyone in attendance, no matter how many there were, especially at the weekly meetings of the party, and on exchanging conversation with them one by one. Thus the leaders understood his nature and method and came to realize that no conversation he held with any leader was transitory--it was an instruction on something that had to be carried out or an observation on a matter that had to be corrected.

Simplicity Is a Basic Characteristic

Through his party activity, a basic characteristic of his, extreme simplicity, has become apparent. It would not be possible for you to realize that the person you were talking to was the vice president unless you knew that in advance, because barriers did not exist within him. If you knew him, and gave him the consideration he merited, the barriers within you would disappear as soon as you came in contact with him and you would find yourself speaking most easily and naturally, because his conduct would encourage you to do so.

Another characteristic that Husni Mubarak was known for through his contact with political leaders was decisiveness. His decisiveness and simplicity were two sides of the same coin.

He would never fail to do what was right, even with the people closest to him.

This characteristic of his became evident in the most recent nominations for membership in the current People's Assembly. There were persons whom important personalities supported against ordinary people who had nothing but the affection of the people in their districts, and he severely opposed that. We have /seen/ more than one example when he ignored the desire of a minister who was close to him in order to be fair to an ordinary citizen whom he did not know but who was in the right.

Alongside this characteristic was another one which stamped Husni Mubarak, and that is that he does not listen to anyone who talks against anyone else. When a specific official gets close to him to talk on any subject, he does not take decisions on any matter immediately--he demands that the other party involved in the matter attend first, and hears the two views at the same time before taking a decision on the matter.

He Does Not Interfere in Anyone's Areas of Competence

Another characteristic that has become prominent in Husni Mubarak's conduct is the fact that he does not interfere in anyone's areas of competence.

Some journalists, for example, have complained that he does not have them accompany him on his foreign trips, although they cover the news about him in their capacity as correspondents in the Office of the Presidency, backing themselves with the argument that every official himself chooses the press delegation that accompanies him from the people who work with him.

His comment on that was, "I do not want to have it said of me that I prefer anyone to anyone else, or that I am favoring anyone. You are all my sons; therefore I ask your papers to determine for me who the editor in chief considers responsible, and that will be between you and your papers."

At the same time, correspondents with the weekly papers made the complaint about him that he has just the daily papers accompany him, and not the weekly ones. To this, he has said, "You have a point. From now on I will have a representative of each press organization accompany me; would that satisfy you?" He actually did as he had promised.

In addition to the above, he is not happy to get involved in things where he has no business. When an issue would be presented to him for discussion at a meeting bearing on the activity of some minister or person concerned, he would refuse to comment and ask the person concerned to do the talking, saying "Everyone has his areas of competence and he must engage in those himself."

Some leaders often complain about some ministries, but will agree only to talk in the presence of the party concerned and therefore says "Let us delay this issue so we can discuss it in the presence of the person in charge of it." If the issue is an important one he will quickly set another appointment to discuss it in his office.

The Management of Meetings

During Husni Mubarak's work with the party, a very important characteristic of his became conspicuous, and that was his ability to manage the meetings whose chairmanship he assumed most democratically but with great discipline at the same time. He would give everyone who wanted to talk an opportunity to do so.

He repeated a phrase for which he was well known and one which the National Party deputies would bandy about: "Here we are going to sit down till the morning. We will not get out of here until you tell me 'Enough, we are exhausted.'" However, at the same time he would not allow discussions to wander far off the subject. Whenever someone who is talking drifts away from the subject of a discussion, he brings him back to it, telling him, "When we finish with this subject, then we can talk about another one."

During the sessions, he listens more than he talks. He possesses an exceptional ability to listen, does not interrupt speakers and does not obstruct /the free flow of/ opinions no matter what the circumstances.

He gives everyone the power to discuss their affairs. For example, if a matter related to some governorate comes up, he will ask the people of the governorate to sit down together first of all to discuss the matter among themselves. Then he will set a meeting for them so that they can inform him of what went on among themselves. He is very happy when they reach agreement among themselves but, if the situation requires a decision on his part, he will not hesitate, no matter what the circumstances, as long as it is the right decision.

In pursuing this practice, a strong quality of presence of mind and sagacity has become apparent. He is able to comprehend everything. More than once he would take a position, then would listen to the views of the person talking to him until the end, then would laugh and say "Is this issue really as you say or are you saying that because the issue is thus-and-such?" The person talking to him would be amazed that he was so "talkative," then would laugh and retreat from his position, after Husni Mubarak had told him, jokingly, "Get to the point."

He is well known for starting the day very early, at 0600 hours in the morning, and starting work at 0800 hours. He often sets appointments for official meetings or meetings with the people at that time. In fact, the Council of Ministers, which is accustomed generally not to start its sessions before 1000 hours, reverted on many occasions to holding the sessions he chaired before 0900 hours.

Although he begins his day at 0600 hours, his day continues until late at night.

These are the qualities that have become apparent through Husni Mubarak's recent experience. They have become apparent when he is at his ease with people, listening, talking, discussing and making decisions with an utter flexibility interspersed with decisiveness. No one who does not know that Husni Mubarak's personality has two sides, simplicity and decisiveness, can deal with him. He is as decisive as he is simple and does not accept shortcomings on the job or any unreasonable excuses for them.

His simplicity makes it easy to contact him and his decisiveness makes it easy for him to carry out his tasks. I believe that these are the characteristics of a successful statesman: to be simple with the masses and decisive with officials. That is his road to the hearts of his people, who have installed him as their president.

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MUBARAK'S DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL MISSIONS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2975, 16 Oct 81 pp 91, 95

/Article by Ahmad Abu Kaff: "Difficult, Delicate Missions on 30 Trips to 40 Countries"/

/Text/ In the 6 years since he was appointed vice president to the late Anwar al-Sadat, Husni Mubarak has truly been a man of difficult, delicate missions. He has made more than 30 trips to more than 40 countries in the world. On some of them he was a delegate of President al-Sadat's or carried letters for kings or presidents, and on most of them he conducted difficult negotiations that required persuasion through logic, sound argument and frankness.

Among his important trips was the one to the People's Republic of China, which had been passing through a serious turning point at that time after the Cultural Revolution and the death of its prime minister Zhou Enlai. He met with President Mao and his premier Hua Guofeng. It was a successful journey by every standard. He then visited China again after the changes in the Far East, the events in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The trip was more than successful.

Also in the Far East, Husni Mubarak made numerous trips to Arab countries, explaining, negotiating and tending to fine points. The same was true of his trips to the countries of Western Europe.

In addition to that, there were his historic trip to northwest Africa and his shuttle trips between Morocco and Algeria on the Sahara problem. While the problem was not radically resolved, Mubarak managed at the time to stop the fighting, which had threatened to erupt into a conflagration.

He spoke about his African trips.

Then about his trips to the United States of America.

These are some of the details and some light on a few of the vice president's trips:

Among Husni Mubarak's first trips was the one he made to Paris in June 1975 to meet with President D'Estaing and discuss the file on French-Egyptian relations as well as issues related to arms, so that France would resume dealing with Egypt. It was a successful trip by all standards.

With the Leader Mao Zedong

In April 1979 Mubarak made a grip to China. It took 8 days, and during it he visited Iran on his way out and back. It was a historic trip in which Mubarak was given a popular and official reception that had been unprecedented, in Beijing and Shanghai both.

Mabarak, through his organized thinking, managed to win the heart of the leader Mao to the point where, after he met him, in the presence of Hua Guofeng, who was the prime minister of China, Mao advised his premier to engage in sincere cooperation with Egypt.

China had emerged from the Cultural Revolution and the events in it.

Hua Guofeng was a strong personality, and the fruits of the trip emerged during the visit.

China actually did agree to provide Egypt with spare parts for MiG aircraft; after the Soviets had suspended shipments of spare parts, China manufactured the aircraft Hsin-7, which is equal to the MiG-17 and -19.

The fact is that Egypt's relations have been growing and becoming consolidated with each year since Husni Mubarak's visit to China, not just in the field of arms but also in the economic and cultural fields.

Husni Mubarak made another visit to China in 1979 in the course of a trip that included North Korea, the United States and West Germany. This trip stimulated bilateral relations between the two countries. It occurred after the changes that had occurred in Southeast Asia following the former Shah's departure from Iran and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It was a trip that realized its objectives.

Africa Is One

In July 1976 Husni Mubarak made an important trip as head of Egypt's delegation to the 13th African summit conference. The incidents in southern Africa were escalating, a plan was needed to cope with the bloody events, and it was necessary to review the methods being followed to deal with the racist minority regime in South Africa, which was cooperating with Israel.

Mubarak became the star of the conference when he called for an escalation of action against the racist regime allied with Israel. He demanded that surveillance over the companies that were engaged in supplying South Africa with oil be intensified and asserted to the Africans that the Arabs were fully prepared to join hands in any resolutions the African countries arrived at.

Husni Mubarak also made another trip in the African contaxt in June 1981, heading Egypt's delegation to the African summit conference that was held in Nairobi and achieved a great success.

The Longest Trip

The late President Anwar al-Sadat made a trip to West Germany, France and the United States of America.

In the wake of al-Sadat's trip, Husni Mubarak, in April 1977, made a long trip to 17 Arab, African and European countries; that was the longest trip Husni Mubarak had made. He had a delicate mission, which was to explain the goal of al-Sadat's trip in that period; in spite of the announcements made about it at the time, al-Sadat's trip was not clear in the minds of many people, and the notion of establishing a Palestinian nation needed explanation.

In addition, Egypt was being charged with abandoning the main cause and had started facing numerous fronts in Africa that could have diverted it from resolving the Palestine cause. There were also rumors, spread about by al-Qadhdhafi that Egypt would intervene militarily in Libya, there was a rumor in Jordan that the establishment of the Palestinian nation would be at Jordan's expense and that the east bank of the Jordan would be annexed to it, and there were many rumors on the Geneva conference.

On this trip, Husni Mubarak met with Hafiz al-Asad, King Hussayn, Prince Fahd, Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Saddam Husayn, the Shah of Iran, Shaykh 'Isa ibn Sulayman /sic/ Al Khalifah, Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan, Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad Al Thani, President Numayri, King Hasan the Second, King Khalid (in London), President Doumediene, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba, President D'Estaing, President Tito and President Ceausescu.

Husni Mubarak told these leaders, and convinced them, that al-Sadat's talks with President Carter constituted a great move forward on the road toward resolution of the issue and had made positive steps, most importantly the recognition of Palestinian rights and the Palestinian entity, a limit to blind support for Israel, and a response to the notion of secure borders.

Husni Mubarak held a conversation with the kings and president on the fact that Egypt was faced with a major issue, the issue of the Middle East, and that it did not intend to enter into side struggles, open new fronts or slip into the conflicts that were being devised for it, ignoring the main one.

He said, "It is al-Qadhdhafi who is the problem of the whole Arab world. No one trusts him or his word and his behavior is against the interests of the Arab world. A Palestinian state should be established on the west bank and Gaza and a passageway should link the two segments.

"The basis for resolving the Middle East issue is total Israeli withdrawal and establishment of a Palestinian state."

The fact is that Husni Mubarak managed to dispel the rumors. This was clear from the announcements the kings and presidents made at that time.

After meeting Mubarak Hafiz al-Asad said, "The Arabs have attained significant progress in America. For the first time the Arab view has become sought out in America and Arab opinions have been heard. That is something that had not happened previously."

King Husayn said that he agreed and that he supported having an independent Palestinian delegation attend the Geneva conference representing the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Prince Fahd said, "The discussions that are going on in the context of Arab solidarity to solve the Middle East problem indicate that what is going on is in the interests of the Arab nation, and Saudi Arabia is totally in agreement with Egypt's point of view."

In Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah said that he blessed al-Sadat's steps.

Even Saddam Husayn said "We here in Baghdad hope that God will grant President al-Sadat success in attaining a comprehensive resolution to the problem of Palestine. Egypt is the heart of the Arab nation."

The Shah of Iran said that he believed that the time was suitable for Egypt to move to resolve the Middle East problem and that he supported Egypt's steps in this context.

In Qatar, the emirates and Bahrain, statements were released that supported what Egypt was doing on behalf of the cause.

King Khalid, who was being treated in London, told Husni Mubarak "I support all of Egypt's steps."

King Hasan the Second declared that President al-Sadat was following a wise policy and said, "I am on your side in peace, just as I was on your side in war."

President Boumediene said, "We support you. You are on the firing line and the Egyptian political approach is the one that has achieved all the progress, in war and in peace."

In Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba said that Tunisia was on Egypt's side in all its steps.

In France, Mubarak's discussions with D'Estaing dealt with the world's problems, and there was complete agreement of views on the need to solve all the problems in the Middle East and Africa.

In Yugoslavia, President Tito stated that his country would use all the diplomatic contacts it could so that a Palestinian nation could be established and the Middle East problem solved.

In Rumanian, Ceausescu declared total support for the establishment of a Palestinian nation and a solution to the Middle East issue.

With the Rulers of Africa

This trip, in September 1977, was without a doubt a hard one and required unusual strength. A plane would barely land in a country than it would take off again in a few hours.

The trip took 35 flying hours in the course of 10 days, in which Husni Mubarak visited 10 countries and met 10 presidents--Julius Nyerere, Samora Machel, Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, Idi Amin, Ja'far Numayri, the late president of North Yemen Ibrahim al-Hamdi, Felix Malloum, Siad Barre, and the prime minister of Djibouti, Ahmad Dini (President Hassan Gouled was not in the country but in New York).

On this long, stimulating trip, the Middle East issue took a serious turn while the southern part of the continent--Rhodesia and South Africa--was in flames. Husni Mubarak skilfully blended the two issues and their premises with the African leaders Nyerere, Kaunda, and Jomo Kenyatta and managed to convince them that the United States held the cards to a solution of both issues, which imposed the responsibility on it of exerting more pressure on the Zionist regime in Israel and the racist regimes in southern Africa to arrive at a sound, just settlement in both regions. From this introduction, Husni Mubarak explicitly described the steps of Egyptian movement on the Middle East issue, and support and agreement was obtained from the leaders on the details, timing and importance of Egyptian movement.

In Zambia Husni Mubarak also made his great coup, visiting the border area between Zambia and Rhodesia. This visit had been placed on Husni Mubarak's program because it was known that the man was basically a soldier and had something to offer Zambia, which was in conflict with and sustaining raids from Rhodesia. Husni Mubarak was the first Egyptian official to go to this area and meet the Rhodesian national leader Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka. Husni Mubarak then went back to Lusaka and at a dinner party said that Africa was not for sale and that it must be for the Africans. The hall reverberated with applause and the following day the papers came out with a picture of Mubarak and the headline "Africa is not for sale" alongside it.

However, what happened in Moazmbique was delightful. In spite of the Soviet plots against Egypt at that time, Husni Mubarak visited Mozambique and met the head of the Frelimo Party (the Mozambique Liberation Front before independence), President Samora Machel, who is a marxist leader. Although it was an overnight visit, Husni Mubarak explained Egypt's actions to him and Samora Machel declared his agreement with Egypt's steps and actions for the sake of the cause, indeed said that he was happy with al-Sadat's wise policy and that the Geneva conference would have to have adequate preparation in order not to fail, and considered that the Geneva conference would of necessity be a good end for resolving the issue.

Machel said, "You are like us; the ultimate end of armed struggle is to compel the enemy to negotiate and realize national hopes at the end. We are in agreement with your policies."

As the views in Zambia favored Egypt's movements, so were views on the situation in the horn of Africa in agreement with the leader of Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta; it

was necessary that matters be settled between Somalia and Ethiopia on Ogaden and that their problems be resolved in sound ways.

The discussions in Djibouti also dealt with the situation in the horn of Africa. Husni Mubarak promised them that he would send Egyptian experts in a number of fields, and the discussions dealt with the same problems in Somalia.

In Uganda, the discussions dealt with an explanation of what had taken place in Husni Mubarak's visit to the other African countries and ways for consolidating relations between Egypt and Uganda.

The discussions with President Numayri in Khartoum and with President Felix Malloum in Ndjamena, the capital of Chad, were aimed at consultation on the latest developments in the situation in the region.

It is true that this African trip was the first high-level one of its kind to these African countries, and it had big repercussions among the African leaders, who considered the visit tantamount to a practical translation of Cairo's support for African positions. It also made it possible for the Africans to gain an understanding of Egypt's movements and to support and back them.

Continuous Success in America

Since November 1978, Husni Mubarak has been making continuous, repeated trips to the United States of America; these have totalled about six. He has come to have many friendships with the American administrations, personalities and Democratic and Republican members of the American Congress.

Among these trips was the visit which began in May 1980, in which he met President Jimmy Carter. Egypt had suspended the autonomy negotiations with Israel after it had become clear that Israel preferred land to peace and things had reached the point where an Israeli female member of parliament presented the draft of a law in the Knesset to incorporate the two parts of Jerusalem and turn them into a single city, and Israel continued to establish numerous settlements. Husni Mubarak went to the United States to inform President Carter of the developments in the autonomy negotiations and the Israeli party's obstinacy, placing obstacles in the road to the endorsement of autonomy.

What is important is that after Mubarak's visit to America, America exerted efforts to get Israel to stop these actions, since America was a full partner in the negotiations.

In addition, on the same visit, Mubarak discussed a number of military issues of great importance, international variables, Egypt's need for a modification in the schedule for the delivery of certain types of arms, training programs, and the development of Egyptian military industries. Husni Mubarak held intensified discussions with Harold Brown, the secretary of defense, and American military figures.

Husni Mubarak's last visit in the late President Anwar al-Sadat's era was the one that took place toward the end of September. It was an important visit under

current conditions and concentrated on three main issues:

The deteriorating situation in Chad, al-Qadhdhafi's belligerence in the region and the grave effects of this situation on the Sudan.

Acceleration of the autonomy negotiations, the need for progress and participation of a high-level American delegation in the negotiations.

Explanation of Egypt's viewpoint on the need for the AWACS transaction with Saudi Arabia to be approved.

In conclusion, these have been glimpses of Husni Mubarak's tours, which have earned him a large reserve of friendship with the leaders of the world and have spread the world out before him so that he could enter into its issues and learn about their secrets in this changing world. I was present at most of them and witnessed the world's leaders and peoples welcoming the hero of October, Husni Mubarak.

Some of Husni Mubarak's Trips to Countries in the World

In June 1975 he visited Paris and held discussions with President D'Estaing. He also visited the French air and space show.

In January 1976 he visited Algeria and Mauritania.

In February 1976 he visited Morocco and Algeria on a tour.

In April 1976 he took a trip to the People's Republic of China via Iran.

In July 1976 he represented Egypt at the African summit conference in Point Louis.

In September 1976 he made an Arab tour in which he visited Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the emirates, Jordan, Iraq and Iran.

In November 1976 he made a visit to the Sudan and Iran.

In January 1977 he visited the Republic of Yemen and Morocco.

In April 1977 he made an Arab visit which included Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, the Sultanate of Oman, the emirates, Qatar and Bahrain. This is the trip in which he visited 17 countries, including Algeria.

In June 1977 he traveled to Paris with three letters from President al-Sadat to the presidents of Gabon, Benin and Morocco.

In September 1977 he made an African tour in which he visited Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, Uganda, Somalia, Kenya, Djibouti, Chad, the Sudan, and North Yemen.

In October 1977 he made an Arab tour that took in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, the emirates, Iran and Jordan.

In December 1977 he visited France and Morocco.

In January 1978 he made an Arab tour that included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the emirates, Iran, South Yemen, North Yemen, Jordan and Iran.

In April 1978 he visited Central Africa, Chad and the Sudan.

In May 1978 he visited Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

In June 1978 he visited Iran.

In October 1978 he visited Iran as part of a trip that included a number of European capitals.

In November 1978 he visited the United States and Spain.

In December 1978 he visited the Sudan and the Sultanate of Oman.

In March 1979 he visited the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, West Germany, Austria, Rumania, France, Italy and Britain.

In June 1979 he visited the United States, France and Britain.

In December 1979 he visited Oman, Korea, China, the United States and West Germany.

In April 1980 he visited Nigeria.

In May 1980 he visited the United States, West Germany and Britain.

In August 1980 he visited West Germany, France, Britain, Rumania, Italy, Austria and the Vatican.

In October 1980 he visited the United States.

In November 1980 he visited the United States.

On 8 June 1981 he made a visit to France to observe the Le Bourget show.

On June 27 1981 he made a visit to Kenya to attend the African summit conference.

In September 1981 Husni Mubarak made his most recent visit to America, conducting negotiations with President Reagan.

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MUBARAK'S AIR FORCE CAREER REVIEWED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 16 Oct 81 pp 82-87, 98

/Article: "Mubarak: An Officer in the Egyptian Air Force"/

/Excerpt] This is the full story of Husni Mubarak, the fighter pilot, from the time he graduated from the Air College until he became a commander general of the Air Force, then assistant to the minister of defense. In its investigation into this story, AL-MUSAWWAR has relied on the secret file which Hamdi Lutfi, AL-MUSAWWAR's military correspondent, got a chance to read. AL-MUSAWWAR has also relied on a team working on his youth which went truthfully and honestly to investigate all the circumstances that involved this whole period, through his comrades in flying school and the people in his class who graduated with him in 1949 then stayed with him as comrades in arms until he became one of its commanders in the air.

On 16 April 1975 President Anwar al-Sadat announced his choice of Husni Mubarak as vice president. Husni Mubarak was a lieutenant general and was still the commander of the Egyptian air force.

In one of his numerous visits to the Egyptian forces, President al-Sadat, speaking of his selection of Lt Gen Muhammad Husni Mubarak, the commander of the Air Force, as vice president, told his fighting men:

"I chose him to be my vice president not because he is a pilot or air force commander, or one of the commanders of October; none of these considerations were absent from my mind, but I chose him above all these considerations because he represented the essence of the people in our country, the Egyptian fighting man, with his genuine qualities, abilities and expertise. All his life he has faced death, in fact, has smashed through death in order to protect life for us. In brief, I chose him because he represents the generation of October, which I would like to see advance toward positions of higher leadership in the ogvernment, so that this leadership may become representative and expressive of the spirit, environment and climate of 6 October, the day our armed forces transcended every impossible obstacle and wall in the name of the people and the motherland."

Husni Mubarak is a military personality who has become polished by experience in the field and the hard military incidents he has lived through. His use of the

forces he commanded, like his leadership measures, have been the result of a high level of application.

At the start of 1970, when the war of attrition was at its peak, the dogfights between us and Israel did not stop for a single day except briefly, in very short intervals; Israel applied a new method of carrying out ambushes on our airplanes, which may be summarized as follows:

The Israeli airplanes would appear in a rectangular formation at a very high altitude, heading for the west bank of the canal, on our radar screen. Orders would immediately be issued for four Egyptian airplanes to counterattack from one of our air bases and suddenly the Israeli planes, pursued by ours, would take flight. At that point eight Israeli planes would appear, flying at low altitude in concealed form, and swoop down on our planes in an unequal battle from which we rarely escaped!

This sort of ambush kept repeating itself, until Maj Gen Husni Mubarak, chief of our air staff, came to put a stop to the "game." As soon as the Israeli airplanes appeared on the radar screens in an Egyptian airbase where Mubarak and some commanders were present, Maj Gen Husni Mubarak would quickly give instructions for Egyptian planes to attack and counterattack the enemy planes, then would abruptly seize a piece of paper and write "abrogate the order quietly" on it, as if nothing had happened.

The base commander would carry out the order in astonishment, and everyone would stand observing the situation as the hidden Israeli planes came out of their ambush to chase the Egyptian planes that had not left their positions. Then everyone would realize the secret behind the deception to parry the enemy planes and Egyptian planes would rapidly swoop down on the Israeli craft, surprising them all, destroying them and bringing them down in distinctive successful combat. Thus did Israel's ambush fail and Egypt's succeed!

There were other plans that Maj Gen Muhammad Husni Mubarak carried out while he headed our air force staff from April 1969 to April 1972, when the late President Anwar al-Sadat assigned him the command of our air force in preparation for the glorious October war. These plans lay within the secret strategies for air attack and counterattack methods and assumed the guise of fertile terrain for tactical air training that took place from 1971-72 to October 1973 in the form of joint war projects with the other main services of our armed forces. The men were governed by the belief that victory would not be earned capriciously and that the sparrows, as Israel described us, could dispatch the "eagles," as their papers kept describing their fliers, until ours came to possess air sovereignty and control over Sinai, the west of the canal, and the hinterland of Egypt, whose protection had become their duty, alongside the duty of embarking on the glorious war--which,as aviation experts in America and Western Europe have described it, was in reality two air wars. The first war started at noon on 6 October and the second air war started on 17 October, in the period that has been termed "the gap," or the severance of communications.

Husni Mubarak led our air force for 17 days with a total piercing vision of the course of the fighting and developments in its forms, through the refined use of air mobility. He was also most concerned about the morale of his men in the air and ground service crews and was constantly among them, so much so that he would spend some time in the Aswan base and then in a few hours would appear at the Alexandria or the Delta base.

In the war, the engineers and technicians working with our air force shortened a week's work to 10 hours. One air brigade made 2,500 takeoffs against the Israeli forces in a week, followed by another air brigade whose pilots made 3,400 takeoffs in less than 2 weeks and a third with 5,000 takeoffs in 17 days, which was the duration of the October war in the air. The planes would also take off from their hangars within 130 or 150 seconds of receiving these orders. These seconds required setting up the airplane, opening the hangar gates, and moving it over to the first airstrip and then to the main airstrip until it was airborne.

This level of performance could only have been achieved as a result of an environment rich with the high-level Egyptian military bearing, that the conscious, mature command possessed with its tremendous doses of experience in high air-to-air and surface-to-air missile combat tactics, instrument flying and night flying, as he told me one day 7 years ago:

"The October war consisted not just of acts of heroism or the ferocious air battles that went on over Sinai or west of the canal--it consisted of preparation programs on all scales, planning in all its numerous, constantly revised forms, good training, coordination with the other main branches of our armed forces, then, ultimately, outfitting, execution and performance. All this effort could have turned into nothing if the pilots with their human capabilities were not above all the resources of the plane with its complicated electronic equipment and advanced technological resources. It is 'the pilot before the plane,' as the old commanders used to say."

The Beginning of the Relationship

The beginning of the relationship between the old bomber pilot Muhammad Husni Mubarak, son of Kafr al-Musaylihah, District of Shabin al-Kawm, who came into the world on 4 May 1928, and the late President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat occurred in the beginning of the fifties, when he went to work in al-'Arish airport after graduating from the Air College on 13 March 1950 and the late President Anwar al-Sadat, who had returned to the armed forces, was assigned to the first cavalry division in al-'Arish and proceeded to visit the town airport and draw its officers into conversation. One day in his small notebook he wrote "I met a flight officer, 2nd Lt Muhammad Husni Mubarak, an intelligent, active patriotic young man whose likes I would like to see everywhere I go."

President al-Sadat came upon this notebook in 1976 among his old papers and Husni Mubarak saw it, as did some of the late president's advisors to whom he said "My eyes alighted on no one but him to assume command of our air force in 1972 and lead it to victory and the noblest revenge for 1967."

In the forties, pilots studied in the War and Air Colleges for a year. Mubarak joined the War College in November 1947 then went to the Air College in 1949. His War College graduating class included the late Maj Gen Qasim Muhammad Hatim, former director of the Department of Arms and Ammunition, the late Air Lt Gen Mahmud Shakir 'Abd-al-Mun'im, Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah, Lt Gen 'Abd Rabb-al-Nabi Hafiz,

Vice Adm Muhammad 'Ali, commander of our navy, Maj Gen al-Sayyid Hamdi, commander of our air defense forces, Maj Gen Dr Faruq Qartam, one of our forces' missile engineering experts, Maj Gen Muhammad Yusri al-Shami, the Governor of Marsa Matruh, and some other military commanders. It also included five pilots in addition to him and the late Lt Gen Mahmud Shakir, former commander of our air force.

After the setback of 1967 and the reconstruction of our armed forces, great attention was shown toward the Air College and the possibility of graduating modern Egyptian pilots who could keep abreast of the sciences of the age and cope with the Israeli pilots, who had been described as legendary. The country's supreme command, in November 1967, assigned the Air College command to Col Husni Mubarak, and he continued to serve in it until June 1969. In this period he graduated new pilots who smashed the legend of the Israeli pilot in free fire fights, air counterattack and Egyptian fighter bomber attacks on the Israeli enemy's positions and theaters in the hinterland of Sinai. They were the nucleus of a generation of Egyptian pilots who etched the traces of the glorious October-Ramadan war on the face of history, then jointly flew French, British, American and Chinese planes with a skill and capability that went beyond the stage of our transition in the air from the technology of the barren eastern pipeline to the technology of integrated circuits and the science of modern air war, thus forging the greatest of beginnings for the strategy of multiple arms sources.

His Secret Reports

The secret reports in his personal military file, which bore the number 201 during his military service then the number 657 after he assumed the position of vice president, in describing the period between 1 July 1958 and the end of June 1958, report that "He performed his duty as the war staff of the Air College and squadron commander at the same time as thoroughly as possible. He has a total grasp of administrative activities and his capacity to supervise is great. He is excellently organized and is an excellent officer from all standpoints. I anticipate a brilliant future for him. Signed, Maj Gen Madkur Abu-al-'Izz, commander of the Egyptian Air College."

This secret report was approved by Maj Gen Jamal 'Afifi, chief of staff of the Egyptian Air Force.

Another report describes him during the period from 1 July 1962 to the end of June 1963, describes him as an excellent officer in his work and his moral behavior, and foresees a great future for him.

The lines of a third report on the period between 1 July 1965 and the end of June 1966, when Lt Gen Husni Mubarak commanded an air brigade and was acting commander of the West Cairo air base at the same time, state that he exerted exceptional efforts in the air and in administration together and was an excellent officer from all standpoints. The report was signed by Lt Gen 'Adil Hafiz, chief of air staff, and 1st Lt Gen Muhammad Sidqi Mahmud, commander of the air force.

The bomber pilot, who has flown close to 6,000 hours, married in 1958 and fathered 'Ala' on 26 November 1960 and Jamal on 28 December 1963.

After the October victory, Air Lt Gen Muhammad Husni Mubarak told President al-Sadat,

"Would you permit me to make a request for the air force?"

President al-Sadat said, "Please do so."

Mubarak immediately said, "We are anxious that you issue a decree pardoning 1st Lt Gen Sidqi Mahmud, the commander of the air force in 1967, and his colleagues in command who have been given prison sentences, in honor of all the men in the air force following the October victory."

The late president said, "Granted. It is a humane request for the people of October. I am in agreement."

What, however, do Husni Mubarak's colleagues say about him?

We met some comrades in arms who had worked with him as pilots and they spoke of their memories of Husni Mubarak. Air Maj Gen Husayn 'Abd-al-'Aziz Wasif, born in 1927, who received a bachelor's degree in military science from the Air College, talked about Husni Mubarak, stating,

"I was not acquainted with him in the Air College, because I was in one group and he was in another. However, our relationship grew strong through flying, in the first years of our service. We graduated from the college in February 1949 then joined the air force and learned to fly in a year and graduated in early 1950."

The retired air major general continued,

"He was a model of orderliness. He was distinguished by his ability to learn administrative matters, to the point where in his very earliest years he was chosen assistant to the college war staff. He rarely left the camp. Then, after that, he was assigned to fighter squadrons in Hilwan, then moved on to bombers.

"He worked with Spitfires, then IL-28's. After that, we were assigned to work as instructors in the Air College in Bilbays, where we stayed until 1959. In addition to training, he performed the function of college war staff. In the latest period, we stayed about 7 years and that was a rich period. We gave more than one intensive course a year and managed to graduate not just seven but 14 classes.

"I remember that his flying hours were much more numerous than those of the other instructors in the college although he undertook administrative burdens and loved discipline. I remember that he would constantly pass the students in review, as a kind of discipline. He was the first person up, early in the morning, before reveille, and he was most firm with the students. He imposed penalties on students who were late, negligent or lax. He loved his work, exerted efforts to the maximum and became a school of military discipline. Proof of that is that the squadron he commanded remained one of the most organized and the men in it had administrative awarness, because his spirit was reflected in his men.

"I stuck by Husni Mubarak constantly as a result of our working together. I met with him daily. On study fellowships abroad, it so happened that he was in the same place I was at the same time, and we often slept in the same room. There were two fellowships, one for bombers and the other for helicopters. He chose the former and I chose the latter. They were in the Soviet Union and were held at the same time. We came back from this fellowship. He gradually advanced until he became commander of a TU-16 bomber brigade, then the Air College decided that he was to travel on a war staff grant to the Frunze Academy. After that, his responsibilities started to proliferate, especially after we reached brigade command. He became a commander at the Cairo West base and I was commander of the al-Dukhaylah base. He was then given the command of the command of the Air College, became air force chief of war staff, then was given command of that before the late president chose him to be his vice president."

He tried to remember. For a while the memories stayed stuck in his head, and then he said, "I went with him on a trip to India. We were seeking the help of foreign instructors, including some Indians. It was decided that these instructors and their families should travel to India on a private plane. Because of Egyptian formality, they decided to invite two Egyptian pilots, and Husni and I were chosen. We traveled together. In addition to being a recreational trip, it was an information and working trip to learn about teaching and training methods in the Indian air force. We observed an air show that was being held at that time."

Of the human side of Husni Mubarak, it is said that he would not issue decisions quickly but continued to evaluate every new responsibility cast on his shoulders.

Air Maj Gen Khalid Hamdi Ahmad says of Husni Mubarak, "He was decisive and firm, but this did not make him rough or coarse. Rather, to the contrary, he was affectionate, tolerant and friendly to all his colleagues. We all know that he could not serve anyone at the expense of his work. We never knew, either, of his trying to get a relative transferred--to the contrary, he refused to act as intermediary on the job. Husni Mubarak does not know how to talk about himself at all. He is a man of few words. Therefore, when he talks, everyone listens to him. He is distinguished by a strong memory and does not forget any of his colleagues, no matter how many years may have gone by. One of his most important characteristics is extreme humility."

War Staff Air Maj Gen Badi' Wafa'i Muhammad, who was with him in the stages of military education and worked with him, says:

"As regards Husni Mubarak's decision to go to the War College, there were a number of reasons for that, among them the fact that that faculty, at that time, accepted only people who were enthusiastic patriots. The problem of grades had not yet appeared; the other colleges accepted adequate grades. As regards Husni Mubarak, enrolling in the War College was his natural entree to the Air College, since it continued to accept only people who had been exceptional in the War College. The class that enrolled in the faculty comprised 22 students, of whom just 17 graduated, some being killed in flight training activities.

"From the standpoint of life on the job, I worked with him when I was a commander of early warning units and radar and he was an Air College director. The flight

commanders' first task in that period was to prepare new staffs of pilots and upgrade the various flight units. By working with him, I can say that Husni Mubarak can lay out the various probabilities and cover them with the appropriate solutions. He is also distinguished by stability in performing air operations. All his decisions and acts are characterized by calm, balance, and high flexibility in dealing with others and facing situations. In spite of his rejection of favoritism, he never forgets his friends. He always stands by them.

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PAPER TAKES TOUR OF MUBARAK'S HOME VILLAGE, TALKS WITH INHABITANTS

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 315, 13 Oct 81 p 7

/Article by Muhammad Amin: "Kafr al-Musaylihah: The Village That Gave Birth to Husni Mubarak"/

/Text/ When the editor in chief, Mr Mamduh Rida, asked me to go at once to Kafr al-Musaylihah, I was gripped by feelings of happiness and anxiety both!

I was happy because I was going to visit the place where Mr Muhammad Husni Mubarak, the new president, had lived as a child, and anxious because I knew nothing about Kafr al-Musaylihah except its name!

All the say, I kept asking myself,"Where can Kafr al-Musaylihah be? How does one get to it? It is just a village that many people might not know, and we might not perhaps even be able to get there by car. Most of our bigger village roads are still rough, narrow and made of dirt. To get to one of those is not an easy matter, so what would the case be with a little village?"

I sat down at the Quwaysina rest house with my photographer colleague. The goal was not to sip a cup of tea so much as to seek information about the road leading to Kafr al-Musaylihah.

The worker in the rest house smiled and said, "It is not far. The village is right next to Shabin al-Kawm on a paved road."

Our car set out for Shabin al-Kawm, and we bore left for 3 kilometers, until we saw a small sign on which was written "Kafr al-Musaylihah" along the road.

Mubarak's Family

We caught sight of an old man who insisted that we come into his home and drink some tea.

Al-Hajj 'Abd-al-Hamid 'Imarah (73 years old) said that he worked as a senior recorder in the general court of Shabin al-Kawm and that Husni Mubarak's father also worked in the same court. Therefore a strong friendship grew between the Mubarak and 'Imarah families.

He went on, "The Mubarak family is well known in the town. The men of the family enjoy a good reputation and their material condition is comfortable. Sayyid Husni's father, may God have mercy on him, was a man of integrity, perceptive in his thinking and forthright. We would spend long evenings together on the south side of the village, discussing our personal affairs and our job.

"I remember that Sayyid Husni's father told me one day that he wanted his son Husni, his eldest son, to enroll in the Faculty of Education and be a teacher, but Husni wanted to go to the War College. He was afraid of the risks it entailed for him but, after thinking, he said, 'Let him have what he wants, we have just one life.' We immediately went to meet Ahmad Musa Dhikri, member of parliament for the Istinha district, who facilitated things for us." Al-Hajjah Fatimah Hasan 'Abd-al-Hadi (his wife) entered the conversation, saying "I spent most of my time with Sayyid Husni's mother, and she was very gracious. She is from a family that is known for its moral conduct, and we stayed together like sisters. Thus I knew Husni when he was small. He was quiet and excellent in his studies. I do not remember his repeating a course once."

Inside the village.

We were dazzled by its elegance and its streets. Most of the homes were of reinforced concrete built in the form of villas. The streets were broad, paved and straight, and there were light poles on both sides of them. There was sanitary water in the homes and trees warmly embracing them.

Muhammad Ahmad Mubarak, 33, head of the real estate registration department in Shabin al-Kawm, said, "The village has 9,000 people and there isn't a single illiterate person in it. Everyone here is educated--in fact the village is considered the first one in the republic which has not had a single illiterate since the fifties."

He added, "The late 'Abd-al-'Aziz Pasha Fahmi (a son of the village) encouraged education and even paid the college expenses of anyone from the village who went to university.

"Therefore we find that the village has produced many famous people, such as Ahmad Hishmat Pasha, former minister of public works, Eng Ahmad Sultan (former deputy prime minister and minister of electricity), Mustafa Bahjat 'Abd-al-Muta'al, current director of the University of al-Minufiyah, Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi, chairman of the Center of Extrasensory Perception /sic/ and Dr 'Ali Mutawi' (former dean of medicine at al-Azhar).

"The adjacent towns even call our village 'Kafr Paris!'"

He went on, "The village has three schools. One of them is a preparatory school and there are two primary schools. Sayyid Husni took his first courses in one of them, the Kafr al-Musaylihah Compulsory School, which has now become the 'Abd-al-'Aziz Fahmi Preparatory School.

"The compulsory school--or the preparatory as it is called now--has two stories. It lies right at the entry to the village, 100 meters from the house where

Mr Husni Mubarak lived as a boy and stayed 2 years before moving to the al-Masa'i al-Mashkurah Secondary School in Shabin al-Kawm."

The Schoolmate

Eng Salah 'Abdallah, official in the survey department in Shabin al-Kawm, 54 years of age and a schoolmate of Mr Husni Mubarak, the nominee for president, says "Sayyid Husni always kept games apart from serious pursuits and did not mix the two. He was an enthusiast at the game of hakshah, or field hockey as they call it nowadays.

"Every evening after finishing school we would play hakshah together on the village threshing-floor, the site of my house now, a few steps away from the house where Sayyid Husni grew up. After finishing the game, we would wander about the streets of the village, but Husni would head straight for the house of his maternal grandfather Shaykh Ahmad Ibrahim, where he lived, and would set his lessons to memory.

"I remember that he was not well disposed toward levity, but was serious in his behavior, in class and at sports. He always observed long silences and was always thinking and constantly looking up.

"When we asked him why he kept looking at the sky, he said,

"'Tomorrow you will learn why.'

"In the secondary stage we separated. He joined the al-Masa'i al-Mashkurah Secondary School in Shabin al-Kawm (now the military school) while I went to industrial school."

The Schoolteacher

'Abd-al-Majid 'Atiyah, 80, the Arabic language instructor in al-Masa'i al-Mashkurah Secondary, who taught Mr Husni Mubarak Arabic, talked about that period, saying "He was an excellent student from the educational and athletic standpoints. My son Husni was interested in his studies and did his homework. His place was neat and well-organized and his command of Arabic was good.

"Since Kafr al-Musaylihah had a large number of pupils in school, they competed in their studies. I can now say without flattery that my son Husni was the most skilful of the exceptional students, as he was skilful from the standpoint of sports.

"Sayyid Husni formed a hockey team in secondary school and he was captain of the team. He earned a good name for the school in sports and won many medals."

Recollections of Relatives

Shaykh Muhammad Musa Mubarak, 72, says that Mr al-Sayyid Mubarak, father of the nominee for president, had no brothers, and Sayyid Husni was his oldest son. Therefore he considered his son like a brother and dealt with him on that basis.

He never happened to use a stick or harsh language to discipline his sons. Rather, he dealt with them, Husni especially, with love and affection and had them take part with him in discussing all things.

"Sayyid Husni's situation was special. He was loved because of his excellence in school, and he was quiet by disposition, spending free time reading the Koran in the northern part of the 'Abd-al-'Aziz Pasha Fahmi Mosque, which was attached to the home where he grew up.

He Loves His Colleagues and Relatives

Al-Hajj 'Abd-al-Fattah Musa Mubarak (a lwayer in the court of cassation) remembers that when Sayyid Husni was tested at the War College, he had to jump up a certain distance; after he performed the test successfully he found the members of the committee whispering, at which point he asked them, "Do you want me to jump higher?" They asked, "Can you jump higher than specified?"

He said, "Yes," then made a high jump which drew the attention and amazement of the members of the committee.

He says, "Sayyid Husni's personality was a subject of regard from childhood. He loved his colleagues and relatives and the people of his village.

"He reached what he aspired to not through effort on anyone's part but through his own seriousness, individual effort and perseverance."

He Adheres Tenaciously to the Truth

Doctor of pharmacy Samih Sa'id Mubarak (45) added that he loved the truth and adhered to it tenaciously from his childhood, giving everyone his due and always standing alongside the weak and oppressed. In spite of his extreme calm, he was "violent" in facing oppression.

He also possessed amazing tenacity and strove for what he wanted through perseverance and seriousness. Throughout his youth he kept dreaming of flying, until he joined the college of his choice.

On the way back, 'Amm Isma'il Yusuf Nar, 80, drew us to the side and said, "Our village boasts of the fact that one of its sons is the patriotic fighting man 'Abd-al-'Aziz Pasha Fahmi.

"We are truly happy that Mr Husni Mubarak, the nominee for the presidency, is the son of our village. He has been a lofty example of genius, morality, honesty and calm."

Great through All That Is in It

Our companion, Ahmad Sami 'Imarah, who insisted on staying with us the whole time, said:

"Don't forget that our village, as it is great through its children, is also great through all that is in it--a health unit, a consumer society, a fish distribution center, five mosques and a club for young people--all these projects were established through our own efforts."

In 1975 it became a section of Shabin al-Kawm.

The village truly is great, through what is in it and the people who are in it, in the form of good peaceloving quiet people who have not witnessed any type of crime in the past 50 years.

Fellow Citizen:

For the sake of a dwelling for every citizen and a glass of milk for every child, and in order that insurance coverage may be extended to cover every citizen:

Tomorrow let us say "Yes" to Husni Mubarak as president.

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PHOTOGRAPH OF SUZANNE MUBARAK

Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic No 259, 11 Oct 81 p 67

[Text]

/Caption: Photograph of Suzanne Mubarak, in glasses; to her right, holding a child, is Mrs Sadat/

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AL-SADAT VIEWS ON POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, RELIGION

Cairo MAY in Arabic No 30, 21 Sep 81 p 3

/Article by Ibrahim Sa'dah: "The Event of the Hour: Al-Sadat: I Will Strike at Vengefulness But I Will Never Strike at Democracy"/

/Text/ The people have said Yes to the latest measures President Anwar al-Sadat passed. The people of Egypt have said No to the factional strife some people have wanted to kindle to create an internal explosion whose consequences or destructive results only God can know.

As a result of the popular referendum, the enthusiasm of the overwhelming majority of the people has stressed opposition to the dangers that threaten them and seek to prevent them from achieving their hopes and dreams.

The people who said Yes said so not just out of enthusiasm for the latest measures, but also in expectation of what the government would do in the coming stage. No one imagines that arresting hundreds and bringing them to trial is all that the state is arranging in order to do away with strife, prevent laxity and return discipline to the Egyptian streets, which have lost their balance and order. No one doubts that the government is intending soon to offer the people its conception of the features of the coming stage they are waiting for and expecting.

I asked President al-Sadat:

"The people have been greatly offended by what has happened most recently. This offense was expressed by the word Yes for the latest measures which have taken place, as a statement of the people's desire to be rid of all the phenomena they have rejected and condemned. The question now is, What next, after these measures?"

The president answered,

"Before we talk about the coming stage, we must talk first about the phenomena that led to the emergence of the attitudes of laxity we have noticed and are complaining about. They are unnatural phenomena, but at the same time they are interlinked. For example, erroneous party conduct--the opposition has turned into resistance, resistance to the regime. Numerous violations are being committed whose perpetrators are not being punished, as is happening in the places of learning and the bureaus of the government, and there is laxity in the streets.

"Some people, domestically and abroad, erred when they said that the regime was facing a shock that might cause it damage and that was why we proceeded with these measures. Foreign correspondents have said so, and some people here have repeated it. This is absolutely incorrect. The regime has not been shaken, nor is the government faced with a situation that could cause its downfall. All that has happened is that some people have imagined that they could challenge the reverence that the government commands. The Moslem Brothers, for instance, tried to use the Islamic groups for their secret organization which they used in the past. In the past, the Brothers engaged in battles against many weak governments before the 23 July revolution. Then they entered into a struggle with the revolution. In all these battles, the Brothers lost their cause. This is a natural situation--their way of thinking is unreasonable and unacceptable. They imagine that no one but them understands religion, which is wrong, and they fancy that no one but they can make religious interpretations, which is also wrong. They stress that they alone are the guardians of religion--a third error. More dangerous than all that is the fact that they have applauded what Khomeyni is doing in Iran. They have applauded a man who carried out his revolution just for the purpose of getting revenge, shedding blood, spreading about chaos and embracing violence. It is a man of this sort that the Brothers have supported and applauded, along with his regime. They are indeed ridiculous and unfortunate."

I asked the president,

"What can we take the Moslem Brothers to task for, and what exposes their real intentions, besides worshipping and trying to advance the cause of religion?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"They never learn from their previous mistakes. After the revolution of 1952, after the fraudulent conduct of the political parties, we told them, 'Clean yourselves up.' The Brothers started plotting. This was a plot that ended with their dissolution in December 1952, that is, just 6 months after the revolution. In January we set forth a period of 3 years, from 16 January 1953 to 16 January 1956, which was to be a transition period. In this time the legislative and executive power was in the hands of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Council of Ministers jointly. This was a natural situation--the revolution, like any revolution, had to secure itself and set forth the laws necessary to do so. It was the Revolutionary Command Council that exercised its rights and issued a decree dissolving the Society of the Moslem Brothers. For this reason, that group had no legitimacy. This is exactly what I told 'Umar al-Talmasani. I knew that the Brothers had brought a case before the council of State against the dissolution decree, on grounds that the decree was illegal! I believe that the Brothers are unaware of the fact that the revolution derives its legitimacy automatically, and the decree dissolving the Society of the Brothers was a sovereign decree on which there can be no discussion and to which there can be no opposition.

"In spite of that, I told al-Talmasani, 'There is nothing to prevent you from engaging in your religious activity and nothing to prevent you from issuing your magazine, on condition that you commit yourself to what I always say, which is, there is to be no religion in politics, and no politics in religion.'

"After that we were taken by surprise by the Islamic groups spreading about in the universities and places of learning. They concentrated their activity among the students in particular. They exploited religion in the worst way in order to push the young people into the abyss they fell into, by the deceptive means we have heard applied in the universities. We have heard about the deceptive practices of the Islamic groups,their prohibition of book fairs in the universities, prohibition of recreational parties, and prohibition of the showing of movies, because they considered that they were the ones in power, the guardians over others and over religion. They started to exercise guardianship over religion in order subsequently to become guardians over Egypt!"

I asked the president,

"Other phenomena besides those of the Islamic groups were involved in the recent measures. Would it be possible to identify some of those?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"There is the phenomenon of the people who have exploited their professions in order to distort the picture and good name of Egypt. There are the people who are engaged in the writing profession who are filled with vindictiveness and want to enjoy distinctive positions they had in the past then lost. I have previously spoken of a journalist who was the editor in chief of AL-AHRAM and, after being banished from AL-AHRAM, mobilized his pen to disfigure the face of Egypt and disfigure the face of the regime by what he wrote in foreign papers, receiving 1,000 pounds per article--just to curse out Egypt and try to distort its good name.

"We did not stand in his way. We let him travel and return as he liked. We have not denied anyone his right to travel. Egypt is a country that applies democracy and the sovereignty of the law. It is really sad that this man--who benefits from democracy, goes out, delivers curses, then comes back without being touched--is the same person who has written in the foreign press, crying about the lack of democracy in Egypt!

"There are many people like this man who have sold their country and sold their mother, Egypt, for some dinars or dollars they grabbed up, in exchange for which they have cursed out their country! In spite of that, no measures were taken against them until very lately. I previously gave them a grace period, starting 15 May, to come back to their country, during which nothing would touch them. Some people did return but others did not and their cases are now before the socialist public prosecutor."

I asked the president,

"What fault do you find with the old-time and contemporary politicians who have been affected by the latest measures?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"They represent the third strange phenomenon we have noticed recently. The most prominent of these people is the man who founded the New Wafd Party, which was against all logic and reason. No revolution takes place to eliminate the corruption of political parties only to have one of the people who corrupted political life come, say No to the revolution and try to move back the wheels of time.

"This man did not give thanks to his lord because we did not infringe upon his freedoms and let him work, earn millions, travel abroad as he liked then return without anyone standing in his way. Not only that--25 years after the revolution, we permitted him to establish a political party, imagining that he had learned his lesson and would not err as he had erred before. However, most frankly, the man tried to overthrow the regime and reverted to his old methods of maneuvering and plotting.

"Again we did not infringe upon his freedoms; rather, it is the people who stood up to him and stated their opinion on those politically corrupt persons; the party dissolved itself by itself. However, our friend did not cease drawing up plots, holding meetings, making contacts with /Pope/ Shanudah and scheming with him as part of his bigger plot, which was to overthrow the regime. These phenomena are numerous but their objective is one. In their totality they constitute the laxity that we are now trying to eliminate and get rid of.

"The people you are talking about all contributed to the same thing, which was to attack the regime. I said earlier that a national regime is part of a nation's sovereignty. The regime in Egypt is a national regime, not a threadbare party regime, not a corrupt royal regime, not a puppet regime brought in by a foreign occupier. This national regime is an inseparable part of national sovereignty, which is not to be attacked. However, the deviant minority ignored all this and attacked the regime."

I asked President al-Sadat,

"What these people are doing is not new. The act of attacking the regime has been going on for 3 years. Why have the measures been taken against them only now and not earlier?"

The president replied,

"Measures were not taken against them earlier because they constituted no threat to the regime. In numerous past years they slandered the regime, the government and the state everywhere, domestically and abroad, in foreign newspapers and in the local ones they issue, on the party platforms and in the religious pulpits, and it did not happen that the regime was jolted or felt afraid of them.

"The goal in the latest measures was not to protect the regime but rather to strike out at the laxity, which has become rampant as a direct result of this incessant slandering. Through this laxity, the people have moved out into the street, the mosque, the church, everywhere.

"The government is preoccupied and will always continue to be preoccupied with construction and the attainment of welfare. The government, along with the party, is working to realize this goal. Then the leaders of the opposition Labor Party come along and ridicule this, saying that the National Party is preoccupying itself with chickens and eggs!

"What is there to keep the party from being concerned with self-sufficiency in food? Isn't that better than being preoccupied with empty political speeches and shouting slogans?

"I believe that the political party's interest in providing food for the citizens is the height of national service; what more does the citizen want than an easy, normal life? What more can a successful political party offer the citizen than to provide prosperity for him?

"The advanced countries in Europe and America are concerned with the welfare of the citizen. The communist countries are concerned only with spreading about ideological theories in the minds of citizens and keeping their stomachs empty and unfed! Political parties in the advanced countries compete to offer electoral platforms that will provide prosperity for the citizen with the least possible burden.

"Our National Party is striving to provide welfare for the citizen. When this party strives to achieve self sufficiency in food for every citizen, these people go out, ridicule it, cast doubts on its accomplishments and slander its leaders!

"Can one be silent about this state of affairs?

"The issue, in my opinion, is no more than one of rancor in the hearts of people who have been blinded by hatred. What they say they do not do. The leaders of the Progress Party, which is headed by communists, are living the life of millionaires, but they feel no embarrassment in shedding crocodile tears over the sufferings of poor citizens. The head of the Grouping Party is rich through inheritance, which he does not deny, but nonetheless he imagines that there are people who believe him when he talks about suffering and the pains of the masses!"

I asked President al-Sadat:

"Let us go back to the question public opinion is raising now, which is, what next, after these procedures? What next, once the roots of discord are eliminated?"

The president replied,

"I had hoped that the latest measures would appear as an electric shock in order to put an end to the state of laxity we are complaining about. We don't have time to waste responding to the vindictive, to people seeking blood revenge and to people who have come out of the caves after decades and imagined that the world is as it used to be and that nothing in it has changed.

"We need every moment in order to work and produce, not jest and joke at the simple-minded. I want to move what we are now doing in al-Salihiyah over into

other areas of work and production. In al-Salihiyah we find serious young people living in tents and working night and day. I want every young person in Egypt to go to al-Salihiyah to see what is happening there. Roads are being built, light poles are being erected, the land is being farmed and produced in accordance with the most up to date achievements in the whole world. I demanded that we be able to reclaim and farm 50,000 feddans before the end of this year. Some people have said that that could never be done, and some others cast doubt on the operation itself. I eagerly declare today that Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid went to al-Salihiyah, along with Eng Husayn 'Uthman, the commissioner of the project, followed upon what has been done and is soon to be done, then came back to Cairo and told me that the area that will be farmed and producing by the end of this year totals 60,000 feddans, not 50,000, as we had been expecting and anticipating.

"What is happening in agriculture is happening in the economy as well. We have succeeded in lowering the inflation rate from 25 percent per annum in 1980 to 11 percent today. That rate does not exceed the rate of growth of the national product and it is less than the inflation rate prevalent in Europe and America. This was achieved thanks to the government's budget surplus, which came to 143 million pounds, as compared with the deficit last year, which totalled 1.25 billion pounds.

"That is the condition of our economy.

"We see nothing that threatens our security or stability.

"However, it is time for us to say No to laxity, and to tell the people who are lax, Stop where you are."

I asked President al-Sadat,

"How can we tell people who are lax to stop where they are?"

President al-Sadat replied,

"In the universities, for example, professors are supposed to work to graduate new generations of groups of people who are scientifically, educationally and academically qualified so that horizons of practical life may open up before these generations, through the science, expertise, patriotism and exploration they possess and can furnish them with. However, if these professors become converted into left-wing or Moslem Brother proselytizers, how can we let them stay in their places in the university?

"What can be said about university professors can also be said about journalists and writers. Journalists form public opinion through what they write every day in their papers. Readers are always influenced by what they read in the papers they buy. It is well known that 90 percent of the citizens' opinions are usually formed through their reading. Since this is the case, how can we permit the existence of two communist papers in the press? How can we let religious fanatics write the material they poison young people with in their papers and magazines?

"For this reason, we abrogated the fanatic religious papers and magazines on the Moslem and Christian sides both. I give thanks to God that the overwhelming

majority of our people said Yes to the latest measures. More than 11 million said Yes in the latest referendum. The results of the referendum give us a starting point in prosecuting laxity and striking out at it and eliminating it.

"We will eliminate laxity everywhere, in the streets, in the universities, in the schools, in the public sector and in the private sector. We will prosecute it in the home and the town and the village. We will prevent religion from being exploited to arrive at some objective to realize a personal goal. We will forcefully combat anyone who tries to implant destructive principles in the spirits of our young people or tries to fill their hearts with blind ignorant fanaticism. We will stand up to everyone who imagines that he can take us back again to the past with all its corruption and corrupt practices."

I asked President al-Sadat:

"Mr President, how can this process of standing up and preventing the repetition of other attempts to drown the country in the state of chaos and laxity that we are suffering from take place? Are the latest measures to achieve this goal sufficient?"

The president replied,

"A series of decrees will be necessary and it will be necessary to start applying them as of the start of October. These decrees will be issued by the Council of Ministers. This is now Thursday. The Council of Ministers will meet next Sunday, that is, before the release of the issue of MAY in which this interview will be published. Every minister will present the measures he considers must be carried out and adopted in his ministry. We are now a country of institutions, leaders, and staffs, and in Egyptian history constitutional organizations have never happened to work with the seriousness with which our current organizations are working.

"Perhaps people are wondering why I did not attend the last Council of Ministers session, in which the council adopted its decision to expel the Soviet Ambassador from Egypt. The reason I did not attend this session is that the whole subject was one of information. The minister of the interior presents his information and the director of General Intelligence presents his information in turn. All the information was presented to the Council of Ministers so that the council could then adopt its decree on the matter. That is what actually happened. The council met without me; I was in 'Abidin Palace at that time, meeting a number of new ambassadors. The minister of the interior presented his information and the director of General Intelligence presented his. The ministers then started commenting and recommending, and ultimately the council issued its decree to expel the ambassador and his diplomatic aides who were implicated along with him.

"What no one knows is that Vice President Husni Mubarak came to 'Abidin Palace after the Council of Ministers meeting ended.

"He told me that the ministers' views differed, as follows:

"The first group demanded that relations with the Soviet Union be severed at once.

"The second group demanded that the steps of cutting off relations proceed gradually and that with the step of expelling the ambassador.

"The third group demanded that relations not be cut off and that we content ourselves with expelling the ambassador and the diplomats who were implicated with him.

The council discussed all that, then agreed in the end to expel the ambassador and the people with him and not to sever relations. I learned all this afterward from Vice President Husni Mubarak. I did not know in advance what the Council of Ministers intended to do with respect to the serious information we came upon. This means that we have real organizations that play their part and commit themselves to their duty. This is what the Council of Ministers did and what it will do at the next session on Sunday when it issues its decrees aimed at standing up to and eliminating the phenomenon of laxity."

I asked President al-Sadat:

"What in your conception is the way to stand up to the phenomenon of laxity that citizens are suffering from?"

The president replied,

"Our institutions demand that laxity be stood up to. I have left it to every official to set out his conception of achieving this goal. The minister of education, for instance, knows more than other people about the conditions of laxity within his own ministry and is consequently able to stand up to it and eliminate them. The minister of the interior knows what is going on in the streets, and how to preserve security on them and keep them from succumbing to laxity. And so on.

"You ask me about my personal notion of how to stand up to laxity. I can tell you, about laxity in the university, for example, that we consider that the political parties, the parties prior to 23 July 1952, corrupted university life. Then the Socialist Union and the Student Organization came along, and these two also corrupted university life. Then the new parties also took part in the corrupting process; former members of the People's Assembly would go to the university to stir up the students. The vice chairman of the Labor Party would also go to the university to take part in the disruption process.

"A bearded member of the People's Assembly went to the university in the days Khomeyni was first making his appearance, they made a fuss over him there, and he imagined that he was the new Khomeyni that Egypt was waiting for! This man earned his living by reciting the Koran in Arab countries. We have no objection to people reciting the Koran for material gain--in Egypt there is a league of reciters to which the most famous chanters of the Koran in the Islamic world belong. However, for a chanter to turn into a political and religious leader, then to dream that he can rule Egypt the way Khomeyni rules Iran, is really ridiculous. That is what some people have done with life in the university.

"They have used rancor, exploited democracy, and worked to corrupt and stir up the students. I have declared that I will strike out at rancor but I never will

strike out at democracy. The fault does not lie with democracy; rather, the fault lies with the people who try to mobilize the climate of democracy to serve their selfish urges, their desires and their rancor.

"For this reason I did not prepare for martial law when I decided to stand up to laxity and direct an electric shock against the lax, the opportunistic, the fanatic and the destructive. I did not strike out at democracy. Rather, I relied on Articles 73 and 74 of the constitution.

"Let me return to my conception of what we can do in the university and give a number of examples of laxity:

"The Islamic groups have become widespread and have tried to engage in swindling. They tried to disrupt the book fair at Alexandria University and cleared it of books by giants of Egyptian literature such as Najob Mahfuz, Tawfiq al-Hakim and Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qeddus, leaving just the books they liked. They have prevented the showing of movies in the universities! In some faculties they have specified the places where female students can sit, far apart from male students! When the university administration comes and takes measures against one of them, he goes to the Council of State and says that he worships his lord and applies his version of Islam, and the judge is compelled to rule in his favor. I do not consider this worship or the application of Islam--it is a kind of swindle, no more, no less.

"Let us see what is happening in universities abroad, in the Western countries and in the Eastern ones. In the former, we find students studying at their own expense and spending no less than 1,000 pounds sterling a year. Students in Egypt study free of charge. If a student in a Western university does something wrong, the professor has the right to expel him and prevent him from studying, and to do so he does not have to have a decree from the director of the university, the university board or a judge.

"If we go to the Eastern countries, we will find that university education is restricted to the children of elite Communist Party members. If a student does something wrong he is dismissed in a second. Not only that, he disappears completely from sight and no one knows where he has gone!

"We in Egypt open the gates of university education to people obtaining a general secondary certificate with the grade specified by the coordinating office, and there is no difference there between the son of a watchman or the son of a minister. No condition demands that the student be a member of the ruling party. We are not asking him to pay 1,000 pounds in tuition. The government defrays these expenses and it builds university villages to house male and female students at token fees in exchange for room and board. In spite of that, demonstrations have been launched and students have destroyed the university villages and broken the windows in them!

"This must all disappear from our university life as of this year.

"In this regard, I would like to have the Council of Ministers present legislation to the People's Assembly giving the university alone the right to inflict penalties on students who do wrong. When that happens, we will not be persecuting the

student. That was what was applied in the past, until I gave the students many things they misunderstood and exploited. In my view, the verdict of punishment should be issued by a court composed of professors, and the student should be able to protest the verdict of the first court before a second one, composed of professors also in addition to a counsellor, and that will issue a final decree on the case.

"Total control will be imposed to maintain stability in the university villages and any student who does not commit himself to being peaceful and orderly will be expelled at once.

"Do students who keep hunting knives in their pockets deserve to be called university students? Students who try to shut down classes on the pretext of performing the noon or evening prayer will never be able to do so again as of today. If they want to perform the obligation of praying while there, they can leave the auditorium and go do it someplace else. But for them to try to shut down classes so that all the students will leave the auditorium to pray is not acceptable to religion. Almighty glorious God said "Are you compelling people to be devout?" The Islamic groups will be proscribed. Disruptive activity will be proscribed. Christian families and activities will be proscribed, without discussion. The word 'proscribed' here means that people who are arrested will be terminated from the university at once. Exploiting places of learning for purposes other than learning will be totally proscribed. This is as far as the universities and combatting laxity in them go.

"There are other sources of laxity I would like to talk about, such as people who call themselves the opposition. I have heard that the Labor Party is thinking of issuing a new newspaper in the place of the paper whose issuance has been proscribed. The Labor Party thought that it had come to constitute a terrifying force and that its paper was vexing the government and we were compelled to proscribe it. This is not true. It is not a strong party or a paper that causes us anxiety. We shut it down because it played a role in factional strife and contributed to the climate of laxity to the point where one of its writers, Fathi Radwan, came to resemble a journalist who spread doubts about judges and public prosecutors who had given wrongful verdicts!

"Therefore I will ask the Supreme Press Council at its next meeting to re-evaluate the party newspapers that have been issued--AL-AHALI, AL-SHA'B and AL-AHRAR. It is necessary to reread and evaluate what has been written in these party papers and present that to the people so that they can render their judgment on the experiment of these papers. The Supreme Press Council will then set forth its notion on the issuance of party papers in the light of the evaluation of the previous stage.

"Democratic practices must be re-evaluated. I imagine that the valuation process can be carried out by members of the People's and Consultative Assemblies, the board of counsellors, the boards of directors of all professional unions, and the chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture. The evaluation will take place, a paper will be prepared to be presented to the people so that they may state their opinion on the procedures for sound democratic practice in the light of the evaluation of the current practices that some people have exploited in order to strike

out at democracy, until we come up with a paper that spells the proper form of democratic practice out for us. No new parties will be established and no new party newspapers will be issued."

I asked the president,

"What about the people on both sides who have exploited religion in order to inflame factional dissension?"

The president replied,

"Mosques and churches are to present religion, religious morality, dimensions of religion and everything that God has commanded. However, mosques and churches are never to be used to spread about rancor or fanaticism. For example, we have heard about some people who demand that radio and television programs be abrogated, as Khomeyni has done. I might point out on this occasion that the Moslem Brothers issued a magazine titled AL-IKHWAN AL-MUSLIMIN in the period before the revolution. I might point out that the people who produced this magazine suffered from a problem. It became apparent to them that one of the most important reasons for the broad circulation of a magazine, any magazine, is the fact that it publishes radio programs. Programs of music and romantic songs are totally at variance with the ideas of the Moslem Brothers, and they failed to solve the problem. They went to their elder, Hasan al-Banna, to consult with him on how to solve it. Hasan al-Banna thought a long time and realized that the magazine would have no circulation unless it published the radio programs. His intelligence guided him to the need to twist the principles he was propounding, and he decided to give agreement to the publication of the radio programs provided that the holy verse which states: 'Hearing, seeing and the heart--he is responsible for all of them' be written at the top of the page in large type."

"The brothers thought that they were thereby committing themselves to their principles and ideas! Is there any ruse greater than those that are aimed against religion and attempt to exploit it and bend it to attain their objectives, even if the objective is only to promote their magazine by publishing the programs of the radio, music and romantic songs?

"Where is the truth? Where is frank talk?

"Are the brothers asking us to twist religion, too, as they did, and to start television programs with the same verse, then continue to give the programs as they are? No, we are not devious. We are not afraid and we do not laugh at ourselves.

"People who do not like episodes that are presented on television can avoid watching them. However, they never have the right to demand that presentation of them be prohibited and to try to deprive other people from watching them.

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LIBERAL PARTY SECRETARY GIVES REPORT ON YEAR'S ACTIVITIES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 163, 7 Sep 81 p 7

/Article by Muhammad Murad al-Sabastasi: "A Report on The Liberal Party's Activity on the Fourth Anniversary of Its Establishment"/

/Text/ Since its establishment, the Liberal Party has gone through various stages characterized by the designations that accompanied its genesis, and the genesis of its fellow parties, after the multi-party system had been absent for close to a century after the 23 July 1952 revolution.

Although the party adopted the name "platform of the right" on the day of its birth, and after that the "Organization," then "Party of the Socialist Liberals," it has suffered a great deal and been faced with innumerable difficulties, provoked, from outside its walls, through the ruling party and its aides and, from within its walls, through what has been said and printed about some people by others.

However, it remained perseverant and firm on the political stage, a proud giant, thanks to the backbone of its sincere self-sacrificing members, who are committed to its ideology, its beliefs, its program and its goals.

The Liberal Party has given all the parties that have come into being recently in Egypt beneficial lessons in constructive criticism and purposeful patriotic ideas. It has also given these parties, whether they have been dissolved, have broken up or have subsequently been established, the main features of the upright, wise policy a political party must pursue, working on behalf of the public interest without anticipating private or public compensation, criticising in order to build without deriving compensation from its self-sacrifice, guiding and being guided without breaking down doors or exploiting influence out of satisfaction or rancor.

The Course of the Parties

The Liberal Party has stayed with the man on the political street, growing and growing, being strengthened and strengthened, at a time in which parties that had thought they were giants disappeared. A dominant party arrogated power, status, and authority to itself but in spite of that was eliminated overnight and became a story of the past, while another party devoted itself assiduously to politics in spite of the old roots it had in the conscience of the Egyptian people and condemned itself to introversion and decline!

A party that arose as a result of a gift from the president and bore the banner of the opposition, in its belief and the belief of the people who established it that it was the legitimate alternative to the Liberal Party, nonetheless disappointed many people's beliefs and turned around completely. It burned the shield toward the ruler instead of the ruled and acted as an opposition to the opposition, criticizing for the sake of criticism and defamation before it could develop a purpose, indicating, making statements, and accepting from the ruler and the ruled what a political party with deep ideas, opinions and consultation would not receive.

Another party withdrew into its own shell, writing with its left hand what its right hand would not accept or approve, becoming divided within itself and trying to unite with others; however, the experiment which it strove for earnestly, to draw the Liberal Party into its lair, did not succeed; rather, the liberals were liberal in their views, liberal in their contributions, and liberal in staying away from that party.

Then the National Party rose up against its venerable founder and his unblemished patriotism, and broad leadership groups from former political organizations rallied around it, although they were not marked by popularity or mass appeal, for people believe that personalities that make complete changes are closer to ignoring their trust than adhering to its objectives and that political caprice does not benefit national issues so much as it benefits its followers and advances their personal relationships!

The Discipline of the National Party

The National Party, though it is the ruling one, is nonetheless in need of discipline within its ranks and unification in its thought, in order to bring the higher interests of the country to the destiny its founders and establishers aspire to. Although it thought of establishing an opposition from within once, that was not destined to succeed, emerge or be put in practice, for sound opposition arises and is nurtured in its thinking, ideology and opinions from outside, with the aim of arriving at the desired goal and showing the ruling party the need to avoid turning away from the straight upright path that the people are satisfied with and approve of.

This is a sketch of what went on, and has been going on, among men in the political street since the establishment of the platforms /in parliament/, proceeding through the parties, their continued existence and the emergence of a number of them.

As for the Liberal Party, much talk must be focused on that, on the occasion of the fourth anniversary of its establishment in July 1977; in dwelling on the fact that this anniversary has endured as a holiday for the freedom from which it has derived its name, in this regard I can mention, and you are the best people to be reminded, that:

The Liberal Party was founded and included within its ranks half a million liberal citizens throughout the 22 of 24 governorates that existed at that time, before the establishment of the two sections of North and South Sinai.

The party entered the 1976 People's Assembly election campaign, won one-eighth the valid votes of the voters and won in 23 districts of parliament.

The Egypt Party, that party of the police, assailed others with a politically vindictive gaze, raining pressure on the party and pressures upon its members, through promises at times and threats at others, finally influencing 18 members who broke away from /our/ ranks and decided to join the ranks of the ruling party, applying the principle of mutual benefit, out of concern on the part of some of them for their working future, and out of solicitude on the part of others, for the interests of their electoral and mass base.

While this unworthy policy on the part of the Egypt Party hastened its demise and burial in the mind of the man in the political street, the Liberal Party entered the 1979 campaign, along with the National Party, and acquired three seats, one of which was withdrawn under the influence of the techniques the obsolete party followed. Two members stayed on in the assembly, stirring up waves and banging against rocks, with sound hearts and genuine, aware spirits. On this occasion, it is proper that they be extolled with the most resounding declarations and that their names be held on high in the record book of honor and sincerity. These two prominent members are Mrs Ulfat Kamil and Mr Muhammad Mahmud Isma'il. Each of them complements the other in terms of ideas, opinions, votes and ennoblement of the name of the liberals under the rotunda of the People's Assembly.

The Liberals and the Consultative /Assembly/

The liberals did not stand immobile in their places, negative in their conduct or fearful for their destiny when on the horizon the notion emerged of establishing the family assembly, to bring together the ideas, values and traditions of the Egyptian family in an attempt to create a sense of balance between the two assemblies in terms of research, study and legislation.

Two opposition parties withdrew from the Consultative Assembly election campaign; the Liberal Party elected to stand fast and undertake to enter the campaign, although the reins would have slipped away on the day of the vote after the campaign had it not been for the balanced thinking, wisdom and farsightedness of the overwhelming majority of the liberal command under the chairmanship of the liberals' leader, Mustafa Kamil Murad.

While the result did not yield the desired expectations, it was a sign of the truth that Egyptian public opinion was favorable to the liberals. The liberal candidates who took part in 12 governorates received about 8 percent of the votes in the republic as a whole, although we stayed out of 14 governorates for reasons beyond the will and resources of the party. Had the campaign been held in all the governorates, the picture and the percentages would have been different.

It is no secret to all that, being appreciative and fair, the situation was totally unreal. Here it is worth pointing to the splendid efforts the perseverance, tumultuous patriotism and burning enthusiasm in the hearts and breasts of the party's

candidates in the governorates that took part in the campaign and the helmsman and commander of each of these governorates, namely Cairo, Alexandria, al-Qalyubiyah, al-Daqahliyah, al-Sharqiyah, Kafr al-Shaykh, Port Said, Suez, al-Buhayrah, al-Fayyum, Bani Suwayf and Sawhaj.

In spite of that, the liberals' voice has been heard under the cupola of this fledgling assembly which asserted its existence less than a year ago. While we will not enumerate the various facets of its activity, it is our duty to extol the forebearance of the liberals' opinion, their constructive active participation in every subject that has been raised or discussed in the Consultative Assembly, their profound studies, their penetrating directives, and their upright alertness; not one of its sessions has failed to see two or three of its five members venturing to talk, to the point where the members of the National Party and the independents ceased to be able to keep abreast of their opinions and ideas. It is indeed correct to state that the liberal members, with their few numbers, represent 50 percent of the power of the speakers taking part in the assembly. The voice of the party leader has risen high in representing the opposition: he has been a giant figure in objectivity, alert in his discourse and maneuver, and calm in his words and expressions.

Flexible politics are politics that do not become rigid or fanatical when such conduct is of no benefit and seize opportunities when they are not to be repeated, before time passes.

The party now has seven members under the cupola of the two assemblies and we hope that their number will multiply in the very near future and they will become the majority, representing the majority, at which time it will be able to realize its goals and assert its program through publication, distribution and execution, before it is condemned.

The Government Is Guided by the Party's Opinions

Since its establishment, the Liberal Party has repeatedly and consistently declared, in its conferences, at its symposia, in its sessions and on the pages of its paper, man of the materials in its program, its members' tendencies, and their criticisms of many of the government's projects in the fields of economics, finance, policy, budgets and stabilization, laws related to the daily and unusual life of the masses of the people and the problems the people are suffering from, such as housing, transportation, supply, wages and salaries, and so forth.

The government and the ruling parties have taken many of the party's views and ideas and embraced them although they have claimed authorship of some of them themselves. Among these constructive ideas, for example but not exclusively, are:

The laws on taxes and the amendments that they have involved.

Wages and salaries and their rate of increase; although they have not reached the level the party recommended, they have come close to what the Liberal Party indicated.

The creation of a money market to improve and support the position of the Egyptian pound.

Holding companies.

Housing and the attempt to solve housing problems through the importation of material and equipment, facilitate acquisition of suitable housing by classes with limited incomes, manpower training, the attempt to mechanize construction to overcome the problem of trained manpower, reduction in the system of deeding, and reduction in rents as far as possible; although the problem has not yet been solved in an appropriate manner, it is on the way, thanks to the liberals' criticisms and directives.

Prices and a review of prices in a manner in keeping with real costs, keeping these in line with the social prices the government imposes, subsidized by the allotted subsidy price.

Social, industrial and agricultural development through horizontal expansion to the extent of the capacity of the means of production, alongside vertical expansion, to the extent that that keeps abreast of quality and proficiency.

The failure to encroach on farmland and the attempt to direct industrial and developmental installations toward the desert.

Development of public and university education, while devoting attention to technical education in order to keep abreast of the requirements of society.

Cultivation of the practices of Islamic law in letter and spirit in many of the government's amended, proposed or issued laws, while creating a climate of fraternity and equality among the state's citizens of various creeds, in spite of the rancor that is being stirred up in various areas of the republic on the part of wayward, spiteful groups that are unaware of the destinies of the people and their brethren, their patriotism and the unity they have experienced for hundreds of years because their spirits are weak and they have been seduced by various means by vindictive people and rejectionist states.

In the foreign realm, we will never forget the points that the Liberal Party raised upon application of the Camp David treaties and the wise decision that the party took at the level of the secretariat general, its permanent council and its political bureau, to the effect that relations must not be normalized until Israel's serious intention to evacuate the beloved national soil and make autonomy clear to all is proved.

The party got what it wanted and what the Egyptian government and negotiators received, although some opposition parties abused them, took control of the situation away from them and declared their rejection of this treaty, which they had previously supported!

The Liberal Party does not stop at Egypt's borders. Its members prefer to take their message beyond our borders and take part and participate with liberal parties

in all places in the free world. The party has sought to join the international liberal movement, sending a delegation of its people who contributed their efforts and went to Austria, participating in the Austrian party's silver anniversary. The first cry that resounded among the liberals of the world was that of the Egyptian liberal party, a cry that was received with approval, appreciation and wonderment and ended with the acceptance of the Egyptian Liberal Party as a member of the international liberals movement, on an equal basis among the representatives of 19 countries of the world.

Suspension of the National Party's Application

This was at the same time that the National Party's application for membership in the international socialist movement was suspended in spite of the resources for proselytization and publicity, affluence and abundant manpower it possesses.

The Liberal Party has gone through various stages, of material revival at times and of pressure and pressures at other times; the situation today has brought it to a stage of near-stability, although that is not enough to carry out the party's commitments, support it, strengthen it and cope with its activities in the governorates, which represent the main structure of the body of the party and the pulsating expression of the masses of liberals throughout the republic.

On its fourth anniversary, the Liberal Party wishes every Egyptian citizen security, safekeeping, and welfare and hopes that its conscious leaders who are moving forward with enthusiasm and patriotism will be the safety valve in helping to solve all the basic issues that are of concern to the nation and the people. May God grant success to all. Long live a free Egypt.

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GOVERNMENT, OPPOSITION DEBATE LATEST SECURITY DECREES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 165, 21 Sep 81 p 5

/Article: "Legal Discussions of the Latest Republican Decrees"/

/Text/ Counsellor Mumtaz Nassar, an independent counsellor, and Eng Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, opposed the republican decrees on the laws while discussing them in the People's Assembly, under the chairmanship of Dr Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the assembly. The assembly gave its agreement to them after they were discussed.

These decrees are related to the laws amending the Law on the Protection of Values from Impropriety, the Law Eliminating the Conditions Arising from the Imposition of Sequestration, the University Organization Law and the Law on Political Parties.

The first of the opposition figures was Mumtaz Nassar (independent), who said "Article 67 of the bylaws stipulates that in the committee reports the names of the people opposed and the reasons for their opposition be mentioned. The reports should declare that the legislative committee to which these decrees were presented did not note my opposition. Therefore, they were in violation."

He then moved on to talk about the decrees on the laws, stating "With all the objectivity for which I have become known, I can tell you most truthfully that national unity is a sacred national duty and a national duty which is derived from the constitution, which in Articles Six and 60, stipulates that the defense of national unity is the duty of every citizen under the aegis of the skies of Egypt. Defense of national unity is something which we do not question, although we do dispute the proper way of protecting this national unity. The proper way is not to turn toward Article 74 of the constitution, on which reliance was placed in the issuance of these decrees of laws."

Sufi Abu Talib, chairman of the assembly, interrupted him to say "We are not intending to discuss Article 74 of the constitution." Mumtaz Nassar responded by saying, "The committee reports relied on this article." Sufi Abu Talib stated, "The republican decree issued permits protesting against the measures taken in accordance with Article 74."

Nassar continued his statement by saying, "Discussion of this subject requires reference to Article 74. If this article is properly observed, there will be no

need also to rely on Article 147, which makes it permissible to issue presidential decrees in the absence of the People's Assembly. The president has issued decrees on laws with reliance on Article 74, which does not give the right to issue decrees on laws, for the reason that Article 74 says 'measures' but does not say 'decrees on laws' as stipulated in Articles 108 and 147. I object to all these decrees on laws, because Article 74 does not make it permissible to issue legislation in this regard, especially since these decrees of laws have diminished the constitutional rights of citizens as stipulated in Chapter Three of the constitution, where Article 141 stipulates that personal freedom is a natural right, is inviolable and is not to be infringed. One cannot investigate a person, imprison him or prevent him from moving around. That is determined by the competent judge or the office of the public prosecutor. Therefore orders of arrest and seizure can be issued only by the investigating authority. Article 144 points out that houses are a sanctuary that may not be entered or inspected, and Article 145 states that freedom of the press or publication is guaranteed and that giving warning against it or suspending it is prohibited. As an exception, in time of war, it is permissible to impose censorship on specific subjects connected to public security or national security in accordance with the law, and this means regulating rights, not diminishing them. Protesting before the socialist prosecutor means that he represents the authorities vis-a-vis the complaint; how can one lodge a protest before the authority that is making the charge?"

Mumtaz Nassar said, "Resorting to an ordinary judge is a sacred right of every citizen."

Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, said,

"We all stand in a single rank before every danger threatening national unity and we are in agreement that this is a domestic and national obligation. However, in spite of that, one might differ on the means for attaining this objective. I can say that what appears in the amendment to the Law on the Protection of Values on protesting before the socialist prosecutor deprives the person making the protest of his ordinary judge and the natural procedures that are the greatest protection of the foundations of justice.

Dr Kamil Layla responded to the opposition by stating that the measures that were taken were political and sovereign in the first place and thus opened the way for people lodging grievances.

Counsellor Hilmi 'Abd-al-Akhir, minister of state for People's Assembly affairs, launched an attack against unjustified opposition. He pointed out that the opposition began its talk by shedding crocodile tears over national unity.

'Abd-al-Akhir said, "The socialist prosecutor is an ordinary judge. The civil judge is an ordinary judge, and the judge in the Court of Values is an ordinary judge. However, the argument in the discussion causes us to deny this court a juridical designation although it contains counsellors."

The opposition did not follow up on this attack, and contented itself with rejecting the decrees of the laws.

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LIBERAL PARTY LEADER DESCRIBES OPPOSITION TO RECENT DECREES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 166, 28 Sep 81 p 1, 2

/Article by Mustafa Kamil Murad: "The Opposition's View: The Liberals' Opposition in Broad Daylight!"/

/Text/ In the last article, we described how President Anwar al-Sadat had constantly thought of establishing political parties directly after the corrective revolution and how he may have postponed carrying the idea out for a few years until he was able to complete the enormous task cast on his shoulders when he assumed power--the problem of the power centers, whom he eliminated with the great corrective movement of 15 May 1971, then the problem of the Russian advisors, which he terminated in 1972, and last but not least the glorious October war that restored Egypt its dignity and fully opened the way, which had seemed blocked, to the peace talks, then the Camp David agreement to establish peace in the Middle East.

President al-Sadat presented a paper on developing the Socialist Union, which led to the appearance of political platforms, then political organizations, then, in November 1976, political parties, in Egyptian politics.

In the political phase following the establishment of the parties in 1976, President al-Sadat asked the parties to review party activity, commit themselves to the national line and stay away from abusiveness, the casting of doubts, and personal provocation. He asked the People's and Consultative Assemblies to give their views on the future of democracy, the opposition and political parties, in a manner where each assembly would form a special committee to discuss this serious political subject and present its report to the assembly.

The two special committees have begun their activity. This means that the president has the goal of starting a new party stage. On that subject, he has declared that he would like a large opposition party to be established alongside the majority party so that political balance between the majority and the minority would be realized. That is without a doubt a sound conception of what party life in Egypt must consist of, if political activity is to be guided with an objectivity and seriousness that will be reflected on the country and the citizens.

Since the political parties were established, experience has confirmed that the Liberal Party, with its practical and scientific program derived from the

conditions of our life, and through its sound exercise of democracy, has underlined the importance of objective opposition, remote from abuse or the settlement of old accounts, in order to continue the march forward.

The Liberal Party has continued along the road it has mapped out for itself. The accusations levelled against it have not filled it with self-loathing and it will never be prevented from continuing its mission by the obstacles that have been placed in its way, which have reached the point where its newspaper was suspended for a long period and its deputies in the People's Assembly were disenfranchised through the suggestion that their interests would be harmed if they remained in the Liberal Party but that they would be rewarded if they joined the government party!

The Liberal Party stayed on the political stage without resources. We have not yet even acquired the /old/ headquarters of the Socialist Union, more than one-third of which were supposed to have been for the Liberal Party, according to the Law on Parties. Nonetheless, the party has managed to preserve its balance and its objectivity. It has not retreated or dissolved itself. At the same time, it has not acted impulsively but it has managed to establish its presence on the Egyptian street.

Then came the elections to the Consultative Assembly, and it was decided that elections would take place on the basis of lists /winning an/ absolute majority. The Liberal Party was the first to protest against the system of election through absolute lists, and the party demanded on the pages of its newspaper that that be amended to the system of relative lists so that the opposition would be given a chance. We quietly and objectively stated the gravity of absolute lists and said that it was a unique system, pursued in Egypt alone, which resulted in depriving the opposition from taking part in parliamentary life.

In spite of our objection, we refused to boycott the Consultative Assembly elections, as the other opposition parties did, proceeding from the principle of rejecting negativism in political activity. In the Consultative Assembly elections, the Liberal Party obtained a quarter of a million votes in the 12 governorates where we did enter the elections. In spite of that, because the elections were held by the system of absolute lists, we did not obtain a single seat in the election. While five members of the Liberal Party were appointed to the Consultative Assembly--a position of the political leaders' which is to be thanked--we could have acquired five times that number at least had the elections taken place by relative lists, as we had demanded.

The Liberal Party managed to establish its presence in the Consultative Assembly through constructive objective discussions, by the testimony of the ruling party as set down in the minutes of the Consultative Assembly meetings; in the case of the two Liberal Party delegates, the minutes of the People's Assembly have testified to the objectivity of the discussions in which they took part.

The newspaper AL-AHRAR has managed to establish the importance of an objective opposition which does not rely on defamation and seeks refuge not in boasting and carping but in constructive, clear, frank opposition. It presents all opinions

on its pages; we even publish ones we differ with and oppose and we publish the aspects and causes of the dispute in order to affirm the principle of free discussion and of replying to opinions with opinions in the context of democracy and the sovereignty of the law. This is AL-AHRAR's policy: objective opposition in broad daylight.

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VACANCIES IN PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY POSTS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 166, 28 Sep 81 p 5

/Article: "Vacant Positions in the People's Assembly: New Nominations for Vice Chairman"/

/Text/ Several major People's Assembly positions have been vacated following the announcement of the latest cabinet change.

The position of the People's Assembly vice chairman for /professional/ groups and workers has been vacated with the appointment of Muhammad Rashwan to be minister of state for People's and Consultative Assembly affairs and 'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan to be minister of state for culture. The position of chairman of the assembly's youth committee, which Radwan chaired, has also become vacant.

The position of vice chairman of the legislative committee has been vacated; this had been assumed by Mukhtar Hani, who has been appointed minister of state for People's and Consultative Assembly Affairs.

The nominations for vice chairman of the People's Assembly for groups have started to be the subject of discussion. The main candidate for that has been Mansur Hasan, former minister of state for the presidency and minister of state for culture and the media, while Mukhtar 'Abd-al-Hamid /is the prime candidate/ for vice chairman of the assembly for workers and peasants. Competition has started for chairmanship of the youth committee in the assembly; Radwan's sole competitor is 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Ghul, the deputy for Qina in the last session. Radwan won the chairmanship of the committee by virtue of the bylaws covering instances when an assembly vice-chairman runs for chairman of the committee.

As a result of the latest change in two governorships, 'Abd-al-Halim Ibrahim Muhammad al-Sa'idi, who was appointed governor of Qina, resigned his membership in the People's Assembly, in accordance with the provisions of the law and the constitution, which stipulate that it is not permissible both to be a member of the People's Assembly and occupy the position of governor, while it is permissible to be both a member of the People's Assembly and a minister. Also resulting from the provision preventing such combinations was the resignation of Dr Ibrahim Lutfi, member of the People's Assembly, from his membership following the issuance of a decree appointing him Governor of al-Jizah. A new chairman is also to be appointed for the Nasir Social Bank, which Ibrahim Lutfi headed.

The vacancy of the seat of Tanta in the Governorate of al-Gharbiyah /professional/ groups will also be announced and new elections will be held there now that the district has been vacated with the appointment of 'Abd-al-Halim al-Sa'idi as vice governor of Qina. In addition, a new member will be appointed to the Consultative Assembly as a successor to Dr Ibrahim Lutfi, who has been appointed Governor of al-Jizah, since he was appointed in conjunction with one-third the members appointed in accordance with presidential decree.

Another new member will also be appointed to succeed Tal'at Yunan, who died last Thursday.

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BRIEFS

LEFTIST ENCOURAGES MOSLEM GROUPS--Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, chairman of the Grouping Party (left-wing) has encouraged Islamic groups to join his party. Khalid Muhyi-al-Din said at the party symposium last Monday that having Islamic groups join the Grouping Party would make coordination between the party and the groups possible with respect to a unified political program for coping with the /current/ difficult circumstances! /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 166, 28 Sep 81 p 1/

PRESIDENT'S GOSSIP WITH JOURNALISTS--After President al-Sadat made his statement at the Supreme Press Council last Wednesday, he stood for a few minutes before leaving the chamber with the journalists, most of whom he had known when he was active in the press in the late fifties. The president asked Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus, "Are you happy with what Muhammad has done?" (Muhammad, Ihsan's son, was among the persons charged in the factional strife case.) Ihsan 'Abd-al-Qaddus replied, "Mr President, our fathers were not happy with our political activity. My son Muhammad is responsible for what he does. He is 34 now and therefore I do not try to interfere with him." The president said, in a paternal spirit, "But Muhammad is violent and they managed to attract him." Ihsan replied, "But Mr President, that is the impetuosity of youth. What reassures me is that he does that on his own initiative, and there is no organization behind him pushing him." President al-Sadat smiled and turned to his colleague 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah, the managing editor of AL-JUMHURIYAH and chairman of the restriction and discipline council in the Journalists' Union, asking him "Are you happy, 'Abd-al-'Aziz, with what Lutfi al-Khuli wrote this week in the foreign press, cursing out Egypt and describing it in the vilest way? What are you going to do with him in the union?" 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah said "I didn't read what Lutfi al-Khuli wrote, Mr President." Salah Jalal, head of the Journalists' Union, confirmed what 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah said, stating, "Mr President, we actually haven't read what Lutfi al-Khuli wrote." The president, smiling, said, "'Abd-al-'Aziz, I know you are always defending them." 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abdallah said, "To the contrary, Mr President, if a person errs he must be given his punishment." /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 166, 28 Sep 81 p 1/

LABOR PARTY HOLDS FIRM--Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, cancelled his trip as a member of the party's delegation performing the pilgrimage obligation this year, in order to follow up on the defense of Labor Party members who have been detained. Ibrahim Shukri said at the Labor Party's symposium last Tuesday that the party would not dissolve itself as the government had hoped but

would continue and would issue an internal pamphlet for distribution among the members, now that it has been decided to prohibit the issuance of a new party paper. Ibrahim Shukri added that the party leaders would start a series of visits to the governorates today (Tuesday) to hold political conferences there. /Text/ /Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic No 166, 28 Sep 81 p 1/ 11887

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BRIDGES TO BE BUILT ACROSS THARTHAR-TIGRIS CANAL DESCRIBED

Moscow TRANSPORTNOYE STROITEL'STVO in Russian No 9, Sep 81 pp 56-57

[Article by Engineers L. F. Baranov and V. N. Vedeneyev: "The Construction of Bridges Across the Tharthar-Tigris Canal in Iraq"]

[Text] Construction of the Lake Tharthar-Tigris River Canal with the Soviet Union's technical assistance is of great national-economic significance for Iraq and will solve a number of important problems of further development of the country's economy.

Introduction of the Tharthar-Tigris Canal into operation will complete the creation of a large hydraulic-engineering complex, whose missions will be to protect Baghdad, the republic's capital, and vast tracts of agricultural land in the Tigris River floodplain from flooding and to reduce the salt content of Lake Tharthar waters so the lake can be used later as a flood-protection and irrigation reservoir of multiple-year capability.

The complex (figure 1) includes: the Tigris River-Lake Tharthar Canal 2, which was built in 1956 (it is actually the 2-3 kilometer wide floodplain of the old river, with a dike on one side), with a discharge rate of up to 11,000 cubic meters per second, which discharges Tigris River floodwater into Lake Tharthar and has at Samarra a headworks 1, which includes a retaining dam, a regulating lock and a GES [hydroelectric-power station]; the Lake Tharthar-Euphrates River Canal 4, which was erected in 1976 with the technical assistance of the Soviet Union and has a discharge rate of up to 1,100 cubic meters of water per second and a regulating head lock 3 that passes water from Lake Tharthar to the Euphrates River; and the Tharthar-Tigris Canal 6, now under construction, with a discharge rate of up to 600 cubic meters per second, which will join the Lake Tharthar-Euphrates River Canal with the Tigris River.

After construction of the indicated complex is completed, Tharthar will be one of the largest irrigation reservoirs in the world. Its full capacity will be 92 cubic kilometers, and annual useful output for irrigation will be as much as 42 cubic kilometers.

Later, the problem of providing for ship navigation between the Tigris and the Euphrates Rivers, with partial use of the Tharthar-Tigris Canal and the construction of a regulating canal 7 to the Euphrates River, is to be resolved.

Figure 1.

Key:

A. To Mosul.
B. Samarra.
C. Tigris River.
D. Lake Tharthar.
E. Euphrates River.
F. Romadi.
G. Lake Khabbaniva.
H. Felluya.
I. Baghdad.
J. Lake Abu-Dibbes.



The creation of this complex of structures, which will solve the problems of water supply and of the drive to prevent flooding, will enable work on the rebuilding of irrigation systems on interriverine irrigated lands, the installation of a land-reclamation network, and the enlistment of new, virgin lands into the agricultural turnover to be promoted at a rapid rate.

The Tharthar-Tigris Canal, with a total length of 65 kilometers, crosses from west to east, for most of its length, agricultural regions of the Mosopotamian lowland. The canal complex includes a water-separating unit 5, a connecting structure 8 with a drop of 8 meters, bridges 10, a motor-vehicle road for inspection purposes 9, three culvert siphons, a gas and pipeline crossing, an LEP [power transmission line], joining drains, branch drains and other structures.

The main earthmoving work is 62 million cubic meters in volume, concrete and reinforced concrete laying comes to 150,000 cubic meters, and construction costs are 68 million Iraqi dinars.

The engineering design for the canal complex and its structures was prepared by Soyuzgiprovodkhoz [All-Union State Survey and Design and Scientific-Research Institute for the Construction of Water-Resources Management Structures]. The canal is being built by the state organization Tartarproyekt, together with local and foreign companies that are doing various types of work.

The construction of one railroad and five motor-vehicle road bridges has started at places where the canal intersects with the Baghdad-Mosul Highway, the Baghdad-Mosul Railroad and local motor-vehicle roads. Motor-vehicle roads on the hydraulic-engineering structures are called for. The bridge designs were prepared by Tbilgiproavtodortrans [Tbilisi Survey and Design Institute for the Design of Facilities for Motor-Vehicle Transport].

In accordance with the requirements of the client--Iraq's Ministry of Irrigation--the highway bridges were designed to meet Iraqi norms, which correspond to British

standards, with a check conducted in accordance with Soviet standards. Forces greater than those calculated were adopted. Soviet norms were used for the railroad bridge, since they give greater values for load on the structure.

With a basic width of 60 meters at the bottom of the canal, a water depth of less than 10 meters (at maximum discharge), and slopes of 1:3, and also taking into account the possibility of ship navigation in the future, a unit scheme of 18 + 3x42.6 + 18 meters (figure 2) was adopted as a base for most of the bridges. Roadway width was set at 8 meters for local roads and 11.5 for arterial roads. For the latter, the construction of two separate bridges in each direction was called for. The railroad bridge was designed for three tracks on common supports, where double-track traffic now exists.



Figure 2.

Key:

ГВВ. High-water horizon.
ГМВ. Low-water horizon.

Metal section beams with road side up and the reinforced-concrete slab that was included in the work were adopted for the 42.6-meter intermediate span structures for the highway bridges. The 18-meter end structures were designed on the basis of six reinforced-concrete beams made at a casting yard. For the bridges, 18,600 cubic meters of concrete and reinforced concrete are being placed, and total weight of the metal structure will reach 2,400 tons.

The materials in the foundations of the bridges being built were represented mainly by sand-and-gravel and clayey soils. Ground water is found at a depth of 1-3 meters from the surface, it contains salt (up to 20 grams per liter), and it possesses sulfate aggressiveness in relation to the concrete.

Taking the hydrogeological conditions into consideration and also the desirability of building the bridges prior to excavation work on the canal, the bridge supports were erected on drilled-type cast-in-place piles 1 with diameters of 1.5 and 1.95 meters. The piles were laid at an average of 20 meters below the designed bottom of the canal. The canal-bed bridge supports were designed as posts 3 with diameter of 1.95 meters, joined by a prefabricated reinforced-concrete crossbar 4. Because of architectural and economic considerations, a variable water horizon and a lack of drift ice, a transition from piles to posts was adopted without the construction of a grillage, which requires high precision in the erection of the drilling columns.

In order to create a smooth surface for the visible portion of the drilling columns that is exposed after the canal's channel is excavated and also to give additional protection from the aggressive medium at the channel depth and somewhat below it, the columns are erected in steel casing pipes 2. The concrete of the pile is prepared from sulfate-resistant cement. The design of the shore support is based upon three cast-in-place piles 1.5 and 1.95 meters in diameter, which are joined by a grillage 5. The posts and crossbar are prefabricated.

The load-carrying capacity of the pile and the computed parameters are checked by static tests of one or two piles that are erected specially for the purpose in a row with one of the shore supports of each bridge.

Erection of the cast-in-place piles has been entrusted to a specialized Iraqi state organization.

In considering the favorable conditions for construction prior to excavation of the canal's bed and the small height of the supports, the spanning structures are to be assembled on the ground surface beside the bridge and installed on the supports later by two cranes of 50-ton lifting capacity each.

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VARIOUS ASPECTS OF DETERIORATION IN ECONOMY REVIEWED AT LENGTH

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 232, 12-19 Oct 81 pp 34, 35

/Article by Michel Murqus: "In the Period 1976-80, Treasury Revenue Deficit Was 5.5 Billion/

/Text/ The Lebanese general budget for next year, 1982, will come to 5,945,000,000 Lebanese pounds, an increase of 15.7 percent over the 1981 budget. Revenues are estimated at 3,024,000,000 pounds, or a drop of 4 percent from the revenues for 1981. The treasury deficit will have risen from 30 to 33 percent between 1981 and 1982; the budget for Section Two has dropped from 33 to 30 percent /of the total/, while expenditures on Section One, covering wages and administrative expenses, account for 70 percent. The deficit comes to 1,995,000,000 pounds.

Since 1975 the budget has been in a constant deficit. The public sector's domestic debts between 1976 and 1980 came to 5.5 million pounds as a result of the state's recourse to loans to cover the treasury deficit. How and where from?

The 2 years' war was a decisive turning point in the traditional development of the accounts of the public sector, which suffered and still suffer from political and civil instability. The disruption has had an effect on the growth of the budget and the increase in its deficit.

One result of the general expansion in the Lebanese economy in 1973 and 1974 was the increase in general treasury revenues, which rose by 29.3 percent between 1973 and 1974. However, the events of 1975 and 1976 cancelled out these revenues, which came to just 152 million Lebanese pounds. It was necessary to wait until 1977 for the revenues to return to their previous level and, in theory, transcend the revenues of 1974 by 13.3 percent. However, a restructuring of the elements of these revenues occurred, on the basis of the data and variables at the same time.

Direct taxes, which accounted for 16.7 percent of total revenues in 1974, accounted for just 10.6 percent of total revenues in 1977. This drop resulted in particular from taxes on built-up property and consequently the prevailing diruption in the building sector. In the case of the drop in taxes on incomes and profits, that resulted from the contraction in income taxes which for the most part were converted to wages.

It became difficult to collect taxes on profits in view of circumstances, and indirect budget revenues dropped from 56.9 percent in 1974 to 41.3 percent in 1977.

Customs duties accounted for 81 percent of total taxes in 1977, as compared with 66 percent in 1974. One should bear in mind that the value of these duties between these two years remained stable. The decline in other taxes, such as those on gasoline, tobacco and liquor, may be ascribed to the proliferation of parallel markets for these goods.

The increase in general overall revenues arises from the various revenues that for the most part consist of the treasury's special account receipts in the Central Bank (a debtor account since 1976) and the government's share of the bank's profits which have been accumulating constantly since 1976 as a result of the increase in interest rates on Eurodollars, especially with the drop in the value of the Lebanese pound relative to foreign currency.

As regards the 1978, 1979 and 1980 budgets, an increase in general revenues had been anticipated as a result of the increase in customs duties and various revenues; however, the drop in customs revenues' share of total budget revenues from 36.7 percent in 1974 to 28.1 percent in 1981 caused these revenues to decline by about 300 million Lebanese pounds, because of the profusion of illegal ports.

A Drop in Activity

The drop in public sector activity in 1975 and its paralysis in 1976 caused a revenue and expenditure deficit. The discrepancy between the rates of decline of revenues and expenditures placed clear boundaries of pressures on public spending, which since 1977 exceeded the 1974 rate by 64.7 percent, while revenues did not rise by more than 13.3 percent. The share of expenditures of Section One on the budget was 64.0 percent in 1974, 70.0 percent in 1977 and 68.2 percent in the 1980 budget.

The value of the wages and expenditures, which represented 66.9 percent of current expenditures in 1974, dropped to 48.5 percent in 1977 and 45.2 percent 1980. This development leads one to believe that other current expenses, including transfers and debt service, are constantly increasing. However, the subsidies the government pays to hold the price of such necessary commodities as sugar and wheat have been entered in the general budget accounts since 1977. The special accounts for fuel, which were in surplus up to the end of 1976, covered the resulting deficit /in fuel prices/in the period 1977-1979, but the fuel price deficit which came to 650 million dinars in 1980, is expected to reach 1.8 billion pounds this year and will be paid out of budget expenditures. The public sector debt service referred to in the budget deals only with the debts that the government has incurred.

Investment expenditures in Sections Two and Three rose from 439 million in 1974 to 601.2 million pounds in 1977 and 1,229,100,000 in 1980. Here we might point out that the loans the Development and Reconstruction Council has contracted for are going to finance certain projects.

In another area, it should be noted that the ministries' budget share has remained as it was, with the exception of the Ministry of Economy and Trade, whose budget after 1977 ecomprised the budget of the Grain and Sugar Beet Bureau.

The moderate growth in revenues and the rapid expansion in expenditures show a successive, growing deficit in budget allocations, which ranged from a surplus of 51 million pounds in 1974, to a deficit of 222.7 million in 1975, 567.8 million in 1977 and 1,366.500,000 million in the 1980 budget. There is expected to be a deficit of 1,496,000,000 in the 1981 budget and of 995 million in the 1982 budget.

What is significant is that the budget revenues in 1979, 1980 and 1981 did not cover the expenditures of Section One of the general budget for these years.

Among the elements of the deficit are a lack of equilibrium between revenues and expenditures and inflation, which has been accompanied by an increase in wages and prices matched by an increase in revenues in general. In 1974, with the start of the inflation, expenditures increased 29.3 percent and imports 19.5 percent. However, they increased by about 64.7 percent in 1977 over their 1974 level, although revenues did not realize a more than 13.3 percent increase.

Government Debts

In the face of this enduring deficit, the government has regularly sought recourse to domestic loans to cover its expenses, through the Ministry of Finance issuance of treasury bonds, since 1977. The value of these bonds rose from 469 million pounds at the end of 1977 to 1,969,000,000 at the end of 1980. The interest on these issues, which are spent to cover Section One of the budget, are increasing every year and the interest is being added to the government's expenditures. This interest has assumed a significant volume, now that interest has risen throughout the world and in Lebanese banks, inducing the Ministry of Finance to raise the interest on issues from 3 percent at the end of April 1979 to 10.25 percent in 1980 and 11.5 percent in 1981--raising the amount of interest on the bonds it issued from 6.65 million pounds in 1977 to 31.95 million in 1978, 53.73 million in 1979, and 138.82 million in 1980.

The government's debts do not stop at the treasury issues--they go beyond that, to the government's recourse to the Bank of Lebanon since the events of 1975 and 1976. Prior to that date the public sector's indebtedness to the bank was limited, because it was subject to Article 115 of the Money and Lending Law. As a consequence of this article, the treasury had a credit account until the end of 1975, then, after 1976, fell into debt to the sum of 765 million pounds. The debt rose to 1,979, 000,000 in 1979 and 2,439,000,000 in 1980 in the wake of the decline in the value of the Lebanese pound.

By virtue of certain amendments to the Money and Lending Law which involved Article 116, the treasury was allowed to disburse 80 percent of this surplus, and disbursements came to 840 million in 1978, 407 million in 1979 and 588 million in 1980. The treasury's recourse to reserves were to cover its debts with the Bank of Lebanon. These debts might reach 2.5 billion pounds, with interest, as a result of Legislative Edict 123 of 30 June 1977. In 1976 the treasury disbursed 981 million pounds, in 1979, 1,487,000,000, and, in 1980, 952 million.

Public sector deposits have not changed much since 1977. Deposits in Lebanese pounds are fed by treasury bonds and Bank of Lebanon offerings. Foreign currency deposits consist of reserves set aside for foreign payments or foreign aid and debts, and their volume is related to the volume of foreign payments.

The public sector, whose credit with the Bank of Lebanon before 1975 came to 734 million pounds, became indebted to the sum of 101 million pounds in 1976, 401 million pounds in 1979 and 513 million in 1980. Interest on these debts came to 40 million in 1978, 55.42 million in 1979, and 67.5 million in 1980.

Public sector debts as a whole came to 5.5 billion Lebanese pounds in the period 1976-1980 and were aimed at covering the treasury deficit. These debts covered 30 percent of budget expenditures in 1977, 38 percent of the 1978 budget, 42 percent of the 1979 budget, and 52 percent of the 1980 budget.

The government's foreign debts came to 1,513,405,700 Lebanese pounds, or 57 percent of the total of these debts. The sum of 653,942,100 Lebanese pounds had not been disbursed by the end of 1980. The interest on these loans came to 23.5 million pounds in 1978, 30.70 million in 1979 and 75.7 million in 1980. To that one should add the rise in the price of foreign currency, since the disbursement of these loans in Lebanese pounds in past years and payment of them after a number of years will cause the treasury to incur a loss as a result of the discrepancy in exchange rates.

11887
CSO: 4404/72

SOVIET STRATEGY THROUGH CREATION OF TRIPARTITE ALLIANCE DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-WAHDAH in Arabic No 14, 15 Oct 81 p 6, 7

/Article: "Political Reports: What Is the Tripartite Alliance's Plan for the Coming Stage?"/

/Text/ The establishment of the tripartite alliance among Libya, South Yemen and Addis Ababa is nothing but a Soviet scheme in a new attempt to pounce upon the area. Past events have stressed that the marxist regime in South Yemen is proceeding to execute what the Soviet Union assigns it. All political interpretations, following the establishment of this alliance, indicate that the three countries are preparing to carry out some activity in the region.

The hostile fruits of the tripartite alliance will appear in the next few months, following completion of the plan the Soviet Union has prepared for it, which the agents in the three regimes will carry out: to put the region in the cauldron of international struggle.

AL-WAHDAH's exclusive information has revealed that agreement was reached at the Aden summit meeting last August on sending a human force from Ethiopia to South Yemen, in addition to Cuban forces and the massive presence of advisors from the Soviet Union, East Germany and the other countries of the Communist regime in Aden. Libya will also send forces to Aden and Ethiopia which will stay there for the training and preparations that are expected in order to perform certain military operations against certain countries in the region.

'Ali 'Antar, the first deputy prime minister in Aden, made a visit to Libya last month and a second one on the first of October. These visits are part of what is called an exchange of information and expertise among the countries of the tripartite alliance, and therefore these visits, and others the three regimes exchange, are part of the treaty's continued injection of a sort of stimulus, and assertion of that continued stimulus, to the end of carrying out the assignment the three countries are given, to carry out the Soviet schemes in the region.

There are questions that many political commentators inside and outside the Arab world are raising: What do the countries of the tripartite alliance want, and why has the military alliance been concluded among them? Libya, one of the members of the alliance, is totally remote from the region.

We say:

The tripartite alliance was established in accordance with Soviet orders and schemes. The Soviet Union is trying to collect or assemble any group of countries /it can/ so that it can have a presence in the sensitive region, and, through these countries, carry out its aggressive designs.

What do these countries want?

We say:

1. To hasten to attack the northern segment of Yemen through what is called the National Democratic Front so that the state of conflict between the nationalist regime in the northern segment and the elements in this front, which receives support and backing from the three regimes that are participating in the alliance, will continue, with the blessing and support of the Soviet Union.

2. Following this stage, that of completing the scheme of surrounding the regime in the northern segment from within and turning it into a marxist regime, they will be in charge of lighting the fire in the north and south of Yemen so that the region will be plunged into something resembling the Vietnam war and so that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact will be able to have a direct presence in the area which will be greater than any previous presence they had.

South Yemen claims that it is acting to unify the two segments of Yemen and that it is trying to realize Yemeni unity, but it is acting deviously and twisting the notion of unity. It wants to gain further time to carry out the schemes against the northern segment of the nation.

On this notion, it was stated, in Chapter One of the program of the Yemeni Socialist Party presented to the party's first conference in October 1978, titled "The Yemeni National Cause":

"The attainment of Yemeni unity is to be considered one of the greatest and most noble goals linking the interests and the destiny of all the Yemeni people in the present and future. It is not a coincidence that this cause has been stirring and continues to stir up intense political and theoretical conflict between the forces of the Yemeni revolution and the forces hostile to it. The exploitative reactionary classes and elements that are hostile to the revolution and the toiling masses have been and still are setting forth the slogan of unity for the sake of their destructive interests, with the aim of pushing our people's national liberation movement along the road of combating the revolutionary transformations.

"These forces are provoking the feelings of the masses, are brandishing the weapon of unity and are setting forth aggressive means for achieving it in order to bring the masses out into civil war and strife among the united people. The Yemeni Socialist Party, and all the most sincere and truthful progressive forces--the ones most prepared to sacrifice for the sake of a united democratic Yemen for the whole Yemeni nation--reject this type of notion of unity, as they reject the means for carrying it out which reaction is trying to rely on. Therefore our party

cannot agree to have Yemeni unity realize the wishes and goals of the reactionary forces: we will struggle to realize Yemeni unity, with its democratic class nature, for the sake of the interests of the broadest masses of the people. Therefore Yemeni unity must acquire a democratic content and must serve the cause of the Yemeni revolution."

This is the Marxist notion which the regime in Aden is propounding with regard to the cause of Yemeni unity. It is clear to us that the regime in Aden is distorting this cause and prompting elements of what is called the National Democratic Front to carry out acts of sabotage along the borders of the northern segment of Yemen, because these elements are the strategic allies of the Aden regime and are what the regime calls "the most sincere progressive forces, the ones most prepared to sacrifice for the sake of a united democratic Yemen."

Forces other than these, which reject a Yemeni unity based on the Marxist notion, are, in the view of the regime in Aden, "reactionary forces" and do not want a marxist union. To this end, the regime in Aden is continuing to support the forces of sabotage in desperate attempts to disrupt stability and security, because Soviet strategy at the present time is asserting the need to work to encourage the forces of sabotage along the borders of the northern segment of the country, in order that Soviet strategy in establishing a Yemeni union serving Soviet aggressive expansion in the area may be achieved.

Therefore the tripartite alliance came into being, with the blessing of the Soviet Union, in order that this alliance could be empowered to achieve Soviet strategic goals. The establishment of this alliance would cause grave repercussions in the area, and this alliance would have the effect of causing any national effort to become exhausted, by preoccupying itself with reasserting stability and order in the region. Therefore this alliance has set forth, in hostility to the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the northern segment of the country, in accordance with a terrible scheme whose objective is to have the region witness further bloodshed; the Russians have started to feel that their affairs have become stabilized in Afghanistan, that Arab positions regarding them have not been effective, and that following the invasion of Afghanistan they can leap into the region through their massive military presence in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The stage of the tripartite treaty occurred to enable them to carry out their aggressive schemes.

Therefore this alliance will remain in effect and the contacts will be active, in spite of the new tactics, attempts and conciliations the three countries carry out to avoid losing some of the gains they have realized through their relationship with the countries of the Gulf and the Peninsula. Lenin says, "One step forward, two steps back."

What next?

11887
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MEANING OF ALLIANCE WITH USSR PROBED

Cairo AL-WAHDAH in Arabic No 13, 15 Sep 81 pp 26, 27

/Article: "The Arab Gulf: What Next, with the Tripartite Military Alliance among Moscow's Allies? The Military Alliance Was Established To Threaten the Gulf Cooperation Council States"/

/Text/ As Kuwait and the state of the emirates were awaiting a response from South Yemen on the mediation the two countries had been carrying out between South Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman, we were surprised by Aden's declaration of the establishment of a tripartite alliance among South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia. The Gulf states were struck with astonishment, as the Gulf Cooperation Council was preparing to meet in al-Ta'if to hear a report from the Kuwaiti foreign minister on the mediation between Oman and South Yemen.

We state that the military treaty concluded among the three countries constitutes a danger to all Arab countries; this treaty did not come into being in accordance with the will of the three countries so much as through Soviet orders to establish a kind of alliance in the area to cope with the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was founded by the will of the Gulf for the sake of economic, cultural and social coordination among the six Gulf countries.

Since the Gulf state foreign ministers' meeting to prepare for the council in the Sultanate of Oman in March, then the Gulf heads' summit meeting in Abu Dhabi, the Soviet Union has been considering that the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council is a threat to its aspirations and expansionist acts in the region. The visit by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwait's foreign minister, to Moscow before the summit conference did not realize its objective--to the contrary, it confirmed that the Soviet Union is against the Gulf states.

A Gulf source commented on this visit by saying, "Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad went to Moscow to discuss the Gulf resolution with the Soviets and they held him responsible for their own problems and concerns in the Gulf."

It is therefore apparent to us that the Soviet Union is active in the region, is closely observing the Gulf states and is enlisting its allies and agents against them. At the time the Gulf leaders were discussing cooperation among their countries at the Abu Dhabi summit, Radio Aden was announcing the arrival of some

vessels of the Soviet fleet in the port of Aden. Following that, there were repeated "Soviet observation maneuvers," and 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the head of the regime, proceeded to visit some Arab countries, Syria, Libya and Algeria. In this tour, he also made a visit to Angola and Ehtiopia on a secret trip. After that visit, the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs arrived in Aden and met with a number of officials, then flew to ethiopia on a similar mission.

Last July the first deputy Soviet defense minister, Marshal Sergei Sokolov, went on a visit to South Yemen that lasted 5 days after which he flew to Ethiopia to continue his mission.

According to the available information, this visit was aimed at establishing coordination in joint military fields and at putting the final touches on the draft of the tripartite alliance of South Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia that was subsequently declared. The visit of the Soviet first deputy defense minister was the last instalment and final arrangement for the treaty and the trilateral alliance.

The threat is serious. Communism is to be considered one of the most dangerous of the ideologies seeking places for themselves in the backward Third World, especially in the Islamic and Arab countries. What binds Mengistu Haile Maryam, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and al-Qadhdhafi together but the illegitimate connection with and membership in world Communism and the Kremlin leaders in Moscow, and participation in conspiratorial roles against the Arab and Islamic nation, in the context of the strategy of the Soviet Union and its expansionist schemes in the Third World?

The whole danger lies in the practices of the Soviet Union and its tools and agents and in its concentrated military presence in the waters and territory of South Yemen and Addis Ababa. This fact exists and is real, and the meeting among 'Ali Nasir, Mengistu and al-Qadhdhafi was aimed only at conspiring in the context of a Soviet plot in which everyone knows the assigned role he is delegated to carry out.

The gravity of the tripartite alliance lies in the fact that it did not come about by chance; rather, it came about as part of a clearly-outlined Soviet scheme that had been prepared for with scrupulous care. Here we have the right to wonder who is threatening the security of the area and looming over it, who came to occupy Afghanistan in order to be close to the Gulf and its oil--indeed, who has been zealously aspiring and covetously seeking for a long time to acquire the oil and dominate the region. Who indeed is the party interested in disrupting the security in the region and shaking its stability? It would be stupid for us to believe what 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, Mengistu or al-Qadhdhafi say, namely that this alliance is meant to cope with increasing military activity in the region on the part of the United States of America and other Western countries that are trying to protect their oil supplies from the gulf. Even if we assume that that is correct, what resources does a small country like South Yemen have for confronting this sort of big power in the region? Then, why is South Yemen pre-empting this kind of cause, since it itself does not have its own will or independence and is interfering in matters that are basically in the jurisdiction of the countries of the Arab Gulf, since South Yemen is a small country and does not have its own will but rather is manipulated by a major power and pushed to be a "thorn" in the heart of the Arab Gulf countries? The country that is pushing it is the Soviet Union; it wants

South Yemen so that it can speak with an Arab voice, and it is the force behind it, pushing it and standing behind it as it most loyally and sincerely carries out the scheme.

Three weeks ago Leonid Zamyatin, director of the International Information Department in the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, said, in a statement published by a Kuwaiti paper, "There will be no stability in the Gulf as long as there is no commitment to the declaration of five principles that Brezhnev recently announced." What does this statement mean? Doesn't it mean that the Soviet Union is looking for a foothold in the region and that it has forcibly intruded through South Yemen to shake its security and stability?

The Arab Gulf countries must be aware of all the plots the Soviet Union is weaving with South Yemen, in participation with Addis Ababa, in this region. Our vision of stability perforce follows from the fact that this tripartite alliance represents a threat to the area. The scheme is now concentrated on two countries, the northern segment of the country, that is, the Yemen Arab Republic, and the Sultanate of Oman--two countries that share land and sea borders with South Yemen. The acts of sabotage along the borders of the northern segment have risen to a high pitch in past weeks. People's Militia forces in Aden, under the command of Salih Muslih, currently minister of defense and previously minister of interior, have taken part in launching attacks on the territory of North Yemen. Omani sabotage teams, supported by the People's Militia, are making attempts to infiltrate Omani soil. On top of all that, South Yemen has mobilized an entire brigade along its borders with Oman and has mobilized six brigades along the borders with the northern segment. What do these mobilizations and acts of aggression mean? They mean danger--the danger that is lying in wait for the countries of the region.

Some Gulf Cooperation Council countries consider that by establishing good relations with Aden it will be possible to neutralize it. For years one of the countries in this council has been gambling on the possibility of reforming the regime in Aden. However, this bet failed from the time it was first tried, and the proof is that since 1975 Kuwait has been trying to mediate between South Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman and this mediation has achieved nothing--rather, South Yemen has exploited it as part of its tactics and strategy, which are based on alliance with the Soviet Union. It has realized internal gains and built itself up militarily and politically, until it has stood on its two feet, acting in a threatening manner and allying itself with the Soviet Union and other communist countries in accordance with the plan that has been set out for taking over the Arab Gulf countries.

South Yemen signed a military treaty with the Soviet Union on 25 October 1979; at that time it was said that this treaty did not have the countries of the area as its target.

What was the gist of this treaty? Soviet fleets entered the waters of the Red Sea on the basis of it and the Soviet Union mobilized destructive weapons in South Yemen, and this regime became a thorn threatening stability and security, on the basis of it. Today a military pact is being signed in accordance with a new Soviet scheme whose target is the whole Gulf Cooperation Council. They will say in Aden, if they have not already said, that this treaty is not aimed at the countries of the area but rather that it is aimed at imperialism and Zionism. What will they

say when the Red Army's feet are threatening and menacing at the gates of the Gulf countries? Will they say "This army has come to protect you from imperialist foreign invasion?" At that point the answer would be, "Will we wait for an explanation from Aden or will we accept what they have said and pretend not to notice the Red Army on Gulf territory?"

We are fully confident that the Arab Gulf leaders realize the risks of the dangers hovering over them and are aware that showing emotions and feelings of brotherhood for the national and domestic interest will not ward off dangers. Good intentions mean only more damage, especially when these intentions are ones of sympathy with communist countries like South Yemen. International communism knows only the logic of red violence, even with the people who are closest to it. What are the events and the change in faces that have successively occurred in Afghanistan, in spite of the marxist natures of these faces, but proof of that!

The tripartite alliance will continue to carry out the Soviet scheme, and South Yemen is the gate through which the Russian bear draws close to the smell of oil. There will be nothing this bear will have to do, on its way to drinking the oil, except crush all the people standing in its way, even if that involves one or more of the countries in the region that have good relations and establish diplomatic relations with it.

11887
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LIFE OF PROFESSIONAL CAMEL RUSTLERS DESCRIBED

Cairo AL-WADI in Arabic No 4, Aug 81 pp 68-69

[Article: "Al-Hambatah in Sudan"]

[Text] "Qamus al-Lughah al-'Ammiyah al-Sudaniyah" [The Lexicon of the Spoken Language in Sudan] by Dr 'Awn al-Sharif Qasim states, "Al-Hambatah is a term used to refer to professional camel rustlers. A Hanbati (pronounced with an n) is a camel rustler; also called Hanbuti."

A few people have compared the work of camel rustlers with the work done by pre-Islamic Arab vagabonds who waylaid caravans and robbed the wealthy. In a study prepared by Mr Sharaf al-Din al-Amin 'Abd-al-Salam of Khartoum University in a book which is to be published in the near future, the author affirms that camel rustlers in Sudan do not steal anything but camels even if they had the chance to steal other valuables. In fact, they do not steal sheep or donkeys; they specialize only in stealing camels. They consider camel rustling to be an act of courage and chivalry, an act that attracts women's affections. Their weapons are rifles, swords and speedy female camels. It's been said that a camel rustler once intercepted a wedding procession in the desert. He fired his gun in the air, to scare those who were celebrating the wedding. Then he stripped the women of their jewelry and placed their gold in a pile in front of him. He then asked the women to come to him and to take their gold and their jewelry. After they had taken their belongings, he asked them to utter a trilling sound of joy as a salute to the camel rustler. All he wanted was to prove to the women that the men with them were not worthy of their respect and their approval.

A camel rustler considers the theft of anything other than camels to be sinful. Camel rustling, however, is a praiseworthy action. In popular songs young women say, "Hambatah shaylin al-Khala, Sayyid Ab wa rawhayn la tijuni bilah" [meaning unknown].

'Abd-al-Salam writes that a camel rustler arms himself with a double-barreled shotgun. The al-Hamar tribes, however, call camel thieves al-sarrajah [saddled camel thieves] because they are always [seen] mounted on the saddles of their camels. Their life is one continuous chase. Although some

people use the word, Suruji to refer to a saddle maker, a suruji for the al-Hamar tribe is a camel thief.

In the area of al-Butanah in East Sudan camel rustlers are called muhajirah [migrants] because they are always traveling like migrant birds.

They may also be called al-Nahhadin [the raiders] in East Sudan because they carry out raids and they strike in deserts and desolate areas. Camel rustling is a phenomenon that has been linked with a particular age during which a Bedouin used to look down upon those who raised cattle or cultivated land. A Bedouin used to consider raising camels and trading in them to be most important business. The most important business that ensued from this was that of confronting camel owners publicly and taking those camels away from them. For the Bedouin the ideal life was that of tending cattle, hunting, individual competition and perpetual motion. The Bedouin rejected the life of stability and equanimity. Bedouins spent what they earned from rustling camels on their sweethearts who would boast of their friendship with brave men. Most camel rustlers have a mastery of the language and can compose popular verse.

The book contains a large amount of verse by camel rustlers. Most of it revolves around subjects that do not differ from those dealt with in old Arab poetry: love verse, vainglorious poetry, satire and verse describing camels, battles, chases and the desert.

A camel rustler despises manual labor, farming and tending cattle. In most cases he works alone and lives in solitude and in hiding, appearing suddenly in front of his victim. He may resort to terror so he can get good camels, but he rarely resorts to direct violence.

The author toured the prisons of Sudan's provinces, especially in Kordofan, where he found some camel rustlers and interviewed them. Their recollections and their popular verse formed the subject of his study. The most famous camel rustler was al-Tayyib (Wad Dahwiyah). His name is al-Tayyib 'Abd-al-Qadir Sulayman but he was commonly known as (Wad Dahwiyah), after his grandfather. He was born in a village on the eastern banks of the Nile near the Umm 'Ali railway station between Khartoum and Port Sudan, and he is a member of the (al-Ja'liyyin) tribe. His early life was quite uneventful: he went to a religious school; he studied the Koran; and he married his cousin at an early age. No one knows why he became a professional rustler after that. He left rustling only after he had grown older; he repented and devoted himself to prayer. He died in 1943 in Kabushiyah after a long life, and he was survived by two daughters. Al-Tayyib is undoubtedly the poet laureate of camel rustlers, and his popular verse is fondly memorized and recited by his tribesmen. 'Abdallah (Wad al-Muqaddam) from the (al-Kawahilah) tribe is also a camel rustler and poet. He retired from camel rustling and settled down as a farmer in the (al-Sawdaki) project.

Sharaf (Wad al-Mahrab) is one of the most famous camel rustlers in the al-Butanah desert. He is one of the older patriarchs of al-Hamidaniyah, a 55-year old man who retired from camel rustling and settled in the village of Meheiriba, west of the Dinder River.

Among the camel rustlers in Kordofan are Abu Jayb Abu Zayd and his son of the Hamar tribe; Hamid Umm Biddah whom the author met in the prison of al-Nuhud city; 'Abdallah Harikah from Abu Zayd, who is also a prisoner in al-Nuhud; 'Awad al-Karim Ibrahim, a farmer from Dar Hamid; Abu Sarij or Musa (Wad Kuku) who died recently; and (Wad Kuku's) daughter who recites the verse of camel rustlers who sing the praises of her father's courage when he used to saddle his camels and disappear for long periods of time in the desert, only to return with the best [specimens of] camels. The poet said: "When Abu Sarij rides, he brings back wealth with his cunning."

However, the question remains, why do those people steal camels?

The author tried to show and analyze the various aspects of this phenomenon. He reviewed the economic aspect of the phenomenon wherein the economy of shepherds is based on raising cattle and camels. But it is the camels that are the basis of wealth because camels have a high barter value. [Therefore] camel owners are the wealthy men; they are followed by those who own cattle; and after them are the destitute who feel wronged and deprived.

There is rivalry and envy between those who tend cattle and those who tend camels. Something akin to that appeared in the history of colonizing American territory where a small war was fought between both parties. Before Islam vagabonds and vagabond poets appeared on the Arabian desert. They used to plunder caravans, and they made no distinction between camels and cattle. They stole everything they could steal from the caravans whose misfortune led them into the grip of the desert vagabonds. Their primary motive was money and nourishment in that desolate environment which they portrayed quite realistically in their verse. Camel rustlers had features other than those which they shared with the vagabonds. They shared their courage, their fortitude and their generosity, but camel rustlers were more fond of women and more gentle with them. Camel rustlers did not steal the property of orphans or widows. They deliberately challenged people of power and did not betray the weak in their raids and plunder operations.

Behind this is the fact that a camel rustler's tribe does not denounce his actions. Deep down in their hearts men wish they were as free and adventurous in the wide open desert as the camel rustlers are. They want to be feared by other tribes and admired by women. Camel rustlers are not rejected by society. Vagabonds, however, were; they were spurned by Arabs. One notices that the verse of Arab vagabonds is almost free of love verse. Although a camel rustler's relationship with a woman is a sensual relationship, the verse composed by the camel rustler in his popular verse depicts that relationship in sensitive terms.

A camel rustler spends his money lavishly in the company of beautiful women so he can enjoy himself and drink. Young women sing the praises of camel rustlers in their songs. If a camel rustler spends all his money, the lady of the house may lend him money which he would pay back when he returns with the booty which he also uses to pay for another evening of entertainment. The author narrates that al-Tayyib (Wad Dahawiyah) was in such a

pleasurable and entertaining gathering. While everybody was engaged in dancing and singing, those whose camels had been stolen surrounded the house. (Wad Dahawiyah), however, remained unperturbed, and he asked his friends to finish their dancing before his departure to fight the intruders and send them away.

He said, "Finish the dance; the skies may fall later."

Women played a role in Bedouin society where the number of camels a man owned determined his standing in the tribe. Chivalry and generosity were values that commanded respect, and a camel rustler had all these characteristics.

Camel rustling became extinct when nomad Bedouins settled and shifted their activities from tending cattle to farming, when security means developed and when powerful vehicles that can travel in rugged terrain entered the desert. Airplanes that can spot an ant in the desert were also [brought into the picture], and there was no longer a place where the camel rustler could hide from law-men and from the regime.

Chivalry was no longer feasible in front of fire power. Nevertheless, the imbalance in the distribution of wealth in Bedouin society was still forcing some people to take up theft as a profession. Some took up camel rustling to avenge themselves of those who stole their property or their herds or to rebel against the authority of foremen and mayors. Their spokesman says:

> "People like us roam our lands because
> "Mayors scorn and administrators offend."

In other words it is better for one to leave a country whose mayors and administrators have rejected one. Those who are represented by a camel rustler are to stay away from these areas. This is an attempt to avoid a confrontation with the mayors and administrators who represent the authority in these areas.

Although a camel rustler may refer to his sweetheart in his verse, his camel remains the most important thing in his life since his very life depends on it. He addresses his camel and imagines him to be a person who senses danger and yearns to settle down. The camel rustler has an ongoing conversation with his camel and does not separate himself from what his camel may feel. He suffers if his camel is sick, and he eulogizes him if he dies just as he would eulogize someone close or dear to him. He attributes to the camel names that indicate fortitude, strength and power.

The phenomenon of camel rustling has almost become extinct in the desert of Sudan. It disappeared when conditions that created this phenomenon and allowed it to continue for a period of time changed. Camel rustlers who are still alive are now old men living the memories of the past. They have become folklore figures whose stories are told in popular verse. Researchers

go to them and record their memories on tapes so that one of the last modes of ancient life, along with its special language, can be preserved.

In the past, even theft had its traditions, its protocol, its virtues and its laws. These gradually receded in front of the encroachment by land-rovers, trucks, helicopters and long range machine guns.

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ANTI-EGYPTIAN MAGAZINE REPORTS SYRIAN READINESS TO DEFEND LIBYA

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 243, 17 Oct 81 p 20

/Article by Louis Faris: "Damascus: Syrian Forces Are Preparing to Go to Libya"/

/Text/ Last Monday, in his first followup on the events in Egypt following the death of President Anwar al-Sadat, the Syrian president, Hafiz al-Asad, when asked about his evaluation of the situation in the Arab region and Egypt, said "We have for some time been expecting, and now further expect, that the Camp David agreements will collapse and will end up as worthless pieces of paper in the actual state of Arab life. This is a firm conviction in our spirits, and the future will eventually show this."

When journalists insisted on asking him his personal position on the death of the Egyptian president, he refused /to comment/ stating, "From the personal standpoint the matter is not important and I do not intend to comment on it." He then went on to say, "I have talked about President al-Sadat in the past. All I can say now is that al-Sadat, in what he did, did not perform good work for the Arab nation." The Syrian president was talking to journalists in his summer residence in Latakia immediately upon concluding political talks that lasted 2 days with the former Lebanese president, Sulayman Franjiyah, who had arrived Sunday morning in the company of his son Robert Franjiyah. Taking part in the talks were a number of Syrian ministers, including Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, as well as the chief of the general staff, Gen Hikmat al-Shihabi.

With regard to these negotiations, the Syrian leader declared, "The only way to a solution to the problem in Lebanon will be through reconciliation among the Lebanese parties. This is what we have striven for and are striving for, and anyone opposing the reconciliation process will suffer great disappointment and loss."

The Syrian president's statements came at a time when Syria, through its official media, was repeating its violent criticisms of the existing regime in Egypt and launching attacks on "President al-Sadat's legacy" and the Sudan.

The political commentator accused President al-Numayri of making preparations to start a war with the Libyan Jamhiriyah in conjunction with the new Egyptian regime and with the broad support of the United States.

In the course of this, information among diplomatic circles in the Syrian capital dwelt on the news that Syria was preparing to send units of its army to Libya. Some of these sources stated that these forces could reach a strength of two armored brigades and that people in these forces had gone into utmost readiness to travel by sea at any moment to Libya on three Russian vessels which the Soviet Union has agreed to place at the disposal of the two Arab countries to that end.

Other diplomatic sources have said that the Syrian troops will not move their weapons along with them because the agreement concluded between Gen Hikmat al-Shihabi, the Syrian chief of staff, and Lt Col Abu Bakr Yunus, Libyan chief of staff, during the latter's visit to Damascus last month, stipulated that the Syrian troops would receive all their weapons and material as soon as they reached Libyan soil.

It is worth mentioning that official sources in Damascus, up to the time of publication of this issue, have not confirmed or denied this diplomatic information. Rather, the diplomatic sources have gone on to confirm what President al-Asad declared in his latest speech, the gist of which was: "The Syrian army will fight alongside the Libyan army in the event Libya is exposed to any aggression."

The diplomats also have testified that the Syrian leader announced on this subject last Monday "The Libyan Jamahiriyah is a main target of imperialism and Zionism and the plot against Libya will remain in effect, but we will defeat the hostile schemes."

Here the political circles are dominated by the belief that Egypt's return to Arab ranks is still far off because a radical change in Egyptian policy is needed and the demise of President al-Sadat, in the opinion of an official Syrian source, constitutes "just a step along the road to Egypt's return to Arab ranks."

11887
4404/72

LOCAL BANKER DISCUSSES CURRENT FISCAL PROBLEMS

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 88

/Article: "Director General of the Banque De Paris et Pays-Bas: The Banks between Two Evils--the Interest Ceiling and Maintenance of Clients"/

/Text/ How can one continue to keep maintaining the ceiling on interest in the emirates, in light of the great wave of increases in worldwide interest rates, at a time when depositors' awareness of the realities of the market and their demand for a high interest on their money are increasing? Here is a conversation on this problem and on banking activity affairs in the emirates with Mr George Thabit, director general of the Banque De Paris et Pays-Bas (Paribas) in Abu Dhabi:

Question: What are the effects of the great rise in worldwide interest rates on the local market and on bank activities, especially in the realm of liquidity?

Answer: It has become apparent that agent depositors at all levels have become well-informed about the vicissitudes of the worldwide interest rates, and it has also become apparent to them that the discrepancies between the interest paid on local and foreign currency are very great. Therefore we see the majority of clients demanding that their deposits in local currency is transferred to deposits in foreign currency so that they can benefit from the difference. This reduces the liquidity of the banks in local currency, increases demand for this currency among the banks and raises the interest on it. For the banks to be able to preserve their liquidity and their credit policies, they are compelled to borrow from foreign markets at worldwide interest rates, and here is where the problem lies, since the cost of these deposits, in spite of the "swapping" facilities the central bank places at the disposal of local banks, remains very high and consequently the borrowing cost to the creditor agent also becomes very high.

For the banks to continue to protect their sound positions and to continue to play their role in stimulating and developing the economic situation, they must create a balance between the interest rate on borrowing and the facilities granted to agents, since they normally resort to demanding facilities from other banks. One should bear in mind that the interest rate on such loans is subject to the market rate, which also is the case in the financing operations that more than one bank take part in, and is subject to the floating interest rates that are calculated each time in accordance with the rates prevailing in the market, based on the terms of the contract itself. In loans of this type, local banks generally suffer

from agents' insistence on reducing the interest rates on loans, and this sometimes compels them to grant terms at a loss in order to keep the agents. One must remember that the central bank has spelled out an interest rate on lending with respect to amounts of less than 5 million dirhams.

Interest on the deposits in excess of that amount is kept free, and the same goes for the amounts the banks deal with. For this reason the interest rate on the dirham rises when interest on the dollar rises. The goal of this wise policy is to get capital to stay at home and encourage it to remain.

Question: What are the most conspicuous problems facing banking activity in the country?

Answer: Perhaps the most conspicuous problems facing banking activity in the country are:

1. The lack of a system for concentrating risks in the central bank. This is the main problem facing the local banks, which are unable to understand and study the real conditions of their agents; this causes them a great deal of difficulty in their daily transactions.

2. The lack of banking specialization increases burdens on commercial banks. The government has established the Real Estate Bank and is in the process of establishing the Industrial Bank.

3. The lack of commercial laws to regulate commercial and banking transactions.

4. The lack of local banking staffs. It is our intention to advance the notion of training some young university people in banking activities.

5. The municipalities of the government, and the chambers of commerce and industry, embrace the notion of a commercial registry, which is to be considered an integrated journal showing the legal status of all companies and organizations in the country.

Question: Cases have been brought before the judiciary where the plaintiffs demand that the courts agree that they can refrain from paying interest on loans they have acquired from banks. What is your comment, especially since the judiciary has agreed that interest is not to be paid in a similar situation?

Answer: The statement on this subject by Shaykh Surur ibn Muhammad, chairman of the board of the Central Bank, has had a good effect. In it, he stressed that the civil courts were competent to review banking cases and apply the specific terms of contracts concluded between agents and banks. This statement is equivalent to an attempt to rule on the dispute that exists on this subject and to stress officials' concern to adopt modern laws that are in keeping with international developments, in order to establish a firm economy. Had this situation been attended to, this precedent would have been a decisive blow for the banking system. As is well known, banks borrow in order to lend, and prohibiting them from a rate

of interest means compelling them to close their doors. This is clear to the Central Bank and has been observed in its memoranda to the banks and in the laws it issued in past years.

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GOVERNMENT TAKES STEPS TO RESOLVE INTEREST RATE DISCREPANCIES

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 88

/Article: "Al-Hadi al-Warfalli, Director General of the Arab Investment Bank: Government Expectations Caused Banks in the Emirates To Avoid a Serious Liquidity Crisis"/

/Text/ The most conspicuous problem in banking activity in the state of the emirates is the presence of a large number of banks in the country. However, the establishment of a central bank will greatly alleviate the severity of this phenomenon. Here is a meeting with al-Hadi al-Warfalli, director general of the Arab Investment Bank in Abu Dhabi:

Question: What have been the most prominent banking developments in the state of the emirates and the Gulf area?

Answer: The most prominent banking and monetary developments the state of the emirates witnessed in 1980 were the establishment of the Central Bank and its commencement of activity.

In the context of the region, the most important event in 1980 was the establishment of the Arab Banking Organization in Bahrain, in which the state of the emirates, the Libyan Jamahiriyah and Kuwait took part.

Question: What is your comment on what is being said about the inadequacy of bank oversight in the state of the emirates?

Answer: The fact that the state's central bank is performing its well known tasks is in itself oversight over the activities of the commercial banks and financial institutions that are subject to the Central Bank. One might mention that the authorities in the state support the Central Bank's effort to create sound bases for banking activity in the state, and this is a situation that has been discussed as a sound approach and a factor for banking stability.

Question: Have the competent monetary authorities taken specific measures to avoid monetary fluctuations and control the monetary situation?

Answer: People following the vicissitudes of the world money markets will observe that the price of the dollar, in its role as the main currency for monetary transactions in the world, has started to fluctuate. It is necessary to point out that the number of local banks conducting transactions in international money markets is small in comparison with the large number of commercial banks in the state of the emirates. However, a study by government officials on the conditions of liquidity in the commercial banks and the difficulties facing these banks have caused them to pass a number of decrees that have been a factor in providing liquidity for the banks. The decree to refinance real estate through the Ministry of Finance and Industry was made for this reason, and this is what has kept the local banks from being as greatly affected as they were in the past by international interest rates.

Question: What are the most outstanding problems facing banking activity in the state of the emirates?

Answer: The most outstanding problem facing banking activity, in my opinion, is the presence of this large number of commercial banks in the country. This naturally leads to some excesses on the part of some banks, especially in providing services to agents, and transgressing against many of the rules and responsibilities of the profession.

Question: In light of these facts, how do you view the future of banking activity in the state of the emirates?

Answer: The state of the emirates is a country that enjoys a distinctive status in the world of finance and the economy. The availability of great resources has made the future of banking activity bright, especially since the Central Bank is now engaged in total oversight over commercial banks and is setting forth outlines for putting the banking process on its proper path.

Question: How do you conceive the role of the commercial banks in investing the oil states' financial surpluses.

Answer: Oil surpluses are generally in the hands of governmental or quasi-governmental banks and financial institutions, and I believe that some local banks are cooperating with some Arab ones in investing these surpluses.

Question: What is your opinion on some clients' request that they refrain from paying interest on the loans they have obtained, on grounds that that conflicts with Islamic law?

Answer: The subject of bank interest is stirring up debate and dispute in the country's banking sector, and some official bodies have presented views and recommendations; the Central Bank has played a part in this regard, recently issuing material reassuring the banking system, to the effect that the special cases bearing on interest should be the area of competence of the civil judiciary and should be reviewed in accordance with the stipulations of agreements, as long as they are to the parties concerned. This is essentially what the banks have sought to endorse and establish. I consider that these latest decrees will be a factor for stability in banking activity.

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2446

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3 December 1981

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No. 2446

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ISRAEL INCREASES TRADE TIES WITH LATIN AMERICA

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 42-43

[Article by Ignacio Klich: "Israel Push Into Latin America"]

[Text]

RECENT NEWS that Mexico's largest food processing company is teaming up with an Israeli combine to set up a vegetable dehydration plant sheds light on Israel's growing interest in agribusiness ventures in Latin America. They are also a sign of Israel's growing drive to export industrial goods and services to the region's Big Four — Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. Israel hopes this will offset the officially forecasted slow-down in its major export markets this year.

Israeli sales to Latin America reached $138m last year, marking a 94.4 per cent increase over exports in 1979. Such a jump suggests that the weakening in Israel's diplomatic links with Latin America — Cuba and Guyana severed ties in 1973-1974, Israeli diplomats have been recalled from Paraguay and El Salvador while the newly independent Caribbean states appear in no hurry to establish diplomatic ties — has paradoxically been accompanied by stronger trade ties.

Sales to Latin America represented only 2.5 per cent of Israel's total exports of $5.54bn last year, but in view of the fact that Israel's exports to the industrialised countries have been steadily dropping while those to the developing countries have been growing, Israeli officials are confident that the Latin American share can be further increased. Industry and Trade Minister Gideon Patt recently announced to Tel Aviv's Financial Club that a $20m fund will be established before the end of the year to find new markets in the Americas.

In Mexico, Productos Deshidratados del Fuerte's $22m plant will be set up in the state of Sinaloa as a joint venture between Alimentos del Fuerte and Israel's Deco-Atikim. The Israelis will provide 20 per cent of the investment and sell their technical expertise. Deco, the dehydration plant of kibbutz Bror Hayil, previously sold its know-how to Brazil and other developing countries, but is the first kibbutz concern ever to participate in foreign investment.

In recent years, industry has been supplementing agriculture, especially in those kibbutzim set up in relatively unproductive areas. Industry now accounts for more than 50 per cent of kibbutz output, or five per cent of total Israeli industrial output. Figures provided by the Kibbutz Industries Association, the umbrella organisation for more than 300 such enterprises on 170 kibbutzim, show that their sales abroad reached $212m last year, with 22 per cent going to the Americas.

Short of investment funds of its own, Deco joined Atikim, a company owned by the industrial conglomerate Koor, the construction firm Solel Boneh, and the investment syndicate Clal — all of which have Latin American connections — to meet the Mexican government's requirement that those selling know-how to Mexico must participate in the investment and risk.

Mexican finance for the dehydration plant will come from Nacional Financiera SA (Nafinsa), the country's development bank. Nafinsa's involvement in the project has to be seen against the background of the agreement it reached earlier this year with the Histadrut labour federation's Bank Hapoalim — ranking 105th in *The Banker's* list of the world's largest banks — to establish an investment fund to promote industrial joint ventures between the two countries.

Koor, itself owned by the Histadrut, has decided that its trade division should open shop in Mexico. But its subsidiaries, Solcoor and Alda Israel Foreign Trade, have already been active in Caracas and Sao Paulo, as well as Panama.

Productos Deshidratados del Fuerte is the first of about 30 proposed joint ventures in food, chemicals and solar energy put forward by the Israelis in the past two years to offset the cost of Mexican oil supplies, which have amounted to 45,000 barrels a day since the fall of the Shah and the return of the Sinai oilfields.

Early in the 1970s, Israel began negotiations with the Mexicans to set up a joint venture in Merida for the assembly of the Arava transport plane, an Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) best-seller in Latin America because of its military and civilian applications. Other aircraft would also be serviced with IAI expertise. However interested Mexico may have been in developing its own domestic aircraft industry through this venture, it was not prepared to buy 75 Arava kits, and the deal was not clinched.

In the case of Venezuela, the signing of a trade pact last November paved the way for public and private sector initiatives in the field of agribusiness. Among these, Israel's Tene Noga dairy industry was reported to be negotiating with Venezuelan businessmen a ten per cent shareholding in a $20m venture to develop a domestic dairy industry with Israeli expertise. Tene Noga's Ionatan and Ioav Hurwitz, sons of Likud's former finance minister, Yigal Hurwitz, also own a farm in Puerto Rico which began exports to the US last year. Earlier, Venezuelan officials of the Orinoquia development project asked the Israelis to prepare an agro-industrial pilot plan for a 20,000 hectare area in the country's eastern region.

Improving trade relations with Brazil is seen by Israeli officials as a way to offset the loss in citrus fruit and juice concentrate sales to the EEC due to Brazilian competition. In spite of the distance, Brazil also provides a useful meeting point for three-way relations with the Arab world. Israeli firms with transnational links are known to have exported American-designed electronics, made in Israel, to customers in the Arab world. Israeli businessmen have also visited Buenos Aires to explore the possibility of selling various industrial items after last year's successful agreement to supply an Ormat solar energy turbine. Israeli agricultural equipment was on display this year at the Sociedad Rural Argentina fair.

Meanwhile, financial links have grown fast. Israel's Leumi, Hapoalim and Discount banks now have subsidiaries and representative offices in Argentina, the Bahamas, Brazil, Curacao, in the Netherlands Antilles, Grand Cayman, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela. More recently, the orthodox Jewish United Mizrahi Bank, Israel's fourth largest financial institution, announced plans to open a subsidiary in Uruguay together with Edmond de Rothschild's Geneva-based Bank Privé. And the expectations of increased trade have led the Zim freight shipping company to extend its Haifa-Barcelona container line to Rio, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, and extend the Miami line to Venezuelan ports.

CSO: 4400/60

ARAB INVESTORS CONSIDER SINGAPORE MARKET

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Lelei Lelaulu]

[Text] FOLLOWING their initial successes in the eurodollar markets, Arab bankers are visiting Singapore, the centre of the Asia dollar market, in droves with a view to expanding into this burgeoning area.

The interest in Singapore specifically, and Asia in general, follows on the increasing Arab participation in the economies of the developing world. For the first seven months of this year, lending to Third World states by the Arab financial institutions totalled $4bn.

An Asian business journal, the authoritative *Far Eastern Economic Review*, has estimated that the top 25 Arab banks in the euromarket had a combined capital of $2.4bn and assets of $51bn in 1979. Increasing confidence with their ability to recycle their own petrodollars boosted these amounts to $3.3bn and $66bn respectively in 1980. Projections for this year point to a 30 per cent increase to a capital of $4.3bn on assets of $90bn. As the *Far Eastern Economic Review* points out, no other group of banks has such a growth potential.

Singapore, centre of the $60bn Asia dollar market, is excited about the increased Arab involvement in their offshore sector. The Asia dollar market is currently dominated by the OECD states, and the dynamism of the Arab banks can only serve to stimulate business, as well as increasing trade in the stock markets in the southeast Asian area. Most of the top 25 Arab institutions in the eurodollar market have been in existence for eight years or less.

Singapore's close ties with Israel may have kept many of the Arab institutions out of Singapore until now. The fledgling Arab banks in earlier days also wanted to tread warily in the Asian markets, so they allied themselves to those big loans which were in some way associated with the Middle East. Thus the early loan syndications preferred by the Arab institutions centred around the big South Korean and Philippines loans.

Saudi Arabia's National Commercial Bank (NCB), by far the largest private bank in the Middle East, spearheaded the Arab flow eastwards when it set up Singapore premises in 1979. This year, the National Bank of Kuwait set up camp, with its eyes on southeast Asia and the relatively untapped Australian fields.

The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (Sama) is holding up approval for NCB's London Branch, so NCB is delaying expanding its Singapore office into a fully-fledged branch. NCB has however received the green light from Sama to open a full branch in Bahrain. Company sources say this is encouraging for the future of their Singapore operation.

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is being discreet about the Arab influx, refusing to divulge the names of banks which have applied for operating licenses in Singapore. The lively Singapore press, on the other hand, has already run reports that the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and the French-based Union de Banques Arabes et Francaises (Ubaf) have secured offshore operating licenses.

These two banks are significant in that they own between them 25 per cent of Uban-Arab Japanese Finance, the institution which has handled most of the Arab financial business in Asia through its Hong Kong office. By going it alone, these two Arab banks are displaying new-found con-

fidence in the Asia dollar markets. Other Arab institutions which have previously relied exclusively on Uban-Arab Japanese Finance for guidance east of Bahrain will be watching the progress of Ubaf and the National Bank of Abu Dhabi with a great deal of interest.

Ubaf owns 20 per cent of Uban-Arab Japanese Finance, making it the largest single shareholder. More importantly, Ubaf had the largest eurodollar involvement last year of any Arab institution. Singapore is particularly happy with developments, as Ubaf will spotlight what they hope will be the main attractions of Asia dollar involvement for those Arab banks still thinking about recycling petrodollars east of Bahrain. Press reports say the Kuwait-Asian Bank, which recently opened for business in Bahrain, will soon open a Singapore branch with a $100m capitalisation to take advantage of the burgeoning trade financing between the Gulf states and Asia.

Others awaiting Singapore licenses include Al Bahrain Arab African Bank, Gulf International Bank and the Arab Banking Corporation. They won't have to wait too long, because the MAS has been jolted into speedier action by the government. The *Far Eastern Economic Review* claims that some of the more important Arab banks have been allowed to jump the queue.

Arab banks are sought for geographical balance by the Singaporeans, but their presence in Singapore also increases the chances of the small industrialised island becoming a truly international financial market. For their part, the Arab banks are drawn to the Asia dollar market by a number of reasons. NCB, for example, provides performance guarantees and hedge financing for many Asian contractors active in the Middle East. This has slowly led NCB to provide similar services in the bigger markets of South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia. Setting up a full branch is a logical extension of this.

Since the oil-price rises of the 1970s, Arab financial managers have tried to expand their role in the direction and placement of their petrodollars. In addition, Arab banks found themselves inevitably drawn to the trade financing opportunities provided by the booming Asian/Middle East trade. There is also the attraction of developing states, which for the most part have excellent credit ratings, seeking capital to help them catch up with the industrialised nations. With its vast population base, the Asian region can also absorb more funds and generate high returns.

Sensing the rising expectations in the region, Arab bankers have themselves warned against over-optimistic projections of their effect on the Asia dollar scene. For one thing, they point out that most of the petrodollars are absorbed by the European institutions, and that they have to line up for interbank interest rates like everybody else. They stress that Singapore is in many ways an extension of the euroloan business and that Asians should not expect the Arabs to contribute to anything that could even vaguely be construed as an alternative to the existing international markets.

There is little doubt, however, that the Arab presence will increase syndication activity in Asia. There is a sizeable amount of syndication with strong Arab involvement at present and this is bound to increase as the Arab banks look at additional project financing ventures.

Set up in 1977, Singapore's floating-rate certificate of deposit (cd) market has gone from strength to strength. Arab appetites for the booming cd market were whetted in 1979 when NCB and Kuwait Pacific Finance both dabbled in issues for Japanese banks. In 1979 they came in with their hands held by DBS-Daiwa Securities and Merrill Lynch International, but since then Kuwait Pacific has jointly managed its own issues. The cd market is not yet inundated with Arab banks, but there is strong Middle East interest in additional use of these instruments.

Heavy Arab buying into the Japanese equity market indicates there will be movement soon on the Singapore and Malaysian markets. The smallness of the two stock markets must limit the amount of Arab buying, but they are certainly testing the markets. The speculation is that more equity investment will grow as the Arabs themselves grow more accustomed to the Asian equity terrain.

The Asians look forward to an increase in the sparse Arab participation in euroasian issues which are listed simultaneously in Europe and Singapore. The Arab-Malaysian Development Bank has, however, managed Banque Nationale d'Algerie and Sonatrach when these two Algerian concerns drew money from the euroasian pool in a reverse flow of funds.

Many more fields will open up with the arrival of Arab banks in Asia. The trend makes a lot of sense: the oil-rich states of the Middle East have often declared their interest in assisting Third World brethren develop their resources. These are long-term development plans and most of the investors in the Middle East prefer such arrangements, as their investments do not need constant overseeing.

The fact that the Arab interest in Asia was sparked by successful participation in the euromarkets raises hopes in banking circles that a whole new force may arise out of European technical expertise backed by Middle East capital and the vast human and natural potential of Asia.

BASSAM ABU-SHARIF DISCUSSES PFLP POLICIES

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 23 Oct 81 pp 12-13

[Interview with Bassam Abu Sharif, PLFP member; date and place not given]

[Text] The return of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) into the fold of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has given the Palestinian Revolution a new dimension. At the last PFLP congress, Dr George Habash was re-elected as general secretary, and despite changes in the leadership, the organisation's secrecy has so far kept it from making details public. To assess the present situation of the PLFP, we talked to one of its outstanding members, Bassam Abu Sharif.

ABU SHARIF's name made headlines when a parcel bomb exploded while he was handling it; the effects of the blast are still to be seen on his face and hands. He has always been one of the Palestinian leaders most sought after by the press, due, in some degree, to his position in the PFLP's information section. Despite the fact that Abu Sharif has, in the meantime, assumed other tasks in the Popular Front, tasks with which he was entrusted at the PFLP's last congress, we interviewed him on the present situation and on the future of the Palestinian cause.

Boycott

The interview took place before the assassination of Anwar Sadat, but has neverless lost nothing of its reach. On the contrary, the death of Egypt's ruler is in a way postulated by Sharif when he says: 'We are firmly convinced that the fall of Nimeiri or Sadat will mean that we will have covered half the distance towards Palestine. There are signs that the struggle for Palestine is accelerating, and we see the call of the Pharmacists in Jordan for a boycott of American goods and the adoption of this decision by other trade unions as an important step, and as one that should be taken up by Arab trade unions in the whole of the Arab homeland.'

'Colonel Qadhafi's call for volunteers to join the battle of dignity is exceedingly important. All Arab regimes should lift the restrictions and allow the masses to join the ranks of the revolution, in order to strengthen our fighters. Those who think that the war is coming to an end are mistaken. The enemy will strike again and again, because Washington's aim is to dominate and subjugate the Middle East and the Zionist entity with its elected tool for this purpose.' These were the opening statements of Abu Sharif and we then proceeded to ask him about civilian targets in Beirut and the strategy that lay behind that Zionist escalation of the conflict.

He answered: 'The aims the Zionist entity is trying to achieve through their criminal war on the towns, villages and camps in the south, and on the civilan district in Beirut, are still the same: the liquidation of the Palestinian revolution — or at least its weakening in order to push through a settlement on the eastern front. The enemy has succeeeded in realising its aims at least temporarily on the western

front, via the treachery of the agent Sadat, and it is now trying to impose total control on the Eastern front, where the Palestinian Revolution constitutes a stumbling block in the face of the Zionist machinations.'

The Eastern front

'As the date for the finalisation of the Camp David accords on the western front grows nearer, the necessity for an imperialist advance on the eastern front increases, in order to complete the design of total US control over the Middle East. Thus we see an increase of political and military activities on that front, and specifically in Lebanon, at this stage. The aim is to strike a lethal blow to the concentration of forces of the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon, and to the Lebanese National Movement, in order to advance the imperialist plots specific to that area, but also as a warning to Syria and as a restriction of the latter's movement in support of our joint forces. Another aim of the escalation was to set the scene for Philip Habib to exploit the situation politically . . .

'As both Schmidt and Haig made clear last month, that political offensive aims at enlarging the Camp David process so as to include the eastern front.' But, as to the outcome of the military situation, and the resistance during the latest attacks, Sharif was candid and sanguine: 'It is true that the enemy has inflicted great losses on the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian population. It is also true that the air raids and bombardments have inflicted heavy losses in human and material terms on the towns and villages and camps involved. But the whole world, including some of the enemy's leaders, have recognised that the blows inflicted by our own forces on the enemy were also major setbacks for the enemy, who has admitted that sixty per cent of the settlers in the villages of north Palestine have migrated to the south.

Havoc

'But it is necessary to add that if the fight was stopped when the blows we dealt the enemy forced it to ask for a ceasefire from the UN, the war has not come to an end. The enemy will strike again, because Washington's ultimate design is to bring the whole region to its knees. The pattern is clear: first Washington gives the green light to the Zionist enemy, ordering him to inflict strong military blows, then it sends in Habib to make political hay out of the havoc caused by Zionist bombs made in the USA . . . We are, however, on our guard and we will not allow these political poisons to go unchecked. We are using this period of respite to prepare for the next and inevitable battle. It is necessary at this point to mention those who helped us during that last battled — and they are the same ones who helped us before and who help us in the future. It is important to point to the pioneering role played by the Jamahiriya in helping the Revolution, because without that help our forces would not have been able to inflict such blows on the enemy.'

'We have, in fact, been helped by the Steadfastness Front, with each member contributing according to his capacity, and it is important to mention Syria's steadfast position, which we rely on in our battles against the enemy. The forces which plotted against us are those of Arab reactionaries, who are now playing a dangerous game in an attempt to silence the Palestinian gun, and to push through the new settlement proposals, a modified Camp David agreement for the eastern front. The reactionary Arabs' role manifests itself in their putting financial pressure on the members of the eastern front, to force them into accepting the proposals made by Washington, whether they relate to the Lebanese problem or the wider Middle East problem. Their dependence on Washington is also visible in the alacrity with which they execute the Americans' economic plans relating to the production of oil.'

Likud or Labour: Kifkif

Concerning the new Zionist government, the PFLP political bureau member had this to say: 'The Likud have formed a government which won the Knesset's confidence in the new government, I believe therefore the present Zionist government to have a short lifespan.

'If we want to evaluate the government politically — and from the point of view of our struggle — I do not see any difference

between this government and any other Zionist government, whether Likud or Labour. The dream of past and present Zionist governments is to establish a Greater Israel, with the active help of Washington, in return for which help the Zionists have turned themselves into the prime executioners of Washington's policies in the Middle East. The present government is a tool of the Camp David alliance, and aims at expanding the framework covered by the said accords. Their next aim is to realise the autonomy scheme, a scheme rejected by our people, the Arab masses. The prime condition for realising this scheme is the elimination of the Palestinian Revolution, as it cannot be put into effect as long as we continue to exist.

'We would like to point out in this context that we will stand opposed with all our power to this scheme, and we will bury it, just as we will bury whoever dares to accept it, or to have relations with those advocating it. At the same time we will oppose the enemy's new government's attempts to subjugate us militarily and we will respond to any such attacks with deep counter-attacks. We will also escalate our activites, both political and military, inside the occupied areas in response to the Zionist escalation and as a continuation of our struggle to liberate our homeland.'

Asked about the help other Arab countries should provide, Abu Sharif said: 'We have never asked the Arab regimes to unleash an instant war against the enemy. What we have demanded was that they prepare for the prospects of a long-drawn out struggle. But at the same time we have insisted that not waging an immediate war does not mean not fighting the enemy. Here we see the importance of brother Muammar Qadhafi's call, as it symbolises exactly what the Palestinian Revolution is calling for. Brother Qadhafi has called on the Arab masses to volunteer and participate in the struggle for honour and dignity, the struggle for the freedom of Palestine. The Revolution opened its ranks to these volunteers.

Widening the front

'What we want the Arab regimes to do is to lift the barriers they impose on the masses and which keep them from participating in the revolution. In addition to this, there are other steps the Arab regimes should, and could take to raise the level of their participation in the battle: political, economic and military steps. For example, why is the Palestinian Revolution not equipped with missiles capable of shooting down the enemy's war planes which now bomb and devastate our towns and villages uncheck? Why do we not have better weapons? We have waged the last battle thanks to the support we received from Libya and Syria. We were thus able to rely on a strong base, and owe much of our might to this help.'

Asked about Sudan, Abu Sharif commented: 'Destroying Nimeiri's regime is an important step in our struggle in Palestine to subvert the Camp David Accords and for the liberation of Palestine. Our calls for help for the Palestinian Revolution and the liberation of Palestine do not make us forget the dialectical nature of this battle, and the ties that bind the battle for the liberation of Palestine to the battle of the Arab masses, for liberation and deliverance from imperialism in all its forms.

The Sudan is an important example. The destruction of the Nimeiri regime has become an essential step in our struggle. By trying to break Egypt's isolation after Sadat's betrayal, Nimeiri is simply performing a role agreed upon by the imperialists and the reactionary Arab regimes. The dangers of Nimeiri's policy reside in it allowing the Zionist enemy to move deeply into Arab territory, into the Nile valley, and this constitutes a great strategic threat to our nation, our civilisation and our culture. Thus it is the duty of the Arab liberation movement to support with all its power the progressive movement in Sudan — just as it supports the progressive movement in Egypt. With Nimeiri gone — and Egypt back in the Arab fold — we would have covered half the way to Palestine.

'America is planning to fight Arab progressive forces and Arab progressive regimes to the death, because it realised that its total domination of our region necessitates this. Thus our national duty demands that we oppose not only the imperialist attacks which take the form of the Zionist war against us, but also that we oppose imperialist interests throughout the region, on many levels — from economic boycott to armed confrontation.

We realise that co-operation between the Palestinian Revolution and the Arab Liberation Movement in a combined effort to strike against imperialism's interests, must constitute an important part of our future action programme, as this will permit us to enlarge the front of our battle against the enemy. It will thus scatter its forces while at the same time leading to an awakening of the Arab masses. The signs of such an awakening are here and so is the time of increased resistance against the common enemy.'

CSO: 4400/61

U.S. ROLE IN SAUDI PEACE EFFORT CHARGED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 23-29 Oct 81 p 7

[Article by Muhammed Abdel Salaam: "Saudis' Peace at Any Price"]

[Text] The Saudi Arabian regime has been using its vast oil revenues to enforce a new US sponsored role in the region. The Saudi Arabians who have always been close to the US, started to become more active in the politics of the region after the signing of the Camp David agreement.

During the Baghdad summit conference, held immediately after Sadat's visit to Israel, Saudi Arabia led a group of Arab States in opposing the imposing of sanctions against Egypt, which in turn undermined that summit conference.

Saudi Arabia's role has been possible because of its unique position. First, Saudi Arabia still enjoys the faith of many Arab states, and second, Saudi Arabia is able to exercise hegemony over most of the region through its manipulation of grants and aid.

What is the Saudi role? Undoubtedly it acts as a rallying point for the US policies in the region which it claims confronts Soviet influence there. This assertion can be backed up by examination of the attitude taken by Saudi Arabia, and several other states in the Baghdad Summit Conference, where they stopped any serious resolutions from being taken. More recently, the calls that have been coming out of Riyad, after the death of Sadat, to admit Egypt back into the Arab ranks are in the same vein.

On a larger scale, Saudi Arabia is playing a big role in financing anti-Soviet forces in the area: the North Yemen regime, the "rebels" in Afghanistan, Omani government, etc.

A mediating role between the US and the Arab regimes, especially the ones that do not have any official relations with the US is also a task undertaken by the Saudis. This role was made clear at the time of the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. The old-new role that Saudi Arabia is trying to play is the presenting of the US policies in the area as its own initiatives. The eight point "peace proposal" made by Crown Prince Fahd, if studied carefully, does not contain anything more than resolution 242 which was rejected by the PLO.

In fact, some points of the Saudi proposal, such as point four — "Recognition of the right of Palestinians to repatriation with compensation for those who do not wish to return" — and point eight — "Guaranteeing the rights of all states in the region to live in peace" contradict the Palestinian National Charter which is accepted by all the factions of the PLO.

Point four does not give the dispersed Palestinians the *absolute right* to return to their homes. The repatriation of the Palestinians is directly followed by "compensation" to those who do not wish to return, which implies that the right to return is not absolute.

Point eight implies that the PLO should recognize Israel, which contradicts the PLO Charter, and the PNC resolutions which rejected any such proposal.

The fact that some points of the Saudi proposal contradict the Palestinian National Charter, brings us to the conclusion that it ("the peace proposal") is backed by the US. In fact, the US position is that if the PLO gives up armed struggle and is willing to recognize Israel, then they would be ready to talk to the PLO, and this attitude does not differ much from the Saudi 'peace proposal.'

BRIEFS

ABU NIDAL OFFICES IN LEBANON--Four offices belonging to Fatah dissident leader Abu Nidal [Mazin Sabri al-Banna] have been set up in Lebanon, two in al-Biqa', one in Northern Lebanon and the fourth in Southern Lebanon. The offices have been supplied with modern weapons. This development follows the Syrian Government's pledge to PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to freeze all activity by Abu Nidal against the PLO within Syrian territory. [Text] [NC041550 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1515 GMT 4 Nov 81]

AIR TRANSPORT TO BE EXPANDED--An agreement to expand air transport links between Tunis and Beirut was initialled last week in Tunis by Lebanese Civil Aviation Director General Edmond Ghosn and his Tunisian counterpart Muhyi al-Din al-Bashrawi. The agreement provides Middle East Airlines (MEA), the Lebanese airline, with rights to a Beirut-Tunis line with a continuation on to Madrid. Similarly Air Tunis, which at present does not fly to Beirut, will receive rights to the Lebanese capital with a continuation on to an Arab capital, not yet specified. A delegation from MEA will visit Tunis this coming December to put the finishing touches to commercial agreements with Air Tunis. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 44, 2 Nov 81 p 5]

CSO: 4500/48

ROMANIA WANTS PLO TO JOIN AUTONOMY TALKS

GF011839 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 1 Nov 81 pp 1, 19

[Excerpts] Beirut--AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM has learned from reliable Palestinian sources that Romania is currently moving toward convincing some Palestinian dignitaries and personalities--especially those in the occupied land--to sit at the autonomy talks with the Israelis as a first step to improve the autonomy rule into a future independent state according to Romania's vision.

The sources have said that Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu is personally interested in this issue. He is even seeking to meet the Palestinian leaders and personalities who visit Romania from time to time. The sources add that Ceausescu met with Khalid al-Fahum, the chairman of the Palestinian National Council, during his visit to Romania a few days ago. He reviewed with him various issues defining Romania's vision concerning the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian cause in particular. The sources say that the Romanian president told al-Fahum that it is necessary for the PLO to join the autonomy negotiations. The Romanian president told al-Fahaum that this is their chance to make the first step toward establishing an independent state through improving the autonomy rule.

On Crown Prince Fahd's initiative to resolve the Middle East crisis, the sources say that Romania believes that the PLO has to adopt this initiative in the upcoming Arab summit conference. Ceausescu adds that the Arab summit's approval of the plan will open the way for a U.S.-Palestinian dialogue and for a wide European recognition of the PLO.

Asked about the hostile European stand toward the PLO and the Palestinian cause in general, Ceausescu said: "You do not have to bother much about the U.S. stand and Reagan's stand in particular toward the PLO and its role is a positive one. This administration will begin a dialogue with the PLO in the near future."

Ceausescu has reiterated his stand supporting the Camp David accords and said he understands that the Soviet initiative is complementary to these accords and not contradictory to them as the Soviets seem to indicate. He said Romania favors the convocation of an international conference that will perpetuate and improve the Camp David accords. "We will move in this direction if the situation demands us to do so," he said.

CSO: 4404/121

EGYPT, ISRAEL INDUSTRY MINISTERS DISCUSS CONTACTS, COOPERATION

TA120926 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 12 Nov 81

[Text] Industry and Trade Minister Gid'on Pat says all obstacles blocking Israeli exports to Egypt have been removed. Israeli businessmen can now go to Cairo on a multivisit visa, and goods will be transported overland. Reporting on the first day of the Egyptian industry minister's visit to Israel is (Harley Breagan).

[Begin recording] [Breagan] Taha Zaki told me he had received a very good impression of Israeli technology and was looking forward to joint ventures.

[Zaki] I am very optimistic about possibilities of collaboration between Egypt and Israel, and, therefore, as I said to my friend, His Excellency Minister Pat, that I foresee that within the next 6 months, and as we proceed--and the faster we proceed, the better--with the peace process, we'll be really collecting the fruits of the peace process. Already today there were at least maybe seven or eight Egyptian businessmen in Isratech exposition and, before they left I requested everyone of them when he returns to report to me and identify the possibilities for joint collaboration.

[Breagan] Industry Minister Pat has this to say on recent developments in Trade ties:

[Pat] For the time being I am satisfied of the fact that we are not exporting anymore just one or two items like we did last year, but a variety of items. In money terms it is not much. If we export to the world for something like 6 billion dollars and to Egypt for 20 million dollars, it's a drop in the bucket.

[Breagan] But the future was optimistic. Pat said they had agreed on joint research teams in solar energy, processing raw materials and textiles. Specific delegations would be taking part in Israeli trade fairs such as foodweek in January. And Israel's participation in the Cairo Fair next March would be much larger.

CSO: 4400/58

BRIEFS

SINAI FORCE DECISION CRITICIZED--Damascus, 1 Nov (KUNA)--A prominent Palestinian leader Sunday criticized a number of European countries for "deciding" to share in a multi-national force in the Sinai and predicted that such a step will lead to the "deterioration" of Euro-Arab relations. Speaker of the Palestinian national council--parliament in exile--Khalid al-Fahum told KUNA that Britain, France and Italy's "approval" to share in this force "will set the whole region in a serious course," and will be considered "an aggressive action against the Palestinian cause and the interests of the Arab countries." He said "the decision confirms the European countries joining in Camp David policy which aims at liquidating the Palestinian issue and ignores the Palestine people's rights." The policy of current President of France Francois Mitterrand "greatly resembles that of another leader of the Socialist Party who contributed in the tripartite aggression on Egypt" in 1956, al-Fahum said. He added, "The attitude of present British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also leads to the same policy of the U.K.'s premier during that same period." [Text] [LD011610 Kuwait KUNA in English 1510 GMT 1 Nov 81]

CSO: 4400/58

LATEST PAN-GULF INDUSTRIAL MOVES EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 pp 44-45

[Article by Paul Barker: "Industrial Cooperation in the Gulf"]

[Text]

HOPES that a joint industrial plan could be presented to the November Gulf Cooperation Council summit receded last month, when a meeting of Gulf industry ministers ended on 17 October, with a decision to set up a committee, under the chairmanship of Bahrain's Youssef al Shirawi, to work out detailed recommendations. This is by no means a sign that the vision of industrial cooperation as the vanguard of economic integration in the area is being strangled at birth, but is more an indication of the difficulties of coordinating — on paper and in policy — the many forms in which industrial cooperation already manifests itself in the Gulf.

Indeed, since the February declaration announcing the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, there have been several important steps forward on the industrial front. During the year, site clearing and other work has started at Sitra for Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company's (GPIC) combined ammonia and methanol plant, and by mid-November prequalified process engineers will have submitted their bids for the job of main contractor. GPIC is equally owned by the Bahraini, Kuwaiti and Saudi government, and was set up only last December.

In April, Qatar and Saudi Arabia signed two agreements for bilateral cooperation in the fields of petrochemicals, iron and steel. Under the agreement on petrochemicals, the two states are to prepare blueprints for joint ventures between the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic) and the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation (QGPC) aimed at utilising oil and gas reserves and avoiding the duplication of projects. The two states will also be examining the possibility of developing associated industries to complement the existing iron and steel mills at Jubail in Saudi Arabia and Umm Said in Qatar.

In July this year there was a significant change of personnel at the Doha-based Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting (GOIC) when Secretary General Dr Ali Abdul Rahman al Khalaf was replaced by a Saudi, Abdullah Hamed al Majed. Under the auspices of Dr al Khalaf, GOIC had carried out valuable research into the basis for both heavy and light industry in the Gulf, and had plans for a joint fibreglass factory, electric bulb manufacturing plant and a sheet glass works. Other projects in the pipeline included Gulf plants to produce intermediate and finished petrochemicals from local feedstock. A more executive role for GOIC might well be one of the ultimate recommendations of the ministerial committee recently established.

Joint cement production in the Gulf is also advancing apace. The Saudi-Bahraini Cement Company is already producing 3,000 tonnes a day from two kilns, and this production rate will increase to 6,000 tonnes a day by the end of the year, when the third and fourth kilns are completed. By the beginning of next year some of the company's cement will be sold in Bahrain as well as Saudi Arabia. The Saudi-Kuwaiti Cement Company has just received bids for its 2.4m tonnes a year clinker plant, which

will be the largest in the area.

Despite all these developments, there is a sense in which they represent cooperation (often only at a bilateral or trilateral level) rather than coordination. To a certain extent this is explained by the fact that coordination is not strictly necessary in certain industries: GOIC has shown, for instance, that the Gulf is likely to remain deficient in cement, iron and steel well into the 1990s, so that avoidance of duplication is not so important as ensuring plants are of sufficiently large capacity to effect economies of scale. In the case of aluminium there is little room for extra capacity beyond that already available in Bahrain and Dubai if the aim of the industry is principally to satisfy the local market, and this is one of the main reasons why the Saudis shelved their plans for a separate aluminium plant and took a share in Aluminium Bahrain (Alba) instead. But

REBELS REPORTED GETTING ARMS FROM VARIOUS COUNTRIES

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 24-25

[Article by John Stokes: "The Afghan Guerrillas' Armourers"]

[Text]

A US-SPONSORED plan to supply the Afghan rebels with arms has recently been exposed in the American media, which have published details of the CIA-organised campaign. Estimates vary, but at a conservative guess experts say that the US has so far spent $30m-$50m on helping the Afghan rebels, and even more has come from allies such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Pakistan and China.

Sources for this information have ranged from State Department officials speaking off the record to journalists, academics and Third World diplomats. The US has used the Afghanistan issue to gain entry to the Islamic world and boost its credibility among hardline Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. But the US position has forced countries like Pakistan to abandon any attempt at a negotiated settlement, which might have established Afghanistan's neutrality and aided the return of over 3m refugees. The US achievement, however, has been to bring together Islamic states, European democracies and Communist China in a secret alliance which can only mean increased bloodshed for the Afghan people.

China was one of the first countries to arm the Afghan rebels — only six months after the communist takeover from former President Daoud. As the Khalk faction of President Tarraki consolidated itself, it banned the Maoist group Sholay-e-Javaid, whose members fled into exile in China. Since then, the Chinese have funded and armed Sholay guerrillas who carry out raids largely in the northeastern province of Badakshan.

Since the Soviet intervention the Chinese have dramatically stepped up their aid to nationalist and religious groups based in Peshawar, Pakistan. They have been instrumental in keeping the rebels stocked with ammunition, which they were particularly short of, for their Soviet-made weapons. Both the Chinese and the Russians use the standard 7.62mm Warsaw Pact bore for their automatic weapons. The Chinese have also provided SAM7 shoulder-to-air missiles, anti-tank guns and ammunition and an extensive range of light arms, grenades and explosives. Many of the rebels are former Afghan army men already trained on Russian equipment, which is very similar to the standard Chinese equipment that the guerrillas are now receiving.

Most of these goods are transported by truck down the Karakorum Highway that links China with Pakistan. The 170km-long road crosses the Hindu Kush near Skardu and this year it is to be widened at a cost of $46m to cater for heavier traffic such as armoured vehicles. Earlier this summer, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang visited Islamabad and promised both the Pakistanis and Afghans increased military help. Chinese naval and military delegations have also paid extensive visits to Pakistan and, it is reported, to the Afghan refugee camps. Pakistan has denied reports that the Chinese Navy is building a port on Baluchistan's coastline.

Egypt Just before he was gunned down, President Sadat told an American reporter what had in fact been well known for some time: that Egypt had been the US's principal 'front man' for clandestine arms supplies to the Afghan resistance. Egypt has been training guerrillas for nearly two years

— but only those belonging to groups officially recognised by the US, largely members of the less fundamentalist groups such as the National Islamic Front, run by Sayed Ahmad Gailani, a Washington and Islamabad favourite.

Egypt has supplied a wide variety of weapons from its stocks of Soviet-made armaments including sophisticated items such as radio equipment. The arms are normally shipped in by transport aircraft which land in Islamabad with Pakistani permission. Other arms go via Oman, where they are taken in by sea to the Baluchistan coast and then north by truck.

Oman is the meeting point for all the major guerrilla leaders who want to make contact with the West and the Arab world, and is the focal point for the CIA's activities in coordinating aid and military training for the Afghan resistance. British help, which has been forthcoming on a small scale — although this is denied by the foreign office — is also channelled through Oman. Sultan Qabous has signed a defence agreement with the US for the use of the former British base on Masirah Island. Funds for the Afghans originating from the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia also go through Oman.

Saudi Arabia's official aid goes through the Organisation of the Islamic Conference or the Pakistan embassy in Jeddah. Officially, the Saudis have handed over $29m from public subscription for the refugees, but unofficial aid given directly to the rebel groups runs into many more millions of dollars. The usual practise is that guerrilla leaders will approach the Saudis to fund a particular arms purchasing project, such as buying arms in Europe or the Gulf. In this way the Saudis can avoid publicity. A fatwa promulgated by Saudi religious leaders allows the payment of local zakat tax directly to the Afghan refugees and the guerrillas. This is of great importance, because it means Muslims everywhere can follow suit, and public subscriptions to the rebels from such far-flung countries as the Philippines, Indonesia and Sudan have been on the increase ever since the fatwa was promulgated.

Iran shelters nearly half-a-million Afghan refugees, belonging mostly to the national minorities inside Afghanistan which have their counterparts in Iran. However, the Tehran regime has been cautious as to whom it arms. Help is certainly going to Hazara rebels — the only Shiites inside Afghanistan.

Although Iran refuses to talk to the Kabul regime and officially takes a strong line against the Soviet intervention, it has not annoyed the Soviets by openly arming the rebels and setting up training camps.

Solidarity groups in the West are largely CIA or European intelligence agency fronts. The most important is the one based in Paris which has delivered thousands of dollars' worth of ammunition (bought on the European market), medicines, clothing and military equipment to the Afghan rebels. It has also sent in two teams of sympathisers who have distributed cash to the various resistance groups. Its most recent success was to set up a radio station inside Afghanistan for the guerrillas' use. The VHF transmitter, broadcasting anti-Soviet news, is aimed at both the Afghan people and the Soviet troops.

Pakistan has clearly played a major role, as none of this aid could ever reach the Afghans without the full connivance of the government of General Zia. However, the ruling junta has laid down a number of conditions for all aid givers. No country should officially acknowledge its role as a weapons supplier, arms should not long remain in the Afghan refugee camps without Pakistan, and all arms deliveries must be overseen by Pakistani officials.

Its aim has been to give as little as possible in the form of funds or arms for the rebel groups, but to take advantage of worldwide sympathy and get other countries to foot the bill. What it has offered is complete freedom of access to all arms givers who abide by the principle of secrecy, in order to avoid increased Soviet pressure on Pakistan.

● Muslim rebels now virtually control Kandahar, Afghanistan's second largest city, according to diplomatic sources in New Delhi. According to reliable accounts, government officials come into Kandahar during the day but withdraw to the safety of Soviet barracks near the airport outside the city by late afternoon. There were similar reports about the situation in Herat.

CSO: 4600/123

OIL MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON STATUS OF OIL MARKET

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 pp 8,9

[Interview with Belkacem Nabi]

[Text] Algeria's Oil Minister Belkacem Nabi clearly did not enjoy the OPEC meeting in Geneva on October 29. After the agreement on a unified pricing structure, Mr Nabi met a selected group of French-speaking correspondents, among them AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO's Randa Takieddine. Translated extracts from Mr Nabi's press conference follow:

Q: Are you satisfied with the results of the meeting?

A. It is not a question of being satisfied or not. I think we have been going through a disturbed period for the past two years insofar as the policy OPEC wants to follow in supplying energy to consumers is concerned. This was after what you all call the second oil shock. But shocks are not permanent. There is always a time when shocks pass. This is what has happened now and things are returning to normal. It may be a balance achieved in one way or another, but in any event it is a balance within the organisation.

Q: It seems there will be a difference of $1 to $1.50 between North African differentials. How do you explain this?

A: By the lack of coherence in OPEC in situations in which an equilibrium is being sought.

Q: Do you agree with this?

A: Personally, I do not find this to be normal. But we are 13 countries which have to decide and one sometimes has to accept very irrational things. The 13 countries do not have a common vision of the future of energy.

Q: Will your country risk having to pay for this difference in the prices of African crudes?

A: I do not think so. This is because experience has shown that while price is definitely a basic factor for consuming countries, it is not only the price that is taken into consideration. There is also the question of relations between consuming and producing countries and the question of security of supply and of the continunity of trade relations between our clients and our country.

It is not mere coincidence that Algeria managed to sell its oil at $40 per barrel when others failed to sell their oil even at $34. The reason is that Algeria has always applied the official price when other countries asked for $6 to $7 more than the official price when the spot market clearly favoured the seller... OPEC is indeed an organisation, but its members are traders, and trade relationships are very important in the daily interactions between sellers and buyers.

Q: But this agreement has given Nigeria a definite advantage over North African producers, notably Algeria and Libya. Is it possible that between now and December you will reconsider and reduce your price?

A: No. Today's agreement is only valid for one month. In December, we will meet again and we hope that coherence will prevail them. There are some countries which panicked. They lost their share of the market and want to regain this share, unfortunately or fortunately, depending on which side you are on. They believe that, by reducing (their price) by $1, this would enable them to take back their part of the market. We will see in December whether or not this is valid reasoning.

Q: Is a change in this situation possible in December? At least insofar as differentials are concerned, if not the basic price?

A: Yes, it will change. Anyway, differentials are a part of the price.

Q: But is not the price of the marker crude frozen until the end of 1982?

A: Yes, the marker crude is frozen. But the sale price may change.

Q: Do you believe that an agreement can be reached within a month between the three African producers?

A: There is not just the question of differentials for North African exporters. There is also a gap between the differentials of Gulf countries as well. Some of the Gulf exporters panicked. Look how some of these countries rushed to reduce their differentials because some of them think they are not selling sufficient oil and they want to boost their sales.

I don't think it is a secret to anyone that when the market favours the seller, every seller tries to have the best differential and when the market favours the buyer, the tendency is to do the utmost to reduce differentials. The thinking is that this is a good way to improve one's competitivity in the market.

But there is a very important new element now. There is one marker crude. Saudi Arabia has increased its price and has reduced its production. Now, winter is coming, there will probably be a slight improvement in the economies of industrialised countries and the dollar will probably stabilise its value if it does not go down. Many financial experts feel the dollar has reached its peak. All these elements will come into play and will affect the decisions of our meeting in December.

Q: There was a move at the OPEC meeting in Abu Dhabi in 1978 to widen the difference in prices for light and heavy crudes on the premise that there should be an increase in the volume of sales of heavy crudes over lighter ones in view of the structure of reserves in OPEC countries. We get the impression that the Abu Dhabi meeting in December will mark a return to the *status quo ante* 1978, with prices of heavier crudes rising and those of light crudes being reduced in order to make light crudes more competitive. Is this a step backwards for OPEC?

A: If this should happen, I do not think it would be a step backwards for OPEC. But it would not be a positive step for consumer countries because everyone knows that light crudes have a wider utilisation than heavier ones, that reserves of light crudes are much more limited than those of heavier crudes and that industrial countries need both heavy and light crudes. Consumer countries would be badly affected.

Q: Do you wish to boost the level of your oil production?

A: Our production policy is determined by a number of elements, in particular our policy of conserving our resources. Prices are not the fundamental element when we consider our production policy, notably because Algeria does not produce crude only. We produce condensates, we produce gas and, now, petrochemicals. So crude is only one element in determining Algeria's revenues.

Q: What is the level of production in Saudi Arabia that is needed to produce a balanced market?

A: In our view, the desired production level for Saudi Arabia is 7 million b/d.

Q: What are your suggestions for OPEC's long term strategy?

A: First, OPEC should have a coherent and logical view that is not over-sensitive to prevailing circumstances. Your colleague has just mentioned that it was believed two years ago that the prices of light crudes should be increased and those of heavier crudes reduced. This is in the long term strategy. But that strategy was drawn up two years ago and it is a strategy which brings the organisation which elaborated it to do exactly the opposite. The least we can say is that it is definitely a questionable strategy.

Either the strategy is not coherent and it should be reviewed, or else the behaviour of OPEC is not coherent and should be changed – or at least the behaviour of certain of its members. There is clearly something

abnormal when you have a contradiction between the strategy document and the current facts facing the organisation. The first thing to do is to reach a coherent and acceptable consensus on the perspectives for energy in the long run.

Q: Does that mean you totally reject the long term strategy:

A: I reject nothing. I only say that there is a contradiction between what is written and what is done within OPEC.

Q: Have you presented new proposals for the strategy:

A: We have made some proposals and some have been accepted. Some are being considered, but everything concerning the long term strategy is under reconsideration. What we ask for is more coherence.

CSO: 4500/48

INTERVIEW WITH SUZANNE MUBARAK'S UNCLE

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 88, 23 Oct 81 pp 32-33

[Interview with John Palmer, Suzanne Mubarak's Uncle, in Bounty Bride in Wales, by Najwa al-Tami; date of interview not specified: "AL-MAJALLAH Interviews Maternal Uncle of President Mubarak's Wife"]

[Text] As Egypt's new president, Husni Mubarak, assumes the reigns of power, his wife, Suzanne emerges by his side as Egypt's first lady. News sources have communicated the fact that she is half British since her mother is from south Wales. It is in Wales, specifically in the village of Bounty Bride, that retired truck driver John Palmer still lives. He is Suzanne's maternal uncle. AL-MAJALLAH visited him in his home and conducted the following interview with him.

[Question] When was the first time you saw your niece?

[Answer] Suzy--this is what we call her in the family--came to visit us in Bounty Bride when she was 12 years old. She stayed for 6 months, and my sister enrolled her in an elementary school so that she could learn the English language and the language of the Welch people as well.

[Question] What was your impression of her at the time?

[Answer] I was quite impressed by her and by her disposition. I remember I used to call her my little princess because she had long hair and she let it hang behind her back. When we saw her again about 8 years later, she had become a young woman and had married Husni Mubarak. She was accompanying him on a visit to Britain to attend the Farnborough airplane exhibition. Suzy and her husband came to visit us here in the village, and we spent a delightful family evening together.

[Question] What did you think of Mr Mubarak after this visit?

[Answer] We thought he was a judicious young man, and our opinion of him was confirmed when we had an opportunity to meet him and to be with him more often late in 1980 when he came to Britain in an official capacity to consult with Mrs Thatcher, Britain's prime minister. The Egyptian

embassy made plans for us to meet him and his family. We stayed with them throughout their visit in Britain at Claridge's Hotel in London.

[Question] What kind of a president do you think he will be?

[Answer] I believe he will play a good role for his country. He is an educated man, and he is not a novice in the world of politics. He has been vice president long enough to have acquired the experience [that would enable him to do] his new work as president. I believe he will be firm. When I met him in 1980 I noticed that he was a determined man who holds firmly to his opinions on certain points despite the fact that our entire conversation centered around family matters. But I do know that he is a strong believer in peace, and I believe that he is sincere when he says that he will pursue the course that al-Sadat had pursued, although I hope his opponents will not do the same thing to him that they did to al-Sadat.

[Question] When was the last time you met Mubarak's family?

[Answer] Early this year. We spent a 21-day vacation in Egypt, from 21 December 1980 to 4 January 1981. We were guests of Suzanne's father, but we used to go every day to the home of Mubarak and Suzanne in Misr al-Jadidah [Heliopolis]. It was an enjoyable trip. It was the first time for my wife, my grandchild and me to fly. Everything was new for us, especially the security measures that surrounded us because we are living here like ordinary people, and we are not accompanied by guards or soldiers.

[Question] Were you under these precautions for the duration of your visit?

[Answer] Yes, we were accompanied by a guard everywhere we went. I remember that when we went to visit the Egyptian museum, Suzanne was with us. Motorcycles preceded our car; the director of the museum greeted us, and there were no visitors in the museum all the time we were there. We also have beautiful memories of the pyramids, of Luxor and of Aswan where the governor greeted us and planned a full itinerary for our visit. We used to travel in some areas in President al-Sadat's airplane.

[Question] Who suggested the visit and when?

[Answer] Mubarak's family suggested it when we went to see them in London late in 1980. The family suggested the idea. And when I say family, I mean Husni, Suzy and the children. But I want to make an important point. We paid for this visit; it was not at the expense of the Egyptian government as has been said of the visits made to Egypt by Mrs Jihan al-Sadat's relatives.

[Question] Tell us something about your sister, Suzanne's mother.

[Answer] She was an educated woman, with a refined taste. She loved music and she used to read a great deal. We even used to say that she took all the brains in the family and did not leave anybody a share. She worked as a nurse at Cardiff Hospital where she met her husband, Dr Thabit,

Suzanne's father. They fell in love and got married, and then she went to Egypt and lived with him. She had two children, Munir, or Tony as we call him, and Suzanne. She learned Arabic, and she died and was buried in Egypt in 1978.

[Question] How do you feel about being related to Egypt's new president?

[Answer] I am excited, but I am also somewhat worried and tense because of conditions. I hope things will settle down because I think Husni is a respectable and an admirable man. By the way I received a letter from a British lady who asked me the same question, and my reply to her was that this was not the first time that a member of the family had become a well-known political figure. My maternal uncle, William Hales, was prime minister of Australia for a while. President Mubarak's case, however, is closer to home because I am like an uncle to him, am I not? He always calls me Uncle John, and he calls my wife Aunt Nelly, just as Suzanne does.

[Question] Have you been in touch with Mubarak's family recently?

[Answer] Yes, of course. We correspond with each other, and we exchange greetings on the occasion of Islamic and Christian feasts. This was before the recent events. At the present time I make inquiries about them through the Egyptian embassy in London. We send them verbal messages and they send us verbal replies through the military office. The most recent example of that was the verbal message I received in response to my questions about what happened during the assassination.

[Question] What were these questions?

[Answer] They all naturally had to do with the safety of the family. I asked whether or not Husni had been wounded, and I was told that he was wounded in his left hand. I asked if Suzanne had attended the parade, and I was told that she was on the stand with Jihan al-Sadat and the rest of the ladies but that none of them had been hurt.

John Palmer

--Suzanne's maternal uncle lives in a modest home, like older retired people do in Britian, with his wife Nelly and his granddaughter, Christina.

--Munir Thabit, Suzanne's brother is working in the Egyptian embassy in Washington.

--Husni Mubarak has two children: 'Ala' and Jamal. The family in Britain call them Allen and Jimmy.

--Suzanne's mother was a nurse in one of the hospitals affiliated with the Prison Administration in Egypt.

--Suzanne attended the American University [in Cairo] where she studied sociology and economics. She married Husni Mubarak when she was 17 years old.

سوزان مع جدتها ووالدتها تحمل علاء

Fig 1

حسني مبارك مع ولديه علاء وجمال

Fig 2

سوزان مبارك في الرابعة عشرة

Fig 3

خال سوزان مبارك وزوجته

Fig 4

PHOTO CAPTIONS

1. Suzanne, with her grandmother and her mother carrying 'Ala'.

2. Husni Mubarak with his two sons, 'Ala' and Jamal.

3. Suzanne Mubarak at 14.

4. Suzanne Mubarak's maternal uncle and his wife.

8592
CSO: 4504/65

IRREGULARITIES BESET FOREIGN TRADE SCENE

Aid From India Requested

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 p 41

[Text] **Iran** has asked for India's help in setting up small cement plants, foundries, and developing the castings, forgings,ceramics, electronics and mining industries. The request was conveyed by Iran's housing and rural development minister, Mohammed Shahab Gonabadi, during a meeting last week with the Indian planning minister, Narayan Dutt Tiwari.

According to the official statement, Iran has also requested help in increasing supplies of building material and creating increased capacities in the construction industry. The Iranian delegation spent a week in New Delhi before travelling on to Moscow.

NZ Lamb Shipment Held Up

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 p 53

[Text] A SHIP loaded and ready to sail for Iran with New Zealand lamb is being held in port because Iran has not paid for earlier shipments. Iran now owes the New Zealand Meat Board NZ$24m ($29m) and the board has adopted a get-tough policy. In September, the Iran Central Bank stopped approving letters of credit for imports and New Zealand meat exporters have not been paid.

The Blue Port Line vessel *Mandana* finished loading 3,200 tonnes of lamb for Iran three weeks ago but has not sailed. Other shipments on the water and already in store in Iran have also not been paid for. One South Island meat processing company has held back payments to farmers who supplied lamb for Iran earlier in the year because the company itself has not been paid.

Meat Board chairman Adam Begg said the situation has reached a stage 'where it needs to be brought home to the Iranian authorities that the delay in payment is a breach of our contract.' The late payment could have a considerable effect on New Zealand's decision to supply lamb to Iran next year.

Last season Iran bought 30,000 tonnes of New Zealand lamb worth about NZ$70m ($84m). There were some delays in payments from Iran but these all eventually came through. This year the delays are much longer, the amount of money involved is much greater and there is no indication that payment is likely soon.

● Turmoil in Iran and Afghanistan has ruined an overland trade route that was becoming a major link between Europe and the Indian sub-continent. International traffic through the customs post at Torkham on the Pakistan-Afghan border has virtually disappeared. Bi-lateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan had also been cut, to one-tenth of what it was.

Before that, customs revenue collected at the post, located 50km from Peshawar, had doubled in two years to $7m as merchants in Europe switched from sending goods by ship to road transport.

The fall of the Shah nearly halved the customs revenue, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan sent it plummeting further. The road between Torkham and Kabul became a major guerrilla target. Travelling became increasingly dangerous. The latest figures show that in the year ending June only $150,000 was collected at Torkham. Pakistan's bilateral trade with Afghanistan has dropped from about 130 trucks a day travelling in each direction to about 40.

Disruption of Petroleum Output

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 54-55

[Article by Philip Marfleet: "Confusion Over Iran's Oil Supplies"]

[Text] AS OPEC's oil ministers were gathering this week in Geneva for their special conference on pricing, there were fresh indications of the extent of difficulties faced by Iran. Previously among the most obdurate of opponents to Saudi Arabia's calls for a lower official price. Iran recently announced that it would peg the value of a barter deal with Romania 'at the Opec price', rather than specifying the $37 a barrel it had insisted on in previous deals. This was the first hint that the Iranians might consider reluctant acceptance of a unified Opec price lower than its preferred level.

Figures on Iran's current oil exports are shrouded in secrecy, and recent reports that they had been seriously disrupted by further war damage are in dispute. The Iraqis claim that air raids on Gurreh pumping station last month have caused chaos at Iran's Gulf terminals, and the National Oil Company of Iraq says that Iranian exports would decrease by 90 per cent as flows to the huge Kharg Island terminal dried up.

The independent Middle East Economic Survey (MEES) has confirmed that Iran has been unable to pump oil to Kharg. Tankers are said to be still loading there, but are rapidly emptying stockpiles. The terminal can store 6m barrels. Given the extent of damage claimed by the Iraqis, these reserves should be close to exhausted, but in London sources in two major oil companies denied that there had been any interruption to regular supplies and said there was no indication yet of a dry-up.

Evidence of disruption, says MEES, comes from Iran's own customers, who have been warned that in future they will be expected to load from the small Lavan and Sirri oil terminals further down the Gulf. The joint capacity of the terminals is some 200,000 barrels a day, not enough to compensate for the 300,000 b/d of the Kharg outlet, if, as alleged, it has ceased to receive oil through the Iranian pipeline network.

Iran disputes the claimed extent of the damage at Gurreh and its effects on exports, though in London an Iranian official did not deny that there had been a disruption of supplies. Iraqi claims, he said, were grossly exaggerated. According to the *Financial Times*, Iran's current output is about 400,000 b/d. This is 20 per cent down on an earlier October estimate of 500,000 b/d and may indicate a disruption to flow, but not the catastrophic decline that others have described.

The problems at Gulf terminals came soon after a series of contractual difficulties for Iran's oil industry. A team from the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) met representatives of 13 Japanese oil companies, British Petroleum and Royal Dutch/Shell in London, in an attempt to establish new terms for nine-month contracts which had counted for a substantial proportion of Iran's oil exports.

The talks produced mixed results. BP ceased to lift Iranian crude after 30 September, while Shell renewed its agreement for 100,000 b/d, but only until March 1982. The Japanese are said to have withdrawn from their contracts to draw 250,000 b/d. London sources in the oil industry said that

the companies were 'very unhappy' with the prices requested by NIOC, though negotiations were continuing.

Recent developments have resulted in a substantial restructuring of Iranian oil markets. Iran has cancelled all production and exploration contracts with a group of major western companies. Shell, BP, Compagnie Francaise des Petroles and Exxon were among those who were told last month that all agreements signed before the Islamic Revolution were now void.

They had belonged to a 14-strong consortium of companies formed to exploit Iranian oil in 1954 after the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh. The consortium agreement had been negotiated in 1973, when the bulk of the Iranian oil industry was already in the hands of the NIOC. In an official statement from the oil ministry in Tehran members of the consortium were said to have 'plundered the oil resources of Iran from 1954 to 1973 while Iran, the justified owner, had only little to benefit from the contract'.

The cancellation was said by the companies merely to be a formal confirmation of existing arrangements.

A large proportion of Iranian production is now being taken up by Eastern European countries. On 1 October, Yugoslavia started to lift Iranian crude as part of a deal which will last until December 1982. Yugoslavia will take 56,000 b/d during the last quarter of 1981, and the balance of 1m tonnes at a rate of 20,200 b/d during 1982.

Following the Yugoslav agreement, Iran signed a protocol with Romania for at least 4m tonnes of Iranian crude. The agreement in principle also provided for 30,000 b/d of Iranian oil to be processed by Romanian refineries. The deal should be finalised within two months.

Both Eastern European deals include arrangements for exchange of manufactured goods for Iranian oil, and Iran is pressing for further barter deals. Iran will buy 75,000 tractors and 50 locomotives from Romania, leasing a further 30 locomotives. Romania has promised technical assistance and spare parts to reconstruct installations damaged in the war with Iraq. The value of such barter deals is dictated by the value of oil. A reduction of $3 a barrel to $34 would have a significant effect on Iran's bargaining power.

CSO: 4600/122

AHWAZ LIBERATION FRONT STATEMENT

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 204, 19 Oct 81 p 14

[Text] During the last week of September, the preparatory committee for the Ahwaz Liberation Front (ALF) held a special meeting during which it confirmed the beginning of its political and organizational activities for the leadership of the people of Ahwaz. This was similar to the "Strong Arab reply which our brothers in Iraq directed toward removing all signs of Persian imperialism and authority in its two faces: the racist and the religious; the Shah's and Khomeyni's."

The Front approved in its meeting the names of the Ahwazi [citizens] who have taken leadership responsibilities there. Sayyid Hadi Sayyid 'Adnan al-Musawi was elected general secretary of the Front, assisted by a committee of 10 people among whom are the deputy director of security and the deputy director of the secretariat and other members. The following statement was also issued:

"Dear Citizens of our Arab nation:

For the past half century or more, the people and the land of the Arab Ahwaz have been under Persian occupation and control, who used the worst methods to destroy, defeat and mislead the citizens of this Arab region.

Our Arab people's fate in Ahwaz was not different from that of the defeated Iranian people. So all of them rose to demand the realization of their nationalistic identities. Our Arab people's destiny in Ahwaz was to offer many martyrs who were against the Shah's organizations, in the hope of establishing a regime that ensured nationalistic independence and respected the honor of Islam and spreading it in the world, carried by the brave Arabs. But our people were disappointed very soon after Khomeyni took over. Within a few days, the Arabs in Ahwaz were the first to be racially stabbed in the back, embodied in the Persian racist spirit that had raised the banner of animosity against the Arab nation since more than 40 centuries.

Khomeyni and his entourage who call themselves religious men suppressed and punished our people severely, trying to prevent these good people from speaking their own language: the language of the Koran.

However, these struggling people refused to yield to this new injustice. They raised the banner of struggle another time, and pushed their best children to armed struggle to attain freedom and independence and to achieve an honorable way of peaceful living

on their land. If there is anything worth mentioning and which will remain in the conscience of these people and this nation, it would be the stand of our people in Iraq, whose blood was shed for the liberation of this area of the Arab nation. Let the blood of those Iraqis mix with the good blood of the Ahwazis for the recovery of our precious Ahwaz, as our faith remains deep that God and history will remember Iraq in its new Arab [holy] mission by what it offered as support in the form of money and men for the liberation of our people and their honor to belong to the Arab nation."

9455
CSO: 4404/109

'POST' COMMENTS ON SHARON 'RED LINES' DOCTRINE

TA091019 Jerusalem POST in English 9 Nov 81 p 8

[David Landau commentary: "Sharon Doctrine for the Jordan"]

[Text] Defence Minister Ari'el Sharon recently spelled out some basic tenets of Israel's defence doctrine in laudably clear and straightforward terms. Doubtless his words were culled and mulled over with care in the chanceries of the surrounding states.

Sharon spoke of "red lines," the crossing of which would be a casus belli for Israel. Thus, he explained, if Syrian troops were to cross into South Lebanon; or if Iraqi troops were to cross into Syria or Jordan; or if Egyptian troops were to cross into Sinai in excess of the numbers permitted under the peace treaty--in any one of these cases, Israel would have to go to war.

(Sharon added that the production or possession of nuclear weapons by an enemy Arab state would also trigger armed action by Israel.)

The defence minister's red line approach harks back to David Ben-Gurion who laid down that Iraq's entry into Jordan would be regarded by Israel as an act of war. The deterrent-effectiveness of that warning lasted for nearly two decades.

Indeed one need hardly be an expert strategist to appreciate the good sense of a red line policy. A small state with a powerful striking arm, surrounded by enemies, cannot wait until the threat is right on its doorstep before striking back.

And it is as well that Sharon spoke out clearly, so that our enemies (and friends too) are forewarned and that they cannot act (militarily) as they please--even on territory that is not contiguous with Israel's borders.

The question is, though, why shouldn't the "Sharon doctrine" apply to the Jordan River?

The Sharon doctrine establishes that Israel's red lines are not identical with its borders, but are drawn deep inside Arab, cannot the Jordan River be another strategic red line? Why must the government seek to establish Israel's political border along that river?

Or, put another way, how can the Likud Government advance strategic arguments for Israel retaining the West Bank when its defence minister has determined that Israel need not hold a territory in order to lay down a strategic red line along the edge of that territory?

Israel could divest itself of the political albatross that is the West Bank while determining--according to the Sharon doctrine--that the Jordan River shall always remain its strategic red line. The West Bank, under whatever rulership, would be virtually demilitarized, and if any attempt were made to bring heavy weapons across the river--that would be a casus belli for Israel.

Because of the narrow dimensions of the whole area, Israel could rightfully insist on permanently maintaining some IDF presence on the mountains or on the river. As Premier Begin often points out, there is a hint of this in the Camp David agreement itself: "All necessary measures will be taken to assure the security of Israel and its neighbours during the transitional period and beyond."

The Sharon doctrine, then, irrefutably strips away the "strategic" argument from the greater Israel (Eretz Yisra'el Hashlema) thesis. That thesis, of course, retains its historical, religious, metaphysical and other wordly arguments. Perhaps the famous French adage fits it best: c'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre--it is lofty, but it has nothing to do with the strategy of warfare.

CSO: 4400/58

ARMY CRITICIZED FOR WEST BANK COLLEGE POLICY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 21 Oct 81 pp 3,7

[Article by Benny Morris]

[Text]

A committee of five Hebrew University teachers has rejected the charge by "senior military government sources" that the academic activities of the West Bank universities "are at best a cover up for political activity and, at worst, for subversive activity."

The five recently published an unofficial report on "The Condition of the Universities in the Occupied Territories" based on months of investigation begun in December 1980. The report recommends that the military government rescind "Order 854" and "refrain from closing universities" (in the territories) as a means of punishment or to prevent disturbances.

Neither the IDF nor Defence Ministry spokesman would comment on the report.

The 14-page document was compiled by Ruth Gavison (jurist), Yehoshua Kolodny (geologist), David Kretzmer (jurist), Eliezer Rabinovitch (physicist), and Menahem Ya'ari (economist).

Order 854, promulgated by the military government in July 1980, is an Israeli addendum to Jordanian (Education) Law No. 16, and extended the Hashemite law — which dealt with kindergartens and schools — to cover the West Bank universities. The order and its appendices empower the government to annually license the universities, to oversee (and veto) appointments of academic staff and the selection of students, and to supervise curriculum and textbooks.

Stating that the Order "allows for infringement of academic freedom," the report calls for its rescission.

"The fact that the Order has not been invoked since its promulgation strengthens our conclusion that it was unneeded," states the report.

The committee of Hebrew University academics confined its investigation to the condition of Bir Zeit, near Ramallah, Bethlehem University, Najah University in Nablus, the Islamic College in Hebron and the Religious College in Gaza and to those "orders and procedures directed especially at the academic institutions and which apply restrictions to them over and above those which apply to the general population."

"Even though there is some support for the view that disruption in the conduct of studies, that stems from friction with the military government, may help a university in its public relations in the Arab states, the committee's impression is that the administrations made great efforts to assure the regular execution of the curriculum, in spite of their awkward position between the hammer and the anvil," the report states.

The report found no evidence for the charge that teaching at the universities, primarily at Bir Zeit, "perverts reality and has little regard for the truth." The committee, for example, was told that the geography of the Land of Israel was taught with maps on which Israeli

settlements do not appear. But it found that Bir Zeit uses State of Israel Survey Department maps and the course includes a tour of Israeli sites.

"There is no doubt that during the course....there is also discussion of Israeli settlements which were erected in places on which previously Arab settlements stood. Obviously this fact may be presented in various ways. However, the committee found no evidence that the study of geography at Bir Zeit is based on denying facts."

The committee also investigated the charge that Bethlehem University, in dismissing its outgoing president, Brother Joseph Lowenstein, had acted to the detriment of academic freedom. The report points out that Lowenstein was fired because the Jordanian government refused to grant the university academic recognition, one condition for which was acceptance of the university by the Association of Arab Universities. The Association accepts as members only universities with Arabs at its head — hence Bethlehem was forced to appoint an Arab in place of Brother Lowenstein.

"After hearing, this, the committee concluded that the decision of the university resulted from the academic straits in which the university found itself, and not from indifference towards academic freedom in the institution."

Looking at the positive aspects of the relations between the universities and the military government, the report points out that in 1967, at the start of the occupation, there were no universities in the administered areas whereas today there are five. "Furthermore, the military government itself approved the establishment of these institutions," the report says.

The report also points out that the military government over the years has allowed teachers from Arab states (mainly Jordan) to lecture at the West Bank universities, and the Israeli authorities recognize the degrees awarded by these universities (for the purpose of salary increments for teachers, for example.)

But on the negative side, "the committee gained the impression that neither the military government nor the universities are interested in cooperation beyond the minimum called for."

In substantiating this impression, the Israeli academics point out that the military government refused to permit "nursing students from Bethlehem University to get practical training in government hospitals in the territories and (refused to allow) student teachers to practise-teach in government schools."

"Thus," the report states, "since the establishment of the institutions, reciprocal relations between them and the military government have been limited for the most part to events of a negative sort in which the military government was engaged in a struggle with one or another of the universities."

The report points out that the military government has over the years closed down universities five times and the committee defines closing a university as "an act of collective punishment and as such... unacceptable."

The report also criticizes the military government, at least in three cases, for refusing to allow persons to serve as university faculty members, despite permission to live in and move about the territories.

The report also criticizes the West Bank government's "refusal" to allow the "creation of additional departments" in Bethlehem University and the refusal to allow Najah University to build a new campus, thus curtailing its scholastic expansion.

The report, however, stresses that "there has been no real friction between the military government and the universities" with regard to "student admissions, setting curriculum and budgeting."

The report states that the only controversy between the authorities and the universities concerning admissions stemmed from Bir Zeit's apparent easing of admission conditions for persons who had previously served prison terms for security offences. "It is no surprise that the authorities disapprove of this policy. Nonetheless, it was our impression that they acted with restraint in this matter, and limited themselves to expressions of protest."

As to the universities' receipt of most of their funds from Arab states hostile to Israel (and, reportedly, from the PLO), the report states, "Although some of the funding sources ... are certainly not to the liking of the military government, it has so far shown no tendency to interfere with the budget policy of these institutions."

Nor, states the report, has the government attempted to cancel or restrict courses. But the government does "limit access of the universities to radioactive materials."

The report also condemns the government's censorship of books in the West Bank, from which 658 books officially have been banned. (The military government refuses to publish the list.) "As academics, we object to all restrictions on books, but in the framework of our present inquiry we express no opinion about the general policy on the matter. We merely ask that the military government reconsider the ban, or at least try to limit it as far as possible. Even if the general ban is maintained, we recommend allowing universities to order a reasonable number of copies for an academic library of *any* book."

CSO: 4400/60

SOCIOECONOMIC STATISTICS REPORTED

TA050931 Jerusalem POST in English 5 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by Shlomo Ma'oz]

[Text] For the first time in the history of Israel, emigrants have outnumbered immigrants during the last two years, government statistician Moshe Sicron disclosed yesterday, presenting journalists with the 1981 statistical abstract.

Other established trends which continued during the period covered were lower marriage and birth rates, more divorces and fewer immigrants.

During each of the last two years, emigrants outnumbered newcomers by approximately 10,000. Projections for this year point to a total of some 11,000 immigrants, with about 20,000 persons expected to leave. The immigration figure is the lowest in Israel's history with the possible exception of 1953, when about that number arrived. Estimates peg the total number of emigrants since 1948 at 300,000.

Israel's population is expected to reach 4 million in April or May of next year, and if recent demographic trends continue, there will be 5.5 million citizens in 2000. Of these 4.3 million will be Jews, an increase of 30 percent, and 1.2 million non-Jews, a 90 percent rise. During the last decade, the population has increased by 900,000 including 700,000 Jews.

Only 94,300 babies were born in 1980, down from 95,600 in 1975. The birth rate for Jewish women dropped from 3.4 per person in 1970 to 2.8 per person last year, with the gap between various ethnic groups dropping in recent years. Among non-Jewish women, the drop for the decade was from 8.9 to 6.0.

The number of Jewish marriages fell from 28,000 in 1975 to 24,700 last year. The sharp drop is partly explained by the aging of the country's population, but lower figures were registered for all age groups. In addition, divorces were up, affecting 6 percent of all couples during the first 5 years of marriage and 10 percent during the first 15 years.

The number of women working outside the home has steadily increased from 31.6 percent in 1975 to 37 percent in 1980. The country's total labour force grew during the same period by 15 percent, reaching 1,318,000, with the number actually employed (accounting for higher unemployment) rising by 11 percent.

Especially large was the increase in employment in financial services--39 percent--and in public services--2 percent. The industrial labour force grew by only 7 percent.

Workers from the administered territories constituted 5.4 percent of the Israeli labour force. Numbering 72,000 last year, they were 34 percent of the territories' total work force.

While families shrank in size, the standard of living showed a steady increase. Real net income of workers is expected to rise by between 8 and 10 percent this year. In 1980 the figure was already 21 percent higher than 5 years previously.

A consumer goods survey showed that by 1980, 3.7 percent of all families owned a deep freezer, 2.6 percent an automatic dishwasher, 34 percent a colour television and 87 percent a black-and-white model. Telephones could be found in 61.5 percent of all homes, private or commercial vehicles parked in front of 36 percent. A total of 12.3 percent enjoyed central heating, 21.6 percent gas heaters, 14 percent electric radiators, and 33 percent kerosene heaters. Air conditioners were owned by 8 percent of all households, 48 percent had electric water heaters and 42.5 percent solar units.

CSO: 4400/58

MAJOR GENERAL BEN-GAL INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON OPERATIONS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Sep 81 p 20

[Interview with Major General Avigdor (Yanush) Ben-Gal, commanding general of the Northern Command, on the occasion of his leaving his command, by Edna Pe'er; date and place not specified]

[Text] "I am a professional soldier. I can serve today in any army in the world, and theoretically and professionally I can do this in an excellent manner because I am a professional soldier. However, in terms of identification and emotion, I can serve only in the IDF," said Major General Avigdor (Yanush) Ben-Gal this week before his leaving his position as commanding general of the Northern Command.

[Question] It is said that you rejoice in combat, that you always rush into action, and with all your strength. Is this true?

[Answer] Yes and no. It depends . . .

[Question] I will ask you something else. When you were commander of Brigade 7, you said that you would want to be a "wartime brigade commander." As a major general have you maintained that attitude?

[Answer] Yes. I will tell it like it is. A cold answer, and to a large extent unethical and unconscionable, and I know that it will be difficult for civilians to understand this. If there were no need for war, armies would not be formed. As a professional military man, I can express my full, true capability only in time of combat. My entire mission is eventually to fight, and therefore, I prepare myself and others. I exist for this purpose, no matter how beastly, cruel, and unpleasant this may sound. Why do I wear a uniform if not to fight?

[Question] And you rush into battle in order to accomplish this mission of yours?

[Answer] I rush not in order to realize my personal desires but only when I come to the conclusion that there is no alternative for solving the problems of our conflict. Only then I am not embarrassed and I do not hesitate to make a recommendation and push for it.

[Question] Does perhaps your "professional bias" as a professional soldier reject other solutions?

[Answer] The more my level rises and the more I move up in grade, the less and less I push for it. Today I am more considerate and more balanced because I have acquired additional tools which are not precisely focused on a solution entailed in military force. In general I believe that today I am more cautious and more moderate than ever. Also because I recognize my particular importance and my considerable influence.

I Have Already Become Embroiled "with Such Matters"

[Question] How, for example, did you use your influence in the intervention in Lebanon, in Zahlah, in the decisions to shoot down the helicopters, and the bombing of the headquarters in Beirut?

[Answer] This was not the responsibility of the Northern Command. You are asking me questions which in order to answer them, I must analyze the political echelon and the General Staff echelon, and I am not in a position . . . at least not in an interview at my separation from command in order to judge others . . . I have already become embroiled with such matters, and I have been censured and I have already had contentions with the press . . . I have a problem with this, therefore I am very cautious this time . . .

[Question] The prime minister once said: "Yanush in the north should fight and not talk!"

[Answer] Yes. The problem is not only mine. The problem involves all the generals in the north. Dado, of blessed memory, also had such difficulties, and I think that Raful also made all kinds of statements during his tour as commanding general of the Northern Command. This is not simply because of the personality of each one of us. It is because the Northern Command in essence is involved not only in a military problem but also in the civilian area, the agricultural area, and everything else . . . the northeastern front is not only military but also political. And at the level of the commanding general of the Northern Command, it is very difficult for a person who really wants to carry out his duty to confine himself to a very limited area. Therefore, you trespass and touch upon matters such as the Arabs of Israel, the Arabs of the Galilee, and the settlement in the Galilee as opposed to the settlement in Judea and Samaria . . .

[Question] It is claimed that you get involved in political procedures. Don't you accept the view that generals should determine only the military procedures?

[Answer] Absolutely not! I speak frankly, and I say openly that generals should also influence the political-defense outlook of the State of Israel. The question as to whether or not they must publicize their view is debatable, however they must definitely have a political, national, Zionist view! Nonetheless, I accept the criticism that generals must not publicize their views in the communications media . . . but the nature of a person is such that . . . it comes out . . .

[Question] And for you "it comes out" often!

[Answer] Not so much and not intentionally. Only when I am agitated and believe that it is right that I should fight for the principles in which I believe. When I have an opinion, I am somehow compelled to react and to bring it to the attention of the public . . .

[Question] In order to mobilize public support?

[Answer] No! In order to express myself . . . I actually restrain myself not to say too much, and at times I fail . . . however it is spontaneous and not premeditated!

"They Did Not Consider Me Fit to be a Tank Commander"

[Question] You once said to me: "I am generally not fit to be in the army." Did you mean it?

[Answer] Yes. Because I am somewhat unusual, "out of it." I did not think that I would remain very long in the army.

[Question] And you have already served more than 25 years. . .

[Answer] Correct. However when they selected people from my company for the tank commander's course, they did not consider me fit . . . I was disorderly, undisciplined, an individualist. My advancement to the rank of lieutenant colonel was rather slow because of confrontations with my commanders. Actually I decided to remain in the army when I took it upon myself to become the commander of Brigade 7.

[Question] You planned a military career?

[Answer] I did not run after the positions. They came to me. I was spoiled, and I received the best positions in the army. Battalion commander at the Canal in the War of Attrition -- an unusual position. Brigade 7 -- The position! Division commander in the north -- the position! In order to receive this position I did much, you should know! This is a position about which I said to myself: Yanush, you are not finishing your military career (and this is not to say that I have finished my military career) without becoming the commanding general of the Northern Command. This is the IDF command. The sector, the essence, everything!!!

[Question] You are now being separated from the Northern Command and are leaving behind many burning and unsolved problems: missiles, terrorists, Syrian domination in Lebanon, and Syria's growing militants . . .

[Answer] Now is actually a good time to leave because in the near future I look for quiet in the North. It is good that I am leaving now because in the coming months they will be playing only with the political procedures: they are resuming the autonomy negotiations in Egypt, the prime minister is traveling to Washington, they are involved in the final stage of the evacuation of the Sinai, and the Americans have acted in an unusual and aggressive manner in suspending the aircraft . . . Aside from this, after the "peak" of the bombings in Beirut and the bombing of the reactor, Israel's military reaction capability has been weakened, and we have moved to the stage of attempting to solve the acute problems in Lebanon by political means.

"The Chief of the General Staff Will Naturally Hope to Restrain Me"

[Question] Upon completion of a tour of duty, one generally makes a self-appraisal. You are certainly evaluating the past. Which action would you not repeat?

[Answer] I was not ready for this question, and it is difficult for me to answer you instantly. This requires analysis and thought. However, with all humility, I do not think that in the last 4 years we have taken any action in the command or in the IDF which has damaged the State of Israel in view of the result which we wanted to achieve. Take, for example, the bombing of the reactor. The advantages in terms of the national security overshadow in the final analysis the disadvantages and the damage caused. There are, of course, a number of actions which I would have expanded after the fact. One of the mistakes in the Litani operation was that we did not occupy the Sur enclave, and it is a springboard for the terrorists. Another mistake in that operation was that we did not take control of the Arnon enclave, the present location of most of the terrorists. We were also not stubborn enough in our opposition to the bringing down of the Lebanese Army into the UNIFIL area, and this is working against us. In general, I would not return to UNIFIL as much as we did, and then Haddad's enclave would be much wider . . . such things.

[Question] What is your fundamental position on the case of the return of our soldier in exchange for 80 imprisoned terrorists?

[Answer] This is a difficult problem of conscience. Essentially, we should oppose this vigorously. However in terms of the pain of the family, we must move toward them. I cannot find fault with this case, however we should not do it frequently so as not to convert it to a norm between us and the terrorists.

[Question] The opportunities that I have had to follow you and to listen to your positions, I have gotten the impression that for you the attainment of the objective, the target -- this takes precedence over everything else. It virtually sanctifies the means.

[Answer] I know exactly to what you are referring. To that operation in which we penetrated Lebanon and in which a soldier disappeared, and I wanted to continue on to the objective and complete the mission in contrast to the chief of the general staff who decided that we must stop the action, give up the mission, and deploy all the forces to find the soldier.

[Question] Correct. Is there a difference of world outlook between you? Or is it perhaps a difference of the conception of an armored person against a paratrooper who has personal experience in such penetrations . . .

[Answer] Neither. Look, there should not be a misunderstanding, I did not give up on the soldier. I thought that it would be possible to do both things simultaneously. Raful had the vantage point of the chief of the general staff . . . At the forward command post there were both the chief of the general staff and the commanding general of the Command, so I permitted myself to take more risks because subconsciously I knew that I was under supervision and therefore I permitted myself to be more extreme. The chief of the general staff naturally will hope to restrain, to block, to slow up, and to see matters in a more balanced perspective.

[Question] He must do this often with you?

[Answer] Not often. I think that it is an excellent synthesis for one who wants to rush forward and complete the action that above him sits one who also knows how to restrain, to block, to slow up, and to see matters in a perspective which is not necessarily immediate but broader.

[Question] How do you explain the fact that in a certain exercise, a theoretical exercise, of course, you let the enemy occupy a certain settlement only for several days? All of this on the basis of a military strategy which everyone agreed was brilliant but to the complete surprise of the chief of the general staff who could not accept your solution and said: "Yanush, it is a Jewish settlement!!!!"

[Answer] Good. You must not be worried. As long as the exercise is theoretical, and it is an exercise of maps or a war game, it is possible to conduct oneself and to give theoretical solutions which will not be exactly in these details the true solution which would be given in the time of war or battle.

"Had I Been Without Values, I Could Not Have Remained in the Army"

[Question] I asked you this because I was wondering if there isn't something here of a world outlook. It is no secret to you that they say "the man without values, there is nothing sacred to him . . ."

[Answer] If I were really without values and nothing were sacred to me, I would not be in the Army! This is my answer. There is no truth to this! The work in which I invest my entire being, my motivation, and the desire to do things in the best and most complete manner, together with my sharp self-criticism -- all of these are not indicative of a person without values. I am not a formalist, and I like to shorten processes and solve problems essentially and on the spot. Small ones and large ones. I know that they also say: "For the sake of his career, Yanush steps on bodies . . ." Lies. A bluff of the first rank! I am concerned about those under my command, I respect them and promote the best of them. I think that I have acquired such a reputation because I am a person who speaks the truth 90 percent of the time, and it is not always pleasant to hear . . .

[Question] In your command do you have much contact with civilians?

[Answer] Yes. I love the civilians in the North.

[Question] After what we saw in Qiryat Shemona, for example, does the morale of the civilian settlements permit us to endure for a length of time the kind of war of attrition to which we were recently subjected?

[Answer] The answer is no and rightfully so. In times of war, the civilians are able to endure the burden. However, in times of peace, in periods between the wars, the civilians are not built psychologically to endure the pressure, the horror, and the fear.

[Question] What does this mean to you as the commanding general in the North?

[Answer] That we must under no circumstances accept as a norm that a civilian settlement in the State of Israel will endure for a length of time during a period of peace enemy shells or terrorists.

[Question] You made a stalemate, a cease-fire . . .

[Answer] Without the cease-fire, we would have emerged more clearly and strongly as victors. The IDF and the State of Israel cannot be blamed. They cut us off in the process of solving the problem.

[Question] You made a stalemate, a cease-fire . . .

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[Question] Did they prepare the settlements in the North, from Qiryat Shemona to the kibbutzim, physically and psychologically for what was to happen?

[Answer] The question is not valid because no one knew that this would happen and on such a scale.

We Did Not Take into Account Abandonments in Qiryat Shemona

[Question] Does the prospect that residents of Qiryat Shemona would leave taken into account before we began to fire?

[Answer] No! Let's talk about me. I, Yanush, Commanding General of the Northern Command, did not believe and did not take into my consideration that there would be such a large abandonment in Qiryat Shemona. I also did not estimate that the reaction of the terrorists would be so massive. However, it is also not correct to say that the settlements of the North, Qiryat Shemona, and Nahariyyah were not prepared. They were surprised, they were not prepared psychologically. However, in foundation, in construction, and organization they have been prepared for years. In Qiryat Shemona there are hundreds of shelters. In the kibbutzim there are tens of shelters. The public has the impression that as a result of these 10 days, they have decided to build shelters in the State of Israel. The problem of Qiryat Shemona is social, sociological, and human. What it lacks is real local leadership grown from below. Incidentally, I want to congratulate Robert and the ad hoc committee. They performed magnificently. I take off my hat to them!

[Question] Then why was the army called to "rescue" the course of civilian life in the town?

[Answer] The army only shortened processes. To say that the Army rescued Qiryat Shemona is a gross exaggeration.

I Do Not Read Novels

[Question] Let's return to you. This week you are leaving the units in the North, and I have seen you sad and emotional . . .

[Answer] Correct. I am leaving a major project on which I have worked. . . and it is difficult to leave. Perhaps to a large extent this is also the end of my military career.

[Question] The army is your entire life/

[Answer] Yes. I live the IDF 24 hours a day. Also whatever areas of interest I have are connected to it. History, strategic studies, international relations.

[Question] Do you read books?

[Answer] I do not read novels, and I do not like to read beautiful literature. I have no patience for this. I love to read biographies of diplomats and military leaders.

[Question] Do you still paint?

[Answer] No.

[Question] Are the dreams of being an architect over, and is there no drawing in secret?

[Answer] I have awakened from all my dreams, and I am moving to another dream. At one time I wanted to be a doctor, then an architect, then a farmer then a merchant! Is there something which I have not wanted? There's no such thing! And I have always ultimately remained in the army.

[Question] In 1962-1963 when you were a captain, you said in an interview for BAMAHANE: "I would want that the living conditions, wage structure, and social status of an officer in the IDF be similar to those of the French officers."

[Answer] That was 20 years ago. Today I have no problems in this matter.

[Question] Has the confidence gap which was created in the wake of the Yom Kippur War between the civilians and the IDF officers reached you?

[Answer] No. I have been lucky in that everywhere, within my command and outside it, I have encountered much sympathy. At times it is even unpleasant. It is impossible to be incognito. You stop at a red light, everyone looks at you, they whisper, and talk.

[Question] Do the people perhaps, despite all of this, like the army?

[Answer] Yes. However, it is also very critical and cruel in its criticism. The people do not know how to forgive their army.

[Question] In the days when there was great tension on the northern border, I saw you in conversations with the troops. You went from battalion to battalion . . .

[Answer] Yes. I believed that a war would break out at any moment, and I felt that I had to speak to them, to prepare them, to look them in the eyes.

[Question] Everyone who heard you then speaking with the troops was very impressed, despite your cynicism, that you could not keep anything back from them. It was precisely because of this that I was surprised to hear that you do not visit the families of those who have been killed in action . . .

[Answer] That is correct . . . perhaps it is a self-defense mechanism . . . perhaps some kind of mechanism of mine to keep myself from excessive exposure to those families . . . perhaps I do not have sufficient courage to cope with parents, wives, children . . . families who have lost sons. I admit that this is a weak point . . I am this way . . .

Moving Through Siberia and India

[Question] When the soldiers in the Golan complained that there was no food, no entertainment, and when they were crying from the cold in the night, and the parkas were not good, there were no socks, and there was none of this and none of that . . you took busses, according to the story, and sent them to Yad Vashem in Jerusalem. When they returned they were already no longer cold, the food was sufficient, and everything was all right. You are pictured as a practical person, somewhat cynical, and not a great ideologue. What was the source of this educational and emotional action which was not so typical of General Yanush? Were you affected somewhat by the Holocaust when you were a child?

[Answer] I do not think so. Together with Gorodich, he is also a controversial figure, we decided to solve the problem of the post-war demoralization that reservist soldiers who had gone on leave brought from the rear and infected the regular army. The fact is that it helped! In the Golan Heights in general it is easy to explain to people the essence of their military service and their presence there. You see the color of the enemy's eyes. You look to the side and to the rear and you see whom you are protecting. I must point out that only in the religious companies, in the companies of the hesder yeshivas [religious schools in which the students spend part of their time in study and part of their time in military training], this was not necessary. They were filled with faith, they knew how to endure difficulties, and they were ready to continue fighting. I have found out that during periods of crises and psychological and physical hardship, the religious education is the best kind in terms of the national values and the psychological strength which it imparts.

[Question] Where does your psychological strength come from? Where did you grow up?

[Answer] I was born in Poland. With the outbreak of the war, my parents took my sister and me (I was 3 years old) and we fled eastward to the Russian-Polish border. As Polish refugees, we were exiled to Siberia where my mother died. I remember the burial . . . my father bribed someone, and he disguised us as Christian children in a Polish orphan's home. This orphan's home travelled on trains together with the Polish Army to India. We moved from one place to another for long months. I remember only that we were searching for food all the time. We searched, we dug, and we stole food . . . this was all that concerned us -- food! I remember that in some railroad station, someone gave me a roll. I was a little boy, I was chewing it, and suddenly a Russian soldier came, opened my mouth (there was a terrible hunger!), and with his hand took out from my mouth the chewed-up food and swallowed it . . . I will never forget it. In India we were assembled by the Jewish Agency, and from there they took us to Israel with the children of Tehran. We went to Israel via the Suez Canal (do you know that I have not been to Egypt since the peace?! Everyone is dying to go. It doesn't attract me!). Afterward they sent us to the kibbutz of Giv'at Brenner. However we did not adjust there. We were refugees, we did not know Hebrew, and there were absorption difficulties. The children there would hit us at night . . . we boarded a "Darom Yehuda" [South Judea] and fled to Tel Aviv. First my sister and then I. I was such a frightened child . . . In Tel Aviv I spent 3 years with a foster family. It was a respected family, however I fought about my status all the time. There I felt myself to be a foreigner and not a member of the club . . . I completed primary school. I went to high school in France. My father came there and took me away. However, I did not want to be the son of an immigrant and I returned to Israel 2 years later. Yes. . . I actually returned for Zionist reasons! I studied in Miqve Yisrael, and afterward I entered the army. . .that's it.

[Question] Just a minute, the inevitable question. Yanush, what's next?

[Answer] I am going to study abroad, what is called a sabbatical year in civilian terms.

I Will Not Enter Political Life

[Question] The gift?

[Answer] You call it the gift . . . I admit that I will miss sitting in the center of things. I do not like sitting on a dormant volcano. As for what will be next and will I be the chief of the general staff, I will save you the next question. I can be the chief of the general staff.

[Question] Do you want to?

[Answer] Very much . . . I am not dying for it . . . there are candidates for this position who are as good as I and perhaps even better.

[Question] You once said to me that you would want to be the minister of defense . .

[Answer] I would prefer to be the minister of defense, however no one has offered it to me. I believe that I will never be the minister of defense. I am not such a personality . . . and I do not intend to enter the political-party cycle in my life.

[Question] According to you, there is no prospect that you will be a minister of defense. How about the chief of the general staff?

[Answer] Yes!

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COMMAND CHANGES MADE IN IDF

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 2 Sep 81 p 4

[Article by Ya'ir 'Amikam: "Amir Drori -- Commanding General of the Northern Command; Major General Uri Simhoni -- Chief of the Training Department"]

[Text] There is much in common between the two generals who assumed their new positions yesterday -- Major General Amir Drori as the commanding general of the Northern Command and Major General Uri Simhoni, the chief of the Training Department.

Both of them are 44 and native-born Israelis. Both of them came up through the infantry ranks in the IDF from the rank of a combat soldier to brigade and division commander. Both of them held staff positions in their operational service and in this way acquired both field and staff experience. Both of them attended training courses abroad and are graduates of Israeli universities.

The point of contact in their careers was at the Hermon post at the time of the capture in the Yom Kippur War. Amir Drori, the commander of the Golani Brigade, was wounded in that battle whereas Uri Simhoni replaced him. Even now Simhoni is replacing Drori as chief of the Training Department. The new commanding general of the Northern Command, Amir Drori, is married and the father of three children.

Drori is a strict officer, professional and original in his thinking, and a graduate of the first class of the military school in Haifa. Among the command positions he has held are battalion commander in the Golani, operations officer in the Southern Command, commander of the Golani brigade, and armored division commander in the Northern Command.

In the Taufiq action in 1960, he received a commendation for bravery from the chief of the general staff. During the Yom Kippur War he served as commander of the Golani Brigade which captured the Hermon, and in the first attempt to take the objective, he was wounded and evacuated to a hospital. After the war he was appointed chief of the Operational Department of the General Staff, and 3 years ago he was appointed chief of the Training Department in the IDF and promoted to major general.

Across the Border

Drori's replacement is Major General Uri Simhoni. A native of the kibbutz Ginnosar who joined the IDF in 1954, he volunteered for the paratroops and took part in most of the retaliatory actions which preceded Operation Kadesh. In Operation Kadesh, he parachuted into the Mitla with the battalion commanded by Raful.

In 1957 he was released from the IDF and did not return to regular service until 1964. He served as the intelligence officer of the Golani, fought in the Six-Day War and in the War of Attrition, and took part in many actions across the border. Afterward he served as the commander of a patrol unit in the north and again crossed the border many times into Lebanon.

In 1972 he was appointed operations officer of the Northern Command and served in this position during the Yom Kippur War. On the last day of the fighting for the Hermon post, he replaced the commander of the Golani Brigade who had been wounded. He returned as commander of the Golani Brigade in 1974, and afterward took over command of the Officers School. Between 1976 and 1978, he served as chief infantry and paratroop officer. Afterward he took advanced training in the United States and was then appointed as deputy chief of the Operations Branch of the General Staff.

Major General Simhoni is a graduate of the history seminar at Tel Aviv University. He is married and has a son and a daughter.

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CAREER OF DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 12 Aug 81 pp 16-18, 51

[Article by Ruti Leviav: "Arik Sharon: Military Profile"]

[Text] One night in July 1953, Arik Sharon, a Jerusalem student (first year), history and oriental studies) was called to the office of the commander of the Jerusalem Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Mishael Shaham.

"Have you heard of Mustafa Samueli?" asked Shaham as he came right to the point.

"I have," responded Sharon in two words. The first year final examinations were approaching, and the call to the office of the brigade commander (in which he was serving as a reserve battalion commander at the time) did not sit well with him.

"We are interested in blowing up his house," continued Shaham. Arik's eyes lit up. Mustafa Samueli was an Arab murderer who had vowed to murder 100 Jews in revenge for the death of his brother who was killed in 5708 (1948).

"I want you to take the assignment," said Lieutenant Colonel Shaham.

Sharon hesitated for a moment: "And what about the university examination?"

"Listen, Arik," said Shaham (according to Sharon himself): "a person faces two possibilities: to learn from the actions of others or that others will learn from his actions . . ."

The following morning, when he left the university behind him, Major (Reserves) Arik Sharon gathered seven of his comrades-in-arms who were released in the meantime, (including Shlomo Baum, a moshavnik [member of a collective settlement] from Kefar Yehezqel and Yitzhaq Ben-Menahem, a big, strong man and also a student at that time whom his friends nicknamed "Gulliver"). Together, the eight went out that night to the nearby Nabi Samwil and blew up what appeared to them to be Samueli's house. In the early morning hours, while they were still stealthily returning towards sleeping Jerusalem, Sharon decided to himself that this was not the way to carry out retaliatory actions. It is not proper that a battalion commander (Reserves) and his fellow students should go out in the middle of the night, without prior preparation, without suitable equipment, and without real training, to carry out actions designed to have a serious effect and which would deter the Arabs of the vicinity from making trouble for the residents of the central region and the Jerusalem corridor.

Lessons From the Defeat at Latrun

When he returned to the office of the brigade commander, Sharon informed Shaham: "This way will not work." At the end of that summer, upon the recommendation of Colonel Mishael Shaham and with the agreement of the then Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General Mordekhai Maqlef, Unit 101 was established for the purpose of carrying out special missions and primarily attacks across the border.

Major Arik Sharon was Appointed Unit Commander

This was not, of course, his first military assignment, however in the future, everyone would remember the establishment of 101 as Arik Sharon's springboard to his military and political future.

He was born in 1928 in Kefar Malal near Kafr Saba, the son of an agronomist and former medical student. (His mother, who began her studies abroad, was forced to terminate them when she immigrated to Israel -- a fact which pained her her entire life). As a high school student, Arik would travel every day to the Geula school in Tel Aviv, and in the afternoon he would return to the settlement and work in the cow barn until the evening hours. He was torn between his love for farming and his desire for study (which was a regular topic of conversation at home), and he finally decided to follow in the footsteps of his father and study agronomy. However, as was to happen throughout his life, it was the security situation which changed his plans. After completing high school, he took a squad leaders course of the Gadna and then a squad leaders course of the armored corps and with the outbreak of the War of Liberations he found himself in Brigade 3, first as a squad leader, then as a platoon sergeant, and finally as a platoon leader.

In the fierce Latrun battle he was the leader of the point platoon, was severely wounded, and left the war with the feeling that he had not fully exploited his capability as a commander. Years afterward he would say: ". . . in every area in which I worked, I forced myself to complete the implementation. If I don't complete something, it simply depresses me."

There was another lesson which he learned at Latrun and which he would also repeat to his subordinates all the time that he was a commander: "Wounded are not to be abandoned in the area."

The defeat at the Latrun battle and the feeling that he did not fully expolit his capabilities motivated him to give up temporarily his studies and his future as a farmer and to throw his lot in with the army. After he was commissioned (without an officer's course), he served as the commander of a reconnaissance company, completed a battalion commanders course and transferred to the Intelligence Corps where he carried out small reconnaissance and commando actions in which were first reflected his personal daring. During his service as a command intelligence office of the Northern Command (his last position in the IDF before going on a leave of absence for the long-awaited studies) he caught the eye of Moshe Dayan for the first time, when he went and captured five Jordanian officers in an extremely short time after the order was given. However, this "romance" between Sharon and Dayan would not last long. It was 4 years later that Chief of the General Staff Dayan would criticize him severely on his "excessive initiative" in the Mitla battle during Operation Kadesh.

Much has already been written about the exploits of Unit 101, the courage of its personnel, and their high level of operational capability. The role of Arik Sharon, its founder and commander, in shaping this special image, made him also a part of that legend. During 1953-54, the men of 101 (who at any time did not number more than 40) carried out tens of daring attacks across the border -- some of them in the form of patrols, others as retaliation for fedayeen penetrations into Israel for purposes of sabotage and terror. The combat tactics of this unit under the command of Sharon caused a major change in the IDF combat doctrine, and lessons learned from its actions were to be applied later as part of the combat doctrine of the infantry in general. Arik personally chose the men of 101, one by one, including civilians who were outstanding combat troops and distinguished military personnel whose reputation he had heard of. At first he had to go from house to house and convince them. Later, when the news about the establishment of the unit began to spread quickly, they began to come to him on their own initiative, men such as Meir Har-Tziyon, a young, lean member of Nahal who appeared one morning at a small camp near Jerusalem with a wooden suitcase in his hand. He asked Arik, "Are you serious?: When he received an affirmative answer, he remained.

To Create an Atmosphere of Tension

A number of retaliatory actions in which the men of 101 took part in collaboration with the then IDF paratroop battalion gave birth to the idea of merging the two units. Indeed, in 1954 Chief of the General Staff Moshe Dayan appointed Ariel Sharon as the commander of the expanded paratroop battalion. The match was not implemented easily. Personnel of both units displayed vigorous opposition and more than a little hostility to each other. The men of 101, who did not attach any importance to the military disciplinary ceremonials, regarded the paratroopers as toy soldiers who would succeed at nothing whereas the paratroopers found it difficult to understand how wild-haired, sloppily dressed, sandal-wearing men could be paratroopers. Many officers and soldiers among the paratroopers requested a transfer to other units. Others were expelled by Sharon, and in their place, personnel of 101, whom he recognized and trusted, were placed in positions of command. Except for Aharon Davidi, whom he appointed as his deputy, Arik virtually cleaned out the headquarters. Actually, the only survivors of the original paratroop battalion were the professional paratroop trainers such as Marcel Tubias who were needed by Sharon and his people who were still not trained in parachute jumping. It was the 101 which set the tone, and its combat doctrine was designed by the new battalion commander for that which was later to be known as the first incarnation of the paratroop brigade.

About the 2 years which preceded Operation Kadesh, in which he commanded the paratroopers, Arik Sharon would later say: "To fight at a time of relative peace when in the rear life is relatively quiet -- for this a special atmosphere is necessary. I myself felt as if I were in the storm of battle. I lived in a special atmosphere and dedicated myself completely to the matter.

With his inspiration, encouragement, and planning, the paratroopers conducted a series of retaliatory actions in Jordan, Egypt, and Syria. The troops rapidly became known for their high level of operational capabilities and the determination to carry out their mission at any cost. Every one of the actions was personally planned until the last detail by Arik himself. About one of them, in which he took part (once he was also wounded, in an action in the region of the kibbutz of Kissufim), Arik relates:

"The problem was how to bring our people into contact with the enemy . . . we were discovered outside the objective, and the Arabs fired like crazy. I gave the order not to return the fire. Then we penetrated. It was the first psychological break of the Arabs, a result of holding fire until the last moment, until actual contact.."

His involvement in retaliatory actions went beyond the planning and execution, and on more than one occasion he was also the initiator. As a young officer (first a major and later a lieutenant colonel), he had access to the General Staff and the then prime minister and Minister of Defense David Ben-Gurion. His opinion was listened to, and to a not insignificant extent, he was already then, in the mid-fifties, one of the shapers of the defense policy of the state. At the same time, during his years as the commander of the paratroops, Arik developed an entire generation of subordinates who would in the future become senior commanders in the IDF: Motta Gur, Rifail Eytan, Dani Matt, and others were trained by him as the next generation.

As a commander he was noted for an extraordinary perception for selecting those men who would not be disappointing when put to the test. He had enormous and heavy requirements, and his subordinates relate that he is not the easiest person to work for. His tendency to create around him an atmosphere of tension (which he customarily referred to as "creative tension"), his stubborness, and his strictness in every matter to the minutest and most exhausting details created a certain distance between him and his personnel. However, in retrospect, those who were with him during the period of 1953-56 (in which he planned and executed about 45 retaliatory actions behind enemy lines) would say that "it is interesting to see the extent that some of the primary qualities which characterized the combat techniques of the unit involved in the retaliatory actions, from the Sinai Campaign and in the Sinai itself are the primary qualities of Arik himself: the tendency to concentrate completely on the execution of the mission, to decide very quickly, to act with great stubborness, to ignore the conventional -- all of these and other qualities which were always his and which were recognizable in him when he was still a child in the home of his parents."

His tendency to ignore the conventional had already caused him at that time to become involved in confrontations with the supreme command when his view did not always agree with those of his superiors. At least in one case -- in which he bowed to orders from above -- Arik learned a very harsh personal lesson. In the last retaliatory action before Operation Kadesh (10 October 1956), the Qalqilyah action, he suggested that in addition to capturing the Qalqilyah police station, there be additional actions such as blocking the road to Shekhem, seizing Khirbat Sufin (a post of the Jordanian Legion east of the town), and the capture of positions north of Qalqilyah itself. His plan, which had been approved by the commanding general of the Command, was disapproved by the chief of the general staff and the minister of defense who believed that aside from the capture of the police station itself there was no need for seizing additional objectives. Arik's plan, which at first glance appeared to be too broad and to have a potential to cause political complications, turned out to be, after the fact, limited and less risky than those which developed in the area. The battle widened as a result of an unexpected encounter with a mobile and heavy Jordanian force, to the point of a danger of a day war, the blocking of which greatly complicated the course of events and inflicted heavy casualties on the paratroopers: 18 killed and 23 wounded. Among the killed was Yarmi, one of the first members of the 101 who had joined the force voluntarily after he had already

been released from service. Ten years later Arik Sharon would say about the Qalqilyah action: "Despite the changes and the complications, the mission was executed completely and successfully. The entire night the paratroopers and their commanders made a supreme effort to accomplish everything possible under the conditions of the action as they were finally approved. It was a difficult and complicated action, in which experience, courage, and perserverance were reflected."

Forced Separation From the Paratroops

If he indeed had thoughts about the differences of viewpoints between him and his superiors, these became manifest less than 3 weeks later during the Mitla battle in the Sinai when he used his own judgment in opposition to the advice of the chief of the general staff -- and paid for it by a forced separation from the paratroops.

On 29 October 1956 at 4:59 pm, 16 Dakota aircraft dropped a paratroop battalion from the 202nd Brigade under the command of Raful over the Parker Memorial in Sinai. It was the signal for the opening of the Sinai Campaign. Two days later the battalion joined up with the brigade east of the Mitla Pass with artillery support and only four tanks. At midnight on 31 October Sharon (then already the commander of the Paratroop Brigade) informed the chief of the general staff of his intention to position himself on both sides of the Pass and requested air support. At 0400 after the force assigned to proceed to the other side of the Pass had already set out, a message was received from the chief of the general staff forbidding its advance.

After an argument between Sharon and Dayan and on the basis of what Sharon later referred to as an inaccurate estimate of the enemy forces in the Pass (based on reports of airforce pilots), approval was given on the following day for the introduction of only a reconnaissance force into the Pass with an explicit order from the chief of the general staff not to engage in conflict with large forces. Arik Sharon explained later that he had decided to send a force larger than that planned (two companies with armored half-tracks, three reconnaissance tanks, a brigade reconnaissance unit, and a mortar battery) in order to provide protection in the event of an unexpected encounter. And indeed, the encounter was completely unexpected. The first two half-tracks which entered the Pass were met with extremely heavy Egyptian fire. Motta Gur, the commander of the force, quickly extricated his people from the crossfire. The result: a bloody battle in which the Paratroop Brigade suffered 38 killed and over 100 wounded.

"The background for the chain of events in the Mitla stemmed from the special character of the unit, the spirit of the paratroopers and their commanders, and the combatant comradeship which prevailed among them," Arik Sharon would say in explaining what happened at Mitla. "The paratroopers were trained and were accustomed to not abandoning wounded or dead on the battlefield. This fact, faith in their course of action, and their combat readiness were the crucial factors which formed their high level of combat capability. This comradeship also caused to a great extent the chain of events in Mitla. The first two armored half-tracks were stopped by murderous enemy fire. Motta was faced with the possibility of following orders not to become involved, thereby abandoning his men. To his credit, it will be said that he did not hesitate for a second and hurried to extricate them."

"The Mitla casualties were not casualties in vain," claimed Sharon. "Beyond the question as to whether it was necessary to enter the Pass in terms of the overall consideration of the battle or tactical considerations of the brigade, the battle was necessary from the human point of view. There are actions which are evaluated not

only in terms of the immediate result but rather in terms of their leaving an imprint on the character of the army, on its combat readiness, and on its moral superiority for the many years and generations to come. The extrication of the wounded in the battle is such an action."

On this issue there was actually no dispute. However, because the size of the reconnaissance force which entered the Mitla was not in conformance with the orders of the chief of the general staff Arik Sharon paid by his separation from the paratroops. In his book "Yoman Ma'arekhet Sinai" [Diary of the Sinai Campaign], the then Chief of the General Staff Moshe Dayan wrote: "This bloody capture of the Heitan defile at Mitla might have been justified if the task of the brigade was to reach Suez and was prevented from doing so by the Egyptian force entrenched against her. But in the present circumstances, when our aim is to proceed southwards to capture Sharm ash-Shaykh . . . there was no vital need to attack the Egyptian unit defending the approaches to the Canal. The valor, daring, and fighting spirit of the paratroop commanders are qualities which should be cultivated and encouraged, but this battle was not essential."

When he was asked in a press interview after the appearance of his book (several years after Operation Kadesh) if he still deplores Sharon's conduct in the Mitla incident, Dayan softened his position and said (in a kind of paraphrase of the statement made in his book although this time in a more positive tone): "In any case, I prefer to work with powerful horses which must be restrained rather than with lazy oxen which must be prodded."

However, after the battle, the powerful horse found himself subject not only to the criticism of the chief of the general staff but also to that of his subordinates. Even though most of them considered him an exemplary commander and outstanding military leader, those commanders who served under him rebelled against him and sought his dismissal. Joining in this demand immediately after the Sinai Campaign was also the Kibbutz Movement (many of whose sons served in the paratroops) who were shaken by the number of men killed in the Mitla battle.

The departure of the brigade commander was, therefore, inevitable, and at the end of 1957 Arik Sharon was separated from the paratroops sent to Britain to study at the Command and Staff School, and was even promoted there to colonel (at the age of 29), and, in actuality, his military advancement was frozen during the coming years.

"The Chief Contractor of the State"

There were certainly those who sympathized with him because he had managed in one swoop to cut off the limb on which he was sitting and from which he could have continued to grow. Colonel Sharon, the man who put the paratroops on the map, attained with them the heights of combat, and swept the entire IDF into a new era, the man for whom the expression "Follow Me" was his almost personal idiom, remained behind, on the outside.

He did not speak about failure, and to all appearances, he also did not consider himself as one who had failed. He also had endless patience, to wait a while in the shadows for the next round, the next opportunity.

He waited 7 years, from 1957 to 1964, years during which he served in the Training Department of the General Staff, was the commander of the Infantry School, and commander of the Armored Reserve Brigade. These were rather prosaic positions for one who had personally commanded tens of daring operations across the border and led the paratroops into battle. There were those who saw him as one who was stepping in place, they expressed amazement about his patience, his self-assurance, his stubbornness, and his faith that the end had not yet come to his magnificent combat career.

And, as usual, he was right.

The turning point came in 1964 when the then Chief of the General Staff Yitzhaq Rabin appointed him as chief of staff of the Northern Command. (Although Rabin disagreed personally with Sharon's methods, he considered him a blessing for the IDF). The Syrian preparations to divert the sources of the Jordan and the heating up of the northern sector led to tens of border incidents in which Sharon found himself in a command position to his liking. In 1966, when he was 38, he was appointed chief of the Training Department, and a year later before the Six-Day War, he was promoted to major general.

The waiting began to pay off.

The Six-Day War found him with an emergency appointment as the commander of a division which broke through and captured the Egyptian positions at Umm Qatf and Abu 'Uwayqilah. This was one of the most complex battles of the war, a joint operation involving armor, infantry, and helicopter-borne paratroopers, which required detailed planning, precise execution, strict coordination, and clear and rapid analysis of the battlefield developments. If Arik Sharon needed an injection of encouragement and reinforcement of his value as a military leader and combat commander, the crushing victory gave him all of this and more -- in prodigious amounts. After the breakthrough of the Egyptian positions, the division under his command continued fighting toward Bi'r Hasanah, captured Qusaymah along the way, preceded to Nakhl where it fought a major armor battle, and in the final stage of the war, it reached the Mitla Pass.

This time, Sharon left the campaign while he had the upperhand in the full sense of the word.

At the end of the war, he returned to his previous position, chief of the Training Department, along with a crystallized combat doctrine which he dictated to the entire Army: how soldiers are to be trained, how units are to conduct exercises, and which combat doctrines will be developed and learned in the IDF. His position became doubly important in light of the lessons of the Six-Day War which the Training Department now had to digest. Moreover, the new cease-fire lines presented the IDF and him with new challenges and severe and burning problems. He rapidly exerted a maximum effort in an initiative to transfer the IDF training bases to Judea and Samaria.

During the War of Attrition (1968-1970), Sharon became involved in fundamental and severe differences with the then Chief of the General Staff Lieutenant-General Hayim Bar-Lev, when Sharon had his own concepts on the way to conduct the war. Nonetheless, in January 1970 Bar-Lev appointed him commanding general of the Southern Command, and in this position, Sharon was able to conduct the final, stormy, and difficult stages of the War of Attrition.

The responsibility which he shouldered was enormous: command of the largest area in the IDF against the main enemy of the State of Israel at that time -- Egypt. He spent most of his time in the desert while coping with problems which in terms of their size and scope were unprecendented in the IDF. In the first weeks after the cease-fire, his subordinates remembered him running around like a crazy man, speaking, pressuring, shouting, running, and prodding in order to assure that the reconstruction, expansion, and improvement of the Bar-Lev Line would be completed by the target date. "I am the chief contractor in the State," he quipped at the time with a very tired smile. Between a stormy telephone conversation with the one responsible for construction in the General Staff and the drawing of lines on a colored map on the wall, he spoke in terms of tons of sand and cement, kilometers of sills, meters of depth, kilometers of roads -- and at times it seemed that he intended to set a world record in the construction of giant pyramids. This was not too far from the truth.

After the end of the War of Attrition on the Suez front (during the course of which he became involved in serious conflicts with his associates on the General Staff and severely criticized their work methods) he focussed his attention on another sector in the area of his command, the Gaza Strip. He personally commanded the operation to elininate the Arab terror in the Strip through a series of strong measures which brought down upon him the anger of the civilian administration in the area, the residents, and a certain segment of the population in Israel. Nevertheless, he achieved his objective, and the Arab terror in the Strip was virtually completely eliminated. Now Sharon turned to stimulate development activity in Pithat Rifiah, and here too he was the subject of severe criticism, primarily because of his evacuation of the local Bedouins. For this "initiative", he was censured by the chief of the general staff.

The command "front" again began to heat up, and Sharon found himself once again in a fighting minority against the IDF establishment. Only this time he was no longer 29 but 45, and his hopes to be appointed as the chief of the general staff, a position to which he naturally aspired, seemed more distant than ever. When it became evident to him that his prospects were nil, he chose to make a stormy departure from the army through some publication of an impulsive announcement, and finally with whatever can be considered an announcement of departure for civilian life after 25 years of service. The date: July 1973.

Three months later the Yom Kippur War broke out and restored him to his natural place: head of a combat force. And this time, as commander of an armored division.

The Crossing and the Praise

If anyone ever had any doubts about the value of his views as a commander and a logistician, the Yom Kippur War came along and tore up the cards. The "enfant terrible" of the IDF, stubborn, uncompromising, impulsive, non-conformist, this time went "to the end." The severe disagreements which erupted between him and the supreme command almost led twice to his removal from his position because of his refusal to follow an order. This time it did not enter his mind to compromise, and he once again proposed his own solutions to throw the Egyptians off balance. His firm stand on the necessity to accelerate the crossing of the Canal finally fell on attentive ears.

Had he ordered the writing of the scenario of his "grand finale" as a commander in the IDF by a professional script writer, he could not have done better than what was done by the events themselves. The Canal-crossing operation was the turning point in the Yom Kippur War and brought his personal praise to heights which probably no IDF commander had known heretofore.

In early 1974, Major General (Res) Ariel Sharon left the IDF -- and this time, for good. It was not a solemn and quiet departure. On his way out, he sharply criticized several of his fellow generals and accused them of neglect of the army and non-development of military thinking.

The dynamic and strict man has now returned to the defense system through the front door, assuming its most senior position, senior even to that to which he had aspired 8 years ago. The largest circle of them all has been closed, the stubborn patience has proved itself more than ever, and the man who 28 years ago established the combat norms for the entire army with a unit of several tens of soldiers, has assumed the position of minister of defense with the knowledge that for the first time in his life he will be able to be the one who has the last word.

5830
CSO: 4323/69

AIRBORNE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM REPORTED

Jerusalem INNOVATION in English No 71, Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

Jerusalem—Israel's armed forces are said to operate an airborne electronic warfare system of original design, according to *Flight*, the internationally respected British aerospace publication. No official comment on this subject is available from Israel sources.

According to that report, this EW system is mounted on an insertable pallet, which fits the short-take-off-and-landing (STOL) Arava transport, a plane developed and manufactured by Israel Aircraft Industries (I.A.I.). The entire EW package, says the British publication, can be installed or removed within minutes.

The electronic instruments for this system are said to have been developed and produced by Elta, I.A.I.'s electronics and communications equipment subsidiary. According to the report the instruments are capable of analyzing incoming electronic signals within fractions of a second; when so desired, interfering signals can be sent out instantaneously.

Observers note that the Israel armed forces were not known to have acquired any significant number of Arava transports; only three such planes are thought to have been used during the Yom Kippur war, mainly for medical evacuation missions.

On the other hand, I.A.I. is known to have exerted considerable efforts to sell this craft abroad, for a large variety of commercial uses, mainly where well developed landing fields are not available. Only recently the company announced receiving an order for ten of these craft from a single customer in the USA.

CSO: 4400/59

MISMANAGEMENT CHARGED AT HAIFA REFINERIES

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 28 Oct 81 p 8

[Article by Mary Hirschfeld]

[Text] HAIFA. — Charges of gross misuse of funds and disregard of the "basic laws of proper management" highlight the State Comptroller's recently published report on the oil refineries here.

Inflated refining fees charged by the country's three oil importers boosted the prices of petrol and all petroleum derivatives higher than any reasonable level, the Comptroller points out.

The $125 million, three-year-old ethylene plant which was to be the backbone of a thriving petrochemicals industry, has turned into a white elephant which consumes about 26 per cent more energy than planned. Its turnover is only about 67 per cent of the minimum needed to make profits.

Every day that the plant fails to process at least 300 tons of ethylene, the report goes on, it loses about $200 per ton of production below its capacity. Since the plant has been operating since July 1979, that means a lot of the taxpayer's money has been lost.

Funded by the government in 1959 to take over the British Oil Company, Oil Refineries Ltd. today employs 1,799 workers and is the country's only provider of refining services. Last year alone the firm's income was IS1.3 billions, and investments totalled IS100 million.

In January 1980 the Refineries and the Fuel Authority agreed to an increase in refining fees, due to price changes in world markets. Each ton of crude oil would now cost $4.65 to refine and each ton of derivates, $10.15. Index linkage was increased and credit periods shortened from 45 to 25 days.

The new rates were clearly set in several documents, the State Comptroller report stresses, but nowhere was it explained how they should be implemented. Although this is a subject with a direct impact on the national economy, nobody seemed to take care that the new rates were properly enforced.

The report's sharpest criticism is reserved for the ethylene plant, a IS200m. bonanza, which seemed trouble-prone from its very conception. The Refineries' board of directors examined the project and gave its approval without carrying out a feasibility check.

Work started early in 1974 and was to be completed by April 1978. Costs were estimated to be around IS53.7m. and the Refineries signed up another company "A" — which happened to be their largest buyer of ethylene — as project manager. All that more than two years after construction had started.

From the beginning it was agreed that optimum production would be 200,000 tons of ethylene a year — when the plant would become profitable. A minimum of 130,000 was considered satisfactory.

Company "A" hired a foreign project planner, who in his turn, took a number of local subcontractors. None of these contracts were

awarded as a result of public tenders and no contracts were signed.

Equipment and materials came to more than IS55m., most of which was spent abroad; 51 per cent in Western Europe (mainly in the foreign planner's country), and a mere 22 per cent in Israel.

The Comptroller details irregularities in payments to foreign contractors and subcontractors. These were to receive a fixed brokers fee plus depreciation costs. In fact, their fees were calculated based on the purchase receipts presented, and this meant an additional difference of several million dollars. At no stage did the Refineries or their main contractor check those receipts or compare them with the merchandise received.

Fees were often paid two or three times. In one instance the Refineries failed to deduct $4,000 from fees paid to a foreign company (which they helped maintain abroad), despite the fact that this had been stipulated in the contract. The main purchasing subcontractor received over one million shekels in fees but until the completion of the present report, he had not yet settled accounts with the Refineries.

Local subcontractors started work at the site by mid-1975 and finished in June, 1979. Again there were but a few public tenders. Contracts were signed long after construction started — or not signed at all. They were not updated, but the Refineries would rather pay what the contractors reported as "additional work." If new contracts were signed, the Refineries claimed, contractors would start demanding different and better conditions.

For instance: the contract stipulated a total of 900,000 working hours, but contractors reported — and were paid for — 1,950,000 hours. Instead of 163,431 weldings, they reported 264,990, and instead of 16 months as planned, construction took 31. The differences were labelled as overtime and contractors were paid accordingly.

Adding insult to injury, a great deal of the additional work consisted of repairing faulty work, which was the result of poor planning and work standards.

Troubles were not over once the plant was finished. It was put into operation in July, 1979 and the next month one of its eight ovens exploded, damaging a second one. In January 1980, a blaze broke out that damaged two other ovens, causing an estimated $2.7m. damage. Later that year all ovens were again put into work.

Internal commissions of inquiry investigated what caused the two accidents; the first was found to be due to faulty operating methods, while the second was caused by the incorrect handling of repair equipment.

Reports show that between July, 1979 and June, 1981, the ethylene plant incurred a IS215m. loss — half of which was ultimately covered by the government.

The Comptroller sees no bright future for the plant. The price of ethylene has gone down steadily for the past years in most world markets, and local consumers already take as much as they can use. It is impracticable to think of boosting production to the desired 200,000 tons a year — unless further petrochemical industries are set up in the country, to use and export ethylene and ethylene-based goods, he states.

CSO: 4400/59

PILOT PLANT AIDS CHEMICAL INDUSTRY

Jerusalem INNOVATION in English No 71, Oct 81 p 7

[Text]

Jerusalem — A unique service for Israel's growing chemical industry is provided by the pilot plant facility, established and operated as part of the Casali Institute of Applied Chemistry. The Casali Institute, in turn, is part of the School of Applied Science and Technology, an increasingly important branch of the Hebrew University's teaching and research activities.

Some years ago critics of institutions of higher education, in this country as in many others, scored some academics' ivory tower isolation. However, they had little difficulty in convincing Israel's universities of the need to go out into the community, and to help solve some of its most urgent problems. The School of Applied Science and Technology was one result of such efforts; it proposes to serve as link between 'pure' science and its industrial application.

Of the seven institutions that operate under the School's aegis, the Casali Institute is perhaps the most advanced; several results of its efforts already have reached the stage of commercial production, in manufacturing plants all over this country. Its functions include the preliminary economic evaluation of newly proposed subjects, the applied research needed for them, and finally also their scaling up to semi-industrial proportions.

The latter objective is served by the pilot plant, a highly versatile installation that can provide a broad range of production facilities and conditions. Those production facilities include a multi-purpose 60 liter reactor of either stainless steel or glass, a 225 liter glass lined pressure reactor, a 200 liter stainless steel reactor system for work under pressure, fluidized bed reactors, a two meter high packed column for vacuum distillation, a 250 liter Nuche type filter and various other kinds of equipment. Instrumentation includes an IBM series 1 minicomputer, which is now being hookedup for on-line data logging and ultimately also for process control, gas chromatographs and other measuring instruments. Within the framework of new projects, to be carried out upon the request of chemical industry firms, the Casali Institute will also consider the acquisition of additional process units, to add capabilities for which existing equipment is inadequate.

Past users of the pilot plant include several of Israel's most important chemical industry firms, all of whom keep coming back for additional projects. The unit, of course, serves as a neutral service center for industry in which the commercial companies' rights and secrets are fully protected. In several instances the facility already has been instrumental in readying new processes for industrial production in Israel; in at least one case, its efforts made the establishment of a completely new manufacturing venture possible.

CSO: 4400/59

BRIEFS

YAFO MOSQUE SITE REQUISITIONED--An unexpected turn in the controversy over the historic Hasan Bakk Mosque in Yafo: Today, the government disclosed that it requisitioned the land on which the mosque stands 6 months ago. Neither the Tel Aviv municipality nor the Muslim trust, nor any of the parties involved in the affair knew about this. The disclosure was made this morning at the Knesset Interior Committee, and from the Knesset, Leslie Susser reports. [Susser--live] The Hassan Bakk land was first requisitioned soon after the founding of the state, but it was released in 1971, and in 1974 it was leased for 50 years to the contractor Gershon Peres, on the understanding that he would develop it, and it was when his plans for development were passed a few months ago by a regional planning committee that the storm broke, for Peres, it seems, wanted to turn the area around the mosque into a tourist center. But now it seems that while the controversy was at its height, the land had all along been the government's, requisitioned once again in May of last year. So while the arguments went back and forth, how come Gershon Peres didn't know the land he had leased was requisitioned, and how come the Arabs of Yafo didn't know, and how come Mayor Lahat [of Tel Aviv] was calling on the government to requisition the land when it already had done so? The interior committee members, after their initial surprise at what the treasury had to say, were unanimous in their belief that the best thing now would be to forget all other ideas and simply restore the mosque, and unless there are further surprises, it seems that this is what the government has in mind. [Excerpts] TA101330 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 10 Nov 81]

TRANSPORT MINISTRY APPOINTMENT--The cabinet yesterday appointed Dr 'Uzi Landau as director-general of the transport ministry, effective 1 December, Landau, 38, son of the late Transport Minister Hayim Landau, has three engineering degrees, and has specialized as a transport engineer since 1971. Landau will replace Arye Grozbord, who is leaving government service. [TA091942 The JERUSALEM POST in English 9 Nov 81 p 3]

PRESSURE MEASURING DEVICE--The Uniseal Decomposition Vessels Company of Nahariya has earned 'approved exporter' status by virtue of its sales success with a new pressure measuring device. The device takes the form of a decomposition vessel that can take pressures of up to 1,200 p.s.i. and is designed for the analysis of the chemical and compositional properties of explosives, propellants and other organic materials. The vessel is unique in that it eliminates any direct contact between the chamber in which the substances are analyzed and the measuring instrument itself. This is important since it prevents volume changes in the vessel and makes unnecessary any corrections for the presence of a foreign body. The lid of the vessel functions as a high-precision mechanical membrane which regulates the pressure that is then displayed on a meter mounted above. The system, made out of stainless steel and specialized Teflon, complements Uniseal's range of smaller decompositon units and sells for $900, forty having so far been sold abroad, mainly in America, Germany and Australia. [Text] [Tel Aviv BUSINESS REVIEW & ECONOMIC NEWS FROM ISRAEL in English No 81, 1981/III p 4]

CSO: 4400/59

KUWAITI OIL MINISTER COMMENTS ON OPEC STRATEGY

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Nov 81 p 13

[Text]

OIL MINISTER Sheikh Ali Al Khalifa predicted that "demand on Opec oil will improve and increase enough to allow the different Opec countries to gain an adequate amount of exports share which in itself will alleviate the burden and pressure to decrease prices", according to a local Bank newspaper.

In an interview with 'Al Watan', Sheikh Khalifa expressed relief the decision on the unification of the oil price at the latest extraordinary meeting in Geneva of the organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries on Oct. 29 "provided us with some kind of stability until next year", he said.

On his view of the problems facing the Opec, Sheikh Khalifa indicated "the greatest problem faced by the Organisation was the circumstances themselves... We have proved our ability to counter them."

"The great hike in prices in the precious period led to a great decrease in demand also, which in turn caused a competition among the Opec countries to conquer the markets," he explained, adding that "this has created an atmosphere whereby no agreement could be reached and where additional decrease (in prices) were introduced through different barter deals, a thing that caused the absence of trust among all the countries."

TRIP

The Kuwaiti Oil Minister pointed out the long term Opec strategy aims at "flexibility and to once in a while review demand, on the Opec oil, and prices in a manner that guarantees the Opec wont' continue to lose the international markets and (that allows it) to be more flexible in relation to the demand expectations."

Sheikh Khalifa was interviewed while en route to Washington. His trip to the US comes in relation to the latest venture by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation to acquire the American Santa Fe Company.

Commenting on the investment policy of Kuwait Petroleum, he indicated the Corporation is a commercial establishment that should venture in realms it deems profitable.

"We all know that refineries outside Kuwait are not profitable. But the fields of exploration and the different exploration services such as digging and survey are economically lucrative," Sheikh Khalifa noted.

He pointed out the high level attained by Santa Fe in the fields of exploration services and engineering. "When we think of expanding our investment base in the Third World, we do that through a company with fame and high efficiency. Everywhere, the first question asked in the field of exploration is about the technical partner," Sheikh Khalifa pointed out.

— *Kuna*

CSO: 4400/54

STRICTER PRESS LAW ISSUED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by Zakaria al Qaq]

[Text]

ERRANT newspapers and their editorial staff face stiffer penalties — including fines and jail sentences of up to two years — according to the newly proposed Press Law now before the National Assembly.

The draft law, which was filed yesterday with the National Assembly by the Cabinet, seeks to replace Article 35 of the law governing the press, under which newspapers can be suspended or have their publishing licences cancelled by order of the Minister of Information.

Under the proposed law, Information Ministry officials will have the right to raid newspaper establishments and printing houses without warrant if such establishments are suspected of having infringed the law.

These inspectors will have the authority to scrutinise files and other documents and bood offending staff.

The bill also calls for the setting up of a Higher Council for the Press and Journalism under the direction of the Council of Ministers. It also calls for financial help for newspaper owners to help them carry out their functions

EXAMPLES

The owners will, on the other hand, have to maintain proper accounts, clearly showing their income and expenditure, especially the sources of income. The books will be maintained according to rules to be formulated by the Information Minister.

Breach of the proposed law regarding the religion of the state or criticism of the Amir or the policies and action of the government will make the Chief Editor, or any of his staff responsible for such breach, liable to a year's imprisonment or a fine of KD 2,000 or both.

A jail term from three to six months and fines from KD 500 — 1,000 can be imposed for reports which provoke sectarian strife, disrupt public harmony, disturb relations with Arab or Islamic countries, or probe into the personal or private lifes of others.

Other examples of offensive reporting include :

Insulting remarks directed at the heads of state of Arab, Muslim or any other country with which Kuwait exchanges diplomatic ties; any leak of stories regarding secret contacts or talks being conducted; any information that may be leaked against the government's directives; any texts in full or part drawn from secret sessions held by courts or at the council of ministers; any details on a crime that the authorities have opted to blackout; any attempt to publish court rulings on crimes related to sex assaults or prostitution or the like: any information which may lead to fluctuations in local currency; any news related to merchants falling bankrupt; publications of any declaration, press release from a person, government or a foreign concern without prior approval of the Information Ministry, and any offending remark directed at a diplomat in Kuwait.

OWNERSHIP

Under the new proposed law, ownership and chief editorship of newspapers will be restricted to Kuwaiti citizens above 25 and not in the employ of any foreign government. At the moment, at least one Kuwaiti magazine is being published by a non-Kuwaiti. The Chief Editor, who must have a sufficient level of education (not stipulated under the bill), will have to personally supervise the preparation of the entire contents of his publication. He could also have more than one editor, each responsible for the supervision of sections of the publication.

CSO: 4400/54

STRAIN IN IRAQI-ITALIAN RELATIONS CITED

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 p 28

[Text] Italian-Iraqi economic cooperation has blossomed during the 'special relationship,' but Rome's recent military-political involvement in the Middle East has annoyed Baghdad, reports Fulvio Grimaldi.

STRAINS are developing in the 'privileged relationship' between Italy and Iraq. At the end of last month the Iraqi foreign minister, Saadoun Hammadi, visited Rome to warn the Italians of Baghdad's uncompromising attitude towards two issues: secret arms supplies to Iran and participation in the planned Sinai peace force.

A year ago, the vice-president of Iraq's command council, Izzat Ibrahim, laid the foundations for this special relationship during discussions in Rome. Economic cooperation was to be increased substantially, as were Iraqi oil supplies to Italy. In return, Rome promised, among other things, to supply Iraq with a fleet of missile-launching vessels.

While today economic relations are still in the ascendant, as shown by the presence of over 60 important Italian companies in Iraq, a cloak of silence has fallen over the naval deal, to which Baghdad had originally assigned decisive importance. Hammadi told a press conference that the subject was not discussed during his visit.

Talking to *8 Days* at the end of his visit, during which he met President Sandro Pertini, Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo and Foreign Trade Minister Raffaele Capria, Hammadi said that any Italian participation, at the prompting of the US, in the Sinai peace force would be unacceptable, as it would mean supporting the already-discredited Camp David process. The issue is currently being debated in Rome. Other Iraqi representatives will tour countries considering such participation, in a concerted diplomatic effort to block the entire project.

Asked what repercussions participation would have on bilateral relations, Hammadi said that it would be more appropriate to speak about them once an official Italian decision has been taken. He added: 'This might well be a subject for discussion at the next Arab summit in November, and I do not discount the possibility of measures being taken against all participants in that force.' Declaring that Iraq was prepared to step up its oil supplies to energy-poor Italy, 'up to the point of meeting any emergency' but on condition that political misunderstandings be removed, Hammadi left little doubt about what such measures could entail.

Another prerequisite for the continuation of the 'special relationship' is the suspension of all Italian arms supplies to Iran. These were revealed by the press and have been confirmed in Tehran.

CSO: 4400/54

BRIEFS

DESALINATION PROJECT--The Ministry of Electricity and Water in Kuwait announced its signing of a $378 million contract with a consortium of Japanese companies for seawater desalination in Kuwait. The total output of all the units will be approximately 72 million imperial gallons per day, with a possible increase to 82 million by using certain chemicals at a very high temperature. The units' current output is 102 million gallons per day, in addition to the other units under construction that will have an output of approximately 43 million gallons. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 90, 30 Oct-6 Nov 81 p 46] 9455

EXPATRIATE LABOR DECREASE--Labour permits issued for the private and oil sectors during the second quarter of 1981 dropped by 15.8 per cent compared to the same period last year, an official report said yesterday. The total number of labour permits issued during that quarter dropped by 24.4 per cent compared to the same period in 1980, the report by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour added. The number of workers entering Kuwait for the first time dropped by 18.5 per cent and final departure of workers increased by 11.7 per cent. Renewal of work permits increased by 1.9 per cent during the second quarter of this year and permits issued to business and handicraft men increased by 122.2 per cent and 272.7 per cent respectively, the report said. Work permits for the construction sector during the second quarter of 1981 reached 51.8 per cent compared to 22.6 for the commercial and 10.1 per cent for the industrial sector. The remainder was issued to the transport, storage, agriculture, real estate, services and insurance sectors.--Kuna. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 7 Nov 81 p 1]

CSO: 4400/54

COMMUNIST PARTY LEADER INTERVIEWED BY CUBAN PRESS

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 6 Oct 81 p 6

[Report on interview with Lebanese Communist Party secretary general Georges Hawi by Rodolfo Casals; date and place not given]

[Text] "Lebanon is now going through a crucial period, probably the most dangerous one since the start of the events that took place in 1975. The savage Israeli attacks, backed by American imperialism, have launched a new phase in the Zionist military escalation against the country," said Georges Hawi, secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party (PCL) Central Committee.

In statements to the Cuban press, the Arab leader — whose party constitutes part of the Lebanese National Movement (MNL) — added that the American-Israeli military escalation could at any moment transform itself into large-scale armed operations and occupation.

For Hawi the objective of the U.S. and Israeli attacks is to attempt to impose on Lebanon the Camp David conspiracy and rush to the aid of Israel's allies inside Lebanon. However, he feels that the heroic struggle being carried out by the joint forces of the MNL and the Palestine Resistance Movement, supported by Syria and the other member-nations of the Firmness and Rejection Front as well as all the revolutionary and progressive forces in the world, has been able to abort the latest American-Israeli plans for aggression.

"At the present time," he reported, "the American imperialists are pushing us to impose a plan that will permit them to achieve what Israeli attacks have not been able to accomplish, that is, to disarm the Palestine Resistance Movement and impose on Lebanon an antinational policy that serves imperialist and Zionist plans."

Going deeper into his evaluation of the extent of the MNL's struggle, the secretary general of the PCL claimed that it had succeeded in creating the basis for the defeat of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary plot aimed at liquidating the Palestine Resistance Movement, torpedoing Syrian resistance, eliminating the Lebanese national presence and incorporating Lebanon into the Camp David agreements as a first step in the generalization of those agreements to all the Arab countries.

"This struggle of the MNL's," he went on, "has also succeeded in defeating the program aimed at imposing a military dictatorship on Lebanon through the utilization of a religious and sectarian army."

For the PCL the solution to the lengthy crisis the country has been going through will be through the restitution of national unity, a guarantee of its independence, affirmation of its Arab appurtenance and dedication to its democratic development. The basis for this solution would consist of breaking off all kinds of relations with the Zionist enemy, liquidating fascist domination over part of the country and liberating the South, occupied by Israel since 1978.

In Hawi's opinion, all of the above makes it imperative for the MNL to work for the realization of a comprehensive plan of national and global opposition to Zionist-imperialist-reactionary domination at all levels (political, popular and military).

The importance of a swift solution to the Lebanese conflict stands in direct relation to the significance the imperialists and their allies assign to the total domination of Lebanon. In connection with this, Hawi explained that Lebanon is the main location where the Palestine Resistance Movement can be dealt severe blows and where a war of attrition can be carried out against Syria to weaken it and paralyze its opposition to the Camp David compromise.

"Our party," he said, "calls for the mobilization of the masses in a great struggle to find a political solution to the problem, one of particular importance to all progressive, patriotic, democratic and antifascist forces in the country. But, having no illusions about the institutions of the American imperialists, Israel and their local agents, the PCL goes on preparing itself for all forms of struggle, including armed combat."

As far as relations with the Palestine Resistance Movement are concerned, the secretary general of the PCL reminded us that the party always strives to strengthen its ties with the leaders of the Palesinian people and to utilize all the abilities of Lebanese and Palestinian patriots in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reactionary elements. He emphasized the fact that the two causes, Lebanese and Palestinian, complement one another within the framework of the progressive Arab national struggle against the policy of betrayal of the Arab cause.

Finally, Hawi stressed the fact that the PCL is convinced that the strengthening of MNL influence is one of the chief guarantees for the preservation of the Palestine Resistance Movement's existence in Lebanon and also of the need for consolidating the tripartite alliance between the MNL, the Palestine Resistance Movement and Syria in order to successfully oppose the Falangist-Zionist plan.

11,466
CSO: 4548/3

FAHD PLAN DECRIED AS EQUIVALENT TO CAMP DAVID

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 30 Oct 81 p 5

[Text]

BEGIN SAID he had been deeply shocked by what had happened. Reagan said that America was overwhelmed by sadness. Telegrams of condolence came from all over the world from rulers ignorant of the true feelings of the Egyptian people. Hosni Mubarak walked with the funeral cortege, shaking with fear and all the while he was saying that Egypt would continue on 'the course of peace' and that relations with Israel were excellent and that US protection would guarantee his regime's safety. But history rejects Mubarak, for he who takes the course of Sadat, takes the course of treason.

ALL THE time we have been directing our attention to the deceased President Sadat, we have been forgetting one important thing: Sadat did not die, because his policies live on. The planners in the White House knew what to do in the event of Sadat's death; all they had to do was put into operation a prearranged programme of action.

This they have done, with Mubarak's succession. But the Americans and the Zionists have still failed to involve anyone save Sadat and Nimeiri in their Camp David process and they have failed even to implement their so-called 'autonomy' plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The Fahd plan

Because of their failure to complete even the treasonable Camp David process, the enemies of the Arab Nation came up with a Camp David in disguise: the Fahd plan. The Fahd plan is the answer which Washington has come up with, in the event of the total collapse of Camp David. When the so respectable President Sadat was at work on his schemes, Prince Fahd remained silent. But now Sadat is silent and therefore the Prince's time has come. The central stage is now no longer Egypt, because machine-guns and grenades have dealt with the principal actor. But the prince remains and his work continues.

Following Sadat's death, the entrancing effect of that event led most Arab governments to send their condolences to the Egyptian regime, in complete disregard of the Baghdad conference and successive Arab League resolutions. Three days after the event, they began to realise that they had made something of a slip-up, so some retreated from their position and announced that actually they welcomed the death of Sadat, but merely objected to the method of his death. While some cancelled plans to travel to Egypt for the state funeral, all were agreed on one thing: the need to contact Nimeiri to reassure him and ask him to continue to follow

his policies, otherwise Sadat's death might spark the historic revolutionary march against the reactionary American axis.

Camp David has not died

Yet the Sudanese regime was filled with horror following Sadat's death and America and its European allies had to come to Egypt's and Sudan's immediate aid. Choosing to intensify its presence in Egypt, the Americans pushed Egypt into choosing the new President with extraordinary speed. The result of all this is that while Sadat may be dead, his policies live on. Camp David has not died yet, there is even as yet no immediate need for the Fahd plan to step in in its place. Therefore the question facing us is this: Has the corpse of Sadat not been enough, or are more showers of bullets going to be necessary to complete the process of reversing the tide of treason?

CSO: 4500/45

STRENGTH OF ECONOMY ASSERTED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 17

[Article by Phil Kelly: "Libya Can Weather the Storm"]

[Text] PRODUCTION LEVELS are the key to oil prices. Demand for oil has dropped in the developed world, mainly because of the slump, while more oil is being produced by non-OPEC countries like Britain and Mexico. The result is that total OPEC production has fallen from about 30 million barrels a day (mbd) in 1979 to 22 mbd this year. Yet Saudi production is virtually the same as two years ago — just over 9 mbd. It had actually risen to 10 mbd before their production was cut by ten per cent on 1st September.

The Saudis cut production because the price for Saudi crude was being forced under the level of $32 a barrel which is the lowest even they will accept. The glut they have created is designed to help the USA and to create problems for three countries which have fought hardest for fair oil prices — the Libyan Jamahiriya, Algeria and Nigeria. In August, at the OPEC Ministerial meeting in Geneva, the Saudis refused to agree with other oil producers that production should be co-ordinated to allow a posted price of $35 a barrel. Adding the premium paid for African crudes like Libya's would have brought the Libyan price to $39-$40 a barrel — Libya's current posted price.

In his speech to the Tripoli rally celebrating the twelfth anniversary of the Libyan revolution, Libyan leader Muammer Qadhafi sharply criticised Saudi policy. 'The reduction in the price of Arab oil benefits America,' he said. 'America wanted the international market flooded with oil in order to bring pressure to bear on countries like Libya, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates to fall in line with US policies in the region. But, Qadhafi pointed out, it was Nigeria which had suffered most from the price squeeze to the point where it could no longer meet its internal commitments. 'This is because it cannot sell its oil in view of the cheap Saudi oil and the market glut; it is this which has prevented others from buying Libyan oil at $40 a barrel,' the Libyan leader declared. This was in the interests of America and the Zionists, he pointed out.

Recent weeks have seen a press campaign of exaggeration and inaccuracies, with the evident intention of persuading world opinion that Libya's reduced oil production will have the effect of both slowing its development programme and limiting its independence of action abroad.

Most persistent in falsifying the situation has been the London weekly *The Economist*. On 5th September, and again on 12th September, the journal claimed that Libyan production was down to as low as 600,000 barrels a day, and that revenues had therefore slipped from $22 billion to $7 billion annually. The figures for current production and revenue are plucked from thin air: *The Economist* also invented a figure for proposed expenditure under the Jamahiriya's 1981-85 Development plan — $70 billion. The actual figure is $62.5 billion. 'A ministerial committee is feverishly trying to work out a series of budget cuts,' the journal claimed. No doubt when *The Economist* gets round to reporting the accurate figure for the development plan, it will describe it as 'cut from the previous $70 billion.'

Susan Morgan, writing in *The Observer* on 6th September, started with the old State Department myth that Libya is an international troublemaker. She claimed that 'Libya spends many millions bankrolling revolutions throughout the world,' and implied that this 'burden' would have to be shed in the light of reduced oil revenues. Libya does contribute to national liberation movements, but it is a small sum indeed compared to the outlays on creating an industrial base for the Jamahiriya.

Domestic economy

At home, Libya seems unlikely to have cash flow problems. Underspending of planned development budgets has been a major problem in the past. Jedouri Azouri Talhi, the Secretary to the General People's Committee, told the General People's Congress in January 1980 that the country had entered the final year of the 1976-80 Development plan 'with overdue projects worth 1,600 million Libyan dinars [$5.5 billion]. This means that the workforce is exhausted, and we have undertaken tasks beyond our powers,' he said.

In an interview with *8 Days* magazine on 6th September, Rajeb Missellati, Governor of the Jamahiriya's Central Bank, outlined the measures which could be taken to make sure that the drop in oil revenue would have minimal effects on the economy:

☐ 'Of course if we are facing a temporary cash flow problem, we will resort to our reserves. Isn't that what reserves are for?' he said. Official reserves are estimated at $14 billion;

☐ Commercial banks in Libya have an estimated three billion Libyan dinars ($10 billion) in savings which has not been tapped for investment;

☐ Libya could borrow easily on the international capital market; commercial loans were estimated at as low as $686 last year, and Libya is abundantly creditworthy, with oil supplies lasting until well into the next century;

☐ Tighter tax collection could yield considerably more revenue.

Ironically, the appreciation of the dollar against other trading currencies enhances Libya's international buying power. Helen Junz, oil economist at Townsend Greenspan, a consulting firm, said the big increase in OPEC's purchasing power resulting from weakened West European currencies is largely offsetting the cuts in output made by some producers,' the *International Herald Tribune* reported on 29th August. Ms Junz estimated that Libya's purchasing power had risen by 21.4 per cent. Mr Missellati estimates that because the Italian lira has dropped so sharply against the dollar, Libya's purchasing power overall has risen by more than 29 per cent. •Italy is Libya's principal trading partner.

The ramifications of the economic campaign became clearer with the announcement that Saudi Arabia was to supply Italy with 200,000 barrels a day, after a gap of twenty months. In August, ENI of Italy stopped lifting crude from its Libyan concessions. 'Although Italy's move was generally ascribed to Tripoli's high prices, it has been generally interpreted as part of NATO's strategy to isolate the Libyan regime,' *8 Days* reported on 18th September.

CSO: 4500/45

AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS REVIEWED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 19

[Text]

LIBYA'S FIRST turkey farm was opened on 9th September by Mr Bashir Jawda, Secretary for Land Reclamation and Agrarian Reform. Comprising four pens with an annual production capacity of 40,000 birds, the project is part of a long-term plan to establish 129 turkey farms with an annual output of almost two million turkeys — the equivalent of more than 12 million kilograms of meat per year.

September also saw the start of work on a major new integrated poultry production project at Aziziyeh, one of the largest yet launched in the Jamahiriya. The scheme aims at producing 5 million tonnes of poultry meat and 6.5 million hatching eggs per year. In addition to slaughter houses and cold storage facilities, the new project will have its own poultry feed mill, with a capacity of 11 tonnes per hour.

The increasing number of agro-industrial schemes in the Jamahiriya has been accompanied by an expansion in the country's feed milling capacity. The latest animal feed plant, described by the Jamahiriya news agency JANA as the largest in Africa, was opened in Tripoli on 3rd September, as part of the celebrations marking the twelfth anniversary of the Al Fateh Revolution. The plant has an hourly capacity of 30 tonnes of cattle and poultry feed, and will bring animal feed production in the Jamahiriya to 375,000 tonnes per annum, according to the General Milling and Feedstuffs Company. Covering a 12 hectare site, the factory has 36 storage silos and will employ 65 workers.

The Jamahiriya's new agro-industrial plants will make a major contribution towards the self-sufficiency in food which Libya's planners are aiming for by the end of the century. By 1985, at the end of the current five year plan period, it is expected that Libya will be importing only 38 per cent of her food requirements, against the present 46.5 per cent. It is also planned that domestic output of processed foods will be meeting 35 per cent of local demand, compared with the current level of 27 per cent.

CSO: 4500/45

ACHIEVEMENTS IN REGIONAL PLANNING LAUDED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 pp 14-16

[Text] The most vital concern for the Libyan Jamahiriya today is development. Over the past ten years her massive oil wealth has been channelled into a series of bold projects designed to ensure that, by the time the oil runs out, Libya will be economically self-sufficient. A special contributor looks at future regional development schemes which are part of a plan to the year 2000.

IN A period of a few decades Libya must make up for centuries of neglect and create an infrastructure that will stand comparison with anywhere in the developed world. Of course, this sort of pressure for rapid development confronts every oil state, but Libya has some unique problems as well to complicate her task.

Despite her vast land area of almost 1.8 million square kilometres, only two per cent is suitable for agriculture. A further eight per cent could be used for pasture and, of the rest, eighty per cent is desert and ten per cent steppe. For Libya's population, now over three million, this means that the provision of adequate food supplies is very difficult. Furthermore, any attempts to increase food production by extending agricultural activities are bound to run up against the very hostile physical environment that covers ninety per cent of the country. One result of this has been that Libya's population has necessarily been concentrated in those areas that are the most fertile — the Mediterranean coast around the towns of Tripoli and Benghazi and, to a lesser extent, Sebha in the Fezzan.

Planning in Libya, given these constraints, must therefore address three separate issues. It must create an effective industrial base for economic self-sufficiency and diversification in the shortest possible time. It must also develop the limited agricultural base to the maximum if the goal of nutritional self-sufficiency by the end of the century is to be achieved. Finally, Libya's population must be dispersed away from the congested coastal areas through the careful location of agricultural and industrial projects in new regions. Here regional planning is of vital importance for it translates national plans which deal with the development of economic sectors into geographic reality. It can maximise the use of available resources and counteract the tendency of population and economic activity to concentrate in the temperate coastal regions.

Environmental constraints and advantages

Availability of water is one of the critical factors in Libya's development, both for regional planning and for her overall aims. The traditional concentration of population along the Mediterranean grew up because this was the only region where there was sufficient rain for agriculture to succeed. In the Tripoli region, the Jefara plain and the Jabal Nafussa receive about 200 mm of rain per year — just sufficient for the dry-farming of wheat and other cereals. In the eastern Benghazi region, rainfall can rise to up to 600 mm in parts of the Jabal al-Akhdar.

Elsewhere rainfall is negligible. This is a critical consideration for industry too, for it also needs vast amounts of water and, unless sufficient amounts are available locally, industrial development is impossible.

Despite the shortage of rain, Libya is extremely fortunate in having vast reserves of underground fossil water. These are located in the Sebha and al-Khalij regions, particularly in the Murzurk, Kufrah and Sarir basins. They have formed the basis of Libya's recent strides in agriculture and, although fears have been expressed about abuse of such a precious resource, it seems that these fossil reserves will be exploited to their maximum in the future.

In addition to water, two other vital raw materials have vitally influenced regional planning. Oil is self-evidently one, for it was the discovery of oil in the 1960s and its exploitation that made the desert south of the Gulf of Sirte into a major economic zone. More recently, the mining of immense deposits of iron ore at Brak, close to Sebha, and the discovery of uranium close to Libya's border with Chad, has spurred increased developmental attention to these areas.

The specific locations of such resources in the interior of the country is one of the factors that has most profoundly affected concepts of regional planning recently, as far as areas remote from traditional population centres are concerned. They have made it possible to consider decentralisation of economic activity beyond just those areas where the oil fields are located and away from the Gulf of Sirte coastline, with its oil-based industry. Now the desert can also play an active role in Libya's development.

The background to regional planning

The pre-revolutionary regime paid lip-service to the idea of regional planning and the detailed planning proposals published in 1966 were designed to counter urban drift, as oil caused urban living standards to rise. Attention was to be paid to improving regional living standards and to infrastructural development. However, the really critical fields of productive agriculture and industry received scant attention. In any case, these plans were rejected in 1968 and the Revolution intervened before new plans could be drawn up.

It was only after a detailed review had been completed in 1972 that new regional plans were prepared. These had had to take into account the piecemeal development projects already underway in industry and agriculture. Industry had to follow the pattern dictated by existing refinery and petrochemical plant. Agriculture was restricted by lack of water resources to the coastal regions of the Jabal al Akhdar and the Jefara plain. The only variation in this pattern was the Kufrah project, then under development, to create 10,000 hectares of fertile land in the desert by the use of fossil water reserves. The difficulties inherent in this type of project were to be made clear in 1973, as the Kufrah scheme came into operation. Fodder yields were low and water demand much higher than expected. As a result, the scheme had to be converted to cereal, rather than fodder, production. All these factors were to dominate the subsequent three-year transitional plan and the 1976-1980 five-year plan that succeeded it.

However, as oil revenues increased after 1973 and 1979, planners began to think ahead to the end of the century. It was clear that concerted regional planning was essential if the Jamahiriya was to successfully settle, supply and employ its anticipated 4.5 to 6.5 million-strong population by the year 2000 AD. Unless action was taken, this population, twice the size of Libya's population today, would be concentrated on the coast and the interior would be completely depopulated.

In 1979 a master plan was drawn up — the National Physical Perspective Plan, or the '2000 Plan'. It was to dictate the general lines development was to follow until the end of the century, at an estimated cost of 103 billion dinars. Detailed development was to be executed through a series of five year plans within the general framework of the master plan.

Both the master plan and the five year plans come under the control of local municipalities and the Secretariat for Municipalities, thus ensuring that a regional perspective will always be kept in view.

The 1981-1985 plan, which forms the first stage of the '2000 Plan', will cost 18,400 million dinars, the equivalent of three years' oil revenues at today's prices, and is to provide an annual growth rate in

gross domestic product (GDP) of 9.4%. Industry gets 23% of total investment and is expected to grow annually at over 20 per cent, both in major heavy industry projects and in the more diversified general and medium industrial sector. Ten per cent of total investment will go to revitalising coastal agriculture, to reduce Libya's dependence on imported food, at present 60% of all the food she consumes. The costs of the plan will of course be borne by oil revenues — as the result, it is hoped, of increased unit prices, since the plan foresees a 15% drop in production from the currently projected figure of 1.75 million barrels per day (b/d) by 1985. The oil sector then will only provide 47% of Libya's total GDP, for non-oil contributions to GDP are to grow from the current figure of 35% to 53%. The new plan is highly ambitious when compared to its predecessor, where the growth rate in GDP was only 7%, but oil revenues have risen. Problems may come from Libya's ability to absorb the massive inputs she proposes.

Agriculture

The pattern that regional development in agriculture will follow is clear. The 170,000 hectares of irrigated land in the Jefara plain and the 40,000 hectares in the Jabal al-Akhdar will be augmented by an additional 66,000 hectares; dry-farming will be extended by a further 350,000 hectares, mainly in the Gulf of Sirte. There will also be a massive increase of 1.5 million hectares in pasturelands.

In addition to these developments, there will be a massive expansion of irrigated agriculture through the use of fossil water in other parts of the Sebha and al-Khalij regions. Schemes similar to the Kufrah scheme have already begun in Sarir and Sebha (Maknoussa) and these are to be extended. The 1981-1985 plan foresees the Kufrah scheme being extended by a further 10,000 hectares while 200,000 hectares of new irrigated land are to be developed in the Sarir basin at Tazerbo.

These desert schemes serve a double purpose. They are considered to be the only way in which Libya can hope to attain food self-sufficiency in a reasonable time, despite the massive costs — land reclamation in Kufrah, for example, costs 10,000 dollars per hectare. In addition they also provide a way of retaining a local population in what are otherwise remote and inhospitable inland areas. By 2000 AD Libya's rural population will number 1.1 million people and will provide a rural workforce of 200,000, 50% more than today's figure. Although the majority will live in the fertile coastal regions, a significant minority will stay in the oases of the Fezzan and the al-Khalij, at Kufrah and Sarir. Sarir, for instance, will require a population of 200,000 to ensure that its schemes are fully operational.

Industry

The other major concern of regional planners has been industrial development. This major industrial sector has to be based on oil and petrochemicals, for oil is the most important national resource, both as an industrial raw material and as an export commodity. Libya earned 4,510 million dinars in 1979 and an estimated 6,500 million dinars in 1980 from oil. The fact that the contribution of oil to GDP is to fall means that petrochemicals and refined petroleum products will have to become an important source of alternative export earnings.

Oil and oil-related activities are almost exclusively located in the al-Khalij region, a region which dominates Libya's economy as a result. Within the region itself, oil provides 98 per cent of GDP and the region as a whole provides 97 per cent of Libya's total GDP. All this wealth is generated in the oil fields and the coastal processing centres of Marsa Brega, Ajadabiah, Sirt and Ras Lanuf, with a small contribution coming from the agricultural sites at Kufrah and Sarir. The importance of oil-related industry has meant that the al-Khalij coast has acquired all the characteristics of an integrated petrochemicals industrial sector. Marsa Brega has a 10,000 b/d refinery, with an associated natural gas plant, a methanol complex and an ammonia/urea plant which started operations in 1980. The new centre of Ras Lanuf contains the most important petrochemicals development. An ethylene complex to produce up to 52,000 tonnes per year is under construction. A new refinery there, once completed, will handle 220,000 b/d and another chemicals complex will take its feedstock from Masada.

Outside al-Khalij, the major centre for industrial development has been the Tripoli region. Quite apart from petrochemical and refining plant at Zawia and

Tripoli, it will house the major industrial development proposed under the 1981-1985 plan — the Misrata steel complex. This massive project, costed at one billion dollars for the initial stages, is to produce 1½ million tonnes of steel by 1986. By the end of the century, production is to reach three million tonnes. An aluminium smelter and foundry may also be built at Zuwara and a nuclear power station is proposed for Tahuna.

Such massive projects automatically involve regional planning. The Misrata complex is to use iron ore from the deposits at Brak and a new railway line is to be built between Tripoli and Sebha, with branches to Brak and Misrata to transport the ore. Similar considerations apply to future water use in the al-Khalij region, for steel production and nuclear power require massive amounts of water, as will the new agricultural irrigation schemes at the coast.

A 400 km long double pipeline has been proposed to run from Sarir to Marsa Brega. There it will split to Ras Lanuf and Sirte, and to Ajadabiah, dividing its annual two million cubic metres of water between the al-Khalij coastal region and the Benghazi region. The ability to interconnect resources between regions is clearly essential, for without this ability, much of Libya's development would have to come to a stop.

Demography and settlement

The basic concern behind all of Libya's regional planning is demography. Fully five-sixths of Libya's population will be urbanised by the end of the century and, without regional planning, it would be forced into the overcrowded districts around Tripoli and Benghazi. To overcome this the proposed future urban growth pattern in the '2000 Plan' encourages settlement in the interior and along the Gulf of Sirte. Tripoli's population is expected to reach almost two million and Benghazi will reach the seven hundred thousand mark. New urban centres in the Sirte region will relieve the pressure on Benghazi and Tripoli, with new towns around Misrata, Ras Lanuf, Marsa Brega and Ajadabiah. Agricultural development in the Benghazi plain and the Jabal al-Akhdar will disperse settlement around Benghazi itself. Development along the southern flank of the Jabal will link in to Derna and Tobruk, making them into more important urban sectors.

The major developments will come in the al-Khalij region interior. The expanded schemes at Sarir and Kufrah will provide a new north-south settlement axis, running down from Ajadabiah, while in the Sebha region, settlement patterns will link the region to Tripoli. These two new axes will, it is hoped, ensure that a significant proportion of the population will continue to live in the interior. Unless such population dispersal is achieved, Libya will become merely a southern Mediterranean littoral state and she will lose her links with Africa south of the Sahara. It is this factor which is perhaps the most important for the future, for, without easy access to the huge potential markets of Africa, Libyan development might face a bleak future.

CSO: 4500/45

URBAN WATER CONTRACTS FOR BRITISH FIRM

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 19

[Text]

THE CONSTRUCTION of modern water supply systems is a key aspect of the Jamahiriya's programme of urban redevelopment. The British firm Baldwin Overseas has been active in this area of Libya's development, and its involvement has been stepped up by the recent award of two water supply and pumping contracts by Benghazi Municipality. The new contracts bring the total value of the firm's Libyan work to $25 million.

The largest of the new contracts, valued at $8.4 million, involves laying 18 kilometres of ductile pipe and 11 kilometres of PVC in Quaffia, a small town just north of Benghazi. Completion is due in 30 months.

The second contract, worth $6 million and for completion in 20 months, is for the installation of eight submersible pumps in an underground reservoir at Sidi Khalifa, a few kilometres north of Quaffia.

Baldwin is already working on a $3.4 million contract for a sewerage pumping and treatment plant at Gasr Abu Hadi, a small town in north central Libya. The project is due for completion next February. Consultant is Poland's Polservice and Britain's Sigmund Pulsometer Pumps is supplying all the mechanical equipment under a $550,000 order.

Baldwin is also working on a $5 million sub-contract from Libya's Al Jabal Contracting Company for a water supply system in Merad Masoud, about 150 kilometres north east of Benghazi. The project is due for completion next August.

CSO: 4500/45

FINNISH FIRMS IN EDUCATION

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 18

[Text]

THE LIBYAN Jamahiriya is engaged in a major expansion of opportunities for vocational and higher education, designed to overcome the shortages of skilled manpower that pose a severe constraint on the country's overall development programme. Finnish firms have played an important role in expanding Libya's educational facilities, and in recent weeks have won further major contracts.

In September it was reported that the Light Industry Secretariat had awarded the OMP Consortium a $9 million contract to build three vocational training centres, to be sited at Beida, Shahat and Marsa Susa. The consortium, which has already completed a $20 million dairy project in the Beida area, is reportedly negotiating for the construction of a fourth training centre and a clinic.

Another vocational training centre is under construction by Finland's Makrotalo at Bani Walid, 200 kilometres south east of Tripoli, and in September it was announced that the firm expects the project to be completed next April. Under contracts with a combined value of $55 million, Makrotalo is also building staff housing complexes at four separate development projects in the Jamahiriya.

In late August it was disclosed that the Finnish firm Are has a two-year, $9 million contract to maintain electrical, plumbing and air conditioning systems at Tripoli's Al Fateh University.

Are's other work in the Jamahiriya includes the provision of site electricity supplies at the Ras Lanouf petrochemicals complex, and instrumentation and electrical installation at the Oasis Oil Company's desert oil camps.

CSO: 4500/45

VEHICLE PRODUCTION RISES

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 18

[Text]

LIBYAN LEADER Muammer Qadhafi officially opened the Jamahiriya's first tractor assembly plant on 2nd September, as part of the celebrations marking the twelfth anniversary of the Revolution. Located at Tajoura, some 20 kilometres east of Tripoli, the LD 10 million plant has an annual production capacity of between 3,000 and 5,000 tractors, depending on the number of shifts worked. The venture was set up and will be operated by the Libyan Tractor Company, formed in June 1977 with a one third stake by Canada's Massey Ferguson and two thirds by the Jamahiriya. Tractor assembly began in temporary premises at Tajoura in June 1979, and last year's output totalled about 2,500 tractors. Three models are produced, and the hope is that about 30 per cent of components will eventually be manufactured in Libya. Last year the tractor plant covered about 30 per cent of domestic demand and this is expected to rise to about 56 per cent by 1985.

Tajoura is also the site of Libya's first bus and truck assembly plant, and a Fiat executive has disclosed to *Jamahiriya Review* that the plant recently entered operation and will soon be officially opened. The venture was set up and will be run by the Libyan Truck Company, created in December 1976, with a capital of LD 12 million — 75 per cent put up by Libya and the rest by Fiat (which in turn is about 13 per cent owned by the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank). Construction of the ultra-modern plant began in 1977 and is now virtually complete, the outstanding work not having prevented start-up.

Initially, the bus and truck plant will confine its activities to assembling imported Fiat parts, but the hope is that between 20 and 25 per cent of parts will eventually be manufactured in the Jamahiriya. By 1985 trucks from the Tajoura plant should be meeting about 12 per cent of Libyan demand, and buses about one quarter.

The Italian Calabrese concern is establishing a truck body and trailer assembly plant near the bus and truck plant, and this is reportedly on the point of starting operations.

The vehicle assembly plants are being set up as part of the Jamahiriya's long-term programme to reduce her dependence on foreign suppliers. One of the major projects in the current five-year plan is a car assembly plant, and approaches have already been made to manufacturers in West Germany, Japan and Britain.

Rapidly rising incomes in Libya, coupled with the country's ambitious development programmes, have led to soaring demand for passenger cars and commercial vehicles. Recent statistics from the Tripoli Chamber of Commerce show that by the end of last year there were a total of 606,674 vehicles in the Jamahiriya, 372,860 were private cars, averaging out at one for every five Libyans. Recently concluded orders point to further increases in the number of vehicles on Libya's roads. British Leyland has reportedly won contracts to supply several thousand vehicles, of which 4,500 will be shipped this year, all of them Land Rovers and Range Rovers. And Japan's Toyota Motor Corporation has won a $42.2 million order for 1,700 light buses and 7,600 four-wheel drive vehicles, *Middle East Economic Digest* reported on 18th September.

CSO: 4500/45

LAA BUYS AIRBUSES

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 19

[Text]

LIBYAN ARAB Airlines, the Jamahiriya's national airline, has placed an order worth an estimated $400 million with the European Airbus Industrie group for ten Airbuses, it was announced in September. Few details of the contract have been disclosed, but it is understood that the ten aircraft include a number of the 250-seat A-300s and also the smaller 200-seat A-310 Airbuses. The first deliveries are due next June, and will be continued for five years at the rate of two aircraft per year.

The Airbus contract is part of LAA's programme to expand its domestic and international services. The airline expects to be carrying 3.6 million passengers per annum by 1985, compared with the current 1.5 million. In April LAA placed an order with Holland's Fokker-VFW for eight F27 light aircraft, and there are reports that it is now negotiating to buy some of the larger F28s.

Parallel with the expansion of LAA's operations has gone a major development of the Jamahiriya's airport facilities. In September it was reported that a $7.7 million design and construction supervision contract for eight new airports has been won by Italy's GPL Generale Progette. They will be sited at Ubari, Zuwara, Nalut, Zliten, Sirte, Derna, Dahra (south of Ras Lanouf) and Greyat, about 150 kilometres south of Tripoli. Mainly to serve medium range domestic flights, the airports will be similar in design, each having a main runway about 2,400 metres long, with provision for extension to 3,600 metres. The first tender documents are expected to be issued next summer, and completion is expected in about four years.

CSO: 4500/45

BRIEFS

LOAN FOR MALAYSIAN MUSLIMS--The Libyan Jamahiriya has granted a ten-year, interest-free loan of $4.66 million to the Malaysian Muslim Welfare Organisation, Perkim, for their new headquarters building in Kuala Lumpur. Details of the loan were disclosed on 27th July by Perkim Vice President and Sarawak State Chief Minister Patinggi Abdul Taib Mahmud, on his return from Tripoli where the loan agreement was signed. The Jamahiriya had earlier given a $6 million loan to Perkim. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 19]

LIGHT INDUSTRY EXPANSION--The celebrations marking the twelfth anniversary of the Al Fateh Revolution saw the opening of the Jamahiriya's latest light industrial plants--a domestic hardware factory in Tripoli and a perfumed soap factory in Janzour. The Tripoli factory, opened on 14th September includes the Arab homeland's first plant for the manufacture of stainless steel utensils. About 45 per cent of the 131,120-item annual output will be exported. Another section of the factory will produce 262,245 aluminum pots and pans per annum on single-shift working. Agreement has reportedly been reached for the factory to be expanded by the addition of a cutlery plant. The Janzour soap factory will be able to produce about 2,000 tonnes of soap per year with one shift of 78 workers. If three-shift working is introduced, output should cover 80 percent of the Jamahiriya's demand for perfumed soap. Industry, with allocations totalling LD 3,930 million, is accorded the lion's share of expenditure in Libya's LD 18,500 million 1981-85 development plan, launched last January. About 30 per cent of the allocations for industry are earmarked for light industrial projects. This year's expenditure for light industry was set at LD 200 million. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 19]

URBAN ROAD CONSTRUCTION--Ring roads are being built in the Jamahiriya's cities to avert congestion caused by the rapidly increasing numbers of vehicles, and particularly private cars, on the roads (see vehicle manufacturing report). The contract for the latest ring road project, for the north eastern town of Derna, has been won by South Korea's Hyundai Construction Company. The 12 kilometre carriageway route was designed by Britain's Howard Humphreys & Sons. The $270 million contract includes the construction of several large bridges and viaducts, the largest being a 400 metre arch bridge spanning the Wadi Derna, about 90 metres above the wadi bed It was also reported in early September that a $165 million road and tree planting scheme for Derna province has been won by the Philippines' Landoil Resources Corporation. The two year contract is for a 135 kilometre highway and for planning 50 hectares with trees. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 17, Oct 81 p 18]

CSO: 4500/45

COUNTRY INCREASES DEPENDENCE ON OIL REVENUES

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 pp 56, 57

[Text]

ANNIE KING-UNDERWOOD reports that, in spite of Omani dependency on its limited oil reserves, 1980 was a bright year for the economy.

THE LATEST report from the Central Bank of Oman shows that the country is becoming more and more dependent on oil revenues, despite the current oil glut. The report says that during 1980 oil revenues were Omani rivals 831.2m ($2.4bn) — 86.6 per cent of the country's total revenues. However, 1981 revenue from oil is estimated at OR1.17bn ($3.39bn), which represents 92 per cent of the total estimated revenue. Projected oil income for 1981-1985 will be OR6.37bn ($18.4bn) out of total revenue of OR6.94bn ($20bn).

The report also reveals that the contribution of the oil sector to the GDP in 1980 went from 61.5 per cent to 69.2 per cent compared with the preceding year. The volume of Omani oil production fell by 4.6 per cent in 1980 to 282,000 b/d from 295,000 b/d in 1979, but this drop in volume was amply compensated by the fact that Omani crude prices increased by 84.4 per cent during the period beginning early 1979 till the end of 1980. For instance, during a span of one month, December 1979 to January 1980, the price of Omani crude shot from $28 to $41 a barrel. After various price swings during 1980, the year ended with Oman obtaining $38.5 a barrel. At the moment Oman is charging $34 a barrel for the fourth quarter of 1981 liftings. Oman has been forced to cut its prices by its main customer, Japan, which refused to pay the previous quarter's $35.5 a barrel price.

Although Oman is not a member of Opec, it has consistently tried to align its oil prices to those of the group.

Crude oil production in Oman has had relatively large fluctuations over the years; it has been declining since 1976, when the peak level of 366,000 b/d was achieved. Due to annual declines in production, the First Five Year Plan (1976-1980) aimed at intensifying exploration activities. The Marmul field was developed, and this made it possible for a production increase by the end of 1980. Based on this success, the planning authorities have projected an increase to 330,000 b/d throughout the Second Five Year Plan period (1981-1985).

A boost to Oman's economy came with the discovery of more natural gas reserves. Proven reserves are estimated at 6.3 trillion cubic feet, of which 1.5 trillion cubic ft comprises associated gas. The Omanis, like the Qataris, have come to realise that their limited oil reserves can be supplemented by developing their natural gas reserves. During the First Five Year Plan three plants were constructed at Yibal, Fahud and Saih Rawl. These plants are at present producing 3,000-5,000 barrels a day. A 20-inch bore natural gas pipeline was constructed from the Yibal fields in the interior of the country to Al Gubrah district in the capital area.

A recent study of Oman's requirements has shown that the amount of gas needed for power generation, household and industrial uses only, over the next forty years would be in the region of 3 trillion cubic feet for the capital area and the areas in the

north near the existing pipeline and its extension to Sohar.

The Central Bank report also mentions that Oman registered a budget surplus during 1980, the first since 1977. Despite this, government spending last year grew much faster than revenues, increasing by 42.17 per cent from OR650.4m ($1.87m) in 1979 to OR924.7m ($2.67bn) in 1980. On the other hand, total revenues went from OR754.1m ($2.17bn) to OR958.9m ($2.77bn) during the same period, an increase of 27.1 per cent. Both these figures were below the projected levels called for by the budget plan for 1980.

1980 was a bright year for Oman's economy, however, as all economic indicators were positive, giving the country's planners an optimistic starting point from which to embark on the ambitious Second Five Year plan. For instance, during 1980 Oman's balance of payments position improved, according to the Central Bank report. A current account surplus of OR362m ($1.05bn) was registered, around four times the 1979 surplus.



CSO: 4400/54

SAUDI OIL SAFEGUARDS QUESTIONED

London 8 DAYS in English No 43, 31 Oct 81 pp 36-37

[Article by Graham Benton]

[Text] SAUDI ARABIA is expected to award a $7bn contract, for building the world's largest oil stockpile, to an American company, as US firms have had experience on a similar project in the US. British firms are also high in the running. Rio Tinto Zinc's Riofinex subsidiary was responsible for site selection and design of the storage facilities for the project — which is causing controversy even within Saudi Arabia.

The so-called 'Red Sea Structure' will have a storage capacity of 1.5bn barrels, equivalent to almost six months' production at the official maximum rate of 8.5m b/d. It is to be sited in the Hijaz mountains, 40km from Yanbu, the Red Sea terminal of the recently-completed trans-Arabian pipeline which runs from the Eastern Province oilfields. Pumping this quantity of oil into bomb-proof storage 'would be sufficient to permit Saudi Arabia to ride out severe and destructive attacks on oil facilities in the Eastern Province,' reported the Houston *Petroleum Information International* newsletter.

New York oil analysts are less impressed by the scheme. One described it as hardly more sensible than 'pumping oil out of one hole into another — and spending several billion dollars in the process.' The scheme is taken as evidence of Saudi Arabia's considerable nervousness about the security of oil flows through the Gulf in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. But sceptics raise several objections to the 'Red Sea Structure' as a sensible precautionary measure.

Most important, they claim, is the fact that port loading facilities rather than oilfields are the really vulnerable targets in wartime. As the Gulf war has shown, oil exports tend to be interrupted by damage to pumping stations, pipelines and terminals rather than oilfields. *Petroleum Information International* even quoted one Petromin official as saying he saw no reason for building a stockpile which would merely duplicate an oilfield in another part of the kingdom.

One New York analyst told the *Wall Street Journal* that the project would be a sensible extension of such security measures as the east-west pipeline, designed 'to ensure stability in the oil markets in case of disruption in the Gulf.' Presumably, crude could be pumped to the Red Sea reserve and stored there for eventual shipment for Yanbu, in the event of interrupted exports from the Gulf.

But other observers claim that the assassination of President Sadat should serve as a reminder of the Red Sea's latent instability. Before the collapse of the Shah and the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq, the West saw Ethiopia and South Yemen as posing the greatest threat to Middle East peace. A Red Sea export terminal for the Saudis is no safer than a Gulf one, claim these critics.

Moreover, they point out, the first stage of the project is not due for completion until 1986, while the fighting in the Gulf is going on now. Critics in the oil industry say that the colossal expense of starting construction would be instantly wasted if the Eastern Province installations were attacked before the project became operational.

The first stage of the Riofinex plan is for above-ground infrastructure and initial tunnel-like parallel caverns to hold the oil. This will cost about $2bn. But in five years'

time, the whole complex will only be able to store about 50m barrels — or just nine days' worth of current Saudi output.

The Ras Tannurah-Yanbu pipeline commissioned this year has a throughput capacity of 1.85m b/d, scheduled to be expanded to 4m b/d. But even when the real work on the Red Sea Structure gets underway after the mid-1980s, planned maximum injection and extraction rates are only 2.35m b/d, which means that almost two years will be needed to fill the subterranean caverns once they are completed. *Petroleum Information International* quotes one oil company official as saying that it is unlikely 'the oil will be in place much before 1990.'

Some Saudi officials are apparently concerned that the huge cost of building the scheme (twice as big as the US's strategic petroleum reserve) will outweigh its usefulness. Even when finished, the storage reserve's extraction capacity would represent little over a quarter of current daily output. It is also unclear whether the crude needed to fill the reserve would be taken from within the official production ceiling of 8.5m b/d — the upper limit allowable if existing Saudi fields are to last into the next century — or from supplementary production.

The first option would mean a restraint on Saudi commitments to Aramco exports, direct Petromin sales or incentive contracts promised to joint venture partners in basic industrial and refinery schemes. The latter would amount to little more than transporting oil from one reservoir in a dangerous zone to another in an equally dangerous zone, say critics of the scheme.

If a slack export market lasts long into the 1980s (by no means a foregone conclusion), the Saudis could afford to divert a substantial portion of production to the projected reserve. But some industry observers feel that in such circumstances the relatively small quantity of Saudi crude available from the Red Sea reserve would make little difference on world markets. In a tighter market, it could be useful in stabilising prices, but the very act of filling up the reserve might be upsetting unless very carefully timed.

Construction was originally planned to start in September. Aramco is not making any comment on the scheme, and there has been no official confirmation from the Saudis. A prime contractor has yet to be chosen, and so apparently has a responsible agency to run the project in Saudi Arabia.

CSO: 4400/55

BA'ATHIST COMMENTS ON MIDEAST DEVELOPMENT

Havana GRANMA in Spanish 12 Oct 81 p 5

[Report on interview with assistant secretary general of the Syrian Ba'ath Party Abdula al-Ahmar by Rodolfo Casals; date and place not given]

[Text] Abdula al-Ahmar categorically stated: "U.S. plans have included and always will include rejection of our party and the Arab peoples in the Middle East."

This interview with the second most important political figure of the Syrian Arab Republic took place in a small conference room at the headquarters of the Syrian Ba'ath Party National Command, of which al-Ahmar is assistant secretary general. In his typically calm and deliberate manner, precise in each of his statements, the focal point of the varied assortment of topics he dealt with was American omnipresence in each of the attacks, pressures, provocations, threats or intrigues daily engaged in in the so-called Arab world, either directly by the foremost imperialist power or through its gendarmes, allies or satellites in the combat zone.

Because of its obvious implications, the Palestinian drama was the indispensable topic he chose to launch his commentary:

"After the Zionist occupation of Palestine," he said, "the United States, responsible for the fact that the Palestinians have to live like refugees and that the Arabs are undergoing a crisis in their struggle, began to attempt to dominate all the Arab peoples. From the start, the Palestinian cause has been the chief focus of the struggle of the Syrian Ba'ath Party and the Arab nation, because everything we are now living through in the Middle East is a result of the attack that took place in 1948, an attack that is still going on due to the fact that Israel, an instrument of the imperialist nations, wants to turn the region into a domain for the application of the racist objectives of international Zionism with the backing and aid of the imperialists. The solution of the Mideast conflict must be based on the return to our peoples of their lands, the complete withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories and the Palestinian people's right of self-determination and to establish their own state."

Then a brief digression to enjoy a cup of the usual, bitter Turkish coffee and al-Ahmar went on with his anti-imperialist denunciation:

"The United States and Israel alone are responsible for the consequences of their policy of aggression. While the United States and Israel have the technology and modern weapons, we have the conviction of our ideas and the firm determination to defend them. On our side we have our brother Arab nations and friends within the socialist community, headed by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The United States does not scare us, although we do keep in mind what it has in terms of strength and potential. But we are certain that our struggle is a just one and we have the support of powerful allies in the socialist camp and throughout the world. In the end the victory will be ours. We will continue to build a socialist system in Syria, continue to fight for Arab unity and a socialist society throughout the Arab nation. On the other hand, the Camp David agreements are trapped in a dead end, but there are some who are looking for a way out for them in one way or another. In connection with this, there are Arab regimes that have been playing a dubious role that has been later exposed in terms of their role as traitors. These regimes are instruments of imperialism and Zionism."

Concerning the current U.S. propaganda campaign in the Middle East aimed at promoting reactionary ideas to the effect that the struggle of the Arab peoples should not be directed against imperialism and Israel but against communism, the assistant secretary general of the Syrian Ba'ath Party said:

"The masses of our peoples are well aware of who has occupied our lands and who those are who are attempting to again play this role against the peoples of the world. They know that Israel cannot go on occupying Palestinian land and engaging in new attacks unless it is fully backed by the United States. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, has never occuped a single Arab land nor does it seek any gain, rather supporting Arab rights that coincide with its firm and clear objectives, which do not permit acts of aggression against peoples. The USSR wants a fair solution in the region, one which will restore their legitimate rights to the Palestinian people and which involves Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories. We are well aware that the United States and its agents are our only enemies and that they are dangerous ones."

The prolonged Lebanese crisis, its origins and future prospects formed the next topic of the interview:

"The United States has taken it upon itself to let the press know, indirectly, that it wants to find a solution to the Lebanese conflict and create stability and peace in the area, but we know that its solutions are based on Israel and that part of Lebanon that is the latter's ally and that they are the aggressors against our people, both Lebanese and Palestinians. Lebanese progressive forces reject Israeli intervention and want to achieve stability through national reconciliation. But Israel, the separatists and Falangists are blocking this goal. We are in favor of the Lebanese National Movement, which proposes that reconciliation can be achieved with positive results if the other party to the affair really and forever breaks off relations with Israel. This is a starting point for initiating discussions as to the future of a united Lebanon."

Then, in al-Ahmar's opinion, was the time to discuss Syria's achievements and the aims of its struggle, led by President Hafiz al-Assad:

"The chief missions of the Syrian revolution are to build an Arab socialist society that will oppose the threats of imperialism, Zionism and reactionary elements, liberate the territories occupied by Israel and free people from the exploitation and oppression the Arab nation has suffered during centuries of backwardness and ignorance. We have organized the masses, which are playing the fundamental role in the development of our society and improving their living conditions. We have laid great importance on our armed forces, the defense of our poeple and our revolutionary achievements. From the start we have had two main goals: to create a strong front that can achieve the objectives of the revolution and to engage in a major effort with other countries in the region to create broad Arab solidarity against Israel and the imperialist aggressor forces."

And lastly, he had a few words to say by way of emphasizing areas of identical interest that exist between Cuba and Syria and underlined his feelings toward the people of Cuba:

"Cuba and Syria are struggling to build a socialist society and working to strengthen the anti-imperialist movement, against Zionism and the reactionary elements and for the liberation of all peoples and progress. There are also ties of friendship between the parties of the two countries for the good of both peoples and their objectives. The people of Cuba are daily winning new victories over imperialism in spite of the blockade, the infiltration of agents and economic and political pressures. I extend my highest esteem for the achievements of the people of Cuba, whom I wish more successes and victories. Cuba's position in support of our struggle attests to the fact that in future the bonds of friendship between our peoples and parties will be made stronger and that the strength of Cuba and Syria will reinforce the struggle of all peoples for peace, freedom and the progress of all mankind."

11,466
CSO: 4548/3

ELECTION OUTCOME DISCUSSED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 pp 4,5

[Text]

Last week's landslide victory of Tunisia's ruling Socialist Destour Party (SDP) in the country's first multi-party elections since independence is a setback for Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's liberalisation efforts. Since 1980 Mr Mzali has been striving to start a process of transition to democracy and political pluralism in the country's political life, and the elections last week were largely the fruit of his endeavors (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, November 2). But with the SDP winning all of the 136 National Assembly seats and 94.6 per cent of the reported 80 per cent voter turnout, the results may backfire on liberalisation by giving powerful hard-line factions in the SDP a mandate to rule as if there were no opposition parties. This is especially likely since none of the opposition received the 5 per cent of the vote necessary for official recognition, although Mr Mzali has indicated that the 5 per cent criterion was not final. In the final analysis, President Habib Bourguiba could grant recognition to any party regardless of the vote.

All of the opposition parties claimed that "grave irregularities" had occurred in the polling, and liberals in the SDP are reported to have admitted that there was a basis to such allegations. Nevertheless, all of the opposition parties, while decrying the elections as a "masquerade," continue to support the "democratisation experiment" that brought them about. Clearly they hope that the clock will not be turned back and now that the Tunisian people have been given a chance to choose their representatives, they will continue to demand elections in the future. If this is the case, then Mr Mzali's efforts will not have been in vain, and the elections will mark the first step towards democracy in Tunisia.

CSO: 4500/48

BRIEFS

ADFAED LOANS INCREASE--Loans offered by the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Aid amounted to approximately 3.5 billion dirhams ($1.16 billion). This is double the sum of its capital of 2 billion dirhams. The Fund's administrative manager, Nassir al-Nuways, said that the Fund had helped finance over 100 projects in Arab and developing countries in Asia and Africa. He also said that the loans which the Fund offered last year alone amounted to 1 billion dirhams. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 90, 31 Oct-6 Nov 81 p 46] 9455

INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITION--The first Arab industrial exhibition will be held in the city of Abu Dhabi between the 23rd and the end of next month, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the nation. It is expected that the following countries will participate in the exhibition: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq and Oman; in addition to several companies and government agencies and semi-government agencies. The main purpose of the exhibition is to offer a clear picture of the Gulf's industries. [Text] [London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 90, 30 Oct-6 Nov 81 p 46] 9455

CSO: 4404/109

BRIEFS

IDB LOAN FOR RURAL PROJECT--The Islamic Development Bank (IDB) has granted a $2.4m loan to North Yemen for rural development projects in the Kholan area of North Yemen. The agreement was signed in Jeddah between Dr Ahmed Ali al Hirjrani, Yemeni Minister of agriculture, and Dr Ahmed Muhammed Ali, president of the IDB. The IDB's assistance of North Yemen over the past three years has totalled $11m, and together with Saudi Arabia it is in the forefront of aiding debt-ridden Yemen. In turn Yemen has been recently trying to increase its exports of food items to Saudi Arabia, to ease its balance of payments problems. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 p 40]

FOOD COMPANY SET UP--A joint North Yemeni-Saudi Arabian company has been set up to build cold stores, supermarkets and poultry and dairy farms in North Yemen, Reuters reported from Sanaa last week. The company, called Foodic (Yemen) Ltd has a capital of YR 100 million (about $22 million) with the Yemeni partner, the General Corporation for Foreign Trade (GFCT), holding 32 percent of the shares. A private Saudi firm, International Corporation for Food (Foodic) and Co, and four other Saudi businessmen holding the remaining 68 percent of the equity. The state-owned GCFT already owns three cold stores in North Yemen, which the joint venture will now operate. The new company is based in Sanaa. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in Arabic No 44, 2 Nov 81 p 12]

CSO: 4400/56

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BRIEFS

BUS ROUTES--Haifa, 19 Nov--A regular daily bus line connecting the border crossing point at the good fence near kibbutz Hanita and Nahariyya will be opened by "Egged" [Israeli Bus Corporation] jointly with the civilian liaison unit in southern Lebanon. The service is intended to provide the Lebanese who travel to Israel every morning for work, visits or medical treatment with convenient, inexpensive commuting service, and which will bring them back to the border in the afternoon. It has been reported by the Egged directorate that a short ceremony to mark the dedication of the line--which is the first of its kind--will be held next Sunday. [Text] [TA191550 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1455 GMT 19 Nov 81]

BUILDING COOPERATION WITH EGYPT--The director of the factories section of Solel Bone, Tzvi Barzilay, has recently visited Egypt and concluded there the establishment of joint plants for the production of bricks, tiles and concrete pipes, as well as plants for industrialized building carpentry. Solel Bone will provide the equipment, know-how and manpower for the operation of the plants. There is a grave housing problem in Egypt and the Egyptians want to develop the building industries. In the coming days Egyptian representatives will arrive in Israel to work for the promotion of the projects. [Text] [TA131412 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Nov 81 p 2]

CSO: 4423/43

BRIEFS

LIBYAN AID TO TERRORISTS--Since April 1981 the relations between Libyan ruler Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi and the Palestinian terrorist organizations led by the Fatah have again tightened. Libya today constitutes a source for considerable financial support for the PLO and a major conduit for the channeling of arms and ammunition to the terrorist organizations. Since April 1981 at least 30 meetings have taken place between PLO and Libyan leaders. Libya extends a great deal of military aid to the terrorists: the supply of arms, aid in training, sending Libyan volunteers to the ranks of "the Palestinian revolution," mobilizing volunteers to the terrorists' ranks, giving intelligence information for the purpose of terrorist acts and granting documents and passports to the terrorists setting out on their missions. Libya has supplied arms to the terrorists so that they can carry out terrorist acts against both Jewish and Israeli targets abroad. Among other things the Libyans have supplied the PLO with surface-to-air missiles of the SAM-0 type and anti-aircraft cannons. After the cease-fire took effect in Lebanon, on 24 July 1981, Libya has continued to funnel arms to the terrorists in Lebanon both via Syria and Lebanese ports. In an airlift Libya has transferred about 200 tons of arms and ammunitions while through its sealift it has transferred about 15,000 tons of various kinds of military equipment. [Text] [TA161425 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Nov 81 p 2]

TERRORISTS' ARMAMENT BY LIBYA--Libya has supplied the terrorists with two patrol ships after the cease-fire in Lebanon took effect. Since the start of the cease-fire the Libyans have supplied the terrorists with large quantities of military equipment including 130-mm cannons, rocket launchers, surface-to-air missiles of the SAM-9 type and anti-aircraft cannons. The IDF spokesman today released information on Libya's involvement in terrorist activity in Lebanon and the entire world Among other things it was reported that Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi undertook to give the PLO about $40 million annually and award large money prizes for every terrorist act. [Text] [TA150821 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 15 Nov 81]

CSO: 4423/43

NATIONAL FRONT LEADERS AIR VIEWS ON MUBARAK

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 6 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

LEADING MEMBERS of the Egyptian National Front recently made known their organisation's attitude towards the new Mubarak regime in their country at a press conference held in London on November 3rd. Dr Hikmat Abu Zaid, Vice-President of the Egyptian National Front and a former cabinet minister in Gamal Abdul Nasser's government; together with her colleague, Dr Abu Bakr, answered many questions from representatives of the Arab and British press, as well as from a correspondent of Al-Zahf Al-Akhdar.

OPENING the conference, Dr Abu Zaid said that one of the major problems affecting the western outlook on Arab affairs was the western media's inability to understand the complex political realities of the Arab world and that, in part, the conference was being held to correct many of the misapprehensions current about the Egyptian opposition. Before answering questions from the press, Dr Abu Bakr made a point of setting out the Egyptian National Front's attitude to the actual manner of ex-President Anwar Sadat's death. He said: 'We would have liked to have seen President Sadat legally tried for his crimes.' Dr Abu Bakr went on to say that Sadat had done harm not only to Egypt, but also to the Palestinians and to the entire Arab people.

Basing

In answer to a question from the right-wing London **Daily Express** as to where the movement was based, Dr Abu Zaid said: 'We really represent the ordinary man, rather than anything else.' Based currently in Beirut, the Egyptian National Front was active throughout the world, as well as in Egypt, Dr Abu Zaid said. In answer to a further question from the same reporter concerning General Saadeddin Shazli's whereabouts at the time of Sadat's death, an inference to the fact that the former Egyptian Chief of Staff was said to have been in Tripoli, Dr Abu Zaid said that it could not be denied that the General would 'go where there are open doors'. Dr Abu Zaid stressed that General Shazli had also been in Algiers around the time of Sadat's death and that both he and the National Front had also been active in Damascus.

David Spanier of the London **Times** asked what the Egyptian National Front's policy would be in the event that the Camp David process were to continue. Dr Abu Bakr answered by saying: 'Camp David does not bring a comprehensive peace to this area of the world, on the contrary, tension has increased since the accords.' Confirming that it was the Front's policy to put this matter before the Egyptian people, Dr Abu Bakr said: 'We need a democratic national regime in Egypt ... We shall have a real referendum and take the treaties to the Egyptian people and I am sure that they will reject them.'

Referring to the damage which the Camp David process had

done to Egypt and its reputation, Dr Abu Zaid said that it now seemed that the new President's policy was but a continuation of Sadat's policy. Sadat's policy had, in her view, only succeeded in bringing Egypt into confrontation with its natural Arab allies. In her opinion, it was axiomatic that: '... If you open up doors with the western countries and the United States, you should not close doors to your brothers.' The treaties signed between Egypt and Israel had been 'approved' in utterly ridiculous referenda, Dr Abu Zaid said, in which the proverbial 99.99 per cent in favour were cast. Countering the popularly held view in the western world, she said that the relationship between Egypt and Israel was anything but normal: 'If objective criteria are applied, it is clear that this is no real peace.'

Allies

Turning to the question of the Egyptian National Front's relationship with the other elements of the Egyptian opposition, Roger Matthews of the London **Financial Times** asked what was the current relationship between the National Front and another major opposition group, the Unionist Progressive Party, the questioner's inference being that there existed differences of opinion. Dr Abu Zaid responded by saying firmly: 'We are not rivals at all.' Admitting that there were some disagreements between the two groups, Dr Abu Zaid nevertheless stressed that on all the important issues, such as the need for democracy, the need to end Sadat's 'open door' economic policy and the need to restore Egypt to the Arab fold, the National Front and the Unionist Progressive Party were in complete agreement.

Referring to the existing 'legal' opposition inside Egypt, Dr Abu Bakr made the following telling point: 'All legal opposition parties have to support Camp David. But you can't ignore the people, their rights ... America and Israel have managed to impose a solution by force on the Egyptian people, that's clear ... but how long will it last?'

Party

A later question concerning the mooted offer by Mubarak to the Socialist Labour Party to participate in government was fielded by Dr Abu Bakr who repeated that the 'legal' opposition was essentially 'designed for foreign consumption, to show (them) that they have opposition parties ...' But Dr Abu Bakr was in no doubt that any party that threw in its lot with Mubarak would be automatically separating itself from the Egyptian people.

As for the Muslim fundamentalists which the Egyptian regime claimed assassinated Sadat, Dr Abu Bakr said that before Sadat there had been no violence, but Sadat himself had armed supporters of his regime and this had brought violence to Egypt's streets and 'Sadat was a victim of his own violence'.

The Fahd plan

Michel Swed-Cousins of the London-based news magazine 8

Days asked what the Egyptian National Front's attitude was to Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd and his eight-point 'peace plan', especially in the light of the forthcoming Arab summit meeting on November 25th. Dr Abu Zaid said that the Fahd plan was an attempt to save Camp David from failure, to breathe life into a dead process. What the Egyptian National Front wanted, as a solution to the Middle East conflict, was the actual implementation of the UN's Resolutions 242 and 338, not a half-hearted attempt to resuscitate a dying diplomatic process. The National Front would wait until the forthcoming summit and for the Palestinians to make their opinion known before responding.

Al-Zahf Al-Akhdar asked Dr Abu Zaid whether she thought there was any connection between the policies of the Mubarak regime and the recent US Congressional agreement to sell AWACs planes to Saudi Arabia. Dr Abu Zaid said that there indeed was a connection and that President Reagan had felt it necessary to go through an 'ordeal' to sell the five aircraft to the Saudis. She said that this episode demonstrated the political weakness of the United States and that if Mubarak were to lean on the US and depend upon it for support, he would eventually find that support wanting. As for the planes, Dr Abu Zaid was in no doubt, they would 'serve the United States more than they will serve the Arabs'.

Democracy and revolution

Confirming that it was the Egyptian National Front's policy to work for a restoration of democracy in Egypt, Dr Abu Bakr said: 'We need a democracy.' But Dr Abu Bakr also laid stress upon the positive aspects of the system under the late Gamal Abdul Nasser, which had broken down the vicissitudes of the Faruq era and had guaranteed the working people, in the cities and on the land, a 50 per cent representation in the Egyptian parliament. The National Front representatives made it clear that economic, as well as political liberation, was necessary for Egypt. As Dr Abu Zaid said, 'Where have all the billions gone?' in reference to Egypt's current $20 billion state debt. She confirmed that they had not been used to build a single school or hospital under Sadat's rule. Her colleague then recounted for journalists detailed informed of the kind of corruption which has become the hallmark of Sadat's Egypt.

Violence

Dr Abu Zaid ended the press conference by answering a question on the use of violence to attain the application of the policies of the Front. She said that violent change may be inevitable and even necessary, adding that: 'Violent revolution is the last stroke open to people . . . revolution, if it is the only solution to our problem . . . well, I am all for it.'

CSO: 4500/51

AL-SADAT'S MEMOIRS OF OCTOBER WAR

Cairo MAYU in Arabic 5, 12 Oct 81

[Article: "Excerpts From President Anwar al-Sadat's Memoirs"]

[5 Oct 81 p 3]

> [Text] I declare in front of God and people that the plan we made for the June war was not carried out. Changes were made to the plan, and these caused the fall of al-'Arish on the first day of the war. When 'Abd-al-Nasir asked 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir, "Do you realize that closing the straits means war?" 'Abd-al-Hakim replied, "Our forces are prepared for anything, Chief." How did we allow the mistake of the air force strike to be repeated, and how did we fall in the same trap twice: in 1956 and 1967?

I chose "Memoirs of the October War" as a title for these articles. At first, I thought for a long time about how I should begin these articles. I thought that I should go back in these memoirs to the years that preceded the war about which I am writing. We've used many names and many adjectives in referring to these years. We called them the years of defeat, and then we changed that name and called them the years of the setback. Then we added the word attrition as an indication of our rejection of defeat; our rejection of capitulation; and our determination to resist and to regain what had eluded us.

Talking about the years of the 1967 defeat cannot begin with the day of the defeat. That discussion [must begin] with the few years that preceded that day.

Before the defeat of 5 June 1967 we had a committee called the Feudalism Liquidation Committee. This committee had begun its work after the 1965 Muslim Brothers' operation and the trials that ensued. An atmosphere of tension and anxiety was prevailing over the country.

Why was the Feudalism Liquidation Committee formed?

It may be that the committee was formed because among the features of a

totalitarian government--and we had such a government at the time--is that of being in a constant state of vigilance. Totalitarian government dominates everything and has its grip on everything: it makes the decisions; it controls the government; and it controls the regime. For this reason a totalitarian government does not allow any laxness anywhere lest such laxness enable others to rush against the totalitarian government and the regime.

I lived through that period.

I lived through all the particulars of that period.

I can say that the experiences I gained during that period made me announce later that the errors of democracy in an entire generation do not add up to the errors of a dictatorship in one day.

I believe that totalitarian government is always against our divine makeup as human beings who were brought into this world to fulfill a mission. Because of its method, its regime and its rule, a totalitarian government is against this mission. Anyone who puts a totalitarian regime into practice is always cautious, apprehensive and anxious. He dreads the anticipated change that people are always striving for to restore the country to sound government which would help them achieve the mission which is expected of them on this earth.

With little food and much freedom people can work, produce and lead a life of contentment. On the other side of the coin, nations that have all kinds of food and all reasonable and unreasonable manifestations of prosperity will not be content and will not rest if we give them all these [material goods] and at the same time deprive them of freedom. When we deprive people of their freedom, it is quite possible--or rather, quite likely--that changes will take place at any time and in any place.

This is what happened in Iran, for example.

Who would have believed that a man like Khomeyni who was expelled from the country and lived many years in exile would have returned to the country, expelled the Shah, ruled Iran and shook the whole world. But it is not true that Khomeyni did all this. It was the people of Iran by themselves who made the revolution. The people of Iran were deprived of their freedom. Their hearts were filled with rejection, with anticipation and with a desire for change. When they had an opportunity to launch their revolution with a man called Khomeyni, they went ahead with him, and the upheaval occurred.

Instead of giving people the freedom for which they had rebelled, Khomeyni wanted to turn the clock backwards to the early years of the pre-Islamic period. Iranians will not accept such a hateful government. The hundreds of victims who lose their lives every day provide the best evidence of the state of chaos which the country has fallen into under Khomeyni's rule.

My experience has taught me that when a person is free, he can give up numerous other things. Freedom cannot be evaluated in terms of money and cannot have a price tag. God gave man his freedom and sent him to this earth to serve in His stead. He thereby distinguished him from all the other creatures. If God gave man this freedom, how can a few people try to take it away from him, to suppress it or to deprive him of it?

Experience has led me to this conviction.

It may surprise the reader to know that I had dictatorial inclinations early in my youth. I had lived with the old school [of thought] that had begun in the first half of the 20th century, the days of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Hitler and Mussolini. I saw how miracles were executed under the rule of dictators and how matters deteriorated under advocates of democracy.

I thank God that I [am the kind of person who] never holds on to a mistake. If the error of a course I am planning becomes evident to me, I stop my plans immediately, and I make plans for a new and different course.

It does not upset me at all to change my mind or my position if experience shows me that this opinion and that position are wrong. There is no shame in correcting a mistake; the shame lies in insisting on the mistake and persisting in it.

On 27 July 1952 I voted twice for adopting a dictatorship with the utmost violence and force. At that time I was quite convinced that the only solution for eradicating political and social corruption from our country lay in adopting dictatorship. For this reason I voted for dictatorship. The fact that I changed my mind later is something that I do not consider shameful; nor do I regard it a failure that I should be ashamed of.

Let me go back to the few years that preceded the defeat.

That committee, [the committee to liquidate feudalism], wounded the Egyptian people sorely. I do not exaggerate if I were to way that that committee represents the harshest [experience] which the people of Egypt had to face in their modern history. I would like historians to devote themselves to this period which saw the birth of the Feudalism Liquidation Committee so that new and future generations can appreciate the magnitude of the suffering people endured during that period.

The Feudalism Liquidation Committee dealt unjustly with many people. It humiliated and degraded them to the point that a citizen from Upper Egypt considered a decision by the committee an infringement on his masculinity. The man was not interested in the property and funds the committee took away from him. But he was concerned, angered and provoked by "the allowance" which the committee decided to issue him at the beginning of every month so he can meet his daily needs. The man from Upper Egypt was infuriated for [what he perceived was an infringement on] his masculinity and commented on this action with intense dismay and disapproval:

"What? Has the time come for me to receive an allowance like women?"

The man disapproved of himself receiving an allowance as divorced women do. He preferred having the committee take over all his fortune and all his possessions, even though he had not committed a crime, to being treated the way women and divorcees were treated; they went to court to ask for an allowance.

The Egyptian suffered from two wounds: the wound inflicted by the totalitarian government which had taken his freedom away; and that inflicted by the Feudalism Liquidation Committee which had ruined the dignity of families, degraded their men and humiliated their women. This was happening to Egyptians at the same time that Egyptian-Arab relations were at their worst. The Arab position was fragmented and in a state of disarray. Egypt had large military forces fighting in Yemen to save the Yemen Revolution which had erupted on 26 September 1962. Egyptian forces were fighting to save the Yemen Revolution from the medieval rule that was being applied in the country.

Our armed forces were able to establish the revolution's foothold, and they were also able to liberate Aden. These were the immediate results of our operation in Yemen. In return for that we lost thousands of our young people, the best of our armed forces, in mountains that were thousands of miles away.

The Yemen war contributed effectively in increasing the fragmentation of the Arab nation. Saudi Arabia's attitude toward this war was well-known and unequivocal. Those who followed Saudi Arabia's course stood beside it, and the number of countries opposing the Yemen operation and opposing the Egyptian military intervention in Yemen increased.

What is more important than all this is the fact that the Yemen operation made Egypt send the best of its armed forces to fight a war that was far away from its borders. These forces did not return to Egypt until after the June war, after the Khartoum conference and after the agreement that took place there between King Faysal and Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir.

We embarked on a war against Israel in June 1967 and a large part of our forces were thousands of miles away from the front. We embarked on a war against a vicious enemy, an enemy that was armed to the teeth, at the same time that we were fighting a battle that was not ours. We were fighting to protect a revolution that was not ours so as to comply with an appeal for Arab nationalism and Arab commitment.

I wish we had learned from the Yemen operation.

This operation should have been utilized to provide practical and real training for our Egyptian forces. Unfortunately, this did not materialize. Furthermore, the command that was in charge of that operation turned it into an operation for pure personal gain.

Some time after combat operations began, a kind of languor set in and only those who needed a financial benefit went to Yemen. Those who went to Yemen

received a double salary. They were also able to buy from Yemen goods they could not find in Egypt, which at that time was closed to almost all imports. [The military men who went to Yemen] used to bring into Egypt the goods and devices they had purchased in Yemen without paying any customs fees for them.

I recall that a list of officers' names was found in the office of one of the command officers. He was the one responsible for selecting the officers who went to Yemen. In front of every name on that list was a different symbol indicating the reason why the officer was selected for serving in Yemen. Among the most curious symbols were the letters, S.I. After decoding it became evident that the letters in that symbol meant, "status improvement." In other words, the officer was being sent to Yemen not to fight, but rather to improve his financial condition.

All this was revealed later after the June defeat and after the investigation in the case in which'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir and his group were charged. These lists, with their symbols, their riddles and their odd qualities, were submitted to the court.

This was the situation in Egypt.

This was how the Arabs were fragmented.

The Soviets--as has been their custom and their practice--did not like having one person's power grow beyond what that person deserves and needs. They were alarmed by 'Abd-al-Nasir's power and by the fact that his leadership had spread from the Ocean to the Gulf. They found that his power had grown beyond what in their view was the allowable limit. 'Abd-al-Nasir had turned into a legend for the Arab nation in the aftermath of the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the War of Suez. His name had become a household word, and the Soviet Union was becoming more infuriated by his growing popularity. Khrushchev contrived two crises with 'Abd-al-Nasir: the first one was in 1958, the year in which the unity with Syria was accomplished; and the second crisis was in 1961, when the separation took place.

As is the Soviets' custom, they wanted to counter 'Abd-al-Nasir's popularity by strengthening another leader who would become his rival. They tried this approach in 1958 when they thought that 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim--who was then the president of Iraq--could compete with 'Abd-al-Nasir and undermine him and his popularity.

Their expectations failed, and 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim disappeared from the scene.

They tried once again with Salah Jadid of Syria.

The Soviet Union's enthusiasm for Salah Jadid was unlike the enthusiasm it had demonstrated for any other leader in the Arab world before him. The Soviets hailed Salah Jadid as a leader, a commander and an inspired man. They called him a leader, a thinker and an innovator. Salah Jadid

returned the favor by spreading Marxism in Syria. He abolished titles and introduced the title of comrade into Syria for the first time. This is the title that is still used in Syria.

I recall that I was on a visit to the Soviet Union in May 1967, a few weeks before the 5 June disaster. There I met a friend of mine, Semenov, a political figure of considerable importance. After World War II he was appointed governor of the part of Germany which the Soviet Union had occupied.

Semenov is a member of the Central Committee, and he is deputy minister of foreign affairs. We have been good friends for a long time. He accompanied me for the entire duration of my visit to the Soviet Union when I headed a parliamentary delegation to attend the May Day celebrations in Moscow on 1 May.

I talked with Semenov about Salah Jadid, who was being lavishly praised by the Soviets at the time, and I recall that Semenov began listing the virtues, the qualities and the miracles of Salah Jadid with an enthusiasm that I had not seen him display before despite the numerous meetings we have had in the past.

I could not take any more of this, and I told Semenov, "You were fooled in the past by 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim, and you alienated Egypt for his sake. You thought that 'Abd-al-Nasir's leadership could be diminished and could come to an end with the leadership of 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim. Where is 'Abd-al-Karim Qasim now? Now you want to repeat the same story with Salah Jadid. Don't you ever learn from your mistakes?"

Semenov did not see my point of view, and he continued to admire Salah Jadid and to be enthusiastic about him.

It seems that he wanted to end the discussion about this subject. We were at Moscow Airport, waiting for the airplane that was to take me back to Cairo after the end of the visit. He whispered to me, "You are going back to Cairo today. You can tell 'Abd-al-Nasir as soon as you land that our information affirms that Israel has mobilized 10 brigades on the Syrian borders."

I did not tarry a single instant after landing at Cairo Airport, and I went immediately to 'Abd-al-Nasir's house to relay to him what I had heard from the Russians. 'Abd-al-Nasir told me that the Russians had relayed to him the same message the day before.

This is how the Soviets operate.

Their actions with al-Qadhdhafi were the same as their actions with 'Abd-al-Nasir. They told Jamal, "Be careful! Israel is mobilizing its forces against Syria. Beware." Then it later turned out that this information was false. They told al-Qadhdhafi, "Watch out! Al-Sadat sent an armored brigade from Alexandria toward the Libyan borders." Al-Qadhdhafi

became frightened and enraged, and he screamed and yelled so that people in all five continents could hear him. It later turned out that we had not sent any military forces. The whole matter was that we had sent trucks carrying a kitchen and an automated bakery to our troops.

The purpose of the Soviets is to hang al-Qadhdhafi by the ankles and let him twist and turn in the wind!

Let me go back to the alleged Israeli troops which Moscow had assured 'Abd-al-Nasir Israel had mobilized.

At that time Salah Jadid was waging the most virulent propaganda campaigns against Egypt and against 'Abd-al-Nasir personally. He slandered and upbraided 'Abd-al-Nasir because Egypt's Sharm al-Shaykh was still under Israeli occupation since the 1956 Suez war. In his addresses to the masses Salah Jadid used to ask 'Abd-al-Nasir questions such as, "Pray tell us, O leader of the Arabs, where is Sharm al-Shaykh now? Pray tell us, idol of the masses, why don't you send your forces to regain Egypt's territory and to seize it from the grip of the Zionists?"

These non-stop, relentless propaganda campaigns that went on made 'Abd-al-Nasir very angry.

But Salah Jadid and his mouthpieces were not satisfied with the matter of Sharm al-Shaykh, and they added to it the matter of the UN emergency forces. They accused 'Abd-al-Nasir of agreeing to the presence of these troops so that the troops can protect him against Israel's attacks.

These were relentless Arab distortions.

At the same time 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir was on an official visit to Pakistan. He heard the same distortions there. Those who were making those distorted statements were wondering how Egypt can accept the Israeli occupation of Sharm al-Shaykh? How could Egypt not show its power? 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir was provoked by this, and he wired 'Abd-al-Nasir to tell him, "Please order the Straits of Tiran closed."

When 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir returned to Cairo, 'Abd-al-Nasir asked him, "Do you know, 'Abd-al-Hakim, what is the meaning of your request? Israel will never acquiesce in this. It means that war will break out between us and Israel. Are you prepared to face such a war?"

'Abd-al-Hakim replied, "Our forces are prepared for anything, Chief."

'Abd-al-Nasir wanted to put an end to these relentless Arab distortions.

He issued an order for the mobilization of the Egyptian armed forces. They were to be transported to Sinai and to take up positions there to challenge and oppose Israel. As I said the best of our armed forces were in Yemen at that time.

'Abd-al-Nasir was not able to recall these forces and to add them to our remaining forces amassed in Sinai.

The people of Egypt woke up one morning to see an endless convoy of vehicles, armored cars and tanks going through cities on their way to Sinai. A tremendous propaganda campaign was organized to cover this major event on radio and television.

It was imperative that a military plan for mobilizing and amassing the troops in Sinai be drawn up.

And a plan was actually drawn up.

On 22 May, Air Force Day, 'Abd-al-Nasir delivered an address announcing the closing of the Straits of Tiran and calling upon the United Nations to withdraw its troops. This was because the presence of the troops there required that Egypt consent to that presence and request it.

At that time UN Secretary General U Thant came to Egypt and met 'Abd-al-Nasir so he can reach an agreement with him about the resolution to withdraw the troops. 'Abd-al-Nasir said that he was asking for the withdrawal of these troops from the Straits of Tiran only and that they were to stay in the other areas. U Thant, however, preferred to have the troops withdrawn from all the areas and not only from the area of the straits.

The UN emergency troops left Sinai and left the straits.

The military command applied itself to the task of making plans.

On 25 May I started going to command headquarters in Nasr City every afternoon. I would go with 'Abd-al-Nasir and a number of our fellow Revolutionary Command Council members to listen to 'Abd-al-Hakim. We would review with him and with the remaining leaders the plans for the battle, and [we would share with them] our views of those plans.

We never left that place before midnight, and we used to have supper at command headquarters. Our last meeting there was on 2 June; it was a Friday. The day before, Thursday, 1 June Israel's prime minister, Eshkol was shivering and trembling, as Weizman later reported. At that time Weizman was operations commander. Eshkol refused to begin the war, and he had rejected Weizman's advice and assurances that Israel would win the war.

The entire world was nervous.

From Washington, Johnson suggested that the parties take a deep breath. From Moscow the Russians sent a message insisting that the interplay be scaled down somewhat so the spectre of war can be kept away.

Communications, messages and wires from all the capitals of the world were arriving, offering advice and mediation.

On 1 June there was a surprising turn of events.

The formation of a coalition government was announced in Tel Aviv; that meant, quite simply, a war government.

I would like to say something for truth's sake and for history's sake. There are people still with us today who can attest to what I will say.

On Friday evening, 2 June 1967 we met around a long table at command headquarters. All the leaders of the armed forces took part in that meeting. As president, Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir endorsed the final military plan. It is known that in all wars a president would issue two directives: he would issue a strategic directive to the commander, and then he would sign the battle order.

'Abd-al-Nasir signed the battle plan and endorsed it.

Then he turned to the air force commander who was seated with us and said, "The Jews will aim their first strike against our air force." The air force commander promptly replied, "We expect this, Mr President, and we prepared our plans accordingly."

'Abd-al-Nasir then said, "Have you estimated the magnitude of our losses from the first strike?"

The air force commander replied, "They will not exceed 10 percent in any case."

Then the president looked at all the commanders and told them, "This is Friday evening. Yesterday, a coalition government was formed in Israel. If war breaks out, it will break out tomorrow, Saturday or the day after, on Sunday. At most war will break out on Monday."

It were as though 'Abd-al-Nasir was reading an open book.

War did actually break out on Monday morning, 5 June.

It is significant that 'Abd-al-Nasir did not leave the commanders of the armed forces in ignorance, as they say. Quite the contrary, he specifically told the air force commander that Israel's first strike would be directed against the Egyptian air force. He asked him to make his plans on that basis so as to minimize the magnitude of the losses. He also specified the time of the battle to all the commanders. He specified the day and also the hour so that none of them would say that the war had taken him by surprise and that he was not prepared for it.

'Abd-al-Nasir had a keen political sense. He was also a distinguished military man. [This military expertise] helped him take part in drawing up the plan for the offensive which was approved by all the commanders and which 'Abd-al-Nasir signed so it would be executed.

War broke out.

[And here] I declare in front of God and in front of people that the plan which had been agreed to and which was to be carried out under orders from 'Abd-al-Nasir was not carried out. Many changes were made into that plan so that it was no longer similar to the original plan.

In my opinion these changes which were made in the original plan were responsible for the fall of the city of al-'Arish on the first day of the fighting.

The fall of al-'Arish meant that the war had ended in the enemy's favor.

Al-'Arish was considered a firm base for our troops. It was there where our troops' needs, supplies and ammunition were stockpiled. It was chosen for that purpose because it was remote from the battle and beyond the enemy's reach. The fall of al-'Arish on the first day of the fighting was shocking.

In the 1956 Suez war al-'Arish fell only after dreadful, violent fighting in Abu 'Ujaylah that lasted for 3 days. Although the Jews had been able to penetrate Abu 'Ujaylah more than once with a counter-attack, they had been forced to retreat each time.

This happened in 1956. In 1967 al-'Arish fell on the first day of the fighting and without any resistance to speak of. With the fall of al-'Arish the outcome of the war was determined.

The ugly defeat which I am not discussing today ensued.

What matters is that on 5 June I woke up to the sound of someone telling me, "The Jews attacked us."

I turned on the small radio beside my bed and heard bulletins about the course of the battle that were issued one after the other by the command. The bulletin that I heard first reported that 27 Israeli airplanes which had been raiding our positions had been shot down.

My only comment to that was, "By God, the Jews went and did it!"

At that time I was quite confident, and I did not change my morning routine. I did not rush to put on my clothes and leave my house, but I went to the bathroom to shave and shower as I usually do every morning.

Later, after I got dressed, I went to the car and asked the driver to take me to Nasr City where command headquarters is located. We drove on Salah Salim Road and suddenly I saw the thick smoke in the sky coming from the direction of Almazah Airport and Cairo Airport. At first I was not disturbed. I knew that we had a missiles system guarding that area, and [I thought] that the smoke must be the smoke of the burning Israeli airplanes that had been shot down.

The car left Salah Salim Road and turned into the road that goes to Nasr City. I saw beside me another large black car flying the Soviet flag. It was the car of the Soviet ambassador. I immediately thought that the ambassador was on his way to headquarters to offer his congratulations on behalf of his government. Or perhaps he had been summoned to headquarters to receive its requests for weapons and ammunition.

I told the driver, "Drive behind the Soviet ambassador's car. He is most certainly on his way with us to headquarters."

Both cars stopped in front of headquarters. I gave the ambassador a chance to enter the building before me. Then I got out of the car and went into the headquarters [building]. I was greeted by a young enthusiastic officer who told me, "The number of Jewish airplanes we shot down has now risen to 50."

I took the elevator down. Headquarters was underground.

I walked into 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir's office.

I saw him standing behind his desk; he was in a daze.

I looked at the large couch in the room, and I saw two of our fellow Revolutionary Command Council members. They were seated, and they were silent.

The sight of 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir in a daze and the sight of the two colleagues and their odd silence made me expect to hear about an unexpected and an unanticipated disaster.

I looked at the field marshal and said, "Good morning, 'Abd-al-Hakim."

'Abd-al-Hakim did not say a single word in reply. He seemed to be oblivious to the fact that I had walked into his office and was standing in front of him.

After a full minute 'Abd-al-Hakim became aware of my presence. He remembered that I had bid him good morning, and he replied in a low voice, "Good morning, Anwar."

I turned and walked toward the sofa and asked my two colleagues, "What is the matter? Tell me, what is wrong?"

Their reply was the last thing I expected to hear. They spoke together, "The Jews destroyed our air force in its entirety."

One of them added, "Do you remember what happened in the 1956 war when the Jews bombed all the airplanes? They did the same thing this morning, and our air force in its entirety has been lost."

What my colleague, the member of the Revolutionary Command Council was saying had extremely serious implications. The error had occurred twice.

The man who was air force commander the first time was the same man who was commander of the air force the second time. Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir had warned that the Jews' first strike would be against the Egyptian air force, and the air force commander had assured 'Abd-al-Nasir in front of all of us that he expected that strike and that he had made his preparations on that basis so that the magnitude of our losses could be minimized. Furthermore, AL-AHRAM had published in its 3 June issue a news story from London that was relayed by news agencies stating that war would break out any day and that Israel would strike the Egyptian air force before starting any other battle.

All this was known to all of us a number of days before the war began. How did we allow the error to be repeated, and how did we fall into the same trap?

I sat down as though I were in a stupor. I could not believe what I had heard.

[12 October 81 p 3]

> [Text] What happened on 5 June was not skill on the part of the Jews at all.
> 'Amir was airborne with all the commanders of the troops, and the missiles corps had orders not to fire any missiles.
> Weizman grasped the significance of the opportunity which fate had brought to him.
> He launched his attack and destroyed the Egyptian air force in its entirety.
> I made the decision to wage the October War 21 days after the 5 June disaster.

The news hit me like a thunderbolt.

I sat down as though I were in a stupor. I could not believe what I had heard.

We were in 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir's office at headquarters, underground. This was on 5 June 1967.

The gloomy news I had heard was that the Jews had destroyed our air force in its entirety. I heard this news from two of our colleagues, members of the Revolutionary Command Council, who were in the room with us. 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir stood behind his desk in a daze.

I was overcome by bitterness as I collapsed on the couch in the room. I had a million questions on my mind.

There was a dead silence in the room. We were dumbfounded and immobilized.

Suddenly the sorrowful silence was interrupted by the ringing of the

telephone and 'Abd-al-Hakim's voice taking the call which was from al-'Arish. The news was grim: the Jews were advancing toward al-'Arish.

As military men we understood immediately the significance of that. Advancing toward al-'Arish meant they were advancing toward the "firm base" or the invulnerable stronghold. If al-'Arish falls, I can say as a military man that the outcome of the war was set. As an invulnerable base, the Jews could not have reached al-'Arish according to the first plan which we had approved unless they did so after bitter fighting in which they would suffer heavy losses. Even after these heavy losses it was doubtful that they would be able to reach it.

However, the plan had been changed as I've already mentioned. To whom would I direct my bewildered questions? With whom would I talk?

The sound of 'Abd-al-Hakim's voice was the only sound that broke the silence in the room. He was still engaged in the phone call from al-'Arish. Suddenly the door of the room that adjoined 'Abd-al-Hakim's office and connected both rooms was opened, and 'Abd-al-Nasir walked in.

I did not know that Jamal had been at headquarters. The distance between 'Abd-al-Nasir's house and headquarters could be traveled in only two minutes. My house, however, was in al-Haram. When the war began 'Abd-al-Nasir was informed, and he was at headquarters within two minutes. He used to go to bed early and to wake up early. When I arrived at headquarters, he was there [already], and the Soviet ambassador who had entered the building with me was ushered to see 'Abd-al-Nasir immediately. I went into 'Abd-al-Hakim's office.

'Abd-al-Nasir told us, "Good morning, gentlemen," and we returned his greeting. Then he turned to 'Abd-al-Hakim and said, "Why did you summon the Russian ambassador, 'Abd-al-Hakim?"

'Abd-al-Hakim replied, "I want the Soviets to ask for a cease fire on our behalf because the United States has entered the war, and it is the United States that bombarded the air force."

In front of me and in front of two of our colleagues 'Abd-al-Nasir told him, "The United States did not enter the war, 'Abd-al-Hakim. Our air force was bombarded by Israel, not by the United States."

'Abd-al-Hakim tried to say something, but 'Abd-al-Nasir retorted, "I will not allow and I will not consent to a declaration that the United States has entered the war unless you bring me the tail of a U.S. airplane with its serial numbers!"

Even as 'Abd-al-Nasir spoke, our radio was stating that we had shot down 70 airplanes. This was after all our airports had been bombarded, including the Heliopolis and Huckstep airports.

'Abd-al-Nasir and 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir had an argument in the midst of which

'Abd-al-Nasir realized that there was no need to embarrass 'Abd-al-Hakim in front of us. He asked us to leave with the understanding that he too would leave. But we understood that he wanted to be alone with 'Abd-al-Hakim to rebuke him. He wanted to ask him, "How could you summon the Soviet ambassador? This is a political action and has nothing to do with the supreme commander. Summoning an ambassador of a foreign country falls under the jurisdiction of the president. If the supreme commander wishes to inform any ambassador about something, he is to present that to the president who makes the decision whether or not to summon that ambassador and whether or not to ask for a cease fire. This is the president's work." Jamal did not want to say this to 'Abd-al-Hakim in our presence.

We actually got up and left. When I went upstairs, I found Armed Forces Chief of Staff Muhammad Fawzi in front of me. He later became supreme commander of the armed forces. I asked him, "What is the situation for our forces in Sinai now that the air force has been bombed?"

Fawzi replied, "The forces are holding up quite well. However, this does not mean that the strike against the air force is not serious. That was an extremely serious operation." I told him, "You have to try to do something." Fawzi replied, "We are doing everything, and the situation is O.K."

It was obvious that the man was in quite a state.

I headed to my car and went to my house in al-Haram. I did not go to the People's Assembly, and I was the speaker of the People's Assembly in those days. I sat in my study at home and reflected on [what had happened].

A string of events unfolded itself in my mind's eye: there was 'Abd-al-Hakim's vacant stare as he talked to me. How can 'Abd-al-Hakim send a message to the commanders in Sinai and ask them to meet him at al-Malis Airport on Monday, 5 June? The supreme commander and all the commanders of the armed forces would be on an airplane, and the commanders of Sinai would be waiting at al-Malis Airport in Sinai!

Naturally the Jews got wind of this and heard about it. It was a valuable opportunity for them. When the supreme commander or the president is airborne, specific instructions are issued that not a single missile be fired until the commander in chief or the president lands.

The Jews came. They came when there were orders that missiles were not to be fired because the supreme commander was airborne. They entered Egyptian air space at 8:30 a.m., at the time when pilots usually have their breakfast after they go off their observation shifts. The routine had not been changed even though we were on the verge of war and even though we knew that the enemy could take this into account since we take such things into account.

What happened on 5 June 1967 was not at all skill on the part of the Jews. All circumstances were in their favor: the supreme commander was airborne with all the commanders of the forces; all the commanders in Sinai were

waiting in al-Malis; and the missiles corps had orders from us not to fire! What else was there? The road was quite clear. With one blow they eliminated our air force in its entirety, and not a single missile was fired.

'Abd-al-Hakim was airborne when this happened. He was half way to his destination, but when he became aware of what had happened, he turned the airplane back. He found that every airport over which he flew had been bombed. He continued to circle in the air in a daze. It may be that he stayed in a daze until I saw him in his office at general headquarters.

Finally the supreme commander was able to land his airplane at Cairo Airport. Even Cairo Airport had been bombed. This was the height of the tragedy. Almazah Airport had been destroyed; our airplanes were completely destroyed; and the air force commander was confirming what had happened when he said, "Quite right, Sir. All our airplanes in Sinai and in Egypt have been bombed."

It would have been impossible for me if there were a battle to station my airplanes within the enemy's reach. It would have been impossible for me to station my airplanes at al-Malis Airport which Israeli airplanes can reach in no time.

On the opposite side in Israel Eshkol was trembling when the straits were closed and when the Egyptian soldiers were amassed in Sinai. He had refused to enter the war. Operations director Weizman had gone to him and told him, "Here are my stripes." He tore off his military stripes and threw them to Eshkol. What did that mean? It meant a military coup. Weizman knew the meaning of opportunity that fate had brought to his doorstep: the Egyptian airplanes were all lined up on the ground as though they were taxicabs, and Weizman is a pilot and director of operations. He directed the battle and destroyed the entire air force because our airplanes were standing on the ground next to each other.

I realized all this as I sat in my house in al-Haram.

The time came when I would usually walk on the balcony in my house. But before I began my walk I called headquarters and asked 'Abd-al-Hakim what the situation was. He told me, "The battle now is around al-'Arish."

I hung up the phone, and I began walking on the balcony of my house.

I began walking from one end of the balcony to the other as though in a trance. Al-Haram Street was in front of me, and trucks coming from al-Tahrir Province were carrying farmers who were cheering, "To Tel Aviv!" They had heard the radio announcement which told the people, "We will reach Tel Aviv." Still in a trance I quickened my pace, and I let out a silent scream, "Tel Aviv? What are you talking about? Al-'Arish has fallen. The war is over. The air force was bombed in 1 hour. In exactly 60 minutes everything in Sinai and in Egypt came to an end." The voice inside me was still rumbling: I quickened my steps, and the trucks that were carrying the farmers who were chanting, "To Tel Aviv," kept coming.

I told myself, "Dear God, what will we tell those people? When will we tell them of the disaster? What is the outcome? Will they [i.e., the Israelis] cross the canal and come into al-Sharqiyah, or will they come from Suez?"

Various emotions surged within me, and many questions went through my mind as I walked on the balcony of my home in al-Haram.

Suddenly I realized that I had been walking for 2 full hours without being aware of it. I ran to the radio and turned it on. I heard the same tune: our forces were doing this and doing that, but there was no mention at all of the fact that our airplanes had been bombed.

Once again I picked up the telephone and called 'Abd-al-Hakim. His reply was, "Al-'Arish fell."

This was the last communication I had with 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir. When I hung up, communications between us had been cut. This was early in the evening of 5 June 1967.

I called Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir and told him, "Jamal, go to headquarters and tell 'Abd-al-Hakim 'Amir to take a rest. You are the commander in chief and you are in charge. This means that you have the primary military responsibility." That is, if anything, God forbid, had happened in the October War, Field Marshal Isma'il knows quite well that I would be the one responsible and not he. I told him, "Jamal, you are the commander in chief." I found that Jamal was in the same state I was in.

Night fell, and the Jews began a psychological war. There were air raids on Cairo all during the night, and the alarm was sounded quite frequently. This was merely a psychological war. My little girl, Nana, who is my youngest child, was only 6 years old at the time. She would become terrified whenever she heard the sound of a missile or an alarm. I sent all my children to the first floor, and then I sent them to Mit Abu al-Kawm where I had built a house 5 or 6 years earlier. They all went there, and I stayed alone in Cairo. I believe that this happened with every Egyptian family.

[We spent] the night in Cairo while artillery and missiles were being fired, alarms were being sounded and airplanes were flying over. That was the case until morning.

I was dumbfounded, and I believe many people were too. People were dumbfounded and stunned. I would sit in my study in the morning and then leave my study and go upstairs to my bedroom.

And here let me pause to reveal a secret for the first time: 21 days after the 5 June 1967 disaster, I made the decision to wage the 1973 October War.

How did this come about, and why did it come about?

This will be the subject of future installments.

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THREATS POSED BY SOVIETS, AL-QADHDHAFI DISCUSSED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 32, 5 Oct 81 p 5

[Interview with Egypt's President Anwar al-Sadat by Ibrahim Sa'dah; date and place of interview not specified: "The Event of the Hour: al-Sadat Reveals the Ambitions of Libya's Madman"]

> [Text] Why I said in my address to the party that al-Qadhdhafi was playing a game that was beyond his abilities.
> Saudi Arabia is not far from the objectives of the Soviet plot and its major ploy.
> The red communist sickle is awaiting the fall of Khomeyni to come forward and surround the Gulf.
> It is no secret that one third of North Yemen is now under the control of the communist government of Aden.

President Anwar al-Sadat issued a warning to Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi last week in response to the suspicious actions that the Libyan president was carrying out near the Sudanese borders. President al-Sadat emphasized that the security and peace of Sudan were part and parcel of the security and peace of Egypt. He also warned that any infringement on Sudan's sovereignty would force Egypt to use all its clout and its capabilities to defend the sovereignty and safety of Sudan.

[Question] In the important address you made on the occasion of the second conference of the Democratic National Party you said that al-Qadhdhafi was trying to play a game that was beyond his abilities. What did you mean, your excellency, by that statement?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi is actually trying to play a game that is quite beyond his abilities. Naturally, it is a game which his mind cannot grasp. As we all know al-Qadhdhafi's behavior stems from the malice that abounds in his mind and in his heart. This malice has led him to devote his life to the attempt to take revenge on two countries: Egypt and Sudan.

Egypt is his primary and major objective, but he knows he cannot achieve that objective so he has been trying to defer that and to take his revenge

on Sudan, the second target. It may surprise you to know that the desire al-Qadhdhafi has to take revenge on Sudan is caused by his personal animosity to Sudan's president Ja'far Numayri. This may be ludicrous in this day and age. Long ago during the Middle Ages it was usual for wars to break out because of personal hostility between kings and rulers. But [today], in the modern age wars break out for numerous and sundry reasons, and personal animosity is not one of them. Al-Qadhdhafi has taken us back today to the early days of barbarism and ignorance. He is full of hate and resentment for Numayri.

This resentment reached a point that al-Qadhdhafi has not been able to hide. He hurled attacks and slanderous remarks against Numayri during his visit to Ethiopia. Al-Qadhdhafi used words that one cannot imagine a head of state would use against another head of state.

[Question] We know that al-Qadhdhafi resents Numayri. Therefore, we find him plotting to create an upheaval inside Sudan. But why does al-Qadhdhafi resent Egypt? What is the secret of this hostility that comes over him every time he thinks of Egypt?

[Answer] He resents Egypt because he cannot get to it. His sick imagination led him to believe that he can rule the Arab nation and the Islamic nation if he can rule Egypt. Swindlers around him persuaded him that he can invade Egypt and rule it and [thereby] achieve his goals of ruling the earth from its capital.

Whenever the fairy tale quality of his dreams became evident to him, his resentment for Egypt increased and his hatred for Egyptians grew. I do not think it unlikely that the Soviet Union is supporting everything which al-Qadhdhafi is doing and planning. If we describe Soviet leaders as a group of villainous people, al-Qadhdhafi would be the arch villain, if one may make such a description. He is much more wicked than the fanatic advocates of violence in the Soviet Union. Al-Qadhdhafi is a man who is ruled by his instincts. All his plans are terrorist, bloodthirsty, destructive and bitter. He is a person who has no values. He is not ashamed of anything; nothing embarrasses him. At the same time he is stupid enough to allow the Soviets to use him to achieve their objectives.

[Question] What are the dimensions of the Soviet plot in the area? What can al-Qadhdhafi contribute to the implementation of that plot either knowingly or unwittingly?

[Answer] The Soviet plan is well-known. It is the same old plan that dates back to the days of the czars. Russia has been dreaming for a long time of reaching warm waters. This is the same dream that leaders of the Soviet Union have these days.

The dimensions of this plan can be determined on the map. As we see it, the plan has the shape of a sickle. It began in Afghanistan, which is a sovereign, Islamic state. The Soviets invaded, occupied and dominated it.

After Afghanistan, we will find that Pakistan will also be threatened by a Soviet communist invasion any time. Iran is the third target in the Soviet plan.

We can consider everything that is happening in Iran these days to be in favor of the Soviet Union. The Iranian communist party has been able to fool Ayatollah Khomeyni. The communists deceived Khomeyni; he believed them and left them alone, and he is now devoting himself as we know to strike the Majahedin-e-Khalq who are leftists but not members of the communist party that deceived Khomeyni. He confided in that party and did not touch it. The communist party is delighted with what Khomeyni is doing these days. The party is expecting Khomeyni to get rid of all those who oppose him and to get rid of his forces at the same time. The communists would then come and reap the harvest.

This reminds me of what I have already said about the Iranian Revolution. I believe that Khomeyni was not the one who ignited the Iranian Revolution from his exile in Paris. Those who really ignited the revolution were those who were calling for it inside Iran. They joined forces with each other and became one force and one clear front. In my opinion the late Shah committed a grievous mistake which some took advantage of to unite all the forces against him and against his government. The error that the Shah committed--and this was at least 2 years before the revolution--was that he abolished all political parties and kept only one party. The Shah forgot what is known as the movement of history which can neither be brought to a standstill nor paralyzed.

The Shah ignored this movement of history and either tried to bring it to a standstill or tried to turn back the wheels of time. People may have accepted a one-party system early in this century during the days of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Hitler and Mussolini. At that time the movement of history made it possible for a single party to rule a country by dictatorship.

Now this has changed.

When we abolish parties and go back to a single-party system, we are thereby obstructing the movement of history. This is exactly what the late Shah did. He abolished political parties, and he put into practice a single-party system. All the forces--communists, leftists, rejectionists, middle classes and poor classes--formed a bloc and opposed the Shah, his regime and his policy. At that time Khomeyni was in exile in Paris. He was not the one then to ignite the revolution of Iran. It was the Shah's error--the fact that he did not acquiesce with the movement of history and obstructed its way--that ignited the revolution.

[Question] Is it not curious that the atheist communists would ally themselves with Khomeyni who came to Iran to herald the first Islamic Republic of the modern age?

[Answer] The communists knew quite well how to take advantage of Khomeyni to realize the first part of their dreams. They would then try to get rid

of him, and the country would come under their control. They would thereby realize the second part of their dreams.

If we were to look at what happened in Iran before the revolution, we would find that the communists have left their mark quite clearly everywhere. The method was 100 percent communist: the rabble rushing out into the streets, burning, destroying and wrecking everything while the Shah is not able to oppose them. The United States advised him not to use violence so that the problem would not get worse and the situation become more critical and volatile.

The matter became extremely strange.

There would be a demonstration in the streets one morning, and policemen would try to contain it. They would use weapons to disperse the demonstrators, and people would die.

On the following day there would be another demonstration to honor the memory of those who had lost their lives in the demonstration of the previous day. On the following Thursday there would be a third demonstration to commemorate their memory. And the story would be repeated on the 40th day of the incident and so on.

The Shah was not able to confront this communist method of provocation and terror. He thought that being lax and making concessions would ease the situation and bring an end to the demonstrations. The Shah actually underestimated many things and made numerous concessions, and this made some people take advantage of the situation and ask for further concessions.

This takes us back once again to the truth of the statement that it was the errors of the Shah that ignited the revolution and not Khomeyni from his exile.

Khomeyni was merely a symbol around which all those who had allied themselves against the Shah rallied. The Shah thought that he could obstruct the movement of history.

After the success of the revolution, every side began to ask for its due right in that revolution.

At first Khomeyni tried to create a balance between clergymen and civilian politicians. He appointed Bani Sadr president and representative of civilian intellectuals. Then he gave clergymen control of the party. In parliament he combined both groups so he could tighten his grip on the country.

And herein lies the difficulty.

Clergymen are not at all suitable for government. This is something that needs no proof or discussion. What was done in Iran by clergymen is the best proof of what I am saying. The clergymen thought that the government

was theirs and the country was theirs, and when Bani-Sadr tried to resist them, they got rid of him.

Conditions turned upside down very quickly in Iran.

A few months ago people used to go out by the thousands to cheer long live Khomeyni. Today thousands go out in the streets, but half of them are Khomeyni supporters and the other half are Majahedin-e-Khalq.

[Question] What can happen in Iran in the near future in the light of what is happening there these days?

[Answer] No one can predict what will happen there. Anything can happen in Iran any day or rather any moment. There is no stability; and there is no security or peace. It would be very easy for the country to turn into a bloodbath for any reason.

In my opinion what is happening in Iran these days is not in the interests of the Iranian people and is not in the interests of Khomeyni himself. It is rather in the interests of the forces that want to dominate Iran under the name of progressiveness and other suspect slogans.

If we were to go back to the Soviet sickle, we would find that Afghanistan was now realizing the Soviets' objectives. And now Iran is catching up with Afghanistan in realizing those objectives.

Moscow will not be satisfied with its interests and objectives in Afghanistan and Iran. It is striving to extend its grip towards the countries of the Gulf. If the Soviets were to dominate Iran, they would have reached the heart of the Gulf without the least exertion or effort since the distance from Kuwait to the Gulf is quite short and quite easy!

The Soviets have an official base in South Yemen. It is the Russians who have the final word in that Arab country which has become a Marxist country and which has joined [other] Marxist countries in treaties. South Yemen is now an Arab country only in name. It is a client, communist state in every sense of that term. It is no secret that South Yemen is moving in on North Yemen and that one third of North Yemen is now under the control of South Yemen.

Saudi Arabia is not far away from the objectives of the Soviet plan and its major ploy. Saudi Arabia has 60 percent of the world's oil reserves, and this in itself makes it a target that the Soviets entertain in their dreams.

The Soviets have bases in and around Bab al-Mandab that are armed with all kinds of weapons.

They have a presence in Ethiopia and Eritrea, and they have influence there.

Then the curve of the sickle extends at Chad, which al-Qadhdhafi has

penetrated, to join it with Libya, and the form and features of the sickle become complete.

It has recently become evident that an attempt was made to strengthen the eastern part of the sickle which includes South Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya.

Hence I am saying that al-Qadhdhafi is playing a game that is beyond his abilities. He is strengthening the sickle which the Soviet Union wants to implant in the area. He approved the tripartite agreement between Libya, South Yemen and Ethiopia under the supervision and direction of the Soviet Union. This agreement will strengthen the security belt that would realize the Soviets' ambitions in the area. It resembles the other security belt that the Soviet Union had previously set up to tie Angola and Mozambique together.

[Question] What is behind this new rapprochement between the three countries: Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen?

[Answer] Regardless of his ambitions, the mad man of Libya will not be able to execute them without the Soviet Union's assistance and approval. If we were to bring together the arch villain, al-Qadhdhafi, and the root of all evil, the Soviet Union, it would become self-evident that such a combination presents a danger that cannot be ignored.

I do not fear for Egypt from al-Qadhdhafi's madness. He knows that he cannot touch it despite the hatred he has in his heart for Egypt, for its people and for its regime. But I am truly frightened for Sudan, and I cannot ignore the dangers that surround it. Sudan is considered the natural extension for Egypt. Accordingly, Egypt considers itself a party in any battle in which Sudan becomes involved or which is imposed on Sudan.

Fraternal Sudan is suffering from a few economic crises and problems. But this does not mean that al-Qadhdhafi is to try to take advantage of these problems and think that he can do in Sudan what he did in Chad.

The madman of Libya is actually making plans for a major ploy in which Sudan would be the target. He would realize with it a portion of his major fantasy which would create for him the new empire he dreams of. The madman's ambitions are unlimited. He achieved something in Chad, and he imagined that he could achieve the same thing in Niger, in Central Africa, in the Cameroon, in Nigeria and in other countries as well.

It is evident that the Soviet Union does not oppose al-Qadhdhafi's ambitions. On the contrary the Soviet Union was able to use him, to direct him and to turn him into the cat's paw with which it threatens regimes that oppose it in the area.

It is for this reason that I warned everybody against the dangers of this major ploy which the Soviet Union planned and which al-Qadhdhafi is a party to. I told the West that it was impossible to stand by and watch the game and the players as though the matter were of no concern to us and posed no threat to us.

It is true that there is nothing new about the Soviet objective of surrounding the area with the communist sickle, but what is new here is that al-Qadhdhafi who took part in the plan is doing so with the only weapon he has: the check book. All that the mad man of Libya does is wave his check book because he is confident that that check book can sometimes accomplish more than armies and military units can. One forgives him for believing that since he was able to buy some people's loyalties and consciences by writing checks. When al-Qadhdhafi plotted the recent aborted coup in Sudan, he did not rely on his armed forces to overthrow his arch enemy, President Numayri; he only depended on his check book. He purchased ordinary cars with private license plates, and these cars roamed the streets of Khartoum. His men, armed with machine guns, rode these cars through the streets of Khartoum and fired at innocent residents of the city. People therefore ran to hide away from the bullets that were streaming from the crazy cars.

Al-Qadhdhafi once tried to coordinate efforts with members of Sudan's opposition for the purpose of overthrowing Numayri's regime. He actually amassed his troops alongside the members of the opposition and marched from the west toward Khartoum. Egypt sent reconnaissance airplanes and discovered the plot. Al-Qadhdhafi got wind of that and withdrew quickly. He did not carry out his plan.

[Question] It is evident that al-Qadhdhafi will not stop and that he will not withdraw from the big league game which he thought he could play. What is Egypt's attitude on all this Mr President?

[Answer] As I said the major target for Libya's mad man is Egypt. He wants to overthrow Egypt's regime, and he wants to subjugate Egypt's people so that all of Cairo would be open to him and he can rule the world from it. Although the mad man is confident that realization of that dream is impossible, he is directing his resentment and his hatred at this stage toward Sudan. Al-Qadhdhafi is forgetting that if he attacks Sudan or threatens its security and its borders, Egypt will not stand by and watch. I warned al-Qadhdhafi in the address I gave at the second conference of the Democratic National Party that he would find Egypt standing beside Sudan the moment he moves to play the game that is beyond him and his abilities.

Sudan is aware of what al-Qadhdhafi is trying to do on its borders. We are deliberating with the Sudanese [on this matter] continuously. Thwarting al-Qadhdhafi's attempts cannot be achieved by ignoring them, but rather by working to abort them and oppose them.

The military in Sudan is as old as the military in Egypt is. Its history goes back 80 years. This means that Sudan is capable of making plans to defend its borders; it is capable of driving away from its territory the aggressors and the mad men.

The military in Sudan do not lack the brains to plan and to fight. The only thing they need is more weapons and more military equipment with which they can teach the mad man an unforgettable lesson.

8592
CSO: 4504/41

GREEN LIGHT FOR CAIRO METRO

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 6 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] In the overcrowded area between the Kubri el-Laymoun and the Cairo Main Railway stations, passers-by rejoice when they see a sign-board reading "Tests of Soil for the Underground Project." It is really refreshing news amidst the mad crowd of the Ramses Square, though it is only a mere sign-board.

Finally, and after years of controversy and delayed decision-making, a most ambitious project, the Cairo Metro, looks like getting underway, thanks to French aid.

The project, which will be undertaken in three main phases, will involve a total around $1,000 million. The first stage is to link by underground tunnel the existing regional line which goes north to el-Marg with the southern regional line to Helwan.

Replacement

The underground tunnel, about 4 km long, will link Sayeda Zeinab in the south with Ramses Square. There will be five new stations, one of which, Tahrir, will replace the present nearby Bab el-Luke Station. Moreover, the two regional lines will be upgraded.

The French extended about £100 million to cover the cost of the first phase, accounting for some two-thirds of the total cost. The contract has been awarded to Interinfra, a French consortium which includes Societe General d'Electricite, Alsthom Atlantique, Spie Batignolle and, on the Egyptian side, the Arab Contractors. Earth works are due to start at the end of this year with completion scheduled for 1986.

The aim of the new underground is to take the traffic load off the buses which currently account for 75 percent of public transport traffic. When the underground is completed, it is expected to take 30 percent of the load, handling some 6,000 to 7,000 passengers an hour, ten times the bus rate.

Big Help

Stage two of the project will involve the construction of an entirely new, completely underground line running from Shubra el-Kheima in the north through Ramses and Ataba in the centre and then westward under the Nile to Dokki, which will be the interchange station for the line to Upper Egypt.

A third stage will be another new, fully underground line for Imbaba in the north-west, running across Zamalek and eastwards under the Nile to Old Cairo.

Securing financing for these later stages is still a long way off so that they remain dreams for a long time to come, though, according to economists, such dreams will not be hard to bring true in view of the expectations of the country's stability and development under peace.--GSS.

CSO: 4500/51

TRANSPORT PLAN LAID OUT

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 30 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] A long and short range national policy to develop transport has been prepared to meet the needs of development in all fields, the Minister of Transport and Communications, Mr Soliman Metwalli told the Dry Goods Transport Conference in Alexandria yesterday.

He said that this policy which has been sanctioned by the Cabinet was translated into working programmes and timetables for implementation according to the plan laid down by the Ministry of Transport.

The plan included the development of the Egyptian commercial fleet through strengthening the state-owned Navigation Company and diversifying its activities, he added.

The Company will be provided with new modern ships so as to be able to cope with the growing maritime transport movement which followed the application of the open door policy, he said.

He added that another company was established for this purpose, namely, the National Company for Navigation which started its activity by transporting grains previously transported by foreign ships.

Mr Metwalli stressed that another company would be established in the coming few months which will increase the capacity of the commercial fleet in dealing with foreign trade and maritime transportation.

Encourage

The state, meanwhile, encourages individuals and private companies to own ships raising the Egyptian flag so as to add to the capability of Egyptian ships to compete with foreign commercial fleets, he said.

He added that the plan also included developing ports and raising their capacities in addition to building new ports to increase their transport capabilities by nearly fifty percent by 1985 while expansion projects in old ports would continue.

The plan in the same time provides for securing skilled maritime labour force through raising the efficiency of the existing labourers or employing new ones who are well trained and able to deal with modern ships, he said.

He added that this was carried out in cooperation with the Arab Academy for Maritime Transport.--MEN

CSO: 4500/51

PAPER DISCUSSES SOVIET 'PERMANENT MARCH TOWARDS IRAN'

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 2 Nov 81 pp 1-2

[Text] A vast propaganda campaign has been orchestrated these days in the Iranian press, emphasizing the trip made by important delegations of the Islamic republic to countries controlled by Moscow.

The trip to North Korea by Parliament President Rafsanjani (together with his family) and the participation of a parliamentary delegation in the conference in Cuba are especially emphasized.

The broad range given to this "information" campaign makes us think that a new phase has been reached in the permanent march of the Soviets toward Iran. Through intermediaries, the Kremlin wants to draw the Islamic Republic into its net.

The process of USSR interference in Iran has involved the following:

1. Encouragement of subversion whose final outcome was the downfall of the shah.

2. Encouragement to the usurper regime when it ordered the mass executions of high officials of the monarchy and military commanders.

3. Ever closer ties with the Khomeyni regime and the Tudeh Party and the agents of other so-called left-wing parties, both Iranian and Lebanese, Palestinian, Afghan, etc.

4. Machinations intended to cut Iran off from the free world and to isolate it politically, economically, and socially (the American hostage affair, etc.).

5. Neutralization, within the Islamic Republic, of less violent elements and elimination of all individuals suspected of sympathies for the West.

6. Enfeoffment of Iran to the East Bloc through massive sales of food products, weapons, industrial equipment, and other manufactured products to the Khomeyni system.

7. Massive infiltration of extreme left-wing agents in the mass media, schools and education (there is practically no more higher education) and in national security.

8. Understanding between the republic of the mullahs and the vassals of Moscow, such as Syria, Libya, South Yemen, Cuba, and North Korea.

9. Establishment of a social structure modeled on the communist system: rationing of current consumption products, nationalization of information media, creation of a national snooping network, prohibition of trips abroad, confiscation of property and limitation on private property, government control over commerce and housing.

Thus we find that all the elements necessary for the establishment of a regime totally loyal to the Kremlin in Iran are now present, waiting for the time after Khomeyni. After the phony imam has vanished--politically or physically--the transfer of power to the Marxists could take place without any trouble in a country where the agents of the Soviet Union already control all leading positions and where all precautions were taken to prevent any challenge and to bar any opposition.

The merits of Marxist society are already being praised to the Iranians and an attempt is being made to snuff out the traditional suspicions of a nation that never had any sympathy for the doctrine of Lenin. The reports published on the occasion of the trip of Islamic leaders to communist countries are highly revealing: all of them glorify the "liberty," the "prosperity," and the "happiness" which the peoples liberated from capitalist oppression enjoy. A society of the Cuban or North Korean type is proposed to our fellow citizens as the ideal.

Our struggle henceforth will enlarge its field of action. Khomeyni is the absolute evil and after him, unfortunately, things will perhaps be even worse. If we do not watch out, his death will lead to the abyss. But this fight is not only our fight; it is also the fight of the entire free world which Soviet imperialism threatens as much as it threatens us.

If Iran had not been destabilized, Afghanistan undoubtedly would not have been invaded. Today, it is not only by delivering weapons to Saudi Arabia and Iraq that one can save the region but rather by aiding Iran in moving away from the abyss. One must cure the disease at its roots, one must put out the fire where it has been lit.

Antoine de Saint-Exupery said: "When the animals you put in a stable die, one after the other, do not bend over them to seek the cause of the disease. Burn your stable." La Citadelle

5058
CSO:4619/16

RAFSANJANI ACCUSED OF SALE OF 'STOLEN' OBJECTS OF ART

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 2 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] Correspondence from Teheran informs us that there has just been an unlawful transfer of art objects stolen from the imperial palaces in Iran. This transfer was carried out by Rafsanjani, the president of the Islamic parliament, himself.

Among the objects in question there is a pendulum clock and two statues, both made of gold, that belonged to the family of the tsar of Russia. These highly valuable objects had been purchased in Europe by the Iranian government on the occasion of the wedding of the Shah with Princess Soraya. A Swiss merchant had served as middleman.

Following the events of February 1979 and the sacking of the palace, the son of ayatollah Montazeri, better known under the name of Ringo and famous for his zeal in the matter of "confiscation" of art objects, had put his hand on these objects. At the end of lengthy negotiations, he turned them over to Rafsanjani. In exchange, he received two very big old carpets also coming from the royal palace plus the sum of 5 million Rials (about Fr 130,000). The objects were then turned over to Rafsanjani's sister.

This lady accompanied her brother on an official voyage to North Korea. On that occasion, the art objects were taken out of Iran in official baggage. Thus there was no reason to go through customs.

All items then were sent to Europe from an airport in the Far East under the cover of the official trip. As president of parliament and by virtue of the 12 October decision of Khomeyni, Mr Rafsanjani is the man who must henceforth decide the destinies of our people. Any further comment is superfluous.

(Source: Exclusivite Iran Libre)

5058
CSO:4619/17

RAFSANJANI CLAIMS 'WAVE OF INTERNAL TERRORISM' IS BROKEN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 Nov 81 p 1

[Text] Tehran--A tough and dangerous wave of internal terrorism has been broken Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, Tehran's provisional Friday Prayer leader said yesterday at Friday prayers held at the Tehran University Campus for over 2 million people, who were commemorating Imam Hussein's martyrdom yesterday.

On Imam Hussein's martyrdom Rafsanjani said that martyrdom as a reality required the presence of a number of factors. The first of these he said was that the cause in which the martyrdom was accomplished should not represent a movement for absolute truth, not a movement impelled by worldly desires, or material advancement. He added that the more a movement tended towards such objectives the more success it would have in the course of history.

Rafsanjani then said that the personality who launches a movement against the established order counted a great deal in reckoning martyrdom in its correct aspect. "Not everyone who revolted qualified for this honor", he said. "It was a vital for the leader to be a representative of total truth in a righteous movement and it is only such a person who gives up his life in its cause deserves the title of martyrdom," Rafsanjani explained.

A third factor which marked out a martyr was the fact of the type of adversary against which or whom he led the movement in the cause of righteousness. "The more corrupt the establishment, or the personality against whom the martyr leads an uprising, the greater is the quality of martyrdom" the prayer leader said.

Then, speaking of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) members, Rafsanjani said "these hypocrites had planned a series of operations on Ashura (the martyrdom of Imam Hussein) through which they aimed at presenting themselves as the true Mujahids and followers of Imam Hussein, while showing up the Islamic Republic to be like the regime of Bani Ummayuds.

"These youths should consider whom they are fighting against. They should examine their own personalities and ask themselves what their objectives really are," the Friday Imam said. "What are their goals? Do they ask who it is who are following the rightful goals? Is it people such as Bakhtiar, Gen. Oveissi, Banisadr, US exploiters, Ashraf and Reza Pahlavi or is it the oppressed people and youths who become martyrs on the battlefields, who are following the right goals?" he asked.

Next, focussing on social and current affairs the prayer leader said that the efforts of the Revolutionary Guards, Committees, the Revolutionary Prosecutor-General and popular support had all led to the back of a very tough and dangerous wave of internal terrorism being broken.

He lauded the enthusiasm of people who had responded so hearily to the call be revolutionary organs to join the battlefronts. He said that with such vast enthusiasm and popular support, together with the strong positions of the Islamic Forces at the fronts, the fruits of victory would be at hand. "After this," he said, "the nation should prepare for the vital task of reconstruction."

Rafsanjani, in another part of his sermon said that without the help of experts the vital task of reconstruction would not be possible.

He said that economic officials of the Supreme Economic Council had put together plans for the revival of the country's economy, defining the limits of private wealth and investments, and future government plans for the distribution of goods through cooperatives.

"With the clarification of these limits, the people should be able to know what they can do with their wealth in order to help the reconstruction of the country", he said.

"The people have to feel some security. Their future has to be clarified. The private sector has to know where it can work. I also announce to the experts that once the hands of the terrorists have been cut from this country and once Iraqi and American aggression ceases against us, the fields will be open for their activities," he added.

Rafsanjani also said that experts and technocrats have come to realize that they can serve the nation only by moving in the stream of the current of the Islamic Revolution and Imam's line.

CSO: 4600/128

NEW PRESIDENT, PRIME MINISTER SAID TO BE BROTHERS

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 2 Nov 81 pp 3, 4

[Text] The foreseeable approval of the appointment--by Khamene'i, president of the Islamic Republic--of Mir Hoseyn Musavi for the job of prime minister was received with a general outcry of indignation by Iran exile circles. This reaction is explained by the close kinship between the new prime minister and the head of state: they are brothers. Furthermore, a third brother is sitting in parliament and a fourth one is assigned to a "diplomatic" post in Paris. One of their sisters is also sitting in parliament under the name of Rahnavard; she also runs an Islamic women's magazine. the revolution, which claimed to do away with oligarchies, is itself becoming dynastic and puts its brand on undertaking of imposition and demagogy.

Furthermore, the Musavi-Khamene'i brothers are known to have been members of the Tudeh, the Iranian CP in the pay of Moscow.

Seied Ali Khamene'i, the one-armed president of the Islamic Republic, was never more than a marginal mullah, more inclined to frequent the terrorist circles in Lebanon and the Palestinian training camps rather than concerning himself with theological problems.

As for the former foreign affairs minister who became prime minister, Mir Hoseyn, he has been in the news in recent months because, on the one hand, he was snubbed by Qadhdhafi at the last meeting of the Rejection Front and, on the other hand, because at that same meeting he rechristened the Persian Gulf as Islamic Gulf. His latest initiative as of now consists in proposing--with the possible alliance of Pakistan--a plan designed to resolve the Afghan crisis. This plan calls for the systematic removal of the big Western powers. The Islamic revolution is increasingly inclining toward the east. Let us recall its big slogan: "Neither to the East, nor to the West." (sources: Archives Iran Libre; Radio islamique 28-29 October.)

5058
CSO:4619/17

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ SAID TO HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY BLOWS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian]

[Text]

AFTER the issuance of the politico-military communique of the Mujahedin Khalq Organization (MKO) and their announcement of the armed revolt against the Islamic Republic of Iran, terroristic actions shaped up all over the country. As a result of these terroristic actions a number of distinguished Islamic leaders were martyred.

For about a month now the terroristic actions of the MKO appear to have decreased considerably and relative security is now on the way to being established in the country.

But what was the reason for the armed revolt of the MKO and what is the reason for the present retreat of this organization?

The great Shaitan U.S. during the three years of the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran has resorted to all kinds of conspiracies in order to eradicate this Revolution and we can dare to say that all the intelligence organizations and sabotage organizations of the U.S. have plotted against the Islamic Republic and have done more dastardly damage than all that these subversive organizations have done from the time of their establishment.

After the ousting of Banisadr and the disappointment of the U.S. for penetration into the executive organs of the Revolution and their failure in forcing Iran to a compromise in the Iraqi imposed war, the great Shaitan thought that it was time to perpetrate internal chaos through the terrorising of distinguished personnel of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. The imposed Iraqi war was intensified and so were the economic boycotts. To the U.S. this looked like the proper time to implement its plot and the MKO of the U.S. issued its politico-military communique on Khordad 30th of the Iranian year 1360

The U.S. which had succeeded in forming an organization within the Leftist and rightist local

forces, after the ousting of Banisadr, the man in charge of this U.S. affiliated organization, the MKO took the responsibility for enacting the U.S. plots for terror and bomb explosions.

Undoubtedly, the MKO was not able to carry out all these plots by itself and all the SAVAK experts who were trained in Israel and U.S., the Communist Leftists and other splinter groups for reasons acted under the banner of MKO for two reasons.

Firstly, the MKO claimed to be an Islamic Organization and secondly, the imperialists with their widespread propaganda tried to introduce this organization as a strong force against the Islamic Republic regime and in this way all the criminal organizations such as the CIA, MOSAD and their puppet pawns could commit all kind of crimes under the cloak of this so-called Islamic MKO.

But more on the issue of the present situation of MKO in Iran.

At present more than 90% of the members and sympathizers of the MKO are arrested and more than 90% of these deceived affiliates of the MKO have realized their wrong doings and have repented as well. And people have realized this through their confession in televised interviews, or the letters written by them from inside the prisons. Of course we should remind you here that the Imperialist mass-media did not mention the confessions at all. The Communist splinter group of PAYKAR which operated under the name of MKO is almost totally destroyed and its members arrested.

The dreadful blow dealt on MKO in their contest with the Islamic Republic of Iran was inflicted on them by the people who forced them to leave the scene for a while. The MKO has lost more than 90% of its organization in this contest with the people. In fact the 36 million member information network of Iran was the only thing that this organization did not count on, and this indeed was the main reason for their eradication. But the cause for the retreat of the remaining 10% of U.S. affiliates under the name of MKO is due to the following reasons:

1– Reorganization, because they lost their organizations in most of the cities.

2– Identification of the characters and their locations for further terroristic and bomb explosion attempts.

3– Revision for the reformation of all the forces that were organized before. Today, after deadly blows inflicted on all the splinter groups which were formed at the time of ousted Banisadr, they have come together to analyse their situation in order to act jointly or separately against the Isla-

mic Republic for a better outcome.

4– To look for an opportunity to receive financial aid from all the espionage forces of U.S., Europe and other global enemies.

5 – Pretending that terror and explosion has ended so that the nation and Islamic characters may forget about lurking dangers and lift the strict security measures, as a result of which they will obtain the opportunity to raid them again freely.

But we should say that our nation have learned lessons from the crimes committed by the splinter U.S. and Israel affiliated groups and are well aware and alert about them. Of course this does not mean that we will not suffer more terroristic actions as well as explosion, but every single one of such crimes committed by these splinter groups will make way for eradicating completely the remaining 10% of these mercenaries.

CSO: 4600/126

MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ CLAIMED TO BE 'LIQUIDATED'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 20 Oct 81 pp 1, 2

> [Text] "The heroic operations of the 'Girl from Shiraz' who set on fire a bus carrying 30 passengers and in turning a 'reactionary' child passenger to charcoal was carried out successfully!!"

Yet another news item appears about a Vahed Company bus carrying 30 passengers, which was set on fire, causing a number of injuries and turning one or two children to charcoal. This is at least the 30th bus which has been the target of anti-imperialist and anti-people troublemakers' machineguns and "cocktails" so far. In our view the latest acts of the Mojahedin, specially the setting of the Vahed bus on fire, confirms that the organization is in disarray and whatever is left of it is not an organization, but only bands, assorted gangs and sick on-the-run individuals. To understand this reality better, some preliminary elaboration is necessary.

Any guerrilla operation normally and generally operates on two basic principles: the goal of the operation and the tactics of carrying out the operation. It goes without saying that a partisan group, particularly one which claims to be the people's vanguard, must fully study and consider all factors and angles involved in a planned attack against a specific goal: for instance a military post, a military headquarters, a government official and the like. The goal of an operation must be so clear, specific and clear-cut as to leave no doubt as to the choice which, being the center of a concentrated attack, would be a loud, clear and swift message of concrete action for the people. The people would thus relate to the operation of a guerrilla group as an act of their own or of the masses.

At the same time the operational tactics of members of a group must have been prepared with total coordination of timing and operation as well as care, efficiency and speed. The least mistake may be their last. So it is that the least carelessness or lack of success in any of the abovementioned requirements is considered a weakness and a great danger for the group involved in the action.

Hand-written papers and reports found recently in group hideouts of troublemakers show that the heads and responsible individuals of the rat holes are also more or less aware of the internal weakness and disgrace of the organization. Their operational reports are replete with statements of weakness and wretched conditions. As the saying goes the wailing has reached a stage that the mortician has joined the mourning!

Before quoting from such secret reports we would like to judge their overt operations according to standards accepted by all such groups so it will become clear why we say the organization has disintegrated.

Pay heed. Both the goal and operational tactics chosen by the Mojahedin for their so-called heroic actions are the most idiotic of goals and tactics. There is no orderly process, no timing and operational coordination, no popular base, no message and no common sense.

The "target" they have picked is neither a military post, a military headquarters, a government official, some important industrial center or the like. Their goal is the bus. At first we were under the impression buses were being burned because the troublemaking leaders of the organization considered doubledeckers as symbols of class society but we saw that regular buses were not immune from Mojahedin's revolutionary liquidation. You saw and we saw what negative effect the setting on fire of more than 20 buses has had against the Mojahedin and how angered the suffering and long delay-facing bus riders became against these weaklings and "the foolish thieves who mistakenly raid the hay barn." We thought if there is any kind of an organization, and system or administration still functioning or any channel of authority still in force, the brilliant results of these amazing operations would have been assessed and a stop put to bus burning!

But the exploit of the girl from Shirazi--the militia or an organization member in Shiraz if you will--well proved that the abovementioned "ifs" are negative and there is no substance to them! May that fantastic organization with all its claims, bluff and bluster and prancings rest in peace. The Shiraz operation showed that the guts of the organization are in disarray and the late "Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization of Iran" has been dead for some time now! A bunch of members, supporters and sympathizers are still around like a dispersed flock. Have you seen dispersed wolves and hyenas, especially when a few remaining ones are trying to escape from the lion?

The choice of buses as operational targets is a stupid move but still more stupid and laughable are the tactics used by the gentlemen, or should we say ladies. They wanted to set a bus on fire by using a so-called new tactic. This time two terrorists get on the bus as passengers and suddenly jumped guerrilla fashion from their back seats, shouting: "Driver stop, a bomb has been planted by them on the vehicle." This was intended to acquit them before the passengers so that they could not complain later that they had not been warned. The two militia or the two heroic members who at the same time were concerned over the waste of time and the possibility of failure, left the bus by the rear door soon after making the announcement which was really intended to cause passengers to rush toward the front door and leave the back door free for carrying out the operation on the run!

Our discouraged and frankly pale heroes nonetheless manage to throw cocktails and incendiary material through the rear door (as recounted by an injured person whose child had also suffered body burns), considering themselves in the roles of Mehdi Reza'i and Fatemeh Amini. The pressurized air caused by the explosions forced the doors to close. The people burned behind the shut doors and an innocent but "reactionary" child was burned to a crisp by the fire of revolutionary ire.

This is the sum total of the heroic operations of this kind of organization possessing all those folders, books and claims that, for example, it has all operational experience at its finger tips, that it is leading the attack and similar rubbish.

You should ask anyone with the least information or experience concerning guerrilla operations and fighting how does the recent operations of the troublemakers, which have turned them into flintstones, particularly the exploit of their girl from Shiraz, tally with the simplest and the most common principles and rules of such fighting?

Don't these operations show that not only has the body of the Mojahedin organization lost its organic cohesion but that its members and supporters are disarrayed, decayed and rotting? Perhaps only a few terrorist acts and explosion may still be carried out through a chain of command and perhaps the Mojahedin may have their hearts in only some of these exploits carried out by their influenced agents and terrorist lackies. Otherwise many of the terrorist acts and mass killings are indicative of disarray and disintegration!

According to notes and handwritten reports found recently in group hideouts, the gentlemen have issued orders that during an operation every terrorist is a commander! In reality, this means, multiplied confusion!

It stands to reason that in every "heroic" operation the troublemakers set sufficient number of tactics and forward and escape routes for those involved in the operation. Everyone issues an order and takes to heel.

Such is the fate of that hard-as-steel and forward looking organization with that special and complicated democratic centralism which wanted, like Saddam, to conquer the domestic front, in 2 or 3 days, with Rajavi's Qadesiyeh.

5854
CSO: 4640/39

'GLOBAL COLONIALISM' BLAMED FOR 'SEPARATION OF RELIGION, POLITICS' NOTION

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 4 Nov 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by Seyyed Hoseyn Musavian]

[Text]

ONE billion Moslems of the world are suffering from discord poverty and dependence. This is a fact while these people have the best natural resources on the globe. They are mostly under the economic and military dominance of the Western or Eastern Superpowers, when they possess the richest culture and religion in the world. But now they are alone with their culture and religion, more lonely and helpless then ever.

If we are really concerned for the establishment of Islam as well as the honour and esteem of the Moslems, we should look into the causes for the abject and lowly state Moslems today find themselves in and attempt to remove these very afflictions.

If you assume that Islam today is that which was given to us by the Prophet Mohammad (SAW), who himself lived it, and committed Moslems follow it as he did, then Moslems today need not have to encounter problems such as the cultural and economic poverty they are faced with today. We must accept that true Islam is not in existence among the followers of Mohammad (SAW), today or we would not find ourselves in such desperate straits.

One of the most important deviations which was seeded in the true Islam by the global colonialism was the "separation between religion and politics. For more than one hundred years now the enemy with all its conspiracies and misleading propaganda, has succeeded in persuading most Moslems in the world that "religion" is separate from "politics." In the Islam of Mohammad (SAW) politics and religion are inseparable from each other. The Messenger of Islam after his flight from Mecca to Medina (Hijrat) formed a government and the formation of a government is the most essential issue in politics.

But, the Prophet (SAW) formed his govern-

ment which is a symbol of politics in the "mosques," a symbol of "religion" and "worship" and not in palaces and castles. He formed his government in the same Mosque in which he prayed everyday and from which he called all the selfish rulers of the world to Islam while predicting that their governments would face decadence and decline otherwise.

'Bilal' the favorite Muezzin of Mohammad (SAW) did not only call the people to prayer, he also called the people to Mosques for Jihad (Holy war in the cause of God) when he called the Azan. During our stay in Medina, some of the brothers tried to meet the prayer Imam of Al-Nabi Mosque in order to discuss the difficulties of the Moslems with him. But unfortunately, they were told that a week before the arrival of the Moslems of the world in Mecca, all the prayer Imams had received letters from the Shah Khalid regime in which the prayer Imams were advised not to contact anybody.

Today, the person who prays in the same place as the Prophet (SAW) did years ago and spent his days and nights in solving the problems of the Moslems, is prohibited from contacting Moslems from other parts in the world. Where Shah Khalid is king and is in charge of politics and prayers in the Prophet's Mosque then such occurrences are only to be expected.

The Prophet of Islam (SAW) after the formation of the "Islamic Government" as the greatest political achievement, took over the government's affairs himself and led the whole community. He considered his interference in political affairs a Divine duty. Jihad and struggle against hypocrites and infidels are the most outstanding features in the life of the Messenger of God and these are only examples from the life of the Prophet of Islam. These are the indications of the fact that the Prophet believed in political leadership, the same as the religious leadership, and he took charge of them both.

And today if we want the establishment of the Mohammad's Islam, we should entrust the political leadership of our societies and countries to one who is also the religious leader. And this magnificent fact has only come to reality in the Islamic country of Iran and Imam Khomeini as a person who studied Islam for 70 years as the religious Marj'a and the religious leader of the Moslems, has accepted the responsibility for the political leadership, formation of the Islamic Government as well as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

Our Friday prayer Imam is the same as our president and our mosques the base for arming people for Jihad in the cause of God against Saddam, the chained dog of U.S. and Zionists. This pattern should be followed till the deliverance of the Moslems. God Willing

CSO: 4600/127

PROGRESS REPORTED IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Increased Production

Tehran BURS in Persian 28 Sep 81 p 7

[Interview with Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development]

[Text] Mohammad Salamati, minister of agriculture and rural development, in a special interview with the reporter of the PARS NEWS AGENCY, in announcing the aforementioned subject, released information and statistics about the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and its related departments.

First, in pointing out the rightfulness of the Islamic forces in the war between right and wrong he said, "The war that we are now engaged in is against the supercilious world and America, because this war has precisely started in connection with God's path and futileness with the leadership of America and its lackey Saddam who do not want to accept this path."

Then, Mohammad Salamati, in regard to the result of the war, added, "Of course the war has caused losses, but as a whole, this war was a blessing for us, and this is not flattering, and I am not saying it for encouragement. It really has been like a rainfall for our nation and has created the necessary concordance among our forces, and in regard to the economic pressures, has caused more resistance and has increased the spirit of sacrifice and we can see this all over Iran clearly at the present time. We see how our youth are competing with each other in going to the war front and the blessing of becoming a Martyr."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development added, "Of course, in the agricultural sector, more than 2 million hectares of our agricultural land is unsafe and has become practically unfit for production, but we saw plainly that this fact caused our farmers in the other areas to increase their activities. The authorities and the various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development increased their activities several times and the statistics for agricultural products for this year has been exceptional. In spite of the war, agricultural production has been unprecedented and it has boasted the morale of our brother farmers and their cooperation with the government at different levels, including the sale of their products to the Ministry of Agriculture which has been appreciative in a way that it has curtailed the hands of the middlemen in most areas. Our farmers have acted on behalf of themselves and the nation." Mohammad Salamati said this about the efforts of the Ministry of Agriculture in connection with aid

to the war front, "Our brothers and sisters of this Ministry have done everything in their power to help the front technically, financially and with their lives, and have been able to dispatch a group to the war front, and we have had a few martyrs and several of the enemy have been captured. Regarding the settlement of the war refugees, we have been able to settle over 100,000 in the different areas of Khuzestan, in offices, agricultural and industrial institutions of Haft-Tapeh and Karun and semi-finished houses and we even have hired some of our war refugee brothers temporarily in the related departments of the Ministry of Agriculture in Karaj. The cash aid of this ministry has been mostly put at the disposal of the war refugee affairs and among these are noticeable number of transportation vehicles like Jeeps, Landrovers, etc. which have also been put at the disposal of military units. A number of ambulances and refrigerator trucks have been taken from fish factories and meat organizations and placed at the disposal of the War Refugees Foundation, the Army, and the guards corps.

"In this regard, a number of trucks and machinery needed by the Army like water tankers, radios, clothes, lump sugar, tea, fruit, and other foodstuffs have been given to this foundation."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, in regard to measures taken by the ministry dealing with job possibilities for the war refugees said, "The agriculture committee established in the War Refugees Foundation, has performed worthwhile activities, and from a financial point of view a large amount of land in Jiroft has been given for cultivation and a great many machines have been put at their disposal."

About the problems of cattle raisers and the circumstances of settling them in safer areas he said, "We have transferred around one and a half million stray cattle at the beginning of the war to safe areas, and in this regard around 25 equipped veterinary units have cooperated closely. Most of these operations have been carried out under the hail of machine gun fire. Certainly, we have lost a number of cattle during the transfer and also, due to the shortage of oil products like motor oil, the engines of a number of agricultural machines have burned out. We have suffered losses like that, but altogether, in comparison with the movements and activities directed by the agricultural division for production those losses have been trivial. For example, the production to fish before the war was 3,000 tons; since the war and at the present time it has reached 30,000 tons all of which has been placed at the disposal of the armed forces."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development in regard to the statistics of wheat purchase and land under cultivation since the war said, "Last year, around 230,000 tons of wheat was purchased around the country, and it reached 760,000 tons this year. This indicates the high production and cooperation of our beloved farmers with the Ministry of Agriculture and also the efficiency and increased activity of the various departments of the Ministry of Agriculture. Despite the imposed war and because of this fact, more than 2 million hectares of our farmland has not been cultivated; still I can say that we saved 420 million dollars in purchasing wheat and this is a result of increased wheat growth in some provinces. For example, in the province of Kordestan, we had a growth rate of between 700 to 800 percent relative to last year, and in other provinces like West Azarbaijan it was 70 percent, in Khuzestan 30 to 40 percent. Other provinces had noticeable increases in wheat purchases due to providing loans on time and the distribution

of twice as many seeds as last year." He added, "In regard to other products like cotton, we had an increase of 70 percent production compared to last year and this year the purchase and distribution network of products has worked better and more accurately."

About the implementation of paragraphs J and D of the Land Distribution Law he added, "Of course, in the beginning of the war all plans were in disarray and implementing the laws were temporarily halted, but a few months after the imposed war and with regard to the security of the nation and in order to curtail the hands of the plunderers, it was necessary that the Islamic land distribution laws again be discussed in Majlis. The mentioned law has not been excluded from the government's agenda and the imposed war was one of the reasons that it is now possible to implement the law [sic]."

The Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development added this at the end of the interview, in the form of a message, "Likewise God has said in the Koran: 'Difficulties and calamities that descend and fall on the nation must not be dealt with weak morale but must be met as kind of a test from God, in order to mold us. God wants this revolution to develop and find its way toward a society based on salvation and the sovereignty of Allah. To our farmer brothers on the occasion of a new agricultural year, I have to say that with increasing faith to continue cultivating since the government is supporting them whole-heartedly and they must know that increasing the level of production is one of the economic guarantees and is guaranteeing our Islamic Revolution.

Rural Road Network Expanded

Tehran BURS in Persian 29 Sep 81 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Mohammad Hadinezhad Hoseyniyan, minister of roads and transportation]

[Text] The Minister of Roads, in an interview said: "Of 12,400 kilometers of rural roads, 8,200 are presently built."

Mr Mohammad Hadinezhad Hoseyniyan, the minister of roads and transportation, yesterday in a press, radio and TV interview, spoke about the activities of that ministry since the revolution up to the present including its actions in relation to the problems of the war and the difficulties resulting from the war and pointed out that it is 1 year after the attack of America's Sadam on the Islamic country of Iran and during this time, the nation has tolerated any kind of possible calamity and disaster. Then he said, "During this war, although we have suffered extensive damages and lost excessive material and human forces we also have achieved progress. Our army, almost empty-handed, was able to fight an army that is supported by all the superpowers and with God's will and with the power of faith and reliance on God we will become victorious."

The Minister of Roads and Transportation in continuing his interview pointed out the problems of road construction and maintenance and said, "In road construction a series of national projects containing freeways, main and secondary roads between provinces and secondary and rural roads within the provinces is budgeted in

the national projects paid by the central government. In regard to freeways, it must be mentioned that in principle the freeway project is designed with regard to the country's economic plan.

In the previous regime, most of the plans were inhuman and correlated with anti-people and anti-religious purposes.

For example, it was agreed to construct a road from Astara to Gorgan without attention to the heavy expenses and the heavy traffic which flows from North Azarbaijan to Astara and without considering the priority of roads in constructing a freeway. In fact, the question of priority must be determined. Of course, it is not bad if we have freeways throughout the country, but for a country like Iran, with regard to its expanded and scattered population, basically freeways are not necessary.

"Instead the broadening of roads is better and in this regard an immense network should be established in order to connect all the cities of the country to each other."

The Minister of Roads and Transportation then said, "A few principal plans are being planned and studied in the country including the road of Bushehr-Anzali which in fact connects the north of the country to the south.

The length of this new road is shorter and also connects the deprived points of the country and also the ports to the industrial poles of the country meaning Qazvin and Arak. It also connects Kerman-Quchan in the central part of the country to the northeast.

Regarding interprovincial roads he said, "During the previous regime, some provinces like Kordestan, Khuzestan, or Fars, Kohkiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad and Chahar-Mahal va Bakhtiari were not considered and nothing had been done for them. Some studies have been done in this regard; for example the Esfehan-Khuzestan highway which passes via Kohkiluyeh and Chahar-Mahal va Bakhtiari Province and secondary roads inside the provinces and villages was started after the revolution and the Ministry of Roads has put all its efforts into these roads.

The problem that the Ministry of Roads is faced with in building roads is the flow of traffic from inside the big cities. Studies have been done in this connection. For example, to connect the Qom road from Hassan Abad to Sharif Abad, and this will reduce the traffic flow between Azarbaijan and Esfahan. The other road is Karaj to Eshtehard which connects with the Saveh road without entering Tehran anymore. The other problem is the country's customs, where some goods come via Jolfa from eastern Russia to western Russia and then enter from the Jolfa border. In this case, if the connecting roads of Bajgiram customs and Lotfabad are built, the route will be shorter and the transport of cargo to the country will be easier."

He then referred to work in progress and work completed and said, "In progress are 400 kilometers of freeways, 53 kilometers of main roads, 4,400 kilometers of secondary roads, 3,700 kilometers of secondary regional roads, and 12,400 kilometers of rural roads of which, up to now nearly 8,200 kilometers of its construction has been completed and the rest is in the process of being built. The budget

of the Ministry of Roads in regard to the national projects was 98 million rials in the past year, and has been absorbed in this manner." Regarding the war, the Minister of Roads and Transportation said, "In this regard, up to now, human resources, including mechanics, drivers, technical supervisors and welders have been dispatched to the war front."

He then said, "We have active and experienced forces for road construction in Iran but they lack capital. In this case, it is agreed to attract young resources throughout the country and provide them with capital. In this regard various projects are in the process of planning and the Ministry of Roads has procured machinery and if it is to the interest of the government, it will put them at the disposal of this group. Since the revolution, the import of machinery has been trivial and we had shortages of spare parts. We have taken some measures in this regard. The important problem is the perception of the facts. At the present time we have a shortage of 250,000 to 300,000 kilometers of roads, but the maximum road construction with existing resources is 500 kilometers this year. Therefore, with the present resources, it will take 50 years to construct the needed roads. We have arranged some meetings in this regard in order to disembark on a new system of road construction for the country.

"The other problem is supplies. For example, to supply cement and asphalt we have made a committee responsible to distribute the basic material for the projects of the ministries.

"I have to mention here, we have an organization called the organization for the expansion of the country's roads, but that unfortunately this year due to the condition of machinery, it has not been active. God willing, we will put into action a plan so that in the future this organization could be run like a province. The Ministry of Roads, with its present machinery, is not able to keep the roads well maintained. For this purpose, we have placed some orders and hope they will arrive very soon.

The most successful program we have had so far has been with the Reconstruction Crusade. For example, for the construction of the Tehran-Qom highway, this ministry signed a contract with the crusade for the construction of two sections. Thirty kilometers remain to be completed in the coming month.

About the country's railroad system the Minister of Roads said, "at the present time the total railway including main and secondary lines is 4,500 kilometers. At present, there is a weakness in power. In this connection, it is planned to import 20 locomotives from the USSR, which will arrive in the coming month. We have rented 20 units and purchased 50 from Romania. Eight units have been purchased from Sweden, which will be delivered in March-April 1982. Twenty units will be delivered by Yugoslavia at the same time. In total we have rented 50 and purchased 78 units.

Arrangements have been made for these locomotives to have spare parts for as long as they last. For training purposes, 260 people will be sent to Romania so that we will not have technical, mechanical and spare parts problems.

The Minister of Roads, in regard to the activities of the Ports and Shipping Organization said, "Before the war, 688 piers were in operation, and from this

number, 19 piers were in Khorramshahr and Abadan which are still standing. Thirty-three piers are still semi-erect in the Imam Khomeyni Port and in general we have tried to utilize the maximum capacity."

Fodder Imports

Tehran BURS in Persian 29 Sep 81 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Ahmad Hoseyn Samimi, chief of the Pasture Development Fund]

[Text] Ahmad Hoseyn Samimi, chief of the Pasture Development Fund in an interview said, "Fodder imports this year have reached 1.75 million metric tons." Distribution of fodder and chicken feed hereafter will be based on the production of cattle raisers and poultry farms and the amount of imported fodder and chicken feed in the current year will be 1.75 million tons.

In the current year for the first time the produced fodder in the country will be purchased by the Pasture Development Fund and will be distributed."

Ahmad Hoseyn Samimi, chief of the Pasture Development Fund, in a special interview with the reporter of the PARS NEWS AGENCY in announcing the subject, described the policies of the previous regime in relation to this fund. He said, "As a result of previous policies, this fund was merely an importer of fodder from outside and in order to produce protein inside we were obliged to import fodder." He added, "Protein is produced in Iran in many ways and among them is the production of white meat based on the establishment of poultry farms and at the present time this industry is dependent on the outside." He added, "At the present time the production of white meat and eggs is approximately 100 percent based on imports which are basically mechanized parts. Milk production, in industrial cattle raising also suffers from the same problem."

Samimi then said, "Securing the fodder for cattle farms and chicken feed is the responsibility of the Pasture Development Fund and from 1980-1981 when foreign trade was carried out by the government, import of fodder has passed from the private sector to the government." He added, "With this plan, the volume of imports of fodder and chicken feed has suddenly increased four times and this duty has been accomplished." Samimi said, "When we say that the Pasture Development Fund is responsible for the import of fodder, it does not mean that it is providing all the needs of the community, but it is providing the shortages of the community's production." He added, "The poultry farm units are generally industrialized and they receive their consumptive materials from us. In the case of industrialized cattle raisers, their most important materials are secured 100 percent by the fund and the remaining imported fodder is used by the traditional and tribal cattle raisers and independent cattle raisers in the villages." Then he added, "About the just distribution of fodder among the cattle raisers, first we have realized that there is a direct relation between the import of chicken feed and chickens and the production of white meat and eggs and also the production of red meat and milk and cattle with the fund's fodder. With these three points in mind, it has been decided to use the number of new-born chicks as the basis for the amount of feed to be distributed. Necessary statistics were gathered in order to regulate import of feed and production of feed internally. Hereafter the import plans will be based on internal shortages." Samimi added, "To continue activities

on this basis, a center called Center for Distribution of New-Born Chicks has been established and it will be obligatory for newborn chick units to give their statistics to this center. This center will distribute its products throughout the country." Samimi said, "The statistics of newborn chicks is given by this center to the fund and based on these statistics, the fund estimates the necessary fodder, and then it notifies the country's ports how much fodder should be delivered to the centers and provinces of the country and the cities."

He added, "The distribution of chicken feed and the delivered amounts to the poultry farms is based on the production of eggs, and for fodder it is based on milk presented to the pasturized milk plant. In other cases the planning is based on production." Samimi said, "This project has prevented the flow of foreign currency out of the country and eliminates probable misuse of funds. It has also reversed the increase in price of newborn chicks from 46 rials to 120 rials back to the same 46 rials for the time being."

Then Samimi, in reference to the import of fodder in the current year said, "This year, like the previous year, we will import around 1.75 million tons of fodder. In the current year, the import of fish meal will be included with those goods that the government must import. We have imported around 150,000 tons of this but we need less than this amount." Samimi said, "With the cooperation of the Economic Mobilization Headquarters, the country's white meat production is delivered to the distribution centers and by this means has been under control. At this time, a more accurate plan is being implemented and an organization called Headquarters for Protein Material is in the process of being established. The duty of this group is to estimate the demand for white meat, red meat, eggs and the necessary fodder according to the needs of the country and to import what is needed and also keep the level of consumption down in the country.

"On the basis of this project, the producers which use the services of the Ministry of Agriculture deliver their products to the centers which are a part of the Ministry of Commerce."

Then he said, "The production of white meat in 1977-78 reached 225,000 tons and this figure in the current year has been 265,000 tons." Samimi said, "The shortage which is seen in Tehran does not exist in the other cities and because of the lack of statistics, the country's level of distribution is irregular." He added, "Tehran needs 4.5 million newborn chicks a month but only 2.5 million are produced in the poultry farms. To eliminate this problem from the month of Aban [23 Oct-21 Nov] and after chicken will be produced on the basis of population, farms, size and the climate of each province until the shortage no longer exists." He added, "We made a quota for barley and the needs of each province is clear to us. In this way there is enough reserve for the provinces and tribes. After the tribes, priority is given to the areas which have difficulty with winter and whose roads are difficult to traverse."

Finally he said, "The production of basic agricultural produce had a noticeable increase this year so that we were able to purchase 4,000 tons of barley domestically and this figure was equal to zero last year. Also, in the current year, for the first time, only domestically produced fodder will be purchased and with this purchase the principal distribution will be accomplished."

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HEBRON'S DUDIN SCORES ATTEMPT ON AL-KHATIB'S LIFE

TA191844 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 19 Nov 81

[From the evening newsreel]

[Excerpts] The head of the village association of the Hebron Hills, Mustafa Dudin, reacted this evening for the first time to the assassination attempt to Yusuf al-Khatib, the head of the village association in Ramalla. In an interview with the radio newsreel in Arabic, he said that this type of action would destroy the remains of the Palestinian people. Our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria, Aye Gus, brings us his remarks:

[Gus] The head of the Hebron Hills Village Association sounded angry in his reaction to the attempt to assassinate his Ramalla counterpart. This is an attempt to strangle freedom, he said, and whoever does such things is a terrorist and a murderer.

Mustafa Dudin, whose life has been threatened several times, warned against a repeat performance of the 1936-38 events, when Arab personalities were murdered by rival gangs. The blood that was spilled, Dudin said, will not remain unavenged. The village association, he said, had no political goals; their goals were social and economic. He claims that the murderers came from among the inhabitants of the territories and that the PLO claims were only intended to cover up those operating from the inside and, inter alia, he aimed an accusing finger at newspaper in the area which incite to murder. Dudin is calling on King Husayn to intervene as, at one time, he fought against terrorists and criminals.

CSO: 4423/43

IDF TO USE SIMULATORS FOR TRAINING

TA151356 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 15 Nov 81 p 4

[Report by Beni Baraq]

[Text] "In the near future, the IDF will revert to making greater use of simulators for training some of the army units. This comes as a result of the defense budget cuts." This remark was made last week by the commander of the southern command, Dan Shomron, who was speaking to reserve soldiers after an exercise in the south.

The major general said that the simulators allow for a lot of savings and yet provide results similar to those obtained in training in the field. The simulators are electronic devices that create the effect of conditions as close as possible to the real situation in the battlefield.

At the same time, the general said, the combat echelon will continue to receive full training in the field since combat troops must train in conditions identical to real war conditions, to the extent possible.

The general dismissed arguments raised by unit members that the IDF had already crossed the red line in the level of training of units as a result of cuts in the cope of training. "The easiest way to effect the defense budget cut is to limit the number of reserve days and training," Dan Shomron said, "but the shift to use of simulators will make it possible to save and redirect the sums that have been saved to areas where it is impossible to cut.

The general added that there are people in the army who hold the opposite view to his, but the greater the budget constraints, the more everyone reaches the conclusion that there is no alternative but to adopt the method he is proposing.

CSO: 4423/43

DAVAR' ON SHARON'S PLAN FOR TERRITORIES

TA131524 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Nov 81 p 13

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "The Autonomy According to Sharon"]

[Text] Those worried about events in the territories these days--the curfew, the arrests, the closure of shops, on the one hand, and the shutting of the Bi'r Zayt University and the East Jerusalem papers on the other hand--and those who believe it is sheer craziness, let them cool down. There is method in this madness. There is a plan that could be called "the Sharon plan" for the implementation in stages of the autonomy along various routes of progression simultaneously: military, political, psychological, economic and in terms of settlement.

Ari'el Sharon may be suspect of many things, but not of acting contrary to the plan, even in those cases where it seems that he is shooting from the hip. Not always is he acting according to the plan and in many cases he is indeed shooting from the hip. But not with regard to Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, or, for example, in regard to the settlement plan at which all at first jeered, but no more. It was implemented in full over 4 years. Taking this precedent as a case in point, one can safely assume that the current shock treatments are also part of an overall scheme.

The fact that there is a long-term plan is not guarantee that the plan is really good, or that it will be implemented. But it exists, and you cannot see that forest for the trees, especially since this is a forest where trees are constantly being planted and cut with mud and wooden chips being flung in all directions. Still, the forest exists. Besides, in order to increase the confusion of some doctrine-shapers from the school of the labor movement, it is necessary to mention that some fundamentals of the plan--albeit not all--were laid down during the Ali government's rule, when Yitzhaq Rabin was prime minister, Shim'on Peres defense minister, Ari'el Sharon the defense minister's adviser and Maj Geen Avraham Tamir the head of the IDF planning branch--the person who was spokesman and executioner of orders of all three, just as he has been with the defense ministers that have served since: 'Ezer Weizman, Menahem Begin and Ari'el Sharon. Some of the things that are being carried out are to a large degree a continuation of what has already been done (and derivations of which are disputed). So, for instance, is the construction of the military and logistic infrastructure, the paving of roads through the length and breadth of Judaea and Samaria: the Alon road, the north and south Trans-Samaria highways as well as building camps, emergency arsenals and other installations

following the lessons learned following the Yom Kippur war. These were done in the style of the way roads were built in the Galilee--one bypassing 'Afula, one bypassing Zefat, one bypassing Tiberias--all of them leading northward. The map of Nahal settlements, military strongholds and civilian outposts along the military traffic routes could be discerned already then. Later, some lines and points that are still under dispute were added to it, but no one questioned the very need to guarantee transportation axes and the possibility for the rapid deployment of the IDF on the eastern front, bearing in mind that the IDF has grown in scope and number of vehicles in a way totally dissimilar to the modest dimensions of the pre 6-day war times. Just taking the number of tanks in the possession of the armies of Jordan, Syria and Iraq into account, plus the aerial and electronic umbrella provided by Saudi Arabia, which includes the AWACS aircraft, the F-15's and all the accompanying ground equipment--all this must show that in the next 4 years and even beyond them there will be no choice but to have full control of the entire network of longitudinal and latitudinal roads crossing Judaea and Samaria, and in having permanent Israeli readiness along the eastern front. All talk about demilitarizing this network is, at best, archaic. According to the "Sharon plan," the IDF units and camps will be located within settlement centers in Judaea and Samaria along these roads, will secure them and be guarded by them as a civilian reserve as part of the area defense. This military-settlement deployment is possible and permitted according to the autonomy agreement (at least insofar as the Israeli interpretation goes) and one may assume that it would be completed in the course of the next few months.

Simultaneously, an effort has been made to establish in Judaea and Samaria a civilian administration that would be separate from the military government. It is opposed by all those elements that shape and influence the conduct of the populations in those areas: first of all the Jordanian Government, which has not given up supervision by those loyal to it and its offices of the education and health services, as well as the PLO and the rejectionist organizations, each of which have positions of influence and control in the public, economic or religious institutions. The question is how to persuade these elements--all of them or at least some of them--that it is not worth their while to object to the establishment of the civilian administration. The question is how to convince them that they will be on the losing side as well as undertake great risks, from all respects, if they continue to object to the civilian administration, whereas if they are incorporated in its establishment they could strengthen their positions in the competition over future influence and power, whether or not an independent state is established--as is their hope--or if there is a 5-year autonomy; whether the Israeli rule continues in the present constellation, or whether the United States succumbs to Saudi appeals and forces Israel to withdraw from Judaea, Samaria and East Jerusalem as per the "Fahd plan."

All three above-mentioned elements: Jordan, the PLO and the rejectionist front--as well as organizations and personalities of local impact, might perhaps be persuaded, in the carrot and stick method, that as far as they are concerned it is better to get used to the constraints of the interim period of continued Israeli control, whose end is not yet known, and call off the boycott or at least accept the establishment of the civilian administration in the areas of the future autonomy. For the purpose of this persuasion the Israeli administration has been applying a thick and heavy stick and has been dealing hard, painful blows. The impression is that the various public figures and elements in the terrirotires are in a state

of shock. If the heavy blows and shock treatment continue, these people will lose their self confidence and are liable to fear tipping the shakey balance among their own rank and file. The supporters of Jordan, the PLO and the rejectionist front will fear losing their position of influence and control at the expense of one another, and all of them will fear losing it for other elements. There is no certainty that this is indeed what will happen, but neither is there certainty that the opposite will occur and, at any rate, all signs indicate that this is the goal of the activities and the shock treatment that are being used without forewarning and in unprecedented force.

This is the stick. The main carrot is, of course, the autonomy talks between Israel and Egypt and the chance that they would terminate in an agreement by the completion of the round of talks in mid-January, as agreed upon between Prime Minister Menahem Begin and late President al-Sadat. True, there is no guarantee that the autonomy talks would end in an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, and the Americans have not been making efforts to help them succeed. On the contrary, the entire "Fahd plan" is intended to torpedo the autonomy talks because it offers the inhabitants of the territories a lot more than autonomy. The "Fahd plan" offers the inhabitants of the territories an independent state at once, as well as a touch of glee: Throwing Israel out with a painful, degrading and dangerous kick without negotiations, without agreement, without mutual concessions. This is the proclaimed purpose of the plan: "To put an end to Israel arrogance." The United States' eyeing of this plan can be regarded by the inhabitants of the territories as U.S. encouragement to not accept the autonomy plan and to not incorporate into the establishment of the civilian administration. Jordan's support of the "Fahd plan" is also undoubtedly aimed at torpedoing the autonomy plan.

At the moment there is a bitter competition between Israel and Jordan, the PLO, the rejectionist front and Saudi Arabia about the implementation of the civilian administration in the territories and about the conduct of the inhabitants of the territories, their institutions and various notables who are under the influence of those four external elements. The United States (and all the more so Europe) has been disturbing Israel in its efforts to guarantee law and order, peace and security in the territories. The Government of Egypt is in a dilemma. It can operate in accordance with the best of its interests and guarantee the preference of the Camp David agreements (including the autonomy plan) over the Saudi "Fahd plan" or any other anti-Egyptian Arab plan. On the other hand, Egypt can recoil from the U.S.-Saudi pressure and join all those who put spokes in the wheels of the autonomy and thus, naturally, in those of the Camp David agreements in their entirety.

This is the second front the autonomy is fighting: the front of the backwater U.S.-European-Saudi sabotage front. The "Sharon plan" has three levels for the implementation of autonomy in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip: creating the Israeli military level, the establishment of the civilian administration and reaching an agreement with Egypt on the authorities of the administrative council and the ways to elect it. To those three levels is added that of "showing muscle" toward the Saudis and the Americans, so that they do not interfere in the Israeli effort to persuade the inhabitants of the territories to stop boycotting the autonomy and the civilian administration.

CSO: 4423/43

'HA'ARETZ' REPORTS LAVI PROJECT BUDGET DIFFICULTIES

TA181144 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 18 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by Ze'ev Schiff]

[Text] The "Lavi" Israeli combat aircraft project is currently in question and may be shelved in accord with the defense minister's instruction as a result of defense budget difficulties in financing its development.

The final decision will probably be made in the next few weeks after the framework for the defense budget for the next few years--and particularly for next year--is worked out. It should be noted that in addition to the Israeli aircraft industries, the air force is determined that the Lavi aircraft should be manufactured according to the predetermined plan, which includes the larger, Pratt and Whitney-made, engine.

During the time of 'Ezer Weizman's term as defense minister, the cabinet had decided to develop the new Israeli combat aircraft, the Lavi. Since then millions of dollars have been invested in the development project, most of which as part of the aircraft industries' activities, but the air force and the Defense Ministry also had expenses. After the decision to produce the Lavi was made, the decision on the engine was altered. At first a General Electric engine was considered, but about a year later the air force demanded a larger engine, manufactured by Pratt and Whitney, to be installed in the aircraft. The air force was adamant in its demand because it argued that it will provide the aircraft with greater operational capability and efficiency. According to experts' estimates, this change would have resulted in an addition of approximately 10 percent to the development expenses. The intention is tomanufacture the engine in Israel, by license, but if the Lavi project is cancelled, the above issue will also become doubtful.

The doubts regarding the Lavi project resurfaced following the decision to cut the defense budget and due to the difficulties in finding funds for the development of the plane. At present, the evaluations are that this involves about $1 billion. Originally the plan was to conclude the project by 1991 and make an attempt to save money by manufacturing a smaller number of the prototypes.

Meanwhile, the defense minister had instructed the IDF to present him with a modified proposal of defense budget cuts for the next year and the following ones until 1987.

BRIEFS

GAZA SOLIDARITY WITH W. BANK--The Gaza Municipality and the town's public institutions have issued a statement of solidarity with Judaea and Samaria. In the statement they express theirsympathy concerning the humiliating measures which they say Israel is adopting against the residents of Judaea and Samaria, and they assert that the Palestinian people is one people, in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The assembled persons called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state under the PLO's leadership. [Text] [TA161819 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 16 Nov 81]

TWO IDF OFFICERS RESIGN--The coordinator of activities in the territories, Maj Gen Dani Mat, is resigning from his post. Our correspondent in the territories, Rafiq Halabi, has learned that yesterday Major General Mat announced his resignation from the post at a meeting of officers in the Ministry of Defense. Major General Mat has sent a letter to the defense minister in which he highly praised their common background in the IDF. The minister of defense summoned Major General Mat to him for a talk and informed him that he was accepting his resignation and asked him to fix the timetable. Our correspondent comments that there have recently been differences of opinion between Major General Mat and the minister of defense over the policy the minister is following in Judaea and Samaria. Our correspondent has also learned that Major General Mat recently stopped dealing with the routine security matters in Judaea and Samaria; the security branch of his office was eliminated. The security branch of his office was eliminated. The coordinator of activities in the territories protested the fact that his post has been drained of power. Col Ya'aqov Katz also completed his post today: That of the military commander of the Judaea and Samaria region. Colonel Katz is an expert in affairs of the civilian administration and will be appointed deputy to the head of the civilian administration in Judaea and Samaria, Prof Menahem Milson. [Text] [TA191592 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 19 Nov 81]

USSR PEACE COMMITTEE INVITATION--A delegation of Knesset members and public figures is scheduled to depart next month on an official visit to the Soviet Union as the guest of the Soviet Peace Committee. The delegation will spend 10 days in the Soviet Union. MK's Tawfiq Zayyad, Yosi Sarid and Avraham Melamed participated in a similar delegation 2 years ago. This time the Soviets extended their invitation to MD's Ora Namir and Rabbi Menahem Hakohen (Labor), to former MK Haya Grossman (MAPAM) and to Da'ud Hanin and Salim Gavarman from Nazareth, who are both RAKAH activists. [Text] [TA181121 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Nov 81 p 1]

NEW W. BANK SETTLEMENTS--Two new settlements will soon be established in Samaria. One will be set up by the Hatzav settlement nucleus, near the settlement of Na'aleh, in northwest Samaria. The other settlement, Netafim, will be established near Elqana. The two will be established on state land near the existing settlements. [Text] [TA161509 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 16 Nov 81]

INCREASED ROMANIAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION--Romania wants to increase economic cooperation with Israel, especially through penetration into spheres such as coproduction and the purchase of know-how. This has been learned from Romanian sources in Bucharest. The Romanians have lately noted the possibility of producing both agricultural and industrial machines in cooperation with Israeli plants. Among other things they proposed that the production of the machinery will be carried out in Romania and that the Israeli cooperation will be expressed mainly in the introduction of computers into these machines. Last week a senior Romanian delegation headed by the minister of state for foreign trade and international economic cooperation, Dumitru Bejan, visited Israel and held discussions with senior Industry and Commerce Ministry officials on current matters. The talks also raised the possibilities of coproduction. The delegation visited an Israetech technical exhibition and examined spheres where the Romanians believe it is possible to begin the new channels of cooperation between the two countries. [Excerpt] [TA161353 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Nov 81 p 13]

MINISTER OF JEWISH AFFAIRS APPOINTMENT--Minister Ytizhaq Moda'i will be appointed special minister for Jewish affairs and will serve as intermediary between the government and the Jewish Agency, as well as the Zionist movement in Israel and abroad. Prime Minister Begin reported this plan to a group of Liberal Party Knesset members, who came to find out what portfolio Minister Moda'i could receive, seeing that he is currently serving as minister without portfolio. As will be recalled, Moda'i wanted to be minister of information, but this did not come about. Begin therefore decided, instead, to offer him the post of "Jerish affairs minister." Moda'i has discussed this with the chairman of the World Zionist Organization, Arye Dulzin, with whom he has strong friendly ties, and expressed his desire to receive the portfolio. [Text] [TA181229 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 18 Nov 81 p 1]

NEW ECONOMIC MINISTRY--The cabinet will decide tomorrow to establish a new ministry to be headed by Minister Ya'aqov Meridor. It will be the Ministry of Economics and Interministerial Coordination. Our political correspondent, Shim'on Schiffer, reports that several Finance Ministry departments will be transferred to Minister Meridor's ministry. [Excerpt] [TA141717 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 14 Nov 81]

CSO: 4423/43

FOREIGN MINISTER DESCRIBES FRUSTRATIONS WITH AMERICAN POLICY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1301, 9 Oct 81 p 24

[Interview with Marwan al-Qasim, Minister of Foreign Affairs by AL-HAWADITH: "Marwan al-Qasim Describes the Lack of Trust between Jordan and America to AL-HAWADITH: We Talk With America From a Fixed Premise on the Basis of a United Arab Position!"; date and place not specified]

/Text/ King Husayn, the monarch of Jordan, will be making a visit to the United States soon to meet with President Reagan and conduct negotiations with the men in his administration. This visit was preceded by some "trial balloons" which Israel let off in the international sky, hinting that Jordan would become the alternative state and that the United States was plotting over the East Bank.

These political and other "balloons" have turned Jordan into a focus of attention in this specific stage. They have also increased questions about the nature of the negotiations that are to take place between King Husayn and the American administration. The Jordanian foreign minister, Marwan al-Qasim, responds to all of them.

AL-HAWADITH: Your excellency, there is talk about an atmosphere of a lack of trust now in Jordanian-American relations. To what extent is this statement correct, and where do relations between Amman and Washington stand today?

Marwan al-Qasim: Jordan is in constant contact with the countries that are concerned with and have influence in the process toward a just peace in the Middle East region. We will continue through our contacts to express not just the Jordanian viewpoint, which we expressed when the Camp David agreements were signed, but indeed the fears we stated and expressed at that time, and are starting to sense again, in the measures Israel is carrying out now that it has taken us farther away from the peace, even before it could begin, and Egypt has entered the Camp David process under the supervision of the United States. The process of holding a dialogue with American officials is continuous along with the statement of Jordanian opinions and expectations on the dangers of the Camp David agreement to the area, which were all correct; all these matters have caused a substantial portion of American society to express its appreciation of the Jordanian position. In addition, in the other area, we find that Israeli aggressiveness against the Arab countries following the signing of the Camp David agreements has increased and become aggravated. In addition, the Israeli occupation authorities have increased the judaization of the occupied territories, the establishment of

settlements there contrary to all international custom and principles, and the imposition of high taxes on the Arab citizens in these occupied territories, especially in the city of Arab Jerusalem, in order to prepare to swallow them up economically and try to make them evacuate the city so that the Jewish coloring can predominate in this holy city. We ourselves consider these to be blatant acts of aggression which Israel carried out after it signed the Camp David agreements with Egypt under the supervision of the United States of America, in addition to the armed military aggression in southern Lebanon and the savage attacks on Beirut and the Iraqi nuclear reactor. These have all shown that the Jordanian viewpoint, and Jordan's fears of the dangers in these agreements, were all proper and correct. We will talk with America and all international parties with this point as our premise.

AL-HAWADITH: What do you expect from the next Arab summit conference, especially as regards Lebanon and developments in the Arab cause?

Marwan al-Qasim: Jordan received the Lebanese emissary, who brought a letter from his excellency the president of Lebanon to his majesty the king. Jordan has always been most clear and explicit: We see, feel and suffer from the aggressions Lebanon and the Lebanese people are suffering through and we believe that this sort of constant aggression against Lebanon must be remedied at the Arab summit level. Such a summit, in our opinion, should be periodic, not just to deal with a specific issue which might arise from Israel's aggression against an Arab country, but rather to conduct an annual review of the issues in the Arab world and planning for Arab action in the future through the summit. The basic discussion at the periodic Arab summit must be on the Arab-Israeli conflict, behind which the Israeli aggression against Lebanon, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, Jerusalem, Golan and Iraq as well is continuing; this will all constitute the main heading of any Arab summit meeting. Therefore, the gist of the matter must be discussed at the summit conference, and that is the Arab-Israeli conflict, the issues that branch off from that, and the formulation of a unified Arab strategy to deal with the main issue of the Arab-Israeli struggle and to confront all developments in it. Each summit conference must discuss the strategic Arab points that have been achieved and carried out and have been discussed at the previous summit conference.

As regards Lebanon, in particular, there is a quadrilateral committee which is playing an important role in its attempt to improve the security situation in Lebanon. Everyone knows that it is Israel that is behind that state of instability which Lebanon is going through today. The question which must be raised is, has this committee become convinced that it is no longer able to continue? If this is the case, will it be necessary for an Arab summit meeting to take place on the subject of Lebanon? The Arab summit will be next November, only 2 months from now; when this conference is held, we will do everything in our power to help Lebanon preserve its national unity, territorial integrity and independence.

AL-HAWADITH: Much talk has gone on in past years on the need for a European initiative to take place in the Middle East. What new things do you expect from such a European initiative?

Marwan al-Qasim: Jordan has always taken a positive position on any initiative that can move the course of peace forward in its proper context, be that initiative European, international or Soviet. Jordan welcomed the Soviet initiative to hold an international conference on the Middle East and prior to that it welcomed the Soviet-American initiative which emerged from the meeting between the American secretary of state and his Soviet counterpart in November 1977. We also welcomed the principles the European leaders presented through the Venice summit of 1980, and we have asserted our receptivity to all initiatives that aim at realizing the principles of a just comprehensive settlement in the Middle East region.

Here I must point out that we cannot expect to have an improved European, American or Soviet understanding of the justice of the Arab cause if there is no single Arab position on presenting the justice of this cause in the international arena. Had there been a strong, united, carefully studied Arab position, we believe that there would have been a clear, effective European position in a form more favorable to our cause. However, the solution in basic form will never occur or arise from foreign initiatives; it will be necessary to build the Arab house and mobilize all Arab resources, including the military notion, at which point there will be people attentive to the Arab situation in a number of important western capitals, and they will take more effective part in the process of a just peace in the region. At the same time we must stay away from polarization of the Palestinian cause, because any process of polarization, or increase in such polarization, will certainly keep this area from peace, because these countries will interfere in the area to preserve their interests more than they will be interested in the security, peace and rights of the parties involved in this area.

We in Jordan do not believe that there is room for a resolution if it is not just, comprehensive and concentrated on firm bases, not on suppositions or unclear conclusions that people will differ over. The Arab-Israeli struggle arose from the Zionist invasion of Palestine. When we say that the Palestinian cause is the central cause of the Arab-Israeli struggle and that it is truly in every sense of the word the essence of the struggle between the Arab nation and Israel, it is necessary to go back to the essence and create a solution which recognizes the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and the need to have Israel withdraw from Arab territories and to have Jerusalem restored to Arab sovereignty. These are the positions of principle which one cannot ignore, or accept in part, because it is no longer a matter of bartering. The foundations for real peace depend on these three principles; therefore we say that while Israeli withdrawal from Sinai might actually occur, in exchange for that Israel is holding on to the West Bank and Gaza, has multiplied its construction of settlements, has isolated Egypt from the arena of the struggle and has brought in its military forces and concentrated them on the eastern front. This in itself has been an exorbitant price. More important than all that, the basic issue is still pending and fragmentary issues which have not helped in the creation of a just, comprehensive peace have taken its place. We say that in any effort toward peace it is necessary to concentrate first and foremost on the basic issue, which is the Palestinian cause, and when this cause is resolved there will not be any dispute over Syrian territory or Lebanese territory. We do not believe that withdrawing from Sinai is an alternative to withdrawing from the occupied Arab territories, and we do not believe that it is necessary or feasible for the Camp David group to try to impose autonomy as

an alternative to the right of self-determination, because Palestinian rights are fixed, like the rights of any people in the world; they have political, economic and legal rights and the whole world has recognized them. Therefore we are sometimes amazed when we see that some Western countries take enthusiastic positions on the application of international principles on self-determination in a specific area, while this enthusiasm lessens or becomes ineffective elsewhere.

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CSO: 4404/91

BRIEFS

LIBYAN JAILED IN ROME--Rome, 19 Nov (AFP)--The prosecution has demanded 18 years' jail for a Libyan on trial here for shooting a former friend in exile in Italy on the orders of Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. The court was told that 'Abd al-Nabi Muhammad Su'ati had fired two shots a jeweller Sa'd Muhammad Baghati on June 11 last year, the deadline Colonel al-Qadhdhafi had publicly given for exiles to return to Libya or "be liquidated on the spot." Mr Su'ati was said to have arrived in Rome a few days beforehand and, after unsuccessfully trying to convince his friend to return, shot and badly wounded him, crying "al-Qadhdhafi, al-Qadhdhafi." Attacks on Libyans living in Italy in the same period killed five people and wounded two others. Several of those allegedly responsible as well as Mr Sua'ati are awaiting trial. [Text] [NC191116 Paris AFP in English 1044 GMT 19 Nov 81]

CSO: 4500/52

BRIEFS

SECRET TALKS WITH ETHIOPIA--Khartoum, 13 Nov (INA)--It was learned here today that Sudanese-Ethiopian military talks are being held in secrecy between the two countries' officials in Khartoum. It was mentioned here that an Ethiopian military delegation had arrived in Khartoum on an unannounced visit. However, reliable sources believe that this visit has to do with an expected visit to Sudan by the Ethiopian defense minister. Two days ago, Gen 'Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil, Sudanese first vice president and defense minister, held talks with the Ethiopian military attache on the Ethiopian minister's visit. [Text] [JN132115 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2010 GMT 13 Nov 81]

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7 December 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2448

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No. 2448

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ANNEXING S. LEBANON LAND CONTINUES--Israeli forces yesterday established three new positions in the area of Bayyadah in southern Lebanon in the western sector. Israeli forces also built a more than 2 km-long road for armored vehicles between the villages of Jubayl and Majdalzun. Meanwhile, Israeli annexation of Lebanese territory continues. Reports from southern Lebanon today indicate that areas of land around the villages of Rumaysh and 'Ayn Ibil have recently been fenced off and occupied. [Text] [NC181543 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in English 1445 GMT 18 Nov 81]

CSO: 4400/62

JORDAN REPORTEDLY FINANCES HOMES IN EAST JERUSALEM

TA170950 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by Abraham Rabinovich]

[Text] Arabs building houses in East Jerusalem have for the past month been receiving from Amman an incentive equivalent of $25,000--part grant, part easy loan.

The arrangement is part of a broad new policy aimed at encouraging Arabs to stay on in Jerusalem. This policy includes generous loans to new businesses and artisan associations.

Although the Israeli Government has banned the entry of money from the joint Jordan-PLO Committee in Amman because of the PLO's participation, it is presumably that committee that is directing the new policy of incentives.

The committee has in the past distributed money to West Bank municipalities and other organizations from a steadfastness fund created by Arab oil nations.

A municipal source said yesterday that East Jerusalemites are given a first payment when they produce in Amman a building licence from the Jerusalem Municipality. Subsequent payments are made when engineer reports are received on the progress of the building. These reports are reportedly certified by prominent East Jerusalem political figures closely identified with the Jordanian Government and the PLO. An Arab engineer confirmed yesterday that such certification was taking place.

A total of 8,000 Jordanian dinars is paid. Of this, 1,000 is reportedly a grant and the remainder a no-interest loan repayable over 15 years. The dinar is equivalent to about 40 shekels.

About 50 building licenses are issued each month for home construction in East Jerusalem. A person long associated with planning in the city's Arab sector said last night that this figure is likely to increase because of Amman's new policy.

By demanding to see a building licence, the source continued, Amman was in effect helping Jerusalem implement the building law which prohibits unlicenced construction.

Municipal sources said that illegal construction in East Jerusalem, once rampant, has virtually ceased in recent years because of tough action against illegal building and because large areas have been opened to the Arab population for building.

Local sources aid that Amman is also granting new businesses in the city large easy term loans and is also offering grants or loans to associations likely to strengthen the Arab economy in the city. "Everyone like shoemakers are trying to form associations like mad in order to get money," said the source.

CSO: 4400/62

PETROLEUM INDUSTRY DATA

Cairo PETROLEUM in Arabic No 3, May-Jun 81 pp 63-64

[Article by Samihah Isma'il: "Petroleum in the ARE"]

[Text] Exploratory Drilling

Exploratory drilling operations in inland areas underwent development during 1980. Some 39 wells were drilled in the Gulf of Suez area in comparison to 18 wells in 1979. One well was drilled in the Mediterranean Sea region in comparison to no wells in 1979. Some 12 wells were drilled in the inland areas of the Eastern Desert in comparison to 10 wells in 1979.

There were a total of 61 exploratory wells drilled during the year in comparison to 45 in 1979. The total footage drilled was 520,400 feet in comparison to 379,700 feet in 1979.

This year's activity was characterized by extensive exploratory operations by Total Oil Company, which drilled two wells in the Gulf of Suez and Eastern Desert area and completed drilling of two other wells in the same area. International Company also drilled two wells in the Delta area. Egyptco drilled two wells in the Western Desert area and Elf-Aquitaine Company drilled a well in the Mediterranean area. In addition, Dimanex-Egypt, Gulf of Suez Company conducted extensive exploratory activity.

Drilling Rigs Operating in 1980

Some 31 drilling rigs were in operation in 1980, including 21 marine rigs and 10 land rigs. These rigs drilled 96 wells in 1980 with a total drilled footage of 729,200 feet, consisting of 35 producing wells and 61 exploratory wells. It should be noted that the number of land rigs in 1980 increased 31 percent over the number of rigs in 1979 (16 rigs).

New Discoveries in 1980

The year 1980 was marked by a larger number of discoveries than in previous years. There were 13 petroleum discoveries in 1980 in addition to gas discoveries at Crocodile - 6 well (Mobile Company) in the north Delta in the Mediterranean region and the GPT-1 well (General Company) in the Western Desert region. These two wells were proven and evaluated in early 1981. In addition, oil was discovered in two areas of the Gulf of Suez: Areas 2.6 and 1, South of Bala'im 3.5. Complete data

on these two discoveries, which belong to (Gupco) Company, will be released in the report on the achievements of 1981, God willing. The exploratory and evaluative drilling during this year disclosed extensions of the oil- and gas-bearing strata in some current oil fields as well as disclosing new strata in others. This led to an increase in the reserves in some oil fields such as the following:

-Bala'im Marine
-Abu Madi
-al-'Alamayn
-Maliahah
-Kh. S. 195

Oil and Gas Reserves and Condensates

The remaining reserves of crude oil in the oil fields at the end of 1980 were estimated at around 3,068,564,000 barrels for an increase of 47 percent over the previous year. This increase is a result of the discoveries that were made during the year, such as Kh. S. 365, Kh. S. 277, Kh. S. 160/3, and Kh. S. 206 belonging to the Gulf of Suez Petroleum Company (Gupco), as well as K.K. 84, F.F. 83, H.H. 83, and J.J. 83 belonging to the Suez Oil Company (Soco). In addition, the reserves of some fields were reevaluated, resulting in an increase in the reserves of fields were reevaluated, resulting in an increase in the reserves of fields such as Bala'im Marine, Malihah, Yuliu, Kh. S. 195, and al-'Alamayn. These revisions were the result of the discovery of new strata or the extension of producing strata.

The remaining reserves of gases was 2.691 trillion cubic feet. This represented a 2.9-percent drop from the previous year due to continued production at a high rate during the year.

Reserves of condensates are estimated at around 64.234 million barrels. This represents a 3.8-percent decline from the previous year as a result of a normal production rate.

[See Chart on following page]

COMPANY	PRODUCING WELLS # OF WELLS	PRODUCING WELLS DRILLED FOOTAGE	EXPLORATORY WELLS # OF WELLS	EXPLORATORY WELLS DRILLED FOOTAGE	TOTAL # OF WELLS	TOTAL DRILLED FOOTAGE
Gulf of Suez Oil Co	14	112,519	17	160,483	31	273,002
General Oil Co	11	38,311	6	31,633	17	69,944
Western Desert Oil Co	-	-	1	2,735	1	2,735
Petroleum	10	57,980	5	45,159	15	103,139
Mobil	-	-	2	19,763	2	19,763
Conoco	-	-	2	26,476	2	26,476
International	-	-	2	28,183	2	28,183
(Abidico)	-	-	5	36,869	5	36,869
Soco	-	-	13	105,936	13	105,936
Total	-	-	3	16,811	3	16,811
Egyptco	-	-	2	12,370	2	12,370
Gulf Oil	-	-	2	22,560	2	22,560
Elf-Aquitaine	-	-	1	11,398	1	11,398
Total	35	208,810	61	520,376	96	729,186

WELLS AND FOOTAGE DRILLED IN 1980 BY COMPANY

8591
CSO: 4504/26

NDP ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 31, 28 Sep 81 p 8

[Article: "Secretary of the National Democratic Party; New Objectives for Organizational Action in the Coming Phase"]

[Text] In an interview with MAYU concerning the basic outlines of the strategies of organizational action within the party, NDP Secretary Kamal al-Shadhili said: "The NDP represents the overwhelming majority, and this causes it not to rely on this large majority. Thus, it suffers from the same affliction that affects many large parties, namely, indifference arising from an excess of self-confidence.

"This dictates that our large party must have an organizational goal.

"Therefore, the organization secretariat has proposed to the conference certain objectives for organizational action in the coming phase:

-Recording and registering the membership at all levels.
-Expanding and stimulating the membership rank and file and achieving an extensive expansion of the various mass meetings.
-Bolstering the communications network among all levels of the party.
-Strengthening the bases of internal organization in order to facilitate action at the various levels of the party.
-Acting to begin preparation of the individuals in the party organizational structure.
-Developing the organizational skills and abilities of organizational officials at all levels.
-Evaluating current leadership standards and augmenting the leadership structure with new individuals.
-Expanding the leadership base with young individuals.
-Fixing the schedules of meetings at all levels.
-Establishing statistics bureaus at all levels.
-Achieving strong liaison between the party and the various trade union organizations so as to permit the support of these unions and the channeling of their activities to increase their effectiveness in serving their members."

Concerning procedure, Kamal al-Shadhili said: "This can be summed up as follows:

The Membership

-All governorate and district committees should seek to expand the level of membership by no less than 50 percent of the current membership.
-Assigning all the members to rank-and-file action committee and involving them in various party activities.

Strengthening the Communications Network

"This includes:
-Fixing the schedules of meetings at the levels of the general secretariat, the permanent council, the governorate secretariats, the district secretariats, and the unit committees.
-Setting the periodicity of reports, including an achievement report once every 3 months and a situation report on political activity once a month.
-Setting the period for field monitoring, including the general secretariat covering all governorates in field mointoring at least once very 3 months, the governorate secretariats covering all districts in field monitoring at least once every month, and the district secretariats covering all units in field monitoring at least once every month.

"In addition, a meeting of governorate secretaries should be held each month under the leadership of the general secretary, the body of the General Secretariat Office should meet once a week, the central specific committees should meet once every 2 weeks, the central specific committees should meet with the heads of the corresponding committees at the level of the governorates once a month, the specific secretariats of the general secretariat should meet with the secretaries at the level of the governorates once a month, and the permanent council should hold a meeting once every 3 months."

Strengthening the Bases of Internal Organization for Action

"This should be done on the following basis:"
-Establishing the procedure for distributing responsibilities within each individual level (the governorate, the district, and the unit).
-Putting into effect and adhering to the principles of the party constitution and drafting rules to ensure that all levels abide by this.
-Drafting a strict set of rules for registration to include registration of membership, registration of leaders and the issuing of cards for them, and the registration of party activities as they arise.
-They establishment of statistics bureaus at the governorate-district level to publish and develop the most important statistics and basic information as it becomes available.

Starting To Prepare Members of the Organizational Structure

"This should be done through the following:"

-The holding of a course for organization officials in all governorates to standardize the methods of organizational action.
-The holding of courses for organization officials in all districts.
-The holding of courses for secretaries of the units to familiarize them with the methods of party action. These courses should focus on the procedure for action, mobilization, and mass communication.

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CAIRO DIVIDED INTO 12 QUARTERS

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 7 Sep 81 p 1

[Article: "Cairo Divided Into 12 Quarters"]

[Text] In a meeting yesterday under the leadership of Governor Sa'd Ma'mun and the secretariat of 'Izzat Muhammad 'Ali, general secretary of the governorate, the Executive Council of the Governorate of Cairo approved a measure redividing the governorate into 12 quarters and establishing five new police precincts to facilitate the rendering of services and ensure thorough supervision over the implementation of these services for the citizens.

The quarters include: Hulwan, consisting of al-Tabin, Hulwan, and 15 May; Misr al-Qadimah, consisting of al-Ma'adi, Misr al-Qadimah, and Jazirah al-Rawdah; Janub, consisting of al-Khalifah and al-Sayyidah Zaynab; Wasat, consisting of al-Darb al-Ahmar, al-Jamaliyah, and Bab al-Sha'riyah; 'Abidin, consisting of 'Abidin, al-Muski, and al-Izbakiyah; Gharb, consisting of Qasr al-Nil, Bulaq, and al-Zamalik; al-Wayali, consisting of al-Zahir, al-Wayali, and Munsha'ah Nasir; Misr al-Jadidah (Misr al-Jadidah, al-Nuzhah, and Madinah Nasr); Shamal (Rawd al-Faraj and al-Sahil); Shubra (Shubra, al-Sharabiyah, and al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'); al-Zaytun (al-Zaytun and Hada'iq al-Qubbah); and Sharq (al-Matariyah, 'Ayn Shams, and al-Salam).

The establishment of five new police precincts was also approved. These princincts are Jazirah al-Rawdah, al-Zamalik, Munsha'ah Nasir, al-Zawiyah al-Hamra', and al-Salam.

The council also agreed to divide Cairo into four police areas each consisting of three quarters, as follows:

-South Cairo (Hulwan, Misr al-Qadimah, and al-Janub quarters).
-North (Shamal, Shubra, and al-Zaytun quarters).
-West (Wasat, Gharb, and 'Abidin quarters).
-East (Misr al-Jadidah, al-Wayali, and al-Sharq quarters).

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AYATOLLAH JANNATI QUESTIONS ANTI-BAHAI SOCIETY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] You who did not believe in theocratic rule before the revolution and were against or indifferent to the revolution, have you changed your line?

Now that the atmosphere of the Islamic Republic does not allow Bahais and anti-Islam a chance to breathe, what is your organizational mission?

Qom--The Friday prayers of this week, on the second day of the revolution-creating month of Moharram, was held most magnificently with the participation of the ever-present people on the Qom scene and a gathering of authorities and representatives of the Majlis, led by Hojjatoleslam Jannati, the religious jurist member of the council of guardians, in Hakim Nezami School.

Before the delivery of sermons, Hojjatoleslam Nateq-Nuri, representative of the Majlis and supervisor of the reconstruction crusade, spoke about the expansion and movement of the revolution for the participants in the prayers. Then, the temporary Friday prayer leader of Qom began the political-worship sermons of the Friday prayers. After greetings to the honorable Prophet and the Immaculate Imams, he described the dimensions of theocracy, primarily in governing and advancing Islamic regulations and precepts. He said: Islam, during the time of the occultation of the Infallible Imam, through the guidance and leadership of a religious scholar and fully qualified Islamicist, can prevent misuses, power worship, and digressions. In continuation, he said: No principle has been as effective as the principle of theocratic rule in the continuation of the revolution and prevention of deviations in thought and action. Should the religious jurist give an order, it is impossible for any individual member of the society, whether scholar or layman, Moslem or non-Moslem, to have the right to deviate from that order, because such

instructions concern the government of the entire society and if this foundation is weakened, the whole Islamic system would be weakened.

Hojjatoleslam Jannati, in another part of the first sermon, raised the questions of the people put to the members of the anti-Bahai society and asked them to clarify their position on the issue of theocratic rule. If they claim to accept this principle and have made a change in their previous views, they should state so clearly; and they should also explain their insistence on monopolizing the information they have on hand. He also asked this group their reason for insisting on fighting against the leftist counterrevolution while ignoring the rightist counterrevolution and the world-devouring United States. He demanded their religious and legal justification for using government resources for group activities. The clarification of these and other questions will enable the people to know how to deal with this group. The temporary Friday prayer leader of Qom raised the questions of the people concerning the anti-Bahai society as follows:

1. Before the revolution, you did not believe in theocratic rule and were outside the revolution, against it, or indifferent to it. Have you changed your line or not?

2. Are you prepared to confess that your previous line was wrong? If not, you have not changed your line and it is clear that you have accepted this line for tactical reasons. Otherwise, why not declare openly: Before the revolution, we found it appropriate to stay out of political issues; we were cutting off the branches while the revolution and the imam were cutting out the roots; we were mistaken. If you make this confession, we will understand that you are truthful.

3. Formerly, you worked against Bahais saying they were dangerous to Islam. And we said that we knew they were dangerous. You said they had relations with Israel and we knew that. We agreed with everything you said. We said that their roots must be destroyed, but you were cutting off the leaves and the branches. Well, now the roots have been destroyed. Today, they have no place in the regime of the Islamic Republic; it does not allow Bahais and anti-Islamic elements the chance to breathe. What is your mission now in this organization? Your previous mission was clear, what is your present mission?

4. What is your reason for penetrating the information center to gather information? Why do you want to be active in the cultural or political sectors?

5. Why do you not give the collected information to operational institutions and revolutionary organizations? Why do you hoard the information? You want to have a monopoly over it. Should the guards corps or similar organizations not have such information at their

diposal in order to search out counterrevolution? Why do you not fully cooperate with the guards corps?

6. You give yourselves the right to use government resources; do you have legal or religious justification for doing so?

7. What is your reason for focusing on the leftist counterrevolution and ignoring the rightist counterrevolution? Did the imam not call the United States the great Satan? Were we not captives of the United States during the last half century? Are our youth not being killed by the United States? What is the reason for putting all your pressures on the other side? At a time when our slogan is "neither Western nor Eastern," why have you left out the Western part and stuck only to the Eastern, despite the fact that we insist that both are dangerous to human society? Are we not to understand that this is the same line which formerly said we should not quarrel with these superpowers but be indifferent to them? These are the basic questions to which they must give answers.

In the second sermon of the Friday prayer, Ayatollah Jannati spoke about the month of Moharram and added: Moharram is a month which gives life to lifeless bodies. It is a month which brings joy, a godly and heavenly joy for withered and dying souls. It is a month that has been the inspiration to Moslems. Opposing powers have always felt threatened by the month of Moharram. This shows that Moharram has a message. It revitalizes the nation. But we must take the most advantage of Moharram, both on the war front and elsewhere. The month of Moharram must be a month of enthusiasm and clamor. The people must be made aware of the dangers which exist within the Islamic society. The people must be made aware of the situation of the counterrevolutionary minigroups, especially domestic counterrevolution, so that they will know about them after the war. Centuries of tears have been shed for Hoseyn's suffering from injustice in order that the people will know who the oppressor is and what he does, so that they will support the wronged one. This is the conclusion that must be arrived at from Moharram: support for those oppressed people such as Imam Hoseyn, who are killed innocently, who become innocent victims of injustice, and who are innocently made homeless. They must be supported throughout history, at any time and at any place. This is where our duties become clarified; if we are in the camp of Imam Hoseyn, we curse the oppressor.

The temporary Friday prayer leader of Qom said in another part of his sermon: This Wednesday is student day. I ask the teachers to inform the students of what is going on in the society, that they are being deceived by lies. On 4 Nov, two events have happened. The first was the arrest of our leader, which ended in his exile to Turkey, and the other was the occupation of the American spy nest by the students following the line of the imam. One day the United States arrests our leader and sends him abroad and a few years later, on the same

day, the students following the line of this leader occupy the American spy nest and take its diplomats as hostages.

In conclusion, I want you to think more clearly and try to make your slogans well thought out.

In regards to overpricing, he said: What can eliminate overpricing is trust in God. I do not know if one can be a Moslem and sell overpriced goods in this situation. Does God permit raising the prices of the food of the people and the rations which are hard to provide? There are two kinds of high prices, one real and the other artificial. Artificial high prices are caused by wealth worshippers and profiteers.

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ISLAMIC FACTORY COUNCILS ISSUE MANIFESTO

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Nov 81 p 15

[Text] In a 5-day seminar, the representatives of more than 390 factories nationwide discussed with a number of authorities the problems of the nation's workers.

The final session of the third national seminar of Islamic factory councils was opened at 1500 on Friday at the Felestin Cinema with the recitation of verses from the Koran. In this session, representatives from more than 390 factories nationwide met with several ministers and representatives of the Majlis.

In this session, Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah, the minister of Islamic guidance, spoke about the necessity of freedom of criticism and the duties of Islamic councils.

Then, brother Fo'ad Karimi, a representative of the Majlis, spoke about the philosophy behind Islamic councils. He explained several principles of the Constitution concerning labor, workers, and production.

In the end, brother Hashemi, the minister of industries, spoke about the capitalist and communist systems and how they differ from Islam. He said: A system that encourages the worker to want comfort while pitting him against the Islamic government is rejected by Islam. In the end, the resolution of the seminar was read and, with the salutation "God is great," was approved by those present.

The text of the resolution of the third national seminar of Islamic factory councils is as follows:

1. In our absolute support for the principle of theocratic rule, which is the secret of the victory and continuation of the Islamic revolution of Iran under the leadership of Imam Khomeyni, we offer

our congratulations to the representatives of the Majlis on conferring part of the authority of the person of the theocratic ruler on the Majlis. We consider this a focal point and the beginning of a new chapter in the writing and ratification of revolutionary laws, in stopping the hands of the capitalists and hoarders, and, as Hojjatoleslam Hahemi-Rafsanjani has interpreted, in the continual struggle against economic terrorists.

2. Today, our most important and essential problem is the imposed war of the mercenary regime of Saddam against the Islamic revolution. The role of the nation of God's party and the people's forces, which include the workers of the factories, is very sensitive and significant to this war. While honoring the memory of the martyrs of Islam and the imposed war, especially the martyred workers, the seminar demands more effort on the part of the directors of production and industrial units to dispatch technical and combative self-sacrificing forces to the war fronts through their cooperation with revolutionary organizations such as the Islamic councils, so that, God willing, this war will end in victory for the Islamic army over international heathenism and the distruction of Saddam.

3. One of the most essential obstacles on the path to growth of the Islamic revolution is the existence of directors who are unfamiliar with the various dimensions of the human being-producing and liberating ideology of Islam and the Islamic Republic. Production and industrial institutions in particular have suffered awesome and destructive blows in this regard. We decisively demand the purge of non-ideological and conciliatory directors as soon as possible.

4. To create perfect coordination between the government organizations, Islamic factory councils, the combative clergy, the revolution guards corps, and the literacy movement, we propose the establishment of Islamic administration classes for workers who are faithful and believe in theocratic rule, in the centers of every city and province, using professors who are true to our ideology, so that, God willing, an effective step is taken to eliminate dependence, to attain self-sufficiency, and to revitalize industry in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

5. Since the councils of the polytechnic university act contrary to the Islamic institutions and councils and noting that the elements of this center have penetrated some of the sensitive organizations, especially the Ministry of Industries and Mines and the organization for national industries, the seminar decisively demands an investigation and action on the part of the authorities.

One of the problems of factory workers is a lack of complete knowledge concerning the financial situation, production level, and amount of losses and damages in their own production units. We demand that all production and industrial units publish for the

workers of that unit, once every three months, a complete list of their work as well as profits and losses and the reasons for them, in order to enable the workers to take steps to eliminate the problems with complete knowledge of the conditions of their production unit.

7. It has frequently been observed that some persons have been purged and dismissed from one factory only to be employed, after a time, at another place with even better conditions. This is because there is no center to register the names of the purged individuals. We request the establishment of such a center to register the names of purged individuals. All governmental units and factories should make their employment decisions in coordination with this center.

8. One of the ways to create coordination between the managers and workers in the production and industrial units is to hold congregational prayers during which the problems of both sides can be aired. The seminar expects the concerned authorities to take steps to Islamicize more than ever before the work atmosphere and eliminate the existing disharmony between managers and workers by proposing a law requiring that prayers be conducted in production and industrial units.

9. We request that the Majlis propose and ratify, as quickly as possible, more extensive and meaningful laws for Islamic societies as well as determine the extent of their activities and official authority.

10. The seminar demands the abolition of Article 33 of the labor law as soon as possible, as it is a tool in the hands of capitalists and liberal managers to dismiss faithful elements from the production and industrial units. It also demands the writing and ratification of an Islamic, revolutionary labor law which will respond to the needs of our revolutionary society.

11. The seminar condemns the U.S. proposal of King Fahd concerning the solidification and legitimization of the occupying regime of Qods and considers it no different than the scandalous U.S. Camp David agreement.

12. We consider the so-called Amnesty International an organization made and nurtured by and a tool in the hands of the criminal superpowers, headed by the criminal United States, and condemn the support of this organization for the bomb-planting hypocrites and pro-American murders and professional terrorists.

13. We support the Islamic revolution of the Moslem nation of Egypt and expect them to increase their efforts. We ask the Egyptian workers to cut off the economic artery of the pro-American regime of Husni Mubarak through nationwide strikes, like the brave Moslem

workers of Iran, and by overthrowing this puppet regime, to establish an Islamic government.

14. The national seminar of Islamic councils of factories declares its unwavering support for the liberation movements of the oppressed people of the world.

15. The seminar expects the national authorities to study, as soon as possible, the cultural, welfare, and social conditions of the workers, farmers, and other oppressed people of the society and declares its support for all the revolutionary and Islamic institutions.

16. The abolition of all enslaving contracts between workers and management, which can effect the establishment of Islamic equity and justice, is one of this seminar's most important demands.

17. We request of all the honorable representatives of the Majlis that more of their attention and interest be given to the problems and difficulties of workers.

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EXPEDITING GOODS FROM CUSTOMS ANNOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 1 Nov 81 p 15

[Report of Dr Hadinezhad Hoseynian, minister of roads and transportation]

> [Text] Tabriz--Dr Hadinezhad Hoseynian, the minister of roads and transportation, entered Ardebil accompanied by members of the committee for the coordination of national transportation last Friday morning, on the third day of his trip to Eastern Azarbaijan Province, and visited the different parts of the office of roads and transportation in this province.

PARS NEWS AGENCY reports: At the time of their departure for Ardebil, the minister of roads and transportation and his entourage visited the roads between Tabriz and Ardebil under construction by the office of roads and transportation of eastern Azarbaijan Province as well as the newly founded area highway police station of Sarab-Ardebil.

This report also indicates that problems concerning the unloading, loading, and transportation of goods from Jolfa customs were discussed in the three-hour meeting between Engineer Hadinezhad Hoseynian, the minister of roads and transportation; the deputy minister of roads; the supervisor of the committee for national transportation; the directors general of customs and the Azarbaijan railroads; and representatives of the Ministry of Commerce and the governor general's office at the railroad station of Jolfa. In this session, it was decided that the proposals presented for eliminating the current difficulties and expediting the transportation of goods from Jolfa customs to the farthest points in the country should be implemented after being studied and approved.

According to this report, the minister of roads and transportation and his entourage made a four-hour visit to various parts of the public storage rooms of the Jolfa customs. This report also states that brotner Hadinezhad Hoseynian and his entourage also went to the

home of the Friday prayer leader of Jolfa and the minister of roads and transportation visited and talked with him for one hour about regional issues.

Building 8,000 Km of Roads

In an interview with the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY, the minister of roads and transportation spoke on the reason for his visit to Jolfa customs: Considering the present conditions of the country, more study of the situation concerning the customs and ports of the country is necessary in order to expedite the release and transportation of goods. Therefore, on this trip, visits were made to the customs of Jolfa and Astara and the operations of the general office of roads and transportation in this region were inspected. The ports of Anzali and Nowshahr will also be visited.

He continued: Our goal on this trip is mostly to make an effort to eliminate their problems after visiting the customs and ports in the north of the country.

Concerning the activities of Jolfa customs, the minister of roads and transportation said: The clearing and loading capacity of goods in this customs has shown a 30 percent increase from 21 Mar-22 Sep 81 compared to the previous six months. If we are able to eliminate the present difficulties, the clearing and loading capacity of goods will certainly increase significantly.

He added: In connection with the increase in the capacity to transport goods by railroad, it was decided that the number of Jolfa-Tabriz trains should be increased. Large but light items, such as boards, pressed wood, fiber board, as well as tractors, already in customs will be transported by truck so that the railroads can begin to transport heavy items.

Dr Hadinezhad Hoseynian, concerning tariffs on goods, said: In connection with the transportation of goods by trucks, there are problems in the new tariffs set by the Ministry of Roads, which we must study. We might call for certain changes after our investigation.

The minister of roads and transportation, concerning the amount of road construction, said: Last year, we had a total of 34,000 km of main, secondary, and rural roads under construction, of which 8,000 km have become operational. This year, as well, despite the wartime difficulties and the shortages of spare parts and construction materials, we hope to have the same amount of roads operational.

He added: The preliminary estimates of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation indicate that about 300,000 km of roads are needed nationwide. Given the present road construction capability in Iran,

it would take 30-40 years to build these roads. In the Ministry of Roads, we are studying road construction systems in general as well as new methods to increase our road construction quantitatively in response to the needs of the people.

The minister of energy [as published] added: By using side loading Pier No 5, the amount of goods that can be cleared through this port will increase to 400,000 tons from 23 Sep 81-20 Mar 82. During the spring and summer of this year, 320,000 tons of goods have been cleared and loaded on the four existing piers. The use of this pier will allow 80,000 more tons to be added to the capacity of the piers of this port.

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MOSCOW-ORIENTED CP ORGAN INTERVIEWS TUDEH SPOKESMEN

Lulea NORRSKENSFLAMMAN in Swedish 7 Oct 81 pp 24-25

[Interview with unidentified members of the Tudeh Party; date and place not given; by Alf Lovenborg]

[Text] The situation in Iran is extremely complicated at present and difficult to understand, even for many who wholeheartedly support the Iranian revolution.

Swedish newspapers are filled with reports of rioting in the streets and indiscriminate executions of demonstrators right on the street.

Opponents of the Iranian revolution are exploiting these events and they foresee the fall of the government and civil war.

The editorial staff of NORRSKENSFLAMMAN approached several Tudeh Party members and sympathizers in Sweden to find out the Communist Party view on these events.

Due to the complicated situation in Iran and the presence of reactionary Iranian elements in Sweden, including former SAVAK agents, the Iranian comrades have asked to present their information without giving their names or place of residence.

Executions

[Question] "Are the reports of mass executions correct and how do you and your party view this?"

[Answer] It is obvious that the revolution must be defended. For this reason, we cannot denounce all executions, not with respect to terrorists who try to destroy the revolutionary leadership through terror bombing or people convicted of serious crimes, CIA agents, etc.

We do, however, denounce the indiscriminate executions on the streets that are now occurring and our party has stated this publicly. Our central committee has said that all death sentences against Mojahedin sympathizers and other leftist extremist groups must be stopped unless they have directly participated in assassination attempts and terrorist actions. They must also be allowed to operate if they do this within the laws of the Iranian Islamic Republic.

Civil War?

[Question] "Do you believe that the risk of a civil war is imminent?"

[Answer] "The situation right now is extremely precarious. The enemies of the revolution are attempting to destabilize the country through assassinations and to create social unrest in order to destroy the revolution.

"The government is now involved in a bitter struggle against the Mojahedin. It has been proven to be guilty of assassination attempts, but there are also many cases in which there is evidence that former SAVAK and CIA agents were responsible for bombings. Assassinations have killed many heroes of the revolution and this has created an atmosphere of confrontation that could lead to a civil war or a counterrevolutionary coup.

"Our central committee has stated, however, that the energy of the people is sufficiently strong to prevent a counterrevolution.

The Government

[Question] "What is your opinion of the present government?"

[Answer] "The present government subscribes to Khomeyni's revolutionary line. That is obvious. This does not preclude, however, that there are sectarian and monopolistic forces as well as clear-sighted and realistic forces that maintain that the primary enemy is American imperialism. These latter forces also believe that the United States is Iran's primary enemy and that the Soviet Union does not represent a threat.

"Before the bombings began it was the realistic and clear-sighted trend that dominated and there were many positive aspects of the government's policies. After the bombings, however, the sectarian trend was reinforced, but prominent people within the government and Iran's religious leaders have stated that they do not accept all these executions and that revolutionary severity must not give way to vindictiveness."

Threat from Abroad

[Question] "How do you view the threat from the United States at present?"

[Answer] "The Western news agencies now want to utilize certain events to create an anti-Iranian mood in the world. In this way, they also want to create a favorable mood for direct military intervention from the United States so that American imperialism can appear as the 'savior' of the Iranian people from what these agencies call the 'revolutionary hell.'

"This threat is now great. There are 60 American, English, and French ships in the Persian Gulf. More than 400,000 NATO soldiers are in the vicinity of Iran.

"The people of Iran must be extremely vigilant in this situation. There is also a carefully orchestrated political effort against Iran. The trips by Sadat and Begin to the United States and Haig's visit to West Germany are part of a conspiracy directed against the people of Iran, among others. Iranian imperialism is being aided by counterrevolutionary forces within Iran, which will support the United States during a military intervention.

"The primary goal is to crush Iran economically. If this effort does not succeed, military means will certainly be considered."

The Iran-Iraq War

[Question] "What would you say about the war with Iraq?"

[Answer] "The war was started in accordance with a plan developed by counterrevolutionary forces. The idea was that Iraq would attack Iran and 'liberate' the Khuzistan province and not the entire region. Bakhtiar was to become prime minister in a government consisting of various counterrevolutionary elements. They believed it would be possible within 3 or 4 days to take all of Khuzistan and then, with the help of counterrevolutionary forces, continue farther. This effort was unsuccessful, however, because of the fighting spirit demonstrated especially by Tudeh Party members and sympathizers at the front."

"Bani Sadr played a double role. He wished to present himself as a great military leader, but his real desire was not for Iran to win the war. He wanted the war to continue and for Iran to be weakened so that those willing to compromise and forces friendly to the United States could take over. When he was deposed, it was a bitter blow to these forces.

"Since the fall of Bani Sadr, we have seen great progress at the front by the army and the revolutionary guard."

Work of Imperialism

"We are defending our country and our revolutionary advances with weapons in hand, but at the same time we believe it is a tragedy that two fraternal nations are fighting each other. It would be more proper to direct a common front against Zionism and American imperialism. The economic consequences of the war are affecting the people of both countries, but as the latest report from the Tudeh Party's political bureau stated:

"The war is a result of a conspiracy planned and coordinated by American, English, and French imperialism and their cohorts in the reactionary countries in this area, i.e., Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Oman, and the emirates of the Persian Gulf. Saddam Takriti's gang and the Iranian counterrevolution were given the task of carrying out this conspiracy.

"It is now clear that the heroic resistance of the revolutionary forces led to the early failure of this conspiracy."

Advances of the Revolution

As we know mass media in the capitalist countries are trying to make it appear that the people have made no advances, or that the situation is even worse than under Pahlavi and SAVAK.

[Question] "How would you describe the advances of the Iranian revolution?"

[Answer] "This is a lie, of course. The reality that is still vivid in the minds of the Iranian people contradict this propaganda. For despite all the pressure from the imperialists, the domestic counterrevolutionary conspiracy, and attempts to limit the revolution to securing the profits of the capitalists and wealthy landowners, the following has occurred during the past 2 years:

The despised, oppressive monarchy has been relegated to the junk heap of history;

The grip of the rich capitalists and landowners on the political, social, economic, and cultural life of the country has been broken.

SAVAK's empire has been crushed and thousands of political prisoners liberated;

Capital that had unjustly accumulated in private hands has been returned to the ownership of the exploited people (70 percent of the industries in the private sector and banks have been nationalized);

Our people have thrown out thousands of American, French, English, German, and Japanese leeches and spies who had a firm grip on the pulse of our country and exploited our people and our land;

Important steps have been taken toward solving some of the most important and most vital social problems, such as stopping the feudal and semifeudal exploitation by the large landowners and merchants, nationalizing foreign trade, and establishing state control over domestic distribution.

"All this and more has been done in the best interest of the people. Speaking of the 'failure' of the Iranian revolution indicates either malevolence or blindness and deafness."

Leftist Extremists

"There is today a tendency toward monopolism, absolutism, and egocentricity within what is called the 'left.' Certain groups are sincere in their positions, but in practical matters they assume incorrect attitudes toward the necessities of the revolution in its present historical phase. In this connection, creative revolutionary action is also replaced by riotous, convulsive, and destructive deeds, i.e., the use of unnecessary violence designed to force their own narrow, sectarian views on others. We are witnesses to the fact that these methods, like the oppressive activities of the right, become a breeding ground for leftist extremism and attempts to create a Maoist 'cultural revolution' which leads to the barbaric methods of Pol Pot.

"The Tudeh Party opposes all such excesses and trends and we see Maoism as the extended arm of American imperialism. Its activity is directed against the main interests of the Iranian revolution. Maoism has already caused great damage."

The Revolution Goes On

[Question] "How do you see the future?"

[Answer] "Despite all these difficulties, the Iranian revolution will go on and be consolidated. The Iranian people are not seeking a way back. Everyone knows how it was under the shah. United States imperialism is our main enemy and it will be fought successfully.

"Our party has told the government many times that we must proceed with fundamental changes. A complete land reform is needed, the tax system msut be changed, and important social changes must be legislated for the good of the people.

"If this does not occur, it will become more difficult to mobilize the masses and the further course of the revolution will be hindered.

"The true forces of the anti-imperialist and popular revolution are now fighting an historic battle on many fronts for our fatherland. This struggle is constantly becoming more and more intense."

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JERUSALEM METROPOLITAN EXPANSION PLANS SAID LACKING COORDINATION

TA200810 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 20 Nov 81 pp 1, 5

[Report by Avraham Rabinovich]

[Text] At least one major urban centre is being planned just outside the city limits of Jerusalem without the Jerusalem municipality, on whose infrastructure the centre will lean, being aware of it.

The situation reflects an almost total lack of coordination between the intensive planning now under way for the Jerusalem metropolitan area by various agencies and planning for the city itself. The ministerial committee on Jerusalem has not been re-established since the elections.

Officials concerned withthe city's development, including some government officials, warn that Jerusalem's demographic character and political future are endangered by the direction of limited population resources in this wildcat manner to the city's periphery rather than the city itself.

A government source revealed this week in an interview that an urban settlement of "several thousand" was planned for 'Anatot less than 1 km from French Hill in northeast Jerusalem. He said several thousand more units were slated for Pesagot, to be created close to al-Birah, just north of Jerusalem.

City engineer Amnon Niv, Jerusalem's chief planner, said yesterday that he had heard rumours this week of 6,000 units being planned for 'Anatot--located across the former green line--but that a senior housing ministry official had denied any knowledge of it.

However, a call by a journalist later to the spokesman of the world Zionist organization settlement department elicited confirmation that the 'Anatot urban centre was being planned and by the department itself. "It will be an urban suburb of Jerusalem," he said. Although the government had approved the 'Anatot project half a year ago, he said, the settlement department has not been eager to release details at this stage of the plan, including the number of units which could even be more than 6,000. This is three times the number in French Hill itself.

The spokesman said Pesagot was being planned as a regional centre with 300-500 units but that it would be expanded in the future.

The ministerial committee on Jerusalem, headed in the last government by Interior Minister Yosef Brug, was dismantled along with all ministerial committees when the new government took office 4 months ago and has not yet been reconstituted. The committee is responsible for coordinating development plans for the city.

The ministerial committee on settlement, however, has been reconstituted under the chairmanship of Agriculture Minister Simha Ehrlich and has been busy drawing up plans in recent months for Jerusalem's periphery, including suburban settlement at the radar west of Jerusalem, adjoining kibbutz Ma'ale Hahamisha.

Officials concerned with Jerusalem's development warned this week that by drawing off limited manpower resources to these suburban satellites, the settlement committee was endangering the Jewish character of Jerusalem itself.

The officials urged the speedy reconstitution of the ministerial committee on Jerusalem and the establishment of coordination with the settlement committee on development of the Jerusalem metropolitan area.

CSO: 4400/62

CONTROVERSY OVER OBTAINING AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 235, 22 Aug 81 pp 26-27

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Why Did Beirut Take Up Libyan Offer To Provide Lebanon with Air Defense System? Chairman of Defense Committee Accuses State of Railroading Operation To Overhaul Mirage Airplanes; Middle East Company Denies It Offered To Overhaul Airplanes at Low Cost"]

[Text] In 1974 while Lebanon's Chamber of Deputies was discussing the general budget, deputies objected to an item in this budget that called for the appropriation of 12 million Lebanese pounds to overhaul Lebanon's Mirage airplanes.

After a violent attack on the government's policy in this area, the chamber then voted to abolish this appropriation. The chamber stated that what was required was the sale of these airplanes and not their overhaul because they were a source of continuing loss to the treasury and had no benefits. The deputies had several justifications for their position. The most prominent of them were the following:

First, despite the fact that Lebanon is classified as a supporting country and not a confrontation country in the Arab-Israeli war, it is basically not involved in fighting Israel. Lebanon's policy is based on that fact. Several Arab-Israeli wars have taken place--the biggest of these wars were the 1967 war and the 1973 war--without Lebanon's participation. In fact, Lebanon did not try using these airplanes once to respond to Israel's attacks, especially when the Israeli air force bombed Beirut Airport.

Second, it has been established technically and militarily that these airplanes cannot be used in Lebanon for several reasons. Among those is the fact that Lebanon's air space is not large enough for the range of these airplanes. No sooner do these airplanes take off from their base than they penetrate the air space of Israel or of other countries in the area. Since the purpose for which these airplanes were purchased no longer exists because the establishment of a unified Arab strategy has not been possible, the use of these airplanes has become impossible and their presence useless, especially since the radar center with which these airplanes operate and which was located on the top of al-Baruk mountain was bombarded by

Israel and put out of operation. In addition, operating these airplanes requires an air defense system, and this system was abolished after the Crotale missiles purchase deal from France was cancelled. The deal was cancelled following the scandal that developed around this deal and involved official figures in the state.

Because of the aforementioned Crotale scandal, the political climate at the time was set for a decision in the Chamber of Deputies to turn down appropriations for overhauling the Mirage airplanes and calling for their sale because Lebanon did not need them.

First, [Lebanon did not need the airplanes] for the aforementioned reasons. In addition, the 1973 war was then considered the last war with Israel.

Second, [Lebanon did not need the airplanes] because the reasons that had led to their purchase no longer existed since the Arab countries had stopped pursuing the plan they had during the sixties to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River.

It is known that the Arab Summit Conference which was held in Alexandria in 1964 approved the plan to divert the tributaries of the Jordan River. To implement that plan the conference also approved [measures to] strengthen the military capabilities of the Arab countries that face Israel and are adjacent to it, or, briefly, the countries that would be involved in this diversion and that could be threatened by Israel for this reason.

Because Lebanon is adjacent to Israel and because the process of diverting the tributaries of the Jordan River would begin in its southern territories, the Alexandria Summit decided to invite the Lebanese government to strengthen its defense and its air force for that purpose. This reinforcement was to be financed by the Arabs in the context of a joint Arab plan. As a result Lebanon made several military deals with France among which was a deal for 12 Mirage airplanes, radar and an air defense system which consists of a French Crotale missiles system to intercept raiding airplanes flying at low altitudes.

The rest of the story is now well-known: the part about the suspension of Arab operations in the project to divert the tributaries [of the river] after Israel bombed project installations; or the part about the concerned Arab countries dragging their feet in paying their full obligations to Lebanon. Then the 1967 defeat was followed by a variety of developments among which was the cancellation of the Crotale deal. This is the deal that complements the radar on al-Baruk which justifies the presence of the Mirage airplanes.

The year 1975 brought its destructive war to Lebanon. That war created an explosion in the Lebanese situation and led to the collapse of the state. All these matters then became dormant, and a discussion about the Mirage airplanes, whose number declined to nine after three of the airplanes fell during training operations, became irrelevant.

However, the government revived the matter and simultaneously stirred a major political controversy. The controversy was a result of the resolution adopted recently by the Council of Ministers, allocating the sum of 117 million pounds to what was called overhauling the Mirage airplanes.

And here reference must be made to the fact that when Lebanon purchased these Mirage airplanes, one airplane cost 10 million pounds. That is, the total [purchase price] at that time was 120 million pounds.

This resolution that was adopted by the Council of Ministers stirred a political controversy which began with numerous questions and exclamations that were soon brought out in the open by the chairman of the parliamentary defense committee, Col Fu'ad Lahud. Col Lahud issued a statement attacking this resolution and asking that it be repealed. He said what is being called for is the sale of these airplanes which are no longer useful for Lebanon. He made veiled charges that shed some light on the background of this resolution.

On the following day an official source in the Ministry of Defense--it is believed that it was Minister Joseph Skaf--responded to the chairman of the Defense Committee with a statement explaining that after the recent developments Lebanon had decided to pursue a policy of strengthening its defense capabilities, and especially its air force. Lebanon had made that decision since it became evident to the government when it looked into the matter of selling the Mirage airplanes, that no country would buy them at the minimum asking price.

The door was thus opened to a political dialogue in which veiled threats were exchanged. Deputy Fu'ad Lahud disclosed information that he had which stated the following:

First, it was not true that these airplanes were put up for sale and that no buyer was found who would pay the minimum price for them. An Arab country has offered to buy them. Libya was prepared to pay twice the Lebanese government's asking price. Deputy Lahud said that Libya offered to purchase these airplanes because, on the one hand, it has Mirage airplanes in its air force and, on the other hand, because it has its own facilities for overhauling and maintaining this kind of airplanes.

Second, these Mirage airplanes that Lebanon owns are now very backward, compared with modern air forces in the world. In addition, they altogether lack the military capabilities to confront modern military aircraft manufactured in the United States, in the Soviet Union or in some European countries, among which is France in particular. Furthermore, from a technical standpoint these airplanes are non-usable. A small country like Lebanon no longer needs this kind of military aircraft. In fact, small countries like Lebanon find it useful to use missile air defense bases which are militarily and technically more effective and have a greater impact. Deputy Lahud cited as an example of this what happened in Israel as soon as Syria set up SAM-6 missile bases in al-Biqa'.

In connection with this Deputy Lahud said, "If Lebanon decided to keep these Mirage airplanes and did not find a buyer for them, overhauling them would not require these exorbitant costs which are said to be 117 million pounds. I have information that the Lebanese Middle East Airways made an offer to overhaul these airplanes at a cost that does not exceed one third that amount. In addition, there are Arab and non-Arab countries that now have plants to maintain and overhaul this kind of airplane. We can turn to these countries [and have the job done] at a much lower cost."

AL-MUSTAQBAL asked the president of the board of directors of Middle East Airways, Mr As'ad Nasr whether what was said about his company making an offer to maintain the Mirage airplanes was true. Mr Nasr denied those statements and said, "We made no offer in this regard."

However, the repercussions in the case continued, and the scope of the campaign against the Council of Ministers' resolution expanded. All of a sudden Deputy Fu'ad Lahud challenged the government that if it persisted in its resolution, saying he would be forced "to reveal everything."

The matter was returned to the Council of Ministers where it was discussed again. Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan left the meeting to announce that the council's resolution was upheld. He went so far as to say that Lebanon had a new defense policy and that according to that policy Lebanon's defense capabilities would be reinforced, the sources of weapons would be diversified, and weapons would be purchased from any international body with whom Lebanon thinks its interests are ensured.

Although Lebanon's traditional policy from the outset has utilized western countries as a source for weapons purchases, and Lebanon has become known for that, this is not the first time for Lebanon to make a decision to diversify the sources of its weapons. A previous occurrence of this kind took place early in the administration of former president Sulayman Franjiyyah when the minister of defense at that time, Dr Ilyas Saba, submitted a plan to diversify the sources of weapons. That plan was adopted, and several deals were made then. Among them was a deal for tanks with the Soviet Union and a deal for other weapons from some eastern countries.

However, the announcement by Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan that Lebanon had decided to strengthen its defense capabilities and diversify the sources of its weapons under these circumstances which Lebanon is experiencing, with Israel's invasions and attacks to which it is subjected, created a psychological atmosphere that reduced the sharpness of the campaign against the resolution to overhaul the Mirage airplanes. Hence, Prime Minister al-Wazzan followed this announcement with another statement in which he announced that Lebanon had reached a decision in principal to accept an offer submitted by Libya to provide Lebanon with air defense missile bases. To this end Prime Minister al-Wazzan received the secretary general of the Arab Brotherhood Office, the Libyan citizen Mr Salih al-Daruqi and informed him that the government had accepted the Libyan offer provided that these bases be operated by Lebanese citizens.

There is no doubt that the government of Prime Minister al-Wazzan has so far realized a respectable measure of success in the area of this preventive action in the campaign against the resolution to overhaul the Mirage airplanes. This action produced official initiatives that are still so far in an advisory framework. This government plan did, nevertheless, succeed; it was described as a master's stroke that at least alleviated the political campaign against the government, causing the leader of this campaign, Deputy Fu'ad Lahud, to suspend his campaign and say that he decided to wait and see what the government would do.

Those who have the inside story are saying that the political battle which began with the attack on the resolution to overhaul the Mirage airplanes and developed into a resolution to accept the Libyan offer has not been played out in full. This is because neither matter can be separated from other political battles that are being fought on the Lebanese scene. The coming days will bring a decisive statement on the matter.

8592
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MERITS OF DEFENSE TREATY WITH USSR DEBATED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 pp 8-10

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Will Lebanon Sign Defense Treaty with Soviet Union?"]

> [Text] Official Lebanon will find itself compelled to turn to the Soviets or the Syrians since Washington is still putting off coming up with a U.S. solution. The United States did not support Fahd's peace plan, so the Palestinians opened fire on the U.S. plan for south Lebanon.

When Israel launched its recent war against the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon, deliberations on a new idea took place in certain official and political Lebanese circles. This idea is new and altogether alien to the nature of Lebanon's traditional policies and foreign relations. It suggests the possibility of Lebanon and the Soviet Union signing a friendship (defense) treaty that would be somewhat similar to the treaty that Syria signed with the Soviets.

The subject of the treaty was presented to President Ilyas Sarkis after the cease fire agreement between Israel and the PLO was reached through U.S. efforts. Lebanese sources stated that among those who took part in presenting the matter and the justifications for it was Minister of Tourism Marwan Hamadah. Those who presented this subject to President Sarkis gave the president a variety of known facts and data that support [the following]:

First, the cease fire that was achieved will remain fragile and subject to collapse at any time as long as it is not shored up by a political agreement. In the future Israeli raids on Lebanon and on the Palestinian Resistance may be more violent and more vicious than they've been before.

Second, there is a possibility that Lebanon may be exposed to a major Israeli invasion whose objective this time would be to occupy the south in its entirety or all of Lebanon. This has become a strong possibility. Various international and Arab sources have much information on this matter

which requires alertness, vigilance and action in any direction to ensure protection for Lebanon against any Israeli invasion and to deter Israel from persisting not only in its bombardment of Lebanon but also in entertaining thoughts about occupying or seizing its territory.

Third, signing a friendship and defense treaty with the Soveit Union may be Lebanon's only way out at this stage. A treaty could not only ensure protection for Lebanon against Israel's aggressions and ambitions, it may also keep partitioning plans away from Lebanon or even protect it from extinction. Such a treaty could help to unravel many of the complications that are still dominating the Lebanese crisis and keeping it running around in vicious circles.

Fourth, the national and future interests of Lebanon make it necessary for Lebanon to disregard all the traditional historical reservations it has had about binding itself with promises and political and non-political relations with the communist world and its leader, the Soviet Union, and to sign a treaty of this kind with a superpower such as the Soviet Union to ensure its own protection, its life and its survival. Under these circumstances it does not seem that Lebanon can sign such a treaty with any other country but the Soviet Union. It is also difficult or impossible at this stage to find a superpower other than the Soviet Union which can provide such protection to Lebanon and to Lebanese territory, especially after it has been established that neither France nor any other European country is qualified to play such a role. Besides, experience has confirmed that it is not possible to trust the positions which the leader of the West, the United States of America, assumes vis a vis Lebanon.

The Crisis Worsens

Proponents of this idea said that regardless of circumstances, Lebanon, which is still being strangled and threatened by partition or extinction, should not be hurt at all by a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, modeled after Syria's treaty with the Soviets. Syria did not hesitate at all in signing such a treaty with the Soviets when it realized that it would face Israel alone and that it would be subject to all kinds of foreign conspiracies whose purpose would be to subjugate it and to impose on it a U.S.-Israeli solution to the Middle East crisis. Syria did not hesitate in signing this treaty after it became certain that there was no hope that a joint Arab force would be created and that all capabilities would be made available so that a strategic balance with Israel can be achieved. That balance was most terribly upset as a result of the Camp David accords which isolated Egypt from the Arab world and from the struggle with Israel.

At first the idea of a treaty with the Soviets was met with various forms of approval by Lebanese officials, but consideration of the subject was soon forgotten, and the matter was not brought up for discussion again at that official level despite the fact that some political circles in the area who oppose U.S. policy in the area toward the Arab-Israeli struggle find that there is no other way out for Lebanon but to turn to the Soviets.

They tell President Ilyas Sarkis that if he does not want to or if he cannot violate Lebanon's traditional policy to ensure its future and his interests he would at least have to suggest or threaten the possibility of leaning toward the Soviets. Thus if the United States and the European countries, Lebanon's traditional allies, are interested in Lebanon's survival, they would do something to save Lebanon from Israel and from its ambitions.

If a discussion about a treaty at this stage in particular makes observers pause, and if such a discussion were to touch on all bases, it is because the importance and indications for such a treaty are derived from the disturbed climates that the Middle East area is experiencing as it continues to stand, on the one hand, on the verge of serious transformations and changes and, on the other hand, because the developments in international struggles are beginning to inundate the area with plans for alliances and treaties which are being sought by the major powers, led by the two U.S. and Soviet superpowers.

On the basis of all this there are two basic factors preventing Lebanon, at least at this stage, from any possibility of taking this new course in its foreign relations, regardless of circumstances and regardless of the magnitude of the dangers that are threatening Lebanon's destiny. These two factors are subject to actual practice in the policy of the Lebanese state.

The first factor is that President Ilyas Sarkis is not the man who can make a decision of this magnitude, if for no reason other than that his term as president is about to expire. It is now certain that he does not want to commit the Lebanese state to any positions that deal with the substance and the structure of the Lebanese regime as a whole and with Lebanon's policy and its Arab and foreign relations.

The second factor is that Lebanon is still counting on--and it appears it will continue to do so--a U.S. solution and European assistance [to solve] its crisis. Accordingly, Lebanon will march to a U.S. tune in almost everything. These are among the established facts that are now clear and known to everyone; they are indisputable.

Indirect Communications

In the context of political remarks which were being muttered in recent days about the political background that spurred the idea of a treaty with the Soviets, some people found a connection between the fact that this idea was proposed and the sudden U.S. interest, which appears to be serious this time, in the Lebanese crisis. The Americans are trying to deal with that crisis in a way that would get Lebanon out of its state of weightlessness and out of the maelstrom of anxiety over its destiny as well. Accordingly, the U.S. administration is strongly affirming that it is holding on to Lebanon and that it will restore it as a factor of stability in the area.

Some political leaders said that such a possibility must not be ruled out especially when the United States finds that discussions about a treaty

with the Soviets have begun in a country like Lebanon. Such discussions are occurring under circumstances that are extremely critical and sensitive, circumstances in which crucial developments are taking place which will determine Lebanon's future for a long time.

Those people said, "If a mere discussion about Lebanon shifting its foreign policy toward the Soviet camp has had this effect on the U.S. administration, there would be no harm in continuing this discussion implicitly or openly so as to give the U.S. action an added impetus. Accordingly, such discussions would constitute a mere warning to the western camp, admonishing it, and especially its leader, the United States, that continuation of its current policy will cause it to lose in fact, and not in words, its major posts in the area.

It is now certain that domestic, political pressure on the principals of the Lebanese state to develop the means of dialogue and communications with the Soviets has risen, now that the U.S. administration's enthusiasm for proceeding with its plan to solve the problem of the south and to establish firm foundations for solving the crisis in Lebanon is gradually waning. These foundations would become a nucleus for a solution to the problem of the area.

After the publicity provided by Washington in the media and in diplomatic circles about the existence of a U.S. plan for the problem of the south, and after the diplomatic moves and communications that included all concerned parties, discussions about that matter soon began to disappear gradually. Now that subject is no longer mentioned.

It so happened that public discussions and investigations into the matter of the U.S. plan stopped immediately after some prominent Palestinian leaders attacked the U.S. plan, describing it as one in a series of conspiracies against the Palestinian question.

This Palestinian attack on the U.S. plan began not too long after the silence that for a short period of time accompanied the cease fire.

At that time some informed sources attributed official Palestinian silence to the fact that during that period the Palestinian command was waiting for the results of the ongoing communications and deliberations. These were taking place first, around the details of the U.S. plan on the one hand and, accordingly, on U.S. guarantees to the PLO in return for the organization's going along with that plan. All these guarantees revolved around U.S. recognition of the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and of the right of the Palestinian people to establish their state on their national soil.

A Problematic Situation

These sources are now inclined to believe that the Saudi peace plan, which was announced by Crown Prince Fahd, to solve the crisis of the Middle East was expected to make up the formula which the United States would accept in

principle as a foundation for achieving a just peace in the area. It would thus become possible to consider the U.S. plan to solve the problem of the south with the liberation organization without considering that plan a political blow against the PLO to divest it of its content and to take away from it the issue of south Lebanon.

Although ongoing communications with Washington regarding the situation in Lebanon and the south have not confirmed decisively that the U.S. plan in the south has failed, the prevailing impression in the Lebanese capital does not encourage optimism. Some officials even think that this opportunity has been lost and that the situation in Lebanon in the coming period may become extremely tense. Preparations for that increasing tension have begun and are evident in the partial deterioration which has recently been experienced on the contact lines in the Lebanese capital. This deterioration was accompanied by rounds of random shelling between the eastern and western sectors of the Lebanese capital.

Observers expect this state of tension to turn into major security disturbances if the United States does not take new action to accept solutions that are acceptable to Arabs and Palestinians. Communications with the U.S. capital about that matter are currently underway. These communications are taking place amidst information that Israel may invade Lebanon to occupy it or at least to occupy its southern part. These possibilities are being discussed among some Arab capitals. Lebanon is calling for an Arab position to apply pressure on the United States so it can prevent Israel from carrying out any military adventure of this kind.

People in the Lebanese capital are now saying that Washington's giving up finally on Arab choices and its return to the course of Israeli choices will put the Lebanese president in an extremely critical position. He would have to face one of two matters: he would either shoulder the responsibility for what may happen to Lebanon as a result of the continued reliance on U.S. policy, or he would have to go back and look into the possibility of counting on Soviet policy and expressing this reliance in various forms. Among those forms would be that of the matter of the friendship treaty. [This situation] is analogous to having a bitter pill to swallow.

There is no doubt, however, that the development of the situation in a manner that would make the Lebanese state face up to the Soviet option will provide considerable help in dispelling official Lebanese reservations on the matter of regulating Lebanese-Syrian relations according to principles and rules governed by security agreements. This [observation] is based on the fact that if circumstances cause the Lebanese state more embarrassment than they are causing it now, it will be easier for Lebanon to sign treaties with Syria because the impact of a treaty with Syria would be less than going directly to the Soviets, as long as some people believe that the outcome would be almost the same.

There is information stating that the matter of the relationship between Syria and Lebanon, as well as the future of this relationship, was discussed during the negotiations which Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan held in both the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait.

This information is corroborated by the statement that was made by Lebanon's prime minister in Kuwait in reference to what has already been mentioned. Al-Wazzan said in that statement that the Lebanese working paper which was submitted to the Arab Follow-Up Committee included a special item that dealt with the matter of the relationship between Syria and Lebanon. Al-Wazzan described this relationship as distinctive and asked that it be defined in detail and that firm texts be written to regulate and direct this relationship.

Accordingly, the question that is being raised now is this: Will Lebanon find itself compelled to give up counting on the United States if it is disappointed one last time by Washington? If this does happen, will the Lebanese state choose to join the Syrian position, or will it go directly to Moscow?

8592
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RESULTS OF AL-JUMAYYIL'S TRIP TO WASHINGTON DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 p 25

[Article by George Bashir: "Bashir al-Jumayyil's Information: New U.S. Initiative To Solve Lebanon's Crisis; 'Washington Has Finally Realized That a Strong, Independent Lebanon Is a Basic Pillar in the Stability of the Entire Middle East Area' "]

[Text] Journalists and correspondents were taken by surprise last Thursday when al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil summoned them to a press conference in his office. At first a group of these correspondents thought that al-Shaykh Bashir wanted to give them the first statement about his impressions of his recent visit to the United States and the results of the negotiations he conducted there with the main figures of the new administration in Washington. However, al-Jumayyil began by telling the journalists, "Tomorrow or the day after I will tell you about the results of my trip to the United States. I am extremely exhausted by the trip because of the long and intense itinerary that had been prepared for me and because of the importance of the negotiations that I conducted with the new U.S. leaders. But today I want to talk with you about the function of the Arab Follow-Up Committee and the sincere desire which I have for expressing the importance of facilitating its function and assisting it in making its mission successful. This is because we consider the function of this committee to be a fundamental and a basic function that we all look forward to. Through its actions, its efforts and our cooperation with its principals we see hope in reaching an end that would curb the sharp tragedy that our home country has been experiencing for 7 years." Al-Jumayyil added, "Today, I will talk with you about the Arab Follow-Up Committee, and tomorrow, about the U.S. Follow-Up Committee."

Some of those attending the press conference tried to dissuade al-Jumayyil from what he had intended to do and to shift [the discussion] from the subject of the Arab Follow-Up Committee and its function to what journalists and correspondents regard as the more prominent and more important subject of the U.S. trip, the negotiations that took place during that trip and the outcome of these negotiations. But al-Shaykh Bashir insisted on his position and said that the function of the Arab Follow-Up Committee was a subject of more importance and more prominence because there were serious

attempts to abort this mission and to thwart the Arab role in solving the Lebanese crisis so as to keep Lebanon subject to the furious storms of international struggles. "I think if the Arab role and the Arab solution are aborted, these international struggles will become more severe and will turn our land into a real battlefield as a result of which we may all perish before the crisis comes to an end."

Last Thursday evening during a meeting that a group of journalists and correspondents held with al-Shaykh Bashir, al-Jumayyil reaffirmed his total commitment to the substance of the declaration that he gave President Sarkis. That declaration was read at the recent meeting of the Follow-Up Committee. It was an absolute commitment not to enter into any dealings with Israel, regardless of the form of a deal, and to consider the Arab Follow-Up Committee capable of producing serious results in the area of helping solve the Lebanese crisis. "We are entitled to assistance from fraternal Arab countries to get out of this tragedy that is sweeping our homeland and our people. We need their assistance to give the legitimate government the opportunity to regain its national sovereignty over all the territory of Lebanon. We need their assistance so that Arab capitals and the principals of the Follow-Up Committee would not accept some of the rumors and errors that are being scattered here and there for the purpose of distorting positions and shaking the confidence [that exists] between us and the committee, especially Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the confidence that any solution can be achieved."

What happened in Washington? With whom did Bashir al-Jumayyil meet? What are his impressions as a result of his negotiations with the officials of the new U.S. administration?

Bashir al-Jumayyil said, "Ever since 1958 Lebanon, the state and country, practically broke most of its close ties with the countries of the free world, and especially with the United States. Relations that were left were superficial. Lebanon wanted to become a neutral country, but no one wanted to acknowledge that neutrality. It went along with everybody, and the outcome of that was that everybody went along with everybody else at Lebanon's expense. They fought and battled with each other on the territory of Lebanon, and Lebanon did not even have the right to state its opinion on what had happened or what was happening on its land. Even when Lebanon said its opinion, nobody heeded it.

"Therefore Lebanon--and this is what we achieved in this visit--will rebuild the bridges between Lebanon and the free world," said al-Jumayyil, "and especially with Washington. We hope that we can feel again that we are part of this free world. We wanted to be with everybody, [and we discovered that] no one was with us. We wanted to please everybody, and as a result [of our efforts], no one was satisfied or pleased with us."

Al-Jumayyil said, "There was a meeting last Monday at President Ronald Reagan's ranch in California. The meeting was attended by his vice president, his secretary of state, his senior assistants and the people who formulate foreign policy in the Middle East. Part of this meeting was set to

discuss the situation in Lebanon. I had the opportunity to meet with some of those people who attended that meeting, and I had lengthy negotiations with them before the California meeting. I have now received some indications of the results of this meeting. Some, if not all, of them are positive. My talks with the American side were candid and realistic. We shared points of view without any complications, and I said what every Lebanese citizen feels. These negotiations left me with the impression that the American side has actually begun to feel that Lebanon is a cornerstone for stability in the Middle East area and that its people have a cultural role they must play in their environment and with the free world [as well]. I learned that since the new administration took office a strong trend has been taking shape in both houses of the U.S. Congress and among the members of the [Senate] Foreign Relations Committee and the Defense Committee whom I met. The new administration strongly favors the need to solve the Lebanese problem so that national sovereignty can be restored and Lebanon can become again the basic factor for stability in the area, and especially in its own surroundings."

Al-Jumayyil added, "Although this information has not yet been formulated into a proposal for a solution or something similar to that, the U.S. administration, the men of that administration and the American people are convinced that the crisis of Lebanon had been shelved long enough and that it has become necessary to find solutions for it and to execute those solutions. This U.S. resolution is not far from being made, and we have to follow-up on it. For this reason and because we believe in the necessity of following up and in follow-up committees, we have formed a follow-up committee to resume the contacts, the search and the sharing of views until the U.S. solution which had been placed on a slow burner becomes well done and can be executed. The execution of the solution is not to be at our expense. Lebanon has been a friend to the United States, and this is something that the American people still feel. I was told in Washington that the men of the new administration in Washington were keeping the problems of the Middle East alive, especially the Palestinian problem and the problem of Lebanon. I was told that they have been involved for some time in studying the nature of each one of these problems separately and in depth in the light of their information, their experience and naturally their strategic interests. But my feeling is that no solution to these problems has ripened yet, although administration officials now have various ingredients to the solutions to each one of these problems. I left Washington with the impression that President Reagan's administration was determined--and not too far from now--to present specific and new proposals for solutions to each one of these problems, starting with the Lebanese problem. Attempts that were made through Washington or through some of its friends in Europe and the Arab world to solve the crisis in Lebanon were only part of this U.S. action." Al-Jumayyil said, "Regarding Lebanon, the legitimate government will be reinforced, supported and strengthened, and all forces and efforts that are present now on the Lebanese scene will be channeled in that direction."

Al-Jumayyil refrained from indicating, explaining or even referring to the persons [involved in these efforts] because in his opinion all the cards must not be revealed at once. What matters here is follow-up, and we are following up.

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OBSTACLES FACING FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 237, 5 Sep 81 pp 34-35

[Article by George Bashir: "All Parties Are with Follow-Up Committee, but Moscow Feels Left Out; Sarkis Expresses Apprehension of Security Test Month Promised by Committee"]

[Text] Will the formidable moral and political international support which the Arab Follow-Up Committee now has to solve the crisis in Lebanon turn into a "check with insufficient funds?"

This is what political and diplomatic circles in the Lebanese capital are talking about. Never before has an Arab committee of this kind and this makeup, which was charged by the council of Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs to fulfill a mission, received the support this committee is receiving. The committee is receiving offers for help from those who are concerned with its mission.

Ever since Arab ministers of foreign affairs, at their last meeting in Tunisia 5 months ago, revived this committee, awakening through it and through its mission the hope that achieving permanent and just solutions to the crisis in Lebanon is possible, questions have been raised about the steps that committee will take in return for the encouragement, the backing and the local, regional and international support that was declared by young and old to bless its steps and to encourage its principals and its parties to go ahead with their actions.

The Crisis of Impediments

Such positive regional and international initiatives usually double the credibility of any committee and make its mission, even though difficult, not impossible [to realize]. However, the Follow-Up Committee, as observers have noted, is still to a certain extent going around itself in circles. Four months ago when Arab ministers of foreign affairs urged that a custom-made Arab solution for Lebanon be formulated, the question that is still being raised today is this: Will the committee continue to perform its function, or will this function be suspended as it's been in the past by such previous committees since the summit meetings of al-Riyadh, Cairo, Baghdad and al-Ta'if, where they collapsed one right after the other?

The aforementioned committees used to face local, regional and international obstacles, and they were not confident that their decisions would be carried out. Therefore, they disappeared from sight, and the Lebanese crisis has gone on for 7 years "in limbo," subject to an explosion and threatening Lebanon's neighbors. This situation has persisted until the recent conference in Tunisia took the initiative and revived the makeup of the committee which began to take action.

Everybody concedes that despite this extensive Arab and international support, which enhanced the credibility of the committee and its chief members, that support had to give the committee a strong momentum to succeed in its mission. The United States declared more than once its total support for the Follow-Up Committee and for an Arab solution to the Lebanese crisis achieved by this committee in particular. The government in Washington declared that it was prepared to offer [the committee] all the means and measures of support. Through unpublicized negotiations which Washington conducted directly or through intermediaries with some principal parties to the Lebanese crisis, the United States encouraged the Lebanese to cooperate with the Follow-Up Committee, to comply with its principals and to meet their requests to facilitate their mission. Washington assumed responsibility for some requirements that in the past had prevented those parties from cooperating with the committee and complying with its missions. An example of this [posture] lies in the statement presented to President Ilyas Sarkis by al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, commander of the Lebanese forces. Washington played a prominent role behind the scenes in bringing about this statement.

Part of Philip Habib's Mission

Some foreign diplomats in Beirut have information that Ambassador Philip Habib, the official and personal envoy of U.S. President Ronald Reagan, said in front of parties concerned with the affairs of the Lebanese crisis that his country was prepared to support an Arab solution to the Lebanese crisis and the efforts that were being made in that regard. He said that the United States would support these efforts to the farthest extent possible, beyond the expectations of the chief members of the committee and of those who have a stake in achieving such a solution [so that] internationalization can be prevented.

Habib responded to this by telling a senior Arab official that Washington considered a solution to the Lebanese crisis, apart from the points of view and the principles that are outlined by the principal figures of the lawful government in Lebanon regarding a solution, to be an appropriate introduction to a solution to the crisis in the Middle East. "It would open the door to a transition period in which the parties to the dispute in the crisis of the area would take a necessary deep breath and calmly and securely investigate the origins and the parts of a solution to the major crisis in the Middle East. The continuing flare-ups on the Lebanese scene," said Habib, "will benefit only those who do not want a just and permanent solution to the Middle East crisis and to the Lebanese crisis.

"Furthermore, continued attempts by any party or parties to start a fire in this explosive Lebanese crisis would seriously damage all parties and would make any regional or international effort to achieve a solution to the Palestinian question quite remote."

Habib made that statement when he wound down his recent tour in the area, and that coincided with the end of the Israeli elections. After that, a statement issued by the White House 2 weeks ago corroborated Habib's statements which were recorded in the minutes of the secret meetings that the U.S. envoy held. That statement was President Reagan's decision to add a new mission to his envoy's basic mission: Habib was to intensify official communications with the parties to the Lebanese crisis to find solutions to that crisis. Habib's basic mission had been confined to the effort to reach a peaceful solution to the missiles crisis between Syria and Israel--Syria had placed the missiles in Lebanon to defend its troops there--and to prevent the outbreak of a new war in the area because of these missiles.

The French Role

Last Sunday Claude Cheysson, minister of foreign affairs in the new French government gave the Arab Follow-Up Committee further credibility by announcing officially on behalf of his country and on behalf of the European community that France and Europe would support the efforts and the mission of the Follow-Up Committee. Cheysson said, "If one day in the context of the four-nation Follow-Up Committee Lebanon's fraternal nations find that a foreign country like France can offer any assistance, let me say," Cheysson said, "that Europe will be prepared to provide that assistance, and France, of course, is a member of the European community."

The statement that was made by the new French minister of foreign affairs was a summary of what Lebanese officials and some Arab officials had heard him tell them during his recent tour. He had discussed with them the European community's backing and support for the efforts of the Arab Follow-Up Committee to find a solution to the Lebanese crisis. Cheysson told those Arab and Lebanese officials that France was totally prepared to obtain approval for this support from the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the European Community which was to meet that week. He said France would be prepared to relay that support to the countries and parties that were involved in Lebanon's crisis. One can provide a clear picture of the considerable credibility that the Follow-Up Committee now had. Naturally that credibility was added to that of its principal members.

The Follow-Up Committee whose members are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Kuwait and the Secretariat General of the Arab League is chaired by President Ilyas Sarkis. It derives its basic credibility from its members. In addition, it has local credibility since various Lebanese parties have given it their confidence; they have complied with its wishes from the outset and with the very few measures that it has taken.

Arab credibility consists of the backing of most of the Arab countries whose ministers of foreign affairs met recently in Tunisia. They support the committee's mission.

International backing for this committee stems from the Americans' conviction that an Arab solution to the Lebanese crisis would be beneficial. This conviction was conveyed in the assurances provided by the government in Washington through the U.S. president's personal envoy, Philip Habib.

Moscow's Role

If we were to add to that the European support and backing that were announced by France's minister of foreign affairs during his recent tour in Beirut, Amman and Damascus the tremendous credibility that the committee's principal figures have becomes evident. Nevertheless, some people are saying that despite its extensive scope, the committee's credibility is still lacking in the absence of Soviet backing and support. The Soviet Union's presence in the Middle East is strong, and the Soviet Union would not accept or allow anyone to diminish that presence or attempt to undermine it or ignore it.

Moscow has not yet announced its willingness to support in practice the efforts of the Arab Follow-Up Committee to solve the Lebanese crisis, at least as Washington, Paris, the European community and the Arab community have done. Moscow's diplomats in Beirut and in the capitals of the area are still not acknowledging the existence of the Follow-Up Committee. No official Soviet statement has been issued to affirm Moscow's wishes that the mission of the Follow-Up Committee succeed. This is happening at a time when those who are in the know are saying that Moscow is feeling isolated from the efforts that are being made to solve the Lebanese crisis just as it is isolated from the efforts to solve the crisis in the Middle East due to Washington's desire to keep Moscow away from these efforts.

On more than one occasion Lebanese officials have expressed their approval of Moscow's practical participation in efforts to solve the crisis of the Middle East and in similar efforts that are being made to solve the Lebanese crisis. On more than one official occasion President Sarkis told Arab and foreign ambassadors that Moscow's role in that area was a basic role and that it was essential to the success and execution of any solution.

Worsening Crisis

The story about dealing with Israel was the basic obstacle which impeded the progress of the Follow-Up Committee during its first meeting in Bayt al-Din about 5 months ago. Through their credibility the government in Beirut and some of the principal members of the Arab Follow-Up Committee were able to overcome this obstacle and obtain a statement from al-Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil rejecting absolutely all forms of dealing with Israel. The principals of the committee were also able to tone down the [rhetoric in the] media and curb campaigns in that regard which had irked some members of the committee. However, the committee has not been able to re-open a single one of the routes that link the two sections of the Lebanese capital; nor has it been able to take a single step of the steps it had promised to take with regard to beginning a dialogue between the Lebanese

parties to bring about national accord and to proceed thence with the committee's basic mission.

In addition, the pessimism and the anxiety that are prevailing in Lebanon because of the deteriorating security situation--not only on the contact lines in Beirut, but also all along the length and breadth of these lines in al-Jabal, in the north and also in the south--are putting the government and all the aforementioned parties during the month of September, which was hoped would be the month of the breakthrough, on the verge of a harsh new test. The test would come in the form of an upheaval that some people fear and others declare that its first stirrings are evident.

Sarkis's Complaint

All this is happening only 1 or 2 months before the previously scheduled Arab Summit conference convenes the end of next November in al-Rabat. An agreement had been reached in principal to hold that meeting 1 month or 3 weeks sooner for the sake of Lebanon and its question.

During this difficult period, not only in the life of the Lebanese crisis, but also for the mission of the Arab Follow-Up Committee, a judgment will be made on the failure or success of the hoped for Arab solution to this crisis, if Lebanon, the plaintiff in this case, can endure more than it has already endured.

President Sarkis unequivocally stated during the luncheon that he hosted last Sunday to honor the French minister that Lebanon can no longer endure the torture, the suffering and the destruction that are the result of the continued crisis and the attempts that are being made to prolong that crisis. This means that the government may have something up its sleeve. This may be the last hand Lebanon will play at the Arab Summit table if the mission of the Follow-Up Committee turns out to be an impossible mission.

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LABOR UNION CADRES' MEETING REVIEWED

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[Article: Speech by Taieb Baccouche to UGTT Cadres in Tunis on 7 September, and Review of Ensuing Discussion]

> [Text] Taieb Baccouche: "We Bear No Responsibility for the Application of Options Which We Have Not Participated in Establishing As a Responsible Party."
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> The Cadres: "Participation by the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] in the Upcoming Legislative Elections Is Conditional Upon the Provision of All Democratic Guarantees."

Last Monday the labor market witnessed an important event, which was the holding of the first meeting of the labor union cadres in the Governorate of Tunis since the Qafsah conference. The meeting lasted a whole day--going on uninterrupted from 10 am till 10 pm. The meeting hall was filled with about 3,000 labor union cadres who had come in response to an appeal made by the Executive Bureau of the UGTT to discuss the main labor union and social issues as well as political events which are of concern to the union members at this critical time. The meeting was also intended to be the culmination of labor union consultations which had taken place and which had included the various provinces. The discussions were quite often characterized by an enthusiastic spirit. Nevertheless, they were carried on in a democratic atmosphere in spite of some high-strung emotional feeling which resulted from [participants'] sensing the seriousness of the topics which had been included in the agenda. The most important of these topics was the position to be taken with regard to the upcoming legislative elections as well as the position to be taken with regard to other issues such as the elimination of the emergency measures, the escalation of prices, and the tension in professional and social relations in some governorates and establishments.

The meeting was conducted by Taieb Baccouche, the secretary general of the UGTT, who was assisted by Sadok Besbes, member of the Executive Bureau of the UGTT and the secretary general of the UGTT's branch in the Governorate of Tunis. He delivered a lengthy speech to those who attended the meeting, and the speech contained a comprehensive assessment of the current labor union situation and political situation. Here is the text of the speech:

[Text of speech] My fellow labor union cadres.

This meeting is the culmination of a series of meetings which the Executive Bureau of the UGTT decided to hold in the various governorates of the country in order to sound out the opinions of the labor union's rank-and-file members within the scope of assessing the work done by the labor union since the Qafsah conference and conducting consultations concerning the most important issues and problems which have been brought up. We did this in order to gain a comprehensive and accurate idea of these issues which one could describe as being crucial in view of the repercussions which they will have on the future of labor union activity and the various social and political forces in the country--with the most important issue being that of the upcoming legislative elections.

Since the Qafsah conference, the Executive Bureau of the UGTT has eagerly been studying the matters which have been brought to its attention. These matters have been of three types. The first type consists of matters which deal with old problems which have been accumulating. The second group of problems goes back to the period of the National Union Committee and is a result of positions taken by some of the employers [then]. The purpose of these positions taken was to obstruct labor union activity before it could be concluded at a national conference. The third group of matters deals with future problems.

It happened by chance that the most important issues and matters concerning the UGTT have become lumped together and have made it necessary to deal with all of them at the same time because dealing with them can no longer be delayed. One of these issues requires that a solution be reached before the end of November, at the very latest, so that the labor union's plan can be clear-cut. This requires the uniting of all efforts and unity in the ranks of the labor union, and this is what is making this period of time a very difficult one.

Right after the Qafsah conference we began to look into the problems which had been accumulating. We found that numerous matters, which had been agreed upon during 1976 and 1977, had been shelved and suspended. Such matters are, for example, the joint contracts, basic statutes, and demands stipulated in the minutes of the meetings. Since the events of 26 January [date of general strike of UGTT] all the demands have been shelved and all the agreements have been suspended. It is only natural that, after the conference, these demands would emerge again and that the dust would be brushed off of them. You know very well that it is difficult to respond to all demands at the same time. As far as the government is concerned, it considers that it has put forth a lot of effort through its modifications in wages which it decided upon last April. It feels this way particularly because these wage increases are not subject to taxation and because they are larger than previous wage increases. For this reason, we have encountered difficulties in achieving many of our demands in view of the fact that the wage increases which have taken place are relatively respectable ones.

But when we bring up this wage increase within the framework of legitimate rights for the workers, it is of little benefit. However, we consider that we have attained as much as is possible, in view of the circumstances, in order that we not once again become victims of the wage-price spiral which has such a negative effect on the purchasing power of the workers. We have, in particular, felt the negative effects of this wage-price spiral during the last 10 months in view of the fact

that the rise in prices, in the final analysis, has been cancelling out [the benefit of] scheduled wage increases.

Therefore we have served notice to the government that we do not intend to once again enter this wage-price spiral, and we have demanded that real pressure be applied to keep prices down while awaiting a modification of the social options.

We do not deny that the government has expended effort in this regard for which we are grateful, especially during the month of Ramadan. But [achievement of] stabilization of prices requires the revision of many of the options. We hope to be able to achieve considerable progress in this regard in view of the preparation of the new plan, even though the preparation of this plan took place in a purely technical and bureaucratic manner and did not take place on the basis of consulting the broad masses of people. It has been preliminary and preparatory work, and its results have not yet been officially communicated to the UGTT. As soon as we are contacted concerning this, we will form technical committees, supported by labor union committees, in order to study and assess these options. Our criterion is how much these options will benefit the workers and laboring masses. We bear no responsibility for the application of options which we did not participate in [establishing]. We will not be responsible for anything unless we actually participate in fixing and outlining it as a responsible party rather than as a party which is merely asked to give its approval to it. Everything that we express our reservations about is not obligatory for us. It is the person who puts it into practice who is responsible for the consequences thereof. Also, our participation in the assessment of these options requires a great degree of readiness on our part in terms of our capabilities and requires serious preparation. If I am harping on this aspect, it is because our other demands could fall by the wayside if they are not included within the framework of the plan. For example, if the option turns out to be a capitalistic one, then it will not be possible to distribute wealth and resources in a just manner, and our demands will become tantamount to asking for the impossible. Thus it is our duty to show the parties concerned that it is necessary to pursue a socialist option in which national capital would play a positive role. This would reduce the influence of the subservient exploitative capitalism of foreign capital which only engages in opportunistic activity in order to accumulate profits. If we put all matters in this context and framework, all other aspects become secondary. Negotiations concerning our demands will no longer be a process of "buying and selling." This option is based on a total concept of distribution of wealth and production, in a just manner, to all groups--especially the workers. All action which results in benefiting the workers has [beneficial] effects for all the other categories of society.

It Is Necessary to Restore the Standing of the Fundamental Labor Unions

Let me point out an example of the problems which we have run up against during recent months. It is the problem concerning the National Transportation Co. The articles of association of this company have remained fixed since 1977. During recent years official circles have not been keeping track of the problem. During the last few weeks the minor officials of the National Transportation Co. have been on strike in protest of administrative delays. The strike took place in an atmosphere of quiet and self-discipline, and no excesses occurred. This has been of great benefit to the work done by labor unions. The lesson which we should draw from this strike is the fact that whenever there is firm cooperation between a

fundamental general labor union and the UGTT, all of our work and efforts will be crowned with success. But chaotic and spontaneous action will only have negative repercussions on labor union activity. Sudden strikes are a bad habit, will entail dire consequences for the workers, and their results can only be negative because they present the opportunity to fire workers.

The problem, then, is one of cooperation between the various organizations which engage in labor union activity. During recent months we have noticed that this cooperation is not as good as it should be and is not solid. Sometimes we have noticed conflicts in the positions taken by some labor union organizations. These are serious matters, and I would like to take this opportunity to draw your attention to them because they are negative phenomena which are detrimental to the creditibility of the UGTT. We must create harmony and integration between the various labor union organizations. The UGTT's constitution and bylaws are very clear in this regard. We are eager to give support to the fundamental labor unions since we consider them to be the backbone of the UGTT and the solid foundation of our labor union activity. Frankly speaking, we have not sufficiently appreciated these fundamental labor union organizations and generally we have considered them to be merely tools of communication. It would be more wholesome if these organizations would perform their real task, embark upon the creation of solutions to existing problems, sound out their rank-and-file workers, hold periodic meetings, and shed themselves of the tendency to rely on the organizational structures which are above them. In this way we would be able to restore standing to the fundamental labor unions and have them become a responsible party in all negotiations because, at the present time, the employers are ignoring all intermediate channels and want only to get in touch directly with the members of the Executive Bureau or the secretary general. Some employers have quite often contacted me personally concerning matters [relating to the fundamental labor unions], but what I did was to ask them to negotiate with the fundamental labor unions. We imposed this as a condition on the administrative board of the Rafahah [Luxury] Co. which refuses to recognize its labor union. This is a basic matter. The fundamental labor unions must shoulder their responsibilities, must hold periodic meetings in the places where their workers work, and they must impose upon all the employers [the fact that these meetings are a normal activity]. This requires that all of the establishments set aside places for these meetings, and this is one of their social obligations. For this reason, we must strive to change these bad traditions and methods, expand the activities of the fundamental labor unions, and induce them to impose the holding of dialogues on the opposing party. I believe that, in this manner, we can solve most of the problems, stimulate labor union activity, put an end to the maneuvers being carried on by some employers, and thwart their efforts to buy off the allegiance of some of the workers and labor union members by means of tempting them through all sorts of inducements. This requires a great sense of labor union responsibility. Whoever is a good target for such temptations and inducements does not, in our opinion, deserve a position of labor union responsibility.

The Social Security Fund Is Not Doing Its Duty in the Best Possible Manner

In addition to this there is the problem of arbitrary firing. During the period of the National Union Committee we noticed a considerable increase in instances of firing workers. It was clear that this was a political position which had been taken by some employers in order to destroy the process of building up the UGTT.

They used the preparation of the national conference as an excuse to deal a blow to the workers and labor union members. This served as proof of their shortsightedness and concern solely with their own narrow interests. At that time, limited means were available to resist these actions because the efforts of all of the labor union members were directed toward firmly establishing the foundations of the UGTT.

After the conference it was no longer possible to accept actions such as these. However, the reality of the situation forces us to take into consideration some of the inveterate mentalities and deeply-rooted traditions. For this reason, since the beginning we have committed ourselves to the holding of a dialogue and have taken the initiative to hold meetings with the leaders of the Federation of Industry and Commerce, and we have informed them of our desire to pursue a policy of conducting dialogues. But we have not yet achieved any positive results. We do not bear any responsibility for this because we have put forth a great deal of effort. This is something which public opinion knows all about. After the conference, some employers agreed, like the owner of a brick factory in Teramdine to rehire workers that had been fired. But other employers continued to be stubborn and to resist the efforts of the labor union members because labor union activity is a democratic form of activity which serves to create democratic movements in the country. Also, some politicans put up resistance to labor union activity because it is in the nature of this activity to create a democratic atmosphere which affects all sectors of the population.

It should be noted that in the public sector the Rafahah Co. remains almost the only company which has not overcome the vestiges of the events of 26 January. We are not concerned with persons, do not want to interfere with their appointment, nor are we interested in their names. What we are concerned with is whether or not the head of the company respects the rights of the labor union. It is on this basis that we are asking the authorities to intervene and shoulder their responsibilities. The reason for this is that there is nobody who is above the law. We are determined that the freedoms of the labor unions should be respected in all of the establishments, including the Rafahah Co.

In the private sector our means of pressure, from the legal standpoint, are limited. This raises an important question. Many pieces of legislation have been passed for the benefit of the employers rather than for the benefit of the workers, and it is our duty to demand that they be changed. For example, when a factory burns down the employer's capital is insured whereas the fate of the workers is uncertain and is not guaranteed. This is what happened in the case of the (Filas) Co. in Safaqis. Workers should be protected from disasters of this sort. For this reason, we have demanded that the government have the National Social Security Fund give aid to workers when emergencies such as this occur, particularly because this fund has been accumulating dozens of billions [of Tunisian dinars] and is not doing its social duty in the best possible manner. It is our duty to have the UGTT concentrate on changing the social legislation and insurance and to have this apply to all sectors [of the population].

We also demand that a stop be put to the exploitation of temporary workers. Many employers fire workers after they have finished their probationary period, then they rehire them, and so on and so forth. This is a disgraceful and exploitative type of action, and it is shameful.

We must also change the types of social insurance and have them keep in step with the economic life [of the country]. There is a contradiction between the situation which exists and the social legislation which we have. This is something which urgently needs to be done. Initial negotiations have already begun in matters of this type such as, for example, revision of the laws concerning arbitrary firing, so that employers will be forced to definitely give up this approach.

In the textile sector in particular, especially in the April 1972 sector, we tangibly felt that some owners of export establishments were provoking workers and inducing them to go on strike in order that they would find an excuse to shut down their establishments when they felt like doing so. For this reason workers need to be alert, cautious, and wary concerning such things. For example, the workers in the (Sika) establishment in Safaqis did not leave the factory even though work had been stopped there. They stationed themselves in the factory and did not go on strike because unorganized strikes weaken the UGTT and cause the labor union organizations to lose their credibility and effectiveness.

We Will Utilize All Means to Protect the UGTT's Finances

One other means of supporting labor union activity and change in legislation is what is called full-time union work. This is something which has both its positive and negative features. One of its dangers is that a union official becomes far removed from workers and from labor in general. His union work begins to be more and more like a profession and a job and becomes bureaucratic. For this reason it is necessary to have rotation of full-time union work [among union members].

One of the repercussions of the events of 26 January has been that the government has come to consider labor union activity as a sideline activity, in each individual establishment, and is using a false interpretation of the law. This paralyzes labor union activity. We have called the government's attention to the fact that full-time labor union work is a duty to society, is an inalienable part of the freedom to engage in labor union activity, and is not a sideline activity. We met with understanding in this regard. The problem continues to exist in the private sector because some employers consider it to be a "privilege." This matter should be dealt with by legislation. We could find some compromise formulas while we are waiting for the passage of new legislation which will support labor union activity.

In addition to this, there is an urgent principal problem--which is that of revising the basic statutes and joint contracts which were formulated spontaneously and in a hurry. The time has come to mobilize and develop all of our labor union capacities in order to keep pace with the new situation. We demand, starting now and till the end of the year, a review of all of these laws, including the Public Service Law, in order to put an end to the disorganization which exists among [workers in] the same categories. This ia a job which will require large-scale labor union consultations. We have noticed that this activity is not making any progress in some sectors. Right now this activity is going on within the scope of committees. All labor union members should be mobilized to engage in this activity, and we should give it our utmost priority. In doing this, we could draw upon the assistance of specialists and experts. However, this would require large material resources [which we do not have]. But one thing which we have noticed is the deterioration of

the UGTT's financial situation. Money is also a mainstay of labor union activity, and right now we are not receiving labor union dues, which are deducted by their establishments, from more than half of our labor union members. Because of this we are in need of a large administrative department in order to keep track of the UGTT's finances. It impels us to take decisive measures so that the workers' money is not wasted. This is something which depends not only on administrative action. It is also something which depends on the labor union members being ready to pursue this matter and to struggle in order to win this battle. We will not hesitate to utilize all legal means to protect the UGTT's finances. There are some employers who are striving to fleece the workers out of their money. This is a basic issue which requires the mobilization of all of our union members so that, in the coming months, we will be able to keep close track of things. I would like to take this opportunity to call upon all of the labor unions to keep in step with this activity and supervise it in order not to pile more responsibility on the shoulders of the UGTT's administration. This is an activity which is part of our general struggle, and not merely an administrative activity. Every labor union should follow up on this matter every month. If negligence is committed by some employers, then we should be ready to confront them with all possible legal means until their mentalities change. And our union cadres, above all, should set an example in the realm of zeal to protect the UGTT's finances.

In addition to these types of pressing matters, there is the matter concerning the UGTT headquarters building. More than half of our labor union activity is paralyzed nowadays because of the cramped offices and rooms there, and some of the members of the Executive Bureau do not even have their own offices. Since our labor union activity has expanded and since we engage in more different kinds of activity, the UGTT headquarters building is now much too small. The Governorate of Tunis alone accounts for a third of our labor union activity. Many of the [labor] associations do not have branches in the capital city of Tunis. At the same time, such branches are necessary for them to keep up with union activities and for distributing responsibilities. Also, the [labor] associations in the Governorate of Tunis operate in place of the fundamental labor unions. This tends to stifle democratic labor union activity in the basic sense of the word.

For this reason, we need to choose a new headquarters for the UGTT as soon as possible in order to stimulate labor union activity in Tunis and so that the other labor union organizations can perform the great role to which they have committed themselves. All of you know about the plan to build the new UGTT headquarters building which has existed since 1977. Let me reassure you about the money that was collected for this purpose. It is necessary to increase this amount of money. This will be done in two ways--new membership dues and social projects which the UGTT is undertaking. But, to be honest, all of the organizations belonging to the UGTT are complaining about a serious deficit. For this reason, it has become urgent to separate between the labor union activity and technical administration of these organizations. It is not reasonable to have the secretary general of the UGTT be transformed into a general manager who would run these organizations. It is necessary to improve the operation and means of administration [of these organizations] and to eliminate all shortcomings because all of us are collectively responsible for the finances of the UGTT. The labor union cadres should have full information about everything that concerns the UGTT. This is something which everybody knows.

In addition to this, the social projects should benefit the workers. Also, the UGTT organizations are called upon to serve as a model for socialist organizations and to set an example in this regard. These examples demonstrate the fact that our work is very difficult and demands a uniting of everyone's efforts. All of the labor union cadres should work together in order to solve [our problems] for the benefit of the UGTT and all of the workers. For this reason, we have decided to present a financial report at every meeting of the administrative board so that the cadres will be well-informed concerning this matter.

We have also decided to create a labor union solidarity fund, the purpose of which will be to take care of labor union members who are victims of job accidents as well as their children and widows. The reason we are doing this is that solidarity is the foremost part of labor union activity and it is something which is achieved not by means of sending telegrams or making speeches--it is achieved through actual deeds. At this juncture I would like to draw your attention to the danger of some chaotic forms of solidarity such as collecting money by means of illegal [lottery] tickets and papers. We must make sure that such an operation is organized through a properly-run solidarity fund.

The Main Consideration Is to Have Unity in the Union Ranks and Independence for the UGTT

There is another subject which has been brought up at the present time, and we would like to know how our cadres feel about it. It is the subject of the upcoming legislative elections. The problem is an important one in view of the gerat effect which it will have on determining the type of labor union activities [which we will be able to pursue]. For this reason, we should deal with this matter very seriously. In recent years there has been no problem because union members have been nominated in the party slates of candidates. But today the situation has changed. At the Qafsah conference the independence of the UGTT was established. This independence is not a hollow slogan. There is very definitely something to it. On the other hand, the situation in general in the country is characterized by the establishment of political pluralism and allowing several [political] trends to participate in the election process. This is a new situation, and it demands that we take a clear position. In this regard, a lot of heavy pressure has been put on the UGTT. The Destourian Socialist Party [PSD] wants to renew the national front with the UGTT, even if [it is necessary to do so] in ways compatible with the new situation. There are also other trends which aim at splitting up the UGTT. We believe that every country has its own characteristics and its own situation. For this reason, we, as labor union members and patriotic citizens, must be acquainted with our special situation so that the solutions which we offer are compatible with it. In this regard, I would like to point out that although the UGTT encourages political pluralism, labor union pluralism is a harmful thing. Political pluralism is an element of support for democracy in the country because a single [ruling] party, even if it is a workers' party, attempts to monopolize all areas [in the life of the country], including the labor unions. The best proof of this is what is now going on in Poland.

We believe that a multi-party system supports the democratic process. But any person who calls for a multi-labor-union system is committing a serious mistake. The reason for this is that labor union traditions and the history of the struggle of the labor union movement in Tunisia go back more than half a century and they are

deeply-rooted in our country. These roots are well anchored in the memory of the Tunisian people. The first attempts were made by Muhammad 'Ali who formed an independent national labor organization. These historical characteristics make it unnecessary to have a multi-labor-union system. In the past we have implicitly accepted the situation of having the labor unions be appendages and subordinate [to other groups]. In other words, they were a force which maneuvered in favor of this or that party. But this is at variance with the independence and democracy of labor union activity. Even if a labor union forms a political party, it would have to remain independent of it structurally so that it would not be transformed into being a mere tool of communication. This is because parties change their policies under various circumstances and change their options according to new conditions and situations. So it is not reasonable to have a labor union be subordinate to the options of such parties. We know very well that the country's constitution does not prohibit a multi-labor-union system. Furthermore, we are not demanding that the authorities prohibit such a multi-labor-union system, nor do we oppose the formation of other labor unions. But we are calling upon our labor union members to appreciate the seriousness of this matter. Whoever wants to form a labor union is free to do so on the condition that he not interfere in the affairs of the UGTT. As for the fictitious and poisonous news printed by some newspapers, this is something which we must be increasingly wary of so that we can show the foolishness of the dreams of all greedy people. The UGTT is an umbrella for all trends and this is something which we are proud of because the existence of many different opinions is something which enriches a dialogue. We do not stifle any opinion, no matter how small a minority of people it represents. It is our duty to develop the traditions of a sound dialogue and to cast off all methods of coercion and domination which tend to create personal resentments and increase enmity within our ranks. Real democracy is the thing which will guarantee the unity of the UGTT. This requires that we obey majority opinion in order to set an example of democratic action and of how to conduct a sound and organized dialogue. I am more or less convinced that all of the relaxation of tensions and democratization and liberalization which has occurred in the country is the result of the struggle which has been waged by the workers and the labor union members. In view of this, it is impossible for the UGTT not to be concerned with the matter of the legislative elections, especially since it has become customary for the UGTT to participate in all of the legislative sessions. In addition to this, all social legislation passes through the Chamber of Deputies. There exist numerous opinions concerning this matter, and we should explain their positive and negative merits. Some of our members are in favor of not participating because they want to stay far removed from the centers of power. Others feel that participation is necessary. The opinions in this regard vary and are of different sorts, and one could summarize them in at least four points:

1. Participation in the elections through independent slates of labor union candidates. This means that we would be acting as a political party and would be competing with all the other parties including the PSD. The question is, does this approach serve the cause of the UGTT, particularly in view of the fact that this option lays the foundation for building a labor party?

2. Some of our members consider that the PSD has the greatest possibilities for success. Consequently they suggest participating with this party in the elections after having agreed upon a negotiated platform and upon a certain number of seats [to be given to members of the UGTT after the elections].

3. Others suggest solutions which represent compromises between the first and second formulas presented above.

4. Still others demand that there be freedom of nomination. That is, they demand that any union member be able to be nominated as a candidate in the slate of candidates which he chooses.

These are the opinions which are preoccupying a great many labor union people. The choice is a difficult one, and it requires a thorough analysis of the positive and negative aspects of each of the above-mentioned formulas. In choosing our option, our criterion will be that of maintaining unity of ranks among our labor union members and maintaining the UGTT's independence. Whatever option we choose, these two conditions must be adhered to. Any solution which does not conform to these principles will be harmful to the UGTT. Making this choice will require a great deal of thought, responsibility, and seriousness. We hope to be able to crystallize all of the opinions by means of discussion so that we can arrive at a view which has the confidence of the majority. We had hoped that a decision in this regard would be taken by the National Council. However, in view of the fact that we have so little time, the future administrative board will take up the study of the matter, especially due to the fact that the National Council will first look into the matter of revising the UGTT's constitution. All the labor union organizations are asked to send in all of their suggestions with regard to this revision so that the suggestions can be sifted through and summarized in the near future.

Normalization of Relations Between the UGTT and All the International Organizations

Another matter which was brought to the attention of the UGTT after the Qafsah conference was that of restoring the good standing of the labor union organization among international circles after it had lost this good standing, in disgraceful fashion, during the course of 3 years. This good standing was definitely and completely restored after we attended the last session of the International Labor Organization in Geneva, and after we normalized relations with all of the regional and international organizations, especially the CISA, OUSA, and GISL. The UGTT also officially attended the meeting of the Executive Bureau of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions which was recently held in Copenhagen. In short, we can assure you that the UGTT's relations with all organizations have definitely been normalized.

We Will Continue Our Struggle Until Habib Achour Regains All of His Rights

At the Qafsah conference we committed ourselves to working toward having Habib Achour regain all of his rights. I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize once again that there are parties who wish to cast suspicion on the UGTT and who have the intention of circulating false information for the purpose of dividing the ranks of our labor union members. But these maneuvers do not bother us. We are determined to carry out what we have committed ourselves to, and we have started doing this from the very first day after the conference, in spite of all of the difficulties which we have had. This is a duty which is imposed upon us by our principles and morals as labor union members. We have chosen to follow the path of argument and persuasion, and we have succeeded in eliminating a good part of the restrictions which Habib Achour was being subjected to, and we consider this to be an important step taken. We will continue our struggle through the use of persuasion

and all other means until Habib Achour finally regains all of his rights and until emergency measures no longer apply to him. Events and actions are the best way to refute all attempts to cast suspicion and to sow disunity. Some parties have no interest in having important steps in this regard be taken. It is no accident that tensions and "storms" occur whenever we achieve a positive step in this regard. However, these attempts to cast suspicion on us are not weakening our determination as labor union members because we have been used to this since the time of the National Union Committee. All such attempts have failed because we have all been careful to maintain unity in our ranks. For this reason, I am convinced that as long as there is a certain amount of trust and credibility among us, and as long as we are united, we will achieve all of our objectives, will thwart all provocations against us and challenge to us, and will show the foolishness of the dreams of all people who would lie in wait to ambush us. The UGTT will firmly continue along its path.

[End of speech]

The Major Concerns of the Labor Union Cadres at the Present Time

Right after Taieb Baccouche's speech, the labor union cadres who were present were invited to take part in a discussion period. Dozens of labor union members took the floor and their remarks continued, without interruption, till 10 pm. They came up with numerous opinions and suggestions, and they offered a variety of interpretations and explanations. It was truly a democratic dialogue and rich discussion which brought out the numerous fundamental concerns and topics which preoccupy our labor union members during the current phase which the UGTT and the country are going through.

In view of the many subjects, and ramifications thereof, which were brought up during the discussion, and in an effort to summarize the most prominent basic topics which were brought up and to crystallize them in the form of distinctive elements and points, we will deal with them one by one.

Position With Regard to the Legislative Elections

Once again the labor union cadres are embarking upon an examination of the subject of the upcoming legislative elections. The first time this happened was during a meeting of the administrative board of the UGTT during the latter part of last June. But with the approach of the date of these elections and the necessity to take a definitive position with regard to them, as soon as possible, the labor union discussions this time took on a nature which was characterized by enthusiasm and great concern and they felt impelled to think more deeply about this sensitive topic and to reflect upon it more closely in spite of the short amount of time available to do do this.

All of those participating in the discussions dealt with this subject in detail and they had numerous remarks and expressed various opinions concerning it. Their remarks were very valuable and enabled all of those present to acquire a comprehensive idea concerning all of the possibilities brought up by this issue as well as the numerous formulas which it suggests, and those present were also given the opportunity to assess the positive and negative aspects of each suggestion. The

discussion participants expressed their delight concerning this initiative consisting of sounding out the opinions of the mass of labor union cadres, who represent the rank-and-file workers, and consulting them before making a decision so that the position taken will represent the labor union, will be based on the opinions of the rank-and-file, and will have everyone's confidence.

As we have said, the opinions varied, but all of the remarks heard were based on a single premise--that of being sure to maintain the UGTT's independence and unity in the ranks of the labor union members. All of those participating in the discussion agreed that this political event will constitute an occasion to test the degree of belief which the labor union members have in the independence of their organization. They also agreed that it will be a test of their eagerness to defend it and their ability to face this event as a united front, to achieve a joint approach and united collective viewpoint, and to overcome all circumstantial considerations and differences in opinions so that the UGTT can emerge as a strongly united organization in spite of the challenges [mounted against it] and the pressure of events.

The discussion participants also emphasized that independence of the UGTT and the unity in ranks of the labor union members are two prior conditions which must exist before embarking upon any action. They said that any decision must be an extension of these two conditions. They said that no position should be taken which would tend to be in conflict with these two basic principles--in order that the UGTT's equilibrium not be impaired and in order that its organizations and structures not develop cracks and flaws. They made it clear that the Qafsah conference and latest crisis, which the labor union movement has experienced, have established, once and for all, the independence of the labor organization from the ruling party and from all other political parties and movements which exist in the country. They also said that these events have consolidated the distinctive identity and personality of the organization and have defined for it its firm foundations and supports which are based on freedom of action for labor unions, freedom to make decisions, and the freedom to oppose all attempts to dominate [them and their organization].

Using as a premise these principles which constitute a charter which obligates all of the union members, the discussion participants attempted to deal with the matter of the legislative elections. They mentioned the UGTT's participation in these elections during previous legislative sessions as a result of historical circumstances which the country had experienced. They pointed out that the situation has changed today after the emergence of new given factors in the arena [of the country's life]. The main such given factors have been the broadening of the terrain where the labor union movement is active, a steady increase of its effectiveness, and support for the independence of the organization vis-a-vis all of the existing political forces, including the PSD. Those participating in the discussion stated that the recent crisis which the country has gone through has created a distance between the UGTT and the ruling party as well as a difference in some of their views and a crisis of confidence, which can neither be eradicated nor can their importance be diminished. They emphasized that this tense relationship between the two parties is what has made it both necessary and inevitable to revise past policies. They said that it is not reasonable to have a continuation of the policy of mutual agreements and alliance between them as long as there are

great differences in some of their points of view, especially in the social and economic realm. In this regard, those present made it clear that there exists no spontaneous relationship between the UGTT and the [Destourian Socialist] Party and that there exist no commitments to undertake joint action as long as the ruling party has not definitely changed its view concerning the labor organization and begun to regard it as a responsible independent party and equal partner in a dialogue. They emphasized that the ruling party, in reality, has not retreated from its old concept of "national unity." This is the concept which was the cause of numerous social crises as a result of the fact that it was exploited by some parties and circles for the purpose of deception and misrepresentation. They mentioned that the UGTT, as a great social force, has broad-based popular support. They said that the UGTT is no longer able to accept these concepts [of how it is as an organization], and that it rejects being a part of a type of unity which would be at the expense of the workers and deny them their effective role in the country's development. In this framework, most of those participating in the discussion expressed their apprehensions concerning the pressures which the UGTT is being exposed to at this time to get it to participate in election fronts which are surrounded by a whole series of concomitant and obscure factors. They emphasized their rejection of an approach such as this which does not bear in mind the freedom of labor union members to decide their own fate themselves, and they rejected this approach which strives to influence them and to harrass them through various means. In this context they also emphasized their rejection of participating in the upcoming legislative elections as a part of any front, no matter who the other parties are that would be participating in it. They stated that it is not possible for the UGTT to join in a front with the PSD as long as the situation in the country has not cleared up. Here they particularly had in mind the absence of sufficient democratic guarantees, in particular the absence of a general legislative amnesty, continuation of political trials and arbitrary practices, and the existence of unconstitutional laws such as the law concerning associations and the press law. They emphasized that the policy of "democratization and liberalization," which the government has pursued for a year, is still fragmentary and brittle in spite of the fact that some positive steps have been taken. They stated that the instances of retreat and the negative steps which the government occasionally decides upon are reason for the labor union members to be cautious and make it necessary for them to stay alert, direct all of their attention toward consolidating their unity, develop the independence of their organization, and be concerned with the social and professional issues which the workers experience every day. In short, one could say that the majority of the labor union cadres participating in the discussion expressed their rejection of the idea of participating in the legislative elections. Some of them, however, were in favor of the possibility of the UGTT participating in these elections provided that there were a number of conditions which have to do with providing all the democratic guarantees [needed] to enter the elections. But they emphasized that, even in this case, participation by the UGTT would have to be independent participation by means of special labor union slates of candidates. They reaffirmed their rejection of any formula which would stick the UGTT in "election fronts," no matter what type of fronts they would be and no matter which parties would be participating in them. This, on the whole, is the position taken by the majority of labor union cadres in the Governorate of Tunis who participated in the discussions dealing with the question of the legislative elections. There were other positions taken, but they represented a small minority. These positions called for participation in the elections within a "national front" along with the PSD, in view of the historical relationship between the two groups. In

short, the zeal of the labor union members to maintain the independence of the UGTT and unity in its ranks was something which was obvious in all of their remarks. This explains their desire to stay apart from all political battles, circumstantial agreements, and involvements which would tend to limit the UGTT's freedom and introduce confusion into the ranks of its rank-and-file workers.

Elimination of Emergency Measures and Unity of Union Ranks

These are among the most important points which emerged in the discussions taken part in by the participants. Most of them touched upon this matter, expressed their opinions concerning it in all frankness and clarity, and dealt with it in all of its aspects. They emphasized the fact that this issue is one of great importance among labor union circles. This is proof of their adherence to the basic principles of labor union activity and proof of their desire to oppose all attempts to discredit these principles. They considered that the struggle to eliminate the emergency measures applying to Habib Achour is a basic struggle in principle and not merely a matter of being loyal to a given person. They said that the issue is not so much a personal one as it is one which concerns harming the prestige of the UGTT and impairing its independence. They emphasized the fact that there is no basis and no justification for keeping Habib Achour out of the labor union arena and depriving him of all of his rights--particularly since he and all the other labor union people have been declared innocent of involvement in the events of 26 January. In this context, they called for elimination of these emergency measures as soon as possible, and they stated that just because they have chosen to be patient and flexible this does not mean that they will wait indefinitely for a solution. They insisted that it is necessary to find a solution to this issue within a reasonable length of time. They considered that although they have chosen to be flexible and see matters in a realistic spirit, they still reject [efforts to] eradicate the issue with the passage of time and shove it aside. They demanded that the rank-and-file workers and labor union people continually be informed concerning the significance of this matter, that the various circumstances be explained to them, and that they be allowed to participate in efforts made to solve the problem. Many of those participating in the discussions attempted to make a detailed analysis of the emergency measures phenomenon. They stated that it is one of the vestiges of the events of 26 January--vestiges which still exist. They said that they represent a continual and direct threat to the independence of the UGTT and that if they continue to exist, they will create a large gap in the credibility of those in the labor union and will impair their independence because these vestiges are like a sword which is pointed at them all the time. Those participating in the discussions expressed their strong determination to continue the struggle to definitely eliminate the restrictions and emergency measures applying to Habib Achour so that he will be able to fully regain his union and political rights. They considered their struggle to be one of defending the independence of the organization and that there is no way that one could misrepresent this struggle or diminish its importance. In this regard, thoseeattending the discussions called upon people to avoid marginal differences concerning this issue as long as all the labor union members are equally anxious and enthusiastic to struggle to elminate the emergency measures and to complete the work of creating conditions for the independence of the organization. They called upon everyone to resist all of the rumors and maneuvers being spread about and engaged in by some parties who have no interest in seeing a growth in the power of the UGTT and who are constantly striving to split up its ranks and sow disunity among its people.

They also made an urgent appeal to clear the air among all labor union members and avoid making all statements which tend to spoil relations among them.

Those present called upon the UGTT's secretary general and the members of the Executive Bureau to continue engaging in their efforts which are necessary in order to solve this problem as soon as possible. They also called upon them to try very hard to put into application the draft law concerning eliminating the emergency measures, which was produced at the Qafsah conference, so that labor union activity is not pushed aside and so that other labor union issues are not neglected. They stated that if the emergency measures continue to be in effect, this will tend to halt the progress of the UGTT, create a feeling of lack of confidence among its rank-and-file members, and cause the creation of feelings of tension among the ranks of the union workers which will not be beneficial to them. In this context, they called upon everyone to stay above the level of all of the circumstantial rancor and make a determined effort to create a solution for this issue, inside the UGTT itself, which would enjoy the confidence of all of the union members and which everyone would be happy about, in view of the fact that the only solution for this dilemma is a solution will be provided by the labor union.

Those present concluded that the UGTT is threatened when there is no unity in the labor union and that such unity is the main consideration. They mentioned that their purpose [in saying all of this] is not their concern with individuals but rather the consolidation of the organization's independence, preservation of its identity, establishment of democratic means of action in the organization, and the thwarting of all attempts which aim to dominate and take possession of the organization.

The Independence of the UGTT and Democracy in Union Activity

Those present emphasized that the principle of the independence of the UGTT is a permanent principle from which there is no retreat, that this is a basic and central motto for labor union activity, and that it is not affected by circumstantial factors of change. They emphasized the fact that this motto was clearly and carefully established by the Qafsah conference, and that this was the focal point of the work done by the conference. They revealed the degree of sensitivity on the part of the labor union's members today concerning this subject and their complete refusal to accept any violation of this principle or to make any concessions in this regard, no matter how slight they might be, since they feel that this independence is the only guarantee for the survival of an organization which will be both strong and a source of enlightenment for those in contact with it. They said that this is the only fortress which can foil all attempts being made to take possession of this labor organization or to establish dominance over it. They said this self-defense, which the organization will commit itself to, does not apply only to one particular political group, but rather applies to and includes all the political groups which exist in the country, no matter what their mottoes and objectives are. In this connection, those participating in the discussion warned of the danger of splits and divisions which might creep into the organization by virtue of some of the actions taken by narrow factions. They said that they consider that the union should be open to all types of ideas and opinions. They also mentioned that the union members alone are the ones who are responsible for the independence of their organization, and that it is up to them to vigilantly

watch over its development and to firmly establish its significance. They said that this will not take place unless they furnish the conditions for the possibility and continuation of this independence. They said that the ingredients of this are unity in union ranks, the creation of an atmosphere of democracy in the UGTT organizations, and the firm establishment among them of the approach of conducting honest dialogues and waging conflicts above-board. Those present noted with delight the degree of awareness on the part of the union members of the importance of this principle, and they were delighted at the degree to which they are able to overcome their disputes easily and in a healthy manner. They also declared that it is necessary to strive to finish creating the conditions necessary for the organization to enjoy its independence. They said that this will not happen unless there is the creation of harmony and integration among the various organizations, support for the role played by the rank-and-file unions, and rejection of all bureaucratic practices. In this realm, they demanded that there be more general meetings and that they be periodical and include consultations with the rank-and-file concerning all issues in order to firmly anchor the permanent tradition of conducting dialogues between the various union organizations. They also stressed the urgency of supporting methods of democratic action, having the cadres always and continuously participate in the making of all decisions, and not having [all of this] restricted merely to a few occasions. They stated that the establishment of evolving democratic life inside the union is the only condition which can guarantee unity in the union, development of the UGTT's internal front, and the establishment of the foundations of collective action which can guarantee the UGTT's immunity against all maneuvers [by hostile parties].

The General Situation in the Country and Public Freedoms

Concerning this subject, those present expressed their preoccupation with the recent events which the country has experienced--especially the trial of a large number of the members of the "Islamic Tendency Movement." They mentioned that this trial reminds them of the series of political trials which occurred in past years and said that this is in conflict with statements made by the government which call for the establishment of democratic life in the country and the pursuit of a policy of "democratization and liberalization." They asserted that this trial is being held in order to suppress political activity and to prevent it from exercising its right to exist and its right to free expression. They said that this is a despotic measure which is at variance with the country's constitution, conflicts with what democratic life in the country demands in terms of recognition of all political trends, without exception, and keeps these political trends from being able to exercise all of their rights. They said that they consider this trial and the verdicts which were passed against those accused to be proof of the fragility of the policy of democratization and liberalization which the government is pursuing, and they said that this is cause for doubt concerning the government's credibility.

In this connection, those present made an appeal for the continuation of the struggle being waged to achieve a profound democratic transformation from which there would be no retreat. They said that this would only take place by clearing up the political climate and making a definite break with all arbitrary practices, rejecting all courses of action which are not in keeping with the spirit of the new times, and eliminating all legislation which is at variance with the constitution

of the country--especially the law concerning associations and the press law. They also emphasized that only the passing of a general legislative amnesty law would guarantee the creation of an atmosphere of trust, dispel all suspicion, clear up the general atmosphere, and put people's minds to rest. They mentioned that the special legislative amnesty which will soon become a law is only a partial measure which does not respond to what is required by the times in terms of boldness and decisiveness in the taking of the necessary political decisions. They also demanded legal recognition of all political movements--dispensing with all procrastinations and underhanded dealings--in addition to lifting the ban from all newspapers which were shut down and respecting freedom of the press. They emphasized the fact that, unless these guarantees are achieved, the policy of "democratization and liberalization" will remain a formality, will be very limited, and will always be threatened by the possibility of suffering a reverse. They warned of the danger of this policy being used merely as a cover or as a temporary breathing spell to enable the government to then continue pursuing a capitalistic social and economic policy which would not be in keeping with the interests of the workers and all other sectors of the population. They considered that the policy of deception and misrepresentation is a useless one, and that it tends to preserve the causitive factors of social instability and impel the country toward more crises. They said that the only guarantee of the country to be immune [from such crises] and for the success of the democratic experiment is for everyone to embark upon overcoming all of the vestiges of previous crises, to eliminate the effects of these vestiges, and to have all social and political forces in all of the realms of the country's general life participate on an equal basis, without any injustices being committed.

Revision of Joint Contracts and Basic Statutes

This is a basic point which was brought up in the remarks of nearly all of those who took part in the discussion. They emphasized the necessity of having the revision be comprehensive and profound in order that it keep pace with our system of economic life which is continually expanding and in order that it respond to our modern needs. They demanded that all of the [illegible]ons and organizations within the UGTT, on all levels, participate in the negotiations which are being conducted with the other social groups. They emphasized that the deadlines for formulation of the plans should be reasonble so that all of the labor union members, in cooperation with their rank-and-file workers, would be able to crystallize their suggestions. They also demanded a comprehensive revision of the joint cadre contracts and the public employment law, radical change in the sections of the labor code, and a modification of the wage scale which would take into consideration the change in prices during recent years and the profits earned by the establishments. They said that this revision of the laws should be based on objective economic factors. They called for cooperation between the labor unions and for showing readiness to enter into negotiations, from a position of strength and firmness, to deal with the obstinate positions taken by some employers. They emphasized that success achieved by the UGTT in its battle concerning the basic statutes and joint contracts will enable it to deal with numerous existing social and professional issues and will then enable it to direct its concern toward the other issues.

The Government Has Not Honored Its Commitments to Stop the Escalation of Prices

The subject of the recent price increases was one important point of discussion in the remarks of the participants. They expressed their great preoccupation with these sudden price increases and their disapproval of the fact that they took place at a time when the government had committed itself to freeze prices until the end of 1981. They emphasized the fact that these price increases, especially prices in the areas of transportation and some basic materials, will tend to limit the effect of the wage increases which the government established last April. They said that they would weaken the purchasing power of the workers, maintain the wage-price spiral, and create a condition of inflation which would be detrimental to the incomes of the working classes. In their remarks, those present stressed that the healthiest and the only solution would be to revise some of the economic options and create a social policy which would be in keeping with the interests of all sectors of our population. They stressed that if the government chooses the capitalist option, this will not be able to eliminate the tensions which exist, but rather will tend to deepen the gap between the various social classes. They said that the only solution lies in taking socialist measures which would put a stop to the domination of the large merchants, eliminate the phenomenon of monopoly, carefully regulate markets and distribution channels, and purge them of middlemen and speculators. They emphasized that, while awaiting this essential revision, it is necessary to take rapid and wholesome measures to put a stop to the trend of steadily escalating prices. They said that this should be done by having the authorities intervene to freeze prices, keep track of them daily, call all speculators to account, and take deterrent measures against them. They also demanded that the finances of all establishments be audited and that instances of misconduct in them be brought to light because this would be a healthy measure for their profitability and would help them to organize their production.

The Social Situation and the Increase in the Phenomenon of Arbitrary Firing

Those present, in their remarks, were very concerned with the tensions present in the country's social situation at the present time. They expressed their complete support for all workers who are engaging in legitimate strikes in order to achieve their legitimate demands. They reminded everyone of the tense social situation which exists in Safaqis, and they demanded that the UGTT intervene and deal with the problems of the workers in that governorate. They said that it is necessary to create a solidarity fund to aid workers who are on strike or to aid those who have been arbitrarily fired. In this regard, they talked about the disgraceful actions and maneuvers engaged in by some employers in order to put a stop to labor union activity in their establishments, and they mentioned the abuse which these employers heap on the workers. They demanded more vigilance and decisiveness in order to oppose such practices and to compel these employers to negotiate with their union and to accept the holding of a dialogue. They pointed out the fact that there is more arbitrary firing and technological unemployment. They demanded that a bold and decisive position be taken with regard to this dangerous phenomenon which is threatening all workers and eating away at the country's economy. They demanded protection for the workers and that all legal guarantees be provided so that the workers would not remain dependent on the whims of some of the employers.

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LOANS TO LIBYA, UAE DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 76

[Text]

TWO NEW BORROWINGS by Arab countries have appeared in the euromarkets recently. Both attracted considerable attention, since they were sizeable loans to relatively rare borrowers.

The most newsworthy was the proposed $200m syndicated credit on behalf of the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company, a new venture designed to handle Libya's foreign investments. Its first foreign borrowing carries the guarantee of the longer-established Libyan Arab Foreign Bank. The terms on the loan — an interest rate of ½ per cent over Libor for seven years, with a three-year grace period before principal repayments become due — are competitive. They are especially so considering that the borrower is newly formed and that Libya is not very popular with the US. American banks' lending dominates the euromarkets, and their attitude can significantly affect the terms of the larger international loans.

Five Arab banks are lead managers of the Libyan deal — Arab Banking Corporation, which is also running the books, Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement, Gulf International Bank, Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company and the Ubaf group — together with Bank of Tokyo and Crédit Lyonnais.

The other relatively unusual borrowing is the $300m credit for Sharjah. More exactly, it is for the ruler, Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed al Qasimi on his own behalf, and on behalf of the emirate of Sharjah and its dependencies. The sheikh has appeared in the euromarkets before. In 1977, for example, he raised $40m as a five-year loan through Grindlay Brandts Limited, and in 1978 raised a substantial $200m for eight years, in a deal lead managed by BAII (Middle East) Incorporated. This was followed last year by a $55m borrowing, lead managed by the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and guaranteed by the emirate of Abu Dhabi. Earlier this year, the sheikh raised a $55m bridging finance loan for one year through Credit Suisse First Boston. That loan, signed in Sharjah in July, also featured the Arab Investment Company and KFTCIC as lead managers.

The sheikh has not, however, previously raised a loan as large as the present $300m. The proposed terms on the borrowing are higher than the international average, reflecting the political risk of lending to Sharjah as seen by foreign banks, as well as the relatively large amount involved. The loan is for six years, whereas the average for the syndicated loan market is around eight to eight and a half years, and the spread over Libor is 1 per cent (or twice what the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company proposes to offer its lenders).

Another way of gauging the relatively unfavourable terms on Sharjah's latest loan is by comparison with the terms on its $200m borrowing in March 1978. The maturity was longer (eight years compared to six this month), and a longer maturity indicates greater confidence on the part of the lender. Also, while the 1 per cent spread paid in 1978 is the same rate as proposed on the latest loan, this must be seen against the sharp decline in spreads over the last three years. A borrower paying a 1 per cent spread three years ago could reasonably expect to pay only ⅓ per cent or ⅝ per cent this year. Sharjah's attractiveness to lenders

has slipped over the period, since it is still paying the same as it did over three years ago.

The bank arranging the borrowing is Credit Suisse First Boston, and the funds are intended to finance capital spending and debt repayments over the next year.

While the Libyan and Sharjah borrowings were capturing much of the attention in the syndicated credit sector of the markets, an equally large transaction was being arranged in the less glamorous area of trade financing. A $279.5m package, finally signed on 29 October in Bahrain, has been assembled to finance the construction of the housing project at Al Hassa for the national guard of Saudi Arabia.

The package shows how many disparate elements have to be put together to finance a major construction project in the Middle East — and how effectively the euro-markets can provide them. The contractor to the project is the Samho Construction International Company of South Korea, and the first two tranches of the package were guaranteed by the Cho-Heung Bank, one of the leading Korean commercial banks.

Bank of America (Asia) organised the documentation of the deal. Its co-lead managers were Arab African International Bank/Al Baab, Arab Asian Bank, Arab Banking Corporation and Saudi American Bank (which also acted as agent). Most of the other banks involved were also Arab or regional banks, though two French banks also participated.

CSO: 4400/68

ISLAMIC COURT CHARTER DRAWN UP AT CONFERENCE

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] JEDDAH, Oct. 26 (SPA) — The International Islamic Court of Justice's charter has been completed here Monday by the committee of experts which concluded a three-day meeting. The final legal draft for the court's charter will be prepared by a committee of technicians.

Habib Chatti, Organization of the Islamic Conference secretary general, who attended the final session, said the session was devoted to completing the Islamic court's charter and determining the next step. The committee agreed to invite technical experts to give the legal touch to the draft.

Chatti added that the experts also agreed to call for a meeting of Islamic ministers of justice in February next year for a final review of the charter. The justice ministers also may make recommendations on the subject to the Islamic foreign ministers' conference, which will consider the final draft's approval.

The experts committee, presided over by Pakistan Justice Minister Sharifuddin Pirzadah, began its meetings at the OIC headquarters here Saturday. It has been entrusted to prepare the International Islamic court of justice's charter as recommended by the Third Islamic Summit of Makkah.

On Sunday, the committee proposed that the Islamic court of justice should comprise 11 members. However, the committee made it clear that the judges must be of proven knowledge and morality of the highest order; they must be famous scholars of Islamic jurisprudence; and must have the finest possible qualifications for these posts.

Chatti concluded his statement by saying that the Islamic Court of Justice is a vital project that will have positive results on the relations among Islamic countries.

The Kingdom, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Tunisia, Senegal, Mauritania, Bangladesh and Pakistan form the experts' committee.

CSO: 4400/70

MINISTRY PLANNING IMPORTANT INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 8 Nov 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] Since the victory of the Saur Revolution and its new phase in particular, major steps have been taken towards development of industries in the country. Added facilities have been and are being provided for the industrial plants, both in the public and private sectors, to help them augment their output and improve their efficiency through better management.

In a short span of time, since the victory of the Saur Revolution, and especially its new phase, many new industrial projects have been planned to produce the essential consumer goods and reduce the import of goods, on which considerable amount of hard currency is spent.

The privileges given to national capital-holders and the necessary protection and incentives provided for them have encouraged them to invest in essential projects and thus take an active part in the development of national economy.

The timely and necessary assistance by the DRA Government to the private investors through concerned Government organisations such as the Industrial Development Bank, the Exports Promotion Bank as well as other credit sources have proved very useful to private investors in solving their financial problems.

The provision of huge facilities, under the law pertaining to development of private industries, such as exemption from custom tax and a low custom tax for the import of raw materials and spare parts needed by the private industrial enterprises has proved highly significant and useful for promoting the growth of the private industries and encouragement of local enterpreneurs.

In addition to the Industrial Development Bank, which is directly responsible for measures to help industrial development efforts in the country through provision of of easy-terms loans and technical guidance, other commercial banks in the country such as the Pashtany Tejaraty Bank and Banke Millie Afghan are also rendering valuable services towards the same end.

So far, the services of these banks have been very fruitful in ensuring a smooth flow of raw materials needed by the private industries.

As a result of the timely assistance of the Government and the prompt essential services provided for the industrial plants in the country, both in the private and public sectors, many industrial plants in the country have reported a rise in their production.

Another major factor, which has been responsible for the rise in industrial production, has been improvement in the working conditions for the workers as well as the increment in their salaries. The workers at the industrial plants now work with redoubled interest and devotion and are actively

contributing to the development of industries in the country.

In order to create good working relations between the management and the workers, collective agreements are being signed one after another, outlining the responsibilities of the workers and the management towards each other. This important measure is already widely welcomed by the managements and workers of various industrial plants in the country.

The Mines and Industries Ministry, which is looking after the development of industries, has adopted commendable measures aimed at rapid industrial development in the country. Through the efforts of the ministry, a number of industrial plants which had been compelled to close down due to the wrong policies of the past regimes, have been reactivated and other industrial plants have been reporting increases in productions as a result of improved management and added facilities made available by the Government.

In order to ensure the success of any industrial project to be launched in the future, the Mines and Industries Ministry opened the other day a three-week-long workshop of pre-investment studies of industrial projects.

The workshop, held with the assistance of the UNDP in Kabul, will discuss different aspects and the importance of technical and economic feasibility studies of a particular project.

Now that the DRA Government plans to undertake a great number of important industrial projects for the welfare of the people and industrial development of the country, to be drawn by the State Planning Committee, the holding of such workshop under the supervision of the experienced foreign and local experts teams, are certain to play a vital role for launching well-founded and well-studied projects.

Such studies are surely needed to make sure the continued successful operation and development of an industrial project.

CSO: 4600/131

INTERESTS PURSUED BY SOVIET UNION IN AFGHANISTAN

Tehran MESSAGE OF REVOLUTION in English No 5, Sep-Oct 81 pp 50-52

[Text] One of the important outcomes of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan is the blow suffered by Marxism and Communism in the Region and the world over.

To challenge the U.S–Chinese influence in Afghanistan, cannot justify nor be the only motive for the Red Army's involvement in the invasion of Afghanistan.

The consequent political isolation of Russia, caused by the Red Army's involvement in Afghanistan, establishes one major conclusion that the Soviet Union have not accepted such a worldwide political set – back only to prevent the U.S – Chinese influence spreading in Afghanistan.

In order to clarify the issue here, we may underline some of the outcomes of the Soviet military invasion of Afghanistan:

1 – The Soviet-backed military coup of Afghanistan in April, 1979, followed by Russian troops occupying most parts of that country, have caused the world Conscience to condemn and protest against this act through the international committees and circles.

This Soviet aggression reveals the true motives behind its recent backings for some of the liberation movements, as a mere tactical gesture to secure the Moscow long – term interests in those regions.

Many countries confronted Russia with economic boycotts, the ban on Moscow Olympics and in some cases severing all political relations with Russia. But the majority of regimes in the southern region of Asia, being either a pro-Moscow regime or a Soviet ally, in addition to the Moscow-backed religious socities and groups, never broke their silence to protest against this tragedy of the twentieth century. They only issued harmless communiques in which they never showed any real protest.

On the other hand, what was more important for Moscow was the unsuccessful attempt to gain the favourable attention of other countries which, as a result, the credibility of the Russian political machine had to endure a serious blow in the international scene.

2 – An evaluation of the losses in military personnel and arms in general, would establish the gravity of this military occupation for the Soviet Union. The extent of the damage and the budget allocated to this aggressesion would simply show an astronomical figure. Every day hundreds of tanks, helicopters, and Super-Sonic fighter jets "MIGS" are being shot down in different regions of Afghanistan. The damage incurred in this way cost the Soviet Union billions of dollars and if the fuel-consumption of this huge war-machine is taken into account, the cost is simply gigantic.

3 – The casualty figures of this two year war for the poor and afflicted people of Afghanistan is reaching the million toll, being the consequence of mass-killings and bombings of the defenceless Afghan urban areas by the Soviet bomber planes. The occupation of Afghanistan has also caused around two million homeless Afghans to emigrate to

Iran and Pakistan. On the Soviet side, a considerable number of military experts and over ten thousand Russian soldiers have been killed. More important, the Soviet Union has had to face a certain degree of discontent and objection in its Red Army towards the Afghan war, symbolyized by the sale of various arms and military gadgets by the Russian soldiers. This dissatisfaction in the Russian Army may have alarming effects in future for the Soviet leaders.

4 – Another outcome of this military intervention has been the disturbing impact on Marxism and Communism throughout the world.

It is generally accepted that the best way of judging a doctrine is by examining the acts and deeds of the government employing it. It could clearly be demonstrated by a referendum that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has caused the people in the Region show a much greater degree of hate towards Russians and even more so towards their ideology, i.e, Communism and Marxism.

5 – One of the most important aspects of this Aggression conflict has been the transforming effect it has had on the people of Afghanistan, so that they are not only far less indifferent towards the happenings of their country today, but they have repeatedly declared that the war will be continued until the Moslem regions of the Soviet Union are also liberated. The existence of such an alarming idea amongst the Afghans will be a grave and long-term danger for the Soviet Union. This idea becomes more plausible when one considers the fact that many of the Moslem Afghans have relatives in the Soviet Union and share the same dialect with them, giving weight to the argument that the liberation of the Soviet Moslems at the hands of the revolutionary Afghans, will sooner or later come true.

The points underlined above are a number of outcomes that the Russian military intervention in Afghanistan has had, giving rise to the question; "What are the ensuing interests sought by Moscow in invading Afghanistan which has cost Russia billions of Dollars and a great number of lives, in addition to being condemned and politically isolated in the international scene?"

It certainly cannot be a mere military presence in Afghanistan; far greater targets are being sought by Kremlin in this aggression. These aims may be classified as follows:

A) – The Natural Resources Of Afghanistan

Taking control and using the rich mineral resources of Afghanistan have always been one of the biggest motives of the Afghan attraction for the Soviet Union.

The greater part of the oil, gas, ruby and cobalt mines in addition to other precious stones and ores like iron, have remained untouched. They have been previously closed and sealed by Russians to be plundered at a later time like now that they have occupied Afghanistan and enjoy a greater degree of legitimacy and security. One example may be the Qandihar's gold mines or the iron mines in the Hadjilak region which is of the best in the world. Also the gas extracted in Afghanistan by the Russians shows an increase of thirty times more than that of the previous year, explaining the presence of the Soviet oil experts working day and night in the Afghan oil and gas fields. Moreover, Afghanistan as a non-industrialized country imports a great deal of goods and products from the Soviet Union, amounting to around 80% of all its imports. But looting the mines and other natural resources of Afghanistan cannot be the only motive for the Soviet military occupation of this country, for the Russians were equally plundering Afghanistan's natural resources before intervening militarily.

B) – Reaching The Warm Coasts Of The South

One of the oldest ambitions of the Soviet's foreign policy has been to find a way to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Eversince the Persian Gulf became economically the most sensitive area in the world, the Americans dominated this particularly vital region, giving Iran – during the deposed Shah's regime- the role of policing the Area. Consequently Moscow initiated a series of conspiracies and political plots to counteract the American spreading influence in the Region, leading to the eventual Soviet

presence in the Persian Gulf. The Russians had accomplished the previous stage of this plot by destabilizing the south-western parts of Pakistan region.

C) – The Soviet – American race For Expansionism

A look into the history will prove the fact that all the south – Asian countries such as Iran and Afghanistan have often been prone to foreign invasions, especially from their northern neighbouring country, the Soviet Union.

The twentieth century civilization and the advancement of science and technology only resulted in intensification of this expantionist tendency among the "civilized countries" and helped them colonize and exploit other smaller undeveloped countries, by various, more intricate mathods. The Soviet Union has not been an exception to this; it has continued violating the rights of, or invading its southern neighbouring countries. Afghanistan is a typical example of the never ending colonial ambitions of Russia.

D) – Confronting The Islamic Revolution In Iran

The Islamic Revolution in Iran has established two important points:

1) – The power of Islam as a revolutionary doctrine was demonstrated.

2) – The practical aspects of Islam were shown, as a religion and "human science," rich and concise enough to provide a nation with rules and principles for its government. So far all the nations on the verge of uprising have looked up to Communism and Marxism for ideological help, but Islam has over – shadowed these popular doctrines and is considered in today's world as the only doctrine which is able to generate a revolution. Therefore, by invading Afghanistan, the Russians may use it as a base to block the way to this Islamic Renaissance and at the same time back the Leftists and the pro- Russian groups or political parties in Iran.

E) – Concerning China

Along with the exit of Americans from Vietnam, and the consequent Russian control of Afghanistan and Vietnam, China, "Democratic Republic Of China" "became surrounded by Russia from both the West and the East. The reason was that with Vietnam and Korea becoming impenetrable on the eastern front, China had to turn to the western regions and focus its attention on Laos, India, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan. The Chinese activities to influence the political systems of the above–named countries, included the backing of the pro – Peking political parties and groups in those countries.

In Ali Bhuto's time, as the Indo – Pakistani conflict intensified, with India a close Russian ally, Pakistan had to call on China for help. The Chinese government gave its military and economic assistance to Pakistan in return of a freeway built by the Chinese from China to the port of Karatchi in the Indian Ocean.

But, at present, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan has tightend the circle around China, giving the Russians the opportunity to spreading an intensive cold- war against China.

CSO: 4600/132

WAR VICTIMS, ISLAMIC POLITICAL CURRENTS DESCRIBED

Windhoek ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 20, 21 Oct 81

[Article by Heinz Gstrein: "Afghanistan--Already Lost To Moscow?"]

[20 Oct 81 p 7]

[Text] Post-Victory Shortage of Ammunition

All hell is breaking loose between Muhammad Agha and Kulangar on the morning after the Soviet tank offensive had been repelled. The tanks that had sneaked past on the previous day have returned unexpectedly on a broad front and are invading the sun-drenched villages, where the grape harvest is in full swing.

Led by the serdar and his minibus, everybody is racing toward the threatened region. The Russians are surrounded by forces racing through backyards and alleys. On the narrow country roads, their tanks are vulnerable, even to a partisan armed with a hand grenade. By nightfall their ranks have thinned out considerably. But the Beautiful villages have been devastated and the Mujahedin are beginning to experience a shortage of ammunition.

This is how a force of only 20 tanks is able to cut off the freedom fighters' main force from retreating to its operational and resupply bases. A council of war is held by moonlight in the ruined mosque. Further resistance during daylight hours is out of the question. The only option remaining is a lateral disengagement into the Dubandi Valley which is protected by a ring of antitank mines.

Sidestepping Into a Valley Protected by Mines

Haji Jomaa Gul, who had himself been in charge of planting the mines, is leading the exodus under cover of darkness: in single file, each man following in the footsteps of the man in front of him, they climb the steep mountain and descend again on the far side. Many are barefoot, many others are wounded. This valley basin, lined with walnut trees and containing villages and stately farms is not only a woodcarving center but also the cradle of the Afghan popular uprising.

As long ago as 1978, this was the place where the people, saying "even if we get killed, our sons and grandsons will continue the fight," armed themselves with

rifles, pistols and knives against Taraki's tanks, cannons and airplanes. In two summers they liberated the valley and made it tankproof by 1979. It made an ideal place to retreat to. It appeared to be a place where one could calmly await further developments.

This became all the more important since dysentery had broken out among the troops. Considering the fact that that their sole subsistence consisted of green tea and green nuts, the prospects were not very good. The patients were placed in quarantine in a nearby valley. There, in a small chateau owned by Haji Jomaa, they were in real beds and enjoyed acceptable sanitary conditions.

But by noon the message came: move up higher; Russian mountain troops are on the way with bloodhounds, coming across the top of the mountain on the opposite narrow side of the valley.

Flight of the Wounded

The 2-hour march by the column of sick and wounded men to the highest village of the valley basin was still manageable. The formerly lovely village showed the effects of destruction as a result of battles which had been raging here for the last 3 years. And within a few hours the Russians might return once more.

Their powerful Caucasus dogs were trained for obedience to their particular handler and were also trained to retrieve their Red Army master's weapon if he was killed, so as to keep it from falling into partisan hands.

By 0200 hours an urgent order was received for the patients to seek safety by negotiating a steep slope of some 600 meters. In the next valley, the order said, two trucks were ready to transport them toward the Afghan-Pakistani border. But that was easier said than done. Those who were simply unable to continue were dragged along by their magnificent Afghan comrades on their walking sticks. Without this flash of inspiration by the column leader, Nassir Ahmat, the whole "hospital" would have fallen into Russian hands. That would have meant death by firing squad or even more cruel kinds of execution.

Partisan Leader and Family in Hannover

Nassir Ahmat was one of those typical partisan personalities each of whom has his own reasons for being anticommunist. He came from a wealthy family in Herat and had come to Germany for a higher education at the age of 22. He remained in Hannover where he had a job, got married and took delight in his young son. In 1979, disquieting rumors about the fate of his family caused him to return home for what he though would be a brief visit.

He found his father in a mass grave hastily dug by Amin's henchmen; two brothers had been murdered and his mother and sister were in hiding with the underground. His passport was confiscated immediately upon his arrival in Afghanistan. There was nothing else for Nassir to do but to join the resistance where he has since distinguished himself on all fronts.

With his glowing patriotism and his European experience, he spent many of his sleepless nights reading Nietzsche's "Thus Spake Zarathustra", like the German infantrymen of World War I, and amazed people with the depth of his philosophical thinking. People like him are not only able to fight for the liberation of Afghanistan, but also to govern it better than did yesterday's feudal overlords and today's "Popular Democrats."

Saved in Pakistan

After the terrible march across the mountain the sick men, imbued with new hope, hobbled toward a rutted road where two trucks were indeed waiting. The partisans really demonstrate amazing organizational talents in the areas they control.

But the journey ended again a few hours later, since here too Russian airborne units had regained control of the last piece of road before the Pakistani border. First they had to await darkness. Then they continued on a mountain road with mules and donkeys. And even there the column was fired upon by the communists who tried to block their last escape route to the Kurram Pass. They had to climb still higher, being overtaken by this fall's first icy blizzard. But with his circumspection, Nassir Ahmat managed to bring the entire group safely across the Kurram Pass into Parachinar in Pakistan. Without exception, they fell off their mounts, more dead than alive with pain and exhaustion.

[21 Oct 81 p 5]

[Text] Isolated Russian Fortifications

One who has spent 3 weeks with the Afghan partisans in the country's southeastern third and has even entered the capital of Kabul, gains a strong impression that the Russians have already lost Afghanistan. Their fall offensive has to date resulted only in small improvements to their fortified positions which partly lie in the middile of liberated areas and can be resupplied only from the air.

Air superiority is about the only thing left to the Red Army toward the end of this second period in the fighting since their intervention which was designed to suppress the national-communist and increasingly Peking-oriented "Chalk" and to aid Babrak Karmal's Moscow-oriented "Partchamis." Pakistan, which otherwise assumes the role of middleman for weapons of all sorts coming from Eastern non-Soviet sources, has to date failed to supply the Mojahedin with either the SAM-7 (which the Palestinians have had at their disposal for a long time) nor with any other effective antiaircraft weapons.

Moscow's Expectations Are Not Coming True

Islamabad is not showing any interest in a strong Afghanistan, be it pro-Soviet or pro-West. A strong Afghanistan could make claims upon border areas as far as the Indus, inhabited by the Pashtunis--an area which the Pakistani military can only now occupy with the excuse of the Soviet presence beyond the border.

What Zia Ul-Haq would dearly love to see on the other hand is a stalemate between the Russians and the partisans and thereby the exclusion of a torn-up neighboring country as a potential, nationally motivated aggressor at his long northwest border and in Baluchistan. There too the old separatist movements appears to be showing new life in opposing the rigid Islamic and altogether quite brutal military regime.

But even at that it is quite possible that the Russians will either finally lose the next round of fighting in the summer of 1982 or that they will seek a political solution of the Afghanistan problem even before then. Local observation would seem to militate against the theory that the Kremlin in its Kabul adventure mainly intended to establish for itself a springboard toward the Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. As far as the Russians original intentions are concerned, it is much more likely that there was a parallel with Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Moscow evidently thought that by means of a short-term military intervention it could eliminate the increasingly dangerous Dubcek-equivalent Amin, which would have resulted in Husak--equivalent Karmal becoming master of the situation within a few months. But these expectations came to naught because of the the severe patriotic resistance on the part of almost the entire Afghan population and because of the surprisingly poor military and political showing by the Partcham communists.

Karmal and the Russians will have lost the game at the latest with the fall of Kabul, which is already largely dominated by small fighting units, urban guerillas and kidnap teams, and with the formation of a national Afghan government in the capital. Therefore the political leaders of the resistance are already today giving consideration to the problems of a post-Soviet era which may not be all that far in the future. Fortunately there are many who feel that absolutely nothing would be gained by replacing the Bolshevist dictatorship with a fanatical Khomeyni-style Islamic tyranny.

Islamic Currents

But a Khomeyni-like trend is followed by the best-armed and most numerous but militarily undistinguished group: the socalled "Hizbi Islami" or Islamic Party. This movement had been present in Afghanistan long before the Russians came (and even prior to the communist takeover in 1978) under the last kind and umbrella movement of all traditionally religiously oriented forces, grouped around the Mujadidi family, headed by the top Islamic authority: Hazret Sebghatullah Mujadidi.

But as a party organization the Hizbi Islami was unilaterally oriented toward Tehran. Gulbeddin Hekmatijar pushed the Mujadidis out, whereupon they founded their own respected and influential but militarily ineffective movement. According to the lip service of its leaders recently given in the mosque of Peshawar, Pakistan, there is agreement on Hizbi's strict re-Islamization program between themselves and the Djamiat Islamia and the otherwise most liberal Harakat-i-Inquilab-i-Islami Afghanistan. Finally, the nationalist resistance wing, which does not care for the mullahs' pervasive interference, was outlawed. A parallel "djirga" (assembly) by the nationalists did likewise to the

Islamic fundamentalists. Fortunately this tilting at windmills on the part of the bigshots in exile in Peshawar does not by any means cause the resistance in the home country, and especially on the fighting front, to fall apart.

Cologne-Trained Scientist As A Centrist Force

Behind Peshawar's green Islam scenery other forces are at work. At their center is Cologne-trained lawyer and economist Dr Azizullah Ludin, political adviser of highly respected Harakat chief Maulana Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi. He has a certificate recognizing him as the coordinator between Harakat, the followers of the Mujajis, the National Front of Ahmad Gilani, and 66 smaller militant groups in the Herat area where his family has its roots. Dr Ludin's objective is to secure for the Afghan intelligentsia and middle class, which are equally threatened by communist doctrine spouters and Islamic fundamentalists, the leadership of a truly modern, open and, for the first time, Western-oriented Afghanistan of tomorrow. The Harakat, with its motto of "moderation in all things," probably has the best chances of becoming a catalyst for a future government coalition in Kabul. Even the two wings of the "Communist Democratic People's Party" should not be excluded from this after the Russians' departure.

Inasmuch as the Harakat's holy warriors are the only ones who are already firmly established in the capital, they will be, at the proper time, the first ones to have their say in the formation of a new, free Afghan government in Kabul. This Afghan centrist party, which is based on the prerevolutionary "Cabi Milli," is therefore likely to become the Afghan party of the future in case of a political solution or after the downfall of the Soviet occupation regime.

9273
CSO: 4620/7

COMMANDO UNIT PRAISED FOR SUCCESSES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] It seems to a casual visitor that the Rishkhor valley with its beautiful autumn touched foliage, quiet small houses and accurate peasants' plots under the trees is a sleep in a hollow, tightly encircled by brownish bald mountains.

But the first impression is delusive—this valley is the seat and base of the redoubtable 37th Commando Brigade, the best commando unit of the National Afghan Army, redoutable to the enemies of the glorious Saur Revolution, of course.

Perhaps, the best proof of the brigade's combat ability, its high level of training is an instruction, circulated among the bands of the counter-revolutionary scum in many a region of the country by their superiors in Pakistan. "When commandos are closing in on you", it says, "you better retreat". But as usual, the commando thrust is so fast, the attack is so unexpected that there is no time left for retreat, only for a stampede panicked flight.

Despite the fact that the main task of the brigade is to secure the peaceful life of the capital and the regions around Kabul, the commandos are always ready to leave on orders for practically any destination in the country when an emergency arises anywhere. During the last seven months the brigade took part in 13 major military operations in the provinces of Paktia, Kandahar, Paktika, Logar, Wardak, Kapisa and Parwan. In other words— in half Afghanistan.

The most difficult operation was realised in Ghazni province, where the bands of the so-called Major Mohammad Hassan, who deserted the army long before, were for quite a time controlling the five gorges, leading to Hazarajat.

The gorges were heavily mined, kept under constant watch and criss-crossed fire by different types of heavy weapons. The headquarters of the band were on the Balboul mountain 3.500 meters high and hidden. The helicopter-borne commando force was swiftly landed on the mountain's slopes and the lightning attack followed under the command of Colonel Abdul Azim. Many bandits were liquidated, piles of weapons, money and important documents were captured, including a "decree" of the military council of the notorious "Hezbe Islami" party, which bestowed upon the fugitive Major the rank of "general" and a sum of 200,000 Afghanis to celebrate the occasion. As for the "general" himself, he saved his life in the most inappropriate manner for a high ranking officer, abandoning the battlefield hastily.

Another big operation, the brigade participated in, was launched in the Panjsher, the "Tiger's paw" valley. It is a very long and narrow valley with practically all areas under heavy fire from the mountains surrounding it. After prolonged fighting, the bandits here were successfully annihilated, but the valley itself was found empty, without the slightest trace of local population. They were discovered later high in the mountains' caves.

TO THE VALLEY

Col Azim's brigade alone brought down to the valley 10,000 old people, women

and children, who were suffering from lack of food, medicine, clothes, even shrouds to bury their dead. The bandits had told the people that after the "Communists" and "infidels" come, everybody will be tortured and killed. On the contrary, when the DRA troops arrived, every simple person among these mistreated people was given food. On their return home at spontaneous mass meetings all these people, therefore, paid their deep respect and showed gratitude to the Soldiers of the Revolution.

"I consider the military successes of the brigade", says its commander, Colonel Abdul Azim, "as determined by three decisive factors. First of all, we have a strong and able party organisation, which directs all the political education of our soldiers, teaches them the heroic fulfilment of their main duty— the defence of the Saur Revolution, its achievements, but at the service of the toiling people of Afghanistan,. The second one is a high level of combat readiness, a fruit of hard, everyday training. And the third factor", (the Colonel smiles) "is the mere fact that the soldiers do not like to sit in barracks at the time when in different parts of their country the counter-revolutionaries are sowing death and violence among the peaceful people whose only dream is to live a secure life, to toil their plots, to work in mills and plants. I would call it the high degree of consciousness, the feeling of involvement of each with the life of the whole country in its happy as well as hard times."

The colonel has the reputation of an imaginative and hard-working officer, proud of 26 years of the military experience. He is the first ever parachute jumper in Afghanistan, a professional paratrooper, a party member from many years ago. Many Government decorations were bestowed on him for his valour and good service but he is especially proud of the Red Banner, which was handed to him recently by Babrak Karmal himself.

"I am quite satisfied with success. And I am very happy that I was able to contribute a little bit to the cause of our revolution, to the building of a new revolutionary army capable of defending my country against the external aggression."

The brigade is obviously following the example of their commander. There is a room of military glory in the brigades new headquarters. Piles of trophies, taken in the battlefields, are the natural decoration of its walls: the American, Chinese, Egyptian, British and Pakistani weapons here are nothing but a grave and detailed account of the real scale of international conspiracy, knocked together by the imperialist, hegemonist and reactionary forces in order to stifle the Saur Revolution.

But, at the same time, this room is evidence of the determination of the Afghan people and its army to frustrate this conspiracy, to crush the counter-revolutionary bandit formations and to bring to the holy land of Afghanistan peace, security and prosperity. And this trend is irreveresible.

CSO: 4600/132

BAKHTAR AIRLINES INCREASES FLIGHTS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 4 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] "In the first six months of the current Afghan year, the Bakhtar Afghan Airlines has recorded a total income of Afs 37,070,810 from the sale of tickets and transportation of freights and goods. During the same period, it has carried 51,591 passengers and 300,627 kgs of goods to various provinces."

This was stated by Col Abdul Latif Lakanwal, President of the Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, to our reporter on the activity, methods of work, the volume of income, the number of passengers and goods carried, as well as on scheduled and non-scheduled flights of the airlines.

"Presently, said Col Lakanwal, "the Bakhtar Airlines has a seven-plane fleet, of which three are ready to fly to the Soviet Union for technical check up and another one is grounded at the Kabul airport due to lack of essential parts. As soon as the parts are made available, it will become serviceable. Another three planes are active. To ensure the smooth operation of the airlines, two AN-26 planes are borrowed from the DRA Air Force."

"Under the present conditions", he added, "when hundreds of people throng the booking office for tickets and reservation, the names of ordinary travellers are registered on a list on the first flight. However, for Government officials and employees, tickets are issued for the first available flight on the basis of official letters brought from their respective organisations."

"The Bakhtar Airlines has increased the number of its flights compared to previous Afghan year 1359 so that our compatriots who wish travel from one province to another can do so without difficulty", he said.

"Unlike last year, the Bakhtar Airlines has introduced this year a few flights a week to Lashkargah, Farah and Jalalabad which has helped people greatly as far as air transportation to these reas is concerned ed. The Bakhtar Airlines has its ticketing offices in each province it serves."

Under the programme, the airline's scheduled flights are as follows:

Kabul-Jalalabad-Kabul, two flights a week,

Kabul-Khust-Kabul, three flights a week.

Kabul-Cheghcharan - Kabul, two flights a week.

Kabul-Mazare Sharif Kabul, two flights a week,

Kabul-Kandahar-Farah - Kabul, two flights a week.

Kabul-Kunduz-Kabul, two flights a week.

Kabul-Faizabad-Kabul, two flights a week.

Kabul-Kandahar-Trinkoot-Kandahar-Kabul, two flights a week.

Kabul-Mazare Sharif-Herat-Mazare Sharif-Kabul, three flights a week.

Kabul-Mazar — Maimana-Mazar-Kabul, one flight a week.

Kabul-Bamiyan-Kabul, three flights a week.

Kabul-Urgoon-Kabul, two flights a week.

Kabul-Gardez-Kabul, one flight a week.

Kabul-Cheghcharan -. Herat-Qalai Nau-Herat - Cheghcharan-Kabul, one flight a week.

Kabul-Kandahar- Lashkargah.Kandahar. Kabul, one flight a week.

In addition to scheduled flights, the Bakhtar Airlines also has special flights from time to time to take care of the heavy booking for passengers and freights..

"The Bakhtar Airlines", said Col Lakanwal, "has an adequate number of planes, technical and administrative personnel, and, in view of its financial conditions, the airlines envisages no immediate development plan except it plans to introduce a weekly flight from Kabul to Zaranj via Kandahar."

"The airline is a non-profitable organisation and it is subsidised by the Government. Due to financial difficulties and the rise in the price of petroleum, the company was compelled to increase its fares by 20 per cent about three months ago.

In 1359 the net incomes of the Airlines was Afs 38,847,220 and its net loss Afs 47,240,196, which clearly indicates its poor financial position", he noted.

"However, the total income in the first months of 1359 was Afs 16 million and of the same period it has amounted to Afs. 37,070,810, which shows an increase of Afs. 21,070,-810 which is attributable to purchase of two AN-24 with a seating capacity of 52 and 20 per cent hike in the fares of tickets and increasing rise in the number of passengers", he said.

CSO: 4600/131

KABUL TO GET POLYCLINIC, BLOOD BANK COMPLEX

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Oct 81 p 3

[Text] The cornerstone of the central polyclinic and the the blood bank complex was laid by the Public Health Minister, Dr Mohammad Ibrahim Azim, at the vicinity of the Pamir Cinema recently.

In an interview with the Kabul New Times, the president of the planning department of the Public Health Ministry, Dr Nesar Ali Nesar, said that the cooperation of the Soviet Union in construction of the two useful and urgent projects is another effective step taken in further strengthening ties between the peoples of the two fraternal and friendly countries.

Dr Nesar added that the central polyclinic and the blood bank proejcts have been undertaken for supplying better health services, particularly supply of blood needed by the patients.

The public welfare projects are scheduled to be completed in two years by the Afghan Construction Units, covering 18,000 square metres. The site for the buildings will cover 5,400 square metres. The polyclinic will have a capacity for 600 patients daily and the blood bank a capacity for 4,000 to 6,000 litres blood annually. The modern central polyclinic will be built in three stories with different wards providing updated services according to the requirements of the day. Similarly, the central blood bank will provide necessary facilities in the processing, preservation and distribution of blood to the patients. The five-story building of the blood bank will be equipped with all modern facilities.

The president of the planning department of the Public Health Ministry said that on the basis of a separate contract concluded with the friendly Soviet Union, the USSR has put at the disposal of the Afghan side 9,000,000 roubles under easy and favourable conditions for building these two projects and the Kunduz hospital. The local currency expenditures of the two projects will be financed from the Government development budget and the foreign exchange expenditures will be financed through the friendly Soviet Union's credit.

The total expenditure for the central polyclinic has been estimated at $3.3 million and afs 70 million, and the expenses for construction and equipment of the blood bank at 3.3 million dollars and afs 50 million. The expenses for the preliminary survey, design, preparing of the blue prints and construction materials not available in the country and the expenses of the experts working on the two projects will be financed by the Soviet credit.

Dr Nesar added that to further expand the scope of curative medicines in the country and create secure conditions for rendering health services to the people of the country, construction of specialized regional and provincial hospitals, basic and sub-health centres, polyclinics and training institutions for providing health services, particularly to the villagers are envisaged with due consideration of the Government's financial capabilities.

Likewise, based on the new division of the Kabul city precincts, construction of modern and well-equipped polyclinics are taken into

consideration in the future plan of the Public Health Ministry keeping in mind the area and the population of the regions so that complete free health services are made available to the people.

CSO: 4600/133

AUSTRIAN SOCIALIST PARTY CHAIRMAN ENDS VISIT

LD172246 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 17 Nov 81

[Excerpts] Karl Blesha, deputy chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party, left Algiers today after a 4-day visit to Algeria.

During his visit to Algeria Karl Blesha held talks with a number of prominent state and party officials. The talks dealt with the ways of bolstering bilateral relations.

A joint Algerian-Austrian statement was issued today following the official visit of the Austrian Socialist Party delegation to Algeria. The statement said that the Austrian delegation held a series of talks with the FLN delegation headed by Brother Silmane Hoffman, member of the Central Committee and chiarman of the party's external relations committee.

The statement remarked that the talks took place in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding, and explained that the talks dealt with the study of bilateral relations and the international situation. The two delegations exchanged information regarding party activities on the national and international levels and examined possibilities of extending and bolstering bilateral cooperation. The statement added that the two delegations expressed their preoccupation with the dangerous tension in the world situation which is distinguished by violating people's rights of independence, the continuation of imperialism with the policy of aggression, interference in countries' internal affairs and the creation of areas of tension and crises in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Latin America, Asia and Africa.

The two delegations firmly stressed their adherence to the national independence and territorial unity of every country, and to safeguarding the sovereignty and the right of every people to free self-determination. The two delegations considered, on the basis of their preoccupation with the development of the situation in the Mediterranean, that any foreign interference is a threat to peace in the region and in the world. The two sides stressed that European security is part and parcel of the security of the Mediterranean. They also expressed their determination to expend all efforts to safeguard the conditions of security in the Mediterranean basis and consequently struggle for dismantling foreign bases and the evacuation of the foreign fleets from the region.

Regarding the analysis of the prevalent situation in Western Europe, the two delegations expressed their satisfaction about the opportunities which have opened after the march of the progressive, democratic forces and the progress which they realized

for their peoples. The two delegations strongly denounced, regarding the situation in the Middle East, all political attempts which ignore the permanent rights of the Palestinian people, they once again stressed their absolute solidarity with the just struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO, its sole legitimate representative. The two delegations also denounced the repeated aggressions against Lebanon and the ploys which are aimed at harming the territorial unity of the Lebanese state. On studying the development of the struggle of the peoples who are still suffering under the domination of colonialism, the two sides recorded with satisfaction the victories which were achieved by the liberation movements in their heroic struggle against colonialism.

On analyzing the prevailing situation in Africa, the Saharan problem and the issue of liquidating colonialism, they expressed the view that peace in the region will not be achieved without the recognition of the right of the Saharan people of self-determination. They called on Morocco and the Polisario Front to enter direct negotiations in order to reach an agreement which would (?serve) the higher interests of their two peoples. The two delegations examined the situation in the southern part of the African continent, Latin America and the international economic situation and the north-south dialogue.

CSO: 4504/91

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL AGREEMENT WITH NETHERLANDS--Algiers--Mr Bouzid Hammiche, secretary general at the ministry of agriculture and agrarian reform, signed last Monday a draft agreement on cooperation, thus setting a seal on the visit to Algeria by a delegation from the Dutch ministry of agriculture and fisheries led by the Dutch deputy minister of agriculture, Mr Zeeuw. The draft cooperation agreement provides for the promotion and development of relations and exchanges between the two countries in the agricultural and agroindustrial sphere as well as for the setting up of a working group to study and relaize all possibilities of cooperation in the agricultural and irrigation spheres. With this end in mind, the working group is to analyze sectors in which such cooperation can be most beneficial for both countries. With a view to achieving these objectives, the group will be mainly entrusted with the task of outlining cooperation programs and projects, encouraging consultations with respect to training and technical aid, and supporting and directing activities aimed at achieving these objectives. [APS report: "New Prospects for Algerian-Dutch Relations"] [Text] [PM161217 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10 Nov 81 p 14]

CSO: 4519/47

NEW MINISTERIAL COMMITTEES FORMED

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 318,16 Oct 81 p 12

[Article: "Ministerial Committees"]

[Excerpt] Ministerial Committee for Environmental Affairs Under Chairmanship of Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din:

President Husni Mubarak has issued a decree forming the Ministerial Committee for Environmental Affairs under the chairmanship of the first deputy prime minister and with the following members:

1. The minister of state for education and scientific research.
2. The minister of reconstruction and minister of state for housing and land reclamation.
3. The minister of state for manpower and training.
4. The minister of transportation, communications and maritime transport.
5. The minister of state for agriculture and food security.
6. The minister of irrigation and minister of state for Sudan affairs.
7. The minister of tourism and civil aviation.
8. The minister of state for health.
9. The minister of industry and mineral resources.
10. The minister of electricity and energy.

The decree makes it clear that the committee may invite to its meetings whomever it deems necessary to attend such meetings. The decree also stipulates that the committee shall carry out the following responsibilities:

1. Draw up the national policy for protecting, improving and safeguarding the environment.

2. Review the legislation in force for environmental protection with the aim of linking such legislation with the current local conditions and propose and prepare the legislation necessary to meet this goal in order to preserve the cultural character and to realize the goals of national development in the agricultural, industrial, construction, social and health spheres.

3. Draw up a policy that guarantees coordination between the efforts of the local organizations and the similar foreign organizations to insure dealing with the problems of pollution.

4. Determine the tasks and responsibilities of the ministries, organizations and authorities in charge of implementing and following up the various legislation connected with environmental protection.

A technical secretariat shall be formed for the Ministerial Committee for Environmental Affairs. This secretariat shall be under the control of the general secretariat of the Council of Ministers and shall have a secretary general who will be appointed on a decision by the prime minister from among prominent specialists in environmental affairs.

Higher Committee for Green Revolution and Food Security:

President Husni Mubarak has issued a decree forming the Higher Ministerial Committee for the Green Revolution and Food Security under the chairmanship of First Deputy Prime Minister Dr Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din and with the following as members:

Engineer Hasaballah Muhammad al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction and minister of state for agriculture and food security.

Engineer Muhammad 'Abd al-Hadi Samahah, the minister of irrigation and minister of state for Sudan affairs.

Dr Mamduh Kamal Jabr, the minister of state for health.

Engineer Muhammad Mahir Muhammad 'Uthman Abazah, the minister of electricy and energy.

Ahmad Nuh, the minister of supply and internal trade.

Fu'ad Kamal Husayn, the minister of state for finance.

Sa'd Muhammad al-Sharbini, the minister of state for popular development.

The minister of reconstruction and minister of state for housing and land reclamation shall be this committee's rapporteur.

The committee referred to in article one of this decree [sic] shall have the power to discuss and follow up all the issues and projects pertaining to the green revolution and food security. In particular, the committee shall:

1. Set priorities for the land reclamation projects according to the nature and productivity of the land and the costs of reclamation.

2. Determine the methods for the ideal use of the available financial resources, both in [the projects for] the currently cultivated lands and the lands to be reclaimed to as to insure use of the available financial resources according to the requirements of agricultural and economic utilization.

3. Guarantee the soundness of the reclamation projects carried out by the local governments in terms of the suitability, priority and feasibility of such projects.

4. Approve the programs necessary to develop the land reclamation and agricultural companies and to overcome the financing difficulties facing the private sector in implementing projects and create adequate incentives to encourage the local and foreign private sector to enter into the fields of land reclamation.

5. Establish the policy for disposing of lands reclaimed.

6. Review the programs of the ministries concerned with constructing the infrastructure facilities and coordinate these programs in a manner that serves the goals of implementing the land reclamation projects.

7. Plan agricultural production in a manner compatible with the food commodity consumption needs.

8. Discuss the programs necessary to realize food security, including the programs to expand the cultivated area and improve the methods adopted in agriculture and in agro-industry.

9. Draw up the general framework for the popular development plans and the priorities for the implementation of their programs, coordinate the projects of the various sectors in the fields of popular development and propose the legislation and the best organizational, administrative and financing methods that make it possible to realize the state's policy in this regard.

Nine Tasks for Ministerial Production Committee Included in Presidential Decree Forming Committees:

President Husni Mubarak has issued a decree forming the Ministerial Production Committee as follows:

The deputy prime minister for production and the minister of petroleum as chairman.

1. The minister of reconstruction and minister of state for housing and land reclamation;

2. The minister of state for agriculture and food security;

3. The minister of transportation, communications and maritime transport;

4. The minister of irrigation and minister of state for Sudan affairs;

5. The minister of industry and mineral resources;

6. The minister of electricity and energy;

7. The minister of state for war production;

8. The minister of state for economy;

9. The minister of state for the People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs concerning the production sector [as members].

The decree stipulates that the Ministerial Production Committee shall have the following powers:

1. Examine and make decisions on the common issues involving the ministries concerned with a certain sector.

2. Discuss the production sectors' development strategies in light of the national strategy.

3. Discuss the policies and plans of both the commodity and the service parts of the production sector in accordance with the national plan's goals.

4. Study the components [of production] and determine production goals; discuss the complete plan for the production goals and the means to realize them; follow up implementation of the plan and propose suitable policies to overcome the problems of [word unintelligible].

5. Study the industrial and agricultural production plan and the sector's [sic] goals in the field to meet the consumption and exportation needs and to establish a balance between the production volume and the quantities that need to be imported so as to realize soundness in the national economy.

6. Discuss the means to link scientific research with the needs of industry and agriculture, considering that this research is a means to enhance the level of performance and to establish the best methods; streamline operations in the various production sectors; study the means to use scientific and applied research for increased productivity, both qualitatively and quantitatively; make use of modern studies and scientific and technological means and exert efforts to transfer them to the fields of production with the aim of bolstering economic and social development.

7. Discuss the plan to provide the skilled manpower needed for the production installations either by developing and enhancing the technical education capacity or by training.

8. Study the problems of the public sector and of the public organizations connected with the committee's work.

9. Discuss the legislation and the regulatory bylaws governing work in the sector's ministries and propose new legislation and bylaws that enable the sector to enhance its performance and to realize its goals.

The decree also stipulates that the committee may form from among its members and others a subcommittee or subcommittees to be entrusted with some of the powers stipulated in the preceding article. The committee may also invite to its meetings whomever it deems fit to invite.

Services Committee Draws Up Service Sector's Plans and Studies Problems of Implementation:

President Husni Mubarak has issued a decree forming the Ministerial Services Committee under the chairmanship of the deputy prime minister for services and the minister of interior and commissioning the following as members:

1. The minister of state for education and scientific research.

2. The minister of social insurance and minister of state for social affairs.

3. The minister of reconstruction and minister of state for housing and land reclamation.

4. The minister of state for manpower and training.

5. The minister of state for the People's Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs concerned with the services sector.

6. The minister of state for health.

7. The minister of state for finance.

9. [no 8] The minister of state for culture.

The decree stipulates that the Ministerial Services Committee shall exercise the following powers:

1. Discuss the policies and plans of the services sector's ministries and coordinate between them so as to draw up a complete services plan at the national level. Study the problems of implementation and propose solutions for them.

2. Study the means necessary to organize the government apparatus, to simplify procedures and to enhance performance in the service agencies and departments, especially the performance of those connected with the needs of the masses and with the masses' dealings with the government agencies.

3. Discuss the legislation and the regulatory bylaws governing work in the sector's ministries so as to enable the sector to realize its goals.

4. Determine the goals of social development and the means to realize them and coordinate the policies of the ministries and agencies concerned.

5. Discuss the complete plan to develop spiritual values and religious behavior in their capacity as one of the fundamental mainstays of society's progress.

6. Discuss the policy of higher and general education in all its stages to insure that education is linked with the environment so as to meet society's needs.

7. Study the short and long-term manpower needs of the government agencies, the public authorities, the local administrative units, the public sector and the private sector and discuss the means to provide the manpower needed to meet the estimated requirements in accordance with the nationsl economic and social development plan. This includes studying the national training policy.

8. Study and discuss the national policy for illiteracy eradication and for adult education in participation with popular and unionist organizations.

9. Study youth problems and activities to insure enhancing the youth's performance capability in the various spheres of youth activity and draw up a plan to fully exploit youth capability in serving society.

10. Study the means of family planning, of enhancing the family and of helping it to develop its own resources through environmental service projects by advancing aid to the family and by providing it with the means of training and education.

11. Study and determine an information and cultural policy compatible with society's values and with the requirements of development.

12. Approve a general policy for the welfare of migrant agricultural workers, for providing them with work, for providing them and their families with social, health and cultural care and for protecting them from material and moral exploitation.

Tasks of Economic and Financial Committee Are to Draw Up Policies That Realize Economic Balance:

President Husni Mubarak has also issued a decree forming the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs under the chairmanship of the deputy prime minister for economic and financial affairs and with the following as members:

1. The minister of social insurance and minister of state for social affairs.

2. The minister of state for agriculture and food security.

3. The minister of industry and mineral resources.

4. The minister of supply and internal trade.

5. The minister of state for finance.

6. The minister of state for economy.

7. The minister of state for popular development.

8. The minister of state for the People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs concerned with the economic and financial affairs sector.

9. The governor of the Central Bank.

The decree stipulates that the committee shall carry out the following tasks:

Study the bases of the state's general budget and of the currency budget.

Formulate financial, economic and currency policies that realize an internal and external economic balance and achieve the targeted economic growth rates.

Follow up implementation of the open-door economic policy and propose the solutions necessary to overcome the obstacles facing implementation.

Follow up implementation of foreign loans and aid, exert efforts to employ these loans and aid without any obstacles and propose the solutions needed to overcome the obstacles facing them.

Express its views on the bills for tax exemptions and exemptions from customs fees.

Task of Legislative Committee Is to Develop Legislation So That It May Keep up With Goals of Democratic Socialist Society:

President Husni Mubarak has issued a decree forming the Ministerial Legislative Affairs Committee under the chairmanship of the minister of justice and with the following as members:

1. Minister of State Albert Barsum Salamah.

2. Dr Amal 'Abd al-Rahim 'Uthman, the minister of social insurance and minister of state for social affairs.

3. 'Abd al-Akhir Muhammad 'Abd al-Akhir, the minister of state for the People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs.

4. Dr Zakariya al-Barri, the minister of al-awqaf [religious trusts].

5. Mukhtar Hasan Salim Hani, the minister of state for the People's Assembly and Consultative Council affairs.

6. The chairman of the State Council.

Any of the ministers may attend the committee's meetings when such meetings discuss issues connected with the activities of his ministry.

The committee may also form subcommittees from among its members and from any members of the judiciary and of the university teaching faculties whose help it decides to enlist.

The committee shall carry out the following tasks:

1. Formulate a plan for the studies connected with developing and coordinating the legislation in a manner compatible with the state's general policy and with the goals of the democratic socialist society as determined by the constitution and propose the bills and bylaws that realize this goal.

2. Prepare and review draft laws complementing the constitution.

3. Review the bills submitted by the prime minister and the ministers after they are completely and objectively studied by the ministerial committee concerned with the activity governed by the bill and after the legislation section of the State Council approves the legal phrasing of the bill so that consideration may be given to putting such bills within the framework of the sound constitutional and legislative principles and so that they may be coordinated with other legislation.

4. Review the draft organizational decrees issed by the president of the republic, the Council of Ministers and the prime minister.

5. Review the draft international agreements.

6. Discuss the issues that any of the other ministerial committees may ask this committee to discuss from the legislative angle.

8494
CSO: 4504/40

NEW CITY BEING CONSTRUCTED IN CAIRO GOVERNORATE

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 32, 5 Oct 81 p 12

[Article: "Al-Salam City in al-Birkah Land, Cairo Governorate, Is Biggest Housing Project Constructed in Republic in Record Time; Sa'd Ma'mun, Governor of Cairo: City With Full Facilities and Services on Area of 2,500 Feddans to Accommodate 75,000 Housing Units With Population of 375,000 People and Costing 400 Million Pounds' Completed First Phase Includes 15,226 Housing Units and Population of 75,000 People; Green Area Equal to 40 Percent of City Area; Public Transportation Links City Which Is 25 Kilometers from al-Tahrir Square, 11 Kilometers From Heliopolis and 8 Kilometers From 'Ayn Shams"]

[Text] The resolutions and recommendations of the second congress of the Democratic National Party, announced by Husni Mubarak, the vice president and the party secretary general, after broad discussions in which the party secretary general, the deputy prime ministers, the minsters and 4,000 leaders and members of the party participated, include this important recommendation in the sphere of housing and reconstruction: "The local government agencies must expedite the studies and plans for the present communities to guarantee guided and directed extension so that public utility projects may be drawn up in accordance with a specific program that insures the ideal use of land. The local agencies must also strengthen and bolster the technical outfits in the governorates."

Complete City

The fact is that what we have seen in al-Salam City in al-Birkah, Cairo Governorate, reaffirms this important recommendation. The governorate has drawn up plans and designs for the construction of a complete city on the Cairo-Ismailia Highway to accommodate 75,000 housing units. The site was cleared of encroachments, levelled and prepared and the actual work started in April 1980 for the construction of the first phase of the city which will include 15,226 housing units with their utilities and services.

Sixty Million Pounds

Sa'd Ma'mun, the governor of Cairo said: "In 1980, the state supplied Cairo Governorate with appropriations of 60 million pounds. Thus, the governorate's appropriations rose from 7 million pounds and 9 million pounds in the 3 preceding years [sic] to 60 million pounds in 1980. The governorate began immediately

preparing plans to use this sum in the construction of a completely new city with its facilities and services beyond the current population area. During the first 3 months of 1980, the governorate agencies prepared plans and blueprints for the construction of this city."

Al-Salam City

The city area is 2,500 feddans or the equivalent of 10.5 million square meters. The estimated value of the lands which were encroached upon is 525 million pounds. The number of the city's housing units is 75,000 units and that of its population is 375,000 people. The green area in the city is 1,000 feddans or the equivalent of 40 percent of the city's entire area, i.e. the area allocated for every resident of the city amounts to 11.2 square meters. This figure presently exceeds 90 percent of what is available to the residents of the republic's cities. The population density is 30 housing units per feddan. The city is 25 kilometers from al-Tahrir Square, 11 kilometers from Heliopolis and 8 kilometers from 'Ayn Shams. When fully completed, the city will cost nearly 400 million pounds. The planning, blueprinting and supervision of implementation has been done completely by the Cairo Governorate agencies. Had these activities been entrusted to consulting firms, as is usually done in such projects, the planning, blueprinting and supervision work would have cost nearly 30 million pounds.

Actually Completed First Phase

The area of this phase is 500 feddans or 2.1 million square meters. The number of the housing units is 15,226 units and that of the population is 75,000 people.

Engineer Fu'ad al-Jawhari, the governor's assistant for engineering affairs, has stated: All the main facilities (roads, water, sewerage, electricity, lighting, telephones, parks and tree-planting) have been completed. The buildings for the main services and the markets required for the creation of a complete and independent city have been constructed. This has been done in the following manner:

Water: So that the city may not depend on the Cairo water network, which needs to be strengthened at present, a project has been carried out to supply the city with water independently of the Cairo water network. The project relies on artesian wells drilled in al-Marj area and includes 20 wells which produce 100,000 cubic meters of water daily. This volume will be enough for the city in its final stages. There are two 21-kilometer water pipelines, one with a diameter of 1,000 millimeters and one with a diameter of 600 millimeters, to carry the water from the wells to the city. There is also a 15-kilometer internal pipeline network for the first phase of the city. These activities have cost 5.25 million pounds.

Sewerage: A complete sewerage network and elevation plants have been built for the first phase. Four pipelines, each with a diameter of 1.5 meters, have also been built to replace part of the two open emergency [sewerage] canals which penetrate the city at a length of 7 kilometers. Priority was given to this part within the framework of the projects to develop the greater Cairo sewerage system which connects these two canals from al-Matariyah to al-Jabal al-Asfar farm. The costs of the sewerage projects for the first phase, which has actually been completed, amounted to 10 million pounds.

Electricity: Electricity has been supplied to the first phase at a capacity of 18 megawatts and at a cost of 3 million pounds. The electrical capacity needed by the city in its final phases is estimated at 100 megawatts within 3 years and will cost 15 million pounds.

Lighting: The city's internal lighting projects, along with a project for lighting the Cairo-Isma'ilia highway from 'Ayn Shams to the city, have been completed. A total of 1,250 electricity poles, 38 kilometers of cables and 23 distribution boards [grids] have been used for the purpose. The necessary electricity load amounts to 350 kilowatts. These activities have cost 500,000 pounds.

Roads: A total of 27 kilometers of main and subsidiary roads have been built. This amounts to 500,000 square meters of asphalted roads and 50,000 lineal meters of road (shoulders and sidewalks). Because of the nature of the desert area in which the city has been built, these works required the transportation of 500,000 cubic meters of soil. The costs of these works amounted to 7 million pounds.

Communications: Two final bus stations have been built to connect the city with Cairo's main squares. A railroad with a length of 11.5 kilometers has been built on 500 square meters of the city [sic] to be linked with Kubri al-Laymun station in Ramsis Square. The city has been supplied with 300 telephone lines as a first stage. These lines have been allocated for the public buildings, the service buildings and the post, telephone and telegraph offices in the city until an independent central is built for the city.

Service Buildings: Al-Salam City in al-Birkah land, Cairo Governorate, includes 25 elementary, general secondary and technical schools containing 669 classrooms, 838 commercial and industrial shops, of which 304 shops have been allocated for the public sector and the rest for the private sector, 8 nurseries, 3 youth centers, 9 consumer cooperatives, 9 food security cooperatives, 9 fish cooperatives, 9 bread distribution outlets, 9 ice shops, 2 automatic bakeries, a flour mill, a comprehensive clinic, 2 curative medical units, a police station, a police complex, a veterinary unit, a (branch of the Green Salon) and a social unit.

City's Second Phase

Engineer Amin Abu Zayd, the Ministry of Housing undersecretary for Cairo Governorate, has stated that 83 million pounds have been allocated for the governorate for the 1981-82 year and that, accordingly, it has been decided to start construction of the second phase of the city which includes:

A total of 22,000 housing units (50 percent of them consisting of 2 [bedrooms] and a living room and 50 percent consisting of 3 [bedrooms] and a living room) and a population of 110,000 people. This phase will also include all the main facilities, service buildings, commercial and industrial markets and public buildings. This phase is scheduled to be fully completed in 1982.

Costs of Unit Ownership

'Izzat Muhammad 'Ali, the Cairo Governorate secretary general, has stated that the transfer of ownership [from public sector to private citizens] in the city will be

on the basis of installments over 30 years without interest and without any advance payment and with the right to benefit from the land. The installments will be as follows:

For a unit consisting of one room, a hall, a kitchen and a bathroom, the monthly installment will be 6.25 pounds.

For a unit consisting of one[bed] room, a living room, a kitchen and a bathroom, the monthly installmente will be 8.33 pounds.

For a unit consisting of 2 rooms, a hall, a kitchen and a bathroom, the monthly installment will be 11.5 pounds.

For a unit consisting of 2 rooms, a living room, a kitchen and a bathroom, the monthly installment will be 12.5 pounds.

For a unit consisting of 3 rooms, a hall, a kitchen and a bathroom, the monthly installment will be 17.75 pounds.

For a unit consisting of 3 rooms, a living room, a kitchen and a bathroom, the monthly installment will be 18.75 pounds.

Housing will be awarded in accordance with the regulations approved by the governorate's local popular council and first priority will be given to workers in al-Salam City.

8494
CSO: 4504/40

REMITTANCES OF EGYPTIANS WORKING ABROAD INCREASING

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 666, 19 Oct 81 pp 21-22

[Article: "Remittances of Egyptians Working Abroad Have Increased"]

[Text] One of the important economic phenomena emerging in Egypt in the 1970's is that of the increasing numbers of Egyptians working abroad and, consequently, of their increasing savings which they transferred to Egypt and which, since then, have come to constitute an important source of foreign currency. The proof of this phenomenon is that the remittances of Egyptians working abroad which did not exceed one million dollars in 1971 have developed to reach $818 million in 1981, not to mention the remittances used for importation without currency transfer, the remittances kept by their owners in the form of deposits and the goods coming into the country with those returning home. The total sum of these remittances amounted to $2,861,600,000 last year.

The rise in the remittances of Egyptians is attributed to a number of banking decisions adopted during the 1970's. In 1968, the system of multiple exchange prices was adopted and an additional 35 percent was paid on top of the official prices for any foreign currencies transferred into the country by Egyptians working abroad. This percentage was raised to 50 percent in May 1972. In 1973, the system of the collateral market for foreign currency was adopted. In 1979, the extra percentage system was terminated and an incentive price was set for foreign currencies. This system has undergone several changes aimed at keeping up with the developments in the currency exchange rates according to the economic circumstances. The aim of these changes has been to encourage the Egyptians working abroad to hand over their savings in foreign currencies to the accredited banks in return for Egyptian pounds.

Chart 1: Remittances of Egyptians Working Abroad to Arab Republic of Egypt
1975-1980

(In Million Pounds**)

Item	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
First, Sums Handed Over	194.1	253.0	384.2	654.1	666.2	818.3
A. Remittances Coming From Abroad	167.9	198.0	284.0	555.8	490.5	642.7
B. Sums Coming in for Purchase of National Goods	1.1	3.1	22.0	8.3	62.3	57.9
C. Banknotes Coming in With Egyptians	25.1	51.9	78.2	90.0	113.4	117.7
Second, Remittances not Handed Over	33.6*	90.1	147.9	201.0	301.6	496.6
A. Individual Deposits in Commercial Banks	18.7	41.8	70.0	90.0	234.5	400.6
B. Individual Deposits in Investment and Business Banks	9.0	21.0	41.0	89.0	46.0	74.2
C. Individual Deposits in Two Joint Arab Banks	25.9	27.3	36.9	22.0	21.1	21.8
Third, Importation Without Money Transfer	92.7	167.5	265.2	587.2	883.3	1,070.0
Total	340.4	510.6	797.3	1,442.3	1,851.1	2,384.9
Value of Goods Coming in Company With Passengers***	68.1	102.1	159.5	288.5	370.5	477.0
Grand Total	408.5	692.7	956.8	1,730.8	2,221.6	2,861.9

* Estimated
** Figures in this chart are calculated on basis of incentive exchange rate for the dollar, amounting to 70 piasters.
*** Estimated on basis that they are equal to 20 percent of total value of annual remittances.

Sums Handed Over by Egyptians Working Abroad to Foreign Currency (Pool) in Accredited Banks
(Distributed According to Country)

(In Million Pounds)

Year	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
A. Remittances Coming From Abroad							
Saudi Arabia	7.9	10.2	12.0	11.1	259.0	245.6	381.2
Kuwait	4.8	0.5	1.1	3.0	32.2	14.3	23.2
Libya	39.5	58.7	79.4	58.3	40.4	17.7	0.3
Gulf Emirates	5.7	5.2	8.6	10.1	14.3	6.1	6.5
Iraq	4.0	0.7	1.3	1.8	6.8	5.4	1.4
Algeria	0.7	2.1	0.7	1.7	1.3	3.0	1.8
Bahrain	-	1.1	2.3	3.1	5.2	2.0	-
Others	3.8	2.0	1.0	0.7	1.5	1.1	1.9
Total From Arab Countries	62.8	80.5	106.4	89.8	360.7	295.2	416.3
Remittances from Australia and other Countries	19.4	16.2	28.1	28.0	27.8	31.8	38.9
Undistributed Remittances [sic]							
England	19.1	32.2	29.9	32.2	23.4	13.7	15.4
America [US]	22.9	31.7	32.2	91.9	72.4	89.9	103.4
France	7.2	7.3	1.4	41.1	71.5	59.9	78.7
Total From Undistributed Countries	49.2	71.2	63.5	166.2	167.3	163.5	197.5
Total Remittances	131.4	167.9	198.0	284.0	555.8	490.5	642.7
Banknotes Coming in With Egyptians	26.5	25.1	51.9	78.2	90.0	113.4	117.7
Sums Coming in for Purchase of National Goods	0.7	1.1	3.1	22.0	8.3	62.3	57.9
Grand Total	158.6	194.1	253.0	384.2	654.1	666.2	818.3

8494
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KHOMEYNI'S PERSECUTION OF BAHA'IS REVIEWED

PM191303 Paris FRANCE-SOIR in French 11 Nov 81 p 2

[Jean-Louis Morillon report: "Khomeyni Gives His 450,000 Baha'is the Choice: Islam or Death"]

[Text] "My cousin was shot, He was a chemical engineer in a sugar refinery and was not involved in any political activity. His wife went to collect the body from Evin prison in Tehran. She was fired from her job in the customs service and we have not heard any more from her."

This evidence given by Mr (Mavaddat), an Iranian who has been living in France for 26 years, sums up the fate of Iran's 450,000 Baha'is—of which 75,000 live in Tehran—an accursed community with a strange name which conceals a very innocent situation. Indeed this religious minority, the largest in the country, dreams only of universal brotherhood. This is obviously a crime for Ayatollah Khomeyni's fanatics, who see the enemies of God, their God of course, everywhere.

Of what was 53-year old (Farhang Mavaddat) accused? Nothing aside from the fact that for 10 years he had been chairman of the Baha'i assembly in Karaj, a small city 40 km from Tehran. The xenophobic fundamentalists discovered aggravating circumstances: Mr (Mavaddat's) three children are studying in the west, two in the United States and one in Europe, which "proves culpable foreign relations," the judge declared.

There is no room for pity in Ayatollah Khomeyni's Iran. Each day men and women are executed, not to mention the dozens of others who are lynched for adultery or nonconformism. Some people are resisting: monarchists, liberal republicans and democratic socialists have planted bombs, staged ambushes and taken up arms to bring down the stifling obscurantist dictatorship at any cost.

But the Baha'is are suffering an even greater injustice: they are not doing anything and yet are the first victims of the Shi'ites' holy war against all those who have the audacity not to believe in the Koran alone. In the cities and villages of ancient Persia they pray three times a day in secret as in the days of history's bloodiest persecutions of Christians and Jews.

Massacres

Unfortunately the examples are increasing. The Baha'is are now being executed in whole batches. The revolution guards are not content with killing; they torture

their victims first. It would be rather tedious to list the names of all those who have recently paid with their lives for a peaceful and open faith. Nonetheless it is necessary to list at least some of the torment inflicted in the past few months on Baha'is returned to their families with or six [as published] bullets in their bodies.

In his apartment in Creteil, Mr (Mavaddat) listed the sorry exploits of the Iranian executioners. The hired thugs were particularly brutal in Hamadan. One Baha'i had his shoulder broken then crushed before being shot. Another, a doctor, had his thighs slashed. A third, also a doctor, had the fingers of one hand crushed and his back burned. Yet another had his right hand shattered and his chest smashed in. The families had to weep in silence. Indeed there was no question of them complaining. The authorities cover up the worst cases of extortion and even directly encourage this—one could venture to say modern—form of inquisition.

Many Baha'is are living and dying like this in Iran's remote villages. Their martyrdom goes unnoticed. Nonetheless cases of sacrifices, each more terrible than the others, filter through.

In the village of Nuk--Khorasan Province--a 72-year old Baha'i farmer was coldly murdered and his wife burned alive. A few weeks ago two young girls aged around 14 were abducted by teachers of Muslim studies, now a compulsory subject in all Iranian schools: their families in Musa-abad, a village near Tehran, and Balu near Orumieh have no hope of seeing them again. "Your daughters have been converted to Allah, they no longer want to live with heretics like you," the authorities told the anguished parents.

Will the Baha'is continue to be massacred one by one in this way--people whose religion has often been described an an attractive utopia? Will their children continue to be seized and forcibly converted? On 19 September 1980 the European parliament adopted a resolution condemning both "the violation of the rights of religious minorities in Iran--particularly the Baha'is--the illegal measures taken against prominent Catholics and Anglicans and the executions of prominent members of the Jewish community." It was in vain. The appeal to humanitarian feelings had no effect on the Ayatollahs.

Harassment

Yazd local radio called on 150 Baha'is in that city of 100,000 inhabitants southeast of Tehran to report to the authorities within 1 week. That is often how it all begins. In (Manshad), a neighboring village, the revolution guards seized the Baha'is' furniture and crops. In Hemmat-abad near Abadeh the wives of several Baha'is were threatened with serious reprisals if their husbands, who had fled to escape Islamic summary justice, did not give themselves up immediately.

Throughout Iran the raids are assuming terrifying proportions. Some 31 Baha'is were recently taken to the mosque in a village near Esfahan and forced to abjure their faith under threat. Some time before that the revolutionary committees in Mashhad in the northeastern part of the country sacked 28 Baha'i houses and dragged the fathers of the families into the mosques to force them to renounce their beliefs under pain of their children being maltreated and their property seized.

This violence began during the winter of 1978-1979, when the shah's regime was gasping its last and support for Ayatollah Khomeyni was growing irresistibly. During the 2 months which preceded the return to Iran of the "supreme guide" exiled in Neauphle-le-Chateau, Yvelines, almost 120 attacks on Baha'is were reported.

Some 500 houses were sacked, destroyed or burned in Shiraz--in the south--and in Azarbayjan Province near the Turkish border. Some 800 families were left without shelter in the harsh climate of those regions. A father and his son were lynched to death and their bodies were then dragged through the streets of Miandowab before being dismenbered and burned. These horrors boded ill for the clerics' monopoly of power. The 2 and 1/2 years which followed merely spread that bloody policy.

Initially Ayatollah Khomeyni pretended not to support this "purging" movement. The Shi'ite leader had even condemned the arson committed by his zealous followers. "Islam preaches tolerance," the Ayatollah stated, always ready to recall great principles, even when he is being blatantly hypocritical. Indeed the omnipotent Ayatollah has done nothing to excommunicate the fanatical criminals who are acting in his name. "Allah is great, he is the only god," the Shi'ites continue to chant with his blessing, regarding the other beliefs stemming from Islam as heresies and treachery.

Asphyxia

The extermination of the Baha'is seems to be following a plan. Different phases of the program have been implemented over the months, each time with more bloodshed and trials. The community's national registers were first stolen by the ultraconservative Tabliqat-e Eslami Brotherhood (Islamic propaganda group) which was led by Ali Raja'i, who was elected president of the republic last July to replace the ousted Bani-sadr.

Thanks to those document the clerics were able to attack the economic foundation of the community in order to asphyxiate it. Unlike Shi'ism, which regards modern education with suspicion, the Baha'i doctrine encourages its followers to study and extend their knowledge and naturally enough many of them had succeeded in securing well-paid positions as merchants or surgeons. Their estates have been sized on various pretexts (the law of force is the only one which the Khomeyni militia follow), bank accounts have been seized, and thousands of Baha'is have been fired from their jobs without reason and stores have been destroyed.

The tide of hatred was gathered momentum. Almost all shrines have been desecrated and ancestors' graveyards razed to the ground by public works vehicles.

Hundreds of Baha'is chose to flee to other countries while there was still time. But that was not enough: assassinations and major trials have increased recently to spread terror and decapitate this hated community.

On 13 January an unknown party fired several fatal shots at Dr Manuchehr Hakim, a respected 70-year old doctor, lecturer [Agrege] in anatomy at the Pris faculty and a gastroenteroldgy specialist respected by the poor people who he treated free in the Baha'i hospital which has since been closed by the regime.

Professor Hakim, who was gunned down in his private consulting room in Tehran, was certainly the victim of the policy aimed at exterminating his fellow believers. Some 2 days before the murder the revolution guards had come to question him at length on his fellow believers. The doctor had refused to give lists, according to his daughter Christine, an ethnologist who has taken refuge in Paris.

Defiance

The day of the funeral 60 doctors in white coats carried Dr Hakim's coffin. Some 5,000 people followed the funeral processing chanting sacred verses. A section of the revolution guards tried to sabotage the ceremony by announcing that bombs had been planted in the cemetery. But the crowd refused to move.

That act of defiance angered the militia who took their revenge a few days later. They ransacked Dr Hakim's house, destroyed the doors and windows and then displayed a search warrant issued 7 months previously. The family home was confiscated on behalf of the "poor people's foundation," a Khomeynist organization used to enlist unemployed people.

Since that assassination trials without lawyers have condemned to death many leaders of the Baha'is who follow a religion in which there are no priests. In each district where Baha'is live the faithful elect a "nine-man spiritual assembly" for 1 year. Is is rumored in Iran that the Shi'ite fundamentalists intend to execute the 4,500 elected representatives of these 500 "spiritual assemblies."

Under the Islamic Republic's constitution the Baha'is are noncitizens, outlawed pariahs. They do not exist. For instance Baha'i marriage is not recognized or recorded, which means it is impossible for a wife to obtain a joint passport with her husband or for the children to have identity cards.

The Baha'is who have the courage to declare their official religion cannot work in the civil service. Public meetings, the publication of religious literature and access to holy places are forbidden them.

The Baha'is no longer have any rights; either to travel or to buy or sell. My father-in-law, formerly a telecommunications engineer, and my mother-in-law, a teacher, have been deprived of their pensions and have no private means of subsistance." Mr (Mavaddat) told me in Creteil. "I know somebody who made a complaint against his Muslim tenant who refused to pay his rent, the authorities replied; 'how dare you? You are a Baha'i, you have no rights. We are confiscating your house.'"

Scapegoat

Why this relentlessness? The principles of their religion compel the Baha'is to be loyal and obedient to the government in office, whatever the political regime. They must even refrain from any militancy in a party and, more especially, from any subversive activity. Therefore they are not very terrible adversaries for the Islamic regime, which is being attacked by much more determined opponents.

Indeed the Baha'is have always suffered discrimination in their native country. They have always been made the scapegoats in time of trouble. Shortly after this

religion was founded, in the middle of the 19th century, 20,000 of them were martyred. In 1955 and 1963 the shah's secret police staged violent demonstrations against them to provide a channel for discontent. But that was nothing to compare with what is happening now.

The pretexts invoked willy-nilly to persecute them are ridiculous. How could they have been the Pahlavi monarchy's henchmen when the past shows that the reverse was ture? It is true that the shah sometimes placed his trust in Baha'is, who are reputed for their integrity and ability. For instance the sovereign's personal physician was a follower of that religion.

The shah, who intended to make his country into a great modern state, adopted the principles which the Baha'is had been preaching for a long time. But that is merely a coincidence. In 1963 women were given the right to vote. All the progressive Baha'i ideas adopted by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi during that famous "white revolution," are now enough to cast suspicion on the Baha'is who refused to veil their women in the Chador and to vote for the Islamic Republic.

The other accusation habitually invoked in the Islamic press during trials is "collusion with zionism." Many Baha'is have indeed received letters from Israel and have sent money there. But there is a very simple explanation for this fact: the Baha'i religion's world center, called the "universal house of justice," is situated on the slopes of Mount Carmel in Haifa, where it enjoys the Israelis' tolerance of all religions on that holy ground.

CSO: 4619/21

PRIME MINISTER'S REACTION TO U.S. 'BRIGHT STAR' OPERATIONS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 15 Nov 81 p 14

[Text] Engineer Mir Hoseyn Musavi, the prime minister, after a visit to Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, took part in an interview yesterday at noon. He spoke about his visit to the Imam, his trip to Kerman, the U.S. military maneuvers in Egypt, the peace proposal for Afghanistan, and the imposed war.

Concerning his visit with the Imam, the prime minister said: This visit with the Imam was in keeping with a good tradition. Since the Imam had not had a private visit for some time, the Cabinet was granted this audience and benefitted from his guidance.

The Imam emphasized the unity between the government, the nation, and the clergy. When the government of the Imam's line was established in Raja'i's Cabinet, the essential goal was to emphasize the unity of the government and the nation. The goal of the present government and Cabinet as well is the same. Engineer Musavi added: Without the presence of the people on the scene, the extensive problems of the revolution will not be solved. Our Islamic revolution has created certain goals that can only materialize with the general participation and active presence of the people on the scene. In the visit to the Imam, this issue was greatly emphasized.

Trip to Kerman

Concerning his recent trip to Kerman, the prime minister said: As you know, a number of our fellow citizens were killed or suffered great damages as the result of the earthquake. In this earthquake, many houses were ruined and much wealth was destroyed. The government must show sensitivity towards this problem. I wanted to witness it first hand and see what assistance the government could provide in this regard. He added: In this province, the people's forces and the clergy are acting extensively, but they need government assistance. We must take action as quickly as possible so that our fellow citizens can spend the cold season in better conditions. He added:

Another important point which must be brought out is that in my encounter with the people of this region, they were in good spirits. When I spoke to them in Golbaft mosque, the slogans that they shouted were the same as those in other parts of Iran, in support of the Islamic revolution. The people said: Take our greetings to the Imam. This demonstrates the extensiveness of the revolution.

'Bright Star' Operations

Concerning the U.S. military operation "Bright Star," he said: The United States is determining its fatal destiny at its own hands day by day. It seems that the destiny of imperialism will be determined in battle with the Islamic people. This battle was begun by our nation with the Islamic revolution and it seems that the time when the United States will suffer the final defeat and bury itself with its own hands is drawing nearer. He added: The United States has brought its forces to the vicinity of Mecca and Medina, but it has not foreseen that the Islamic people will not remain indifferent to these aggressions. Each one of these steps will have great influence in making the people see clearly, especially when that awareness is coupled with a return to godly ways. This return will rapidly end in an extensive battle against the worldwide oppressive forces headed by the United States. We are witnessing that the United States is bringing this battle closer and we have declared our position regarding this issue. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a declaration in this regard announcing its opposition. Here we warn the United States that with this action, it will mobilize all the regional Moslem forces against itself and against the U.S.-dependent rulers. He said: We are not afraid of this issue. The Islamic people must be alert and prepared, as ever, throughout the world in order to respond to every blow with another blow.

Afghanistan Peace Proposal

Engineer Musavi, concerning the Afghanistan peace proposal and its reception throughout the world, said: Concerning this plan, all that can be said has already been expressed in various views. With regards for the internal makeup of the Afghan nation and the political experience gained from our revolution, we included certain points in this plan which, in the long run, will result in the unity of the struggling people's forces of Afghanistan. He said: This plan will bring about among the people's movements of Afghanistan a purging of the elements who are dependent on the West and the East. This is very important for the people of Afghanistan. This plan reemphasizes the issue we have thusfar been emphasizing: that the Soviet Union, with its occupation of Afghanistan, provides the best excuse for the United States to have a presence in the region. In fact, the continued presence of the United States in the region is in part dependent on the military presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This is ultimately helping the United States. To resolve the

Afghanistan issue, the only regime which should come to power in this country is one which is Islamic and anti-oppressive. The existence of such a regime can, in the long run, bring closer the fatal destiny of the United States.

The War

In conclusion, Engineer Musavi, the prime minister, sent a message concerning the war and said: The government usually receives a message from the nation. He said: We hear the shouts and revolutionary slogans of the people. The government must listen for such issues. These slogans which rise up from the pure nature of the people and from their deep belief in Islam and human honor and dignity must be noted. If the government is able to receive these messages and direct its actions accordingly, it can move along the correct path. For this reason, I do not have a message as such for the people.

The prime minister added: We give priority to the issue of the war. Our brave fighters, including the military and guards corps forces, are fighting on the war fronts and defending the lord of Islam. In fact, they defend the proven existence for which human beings have the right. Our government and our nation are with them and fully support them. The government puts all of its resources at the disposal of the brave Moslem combatants.

He added: Our combatants must know that the front does not end with Iraq. The front continues and extends to Egypt.

He said: The movement has expanded layer by layer and stratum by stratum in our society. It is precisely the very front that Islam has opened against heathenism to eliminate heathenism on all levels. Our nation totally serves Islam and the Cabinet ministers are servants of Islam. They are servants of these brothers. We have mobilized all of our resources to fight and we know to what extent this war is destiny-making. I believe that if we are also active on the political scene, we will attain a decisive victory.

9593
CSO: 4640/58

TUDEH INFILTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CLAIMED

GF231740 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 23 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots, as we informed you during the news, Mullah Musavi-tabrizi, the chief revolution prosecutor of the regime of the Islamic Republic, in an interview with the government newspaper ETELA'AT confessed that the Tudeh Party and the majority branch of the Feda'iyan-e Khalq have been able to infiltrate the revolution guards and other Islamic organizations of Khomeyni's regime. Has Musavi-tabrizi revealed a new secret? Did he announce something in the interview that the Iranian nation was not aware of? No, not at all. The thing that the executioner of the Islamic regime referred to [words indistinct].

(?It is not surprising to find this godless group cooperation) with the Mullahs. This treacherous and foreign-directed party's only concern is to commit treachery against Iran and to cost our homeland its independence.

The free activity of the Tudeh members, who openly deny the almighty and consider religion to be the opiate of the masses, is a sign of freedom and democracy for the Mullahs in the Islamic Republic. They used to mention this to foreigners.

The thing that may be new is Musavi-tabrizi's claim that the regime is trying to discover members of the party and execute them. It seems that either Musavi-tabrizi does not know—which seems farfetched—or he is feigning ignorance. What better recognition of the Tudeh Party members when for the past 3 years the first secretary of Tudeh Communist Party and dear friend of Ayatollah Beheshti, Kurodding Kianuri, has been called Ayatollah Kianuri by the people of Iran? What better recognition when Hojjat Ol-eslam Ehsan Tabari, in reciting tales of Imam Hoseyn's battle with Yazid, equates it with the Marxist revolution? This is the same Ehsan Tabari who in an issue of mardom in 1945 wrote that the party's belief is that the Iranian Government should immediately grant the northern oil exploration rights to the Soviet Union and the southern ones to the United Kingdom. He added: We should accept that the Soviet Union has vital interests in Iran and that that nation must be given the required (?rights). Similarly, [the Tudeh Party] has no objection to granting special rights to the United Kingdom.

Finally, the Mullahs, with the directorship of the destroyed Ayatollah Beheshti, prepared the grounds for implementing this suggestion. Does Musavi-tabrizi not know all this?

Let us assume that the prosecutor does not know the history of the Tudeh's previous treacheries. Is he not aware of the services of the Tudeh Party to the regime of the Islamic Republic in the past 3 years? Is he not aware of the secret agreements between his regime and those powers referred to by Ehsan Tabari? Does he not know that Ayatollah Kianuri has been and is following the Imam's line and has put his party's security and espionage organization--which is operated by experts of a foreign power--completely at the disposal of the Imam of Jamaran to be used for putting the idealistic, deceived youth at the mercy of the executioners of the regime who have been deserted by the so-called Mojahed brother Mas'ud Rajavi? Of course, this is the same Rajavi who until very recently followed the Imam's policies and who now sends the innocent youth who are thirsty for freedom to the execution chambers of his former Imam. Is the Hojjat ol-Eslam val-Moslemin who himself killed thousands of these youth not aware of the identity of the ones who informed him about these children of Iran?

If Musavi-tabrizi, whose black deeds as the Islamic executioner have made [words indistinct] look like angels, does not know all that was said and is still looking for Tudeh members who have infiltrated Islamic organizations and revolutionary departments of his Imam's regime, then all he has to do is take a good look at the regime and the so-called officials of these organizations--the same people who hold Islamic-Marxist prayer sessions with him. If he is still not successful, then he should contact the 36-million-strong intelligence organization. He can then be sure that the Iranian nation has recognized each treacherous Tudeh member, just as they have all the treacherous Mullahs whose names have been carved on the trees from which they will be hanged.

CSO: 4640/55

REZA PAHLAVI CLAIMS SUPPORT IN ARMY, BAZAAR

PM231359 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 21-27 Nov 81 pp 1-3

[Interview with Prince Reza Pahlavi by Amir Taheri in Cairo-date not given]

[Excerpts] The Prince began by saying: "You are welcome. Don't forget that I am still a student."

As a matter of fact, if things in Iran had not gone the way they have gone and had his father, the former shah, remained in power, Prince Reza would even now still have been a student at Princeton University in the United States completing his studies in economics and political sciences. But things have developed contrary to what one would have wished.

The prince said: "For more than 3 years I have been thinking about my future like any person of my age would do. I have come to the conclusion that I must follow the path which my fate has destined for me, I must devote myself to my country. The events that have swept through Iran in the past 3 years have changed the form of my responsibilities but not their essence or basis. This outward change is temporary because man can never divorce himself from his fate."

Replying to a question as to how optimistic he is about the possibility of taking over power in Iran, he said: "I am sure of this. Monarchy alone can save Iran from what it is suffering and restore peace and security to its land. Sooner or later everybody will realize this fact and I will return to my country in order to carry out my constitutional responsibilities."

Prince Reza declines to commit himself to a specific period of time but, in the course of his talk with us, it clearly appears that he and his close advisers have become convinced that monarchy is daily on the ascendancy in Iran.

The prince continued: "I cannot reveal our time schedule but I can say that everything is going according to the plans we have laid down. I cannot believe that the present transitional period in Iran will last long."

We asked him if he has a special organization of his own. He replied: "I am not a politician. By this I mean that I am not the head of a party or of a political group. The monarchy's role is to stand above the various parties and factions and then to symbolize the hopes and aspirations of the people as a whole. But there are many nationalist organizations that are stuggling to save Iran from the present situation. These organizations are not necessarily monarchist."

He added: "Anybody who is struggling in defense of Iran's freedom and independence must be supported regardless of ideological and political differences. In any case the king must stand above the parties so as to represent national sovereignty. This is the reason why I consider myself as the King of all Iranians, including those who are opposed to monarchy."

But does this mean that he will become only a figurehead? In reply to this question, he said: "This is out of the question now. What I mean by constitutional monarch is to serve the country in accordance with the provisions of the 1906 constitution which gave monarchy specific powers with the rights and priviliges consequent upon them. No more and no less."

He explained to us at length that he does not share the view that Iran can live in peace under the rule of a regime that is purely despotic. Rather, he believes that the presence of monarchy would prevent the domination of despots and the emergence of military dictators. He came to the conclusion that the countries that have rejected monarchy have either fallen under military dictatorship or have been rent by chaos and confusion.

Planting Secret Cells

He said that his supporters have now become "well organized" inside the country but declined to give any details.

He added: "What is important is that the Iranians should know that I am not idle. Also there is no need to intensify the focusing on my acitivities. I do not wish to steal the press headlines because all that I would like to do is to save my country from its predicament and from total catastrophe."

Apparently the groups and organizations supporting monarchy outside Iran are still in disagreement among themselves because of feuds and personal disputes. But last week 29 of these organizations, most of which are in Europe and the United States, announced that they have united in order to form a "unified command," but so far we have been unable to trace this "new command" or find out what it intends to do.

Prince Reza explained to us that he considers the following groups as the backbone for concentrating and mobilizing the supporters of monarchy: the urban workers who are threatened by unemployment and inflation; the middle class which is threatened by physical liquidation; the armed forces which the prince says is "100 percent loyal to monarchy"; and finally the tribes whose number is estimated at 6 million people who live in the border areas. A number of leaders of the Kurdish and Baluchi tribes have also pledged loyalty to Prince Reza, who also says that the majority of the powerful Qashka'i tribes have become loyal to him.

Prince Reza explained that what is more important than all this is the fact that his supporters have been able to make contact with the "bazaar" merchants in Tehran. It was the "bazaar merchants" that in the past financed Khomeyni's campaign against the shah and paralyzed his government through strikes and the staging of political strikes.

Prince Reza says: "The bazaar merchants have once again begun to rally around me, having realized that the present ruling group in Tehran intends to eliminate their business and private trade and because they have no choice before them other than

monarchy or communism. In the circumstances, the merchant faction cannot but join the line running counter to the line that has led to their present misery and hardships."

If the behavior of the army officers banished abroad is considered as the touchstone of the Iranian military's loyalty to monarchy, the Iranian armed forces that are now fighting a war with Iraq are considered to be the most important base for monarchy in Iran itself. There are now hundreds of exiled officers, from the rank of lieutenant to that of general, who have now begun to openly speak of their support for the young prince. Many officers inside Iran are seeking to establish contact with the army personnel and the tribes probably with the aim of planting secret armed cells. The send reports and voice recordings about meetings held inside Iran along with pictures "of the activities that are taking place in support of monarchy." Recently the royalists pasted up a big picture of the prince on one of the oil tanks on Khark Island in the Gulf. The Iranian authorities immediately sent a revolutionary guard unit by plane to the island in order to tear down the pictures and any undesirable posters.

The prince hopes to rally the educated majority behind him--of whose loyalty he is in great need in order to restore the situation to normal and to revive the collapsed Iranian economy. The prince is well aware of the major problems from which Iran is suffering at present and which it is impossible for a single person or single party to deal with or to solve alone.

In this regard the prince insists on saying that "any party that claims it is possible for any single faction or party to save Iran from its present dilemma and rebuild it is quite wrong." He said: "All the nation must unite and work for a decade before we can repair the damage that has been done to the country."

Obviously, Prince Reza has still much to learn with regard to political practices but those close to him say that he is learning fast. He has been able to deal with a number of difficult negotiations with leftist opposition groups and in the end he was able to convince them that fighting Iman Khomeyni must be their primary target. He has also been successful in reducing hostility toward him among the other opposition groups to the extent that Adm Ahmad Madani, the former minister of defense in Khomeyni's Government, and Hasan Nazih, the former chairman of the national Iranian Oil Company, have been saying that monarchists will not be excluded from any agreement reached in future after Khomeyni is overthrown. Previously these two personalities directed all their opposition against the shah.

CSO: 4604/7

'NVOI' ON AIMS OF 'BRIGHT STAR' MANEUVERS

TA231055 (Clandestine) National Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1730 GMT 22 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary: "U.S. Imperialism is the Foe of the Independence of Nations and Governments"]

[Text] Dear compatriots: Some time ago Mr Musavi Khamene'i, our Islamic Republic's prime minister, strongly condemned the U.S. military maneuvers code named bright star. He called upon all the people of our region to rise decisively against the conspiracies of U.S. imperialism in the near and Middle East. He declared that such aggressive measures by the Washington Administration should bring about the intensification of the nations' struggles against the United States' aggressive policy.

As we are aware, the Americans have chosen Egypt as the place to conduct their military maneuvers, and this is not accidental, for, following the overthrow of the bloody regime of the annihilated shah in our country, U.S. imperialism has specifically assigned Egypt's rulers with fulfilling the role of the new gendarme. In these maneuvers military units of the U.S. rapid deployment force, namely about 4,000 U.S. soldiers and officers, and large quantities of equipment, weapons and military hardware, including tanks, armored vehicles, artillery pieces, B-52 strategic bombers and AWACS type planes participated. In these maneuvers, which were conducted on Egyptian soil, more than 4,000 Egyptian army personnel also participated along with the U.S. forces. At the same time, within the framework of these maneuvers military training was carried out on the territory of other countries that have regimes subservient to U.S. imperialism, namely in Sudan, Somalia and Oman in which the armed forces of these countries also participated.

In these maneuvers a so-called plan of occupying and holding positions was tested, signifying the preparation of armed aggression against a country whose regime in the region is not to the liking of U.S. imperialism. On the eve of these maneuvers general [name indistinct], commander of the U.S. rapid deployment forces, in an interview with the Italian newspaper journal [name indistinct] declared with an impudence that is characteristic of the current U.S. Administration that this maneuver is a fundamental exercise on a world scale. He said: We are prepared for war, and this preparedness by itself contributes a new factor to the situation in the near east and North Africa.

This so-called new factor in the policy of the new U.S. Administration in our region--a region which has attracted the covetous attention of U.S. imperialism toward its rich oil resources and sensitive strategic position--is very clear. This

new factor is the self-same impudent over conspiracies and armed provocations against the region's independent and anti-imperialist systems, including our liberated homeland, which has aroused the mad wrath of U.S. imperialism by overthrowing the U.S. puppet and gendarme regime and also by implementing an independent and anti-imperialist policy.

Progressive mankind and all independent nations and governments of our region are indignant at the provocative maneuvers of the U.S. forces which have overtly posed a threat not only to the peace and security of our region but also to the peace and security of the world. It is particularly on the basis of this indignation of nations that our country's ministry of foreign affairs, in its special statement, decisively condemned these provocative and impudent acts of the U.S. Administration.

In order to ensure its so-called vital interests--and we should expect that in no time at all it will declare the whole world as a zone of such alleged interests--U.S. imperialism does not refrain from resorting to any crime and plot; and it is acting more impudently every day in regards to independent and anti-imperialist countries. For this reason the struggle against world-devouring America, this primary and main foe of nations, must not be weakened even for one moment.

CSO: 4640/55

MAJLIS TO CONSIDER NEW CHARTER FOR REVOLUTION GUARDS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 10 Feb 81 p 2

> [Text] Shiraz Majlis deputy Sabah Zanganeh told a press conference held in the Majlis building the day before yesterday that the Majlis defense affairs committee has drawn up a new charter for the revolutionary guards.

Zanganeh said the charter of the revolutionary guards was approved the first time by the Revolutionary Council and the corps had been operating accordingly but in order to determine the duties and prerogatives of the corps more precisely the committee drew up the new charter over a period of 6 months with the help of corps commanders and invited corps members as well as the advice of experienced individuals. The document will be probably sent to the Majlis next week. Of course concurrent with this work, the committee also studied a plan to rebuild the armed forces and the result of that too will be announced soon. Referring to details of the new charter for guards corps, Zanganeh said: The new charter puts a stop to any dishonesty, deviation or centralization of power that would lead to dictatorship within the corps. The goals of the corps set forth in the new charter comprise: protecting the Islamic Revolution and its benefits, fighting on God's path, struggling against internal despotism, mobilization of the Muslim people and unstinting support for the world's weak and oppressed. All these goals must be sought under the direction and instruction of the rule of theocracy and with due consideration of religious precepts. He stressed that the corps, with the sincere cooperation of other military and security forces, is the protector of the independence and territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is also to act on military, political and ideological levels. The defense affairs committee has clearly determined the limits and boundaries of such activities in order to avoid interference with other organs of the country. The Shiraz deputy added: The new charter calls for the appointment of a mojtahed [clergy versed in religious jurisprudence] as a representative of the supreme leadership dispensing true and mandatory guidance to further the culture of theocracy and the Imamate. The charter sets a centralized command structure, with prerogatives given according to set responsibilities. Except in cases involving military orders of the Supreme Defense Council, the centralized command will in all other cases confer with the council before making decisions. In order to speed up work and to reduce staff headquarter cadres, effort has been made in the charter to reduce the membership on the Supreme [Guards] Corps Council. Concerning the corps' budget he said: This would be drawn up each year by the administrative and financial section and it would be presented to the council of ministers by the minister without portfolio. The government would then include it in the general budget to be sent to the Majles for approval.

According to this charter, members of the guards corps will be chosen from among educated, trustworthy, committed, courageous individuals with good character.

Sabah Zanganeh continued his statement by saying that in dealing with the information and research section, the charter has considered two factors: the centralization of information and research and to insure its humane aspects. Another interesting point contained in the charter is the possibility of a review of the document 2 years after it has been in force. This is to make possible the incorporation of positive and useful points which may develop in the future. Referring to the need of an information bureau for the corps Zanganeh said: The corps needs an information and research bureau to help its internal work and help it achieve the goals spelled out in the charter. Although such a bureau would be centralized unit its activities would nevertheless be coordinated with other information and research organizations.

The Shiraz Majlis deputy commented on the reduction in the membership of the Supreme [Guards] Corps Council by saying: After considering the new table of organization of the corps we concluded that some of its units, such as the provincial coordinating section dealing with matters that fall within the authority of each local commander, were superfluous. Referring to the veto power given to the representative of the Leader, Zanganeh said this was to prevent possible deviation within the command level.

Zanganeh continued: Of course we have not until now reached such a stage with the corps in practice but the defense affairs committee had this in mind as a precautionary measure for the future. This will apply only to instances where the representative of the Leadership should feel that any moves sanctioned by the Supreme Corps Council are clearly contrary to the faith or contrary to the tenets of Islam. The representative of the Leadership also enjoys veto power, to a degree, over military plans in so far as such plans affect Islamic guidelines. In other words, if he should feel that a military tactic would violate Islamic principles or that the Supreme [Guards] Corps Council possibly intends to use unlawful methods to achieve a goal, the representative of the Leadership could oppose such moves and would have veto power.

5854
CSO: 4640/38

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON NMRI ATTITUDE ON AUTONOMY

NC181153 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 17 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary: "The National Resistance Movement and Autonomy for Iranian Races"]

[Text] Autonomy is a word that has been brought up and heard many times during the past 3 years. Some political groups, especially in areas like Kordestan, have placed the gaining of autonomy at the top of the list of their programs.

The "Islamic Republic" greatly fears this word, and Khomeyni's clique prefers to use the Persian word of sel-management [khod gardani] instead of the word autonomy [khod mokhtari] that connotes [words indistinct], exceptionally in this case.

What is autonomy that the clergy fear it, combatants die for it and leaders of political parties exploit it? Autonomy is the right of the people to freely manage their special affairs within the framework of a central government. A glance at the charter of the national resistance movement of Iran [NRMI] and the basis of the thought of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, the movement's leader, show that we not only do not oppose the granting of this right to the various (?races) of the Iranian nation, including our Kurdish compatriots, but the main objective of the movement is to ensure the [word indistinct] free administration of Iran by the Iranian nation. To make our point clearer, we can say that the main difference we have with Khomeyni's regime is that the Mullahs have deprived this right not only from the people of [word indistinct] areas, but from the entire Iranian nation. We remember how [words indistinct], leader of one of the parties that has now (?joined) the (?united) front of the communists said in a radio interview: we will not unite with the NRMI and Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, because he opposes our people's autonomy.

In view of all that which has been said during the past 1 year and some months on the autonomy of Iranian (?races) by radio Iran. In view of the (?contents of the program) of the NRMI and the basis of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar's basis of thought, as well as in view of (?all) Dr Shapur Bakhtiar has said in various press and radio-television interviews concerning autonomy. We clearly see how baseless the remarks of the leader of the said party were. Saying that the NRMI and Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, the movement's leader, opposes the autonomy of Iranian races is more a slander than a political opinion. This becomes more interesting when the leader of that party, in giving a reason for Dr Bakhtiar's opposition to autonomy, added that whenever Shapur Bakhtiar talks of autonomy he immediately (?stresses) Iran's territorial integrity. To what extent the (?stressing of) Iran's territorial integrity can show Dr Bakhtiar's opposition to autonomy is something that the leader of that party should be asked.

We believe that the majority of rights for the administration of the regional affairs of various provinces should be given to the people of same province and that people of each province and district should be able, (?through a democratic) [word indistinct], to have a say in the appointment of regional officials responsible for regional affairs and to supervise their activities. We also believe that Iran's culture is a collection of the cultures of all Iranian (?nationalities) and any attempt toward the strengthening and development of the language and culture of the Iranian races will be toward the strengthening of the Iranian nation's culture. We consider the right of each and every member of the Iranian nation and all Iranian (?races) in speaking in the language or (?dialects) [word indistinct] as the primary right of each and every one of them. (?Therefore), how can we (?oppose the autonomy of a place like Kordestan)? contrary to the Mullahs, we do not fear the word autonomy. We want autonomy not only for Kordestan but for all the people of Iran [words indistinct] and (?stress the need) for Iran's territorial integrity and (?solidarity).

CSO: 4640/55

OFFICIAL OUTLINES JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION REFORMS

LD231502 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 23 Nov 81

[Text] In order to speed up the affairs of the ministry of justice and other judicial matters of the country, duties and responsibilities within the ministry of justice have been divided among the members of the supreme judicial council. The director general of the supreme judicial council secretariat has granted an interview to Pars News Agency. Announcing the above reform, he said that the new decisions by the supreme judicial council on the apportionment of duties were made during three consecutive sessions of the council held in the morning and in the afternoon. He added that in the new allocation of work within the supreme judicial council, Mr Musavi Ardabili, the president of the country's supreme court, and member of the supreme judicial council, will deal with coordination; the perjury and bankruptcy sections; offences committed by judges of the ministry of justice; matters concerning the medical examiner's office; judicial assistance and related matters; the bar association's relations with the supreme judicial council; correspondence with the department of registration of documents; applications from heads of marriage registration offices; applications from heads of official document registration offices; applications from the justice ministry's official advisors, matters concerning the department of plans and investigations including organization and budget; matters concerning the official organ of the Islamic Republic of Iran; applications from heads of justice departments in provincial towns and provinces and director generals of reconciliation and general courts regarding administrative and judicial affairs in their jurisdiction; matters concerning pardons and amnesties; the transfer of judges; participation in the commission responsible for transfers, the retirement of judges and [words indistinct].

Prosecutor General Mr Rabbani-amlashi, member of the supreme judicial council, will supervise matters concerning the transfers of judges in public prosecutors offices; the promotion of judges; meeting the needs of the ministry of justice with regard to the recruitment of judges and the retirement of judges in public prosecutors' offices; applications from the head of administrative and financial affairs: the department of inspectorate and its affairs; the public relations office and affairs concerning prisoners and prisons throughout the country; applications from provincial and town public prosecutors; and administrative and judicial affairs in their jurisdiction and matters concerning civil courts.

The director general of the supreme judicial council secretariat added that supreme judicial council member Mr Motada'i will handle matters concerning judicial juris diction; the appropriate places for Islamic Revolution courts to be formed and the

number of branches they should have--the proposals to be presented to the council for approval after due investigation; the investigation of complaints made against religious judges and against revolutionary institutions in courts-appeals against sentences; investigation of the affairs of guild courts, anti-drug smuggling courts, and courts dealing with offences prohibited under Islam.

He said that, according to decisions made in the supreme judicial council at its sessions No 176, 177 and 178, the responsibilities allocated to Mr Javadi-'amoli, member of the supreme judicial council, will include matters concerning education and research and determining the policies to be followed with regard to the problems of revolution courts and prosecutors' offices. Also according to the recent decisions made by the supreme judicial council, the responsibilities allocated to Mr Mohammad Mo'men, a member of the supreme judicial council, include recruitment, assessment of qualifications, testing and finally assessment of religious knowledge for revolution courts and civil courts; signing the letter informing those judges who have been accepted in their interviews of their training period; theological questions raised by religious judges; meeting the recruitment needs and shortages in the revolution courts; liaison between the revolution prosecutor's office and the supreme judicial council; forming and investigating supreme courts, revolution courts, military courts and guards corps courts and the judicial organization of the armed forces.

The director general of the supreme judicial council secretariat finally added that, according to the decisions made by the supreme judicial council, the responsibilities allocated to Mr Seyyed Mohammad 'Ashghari, the minister of justice, include matters related to liaison between the ministry of justice and other ministries, and matters related to bills, defending the bills and steering them through the council of ministers, commissions and the Islamic Majlis.

CSO: 4640/55

BIOGRAPHY OF PRESIDENT KHAMENEH'I PUBLISHED

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Oct 81 pp 1, 8

[Text] Hojjatoleslam Seyyed 'Ali Khemeneh'i was born in 1318 [21 Mar 39-20 Mar 40] in a clerical family in the holy city of Mashhad.

His father, Hoffatoleslam Haj Seyyed Javad Khameneh'i, was one of the pious and devout religious leaders of Mashhad and his mother was the daughter of Hojjatoleslam Seyyed Hashem Najafabadi. After completing his primary education he began the study of religious sciences at the Navvab school in the city. During this period he benefited from the teachings of such personalities as Ayatollah Milani and Ayatollah Haj Sheykh Hashem Qazvini. He also spent 2 years of training in Mashhad.

During 1957-1958 he made a pilgrimage to Holy Najaf and returned home after a brief period. He went to Qom in 1958-1959 and improved his knowledge as a pupil of such masters as grand Ayatollah Borujerdi, Imam Khomeyni and Ayatollah Ha'eri. During the 5 June uprising and the start of Imam Khomeyni's prophetic movement, he was at the leader's side, and he was arrested in Birjand while carrying the Imam's message concerning the Ashura of 1963-1964 to Ayatollah Milani. Also, he and a number of religious teachers set up a secret religiously-oriented organization in the parish which was discovered, resulting in the arrests of Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah Rabbani. He and a few others went into hiding. During 1963-1964 Mr Khameneh'i once again returned to Mashhad where he was under constant harrassment and threat from SAVAK and agents of the extinct shah. Nevertheless he energetically devoted himself to teaching religious principles and the system of religious law to scholars. His discourses on "Nahjolbalagheh" [Imam Ali's book revered by Shi'ites as second after the Holy Koran] and his religious analyses attracted various groups of people, particularly the interested young generation.

During all of his life he moved in the vanguard of the Islamic revolution and resurgence, being imprisoned 6 times between 1964 and 1979 in solitary confinement.

Up on release from prison during 1975-1976, he expanded ideological teachings on comparative and analytical religious issues and furthered Islamic and revolutionary thought in the younger generation by his fiery speeches throughout the country and during 1977-1978, he along with a number of committed religious personalities, drew up a plan of religious militancy in the country. In the same year he was exiled to Iranshahr and then to Jiroft. During his terms of imprisonment as well as exiles he was never free from SAVAK's harrassment and repression.

As the Islamic revolution of the people gathered strength, Hojjatoleslam Khameneh'i became a member of the Revolutionary Council at the invitation of the martyred Ayatollah Mathari and the approval of Imam Khomeyni.

Following the victory of the revolution and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, he served in sensitive reamparts in addition to his continued membership in the Revolutionary Council: Representative of the Revolutionary Council in the Ministry of Defense, acting head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards corps, the Imam's representative on the Higher Defense Council, a deputy of the people of Teheran in the Majlis, Friday prayer leader of Reheran, and finally elected president of the republic in the recent elections which gave him a decisive majority with 16,007,972 votes.

The president of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also the author of such publications as "The Future Islam's Realm" which came out in 1965-1966 and was banned at that time; "Muslims in India's Freedom Movement"; "The Indictment of Western Culture," translation; "The Peace of Imam Hassan," a translation; "General Islamic Thought in the Koran"; "Patience"; "The Depths of Prayer"; "The Life of Imam Sadeq"; "Lessons From Nahjolbalagheh"; "A Collection of Speeches." With the outbreak of the imposed war, the president of the Islamic Republic of Iran put on the uniform of battle and by visiting war fronts and talking with the Islamic warriors not only uplifted their morale but also looked into problems and shortcomings. With the help of other members of the Higher Defense Council he also devoted attention to the organization of the armed forces. On 27 Jan 81 he was wounded during a public speech when a bomb hidden in a tape recorder by hypocrite-troublemakers at the Abazar Mosque exploded but he soon regained his health. After his recovery he has consistently stated: "I feel that the renewed chance of life has been bestowed by God so that I may serve Islam and the people so much more."

Hojjatoleslam Khameneh'i who was unanimously voted as secretary-general of the Islamic Republican Party following the martyrdom of Dr Bahonar is married and has 4 children.

5854
CSO: 4640/38

BRIEFS

'HYPOCRITES' ASSASSINATE BOOKSHOP OWNER--According to the Mashhad Islamic Revolution Guards Corps public relations office, this morning one of our Muslim compatriots was assassinated in his bookshop by two mercenaries belonging to the hypocrites organization [Mojahedin-e Khalq]. He was admitted to the hospital but died minutes after his arrival. The revolution guards report adds that after leaving the bookshop the assassins opened fire on two pedestrians, wounding one in the arm and the other in the abdomen. They were admitted to the hospital. The terrorists managed to escape after stealing a motorcycle. According to the same report, the condition of the wounded persons is satisfactory. [Text] [GF181544 Mashhad Domestic Service in Persian 1430 GMT 18 Nov 81]

CONFISCATION OF FARMLAND ALLEGED--Western political observers in Tehran believe that a new crisis will engulf the Islamic Republic in the near future. According to these observers, after the establishment of the Islamic regime many of the Mullahs ruling Iran have taken back farmland from farmers who had acquired ownership during the past regime. (?These Mullahs have now) become big landowners. This group of landowning Mullahs oppose the land reform bill and the distribution of land to farmers. The opinion of (?this faction) of Mullahs is that throughout the history of Islam farmers have always been subject to the clergy and that this is the way they should continue to be. [Text] [NC191710 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 19 Nov 81]

MUSAVI, KHAMENEI MEET PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS--According to a Pars correspondent report governors-general from all over the country, in a meeting attended by President Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, studied and exchanged views on the problems of the various provinces. Central news unit report states that the governors-general met and had talks this morning with Prime Minister Mir-Hoseyn Musavi. During this session, attended by Gharazi, minister of petroleum, Ghafuri, minister of energy; Parvaresh, minister of education and training; Nikravesh, minister of interior; and under-secretaries and advisers from the ministry of the interior, the current problems of the various provinces were discussed. Talks also took place about the manner of contacts to be established by the governors-general with the council of government, the problems of the provinces and on holding joint seminars between the governors-general and the council of government. [Text] [LD201320 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 20 Nov 81]

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON MIANDUAB EXECUTIONS--The barbaric regime of Ruhollah Khomeyni has executed 4 Kurdish and 10 Azari youths in the city of Mianduab. The executions took place 20 November. [Text] [GF231600 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1300 GMT 23 Nov 81]

CSO: 4640/55

CAUTION URGED IN MAKING WAR CLAIMS

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 63

[Text] SABAH KACHACHI, the Iraqi ministry of planning's chief industrial advisor, has warned that foreign firms seeking compensation for losses incurred on work in Iraq delayed by the Gulf war will face tough negotiations. The warning came just as Yohei Mimura, president of Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation, was preparing to visit Baghdad in the hope of settling the firm's claims on projects in Iraq, including Baghdad's $95m parade square and a new national museum.

Kachachi urged firms to refrain from jumping onto a 'get rich quick' bandwagon. He told *8 Days*: 'Firms have the right to submit claims, but they make the mistake of comparing Iraq to other Gulf states. Here they are dealing with a system, and an underdeveloped system at that. If they want a fast buck they should go somewhere else.' Government officials believe that some foreign contractors may be viewing the claims procedures as a way of turning their own inefficiency to advantage. While they acknowledge there are companies with legitimate rights to compensation, they suggest that others will be casting seed on very stony ground.

It is the Japanese who have been hardest hit by the delays and shortages prompted by the war. Another firm due to open talks is Toa Harbour Works Company, part of a consortium with Sumitomo Heavy Industries and Marubeni Corporation which won a $232m contract to carry out work on the second phase of Khor al Zubair port three years ago. Other Japanese firms have already submitted claims, and the list of foreign companies seeking damages is growing fast. At least two British concerns have entered the race and others are expected to follow.

'The Iraqis have not been all that sympathetic. But they have been helpful in expanding contract time, which is a form of cash assistance,' one diplomat said, and suggested that in some cases the lure of further business had been offered to divert companies from making claims.

The authorities are certainly looking more favourably on firms caught at the outbreak of the war, in areas like Basra that were immediately affected. Other companies, whose personnel downed tools on projects away from the fighting, are not being taken seriously.

The director general of foreign economic relations at Iraq's ministry of trade, Faruq al Ubaidi, said that the principle of claims has already been conceded where the original terms of a contract have made due provision. But he stressed that each case would be examined on its individual merit, and accused some firms of 'fishing in troubled waters. A case will be considered provided the firm did not leave the country, or demonstrate any reluctance to carry on,' he said. 'In cases where a firm left the site, such behaviour cannot be tolerated.

'Some enterprises have already been compensated, for example over the closure of Basra port. Others have asked for loans. Compensation is not necessarily financial. It can be through an extension to a contract, because delays cost money.'

Whether much cash has been handed out or not remains largely a matter of conjecture, although observers believe most concessions have come in time extensions and further business. In any event, talks are likely to be lengthy and subject to protracted wrangling in the slow-moving bureaucratic machinery. 'Millions of dinars will not be handed out on a silver platter,' Kachachi said. 'But if you deserve something you will get it.'

CSO: 4400/68

BRIEFS

EXTRA OIL TO INDIA--Iraq has offered to supply 1.5m tonnes of crude oil to India next year, in addition to the 3.5m tonnes already pledged, according to the Indian oil minister, P. C. Sethi. India will decide on the offer within the month, after it reviews its oil needs. The price quoted for the additional supplies is 60 cents a barrel above that for the 3.5m tonnes, because of higher shipping costs. India was importing some 6m tonnes of crude from Iraq annually before the Gulf war. Supplies so far this year total some 0.6m tonnes, said Sethi. India also gets oil from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Algeria. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 67]

CSO: 4400/68

BRIEFS

BAN ON EGYPTIAN AUTHOR'S WORKS--Amman, 10 Nov (PETRA)--Upon the recommendation of the Main Bureau for Boycotting Israel, Mr Ahmad al-'Utum, director of the Press and Publication Bureau, has decided to ban the entry and distribution of all the writings and other literary works of Egyptian writer Anis Mansur due to his sympathies for Israel and his support for the peace treaty, in addition to his effective role in bolstering Egyptian-Israeli relations. The director of the Press and Publication Bureau has also decided to ban the entry and distribution of medium-size copies of the holy Koran, which were printed by the Egyptian press and its library in 1963. [Text] [JN101706 Amman PETRA-JNA in Arabic 1445 GMT 10 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/125

PRIME MINISTER COMMENTS ON INTERNAL POLITICAL SITUATION

PM261639 Paris LE MONDE in French 22-23 Nov 81 p 5

[Unattributed interview with Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan: "The State Institutions Will be Preserved"--date and place not given, first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] In answering our questions Lebanese Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan was kind enough to explain to us the progress made in normalizing the situation in Lebanon and the difficulties which this enterprise is encountering.

[Question] What progress has been made since the April 1981 events in paving the way for a solution to the Lebanese crisis in the framework of the four-party Arab Vigilance Committee?

[Answer] Despite the obstacles it has encountered, the efforts and approaches made by the four-party Vigilance Committee have produced positive results, the most important being the fact that the cease-fire is still in force. Of course, circumstances are still difficult, but the determination of an entire people who have decided to shoulder responsibility for their own destiny prompts us to be optimistic.

[Question] What are the major obstacles which you encounter in the sphere of strengthening security and consolidating national accord?

[Answer] We cannot deny the existence of some uncontrolled armed forces which have found in our country a fertile ground for their partisan struggles and confrontations. There would not even be any point in denying that the Lebanese Government is unfortunately handicapped in face of these forces, whose means for action far outweigh those of the government. There are many reasons for this, stemming from the tragic circumstances created by Israel's hostile, aggressive and expansionist policy toward the Palestinian people who have been expelled from their national territory. These people have been forced to disperse among the Arab countries. These same circumstances have meant that Lebanon has long borne the main burden of the Palestinian problem, with its inevitable complications. They have also enabled some suspect forces to push Lebanon toward explosion and disaster, to exploit circumstances and internal blunders to fuel the fire which, for more than 7 years, has been gaining ground and ravaging the Lebanese people's lives, goods, hope and future.

[Question] An upsurge of Lebanese nationalism can be observed in all Lebanon's Muslim communities. Do you think that that is likely to favor the settlement of the Lebanese crisis?

[Answer] The phenomenon to which you refer is not new. The Muslims have long and energetically opposed any policy intended to harm Lebanon's unity, territorial integrity and independence. Of course, in our view and our concept of the Lebanese problem, Lebanese nationalism is linked to the broader framework of Arab nationalism. But this connection in no way undermines Lebanon's specific conditions, its independence or the agreement which exists among its citizens on the general principles which make this country a remarkable experiment and a model which should be followed everywhere where similar conditions exist to those prevailing in Lebanon.

[Question] How do you plan to remove the objections made by some circles in Lebanon to the use of the army as a vital tool for restoring the state's authority?

[Answer] We are convinced that, unless the state has the decisive force which the Lebanese Army represents, it will inevitably find it impossible to establish law and order in the country and impose its sovereignty over the whole Lebanese territory. Nonetheless we make no secret of the fact that the present state of the Lebanese Army necessitates major reforms and substantial reassessments and corrections if it is to be able to assume its proper role, in other words to become the army of the Lebanese nation and all Lebanese citizens.

[Question] The year 1982 promises to be crucial. Do you think that the election of the new president of the republic will go smoothly, thereby safeguarding the country's institutions?

[Answer] The Lebanese Parliament, whose job it is to elect the new president of the republic, has proved in many delicate and serious situations that it is capable of shouldering its national responsibilities. This encourages me to think that the election of the new president will go smoothly and thus safeguard the state, its institutions and its future. It is also necessary to note the firm will of the Lebanese people who, after many disastrous years, are more determined that ever not to allow any attack on the values which I have just mentioned. Should the worst happen and we, for one reason or another, find it impossible to elect a new president, the cabinet has to take on responsibility of executive power under the terms of the constitution. Legality will thus be maintained and preserved.

CSO: 4419/7

LEBANESE-CUBAN FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY CREATED

PM191113 Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 14 Nov 81 p 4

[Unattributed report: "At Meeting Sponsored by National Movement: A Lebanese-Cuban Friendship Society"]

[Text] The establishment of a Lebanese-Cuban Friendship Society and the launching next week of "a campaign for solidarity with the Cuban revolution and the revolutionary movement in Latin America" were announced at the headquarters of the National Movement Central Political Council yesterday.

The meeting [at the headquarters] was attended by the leaders of the "national movement" and its affiliated parties and by Deputies Zahir al-Khatib and Najah Wakim.

Ilyas al-Habr, chairman of the National Federation of Trade Unions and Employees in Lebanon, delivered a speech in which he said: "Our initiative today is not simply one of loyalty to the Cuban revolution's attitude toward the struggle of our people, the Arab people and the Palestinian revolution; it is a confirmation of the bonds of joint struggle that bind our two peoples [the Lebanese and Cuban peoples] and the Arab people against the common enemy, against American imperialism and its stooges."

He added that the purpose of founding the society "is to emphasize the support of the broadest sectors of our people for the Cuban revolution, which is now being subjected to insolent threats by American officials--threats that have reached the point of preparations for a new American invasion of Cuban territory.... Under the guise of assisting the national liberation movements, Washington and its agents in the area do not hesitate to provoke and threaten Cuba and to spread infectious diseases in the island's sky as though Cuba and Nicaragua were behind the tragedies imposed by the American monopolies on the peoples of the American continent.... [Sentence as published]

"Any future invasion Washington ventures to carry out will meet the same fate as the American Bay of Pigs invasion 20 years ago."

He called on "all who cherish the cause of peace and people's freedom to raise their voice in solidarity with the island of freedom."

Nasir al-As'ad, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Action Organization, read out the list of names of those who have agreed to join the society and suggested to those present that they agree to establish an administrative body under the chairmanship of al-Habr. They agreed.

(David Pavlovich), Cuban Embassy charge d'affaires, also spoke. He said: "The formation of the society is a culmination of the Lebanese people's solidarity with the Cuban people since the eruption of the Cuban revolution. It is a qualitative step in raising the level of solidarity with the people of Cuba at a time when the American threats against Cuba have begun to take a serious turn."

CSO: 4404/125

BRIEFS

ISRAELI INVASION PLANS--Beirut, 22 Nov (JANA)--The Lebanese magazine AL-KIFAH AL-ARABI yesterday said the Zionist enemy is planning to overrun southern Lebanon before its alleged pullout from occupied Sinai. The paper quoted informed sources as saying that the planned Israeli military attack is designed to push back the joint Lebanese and Palestinian forces to the city of Sidon and the Kharrub and Albiqa' regions. Then, the Israelis will bargain through the Americans and West Europeans for declaring southern Lebanon a no-go region for the Palestinians. The Israelis will also call for the demilitarisation of the region except for the presence there of UN forces. In return, the Israelis will offer their withdrawal from the Lebanese border region. [Text] [LD221032 Tripoli JANA in English 0830 GMT 22 Nov 81]

CSO: 4400/64

ENVOY COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA

BK201142 Hong Kong AFP in English 0745 GMT 20 Nov 81

[Text] Canberra, 20 Nov (AFP)--Trade between Australia and Libya is increasing rapidly with friendships growing between the two countries.

Making this clear at a press conference today, the secretary of the People's Committee, the ambassador of Libya to Australia, Mr Suleiman Oreibi, said there has been an increase from a $65 million to over a $200 million (U.S. $7.4 million to $228 million) in the last year in trade.

Mr Oreibi said much of this increase came from discussions with visiting delegations who had made agreements covering the future.

The press conference was called to emphasise Libya's desire for the closest relations with Australia, recognising that even if Australia under the Anzus Agreement was an ally of the U.S.A., "friendly Australian people would be prepared to study the Libyan point of view."

Since January 1981, the Australian Government and several state governments had invited Libyans, involving 44 people, on special missions.

"Some of the state governments have agricultural projects in Libya where many Australians are working full time assisting agriculture in the Jamahiriyah. Many Australians are travelling to Libya to work on oil projects. They are developing close, friendly relations with the Libyan people," Mr Oreibi said.

Students from Libya were now joining Australian universities and generally it was hoped by the Libyan Government that not only trade, but general understanding across the world between Australia and Libya would grow, he said.

Mr Oreibi denounced the continuing American campaign against Libya and dismissed with scorn any suggestion of the sudden death or assassination of Libya's leader, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. He referred to the "intrusion of the American Sixth Fleet into the Gulf of Sidra last August and the American military exercises in Egypt" as evidence of aggression against the Arab nation.

Mr Oreibi assured the Australian press that Libyan access to the Australian Government leaders was frequent and friendly.

CSO: 4500/54

BRIEFS

REPORT ON MILITARY MANEUVERS—The military maneuvers which are being staged by the aggressive American rapid deployment forces on Egyptian territory entered their decisive phase yesterday with an air attack in which 1,000 American soldiers participated. With the help of the American AWACS planes, the fighter planes attempted to ward off an attack carried out by the American B-52 type bomber planes, which unleashed their bombs on targets on Egyptian territory close to the Libyan border. Thus, the American maneuvers have assumed different forms since they began on 14 November with a view to intimidating the Arab people, who have become certain that America is their archenemy. [Text] [MC230944 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 23 Nov 81]

DELEGATE SPEAKS ABOUT U.S. 'THREATS'—New York, 23 Nov (JANA)—The Libyan delegate [to the United Nations] in New York has had a meeting with the chairman of the UN Security Council. He informed the chairman about the blatant American threats and the subversive terrorist activities carried out by America against the people of the Jamahiriyah. He also told him about the American campaigns of deception and accusations which fall within the American preparations for premeditated aggression against the Jamahiriyah. The JANA correspondent in New York has learned that the chairman of the UN Security Council will acquaint members of the council with what the Libyan delegate submitted during the meeting, which took place within the framework of enlightening world public opinion and peace and security-loving forces about American threats and the provocative moves aimed at aggression against the Jamahiriyah. [Text] [LD231646 Tripoli JANA in Arabic 1400 GMT 23 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/92

INTERVIEW WITH MINISTER OF ENERGY, MINES

Kuwait OAPEC BULLETIN in English No 10, Oct 81 pp 16-19

[Interview with Muhammed Mukhtar Ould Zamel, minister of mines and energy, with OAPEC BULLETIN: "The Energy Situation in Mauritania: Interview With Minister of Mines And Energy"]

[Text] In energy scarce Mauritania, where a very large area is a desert wasteland, the Western Sahara conflict and the prolonged drought years have left the country with an ailing economy, lacking the infrastructure needed to meet its basic energy requirements.

The urgent task facing Mauritania's planners today is to create links between the mining sector, providing 80% of Mauritania's foreign exports revenue and other sectors of the economy. A number of foreign financial institutions, including Arab interests, have invested in the mining sector in Mauritania. The Société Nationale Industrielle et Miniere (SNIM), the state research instrument, is owned (49%) by the governments of Iraq and Morocco, the Kuwait Foreign Trading Company and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The Bank also provides loans to finance Mauritania's oil imports, from Saudi Arabia or any other IDB member.

According to a recent agreement with Saudi Arabia, Mauritania's crude oil imports will be processed abroad and Mauritania will import its product requirements, until the Nouadhibou refinery becomes operational. Construction of the one million tons a year refinery has been reactivated by Algeria's Sonatrach and is expected to come onstream in 1983. The construction of the refinery was first undertaken by an Austrian firm in 1974 but start-up was delayed as a result of the war and defects in the refinery construction.

Oil exploration in Mauritania has proved discouraging so far. Texaco-Exxon relinquished its onshore permit in the Taoudeni basin in June 1975 and Shell its deepwater concession in December 1975. Later exploration was jointly carried out by Hispanoil (operator), Getty Oil, Agip and Phillips in 1977, but no commercial discoveries were made.

In the following interview with the *OAPEC Bulletin*, Mauritania's Minister of Mines and Energy, Mr. Muhammed Mukhtar Ould Zamel, shed some light on exploratory activity, the energy situation and energy developments in Mauritania, particularly with regard to the country's energy sources, consumption, and the efforts made to organize the energy sector in preparation for the Second Arab Energy Conference to be held in Doha, Qatar, 1982.

Q. *The First Arab Energy Conference, recommended the formation of national energy committees. What steps has Mauritania taken in this regard? What government organ or body is now in charge of energy matters in your country?*

A. The energy sector, of particular interest to all countries of the world, is of major concern to us in Mauritania. Until one month ago, energy matters were handled by various bodies, which had led to dispersed efforts and impeded comprehensive planning in this vital sector. Due to the importance of this sector and acting upon the recommendations of the First Arab Energy Conference, held in Abu Dhabi in 1979, the Ministry of Energy and Mines is now in charge of formulating the country's energy options, particularly with regard to the formation of a national committee. The committee will lay down the country's unified policy, taking into account the producing and consuming sectors as well as energy consumption patterns, regardless of the energy source. The energy sector, which was neglected in the past, is now given priority as we endeavor to meet our energy requirements, especially since we lack the natural resources needed for consumption.

Q. *What are your main sources of energy, domestic sources in particular?*

A. Energy sources in Mauritania, are: a) *wood and charcoal*, used primarily to meet between 80-90% of the total requirements of household consumption, and providing all energy requirements in rural areas. The share of this source in Mauritania's total energy consumption exceeds 60%, which indicates the importance of this source at present. We realize, however, the finite nature of these resouces in a country where 80% of the area is a desert. b) *petroleum products*, imported in part from the Senegal while the bulk is purchased on the free market. We are now heading toward reliance on crude oil imports from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi crude will be processed in Europe according to an agreement with the European side, which will come into effect at the end of September 1981.

Q. What is your total consumption of petroleum products?

Local consumption of petroleum products averages 130,000 tons per year at present. This includes about 80,000 tons of gas oil used for heating, cooling, power generation and transport, and 50,000 tons of various other products. Gasoline alone, comprises about 30% of the country's total consumption of products. A rising trend in consumption patterns is expected next year. Consumption peaked in 1978, reaching 175,000 tons and then fell back following the shut down of a copper mine, 250 km. off the coast. The mine and its ancillary transport facilities consumed a large share of our petroleum products.

It is relevant in this context to refer to the oil refinery which is currently being established at Nouadhibou, 450 kms (north) from Nouakchott. The refinery which will become operational early next year, with a design capacity of one million tons per year, is based on the design of the Algerian Hassi Masoud refinery. Plans are underway for preparing the technical staff needed to manage and operate the refinery. We presently have a number of trainees in Qatar; others are being sent abroad. A $3 million budget has already been allocated for training purposes. Concerning the refinery output, we have a plan for optimum operation, to produce at levels above local consumption requirements, at a rate to be determined later. The surplus will be directed toward the export market.

Q. Are there any oil exploratory efforts going on at present?

Efforts are being made in several directions. We currently have a project, co-financed by the World Bank, aimed at preparing the legal and administrative framework to boost oil exploration in Mauritania. The project has already led us to a new evaluation of available data and a new study of the offshore and Taoudeni basins. Some companies have shown interest in the results of the study but negotiations are still at an early stage. As for our own past efforts, the amounts we have discovered were noncommercial. The field of exploration is very complicated and it is very difficult for countries which lack the necessary expertise and accurate data to undertake such activities.

Q. How would you outline your priorities with regard to energy in the future?

We are moving in two directions:

1. exploration for natural resources including both oil and coal.

2. development of alternative energy sources, particularly solar and wind energy, abundant in a coastal, desert country like Mauritania. The technology available to us in this field remains at a primary level of scientific research and the financial and human resources needed for its development are beyond Mauritania's potential at present. We hope to catch up in the future as we become more scientifically equipped to harness these two major resources.

Q. What are the opportunities for cooperation with other Arab countries in the field of energy?

Cooperation with other Arab countries can be achieved through:

1. formulation of technical guidelines for oil exploration.
2. import of crude oil through trade exchange relations.
3. refinery construction, operation and provision of technical staff.

In the future, the scope of cooperation may include:

1. the use of Arab expertise in oil exploration.
2. participation in the development of alternative energy sources as part of the activities of the new institute we have decided to establish for this purpose. This project will require resources that are not at present available to us. We expect to establish this institute within the next few months with a view to developing solar and wind energy and to producing equipment more suitable to Mauritania's local energy consumption.

3. a third area of cooperation includes securing crude supplies for domestic consumption, which will enable us to become independent of foreign companies, through direct deals between Mauritania and the Arab countries.

CSO: 4500/55

COUNTRY'S FREE MARKET PHILOSOPHY DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 pp 66-67

[Article by Annie King-Underwood]

[Text] FOR FOREIGN companies looking to tap the modest Omani market, the recipe is the same as in most Gulf states: form joint ventures. The snags, as one British businessman with long experience in Muscat has found, are that: 'The goodwill is there and the regulations are clear, but on a practical level there is some sort of confusion.'

The Middle East Association's Tim Owen, who visited the country recently reiterated this view in his published report: 'Omani businessmen are interested in setting up joint ventures with British firms, though some are rather vague as to how to set about it.'

The visitor to Oman soon realises that oil revenues are filtering down to the public. And besides increased state social and welfare budgets, there are now more private businesses setting up.

The second five year plan makes it clear that Oman will continue to follow the laissez-faire approach to trade. Indeed, to apply 'a free economic system based on market economy and free competition' is one of the plan's chief targets. For Owen, it was clear that: 'Small businesses are setting up apace. And it is accepted practice for those employed by the government and the oil company to run their own businesses on the side, often with great ingenuity.'

The rise of the smaller businesses can be attributed to the loans on favourable terms that are being provided by various government funds. Under the first five year plan the government established a fishermen's support fund (to provide modern boats, motors, nets and other equipment), for example, and similar funds were set up to help farmers and others in agriculture. The Development Bank of Oman was created to provide medium- and long-term financing to the private sector.

The second five year plan also aims to 'provide for the creation of a national economy based on private enterprise and free from monopolistic practices.'

It adds: 'For this purpose the government envisages extending to the private sector — to the degree permitted by the availability of resources — various incentives, tax exemptions and concessional loans . . . (and is looking to) participate in the equity of vital projects.'

The regulations on joint-venture formation in Oman are no stricter than in other Gulf states. The law permits a foreign company to do business in Oman provided it does so through an Omani company which has a minimum paid-up capital of Omani riyal 150,000 ($430,000). This sum may be reduced to a final minimum of OR 30,000 ($85,000) if 'deemed advisable by the Foreign Investment Committee, in accordance with reasonable economic evidence adduced by the committee and supported by the minister of commerce and industry, subject to the approval of the Development Council.'

The foreign company must also have Omani partners with at least a 35 per cent share of both capital and profits. But the Commercial Agencies Law (Royal Decree 26/77) requires Omani participation of at least 51 per cent in such agencies. The appointment of local agents is very strictly enforced.

However, finding agents in Oman at the moment is not easy, as the market is very small and the number of businessmen involved in agency work limited. It is expected that this problem will soon be resolved, as local businesses start feeling the benefit of government support.

CSO: 4400/68

BRIEFS

JAPANESE OIL EXPLORATION--Nippon Company and Taikoko of Japan were last week awarded a six-year oil exploration concession in Oman. According to a government statement, the Japanese firms will spend $104m on exploring oil in a 3.9m hectare area between Bar al Hickman and Afar, some 200km south of Muscat. Under the contract. Oman would get between 82 and 87 per cent of any oil. A 1978 study showed Oman to have an estimated 6bn barrels of reserves. The sultanate currently produces about 300,000b/d. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 66]

CSO: 4400/68

GCC CONSIDERING IMPORT TARIFFS

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 69

[Text] THE industry ministers of the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council recommended the introduction of import tariffs to protect domestic products to the 10 November GCC summit meeting held in Riyadh.

European industry chiefs have refrained from comment — it is not known what form the tariffs will take or what commodities will be affected most. The marketing director of a British company which exports construction material to the Gulf said: 'So far we do not know what is meant by import tariffs in this context and we do not know what type of products will be penalised the highest.'

The industry ministers of GCC members Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman met for two days in Riyadh at the end of last month. The meeting's chairman, Saudi Minister of Industry Ghazi al Gosaibi, said that the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consulting had been asked to conduct studies on the iron and steel industry, the marketing of petrochemical products and the establishment of joint projects.

Gulf business circles take the minister's comments to mean that iron and steel will be one of the first commodities to be subject to high tariffs. They also expect cement, food products, particularly canned food, and petrochemical byproducts such as detergents to be on the tariff list.

Gosaibi also said that the industry ministerial committee had successfully formulated a framework within which various organisations could carry out different assignments all aiming to achieve economic unity between the six states. He was confident that the Gulf states would be able to duplicate the EEC model.

The industry ministers decided to form a subcommittee consisting of the heads of national companies involved with basic industries and using local resources. It will be responsible for implementing the recommendations of the ministerial committee as they relate to achieving self-sufficiency, lessening dependence on foreign imports and expertise and unifying pace and style of development.

Another body, a technical cooperation committee, will be set up to liaise with the GCC General Secretariat to devise a system for exchange of information on industrial projects and draw up plans for statistical information concerning industrial activity in the Gulf. This committee will hold its first meeting in Bahrain early next month.

Western businessmen are adopting a wait and see attitude to the new proposals — mainly because similar decisions have been reached in the past but not implemented. However, the number of concrete decisions taken in Riyadh suggests that things might be different this time. Abdullah Bishara, secretary general of the GCC, told newsmen that 'barely four months into our first year we already have an impressive record in achieving what we set out to do.' He added that the GCC was working at a very fast rate in order to ensure the implementation of all the necessary steps to achieve economic unity.

CSO: 4400/71

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR RELEASES CRIME STATISTICS

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Oct 81 pp 3 & 16

[Text] RIYADH, Oct. 26 (SPA) — The Interior Ministry Monday reaffirmed that Saudi Arabia continues to record the minimum rate of criminal incidents. According to official statistics, the crime rate represents a reasonable average if compared to any other state, especially taking into consideration the comprehensive development in all fields and importing manpower of different nationalities.

The Ministry said the low rate of criminal incidents and prevalence of security and stability in a manner unmatched by any other country are the direct results of the application of the Islamic law (Sharia) in the country.

The Annual Statistical Book of the Interior Ministry for the year 1400 H (1980) dealt with the activities of the ministry and the departments connected with it. It said there was a drop in the number of some criminal incidents in comparison to those of the past year, adding that there were 460 physical assaults during 1980 with a drop of 111 incidents as compared to 1979.

The incidents included 87 premeditated murders, showing a decline of 28 incidents over the previous year; 21 accidental homicides that equaled the number for 1979; and 160 attempted murders which was 35 percent less than 1980. These incidents also included 65 murder threats, 25 percent less than last year's; 56 suicide cases showing an increase of 29 cases over 1979; and 71 attempted suicides, 12 percent less than 1979.

During 1980 there were 2,797 cases of theft, which represented 24 percent of total criminal cases but were 208 cases less than the previous year. These cases included: (1) 865 cases of car theft showing a decrease of 52 cases over 1979, (2) 606 house thefts with a fall of 1.3 percent (3) 488 thefts in commercial establishments with an increase of 57 cases over the last year (4) 299 cases of property theft, 137 less than the past year (5) 539 miscellaneous thefts.

There were 1,406 moral crimes this year, which formed 12 percent of the total criminal cases with a slight increase over the previous year. The 2,797 cases pertaining alcoholics included drinking, distilling and possessing of liquor — registering 24.2 percent of the total criminal cases with an increase of 104 cases over the last year. There were 21 cases of bribery this year; 153 cases of forgery and imposture, which was 1.3 percent of the total criminal cases. The cases of speculation numbered 3,252, recording 28 percent of the total criminal cases. Meanwhile, 41 cases of kidnapping were reported this year.

Summing up, the statistical book said there were 11,536 criminal cases this year as compared to 11,143 cases during 1979, with an increase of 393 cases. The number of criminals involved in these cases was 12,182, which shows a marked proximity between the number of cases and their perpetrators. These cases, however, occurred at the level of individuals and not organizations or gangs. The number of Saudi Arabian criminals was 8,021 or 66 percent and foreigners 4,161, or 34 percent.

The 87 cases of murder were committed by 64 persons, of whom 33 were Saudi Arabians and 31 other nationals. The 127 cases of suicide and attempted suicide were committed by 77 Saudis and 50 non-Saudis. The 21 cases of bribery involved 25 persons, of whom 17 were non-Saudis. Of the 44 cases of forgery, 38 were committed by non-Saudis. Likewise, the 12 cases of counterfeiting were committed by 12 persons including 10 non-Saudis.

A review of the criminal cases would show that 63.2 percent accused were involved in secondary crimes as compared to principal cases such as premeditated murder. Further, 3,166 accused, or 26.9 percent, were charged with liquor cases, teasing of women and forbidden privacy. While these are not considered as punishable crimes in other countries, Saudi Arabia which applies the Sharia considers them so. Moreover, the statistical

book mentioned that there were 7,953 detainees this year, of whom 4,331 were Saudis and 3,622 were non-Saudis.

Meanwhile, Interior Undersecretary Dr. Ibrahim Al-Awaji said that the contents of the statistical book reflect the activities of the various departments of the Interior Ministry having a bearing, directly or indirectly, on the interests and welfare of the citizens. He added that the figures represent a normal situation, and even less in percentage if compared with the crimes perpetrated in other countries. He said that the all-out development in the country and job opportunities have tempted many people from Arab and other states to come and benefit from those opportunities. He said the Kingdom welcomed their participation in accordance with the residence rules for aliens, but will never accept any disrespect to the rules and regulations as well as the Arab customs and traditions.

According to the statistics, there were 2,634 cases of narcotics during 1980 as against 2,732 during the year preceding, which registered a drop of 98 cases or 5 percent. It added that 36.5 percent of the total accused in narcotics cases were foreigners.

In the case of traffic, the statistical book said that 346,363 number plates were issued during 1980, as against 290,207 in 1979, 22,805 in 1971. Of these, 197,029 were private cars, 142,423 transport vehicles, 4,413 coasters and 1,478 motorcycles. The essential reasons for the stupendous increase in the number of vehicles has been the increase in population, in addition to the vast span of the country which makes it necessary for the people to own transportation. The other factors that contribute to the rise in the number of vehicles are the high purchasing power of the individuals, low customs duty, the state's intervention in specifying the profit for car dealers and the low cost of fuel. The book said that in 1971 there were 144,768 vehicles registered, whereas their number rose to 2,096,479 in 1980.

Likewise, 206,549 driving licenses were issued in 1980. Of the 18,758 traffic accidents, 16,218 people were injured and 731 were killed. Comparing the traffic accidents to the Kingdom's population, the accident rate was 208 per 100,000 people. The number of injured per 100,000 was 180 people and the number of killed was 30 per 100,000.

As regards incoming vehicles during the pilgrimage season, 14,690 vehicles entered the Kingdom during the four days prior to the pilgrimage from the inlets of Halat Ammar, Rugie, Salwa, Jizan and Najran. A total of 2,219,580 vehicles entered Makkah during 15/11/1400H and 9/12/1400H, and 2,094,960 vehicles made an exit from Makkah during the same period. Vehicles moving in and out of Arafat on 8, 9/12/1400H numbered 82,848 coming in and 34,371 going out.

Referring to civil defense, the report said the Kingdom-level fire-fighting operations during 1980 number 4,419 as against 3,870 in the year preceding. The number of those killed in these operations was 713 male and 98 female, with a material loss worth SR197,865,747. Likewise, there were 572 cases of rescue operation in 1980 as against 559 in the year preceding. In these operations, 1,025 male and 97 female died with a material loss of SR58,774,227.

The report said that during 1980, 1,431 people infiltrated into the country as against 977 during the past year. This showed an increase of 454 cases or 46 percent. In these cases, 7,999 infiltrators were arrested, as against 6,307 infiltrators in 1979. Smuggling cases numbered 779 as against 697, showing an increase of 12 percent.

Awaji said that Saudi Arabian nationality was granted to 1,124 persons during 1980. Of these, 546 were male and 578 female. The previous year the number of persons granted nationality was only 1,024. In regard to the College of Internal Security Forces, he said that the number of students in 1980 rose to 1,036, which was the biggest number in the history of the college. A total of 2,465 cadets have graduated from the college since its inception.

He referred to medical care for the military and civilian officials of the Public Security and said that the nucleus for this care was laid down with the inauguration of the Public Security Hospital in Riyadh. It was followed by a number of clinics that were opened in different areas. He added that the first phase of the hospital has been completed.

He also referred to the educational aspects and mentioned the role of the Officers' Institute, Cadets' Institute, Civil Defense Institute, Traffic Institute, Passports Institute, musical and physical training schools as well as shooting, language and horseracing schools. During the past decade, he said, 2,073 students were sent abroad for higher education and training. Of these, 979 were sent for a Bachelor's degree, 75 for the Master's degree and 19 for the doctorate. These students included 131 officers, 239 non-commissioned officers, 82 officials and 1,721 cadets. The third Five-Year plan needed 4,211 academicians and technicians, he added.

CSO: 4400/71

RENT CONTROLS TO BE LIFTED

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 pp 6-7

[Text] IN A YEAR'S time, at the beginning of 1403AH, rent control is to be abolished in Saudi Arabia with the blessing of the religious authorities. Some Saudis in government and elsewhere, however, are arguing for a further freeze on rents. They fear that the abolition of rent control will add to the current strong inflationary pressures, and could also create a class conflict between landlords and tenants that Saudi Arabia's fledgling political institutions might not be able to contain. The debate provides one of the clearest examples in recent times of how Saudi religious forces influence the government and the Saud family in their running of the country.

The decontrolling of rents by 1403AH was legislated for in Resolution No. 231 of 4 November last year. In its preamble, the resolution suggested that the abolition of rent control would be possible next year because the housing crisis that had led to state intervention would be over. This assumption was questioned in an editorial in the newspaper *Al Nadwa* in mid-September. The paper called for a further freeze. The measured reply of the clergy was carried in the national press in October.

The arguments were put forward by Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Baz, president of Saudi Arabia's religious research committee and one of the kingdom's most prominent clergymen. Free rents, he says are in harmony with the precepts of Islam and are in the public interest, while restricting rents is unjust to landlords and is an 'illegal usurpation' of their money, contrary to the divine orders and the instructions of the Prophet.

More practically, Sheikh Abdulaziz pointed to the measures taken by the government directly and through the Real Estate Development Fund (REDF) to ease the housing shortage and to reduce rents, and said that any disputes between landlord and tenant as a result of decontrolled rents could be settled in the courts.

Sheikh Abdulaziz is an enigma figure on the Saudi scene, and his influence and standing with the government has fluctuated over the years. Now generally acknowledged as the leading figure in the ulema, he has often proved a thorn in the side of the authorities. King Faisal suppressed an article by the theologian on the flatness of the earth and also prevented him from assuming the position of Grand Mufti in 1967. Sheikh Abdulaziz was also the mentor of Juhaiman al Utaiba, leader of the 1980 Mecca occupation, but the two fought over the extent to which a fundamentalist reading of the Koran and Sunna required outright condemnation of the ruling family. Juhaiman wrote in one of his pamphlets: 'The ulema have warned the royal family about its corruption but Abdulaziz is in the family's pay and has endorsed their actions.' Sheikh Abdulaziz signed the fatwa authorising Juhaiman's execution after the Mecca siege.

For these reasons, the impact of Sheikh Abdulaziz's highly publicised remarks on the need to go through with the abolition of rent control has to be assessed with care. In general, however, the strength of the ulema has been growing over the past two years, and its advocacy of free-market rents could be interpreted as a muted demand for an end to the extensive state intervention that has characterised the Saudi economy in the past decade.

The government's success in alleviating the housing shortage and the performance of the REDF itself are open to debate.

Although the public housing programme has made considerable strides, there are still areas of deficient housing.

Since 1975, the REDF has made 150,000 loans worth Saudi riyals 30bn ($8.7bn) to individuals and 150 loans worth SR1.5bn ($439m) to developers, and has undoubtedly helped to ease the housing crisis. But it has an appalling record on repayment and replenishment, and has had to approach the government every year for fresh money to continue its programme. Only last month Crown Prince Fahd had to announce another effective rescheduling of REDF debts, allowing borrowers extensions of 60 rather than 30 days on payments, after which they are still eligible to a 20 per cent reduction of their capital liability.

The religious lobby's insistence on ending rent controls may help to ease the REDF's problems, even if it does boost inflation. This could help the housing programme to maintain momentum despite the likelihood of a general expenditure squeeze. But the overriding implication is that the religious authorities in Saudi Arabia are clearly pressing the government for a quick return to unfettered private enterprise.

CSO: 4400/71

BRIEFS

NEW PHONE CODES RELEASED--Riyadh, Oct. 19--Saudi Telephone has added two numbers to its list of special codes. The numbers allow residents emergency access to appropriate departments and agencies. The code number "930" has been introduced Kingdom-wide for the use of telex customers who need to report troubles to Saudi Telex. The "914" special service also has been introduced to enable subscribers to report faults with their automatic mobile telephone service, a Saudi Telephone spokesman said. Regarding the "930" code, Saudi Telephone's modern switching equipment automatically converts the three-digit service code to the appropriate seven-digit Saudi Telex number. [Text] [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 20 Oct 81 p 2]

CSO: 4400/70

BRIEFS

FORCE AGAINST STUDENTS URGED--Khartoum, 17 Nov (INA)--Gen 'Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil, Sudanese first vice president and defense minister, has attacked Khartoum University students, calling them "a minority of renegades." At a press conference last night, he said what happened at Khartoum University should be a subject for reflection. He warned that the university atmosphere would change and that "we should not hasten events." In a strongly worded editorial today, AL-SAHAFAH urged the use of force against the students, adding that what happened at the university "tolls the alarm." [Text] [JN171126 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1050 GMT 17 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/92

BRIEFS

CLASHES IN ALEPPO--Information received by the Voice of Lebanon Radio indicates that during ceremonies marking the anniversary of the corrective movement on 16 November, an armed man hurled a handgrenade at the governor of Aleppo, Nuhad al-Qadi, as he was passing in his car near the al-Shaykh Taha Bridge. His driver and two aides were killed while the governor miraculously escaped. The hurler of the grenade then attempted suicide by firing at himself with a pistol. As a result, the security atmosphere became tense in the area. The tension soon spread to al-Jumayliyah and Qabr Hananu areas where clashes occurred between the security forces and the Muslim Brotherhood. A number of persons were killed or wounded from both sides. Moreover, the special units have detained about 100 suspected persons and threw them in prisons after beating them up. In the Aleppo quarters, particularly in the al-Sabil quarter, tension and arrests are continuing coupled with bursts of gunfire to cover the security forces operations against the Muslim Brotherhood and their sympathizers. Intensive security barricades have been noticed in the township, particularly near the government departments. [Text] [NC201620 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1515 GMT 20 Nov 81]

CLASHES TAKE PLACE--The Voice of Lebanon has received information about new incidents in Hamah, al-Raqqah and Aleppo in Syria which resulted in a number of casualties. In Hamah last Saturday the Syrian Army intercepted big demonstrations staged in protest against the People's Assembly elections. A clash ensued in which three demonstrators and an army soldier were killed and a number of others were wounded. In al-Raqqah, the Muslim Brotherhood killed the occupants of a military vehicle they ambushed. In Aleppo, the sounds of explosions and bursts of machine-gun fire have not ceased. Military patrols never leave the streets. [Text] [NC162042 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 2015 GMT 16 Nov 81]

PAYMENT FOR LEBANON WITHDRAWAL--Riyadh, 13 Nov (MENA)--Syria has asked the Arab Followup Committee at its meeting in Beirut on Saturday for the sum of 16.25 billion dollars as a pre-condition for its withdrawal from Lebanon, AL-YAMAMAH magazine reported today. The Followup Committee made reservations regarding the sum, which it said is equal to Syria's state budget for the next 8 years, and the committee members expressed astonishment at Syria's request for such a big sum, quoting diplomatic sources close to the committee the weekly said. The Arab Folluwup Committee for resolving the Lebanon issue comprises Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and the Arab League secretary general and is presided over by President Ilias Sarkis. [Text] [NC132255 Cairo MENA in English 2225 GMT 13 Nov 81]

CSO: 4400/64

BRIEFS

GERMAN INDUSTRIAL PARTICIPATION--Krupp, the West German industrial giant, has expressed interest in participating in the industrialisation of the UAE. An eight-member delegation from Fried Krupp GmbH and its subsidiaries, on a visit to the UAE, expressed the group's readiness to develop its activities in the country. The group, whose interests range from shipbuilding and engineering to construction and petrochemicals, has already completed several contracts in the UAE and other Gulf states. According to Omar Arafat Deesi, foreign relations director of Dubai Chamber of Commerce, the projects in which the team expressed interest included refineries, petrochemicals and light industry. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 66]

CSO: 4400/68

END

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ISRAELI REPORT ON PROBLEM AT CAIRO EXHIBITION

TA091337 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1110 GMT 9 Nov 81

[Text] Tel Aviv, 9 Nov--An official complaint about the refusal of Egyptian newspapers to publish Israeli announcements in the course of a Cairo fair was submitted at the time of the fair by the management of the Israeli pavilion to the Israeli Embassy in Cairo. The latter transferred the complaint to the Egyptian foreign ministry. However, even after the intervention of the Israeli ambassador to Cairo, Mr Moshe Sason, with high-level representatives of the Egyptian government no reason was given for this.

Upon his return to Israel from the exhibition, the manager of the Israeli pavilion, Mr Moshe Neyar, said the publication that refused to publish Israeli ads, despite orders and requests a few months earlier, were AL-AHRAM, AKHBAR AL-YAWM and OCTOBER.

Mr Neyar further noted that the Egyptian Minister of State for Economy, Dr Sulayman Nur al-Din, refrained from entering the Israeli pavilion and passed it by during his tour of the fair. Dr Sulayman explained to the manager of the Israeli pavilion that he would come to the Israeli pavilion for a special visit but he never did so.

Nevertheless, several high-level Egyptian personages, including the Egyptian industry and mineral resources minister and the Tourism and Civil Aviation Minister, Mr 'Ali Kamal al-Nazir did visit the Israeli pavilion. They were greatly impressed by the Israeli exhibits which spread over 700 square meters.

From the economic point of view the manager of the pavilion concluded that about 60 of the Israeli participants in the exhibition were satisfied, thanks to forming ties with local agents, receiving orders and being able to leave a permanent exhibition in Egypt. Some of the participants even sold their exhibits on the spot. The Egyptian visitors included 1,500 buyers in addition to the public, including engineers and students.

Mr Neyar estimates that orders received during the exhibition amounted to several hundred thousand dollars. His estimate is based on procurement agreements signed by Egyptian buyers and Israeli exhibitors.

The export institute, which organized the Israeli pavilion, conducted an on-the-spot survey and distributed among the Israeli exhibitors lists of potential buyers. Thus deep contact with local trade elements was possible. Efforts were also made to form ties with members of the Cairo chamber of commerce who were guests of the Israeli pavilion and expressed the wish to maintain regular commercial ties.

BRIEFS

FRENCH SEE POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN PLO--The French ruling party believes there are positive elements in the PLO that can give rise to the hope that the Middle East conflict would be resolved. The person in charge of the French Socialist Party's international relations department told our correspondent in Paris that the PLO has already been given a status similar, at least, to the status his party will soon grant some African liberation movements. He noted that the Palestinians need a state, but must first recognize Israel's right to exist. [Text] [TA052115 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 5 Nov 81]

CSO: 4423/42

ALF LEADER ON EGYPT, BREZHNEV INITIATIVE

GF231652 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 22 Nov 81 p 17

["Text" of exclusive interview by 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, PLO Executive Committee member and secretary general of the Arab Liberation Front granted to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM correspondent Khalid Salam in Beirut--no date given]

[Excerpt] [Question] Did the Palestinian command study the post-al-Sadat era at its executive committee meeting?

[Answer] Yes, it studied it initially and quickly because the command has only held one short meeting since al-Sadat's death due to the lack of time. During that meeting the command decided that the post-al-Sadat era will be very risky despite all positive points in al-Sadat's assassination. These risks are manifested in the possibility of enemy aggression to perpetuate the de facto situation and prevent any possible jolt, of which al-Sadat's [assassination] constituted the beginning, in my view, the command studied all dimensions of the situation in the light of which we have to proceed.

[Question] Including the possibility of inviting Egypt's Mubarak to the Arab summit and back to Arab ranks?

[Answer] For us, the subject is out of question because the trouble with the Egyptian regime is not confined to al-Sadat as an individual but with Egypt's policy. After al-Sadat's successor, Mubarak, announced the willingness to coninue the same policy, we do not see any essential change in the regime's stand.

However, we do not rule out that some Arab regime might make some moves in an attempt to control the situation and bring Mubarak to the Arab summit under the claim that the problem was with al-Sadat and ended with his disappearance. We do not share that view either as Palestinians or as the executive committee. Our stand on this issue is clear and this issue has already been settled.

[Question] Has the PLO therefore transferred two issues or two initiatives to the forthcoming summit--the two initiatives of Brezhnev, as Abu 'Ammar said in Moscow, and of Fahd?

[Answer] As a front, we have a clear stand on Brezhnev's initiative. This stand was announced by the Palestinian national assembly. We judged his initiative the same way as we judge any initiative. Brezhnev's initiative did not treat the Palestinian cause in its historical dimensions. So far, no initiative has been put forward that treats the cause with these dimensions. Rather, all treatments have been geographical, if we take international calculations and interests into consideration. Initiatives may differ in intentions, but in the end, for us they are the same.

CSO: 4404/131

ABU-MAZIN DISCUSSES FAHD PLAN, SAUDI-USSR RELATIONS

JN241005 Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 21 Nov 81 pp 34-35

[Dispatch by Sulayman Nimr]

[Excerpts] Riyadh--When Mahmud 'Abass (Abu Mazin), member of the PLO Executive Committee, visited the Saudi capital last Saturday and Sunday [14 and 15 November], political observers said the purpose of his visit to Riyadh was to resume discussions with Saudi officials on the Palestinian attitude toward the Saudi peace plan. But other observers said the visit was linked with the reports that the PLO was mediating between Moscow and Riyadh. These observers reached such conclusions from the premise that Abu Mazin is head of the Arab-Soviet Friendship Society and he also accompanied Yasir 'Arafat on his last visit to Moscow.

When AL-MUSTAQBAL met with the Palestinian official, its first question to him was "Has Abu Mazin indeed come to Riyadh for the purpose of mediating between Riyadh and Moscow on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries?"

Abu Mazin did not deny or confirm the matter, although he stressed that his visit was not for the purpose of discussing the Saudi plan with officials in Riyadh. He said: "We in the PLO are keen on seeing an exchange of diplomatic relations between a sister state like Saudi Arabia and a friendly state like the USSR. The Saudi crown prince and his foreign minister previously announced that the USSR has an important role to play in the Middle East question. Moscow welcomed this announcement, which was considered a courtship between the two capitals that could lead to a dialogue between them. We in the PLO hope that we will be able to develop this dialogue into an exchange of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Riyadh.

I asked Abu Mazin:

[Question] It is said that the PLO has not yet announced its clear position on the Prince Fahd peace plan. While PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat has welcomed the Saudi plan, seven Palestinian leaders have said that they have observations or reservations on some of the points in the plan. What is the PLO's position or possible position on the Saudi peace plan?

[Answer] PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat has repeatedly welcomed the Saudi peace plan and said that it is a suitable basis for a just and comprehensive solution in the region. This is the true PLO position, although the organization has observations on some

of the points in the plan. These observations were made by Yasir 'Arafat in his talks with Saudi officials during his last visit to Riyadh and will also be raised during the Arab summit. As for the organizations that have announced their rejection of the plan, each one has rejected it from its own viewpoint and from a specific angle. We believe that total rejection for the sake of rejection is irresponsible. If you want to know the true PLO position, then it is the one announced by Yasir 'Arafat.

[Question] Do you think political circumstances in the region will change after Israel's withdrawal from Sinai in April? Do you expect this to happen, and what would the circumstances be?

[Answer] Let us be frank. You mean the end of the Camp David accords. Let me tell you that the Camp David accords have two parts; one Egyptian and one Palestinian. The Egyptian part will be accomplished. The new Egyptian regime will not go back on the Camp David accords, but will be less enthusiastic about continuing the talks of autonomy. The reason is Palestinian rejection of the autonomy idea and the fact that Egypt will not be as keen on continuing the negotiations with Israel after retrieving its own territory. This will create a political vacuum in the region which must be filled.

[Question] You speak about a political vacuum in the region after Arpil. But don't you think that the Prince Fahd peace plan could fill this vacuum; in other words, it could be the basis for political activity in the region?

[Answer] If the Prince Fahd plan is approved by the Arabs at least, it would become an Arab peace plan. Then the world would not have an excuse to say that the Arabs are vague in their stands and do not clearly say what they want. Arab approval of the Prince Fahd plan would place the United States in a very embarrassing situation, because its real intentions about peace in the region would be put to a difficult test. I will not be disclosing a secret when I say that the United States hopes for the Arabs to reject the Saudi peace plan so that it would not be placed in an embarrassing situation before the world and its friends in the region.

[Question] Do you believe that the coming Arab summit will succeed in achieving again a minimum agreement of Arab solidarity?

[Answer] This will be difficult. The reason is that the Fes summit is taking place in circumstances which are similar to those in which the Amman summit was held, with the exception that none of the Arab states will boycott the Fes summit as in the case of the Amman summit, which was boycotted by six Arab states. Bilateral Arab differences are still strong. What should have taken place was that these differences should have been solved before convening the summit so that they would not have an impact on the summit resolutions and the achievement of minimum agreement on Arab solidarity.

[Question] What will be your position in the Arab summit as Palestinians?

[Answer] We will demand that the Arabs achieve a minimum agreement of Arab solidarity. We will request complete support for the Palestine question, suspension of interference in the affairs of the Palestinian revolution and material, rather than propaganda, support for the sweeping uprising in the occupied territory these days. Our demands will be many, but I can sum them up as the necessity to prepare ourselves for a confrontation with the Israeli enemy.

[Question] What will be the PLO position if the subject of Egypt is brought up at the Arab summit?

[Answer] We are against the return to the Arab fold of the Egyptian regime under present conditions, because the reasons which led to its existence still exist. The Arabs boycotted the former Egyptian regime because it signed and implemented the Camp David accords. The present Egyptian regime has declared that it is still committed to the accords. Therefore the reasons have not changed. There is nothing new to enable us to see the possibility of the Egyptian regime's return to the Arab world.

[Question] Do you believe that the Arabs have shifted from a state of war with Israel to one of peaceful coexistence?

[Answer] There is in practice no war between the Arabs and Israel. Egypt has departed from the confrontation battle, and the other Arab fronts are silent. Thus, there is a truce between the Arabs and Israel. In other words, there is neither a state of war nor peaceful coexistence. This truce might last for a long time as after 1948 or might be shortened based on Arab circumstances.

[Question] Why this Palestinian concern and endeavor to bring about a U.S. recognition of the PLO?

[Answer] We believe that U.S. recognition of the Palestinian people's full rights is very important. The United States can bring pressure to bear on Israel. We are keen on obtaining Washington's recognition without any conditions. There have been on various occasions many unofficial Palestinian-U.S. contacts. During the Lebanese war, we saved 150 U.S. families. They acknowledged and expressed their thanks to us via their friends. We are keen on having the U.S. recognize the PLO without any conditions because the United States is a big power. We are interested in obtaining U.S. recognition just as we are interested in obtaining the recognition of the entire world. What kind of a revolution is that which is not keen on having world recognition? The objectives of our political struggle since 1965 have been summed up in the need to have the world recognize us as a people. We started with the Arab world, then with the United Nations and the nonaligned countries. Then we moved toward Europe because we want the entire world and not only the United States to recognize us.

[Question] It has been observed that there is stronger Palestinian support for the Saudi peace plan inside the occupied Arab territories than outside these territories. How do you explain that?

[Answer] The Palestinian stand inside the occupied territories is no different from that outside. The Palestinians inside the occupied territories believe in the legitimacy which represents them, the PLO, and in the PLO's symbol, Yasir 'Arafat. Yasir 'Arafat has stated that the [Saudi] initiative can serve as a basis for a solution. The Palestinians inside the occupied territories have said the same thing but with more explanation. Had Yasir 'Arafat not welcomed the Saudi plan, the West Bank and Gaza mayors would not have welcomed it.

[Question] During Yasir 'Arafat's recent visit to Moscow, you discussed, among other topics, the Soviet Jews' emigration to Israel. Did the Soviets give you any promises to stop this emigration?

[Answer] This subject has been raised with the Arab countries and with other countries such as the Soviet Union because it concerns us very much. We have for some time been holding a calm dialogue with Moscow on this subject. We are not concerned over the Jews' emigration from the Soviet Union to any place, but we are concerned over the arrival of the Jews in occupied Palestine. During our recent visit, we obtained promises from the Soviet Union to the effect that there will be a reduction in the number of Jews emigrating to occupied Palestine.

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VARIOUS ASPECTS OF WESTERN SAHARA WAR REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 205, 26 Oct 81 pp 18-21

/Article by al-Salami al-Husni: "Has the Algerian-Moroccan War Started?"/

/Text/ The Polisario attack of 13 October on the town of Guelta Zemmur in the middle of the Western Sahara, using modern weapons, has put a limit to the hopes the summit conference meeting of the Organization of African Unity had raised that a peaceful, negotiated resolution of the Western Sahara issue would be reached. King Hassan the Second declared, immediately after the attack on the town, that what had happened constituted a violation of the cease fire and consequently of the Organization of African Unity resolutions, and that he found himself compelled to regain his freedom of movement and military confrontation.

The attack on Guelta Zemmur -- following the cease fire that had lasted a number of months after King Hassan the Second declared his agreement to the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara under the supervision of international organizations, and after preparations had started for holding this referendum and solving the problem that were hanging or that had arisen from the issue through negotiation - raises a number of questions bearing on the destiny of the region and Algerian-Moroccan relations, just as it answers them. The motives and the background for Polisario's attack on Guelta Zemmur do not seem innocent or remote from the factors that now govern domestic conditions in Algeria, as well as internal conditions in the Polisario front and the front's position on the referendum. There is no doubt that the choice of Guelta Zemmur, which was exposed to a similar attack last April, was made with the objective of concealing this background and giving strategic dimensions to this process. As this town lies on the border of Mauritania (which is about 40 kilometers away) and is far from the Moroccan-Algerian borders, the purpose was to keep Algeria, which had closed its borders with Morocco through a military buildup, from being accused /of the attack/.

In addition, Guelta Zemmur lies between the provinces of El Aiun to the north and Tiris El Gharbia and Dakhla to the south and is also on the main road linking Nouakchott to Zouirat in the Western Desert. Before the Organization of African Unity resolutions and King Hassan the Second's declaration on the referendum plan, Polisario had aimed, by attacking Guelta Zemmur, to take it over, use it as a springboard to the west, to the Pacific, and therefore cut the Sahara in two and isolate the Moroccan forces in Tiris El Gharibia, surround them, and cut off aid to them. This sort of military plan is well known in desert war, but Polisario always failed to achieve this goal and one cannot rule out the possibility that it had hoped to carry out this military plan

through this new attack not to inflict a military defeat on the Moroccan forces this time but to surround them and impose negotiations with Morocco, which has been rejected by the Moroccan king, who considers that the issue of the Western Sahara is a Moroccan-Algerian one and involves other parties, none of which, however, is the Polisario front.

In the past, though, the front performed its military operations under the aegis of Algerian approval and Mauritanian indifference, while today it launched the attack on Guelta Zemmur at a time when the Algerian army was stationed on the borders with Morocco, specifically to prevent such operations, in order to carry out President Chadli Bendjadid's commitment to the African unity summit resolutions for a peaceful negotiated solution, which included a cease fire. This Algerian commitment was in practice represented by the closing of the borders, or at least surveillance over them, to prevent any incursions by Polisario forces through these borders. King Hassan the Second also managed, on his return from Nairobi, to obtain a Mauritanian commitment similar to the Algerian one through a meeting Hassan the Second held with the president of Mauritania, Ould Haidalla, in al-Ta'if. In addition to this, Algeria, after the Nairobi summit, closed the road along the Algerian-Libyan border, known as the Polisario Road, through which the front is supplied with arms. From the practical standpoint, all of these measures constitute actual guarantees for a cease fire which Polisario had wanted to reach through direct negotiations with Morocco. What happened in the recent period to change these guarantees, or the Algerian and Mauritanian position, so that Polisario could circumvent everything and attack Guelta Zemmur, as it did recently, with the modern arms it possesses, with which it brought down two Moroccan airplanes, in addition to the armored cars and heavy weapons it used for the first time, according to information in the Moroccan statement? In any event, one cannot find the answer on the Moroccan side because whatever the situation might be it is not in Morocco's interests to go back to war in the Western Sahara in its current domestic condition, because that would mean, on King Hassan the Second's part, giving in to the desire of the Socialist Federation of Popular Powers, which rejects the referendum. Likewise, it is not possible to seek an answer from the Mauritanian party, for two reasons -- the special experience of Mauritania, which has lost a great deal from the war, and the instability and constant threats it has brought to the Nouakchott government, which was the first to seek peace because it was the first to benefit from it, and second the fact that the Mauritanian authorities do not actually control the broad areas lying north of Zouirat, a mountainous region extending from Tindouf in Algeria to Bu Craa near the town of Guelta Zemmur, so that consequently the military divisions belonging to the Polisario front can easily move from Tindouf to Guelta Zemmur without facing or skirmishing with Mauritanian units or even risking discovery by the weak Mauritanian military authorities, as well as enjoying tribal relations with the tribes in northern Mauritania, in the case of a number of Polisario elements.

Therefore the real reasons and background to this military attack must lie in Algerian domestic conditions and what is going on inside Polisario.

Since the Algerian president, Chadli Bendjadid, began liquidating the power centers and resolving internal disputes in order to build his own era, the basic phenomenon distinguishing the internal Algerian situation has been the accumulation of problems that date back to Boumediene's corrective movement and perhaps even to independence, and the transformation of the country, since Boumediene's death, into a number of small countries and the fragmentation of the decision making centers. President Chadli Bendjadid's efforts and movements since he assumed power have all been aimed just

at restoring the single decision making that he represents in his capacity as the actual president. Before the beginning of summer of this year, the liquidations were marginal and did not include such basic elements as Bouteflika, Yahyaoui or other competing leaders -- rather, it was in the past few months that Bendjadid proceeded with the necessary step, which was to liquidate these leaders and remove them from decision making positions. It was anticipated that Bendjadid would appoint a new prime minister and shuffle the cabinet; however, numerous difficulties that had not been anticipated arose from the removal of the leaders competing with him, and that caused him to delay the next step, although he did try recently to eliminate these problems through a radical change in the Algerian media, once he had discovered that these media were dominated by his adversaries. Thus Chadli Bendjadid has so far "cleaned up" most of the economic institutions, media and military security, which has come into civilian hands, guaranteeing these agencies' loyalty to him. However, what is not known now is whether Chadli Bendjadid still enjoys the confidence of the army, which brought him to the presidency following Boumediene's death, and consequently whether the senior officers in the Algerian army, who were raised in Boumediene's era, support Chadli Bendjadid just in order to eliminate the adversaries or also back his domestic policy and his methods for treating crises and share his view on the cultural inssue, which has been transformed into a political one. If the army, which views what is going on domestically in Algeria in a manner similar to the way it did when it was commanded by a minister of defense named Boumediene in the era of Ahmed Ben Bella, does not support Chadli Bendjadid's policies, or even if it is neutral, the centers of decisionmaking that Bendjadid eliminated will not miss the opportunity to bring the army in and return it to the arena of political struggle; this will not come about by pushing him to solve domestic political problems and suppress disturbances or student demonstrations -- because there is a risk to everyone in that -- but rather by pushing him to stir up war with Morocco, especially since the roots of this war have spread since the independence of Algeria and the first conflict on the borders in the era of Ahmed Ben Bella. The centers of decisionmaking that have been liquidated and eliminated represent the hard-line wing in the Algerian regime and consider themselves to have been Boumediene's partners in stirring up the Sahara issue and the heirs of the view which holds that Algeria is the leader of the Maghreb and the African continent and bears the banner of the "people's Maghreb" -- goals that Shadli Bendjadid has abandoned.

From the beginning of the war in the Western Sahara, the hard-line leaders in the Algerian regime had been hoping to occupy a position of leadership through Polisario, especially following Boumediene's death. Chadli Bendjadid came up against difficulties in imposing his authority and therefore this hard-line wing, which believes that continued tension and military skirmishes in the Western Sahara are its only means for coping with the liquidation activities directed against it, found its instrument in the summit resolutions of the Organization of African Unity, and Chadli Bendjadid actually did take measures against Yahyaoui and his supporters and Bouteflika, directly after Hassan the Second had given his agreement to the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara. Consequently, after Chadli Bendjadid had become assured that the Sahara issue was resolved and that it would perhaps be possible to restore Moroccan-Algerian relations, the hard-line wing in the Algerian regime continued to stand directly opposed to any Algerian-Moroccan negotiations; Col Kasdi Mirbah played a role in this area which resulted in his dismissal from his position.

For these reasons, resumption of the war in the Western Sahara means, as regards the hard-line wing in the Algerian regime, which has been eliminated, a new breather and

a final chance for salvation which cannot be ignored because Chadli Bendjadid's commitment to prevent military operations from setting out from Algerian soil -- a commitment which was safeguarded in practice by the Algerian mobilization on the Moroccan borders -- is in fact the start of the road toward restoring Moroccan-Algerian relations to their natural state. It was expected that an announcement would be made on the restoration of these relations after an expected meeting between Chadli Bendjadid and King Hassan the Second in Paris under the aegis of France. This means that now that Algerian-Tunisian relations have reached an advanced stage of improvement, Chadli Bendjadid has come to enjoy actual power in the context of the Maghreb and this enables him to impose his dominance domestically and consequently put an end to the hard-line wing completely.

From the standpoint of Polisario, the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity summit and King Hassan the Second's agreement to the holding of a referendum in the Western Sahara have raised disputes within the front on the one hand and have put it on the sidelines on the other. The referendum is concerned only with the people who really inhabit Saguia El Hamra and Rio De Oro, while the Polisario front contains a majority which does not belong to this area, in spite of its affiliation with Saharan tribes from northern Mauritania, southern Algeria and even Mali; consequently it is not involved with the referendum, which it considers will mean the termination of its political role in establishing its own country. These are the same elements which impose the condition of direct negotiations with Morocco in exchange for agreeing to a referendum and cease fire. The position of this majority, to which a number of front leaders belong, will be strengthened as a result of Polisario's shift to a marginal position which threatens to eliminate it following the holding of the referendum which will confirm that the Sahara belongs to Morocco. Therefore the resumption of military action and the violation of the cease fire will realize a number of goals at the same time for the front, most important being to transcend internal disputes, revive its existence, and impose Morocco's recognition of the front and direct negotiation with it, not over the referendum but over the independence of the Sahara, the absorption of the elements that make up the majority within the population of Saguia El Hamra and Rio De Oro, and the recognition /of the front members/ in the event agreement is reached to the referendum.

Thus domestic Algerian factors have coincided with the new situation which Polisario has faced following the Nairobi summit and it was through this that the military invasion of Guelta Zemmur came about, realizing all the goals that the hard-line wing in the Algerian government and the majority directing Polisario policy are working toward. However, this military attack is different from the other Polisario military operations in that it actually threatens to be the direct start of an Algerian-Moroccan war, which is what Polisario had previously striven for without success by disguising its units as Moroccans and striking at Algerian military concentrations.

It is to be noted that the Algerian reaction was stated by the Political Bureau of the Algerian Liberation Front, that is, Chadli Bendjadid. The Algerian statement stressed Algeria's desire to pursue a peaceful negotiated solution to the issue of the Western Sahara, Algeria's commitment to the undertaking Chadli Bendjadid made, and rejection of the Moroccan charges. Polisario has kept silent and has not even declared whether it embraces the military operation against the town of Guelta Zemmur, and this explains the goal of the military attack, which seems to have embarrassed the Algerian authorities and caused Polisario to lose the card of international recognition and the benefit of the Organization of African Unity resolutions.

Faced with Polisario's violation of the cease fire and the violent Moroccan reaction to this military attack, the danger that war will break out again has come to loom over the northwestern region of the African continent and the factors which prompted the Polisario military operation could result in the outbreak of an Algerian-Moroccan war if the parties concerned lose their control of the new conditions.

However, Arab efforts, which were exerted as soon as the situation reached a crisis with the Polisario front's military attack, have calmed the tension to some extent, at least as far as the likelihood of the outbreak of an Algerian-Moroccan war go. These Arab contacts were represented by Arab League intervention and the efforts of some neighboring countries, including Tunisia. Nonetheless, anxiety over a probable deterioration of the situation continues to dominate the region. In its first declaration 4 days after the operation, the Polisario front declared that it was in control of the town of Guelta Zemmur, that the battles were going on, and that it intended through its military attack to "reveal Morocco's intentions," which were not peaceful. A day later, informed sources said that Polisario had taken control only of advanced positions close to the town, that the losses on both sides were high, that the Moroccan forces reimposed control over the area, that the battles continued for about 6 consecutive days, and that they were among the biggest battles the Sahara war had witnessed since 1976. Although the full details of these battles are not known, it is now certain that Polisario's attack has brought the clock back to the situation that prevailed before the Nairobi conference and King Hassan the Second's declaration of agreement to the holding of a referendum on autonomy among the people of the Sahara, and that therefore it is not to be expected, in the light of Moroccan statements, that Morocco will continue unilaterally with the cease fire and execution of the African summit resolutions, especially since the Polisario attack was clearly connnected to political conditions and situations that are outside the domestic elements of the Western Sahara issue.

The ramifications of the Polisario action may not stop at this point but may in one way or another affect the activities of the Arab summit which is to be held in the Moroccan city of Fez toward the end of next month and might cast some light on the motives behind the attack which Polisario made. If the Algerian president, Chedli Bendjadid, attends the Arab summit conference, all eyes will be directed toward the possibility that he will meet with Hassan the Second, or at least toward the negotiations between the two countries that will take place in the halls.

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VARIOUS ASPECTS OF ARAB BANKING EXAMINED

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[Text]

Arab banking has come of age: the likes of Bahrain and Kuwait are now world money centres. In this special 36-page report, an expert team of 8 Days writers looks at the phenomenon of Arab banking from all angles. Included in the topics they discuss and analyse are: a mystery $25bn gap between Opec surpluses and investment, euromarket trends, the future of the consortia, co-financing and Third World aid, the Islamic factor, takeovers and the push for business in the West as well as firm control of the domestic markets. It opens with a report by Anthony Marriott on the system's linchpin: Opec revenues.

The growth of the Arab banks over the last decade has shown the world's traditional money centres in Europe and the US not only that an indigenous banking system could be established swiftly and efficiently in the Middle East, but that this newly-created league of Arab banking institutions is now capable of making major contributions to the redeployment of Opec surplus funds to the non-oil producing nations. The extraordinary rise of the Arab banks, in the face of heavy competition from western banks in their home markets as well as outside the Middle East, has given them an opportunity to shift the balance of financial power from the capital markets — traditionally based in New York and London — to the new money centres such as Bahrain and Kuwait.

However, while the smooth growth of the Arab banks can be linked to the increase in the oil surplus funds of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the future task of handling the inflows and outflows of Middle East petrodollars seems likely to be far more difficult than it has been — over the last three

years of troubled and volatile capital markets worldwide. And yet the burden of recycling the fluctuating surplus will more-than-ever rest with the Arab banks.

The problem is complex but, on a simple analysis, breaks down into two distinct concerns: first, the western banks have encountered serious limitations on their ability to lend money to the non-oil nations by way of recycling, and second, the volume of the Opec surplus itself is changing radically, as the effects of world recession and an oil glut filter through to the economies of the oil producing states.

The Arab banks face a massive juggling act. They must take the strain off the western banking system, which has been creaking since the impact of the second 'oil shock' in 1979, while at the same time they must be prepared to fund not only the non-oil states both in the industrialised and in the Third World but even those Opec states who are now finding that the cost of their development programmes is outstripping the income from their oil revenues. On top of all this, the Arab banks — not unnaturally — are expected to make a profit.

While the problems of the western banks have not gone unnoticed in the Middle East over the last year, the sudden shift in the flow of Opec funds, which has led to drastic revisions in the forecasts of the members' financial surplus for 1981 and 1982, caught nearly everyone unawares until earlier this summer. Up to that point, banks and governments alike had been predicting a repeat performance of last year.

In 1980 the total quantity of Opec exports amounted to $301bn in dollar values, of which $274bn came from the sale of oil. Since the combined Opec import bill amounted only to $190bn, Opec recorded a financial surplus of $111bn. This figure was reduced to $103bn after official transfers from reserves, and became the generally accepted figure for the net Opec surplus.

In January, Morgan Guaranty Trust (whose financial statistics and economic reports are among the most widely regarded of any produced by western banks) was predicting that the net current account surplus would reach $110bn for 1981. The following month, the First National Bank of Chicago, allowing for the effects of the recession, joined the ranks of the forecasters with estimates of a net surplus after transfers of $86bn. By the end of June, both Chase Manhattan and Morgan Guaranty had revised their figures downwards into rough agreement with the First Chicago assessment.

The major flurry arose on 25 June in an article published in New York and syndicated throughout the Middle East in the *International Herald Tribune*. Two economists at the securities firm of Rosenkrantz, Ehrenkantz, Lyon & Ross — who had successfully predicted the current oil glut as far back as April 1980 — were suddenly predicting that the year-end Opec surplus would be as little as $30bn, going into deficit in 1982 and 1983. Development programmes in the Gulf states could not be cut or postponed sufficiently to allow imports to cost less than oil exports.

So startling a prediction was this that it received wide coverage both in the Middle East and in Europe. The argument ran as follows: with non-oil sources of energy currently growing at a rate of five per cent, and with non-Opec oil supplies expanding rapidly and coming on the international market at almost the same growth rate, the downward pressure on oil prices would continue, with the average price of oil likely to stabilise at around $30 a barrel. On this basis, total Opec exports would come to no more than $260bn in 1981, with a figure of $215bn in 1982 being outstripped by a total import bill of $250bn.

The controversy surrounding these numbers still persists, but Wall Street at least now believes that estimates of the Opec surplus have been generally too high.

The problem for the Arab banks is that any reduction in the petrodollar surplus would not be uniform throughout Opec. First National Bank of Chicago has estimated that if the surplus were to be reduced to $68bn in 1981 (a figure which it was predicting at the end of July), Iran, Iraq, Algeria and the non-Arab members of Opec would all be in deficit. Should the net surplus be even lower, certain other Arab producers — Bahrain in particular — would also be in deficit.

If nothing else, the current debate over the size of the Opec surplus has drawn the attention of Arab banks to the possibility that they may be called upon to fund any cash shortages which Opec members may experience as a result of the oil glut and the recession in the West: recycling from Opec to non-Opec states is not the only likely flow of funds in the coming years, since Opec may well be forced to finance the deficits of individual members such as Nigeria.

While the overall size of Opec surplus funds to be redeployed in the next two years seems certain to be less than those of 1980 — and perhaps even 1979 — the burden of recycling will remain firmly with the Arab banks, for a number of reasons.

Foremost among these has been the inability of the western banks to increase their capital resources sufficiently to enable them both to lend and take funds on deposit. Banks accept and dispense deposits and loans up to a ceiling generally permitted by their national banking regulators. Prudent banking has it that a bank should not lend or accept on deposit more than 15-17 times their capital base, which is normally measured as the bank's equity, reserves and specially subordinated loans. However, as loan and deposit activity increased in line with the growth of the Opec

surplus in the mid-1970s, the banks were unable to show a corresponding increase in their capital. When some of the western banks tried to lend more than was deemed prudent, given the size of their total shareholders' funds, the resultant secondary banking crisis of 1974 and after brought home the lesson that too much expansion of banking business on too little capital can only lead to disaster.

In the wake of the second oil 'shock', the western banks have been cautious not to expose themselves to the perils of over-extension, and with good cause. At least 360 banks are currently affected by Poland's debt-rescheduling problems. With Third World loans to Jamaica, Zaire and Turkey also causing concern — particularly to the New York banks — the spectre of loan losses wiping out large portions of the western banks' capital has not been far away.

Nor indeed have the banking regulators, both private and governmental, who monitor the activities of the US and European banks. While the western central banks have been preaching caution and encouraging a more conservative attitude in deciding what is a prudent asset-to-capital ratio, so the private credit rating agencies have been making pronouncements of their own. Last month, following a 40 per cent drop in profits in the second quarter and the spectacular removal of $4.5bn of Kuwaiti government funds under its management, Citicorp had its Triple-A credit rating cut to a Double-A-plus. The largest banking group in the US is therefore no longer the best credit, suffering a demotion already experienced by First National Bank of Chicago, the ninth-largest US bank.

Without higher profitability to boost their capital reserves, and in the absence of major capital injections from shareholders, who are dissatisfied at the low levels of return on their investment, the western banks have been powerless to increase their balance sheets in line with the growth in the last three years of the Opec surplus. Not only has this hampered the efforts of the western banks in recycling funds to the non-oil nations, it has also made them unattractive institutions for Opec deposits.

Earlier this summer, the Bank for International Settlements in Basle reported that in the last quarter of 1980 Opec had increased net deposits in the western banking system by only $1.4bn. This was a dramatic change from the first nine months of the same year when, by the end of September 1980, the net increase with western banks stood at $34bn: Opec had started to shift its money elsewhere. The freezing of Iranian assets in the fourth quarter of 1980 clearly taught the rest of Opec — and the Gulf states especially — that western banks could respond to political pressures.

So far the greatest losers from the switch away from the western banks to the Arab financial institutions have been the US banks. Chase Manhattan Bank has estimated that during the whole of 1980 Opec members increased their deposits with the US banks and their foreign branches by only $1.1bn.

While much of the funds previously on direct deposit with the US banks now filter back into the western banking system by way of private placements and fiduciary accounts with Swiss banks, the Arab banks are major beneficiaries of Opec disquet at the condition of the western banks. The effect is two-fold: pressure has been taken off the larger European and US banks, while at the same time the Arab banks have been given an unparalleled stimulus to growth.

The Arab banks are well placed to take advantage of the shift of Opec funds away from their traditional resting-places.

DRIVE FOR LOCAL EXPERTISE

The increasing sophistication of banking in the Gulf, and the burgeoning slice of local business now being captured by local institutions, has inevitably put skilled banking manpower at a premium. Richard Walker looks at how Arab banks are tackling the problem of finding men to handle the money.

The rapid expansion of banking in the Middle East has led to immense pressures on Arab and western institutions alike. But while commentators have focused mainly on the balance sheets and loan activities of the banks operating in the region, the banks themselves have been concentrating on a less publicised pressure — staffing.

For as the banks have grown in terms of capital and assets, their need has increased for trained and experienced people capable of bringing sophisticated banking techniques to the Middle East markets. At present there is a real shortage, especially in the Arab institutions, of the skilled personnel needed to sustain the remarkable growth of the past 10 years.

So great is the pressure on the institutions of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf to find good management that it is now acknowledged that this is the one factor that could impede their future growth.

Fifteen years ago, the major transfers of capital in the Middle

East were carried out almost exclusively by branches of foreign banks, such as Grindlays and the British Bank of the Middle East. As a result, the most able bankers with knowledge of the Arab world were likely to be found in a western bank.

It is for this reason that in the 1960s the common trend among the indigenous Middle East banks, many still in the fledgling stage, was to enter into management contracts with foreign banks. National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia, now a strong and independent entity, originally relied heavily on the Bank of America, which provided all its operations staff. Similarly, the Commercial Bank of Kuwait developed its current expertise only after many years during which the bank's senior positions were filled by personnel from Chase Manhattan under a management contract.

Two other trends developed at the Arab banks during the 1970s. Instead of full management contracts with foreign banks, senior western managers were seconded for short periods under what were known as technical assistance agreements. Temporary help could be given while the bank was being set up, and it was in this way that Gulf International Bank was able to draw upon the services of a handful of senior officers from Citibank in its early days. Alternatively, the Arab banks chose to buy in expertise independently of any one of the western banks by recruiting (normally with the help of a specialist firm of executive search consultants) western nationals, who could become an expatriate work force.

Now the trend is away from management contracts, technical assistance agreements and the recruitment of expatriates: today the search is for qualified Arab staff with the ultimate objective of having a bank entirely composed of capable and experienced Arab bankers. But there is not a sufficiently large pool of senior banking talent yet, and the new generation cannot be trained fast enough to meet the growth in demand for their services. Furthermore, the western banks have seen the need to employ Arabic speakers in their Middle East branches — resulting in intense competition to recruit qualified Arab nationals.

To alleviate this problem, many Middle East banks now send their bright young recruits to the training programmes run by the money centre banks. Saudi International Bank has linked up with the Morgan Guaranty training course in New York. Others are using the Chase Manhattan course in London or the Citibank course in Athens. However, while it is accepted that the American banks operating internationally still provide the highest attainable standard of financial teaching to produce sharp young marketing staff and credit analysts, their courses are not aimed specifically at the needs of the Arabian peninsula. So Gulf Bank now runs its own continuous training programme in Kuwait on the grounds that a well-managed local course in finance and analysis will produce better Arab bankers than a protracted exile in Europe or the United States.

The move to local training courses like Gulf Bank's has been accompanied by the realisation that the best talent can only be recruited by people who know the business fully and who, as senior officers in the bank, are able to devote themselves entirely to the job of attracting and keeping motivated individuals. Gulf Bank last year appointed a highly-qualified vice president to work exclusively on the bank's training and personnel needs.

The trend towards high ranking senior executives taking the recruitment burden from the shoulders of line managers in the Arab banks is one which John G. McCarthy Jr, head of the Middle East department at the executive search firm of Russell Reynolds, believes will become more pronounced in the future as the Arab banks grow. 'In the past the indigenous banks have concentrated on the day-to-day business of taking deposits and making loans without giving enough attention to the human capital needed to run a bank. The appointment of top personnel directors to the senior management teams of banks like Gulf takes some of the pressure off the bank's other officers, yet it also makes it possible to establish carefully run training programmes in the bank's own headquarters.'

However, the executive search firms themselves have been far from idle of late. As the need for managers with first hand knowledge both of the Middle East and of computerised banking has become more acute, so the recruiters have been forced to look further afield. This has taken two very distinct forms: first, the searchers have found themselves attracting a growing number of Arabic-speaking candidates from overseas; second, the Arab banks that formerly operated in one or two major locations in the Gulf are rapidly expanding into Europe and the United States with a consequent need for senior managers for their New York or London offices.

Wooing back bankers whose family ties lie in the Middle East but whose careers have been exclusively in the West is seen as the coming of age of the new Arab banks. Ten years ago it would have been difficult to lure second-generation Americans or Canadians of Arabic origin to the newly-formed Gulf institutions. Now it is viewed as an opportunity for a successful and lucrative career as well as a chance to re-establish regional roots. The change in the US tax treatment of US nationals working overseas has also served as an inducement to work abroad.

For the westerner, the opening up of offices outside their traditional area by the Arab banks

NEW TRENDS IN PETRO-SURPLUS RECYCLING

Opec countries are moving out of traditional outlets into new forms of placements and investments, finds ***John Leroux*** *in this report on the euromarkets.*

Opec nations accumulated some $185bn in current account surpluses, net of official transfers, between 1979 and March this year. Yet, barely $70bn of those temporary excess funds have seeped through the international banking network during that period. Another $81bn showed up through the following channels: $22bn into US government securities, corporate bonds and stocks, $3.1bn in UK instruments and stocks, $21bn into aid programmes, the IMF and the World Bank and $31.5bn in other forms of investments elsewhere in the industrial world.

This leaves an unidentified gap of $20-$25bn in Opec's redeployment operations, a figure which has been increasing steadily since the second round of major oil price rises. Obviously, the sharp fluctuations of exchange rates on the international money markets have made the task of both the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle and the Bank of England even more difficult in tracking down how Opec, particularly the Gulf states, actually spreads its resources on the world capital markets.

But for Professor Alexandre Lamfalussy, the Belgian deputy general manager and economic adviser to the BIS, there is no doubt: the gap is widening between anticipated surpluses and the visible redeployment of funds by Opec. 'We already noticed the phenomenon in the first quarter of 1981 while preparing our report on international banking developments. And the trend continued through the second quarter.'

By the end of December 1978, when the upward pressure on oil prices was already bubbling with the Iranian revolution, Opec had aggregate bank assets of $82.5bn in hundreds of institutions throughout Europe, North America, Japan and a string of offshore centres, with a net total of $56.1bn after deducting liabilities. By the spring 1981, the gross total had reached $161.5bn for a net increase, minus liabilities, of $70bn.

'At worst,' explained a BIS source to *8 Days*, 'there may be a very light under-evaluation a few billion dollars, but the figure is quite representative.' This would show that out of its total accumulated surpluses, Opec would be keeping around 40 per cent of its funds in short-term deposits, the remainder going into equity and debt instruments. 'As happened after the first oil shock,' claims Lamfalussy, 'new figures indicate that oil exporting nations are in fact shifting away from traditional outlets into new forms of placements and investments.'

During the first quarter of 1981, the BIS indicated that 'barely 40 per cent of new Opec deposits were denominated in dollars, suggesting as far as their bank deposits are concerned, that Opec countries' investment pattern had a stabilising influence on the exchange markets' at a time when the dollar was so high. And in fact, a better timing couldn't have been chosen to step out of the dollar to buy cheap European and Japanese currencies. That trend persisted through the second quarter of 1981, confirms the BIS with its preliminary figures, with private European bankers pointing towards 'tremendous pressure on the deutschmark during the summer, which eventually led to a currency readjustment in Europe.

The wave of nationalisations in [illegible] in turn provides new opportunities: formerly an expatriate working for a bank in the Gulf could well have expected to have had a limited career horizon as the new generation of local bankers advanced. With the rapid overseas expansion of Arab banks — especially with the latest changes in US banking laws allowing offshore banking in New York — a westerner may now look to the possibility of a lengthy career with an Arab bank both in the Middle East and in the West.

This change is well documented by Russell Reynolds, which has been the most active of the executive search firms in the Middle East for many years. So far this year [illegible] per cent of their assignments for Arab institutions have been for bankers to work in the new branches and subsidiaries in the West. Russell Reynolds was founded as a New York firm before spreading overseas itself. McCarthy himself has been frequently quizzed by bankers about to set up their US operation and look for senior staff. 'People I have worked for exclusively in the Middle East will ask me to help them find managers for their new US subsidiary.'

The hectic search to find banking talent for the Middle East seems destined to intensify rather than diminish over the coming five years, and the premium for being a qualified and ambitious Arab speaker is likely to remain great. Although the western banks in the Gulf are less aggressive in their recruiting than they were, the eagerness to expand has made the Arab banks and investment funds active to the point at which they are prepared to hire good bankers away from rival firms.

High-flyers have switched banks not only from one part of the Gulf to another but, say, to institutions on the other side of the street in Manama. When talent is in short supply, the seller's market prevails. France, coupled with massive demonstrations for nuclear

disarmament throughout the continent, strengthened further Arab apprehension towards Europe. One thing is clear: private Arab capital is fleeing Europe in favour of the US and Far East Asia, 5 *Days* understands from Arab financial sources in Paris and Geneva.

Still, the growing Opec liquidity on the international markets, which really peaked by late autumn of 1980 for the high absorbing countries and which may already have reached a ceiling for the low absorbing countries, helped Arab commercial banks and mixed consortia to make new inroads in the syndicated euromarkets.

Over the first nine months of 1981, the value of deals managed or co-managed by institutions listed among the top 100 world banks involved in eurocredits shot up to $5.5bn against less than $2bn over the same period last year. This time, twelve Middle East institutions made the *Euromoney* 100 list compared to 10 last year and less than a handful in 1979.

On the surface, such a performance may still remain small by world standards with a share of 4.6 per cent of some $120bn worth of deals. But once US jumbo loans — to which Arab institutions didn't have access on the management side anway — are retrieved, thus diluting the overall value of deals to about $80bn, the Arab share comes close to 7 per cent. In more general terms however, leaving aside the strict criteria of lead or co-lead management, Arab institutions now participate in more than 60 per cent of euroloans.

Except for a few institutions, such as the Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company, Gulf International Bank, Saudi International Bank, Al-Ubaf group and BAII, and perhaps the newly created Al-Mal group based in London, the characteristic of most Arab banks is that they are still mere funders with only limited resources to structure a deal. Despite the Arab Banking Corporation's aggressiveness this year on the market — with 45 deals valued at $1.2bn under management or co-management — it acts very seldom as the loan agent, a position regarded as strategic within a syndicate in order to stay in close touch with customers and to be able to forecast their future needs.

An interesting development this year among Arab euromarket players was the change in configuration. Whereas Gulf, Al-Ubaf, Saudi International, Arab African International Bank, with its affiliate Al-Baab, and the National Bank of Kuwait held two-thirds of managed deals in 1980, their share has shrunk to a mere third this year. Beside ABC, which has increased tenfold the deals under its management, the Arab bank group leaped to the second place, followed closely by KFTCIC and Al Saudi Banque in fourth and fifth positions respectively.

the top Arab movers on the syndicated Euromarkets

(deals managed or co-managed in million $)

	(Jan-Sept) 1980		rank	(Jan-Sept) 1981		rank
	amount	number of loans		amount	number of loans	
Gulf International	454.18	23	1	845.16	40	3
Al-Ubaf	214.83	12	2	297.76	17	6
Saudi International Bank	213.66	11	3	213.39	18	9
Arab-African and Al-Baab	191.05	12	4	208.30	19	10
National Bank of Kuwait	174.59	16	5	233.73	14	8
Arab Banking Corp.	157.50	5	6	1,214.41	45	1
European Arab Bank	157.48	6	7			
National Commercial Bank (S.A.)	135.39	10	8	167.68	8	12
BAII	134.70	5	9	261.19	13	7
National Bank of Abu Dhabi	108.51	9	10			
Arab Bank Group				940.81	22	2
KFTCIC				598.72	16	4
Al-Saudi Banque				344.13	12	5
Arlabank				177.77	15	11
total	1,941.89	109		5,503.05	239	
Share of total loans as recorded by Euromoney Syndication Guide among 100 leading world banks:	4.08%			4.59%		

the ups and downs of ME assets spread in Western banks(1)

countries	first quarter 1980	second quarter 1980	third quarter 1980	fourth quarter 1980	first quarter 1981
low absorbers: Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE	45.772	49.098	54.454	56.855	65.671
high absorbers: Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Oman	42.274	48.829	50.983	51.959	46.173
Egypt	4.224	4.957	5.065	5.149	5.212
Jordan	1.342	1.544	1.614	1.730	2.405
Lebanon	5.248	5.585	5.916	5.978	6.132
Syria	857	914	905	847	970
North Yemen	1.135	742	771	694	654
South Yemen	283	377	355	360	318
residual (2)	12.862	14.577	13.880	14.102	12.111
Algeria	4.111	4.647	5.026	4.616	4.299
Djibouti	131	131	126	150	140
Mauritania	123	149	185	131	134
Morocco	692	737	726	710	545
Somalia	83	66	53	65	79
Sudan	466	508	464	539	711
Tunisia	610	746	850	719	676
total	120.218	133.607	141.363	144.604	146.230
oil-exporting countries:	129.553	145.439	155.769	159.668	161.513

Source: Bank for International Settlements

(1) end of periods — includes gross liabilities by banks in Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, France, West Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, UK, Canada, Japan and for offshore branches of US banks vis-a-vis the Middle East

(2) includes positions of US banks vis-a-vis ME countries other than Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Libya.

ARAB MERCHANT BANKS BEGIN TO BREAK THEIR WESTERN CHAINS

John LeRoux reports on the evolution of Arab merchant banking, which is progressing away from the western Arab consortia of recent years towards the concept of all-Arab groupings. These megabanks, based on the concept that 'big capital means big business' are having to face up to the lack of human resources – in some cases, with success.

In the Middle East the concept of western-Arab banking consortia is giving way to Arab merchant banking, and new creative instruments are being designed specifically for this fast-changing business environment. This shift is probably the most crucial in the Middle East banking and money management in the 1980s. It may take another 5-7 years to get off the ground, but is bound to [illegible] new avenues and conduits [illegible] bankers and financiers.

Just consider the following steps:

● In the late 1960s and early 1970s, four banking channels were opened up: Beirut as a stepping stone, Switzerland, France with the three mixed banking consortia (FRAB bank in 1969, UBAF in 1970 and BAII in 1973) and New York's First City and Chase Manhattan.

● In 1975, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman and Iraq banded together to establish the first big all-Arab consortium — Gulf International Bank. Algeria and Libya jointly set up Banque Intercontinentale Arabe in Paris. Meanwhile, the Beirut channel was virtually neutralised, forcing banks to set up shop where the action was — Europe.

● Despite the flux of petrodollar surpluses, Arab banks were hardly making hefty inroads on the international markets. Still in the establishment phase, their capital base was very narrow by world standards. Abdulla Saudi of the Libya Arab Foreign Bank decided 'to break the chains' and push for a jumbo institution capitalised at $1bn by Libya, Kuwait and the UAE. With Saudi Arabia refusing to join in, the Arab Banking Corporation was founded in 1980, aiming at international bank status. Meanwhile the House of Saud had gone its own way with Saudi International Bank in 1975. This was to act in conjunction with western partners as an unofficial spearhead to develop new outlets for SAMA and other funds under official government management.

● The concept of a megabank such as ABC caught the imagination of many Arab bankers who now claim that 'big capital means big business' and that is where the future lies.

But the problem is really the following: although a large capital base counts in international banking, it can't really make up for the lack of human resources which still plagues most Arab institutions.

Pioneers like Dr Shafiq Akhras, the Syrian founder of the Arab Finance Corporation, and Abdel Majid Shoman of the Arab Bank, spearheaded a whole new breed of 'financial engineers', as Hikmat Nashashibi is fond of calling himself. As chief executive of the newly-formed Al Mal group based in London, Nashashibi and his deputy Omar Kassim reflect the aggressiveness and drive of a new generation of innovators. Experienced in the most advanced western banking techniques, new bankers are returning to their roots, like Talat Othman of Al Saudi Banque, a Palestinian who lived for 32 years in the US and who speaks Arabic with a strong American accent.

Al Mal, the reborn Arab International Finance Company (Arinfi), the Arab Bank Investment Company, Roger Azzar SA in Paris, Arab Leasing and others are trying to do more than just a[illegible]ing comp[illegible] market. With small capital, they are attempting to capture petrodollar flows channel them into brand new types of vehicles.

The frontrunner of them all is surely the London-based Arinfi group, headed by Walid Said, an Oxford-educated Iraqi. As a reshaped investment house, which nearly lost its shirt in the international bond slump of 1976-1978, Arinfi will prove a model for ambitious Arab merchant bankers in a few years' time. Unlike Ghaith Pharaon who, with the assistance of Roger Azzar, aquires already-made assets throughout the world, or Roger Tamraz, chairman of First Arabian Corporation, who takes over assets to sell them back eventually for a profit (at least in the real estate market), the whole aim of Arinfi is a double one: to avoid being sucked into one particular market, be it eurobonds or real estate, and create its own institutional circuit.

Aside from the Kuwait Asian Bank, for which it acted as agent for the subscription drive, the group launched Arab Leasing in 1979, the first such venture in the Middle East; United American Properties in 1980 which, as a real estate fund, now manages $40m worth of assets in the US; and Ampetrol, 'a vehicle for institutional and private investors to participate in a balanced US energy portfolio covering oil and gas, solar heating, coal, geothermal energy and shale oil sectors.'

It will soon be setting up a brand-new investment vehicle aimed at getting a share of the booming business opportunities in Southeast Asia and the Australian continent, with the help of New Japan Securities Europe Limited, Sun Hung Kai Securities and Ord Minnett. The group already has a Hong Kong affiliate, Arinfi Asia, which reportedly operates very successfully. 'We are small and we want to remain small and profitable,' says Ghias el Yafi, a former vice-president for the Middle East at Merrill Lynch International (London).

Despite its drive, the holding company of Arinfi has only $[illegible] in paid-up capital. Although a string of other ventures and investments are in the offing for 1982, Arinfi's next big step will be to consolidate its impressive portfolio by decentralising management. All operations are now undertaken from Arinfi but as the affiliates grow, separate management will be required for each. That should thrust the group into the limelight within the next five years.

Other institutions, small by world standards but fairly important in the Middle East, are following suit, though perhaps more cautiously. The Paris-based Lebanese Audi Group has set two important targets for future expansion: the US and Lebanon.

Already deeply involved in banking (Paris, Switzerland, Lebanon, the UAE), insurance (personal, general purposes and marine freight) and real estate, Banque Audi Group believes that Lebanon still has tremendous potential against the day the civil war ends. Its bank assets have grown since the '1975 events' from Lebanese £300m ($65m) to L£2bn ($440m) and proves that widespread business among small- and medium-size depositors can still be very profitable, despite heavy liquidity.

This type of business is increasingly being taken care of by Banque Audi (Suisse) SA, Banque Audi (France) SA and the Sharjah-based Investment Bank. In July, the group took full control of the Swiss affiliate by acquiring the Notz family's 50 per cent share, and boosted the bank's total capital resources from SF6m ($3.2m) to SF16m ($8.5m). Soon, it plans to open up an offshore bank in New York, to set up its own real estate investment vehicle, and perhaps go into oil and gas exploration. It also aims at opening up in London to broaden its financial services to customers.

THE ARABISATION OF MIXED BANK CONSORTIA

*A number of mixed bank consortia are coming under pressure from Arab shareholders to dilute their western holdings. **John LeRoux** investigates this move towards independence.*

Three brand names in the world banking sphere will never be the same again: UBAF, FRAB Bank and Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (BAII). All three have been subjected to intense pressure for Arab takeovers and, so far, two have succumbed to a 'do it yourself' drive by Middle Eastern institutions.

The powerful French Credit Lyonnais has withdrawn from the international group holding company, UBIC Nederland, while the French Société Générale has pulled out from FRAB, together with Swiss Bank Corporation, Industrial Bank of Japan and the Amsterdam Rotterdam Bank NV, among the biggest western shareholders. The western vaccum will be filled by the National Bank of Kuwait which now holds 51 per cent.

And now, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and Saudi Arabia's Arab Petroleum Investments Corporation are pressing their 15 fellow Arab shareholders to take majority control of BAII, which always insisted on maintaining a 50-50 western Arab shareholding.

Unlike FRAB (which was never highly profitable, due to long-standing management differences between its two family shareholders) and UBIC (where Credit Lyonnais was regarded as far too powerful a shareholder, with 40 per cent), the problems facing BAII stem particularly from its western and Kuwaiti shareholders.

Last year the holding company, Compagnie Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement, tried unsuccessfully to raise its capital by $50m. But it could only gather $28m, simply because western and Kuwaiti shareholders would not go further, depite other Arab participants' readiness. With a remarkable 22-23 per cent yield, CAII can still run through the next 14 months without further raising its capital.

But beyond that, the strain on capital might start to show — and slow down the 25 per cent yearly expansion rate achieved so far. That is why less than $6m will be paid out this year in dividends, after the deduction of some hefty provisions. The banking group could take three different paths to solve the capital problem:

- It could give way to Arab pressure by substantially increasing Middle Eastern institutions' share.
- It could finally restructure its shareholding by allowing an across-the-board authorised capital increase. This would attract new non-Arab partners from Latin America and Asia, and satisfy the needs of Arab shareholders who want to invest more. But the outcome, though diluting the quality of non-Arab shareholders, would keep intact the 50-50 ratio and protect the management, which has proved very successful.

More so than with UBAF, the result of BAII's reconversion could be very significant for future trends in Middle East finance. BAII is considered as the best among the very few Arab-linked institutions that have gone into international merchant banking.

This phenomenon of mixed banking consortia breaking up, as forecast by *8 Days* last spring, could eventually catch up with the European-Arab Bank group. Applying the same 50-50 principle as BAII, EAB is bound to be affected in some way by the 'do it yourself' tide. Aside from FRAB Holding, four out of EAB's 11 western banks were involved in FRAB Bank.

Now that international money circuits have been established through those consortia, some observers think it might well be time to consolidate and merge a few of the mammoth structures. That, at least, is what Libya's central bank governor, Rajeb Misselati, believes: 'We have an interest in the four Paris-based consortia and we are competing against ourselves. Why should that be? One day, those consortia should perhaps come together and join forces.'

THIRD WORLD BENEFITS FROM ARAB CO-FINANCING SCHEMES

As development projects increased in size and scope, so the source of aid has had to diversify. Co-financing has provided a convenient mechanism whereby aid bodies can join forces with commercial banks. Arab agencies started participating in co-financing schemes in 1974, initially melding petrodollars with western funds, and later drawing in Arab banks. ***John Leroux*** *surveys the background to Arab co-financing and shows how this relatively new technique in recycling petrodollars will benefit developing nations.*

Increasing amounts of Opec aid funds are being channelled into co-financing schemes, a relatively recent development for Arab money initially involving the blending of petrodollars with western aid programmes. A new departure — still in the experimental stage — is the combining of low-cost aid with funds from commercial banks.

Yet, its emergence could have a tremendous impact — not only in the Middle East but internationally on the capital markets — by stimulating western and Japanese banking involvement in the Third World under the umbrella of new guarantees, providing a rapidly growing outlet for Arab banking circuits (which, by and large, have concentrated on sovereign risk lending so far), and boosting the overall commitment capacity of the ten Opec funds.

Over the past 18 months, those funds (including the ad hoc aid programmes of Qatar and the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank but excluding the Venezuela Investment Fund) have increased their total authorised capital to a massive 26.2bn to fund cumulative commitments which by the end of last year had already exceeded $14bn.

Three other funding sources should be taken into consideration: the $890m Arab Monetary Fund, which concentrates on balance of payment support and technical assistance programmes; the $5bn Arab Special Fund set up in Amman in November 1980; and the $3bn Islamic Special Fund established by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.

Of course neither the Islamic Special Fund nor the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) can participate directly in loans carrying interest rates. Nevertheless, this still leaves some $30bn, which if matched up under the most conservative programme of $2 per petrodollar would produce a staggering capital pool of almost $100bn. This is equivalent to the average yearly value of euromarket loans since 1978.

For Talat Othman, general manager of the Saudi Arab Finance Corporation in Paris, this type of blending of funds appears even more likely now that his own group is actively involved in parallel financing. 'There are three major phases to go through before we can see fully fledged blending,' explains Othman, but at least the momentum already exists.

'We are now in phase one: funding certain projects supported by several Opec organisations. For instance, Al Saudi Banque offered guarantee facilities in the form of letters of credit to Mauritania to buy crude oil from the Gulf. The whole deal was in fact financed by the IDB. The management of the Mauritanian Iron Ore Complex also asked us to become their bankers while it is getting aid from the Kuwaiti Fund. Elsewhere, we are providing guarantee facilities to import capital equipment for beneficiaries of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (Badea).'

In other words, parallel financing is only a preliminary step to actual co-financing and merely involves two or more institutions working separately without any form of coordination. The second phase, as Othman sees it, will come when Opec funds deliberately reduce their funding of a project to make room for commercial banks. This would still be parallel financing but of a more flexible type than Opec funding organisations have participated in during their programmes so far.

The third step would involve the introduction of the concept of co-financing for projects which command substantial funds but no to the extent of purely commercial ventures.

The concept of blending private and development funds is not a new one. The IMF concluded stand-by facilities for balance of payment purposes which, as far back as the 1950s involved commercial institutions. In the 1960s the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank offered participations to commercial banks at their fixed rate credits for development projects.

the OPEC funds: the 1980 performance

(in billion $)

funds	authorised capital 1981	total commitments a	total commitments b	gross disbursements a	gross disbursements b	net disbursements a	net disbursements b
Abu Dhabi	1,089.3	95.7	5.1	63.7	117.8	52.6	111.8
Arab Fund	2,826.0	76.4	32.1	82.4	12.9	72.8	9.9
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA)	730.0	64.8	26.2	35.9	11.9	35.9	11.9
Iraqi Fund	670.0	258.1	—	—	—	—	—
Islamic Development Bank	2,249.6	39.6	399.7	23.7	376.2	23.7	90.0
Kuwaiti Fund	7,267.0	241.0	29.6	320.5	5.8	277.4	3.9
Opec Fund	4,000.0	217.8	33.0	120.9	30.0	120.9	30.0
Saudi Fund	7,310.0	254.2	—	339.4	—	316.4	—
total (note 1)	26,141.9	1,247.6	525.7	986.5	554.6	899.7	257.5
Arab Monetary Fund (note 2)	890.0	45.9	—	45.9	—	—	29.8

notes

a: concessionary aid or grants

b: non-concessionary aid or loans

1: The total capitalisation should be boosted by two other special funds set up in 1980-1981, one of $5bn established at the 1980 Amman Summit, funded by Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE and managed by the Arab Fund and a $3bn Islamic Fund financed by Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

2: Full capital is expected to be paid by 16 January 1982.

Arab Monetary Fund: $890m available for balance of payments support and technical aid programmes.

The first mixed co-financing loan, between the World Bank and the Bank of America (as agent for a commercial syndicate of 16 banks), was completed in December 1975. The project was a steel expansion programme in Brazil for Companhia Siderurgica Nacional. The private syndicate provided $55m, while the World Bank contributed $95m.

The trend towards projects co-financed by western aid agencies and Opec funds will accelerate in the 1980s. According to figures compiled by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, between 1974 and 1979 some 250 projects, totalling $15bn, were jointly backed by western technomoney and petrofunds.

Initially, co-financing was foreseen by petrodollar economies as a means of compensating for their lack of human resources. Then between 1974-1975 Kuwait started working on the establishment of an Arab fund coordination secretariat. The first meeting, attended by representatives from the Kuwaiti Fund, the Arab Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund and the Saudi Fund, was held in September 1975. In 1976, the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank joined the secretariat, followed by Qatar in 1978 and the Opec Fund in 1979. The secretariat now also includes the Islamic Development Bank and Badea.

In 1975-1976 technical committees were set up to standardise basic documents including loan agreements, procurement guidelines and disbursement procedures. The most pressing issue concerned the Opec Fund procurement guidelines as these bore little resemblance to those of the World Bank or other western agencies. Western funds tend to attach conditions to their loans; for example insisting on having their nationals supplying goods and services.

In the case of petrodollar loans, the creditor puts the contract out to international tender and developing countries are given a

OPEC official development assistance 1979-80

	disbursements ($billion)		share of GNP (%)		share of grant components (%)	
	1979	1980	1979	1980	1979	1980
Saudi Arabia	2,297	3,033	3.01	2.60	62.1	86.7
Kuwait	1,055	1,188	4.09	3.88	74.3	87.8
UAE	1,114	1,062	5.87	3.96	97.2	86.1
Iraq	847	829	2.53	2.12	81.8	87.7
Qatar	277	299	5.89	4.50	97.0	99.5
Libya	105	281	0.45	0.92	100	97.9
Venezuela	82	130	0.17	0.23	100	100
Algeria	272	83	0.67	0.21	77.4	86
Nigeria	31	42	0.04	0.05	100	100
Iran	21	3	0.03	—	—	100
total	6,101	6,950	1.48	1.35	78.5	89.1

note: final figures from OECD Development Assistance Committee as set under their definition of aid. For instance, short-term trade financing carried out by the Islamic Development Bank is not considered as aid.

certain amount of preferential treatment. For example the IDB and the Kuwaitis accept a 10 per cent overprice margin for goods and 15 per cent for services. Even so, only some 10 per cent of contracts a year are awarded to LDCs.

The coordination secretariat's major innovation was the establishment of a common pipeline of projects. Twice a year fund representatives meet in Kuwait to compare notes and exchange ideas for co-financing deals. No similar structure exists among OECD countries, and as a result of bureaucracy, differences in approach and wide gaps in basic documentation have handicapped coordination.

Nineteen-seventy-nine was a boom year for co-financing, involving nearly $7bn worth of projects, the percentage varying from fund to fund. Overall (between 1974 and 1979), of the $14.4bn worth of projects co-financed by Opec and the OCED, $2.4bn came from the West and Japan, $5.5bn from Arab funds and $6bn from multilateral organisations.

The World Bank was the biggest financier (134 projects, worth $4.2bn), followed by West Germany with $800m (34 projects), France with $500m (25 projects) and the EEC $430m (31 projects).

A MODEL SYSTEM TO UNDERCUT COMMERCIAL BANK TERMS

One technique that Arab funds could employ with commercial bank funds comes from the World Bank, on which the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development originally modelled itself. The system works as follows:

- **The euromarket practice of pricing loans on floating rate terms above Libor is put into effect. Floating rates already exist in Jeddah (Jibor), Bahrain (Bibor) and Kuwait (Kibor). Further financial integration, under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council, among major Gulf donors could assist the technique;**
- **An optional cross-default clause in the loan agreement ties the credit to the borrower's obligations to the Development Fund. However, defaults have not been registered so far by leading Arab funds, which prefer to roll over, or carry over, their funding if the grace period turns out to be insufficient;**
- **The aid fund acts as the channel for repayments either directly or indirectly, thus offering greater security to private lenders;**
- **The commercial banks are given access to specialised feasibility studies and project analyses.**

Moreover, the Opec Fund would offer continuing technical supervision of the project. But because of the tougher supervision requirements introduced by the commercial bank participation, this could strain the already poor human resources from which most Opec funds suffer. At the first stage, this could be implemented by triangular financing through the addition of western aid funds.

The Bank of America, which considers itself the leading commercial institution in co-financing, says that improved commercial terms for the borrower can take the form of longer grace periods, longer maturities and slight rate advantages. Citibank claims that co-finances which it has monitored have been ⅛ per cent to ¼ per cent below the pricing that would have been used if the loans had been solely under commercial terms. It seems that guarantees are offered by the Opec Fund's presence, coupled with pressure from the Fund to fight for better terms on behalf of the borrower.

EXPANSION: LEARNING THE RULES OF THE ABC

Giles Masters reports on the worldwide expansion of the Middle East banks in the last decade, which has been brought about primarily by the establishment of overseas branches and banking subsidiaries and by acquisitions of western banks which have proven track records.

The buzz went around New York this summer that American Express had agreed to sell its entire banking operations to the Saudi Arabians. American Express International Banking Corporation (AEIBC) was to be spun off from its parent as a result of the Amex takeover of the New York brokerage house Shearson, Loeb Rhoades. The purchaser was to be the kingdom's National Commercial Bank. In the 1960s, such a story would have been ridiculed on Wall Street. In the 1970s the same story would have caused uproar and charges of Arab interference in the financial affairs of the US. In the 1980s, the report was both believed and the purchase commended as being eminently sensible for all the parties concerned.

As it turned out, the deal was called off in the very last stages of negotiations. Nonetheless, it provides an intriguing insight into the way attitudes have changed in both the West and Middle East. New York's financial community was only too happy to see a major banking concern fall into the hands of a Saudi bank; the Saudis, meanwhile, were more than ready to consider such a prominent acquisition of an established US bank.

The expansion of Middle East banks worldwide in the last decade

has only come about through this change in outlook. In the early 1970s, there was a grudging acceptance on the part of the West that Arab banking funds might, as a last resort, be a fruitful source of dollars for a syndicated loan. Now, banks such as the Arab Banking Corporation based in Bahrain, head every invitation to join a loan syndicate and, more often than not, are the initiators of the loan. ABC has recently even lead managed a eurobond issue. It is this encouragement to become an active element in international banking that has led to their recent overseas drive.

This expansion outside the banks' traditional area of operation has taken many forms.

However, two forms of expansion stand out: the establishment of overseas branches and banking subsidiaries by means of internally generated growth, and acquisitions of western banks with a proven track record.

The recent announcement of the London opening of a branch office by the Arab Banking Corporation, with another branch office in New York, is a good example of the speed with which international Arab banks are expanding. Formed only last year by the governments of Libya, Kuwait and the UAE with an authorised capital of $1bn, ABC has already become one of the prime movers in the euromarkets by introducing successful innovations to loan packages and by securing good relations with the western banks.

ABC's policy of swift overseas growth by means of self-generated expansion is in sharp contrast with that of Arab Asian Bank, an off-shoot of the Arab Malaysian Development Bank. Arab Asian was formed as an exempt company in Bahrain at the start of this year but startled financial circles in the City of London by successfully launching an agreed bid for the British banking, trading and finance house of United City Merchants. The bid was bold, since it was the first occasion in the UK that an Arab backed takeover had been made for a British finance house. It remains one of only a handful of Middle Eastern bids for companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange. Once again, five years ago press comment and City reaction would have been unfavourable in the extreme, yet the Arab Asian bid received nothing but praise.

At almost the same time, perhaps the strongest example to date of the change in attitude to Arab banks took place in the US. On the afternoon when Britain's Midland Bank was given the final clearance to proceed with its acquisition of the Californian holding company which owned Crocker National Bank, a consortium of Arab investors received the approval of the US Federal Reserve Board to take over another US bank holding company, Financial General Bankshares.

At the time, it was the largest Arab acquisition of any single US company and signalled the Reagan administration's acceptance of Middle East control of US banks and companies. The Fed's decision has since led to the agreed $2.5bn bid for Santa Fe International by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, and seems destined to lead to a spate of bank takeovers in the US by Arab institutions.

Almost four years ago, however, when the attempt to purchase Financial General first took place, there was a storm of opposition to the bid. Although the members of the consortium were prominent and respected individuals in Gulf banking and government, the Financial General board engendered fierce hostility to the idea of an Arab-controlled bank based in Washington.

The head of the consortium was Sheikh Kamal Adham, former director-in-chief of Saudi Arabia's central intelligence agency, together with Abdullah Darwaish, financial adviser to the royal family of Abu Dhabi, and Faisal Saud al Fulaij, one-time head of Kuwait Airways and the current head of the Kuwait International Finance Company (KIFCO). Each man represented funds from his own country. Investors from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait were also involved.

Had the bid been blocked by the US central bank after the 15 months of deliberation required before the Fed announced its decision in September, hopes of encouraging Arab investment and banking expansion in the US would have suffered.

Earlier in the year, however, the Financial General board had withdrawn its opposition to the consortium bid and urged the bank's shareholders to accept the offer. The Fed's decision to allow the bid to go ahead was the first open indication of the new administration's feelings towards Arab investment (though under the US constitution the Fed is in principle independent of the president) and contrasted with the two moratoria on foreign bank takeovers imposed under Carter after the 1980 Arab acquisition of banks in Arizona and Detroit.

The decision could not have come at a better time for New York, which is soon to launch International Banking Facilities (IBFs). These are the US equivalent of Bahrain's Offshore Banking Units, and will be able to operate in the euromarkets directly from New York without being subject to domestic reserve requirements and interest rate controls. The establishment of IBFs has been on bankers' agenda for many years. As of 3 December they will be allowed to commence operations, competing with London banks for a valuable share of the eurocurrency markets.

US banks will be allowed to set up independent and separate IBFs, but the Arab banks in particular are setting up or expanding operations so as to take advantage of the new laws. Gulf International Bank has been gearing up for the expected flood of loans and new issues by recruiting new staff, while Saudi International Bank has also been expanding its presence in New York over the course of the year. While bankers disagree over the threat offered to London by offshore banking in New York, it is clear that the Arab banks expect to be at the forefront of any new banking activity in western financial markets.

DMI: THE HALAL ALTERNATIVE

Banking in the Middle East has always raised cultural and moral questions as well as financial ones. Only now, however, have viable Islamic alternatives to the western system taken hold. John LeRoux reports on their growth and prospects.

Could a merger of traditional and Islamic institutions become a landmark of Middle East banking in the 1980s? That is what Dr Yusef Salman al Fadel al Sabbagh, a distinguished Kuwaiti economist teaching at the Geneva-based Centre for Education in International Management (CET), foresees for the end of the current decade. 'With the actual growth experienced on both sides of the fence, it's bound to happen,' says Dr al Sabbagh, who is working on a new book covering major new trends in Middle East finances.

But could 'riba' (interest or usury) and 'halal' (authorised by Islam) institutions really share their growth? Dr Mustapha Nour, vice-president of Dar al Maal al Islami, claims it is possible, and points to the experience of Bank Misr which opened up seven very successful branches in Egypt operating under the strict Islamic rules, though its overall activities are based on interest.

With combined assets exceeding $200bn, the 100 largest Arab riba-oriented banks are way ahead of their Islamic counterparts. Moreover, the whole issue of applying the Sharia to finance has become a sensitive and controversial one in the Middle East. Ironically, the experience of Islamic institutions has mostly drawn attention and curiosity from western bankers, while most Arab financiers scorn the whole concept as 'backward'. This has made the credibility gap even greater.

But although halal institutions are, as yet, largely a thing of the future with Saudi Arabia refusing to issue an operating licence to an Islamic commercial venture until it can prove that the system is a reliable alternative to the better-known riba concept, the halal movement has, since 1977, gained tremendous momentum throughout the Muslim world. Fourteen Islamic institutions established in Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan and London, together with the Jeddah-based Islamic Development Bank (more a channel for aid than a profit-oriented institution) and the newly established Dar al Maal al Islami (DMI or Islamic House of Funds), have total assets easily in excess of $3bn.

Aside from their commercial activities, which are carried out through five out of 36 recognised Islamic financial instruments, the Islamic movement's source of strength lies in its depositors, most of whom have never dealt with a riba institution. 'Less than five per cent of Egyptians have accounts with traditional banks simply because there is an overall resistance to accept the unlawful riba,' says Dr Mustapha Nour. Prince Mohammed al Faisal al Saud, son of the late king and founder of DMI, refers to widespread hoarding throughout the Middle East as proof that the riba system is considered unfit for Muslims. Estimates of hoarding made a few years ago by the Riyadh-based International Association of Islamic Banks range from between $12bn for Saudi Arabia alone and up to $40bn for the entire Middle East.

The real 'performance test' for Islamic bankers will come during 1982-1983 with DMI rushing to establish a world-wide Muslim network of banks, investment companies and solidarity (insurance) funds to convince Saudi monetary authorities that the system is workable and can reliably manage petrodollar surpluses seeping through the social layers of the Arabian Peninsula. Yet DMI, through its would-be 100 per cent Islamic Investment Company affiliate (scheduled to be absorbed in January 1982) is the only foreign institution allowed to advertise and mobilise funds inside the kingdom without any official licence.

Its 'investment trusts', known as 'modarabas', are the only instruments officially sanctioned by the Organisation of Supreme Scholars of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, under the chairmanship of Sheikh Abdelaziz bin Abed Allah Bin Baz on 23 February, 1981. The concept had been approved in September 1978 by the more liberal al Azhan Council of Scholars in Cairo. Offices supervised directly by Prince Mohammed al Faisal are now expanding fast throughout Saudi Arabia.

Registered as a trust in the Bahamas on 27 July, 1981, DMI is aiming for a minimum paid-up capital of $310m by 1 January, 1982, shared as follows: $180m collected so far from private subscribers known as 'founders', who include Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul Haq, Malaysian deputy head of state Tuanko Abdel Rahman, the emir of Bahrain Sheikh Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa, Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiri, Prince Abdallah al Faisal al Saud, Prince Saud bin Abdel Rahman Alturki al Sudani, and Prince Majed bin Abdelaziz al Saud; $60m from the takeover of the Islamic Investment Companies, and the balance from public subscription which, by early October, amounted to $35m.

Officially, the 1981-1982 financial year was originally planned to yield the establishment three investment companies worth $5m each in authorised capital, a European Islamic Bank worth

$50m to be set up in Geneva, and one consultancy company worth $2m. But recent official visits made by Prince Mohammed and the top management of DMI to Senegal and Guinea brought a flurry of invitations to set up affiliates elsewhere in Africa and Asia.

In Guinea, for the first time since independence, the government has allowed a foreign financial group to take a majority position (51 per cent) in three institutions: an Islamic bank, an investment company and a solidarity fund, with a combined capitalisation of $30m. Moreover, despite strict foreign exchange controls, DMI is soon to launch a public subscription for $2m. DMI shares will be held under trusteeship by the Central Bank, which will then issue owner certificates to shareholders inside the country. As for payment of DMI dividends, the Central Bank will pocket the dollars and issue the equivalent amount in 'silly' currency ('elephant' in the sousou language). When and if shareholders want to liquidate their DMI holding, the reverse operation will take place, thereby dealing with the obstacle of foreign exchange controls.

Guinea will be the first Muslim country to host DMI subsidiaries. So far, official invitations to set up similar affiliates have been made by Benin, Niger, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Brunei and Bangladesh. In addition, a visit to Pakistan and Malaysia are planned for next January for the official signing of documents.

Dr Ibrahim Kamel, DMI's executive vice-president, anticipates that the expansion plan will, in fact, move much faster than forecast in the private and public prospectus. Beside Guinea, DMI-controlled institutions could be established in at least four countries and possibly up to six by early 1983 — Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Morocco, Mauritania and Pakistan. Already, the Muslim community of Australia has processed all the required documents enabling it to launch its own Islamic Investment Company, with a 51 per cent DMI participation, within a few months.

By year-end, DMI is expected to have well over $500m under its management, of which $370m will come through its eight modarabas (including the monthly institutional trust), $70m of which will come from subscriptions [illegible] channelled in the fourth modaraba, and $180m from the remaining public and private subscriptions. Thanks to a steady stream of [illegible] deposits, mainly from Egypt and the Gulf, modarabas managed by the Islamic Investment Company (IIC) are growing by $20m a month, Mustapha Nour claims. At such a rate, accumulated assets and trust funds could swell easily to the $1bn mark by late July 1983 — the end of the second full operating year — if not by late 1982, depending on how fast DMI can spread its international web.

The next year and a half will thus be crucial for DMI. It is the only Islamic institution with a religious board, whose decisions determine the group's activities. It remains to be seen whether it can compete in size with such riba institutions as Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) or Gulf International, two government-sponsored vehicles which aim to lead a major consolidation drive among Middle East banks.

how much 'going Islamic' can yield for your investments

(annualised rates for 1981 on % basis)

Modarabas	investment outlet	date of issue	April 30	June 30	July 31	August 31	September 30
first (fixed term: 3 years)	commodities, currencies and leasing	1.1.79	12.65	7.60	14.01	13.84	14.95
second (fixed term: 5 years)	fully hedged positions in commodities and leasing	1.5.79	10.95	9.84	12.90	12.75	13.27
third (fixed term: solidarity product)	same as second but more secure positions and leasing with top grade world corporations	1.10.79	8.85	11.50	11.55	11.43	12.23
fourth (current account in US $	fairly open to various outlets including trade financing	1.2.80	11.58	8.25	15.87	16.63	12.96
Saudi Riyals			16.83	14.61	16.59	20.08	12.82
Kuwaiti Dinars			19.17	25.93	21.05	17.22	10.53
Qatari Riyals			12.16	8.31	15.81	16.67	13.15
UAE Dirham			12.65	7.87	15.67	17.05	13.03
fifth (fixed term: fifth one year)	as in first Modarabas	1.2.80	repaid on 1.2.81				
			8.61	1.52	11.20	12.54	13.14
sixth (fixed term: three years Saudi Riyals)	as in second Modarabas	1.12.80	12.45	21.89	10.45	15.90	13.60
seventh (open-ended)	close to third Modarabas	1.12.80	11.58	11.50	16.85	16.80	12.96
monthly	US $	—	—	15.62	16.24	15.53	15.04
institutional	Saudi Riyals	—	—	18.20	13.43	12.80	12.62

TAKING ON THE WEST AT ITS OWN GAME

The western banks' halcyon days in the Gulf are now over, reports Adrian Fellows, as Arab banks like ABC and GIB surge into major standing.

'There is an uneasy quiet about the American banks in Bahrain these days,' says a senior executive from a large US company, who is a frequent visitor to the Gulf. 'It's as if they had been upstaged, and don't know what to do next.'

Few western bankers would agree with such a statement about their operations in the Middle East. But the feeling outside the overseas bankers' clubs is that the days of high growth for the British and US banks in the Gulf are long gone — and that the competition for business, and for the Arabic-speaking executives to conduct that business, is becoming stiffer.

Arab governments are investing more of their own funds directly in the West now, of course. Inevitably, they are setting up more sophisticated banking institutions to handle their deposits. The immediate losers in this process are the British and American bankers, who in the past have been the financial intermediaries between western users of funds and those providing them in the Middle East.

It is important to realise just how fast this turnabout is taking place, for the US banks in particular. Formerly, the US commercial banker in the Gulf was offering security and technical expertise. The security was there for governments and individuals wanting to deposit money with a New York bank and know it would be safe. Funds could be wired around the world discretely and efficiently, free from political risk and protected from the vagaries of any borrower who might be in need of a loan.

If the funds were to be lent on to a third party, that was the bank's affair so long as it preserved and paid the appropriate interest on its deposits. This was where the institution's technical expertise was essential. It was for the bank, with its decades of experience, to assess borrower credit-worthiness, or to look to the complexities of a tight loan agreement, or to read foreign exchange or money-market trends correctly.

Close links would sometimes be built up between a particular ruling family and an individual bank, as between the late Shah and Chase Manhattan Bank. But ultimately Middle Eastern depositors were relying on the ability of the US banks to look after their money and not to make mistakes.

The US banks lost a big slice of their Middle East business after the 1979 Iranian revolution. But they lost far more in terms of their Middle East credibility that November, when President Carter had Iranian assets frozen not only in the US but, more ominously, in the overseas branches of all American banks. The shock waves were felt throughout the Middle East: if one US president could so easily impound the deposits of a single oil producer, could another do the same to other oil producers' money?

The answer was yes, and the US banks in the Gulf have been living with that realisation ever since: one of their main selling points, security, was no longer assured. The banks themselves were helpless to defy the laws and the decrees of their own government.

Though the likes of Citibank and Chase Manhattan, which has long had good relations with institutional depositors in key Gulf states, valiantly argued that their non-Iranian depositors would still be as well protected as in the past, a massive switching of funds began. New international deposits were placed, not with US banks, but with European (and especially Swiss) and Arab institutions. The security argument was not accepted.

Nor, indeed, has the banks' offer of technical expertise been accepted as a selling point since then. Quite simply, the Arab banks have learned to do what was previously thought the western institutions' sole prerogative.

In the last two years, Bahrain's Gulf International Bank (GIB) has surged forward. It has not only increased its deposit-taking; it has become one of the key lead managers in the syndicated eurocurrency markets. Last year GIB doubled its balance sheet, taking its assets to $2.9bn.

GIB is owned by the governments of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and has been competing with the western banks in their own markets as well as in the Gulf. Recently it announced an increase in its capital from Bahrain dinars 68m ($180m) to BD100m ($265m).

The growth of the Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) in Bahrain, with assets now near $5bn, has also given the US banks pause for thought. Owned by the governments of Libya, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi, ABC has been an aggressive participant in both the eurocurrency syndicated loan and bond markets. It was established, moreover with the clear intention of competing in size with the western banks.

'Another year, and ABC will be be able to do anything we can do,' one American banker admitted recently in Bahrain. Though ABC has been in operation for barely a year, some suspect that it can already hold its own with the US banks in all aspects of commercial banking

Before the freezing of Iranian assets, ABC did not even exist. Both GIB and Al Bahrain Arab African Bank had but a fraction of their present world banking clout. Equally, institutions like the National Bank of Bahrain, which concentrate specifically on the Gulf markets, were still recruiting their teams before November 1979. Now they are fully operational — and the US banks, for the first time since they displaced the British as the leaders in the Gulf, are learning the

meaning of competition.

The two years since the Carter freeze have seen US banks in the Middle East suffering from the trend away from western banks in international markets. They have also seen some major shifts of opinion by states in the region on the question of outsiders providing banking services in the states' own domestic markets.

The formation of state-owned international consortia, like ABC and GIB, is only one part of the move away from the western banks. Nowhere is the policy of promoting national banks at the expense of overseas rivals more clearly seen than in Saudi Arabia: Riyadh's legislation to put foreign banks operating in the kingdom under local ownership most affected the US banks, who had very profitable Saudi branches.

Citibank was hit especially hard by Saudiisation. In spite of some heavy lobbying against the proposed form of nationalisation of the foreign banks, in 1980 Citibank had to yield its pre-eminent position for a 40 per cent holding in a new joint venture.

The name of Citibank does not appear in this new entity at all. Saudi American Bank, as it is now known, is run by Citibank under a management contract — but control rests firmly in Saudi hands.

Like Chase Manhattan and Banker's Trust, Citibank now runs its Middle East operations from Bahrain. Saudi American, meanwhile, is booming, and the year following its formation in July 1980 saw its loan book increase by 69 per cent, with total balance sheet footing of $3.2bn.

In Bahrain, Citibank is said to have a team of 40 active marketing staff covering Saudi Arabia to keep its image independent of Saudi American. Whatever the truth of such claims, Citibank is the largest of the US banks with a presence in Bahrain and has over 150 fulltime employees.

How long Citibank will be able to retain its strength in the Middle East is hard to assess. Having lost Saudi Arabia last year, the bank's holding company, Citicorp, was treated to the further indignity of publicly losing at least $4.5bn of Kuwaiti governments funds under management in New York to Morgan Stanley. A further $3bn was also rumoured to have been transferred from Citicorp to Chemical Bank, though this has not been admitted by Citicorp.

Such a heavy loss of funds, representing at least 20 per cent of those under its management, contributed to the bank's down grading by the Standard and Poors rating agency from Triple A to Double A Plus. This can scarcely have added to Citicorp's standing in the Gulf. With harsh words in public by Kuwait's finance ministry and a second-quarter drop in worldwide profits of 40 per cent, so far 1981 has been a difficult year for Citibank.

Yet while Citibank's plight in the Middle East has been one of the more noticeable cases of US banks suffering from competition, it is far from an isolated one. Three years ago, most banking-sector executive search mandates (i.e. headhunts) in the Middle East might have been expected to be for western institutions. Now they are in a minority, as the indigenous banks recruit to deal with their growing business.

Even in Bahrain, where the late 1970s saw a flood of western bankers adding to the established presence of Grindlays, the British Bank of the Middle East and Chase Manhattan, few of the US banks are now recruiting in large numbers.

'For the foreigners, the expensionary period of Middle East banking is over. From now on, the growth is going to come from Arab banks, doing Arab business at home and overseas.' Such is the verdict of a young Arab banker.

BAHRAIN GOES AHEAD ONSHORE AND OFFSHORE

NIGEL ASH analyses the burgeoning bank activity in Bahrain, as the Monetary Authority continues to attract foreign business.

In most national capitals, taxi drivers know where to find you a good time, a hotel or an airport: in Manama, Bahrain they seem to possess an encyclopaedic knowledge of the whereabouts of banks. There are more than 160 of them. The greatest concentration is in Government Road in the city centre, where it often seems easier to get a loan than a packet of cigarettes.

In 1932 Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf to strike oil. Everyone on the island knows that within a few years it will also be the first place in the Gulf to find that oil has all gone. The government hopes that the island's future will then lie in the rich wells of international and regional finance which it will tap through an aggressive and successful concentration of offshore Banking.

These banks have been permitted in Bahrain since October 1975. To date there are nearly 70 of them. In return for an annual licence fee of under Bahrain dinars 11,000 ($29,000), the banks are permitted to operate with no tax on their profits, no forced maintenance or reserves locally and no enforced liquidity ratios. Such a climate soon attracted outside bankers. The Bahrain Monetary Authority allowed established commercial banks on the island to set up their own offshore banking units (OBUs).

The condition for all the offshore operators is that their business must be non-resident. It was inevitable that the big European and US banks would set up offshore facilities, but the Bahrainis have sought also to attract banks from the Far East, in particular India, the Philippines, South Korea and Japan.

One of the surprises about the Japanese is that only the Bank of Tokyo has taken up an offshore licence. It received its first approval in 1980. Other Japanese banks like, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Daichi Kangyo, have been content to operate representative offices.

Considering that Japanese trade to the Gulf region this year is expected to exceed $10bn and about 40 per cent of all bills require yen settlement, the tardiness of the Japanese big banks to move into Bahrain's lively offshore sector may seem surprising. However, one US banker commented: 'The Japanese are cautious, which some might say is no bad thing in banking, even offshore banking. They open their representative offices and then spend a year just watching, seeing how things work, getting to know the market's weaknesses and strengths. When they think they know enough, they will prepare their plan of action. I anticipate that when the Japanese name plaques start going up, they are going to lock into a lot of business with a lot of speed.'

The Japanese banks are mostly refugees from Beirut. Like many other moneymen, they waited a long time to see if the strife that divided the Lebanon would subside. The imminent Japanese commitment to Bahrain would seem to confirm their final despair of the Lebanese capital.

But, whatever effect the Japanese will have when they begin to operate in strength, there is no doubting the remarkable impact of the Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) on the island's offshore activities. This mammoth bank, with $1bn ($750m paid up) capital, was established as a Bahraini joint stock company by special emiri decree on 17 January, 1980. Its equal shareholders are the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, the Libyan Secretariat of Treasury and the Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance.

Though ABC has state backers, it is not another regional pan-Arab institution with hazy objectives, but a commercial heavyweight dedicated to carving itself a position in international markets and demonstrating that the Arabs can make their own money work for them. The man most responsible for establishing ABC is a 44-year-old Libyan, Abdulla Saudi, who during the late 1970s steered the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank from a position of relative financial obscurity to a small empire, running more than 20 subsidiaries, affiliates and associated institutions in 15 countries.

As president and chief executive of ABC, Saudi says his bank is guaranteed free of political constraints from any of his three state backers. Though some US bankers in Bahrain still expressed doubts about the Libyan connection, those with no political axe to grind against Tripoli seem convinced that ABC is going to be what it says it is.

All the same, a year ago, Saudi's problem was to show the international banking community that ABC meant business. He said: 'We were born big, but we are still young.' He solved the difficulty of launching an unprecedented thrust into the international syndicated loan market, and gained for himself almost immediate status as one of the euromarket's most aggressive lead managers. At the end of the first half of this year, ABC stood seventh in lead managerships. It has now led, managed or co-managed $15.3bn in syndicated loans.

Saudi achieved his objectives. He put ABC on the map, styled as a 'bankers' bank'. He told *8 Days*: 'We have the muscle and we started by having a good capital base. You find a lot of Arab investors who lack experience and are tired of dealing with brokers. They would much prefer partners to brokers. With a small capital you can't get partners, but you can do it with the capital of ABC.'

Saudi shows a deep distrust of the way western banks operate on little-changing financial bases. He believes many of the 'big ticket' banks are seriously

undercapitalised. 'In 1970 the eurodollar market was worth $100m. Today it is worth $450bn. Well, I didn't see a change in the capital structure of the big banks. They just spread the load.' That, believes Saudi, is not the way to do it.

This year, the US magazine *Institutional Investor* chose Saudi as one of their bankers of the year. But they did point out that there was more to banking than syndicated loans. This reservation has been expressed elsewhere. June 1981 figures, just published by ABC, show that since year end 1980 total assets have risen from $1.952bn –$3.457bn while deposits have moved from $1.498bn to $2.540bn over the same period. Abdulla Saudi makes the point that around 42 per cent of his deposits come from foreign international banks.

The problem for ABC watchers is the limited funds that the bank has put out for loans and bonds, just $877m to 30 June 1981 (from $296m at 30 December, 1980). This represents only 25 per cent transference. Saudi, with his conservative attitude towards captialisation, told *8 Days* he sees no weakness in this low lending profile. 'We make money on interbank money markets,' he said. Indeed, at the moment there is probably more money to be made from medium-term interbank deals than straightforward loans. But ABC's critics say that simply playing the money markets makes the house seem more like an investment company than a bank.

Saudi says he knows what people say and he also knows they are wrong. ABC is a banking giant and as it takes on more expertise, it will expand its role until it is unquestionable and potent. In January 1982 the bank will open offices in New York and London. In the latter Saudi is confident the Bank of England will approve ABC for exchange dealings. Sometime later next year the bank will also start operations in Singapore.

At the other end of Bahrain's banking spectrum are the medium-size workaday commercial banks, most of them with offshore affiliates, who are responsible for the basic and no less important financial wellbeing of the island economy.

The National Bank of Bahrain (NBB) will be celebrating its 25th jubilee on the island's national day on 16 December this year, though its real birthday isn't until next January. It was Bahrain's first-ever limited company. It now has 16 Bahrain branches which control 30 to 35 per cent of local business. It plans for itself a growing role in the rest of the Gulf and is soon to open a branch in Abu Dhabi. It was granted an OBU licence last June and has so far lead-managed 11 deals worth $224m and managed, co-managed or participated in 20 other syndications worth a total of $1.957bn.

The 1980 accounts show assets of BD297.332 ($788m) and a net operating income of BD4,795m. It is a healthy, ambitious but careful organisation, which is intent on training Bahrainis. The bank's two 'bibles' — a credit policy and an operational manual — were astounding in their comprehensive and thoroughly clear detail.

As one of the island's leading local banks, NBB recently organised the first loan documentation seminar in Bahrain, attended by 45 banks. It is negotiating with Visa to produce a local charge card, but in Bahrain cheque cards do not exist. As one banker pointed out: 'If anyone bounces a cheque on you, you have only to go to the police and prove it's a dud and then the person who owes you will be put in jail until the money is paid.'

Yacoub Yousef Mohammed, one of the bank's assistant general managers, told *8 Days* that domestically, NBB's prospects for growth were limited by the small size of the market. It might well increase its share of local business, but the profits were nothing compared to regional potential. NBB customers are charged eight per cent for personal credit and receive three-and-a-half per cent on normal savings accounts. However timed deposits yield 10.5 per cent up to 12 months.

'The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has opened the doors for expansion by banks such as ourselves,' says Mohammed. 'We have already started in Saudi Arabia with structured facilities, syndication and contractor financing. We are also looking at Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar and to a lesser extent Oman for new business.' Mohammed concedes that in time Bahrain's bankers may also be able to deal with Iran, but that will not be for at least ten years. 'It is important that we remain neutral,' he said. The political and sheer practical problems of dealing with anyone in Iran rule out relations between any Arab banks and that country in the near future.

Viney Sawhney, NBB's manager of syndications and regional marketing, believes that one of the areas where the bank will be able to establish itself is in funding for marine ventures. 'There is a very real lack of offshore supply craft for rigs in the Gulf. We have studied the problem and have the money available to fund people who want to enter into this area.'

KUWAIT LIVENS UP THE MARKETS

Future generations in the Gulf states will not have the vast oil reserves of today. Kuwait's dynamic new finance minister is already planning for that future and startling financiers, says ***Piers Montondene.***

'Kuwait could use a more exacting and professional approach to the management of its money. And it looks as though it will get it.' The closing sentences of *Institutional Investor*'s profile of Kuwait's new finance minister, Abdullatif al Hamad, have an almost prophetic ring to them. When the profile appeared, in August, the minister had hardly been given time to get his kness under the desk, yet already it was clear that he would shake up his country's bankers throughout the world as nothing had shaken them before.

Within a month of the article hitting newstands in New York, Citicorp had been fired as one of Kuwait's investment managers. It was admitted that $4.5bn had been transferred to investment bankers Morgan Stanley, and another $3bn was rumoured to have been moved to Chemical Bank. Since that time, Kuwait's other investment managers have been trying to out-perform the stock markets as if there was no tomorrow. For some of them, there won't be a tomorrow unless they shape up,' is the comment being officially leaked from the ministry of finance in Kuwait.

By the end of 1980, $60bn worth of foreign assets were tied up in the form of deposits and investments somewhere in the West, owned by the Kuwaiti government. Yet, according to official western figures for 1980, Kuwait's $60bn in foreign assets earned the country only $6bn in investment income. This is despite direct investments ranging from Mercedes Benz shares to London property development and, reputedly, five per cent of the top hundred equity stocks in the US. In the year in which interest rates hit record high levels in the US and Europe, and when US prime was above 20 per cent at the end of the year, a bare 10 per cent return on investment seemed perhaps a little thin.

This was clearly the feeling of Kuwait's new minister. The new official policy was to turn over as much as five per cent of Kuwait's holding every week in order to take profits and improve the portfolio, rather than merely invest and forget about the holding. Furthermore, more money was to be placed into US equities at the expense of certificates of deposit and bonds, on the assumption that any up-turn in the US economy would see immediate capital gains for shares in carefully selected industry sectors.

When rumours of the new Kuwaiti policy of active rather than passive investment in the US first began to filter from the investment banks at the start of the summer, they were generally discounted. The 'Green Monday' syndrome, as it was known, did not accord with Kuwait's former policy of holding shares long term as an overall hedge. The idea of churning stocks and pumping up the stock market sounded too much like the plot of 'Green Monday', in which a mysterious Gulf state engineers a stock market boom in order to double its investment. Yet the leaks in the US press about the differences of opinion which led to the dismissal of Citicorp have all the makings of a financial thriller.

Within days, another manifestation of Kuwait's new and aggressive policy for its overseas investments appeared — a massive takeover bid for one of the largest oil drilling companies in the US, Santa Fe International. Ostensibly, the $2.5bn bid is being launched by the Kuwait Petroleum Company, but commentators in Kuwait see the hand of Al Hamad behind the deal. If successful, it will be by far the largest takeover of any company by Middle East interests, and will turn KPC into an international oil major. It will even own a stake in Britain's North Sea Thistle oil field, as well as having oil and gas drilling rights and expertise.

The 38-year-old finance minister studied both in California and at Harvard before returning to Kuwait to embark on a career in investment banking. For above all else, Al Hamad is an investment banker. Unlike his predecessor, Abdul Rahman al Atiqi, who in his 15 years at the ministry of finance saw Kuwait develop from a small provincial state with only one first class hotel to a financial giant in the world's capital markets, Al Hamad comes from a generation which has been forced to put a great deal of money to productive use outside the country. He also has first hand experience of running an investment bank successfully and efficiently.

Al Hamad was managing director of the Kuwait Investment Company in the 1970s, and changed it from a sleepy fund for surplus government cash into an active international merchant bank. He went on to reform the Kuwait Fund for Arab Development, modelling it on the better parts of the World Bank and introducing project financing and, effectively, co-financing with other sources of funds.

Now Al Hamad is running his country's portfolio, the same form of sweeping dynamism has already become apparent; nor is it confined to the international arena. When

KIC's profits fell early this year. soon after the parliamentary elections in March and Al Hamad's appointment as finance minister. he proposed a cut in the dividend. This led to the resignation of the KIC chairman since dividend cuts are unheard of on the Kuwait stock exchange. Yet the market pushed the KIC shares up from KD5 ($17) to KD11 ($38) upon the announcement of the resignation: sound banking had overcome expediency. and this was something the local stock market could appreciate.

How the rest of the world will react to Kuwait's new investment policy remains to be seen. By the end of this year Kuwait will have more than $75bn in foreign assets. according to the revised estimates for the 1981 current account surplus. That is a great deal of money. by any standards. freely available for investment. A fundamental move away from passive investment in five per cent holdings or less. in blue chip stocks in Britain and the US. to a policy of churning stocks for quick profit on the one hand while gaining control of industrial giants on the other. will have turned Kuwait's finance ministry into an industrial holding company from merely an investment fund.

Perhaps the reasoning behind Al Hamad's philosophy of active participation stems from the surplus assets themselves. The Kuwaiti government strongly believes that its oil wealth should be held in trust for future generations who may see the oil run out and have to find a new national livelihood. In other words. Kuwait is investing for its future: which will require trained manpower as much as money.

CSO: 4400/69

VARIOUS NEW ARAB AID PROGRAMS FOR TUNISIA DESCRIBED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 242, 10 Oct 81 pp 51, 55

/Article: "Economic Relations between Tunisia and the Arabs: Success on All Fronts, Development in Every Field"/

/Text/ Tunisian-Arab relations are good on all levels and in all directions! This is underlined by the enduring calm on the political front between Tunisia and every Arab country, and also by the growth and development of economic and financial relations between Tunisia and most Arab countries.

While moving the Arab League to Tunisia and approving Tunisia as its temporary headquarters in 1979 helped cool down relations between Tunisia and some Arab countries that had previously been tense and helped strengthen Tunisia's good relations with other countries, that has all helped open the door to broad financial and economic cooperation between Tunisia and the other Arab countries, now that the general political climate has provided all the ingredients for unleashing and releasing possibilities to engage in such coordination and benefit from their opportunities.

Within this general outline, the past few weeks contained some developments which were new in themselves and some that rounded out and consolidated previous steps.

Toward Algeria

In the context of North Africa, Tunisia signed three financial, technical and cultural cooperation agreements with its brother and neighbor Algeria, in final form, in the following framework:

1. The first agreement stipulates the establishment of a joint Tunisian-Algerian investment bank with capital of $40 million that is actually to start operation at the beginning of next year. In particular, the bank will participate in financing projects to develop border areas and finance joint or individual development projects in both countries.

2. The second agreement calls for the establishment of an Institute of Public Finance in Algeria. The institute's purpose is to prepare and train Tunisian and Algerian staffs in the sciences of public finance. In exchange, there will be another institute in Tunisia specializing in preparing and training Algerian and Tunisian staffs in the banking and insurance sector.

3. The third agreement calls for the establishment of a joint Tunisian-Algerian organization for youth care, which will engage in financing sporting, cultural, and social activities in the two countries and expanding exchanges of delegations and visits among young people.

These agreements between the two countries are not new; their authorities had concluded all of them a few months ago. What is new, however, is that the preliminary agreements have evolved into final ones and that the final agreements will very soon enter the stage of actual execution. That calls for total satisfaction, especially since the atmosphere in many bilateral and multilateral Arab relationships in the past has resulted in the abrogation of preliminary agreement rather than their evolution into final ones.

The signing of the agreements in the first week of September, during the visit Tunisia's prime minister, Muhamed Mzali, made to Algeria, as part of the visits he exchanges with his Algerian colleague Ahmad Abdel Ghani every 6 months, leads one to expect further accomplishments during the Algerian prime minister's next visit in February 1982.

Toward Libya

A week after the signing of these agreements with Algeria, the Tunisian authorities signed a new agreement with their counterparts in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah for economic cooperation between the two countries. This is considered a complement to and a development of previous agreements signed by the two of them in 1973, 1977, and 1979.

The new agreement includes a number of sections and contexts, as follows:

1. In the industrial context, the agreement calls for the formation of committees to study possibilities for achieving industrial integration between the two countries, especially in the sectors of phosphatic fertilizers and petrochemical industries.

2. In the context of transport and communications, the agreement calls for efforts to increase and expand the system of land routes between the two countries and formation of a committee to revive the project of a joint shipping company. It also calls for consolidation of telephone lines and telecommunications.

3. In the realm of electricity, the agreement calls for steps to link the Tunisian and Libyan electricity grids in a manner that will enable the two countries to benefit from the surplus of each in a continuous fashion and from the acceleration in the process of bringing electricity to various areas and developing these areas.

The important aspect of this agreement does not just lie its contents and the different aspects of cooperation it contains but also, in the first place, the fact that it will revive projects between the two countries that ought to have seen the light of day at a previous period, and would have done so had it not been for narrow political vision or other preoccupations.

Also toward Qatar

At the same time, the Tunisian authorities signed a preliminary agreement with Qatari authorities to establish a bank as a joint venture with Qatar and France,

30 percent of whose shares would be distributed to Qatar and France, each, and 40 percent to Tunisia.

Among the information being circulated on the agreement (which has not entered the stage of execution pending its final signing by the authorities of the three countries), one may observe the following:

1. The proposed bank will be one of a series of investment banks which Tunisia has formulated a plan to establish; the first of these was established by agreement with Kuwait (with capital of $250 million), followed by a second by agreement with Saudi Arabia (with capital of $250 million). Now comes the turn of the third bank.

2. It had been planned that this third bank would be established as a joint venture among Tunisia, France, Iraq and the emirates. It appears that the circumstances of the Gulf war between Iraq and Iran have prevented Iraq from following up on its interest in the project, and the emirates' failure to take part in this bank may be explained by the fact that it was just a prelude to another project between Tunisia and the emirates similar to the venture between Tunisia and Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

3. The capital of the new bank has not yet been determined but it is understood that that will be within the range of $100 million. That is much less than the capital of $250 million originally planned for, to which the former French premier Raymond Barre had declared France was committed and would have a share. However, it appears that economic and financial developments in France, the additional burdens they have imposed on the regime and the regime's desire to orient French bank activities in new directions have prompted the government of Mitterrand, in the person of the minister of economy, Jacques Delors, to request a reduction in the value of its contribution and to request that the entire capital be reduced so that France's share of the bank's capital could continue to be suitable and significant. This is the way it has turned out.

Whatever the new bank's capital might be, the important thing about it is that it has added a new country to the network of banking ventures with Tunisia, while allowing it to retain the opportunity, in the near future, of participating with another potential partner, the emirates, and in the medium range the opportunity of participating with yet another potential partner, Iraq. One shoud bear in mind that if the new project is a success, that will open the way to increasing its capital and expanding the scope, context and volume of its activities, separately or in cooperation with other investment banks.

In addition, one should bear in mind that the agreement to establish a bank between Qatar and Tunisia (and France) has been preceded by an agreement (whose execution is underway) to use in Qatar surplus Tunisian currency, and that has resulted in similar agreements with Saudia Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and so forth which have also started to be carried out.

And Toward Kuwait

This time Tunisia and Kuwait have also been working together to give economic and investment cooperation between the two a new push which will strengthen its quantum leap from ordinary limited cooperation to a cooperation graced with numerous facets and integrated fronts.

This took place in the course of the visit that Mr Abdelaziz Lasram, the Tunisian minister of economy, made to Kuwait in the last week of September to discuss a group of issues regarding cooperation between the two countries and to prepare for the anticipated visit that the Kuwaiti crown prince, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah, will soon make to Tunisia; this will be another occasion to make a new move toward Kuwaiti-Tunisian cooperation, which is now considered one of the most successful, integrated and pervasive forms of cooperation between Tunisia and other Arab countries. The Tunisian minister of economy expressed this fact in Kuwait itself by making the following observations:

1. Relations between Tunisia and Kuwait were fundamentally based in the past on certain loans Tunisia receives from the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development.

2. However, these relations have developed and have now taken the form of exemplary cooperation and integration, because Kuwait no longer contents itself with the broad financing of certain Tunisian projects; rather, it has proceeded to finance numerous joint projects of a developmental and productive character, especially heavy chemical industry projects linked with phosphate and tourist, development and housing development ventures.

3. The goal of Tunisia and Kuwait now is to expand cooperation between themselves in this integrated fashion in such other areas as energy, high-technology industries and the nuclear field. The Tunisian minister has stated that the ruler of Kuwait, Jabir al-Ahmad, the crown prince, Shaykh Sa'd, and all Kuwaiti officials have felt an intense desire to do so. What leads one to expect success in this field are not just the previous successes that have been achieved but also provision of the necessary material and equipment by means of joint Kuwaiti-Tunisian organizations existing in Tunisia, in particular the joint Tunisian-Kuwait Investment Bank. Kuwait is prepared to take part in Tunisian projects in accordance with the economic feasibility of the projects and Tunisia's absorptive capacity. Tunisia will be very content with that.

4. However, the [most] important development Minister Lasram's visit to Kuwait has brought out is the declaration in the course of the visit of the fact that Kuwait would present an application to nominate Tunisia for membership in the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) during the organization's next ministerial meeting in Abu Dhabi next December, now that Tunisia has agreed to go along with the view of Kuwait and the other member countries in this regard and join the Arab oil organization.

The importance of this step lies not just in Tunisia's adherence to membership in an important regional club dealing with the most important strategic resource in the world -- it lies also in faith in Tunisia's oil resources and future, as reflected by its nomination for membership in this club.

It might be pure coincidence that the announcement of this step, for which preparations have been going on for some time, occurred at the same time as the announcement of information on oil discoveries in Tunisia which, in the event they are proved, will result in doubling or quadrupling Tunisia's proved crude oil reserves.

In the middle of September, information circulating in American oil circles indicated that the oil exploration being undertaken by two companies, Standard of Indiana

(Amoco) and Tenneco resulted in two new fields which, if the expectations made on them are valid, will have the effect of raising Tunisia's proved reserves from 2.35 billion to 5 to 10 billion barrels.

While some observers insist on refusing to be exaggeratedly optimistic on the new discoveries at this time some also state that these discoveries will not permit Tunisia to export crude oil in large volumes before the end of the eighties and that these quantities will not exceed 500,000 or 600,000 barrels a day at that time.

Two geological considerations prompt these observers to have good expectations regarding the two new discoveries:

First, the field discovered by Amoco in southwestern Tunisia near the Algerian border can be considered the first confirmation that Algerian oil fields extend inside Tunisian territory.

Second, the Tenneco company's discovery is situated onshore along the Gulf of Gabes, where geologists have discovered numerous oil deposits.

The important thing in both cases is that the oil discovered is of a light quality with low sulphur content -- that is, it is similar to high-priced Algerian and Libyan crudes.

In any event, if Tunisian oil exports reach a rate of 500,000 or 600,000 barrels a day at the end of this decade, that will not be insignificant. Aside from the fact that it will make up for what Tunisia lost when it was compelled to reduce its oil exports, it will provide it with new bargaining power in international economic, financial, and technological relations with the whole world and will also furnish it with political support in its regional and international setting. Above and beyond that, it will enable it to increase its foreign currency revenues (at today's prices) by about $7 billion a year, and this holds positive implications on all economic and political levels together.

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CSO: 4504/47

PLO PAPER VIEWS ALTERNATIVES TO SETTLEMENT

JN251829 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1540 GMT 25 Nov 81

[Excerpts] In an editorial this week under the headline of "Palestine Will Raise Your Banner," FILASTIN ATH-THAWRAH, the PLO central paper, first addresses words of allegiance to the martyr commander Majid Abu Sharar, who was martyred 40 days ago.

The Palestine which was lost by the Arab regimes in 1948 will not be regained without the disappearance of these same Arab regimes. The condition for Palestine's liberation lies in achieving Arab change.

The Arab regimes that have existed in the region since 1948 recognize Israel and coexist with it. They also recognize the international resolutions which candidly recognize Israel. Moreover, these regimes do not fight Israel and perhaps do not even contemplate it, due to the lack of a pan-Arab policy or a policy of self-interest against Israel and due to Arab fragmentation in the arena, rather than unified Arab action.

We must make the following observations on the Arab stand during the Fes summit: First among these is that international settlement of the Palestinian issue can only be based on a U.S.-Soviet detente similar to that producing the 1977 statement. Observers now believe that the U.S. Administration under President Reagan has rejected the bases on which international detente was founded and replaced these with an escalation of tension all over the world. The issue of the U.S. missiles in Europe and the strategic alliance in the Middle East are ample proofs of this. Thus, talk of a Soviet-U.S. agreement on the Fahd plan or on the international conference in the Middle East has no scientific basis and lacks a sound view of the international situation.

Second, the European-U.S. settlement of the Palestinian issue is impractical and unrealistic. This is because, in the first place, the course of such a settlement clashes with international and pan-Arab courses. Talk about making the short-term Arab course fit within the Camp David framework would, in practice, lead to Arab fragmentation, whether such fragmentation resulted from internal pan-Arab causes or those pertaining to the policy of Arab axes. Arab regimes have to view international reality as it is, with all its tension and polarization. Even if all the Arab regimes were biased toward the U.S.-European settlement, this settlement would still be doomed to failure because it does not reflect the international

balance of power. Rather, it is part of an escalation policy and runs counter to the policy of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Third, the most prominent example of a European-U.S. settlement is the Camp David accords.

Fourth, the sole Arab alternative, in light of the international escalation and the fact that a relaxation in the situation is unlikely, is that of fighting against Israel, particularly in an international atmosphere that is truly appropriate for the local sides in the region to play a specific role.

As for proposing an Arab settlement, we still do not know whether those who proposed it have taken all these factors into consideration. The issue of settlement does not boil down to proposing points or articles just for the sake of publicity or defining the Arab stand in accordance with these articles. Naturally, it would be a grave mistake for us to lay down inflexible guidelines for Arab action in an ever-changing international and Arab situation.

In conclusion, the paper says: Thus, during the Fes summit the Arab regimes must think and move in a different manner [as heard] so long as they are incapable, in practice, of achieving their own settlement and so long as an international settlement is impossible due to the absence of an international relaxation, particularly where the Middle East is concerned.

Thus the Arab regimes have one international and Arab alternative left: the alternative of fighting. Shall we contemplate such an alternative rather than be lost again in the illusions of the Europeans and Americans?

CSO: 4404/131

BAGHDAD DAILY ACCUSES EGYPT, SYRIA OF TREASON

JN201522 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0800 GMT 20 Nov 81

[Text] Baghdad, 20 Nov (INA)--ATH-THAWRAH has described the Egyptian regime's conduct following al-Sadat's death as treason both on the national and pan-Arab levels, particularly regarding this regime's relations with the Zionist entity and its alliance with the United States.

In an editorial today, the paper says: The Egyptian regime's conduct amounts to yet another break with the Arab body. Consequently, the masses of the Egyptian Arab people and the masses of the Arab nation and its vanguard forces' countries and government opposed to the Camp David process will continue the struggle to topple the Egyptian regime and the policy of settlement. The paper adds: The Camp David process is not more than the progeny of imperialist and Zionist machinations. It is a course diametrically opposed to every honorable pan-Arab liberation course.

ATH-THAWRAH sees a link between the trends of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, saying: Both regimes are up to their ears in the same treasonous and defeatist course. The state of affairs reached in Egypt in 4 years with regard to reconciliation with and recognition of the enemy will be reached in Syria in a few more years. The difference between the two regimes is that the Egyptian regime marched along the course of settlement to serve U.S. and Zionist interests and schemes in a direct and open manner; whereas, the Syrian regime continued its games to tame the Palestinian and Lebanese national wills in order to reach the same objectives as the Egyptian regime.

The paper asserts that the Syrian regime is playing a destructive role against Arab solidarity and joint Arab action so as to weaken the Arab stand and instill a spirit of despair and defeat in Arab society. It always prefers to march along tortuous and hard terrain toward pan-Arab treason and the realization of reconciliation with the Zionist enemy.

CSO: 4004/127

BRIEFS

IRAQ PUMPING OIL TO LEBANESE--Lebanese Oil Minister Muhammad Yusuf Baydun announced today that Iraq and Lebanon have signed an agreement to resume the pumping of Iraqi crude oil to the Iraqi refinery in northern Lebanon. The pumping has been suspended since March 1976. The agreement was signed by Baydun during his visit to Iraq. The Lebanese minister returned to Beirut last night. [Text] [JN171311 Monte Carlo Radio Monto Carlo in Arabic 1200 GMT 17 Nov 81]

IRAQI-LEBANESE OIL MINISTERS DISCUSSIONS--Baghdad, 14 Nov (INA)--Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, Revolution Command Council member and oil minister, and Yusuf Baydun, Lebanese industry oil minister discussed here today ways to promote oil relations between the two fraternal countries. The Lebanese industry and oil minister arrived in Baghdad yesterday on a visit of several days for talks on the promotion of relations between the two countries, particularly in the sphere of oil. [Text] [JN141442 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1415 GMT 14 Nov 81]

SAUDI LOAN TO PLO--Saudi authorities on 10 November gave $28.5 million to the PLO representative in Riyadh, Rafiq al-Natshah. This money, in the form of a loan, is the third part of the annual aid Saudi Arabia gives the PLO in accordance with the resolutions of the Baghdad conference. The Saudis make no secret of the fact they are funding the PLO even though it is occurring at a time when the United States is stepping up its support for the Riyadh authorities. The check was handed to the PLO representative 48 hours after the Saudi authorities complained about the penetration of Israeli planes into their airspace. [Ya'Aqov Erez] [Text] [TA120948 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 12 Nov 81]

CSO: 4423/42

OPEC'S YAMANI FOR PROGRESS IN NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE

AU251215 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 25 Nov 81 p 1

[Special DIE PRESSE report by "HO": "OPEC Wants More Active Role in North-South Dialogue"]

[Text] OPEC is increasingly becoming aware of its important role in the dialogue between industrialized and developing countries. Yesterday Saudi Arabia's Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani declared in his opening statement at a 3-day "oil seminar" in Vienna that "a fair and objective dialogue between North and South is inconceivable without the essential participation of OPEC."

Any North-South dialogue must be based on the discussion of energy problems, he said, and since OPEC is the most important oil supplier it is only logical for it to play a decisive role in the discussions. The oil exporting countries, he said, want to play a "more positive and more effective role," to ensure that rapid progress is made at the negotiations.

Yamani, who chairs the 3-day seminar on energy and development questions, also stressed that the current glut in the oil market is only a transitory phase and does not signal the end of the energy problem. Dr (Fadhil J. al-Chalabi), deputy secretary general of OPEC, outlined three possible price strategies: the oil price could be oriented on the cost of alternative energies and would have to make possible a healthy and steady growth of the world economy; the oil price could be fixed in such a way that OPEC would retain a stable share in the world energy market; or one could leave the price development to the market forces, with OPEC fixing a minimum price.

At the seminar, which is being attended by 500 participants from all over the world --including besides prominent OPEC figures French Economy Minister Jacques Delors and FRG Economics Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff--at the heavily guarded Vienna Intercontinental Hotel, among other things questions of the future oil supply of industrialized and developing countries are in the center of numerous experts lectures and panel discussions. Four working papers will be presented, dealing with questions of oil pricing policy, energy problems of the Third World, energy dependence of developing countries without oil resources of their own, and global energy and development problems.

In his greetings address Chancellor Kreisky combined oil policy with world politics, and indirectly pleaded for a Palestinian state. He declared that a Middle East peace was the basic prerequisite for a closer cooperation as envisaged by OPEC.
CSO: 4420/1

BRIEFS

OPEC DISCUSSES PRICE STRATEGY--Vienna--The OPEC seminar "energy and development" which will be held today and tomorrow at the Vienna Interncontinental Hotel, will deal with the future development of hydrocarbons prices, the energy dependence of oil-importing countries, and the energy problems of the Third and the Fourth World. The seminar will be attended by the OPEC oil ministers and 450 oil experts, as well as by representatives of international organizations. The seminar was preceded by a meeting of the OPEC committee for long-term strategy held last weekend also at the Intercontinental Hotel. The central issue at this conference held under the chairmanship of Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Yamani was a possible change in the strategy of the oil cartel. Concrete results of the meeting held behind strictly closed doors are to be revealed only at the next OPEC oil ministers conference on 9 December in Abu Dhabi. Meanwhile, OPEC members Nigeria and Iran have announced a further increase in their crude oil production. [Text] [AU241011 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 24 Nov 81 p 7]

CSO: 4420/1

JOURNALIST VISITS GHAZNI, MEETS RESISTANCE GROUP

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Sep 81, 1 Oct 81

[Article by Jean Bertolino: "Afghanistan: Impostors and Heroes of the Resistance"]

[30 Sep 81 p 5]

[Text] I. The Ogre of Zurmatt

The Afghan guide who has been given to us by the Jabbah-e-Nejat-e-Milli (National Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan) is a 120-kilo giant of fearful appearance. Right off, we nicknamed him the ogre of Zurmatt, in reference to the valley he comes from. He is first taking us to his home territory, to the ground of his exploits. Ashmatallah Mojadidi, one of the top officials of the Jabbah and the man who gave him the mission of protecting us through our journey, presented him to us as his province's No 1 shot with the rocket-launcher. It seems that he has destroyed several dozen Soviet tanks by himself. Could one wish to be in better hands?

Waziristan, a border area, has centuries-old cedars on its heights that busy woodsmen cut indiscriminately. Caravans of camels laden with wood clog the track. This is the principal trade with Pakistan. Entire forests have already been mutilated, and the rocky slopes, with trunks cut off a meter above ground scattered over them, resemble cemeteries.

Contrary to the general rule prevailing in Afghanistan, the inhabitants of Waziristan, the Waziri, are hardly hospitable. High walls, decorated with moldings and pierced with weep holes, protect their pretty villages of Biblical aspect. The looks of the inhabitants are hostile and fugitive, their replies to our greetings barely muttered. We avoid camping near them, we sleep out at night in desert areas, from from dwellings and crops. On the second evening, near a stream to which we have withdrawn to wash, some gunshots come at us and we run to get to Sado Khan.

"You must not get an inch away from me," he growls.

At an inn near the border, he gets his horse back. His demeanor is really imposing now, and we, with our painful legs and bloody feet, envy him.

The 10 men of his group, armed with Kalashnikovs, rocket-launchers and rifles, and four camels, walk as we do, painfully, behind the ogre's mount. Three of the four animals are laden with weapons and ammunition which Jabbah-e-Nejat has entrusted to

him for the combatants of Zurmatt. The fourth carries our equipment. He has billed us for everything, the entire caravan, plus his protection.

Not having been able to hire mules or donkeys, here we are, forced to cross passes rising to 4,000 meters by paths that follow the stream beds. Half a day of rest on the back of a camel costs 5,000 afghanis over and above what we have already paid. It is a racket. We are sure that the Jabbah has taken care of all the travel costs for this mission and that Sado Khan is cheating it, as he is cheating us. The pockets of his jacket are stuffed with paper money. During our stops, he likes to show it, and the gleam of cupidity that we read in his face disturbs us. At mealtime, our menu invariably consists of bread and tea. But if the ogre and his acolytes catch sight of a shepherds' camp, they don't miss the chance to have a feast, leaving us to continue on the path alone with the camel-driver.

In the Liberated Zones

A strong smell of wild absinthe impregnates the air of the high peaks. The war is far off, very far. In these valleys cut off from everything, one comes not to believe in it anymore. We reach the Zadran region, and this time, to our great surprise, far from avoiding the roadways as we have done up to now, we take the vehicle road connecting Khowst and Gardez, toward Gardez. The calm assurance of our escorts indicates the absence of any danger. The roadside is edifying too.

Along several dozen kilometers lie the shells of tanks. Not just one, but 8 or 10 convoys have been annihilated here, one after the other. This happened when Taraki was in power, but the Soviets have not yet done anything to reopen this stretch of road.[1] In the villages, life seems to be resuming its normal course. People are rebuilding the bombed-out houses here and there, restoring the irrigation canals, cultivating the fields, dozing at siesta time in the open air outside the tea houses. Here, the resistance fighters are these people. Not a single helicopter, not a single airplane disturbs their peace.

Here, a wide antitank ditch cuts the road. This is the end of the zone of security. We cut off toward the mountains. More passes to top, and still no shadow of a Russian presence. We do not encounter any Afghans either. We dream of Sado Khan's house, of the banquets he has promised us, and in the barren fastnesses of the steppe, we keep our eyes out for a massive and solid chateau, in the image of its master, to appear. Why this stop in a nomads' encampment when we are so near our goal? Yes, why delay us? We want to get to our host's house as quickly as possible, to take a bath, rest up, wash our stinking clothes, encrusted with dried sweat. Surprise! This is the chateau of Sado Khan, the ogre of Zurmatt. A few miserable tents in a rocky setting, with no water or trees.

Now it remains to see our rocket-launcher at work against the Russian tanks. Gardez is only 3 hours from where we are, and the echos of battle reach us from there. The mujahidin of Hesbi Yunis Rallis, led by a shock mullah, the mullah Jellaledin, are giving a rough time to the Soviet garrison stationed in the town and are even daring

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1. Nur Mohammed Taraki, named chief of state on 30 April 1978, after the coup d'etat that toppled President Daoud, was killed in the bloody coup by his prime minister Hafizullah Amin, who seized power in September 1979.

to attack it in broad daylight, defying the MiGs that criss-cross the Zurmatt sky before dropping their bombs. We insist on going to the combat zones, but Sado Khan does does not seem in a hurry to take us there.

Each night--it is Ramadan--the ogre presides over banquets, devouring half a goat by himself, and we, off in our tent, like so many bearers of the plague, wait. On the 6th day, Sado Khan finally stirs and takes us to Zermal, a big Zurmatt village located between Gardez, Mota-Khan and Ghazni.

A Soviet Convoy Wiped Out

The surest way to own a province is to put it in ruin," wrote Machiavelli. This is exactly what the Soviets have done here, in this locality almost entirely emptied of its inhabitants, who have fled to Pakistan in successive waves. After their departure, the Kushi nomads of the region installed themselves in their place, among the debris of the houses, letting their flocks complete the destruction of the orchards and plantations.

The ogre has not come to Zermal to make war: we discover that he is not distributing free of charge the weapons that his organization has entrusted to him for the fighters, but is selling them to confederates of dubious appearance. This time we are certain that this man is using the resistance to enrich himself and profiting from a usurped reputation, and that with him, we are completely cut off from reality.

The name of Amin Wardak comes back to our mind. Amin is a well-known and honest resistance fighter who lives in Jeratu, in Wardak province, his province. Only he can liberate us from the ogre, but it is still necessary for the ogre to agree to take us to him. Unfortunately, his pockets stuffed with money, he takes us back to his camp once his business is completed. On the 10th day, at 10 in the morning, two Soviet helicopters pass over our tents. At noon, after exacting 50,000 afghanis for taking us where we want to go, Sado Khan and his troop finally break camp. At sunset, we pass near the town of Gardez.

A tank suddenly appears over some wild oats. Then another, then trucks, armored cars, dozens of them, in Indian file, immobile. We pause for a bit. Sado Khan guffaws, dashes toward the enemy, who do not budge, shouting a great war cry. We catch up to him and understand the reasons for his bravado. All these vehicles are lifeless. They are burnt-out scrap iron, as if suddenly petrified, as they moved, by the ambush that took them by surprise, and they litter the middle of the Gardez-Zermal road. Neither the Russians--who until now have been anxious to wipe out the signs of their vulnerability--nor the government has yet come to take them away.

The adventure that we are living in the footsteps of Sado Khan is not unique of its kind. Afghanistan has always had the reputation of being an uncertain country, hard to govern. Its tortuous relief, spiked with summits that peak at 6,000 meters, and a myriad of deep gorges, the only routes of communication and scarcely used, have from all time been the allies of the highway robbers that hold the caravans to ransom.

A positive aspect compensated for this inconvenience. From remotest antiquity, the chaotic landscapes of the Hindu Kush have also served as natural ramparts against the invaders who surge up from the steppes of Central Asia. Today they still fill this double role, but if they want to be totally credible, the genuine Afghan fight-

ers will have to rid themselves of the malefactors who operate in their territory, for the latter constitute the embryo of truth on which Soviet propaganda is based when it calls the resistance fighters as a whole scoundrels and bandits.

Last year, a band of Kushi nomads stopped on the Kabul-Ghazni road, at dusk, an overcrowded bus full of civilians and a car occupied by a doctor and his wife and daughter. All the travelers were robbed, and 17 of them were pitilessly beaten, including the doctor and his family. Since they could not tarry too long at that spot, which is watched closely by the Soviets, the robbers mutilated several women to grab their bracelets and earrings fast. This horrible crime has gone unpunished.

In order to move freely within the country, the highwaymen join one of the six official resistance organizations, which gives them a sort of immunity. If they are overseen by true mujahidin, they can claim a recognized membership card, show a membership card, and worse still, by claiming to be giving the Russians a hard time, they can use this means to obtain weapons.

Laxity in Recruiting

In Peshawar, in Pakistan, where the Afghan opposition as a whole has established its general headquarters since the beginning of the Soviet intervention, the officials of certain organizations, dominated by a spirit of rivalry, a desire for power, show an insensitive laxity in their recruiting. The only thing that matters to them is the number of partisans they can rally as against the local competition.

It is not by remaining splintered that the resistance will be able to police itself seriously, no longer tolerating black sheep in its ranks and becoming irreproachable. Can its unification, which is more necessary than ever, be achieved with the people who are presently leading it?

[1 Oct 81 p 7]

[Text] II. The Robin Hood of Jeratu

> Jean Bertolino, with Olivier Warin, did a report from Afghanistan, broadcast by TF [French Television] 1 on Wednesday 30 September. After denouncing the attitude of the impostors who join with the resistance organizations in order to engage in criminal activities (LE MONDE of 30 September), he tells the exploits of the genuine fighters. In 2 years of warfare, the resistance has fewer guerrillas than in its beginning, but they are now better-organized and more effective.

Big, very slim, Amin Wardak possesses the determination and nobility of the legendary hero. His slightly curved back and his lined face, a little sad, give him an air of fragility that accentuates the attractive aspect of him. The people of his valley are devoted to him not by tradition or out of fear: his behavior, both respectful and familiar, earns him the sympathy of his coreligionists. He is the antithesis of Sado Khan, the brigand. As the crow flies, the big Soviet garrison of Ghazni, the main nerve center on the Kabul-Kandahar road, is barely 20 miles away. This is hard to believe, so deep is the feeling of peace that the valley gives.

We are in the harvest season. In the fields, the peasants cut the ripe wheat with sickles, while the children make up the sheaves. Women draw water from the springs and come back carrying the jugs on their heads. They walk slowly, stepping aside and turning as we pass. Silent, withdrawn, furtive, they have, under their dark-colored veils, the appearance of specters. Distant calls, the nostalgic cantilena sung by a little shepherd, mix with the chirpings of the birds and the mooings of the flocks. Whereas a year ago the sky of Jeratu was furrowed by the combat helicopters daily, says Amin Wardak, "the whole valley today is free." He adds: "This year, the Soviets have come only once, in the spring. It was a real invasion: 2,000 tanks, 10,000 men, airplanes. They surrounded all our villages, shelled several houses, shot some 20 people. I was with my mujahidin, in the mountains. At night, we came down to shoot at the tanks with our rocket-launchers and to lay mines. We destroyed a good 60 of them in that way. The Soviets cannot control all the vallies."

As everywhere else, one can find among the Afghans individuals prepared to betray for money. Two days after our arrival in Jeratu, some peasants who found on the road two unknown persons of dubious appearance came to inform Abdallah, Amin's cousin, about them, as well as his direct assistant for war affairs. The latter immediately took several mujahidin with him and went off to arrest them. An hour later, they brought them back, and searched them in front of us. Impressive wads of paper money were taken from the suspects' pockets and thrown on the ground. Abdallah, furious, took a sheaf of bills and used it to hit them in the face: "We came to collect some debts," one of them insisted.

The two presumed spies were from Zurmatt. That was therefore where they were to be judged. And since the highest political and spiritual authority in Zurmatt is the famous mullah Jellaledin, the one who attacks the Soviet bases in Gardez in daylight, it is improbable that they will get any clemency. If they are found guilty, they will be executed on the spot. An interesting detail: the mullah Jelleledin, a "fundamentalist" of the Hesbi Yunis Rallis, and Amin Wardak, affiliated with the Maaz e Milli Islami of Ghailani, a moderate nationalist party, do not echo in the field the dissensions that prevail in Peshawar. Whenever they have the opportunity, they collaborate. This is a proof that the politicians' quarrels do not reach at all, or very little, those whose sole objective is to fight the occupiers.

In Jeratu, it is Amin Wardak who renders justice. When he was a child, he dreamed of exercising that profession. To kid him gently, his father nicknamed him Qazi--that is, judge. That nickname has stuck with him. He is still called that throughout the province. Since he has been leading the armed struggle, he has had the power to judge the traitors or suspects in his sector. Qazi has truly become a qazi, and no one disputes him. He already had the name, and now he has the function. One day, in the shade of an orchard, we witnessed a session of the people's court. Amin, seated in the center of a circle composed of the council of elders, with their long white beards, and villagers, is lecturing a youth.

We interrupt him:

"What has he done wrong?'

"Perhaps nothing," replies the judge. "The government authorities often recruit people by force for military service. This one did not avoid it, and for more than a year he has been a soldier with the Khalqis. He has just deserted, he says, and

is coming back to his family here. But he may be a spy. He may be coming among us, staying 2 or 3 months, and then going back to the Soviets to give them information."

"What are you going to do, then?"

"If he has decided to become a true mujahid, to fight like them, he will be one of ours. For the moment, we are not sure about him. We have also asked his uncle to be his guarantor. If this boy betrays us, we will burn his parents' house, we will distribute their lands to the peasants, and we will also burn his uncle's house."

The sentence, translated into Pashtu, is immediately approved by a collective nodding of heads. "These are our laws, our customs," Amin tells us, joining his hands in the prayer than closes each hearing: "God, make the Soviets go away, give us victory, let Afghanistan be free." The session is over.

He is a strange personage, this Robin Hood of Jeratu of ours, who has established his general headquarters in the ruins of the family manor. Two of its four towers still rise like a challenge amid the piles of debris and pieces of wall 2 meters thick. They still have a proud aspect despite their gaping wounds. The Soviets hammered away at this edifice, attacked it on several occasions, by air and by land, mined it, bomarded it, shelled it. And like the members of the family that inhabit it, it holds up! Amin Wardak's father, a refugee in Pakistan, is the chief of the tribe of the Wardakis, which has about 500,000 members and 60,000 rifles. There is no doubt but that the Soviets, in attacking the Wardak stronghold, wanted to destroy a symbol, that of feudalism. But Afghan feudalism perhaps does not correspond entirely to the idea they have of it.

"In this country that was unreliable, we had obligations toward our peasants," Amin Wardak tells us. "True, we took 50 percent of their harvests, but in exchange, we had to maintain armed men, for their protection, see to their health needs, organize marriage festivities, receive them in our home. When I was a child, we had an average of 60 guests per day. If we had been so horrible as the Russians claim, do you think the people would remain faithful to us? Our whole family is now scattered. I alone am here, with my younger brother Mustapha, to lead the struggle. It would be easy to kill us. But as you see for yourselves, the population follows us, fights by our side."

Soviet Tanks at 30 Meters

As between feudalism and the patriarchal system, there are nuances that the Soviet propagandists have perhaps not clearly grasped. The system of society that Amin Wardak is defending incarnates, for the time being, the soul of Afghanistan. An attempt to strike it down by force can only strengthen it. What values other than their faith and their traditions can the Afghans draw on as support in their struggle? When we ask our host whether he has the feeling that the Soviets are bringing a little progress to his country, he takes offense: "That is not possible: they are bombing us, massacring us, forcing us into exile, destroying our homes. Never will the Afghans accept foreign domination. Our choice is a simple one--to live free or die."

Some assert that the Afghan rebels are not free, that despite themselves they are under an alienating sociological pressure and that they will be able to progress only by breaking the chains that keep them from evolving. But if they had been morally and politically ready for that, they would already have made their revolution by tehmselves.

If the Soviets come more and more infrequently into the valley of the Robin Hood of Jeratu, he, for his part, is not above going to them. One night, he took us to exactly 30 meters from the big Kabul-Ghazni asphalt road, and only 10 kilometers from Ghazni, to a grove of poplars so suspicious-looking that all the trunks are riddled with bullets and shell debris, split, half-broken, and the ground is strewn with rocket scraps.

Dawn comes. Crouching in the grass, we are on the lookout. At 0800 hours, the road comes to life. Buses, taxis, trucks pass at a fast clip. We are at a slightly lower level, and they stand out sharply in the landscape. At 0900 hours, the characteristic throb of the helicopter rotors rises, crescendo. In a distressing tumult, two MI-24 helicopters pass just over the foliage. At 1000 hours, an immense Russian convoy rushes out toward Kabul. Then nothing more, except for civilian vehicles.

At 1600 hours, an iron sound of caterpillars announces the approach of an armored column. Dozens of tanks and half-tracks pass right in front of our eyes. All at once, one of them hiccups, slows down and stops right in front of us, while the convoy continues to roll away. Three of the six soldiers seated on their machine look over our position. The seconds seem interminable. Suddenly, the half-track starts off again.

Amin Wardak smiles: "In daytime, they are the masters of the ground, but in half an hour they will all have turned back into their fortress, and in 7 hours, at 2300 hours, we will attack them."

Is this bluster? Not at all. At the hour stated, we are in the very center of Ghazni, right in the middle of the Soviet formation, and what is more, with the entire complicity of the inhabitants, who propose going onto their rooftops so as to observe the situation better. To the right, 50 meters from our position, is the former high school that today houses the Russian tank crews; to the right are the gendarmerie and the heliport; opposite us, 100 meters off, is the fortress. Amin Wardak's 60 mujahidin move ahead in the dark, approaching their target. We hear the calls that the sentinels periodically cry out in order to keep awake. Three rockets flash toward the troop's barrack-rooms.

The counterattack is immediate. Volleys of tracers go off in all directions, then the 80-mm mortars, the tank guns, the big artillery pieces, the garrison's entire arsenal goes into action. But where to shoot? At whom? They cannot decently raze the town. Then they take its streets in an enfilade, hammering the periphery. By good luck, not all the passages are in their line of fire. We take off very fast. The technique of the Robin Hood of Jeratu: hit and run. We are already far off. The monster that we have unleashed is unaware of this and pounds away at nothing.

The number of Soviet dead in Afghanistan is estimated at 10,000--10,000 men killed by surprise in their cantonments or in their tanks. This despite a considerable disproportion in the armaments employed by the two belligerents, despite the immense disparities in their mentalities and their standards of living. The mujahidin are poor, undernourished, poorly armed, illiterate for the most part. It is not by the deadly arguments of airplanes, tanks and combat helicopters that they will be convinced of the benefits of progress. The industrial world has carried out in their country an invasion, in its most barbarous form, that is felt as a violation.

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PUBLIC PROSECUTOR DISCUSSES INVESTIGATION OF SECTARIAN DISTURBANCES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Sep 81 p 3

[Interview with Public Prosecutor Salah al-Rashidi by Rajab al-Banna; date and place of interview not specified: "Public Prosecutor Opens Investigation File in Sectarian Sedition Events; 'This Is How the Threads of the Conspiracy Were Spun' "]

> [Text] "They took advantage of a loophole in the law; pushed young people in the foreground and hid behind them."
> "Erroneous ideas about religion took hold in many minds, and people rushed into an endless current."

The public prosecutor has been silent for 3 full months. For almost 2 years he has been gathering the threads of the conspiracy which make up the web of the sectarian sedition incidents. He preferred working with his men in total silence so they could unravel the secrets of the conspiracy and unveil the truth behind every incident that occurred during those days. His motto was, "We are men who investigate and verify. Our role is to serve justice. We cannot say anything until we are certain of [our facts]."

Counselor Salah al-Rashidi, the public prosecutor, is now certain [of the facts]. Before giving his testimony for history and imparting the view he gleaned from his daily experience in search of the truth, [we asked him]: "How did the sectarian sedition incidents begin? Who are the real main characters in those incidents? What is the destiny that awaits them? Where does all this end?

[Question] From the standpoint of one who has been leading the team of investigators throughout the country, how did this begin?

Counselor Salah al-Rashidi bowed his head for a moment [as though he were] looking for a place to begin, which he soon found.

[Answer] I was preoccupied with the investigation into the incidents at al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' which lasted over 2 months. Then I became exclusively preoccupied with preparing the reports about what had happened in those

incidents and the results of the investigation. What attracted my attention in the investigation was the fact that the incident itself appeared to be very small, even trivial. It was something that could happen between members of the same family or members of the same sect. However, what did happen was one thing and the rumors and allegations that were circulated around the incidents and traveled from one place to another like wildfire were another. The incident itself had no serious consequences, but it was the provocation that had a great effect in fomenting the sedition and provoking the public. The effects of the violence were greater and more horrifying on the day following the incidents than everything that had happened on the first day. This indicates that the incident was used by certain groups to damage the stability of domestic conditions.

A Pause Is Essential

[Question] A pause here is essential. Why were these rumors and allegations circulated? Whose interests did they serve?

[Answer] It became evident to me first that fomenting sedition between Muslims and Copts was in the interests of a malicious, misguided group that was going after private aims and did not heed the interests or the safety of the country.

A Year of Preparations for the Sedition

[Question] I believe that al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' was masterly executed. Before al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' we used to hear and read about events here and there, and statements used to be issued. Where did these incidents stand in the general framework of the sedition that was unfolded later? Were they within that framework or not?

[Answer] In the course of my work in 1980 I noticed that that year abounded in such events. Occasionally, someone would take advantage of them. I related the events in a memorandum in which I dealt with what had happened during that year. I referred to the fact that that phenomenon was a serious one and that matters had to be dealt with firmly before sedition spreads.

At the Right Time

Therefore, when the president took those measures I was certain that this method of handling the situation was a wise one. It came at the right time to protect the country from a conspiracy whose purpose was to damage the legitimate authorities in the country and infringe upon the safety and security of the homeland.

The facts as I had them after the incidents of 1980 were that at the time when the state was on its way to achieve its goals, a few opportunists and conspirators were trying to use a few individual and limited incidents to create a rift and a split on the domestic front. They wanted to break up national unity and to foment sedition between Muslims and Copts on the basis of distortions and misunderstandings.

At the same time extremist elements were actually stirring up riots and, in some cases, behaving in a suspicious manner for motives that in some cases were hard to understand. There were also other incidents perpetrated by a small fanatic, unenlightened minority in a few governorates. The purpose [of those extremists] was to show the world that the people of Egypt had turned into discordant sects, that the rule of law had disappeared from the country and that no person felt he was safe. The prosecution would go to the locations of the incidents soon after they happened to investigate them in the context of the sovereign law. We had to stand in the way of the mercenaries who would sell the country's reputation, [and we had to stop] the rumor mongers and those who claim to be in the know.

Relevant Facts Revealed by Investigation

[Question] Did the most important features of the conspiracy become evident from the investigation that was conducted into the year of preparations for the sedition?

Counselor Salah al-Rashidi chose his words very carefully.

[Answer] Yes, there were indications that caught my attention in the investigations of 1980 and 1981. The first one of them was that people were trying to impose erroneous notions about religion on the public in a manner that had nothing to do with the spirit of [all] religions. In one of the governorates of Upper Egypt, for example, there were numerous attacks on women who were walking with their husbands or brothers. The second of these was in the numerous disputes that developed over vacant lots, especially those that are owned by the state. Each group would try to take over one lot and turn it into a mosque or a church. These [incidents] were accompanied by disputes and provocations that sometimes developed into gun [battles] whose purpose was to disrupt the peace. The third of these indications lay in the ubiquitous allegations and false rumors to incite sedition. In some cases, for example, we were informed that thefts had occurred in the context of sectarian attacks, and the investigation later proved that these reports were false, and all the stolen articles were found.

Their Purpose Is To Provoke People's Feelings

I discovered from the investigation that part of the sedition plot was to give us information about imaginary thefts, vandalism in some stores, kidnapping young women or arson in houses of worship. Then an investigation would reveal that all these incidents had been contrived to provoke people's feelings. Each incident would be quickly magnified and [false incidents] would be added to each one to increase the volatility of people's emotions.

This is the reason why I took the time to issue a statement every now and then so that the facts would be clear to public opinion and so that these imaginary incidents would not be exploited to manipulate the people's resources.

The fourth indication that attracted my attention was the fact that children or young boys were used to commit reckless acts, and they were encouraged to take advantage of opportunities to rob some stores during the contrived disputes. Some of the boys were induced to vandalize some of the stores to create a state of chaos and disrupt the peace in the sections [where these stores are located]. In this climate the fires of sectarian sedition would spread.

What also attracted my attention in the investigation was the fact that some extremist leaders went beyond the limits of their natural roles and functions. They even used houses of worship to prod people to hate the country's legitimate regime. This is considered a crime for which there is a penalty in the penal code. Those people are being questioned now by the public prosecution.

As the law states, protecting national unity is supposed to be the duty of every citizen. All organizations in the state and all popular organizations are required by the National Unity Protection Act to work to support and preserve this national unity. The law defined the notion of national unity in clear terms for every citizen. It stated that national unity is the unity that is based on respecting the law of the state and the basic components of society which are defined in the constitution, and especially freedom of religion and freedom of opinion, without infringing upon the freedoms of others or the basic components of society.

The Law Rules Us All

The same law also gives each citizen the basic obligation of always giving general national interests priority over the private interests of every force, sect or group.

Every citizen is supposed to know his rights and his duties as well as the penalties that would be in store for him if he endangers national unity in any way, either by violence, threats or any other illegal way, or if he opposes the state's public policy or influences its political and constitutional institutions. Anyone who publicizes false or biased news, bulletins or rumors with the intention of damaging national unity is subject to imprisonment and a fine. Anyone who incites hatred against a class or a group of people or foments sedition among them is subject to imprisonment also. Every young man, every clergyman and everyone who works in politics is supposed to know about these matters in a state that observes the sovereignty of the law. Therefore, all individuals must observe the law in their conduct. The conduct of the state and of its institutions is also subject to the law.

I tell you, the matter is now different following President al-Sadat's initiative with his recent measures and with the spirit of discipline that has begun to prevail in the country. This is splendid because it guarantees and protects our country.

They Even Took Advantage of Children

[Question] I believe that we need to pause here. The fact that young boys are appearing on the scene of these crimes may be significant. It may signify that those who are making them do these things know that the law will not punish those boys because of their age. What can be done about that?

Counselor Salah al-Rashidi replied quickly and resolutely.

[Answer] Yes, this is serious. It is serious because the hand of the law cannot reach those boys and punish them. It is serious because those young people are being taught to commit crimes in front of us. The only thing the prosecution can do is [either] turn them over to their parents in accordance with the stipulations of the law, or have them committed to one of the juvenile institutions with special conditions and measures.

If you were to ask me for my opinion, I would say without hesitation that the present juvenile law has to be amended. In the former law a juvenile was someone under the age of 15; in the present law it is anyone under 18. Can we say that a 17-year old person is not responsible for his actions? Can we approve of him vandalizing [property], taking part in a conspiracy, threatening the security of peaceful people and fanning the fires of sectarian passions with his actions? Do we then turn him over to his parents or do nothing more than commit him to a juvenile institution? Let us reconsider this law. Let us ask sociologists, psychologists, legal experts and experts in Islamic law, when is a person responsible for his actions. Let us then determine the age of a juvenile in light of their replies.

The Defendants of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'

[Question] Your excellency, Mr Prosecutor, let us go back to the beginning. Where does the investigation into the incidents of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' stand?

[Answer] The prosecution's investigation has been concluded. The only matters that are left for us to do are a few criminal laboratory reports about the weapons and the ammunition that were apprehended. We have confined the indictment to 58 persons who were detained for questioning. The recent decisions placed them in protective custody.

[Question] What about the prosecution's charges against them? When will they be put on trial?

[Answer] The indictment includes several charges. They participated in a demonstration that threatened public peace; they were carrying firearms when they demonstrated; they willfully killed 17 persons; they had weapons and ammunition in their possession without permits; they willfully set fire to some public and private property; and they resisted public authorities. They will all be turned over to the state security court where they will be tried as soon as the reports from the criminal laboratory are received.

[Question] How will they be tried?

Counselor Salah al-Rashidi replied quickly.

[Answer] They will be tried according to the laws that are in effect. We must mention that in Egypt the law and only the law is sovereign, and all citizens are equal in the eyes of the law.

I Learned Many Lessons

[Question] What lessons did you learn from your experiences with everything that happened in the sedition incidents?

[Answer] You are right. I learned many lessons. Among the lessons I learned, for example, is that the greatest protection for the country lies in the awareness of its citizens. It was the citizens' awareness that made them stand behind the president's recent resolutions. People will not allow tricksters and rumor mongers to create a split in their midst. All divine religions advocate affection, peace and fraternity.

The second lesson [I learned] is that there is a small group of people trying to drag the country into foolish schemes, and they get others involved in what is destroying them.

The third lesson [I learned] is that in many cases the vigilance of religious leaders and security agencies played an effective part in calming passions, reducing the effect of these incidents and putting them into proper perspective. The measures taken by the Ministry of the Interior to collect unlicensed weapons or to revoke some of the licenses for weapons had an effect on preserving public security. It was a necessary measure for the safety of citizens.

[Question] The other question I have to ask you is this: if the prosecution asks the court for the maximum penalty for the defendants, it will do so in the name of society with all its sects. But what concerns me is the future. How do we protect the future? Do you have something to say about that after the sleepless nights you spent investigating this case?

Counselor Salah al-Rashidi's features became grave and very attentive.

[Question] I too am concerned about the future. We must all work to protect our country and its young people. I believe that Muslim and Christian religious leaders are primarily responsible for this. It is their duty to teach tolerance and to strive for it in the same way they strive for the country and for its safety. They also have to take swift action to be on the scene as soon as such a sectarian incident occurs because their presence reassures people. They could then explain the facts and would not give the rumor mongers and those who arouse people's fears an opportunity to [get to the people].

In concluding his statements Public Prosecutor Counselor Salah al-Rashidi said, "Some erroneous concepts of religion have found their way into young people's minds. It is the role of Muslim and Christian religious leaders to uproot those erroneous ideas and to plant correct ones in their place so that young people would not be led by deviant ideas that have nothing to do with the essence of religion and its tolerance.

8592
CSO: 4504/43

NEW STATISTICS OFFERED ON POPULATION, WORKFORCE

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 26 Sep 81 p 4

/Article by Dr Husayn Tawfiq: "The Population Has Increased 2.5 Percent While the Number of Government Employees Increased 10 Percent!"/

/Text/ The Central Agency for Organization and Management has uncovered an odd fact: the number of government employees is increasing four times faster than the population. Every year the increase in the number of employees comes to 10 percent while the population increase is just 2.5 percent. Thus the crisis in bureaus and offices is four times greater than the crisis in the population.

What is happening here requires some sort of close scrutiny.

It became apparent to the Central Agency for Organization and Management that there has been an inflation in the volume of labor in the government apparatus. This may be attributed to the great rise in the annual rates of increase of labor, which came to 10 percent on the average in in the period 1965-1979.

The growth of labor in the electricity and power sector is to be considered abnormal, since the rate of growth of positions in this sector suddenly rose by 10 percent over the rate in the immediately preceding year, 1977.

We find that the highest rate of increase after that was in jobs in the housing and reconstruction sector; that came to 159.1 percent of the level in the base year, 1977, in 1979.

That was followed by the culture and information sector, where the workforce grew by 34.9 percent.

Through an investigation and analysis of the general government budget in the period 1965-1979, it has become apparent that workforce grew by 137 percent while the population increased by 35 percent in that period. That is, the rate of increase in the workforce was four times that of the population increase in that period.

It was also clear that the ratio of the workforce to the population is constantly increasing from year to year. While there were 31 employees per 1,000 people in 1965, we find that there were 55 employees per thousand in 1979.

The general rate of increase in labor in the government system came to 16 percent in the period 1977-1979, differing from one budget to the next by varying amounts.

The general rate of increase in the government's central budgets came to 23 percent, while the corresponding rate in local government budgets totalled 19.3 percent and in service authorities 15.3 percent.

Going by the figures given in the Central Agency for Organization and Administration report, the number of deputy prime ministers was five in 1977 and rose to six in 1978, then dropped to four in 1979.

Conclusions

The study's most important conclusions were focussed on the fact that the labor structure in the government system, according to the most up to date budgets now available for 1979, consisted of 1,875,651 employees of which special staff consisted of 15.34 percent of the total.

From this it is apparent that:

With regard to employees not performing jobs in the general staff, it is clear that they account for about 6.5 percent of total employees in the government apparatus, in accordance with the following breakdown: 33,223 employees on loan, or 28.3 percent of the total; 11,848 appointed employees, for 10.1 percent, 4,831 employees on special leave, or 41.2 percent /sic/, 2,184 employees on foreign leave, and 21,766 conscripted in the army.

From that, the following is apparent:

People on loan total more than one quarter of the employees in the government system and are not working.

The total of special leaves comes to more than 40 percent of people not performing work in the government system.

As regards labor trends, during the period 1965-1979 we observe a development in labor that resulted in inflation in the volume of labor in the government apparatus which may be attributed to a great rise in the annual rates of increase in labor in this period, which came to an average of 10 percent per annum while the average annual population increase came to about 2.5 percent. This means that there is inflation in the volume of the workforce in the government system.

The great increase referred to above in the volume of labor may also be attributed to:

A change in the role of government: the government is no longer a sovereign government whose task was confined to offering basic services in the areas of defense, security, justice, health, education and certain other services -- its role has expanded to include all aspects of economic and social activity, as it has become committed to the principle of comprehensive planning in this field.

The government's commitment to appointing graduates of universities: the government has committed itself to appointing graduates for a number of years, having adopted the principle of justice which gives every citizen an equal amount of job opportunities and a suitable income.

11887
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DETAINEES TO HAVE VISITS DURING RELIGIOUS, NATIONAL HOLIDAY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 5 Oct 81 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Socialist Prosecutor Decides To Allow All Detainess in Sedition Incidents To Have Visits in Bayram"]

[Text] Counselor 'Abd-al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor decided that all detainees, including those involved in the investigation as well as those who are not involved in it, were to be allowed to have visits as an exceptional measure on the occasion of the 6 October celebration and the holy feast of Bairam. Competent authorities at the Ministry of the Interior have been notified of this decision so that it may be carried out. Detainees will be allowed to meet their relatives during open visitations, which [usually] take place on the occasion of the feast, in the locations where the detainees are being held.

This is the first time the socialist prosecutor allows visits for all detainees. During the last few days only one of the detainees was exempted from this measure. He is Mr 'Abd-al- 'Aziz al-Shurbaji an attorney and former president of the bar association. His family was allowed to visit him in the hospital.

The office of the socialist public prosecutor resumed its questioning of Fu'ad Siraj al-Din yesterday. He was questioned for 4 hours for the second day in a row in the presence of 5 attorneys. During the questioning the interrogator confronted Siraj al-Din with the available evidence that has been attributed to him regarding sectarian sedition: his attempt to revive the New al-Wafd party after the decision to disband it had been made; his meetings with some people who were behind fanning the fires of sectarian sedition among the individuals of this nation; and his relations with the Muslim Brothers and with the Labor party. The investigator also confronted Siraj al-Din with the opinions he had written and declared on the peace initiative and on his meetings in Alexandria. Siraj al-Din's questioning will be resumed for a third time on 12 October.

The office continued to question a new group of people, who are engaged in extremist religious activities, and a number of people who are involved

in counter-political activities. Among those is Hamid al-Azhari, an attorney and a former member of the board of directors of the bar association; Dr 'Ali Nawiji, a physician in Disuq who is one of the Marxist leaders in the Grouping party; 'Abd-al-'Azim Manaf, who is one of the writers of the Grouping party; and 19 persons who are leaders of Islamic groups and members of the al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah Society [The Society of Repudiation and Renunciation/.

Today, the agency will question 18 other persons who are in custody for stirring up sectarian sedition. The agency is also completing its questioning of Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, former member of the People's Assembly.

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AIRPORT, AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 16 Oct 81 p 15

[Article by Muhammad Zayid: "After the Incident of the Packages That Exploded on the Airplane Coming from Libya, Minister of Aviation Says, 'I Asked for the Construction of an Armored Warehouse Where Packages Would Be Examined before They Get to the Airport without Their Owners' "]

[Text] After the horrible objectives of the criminals who planned the incident of the explosive packages on the airplane that came to Cairo from Tripoli in Libya via Malta became evident, I conveyed to Jamal al-Nazir, minister of tourism and civil aviation, the serious question that was on everyone's mind: "What new security measures are we taking to safeguard ourselves against these criminal attempts? Had it not been for God's care alone, whose will it was that the airplane arrive late, the explosion would have occurred, just as the criminals had planned it, inside the airport terminal, and many innocent lives would have been lost."

Jamal al-Nazir told me, "Thank God for His care [not only] in delaying the airplane but also in letting it arrive when it did arrive in particular. If it had been late another half hour, the explosion would have occurred in the air, and the airplane and all those on it would have been destroyed. Regarding security measures, we are actually taking many of them. However, it turned out that none of the airplane's passengers was the owner of the package that exploded. Therefore, we made several new decisions to ensure the utmost security and safety against such criminal attempts on the part of the enemies of life.

"The first one of these decisions is this: No packages unaccompanied by passengers are to be accepted. Passengers used to arrive at the airport, and then their luggage would arrive a day or two later.

"Second, an armored warehouse far from the airport buildings is to be constructed. Any packages arriving on the airplanes of international airlines without their owners are to be transported to that warehouse. Inside that warehouse, which can withstand any explosion, packages would be inspected by the most modern devices. At present there are such warehouses in

some international airports. I gave instructions that construction on such a warehouse begin immediately. It will be completed in about 4 months. During this period packages will be inspceted by the most modern devices before they are carried to the airport terminal.

"Third, passengers on airplanes arriving from some airports will have to identify their luggage under the airplane itself, and their luggage would accompany them to the airport terminal.

"The fourth decision [I made] is that passengers on Egyptian airplanes taking off from any airport in the world are to provide complete personal data on every package before that package is weighed. Airline employees are to make sure that this measure is carried out."

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RELIGIOUS DISTURBANCES IN ASYUT DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 13 Oct 81 p 7

[Article: "Nabawi Isma'il Announces, '50 Members of Islamic Societies and of al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah Society Carried Out the Criminal Attack on Asyut; Police Opposed Them and Crushed Their Criminal Attempt' "]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il announced that policemen were in full control of the situation in Asyut before noon on the day of the incident--Thursday, the first day of Bairam. He said, "I went to Asyut yesterday, and I found out all the facts about what happened there. I saw that life was normal, and I visited the wounded policemen. I found out that much of what was broadcast by the radio [services] of the rejection countries was extremely exaggerated. They are making up things. I wonder: how can they be so imaginative?" He said, "The men of the media are in Asyut to see the facts as they are."

The deputy prime minister said, "It turned out that this small group of religious deviants were members of Islamic societies and of the al-Takfir [Atonement] societies which pursue a course of violence. The members of these societies are from the governorates of al-Minya, Qina and Asyut." He said, "They had made arrangements after the assassination of the late president to carry out a few operations to disturb the peace and to execute the plans for which they had been striving." He said that they were 45 to 50 individuals. "They attacked policemen and people in the street unexpectedly, but this lasted only for a few hours, and it was only in Asyut. What they did on a sad feast day is a criminal act that is not consistent with [any] religion or with humanity. The whole country was in mourning. It was one of the worst Bairams we've had. The simplest principles of humanity and religion would have had them share the people's mourning, but they lost their feelings and they tried to scare people. They were inclined to carry out repeated operations in some of the governorates, and they agreed to carry out this operation in Asyut. This is what we found out after we apprehended them."

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il described the magnitude of the Asyut incidents in a television interview that was broadcast yesterday evening. He said in that interview that that

deviant group began [their operation] when a group of them drove in a Peugeot to attack unarmed policemen in front of Nasir mosque in Asyut. The policemen are unarmed as they usually are on all such occasions. They killed several of the unarmed policemen, and then they turned to the security administration building. They treacherously attacked the policemen who stand [guard] in front of the administration building. Then a group of them entered the building, where they were opposed by a police force. The commander of the operation was wounded. He got away, but he was [later] arrested. A group of them climbed on the roof of the security administration building, and continued to exchange fire with the police force. They believed that being in that place would give them strength and prevent an attack against them."

The deputy prime minister said, "Another group stole a flatbed truck that belonged to the university hospital in Asyut. They drove to one of the police stations and fired on the police force which oppsed them valiantly. They then turned and ran and were pursued by policemen who wounded some and arrested others. Some of those who escaped took a vacant police car that was parked [there], and drove it to the second police station. They fired on the police station and tried to break into it. The policemen there opposed them, so they escaped and sought refuge in the homes surrounding the police station. Some of them climbed on the rooftops of houses and fired [their weapons]. They shot one or two policemen they saw at the supply office while they were on their way to the second police station. They also attacked the policemen who were guarding the installations."

Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il spoke about this criminal adolescent conduct and said, "Didn't those people imagine when they were committing their hideous crime and their irresponsible actions that they could shoot one of their brothers or relatives as well as the helpless people who were walking unprotected in the street on a feast day? Is this smart? They thought that there would be no controls, but they were wrong. In a short period of time the situation was normal in Asyut after policemen pursued them in the homes and locations where they had sought refuge. As a result 9 of them were killed and 10 were wounded and arrested. Another 37 persons who took part in these actions were also arrested."

Mock Helicopter Action

The deputy prime minister and the minister of the interior said, "I contacted my associate, Field Marshal Abu Ghazalah and we set up a mock operation involving two helicopters that flew over the security administration [building] to distract [the dissidents] for a while until police forces were able to take their proper action and to oppose them. When they began fleeing from the security administration [building], they were arrested. Some of them went into homes around the security administration [building], and they were pursued by policemen who arrested them and those who helped them. The [dissidents] got help from some people who had prepared their homes so they could hide them and those like them."

Nabawi Isma'il said, "One of [the dissidents] stood on the roof of the house opposite the police station. He had rapid firing weapons--automatic

weapons--and he began shooting at the station. One of the officers on the street shot him. The boy dropped his weapon, but he remained hanging from the rooftop of the building. Why would he put himself in such a position? Why would young people commit such serious criminal actions and terrify people? Did they think that they could get away with this easily after the late president's assassination? What would all this lead to? What is the reason for these adolescent and criminal operations, and why are they playing with fire? The spirit of evil and crime is engrained in them, and we warned them against it many times. We said that this was a wrong trend; it was neither religion nor Islam. Strange business! All the weapons that they had with them were Russian-made rapid-firing automatic weapons. We seized 18 weapons varying from automatic rifles to Russian pistols. They treacherously took away weapons from the soldiers who were shooting at them. But we now have these weapons back. We seized these weapons which they had taken when we attacked them in their hideouts. We also seized many documents and papers indicating their plans. There were names and data about their plans. We also seized two bombs and military clothing which they were going to use to deceive people and to carry out their attempts."

Blind Malice and Foolishness

The deputy prime minister said, "This deviant handful of people were disappointed when the people in Asyut felt that something unusual was going on. They became aware of it, and the police forces became aware of it. They took up their positions and shot at them after they began their attack and wounded a few armed policemen whom they caught unawares. An officer died. The police opposed them from the first moment despite the surprise [factor]. This is all that happened in Asyut. A few foreign correspondents told me they had been following the incidents and they found the broadcasts of the rejection states exaggerated."

The deputy prime minister declared, "This is blind malice, recklessness and a loss of the power of perception."

A Great Nation

The deputy prime minister concluded his interview with the female television announcer by saying, "The people of Egypt are a great and noble people. They mourned their departed leader. Millions from all the governorates wanted to march in his funeral. The grass roots of our nation and all its groups and sectors are well and in the best shape they can be in. As I told the late leader as a result of the previous referendum: the Egyptian people are truly a great people. Situations affirm their greatness.

"Our people endure shocks, and they rise to the occasion to meet the hopes of the nation. Our people would teach the demented rejection fronts a lesson in conduct and gallantry by the firm stance they have taken. What happened was perpetrated by a deviant group, and they are a small minority among the people.

"It is regrettable that at the site of death and mourning one hears insults against the late leader from the rejection states and from the Soviets. Is this ethical or human? Is this Arab nobility or gallantry? At the same time many western countries are mourning the Arab nation's loss of the departed president while the madman, al-Qadhdhafi, has lost all the fundamentals of humanity.

"We are being called upon in these circumstances to form one rank to preserve our country and the safety of our homeland."

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HEAVY FINES FOR MISDEMEANORS TO BE INSTITUTED

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 19 Nov 81 p 1

[Text] RADICAL changes in the penal code aimed at safeguarding values and the protection of society will be considered at today's meeting of the Legislative Committee, according to the Minister of Justice, Mr Ahmed Samir Sami.

Many offences seen to threaten national unity and the economic and social stability of the community would be punishable in the revised code and long prison sentences and fines would be applied to put an end to all breakdowns in public conduct, he added.

The Cabinet Committee on Legislation will concentrate on writing the amendments and draft laws which will then be referred to the Shura Council and the People's Assembly for discussion.

RELIGION

Among penalties which will be stiffened are those punishing offences such as exploiting religion to destructive ends, illegal seizure of land and property hoarding small change to cause acute shortages, molesting women in public and publishing sub - standard text - books for schools.

The amendments will provide for larger fines as a deterrent to violators who no longer respect the fines provided for in existing laws, the Minister of Justice said.

Maximum fines for certain offences are expected to go as high as L.E. 500. A civil servant who leaves his post for no reasonable reason and without permission in a way that impedes work and causes harm to the public would fall into this category.

NEGLIGENCE

Negligence in driving public transport vehicles which may threaten passengers' lives and result in damage to public property could also be punished by the maximum fine of L.E. 500 under the proposed amendments.

Molesting women in the street and committing obscene actions will be fined at a maximum of L.E. 300. This category will also include offences such as fraudulent actions related to official documents in marriages and courts as well as stealing papers from government files

Noisy singing which disturbs the peace and public shouting aimed at causing noise will be fined to a maximum of L.E. 200. This fine will also apply in cases of assault against civil servants or of insulting them while performing their duties.

Speeches or sermons in the places of worship dealing with politics or government action will be punishable by sentences ranging between 6 months and 5 years if prior permission from the authorities has not been requested and received. This will be accompanied by fines ranging between L.E. 100 and L.E. 500.

The same penalty will be applicable in cases of abusing the religious call to propagate subversive and extremist ideas, a matter which threatens national unity and reveal a vile disrespect of religions.

Meanwhile a republican decree was issued yesterday defining offences and crimes which would be referres to emergency courts. Such courts will act as provided by the state of Emergency which was proclaimed last month following the criminal offence which claimed the life of the late leader Mohamed Anwar el-Sadat.

CSO: 4500/59

BRIEF BIOGRAPHIES OF NEW MINISTERS, GOVERNORS GIVEN

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Sep 81 p 6

/Article: "Candidates in the Cabinet Change and New Governors"/

/Text/ Ministers of State for People's and Consultative Assembly Affairs

Albert Barsum Salamah

He was born in 1905.

He graduated from the Faculty of Law, Cairo University, 1926.

He worked in the legal profession and was registered in /the court of/ cassation in 1948.

He was appointed member of the People's Assembly (as a public personality) in 1971.

He was appointed to the People's Assembly's permanent committee in 1972.

He was appointed minister of state for People's Assembly affairs in March 1973.

He was reappointed minister of state for People's Assembly affairs in the cabinet formed under President Anwar al-Sadat's premiership on 25 April 1974.

He was appointed minister of state for Council of Ministers' affairs, followup and surveillance for the period November 1976-October 1977.

He was appointed member of the People's Assembly in 1976.

He was appointed member of the People's Assembly (as a public personality) in June 1979, then was appointed assistant secretary to the National Democratic Party.

Muhammad Rashwan Mahmud

He was born on 15 September 1925 in Jirja.

He is a graduate of the Institute of Higher Management.

He received a diploma in accounting and economics from the British Institute of Accounting in London.

He is a member of the board of the transportation companies (Ministry of Transportation).

In November 1971 he became a member of the National Assembly.

Mukhtar Hasan Hani

He was elected to the National Assembly in 1969 from the district of Qalyub.

He was [made] a member of the constitutional committee in 1971.

He was elected National Assembly member for the district of Qalyub in 1971.

He was elected vice chairman of the national mobilization committee in the People's Assembly in 1971.

He was an Egyptian member of the charter association for the union state between Egypt and Libya in 1973.

He headed the Arab parliamentary delegation that visited Mauritania in 1975.

'Abd-al-Hamid Radwan

He was born on 5 February 1941 and is a native of East Tawq, Sawhaj.

He is married and had three children in 1978.

He acquired a bachelor's degree in law at Cairo University, 1966.

He has been a member of the People's Assembly since 1971.

He has been chairman of the Sawhaj Governorate parliamentary group since 1974.

He has represented the People's Assembly at more than one international conference.

He has been a member of the youth committee, the legislative committee and the foreign relations committee of the assembly.

On 4 November 1977 he was [appointed] vice chairman of the People's Assembly.

On 23 June 1979 he was [appointed] vice chairman of the People's Assembly.

Mahrus Abu Husayn, Governor of Bani Suwayf

He was appointed assistant to the minister of war in May 1976.

He was appointed governor of the Governorate of Suez in May 1977.

On 27 November 1978 he was appointed governor of the Governorate of al-Minufiyah.

He enrolled as a member of the al-Minufiyah University council in December 1978.

'Abd-al-Halim al-Sa'idi, Governor of Qina

He is a member of the People's Assembly for the district of West Mahallah Ruh.

He has assumed a number of positions in local government, such as chairman of the district of East Cairo and assistant secretary general of the Governorate of Cairo.

'Abd-al-Munsif Hazin, Governor of al-Minufiyah

He was born on 3 February 1936.

He graduated from the Faculty of Letters at 'Ayn Shams University in 1964.

He acquired a bachelor's degree in psychology and social studies.

He found work as a social specialist in the Ministry of Social Affairs in October 1964.

He is a former armed forces reserve officer.

He was a member of the People's Assembly in three sessions, 1969, 1971 and 1976.

He was chairman of the social affairs committee of the People's Assembly for 5 years.

He was appointed governor of the Governorate of Qina on 28 November 1978.

Dr Naji Shatlah, Governor of Kafr al-Shaykh

He is vice president of al-Minufiyah Governorate and secretary general of the National Party for al-Minufiyah. He graduated from the Faculty of Agriculture, Cairo University, in 1959 and traveled on fellowship to the United States of America to acquire a doctorate from Louisiana State University in 1965.

He worked as an instructor in the Higher Agricultural Institute in Shabin al-Kawm in 1965, as an instructor in the Faculty of Agriculture at the University of Asyut, as an assistant professor in 1970, as a professor in the /Faculty of/ Agriculture at Shabin al-Kawm, as a vice chairman of the faculty in 1975, then as vice president of al-Minufiyah University in 1980. He has been secretary general of the National Party in al-Minufiyah since 19 February 1979, is married and has three children.

Salah-al-Din Ibrahim, Governor of al-Minya

He was born on 12 August 1924.

He graduated from the Police College, class of 1945.

He worked in criminal investigation, then state security investigation.

He was appointed assistant, then deputy director of security for Cairo for 2 years.

He was appointed Isma'iliyah security director, then was promoted to the rank of major general, at which rank he was appointed to the position of assistant to the minister

of the interior for the canal and east Delta regions.

Ibrahim Mahmud Lutfi, Governor of al-Jizah

He acquired a bachelor's degree from the Faculty of Commerce in 1941.

He worked as an accountant in the National Bank.

He worked as an inspector in the Bureau of Accounting, then as financial director in the Railway Authority.

He was vice chairman of the Central Accounting Agency.

In March 1974 he was appointed chairman of the board of the Nasir Social Bank Authority.

In March 1981 a decree was issued extending his service as chairman of the board of the Nasir Social Bank to mark appreciation of his efforts and to benefit from his expertise.

Mansur Hasan Is Nominated for the Position of Vice Chairman of the People's Assembly

He was born in 1937.

He acquired a bachelor's degree in commerce, Department of Economics, Cairo University.

He has a master's degree in political science from the University of Michigan in America.

He was elected president of the Arab Students' Association.

After returning, he worked in the Information Section of the Arab League.

He was elected member of the People's Assembly for the district of Abu Kabir, al-Sharqiyah, for two terms.

He was appointed director of President al-Sadat's office for People's Assembly affairs on 7 February 1979.

He was appointed official spokesman of the National Party.

He was appointed minister of state for the office of the president and supervisor of the Ministry of Culture and Information in 1979.

On 20 June 1979 he assumed the tasks of minister of information and culture.

He was appointed assistant secretary of the National Party.

In 1972 he was chairman of the board of the General Nile Heavy Transportation Company.

He was a vice-chairman of parliament.

On 20 October 1977 he became chairman of the Cairo Public Transportation Authority.

In June 1979 he was elected vice chairman of the People's Assembly (for workers).

On 11 February 1981 he was secretary of the National Party board in the Governorate of Cairo.

11887
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FORMER COLLEAGUE BITTERLY DENOUNCES KHOMEYNI

London 8 DAYS in English 14 Nov 81 pp 6-7

[Text] AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S words at Tehran airport on 1 February 1979 were ecstatic. As thousands of joyful Iranians swarmed about the 747 jumbo jet that flew him into revolutionary Iran, Khomeini declared that the country ought to be renamed 'Rezaian' after the famous family of dissidents who were arrested and tortured by the Shah's secret police back in the early 1970s. In a highly-publicised trial at the time it came to light that Khalil Rezai's two sons were brutally murdered by Savak and the father himself was forced to witness the gang rape of his young daughter.

Khomeini stopped short of proclaiming the new Islamic Republic of Rezaian, but he did appoint Khalil Rezai, now in his mid-sixties, as head of the Iranian Committee for Human Rights. As one Iranian journalist remarked: 'If Khomeini was Iran's leader, then Khalil Rezai was its conscience.'

Last week Khalil Rezai fled Iran. In Paris, where he joined a long line of exiled Iranian prime ministers, politicians and businessmen, all opponents of Khomeini's fundamentalist regime, the embittered Khalil Rezai told newsmen: 'My sons died to replace the Shah's regime with one that's a hundred times worse.'

As a close Khomeini adviser, Rezai was privy to some of the state secrets kept under tight wraps by the Ayatollah. Rezai told a Paris press conference that Ayatollah Shariat Madari, the only other clergyman whose influence comes close to matching Khomeini's, attempted to leave Iran last September, but was halted by the revolutionary authorities. Shariat Madari, the spiritual leader of the country's 10m Turkish-speaking Azerbaijanis, had applied for a visa to undertake the Hajj pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.

Rezai was also able to confirm persistent reports that during the past year Shariat Madari, who had criticised Khomeini's notion of a theocratic government, has also been kept under virtual house arrest in Iran's holy city of Qom, and barred from returning to Azerbaijan in the northwestern corner of the country.

Two independent Iranian sources also told *8 Days* that even Ayatollah Khomeini's own grandson, Hossein, is not above suspicion in the shaky Iranian republic. One version has it that Hossein's outspoken support of ex-President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr proved so embarrassing to the authorities that they issued an ultimatum: either the grandson cool off in a monastery for a couple of years, or face arrest. So, according to one reliable source: 'They locked him up in Qom theological seminary.' But another Iranian source claimed that Hossein remains in north Tehran under his grandfather's stern custody.

Although clerical and popular support for President Ali Khameini's fundamentalist regime has waned, the various opposition factions remain as disparate and divided as ever.

No longer are the Mujaheddin willing to stage open street battles in the large cities against the zealous and heavily-armed Revolutionary Guards. After suffering more than 2,500 casualties in the last three months, according to the Mujaheddin's own reckoning, the guerrilla organisation realises that even with the backing of former President Bani Sadr they still cannot muster enough grass roots support for a mass revolt against the fundamentalists.

An Iranian businessman in Paris who frequently telephones contacts throughout

Iran told *8 Days*: 'Most Iranians are against the current regime of President Ali Khameini, but they're not about to take to the streets in the same massive numbers that they did against the Shah. Iranians now are afraid, and cynicism has replaced their revolutionary fervour.'

Nevertheless, the violence escalates. Daily government executions continue, and the Mujaheddin guerrillas have retaliated by descending on small villages, rounding up all the Islamic prosecutors and policemen and then executing them after a hasty mock trial. So far, there are no signs of either side letting up. Khameini, himself badly wounded several months ago by a Mujaheddin bomb, has rebuffed attempts by the more moderate clergymen in Iran's Majlis to reach some sort of reconciliation with the growing ranks of the opposition.

CSO: 4600/135

SOUTHERN FISHERIES PLANNING TO RENT FOREIGN SHIPS

Tehran KAYHAN AIRMAIL EDITION in Persian 4 Nov 81 p 10

[Interview with Hoseyn Amir-Mo'ayyed, managing director of Southern Fisheries]

[Text] Production of Southern Fisheries has doubled compared to last year, and this year twenty thousand tons of fish are being taken from southern waters. In an exclusive interview with the KAYHAN economic correspondent, Hoseyn Amir-Mo'ayyed, managing director of Southern Fisheries stated: "As a result of efforts to supply more fish to the market and preparing the refrigerators in Bandar Langeh, Kenarak, Jashk, and Chahbahar which began operation recently, we hope that during this year's fishing season we will be able to double our production of fish over past years."

He added: "It has been anticipated and estimated that during this year's fishing season which will begin on 6 November, twenty thousand tons of fish will be caught and supplied to the market gradually and that three thousand tons of this catch will be canned before being offered to the consumers."

In reply to the question of what measures had been taken to purchase a mother ship which the Southern Fisheries had planned earlier, Amir-Mo'ayyed said: "At present the question of buying a mother ship has been dismissed, and we are now ready to study renting foreign ships under conditions of proposed rates so we will be able to fill our requirements for fish this season by renting fishing ships at a reasonable price."

CSO: 4640/70

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH PAKISTAN--Iran wants to buy more foodstuffs from Pakistan and increase rail traffic between the two countries, according to a senior Iranian foreign ministry official. Hossein Lavasani, director general for political affairs in the Iranian foreign ministry, recently led a nine-member economic delegation to Pakistan. At the end of the three-day meeting, Lavasani said Pakistan fulfilled Iran's three main criteria for trading partners now that it had turned away from US and Western European markets. Pakistan, he noted, was Islamic, a Third World country, and a neighbour. Since Iran's Islamic revolution, imports from Pakistan have quintupled, from $45m in the year to June 1979 to $230m last fiscal year. Iran is Pakistan's second most important export market, with only China buying more ($357m). Iran's exports to Pakistan totalled $2.5m last year, down from $9.5m the year before. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 67]

CSO: 4600/135

DEPUTY MINISTER OF PETROLEUM INTERVIEWED

Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 29 Oct 81 pp 72-73

[Interview with Abdul Mussim Samarrai, Iraqi deputy minister of oil, by L'USINE NOUVELLE special correspondent in Baghdad, Marie Sellier, date not specified]

> [Text] Abdul Mussim Samarrai, Iraqi deputy minister of oil, met with L'USINE NOUVELLE in Baghdad. He explained the Iraqi oil situation following 14 months of conflict with Iran; he detailed the large development projects in this area; he got onto the problem of energy savings and new forms of energy, and he touched on relations with France. Sabri Al-Maini, the ministry's director general for foreign relations who was present at the interview, responded to our questions about prices and OPEC. Assertions were made which will be sure to cause surprise.

[Question] Before the conflict broke out with Iran, Iraq was the Middle East's fourth largest oil producer with a production of 3.5 million barrels a day. How much are you producing today, and what portion is exports? To what extent have your oil installations been damaged and how expensive is your reconstruction getting to be?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: We are currently producing 1 million barrels a day. However, I will not disclose to you the level of our exports which is a secret strategic piece of information. The damage suffered by our installations is sizeable, both regarding producing stations and with respect to terminals and our refinery equipment. Since certain refineries of ours have been destroyed, we are forced to export oil in order for it to be processed outside the country and to import an appreciable quantity of petroleum products from abroad. We are still in the process of assessing the damage, which is particularly difficult to do in the combat zone. So it is impossible for me to put forward a figure. But reconstruction will certainly take time--months, or even years--for the installations needing equipment with long delivery periods.

[Question] If the war were to come to an end, would you be in a position to rapidly regain your previous export level?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: Yes, as soon as the conflict ended we would be able within a short period of time to reach a production and export level equivalent to that of 1980. But it is also possible that the war might persist. Since the south's terminals are disabled we are currently exporting via the oil pipeline which links Kirkuk to Banias in Syria and of course through the one which ends up in Bortyol in Turkey which has not stopped operating during the conflict. Moreover, we are having talks with Lebanon in order to resume exporting from the Tripoli terminal--with a capacity of 500,000 barrels a day--but we are not able to judge what the result of those talks might be since we are not the only ones involved. The Lebanese-Syrian dispute in particular has an effect on these negotiations.

[Question] Where does the construction project of an oil pipeline linking the Basrah fields to Yambo in Saudi Arabia stand?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: This matter is only at the study stage. It is a gigantic project with many technical unknowns and the project's cost will exceed $2.5 billion. But as far as we are concerned we are prepared to make this investment.

[Question] How are your relations with Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: We have excellent relations with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which has shown itself to be extremely fraternal and cooperative. Just like Kuwait, Libya and the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia took over supplying our customers--particularly France and Italy which were our main purchasers--at the time when the war had its greatest effect on us, which was from September to March, and when those countries needed oil. Then it was the buyers themselves who stopped taking what they had been taking. For the market today is a buyers' market. You really saw that this summer when, instead of increasing their strategic reserves by 4 million barrels as usual, consumer countries drew down their stocks by 3 or 4 million barrels with the sole purpose of getting prices lowered.

[Question] You have recently reduced your price per barrel by $2. Are you therefore indeed selling at $34 a barrel?

[Answer] Sabri Al-Maini: No, that is wrong. We are currently selling at $36 just like Saudi Arabia is for certain grades of crude.

[Question] Are you going to argue for unified pricing at OPEC's special meeting opening in Geneva this week?

[Answer] Sabri Al-Maini: We are very favorable towards unified pricing and it is in that perspective that we are going to Geneva. As you know, we belong to OPEC's long term strategy group, to which we have belonged from the start, by the way. We can only hope that an agreement will be reached, but that does not depend on us alone.

Abdul Samarrai: The problem is not so much that of prices as of production and the attitude of certain countries--which I will not name--which think that by continuing to produce at a high level they will ultimately be deterring any alternative to oil.

They are mistaken, for they themselves will have to turn to an alternative some time or other. By acting that way they are succeeding in doing little more than preventing small producers from selling their output. If a country which today is producing 9.5 million barrels a day, this would make it possible for all the African countries to regain a normal export level. The problem of prices is nothing but the result of that situation.

[Question] So you feel that Saudi Arabia is to blame, that Saudi Arabia, by deliberately keeping up a high output...

[Answer] Sabri Al-Maini: No! Saudi Arabia is acting this way to get the other countries to lower their prices. But if an agreement is reached in this area then it will certainly reduce its output. In this way a market equilibrium will be regained which benefits producers and not just consumers as is currently the situation.

[Question] Is not the decline in your oil revenues jeopardizing your sizeable investment program in the oil area?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: We are carrying out our plan as before. We are having absolutely no problem in financing our projects. What is more, the conflict has led us to increase our investments for security reasons and to start up jobs, some of which were only slated to begin in 1984, in order to anticipate the situation if the war continues. This increase is such that for our 1981 total we will have exceeded the $2 billion of investments initially planned for petroleum development.

[Question] What are your main projects?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: The main part of our budget is devoted to exploration--we dug nearly a thousand holes in 1981--and to development of oil fields, which is quite expensive, especially when one is working with French companies whose services and equipment are particularly costly.

[Question] Does that mean that you would like to do without their services?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: No, of course not. On the contrary, we wish to continue our cooperation with France, whose technology is useful to us. Besides, if I am to judge by the number of French firms in Iraq, France is taking an appreciable share of our investments, not so much in the oil area as in the areas of BTP [building construction and public works], communications, transportation and data processing. Moreover, France is our number one partner after Japan if it is not in fact number one, period. Unfortunately that has not been stated enough in the French press.

[Question] You also must have plans in the area of natural gas since a large part of the natural gas you are producing is still burned off on the spot.

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: In fact, that represents an important element of our investments, since until nationalization foreign companies were careful not to do anything whatsoever in this area. If it were not for the war, we would have

been in a position in 1984 to process all natural gas produced. In this area as in the areas of GPL [liquefied petroleum gas], naphtha, and petrochemicals, we have an urgent need for technology, technicians and training from developed countries such as the United States, Japan or European countries.

[Question] Are you interested in new forms of energy?

[Answer] Abdul Samarrai: Certainly, and especially in energy savings. To have oil does not mean that energy is cheap. Besides, we are talking about a fossil resource so it is exhaustible. That is why 10 years ago we provided ourselves with a law in the area of energy savings, the results of which we are starting to appreciate. But there remains much to be done, in both the state production sector--the main consumer--and in the household sector. Moreover, we would like to develop the hydroelectric potential in the northern part of the country and to turn to solar energy which is quite appropriate for this country. Our objective is for solar energy's share to reach 2 percent of our energy total by 1990, but, for my part, I do not think that can be reached before the year 2000.

9631
CSO: 4419/2

IRAQI-LIBERIAN PRESS STATEMENT ISSUED 13 NOVEMBER

JN120909 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 0800 GMT 13 Nov 81

[Text] Baghdad--Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel Bacchus Matthews left Baghdad for Jidda this morning following a 3-day visit to Iraq at the invitation of Foreign Minister Dr Sa'dun Hammadi.

In a statement to INA, Matthews said the visit had positive results that will contribute to promoting bilateral cooperation. He was seen off by 'Abd al-Karim al-Amir al-Safir, chief of the second department in the Foreign Ministry.

Following is the text of a press statement issued on the Liberian foreign minister's visit to Iraq:

At the invitation of Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, foreign minister of the Republic of Iraq, Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel Bacchus Matthews made an official visit to the Republic of Iraq 10-12 November 1981. During his stay in the Republic of Iraq, the Liberia Foreign Minister was received by Taha Ysin Ramadan, member of the Revolution Command Council [RCC] and first deputy prime minister and RCC member Hikmat Ibranim.

Discussions on bilateral relations were held between Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, foreign minister of the Republic of Iraq, and Liberian Foreign Minister Gabriel Bacchus Matthews in an atmosphere of frankness, amity and mutual understanding. Both sides expressed a sincere desire to further promote these relations to serve the interests of the Iraqi and Liberian peoples.

The discussions also dealt with the situation in the Arab region, international and regional issues of common interest and Arab-African relations. Both sides underlined the importance of strengthening Arab-African cooperation, asserting that the roots of the Arab nation's ties with the African peoples are entrenched in a common history, continue at present and increase in importance with time.

The Liberian foreign minister expressed deep gratitude for the warm reception and hospitality he was accorded during his stay in the Republic of Iraq.

CSO: 4404/127

ISLAMIC ACTION ORGANIZATION DECLARES HUNGER STRIKE

Tehran AL-SHAHID in Arabic No 62, 20 May 81 pp 28-29

[Interview with Unidentified Member of Islamic Action Organization in Paris by Muhammad al-Nuri: "Islamic Action Organization Announces Hunger Strike in Paris"]

[Text] At 10 a.m. on 22 April 1981 a group of young, rebellious Iraqis, who are members of the Europe chapter of the Islamic Action Organization occupied the building of Amnesty International in Paris. There they announced that they would go on a hunger strike of unlimited duration and maintain a sacred sit-in to protest the international conspiracy of silence against the tragedy of the Iraqi people who are suffering under the most violently tyrannical regime of the modern age. [The hunger strikers stated they were undertaking this action] to make the voice of the tyrannized people of Iraq heard in the world, to speak to the conscience of the world and to expose the media of the Iraqi regime as well as all the media of Zionist imperialism which have recently committed a crime by defending the regime of the al-Takriti assassin and portraying him as a national hero of the Arabs.

World news agencies relayed news of the hunger strike as soon as it was announced, and the news spread all over the world. Since it is committed to defending the rights of Muslim nations that are oppressed in their opposition to colonialism and imperialism, AL-SHAHID Magazine conducted this exclusive interview with the spokesmen for the hunger strikers at the offices of Amnesty International so that the truth about people's rights may prevail and the falsehood of tyrants thwarted. The interview went as follows:

In the name of God Almighty:

[Question] Who are you?

[Answer] We are members of the Islamic Action Organization which is struggling against the ruling tyrannical Ba'th regime in Baghdad. We are striving to establish an Islamic government in Iraq to free the masses of the people from terror and torture; to spread justice and freedom; and to

realize the full independence of the oppressed people of Iraq. Many of our people have lost their lives in pursuit of that cause, and thousands have been imprisoned. We took up arms and decided to wage a holy war in the name of God and the oppressed. Every day one of our young people loses his life in the course of liberating Iraq from its executioners.

[Question] Why did you decide to stage a sit-in and to go on a hunger strike in Paris and at Amnesty International offices in particular?

[Answer] Our Iraqi people are suffering from the worst kinds of injustice and persecution. They are going through a severe historical ordeal in the gloom of three oppressive factors: [the opporession of] the terrorist regime; the oppression of the war against the Islamic Republic of Iran which is being forced on the Iraqi people; and the oppression of the international conspiracy of silence about the suffering of 13 million persons who have been persecuted for 10 years.

We are doing [this] to break the conspiracy of silence around the suffering of our people. We want to awaken the conscience of the world to what is happening in Iraq where all human rights are being violated. People are being killed, executed and tortured in prisons, and men and women--even children--are being collectively arrested. What is happening in Iraq has no precedent, not even in the Middle Ages or in the ages of al-Hajjaj, Ibn Ziyad, Genghis Khan, Pharoah and all the tyrants of history.

Going on a hunger strike is a means by which we hope to awaken the conscience of the world, and especially the conscience of the European people, who bear part of the responsibility [for what is happening]. This is because it is the regimes of these people that are providing Saddam's regime with the military, political and financial support that is perpetuating his terrorist, shaky government.

Regarding our reasons for choosing France, we did so, first, because some of us are students here. Second, because at present France bears the larger portion of the responsibility for this agony that we are suffering. France has agreed to act as agent and sponsor of U.S. imperialism in its decision to support Saddam and strike the revolution of the Muslim people of Iraq. Today, the French regime is supplying weapons and equipment to Saddam who forced our Iraqi army to wage a losing and an unjust war against a fraternal Muslim nation to serve the objectives of U.S. colonialism and to preserve the interests of foreign monopolies.

The French people do not know much about what is happening in Iraq where serious and continuous violations of human rights have been taking place, especially recently. Saddam became paranoid and began killing countless numbers of even old people and children. He has made thousands of families homeless, driving them away from their homes and their countries and leaving them in the desert.

Our duty is to make the French people aware of the tragedy of the Iraqi people. We hold the French people responsible for supporting an unjust,

terrorist regime, and we ask them to stop any military or political support for Saddam's regime in his insane, losing war against a fraternal, Muslim people.

Regarding our reasons for choosing the offices of Amnesty International, naturally it was not because we believe that it is the place of these organizations to bring an end to the tragedy of our Iraqi people and of all the other oppressed people. Our choice was due to the fact that the offices of Amnesty International would present the best forum from which our voices would be heard by the world, exposing the false Iraqi propaganda behind which Saddam's regime hides and with which he tries to cover up his crimes and his terror and pass himself off as a progressive, democratic ruler.

We do not have the funds from our oil which Saddam is spending lavishly on his hired media and on those who mouth his propaganda so as to expose his regime in this manner. The only thing we have is the voice of truth, a voice that is furious and has been ill-treated. For us this is enough to continue our efforts and to strive in our struggle against the falsehood of Saddam. We firmly believe that we will ultimately be victorious because right is ultimately victorious as God Almighty said, "Falsehood was bound to be discomfited" [al-Isra': 81]. The experience of the defenseless people of Iran who resisted the Shah's military, his funds and his world-wide deception and who were armed with nothing but their faith in God and in truth [gives us inspiration. Led by Imam Khomeyni the Iranian people, who are our best example and model, defeated the soldiers of the devil. We will continue to strive and to work until we overthrow Saddam and his regime and establish a just, Islamic government in Iraq.

[Question] What is happening in Iraq now?

[Answer] What is happening in Iraq today is shocking and unimaginable. Every day that goes by with our people under the Ba'th regime is like an eternity of suffering and pain.

There are 70,000 political prisoners who fight and oppose the regime. Among them are thinkers, professors, scientists, students and workers. Their crime was in saying that their God was Allah, and they refused to comply with Saddam's orders and yield to his tyranny which destroyed Iraq and its people.

The 100,000 martyrs of the Islamic Revolution reveal the magnitude of the popular opposition to Saddam. [The figure] also reveals the brutality and the barbaric quality of this treacherous regime.

A quarter of a million persons have been made homeless and forced to leave their homes. They were thrown out of their homes and out of their country by Saddam and left in the wilderness.

The torture that is taking place in prisons is shocking. Hands are amputated; eyes are gouged; and bodies are burned and disabled. It is terrible. It is incredible that most of those who get out of Saddam's prisons cannot

last long. A few weeks after their release, they are usually taken to their graves. Saddam's terror is not confined to Iraq. He pursues the fighters, the liberals and all those who oppose him abroad. The networks of terror and murder that are personally directed by Saddam have denied life even to Iraqis living abroad. After the death of the late Ayatollah al-Sadr, the late Ayatollah al-Sayyid Hasan al-Shirazi was killed in Beirut. Many Iraqi fighters were killed after them. Among them was the late Mr Salih al-Husayni and others who opposed injustice and tyranny. Those are the victims of Saddam's regime: thinking scientists and intellectuals who oppose him and the elite of Iraq's young people and students, the harbingers of its future.

This is above and beyond his recent crime, the aggressive war [he launched] against the Islamic Revolution in Iran in which 100,000 persons were killed and wounded. Iraq lost funds and scores of years of the the efforts the Iraqi people had put into Iraq's economic institutions, its military installations and in its army, which was formed to protect the people and the country against Israel and colonialism. Instead, that army was suddenly used to secure the hold of the Israeli occupation against the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the staunchest enemy of Israel and U.S. colonialism.

We firmly believe that Saddam's regime is inevitably doomed. Such a regime cannot last long despite the level of terror and the level of foreign and colonialist support it has. The Shah's regime did not last. However, we want to expedite the departure of this regime and relieve the Iraqi people of its burden and its crimes as soon as possible. We want to achieve the hopes of the Iraqi people who have been fighting against British and U.S. colonialism since the revolution of the 20th to establish an independent and free Islamic government. This will be realized soon, God willing.

[Question] How did the French regime, and especially the French police, treat you?

[Answer] The regime here showed us its true colors in the French police which actually provided the best reflection of the French regime's attitude toward the people of Iraq. Our treatment by the French police was consistent with the attitude of a regime that arms the enemy of the Iraqi people, Saddam al-Takriti. It was not unlikely that the French police treat the representatives of the Iraqi people as cruelly as they did.

We had terrifying moments with the French police which used to chase the freedom fighters everywhere in Paris when they were distributing leaflets that voiced opposition to Saddam, writing slogans on walls or putting up posters that had pictures of martyrs and expressions of death to Saddam. [Some of these expressions], which were in French and in Arabic were: Down with the Ba'th regime; Victory to Islam; Where are human rights in Iraq? There are 1,000 martyrs in Iraq; and Long live Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the Islamic Revolution.

French police detained freedom fighters more than once and questioned them. The police asked those freedom fighters to leave France and not to reside

in the country. They also deported some freedom fighters after arresting and torturing them for no crime that they committed; they only wanted to make the world and the conscience of the world hear their people.

[Question] Have political organizations and parties supported you?

[Answer] So far we've had support from a large number of Islamic and national organizations and a number of freedom-fighting scholars. We received wires expressing support from the Islamic Alliance of Iraqi Students in London, from the Alliance of Islamic Students in Britain, from the Islamic Committees of Muslim Students in the United States, from Tunisian students in France, from the Society of Muslim Students in Brussels, from the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and from the Alliance of Muslim Students in the Arabian Peninsula living in Europe and the United States.

[We also received expressions of support] from the Alliance of Iranian, Muslim Students in France. We also received a wire expressing support from the religious authority who was banished from Iraq, the Great Ayatollah al-Sayyid Muhammad al-Jasini al-Shirazi. [We also received expressions of support] from the freedom-fighting religious scholars in Iraq and from a number of freedom-fighting scholars outside Iraq.

[Author's Comment] Before leaving the offices of Amensty International the correspondent of the French newspaper, LE MONDE and a number of French journalists came in to interview the hunger strikers and to ask them the reasons and the objectives of their hunger strike. Thus, we bid the Muslim fighters farewell, and we hope to meet them in Baghdad on a bright, sunny morning that would usher in victory and independence.

8592
CSO: 8004/046

OPPOSITION, STRUGGLE AGAINST SADDAM'S REGIME CONTINUES

Tehran AL-SHAHID in Arabic No 62, 20 May 81 pp 14-15

[Article by Abu Layth: "Iraqis Fighting Saddam on the Front of Truth"]

[Excerpt] The Action Organization and the Perpetual Readiness

All the members of the military arm of the Iraqi Islamic Action Organization who have joined their brothers in Islam to defend the state of the Koran affirmed in our meetings with them that they will continue fighting regardless of the circumstances.

Abu Sadiq, one of the officials of the organization who has been leading a group of young believers against the mercenaries of the infidels even before war broke out and who is still leading them now, said, "It is our duty as Iraqis to be on the front lines opposite the mercenaries of al-Ba'th who are fighting the Iranians. This attack is nothing more than a conspiracy prepared in advance by the enemies of Islam to destroy the Islamic people in Iraq after imperialism lost all its interests in Iran and received a blow the likes of which it had never received before in the course of its lengthy career of subjugating people. This war was never a war between Persians and Arabs, as the infidel bunch of al-Ba'th claim it is."

Regarding the capabilities of the armed military groups and their ability to resist the tribal regime that is in power in the country and abroad, Abu Sadiq added:

"We have young people who are believers and who went through intense military courses to become qualified to oppose the enemy with full force. Although our groups are few [in number], compared with the groups of Iraqi and non-Iraqi mercenaries and with the material incentives [they have], those who sacrifice in the cause of God alone will come out ahead in the confrontation. Therefore, one finds that they fear nothing [and no one] but God. The Prophet's Tradition [tells us], 'He who fears God will be feared by everyone else.' Therefore, our confrontation with the agents of al-Ba'th in Iraq and outside it, but especially on the various battlefronts, affirms that our victory, which is a victory for Islam, is at hand. The day will

come, God willing, when we will proclaim our victory to the leader of our Islamic course, the great Imam Khomeyni, and to our oppressed people in Iraq."

"You mentioned in your statements confrontation with the Ba'th regime inside and outside Iraq. What is the nature of this confrontation?"

"You know and many people know that the first outbreak in the armed struggle in Iraq was carried out by one of the freedom fighters of the Islamic Action Organization in Iraq on 10 Muharram 1400 Hegira [30 November 1979] in the heroic operation which the late freedom fighter, Talib al-'Alili executed when he assassinated one of the agents of the infidel regime. This was followed by the al-Mustansiriyah operations which were carried out by the late freedom fighter Samir Nur 'Ali. [That was followed by] the al-Waziriyah operation which was carried out by the late Abu Khalid. That operation shook up the principals of the regime who were saved from this confrontation only by calling upon British and U.S. minds for help. The advice offered by those was to expatriate the faithful people of Iraq for no other reason than the fact that they were saying Allah is our god. However, this did not save the regime. The operations of our freedom fighters expanded and were also moved outside Iraq. The assassinations of al-Ba'th agents were examples of these heroic operations. The first of these was the attack on the Iraqi embassy in Rome; it was carried out by the late Muzaffar Bakr. [Another operation] was the assassination of one of Saddam's in-laws while he was in Paris to conclude a deal with the French government for the purchase of Mirage airplanes. All these operations, in addition to the participation of our brave men in successive operations with the faithful forces of the Islamic Republic to ward off the treacherous attack and their participation with other groups that go into Iraq occasionally, indicate that the faithful Iraqi people reject all forms of bargaining with the bunch of agents in Baghdad. Let me say finally that the Muslim groups of our fighters will not put down their arms until victory is achieved. This is not improbable, for God promises us [victory] in a number of His Holy verses.

" 'In the name of God, the Merciful the Compassionate: We succoured them, and they became victorious' [al-Safat: 116]; 'Believers, if you help Allah, Allah will help you and make you strong' [Muhammad: 7]; 'We shall help Our apostles and the true believers both in this world and on the day when the witnesses rise to testify' [Ghafir: 51]. God the Great spoke the truth."

As we bid Brother Abu Sadiq farewell our hearts were with him and with all the Iraqi freedom fighters who are standing up to the bunch of al-Ba'th. They do not fear death; they have transcended all narrow racist and regional values, and they have established their revolutionary qualities and their sincerity to God's message.

Yes, we bid them farewell and we saw victory, hope, determination and a firm resolve in their eyes.

The impression I had which captured my attention is the interest which Brother Abu Sadiq and the leadership of the organization have in the military course which proves the revolutionary character of this organization and the accuracy of its view of the confrontation.

8592
CSO: 8004/046

BAGHDAD ROUNDUP ON IRANIAN POW MESSAGES

NC211326 [Editorial Report] Baghdad in Persian to Iran at 0600 GMT on 18, 19, 20 and 21 November carries recorded messages of Iranian POW's to their families and friends.

On 18 November the radio starts its program on recorded messages with a talk addressed to "Iranian sisters and brothers and families who (?have suffered) from the war." The talk says that "the POW's in Iraq are living under very (?good) conditions and all living facilities are given to them. Their only thought is to free Iran from the clutches of clericism and to see their dear ones again. This humanitarian and natural wish of theirs led us to reply to their request on making their message reach the ears of their compatriots and members of their families. (?We informed them) that they can send their messages to their families and inform them of their health. They were truly overjoyed." The radio then invites listeners to hear the messages of "the Iranian military captives who are actually Iraq's guests." The recorded messages that follow are all by enlisted men who state their name and address and ask listeners to inform their families and friends that they are well. One such message is from Private ('Abbas) [name indistinct] who says: "I was captured about a month ago in the Shush front by the Iraqi forces. I am very well and send my greetings to my mother, father, sister, brother and friends. I hope all of them are in good health. We thank those who are looking after us here. They are truly going through great troubles. We hope that the war ends and peace comes so that we can return to our homeland. I ask all those who hear my voice to inform telephone number 963070, Mr (Rudakani), or number 922067 [name indistinct], so that they can inform my family."

On 19 November, the radio opens its recorded messages program with a talk addressed to "the brothers in the armed forces, NCO's and brave soldiers of Iran." The talk then goes on to say that "Iraq and the cities of Karbala, al-Najaf and Kazemeyn are waiting to welcome you. By joining the Iraqi Armed Forces, you leave the defense of Khomeyni's anti-Islamic, antipeople and anti-Iranian regime to the revolution guards and opportunist mullahs. Khomeyni's regime is a warmongering regime and its (?doings) are contrary to the teachings of Islam and of the pure Mohammedan faith. Do not listen to the regime's fabrications and to the deceits and charlatanism of a bunch of sly mullahs whose intention is nothing but your destruction. Do not get yourself killed uselessly for the sake of preserving Khomeyni's fascist regime, a regime that has murdered tens of thousands of children, youths and your brothers and sisters. The officers, NCO's and privates who join the Muslim Iraqi forces will see, from the first moment after they are welcomed, the Islamic morals and behaviour of their Iraqi brothers." The same type of messages as broadcast on the previous day--name, address and short message--are then broadcast.

On 20 November the radio carries an opening talk, several short messages and a long message by one of the POW's (filed as NC211015).

On 21 November, the radio is heard with very poor reception to carry an opening talk addressed to the "brave officers, NCO's and privates" telling them that "the Iraqi (?forces) consider you to be their brothers. So far hundreds of the armed forces officers and NCO's have joined the Iraqi forces and are living (?next to their Iraqi brothers) in Iraq. The Iraqi forces welcomes you, oh brothers in the armed forces, with open arms. If you want (?to stay alive), if you want to save Iran, if you want (?to enjoy the support of the Iranian people) leave the war fronts and join the ranks of the people [words indistinct]. If you are (?near Iraqi positions) [words indistinct] you can hoist a white banner and surrender. Iraq, the (?Muslim country) and the country (?where the imams) [words indistinct] will welcome you brothers warmly. Oh brothers in the armed forces, oh (?brother) officers, NCO's and privates of the armed forces [words indistinct] and gendarmerie: Advise your dear ones [words indistinct] (?to give themselves up to the Iraqi forces)." The remainder of the talk is unmonitorable, but points heard speak of how Iraq does not wish "its brothers in the armed forces to be killed on the fronts or to become victims of the executioners of Khomeyni's regime." In conclusion, the talk is heard to call on the military personnel to join the Iraqi forces and to "overthrow an anti-Iranian, antipeople and anti-Islamic regime."

The radio then broadcasts a recorded report from "one of the POW's camps" and says that "we have reiterated that we do not call these people prisoners but we consider them to be our dear and Muslim brothers." A recording of remarks by an Iranian POW is then broadcast who says that "after talking with officials of the camp and so that we would not waste our time" a request was made "and workshop was formed here" where a number of sewing machines were installed. In continuation he says that the Iranian Armed Forces personnel who are in the camp were put to work on the sewing machines. He then goes on to apparently tell "the International Red Cross" not to worry about them. He adds that the Iranians in the camp are receiving a wage for the work they do and says that they are well treated by the Iraqis. Other POW's interviewed express satisfaction with their jobs and health and their hope that the war will end soon.

Reception improves during the last message by an unidentified person who addresses his 10-minute talk to the Iranian nation in which he condemns the Iranian regime and praises the "Mojahed youths, or the constructors of a flourishing Iran," and warns the regime "in the name of a military."

CSO: 4400/65

BRIEFS

AHVAZ ARAB FRONT ADDRESSES MINISTERS--Baghda, 22 Nov (INCA)--The Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz has appealed to the Arab foreign ministers that the Ahvaz Arab people's struggle should have a voice in the 12th Arab summit conference, opening in Fes on Wednesday. In a message addressed to the Arab foreign ministers conference, which began meetings in Morocco today, the front reviewed the Khomeyni regime's repressive, savage practices against the Ahvaz Arab people--practices which exceed those of the shah's regime. The message added that the new rulers had announced that the four million people in Ahvaz Province are not Arabs but Persians speaking Arabic as a result of living near Iraq's border. The message said: In view of this new situation, our people had no alternative but take up struggle once again, unimpeded by the Khomeyni regime's harsh treatment, imprisonment and inhuman executions, which reached their climax in cruelty by mutilating dead bodies, dismembering those sentenced to death before executing them, killing children, disemboweling pregnant women and other reprehensible actions. Concluding its message, the front asked how a racist Persian regime like that of Khomeyni can stand at the side of the Arabs in any of their fateful pan-Arab issues. [Text] [JN221953 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1830 GMT 22 Nov 81]

ITALY, IRAQ ECONOMIC COOPERATION--Baghdad,26 Nov (INA)--Iraqi Trade Minister Hasan 'Ali and Italian Foreign Trade Minister Nicola Capria today signed joint minutes for economic and trade cooperation between Iraq and Italy. The signing of the minutes came at the end of the third session of the joint Iraqi-Italian committee for economic, trade and technical cooperaton. In a speech at the ceremony, 'Ali pointed out that Iraq and Italy are determined to develop and enhance cooperation in various fields. He added that the two sides will map out a working program to organize their relations in 1982. In a reply speech, Capria said that economic relations between the two countries have reached an advanced stage and they are forging ahead toward attaining development and progress in service of the two countries. He expressed hope that Iraq would achieve its objectives in the economic and social development. The minutes include the 1982 cooperation formula in the fields of trade, industry, agriculture, irrigation, transportation, communications, construction and technical cooperation. The next session of the Iraqi-Italian joint committee will be held in Rome during the last quarter of 1982. The signing ceremony was attended by the Italian ambassador in Baghdad and the members of the Iraqi and Italian sides to the committee. [Text] [JN261805 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1715 GMT 26 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/127

BEGIN DISCUSSES KNESSET TACTICS

TA101207 Tel Avid YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 Nov 81 p 4

[Report by Yisra'el Tomer and Gid'on Reicher]

[Text] All Knesset votes will be concentrated on 1 day of the week so that ministers can participate in the vote and to avoid parliamentary defeats. This was decided upon yesterday by the coalition factions in their first meeting since the establishment of the current Knesset. The prime minister attended the meeting.

Prime Minister Begin, who was the only speaker during the session--which was held in a cordial atmosphere--announced that the cabinet is determined to serve for 4 years and that no talk on holding early elections would help.

Begin dismissed the fact that the coalition holds power by only a narrow margin, saying that even the victory of the U.S. administration on AWACS was reached by a majority of only 2 votes.

Begin devoted a large part of his remarks to rebuking those coalition faction members who frequently abstain from the sessions and the votes. "It is scandalous that colleagues do not show up and the coalition sometimes loses in votes," he said, and retorted: "Why can't the Knesset members be at work 2 and 1/2 days a week?"

Later Begin expressed anger at those coalition and Likud MK's who periodically announce that they cannot vote on a certain issue because of "conscientious objecting." In his opinion there is only one matter that affects one's conscience: religion.

Begin listed the four major goals of his government for the next 4 years:

--Fortify peace, for which such a high price has been paid.

--Prevent the repartition of western Eretz Yisra'el and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

--Improve the economy.

--Rehabilitate slum neighborhoods.

Coalition Chairman MK Avraham Shapira specified the steps that are aimed at guaranteeing proper coalition functioning in the Knesset, including a resolution that every Knesset member from the coalition factions who wishes to go abroad would have to obtain a written approval for his trip from the coalition executive.

CSO: 4423/42

BEGIN REPORTEDLY DOES NOT TRUST HIS CABINET

TA091407 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by 'Uzi Benziman]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin yesterday told members of his cabinet that he refrained from submitting to them for debate sensitive issues connected with foreign affairs and defense since he could not rely on their ability to refrain from leaks. This was said by Mr Begin in reply to questions raised by the Minister of Communication, Mordekhay Tzipori, with regard to several moves and positions in the spheres of foreign affairs and defense. Tzipori asked why Nadim Zaru, former mayor of Ramallah, who had been expelled, had been brought back, and whether government policy had changed on this subject. The prime minister answered that Zaru was returned at the instruction of Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon, with the prime minister's knowledge, and that no policy change had occurred. It was nevertheless decided to conduct a debate on this in the government plenary in the near future.

Tzipori also asked what will be the Israeli Government's position on the deliberations with the American administration regarding strategic cooperation, to take place between the defnese ministers of both countries at the end of the month. Mr Begin's reply to this was that he was prevented from bringing before the government the positions to be presented by Mr Sharon in his talks with Caspar Weinberger, since a prior government debate would be leaked and reveal to the Americans Israel's considerations and tactical positions in the negotiations. "Can I submit these subjects to you for debate?", Mr Begin asked. "Are you ready to promise that there will be no leaks? You know very well that you are not capable of taking upon yourselves such a commitment."

In this connection Mr Begin complained that he was not successful in forming a ministerial defense committee, since he was not willing to establish a committee of 13 ministers (the number of cabinet members considering themselves entitled to be included in the committee), and that he therefore had no choice but to carry on the unofficial consultations with a few of the cabinet members (in particular: Sharon, Shamir, Burg and Ehrlich -- 'U.B.). The prime minister promised however that subjects of foreign affairs and defense would be submitted to the government plenary before decisions are adopted. This rule will apply also to the negotiations to be conducted by Minister Sharon in the United States on the subject of strategic cooperation.

Minister of Transportation Hayim Corfu jokingly remarked that Mr Begin could immediately form a ministerial defense committee (of five members), according to his wish, since he was assured a majority in the cabinet on this matter: the five ministers to be included in the committee, as well as five other ministers who do not demand to be appointed as members (Meridor, Corfu, Sharir, Pat and Berman).

CSO: 4423/42

PERES ON ALIGNMENT-LIKUD COOPERATION

TA061921 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1815 GMT 6 Nov 81

[Labor Party chairman MK Shim'on Peres interviewed by Party Affairs correspondent Nisim Mish'al--date and place of interview not given--viedotaped]

[Excerpt] [Question] Mr Peres, the idea of establishing a government of national unity this week gained considerable momentum. The question is: Under what conditions would you be ready to join such a government?

[Answer] Since we are dealing with a very serious issue, I would like to clarify each point. First of all, I would want to know what is involved: Our joining Mr Begin's government as it is? In my view, this would not be a government of unity. Those who are proposing this idea assume, I take it, that the present government would be disbanded, and a new government formed. I doubt that this is the Likud's stand.

[Question] And in this situation, would the alignment be ready to join--if a new government were to be formed?

[Answer] I have not yet finished explaining my stand. A national unity government can, I believe, be formed, in one of two cases: Either an emergency situation is created--and I am not just speaking of a military emergency, I can definitely imagine a political emergency, which I shall outline briefly. If we withdraw from Sinai and the peace is imperiled, if relations with Egypt deteriorate, and our relations with the United States hit an even lower point--that is, we end up without Sinai, without peace, without Egypt and without the United States--there is no doubt that this would be a political state of emergency.

[Question] And only then you would be ready to join a national unity government?

[Answer] I did not say "we." I ask: What are the objective conditions under which it is possible to speak seriously about a government of national unity, and not just some momentum or other. There is also another possibility: You see this kind of emergency situation forming on the horizon, and you say, let us prevent it. In order to prevent it, you need certain clauses and a joint political platform. What must be done to prevent the formation of such a state of affairs? In other words, you need a new governmental platform.

To be perfectly clear on this issue: I believe that none of these three elements now exists. I believe that the Likud government thinks that the situation is still very good--that is not my view, and I hope that the serious things I have described will not come to pass, although there are incipient manifestations of each of these four [as heard] elements which are very bothersome. I am certain that every Israeli should today be worried. At this moment, I cannot see any joint platform between ourselves and the Likud. The Likud is going in one direction, while we are going [word indistinct] in the opposite direction.

[Question] In your Knesset speech this week, you spoke of Israel now being in a state of emergency. If this is in fact the situation, why do you not initiate or work for or call for the formation of a national unity government?

[Answer] I do not believe that I can convince--as I have said this throughout the years--for what is the issue here? It is not a matter of Mr Begin's wanting the whole land of Israel while we do not want it. If this were the choice, who among us would concede even an inch of territory? But Mr Begin believes that he, through his policy, can bring Israel to a safe haven and to a paradise on earth, whereas I believe that the price of his policy is unbearably heavy. In order to form such a government, both sides--the Likud and the Alignment--must arrive at the identical conclusion, but we have not arrived at it. We view the situation with gravity; the Likud seems to view things rosily and artificially.

CSO: 4423/42

'MA'ARIV'S' HARIF ON ISRAELI-U.S. RELATIONS

TA061607 Te' Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Nov 81 p 13

[Excerpts] When we met the prime minister at the beginning of the week in the Knesset after he had delivered his speech, he could not predict how things would develop in the course of the week. The opening shots had been fired and there was nothing to do but to wait and see if they had hit the target. "We shall overcome...we shall overcome," said the prime minister. How? That he could not say, nor predict the future events, but he was convinced: "We shall overcome."

That was on Monday afternoon. Before noon on Wednesday, the Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, William Brown, came away from a meeting with the prime minister after handing him a note from Secretary of State Alexander Haig, which the prime minister was able to term "highly estimable." Its substance was a reaffirmation (likewise made public by Haig the same day in Washington) that the United States regards itself committed to just one thing: the Camp David accords--and consequently does not, ostensibly, regard the Saudi plan as the basis for a peace settlement.

In his message Haig also had other things to say. He requested of the prime minister: "Let bygones be bygones and let us look to the future...for the sake of our mutual interests..."

Still, for the present at least, there would appear to be no grounds for reassurance, despite the positive developments that shaped up in the 2 days after the prime minister's Knesset address signal to Reagan that his administration was making its calculations without taking into account the partner in control of at least 50 percent of the "deal," that is to say, the Middle East conflict.

These developments--the hasty communique inviting Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon to meet with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to conclude a memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation between the two countries, and Haig's note the following day may be proof that the administration does indeed accept Begin's dictum that "without Israel's agreement, there will be no agreement in the Middle East." But if that is so, the question arises why the United States has seen fit to behave as it did in the past few days: to ignore the conclusions arrived at by Begin and Reagan, to defer implementation of the conclusion arrived at by Weinberger and Sharon on a memorandum of understanding, and to proclaim almost daily that there are also "positive" points in the Saudis' eight-point plan: up to the moment when Begin asserted from the Knesset rostrum that Israel was admittedly a small country,

but constitutes 50 percent of any agreement in the Middle East--until then, were the Americans unaware of this "revelation"?

One can argue, of course, that this is an inexperienced administration which, having Middle East events thrust upon it at a time when it wished to devote itself primarily to domestic affairs and to promoting the U.S. economy, and therefore is constrained to find solutions and steps that would leave the initiative in its hands. And being ill-prepared for these events, it has, in its bewilderment, necessarily blundered.

A different appraisal of the "misunderstandings" with the United States was voiced in a meeting this week by Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon. In the main, these stem from the absence of a clear U.S. policy. They (the Americans) are trying to operate simultaneously in several different directions. And within the framework of their endeavors to conquer the hearts of the Saudis, the Egyptians and even the Iraqis, the element that can most easily be ignored--so it seems to them--is Israel.

To those in the meeting who may have wondered how the Iraqis came into the picture, Sharon was able to relate what he had earlier in the week related to U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis when the latter sought to contradict the defense minister's public utterance to the effect that Iraq was currently among the happy recipients of American weapons:

"We know nothing about it," was Lewis' rejoinder when Sharon stood by his remark.

But Sharon insisted: "I can prove it to you..."

"Certainly not direct deliveries," the U.S. ambassador added in defense of his stand. "Perhaps indirectly, without U.S. knowledge...

"No," Sharon asserted. "Directly too...and I can prove it to you."

However, when pressed in public to elaborate on this subject of arms deliveries to Iraq, the defense minister made do with throwing out a hint. At the meeting he said: "We could have used this intelligence to facilitate our campaign against the AWACS deal, but there are certain things between countries which just aren't done..."

Presumably the ambassador was at last convinced that, even without the benefit of strategic cooperation, Israel knows something about what the United States is up to in the region. And this conduct by the Americans gives us pause for reflection: If the Reagan administration really intends to establish strategic cooperation with Israel, and if the nice things Reagan said when Begin visited the White House were not merely designed to help him gain Israel's consent to the deal with the Saudis, then what do we see of this in practice? Is a serious strategic partner precluded from knowing about U.S. aims regarding Iraq--the same Iraq which has openly spoken of Israel's destruction?

There is no doubt that the Americans are seeking to cook up something with the Iraqis. When Secretary of State Haig concluded his visit to Israel last April and returned home, a member of his entourage here, Morris Draper (deputy assistant secretary of state in charge of the Lebanese desk) left for talks in Baghdad.

Then and there warning lights went on in Israel: What, from Israel's point of view, was the significance of the United States' wooing of Iraq? (Now it is comprehensible why Washington reacted so vigorously--suspension of plane deliveries to Israel--following the destruction of the nuclear reactor in Iraq.) So, even when the United States says, through its ambassador that it knows nothing about the supply of U.S. weapons to Iraq ("certainly not directly"), there is no reason to shut off the warning lights.

The defense minister told his colleagues that what has been shaping up of late in U.S.-Israeli relations, prior to approval of the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia and all the more so after it, when the heads of the administration "suddenly" began to talk favorably about the need for talks with the PLO ("if" it recognizes "Israel's right to exist") and have now discovered how positive is the Saudi plan, constitutes evidence of a process liable to hurt Israel badly, so it must be halted at once.

Borrowing a concept from the military sphere, Arik explained to his colleagues: "It seems to me that the state of relations now prevailing between the United States and Israel can be defined as follows: The two sides, the United States and Israel, are deploying in staging areas." (That is, an assembly at which objectives, targets and division of forces are discussed prior to the launching of deliberately initiated operations.)

Not all the possible U.S. initiatives are clear as yet, but enough is known for Israel to be convinced that it is dutybound to make it immediately clear, in various and tangible ways, that no U.S. plan or initiative will succeed if it ignores Israel.

This is the meaning of the key sentence in this week's Begin speech in the Knesset: "Without Israel's agreement, there will be no agreement in the Middle East."

Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon also said as much in a conversation with Samuel Lewis, which took place at the ambassador's request after he had seen a press report that Arik "had no time" now to visit the United States in order to meet with Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger on the subject of strategic cooperation.

Lewis, the skilled professional diplomat "smelled" something. He knew that Weinberger had not sent any invitation to Sharon (even though at their meeting in Washington it had been arranged that Sharon would be coming early in November). So what was behind this statement attributed to the defense minister that he was "postponing the visit" because of other business?

To get to the bottom of things first hand, Lewis asked to meet with Sharon. And he heard: He heard about the delivery of U.S. weapons to Iraq...and he heard that "from this moment on" Israel regarded Saudi Arabia, Washington's pet, as a confrontation state "in all respects"...and he heard that the United States need not be surprised by developments in Lebanon, since Israel could not indefinitely tolerate the scores of violations of the cease-fire perpetrated against Major Haddad's enclave...

And what of the "postponement" of the minister's U.S. visit?

Sharon strove to put on a show of indifference. He explained to his visitor that even though he was interested in going to Washington, "it is important for all concerned to know we will defend our own interests by ourselves...we have nothing to gain by being argumentative but we shall not yield on matters that are vital to us."

Lewis was able to grasp the intent of the statement, "we shall defend our own interests by ourselves" in the context of the warning that "the United States need not be surprised by what will happen in Lebanon if the violations there persist..." And he could get the import of "we shall not yield on matters that are vital to us" in connection with the assertion that Saudi Arabia is "from this moment on a confrontation state in all respects."

Without going into details, Sharon told the ambassador: "To demand consideration without bestowing consideration is to demand the absolute impossible. Everything rests on reciprocity."

During consultations in Jerusalem this week, the defense minister's colorful military imagery served to make concrete the emerging reality: "It seems to me that all parties now realize where they are heading. Anyway, it is clear to them (the United States) that we are heading for a struggle, and struggle we shall...in the IDF we have so-called 'combat patrols'--we have to be careful that a patrol does not evolve into an unplanned war..."

Did Sharon drop Lewis a hint about the invitation not forthcoming from his counterpart, Caspar Weinberger?

"We asked for nothing. This is as much in their interest as it is in ours..."

The Sharon-Lewis conversation took palce on Sunday [1 Nov]. The fact that two days later, on Tuesday, Sharon received an invitation from Caspar Weinberger to go to Washington to discuss conclusion of the memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation, is of course very significant. The proximity between the delivery of the invitation and the Sharon-Lewis conversation cannot be dismissed as a mere coincidence. The full content of the conversation, as reported to Washington by the ambassador, was a fitting incentive. Likewise, the announcement of the imminent trip by Philip Habib, whose mission (removal of the Syrian missiles from Lebanon...) was all but forgotten may be seen to have been prompted by statements on the "gravity of the situation now prevailing in Lebanon" and by the defense minister's tour of the Haddad enclave in the company of the chief of staff and IDF generals. In his Knesset speech, the prime minister said. "We shall await his (Habib's) arrival and see what he brings; if there is no alternative, then we ourselves will destroy them (the Syrian missiles)."

Similarly, Begin prefaced his remarks with a quote from the note he received in this matter from President Reagan stating: "We decidedly concur with Israel that Syria has overstepped a certain threshold in its latest operations. It is incumbent on Syria to withdraw and to return to the status quo ante." (Begin: "There can be no more binding pledge than this on the part of the President of the United States"). What all this amounts to is the political justification for just such an operation against Syria.

The results were not long in coming: Sharon was invited there, Philip Habib will be coming here. It is plain that the administration grasped the hints from both Begin and Sharon (who are acting in finely honed coordination, in conjunction with Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir).

True, the United States sought to explain the delay of the invitation to the defense minister as "technical and of no significance." But as Arik Sharon remarked: "Never mind, we know each other."

The American stake at the moment is clear: How to handle matters so that Israel will not be forced to take action against the Syrians. The United States hopes that maybe the Saudis will exert their influence on the Syrians, but they cannot be sure of this. Accordingly, it is the United States that needs a dialogue with Israel, to reassure it lest it invoke its right "to act in self-defense" against the Syrians, thus scuttling in one fell stroke all the initiatives being formulated in Washington--whether vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia or Iraq and, of course, vis-a-vis Egypt.

To say that the invitation to Sharon on Tuesday and Haig's message to Begin the following day constitute a restoration of the full understanding with Israel--to say this would be a great exaggeration.

Begin expressed the hope that "we shall overcome," and the prospects for that are definitely good, but that is not to say that Israel has already overcome. Still, there is much significance to the fact that it has obliged the United States to take it into consideration.

The test, or rather the first but not the only test, will come with the content of a memorandum of understanding that the United States would be ready to endorse. If, for instance, in the context of strategic cooperation the United States will be ready to store "bandages" (the contemptuous description for the notion of storing emergency medicaments in Israel for use by the U.S. Army operating in the region), that would be neither serious nor interesting, as the defense minister will tell you. If, on the other hand, the United States is ready, as part of the strategic cooperation, to maintain real weapon arsenals here, and to hold substantive talks (not spin yarns of their knowing nothing about U.S. arms going to Iraq...) and to engage in joint planning, joint exercises and the like, then that will be more to the point. That will have genuine political significance, over and above the military-security aspects.

This we will be able to know even before the defense minister goes to Washington to conclude the memorandum of understanding, when joint working groups meet for talks.

At present, all-dominant is the U.S. desire to calm Israel, so that it will not take action against the Syrians even if the missiles are not promptly withdrawn from Lebanon--notwithstanding President Reagan's pledge--and the desire to ensure the final evacuation of Sinai without a hitch in April 1982.

Haig's message to the prime minister this week says what the prime minister wanted to hear, namely, that "Camp David alone" is the basis for a peace settlement. But that is not all he wrote. The message also speaks of letting bygones be bygones

and of facing the future for the sake of mutual interests, and this in itself is "highly estimable," as the prime minister observed. But it is difficult to shake off the impression that even this message, which is wholly designed to calm Israel and restore the trust that was shaken by Washington's recent conduct, smacks of insincerity. For example, Haig calls on Israel not to attack the United States over the Saudi plan, for in so doing it will only embarrass the United States and drag it into discussing details which it is not necessary to discuss, because this (the Saudi plan) is not a genuine issue. Instead, Haig advocates a joint effort to speed up the autonomy issue, which will ipso facto stifle the voices raised in favor of the Saudi plan.

These words are truly encouraging. But what is behind the contention that Israel "embarrasses the United States and drags it" into discussing details of a plan as irrelevant as the Saudi plan? Have not the President, the secretary of defense and also the secretary of state discovered, and proclaimed from the rooftops, positive details in this plan? And what did Weinberger say to King Husayn on this issue? As for the secretary of defense, he has accepted virtually all of Prince Fahd's eight points...

Thus far there is no evidence that Reagan's Washington has indeed changed its stand. At most they erred in the timing of their praise for the Saudis and their beating the drum for the Saudi plan as being "only" complementary to the Camp David accords--doing this before Israel has evacuated the whole of Sinai and while the Lebanese issue remains unresolved. Given the vigor of Israel's reaction, the United States felt obliged to shower messages of conciliation (it is an almost foregone conclusion that in the wake of Haig, Reagan too will be sending Begin a message), but the "evil weed" has not been uprooted.

However, the reality that emerged this week need not leave Israel discouraged. On the contrary, it has been plainly demonstrated that Israel is a small country but one without which things cannot get done in this part of the world. During the crystallization of the moves made this week by the prime minister and by the foreign and defense ministers, Sharon put it this way: "We are capable of withstanding pressure, even if it is very great pressure."

CSO: 4423/42

'HA'ARETZ' ON U.S.-ISRAELI STRATEGIC COOPERATION

TA041413 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Nov 81 p 7

[Yo'el Marcus commentary: "Why be Killed for Them?"]

[Text] Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon's decision to freeze the talks planned for him and delegation in Washington on the issue of strategic cooperation is, of course, an act of protest. However, if I know Mr Begin, this "demonstration" will not last long. Both the prime minister and his minister of defense will obviously make a conciliation after a friendly letter from President Reagan arrives. If this prediction really comes true, as may be imagined, it will be a great pity, because I would advise the government to take advantage of this move in order to make a timely break from actually realizing (for the moment) the abstract idea of strategic cooperation between the two countries. The government's main goal is to look after the country's security and guarantee its existence. It does not -- as Israeli prime ministers have said over and over again -- want U.S. soldiers to be killed for Israel. But, to the same extent, neither is it worth our volunteering or, to put it more precisely, being pushed into being killed for the United States.

Israel has on more than one occasion shown a rare skill in entering into commitments likely to trouble generations without thinking in advance about the risks and development. The entire adventure, for example, of granting autonomy to the Palestinians, and recognizing their legitimate rights (rights to what?), which in fact lays the ground for the foundation of a Palestinian state, was embarked upon by Begin without an in-depth debate, almost as a distraction. Over the last few months Israel -- again without any in-depth debate over the implications of the move with regard to its future and freedom of action -- has been making attempts to get involved in a partnership that would not only set it in the path of the Soviet "steamroller" but could, one of these days in the not-too-distant future, even require it to make sacrifices -- dear ones. If we were faced with a situation in which it was the United State that was requesting and pushing for partnership, it would be difficult to refuse the friend that has been guaranteeing our security for many years now. But for us to insist on donating blood, sweat and tears while they appear to be doing Israel a "favor" is not only not in our national interest, but borders on first-degree blindness. After all, as IDF slang puts it: We have troubles of our own.

Israel must think again about the issue of strategic cooperation -- in-depth and not as a "punishment" for the U.S. Administration for the sympathy it is providing Saudi Arabia and its plan. The plan is not much of a plan and, in any event, is

not viable. It is worth remembering that it originated in an interview Prince Fahd granted to Ms (Katherine Graham) (the publisher of the Washington POST) at the end of last summer. At that time Fahd went even further and even hinted at the possibility of diplomatic ties with Israel. The interview was the spearhead of a Saudi Arabian offensive to prove its moderation and positive influence in the area with the goal of winning over U.S. public opinion and, through this, gaining approval for its shopping lists. A short time after the Washington POST interview, the beautiful feathers molted from Fahd's words took the form of an eight-point plan and the U.S. Administration used it as a alibi to persuade Congress that Saudi Arabia was really peace-loving and the most moderate country.

It was not difficult for the U.S. Administration to point to the fact that Saudi Arabia's willingness to agree that Israel should remain in tact -- although under draconian conditions -- was very positive, especially when taking into account the fact that for 30 years it had been in favor of a "jihad," a holy war to push Israel out by force. The sad thing that happened was that, in the process of the great persuasion campaign in the Congress, the administration itself fell in love with its tactical alibi and began to regard it as a possible political option to fill in the large empty space becoming marked in the wake of Camp David. This empty place was created both because the Palestinian section in the Camp David agreement remained unsolved and because the Reagan administration was unable to formulate an operation view for a continuation of the peace process.

Although this trend is not pleasant, it is doubtful if it would be worth exaggerating the dangers of the Saudi Arabian plan. In another few weeks Saudi Arabia, at the expected Area summit in Fes, will be forced to shed from its proposal the last decorative feathers left to it; and if it is not viable in its current form, it will certainly be less so in another month. And when a plan is unacceptable to one of the negotiating parties -- and even a section of those in favor of it has reservations about some of its clauses -- it is sentenced, sooner or later, to be dropped. In addition to this, we must believe President Reagan's latest declarations that he wants to guarantee Israel's security and that he does not intend to impose any solution on it. The fact that the AWACS deal only scraped through also taught the Reagan administration that "selling Israel out," that is, endangering its security, is not something that will be easily accepted by U.S. public opinion.

From this it follows that -- without any connection to Fahd's plan -- we are taking advantage of this opportunity to play at "being angry." In any case it is worth thinking more seriously about the issue of strategic cooperation. What would it give us? Would we get any benefit out of this partnership? Some people say that the Americans are not serious anyway. If this is so, we have no need to place ourselves on the map of targets for Soviet missiles and take serious restrictions upon ourselves (for example, we would not be able to down the Saudi Arabian AWACS planes if a security need for this were to arise). If this is serious -- informed Americans swear that this is so -- it would certainly be desirable to weigh whether the U.S. strategic concept is correct and suitable for us. So far it is difficult, at least, to see that the United States has ended its military helplessness when replying to local Soviet challenges. What is being said in Washington is indeed aggressive. However in the field of operational ability what is apparent is a mixture of amateurishness, incompetence and lack of direction. "There is nothing to depend on," "this is not serious," U.S. columnists say. And if the role of central pillar in the

containment of the Soviets is really intended for Saudi Arabia in the concept being formulated, it is clear that there is a basic fault in the U.S. view and it is difficult to see much logic in our incorporation in it.

It is the right of the United States to see to its security as it sees fit, just as it is our right to build our security establishment in accordance with what appears reasonable to us. From this it follows that it is worth continuing along the line of building up our strength by means of U.S. weapons; a strong Israel in any case represents a firm foundation, although a modest one, in the defense system of the west, even if the (?Bechtel) company does not think so. Does the United States want to base its security on Saudi Arabia? Let is enjoy doing so. If it has made another mistake, as it did in Iran, we will be in the area, always prepared to lend a friendly, loyal hand -- without the unpleasantnesses of imposed memorandums of understanding or formal commitments.

CSO: 4423/42

ISRAELI POLL SHOWS PUBLIC FAVORING RABIN OVER PERES

TA101119 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Nov 81 p 4

[Pori Poll]

[Text] Yitzhaq Rabin is by far the preferred people's choice as leader of the Labor Party than Shim'on Peres. He leads both in the public at large and in those who voted Labor. This emerged from a nationwide Pori Poll commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

To the question "Who, in your opinion, should lead the Labor Party?" 34.6 percent opted for Rabin compared with 14.3 percent who voted for Peres. Among the Labor Party voters Rabin got 34.9 percent, and Peres 28.3.

Some 10.9 percent (compared with 14.2 percent among the Labor Party voters' public) would like President Yitzhaq Naval to lead the Labor Party.

Mordekhay Gur reached fourth place as the Preferred Party leader, receiving 3.2 percent of the vote (and 2.4 percent from among Labor Party voters).

Yosi Sarid, Abba Eban, Hayim Bar-lev, Eliyahu Speiser, Hayim Herzog, Hayim Tzadoq, Me'ir 'Amit, Ya'aqov Levinson and Arye Eli'av each got less than 1 percent.

It should be noted that Hayim Bar-lev got 0.5 percent (versus 0.6 among the party supporters), whereas Eliyahu Speiser received 0.2 percent of all the votes and not even one single vote from among the Labor Party voters.

Some 33.7 percent (18.4 percent among the Labor Party supporters) do not envision any personality they think is worthy of leading the party at this moment.

The poll is a representative cross-section comprising 1,200 males and females from age 18 and above.

CSO: 4423/42

POLL SHOWS ISRAELIS FEEL BETTER OFF ECONOMICALLY

TA120859 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] Despite the wave of strikes now afflicting the public service, the public feels that its personal economic situation has in fact improved. Only one-third of the public now complains that they feel the economic pinch and that the money they earn is not enough to "get them through the month." This is the lowest rate of complaint recorded by the Pori Poll since 1978. These findings were made in a countrywide poll commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

Question: "Do you feel that the money you earn now suffices you more, less or to the same degree to get through the month as it did 6 months ago?" To this question, 37.1 percent replied less, as against 45.7 percent who said "to the same degree" and 10.7 percent who said even more.

The conductor of the poll, Pori director Refa'el Gil, notes that this is the first time since 1978 that the percentage of persons complaining that their money is insufficient is lower than the percentage saying that they have enough money to get through the month.

Among those with above-average incomes, 14.5 percent said that their earnings now provide them more than in the past, while the percentage of those saying that their earnings provide them "to the same degree" is twice that of those complaining that their earnings are insufficient: 54.3 percent to 26.4 percent.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women, aged 18 and above, who were interviewed personally in their homes throughout the country, in complete confidentiality.

CSO: 4423/42

TREASURY REQUESTING SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET

TA241003 Jersualem JERUSALEM POST in English 24 Nov 81 p 1, 10

[Text] The treasury yesterday put a supplementary budget of 4.12 billion Israeli shekels before the Knesset finance committee, circumventing a plenary debate by resorting to article 3 of the budget law which says that revenue additional to that foreseen in the original budget may be used for extra expenditure, with the committee's approval.

The treasury spokesman last night estimated revenues to be 6 billion shekels bigger than forecast in the budget.

The additional appropriation is requested to cover expenditure on subsidies, for which hardly any money remains in the general budget reserve. The treasury spokesman said that the additional budget will be enough to cover subsidy costs until the end of the fiscal year.

Of the total sum requested, 743 million shekels is for local authorities, 2.15 billion shekels for fuel subsidies, 210 million shekels for water, 107 million shekels for subsidies to frozen chicken, 60 million shekels for milk, and 330 million shekels for subsidies to other goods and services. A total of 250 million shekels is requested for subsidizing exports to Europe, and another 150 million shekels to cover the deficit in the exchange rate insurance system for these exports. One hundred and twenty million shekels is earmarked for research and development, with another 300 million shekels requested for the same purpose in the form of an authority to undertake commitments.

Expenditure on subsidies this year has so far totalled 11 billion shekels--some 5.5 percent of the budget--and the subsidy to fuel alone has cost 5 billion.

A second supplementary budget will be needed to cover additional defence expenditures and certain technical changes in the original estimates caused by fluctuations in the exchange rates of foreign currencies.

Budget Director Ya'acov Gadish explained that the extra revenue was obtained "as a result of the subsidy policy," which increased real incomes and hence the revenue from direct taxes. The gross national product is now expected to be 5 percent higher than in the preceding fiscal year, instead of 3 percent as originally forecast.

CSO: 4400/72

HEBRON'S DUDIN DISCUSSES ATTITUDE TOWARD PLO

TA270750 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Nov 81 pp 2, 9

[Report by David Richardson]

[Text] Mustafa Dudin, chairman of the Hebron area village league, does not recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization as "the sole representative of the Palestinian people," as the PLO claims to be. The leader of the first and largest of the recently formed rural associations in the West Bank stresses that his prime concern is with the social and economic welfare of the villagers he represents.

"We are concerned with the interests of our people in this area because we are the owners of the land here. And we (the Dudin tribe which numbers almost 4,000) are the biggest in the area and have been living here for more than 1,000 years. For this reason we believe that we are not in need of instruction or advice from anyone about the national line," the 66-year-old former Jordanian minister and adviser to the Egyptian Government said in an interview yesterday in his heavily guarded offices here.

Dudin was at pains to stress during carefully considered remarks at the beginning of the interview that the vilification he has been subjected to by radically nationalist circles in the West Bank and abroad were the result of "confusion" based on reports sent to the PLO in Beirut "by four local mayors" (whom he refused to name) and the East Jerusalem daily AL-FAJR, "which claims to speak for the PLO here," he said.

He said that none of the leaders of the three village leagues "thought he was going to replace anybody, and we never thought that nor in the long run we would claim to represent anyone on political issues." There was no intention to replace or pull the carpet from under the PLO, he insisted.

But Dudin made it clear that he and his supporters feel that Palestinians in the West Bank have a right to speak out and a role to play in solving their own problems.

The confusion that characterized Arab and Palestinian reaction to the eight-point Saudi plan during the week's Arab summit in Fes was such that "it is not clear who represents whom. 'Arafat and the Fatah appeared in favor while Habash and the others said no; some local mayors came out in favour and others refused," he observed.

"Every Arab state claims the right to an opinion on the Palestinian question. Why should it be that only those Arabs who live in the area and live the problems of occupation day by day are denied an opinion and are called traitors when they speak out independently?

"Perhaps we have a different view but this is our right," he said, making a plea for co-existence between Arabs and Jews--"the two nations that live between the river and the sea."

"This has led us to the conclusion that we should seek peace through negotiations--we have tried four wars and achieved nothing," he said, re-endorsing President Anwar al-Sadat's approach as "a correct step towards peace."

But on the broad lines of a final settlement, Dudin stressed that his demands were not different from those of other Palestinians. "Israeli troops should be withdrawn from the occupied territories till the 1967 boundaries. But our conception is that this should happen through a peace process--we condemn terrorism whether from Arabs or Jews."

Dudin's area of jurisdiction has become the focus of the latest settlement drive under Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon, who is using army Nahal units to establish outposts on generally barren hills in the area south of Hebron. Dudin absolutely rejected Israeli settlements and said they were counter to the peace process he supported.

He went on to say that by virtue of the Arab world's acceptance of UN Resolution 242 which implicitly recognizes Israel they had accepted that the problem of the Palestinian refugees was separate from that of the territories. "Their problem is one of return or compensation--ours is one of occupation. There is no reason to link the two," he said touching the heart of the political dilemma of local Palestinians.

The assassination last week of his colleague from Ramallah Yusuf al-Khatib, was an act of terrorism, he urged, and counterproductive. "This will give us a bad reputation abroad as people will become convinced that the Arabs will kill anybody who calls for peace," he said.

He repeated his call for an armed villagers' militia under the control of the leagues, although the military government has already turned down a similar request he made at al-Khatib's funeral on Monday.

Dudin, chairman of the most powerful village league in the West Bank, played down his alleged close cooperation with the military government, although he acknowledged that 50 percent of the more than 80 million shekels invested in the development projects in his villages were an outright grant from the authorities.

"Under international law the military government is responsible for the area. We are forced to contact them for permission to build even one room or open a road," he said.

Dudin said that since his league's formation in July 1978 it has paved 65 kilometres of road, built 24 schools and four clinics, and provided 16 villages with their own electrical generators. "Fifteen villages west of Dura are to have running water for the first time in their history," he said.

Before the leagues were formed, he said, the villages were totally overlooked. All the funds and development activity went to the towns, he claimed.

Returning to the PLO, Dudin said that he was unafraid and quite prepared to meet Yasir 'Arafat even in Beirut, "if it served the peace process."

"We cannot deny the PLO a role, but personally I would like to see King Husayn play a fundamental role in finding a solution--since he is best qualified," he said.

CSO: 4400/72

COST OF NEGEV AIRFIELDS FAR ABOVE ESTIMATES

TA120820 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by Economic Affairs Correspondent El'azar Levin]

[Text] The investment in the construction of the Negev airfields will total $1.07 billion, or $30 million more than the original U.S. estimate and $100 million above the Israeli defense ministry estimate. The final calculations have just been completed.

When the project got underway, the U.S. Corps of Engineers and the construction firms involved thought that the cost of the two airfields would be $1.05 billion, of which $800 million would be covered by a special U.S. grant and the rest by funds from the regular U.S. military aid to Israel. The defense ministry's calculations showed that efficient management could get the job done for $970 million, thus enabling a major saving to be made in the defense budget. It now turns out that the cost will exceed even the U.S. estimate.

It is reported that the U.S. contractors have prepared stacks of documents containing many explanations for the budget deviation. Among these explanations: Complaints about the quality of the work of the Israeli contractors, difficulties in the supply of raw materials, climatic difficulties and others.

Already a few months ago defense ministry experts said that the outlay would exceed the estimate, but the American contractors refused to heed the figures. When they met with Defense Minister Sharon a month and a half ago, the Americans continued to insist that the estimate would not be exceeded. Only now have they admitted officially that the outlay will exceed the initial estimates by $30 million to $100 million.

So far, the U.S. firms have paid out about $900 million to contractors and supplies involved in the construction of the fields. The remainder will be paid out in the coming months.

CSO: 4423/42

EXPANDED USE OF AIRBASE APPROVED

TA270743 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 27 Nov 81 p 3

[Report by Joshua Brilliant]

[Text] Ben-Gurion Airport--The Israel Air Force has agreed that foreign civilian aircraft may land at its new airbase at 'Uvda, the airport's authority Director-General Ramon Harel said in an interview yesterday.

At present, 'Uvda may be used in emergencies only--if planes cannot land at 'Ezyon or Elat. But after April 1982, when Israel is scheduled to withdraw from the Sinai base, foreign aircraft may regularly bring tourists to 'Uvda, he added.

This concession by the air force is designed to help boost tourism to Elat.

The Elat airport can accommodate only small passenger planes, such as the Boeing 737, and if Egypt denies use of 'Ezyon it would be difficult to promote the resort town. As a result, security authorities drew up a number of restrictions, such as limited approach lanes to 'Uvda and prohibiting photography.

Harel said the final decision whether to use 'Uvda or 'Ezyon during the next two years will be taken at a later date. It will depend on Egypt's consent to the use of 'Ezyon and the charges for services and the availability of necessary equipment. He said he preferred 'Ezyon because it is closer to Elat.

The airports authority official added that no investments will be made at 'Uvda. There will be only "bare essentials" and passengers will be taken from the airport in airconditioned buses to a terminal at Elat for passport and customs checks.

Arrangements will be similar to those currently existing at 'Ezyon, Harel said. He said the authority will improve services in Elat by enlarging the arrival hall so that passengers will not spend more than 30 minutes there.

These arrangements will be in effect until a new airport is built north of Elat, but the government has still to decide whether to build it 4.5 or 11 kilometres north of the town.

CSO: 4400/72

BRIEFS

TRANS-SAMARIA ROAD DEDICATED--The ceremony of digging [as heard] the road across Samaria was held near the settlement of Elqana in the afternoon. The road will be named after former minister of transport, the late Hayim Landau. The Haim Road as it is called now was inaugurated by Prime Minister Menahem Begin today. [Excerpt] [TA121658 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 12 Nov 81]

JORDANIAN MOSQUE FUNDS--The Prime Minister's adviser for Arab affiars, Binyamin Gur-arye, says Israel will not allow the acceptance within its boundaries of contributions from enemy countries. Gur-arye said this today to our correspondent, Arye Gus, in reaction to yesterday's announcement by the Jordanian Awqaf, Islamic affairs and holy places minister that he had donated 20,000 dinars for the restoration of the Hasan Bakk Mosque in Yafo. The Jordanian minister said this would be the first such donation to the occupied land. [Text] [TA091207 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 9 Nov 81]

JEWISH GOLAN POPULATION INCREASED--The Jewish agency's land settlement department will speed up the plan to settle 10,000 Jews on the Golan Heights in 2 years. At present, there are only a little more than 6,000 Jews on the Golan Heights. [Text] [TA052115 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 5 Nov 81]

IMMIGRATION FROM USSR--In October only 368 Soviet Jews arrived in Vienna, the lowest monthly figure to date. This was reported today by Ms (Jacobson) from the National Committee for Soviet Jews. She said the continued drop in the number of emigrants proves that the "gates of Jewish emigration have in fact been closed." In September, 405 Jews emigrated from the Soviet Union. Of the 368 who arrived in Vienna in October, 89 came to Israel and 279 opted to emigrate to Western countries. [Text] [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2030 GMT 2 Nov 81 TA]

CSO: 4423/42

TREATMENT OF PALESTINIANS DESCRIBED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 23-29 Oct 81 p 10

[Text] Israeli officials, rationalising their occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and looking for a way to keep the Palestinian refugees out, have often referred to Jordan as "the Palestinian State." They point to the fact that Palestinians make up over 60 percent of Jordan's 2.2 million population in the East Bank and that all Palestinian residents of Jordan and Jordan-controlled West Bank in 1950 were granted citizenship.

The Jordanian regime begins its argument from the opposite vantage point: looking towards Palestine they refer to the West Bank as "occupied Arab land" that should return to Arab control. They look forward to regaining this rich agricultural area — if only in a Palestinian-Jordanian federation — in which they, by superior political and economic might, will have control.

Palestinians in Jordan, as elsewhere, (aside from those in the service of the Hashemite regime) categorically reject both Israeli and Jordanian claims. They demand "an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza under the leadership of the PLO." Bitter is their memory of three wars in which the Zionists pushed them as refugees over the borders into neighbouring Arab countries. Equally bitter is their memory of Arab armies who failed to defend them and have since acted to crush their own movement for national liberation.

Jordan and the PLO

Though Jordan is described in the Western press as a "confrontation state" (with Israel), it has repressed the Palestinian national movement within Jordan aimed at return to and liberation of Palestine-seeing it as a threat to the 'stability' of the monarchy. Since Black September 1970, when the resistance lost heavily to the King's army — the guerilla movement has been illegal in Jordan.

It has since been illegal for ordinary citzens "*to carry arms . . . It is also prohibited to buy weapons and keep them in houses . . . except with a license. Whoever disobeys shall be considered an outlaw or an enemy agent and the most severe punishment will be taken against him.*" (by order of Military Governor General Wasfi al-Tal; December 15, 1970)

At 1974's Rabat summit conference, King Hussein was forced to officially recognise the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. This diplomatic recognition was necessary for his own backing by the oil-rich Arab states. The superficiality of this recognition is apparent from the ban on political expression and military activity in Jordan which mocks PLO representation.

"The only place for the Palestinian flag is at the PLO office," remarks one Palestinian woman educator, "so in fact the PLO is not recognised."

There is no law against raising the Palestinian flag as such, but it is understood that so doing could involve enforcement of one of the 1936 Mandate Emergency Defence Regulations (still in force) which makes "disruption of the public order and incitement" an offense.

Likewise there are no specific laws against relations with or membership in the PLO, but a 1955 law prohibits parties which have not obtained government registration. To be registered, their "*purposes* (must be) *legal and the means peaceful.*" In practise this definition has excluded the Communist Party and member parties of the PLO.

The regime is selective in

its prosecution of members of "illegal organisations." The members of the Palestine National Council and employees of the Amman PLO office, for example, are officially known.

There are currently an estimated 70 political prisoners (all men) in Jordanian jails. The majority are Palestinian and were accused of membership in "illegal organisations"; some were accused of military activities. Several Palestinians in Jordan concurred: "Now is not the time to imprison activists in the national movement — though they are known and their names recorded in the intelligence files — those arrested as used as warnings to the others."

Political repression is also found in a more general sense-control over school curriculum and hiring of staff, censorship of the news media, and cultural expressions — TV productions, theatre, and book publication.

School Curriculum

The "Palestinian cause" is taught in a general way as part of the Jordanian curriculum, whether in government, private or UNRWA schools, but there is no mention of the Palestinian national movement, *fedayiin* or the PLO. One Palestinian educator sums it up, "Palestine is the Holyland occupied by Israel, a paradise lost that must be liberated and returned to the Arabs.

"History texts treat the West Bank as part of Jordan and Gaza — a Palestinian town under Egyptian rule — and Haifa and Jaffa as lost cities. They pay little attention to the '67 war and since."

School libraries are stocked with books on traditional themes with more emphasis on ancient culture than on the present. There are no books from a 'left' perspective and most contemporary Palestinian writers are excluded from the shelves: only those who support the Arab regimes, like Najuib Mahfouz and Tawfiq al-Hakim (Egypt), are found. Books published by Palestinian publishing houses in Beirut are not allowed.

Principals and teachers responsible for ordering books must obtain permission from the ministry of culture and education before any purchase is made.

Media Censorship

Newspapers are internally controlled so there is no need for external censorship. (There was a government censor until about 10 years ago). Once or twice a year, a newspaper has "slipped" and printed something considered unfavourable by the regime, and has been temporarily closed down.

Policy-making rests with the editors but all journalists quickly understand what material will be acceptable for print. Occasionally, the ministry of information directly supplies material for the main editorial columns.

Palestinian nationalists who work at the daily papers just "do their job" repeating the government line. Some are fortunate to secure jobs in the cultural, literary or 'occupied land' sections — where they have a bit more freedom to express their political views.

An example of political censorship that runs counter to most Palestinians' feelings has been coverage of the Iraq-Iran war. Jordanian papers echo the regime's pro-Iraq policy. A Palestinian working in one of the daily papers privately echoed the sentiments of most Palestinians when he said: "Why are these states wasting human and economic resources fighting each other when our main enemy is Israel? The Iraqis say they are fighting 'to regain occupied Arab territory' — what about Jerusalem?"

Cultural Censorship

Books must pass through the "circle of printing and publishing" before they can be printed. One Palestinian writer gave his comment on censorship: "we can write on anything — except for politics, religion, or sex." Collections of poetry and short stories expressly dealing with the occupation of Palestine from a national, progressive perspective are usually censored.

Television serials, one of the most popular forms of entertainment, are also reviewed for political content. Recently, a Palestinian-Syrian production of a 15-part dramatised version of Felicia Langer's "With My Own Eyes" (in which she details Israeli torture of Palestinian prisoners) was censored.

Theatre performances, though less popular, are also scrutinized on opening night by those seated in the "reserved section." Earlier this year, "The Shoes of Mr. Tafish," a local adaptation of a piece by Gogol — with a theme of class struggle — was cancelled by the ministry of culture after one performance.

Contacts With the Outside World

The government controls travel of its citizens in and out of the country. Students studying in the socialist countries have

come under particular scrutiny in recent years. One medical student, a Palestinian from the West Bank who had been denied exit via Lydda airport, met the same fate in Amman. "Just as I was boarding the plane," she said, "the *mukhabarat* (secret service) took my passport and I missed the flight." Others were less lucky — their passports have been held for up to a year with no charge presented against them.

Graduates of universities in socialist countries and those reported by intelligence agents to have been involved in "politics" outside often find it difficult to gain employment upon return to Jordan.

Thousands of people on the intelligence lists have been called for investigation at the police-military-intelligence complex over the last 10 years. Others have not been able to renew their passports outside Jordan. They are, in effect, being asked to return to report to the intelligence service.

While these harassments are not specifically directed against Palestinian residents of Jordan, they are in fact most affected by them. Palestinians are involved in supporting their cause in universities internationally — few Jordanians are. Palestinians, answering the PLO call, have gone to fight in Lebanon. Palestinians are the majority of those who go to attend meetings such as April's PNC meeting in Damascus where non-PNC members were prevented from leaving the country.

Stability?

Jordan's plucky King has engineered a facade of 'stability' for the outside world. The *Middle East Economic Digest* report on Jordan, published in July 1980, summed up the country over which his regime governs as, "a conservative, yet rapidly changing, society seemingly unaffected by the revolutionary turmoil, real or potential, which surrounds it." The MEED report, which was full of uncritical 'puffs' for various functionaries and agencies of the Jordanian state, sums up the image Hussein wishes to promote. For many of his subjects, however, fear and imposed silence dominate their lives. Jordan is far from the tranquil oasis its apologists present.

CSO: 4400/73

IMPROVED MEDICAL CARE SOUGHT

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 p 43

[Text] JORDAN'S plan to build its second-largest medical complex, northeast of Amman, is still in its infant stages but, under an agreement just signed between the ministry of health, which is the official body responsible, and the American Herman Smith Company, the project's consultants, the basic design is now well under way. According to the $1.25m agreement, the foreign company will provide the groundwork for the establishment of the complex over the next six months.

Bidding for the project has not started yet, since tenders will not be floated until May 1982. According to health ministry officials in Jordan, Herman Smith is not permitted to have affiliations with any contractors, as the ministry of health will be selecting them acting on the advice of the consultants.

In the meantime, Herman Smith will be preparing the basic design, which will materialise on a 170,000 sq m area already expropriated by the ministry of health. The complex will cost an estimated $90m though officials predict that expenses may go up by $10m due to price rises.

Project Director Dr Musrafa Barmawi told *8 Days* that the complex would be unique in the Middle East because of the number of its departments. These will include: general surgery, general medicine, pediatrics, a burn unit, an emergency section, a rehabilitation and physiotherapy centre, a central blood bank including a frozen blood bank unit, a psychiatric unit for acute cases and a department for the treatment of drug addiction. The complex will also have a separate medico-legal department, a nursing unit and nursing quarters, as a 550-bed hospital. In the long run, the ministry of health plans to use the hospital as a training school for nurses, doctors and other medical specialists.

Herman Smith is now preparing a master plan for both the nursing unit and the overall complex, and is also in charge of establishing an operative system to run the hospital. For the time being, it is administering the various parts of the project as well as monitoring its budget.

The consultancy work is to be carried out according to a specific schedule, covering the next 22 months. The ministry of health is recruiting efficient and well-trained personnel to man the hospital. In a bid to attract specialised staff, the ministry has sent some doctors to the US and UK to train in the different fields needed at the hospital.

The ministry is also trying to boost its nursing corps by mounting campaigns to persuade more women to take up the profession. During the next five years, the ministry plans to expand the capacity of its nursing schools to meet the needs of the hospital, to be called the Prince Hamzeh Hospital. When completed, it will overcome some of the medical and health problems Jordan is currently facing.

There are only 14 government-run hospitals throughout the country, with a total of 1,450 beds. This works out at 17.1 hospital beds for every 10,000 people, a ratio well below universally accepted standards. The ministry foresees a narrowing of this ratio in the near future, making it 30 beds for every 10,000 people, as under its Five Year Development Plan it intends to add about 1,500 beds in various hospitals to be built around the country. Within the next two months, work will have started on a 300-bed hospital in Irbid at a cost of $45m. Another $30m is to be allocated for two hospitals projected for Karak and Rafileh in

the south.

No plans have been finalised for the latter two hospitals, but the ministry of health is keen on starting them, since Jordan lacks good medical services. Dr Barmawi pointed out that the annual rise in Jordan's population — 3.4 per cent — is far greater than the expansion in medical services.

CSO: 4400/73

SOLAR-POWERED DESALINATION PROJECT DISCUSSED

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES SUPPLEMENT in English 27 Oct 81 p 6

[Text] JORDANIAN engineers are investigating the potential use of solar energy as a power source in a programme which began about five years ago.

The programme has been concentrating on desalination of sea water, hothouse farming, roadside and rural telephone communications, production of potash and home water heating and cooling systems. On the horizon are other potential projects that include the use of solar power to pump water and generate electricity.

The focal point of solar energy research today is the Mechanical Engineering Department of the Royal Scientific Society, Jordan's ten-year-old institute of research and technology. There, efforts are well into carrying out three main programmes to harness sun power for desalination, home water heating and the heating and cooling of houses.

Most dramatic is the work going on in the southern port city of Aqaba where the RSS and the West German company Dornier System are testing a new method of turning sea water into fresh water. Dornier designed the system and the RSS has been running it under a two-year programme that has achieved a current production of six litres of fresh water per day per square metre of solar-collecting surface.

The Aqaba station is, in fact, the first in the world to apply the 'heat-pipe' principle to desalination of water through solar energy. Simply described, the process is one by which flat solar-collecting surfaces are heated by the sun's rays to temperatures of over 100°C. Embedded in the hot surfaces are pipes made of aluminium or other metals through which the sea water slowly passes, is heated and becomes vapour. The vapour then strikes a cooler surface and condenses into fresh drinkable water.

The RSS engineers are constantly monitoring performance at the Aqaba plant to further improve operating methods and are experimenting with different materials in various parts of the system. The solar collectors, heat pipes and condenser pipes are all being tested in different metals, such as aluminium, steel or alloys of copper, nickle and chrome, to see which will give the best results.

"We want to find the material that will give us the maximum output of fresh water," says Mohammad Qashou, head of the RSS Solar Energy Unit. "We're not interested in pure research for its own sake. Rather, like everything else we do at RSS, we're after the end product and its use by the consumer."

When perfected, the desalination system will become available for commercial production. Although Dornier System retains international manufacturing rights, the RSS has been given exclusive rights of manufacture and sale in the Middle East.

Home water heaters, another RSS solar energy venture, have been commercially produced by private Jordanian companies for the past several years. The heaters work on the same simple principle: water passes through metal pipes that have been heated to a very high temperature (75°-80°C average) by the sun's rays and is stored in insulated rooftop tanks.

The RSS has now perfected a system that can be produced in Jordan with locally available materials at a cost price of about $300. Such a typical home unit would include three square meters of solar-collecting surface and produce 150 litres of hot water daily.

"Solar water heaters should be used in every house in Jordan," Mr Qashou insists. In a first production effort, the RSS recently reached agreement to provide 30 water heaters for use in the faculty housing project of Yarmouk University in north Jordan.

CSO: 4400/73

KUWAITI PAPER ON U.S. POLICY, FAHD PLAN

LD211238 Kuwait KUNA in English 1119 GMT 21 Nov 81

[Press Review]

[Text] Kuwait, 21 Nov (KUNCA)--AL-RA'Y AL-AMM on the Saudi peace proposals, the Fes summit and the American policy:

"Essentially, the problem does not lie with us. It is with our enemies in Washington and Tel Aviv. That is why we (Arabs) should not differ and meet on illusions.

"Israel and America do not at all want the establishment of real peace in the region. The initial objection to the Fahd peace proposals came from the U.S. and Israel. The former does not hide its plans to disintegrate the Arab potence, since disintegration is the ideal state that allows the U.S. to realize its aims and to strengthen the Israeli presence as free and preponderent and as an executioner of the Arab.

"If we offer her our split in the Fes summit, the U.S. will arrive at a new situation that suits those plans. The split among the Arabs provides this country with an excellent atmosphere whereby it could exert efforts and succeed in achieving more disintegration (among us). For this purpose, the U.S. wishes to 'neutralize' the Arab oil power in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf after it neutralized the Arab military power in Egypt. It is then incumbent upon us to bloc this road on her especially since all the Arab states, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, recognize the UN resolutions which form the bases of Crown Prince Fahd proposal.

"The Saudi crown prince did not propose his initiative out of nowhere. As such, it is ample to throw the Saudi ball in the American lap since this constitutes the decisive test of the American policies and outlooks in the Middle East.

"Israel as we know and as Saudi Arabia has announced has been occupying Saudi land (two islands in the Red Sea) since the June war of 1967. Israel did not give these lands back to Saudi Arabia, despite the distinctive relations linking Washington and Riyadh. Israel with the consent of Washington of course, does not answer the U.S. back with regard to matters relating to its expansionist 'accomplishments' made at the expense of Arabs, whether Saudis or others. The test will affirm an established fact, that the U.S. always waited for compromises on the part of the Arabs. She never tried for one day to restore to them their rights. In fact,

she was the one to usurp their rights with a Zionist arm. Hence the U.S. accepted the peaceful spirit of the Saudi proposal and its recognition of the 'right of all the countries of the region to live in peace, but the 'countries of the region' in Washington and Israel's point of view do not include the Palestinian state nor Arab Jerusalem.

"If Washington has other cards, let us see what the Saudi proposal can get out of them."

CSO: 4400/65

INFORMATION MINISTRY WARNS 'AL-TALI'AH' FOR DAMAGING ARTICLES

Text of Ministry Warning

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 715, 28 Oct 81 p 9

/Text/ The Ministry of Information has sent us this warning, which shows our violations of the Press Law. In it, it referred to the subject of the violation, which resulted in the besmirching of relations between Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman.

We are publishing this warning without comment, leaving the judgment on this warning to the reader, who in turn, through his perusal of the subjects that were published, will be able to appreciate the vexations and difficulties the press suffers in interpreting the Press Law, especially concerning matters of destiny. Perhaps our consolation in this warning is the fact that the Ministry of Information has taken a step forward from the past by adopting measures which have less harsh than previous ones in taking a decision on an administrative shutdown.

/Signed/ The editor.

The honorable editor in chief of the magazine AL-TALI'AH:

On pages nine and 58 of issue 714 of the magazine AL-TALI'AH, issued on 21 October 1981, you published two articles, the first of which, published on page nine, in the section "On Local Politics," titled "The Assembly and Foreign Policy," had the effect of besmirching relations between Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman, and the second, published on page 58, under the title "O Nation Laughed at -- the Beginnings of a First Glimmer," also had the effect of besmirching relations between Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Since the material published is to be considered a violation of the prohibition stipulated in Paragraph Two of Article 24 of Law Three for 1961, issuing the Press and Publications Law, we warn you that what you have published is prohibited by law.

This warning is to be published in the first issue of the magazine following your receipt of it.

/Signed/ Deputy assistant minister for technical affairs, Hamad Yusuf al-Rumi.

Copy/Office of his excellency the minister

Copy/Office of the deputy minister

Copy/Assistant deputy for technical affairs

Copy/The Technical Bureau

Copy/Legal Counsellor

Copy/The Press Censorship Department

Text of 'Assembly' Article

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 714, 21 Oct 81 p 9

/Text/ The National Assembly began its session following the summer vacation yesterday, Tuesday, and witnessed more than one event concerning the Gulf and Arab stage that had an effect on the local level, whether political or economic in nature. Although the first session in the life of the assembly was as short as it was, as many people have said, and there was no scope for evaluating, discussing or debating the government's practices in all their foreign and domestic aspects, there will be adequate time in its next session to discuss these matters.

What is to be observed these days, as the local daily papers are stating, is the start of parliamentary activity in accordance with the drafts of laws the deputies are offering for presentation in the session that began yesterday. The prominent feature of this coming activity, is the discussion of local issues in the context of the laws dealing with these matters, with respect to recommendations of amendments to the Civil Service Law which was approved in the last session and other laws.

Although we are wholly convinced of the importance of these laws and the need to amend them in a manner that is compatible with the principles and spirit of the Kuwaiti constitution, foreign issues are so important that they must be taken up without delay, neglect or disregard. They may even be more influential than domestic issues.

We all remember, while the assembly was discussing this in its last session and was approving the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council within the context of the participation by the people and the consecration of real democracy in the council countries, that we entered the council by way of the agreement of the people as represented by the National Assembly. What is clear through the course of events and through the parties to this council is that the Sultanate of Oman has a strategic alliance with the Egyptian regime of the eras of al-Sadat and Husni Mubarak, who wants to complete his predecessor's course, and this is not an ordinary rapprochement or a continuation of relations as some people imagine. This strategic alliance, under the leadership of the United States, whose secretary of state, Haig, has declared the intention to carry out joint Egyptian-American maneuvers with the Gulf countries, has the Sultanate of Oman as its goal; in our opinion, if one of the parties enters this American alliance, that will basically draw the region into subjection to this council's label and transform it into a tributary of this council.

The other matter is the United States' supplying American arms, including AWACS airplanes, entailing conditions for strengthening the American military presence in Saudi Arabia and causing it ultimately to dominate the course of affairs there, creating a kind of direct American hegemony through the gathering and the use of information by the United States, which will control affairs in accordance with data from this information. This is what is going on in the oil area, through the role the Saudi Kingdom is subsequently playing by virtue of the policy that the parties to the council are carrying out. As a result, that places this region, and places the resources of our Gulf peoples, in the basket of American interests, even though this basket includes the Israeli party. This will result in creating an international tension which is not in this region's interests, under various American pretexts which are aimed only at taking over the economic and military resources of the Gulf to the advantage of the United States.

All these matters contradict the general Kuwaiti approach of preserving a kind of independence in its dealings and of keeping the area separate from the dangers of conflict. It is our absolute belief that the assembly must discuss this important serious matter because ultimately it will affect even our daily lives, practices and living. Anyone who thinks that these are foreign matters which it would be best to avoid discussing and to avoid addressing, as if they do not affect our Kuwaiti arena, is wrong.

Text of Commentary

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 714, 21 Oct 81 p 58

/Text/ The recitative on solidarity in Arab ranks has resumed, in preparation for the return of the former al-Sadat regime, now the Mubarak regime, to the Arab ranks with all the practices both have pursued, leading to the conclusion of treasonous agreements with the Zionist enemy, the consummation of normalization and the declaration by Mr Husni and by Abu Ghazalah that "Israel" is a friendly country.

Radio Riyadh started this process in its comment last Friday by calling for the restoration of solidary in Arab ranks and mentioning that the absence of Arab coordination and the limited nature of positive contacts have encouraged hostile forces to monopolize power in some countries of the region and draw them far away from other elements and goals in the nation.

Here we all remember the literature of Arab ranks, solidarity, and other expressions from the period before al-Sadat made his initiative of visiting Jerusalem and starting on his treasonous course. In spite of his course, which stripped the gears of our domestic and national goals, it is now hoped that the Sadatist regime will be brought back to the Arab corral, with all the concomitant policies that are contrary to our goals, as if the process is not political in nature but a quarrel among persons who can quickly reserve their collective course of activities, once again to perform in the orchestra of Arab ranks, preparatory to a new initiative which will emerge in the crescendo of this orchestra.

11887
CSO: 4404/96

BRIEFS

PUBLICATION SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS--Kuwait, 16 Nov (QNA)--Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir the Kuwaiti deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and acting information minister, has issued a decree suspending the Kuwaiti weekly magazine AL-MUJTAMA' for 1 month effective today for violation of Kuwait's publication law. AL-MUJTAMA' is published by the Social Reformation Society in Kuwait. The magazine had published an article in its latest issue assailing an Arab state. [Text] [GF170610 Doha QNA in Arabic 2020 GMT 16 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/127

BRIEFS

SAUDI, QATARI FINANCIAL AID--The Bank of Lebanon announced today that $76 million and $13 million have been transferred to the Lebanese Government from the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and Qatar respectively under the Arab aid program approved by the 1979 Tunis summit conference. [NC262249 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 26 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/127

ENERGY CONSUMPTION, PRODUCTION OUTLOOKS REVIEWED

Paris EUROPE OUTREMER in French No 617, Jun 81 pp 23-25

[Article: "Morocco Covered Only 17 Percent of Its Energy Needs in 1980"]

[Text] Growing only 0.8 percent as against 8.4 percent in 1979, energy consumption increased very little in 1980, totaling 4.681 million tons of oil-equivalent (TEP). This result is explained by an increase in sales of dark products and a contraction of sales of light products, which have doubtlessly undergone sharp price rises.

The country's primary-energy needs have been met 83-percent by petroleum products, 8 percent by coal, 8-percent also by hydroelectricity, and finally, 1-percent by natural gas. The national resources, estimated at 804,000 TEP, as against 817,000 in 1979, covered only 17 percent of the total, instead of 18 percent, mainly as the result of a drop in the contribution of electricity of hydraulic origin. The energy deficit, estimated at 3.877 million TEP, therefore increased by 49,000 TEP, and the rate of energy dependence on foreign sources was 83 percent.

Hydrocarbons

Since the rise in the cost of crude oil was a heavy burden on the Compensation Fund, the authorities have been led to raise the prices of the hydrocarbons and electricity sharply, but without entirely matching the increase in importation costs. Furthermore, they have gone on with the campaign on energy-saving, they have continued the effort to develop local resources, notably by installation of hydroelectric facilities, and they have intensified the prospecting for oil, while at the same time activating research on other forms of energy and developing the processes for mining the bituminous schists.

Total consumption of refined products, evaluated at 3.871 million tons as against 3.823 million, excluding bitumens and lubricants, increased only 1.2 percent, as against 12.3 percent last year. In effect, while there was a 4.6-percent rise in sales of fuel oil, to meet the needs of the thermal power plants, consumption of motor fuels dropped sharply as a result of the heavy increases in retail prices; thus, deliveries of super gasoline, regular gasoline and gas-oil dropped, respectively, by 7.8 percent, 4.4 percent and 2.3 percent. Finally, use of liquefied gases continued to develop, but at a rate of 3 percent, far lower than the 13 percent noted during the preceding 2 years. Refining of petroleum products was done by SAMIR [Moroccan-Italian Refining Corporation] and the Moroccan Petroleum Company, The former processed 3.3 million tons and the latter, 920,000 tons; together, they delivered 4.06 million tons.

In the face of these needs, national production of hydrocarbons was only 13,000 tons of oil, as against 18,600 tons, and a volume of gas of 67.4 million m^3, as against 75.4 million. Its proportion in national resources thus dropped from 9 percent to less than 8 percent, and it covered only 1 percent of total consumption. At the same time, purchases of oil--9/10 of them from the Gulf region and the rest from the USSR--totaled only 4 million tons as against 4.5 million, for a drop of nearly 12 percent, contrasting with the 55-percent increase registered last year, during which a big expansion of refining capacities had been carried out.

However, purchases of crude and refined products came, in Customs terms, to 3,625.8 million dirhams, thus growing by nearly 46 percent: the result of the big price increases in 1979, further boosts in 1979, and to a lesser degree, the firming-up of the dollar.

So as not to bear the entire brunt of the oil-price increases, the public authorities raised, on 8 January and 24 June, the consumer prices for petroleum products. For the first time, though, these increases were differentiated by product. Thus, after the second readjustment, super gasoline was increased by 28 percent and fuel oil by 62.6 percent; but the price of the latter product is still only half that of gasoline.

Prospecting was also intensified, under the supervision of the Office of Mining Exploration and Participations, either alone or in association with foreign partners. Under this heading, drilling campaigns were continued in the Gharb and in the Essaouira region, where the geological structures seem promising; they have already led to discovery of natural-gas reserves estimated at 5 billion m^3.

Electricity

According to data that are still provisional, consumption of electricity, at 4.4 billion kilowatthours, increased by 9 percent, a rate close to that of last year. Net production--still 90-percent provided for by the National Electricity Office--rose, after deduction of distribution-network losses, from 4.558 billion kilowatthours to 4.953 billion, 70 percent of it furnished by the thermal power plants. The share for the hydroelectric power stations fell, representing only 30 percent of total supplies as against one-third in 1979.

Furthermore, the electricity rates, which had been unchanged since 1976, were boosted sharply on 1 September because of the jump in production costs. In addition, it was decided to develop the use of local coal in the thermal power plants. For this purose, the Casablanca plan was changed over, and the Mohammedia power plant, whose four sets total 600 megawatts (MW), will also use coal. Likewise, the equipping of the hydroelectric installations was continued. In this area, the year was marked by the placing in service of the Oued El Makhazine and Idriss I installations, with power of 34 MW and 40 MW, respectively, and the startup, in May, of the first 126-MW set of the El Massira dam. At the end of 1980, the installed power of the installations in operation totaled 604 MW for the hydraulic power plants and 634 MW for the thermal units, to which is added the 163 MW of power of the small plants.

In order to strengthen the production potential, important projects involving the Matmata gallery for diversion of Oued Sebou and the M'Jaara dam on the Upper Ouargha

are continuing. In addition, the studies relating to the first section of the Timhadit power plant, which will use the bituminous schists, have been completed.

Coal

The anthracite production of the Jerada mines dropped again in 1980; at 680,000 tons, as against 710,000 tons, it thus dropped by 4.2 percent, as against 1.4 percent in 1979.

On the other hand, sales were up by 6.9 percent, reaching 719,400 tons as against 673,000 tons a year earlier. This development is related to a new expansion--on the order of one-fourth--of exports, which went from 70,200 tons to 89,500 tons, and even more, to an increase in deliveries to the local market, including more than 90 percent to the ONE [National Electricity Office] for the needs of the thermal power plants. Although the Jerada power plant, installed near the mine, used only 495,000 tons, because of technical difficulties, as against 526,000 tons a year earlier, the Casablanca unit, converted to coal during the year, used 52,000 tons of coal.

Furthermore, 28,600 tons of soft coal and coke was imported, going mainly to the industrial sector.

In order to cope with the foreseeable expansion of demand, coming not only from the ONE but also from other big consumers of energy, such as the cement plants and the sugar refineries, the coal mines continued with the equipping of coal-workings No 5 and undertook exploration work so as to determine the deposit's reserves.

In order to reduce the country's energy dependence and limit the expenses of oil importation, the public authorities are striving to develop the other energy sources.

In addition to the development of the bituminous schists, which could serve to produce not only electricity but also oil and gas, uranium has been explored for, mainly in the zones of the Upper Moulouya and the western Upper Atlas. Likewise, tests on extraction of it by means of phosphoric acid have been carried out. This research is nurturing the long-term hope of placing a nuclear power plant in service. Finally, even though its contribution is presently limited, solar energy is being used to operate many small-sized installations, and use of it could be extended to other applications encompassing the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors.

11267
CSO: 4519/26

BRIEFS

WARNING AGAINST EUROPEAN SINAI FORCE--A responsible source at the PDRY Foreign Ministry stated today that the decision of the governments of Britain, France, Italy and the Netherlands to participate in the multinational force scheduled to be established in the Sinai after the alleged Zionist withdrawal means support by these states for the treasonous Camp David accords which are rejected by the Arab states and the PLO. The source added that the PDRY Government warns of the gravity of this decision which has not contributed at all toward finding a comprehensive and just solution to the Middle East crisis. The source declared Democratic Yemen's rejection of that decision. The source added that an official note was handed today to the Italian ambassador and the charges d'affaires in Aden of the embassies of France and Britain on Democratic Yemen's stand toward their governments' decision. The extent of the damage that their governments' decision will cause to the West European-Arab relations was also explained to the three West European diplomats. [Text] [EA261726 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 26 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/129

SAUDI UN DELEGATE DENIES STATEMENT TO 'NEW YORK TIMES'

PM201715 Jidda 'UKAZ in Arabic 18 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by Mustafa Idris: "Al-Laqqani Tells 'UKAZ by Telephone: 'NEW YORK TIMES Distorted my Statement; Saudi Plans Needs No Further Explanations'"]

[Text] Jidda--In a telephone conversation with 'UKAZ, Saudi UN delegate Ja'far al-Laqqani, denied the statement attributed to him by the NEW YORK TIMES the day before yesterday. The paper quoted the Saudi official as saying that the Saudi plan recognizes Israel.

He said that the paper distorted the statement he made to its reporter, whom he met at the UN entrance. Al-Laqqani said that the newspaper's reporter asked him whether the Saudi plan, in its seventh point concerning peaceful coexistence between all peoples of the area, implied recognition of Israel. He replied that he had nothing to add to what Saudi officials have already said. When the reporter repeated his question to the Saudi delegate, as to whether this clause includes Israel, he replied: The Saudi peace plan contains eight steps, and if these lead to peace then this would become possible. This clause [on peaceful coexistence] should not be taken separately but must be part of the plan as a whole, including the establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. If all the plans' points are fulfilled and Israel recognizes the PLO, then the implementation of the various stages of the plan would lead to the peaceful coexistence of the peoples of the area. You cannot take one segment of the plan and interpret it the way you see it.

Al-Laqqani said: This was the gist of my statement to the NEW YORK TIMES correspondent, but on the following day I was surprised by a headline saying that the Saudi UN delegate says the plan recognizes Israel.

Speaking about the reaction to the Saudi peace plan in political circles, Al-Laqqani said that all the political circles believe that the plan will succeed and will be implemented within a short time in view of its seriousness and the favorable reactions to it.

CSO: 4404/129

DOMESTIC PRESS COMMENTS ON RECENT EVENTS IN REGION

American Relations With Egypt

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 15 Oct 81 p 11

/Article by Muhammad 'Ali al-Jifri/

/Text/ As a child, Ahmad Shawqi, later the prince of poets, was afflicted with a nervous twitch in the eye and always used to look up at the sky. Once his grandmother took him to the khedive who was ruling Egypt at the time; when the khedive saw what he was suffering from, he took a collection of gold pounds and cast them on the ground before the child. The child proceeded to lower his gaze to the ground and play with the coins, and the khedive told Shawqi's grandmother, "Do this with him to get him to fix his gaze on the ground." She said, "But this drug only comes from your pharmacy, my lord." He stated, "Whenever you need it bring him to me; I am going to be the last person spreading gold around Egypt."

This prophecy unfortunately has been correct--up to this day.

We want Egypt to remain solidly in Arab ranks so that they will be able to realize victories like those of Hittin, 'Ayn Jalut and the fortifications of Bar-Lev. While the Arabs have lost the Egypt of al-Sadat, they most certainly want to win the Egypt of Mubarak. However, the glee at gaining revenge that a group of Arabs has shown over the murder of President al-Sadat (may God have mercy on him) will not help to win Egypt back, no matter how many gold pounds they scatter about. Since this is the situation, it will make even al-Sadat's opponents feel sympathy for him when dead, even though they hated him when alive; as for al-Sadat's successors, their delight over his suffering has made them feel more strongly that he died as a martyr and that a martyr is only so when he is right, while if a criminal receives his punishment he remains a criminal. Whatever the case, delight over suffering is unworthy of honorable people: "Remember the good qualities of those of you who have died."

So far, what is clear for certain is that al-Sadat's policy of curbing the religious current is what caused his death, not his policy on Camp David; Egyptians are strongly religious and deeply devout, so a violent confrontation with this way of thinking makes Egyptians more adamant and viciously hostile. It is to be noted that the observance of prayer among Egyptian communities is more apparent than in other expatriate groups. Therefore, the inauguration of the Mubarak era with the

dismissal of 18 officers from the armed forces because of their religious beliefs, which raises questions, is conduct that in any case cannot be compared with that to which the late president resorted when he put many people who held religious beliefs in prison and stated that he had erred when he opened the prisons and released the Moslem Brothers who had been imprisoned in the days of President 'Abd-al-Nasir; that was something that many people found repugnant, among Arabs and Western media alike.

In spite of the terrible economic straits that are grinding Egypt down in these lean years, the Arabs must not wait for Mubarak to change Egypt's policy in the next 6 months at least, even if they hint at reviving the economic situation in Egypt /in exchange/. The reason for that is that one can draw back from al-Sadat's line at the present time only through radical changes such as a declaration of war on Israel by Egypt. The Camp David policy has almost been consummated, except for an important part regarding Egypt, the restoration of the rest of Sinai. The declaration of a state of emergency is close to being reasonable, since the country needs security and stability in these circumstances, right after its need for food.

Mubarak has declared that he will not utter a word in defamation against Col al-Qadhdhafi, which shows a sense of responsibility for which one must be thankful. He has declared that the Arabs must take the initiative of effecting a reconciliation, because they were the ones who broke off relations with Egypt and it is distressing to Arab citizens that the Arabs should have relations with the United States and the Soviet Union but not with Egypt. Herein lies the shrewd Israeli ruse which the Arabs ignored and al-Sadat's Egypt ignored, the ruse that caused Begin to insist on attending al-Sadat's funeral in his odious person, in order to inhibit the Arabs from clearing the air with Egypt. Letting Egypt slip into the Western net means that Husni Mubarak's pharmacy will be filled with American drugs, making Egypt hostage to the science of the United States, just as some Arab regimes have become hostage to the science of the Soviet Union. Each of them is an enemy, and the third is Begin.

Latest News From Egypt

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 19 Oct 81 p 19

/Article by Dr Muhammad 'Ali al-Barr/

/Text/ It appears that the assassination of President al-Sadat entails many consequences on the road toward peace in the Middle East. It has perhaps resulted in impeding the Camp David agreement, in accordance with which Israel is to withdraw from the final third of Sinai, where it has established many settlements, in April 1982.

In his meetings with the late president, Begin was anxious to stress the views that the opposition line in Egypt, especially the Islamic current was threatening the course of peace and normalization and that Israel could not withdraw unless this opposition was stifled.

In fact, the late president did carry out his recent measures against the Egyptian opposition, especially its Islamic current which constitutes a sort of danger to the Camp David agreement and his started to take hold of young people in the universities in particular.

When he carried out this campaign, "to satisfy his friends Begin and America," President al-Sadat was surprised to see the Western media launch a harsh attack on him, accusing him of being dictatorial and compelling him to expel an American television correspondent and confiscate his films, expel the correspondent of the broad-circulation French newspaper LE MONDE, and expel another group of Western newspaper and magazine correspondents.

Al-Sadat insisted on not giving his inveterate friend Begin an excuse to delay his withdrawal from Sinai; it is no secret that al-Sadat hated Begin because he had acted contemptuously with him a number of times, but was compelled to turn a deaf ear for the sake of obtaining the withdrawal from Sinai.

Al-Sadat's extreme concern not to give Begin any excuses not to withdraw, on the pretext that there was no stability, was one of the reasons why Begin intensified his demands and swindled al-Sadat to the utmost. This is what prompted Professor Kerr, a specialist in Middle East affairs at the American University, to state, in an interview he gave that AL-MAJALLAH published on 3 October 1981 (that is, a few days before al-Sadat's death): "Al-Sadat's problem with Israel resembles the problem of a man who orders some goods from a shop, then goes to the shop and pays for his goods every day before receiving them. It is unfair exploitation by Begin of al-Sadat's embarrassing situation."

Suddenly, in the middle of the military parade, an armed group stopped in front of the president's stand, showered a hail of bullets on him and cut him down in a military operation with a high level of precision, thus taking by surprise al-Sadat's special guard which had received a high level of training in the United States, killing along with the president his special adjutant (the chief of the special guard), two guards and three American officers who were rumored also to be among al-Sadat's guards.

A number of fronts laid claim to this assassination act, among the most prominent of them being that of Lt Gen al-Shadhili, commander of the October 1973 war, whom al-Sadat exiled and who is leading the opposition abroad.

However, the international media ignored and laughed at all these claims, charging that they were lies and accusing extremist Islamic elements whom al-Sadat had previously put in prison a month before the assassination. It is worth pointing out that the Islamic groups did not claim credit for this incident at all, but they were of course not given a chance to express their view.

It happened, on 'Id al-Adha, that the Egyptian authorities prohibited the holdday prayer in Asyut, carrying out the emergency law, the people at prayer skirmished with the police, and fighting took place in which a number of people were killed or wounded. The Western media talked about the occurrence of broad disturbances.

It appears that the news agencies will be increasingly raining news of disturbances and instability in Egypt upon us as of now, and this is precisely what Begin wants, in order to be able to say that Egypt is suffering from instability and that he cannot withdraw from Egypt as a result. The Israeli newspaper JERUSALEM POST has published material supporting this approach, stating, "Israeli withdrawal from Sinai may be endangered unless there are sure guarantees that Egypt will continue along al-Sadat's path." Begin himself stated on his return from President al-Sadat's funeral that the situation in Egypt was serious, then, in order to reassure the Egyptian leaders a little went on to say that he had confidence in the new leadership.

Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli foreign minister, declared that Israel's final withdrawal from Sinai would be contingent on the course of events, in an obvious reference to the possibility that Israel might not withdraw. The Israeli chief of staff, Rafael Eytan, said that the death of the Egyptian president had compelled Israel to prepare itself for every eventuality. It is worth pointing out that Eytan stated shortly before President al-Sadat's death that Israel's relations with Egypt depended entirely on al-Sadat's continuation in power and that al-Sadat's departure would block the road to peace. That angered al-Sadat at the time and caused him to cancel the Israeli chief of staff's visit to Egypt.

The Israeli woman deputy Geula Cohen declared "The peace process depends on one person, whose fate depends on one bullet."

The news agencies published the report that Jewish settlements in Sinai danced for joy when they heard the news of al-Sadat's assassination, because that in their view meant they "would not have to withdraw from Sinai." That was at a time when they sent a delegation of their people to take part in mourning the death of President al-Sadat.

AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, on 10 October 1981, published a special letter from the OBSERVER service in Cairo providing a political analysis under the title "Will Israel return the last third of Sinai?" That stated that the Egyptian government's main concern was that the Israelis would try to delay returning the last segment of occupied Sinai, which was supposed to revert to Egypt next April, on the excuse that Egypt was not sufficiently stable and that that would make dealing with it difficult.

It appears that the Western countries have had more than one doubt about Egypt's domestic situation and stability. This is what the Western media have written, and it is also what prompted the Australian deputy foreign minister, Mr Doug Anthony, to make the statement that his country had many reservations on the subject of its participation in the peacekeeping force which would replace the Israeli forces following their final withdrawal from Sinai, because he had doubts about Egypt's stability and consequently about Israel's withdrawal.

The American magazine NEWSWEEK published an editorial stating "To be faithful to the contents of the Camp David agreements will require new negotiations behind the scenes on the toughest parts of the agreement." The magazine wondered if Israel's withdrawal from the remaining part of Sinai could take place when April 1982 came around.

The British DAILY TELEGRAPH also published an article stating that the Western governments were expressing their anxiety and fear that the assassination of President al-Sadat would endanger the Camp David peace and deal a finishing blow to the European initiative to settle the Middle East crisis. Western observers believe that the new Egyptian leadership will need to get close to the Arab regimes and they believe that if that happens there will be great doubts about Israel's readiness to withdraw from the rest of Sinai and hand it over to Egypt at a specific time, which is next April.

What is noteworthy is the reports published in the Tunisian papers on efforts to invite Egypt to the next Arab summit.

While Begin could not get out of the peace agreement he made with al-Sadat at Camp David, by which the separate peace was made with Egypt, as long as Egypt was isolated from the rest of the Arab world and the issues of Jerusalem, Golan, and the West Bank were kept out of the heart of the agreement--while Begin could not get out of this agreement as long as conditions were stable, especially when al-Sadat was present, the way for him to renege on his agreement to withdraw from Sinai would open only through al-Sadat's departure and the creation of a state of instability in which the withdrawal stipulated for next April would be impossible. This was underlined by what Professor Kerr, the specialist on Middle East affairs, said in his interview published by AL-MAJALLAH on 3 October 1981, that is, a few days before the assassination of al-Sadat: "If we want to preserve Sadatism it would be well for us to relinquish al-Sadat." It appears that al-Sadat has actually been relinquished, in a dramatic, extremely harsh manner.

A short time before al-Sadat's death the French magazine AFIQUE-ASIE published a report whose contents were attributed to diplomatic sources in Washington, stating "The Americans will spare no effort to guarantee that Husni Mubarak takes President al-Sadat's place, and Washington has become convinced that President al-Sadat is no longer able to control the domestic situation in Egypt and that he is no longer able to reach certain specific goals of a new American strategy in the Middle East."

The French magazine went on to say that the American leaders had come to view al-Sadat as a burden around their necks, now that he had lost his cards on the regional and international levels, and it appeared that this burden had been eliminated by the most accurate and precise means of execution.

The magazine NEW STATESMAN wrote that officials in Washington considered the Egyptian administration, under al-Sadat's leadership, to be heavily burdened and inefficient and that it was clearly not suited to the new American policy in the region.

It appears that President al-Sadat was eliminated after he had become totally worn out and was no longer of use to the new American policy but indeed had come to constitute a heavy burden on it.

Before his death, President al-Sadat was going through a state of frustration and despair with his friends, for whom he had done everything. He saw them snubbing him covertly; the news agencies wrote that al-Sadat was experiencing a state of

anxiety over America, a state that afflicts any political leader who puts all his cards in the basket of American policy (see AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT, 12 October 1981).

Political analysts say that Begin is the main beneficiary of the murder of his determined friend Anwar al-Sadat, since that has created a state of instability in Egypt which the clever, deceitful politician will use as an excuse to avoid withdrawing from the rest of Sinai territory. It is also expected that the attack on extremist Islamic elements will intensify on grounds that they are the direct cause of al-Sadat's murder.

Begin, as a result of this situation, can impose humiliating new conditions for the anticipated withdrawal which he could get out of at any instant.

Thus it seems that al-Sadat's policy has not led to what he had hoped for in the way of Israel's withdrawal, the attainment of peace, and improvement of the bad economic situation in Egypt--indeed, contrary to all that, this policy has led to the killing of al-Sadat himself and the continued presence of the Jewish occupiers on the bank, Golan and Jerusalem, perhaps even in Sinai itself.

Will the Arabs gain understanding from al-Sadat's lesson, now that the lesson of the Shah has passed by?

Outlook for Next Summit

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 24 Oct 81 p 2

/Article/

/Text/ The Arab countries' agreement that the next Arab summit conference should be held on schedule in the city of Fez a month from now is a frank admission on the part of the Arab countries, especially the leading ones, that strong reasons dictate that haste be made in holding such a conference as soon as possible and in producing collective conceptions of all the problems at issue.

It is not strange that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should be among the first Arab countries to agree that the conference be held on schedule. The kingdom--which is now leading the Arab movement along the road toward a just, comprehensive settlement to the Arab cause, is exerting every effort to clear the Arab air and is stressing its commitment to resolutions of Arab unanimity--realizes that present Arab circumstances demand that one sit down with others at the table of discussion and mutual understanding and adopt every decision which will strengthen and bolster Arab solidarity.

The next summit faces positive and negative aspects. Among the positive aspects is the kingdom's peace plan, which has received international support and appreciation; among the negative aspects are the disputes among brothers, the change in Egypt, and the explosive situation in Lebanon and the Maghreb. Naturally the positive aspects will enjoy unanimity, but the negatives will be given the attention of wise persons who will demand that they be limited and that solutions be created which will

guarantee that they are transformed into positives. This is what we are hoping for and aspiring to from the next summit.

Fahd's Wisdom and the Actual State of the Problem

The day before yesterday His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and deputy minister, was the first speaker before the International Conference on Cooperation and Development in Cancun.

The rulers and leaders of 22 industrial and developing countries listened to Fahd as he addressed the entire international community in the language of civilization, the language of logic, the language of wisdom and comprehension of the dangers that are surrounding this world.

Fahd said, "The international status of the participating countries, and the ability of the people taking part in this conference, will make it possible to realize one's hopes." His highness undoubtedly meant that the countries taking part in the Cancun conference, in particular the industrial ones, could realize the hopes and aspirations the developing countries are aiming toward if they could cope with the problems set before them in a spirit of responsibility and awareness of the disasters and dangers that could await the entire international community if the major industrial countries do not devote greater attention to issues of development in the third world. His highness referred clearly to this point when he said "In this conference we are facing the issue of development throughout the world, and that is a subject that demands that we concentrate attention on the practical aspects, which can transform the viewpoints that now exist among the various parties into a deep realization that development and stability can be attained only through a true cooperation based on common interests."

Through this perception Saudi conception, his highness the crown prince and deputy prime minister specified the grave effects that might arise through a lack of interest in the countries of the third world on the part of the advanced countries. His highness also directed attention to the fact that this grave issue must be dealt with in a proper manner, in demanding that attention be focussed on practical aspects in order to prevent the outbreak of dangerous clashes among the viewpoints that exist now if the existence of two camps does not disappear--one the camp of the rich industrial countries and the other the camp of the developing countries or the countries of the third world. The grave effects of the mere outbreak of such clashes of views will consequently be reflected on development programs not just in the third world but also in all areas of the world, without exception.

Through a perceptive, aware, cognizant vision and full grasp of all the dimensions of the current and future stages, his highness considered that joint action on the part of all in the desire to eliminate the great discrepancy that now exists in levels of development is absolutely necessary and his highness also considered that any serious action to this end is to be considered a vital, essential goal that deserves to receive maximum priority from everyone.

Fahd considered that unless reasonable rates of growth are achieved in the developing countries, it will be difficult for the major countries themselves to continue to achieve reasonable rates for their own peoples.

Following this objective linkage, in which his highness specified the interests of the world, he then gave a living example of the truth of this theory in the accomplishments of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which is not an industrial country but a developing one and at the same time has become a major aid-providing country to the developing countries; on this point, his highness said:

"The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as a member of the international community, has striven for cooperation with the countries of the world, proceeding thereby from its deep feeling that the goals of national development can be realized only in a context of mutual international cooperation. Therefore, it is taking part in this conference and has a clear notion that international cooperation for the sake of development is not the demand of a specific group at the expense of another group but is meant to achieve the mutual interests of all; the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will, in the future as in the past, be prepared to cooperate in any international effort that is made to achieve these goals."

Thus, through this clear comprehensive statement, his highness the crown prince and deputy minister has defined the steps that the industrial countries and the developing ones must carry out in the future to realize further welfare and prosperity.

American Attitudes on Egypt

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 25 Oct 81 p 2

/Article by 'Adnan Kamil/

/Text/ What the new president of Egypt, Mr Husni Mubarak, will do is not important now--rather, the important thing is what America will do, now that President Anwar al-Sadat has been assassinated in dramatic fashion before the television cameramen's lenses and hundreds of millions of witnesses in various areas of the world.

Husni Mubarak is condemned by the legacy he has been given. He is unable to offer concessions to his adversaries domestically or abroad because such concessions could in the context of current pressures be interpreted as a sign of weakness on his part and an encouragement of the opposition to demand more, perhaps Husni Mubarak's chair itself. He is also unable to realize any noticeable progress in his talks with the Israelis, because he cannot offer them more than al-Sadat did and because all Egypt's cards are in America's hands, as a result of the Sadatist hope that America would act in the way its former president had indicated it would, would act with him on behalf of the Palestinian cause. Thus Husni Mubarak finds that he is condemned by his circumstances and that he has no real power over them. The American position remains the important one. So far, American reactions have been somewhat odd. Al-Sadat was killed in a conspiracy in which the Soviet Union was said not to have a hand. In spite of that, American air and naval forces went into action in a muscle-flexing operation without precedent in the region, blanketing Egyptian territory with a dense cover of American military power. We would be very naive if we believed that America was trying to protect Egypt from Libya, because Libya does not have the military force or manpower to challenge the Egyptian army. What, or who, is the target of the American military display? One should

bear in mind that this military display does not politically serve the new president, Husni Mubarak, and that at the same time it strikingly inflates the powers of Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi, and the number of "fugitives" in the form of former American agents in American Central Intelligence who are working with him are starting to multiply in a provocative manner.

I believe that the statement that America, through its intelligence agencies, carried out the process of al-Sadat's assassination is exaggerated--a rumor which gladdens Russian intelligence agencies, if they are not the source of it. The gains that America is realizing through al-Sadat's dramatic death are much less than the moral and material loss in the short and long term that American interests in various areas of the world are afflicted with. However, it will be difficult in any case for the truth to come out in this sort of matter, even as regards the direct investigators, who might identify the direct perpetrators but will never find the thread that connects them to the hidden planner and mover.

The death of al-Sadat is another of the "electric shocks" whose occurrence was relished /and/ greatly harmed America. It was not just al-Sadat alone but also American prestige and influence as well that was assassinated in Egypt. American military influence was not what was being tested in Egypt--rather, it was America's power to stand alongside its friends and the people who were banking on it. Al-Sadat had shut all the doors before him except the American one and believed that all the cards in the Middle East were in Washington's hands; the result was that Washington failed to live up even to the humble promise it gave him of stopping the Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and that led to his dramatic end. While America was not able to justify to al-Sadat why he had bet on it, will it be able to offer Husni Mubarak the justifications that would cause him to deal with it in confidence over his political future and his life?

The first American reaction was a military response. Unless America has information we are ignorant of, that response was exaggerated. If the response was an expression of American anger toward the Soviet Union for disrupting the stability in the area, American calculations were wrong, because the Russians do nothing except exploit American mistakes and reap the fruit that Israel has sown in the region, and they will continue to so that as long as America and Israel continue to provide them with an appropriate atmosphere to do so.

The Middle East region rejects Communism but Russian influence infiltrates through the slogans of the left, socialism, and revolutionary action. It will be difficult to fight slogans of this kind as long as America fails to deal with the region on a basis of mutuality of interests and benefits and respect for others.

11887
CSO: 4404/102

SAUDI NEWSPAPERS DENOUNCE IRANIAN REGIME

LD221516 Riyadh SPA in English 1204 GMT 22 Nov 81

[Press review]

[Excerpt] Riyadh, 22 Nov (SPA)--AL-MEDINAH and 'UKAZ newspapers denounced the Iranian regime's heaps of charges and allegations against the kingdom and its peace plan, emanating from their ignorance and jealousies.

AL-MEDINAH described the campaigns of the ignorant Khomeyni regime as similar to those of the Zionist leaders' propaganda to insult the generous country of Saudi Arabia and its noble people.

"Khomeyni and his hypocritic gang of murderers are copying the Jewish rotten thought and hostile campaigns against the kingdom and its leaders," the paper added.

"The kingdom's peace plan supported by Yasir 'Arafat and the leaders and people of occupied Arab lands can be the only basis for realizing the Palestinian peoples aspirations and not the Khomeyni gang's ignorant ideas coming out of their suspicious relations with Israel," AL-MEDINAH said.

'UKAZ described Khomeyni and his gang as "anti-Islam." "The provocations of the Khomeyni regime against the kingdom, its peace plan and Mr Yasir 'Arafat are providing proof of the Iranian leaders foolish and irrational approach," the paper said.

The paper observed the Iranian people, who aspired to establish an Islamic rule in Iran, are now faced with bloodthirsty men, professional murderers, anti-peace and anti-Islam Khomeyni regime.

CSO: 4400/66

ARAB AIDES CITED ON FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

PM260845 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 25 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT correspondent: "Sa'ud al-Faysal Says: 'Summit Will Either Accept, Alter, or Drop the Plan'"]

[Text] Fes--At the end of the final meeting of the Arab foreign ministers conference Saudi Foreign Minister Amir Sa'ud al-Faysal said to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT: The Saudi principles are now to be put before the Arab summit for consideration. If the summit finds them suitable they will be accepted and endorsed; if they are found incomplete they will be completed. But if the Arab kings and heads of state find that we need another alternative then it means that the plan will be dropped.

Asked about the European countries' attitude if the plan is amended, he said: We are not now concerned with evaluating the position of any other state. In fact what we are seeking and trying to achieve is a common Arab stand whether with regard to this plan or any other proposed plans.

Sudanese Foreign Minister Muhammad al-Mirghani said: We are with the Saudi initiative and support it as a whole.

Omani Foreign Ministry Under Secretary Yusuf al-Alawi said: Our stand is clear from the beginning. We are not with the hardline faction, nor do we want more than a moderate and balanced political line that will enable us to serve the Arab nation. In this regard we are prepared to work day and night in order to achieve this objective.

Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad said: I will not say that the conference was 100 percent successful but it was one of the best conferences held so far. Discussions at the conference were quite objective, which enabled us to reach many positive results with which I am satisfied.

[PLO Political Department Chief] Faruq Qaddumi said: The problem is that we cannot recognize Israel. This is the central point of our discussion and debate at the conference.

Jordanian Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim said: The discussions took place in a positive atmosphere and we hope to adopt resolutions that will satisfy all the Arab countries.
CSO: 4404/129

BRIEFS

KING'S MESSAGE FROM AL-ASAD--Riyadh, 23 Nov (SPA)--Today REUTER Arabic Service attributed a report to SPA to the effect that His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz received a message from Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad opposing the Saudi peace plan. SPA would like to categorically deny that it issued such a report. What SPA reported was that today his majesty received a verbal message from President al-Asad, when he received Mr Rif'at al-Asad commander of the Syrian Defense Corps. SPA never reported on the content of the message. [Text] [LD231900 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1817 GMT 23 Nov 81]

AWACS RETURN TO U.S. DENIED--Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation, has stressed that our relations with our brothers in Iraq are becoming stronger and are developing in the direction of the Arab nation's goals. In a statement to the evening paper AL-JAZIRAH yesterday, Prince Sultan said that our relations with our brothers in the YAR are special. They are based on a common ideology, neighborliness, a common destiny and aspirations, and hope for a better future for the two countries that is characterized by peace, stability, security, prosperity and noninterference in the internal affairs of any country. Asked about the return of two of the four AWACS planes currently in Saudi Arabia, Prince Sultan said that this is not true. He declared: The U.S. Government has denied this. In conclusion Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz said: As everyone knows, Saudi Arabia has throughout its history adopted honorable, independent and clear stands and seeks only to serve Arab and Muslim causes with all its resources and capabilities. This annoys our enemies very much. It also explains the repeated attempts to slander and harm this country and its noble people. Prince Sultan added: We shall continue to do all that can serve the goals of the Arab and Muslim nation. We shall never deviate from this policy and shall ignore all the doubting Thomases. [Text] [GF221911 Riyadh Domestic Television Service in Arabic 1800 GMT 22 Nov 81]

SOVIET ARMS VIA SAUDI ARABIA--Soviet arms are being unloaded at a Saudi port and from there shipped to Iraq. This was stated by the director of military intelligence, Maj Gen Yehoshu'a Sagi, in a briefing to the members of the Knesset delegation which yesterday launched its information campaign against the Saudi settlement plan. [Gid'on Samet]. [Excerpt] [TA121129 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Nov 81 pp 1, 2]

CSO: 4423/42

ELECTION RESULTS ASSESSED; OPPOSITION CLAIMS FRAUD

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 pp 18-19

[Text] THE TUNISIAN legislative elections on 1 November, the first under a multiparty system since independence in 1956, resulted in a landslide victory for President Habib Bourguiba's Parti Socialiste Destourien (PSD). While few observers expected the PSD's long hegemony over the country's political affairs to be seriously threatened, nevertheless the news that the PSD has won all the 136 seats in the new National Assembly and captured 94.6 per cent of the vote surprised many.

In addition to the PSD, three other political groupings participated in the elections: the Mouvement des Democrates Sociales (MDS) led by Ahmed Mestiri; a dissident faction of the Mouvement d'Unité Populaire (MUP) under Mohammed Belhadj Ammor and Mohammed Harmel's Parti Communiste Tunisien (PCT).

The leading opposition forces took part in the hope that a rigid one-party state could be transformed into a multiparty democracy. Their leaders predicted that the three contending parties could expect to win between ten and fourteen seats in the new parliament.

This optimism proved to be shortlived, as in the last week of the election campaign several parties had to cancel meetings because of attacks by hooligans. The opposition claimed that gangs of unemployed youths were mobilised by local PSD barons to sabotage their electoral campaign. Nonetheless, non-PSD forces were for the first time given access to television and radio to voice their criticisms of government policies.

The electoral results, with the opposition capturing only 5.4 per cent of the vote, led to claims that government supporters rigged the ballot. Minister of the Interior Driss Guiga replied that the opposition was trying to cover up its failure by unsubstantiated accusations of fraud.

Western journalists who visited polling stations in the suburbs of Tunis reported how government-appointed officials prevented opposition members from taking part in control commissions which were to supervise the voting. The MDS denounced what it called the 'electoral farce', claiming that 'the government did not even seek to cover up the fraud by furnishing credible electoral figures', adding that Tunisia 'deserved a better deal which could have made it an example for the rest of the Third World'.

Communist Party Secretary General Mohammed Harmel described the official results as 'ridiculous when compared to electoral reality'. The MUP faction contesting the elections largely echoed this view.

In the wake of the election, only the PCT will be recognised legally. The other parties required at least five per cent of the vote to qualify for official recognition. The Communist Party was exempted from this proviso, because according to President Bourguiba, in 1963 it had simply been suspended and therefore never ceased to exist in law. The MDS, the leading opposition vote catcher, polled 3.28 per cent.

The non-recognition of the MDS and MUP presents Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali with something of a political dilemma because it will leave a significant sector of the moderate opposition in the political wilderness. One of the goals of the legislative elections was to integrate the opposition into the political process, both electorally and in parliament, and defuse the tensions of the past few years.

It is not inconceivable however, that the

government may backtrack on the five per cent barrier in order to prevent MDS and MUP supporters from joining forces with the more radical semi-clandestine opposition groups. It is these underground political factions which would benefit most from the unexpected PDS landslide.

The MUP, headed by Ahmed Ben Salah, who is in exile, and the radical fundamentalist Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI), whose leaders Rachid Ghannouchi and Abdel Fateh Mourou were sentenced in September to long prison terms, claimed even before the elections that the ballot would be rigged and that participation under these conditions was only likely to reinforce the authoritarian nature of the regime.

The 134 newly elected deputies included 27 members of the trade union movement, Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT). Against the advice of UGTT Secretary General Taieb Baccouche, the UGTT joined forces with the PSD to form a national front. As a result Baccouche refused to stand as a candidate.

CSO: 4500/61

INDUSTRIAL DECENTRALIZATION ENCOURAGED

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 19

[Text] TUNISIA'S next Five Year development plan (1982-1986) will have industrial decentralisation as one of its central features. A new law has recently been passed, aimed at encouraging Tunisian, as well as foreign, industrialists to set up activities in the country's neglected hinterland.

The concentration of economic activity in the Greater Tunis area and along the coast generally, has encouraged a rural exodus and exacerbated regional disparities. It is estimated that the Tunis area alone attracted some 100,000 people from the other provinces between 1975 and 1980. Young people, in particular, are thronging to the urban areas in search of work and better living standards.

The recent creation of the Agence pour le Développement Régional (ADR) was intended to promote a more balanced economic development profile in Tunisia. The government has introduced a revised investment code, to provide handsome incentives for the establishment of factories inland.

'The new investment law divides the country into five different areas, with material incentives rising in relation to the number of jobs created and the extent of decentralisation,' Moncef ben Abdallah, director of the Agence de Promotion Industrielle (API), told *8 Days*. He added: 'An investor who starts up a factory in an unfavoured region will benefit from substantial financial advantages, including longer tax holidays and greater government subsidies.'

In the Greater Tunis area and the towns of Sousse and Sfax, no special advantages are offered. The remaining coastal areas will continue to benefit from Law 74 of August 1974. The investment zones in the interior will offer investors government-backed finance and a wide range of other economic 'perks'. Nonetheless, the plan to set up the $18.5m Polyester Fibres of Tunisia (PFT) factory in Kairouan, 90km south of the capital, has yet to materialise.

The government's decision to accord high priority to economic decentralisation follows the publication of a special report on regional imbalances prepared by a study group of civil servants, university professors and others. The report found, for instance, that although the Greater Tunis area contains only 18 per cent of Tunisia's population, 30 per cent of the country's consumption expenditures take place there. Per capita spending in the capital is Tunisian dinars 260 ($520) a year, compared with the rest of the country's TD147 ($294).

The study group also found that this gap between Tunis and the rest of the country was growing: in 1966, per capita consumption in Tunis was 56 per cent greater than in the interior. It was 77 per cent greater in 1975 and over 80 per cent last year. The progress achieved in industrialisation mostly benefited the Tunis area. Almost 40 per cent of the new industrial employment created has been within a radius of 20km around the capital. The other coastal regions accounted for between 45-50 per cent of jobs created in the manufacturing sector.

Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the mountainous northern region, the sun-baked central plateau and the desolate Saharan provinces have been gradually drained of their young manpower. Tunis alone attracts 15,000-20,000 people a year from the interior, and more seek work abroad, especially in France.

The study group believes that Tunisia's growing manpower will not be absorbed through industrialisation alone. It recommends that more attention be directed towards improving living conditions in the rural areas and boosting producer prices so that young people can make a profit from working the land. The government has noted these findings and has established an organisation for rural areas similar to the API. Known as the Agence de Promotion des Investissements Agricoles, its task is to ease the flow of credit to the farming sector.

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END

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'IDF RADIO' REPORTS SYRIA'S TIES WITH GOLAN DRUZE

TA231741 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 23 Nov 81

[Text] The Syrian administration has recently selected Nur al-Din Kanj to serve as member of the Syrian People's Council. Nur al-Din Kanj is the brother of Kamal Kanj, who lives in Majdal Shams and who is one of the major opponents of Israeli rule over the Golan Heights. People on the Golan regard this election as a signal to the Golan Druze that Syria is supporting the battle of the extremists against Israel. Here is a report by our correspondent in the north, Menahem Horowitz:

[Begin recording] Kamal Kanj and Shaykh Sulyman Kanj tried in the 1950's to be elected to the Syrian People's Council but always failed. Their subsequent attempts to penetrate the top Ba'th Party leadership were similarly fruitless. Only a few weeks ago, when the Syrian People's Council--comprising members of the Nationalist Front, the Ba'th Party and the communists--was selected, it emerged that Nur al-Din Kanj was one of the 160 members of that council. Nur al-Din Kanj is the brother of Kamal Kanj who at present is the leader of the opponents of Israeli rule on the Golan. Kanj was only recently released from jail after having been charged with instigation against Israel and the military government. Nur al-Din Kanj was a senior officer in the al-Ladhiqiyah District.

People on the Golan regard this election as a clear signal to the Golan Druze that the Syrian regime has selected as a parliament member someone who is associated with the Golan Druze.

Recently the Syrian regime has been doing everything to influence the Golan Druze, particularly by broadcasting television propaganda films and by holding talks in Syria with Golan Druze students who have visited Israel. People on the Golan have said that in meetings between Druze from Israel and Syria held under UN auspices near the Druze village of Majdal Shams, anti-Israeli statements are made, particularly by the Syrian Druze. [end recording]

CSO: 4423/45

ARAB COMMON MARKET IDEA DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 pp 44-45

[Article by Annie King-Underwood: "Arab Common Market Moves"]

[Text] Arab businessmen are pressing the Gulf states to give them an extra edge in the hard fought battles for lucrative trade deals in the oil-producing region. They voiced their grievances at the existing levels of trade between Arab countries at a recent series of meetings of the Federation of Arab Industries in Amman.

The outcome was the revival of the idea of an Arab Common Market. Business circles in the Middle East interpret this as a response to the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The driving forces behind the common market concept are the two Arab League organisations, the Arab Economic Unity Council based in Amman and the Organisation of Arab Industrial Developed based in Baghdad. The meetings in Amman were held under their auspices.

The final Amman communique called for greater cooperation among Arab states, especially in trade. During the meetings it was implied that the Gulf states had not contributed sufficiently towards the development of inter-Arab trade. Federation representatives repeatedly claimed that some states in the region were importing goods from non-Arab countries realising full well that a brother Arab country produced the same commodity.

For the Gulf states, the formation of an Arab Common Market is a very long-term plan. In an interview with 8 DAYS at the end of last year, the Bahrain's minister of commerce, Habib Kassim, summed up the feeling in the Gulf: "To form a pan-Arab Common Market would be difficult. We should have more regional markets which together, I am convinced will succeed in creating a larger one." Referring to the regions outside the Gulf, Kassim added: "I hope that other regions are working in the same way so that a pan-Arab Common Market will become a reality."

On a more practical level the meetings decided that the formation of pan-Arab companies should be given priority, specially those concerned with transport. It was suggested that Arab Shipping Federation's project to set up a shipping company with a projected capital of $100 m. should be implemented as soon as possible. Recent studies made by the ASF show that Arab shipping companies have only 15 percent of the total sea trade in Arab ports.

The importance of setting up a pan-Arab company for land transport was also stressed. The Arab Economic Unity Council has agreed to the plans put forward by the federations to increase the land and rail networks as soon as possible.

To coordinate the work of the existing pan-Arab companies, the heads of the Arab Mining Company, the Arab Company for Livestock Development, the Arab Industrial Investment Company, the Arab Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Company, the Arab Potash Company and the Arab Fishing Company, met in Amman last August. They urged the formation of companies similar to theirs dealing with other commodities, in order to ensure that Arab states are more closely involved in the development of the region as a whole.

The Arab Economic Unity Council has been trying to set up a common market for the past 17 years, but as its spokesman told 8 DAYS: "We have not succeeded in forming a comprehensive market basically because the area has been riddled with internal and external problems. But we are optimistic that in the near future there will be more cooperation and maybe one day the Arab Common Market will be on the same level as the EEC."

However, there was a sceptical reaction by an Amman banker: "If we look around the Middle East we will see that there is very little cooperation, for instance, in the monetary field; how do you expect to have cooperation on wider economic issues?"

CSO: 4400/55

MEANING OF NEW OIL POLICY DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 81, 29 Aug-4 Sep 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Sayyid Ahmad: "The Results of the OPEC Conference in Geneva: What Is the Meaning of Saudi Arabia's Decision to Lower its Production and Freeze the Price of its Oil?"]

[Text] Jiddah--Those who follow OPEC meetings and the petroleum market in general usually hesitate to make predictions, no matter how carefully they read the news and no matter how complete their information is. This is due to the unique characteristic of oil as a strategic material which involves political and economic factors more than any other material.

The last meeting which was held in Geneva reaffirmed this fact. The atmosphere which had been prepared for the reaching of an agreement which would set a uniform price scale with a maximum price of $34 per barrel, after 2 and 1/2 years of anarchy in oil prices, evaporated like a mirage after 3 days of tough negotiations which included contacts with kings and heads of state.

The conference began with a surprise, which was the announcement made by Humberto Calderon Berti, the Venezuelan minister of oil and mines, that his country would not reduce the price of its oil lower than $36 per barrel. The surprise was that this announcement came from Venezuela which was being represented by none other than Berti.

Venezuela was a founding member of OPEC and was the leading oil producer among OPEC nations during the sixties. This fact makes Venezuela appreciate the responsibility involved in maintaining the organization's unity. Berti, in particular, is known for his moderation and for his constant effort to reconcile differing points of view at stormy meetings.

Venezuela has its reasons for taking this position. It can easily market its oil production, which totals 1.8 million barrels a day. Half of this oil is sold as refined oil to the U.S. and its neighbors in Latin America. In addition to this, Berti does not want to arouse a domestic political storm in his country by agreeing to the price reduction. No doubt he is bearing in mind the difficulties which were experienced by the head of (PEMEX), the Mexican oil corporation, when the price of Mexican oil was reduced by $4 per barrel and this caused a political conflict which led to his resignation.

Officially the last meeting does not have the right to issue decisions. It is a consultative meeting, as official statements describe it. But the consultative meeting can be transformed into an emergency meeting if 10 of the organization's 13 members decide to do so.

But OPEC has a tradition according to which this is not done unless decisions, which are to be announced, are reached unanimously. This is done in order to maintain OPEC's unity and image in the eyes of the world.

Why Did Saudi Arabia Agree [To Attend the Meeting]?

Actually consultations never ended after the regular [OPEC] meeting which was held last May. Al-Ta'if, which is the Saudi government's summer capital, was the scene of visits by numerous oil ministers, the most recent visitor being Shaykh 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister. Also, 'Ali 'Abd al-Salam al-Turayki, the Libyan secretary of foreign affairs, toured the Gulf nations and urged them to conduct talks with Saudi Arabia in order to revise their policy concerning oil prices and production. The [oil] ministers of Libya, Nigeria and Algeria constantly met and consulted each other, and these efforts were crowned by the holding of a mini-conference in Tripoli last June.

In addition to this the meetings of the Long-Range Strategy Committee--which included the [oil] ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Iran and Venezuela, and which were held 2 days before the consultative meeting--constituted an occasion to engage in more close contacts.

The prevailing feeling was that the conference would emerge with a decision which would unify oil prices, setting a maximum price of $34 per barrel, and that this would be followed by Saudi Arabia reducing its production. It was also felt that greater strides would be made in the realm of achieving a united strategy. This feeling was justified by what was being said concerning the fact that Libya and Nigeria were examining the possibility of reducing their prices and on the basis of a statement made by Price Sa'ud al-Faysal during his trip to Latin America during the early part of this month. During that trip he stated that if the upcoming OPEC meeting was to be a successful one, then it would be necessary to agree on objectives. The objectives which Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal had in mind were those concerning a uniform price and concerning strategy. Thus when Saudi Arabia decided to attend, there was even greater reason to feel that agreement had been reached and that the ministers would be meeting in Geneva in order to set the official wording of the agreement. The statement which was made last Saturday by Shaykh Muhammad Ibrahim Mas'ud, the Saudi deputy minister of petroleum, only reaffirmed this view. He said that Saudi Arabia had agreed to attend the conference after being reassured that agreement had been reached to set the price at $34 per barrel. But Venezuela's decision to insist on a price of $36 per barrel put the conference into quicksand, according to Dr Soebroto, the Indonesian minister of mining and energy and chairman of the conference. This position induced the hardliners in Libya and Iran to return to their old positions. Iraq suggested a compromise solution, which was that of a price of $35 per barrel, but Shaykh Yamani clearly said that he was not prepared to go above $34 per barrel.

This was the reason for the idea of getting in touch with the kings and heads of state and to have them intervene in order to resolve the situation. Nan Nguema, the secretary general of OPEC, said: "We got in touch with the leaders [of the OPEC nations] so that they could orient us in terms of whether we should talk political language or economic language." Although the secretary general, who is from Gabon, did not explain what he meant, he was referring to the dilemma facing the organization which has built its reputation on its success in achieving high prices for its valuable resource. Reducing the price of oil seems to be a retreat from this past history [of accomplishment]. As Berti said: "We have spent 20 years getting to the point where the price of our oil is $36 per barrel, and right now we are not prepared to retreat from this position."

Of course, the oil market represents another reality. Mexico, Britain, Norway, Egypt and Oman have reduced the prices of their oil in accordance with the state of the oil market. However, as far as OPEC is concerned, the matter was too hard to swallow because of the political factor involved.

Two Important Decisions

One of the ministers summarized the matter by saying that OPEC was undergoing a crisis. But the crisis climate did not last long. After the conclusion of the conference, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi minister of petroleum and mineral resources, held a press conference in which he announced two important decisions:

1. Reduction of Saudi oil production by 1 million barrels a day next September, and a monthly review of the volume of oil production thereafter.

2. Freezing of the price of Saudi oil at a maximum of $34 per barrel until the end of 1982.

This Saudi decision means several things:

1. This is considered to have been a generous impulse vis-a-vis the OPEC nations which are unable to market their oil.

2. This will provide an opportunity to prove the statement made by the Saudis that increased Saudi production is not the cause of the indigestion which is taking place. Statistics bear this out. Even if Saudi Arabia cut its production as much as it possibly could--which would be 2 million [a day]--this cut in production could not be made up for by Nigeria, Iraq, and Iran--not to mention the other oil-producing nations--the three of which hope to be able to export a combined total of 2.5 million barrels per day.

3. Monthly review of decisions concerning the volume of oil production is considered to be a trump card to be used when maneuvering [concerning oil prices] because it is possible to increase or decrease the volume of oil production in accordance with how close or how far away the members of OPEC are with respect to the agreement concerning the uniform price. Consequently this is considered a strong card to play during the upcoming conference in December.

4. Freezing the price until the end of next year means that Saudi Arabia, in the future, will not accept the price of $34 per barrel which, according to Yamani, has already become "history." This is being supported by the fact that the dollar, which is the main currency used in petroleum commerce, has been strengthened and the revenues of the oil-producing countries have consequently increased by 15 percent since the beginning of the year.

5. All of these factors taken together will constitute pressure on the nations charging high prices for their oil to reduce their prices and to increase their share [of oil production] and in the oil market. 'Ali Khalifah al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti minister, predicted that all the [OPEC] nations, with the exception of Venezuela, Iran, and Iraq, would reduce their prices.

The lack of agreement concerning a uniform price has not only hurt OPEC. It has also hurt Mexico and Britain who were hoping for an increase in the price of Saudi oil so that they could also increase their prices. Mexico recently took out a loan of $7 billion and is striving to increase its income in any way possible. Britain is striving to strengthen the pound sterling, and the only way available for it to do this is to increase its oil revenues. Although the failure to agree [on a uniform price] has caused a crisis for OPEC, the Saudi decision, according to the Libyan minister, is a "step in the right direction." This has caused him to change his decision to boycott the next conference. It is a characteristic of OPEC that there is always room to narrow the gap of differences [among its members] and to work toward preserving the organization's unity. But in spite of the differences within OPEC and the inconsistency of its share in the international oil market, its influence still remains great.

9468
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STRATEGIC BACKGROUND, RESULTS OF SOVIET INVASION ANALYZED

Bonn DIE WELT in German No 264, 12 Nov 81 p 6

[Article by Herbert Kremp: "The Struggle of the Afghan People"]

[Text] The general public, both in East and West, does not have access to day-to-day news about how the war in Afghanistan is going. What little information there is, is shot through with propaganda and rumor. Soviet information policy has thrown a veil over the combat zone just as Vietnam did in Cambodia and China did in February and March 1979 in Vietnam. Communist wars are secret wars.

But the veil of secrecy does have holes; it is not tight enough to obscure the military actions entirely. Thus, it is clear by now that the Soviet Union's efforts over the past 2 years to exercise military control over Afghanistan and to integrate it politically into its empire have not met with success. On the contrary: Since June 1980, 6 months after the 27 December 1979 invasion date generally accepted in the West, the Soviets have been drawn into the vortex of a guerilla war that has shaken their military doctrine which had been tailored to quick victory.

Soviet losses (as of October) give an indication, if not the only one, of the severity of the fighting. The invasion army has had a casualty toll of 4,000 to 6,000 dead and 1,200 wounded. In a broadcast by "Radio Nangarha," located east of Kabul, which was received in Peshawar, Pakistan on 28 October, the insurgents claimed that "one Soviet soldier is killed every 57 minutes."

Anyone familiar with Vietnam war body counts will be inclined to doubt such figures. But the insurgents have begun in the meantime to photograph their victims with Chinese and Japanese cameras. Western experts have seen the photographs of 53 of about 100 downed helicopter gunships (including registry numbers) as well as pictures of a third of some 2,500 destroyed trucks and armored personnel carriers (APC) lying by the roadside of the only strategic circular highway running from Mesar-i-Sharif to Herat via Kabul and Kandahar.

Another indication for the serious blow Soviet military doctrine has suffered is the rationale for the losses —which are in themselves not serious for a major military power— that is offered to the immediately concerned segments of the population. The version put out for internal Russian consumption is that the Soviet soldiers were "murdered by the Chinese." Moscow thereby attempts to divert attention from the fact that the invasion army is surrounded by the rising waters of a popular war which, based on unanimous estimates, is being supported by 98 percent of the Afghan population and by 90 percent of the administration and the army inside the country, either directly or indirectly. This support by far exceeds the "enemy quotients" with which the Americans had to contend toward the end of the Vietnam war.

Historical Analogies of the Guerilla War

If one looks for historical analogies for the Afghan guerilla war, Vietnam will not do. The Americans were engaged in overseas combat and in a divided country at that. They were fighting against guerilla forces which had infiltrated and had not become a genuine army until a long period of combat went by and whose centers in the north could only be attacked from the air due to a self-imposed restriction on escalating hostilities. The Soviet situation is more like that of Japan in her war with China after 1937 or like the campaign mounted by Vietnam against Cambodia since 1979.

The following factors are comparable: A neighboring big power mounts an attack with the aim of subjection and political domination. The superior attacking forces succeed in making early gains.

The attacker makes deep advances but is unable to destroy the enemy. Resistance is enhanced by the telluric character of the country, by the large areas of inaccessible territory, by the scant importance of the cities and the vulnerability of the small number of strategic highways.

The resistance makes use of its superior mobility. It appears with that particular unpredictability that gives the impression to the attacker that the danger is ever-present. Combat assumes an iregularity, a dimension of untended, total war.

The guerillas are nurtured by the political commitment of a united people which sees its individuality and existence threatened. Due to a simple set of parameters, it assumes both the receptivity and the destructive power of water. Due to a simple mentality, it can draw on an archetypal political axiom— that of distinguishing between friends and enemies.

Russia itself, in the great patriotic wars against Napoleon and Hitler, knew how to put to use both depth of territory, irregularity and the political commitment of her people— even if not in the Maoist sense of a "long-lasting war."

Now it is hardly likely that the Soviet strategists are unaware of the Asiatic doctrine of a popular war and its dangers for an attacker no matter how well armed he may be. There have been enough examples of it since 1945. This is why the application of the Blitzkrieg method in the Afghan situation is even harder to understand. The Soviets attacked with formations and weapons geared to conflict with NATO units— with nine divisions comprising 10,000 men each.

For all that, they did not come upon the Afghan scene unprepared, challenged by unexpected events. The Afghan war theater is divided into three acts of which the first began as early as 27 April 1979 when Taraki took over from the communist Khalq group in Kabul

The Soviet-initiated coup triggered resistance of the Islamic mujahedin, of the groups and tribes Hizb-i Islam, Jamaat-i Islam, of the Hazara in the center of the country and of the Tadziks near the Soviet frontier. In early 1979, president Taraki concluded the Soviet-Afghan friendship pact.

Things came to a head when Amin, the leader of the rival communist Parchan group, seized power from Taraki and had him liquidated. Whether or not president Amin really wanted to join forces with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the rebel leader of the Hizb-i Islam group, as the Soviets assert, will remain a mystery.

It will also remain a mystery exactly who it was that asked the Soviets to intervene on the basis of the friendship pact— Amin or Babrak Karmal of the Parchan party, who now is the man the Soviets are betting on. Amin, at any rate, was murdered by a Soviet or Afghan assassination squad in his villa on the outskirts of Kabul, close to the Soviet embassy.

As for the Soviet invasion, it commenced earlier than 27 December 1979— in fact it started at the beginning of the month. At that time, commandoes who were part of Amin's 4,000 Soviet "advisers" occupied Bagram airfield north of Kabul. In mid-December, three Soviet airborne battalions arrived there and then proceeded to occupy the two remaining airports in Afghanistan: Shindad and Kandahar. At that moment, the Soviet military machine went into action— 50,000 men with 4,000 armored personnel carriers, hundreds of tanks and other heavy equipment.

4 days later, they had reached all the important centers of the country, to the astonishment of Western experts. Traffic jams developed in the crowded settlements and along the narrow secondary roads. The Soviet juggernaut encountered little resistance; the soldiers did not even wear their steel helmets. The mountains and deserts, the countryside all around was silent. Was the war over already ?

Generally speaking, the struggle against an occupying power does not call for special, spectacular motivations. The mjahedin already had tasted combat against the communists in Kabul when the Russian invasion began. But there was an incident during the first few days of occupation which was like a rallying cry. In Khairkana, a suburb of Kabul, a 17 year-old boy followed by a crowd of children ran up to a Soviet soldier who had just dismounted from his tank and shot him dead. The occupiers reacted in their own way. They opened fire with automatic weapons; six of the children were killed.

The resistance movement, comprising 35,000 men according to estimates in early 1980, at first was an easy target for the Soviets. Initially, the tribes had been fighting against the unwieldy and unreliable units of Taraki's and Karmal's— some 90,000 soldiers, 30,000 policemen and 30,000 border guards mainly concentrated in the cities and in fortified police stations. The open country was dominated by the mujahedin; they could maintain their position there without excess danger in their accustomed tribal aggregations of 5,000 to 20,000 members each.

When Soviet helicopter gunships began to be used in combat, a new tactical situation arose. During the first few months of the invasion, the tribes sustained heavy losses. Most of the 15,000 to 20,000 casualties so far were killed during that early phase.

By April 1980, the tribes began to break down into guerilla units of 40 to 50 men each. They thereby gained in mobility and began to utilize the depth of inaccessible areas of the country. From their mountain hideouts they fired at the gunships descending into the valleys and they ambushed personnel buses and motor convoys of the Russians and the regular Afghan army.

They were offered easy targets. Most Soviet material and supplies which cannot be flown in must be transported to the strategic highway circling the Afghan highlands via just two roads— the one from Kushka to Herat in the west and the one from Samarkand to Mesar-i Sharif in the center. These roads resemble long funnels through which everything must pass. There are no railroads in Afghanistan.

In view of growing guerilla activity and the ineffectiveness of the operationally limited heavy military equipment, the Soviets were forced to change their tactics in mid-1980. They pulled back part of their units trained in conventional large-scale combat (which was dubbed a "partial withdrawal" by Western newspapers) and replaced immobile divisions with better organized commando units hastily trained in guerilla tactics.

The invasion army increased both in numbers and in mobile armored personnel carriers. It was meant to make up for Afghan government units depleted through desertion.

At this stage of the fighting, the Russians believed they might neutralize the guerillas by sealing off the 1,600-kilometer frontier with Pakistan. In the initial stages of the invasion, they had already sealed off Wakhan, the long finger pointing to the 60-kilometer long frontier with China. Soviet helicopters now dropped more than a million butterfly mines of the PFM type with liquid fuzes in plastic casings on the footpaths in the border area.

This mine, originally developed by the Americans, has a 15-year to 20-year life span. Since it looks like a piece of grey rock, it is hard to detect but can be detonated when thrown. According to information supplied by the resistance movement, 600 civilians and 100 fighters have been wounded and/or killed by these mines thus far.

The assaults on the highway network did not lessen. On the contrary: the growth in size of the invasion army made the search for targets easier. As of September 1980, convoys underway from Herat and Kabul came under more and more frequent attack. The rebels used captured Soviet tank mines of the TM-46 type to mine the roads. When more and more tanks were destroyed, the Soviets began using one to two helicopters per convoy; but these had to be relieved on these long trips. The helicopters have been flying at rather high altitudes, since the guerillas have meantime added heavy Russian machine guns of the "Dashika" type (which have a range of 2,000 meters) to their arsenal.

The Soviets went searching for the metal mines with mine detection vehicles. And when the guerillas had destroyed 12 of these vehicles with plastic-encased mines, the Soviets sent in tanks with heavy rollers in front. But concentrated charges of five mines on top of one another made this enterprise too costly. Specially trained dogs did no better; the guerillas neutralized their sense of smell by spreading red pepper. Engineering students from Kabul dismantled tank mines and made booby traps out of them which are "contaminating" the roadside and underbrush.

Where the guerillas are getting their weapons and recruits from has been the subject of much speculation. In the last days of his life, Sadat said the United States is a supplier. The Chinese are supplying small arms, stick grenades and old-style anti-tank grenade launchers without Chinese inscriptions. But the bulk of the arms is of Soviet origin. It comes from Afghan army stores (200,000 small arms alone), from tribes initially loyal to the government which have since switched sides and— from the black market.

President Babrak Karmal's armed forces have shrunk from 150,000 at the outset to a third that size— 30,000 army and 20,000 militia. A steady stream of deserters is bringing its weapons and its know-how along. Special Soviet units go to the villages to search for recruits. The 18 to 30 year-old Afghans are thrown into combat after brief training and a large proportion of them deserts after the first engagement. On the black market, a soldier can sell a Kalashnikov automatic rifle for $2,000 —which equals 3 years' pay— and a cartridge for one dollar. The guerillas have lots of money because they are now collecting taxes in place of the Kabul government.

The government no longer is in a position to run the country. The administrative personnel is unreliable and is being replaced by occupation officials (just like in Cambodia). Now that many city streets formerly named after royalty have been changed to communist-tinged names, postal deliveries no longer function anywhere.

The cities are becoming increasingly unsafe even though the occupiers are concentrated there. Two million out of the 20 million Afghans live in these urban centers. Organized resistance is mounted by terrorist cells which engage in assassination attempts against high government officials, party members and the Soviets. A report by the German embassy in Kabul dated 18 August of this year said in part: "Kabul itself continues to be the scene of action by the freedom fighters— a fact not only confirmed by our own observations but by a growing number of reports contained in the government-controlled news media as well..."

The city of Kandahar at the southern end of the strategic circular highway is 60 percent controlled by the resistance movement already. The methods used by the rebels to attain control are both cruel and effective. When they capture the administrative headquarters of a city or village, they burn the local residents register (to protect deserters returning home) and make use of the party membership lists they find for blackmail purposes.

First, each party member is asked to pay ransom and to pledge his cooperation with the resistance movement. If he refuses or fails to reply, he is condemned to death by a secret court. As a consequence, the party elite which is identical to the political and economic administrative apparatus is thinned out— either by taking flight or being put to death. Thousands of functionaries disappear into Soviet "exile" under one pretext or another.

During the course of this year, the number of insurgents has increased to 70,000. The Soviet Union is said to be thinking of increasing its troop strength beyond the present 85,000 men. The caliber of the Soviet officers and enlisted men is described in "negative terms" by experts and embassies. The political and religious commitment of the insurgents, on the other hand, makes for a positive caliber. This is particularly true of the leaders of the groups which for the most part are still operating in a decentralized fashion. 20 year-old commanders of superior tribal origin are at the head of thousands of mujahedin.

Invaders Have Long Since Gotten Stuck

Charismatic leadership qualities belong to the traditions of tribal life. This would appear to be one of the more profound reasons why the effectiveness of the guerillas has increased disproportionately as against that of the Soviets. Another reason is that Soviet soldiers remain in Afghanistan no more than 6 months before being relieved. This quick turnaround, most likely effected for humanitarian reasons, is made at the expense of experience and combat strength. How heavily the war weighs on the Soviet soldiers can be seen from the language used to describe the insurgents. They are called "dushman" which is the Turkish word for "mortal enemy" or "archenemy." The guerillas are called "basmachi" which is the Uzbek word for "gang" or "band of robbers."

In this struggle, which has been escalating over the past 2 years, the Soviets have but a few moves left. The concentration of the guerillas upon the narrow network of roads makes it impossible for them to increase their troop strength to the "Vietnam level" (of 500,000 men). In a guerilla war, the normal ratio between regulars and guerillas is 10:1. In order to win, the Soviets would have to have 200,000 Afghan government troops in addition to half a million Soviet soldiers; but it would be impossible to muster so large a fighting force, pitting Afghan against Afghan.

The Soviets are moving up and down this country which is too big for them without being able to orient themselves. What they get from the civilians is poisoned oranges or wrong information. Even under the best of circumstances, it is hard to get a precise answer from an Afghan. Even infrared photography does not work. The range finders, sensitive to heat, react to chains of campfires which point to desolate areas and deep gorges. Thus, the Soviets have turned to chemical (not biological) weapons. Soman, sarin, V-gas, phosgene and whatever other trade names these gases go by are dropped in canister bombs in pinpointed air strikes.

As a rule, these gases do not kill —except for children and old people with respiratory ailments— but they do cause unconsciousness lasting 40 to 45 minutes. Thus, the chemical weapon can only be used in pinpointed strikes and will remain effective for a short time. It does not alter the overall situation. It does not help get the convoys moving again on roads that are blocked for 2 or 3 days at a time.

The outcome of the two-year expedition is plain to see. The Soviets have gotten stuck in Afghanistan— militarily and politically. Their first operation on their own outside their empire has placed a dent in the victorious war doctrine. It is not a mistake, therefore, to call the war in Afghanistan the most important engagement since the second World War.

9478
CSO: 4620/10

DOMESTIC POLITICS ANALYZED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 23, 11 Nov 81 pp 3-6

[Text]

The next few months are likely to bring some major changes in the Algerian government, as President **Chadli Benjedid** seeks to diffuse mounting political pressure and social discontent, give a badly needed fillip to his regime's public image and place more of his faithfuls in key senior positions. Already on the agenda for December is an important session of the ruling *Front de Libération Nationale* (FLN) central committee. Three topics are to be at the centre of deliberations: 1) what role to give the private sector in economic affairs 2) the hyper-sensitive cultural question with its explosive regional implications and 3) the long-awaited family code. Decisions taken on these crucial matters will help gauge to what extent Chadli is free to stamp his own will on Algeria's political future, and what alliances he has made to consolidate his authority.

Since coming to power in January 1979 as a compromise candidate imposed by the armed forces, Chadli — who has been nicknamed "The Godfather" by the Algerian political élite — has surprised the FLN hierarchy and his principal opponents by his tactical manoeuvring skill. Over the past thirty months, he has been able to eclipse and then eliminate other contenders for power and privilege in the Algerian state system: namely the ex-party grandee, Col. **Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui**, supported by radical pan-Arab and left-wing forces, and **Abdelaziz Bouteflika**, the head of secular moderates preaching a rapprochement with the West and a liberalisation of the economy. Bouteflika's fall from favour also implies a regional shift in the regime's base, as it constitutes the dismemberment of the so-called Oudja group, which was close to late President **Houari Boumedienne**, and the rise of another faction associated with the northeastern part of the country around the town of Annaba.

Chadli's success is his pragmatic middle of the road approach, which advocates a sort of *realpolitik* on domestic affairs destined gradually to loosen the enforced austerity of the past two decades. Implicit in the policy is an opening to the "non-exploiting" private sector, and a building of special relations with socialist France, although not at the expense of African and Arab connections. Chadli has still been obliged to make some concessions to hardline party bureaucrats, the military hierarchy and traditional religious leaders. His initiatives could thus be restricted in the future.

By enlarging the FLN political bureau last summer, he managed to shore up his own influence, but the top party organ remains a graphic example of the contending, and contradictory, currents in Algerian political life. The FLN is more an apparatus for distributing power and wealth than a veritable political party. It is fairly distant from daily realities and grass roots opinion. Besides the head of state, the FLN political bureau is composed of:

☐ **Rabah Bitat**: The only remaining active historical leader of the FLN, he is currently president of the rubber stamp national assembly. Representing the perennity of the Algerian revolution, Bitat is a pragmatist, which accounts for his political longevity in the often turbulent history of FLN infighting. His direct influence remains limited, but his historic value and extensive international contacts are appreciated in ruling circles. Nevertheless, we understand that his active days in politics are probably numbered, as he could be replaced in the next political bureau realignment.

☐ **Col. Abdallah Belhouchet**: Vice-minister of defence, Belhouchet is the only active military figure in the FLN supreme organ. He has the reputation of being the armed forces' "eyes and ears", playing a behind-the-scenes role, only directly intervening when crises arise. His political credo is limited: preserve the basic values of the Algerian revolution, which can be resumed as intransigent nationalism and rhetorical socialism.

☐ **Mohammed Said Mazouzi**: Prestigious president of the economic and social commission of the FLN, he succeeded Yahiaoui as leader of the progressive forces. He is close to the

semi-clandestine Algerian communist party, *le Parti d'Avant-Garde Socialiste* (PAGS), which he helped to infiltrate into the trade union movement, *Union Nationale des Travailleurs Algeriens* (UNTA), when he was minister of labour. His influence radiates in university circles, and he also maintains contacts with islamic progressives. Another positive point for Mazouzi is that he can muster Berber support, being himself from the Kabylia region.

☐ **Boualem Benhammouda:** minister of interior, he is associated with moderate islamic reformism. His portfolio has lost much of its importance, as security matters are now squarely placed in the hands of regional military commanders.

☐ **Mohammed Ben Abdallah Abdelghani:** Figurehead prime minister, he rarely has the occasion to actively participate in the decision making process. In fact, we understand that he is one of the prime candidates to disappear from the political scene in coming months. Abdelghani has the reputation of being a conservative, close to Bouteflika, with support from those who enjoy bureaucratic privileges.

☐ **Mohammed Chérif Messadia:** Chadli's *éminence grise*, he has been responsible for the campaign against the radicals and marxists within the FLN, notifying PAGS cadres that they cannot continue to maintain one foot within the ruling party and one in the opposition. He replaced Yahiaoui last year as FLN party secretary, and has since then been "renovating" party mass organisations and the press, by sacking radicals and replacing them with colourless, but reliable, bureaucrats. Politically, he is reportedly close to the pan-Arab Baathist ideology, although radicals tax him as being a sheer opportunist.

☐ **Mohammed Benyahia:** The respected minister of foreign affairs, who miraculously survived a plane crash earlier in the year in **Mali**. He is expected to resume his functions in the near future. An ideologue, leaning towards the PAGS and sympathetic to the moslem progressives, he has much support among modernist intellectuals, and is greatly appreciated in African and Arab diplomatic circles.

☐ **Boualem Baki:** minister of justice. He assisted Chadli in sweeping out of the parastatals and upper echelons of the administrations those officials too closely associated with Boumedienne, and wielded the broom of the anti-corruption campaign which was also a convenient means of carrying out highly political operations. In the moderate camp, he maintains contacts with islamic traditionalists.
tionalists.

☐ **Mohammed Yala:** minister of finance. He plays a pivotal role in the Chadli regime, and his influence is liable to grow even further. In particular, we hear he is a candidate to replace Abdelghani as premier. Close to France, he has been selected to negotiate the tricky liquefied natural gas (LNG) price dispute with Paris. We understand that he has already succeeded in hammering out a compromise, which will probably be announced during **Mitterrand**'s state visit to Algeria at the end of November. Yala maintains relations with the progressive camp, being a close friend of Benyahia, and can muster support from the Berbers. (He hails from petite Kabylie).

The concessions made to moslem traditionalists and FLN conservatives have been largely responsible for the rising tension, discreetly evident in the Algerian capital. Since the end of the summer, numerous roadblocks have been set up on the roads leading to the Kabylia region. The authorities fear a repetition of last year's riots in the Berber heartland of Tizi Ouzou. Unlike the Kurds in Iraq, the Berbers are not a secessionist movement, but one which is seeking to defend its cultural rights against what Berber leaders refer to as "Arab Imperialism." The campaign over the past decade to make Arabic not only the official language, but also the working language, has ruffled Berber sensitivity. Many Berbers speak poorly the Algerian Arabic dialect, and only a few can read and write classical Arabic. The Arabisation of the school system and the state administration as well as the banning of publications in the Berber language, *Tamazigh,* has convinced many younger members of the community that only violent resistance will enable them to win cultural rights. For example, Berber singers such as **Ait Mengellat, Idir** and **Ferhat** are practically forbidden from giving concerts in the region. Consequently, most of the cultural renaissance is taking place among the Berber diaspora in **France**. Certain Berber dissidents even maintain ties with **Morocco**, and with the French secret service, **SDECE**. Now, Berber dissidents could join in with *Parti d'Avant-Garde Socialiste* (PAGS) members and moslem progressives to form a more coherent opposition force within the country. The government, according to our sources, is quite worried by such an eventuality, and has strengthened security forces in the Berber areas.

It is the islamic fundamentalists who are the driving force behind the Arabisation movement, trying to push Algeria towards the Middle Eastern Arab mainstream. Unlike **Egypt** or **Tunisia**, for example,the movement has yet to be moulded into a political party. For the present, the fundamentalists operate on the local level, trying to convince parents to dress their children in accordance with islamic precepts, and opening up clandestine mosques in the suburbs of major towns. Isolated incidents in the south-eastern Saharan provinces have led in the past year to clashes between the authorities and fundamentalists. The central moslem traditionalist figure in ruling circles is the minister of religious affairs, **Abderrahmane Chibane**. His hardline declarations have raised eyebrows in the capital. (Before the moslem holiday of Ramadam in July he said that fasting was to be obligatory). Other ministers favourable to this current, include Boualem Baki and Boualem Benhammouda.

A progressive islamic current is trying to amalgamate the forward-looking precepts of the Coran with the nationalist values of the Algerian revolution. The ideologue of this faction is **Mohammed Elmili**, ambassador to **Athens**, but residing in Algiers. Another key islamic progressive is **Ahmed Brahimi Taleb**, brother of the minister of planning and son of one of the leaders of the reformist *Ouleymas* movement in the 1930-40s. **Salim Saadi**, minister of agriculture and **Abdelrazzak Bouhara**, minister of health, are generally considered in this camp. Significantly, two respected diplomats,

Mustapha Lachraf and Redha Malek, have given moslems their critical support. This group, though, is not homogenous. Its members are liable to look towards **Iran, Libya** and surprisingly even to **Iraq**.

The Arabisation drive has spawned numerous problems for Algerian youth. It should be remembered that over half the population is less than 18 years old. Having at the start favourably reacted to the Arabisation of the school system, they now realise that job outlets are few for those who cannot master French. Their disenchantment has thus provided a recruiting ground for fundamentalists, who are having a field day at the Ben Akroun campus on Algiers' heights. Nonetheless, secondary school students prefer French to Arabic when they are given the choice. Hence the number of students leaving high school with diplomas in Arabic has fallen from 55.6% in 1976-77, to under 50% in 1980-81. Senior Algerian bureaucrats and politicians prefer sending their offsprings to the exclusive French-run *Lycée Descartes* in Algiers.

The linguistic question is a hornets' nest for the government, and no matter what course is taken, a large sector of the population will be dissatisfied. Feelings will probably also run high when the family code is discussed, after years of delays, in December. We have had a glimpse of an outline draft, which indicates that the government has made numerous concessions to fundamentalists. In particular, the codification of the role of Algerian women will limit many of their hard-won advances. For instance, women will not be able to work or leave the country without written permission of a male family member. Moreover, little attention is given to family planning, and Algeria has one of the highest birth rates in Africa.

We understand that PAGS, after according critical support to the regime since 1971, is now prepared to constitute an active oppostion movement. Many of its cadres in the union movement, the FLN youth organisation and the press have been sacked. They can benefit from the difficulties of daily life in the urban centres to canalise working class support, but they are in no position seriously to threaten government authority. The same holds true for opposition forces abroad, whose influence is even more limited. Our external opposition tally sheet is as follows:—

☐ *le Front des Forces Socialistes* (FFS): led from **Morocco** and France by an historical leader of the FLN, **Ait Ahmed**. The FFS is attempting to revive the Berber movement, Ahmed himself having launched in 1962 an armed uprising against the government. Recently, Ahmed has patched up relations with ex-president **Ben Bella**. (This rapprochement was more personal than politically). Ahmed's support for the Moroccan cause in the **Western Sahara** is particularly derided in Algiers.

☐ *le Parti de la Révolution Socialiste* (PRS): led from Paris by another FLN founder, **Mohammed Boudiaf**. The PRS publishes a French language publication, *El Jarida* (The Journal), which criticizes from a left-wing viewpoint the government's policies. Boudiaf, whose influence is limited, has the advantage of never having been associated with the regime since 1962.

☐ l'Union des Travailleurs Arabes (UTA): a marginal movement mainly implanted in Algerian student and worker circles in France; it is ideologically confused, seeking to integrate Maoist, Trotskyist and Baathist precepts. It briefly made the headlines last year when a young Algerian soldier was arrested and brought to trial for distributing UTA propaganda in army barracks.

Now, the discussions around what role should be given to the private sector is likely to spark off passions, and polarize radicals even more against the Chadli regime. A debate has been opened up in the press to prepare public opinion for concessions to be made to private businessmen. The government is obliged to provide incentives, because the powerful state capitalist sector, including the 17 para-statals created to centralise the economy has proved to be highly inefficient. So have state farms. Last year private farmers were granted the right to sell their produce directly, without going through state-controlled marketing agencies, with the result that for the first time in years it is possible to find all sorts of fruits and vegetables on sale. However, the price is often beyond the capacity of modest pockets. Sectors of privilege and corruption have been created by access to scarce merchandise and foreign currency. The nomination at the head of a ministry or para-statal provides a golden occasion to build up or reinforce a regional or political clan through the careful use of sinecures and other prebends. The removal in 1979 of the powerful minister of industry, **Belaid Abdessalem**, started the attack against entrenched business-minded bureaucrats, who cynically defend the state sector as a "popular conquest" and as the motor of "Algerian socialism". If an opening to private enterprise is in the pipeline, it would be wrong to expect a complete *volte face* on economic policy, along the lines of the late president **Anwar Sadat**'s *infitah*. Again, Chadli must contend with conflicting interests and probably cannot go as far as he would like. For one thing, liberalisation would probably mean an acceleration of the rate of inflation, now running at about 20% a year. Measures to assuage popular demands are also expected, such as an increase from $75 to $450 a year in the hard currency allocation for Algerians travelling abroad. Because of the shortage of hard currency, black market discounts on the Algerian dinar can reach up to 300%.

In international affairs, Chadli would like to reach a settlement on the Western Saharan dispute, but is

not willing to sell out the Polisario Front. Relations with Tunisia have markedly improved, and a joint-bank is soon to be set up. Links with Libya remain troublesome. The Algerians do not appreciate maps published in Tripoli indicating that part of its Saharan territory belongs to Libya; and we understand that Libyan troops have occupied a strip of Algerian territory close to the oasis of Alrar Est. Chadli has made special efforts to broaden cooperation with sub-Saharan states, visiting eleven black capitals earlier in the year. Undoubtedly, it is with France that the most substantial changes could be worked out, on the basis of much closer economic ties, especially on energy questions. We understand that the French are even preparing a project for co-development--a sort of mini bilateral north-south pact. By the same token, Algeria's military supplies could be diversified away from the Soviet Union. France of course, will be offering specimens of its modern arsenal, with emphasis on Mirage jet fighters and armoured vehicles. Algeria's diplomatic role in freeing American prisoners in Iran earlier in the year could also make more US military hardware available. We noted with interest, that the secretary-general of the defence ministry, Col. Ben Youssef, was in Washington at the end of September to open up talks on arms procurement.

CSO: 4500/56

OIL EXPLORATION PLANS REVIEWED

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 pp 54-55

[Text] ALGERIA is to boost oil exploration in its vast Saharan provinces, starting in 1982. According to official government figures, $3bn will be invested in hydrocarbon exploration during the current Five Year Development Plan (1980-1984).

Between 1970 and 1979, only around 60m tonnes of new oil reserves were discovered, while the pace of extraction quickened. Algeria's reserves plummeted from the equivalent of 34.3 years in 1971 to a dangerously low level of 20 years in 1980. Sonatrach officials, alarmed at this trend, decided to relaunch exploration activities, and to try and convince western oil groups to step up their operations in the country.

A number of western oil groups pulled out of Algeria in the wake of the 1971 nationalisation of the oil industry, and by the end of 1979 only four remained: CFP-Total, Braspetro (the exploration arm of the Brazilian state company, Petrobras), Hispanoil and the West German Sopetral, a consortium of Saarberbergwerke, Veba, Union Reinische and Wintershall.

With the offer of new acreage in virtually unexplored Saharan tracts, the number of oil companies currently active in Algeria has risen to 15. These include America's Sohio, Sun Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Kerr McGee, France's Elf Aquitaine and British Petroleum. Some 100,000 sq km and additional acreage has been parcelled out under new exploration agreements since 1979. 'We do not expect to find new fields as large as Hassi Messaoud, but we are confident that small to medium-sized ones will be discovered,' a western oilman in Algiers told *8 Days*.

Eight companies have each taken one block, four have picked up two blocks and three have taken three blocks. The Algerian government chose a good time to try and attract western oil companies: when the exploration territory was made available at the beginning of 1980, oil was in demand on the world market. The Algerians linked the lifting of their high grade oil to the signing of new exploration agreements.

Between 1 January and 30 August 1980, a special $3 premium was tacked onto liftings, and deposited in Algerian bank accounts as an advance on exploration outlay under the new accords which the companies were invited to sign. Rather than write off the often considerable sums which built up in these special accounts, a number of oil concerns decided to undertake exploration activity in Algeria.

The formula worked out by Sonatrach for new exploration agreements combines elements of both joint venture and production-sharing contracts. Development expenditure will be allocated according to the number of shares taken by Sonatrach and its foreign partners. However, in contrast to Egypt, Libya and Qatar, Algeria levies taxes on oil lifted by foreign companies in the event of discoveries.

Following a review of existing seismic surveys, the vast majority of oil companies decided to choose acreage in the Great Western Erg, southeast of the Hassi Messaoud field. Located along the Tunisian and Algerian borders, this zone is thought to hold considerable promise. Nonetheless, *8 Days* was told that work would progress slowly because of the lack of roads and basic infrastructure, and the often harsh climatic conditions.

Of all the western oil companies, only Amoco sought to chart out new hydrocarbon territory. Its block 312 is located in the extreme western part of Algeria, near the Moroccan frontier between Ain Sefra and Colomb-Bechar. Several factors influenced

Amoco's choice. Although deep in the Saharan hinterland, the region is served by a railway line. Moreover, seismic studies made years back by the French are reportedly encouraging.

Most of the companies are still in the initial phase of their exploration programme, with wildcat drilling scheduled to get underway only in mid 1982. The number of exploration wells drilled could double in 1983, from the present figure of four. Sonatrach holds by far the greatest amount of exploration acreage. In particular, it possesses large tracts in the central-southern region, stretching from Ouargla in the north to south of the Salah oasis. 'We reckon that this area contains substantial quantities of natural gas,' a western oil official told *Days*. 'Since the Algerians automatically take control of any gas finds, this area is not really interesting for us,' he added.

With immense reserves of natural gas — it ranks third in the world behind the Soviet Union and the US — Algeria is in no rush to explore this area, considering it a strategic reserve. Sonatrach has limited its activities since 1978 to the development and extension of existing fields, and exploration has been mainly limited to seismic studies. But now that the state company has been reorganised under the direction of Energy Minister Belkacem Nabi, Sonatrach should play a leading role in the new exploration drive.

CSO: 4500/50

CASBAH'S CONDITION CRITICIZED

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 p 60

[Text]

ALGIERS' historic Casbah, with its precious Islamic heritage and momentos of the liberation struggle, is seriously menaced by the ravages of time and general neglect. Unless the Algerian government provides the Algerian dinars 80m ($335m) needed to finance the first phase of an emergency rehabilitation programme, further decline of the Casbah's 1,700 buildings is inevitable.

With its maze of streets and blind alleys, the Casbah came to embody the Algerians' spirit of resistance to the encroachment of French colonialism. In this labyrinth, gradually hemmed in by the expanding colonial city, the flame of Algerian nationalism was kept burning by successive generations. Not surprisingly, the Casbah played a heroic role in the liberation struggle.

Despite this, little was done in the first years of independence to improve living conditions in the Casbah. Property speculation added to the Casbah's problems, as landlords, exploiting the housing shortage, crowded as many as seven families in the space originally allotted to one.

In the last twenty years the Casbah's social composition has altered radically, as many of the original inhabitants moved to the suburbs to be replaced by people from the countryside, moving to the city in search of work.

Traditional occupations also disappeared, as artisans died out or found shrinking outlets for their products. A 67-year-old carpenter told me: 'I remember how busy my shop was only 25 years ago — now people prefer to buy factory furniture instead of my decorated traditional pieces. There was no future in this profession, so my sons became civil servants and moved to the suburbs. I am afraid that the secrets of my art will disappear with me.'

Some years ago, the Algerian government, in collaboration with UNESCO, set up a workshop known as the Atelier de Restauration du Casbah to study ways of checking the Casbah's decline. The team's main ambition was to reintegrate the Casbah into the life of the city, without turning it into a museum.

A masterplan was drawn up by a group of architects, engineers, art historians and urban planners. With the knowledge gathered over the past seven years, the Casbah workshop has sought to devise new low-cost means of renovating buildings without marring their original architecture.

According to some estimates, it costs about $160,000 to restore a Casbah building, a sum out of the reach of most property owners. Only government subsidies could provide the driving force for a massive rehabilitation scheme. In spite of official declarations about the necessity of preserving the country's heritage, the Casbah is not high on the government's list of priorities.

For the moment, a holding operation is going on in the Casbah; dangerous houses are evacuated and others shored up. Just five years ago, a hundred houses were classified by Atelier experts as in 'extremely critical condition,' while now five hundred buildings fall into this category.

Nonetheless, a walk through the Casbah still provides some surprises. The interior courtyards of seemingly derelict buildings retain much of their past magnificence. If the streets are litter-ridden, the houses are meticulously clean.

On a tour of the Casbah with an Atelier member, I visited some remarkable sites: an almost hidden cemetery dating from the sixteenth century containing magnificently carved tombstones and monuments. Another masterpiece is the palace of the pre-colonial Governor of Algiers, known as the Dey. Closed to the public, this palace occupies a splendid site dominating the Casbah and the bay of Algiers. It too is in sorry shape, with hand painted tiles falling off the walls and once-splendid woodwork falling to pieces.

CSO: 4500/50

RESTRICTIONS ON STUDY OF HISTORY OF REVOLUTION WAIVED

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Nov 81 p 38

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "On the 27th Anniversary of the Insurrection--Seminar in Algiers Lifts Revolution History Taboos."]

/Text/ Algiers--The celebration of the 27th anniversary of the FLN's unleashing of armed conflict on 1 November 1954 was preceded by the holding of a national seminar on the history of the Algerian revolution at the Palace of Nations, near the capitol. For 4 days, nearly 1,000 participants met. The press and television gave wide coverage to the work of the conference, which was opened by the president of the republic, Mr Chadli Bendjedid. In the opinion of some specialists, the colloquium, devoted essentially to the preparation and unleashing of the revolution, fell far short of bearing the fruit with regard to history that might have been expected. Nevertheless, it constitutes an event of utmost political importance, and it was seen as such by public opinion.

Under Boumediène's presidency, the history of the war and the Algerian National Movement remained restricted subjects. Nothing irritated the late president more than to have the role of the "historic leaders" mentioned in his presence, perhaps because he was not among them. The head of state readily condemned foreign writers who, according to him, exploited the history of the Algerian revolution for financial gain, but for all that, he discouraged Algerian historians from engaging in studies, saying that it was still too early to produce "objective works."

Since his election, President Chadli Bendjedid has, on the contrary, continuously exhorted Algerian intellectuals and researchers to take up their pens. "Our duty is to openly admit that we have not supplied the necessary effort to educate our children on the glories of their revolution," he stated last August 20, on the occasion of "Mujahid" day (the national veterans day). "We have thus allowed certain elements who opposed the revolution, or who were content with the role of spectator in it, and who recoiled at the word 'jihad' (holy war) or the term 'militant,' to act against the revolution."

That the restrictions have been lifted is impossible to deny after the recently concluded siminar. The conference participants who succeeded each other at the podium recalled the divisive inflighting in the national movement just prior to

the insurrection, the formation of the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA), and the role played by the historic leaders. Names that for a good while have not been heard in official circles were mentioned, such as Ait Ahmed and Boudiaf, currently opposition members in exile, or Krim Belkacem and Khider, whose assassinations were never clearly explained. Their parts in the revolution were explicitly stated, without ever being minimized. Better yet, such players of the revolution as Ouamrane, previously adjudant to Krim Belkacem, Ben Tobbal, who commanded wilaya 2, Zbiri, head of wilaya 3, Saouf El Arab, Mohammedi Said, Yacef Saadi, and Mrs Djamila Bouhired, one of the protagonists of the battle of Algiers.

Returnees

Putting aside past quarrels, the leaders of the autonomous zone of Algiers mixed fraternally with those of wilaya 4, with whom they had nevertheless clashed violently. Perhaps even more significant was the presence of a large number of previous leaders of the French Federation of the FLN who, for the most part during the past 20 years, have kept themselves out of power. Among them were found the past coordinator of the federal committee, Omar Boudaoud, and several of its members including Amar Ladlani, Rabah Bouaziz, Mohand Ben Younef, and Abdelkrim Souissi, current president of the Association of Algerians in Europe.

Mr Chadli Benjedid, largely responsible for these returnees, and visibly happy to mingle with his companions of the struggle, encouraged the participants to give their testimonies and to dig up documents and records and, in this way, contribute to the writing of the history of the revolution. Some have already begun. Ali Haroun, for example, a previous chief of the French Federation of the FLN, is preparing a collective work on the participation of immigration to the liberation struggle.

It is to be hoped, however, that the book, if published, will not be banned in Algeria, as is the case of several books written on the subject and published in France by Algerians, such as Mohamed Harbi, Ferhat Abbas, past president of the GPRA [Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic], and Commandant Azzedine. "Regardless of what partisan analysis these authors make," wrote historian Mahfoud Kaddache in an article on this subject in EL MOUDJAHID, "regardless of what criticism may be made of their investigative methods, no denial can be made of the fact that their works constitute important testimonies that, as objects of scientific analysis, will bring about progress in the writing of this history."

Professor Kaddache adds: "Nobody can be prohibited from writing since the criterion must remain scientific."

In this, there is a new inflection that raises fair hopes.

9802
CSO: 4519/36

MINISTER EXPLAINS REASONS FOR FUEL SHORTAGE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] The Deputy Oil Minister announced that there is no problem regarding oil and gasoline distribution and that disorders of the past several days over gasoline distribution to filling stations have been brought to an end.

Deputy Oil Minister Engineer Seyyed Hasan Kheradmand, during an interview, explained the recent disorders over gasoline distribution. He said: "A committee has been formed by the Ministry of Oil to investigate the cause of these disorders. As soon as the committee presents its report, the reasons for these incidents will be fully disclosed to the public." He asked fellow citizens not to give any credence to rumors circulated by the agents of counterrevolution.

Engineer Kheradmand, while denying such rumors as the bombing of the Kharq Island oil installations and an oil-industry strike, stated: "Of course, there has been some shortages in the delivery of fuel to tanker trucks but through the persistent efforts of responsible officials this problem has been completely remedied."

He added: "Fuel delivery for the period 23 October through 1 November was carried out smoothly with the help of committed truck drivers who are in charge of gasoline transport on the city level. The only problem that arose was in connection with the last 2-day holiday weekend. Customarily, full deliveries of fuel are not made on holidays and perhaps this was the cause of the gasoline shortage in recent days."

He noted: "Our tanker trucks have through perseverance eliminated the gasoline shortage. According to reports reaching us the problem has now been brought to an end. There is nothing at all for the citizens to worry about." He added: "According to the information I have, a daily average of between 150 and 200 tanker trucks are responsible for delivering gasoline to urban areas. At the request of every filling station, gasoline is delivered by between one and four tanker trucks to these stations."

Continuing he said: "Dear citizens should not in any way worry about gasoline shortages in storage facilities, pipelines and refineries--especially the Tehran refinery--because production is continuing as before and there is no cause for concern. This was an intermittent problem of fuel distribution which, thank God, has been eliminated." In conclusion the Deputy Oil Minister asked committed Muslims to call either 591063 or 660127 should they observe difficulties in fuel distribution and keep responsible officials informed.

CSO: 4640/63

TEHRAN ELABORATES POSITION ON AFGHAN SETTLEMENT

Aid to Afghan Refugees

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 10 Nov 81 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN, Nov. 9 (Pars) — There are presently 1.5 million Afghan refugees in Iran mostly residing in the two border provinces of Khorasan and Sistan Baluchestan according to a ministry of interior spokesman.

Speaking in an interview with the Persian daily Kayhan on Sunday, Dr. Mohammad Sorureddin, the Political Undersecretary of the Interior Ministry on the refugee problem said that the Afghan refugees fled the oppression of the ruling regime of Afghanistan just as the Iranian refugees left parts of the country where Saddam and his expansionist master were imposing oppression. He said that from an Islamic view point Iran was duty bound to assist those refugees who sought to free their country from oppression, but the Iranian government was in no way obliged to help those Afghan "refugees" who were criminals or were from questionable political parties.

He cited the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party as an example of these and he said that they were serving only the interests of the Soviet Union by concealing Soviet crimes in Afghanistan. He reiterated Iran's policy of "Neither East nor West" and said his country would support the truly oppressed.

Speaking on the budget allocated to the Afghan refugees Dr. Sorureddin said that the government should allocate about 2.5 million rials for every 50,000 refugees annually. This he said was despite the fact that Iran received no outside assistance and had 2 million homeless itself because of the Iraqi imposed war. Also additional expenditure on the war had made the situation more difficult but he assured the care of the Afghan refugees as Iran's religious duty.

Commenting on Iran's participation in the recent session of the High Commissariat for Refugees in Geneva

he said Iran's objective was two fold: To discuss further the Afghanistan problem and the occupation of Soviet forces thus attracting world attention to the oppressed Afghan people and secondly to silence hostile western propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran as being a system against humanitarian issues.

Foreign Ministry Plan

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 12 Nov 81 p 2

[Editorial by Zainab: "Iran's Afghan Plan: Removing Excuses"]

[Text]

Following the revolutionary proposal of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the formation of an anti-Zionist anti-Imperialist Islamic front, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic has presented a solution for the Afghanistan issue. This solution clearly projects the attitudes of the Islamic Republic vis-a-vis the present government of Afghanistan and the Soviet forces occupying that country.

After a long period of inactivity and stagnation, imposed upon the Foreign Ministry by various factors, the Third Revolution, i.e. the ousting of liberal and hypocrite elements from the official ranks, paved the way for the revitalization of this vital organ.

Because the Islamic Revolution has come to a stage where its export is an essential condition of its continuation, the activities of the Foreign Ministry play an indispensable role in the further development of the revolution. This Ministry must take long, rapid strides in countering imperialist strategies and policies against Iran. Through its Islamic oriented measures it must neutralize all attempts to isolate and weaken this Republic. Before all else, it must tend (according to the Qur'an) to the affairs of the Muslims and the region which have direct effects upon itself. Finally it is the responsibility of this organ to materialize in strategy and action, the life giving guidelines of Imam Khomeini and the authentic slogans of the revolution chanted by the Muslim masses and supported by the ever increasing blood of the martyrs, proclaiming neither East or nor West but Islamic Republic.

The Afghanistan plan submitted by the Foreign Ministry reflects the fact that this organ has attempted to meet most of the aforementioned priorities and goals, despite the great pressure of problems imposed on the country by Western imperialism. This is an evident sign, of the stabilization of the Islamic Republic's government and its march towards realizing the divine goals before it.

Considering Afghanistan's strategic location vis-a-vis Iran, the present aggression which Soviet forces have launched against it's territory, and the predominant Muslim population of Afghanistan, it becomes clear why the Islamic Republic feels responsible to propose a solution which would recognize the natural rights of the Muslim Afghan people and put an end to Soviet aggression.

The proposal consists mainly of two major aspects both of which are anti-imperialist in nature. First is the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghan territory and their replacement with anti-imperialist Muslim peace keeping forces. Secondly the plan calls for the establishment of a popular Muslim government independent of any superpowers. The other components of this proposal are presented in such a way that they deprive the Soviets and even Pakistan of any pretext for denouncing or not accepting this proposal.

With the presentation of this plan, the Soviets, who consistently claim that they have entered Afghanistan by popular demand and due to American threats and who also allege that they will retreat from Afghan territory whenever the threats are removed, will have no justification for their further occupation. In reality the submission of this proposal clearly serves as a gauge which determines. The sincerity of all the involved parties Pakistan included. Even the deployment of American naval ships in the Indian Ocean which is continuing and escalating, under the pretext of confronting the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and its threat to the whole region, will be questioned or more precisely, exposed for the world.

Primarily this proposal prevents any further internationalization of the Afghan issue. Secondly, by showing that Muslim countries are capable of solving their own dilemmas without foreign intervention, the worldwide imperialist hegemony of America and Russia can be rightfully broken.

When and if the Soviets reject this plan and other parties refrain from adhering to it, it will become clear for the world and particularly the mustaz'afin that as Imam Khomeini once mentioned these superpowers (America and Russia) unite over their economic interests and claim to have disputes only when these same interests require it. Actually both fear a firm and solid ideology rooted in the divine power of God and the firm hearts of the believers. Both feel greatly threatened by the realization of this ideology in Iran and the man of God who engineered it, Imam Khomeini.

Naturally, any plan or proposal submitted by the Islamic Republic seeks out and serves the needs of the downtrodden peoples and thus contradicts the expansionist policies of the major powers. This plan is no exception. After this proposal was presented on Tuesday by the Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry, the Yankee media in general refrained from broadcasting this news. This policy of censorship, misinformation and "half news" becomes more evident when we study the great propaganda scheme these same imperialist mediums launched when Fahd's compromising eight point plan was announced. Both plans originate from Third World countries, the difference lies in the fact that one serves and benefits the downtrodden masses, the refugees and the homeless Afghan people. The other serves millions of petro-dollars to the cartels and trusts governing over the imperialist system. The eight points leads the legendary struggle of the Palestinians for their just rights to a disgraceful compromise with their outright enemy, Zionism.

The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic has removed the clouds of uncertainty and fraud from the Afghanistan issue by proposing an explicit and effective plan. Although the Yankee media is attempting to suffocate and ignore these evident signs of the Islamic Republic's emergence as a determining factor in the region, the downtrodden masses are listening and realizing bit by bit that Islam is the only force capable of emancipating them from the chains of arrogance and oppression.

CSO: 4600/124

TUDEH NETWORK EXPOSED, CLAIM TEHRAN REPORTS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 pp 5-6

[Text] A network of pro-Moscow communist Tudeh party agents has been discovered in the Iranian armed forces and several of its members have been summarily executed, according to reports from Iran. Many other suspects are said to have been rounded up, the numbers said to be already in the "hundreds."

Tehran radio and newspapers recently reported without explanation the execution of five air force officers. Informed sources say it has now been revealed the five were members of the Tudeh network mainly centred in the air force.

The media's silence about the affair is said to be explained by the fact that investigations continue and further arrests can be expected.

Most of the arrests are reported to have taken place at one of the country's biggest air bases near Hamadan, but others are reported from the central military administrative offices in Tehran and in other big cities like Shiraz and Isfahan.

Significantly, the authorities in Tehran have closed down the Soviet cultural centre, which has functioned for many decades in the capital. No explanation has been given, but IPS sources say it coincided with the beginning of the arrests at Hamadan and in Tehran. A "mild" protest was made over the closure, but, again significantly, Moscow radio's Persian language broadcasts have avoided any reference to it or the execution of the military men.

The Tudeh has always made the armed forces one of their main hunting grounds. Even in the late 70's a military cell was broken up in Tehran. Earlier, following the collapse of the Mossadeq government in 1953, a huge Tudeh network was discovered and dismantled, with large numbers of arrests.

CSO: 4600/134

OPPOSITION GROUPS' COALITION PLANS FALTER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 p 6

[Text] Moves towards setting up a loose coalition of exile opposition groups in Paris faltered this week. A pessimistic source close to the talks said gloomily that the first round of negotiations could accurately be described as "collapsing."

Though not prepared to write off the coalition plan yet, other sources contacted by IPS also conceded there were serious problems. These were, according to one usually reliable informant, related to differences between National Iranian Resistence Movement leader Shahpour Bakhtiar and a former National Front colleague in Admiral Ahmad Madani. Madani joined the opposition groups after serving for some time as minister of defence for the Khomeyni regime and standing for the presidency of the Islamic republic.

Although nobody would confirm what the differences were, some sources hinted clearly that both Bakhtiar and Madani felt they should play the leading role in the coalition.

An IPS informant said that veteran statesman Ali Amini was upset at the turn events had taken following considerable original optimism. He is reported as having told friends that "if anyone is to be leader it will be in a liberated Iran and not elsewhere," and that political figures should bury their differences and forget their own individual interests until they were home again.

Amini and a moderate Paris-based religious figure in Ayatollah Mehdi Rouhani have been acting as go-betweens in the negotiations between the leaders of the different groups. Sources close to both men were not prepared to concede that they felt the negotiations had finally atrophied, but they admitted both men were sadly disappointed.

The disappointment was heightened, sources hinted, by the fact that right wing figures like the Shah's former strongman Ghalamali Oveissi seemed happy to concede some of their individual identity to take part in the coalition project. The only agreement demanded from the participants in the coalition was that they would work together solely to topple Khomeyni and then to ensure a plebiscite was taken to ascertain the people of Iran's preference for the form of their future regime.

The coalition scheme has not been dropped and contacts will continue, IPS was led to believe.

CSO: 4600/134

KURDISH SPLIT REPORTED TO BE WIDENING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 p 9

[Text] As reports of fierce fighting between tribesmen and revolutionary guards continue to come in from Kurdestan, sources close to the Kurds confirm IPS' news last week of a split in their ranks.

Though one of the best-known leaders in Abdolrahman Ghassemloo, who heads the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran, has announced that he is joining the Rajavi-Bani-Sadr National Council of Resistance, the bulk of the Kurds under arms are said to have decided to remain under the overall leadership of the more moderate Shaikh Ezzedin Hossaini.

These latter include the Gurani, Javanroodi, Eghbali and Sanjabi Kurds. The followers of Sardar Jaf, the strongly monarchist tribal leader whose son was executed by the mullahs, are retaining their own strongly-independent royalist line. The Barzanis, traditonal fighters against the Iraqi regime and strong advocates of autonomy, and the Qomleh remnants of Seif Ghazi have not committed themselves to either Ghassemloo, whom they have previously shunned, or Hossaini.

Shapour Bakhtiar's strong following among many of the Kurds has encouraged the break with Ghassemloo, for these men are not happy with the alliance with the Mojahedin, sources say. Some observers see the possibility that Ghassamloo could find his position seriously undermined by his decision. He has already been widely criticised by Kurds for his extreme Marxist views.

In addition, sources say, his well-known separatist inclinations, even if he keeps them in check at present, have very little support among the rank and file of the Kurdish fighters. They prefer a return to their privileged status under the Shah's regime, when they felt they had some autonomy without the cares involved in having to run wider affairs. Ghassemloo has been a long time away from his native area and his critics say that, unlike Hossaini, he is not so well aware of the popular mood.

Autonomy, in fact, for most of the Kurds means freedom to deal with their fellow-Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the right to bear arms under the benevolent supervision of the army, just as they did until three years ago. They are not anxious to compromise their relations with any future Tehran regime, either.

Meanwhile, the Tehran press and radio have reported many new incidents in Kurdestan in the past week or so. They include the killing of a revolutionary guard of 16 and afterwards the burning of his body, as well as admissions of many deaths among the security forces, though not the army. The arrest of one claimed tribal leader named Rashid Pirouti was also reported by the Tehran daily ETTELAAT; he was accused of being the leader of one of the "American groups" and of "torturing many good citizens who believed in the revolution."

Four members of the Construction Crusade were also ambushed and killed near Mahabad, the Islamic Republic newspaper reported. The killers were singing and dancing around the burning car of the dead men when they were interrupted by revolutionary guards and made off, the paper said.

CSO: 4600/134

FORMER OPPONENT OF SHAH APPEALS TO WORLD

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 pp 6-7

[Text] Khalil Rezai, a longtime leftist political activist in Iran whose family became famous there after three of his children, all members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisation, were killed fighting the Shah's regime, says that contrary to what many people say Khomeyni is fully aware of everything that is happening in the country, including the killings.

"In several cases I personally told him that people described to him as criminals, and who were thrown into jail and their property confiscated, were in fact completely innocent, but every time I found my remarks did not please him," Rezai, who recently escaped from the Islamic republic where he had become a prominent figure, told reporters in Paris. He said Khomeyni directed many of the actions himself.

The Rezai family, including the mother, became heroes at the time of the 1978 uprising because of their implacable fight against the Shah and his regime over previous years. No appeals to reason on the part of their friends could prevent them trying to martyr themselves in a chilling rehearsal for events that were to come.

Khalil Rezai, who left Iran five months ago for the United States with the authorisation of the Tehran regime but then began an anti-Khomeyni campaign, now has a price on his head, he says. His family in Tehran is being persecuted and his property has been confiscated. He is currently in Europe giving a series of talks and interviews as a continuation of his campaign against the mullahs.

He accused Khomeyni this week of "exterminating at least 20 times as many as the Shah did throughout his lifetime." Under the Shah, he said, youngsters under 18 would never face execution and all detainees would face trial, even if only "show" ones, because of the Shah's concern in the light of internationally approved principles.

"But under Khomeyni even girls of nine years of age are executed, along with 90-year-olds, without trial and without the slightest respect for justice," Rezai said. Part of the vast Aryamehr stadium, which could hold 100,000 people, had even been turned into a prison, so many people were being arrested.

Rezai also accused Khomeyni's friends and close entourage of "the worst kind of corruption," as well as plundering the country's wealth. "They are looting and plundering people and the nation of billions--many of the so-called organisations to help the deprived are covers for robbing the public and sending out money. Beheshti, now assassinated, Khomeyni's close family and some of his close aides have all been in this dirty business."

He claimed that only 10 per cent of Iranians, mostly the illiterate and fanatical sections, still supported Khomeyni. Intellectuals, liberals, journalists and other patriots who opposed the ayatollah were either executed, imprisoned, in hiding or had fled the country. Those who remained and cooperated with the regime were those who benefited immediately from it.

According to Rezai the Mojahedin organisation constituted the only hope for the majority of Iranians. "There are more than five million Mojahedin in Iran, and millions of other Iranians support them," he said. "If Khomeyni is right in saying that the Mojahadin do not represent anything, that they are not important, that they are finished--then why does he not allow them just one single demonstration?"

He said that one of the main reasons why Khomeyni's regime survives was continued Western support, including from the United States, France and Britain. They were willing to provide anything Khomeyni needed. Recently he had signed a $20 million arms deal with the U.S. Support from the hardline Arab countries like Libya was another factor.

Rezai was also bitter about the failure of international human rights organisations to pursue effective campaigns against the Tehran regime. "During the Shah's regime they would go screaming, shouting, denouncing and demonstrating for those arrested, never mind executed, but now that Khomeyni is executing hundreds at once they stay mute," he said.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Rezai said he was convinced it would never occupy Iran. "Iran is not Afghanistan," he said. "The Mojaheden fighting the Afghan government are reactionaries, while our Mojahedin are revolutionaries. Even with the help of the Tudeh party, Khomeyni cannot last for a long time, either."

Iranians today were living in a hell, Rezai said. All the country's elite had left--in Canada alone, 15,000 Iranian doctors and engineers were working. They would never come back to Iran.

"Khomeyni has ruined the country, has destroyed even its historical monuments and is doing his best to wipe out Iranian civilisation and history," Rezai declared. "He must be fought as a foreign evil."

CSO: 4600/134

POWER STRUGGLE AMONG RULING MULLAHS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 pp 1-2

[Text] Once again there are signs of a new power struggle among the ruling mullahs in Iran. Iran's new president Ali Khamenei has made it clear that, like Bani-Sadr before him, he does not see his office as merely a protocol one and that he plans to rule.

This is shown, Iran watchers point out, by his choice of young, inexperienced revolutionaries as successive nominees for the premiership to replace his main rival, the influential Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, whom he forced into resigning.

Khamenei also sees the concentration of hardline revolutionary MPs in the Majlis as another source of power which he can exploit, it is said. Even Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, he feels, can be circumnavigated by direct appeal to the extremists, so Hashemi Rafsanjani's good relationship with Mahdavi-Kani need be no obstacle.

While Mahdavi-Kani has greater support on the revolutionary committee and among the revolutionary corpsmen and police (he was a key figure in setting up the committees and courts) Khamenei is on good terms with Mussavi-Tabrizi, the powerful revolutionary prosecutor-general. But sources in Tehran say the Majlis may not turn out to be the staunch ally Khamenei sees in it, and will probably prove divided on a great many issues.

Differences between the two groupings are on policy. Mahdavi-Kani and Rafsanjani are said to be both against outright socialisation of the economy. Last Friday Rafsanjani said there should be early clarification of the private sector's role to assure it of its place and give busnessmen some security, while experts must be called back to serve the country.

But Khamenei is quoted as saying that "no matter how much we pamper and encourage the private sector and the technocrats they will never help us, so we had better give up wooing them and go about running the country the way we know best without their help."

Ayatollah Khomeyni's current silence on the obvious differences that divide the two mullah camps is a repeat of his performance at the time when Bani-Sadr precipitated his own conflict with the hardliners. This is probably due, sources in Tehran feel, to the fact that he is not sure which side to back. They point out that at the height of the crisis involving Bani-Sadr he preserved a three-week silence before he came out with his comments on the dispute.

Meanwhile the regime faces many problems. These include a faltering economy, with a real cash crisis; the opposition remains active with continued killing of regime supporters reported in the Tehran press--the most serious last week the attempt on the life of Khomeyni's Mashad representative, Abbas Vaez Tabbasi, which resulted in the death of his deputy, Mohammad Javad Modarressi, and his guards; internationally, the regime's prestige continues to drop, with the much-vaunted plan for the liberation of Palestine ending up as something of a joke and the Afghanistan plan also preliminarily proving a damp squib. At the same time Saudi Prince Fahd's plan for Mideast peace continues to gain ground, while the Tehran regime has set itself completely against it. This is one of the factors causing continued coolness between Tehran and the Palestinians, whose chief, Yasser Arafat, has welcomed the Fahd initiative. The war also is going badly and the top military brass is getting angry and impatient with continued inefficiency, failure to obtain supplies, and the apparent greed and unwordliness of the mullahs. The military failed to intervene in recent battles in the Kurdish town of Boukan, where revolutionary guards were left to deal with the attackers.

Signs of an incipient growth in support for the monarchy with leaflets being spread and, even according to one Tehran report, a brief demonstration in the street to mark Empress Farah's birthday during which the crowd called for "Bakhtiar to bring back the Shah," and other reports of the exile opposition groups trying to come together in a bid to topple the regime, have also been noted by leaders in Tehran.

Observers feel that the decision to return this year to traditional-type mourning ceremonies for Moharram for the first time since the revolution, instead of turning the period into another political campaign as in the past two years, was in response to the heavy pressures on the regime.

Radio monitors said that even Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Mossoud Rajavi and Bani-Sadr escaped attack last week in a surprisingly quiet period. There were, however, occasional attacks on the late Shah and his father and even young Reza.

CSO: 4600/134

SDAR OFFICIAL: REVOLUTION HAS STRENGTHENED LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1 Nov 81 p 14

[Text] Ma' al-Aynayn Sadiq, the new ambassador of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic in Tehran and member of the POLISARIO movement said in an interview: "The Iran Islamic revolution is like a mother for the liberation movements of the world," because this revolution, through its victory over one of the biggest mercenaries of imperialism, has resulted in a reinforcement of all the liberation movements of the world.

He began by referring to the history of the Sahara and the establishment of a democratic republic in that country: "The Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, which has an Arab Islamic government, is located in the northwestern part of Africa and has common borders with Mauritania, Algeria and Morocco. This country, which covers an area of 482,000 square kilometers and has a population of nearly 1 million people, has stood up in fight against the colonialism of foreign governments like France, England, Portugal, Holland, Spain and Morocco.

"The existence of the Saharan liberation movement was announced in 1967; and in 1970, following the martyrdom of tens of thousands of people of the Sahara by the Spanish army, this movement started its armed struggle. In the first clash, 85 percent of its territory was liberated by killing hundreds of Spanish soldiers and capturing some tens of them. At the end of 1975, the king of Morocco, by using his army against the troops of the Saharan liberation army and with the cooperation of colonialist Spain and Mauritania, brought about a multifaceted alliance against the Saharan nation. In February 1976, Spain officially gave up the territory of the Sahara and we announced the independence of our country and started the struggle against the Mauritanian and Moroccan occupiers. Finally, in August 1979, a peace treaty was signed between the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the Mauritanian forces; in accordance with it, Mauritania recalled its troops from the areas under its occupation and respected the rights of our people, officially recognizing the POLISARIO liberation front as the sole legitimate representative of the Saharan nation; thus, the Saharan liberation movement is continuing its struggle against the regime of King Hassan in Morocco."

The ambassador added: "In addition to liberating 85 percent of our territory, we have succeeded in occupying some parts of southern Morocco, and until such time when the occupying troops leave our soil, we shall not leave their own territory."

The POLISARIO ambassador went on: "To date 51 countries and also the OAU have officially recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic." In reference to the goals and plans of the POLISARIO front, he said: "We started our struggle with few human and material resources and the only factor in the victory of the Saharan people is the strength of their faith." In reference to the activities that his country has carried out so far for the Saharan people, he stated: "In the areas that are far removed from the reach of enemy attacks we have been able, in addition to the military training of the people, to establish organizations to deal with the domestic and foreign affairs of the Sahara. These organizations have provided the people with important social services such as camps for refugees, hospitals, schools, etc. As a result, the literacy rate of the Saharan people increased from 5 to 75 percent; children became acquainted with the Koran and the principles of Islam in the mosques during a 2-year period before starting their primary education, which is compulsory for all."

In relation to carrying out negotiations with the Moroccan Government with a view to ending the war, he stated: "Even though Morocco is an invader and an occupier, we wish to find a peaceful solution and a dialogue with this country in order to put an end to the war and bloodshed and economic losses. However, the Morrocan Government has always refused to accept negotiations, because it knows that to accept a dialogue will be equivalent to officially recognizing the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic."

In relation to the OAU plan, which has apparently been accepted by King Hassan, the ambassador said: "Under pressure of public opinion, King Hassan has apparently accepted this plan, in which it is proposed that a UN-supervised referendum be carried out to determine the fate of the people, but this is only a propaganda maneuver."

He added: "Since the preliminary to holding such a referendum is the withdrawal of the invaders, King Hassan has refused to carry out this operation; and he would like the people of the region under the occupation of the Moroccan troops to cast a ballot under his own supervision by force of arms."

The POLISARIO ambassador, referring to the fact that the Saharan people are at the same time attempting to continue their nation's struggle against the invaders without becoming dependent on either of the superpowers, said in relation to obtaining weapons for the Saharan guerrillas: "We fulfill two-thirds of our needs in arms and ammunition by capturing booty from the Moroccan troops and we obtain the rest from friendly countries."

Ma' al-Aynayn Sadiq then said in support of the Iran Islamic revolution: "The victory of this revolution for us is like our own victory, because this movement, through its victory over one of the biggest mercenaries of imperialism, has resulted in the strengthening of all the liberation movements of the world."

In reference to the relations between the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic and the Iran Islamic Republic and their common points of view, he said: "The two countries have excellent relations and their mutual points of view--especially

on the struggle against imperialism to achieve genuine independence--are very similar. For this reason, we have decided that, in spite of the request from some Asian countries to establish an embassy in them, the first embassy we open on this continent to be in Tehran." The POLISARIO ambassador added: "The Republic of the Sahara and the Iran Islamic Republic are getting better acquainted with each other and they will fight hand in hand against imperialism and Zionism, for the freedom of all human beings. In general, we consider every country that is struggling against imperialism, for freedom and independence, as having a common goal with us."

The new ambassador of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic finally wished for unity and power for Iran under Imam Khomeyni and said: "My message to the people of Iran, espeically to the families of the martyrs, carries the friendship, brotherhood and solidarity of the people and government of the Sahara. We wish that the Iran Islamic Republic will soon be able to carry out well its responsibilities in the international arena and free the people from tyranny; because the Iran Islamic revolution is like a mother to all the liberation movements of the world."

CSO: 4640/64

WIDENING OF REPRESSION OF DISSIDENTS: THE KILLING CONTINUES

London 8 DAYS in English 7 Nov 81 pp 16-17

[Text] AS IRAN'S parliament, the Majlis, finally appointed hardliner Mir Hussein Mousavi as prime minister — after unprecedented arguments and rejecting two earlier candidates put forward by the newly-elected President Khamenei — the fundamentalist regime was widening its repression of dissidents. Now soldiers, airmen and clergy are facing the firing squads.

Recent executions have included:

- In the northern city of Rasht, four soldiers were shot after being accused of cooperating with the armed resistance group, the Mujaheddin. A government statement broadcast in Tehran said that they had been found in a 'team house', a secret base of the kind the Mujaheddin have used to organise their squads of street fighters.
- Five pilots have been executed, say sources in Tehran. They too had been accused of cooperating with *munafiqin* — 'hypocrites' — the term used in government statements to indicate the Mujaheddin.
- Four young clergymen are said to have been shot after allegations that they had been associating with the leftists. Opposition sources named them as Ahmad Mohaddeth, Amir Sharifreza, Yunes Bahrani and Mohsen al Eshagh.

News of the killings came as the former president, Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, called on the government's Revolutionary Guards to join the opposition in a mass movement to overthrow the regime. He also appealed to 'clergymen, intellectuals and political personalities to protest and to break the silence'.

In response, Ayatollah Khomeini warned the Revolutionary Guards that any suggestion of disunity in their ranks would allow 'counter-revolutionaries' to infiltrate them. He urged the guards, or *pasdaran*, who have enforced the country's internal security since the fall of the Shah, 'to oppose those whose Islam is different from that of the clergymen' — a reference to the 'radical Islam' of the Mujaheddin.

The execution of military personnel is an important departure for the government. Hitherto the armed forces have been acknowledged as loyal to Tehran, though there have long been claims from the opposition that they have widespread influence among the lower ranks.

The execution of pilots is particularly significant, as Iran is desperately short of aircrew. The death sentence on the airmen may indicate deepening concern about opposition influence in the airforce. It was under the protection of airforce personnel that Bani Sadr and the Mujaheddin leader, Massoud Rajavi, were flown out of Iran in August.

The shooting of the four mullahs also marks the first occasion on which a group of clergy have been executed. At the beginning of October Ayatollah Habibollah Ashuri, who had been in prison for nine months, was among a group of 50 suspected dissidents executed in Tehran. And a Majlis deputy, Ayatollah Ghaffouri, has been in hiding since his two sons, Sadegh and Mohammed Qazem, were executed two months ago.

Sources in Iran report that families who have asked for the bodies of their executed sons and daughters claim that a practice associated with the regime of the Shah has been reintroduced. They have been asked to pay 1,000 tomans (about $75) for each bullet hole in the victim's corpse. Recently a large number of Tehran families were refused permission to retrieve the corpses.

The human rights organisation, Amnesty International, has asked the Iranian gov-

ernment for facilities for an investigating delegation to visit Iran. But Ayatollah Khomeini said that Amnesty was 'corrupt'. Addressing members of Iran's Parent-Teachers Association, Khomeini described Amnesty as 'a diabolical power'. 'They have a mission,' he said, 'to crush this Islamic movement and, accordingly, Islam.'

The foreign ministry in Tehran later issued a statement listing eight conditions for an Amnesty investigation. They included the repudiating of 'zionist and imperialist' interventions in Lebanon and in Central America, guaranteeing that the delegation would include at least one Muslim lawyer, and a prior condemnation of 'the criminal behaviour' of the Mujaheddin.

Amnesty claims that 'a minimum' of 3,400 executions have been carried out in Iran since 1979. In 1980, it says, nearly two-thirds of all known executions throughout the world took place in Iran. On 21 October Amnesty declared that since the dismissal of Bani Sadr in June, 1,800 people have been shot by the regime.

The revolutionary prosecutor general, Musavi Tabrizi, countered Amnesty's figures. Official figures, he said, showed that 1,405 executions had taken place since June. He said that the rate of assassinations and attacks by opposition forces had declined markedly in recent weeks.

Musavi Fabrizi claimed that since June half the supporters of what he contemptuously termed the 'mini-groups' of the left-wing opposition had 'repented' and that 90 per cent of those arrested had also repented. 'Guidance programmes have been organised for them in prisons,' he said.

The opposition has received support from an unexpected quarter. After last month's fiery speech in the Majlis in which he warned that Iran could become 'an ocean of blood', Mehdi Bazargan, the former prime minister, has published a document attacking the government's policies.

Bazargan — a leading moderate who was the first prime minister after the revolution — refers directly to the Mujaheddin as 'our youth, young men and women who are dying in street clashes or by order of the Revolutionary Force'. He appealed to Ayatollah Khomeini: 'Stop and rethink before it is too late.'

After his Majlis speech, Bazargan was furiously attacked by fundamentalist deputies. He was branded as an 'American lackey', and deputy Hojatoleslam Rezvani accused Bazargan and his political allies of implication in the wave of assassinations that swept Iran over the summer.

While Bazargan was publishing his protests in Tehran, unexpected dissension in the Majlis held up the election of a new prime minister.

As President Khamenei moved ratification of his nominee, Dr Ali Velayati, all observers expected automatic approval. Velayati, an American-educated doctor, is a member of the little-known fundamentalist grouping, Hojatiyeh, distinguished by its strong opposition to leftwing ideas and its anti-Bahai activities. These hardline credentials were expected to present him as a good candidate to work closely with the equally intransigent new president.

To the astonishment of most Iranians, Velayati was narrowly rejected — by a majority of six votes among the 207 deputies present.

Velayati was later said to have been rejected because there was insufficient evidence that he had taken part in the struggle to overthrow the Shah. Khamenei declared the rejection had been 'courageous'. 'The independence of the Majlis is precious to us,' he said. 'The Majlis is the source of all decisions.' He added that he had five more candidates for the post of prime minister.

His second choice, Oil Minister Mohammed Gharazi, also failed to win the deputies' approval, and Khamenei brought forward the hardline Foreign Minister Mousavi as a third option, but this time demanding a vote of confidence for his latest choice. Mousavi was finally approved.

During the confusion of the nominations and rejections, the former prime minister, Ayatollah Mahdavi Kani, remained in office. He had resigned in mid-October after what were described in Tehran as 'clear signs of tension' between himself and Khamenei during the presidential election in which they were both candidates.

The recent dissension is attributed by some observers of Majlis affairs to indicate the emergence of an informal alliance around Mahdavi Kani, who is not a member of the ruling Islamic Republican Party. This new group is thought to favour a more 'moderate' approach to domestic policies, especially that of repression.

CSO: 4600/125

ITALIAN WORKERS IN COUNTRY: A SENSE OF OPPRESSION

London 8 DAYS in English 7 Nov 81 p 39

[Text]

THE TIME we should have decided to leave Iran was when the Shah was overthrown. We didn't, so now we are trapped in this theatre of the absurd,' was how one Italian official describes the position of his country's companies operating in Iran. They are trapped chasing payments for work already completed while every day they accumulate fresh debts so that the break-off point always has to be postponed.

For many, news that such an air of gloom hangs over Italy's companies working in Iran is a surprise. By staying Italy now finds herself among the top two or three foreign nations still working on the sort of contracts that once made Iran such an attraction to the outside world. Currently Italian companies, many state-owned, are involved in projects valued at about $6bn, according to their embassy in Tehran. Some 1,300 Italian workers and their families are living in the country and, if work on the Bandar Abbas port gets under way later this year, the number will go over 2,000.

Explaining the Italian role in Iran, Dr Giacomo Sanfelite, first secretary for commercial affairs, said: 'We were the last major western country to become involved in Iran. As a result our main companies arrived here at much the same time, and most of our contracts were signed after 1974. The embassy, like many others, seems to fear that if it leaves all would be lost.

The main Italian companies operating in Iran are:

- Italconstructor — a consortium led by Condotte d'Acqua and including Dragomar, CMF and Italedil, with a $1bn contract to build the port of Bandar Abbas on the Gulf;
- Italimpianti — with an equipment supply and installation contract on a $3bn new steel mill planned for the Isfahan area in central Iran;
- Gruppo Industrie Elettro (GIE) — involved in constructing power stations at Bandar Abbas, Isfahan and at Kalan, north of Tehran;
- Saipem and Snamprogetti — both subsidiaries of ENI, the state oil company, involved in contract maintenance work on pipelines, construction of 400km of gas pipeline in southern Iran and of the Kangiran gas treatment and gathering station in the northeast;
- Italstrade — which has just completed a 400km highway east of Tehran;
- IPI-System — assemblers of prefabricated schools and temporary housing complexes for use on major construction sites; and,
- SAE — power lines and sub-stations connecting Bandar Abbas to the national grid and Isfahan, 750km away.

Despite this list many of the individual site managers and representatives of these different companies evince an air of depression and, in some cases, of fear. A case in point is the work on the Bandar Abbas port, the completion of which is of strategic importance to Iran, given the Gulf war and the long-term benefits of a port at the mouth of the Gulf.

At the end of August Iran gave the go ahead to a new agreement for Italconstruct to finish the work. This entailed a price escalation, and Iran's agreement to pay about $220m for work already done. Faced with an acute foreign exchange shortage the Iran Central Bank has, so far, simply ignored this agreement and has not made

the first instalment payment of $30m of this sum. In so doing, it has thrown into doubt the whole scheme.

One other aspect of the Bandar Abbas project which has deeply angered the 1,000-member Italian expatriate staff centres on the refusal of permission for the catering company to import food for the site camp. Worse still is the position of those GIE workers involved in the Isfahan power station. For several months, they have been effectively forced — at one point by armed revolutionary guards — to operate the plant on Iran's behalf, as their customer is refusing to accept its handover.

For Saipem and Snamprogetti the central problem remains uncertainty over its construction contract on the 400km gas pipeline from Kangan on the Gulf to join the existing IGAT-1 line that runs the length of the country north to south. Originally part of the gas supply arrangement with the Soviet Union this pipeline is now being seen as a major development of the domestic gas system. However, Saipem seems unable to obtain a firm starting date.

IPI-System is on the verge of leaving Iran with one complex being monthly repainted and touched up in the hope that the customer will take possession. And, although Italstrada has a good relationship with the ministry of roads, it may prefer to leave rather than accept fresh contracts.

Almost all senior Italian staff speak of 'counting the days' till their own departures. Among the most pessimistic of all the managers was one who likened the position of his company and others to the mythical tree of Bertoldo. Bertoldo, so the story goes, was sentenced to be hung and asked for the right to choose a tree. Day after day Bertoldo refused the trees offered and so his life went on. 'That's our position. We're only refusing the trees, no more.'

CSO: 4600/125

MOJAHEDIN, COUNCIL WARN ON OIL CONTRACTS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 pp 8-9

[Text] The National Council of Resistance set up by Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi and former president Bani-Sadr has warned governments and oil companies in a communique that they should not make agreements with the Khomeyni regime if they don't want to risk losing their money and future opportunities in Iran once the government has changed.

The statement also warned that it was highly doubtful whether the regime could honour the agreements it might make. Observers saw this as a warning that more strikes in the oilfields are being planned; reports from Tehran have already reported rumours that strikes have hit the industry.

The council also said that any future regime and the people of Iran as a whole would have no responsibility for repaying governments or companies who might sign deals with the present regime in Tehran. All oil dealings with Iran had political overtones for the Iranian people and in their eyes had no value, it warned.

The statement follows the recent OPEC agreement on reducing oil prices and claims in Tehran that this could lead to more sales and income for Iran.

A statement by the Mojahedin-e-Khalq organisation has also this week drawn the attention of world leaders to the fact that authorities in Tehran are taking blood from prisoners in Iranian jails before they are executed because of the shortage of blood and plasma in the country's hospitals. The statement claimed the practice is widespread.

The Mojahedin has also sent a cable to the International Red Cross at its Manila conference and in Geneva complaining of particularly harsh torture being carried out on prisoners in Iran. It claims some of this is the worst-ever drawn to the organisation's attention.

The cable also complained of psychological torture being imposed on Mojahedin prisoners, who were forced to watch torturing of their companions. A film obtained recently by the Mojahedin and shown on TV in the West also showed young prisoners being forced to watch the hanging of a fellow prisoner.

Conditions in prisons are also appalling, with sometimes 50 people packed into rooms meant to take only 12, the Mojahedin statement said.

The International Committee of the Red Cross earlier in the week criticised both Iran and Iraq for failing to observe the Geneva Conventions in their treatment of prisoners of war and refugees.

Its president, Alexander Hay, said the committee had had to insist on both parties respecting their obligations to the international treaty. In Iran prisoners were held for several months in places of detention which did not meet the requirements of the conventions. In Iraq civilians, women, children and old people, who had been evacuated at the time of the first offensive, were being held in prisoner-of-war camps, despite repeated representations by the ICRC.

Many Iranian families have also complained to the International Red Cross that members of their families, many of them civilians who were working in the war-hit areas of Iraq at the beginning of the war between the two countries, have disappeared without trace even though it is known they were captured and taken away by Iraqi troops. Some have never contacted their families though they were known to be alive at the time of their capture.

Representations to the Iraqi authorities have apparently failed to obtain satisfactory replies over the whereabout of many missing people. There is no evidence to suggest those sought are dead, but a general lack of humanitarian consideration is a charge levelled against the Iraqi authorities.

CSO: 4600/134

ROAD NETWORK BEING EXPANDED IN SISTAN VA BALUCHISTAN

Tehran KAYHAN AIRMAIL EDITION in Persian No 443, 4 Nov 81 p 10

[Text] Wednesday, 28 Oct, Zahedan, KAYHAN correspondent--In an interview with the KAYHAN correspondent, the director general of roads and transport for the Province of Sistan va Baluchistan stated the following about the condition of the roads in the province:

Regarding asphalting of the Zahedan-Kerman highway, Engineer Kordi, director general of roads and transport for Sistan va Baluchistan said: "As you know, before the revolution the contractor for this road work was a foreign company, and after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, they left this work half finished and departed. No other contractor was prepared to complete this road until brother martyr Engineer Musa Kalantari, minister of roads, proposed that this work should be completed by the Ministry of Roads and Transport. And this was unprecedented in Iran because the Ministry of Roads and Transport is responsible only for protecting and maintaining the roads." He added that: "The asphalt complex--whose managers belonged to a foreign company and had taken most of its equipment with them--was repaired and made ready for operation through the efforts of the engineers of the Ministry of Roads. By virtue of the efforts that the engineers and workers of this department have shown, the asphalting of this road will be completed in three more weeks. Although in continuing the operations of this road about 90 million rials have been saved; nevertheless, from the aspect of quality, even if it is not higher than the work of the foreign company, neither will it be lower."

Regarding other roads in the province, Engineer Kordi stated: "The work on Zabol-Zahedan highway, which was begun in the month of May this year, at present has been completed from 'Shileh' to 'Lutak,' which is a distance of 80 kilometers. Operations on the Saravan-Khash highway is also continuing, and it has been asphalted from 'Kesht' to Saravan, which is a distance of 45 kilometers." Regarding the difficulties on this department, the director general of roads and transport said: "At present, we are encountering shortages in equipment and tar as well as manpower including engineers, technicians and mechanics."

CSO: 4640/65

AFGHANISTAN PLAN LAUNCH FAILS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 46, 12 Nov 81 pp 3-4

[Text] The Iranian government's announcement of its plan to launch an Afghanistan settlement turned out to be one more political debacle for its retiring foreign minister and new premier Mir Hossain Mussavi. The response to the first details put out was so sceptical that Mussavi had to announce that what had been revealed was only part of the whole thing and the more interesting part would be revealed later.

Mussavi was hoping to launch his plan as a major diplomatic break-through for the Islamic government. The regime felt it was badly in need of a diplomatic victory if it was to establish a respectable place among the Islamic nations, especially after accusations that it was buying arms from Israel. Already its plan for liberation of Palestine had been treated with something akin to derision.

Mussavi, too, was in need of a boost for his reputation after a period in office which had demonstrably produced little, if any, benefit for Iran.

Not unexpectedly, the Tehran rumour mill said that Mussavi was playing the mullahs' customary game of "delivering a sermon in instalments." Then it picked up the plan that was announced and began to analyse it. The comments disseminated were sufficiently damaging to the regime for the Islamic Republican party newspaper to warn "rumour mongers" of severe punishment if they persisted.

Mussavi's Afghanistan plan called for withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces and their replacement by a peace-keeping force composed of troops from Islamic nations. It also called for a mechanism to ensure that the departure of the Soviet occupation forces would not work to the advantage of Western "imperialist forces." The plan left the question of the legality of the Karmal regime and the position of the Islamic freedom fighters ambiguous.

The regime's internal critics, who have no access to the normal means of communications, have to resort to rumour mongering to put their ideas across. So they spread rumours that the Khomeyni regime was about to recognise the Kabul regime of Babrak Karmal, who, they said, was being held in power against the wishes of the Muslin Afghan nation by Soviet overlords.

"A fine record for Khomeyni's so-called Islamic regime, which applauds the murder of Sadat, a Muslim, but tries to protect Karmal, a self-confessed communist atheist," so the rumour mongers went on. This hit home, for Khomeyni never misses a chance to denounce Sadat and Hosni Mubarak but he rarely, if ever, refers to Karmal or the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Then new questions were raised. What had the mullahs done to help the Afghan Muslims? Sadat, who according to Khomeyni was an enemy of Islam, had given the Afghan rebels arms to fight atheists. But Khomeyni, who is being hailed by the mullahs as the "Saviour of Islam," not only has never materially helped the Afghans but also, it was pointed out, is hand-in-glove with atheistic communist Russians.

By last Thursday the regime, which obviously feels vulnerable in the face of the Tehran rumour mill, began to take advantage of the Moharram mourning ceremonies in an effort to distract people from the damaging talk. The controlled media suddenly dropped all references to the Afghan plan. The plan was obviously accepted to be a failure.

The regime's critics were not prepared, however, to accept a cease-fire, especially with the mullahs so obviously on the defensive. They suggested that the plan provided for replacement of Soviet troops by troops from South Yemen, the PLO and Libya, "who are in any case Soviet surrogates."

The argument was clear. The Khomeyni regime, which claimed to be Islamic, was now helping the Soviets to extricate themselves from their Afghan quicksand, while enabling them to retain their hold on the country through their Yemeni and other Muslim allies.

Additionally, Soviet puppets in Kabul would receive legitimacy. As to the Afghan freedom fighters, they could join other "Mojahedin" groups to provide revolutionary guards with target practice.

This last accusation so angered the mullahs that by Sunday they were claiming Israeli intelligence was behind the wave of rumours spreading in Iran against "Brother Mussavi's Afghanistan plan."

The final plan, issued Tuesday, suggested the Iranian Islamic revolutionary model could be used in Afghanistan. A 30-member Ulemas Council drawn from Islamic nations would supervise the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the setting up of a revolutionary council on the same pattern as that created under Khomeyni in Iran. As in Iran the revolutionary council would prepare the ground for the formation of a provisional government and the election of a constituent assembly.

This time the plan suggested troops to replace the Soviet forces should come from Iran, Pakistan and only one other Muslim state.

CSO: 4600/134

RISE IN NUMBER OF STUDENTS ABROAD: DRAFT EXEMPTION IS FACTOR

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 7 Nov 81 p 9

[Report from Oulu by HELSINGIN SANOMAT reporter]

[Text] Hundreds of Iranians are applying for admittance to Finnish universities. The number of Iranian students applying for the University of Oulu alone last spring was over 300, but only a few were admitted. The secretaries of studies of the universities are constantly receiving requests also this fall regarding the possibilities for study in Finland.

The rush by Iranians to the universities of Finland, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland is to a large extent due to the fact that the universities of Iran have at times been closed.

Young Iranian men also try to escape army service at a time of war. They are exempted from the draft if they have the papers to prove that they are studying abroad.

The individuals who have applied for universities in Finland usually have relatively plenty of money to pay for their studies. One individual, who was applying for the University of Oulu and who was asked about his means, showed his bankbook wherein the figures of the balance did not even fit onto one single line.

The Iranians are mostly interested in technology and medicine, although many of them are also willing to study science. Some of them have already studied for a year or two and they have the best possibilities to transfer into continued studies.

"There are even a few high school students within this crowd. They want to get abroad at any cost. We cannot even process their applications," according to secretary of studies, Jekka Pirinen, of the Faculty of Natural Sciences of the University of Oulu. He processed at least 50 applications.

Secretary of studies Taina Sampo of the Institute of Technology of Otaniemi tells that the actual peak of applications was last spring. It has been more quiet recently. This might be partly because of the fact that the government of Iran has frozen the assets of the citizens and it does not seem possible for those who leave the country to get their assets out of the country.

The Flood of Students was a Concern

The professors of Oulu were already concerned about the flood of Iranians. The Faculty of Medicine thus decided to have all applicants take an entrance examination, which naturally was given only in Swedish and Finnish. The surge was thus prevented. The foreign applicants of the Institute of Technology were given tests to evaluate their starting level. Hereby their knowledge of mathematics, physics and chemistry was tested. The experiment involving these tests was quite costly and according to secretary of studies Taina Samo the usefulness of the tests did not match the costs. At the Institute of Technology there will thus probably be a return to a selection based on applications, whereby each case is processed one at a time.

Around 10 Iranians are now studying at the Institute of Technology. Sampo says that applicants are now beginning to come also from other troubled countries of the Near East, among others Iraq, Syria and Algeria.

The advisory office of the students of the University of Helsinki has also been kept busy by Iranians interested in studying at the faculties of natural sciences, medicine and agriculture and forestry. Most of these have had to take entrance examinations and not many of them have passed.

Last winter more Iranians than usual were asking about scholarships at the grant office of the Ministry of Education. Since the scholarship exchange agreement between Iran and Finland is no longer in force, the applicants had to return empty-handed. Direct applications for grants can be made to the Ministry of Education only for a doctoral thesis or for studies of the Finnish language. The applicants were, however, mostly students of technical subjects.

The number of foreign students at the universities of Finland is currently 650. The number constitutes 0.8 percent of all university students.

9662
CSO: 3107/22

BRIEFS

TRACTOR FACTORY OUTPUT--With the coming into operation of five important industrial projects of the Tabriz Tractor Factory, its industrial production will increase a considerable amount. While announcing this news in an exclusive interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY in Tabriz, Engineer Tahmasebi, acting director of the Tabriz Tractor Factory, added that at present this factory has five important industrial plans being implemented, including the plant to manufacture 20,000 tractors per year, the plan to produce 30,000 Perkins engines per year, and the big plan for a 50,000-ton foundary where big, medium, and small parts for agricultural equipment will be produced on three assembly lines. He said that the assembly line for small parts for this plan will began operation within the next 20 days. Regarding the level of production this year, the acting director of the Tabriz Tractor Factory said: "In the first 6 months of the current year, 5,379 Universal and Massey-Ferguson tractors have been assembled by this factory, and they have been distributed to the country's farmers by the agencies for agricultural equipment." [Text] [Tehran BURS in Persian 9 Nov 81 p 1]

CSO: 4640/62

FINANCE MINISTER ARIDOR INTERVIEWED ON POLICIES

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 9 Oct 81 Weekend Supplement p 9

[Interview with Yoram Aridor, finance minister, by Aviezer Golan; date and place not specified]

[Text] Finance Minister Yoram Aridor came to Washington to present to the administration the annual request for economic and military aid (for 1983), at a very unpleasant time.

The whole administration is involved in a feverish effort to cut the budget, and whole systems of welfare are being terminated, despite the vocal protests of the liberals in the United States. At such a time, it is very difficult to justify aid in the billions of dollars to Israel, especially since Israel is not satisfied with its present rate of aid (at 2.2 billion dollars), but Aridor requested an increase to almost 3 billion dollars.

And as if that were not enough, during the finance minister's stay in the United States--for 2 weeks--the dispute surrounding the AWACS deal and the rest of the Saudi package sharpened, and President Reagan announced, at a press conference, very harsh words about "the intervention of foreigners in the foreign policy" of the United States. The reference was understood to be to Israel.

I asked Yoram Aridor, when I interviewed him, if there had been an influence on his mission on the part of the Israeli government. He responded carefully, as he is wont to weigh each word:

Answer: After the president's press conference, I met with the budget director, David Stockman. The discussion was candid, and we spoke of Israel's economic problems, and about the steps we have taken to solve them, and the reasons for an increase in American aid to us. At the meeting with him, I did not sense any change in the atmosphere, as compared to other meetings which I had had prior to the president's declarations at the press conference.

Although I apparently came at an inconvenient time, because of the differences over the AWACS, in terms of the purpose for which I did come--I return home encouraged by the understanding which I discovered here of the problems that Israel is suffering economically.

Question: Will the defined request for aid be granted?

Answer: The request will be studied in detail in the coming months, according to the usual arrangement.

(Mr Aridor is not only cautious in his formulations. When he spoke to finance ministers who convened at the Monetary Fund conference, he drew laughter and applause when he said: "Every finance minister must be by nature a cautious man--but what cautious man would agree to become a finance minister?" He is also famous for his suspicious attitude towards representatives of the media. When he agreed to give this interview, the first in a long time, he insisted that his words be quoted exactly as said, without changes. He said: "The subjects which I have discussed here are so important as not to be endangered by journalistic telegraphy." His condition was accepted.

(In contrast to earlier visits to Washington by preceding finance ministers, Aridor was not satisfied to meet his American counterpart, and members of the financial system of the United States. He also met with Secretary of State Haig, but regarding that meeting he refused to say a word. He also met with dozens of senators and congressional representatives, committee heads of the two houses, and the like. In total, he met about 100 people. One of his more unusual meetings was a dinner given by the speakers of the two legislative bodies, from both parties.

(Mr Aridor did his homework and came to every meeting with the appropriate quote. At the dinner he opened by reading from a text):

Aridor: "The will of people who are struggling for the sacred goal of the freedom of their land will not be defeated by any force posed by their enemies." (Folding his paper, Aridor continued): These words are appropriately said about Israel, but were in fact said by one of the fathers of the American revolution, Patrick Henry, in the same speech in which he ended with the famous words: "Give me liberty or give me death."

Question: This may have drawn a lot of applause, but is a successful quote enough to "sell" a request for increased aid, in the atmosphere of cuts which is prevailing in Washington today?

Aridor: I emphasized that the request completely derives from the defense needs of Israel. One-third of Israel's budget is devoted to debt service, and these debts (which are paid promptly and on time) were caused by expenditures for defense needs in the past and in the future. I gave as an example the new deployments in the Negev, costing Israel about 5 billion dollars, even though we have received from America only 3 billion--most in the form of loans. I explained that if America views Israel as an ally, then the security problems of Israel must be examined for their effect on the security interests of America, which require a strong Israel. This approach was received with understanding.

Question: But didn't the Israeli economic situation influence the discussions? Doesn't Israeli inflation give the Americans the feeling that their aid is being poured into a bottomless pit?

(Apparently the Americans with whom Aridor met were well informed about the condition of the Israeli economy, and not only about the situation as it is pessimistically reflected in Israeli headlines.)

Aridor: They were particularly interested in how we succeeded in stopping the growth of inflation while increasing exports and without increasing unemployment.

(No wonder, this is the problem which faces the Reagan administration today. He succeeded in reducing inflation, but unemployment increased, and high interest rates--which strengthened the dollar abroad--hurt exports and is not enabling increased investment, on which the administration has hung its hopes for increasing revenues despite a tax reduction....

(But Aridor does not want to sound as though he lectured the Americans on how to manage their economy.)

Aridor: I explained to them the techniques and stages which I was following to reduce three-digit inflation, but I emphasized that these techniques might not be appropriate for a relatively small inflation such as that of the United States. They understood. They also understood that the reduction of inflation is a gradual process.

When I visited here in May and was asked what I intended to do, I was asked questions similar to those asked now, but then the questions were accompanied by skepticism, while now they are accompanied by curiosity.

(One of the measures used by Aridor, which aroused interest among his counterparts, was the elimination of the fuel subsidy. This arouses associations with the situation in America, where although there is not a direct fuel subsidy, there is something similar: fixed low prices for fuel which is produced within the United States.)

Aridor: One of the things which helped me this time was that I was able to point to those measures which were taken in Israel to reduce the current budget. When I assumed my current position, the fuel subsidy was 45 percent--and it was completely eliminated, but not in one drastic step, but rather in six graded steps--three before the elections and three after. This proved to be a positive method, and I attribute to it the reduction in the amount of money in circulation, which began in September.

(But a reduction in budget is not accomplished only by eliminating the fuel subsidy. Aridor also decreed that governmental ministries freeze their activities. The freeze has lasted 2 months, and a number of ministers have rebelled against it. I asked him about this.)

Aridor: I can appreciate that no minister is satisfied when the activity of his ministry is cut. But I believe that they all can distinguish between essential and less essential expenditures, the latter of which can be deferred to reduce the national budget, which is essential to stop inflation and increase economic growth.

Question: And what is the truth about the "ministers' rebellion"? How did they accept your decree?

Aridor: The decision to freeze activity was mine, by virtue of my authority as executor of the budget. Later the decision became a resolution of the whole

cabinet, and I was even requested--without eliminating the freeze--to present in November a proposal to cut 3 to 5 percent from the current budget. Ministries which had already cut their budgets by the requested percentage were released from the freeze. Those were--in terms of their expenditures--the big three: the Ministry of Defense, Education, and Housing. Perhaps my methods were not routine, but they were effective.

(I repeated for him the claim which is heard in Israel, that his methods are emptying the country's coffers of foreign exchange. This was the only time in the interview that he lost his coolness.)

Aridor: There is no basis to that claim. Some of the news media, as well as Mr Peres, have acted as though hundreds of millions of dollars have been wasted on the imports of cars and televisions, after the import duty was lowered. I have reported the exact figures--and if there was any additional spending on imports (and not advance buying) it amounted to no more than 40 million dollars, which is 0.3 percent of the total annual imports. In contrast to its marginal effect on the scope of imports, it was very essential in the fight against inflation. Yet they continue to complain. It is too bad that baseless claims are cast into space without self criticism.

(The anger of Aridor stemmed, at least in part, from the fact that these "baseless" claims had reached the United States and he was frequently asked about them at length.)

Aridor: You have no idea how much time I was forced to devote to inform my hosts of the correct figures (in the abridgment of the Israeli case, which was given to the hosts, the budget cuts received six lines; the increase in production--five; but the "television and car affair" received 15 lines). I assume that the truth put their minds at ease. But this is an example of how the country can be damaged by presumably objective publications which are in fact lies.

(It seems that his anger towards economic journalists was boiling when he prepared his speech which he gave at the Monetary Fund conference, but there his anger found salvation in sarcasm.)

Aridor (in his speech at the conference): "We who deal in the economies of countries are for the most part ministers of finance. We will never win the Nobel Prize in economics, because unlike the Nobel Prizes in other fields, in economics the prize is given only to those who advise others....

(After he has vented his anger, the seriousness which is characteristic of him returns, and he quotes from another of his speeches, a speech which he gave at the Congressional dinner.)

Aridor: In spite of the great difference between the Israeli economy and the American economy, the two have three common problems, which may be called the three ex's:

Expenditure, excessive taxation, and expectation.

(Aridor emphasized the necessity for dealing with expectations of the public as a real component of the economy, and not just as a partial component in weighing supply and demand.)

Aridor: In my opinion, economic theory has to develop this subject.

Question: What expectations may the public have of you, with your return home?

Aridor: Even after my visit to the United States I see no reason not to continue the present economic policy, as it was implemented both before and after the elections.

(From the distance of thousands of kilometers, it is difficult for me to judge whether these words will be received in Israel as good news.)

7075
CSO: 4423/28

GROUP OPPOSED TO SINAI WITHDRAWAL TRIES TO SETTLE IN OFIRA

Authorities Prevent Occupation

TA251044 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 25 Nov 81 pp 1, 15

[Report by Sha'ul Galay]

[Text] Last night an attempt to settle in Ofira by a group opposed to the withdrawal from Sinai was apparently foiled after the discovery in Ofira of the group's local contact.

Because of police surveillance, the man could not contact his colleagues who had reached Elat and were waiting there for an announcement by him that "everything is fine."

At dawn, a truck containing the settlers' equipment was stopped at a roadblock at the entrance to Ofira.

The settlers had planned to take over several vacant apartments there and had maintained contacts with several of the local inhabitants. MA'ARIV has learned that about 2 weeks ago a delegation of settlers visited the town in order to ascertain the public's reaction in Ofira if they were indeed to occupy these apartments.

The settlers said that they were told then that the inhabitants saw "importance in the creation of an active pocket of resistance to the evacuation of Ofira, too."

The settlers are members of the Ma'oz group, the most extremist of the groups opposing the Sinai withdrawal, whose leaders include Rabbi Ari'el who was candidate number two in Rabbi Kahana's Knesset list.

The Ofira police, the security forces and local administrators learned only after midnight of the settlers' intentions. The roadblocks were then immediately reinforced.

Government Allows Entry

TA251046 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 25 Nov 81

[Text] Six families and about 20 high school students--members of the movement to stop the withdrawal from the Sinai--have now arrived in Ofira, after waiting some 6 hours near the security checkpoint at the entrance to the town. Deputy police chief inspector Qedem told our correspondent, Eytan Rabin, that the decision to allow the members of the movement to enter the town was made by the government; thus, we could not interefere.

Four families are already living with local residents, and our correspondent has learned that the rest intend to camp on the beach. The local authorities in Ofira have made it plain that if they violate the law or occupy apartments they will be arrested as squatters.

More 'Squatters' Arrive

TA261834 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 26 Nov 81

[Text] The number of new residents who have arrived in Ofira since yesterday now stands at 60. They include 35 yeshiva students, including girls, and several families that will engage mainly in teaching. Today the squatters declared the establishment of a yeshiva and they said they would ask for formal recognition. They also submitted an official request to the southern Sinai directorate to enable them to live in 16 vacant apartments.

CSO: 4423/45

GOLAN SETTLERS DEMAND ANNEXATION

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Oct 81 p 2

[Article by Menahem Rahat: "Golan Settlers Committee Demands Immediate Annexation"]

[Text] The Golan Settlers Committee, at its holiday meeting at Katsrin, called upon the government to immediately implement Israeli law in the Golan Heights--as the last and only means of preventing erosion of the position of the Druse in the Golan with respect to Israel.

The committee, which represents all of the Jewish settlements in Golan, devoted its session to recent developments in the Druse settlements of the Golan Heights, and to the new policy of the Defense Ministry in the area, which permits the Druse Arabs to return their identity cards. The committee rejected the definition of "a new policy" which has been given to these measures, and it defined these measures as a collapse of the old policy.

Members of the committee noted that in spite of efforts by persons of the military administration in Golan to explain to them the meaning of the "new policy" in the Druse villages, they were not convinced of its correctness. According to them, Golan settlers are now afraid of deep frustration in the face of the deterioration of the situation in the Druse villages, and to this is added the frustration caused by the freeze on further development plans in the Golan Heights.

The committee decided to demand an urgent meeting with the prime minister at which they would clarify their demand for the immediate imposition of Israeli law within Golan.

The settlers committee decided to protest the fact that the state of Israel is not protecting its loyal citizens among the Druse of the Golan, who have preferred to take on the many risks of their decision not to turn in their identity cards. The committee believes that the appointment of a special officer in Golan to receive identity cards is an act of surrender to PLO threats, Syrian spies, and pressure by the Damascus government.

Members of the committee explained that doubts among the Druse appeared against the background of the Camp David accords, within the framework of which the government accepted the evacuation of Israeli settlements in Sinai. The Druse, according to committee members, are afraid that Israel will also give up the Golan

Heights, on the assumption that the government will not find it difficult to "cede" the Druse Arabs, in the face of its ceding settlements populated by Jews.

Against this background, the committee decided to demand now, as strongly as possible, the immediate imposition of Israeli law in Golan, in order to prove that there is no basis for these fears, and that the concessions in Sinai will not be repeated in Golan.

At the same time, extreme nationalist groups in the Druse villages this week raised two new demands: permission for the Druse Arabs to market the apples which they grow in Damascus, and the dissolution of the local councils to enable the people to elect new councils.

Extremists in Majd-al-Shams claim that apples which they grow are "products of Syria" since the whole region is "Syrian territory." The extremists also claim that all council leaders are surrogates, having been selected by the military administration, which appointed people to these positions on the basis of their being known as moderates. The extremists claim that these leaders do not represent the residents of the villages.

7075
CSO: 4423/28

BETHLEHEM MAYOR DEPLORES DEMOLITION OF HOUSES

TA231425 Tel Aviv 'AL-HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 23 Nov 81 p 3

[Report by Q. Amnon]

[Excerpts] The collective punishment policy in the West Bank has particularly stunned those who are termed "moderates." The demolition of houses in Bayt Sahur and Bethlehem raised among them the following musings: What hopes can one have if, in the wake of the tossing of a stone or a bottle by three boys, the authorities blow up four two-storey houses, forcing dozens people on the street?

We approached Bethlehem mayor Ilyas Frayj to hear his opinion on the recent incidents. He is still shocked by what he calls the "oppressive hand policy" introduced by Ari'el Sharon in the territories. "We are being oppressed. Who will help us?" he asks. "How can Jews perpetrate such an act of oppression: The demolition of four houses and the throwing into the streets of 55 people because of a misdemeanor committed by boys? Is this what the members of a nation that has known 2,000 years of oppression do? Where is your morality? To punish children and old people for a misdemeanor that caused no damage? And now, after this, are people expected to remain quiet?"

Ilyas Frayj does not let you ask questions. He is excited and continues in his monologue.

"Believe me, all of us in Bethlehem and Bayt Sahur were stunned by that act. If these are Israel's intentions, then there is no hope for a settlement. This is no longer a hard hand, this is terror. And to do this in Bethlehem, before Christmas? Do the authorities know what they are doing? That act aroused the Palestinian population, regardless of class or age."

Except for one, Bisharah Qimsiyah, who defended the demolition of the houses on Israeli television, I remind Major Frayj.

"That man does not deserve to be mentioned," utters Frayj and refuses to talk about the subject. And, indeed, nobody in Bethlehem was willing to discuss this phenomenon. "That man is simply disgusting if he is able to justify on

television the demolition of the houses, one of which belonged to his relative," I was told by a Bethlehem Municipality employee. "He is altogether a product of the military government and is representing only himself."

Ilyas Frayj continues: "A commission of enquiry must be set up, which will issue a just verdict about the horrible injustice committed against innocent people. This issue must not be struck off the agenda."

The impression is that there has never been such a consensus in the territories and such a solid support for the PLO. Regardless whether they are George Habash sympathizers or steadfast supporters of King Husayn, all keep repeating in one voice: "The PLO is our sole and legitimate representative."

"When practically the whole world is of that opinion, how can we have a different one?" says Frayj.

Ilyas Frayj expects from the Arab summit in Fes realistic resolutions. Prince Fahd's eight-point plan is acceptable to him, but he hopes for a mutual Israeli-Palestinian recognition "so that the time may come for negotiations between representatives of Israel and official representatives of the Palestinians: the PLO."

From top-level policy he comes down again to the demolition of houses, unable to be calmed: "When a Jewish boy throws stones at policemen in Jerusalem and even injures them, will the authorities dare blow up his house?" he asks, adding: "Valiant heroes, be ashamed of yourselves!"

CSO: 4423/45

ATTORNEY LANGER INTERVIEWED ON RESISTANCE TO OCCUPATION

Havana TRICONTINENTAL in Spanish No 77, Jul-Aug 81 pp 39-43

[Interview with Israeli attorney Felicia Langer, by Virgilio Calvo]

[Text] Israeli attorney Felicia Langer, who for years has dedicated herself entirely to defending Palestinian patriots in the territories occupied by Israel, talked to TRICONTINENTAL about her work, the main problems experienced by Palestinians in the occupied territories, and the situation in Israel. We now offer our readers extracts from that conversation.

[Question] What policy is Israel following in the occupied Palestinian territory?

[Answer] To try to eliminate the Palestinian people's spirit of struggle. To exterminate their leaders. But they don't understand that for each leader they eliminate, 10 more arise. They don't understand the Palestinian people's extraordinary vitality and their unbending determination to fight and not give up.

[Question] How do they carry out their plans for extermination against the Palestinian leaders?

[Answer] The method is to arrest everyone suspected of being a leader, using different means for that, from denunciation to mass detention. Afterward, when they find a leader, they cover his head with a piece of cloth so that he can't be identified and take him to southern Lebanon, where they give him to the separatist Saad Haddad, which is in fact the same as a death sentence.

[Question] Do you believe, then, that Israel is violating human rights in the occupied territories?

[Answer] Israel has been violating human rights in the occupied territories since 1967, continually and systematically, without taking into account any international law. Israel brutally commits war crimes in the occupied territories through its ongoing policy of collective punishment, torture of prisoners, mass arrests, etc. As a single example, I can tell you that some 20,000 houses belonging to Palestinian families have been destroyed by the Israeli occupation forces as a terrorist measure against the civilian population.

[Question] In your opinion, what is the core of the Middle Eastern problem?

[Answer] I think that the fundamental issue in the problem of war and peace in the Middle East lies in the lack of rights experienced by the Palestinian people.

[Question] How is the Palestinian people's opposition to the Israeli occupation manifested?

[Answer] You probably know that even the Palestinian children fight against the occupation. Once, in court, I thought that for the Israeli authorities the Palestinians have no children, for even the 12- and 13-year-olds were called terrorists, and treated by the police as if they were men, although actually it must be said that they've had to fight with total determination against the oppressors.

[Question] With what type of weapon do these children fight?

[Answer] With stones. Stones are the only weapons they have, the only thing left in their territory. But the occupation judges say in the military courts that stones should be considered firearms. In a military court I said, not long ago, that Israel had raised stones to a very high level, such that they were perhaps being given the same importance as in the Stone Age, judging people, even children, for throwing stones, for flying the Palestinian flag, or for having patriotic feelings.

[Question] How would you describe the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories?

[Answer] It's really a sea of blood and tears, but it is also evidence of the perseverance, patience, and profound optimism of the Palestinian people in their struggle.

[Question] Do you think the Palestinian people's will to fight has been exhausted?

[Answer] Perhaps others would say, "Let's give this up; we live only once. Why live fighting all the time?" But you will never hear it from the Palestinians in the occupied territories. Their will to fight is tremendous.

[Question] What can you tell us about the terrorist attacks on prominent Palestinians?

[Answer] After the occupying forces saw their failure in the courts during the trumped-up trials of Palestinian figures, especially those intended to eliminate Bassam Shak'a, the mayor of Nablus, they decided to make use of the method of terrorist assassination. They tried to eliminate by that means the men who were opposing them from nearly invulnerable positions, within the law imposed by the occupation authorities themselves. But they didn't realize that whereas before they were followed by the masses, they're now also considered heroes, living denunciations of the occupation and the criminal methods of the occupiers.

[Question] How does the struggle for peace stand in Israel?

[Answer] The forces fighting for peace in Israel aren't very well developed, and their struggle is still very weak, but we are trying day and night to convince the people that the present Israeli policy only causes more unemployment, poverty, corruption, cruelty, economic stagnation, and inflation.

As vice-president of the Israel League of Human Rights I can tell you that we are carrying on a battle against oppression and the constant violation of human rights in the occupied Arab territories. It's a long, thankless struggle, but, like our Palestinian friends, we will maintain our resolve.

9085
CSO: 4548/4

BRIEFS

INFLATION RATE--A rate of inflation of 85 percent is predicted for 1982; there is no intention to increase the rate of taxes; the gradual reduction of subsidies will continue--these initial forecasts on what is to be expected next year were issued Sunday by Finance Minister Yoram Aridor in an internal meeting of representatives of the coalition factions in the Knesset Finance Committee. Aridor added that there would be real cuts in next year's budget compared to the current one. He appealed to the Knesset members to help him exert pressure on the ministers to agree to the cuts and suggested that "each minister should be handled separately" so that he comply with the required cuts. Concerning taxation policy, the finance minister said that there is no intention to raise the rate of taxes. He noted that it was no longer possible to raise the rate of current taxes but that tax collection should increase. As for subsidies, the finance minister's policy will be to gradually cut subsidies of basic commodities and to cancel the subsidies of water and electricity. [David Lipkin] [Text] [TA241213 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Nov 81 p 1]

DEFENSE INDUSTRY DISMISSALS--Mass dismissals are expected in defense industry plants following cuts in the defense budget that have prompted cancellations of local orders from the defense industry as well as the discontinuation of projects developed in those plants. In defense industry plants in the north, more than 100 workers were already dismissed last week. Dismissals are being effected also in defense industry plants in the center of Israel and additional dismissals are expected. Dismissals in the defense industry mean the release of qualified manpower, in whose training much toil and expense was invested. Authoritative sources in the defense establishment confirmed yesterday that there had been dismissals. However, the defense industry's spokesman, Yosef 'Evron, declined to comment. The fact that the defense industry management refrains from relating to the issue through its spokesman testifies, according to reliable sources, to the embarrassment and frustration reigning there following Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon's decision to cut the defense budget. Recently, defense industry production was expanded and the sale of "Hetz" shells to Switzerland was reported. These shells are being sold by the defense industry to 18 countries throughout the world. In spite of all this, the defense industry management has been forced to dismiss employees. [Ya'aqov Erez] [Text] [TA231544 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Nov 81 p 2]

DEFENSE BUDGET CUT--The defense budget will be cut by 10 percent this year and will be frozen in real terms in the coming 5 years. This conclusion was recently finalized between the finance and defense ministries. The cut in the budget will force the Defense Ministry to cancel contracts signed with contractors and suppliers and pay them compensation for this. According to various decisions made since the beginning of the year the defense budget was supposed to total 40 billion shekels but it was decided in recent deliberations that the budget will not exceed 36.5 billion shekels. In its meeting on Sunday the finance minister intends to submit to the cabinet for approval a proposal to cut 1.25 billion shekels from the current budget. The cut involved will encompass all government ministries' budgets except wage expenditures. [Text] [TA261307 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Nov 81 p 2]

BAR-LEV WINS--Tel Aviv, 26 Nov--MK Hayim Bar-Lev was this evening elected by the Labor Party's Central Committee as the party's secretary general by a vote of 607 against the 351 obtained by his opponent, MK Eliyahu Speiser. The vote, by secret ballot, took place in Tel Aviv's Beit Arlozorov. Voting were 995 of the 1,104 members of the Central Committee. [Text] [TA261659 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1630 GMT 26 Nov 81]

SEPTEMBER UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES--The number of persons seeking work in September increased by about 1,800 and reached 37,289, as compared to 35,421 in August, according to figures from the Employment Service. The additional number of those seeking work was distributed throughout all regions, except for Tel Aviv, Rehovot, Nazereth, and the Western Negev. In the past month there was an increase in the number of requests for workers, reaching 18,047 as compared to 17,969 in August. The number of those unemployed for 6 or more days totaled in September 12,678 as compared to 13,587 in the preceding month. The decline in the number of unemployed was recorded in all regions except Nazereth, where there were recorded 743 unemployed, as compared to 660 in August, and in the southern Sharon where there were recorded 553 as compared to 491 for the month of August. In the month of September, the employment bureaus were unable to supply 1,756 requested workers, because of a lack of candidates, as compared to 1,505 in August. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 9 Oct 81 p 8] 7075

FUTURE POPULATION ESTIMATE--In the year 2000, the population of Israel will reach about 5.5 million, as compared to 3.9 million at the end of 1980. In the next 20 years a growth of 40 percent is expected for the Israeli population. This data appears in a forecast of the population of Israel until the year 2000, which was prepared by the Central Bureau for Statistics. These figures indicate a substantial slowing expected in the rate of growth of the population in Israel in the next 20 years. This stems from an expected decline in the birth rate in Israel, as well as a reduction in the difference between immigration and emigration. In the forecast, the Central Bureau for Statistics bases itself on the assumption that in the next decade, until 1990, 10,000 persons will emigrate each year, and that in the following decade--1991-2000--the number of emigrants will increase to 15,000 per year. As for immigration, the Bureau assumes that until 1990, 25,000 Jews will immigrate each year, and that later, until the year 2000, immigration will decline to 20,000 persons per year. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Sep 81 p 6] 7075

CSO: 4423/28

TRIPOLI'S INFLUENCE IN AFRICA SEEN INCREASING

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 p 33

[Text] ONE OF THE striking features of the African scene at the moment is the growing friendship between Angola and Libya. President José Eduardo dos Santos of Angola made Tripoli both his first and last port of call during his recent three-week foreign tour and, according to Luanda's state-controlled media, he used both stopovers in the Libyan capital to have talks with Colonel Qaddafi.

Angola needs all the friends it can get at the moment in view of the escalating South African military threat to its southern border provinces. One of Dos Santos' aims, in a tour that took him to Libya, Eastern Europe, France and North Korea from 30 September to 20 October, was to seek aid to help his country overcome the effects of the South African invasion last August.

But a friendship between the Soviet Union's closest ally in Black Africa and Libya is bound to arouse suspicion in the West. The Afro-Arab meeting held in Lisbon last week provided a good illustration of this friendship at work. It was soon obvious to anyone following the meeting — convened to prepare for the Afro-Arab conference to be held in Luanda from 6-9 December — where the money for the meeting was coming from. It was certainly not Angola, struggling with huge food and arms imports: the three-day session was held in Lisbon's most expensive hotel, the Ritz.

In exchange for the financial support it is providing, Libya has been allowed to dominate the conference. Resolutions issued by the Lisbon gathering, including one expressing solidarity with Libya, another demanding the release of all political detainees in Egypt and a third denouncing US military threats — mainly November's joint manoeuvres with Egypt — to the Arab world, and particularly Colonel Qaddafi's part of it, left no one in doubt as to who called the tune.

The programme of the Luanda conference was hammered out at a meeting in Tripoli last August — just as South African troops were driving hundreds of thousands of Angolan refugees into the bush. The conference will bring together PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, the head of Namibia's Swapo guerrilla movement, Sam Nujoma, and Oliver Tambo, president of South Africa's banned African National Congress. Its conclusion will coincide with the 25th anniversary of the foundation of Angola's ruling MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola).

The Lisbon meeting gave a foretaste of the kind of Afro-Arab solidarity the Luanda conference would preach, and made it clear that it would be heavily influenced by the author of the Green Book. Libya's Omar al Hamidi, president of the international preparatory committee of the Luanda conference and general secretary of the Tripoli-based Arab People's Congress, set the tone at the solidarity rally held on the eve of the Lisbon meeting.

One of the main targets of his speech was the Middle East peace plan worked out by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd, which he denounced as an extension of the Camp David agreement. Yasser Arafat's first reaction to the plan was favourable. The

general secretary of the PLO executive committee. Mohammed Nashashibi, originally scheduled to attend the Lisbon meeting, failed to turn up. The organisers said he had been forced to cancel his trip due to a meeting of the PLO executive, but no one was sent in his place.

The declared aim of the Luanda conference is to find a common strategy for Arabs and Black Africans against a common enemy. This is seen as imperialism, represented by Israeli threats against its Arab neighbours, and South African ones against Angola and other frontline black states.

At least on paper, those coming to Luanda are mass organisations rather than governmental bodies. Consequently, the December conference will concentrate on forging political ties.

The list of the organisations invited to Luanda is certainly impressive. Apart from the PLO, it includes Greece's victorious Pasok, the Cuban Communist Party, Malta's ruling Labour Party, the Italian Socialist Party, and the Soviet Union's influential Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee. Those coming from Africa include delegations from the ruling parties of Algeria, Mozambique, Zambia, Tanzania, Guinea-Conakry, Benin, Togo, Congo and Chad.

Some of the countries which Libya's plans in Africa most immediately concern have not heeded the Luanda call. The Libyan investment, however, looks as though it might pay off. Following Qaddafi's success at the OAU Nairobi summit in smoothing the feathers his country's intervention in Chad, and earlier in Uganda, had ruffled, the December conference promises to provide Libya with a new propaganda platform.

CSO: 4500/53

LIQUIDITY PROBLEMS SEEN EASING

London 8 DAYS in English No 45, 14 Nov 81 p 64

[Text] THERE IS optimism in Tripoli banking circles, following last month's Opec meeting in Geneva, that the liquidity problems Libya has been experiencing are over. Oil revenues had been slashed in half because of the international oil crisis, and some foreign contractors were recently reporting delays in payment. But after the Opec meeting, which set a level of $38 a barrel for high-quality crudes like the Libyan product, officials at the country's central bank are showing visible signs of relief, and saying that whatever cash flow problems had existed, they were now a thing of the past. Some are even enthusiastically predicting that liftings will get back to around 1m barrels a day by the beginning of next year — although the oil companies are far less confident. The current level is 600,000 b/d.

However, it seems that there are still some lingering cash problems. While top central bank officials are dismissive of rumours that letters of credit are to be stopped, they do not deny them outright. Libya has also taken out a $200m loan on the euromarkets, its first for many years. The seven-year loan, managed by the Bahrain-based Arab Banking Corporation (which is partly owned by the Libyans and whose president, Abdulla Saudi, was formerly in charge of the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank), is set at ½ per cent over Libor.

London bankers consider the rate somewhat harsh, given Libya's financial credibility. The banks participating — all Arab, Japanese or French — include UBAF, BAII, Gulf International Bank, Credit Lyonnais, Banque Européenne de Tokyo and the Kuwait Foreign Trading Contracting and Investment Company.

What the loan is intended for is unclear: admitted one ABC official: 'It's shrouded in secrecy.' It is doubtful whether it has anything to do with cash flow problems — if that were the case, Libya would have gone through the IMF. And, as one US banker closely involved in dealings with Libya noted: 'If they really needed money, they wouldn't be looking for $200m; it's a tear-drop.' The fact that the loan is not being taken out by the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, Tripoli's normal international banking channel, also argues against liquidity reasons.

All the signs indicate that the money is destined for use outside the country. The Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFIC), which is taking the loan, was set up recently to manage all Libya's non-banking investments abroad; it has no involvement with projects within the country. One project that the money could be earmarked for is the 25-storey tower block the Libyans plan to build in New York. The building, to be called Libya House, will be sited in the heart of Manhattan and will provide offices and accommodation for Libya's UN mission. However, as a property deal it falls within the scope of LAFIC's activities.

CSO: 4500/53

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SEEN LEADING TO SELF SUFFICIENCY

Valletta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 30 Oct 81 p 6

[Text]

•During his recent visit to the Jamahiriya, the President of Czechoslovakia, Gustav Husak, visited an agricultural project in Tajoura. Named Al Nasr, this project includes a milk processing plant and a station for rearing cows.

August saw the start of production tests in the first ures plant in Mara Breige. A similar project is still under construction. Ures is an industrial fertiliser and 90 per cent of the production will be used to fertilise the soil with azote and nitrogen. Ures is also used in animal fodder and in other chemical fertilisers.

Industrial activity increased in September and a number of projects were inaugurated. There was the official opening of the first turkey farm in the Jamahiriya which is able to produce 40,000 turkeys each year. 129 such farms are to be built and the total production is expected to be 12 million kilos of meat annually.

Joint-ventures

Another project for poultry meat production was inaugurated in Al-Azizijah. This project will be totally completed in 33 months with the aim of producing five million tons of meat annually and also six and a half million hatching eggs every year. This project also includes the construction of a fodder plant producing at the rate of 11 tons an hour.

Also completed and officially inaugurated was the fishing port at Misratha. This incorporates a large number of quays, workshops, cold storage and other public amenities.

A factory was opened in Janzour for the production of perfumed soap. This is expected to produce 2,000 tons of soap annually operating on one shift basis. Total production on a 24-hour basis will meet 80 per cent of the national demand.

Meanwhile, a trade cooperation agreement was signed with Tunisia which aims at establishing joint-ventures. Talks were also held with the Italian Government for the development of communications. Italy has a large amount of trade with Libya and better communications will help to quicken the industrial development in which Italy is aiding.

Amongst other projects we may mention again the domestic utensils factory which also incorporates a plant for the production of aluminium objects. 45 per

cent of this factory's production will be exported. There is also an agreement for the construction of a factory to produce cutlery.

As a measure for the Revolution's achievements, it can be said that a large number of projects producing food, tobacco, cement, construction materials, cloth, leather goods, chemicals and petro-chemicals, objects of glass and electricity fittings, are being operated. A large number of others are in an advanced stage of completion.

Independent

Meanwhile, during this month, two new industrial projects started operating in Tripoli. These are a factory producing stainless steel domestic utensils and a perfumed soap factory.

These are just a few of the projects listed in the Jamahiriya industrail development plan aimed at making the country independent in the production and consumption field.

In twelve years, the Libyan Revolution succeeded in changing the Jamahiriya from a consumer country dependent on imports controlled by monopolists, into an industrial country able to prodice much of its needs.

In the years 1962 to 1970, the money voted for the industrial sector was only 28.5 million Libyan dinars, making up roughly to just over 4 per cent of the total amount. The annual increase during this period was only 7 per cent, which in industrial activities resulted in an increase from 10 million Libyan dinars in 1962 to 19 million in 1969. At the same time, the increase in oil revenues was 12 fold: i.e.from around 49 million it went up to 619 million dinars.

The expenses voted for the construction of industries which started the change in Jamahiriya was about 900 million dinars for the years 1970 up to 1978. This was 13 per cent of the total expense for development started by the Revolution.

Three stages

The plan was programmed in three stages. The first and initial stage which covered the years 1970/71 and 1971/72 contained a threefold increase in expenses on the year 1969/70. The second stage covered the three years plan for 1973 up to 1975. During this period the number of investments ran up to 300 million dinars and saw the completion of 18 projects.

The third stage was the development plan for 1976/80. The expenses voted for this plan were nearly 1,516 million dinars.

This plan strategy in industrial development, was aimed at giving priority to projects manufacturing primary domestic objects in a short time, so as to lessen imports. First on the list were basic metal industries, including two chemical complexes for the extraction of salts.

The Revolution continued to progress and this year saw the start of new projects and the completion of others. In July this year the Secretary for Heavy Industries signed a contract with the Jugoslav Government for a joint-venture in managing and operating an aluminium plant which will be built in the area of Al-Niqat Al-Khums. The plant will be built on a 200 acre site to project is to be built to Produce petroleum charcoal. This particular project will employ 1,200 producers.

CSO: 4500/53

BRIEFS

INTERNATIONAL MARKET LOAN--A syndicate of seven banks, led by the Arab Banking Corporation, is arranging a $200 million Eurocredit for the newly formed Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFIC). This has raised some eyebrows because loans to Libya in the international market are extremely rare, leading some bankers to speculate that the Libyans are seeking to establish a little more of a presence in the market. A more specific reason for the loan involves LAFIC, which is intended to promote foreign investment for Libya. LAFIC plans to devote its efforts to foreign equity investments and property holdings. These activities were formerly carried out by the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, which now will be free to concentrate on traditional banking business. Arrangements for the seven-year loan are still at a preliminary stage. Libya had asked for an interest rate spread of 1/2 per cent above LIBOR but the spread may be increased to 3/4 per cent. Among the other banks reported to be taking part in the syndicate are Gulf International Bank, Banque Europeenne de Tokyo, Credit Lyonnais, Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Company, Banque Arabe et Internationale d'Investissement (BAII) and Union des Banques Arabes et Francaises (UBAF). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 45, 9 Nov 81 p 11]

CZECHOSLOVAKIA HEALTH AGREEMENT--A cooperation agreement was signed in Tripoli 28 October between Jamahiriyah and Czechoslovakia. It was signed by secretary of the General People's Committee for Health and the Czech health minister. [Text] [LD290222 Tripoli JANA in English 1837 GMT 28 Oct 81 LD]

CSO: 4500/58

PROSPECTS FOR PEACE PLAN DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1294, 21 Aug 81 pp 4-5

[Article: "Is the Saudi Plan Being Turned Into an Arab Initiative?"]

[Text] Prince Fahd Has Abolished the Open-Door Peace Settlement and Is Forcing the U.S. To Make a Definite Choice.

Right after the issuance of the decisions of the summit conference in Baghdad (October 1978), the magazine U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT published an extensive article dealing with Saudi Arabia. The bold headline on the front cover of the magazine, which appeared in conjunction with the article, questioned the real role which this Arab nation is playing in the Middle East crisis!

This magazine, which follows the lead of the U.S. State Department, concluded that Saudi Arabia basically is not pro-American, but is instead creating for itself its own strategy which usually is described as one of moderation. [The article concluded that] this is the strategy, the foundations of which were set by King 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, and by King Faysal after him, and the source of inspiration of which is a pan-Arab national position with all of its Palestinian dimensions and roots, especially with regard to the status of Jerusalem.

The objective had in mind in disclosing Saudi Arabia's role at that particular time was to publicly state its political position taken at the above-mentioned conference and to categorize it as being one of the nations rejecting the Camp David agreements and any solution which does not take into consideration the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people--including giving the Palestinians an independent state with Eastern Jerusalem as its capital.

The magazine, at the suggestion of the State Department, said that Washington must reassess its relationship with Saudi Arabia, particularly in view of the difference in viewpoints concerning the solutions suggested for the Middle East crisis. These are the solutions which favor non-recognition of the PLO, recognition of Israel within the framework of an open-door peace settlement which would guarantee its survival, and granting Israel the right to exist as a social and historical entity which is organically part of the Middle Eastern region.

When the plan of Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Saudi crown prince and first deputy prime minister, was published, it caused a lot of commotion among international circles and in Arab capitals. This was particularly true because the interpretations which were given to this plan went beyond the text of the plan and expressed what was already in people's hearts. According to a Saudi official, what this meant was that the viewpoint from which some nations saw the essence of the plan indicated a political change with regard to these nations' position concerning Saudi Arabia rather than concerning the plan itself. For this reason, this initiative was interpreted within regional frameworks which were not without incrimination and slander. This, in his opinion, affects the basic issue which must be kept as the cornerstone in any solution or in any comprehensive settlement. As for differences with Saudi Arabia concerning some international issues, this tends to harm the national interest.

Washington was the first to object to the plan. A White House spokesman said that Saudi Arabia "has come out with nothing new in the eight points which it has mentioned." The new things which Reagan's administration was referring to were what Alexander Haig, the secretary of state, had heard in Riyadh during his first trip there. Chancellor Schmidt related that he had been awakened early one morning and told that the attack which Israel was preparing against Syria would meet with a decisive position taken by the Arabs and that Saudi Arabia would be among the foremost Arab nations taking part in the battle--with all of its military, economic, and political means. Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Saudi foreign minister, told him: "If the Reagan administration is serious in its efforts to achieve progress in the peace process in the Middle East, then it must offer some new ideas and not be content with the ideas which it inherited from the Carter administration."

In saying this, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal was referring to the difference in order of priorities with regard to the comprehensive strategic view of the security of the Middle East. Alexander Haig wanted to avoid a clash with Israel both for personal reasons (he seeks to be President of the U.S.) and for political reasons (he has to please the Zionist lobby). This is why he had put the Persian Gulf and the protection of its oil at the top of the list of priorities as far as the Western nations are concerned.

However, Saudi officials told him that the basic danger is that Israel is inflexible and stubborn and that its expansionist aims will destroy all Western interests [in the Middle East], including the interests of both Europe and the U.S.

On his way back to Washington, Haig stopped off in Europe and heard statements which were similar to these. It appears that the promise which he had made to himself to attempt to change the new U.S. view of the Middle East crisis has not been kept. Proof of this is the fact that Secretary of State Haig, at the conference in Mexico, told the ministers of 22 nations that the 24 July truce in Lebanon would have its effect on the Camp David negotiations. A short time later, Reagan, in the presence of Sadat, said that the Camp David agreements were still the correct framework for a settlement of the Middle East crisis.

Commentators say that there is a connection between the position which Reagan expressed and the date of the publication of Prince Fahd's plan which he announced on Saturday, 8 August of this year via the Saudi News Agency. What this means is that this announcement constituted a reply to the negotiations which had taken place with Sadat and constituted an extended announcement concerning the series of discussions which he would be conducting with Reagan later on, that is, after Reagan meets with Menachem Begin and King Husayn during the next 2 months. Richard Jones, a commentator for the newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES, wrote an article in which he said that Prince Fahd was cancelling his visit to Washington because of his differences with the Reagan administration concerning the PLO.

This commentator suggested this conclusion based on information which had been circulated by Richard Allen in the White House, according to which the meeting between President Reagan and Prince Fahd would not take place in Washington, but rather in another location. This is why observers have felt that a difference in opinion has arisen and that this might modify the program of this visit.

Whatever have been the results, this initiative as such was totally rejected by Israel. The first reaction came over the radio, and it was essentially as follows: Prince Fahd's plan is a plot against Israel because its objective is to liquidate Israel in stages. It aims to do this by means of getting the Israel Defense Forces to leave the West Bank and to grant Israel's Palestinian enemies a state which, in the future, might launch a war of genocide [against Israel] with the backing of the Arab nations. Yitzhak Shamir, the Israeli minister of foreign affairs, rejected the eight points in their entirety and declared that they were not acceptable.

On Sunday Menachem Begin admitted that he had studied the points of the plan together with a special committee, and said that he had come to the fundamental conclusion that the text of the plan does not recognize the State of Israel. For this reason Begin, in his speech, attacked the newspaper which had seen in this initiative a glimmer of hope which would lead to recognition of Israel. Then he said: "Prince Fahd did not refer to Israel. As far as the matter of recognition is concerned, what he said was no different from what is said by the other Arab countries which for 20 years have been saying that Israel is not a state." From the interpretation which Begin gave to the initiative it appears that there is basically no recognition [of Israel] and that such recognition is not possible. UN sources say that the Saudi plan differs from the Soviet plan which, via Resolution 242, is in favor of guaranteeing that all nations of the area live in peace. When Moscow says this, it is also referring to the State of Israel since Israel is one of the states recognized by the Soviet Union and with which it has diplomatic relations, even though these relations have become weak in recent times. However, Saudi Arabia is in favor of guaranteeing to every nation of the area, that is, to the nations which it recognizes, [the right to live in peace]. Since Israel, in the eyes of Saudi Arabia, is a usurper nation which expelled the [Palestinian] native inhabitants and seized their wealth and property, the text of the plan does not apply to Israel.

When a commentator on Israeli television said that the Saudi plan was a turning point for aborting the Camp David agreements, [this meant that the plan aimed at] abolition of the open-door peace settlement and merely the establishment of

a state of peace in the Middle East, to be followed by the proclamation of the Palestinian state and the withdrawal of Israel from all of the occupied lands. But al-Habib al-Shati, the secretary general of the Islamic Conference Organization, views the plan as follows: "It is a unique opportunity for the Western nations, especially the U.S." He also described the plan as "having broken the deadlock concerning the future of the region since it represents the decisions made by the Islamic summit meetings at Mecca and al-Ta'if."

Reactions came from the Gulf area, and the general principles of the plan were welcomed by Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad said: "The speech by Prince Fahd has set a new framework for cooperation with Washington. His speech expresses a new political orientation which contains a qualitative and objective change." He also expressed his belief that the U.S. position which supports Israel will remain as it is unless the Arab nations, all together, hasten to take a political position vis-a-vis the U.S. and its interests in the Arab world.

This is what impelled most of the newspapers in the Gulf area to demand quick action to transform the Saudi plan into a pan-Arab initiative and to strive toward mobilizing strong Islamic and Arab support for it. Some Gulf newspapers also demanded that the upcoming summit conference issue a political statement which would force the U.S. to make a definite choice.

In Beirut the Islamic Bloc and the National Front for the Preservation of the South saw this plan as an initiative for solving the crisis of the area and as a significant event which puts the Arab cause on a new path. For this reason, Arab authorities were called upon to critically examine the positive features contained in the plan for the purpose of utilizing it to further the interests of the Arabs.

Viewing the plan from this angle does not mean interpreting the plan as a new formula for preserving the Arab nature of Jerusalem, affirming the rights of the Palestinians, and protecting the occupied territories. It really means seeing the plan from the point of view of Saudi Arabia's position of power in the world. After Egypt's exit [from this position of power], Saudi Arabia became the nation concerned with decisions concerning war and peace in the area. Every time Israel prepared to launch a fifth war--and this occurred more than four times, according to the newspaper JERUSALEM POST--it was Saudi pressure on the U.S. which postponed this Israeli military decision. In the 1973 war it was the position taken by Saudi Arabia, in addition to the oil-producing Gulf states, which gave the eastern front its international thrust and effect.

That is why it is said that the initiative of Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz which has encountered some objections on the part of Arab and Palestinian forces, has provided new bases for talks to be held with the U.S. administration. [The bases for] these talks could be summarized as follows:

1. The Arabs have been given an initiative, other than the international initiatives, which they can [use and] modify as a basis for a just and comprehensive solution [for the Middle East problem].

2. The initiative abolishes all the circumstances which were created by Henry Kissinger in 1973. These are the circumstances which led to Camp David and the separate open-door peace settlement. This plan means that it would not be permissible for any Arab nation to make a separate peace with Israel. It also means that any future solution would have to take into account the views of the Palestinians and the views of all of the Arab nations which met in Baghdad.

3. This comprehensive solution automatically abolishes the step-by-step policy which was utilized by the U.S. to destroy the unity of the Arab ranks.

4. [The plan means] arriving at a definite solution before the end of this year, otherwise the positions taken by the nations of the region will undergo a radical change. The purpose of all of this is to hasten to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank before the West Bank is made Jewish by means of the plan of Sharon, the minister of defense, who was the Israeli official who most violently attacked the Saudi initiative since it represented a threat to his dreams.

5. [The plan means] forcing the U.S. administration to come out of its swamp of delays and procrastinations, after [others] have accused it of merely pretending to be angry at Israel in order to quiet down the Arab nations.

Apparently these points will also serve as [the basis for] a program of action to precede the visit of Francois Mitterrand, the French prime minister, to Riyadh.

These are also points which Menachem Begin has described as being a type which are poisonous to Israel. In response to a question concerning his attacks on the government authorities in Riyadh, he said that the importance of the role of the Saudis is not only in what Saudi Arabia itself undertakes, but also in what it encourages others to undertake. As an example of this, he mentioned the financial and military aid which Saudi Arabia gives to the confrontation states and to the PLO, and in the context of this subject he also mentioned [Saudi Arabia's] compensation of Iraq for the destruction of its nuclear reactor, and King Khalid's talks in London and Paris in which he insisted on the necessity to recognize the PLO and in which he encouraged the European initiative. As far as Begin is concerned, all of these things represent the central force of Saudi Arabia's new action program, and Israel is afraid that the West will take this force into consideration.

Many observers are saying that, at a time when most nations are searching for a role to play, Saudi Arabia is already playing a role and is even diminishing it--or in any case is not exaggerating it. It has made the contacts that were necessary to make, has been able to arrive at this new point in the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and has considered this to be a normal thing.

Riyadh was the one who came up with the initiative and started the contacts. This was confirmed by Crown Prince Fahd, who said: "Following the instructions of His Majesty the King, we got in touch with Washington and expressed to the U.S. our great alarm concerning the deterioration of the situation, and we demanded that the U.S. put pressure on Israel before the situation comes to the point of exploding."

It is true that the cease-fire agreement is one of the results achieved by the intervention which took place due to national inspiration based on firm convictions concerning the basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict. "But," [according to Prince Fahd], "the decision to have the cease-fire does not mean that the Palestinian people have ceased marching along the path toward achieving their rights. This decision was made necessary by particular human circumstances at a particular critical time because our national commitment to the Palestine cause made it obligatory for us to act to save innocent lives which were being snuffed out by Israeli airplanes."

Saudi Arabia found that this was a suitable time for making particular proposals for a solution to the Palestine problem. It pointed out the basic tenets which have been the basis of its policy regarding the reality of the conflict with Israel. The proposals made by Prince Fahd do remind one of what was proposed in the past and some of them are inspired by summit meetings and UN decisions. But this particular version of [the proposals for] the solution gives the proposals a distinctive dimension at this particular time. These proposals are coming out before Prince Fahd's expected visit to Washington, and it is as if he wanted to publish the agenda of his talks with President Reagan in advance so that there would not be a repetition of what occurred with President Carter when he stated that "no Arab leader had ever suggested to him the idea of establishing a Palestinian state." Prince Fahd's plan will also be a new standard by which to test the intentions of the Reagan administration, particularly when he stresses that the time has come for the U.S. to be "less biased in favor of Israel and more just in its attitude towards the Arabs."

If the Republican administration right now is busy reordering priorities concerning the Middle East and making oil a top priority, then the reality of the situation requires making use of this new situation by means of making the U.S. position more pliable and flexible vis-a-vis the Arab position in order to safeguard the rights of the Arabs.

Thus the new effort has not been to induce the U.S. to join ranks with the Arabs, but rather to induce the U.S. to recognize what it so far has refused to recognize--that the right of the Palestinians to self-determination constitutes the normal basis for the solution [to the Middle East problem] and that events have proven that it is necessary to open a dialogue with the PLO. The fact is that the "implied" U.S. plan to acknowledge the role of the PLO is only emerging because of pressure. This plan crystallized somewhat during the latter part of President Carter's administration. The process of U.S.-Palestinian contacts would have resulted in recognition if the deal had taken place as planned--that is, the deal concerning freeing the American hostages who were being held in the U.S. Embassy in Iran. According to this secret arrangement, Yasir 'Arafat himself was to deliver the hostages to the White House, and this development was to be a natural prelude to contacts, recognition, and negotiations, on the basis that everything else would come later.

But this process failed--certainly due to Khomeyni!

Right now, who is there that is able to undertake the role of building the bridge between the U.S. and the Palestinians? The Palestinians are the ones who are

foremost concerned by the decision. The Americans are in a position to take this decision and develop it. And the Europeans are in a position to help undertake the role of intermediary, on the basis of the fact that a European channel leading to the solution would be automatically linked to the U.S. channel. So far nothing has happened to indicate that President Reagan's administration has made a clear and definite plan concerning its policy in the Middle East. So far its top priority has been the matter of relations with the Soviet Union. Starting now, and till the end of this year, President Reagan is scheduled to be visited by a number of Arab leaders so that he can complete his picture of the situation. Then the U.S. administration will proceed to prepare its own ideas and concepts concerning a solution for the Middle East crisis. For this reason, the current phase is one of fluidity and lack of decision, since the hope is that the "plan" will be ready by the beginning of next year. But there is absolutely nothing to prevent new developments from occurring before this deadline, which could render useless all of the analyses that have been made so far concerning the Middle East--so that the Arabs will not be called upon again to wait for the realization of a false hope!

9468
CSO: 4404/2

CENTRAL REGION AGRICULTURE PROJECT DEDICATED

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 1 Nov 81 pp 11-12

[Text] Damazine, Nov 1 (SUNA)--On behalf of President Nimeri the Central Region Governor Abdel Rahim Mahmoud opened yesterday the Damazine project for Agriculture and Animal production.

Attended the occasion were, "the guardian of the project" H.E the Saudi Prince Mohamed El Faisal Al Saud and the region's officials.

Mahmoud speaking at the opening ceremony said that the May Revolution has drawn from the principles and higher ideals of Islam all what would boost the ties of friendship and brotherhood between the Arab and Islamic nations.

The Revolution's call for Arab solidarity as well as Afro-Arab solidarity was to realize peace and stability through the economic integration for th enefit of the Arab nation and the mankind as the whole, he added.

Mahmoud went on saying that the project confirms all the constructive endeavours for the exploitation of the possible resources to contribute in securing the growing need for food in the world.

On the other hand, H.E. the Saudi Prince in statement to SUNA, praised the great achievement scored in the project and expressed his admiration over what had been achieved as well as his willingness to go ahead in promoting the project.

He added that the project was a fruit of the Saudi-Sudanese cooperation.

Speaking at the occasion was also the Vice Chairman of the projects Board Fatha Rahman El Beshir who said that, the project has economic and social goals as well as to realize food abundancy for Arab nation.

He added that the project resembles a leading experiment for the fruitful cooperation and integration between the Saudi and Sudanese private sectors. Thus it had been considered to be the unique example for the Sudanese-Arab future cooperation.

It is to be recalled that the cultivated area of the 500,000 feddan-project this season reached 70,000 feddan to be raised to 210,000 feddan in 87/88 season.

The cost of the project's first phase reached $36 millions.

CSO: 4500/57

BRIEFS

CONVENTIONAL AGRICULTURE PROGRAM--Khartoum, Nov. 4 (SUNA)--Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources Minister Dr. Omer El Amin Mohamed announced his Ministry would implement a $100 million programme in irrigated agriculture and animal resources during the coming 10 years. The Minister was speaking here yesterday to farmers representatives of the conventional irrigated and mechanized agriculture sector. Dr. Mohamed said the state would provide the needs of farmers in this section. Some 1,000 tractors would be imported to be distributed to farmers, he added. The Minister praised the efforts of the farmers in the irrigated sector despite the low potentials and the little attention given to this particular sector. He added that the coming season would witness an abundant produce through increased effort and the commitment of the state to provide all requirements of production. The Minister welcomed the formation of farmers' cooperative societies and promised to extend a helping hand to enable these cooperative societies function as required. The meeting was attended by State Minister of Agriculture Dr. Mohd. Hassan El Jak. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 4 Nov 81 pp 10-11]

CSO: 4500/57

BRIEFS

LABOR LEADER PARDONED--Tunis, 30 Nov (AFP)--Veteran trade union leader Habib Achour received a presidential pardon today for his role in a general strike and subsequent riots in Tunisia in January 1978 and was named president of the country's trade union federation. Mr Achour, 68, former secretary-general of the Tunisian General Workers' Union (UGTT), who has been under house arrest, was the only trade union leader convicted in connection with the unrest not so far pardoned by President Habib Bourguiba. The move was announced by President Bourguiba during a meeting at the palace of Carthage with the former leader of the UGTT and members of its executive bureau. Mr Achour, who is also vice-president of the Brussels-based International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), was today also named president of the UGTT by its national council, thus returning to the head of Tunisia's labour movement from which he was ousted after the events of January 1978. [Text] [NC301343 Paris AFP in English 1321 GMT 30 Nov 81]

CSO: 4500/60

NEW MILITARY DIMENSION EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 44, 7 Nov 81 pp 22-23

[Text]

THE SURPRISE ATTACK, in mid-October, by a powerful armoured column of Polisario guerrillas on the well-fortified Moroccan garrison at Guelta Zemmur, has raised questions as to the viability of the OAU referendum to determine the future of the former Spanish colony.

The Algerian-backed Polisario employed, for the first time, heavy battle tanks, reportedly of the Soviet T54 class, as well as SAM6 and SAM8 anti-aircraft missiles — with devastating effect. The Polisario column not only overran the 1,800-strong Moroccan position, but also managed to shoot down two Mirage F1 jet fighters and a Hercules C130 plane fitted with sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment.

It seems clear that the Saharan war is no longer merely a guerrilla conflict. The Polisario is increasingly able to match Moroccan firepower. Nonetheless, Polisario commanders still strike with great stealth and quickly withdraw their forces to avoid providing Moroccan aircraft with easy targets. Now, however, the Moroccans will be more cautious before engaging their aircraft, consequently weakening one of their few remaining points of military superiority over the Polisario.

The assault on Guelta Zemmur was the first major military action launched by the Polisario since it was decided at the July OAU summit to hold a self-determination referendum in the Western Sahara. From a purely military point of view, the Polisario strikingly demonstrated its capacity to adapt tactics to the new conditions engendered by the Moroccan strategy of building a defensive rampart across the Sahara to check guerrilla movements: Guelta Zemmur is 100km southeast of the protective wall surrounding the Saharan heartland, and close to the Mauritanian frontier.

When recently asked by *8 Days* in Algeria if the Moroccan-built wall had effectively turned the tide of the conflict in favour of Morocco's armed forces, Polisario Minister of Information Mohammed Salem Ould Saleck said: 'In the past we have always been able to counter any new Moroccan tactic or weapon, and I can assure you that this time the situation will not be any different.'

Even if the Moroccan wall remains intact, the Polisario has inflicted a severe setback on the Moroccan armed forces. The guerrillas will undoubtedly attempt to smash the wall at a weak point and force a withdrawal of Moroccan units to the few remaining towns under their control. Moreover, the Polisario's ability to hold Moroccan airpower in check will be a crucial factor in the next phase of the war.

King Hassan has attempted to use the Guelta Zemmur attack to reconcile Morocco's internal political differences. The riots last June, and the arrest of leading figures within the Union Socialiste de Forces Progressistes (USFP) in September, have rendered the pact established with Hassan in 1975 for the 'recuperation' of the lost Saharan provinces a thing of the past.

The USFP feared that the king had made too many concessions at the Nairobi OAU summit conference, and urged that a more prudent approach be adopted. In particular, they are worried that Hassan is under strong pressure from the progressive sector of the business community, symbolised by ex-premier Ahmed Osman (the king's brother-in-law), and international financial organisations.

The war is a serious drain on the kingdom's economy, costing an estimated $3m a day. Social pressure is growing for a more equitable distribution of wealth, and various politicians and economic planners are pleading the case for peace and, consequently, economic expansion so that badly needed reform measures can be introduced.

King Hassan has tried to mollify the opposition by declaring that after Guelta Zemmur he no longer feels bound by the resolutions of the Nairobi summit. So far, however, there are no indications that he really intends to backtrack on the OAU peace process, although a number of basic points such as the ceasefire, the exact referendum procedure and international supervision still remain to be worked out.

Interestingly, Rabat did not accuse either Algeria or Libya of encouraging the Polisario to attack Guelta Zemmur, perhaps because King Hassan does not want a diplomatic incident with Algiers or Tripoli to interfere with the Arab League conference scheduled to take place in Rabat at the end of November.

On the other hand, the Moroccans accused Mauritania not only of abetting Polisario forces, but also of sending military forces to bolster Saharan guerrillas. French diplomatic sources in Paris told *8 Days* that they practically ruled out this being the case as President Khouna Ould Haydalla's government has no interest in being involved in the war.

Having signed a peace treaty with the Polisario in August 1979, Mauritanian officials have tried to maintain strict neutrality. This has not prevented a steady deterioration in relations between Nouakchott and Rabat, which culminated in a Moroccan-backed coup attempt against Ould Haydalla in March. Diplomatic relations were officially restored at June's Islamic summit conference in Taif, but Foreign Minister Dahane Ould Mahmoud was sacked for this initiative, which was judged as premature by Mauritania's ruling military committee. Only one, junior, Moroccan diplomat is currently in Nouakchott, and the weekly Royal Air Maroc flight to Mauritania has not been inaugurated.

Mauritanian officials are seriously worried about further destabilisation attempts by their powerful neighbour, and are hoping that American influence in Rabat will temper the anti-Mauritanian campaign currently going on.

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END

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SYRIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD 'ARAFAT ANALYZED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 201, 28 Sep 81 pp 18-19

[Text] The "moderates" seldom survive at a time of confusion and anarchy. There is much evidence for this starting with Kerenski (who held the post of prime minister during the transition period between the eras of Tsarist Russia and Red Russia) and ending with Shahpur Bakhtiar in Iran.

The "extremists" are those who usually overthrow those "moderates" who are skilled in the art of maneuvering and dealing with contradictory situations, at the same time keeping their heads safe and above water, without sacrificing basic principles which they have vowed to achieve.

Nevertheless, on many occasions such expressions as 'moderates' and 'extremists' are used as a mere excuse to achieve objectives that are unrelated to their principles.

When evaluating the extent of the hidden war waged by al-Asad against 'Arafat, it would be difficult to say that this is a 'moderate' and that is an 'extremist,' or the other way around. The important thing is that the masks behind which the political stands are concealed, make political observers who are presently following the Palestinian situation ask: "Has al-Asad started his war against 'Arafat?".

Those who have been following the latest stages of the Palestinian situation which is squeezed between the hammer and the anvil, would, no doubt, have noticed the reference made in the Israeli newspaper, the JERUSALEM POST, concerning Sharon's new ideas about the occupied regions. The newspaper commentator writes quoting a semi-official source in occupied Jerusalem, as follows: "We, ourselves, are not in a hurry, since many of the Arabs in the region consider Jordan as being Palestine. No one raised an objection against Foreign Minister Shamir, Defense Minister Sharon, or the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations Blum when they referred to Jordan as being the Palestinian State."

This phrase, which was meant to upstage King Husayn and force him to take part in the autonomy talks to be resumed in New York in a few days, is now being used by the Damascus regime with the aim of severing relations between the Palestinian

resistence and Amman, relations whose most prominent feature is the meetings between their joint committees.

The phrase is also used to push 'Arafat into waging a side battle against King Husayn on behalf of the Syrian Regime.

For this reason, observers who are following the situation on the Palestinian front at present would notice that the outward appearance of harmony between Damascus and the resistance, which has rendered the Talal-Za'tar tragedy as a forgotten memory in history, is now passing through a very critical stage wherein hints are made to Yasir 'Arafat that there are alternatives to his leadership who may be placed in power.

It is no secret that relations between Hafiz al-Asad and Yasir 'Arafat have not always been marked with harmony.

Mutual suspicion prevails over the details of their relationship.

In fact, certain elements of Palestinian leadership have been continuously leaking reports of Syrian campaigns to slander 'Arafat each time he tries to appear before an international body as a responsible statesman.

These campaigns against 'Arafat were apparent in the series of attacks led by Damascus against his collaborators representing the PLO in Europe.

Following the assassination [sic] of Abu-Dawud, the attack against the Jewish synagogue in Vienna and the murder of French Ambassador Delamare in Beirut a few days after he accompanied French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson to his meeting with 'Arafat, doubts began to spread in certain resistence circles regarding which 'operations' could have been the responsibility of the Israeli Intelligence, and which 'operations' were engineered by the Damascus Regime.

What prompted 'Arafat to have stronger doubts were the reports that Syria had recently offered assylum to a group of Palestinians who are anti-'Arafat, led by Sabri al-Banna, "Abu-Nidal," whom 'Arafat had dismissed from the PLO in 1972 and who was sentenced to death in absentia because of his opposition to the diplomatic plan adopted by the PLO.

At the time when 'Arafat declared at the United Nations that he was carrying a rifle and an olive branch, Abu-Nidal, who on his part had condemned 'Arafat to death in absentia, was talking about the rifle in the name of Fatah, the revolutionary leadership.

Abu-Nidal's name was linked with the assassination attempt of 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam, foreign minister of the Syrian regime, in 1978.

For this very reason, it is a great surprise to see him now under the protection of Damascus.

Observers, however, consider this as the clear stand of Damascus toward the leadership of 'Arafat.

One indication of Abu-Nidal's actions under the protection of Damascus and against the leadership of 'Arafat was the discovery by PLO intelligence of an attempt which he had engineered to assassinate it's representative in Belgrade, the capial of Yugoslavia. The attempt led to the capture of four Palestinians, one of whom succeeded in infiltrating the office of the organization there. Suspicion on the part of certain elements of the 'Arafat leadership went to the extent of accusing Abu-Nidal, who is sheltered under the Syrian "umbrella," of competing with Israeli intelligence in the assassination of Na'im Khadar, the representative of the organization in Brussels. Some of them even went to the extent of accusing him of assassinating Abu-Dawud who was responsible for the "Munich operation" against the Israeli athletes.

Whatever the case may be, the announcement of such accusations is not a practical matter, since the destruction of these Palestinian leaders is only in the interest of Israel, and consequently, it is not improbable that Israeli intelligence carried out the assassination crimes.

Thus any accusation made outside this scope would be an attempt to acquit the Israelis of the crimes, the execution of which serves their direct interests.

This also applies to the attack carried out against the Jewish synagogue in Vienna, despite the fact that the Austrian police, as reported by certain news agencies, have directed their accusations against members of the 'Asifah organization led by Abu-Nidal.

But soon the PLO declared its responsibility for the attack.

Those who link these incidents with the Syrian regime and consequently consider them as having been carried out under the "umbrella" of Damascus, denounce the assassination incident of the French Ambassador in Beirut following failure of the attempt to abduct him on September 4.

Certain political analysts, however, consider that the roots of the present dispute between al-Asad and 'Arafat go back to the beginning of the Iraqi-Iranian war, when Syria encouraged the PLO to give total support to the Iranian side and pressured it to boycott the Arab Summit Conference held in Amman.

Certain Palestinian leaders have complained that Damascus does not allow 'Arafat free or independent movement even at diplomatic levels.

This has, naturally, aroused Palestinian reactions on the side of 'Arafat.

Observers have pointed out that one such reaction was apparent in the fact that there were no representatives on behalf of Damascus at the various festivals organized by the PLO in Lebanon, despite the presence of the Syrian peace-keeping force there.

Observers have also referred to the unfortunate battles in Tripoli between the Al-Akkawi family, who represent the resistence, and the group of Ali 'Id which relies on the Syrian regime.

However, certain observers specifically denounce the Palestinian resistence, which had conducted talks with the French Foreign Minister during his meeting with 'Arafat, for keeping to itself the information relating to Palestine in its desire to emphasize the independence of the Palestinian decision and not passing such information to Damascus.

Against this, there were the shuttle trips of Philip Habib to Damascus, trips which the Palestinian Resistence, under the leadership of 'Arafat, considered suspicious. They even refused to acknowledge the benefit or the necessity of meeting with the American envoy at all.

But certain leaders of the resistence, who have tried to ascertain a clear picture of the situation, insist that granting fighting positions to the Palestine Liberation Army on the firing lines in Beirut means that Damascus is reevaluating the Palestinian role and totally rejecting the armed presence of the original organizations.

On a related issue, certain leaders under 'Arafat refer to the existence of rapprochement between Damascus and the Phalange which is apparent in their acceptance, in principle, of stopping the supply of arms to all fighters on all sides. The organization has objected to this acceptance in principle because in practice it means exposing the Palestinian resistence before Israel and before its enemies, the opposing forces within Lebanon.

To this, one would naturally add the point discussed at the introduction of the analysis, which is the question of the continuation of relations between the resistence and Amman and in particular the continuation of the Jordanian-Palestinian Joint Committee meetings.

Syrian-Jordanian relations are still tense in the midst of Syrian press uproars concerning the existence of a Jordanian 'solution,' despite the clear and repeated denial by Amman. These uproars seem to be aimed at forcing 'Arafat to sever his remaining ties with King Husayn, who is well-known for his clear pan-Arab stand towards the Tehran regime, at a time when the PLO's relations with Iran have declined and weakened. The PLO representative, Hani al-Hasan, has recently met with Mas'ud Rajavi, leader of the group of Mojahedin-e Khalq which is attempting to overthrow the Khomeyni regime by the force of arms.

9902
CSO: 4404/50

BEAUFORT FORTRESS DEFENDERS SHARE EXPERIENCES

Beirut FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 388, 24 Aug 81 pp 17-19

[Article by Jiyad al-'Ilmi and Ibrahim Ibrahim: "Al-Shuqayf, the Fortress of Challenge"]

[Text] This Is Where Saladin Started Out From, and Here We Are the Closest to Palestine.

"Abu al-Fida'," Commander of the Fortress, Says: "There Are No Dead Or Wounded in the Ranks of the Defenders."

As we were on our way to the al-Shuqayf [Beaufort] Fortress, our minds were distracted by many different thoughts. Some of our thoughts were about the days of the past, about Saladin, who started out from the al-Shuqayf Fortress when he liberated Jerusalem from the Crusaders. Today our Palestinian people are starting out from the very same fortress and have the same objective--the liberation of Palestine.

The al-Shuqayf Fortress is a hard rock which Begin has butted his head against with his American horns and which has destroyed all of his dreams.

The al-Shuqayf Fortress has a long history of glorious deeds, and with every passing day the soldiers of the Palestinian revolution are adding still new glory to this history.

The loftiness of the fortress is like the loftiness of the soldiers there, and its pride in its history is like the pride of those who are defending it against the attacks and onslaughts of the enemy. This fortress has a history which has been written in blood and is a history of epic heroism. It is a fortress which is a symbol, it is the fortress of the Palestinian revolution, and it is the fortress of challenge.

We Know No Fear

One teen-age soldier named Sa'di, when asked about the latest battle with the Zionist enemy, told us: "Enemy air attacks and Sa'd Haddad's artillery shells rained in upon us, but they were not able to silence our guns. Quite the contrary. What happened was that we were able to silence the guns of the enemy and to inflict

heavy losses upon him. We who are here do not at all know the meaning of fear. In al-Shugayf Fortress we also do not know what it is to sleep. This is because the enemy is basically concentrating his attacks on our fortress because it is, in fact, a beacon and symbol of the struggle of the Palestinian revolution." Sa'di went on to say: "When the enemy's modern airplanes attack us, we have no doubt at all that each time this happens we will be able to defeat this American technology."

We Are the Closest to Palestine

The soldiers of the al-Shugayf Fortress, together with all of the other detachments of the Palestinian revolution, constitute an organic unit, but every day these soldiers, from the top of the fortress, clearly see Palestine.

Balal, commander of one of the camouflaged positions in the al-Shuqayf Fortress, says to us in his very rapid and terse manner: "We have been fighting here for years just like all of the other Fedayeen. But the difference between us and you is the fact that we are closer to Palestine and, when the day of victory comes, we will enter Palestine before you do. This is the hope that all of us have. As for the shells of the Zionist enemy, we here make ashtrays out of them. This is the only way they affect us, if they affect us at all. In the sixth war the Palestinian revolution taught its enemy quite a few lessons about steadfastness, accuracy of fire, and combat tactics. We are proud of the fact that we have not lost any of our personnel in the Palestinian revolution and that we have forced the enemy to suffer many casualties in terms of killed and wounded."

The Enemy Is Losing His Nerve

Abu Rabi', another soldier, said: "The sixth war began with the enemy bombing the city of al-Nabatiyah, and our joint forces responded to this with effective shelling. We began to shell Nahariya and Tabariya, and our firing was accurate. The enemy became furious and full of rage because the Palestinian Resistance possessed artillery which could fire as far as the Zionist settlements. So after the enemy was unable to achieve any of his objectives he resorted to bombing bridges and supply routes. However we were not affected by this, and supplies kept on coming to us. In fact, we even managed to distribute supplies and food-stuffs to the civilian population."

"The enemy once again concentrated on bombing residential houses and buildings, the objective being to undermine the morale of the masses in al-Nabatiyah. But the enemy saw us give our artillery response and saw that our morale stayed high, and thus the morale of the masses became even better and their degree of solidarity with our soldiers increased."

Abu al-'Asal, the Yemeni

Abu al-'Asal, a citizen from North Yemen, said: "I came here to defend the Palestinian revolution. Many of the Arab regimes are not even lifting a finger. When I came here to the fortress, I found that my fellow-soldiers were startlingly and amazingly steadfast. During the sixth war I participated in directing fire against the enemy at the al-Khardali Bridge, al'Qalay'ah, Nahariya, and other places. We were able to inflict losses on the battalions of the enemy which he did not

expect. Here at the steadfast al-Shuqayf Fortress all of our soldiers are distinguished by their strong will, belief, and commitment. These are things which, when taken all together, constitute the cornerstone of victory."

Abu Khalil: "A Strange Story!"

The soldier Abu Khalil has a strange story which demonstrates the strangeness of the attitudes taken by some of the Arab regimes. He once visited his family in one of the Arab countries, and during that visit he was put in prison. When he was released from prison he was put under house arrest. But he managed to escape and then came to the al-Shuqayf Fortress where he is now fighting alongside his comrades to defend the honor of his nation. Abu Khalil says: "It is our national responsibility and the responsibility of every Arab citizen to protect the [Palestinian] revolution. It was on the basis of this belief that I escaped from my house arrest and came here in order to help my brethren here defend our Palestinian nation against the Zionist enemy. It is better that I die here on these front lines. The role of those of us here in the al-Shuqayf Fortress is primarily to defend the fortress. But in the recent war we did do our share of fighting with our 85-mm cannons. This filled us with additional joy and pride. [We then realized that] the fortress was a way toward the liberation of Palestine."

We Lost No Soldiers

Another soldier, 'Abd al-Jabbar Mansur Hasan (from North Yemen), maintains that the Zionist enemy fired 12 rockets at the Palestinian positions, but nevertheless did not inflict any losses. He says: "We lie here in wait for the enemy, and our artillery always thunders. We are gaining more and more combat experience every day."

Abu Bashir, another soldier from Yemen, says: "I was in a military patrol, and when the patrol ended I was transferred to the al-Shuqayf Fortress. As you see, we stand here as an impregnable wall for the defense of the [Palestinian] revolution. The enemy knows what this fortress means and knows the significance of its defenders." "This front-line position is proud of the fact that it has among its ranks soldiers from most of the Arab countries. It has Lebanese, Saudis, Jordanians, Syrians, Yemenis, Iraqis, and Tunisians, in addition to its Palestinian soldiers."

"This situation demonstrates the real meaning of the unity of the Arabs' common destiny. And is Palestine not the loftiest symbol of the Arab nation?"

The Fortress Commander: "We Protect a Strategic Axis"

Those who engage in combat within view of their native land actually have a very accurate picture concerning the situation which has resulted from the sixth war. This was summarized for us by Abu al-Fida', the person responsible for the al-Shuqayf Fortress-Arnawn axis. He said: "In battle the most important thing is morale. We in the joint forces are proud of the high morale of our soldiers both during battle and afterward. This high morale raises the morale of the masses in South Lebanon and in al-Nabatiyah. In spite of the heavy bombing and shelling by the enemy, in spite of the fact that he has used Milanc rockets for the first time, and in spite of the fact that the enemy has also used the most modern of weapons and advanced technological equipment, he has not wounded any of our soldiers

and not one member of our ranks has been killed. This is something which makes our citizens even more steadfast. During the last war we were able to put an end to the fear, aroused by propaganda, which people had of the American-made F-16."

"The important factor which surfaced during the sixth ear was the kinship and solidarity which exists between the soldiers and the masses. We are working toward further anchoring this feeling because it is one of the most important factors of steadfastness and victory. Even though cooperation is good, we always work toward making new imporvements."

Abu al-Fida' goes on to say: "In the case of the Fortress-Arnawn axis, our basic mission is to protect this axis which is considered to be a very important strategic position both as far as the Palestinian revolution is concerned and as far as the Zionist enemy is concerned. The reason for this is that the fortress is considered to be the first line of denense. As I said, our basic mission is to protect the fortress. But, even so, we have participated in battle and [our] heavy artillery has participated in the shelling of enemy positions and movements. We had a skirmish with the Zionists and, from the Fortress-Arnawn axis, we were able to silence the enemy's artillery batteries. We were able to do this because of the accuracy of our fire. After a while the enemy resumed his shelling, but did so from numerous different positions in order to deflect our attention from his principal position. But, at the same time, we spoiled the enemy's plans to mislead us and hit him hard."

The Deputy Commander of the Forces in al-Nabitiyah

After spending a whole day at the al-Shuqayf Fortress and the Arnawn axis, we returned to al-Nabatiyah. There we went to the headquarters of the supreme command of the joint forces, and met with Maj Marwan, the deputy commander of the joint forces in al-Nabatiyah. He told us the following:

"The enemy army, during 2 weeks of combat, tried to keep Begin's promise that 'from now on there will be no more Fedayeen in Lebanon,' and 'there will be no more missiles in the North.' It was a war in the real sense of the word, and during the war all of the Zionists' plans were ruined. It happened this way because of the steadfastness of our Palestinian soldiers and because of their willingness to challenge the enemy. This war was our verdict and our criterion."

"The second factor was the widespread steadfastness and solidarity of the masses and their readiness to sacrifice, respond to the call, and defend their land. The third factor was our combat approach which foiled the enemy."

The Enemy Is Weak, No Matter How Far His Arm Reaches Out

"Begin has tried hard to destroy the infra-structure of the revolution and to drive a wedge between it and its masses. He has resorted to bombing bridges and planting terror and fear in people's hearts, the idea being to isolate South Lebanon from the rest of Lebanon. He has also bombed Beirut in an effort to destroy people's morale. But this has only increased the citizens' determination, and they have come forward to help our soldiers rebuild bridges, open up roads, and make sure that the roads are open between North and South Lebanon. This is an indication of

the mutual bonds and feelings of brotherhood between the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples. It is also proof of the weakness of the enemy, no matter how far his arm reaches out. The hand of the revolution is still able to strike at his forces and his settlements." Maj Marwan went on to say: "It appears that the enemy's muscles of 1967 have grown old by now and that they will never again be able to affect us."

"We have achieved this because of the will power of our men and the firmness of our revolution. No matter how light our weapons are, they are still effective."

"Now we are able to say that the enemy, who militarily tried to emerge from the war with his honor intact, has only suffered another defeat. During the course of 4 days the enemy attempted--by land, sea, and air--to undertake operations of deception which extended from the al-Shuqayf Fortress throughout the rest of South Lebanon. He attacked the al-Musaylah position, after which he admitted that, among his attacking forces, a major had been killed and seven others had been wounded. Our only loss was the death of one of our heroes in the Arab Army of Lebanon."

"The enemy also met with another failure. He had set up an ambush in the al-Jiyah area, utilizing boats and battleships. After the operation the enemy lied and declared that he had hit the vital supply area of the Fedayeen north of Sidon. This declaration in reality referred to the fact that the enemy had hit two civilian vehicles which were travelling along the main road and had killed three Lebanese civilians."

"The enemy is making statements which are either inaccurate or are false. The truth is that the forces of the revolution are still intact and are growing stronger every day."

9468
CSO: 4304/163

MOROCCO-IRAQ COOPERATION OUTLINED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 21 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] Mr Saadoun Chaker, minister of interior and member of the Command Council of the Iraqi Revolution, left Tuesday afternoon from Rabat-Sale airport following a 5-day official visit capped by the audience he was given by His Majesty King Hassan II.

Mr Saadoun Chaker was greeted at the airport by M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation; Driss Basri, minister of interior; Aouni Sydki Bakr, the Ambassador of the Iraqi Republic to Rabat, and Omar Benchemsi, the royal governor of the prefecture of Rabat-Sale.

At the conclusion of the visit, the following press communique was published: "at the invitation of his Moroccan counterpart, Mr Saadoun Chaker Mahmoud, member of the Revolutionary Command Council and minister of interior of the sister republic of Iraq, made an official visit to the Kingdom of Morocco from Friday 17 Dhu-al-Hijja 1401 (corresponding to 16 October 1981) to Tuesday 21 Dhu-al-Hijja 1401 (corresponding to 20 October 1981).

This visit provided his excellency the minister of interior of the Iraqi Republic to acquaint himself with the procedures employed by the Moroccan interior ministry and with its major accomplishments.

The visit of the illustrious guest and the delegation that accompanied him was an extremely busy one which included a working session held Friday 16 October at the main offices of the interior ministry with the interior minister, who was accompanied by his close advisers.

That working session resulted in the two sides expressing their satisfaction with the solidity of the friendly ties existing between His Majesty King Hassan II--may God glorify him!--and his fraternal counterpart, his excellency President Saddam Hussein.

The two ministers also reviewed prospects for cooperation between the two ministries as well as possibilities of consolidating them in the interest of the two fraternal countries.

His excellency the minister then visited the Central Directorate of the National Criminal Investigation Bureau, where he was briefed on the major programs operated

by that agency and where Col Abdelhaq Kadiri, director general of the bureau, gave him an overall view of the bureau's activities and missions assigned to it as they relate to safeguarding the security and domestic tranquility of the citizens as well as protecting their property.

The same day, in the afternoon, the high-ranking Iraqi official attended a working session at the headquarters of the wilaya of Grand Casablanca with the royal Wali and the royal governors in the various prefectures, elected officials and heads of administrative agencies, during the course of which the fraternal Iraqi delegation was familiarized with the urban projects and development programs to be carried out in the country's economic capital.

On Saturday 17 October the illustrious delegation made a call on the General Inspectorate of Auxiliary Forces and the General Inspectorate of Civilian Protection, where the officials of those two important bodies briefed the delegation and explained what they are doing in the fields of security and civilian protection.

Simulations and technical demonstrations were carried out by the civilian protection personnel to demonstrate the mission and activities of that agency.

On Sunday 18 October, his excellency the minister of interior of the fraternal Iraqi republic went to the city of Marrakech, where he was welcomed to that province by the royal governor as well as local authorities and elected officials. Then, along with the delegation accompanying him, he visited the historic monuments and traditional "souks" found in great number in the capital of the southern region.

His excellency Saadoun Chaker then went, on Monday 19 October, to the city of Ifrane, where he was given an audience with his majesty the King--may God glorify him!--before leaving for Fes.

On Tuesday 20 October his excellency the minister and the delegation accompanying him visited the Training Center for Technical Assistants in Plants and Horticulture at Sale. Prior to that, the two ministers held a final working session during which a draft protocol agreement on administrative and technical cooperation between the respective ministries of the two countries was read.

9516
CSO: 4519/33

PROBLEM OF RADICAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS AMONG YOUTH EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18, 19, 20, 21 Oct 81

[18 Oct 81 p 3]

[Text] How can we protect our youth from the phenomenon of religious radicalism and eliminate the crushing crisis that has made the youth turn to false concepts that have infiltrated their minds to give them a false sense of indentity? How can we bolster religious feeling among the youth to turn them into a force that moves independently and that wages its difficult experience with "the baser soul that incites to evil" so that we can lead them past the phase of struggle and fragmentation to the phase of stability and security?

He who looks for the truth in the minds of the youth finds that this crushing crisis is caused by numerous negative aspects found in our life, especially the failure of some state establishments to perform their educational, guidance and informative roles.

This is what university professors who specialize in working and dealing with youth assert.

It is the opinion of Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-Zahir, psychological health instructor at Tanta University's School of Education, that radicalism is something almost no society is free of. There is positive radicalism embodied in intellectual pursuit and in the attempts to research and innovate and [there is a radicalism] that is negative and destructive and that allows the youth to see nothing but what they believe to be correct. Not only this. Negative radicalism makes the youth try to destroy all that they disagree with, using all legitimate and illegitimate means to destroy anything but what they believe in.

The climate of radicalism begins to emerge in an environment that restricts freedom of movement and under totalitarian systems. This radicalism assumes a religious form if religion lives in the public conscience. Here, social psychology asserts that the phenomenon of radicalism in a society is considered an indicator of the presence of tensions in that society.

Numerous Contradictions Under Which This Generation Has Lived

This generation, according to Dr 'Abd al-Zahir, has lived under the numerous contradictions of expressed slogans and a contrasting reality--contradictions that

have led to the perplexity of the youth and that have pushed them toward radicalism. Young people lived their childhood under the dreams and vision of broad economic, political and social aspirations painted for them by all the official agencies. When those aspirations were dashed on the rock of reality, the gap between the level of aspirations and real capabilities widened.

The youth have noticed, for example, violoation of the principle that "reward is tied to work" and have proceeded to reiterate that they spent the most precious days of their life in the trenches and returned after the war to find that the exploiters had realized a so-called "illicit aggrandization" under the canopy of the war for which the youth paid in sweat and blood. Youth thus started the voyage of suffering, and the guiding models disappeared from their life, especially their intellectual life. So the Egyptian intellect became daring enough to destroy the ideas of intellectuals such as Muhammad "Abduh, Taha Husayn, al-'Aqqad and others.

How Can We Turn Youth Into an Independent Force?

Dr 'Adil Sadiq, professor of psychiatric medicine at 'Ayn Shams University, says: "Whoever talks to the youth about religion must have the intellectual arguments to convince their minds and must have the ability to help the youth conscience attain the stage of conscientious conviction. We can then turn the youth into an independent force and let them wage opposition to the 'baser soul that incites to evil' so that a balance can be established and the youth surmount the phase of struggle to the phase of stability.

"While tackling the issue of dealing correctly with the youth, we should not forget to provide them with full knowledge free of all restriction because this knowledge is the way to maintain a sound personality. We will thus protect the youth from straying into the labyrinths of ignorance and illusion. Knowledge must not be fragmented or amputated because it is there for every youth to drink from copiously to enlighten his mind and then to add to this knowledge."

How Should Youth Be Educated Religiously?

Dr 'Adil Sadiq adds: "If we want to give our youth a sound religious education, then we must enlighten the minds of the youth with all forms of available knowledge, tying this knowledge to religion. This requires a revolution in our country's system of education. Without such a revolution, there will be no hope of reform.

"Some may get the idea," Dr Sadiq goes on to say, "that I am calling for the subjugation of religion to the age. But what I am demanding is that the system of education be improved to keep up with the enormous progress achieved by the human intellect. Some may also believe that the enormous scientific development has had its impact on the faith of the youth. I believe the contrary, because civilized progress strengthens youth's faith in the oneness of the Creator.

"Whoever has the opportunity to familiarize himself with the scientific facts that emerge every hour will feel the supernatural power behind this system that

governs the universe. Such a person will then comprehend the oneness of the Creator through his comprehension of the constancy and similarity of the laws that govern and regulate the movement of daily life and existence. Perhaps this is the secret behind the exhortation that man contemplate himself and God's creatures around him."

Dr Sadiq adds: "This requires the adoption of new methods to educate our children and youth religiously. It is a difficult task, which these days falls on the shoulders of the clergymen as long as they want to be the carriers of the banner and the men in charge of safeguarding religion and in charge of religious enlightenment, guidance and educational affairs."

How Do We Link Religion to Life?

We asked: How do we link religion to life?

The professor of psychiatric medicine answered: "Can we not make students say at the end of a biology class: Praised be the great Creator? Can we not present to the youth health materials connected with sanitation and protection from disease as a form of behavior mentioned in the divine books for the protection of man's health?

"Can the disciplines of psychology, geography, physics and chemistry not be presented to the students in a manner that makes them ultimately feel God's wisdom in creating man and the earth's oceans and rivers?

"We must convince our youth that the main goal of the divine law is to organize mankind's life and to realize his happiness. If we prohibit a child or a youth from doing what is wrong, we must explain to him the degree of happiness he will experience if he does the opposite of what is wrong. This is closer to the child's mind and soul. We can then add that there is punishment for those who neglect God's laws.

"As for the information media and the press, a revolution must be declared to eliminate baseness and disregard for the divine teachings and to entrench religious feeling among the youth.

Negative Aspects Must Be Eliminated

"This necessarily requires the formation of an enlightened committee of politicians, economists, educators, media people and clergymen to participate in formulating a comprehensive plan to eliminate the existing negative aspects through an enlightened depiction of all the youth's issues and problems with society.

"The child or youth must realize that he himself is the best means for organizing his life and realizing the utmost degree of happiness as a complete human being."

'Ali Khalil Mustafa, an assistant professor at Tanta University's School of Education: In Islam, the youth's political education is based on dealing with

the government authorities, on participating in approval of the Islamic system of government, on listening to the other opinion, even if it is an opposing opinion, on adhering to the public right and order and exerting efforts to stabilize it and on liberating the youth from slavery to anybody but God, especially since the youth need psychological security.

How Do We Correct Youth March?

To correct the youth's religious march, we must teach them that ethics are an indivisible whole, that the Muslim is primarily a man of ethical civilization and that he cherishes ethics. The Islamic civilization has been the highest civilization known on earth. In using sound methods of educating the youth ethically, Islam takes into consideration the period concerned and then recommends that self-control be exercised according to the yardstick of obedience to God. At the same time, Islam is concerned with educating the human aspect in careful integration with the psychological, ethical and social aspects. The goals of youth education in Islam mean bringing up youth as distinguished human beings who know, obey and worship their God, who know themselves, who know their message and know their assets in life. With this, the youth's personality grows up with a strong balance whereby no aspect dominates the other, whether in society, at school or anywhere else. This is because when Islam addresses man, it addresses him from where he is. What is more, Islam does not speak to only one class of people or to one particular force.

Return to System of Free Sessions at al-Azhar

This is why we must return to the system of free sessions at al-Azhar to teach the youth their religious affairs in a manner compatible with the Koran and the Sunna. Such sessions must be broadcast, and prominent men of the Islamic call must be invited to them. The foundation of Koranic memorization schools in the city and the village must be encouraged and religious books must be provided at a reasonable price.

[19 Oct 81 p 3]

[Text] Religious inclination among individuals is normal and causes society no anxiety.

But when this inclination turns into groups, some of them radical and with principles urging violence and the imposition of opinion by force, and into a religious craze, and when these groups start to deal with the language of bullets, then society must confront this danger that threatens the cohesion of its structure.

Tackling this danger, however, requires that we move closer and closer to those youths who have strayed from sound religious inclination.

Tanta University researchers have conducted the first study to examine religious inclinations among thousands of the university's male and female students and to find out how these inclinations have turned from prayers, veils and the reading

of religions books into initially moderate groups that then turn with time toward blinding radicalism and fanaticism.

The question is: How have these religious groups been able to attract university students to their membership, even though they have been able to reach only 11 percent of the university students, according to the research?

The study has proven important facts that have nothing to do with the genius of the leaders of the religious groups who have not even reached the stage of maturity and each of whom is no more than 23 years old. The facts have to do, as the study has revealed, with the importance of religion and with society's need for it. This is not strange to the personality of the Egyptian man because religion is a basic component of this personality, from which the religious aspect cannot be separated, regardless of the opposing currents.

High school and university education are the two phases when the youth are at a decisive age. They are the stages in which the child grows suddenly and undergoes psychological and physical transformations that exceed his ability to understand the change. In these stages, the young cannot keep up with and discover themselves but continue to struggle to familiarize themselves with characteristics that "are not him." Their perplexity increases and they become afflicted with "confustion."

In primitive societies, this was considered a state of "temporary confusion," according to Dr Muhammad al-Shal'lan, professor of psychology at 'Ayn Shams University. But in the modern age, this state is prolonged and stays with the youth throughout the period of high school and university education and may even extend to the post-graduation period when the youth emerge to life and cannot find a satisfactory job or an apartment in which to start a new family life.

Some of the youth can withstand this hardship until they are able to reorganize their lives, liquidate the "crisis" and create from within themselves the answers to the questions perplexing them--that is, until they begin to grow from within.

The psychology professor adds that the youth led the world in the 1960's and then came the setback of the Third World that resulted in the loss of faith in science, socialism and nationalism, all of which are products of the 20th century. The Egyptian youth's confusion escalated after 1967 but the 1967 setback is not the direct and sole cause ofthe Egyptian youth crisis. It is one of the causes. All these "changes" have shaken the youth and have caused their confidence in the world to be "shaken." What has been constant is religion and this is why youth has turned to religion.

Islamic Garb A Form of Protest

Dr Siham Mahmud al-'Iraqi says in her study [presumably the study at Tanta University]: The study divides youth into three categories insofar as their attitude toward religion is concerned:

The first category accepts religion as a result of obedience and tradition. This group is neither zealous nor rebellious against religion. The second category

imitates the atheist West and takes a position of open hostility to religion. The third category clings to religion, is enthusiastic about it and defends it. This is the category that has been the target of the religious groups and of the religious currents that these groups have produced. The research has proven that the currents include both the moderate and the radical.

The moderates in the Islamic groups cannot be a positive element. The least that is required of a moderate member is to grow his beard, if he is a man, or to wear the veils, or the so-called Islamic uniform, if a woman. This veil is as far as can be from Islam. Some university professors even caught one of these veiled female students cheating in last year's academic examinations. This student was scolded for cheating, which is incompatible with honor and with the ideals the student claims to defend and that she symbolizes by wearing the veil. The study has also proven an important fact, namely, that the "moderates" in the religious groups cannot think for themselves and so follow the others thoughtlessly.

The study has also revealed another fact, namely, that after the assassination of Shaykh al-Zahabi by the Atonement and Migration Group, which tortured al-Zahabi to death, these religious groups did not "subside" but proceeded to declare their presence more strongly and the number of their members, who grew their beards and wore veils as a sign of protest over the arrest of those who perpetrated the ugly crime, increased.

The study has also proven, according to Dr Siham Mahmud al-'Iraqi, that the radical in these groups is the personality that represents them and that the will of the group is embodied in the will of this radical. The radicals are not concerned with the moderates and totally ignore them as if they were a neglected and powerless element. But the "representative radical" personality continues to attract more and more moderates and to guarantee their loyalty to it, even though the moderates, as the study confirms, have not proven their existence in any way.

Failure of Islamic Call Agencies

There is an important question: Why have these moderates gone to the religious groups to be used by the radicals in these groups for their own purposes? The study says that there has been a religious vacuum, even though religion is a goal because it represents values and constancy. There has been failure to enlighten the youth religiously and the youth have not found in the state establishments the good example and the sincere guide to lead them religiously and ethically. This failure has extended to the Islamic call agencies, especially as a result of the poor education of the preachers. The mosque has also failed to perform its role because of the inability of the imams to keep up with the issues of the age and because of their reliance on traditional cultural patterns that do not answer the questions of the youth or respond to what goes on in their minds in the wake of the intensifying struggle in their society.

Cultural illiteracy and the negative aspects of the system of education [have had their impact.] There is no doubt that there is a strong relationship between illiteracy and a poor cultural standard and the subsequent religious illiteracy,

which makes many depend on mosque preachers for their religious education, preachers who in some cases are not qualified.

The youth welfare agencies have also failed to provide a balanced program to fill the youth's free time throughout the year.

There is also the intellectual invasion and the hostile intellectual currents that have sought to destroy the Islamic societies by casting doubts on the principle of religion and by ridiculing the faith and the revival of Islamic legislation in the life of Islamic societies.

The research has also proven that for all the aforementioned reasons, the emergence of the religious inclination among university youth has had a good effect on the minds of many people. Some have commended the youth for this return to religion and have viewed it as a spark of hope compatible with the nature of the religious Egyptian people and one that restores youth's self-confidence. This return has been reflected in various forms, such as women wearing the Islamic garb, youth growing their beards, the performance of religious rites on university campuses and the holding of fairs for religious books and publications. Other officials in charge of youth have taken a more cautious attitude toward this inclination while waiting for its consequences. This attitude has been more realistic, considering that the religious inclinations have turned into radical organizations and groups advocating their principles through violence, the imposition of opinion by force and religious fanaticism.

Does Religion Bring Happiness?

The research has even proven that the overwhelming majority of Tanta University students believes that religion makes man's life happier, with the exclusion of the senior classes, which deny that religion makes man's life happier. Perhaps the reason for this is their approaching graduation and their having to face practical life, which requires that man be skillful, excelling and acceptable to society. What is surprising is that a low percentage of the female students belonging to the religious groups believes that religion brings happiness compared with the male students. The students most strongly supporting the presence of this relationship [between religion and happiness] are the agricultural students, whereas the students least supporting have been those of the school of Commerce.

As for the relationship between misery and faith, the students have not given a definite opinion in this regard. The percentage of those who believe that misery shakes faith exceeds the percentage of those who believe that such shaking of faith may occur at times. Neither group amounts to one half the number of students. It has also been noted that a larger percentage of students believes that the more misery is encountered in life the more strongly faith is shaken. Meanwhile, the number of female students who refute this relationship exceeds the number of male students who do. A larger percentage of students belonging to the religious groups denies that misery shakes faith. A higher percentage of students not belonging to the religious groups believes that this relationship exists at times. What is again surprising is that a large percentage of female

students associated with the religious groups, compared with male students belonging to such groups, denies the presence of any relationship between misery and the shaking of faith.

Increased production is strongly connected with faith, according to the students. However, the percentage of students who hold such a belief decreases in the later classes. The members of the religious groups have a stronger belief in this view.

These ideas reflect the degree of religion's impact on the life of the youth. The study has also proven that the majority of the students are aware of the presence of a religious inclination among university youth. The number of those denying the presence of such an inclination has amounted to five students [as published]. The students who acknowledge the presence of this inclination have attributed it to the following reasons:

Upbringing, the environment, the raising of the slogan on the state of science and faith, the presence of antireligious currents and the feeling of helplessness vis-a-vis the problems facing the youth. Some religious scholars have tried to analyze and entrench the Islamic concepts and values and others have said that this inclination is "transient" and is only a temporary phase through which the youth pass and that quickly disappears.

Students Predicted Deviation of Groups

The study has also proven that the percentage of male students belonging to the religious groups is higher than that of female students belonging to such groups. This is an indication that female group members lack confidence in their male colleagues in the university. The highest membership percentage is in Kafr al-Shaykh College of Education and the lowest is in the School of Sciences. Membership in religious groups in the schools of medicine and dentistry has been confined to male students.

By asking the students about the reasons for joining the religious groups, it has been proven that the most important reasons are participation in the Islamic call and gaining social status, especially among the female students. One quarter of the students of the School of Sciences have attributed this membership to free time.

A large percentage of the university students agree that the most important message of the religious groups is to call for application of the Islamic way of life to solve youth problems and to play a role in fighting myths. It is as if the Tanta University students were predicting what would happen when they answered a question about the strongest guarantees that they deem necessary to prevent the groups from deviating and turning radical. In reply to the question, the students said that the guarantees are: elimination of negative aspects within the religious groups and avoidance of fanaticism. They also said that this must be coupled with giving youth the opportunity to state their views openly and without the fear or oppression that leads to secrecy, radicalism and the use of violence.

Dr Siham Mahmud al-'Iraqi then discusses the growth of religious awareness among the youth. She says in her research that this growth depends on the sources from which they derive their information, such as the home and the school. Regarding the latter, she says that the fault in teaching religion stems from the difficulty of the Koranic phrases presented to the students, especially in the elementary stage. These phrases are inclined more toward "intimidation" than "encouragement." They must be replaced by phrases from the venerable Koran that give a good example and that improve the students' command of Arabic. The students should not be compelled to memorize without understanding what they memorize. Greater stress must be laid on reward than on punishment. Dr Siham says that the students' answers in the research prove that religious books are the main source of religious information for the students, followed by the Koranic [religious] broadcasting stations. The media most destructive to religious values are the movies, television, radio stations, the theater, magazines and newspapers.

The students have supported a question concerning the introduction of religious education as a subject for university students as a way of familiarizing the youth with their intellectual and cultural heritage and achieving youth steadfastness in the face of the confusion and doubt that Western civilization plants in the path of the youth--confusion and doubt that weaken the youth's resolution and religious and moral values.

[20 Oct 81 p 3]

[Text] The dialog on the topic of the hour, meaning the intellectual radicalism with which the religious groups have veered toward a dangerous turning point that is destructive to whatever is beautiful and good in our life, goes on.

Turning to religion is exactly like seeking refuge in a safe oasis and in great ideals and morals that are tantamount to a good example for all people. But when a minority strays with religion to the labyrinths of violence and of a dialog with bullets and blood, then such straying should be fought with the same violence with which this minority deceives the youth, portraying this violence to them as the path of salvation.

Psychologists and sociologists assert here that the radicals must be debated and that their ideas must be made public so that all can see the error into which these radicals have fallen.

"These radicals must be debated so that we can know precisely what is going on in their heads. Then each of them should get the punishment he deserves. This should be done with them as groups, not individually. The debates and what goes on in them must be announced to the public so that the followers of the radicals can see how these radicals think, how they carry out their sabotage and how they lead people like a herd without being aware of the consequences of their actions or of the harm they cause society."

This is the opinion of a team of psychologists. Speaking on behalf of this team, Dr Muhammad Sha'lan, a psychology professor, has said:

Before I begin explaining the benefits of this theory, I must recount a novel called "1984" by English author George Orwell, who was a member of the British Socialist Party and who fought in the Spanish Civil War. The novel tells the story of the struggle for power among the socialist parties. The writer predicted that the entire world would ultimately turn toward a single party that would rule the world. The novel also relates how such a party should have a strong organization to guarantee the absence of dissension among its members and to insure that there is no swerving from the teachings, traditions, instructions and regulations of the party's leaders. To guarantee that there is no dissent, the leaders know every big and small detail in the party members' life through television surveillance of their life in their home. In the course of the story, the leaders discover that there is a member who has dared to deviate and who has developed a love relationship with a female colleague. Because the party bans love, the member is arrested and his ideas are debated before a court so that they can destroy his idea of the presence of so-called "love." When the member is ultimately persuaded, through brainwashing and other methods, that all his ideas that oppose the party are wrong, he is executed, meaning that he is given the punishment stipulated by their law, because such punishment cannot be meted out without a debate.

In interpreting this story in terms of our Egyptian society, Dr Muhammad Sha'lan says that the radical must be debated constantly, his opinions must be made known and he, before others, must be convinced of his grave error against his society. This is because some people were incarcerated in jails when they represented nothing at all and were of absolutely no political or intellectual weight and then emerged from prisons as heroes. We do not want to create heroes from these dangerous terrorists. Therefore, they must be debated individually and constantly, as this British story shows, because such a debate will provide public opinion with the opportunity to deal with this radical thought and to expose its mistakes by their very roots.

Dr Sha'lan adds: The crime committed by a member of these groups against Egypt when he fired his bullets into the heart of Egypt's leaders is not an individual crime but a crime of disposition, meaning that it reflects the disposition of a society created by these terrorists. It is a crime in which those who cheered the terrorists, those who encouraged them and those who purchased the weapons have taken part. It is also a crime in which those who had previously tried but failed, those who had the will but not the means and those who did not think loudly have participated. The terrorist leads a group. The group does nothing but is influenced by the terrorist's thought. These individuals, be they youth or student members of such groups, must know the fault of these terrorists. Such a fault cannot be exposed except through debate and by making the terrorists' ideas and thoughts known to the public.

The absence of student organizations and of bilateral [presumably co-ed] organizations and groups in schools and universities has encouraged the youth to join the religious groups because at this age they develop the "identity crisis" and seek an identity. In their actions and steps, they always ask: Who am I, who am I? Then they cast themselves in an exaggerated mold.

Moreover, the youth look at society's "elite" and rebel against them instead of using this elite's efforts and struggle in life to get where it is and using this elite's talents as a model of behavior in this life. The groups that the youth join transform this elite into a rival and the youth come to view it with jealousy, hatred and admiration at the same time.

A youth also views the head of the state as an extension of the father in his small family. With this rejection, a youth wants to tell the head: "I exist." This means that the rejection begins inside the youth's family, which is the youth's original group.

In this voyage in search of identity, the youth engages in the process of selection. He starts with the father, only to reject him. He then glorifies a nonexistent hero as a substitute for the father. Were the father dead, the youth would turn him into a hero. The important thing is to prove that he is rebellious against authority. He finds in this rebellion a constant argument for striking whoever wants to strike him because the youth takes refuge in an authority that has no direct control over him or in a nonexistent authority. Citing examples of this, Dr Muhammad Sha'lan says: There is the example of the Shi'ites and al-Husayn. They are the ones who killed al-Husayn and are now the ones who lament him. Another example is what happened to Christ. They crucified and killed him and then worshipped him.

Another example is the musician Mozart who was killed morally despite his genius. People denied this genius throughout his life and then 50 years after he had died poor and penniless, they glorified him. The phenomenon of killing a leader and then seeking protection (behind his name) is a well-known historical phenomenon.

A psychologically healthy youth joins a group that is not opposed to society, that is capable of development and that provides the youth with an atmosphere of free discussion. By virtue of its emanating from society, such a group does not lead to radicalism and terror. Moreover, such a group, unlike a party, is not an instrument of society and so the youth has no reason to rebel against it in this delicate phase of his life. The youth should be free to join such groups when he is mature and capable of making a choice. Therefore, universities, clubs and educational, athletic and cultural groups provide the right atmosphere for the youth to find his identity.

Why do all the leaders of the radical groups came from the schools of medicine, engineering and sciences, all of which are practical schools?

Because these schools are closer to logical and scientific thinking and because their sciences are definite and clear-cut. A student in these schools follows a certain order. As for the schools of arts and literature, their members and the disciplines they learn represent perplexity and controversy. This is not what is wanted in groups that demand complete obedience from their members.

Not every religious group is radical. But the exceptional groups are the ones that embody the flaws and that arouse our aversion. This mad behavior that we

see reflects "one grain of truth." It reflects a serious social reality. We are suffering from a flaw that we can see and we must offer the youth a new framework. Through these groups, the youth enters the stage of radicalism and then the suicidal stage of death just because these groups are his opportunity to say no.

At present, the youth, according to Dr Muhammad Sha'lan, needs a higher model and example and needs more democracy, coupled with the ability to see the possible complications. In his relationship with authority, the youth needs to have the means that make possible objective criticism, not intellectual terrorism.

Dr Sihem Mahmud al-Iraqi, the author of the study on religious inclinations among Tanta University male and female students, says: Taking refuge in the religious groups reflects the phenomenon of "escape" from the conflicts of society. This is an escape in which the student says: I am a monk. I don't want the world. I want the hereafter. I am not interested in owning a car or an apartment. I can live under simple conditions. Dr Siham also says that the students thus kill their ambition and their love of life, even though religion is for this world and for the hereafter. She also says that the numerous shocks that the student encounters in his life makes him resort to whoever will solve his problems. The research has proven that the students that join the religious groups in their initial years [at college] abandon the groups in their final years when the time for graduation and for facing life approaches and when they find that "religion" alone cannot help them. Thus, the student's confidence in these groups diminishes and the groups' role in and influence on his life decreases.

The presence of an imbalance or of vacuum [rest of sentence dropped]. [Beginning of sentence dropped] Tanta School of Education has an important educational opinion regarding what is happening in the student arena. He [presumably Dr Ibrahim Mutawi', as text later indicates] says:

The presence of a cultural imbalance or vacuum in society makes the youth try to fill this vacuum with all the radical inclinations that lead to fanaticism. This leads at times to retreat and seclusion from society. All these are signs of sickness and a form of aggression against society. Even though the phenomenon of radicalism is confined to the minority, this minority has an influence on its environment. So how do we tackle this radicalism in an important sector of the youth? Dr Mutawi' says: By establishing a relationship between the youth and university officials--a relationship of "care, of open-door policy and of boundless listening" to youth problems, even if it is necessary to listen constantly to the problems of individual students. A student with a "need" is most proud of his dignity and needs a "few private minutes" for his problems to be heard and solved. In this regard, Dr Ibrahim Mutawi' says: If I ban a student from entering the university because he wears a jilbab, then I must know why the jilbab is worn. Is it poverty or something else? If it is poverty, then I must immediately provide the student with enough money to buy a shirt and a pair of trousers, without hurting his feelings. I must get to the problem and solve it immediately.

A female student came carrying a bundle under her arm and said: My stepmother has torn all my clothes to pieces and this is what is left of them. She has also

kicked me out of the house. This student had to be accommodated at the university city immediately. Her expenses have to be covered and she has to be supplied with clothes befitting a university student.

He has also said: We must eliminate hollow pomp in universities. I have heard that Dr Hasan Hamdi, the president of Cairo University, prevented some female students from entering the university on the first day of schooling because they were wearing unacceptable clothes. We must eliminate radicalism in all its forms. Clothes clinging to the body must be eliminated and the phenomenon of the "tent" is also one of excessive radicalism. Dr Ibrahim Mutawi' has also said: Final-year students at the College of Education go to secondary schools for practical training. If a student passes all the written subjects and fails the practical training, he has to repeat the year. This is why the principals of all secondary schools have been warned that the appearance of the trainee who teaches secondary school students during training must be appropriate so that he can provide a good example.

Ultimately, the example itself is something relative. But I want whoever graduates to practial life and leads the youth to uphold as much as possible the sound example he offers society. Relativity is acceptable here. I do not demand exemplary idealism of the graduate. I only demand that his appearance be compatible with the learning and the values he represents. This is why I am against going too far in the television or theater comedies that present the teacher as someone dressed in tattered clothes, someone who is not wearing shoes or someone whose pants are all warped and twisted as a means of evoking laughter. There are comic situations that do not at all rely on appearance but on dialog and a turn of phrase. I urge this so that the youth may not ridicule the example in our country, and the teacher has an important role in providing this example to the youth. This is how we should think of the youth while they are in the university and how we should think of what they will represent when they graduate. This is also why we should always exert efforts to reach the broad student base and why the relationship of university professors and deans should not be confined to a small group of students. This can only be achieved by bolstering social and cultural activity. The current university budget has adequate funds. Scout and internal tourist trips must also be restored.

Dr Ibrahim Mutawi' has also said that religious inclination among the students is desirable if it leads them toward idealism and exemplary behavior. I have known through my work in the university a number of so-called amirs of religious groups. As individuals, they are idealistic and ethical. But when they enroll in a group, their personality changes like that of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. In a group, the amir becomes dominant and demands that his colleagues turn to patternism and to obedience. When this person, who believes in violence and rejection, assumes command, his bad influence affects a large group. This is why we must focus in the coming phase on the system of university families engaged in cultural activity. Dr Ibrahim Mutawi' has also said that one of the most surprising things is that the religious groups that existed in Tanta University used to refuse to let the students not loyal to them carry out any activity, even though the university administration used to allow the groups to hold their religious symposiums.

Dr Ibrahim Mutawi' has also said that the new university regulation which gives a dean the direct right to punish students who violate the university campus and laws will have an immediate impact on discipline in the university. The dean is in direct touch with his students, knows every big and small detail about them and can mete out the punishment that he deems fit for the personality of this or that student.

[21 Oct 81 p 3]

[Text] If some of our youth have been exposed to the infiltration of the thought of the radical groups that have succeeded in invading the minds of this youth under the mask of religion, then this has taken place in the absence of the agencies in charge of the [Islamic] call in our country. These agencies, with the historical and national responsibility they shoulder toward our children, who seek out their religion from every available source during their growing years, have been absent.

If all of the signs indicate that the call agencies have not performed their duty ideally so far, then the important question is: What have these agencies of ours done to protect the youth so that the tragedy does not recur and so that a misled minority of our youth is not led toward the abyss of deviation without knowing where the waves of fanaticism and terror will hurl it?

To start with, Professor Jabir Hamzah explains how, in his opinion, our youth swerve. The rapid onrush toward the West and its materialism has left the people in a hard struggle and in a heated daily battle whose arena is the home, the street, the movie theater, the school, the magazine, the newspaper and the book.

A look at our society currently reveals to us the great development undergone by this society.

As long as there is extreme corruption, then such corruption inevitably will be countered by radicalism in religion or by a misunderstanding of our religious traditions. Islam is the religion of life, of society and of the state.

But there are those who deviate with their thinking--encouraged by the missionaries and advocates of certain sects and by the propagators of certain ideas who are motivated either by ignorance or by misleading falsehood--toward abandoning our Islamic restrictions in order to catch up with the West, as if the sciences of the West cannot be put to use unless we abandon our moral values and our inherited ideals. Some traditions may change in form but their content continues unchanged. Women have come out to get an education and to work; but this doesn't mean that a woman should be wicked and wanton.

The venerable Koran has laid down for us a wise course to guide our children in the right direction, as demonstrated in the anecdote of Luqman and his son. "We have given Luqman wisdom. Thank God, because whoever thanks Him does so for himself. As for those who blaspheme, God is still rich and praiseworthy." This phrase leads us to the most important educational bases, according to

Jabir Hamzah, and all modern theories diminish next to it. These bases are the good example.

To return to our traditions and create the virtuous society with refined traditions, certain steps and measures have to be taken. These steps and measures are presented as follows by 'Abd al-Hafiz al-Farghali al-Qarni, one of the prominent ulema of al-Azhar:

Purge society of the elements of provocation and give life serious objectives that make use of man's psychological capability. Make worship a part of the man's lively activity, urge man to marry at an early age and change the economic conditions so that we can turn toward simplicity and open our eyes to the facts of our religion, which demand of us strong faith but without rigidity, radicalism or deviation.

This requires that a system be laid down whereby we build our lives on firm foundations of excellent morals and noble traditions.

God has laid down for us the system of religious observances, according to Professor Muhammad Ibrahim al-Khatib.

God has laid down for us the system of religious observances, embodied in devotional, physical and financial observances, that is very precise and disciplines to teach people how to be disciplined in their life and how to live it in freedom from laxity and excess. To preserve the soul, God has laid down for us the system of punishment. To safeguard religion, He has laid down for us the system of jihad. He has also laid down for us the system of punishment in order to preserve mind, honor and property. We thus find the system in what God has legislated. If a man swerves from this system in any way, in any place or at any time, then this is a sign of the deviation of this man.

Then comes the role of treatment, embodied in returning a straying man to the right and disciplined path, on two bases: The first is that bringing up man's soul on the path of righteousness, order and discipline cannot be done by theoretical teachings alone. There has to be a good example in every sphere of life.

The second basis is that positive [al-wad'iyah] laws are not enough on their own to create the righteous citizen who is disciplined in his work and his behavior. This is why we find that Islam is eager to make man's conscience his executive power and the element controlling his behavior in every aspect of life. To develop this conscience, Islam urges man to remember that God knows him and knows everything his heart conceals. Islam also urges man to remember that the devil is his enemy and urges him to bring himself to account.

The question presently addressed to the officials in charge of the [Islamic] call in our country is: How did the youth reach this stage of intellectual and religious aimlessness that has made it easier for some radicals to control their thinking?

Answering this question, Dr 'Abd al-Rahman al-Najjar, the general director of mosques, says: The youth have reached this stage because the system of education, beginning with the elementary stage and ending with the secondary and university stage, has not given them an adequate degree of sound religious education. It is not right to turn the clergymen into the hanger on which we hang any deviation that occurs in the country. We have 6,000 mosques under the control of the Ministry [of Religious Trusts] and their preachers are up to the level of the responsibility, with the exception of a few who can be counted on our fingers.

This is the case at a time when alien ideas and imported books that propagate radical sects, such as the Vhi'ites and the Khawarij, under the eyes and ears of all the responsible agencies are actively at work. This has caused radicalism to develop among many youths and has made this radicalism a sign of piety in the eyes of these youths, even though mosque imams frequently say that religion means ease and not difficulty, quoting in this regard God's words: "God has intended you no hardship in religion," and "God wants ease and not hardship for you." I wish the youth knew the advice God's prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, gave Abu Musa al-Ash'ari and Mu'az ibn Jabal when he sent them to Yemen to call for Islam. The prophet told them: "Make matters easy and not hard, preach and do not scare people away. Obey each other and do not disagree." This is how the youth should be enlightened so that we can guarantee that they will march on the right path. To tell the truth, this is how the clergymen advocate religion. But there are violent currents and media that make the material aspects look attractive to the youth.

It is the duty of the purposeful media to preach religion in this manner. The media are to be faulted for the timing of their religious programs which I consider to be strong and capable of performing what is required of them. These programs provide easy doses acceptable to all, beginning with the children who are attracted to purposeful plays and to dialog in simple language.

The general director of mosques adds: Everybody should rise to the level of responsibility so that religion can be presented to the youth in a bright framework that is free of radicalism and fanaticism.

The question still raised is: How do we protect our youth from religious radicalism?

'Abdallah 'Ali Karim, the ministry's undersecretary for al-Azhar institutes affairs, says: If we want to protect our youth from religious radicalism, we must fill the religious vacuum they experience by:

Preparing advocates who understand the rules of religion in freedom from radicalism. A radical is one who claims that religious teachings call for radicalism. Radicalism can be attributed to those who call for banning employment because they view jobs as a source of illicit income, to those who call for banning prayers in mosques behind the leadership of the existing imams and to those who call for banning Friday prayers on the grounds that there is no proper Muslim imam [to lead the Friday prayers]. Whoever advocates such things is a radical.

A religious person is one who abides by the easy and simple teachings of religion. The teachings of religion are clear and simple and are free of all ambiguity. The venerable prophet says: "Religion is simplicity and religion will overcome whoever approaches it with strictness. So, make religion closer to the hearts and make it lead to the right path." This means that there is no sternness in religion. The advocates of religion must spread in the schools and teach religion in the institutes and in the universities, stresses the ministry's undersecretary for al-Azhar institutes affairs.

We must also fill this vacuum by preparing a sound course in religion to be taught to students at all levels, beginning with the elementary schools and institutes and ending with secondary schools and universities, each group of students according to their level. Such courses should be free of these [radical] impurities. The youth will then grow up with a religious shield that will make him unreceptive to the radical teachings that he will therefore reject.

To confront this radicalism, a plan is being implemented jointly by the [Islamic] Research Academy and al-Azhar to have advocates and preachers fill the youth's free time, according to the available resources. The Ministry of Religious Trusts takes part in providing the current mosques with preachers. We are fully prepared to advance all assistance to the Ministry of Education.

The information media must adhere to sound religious teachings in all their programs.

According to Prof Taha Kasiyah, the strictures and references made by the Koran in regard to living natural life as it should be lived and in regard to enjoying life and what it provides are for the purpose of creating the right atmosphere for man to enjoy life without causing any damaging consequences harmful to man, to society and to life itself.

Islam's legislation and instructions concerning religion and life do not abolish or confine man's nature. Rather, they lay down for this nature its course, make clear its sphere and guide it to realize good, security and happiness in life. Religion is for life and for providing man with happiness and security. At the same time, religion stands in the face of deviation and lusts to protect man from himself and from his evils.

Thus, Islam's call for the balanced and happy life that it preaches is a call that emerges within a balanced, complete and comprehensive framework of unification. We must once again examine and think carefully of our venerable book and of the Sunna of our prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, so that our understanding of our religion and its message will be a correct understanding free of all flaws and ailments.

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BRIEFS

STUDENT LOANS--It has been decided to distribute 1.75 million pounds in loans to university students. It has also been decided to unify the value of university student loans at the rate of 25 pounds per loan for students in the theoretical colleges and 30 pounds per loan for students in the vocational colleges. A total of 62,000 students will benefit from this system, compared to 51,000 students benefiting from it last year. Samir Mutawalli, chairman of Nasir Social Bank, has stated that the student loan appropriations will be distributed to the colleges next Sunday at a meeting to be attended by representatives of the universities. The bank chairman has also stated that the bank's Board of Directors has approved special pensions for 224 families to whom al-Sadat pension requirements do not apply and who receive no government pensions. As of next Saturday, the bank will begin disbursing profits to the depositors at a rate of 12 percent tax-free profit to owners of investment deposits that have totaled 115 million pounds. If the depositor wishes to add the profit to his investment account, this will be done on a retroactive basis dating back to last July. It has also been decided to participate with 1.5 million pounds in the capital of the National Company for the Production of Corn Sugar and the capital of al-Isma'il iyah al-Jadidah [New Ismailia] Company. It has been further decided to bolster the [food] security projects. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 20 Oct 81 p 1] 8494

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IRAN-SOVIET RELATIONS VIEWED IN LIGHT OF ANTI-U.S. CLIMATE

Brussels L'Eventail SPECIAL in French 22 Oct 81 p 16

> [Text] What is the status of relations between Tehran and Moscow now that the Ayatollah Khomeyni has expressed undisguised hostility toward the Soviet Union? Over the past 8 months, relations between the two countries were expressed by diplomatic messages and official contacts. Can one thus now speak of a real opposition?

The USSR wanted to establish a direct dialogue with the Iranian authorities although the level of contacts remained relatively low; the respective foreign ministers did not always meet.

Anti-American Climate

It is however clear that the Soviet Union has made efforts to improve its relations with Tehran. Mr Leonid Brezhnev sent no less than six messages to the "Imam" - since the start of the year. Moreover, Moscow has adopted a position of neutrality on the Iranian-Iraqi issue while it is linked to Baghdad by a friendship treaty. The USSR is thus employing the weapons of diplomacy and propaganda in order, parallel in Iran, to encourage an anti-American climate, thus hoping to obtain the favors of the Shiite establishment.

Did not the Soviet ambassador in Iran, Mr Vladimir Vinogradov, hold a meeting with Mohammed Ali Rajai, who was later assassinated, in order to condemn the foreign policy of the Reagan administration shortly after the release of the American hostages? Moreover, the Soviet press has kept up this propaganda action, not hesitating to picture the bomb attack last June against the Islamic Republican Party as a deed done by agents of the CIA.

PRAVDA even wrote that the American intelligence services, in concert with their Israeli and Egyptian counterparts, are supporting the antigovernment movement headed by former president Bani Sadr and are promoting the presence of Afghan rebel organizations in the eastern part of Iran.

During that time, Moscow has been working hard to support the pro-Soviet Iranian Tudeh Party, trying to guarantee its survival as a viable political force in the context of the Islamic "bitter-end" revolution. The Soviet Union very certainly hopes that the Iranian left-wing forces will wind up gaining ground. Among them,

we must note, the Tudeh Party has been hardly touched by the political upheaval orchestrated by the regime of Khomeyni even though the "mojahedin" of the left had been decimated by the "Revolutionary Guard." Relatively few members of that same Tudeh Party were worried by the waves of arrests and executions in recent times. And the recent penalties against the Tudeh Party cannot be considered serious because they were confined to the closing of party headquarters in Tehran, its daily MARDOM, as well as the obstacles placed in the way of seven party members who wanted to run in the elections this summer. Why did the Tudeh Party manage to avoid the persecutions that hit other left-wing movements? Perhaps because it favors the progressive aspect of the revolution of the Ayatollah? Did not the Tudeh Party declare that it "would support the Islamic republic so long as it pursues an anti-imperialist, anti-despotic orientation in favor of the oppressed masses?" It declares that it rejects armed violence as a political instrument. On the other hand, the protection given it by the Soviet Union serves as a protective screen for it. In a word, the only common term between the Tudeh Party and Khomeyni is anti-Americanism.

Tudeh Party Growing Rapidly

In 1976 the Tudeh Party might have had an estimated 1,000 members; it seems that it gained in importance after the Islamic revolution. In 1979, its candidates to the constituent assembly got 50,000 votes and during the parliamentary elections in March 1980, the party garnered 60,000 votes. As for the readers of MARDOM, they were also estimated at about 60,000 in the middle of 1981. Some people say that the Iranian working class, the anti-Khomeyni bourgeoisie, and certain separatist national groups also give it their support. That does not prevent relations between Moscow and Tehran from becoming normalized although somewhat lukewarm at that. While Iran pursues a policy which "tilts neither to the East, nor to the West, declaring that it does not want to depend on any superpower," it nevertheless tries to keep its distance from the USSR following the invasion of Afghanistan and after the Kremlin did not condemn Iraq as part of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict.

Right now however the anti-American feelings, which the Soviet Union keeps stirring up in Iran, are considered disquieting by the American government "which is afraid that Moscow might be contemplating possible intervention in the affairs of Iran."

5058
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REPORTERS IN TEHRAN VIEW TUDEH'S STRENGTH, OVERSEAS OPPOSITION

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 20, 21 Nov 81

[20 Nov 81 p 14]

[Article by Eva Hernback: "Iran's Communists Are Hiding From the Left, Faithful To Both Moscow and Khomeini"]

Tudeh Operating Behind Scene

[Text] While the leftists are being executed on a conveyer belt in Iran, the Moscow-loyal Communist Party is staying in the good graces of the leading priests. Everyone can see that the party's aim is to prepare the ground for Soviet influence, but it is a riddle why the Khomeini regime allows them to continue.

Tehran, 1 Nov--While the left is being executed in large numbers in Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic republic, Tudeh, the Communist Party loyal to Moscow, is alive and working. The Tudeh Party has declared its loyalty to the Islamic revolution and many in Iran are worried about the game they are playing.

Tudeh is alive, but not openly. Tudeh, which when translated means "The Masses," lives underground--not like the others on the left for fear of Islamic justice, but for fear of the others on the left. Tudeh has in fact given out names and addresses to the regime, information which has resulted in seizures, torture and executions. Tudeh is therefore a target for attack by guerrillas on the left.

Tudeh no longer has any offices or commonly known newspapers, and the leaders of Tudeh move carefully in the capital. But that does not mean that Tudeh has been silenced. The party's newspaper MARDOM (The People) comes out and is disseminated free through mailboxes and at work places. About 50 other publications appear regularly, and Tudeh also has a significant book publishing business.

Much Money

"Books of expensive quality," said an Iranian. That shows that the party has much money at its disposal. And everybody knows where this money comes from: Moscow.

Caption: "Don't worry, she will be yours," says the Communist Party Secretary General Noureddin Kianouri--in full ayatollah finery--to Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in this cartoon in an Iranian exile newspaper.

Tudeh stands near the figures of power today. Various advisors at the highest level are Tudeh members. An example: Behzad Nabavi, acting prime minister, sat in prison during the Shah regime accused of membership in the Tudeh Party. Today he appears as one of the most zealous fundamentalists, and according to a reliable source in Tehran he is the leader of an important group in the inner power circles, Mujahedin Enghelab Eslami (not to be confused with the Moslem guerrilla group Mujahedin Khalq which is engaged in armed fighting with the Khomeini regime).

Change Sides

"Once Tudeh, always Tudeh," said an Iranian who relates how a cousin of his, an active Tudeh member, changed his colors during the final days of the revolution against the Shah. He disappeared for 6 months, and popped up later with the typical beard, having read the Koran carefully. He did not want to talk about his past under the banner of Tudeh.

During the Shah's time in power there were examples of Tudeh people who, after disappearing for a time, appeared again within the Shah's power group, for example within the secret police Savak, or even in a ministerial post.

Tudeh, which has its strongest foothold in the northern provinces of the country, played the main role when Azerbaijan province declared its independence at the end of World War II. The Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan existed for a year under Tudeh control and supported by Russian troops. Later it was crushed by the Shah.

During the 1950's, when nationalist Mohammed Mossadegh with strong popular support nearly crushed the power position of the monarchy, he was supported from the beginning by Tudeh. When later a CIA-directed coup crushed Mossadegh and gave all power back to the Shah, Tudeh refrained from acting, in spite of having certain possibilities, for example adherents within the army. It is said that Tudeh was waiting for orders from Moscow, but did not receive any.

This historical background indicates that Tudeh has no great popular support. The number of members is estimated to be a few thousand.

Tudeh claims to have participated in the popular uprising against the Shah. But according to their own information only five party members were killed in the revolt which cost tens of thousands of Iranian lives.

Suspicion Against Tudeh

In general Iranians are suspicious of Tudeh. They know that the party is Moscow's instrument and they are seldom surprised by Tudeh's actions. But many are asking today why the priesthood is so friendly with Tudeh.

One explanation is that the priests are only carrying out practical politics. However nationalistic they are in their utterances, they can not escape the fact that they have a 2000 km border with the Soviet Union.

Others explain that the alliance is the result of effective infiltration by Tudeh. The above-named group Mujahedin Enghelab Eslami is said to be made up of people who were ejected partly from Tudeh, partly from the Islamic guerrilla group Mujahedin Khalq. The group is alternately called fascist and procommunist.

In a secret-stamped item published in the British publication FOREIGN REPORT it was stated that Soviet leaders, including President Leonid Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Aleksey Kosygin met in June 1979 with the leaders of Tudeh who visited Moscow in secret.

The Soviet leaders are said to have expressed their dissatisfaction with Tudeh, and gave orders to stop all activity directed against the Khomeini regime, and to cooperate with other leftist groups, primarily with Mujahedin Khalq and Fedayin Khalq. This was before these groups took up arms against Khomeini.

Moscow's Order

Moscow's order resulted in meetings between Tudeh and the two guerrilla groups. After several such meetings and proposals for cooperation, Fedayin split into a

majority, which declared its loyalty to Khomeini, and a minority which instead took up arms against the regime. It was reported that even a few members of Mujahedin then left their organization and joined Khomeini's side.

The Fedayin majority has, exactly like the Tudeh, given out information about leftists, primarily comrades within the Fedayin minority, and thereby cooperated in their execution.

But the struggle for power within Iran's leadership is still going on. In a conversation with a leading newspaperman in Tehran, a member of the government party IRP, he disclosed that there is far from unity about Tudeh's freedom of movement within the Islamic republic.

Tudeh and IRP

"Tudeh is with us now, but we know that this is a tactic. They have only chosen another method than the other leftist groups, which are causing armed strife. But the day that the Soviets with their ideology go against us--through Tudeh--then we will take them on also.

"The Soviets are satisfied just now that we have thrown out the United States, but they are biding their time in Moscow."

These comments are typical of the line within the regime which is sharply anticommunist, and one gets the clear impression that the future of Tudeh depends entirely on how the struggle for power in Iran develops. Exactly as in the fall of Azerbaijan and Mossadegh, Tudeh is playing a dangerous game which can cost them many lives before the firing squads, now as then. So far in Tehran we have only heard rumors of two cases of executions of Tudeh members.

"That was a mistake, out in the country. They were executed a little too quickly," an Iranian commentator informed me.

But when one looks at Iran's foreign policy profile during recent months, Tudeh is making progress. Attacks against the Soviets can not be compared with those directed against the United States. They never contain personal attacks against the Soviet leaders, and are of a more rhetorical character. One can also see a clear reduction of criticism of the Soviet war against the Moslem guerrillas in Afghanistan.

Representatives of the regime in Iran have, during the fall, taken a number of trips abroad and concluded new trade agreements. The list of countries tells its own story about the choice of alliances by Iran's leaders: North Korea, Cuba, Yugoslavia, Romania, East Germany, Bulgaria, South Yemen and the Soviet Union.

[21 Nov 81 p 5]

Embassies Act to Quell Opposition Abroad

[Article by Eva Hernback and Lillemor Wallden: "Iran Orders Ambassadors: Silence Opposition Abroad"]

> [Text] Iranian authorities have been trying for several months by different methods to silence the opposition abroad. By stopping support money from parents to youths who are studying abroad they are trying to force the students to return home. They are also urging the parents directly to bring them home. Some parents have been forced to write that the money they are sending is the last, and is intended to pay the way home for the child or children. They have regulated which subjects that can be studied abroad--some subjects have been declared of no value to Iran, and are forbidden. There is proof that students who have returned home have been seized immediately and quickly executed.

DAGENS NYHETER has obtained a number of secret-stamped documents which show that Iranian students abroad are being threatened in different ways. One document shows that embassies have received orders to report opponents, not to renew their passports, and to deal only with them for purposes of sending them home.

One document from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to the embassy in the Philippines reveals that eight returning students were seized and executed even before there was evidence against them.

Another document tells that the Iranian Embassy in London is notifying personnel concerned that money from home to students in England is being stopped and that parents and guardians should take steps to send their children home.

Passports Withdrawn

DAGENS NYHETER has also read a report from the Iranian Embassy in Stockholm to the Iranian Foreign Ministry in Tehran concerning a student in Stockholm. In the report the student in question is named as one of the leaders of the Mujahedin Khalq guerrilla group in Sweden.

The ambassador points out in the introduction to his report that he is so describing the student only because he was ordered to do it, but that he really disapproves of making written reports about people.

Several Iranians in Sweden have already been in trouble for not having their passports renewed. Reports of withdrawn passports have also come from France, Britain and West Germany.

Appeal to the UN

Mujahedin Khalq's leader Massoud Rajavi, who lives in exile in Paris, sent a letter last Sunday to the UN secretary general because of the regime's actions against

Iranians abroad. It contained the following requests:
- that Iranian citizens could be given passports issued by the UN.
- that the UN request governments concerned to arrange residence and work permits for Iranians without passports.
- that the UN notify its member countries that deportation of Iranians whose passports have been withdrawn means prison, torture and execution.

The Documents

This is a secret-stamped letter from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to all embassies and consulates abroad. At the top is the emblem of the Islamic republic, the sender's address, a stamp which says "Top Secret - Urgent," a registry number and a date.

Then it says:

"In the name of God the Almighty

"Circular to all delegations of the Iranian Islamic Republic abroad.

"Commencing with the date of this circular all those assigned to the delegations are bound to report the names of all Bahais and antirevolutionaries, especially the so-called 'students' who live in the areas for which you are responsible. You will not extend the passports of these persons, except to give them only a document to travel home.

"Acting Foreign Minister

Section for Cultural and Consular Affairs

Javad Mansouri, 12 August 1981"

This is a secret-stamped letter from Iran's Foreign Ministry to the Iranian Consulate in Manila, The Philippines. At the top there is a stamp which states the secret character of the document, the Islamic republic's emblem, address, date and registry number.

Then it says:

"In the name of God the Almighty

"Please promptly send information relating to these students:
1. Ali Mirhashemi
2. Hossein Sedghi
3. Ghasem Shahparast
4. Bidjan Mazidi
5. Khavar Sohrabi
6. Roya Irvani
7. Parichehr Behrovan
8. Zahra Ghasemi

who were eliminated because they were antirevolutionaries--so we can complete their cases and release their names to the mass media.

"Send the information to the Foreign Ministry of the Iranian Islamic Republic.

"Acting Foreign Minister

Section for Cultural and Consular Affairs

Javad Mansouri, 12 August 1981"

Iranians in Sweden Risk Losing Passports

In Sweden there are about 1200 Iranian students at the university. Many of them are against the regime which rules today in Iran.

Iranian authorities have now taken drastic steps to get them to return home. The students' passports can be withdrawn.

As guest students in Sweden the Iranian students have a passport which lasts for 5 years, but for the passport to be valid it must be stamped every year by the Iranian Embassy.

In August this year came strict orders from the Iranian authorities. Extending students' passports can now no longer be done routinely. The Iranian authorities must first determine that the students can remain in Sweden. Furthermore, the Iranian Embassy must find out and report home on the activities of opponents of the regime in Sweden.

Seek Asylum

Students who have already turned in their passports are expecting word on whether they can remain or not.

"If they receive orders to go home but still choose to remain they can ask for political asylum," said Division Chief Bjorn Weibo at the Immigration Department. "But that is a difficult choice, since they are concerned about what will happen to their families and relatives in Iran.

"If they go home to Iran they can be in trouble. Iran is hardly a nation of law today," explained Bjorn Weibo. "Whatever the students decide can lead to unfortunate results. THe students who do not get their passports back from the Iranian Embassy can request a foreigner's passport from the police."

9287
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OPPOSITION TO SADDAM HUSAYN SAID TO BE MOUNTING

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 9 Oct 81 p 10

[Article by Yehoshua Tadmor: "Opposition to Saddam Husayn Increases: No Certainty That Iraq-Iran War Will Continue for a Long Time"]

[Text] In recent months there have been signs among foreign experts of a revision in the view that holds that the Iraq-Iran war will continue for years because it is a war between two peoples over a piece of land vital to both of them. The authors of this opinion also held that it was a matter of primitive peoples who have difficulty adjusting to peaceful coexistence, especially since Iraq-Iran relations in recent years have been a history of one long war with short interludes and truces in between, and therefore one should not expect a conclusion of the present war.

Recently, other estimates of the situation are being heard. There is no longer talk of a "people's war" between Iraq and Iran, a war with no end in sight. The Iraqi motivation is no longer "all-out." Within Iraq there is strong opposition, from all parts of the spectrum--Shiites, Kurds, Communists, Arabs and others--and observers claim that there may be a surprise in store. At the moment every expression of opposition is suppressed with an iron hand, every day Saddam Husayn's opponents from the top political and military echelons are taken out and executed, but over and over again there are reports of attempts to get him. All of which is testimony to the danger facing his rule.

From Failure to Failure

Lately, one well-known expert described the Iraq-Iran war in recent months as resembling the trench warfare along the Somme in World War I. It is perhaps a nice description, but it is not entirely accurate. For the Iranians, despite their terrible difficulties at home, have lately begun to attack here and there successfully. On 29 September, for example, the Iranians announced that they had liberated the important oil town of 'Abadan, which had been surrounded on all sides. The next day the Iraqis announced that they had in fact retreated from 'Abadan. This was perhaps the biggest Iranian victory this year. In other sectors, too, in recent days, the Iranians have begun opening local offensives that force the Iraqis to stay on the alert and fight back.

Meanwhile, as we said, the internal opposition in Iraq is increasing, and even if it has difficulty now in taking to the streets, as long as the situation at the

front is bad, underground elements will increase their efforts to remove Saddam Husayn. And if he should be removed, all the Iraqi courses of action and the Iranian reaction to them would likely change.

The U.S. and USSR Mix In

Meanwhile, the USSR and the United States are mixing in in the area in advance of unexpected developments. Secretary of State Haig made maximum use of the episode of the Iranian attack on Kuwait to convince the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the vital importance of the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, by emphasizing that if the Saudis had planes like these, they would gain 14 minutes warning time before the appearance of enemy planes. The Russians, for their part, are quietly but systematically renewing the supply of arms to the Iraqi forces. Shipments are reaching Iraq's sea and air ports now that it has succeeded in clearing adjacent areas of Iranian forces.

When First Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Ramadan left for Moscow, relations between the two countries were at their nadir, almost at the point of rupture. But Ramadan, the senior personality in the Iraqi upper echelon after Saddam Husayn, managed to get across to the leaders of the USSR that if they did not renew the shipments, Iraq would turn to the United States. In fact, there were already signals from Washington to Baghdad and even a public declaration by Secretary of State Haig on the matter of Iraq. The Soviet leaders, who actually abhor Saddam Husayn, decided that they had no choice but to renew cooperation with the devil. Thus, Soviet weaponry is again flowing to Iraq. It is still a relatively small flow and certainly depends on the political demands that the Soviet side will make in the near future on Saddam Husayn. That is to say, no changes are yet in the offing. All of which helps Saddam Husayn strengthen his position in the war, even if there is no end to this war, and to hope that the Iranian regime will collapse.

Saddam Husayn, who opened the war and hoped for easy victories, now understands well that there are no prospects for a new peace initiative. The deposed president Bani Sadr was the last at this stage with whom it would have been possible to negotiate. Since his overthrow, the Iranians have been steeled in their decision to continue the war at all costs and to expel the Iraqis by force from their land. From a military point of view, the Iraqis have the edge, but from the point of view of morale and motivation, certainly the Iranians, who are eating each other alive in Tehran, are the ones who are displaying the willingness and ability to stand firm.

The Root of the Weakness

The Iraqis have military superiority over the Iranians, and it is therefore difficult to understand the great weakness in the Iraqi army, composed of 12 divisions and equipped with the best Soviet weapons. Experts in Iraqi affairs believe that the root cause of the weakness is to be found in the systematic elimination, over the years, of the best generals, who seemed to Saddam Husayn to be his enemies. As his suspicions have grown in recent years, so have the bloodbaths and tremors that have visited the high echelons of the military and the administration. But even those officers who were promoted, on the basis of their membership in the Ba'th Party, have not proved their efficiency in the field as was expected of them.

Another weakness was revealed in the high Iraqi command when there was need to move brigades and divisions on a large scale. They were not accustomed to that and proved to be lacking the experience or ability to carry out movements of large forces of this sort.

A lack of motivation was also one of the factors in the services' bad performance. The soldiers, and apparently also the junior officer corps, did not identify with the war, and when the formations began to lose soldiers, the Iraqi manpower was revealed in all its weakness. In fact, the Iranian forces were struck at the first stage and scattered in every direction, but when thousands of bands of fanatic volunteers arrived at the front from all parts of Iran under the banner of defending the homeland, they were turned into a real force.

If in fact Saddam Husayn were to be eliminated by elements opposed to a continuation of the war earlier than was thought in the past, those elements would influence a political settlement as well as a change in the Iraqi military situation.

9794
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PROS, CONS OF RENEWAL OF RELATIONS WITH USSR DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Oct 81 pp 15, 18

[Article by Ya'aqov Broz: "Israel-USSR: Who Would Gain From a Renewal of Ties?"]

> [Text] Despite the Shamir-Gromyko meeting, the question is still undecided. No one disputes the importance of the matter, but it must be dealt with in a carefully thought out and planned way so as not to endanger Israel's existing vital accomplishments and interests.

The matter of renewing diplomatic ties between Israel and the USSR has come up again, in the wake of the meeting 2 weeks ago in New York of the two countries' foreign ministers. It was, of course, Moscow that took the step of severing relations at the time of the Six Day War. All the other members of the Soviet bloc, except for Romania, then followed suit.

The cessation of all formal ties was not accompanied by a repeal of Soviet Russia's recognition of Israel. This is one of the isolated incidents in which a country (and this is true of the rest of the communist bloc countries that did likewise) that had already established diplomatic relations with another country refused to renew them only because it disputed that country's policy. There are dozens of other countries whose behavior the USSR opposes, but it nevertheless maintains firm relations with them. In the situation as constituted, the lack of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet bloc over the last 14 years has become an integral part of the Middle Eastern political scene.

Despite the break, all contacts were not completely cut off. There were prior meetings of the foreign ministers, in 1973 and in 1975; unofficial Russian delegations have visited Israel; and Israeli delegations of a cultural or scientific nature, and one member of the Knesset, have spent time in the USSR. All these years Russian policy has been marked by hostile activity against Israel, by blind support of the Arabs and by an astounding tolerance toward the manufacture and distribution of virulently anti-Semitic literature within Russia itself. A kind of external implication of this last topic can be seen in the UN resolution that equated Zionism to racism, a resolution that, according to research done a few years ago, was principally the fruit of a Soviet effort and not the direct outcome of an Arab initiative.

An Open Question

It is an interesting paradox that it was precisely under these circumstances that one of the most important breakthroughs in the history of the Zionist enterprise was accomplished: The gates of Russia were opened for significant immigration of Jews to Israel. (We will not deal here with the distressing paradox that most of these Jews today are not joining us.)

It is difficult to determine if Soviet accomplishments in the Arab world since 1967 were precisely the result of its breaking relations with Israel or would have been smaller but for that break. It could also be claimed that in so doing it lost a vital lever in its political game with the Arab countries. Its success thus far has not been as great as one might have supposed. The bottom line is that the principal large Arab states have remained outside its sphere of influence and its active partnership is mainly with crumbling or crisis-ridden regimes like Syria, Libya and South Yemen. Beyond that, it also had no part in the peace process that began with President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The price it pays as a result of a lack of direct channels of communication between itself and Israel includes, among other things, a reduction in its maneuverability vis-a-vis the Arabs and its inferior position in comparison with the United States, which has access to all the sides involved in the conflict in the area. The power and dimensions of the two countries, the USSR and Israel, are obviously totally different from one another, but one of the characteristics of the situation that was created after the break in relations between them is the growth in the relative dependence of each of them on one of the active sides in the Middle East: Israel on the United States and the USSR on the Arab countries. It is an open question as to how much an improvement in relations between them would reduce this relative dependence.

A Common Denominator

Two research studies published this year deal with the topic of diplomatic relations with the USSR. The first--"The Possibility for a Soviet-Israeli Dialog" (in English) by Dr Jacob Ro'i and Rita Gotlibovitz--is a publication of the Center for Strategic Studies located near the University of Tel Aviv; the second--"Advantages and Disadvantages in Renewing Diplomatic Ties Between Israel and the USSR"--is the work of a research group at the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations located near the Hebrew University.

According to one of the conclusions reached by the investigators, the finding of a common denominator for an Israeli-Soviet dialog in the narrow area of the Arab-Israeli conflict alone is very problematic. The policy of the USSR on central issues in the area results from its perceived need to continue to tighten its relations with certain states and groups in the Arab world and reflects more, or at least no less, the positions of those countries than its own position. The result is that the gulf that separates the USSR and Israel is in fact identical with, or at least very similar to, the gulf that looms between it and its Arab enemies. From Russia's point of view, any change in its stand is likely to deflect the course of things in a direction that would be unwelcome to it, such as weakening the opposition of the radical Arab states to the peace process and to rapprochement with the United States.

In the wider sphere, on the other hand, common interests could turn up between the USSR and Israel. There have been situations in recent years in which the two of them have found themselves--separately and not together--on the same side of the fence. Both approved of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq; after the bombing of the nuclear reactor near Baghdad--according to press reports--senior Western Soviet military attaches complimented their Israeli counterparts for carrying out an operation of this sort without getting permission from others; both countries are interested in preventing the Red Sea from becoming an Arab lake.

There are also other Russian interests. For example, the Soviets are not very happy about a possible rapprochement between China and Israel lest it lead to the transfer of advanced technological information to Peking; Israeli-American strategic cooperation, which is being talked about these days, is certainly not to the liking of the USSR, and we can surmise that it would want to cancel it completely or at least reduce it as much as possible. It is possible that we can learn, in this connection, from what happened in 1953 after the break in relations following the hurling of an explosive charge into the yard of the Soviet embassy in Tel Aviv; in a letter sent in advance of the resumption in relations, the foreign minister at the time, Moshe Sharett, declared to his counterpart Molotov in Moscow--we can assume, at the request of the Soviets--Israel's obligation "not to join any pact or agreement of an aggressive character toward the USSR."

From Israel's point of view, there are advantages and disadvantages in a resumption of relations with the Soviet Union. Among the advantages is the capability of treating directly--without intermediaries whose steps are dictated by their own interests--all topics concerning the two countries in the political, economic and cultural spheres, and in all areas of life including the matter of the Jews. A resumption of ties might have a restraining influence on Moscow's hostility, which today is expressed, among other ways, in an effort to represent Israel as a country "beyond the pale" of the international community and to arouse doubts about its very right to exist. The existence of firm ties would undermine any such Soviet claim. An official Israeli presence in Moscow would permit the strengthening of bonds with Russia's Jews and the reinforcement of their national consciousness. Israel would be extricated from its international isolation, since not only countries of the Soviet bloc but third world countries as well would almost certainly follow in the footsteps of the USSR in renewing ties with it. Thus, once again, as was the case from the end of the 50's until the beginning of the 70's, a broad base would be opened for diverse and multifaceted Israeli activity in various parts of the world.

There could also be, as we said, disadvantages to a resumption of ties. It might limit Israel's freedom of action on behalf of the Jews of Russia: it would grant additional weight to Russia's claim to play a role equal to that of the United States in the peace process without it changing its basic stand on the matter of its demand for a return to the borders of 1967 and the implementation of Palestinian rights as it sees them. Under certain conditions, it would likely hurt our relations with the United States, to some extent or other, without being accompanied by accomplishments worthy of the name.

A resumption of diplomatic relations with the USSR is not around the corner. No one would dispute the importance of the matter, which must be acted on in a well-planned and calculated fashion without endangering Israel's existing vital interests and accomplishments.

9794
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ARTILLERY FORCES DEPLOY NEW RADAR

Tel Aviv YEDIOT AHARONOT in Hebrew 18 Aug 81 p 5

[Article by Ya'ir Amikam: "Artillery Corps Operates New Radar to Pinpoint Fire Sources"]

[Text] "Despite the success attained by our artillery people in their war against the terrorists in southern Lebanon it is difficult to prevent the activity of the terrorist organizations. They fire a large quantity of shells quickly and move away from the place, and it is difficult to pinpoint them. The terrorists have first-class artillery arms, and of late have even begun to operate firing computers."

This was said yesterday by the chief artillery officer, Brig Gen Arye Mizrahi, on a tour of military correspondents which was conducted on the occasion of Armed Forces Day. Brig Gen Mizrahi also said that Israel is in an inferior position as compared with the Arab nations in everything related to the quantity of artillery and thus there must be an increase in the number of sophisticated instruments which make it possible to narrow the gap.

Yesterday for the first time two of these sophisticated instruments were revealed: a new artillery range radar, which makes it possible to quickly identify the source of fire; and a muzzle-velocity calibrator, which makes it possible to measure the velocity of the shell and thereby to compensate for the deflections.

Training Aids

On the tour, which was conducted at a training base of the Artillery Corps, the most modern training aids (simulators) were displayed, which make it possible to call up reservists for 3-day training and to impart to them in mixed classes most of the material which heretofore was given only under field conditions. The new aids save up to 10 days of reserve training per year.

The chief artillery officer said that the Arab countries have multiplied their artillery armament since the Yom Kippur War and today the policy of operating artillery is based upon Soviet theory models: maximum nests, within a minimum of area.

Improvement in the Arab armies is also the result of an upgrading of materiel and of the operational techniques such as the introduction of firing computers which are available on the free market today.

Many Volunteers

"Our artillerymen are now making more precise and rapid hits than in the past. They have the advantage, also, of improved range," said Brig Gen Mizrahi. "The artillery has become a decisive force on the battlefield, and an inseparable part of it. The Artillery Corps of today is a mobile and computerized corps, with high and efficient firing capability which responds in the best possible manner to the fire cover requirements of the group being supported. Today, the Artillery Corps is no longer recognizable in comparison to those firing pieces which existed in the previous decade. Nevertheless, we must guard against the gap which exists from a quantitative standpoint between us and the Arabs by the introduction of highly sophisticated means which will enable us to accomplish firing more speedily and with more precision."

With regard to the disposition of manpower, said the chief artillery officer, inasmuch as this is not a volunteer force, many of the recruits request assignment to the artillery division. The Corp has even absorbed soldiers who were freed from Megiddo Prison, and recently such a trainee successfully completed a course for artillery commanders.

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MAJOR GENERAL BEN-GAL VIEWED AS CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE

Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 9 Sep 81 pp 19, 20, 53

[Article by Emmanuel Rosen: "Yanosh: Departure from the North"]

[Text] When he was commander of a division of Sherman tanks, Capt Avigdor ("Yanosh") Ben-Gal was assigned the task of securing a place somewhere in the North, a mission which several infantry units previously designated for that had failed miserably at. "Yanosh's" superiors knew him and his character, and, when they heard about the infantry mission assigned to the scattered armoured force which detests discipline, procedures and administration, they hastened to "lament" his assignment there. After 2 days, when they visited the site that was hit, a big surprise awaited them. "Yanosh," the well known wild one, was there all dressed in full military uniform instructing his soldiers who were set in their posts in full readiness. Someone called it "vision of the last days." The commanders who were "mourning" had no choice but to establish that the division of Shermans had achieved total success with respect to their objective.

That was perhaps one of the first times that Avigdor Ben-Gal managed to suprise and confuse his commanders and those surrounding them. Ever since he vehemently refused to attend a course for officers of armoured forces despite the repeated urgings of his superior officers and till the time last week when he removed, in part, his rigid exterior and wiped a tear away during the ceremony of the change of command in the northern sector--from then until today, "Yanosh" has been a figure immersed in controversy.

What has not been said about him? That he tramples and treads and stings his subordinates with insufferable cynicism, that those near him work out of an inertia of fear, that he is given to outbursts of anger, and that he is a warmonger who wants to conquer Damascus at the peak of his successes. But this is also "Yanosh" about whom those surrounding him testify that he has transformed the concept of "friend" to an almost holy value; that he has the sensitive soul of a newborn babe; that he fights for the rights of his subordinates with almost unlimited zeal; that he is a military genius and an intellectual scholar in other realms; that he sweeps people along after him to do unconventional ethical work; that no once can compare with him as far as integrity and honesty and not embellishing are concerned.

There are few Israel Defense Force officers whose names have been connected to so many opposite and conflicting qualities, around whose life styles so many myths and legends and stories have sprung up. He has extreme enemies who drip poison whenever

anyone mentions his name, and he has blindly enthusiastic admirers. "Yanosh" believes that the era of gods in the military is over, and he sends away servants and "yes men." Yet at the termination ceremony that was arranged for him at the northern command, one of the officers expressed the majority feeling when he said, "'Yanosh' got where he is by virtue of tremendous spirit."

"Yanosh" is one of those people who fit the following saying well: "You can agree with him or not, but you can never ignore his existence." In every post which he fills, "Yanosh" exercises his "bulldozer personality" and presents his opinions and views aggressively, and no one can ever stand in his way. For 4 years--we were told--you could feel "Yanosh's" spirit in every corner of the northern command. Some say this in a complimentary way. Others emphasize his influence as negative and destructive.

Aluf (corr. to Brigadier) Avigdor Ben-Gal leapt forth like a meteor into the consciousness within and outside the IDF at the end of the Yom Kippur War, the same war which destroyed old gods and myths and replaced them with new ones. Until that war, "Yanosh" advanced within the context of posts in the armoured forces in the usual way and influenced quite a bit by run-ins and bitter arguments with his commanding officers.

In the early 60's, he commanded a division of tanks in sector 7 during a period in which there were no true operational actions. At the time of the water incidents on the Syrian border, "Yanosh" was appointed Operations Branch officer over that sector, and, in that capacity, his vehicle went over a mine and he was hospitalized for quite a while.

"Yanosh" lived and grew up in Tel-Aviv, shared an apartment with his good friend Yossi Ben-Hanan and drove around the streets in a Mustang. They spoke of him then as the "hooligan" in sector 7, and his mysterious controversial image was already then in an advanced stage of development.

Two months before the outbreak of the Six-Day Way, "Yanosh" left the country briefly, perhaps with the secret intention of leaving the army, but he heard about the tension on the borders and returned to the army to be appointed Operations Branch officer in his armoured sector of Yeshkha Shadmi. "I was ready at that time to go back to being a company commander to fight in some such capacity," "Yanosh" later said in a statement which would reinforce the opinion of his opponents who were convinced of their view of "Yanosh" as a warmonger.

On the eve of the war of attrition, he was appointed commander of a battalion of tanks in the regular sector in Sinai. On the Sabbath, 7 March, 1969, he, together with his friend Yossi Ben-Hanan, organized a race for an Egyptian pilot whose plane was brought down on the other side of the canal. The race ended in a tie and "Yanosh," with his operational sense sharp even then, estimated that this was the final day of peace in the Sinai. That evening, the war of attrition began.

Before receiving his appointment as commander of Brigade 7, "Yanosh" was appointed to head a course for armoured force platoon commanders. This was another point of contact with his good friend Ben-Hanan who was a teacher in the course. The two of them would spend days and nights in the command office, and, in the course of many hours, they would write dozens of theoretical dossiers. No one asked this of them,

but "Yanosh" gave as an explanation of his actions "the glory of argument" and the joy of intense creativity.

Brigade 7 to which he was appointed commander, was a superior brigade. For "Yanosh" this was a comfortable base to begin to apply his unique approach. He set aside familiar doctrines and avoided setting up regular sessions and debates about high strategy. Further, he turned directly to the understanding of each of his officers, asked them difficult questions in great detail, forced them to work very hard and produce results of unusually disciplined work.

"Yanosh" went after large objectives. He filled his subordinates with his belief that "there is nothing that the military system cannot tackle." With this slogan, he created and supervised a multifaceted exercise in success.

He led the armoured column on the road to the Independence Day parade in Jerusalem and organized a huge rally in Latrun to mark the 25 years of the brigade.

His opponents refused to accept the distinction between "Yanosh" the unit commander and "Yanosh" the moderate citizen who detests war. When he explains that war is likely, they returned to the old sayings from before the Yom Kippur War: "Yanosh" is crazy; "Yanosh" incites war; "Yanosh" is an angry prophet.

He did not get upset by the image, at least outwardly with his cynical outlook which ignored the barbs of criticism. His sharp instincts and his professional armoured force orientation led him on the eve of the Jewish New Year to send all the unit officers up North and to prepare them for the possibility of war. He explained, interpreted and patrolled with his officers in order to familiarize them with the area.

When the alert began, he sent Avigdor Kahalani and his regiment North and, when the argument was raised about whether the entire 7th brigade should go North, "Yanosh" burst out: "What do you mean? There is no question about it! The 7th brigade will fight in the North!"

"Yanosh" was always a loyal soldier who carried out orders, but until he actually carried it out, he always did everything in his power to get his way in the higher echelons. And he did this with "a bulldozer approach" and with a talent for persuasion which brought him almost total success.

On Friday, the eve of the Yom Kippur War, "Yanosh" called his subordinate officers together and explained that they must prepare for war with concrete orders. He established the command group for 2 pm the next day, but by then the guns were already blasting and the command group was transferred to the communications network. In the armoured troop vehicle which took him out to the battlefield, a subordinate asked him, "Tell me, commander, is this serious?" "What do you mean?" answered "Yanosh," "can't you see that it isn't touching us at all?"

But it was serious, very serious. "Yanosh" the cynical and sarcastic revealed himself in wartime to be a friend with a sensitive soul. The commander who in peacetime was always so hard to get along with, who created around him a constant atmosphere of tension and nerves and who hurt and insulted--in wartime revealed himself to have astonishing vision. His subordinate officer, Avigdor Kahalani, says

of him: "He revived our spirits and gave us confidence that somebody was running the battle properly." "Yanosh" directed the battle from behind with deliberation and, because of that, came up for a certain amount of criticism at the end of the war, but he garnered praise from among the officers of the brigade who said, "In this hell, it is not easy to think."

The Field Commanders Are Always Right

And he thought. He worried about the reserves of tanks and of manpower even in the most difficult times, and he displayed a remarkable stubbornness about performance, and he put every possible soldier, tank and force onto the battlefield.

"Yanosh" followed through as the voice of his friend, the regimental commander grew weaker. He feared his downfall and received the news of it with a spontaneous outburst. "Why did we send him there?" His worst moments came with the wounding of his good friend Yossi Ben-Hanan. When communication with Yossi was cut off, "Yanosh" wrote on the dust of his armoured troop vehicle with his finger, "Yossi is dead!" But he yelled into the communications apparatus, "I will get you out, my brother," organized a brigade-wide effort, and did everything until he got the wounded Yossi to the hospital. Whoever was near him during those moments says that Yossi Ben-Hanan's wounding and the break in communication constituted "Yanosh's" worst moments in the entire war.

The war ended. "Yanosh" decided to leave it behind as quickly as possible and to think about the future. He vehemently refused to speak of the errors of his associates. This week he told me, "I assume that it was difficult, then, to criticize my friends in the brigade even if there were some who were not so good. I felt then that a certain amount of time should pass in order to be free of feelings and to offer a constructive and accurate criticism." He did finally offer this criticism in a personal conversation with Mordechai Gur after quite a long time when his words could no longer hurt anyone. "Yanosh" took the responsibility on himself. "My principle," he told me as he ended his command this week, "is that the field commanders are always right and that the job of the administration is to serve the field staff."

Beyond this principle, he conducted a dispassionate and logical analysis of his own mistakes and of the failures of the 7th brigade. "He was like an open book, and his openness added to his intellectual integrity allowed us to learn things and draw conclusions almost without having to examine them." That was how Major General Mordechai Gur, chief of staff at the time, expressed it. "He conducted this analysis without embellishment, without embarrassment and without any attempt to fancy it up and try to make it look good."

The day after the war, "Yanosh" returned to his old system of "target dates." When he was still a commander in Sinai he once determined, "Tonight the Egyptians will attack." As unit commander in the North, he established "target dates" for the coming war and dragged his subordinates along towards goals and energetic work.

After the war, the arguments were also renewed concerning relations between the military and civilians on the Golan Heights. "Yanosh" saw the Golan Heights as a platform for the defense of Israel. He called for maximal defense, the creation of a see of natural obstacles and the maximal fortification of the Golan settlements.

In the Yom Kippur War, "Yanosh" learned about the critical importance of masses and volume, and he tried to apply the principle of quantity in a country which has been accustomed to relying on quality alone. The chief of staff Moteh Gur had many arguments with him on this subject, but "Yanosh's" ability to apply doctrines and general axioms to the specific problems of the Golan Heights led the chief of staff to give him a serious "push" and to appoint him as commander of the regular armoured group on the Golan Heights.

"Yanosh" received this announcement with obvious confusion. As group commander, he came into contact for the first time with abstract professional long-term thinking. He developed systems and fighting techniques unique to the Golan Heights, fortified it and left little work for those who came after him. The Golan Heights which "Yanosh" shaped as group commander, was, with slight changes, the Golan Heights that he left last week as head of the Northern command.

He felt that the fate of the Golan Heights rested on his shoulders, and the work norms that he established were astonishing. Discussions were carried on until the early hours of the morning, and "Yanosh" saw with satisfaction the improvement in the work ethic over time. He believed that not only the officers should work but also the soldiers. Their job was to struggle and work hard. He intentionally made light at first of the small problems of conditions of service and spoke openly with his soldiers about decisive and weighty military issues. He believed that the average soldier wanted to be talked to about important things--the coming war--and not about a hot shower.

Selective in His Choice of Posts for the Brigadier

Moteh Gur appointed him assistant to the head of the Operations Branch at General Headquarters against "Yanosh's" will. "I did this," explains Moteh, "out of admiration for his intellectual ability and out of confidence that he could contribute a great deal in discussions concerning the future of the IDF and its structure. His contribution in the planning of the Entebbe operation proved me right. "Yanosh" is graced with the ability to philosophize about military subjects but also to translate the philosophy into decisions. For this reason, apparently, the nickname stuck--"philosopher commander."

On the general staff, there was no longer any doubt that "Yanosh" was a candidate for the rank of Brigadier. They proposed one position for him. He turned it down and then Moteh appointed him chief of the Northern command in place of Rifa'el Eytan.

The system which "Yanosh" developed in the Northern command earned many opponents and lively supporters, but no one questioned the fact that this system was very unique. He put his new officers to the test in the early months of their service. He worked them hard, was very critical and refrained from praising them. His critics say that in this way, he tried to get them accustomed to his ideas as though he were saying, "I decide things here." "Yanosh" refused to get to know his officers by way of an office and paperwork.

His military understanding which has been called "brilliant" allowed him to involve himself in the smallest details of each of his subordinate officers. His stubbornness, his curiosity and his capacity to follow the implementation of the most

marginal order forced his officers to rise above mediocrity, to avoid trying to "brown nose" him and to prepare themselves for sessions with the chief as though for final exams at the university. "To be a subordinate officer with "Yanosh," one of them explained, "means to always think five steps ahead. He simply knows the area you are working in, and your preparation forces you to a state of readiness which in itself is already half the work."

When his officers did not carry their load, he used his cynicism and went after them.

The considerable responsibility which he placed on his officers and the almost complete backing which he gave them did not stop him from being an extreme centralist. Under his command, he institutionalized the norm that the chief has the last word on every subject whether small or great. Often at night the telephone wakened him many times because "Yanosh" wanted to receive information about every event. He explained: "If they start to classify information for me, I will be in bad shape."

Friends of "Yanosh" say they were ready to do anything for him. On his part, he was very generous to them. When the bus driving permit of one of his drivers was about to be canceled, "Yanosh" fought for him and went as high as the chief military attorney. His formality was informality. He made fun of ceremony, left people with a handshake and met officers in coffeehouses.

Nonetheless, it is pointed out, "Yanosh" as Brigadier was no longer the same wild man of the 7th brigade and the happy days in the South.

Some say that his approaches to strategic questions were childish, but with "Yanosh" there existed a clear differentiation between mere talk and concrete decisions. Almost everyone who knows him points out his considerable talent in distinguishing between the essential and the inessential and to focus on the important points. The esteem of the infantry for him was perhaps "Yanosh's" biggest surprise as commanding officer. The command's involvement in action and roads past the lines of the terrorists in Southern Lebanon forced the armoured forces man to become very knowledgeable about infantry matters, and he did so in his own unique way.

During the 4 years under his leadership, the Northern Command received an infantry orientation, and the paratroopers and Golani commands waited in line for his missions. A senior infantry commander said of "Yanosh" this week: "He amazed us with his familiarity with infantry matters. He never commanded or participated in an infantry action, but his immersion in details and his feeling for the subject, you felt as though he was actually in the field."

Ready for an Attack at any Time

His immersion in details and his professional studies created new standards for the infantry with regard to action and the ability to listen. "If you can pass 'Yanosh's' inspection, you could be sure that you were ready for action." He created a positive competition between the paratroopers and the 'Golani.' He himself wandered for days in his transport, observing terrorists' targets across the border, studying aerial photographs and getting to know every location. He contributed to the improvement of equipment for the infantry (his contribution is

great on the subject of bridges, for example, and he developed a system of "intelligence for operation," and the old-timers among the infantry could not remember anything like it.

The passionate and successful love affair with the infantry officers--without doubt tangible evidence of "Yanosh's" integration into his multi-soldier role--did not repeat itself much on the subject of the relationship to the Northern settlements and to the broad defense system. His view on that subject is described as "What is important to Israel is how many tanks it has." Some argue that his sensitivity to the subject of the settlements was not great, and they point to the lack of experience in the solution of problems in depth. "It is not possible for me to have the kind of sensitive involvement in this subject that Rapol had," he explained, "and I have, therefore, emphasized the defense side more."

The crown of "Yanosh's" operational labors was no doubt the Litani mission. "There is no operation which earned so much criticism and reaped so many accomplishments as the Litani operation," "Yanosh" argued. Mordechai Gur said that in the Litani mission, "Yanosh" proved himself as a great commander in that he plotted a classic infantry plan.

"Yanosh" established and institutionalized Israel's relations with the Christians in Southern Lebanon and saw in them a national asset. He continued to push for many missions against terrorists. "My wish for many missions does not stem from my character but from the essence of my job. This is, in my opinion, how anyone who serves as head of the Northern Command should conduct himself."

The Northern Command, from his point of view, was ready each day for an attack; intelligence worked day and night. Military sources defined the activities of the paratroopers and the Golani in glowing terms.

This week "Yanosh" left the Northern Command regretfully. "I could have continued in the post from a spiritual and physical point of view," he says, "but I am satisfied that I have begun to complete all kinds of projects and now it is time to face new challenges in the middle and long term."

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FOREIGN CURRENCY CRISIS FEARED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Aug 81 p 9

[Article by Shimshon Ehrlich: "Is the Till Being Depleted?"]

[Text] Is Israel facing a crisis in its foreign currency till which it has dreaded for decades? This question has arisen again following many discouraging signs and against the backdrop of general fears about the outcomes of economic policy. The stand relative to these fears is the dividing line between the optimists, who, in contrast to the past, are not divided among people of the Bank of Israel and the Treasury, just as parties are no longer divided between hawks and doves.

The seemingly outstanding sign is the drop in the foreign exchange surplus for a total of about $113 billion in recent months. According to the data of the Bank of Israel, the foreign exchange surplus in April amounted to $2.9 million. It dropped to $2.9 million in May, stayed at the same level in June and dropped again to $2.883 million in June [sic]. In sum, the surpluses dropped by $113 million in the course of 3 months. This is not a particularly great drop from the standpoint of its extent; it is no greater than 3.8 percent. Moreover, this shows a drop on the basis of a previous rise of some $200 million since the first of the year. But the fear is that an extended process is taking place, the implications of which are apt to be great. This assessment is based upon the projection of payments and receipts of foreign currency for the near future. Thus, the lags in the data on the balance of payments come in to the picture, which prevent an updating of the assessment at least to the level to which it was accepted in the past.

There are those who argue that the actual drop in surpluses was greater than the official data by several hundred million dollars. That could have been examined by tracing the development of short-term loans from abroad, which were able to stem the shortage of surpluses as a result of large withdrawals and of smaller transfers of foreign currency. But most recent data on the division of the debt in foreign currency which were publicized refer to February. Even the data in preparation about to be made public refer to the month of March. Data referring to such a period are analogous to archaeological finds; and yet even from the March data something can be learned: the deterioration in the foreign debt structure continues.

Even with the March data, a continuation is indicated of the trend of deterioration in the debt situation of the country. During the 3 months between December 1980 and March 1981, the debt overall increased by $682 million to reach $17.7 billion.

This is an increase of 4 percent. At the same time there was a 2.8 percent increase in the debts which must be liquidated within 5 years of their inception, the average debt which must be liquidated within 4 years increased by 5 percent, whereas short-term debt, which must be liquidated within 1 year after receipt of disbursements, increased by 9.2 percent. This same trend is also apparent in the allocation of sums which must be returned during the coming year, in accordance with the terms of repayment. The overall sum which must be repaid during the course of the year beginning April, increased by 6.3 percent, while the portion of the repayment on long-term debt dropped by 3.5 percent, the portion of the account for medium-range debt increased by 8.3 percent, and the portion of the short-term debt increased by 9 percent. This is a deterioration in the debt structure. Nevertheless, there still remains the portion of the long-term debt at a rate of three-quarters of the total debts, and at a rate of two-thirds of the annual repayment.

Growth of Monthly Deficit

What has occurred near the 5 months afterward, it is not possible to ascertain. Even tracing export and import is not easy. The Mal'am strike has affected reports on such subjects and has led to a lag of about 2 months in publicizing import date. Thus, we have export data for the first 7 months of the year, but import data for only 4 months. In export, excluding diamonds, there has not been a real increase. Whereas during all of 1980 the monthly average was $329 million, the monthly average during the first 7 months of this year was $337 million. This is an increase of 2.4 percent, which more or less matches the world inflation. Import for the 4 months of 1981, $668 million as contrasted with the monthly average of $655 million in 1980. Since March, as has been stated, there are no data on imports. The data on the movement of services and capital are even more delayed.

In any case, in the current balance which includes only import data and export for the first quarter of the year, the monthly deficit grew from $214 million in 1980 to $230 million in 1981. This is, in any case, an increase of 7.4 percent.

What is not specifically understandable from these data, is the "profit" which is included in them and has come into the hands of the government with no effort on its part. A drop in fuel prices and in prices of precious stones saved the state some $800 million as compared with projections. The limitations on credit for jewelers reduced the inventory of diamonds and freed several hundred million additional dollars for reserves. But with all this the situation, as stated, arouses special worry in light of projections of demand and the offer of foreign currency in the near future.

The private sector has for a considerable time been a "net consumer" of dollars. This means that it buys more dollars for its needs than it sells to the Bank of Israel. The Government of Israel, which must make up the shortage, benefited last year from considerably larger than usual receipts from the United States for the construction of the airfields. This year, in contrast, larger outlays are anticipated in the governmental sector, against which there are insufficient receipts. The combination of shortage in the private sector and insufficient surplus in the public sector does not bode well.

But the optimists are not showing panic. According to them, it will be possible to overcome the problems by means of a restrictive economic policy which will

influence an increased export and a reduced import; and the temporary problem of a drop in surplus, should such occur, can be solved by means of the short-term movement of capital. If only the interest rate is raised, for example, credit will be restricted, people will prefer earlier transfer of dollars from export and from other sources, and the importers will not rush to draw off expensive money. And if all of this does not improve the situation, it will be possible to garner the deficit within the framework of world banking by means of the foreign delegations from the Israeli banks. In addition to which, in their opinion, Israel has always known how to deal with surpluses. It never had to face the problem of garnering credits, since it always discharges its debts on time. It will, therefore, not find any difficulty in continuing to garner what it requires in time of emergency.

Would that such assessments were true. Bankers and financial people in the Government and outside are not convinced that it is so. The world banks are limited in the amount of credit they are permitted to extend to a single borrower or to a single country, and that includes the branches of Israeli banks abroad, as well. They operate according to collateral limits with regard to the borrowing country and the degree of that country's collateral is apt to drop precipitously from one day to the next in the manner of certain stocks on the exchange during a crisis in the market.

Whether the optimists are right or the pessimists' assessment is correct, there is no doubt that the forecast of both demands urgent economic steps particularly in the area of budgetary cuts. The situation certainly does not make possible the setting up of structures in the billions in the Defense Ministry, an increase in the pay scale of the regular armed forces, allocation of billions for Talmudical academies, establishment of an expensive base for new settlements, and other wasteful money practices--which are in the category of sin, given the present condition of the country, even as it is viewed in the eyes of the optimists.

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ARAB POLITICAL ACTIVISM SEEN IN ISRAEL PROPER

Damascus SAWT FALASTIN in Arabic No 163 Aug 81 pp 42-46

[Article by Ibrahim 'Abd al-Karim: "Arab Political Organizations in Occupied Palestine: Reserve Forces for the Palestinian Resistance Movement"]

[Text] Recent years have witnessed a steady increase in the level of the struggle being waged by the Palestinian masses in the areas of Palestine which were occupied in 1948. It is no longer to be considered a temporary phenomenon which results from reactions [by the Palestinian Arabs to the Israelis]. This steady growth in the struggle being waged by the Palestinians has now reached the point of being a national attitude which one could describe as being permanent, and the struggle now relies on precision, organization, and effectiveness.

In spite of all of the forms of Zionist persecution and repression which our people have been subjected to under the occupation, the forms of combat utilized by the Palestinian national patriotic forces have been transformed into a base which has strengthened the positions of our mass struggle both in terms of intellectual-political premises and in terms of the correct and required manner of interacting with the Palestine cause.

In the part of Palestine which was occupied in 1948 national movements have emerged which have adopted programs of action which respond to the temporary and strategic tasks of the struggle against Zionism.

The work of these movements is not restricted to escalating the struggles required purely in order to improve the living conditions of our people. It has gone beyond that and is demanding political freedoms and the attainment of permanent national rights for the Palestinian Arab people.

In other words, this struggle has come to have two dimensions--the class dimension and the national ethnic dimension.

In terms of the class dimension, the struggle is consisting of action to put a stop to exploitation by the Zionist economic machine of the Arabs as laborers, farmers, and small wage-earners. In terms of the national ethnic dimension, the struggle is asserting the Arab identity of the Palestinian people in their occupied homeland, and is working on the attainment of the final objectives which would secure for the Palestinian people their freedom and dignity.

One of the aspects of the emergence of mass organizations of a political nature among the ranks of the Arabs in occupied Palestine was the fact that it put into practice the intellectual-political premises of the militant vanguard proups of the Palestinian Arab people.

These organizations have attracted, as followers, numerous national personalities among the Arabs, and a realistic and revolutionary view of the Arab-Zionist struggle has become more firmly anchored among the ranks of our people.

Al-'Ard was one of the largest and most active political movements which emerged in the Palestinian arena during the late fifties and early sixties.

This movement, both intellectually and in practice, plunged into the struggle to oppose the enemy. At that time, this movement was considered to be an exception to the situation whcch was characterized by a lack of existence of independent Arab movements in occupied Palestine which embodied all aspects of the Arab struggle. As we know, the Israeli Communist Party, which before 1948 was known as the "League of National Liberation," represented almost the only framework within which the Palestinian Arabs could wage their struggle inside Israel.

The situation stayed this way until, in 1957, there occurred the formation of the "Arab Front," which, a few months after it was formed, was renamed the "Democratic Popular Front." After the schism which occurred in this organization, the Arab nationalist wing, which included Habib Qahwaji, Mansur Kardush, and Salih Baransi, formed an organization called the al-'Ard. This took place in April 1959.

This movement entered numerous struggles on the cultural, political, and practical levels until the Zionist authorities, in 1965, finally prohibited its activities, arrested a number of its members, and exiled some of the other members to places outside occupied Palestine.

After the emergence of the armed Palestinian resistance movement in 1965, the Palestinian people enrolled in its ranks because it was a progressive approach toward carrying out the struggle. However, this approach was not so much a replacement of the other means of waging the struggle as it was a differentiation and qualitative shift in the direction of Palestinian national action. Thus it is possible for us to view the Arab political organizations inside occupied Palestine not from the standpoint of their being a marginal and powerless method [of waging the national struggle], but rather from the standpoint of their being reserve forces for the Palestinian resistance movement which is waging the armed struggle.

Numerous Movements, and Common Premises

In the areas of Palestine which were occupied in 1948, especially in the village areas, political organizations relatively small in scope are widespread. They have assumed the task of presenting the Palestinian masses with the facts concerning their cause, often they have led the struggles being waged by these masses, and they have guided their struggles in a way which makes them take firmer positions in their confrontation with the Zionist authorities.

Although these movements do not resemble each other in the way they were constituted and in the type of personnel in them, they do resemble each other in terms of the

short-range and long-range objectives which they strive to attain. Thus the differences between them are marginal because they do not affect the basic issue--which is that of their position with regard to the Zionist occupation.

The Progressive National Movement

The Progressive National Movement is the most important of these movements. Most of the personnel in this movement are educated people. Although a great number of these people received their education in Israeli universities, these educated people nevertheless have maintained their Palestinian Arab identity--in spite of all the attempts made by the Zionists to erase and distort this identity.

The members of this movement possess a high degree of awareness concerning the struggle as well as appreciation of the scope of the Zionist danger which is threatening the Palestine cause and the Arab world.

There are more than 150 members in this movement. In Israel proper there are more than 500 Arabs who support the movement. The first organized group belonging to this movement was formed in Umm al-Fahm in 1972. "Those who undertook to form the group were progressive young people, some of whom had previously belonged to al-'Ard" (DAVAR, 20 February 1979).

The movement has adopted an ideology in which the aspect of action is prominent. It believes in the necessity of working toward changing the reality of the lives [of the Palestinians]. Thus it saw military operations as being the thing which would achieve this. Consequently four of its members, for example, undertook four military operations in the occupied city of Haifa early last year. Recently they were arrested and sentenced to between 4 and 10 years of imprisonment. In addition to this, seven other members were arrested and charged with being members of the PLO. Quite a few members of the movement have received training in the Palestinian resistance movement camps outside occupied Palestine. Then they returned to occupied Palestine in order to train others and in order to undertake operations against Israeli military objectives.

In 1979 this movement addressed a declaration to the Palestinian National Council during its 14th session, and the declaration contained the following: "The Progressive National Movement is an inalienable part of our people who are suffering under the Zionist occupation all over Palestine. We are a people who are combatting this occupation with rare heroism and we do not recognize the Zionist entity" (DAVAR, 2 February 1979).

The Native Sons Movement

This movement is active in the villages of Galilee and the Triangle, especially in Umm al-Fahm, al-Tayyibah, Kabul, and Sakhnin. In these villages the movement has members who are effective and who utilize their responsibilities as members of the local village councils as a means of helping to strengthen the bonds between them and the inhabitants of these villages. There are more than 100 members of the Native Sons Movement, and it enjoys the support of approximately 1,000 Arabs.

This movement believes in ending the Arab-Zionist conflict by means of liberating Palestine and setting up a Palestinian state as an alternative to the Zionist entity,

without making any distinction between the areas of Palestine occupied in 1948 and the areas occupied in 1967.

The Publishing House and Organization Called "The Voice"

The Zionist authorities consider this organization to be one of the most dangerous organizations in Israel because it prints pamphlets, put out by the PLO, in its printing press in Acre and distributes these pamphlets among the Arab inhabitants. This organization feels that the Palestinians can only regain their usurped rights by force, and its members reject the idea of conducting any negotiations with Israel. They are also calling for doing away with the Israeli-Sadat peace treaty and everything that resulted as a consequence of it. The members of this organization also believe that the intellectual and cultural war should be waged along with the armed struggle. They are demanding that there be established, in Nazartth, an Arab university which would differ in nature and curriculum from the Israeli universities.

The Committee for Reviving the Memory of Rashid Husayn

This committee was formed after the assassination of the Palestinian freedom-fighter Rashid Husayn in the U.S.

Rashid Husayn was from the Arab village of Musmus which is located north of the Triangle. He went to the U.S. in order to study and there he took up residence in New York. There he gradually took on more and more responsibilities connected with the Palestinian struggle until he became a spokesman for the PLO in the U.S. This was what led the Zionist American Jews to attack his home at night and set it afire, burning it up along with everybody who was inside.

The body of the martyr Rashid Husayn was brought back to Palestine and buried in his place of birth in spite of the attempts made by the Israeli security forces to stop this and in spite of their disapproval of this--because of their fear that this would arouse Arab national feelings against the occupation authorities.

The Committee for Reviving the Memory of Rashid Husayn organizes mass demonstrations and festivities every year which turn into national [Palestinian] celebrations which fill the Arabs with an even greater degree of persistence and resistance.

The Renaissance Movement

This movement, like the PLO, believes in the necessity of establishing a democratic secular state in Palestine.

Most of the members of this movement are from the Arab villages of the Triangle (Umm al-Fahm, Jatt, Baqah al-Gharbiyah, al-Tayyibah, Qalansuwah, al-Tirah, and Kafr Qasim).

The movement has approximately 200 members, and has the support of about 700 other Arabs. One of the most prominent members in the movement is a member of the local council in al-Tayyibah. These movements inside Israel have been able to show their ability to exist and to express the fact that the Arabs are not bending to the will of the occupiers. In addition to these movements there are also other groups whose ranks include a number of Arab citizens.

Last February witnessed the establishment of a committee for coordination and cooperation between all of the political groups in Israel proper, and the committee was called the "National Coordination Committee." All of these organizations were thereby merged under a single roof, and this took place at a meeting in Umm al-Fahm. Right after the meeting there was an exchange of opinions and information and numerous contacts and secret consultations took place between this committee and the "Committee of National Guidance" which is active in the territories occupied in 1967.

As we know, both of these committees have virtually the same objective. No visible activity has resulted from their cooperation, particularly after the National Coordination Committee, last April, was forbidden to engage in any activity.

All of the Arab political organizations in occupied Palestine are in agreement concerning fundamental points which they consider to be the working principles which guide their activities. They are:

1. The Palestine question is the essence of the Arab-Zionist conflict.

2. The Arabs in that part of Palestine which was occupied in 1948 are an inalienable part of the Palestinian Arab people as a whole who, in turn, are an inalienable part of the Arab nation.

3. The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people.

4. Palestinian national unity is an urgent necessity on both the tactical and strategic levels.

5. The struggle against Israel is a struggle against Zionism as a racist movement which is allied with imperialism.

As we see, these intellectual premises of the Arab political organizations express the commitment of the [Palestinian] masses in Israel to the movement which encompasses the Palestinian struggle, in particular, and the Arab and international struggle, in general.

Why Was the Activity of the National Coordination Committee Prohibited?

Benyamin Gur Arieh, the Israeli prime minister's adviser for Arab affairs, says: "This committee was involved with the PLO and its [political] line was similar to that of the PLO." He went on to say: "We have reached a dangerous stage. This represents a danger to the security of the state! This is why this committee was declared illegal."

Arieh also feels "that the 'Israeli Arabs' now feel stronger than they ever have before. They believe that the deterrent force of the Israeli army has been blunted and they are hoping that in the next round the Arabs will be victorious. These Arabs also believe in the effectiveness of using the oil weapon in the upcoming battle, and they believe in the power of the petrodollar to exert pressure in the direction of helping the Arabs achieve what they want."

This Israeli view is an indication of the justifications which the Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin had for giving the order to prohibit this committee's activities.

The Israeli newspaper HA'ARETZ said on 17 April 1981: "The prime minister, in his capacity as minister of defense, issued an order on 16 April 1981 which states that the National Coordination Committee, which is considered to be the supreme command of nine extremist Arab organizations in Israel and which strives to eliminate the existence of Israel and of Zionism, is hereby declared an illegal organization."

It should be pointed out that the expression "Arab extremist" is used to apply to any Arab person, organization, or point of view committed to the cause of the Palestinian Arab people and having, as a basic premise, the view that the solution to the conflict in the area can only be achieved by means of securing for the Palestinian people their legitimate national rights in their own land.

The Israeli writer Yisrael (Landers), in the newspaper DAVAR on 2 February 1979, referred to the extent to which this phenomenon has grown, especially recently, due to the establishment of numerous blocs and organizations among whom he calls the "Israeli Arabs." He also says: "These blocs of people are not content to merely support the establishment of a Palestinian state. They also reject the existence of Israel. In this respect, their positions resemble those of the 'rejectionist organizations' in the PLO."

It is a fact which is taken for granted that the Zionist authorities prohibit the emergence of any political organization which, in its name, refers to its Arab national identity. The word "Arab" does not exist in the lexicon of names of organizations which Israel permits the formation of. The pretext for doing this is the so-called "Ottoman law" which stipulates the "prohibition of registering any racial associations or parties." In other words, this is how the Israelis view it if the work "Arab" is used in the name of any organization or movement, and thus it is accused of being "racist."

The Zionist authorities not only apply this principle when concerning the formal name of such organizations and movements, but also apply it concerning the content of these movements which have nothing to do with Israeli politics. These authorities are ignoring the fact that all Zionist parties and institutions were established on racial foundations.

This Israeli point of view indicates the degree of alarm felt by the Zionist mentality because of the growing power of influence of all of the Arab organizations which are guiding the struggle of our people inside Israel. It is reflected by Arieh, who says: "The Arabs in Israel have turned into stubborn and recalcitrant fighters. They are more prepared than they previously were to defend their rights, and they transform every civic problem into an Arab national problem. For example, they consider their lack of housing to be the tip of a spear aimed at the Arab citizens, they consider the freeze on hiring to be a violation of [the policy of] hiring Arabs employees, and so on. The list of accusations being made against Israel is becoming endless." The Israeli writer David (Shahim) has been observing with alarm the profoundness of the revolutionary changes which have been occurring among our people. He says: "Up till the last war, in 1973, the Arab minority in

Israel fought for its civil rights and for equality of opportunity. But today they consider themselves to be an inalienable part of the Palestinian Arab people as a whole, not only in terms of their origin and identity, but also in terms of their political struggle" (YEDIOTH AHARONOT, 25 January 1979).

YEDIOTH AHARONOT, in an article on 8 May 1981, again refers to this Israeli feeling of alarm concerning this, saying: "The activities being engaged in by the extremist branch of the Native Sons Movement in the city of Lod has become a cause for alarm for the security apparatus in Israel. This movement is striving to create an atmosphere of provocation both among the Arabs and among the Jews in Lod."

Yehuda Litani criticizes the Israeli approach in dealing with actions engaged in by Arabs. He makes an implicit appeal for the necessity of absorbing these activities by utilizing some other approach in order to pave the way for prohibiting them in the final analysis. He says: "There has been an increase in the national awareness [of the Arabs] in the occupied areas, and the Arab inhabitants are rallying more and more around the banner of the PLO. What official spokesmen among the military rulers and security apparatus have described as being a 'strong-arm policy' has contributed toward increasing [the Arabs'] internal solidarity and increasing their national awareness" (HA'ARETZ, 31 May 1979).

Although the matter of supporting the PLO has been brought up at every official and unofficial meeting held by the Arabs, in the early part of 1979 it took on a new direction and has become something more openly [practiced and discussed] in the face of the Israeli authorities.

DAVAR, on 21 January 1979, said: "There was a joint meeting of the 'Regional' Committee for Defense of the Land and the Committee of Chairmen of the Arab Local Councils which was held in Nazareth and which was attended by 28 local council chairmen as well as three members of the Knesset who belonged to the 'Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.' Those present at the meeting expressed their support for the PLO. This is the first time that such resolutions have been passed at a regional meeting of the chairmen of the Arab local councils and the Committee for the Defense of the Lands of the Arabs."

As for the formulas for carrying out aspects of the Arab struggle in occupied Palestine, the work of the Arab political organizations revolves around both negative and positive forms of combat. The negative forms of combat are the organization of symposiums, the writing of protest notes to the UN, sit-in strikes, marches, and national festivals.

The positive forms of combat are the organization of labor strikes, refusing to work in Israeli establishments, destruction of the economic installations of the enemy, hitting the enemy's means of communications, and undertaking bold operations against Israeli military objectives.

Our conclusion is that, by means of these positive and negative forms of waging the Palestinian struggle, it has been shown that it is not within the power of the occupation authorities to put a stop to the growing force of the national renaissance which is being experienced by our masses of people who will accept no alternative to the attainment of their complete national rights, under the leadership of the PLO.

9468
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WEST BANK ARABS SAID SHOWING LITTLE RESISTANCE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Oct 81 p 11

[Article by Avraham Sweitzer: "The Palestinians: The Conquest Is Not the Greatest Evil"]

[Text] The murder of President al-Sadat has again created an opportunity for enemy critics to accuse him of treason on the Palestinian issue: The shouts of joy in Beirut, like more quiet rejoicing upon hearing the report of the attack on his life, were intended to focus attention of the unforgiveable Pan-Arab sin of the late president. But there is in all of this something of the deception of swindlers at cards: it was not al-Sadat, and not even Menahem Begin, who was guilty of continuing the Israeli conquest of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. The guilty parties are the Arab inhabitants of these parts of the country.

There are few national movements which have won such continuous and sympathetic appreciation in the last 15 years as the Palestinian national movement--and in any case we cannot recall an instance in which such comprehensive ethical and political recognition was granted as was granted to the self-proclaimed representative of this movement--the PLO. But the truth is, and almost 15 years of Israeli conquest prove it, that in the national order of precedences of the Palestinian people, shaking off the yoke of the foreign conqueror is not in first place. For if it were otherwise, the Palestinians, who live under the regime of conquest, would engage in a real struggle against it, one in which they would kill and be killed. One might suppose that a bloody struggle would bring liberation from Israeli conquest--but it seems that in the balance between objective and cost, the cost appears too high.

What is characteristic of the PLO is that it is a foreign, or at least, external body: Its basic fighting strength in the organizations subordinate to it is drawn from the Palestinian diaspora, which has already lived for 30 years and more outside the area of the Israeli presence. A simple count of the years is sufficient to be convinced that the large majority of fighters in the ranks of the Palestinian organizations have never even had personal acquaintance with the people or the land which they are prepared to sacrifice their lives to liberate from the hands of a foreign conqueror. One might say with only a little exaggeration that whoever fights against the Israeli conquest is not a Palestinian in the accepted sense of the word, and whoever is a Palestinian, does not fight.

Examples of a struggle against a regime of conquest, one which is primary in the national order of priorities, are not lacking: We will mention here only the Irish or Vietnamese example which are familiar to every newspaper reader. But in order to avoid the attitude of Jewish haughtiness vis a vis the Arabs, it is worthwhile to note the Arab rebellion in Algeria. This rebellion was carried on for 10 consecutive years: it was bloody, because the Arabs who led it faced a large French army, a widespread civilian presence of French settlers and were under the scrutiny of the French intelligence services with connections at all levels of the Arab population. Not only that, but the war was conducted in Algeria and by local guerrilla forces, while the semiregular armed force, which is similar to the PLO of today, sat in camps in neighboring lands outside the country and entered it only after the French had pulled out.

The picture of war conditions in Algeria: a large foreign army, settlers and the presence of French security services everywhere make conspicuous the difference between the Arabs of Algeria on the one hand and the Palestinians on the other. Indeed it is true that there are also qualitative differences in the methods of control of a colonial regime on the one hand and a libertarian one on the other--but it seems that the essential difference is hidden in the national order of precedence of the Algerians as opposed to the Palestinians. The difference is expressed in the fact that for the Algerians, independence was an absolute value, but for the Palestinians, being rational people, independence is one item in the calculation of national profit and loss.

It should be said immediately in order to prevent misunderstandings that the Arabs of Israel are not resolved to and will not be resolved to the Israeli conquest in the future. But their way of reacting to conquest is different from that of the Algerians, for example, and they pin their hope for liberation from the Israeli conquest on Western countries--and lately on the pressure of world public opinion, including public opinion in the West, to impel the governments to extricate them from the hands of the Jews. In this substantive sense the PLO, with its militant ideology, is not only the exclusive representative of the Palestinians, but is their antithesis, and the deep genuine anger of the Palestinians, directed against al-Sadat and his method, originates in what seems to them his insufficient adherence to the objective of Palestinian liberation and, what is worse, his reconciliation with Israel--for what is left to them apart from irreconciliation, given their lack of desire to take their fate in their own hands. In essence, not much has changed since 1948: The Palestinians know how to hate, but have left the job of expelling the Jews to the armies of Arab countries--and whoever has not fled has made a long-range conciliation with the Jews.

If this evaluation is correct, it follows that agreed upon autonomy as required by the Camp David accords was vain hocus-pocus. It implied reconciliation in principle, and not temporarily, to living in a regime of conquest: such a reconciliation is acceptable to Egypt which knows that there is a time for war and a time for talking, as required by circumstances. But for the Palestinians who did not fight, there was but one basic approach, that of refusing to talk. Mr Begin either does not understand this or pretends not to understand it--from whence his stubborn insistence, apparently not only formal, in an autonomy concept a la the Camp David accords.

The only statesman in the Likud wing of the Israeli political spectrum (the wing which does not want to accept territorial separation from the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza), who is alert to the Palestinian reality and is trying to base an Israeli policy on it, is Moshe Dayan. Testimony to what is the principle behind the idea of unilateral autonomy, which circumvents the formal agreement of the Arabs of Israel to a way of life whose substance is continuing temporality. That is to say, a situation which strikes a balance of power but is less subject to political changes when they occur. And as things seem now--the Arab states will go to war with Israel when they will, according to their own needs and not in order to liberate the plundered land. In Israel the predominant concept is not to again divide the land of Israel; and while the Palestinians refuse to take the expulsion of the captor into their own hands, Dayan's way is the only one which can lead to a more tolerable coexistence. Nothing better can be expected in the foreseeable future.

9794
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ISRAEL ARAB STUDENT STATISTICS GIVEN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Oct 81 p 21

[Article by a MA'ARIV correspondent: "Survey of the School of Education in the Hebrew University: Level of Students in the Arab Sector--92 percent"]

[Text] More than half the teachers in the Arab sector are not certified, nevertheless the level of students in this sector, in the system of primary education, is higher than in all the other Arab countries.

These are the results of a new study entitled "Educational Accomplishments of Arab Primary Schools in Israel." The study was edited by Joseph Ba'shi, Dr Sorel Qahel and Dr Daniel Davis of the School of Education of the Hebrew University. In the study, which was ordered and financed by the Office of Education, 4,683 students were checked.

The level of students in the Arab sector in Israel reaches 92 percent as compared with 50 percent in Arab countries. In the course of the years of study, and especially after the sixth grade, a 32 percent dropout rate appears. The researchers note that although the dropout rate is decreasing, there is no immediate solution to this problem.

In examining the results of the learning accomplishments of the Arab primary school students, it turns out that the level of students unable to read does not exceed 10 percent. The researchers found that one-third of the students at the end of the fourth grade still could not add four numbers. The investigators estimate that the number of students who are not familiar with the area of simple fractions in the Arab sector is about 25 percent in the sixth grade.

In the area of science and geography half the students in the schools did not know the function of a barometer. On the matter of Hebrew language, the investigators point out that difficulties exist as to goals in the teaching of Hebrew in Arab schools.

The researchers further emphasize that as a result of the low level of services which the Arab schools receive from the local administration, there exists a not insignificant gap between the Jewish and the Arab educational system. The matter shows up in the relatively greater crowding of classrooms and also in the fact that nurses are found in 44 percent of the institutions as opposed to 95 percent of the Jewish institutions. Psychologists and social workers are not to be found in the Arab sector at all.

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ARAB CONSTRUCTION IN WEST BANK INCREASES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Oct 81 p 27

[Article by Yosef Tzuri'el: "Arab Settlement in Judea and Samaria Larger Than Jewish Settlement"]

> [Text] Arab construction in Judea and Samaria in the last decade has grown several fold. When they hear about Jewish settlement plans, Arab owners of undeveloped land rush to build--even on rocks.

A narrow and winding dusty path leads to the house on the hill. The house stands alone. Around it are rocks, remnants of building materials, and seeds of first plantings. A surface of sand is arranged for laying the first floor. Steps that have not yet been covered lead up to the second. But the family is already living on the third.

This, if you will, is a settlement similar to those of the Arabs of Judea and Samaria, and one of many in the area. There are those which were built by permit according to an authorized master plan, and those whose builders did not bother to get any kind of official authorization. Many have caught the fever of Jewish settlement, and, with the encouragement of various Arab groups, have gotten up and established faits accomplis in the territory before it is too late, perhaps to apply the brakes to what the local Arabs consider dangerous even from a continuing military regime.

By accident I arrived at the house on the hilltop. I stopped at the entrance, and the owners of the house were already apologizing for the fact that the floor was not yet complete and for the initial, temporary door, and that in general many details were missing prior to completion of construction work. But about the initial plantings, he [sic] spoke with pride. "You see," he told me, "in 3 years there will be plenty of grape clusters here. And in 5 years there will be pomegranates."

We went up to the third floor, in the center of which was a spacious living room with a large porch in front. I was invited to sit on one of the easy chairs covered with red velvet. On a table of modern design there were several demitasses of coffee. Pictures of family members decorated the walls, and in the corner was a wooden stand with a revolving lampshade of the kind found in night clubs.

The woman talked about her work as a teacher and, in the spirit of the times, complained that her salary did not match the effort that she invested in her students. Her husband said that he had no complaints. As a bookkeeper he had sufficient work and income, and, in his opinion, one should not exaggerate the value of money.

We did not touch on politics. Under the influence of his wife, the man kept away from public activity and dedicated his free time to domestic matters. Once he used to spend many hours in coffeehouses with other family members from the village in idle conversation. In the last 2 years he has spent his time entirely in building his house, and she--in raising their five children.

In Israeli terms, only contractors build houses like these, and they generally divide them into apartments. Here, in an area that is neither urban nor rural, where large distances stretch between one settled territory and the next, living arrangements are different.

Two Houses Opposite Each Other

In order to bring home what was already understood, my host suggested that we sit on the porch. I took the third cup of coffee and sat outside with the man and his wife. It was afternoon. Many of the passers-by on the road waved, and there were some who inquired about the pace of construction and wished them the best.

On the mountain opposite two houses, far apart from each other. "These are my relatives' houses," the man explained. One of them would be coming by in another half hour. He always came to visit. "He does not have a telephone yet. We have one because we know someone. But, God willing, he will have one shortly, too."

A nice house. A nice wife. But why build the house right here? And why now and not 10 years ago or 5 years ago? And what about the houses opposite? Did they also lack the wherewithal to build, and only in the last few years was an effort made, and within a year and a half such luxurious home went up?

One could not ask such direct questions from such a host, in whose home I had spent a good hour. But one could ask the officials of the military regime and people from the Israeli authorities, and their responses point up a reality which many are aware of but do not know how to confront or whether it need be confronted at all.

The facts show that in 1968 there were 51,000 square meters of construction starts in all Judea and Samaria. Nine years later 541,000 square meters were listed. Two years ago there were 642,000 square meters. This year the construction starts will reach 790,000 square meters. And as for completions: in 1968--63,000 square meters; in 1977--504,000 square meters; in 1979--568,000 square meters; in 1980--596,000 square meters.

No One To Supervise

Since close to 70 percent of the Arab population lives in villages, most of the construction is found in those areas. That is also where there are wide open spaces and greater possibilities for "deviations." In numbers: in 1978 construction was completed on 307,000 square meters.

A year later the residential construction area increased and reached 307,000 square meters. This year the total is almost 440,000 square meters.

The more Arab construction increases in Judea and Samaria, the more the construction of small houses decreases and the greater the intent to build substantial homes which, in time, would house grandchildren and great-grandchildren. In the last 5 years, there were almost no two-room apartments built. There were no one-room apartments. In the language of numbers: 3-room houses with plumbing in 1978--1,382; in 1979--1,657; last year--1,763. Houses of 4 rooms and more; 3 years ago--1,317; 2 years ago--1,402; last year--1,546.

These numbers from Judean and Samarian headquarters are not final. There is not, and it is apparently impossible for an army of supervisors to be appointed to supervise the housing sector in the area. On this matter there is a constellation of factors which keep the military regime from being up to date. First of all, fear reigns among the Arabs of the area about Jewish settlement, and what the imagination lacks is made up for by the announcements and tours made from time to time by settlement organizations. Everything that they announce and promise is already translated to "tomorrow" and distributed in the territory. But what is being done today in the area of Jewish settlement is already enough to encourage Arabs who own property--developed and undeveloped--to mobilize and shift to operations with the purpose of stopping Jewish settlement in their midst.

That was what the man whose house I had visited had done, also his relative who joined me later in conversation. He hurried to settle on a rocky hill, of which he claims ownership, before it would be too late. But it is also possible to explain it another way: "I could have continued living in my father's house," said the relative, "but these are not normal times. Every morning I would travel by bus to work in Israel, and would see my father's land, which he inherited from his father, and there was no quiet in my heart. I would ask myself: What would be on this land if it wouldn't be good for raising vegetables and fruits, perhaps some day we would be able to build on it?"

"Above or Below"

So he spoke and the man of the house smiled. One could see that he was satisfied with the way things were put. And when he was asked about the trouble that he and his wife and children encountered in coming to live on this desolate rocky hill, he sank into thought and afterward said: "Look, my cousin said the main thing. As Arabs and as villagers, we would obviously make some use of our land. So we got up and built a house. With the help of the family, of course, for without them, the house would not be."

The sun set. A light went on in the house opposite and in the livingroom in which we had relaxed. Dusk settled in. "It is so pretty," the man of the house said, pointing to the twilight colors. The conversation drew to a close.

On my way out, the relative who lives on the mountain opposite accompanied me, and during the trip in my car to his house, he said: "We are locals. If we want to continue to be, we have to establish roots. Of course this could be on the mountain top, above or below. That is the way we are."

I asked him: "And what about Jewish settlement?"

"That is already politics," he answered me. "I do not understand it. Leave it to God. He will find the way between us and you...."

9794
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SALINE WATER USED IN AGRICULTURE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Aug 81 p 16

[Article by Aharon Fariel: "Irrigation With Saline Water Improves Vegetable Crop"]

[Text] The level of utilization of the sources of "good" water in the country has reached a critical level: we do not have, at the subterranean level, water resources available for use at all times and in any quantity. Alternative sources of water must be located for the largest water consumer--agriculture--and there is an abundance of such sources.

This is saline water and purified waste water, that can be utilized for plants.

Currently, there are 20 million cubic meters of saline water being used annually (which contain from 4500 to 5000 milligrams of common salts per liter) for the irrigation of field crops. But saline water has a disadvantage. It contains sodium, for example, which causes damage to the soil by reducing the permeability of the water and by destroying the natural structure of the soil. "This damage cannot be reversed," explains Dr Bruno Yaron, Director of the Soil and Water Institute of the Agricultural Research Administration.

Since saline water is apt to influence the growth, the yield and the soil, the remaining problem was to select the plants "resistant" to it, which would also not damage the soil.

Up to the end of the decade, agriculture will utilize in irrigation some 300 million cubic meters of purified waste water annually, after a "high level purification" of removing toxic materials, organic compounds and metal residue from the waster water. In light of the potential for the utilization of purified waste water, a staff of researchers in the Soil and Water Institute, headed by Prof Yitzhak Sheinberg, has begun to study the possibilities of irrigation with saline water, and the use of chemical means to prevent destruction of the soil as a consequence of the use of such water.

The practical research for the use of saline water in agriculture began in 1970, when members of Kibbutz Nahal Oz turned to researchers of the Soil and Water Institute to seek advice on how to utilize an abundantly flowing water well which contained about 4,000 mg of salts per liter inasmuch as agricultural water contains between 250 and 400 mg of salts per liter.

The research team, headed by Prof Yitzhak Sheinberg, proposed a solution: use of gypsum (as a by-product of the chemical industry), to be spread over the area and, because of the characteristic of gypsum, it would be possible to neutralize the sodium and permit water to penetrate the soil. Over a period of 2 years, they irrigated the cotton fields of the kibbutz with saline water--and it became clear that no damage at all was caused to the soil and there was not the slightest reduction in the level and quality of the crop in comparison with the national average.

Virgin Soil

Following the success of the experiment other enterprises in the northern Negev began irrigating their cotton fields with saline water, drawn from wells, and that only after approval by the experts from the Soil and Water Institute.

Beyond well water, there is the Negev and in the Arava potential for saline water on the subterranean level which has other "characteristics" than well water because of the high quantity of salts contained in it. However, a use has been found for this water as well through a study which is the first of its kind in the world, carried out by Dr David Russo of the Soil and Water Institute.

"The idea was to utilize virgin soil which had never been cultivated from the very beginning. The assumption was that there was no possibility whatever to utilize it for agriculture. And the single solution recommended at the time by experts of the Department of Settlement of the Jewish Agency was to bring from other locations "good" soil and spread it over the virgin soil at a thickness of 50 centimeters, as a base for plantings," Dr Yaron notes.

After 3 years of experimentation at Moshav Tzofar, which were conducted by Dr Russo, it was demonstrated that it would be possible to grow vegetables in "virgin soil" in the Arava which contains large quantitites of gypsum and stone--and even to irrigate the fields with saline water.

Fertilization and Irrigation

Results of the experiments amazed even the optimists among the researchers: "We succeeded in getting 6 tons per dunum of California pepper in experimental tracts, and about 4 tons in commercial tracts; in tomatoes, we got 12 tons per dunum in experimental tracts and in commercial tracts," Dr Yaron notes.

The success of the studies--part of which have gone over to semi-commercial and commercial stage--have made possible the utiliziation of 5,0000 dunums in the Tzofar region in the Arava, which is the only place on earth where desert "virgin" soil is utilized for agricultural plantings.

The staff of researchers headed by Dr Amos Feigin and Dr Hanoch Bilory has demonstrated with purified waste water, various plantings can utilizie the nitrates in sewage water as nutrients for the plant and thereby also prevent the penetration of the nitrates into the soil and the contamination of underground water. Thus they succeeded in Kibbutz Tzar'a in obtaining high yields of cotton and sugar beets through the use of the waste water of Jerusalem; and in other places waste water is being utilized for the irrigation of cotton and sugar-beet fields "on condition that the project is carried out with the proper regimen."

8090
CSO: 4323/72

BRIEFS

TERRORIST GROUPS IN CYPRUS--Hundreds of terrorists from Palestinian terror organizations have arrived in Cyprus in recent months camouflaged as tourists from Western countries. Many of them were equipped with forged passports to make their stay on the island easier and especially in order to purchase equipment and food for the training camps that they erected in the Trudos mountains. In a talk with MA'ARIV senior police officers expressed dissatisfaction with the presence of hundreds of terrorists in Cyprus. In their opinion they are equipped with much weaponry that might in the future threaten the army in the Greek part of the island--if relations with Turkey should heat up again in the area. It has been learned that many inhabitants have submitted protests to the authorities in Nicosia against the activities of the terrorists on the island and in particular in the rural parts. They complain that bands of terrorists who are training there destroy their crops, disturb the pasturage and bother the residents. Sources in Cyprus report that the commanders of the terrorist bands hang out in nightclubs and luxury restaurants, behave crudely and sometimes refuse to pay. The Greek police is forced to intervene in fistfights in which the terrorists are involved. Generally the authorities on the island prefer to ignore the terrorists' presence and activities. There is a conspiracy of silence in that regard. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Oct 81 p 1] 9794

STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATIONS--The Center for Strategic Studies of the University of Tel Aviv will, in the next few months, publish three studies on topics concerning basic problems of the Middle East. The first study is "Cooperation Between Israel and Egypt: Positions and Directions" by Dr Shim'on Tzelniqer and Dr Zaki Shalom. The study examines the influence of ways and different levels of Israeli-Egyptian cooperation on the stabilization of the peace between the two countries. The study recommends very carefully controlled cooperation, especially on well-defined projects. The second study is "The U.S. and the Palestinians: The Carter Period" by Dr Abraham ben Zvi. It analyzes U.S. policy in the Middle East in the period from 1977-1980. The third study is "An American-Israeli Defense Pact" by Dr Ya'ir 'Evron, which surveys the advantages and disadvantages in a possible defense agreement between Israel and the United States. The editor of the series of studies is the head of the Center for Strategic Studies, Gen (Res) Aharon Yariv, and the editorial coordinator is Joseph 'Alper. The Center is also preparing a publication the subject of which is "The Balance of Power in the Middle East" edited by Dr Mark Hiller, which contains, in addition to Hiller's research, work by Brig Gen (Res) 'Aryeh Shilo and Col (Res) Ze'ev 'Eitan. This publication is the only detailed source of information on the armed forces in our area. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Oct 81 p 2] 9794

CSO: 4423/27

BANK GOVERNOR DISCUSSES INTEREST SITUATION, CONTROL MEASURES

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 29, Aug 81 p 26

[Interview with Governor of Jordan's Central Bank by AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL: "Al-Nablusi: 'We Took Steps Which Raised Interest Rates and Curbed Conversions; Some Banks Lowered Loans for Financing Centers With Foreign Currency'"; date and place not specified]

[Text] AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL met with Dr Muhammad Sa'id al-Nablusi, governor of Jordan's Central Bank, in an interview which shed light on interest market developments in Jordan and Central Bank policy toward them. The interview went as follows:

Question: How was it possible to keep the Jordanian market stable under rising world interest rates?

Answer: The fact is, we have not been unaffected by the international situation, especially during the past 2 years. However, our monetary system is designed in a manner which enables it to take in external pressures and absorb a large portion of their reflections upon the local market. The first of the phenomena which began to create pressure in the local market was definitely the phenomenon of inflation (with its external and internal sources). This resulted in accelerated erosion of real return on savings, so that we began to see a negative return. In other words, the rate of inflation began to exceed the interest paid on deposits or savings. A situation like this becomes a source of intense pressure on local liquidity when it is accompanied by an increase in world interest rates, as occurred in the last 2 years. Therefore, it was necessary to draw up a new policy to confront the results."

Question: On what area was this policy concentrated, and to what extent was it able to achieve its objectives?

Answer: We concentrated on altering the framework of local interests so as to serve two main goals: Weakening incentives and possibilities for conversion to foreign currencies; and guaranteeing a real return on capital equal to, if not greater than, the rate of inflation. In order to reach this goal, we relied on raising the interest rate on growth securities, which we issue at 7-3/4 - 8 percent. This price can be considered, in Jordan's situation, equivalent to a floor floor which indirectly determines the interest rate among banks, as well as the interest rates [on loans] borrowed from and loaned to the public. Raising the

interest on growth securities actually resulted in raising the median rate of interest on time deposits to 8 percent, that is, approximately 1-1/2 points higher than the lower limit imposed by the Central Bank. The prime rate also rose to 10-11 percent (even to 12 percent, if the effect of compound interest is taken into consideration). As a result, the cost of borrowing is now 12 percent.

Question: Were these measures enough to curb conversion to foreign currencies?

Answer: The fact is, in the first year in which interests rose, we did not feel pressure on liquidity, perhaps because opportunities for profitable investment are abundant in Jordan, and generally at tempting interest rates. Jordanian money is also stable and strong, and freedom of exchange is observed, aside from the fact that the depositor did not notice fluctuations in interest in the first phase. However, the continuous wave of rising interest rates began to change yields in the subsequent phase. Since the middle of 1980 we have begun to notice strong reflections of the rising interest rates on the domestic scene. Conversions began to increase, and the banks established centers with foreign currency, especially since [the banks] acquired the equivalent of 50 percent of the total of their foreign loans from the Central Bank and did not need to use them, for the most part. They used this surplus, as it appears, to feed the foreign exchange centers. Part of what increased the pressure was the fact that some of the banks began to tighten the policy on loans and the financing of economic activity, and to liquidate their investment portfolios for the purpose of converting their liquidity into centers with [foreign] currency. Thus, the situation required new measures concentrating on two matters: a) Providing liquidity in the banks by lowering the compulsory reserves by 3 percent, so that the statutory reserve on demand deposits became 8 percent instead of 11 percent, and on time deposits, 10 percent instead of 13 percent; and b) requiring the banks to invest 10 percent of their deposits in Jordanian dinars into portfolio investments. This [latter] measure resulted in the decline of the banks' liquidity, consequently forcing them to liquidate a portion of the foreign exchange discount centers and exchange them in dinars through swap operations with the Central Bank. With this we came to a better balance of liquidity and a stable monetary situation.

Question: How did the issue price of the dinar evolve during this period?

Answer: The Jordanian dinar is tied to the unit basket of the special drawing rights (SDR). It is composed of five major currencies, among which the dollar has the greatest weight. In view of the dollar's improvement with respect to the basket currencies, the SDR unit has lowered with respect to the dollar at a rate approaching 10 percent. Paralleling this, the issue price of the Jordanian dinar, with respect to the dollar, has lowered about 10 percent since the end of 1979. Nonetheless, it has not lowered, but improved, with respect to most of the major currencies, in view of the fact that the issue prices of these currencies lowered at higher rates with respect to the U.S. dollar.

Question: How do you assess the monetary situation of Jordan from the standpoint of the balance of payments?

Answer: The Jordanian balance of payments index was a surplus amounting to about 2.120 billion dinars at the end of 1980, that is, over $360 million, which is a development without precedent. As for the national foreign reserve, it rose to $2 million, that is, the equivalent of 9 months of revenues. This is a high rate, and a basic indicator of the strength of the monetary situation.

9605
CSO: 4004/37

REAGAN'S POLICY ON LEBANON, MIDDLE EAST EXAMINED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 230, 28 Sep-4 Oct 81, pp 10-11

[Article by Emil Khoury: "Lebanon To Face Continued Turmoil Should Reagan Pursue Carter's Policy"]

[Text] The question which continues to surface in the official diplomatic circles is: Has President Ronald Reagan's policy actually changed, and is it serious about finding quick and just solutions to the problems of Lebanon and the Middle East, or does it continue to fluctuate in confusion as it attempts to please both the Arabs and Israelis while, simultaneously trying to reconcile the twin objectives of guaranteeing the security of the oil sources and Israel. No sooner does the Reagan policy begin to depart from the Kissingerian lines of the past two administrations than it is forced back into line with Israel's conspiratorial designs on Lebanon and other countries of the region.

Some visitors to Washington claim that America's policy under Reagan is different from its policy under Jimmy Carter, not only on the Middle East, but with respect to relations with the Soviet Union and all countries aligned with it. Others claim that the United States has no steady foreign policy, but one that changes according to circumstances. They insist that America deliberately espouses a dual policy, under which it tells Lebanon one thing and Syria another. The same is true, they maintain, with respect to Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Observers are convinced that there is no way to assess America's new policy, if there is a new one, until that policy is translated into action. Should events prove that there has been no radical change in that policy with respect to Lebanon and the region, and should it continue to follow the broad outlines put in place since 1969, the year Lebanon exploded in turmoil, then the picture is dim indeed. In that event, the pessimism expressed by Foreign Minister Fu'ad Dabbus [sic] may well be justified.

The messages and reports that used to reach the Foreign Ministry and the president of Lebanon during the Carter administration pointed to one thing: America's policy was hostage to the influence of the CIA, which, in turn, was bound to the policy laid down by Kissinger. The evidence for this is that despite President Carter's promises to Lebanon, he was unable to find a sound solution, one that would have extricated Lebanon from the quagmire it has been floundering in since 1969.

Based on the reports received by Lebanese officials during the Carter administration, and barring a change in American policy under Reagan, the future looks as follows:

1. The coming years are likely to witness a period of direct threat to the oil-producing states in an effort to compel them to change their pricing policy and to join the move toward international reconciliation, which is likely to begin with a summit conference between the leaders of the two superpowers. Such an objective cannot be accomplished without promoting an explosion in Lebanon, one whose sparks are calculated to ignite other explosions in the area but sufficiently controlled as not to undermine the authority of the Lebanese president or radically change the destiny of the country.

2. There will be no attempt to solve the Lebanese problem before finding a solution to the regional problem.

3. There will be no attempt to solve the Lebanese problem without first organizing the Gulf region and bringing the Iranian situation under control.

4. There will be no solution as long as the official authorities continue to confront the settlement policy.

In order to prolong the Lebanese crisis pending the fulfillment of the objectives cited earlier, the reports [received by Lebanon from Washington] indicate the following:

1. Intentional gaps will be left in any official security plan in order to permit an occasional armed collision to erupt for the purpose of making it more difficult for the [Lebanese] Army to intervene or to reach a state of total organization and readiness.

2. Attempts will be made to weaken the UN Emergency Force in the south, to increase the frequency of attacks on it to paralyze its effectiveness, to doom every proposed solution to failure, and to compel the Shiites of the South to leave the area.

3. Attempts to increase military pressure against the Maronite regions, especially in the mountains, will continue.

4. Efforts will be made to incite sectarian strife through occasional assassinations and assassination attempts.

5. Efforts will continue to prevent any rapproachement between Syria and all or some of the leaders of the Lebanese Front.

6. There will be an attempt to hamper the work of the Arab Follow-up Committee.

7. There will be an effort to poison the atmosphere and to promote occasional confrontation between the warring parties and the army to prevent the latter from gaining control of all parts of the country.

8. There will be an effort to disrupt the operation of Parliament and to prevent it from electing a new president to succeed President Sarkis within the time constraints mandated by the constitution. There are several ways by which President Sarkis may be kept in office till the expiration of his constitutional team.

There is reason to fear that the period before Parliament convenes to elect a new president will be a difficult one, possibly marked by the spread of violence to all parts of the country. It might become necessary during this period of constitutional vacuum to settle political differences by force and to rely on the creation of accomplished facts as the norm for solving the country's problems, be that in the area of settlement, the Israeli encroachments in the south or in deciding the political future of Lebanon.

Should these reports which unmask the conspiratorial designs on Lebanon prove true, the question is whether the [new] American administration will be guided by them or will embark on a new policy with respect to Lebanon and the region, and thus give credence to reports that a change is in the making.

The coming months will answer this question.

9063
CSO: 4404/49

FRENCH POLITICAL, MILITARY ASSISTANCE DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 230, 28 Sep-4 Oct 81 pp 13-14

[Article by R.Sh.: "French Sympathy for Lebanon Translated Into Military and Political Support"]

[Text] Lebanese diplomatic circles attach special significance to a visit to France by a Lebanese military delegation, headed by Army Chief of General Staff Maj Gen Munir Tarbiyyeh. The purpose of the visit is to acquaint the delegation with the latest French military equipment, in preparation for an arms deal to be financed by a long-term 500 million franc loan. In addition, France will grant a second 100 million franc loan to refinance the balance of a prior loan to Lebanon. Gen Victory Khoury, commander of the Army, had already paved the way for this visit when he toured the French capital to attend the International Aviation Exhibition held at Le Bourget Airport, and where he met with France's Defense Minister Arnot and a number of French military officials to discuss matters relating to the reequipping and reorganizing of the Lebanese army.

The importance of the visit lies not so much in the military equipment to be purchased with the aid of the French loan, but in the political ramifications of the visit. France's desire to support the Lebanese Government by way of strengthening Lebanon's security agencies and, in particular, the army, which is very evident under President Francois Mitterrand, signals that France has decided on a new policy regarding Lebanon's future, a policy of support for the legally constituted government as the only means for restoring peace and stability to the war-torn country. The new policy reflects France's conviction that Lebanon's problems, political or security-related, cannot be solved unless Lebanon has internal security. Mr Claude Cheysson, minister of foreign affairs, expressed this sentiment on his most recent visit to Beirut, when he repeatedly affirmed France's support for the Lebanese Government and underscored the need to restore all arms of the government, particularly the army, to normal activity.

This expression of support takes on greater significance in view of the fact that not only does it reflect the French position, but the position of all the European countries over which France has influence. Further, French support is in harmony with the resolutions adopted at successive European summit conferences during the past years, particularly those that have taken place after the Socialists took over the reigns of the French Government.

Lebanese officials who accompanied Minister Cheysson while visiting Beirut spoke of his enthusiasm upon seeing the Lebanese soldiers who were assigned to escort him. They tell of the many questions he raised regarding the army, its composition and what was being done to insure harmony among the soldiers who adhere to diverse religious faiths. Lebanese officials assert that Mr Cheysson was provided with detailed information on the various stages of rebuilding the Lebanese Army. According to these officials, Mr Cheysson on several occasions suggested ways to enable the army to extend its control to all parts of Lebanon.

In another gesture of support, the French Government, in addition to the loan, is offering on a grant basis 13 AMX tanks to the Lebanese Army. The army had once owned tens of these tanks before the 2-year war, of which a few still survive after having been restored to working condition. The grant also includes a number of half-tracks of the FAB type, ammunition, communications gear and other equipment, as well as an offer to double the number of military officers receiving special training in France.

The first shipment of the military assistance package arrived in Beirut toward the end of last week, and a second shipment is expected next month. After a period of anxiety that France might suspend delivery of the aid package in protest against the assassination in Beirut of French Ambassador Louis Delamore, Lebanese officials' fears were relieved when delivery came on schedule. A Lebanese Government source subsequently stated that France was aware and understanding of the unusual circumstances of Lebanese political life, which led to the murder of Mr Delamore. He added that France would not attempt to "punish" the Lebanese Government for a crime for which the latter was not responsible. To underscore this point, it appears, the French Government decided to proceed with the delivery in order to enable the Lebanese Army to regain the role it once occupied before the 2-year war and the subsequent turmoil in Lebanon.

[To contrast the French and American positions on the subject of aid to Lebanon,] a [Lebanese] government minister related a recent conversation he had had with a prominent American visitor to Lebanon. The Minister, in his words, had chided the American on the way Washington's support for Lebanon fails to go beyond the realm of words, a situation he claims to have characterized as "one giving rise to blushing and raised eyebrows." The minister added that while the American Administration gives grants and aid to numerous governments, whose situations are far less difficult than Lebanon's, and whose alliances with Washington are less than ironclad, it grudges its strong ally, Lebanon, any meaningful measure of effective aid and support. That, according to the minister, was no way to induce Lebanon to maintain or enhance its friendship with America. The minister went on to say that the American visitor was impressed with his candor and promised to convey his message to President Reagan.

What will Lebanon ask of France?

The military sources are secretive about Lebanon's aid request; they would only say that the delegation currently in Paris is looking over the latest in French equipment and negotiating prices with manufacturers' representatives.

The military's most urgent priority is to develop its infantry capability by procuring tanks, half-track, armored and transport vehicles. In addition, the army needs to restock its ammunition supply which had incurred heavy losses in looting raids of army depots during the war. Also, the army needs to upgrade its supply of anti-tank ammunition by purchasing French Milan missiles. The army already has a number of these missiles.

At present, the army is adequately supplied with individual infantry weapons, but there might be a need for additional weapons in this category in the future if the army is increased to 30,000 members. Our military sources said further that the question of repairing the country's Mirage fighters and restoring its missile-based air defense network will not be a subject of discussion [with the French Government]. According to the military sources, an agreement to restore the Mirage aicraft to working condition has already been reached with the French company OFEMA [French Office for the Exportation of Aeronautical Equipment] at a cost of 117 million Lebanese pounds. The Council of Ministers had reportedly approved the agreement on 22 July 1981, in response to a request submitted by the defense minister on 13 July 1981. Lebanon is now studying the possibility of financing are part of the agreement from Arab assistance funds approved at the 1979 Tunis summit meeting, with the remaining part to be paid for from this year's 3 billion pounds budget.

9063
CSO: 4404/49

CAMPAIGN TO OUST AL-WAZZAN CABINET DISCUSSED

National Movement Dissatisfied

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 86, 3-9 Oct 81 pp 29-30

[Text] Beirut--The competition between the security conditions and the political conditions--a competition which began a few days before the latest meeting of the Arab Followup Committee on 3 Sep 81--is still the distinctive feature in the Lebanese situation. While the Lebanese Government (and some unofficial Lebanese and Palestinian circles) are preoccupied with investigating the issue of the explosives planted in various parts of Lebanon and aimed against the Palestinian, Syrian and leftist Lebanese presence, a new front has been opened recently to oust the cabinet of Shafiq al-Wazzan who has been fighting the calls urging him to step aside and who has been exchanging with those urging him to step aside accusations that are not altogether free of harshness.

It seems as if the sudden tension in the security situation on the eve of the Arab Followup Committee meeting was aimed at embroiling the committee in the security concern after it had overcome this concern in its previous meetings and had moved to tackle the issue of the dealings between some Lebanese parties and Israel. The committee had sought to settle this issue in order to prepare for beginning the dialogue for national detente and for ending the Lebanese crisis.

This is why when the committee's resolutions were issued, the questions of reaffirming the cease-fire and of opening corridors between the two sections of the capital were the most strongly stressed issues in the list of resolutions which also called for forming an Arab committee to control the ports and the coastline in order to prevent the delivery of weapons to illegal parties. The interest of each of the main disputing Lebanese sides (the National Movement and the Lebanese Front) in giving priority to one of these two issues over the other constitutes one of the focal points of the current political struggle in Lebanon.

The Lebanese National Movement issue a statement last Friday referring to this issue and reaffirming the movement's position toward it. The statement says in part that the movement "acted tolerantly in the past when it agreed to equate the importance of the resolution concerning control of the ports and the coastline with the importance of the two resolutions on reaffirming the cease-fire and on opening corridors. The movement acted even more tolerantly when it agreed to give the Followup Committee's resolution to open corridors priority over everything else." The statement adds that the movement has now changed its position in light of "the

official Phalangist blackmail" and in the light of "information confirming continuation of the Phalangist-Israeli relationship." The statement adds that the movement now demands that "absolute priority be given to the resolution concerning control of the ports and of the coastline, with abidance by the other resolutions."

This issue is not the only issue with which the National Movement's statement has dealt. Rather, there has been another and more important issue, namely the issue of the cabinet's continuation. The statement has accused the cabinet of following President Ilyas Sarkis' course of imposing Bashir al-Jumayyil, the Lebanese Forces commander, as the sole representative of the Christians and of recognizing the army despite the accusations made against its neutrality.

The National Movement had demanded withdrawal of the army units from the tangential points in the capital and the replcement of these units by internal security forces prior to opening the other corridors between East and West Beirut. Meanwhile, the Lebanese Front believes that withdrawal of its forces from the tangential points in the capital's eastern front will lead to an imbalance that can be corrected only through the use of units of the Lebanese army. This argument is still obstructing removal of the barriers between the two parts of Beirut and restoration of normal life to the quarters adjacent to the tangential points--quarters which experience tension every night.

As for representation of the Christians, the National Movement, which includes secular parties in its ranks, insists that this representation should not belong to the Phalange alone. Walid Junblat, the National Movement chairman, recently told AL-MAJALLAH in an exclusive interview that the National Movement which he heads rejects dialogue with the Phalange as the sole Christian side even if this rejection will lead to renewed war.

In its statement, the National Movement has reaffirmed in strong terms its position vis-a-vis the issue of representation of the Christians, the issue of the army and the issue of the prime minister's subservience to the president. The movement has also threatened to withdraw the cover from al-Wazzan and to oust his cabinet.

Support for Raymond Iddih

To confront the government's attempt to create a rift between the National Movement and the traditional Islamic organizations, the movement has declared that it is not waging a factional battle and has called for forming a "comprehensive national front capable of saving Lebanon."

Some political circles believe that the campaign against al-Wazzan cabinet has exploded because of the Lebanese working paper submitted to the Arab Followup Committee--a paper which has failed to mention political reform. Leading figures in the National Movement had blamed al-Wazzan cabinet for this shortcoming at the outset of the campaign. But some observers, whose attention has been drawn by two references in the movement's latest statement to the "summer of 1982" which will witness the peak of the conspiracy, according to the statement--these observers believe that with the approach of the final year of President Ilyas Sarkis' term in office, the National Movement has launched the next presidential election campaign which will take place next summer. Reports are being circulated in Beirut about the possibility that President Sarkis will be nominated again to run in that campaign.

The National Movement's campaign has come at a time when a main ally of this movement, namely ex-President Sulaymand Franjiyah, has announced his support for the nomination of Raymond Iddih, the member of the Lebanese House of Deputies who is currently living in Paris and who waged the 1976 presidential election campaign against Ilyas Sarkis.

The timing of the campaign against the cabinet has aroused the concern of Prime Minister al-Wazzan, considering that the campaign has come on the eve of the Higher Coordination Committee's meeting in Damascus. The Syrian Government, the PLO, the Lebanese National Movement and the Lebanese Amal Movement are represented in this committee. This committee's meeting is a political-security meeting in which the various forms of cooperation among the three sides operating on the Lebanese arena are discussed. This campaign has embarrassed al-Wazzan who has been trying, with difficulty, to win the support of some Lebanese parties for his cabinet. It seems that the visit which al-Wazzan made to Damascus last August did not reassure him of the future of his cabinet. The first crisis erupted between the National Movement and al-Wazzan when the latter tried to carry on with the plan to overhaul the French-made Lebanese Mirage aircraft despite the National Movement's oppostion to this step on the grounds that it would strengthen the army before it solves its presumed crisis. The crisis reached the point where Walid Junblatt threatened to withdraw two cabinet ministers considered supporters of the National Movement while Kamil al-As'as, the Chamber of Deputies speaker, threatened to withdraw his two ministers in retaliation. It is circulated here that with intervention by President Sarkis, it was possible to avert the confrontation over this issue by shelving it, at least temporarily.

In any case, the struggle in Lebanon is still within its political bounds. In his address on occasion of the start of his sixth year in office, President Sarkis considered this [struggle within the political bounds] as the only solution available to the Lebanese who are in unanimous agreement on safeguarding their country, supported by Arab determination and international backing. But the final date for the confrontation has been set. This date is the summer of next year when Lebanon will determine the identity of its new president.

Until then, nobody can speculate that the struggle will not exceed the political limits, especially since Israeli intervention has not been totally eliminated from the Lebanese crisis. Perhaps this is what U.S. Envoy Philip Habib meant when he told the Middle East Institute's annual conference in Washington last week that "the cease-fire in Lebanon (achieved last July in southern Lebanon between Israel and the Palestinian resistance) is fragile and we have to build upon it to consolidate it."

Habib, who lauded the Arab Followup Committee's efforts, also said that what is required is continued movement "because if we don't show movement, there is the likelihood of renewed confrontation and escalation."

Campaign Fails

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 231, 5-11 Oct 81 p 13

[Article by Rafiq Shallala]

[Text] Lebanese political circles have been perplexed in explaining the causes of the campaign launched by Muhsin Ibrahim, National Movement executive secretary general, against Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, demanding that al-Wazzan resign on the grounds that he has failed to carry out the demand of the current which he represents. The perplexity is due to the fact that the country is passing through a delicate situation that does not allow for the political maneuvers and campaigns that used to be launched to oust one cabinet and bring in another. The politicians have been unanimous in raising question marks regarding the reasons which have motivated Ibrahim to adopt a negative attitude toward the present cabinet and toward its head in particular, keeping in mind that Walid Jumblatt, National Movement chairman, has not taken a similar position despite his reservations on the government's efforts in the political and social spheres.

Even though the campaign started during a demonstration by a number of citizens of the upper Northern al-Matn villages who had come [to the capital] to demand some developmental reforms in their villages, the positions declared by Ibrahim have gone beyond the framework of demands to include the current political conditions.

In an endeavor to clarify the dimensions of the campaign against al-Wazzan, political circles have raised several political possibilities that are becoming increasingly clear.

One of these possibilities is that the goal of the campaign is to draw al-Wazzan's attention to the need to refer to the National Movement before making his decisions, considering that the movement is a fundamental party in the Lebanese arena that cannot be disregarded. This is what has become evident through some statements speaking of the "disregard" displayed toward influential parties in the "national areas" and of "exclusiveness" in dealing with the existing problems.

Other circles believe that the campaign has sought to topple the cabinet in order to lead the country into a government crisis that would be difficult to overcome.

The second goal of "ousting" the cabinet is, in the opinion of these circles, to drop the unified Lebanese working paper submitted to the Arab Followup Committee. This would lead to freezing the committee's work, keeping in mind that this committee is semi-frozen without al-Jumayyil. The ouster or continuation of the cabinet [depends on] various considerations, the most important being the stalling implementation of the resolutions adopted by the committee, especially the resolutions pertaining to reaffirmation of the fragile cease-fire, opening the crossing "gates" between East and West Beirut and the creation of a committee to control the Lebanese ports and coastline to prevent the delivery of weapons to any side other than the legitimate authority.

Ex-President Sham'un believes that the campaign against the cabinet is inspired from abroad, and accuses Syria of stirring this campaign to create a political crisis that would divert attention from the Followup Committee's work. It would curtail

the committee's enthusiastic implementation of its resolution on the pretext that the political position is not unified and is suffering from domestic tremors, especially since the regine without an executive authority, namely a cabinet, is incapable of moving forward at all.

Where Is Damascus?

But the [Lebanese] government sources say that Syria is not behind the campaign against al-Wazzan cabinet. This has been confirmed by Col Muhammad Ghanim, Syria's representative in the Followup Cimmittee, to more than one official who has asked him about the true Syrian position vis-a-vis criticism levelled against the al-Wazzan cabinet, keeping in mind that those who have launched the campaign have tried to imply that Damascus is not pleased with the current cabinet.

The government sources add that the Syrians have no thought of shaking the cabinet at present because the circumstance does not permit the creation of a political crisis to be added to the security crises.

Some observers believe that the campaign against al-Wazzan cabinet may be connected with the election campaign for the speakership of the Chamber of Deputies, especially since some people have tried to imply that the regime is exerting efforts to obstruct the return of Speaker Kamil al-As'ad to the head of the legislative authority. We should keep in mind, however, that the regime has asserted that it is neutral in this campaign, that it wants the democratic game to take its course peacefully and wants the deputies, and nobody else, to determine who is to be elected to the speakership of the chamber.

What Is Result?

The fact is that the campaign against Prime Minister al-Wazzan has had a peaceful [sic] outcome. The Sunni and Shi'ite Islamic leaderships have rallied behind al-Wazzan. The Islamic street has displayed for al-Wazzan support rarely won by a prime minister under normal circumstances, not to mention abnormal security and political circumstances.

Where will the campaign against the cabinet get?

Those who are well-informed assert that the campaign has been "deflated" and will not realize its goals, regardless of how diverse they are, and that it has been characterized by a personal quality which has caused it to lose much of its momentum. As for the "deflation," it is due to several reasons, the most important being:

The support shown for the prime minister, the balanced position that Prime Minister al-Wazzan ahs taken in dealing with the campaign, the non-supportive Syrian position toward the campaign of which Prime Minister al-Wazzan has been informed by Colonel Ghanim, the stress on the regime's neutrality in the election campaign for the speakership of the Chamber of Deputies and the position of Walid Junblatt who is represented in the cabinet by two ministers, both of whom have asserted that ousting the cabinet is not at all considered in the calculations of the progressive leader.

On the basis of these facts, it seems that ousting the cabinet is not considered in the calculations of influential forces, both Lebanese and non-Lebanese, in this phrase

because holding the Lebanese cabinet accountable for problems which are not of its own making constitutes excessive unfairness.

Therefore, Prime Minister al-Wazzan has won the battle which was intended to destroy him. Others may pay the cost of an ill-timed campaign with vague goals and objectives.

8494
CSO: 4404/47

FINANCIAL SITUATION, RISING OIL BILL DISCUSSED

Growth of Deficit

Beirut AL-IQTI[illegible] WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 28, Jul 81 p 16

[Article by Rashid Hasan: "The Red Line"]

[Text] The reports and statistics that have been published in the course of the debate on the 1981 budget provide evidence that Lebanon's financial position has entered a new phase and that the situation is likely to worsen in 1981. The public debt is increasing at a faster rate than has been expected, a development that is putting increasing pressure on the exchange rate of Lebanon's currency as well as on its foreign currency and gold reserves. This article examines the extent of the deterioration and investigates the government's options for remedying or softening the impacy of these developments.

Lebanon's ability to maintain a stable financial position despite the political turmoil that has been plaguing the country prompted a Gulf state banker to wonder about Lebanon's "secret" for maintaining a stable lira in the face of constant pressure within the country and rising interest rates abroad. The country's puzzling ability to maintain a stable financial position, however, necessarily has limits. Sooner or later, if the twin problems of security and political turmoil continue unabated, Lebanon will reach its economic limits. Have we reached those limits yet, or do we have room to maneuver and buy a little extra time? If so, how long? From the beginning of this year, a variety of indicators have been signalling that the situation is deteriorating and that the burden of defending our currency is growing heavier. The public debt stood at 4.2 billion Lebanese Liras at the end of 1980. If the deficit expected in the new budget, which must be financed from internal or external revenues, is taken into account, the public debt may climb to 6.0 billion liras by the end of 1981. The government's ability to make up this deficit will be hampered even further--in comparison with 1980--if the conspicuous slowdown in the flow of Arab assistance payments continues. Of the $400 million earmarked annually by the Arab governments to help Lebanon, only Kuwait so far has made a payment--late at that--of $37.8 million on its allotment of $168.3 million. The only avenue open to the government to make up the deficit is to use next year's investment allocation--those stipulated in Chapter 2 of the budget--and to delay other [illegible]eted spending till the following year.

This means that spending for investment and development will be frozen at this year's level, with all the negative effects of such an action on the economy. This comes on top of approximately 1.5 billion liras originally earmarked for investment projects in the 1980 budget that have been turned over to this year's fiscal budget. Furthermore, the delay in approving this year's budget may hamper the spending of allocated funds, which can only be spent leagally after the budget is approved. It will be difficult, for example, to spend the total appropriation for investment projects in 6 months. Was the delay in approving the budget an indirect ploy to reduce government spending and thus moderate the growth of the deficit?

Overdue Payments

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WL AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 28 Jul 81 p 17

[Article: Delinquency in Paying Oil Bill Threatens Shutdown of Lebanons Tapline"]

[Text] What is the cause of the government's budget deficit? The deficit is the result of the widening gap between spending and shrinking revenues. On the spending side, two major items are responsible for the fissures in Lebanon's Financial facade: government subsidies for fuel and bread, which accounted for 25 percent of the budget, and the oil bill, which increased by $600 million in 1980 and accounted for 30 percent of the cost of all imports.

AL IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL has learned that because of the unexpected events of April the government has been compelled to delay payments on oil imported via the Tapline. As a result, Tapline officials protested and threatened to stop the flow of crude oil to the Zahareni [refinery] unless $53 million in overdue payments were made. This development drives home the point that the government no longer has sufficient room to maneuver. It also underscores the negative effects the constantly rising oil bill is having on the budget and foreign currency reserves. At the end of February the foreign currency reserves stood at slightly more than $1.5 billion, and this means that the cost of imported oil is approximately 40 percent of these reserves. This situation demonstrates the need to rebuild the Central Bank's foreign currency reserves and demonstrates the importance of Arab financial aid, as well as remittances from Lebanese citizens working overseas, the latter being the major source of financing Lebanon's foreign purchases.

The country's inability to pay its debts is expected to result in a decline in the flow of Arab aid this year.

It is also believed that remittances from Lebanese workers abroad slowed down during the first 6 months of this year, particularly after the events of April. This development could adversely affect the country's balance of payments and further reduce the government's ability to put its financial house in order before the end of the year, unless the security situation improves and the interest rate on U.S. currency declines. Another factor that is bound to have an adverse effect on the country's foreign currency supply is traceable to the Central Bank itself, which, on several occasions, had to enter the foreign currency market, most likely to fill some of its needs for foreign currency. The effect of this action, likely to be reflected as a decline in the country's foreign currency reserves, is yet to be estimated.

Let us go back to the fundamental question: How long can Lebanon continue to manage its financial situation? To answer the question it is essential to know whether the country's growing budget deficit is or is not accompanied by a balance of payments deficit. In his interview by AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL, [Finance] Minister al-Khalil emphasized that this point was the true test of Lebanon's financial situation.

The strong pressures to which Lebanese currency has been subjected to since the beginning of the year may be in part the result of a trend to switch to foreign currencies prompted by higher interest rates on the latter, as well as a slowdown in the flow of foreign currency from abroad.

At any rate, the government's budget deficit, expected to exceed one billion Lebanese pounds this year, will have negative effects, particularly in view of the fact that such a deficit will impact strongly on [the country's] financial liquidity. This in turn will accelerate the demand for foreign currency, especially U.S. dollars, which currently fetch high interest rates. Such a demand, if not balanced by higher remittances of foreign currency from Lebanese citizens working abroad and Arab aid payments, will put strong pressure on the exchange rate of Lebanese currency. By contrast, a net flow into the country of foreign capital will result in a greater availability of foreign currencies in the market, sufficient to meet or, possible, exceed the expected demand. More important, however, is that the government would be able to finance its foreign imports from foreign currency supplies in the local market, while, simultaneously, maintaining a stable exchange rate. In the event that inadequate foreign currency supplies flow into the country, the government will be faced with two options: either fill its foreign currency needs by buying on the local market, thus causing the cost of such currency to rise and the exchange rate of Lebanese currency to drop, or dip into its foreign currency reserves, with equally detrimental effects on the exchange rate of the pound, although indirectly. For this reason, the Central Bank will be working very closely with the Ministry of Finance to maintain liquidity and prevent a rush on foreign currency. Such a tactic is calculated to preserve a stable exhange rate and serve as a holding action pending a drop in the interest rates paid on dollar deposits. Toward this end, one important step has already been taken: the Ministry of Finance has already begun to sell to the public 3-month treasury bonds paying an interest rate of 14 percent. This rate of interest compares favorably with the average of 15 percent paid by banks in the past 3 months. In fact it is 2 points or more higher than what banks have been paying on 3-month accounts. In this respect, the Central Bank has already entered the competition for cash deposits against the commercial banks. A substantial number of large depositers, acting through several commercial banks, is reported to have underwritten upwards of 400 million pounds of the Central Bank's bond issue. Should the high interest rate paid on treasury bonds continue, banks will be compelled to raise the interest rate paid to their depositers. Lebanon's Central Bank is expected to take advantage of any lowering of interest rates on dollar deposits to strengthen the Lebanese pound and improve the country's balance of payments. In brief, the net result is that the budget deficit may improve somewhat giving the government a better chance to deal with it without added pressure on the foreign currency reserves while, simultaneously, maintaining the exchange rate of the pound.

the foreign currency reserves while, simultaneously, maintaining the exchange rate of the pound.

It must be pointed out, however, that the Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance cannot perform miracles. Furthermore, our foreign currency reserves are not miraculous either and cannot be subdivided ad infinitum. Consequently, it behooves all those in positions of responsibility, Lebanese and Arab, to be aware of the potentially grave future developments.

Finance Minister Interviewed

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 28, Jul 81 pp 18-19

[Interview with Finance Minister Ali al-Khalil by AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL; date and place not specified]

[Text] AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL conducted an interview with the Finance Minister of Lebanon Dr Ali al-Khalil to discuss the government's financial position. The purpose of the interview was to respond to a fundamental question: Has the government's budget deficit reached a point where it could threaten the country's financial future and the future of its currency? The interview also sought to discover what means the government has to finance its ever-increasing debt and to narrow the widening gap between its revenues and expenditures.

[Question] The government's debt, according to some [experts] has reached or will soon reach the "red line." a level beyond which we cannot go without causing severe damage to the country's economy. How do you assess this view?

[Answer] In spite of the large jump in the government's debt over the past few years, I can still say responsibly that the debt—estimated at 4.5 billion Lebanese Pounds as of April 15,1981—has not reached a dangerous level. There are three principal reasons for this assessment:

1. The ratio of the debt to the national income is still within acceptable bounds, better, in fact, than it is in many advanced countries.

2. The foreign debt, which stands at 725 million Lebanese Pounds, constitutes no more than 16 percent of the total debt. As is well known, it is the foreign debt which poses the greater danger to the exchange rate of our currency because it tends to deplete the government's foreign currency reserves. The internal portion of the debt, however, is financed from internal revenue sources.

3. A significant portion of the government's debt exists only on paper. When one takes into account an estimated 1 billion Lebanese Pounds owed the government by corporations and individuals in the form of taxes and fees, as well as 4 billion pounds in cash advances made to bail out public utility concerns and city governments—electricity, eater, and the Municipal Government of Beirut are examples—a good portion of the debt is merely a bookkeeping one. The government expects to collect on these loans when the concerns in question return to solvency.

[Question] To what extent are these treasury loans collectible? Are not some of them, for one reason or another, dead debts?

[Answer] These advances, which are in reality high-interest loans, are made to public utility companies and other public institutions on the basis of a well-established principle. The loans are made only when it is demonstrated that withholding them would result in the interruption of vital public services. Another criterion in granting the loans is the recepient's ability to repay.

Each loan application is evaluated on its own merits. The Municipal Government of Beirut owes the national treasury substantial sums, but it has sufficient assets to cover its debts easily. Lebanon's Electric Company owes more than 700 million pounds, but it can easily move to profitability if the security situation improves and if it raises prices to a level compatible with costs. A 300 million pound treasury loan has also been made to a number of industrial companies. These are all loans and not dead ones. There are other examples. What it boils down to is that the treasury is a debtor as well as a creditor. The major difference is that, as a creditor, the treasury is unable to collect its loans at this time and must attempt to manage its affairs by other means. This is the crux of the problem.

[Question] The anticipated deficit in the 1981 budget is estimated at 1.5 billion pounds. How will that affect the governments' debt?

[Answer] Naturally, the debt will increase by the amount of the net deficit in this years' budget. I emphasize "net" because a part of this fiscal years' allocations will not be spent and will be turned over to next years' budget. The reason for this is that some government agencies will not be able to spend their budget allocations this fiscal year. As an example, approximately 1.5 billion pounds of the 1980 budget were turned over to the 1981 budget. This is not exactly a normal situation and is attributed to the fact that some government agencies are unable to spend their budget allocations on worthwhile projects. Another factor which has a great bearing on the ultimate size of the net deficit is the size of aid from outside Lebanon, particularly [the time of receipt of] Arab assistance payments approved at the Tunis Summit Conference.

[Question] When will you begin to worry about the public debt?

[Answer] When it begins to affect adversely our balance of payments, that is our gold and foreign currency reserves. We hope we do not reach that point. So far, we are in a strong position. In 1980, our balance of payments had a surplus of $450 million. In 1979, we had a surplus of $400 million. We expect a greater surplus this year, provided the security situation improves. If the security situation deteriorates, our balance of payments will suffer.

[Question] Is there a serious effort, in the face of these potential threats, to develop the treasury's income resources? What can be done in this area?

[Answer] The drop in the governments' revenues in relation to its expenditures during the past 3 years can be attributed to a number of causes, most notably, and indisputably, the loss of control of the security situation and the government's inability to function. Without this ability, the government cannot collect taxes. Consider the Customs Service as an example. Revenues from this source have declined

sharply in direct proportion to the worsening political situation, the number of illegal ports created, and the runaway smuggling tade. Based on the rate of growth of revenues from this source over the past few years, we had expected to collect 1-5 billion pounds in 1981 customs duties. Our present expectations for the year are no more than 500 million pounds.

The same is true with regard to the collection of direct taxes. The atmosphere which encourages people to avoid paying customs duties, ecourages them to avoid payint taxes and to cheat the treasury. Faced with this situation, what can the government do? We must concede that the only solution hinges on the return of political stability and the resumption of governmental authority. In view of this reality, Arab financial aid very important. It helps us to close the gap between revenues and expenditures and keeps us from reaching the danger point. Our hopes are pinned on Arab and international efforts to put a final end to Lebanon's tragedy and restore the country to economic and financial health.

[Question] Arab financial aid, if paid, will help cover some of the deficit. How will the rest of the deficit be covered and what is the best policy to accomplish that end?

[Answer] The Ministry of Finance, in cooperation with the Central Bank, has evolved a sound, comprehensive policy for financing the deficit and for absorbing any negative effects that the deficit may have on the exchange rate of the Lebanese Pound and consequently, on the rate of inflation. In line with this policy, the deficit will be financed primarily through the issuance of treasury bonds without resort to external or internal sources. We expect the bonds to help absorb some of the liquidity of the local market and raise interest rates on Lebanese currency deposits to make them competitive with interest rates paid on other currencies. This action is calculated to strengthen the Lebanese Pound and preserve its exchange rate. It is noteworthy that the bonds appear to be quite popular with the public. The banks are contributing to this effort by making the bonds available to the public.

It is possible, however, that, in addition to local and Arab [aid] resources, we may still need foreign loans, particularly from Arab development funds, the World Bank, and other international institutions, which grant loans on easy terms, in order to finance certain development projects.

[Question] Some people believe that the government subsidies for fuel and other things are no longer justified in view of the worsening budget deficit. What is your view on this point?

[Answer] Subsidies for fuel and bread cost the treasury 1 billion pounds [per year], and they are likely to go up if there is a further increase in the price of oil Subsidies account for 25 percent of actual government spending. This subject is important indeed and must be reviewed with an eye toward balancing the interests of the government and the consumer. We must find out who shoulders the burden of the subsidies and who benefits from them and how. In particular, we must find out how these subsidies affect the price of commodities. What is the value of a subsidized item, for instance, when it can be imported or bought unsubsidized at a lower cost? It is necessary, in my opinion, to review the subsidy policy and to reestablish it on a sounder economic and social foundation.

[Question] Let us go back to Arab aid. The published figures show a significant decline in the amount of Arab aid received in 1981. Some Arab countries have not paid a piaster of their commitments so far. How does the government plan to deal with this issue?

[Answer] Atab aid commitments are brotherly obligations. They are not binding commitments. Although some payments are past due, they will be paid. The best we can do is to remind those who made the commitments to fulfill them. We must let them know that we count on these commitments in our hour of need. Arab aid payments serve as a safety valve for us. Viewed from another perspective, these commitments are an expression of solidarity with Lebanon in its time of crisis. We are not a poor country. We have built one of the most successful economic systems in the region without the aid of oil revenues, relying solely on our talents, dynamism, and the flexibility of our economic system. But, as everyone is aware, we have suffered a great deal during the past several years, possible more than many other nations and states could bear. We have lost a great deal. We, therefore, must preserve what we have left in order to reconstruct our economy and resume our former role in the Arab world and the international community. We hope that the promised payments will be made on time so that the Lebanese Government may undertake some of its more urgent tasks such as revitalizing services and halting the deterioration of the infrastructure on which its economy depends.

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OFFICIAL DISCUSSES BEIRUT PORT ACTIVITIES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic No 230, 28 Sep-4 Oct 81 pp 13-14

[Interview with Mr Henry Far'un, council chairman and director general of the Lebanese Port Authority, by Fadia al-Sharqasi: "Illegal Harbors Cut Customs Service Revenues"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The wall surrounding the [Beirut] port is low. The firing of one bullet is enough to shut down the port's activities. But, most often, one word is enough to reopen it. It serves as a safety valve in a city without security. The port is known as the "vanquisher" of all those who go by the name of "al-Furaqa'" [the parties]. In spite of the turmoil surrounding it, the harbor operates daily, bringing many blessings for which we ought to be thankful. The details of its profits and losses are well known. The important thing is that it remains open to welcome ships and receive goods. Equally important is that its workers manage to go home safely at night. The war has stripped the port of its title as a public service agency, one worthy of protection, to enable it to continue to serve all of us. The war has also stripped it of its position despite the fact that no others have sprung up to replace it. The war has stripped the port of its title as a meeting place for people from all parts of the country. Many [former users] would rather patronize the illegal harbors that have sprung up in its vicinity, often a short distance away.

Mr Henry Far'un, council chairman and director general of the Port Authority, has tired of emphasizing the importance of the port as a meeting place for all Lebanese. He has tired of telling people that the port belongs to them, that it should be excluded from the crisis, that restoring the port to normal use should not wait till a solution to the Middle East problem is found. He has made frequent appeals to put an end to the illegal harbors, not only in consideration of the fact that the Beirut harbor is a fundamental public service operation, but on the grounds that its survival is in the best interest of all people. All Mr Far'un got in return from [former] users were promises that are frequently broken. Following are Mr Far'un's answers to the questions put to him about the port by AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI:

[Question] Why was the port shut down on several occasions?

[Answer] There are many explanations for the involuntary shutdowns to which the port is subjected. The primary reason, however, is the unstable political situation which Lebanon has been witnessing for a number of years. The instability creates security problems at the port which is located on the border [between East and West Beirut].

[Question] Are the forcible shutdowns caused by parties who stand to benefit from harbor disruptions?

[Answer] I am not the security official, and therefore, I cannot specify the party responsible for the shutdowns. On the basis of the information I can gather after every security-related shutdown, I can say that most parties want the port to remain open. Most parties recognize the importance of the port's services to the local economy and the Arab world at large.

[Question] Do the shutdowns promote the growth of illegal harbors, and what is your estimate of the losses due to these shutdowns? How about smuggling operations, and what has been done to halt them?

[Answer] Of course the arbitrary shutdowns to which the port is subjected from time to time prompt some importers to use illegal harbors. The losses due to shutdowns are enormous not only in financial terms but in terms of morale. The losses cannot be recouped easily. After 4 years of hard work to renew confidence in the port, we were able to restore business with the world's major shipping companies. We were able to reestablish business with 225 international harbors, approximately 73 percent of the 1974 level, the year preceding the outbreak of violence.

When the port facilities were closed from 2-20 April of this year, the losses were estimated at 1.5 million Lebanese pounds, but operations resumed on a satisfactory level. The Port Authority is now operating in the red. The budget deficit as of the middle of this year is 15 million Lebanese pounds and could reach 60 million pounds by the end of the year, particularly if we take into account the additional financial burden due to cost of living increases. This, of course, assumes that the security situation does not improve.

As for the other half of the question, smuggling by way of illegal harbors is growing by leaps and bounds. It is a destructive phenomenon, which has caused more damage to the port than the war which began in 1975.

When smuggling and tampering with goods destined for the Beirut port--in which some of our leading businessmen and industrialists were involved--I sounded the alarm by means of a press announcement on 29 July of this year. In that announcement, I explained to government officials and the public the extent of the financial losses to the Port Authority and the national treasury caused by smuggling. I pointed out that Customs Service revenues in July and August have dropped to 30 million and 23 million Lebanese pounds, respectively, a decrease of 65 million pounds than had been estimated for that period in this year's budget.

Customs Service revenues for the first half of 1981 are 150 million Lebanese pounds below the level of the corresponding period in 1980. If this abnormal situation continues, the difference in revenues for both years may reach 300 million pounds by the end of this year.

The biggest loss was in the category of harbor fees, which, for the first half of this year stood at 116.5 million pounds vs. 235.5 million pounds for the corresponding period of 1980, a 50 percent drop. The loss, in terms of total

Customs Service revenues, means that the ratio of fees to total revenue has dropped from 65.6 to 55.2 percent. In response to my public announcement and discussions with government officials, Mr Ilyas al-Hirawi, minister of public works and transport, issued a public statement warning treasury cheaters and consumers to desist from this improper activity or face the penalties established by law for this type of violation. I will, for the present, settle for the steps taken to date to stem this activity, in the hopes that these measures will raise the civic consciousness of the illegal importers and restore their sense of responsibility.

[Question] Would you give us some statistical data on the part's present activity?

[Answer] Despite the relative security we have enjoyed since the events of last April, port activity is slow. It is below the level recorded for the first quarter of this year, which, as mentioned earlier, was 73 percent of the 1974 level. After a surge in activity at the beginning of the year, we suffered a setback when the port was closed in the wake of the latest security disturbances. The shutdown lasted from 2 April to 20 April. Work resumed cautiously as the security situation improved, and in July the port activity reached a moderate level with the handling of 167,879 tons of cargo. The corresponding figures for April, May and June preceding were 122,680, 88,342 and 89,487 tons, respectively. One can see from this that the average level of activity for these 4 months was lower than it was during the first quarter of the year, when activity had nearly returned to normal. A total of 713 ships entered the harbor in the first quarter, where they unloaded 702,021 tons and took on 177,729 tons. The total volume of cargo handled for the period was 468,388 tons. When the two periods are compared, the figures are as follows: 42.3 percent drop in the number of ships received, a 43 percent drop in the weight of cargo delivered, a 84.7 percent drop in the weight of cargo shipped out, and a 46 percent drop in the level of total activity.

[Question] We have heard of your proposal to have the port declared a neutral zone. Anything new on this point?

[Answer] The frequent reverses in the security situation paralyze the efforts of those officials who are trying to improve the security problem. This is true not only with respect to the port, but also with respect to passage from one part of the city to the other. The security plan which would neutralize the port and a corridor to the commercial district is still a promise. It is yet to be implemented. In my daily contacts [with officials] I do all I can to have the plan implemented, in the belief that it is the desire of all Lebanese people and a key step toward national reconciliation.

[Question] There was a period when the port served as a passage way for going from East to West Beirut. Why was this passage closed?

[Answer] As you know, the port is under the jurisdiction of the Army and the National Security Force [the police]. This has been the case since the end of 1976, when the port resumed normal activity. Anyone wishing to enter the port then had to secure a special permit from the Port Security Office. This was

followed by a period when the harbor became the only safe way to cross from one part of the city to the other, a development that compelled harbor officials to overlook the special permit measures in order to facilitate free passage. Port officials took special measures to facilitate the flow of traffic through the port area. Although this period was occasionally marred by gunfire, it is truly a proud one in the history of the port. It underscores what I have repeatedly said since the port resumed normal activity in 1976, specifically that the port should serve as a model of peaceful coexistence for Lebanese people of all faiths. The harbor must be made a neutral zone; it must be excluded from all conflicts if it is to serve the interest of all. Subsequent security developments made passage through the port hazardous. As a result, the Port Security Office reinstituted the special permit requirement.

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FOOD PRODUCTS SUPPLY FALLS SHORT

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 23 Oct 81 pp 1, 7

[Text] The volume of plant products grown and the degree to which internal production covered domestic needs over the 3 years of the 1978-1980 plan were as follows:

Products	Yield 77-78	Yield 78-79	Yield 79-80	Average	Self-sufficiency Percentage
Main Cereal Crops	45,930	39,942	45,057	43,643	72.0
Sugar	3,660	3,340	3,355	3,452	53.6
Vegetable Oils	222	378	432	344	18.2

The average production level for the main cereals over the 3-year plan was higher than during the preceding 5-year plan: 43.64, compared to 39.13 hundredweight.

Average sugar production was 43.8 percent higher than during the previous 5-year planning period (345,200 tons over 240,000 tons).

By contrast, the decline in vegetable oil production, when compared with the average annual levels recorded in the 1973-1977 planning period (34,400 tons compared to 42,900 tons) is primarily due to the very poor olive harvest of 1977-1978, but also to the stagnation in production of seed-oil, caused by lack of coordinated policies in that subsector.

Meat production was as follows:

Product	Yield 1978	Yield 1979	Yield 1980	Average	Self-sufficiency Percentage
Meat and offal (thousands of tons)	298	313	331	314	100
Milk (millions of liters)	659	730	780	723	50

Meat production was on an upward trend, especially poultry. The average production level was 314,000 tons during the planning period; overall meat production in 1978 was 8 percent over 1977 (298,000 tons in 1978 compared to 276,000 tons in 1977), while production in 1979 was 5 percent over 1978, and 1980's level was 5.7 percent over the 1979 level.

With regard to cow's milk, the trend was positive (4.6 percent annual increase, on average, during the period 1969-1980). Milk production in 1980 grew 6.8 percent compared to 1979, which was 11 percent over the 1978 level. The latter in turn was a 6 percent increase over 1977.

Improvement of Human Nutrition

The major efforts that have gone into production of products rich in protein, such as milk (which has its own planning document--production is increasing at a lively pace) and meat (especially poultry, the large-scale production of which is making low cost protein available to a broad cross-section of the populace), are raising the nutritional level of the populace. An assessment of the dimensions of progress in that field cannot be made without an appropriate survey of domestic household consumption.

Improving the Balance of Trade:

The following trends were shown in agricultural imports during the last 3 years:

Agricultural imports over the 3-year planning period accounted for 26.39 percent of the dollar value of the country's overall imports; it should be emphasized, however, that such imports themselves were 29.63 percent of all imports during the 1973-1977 period.

The average increase in the cost of basic food commodity imports (cereals, sugar, milk, vegetable oil) was about 23.5 percent per year during the 3-year planning period, a figure which covers both the increase in the volume of imported products and the inflation in world market prices.

Thus, agricultural imports, rather than declining, grew in both volume and unit cost during the 3-year planning period.

Covering Imports

The trend in agricultural exports during the last 3 years was as follows:

Agricultural exports accounted for 35.1 percent of the cash value of the country's total exports during the 3-year planning period.

The figures for the principal export products were as follows (in millions of dirhams).

Overall, agricultural exports during the 3-year period showed an annual increase in value of 14.78 percent, while agricultural imports had an average growth of 19.76 percent per year over the same period.

Agricultural imports covered 74.7 percent of the cost of agricultural exports in 1978, 70.5 percent in 1979, and 68.6 percent in 1980 (estimate).

Food product exports covered 84.7 percent of food product imports in 1978, 78.0 percent in 1979, and 83.8 percent in 1980 (estimate).

Agricultural exports, as shown in the chart below, covered a slightly greater portion of overall imports in 1980 than in 1979, which was somewhat down from 1978.

Value of agricultural imports and exports in millions of dirhams:

The terms of trade in agricultural products showed some improvement, in that the value per ton ratio of exports over imports improved: 1.21 in 1980, compared to 1.13 at the start of the 1978-1980 plan.

Trends in Agricultural Imports

	1978	1979	1980
Imports (in thousands of tons)	2,869	3,018	3,272
Imports (dirhams)	3,193	3,072	4,580
Unit price in dirhams/ton	1,112.9	1,226.6	1,399.7
Agricultural imports as percentage of overall imports	25.83	25.84	27.27

Trends in Agricultural Exports

	Wheat	Sugar	Milk Products	Oils
1978				
1000 T	1,555	289	35	137
MDH (millions of dirhams)	856	305	156	333
1979				
1000 T	1,487	279	41	173
MDH	968	457	185	269
1980				
1000 T	1,650	328	41	152
MDH	1,258	627	251	383
Average				
1000 T	1,564	299	39	154
MDH	1,026	462	197	328

Trends in Cost of Imports

	1978	1979	1980
Exports in thousands of tons	1,694	1,526	1,860
Exports in millions of DH	2,384	2,610	3,141
Unit price in DH/ton	1,407.3	1,710.3	1,688.7
Agricultural exports as percentage of overall exports	38.1	35.8	32.6

Trends in Basic Commodities

	1978	1979	1980
Agricultural exports	2,384	2,610	3,141
Overall imports	12,361	14,328	16,796
Percentage covered	19.3	18.2	18.7

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FLOUR, SUGAR, OIL, OTHER ASPECTS OF AGRO-INDUSTRY REVIEWED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 23 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] Agricultural and food industries complement agricultural production: they greatly improve the profitability of investments, especially those for irrigation. They contribute to job creation and increasing agricultural production. They constitute what is called agro-industry.

Agro-industry is a big part of our nation's activity, both economic and industrial. It encompasses many domains, such as drying, preservation, and processing of agricultural products, both animal and vegetable.

These activities cover a broad spectrum and extend, among other things, to industries based on cereals (manufacture of doughs and semolina), to sugar-works and refineries, to fatty substances industries (oil-works), to dairies (manufacture of numerous mass consumption milk-based products), to plant product canning (fruits, vegetables), to livestock feed, to cotton (the textile industry), to wood and cork industries (paper, briquettes, etc). So we see that this is a very widespread domain, which has wide-ranging effects on the whole national economy.

The Flour Mills

Among the cereal-based industries we would point out the flour mills; there are 67 of them in this country, and with a current milling capacity of 17 million hundredweight; they are concentrated in the Casablanca area. Their business is largely the milling of imported early wheat.

Apart from these industrial flour mills, there are about 7,000 small mills operating in the country with a total milling capacity of 23 million hundredweight. Presently, therefore, the small-scale milling sector is bigger by far than the industrial sector; but that situation could change as a result of the rapid expansion of the field of activity of industrial milling, a phenomenon produced by the demographic growth and increasing urbanization of the country.

Modern bakeries, dough and couscous factories, and bread-product industries make up another category of cereal-based industries; there are presently 548 modern bakeries, 24 food-paste and couscous factories, 21 bread-product plants and two cracker factories.

Sugar-Works and Refineries

As for sugar-works and sugar refineries, they have the capacity to process 40,000 tons of raw material per day (including 3,000 of cane). The sugar industry is a veritable bright spot in the economic development scene.

In fact, established as it is in the heart of rural population concentrations, it tends to inspire urbanization and diverse investments, for it attracts ever-increasing numbers of people. But building up a sugar-works takes a great deal of investment, which sometimes poses difficult problems.

However, one thing that should be noted is the great importance of the "sugar policy" the government is carrying out, on the initiative of His Majesty King Hassan II, a policy thanks to which not only will we achieve self-sufficiency [in sugar] but we will even become exporters of that commodity which is increasing in demand around the world.

As for the refineries, there are six of them, including three that are integral components of sugar-works; their refining capacity is adequate to the needs of the country, presently estimated at 600,000 tons per year.

Oil-Works

With regard to vegetable oils, which includes both oleaginous seed-oils and olive oil, we presently have two plants for the trituration of oleaginous seeds (one in Casablanca, the other in Kenutra), especially sunflower seeds. But this crop suffers from many drawbacks. The olive oil works are a growth sector which should concentrate on supplying the local market; naturally, the volume of activity in the oil-works varies according to the size of the crop.

Dairy Industries

Morocco presently has a dozen dairies with a total nominal capacity of 1,255,000 liters per day. In general, the quantities of milk being processed are rapidly increasing: but the progress being made in that industry is hindered by the vagaries of lactation levels.

Vegetable Canning

There are 88 canneries processing plant products in Morocco, including 27 in Casablanca and 23 in Marrakech. In the last 3 years 80 percent of their production has been exported.

In the field of cotton ginning, our production is primarily of long-yarn varieties. The country has six operating factories.

There are 21 plants for the manufacture of animal feed, and almost all of them are in Casablanca: they provide feed primarily for the "two-legged" animals (poultry) but also for the "four-footed" kind (cattle and sheep).

Wood and Wood-Based Industries

Wood and cork industries are divided into four basic categories: wood panels; cork processing; brush manufacturing; paper pulp (the bulk of the latter is for export).

Thus, we see that our agroindustrial activity is widespread; it would become even more so, if it were not held back by climatological conditions which sometimes keep down the size of the harvests.

9516
CSO: 4519/33

FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS, MONETARY POLICY DISCUSSED

Syrian Monetary Policy

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 30, Sep 81 pp 12-13

[Article by Sami Ahmad: "Governor of Syria's Central Bank states: 'Growing Flotation Determines Issue Price of Syrian Pound'; New Measures Lowered Demand for Foreign Currencies"]

[Text] During the past 4 months Syria has witnessed important monetary developments aimed at stabilizing the Syrian pound, striking at the monetary black market, and improving the balance of trade and the balance of payments. AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL asked the governor of Syria's Central Bank, Mr Rif'at al-'Iaqd, for an initial evaluation of the experiment and its dimensions, along with a definition of Syrian monetary policy. He replied:

"Before evaluating the results achieved by the parallel market which was created about 4 months ago, I must give a brief description of the monetary system and situation in Syria and about the monetary and financial phase in which Syria has been living for a short time.

"In the area of determining the issue price of its currency with respect to other currencies, Syria follows an intermediate system among the systems applied in the world. It has not tied its currency to the special drawing rights, and also has not tied it to a specific basket of the world currencies included in its foreign trade, nor to one of the monetary blocks recognized in the world, such as the Pound Sterling block, the French franc, or the like. Syria also has not followed the principle of free flotation for its currency, nor the principle of an organic tie to a strong world currency, such as the U.S. dollar. Although Syria has considered the U.S. dollar a key to pricing other foreign currencies with respect to the Syrian pound (the dollar is the most pervasive international transaction currency among foreign monies), nonetheless, Syria has not adhered to a fixed parity with this currency. Thus, we can describe the method we follow in determining the issue price of the Syrian pound as the "growing flotation" method, since it abandons the semi-fixed issue price based on the key currency, as the good of the national economy requires this measure."

If we were not now faced with evaluating this method and the extent of its relationship to the existing economic system in Syria, which is built upon the existence of the public sector as the dominant sector, especially in the field

of foreign trade and in the field of fixing domestic prices, then we would have to say that it is waiting for rules to be laid down, rules which are more realistic, more constant, and more of service to our economic goals in the field of defining the bases of the issue price for the Syrian pound. We should, as much as possible, reduce the opportunities for changing the issue price and strive to keep the issue price semistable, since price oscillations have bad material effects on foreign exchanges and on the level of domestic prices and wages. We should do so on the condition that the issue price be within limits which can be defended: On the basis of trying to equalize the balance of payments; on the basis of trying to control the unexpected psychological factors which, in most cases, result in draining finances and capital and speculation in foreign money markets and precious metals; and on the basis of opening numercus horizons and channels to absorb surplus liquidity, especially in the fields of production projects with short-term yields.

"In this respect we can be assured that the steps listed below have begun to give results, and their effects have been reflected in improvement in the issue price of the Syrian pound in foreign markets. These steps, which were carried out in the monetary field, included raising interest rates on deposits by a tangible percentage about 6 months ago, and creating the parallel market recently. Other measures were taken and are being taken one by one in the financial field, such as:

--Limiting consumer spending and providing consumer education.

--Improving methods of taxation and introducing important reforms to the tax system.

--Regulating importation through subjecting private sector imports (which constituted an important proportion of Syria's total imports) to the "previous supply system," and requiring importers from the private sector to pay the value of their goods only through the local banks.

--Providing the noncommercial needs of the private sector from the banking system, and, as a consequence, extensively weakening opportunities for requesting the foreign exchange discount from foreign markets and from the black market.

--Earnestly fighting black market agents, because the areas where these agents operate, in the event they are tolerated, continue to be a basis for meeting foreign exchange discount demands for various illegal purposes, and consequently returning to their influence on the issue price of the Syrian pound.

"If we wanted to evaluate the results achieved by the parallel market since its creation, we could summarize them as follows:

--Reducing, to a great extent, the opportunities for demand on foreign exchange currencies from the unregulated market by establishing specialized banks and by providing the citizens all their legal commercial and noncommercial needs from these banks. This reason, in and of itself, is enough to paralyze this market's demand.

--Creating a promotional price which is applied to a limited number of activities, foremost among them the unexpected revenues arising from transfers by Syrians living abroad to their relatives, and from tourist revenues, commissions, and the like. Private sector imports were dealt with in their entirety, and promotional prices were allowed to be applied at specific percentages of the value of certain export goods.

"In this field we confirm that it is not necessary to subject the equivalent price to the law of supply and demand, because the natural supply and demand factors which obtain under free conversion, and consequently under flotation, are not available for this price. Instead, this promotional price must finally stabilize at a price derived from findings based on an objective study of the activities which it encompasses, more than basing it on supply prices in the commercial markets or in the black market. Also, the stability of this promotional price will help the value stability of monies and foreign trade transactions which are carried out based upon it, and consequently it will help the stability of prices on imported goods.

"On the basis of the foregoing experiments through which Syria has passed, the equivalent market will be one of the elements helping to return balance to the balance of payments, in addition to the other elements which have begun to be applied, in stages and carefully, in other fields. Foremost among these are raising production, encouraging investment and savings, consumer education, and limiting unnecessary spending."

Syrian Mortgage Bank

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 30, Sep 81 p 13

[Text] The Mortgage Bank in Syria, which is similar to the Housing Bank in Lebanon, is participating in a rather important role in the construction activity. The following provides information on the Mortgage Bank on the basis of the answers to questions from AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL:

Question: How do you evaluate the results of your bank's activity for 1980 on the level of loans and services?

Answer: During the past 15 years the bank has been able to cover all of the country's provinces with 13 operating branches. Their investments have seen a great increase, since at the end of 1980 their total was 2,014.03 million Syrian pounds, of which 399.2 million pounds were invested in 1980. Also, the sum of 189.6 million pounds was invested up to 10 June 1980. Thus, the bank is effectively participating in supporting the construction activity in the country and stimulating the building of residential structures. This includes support for the housing cooperatives, which are gaining a large percentage of the bank's financing.

Question: How do you evaluate the role of specialized banks in the national economy, and what is the extent of revenue necessary for their activity?

Answer: Banking specialization is a line which Syria has followed, beginning in 1967. It started from specific goals, foremost among them the redistribution of

financing resources among specialized banks operating in Syria, so as to provide financing resources for each specialized bank sufficient to enable it to respond to the needs of the economic sector it covers with its loans. There are many ways to accomplish this, among them: Supporting the bank's capital; requiring certain governmental administrations, public institutions, and public companies to deposit their funds at a specific bank and no other; and opening up an opportunity for each bank to supply the loans granted by Syria's Central Bank, under the conditions imposed by that bank.

Question: To what extent has the bank's administration developed, both on the level of the techniques employed and the availability of skilled staff?

Answer: The bank periodically and continuously conducts technical and scientific studies to develop and modernize operating methods, taking into consideration the expansion of its operations and the growth of its revenues and investments. The bank adopted many modern administrative methods, introduced mechanization [sic--automation?] into its operations, and developed the accounting equipment which it uses. It provided the large branches with advanced accounting equipment with high performance and operational capability.

The bank sets up periodic training courses in various specialties for senior employees who have been nominated to take responsibility for departments and divisions, and for new employees for the purpose of qualifying them for bank work.

Question: What is the ratio of loans in your bank for the public and private sectors?

Answer: The sectors benefiting from the bank's loans are numerous. The most important of them are: The cooperative sector, representing the housing cooperatives; individuals, the majority of them among those who have a limited income and a few of them among the owners of tourist establishments, hospitals, and schools; and the public sector, which represents the official quarters concerned with the field of residential construction and building activity. In order to give a clear picture of how much these sectors benefited from the bank's loans in 1980, we present the following statistics:

Private sector	51.61 percent
Cooperative sector	45.51 percent
Public sector	2.88 percent

Question: How do you participate in developing the mortgage sector in Syria?

Answer: The mortgage sector is a broad sector, and the Mortgage Bank has a role in this sector. However, in accordance with the regulations on the basis of which the bank operates, it covers only a percentage of the mortgage sector activity in the country. Thus, the bank grants loans only for building, completing, and purchasing houses for the citizens who do not own homes, and for building and completing tourist facilities, hospitals, and schools.

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14 December 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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BRIEFS

OPEC-LDC TRADE STATISTICS--Trade between OPEC members and non-oil producing lesser developed countries (LDCs) increased sixfold in the 1970s. Exports from the non-oil LDCs to OPEC countries increased by 464 per cent, outpacing growth in their exports to the rest of the world for most of the period from 1972-1979. In a paper published in the forthcoming OPEC REVIEW, two British economists, Paul Hallwood and Stuart Sinclair, assess the nature of trade between non-oil LDCs and OPEC members. From a value of $3.3bn in 1973, exports from non-oil producing LDCs to oil exporting countries reached $15.2bn by 1979. For their part, oil exporting countries increased exports to non-oil LDCs from $7.8bn in 1973 to $46bn by 1979. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 41]

CSO: 4400/75

BRIEFS

NEW STEEL PLANT--Kobe Steel of Japan has been awarded a $207m contract by the Arab Company for Iron and Steel to build a steel plant in Bahrain. Scheduled for completion in 30 months, and serviced by a dry dock, the plant will be the largest steel works in the region. It is expected to meet the entire requirements of the area. The Japanese company has also signed a contract with the Al Jazirah Contracting and Investment Company for dredging work at the port of Manama, and is to build associated docks. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 40]

CSO: 4400/75

POPE SHANUDAH'S LIFE, VIEWS EXAMINED, DISPUTE WITH AL-SADAT NOTED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 9 Sep 81 p 12

[Article: "Head of [Coptic] Orthodox Church: Journalist and Archeologist Dismissed by al-Sadat; Conflict Within Church Over Camp David"]

[Text] In recent years, a conflict has been going on in the Egyptian [Coptic] Orthodox Church between the Sunday Schools Movement and the Sunday school graduates on the one hand and, on the other hand, the traditionalist Christian clergymen who have controlled the church from top to bottom. One of the main figures of this struggle has been Pope Shanudah III, at one time the editor of MADARIS AL-AHAD [Sunday Schools] magazine.

What is strange is that a number of Shanudah's opponents have censured him, after Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, for getting involved in supporting the Camp David policy, the open-door economy and the special relations with the United States and Israel.

Who Is Pope Shanudah?

He is 57 years old.

He graduated from the history department of the School of Arts, Cairo University, in 1945. He taught for a short period after graduation and wrote from abroad for AL-JUMHURIYAH, which was founded by the late leader Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.

He attained the rank of reserve officer in the armed forces during his studies.

He acquired a diploma in archeology from Cairo University after graduating from the history department.

He gave up teaching and enrolled in the Theology College from which the [Coptic] Orthodox clergymen graduate.

He joined the service in the Sunday schools--Anba Antonius School in Shubra, Cairo.

He then became editor of MADARIS AL-AHAD magazine. The Sunday Schools Movement reflected a trend among the educated Orthodox [Copts] to create a generation of educated clergymen instead of the semieducated traditional clergymen who have controlled the Orthodox [Coptic] Church from top to bottom.

He enrolled in the Syriac [pertaining to the Syriac Church of Antioch, not Syria] Monastery with other graduates who wanted to join the monastic order. The head of the Syriac Abbey was the only one at the time who accepted and welcomed the enrollment of educated persons in the monastery.

Shanudah was preceded to the monastery by Matta al-Maskin, a graduate of the School of Pharmacology, and by Anba Samuel, the present bishop in charge of services, who graduated from the School of Law.

A conflict erupted between the educated group and the other monks and so Pope Shanudah and his two colleagues left the Syriac Monastery for another monastery near al-Fayyum desert.

But another conflict soon erupted between Shanudah and Matta al-Maskin, and this motivated Shanudah to return to the Syriac Monastery.

Those connected with the church say that the reasons for the conflict between the two are not fully clear but that it is most likely that the conflict resulted from Shanudah's excessive inclination toward ascetism and seclusion--something that provoked Matta al-Maskin's objection.

Start of Conflict

In 1961-62, the late Patriarch Kirillus VI ordained Shanudah general bishop in charge of educational affairs in the Orthodox [Coptic] Church.

After his ordination, Shanudah engaged in extensive activity giving lectures and sermons, and this gained him strong popularity among members of the Orthodox Church.

Patriarch Kirillus VI became annoyed with Shunudah's activities and asked him to stop lecturing and to return to the monastery.

Shanudah's popularity among the Orthodox did not come to an end during his retreat in the monastery. Thousands used to go to him daily in defiance of the patriarch's decision and in support of the bishop.

After the death of former Patriach Yusab, Egyptian Church authorities asked that the elections for a new patriarch be delayed until the election bylaws were amended to prevent the Sunday Schools representatives from attaining the position of patriarch. The Ministry of Interior (under Zakariya Muhyi al-Din) responded to the demand at the time and the bylaws were amended so that balloting could be conducted, for the first time, among three candidates. The bylaws also set the candidate's age requirement in such a way as to exceed the age of

the "dangerous trio"--namely, Shanudah, Matta al-Maskin and Samuel, who belonged to the Sunday Schools Movement.

Thus, the late Kirillus VI, who had ordained Shanudah a bishop and then disagreed with him, won the position of patriarch.

After Kirillus' death, Anba Shanudah was one of the elected three (even though he did not win the largest number of votes) and won by the ballot. He was installed patriarch and after his installation he instructed that the title be changed from patriarch to pope.

Unforgivable Mistakes

Those close to Pope Shanudah censure him for his individualistic inclination, which he gained from the Sunday Schools Movement. They say that he listens to others well but does not take their opinion most of the time.

They also say that his individualism and his failure to make use of advice prompt him at times to focus on marginal and futile issues.

One of his mistakes, which the enlightened members of the church do not forgive him, is his involvement in adopting a declared political position toward issues that are the subject of dispute among Egyptians, such as the Camp David policies, the issue of the open-door economy and the special relations with the United States and Israel.

As for religious issues concerning the Christians, the enlightened censure him for his excessive strictness and his insistence on following the letter of the church's teachings without any consideration for the new conditions in Egypt and the world and for the special cases of some church members. One of these issues concerns the Christians' [Copts'] rights to get a divorce under circumstances in which it is impossible for the two sides to live together. The former patriarch had permitted this right of divorce under special circumstances. But Pope Shanudah has totally abolished this right and has not even acknowledged those special cases that had been approved by the previous patriarch.

One thing that draws attention to the individualism of Pope Shanudah, who has been a member of the Journalists Union since he was editor of MADARIS AL-AHAD magazine, is that he still lists his name as the chief editor of an ordinary and extremely modest publication consisting of several pages and called MAJALLAT AL-KARAZAH.

After a period of firm relations with President al-Sadat during which he supported al-Sadat's political positions in the wake of his visit to occupied Jerusalem, the situation has now ended up in total estrangement because of Pope Shanudah's protests over some sectarian incidents last year and because of his retreat to the monastery and his refusal to celebrate the [Christmas] holiday.

President al-Sadat has launched a violent campaign against Pope Shanudah in his speeches and statements and has accused him of attempting to set up a Christian state in Upper Egypt, with Asyut as its capital.

The main motive behind President al-Sadat's wrath is his belief that the pope's position is what prompted demonstrations hostile to him during his visit to the United States.

8494

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MUBARAK COULD SHOW INDEPENDENCE FROM SADAT BY CLOSING U.S. BASES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 243, 17 Oct 81 pp 10-11

[Article by Nabil Khuri: "Egypt: Shadow President"]

[Text] Before AL-MUSTAQBAL was published, I had gone on a tour of most of the Arab capitals. The tour involved a combination of preparations for publication of AL-MUSTAQBAL, such as opening offices, concluding contracts with reporters and correspondents and meeting some Arab officials to explain to them the idea and the dimensions involved in the publication of the first Arab magazine in exile after more than a half a century.

I had to stop in Cairo and one of the people I met there was Usamah al-Baz, then undersecretary in the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Isma'il Fahmi was the minister [of foreign affairs] at the time. Of course, there was no Camp David and no al-Sadat visit to Jerusalem then and Egypt was still with the Arabs and in the Arab battle against Israel.

After publication of AL-MUSTAQBAL in early 1977, I met with Usamah al-Baz in Paris more than once when he came to the French capital in the company of Isma'il Fahmi.

We--Fahmi, al-Baz and the writer of these lines--had more than one session and one discussion on Arab policy--developments in the situation and the Geneva conference, which was most ardently supported by Egypt and by Fahmi.

Suddenly, al-Sadat went to Jerusalem and the world turned upside down.

Isma'il Fahmi resigned and began to write for AL-MUSTAQBAL.

Usamah al-Baz disappeared.

And AL-MUSTAQBAL began its campaign against Anwar al-Sadat.

One day, the telephone in my house rang and the speaker on the other end was Usamah al-Baz. I was astonished.

I wanted to avoid a conversation because al-Baz represented to me al-Sadat's new Egypt, which I don't know and which is on its way to concluding peace with Israel. Al-Baz insisted that we meet.

He said: I am here in the company of Vice President Husni Mubarak. Why don't we meet?

I tried to decline.

He went on: Why don't we meet and you can tell his excellency the vice president frankly of the Arab opinion of what al-Sadat has done. We need those who will familiarize us with the other viewpoint.

I again declined.

He went on: Are you afraid of a confrontation, of a dialog?

I went to meet Husni Mubarak and Usamah al-Baz.

There was no dialog. There was a battle in which I stated my opinion and the Arab opinion regarding al-Sadat with all the emotions of that phase.

Husni Mubarak was no less emotional and went to the extent of accusing AL-MUSTAQBAL of being an agent of some Arab regimes.

At this point, I exploded, saying: "If you consider AL-MUSTAQBAL's opposition to al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and its rejection of Camp David 'agentry,' then what is the description that can be applied to the visit of the president of the biggest Arab state to Israel, what can we call Camp David...and what...?"

Mubarak interrupted me to say: "We have done this for the sake of the Arabs and for Palestine and time will prove this."

I said: "You have done no more than to isolate Egypt from the Arabs, to pull Egypt out of the battle and to give Israel its main dream of waging its war against the Arabs without Egypt."

He said: "You are wrong and time will prove this to you. Let the Arabs come forward with a better solution and we will march behind them."

I said: "Camp David is no solution. It is capitulation."

He again interrupted me: "You, the Arabs, don't understand Egypt's position. Naturally, you cannot and you dare not publish Egypt's complete viewpoint..."

I replied: "Please don't challenge me. I am fully prepared to publish all you say, on condition that you put it in the form of an article and that we answer it."

Mubarak said: "I am not good at writing. But why shouldn't Usamah write the article?"

And so it was.

The article was published on 25 March 1979 under the title "Egypt's View of the Situation" and I answered the article with one of my own published in the same edition under the title "AL-MUSTAQBAL's View of the Situation."

The article generated a major uproar and its publication was considered a form of daring close to madness, especially in the state of wrath and turmoil in which the Arab world was living.

The reactions came in rapid succession and could possibly have continued for a long time had it not been for the quick development of events, which proved that the "Egyptian view" inspiring al-Baz' article did not reflect reality.

Camp David ended with a "separate peace" and the Palestinian people's rights, self-rule and the Palestinian state have continued to be mere ink on paper.

What did al-Baz say in his article and what has actually happened?

Al-Baz said:

"Egypt has not relinquished any Palestinian right because neither Egypt nor others have the power to relinquish these rights and because we have no interest in adopting such a position. It is no secret that Egypt's interest and Palestine's interest are identical to a degree unparalleled in the relationship between Palestine and any other Arab country with common borders with Israel. We have a definite interest in the rise of a Palestinian state capable of confronting the Israelis culturally and economically in this area, which is directly connected with our strategic security."

Where does Egypt now stand vis-a-vis these statements and has it mentioned the "independent Palestinian state" even once?

Al-Baz also said:

"In accordance with the Camp David framework, the Palestinian self-rule government is supposed to replace the Israeli military government and the civilian administration this government controls. Legally, this means that the self-rule government will assume all the powers of the abolished government without any bargaining."

Where does this concept of "self-rule" stand vis-a-vis the concept that Israel is projecting now?

Al-Baz went on to say:

"Israel knows quite well that Egypt cannot accept a separate peace treaty with it and that this Egyptian position emanates not only from a commitment we have undertaken but also from an objective assessment of the Egyptian interest itself. Israel also knows that if it doesn't cooperate in setting up a real self-rule with broad powers, then we will have another bone to pick with it.

"Israel knows that in refusing to acknowledge the Palestinian people's right to rule themselves, it finds itself completely isolated. There isn't a single country in the world that accepts this distorted Israeli projection of self-rule. When the Americans talked [to the Israelis] on this matter, the Israelis could not say a single word in its defense. The Israelis even tried to dodge the matter and told the Americans that what had been published was no more than one of several alternatives and that Sharon, with his blind fanaticism, was the one who announced those incomplete paragraphs of the report drawn up by the committee entrusted with studying the issue. I am not citing this to show Israel's goodwill but to show that it is aware of its weak argument and of its inability to confront anybody with this argument.

"On the other hand, the United States is aware that it is better for it to broaden its understanding of the Palestinian people's issue, that the entire Arab nation is unanimous in demanding this understanding of the United States, that this nation attaches extreme importance to this understanding in its dealing with the United States and that this nation uses this understanding as a measuring stick for judging U.S. policy in the area and the sincerity of Washington's intentions. On this basis, Egypt submitted to the United States a memorandum on the Arab concept of self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza calling for the Palestinian government to enjoy full executive, legislative and judiciary powers and to control the land, water, taxes, general security, travel, movement and the various forms of economic activity. We will watch the U.S. position toward this vital issue in the coming months to see how it will put into practice the commitment President Carter undertook before the Egyptian People's Assembly to exert his utmost efforts so that the settlement will cover all aspects of the conflict."

Where do these statements stand vis-a-vis what has actually happened? Hasn't the plan of Sharon, "with his blind fanaticism," become the only plan currently projected and accepted by Israel?

Where is the U.S. position that al-Baz promised?

Al-Baz further said:

"The entire world knows, or must know, that if any Arab country is exposed to aggression by Israel or by others, Egypt will consider such an aggression an attack against it. We are not saying this out of the desire to launch slogans or out of intellectual luxury. We declare this being fully aware of all the dimensions and consequences of this declaration."

There is no need to answer this paragraph. The destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the barbaric Israeli raid against Beirut, the list of Israel's daily aggressions against southern Lebanon and Egypt's position toward all this are the only answer to this "view."

Why do I write about Usamah al-Baz?

Briefly, because Usamah al-Baz is the political mind behind Husni Mubarak. Consequently, this mind will participate in formulating Egypt's policy in Husni

Mubarak's era. Moreover, we would not be exaggerating if we said, on the basis of definite information at our disposal, that al-Baz will be the shadow president in the coming era.

We only ask Usamah al-Baz to be true to the article he wrote in AL-MUSTAQBAL more than 2 years ago and especially true to his words when he said:

"Briefly, we believe that the Arab nation is the only one capable of safeguarding the area's security and stability. Moreover, we reject the vacuum theories that have begun to emerge anew in the area in the wake of the Iranian revolution, which is undoubtedly one of the most serious developments experienced by the area. We believe that we, the Arabs, are capable of filling any vacuum in our area. Our capability will improve continually if we employ our material and spiritual resources well, especially since the signs indicate that all the countries adjacent to our area are constantly moving closer to us and are gradually ridding themselves of the residues that accumulated in the colonialist age to which we were all subjected in the second half of the last century and the first half of this century.

"It is ridiculous when some say that Egypt is seeking anew to lead the area to the age of alliances or that Egypt is performing the role of the West's policeman in the area. This is the last thing to occur to us. As Egypt confronted the Baghdad Pact and the desperate endeavors by the United States and the Western countries to turn the Arab area into a sphere of Western influence under the pretext of fighting the communist danger, we will confront any endeavor to bring back this influence under a new form and we will not accept any alliance that swerves from the circles to which we have committed ourselves, namely the Arab, African and Islamic circles and the nonalignment circle that, we believe, can play a bigger and more serious role in the coming period if they confront the challenges facing them courageously and seriously."

By the time this edition of AL-MUSTAQBAL is issued, Husni Mubarak will have become the fourth president of Egypt since the 1952 revolution. A lot has been said and will be said about Mubarak and a lot has been written and will be written about him, including such statements as: He is not responsible for al-Sadat's policy and he was merely an "executor" of that policy under the guardianship of al-Sadat.

Now that he has become the number one official, will he read what al-Baz, "his shadow," wrote on his instruction and under his supervision?

Right now, we ask Mubarak for no more than this. Let him start by abolishing the U.S. military facilities in Egypt.

8494
CSO: 4504/56

EXPANDED SYSTEM OF YOUTH CLUBS PROMOTED BY MINISTRY OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Oct 81 p 1

[Article by Marzuq Hilal and Majidah Ibrahim: "Al-Azhar Discusses Question of Correcting Faulty Concepts Among Youth"]

[Text] Today, Al-Azhar Higher Council and the Islamic Research Academy will discuss in an emergency meeting under the chairmanship of Grand Imam Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman Bisar, the shaykh of al-Azhar, the method of work in the current phase, the reply to false beliefs, refutation of faulty concepts and the confrontation to eliminate religious doubts and to correct the Islamic concepts among the youth. It has been decided to form a committee to issue a scientific religious series to present the religious issues correctly. This publication will be financed by the Islamic Research Academy.

The Ministry of Social Affairs has decided to expand the creation of social youth clubs so that they may occupy the youth's free time and familiarize them with the correct concepts that enable them to perform a positive role in development and construction activities. It has also been decided to train the leaders who will manage these clubs as of the beginning of November so that this goal can be realized.

This is stated in the resolutions issued by a plenary meeting held yesterday by Dr Amal 'Uthman, minister of social affairs, with the directors of social affairs in the seven districts of Cairo, with the officials in charge of management of the clubs and with the undersecretaries in the Ministry of Social Affairs. The meeting was also attended by His Eminence Shaykh Ahmad Hasan al-Baquri, chairman of the Muslim Youth Associations.

At the meeting, the minister said: In view of the effectiveness of the private activity in this sphere, it has been decided to entrust the management of the social clubs to some private associations. There are 26 clubs in Cairo's districts and this number will be increased in the governorates.

Symbolic Subscriptions

The minister also said: These clubs will open their doors to various youth groups, be they comprised of students, workers or farmers, in return for symbolic

subscriptions and will carry out programs compatible with youth needs, including classes to improve the students [academically] up to the university level. This is in addition to technical training for whomever wishes to get it, recreational programs, national and religious lectures and summer trips and camps.

The minister stressed that the state (subsidizes) these clubs and will provide them with all the necessary material resources. As of the beginning of November, the ministry will conduct training courses for the leader who will manage these clubs so that the clubs can realize the desired goal of raising a good generation capable of realizing the people's aspirations for development and prosperity.

8494
CSO: 4504/56

BRIEFS

POPULAR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS--Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, chairman of the Democratic National Party's Popular Development Committee, has stated that the popular development projects will experience a new upsurge in the coming phase so as to serve Egypt's prosperity in the light of President Husni Mubarak's instructions. 'Uthman has also said that the system of work will focus on compressing the time needed to build the production projects so that such projects can enter the production phase in the shortest time possible. The work plan will also focus on overcoming all the difficulties that face development. At his meeting with the party's popular development sector yesterday, 'Uthman said that emphasis will be placed on the "productive village project." This type of project calls for establishing central firms in Cairo with branches in the provinces to transform the village from a consuming to a productive entity. 'Uthman also said that 5,000 feddans of reclaimed land west of al-Nubariyah will be distributed to graduates [of agriculture schools] before the end of this year at the rate of 10 feddans per graduate. It has also been decided to use the system of collective farms and to employ modern irrigation systems to increase the production of vegetables, fruits and various kinds of cotton. [Text] [Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 19 Oct 81 p 8] 8494

DISCIPLINE IN TAX AGENCY--Report by Fu'ad Fawwaz--It has been decided to watch the arrival and departure of the Tax Agency workers so that they work from 0815 to 1615 to clear delayed files and backlog and to facilitate matters for the taxpayers. The General Directorate of Administrative Guidance is making daily inspections to monitor the presence of workers during work hours. This has been stated by an official of the Tax Agency who has said that these measures come as part of the steps to establish discipline and to prevent laxity. The official added that it has been decided to streamline spending in the bureaucratic departments. The agency will receive at the beginning of next January the new tax [agency] building, which has 208 rooms and can accommodate nearly 1,000 workers. The agency workers have also been trained to use the electronic computer, which will go into operation next January. [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 21 Oct 81 p 6] 8494

INCREASE IN SAVINGS--An increase of 3.54 billion pounds has been realized in total savings as a result of increased interest rates for saving deposits in the preceding period. The savings accumulated by the banking system, represented in on-demand and set-term deposits, rose from 1,512,000,000 pounds in 1977 to

5,052,000,000 pounds at the end of June 1981. The deputy prime minister for economic and financial affairs has stated that the gross national product for 1980-81 amounts to 14.4 billion pounds compared to 13.2 billions in 1979-80, that is, an increase of 1.2 billion pounds or nearly 9.1 percent. The commodity sectors have contributed nearly 604 million pounds, the service and production sectors nearly 346 million pounds and the social and civil service sectors nearly 263 million pounds to this increase. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 18 Oct 81 p 9] 8494

CSO: 4504/56

NOWBARI CALLS FOR 'DEMOCRATIC PLURALISM' AFTER KHOMEYNI

Vienna ARBEITER ZEITUNG in German No 259, 9 Nov 81 p 3

[Interview with Ali Reza Nowbari, former president of the Central Bank, by Editor Peter Palinka; time and place not given]

[Text] "The present regime in Iran gives open signs of fascist character in several respects." This was the way the most important associate of the exiled Iranian president Bani-Sadr, the former head of the Iranian National Bank, Ali Reza Nowbari, characterized political conditions in his homeland, which he left after having spent several weeks underground. Nowbari, who like Bani-Sadr, intends to live in exile in France, says of Iran's future, "Khomeyni has at most 15 percent of the population behind him; his rule will collapse for economic and political reasons within a relatively short time." Nowbari, in the conversation with AZ editor Peter Palinka in Frankfurt, was appealing for a broad unity of all opposition groups, with the exception of those who would not accept the justification of the revolution against the Shah, such as the former minister-president Bakhtiar. "The army, together with the masses, will create pluralism."

AZ: Mr. Nowbari, would you describe for us your previous political development in Iran?

Nowbari: Since the beginning of the 1970's, I had been working closely with Mr. Bani-Sadr. When the revolution against the Shah succeeded in 1979, I returned from the U.S.--among other things I had been studying at Stanford. Together with a number of friends, I started the newspaper ISLAMIC REVOLUTION; I was the publisher. We had no experience in journalism, we only felt ourselves bound by the ideas of freedom of the press and of opinion. On 15 November 1979, 1 day after Mr. Carter froze our assets, I was appointed president of the Central Bank of Iran. I held this position for 19 months, probably one of the longest tenures of office in the history of the Islamic Republic. On the same day that command of the army was taken away from Mr. Bani-Sadr, I went underground. For 17 days, the revolutionary guards surrounded the Central Bank; but my own guards succeeded in holding them off for those 17 days.

AZ: How do you see the present political situation in Iran?

Nowbari: I think it a shame that the great hopes and expectations for our republic have been so let down. We began as a progressive movement in the Middle

East and in the world and now we have a regime, which in several respects shows openly fascist traits. We still believe today that our revolution was inspired by the humanitarian traditions of Islam and the whole world and we wanted to show this world the spirituality that was missing in the 20th century. We wanted to provide new answers for the problems of mankind, especially of young people. These hopes have been shattered, our people now feel only bitterness, impotence, or hate.

AZ: Bani-Sadr as well as yourself are still religious elements of the movement just as are the present rulers. What led to this split in the religious movement?

Nowbari: There is a proverb, "Even the devil can have his version of God." It is true that we were all under the banner of Khomeyni before the revolution: Bani-Sadr, Beheshti, most of the intellectuals, many Marxists. That does not mean that we had no differences of opinion, which then surfaced after the revolution against the Shah. We suppressed these differences because our striving for freedom and independence was even greater and more important. All that changed, as did the feeling among the people: in the beginning, when we held the referendum for the Islamic Republic, Khomeyni had more than 90 percent of the people behind him; now it would probably be around 15 percent.

AZ: Then why is he still in power?

Nowbari: There are many dictators who no longer have any support and who still remain in power: the way in which they came to power varies: Khomeyni had almost the entire people behind him; Hitler had fewer though still a mass movement; the Shah never had more than 10 percent. Khomeyni maintains himself like the dictators today in Chile or Argentina: there are massive arrests and executions. You demonstrate and you are arrested; you watch a demonstration and you are arrested; mothers are praised when they denounce their children and vice-versa. There are slogans that urge denouncing anyone who thinks against the regime. This I call fascism.

AZ: How much longer will this system survive?

Nowbari: I don't think for much longer. I don't want to name a date that won't come to pass. But Khomeyni is increasingly losing everything: the intellectuals are already lost, opposition is growing among the clergy--six out of eight of the great ayatollahs are already against him--in the army he has practically no following.

AZ: Then why doesn't the army intervene?

Nowbari: Because it is not in Teheran but tied up in the war with Iraq. This is an absolutely stupid war between two naked men who are fighting for a scrap of clothing. The war continues to go on because it is to the advantage of two dictators, Saddam Hussein and Khomeyni.

AZ: What prospects do you see for the opposition?

Nowbari: It has to be known that we have no tradition of organized groups or parties in Iran. Khomeyni was victorious because he had access to the masses; and that is how we must do it also. We, that is the strongest group, the Mojaheddin or National Front. Our vision is the creation of a democratic pluralism and economic planning that will make investments possible. At the moment nothing is happening economically, private parties are hoarding and not investing, and the state administration is incapable of planning.

AZ: Does this include alliance with supporters of the Shah?

Nowbari: Absolutely not. The royalists, because of their crimes, have no following, not even in the army. There are many jokes today comparing the Shah with Khomeyni, there are also people who say that Khomeyni is worse than the Shah, but no one yearns for the return of the monarchy. We also exclude--in contrast to General Madani--the last minister-president under the Shah, Bakhtiar, from this alliance, who is working against us now in Paris. Anyhow, we must succeed in winning soon and in restoring democratic pluralism. Otherwise, the disappointed masses will turn to a new strong man.

9878
CSO: 4620/8

TEENAGERS COMMEMORATE 'BASSIJ' FOUNDING

NC300938 Paris AFP in English 0919 GMT 30 Nov 81

[Text] Tehran, 30 Nov (AFP)--There are noisy week-long celebrations throughout the country to commemorate the second anniversary of the founding of the "Bassij"--literally "mobilisation of the disinherited"--composed of teenagers watching for "plots by Americans and hypocrites."

The average age is between 16-18, but some of them are not even 14 years old. Over the past few days they have been parading in their thousands in the capital and other Iranian towns. Most do not wear uniforms, but some of the older ones wear the green camouflage combat kit of the "Pasdarans" revolutionary guards.

Many marching down the Enghelab (Revolution) Avenue proudly shoulder rifles with flowers in the barrels while others handled their weapons awkwardly.

The "Bassij" guard mosques and go on patrols at night, ready to warn their "brothers" if they see any suspicious activities. If one of them gives really fine service, he is rewarded by being allowed to go to one of the war fronts against Iraq, and when he is older to join the Pasdarans or the revolutionary committees.

The Bassij is profoundly nationalistic and militaristic, with martyrdom a proclaimed ideal. Members look on internal and external enemies as all being linked in the same anti-Tehran plot.

Ali Akhbar, a worker, told the daily newspaper KEYHAN: "I demand that our leaders allow us to exterminate the hypocrites to their very roots."

Another "Bassij," Akbar Mohammadi, told KEYHAN: "I will fight to the bitter end until the banner 'There is no God but allah' flies over the entire world."

Iranian newspapers fulsomely praise the Bassij with such phrases as "these young men use their chaste bodies as shields against bullets from East or West."

Iranian leaders like Hojjat ol-Eslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, the speaker of Parliament are enthusiastic over the teenagers who "day and night defend the poor people, without expecting payment or glory."

Hojjat ol-Eslam Salek, the head of the Bassij, recently recalled how the movement was founded on 26 November 1979 by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni when he "mobilised an army of 20 million" against the "huge CIA (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) fleet steaming towards the Gulf."

The authorities have published details about the "Bassij" showing that two million teenagers have been given some kind of military training: there are "bases" in 3,000 mosques, including 500 in Tehran; 21,000 members have been sent to the warfront.

Members are recruited in schools and factories and they are given political training. Even young women are taught how to fire guns.

CSO: 4600/139

COMMENTARY REPLIES TO KHAMENE'I'S ACCUSATIONS

NC261400 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 25 Nov 81

[Station commentary]

[Text] Compatriots! Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, president of Khomeyni's so-called republic, thinks that he has replied to the Free Voice of Iran. He has said that this radio speaks of the situation in Iran as if only a few more days are left before the downfall of the Islamic Republic and that by badly describing the situation it intends to deprive the people of their hopes for the future, to do away with the people's trust in the government in a bid to leave the government to itself. He then added that "naturally without the help of the nation, the government cannot do anything important but our domestic situation--despite the existence of hundreds of difficulties--is not as bad as they say. We do have many difficulties and it is a sin to tell the people that we do not have any difficulties. But having difficulties does not mean that there is no cure for the illness. Difficulty is like an illness. A wise and proficient doctor can heal this illness and this needs patience and time. We have difficulties--in the economy, security and the war as well as the fact that production units have stopped working, refineries are idle and so on and so forth. But we will overcome these difficulties as we overcame the difficulty of the monarchy and of U.S. domination. If the nation does not lose faith in God and the "leadership," all these difficulties can be overcome. But if the government and nation do not act in unison, then these difficulties will not be solved and smaller difficulties than these will not be solved either."

Compatriots! With these contradictory remarks and with all these "ifs" and "buts," although Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i did not confirm our judgement on the fate of Khomeyni's regime, he did not refute it. He cannot tell millions of unemployed people that "we have created jobs for everyone." He is compelled to place this alongside the hundreds of difficulties that the regime is facing. Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i cannot tell the people, who can see for themselves how much the country's industrial and agricultural production has fallen, that "no disorder can be seen in our agricultural and industrial affairs." In this case too he is compelled to list this among the difficulties. Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i cannot tell the war refugees that "nothing has happened and no incident has been the cause for you to leave your home and livelihood," he very simply places the lack of order and welfare of more than 1.5 million people among the hundreds of difficulties. He cannot tell the residents of cities, villages and tribes that there

is no sign of disturbance and that complete security rules everywhere. What he can say is that "the lack of security is also among the problems that we are thinking of uprooting." Just as the budget--the larger part of which is a deficit and without sources to compensate for this deficit--the oil production for which no step has been taken to increase it and which has not surpassed producing the 1-million-barrel per day for more than 2 years now and, finally, institutions and organizations of which all the wheels are stuck in the mud and unable to make a step forward, for the regime's president, all these are difficulties of the same kind for which remedies from a proficient doctor should be found. But the essence of the matter is that by mentioning the proficient doctor or doctors perfunctorily and by using ambiguous words, Khamene'i thinks that he can convince the people, but they know that the regime's Achilles' heel is the lack of men--efficient men.

Actually, the cause of the regime's problems is that it had men for destroying, but no one for construction. It is because of this lack of men that Khomeyni's anti-national regime has so far been unable to do a damn thing and will be unable to move or solve any problems in the future.

Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i has not denied any of the difficulties about which we have spoken on the Free Voice of Iran so far. He accepts all that we say. He also confirms the existence of the same difficulties, and, if there are differences in the assessments made by the Free Voice of Iran with the assessments made by Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, it is in that by using a few "ifs" and "buts" he claims that the destructive regime will solve these difficulties, and we say that if ifs and ands were pots and pans there would be no use for tinkers.

Yes, if there were proficient doctors; if the nation shows coordination with Khomeyni's Islamic Republic; if the atmosphere is created for jobs and Iran's reconstruction; if the political and social situations in the area help; if the country's purse is not empty and the government is given sufficient money, all these problems can be solved. But all these ifs in themselves constitute a big problem.

When Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i speaks of having solved the problem of monarchy and U.S. domination, he either knows and does not consider it convenient to say that he knows, or he does not know and does not understand that what was done was destruction, not construction. And even in this destruction all that which Khomeyni has done have been illusive. All that which was done was illusive and not deep and profound. As the great danger hovering above Khomeyni's Islamic Republic is the same danger that one day hit the great French revolution and brought out a Napoleon Bonaparte from the heart of the revolution and placed on the emperor's throne and shattered the dreams and illusions of all those who, for more than 5 years, had done nothing but destroying and killing. Of course there are thousands of differences between the sedition brought by Khomeyni and the great French revolution, but there is one common point between these two--massacres and destruction.

The fact that we say that Khomeyni's self-made regime has reached an impasse and can neither go forward nor backward and its only fate is downfall it is because we know that the regime has many mullahs, many narrators, many murderers, it has many Khamene'is, Rafsanjanis and Khalkhalis. But it does not have a

doctor, or better said, doctors proficient in politics. And with the tools the functions of which were destruction a country cannot be constructed and, as Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i said, hundreds of problems be solved. If for almost 3 years any one of the regime's officials could have performed this miracle he would have done so so far and not say--and that after 3 years--that "people be hopeful because we will solve these difficulties in the future."

Khomeyni's self-made republic is doomed to fall and if, for example, it keeps the Iranian nation busy for a few more days with a bunch of empty words, sooner or later it will not be able to escape its definite fate and with (?wishful thinking) the mullahs cannot keep this paper image propped up, oh compatriots!

CSO: 4640/71

CLANDESTINE ON 'IRANIAN NATIONALISTS' STRUGGLES

NC021712 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 2 Dec 81

[Text] Our compatriots' national struggles aimed at overthrowing Khomeyni's antinational regime continue on a vast scale. Despite the regime's efforts to attract the public opinion in Iran to the war and to condemn national struggles among commotions of the war, patriots believing in Iran's unity, independence, history and freedom continue to destroy the regime's internal bases and kill elements of the mullahs' dictatorship. We inform our dear compatriots and listeners of the Free Voice of Iran of a number of short reports as an example of part of these national struggles.

Antiregime patriots killed eight of the regime's Revolution Guards in Isfahan and blew up a car belonging to the guards. A Free Voice of Iran correspondent reports that opponents of the regime killed the guards while they were being followed by the guards. In this incident in Isfahan 12 Revolution Guards were wounded. They are now in the hospital, and three of them are in very critical condition. The three wounded Revolution Guards have undergone a number of operations so far, but the doctors treating them express dissatisfaction on the effect of the operations and treatment. Our correspondent reports that one of the Revolution Guards who died on his way to the hospital, Morteza Tajik, led the group in charge of the killing of the regime's opponents in Isfahan. Following the killing of this group [presumably the Revolution Guards], the regime issued orders on the execution of 20 political prisoners in Isfahan.

Another report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent indicates that in an attack by a group of Revolution Guards against a communal house of patriotic forces opposing the regime on Saba Avenue, East Tehran, two of the Revolution Guards were killed and three of them were wounded.

CSO: 4640/72

RADIO SCORES MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ

NC021650 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 1 Dec 81

[Unattributed talk]

[Text] Dear compatriots! In our talk today we will study the confessions made by two of the leaders of the Islamic Republic. One of these two is the master of the other in hypocrisy and deceit. His name is renowned all over the world and is Khomeyni. The second person, even though a student of the first, sets one step further than his master in hypocrisy. His name is Hashemi-Rafsanjani.

Recently, Khomeyni has been making some confessions that will undoubtedly form a major part of the regrettable history of the adverse republic--confessions that apparently lighten the burden of his endless crimes and which grant him some calm in these last days of his bloody and treacherous life.

Among Khomeyni's confessions were those concerning the dark incidents of the winter of about 3 years ago, in February 1978, when treacherous and plundering groups--groups whose mission was to destroy--in addition to setting fire to the wealth of the nation, attacked the garrisons and plundered the big and small arms of the Iranian Army. These are the same groups which fired at any conscientious officer or civilian, did all that should not have been done, the most important part of treacherous missions and those acts which led to the disintegration of the armed forces and the country's security organs, placed the destiny of Iran and of the Iranians in the hands of a bunch of hooligans and, by weakening one of the world's strongest armies, brought in the foreign aggressors who exploited the weakness of the country's leadership and aggressed against our country in a bid to confront idiotic plans.

Khomeyni's last confession bothers the conscience of all the Iranians and pours oil on the fire of rage and hatred. After almost 3 years of secrecy, Khomeyni finally confesses that at the very beginning of this cursed and wretched revolution, in February 1978, the Mojahedin-e Khalq plundered the military garrisons and, in addition to confiscating the arms of the armed forces--the belongings of the Iranian nation--they started arresting and assassinating the military personnel.

Even though something has been omitted in Khomeyni's confessions and no reference has been made to the plunderings and pillagings by the then revolutionary holligans and the present bullying hezbollahis, nevertheless one point is worthy of

reflection more than the other points. Why and how did Mr Khomeyni wait for 3 whole years and keep this secret from the Iranian nation and unveiled all this when he rose in a war with the Mojahedin? Of course, there is no doubt in the fact that many alert people were aware of how a small organization like the Mojahedin-e Khalq suddenly came to own a great quantity of various types of modern arms and formed a terrorist army and set up a training camp. But the main point is: Why did Khomeyni and other leaders, even though they were aware of this treason, stay silent and are today using this as a weapon against their rival the Mojahedin organization? Had the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization, as during the disturbances of the summer, fall and winter of 1978, remained connected to Khomeyni and shared in ruling as the rest of Khomeyni's pets, would Khomeyni have confessed what he did and unveiled the truth? There is no doubt that he wouldn't have done so, in the same way that he knows many other bitter truths and about satanic plans and Iran-destroying plots of 3 years ago and does not speak. Khomeyni makes no mention of his relations and about the relations between his bearded and beardless associates with foreigners and envoys of colonialist powers. However, there is no doubt that history knows all the details of this treason by heart and the Iranian nation will come to know of these sooner or later.

In today's talk we will discuss another confession made by a fox-faced mullah like Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In his meeting with members of the Central Committee of the so-called reconstruction crusade, Mullah Hashemi-Rafsanjani said that the reopening of the universities will create great difficulties for the regime. Therefore, the members of this antipeople institution should prepare themselves to confront any problem in relation with this.

Mullah Rafsanjani, whose impudence has surpassed the limits of shamelessness, calls an antipeople and repressive institution like the destruction crusade the dearest institution of the Islamic Republic and says that they should be supported as much as possible.

Actually, like the other mullahs of the regime who always express flagrant support for the knife-wielders and plundering hezbollahis, Hashemi-Rafsanjani advises members of the destruction crusade to prepare themselves to continue rendering their services to the bloodthirsty imam and his criminal mullahs if the universities are reopened. In these remarks by Hashemi-Rafsanjani there lies another confession and that is that if the universities are reopened the regime will truly face a great problem. This is of course true because this time Iran's zealous and alert youths will turn the university into impenetrable position. This time the university will be the manifester of the loftiest feelings of Iran's youths and this time Iran's youths will not be deceived by any of the claimants of the so-called Islamic regime. By uprooting this cursed regime they will put a more cursed regime like the Democratic Islamic Republic in the hands of its harbingers and, like today, the holy anthem of "Long live Iran" will ring throughout our homeland.

CSO: 4640/71

CLANDESTINE CALLS FOR REFUGE TO REPENTING GUARDS

NC281835 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 28 Nov 81

[Text] Armed combatants in our country who have resumed the killing of the fascist mullahs at the request of the Iranian nation, continue their attempts to assassinate mullahs and the regime's officials. Reports from a reliable source in Tehran state that a group of fugitive Revolution Guards have joined antiregime groups, bringing with them their arms and ammunition. Latest reports indicate that several fugitive Revolution Guards had assisted armed combatants in the revolutionary execution of Mullah Shari'ati-Fard and his two bodyguards.

An informed source told a Free Voice of Iran correspondent in Tehran that the existing differences within the Revolution Guards Corps stem from the fact that after having gained full acquaintance with the mullahs and with the antinational ideals of the so-called Islamic regime, many of the Revolution Guards are no longer prepared to serve such a regime and to be the means used in killing their compatriots. In many cases too, some Revolution Guards have shown brave resistance against the mullahs, and this is the reason why these Revolution Guards have been sentenced to imprisonment by the mullahs.

Ending this report, we, in the name of the Free Voice of Iran, ask our compatriots to grant refuge to fugitive Revolution Guards if their request is trusted and to welcome Revolution Guards who join the people. The Free Voice of Iran also advises those Revolution Guards who were previously deceived by Khomeyni's disgraceful regime and who now regret this to leave their jobs and to fearlessly join the ranks of the armed combatants in any antiregime group, especially opposition groups with nationalist feelings and belief in Iran's history and traditions. The arms of national groups that believe in the history and oneness of the Aryan race are open to these brothers who want to compensate their past sins against the Iranian nation.

CSO: 4640/72

REGIME REPORTED USING FAHD PLAN TO DECEIVE PEOPLE

GF261745 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 26 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots, as you have heard and read, the propaganda machine of Khomeyni's regime these days is using the Saudi Arabian proposal for solving the Arab-Israeli dispute as an excuse for another propaganda campaign. This is being done in order to divert people's thoughts from fundamental problems for a few more days. This is why last week another street show was arranged as a so-called battle against imperialism. This is not the first time that the play of death [of] the United States has been produced by the authorities of the reign of terror in Tehran and other cities.

However, if there were some who believed if during the first months of the mullahs' rule that participating in such plays was truly a battle against imperialism--when the secret collusion of the Tehran regime with all imperialists was revealed and when it became clear to anyone with the slightest amount of intelligence that such man-made plays are only enacted when the mullahs have reached the bottom of the pot--hardly anyone has shown the desire to participate in one. For ordinary people in the streets, who are not used to political analysis, who have to stand in line for a few liters of heating oil, put up with meat and sugar rationing--forced on them by the government that allegedly is a defender of the oppressed--and put up with shortages of essential goods, the question arises: Why should they listen to the meaningless words of the ruling mullahs and worry about other nations?

The mullahs are sitting in warm cozy houses and in the manner of masters and feudalists have their meat, oil, rice, chicken and heating oil delivered every week to their houses by their servants and gunslingers. For the ordinary people, who for a time followed the mullahs of the Islamic Republic purely out of their religious beliefs and who had considered this deceptive lot their religious leaders, the simple question is posed: Why is it that the mullahs and prayer leaders have shouted about the defense of the oppressed nations and cry for the oppressed people yet have not taken one step to help the oppressed classes--on the basis of their own confession--in the past 3 years of their rule? They have actually strengthened their bonds of slavery, clamped their mouths and put a spy or professional killer in charge of each and every one of them so that if they make

one gesture of dissent in their bread of heating oil lines they will either be executed on the spot as enemies of the deputy of Mahdi or as infidels or as wagers of war against God or taken to one of the countless dungeons.

Regardless of all the slogans, chants and plays set up in Jamaran, at the former Tehran University and on Tehran streets, the ordinary people only ask each other where in the world is life like this? There were no such things during the monarchy. The Islam that Khomeyni has brought has nothing in common with our Islam and that of our forefathers. The same people sigh and tell each other: It is what we deserve. We revolted for just such a thing.

We, however, say no. You innocent people, you oppressed masses of the Iranian people, this is not what you deserve. You are experiencing very bitter but important times. What you have suffered in these past 3 years is all a great lesson to you and your children not to be deceived by promises of others. Until you have learned about someone you should not become his follower. Do not allow the mullahs to give you empty slogans in the place of bread and water. Do not allow them to destroy your country in the guise of a battle against imperialism. [Do not allow them to] destroy the country's economy, its talent and its natural resources in such a manner that will enable the same imperialists who are waiting like vultures to devour the nearly dead body of your homeland.

If you do not want to witness the complete destruction of the motherland and furhter misery for yourselves and your children, you must move. You must topple the deceitful and criminal regime of Khomeyni. Iranians, you who reside by the Persian Gulf, you brave Kurdish and Azarbayjani fighters, you Baluchi, Turkmen, Khuzestani and Khorasani warriors, you Persians, Mazandaranis and Gilanis, you have nothing to lose in this battle to free (?yourselves) from the claws of these satans ruling Iran--these road rollers of imperialism and colonialism--but the bonds of slavery.

CSO: 4640/72

OVERVIEW OF AZERBAYJANI ENGINEERING PROJECTS GIVEN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] By implementing the plan to utilize river water along the Iran-Turkey border putting into operation the Khoda-Afarin Dam, 105,000 hectares of barren land will be cultivated and 140 megawatts of electrical power will be produced by the dam.

During a press conference, Engineer Milani, managing director of the Azerbayjan Regional Water Organization, while making this announcement, elaborated on the post-revolution activities of this organization: "The Azerbayjan Regional Water Organization since the revolution in order to attain technical self-sufficiency and free itself from foreign and domestic consulting engineers, by attracting pious, committed and expert forces, has been able to undertake 12 major and 200 minor projects like dam construction, water distribution and sewage, drainage, digging of deep and semi-deep wells and canals, irrigation, dredging and canalization; river flood control as well as the repair of these facilities. And a number of these projects have gone into operation."

During the press conference, the managing director of the Azerbayjan Regional Water Organization disclosed the following concerning the most important projects undertaken by the organization:

"The project to utilize the river water along the Iran-Turkey border through which 65,000 hectares of regional land will be brought under cultivation in five fields. The construction project for the Khoda-Afarin Dam in Moghan is also one of the country's important and major projects. This dam is to be built across the Arax River along the Iran-Soviet border through cooperation between the two countries. Upon completion of this project, 40,000 hectares of secondary terrace land in the region will be brought under cultivation and the dam will produce 140 megawatts of electric power."

He added: "The survey work for the project has been completed and its actual implementation will soon begin. More than 2,000 of the country's unemployed will be hired for this work.

"Among the Azerbayjan Regional Water Organization's other projects are the Shut hydroelectric plant in Moghan; the construction of the Qanbar Dam in Azarshahr; the multi-purpose project for the Sufichay River in Maragheh; dam construction in Urumiyeh and Salmas; land drainage in Moghan; and an irrigation project for 79 cities and villages; a sewage project for Tabriz; and providing water to the 800-megwatt thermal power station in Tabriz."

He went on to say: Furthermore, during the period since the revolution, the Azerbayjan Regional Water Organization has succeeded in digging and putting into operation 131,565 deep and semi-deep wells plus 1,887 canals in the region. Among the organization's other activities during this period, 6,150 branch-lines have been put in and 325 kilometers of dredging, canals and drainage completed in the border areas of Moghan; irrigation has been provided to 60,000 hectares of arable land; the completion and operation of pumping stations in districts 3 and 7 that generate 102 million watt-hours of power from the Arax Dam; and the first steps in the construction of factories to manufacture sewer and chlorine piping."

CSO: 4640/74

BRIEFS

MERCHANTS, BAZAARIS ARRESTED--Our correspondent has reported that several prominent merchants and Tehran bazaaris have been arrested on charges of not being ready to invest. Some days ago Khomeyni's prime minister, Musavi-Khamene'i, had requested that the Iranian merchants resume their commercial and trade activities, assuring them that the Islamic regime's clergymen will no longer confiscate their capital and wealth. It was said in Tehran's commercial circles that the regime intends to confiscate the wealth of the arrested merchants on grounds of paralyzing the country's economy. [Text] [NC251638 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 25 Nov 81]

TUDEH PARTY, GUARD CORPS--Sheykh Mahallati, Ruhollah Khomeyni's representative in the Revolution Guards Corps, has told the PARS News Agency that opponents of the regime have infiltrated into the Revolution Guards Corps. He said that these people are members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization who want to incite the Revolution Guards against the regime. Some days ago Musavi-Tabrizi had said that agents of the Tudeh Party had infiltrated into the Revolution Guards Corps and other Islamic organs. Political observers in Tehran state that the changing of the Tudeh Party members to the Mojahedin by Sheykh Mahallati came after threats by the Tudeh Party. According to these observers, the Tudeh Party has told Ruhollah Khomeyni that iff such reports are published on the Tudeh Party members, the party will stop assisting the Islamic Republic. [Text] [NC261545 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 26 Nov 81]

ANTIREGIME UNION--Our correspondent in Tehran has reported that a newly formed Civil Servants Union has issued a statement calling on all Iranian patriots to unite and prepare to remove the clerical regime. In this statement, the organizers of the Civil Servants Union have not been named. In its statement, the newly formed Civil Servants Union warns various groups to regain their homeland's territory and national identity first and then carry out ideological struggles. Several other groups and organizations have also issued statements calling on opponents of the regime to unite their ranks to overthrow the clerical regime. [Text] [NC261724 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 26 Nov 81]

MUSAVI'S VISIT TO BALUCHESTAN--According to the Voice of Iran correspondent, clashes between Baluch combatants and Khomeyni's guards continue in Sistan Baluchestan Province. Following the increased unrest in this part of our country, Hoseyn Musavi-Khamene'i, the prime minister of the mullahs' regime, accompanied

by Banki, the regime's minister of state in charge of plan and budget organizations, unexpectedly arrived in Zahedan on Friday to deliver speeches in order to reduce the opposition of the Baluch people against the ruling regime and encourage their agents to continue their cooperation with the regime. Our correspondent adds: During the past week, sporadic clashes have taken place between the courageous combatants of the Baluch Unity Organization and Khomeyni's guards in various parts of Baluchestan. As a result a large number of Khomeyni's mercenaries were killed. According to the latest reports from Baluchestan, the freedom fighters' struggle against the treacherous antinationalists continues. Baluch combatants are recording new victories against Khomeyni's guards every day. [Text] [GF291010 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 29 Nov 81]

OPPOSITION COALESCING--A report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent indicates that the topic of forming a united force of opponents of the regime abroad was once again (?brought up) during the past week and noteworthy steps were taken to this effect. Information gained by the Free Voice of Iran correspondent states that Dr 'Ali Amini, in the role of coordinator toward this end, scored successes and, during various meetings, was able to create a rapprochement in the views of some of the opponents. It is said that efforts toward a coalition between members (?disagreeing) on national resistance against Khomeyni may reach results. This coalition is to take form as a council and not as a government-in-exile. Our correspondent has also reported that after his talks with leaders of fronts opposing the Tehran regime and toward national unity, Dr 'Ali Amini has apparently left Paris for a rest. Observers acquainted with matters pertaining to the national opposition abroad consider this trip of rest to be part of Dr 'Ali Amini's efforts toward a coalition of opponents of Khomeyni's regime, especially since this trip will be to the United States of America. [Text] [NC021701 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 2 Dec 81]

NOWBARI'S ANTIREGIME ACTIVITIES--Our correspondent has reported that former governor of the Central Bank of Iran, 'Alireza Nowbari, has started extensive activities in opposition to the clerical regime. He has contacted economic organizations and individuals in Europe who probably have economic relations with Khomeyni's regime and has submitted information and statistics to them that show the financial bankruptcy of the clerical regime. By doing so 'Alireza Nowbari wants to prevent the regime's trade associates abroad from continuing this cooperation with the clerical regime. [Text] [NC021715 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 2 Dec 81]

AMBASSADOR TO SAHARA APPOINTED--Algiers, 1 Dec (PARS News Agency)--The credentials of Mohammad Mehdi Karani, appointed as Iran's ambassador to the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic have been accepted by the Sahrawi Foreign Ministry. The Sahrawi Ministry added that the expansion in relations between these two countries would further stabilize the anti-imperialist campaign. Mohammad Mehdi Karani is also the ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Algiers. [Text] [LD020156 Tehran PARS in English 1754 GMT 1 Dec 81]

CSO: 4600/139

FIXED LINK ACROSS GIBRALTAR STRAIT DISCUSSED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 12 Oct 81 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Mohamed Kabbaj, head of the mission to the Royal [Spanish Government and chief of the project to build a fixed link across the Straits of Gibraltar, by Nassiri Mustafa, date and place not given]

> [Text] Yesterday, an idea which has long been an intriguiing fantasy became a reality: A reality in the form of the royal meeting between his majesty King Hassan II and his majesty King Juan Carlos, who immediately decided to begin working toward the realization of that grandiose project, the fixed link between Europe and Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar.
>
> It will be recalled that the first steps toward actualization of the project were the establishment of the Joint Hispano-Moroccan Commission, from which emerged two research firms, the Moroccan one being the National Straits Research Company (SNED).
>
> It will also be recalled that his majesty the King, who attaches special importance to this project, named Mr Mohamed Kabbaj to personally watch over the implementation of the project.
>
> In the following interview which he gave to L'OPINION, Mr Kabbaj discusses the unfolding of the various phases of the project and emphasizes the many benefits our country cannot fail to realize from the fixed link, once it is built.

[Question] Doubtless the proposed fixed link across the Straits of Gibraltar will mean a revolution in technology and communications. Would you tell us, Mr Kabbaj, how the idea was born?

[Answer] The history of this project deserves full explanation. I will confine myself to saying that the idea was born in the minds of great engineers who dreamed of great projects. After the opening of the Suez and then Panama Canals, many engineers gave thought to proposals to build a link across La Mancha and Gibraltar.

Ideas along this line go back to the end of the 19th Century, around 1860. From that time on, the idea haunted the minds of the great engineers, especially Spanish engineers during the occupation of northern Morocco.

After the Rifa war, the idea had a great deal of appeal, for strategic and economic reasons.

Other countries were also interested, especially France during the years of the occupation of Algeria. After the discovery of natural gas in Algeria, France thought about transporting the gas by means of a system of pipelines across the Straits of Gibraltar. So several projects relating to the Straits and a Spain-Morocco link were born.

But the idea did not really come to life until after the royal meeting between his majesty King Hassan II and his majesty King Juan Carlos in June 1978. That meeting really got the project started, since the two heads of state decided that Spain and Morocco would cooperate to build this great construction.

This is the basic history and the broad lines of the idea of a link across the Straits of Gibraltar.

[Question] From time to time, we hear talk of missions or projects related to research--already begun--preparing for the construction of the link. Can you tell us about them?

[Answer] We began be defining the first task completed after the royal decision: We proceeded to establish a joint commission set up following the signing of an agreement between the Moroccan and Spanish Governments. This joint commission itself created two research companies--including the National Straits Research Company (SNED).

His majesty the King named his royal highness Prince Moulay Hassan Bel Mehdi to head that company.

The first task of the joint commission was to establish a rational series of studies concerning the scope of the project, the advanced technology in every domain that would be needed. To this end, the commission contacted many experts.

Three main phases were established for the unfolding of the program.

(1) Preliminary Phase.
(2) Pre-feasibility Phase.
(3) Feasibility Phase.

The preliminary phase, which has begun, itself includes two sub-phases: That of general studies or diagnosis, which has been under way since the beginning of the year and which will conclude within the next few months.

This is a very important stage, in which several Moroccan and foreign experts are taking part in the research. It is going to pull together what is known about the straits as well as the main conclusions that can be drawn from that data. The studies will cover such areas as:

- Physical data: Geology, oceanography, etc.
- Different types of feasible constructions and their design.
- A monograph on the economics.
- Legal aspects.

With these studies, we will have taken an important step and be moving forward to the next stage in accomplishment of our task.

For the preparation of this assessment, we have carried out a number of exploratory operations and physical surveys, organized technical symposia to get the advice of internationally known experts. We are going to begin a second phase, which is the stage of the preliminary study per se, which will begin upon completion of the diagnostic study (early 1982-summer 1982).

That study is going to complete the preliminary phase, which should have two primary results:

- A decision on the general concept of the link (construction).
- The approximate cost of the type of link chosen and its economic and general utility.

Then we will embark on what are called detailed studies.

[Question] This is an enormous project, which mupt overcome both technological and legal problems, among others. Can you tell us about the most serious ones?

[Answer] The problems in every branch of this project are many and complex. In every domain it touches, this project is a world "first." For example, in terms of the very great depth of the waters in the Straits, the concept of building something in those depths, the whole thing is new and unique.

Similarly, given the physical conditions in the Straits, which are unusual and peculiar, we find ourselves facing problems that can only be resolved in exceptional and original ways.

With respect to legal questions, the problem is rather complex, since it involves the latest contemporary ideas on law of the sea, on which numerous international conferences have been held. These terribly complex questions continue to be the subject of debates.

In that domain, several Moroccan and Spanish experts are working together to find appropriate solutions to these problems.

[Question] Fairly sizable projects have been built here and there around the world. They connect land separated by fairly large stretches of the sea. Would any of them be comparable with the Hispano-Moroccan fixed link?

[Answer] In fact, there is the example of the tunnel in Japan, the Seikar tunnel. It is a very big project, in terms of the size--54 km long--and connects two of Japan's islands. While that project is an interesting and original example, we do not think one could say it is exactly the same as what we propose to build.

For our part, we must confine ourselves to the conditions of land and sea, which are in fact different.

[Question] Several approaches to the building of this project have been advanced. The final decision on the type of construction cannot be made until after the studies have been completed. Would you tell us, Mr Kabbaj, about the different solutions being promoted?

[Answer] The solutions are very diverse. Some are on the surface: Bridges. Several versions of this kind of project might be envisaged. Or subterranean. For the moment, we are not dismissing any possibility, for we do not want to make a precipitous decision. Our decision should be based on objective and rational factors.

The point of the preliminary sturies is just precisely to compare the various solutions in terms of their advantages and disadvantages technically, economically, legally, and with regard to their effect on the environment, and also in terms of their political and strategic significance and security and effects on security.

All these factors will be taken into consideration in the final decision.

[Question] Have other countries shown their interest in the project, for example by taking part in the studies that are under way?

[Answer] Several countries have shown interest in the studies for thos project. Some of them are already participating. Others will later on. I think that, given the importance of the project and the sophisticated technology that will be required, we will have to bring in specialists in the most unusual disciplines, in which there are only a few real experts in the entire world, in order to get a grasp on the essential factors we are studying.

Such a project, which will connect two continents, must be considered in relation to the levels of communication possible for the countries of the two continents.

All the countries we have contacted--as well as the international organizations--have expressed great interest in the project. We have seen this in the Arab world, where several resolutions in support of it have been adopted. Several European organizations, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the EEC, the conference of European transportation ministers, the international railroad union, and other organizations have expressed their interest and given their support to the project. The same level of interest has been aroused in Africa.

[Question] Can you tell us, Mr Kabbaj, about the road and rail implications of the project?

[Answer] The Straits are the junction point between two important and complementary continents. The link across the Straits can only really be useful if it is supplemented by a new concept of trade between the North and South, and thus a new concept of the systems that will carry that trade. In that connection, the project study will contain proposals relating to all the systems which will arrive or end at the link itself, whether they are roads, railroads, or pipelines. Already, we have a number of ideas as to the design of these systems, which have been presented before international bodies. The project has given both Africa and Europe--and Africa in particular--a new vision of the networks connecting them. Europe was neglecting its southwestern region (Spain in particular) and very few European trunk lines terminate there, though now Europe realizes that these lines should extend beyond Spain and the Strait of Gibraltar. Just as Africa realizes that trade from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa have to cross our country to reach Europe via the Straits of Gibraltar.

[Question] Morocco and Spain are both cognizant of the benefits that cannot fail to be realized from this new communications link once it is complete. Prospects are very promising, it is said...

[Answer] The project is a grandiose one in its own right, construction of which will create thousands of jobs both in northern Morocco and souther Spain, and it will also have major impact on the varioup other sectors of the economy, in particular on tourism, which will certainly have enormous growth. In terms of industry and agriculture, the project will have positive impact in the sense that our country's products will be competitive on European markets, just as our country will be able to import products at lower cost. Morocco and Spain will thus become the nexus of communications between Europe and Africa and will certainly benefit from that position.

[Question] Some rough estimates as to the cost of the project have been made, but it is obvious that the cost can only be determined with any precision after the studies are completed. Could we have the order of magnitude?

[Answer] It is at present very difficult to cite numbers. However, I will give you some approximate costs for projects of comparable size. The Seikan tunnel in Japan cost--in current money--some 10 billion dirhams. It is estimated that the tunnel under La Mancha (about 50 km) will cost at least 6 billion dirhams, even using the least costly design. These are only orders of magnitude, for the very notion of cost is difficult to pin down until the nature of the project has been spelled out. There is a difference between a tunnel and a bridge, between a one-track railroad tunnel and a two-track tunnel.

[Question] One sure benefit for Morocco: The project is a chance for Moroccan technicians and cadres to get new training and experience....

[Answer] In fact, it is a chance to enlist the participation of Moroccan researchers and cadres in a high-technology project and to familiarize them with the most diverse techniques. Highly skilled nationals in a number of technical branches are participating in this project. SNEP will try to involve people in very field, in both the private sector and the academic world.

[Question] The proposed fixed link across the Straits will turn Morocco into a tree with its roots in Africa and its foliage in Europe....

[Answer] The project does highlight the key position Morocco occupies, with shorelines on the Mediterranean in the north and on the Atlantic in the west, responsible along with Spain for guarding the Strait, which is one of the most important passages and maritime lanes in the world. We will take great pride in building this project, which testifies to the strategic position our country occupies.

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CSO: 5200/5002

PFLO LEADER DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S SITUATION, INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT

Havana TRICONTINENTAL in Spanish No 77, Jul-Aug 81 pp 6-20

[Interview with Abd-Al Aziz al-Qadi, secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), by Rodolfo Cassals; somewhere on the Arabian peninsula; date not given: "Oman: Toward the Constitution of a Broad Democratic Front"]

[Text] One of the points of interest for any newspaper reporter who visits the Mideast is without a doubt the situation in Oman (310,000 sq km and barely 2 million inhabitants), where Sultan Qabus, a front for Anglo-American neocolonialism, exercises a ferocious tyranny with the help of imperialist and mercenary troops.

Located in the extreme southeastern part of the Arabian peninsula, its privileged geographical situation--with coasts on the Arabian Sea and the Guld of Oman and control over the Strait of Hormuz, on the so-called "petroleum route"--has made Oman a very appetizing morsel for imperialists interests: first Great Britain, and then the United States, both of which maintain large military bases there, as well as a sizeable and menacing naval air force.

The Omani people have never agreed with this "destiny" that its enemies have tried to impose on it. After long years of political struggle, the armed struggle for liberation began on 9 June 1965, led by its vanguard, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).

Unable to contain the popular rebellion, which had gathered considerable strength in the Qara's Mountains in the southwestern province of Dhofar, the sultan begged reinforcements from the British military garrison there. New special and mercenary troops were sent, and later, complying with instructions from Washington, the former shah of Iran dispatched an expeditionary force of several thousand men armed with modern weapons and several airplanes and armed helicopters. The war of extermination and scorched earth spread throughout all Dhofar. The imperialists, whose propaganda had for a long time silenced the Oamni people's struggle for true independence, then talked of "great victories." They even claimed that the insurrection had been stifled forever.

But once again they were mistaken.

On the Arab Peninsula we met Abd-al Aziz al-Qadi, the most admired leader of the Omani people. Mutual friends had arranged the interview, which took place over tea at a small table amid modest surroundings.

The secretary general of the PFLO, a man of medium height, slender, with black hair and moustache, began the dialogue with the reporters. First he sent an emotional greeting to Cuba and its leaders, expressing his faith and confidence in the Cuban people's ability to confront and defeat the imperialist maneuvers and to develop and deepen its socialist revolution.

"Cuba, under the leadership of Fidel Castro," he said, "is present in millions and millions of people throughout the world, including the Omani people, and it has the support of all the progressive and democratic forces of humanity." Then Abd-al Aziz al-Qadi proceeded immediately to analyze his country's dependent situation:

"Oman is going through abnormal circumstances which differentiate it from other countries in the region. The real political power there continues to be in the hands of British imperialism which, because of its historical relations with the sultanate, continues to interfere in the country's internal affairs.

"On 23 July 1970, the British replaced Sultan Said ben Taimur with his son, Qabus, and tried to make the resignation appear normal. Following instructions from his masters, the new sultan tried to replace the national hymn, flag and government and began to work to make the country a member of the Arab League and the United Nations, but he did not mention suspension of the agreements which gave Great Britain military facilities to 'protect' Oman."

[Question] Then the accusations concerning the establishment of foreign bases are true?

[Answer] The English military bases were already in Oman before 1970, and those on Masirah Island and others are still being used. The sultan also continued to employ the army officers who took part in the events of that year, and at present many of those officers are still in positions of authority. However, the high-ranking officers of the Omani army are English; that is, the heads of the air force, navy and army. There are English military commanders even down to the battalion, company and squad levels.

[Question] How about military units and advisers from other countries?

[Answer] The British have a special force of soldiers in Oman. Until 1976, those troops numbered about 5,000 distributed among three bases, but in recent years, and especially since the fall of the shah of Iran, the British have stepped up their military activity in Oman and increased their troops to 8,000 soldiers. That is a direct and special force under command of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, the British have also increased the number of their officers and advisers, and there are now some 13,000 counting military commanders, advisers and soldiers, which shows that the English presence and its interference is not decreasing, but rather is increasing more and more.

There are also Egyptian and Jordanian troops in Iman, but those forces only act as advisers to Qabus's soldiers.

[Question] What has been the effect of the sultan's policy of surrendering the national sovereignty to imperialism?

[Answer] Obviously, it has been the internal isolation of the Omani regime, the result of the emerging awareness by the masses of the true situation. British and American imperialism have taken on the task of strengthening the sultanate militarily as a result of the situation created in the area by the fall of the shah.

They see their interests in that region threatened and are increasing their activities in Oman, not only to defeat the desire the liberation, but also to train the regime to play a predetermined role against other countries in the area.

[Question] In recent years the American imperialists have been pressuring Qabus to allow them to establish military bases in the country. Is that part of this policy?

[Answer] During 1978, 1979 and 1980, the United States sent four military delegations to negotiate the installation of military bases in Oman. Some of those delegations remained in the country several months and visited the bases at Salalah, Masirah, Khazar, Zambrit, Beit al Falay and Sib.

At the end of 1979, Oman and the United States reached an agreement in principle on "economic and military cooperation," and the PFLO decided at that time to publicize and denounce the negotiations, while the sultanate tried to deny them. However, in 1980 the United States began to make official statements concerning the facilities that Oman had given it, and on 4 June 1980 the agreement was formally signed and made public under the title, "Agreement for Economic and Military Cooperation Between the United States and Oman."

[Question] What did those agreements contain?

[Answer] Some of the articles of the agreement were published and others remained secret. Among the published provisions is concession to the United States, should it be considered necessary, of the use of land and naval bases already existing in Oman, as well as facilities for storing war munitions and medical supplies.

Among the secret agreements, the PFLO was able to ascertain that the United States will have the potential to use the Masirah base permanently, to install another naval air base at Khazar, in the Strait of Hormuz, and an espionage center on the Island of Om Alganan, also in that strait. Likewise, Qabus gave the Americans the right to exercise total authority in Musandam Province, on the Arabian Gulf.

[Question] They say there are several thousand Yankee soldiers in Oman. Is the exact number known?

[Answer] The number of American soldiers in Oman varies, due to the fact that their naval fleet in the area is in the Gulf of Oman as well as in the Arabian Gulf. The estimate at this time is about 10,000 but not all of them are stationed in Oman. Those who are in the country are concentrated in Masirah and in Musandam and have the people of the latter under their control.

In addition, according to the agreements between the United States and Oman, Yankee imperialism is going to construct warehouses in Masirah, Zambrit and other points within the sultanate, and it will pay Qabus a total of $500 million. From these expenditures one can deduce that the United States is doing all it can to make

Oman an important American base, a prospect confirmed by the installation of bases on Masirah and Om Alganan and by the facilities that Qabus has given the Americans in the ports of Azit and Salalah.

[Question] What is the country's economic situation?

[Answer] As is known, Oman has a single-product economy. Petroleum, the chief source of income, is controlled by foreign interests. Dependence on petroleum is such that of a national income of 520 million rials (1 rial equals $2.50), 455 million come from crude oil and the remaining 65 million from agriculture and Saudi assistance.

After Gabus assumed power he undertook, following instructions from Great Britain, to build some schools, hospitals, electrical power projects, water wells, etc., to make the people think the new government was concerned and so to induce them to take a position against the liberation movement and in favor of the regime. In recent years, however, the regime has not been able to continue with those "reforms," and unemployment, emigration and illiteracy have increased as a result.

By the end of 1977, petroleum production had begun to show a decline, to the extent that while 380,000 barrels per day were being extracted 4 years ago, today only 300,000 to 310,000 barrels are being produced. The situation has been aggravated by the intensification of the sacking and exploitation of economic resources without concern for conservation, by the increase of misappropriation of public funds by officials and by lack of planning.

In spite of aid to the Omani budget from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, in 1978 there was a deficit of 50 million rials and in 1979 a deficit of 80 million.

[Question] To what extent has this policy affected the popular masses?

[Answer] As a result of the opening of the regime to foreign capital, there has been a displacement of Omani workers. There is a great exodus of peasants, craftsmen and livestock farmers to the cities, because the majority of the peasants have lost their lands, craftsmen have lost their jobs because of foreign competition and the cattlemen are threatened by meat imports.

The capitalist firms, which bring in labor from South Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan and other places, receive all sorts of facilities from Qabus and do not respect the interests of the peasants, fishermen and other Omani workers. These sectors, seeing their means of livelihood gone and that they are swelling the unemployment rolls, are those, basically, who emigrate to the cities. Some have enlisted in Qabus's army to be able to sustain their families and other emigrate in search of work.

On the other hand, all union institutions which might defend the rights of the workers are banned in the country. There is no constitution to protect the interests of the people; strikes and demonstrations are prohibited and to engage in them is considered a crime.

So there is only one way open to the people: illegal revolutionary activity, and the PFLO's reorganization work toward independence occupies an essential place in this task.

[Question] What other revolutionary forces are there in Oman, and what methods of struggle do they use?

[Answer] Sultan Qabus's government prohibits the activities of mass organizations, and therefore the PFLO has begun the task, in the last few years, of secretly organizing the peasants and other workers and linking them politically to the front.

In addition to the PFLO there are in Oman:

The Arab Omani Labor Party, a small organization created in 1970. It is organized in some areas, but it does not participate in any public struggle, nor does it play any role in the revolutionary struggle which is going on. There is also a small, disorganized Nasserite organization, located mainly in Gafar. The Labor Party and the Nasserites are nationalist elements who do not accept either Qabus or the foreign presence.

There is also the Imam Galeb Association, which has a tribal and religious influence in some areas, mostly in Nazuak and Jabal. This association is also against foreign interference and the sultan.

In 1980 the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oman appeared. It has ties with the Iranian Shi'ites (the number of Shi'ites in Oman is about 3 or 4 percent of the entire population). The Islamic Front is composed of a small group of students influenced by the Iranian revolution. They are against the Yankees, the British and Qabus, but they are a uniquely religious movement. This Islamic Front has been organized also in North Yemen, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, because the Khomeini victory in Iran has served to bolster the religious movements in the Arab countries.

A few months ago the Islamic Front issued a statement attacking Qabus and the foreign presence and demonstrated in favor of the PFLO struggle.

All these small organizations have a limited presence in the area, and they are not carrying on any struggle against the government; but the PFLO believes that they do constitute a nationalist position opposed to the sultan.

To date the Omani people have known only two political forces: the reactionary government and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. The other organizations have proclaimed that the only political force that can achieve the objective of independence is the PFLO, and for some time there have been contacts between those organizations and the PFLO, which has been trying to organize them into a unified political base so that a single line may be adopted in confronting the regime.

[Question] On what principles is the effort to unify these forces based?

[Answer] There are three basic objectives toward which we need to work to unite these organizations on a common political base:

1) Expulsion of foreign military troops and bases; 2) the achievement of democratic freedoms for the people: the right to unionize, to organize, to hold meetings and to strike; and 3) to take an international position against the Camp David

agreements which are supported by Qabus, and to achieve solidarity with the national Arab movement, especially with the just struggle of the Palestinian people.

These are the three aspects on which the work must be centered, because they are basic goals to be achieved by the Omani people. For the PFLO these goals are a tactical objective and are part of our strategic program. The need to create this common political foundation on which all the people must work stems from the fact that certain Omani leaders, including religious and tribal leaders, have different ideologies; therefore we try to find common goals which interest not only one group, but the entire people.

[Question] What is the essence of the tactical and strategic programs of the PFLO?

[Answer] The PFLO has a complete political program which sets forth in detail all the tasks of the popular struggle phase, from both the internal and the international point of view. This program was approved at the Fourth PFLO Congress in 1974 and includes an outline of how to carry on the struggle at this time as well as when independence is achieved.

Our political program expresses the long-range aspirations of the PFLO and follows along those general lines. It does not outline the work of other forces in the country, but only the political, economic and social tasks of the PFLO. Therefore the basic objective of the minimum program for this phase is to form a broad, unified democratic front, the name for which will be discussed with the other groups. The PFLO will continue to carry out its strategic program and at the same time will try to create that broad unified front, so that it may play its role in the struggle for national independence.

Dialogue and contacts are being made between the PFLO and the other groups, and when an agreement is reached it will be made public. The Imam Galeb Association and the Labor Party, for example, have already come out in favor of the basic program and the PFLO proposes to contact all the other leaders and tribal chiefs who are against the foreign presence and Qabus.

[Question] How about the political and military situation of the PFLO? What are its immediate and medium-range tasks?

[Answer] For 3 years not the PFLO has not considered, among its plans, a broad military confrontation with the government, and during this time it has worked at the task of strengthening its internal organization, creating a strong popular base, and when that is consolidated it will joint the battle again.

In a complete review of past work, very valuable lessons were learned from the mistakes made. We must take advantage of these experiences in order not to repeat the same errors: The armed struggle of the PFLO, when it is carried out without an organization suited to the policy to be followed, can work against the consolidation of the front.

It was decided forst to strengthen the organization, so that we might take advantage of the armed struggle later on. In our circumstances, when the guerrillas are concentrated in a single area (Dhofar), it is easier for the enemy to find and eliminate them. Now that the PFLO is strengthened in all areas, when it takes up the guerrilla war in several places at once, it will be much harder for the enemy to destroy it.

The armed struggle was concentrated in Dhofar and was very weak in other places. For that reason, we are now working on the organization of the front throughout the country, so that we can launch the armed struggle not only in Dhofar, but in other areas of the country.

The armed struggle in Oman must be balanced with the development and strengthening of the mass political movement, because if this is not done, it will fail. The PFLO is not only dedicated to strengthening itself, but also to achieving this mass political movement. That is why we put so much emphasis on the creation of popular, worker, peasant and student organizations--because unless they are created, that mass political task cannot be achieved. We can say that there are already in the country the National Workers Committee of Oman, the National Student Union of Oman, the Omani Student Organization and the Omani Women's Organization.

At this time, the PFLO has a military presence in Dhofar, but it does not plan to take a large part in any fighting, except in case of attack. That armed force is for training and self-defense, and it goes into combat only in case of necessity. The program for these forces was set up in the PFLO's strengthening phase, which has three basic points:

1) To devote itself to political work among the masses; 2) to create networks of contacts in the country and in the cities; and 3) to defend itself when attacked by the enemy.

[Question] Since the Front's Fourth Congress there have been substantial changes in the national situation. How does the PFLO plan to confront them?

[Answer] We are already beginning to prepare for the PFLO's Fifth National Congress, and at the end of last September we held a general assembly of the front's leadership with the local leadership and other cadres, in which an agenda for the forthcoming congress was announced.

Work has begun on the documents to be discussed by the congress. One is related to modification of the earlier political program, since it was approved in 1974 and some important events have occurred since then. During the Fourth Congress it was the British presence and that of the shah of Iran and their influence on Oman. Then the Yankees arrived. Therefore the new political program must take into consideration that American military presence and the dangerous influence of Yankee imperialism on the Qabus government. Therefore we must outline new steps to be taken in the face of the U.S. plans in Oman.

With respect to the internal rules of the PFLO, these will have to be modified at the congress, adding new tasks such as, for example, the PFLO's interest in building a broad democratic front which will group together all the progressive forces in the country and which must carry out its program and strengthen the vanguard.

The third document to be discussed in the Fifth Congress is the political report, which will basically treat the development of the PFLO since the last congress and analyze the national, international and Arab situations and the efforts and work realized by the creation of the broad front. In addition, certainly, the congress will hold elections for a new leadership.

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BRIEFS

LUBRICATING OIL PLANT AGREEMENT--Saudi Arabia has signed a $1bn agreement with two US companies to build a lubricating oil plant at the industrial complex of Jubail on the Gulf coast. The agreement was signed in Riyadh by the state owned Petroleum and Minerals Corporation (Petromin), Texaco and Chevron. The plant is to produce 12,000 barrels of lube oil base stocks per day. Petromin has said the plant, which will also produce 10,000 barrels of asphalt per day, will be in operation by 1983 and reach full capacity three years later. It will export six types of specialised base oil products. The plant is one of five refineries planned by Saudi Arabia in collaboration with international oil companies. Two of them will be at Jubail, two at Saudi Arabia's second industrial complex at Yanbu on the Red Sea and one at Rabigh. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 59]

LOAN TO MALTA--Saudi Arabia is to lend Malta about $28m Prime Minister Dom Mintoff announced in Valetta last week. He added that some $14m would go towards building a new shipyard at the Grand Harbour while the rest will help meet the costs of a water desalination project and a telecommunications system. No further details of the loan were announced, but Saudi Arabia agreed in principle to participate in the three Maltese development projects after an official visit by the Maltese prime minister in September, when he had talks with King Khaled. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 41]

MINEFA MAJOR SHAREHOLDER--Minefa Holdings, a Middle East investment group based in Amsterdam, will become the majority shareholder in the Dutch construction group Ballast-Nedam, which recently won a $564m contract for work on the Bahrain causeway. Minefa, which is owned by Saudi Arabian and other Middle East investors, will take over the 33 per cent holding in Ballast currently held by Antillian Holding Company. The acquisition, valued at $14.7m will boost its stake to about 70 per cent. The Dutch company, which conducts almost half its operations in Saudi Arabia, is expecting its net profits to rise 12 per cent this year to $11.38m on a turnover of $731.7m. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 40]

RADAR EQUIPMENT FOR JUBAYL--Saudi Arabia has awarded a multi-million dollar contract for a maritime surveillance system in the Gulf to the French engineering and electronics firm Thomson CSF. The company said last week that the system would be in operation by late 1982 at Jubail, the Gulf port destined to handle substantial oil tanker and container traffic. Monitoring of ship movements will

be carried out by two radars with ranges of about 25 miles, according to the project's West German consultants Hanseatic Port Systems. One of the radars will be placed on the port's existing control tower, and the other one will be inside a concrete tower to be built on the coral island of Al-Jurayd, some 25 miles offshore. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 p 12]

SAUDI REGISTRY ATTRACTS TANKERS--Many ship-owners are switching to the Saudi Arabian flag in order to take advantage of fuel oil discounts enjoyed by the Saudi fleet, according to the latest issue of LLOYD'S SHIPPING ECONOMIST. At the end of October, a total of 58 vessels had switched to Saudi registration during 1981. The magazine noted that vessels which are at least 51 per cent Saudi-owned, which fly the Saudi flag and which trade with Saudi Arabia can purchase bunker fuel at only one-fifth of normal market prices. The discount would cut the fuel for a very large crude carrier (vlcc) carrying crude oil from Saudi Arabia to northwestern Europe and returning in ballast (from $1.6 million to $250,000). The discounts are understood to be part of a deliberate Saudi Arabian policy to encourage expansion of its national fleet. Given the tight conditions under which tankers are operating at present and which have resulted in the laying up of a large number of tankers or their use as floating storage tanks, the Saudi move has considerable attractions. In some instances, it offers a way for shippers to stay in business when they might otherwise have been forced to go under. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 4-5]

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POLITICAL SYSTEM OF YEMEN EXAMINED

Paris REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE in French Aug 81, pp 745-768

[Article by Patrick Labaune: "Tribal Democracy and the Political System in the Yemen Arab Republic"]

[Text] The assassinations 8 months apart of the chief of state of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), Ibrahim al-Hamdi, on 11 October 1977, and of his successor, Lt Col Ahmad al-Ghashmi, on 24 June 1978, the frontier war with Saudi Arabia at the beginning of 1980, the increase in the number of attempted coups d'etat, the repeated occurrence of mutinies within the armed forces, and the endemic state of war by the tribes against central authority--all of these circumstances throw light on the tensions, both domestic and external, which work on the North Yemen government.[1]

The powerful tribal phenomenon and its after-affects are reportedly part of the essential background of most of the YAR's ups and downs. In any case, this seems to be the view of certain of the Middle East specialists and the majority of the political leaders of North Yemen. The former saw in these explosions of violence the strength of "feudal" power within the tribes belonging to Zaydite Islam,[2] the autocratic and capricious domination of a few, powerful tribal chiefs over a large proportion of the population.[3] From an apparently opposite point of view but leading finally to the same end, the Yemeni leaders have denounced the dangers of tribal power for the maintenance of state unity and its inability to face up to the demands of modernization.[4]

Essentially negative but scientifically doubtful, these views are far from reflecting the totality of the tribal phenomenon. If for the former the absence of experience in the field makes it impossible to read the tribal tea leaves and for the latter the requirements of national development oblige them to downplay the tribal world, anthropological work and the status of a non-participating observer make it possible to avoid these two snags. From another point of view the immediate inclusion of the tribal phenomenon in the category of archaic, feudal, demoniac, or conservative elements disposes a little too rapidly, in our view and in the name of Western-centered dogmatism, the eventual, positive aspects of the phenomenon being discussed. More precisely, this classification does not take into account one of the most original and specific political forms of North Yemeni society, which we might agree to call the democratic forms of the tribes observing Zaydite Islam.

Autopsy of Tribal Democracy

The long-time underground survival of this phenomenon, and then this rebirth of a

singular political tradition, constitute a rather rare exception in the developing countries, for which reason it deserves to be strongly underlined. Although we cannot analyze here the democratic essence of Zaydite Islam,[5] we will try to throw light on some aspects of this tribal democracy and to demystify a certain number of dominant cliches concerning this social organization.

The Analysis of Walter von Dostal and Its Shortcomings

Despite the interest and originality of such a phenomenon, and as paradoxical as that may appear, the bibliography on this subject is marked by its sparseness. As a practical matter, only one article by Walter von Dostal describes some features of this tribal democracy, even though his work is concentrated exclusively on the Bani Hushaysh tribe, which lives in the area northeast of the Yemeni capital.[6]

However, this study is not without its shortcomings in terms of our problem. More than an evaluation of the democratic institutions or processes within this tribe, it is an anthropological effort, notably dealing with economic mechanisms, stating the autonomy of tribal society in terms of an external center, which holds the attention of the author. The fact remains that one of the basic principles of tribal democracy reportedly rests on the equality of members of the tribe in the exercise of three institutions defined by tribal law ('urf al-qabili) for men able to bear arms.

The first of these institutions is said to reside in the mediating role of every man in the tribe (qabili) in case of quarrels and is known by the term of hakim.[7] An idealized type of example illustrates this situation of equality:

"Let us take the case of two men involved in a serious quarrel. In such a case a man with the rank of qabili will intervene and invite them to put their curved knives (jambiyah) back into the scabbards. By this procedure the passerby takes the role of a hakim, and the quarrelers are obliged to bow to this request and to put their knives back into the scabbard. From this moment they are in the state called "the return to justice" ('awd al-'addad), that is, they must refrain from any violent action. The meaning of such an arrangement for personal honor (sulh fi-l-wadih), as this expression indicates, is to turn back any aggressive tendency and to prevent any bloody encounter."[8]

The second institution in which the men of the tribe have real equality is that of the rafiq, or "escort of the friends of the tribe."[9] In effect, this devolves from the sovereignty of the tribe over its territory, from the need for juridical provisions for protecting the life and property of the tribe's friends during their stay within the tribal boundaries. These guarantees of protection are carried out by the rafiq. "This function," Dostal states, "can be undertaken by any member of the tribe who agrees to it, after the clarification of the financial arrangement with the friends of the tribe, in order to bear this responsibility defined by tribal law."[10]

Finally, this equality is shown in the institution of the halif, which can be translated by the expression, "partners in the property." Its field of application rests in the relationships between the individuals of different tribes. "A common contract (muhalafah) is drawn up for the protection of the partners' intersts in the property (halif) in each of the tribal exchanges on the basis of reciprocity. The power to enter into a muhalafah is left to the free judgment of each member of the tribe."[11]

While supporting us in our view of things, the description of these institutions by Dostal--beyond their identification--as intangible proof of tribal democracy, nevertheless seems to us to be too compartmentalized, too much reduced in scope, and fossilized. As these are limited to some aspects of the daily life of the qabili, there is nothing to prove that other institutions based on tribal law are shared on the basis of equality of rights and exercise among all the members of the tribe. In the second place, analysis reduces the notion of democracy to a simple, institutional relationship of egalitarianism. Finally, and because of this institutional relationship of egalitarianism. Finally, and because of this institutional perspective, Dostal's interpretation does not make into account the eventual changes,which take place with the modification of the external environment of the tribal world, particularly the development of a new, central political sector of a republican type, since the coup d'etat of 26 September 1962, which put an end to the thousand-year long reign of the Zaydite Imams. In other words, the dynamic character of the social situation has been brushed aside.

It also seems more decisive to us for demonstration purposes to base the analysis on the role and the functions of the tribal chief (shaykh). The powers, the choice, and the limits to the latter's authority will make it possible to include at the same time the most characteristic features of tribal democracy--if one advances the view by means of hypothesis that the function of the shaykh is above all the most authoritarian position in the tribal framework which must involve the most precautions--and in this way to set out the possible changes which have taken place in this phenomenon since the establishment of the republic.[12]

The Powers of the Shaykh

The type of political organization which one finds the most frequently in the YAR at the level of the basic communities is the centralized tribe in which, within units of various sizes, maintaining more or less loose relationships, authority is relatively concentrated around the shaykh. However, in these Zaydite tribes there is no "strong" authority in the sense that the shaykh would have the power to use force to impose his decisions, because he holds his authority from those whom he governs.

More explicitly, in this tribal community, the power of the tribal chief is, above all, that of the conciliator and the distributor. The primordial role of the shaykh is to protect, by all means authorized by the 'urf, the cohesion of the tribe and to ensure its survival, in both political and social terms. The choices and decisions made rest almost always on the consent of the tribe. If he tries to avoid applying this rule, the men of the tribe can remind him of it violently, going as far as the assassination of the man whom they had elected but who violated the norms in effect. This kind of internal conflict--and very rare it is--nevertheless occurred more frequently during the civil war from 1962 to 1970, which opposed the imam who had been overthrown to the emerging republic. The choice of sides by the shaykh did not automatically coincide with the aspirations of the tribesmen.

We will introduce here two fundamental roles of the shaykh: his military power and his judicial function. His traditional function, in effect, is two-fold: he is the leader in wartime and the judge of his tribe.

In time of war, it is he who raises and commands a troop of soldiers and organizes local defense. However, he is only the first among equals, and his wishes are constantly limited by those of the leaders of the tribe or of the tribal confederation.[13] All major decisions concerning the external life of the tribal group, and particularly those involving peace or war, are made in council. In this case the responsibility is a collective one. In these councils the shaykh does not have a casting vote, nor the power of decision. The general consensus decides it, and the minority is never bound by the decisions of the majority. It is frequently noted that a clan or a tribe will refuse to join in collective action against another clan or another tribe of the same tribal confederation. Nevertheless, it is clear that a shaykh with a strong personality will succeed in imposing his will on all of the tribe, if he feels himself sufficiently supported. With the civil war and the attempts at infringement of tribal rights by the central government, seeking to establish its authority at the national level, the functions of the shaykh as a military leader have been consolidated. The tribe (qabila) is, in effect, "a more political than economic group, whose existence is only taken to the limits which compose it when one or several of them feel themselves threatened."[14] The increase in external threats to the tribal group since 1962 has reduced the decisions of the shaykh in this area. Once the decision is made, it is the various regions, and entire peoples, who enter into a state of war or peace.

In time of peace the shaykh is the judge of the tribal group. Although he cannot intervene in the daily life of the factions or patriarchal families, on the other hand, in case of murder within the qabila, he establishes the blood price, following the standard established by custom. If, in such a case, compensation cannot be made, he determines the periods of peace between rival factions which limit the exercise of the right of revenge. As a judge, he settles the small disputes in the daily life of the tribe. Thus, generally, every afternoon the shaykh holds his court of justice, the majlis, open to all and charged with settling all disputes. This court of justice has a very old egalitarian basis. All men consider themselves to be equal, and it is they who have delegated to the tribal chief the powers he possesses as an arbiter. Each of the parties involved speaks in turn before hearing him pronounce sentence, in principle without right of appeal, in the framework of the constraints of tribal law and Islam. The shaykh has no other choice, faced with the multiple, small or large conflicts, than to comply, because it is by his capacity to settle disagreements that his power perpetuates itself.

The fact remains that we should avoid considering this judicial power turned over to the tribal chief in the sense in which we understand it in the West. In this anarchical and amorphous setting the notion of authority hardly exists. And any judgment rendered by the shaykh can always be purely and simply ignored, if the judge does not have sufficient force behind him to ensure execution of the verdict. Finally, in rendering his judgment the shaykh is often assisted, in this case also, by a council of tribal and religious leaders.

The powers of the chief of the tribe considerably limited, and their exercise depends essentially on his personality and on the extent of his support. In this sense there is no strong and powerful coercive authority in these Yemeni tribes. The power of the shaykh is very far from being absolute, his role being that of a conciliator and an umpire. Moreover, the title of supreme chief of a tribal confederation (shaykh al-masha'ikh) seems to be an honorofic position without a

political foundation and without real authority outside his own tribe, since the chief who holds this position is not always certain of making himself heard by those who freely chose him. His role is limited to leading the tribal confederation in time of war.

The Election of a Tribal Chief

We can see even more clearly the reduced extent of the authority of the shaykh by studying the procedure for acceding to this position. Generally, the choice of the tribal chief follows a democratic process, despite some restrictive rules which alter the model here and there.

This way of choosing the chief is lost in history. The oldest known example is the choice of the Mukarrib of the kingdom of Saba (8th to 6th centuries B C). Their chiefs were then chosen from among the noble families. In parallel fashion, but hierarchically lower-ranking, an interesting institution in the pre-Islamic kingdoms of Southern Arabia seems to have been eponymous power. The chiefs of certain clans, called kabir, took turns in exercising certain juridical or religious functions for a previously determined period of time. Official acts were often dated in terms of the year of their office. Related to the same eponymous institution, there was a kind of council which brought together the representatives of the different tribes and made decisions on taxes and irrigation.[15]

Without automatically seeing a resurgence of past actions in the present, a certain continuity in terms of this way of designation of the tribal chief can be seen in the present tribal mosaic. The shaykh is often elected by his equals in the individual families, called mashaykh, within which this duty is hereditary.[16] However, and with a view to the result of our inquiry, non-transmission of the political functions within the tribe by means of family succession is the rule and the guarantee of control of political decisions by the elected representative. In other words, power cannot be exercised without control by the voting tribal members, that is, by the men capable of bearing arms, which excludes certain castes considered inferior.[17]

The fact remains that it is difficult to phrase a general rule on this matter: the designation of the shaykh does not appear to follow the same rule from one tribe to another. To illustrate this, among the Bani Hushaysh: "A village chief (shaykh al-qarya) is elected by the inhabitants of the village. For the election of the leader of a tribal unit, the chief of a tribe of 12 villages or inhabited areas (shaykh al-thuman), an assembly of men having the right to vote will be called by the village chiefs of the thuman...For the position of chief of the tribe, the candidate will be elected from among the tribal chiefs of the thuman. In all these elections a simple majority (aghlab al-akthar) is decisive."[18]

On the other hand, among the Hashid, according to Joseph Chelhod, "the decision must be made by unanimity. If, despite the efforts made to reach total agreement, a difference of opinion remains within the assembly, a majority, even a simple majority, is not enough. Such a majority could not claim to impose its will. To bring the minority to give its consent, use is then made of very effective pressure which deserves being mentinned because of its originality: to bring the opposition into line, the majority group goes to visit them as guests and remains there as long as

the opposition exists. Although this hospitality is imposed on them, the conventions are maintained, in spite of everything, of attending to the needs of their unwelcome guests."[19]

However, there is general agreement in stating that an element outside the tribal group cannot intervene in the election. Even the shaykh of a tribal confederation cannot oppose the election of a clan chief. That would be a political error which he would not commit.

Nevertheless, the process may encounter a certain number of obstacles which reduce by that extent the democratic impact of the election. A son of a shaykh, for example, if he is an individual with a strong personality, and if the tribe considers that he would represent it properly, has every chance to become chief of the tribe on the death of his father. It may also be that the men of the tribe would refuse him and give their votes to another candidate. That happens most often in tribes where two families of almost equal importance vie for a position of preeminence. In order not to create hatred and tension, the men very wisely choose their leader now from one family and then from the other. If these practices restrict the number of candidates and, consequently, the workings of democracy, they are logical in terms of the spirit of the future role played by the shaykh: protecting the cohesion of his qabila by every means. It would be paradoxical for the election of the chief of the tribe to be the object of divisions and of conflicts within the tribe, although these exist.

A Legitimacy of Questioning

Once elected, the shaykh rarely sees his legitimacy truly shaken. Unless he has made serious mistakes, inertia wins over change, and the chief of the tribe is retained in power: the eternal past wins. The tribal people tend to legtimize the people in place and elected according to the rules, to respect what has always been the case, to consider what is routine as an inviolable norm. Here we see Weber's conception of the legitimacy of traditional power.[20] Furthermore, as we have noted, this phenomenon of perpetuation in power is supported, in certain cases, by that of political heredity.

However, it would be naive to believe that elections and the legitimacy of this traditional authority are never challenged. The mechanisms for challenging tribal authority are there to be used, to the extent that they make it possible to restore the true dimensions of a phenomenon which is generally under-estimated or passed over in silence.

Internal and permanent conflicts between the tribes already cause a violent competition for the leading positions. All the electoral assemblies are thus accompanied by interminable discussions where antagonisms turn against each other and where the candidates show their tactical or oratorical qualities. Moreover, to avoid bloody conflict, the participants must turn over their weapons, and especially their firearms, to the shaykh of the place where the assembly is held. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the authority of the shaykh somewhat hides the competition which exists between the different candidates able to contend for the title which is at the top of the tribal organization. In effect, this could not hide the fact that there is a permanent competition for power which in general goes on clandestinely between

mashaykha families and according to precisely defined rules. Certainly, and if unanimous agreement is not automatically reached, there is hardly any place in these Zaydite tribes for disagreement to be expressed in the form of open opposition to the power of the shaykh. The struggle among the Bakil for the title of shaykh al-masha'ikh of this tribal confederation reveals this silent, subterranean competition which is difficult, it is true, for the observer to appreciate.

As power is exerted in the settlement at the least cost of the conflicts within the tribal group and in the protection of the latter against the material or human dangers which may come from the outside, the opposition to the chief of the tribe can only be expressed by indirect ways and therefore ends as much in the strengthening of his authority as in its weakening.[21] Opposition can show itself in the refusal to recognize authority any longer. This is a refusal which inevitably involves, at the level of the tribal confederation, the secession of one or several tribes and, at the level of a single tribe, the secession of one or several subtribal groups ('ashira).

This opposition is also legitimized by its justification of social stratification. Although the latter is close to a caste system, nevertheless the shaykh does not have the status of an untouchable, either from the political or religious point of view, even if his election takes place, most often, through the use of the Friday prayers. The troubles encountered by the Egyptian expeditionary corps sent to the YAR, in supporting the tottering republic from 1962 to 1967, have validated this remark. The Egyptian forces, thinking they could control a tribe by the arrest or the assassination of its leader, were cherishing illusions. They couldn't intimidate a tribe by imprisoning or executing its leaders: we could be tempted to state the opposite is true.

Finally, the shaykh can see his authority questioned for reasons of personality, or rather of the political course adopted toward the central government. In effect it is appropriate to emphasize this function of the shaykh, the sole spokesman of the tribe in its relations with the governmnnt authorities, the most important element in the system of relationships between the government of San'a', on the one hand, and the tribal world, on the other. Thus, his attitude toward the government contains a thread by means of which the opposition--simultaneously possible and potential--can show itself more freely. The fall of the Zaydite Imam in 1962, for some families, was also an opportunity used to "dethrone" the shaykh. A well-known example is often mentioned to illustrate this situation: that of the al-Ghashmi family, which eliminated the Massaldi family within the Hamdan al-Yaman tribe. The Massaldi shaykh had received Imam Badr following the coup d'etat of 26 September 1962 and, in that way, had committed himself in favor of the imam without having received the consent of the community of qabili.

That is to say that, beside the traditional legality there also exists a legitimacy of opposition to established authority. The tribal society of North Yemnn is therefore a competitive society where the leaders are selected by elections. Competition, even if it is restricted, nevertheless exists. This explains why you do not find in this region a single case of a shaykh in office by right of conquest. Moreover, if that were the case, the domination exercised by a tribal chief would have nothing in common with that exercised by traditional chiefs· the regime established would be purely feudal and coercive.[22]

A New Interpretation of the North Yemeni Political System

Although the analysis up to the present has been based on the description of some aspects of tribal leadership and its democratic variations, we would now like to reintegrate this fact into an overall view of North Yemeni political life. This kind of insertion will be all the more delicate as the too rare political science studies on this subject have largely ignored this variable, as we have said, and discussed the republican political regime now being built as the product of developments coming from outside this society.

Tribal Democracy, Civil War, and End of the Conflict

Despite different angles of attack, the analysis of the North Yemeni civil war (1962-1970) and of its outcome are summarized as the consequence of a strategic contest simultaneously at the regional and world level. These different forms of presentation involve either descriptive articles,[23] the law and international organizations and more generally foreign policy,[24] or finally borrowing from the theory of dependence and notably the works of Jean Lagadec,[25] not to mention the inevitable and obsolete studies on the clash between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.[26]

The authors of these studies "regionalize" the conflict by analyzing the close military or ideological links which unite the republican side and Nasir's Egypt, and, on the other hand, the resistance of the imam to Saudi Arabia, his natural source of support. Elsewhere, they raise the conflict to the "world" level by raising the impact of Soviet-American antagonism. In other words, a civil war in a framework which, consequently, goes beyond it. These approaches, even if they do not state it openly, have a pronounced, systematic aftertaste. More precisely, according to this interpretation, the United States and the Soviet Union each reportedly has a sub-system under it (Saudi and Egyptian). The sub-systems also have their own sub-systems (the imam and the republic).

Without totally denying this vision of things and its partial pertinence to our analysis, we would object first to concealing the conflict as a moment in the historical process of Yemen. Then, even if the studies mentioned take into account, here or there, "domestic" explanations of the conflict, the tribal element and even more its democratic essence and its implications have been largely left out of these discussions.

Now, if the forces of the deposed imam were able to resist for nealy 8 years the joint attacks of the republican and Egyptian armed forces, thanks, it is true, to the financial and material subsidies of the Riyadh government, their remaining in the political struggle is also due in very large part to the support of the numerous Zaydite tribes. Disillusioned and irritated by the new regime, the tribes were expecting from the republic the establishment of a political system where the mechanisms of traditional democracy would be transposed to the national level. Didn't the term "republic" imply the establishment of a representative system? Avoiding or not mentioning this desire, the regime of Marshal Sallah (September, 1962, to November, 1967) over the months lost its contact with the tribal world--inclined, at the beginning, to support it--and wound up by finding itself isolated in its palace by the water-tight precautions of its Egyptian guard.

In this context of limitation of resources to the tribes, opposition both to the republican as well as the imam's side was little by little to rebalance the bi-polarized political system and put an end to the conflict. The development of this third force and its strengthening until it seized power in November, 1967, was to be determined by the desire to integrate the democratic aspirations of the tribal people into its program. This movement was to align itself on the positions decided on at the Amran conference in November, 1963, which demanded, among other things, an elected national assembly.

It would be too simplistic to describe this acceptance of the tribal positions as a strategy aimed at using the rivalries between the various tribal groups for the simple conquest of power.[27] From another point of view this would mean reducing the impact of this commitment to stating that this third force, in view of the fear that the developing republican regime would further alienate the tribal forces, was only a favorable alternative to an opening in their direction. Regarding the possible impact of world and regional antagonisms on the end of the conflict, it was not effective following a double disengagement. First of all, with the failure and withdrawal of the UN Mission in September, 1964, the Soviet Union and the United States, as Jean Lagadec recalls it, "abandoned the negotiated area which was henceforth left to the Arabs."[28] In the second place the Khartoum agreements of August, 1967, were to involve the withdrawal of Egyptian forces, leaving only North Yemeni forces face to face for a solution of the conflict. In other words, the resolution of the armed conflict became, as of that date, an internal matter within the borders and for the leaders of the Yemeni state.

That is the result of a double convergence of events which took place in the tribal crucible. The republic, on the one hand, provoked a new dynamic in this centuries-old political tradition, by liberating the tribal forces held back during the period of the imams (notably by an ingenious system of hostages), as was apparent in the repeated crises which arose in the course of the last 2 decades between the tribes and the central government. On the other hand, and parallel to it, there emerged in the forefront of the political scene elite figures marked by their historical and social environment, in the image of the religious judges (qadat; qadi is the singular form). These were Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, Muhammad al-Zubayri, and Shaykh Ahmad Numan. A nationalism revivified by the presence of the Egyptian expeditionary corps and the memory of tribal institutions and mechanisms depended at the same time on the supporters of this third force, because of their local or regional origins, without reflecting the weight of Western democratic ideology.[29]

Once in control of the central government, the leaders of the third force became involved in a process which was based on the principles and the needs of tribal democracy. Only then did it seem possible for political activity to be organized, to express itself, and to orient itself by having recourse to this old concept of power. In the first stage, in addition to the adoption of the concept of power jointly exercised, a National Council (Majlis al-Watani) was created in December, 1968, including 45 masha'ikh (plural of shaykh) and which would act as a legislative body. The establishment of this Council coincided with the progressive rallying to the republican regime of the Zaydite tribes (Murad, Bani Harith, Bani Matar, a few clans of the Khawlan tribe, etc) and also of leading figures of the royalist camp, as, for example, General Qasim al-Muntasir in January, 1969, who for many months had posed a constant threat to Sana, and Ahmad al-Shami, minister of foreign

affairs under Imam Badr. As the latter had become a leader without followers, he had to resign himself to exile, thus putting an end to the civil war.

With these movements in support of the republic and the division of the central political apparatus with the masha'ikh and the former supporters of the imam, the National Council assumed new powers (notably the right to withdraw its confidence in the government and to relieve the prime minister of his office), and the number of its members went up from 45 to 63. The behavior of this council and its success would make it possible to overcome the last pockets of resistance and the consequences of the war. A spiralling process developed, tending toward a democratic form of government. With the embryo of a parliamentary democracy in place, the latter was strengthened when the Zaydite tribes rallied to its support. By a chain reaction the democratic aspects of the political system grew.

The model was to be completed with the first general elections in North Yemeni history on 10 March 1971, for the election of 159 members of a National Assembly (Majlis al-Shura), elected by males over 18 years of age.[30] It is generally estimated that the tribal chiefs occupied about 70 percent of the seats,[31] and that domination took concrete form with the election of the shaykh al-mash'ikh of the Hashid tribe, 'Abd Allah al-Ahmar as president of this Assembly. By their support of the republican government the tribes proved their profound desire to play the democratic game. In this sense the government succeeded in its effort to achieve national integration by means of the participation of the Zaydite tribes, which up to then had been actively in rebellion against its authority.

Even more, the elections of March, 1971, and the establishment of the Majlis al-Shura marked the victory of the tribal front. Our previous arguments tended to conclude that representative democracy constituted more specifically a value of the tribal sector than a rule of the central government. The adhesion of these northern and eastern tribes only really took place with the central government taking this democratic ideal into consideration. The commitment of the central government was facilitated, it is true, by the predominance of the religious judges (qadat) within the government apparatus. These figures felt better than anyone the aspirations of the tribal bloc. In other terms, the Majlis al-Shura should not be interpreted as a representation of the new values of the central government, but rather as the transposition of the ideological foundations of the Zaydite tribes. In a way this was a true example of the transmigration of the democratic values and rules of the tribal groups to the core of the national entity.

Tribal Democracy and the Militarization of the Political System

From the very fact of this over-representation of the masha'ikh in the National Assembly, we should consider, without any illusions, the ambivalent role of this institution. It was simultaneously an outlet for a divided tribal opposition and also the affirmation of tribal power in the national political field, The tribal chiefs, by their position and by their participation in national political life, were to create the conditions for a new, stronger position for their political encroachments. Many members of their families were to hold governmental cabinet positions and administrative posts and to climb rapidly the various echelons of the military hierachy.[32] The penetration of the masha'ikh at all levels of society, civilian and military, and the consequent practice of nepotism resulting from this

involvement were constant factors under the regime of Caid (qadi) Iryani (November 1967 - June 1974). Faced with this general assault, would the central government, or at least some of the figures composing it, react?

We can easily interpret the new entry of the armed forces into political life, at the time of the coup d'etat of 13 June 1974, as a reaction to this encroachment. In effect the military officers, symbols of national unity as in most of the transitional societies, looked on this assembly without pleasure as an instant of the tendencies tearing the country apart, even if, and that was to its credit, it had make it possible to transform antagonisms on the battlefield into verbal clashes. More precisely, the North Yemeni Army was then claiming fully its double function, that is, defense and the management of the country. The key words used by the new regime to express its objectives were built around two concepts; unity and political stability, on the one hand, and economic modernization, on the other hand. The former was aimed at tribal dissidence, which was constantly denounced. The latter envisaged the economic takeoff of the country in terms of the model well-known in the West. Despite this analytical distinction, the two concerns were closely linked. In the eyes of the military only economic development would permit the "detribalization" of the country. On the other hand this would then permit political stability, in turn making possible an increase in foreign aid and investments which the government should assure and encourage. Thus, the strategy of action envisaged rested in the destruction of the institutions invaded by the tribes, which were a sign of national disunity, of a brake on economic development, and of governmental instability (11 governments in less than 7 years under the regime of Caid Iryani).

In this direction and tending to play the role of umpire betwenn the different sectors of society, the military, from the time they took power, "froze" the institution where the opposing clans clashed publicly. While rejecting the alternative of parliamentary democracy demanded by the tribes, the central government under military control nevertheless did not completely dismiss the concept of democracy from its political program, but rather proposed a new form of democracy which would not be subject to tribal control.[33] The suspension and then the suppression, in October, 1975, of the representative system led inevitably to increased tensions between the tribes and the military authorities.

In a purely tribal system the tendency toward unification, as we have said, shows itself when the threat of an external danger is in sight. Faced with the decisions by the central government, considered disturbing for their traditional political values and their partial control of the central government, the tribal chiefs did not hesitate to join forces to halt such proceedings. When, by definition, the tribal world is divided into as many elements as there are tribes, there appeared, with the dissolution of "their" National Assembly, a process of tribal concentration. This phenomenon took concrete form at the time of the second Khamir Conference on 7-8 November 1975, whose importance should be underlined. Old tribal rivalries and differences then tended to be sunk in a common framework for the defense of representative democracy, while challenging the right of the military to dissolve the National Assembly.

The successive rebellions of the Hashid tribes, under the leadership of Shaykh al-Ahmar in February, 1976, in the fall of the same year, and then in July 1977 and January 1978, had no other objective than the holding of general elections. These

rebellions owed their legitimacy among the tribal people as much to their opposition to the order established by the military as to their collective struggle for parliamentary democracy. Beyond the classic stereotypes on this subject the community of the masha'ikh was far from being reduced to being leaders without followers, feudal chiefs cut off from their social foundations, or elite groups based on force and constraint. Parliamentary representation and its defense played the role of contributing to the cohesion and immediate mobilization of all of the Yemeni tribal community, while at the same time constituting one of the primary causes of the chronic instability of the country.

For most of the observers the assassination of the chief of state, Lt Col Ibrahim al-Hamdi in October, 1977, could be explained almost exclusively by his lack of success in detaching the YAR from Saudi influence. His efforts, already well advanced, at establishing a dialogue with the Marxist regime in Aden for the unification of the two Yemens reportedly made the Saudi court in Riyadh decide to hatch the plot. This version of events should not be ignored in considering the Yemeni situation. It remains nonetheless true that one of the plausible hypotheses for the conspiracy reportedly resided in the failure of a policy which aimed at destroying the practices found in tribal democracy, to the benefit of a military dictatorship of the Third World type.

In our opinion this last explanation has a certain credibility in view of events. Designated chief of state on the day following the assassination of President Hamdi, Lt Col Ahmad al-Ghasmi, in order to appease tribal opposition and consolidate his authority, undertook to bring his country toward "a regime of parliamentary democracy," in his own words. To this effect, in February 1978 he appointed 99 deputies to constitute the People's Constituent Assembly. His successor, Lt Col Ali Abd Allah Salih, placed in the same context of a politically precarious position, was to accentuate the involvement of the tribes in this new parliament. Responding to the demands of the northern tribes, he would be forced to accept, in August 1978, the nomination of Sadik Amin Abu Ra's, one of the chiefs of the Bakil tribal confederation, and of Abd Allah al-Ahmar, shaykh al-masha'ikh of the Hashid tribes, as full members of the Assembly. It was sympotomatic of the situation that the latter strongly criticized this procedure of designating the deputies by presidential appointment. He called for free elections and appealed to the people "to avoid the return to power of one single man."[34] Nevertheless, and after the reactivation of parliamentary forms, the YAR has had domestic political stability, particularly in terms of the tribal front, which is in contrast with the uninterrupted sequence of shattering divisions and violent rebellions during the presidency of Ibrahim al-Hamdi.

We are aware that our analysis only touches on a part of the fabric of the North Yemeni political system. Our object was to depart from the majority of the analyses which sought to present in a global or regional context, in beautifully finished terms, the political phenomena of the YAR. Paradoxically, when Yemen is regarded as a country recently emerged from isolation and whose importance in the international system is reduced to the trivial, the studies devoted to it, generally on the basis of a compilation of data made in the West, essentially bear on its foreign policy. These studies seek either to determine the effects of world events by focusing solely on Yemeni contral government figures and actors or by bringing out superficially from the entanglements of this society its impact on the Arabic region, and even eventually on East-West conflict. In the two cases the tribal dimension is skimmed over or ignored.

Although the pertinence of an overall view of the object studied is clear, our analysis has been deliberately stated in terms of the singular nature of our subject, that is, the democratic inclinations of the Zaydite tribes. Now, ignored or discarded by some, presented in the best of cases as a secondary phenomenon or a residue of the archaic aspect of North Yemen, this kind of conduct by an important sector of political society makes it possible to understand the cause of the conflicts originating within the YAR. It seems preferable to us at least to understand the overlapping of events in terms of when they occurred. Finally, and perhaps this is the essential point, this procedure evaluates the traditional norms, values, and forms of behavior which, by their successive impacts, serve to make us understand how the present situation came about.

Tribal Democracy and Center-Periphery Paradigm

Can the various conclusions of this analysis contribute to the debate on the center-periphery paradigm, a new conceptual framework much in vogue among political scientists?

1) The North Yemeni example introduces a question mark in the articulation of dependence and of domination in center-periphery relationships. The very word paradigm suggests an idea of hierarchical relationship, of inequality, and of a socio-historic separation between the two political sectors. It is difficult to conceive of the idea that the periphery should have relationships of equality with the center, that it would have specialized rather than subordinate functions, or that it might create political values different from or opposed to those of the center.[35]

According to Edward Shils, considered the pioneer in this matter, the center by definition would be the place for power and values and would hold them exclusively. The periphery, linked to the center, reduced to a simple residue on the way to disappearing, would not have real autonomy in any case. From this point of view we can ask ourselves if this "powerless" sector can be considered to pertain to the political domain. It is true that this view of things is appropriate to this author for whom the myth of consensual societies replaces any other consideration. The object of study is limited to the process of formation of the center, understood as the principal receptacle of the values and the forced dominant in society: the periphery disappears from the problem.

Also, and more generally, we might reproach most of the authors who use this conceptual framework with an analytical tendency which one might call "centro-centrism."[37] By that we mean that even if the author takes under consideration a sector long ignored by French political science and largely isolated, without reference to a center in the various works on the local power structure of American sociology,[38] the peripheral power remains underestimated to the benefit center, to the point that the initially bipolar analytical project is reduced at the end to a single pole analysis.

In the Yemeni framework we will refuse to place such value on the center as to make it the exclusive force for change, the sole decision maker, and the single force crystallizing the values, rules, or processes of the overall social and political system. The application of this paradigm to the YAR weakens the rather fixed concept

of a kind of resignation in the periphery contained in the "centro-centrist" vision. More precisely, three features of the tribal periphery seem to us to go in the direction of this view.

First of all, it is necessary to take into consideration a dynamic process indigenous to the periphery. If we ask, and properly so, about the cleavages, the re-organizations, the modifications, and the changes which affect the structure of the center, the periphery also has such developments. For example, the tribal periphery, as we have seen, evolves between, on the one hand, the lessening of its antagonisms and its regrouping in the face of an external danger or for the defense of parliamentary democracy and, on the other hand, the infinitesimal and conflict-prone divisions, either as a result of historic, religious, or topographical developments or as a result of the practices of the center(manipulation, domination by force, etc). A more detailed empirical analysis would unviel the specific and real potentialities of this peripheral dynamic process.

In the second place, the possible specialized aspects of the periphery, beside those pertaining to the center, tend toward a rebalancing process in terms of the latter. These are specialized aspects which would lead us to depict the periphery as provided with its own administrative authority in its natural zones of control (the shaykh is the judge, the collector of taxes, the first to oppose an administration projected by the center) and with its intrinsic military element through the existence of tribal armed bands competing with the national army. However, above all, and this was the essential point of our argument, the periphery has a kind of ideological specialization from the fact of its developing rules and values distinct from those of the center (tribal law, promotion of a form of democracy).

Finally, and as a corollary to this kind of specialization, "centro-centrism" could encounter its limits if we studied the autonomy of the peripheral area by comparison with the center. Historically, Christina Robin tells us that the Yemeni tribes have always bad a wide margin for maneuver by comparison with the pre-Islamic kingdoms.[39] Economically, Walter von Dostal characterizes this autonomy by the exercise of control of the means of production (juwara) by the tribe and by making a distinction between the weekly tribal market (suq)--controlled by a shaykh--where local products make up the bulk of the merchandise, and the permanent city market where imported products have a real monopoly.[40] Sociologically, in view of the impregnation. Peripheral autonomy is shown in depth in the opposition of the nomads to any durable, radical central authority. Thus, it expresses the profound hostility of the tribes toward a political sector whose centralist and autocratic concepts are unacceptable to the sons of the desert.

If we could set out some targets for the elimination of a "centro-centrist" analysis, we would conclude, without being certain of being complete, that the indigenous dynamic processes, specific specializations, and autonomous aspects of the periphery constitute, in our view and for our purposes, the features which most limit peripheral "fatalism."

2) The tripolar concept--center, periphery, and semi-periphery--advanced by Wallerstein[41] and its development into "a quadrimodal system" with the notion of a semi-center proposed by Bernard Corbineau[42] seems to us to make an important contribution to the understanding of the North Yemeni political system. If these two authors

use these concepts in an inter-national or inter-regional problem, we would like to test its reliability quickly at an intra-national level.

These t categories of semi-center and of semi-periphery, beyond the fact that they fragment the dual rigidity of the paradigm, should be understood not only as designating "the articulation of the center and of the periphery" but as partially detached from their respective sectors, without thereby involving a definitive plunge into the opposite sector. Elements pertaining to the central zone, depending on circumstances, will be able to flow back toward the periphery, winding up in the semi-center or, on the contrary, peripheral actors will move toward the center and wind up in the semi-periphery. These movements therefore do not imply in any way a kind of integration in the opposite segment. In this sense these "interlands" are incompletely centralized or integrated into the periphery but retain the characteristics of their sector or origin. On the basis of these clarifications and of this expansion in the hierarchy of the paradigm, we can look for the explanatory pertinence of possible actors who are semi-central and semi-peripheral in the North Yemeni framework, with the preceding, empirical conclusions.

We have commented on the difficult of placing the qudat, these religious judges who, on the one hand, have by their very essence a clientele and an audience in the peripheral sector and, on the other hand, look like figures of the central elite because of their involvement in the administrative, diplomatic, and political functions of the state apparatus, or at least what passes for it. Political events since the establishment of the republic regime have confirmed their inclination toward this sector, particularly with the assumption of control by the latter under the regime of Caid Iryani and their return to the center of the political scene since the assassination of President Hamdi.[44] If, therefore, these central actors contribute by definition to spread values and institutions, they retain sufficient contact in order not to lose touch with the concerns of the periphery, to the point, as we have noted, that they are preparing the holding of general elections and the constitution of a National Assembly (Majlis). As a point of union between the center and the periphery, imperfectly centralized in particular by their taking into effective consideration the democratic demands of the tribal forces, these qudat look very much like semi-central actors.

On the peripheral side the transposition to the national stage of the democratic aspirations of the tribal world between 1969-1974 and since 1978 is not without impact on this sector. The election or the co-opting of tribal chiefs in the successive National Assemblies has led these figures to acquire the position of privileged spokesmen of the center in its relations with the tribal masses and inversely as well. As a spokesman of the tribal community, the shaykh, by the institutionalization of parliamentary life, becomes--and in addition to his traditional functions--the figure responsible for the 'external affairs" of this social group. If for example, the tribe feels the inclination to improve its relations with the political center, or rather feels the need for aid from the latter to assist in its agricultural development, it is the shaykh, simultaneously elected by the tribe (that is, by tribal democracy) and its representative to the San'a' government (that is, with parliamentary democracy), who plays the role of intermediary or, more precisely, the bearer of peripheral claims. In no case does this prejudice his integration with central-oriented ideas. Consequently, the tribal chiefs look to us like personages of the semi-peripheral element, as it is true

that with parliamentary democracy and at the sides of the qudat they hold this essential power as a hyphen between the two poles of society and of the North Yemeni political system, a role which an official appointed and delegated by the central government would normally hold.

The use of these concepts has the advantage of taking into consideration the dynamic processes of the center, as well as those of the periphery. This fragments the possible supremecy of the center. Elsewhere, this provides an explanation of the political system under study. The existence of semi-central and semi-peripheral actors in the political arena and their participation in the system of government attenuate bipolarized conflict and permit the relative stability of North Yemeni society in its national dimensions. The regime of Caid Iryani and of Presidents Ghashmi and Salih illustrate this, without, we should note, ignoring intra-sectoral antagonisms and instability.

Our purpose was to set out some benchmarks for a conceptual framework which, by its elasticity and a form which is still sufficiently supple, "to lend itself to multiple combinations and which can be modified without being disfigured."[45] It goes without saying, however, that our definition and our perception of "center-centrism," our attempt to substitute for its pure form a "quadrimodal" form" evidently require further development, refinement, confirmation, or even contradiction, as it is true that the course of research does not take place in a straight line.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more details on these events, refer to the articles by Michel Tuchscherer, "Les deux Yemen en crise" [The Two Yemens in Crisis], MAGHREB-MACHREK, July-August-September, 1978, pp 21-25, and "Les six premiers mois du Colonel Saleh a la tete de la Republique Arabe du Yemen, juillet-december 1978" [The First Six Months of Colonel Saleh As Leader of the Yemeni Arab Republic, July-December, 1978], MAGHREB-MACHREK, January-February-March, 1978, pp 15-20.

2. Zaydite Islam is a branch (firqa) of Shi'ite Islam, now limited only to North Yemen. Islamologists agree in defining this Shi'ite variant as little different from Sunnite Islam. For more details on this view of the world and its development in the Yemeni framework, refer to Cornelis van Arendouk, "Les debuts de l'immat zaydite au Yemen: [The Beginnings of the Zaydite System of Imans in Yemen], Leyden, E J Brill, 1960, 376 pages. For a more political view see the work of Abdin (Al. Tayib Zayn Al), "The Role of Islam in the State, Yemen Arab Republic (1940-1972)," Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1975; 572 pages.

3. That is at least the interpretation of the different articles of Philippe Rondot, "Influences tribales et forces progressistes au Yemen du Nord" [Tribal Influences et Progressive Forces in Norty Yemen], MAGHREB-MACHREK, January-February-March, 1978, pp 10-14; and "L'imbroglio Yemenite" [The Yemeni Imbroglio], DEFENSE NATIONALE, December, 1978, pp 79-94.

4. See in particular the speech of President al-Hamdi of 25 September 1977, the text of which was published in the daily newspaper AL-THAWRA (of Sanaa), 26 September 1977.

5. On this theme we cite: R Strothmann, "Al-Zaydiya," in "Encyclopedie de l'Islam," Leyden, E J Brill, 1936, vol 5, pp 1264-1266; Ignazio Guidi, "Gli scritorri zayditi el'esegesi coranica mutuzilita," Rome, Typographia del Sento, 1925, "The Zaydi Writers' Interpretation of the Kran According to Mu'tazila" 20 pages; and M M Moreno, "La dottrina zeidita nello Yemen," ["Zaydite Culture in Yemen"] in REVISTA COLONIALE ITALIANE, 1928, pp 687-699 and 1929, pp 281-289, 392-402, 794-796.

6. Walter von Dostal, "Sozio-okonomische Aspekte der stammes-demokratie in Nordost Yemen," [Socio-economic Aspects of Democratic Growth in Northeast Yemen] in SOCIOLOGUS, 24 (1), 1974, pp 1-15.

7. This institution has also been noted by Edward Glaser, "Meine reise durch Arhab und Hashid," [My Trip Through Arhab and Hashid] in "Petermann's Mitteilungen," [Petermann's Reports] 30, 1884, pp 176-177, and Ettore Rossi, "Il diritto consuetudinario della tribu arabe del Yemen," ["The Customary Law of the Arab Tribe of Yemen"] in REVISTA DEGLI STUDI ORIENTALI, 33, 1948, p 33.

8. Walter von Dostal, op cit, p 7.

9. See also Carl Rathjens, "Taghut gegen shari'a," in "Jahrbuch des Lindens museums," 1951, p 181.

10. Walter von Dostal, op cit, p 7.

11. Ibid, p 7.

12. On this last point, see the argument of R G d'Abrahams, "The Political Organization of Unyamwezi," Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1967, 208 pages. The author studies the position of the chief of the tribe and the Manner of accession to this position, in close relationship to the study of Tanganyikian and then Tanzanian developments.

13. In the YAR this generally concerns 2 tribal confederations: the Hashid and the Bakil. See J Schleiffer, "Hashid and Bakil," in "Enclopedie de l'Islam," op cit, vol 3, p 285.

14. Joseph Chelhod, "La parente et le mariage au Yemen," [Relatives and Marriage in Yemen"] in ETHNOGRAPHIE, 67.

15. On this institution in Saba, one may read with interest the work of the Soviet Southern Arab specialist, A G Lundin, "Gosudarotivo Mukarribov Saba' ["The Nation of the King of Saba"] (Sabajkij eponimat)," Moscow, Nauka, 1971, 301 pages. The non-Russian speaker will have an extended resume in French, pp 168-293.

16. See R B Serjeant, "Societe et gouvernement en Arabie du Sud" [Society and Government in South Arabia], in ARABICA, October, 1967, p 286; Tudy Bernier, "Confederations et tribus du Sud de l'Arabie," in CAHIERS DE L'AFRIQUE ET l'Asie," 1st quarter, 1959, p 220; and Fred Halliday, "Counterrevolution in the Yemen," NEW LEFT REVIEW, September-October, 1970, p 7.

17. The classical approach is to present North Yemeni social structure as belonging to the caste system. Thus, the caste of the "'anadil," who hold jobs looked down on (butcher, barber, cobbler) are prohibited from bearing arms.

18. Walter von Dostal, op cit 00 8-9.

19. Joseph Chelhod, "L'organisation sociale au Yemen," ["Social Organization in Yemen"] in ETHNOGRAPHIE, 64, 1970, p 71.

20. Max Weber, "The Theory of Social and Economic Organization," New York, Oxford University Press, 1947. "Traditional authority rests on the established belief in the sacred character of the traditions handed down from time immemorial and in the legitimacy of the status of those who hold the instruments of authority."

21. In certain societies, notably in Africa, this kind of challenge is carried out by the use of magic or sorcery. See Georges Balandier, "Anthropologie politique" [Political Anthropology], Paris, PUF, 1969, p 78. This does not appear to apply to our object.

22. For all of South Arabia, a single case, already old, is known to us: that of the sultans of Lahej in the present People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden), noted by Tudy Bernier, op cit, p 221.

23. Among the works most usually mentioned we cite: Manfred W Wenner, "The Modern Yemen, 1918-1966," Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967, 257 pages; Dana Adams Schmidt, "Yemen: the Unknown War," New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1918, 316 pages; Edgar O'Balance, "The War in the Yemen," London, Faber and Faber, 1971, 218 pages; and Robert W Stookey, "Yemen: the Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic," Boulder, Westview Press, 1978, 322 pages.

24. In the view, among others, of the articles by M d'Ossad, "Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Intervention in Yemen," in ISRAEL LAW REVIEW, April, 1970, pp 216-248; Olivier Carre, "La ligue des Etats Arabes: [The Arab League], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, April, 1971, pp 344-355; Mohamed Jamal Gamil, "La politique etrangere contemporaine du Yemen" [Contemporary Foreign Policy in Yemen], Bordeaux, Universite de droit de Bordeaux, 1974, 62 pages; Stanko Guldescu, "War and Peace in Yemen," in QUEEN'S QUARTERLY, autumn, 1967, pp 472-488; and Noel Jeandet, "Les deux Republiques du Yemen et la confrontation Est-Ouest" [The Two Yemen Republics and the East-West Confrontation], in REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE, June 1975, pp 99-107.

25. Jean Lagadec, "Le conflit au Nord-Yemen: aspect de l'affrontement au sein du monde arabe" [The Conflict in North Yemen: an Aspect of the Clash Within the Arab World], Memoire for DES [Advanced Studies Diploma] in political science, Paris I, 1973, 150 pages; and "La fin du conflit Yemenite" [The End of the Yemeni Conflict] in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, April, 1974, pp 344-355.

26. In addition to the works of the previously mentioned author, we refer to those of Fred Halliday, "Arabia Without Sultans," London, Penguin Press, 1974, notably referring to the YAR on pp 81-150, and, by the same author, "Counter-revolution in the Yemen," op cit, pp 3-25; Georges Pasteur, "Yemen: unification

et affrontements" [Yemen: Unification and Struggle], in NOUVELLE CRITIQUE, February, 1973, pp 52-53; and Marc Pellas, "Yemen du Nord: la lutte des forces revolutionnaires" [North Yemen: the Struggle of the Revolutionary Forces], in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, August, 1973.

27. As was the case for the establishment of colonies in Black Africa. See Lancine Sylla, "Tribalisme et parti unique en Afrique noire" [Tribalism and the Single Party in Black Africa], Paris, Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977, pp 54-57.

28. Jean Lagadec, op cit, p 350.

29. By way of illustration we can appreciate these tribal and historical impacts on the third force by citing a short passage from the novel of al-Zubayri, "Masat Waq al-Waq." The author imagines a dialogue on democracy between the martyrs of contemporary tribes in heaven who "agree on a method for maintaining power. They ask that future governments resemble those in power at the time of Ma'in, Saba, and Himyar, when the tribes had a special council where all were represented and participated through the council in the exercise of power." Mentioned and translated in the work of Amrani (Abd al-Rahman Muhammad al-Amrani), "Al-Zubayri, le lettre revolutionaire du Yemen: [Al-Zubayri, the Revolutionary Scholar of Yemen], Paris, Master's Thesis in Arabic, Universite de Paris IV, 1978, p 8.

30. Despite all the interest in these elections in a country largely dominated by tribal values, only a very short article by Nicholas Ashford, "Yemen Leader Explains Village Role in Country's First Election," in THE TIMES [of London], 6 January 1971, informs us of the development of the electoral campaign (despite the anecdotal and fragmentary aspect of the article).

31. According to Georges Pasteur, "Yemen: liberation nationale, unification et probleme de classe" [Yemen: National Liberation, Unification, and Class Problem], in CAHIERS DU COMMUNISME, April, 1973, p 98.

32. On this theme see Robert W Stookey, "Social Structure and Politics in the Yemen Arab Republic," in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL, summer, 1974, pp 253-254.

33. "The concept of democracy today is no longer what it once was," stated President al-Hamdi (AL-THAWRA of 5 April 1977). In this connection the president decided to organize a "great people's congress," but the arrangements for the election of its members appeared more than hazy in the eyes of the masha'ikh and provoked their sharp reaction against the idea.

34. See Michel Tuchscherer, op cit, p 15.

35. This last idea was expressed by Yves Schemeil, "Les elites politiques au Proche-Orient [Political Elites in the Near East], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, June, 1978, p 568.

36. Edward Shils, "Center and Periphery: Essay in Macro-Sociology," Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1975, 516 pages; and "Center and Periphery," in

"The Logic of Personal Knowledge: Essays Presented to Michael Polanyi on His Seventieth Birthday," London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, pp 117-131.

37. The term was suggested to us by Alfred Grosser at the time we were preparing our thesis.

38. A critique presented by Pierre Germion, "Le pouvoir peripherique: Bureaucrates et notables dans le systeme politique francais" [Peripheral Power: Bureaucrats and Prominent Personalities in the French Political System], Paris, Le Seuil, 1976, p 13.

39. Christian Robin, "Le pays de Hamdan et Hawlan Quda'a (Nord-Yemen) avant l'Islam," Paris, Third Cycle Thesis, 466 pages.

40. Walter von Dostal, op cit, pp 9-11.

41. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Modern World System," New York, London, Academic Press, 1974, 410 pages; "Sous-developpement et dependance" [Under Development and Dependence], ESPRIT, February, 1974, pp 211-240; and "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis," COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, September, 1974.

42. Bernard Corbineau, "Le dialogue euro-arabe; instance du nouvel order international (1973-1978)" [The Euro-Arab Dialogue: an Instance of the New International Order (1973-1978)], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, June, 1980, pp 560-598.

43. The rigidity of this paradigm has often been criticizdd. See Jean-Francois Bayart, "L'analyse des situations autoritaires: etude bibliographique" [The Analysis of Authoritarian Situations: a Bibliographic Study], REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, June, 1976, p 486.

44. Particularly with Caid [qadi] 'Abd al-Karim Arashi holding power on an interim basis after the death of President Ghasmi and presently vice-president of the republic.

45. Yves Schemeil, op cit, p 541.

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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WORLD BANK TO GET $1.5 BILLION FROM GULF COUNTRIES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 5-6

[Text]

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE have agreed to lend the World Bank around $1.5 billion during the coming year. The new loans, which may be the first major financial support to come from the Arab countries in several years, would provide nearly a fifth of the $8 billion which the World Bank plans to borrow this year to help underwrite its loan projects.

Saudi Arabia has pledged around $1 billion for this fiscal year, according to an informed source, who suggested that the amount could be repeated in successive years. Another $500 million will come from Kuwait and the UAE.

News of the loans followed the return of World Bank President A W Clausen from a trip to Saudi Arabia a fortnight ago. Mr Clausen also visited Kuwait, the UAE and Jordan several weeks earlier. In addition, Kuwait was recently reported to have agreed to lend the bank KD30 million, or about $100 million, a step which was described here as an initial lending action by Kuwait.

The maturities and interest rates of the loan agreements had not been made available by the World Bank at the time of writing. Informed sources said, however, that the new funds were not earmarked for any special bank programmes, notably lending in the energy area which the bank is known to want to increase vastly.

Nor do the loans seem to be linked to the controversial issue of observer status for the Palestine Liberation Organisation at the joint annual meeting of the World Bank and its sister organisation, the International Monetary Fund. World Bank officials have generally been reticent about the size of lending by the Arab oil exporting countries to the bank over the past 15 months, dating back to mid-summer of 1980, when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia appeared to halt their lending in a gesture which was widely interpreted as throwing the two countries' support behind the PLO's position during manoeuvring over whether the PLO would be granted observer status at the 1980 annual meeting. A know-

knowledgeable bank source observed that, while there was a "standstill" in direct placements by the bank with the governments of the Arab capital surplus members of OPEC, "we do have indications that they bought in the public market."

However, whether or not financial support from the Arab countries has been forthcoming since then, it does appear clear that the new agreements mark the first lending of major size from the Arab oil countries since the mid-1970s. In this regard, they notably follow on the heels of last spring's agreement by Saudi Arabia to lend the IMF nearly $10 billion over the coming two years.

Despite its seeming willingness to back the bank financially, however, it does not appear at this point that Riyadh expects its new lending effort to lead directly to an increase in the voting shares of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, such as followed its loan to the IMF. But a source intimated that an increase in the voting shares of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE, which must be decided by the bank's Board of Executive Directors, will be brought up before the board eventually, although it is not yet on the agenda.

Sources also note that it is "very significant" that the Kuwaiti loan will be made in dinars and the Saudi loan perhaps in a mixture of riyals and dollars. Use of their national currencies in transactions with the bank, which for Kuwait at least is the first time it has done so since 1974, is regarded as additionally expressing the countries' support for the bank.

CSO: 4400/77

WEST BANK, GAZA LEADERS' VIEWS DISCUSSED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 82, 5-11 Sep 81 pp 12-17

[Article by Muhammad Ma'tuq: "How Do You Accept Being an Alternative to the PLO? What Is Your Opinion of Prince Fahd's Proposals To Solve the Crisis? What Do You Say to Sharon, and What Is Your Opinion of his Projects and Plans? What Are the Conditions To Begin the Palestinian Dialogue With the United States"]

[Text] In his letter to the American secretary of state, Alexander Haig, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin inquired as to the date for the return of President Reagan's envoy, Phillip Habib, to the Middle East, in order to continue his mission, which began with the onset of the Syrian missile crisis in Lebanon last May and ended with the achievement of a cease-fire between Israel and the PLO, without it being named. Haig replied publicly that Habib would return "when Reagan feels his return would be useful." However, informed sources say that this time Habib will be carrying some proposals pertaining to a solution of the Palestinian problem, and that within the framework of his new mission, he will meet with Palestinian leaders who have a connection with the PLO in certain Arab states, in order to present these proposals to them.

According to this assumption, the leadership of the Palestinian Resistance fears a large-scale operation against them in Lebanon, accompanied by an organized and harsh campaign of repression in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This has started recently, with the beginning of implementation of the so-called "new Israeli policy" in the occupied areas.

Editorials in some of the Western press are suggesting to Reagan's administration that they ask the Israelis to adhere to their promise to establish self-rule during the next year. However, the United States would have to reconsider one of its previous commitments to Israel and open a direct dialogue with the PLO.

In fact, the statement of Mr Brzezinski, former President Carter's advisor for national security affairs, did not pass without an uproar. He said it was necessary to talk to the Palestinians, by virtue of the fact that the commitment to Israel not to undertake direct contact with them was made by former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, in a private capacity. Some Palestinian circles in Beirut consider that to be an indication of a change in the official American position regarding the PLO, despite the fact that Brzezinski no longer occupies an official post in the new American administration.

In these circles' opinion, the statements of the new Israeli defense minister, Aeriel Sharon, about his intention to begin a dialogue with Palestinian leaders of the West Bank and Gaza next fall, falls within the American plan to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Sharon has in fact begun his preliminary contacts. He held a series of political meetings with mayors and political dignitaries in Tulkarm, Gaza, Hebron and East Jerusalem.

No one doubts that Israel is trying to intimidate the mayors and other Palestinian dignitaries, who are all loyal to the PLO, by the threat to use its alternate "agents" in the haggling. This is what Moshe Dayan referred to as reprehensible, in an interview with a British newspaper, in which he advised Sharon not to substitute "agents" for the true representatives of the Palestinian people, even if they were supporters of the PLO.

The West Bank and Gaza mayors, and other national personalities, are certain that the Israeli and American policy aimed at isolating the PLO will not succeed. They told AL-MAJALLAH, in a series of telephone interviews we conducted with them, that it would be useless to meet with the United States, unless it totally changes its policy in the Middle East, and in that framework, recognizes the PLO. At that time, those who represent the PLO would no longer be suspicious about dialogues with the United States.

The mayor of Nabulus, Bassam al-Shak'ah, the acting mayor of Hebron, Dr Mustafa al-Natshah (the actual mayor is Fahd al-Qawasimah, whom Israel exiled, following the Hebron fedayeen operation in May of last year), the mayor of Ramallah, Karim Khalaf, the mayor of Gaza, Rashad al-Shawa, and Anwar Nusaymah, one of the leading political dignitaries in occupied Jerusalem, all responded to AL-MAJALLAH's questions. These interviews took the form of a poll conducted by AL-MAJALLAH with the most prominent West Bank and Gaza personalities.

The PLO

Al-Shak'ah, who lost both legs in that booby-trapped car incident last year, says that the PLO's legality and exclusivity in representing the Palestinian people is derived from the Palestinian people themselves. "It fully represents the Palestinian people, it is their leadership. Therefore, it is their free will, because in view of the Palestinian people's dispersal and being under occupation, they cannot express themselves. The PLO represents the Palestinian people's free will."

Al-Shak'ah added: "The PLO represents the Palestinian people just as much as any government in the world represents its people. Despite the circumstances and dispersal of the Palestinian people, no group exists that opposes PLO representation of the Palestinians."

Al-Shak'ah views himself differently today from the one whose car was mined, just as he believes the PLO is changing and represents the Palestinian people "with all its capabilities and wherever it is present." Moreover, the situation with regard to the occupied territory "where our people are constantly affirming their cohesiveness with their leadership, which has proven its ability to wisely pursue the course of action and has been able to extract many gains on behalf of the Palestinian right, and has increased its importance and standing on both the Arab and international levels."

Al-Shak'ah also points to the fact of "the support that the legal Palestinian leadership has received from liberation movements and all the peoples of the world."

Anwar Nusaybah, who held several ministerial posts in the Jordanian government prior to 1967, supports the PLO's representation of the Palestinian people. "All the Arab states have endorsed this position. The PLO also enjoys support from widespread sectors, although I did not say unanimous. What could be more legal?

Al-Shawa's Caution

Rashad al-Shawa, the mayor of Gaza, who apparently was still remembering Sharon's atmosphere of intimidation during the recent meeting with him, was more cautious about talking about the PLO. He did not mention it by name in our interview with him. When he sensed that we had noticed that, he commented that "you do not appreciate our position here at home. The benefit of certain statements is paltry in comparison with the damage that might result from them." The Israeli military government in the occupied territory has forbidden anyone to support the PLO in any public statements, on grounds that the PLO wants to destroy Israel.

Despite that, al-Shawa's position differs considerably from the positions of his colleagues regarding the PLO as the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people. "The general circumstances through which the Palestinians have passed, the circumstances which created it (the PLO) and the dimensions that it has, has given it full legality, until later, when the Palestinians shall insist on being independent in choosing those who shall represent them."

Rashad al-Shawa's caution in discussing political questions, since he has not yet made any statements about his meeting with Sharon, was in contrast to the mayor of Tulkarm, Hilmi Hanun, who told reporters after his meeting with the Israeli defense minister that he rejected the self-rule plan within the framework of the Camp David process and that he was not willing to discuss its details. Hanun was not hesitant about declaring, "the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians, and it is the one to discuss our future."

Within the context of our conversation with him, al-Shawa said: "Sharon talked about the matter of self-rule and I replied that by far the most important thing about self-rule for us is that you recognize our right to self-determination and the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state west of the Jordan River."

Al-Shawa made it clear that the purpose of pointing out the place of the state was in reply to Sharon's claim that the place for the Palestinian state was Jordan.

Al-Shawa, who previously was exposed to threats due to his support for "complete self-rule" and not for what Israel proposes, says that the expression of right of self-determination "adequately covers all Palestinian and Arab demands."

We asked al-Shawa whether the subject of the PLO was discussed, and he replied in the negative. He then said, "Tacitly our position was understood, that we have one legal representative." He added that he did not raise the matter for fear of getting into matters of perception.

Al-Shawa says that the Israelis are still promoting the "debased self-rule that they have repeatedly announced." He added that the Israeli government, through other measures that lift some restrictions from general freedoms, "is trying to ease the atmosphere that they brought about, in the hope that it can carry on a discussion with the Palestinians. However, I do not believe that this policy will succeed in finding a single Palestinian, either within or abroad, who will consider himself an alternative to the Palestinian leadership."

Mustafa al-Natshah, "up to now" has seen no lessening of restrictions. He is afraid that "this is propaganda intended for overseas. We have heard, but we will not yet perceive any benefits."

Bassam al-Shak'ah thinks that the so-called new policy "is an attempt to cover over the racist, expansionist policy, and to take the opportunity to digest the expansions that Israel has achieved despite the world, through her fait accomplaits."

Agents

Al-Shak'ah says that Sharon can impose contact on the basis of his responsibility, but "there is no indication of an intention to deal with the masses of the people, in terms of achieving their national interests. There are no indicators of contact with other than agents, in order to spotlight them and give the agent forces room to be active in the area."

Among them is Mustafa Dudin, whom the mayors and national dignitaries of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip describe as "a puppet in the hands of the occupation authorities who use him to achieve their best interests." Mustafa Dudin is not alone; on the contrary, there are other persons in various areas who behave like him, as al-Shak'ah told us. Dudin heads one of the village leagues that is active in Hebron. Al-Shak'ah says that Dudin's activity "is aimed at creating contradictions in our Palestinian society and between village and town, and at exploiting circumstances for the benefit of the occupation and liquidation policies."

Al-Shak'ah describes Dudin as being "a shameless person who thoughtlessly provokes our people. His only standing is with some opportunistic agents, out for their own interests, who have become isolated from the lives of their people."

Al-Natshah, in whose area Dudin is active, considers that using Dudin as a political symbol "is one of the military government's attempts to create an alternative leadership." However, he believes that this attempt is destined for failure.

Therefore, there is consensus in the West Bank and Gaza that there is no possible alternative to the PLO domestically or abroad Karim Khalaf, who is

awaiting permission to go abroad to Houston to complete his treatment, and who has previously met with many officials in numerous countries, says that he always tells those he meets that "if you want to do business, go to the PLO. All our people are committed to the decisions and steps that its leadership makes."

Dialogue With America

However, what about dialogue with the United States which so far refuses to have any direct contact with the PLO and forbids its representatives, including Habib, when announcing the cease-fire decision between the Palestinians and Israel, from even mentioning its name? Would there be any benefit from a Palestinian dialogue with it, and who would conduct this dialogue on the Palestinian side?

There was consensus among the Palestinian dignitaries who responded to AL-MAJALLAH's question that none of them nor anyone else outside of the PLO has the authority to represent the Palestinians. There was also consensus on the need to have a Palestinian-American dialogue.

Bassam al-Shak'ah says that "the question of dialogue with the United States is basically rejected unless America completely changes its policy. If that change in its goals occurred, then naturally, Washington would recognize the PLO, because any effective and advantageous policy must deal with it."

Rashad al-Shawa responded to the same question, by saying, "I am prepared, as I have previously said, to meet and talk with anyone in the interests of finding solutions. But I am not an authority who can make decisions or sign in the name of the Palestinian people. If I met with the representatives of the United States or anyone else, my meeting would be to reemphasize once again our position with regard to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and their right to establish an independent and sovereign state on their territory."

Al-Shawa added: "I do not have the qualifications to enable me to represent the Palestinian people in a dialogue with America. Naturally, with those qualifications not existing, I will not come forward, nor will anyone else."

This is the view of al-Natshah as well. "No one would consent to be an alternative to the PLO in the occupied areas, and no one could enter into any dialogue with the Americans regarding any matter pertaining to the Palestinian people unless the PLO empowered them to do so."

Karim Khalaf referred to the United States' role in the recent cease-fire on the Lebanese-Palestinian border, and despite that he says: "The United States is still ignoring a basic fact, that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian people. If America really wants to bring peace to the area, and I doubt that, it would understand that the PLO is a fundamental party to the peace process."

Anwar Nusaybah said that the Palestinian-American dialogue "depends on America itself. In the circumstances in which we live, our Lord gave us the intelligence to solve our problems through dialogue. If there is room for dialogue, let it take place. The ball now is in the United States' court.

The United States stipulates that the PLO or the Palestinian party to the dialogue must recognize Israel in order for the American-Palestinian dialogue to take place. But, all the Palestinian dignitaries believe that that should be left to the PLO to determine. It is the sole legal representative, and it is the decision-maker in all such matters. Al-Natashah who has frequently been ousted from Hebron because of his hostile positions toward the occupation authorities, does not expect the question of recognizing Israel to be difficult. "When there is an independent Palestinian state, it will inevitably recognize the peoples of the area as all being on the same footing of equality."

Prince Fahd's Plan

Among the most important proposals that the United States recommends be discussed with the PLO are the recent proposals of Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, which call for complete Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab lands, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, with Jerusalem as its capital.

The Palestinian dignitaries were familiar with Prince Fahd's proposals, and their interests were kindled on various levels. They had positive views concerning them.

Al-Shak'ah says: "Actually, we find something new in the plan with respect to the policy of Arab officials. Accordingly, it is a submission that in fact expresses the just demands of our people and our nation." He added: "Our masses find that the effectiveness of this submission would increase if it would become the springboard for an Arab consensus, which itself would express unity of position toward the issues which our nation faces and the challenges which it is facing in various Arab areas, including Lebanon."

We asked al-Shak'ah what his position would be if Prince Fahd's proposals became a unanimous Arab plan, and he said that it was too early to tell. He added: "There is nothing in place that would allow me to express an opinion regarding this matter. Our leadership, the PLO, is able and qualified to express itself." It should be noted that the PLO, through its spokesman Yasser Arafat, has supported these proposals.

Al-Natshah says that "We are familiar with Prince Fahd's plan and we support it. It is a positive step toward solving the Palestinian problem."

Khalaf supports the plan, while also expressing some reservations. He says: "I believe that the articles that the plan contains comprise the minimum that can possibly be considered as a basis for a unified Arab position which would have any substance and influence."

Khalaf added that the PLO has "the sole right to speak for the Palestinian people." Khalaf calls on Saudi Arabia to take "practical and indicative steps against the United States, which continues its enmity toward the Palestinian people." However, he concluded by saying that they "in the occupied lands are committed to whatever positions the PLO takes regarding whatever ideas and proposals are raised."

Al-Shawa describes Prince Fahd's plan as being "an important springboard toward achieving peace." He says: "We can summarize it as something that we want. The crux is not in the plan itself, but rather in how much we achieve from these plans."

Al-Shawa says that "I am not optimistic about achieving gains in the near future. Therefore, I believe that our duty here at home is to depend to a very large extent on time and on the assistance of our brothers abroad, to make it possible for us to endure."

However, al-Shawa leaves a surprising footnote. "This is another thing that was not expected. As for reaching a solution as a result of studied steps and planning, I don't see that any time soon."

Sharon's "Plan"

However, there is Sharon's "plan" that considers that the Palestinian state in effect exists in Jordan. Al-Shawa forcibly expressed the view, in his meeting with the Israeli defense minister, that the location of the Palestinian state was west of the Jordan, not east of it. As for al-Shak'ah, he says that "Israel's leaders, including Sharon, are good at giving opinions that they have no right to in any way whatsoever. This is a kind of Israeli deception, so that they can structure the area in ways that will serve their aggressive, expansionist interests. It is similar to the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq or interfering in Lebanon. In this case, they are intervening in the matter of Jordan."

Al-Shak'ah added: "Sharon is no different in this than Peres who raised the Jordanian option as an alternative to self-rule." Al-Shak'ah feels that Jordan has a role in solving the Palestinian problem, just as any other Arab state has a role, equal to its standing with the PLO, on behalf of achieving the Palestinian national interests.

Al-Natshah holds the same view, that "Jordan will have a helper's role regarding the matter of the Palestinian people," but he points out that Jordan itself considers the PLO to be the sole, legal representative of the Palestinian people. He goes on to say: "The Palestinian state will have a special, close relationship with Jordan, by virtue of the fact that it has a long, mutual border with the Palestinian state."

Regarding the same matter, al-Shawa says: "Ultimately, there is no doubt that Jordan will have a major role, because Jordan is the eastern key to the occupied lands, just as we in the occupied territory are an outlet for Jordan to the Mediterranean Sea. Jordan and the occupied territory complement each other."

However, al-Shawa adds: "There is no role for Jordan or anyone else now." One of the Palestinian dignitaries, who previously conceded his support for a major Jordanian role in solving the Palestinian problem, is Anwar Nusaybah. He is a former minister of defense, a former minister of education, a former minister of public works, a former governor and a former ambassador in Jordan. Nusaybah says: "From my point of view, resolution 242 requires Israel to withdraw completely from the territory of those states with whom she entered into war in 1967, and that is in the interests of these states. Accordingly, I

considered that Jordan had a basic role. However, after the Arab summit conference in Rabat and the decision requiring efforts to solve the Palestinian problem in regard to all its aspects and roots, in return for a true peace, the PLO was the only one left that could assume this responsibility."

Nusaybah says: "At this stage, the PLO is the foundation."

Finally, these are the positions of the most prominent Palestinian dignitaries in the occupied territory, after the decision to cut off Arab assistance to the occupied lands, which the joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee was raising. Everyone who responded to AL-MAJALLAH's questions recognized that the purpose of the decision was to destroy growth projects in the occupied territory, especially since Israel did not compensate for money forbidden to enter with funds that it gave itself. Al-Shak'ah says that Israel could bear the additional burdens. Therefore, he considers the decision to have political goals. Through the pages of AL-MAJALLAH, he is addressing the Arab nations to formulate a counterplan to safeguard the steadfastness of the Palestinian at home.

While awaiting that, Karim Khalaf says: "The stopping of municipal services will not affect the morale of our people. Its rights and its will come before all else."

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CSO: 4404/58

REPORT SHOWS FALL IN OPEC DEPOSITS IN WESTERN BANKS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 p 6

[Text]

There was a marked decline in deposits by OPEC countries in the international banking system in the second quarter of this year, according to the latest report published by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), which groups major banks in the West and Japan. OPEC countries placed only $1.6 billion with reporting banks, compared with deposits of $5.1 billion in the first quarter.

The BIS report indicates that OPEC countries made a net contribution of some $7.5 billion in the first three months of this year. However, OPEC countries borrowed almost as much as they deposited during the second quarter, thus cancelling them out as net suppliers of funds. Most of the extra demand for credit came from Middle Eastern OPEC members.

US and European banks were the main suppliers of international liquidity during the period. There was a net outflow of funds from US banks totalling $7.6 billion. This continued a first quarter trend and brought the total net outflow of funds from the US to $56 billion since the end of March 1980. European banks were also major net contributors of funds during the second quarter, with their overall net external liabilities falling by some $8.5 billion.

Lending within the reporting area declined from $23 billion in the first quarter to $19 billion in the second. New lending to countries outside the reporting area increased from $7 billion to $16 billion. Lending to non-oil developing countries climbed markedly from $4.9 billion to $8.5 billion. Commenting on this, the BIS report said: "The acceleration in borrowing was brought about in large measure by countries outside Latin America that had on balance hardly any recourse to international bank credit in the first quarter of the year."

Eastern Europe continued to draw down its deposits in the reporting banks. The Soviet Union alone drew down its deposits by $1.9 billion, bringing total

Soviet withdrawals over the first half to an unadjusted $5 billion. Comecon deposits in the West now stand at $9.4 billion and those of the Soviet Union at $3.6 billion. During the second quarter, borrowing by these countries from the West fell by $1.7 billion to $57.2 billion.

The BIS report estimated that the West had $14.1 billion in loans outstanding to Poland at the end of June, compared to $14.7 billion at the end of the first quarter. Loans to Romania declined from $5.4 billion to $5.1 billion. The scale of these countries' indebtedness and the accompanying trend on the part of the Soviet Union towards reducing its deposits in the West are clearly significant in relation to the recent announcements by Poland and Hungary that they are intending to apply for IMF membership. If their membership bid succeeds it will allow them access to substantial sources of new credit. Poland, for example, would be able to borrow somewhere in the region of $4-5 billion, representing four times its likely quota. This would relieve the Soviet Union (and Western banks) of some of the strain involved in trying to keep afloat the troubled economies of its Eastern bloc allies.

The new BIS figures also show that Mexico has overtaken Brazil as the world's largest borrower from the international banking system, with gross borrowing standing at $45 billion during the second quarter, compared to $42.7 billion in the first. Brazil's total rose from $43.8 billion to $44.1 billion by the end of June.

The BIS commented that the credit off-take of non-oil developing countries in the first half of this year, which amounted to $13.4 billion, was less than in both the first half of last year when it stood at $14.8 billion and the second half, when it totalled $24.7 billion.

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OPEN REGISTRIES BAR EXPANSION OF OPEC FLEETS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 6-7

[Text]

Flags of convenience in international shipping are a major obstacle to OPEC countries seeking to develop their own tanker fleets, a UN official charged in a report carried by the OPEC news agency last week.

In a forthcoming article in the *OPEC Review*, Director of the Committee on Shipping of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Adib al-Jadir advocates phasing out the system of open registries of shipping. Putting an end to flags of convenience would rationalise world shipping, enable OPEC countries to play a greater role in the transport, marketing and distribution of oil, and provide an opportunity for increased economic cooperation between oil exporting and other developing countries.

Last May in a special session, UNCTAD's shipping Committee approved by a majority vote a process for abolishing flags of convenience. The Group of 77 was united in demanding the establishment of true economic links between flag and vessel. Only Liberia, which derives almost 10 per cent of its foreign exchange from the open registry system, stood apart with a dissenting vote.

The OPEC news agency said Mr Jadir urged that the process set in motion at the May UNCTAD meeting must now be actively pursued, especially by the OPEC countries, "which have an inherent interest in expanding their fleets". The OPEC countries have both economic and strategic reasons for wishing to increase their share of ownership of the world's tanker fleet and their participation in the transport and distribution of oil. At present, the maritime transport of hydrocarbons is almost totally dominated by multinational corporations and shipowners of the developed market-economy countries. In 1980 OPEC countries held only 3.6 per cent of the world's tanker fleet, while developed countries owned 52 per cent.

Flags of convenience accounted for 36.2 per cent of world tanker tonnage, according to Mr Jadir. Consequently "there has to be a substantial transfer from

open-registry tanker tonnage to the national fleets of these developing countries." Developing countries as a whole, including OPEC, owned only 7.6 per cent of total tanker tonnage in 1980.

The case against flags of convenience is quite strong. Vessels flying flags of convenience often break shipping codes, avoid taxes and, according to a recent editorial in the *Bulletin* of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), have been used to violate the UN embargo on oil exports to South Africa. Mr Jadir sees them "at the root of irrational and erratic developments in the world's shipping fleet in recent years," which include mounting incidents of maritime fraud (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, November 9), shipwrecks, scuttling of vessels, and environmental disasters. Many transnational corporations are involved in open registry operations because of lower crew costs; in some cases labour costs under convenient flags are half of those under a national fleet. Flags of convenience are, in Mr Jadir's words "a tool for transnational corporations and developed countries used in maintaining their domination over the transport of oil and other bulk cargoes."

In Mr Jadir's view, if open registries are abolished the best course for developing countries to follow in expanding their fleets and their share of world shipping would be in cooperation between the oil and non-oil exporters. Mr Jadir points out that "in the non-oil exporting developing countries there is an abundance of trained and highly efficient manpower, as well as management potential, for the manning of tanker fleets. At the same time, OPEC countries have a financial and low fuel cost advantage. By bringing together these elements in the form of joint ventures with other developing countries, OPEC countries can contribute to cementing effective economic cooperation within the developing world."

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OPECNA ENTERS ITS SECOND YEAR

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 p 8

[Text]

OPECNA, the news agency jointly owned by the members of OPEC, celebrated its first birthday last week with some sober – and sobering – comments from the current President of the OPEC Conference, Indonesia's Minister for Mines and Energy Dr Subroto, and Dr Ibrahim Shihata, Director General of the OPEC Fund for International Development. In its first year of operation, *OPECNA* has distributed more than 300,000 words of news to about 400 subscribers in 70 countries.

Both Dr Subroto and Dr Shihata expressed qualified satisfaction with *OPECNA*'s performance during its first year of operations; this newsletter, which has examined the infant news agency's daily offerings throughout the year, agrees with their judgements. The Vienna-based news agency depends for its reports on the media of OPEC's 13 members as well as on contributions from its staff at headquarters. There can be little doubt that *OPECNA* has been a positive force in reporting the activities of the oil exporting states over the past year and no doubt whatsoever that it could do a far better job if these countries cooperated more fully with their own news agency. "Member country input for *OPECNA*, reflecting their internal activities, is essential," Dr Subroto declared. In wishing *OPECNA* well as it enters its second year, *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO* echoes Dr Subroto's desire for a greater flow of news. Some OPEC countries act as if *OPECNA* did not exist. They hurt not only OPEC as an organisation but also themselves.

Dr Subroto conceded that a year was too short a period in which to judge *OPECNA*'s impact. "However," he said, "it is helping to combat bias and ignorance about the organisation, together with efforts it is making in other areas such as OPEC workshops for journalists ... Perhaps a direct and frequent dialogue should be established between *OPECNA* and the editors of major news services and media in an effort to help them see our point of view."

Dr Subroto saw the tide of bitterness against OPEC receding. "In a general sense," he said, "there has been a steady improvement of the OPEC image. Besides *OPECNA*, there are other forces that are contributing to an improvement of the organisation's image because of a better appreciation in the world of what OPEC is doing. There is less talk of OPEC as the cause of the world's ills. In scientific and academic circles, as well as in the press, there is now an awareness of the energy problem and the role OPEC has played in preventing a terrible crisis."

Dr Shihata marked *OPECNA*'s first birthday by examining the Third World's attempts to counter the influence of Western news agencies and the way in which they dominate the flow of news. While asserting that there was a good deal of truth in Third World complaints that the Western agencies tended to reflect the views of industrial nations in their reporting, Dr Shihata addressed the problem pragmatically.

"What is needed," he declared, "is either the establishment of a truly international agency run collectively, which does not seem to be a practical solution, or at least an attempt to balance the present situation by the creation of counterpart agencies reflecting the views and interests of the Third World." *OPECNA*, he said, was not necessarily attempting to counter the Western agencies, adding that "it would be pretentious to say that through *OPECNA* we have changed the international information order. But at least it is one of the serious attempts being made to influence the present order with the objective of making it a more balanced one."

There have been suggestions, including one by Dr Subroto, that *OPECNA* should be expanded to cover Third World events outside the immediate orbit of OPEC. According to Dr Subroto, "as an ideal target, *OPECNA* should eventually expand into covering news on and about other developing countries. For the immediate future, it should extend its coverage to important international *fora* that touch upon the energy problems and the development of the Third World. OPEC would render a good service to the developing countries by interpreting and analysing the meaning of these international events."

Dr Shihata felt that *OPECNA* was heading in the right direction, "but it should not stop at that. It would be a mistake to lose sight of the objective. More has to be done in terms of coverage and analysis, and even in countering views that come from industrialised countries on issues of relevance to the Third World." Stereotyped images were one of the world's principal problems and were a potential barrier to assistance for developing countries. "The way to change these images," he stressed, "is through direct contact and more free flow of information. That is what we should be doing."

And so say all of us.

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OIL MARKET PROSPECTS: IEA SEES A CONFUSED PICTURE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 8-9

[Article by Randa Takieddine]

[Text]

The International Energy Agency is forecasting a de-stocking of crude oil of between 3.6 and 3.7 million b/d by oil companies during the first quarter of 1982, but admits that its perceptions of the market are clouded by a host of unknown quantities. An IEA official who asked not to be identified told this newsletter there was a discrepancy in the figures for the drawing down of stocks of oil "that cannot really be explained at the moment".

If, for example, the forecasts given to the IEA by market participants are to be believed, current de-stocking is only some 500,000 to 600,000 b/d, well below the generally accepted figure of 2 million b/d for the final quarter of 1981. The same sources are responsible for the predictions for the first three months of next year and these are at least 1 million b/d above IEA expectations for de-stocking at that time of the year.

According to the official, the confusion is not due to the agency's lack of forecasting ability or a paucity of information. The villain of the piece is the time lag between the statistical insights provided by the oil market and reality in what are clearly conditions of flux. "We will eventually know what the situation is," the official said. "We are in a position of seeing certain things and suspecting something else to be the case not being able to prove it other than by pointing to circumstantial evidence."

The official explained that "a lot of things are different in the oil market now. It is only natural that they affect systems put in place during times of more regularity." The principal change, he said, was the sharp drop in demand for oil which began towards the end of 1979 and which has continued ever since. "This drop is now starting to taper off," the official said. "It is not stopping, but the rate of drop is now lower than it was at the beginning of the year. Demand in the IEA area dropped almost 8 per cent in the first half of 1981 but the slowdown in the second half will bring

the overall drop in demand closer to 6.5 to 7 per cent for the year. The rate of drop at the moment is maybe of the order of 4 per cent."

De-stocking was due both to the normal cyclical draw-down of oil and the cost of carrying a large inventory at high interest rates, the official noted. "What is clouding the picture is the question of sea stocks. We have certain indications, but we have no hard evidence. Nor, I think, has anyone else, including the producers themselves, of how much of the sea stocks have been landed to replace land stocks and how much has not and is actually at sea. We know the trend, but we do not have absolute statistics."

Questioned on predictions by OPEC ministers, notably Saudi Arabia's Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, that the oil market will lose its softness and move into balance after the first quarter of 1982, the IEA official pointed to the problem of forecasting demand. "At the moment, our forecast is that demand will be more or less flat in the IEA area next year. We think that demand in the IEA area will average 32.9 million b/d by the end of the year, compared to 38.7 million b/d just two years ago, and that it will stay at about this figure.

"It does not seem that there are indications that economic growth is going to pick up in the next few months," the official stated, speaking before President Reagan's own rather pessimistic forecasts for the US economy. "Even though overall demand for the year may be flat," the official added, "demand might continue to drop in the first half of the year."

This, the official said, "would lead one to believe that, at the production level planned by OPEC, the state of the market would be more or less the same as it is now.

There were, however, some variables. "The stock draw will have to end at some point," the official said. "If we have a very hard winter and a stock draw that is terminating and market participants at that point who are ready to take on new inventories, there may be an upswing in demand But it would not be an upswing in demand because of final consumption. It would be because of conditions in the market."

The timing for this upswing, the official said, was between February and April of next year. "If it does not happen then, there is not much chance that it will happen during the next two quarters even with the normal cyclical build-up of stocks."

Turning to prospects for oil prices, the official noted that the softness of the market was dictating price differentials. "Even the market participants on the producing side have set their differentials in line with a market judgement which indicates that the market will only support a certain amount of differential above the OPEC marker crude price," the official said. "They did not go to the limit allowed by the OPEC agreement and

this argument is not yet over. There are other market participants like North Sea producers and Mexico and they have made similar market judgements. There is some harmony, but it is not yet total. The market participants are not yet unanimous on what the market will support."

Taking a still longer view, the IEA official could have been mistaken for a member of OPEC's Secretariat. "What we in the IEA do not forget is that oil is not an infinite resource. It has limits which are perhaps longer than we first thought they were but in the longer term we have to keep thinking about changing the structures of our economies as much as possible away from oil. There are sectors such as transport where oil will remain indispensible for some time to come, but firing a boiler with oil does not make much sense any more. There are cheaper and more efficient ways of doing it and there is coal in abundant supply to do the job. Oil is a premium fuel. So is natural gas. They should not be used to fire boilers. They should only be used in sectors where it is hard to replace them."

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ESTABLISHMENT OF NAVAL FORCE FOR GCC DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 239, 19 Sep 81 pp 29-31

[Article by Riyadh Najib Al-Rayyis: "AL-MUSTAQBAL Publishes the Minutes of the Ta'if Conference Sessions, Establishment of a Joint Gulf Naval Force, and Pipeline to Avoid the Straits of Hormuz"]

[Text] The meeting of the foreign ministers of the Gulf states in Ta'if on 31 August was tantamount to a decisive change in Gulf relations, and in determining the list of priorities which international variables have imposed upon them. Over the 3-day period, many of the expressions on the same faces that had attended the Abu Dhabi conference last May changed. Some comraderie and closeness has developed among the six ministers, which was not present at the famous Abu Dhabi meeting. Broad smiles have appeared on some of the faces, from which laughter had long been missing.

The Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] has become a reality, and no longer is there scope for any nation to impose its political concepts, military priorities and economic conditions on the others.

Therefore, these concepts must be unified, these priorities agreed upon, and these conditions discussed. All of this has become mutual premises for a single goal. Therefore, it must be emphasized that the Gulf states' foreign ministers were more determined than at any time in the past to confront the political variables that have just occurred during the past 3 months with a great deal of realism, along with discussion of matters which various previous conferences had put off in the past, with a great deal of flexibility and openness, without any prior position, even if it had been previously announced in previous conferences of through other forums.

Over the 3 days in Ta'if, the Gulf states' foreign ministers held seven meetings. Five of them were closed, and could be attended only by the ministers themselves along with the Council's secretary general. Two meetings were open and attended by all the members of the delegations.

In the two general meetings, attended by a delegation from each state, there was discussion of procedural matters placed on the agenda by the secretariat general. At the closed meetings, they were immersed in the political changes which the ministers wanted to discuss alone, without advisors, deputies or aides, in a congenial atmosphere, free of the formality of the tradition conference. The Gulf

foreign ministers had been satisfied with this arrangement, after its success in Musqat and Abu Dhabi, since the ministers are well acquainted with each others' personalities. It seemed to be easier to discuss the most sensitive and complex matters, without each one of their countries having to assume a formal position, from which it might be difficult to back off of or to rally around.

As for those present, the "six Gulf knights" were well known and most of them are contemporaries of Gulf events, during the past 10 years, apart from the "newly graduated knight," the GCC's secretary general, 'Abdullah Bisharah. The knights of the Gulf roundtable met in Ta'if as a GCC ministerial council, holding its first session since its official establishment in Abu Dhabi 3 months ago. The sessions were chaired by Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the Saudi foreign minister, in his capacity as minister of the host nation. Those in attendance were: Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, foreign minister of Kuwait; Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Mubarek Al Khalifah, foreign minister of Bahrain; Qais 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Zawawi, foreign minister of Omah; Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Saif Al Thani, foreign minister of Qatar; and Rashad 'Abdullah al-Nu'aymi, foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates.

Discussion began with the Omani security paper, upon which discussion had been postposed at the Abu Dhabi conference. In fact its existence was continually denied throughout that conference. The Omani paper has two sections:

The first is political and discusses the priorities of Gulf policy, pertaining to cooperation with the United States and the Western nations, and the position of these priorities with respect to the Soviet Union and its cooperating nations in the region.

The second part is military. It discusses defensive and security questions, and what is needed to establish true military coordination in the Gulf, in light of the traditional and continual saying that responsibility for Gulf security and its defense is the responsibility of the Gulf states alone.

The Omani paper was submitted with specific proposals in this regard. The highlights are:

* Establish a joint Gulf naval force, forming the nucleus of a military unit to defend the Gulf. Since all the Gulf nations face on the sea, the matter of creating a joint naval force comes within defensive priorities.

* Increase the size of Gulf armed forces to equal the other hostile forces located on another part of the Arabian Peninsula.

* Hold joint military manuevers among the Gulf states, represented by the various services, at different times, in accordance with a time schedule, as a part of the beginning of Gulf military coordination.

* Unify the sources of Gulf weapons and training, and the means of purchasing them.

* Unify the means of Gulf air defense, so as to cover all the points of entry and exit on the Arabian Peninsula, and form an integrated air defense network to ensure the protection of Gulf airspace and to form an early warning system.

In order to clarify Omani thinking with respect to these proposals, the purpose of them is to distribute military responsibilities among the Gulf states, in such a way as to define for each state the role that it is required to play. The proposal to create a joint Gulf naval force, for example, does not mean establishing a new Gulf naval force from scratch, as much as it means gathering currently existing naval units of each nation into a joint naval force, under unified leadership, which would determine each nation's role in protecting specific parts of the Gulf, apart from supplementing existing naval shortfalls by purchasing new equipment to strengthen this naval force. Each state would bear a part of the shortfalls, so that creation of this force can be completed. Each state's naval units would remain under its authority within the joint command, and a joint strategic role.

With regard to forming a joint air defense network, the purpose is also to strengthen the already existing Gulf air defense networks, tie them together, and fill the gaps that exist by purchasing new equipment. A specific role would be defined for each state within an air defense strategy for the region. Moreover, with regard to the other military proposals which the Omani paper contains, military sovereignty over its armed forces is retained by each state, under a joint unified command umbrella, which would determine for each of the forces its Gulf role, as separate from its national role, within a unified Gulf defense strategy.

The Saudi Paper

In addition to the Omani paper, there was a Saudi security paper before the Gulf ministerial council in Ta'if. The council discussed the Saudi paper, which in its military section covered the same ground that the Omani paper dealt with, but it was radially different in its political section from the Omani concept.

The political disparity was clear between the Saudi and Omani papers. The Saudi paper stressed that its political priorities are for the Arab and Islamic issues, and accordingly, the GCC foreign policy must stem from the reality of its Arab and Islamic membership. The Omani paper raised a fundamental question: should GCC priorities be for Gulf issues or for the Middle East issue? Accordingly, the Gulf enemy must be clearly defined at this stage, i.e., a return to the list of political and military priorities, based on practical political and military coordination.

The Sultanate of Oman submitted comments on the Saudi paper. There were thus three papers before the council: the Omani paper, the Saudi paper, and the comments by Oman on the Saudi paper. The ministerial council agreed to coordinate between the three papers and to draw up a unified report, during the meetings of the second ministerial council, which it would submit to the second Gulf summit, in its capacity as the Supreme Council, for a decision on practical steps in that regard and to implement them.

When the discussion regarding political and military situations reached this point, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, in the name of Saudi Arabia, submitted a proposal inviting the chiefs of staffs of the Gulf states' armed forces to a meeting to discuss the development of these military and security proposals, provided that that be followed by another conference of the Gulf states' defense ministers, to which the chiefs of staff would report their concepts, so that in turn, the defense ministers could submit a detailed and practical report to the Gulf summit conference, where the Supreme Council could adopt the expected security and military decisions. All the

ministers approved the Saudi proposal without reservation. The ministerial council stressed the need for the meeting of the chiefs of staff and the defense ministers during the next few weeks, so that they would precede the date of the second Gulf summit to be held in Riyadh on 3 November. The Saudi proposal was considered the first practical step of its kind in the life of the Gulf states, just as the meeting of the chiefs of staff and the defense ministers is without precedent in Gulf history.

A Pipeline Outside of Hormuz

After the completion of the discussion regarding the security papers, and agreement was reached on inviting the military men to meet, Oman submitted a proposal to the ministerial council for an oil pipeline, passing through Omani territory, avoiding the Straits of Hormuz and the ports of the Arab Gulf, and flowing through the Arabian Sea directly to the Indian Ocean.

In its presentation of the proposal, Oman said that, since everyone feared the possibility of the closure of the Straits of Hormuz in the event of its being mined, it was necessary to consider an alternative to ensure the continuous delivery of oil to the world, without Hormuz being the only artery. Therefore, the Sultanate had prepared an exhaustive study regarding the building of a pipeline to pump oil from the Gulf countries to Oman's port on the Arabian Sea. This pipeline would begin on Kuwaiti territory, passing through Saudi territory to UAE territory and then to Oman. This line would be connected to another line carrying Qatari and Bahraini oil. The Sultanate has filed its study for this huge project with the council's secretariat general, so that it can be distributed to the members for their study. It is to be discussed at the next ministerial council, to be prepared for referral to a special conference of Gulf oil ministers, to be held later, for discussion and to adopt a decision in that regard.

The Omani study mentioned that some of the benefits of this project lie in the fact that it would negate the importance and sensitivity of the Straits of Hormuz, in the event of sabotage closing it or as a result of it being occupied, for example. It would create another source for marketing oil, other than the traditional sources, such as the present refineries and ports. It would also reduce the exorbitant insurance fees, which are levied on oil tankers, currently transiting the Gulf, on the basis that it is a war zone. In addition to that, this pipeline project would, to a great extent, reduce the hideous pollution problem from which the Gulf suffers.

It is true that this pipeline project would not be able to pump more than 10 million barrels a day, at a maximum, and 5 million barrels daily as a median. Consequently, it will not substitute for the current pumping and shipping operations, and it will not have the capacity for all their many potentialities. However, it would reduce the pressure on them, and would continue to be a permanent alternative for the continuation of the flow of oil to the consuming nations, no matter what convulsions occurred in the Gulf, i.e., under any circumstances, even though with reduced quantitites, it would be a permanent guarantee that the flow of oil would not be cut off.

All the Gulf states welcomed this Omani project in principle, and Kuwait said that it had had a similar project, several years ago, to build a pipeline to transport

Kuwaiti oil to South Yemen through which the Aden refinery would have been supplied. However, this project was not implementated at that time, for many reasons, mostly political, along with the geographical difference that Kuwaiti oil would have been flowing into the Red Sea, which is an enclosed, confined area like the Gulf, whereas, in the Omani project, Arab oil would be flowing through the Arabian Sea to the Indian Ocean which is a vast area and difficult to blockade.

The fact is that Oman, in its plan, is offering an alternative to Hormuz and the Gulf. However, it would benefit from achieving it for many reasons, most importantly, that reducing the strategic importance of the Straits of Hormuz would automatically mean reducing the burden of its military defense, which would please the Sultanate greatly, and would also free it of other defensive matters. In addition, the Omani ports on the Arabian Sea would become the primary oil exporting ports. Moreover, the transit fees levied on oil passing through Omani territory would increase, and would strengthen the country's income. From the political, security and economic points of view, this pipeline project would be of great benefit to Oman, and would increase its strategic importance as much as it would bolster its economic situation.

The Iraqi-Iranian war has made the Omanis more apprehensive about defending the Straits of Hormuz and the water passageways of the Gulf. Since the first Omani plan to defend the Straits of Hormuz, which they submitted to the Gulf states in 1979, and which met with no response worth mentioning, calling on the oil exporting and consuming states to cooperate in buying advanced naval equipment, such as mine-sweepers and torpedo boats to reinforce Omani defensive capability, the internal situation in Iran has worsened and become chaotic. With this, the ability to negotiate with a central authority has diminished. Then came the seizure of the Danish ship carrying goods to Iraq by Iran, followed by the incident of the seizure of the Kuwaiti ship, which once again raised the fear that Iran, under some circumstance or other, so long as the war with Iraq continued outside its borders and its civil was continued inside, would resort to more ship seizures and would block navigation through the Straits, through mining them, in the event any nation resisted the Iranians in trying to protect their ships. Behind these fears lies the importance of the Omani pipeline project.

Suspension of Mediation between Oman and Aden

The discussion among the Gulf states' foreign ministers, meeting alone around the round table, then shifted to the mediation efforts between Oman and South Yemen, which the Musqat conference called for last March. It had begun as a tripartite effort among Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, but it ended as bilateral between Kuwait and the UAE. Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, the Kuwaiti foreign minister, and Rashid 'Abdullah, the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, undertook the latest effort in that regard last April, but it ended in failure. The decision was finally made to stop the mediation between the two countries, because of the council's conviction that South Yemen did not want these efforts to succeed and did not wish to reach a solution to settle its dispute with Oman. After 10 years of mediation attempts, under various aegis and in which Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad has always played a fundamental role, this mediation was transferred to the council's secretariat general, due to the feeling that any possibility of future mediation must be through the secretariat general and not through an individual state. The burial of the mediation efforts between Musqat and Aden means two fundamental things:

1. An end to the traditionally neutral position taken by Kuwait, together with the UAE, between Oman and South Yemen, and consequently, the joining of Kuwait and the UAE to the Omani side as a part of their political alliance within the GCC.

2. An end to any special relationship by some GCC states with South Yemen, at the expense of its relations with Oman. Aden no longer has a specific familiarity through which it can influence the Gulf states, as it used to have with Kuwait and Abu Dhabi. Consequently, this is the first position of solidarity that the Gulf nations have taken among themselves in the history of the GCC, irrespective of their previous and relations with a specific country.

Stemming from this second decision, agreement was reached on stopping the economic assistance that some GCC states, including Saudi Arabia but primarily Kuwait and UAE, were giving to South Yemen. However, it was decided to continue the economic obligations that Kuwait and the UAE had previously pledged to build a public housing complex in South Yemen, but further economic assistance and GCC obligations to Aden will not be renewed. The decision to suspend the mediation efforts and stop economic assistant is tantamount to a victory for the Omani point of view, as well as being a victory for the first unified Gulf political and economic position with respect to any issue, especially an issue around which controversy and dispute has swirled for more than 10 years.

The first day of the 3 Ta'if Summit days ended, and there was laughter again on the faces of the six Gulf knights. Today, by an Arab measure, a giant step has been taken toward Gulf cooperation.

7005
CSO: 4404/25

AFGHAN REBELS ATTACK KABUL HOTEL

TA241538 London BBC World Service in English 1500 GMT 24 Nov 81

[From "Radio Newsreel"]

[Text] Western diplomatic reports in Delhi say that rebels in Afghanistan have made a rocket attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul. The attack is said to have taken place on Saturday, when delegates of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization was staying at the hotel, although they were not in the building at the time.

Our correspondent in Delhi Mark Tully has been monitoring reports and sent us this despatch, which we will read for you:

There is no estimate of damage or casualties but the blast from the rocket broke windows in houses near the hotel. Other explosions were also heard during the 4-day meeting of the solidarity organization. Radio Kabul led its bulletins for the reports of the organization's meeting, indicating that the government of President Babrak Karmal hopes it would demonstrate international support and so the situation in Kabul was under control. [sentence as heard] After the rocket attack on the Intercontinental, Soviet troops set up at least two road blocks and Soviet troops are seen patrolling the streets on foot. Normally Soviet troops are only involved in security at night and they usually patrol in armoured vehicles.

Outside Kabul, the diplomats report fighting in several different places. Soviet and Afghan troops have again been active in the areas around the town of Paghman only some 15 miles from the capital. But guerrillas are still reported to be able to move freely in the town by day or night.

Diplomats now confirm an earlier report that a helicopter was shot down in Parvan Province to the north of the capital earlier this month. They say that there are Soviet troop concentrations every 15 km along the keyroad from Kabul to the Salang Pass, which leads to the Soviet border.

A visitor from the city of Mazar-I-Sharif, the other side of the Salang Pass, and near the Soviet border, told diplomats guerrilla activities there had also increased. He confirmed an earlier report that an arms depot had been captured and 27 military personnel kidnapped.

CSO: 4600/138

ADVANCEMENTS IN SOCIAL, CONSUMER SERVICES REPORTED

University Registration

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] KABUL, November 14 (Bakhtar).— Over 4,000 boys and girls from the 12th grade of the various Kabul city lycees took the university entrance examination yesterday.

A total of 2,700 boys and 1,400 girls from the Habibia, Speen Kalai, Ebne Seena, Rabea Balkhi, Shirshah Soori, Ariana, Aisha Durani, Amani, Rahman Baba, Khushal Khan, Manmoude Tarzi and Shahe Doshamshira lycees took the examination, conducted in the Kabul university, the Polytechnic institute and the Afghan Institute of Technology.

The president of the education department of the Higher and Vocational Education Ministry said that, due to the increase in students' admission to the university, the examination is conducted in two stages. One of these was held yesterday and the other is scheduled for November 20.

In yesterday's examinations, 3,000 students in the field of science and 1,100 students in the field of social studies appeared.

The questions are of the multiple choice type.

The examinations were supervised by the Deputy Minister of Higher and Vocational Education, the Rector of the university and 380 university professors and an examination commission, comprising representatives of the Prime Ministry and ministries of Education, Higher and Vocational Education, Public Health, and Communications and the PDPA CC.

Firewood Supplies

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] In the last one month, over 4,000 kharwars of fuel wood (each kharwar is 80 seers and each seer is seven kgs) have been distributed to the Kabul citizens.

At present, there are 72,000 residential houses in Kabul and the population of the Kabul city is estimated at over one million. As housing is a problem for the citizens, the supply and provision of essential commodities especially the fuel wood for all is worth study and consideration. The most pressing need is that of distribution of fuel wood for winter and checking and controlling its price.

Talking to the Kabul New Times on the distribution, price and amount of fuel wood, stored in various parts of the city, Kabul Mayor Eng Adena Sangeen said: "The Kabul Municipality, in pursuance of the progressive policy of the party and the popular Government, taking into view the financial means, has adopted necessary and positive measures to render public service as required of a municipality. It has already undertaken ambitious projects to solve gradually the housing problems in the city and the same is true about the ways and means to solve the problem of provision of essential commodities for the Kabul citizens."

The municipality has been aware of the shortage of fuel wood and the rise in its price. With Afs 8 million at its disposal, it began to procure fuel wood to be distributed to the citizens especially during the winter. It has also obtained an additional Afs 60 million as a bank loan for the procurement, and the operation continues.

Prior to the distribution, said Eng Sangeen, one seer of fuel wood in Kabul market was sold for Afs 60 to 70 and now it is available at Afs 50 and even less at the open market.

With necessary authorisation from the concerned authorities, the municipality began to procure fuel wood in the first quarter of the current Afghan year, Continued purchase is being done since the beginning of Sunbula and efforts are on for purchase and storage of fuel wood in seven distribution centres in Kabul, he noted.

So far, the authorised purchasing body has procured over 10,000 kharwars, which are stored at the centers.

The procurement body, utilising the favourable conditions in the East Zone and with the cooperation and assistance of the party and Government employees, is purchasing every day a certain amount of fuel wood and transfers it to the centres.

TO BE NOTED

By the advent of winter, it had already begun distribution and sale of fuel wood from its 10,000 kharwars fuel wood already procured and stored. "Ought to be noted", said Eng Sangeen, "that some of the citizens have already procured their winter supply, and some are depending on electricity and petroleum and diesel stoves within the city and the people in the outskirts of Kabul are felling dry trees to be used for winter, which helps lessen the demand for fuel wood."

He added that all-sided evaluation studies show that the consumption of fuel wood during winter in Kabul, excluding the Government and non-Government organisations, reaches 20,000 kharwars a year. Thus, the municipality has committed itself to supply the 20,000 kharwars fuel wood and to halve the per seer price.

The distribution is taking place under the supervision of an authorised body and each citizen can receive 50 seers at Afs. 30 per ser on presenting a document certifying their residence in Kabul. So far, over 4,000 kharwars have been sold and distributed through various sale outlets in the city. "The distribution will continue until the people's need in the city is fully met", Eng Sangeen affirmed.

The municipality has also felled a number of dry trees belonging to it and added it to the purchased fuel wood. The wood is sold at a subsidised price, he noted. Taking into view the shortage of power during winter when the water in the reservoirs subsides, the municipality has been prompt in supplying adequate amounts of fuel wood.

"If its financial position is strengthened, the municipality is a position to supply most of the essentials of the people in the city and thus contribute towards stabilisation of prices and checking the price-hikes", Eng Sangeen said.

To prevent the felling of trees and ensur a modern way of living for Kabul citizens, useful water supply projects, sewage, central heating networks as well as building of high-rise apartment houses with full

amenities and all modern facilities are planned in the Master Plan for Kabul.

He hoped that the people, like the party and Government authorities, will "help the municipality in carrying out the progressive projects aimed at serving the masses."

According to the personal observation of the Kabul New Times reporter, an adequate supply of fuel wood is stored at the centres and the people receive the required amounts of wood in a regular and orderly manner under the supervision of a three-man body composed of the representativ of the party precinct, the police and the municipality precinct.

Bank Accounts

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] Ghulam Dastagir, son of Abdul Ghyas the saving account holder no. 1569 of the Banke Millie Afghan City Branch has won the first prize of Afs 100,000 of the bank's 1359 raffle, held to the benefit of saving account holders.

Mohammad Hakim Arjumand, director general of the saving accounts department of the Banke Millie (Afghan National Bank), talking to the Kabul New Times reporter on this year's raffle and the number of saving accounts in the centre of the bank and its city branches during the Afghan year 1359 said: "Compared to the year 1358 there has been an increase of 5445 in the number of saving accounts, amounting to Afs 235,914,-440,71. The marked increase in number of saving accounts is indicator of people's confidence and trust to the banking service in the country and improvement of quality of work.

In 1359, 53,458 accounts met the requirements to be included in the raffle out of which 917 prizes were awarded to the account holders amounting to Afs 655,00. This included the saving accounts with the main office and its city branches. This system has been most instrumental in encouraging further the clients to open more saving accounts in the banks from which both the bank and the clients themselves will benefit.

The prizes allocated for the holders of the saving accounts for the 1359 were: Afs 100,000, one prize, Afs 50,000 one prize, Afs 20,000 one prize; Afs 10,000-two prizes; Afs 5,000 twelve prizes; Afs 1,000—180 prizes; Afs 500— 270 prizes and Afs 200—450 prizes respectively.

Mohammad Hakim Arjumand said, an impressive achievement has been made during 1358 and 1359. Last year, the bank succeeded to open 5445 new saving accounts in its main office and its branches. This clearly show the efficiency in the services of the bank and the hard work rendered by the bank employees.

In response to another question, Arjumand said that the saving account holders who during the six months or during the whole year has in their accounts at least Afs 200 are entitled to enter the annual raffle and benefit from its prizes. Afs 100 is the minimum amount required for the opening a saving account and the bank pays 9 per cent interest to the saving account holders.

He added, against payment of Afs 100 the Saving Account Department will put at the disposal of the clients the saving account box, specially arranged for the children. This has proven useful for encouraging the children in saving.

Meanwhile, for the further encouragement of the clients the bank does not charge the clients for the saving account booklet.

He added, the Banke Mi-

llie Afghan will soon celebrate its fifty years of service in the country. In the course of its existence as a leading bank in the country, it has widely served the people of the country. It has always tried to offer useful services and improve quality and efficiency in its services at local and foreign branches.

Textile Productions

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] The Afghan Guzargah Textile Mill will soon start producing Shery textile pieces. With the victory of the Saur Revolution, especially its new phase, the workers and employees of the Mill has been making untiring efforts to augment the level of productions. Thus they are working hard and carrying out their duties with revolutionary spirit.

The Omid, Naway and thread spinning units, the three combined complex, began operation in 1957 under the private investment law. Following the death of late Sayyed Murtaza, the management of the Factory was handed over, by the Ministry of Mines and Industries, to the Afghan Textile Mills.

Talking to the reporter of the Kabul New Times on method of work, level of productions, number of skilled personnel and workers, Ghulam Muhaiuddin Azemi, president of the Afghan Guzargah Textile Mill said that the main production is rayon pieces which very well compete, qualitywise, with similar imported product. However, for some time efforts are being made to produce a kind of textile piece called Shery which is of great demand at the local market.

The production capacity of the factory was planned to reach three million metres a year on the basis of 6,000 hours work. During the first six months of the current Afghan year 1,287,-405 metres of textile is dyed which fell short of the plan target. Nearly 30 per cent of the workers of the factory have joined the army, resulting to reduction of working hours. Yet efforts are being made to make up for the fall in production through employment of new workers. At present some 6000 metres of textile is dyed daily.

The spinning section is one of the important components of the factory. All the machines are imported from the friendly Soviet Union. Previously the thread on spool was imported which was uneconomical and time consuming. With the import and installation of the spinning plant, many difficulties were removed. Efforts are being to make maximum use of the production capacity of spinning plant to meet the daily requirement of thread at the weaving plant, where there are modern machine imported from Japan.

The dyeing section is operating on two shifts at its maximum production capacity. It can dye from seven to 10,000 metres of rayon in 24 hours. In the first six months of the current year 94 per cent of plan target was implemented.

The factory also has well equipped workshop which was expanded and renovated in 1979 and additional machinery was installed. Through renovation and installation of new and modern machinery now most of the spare parts are required.

The Guzargah Textile Mill has three boilers each

with the capacity of one ton of steam in one hour. The casting section also plays an important role in keeping the factory running as part of the spare parts which are not readily available are produced at this section. Orders are also accepted from time to time from other textile mills when they are in desparate needs for essential spare parts.

The whole factory has ventillation system which regulates the humidity and temperatures of various sections as each section needs different percentage of humidity.

The Guzargah Textile Mill plans to sink a deep well in the future within the premises of the factory. A contract has already been signed with the Jangalak Factories in this regard. Because the water is now obtained from the shallow wells and during the summer due to shortage of water the factory faces some difficulties.

Hospital Accommodations

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 19 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

More than 160,840 patents have been examined and treated at the Ali Abad hospital during the first six months of the current year.

Stating the above in an interview with the Kabul News Times, Dr Haider Ali Shefa, president of the Ali Abad hospital, of the Public Health Ministry, said that the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, as part of its efforts to serve the people and homeland, is providing facilities in various spheres to help our compatriots. To realise the aspirations of the glorious Saur Revolution, especially its new evolutionary phase, and to provide further facilities for the people the number of beds in the Ali Abad hospital is increased to 600 for the indoor patients. The tuberculosis and mental diseases patients are treated free of charge at the hospital.

He said that presently surgery, internal, mental diseases, sanatorium (for men), radiology, Cobalt-60, laboratories and emergency wards are active in the hospital and the number of the patients during the first six months of the current year in the surgery, internal diseases, mental diseases and the sanatorium were 4,767 and the patients of the emeergncy ward were 10,827 and 33,957 dressing have been carried out in the hospital.

Similarly, 92,287 laboratory tests, 4,620 radiography and 12,961 patients have been treated by the Cobalt-60.

The number of patients undergone surgery are 1,921. The patients excluding the emergency cases are usually introduced by the central polyclinic.

Dr Shefa added that after the victory of the new evolutionary phase of the

glorious Saur Revolution major changes were introduced in the hospital. On the proposal of the hospital the tuberculosis and mental ailments are treated free of charge. The internal ward was seperated from the surgery and 100 beds were added to the surgery ward. Two automatic radiography machines equipped with all modern facilities were installed and started work in the radiology ward. The hematology and biochemical laboratories were equipped and presently the tests of the emergency patients, indoor patients and the students are carried out regularly.

Likewise the bactoriology laboratory was also equipped with modern facilities. To better serve the compatriots we envisage construction of two new operation theatres equipped with modern facilities for the urology ward, increasing the number of the beds in the ward from 35 to 70 until the end of the current year.

Likewise, construction of a building equipped with isotope laboratory with a 120-bed capacity in the sphere of Cobalt therapy with the assistance of the friendly country Hungary and construction of a seperate laboratory for the emergency ward of the internal and mental diseases, and surgery is also envisaged to be completed in the current year.

CSO: 4600/140

BRIEFS

SOVIETS 'CONCENTRATING' TROOPS--New Delhi, 24 Nov (AFP)--The Soviet military command in Afghanistan is concentrating troops every 15 kms (about 10 miles) on the road from Kabul to Salang Pass, Western diplomatic sources said here today. The sources, however, could not give any reason for the Soviet military maneuver. The Salang Pass connects the Afghan capital with the Soviet border. The sources said that cutting down of roadside trees and levelling of roadside buildings were continuing on the strategic road. There was, however, no independent confirmation of the troops concentration. [Text] [BK241723 Hong Kong AFP in English 1647 GMT 24 Nov 81]

KIDNAPPED SOVIET OFFICIAL'S APPEAL--A Soviet official held hostage by an Afghan rebel group is said to have appealed to President Brezhnev to speed up negotiations for his release. The official, Mr (Okim Riyuk), who is a senior adviser at the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, was kidnapped 2 months ago by the guerrillas who told a news conference in Peshawar that they want the release of prisoners held by the Kabul regime in exchange for the official's freedom. [Text] [TA300623 London BBC World Service in English 0600 GMT 30 Nov 81]

CSO: 4600/138

COPTS SAY TENSION RELAXED UNDER MUBARAK

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 16-22 Nov 81 pp 56-58

[Article by David Rogers]

[Text]

The pretty Coptic teenager shock her long, black hair and pointed to her skin-tight American jeans. "I wear what I want now. I feel safer," she said.

Although their Pope has been banished, Egypt's Christian Copts have emerged from the upheavals of the past six months more confident about their future in a Moslem land.

"It was a summer of fear, an autumn of near-disaster and now comes a winter of hope," was how a Coptic doctor summed up 1981 in an interview with the Reuter news agency.

The hope stems from a tough government crackdown on Moslem extremists and the repeated pledges by Egypt's new President, Hosni Mubarak, to stamp out violence and religious fanaticism.

"If Mr. Mubarak stands for law and order, I'm one thousand percent for Mr. Mubarak," said the wife of a Coptic businessman. "I was really frightened last summer."

She was referring to June's street clashes in the teeming Cairo slums of Zawya al-Hamra when Moslems and Copts battled for three days. Fourteen people were killed and Coptic homes and shops attacked.

The violence sent shivers through the Coptic community, who claim to be descendants of the Pharaohs but now make up little more than one-tenth of Egypt's 44 million population.

There had been occasional Moslem-Coptic clashes in the past but the ferocity and location of the Zawya al-Hamra fighting was new. It convinced many Copts they faced a major, long-term threat from the rising power of Moslem fundamentalism.

For the first time in living memory armed police were put on all Coptic churches — they are still there — but failed to stop a bomb attack on a Christian wedding, which killed three and left 56 people seriously injured.

Leaflets threatening to kill Christians were found. Some Copts talked of emigration and made gloomy analogies with the situation in Lebanon.

"You could feel the growing intolerance," said a housewife. "I remember being caught in a traffic jam and watching one of those bearded ones (fundamentalists) spit at a woman driver who had bare shoulders."

CRITICISM

In private, some Copts voiced derision when the late President Anwar Sadat initially blamed left-wingers for the violence and were concerned that he waited weeks before moving against Moslem extremists.

Since Sadat's assassination by Moslem fanatics on October 6, the Egyptian government has accepted that his measures last September were a case of "too little, too late."

In some statements, there appears to be implied criticism that Sadat widened the net and rounded up hundreds of political critics along with religious extremists.

He also stripped the Coptic patriarch, Pope Shenouda, of temporal power and arrested eight bishops, 30 priests and 130 Coptic laymen. The action against the Christians was generally seen as an attempt to balance the far bigger crackdown on Moslem fundamentalists.

The patriarch, who had bad personal relations with Sadat, was accused by the late Egyptian leader of stirring up sectarian strife. The government said it no longer recognized him as head of the church and appointed a committee of five bishops to take his place.

According to church officials, the Coptic detainees have now been taken to a desert prison where they can pray together and the patriarchate is allowed to supply them with food.

The move is seen by the church as a significant relaxation and an omen for improved relations with the government, John el-Raheb, administrator of public, ecumenical and social services, told Reuter.

"We have also been encouraged by Mr. Mubarak's assurance that all the detainees found to be innocent will be released within two months."

CONFIDENCE

Raheb says that a Coptic Cabinet minister, Albert Barsoum Salama, is now liaising between church and government and speaks of "a new confidence" in the Coptic community at large.

"The difference is that in the past the Moslem extremists used to be viewed as a threat to the Copts. Now they are seen as a threat to the state," he said.

Raheb says the Coptic detainees are being held in Wadi Natroun, an oasis halfway between Cairo and Alexandria, close to the monastery where Pope Shenouda has been banished by the government.

Pope Shenouda has not been allowed to receive visitors except for a few church bishops. Callers are turned away from the monastery, where 130 monks eke out a living tilling almost barren land.

The church still looks on him as its spiritual head and special prayers for the patriarch are being read. Each Sunday congregations throughout Egypt are told "The Pope is still the Pope."

POPE

Eventually, Raheb says, the church hopes the government will revoke Sadat's action in withdrawing state recognition of Pope Shenouda.

Meanwhile, the committee of bishops is cooperating with the government. It now has only four members. The fifth, Bishop Samuel, was killed when Sadat's assassins sprayed bullets into the presidential stand at a military parade.

The bearded bishop, a popular figure regarded as a pillar of the church, was sitting two rows behind President Sadat at the time. A bullet passed through his thigh from right to left and he failed to revive after an operation.

"After all this turmoil, most Copts now feel a lot more secure," Raheb said.

Mubarak has described himself as a moderate Moslem and, unlike President Sadat, does not pay highly-publicized visits to the mosque every Friday.

"Mr. Mubarak owes the fundamentalist groups no favors at all," said a Coptic journalist. In the early 1970s, President Sadat lifted restrictions on the Moslem Brothers to help him counter leftist influence.

"Nobody will ever have to tell the new President about the danger posed by Moslem fanatics... That can only help us all," he added.●

CSO: 4500/62

NEW PRESIDENT DISCUSSES CONDITIONS PREVAILING IN COUNTRY

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Nov 81 p 14

[Text] Hojjatoleslam Seyyed 'Ali Khameneh'i, president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, addressed the Moslem nation yesterday afternoon.

In one part of his speech, the president referred to the total unity of the people from the beginning of the victory of the revolution and said: The presense of the people on the scene and their awareness is evident when from 19 million voters nearly 17 million unanimously elect one person as president and I am proud of this responsibility. He added: I do not consider myself the president of the people. The president of our nation is this huge mass of people who have elected me as president.

In another part of his speech, concerning the issue of the war, the president said: The war is one of our most important concerns. Our Moslem nation knows very well why it was started and, to quote the imam, "Good will come of the event." Hojjatoleslam Khameneh'i added: This war could not force us to retreat even one step and we have put the enemy in a predicament in the true sense of the word. Our enemy truly regrets having started this war. By the grace of God, we are superior on all fronts. The president said: When in the beginning of the war the enemy advanced, it won a 60 km victory; but, when we pushed the enemy back km by km, victory was ours 60 times over.

The complete text of the president's message is as follows:

In the name of God the compassionate and the merciful. Greetings to all my dear compatriots, brothers, and sisters throughout the country.

Since Tir [22 Jun-22 Jul], when the so-called assassination attempt on me occurred, I have not had the opportunity to speak to you, compatriots, with a collected mind.

The president said: The day before 6 Tir [27 Jun] was a Friday, when I gave the sermon for the Friday prayer and made a speech. The next day, that incident occurred. It has been four months and a few days since that day, during which time I have only been able to give a few

short interviews and speak a little before the elections. This is the first time since you conferred on me this new responsibility that I have been able to speak about certain issues. Of course, during these few months, many events have occurred in our country, events each of which can be considered significant and important in the history of any nation--the collective martyrdom of a number of elected officials, the elected president and the prime minister of the people in a single incident, many events in the country which, of course, indicated a political current outside the country as well. Today, as I am speaking to you, I have a position and responsibilities that I did not have four months ago. Since you, the people, have given me this responsibility with your votes, I must thank you for the trust you have shown in me by electing me president and I must say that I am proud of this position and responsibility, because the responsibility of the president of a country on the move so bravely and distinctively, which is going through the greatest political, military, and economic circumstances, especially at this sensitive moment in the history of the nation, would make anyone proud. But, at the same time, I must make another point. I do not consider myself the president of this great republic. Our republic and the huge masses of our people who have chosen me as their president have many distinguished persons among them. There are so many pious, learned, scholarly, and distinguished persons--intellectually and spiritually--and men of action in your society. I do not consider myself the president of this great republic, a society where scholars, scientists, artists, speakers, poets, politicians, and intellectuals sacrifice their lives, where mothers and fathers have given their children, and where there are many other exceptional elements. This is the title that the Constitution has given me, but I consider myself the servant and the trustee of these people. You must know, my brothers and sisters throughout the country, that I consider myself a person you trust and in whom the republic has confidence. I hope to be able to do my duties in this position and with your trust.

The Present Conditions of the Country

I have a few words to say to you about the present conditions of the country. I believe the conditions under which the people elected me president, the political conditions of the country, are at their best. Never in our past history, including the nearly three years since the victory of the revolution, has our nation been in such a good political situation. In the next part of the president's message, we read: I will merely mention to you a few items that will indicate to you that our nation and country are in a very good political situation. First is the great presense of the people on the political scene and the change in the destiny of the country. Never before have our people been so consciously part of the scene. Today, the people are on the scene and their presense is a conscious one. Just take a look at the presidential elections, which took place nearly a month ago; you see that of 19 million people who have the

right to vote in the country, 17 million participated. In other words, all are of the same opinion, are united in one opinion. This is an extraordinary phenomenon in the history of our nation. It is true that we had a referendum for the Islamic Republic and that 99 percent fo the people voted for an Islamic Republic; but we must also realize that at the same time, the various political factions did not dominate the country. The deviant political factions of the conciliators and the foreign powers of the liberals, the hypocrites, the opposing heathens, and the open belligerents were not at work in our country. Naturally, with the propaganda, the heat, and the enthusiasm of the beginning of the revolution the people would give their votes. But now, at a time when nearly three years have passed since our revolution, when the foreigners have worked so much on our people and so many deviant factions have been working to misguide the nation, first of all, the people participate so decisively in the presidential elections and then they vote for one person which they have favored and trusted, for whatever reason. This phenomenon is very significant. It speaks of the unity of the people, who act consciously. The second issue that proves my claim is the good political situation of the country. Today, the deviant factions, and even faces, have been exposed in our country. One of the important problems of the revolution is that the deviant groups grow in the society and become stronger, and some individuals are able to attract some of the people, rally behind some figures, and, by finding a place among the people, try to divide the people and ruin the revolution. Of course, our society has had such factions. There were those among our people who considered themselves in charge of everything in the revolution. In fact, they considered themselves the owners of the revolution and believed that the people, or a certain strata which bore the burden of the revolution and brought it to fruition, should stop interfering once victory had been achieved and should leave the scene so that they could rule. They could not accept that an individual from the oppressed class, the poor, deprived family without even an educational degree or a political past, or an individual from the clergy could be placed at the high levels of government. In the beginning of the revolution, these individuals were not even careful. They spoke out openly. Addressing the clergy, they said: You go to the mosques, do your studies and prayers, and let us do our work. When they would speak this way to the clergy, naturally, they would use a harsher tone in speaking to the masses of the people. They did not even consider them human beings. They were among those who tried to place themselves at the heart of this revolution. By pretending to side with the people, they tried to take charge of the people. There were many groups, figures, and movements in our society who were supported by international organizations. Some were supported by the Western superpower and some by the Eastern superpower. Had they had the opportunity in our society and had they not been exposed, they could have created a great danger for our revolution in the future. In most of the revolutions in the world, the danger and the deviant aspects have started from this point and the revolutionary forces

have been pushed aside by such individuals. Thus, the scene was prepared for them and through their peculiar propaganda and intrigues, they took over the revolution and misdirected it. In our society, this has existed. Today, you see that these movements and even particular figures from these movements have been exposed. Our people would not give one red cent for such individuals. In fact, this danger to the people has been eliminated. Those conciliatory groups who were ready to compromise with the United States and other superpowers in order to--in their own minds and as they claimed--protect the country, but in truth, in order to keep themselves in power, have been exposed.

Those groups who were trying at any price to find a place in the people's hearts while relying on the East or the West, have been exposed.

The hypocrites, the conciliators, the liberals, and the groups dependent on the East or the West have no credit in the eyes of the people. In other words, the people have recognized these individuals through the words of the imam, who is the truest expression of the revolution and who is personally the actual crystalization of the revolution. The imam himself, most decisively and openly, exposed the hypocrites, the liberals, the opposing groups, and the compromisers. Now, the imam's revolutionary line remains in the society. If, by the grace of God, this line is not disintegrated and is not inflicted with sluggishness, inactivity, and stagnation, it can move this country forward for many years. This is one of the characteristics of our time. Such a situation did not exist a few months ago.

Export of the Revolution

Another characteristic of our time and our era is the special present movement in which the recent presidency has taken place and in which, despite all the oppositions, our revolution has been exported abroad. You all remember that the imam said: "Do not say that revolution must be exported, say that our revolution must be exported." Of course, the vile hands of imperialistic policies and Zionist networks have tried to misinterpret this statment and have told our neighbors that the Iranian revolution intends to cause rebellion in their countries. But this was not the intent of the statement. The imam has frequently said that what is meant is that the culture and true spirit of the revolution, like the pleasant spring air, cannot be contained within walls; no line or border can keep it in; it passes through and is exported. There is no wall or door which can stop pleasant spring air or the scent of spring flowers. The revolution brings its pleasant scent to the noses of those who are eager. You see that in countries in the region who were followers of the United States, the Islamic revolution has shown its presense without the slightest interference from us.

In Egypt, Iraq, and other places, it is blossoming. Our message has reached other nations. I will speak of it in the section on foreign policy.

We became an issue throughout the world in international circles. Although they did not allow us for more than two years to have a foreign ministry, to revive our policy in international circles, today, this obstacle has been eliminated. The Western world, the Islamic and Eastern world, the world of the deprived and the oppressed, and the world of people of culture and civilization are becoming more or less familiar with our problems and goals and they are beginning to understand us. And in time, they will understand us. This is one of the characteristics that has created the distinguished political situation of today. Therefore, I must tell you that today, when you are at the threshhold and near the end of the third year of the victory of the revolution, politically, we have a distinguished situation, in terms of both foreign and domestic policy as well as in terms of principles and foundations.

Mr Khameneh'i then added: With this introduction, I will now deal with a few of the nation's problems, because we might not have enough time to finish. What remains, I will leave for another time and, if I am alive, God willing, once in a while I will speak to you about the essential and important national issues, both on television as well as in international circles when the issues come up.

The issues I would like to address include the economy and the war, which are among the most essential of our problems, and foreign policy. These form the major part of our problems, about which I will speak. First, I will raise the issue of the war.

The Issue of the War

Today's war is, in fact, the most important issue. You have been told much about it. Today our nation knows why the war was started and why Iraq invaded us and they know what blessings this war has brought us.

As the imam has said, "Good has come of it." This war which has occurred has had some good in it. You know what the war has been in the past. I would like to explain a few points to you about the present and the future of the war. Firstly, this war was unable to make us dependent in the slightest way. In fact, we have been at war for 13 months, and with the passing of time, we have gained superiority on the battlefield for more than a year. We have put the enemy in a predicament in the true sense of the word. Today, our enemy regrets having started the war. We have purchased arms in the course of this period, but not as much as a country at war generally does.

Arms and ammunition are not things that one can be thrifty about. A country at war, for instance Iraq, spends billions in buying arms and is regularly supplied with arms and ammunition. We have purchased arms and ammunition, but we have not bought the arms or spent one hundredth of the money of a country at war. We have fought with what we had, with thrift and faith. Our children speak the truth when they say, "Our weapon is 'God is great' and we rely on God and have faith in God." In many cases, the support of the nation replaced the shortage of arms. We were able to use our arms which had been out of order. We were able to use outdated arms in place of modern arms. We have used modern arms better than they are usually used and we are presently doing so.

By employing the faithful human resources, we have been able to fill the gap caused by the lack of arms. Our spirits are constantly better than before. We should wipe away the effects of the harsh attacks inflicted in the beginning of the war to compensate for the vacuum and shortcomings. Today, on the battlefield, without becoming dependent on anyone and without spending much money compared to the enemy, we have not suffered many casualties and we have superiority on the battlefield. This is all by the grace of God. And it was the help of you people which made the military spirit rejoice and made it work. On the battlefields, on the front, behind the front, and in the cities close to the front, I have felt this. If it were not for the assistance of the people, our soldiers and guards would not be fighting thus. The spiritual and physical help of the people has been able to make them fight better and thusfar we are winning the war. Of course, you know that when the enemy attacked and took advantage of our negligence to advance 60 km, this was a victory for them. But, when we retake this 60 km, km by km, and make them retreat, this is, in fact, 60 victories for us. And these victories continue and will continue. The enemy has been driven totally out of the land in these regions. The future of the war belongs to us and we have no doubt about this. Today, the condition of our military and guard corps and the condition of our other fighting forces is much better than in the past. Of course, I recommend that our people consider the war as our top concern. If we end this war successfully and victoriously, the greater part of our economic and political problems will be solved. It is for this very reason that the enemy is resisting. It does not want to let us finish the war victoriously. Our major worldwide enemies aid the dependent regime of Iraq and do not let the war end. This is because if we are able to end the war victoriously, our problems will, God willing, be solved.

The Economy

Now, concerning the national economy, I have proposed that the ministers of economy, industries and mines, and commerce and the authorities of the economic mobilization speak more to you. This, God willing, will be done. It is necessary for our people to know about

the economic problems of the country, which are, in actuality, a combination of difficulties and successes. But, before the ministers of economic affairs speak to you, I will tell you a little about the economy. First, you know that our economy, that is, the economy which we inherited from the past regime, had two characteristics. First, it was dependent on foreign powers; that is, everything, including machinery, industrial and agricultural tools, the raw materials for factories, various equipment for agricultural development, foodstuff, luxury items, clothing, etc., was imported from abroad. To quote a friend, the factory which produced something was a means for the consumption of a foreign company. Our baker who baked bread was, in fact, baking U.S. wheat in his kiln. In other words, on all levels, our economy was dependent; we were not self-sufficient. The second characteristic was that our national income was dependent on the oil industry. That is, in our exports, we relied for the most part on the oil industry, and we still do. You know that the largest customers for oil are those Western companies. In our country, the largest customers were the United States and Japan. Our country was under siege from both sides by the steel grip of the enemy, who could squeeze the jugular vein of our economy at any moment. This is the peculiar economy that we have inherited and is left for us from the past regime. Of course, in the past two or three years, much has been done to cut this dependency. We have turned off the oil faucets to some and we have reduced our production to a minimum. By reducing production, we have added to the life of our oil reserves and we have put emphasis on the domestic production of goods. Our agriculture has begun to thrive; our fields are green; and wheat and rice have been planted. This year, our rice production is one million tons and we have significant amounts of wheat compared to the past year. The nation felt that it should stand on its own feet. But this dependency has damaged us somewhat and the enemy has tried to take maximum advantage of this weakness of ours in order to put us under pressure. I must point out here that in the same way that the enemy had made a mistake in its calculations on the political and military fronts, considering us less powerful than we were and suffering the consequences of its miscalculation, on the economic front as well, it could not estimate the power of our people. It did not see in our people the power of revolution and faith. Perhaps if we had been another nation and the revolutionary conditions had not existed, the enemy could have succeeded. But our enemy has thusfar been unable to benefit from these pressures because the nation has resisted the enemy. The important point is that if our nation sees certain shortcomings in the economy of the society, for instance, high prices or, in certain cases, shortages or if they see unemployment in the society, they must know that these are the side effects of resistance. We could have chosen not to resist the United States. We could choose not to be obstinate in our belief in Islamic government in order to have an independent economy. All these shortcomings could have been immediately eliminated in the short term. But our situation and our dependence would be worse in the long run. The

Israelites at the time of the prophet Moses, when they left Egypt and wanted to resist the dictatorial regime of the Pharaoh, faced many difficulties along the way. They complained to their great prophet and, as the Koran says, they used to give a list of certain food items they demanded. Obviously, such items were not available there. There was God's solace and "manna," but there was not a variety of foods. Moses answered: If you want these, you should go back to Egypt and live under the same dictatorial conditions. Obviously, the Israelites did not want to give up this tolerable hardship for the violent hardship of living under the dictatorship. Our nation will never yield to pressure. It will, instead, stand up and will be victorious. We can be assured that with the resistance of our nation, within a period of less than two years, we can achieve a stable economy and make our society attain many of the goals we were shouting for in our slogans. At the present time, we are resisting and we are tolerating this difficulty. We are sure that victory will be ours. In order to strengthen our resistance even more, I believe that the government, the Majlis, and the nation must, in harmony, take a series of steps, which I will mention briefly.

Firstly, the Majlis must attempt to immediately define the activities of governmental, private, and cooperative sectors. It must determine how and to what extent economic activities are to take place in these sectors. It must quickly clarify and determine the banking system. The government must continue as rapidly as possible the just distribution system so that our existing foodstuff reaches all the people. The people must try to eliminate the consumer culture of the society and change it into a revolutionary culture. The forces which are engaged in the dependent sectors of the economy must be brought into the non-dependent sectors. We are not, by any means, asking the people to fast, but we want them to practice thrift in consumption, especially of items that make us more dependent on foreign countries. Of course, these brief recommendations and summaries must be further explained. God willing, I will explain them when I speak about foreign policy.

Hoping to see you soon.

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GOVERNMENT PLANS TO REMAN MINISTRIES, OFFICES

New Employment Law Explained

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 81 p 15

[Interview with Dr 'Abdollah Jasabi, director-general of the Organization for Administrative and Employment Affairs]

[Text] With the new employment law, an employee can enjoy a fair living.

The national employment law will be completely replaced by a new law based on Islamic values. This law will be characterized firstly by a decrease in the differences between minimum and maximum salaries; secondly, by a direct correspondence between salary increases and inflation; thirdly, by attention given to the issue of marriage and number of children supported by the employee; and, fourthly, by its regard for the level of expertise, competence, experience, and commitment, which will play an important and essential role in salary increases and benefits to employees. These issues were pointed out by Dr 'Abdollah Jasabi, director-general of the national Organization for Administrative and Employment Affairs [OAEA], in an interview with the economic service correspondent of KEYHAN.

Continuing his statements, Dr 'Abdollah Jasabi said: A new law concerning the welfare of government employees in a medium-term program has been drafted by the OAEA. This law should be implemented in three stages: (1) devising an Islamic value system, (2) devising supervisory guidelines for the bill or laws, and (3) devising articles and regulations. The first two stages and several portions of

the third have been completed. We hope to complete the remainder within three or four months. Of course, after the law has been drafted, its operational charters must also be prepared. In accordance with the wishes of the prime minister, we will try to send the laws part by part to the Cabinet in order to expedite its ratification.

In any case, we hope to complete this law and its operational charter in the next six months to a year. With the ratification of the new national employment law, all the laws and notes of the present articles will be put aside forever. It must be stated that in devising the Islamic training system and the principles governing the laws, Islamic experts and specialists have been consulted to ensure that we respond to the needs of our revolutionary Islamic society.

The director-general of the OAEA added: On the whole, the OAEA has three plans: a short-term, a medium-term, and a long-term plan. In the short-term plan, we have in mind to reform and change a series of existing articles and bills. For instance, the maximum retirement salary of those covered by the national employment law is 86,300 rials and there is still discrimination in some of the government institutions and companies which must be eliminated. Of course, it should be noted that the salaries of retired persons at the present time are low. This issue is being studied and if the government will allow, the salaries of retired persons will also be revised.

The second stage is to coordinate salaries and benefits in government offices, institutions, and companies so that two employees who have equal education and expertise in two different offices will enjoy equal salaries and benefits. The third stage consists of the reform of Article 14 of the employment law, determining the necessary requirements to enter official service and ensuring that employees believe in one of the religions officially recognized in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic. The fourth stage seeks to reform the Note to Article 74 of the employment law. In this legislative note, 10 years of early retirement are allowed government employees. We believe that capable persons who are able to work should not retire. The fifth stage is to change the legislative note to the 21 Mar 77-20 Mar 78 budget law and stop its implementation by the OAEA. In this note, 7.16 billion rials have been imposed annually on the national budget.

In the short term plan, changes have been included in the OAEA. These changes are in their final stages. This organization has begun this week to put into effect its new program. It has also reduced its personnel from 700 to 500.

Dr 'Abdollah Jasabi then referred to the third plan of the OAEA: The long-term plan of the OAEA includes planning the administrative system from the standpoint of the number of necessary ministries and organizations. This stage of the job must be accomplished with the

assistance of all the organizations and the entire government. For example, in order to organize the agricultural sector, the short-term, medium-term, and long-term policies of this sector must be determined. Therefore, in other sectors, including industry, money and banking, housing and city planning, education, services, etc., the same system must be implemented. For this reason, this part of the plan may span over many years and will depend on the work planned and the policies set in the organizations.

Concerning hiring personnel for government offices, the director-general of the OAEA said: Some of the government organizations, ministries, and others are permitted to hire their needed personnel upon the approval of the Cabinet. In this regard, the OAEA has asked the government offices and their affiliates to fill their personnel needs from the surplus in government organizations and offices in order to avoid placing a new financial burden on the shoulders of the government.

In conclusion, Dr 'Abdollah Jasabi added: It will be several months before the new national employment law is prepared and offered to the Majlis. I hope the salary chart which has been included in this law will provide a fair living for government employees. But the implementation of this chart depends on the financial ability of the government and its implementation might be postponed for some time, perhaps until the elimination of such difficulties as the imposed war.

Restoration Bill Discussed

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 81 p 5

[Talk by Hojjatoleslam 'Abdolmajid Ma'adikhah, minister of guidance]

> [Excerpts] The existence of bureaucratic red tape in departments is one of the major problems of organizations and institutions affiliated with the government.
>
> Basic steps must be taken to establish a new system in departments.
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> The legislative bill to reman the ministries and government institutions was ratified by the Majlis some time ago. The organizational procedures for the restoration of offices and the determination of types of punishment by primary, high, and review committees have been outlined in this bill.
>
> This bill has been offered to the Majlis to reman departments and educational and other institutions

> and to purge individuals who have in some way prevented, in the past, or are preventing, at present, the establishment, growth, and expansion of the revolution and also individuals who are not suitable for governmental employment in the Islamic Republic.

This bill recognizes that restoring and Islamicizing the administrative system are vital issues. And the goal is that with the passage of this bill, the ministries and government institutions as well as educational centers will begin their activities as living and healthy organisms and that the committed, faithful employees who suffer from the present form of the departments will, in the course of doing their humane and social duties, be protected and will be able, with hope and cheerfulness, to continue their growth and development.

The legislative bill to reman the ministries and government institutions consists of 5 sections and 75 articles. Section 1 of this bill deals with the organization of restoration committees in each ministry, government institution, and municipality. Section 2 of this bill addresses crimes and misdemeanors, including political, military, financial, and administrative crimes and misdemeanors. Among the crimes since the establishment of the Islamic Republic which are addressed in Part B of this Section are: uprising against the Islamic Republic of Iran; participation in espionage organizations against the Islamic Republic or spying on behalf of foreigners or outlawed domestic groups; working for outlawed groups against the Islamic Republic of Iran; committing actions against the well-being of the Islamic Republic, such as spreading rumors, disruption, working too little, and illegal strikes, sit-ins, and demonstrations; smuggling arms and ammunition; and using the pen or expressing any kind of propaganda to weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In Section 3 of this bill, in 11 items, all kinds of punishments have been dealt with. These punishments range from a written reprimand put in the person's file to termination of government service.

In Section 4 of this bill, the guidelines governing the restoration of manpower have been addressed and certain decisions have been made concerning the leaders of the previous regime, counterrevolutionaries, and traitors to the regime of the Islamic Republic. Among these, mention can be made of Part 2, Article 28, according to which membership in espionage organizations against the Islamic Republic, spying and intelligence gathering on behalf of foreign countries before or after the revolution, and obtaining information on behalf of domestic outlawed and deviant groups will result in permanent termination of government employment.

Section 5 is devoted to investigations and the authorizations of primary and review committees. Mention should be made of

Article 44, which states: "The punishment must be appropriate to the importance of the occupation; that is, the more important the position, the harsher the punishment."

In early summer of 1979, the historical decree of the imam concerning the purge on departments was issued. On the basis of this decree, the law of purges was devised and was ratified by the Revolutionary Council in December. On the basis of this bill, employees who have cooperated with SAVAK in the past or who were directors or otherwise in charge of security offices in departments and have, by some means, through their pens, speeches, or membership in the Rastakhiz Party, strengthened the tyrant's oppressive organization, are subject to various punishments. On the basis of this bill, the 5-member committee for purging each department was increased to 10 by the central office on purges and 3 others were appointed by the related minister.

The purging of departments was, in many cases, confronted with difficulties. In many cases, it has been observed that group issues and personal grudges have overshadowed the main issue. In mid-summer of 1980, the committee on purges announced that the OAEA had not yet been completely purged and that, thusfar, certain elements had prevented this department from being purged of SAVAK and tyrannical elements and the prosecutor was asked to dismiss and put on trial its supervisor.

In early fall of the same year, martyr Dr 'Abbaspur, the minister of energy, suggested at the seminar on purges that the name of this organization be changed to Crusade for Purges in order to enable individuals who are subjected to certain regulations to continue in other services in the society and the term "purging" would not prevent them from carrying on their social lives.

During this same time, we witnessed that the minister of guidance of the time closed down this ministry in order to make fundamental changes and to reman. Following this event, the restoration bill for remanning the ministries and government institutions was presented to the Majlis on 9 Feb 81.

We spoke with several people including government employees as well as the minister of guidance and the director-general of the OAEA in order to learn of their views concerning the problems and difficul ties of remanning the departments, the fact that changes in departments must be fundamental, and the causes of some of the shortcomings and work slow-downs, etc.

Interview with the Minister of Guidance

Hojjatoleslam 'Abdolmajid Ma'adikhah, the minister of guidance, in an interview with us concerning the implementational process of the restoration bill and its obstacles and difficulties, says:

"In the restoration bill which was ratified by the Majlis, certain guidelines and conditions were anticipated for its operational charter which would require the writing of certain charters in the ministries and government institutions under the supervision of the minister and the director of that institution. The Cabinet, in order to coordinate the implementation of the bill, charged a number of the Cabinet members and the director and supervisor or the national OAEA with writing a single charter in order to enable us to coordinate the implementation of this important and significant bill with consideration for various views." Concerning whether difficulties will be encountered in implementing the ratified laws of this bill, the minister of guidance said: "Considering the relative agreement of the Cabinet members, it would seem that after a single charter has been written, no significant difficulty would exist for its implementation. But, what might cause disruption, more than anything else, in revolutionary bills is lack of coordination in their implementation. In this connection, attention to one essential point is necessary, because mysterious hands may begin to work to poison the atmosphere in the departments through certain underhanded actions. Therefore, we must keep alert for various actions in this regard lest in the name of concern for the revolution, actions are undertaken that would be totally contrary to the spirit of this bill."

What must be noted more than anything else in the restoration of departments is the views of employees towards the revolution and the goals of the Islamic Republic. Except for the rare cases of those guilty of high treason, others must be provided appropriate opportunities if they sincerely wish to serve the people and the revolution.

We think our people, with the exception of loyal, dependent servants, who are a minority in the society, consist of two groups: revolutionaries and potential revolutionaries. The authorities of the Islamic Republic are making an effort to uncover and identify the potential revolutionaries and give them a chance to reveal themselves. If we consider potential revolutionaries as non-revolutionary in the negative sense of the word, we will deprive a significant number of the people from growth. At the same time, we should deal openly and decisively with all of those who have not understood, under such favorable conditions, the great, revolutionary people of Iran and who intend to be negligent. We cannot continually depleat the treasury of the Moslems without obtaining positive results.

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WEST BANKERS VOICE OBJECTIONS TO AUTONOMY PLAN

Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 30, 31 Aug, 1 Sep 81

[30 Aug 81 pp 1, 6]

[Text] AL-SHA'B Continues Its Opinion Poll. It Is Not Possible To Accept Anything Other Than a Palestinian State.

Jerusalem--The Palestinian masses in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip continue to reject the declaration made by Sadat and Begin at the end of their talks in Alexandria. Their declaration was that they had agreed to resume talks concerning so-called "autonomy" for the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. A large number of Palestinian figures and personalities have commented on this declaration and have reiterated their previous unswerving positions. These positions state that the autonomy plan does not concern them in any respect, and that they consider the autonomy plan to be a conspiracy directed against the hopes and aspirations of the Palestinian people who are striving to attain their legitimate rights--which have been established by the international community, as represented by the UN.

Moreover, AL-SHA'B interviewed a number of personalities in Jerusalem who talked about their present-day feelings about the matter and gave their opinions with regard to Sadat's and Begin's continual insistence on ignoring the voice of the Palestinian masses who are rejecting this autonomy plot.

Dr Amin al-Khatib, head of the Federation of Charity Associations in Jerusalem, said: "I do not believe that any plan for a solution to the Palestine problem which does not include the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the territory of Palestine will be successful, no matter how skillfully its sponsors choose names for it and think up methods of attempting to convince us to accept it. We are quite confident that a people such as the Palestinian people, who have gone through great hardships and have become seasoned concerning all different types of plans and half-solutions, will not be able to accept or be content with any solution other than a Palestinian state."

"That which is called 'autonomy' or 'self-rule' is nothing more than a mere toy which Sadat has wanted to play with after sensing failure in both his domestic and foreign policies. The unrest which is going on inside Egypt is proof of this."

"We have the following to say to Sadat: 'The Palestinian people, inside the occupied territories, do not wish to have you speak or negotiate in their behalf. Give both yourself and us some peace and do not bother us with this whirlpool which is called "autonomy."'" Zalikhah Shihabi, the head of the Jerusalem Women's Federation, said: "Everything concerning autonomy--whether it be the autonomy talks, resumption of such talks, their cessation, or the breaking off of such talks altogether--does not concern us. The reason for this is that we know that it is merely a waste of time, and the objective of those who are calling for autonomy is to decrease the resentment of world public opinion against them, to attempt to outflank and encircle the PLO, and to flee from the truth which is shining as brightly as the sun. This truth is that the PLO is the only body authorized to discuss all matters which concern the Palestine question. All of us here agree that there should be an independent Palestinian state. Anything other than that will only meet with rejection and indifference on the part of the Palestinian people."

AL-SHA'B also interviewed some personalities in Jerusalem of various orientations and in various sectors [of the population], and they also firmly rejected autonomy. One of the persons interviewed by AL-SHA'B was a prominent merchant in the city who gave a derisive answer to the question which we put to him, which was: "What is your opinion about the autonomy plan which people are talking about?" He answered: "As for this autonomy, there is no human conscience in the world which would accept what they are offering us. How can you expect our people to accept it?" The superintendent of a secondary school said: "Any person who would want to talk about this proposed autonomy with any Palestinian who lives here under occupation is a person who is unaware of the course of events here and does not know the roots of this issue. During the last 14 years of occupation which we have lived through, we have come to know more than others know concerning what the Israelis are thinking about and what they want for us. This is why we have become immune to everything which is proposed and also immune to everything that will be proposed in the future."

In addition to today's article, AL-SHA'B will continue its poll of the opinions and points of view of our people concerning so-called "autonomy."

[31 Aug 81 pp 1, 5]

[Text] The People of the Hebron Uplands Say: "Our Palestinian People Reject 'Autonomy'."

Hebron--Numerous sectors of Palestinians in the Hebron uplands area--including al-Fawwar, Dura, Halhul, al-Zahiriyah, and every other village and city in the area --have expressed their total rejection of so-called "autonomy" for the Palestinians. All of these sectors of people agreed that this autonomy is a consecration of Israeli military occupation and would confer legitimacy upon it.

Our correspondent in Hebron interviewed a number of people from the Hebron uplands area, and as a result of this we are publishing a number of their statements which constitute a total rejection of autonomy.

Mustafa 'Abd al-Nabi al-Natshah, deputy mayor of Hebron: "Autonomy is a continuation of military occupation, only with a mask over it." "Autonomy, which is tantamount to local rule, does not contain any of the elements of establishing an

independent state. It is a deception utilized in order to impose permanent occupation and would confer permanent legitimacy upon the military occupation. This is something which we totally reject."

Muhammad Musa 'Amru, mayor of Dura: "The autonomy which has been proposed is something that we totally reject. This proposed autonomy merely means another form of occupation and it does not grant the Palestinian people any of their rights. It constitutes rule of the Palestinians by annihilating some of them."

"As far as I am concerned, any solution which does not lead to giving the Palestinian people all of their legitimate rights completely is something which we reject."

Hijazi Mudiyah, deputy mayor of Halhul: "We do not at all support autonomy because it does not grant the Palestinian people their rights. It merely means permanent occupation of our Palestinian land. For this reason we totally reject it."

Kamal Hassunah, an attorney: "Autonomy is usually granted to minority people, living among [majority] peoples, and is granted within a limited internal framework. It is not usually granted to an entire nation of people which has foundations and rights like all of the other peoples of the world. Autonomy does not grant even the most basic of human rights which are internationally recognized.

"UN supervision of the occupied territories for a limited period of time could constitute a step in the direction of having the Palestinian people achieve thier aspirations and rights."

Dr 'Awni al-Saghir, member of the Hebron Municipal Council: "We have made our stand clear from the beginning. Our position is that we reject everything which conflicts with our natural right to exist and live in dignity as an independent and united people, and we reject everything which conflicts with our right to determine our own destiny and to establish our independent state in the territory of our nation."

Dr Muhammad Nasir al-Din, head of the Dentists' Union in the West Bank: "What is called 'autonomy' is a type of administrative self-rule which does not grant the Palestinian people their minimum rights, and for this reason we reject it."

The pharmacist 'Ali Ghazal al-Qawasimi, head of the Pharmacists' Union Subcommittee in Hebron: "Autonomy is totally rejected by our Palestinian Arab people both inside and outside the occupied territories because what is based on a falsehood is indeed a falsehood."

Dr Karam Nasir al-Din, head of the Hebron Red Crescent Association: "Autonomy is rejected by our Palestinian people because it does not achieve the hopes and aspirations of this people which has suffered so much from a cruel occupation. This people must attain its rights just as the other peoples of the world have done."

Al-Hajj 'Ali 'Ashur, member of the Hebron Municipality: "Autonomy is primarily a consecration of the occupation. Putting autonomy into effect would mean saving

Israel's reputation internationally. It would mean that the Palestinians would have self-rule inside Israel since the Israelis consider that the land [of the West Bank] is their land. The owners of the land would be Arabs of the land of Israel. In other words, the Arabs would not be the real owners of the land. Accepting autonomy would mean accepting Israeli domination of our country and of our land, and would give Israel the freedom to build settlements, confiscate land, and expel the land's inhabitants from it. In addition to this, it would mean polishing up the evil face of the occupation. The inhabitants of this country are its real owners who are both in the occupied territories and outside them. Whoever accepts or works toward putting into practice this autonomy will be tarnished as a traitor to his land and to his nation."

[1 Sep 81 pp 1, 5]

[Text] The People of Ramallah and al-Birah Reject So-Called "Autonomy."

Ramallah, al-Birah--The Palestinian people of the West Bank are continuing to express their disapproval and rejection of so-called "autonomy." They have described it as a creation of the occupation and a part of it. Still others have described is as having the objective of considering the Palestinian citizens in the occupied territories as being foreign inhabitants in Israeli territory.

AL-SHA'B's correspondent interviewed a number of people in Ramallah and al-Birah, and what follows is a number of their statements which totally reject autonomy.

Ibrahim al-Tawil, Mayor of al-Birah

Ibrahim al-Tawil, mayor of al-Birah, said: "Our people have not rejected autonomy for no reason. The rejection is based on the convictions of Palestinians living both inside and outside the occupied territories. What is called 'autonomy' is nothing more than a creation of the occupation and a part of it. Agreeing to this autonomy means conferring legitimacy upon the occupation."

Mr al-Tawil then asked: "What kind of autonomy is it that does not grant our Palestinian people their legitimate rights--people who, like any other people, are demanding to live in peace and tranquility?"

He added: "Autonomy, as the Israelis understand it, means withdrawing army patrols and leaving [military] camps and settlements all over the West Bank. Furthermore, Begin has threatened to open the doors of his jails if any of the autonomy officials think about establishing their own state."

"So what is this autonomy which is nothing more than another version of the occupation? What it is is the deception and misleading of world public opinion and the other peoples of the world."

Mr al-Tawil asserted that there are no people--and that there never will be people --who will participate in carrying out this step. He said that if there were any such mercenaries, they would not represent anybody and would not number even 1 person out of 10,000. He said that all [Palestinian] citizens reject this plan.

Dr Samir Katibah, Head of the West Bank Branch of the Doctors' Union

Dr Samir Katibah made the following comments: "I am not at all convinced that there are any serious fruitful efforts being made to solve the Palestine question. The only efforts being made are those which promote what the occupation authorities intend to impose, and what they intend to impose is the concept that the Arab citizens of the occupied areas should be considered to be foreigners in Israeli territory. Take the proposals made by Sadat, who is not entitled to speak in behalf of the Palestinians. Even these proposals, which do not even represent the minimum Palestinian demands, are not acceptable to the Israelis."

He added: "Any attempt to choose any of the various models presented as a solution to the Palestine question will certainly, sooner or later, meet with failure." Then he said: "I still remember the solution which was set up in 1947-48 by all the parties, with the exception of the Palestinians. We are still suffering from the complications brought on by this solution's failure. The reason that the solution failed was that it talked about the future of the Palestinian people without having representatives of the Palestinian people be present. For this reason, the result of this solution was wars and battles. What is happening right now is a repetition of what happened then, and consequently the problem will continue to exist, without any solution being found."

He added: "The only real solution is a radical solution which would grant all Palestinians the right to exist, to be free, to be sovereign [in their own land], to have self-determination, and to establish a Palestinian state--and this would allow the people who are concerned with this issue and who are entitled to have this right to exist without anyone exercising a trusteeship over them."

"An agreement such as this has the possibility of being permanent. Otherwise, what will happen is the establishment of agreements and the imposition of a status which might last for a few months or a few years, but then we would find someone demanding [a permanent solution]."

Mr Katibah went on to say: "If the person making this demand is the person who is entitled to the right, then he will not be affected by any repressive measures or difficulties which stand in his way when attempting to realize his hopes and objectives. In short, we want a solution which is really a just and permanent solution. And it is difficult to achieve such a solution without involving the legitimate representatives of the Palestinians."

Wasif (Shakukani), Head of the Association of Friends of the Community

Mr Wasif (Shakukani), head of the Association of Friends of the Community in al-Birah, had the following comments: "We totally reject autonomy. The approaches which are being pursued will not find any hearing nor will they find the slightest response [on our part]."

He went on to say: "Our people are firmly marching along with the PLO, and we will not accept any alternative to that of the Palestinians having a nation in their land, the land of their fathers, and the land of their forefathers." He added:

"Jerusalem, which was conquered by 'Amr [ibn al-'As] and was liberated by Saladin, will once again be liberated by the PLO. Any alternative type of leadership will be stillborn, and our leaders are known to everyone. No matter how hard these parasites try, they will never be an alternative to our legitimate leaders."

Then he went on to say: "In the end, our people will be triumphant."

'Izz al-Din al-'Iryan, Head of the Red Crescent Association in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

'Izz al-Din al-'Iryan, head of the Central Committee of the Red Crescent Association in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, said: "The Palestinian people have rejected what is called 'autonomy' because it was the creation of the Camp David agreements, which have been rejected by the Palestinian people. Since the general foundation has been rejected, this means that everything that branches out from it is also being rejected."

He added: "[This will be true] unless autonomy, as such, reaches the point of including the Palestinian people's minimum demands in terms of receiving their national rights and establishing their independent Palestinian state."

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AMBASSADOR TO U.S. DISCUSSES JORDAN'S PEACE PRINCIPLES

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in Enblish No 492, 23-29 Nov 81 pp 38-40

[Article by Lydia Georgi]

[Text]

King Hussein of Jordan, in his talks with President Ronald Reagan, outlined three "specific principles upon which a lasting peace would depend," according to the Jordanian ambassador in Washington, Abdel-Hadi al-Majali.

In an interview with *Monday Morning* last week, Ambassador al-Majali said the three peace principles specified by King Hussein were:

- Israel's total withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem.
- Recognition of the Palestinians' legitimate rights, including their right to self-determination and "the establishment of an independent state in Palestine if they so desire."
- "The right of all states in the area to live in peace and security."

The Jordanian ambassador said his government "views the proposed (Saudi) eight-point peace plan as entirely consistent with the above principles and as being similar to a position that Jordan has been advocating for many years."

The Saudi plan, proposed by Crown Prince Fahd last August, includes the three Jordanian principles but goes beyond them and differs from them in some respects — notably in its unconditional call for the establishment of a Palestinian state "with Jerusalem as its capital" after a few months' transitional period during which the West Bank and Gaza would be under a U.N. mandate.

While neither the three principles advocated by Jordan nor Saudi Arabia's

eight principles make a direct reference to the role of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Crown Prince Fahd stated this month that "there is no peace without the Palestinian people and no Palestinian state without the PLO." King Hussein has meanwhile advocated simultaneous mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO and PLO involvement in the peace process.

PRINCIPLES

The Jordanian ambassador, in a statement sent to Beirut by telex in response to *Monday Morning's* questions, said: "In outlining to President Reagan and the top officials in his administration the historical background of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, His Majesty (King Hussein) stressed that a solution must be based on internationally recognized principles, mainly the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force.

"His Majesty outlined the specific principles upon which a lasting peace would depend:

"1. Total withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

"2. Recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who are the core of the problem, including their right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state in Palestine if they so desire.

"3. The right of all states in the area to live in peace and security."

The third principle, which is included in the Saudi peace plan, has been rejected by a number of Arab leaders, including the PLO, on the grounds that it implies recognition of Israel. "Jordan," Ambassador al-Majali said, "has since 1967 been constant in its adherence to the internationally accepted principles for the achievement of peace as outlined in United Nations resolutions, mainly the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories, the self-determination of the Palestinians, and the right of every state in the area to live in secure borders.

"Jordan views the proposed eight-point peace plan as entirely consistent with the above principles and as being similar to a position that Jordan has been advocating for many years."

Al-Majali, however, preferred not to provide a direct answer to a question on the position Jordan would take on the eight-point plan at this week's Arab summit conference in Fez, Morocco.

Camp David

Confirming Jordan's rejection of the Egyptian-Israeli-American peace process, the ambassador said: "Regarding the Camp David accords, Jordan's position in rejecting them is very clear. It considers them a retreat from the internationally recognized principles covering the establishment of peace in the area."

But the ambassador did not answer a question on Jordan's attitude to Western Europe's proposed participation in the Sinai peace-keeping force, which several Arab countries have said would be an expression of support for the Camp David process.

Evaluating King Hussein's official visit to the U.S. earlier this month, Ambassador al-Majali said: "His Majesty's visit to the U.S. gave him the opportunity to discuss and clarify in detail with President Reagan and top officials of the new administration, Jordan's point of view regarding the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

"The King's visit must be considered timely, coming as it did at this period when the American administration is in the process of formulating its policies on the Middle East.

"The two leaders, during two lengthy meetings, held a frank, constructive and friendly dialogue. In speaking of these meetings later that week, King Hussein said: 'I found a mood that is different to that which I perceived in recent years, an awareness of the importance of developments in our part of the world, a determination to work together and hopefully to make a joint contribution eventually to the just, lasting peace we seek...' "

SOVIET

A controversial issue that hit the headlines during the Jordanian monarch's visit to Washington was Jordan's purchase of surface-to-air missiles from the Soviet Union. Reports from the U.S. at the time quoted a senior American official as saying that the deal, Jordan's first major weapons purchase from the Soviet Union, "could clearly complicate our relationship" in the defense supply field.

The United States has been Jordan's principal military supplier for a long time, and the official did not specify how the Soviet-Jordanian deal might complicate this relationship, but international news agencies quoted observers as saying that "it could stir congressional concern over a possible new threat to Israel."

U.S.-Jordan commercial and government-to-government military sales planned for the current financial year are estimated at 175 million dollars.

The Jordanian ambassador in Washington told *Monday Morning* that Jordan's purchase of arms from the Soviet Union "is consistent both with its right to defend itself against any aggression and with its policy of diversification in its military equipment."

Al-Majali noted that "His Majesty has made it clear that regardless of the source of the arms purchased, those armaments become Jordanian the minute they arrive in Jordan. We have been maintaining normal relations with the Soviet Union on an equal basis for a long period of time, and there are no conditions attached to the purchase of Soviet arms."

He added: "However, Jordan will continue to purchase arms from its traditional suppliers."●

CSO: 4400/74

EFFORTS MADE TO MOVE ELECTIONS UP

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 16

[Text]

LEBANON'S marble-lined presidential palace, on a hilltop overlooking Beirut, will be the goal over the next ten months for candidates in the republic's seventh presidential elections. But already moves are underway in Beirut to bring the elections forward from September 1982 to next April or May, a change which would, in the view of those championing it, cut some months off the elective mandate of the present incumbent, Elias Sarkis.

One member of the 99-seat parliament who favours such a move in Najah Wakim, an independent Nasserist representing a constituency in the capital. He told *8 Days* that more than 50 per cent of the surviving 92 MPs favour tabling a motion in the house to bring the presidential race forward, though a constitutional motion like this would require a two-thirds majority.

A similar motion in the run-up to the previous presidential election succeeded in bringing polling forward to May 1976. But the president in power at that time, the seasoned northern war-lord Suleiman Franjieh, insisted on sitting out the full term of his mandate, despite an abortive military takeover aimed at forcing his resignation and many other moves against him.

Wakim says that the proposal to curtail Sarkis' mandate has been supported by MPs from the Lebanese National Movement (leftist), the northern Karami bloc and Franjieh's surviving bloc. More recently, it has gained the support of Speaker Kamel Asaad's supporters, but lost that of powerful Sunni leader Saeb Salam's bloc. The rightwing Lebanese Front, Wakim reports, is opposed to any attempt to bring the elections forward.

CSO: 4400/74

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN HADDAD'S ENCLAVE DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 pp 16-17

[Article by Earleen Tatro]

[Text]

SAAD HADDAD, the South Lebanon Christian who faces court-martial by the Lebanese army if he sets foot north of his Israeli-backed 'Free Lebanon' enclave, undeniably has a flair for the dramatic. In a three-day period this month, the man who beat Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the punch in making peace with Israel announced his resignation, withdrew his resignation, said he was only 'considering' withdrawing it and then said he would withdraw it if certain 'conditions' were met.

Major Haddad was not saying publicly what these conditions were or who was supposed to meet them. Various theories were put forward, none one hundred per cent convincing. Some Beirut-based diplomats and other South Lebanon watchers suggested that his five-year rebellion against the Lebanese government and his collaboration with Israel against the Palestinians had left the man so physically exhausted and mentally frustrated that he simply wanted to step aside as satrap of the narrow border strip wedged between Israel and the buffer zone patrolled by the UN interim force in Lebanon (Unifil). These observers also pointed out that as long as the Israelis call the shots in 'Free Lebanon' it makes little difference who serves as the Lebanese commander.

Haddad has checked into Israeli hospitals for treatment several times in the past year, and those who have seen him recently say he looks far older than his 44 years. Israeli radio reported that Haddad was claiming there were 'elements' in his enclave which were trying to usurp control.

It is a measure of the tangled state of affairs that the quickest way for most people in Beirut to find out what Major Haddad has allegedly been saying is to tune into Israeli radio's Arabic and English broadcasts which were quoting 'The Voice of Hope', the radio station run by American Christian missionaries in Haddad's 'capital' of Marjayoun. (The Voice of Hope, which intersperses Bible readings with country-and-western songs, is not received in the Lebanese capital, 65 km away.)

The Israelis also suggested there were internal disputes in Haddad's enclave over priority given to repairing damages caused by the artillery of Palestinians and their Lebanese leftist allies.

Some Lebanese civilians, both Christian and Muslim, who periodically visit the enclave said there was some friction among the enclave's inhabitants — not just over repair work but also over the apportionment of decision-making on even the most local levels. While these sources stressed that they did not think this friction was strong enough to cause any major change in the status quo in the enclave, they did feel that the Christians who represent 40 per cent of the enclave's estimated 100,000 residents make nearly every decision which isn't made by the Israelis.

It is a sore point with Shiite Muslims who used to live in the area that Haddadland tends to be perceived internationally (when it is perceived at all) as the Christian enclave with a Christian militia. South Lebanon is the traditional homeland of many of the country's Shiites, a place where

Shiites and Maronite and Catholic Christians live next to each other in neighbouring villages and sometimes share the same village.

Some estimate that as many as half of Haddad's 2,000-strong militia are Shiite. Outside the enclave there have been periodic clashes this year between Shiites and members or supporters of the Palestinian-National Movement alliance — sometimes growing out of personal arguments, other times from the increasing impatience with the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation.

Lebanese travellers to Haddadland also said they detect some other undercurrents in the enclave which while not threatening upheaval, do indicate that the people of 'Free Lebanon' are not of one mind. These travellers suggested that there is an awareness in the enclave that sooner or later there may be a day of reckoning when people have to decide whether they are going to be regarded as Lebanese or Israeli.

Another undercurrent, one Lebanese observer suggested, involves the Druze. Israeli Druze serve in the Israeli army, the only Muslim Arabs entrusted to do so, and Lebanese Druze in the Hasbaya area came under fire earlier this year when the guns in Haddadland turned on Palestinian bases around Hasbaya north of the enclave's eastern-most arm.

Major Haddad, in his on-again, off-again resignation statements, said he was 'cancelling the authority' of some of his militia officers in the east, again offering no public explanation. During and immediately after Major Haddad's resignation theatrics, visitors reported that the enclave seemed calm with no visible signs of tension. Unifil troops appeared to be on no special state of alert. The 24 July ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians was still generally holding.

CSO: 4400/74

LEBANESE POUND DECLINING

Paris AN-NAHAR REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 1-2

[Article by Marwan Iskandar]

[Text]

In the past two months most European currencies have regained a significant proportion of the value they have lost in relation to the dollar on foreign exchange markets during the course of this year. By contrast, the Lebanese pound has continued to slide downwards in value despite heavy support from the Bank of Lebanon. Improvements in the exchange rate for the pound have been minor ones and have never exceeded 4 per cent over the past two months. Nonetheless, Lebanon's Finance Minister, although he is projecting that the government's expenditures will exceed budgeted revenues by 40 per cent, felt comfortable in saying that the Lebanese pound is still a relatively strong currency and is backed by substantial resources in foreign exchange and in gold.

It is certainly true that the Lebanese pound has strong backing from gold. This amounts to 9.8 million ounces and at today's values Lebanon's bullion holdings are sufficient to cover two years' imports and to settle the country's external debt as well. Insofar as its reserves are concerned, the Lebanese pound did not therefore need to have suffered the deterioration in value that it has done. But this brings us to the second element in determining the strength of the currency – the efficiency of the economy of which it is a part and the weight of public debt upon that economy. And on both these scores Lebanon has been carrying a heavy and increasing burden.

Productive efficiency in Lebanon today is hampered by power cuts, by low productivity and by rampant absenteeism. What is more, there is now virtually no support by one sector of the economy for other sectors because such support is dependent upon adequate infrastructure. Lebanese industrialists and traders are therefore charging their customers what the market will bear

in a given area and there are now significant differences in the prices for the same commodity in different parts of the country. This fragmentation of a single Lebanese market into hundreds of autonomous markets has seen its advantages being outweighed by disadvantages.

Banking is the only sector which seems to have continued to thrive in Lebanon despite current conditions, or perhaps because of these conditions. But while the banks have increased their resources by 22 per cent this year, this performance has been achieved because the value of deposits denominated in foreign currencies has increased substantially as a result of the depreciation of the Lebanese pound, the currency in which the overall figure for deposits is denominated. Moreover, the cost of living in the first nine months of 1981 attained a level that was 22 per cent higher than at the end of last year; when one considers the impact of increases in public sector salaries which were to be paid out in October with retroactive effect to the beginning of 1981, it is more than likely that inflation will rise by at least six per cent during the final quarter of the year. This means that salaries will need to be increased in the coming year by some 28 per cent, a figure which is very high in any circumstances and which cannot be borne in the context of prevalent conditions in Lebanon. Consequently, the Lebanese pound will in all likelihood plunge to the low LL5 to the dollar before many months have elapsed.

In addition to the factors noted above, one major element contributing to the downward slide of the pound will be the real cumulative deficit of the Lebanese Treasury. This deficit is stated officially to be LL 6.4 billion but is in fact closer to LL 12 billion. The difference between the two figures is mainly attributable to the cumulative deficits of the Fuel Compensation Fund. This exceeds LL 5 billion but it is never mentioned in official statistics. Even after the latest price increases for petroleum products (which will contribute to higher inflation), the Fund is facing a current deficit equal to LL 800 million a year. The interest charges on public loans denominated in Lebanese pounds are now running at a rate of 14.25 per cent and the low interest rates on loans in other currencies are having a bigger impact than it was originally estimated that they would have because the exchange value of the Lebanese pound has gone down significantly.

Even with improved security, this gloomy prospect cannot be turned around overnight. Treatment of these basic problems will have to be drastic and aim at overcompensation for the ills that have accumulated during the years of war and neglect. The only element in Lebanon which still contains promise is the individual Lebanese, but that individual has to have freedom of movement, security and enjoyment of life if he is to continue to contribute to his country's welfare as well as to his own. But at present, the havens of security and prosperity are to be found elsewhere and Lebanon's prospects seem sterile and depressing.

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DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY TO REOPEN TRIPOLI OIL TERMINAL

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in Enblish No 46, 16 Nov 81 p 11

[Article by Marwan Iskandar]

[Text]

Lebanon's Minister of Petroleum Mohammed Beydoun visited Iraq last weekend for talks which dealt ostensibly with obtaining supplies of crude oil. In fact, this newsletter has learned, the discussions will lead to an agreement being signed between Lebanon and Iraq to reopen the oil terminal at Tripoli to permit tankers to load Iraqi crude at this Mediterranean port.

In April 1978, Iraq halted deliveries through the old IPC pipeline which has its terminals at Tripoli in Lebanon and at Banias in Syria because of disagreements between Iraq and Syria over transit and loading fees. Political tensions between these two countries served to sharpen these differences. But while political discord persists to this day, it seems that the problems of transit dues and deliveries of Iraqi crude to Syria's refinery at Homs have been resolved.

An agreement to re-activate the Tripoli oil terminal would come at a highly critical moment for Lebanon. On the one hand, it would reduce the cost of crude oil delivered to Tripoli's refinery by at least $1 per barrel. This is the surcharge imposed by Tapline on deliveries of Saudi crude to the refinery by small tankers from Tapline's terminal at Zahrani in southern Lebanon. Also, Lebanon would earn a transit and loading fee which could equal $0.50 per barrel. If the full capacity of the IPC pipeline were used, some 500,000 b/d of Iraqi crude would pass through Lebanon and this would provide Lebanon with $46 million in income over a year in addition to the $ 10 million that would be saved on the cost of crude for the Tripoli refinery.

Fuel prices in Lebanon were re-adjusted last month in order to reduce the deficit being incurred by the government because previous prices did not cover costs (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 26). The deficit had been accumulating at a rate of $400 million a year and the new price scale still leaves an annual shortfall of $150 million. The flow of Iraqi oil to Tripoli could reduce this deficit by a maximum of $56 million a year, but the reduction could be much lower depending on the rate of flow.

The new Iraqi price of $34.90 per barrel for 36° API Kirkuk crude at Mediterranean ports provides buyers with crude of good qualities at convenient ports (Tripoli, Banias and Dortyol in Turkey). A re-activation of deliveries to Syria and Lebanon would indicate full utilisation of the Turkish pipeline. If, in turn, the IPC pipeline was used to its full capacity, this would mean that Iraq's exports from Mediterranean ports could equal 2.4 million b/d. This figure is not much below Iraq's exports of 3 million b/d in early 1980, before the war with Iran disrupted exports through the Gulf.

CSO: 4400/74

SYNDICATED LOAN GETS MIXED RECEPTION

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 48

[Article by Lionel Peters]

[Text] THE MARKET reception to the news that Libya is raising $200m in the syndicated loan market was extremely warm. The terms of the loan are attractive — seven years at ½ per cent when compared with the ⅜-½ per cent which Algeria's state oil and gas company Sonatrach is demanding for its debt renegotiation.

As one would expect, all those banks who are looking to extend their relationship with the borrower will want to be in on the loan, as will most of the Arab banks who lend in these markets. However, the reaction from several of the Bahrain branches of the major western banks was definitely cooler. Many rejected the offer telex on the grounds that they didn't like Libya as a credit risk and weren't enamoured of Tripoli's policies.

The full lead management group has now been formed. It consists of: Arab Banking Corporation, Arab Bank Limited, BAII, Banque Européenne de Tokyo, Crédit Lyonnais, Gulf International Bank, KFTCIC, and UBAF in Paris. A second group of managers has also been completed, each underwriting $15m apiece. They are: State Bank of India, CCF, Banco Arabe Espanol, Arab Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade, Banque Intercontinentale Arabe, Arab International Bank in Cairo and Arab Latin American Bank in Lima, Peru. With the management group now completed, the loan is in general syndication. Already the Eastern bloc banks are considering participating in the loan: Moscow Narodny will definitely be involved.

The French banks are also keen to participate, as they always are in Arab deals, while the Americans and the British will be notable by their absence. The American banks closely follow US foreign policy in their lending; when the Russians invaded Afghanistan, the American banks deliberately stayed out of Eastern bloc loans (with the exception of Yugoslavian ventures).

Using Arab Banking Corporation (ABC) as the major lead manager was an obvious choice for the Libyans. ABC is perhaps the most aggressive Arab bank in the markets today, and has rapidly built up a considerable network of banking contacts. Furthermore, ABC does have the distinct advantage of numbering the Libyan government as one of its shareholders.

Elsewhere in the markets, the Arab banks have again been active. KFTCIC and the National Bank of Kuwait are currently arranging a $35m credit for the Central Bank of Turkey, to finance oil shipments from Iraq. The facility carries a spread of 1 per cent over Libor for a period of six months. The lead managers are arranging a wide syndication for the loan and are paying 1/16 per cent for $1-2m, ⅛ per cent for $3-4m and 3/16 per cent for $5m-plus. It is the second loan for the Central Bank of Turkey this year: in July it borrowed $100m from an all-Arab bank syndicate lead managed by the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank with the Arab Turkish Bank as agent. The maturity was one year and the spread was split at 1 per cent above Libor for the first six months, rising to 1¼ per cent for the remaining six months. Again, the proceeds were to finance essential imports.

The rush of guarantee facilities doesn't

seem to be slowing. National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia has arranged a facility for Saudi riyals 86m ($25m) to Edok SA-Eter SA. Managers were Saudi British Bank and Saudi Cairo Bank. Co-managers were Al Bahrain Arab African Bank, Al Saudi Bank, European Arab Bank. Participants were Union de Banques Arabes et Francaises.

This facility is just one of several that NCB has arranged this year. It has also been an active co-lead manager in several non-Arab loans, most recently as a co-lead manager in the $200m facility to Banco de Chile.

The final amount of the facility to the Federation of Malaya has been raised from $650m to $700m. Despite the fine pricing, the syndication received a very good reception in all the major financing centres. Apart from the 17 co-lead managers there are 11 managers, eight co-managers and 17 participants. These 24 banks come from a widespread geographical area, reflecting the overall appeal of the credit. If the documentation is completed without too many problems then signing will take place in Kuala Lumpur on 13 November.

In the eurobond market, the World Bank has issued bonds totalling Kuwaiti dinars 30m ($106m). The maturity is 10 years.

CSO: 4500/64

BRIEFS

SOPHISTICATED NAVAL DEVELOPMENT--Paris, November 7--The "spectacular" development of Libya's Navy "modifies somewhat the strategic situation in the Mediterranean", according to the 1982 edition of the French naval yearbook Flottes de Combat (Combat Fleets). The yearbook said that Libyan leader Moamer Kadhafi had acquired or ordered "very sophisticated" warships from abroad. Beyond four Wadi M'Ragh-type missile-launching gunboats constructed in Italy and delivered in 1980 and 1981, the Libyan Navy had obtained a fourth Fox Trot submarine and two Soviet Natya minesweepers. Libya had also ordered 10 Combattante II missile-launching patrol boats from France, but delivery was postponed by the French Government. The yearbook said that Tripoli might also shortly receive two Koni frigates and four Soviet Nanushka II missile-launching gunboats. The author expressed doubt over the ability of Libyan personnel to operate and maintain the vessels "without permanent outside aid". Combattante patrol boats have already been bought by West Germany (20), Iran (12), Greece (10), and Nigeria, Qatar and Tunisia (three each). They are armed with Harpoon, Otomat or Exocet MM38 self-directing missiles capable of hitting maritime targets 40-100 km (24-60 miles) away. [Paris AFRICA AFP in English 10 Nov 81 p 16]

TRIPOLI'S IRE--On learning that Egypt's first industrial complex for the manufacture of armored vehicles and cannons, inaugurated in December 1980, is equipped largely with machine tools purchased in Czechoslovakia and the GDR, Tripoli has demanded an explanation from both these countries. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 23 Nov 81 p 72]

CSO: 4519/52

INTERVIEW WITH MOHAMED KHOUNA OULD HAIDALLA

Dakar AFRIQUE TRIBUNE in French Oct 81 pp 4,6

[Interview conducted by Ibrahima Signate: "Haidallah: 'Mauritania is not a satellite. It makes its own sovereign decisions based on its own interests and situation'"[1]]

[Text] [Question] The resolution on the Sahara passed at the OAU summit meeting in Nairobi had triggered a great deal of hope. Today, it appears that the two involved parties, i.e., Morocco and the Polisario, do not share the same concept regarding the referendum as decided by the African organization and accepted by King Hassan II. Could you tell us what is Mauritania's concept of the referendum and of the role which the committee for its implementation should play?

[Answer] The fact that the Polisario and Morocco do not interpret the resolution in the same manner is not astonishing. A revolutionary movement which is fighting to regain its fatherland and a monarchy which considers itself the mother country would be unlikely to have converging viewpoints on problems.

As to our own view regarding the referendum, I had presented it clearly in Nairobi at the OAU summit meeting last June. Our suggestions, which were used as a basis for the adopted resolution, were the following:

1. Immediate and solemn declaration by the three states bordering on the Sahara and the Polisario Front on their willingness to collaborate in the organization of a self-determination referendum supervised by a neutral authority and under United Nations and OAU control.

2. A solemn pledge by the three countries and the Polisario Front to respect scrupulously the free will expressed by the Sahraoui people and the integrity of their national territory as it was under Spanish colonial rule in accordance with the stipulations of Resolution 1514 of the United Nations General Assembly.

3. Appointment of an interim neutral administration which would immediately make contact with the protagonists in the conflict (Morocco-Polisario Front) for the implementation of the measures necessary for the consultation, and which are the following:

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1. Interview granted before the meeting of the Committee on the Implementation of the Sahara Referendum in Nairobi.

Immediate cease fire;

Withdrawal of forces from some points to be determined and their replacement by neutral elements;

Supervision of administration activities in the Sahara by the neutral interim administration.

It is still our belief that positive results can be achieved by honoring the spirit and the letter of the resolution.

As to the ad hoc committee, its role is clear. Together with the parties to the conflict, the committee must formulate the practical steps leading to a cease fire and a referendum.

[Question] Mauritania is perfectly familiar with the case of the Western Sahara, as you pointed out in Nairobi. What is therefore your position on the controversial problem of the Sahraouis who must participate in this referendum? Are you satisfied with the solution according to which the lists drawn up by the former Spanish administration were to be used for this purpose? If not, what would you suggest?

[Answer] In a country in which the great majority of the population is nomad and survives by moving its cattle over long distances, it is unquestionable that the results of any census are likely to be doubtful. We are facing this type of problem even within our own country. To this you must add the fact that the populations traditionally dislike to be counted and registered for one reason or another.

All of these factors lead me to believe that the results of the last census taken by the former colonial power is somewhat unrealistic. However, I think that it offers a very good base.

[Question] Has the resumption of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Libya been one of the elements which has made the normalizing of relations between Morocco and Mauritania possible? How is the resumption of relations between Rabat and Nouakchott manifested in specific terms?

[Answer] Mauritania is not a satellite. It makes its fully sovereign decisions in accordance with its own interests and situation.

Mauritania maintained diplomatic and other quite good relations with Morocco at the height of the crisis in Moroccan-Libyan relations.

We broke our diplomatic relations with Morocco in the aftermath of the attempted coup organized by Morocco against our country last 16 March.

Recently, we made the decision to resume such diplomatic relations and are working to that end.

However, our country insists on the organization of such relations on a new basis whose main characteristics will be sincerity, mutual respect, noninterference in

domestic affairs and respect for the borders drawn up by the colonial powers. Furthermore, we believe in the integrity of the Taif agreement, which must be applied as is.

[Question] Can the Mauritanian opponents of the AMD, who were traditionally supported by Morocco, rejoin the national community? If yes, under what conditions?

[Answer] Mauritania has never shut its doors to its citizens. Anyone who considers himself a Mauritanian could return home. His fate will depend exclusively on his behavior toward his country's institutions. Those who have violated such institutions will be penalized by the law; conversely, those who have done nothing wrong have nothing to fear.

[Question] Your relations with Senegal have improved considerably of late. How do you assess them?

[Answer] We have excellent relations with Senegal. They have been strengthened indeed of late thanks to the proper steps taken after our brother and friend Abdou Diouf came to power. I have great faith in the future development of our already cloudless relations.

[Question] The reasons and purposes of the latest political changes in Mauritania (stay of the process of return to a civilian system, strong reappearance of the military in the government) have not always been clearly understood by foreign public opinion. Could you provide us with some explanations?

[Answer] The resumption of the power by the military last April does not, in my view, represent a step back but rather a necessary tactical maneuver. After the attempted 16 March coup our country was threatened from the outside. Therefore, it became necessary to remove the threat of its destabilization in order to be able to face the experience of true democracy with calm and serenity. Mauritania has chosen a democratic future based on political pluralism.

[Question] Has the possibility of establishing a civilian regime been eliminated forever?

[Answer] A civilian regime will be henceforth based on elections after the democratic institutions have been organized.

[Question] When you acceded to power you undertook two major projects: elimination of slavery and a just solution of the cultural problem (the problem of national languages). How far have you gone in their implementation? What were the obstacles you faced? Has progress been made in the land reform?

[Answer] Regarding the elimination of slavery and the cultural problem, the moment they came to power the national armed forces took urgent measures to provide a just and definitive solution to these problems by favoring a balance and the blossoming of Mauritanian society.

It was thus that, as far as the linguistic problem was concerned, we voted in favor of cultural independence. Let us emphasize at this point that actually the contradiction exists not on the level of our national languages but rather between the national languages, on the one hand, and the language of the colonizer, on the other.

The 1979 decision of the National Salvation Military Committee stipulates that our languages will be introduced in our educational system starting with 1986.

Numerous obstacles have had to be faced. In addition to those of a technical and material nature (transcribing, curriculae, development of teaching methods, etc.), we could mention the opposition shown by some of our cadres trained in the French language, who support the teaching of the French language on the same level as Arabic.

As to slavery, you realize that this is an anachronistic and inhuman practice at the end of the 20th century. Therefore, the suppression of this regressive social system was necessary both on the political and religious levels. Consequently, the decision to abolish slavery was made and we formulated a number of proper steps which would ensure its success. In particular, this involves the implementation of an agrarian reform.

As one may suspect, this project faces major obstacles: there is a sterile conflict between landowners who would like to keep their huge estates and the landless peasants who are sometimes goaded by some politicians.

It goes without saying that intensive psychological preparations must be made for the landowners to agree to surrender some of their privileges, on the one hand, and to distribute the land among the peasants in an orderly and smooth fashion, on the other.

[Question] Eventually, are you planning to set up a political movement to guide the masses with a view to achieving your objectives?

[Answer] We are indeed considering the development of a structure for the guidance of our people. It will not be a political party in the sense that its purpose will not be either the assumption or preservation of power. Political parties will be established and will compete among themselves at the proper time. For the time being, it is necessary to develop a structure related to the masses which will explain and support recovery efforts undertaken by the armed forces and eliminate the political vacuum within the masses, a vacuum which special interests sometimes try to fill, thus facilitating foreign influences.

[Question] Speaking of the economy, could you describe to us difficulties and the progress achieved in the implementation of the economic development plan?

[Answer] As you know, on 10 July 1978 the armed forces faced a catastrophic economic situation caused not only by the combined effects of the war in the Sahara, a long drought and the burden of a global inflation, but also by the consequences of 20 years of poor management. That is why a real economic development plan was drafted. Appreciable results have been achieved: reduction of the budgetary deficit, reorganization of foreign indebtedness, improvement of state-owned companies, redynamizing of the administration, etc. Naturally, a great deal remains to be done. That is why last April the government formulated an action plan which updates the development plan and which, we hope, will enable us to face effectively the various economic and social problems we face until the imminent promulgation of the fourth economic development plan.

[Question] Mauritania ascribes great importance to the OMVS [Senegal River Development Organization] plan which is currently the target of a heated international campaign. What is the Mauritanian government's reaction to this campaign?

[Answer] In accordance with its principles, Mauritania has always attached great importance to regional or subregional agencies whose main purpose is to coordinate efforts with a view to the economic and social development of member states.

It is in this spirit, therefore, that Mauritania is continuing to ascribe great importance to the OMVS project which, to my knowledge, has never been truly the target of a heated international campaign. Naturally, there have been reservations expressed on the part of some newspapers and financing agencies as to its profitability, its ecological efforts and mainly the ability of member states to maintain the pace of this project.

To this effect, I believe that the OMVS high commission, which has had a number of studies made on this project, has dropped its reservations, having seen that the positive aspects are far superior to the negative.

In any case, 85 percent of the financing stipulated in the project has been made available. The damming of the Diama will be undertaken in November or December; several months later the damming of the Manantali will be undertaken.

[Question] One final question. Generally speaking, what is your reaction to the accession to power of the socialists in France? In particular, do you consider that the new French government is properly placed to play a useful mediation role between Morocco and the Polisario Front, as suggested by a Sahraoui official?

[Answer] We welcomed the assumption of power by the socialists in France. Mauritania and France have maintained traditional cooperation relations and we would like to see this cooperation developed even further with the new socialist government.

As to the role which France could play in the Saharan conflict, I believe that with the good relations it is maintaining with all concerned parties, it is possible and entirely desirable for France to play a positive and determining role in the settlement of this conflict.

5157
CSO: 4519/29

ECONOMIC SETBACK OUTLINED

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 pp 22-23

[Text] WHILE Morocco seems to be poised at last for a breakthrough in the Sahara conflict, the country's economy has suddenly taken a grave turn for the worse. Morocco has just suffered its worst drought for 35 years, is faced with a skyrocketing import bill and is scrambling for some way to bridge the widening trade deficit. This sudden deterioration in its economic health coincides ominously with the launch of its new five-year economic recovery plan.

Investment of dirhams 110bn (about $20bn) under the plan lays emphasis on industrial revival, rural development and a reduction in food and energy imports. Stress on import substitution involves an expansion of farm production, especially cultivation of sugar cane, cereals, edible oilseeds, citrus fruits and fresh vegetables. The plan also wants to promote small and medium-sized industries to manufacture domestic hardware consumer goods, electric components, ready-made clothing for local markets and export, and motor vehicle parts. New light industrial development is to be diverted from the main Mohammedia-Casablanca axis to generate employment in the provinces and the countryside with small, labour-intensive industry.

The emphasis on ironing out social and geographical disparities is timely. Consciousness of economic deprivation was largely responsible for the outbreak of serious rioting in Casablanca last June, resulting in many deaths at the hands of the paramilitary police (637 casualties according to the opposition parties; 67 according to the government). The riots followed a general strike and were sparked off by the removal of food subsidies at the behest of the [illegible]

There is not a great deal the country's economic managers can do at present to avert a catastrophe, apart from draw up planning blueprints. The government's economic experts in Rabat know that a revival of business depends more than anything else on plenty of rain. Moroccans anxiously watch the heavy, leaden skies, but so far there has been no significant downpour. As one government economist put it, gloomily reflecting the weather: 'The economy simply cannot stand a third year of drought.'

It is impossible to predict what the weather will do in 1982. But unless next year's harvest is a good one, it will be difficult to contemplate cutting back on food imports as hoped. Similarly, although the government is pledged to an oil self-sufficiency programme based on the development of indigenous shale rock, this is unlikely to make any impact for a decade. So there is no immediate prospect of cutting back on energy imports either.

The lip-service paid in the past to ironing out social inequality has resulted in little concrete achievement. In a comprehensive report on the economy three years ago, the World Bank said inequality in the country was increasing. About forty per cent of the population is reckoned to be below the poverty line (drawn at an annual income of $2,000).

Life for the average Moroccan has become increasingly difficult. Although as a result of food riots, the subsidies on essential foodstuffs have been partly restored, food costs have still risen substantially. Foreign observers call big cities such as Casablanca political tinder boxes, their huge shanty town populations, constantly swollen by rural newcomers, ready to

explode at any provocation.

Only about a quarter of children go to school, and less than half the adult population can find jobs. Idle children and teenagers swarm the streets. The living conditions of the poor are indescribably squalid.

Western diplomats in Rabat are afraid that economic desperation and the pent-up frustration of the poor will almost certainly vent itself in more violent rioting. Last week, King Hassan orchestrated a cabinet reshuffle which weeded out former ministers of doubtful loyalty. But playing a parliamentary game is irrelevant to the country's problems. As one diplomat put it 'After all, the government has made few real changes. Its only response to the Casablanca riots was increased repression. Murdering hundreds on the streets may cow people for a while, but if conditions continue to degenerate they will go on the rampage again. Next time, I expect even more bloodshed.'

One indication of how severe conditions have become was the king's televised instruction to desist from the customary slaughter of sheep for the traditional Eid el-Kebir feast marking the end of Ramadan. It is the first time since independence in 1956 that such a request has had to be made. King Hassan explained to his audience that with livestock herds already depleted by 30 per cent, further slaughter would virtually wipe out the country's sheep population for the future. Shortage of fodder has already forced farmers to kill off an unprecedented number of animals.

The drought also took its toll of the grain harvest. According to Abdul Latif Ghissassi, the minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, this year's grain harvest was only half the normal 4m tonnes. He estimated that this year's imports would have to amount to 3.5m tonnes at a cost of dirhams 3.6bn ($692m).

Such indications of impending agricultural disaster are complemented by trade figures from the Office des Changes which show the trade deficit widening at an alarming rate. Figures for the first half of 1981 show exports up by 15 per cent in value over the same period of 1980, but imports increasing by 28.8 per cent. This means that only 52.4 per cent of imports were covered by exports compared with 65.3 per cent a year ago. The heaviest import expense is energy, which rose by a third to dirhams 2.75bn ($529m). Disturbingly, energy imports now cost more than phosphate exports (the mainstay of Moroccan trade) which themselves have increased not because of greater export volume or better prices but solely as a result of the appreciation of the dollar.

Great hopes are placed on the new five-year development plan. This year's disastrous drought was particularly unfortunate since the economy otherwise looked to be improving more impressively than might have been expected after the three-year 1978-1980 austerity programme. That programme was instituted to reintroduce equilibrium in the economy caused by structural weaknesses, falling phosphate prices, the growing energy bill, a crushing external debt burden and large current account and budget deficits — all of which had conspired to wreck the ambitious 1973-1977 development.

The austerity programme seems to have done the trick in putting the economy back on course (even at a considerable price in social tension). Now the Moroccan government has to work out how to finance a projected growth rate of 6.5 per cent a year. The then finance minister, Abdel Kamel Reghaye, was told by the World Bank's president, Tom Clausen, in September that the country could not expect to get as much World Bank aid as it had hoped for. In line with the direction in which the multilateral aid institution is being forced, he recommended joint financing of programmes.

The gloomy statistics and the Casablanca riots are both making it difficult for Morocco to attract the required foreign investment. If the drought goes on, most observers expect further social upheavals — and a consequent decline in investment. Can the government get to grips with the crisis? Western diplomats, at least, are guardedly sceptical. They see the replacement of the competent Reghaye at the finance ministry in the cabinet reshuffle as an indication that the king is content simply to search for scapegoats.

CSO: 4500/63

DEFENSE MINISTER'S SPEECH ON ARMED FORCES DAY

Aden AL-RAYAH in Arabic 1 Sep 81 p 8

[Speech by PDRY Defense Minister, 'Ali Ahmad Nasi al-Bishi: "Success Achieved in Building the Armed Forces Is One of the Fruits of Our Yemeni Socialist Party's Correct Programs"]

[Text] Comrade secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, Comrade members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee, Comrade ministers,

Distinguished guests,

All our Yemeni people are celebrating the tenth anniversary of our Armed Forces Day, whose basic structure was founded as a result of the 22 June corrective step, as one of the important accomplishments of the glorious 14 October revolution. It gives me great pleasure on this occasion to welcome the heads and members of the delegations from brotherly and friendly armies, who have come to join with us in the celebrations of this anniversary.

I am also pleased on this glorious day to convey my warmest greetings to the officers, NCOs and men of the armed forces, the people's police, the militia, state security and the people's forces. On this occasion, I should not neglect to salute the fighters of the people's war of liberation, and the fathers, sons and mothers of the Yemeni revolution's martyrs who achieved independence and victory for our people through their sacrifices.

Our celebrations have been crowned by political and military activities which were inaugurated at the beginning of this year in all units of our armed forces, stemming from decisions of the emergency general conference of our Yemeni Socialist Party, in accordance with the invitation of the Central Committee, at its eighth session, sent to the heroes of our armed forces, pertaining to preparations to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Army Day.

These celebrations are also on behalf of the achievements and stirring work of the masses of our people and our armed forces, on behalf of accomplishing the important matters of the second 5-year plan, through raising production and improving the people's standard of living. When we celebrate the tenth Armed Forces Day, we are celebrating one of the national holidays of our glorious Yemeni people who have passionately loved freedom and who have defended it throughout their glorious history, making the greatest sacrifices for their sovereignty, independence and

territorial integrity. They have constantly refused to be provoked, intimidated or vanquished. They therefore cherish every defender of their freedom and their nation's soil.

Our intrepid armed forces have earned the greatest thanks and esteem for their heroic role and continuous steadfastness in the face of all kinds of imperialist and reactionary plots.

This intrepid army has grown and developed through the battles of national and class struggle and has been tempered in the turmoil of savage battle.

Long live the people's efforts, stemming from among their ranks, uniting together the hopes and aspirations for strong and lasting unity, inspiring in the masses of people determination, will and love of country, and making sacrifice a strong tool in the hands of the party and people, in order to protect the revolution's gains and consolidate its accomplishments.

Because they are marked by these revolutionary characteristics, they have emerged victorious from all the battles which they have fought in defense of the nation, revolutionary principles and in the people's interests.

If our armed forces have achieved those victories and have been able to protect the revolution and its gains throughout the years since independence, when they were small in number and weak in training and armament, then today they have become powerfully armed and trained, and highly conscious, highly skilled and greatly effective on all combat levels.

Our armed forces have not only carried out their duties in the nation's defense, but also have become an influential force, sharing in economic and social growth. They have clearly shown that, through joining the masses in building roads, schools, hospitals, housing units, digging wells and harvesting agricultural crops, as well as their full sponsorship of schools for the nomadic bedouin.

Comrade secretary general,

Comrade members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee,

Comrades,

The experience of the past years has confirmed the correctness of our Yemeni Socialist Party's program and the validity of its political line in all fields. The success achieved in building the armed forces was one of that program's fruits. I would like to emphasize that the men, NCOs and officers of the armed forces give their absolute loyalty to the Yemen Socialist Party and believe in its domestic and foreign policy, and in all the decisions and directives of the Central Committee, Political Bureau and the revolutionary government, aimed a completing the important tasks of this stage of the national democratic revolution, and achieving all the Yemeni revolution's goals for social progress and unity.

Since we are expressing our extreme pleasure at the high level that our armed forces have attained, we would be remiss not to mention that that has been accomplished thanks to the fruitful cooperation and lasting friendship existing between our party

and people and the friendly Soviet party and people, that people who have impartially given and are giving their sweat and blood to help all peoples fighting for freedom and peace, demonstrating their loyalty to the principles of the proletariat, constantly standing beside the just struggle of our Yemeni people, giving them all kinds of assistance and support on behalf of progress and development, just as they stand beside the struggle of our Arab peoples in their fight against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

As we express our appreciation for this assistance, we would like to stress that relations between our country and the peoples and parties of the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, will continue to be deep-rooted and will remain forever like the lofty Ural mountains.

Once again, I welcome all our guests who are joining with us on this occasion.

Absolute love and loyalty for the Yemen Socialist Party.

Thank you.

7005
CSO: 4404/25

YAMANI PLEDGES TO DEFEND $34 MARKER PRICE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 9-11

[Text]

Saudi Arabia is determined to defend the $34 per barrel price for Arabian Light crude against all comers, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani declared in Riyadh last week. The Saudi Arabian Oil Minister told British correspondents that the Kingdom was prepared to drop production to as low as 7 million b/d to counter efforts by purchasers to drive down the price of the OPEC marker crude or flood the market with oil if the organisation's other members tried to overstep the $4 upward limit on differentials. "We will raise it (production) if someone is playing with prices," Sheikh Yamani declared. He hinted that differentials might be lowered at OPEC's next meeting in Abu Dhabi in December.

Sheikh Yamani left none of the correspondents in any doubt that he meant business. In October, he revealed, Saudi Arabia had raised its production to 9.6 million b/d to put additional pressure on the other 12 members of OPEC to agree on a unified pricing system. His own prediction was that the present glut of oil would end around April of next year, with the market in balance and demand for OPEC oil up to 23 to 24 million b/d from the present level of 20 to 21 million b/d. He said he saw no reason other than an attempt to manipulate prices that would prompt Saudi Arabia to alter its November production rate of 8.5 million b/d for several years.

In the event of a cease-fire between Iraq and Iran, this could mean bad news for the Iranians. Sheikh Yamani indicated the Kingdom would only relinquish part of its 8.5 million b/d share of the world oil market if it agreed to do so in advance, a factor that would clearly favour Iraq. The Iraqis, he noted, would be capable of boosting output to nearly 3 million b/d within five to six weeks after hostilities were halted and had already purchased equipment to permit a temporary increase in exports. If Iran was likewise able to increase its exports, this would mean the joint output of the two warring Gulf states could reach 6 million b/d, he said, although he acknowledged that Iran's ability to export

oil was not known at present because of damage inflicted in September by Iraqi bombers to the Gurreh pumping station which supplies Iran's Kharg Island export terminal with crude.

(In the view of this newsletter, an increase in the combined output of Iraq and Iran to 6 millio... b/d, if it should occur during the second half of 1982, would absorb the projected increase in demand and still leave an excess of supplies. In the meantime, there are reasons to believe that Iraq's exports could reach 2.4 million b/d well before that time. If, therefore, Saudi Arabia is to maintain its commitment to support the current price structure, it might have to reduce its exports by significant additional amounts. Saudi Arabia's ability to reduce output does, nonetheless, have a floor to it and the question would then be whether Saudi Arabia's minimum production would still leave the market glutted with oil.)

Sheikh Yamani did indicate however a degree of flexibility in Saudi production plans. Commenting that Saudi Arabia's financial planning was based on oil production of 6.2 million b/d at $32 per barrel, he added: "I think our finance minister would be happy with 7 million b/d."

The primacy of oil in Saudi Arabian thinking was illustrated by Sheikh Yamani's comment on the industrial complexes being built at Jubail and Yanbu to use associated gas as a feedstock. There would be no need, he noted, to cut gas production until oil output fell below 7 million b/d. If this should occur, Sheikh Yamani told the correspondents, the petrochemical plants might have to accept lower deliveries of gas and reduce their production of petrochemicals.

Sheikh Yamani indicated that oil liftings by the old ARAMCO consortium – Exxon, Socal, Mobil and Texaco – were averaging 6.5 million b/d and that about 2 million b/d was being sold to Third World countries, either through direct sales or as the result of liftings by independent oil companies. He saw no prospects for a significant slump in sales to the old ARAMCO partners. "If we leave it to market forces," he said, "when it comes to Saudi Arabia (dealing) with four American oil companies relying mostly on Saudi supplies. I don't think they'll come down in their liftings much."

Sheikh Yamani also indicated that the current de-stocking by oil companies of some 2 million b/d was going on at a higher rate than had been thought likely inside OPEC a few months ago. One reason was that oil companies saw no reason to hold extraordinarily high stocks when there was reasonable assurance of the continuity of supplies at stable prices.

Continuity – and Saudi Arabia's ability to remain a major force in the oil market for many years to come – was a recurring theme in Sheikh Yamani's survey for the

correspondents of Saudi Arabia's oil industry. The Kingdom's published figure for proven reserves of 173 billion bbl out of world reserves of 650 billion bbl had been calculated in a very conservative way, he insisted. There was considerable debate inside Petromin, the state-owned oil company, on the size of Saudi Arabia's reserves. The current figure for proven reserves was calculated from the amount of oil shown by production and exploration wells and did not take into account the size of reservoirs that had been indicated by seismic exploration work. "If I applied the Mexican method (of calculating the size of reserves), you would be amazed," he stated. "You would have to fasten your seat belts."

Furthermore, Sheikh Yamani noted, exploration had been limited principally to ARAMCO's operating area, where new discoveries tended to be small. But he said there was reason to believe that large fields remained to be discovered outside the ARAMCO zone and he added that there was a "possibility" that non-ARAMCO companies would be allowed to prospect for oil, although there were no immediate plans for such a move. Saudi Arabia, he declared, was currently finding almost as much new oil as it produced.

(Underlying this statement, this newsletter believes, is the fact that geological and seismic work undertaken in the Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter) desert in southern Saudi Arabia indicates the probability of vast oil resources. But the Saudis have chosen to leave this area undeveloped. There are two reasons: the Rub al-Khali is a difficult area for oil operations and Saudi Arabia already faces enough pressure from other producers because of its declared reserves base and its accumulating oil surplus funds. Moreover, the Saudis prefer by nature to maintain a low profile. Their aggressive pressure on world oil markets prior to the reunification of the pricing system was due to their conviction that the market for oil as such had come to face serious threats. This point was made clearly by Sheikh Yamani in a paper which he delivered to the Oxford Energy Seminar in September and which was published by this newsletter in its issue of October 19.)

Sheikh Yamani said he believed it would be several years before demand for OPEC oil rose above 29 million b/d, which is below the organisation's production capacity of 30 million b/d. In the meantime, OPEC's long term strategy was undergoing revision to make it more flexible, he said. The strategy was drawn up when oil was selling at about $18 per barrel two years ago and would have provided for regular increases in oil prices which were indexed to economic growth, inflation and other factors to raise gradually the real price of oil. The strategy will be discussed at Abu Dhabi.

The revised strategy might make provisions for

lower oil prices in certain circumstances, Sheikh Yamani hinted. Last month's extraordinary meeting of OPEC ministers in Geneva had been significant, he pointed out, because "we learned for the first time we could lower prices as well as increase them."

As a footnote, Sheikh Yamani provided a decent burial for some persistent, but highly suspicious reports that Saudi Arabia was planning to build huge bomb-proof storage tanks near Yanbu on the Red Sea capable of holding 1.5 billion bbl of crude. It was this newsletter's view that the reports, which began to circulate in October and which the Saudi authorities refused either to confirm or deny, were intended to frighten other OPEC producers at a time when the glut of oil engineered by Saudi Arabia had already made them extremely nervous.

Sheikh Yamani dismissed the reports. Saudi Arabia was considering the development of storage facilities at its main export terminals, he said. But he added that this extra storage capacity would probably handle no more than a week's exports of crude or four weeks' supply of refined products, normal amounts for an exporting country.

CSO: 4400/77

OIL EXPLORATION TO CONTINUE

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 pp 54-55

[Text] SAUDI ARABIA is considering opening up new oil exploration areas to international companies. Sheikh Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, is studying the possibility of inviting exploration companies to search in areas outside the concession controlled by the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco). These areas, in the Eastern Province, contain virtually all the kingdom's proven oil reserves, estimated at more than 173bn barrels.

Oil companies and the government are convinced that there is much more oil and gas to be found in Saudi Arabia, particularly in an area between Riyadh in the Central Province and the Iraqi border. Aramco partners — Exxon, Standard Oil of California, Texaco and Mobil — are thought to be among companies anxious to extend the search in Saudi Arabia, which already has by far the world's biggest reserves.

At its present rate of production — 8.5m barrels a day — Saudi Arabia has enough proven reserves to last about 56 years. Sheikh Yamani claims that the government's official estimates of proven reserves are very conservative.

Members of Aramco — now an effectively nationalised company — tend to be even more conservative in their reserves appraisal, however. They estimate their own proven reserves at 113.5bn barrels, although they believe that probable reserves (the amount expected to be recovered using existing technology) to be nearer 179bn barrels. It is estimated that Aramco controls some [illegible] per cent of the Saudi reserves.

Significantly, Saudi reserves have continued to rise in spite of the very big increase in the kingdom's production rate since the early 1970s. Aramco is continuing to find new fields in its concession area. Sheikh Yamani said last week that while nothing was planned immediately, it was a possibility that new exploration areas could be licensed to companies outside the Aramco partnership. European and US groups are thought to have already expressed interest in possible new concessions.

Another route open to the Saudi government is the commissioning of Aramco members to carry out explorations for a fee. The kingdom would then gain additional knowledge of its reserves without the need for new licensing concessions.

Earlier this month, a new study released by Opec news agency, Opecna, reported that several 'huge' fields have been discovered but not tapped in Saudi Arabia. It also claimed that there are untapped fields around the world which, when developed, would add a total of around 450bn barrels of oil to the world's current proven reserves of about 650bn barrels. The agency was quoting a study by the Italian oil company Agip.

Better recovery methods and other new technology could add a further 567bn barrels to total world reserves by the year 2000, adding up to a total of 1,669bn barrels, according to Agip vice-chairman Marcello Colitti.

Opecna said the study estimated that seven 'super giant' fields remained to be tapped — three in the Middle East and one each in North America, Latin America, Africa and Western Europe. It did not specify exact locations, however.

Colitti said over 30 per cent, or 139bn barrels, of the undiscovered oil was in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, the Americas and Oceania could have undiscovered reserves of over 200bn barrels, he added.

'Much exploration and development remain to be done in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq, where prospects are very interesting,' he said. 'Prospects are not so promising in Syria and Oman. In Iraq it is likely that new giant fields will be found, and it is presumed that the value of the reserves will rise markedly as a result of development of the deeper parts of known productive deposits. The offshore area of the Arabian peninsula on the Indian Ocean side appears to be of great interest, although as yet it has barely been exploited.'

Colitti added that a probable 55bn barrels of oil remained to be discovered in Africa. This and an estimated 42bn barrels to be extracted through enhanced recovery techniques should boost the continent's total reserves to 180bn barrels by the end of the century. Although many of the huge but hardly explored sedimentary oil basins in Africa are not very promising, some — such as in Chad — look quite favourable.

Colitti expected new finds in the US and Canada, especially in the Arctic basins and off the Labrador coast, as well as in the Atlantic coast basins of Central and South America. He also referred to enormous reserves of natural gas in the Middle East, both associated with oilfields and independent of them.

He said that proven reserves in the region, plus additions likely by the year 2000, could total 53,300bn cubic metres, more than 42 per cent of which was still undiscovered.

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AIRPORTS' VIABILITY QUESTIONED

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 p 53

[Article by John Stokes]

[Text]

AS THE construction of the new Riyadh airport passes the halfway stage, some Saudi officials are having doubts about the series of massive airports the kingdom is planning.

Jeddah airport, which boasts the world's largest terminal, was completed earlier this year at a cost of Saudi riyals 17bn ($5bn). During the Hajj, when over one million pilgrims came from all over the Muslim world, the airport was still only used to less than 50 per cent capacity.

The one going up near Riyadh is even larger. Some 35km north of the capital, the first phase of the construction programme is nearing completion. Initially there will be three terminals: international, domestic and Royal. There are separate departure and arrival highways to the city. The design concept of the managing contractor, Saudi Arabian Bechtel, allows for modular expansion as the city's needs grow. The old airport inside the city was directly in the path of its future development.

The airport already employs 10,000 men, drawn from nearly a dozen countries, who work for a total of 59 subcontractors. Such is the technology used in the construction that the worldwide procurement of goods and materials is operated via satellite and computer. There is also a huge tree-planting and landscaping scheme that will change the city's desert environment beyond recognition.

With a third massive airport planned for Damman at the end of the decade, some Saudis are now wondering what they will do with the potentially under-used giants. Officials estimate that, by the year 2000, the airport will serve 15m passengers a year (twice the kingdom's population). However, such figures are not taken seriously by Saudi critics of the International Airports Project, the arm of the defence ministry which is responsible for building them.

Another consideration affecting the airports' viability is the phenomenal manpower they require. By 1985 Jeddah airport will need a normal staffing level of 15,000 bolstered by another 3,000 during the Hajj. Riyadh airport will need even more.

Training programmes have been started for Saudi management personnel, but there will simply not be enough Saudis (especially trained Saudis) to go round. Also, the massive number of Pakistanis, Indians, South Koreans and Filipinos needed to maintain the airports goes against the main tenets of the third plan, which aims to cut back on imported labour. Only 70 Saudis are currently studying airport management in the US and West Germany, a total hardly adequate for Jeddah airport alone.

The airports' huge running costs may well mean little to the Saudis at the moment, but their upkeep alone could start to hurt if and when Saudi oil revenues go down, one western expert has claimed.

CSO: 4400/76

MINISTER OF PLANNING DISCUSSES PLANS FOR INVESTMENT, GROWTH

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 31, Oct 81 pp 56, 57

[Interview with Minister of Planning Dr Salim Yasin by AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL: "Three Development Strategies Crystallize the Goals of the New 5-Year Plan"; date and place not specified]

/Text/ In spite of its heavy defense burdens, Syria has set forth a new 5-year plan for 1981-85 which stands apart from other plans by its comprehensive nature. Its costs come to 101.4 billion Syrian pounds and it is aimed at developing local product by 7.6 percent per year and raising per capita income by 3.7 percent per year. The Syrian minister of planning, Dr Salim Yasin, declared the goals and ambitions of the plan to IL-IQTISAD WAL-A'MAL, and here is the conversation:

Question: The fifth 5-year plan has been prepared in accordance with two considerations, the short-term and the long-term (5- and 1-year); could you explain these two considerations to us?

Answer: The fifth 5-year plan represents an economic and social policy platform for the coming period 1981-85. It was essential to arrive at a clear definition of this economic and social platform through a general definition of economic and social features over the long term so that it would reflect a picture of society and its desired economic and social relations.

Within this context, based on the results of a study and analysis of Syria's economic and social situation, a detailed study was made on the 1980 data in accordance with basic detailed variables and indices, and it was considered a basic point for preparing a long-range strategy of economic and social development up to 2000 in the 5- and 10-year contexts.

The goals of economic and social development in the period 1981-1990 (the 10-year context) were crystallized in the light of this strategy, in addition to the goals of economic and social development for the period 1981-85 (the 5-year context). These goals constituted executive stages for long-range development strategy.

Question: What are this plan's general goals?

Answer: The general goals of the fifth 5-year plan as one of the executive stages of the long-term strategy are to:

1. Increase citizens' income and raise their standard of living and culture.

2. Change the structure of the economy in favor of the economic sectors.

3. Liberate the economy by realizing increasing rates of self-sufficiency.

4. Insure justice in the distribution of income in a manner realizing a better life for everyone.

5. Benefit from the productive industrial and agricultural private sector, encourage it in areas supporting the public sector, and participate with it in carrying out development programs.

6. Encourage the joint sector and create formulas and systems that will guarantee that the volume of private funds invested in the various productive sectors increases.

7. Priorities in the fifth 5-year plan will be as follows:

A. The optimum use of existing economic projects and the effort to put projects that are being carried out or are planned to be established in productive operation as quickly as possible.

B. Attainment of broad, rapid development in the agricultural sector, in its plant and livestock areas both, considering developing the rural areas and developing and reducing the discrepancies between them and the urban areas to be the primary task of the economic and social plans.

8. Increase the average working person's share of gross domestic product.

9. Guide consumption in the light of coordination of consumption patterns and productive resources.

10. Increase the proportion of teachers and people with specializations among the total number of working persons.

11. Limit functional illiteracy.

12. Provide suitable housing for citizens.

13. Reform administration in the government and economic sectors.

14. Set prices of production in the light of economic costs.

15. Determine wages, salaries and bonuses in the light of the criteria of the economic costs of production and the criteria of performance and costs of living.

16. In the context of the general budget, goals have been determined as:

Achieving a better correspondence between total local revenues and expenditures in the general budget and between them and gross domestic product.

Increasing local current and investment revenues.

Limiting current spending and maintaining suitable investment spending in order to achieve production goals and basic services in the various sectors.

Reducing the deficit in the general government budget.

Question: What are the economic and social goals of the development plan?

Answer: The goals that have been spelled out for the domestic economy in the fifth 5-year economic and social development plan are focused on the following points:

1. Increasing gross domestic product by 44.1 percent in the plan in order that that will rise from 55,273,000,000 Syrian pounds in the base year to 79,673,000,000 in fixed 1980 prices in 1985 for an average rate of growth of 7.6 percent a year.

2. Increasing the per capita share of gross domestic product by an average rate of 3.7 percent a year, so that that will rise from 6,156 pounds in the base year to 7,397 pounds in 1980 prices in 1985.

3. Increasing the total ultimate consumption of goods and services by 38.6 percent, so that that will rise from 44,777,000,000 pounds in the base year to 62,083,000,000 in 1985, or an annual growth rate of 6.8 percent.

4. Setting the ratio of total ultimate consumption of goods and services to gross domestic product at 81 percent in the base year and 77.9 percent in 1985.

5. Raising the level of ultimate per capita consumption by an average annual rate of 3 percent.

6. Raising the nutritional level so that the per capita share of calories will rise in the base year to 2,807 in 1985.

7. Raising the citizens' educational level by raising the proportion of educated persons among the total population above 10 years of age from 65.3 percent in the base year to 75 percent in 1985.

8. Increasing employed persons per capita share of gross domestic product (productive) by an annual rate of 3.3 percent on the average up to 1985.

9. Setting the ratio of total investment to gross domestic product at 29.7 percent in 1985.

10. Setting total investments at 101,493,000,000 Syrian pounds in the fifth 5-year plan period, so that total investments in 1985 will be 37.6 percent greater than the level of investment in the base year, for an average growth rate of 6.6 percent per year.

11. Setting the rate of increase in the imports of goods and services at 18.2 percent during the years of the plan, or an average growth rate of 3.4 percent per year, so that the ratio of imported goods and services for ultimate consumption to total ultimate consumption will decline from 7.4 percent in the base year to 5.9 percent in 1985, the ratio of imports of goods and services for intermediate consumption (production requirements) to total intermediate consumption will drop from

24.8 percent in the base year to 17.2 percent in 1985, and the ratio of imports of goods and services for capital formation to total capital formation (investment) will decline from 34.5 percent in the base year to 30.8 percent in 1985.

12. Increasing exports of goods and services during the plan by 37.1 percent, for an average rate of growth of 6.5 percent per year, setting the ratio of exports of goods and services to gross domestic product at 12.4 percent in the base year and 11.3 percent in 1985.

13. Raising the commodity sectors' contribution to gross product to 52 percent and that of the productive service sector to 29 percent in 1985.

14. Setting the share of the productive sectors (excluding oil activity) relative to total employed persons at 61.1 percent in 1985.

15. Setting the share of the commodity sectors during the plan relative to total investments at 46.1 percent, the share of the productive service sectors at 33.7 percent, and the share of the group, social and personal service sectors at 20.2 percent.

Question: Has the new plan made allocations for projects which were not completed in the previous plan?

Answer: In reality, work on preparing the fifth 5-year plan and formulating its goals has been broken down into two stages:

A. A basic stage: during this, various branch plans have been set forth, that is, plans for production, employment and investment based on the optimum use of existing capabilities, including:

Improved use of existing capacities, assets and resources, and ones which are to be constructed and whose operation is to start during the fifth 5-year plan.

Raising the productivity of labor and fixed assets and improving the use of available materials and local products.

Making maximum possible economic use of work shifts.

Retaining and continuing to renovate existing capacities.

B. A final stage: during this stage, the fifth 5-year plan was prepared, proceeding from the basic stage plan on the one hand and from the frameworks of indices, goals and strategies of economic and social development strategy for the period 1981-85, so that existing productive capacities could be rounded out by new productive capacities on the basis of project index lists bearing on each sector. On that basis, the plan comprises two classes of projects:

A. Basic stage projects: these consist of:

Projects on which work began in 1981 in accordance with the fourth 5-year plan.

Projects which are aimed at eliminating bottlenecks in existing capacities.

Projects to improve and renovate existing capacities. The plan has given top priority to the execution of these projects.

B. New projects: these include other projects on which work will start during the plan period.

Question: What are the methods used for setting the plan out?

Answer: In preparing the plan, all available technical tools and methods that are compatible with the nature of the available data and information have been used in the manner presented in the answer to the first question. Although this plan has used modern tools of economic planning, such as commodity balances, mathematical models, studies of anticipated demand, sectoral surveys and so forth, in addition to the tools that were used in the past, or fourth, 5-year plan, the planning process still aspires to use more tools and more modern methods in the future.

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SALIH TRIES TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC BALANCE

London 8 DAYS in English No 46, 21 Nov 81 pp 4-5

[Text] NORTH YEMEN'S President Ali Abdullah Saleh has opened the diplomatic season in characteristic style, with visits to Moscow and Riyadh. His attempts to strike a workable regional and superpower balance for his underdeveloped country meanwhile assume a greater urgency with news of increased fighting between government forces and rebels in the south and centre of the country.

Usually reliable Arab sources report that the confrontation with the rebels, which has simmered for five years in the republic's remote mountain reaches, was stepped up recently to the point where the government forces had to deploy air power against rebel regions in the south. Other reports say the rebels are now well dug in on heights overlooking Taizz and Ibb — both some considerable distance from the region bordering pro-Soviet South Yemen where the rebellion has previously been endemic.

At his farewell banquet in Moscow, President Saleh enthused: 'In his heart every Yemeni is loyal to the Soviet Union.' These remarks may have puzzled his battle-weary troops back home, as they see the rebellion, which they suspect is backed by the Soviets, gaining in strength every week. But his purpose, according to at least one report, was linked to his troops' interests: it was to seek renewed shipments of Soviet ammunition, now in particularly short supply since much of the republic's stock was sold to the Iraqis some months ago.

These sources say that Moscow has been keeping up its agreed levels of arms shipments to North Yemeni ports to cater for the republic's special needs. But any arms supplier to the regime in Sanaa should know the pitfalls: the government has a long-standing tendency to sell off military supplies soon after delivery, and back in 1978 President Saleh had no sooner clinched a new arms deal with the US than he went and begged more from the Soviets.

Sanaa's ability to play the big powers off against one another stems from the republic's strategic location, wedged in between the Americans' and the Soviets' trustiest allies in the Arabian peninsula (Saudi Arabia and South Yemen respectively). North Yemen's population of around 5.3m dwarfs that of its southern neighbour (1.9m), and about equals that of Saudi Arabia, while being concentrated inside much tighter national boundaries. Over a million North Yemenis are estimated to work inside Saudi Arabia, and tribal links are strong between North Yemen and some of the Saudi nationals living just to the republic's north.

The monarchy therefore has a considerable interest in the stability and political direction of the North Yemeni government, and has often acted to defend those interests since the kingdom's own consolidation some fifty years ago. Saudi Arabia balances Sanaa's books by financing the national budget deficit and by other forms of direct aid. It also pays for much of North Yemen's arms requirements, though it insists that American spare parts for its weapons should all be routed through Saudi Arabia, in order to boost the kingdom's political leverage on Sanaa. Supplies have been held up on at least two occasions recently.

Tension between Sanaa and Riyadh has been running higher than usual for most of this year, since the Yemeni authorities' detention a year ago of the pro-Saudi former foreign minister, Abdullah al Asnag. Asnag is reportedly still under house arrest in Sanaa, but has not yet been brought to trial on the charges of 'conspi-

racy' levelled at the time of his arrest. The delay presumably arises from a wish not to embarrass the Saudis. His friend Mohammed Khamis, former head of the republic's intelligence service, was killed in a car crash in somewhat suspicious circumstances earlier this year.

The rebellion has meanwhile continued apace, spreading even to tribes such as the Hashid and Bakil, previously considered staunchly conservative. The rebels' leadership is vested mainly in the National Democratic Front (NDF), which has links with the South Yemeni regime in Aden — though the scale of the insurrection is now clearly greater than that of a purely Aden-instigated border dispute.

The NDF is reportedly still interested in attaining a political settlement to their grievances, preferably through the inclusion of NDF ministers in central government. In recent weeks the NDF has repeated its offer to meet government representatives 'anywhere at all in the country' — the wording of the offer itself a clear indication that the Front feels it has strong countrywide support, including in the colourful bazaars of Sanaa.

The Front recently made another goodwill gesture by releasing an officer cousin of President Saleh, captured by the rebels in an earlier engagement, in exchange for the government's release of an unnamed rebel captive.

Saleh's visit to Moscow was intended, in part, to ward off rebel criticisms that he is one-sidedly aligned with the Saudis. Nevertheless, the government has still refused to open negotiations with the NDF. North Yemen thus remains a running sore in the Arabian peninsula, a place where regional powers can continue to fight out their wars-by-proxy.

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NEW UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT DISCUSSES ISSUES, ASPIRATIONS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1300, 2 Oct 81 pp 22-23

[Interview with 'Ismat Kattanah, UN General Assembly President: "Credit for My Success Goes to Iraq's Policy; I Work for Implementation of Previous Resolutions Instead of Adoption of New Resolutions; No Position Toward Fateful Arab Issues, No Matter What This Position Is, Will Embarrass Me"]

[Text] After the election of 'Ismat Kattanah as president of the 36th UN General Assembly session, Israel launched a concerted propaganda campaign claiming that the Arab world representatives are not neutral and objective. Thus, they cannot differentiate between their role and their person. For example, the sentiments of Mr Kattanah, undersecretary in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, may dominate the judgment and actions of Mr Kattanah, the assembly president.

As for the Arab countries, this selection has been tantamount to some kind of a test of the unity of their ranks, keeping in mind that numerous barriers were erected by some Arab representatives to prevent Kattanah's election.

The new item listed on the assembly agenda pertains to the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. This item was included despite the objection of the U.S. delegation, which wanted the word "aggression" omitted from the formulation of the item because it does not view this action as constituting a threat to world peace and security. Observers believe that the discussion on this item will be a test of the quality of 'Ismat Kattanah's presidency.

The other issue that the delegates anticipate pertains to suspending Israel's membership in the United Nations during this session. Some believe that a team of Arab delegates may raise this issue. It seems that the Arab group has, with the approval of the PLO, adopted a resolution to the effect that a letter of reservation be drafted against the Israeli delegation because it doesn't represent Palestine.

These two issues and others represent an important aspect of the essence of the Arab strategy at the 36th UN General Assembly session. The Arab ministers of foreign affairs will meet shortly to coordinate these issues and to present them in a manner that will not lead to an airing of their dirty linen on the roof of the United Nations but give them a minimum degree of accord in the presence of one of their representatives in this elevated position, as was the case in the days of Charles Malik, al-Munji Slim and Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

On these issues and others, AL-HAWADITH has had this interview with 'Ismat Kattanah:

[Question] You seemed relieved immediately after winning the presidency of the General Assembly. Was there anything that annoyed you in the process of your election as president of the 36th UN General Assembly session?

[Answer] Not at all. One of your colleages asked about my expectations of success only 5 minutes before the poll and I said: 50 50. Yesterday, he came back to ask me in surprise: How did you know that the result would be 50 to 50?

[Question] Right, how did you know?

[Answer] It is a matter of calculation, which is a definite science, and not of interpretation. The fact is that the number of countries that had promised to vote for us was a little more than the number of votes I received. There was also, naturally, the element of error in defining the percentage. But in any case, I was confident that the result would be very close to what I expected and it was.

[Question] Did you resent the manner in which you have been selected as the new president, considering that it was the luck of the draw, which left it completely to chance that the piece of paper bearing your name was drawn and not that of the other candidate?

[Answer] There were five pieces of paper bearing the names of countries and a sixth paper with the name of (Koh), the candidate who did not enter the second phase. Had the names of the candidates been written on the six pieces of paper, Iraq would have won without the need for a draw. As for Bangladesh's claim that it had secured 90 or 100 votes, I did not believe that claim from the start. Before the poll, I did not mention the number of votes we expected because it was not right to do so.

[Question] But the reactions have ranged from embarrassment over the manner of the victory to thanking luck for being the cause of the victory. Do you feel any regret because luck was a factor in your success?

[Answer] Not at all. I was ready to congratulate the other candidate if he had won. But I did expect to win. What is important is the outcome and not the method, even if it is dramatic.

[Question] Iraq as a state and 'Ismat Kattanah as a person did a lot in the lobbies to insure your election as president. But this activity was confined to the recent period only. Was this due to your preoccupation with other issues or were there other reasons for delaying the "lobbying" activity?

[Answer] Iraq has more than 80 embassies and diplomatic missions abroad. These missions did their duty by contacting other governments a long time ago to win support for Iraq's candidate. But the number of UN members is 153, excluding South Africa. This is why I came personally to contact the countries with which we have no diplomatic representation and, at the same time, to underline the contacts with the other countries. It was an act of persuasion in the arena. But

there is no doubt that the major credit for my success goes to Iraq's policy. All the efforts exerted to undermine the reputation of Iraq and of the leadership of the Iraqi revolution failed.

[Question] Who do you mean by the other candidates [sic]? Do you mean only those whose names were included in the list or others as well?

[Answer] This is no place for mentioning names. The government knows and the countries also know. There is more than one candidate who went and talked with most of the countries, saying that so and so is all right but Iraq is in a state of war and is occupying territory [of others] and so forth. There were also other attempts to undermine Iraq's reputation. But the failure of those candidates to persuade a sufficient number [of UN members] to drop Iraq's candidate has been a proof of the good reputation the Iraqi revolutionary leadership and government enjoy in the third world and in the world generally.

[Question] Some circles have begun to express their reservations, and even doubts, about you because you are an Arab, and an Iraqi in particular, claiming that you will lead the General Assembly toward exaggerated sympathy for the Arabs and for the Palestinian cause. How do you intend to deal with this?

[Answer] I will confront it in two ways: First, by trying as hard as I can to be a good president. We can erase a large part of these reservations and question marks with experience. I will try to understand the good opinion of those who harbor goodwill for us. As for the tendentious, there is another way to deal with them by not providing them with any gap through which to infiltrate and prove their ill intentions and by not giving them the opportunity to say that the president of the General Assembly has actually been biased. This matter--partiality to the Arab cause--leaves it up to the Arab delegations and to Iraq to confront whatever harms Iraq's reputation. We hope that the Arab delegation will rise to the level of responsibility and will defend themselves. These delegations do not need the General Assembly president to defend them. There is a difference between the General Assembly president and the representative of a state and between 'Ismat Kattanah as president of the General Assembly and 'Ismat Kattanah who occupied Iraq's seat. This difference is known to the Iraqi Government and is also known to the international community and we will act in its light.

[Question] Is this difference supported by the Iraqi Government and has the Iraqi Government agreed to let 'Ismat Kattanah the General Assembly president be independent of the Iraqi delegation?

[Answer] I have not said that there is a separation. What I am saying is that there is a difference between my occupying the seat of the presidency and my occupying, for example, Iraq's seat in the Security Council and my repaying the Israeli representative in kind.

[Question] At the outset of your success, Israel's representative has accused you of bias in the opening speech you delivered. This is the first step on a long path that Israel intends to follow against you. How do you plan to confront this intention?

[Answer] What the Israeli delegate said is almost exactly identical to what I expected. My references to the General Assembly's resolutions on the Palestinian people's inalienable rights to self-determination, repatriation and the creation of an independent Palestinian state under the leadership of the PLO, the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative, are quotes from UN resolutions and I have not brought them from Iraq. I said that we have adopted hundreds of resolutions but the political will to abide by and to implement these resolutions is nonexistent. I have not left a gap through which anybody with a single grain of fairness can undermine the position that I currently hold. But the Israeli representative is without fairness. He is tendentious and this is what I expect of him. What is important is that no representative, including the U.S. representative, has reiterated what the Israeli representative said. Israel's isolation on this issue has been total because Israel is the only country that has followed this course.

[Question] Do you expect the Arab strategy in this session to be similar to that of the previous sessions or do you expect a change to develop in this strategy by virtue of the fact that you, an Arab, are president of the General Assembly?

[Answer] I hope that will not be so and I hope that no Arab delegation will think that I will be embarrassed if any position is taken toward any issue whatsoever, especially the fateful Arab issues. With his qualifications, the president can, I believe, deal with any issue.

[Question] According to your expectations, do you think the Saudi initiative will be presented to the General Assembly either directly or indirectly?

[Answer] This issue is premature because I have not yet contacted the Arab delegations to discuss the manner in which to raise the Palestine issue and the Middle East issue, the two main items in the General Assembly. On 21 September, we started the general debate, which will continue until 13 October. During this period, I will hold contacts with the geographic groups in order to present to the General Assembly the agenda and the procedure of action for dealing with the issues. I don't know how long the debate on the Palestinian issue will last to be able to answer the question of what the Arab position will be or of what proposals the Arab and friendly delegations will present and whether such proposals will be close to the Saudi initiative or far from it. All this is premature.

[Question] The issue of the destruction of the Iraqi reactor is included [in the agenda] for the first time. Would you prefer to preside over the debate on this issue or to have one of your two deputies do so?

[Answer] I have not made a decision yet. But this decision is up to me personally in my capacity as president of the General Assembly. However, I believe that some people exaggerate the powers of the General Assembly president on this and other issues. The president is bound to implement the provisions of the bylaws. The matter will be up to my personal decision as to when to preside and when to ask one of my two deputies to take my place. The two issues must be separated from each other.

[Question] Some General Assembly presidents have been known to cling to the letter of the law and others have been known to interpret the laws and to deal with them

skillfully to serve their political sympathies. For example, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, an ex-president of the General Assembly, was able to move the assembly politically, but within the framework of the laws. What do you expect of yourself and what method will you follow?

[Answer] My method.

[Question] Which is?

[Answer] After 25 years as a representative of my country, Iraq, in the United Nations and as a member of the General Secretariat for more than 11 years, I have formed impressions, first, on the possibilities of action through the General Assembly--possibilities which are undoubtedly limited for reasons known to all. But the president of this General Assembly in particular has the opportunity to contribute more effectively than some of the ex-presidents. You have mentioned brother Bouteflika. You probably know that I was a member of the General Secretariat during his presidency. I believe that the international climate has changed a great deal insofar as the particular issue to which you are referring, namely, the issue of inviting brother Yasif 'Arafat to the United Nations, is concerned. At the time, this issue was the event of the year, of the season and of the decade. But it has now become a routine issue. After 1974, the PLO became an observer member of the United Nations who attends the General Assembly meetings in this capacity. This has now become a foregone conclusion that can no longer be disturbed. But stirring up what the PLO and the other Arab delegations want insofar as their fateful issues are concerned is up to the Arab states and not the General Assembly president.

The president is prepared to contribute as much as he can to help the General Assembly adopt resolutions. As you saw, I have emphasized especially the need to abide by and to implement the resolutions and to create the political will for such abidance and implementation instead of repeated approval of the resolutions year after year and then forgetting the resolutions as soon as they are approved.

[Question] The United States, particularly the new U.S. administration, has tried to avoid committing itself to many of the UN resolutions and inclinations, including the law of the sea, the comprehensive negotiations and other issues. Are you going to try to bring back the U.S. administration to play a role and to contribute to reviving the issues raised in the United Nations?

[Answer] In the two spheres that you have mentioned, the United States has a distinct stance and position different from the position of its Western allies. As you have said, when the new administration came, it said that it would reconsider the position that the United States had adopted in these two spheres and that it would determine its new position after a complete study. As far as I know, the United States has not yet reached the point of declaring the final outcome of this reconsideration of its position.

As for the comprehensive negotiations, the United States has, insofar as I know, left this issue till after conclusion of the limited summit conference expected to be convened in Cancun, Mexico, in October. As for the Law of the Sea, the

issue has been postponed till next year. I believe that the issue depends primarily on an announcement by the United States of the outcome of its study as soon as possible and on efforts by the other delegations to persuade the United States to approve the collective agreement on the law of the sea, on the comprehensive negotiations and on the details of the south-north dialogue.

[Question] Generally speaking, will you try to exert personal influence?

[Answer] Insofar as the Law of the Sea is concerned, nothing is being discussed at present. As for the comprehensive negotiations, my predecessor exerted exhausting and commendable efforts to bring the U.S. viewpoint closer to the other viewpoints insofar as the process of holding the negotiations is concerned. It is my intention to focus on the details of this issue, to exert my utmost efforts in following it up, to try to bring the viewpoints closer to each other and to begin these negotiations without any delay.

[Question] What do you expect of 'Ismat Kattanah as president of the current session of the General Assembly?

[Answer] To rise to the level of the trust and to have it said at the end of the session, or at the end of special sessions if they are held, that he has done what he should and that the confidence of the international community in Iraq and in its candidate has not been misplaced.

[Question] And what do you expect of the 36th UN General Assembly session?

[Answer] I hope for a lot but I expect a lot less than I hope for. I hope to find a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Palestinian people's issue, which is the crux of the conflict. I hope that Namibia will attain its independence and will join the United Nations. I hope that the dialog between the north and the south will begin and will achieve great progress. I hope that we will put an end to the arms race instead of piling up resolutions on this issue. I hope to complete the Law of the Sea, which had already been approved unanimously but which has been reopened by the new administration in Washington. I hope that we will close this door and that we will sign the final agreement before the new president is elected next year.

[Question] And you expect?

[Answer] I expect, and hope, that we will at least succeed in the next 10 months in the issue of the Law of the Sea and the issue of Namibia. As for the issue which is closer to our hearts and minds, namely, the Palestinian people's issue, I don't expect, regrettably, the Palestinian people to enjoy all their inalienable rights during my presidency of the General Assembly.

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ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK PLAYS INCREASING ROLE IN ISLAMIC WORLD PROJECTS

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 86, 3-9 Oct 81 pp 44-45

[Article by al-Sadd Sayyid Ahmad: "Economy Free of Usury; Islamic Bank: Its Aid Includes 38 Countries"]

[Text] At the beginning of this month, Bangladesh concluded an agreement with the Islamic Development Bank in Jiddah to provide it with $12 million to finance the purchase of cement from Indonesia. Last year, Bangladesh received from the bank loans totaling $55 million to finance various commercial transactions. What Bangladesh has received exemplifies the bank's growing role in the economies of the Islamic countries.

At the end of last August, the bank's board of directors held a meeting at which it approved the allocation of $82 million to be distributed in various spheres. In commercial financing, for example, the board agreed to allocate $23 million for Pakistan to purchase oil, $5 million for Niger to purchase containers, $22 million for Morocco to purchase edible oil and $18 million for Turkey to purchase oil.

In the sphere of financing projects, the board allocated $11.5 million for the Moroccan National Development Bank, $124,000 for a synthetic leather firm in Bangladesh and $650,000 for a marble company in Pakistan. Finally, in the sphere of technical aid, the bank allocated $750,000 for Upper Volta to help it secure the technical means necessary to review bid papers, $100,000 for a study of the possibilities of oil storage in Mali and $1.5 million for an economic feasibility study on a 200-kilometer long highway between Algeria and Niger.

International Activity

The Islamic Development Bank, which was established in 1973 and which started its actual activities 2 years later, has made it one of its main goals to strengthen economic ties between the Islamic countries and to be the economic arm of the Islamic Conference Organization. Consequently, the bank has extended its activities to the 38 member countries of the conference, now that Egypt's and Afghanistan's membership has been suspended.

The bank operates in the various spheres in order to realize its goal, whether by advancing loans for the various development projects, by partnership in capital, by embarking on joint investments or by advancing technical aid. The bank does all this within the framework of encouraging joint investments among the Islamic

countries. For example, the bank has asked the Turkish Cement Establishment to set up a joint cement plant for Mali, Niger and Upper Volta.

Since its foundation and the start of its actual operations 5 years ago, the cost of the operations conducted by the bank has amounted to $1.58 billion, from which 36 countries have benefited. A comparison between the years 1978-79 and 1979-80 demonstrates the extent of growth realized by the bank. The volume of operations increased in this period from 50 to 62 operations. This resulted in an increase in spending from $490.9 million to $649.96 million.

In projects, the volume of financing jumped from $152.85 to $170.97 million and covered 26 Islamic countries--including the Maldives, Djibouti, Lebanon, Libya and Gambia, which have benefited directly from the bank's activities for the first time.

Distribution of Financing

Distribution of the financing according to type of activity shows that 14.9 percent of the spending has gone into the agricultural sector, 36.5 percent to the industry and mining sector, 21.9 percent to communications, 16.9 percent to public utilities such as electricity and water, and 9.8 percent to social services, such as health and education. In the same year [sic], $50.56 million was contributed to securing the liquidity needed for eight projects in seven Islamic countries. A sum of $11.16 million was spent from the budget allocated for last year, amounting to $11.43 million; $13.89 million was allocated for this year.

It is evident that the bank has succeeded in helping the Islamic countries secure the financing necessary to implement various development projects. But some observers believe that the bank's role exceeds that of being a mere regional development and aid agency similar to the various development funds with which the area abounds. The bank must, observers believe, seek to entrench its role as a central Islamic bank, especially in view of the growing Islamic financial movement, which seeks to occupy an important position in the world of international finance on the basis of Islamic rules that are free of the usurious system.

The bank officials acknowledge this and hope that in the future the bank will play the role of the central bank for the Islamic banks and financial houses that have begun to spread and to engage in their operations in accordance with the Islamic Shari'a.

The Islamic Financing House, whose establishment was announced in Geneva last June, is one of the biggest of these houses, and it seeks to gather the savings of individuals and groups in freedom from governmental activity, to secure the money necessary to finance development operations on the basis of profit and loss and to conduct its operations in accordance with the Islamic Shari'a.

This house's approved capital is $1 billion of which $250 million are paid. Last month, the house's shares were offered for sale in 49 Islamic countries and 5 other countries distinguished by the presence of influential Islamic communities in them. The value of the shares ranges from $100 [per share] to $1 million to guarantee the biggest participation possible by individuals in these countries.

Moving Force

Prince Muhammad al-Faysal, son of the late King Faysal, who is the moving force behind this project, announced in the press conference he held in Geneva last June on the opening of the house's operations that there is approval to set up Islamic banks in Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Pakistan, Burundi, Nigeria and Guinea. He also announced that there are plans to set up a regional bank for the Middle East.

One of the means to which the house will resort is silent partnership [al-mudarabah]. The best definition for it is that it combines capital with human effort in profitable investments in contrast to usury and interest, which are collected without any noteworthy effort. There are various kinds of silent partnership, such as continuous partnerships and partnerships limited to one transaction and covering a certain period of time and date. A participant has the right to enter the partnership or withdraw from it. But this is done in accordance with certain conditions determined by the nature of the partnership.

The Islamic Financing House has gone beyond the limits of theoretical discussion and entered the field of actual experience several years ago. One of the pioneer projects with which the house has initiated its operations is al-Dammazin agricultural project in Sudan where the house has 300,000 hectares of land. Work has started on 30,000 hectares and the project is expected to be completed in 1984. The house started by providing $3 million for the purchase of machinery and then the work began. The total cost will be $58 million. The house hopes to regain the money it spends on the project and some profit from leasing equipment and from the effort the company exerts in managing the project.

The level of the Islamic Development Bank's operations and the benefit the Islamic countries have felt as a result of these operations made these countries agree to double the bank's capital at the Islamic summit held in al-Ta'if at the beginning of this year. The growing role of individual and group efforts to try economic means more compatible with the Islamic spirit make it necessary to combine and concentrate these efforts so that they can give the Islamic political movement its desired economic dimension. What will give the Islamic world its place in the international community is increased inter-Islamic trade and increased joint projects between the various Islamic countries at the expense of these countries' reliance on non-Islamic economic groups.

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FRENCH ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST, MITTERRAND'S SAUDI TRIP EXAMINED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 85, 26 Sep-2 Oct 81 pp 13, 15-19

[Article by 'Abd al-Karim Abu al-Nasr: "AL-MAJALLAH Enters Mitterrand's Secret World: France Is Seeking To Establish Axis With Saudi Arabia, With Prince Fahd's Initiative as Its Mainstay; How Does New Administration Formulate Its Policy in Area and Who Are President's Advisers; Mitterrand's Plans: Initiative Begun in Jerusalem and Peace Conference in Paris; French President: 'I Will Be Frank With Israel and Will Advise It To Accept Palestinian State'"]

[Text] Those close to Francois Mitterrand do not hide the fact that the French president considers his visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (26-28 September) of "extreme significance" not only at the level of bilateral relations but especially with regard to the situation in the Middle East and the Gulf and in connection with the possibilities of finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Mitterrand's agencies have prepared two kinds of files for this visit, which, in the opinion of a prominent French official, is a "lot more important" than ex-President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to Saudi Arabia in March 1980. The first group of files is those concerning bilateral relations, especially economic, commercial and financial relations. The second kind is tantamount to a single "top secret" file that has been seen only by Mitterrand and his top advisers. This file pertains to the political aspect of the visit. Policy will be, according to the prominent French official, "the main focus of the talks between Mitterrand, King Khalid, Crown Prince Fahd and the Saudi officials. What is meant by policy here is the Middle East crisis and Prince Fahd's initiative."

Mitterrand will visit Saudi Arabia while relying on two main supports: He is, on the one hand, the strongest European leader at the present time despite the economic problems being experienced by his country. He is stronger than German Chancellor Schmidt, who faces the threat of being ousted because of internal and international considerations, and stronger than British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who is facing sharp economic and political crises. Internally, Mitterrand is even stronger than President Reagan because his party has an overwhelming parliamentary majority (290 socialist deputies out of a total of 491 deputies in the National Assembly). Moreover, Mitterrand's attainment of power after 23 years of conservative, rightist Gaullist government has created some sort of a coup and has generated a strong popular current supporting

Mitterrand. Indeed, Mitterrand, in the opinion of neutral French experts, is even stronger than General de Gaulle himself was. The socialists may remain in power for 14 years at least. This is important for long-term cooperation between states.

The other support on which Mitterrand relies is that he wants to play a major role in the Middle East. One of those close to the new French regime has told us that Mitterrand doesn't want to "sell words and spread promises" but to launch an initiative or engage in a movement that will actually have tangible results. This is why he is moving carefully and slowly and why France's Mideast policy seems, at the start, incomplete and as if it were a continuation of the preceding era. Mitterrand doesn't want to be a continuation of de Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard d'Estaing. He wants to perform in the Middle East a major act to which his name will be tied and that will produce practical results. This is why he is eager to gather full information and details and to listen to the area's influential leaders before embarking on any actual movement. The same source says that to Mitterrand, Saudi Arabia is a country with a fundamental weight in the entire area and no initiative or movement for a comprehensive solution of the conflict can succeed if not supported by Saudi Arabia.

Mitterrand cannot be understood and the dimensions of his visit to Saudi Arabia cannot be comprehended unless we enter the French president's "secret world." We started several weeks ago to gather the largest possible amount of information, especially from well-informed French and Arab sources, on Mitterrand's secret world because this aspect has not yet been tackled by any Arab paper or magazine in a complete and comprehensive manner. The information we have gathered reveals important things. Some of the information pertaining to the questions listed below is published for the first time:

1. Who are Mitterrand's advisers on foreign and Middle East policy? How deeply spread is the Zionist influence in the French administration and in French decision making? How are decisions made?

2. What are the plans and ideas of Mitterrand and his group concerning the Middle East crisis in particular and area issues generally?

3. What is the "password" in Mitterrand's visit to Saudi Arabia and what are the fundamental issues that he will discuss with King Khalid and Prince Fahd?

Very Confidential and Decision Is His

We will start from the beginning with Mitterrand himself.

Mitterrand is 65 years old and likes to listen to the opinions of his advisers, especially those whom he trusts and has known for years. He likes to debate with them and is interested in reading their reports. He is surrounded at the Elysee Palace by a larger number of advisers and aides than any other French president. He has 42 advisers and aides whereas d'Estaing, for example, had only 25. He listens to his advisers but ultimately he himself makes the fundamental decisions according to what he deems fit for his country's interest or

his party's interest (when he was just the Socialist Party chairman). One of those who has known Mitterrand for years has told us: "Mitterrand is not a vague man but a very confidential man. He hates ambiguity and likes clarity. He is open and a first-class debater, but he keeps his secrets to himself and does not acquaint anybody with them until the right time, which frequently means at the moment of the implementation of this or that decision. Mitterrand debates with the others but he especially debates with himself when he retreats by himself, as he often does. He can be called the democratic dictator: The decision is up to him but this decision is the result, or the essence, of a dialog with others or of reading their reports."

"Israel's Man" in Mitterrand's Administration

Mitterrand's men are two kinds: The advisers and the friends on the one hand and the ministers and influential people on the other. In Mitterrand's administration, whether at the Elysee Palace, in the Socialist Party or in the government, there are two prominent currents insofar as the Middle East is concerned: A current supporting Israeli as a result of numerous factors and a current with an understanding of the Arab viewpoint and of France's short and long-range interests.

Let us enter Mitterrand's secret world:

First, the Elysee Palace where the French president's advisers and close friends are: The group of advisers and aides is supervised by the so-called "big trio," namely: Jaques Attali, 38 years old and Mitterrand's special adviser, is the man who prepares the main files and is considered the most powerful man in the Elysee; Pierre Beregory, who is the Elysee secretary general and is 61 years old; and Andre Rousselet, who is 59 years old and is the head of Mitterrand's office and the man for special tasks.

1. Attali is primarily Mitterrand's economic braintrust. But he is especially the adviser in whom Mitterrand has utmost confidence and who helps Mitterrand formulate the major strategic plans and prepare for summit meetings with world leaders. Attali is, for example, the man who supervised preparation of all the files for the Ottawa summit. Mitterrand's strong relationship with Attali goes back 13 years. Attali's office is right next to Mitterrand's at the Elysee. Frequently, prominent visitors pass through Attali's office before they enter the president's office. Attali is "intelligent and rich with ideas," according to one of those who knows him. He explains the complex issues to Mitterrand. He has written six books, in addition to many studies and articles. He comes from a rich family. But Attali is a Zionist to the utmost and is the most Zionistic of Mitterrand's group. He feels a strong link with Israel and doesn't hide this feeling. For example, he visits Israel several times a year and stays there in some settlements so as to familiarize himself with the Israeli way of life or to retreat into himself. He has written some of his books in Israel. Politically, he is "Israel's man" in Mitterrand's administration. He is currently writing a book entitled "Jews and Money." The Israelis contact him to convey through him their requests and their messages to the French president. Attali is not only a Jew but also a member of the Executive Council of the French Jewish Organizations and his influence in these organizations is strong.

For example, Attali attended the meeting that took place between Mitterrand and the Israeli ambassador in Paris in the wake of the meeting of Claude Cheysson, the French minister of external relations, with Yasir 'Arafat in Beirut. During the meeting with Mitterrand, the Israeli ambassador protested the Cheysson-'Arafat meeting. Mitterrand entrusts Attali to convey some "messages" to the Israelis. For example, Mitterrand sent Attali to Tel Aviv this week before the start of his visit to Saudi Arabia. Attali has strong influence with Mitterrand and those close to him say that he played a fundamental, decisive role in persuading Mitterrand to run seriously against Giscard d'Estaing because Mitterrand had been reluctant and not sure of the result. It is also said that Attali conveys to the Israelis Mitterrand's "warnings" about Begin's policy.

2. Pierre Beregory, the Elysee secretary general: He is also sympathetic to Israel, especially since he is of Jewish extraction and since he took refuge in France from East Europe. But he cannot be considered committed to Israel and the Zionist Movement like Attali. In any case, his role at the Elysee is not so much the role of a "political adviser" to Mitterrand as it is that of organizer and superviser of all those working in the palace (both advisers and aides). His team, consisting of 25 members, can be considered more like a government within Mitterrand's administration operating along a parallel line to that of the actual government. Informed sources say that he has "his group" in every ministry and that the Elysee thus knows exactly what is happening here and there. He meets with Mitterrand several times daily and his relationship with Mitterrand dates back to 1975.

3. Andre Rousselet, the head of Mitterrand's office: He has no definite political views and is used by the president for "special secret tasks."

In addition to the big trio, we must mention Pierre Marion, the new French intelligence chief, who was appointed by Mitterrand after the election. Marion supports the establishment of coordination with Israeli intelligence and it is said that he visited Israel secretly for this purpose last August. It is well known that there is a strong current in the French intelligence agencies inclined toward cooperation with the Israelis.

Foreign Ministry "Currents"

Second, the cabinet: In the French cabinet, the strongest force that is sympathetic to the Arabs, that understands their issues and that is eager to maintain a strong French-Arab relationship is the Ministry of External Relations. This ministry contains a large number of officials and diplomats who are sympathetic to the Arabs. You even find in the ministry several Arab currents: There is a current that supports Saudi Arabia, the Gulf and Iraq, a pro-Palestinian current, a pro-Algeria current, a pro-Morocco current, a pro-Libya current, a pro-Lebanon current, a pro-Egypt current and so forth. Claude Cheysson, the minister of external relations (60 years old), is considered to a large degree "a friend of the Arabs" even though he is not hostile to Israel. Cheysson has broad experience in Third World affairs generally and in Arab-world affairs in particular as a result of the years of his work within the framework of the EEC. He believes that strengthening relations with the Arab world is a "vital" and indispensable issue for France. Cheysson is realistic and is like Mitterrand in this respect.

He is a skillful, daring and frank negotiator with a witty spirit. His influence with Mitterrand is stronger than that of his "colleagues" during Giscard d'Estaing's term. But he has no influence inside the Socialist Party. Cheysson was, for example, one of the strongest supporters of Algeria's independence from France since 1956. His Mideastern views are largely similar to Mitterrand's. He supports Israel's presence within secure and acknowledged borders, supports giving the Palestinians the right to self-determination, especially the right to set up an independent Palestinian state, and supports Israel's withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967. He also supports the need to have the PLO participate in the peace process and believes that movement should be made step-by-step and that the Camp David agreement is a "good step" on the path to peace. He also believes that the solution to the Palestinian problem cannot be realized through implementation of the self-rule stipulated by the Camp David agreement but by finding a broader and more comprehensive solution to the problem. Cheysson has two assistants for Middle East affairs. The first is Bruno Delaye, a socialist young man who is considered an expert in Gulf and OPEC affairs. Bruno's father was France's ambassador in Tehran during the shah's era. The second is (Dominique Camille Deneuve), who is also a young man with broad experience in Middle East affairs that he gained while working in the United Nations. Both men understand the Arab viewpoint. In addition to these two, there are two other influential officials in the Ministry of External Relations. The first is Jacques Andreani who has extensive influence and who currently holds the post of director of the ministry's political affairs. He was France's ambassador in Cairo around the end of Giscard d'Estaing's term. Mitterrand has sent him on a tour of some Arab countries, including Egypt. Andreani is a friend of the Arabs and he considers the Camp David treaty a "positive step," though a step that must be surpassed with respect to solving the Palestinian issue. One of his responsibilities in the ministry is to keep track of Moscow's activities in the Arab area. The second is Serge Boidevail, the head of the ministry's Middle East Department. He is also sympathetic to the Arabs and has strong relations with the Iraqis and Libyans. He is the one who played the major role in France's negotiations with Iraq for construction of the nuclear reactor near Baghdad during Giscard d'Estaing's era.

Ministers Sympathetic to Arabs

The present French cabinet includes a number of prominent ministers who are sympathetic to the Arabs. The minister closest to the Arabs is Michel Jobert, the minister of state for foreign trade. Jobert is a leftist Gaullist who was minister of external relations under Pompidou's presidency during the 1973 war. At the time, Jobert clashed with Dr Kissinger and worked to foil a U.S. scheme aimed at forming a U.S.-European front to fight and strike OPEC. Jobert believes in the necessity of cooperation with the Arabs and the oil countries not only at the political level but in all the spheres of interest to both sides. He is frank and daring. One of the reasons for including him in the cabinet was the eagerness to reassure the Arabs. In addition to Jobert, there is Jean-Pierre Chevenement, the French minister of state for scientific research and technology. He is one of the leaders of the current supporting the Arabs and the Palestinians in the Socialist Party. Chevenement has said in an interview with AL-MAJALLAH: "We want to preserve the ties of friendship existing between France and the Arabs

for a long time and we want this friendship to grow firmer and broader. Regarding our relations with Saudi Arabia, I can say that there are countries that are prepared to perform a historical role, relying not on the number of their population but on their geographic location and on the values that they represent and initiatives that they try to realize--initiatives that serve the good of the entire world. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is one of these countries. We are eager to preserve, strengthen and bolster the good relations between the two countries. On our part, we will try to strengthen the cooperation with Saudi Arabia and to broaden its scope."

Ministers Jobert and Chevenement, in addition to Cheysson and other ministers, will accompany Mitterrand on his visit to Saudi Arabia.

There are three other ministers who are sympathetic to the Arabs and who have a strong influence in the cabinet and in Mitterrand's administration. They are: Jacques Delors, the minister of economy, who underlines to Mitterrand the "vital importance" of cementing cooperation with the Arabs; Charles Hernu, the minister of defense, who is fully aware of the importance of the weapons deals with the Arabs (especially since one half of the French weapon sales in the world are absorbed by the Arab states, led by the Gulf states); and Jean-Pierre Cot, minister of development [title as published], who is seeking to set up huge cooperation projects among the French, the Arabs and the African countries. You may also add to these Michel Rocard, the minister of state for [economic] planning [and development]. Rocard is one of the leaders of the Socialist party, is a traditional rival of Mitterrand's and a candidate for the next presidential term. There are of course the four communist ministers who are committed to their party line, which is one of support for the Arab position and the Palestinian issue. The premier is Pierre Mauroy, who is a traditional socialist with strong historical ties with Israel, especially with Shimon Peres. Mauroy has no broad experience in foreign affairs but has recently begun to show interest in them. One of Mauroy's friends has said: "Mauroy is especially interested in internal issues. But he has now begun to realize that there has to be firm cooperation with the Arabs."

Struggle Within the Socialist Party

Third, Socialist Party: This party, which is now in control of the presidency and of the National Assembly in France, is traditionally the French party most supportive of Israel and of the Zionist movement. It includes a large number of Jews from top to bottom. Leon Blum is one of the party's founders and historical leaders. He established very firm ties with the Zionist movement and urged the British to encourage Jewish immigration to Palestine. Socialist Guy Mollet was the French premier when the French Government took part with Israel and Britain in staging the 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt. Mitterrand has firm relations with the Israelis, especially with the Labor Party and with its leader, Shimon Peres. Mitterrand has visited Israel several times, most recently last year. Mitterrand feels a strong commitment toward the Jews and toward Israel. However, he has not concealed his concern for the realization of peace in the area and for the creation of a Palestinian homeland. In 1974, Mitterrand met with Yasir 'Arafat at the premises of AL-AHRAM in Cairo and told 'Arafat: "I

support Israel's existence within secure and recognized borders. But I also believe that the Palestinian people have the right to a homeland and the right to set up their state." There are three currents within the Socialist Party at present. The strongest of these is still sympathetic to the Jews and to Israel. Lionel Jospin, the new party chairman, is a friend of Israel's. There is a second current, representing 20 percent of the party, which is considered to the left of the party and which is known by the name of the Center for Socialist Studies, Research and Culture. Minister Chevenement is one of this current's leaders. There is a third current, which can be considered the center current and which is led by Minister Michel Rocard. Insofar as the Middle East is concerned, this current moves in a practical manner and without any ideological commitments. Those who are informed say that there is presently a struggle among these currents insofar as France's Middle East policy is concerned.

Naturally, Mitterrand takes these factors into consideration. But ultimately, he is the one who makes the fundamental decisions pertaining to the Middle East and nobody can acutally influence him, according to those who know him. Mitterrand makes use of this or that current to carry out his Middle East policy.

Initiative Beginning in Jerusalem

But what is Mitterrand's Middle East policy? A well-informed French source has said: "So far, Mitterrand's administration has no definite and complete policy for the Middle East but has a number of ideas and proposals that the French president is studying with his advisers in preparation for launching an initiative at the right time."

Sources close to Mitterrand's administration have summed up for AL-MAJALLAH the most important ideas and components on which France's current policy toward the Middle East is based. These ideas and components are:

Mitterrand is eager to establish a "delicate balance" between his efforts for strong relations with the Arabs and his traditional friendship with Israel. He believes that he can make use of this friendship and of the influence he has among the Israelis, especially among the ranks of the Labor Party, to achieve peace in the area. Mitterrand also believes that his friendship for Israel gives him the "right" to be frank with the Israelis. Mitterrand is reported to have said: "I am a friend of Israel's and I will speak frankly. I will advise Israel to accept the establishment of a Palestinian state." Mitterrand has raised this issue with Peres more than once and the latter's response was: "The Palestinian state already exists and its name is Jordan." But Mitterrand doesn't support this opinion, even though he has not specified where the Palestinian state should be located.

Mitterrand believes that the area's and the world's conditions do not permit direct movement toward a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, he believes in step-by-step progress. This is why he supports the Camp David agreement which, in his opinion, has been a "daring step" on the path to peace. But Mitterrand also believes that the Camp David agreement will come to an end in the spring of 1982 with the evacuation of the Israelis from

the Sinai, and he believes that the second part [of the agreement] concerning Palestinian self-rule cannot be a basis for solving the Palestinian problem. It is Mitterrand's opinion that current conditions are not suitable for holding an international conference similar to the Geneva conference and that various moves and endeavors must be made to achieve peace.

Mitterrand believes that the U.S. role in the Middle East is "important" but he acknowledges tacitly that the Reagan administration rejects all non-American ideas, proposals and initiatives. Mitterrand says that had it not been for the mission of U.S. envoy Philip Habib, war would have erupted between Syria and France. But at the same time, Mitterrand is betting on a French-Arab or a European-Arab movement concerning the Middle East and believes that this is "best" for achieving progress. However, there has to be full agreement between the Arabs and the Europeans and this is something that does not yet exist.

A prominent French source has told us that Mitterrand is thinking of a French initiative to solve the Middle East crisis--an initiative that "starts with Jerusalem, includes Lebanon and goes on to settle the Palestinian issue." But the source has added that this initiative is still a mere idea, even though Mitterrand has consulted with some of the Arab leaders with whom he has met on some of the lines of this idea. A prominent Arab official who met with Mitterrand recently has assured us that the French president is acutely concerned with Jerusalem "because he is in love with this city," especially with its holy places. But Mitterrand doesn't want to launch any initiative before he is confident of its success or of its achieving some results. With Lebanon, for example, France is seeking to strengthen the army and to help realize inter-Lebanese detente and Lebanese-Palestinian rapprochement. Sources close to Mitterrand say that the Saudi visit will form a main element in the French president's plans to launch any initiative and that he will not, in all likelihood, embark on such an initiative before 1982.

Peace Conference in Paris?

A well-informed French source has assured us that one of the ideas raised confidentially in Mitterrand's circles is the idea of holding a Middle East peace conference in Paris to focus in particular on the issue of a Palestinian-Israeli dialog and the issue of Jerusalem. The source has said that this idea is the subject of study and consultation with some of the parties concerned but that no decision has yet been made on it. Mitterrand believes strongly in the necessity of establishing direct negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis. It is expected that he will raise this point during his visit to Israel at the beginning of 1982. Moreover, Mitterrand believes in the need for "the PLO to obtain the right to negotiate with Israel, if it recognizes Israel's existence." But the French president's circles find it unlikely that any progress will be achieved in this regard as long as Begin is in power.

Toward a Saudi-French "Axis?"

We now come to Mitterrand's visit to Saudi Arabia. The French president's circles consider this visit "extremely significant," indeed the "most significant" visit made by Mitterrand abroad. While the Israelis were announcing

that Israel would be the first country to be visited by Mitterrand, the French president suddenly decided--especially in the wake of King Khalid's visit to Paris last June and the raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor--that Saudi Arabia would be the first country that he would visit officially.

These circles say that Mitterrand does not view Saudi Arabia as an enormous economic, financial and oil power, whether by itself or with its friendships and its influence in the area, but views it primarily as a major political power in the Middle East with which consultations must be held and coordination and an understanding must be established to bring success to any comprehensive and just solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is why Mitterrand's talks with King Khalid, Prince Fahd and the Saudi officials will be political talks primarily and will focus in particular on the Middle East crisis, on Lebanon, on Afghanistan, on the Gulf situation and on U.S. and Russian policy in the area.

A high-level French source has revealed to us that Mitterrand is seeking seriously to establish some kind of a French-Saudi "axis" or "alliance" to move within the framework of the Middle East crisis, with the objective of finding a solution to this crisis. The mainstay of this "axis" will be Prince Fahd's initiative to achieve a just and comprehensive solution in the area. Naturally, such an "axis" will not be called an "axis" but will be tantamount to some kind of a tacit understanding between Saudi Arabia and France to move together, whether in the area, at the European level or at the level of the United States, to revitalize the efforts for peace in the Middle East. The fact is that Mitterrand expressed great interest in and support for Prince Fahd's initiative during the meeting which he held earlier this month in Paris with the Saudi crown prince in the presence of Prince Salman ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Riyadh Province. The well-informed French source has said that it is expected that Mitterrand will announce his open support for this initiative during his visit to Saudi Arabia and that it is most likely that a joint communique will be issued noting this support.

A prominent French official has told us that Mitterrand's administration is being asked currently by some Arab circles to act independently of Europe, to "drag" Europe along and to urge it to play a positive role in the Middle East crisis. It is the opinion of this official that there is Arab "annoyance" with the frozen European role and with the fact that Europe has left the arena completely to the United States and Russia.

Though Mitterrand himself will not discuss the economic, oil, financial and trade issues, the big delegation accompanying him will discuss these matters with Saudi officials. It is important for the economic side of this visit to succeed because the French economy will collapse if the Arab monies and deposits are withdrawn, if the numerous trade and military contracts are cancelled and if the various Arab investments in France are brought to a halt. There are several [Arab] countries awaiting the outcome of this visit in order to conclude new contracts with France or to resume their investments in France after having frozen them in the wake of Mitterrand's election.

Saudi Arabia is very important for the French economy. At present, it supplies France with the equivalent of 50 percent, perhaps even more, of its oil needs. Saudi Arabia also has with France weapons deals valued at several billion francs, in addition to commercial contracts and agreements and the Saudi assets in French banks.

An informed French source has told us that the French side wishes to conclude new economic and commercial contracts with Saudi Arabia and to obtain a large loan to bolster the French economy, in addition to certain arrangements concerning oil (including, for example, payment for the imported Saudi oil in francs instead of dollars).

But what is more important to Mitterrand is to reach a full understanding with the Saudi officials over a joint movement to settle the Middle East crisis on the basis of Prince Fahd's initiative. This may be the beginning of important developments in the area.

8494
CSO: 4404/35

EUPHRATES WATER DISPUTE BETWEEN IRAQ, SYRIA, TURKEY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 p 53

[Article: "Iraq and Waters of the Euphrates between Turkey, Jordan and Syria"]

[Text] Will the waters of the Euphrates become the subject of a harsh and a new dispute between Turkey on the one hand, Syria on the other and Iraq as a third party, or will the waters of the Euphrates become the subject of a dispute between Syria and Iraq on one side opposite Turkey?

The question is being discussed on the basis of information from numerous sources about incompatible projects that are being prepared by Turkey and Iraq to utilize the waters of the river. These projects would affect the quantities of water that would be available from the river in each one of the countries through which the river flows or in each country that wants to benefit from the water.

While an announcement was made in Baghdad of an Iraqi-Jordanian project to bring the waters of the Euphrates River into Jordan, an announcement was made at the same time in Turkey of a Turkish project to build a huge dam on the Euphrates River to supply Turkish agricultural and electrical needs.

The Iraqi plan to bring the waters of the Euphrates into Jordan requires the installation of a 650 kilometer pipeline that would be equipped with water pumping and water purification stations, storage tanks and power auxiliaries. While total costs for the project were estimated at almost 1 billion dollars, Iraqi information indicated that studies on the project and preparations for its technical designs had begun as a prelude to commissioning a study of the final designs that are necessary to conduct the process of commissioning implementation.

But implementation of this project will continue to depend on the quantity of water available in Iraq from the Euphrates and on the fact that the proportions and ratios of the available water have to exceed Iraq's needs. This may become doubtful and may, accordingly, thwart implementation of the project if Turkey goes ahead with its plan to build the new dam which will affect not only the quantities of water available to Iraq from the

Euphrates, but it will also affect the quantities of water available [from that river] to Syria, although in different proportions.

The Turkish project seeks to utilize the waters of the huge dam that is supposed to be built in irrigating a vast section of Turkey's eastern territories and in generating electricity at rates that would reduce by a third the amount of water flowing into Syria and Iraq.

This not only means that the project to bring the water of the Euphrates into Jordan is impeded, but it also implies dangers of various proportions to Iraq, which relies on the waters of the Euphrates for many Iraqi irrigation projects. It also implies dangers to Syria, which relies on the Euphrates for irrigation and generating electricity.

What matters is that this operation can become a new field for coordination that would impose itself on both Iraq and Syria. This effort would be backed by Jordan to prevent Turkey from having exclusive access to the Euphrates, and it would benefit the common interest between Iraq and Syria in operating the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline--and the Kirkuk-Tripoli pipeline in Lebanon as well--at full capacity. Operation of these pipelines may even be expanded not only to meet the immediate interests of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon that would result from this operation, but this would also become a pressure tool that Iraq and Syria can apply on Turkey which would have much to consider before cutting or interrupting part of the flow of the waters of the Euphrates, if the joint response from Syria and Iraq will be to deny Turkey the benefit of Iraqi oil and the flow of Iraqi oil exports through Turkey.

8592
CSO: 4404/3

PIPELINES ESTABLISHED TO CIRCUMVENT GULF IN CASE OF WAR

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 pp 52, 53

[Article: "Pipeline Plans To Carry Oil Away From Dangers of Middle East; The First Pipeline Would Run from Saudi Arabi's Wells, to Port of Yanbu', to Suez and to Consuming Countries; Second Pipeline Would Run from Wells of Iraq to al-Basrah and from these Wells to Turkey and thence to Europe"]

[Text] Information that became available in recent days revealed that there are new plans to transport crude oil and refined oil products from the areas of production in the countries of the Arabian Gulf to the various areas of consumption, especially the industrial world, via safe routes that are far from the areas of tension in the Middle East and from the more volatile areas or the areas that are more susceptible to disturbances if some situations in the area were to take a negative turn.

On the one hand, information indicates that implementation of the idea of establishing a pipeline to carry crude oil from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Japan and the countries of the Far East through Oman will not be delayed. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has begun studying a project inspired by this idea in the context of establishing a 1,500 kilometer pipeline between Ra's Tanurah and Oman that would go through al-Rub' al-Khali in the kingdom. This would be a preliminary step to making the studies and preparations for a special bid to commission the construction of the pipeline.

Preliminary studies showed that the cost of establishing the aforementioned pipeline is estimated at about 4 billion dollars. This project will be the subject of severe competition, especially by Japanese companies which were among the first to propose the idea for the project and conduct the preliminary studies for it. The Japanese companies did that in response to Japanese ideas and interests. They want to provide means for transporting oil that would circumvent some of the security dangers to which present supply lines through the Straits of Hormuz may be exposed. It is known that at present Japan imports about 70 percent of the crude oil it needs from the Gulf area.

On the other hand the Jordanian newspaper AL-RA'Y reported from reponsible Iraqi sources that Iraq would soon begin the preliminary work for building

a pipeline to carry oil to the Jordanian port of al-'Aqabah on the Red Sea.

Information that is being circulated stated that the estimated length of the forthcoming pipeline is 1,300 kilometers and that the pipeline would spare Iraq from circumnavigating the Arabian Peninsula in the process of transporting its oil exports.

While THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, an oil publication which is published in Cyprus, relayed information from yet another standpoint about communications that Iraq was conducting with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to build a pipeline to carry the oil that is pumped from the area of al-Basrah to a terminal station on the Red Sea across Saudi territory, various agencies of the media quoted a statement made by Iraqi minister of oil, Mr 'Abd-al-Karim Tayih during his recent visit to London. Mr Tayih sais that the prolonged war with Iran was forcing Iraq to begin considering the possibility of laying a pipeline across Kuwaiti and Saudi territory to transport the oil that is ready for export. The Iraqi minister affirmed that Iraq had obtained approval from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for building such a pipeline that would be several hundred kilometers long. That pipeline would transport about 50 million tons of Iraqi oil per year (about a million barrels per day).

In the information he gave about the proposed pipeline the Iraqi minister linked the fact that Iraq has not been able to export any oil at all through the Gulf because of the war with Iran with Iraq's ability to export additional quantities of oil and refined oil products if it had additional outlets. [He said that] this was the case at a time when currently produced quantities of Iraqi oil have not yet reached 1 million barrels per day and at a time when Iraq was using the pipeline between Kirkuk and Banyas in Syria--which is not yet operating at full capacity--and the pipeline from the Iraqi oil fields to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean Sea to export the oil it is exporting.

While none of the Iraqi sources linked the Iraqi pipeline project across Jordan to the port of al-'Aqabah with the Iraqi pipeline project across Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea, it was evident from all the information that the two projects were quite different, even though they may complement each other.

The fact is that one can look at all these projects from several different perspectives without seeing any contradictions. They all agree on the fact that these projects ensure safe routes for transporting crude oil exports from the exporting countries to the consuming countries. This is equally the case with regard to the international oil industry or the exporting countries that wish to have more control over the means of exporting their products.

The first perspective from which these projects can be viewed is that they expand a general trend which some Gulf countries that export crude oil began in the mid seventies--even though they did so unilaterally. The trend began when those countries began building the pipelines from those

countries to ports across routes and lands that were far away from the area of permanent tension and fury in the Middle East and especially via Lebanon and Syria, both of which, together with the Resistance, are confronting Israel in successive battles.

Ever since that time these projects were manifested in the following:

1. A pipeline to transport oil from the Saudi areas of production to the port of Yanbu' on the Red Sea across Saudi territory, without going through any [other] country. The oil that is ready for export would then be transported from the port of Yanbu' across the Red Sea, through the Suez Canal and on [either] to western Europe or to other consuming areas in the other direction. This pipeline would spare the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the international oil industry any need for the TAPline pipelines which now carry crude oil only in quantities that are needed by the al-Zarqa' refinery in Jordan and the al-Zahrani refinery in Lebanon. That pipeline used to transport other quantities of oil for export from al-Zahrani to Europe. The bombing of the refinery and the pipeline in Lebanese territory during the recent Israeli attack on Lebanon provided certain confirmation for the idea of doing away with this pipeline with regard to Saudi oil exports.

2. A pipeline for transporting crude oil from Iraq to Turkey, either to meet Turkey's needs or to export the oil to Europe from one of Turkey's ports on the Mediterranean Sea. Besides, there is another pipeline linked with the first to transport Iraqi oil for export via the port of al-Basrah. Although Iraq's objectives from the two complementary aforementioned pipelines was to diversify the means of transporting its oil exports, thereby enabling Iraq to do without the Iraqi pipeline from Kirkuk to Banyas in Syria and from Kirkuk to Tripoli in Lebanon because of the disputes between Iraq and Syria, Turkish extortion attempts in the matter of oil transport fees or in the matter of Turkey's payments for its Iraqi oil imports, occasionally caused a few disruptions in Iraqi plans. The war with Iran also thwarted the possibility of reaping the benefit of exporting oil from al-Basrah and, with the reduction in the negative level of Iraqi-Syrian relations, helped restore operations on the Kirkuk-Banyas pipeline. However, the war also brought up serious projects for building pipelines to transport oil across Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to ports on the Red Sea.

Within this trend it is worth referring to new information affirming Iraq's need for such projects. This information suggests that the climates of war with Iran may last for a long time during which Iraq will not be able to export crude oil from outlets on the Gulf. The latest information [in this regard] pertains to the recent Turkish attempt to compel Iraq to increase its oil exports to Turkey and to grant it easy terms. Turkey also wants to force Iraq to raise the fees it pays for its oil to flow through the pipelines that are laid across Turkey, from 38 cents to 1 dollar per barrel, or an increase of 161 percent, at once. Turkey began this attempt during the visit which Mr Taha Yasin Ramadan, first deputy prime minister of Iraq, made to Turkey in mid August. Mr Ramadan was visiting Turkey to look into the development of economic and commercial cooperation between the two countries. Turkey was thereby trying to take advantage of Iraq's situation and its need for existing outlets to export its oil.

8592
CSO: 4404/3

FOREIGN MINISTER SAYS ARMY CONTROLLING SITUATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Nov 81 p 6

[Interview with Foreign Minister Shah Mohammad Dost]

[Text] "The Afghan army is from now on in complete control of the situation throughout the country" and "the overwhelming majority of the people support the government and the party," declared the Afghan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Shah Mohammed Dost, in a recent interview granted to AFP special correspondent, Alain Faudeux, who obtained a visa to enter Afghanistan. The minister again stated, "The rebellion can no longer harm the government or the country" and "we are no longer faced with the problem of national reconciliation, because there is no confrontation with the population, but only with rebels from outside." "We are stronger than we have ever been since the second phase of the revolution" (end of December 1979, date of entrance of Soviet troops), he added.

Recalling discussions of an attempt at political control, Mr Dost stated: "The Pakistanis refuse to sit down with us at a conference table, although problems of procedure preceding basic negotiations have already been resolved by indirect negotiations through the secretary general of the United Nations. Nevertheless, we have proven our greater flexibility in our proposals of 24 August by accepting bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotiations, as well as the presence of the UN secretary general. However, we will not agree to any other forum than that of a meeting of the concerned countries."

The question of Afghanistan should soon be taken up by the United Nations General Assembly. It is probably within the perspective of this debate that President Karmal developed the thesis of intensification of the "undeclared war" in an interview with the Soviet daily LITERATOURNAYA GAZETTA (LE MONDE 29 October). Although he indicated that the military situation was "very satisfactory", the minister of foreign affairs did not deny, however, that "the counter-revolutionaries could assassinate, or destroy a school or a hospital" but, he stated, "that isn't enough to upset the government."

The AFP correspondent remarked that large forces of the Afghan army controlled the capital where Soviet forces were becoming inconspicuous. In the streets, the authorities control the young men who are likley to enlist in the army. In spite of the presence near the city of divisions of the red army, Soviet soldiers are rarely seen in Kabul. They would not be allowed to return to the city.

On the other hand, the daily KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA writes that the Kandahar region, in the southwest of Afghanistan, is the area where the rebels are strongest. In the city, "it is impossible to walk peacefully. The terrorists are hunting down members of the Afghan party and security agents." The newspaper writes that the region is under the threat of a general offensive from "counter-revolutionary bandits" who wish to establish an "independent Islamic republic."

9174
CSO: 4619/19

SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGE REVERSES OF INVASION

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Oct 81 p 4

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent I. Shchedrov, Kabul: "Afghanistan: Everyday Life in a Distant Province"]

> [Text] You will not read about the provinces of Farah and Nimruz in the far southwestern part of Afghanistan in tourist guidebooks. And at the present time it frequently takes several days "by stagecoach" across roadless terrain to reach the area, and yet they are only a few hundred kilometers distant from the closest major cities -- Qandahar or Herat. The Southwestern zone borders on two countries -- Pakistan and Iran. In short, these are Afghanistan's extreme borderlands.

A truck convoy carrying food provisions and medical supplies, which on the previous day had left Shindand, a small town and administrative seat in Herat Province, escorted by armored personnel carriers, had uneventfully completed almost the entire journey, when it struck landmines planted by saboteurs only 10 kilometers from Farah. Once again there were casualties. In recent months the bandits have been refraining from operating in the open or in large forces. Taking refuge in the mountains, they prefer to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism.

We were in luck: we obtained seats on helicopters traveling southwest from Shindand. We reached Farah in 40 minutes. An hour later we passed Zaranj, administrative center of Nimruz Province. Mountains, stony deserts with dry stream beds, roads few and far between, and a few green oases along narrow streams, which once again will flow swift and strong when spring comes; the square black tents of Baluchi nomads stand out against the yellowish-gray background. To the south the now accustomed terrain is suddenly interrupted by the blue surfaces of enormous lakes -- the country's largest. The principal rivers of Western Afghanistan -- the Farah and the Helmand -- carry the last remnants of their waters into these lakes, which lie adjacent to vast lifeless stretches of sands, crossed by a few caravan trails. One of these deserts is called the Dasht-i-Margo -- desert of death. This is what Seistan -- once the richest granary of the Middle East from Mesopotamia to India -- looks like today. Standing as reminders of its past grandeur are dozens of silent fortresses and sand-choked or silt-clogged remnants of canals of an ancient agricultural civilization.

Farah is today the main administrative center of the province of the same name and the entire Southwest zone. Nestled beyond mountain ranges, it suddenly and unexpectedly appears, sprawled out along the bank of the river, with its ancient fortress and cleanly laid-out streets, which is quite a rarity in Afghan towns. The helicopters make one final circle before landing. People swiftly converge on the landing field from all directions. The helicopter was bringing news, the latest newspapers, and long awaited supplies. Within about half an hour everything was back to normal. The field was empty, while the adobe town, consisting for the most part of single-story buildings, continued to live its normal life. The doors of the shops, "Hukans," were open wide. Wandering merchants were peddling rugs "right off the shoulder." There were few women on the streets, and those who were to be seen were wearing the paranja. Seated in the shade on small rugs were gray-bearded scribes with pens, ink and stacks of paper, looking as if they were right out of medieval miniatures.

While en route from Kabul to Farah on board an "aerial stagecoach," I became acquainted with a municipal committee secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Muhammed Akbar Maliar is a trimly-built young man with a small mustache and an open smile. He looks younger than his 28 years. But the external appearance is deceiving. Rafiq (comrade) Maliar had been a party member for 11 years now, approximately seven of those as an illegal. He is a native of Farah, from the village of Noubahar. He completed 12 years of schooling here in town. He is a former teacher. He has served as secretary since the beginning of last year.

In the difficult situation which still exists in Afghanistan, a party city committee secretary must do a great deal personally. As other activists, he always has his weapon with him: frequently he must drop whatever he is doing and head out on a combat operation. Or, as on this occasion, he must go to Kabul to "obtain" 21 bicycles, 6 motorcycles, as well as 2 refrigerators -- for the Pioneer camp, and blackboards, for the school. After obtaining them, he must arrange for shipment to the province.

The town has a population of slightly more than 15,000. In a short period of time, in spite of a grim situation close to that in a combat zone, the ranks of the PDPA have been growing, replacing casualties sustained in combat and losses due to sending off the best comrades to the republic's armed forces and to other sectors of the struggle. There are presently 275 members of the PDPA in 16 party organizations. In a year's time the ranks of the Farah organization grew by 115 newly accepted comrades. The ranks of the Democratic Organization of Youth of Afghanistan also grew, as did those of the Democratic Organization of Women of Afghanistan and other mass organizations.

Along with helicopters, local leaders received from Kabul draft regional development plans. Economists believe that this region's fame as an agricultural producer can be revived. Studies have already been conducted on the major rivers -- the Helmand and the Farah. Plans have been drawn up which cover the next 15-20 years.

Commencement of extensive implementation of these plans by the people's government is hindered not only by a lack of funds and know-how but also by the economic war unleashed by foreign mercenaries and counterrevolutionaries. Near Zaranj bandits are attempting to thwart efforts to clear a freshwater canal, which is of vital importance to the town, and in an area where planned dams are to be built, they are

attempting to hinder the delivery of needed construction materials and equipment and commencement of work on the project. But gradual normalization of the situation is already making it possible to begin carrying out these important long-range projects.

At Band-i-Kamal Khan, on the Helmand River, construction will begin in the fall on the largest hydroelectric power complex in the western part of the republic. On completion, it will be possible to control river flow both during the seasonal high waters and during drought. The plan was drawn up by Afghan specialists. In addition, many tens of thousands of hectares of abandoned and virgin lands will be developed. It will be possible to grow several crops each year.

A second large-scale project involves a hydroelectric power complex on the Farah River. Several years ago it was included in the national plan, but subsequently, due to a lack of funds, the project was halted. Upon completion of the Farah River project, which will take from 15 to 20 years, irrigated cropland in the province will triple, totaling 100,000 hectares.

A Farah master development plan extending up to the year 2003, which has been approved in Kabul, is already being carried out: new streets are being laid out, and the town's first public recreation park has been established.

This summer the Farah airport began receiving aircraft of the Bahtar Civil Airlines. Preparation work is in the completion stages, and construction will soon begin on an almost 70 kilometer modern highway, which will link up with the Herat-Qandahar section of Afghanistan's belt highway. Construction is also in the completion stages on a teacher-training secondary school, a hotel and public baths in Farah. A general-curriculum evening school for adults has opened. All 30 schools are operating, in spite of the bandits' threats to take reprisals against teachers and pupils.

Quite recently a mass rally was held in Farah, at which construction officially began on the first cultural center in the western part of the country, to contain a cinema, library, and facilities for amateur performing arts activities. And this is taking place in a region of almost total illiteracy, which even today contains not a single cinema or theater. Also in operation here is an agricultural secondary school, established during the years of people's rule. The republic's third machine-tractor station, the first in the western part of the country, will soon be established.

I spoke with peasants from nearby villages, artisans and shopkeepers -- there are as yet no enterprises in the town: they approve of the steps being taken by the people's government to improve the quality of life and to develop the region, and they condemn the activities of the counterrevolutionary bands.

I should like to finish my report on the new life in Farah with the story of Baghepul ("Garden by the Bridge"). At one time this was the residence of a scion of the royal family and governor of this distant region. The people's government decided that "Garden by the Bridge" should become a Pioneer camp. And they proceeded to open such a camp. The bandits threatened to burn it to the ground. In spite of threats, however, the camp became reality on the banks of the ancient Farah River. Everything has been provided for the rest and recreation of the children of working people in facilities burnt down by the bandits and rebuilt during volunteer labor days.

One reaches Baghepul from town by crossing a bridge across the Farah River. One immediately finds oneself in a shady green area of cypress, pomegranate and other fruit trees.

Boys and girls, who have come here from many localities in the southwestern part of the country, assembled in formation behind the banner, to the accompaniment of bugle and drum, adorned in crimson ties.

We subsequently took a tour of the camp. There was a swimming pool and an athletic field. The iron double-decker army bunk beds -- a gift to the children from the military garrison -- were set up in the living quarters of the former governor's palace. A folk instrument which looked like a mini-organ was standing on the porch: amateur performing artists were preparing a concert for parents. Pathan, Baluchi, and Tajik live here as one big happy family. During these difficult days they do not forget their brothers and fathers, many of whom have fallen in battle at the hands of mercenaries, fighting for a new life. The camp's Pioneer detachments bear the names of fallen heroes. Major Abdul Aziz was chief of police of Farah Province. He was killed in May of this year. Many of the children in the detachment named after him remember well this fearless commander.

Second-grader Amanulla Salem Muhammed is at camp together with his three little brothers. Their father, member of a volunteer detachment for defense of the revolution, was also killed. But the detachment bears the name of Babahli, a comrade in arms of their father, one of the heroes who have died fighting for a better future.

On our return journey we could see from the bridge a motion picture flashing on the white cloth of a jury-rigged screen. Patrons from the neighboring military subunit had brought the children a mobile motion picture projection unit. They also promised to tell the children about the difficult field operation they had completed a few days previously. Over a period of two weeks, smashing the remnants of counterrevolutionary bands, they had traveled by vehicle approximately 1,300 kilometers across the stony deserts and drifting sands of Seistan, in heat reaching 50 degrees Celsius, so that the children and the entire Afghan people could live in peace, so that their dreams of a bright future could come true.

3024
CSO: 1830/119

LATEST MUJAHEDIN COMBAT SUCCESSES REVIEWED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 21 Nov 81 p 6

[Article by Ernst Levy: "The Mujahedin Are Today In Control of the Major Portion of Afghanistan--Victories over Soviet Occupying Forces--Moscow's Embassy Attacked"]

[Text] Frankfurt, 20 November--During the last few months the Afghan Mujahedin (freedom fighters) have had considerable success in their fight against the Soviet occupation troops and Babrak Karmal's communist regime. This is reflected less in spectacular battles and conquests (though even here we might cite the de facto seizure of the southeastern provincial capital of Kandahar), than in the spread of areas throughout the country which are under their control. There are recurring indications for this in the Soviet party newspaper PRAVDA which, whenever possible, tries to give only positive news reports about its communist-dominated neighboring country. Thus on 4 October PRAVDA published a 4-column report from Afghanistan about the mining of roads, attacks on food and medicine transports and other sabotage and terrorist operations on the part of the resistance fighters to whom they refer as "counterrevolutionaries" and "bandits." Since that date there has been no end to reports in Soviet papers about attacks in Afghanistan.

According to travelers returning from Afghanistan, the Mujahedin now control practically the entire country with the exception of troop concentration areas. Even in the cities on can expect gunfire at any time. It is possible that the increase in attacks is responsible for the disappearance of Soviet soldiers from the Kabul street scene and their retreat to their own camps and settlements. During the last few weeks the suburban Soviet embassy has been repeatedly attacked by Mujahedin rockets. Even the soviet soldiers' living quarters near the capital are no longer safe from such attacks.

Road traffic between individual cities of the country are today almost entirely under Mujahedin control. Because of this, drivers of private bus and truck lines carry identification papers issued by the Mujahedin so as to be able to pass through the freedom fighters' control posts. The bus drivers especially carry food to the Mujahedin. Anyone disobeying the Mujahedins' orders receives a warning from them and can in an emergency count on more severe measures. The government in Kabul is well aware of this, but is unable to do anything aobut it without risking the complete collapse of intra-Afghan traffic on which the country's supply lines depend. Government trucks and buses daring to travel on Afghan roads frequently fail to arrive at their destinations because the drivers are shot by the Mujahedin.

The country's food supply remains adequate, but prices have increased considerably. One kilo of meat for example costs the equivalent of DM 12-15 today, as compared with DM 3 previously. Increases in food costs are primarily a factor of the difficult transport situation, especially in the direction of the capital of Kabul. Not every food shipment reaches its destination and those which reach the big cities have usually made appropriate contributions to the Mujahedin. To pay for military equipment, the Mujahedin have lately been prospecting for emeralds which are found near the surface in the Panjir valley.

Recruitment of resistance fighters in the country is almost automatic since every male Afghan who loses relatives by actions of Soviet troops of Karmal army members leaves for the mountains in accordance with the old law of vendetta. There he joins the Mujahedin in their battle against the enemy to avenge the death of his relatives.

The resistance groups operating out of Pakistan have lately seen a greater increase in recruits than heretofore by way of a new recruiting method among border-crossing male refugees. The Mujahedins' argument used with these refugees is that inasmuch as they have fled the Russian troops and the communist regime, they are enemies of that regime and must therefore fight against it. It is said that because of this, many Afghan refugees, are not remaining in Pakistan as in the past but merely use that country as a station on their way to India. In India they either settle down for good or try, more than anything else, to continue their travel into the FRG. This new itinerary of Afghan refugees appears to be a new development which started about 3 months ago. India itself, though allied with the USSR in a friendship pact, is said not to interfere with the incoming Afghan refugees in any way.

In the meantime, the strongest foreign-based Afghan resistance group, led by Hekmatyar, has published in the last issue of its monthly publication RAHI-HAGH (The Way of Truth), which appears in Iran in Farsi, an account of its fight against Soviet troops and Babrak Karmal's army during the March-September 1981 period. According to this report, Hekmatyar's resistance fighters destroyed during those 6 months one enemy aircraft, 4 helicopters, 376 armored vehicles, 146 trucks and gasoline transports and 15 jeeps. During the same period, the Mujahedin captured 432 rifles, 195 Kalashnikovs, 200 hand grenades, 30,244 items of ammunition of various sorts and 47 radio transmitters. According to RAHI-HAGH, the resistance fighters during this period killed 34 Soviet officers and 16 officers of the Karmal army. The number of Soviet soldiers killed is given as 3,556, and 922 Afghan soldiers. In addition, during the six-month period 241 Afghan civilians were killed who were members of the two wings of the communist Democratic People's Party of Afghanistan. In addition, 138 Afghan soldiers of fortune are said to have been killed, who had voluntarily offered their services to Karmal's army in return for pay.

9273
CSO: 4620/11

PLANS OF BALUCHESTAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION OUTLINED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German No 277, 29-30 Nov 81 p 5

[Interview with Ataullah Mengal, London BLO Representative]

[Text] A cool and rainy night in one of the nondescript suburbs in the north of London. In the cramped living room of a typical English house, an immigrant is speaking with excitement and animation of his homeland, 10,000 kilometers away. Ataullah Mengal, one of the sardars or tribal leaders from Pakistani Baluchestan, is an easy man to like right off. He is a wiry, gaunt man of more than 50 wearing Western clothes. His face is long and pale; he has thin hair, dark eyes that stare at you and a thin, carefully trimmed beard. Ataullah Mengal no longer believes that Baluchestan has a future as part of Pakistan. In his view, the Baluchi nation can survive only in its own, completely sovereign state. For Mengal, armed resistance against the central government in Islamabad is merely a question of time. The hot war will come as soon as money and weapons are available and as soon as enough guerillas have been trained.

Examples from History

Ataullah Mengal is the London representative of the Baluchestan Liberation Organization (BLO) which he himself founded in the British capital last July. He sees the BLO as the most recent link in a long chain of attempts to transform Baluchestan into a sovereign state. The first serious attempt to achieve this goal goes back to the 15th century when the legendary tribal leader Mir Chakar Rind succeeded, if only for a short time, in creating a union among the Baluchi tribes from the Makran coast to the Quetta of today. The confederation of Kalat, founded in 1666, endured somewhat longer. Nasir Khan, the 6th khan of Kalat who reigned in the second half of the 18th century, succeeded in creating the most sophisticated political system ever in Baluchi history. There was a wazir (prime minister), two legislative councils (an "upper" and a "lower house"), an army and a centrally administered system of taxation— this latter fact, however, being a matter of dispute among historians. After Afghan suzerainty was broken in 1758, Kalat enjoyed full sovereignty until the arrival of the British.

"The Great Game" between the English crown and the Russian czar brought Afghanistan a guarantee of statehood; but for Baluchestan, which the English thought of great strategic value, it meant the end of sovereignty. After heavy fighting which lasted more than 40 years, Kalat was finally subdued. The English colonial administration partitioned Baluchi territory systematically and at will, creating a Persian Baluchestan west of the "Goldsmith Line;" an Afghan Baluchestan north of the "Durand Line;" a British Baluchestan south of the "Durand Line" and four principalities by the grace of Britain: Kharan, Makran, Las Bela and a lesser version of Kalat which still rated a 19-gun salute, however.

Annexation by Pakistan

After the English hastily quit the subcontinent in 1947, led by viceroy Mountbatten, the then khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan Baluch, at first thought that his principality would regain both its full sovereignty and its lost territories. In his view, the khanate could under no circumstances become part of an Indian union of whatever configuration. Even during the thirties, during the struggle for independence, a free and independent Baluchestan had already been the goal of the Kalat National Party which Mengal looks upon as a direct political antecedent of his own BLO. The khan, who was worried in the main about maintaining his privileges, proclaimed Kalat's independence on 15 August 1947 but agreed at the same time to the transfer of all former British rights to the newly created state of Pakistan. In order to achieve the complete amalgamation of the khanate with Pakistan, the Pakistani army marched on Kalat in late March 1948. The khan immediately gave in; but his brother, Prince Abdul Karim, who had fled to Afghanistan with several hundred men, unsuccessfully proclaimed the independence of Kalat in the name of the Baluch National Liberation Committee. The sardars were not in agreement, either; but the die had been cast. Kalat now was a part of Pakistan.

In 1955, the provinces of West Pakistan were combined to form one single administrative unit. The official reason given was the need for more efficiency; but the real reason was that the dominant Punjabis were afraid that the Bengalis of East Pakistan might join forces with the ethnic minorities of West Pakistan. In the aftermath, the Baluchis, demanding autonomy, voiced their opposition so strongly that the army entered Kalat once again on 6 October 1958 and arrested the khan who had long since been stripped of his power. A few days later, a skirmish between Baluchi tribesmen and regular army units took place in the mountain village of Wad, which is still remembered today. For more than a year after that, several hundred partisans led by 90 year-old tribal chieftain Nauroz Khan offered strong resistance. The number of those who believed that only armed force would help bring about an autonomous or perhaps even a sovereign homeland for the Baluchis kept on growing. By 1963, the guerilla organization Parari, established by Sher Mohammad Marri, disposed of strongpoints in almost all of Baluchestan. Until 1969, when the unification of the provinces of West Pakistan was rescinded, there were sporadic engagements between the Pararis and the army under the command of General Tikka Khan, called the "butcher of Baluchestan" by the rebels because of his unscrupulous methods.

From Autonomy to Secession

Despite a cessation of hostilities, most of the guerillas, now led by Mir Hazar Ramkhani, Sher Mohammad Marri's former deputy, remained underground. In 1973, after autonomy negotiations broke down, the then prime minister Bhutto dissolved the provincial government headed by Mengal and placed well-known Baluchi leaders under arrest. This provided the starting signal for a fierce struggle for liberation which, however, has gone almost unnoticed throughout the world. By the middle of 1974, the Pararis had seized practical control over large parts of the province. Since the Shah of Iran was worried about the unrest spreading to his portion of Baluchestan—where the Baluchestan Liberation Front (BLF), supported by Iraq, had been active between 1968 and 1973—he supplied Bhutto with modern helicopters. In early September 1974, a 3-day battle took place near Chamalang in which the army displayed its newly acquired technical superiority without mercy. Chamalang is the traditional summer grazing area of the nomads of the Marris tribe. This attack on the summer camp forced the Pararis to wage a hopeless, open battle. Thousands of Marris fled to the southern part of Afghanistan; the Pararis gained more adherents and turned into an out-and-out secessionist movement, changing their name to Baluch People's Liberation Front (BPLF).

After Bhutto's overthrow, the new head of state, General Zia, released 6,000 prisoners, among them Mengal, in August 1977. But Zia was not and still is not in the mood to grant autonomy. The BPLF remained in Afghanistan even after the Soviet invasion but unlike most Afghan Baluchis does not take part in the fight against the invaders and the Babrak Karmal regime. Some 4,000 Pakistani Baluchis, most of them Marris, Mengal says, still live in camps in the Kandahar region today. Neither the BPLF, nor the BLO really has to worry about gaining adherents. The Baluch Students Organization (BSO) and the BSO-Awami splinter group constitute a never-ending reservoir of nationalists no longer willing to negotiate.

The Mengal-Bizenjo-Marri Triumvirate

Previously, Mengal belonged to the more moderate faction which would have been satisfied with genuine autonomy as a part of Pakistan. But now he, too, insists on the creation of a sovereign state of Baluchestan and a re-drawing of the frontiers established by the British. There can only be a (Greater) Baluchestan, he says, but will not be pinned down as to its size. Bandar Abbas in Iran, which was included in Greater Baluchestan in former maps, is not a part of it, he says. But the Der Ghazi Khan district in the northeast is. Autonomy as a part of Pakistan will no longer do as a goal today, since the Punjabis are unwilling to discard their colonial attitude toward the minority provinces. Mengal draws a parallel to East Pakistan, the present Bangladesh, which was exploited by West Pakistan until it finally seceded. He no longer has any confidence in the central government. He recalls the promise of free conduct for Abdul Karim and Nauroz Khan, sworn on the Koran but broken nonetheless; he accuses the army of extreme brutality and says that the dominant Punjabis are unwilling to compromise in any way.

To a large extent it is probably to Mengal's credit that the very heterogeneous Baluchi resistance movement is not really torn by internal dissension. The one extreme is represented by the long militant sardar of the Marris, Khair Bux Marri, who ceased believing in political solutions long ago. It is no accident that Marri tribesmen are dominant in the BPLF. In the early seventies, Khair Bux Marri was chairman of the National Awami Party which ran the government in Baluchestan. He would not affix his signature to the constitution worked out by Bhutto in 1973 because he felt the autonomy provisions contained therein were meaningless. Lateron, he asked General Zia to withdraw all army units from Baluchestan as a precondition for talks. Unlike all the other sardars, Marri has close ties to Baluchi tradition which he combines, however, with his own particular brand of Marxism-Leninism.

A far more moderate position is taken by Mir Ghaus Bux Bizenjo, whom the knowledgable American journalist Selig S. Harrison considers one of the most able of Pakistani politicians (cf: In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, New York and Washington 1981). Bizenjo does not yet preclude a political solution which enables the Baluchis to maintain their independence. His Pakistan National Party--a successor to the National Awami Party, which is outlawed along with all other political parties--has a great deal of support among the Baluchi population. Bizenjo feels that the Baluchestan problem cannot be separated from the basic problem of the entire region which consists of four artificially created states (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) each of which comprises not just one but several nations. As early as 1947, he enthusiastically called for a sovereign national state of Baluchestan in the parliament of Kalat. Today, he is enthusiastic about how the Soviet Union--in theory, if not in practice--proposes to solve the nationalities question by granting autonomous status. Bizenjo's pro-Soviet position must also be seen in the light of repeated U.S. military aid to the Pakistani central government. The weapons thus supplied have often enough been used against the tribes. In addition to Mengal, Marri and Bizenjo to whom Harrison refers as the triumvirate of the Baluchi resistance, there are other moderates who have spoken out in favor of Baluchi national identity: Nawab Akbar Bugti, the sardar of the Bugti tribe and Sher Baz Mazari who hails from Dera Ghazi Khan district, a part of the Northwest Frontier region.

Mengal believes that a free Greater Baluchestan, containing at least 7.5 million inhabitants, could survive. Enough food could be grown to fill domestic needs. Energy resources such as natural gas, coal and oil are in abundant supply as well as other natural resources such as copper and onyx. The 900-kilometer coastline would permit the country to build up a propserous fishing industry. But even if an independent Baluchestan could indeed become viable, it could not really come into existence, as Mengal readily admits, without outside help. Although he really is averse to becoming involved with big power politics, Mengal says, if one of the big powers were to oppose Baluchi efforts to achieve independence, the Baluchis would have to look to the other for help. And Mengal leaves no doubt about the fact that the one power he is referring to is the United States and the other is the Soviet Union. But for the time being no outside assistance is supposedly forthcoming. Both he and the BLO are making do with what they themselves have.

A New "Great Game" ?

For global strategists, the Baluchestan question offers a broad spectrum of activity today. What is of greater interest to the Soviet Union: a formally independent Baluchestan; a Greater Afghanistan reaching to the Arabian Sea, or a Pakistan, weakened by inner tensions ? Or, would it not be easier to gain access to the Persian-Arabic Gulf—insofar as the Soviet Union actually does pursue this goal—through an Iran which threatens to slide into chaos ? Following Selig Harrison's lead, one could argue that Baluchi resistance increases Soviet options. With the strong support of the Baluchis, Moscow could exert a good deal of pressure on Islamabad and possibly on Tehran. Addressing himself to Pakistan, foreign minister Gromyko outlined the Balkanization scenario once before. U.S. freedom of action, on the other hand, is considerably limited by the Baluchestan problem—for instance with regard to arms supplies for Pakistan or the Afghan mojahedin—since the Soviet Union could counter by supporting the Baluchis and other minorities. India, which would like to expand its role as the leading power in the area, may find strengthening the Baluchis attractive in view of the concomitant weakening of Pakistan. But Mengal is not looking to India for help. One might interpret the sardar's thinking as follows: with whom the Baluchis will come to terms will depend less on political principle than on expediency. The way is clear for a new "Great Game". The players may now take their seats at the table.

The largest territorial demands for a Greater Baluchestan were made by the Iraqi-supported BLF. Today's demands are more moderate.

Key:

1. Greater Baluchestan frontiers
2. Present frontiers
3. Frontiers of Baluchi majority

9478
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'MAY' REVEALS DETAILS OF DETAINEES' RELEASE

PM021551 Cairo MAY in Arabic 30 Nov 81 p 1

[Report by chief editor Ibrahim Sa'dah: "Why Did President Mubarak Decide To Release the Politicians?"]

[Text] President Husni Mubarak summoned the socialist public prosecutor to a private meeting in al-'Urubah Palace. At the meeting the president asked about the progress made in the investigations which the prosecutor's office has been carrying out with the detainees--both politicians and nonpoliticians--since the beginning of September. The socialist prosecutor said that investigations are continuing and that the detainees are being interrogated in accordance with an agreed schedule.

President Mubarak asked: "Are there any specific charges against the detainees involving state safety and security?" Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, replied: "There is the case of communicating with a foreign state, of which some of the detainees are accused." President Mubarak said: "We will absolutely not be lenient in this case. After you are through with it, refer it to state security prosecution."

The public prosecutor said: "The case of communicating with a foreign state aside, we are interrogating the rest of the detainees--politicians and journalists--about their actions and writings."

The president said: "I want an urgent evaluation of these people's position in light of the investigation."

Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali promised to prepare such an evaluation within a week for submission to the president. The meeting was over.

After a week the socialist public prosecutor asked for a meeting with the president. The meeting was fixed for the following day. Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali submitted to the president a full evaluation of the politicians' position and the actions for which they were being investigated.

President Husni Mubarak found that the charges against them were no longer relevant, particularly in the light of the great danger which the country has been facing and which culminated in the assassination of the late leader Anwar al-Sadat.

After reading the report submitted to him by the socialist public prosecutor the president held meeting with a number of his aides who are responsible for the various government organs. At the meeting the president acquainted his aides with the public prosecutor's report. The president then asked:

"Is there anything in the actions attributed to the 31 detained politicians that constitutes any danger to Egypt's security, or has any connection been made with the incidents of sectarian strife or with the terror plan we are now confronting?"

Those present were unanimous in completely excluding the existence of such a connection. All the security organs confirmed that the charges against the politicians have nothing to do with the sectarian strife or the terror plan.

The meeting ended without any of those present knowing what President Mubarak had in mind or the reason why they were summoned to discuss this matter.

Before those present left the meeting President Mubarak asked Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior Nabawi Isma'il to order two vehicles to transport a number of the detained politicians, because he might meet them and talk to them at a later date.

The following day President Mubarak ordered that a place be prepared in al-'Urubah Palace to receive 50 persons expected to arrive the following morning. The president did not reveal the names of those persons but ordered his private secretariat to prepare for their arrivals and entry into the palace. The president only said: I will tell you the names tomorrow.

Immediately on his arrival at al-'Urubah Palace the following morning, the president went to the place prepared to receive the 50 persons. He looked at it and at the chairs lined up there, and nodded with approval. He then went to his office to begin his daily work.

President Mubarak then telephones Nabawi Isma'il in his office at the Ministry of the Interior. He told him: "I would like you to bring over the politicians whose names we reviewed. Bring them to al-'Urubah Palace by car without telling them where they are going."

Up to this moment nobody knew what the president wanted to do or to say to the politicians.

Nabawi Isma'il carried out the president's instructions.

The cars picked up the politicians either from jail or from hospital. First they were told that they were going to see the socialist prosecutor, and later they were told that they were to meet the president at al-'Urubah Palace.

The meeting took place and was attended by [first deputy prime minister] Dr Fu'ad Muhyi ad-Din and by Nabawi Isma'il. Everybody was surprised by the president's decision to release them all and to allow them to return to their homes and normal life. The decision had wide repercussions in popular circles.

President Mubarak sees what he did as something normal and to be expected. The decision to detain a number of citizens last September was not an indefinite decision, meaning that they were to be detained indefinitely. Rather it was a specific decision depending on the outcome of the investigations being carried out by the socialist public prosecutor's office.

It was clear to the president, on the basis of the report which counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali submitted to him, that the maximum action that could be taken against some of the detainees was to refer them to the court of ethics to be questioned about their actions and about their writings in the local and foreign press.

President Mubarak found that the security situation created recently by the terror plan makes it imperative to rally everybody and calls for the solidarity of everybody--both supporters and opposition--in order to protect the safety and security of Egypt against the grave consequences of this plan. Thus the president decided to release 31 politicians--a decision that could apply equally to anyone whose stand is cleared and whose innocence is proved.

CSO: 4504/103

BRIEFS

AFRICAN, NONALIGNED ROLES--President Muhammad Husni Mubarak has emphasized Egypt's role on the African continent and the importance underlying the boosting of Egyptian-African relations in all domains. The president also delineated the importance of bolstering the nonaligned movement and of promoting Egypt's role against the attempts which are aimed at harming this movement. The president made the above statement during the meeting which he held this morning with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr Butrus Ghali. After the meeting, Dr Butrus Ghali stated that he had submitted to President Mubarak a complete plan for the moves which Egypt will make within the coming months within two groups of African states and of nonaligned states. He added that the president approved of these moves, which are basically aimed at activating cooperation between Egypt and the African states and at bolstering African unity, in addition to emphasize Egypt's role within the group of nonaligned states, defining the nonaligned movement's concepts so they can conform with the new international conditions and preserving these concepts from the deviations which are endangering them. Dr Butrus Ghali said that Kamal Hasan 'Ali submitted to the president the plan for the takeover of the remaining part of the Sinai and that the deputy prime minister and foreign minister will meet with the pertinent ministers next Tuesday to discuss which installations Egypt needs so that these installations can be kept in the Sinai prior to the final Israeli withdrawal. [Text] [NC281554 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 28 Nov 81]

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STUDENT DESCRIBES PEOPLE'S PLIGHT IN TEHRAN

Zurich DIE WELTWOCHE in German 4 Nov 81 p 13

[Text] The following letter was received in the West only a few days ago; it was written by an Iranian student. As active now as he once was in anti-Shah demonstrations in his country, he supports the anti-Khomeyni movement. He shows definite sympathies for the radical leftist popular Modjahedin and the Feddayin, without however belonging to these organizations or to any political party.

"We live in fear and terror. People walk through the streets as if numbed, as if they cannot shake off the dreadful nightmare. Every evening the television shows pictures of youthful prisoners who have refused to give their names. The attorney general then orders the viewers and the '36 million counter-espionage organizations to denounce the prisoners and to identify them.' We weep quietly to ourselves, go to bed and cannot sleep. In the morning we arise and hear on the radio the report of that night's executions. Such is the way that each new day begins.

I am disgusted at the international human rights organizations. During the reign of the Shah they were so active, and now they will scarcely move a finger against the mass execution of our young people. The Left of Europe once demonstrated against the Shah, took to the streets, exposed themselves to police attacks. Where are they today, why is their voice not heard against Khomeyni? During his 37 years in power the Shah did not kill nearly as many people as these mullah-beasts have in the past three years.

The revolutionary guards can break into our apartments at any time in search of suspected literature and weapons. If they take a member of the household with them, his family will hear nothing more from him for months. Not a word about his whereabouts, his fate. If he is lucky, then he will turn up one day and say that his arrest was due to a 'misunderstanding.'

The aged Khomeyni is still supported by a part of our illiterate masses, as well as by hooligans, criminals, thieves, alcoholics, social elements and some merchants in the bazaars. These bazaar merchants belong to the Islamic Republican party and get as their reward monopoly rights for all imports. Billions have flowed into their pockets. As for the suffering masses, this swindler of an ayatollah has persuaded them that Islam is in danger and that the time of the prophet has returned. Everyone must reach for his weapon in the 'desert of Kerbala' and fight to preserve Islam. Khomeyni deceived the whole Iranian nation when he set forward his

empty promises from his Parisian exile: freedom, democracy, independence. These great words are not worth a cent any longer. Whoever even speaks the word 'freedom' will soon feel the lash or even bullets. Democracy has lost all content. As for independence: this mad old man has made us dependent upon other countries as we never were under the Shah. Because our imports have risen astronomically, we are no longer producing anything and exports have fallen to a dangerous low.

As an Iranian I will never forget the attitude of different countries toward us. The Russians have named the bestial executioner Khalkhali a 'hero' and are laughing at the entire Iranian nation. The Moscow-loyal Tudeh party kisses Khomeyni's feet, knowing full well that this is the only way they can exist against the will of the people. With inhuman smugness Fidel Castro dismisses Khomeyni's crimes with the justification, 'We also had thousands of counterrevolutionaries in Cuba after the revolution.' And America is happy that the progressive Left and its organizations have been destroyed, hoping that by some coup d'etat the Right will return to power in Iran.

Today we are inhabitants of a country that has been left in the lurch. The economically most important parts of the country are occupied by the Iraqi enemy. All because of a war which this evil old man set in motion to export his decadent Islamic revolution. We have 2 million people left homeless because of the war, a million and a half Afghanistani refugees who fled from their proletarian paradise into a land scourged by an Islamic catastrophe. In addition we have 6 million unemployed, almost half of the working age population. We stand in line for eggs, butter, milk, yogurt, meat, chicken, soap, washing powder, sugar, etc, etc. Our young people are condemned to idelness and self-destruction, even to drugs, despite the severe penalties. If the universities ever open again there will no longer be any normal, politically objective entrance examination. Only those who are on 'the correct path of Khomeyni,' on the path of this sect-ridden Islam, will be admitted. This will be determined by the mullahs and the ayatollahs. And so the most intelligent segment of our young people capable of university study will be excluded from the universities and stupidity and bigotry will be rewarded. This year the sympathizers of the popular Mojahedin have been excluded even from the elementary schools and high schools. These poor children will be punished for life.

Khomeyni is like a bulldozer: he destroys and destroys and destroys. He rebuilds nothing. For three years now. How much longer?"

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BRIEFS

BANI-SADR'S RETURN--Hanover, 2 Dec (DPA)--Iranian former president Bani-Sadr, who has taken refuge in France, has announced that he will return to his country "very soon." In an interview with Hanover NEUE PRESSE (Thursday edition) he said: "I am preparing for a return. I would like to enter officially but if that is impossible, secretly, and soon." According to Bani-Sadr, who was deposed as president by Khomeyni, leader of the Iranian revolution, "Khomeyni's despotic regime is completely finished." "Unless the present economic situation improves Khomeyni's overthrow is imminent. He ought to step up oil production but the installations have been destroyed by bombs." There is, therefore, "no salvation." According to the ex-president, "the Americans are counting on an overthrow by force" in Iran. A coup would suit the United States "to perfection," he said. An edited version of the interview was prereleased to DPA by the paper. [Text] [LD022130 Hamburg DPA in German 2032 GMT 2 Dec 81]

CSO: 4620/12

MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS TRUSTS DISCUSSES KHOMEYNI'S RELIGIOUS CLAIMS

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 201, 28 Sep 81 pp 28-29

[Interview With Nuri Faysal Shahir, Iraqi minister of religious trusts, by Salah Fa'iq: "Nuri Faysal Shahir, Iraqi Minister of Religious Trusts, to AL-DUSTUR: 'Khomeyni Alleges That As Religion, Islam Is Not Yet Complete'"]

[Text] Islamic Organizations Conference: Nuri Faysal Shahir, Iraqi minister of religious trusts and religious affairs, came to London as Iraq's representative to the Islamic Organizations Conference, which was held in the British capital recently. On the occasion, AL-DUSTUR conducted this interview with him:

[Question] What is the goal behind the convocation of this conference in London and what are the delegations that have taken part in it?

[Answer] The fundamental goal of the conference is to celebrate the 15th centennial anniversary of the prophet's migration. This celebration was more like a conference for the Islamic organizations in England and Ireland. It has been attended by representatives of the Islamic associations of the Islamic minorities that live in this country, in addition to Islamic delegations from the Netherlands, the Gulf states and representatives of the Islamic organizations in Europe. One of the objectives behind the holding of this conference was also to get acquainted with the activities of the Islamic associations and to adopt resolutions concerning Muslims generally. The Iraqi delegation has contributed distinguished efforts in this regard by enriching the conference with studies and positive proposals. The conference has adopted important resolutions that strengthen the Muslims in England, Ireland and Europe generally and in the Muslim world as well.

The most important of these resolutions are:

1. Condemnation of the heresies introduced by Khomeyni against Islam and leading to distortion of the image of Islam in the world.

2. Condemnation of Khomeyni's cooperation with the Zionist regime and with the United States through the purchase of their weapons to strike the Muslim Iraqi people.

3. Condemnation of Khomeyni's regime for its failure to respond to the cease-fire calls even though Iraq has expressed its readiness for such a cease-fire

frequently and has shown complete understanding toward the efforts of the Islamic mediation committee, the nonaligned committee and the UN committee. But the intransigence of Khomeyni's regime has obstructed the achievement of a solution.

The conference in its entirety has come to understand that Iraq did not begin the war, that Iran is the one that launched the aggression, that Iraq has no ambitions in Iranian territories and that all Iraq wants is the legitimate Iraqi rights and nonintervention in its domestic affairs.

[Question] The resolutions also condemn Khomeyni's falsifications and allegations. What are these falsifications and allegations?

[Answer] The first falsification is the title Khomeyni has given himself, namely, the title of ayatollah, which doesn't exist in Islam or in other religions. The second falsification is Khomeyni's declaration 2 months after he had seized power that as a religion Islam is not yet complete, that the message of Islam and of the venerable Koran is still deficient and that the awaited mahdi will appear to complete this message, according to Khomeyni's claims. Were it not for Iraq's position, Khomeyni would have followed this allegation by saying that he is the awaited mahdi. This, of course, is in contradiction to the religion and the words of the Koran. Khomeyni has also claimed that the remains of Imam 'Ali were moved from al-Najaf to Qom, keeping in mind that Khomeyni had worshipped in the presence of Imam 'Ali's remains [in al-Najaf] for many years. Khomeyni has alleged this for political reasons aimed at moving the religious tenure [to Qom]. There has also been the slogan: "God is great, Khomeyni is great." Thus, Khomeyni's name is coupled with the name of the Almighty. This is atheism and infidelity. On the other hand, can a Muslim cooperate with the Zionists? The archenemy of Islam at present is Zionism. In his cooperation with the Zionists to get weapons with which to strike the Muslim Iraqi people, Khomeyni is committing the worst form of blasphemy. There is also the closing of the universities and the distortion of Islam's image in the West. Khomeyni claims that the universities are against Islam. He has also abolished the ministry of information. Khomeyni has thus become the guide, the jurisprudent and the reference for all Muslims, according to his claim. This has been even laid down in the new Iranian constitution. This is only a part of the distortions and falsifications that Khomeyni has committed against Islam. This behavior is dangerous to Islam itself because it comes from within religion itself to exploit religion for political purposes.

[Question] Is this another reason for the present Iraq-Iran war?

[Answer] In fact, Iraq is fighting on behalf of the Arab nation and the Muslim peoples because not only has Khomeyni usurped Iraqi territories, but he has also usurped the three Arab islands. Therefore, in its just war Iraq is fighting in defense of the Arab nation. If we review history, we would find that the Persian ambitions in the Arab territories date back hundreds of years. Moreover, all the secret movements that have emerged [in Iran], such as Baha'ism, Bahbahanism, Zarathustrianism and so forth, are movements that have distorted Islam and are basically Persian movements. In our information efforts, in which the Ministry of Religious Trusts plays an important role, we fight in defense of all the Muslim peoples with the aim of safeguarding the essence of the orthodox Islamic

religion. This is a major responsibility of all Muslims. The Islamic World League has participated in defending the religion through its response to Khomeyni's declaration saying that the message of Islam is not yet complete. Our ministry distributes a special monthly publication on Khomeyni's fabrications. We have in our possession rugs, which we displayed at the conference, with distorted phrases of the Koran woven in them. He has distorted some of the Koranic phrases. These rugs are made in Iran. Khomeyni begins with a little to end up with a lot. Were it not for Iraq's confrontation against this band, Khomeyni would have declared himself the awaited Mahdi.

[Question] Regarding details of the Israeli weapon supplies to Iran, you said in your latest press conference that whoever wants more details on this issue should go to Bani-Sadr. Why have you singled out Bani-Sadr in particular?

[Answer] Because he was the head of the state when the weapons were purchased and because he knows the full details. The press, especially AL-DUSTUR, has published accurate details, names and figures on the weapon purchases. This is very important because Bani-Sadr was the head of state, and legally so. He still is because he was elected by the majority of the Iranian people and then dismissed by one person, namely, Khomeyni.

[Question] What is the outcome of the efforts made by the United Nations, the organization of the Islamic States Conference and the nonaligned countries to put an end to this war?

[Answer] The efforts of all of the parties you have mentioned are commendable. But every time they turn toward Iran, they find the doors closed. The latest meeting of the representatives of the nonaligned countries was with Rajai, who has since been assassinated. Rajai told the representatives openly that the solution is with guns and on the battlefronts and not through peace. On our part, our position is clear and sound. We only want the Iraqi right to the land and the water. These delegations have constantly pointed out that Iraq is positive and understanding, that it has facilitated their mission and displayed full readiness but that Khomeyni's intransigence is the obstacle in the path to a solution.

[Question] What is the role of the Ministry of Religious Trusts in social security in Iraq?

[Answer] The activities of the Iraqi Ministry of Religious Trusts and Religious Affairs are divided into two parts: One concerned with religious affairs and with providing care for all mosques, churches and places of worship in Iraq. This part also enlightens the masses on the essence of Islam and provides care for all the imams, preachers and clergymen from all religions. The ministry's other activities are concerned with developing the religious trust monies and with investing these monies in construction projects, such as building apartments, markets and schools, in addition to building mosques and other places of worship. As for social security, before this year the ministry used to advance aid to the country's needy. In the wake of the latest legislation by the Revolution Command Council, it has been decided to give all the country's old and disabled a set salary. Thus, this duty is now entrusted to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

[Question] Does the ministry perform any role in religious education in the Iraqi schools?

[Answer] Yes. Religious education in the schools is controlled by the Ministry of Education and university education is controlled by the Ministry of Higher Education. However, the role of the Ministry of Religious Trusts in this sphere is to supervise the curricula and to take part in formulating them for these schools, institutes and colleges. Moreover, the ministry also supervises the appointment of a large number of graduates as preachers or employees in its agencies. There is a permanent joint committee of the Ministry of Religious Trusts, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher Education for this purpose. We have in our ministry religious enlightenment committees concerned with the preachers in all the mosques. We meet with them monthly and explain to them the religious positions and the heresies attached anew to Islam so that the masses may be enlightened accordingly.

[Question] Does your ministry play a role in editing and printing Islamic heritage books?

[Answer] The Iraqi Ministry of Religious Trusts is, by the admission of all the ministries concerned with religious affairs in the Islamic world, the ministry that prints this heritage. So far, we have printed nearly 50 volumes of Arab Islamic heritage that can rarely be found in the world's libraries. Our ministry possesses the biggest library in this field in Iraq, even in the world. All these books are from old manuscripts. The ministry has a committee to read these manuscripts and to reprint what is useful at present. A large portion of the printed books is distributed to the Islamic world free of charge.

[Question] There is a major project in Iraq to repair the holy places. What is your ministry's contribution to this project?

[Answer] The truth is that this plan is not the ministry's plan but the plan of President Saddam Husayn who has instructed that consultants be brought from abroad. The consultants have arrived and we have actually begun the work, rebuilding not only inside the holy places but also around them. Work is going on ceaselessly in al-Najaf and Karbala'. Moreover, we are in the middle of the work to build the tomb of Shaykh 'Abd al-Qadir al-Kaylani and Abu Hanifah's Mosque. This work has cost nearly 1.5 million dinars. As for the sums allocated for these projects, they are not included in the ministry's budget but come from the state's general budget on special instructions from the president.

[Question] But the ministry also has its funds, especially the religious trust funds and the profits they produce. Aren't these funds enough to manage the ministry's financial affairs?

[Answer] This, meaning the profits from the religious trusts, forms an important part of the ministry's budget. But the Ministry of Religious Trusts is the only ministry in the state linked directly to the president and not to the Council of Ministers. All our correspondence and demands are presented to the president directly. This is why the ministry's tasks are easy to achieve. Let me give you an example. We have gotten our ministry's budget and on top of this budget we have received 7 million dinars from the president so far.

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REASONS FOR DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO FRANCE DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 197, 31 Aug 81 pp 30-31

[Article: "French Circles Say Nuclear Reactor Was Not Only Reason for the Visit"]

[Text] The Visit of Tariq 'Aziz

A few months before Mr Tariq 'Aziz, Iraq's deputy prime minister visited France last 19 and 20 August, observers were following with interest communications between Iraq and France regarding the visit and the measures for bilateral relations [between the two countries], especially in the aftermath of the Zionist attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, Tammuz. The doubts and the comments that were being expressed revolved around the position of the new French administration and the French Socialist party on cooperation with Iraq and with the Arabs in accordance with the strategic view in international relations which was devised by Iraq's president Saddam Husayn. That strategic view states that cooperation with Iraq must include all fields and may not be confined to one field and exclude others. Therefore, the French press, and especially the newspaper, LE MONDE thought that Iraqi-French relations or rather Arab-French relations depended on the reply of President Mitterand's administration to the question that it was being asked: Will France rebuild the Iraqi nuclear reactor or not?

During Mr Tariq 'Aziz's visit to Paris the press and the agencies of the media focused noticeably on [the matter of] rebuilding the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the proposed French choices, especially those that pertain to beefing up activities for monitoring Iraqi nuclear establishments and providing them with "caramel" uranium as a condition for rebuilding the Iraqi nuclear reactor. According to the information of French circles it seems that the talks Mr Tariq 'Aziz held with French officials did not deal with an investigation of these details, which were left to the experts, but that they rather focused particularly on the basic principles in French-Iraqi relations. The Iraqi official talked and met with a number of French officials during this tour. He met President Mitterand, Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, Minister of Foreign Affairs Claude Cheysson and Minister of State for Foreign Trade Michel Jobert. In addition, he met the minister of education and the president of the socialist parliamentary group,

Pierre Joxe. Mr Tariq 'Aziz was supposed to meet Mr Lionel Juspain, the secretary general of the party, but Mr Juspain expressed his regrets because he was not going to be in Paris. This tour of talks left French circles with the impression that the important aspect of Mr Tariq 'Aziz's visit actually involved reopening the bridges with France after the presidential elections which changed the nature of government in France. Ever since the left came into power in France a few months ago Arab-French relations have been foundering in a climate of anticipation and mutual fears. Even the visit by the king of Saudi Arabia to Paris did not allow these relations to assume a kind of new impetus, especially since the impression which Francois Mitterand's elections campaign left with the Arabs was not a favorable one. Mitterand is known for his past and for his relations with Zionist circles. In addition, when he was secretary general of the French Socialist party his visits to the Middle East area were to Israel. Furthermore, the French Socialist party since 1971 had not bothered to form relations with the Arab countries of the Middle East for reasons that may not be related to Arab or French interests but rather to Mitterand's one-sided ties in the area with the Israeli Labor party through international socialism. For these reasons Mr Tariq 'Aziz's tour and talks with more than one French official were construed as an effort to lay down political foundations and principles and to provide an opportunity for the new French administration and the Arabs to become acquainted. For these reasons also the statement that the purpose of Mr Tariq 'Aziz's visit to France was to ask that the nuclear reactor be rebuilt is lacking; it conveys a partial view of the matter.

What results were achieved by the Iraqi official's visit to France in the context of prospects for the visit and in the views of both sides that set up the visit?

French circles are saying that President Mitterand's administration, whose ideas about Iraq's positions and policy on the most important Arab and international problems were general in nature, was surprised by the sedateness and the perception of Iraqi inclinations. Mitterand's administration came out of the talks with new perceptions that Iraq was taking up a clear, political strategy based on principles and that its political positions and actions were coordinated and consistent with its ambitions for building the country domestically. French circles do not hide the fact that Iraqi and French parties defined the points on which they disagree and agree regarding the questions they dealt with in the talks. But what matters according to French circles is that French officials found themselves facing a political party that was intent on making the bilateral relations between the two countries reciprocal and equal in all areas and based on common interests as well as mutual understanding. The same circles add that this reality and this framework for the relations make the results [of the talks] on detailed questions a foregone conclusion. The matter of rebuilding the Iraqi nuclear reactor and supplying Iraq with weapons and equipment and also developing commercial exchange [between the two countries] becomes in the end a practical manifestation of this general framework for the bilateral relations which was defined during the visit of Mr Tariq 'Aziz to Paris. Therefore, in view of the mutual satisfaction with the political

results of the Iraqi official's visit, new prospects have been defined in French-Arab cooperation. In fact, this cooperation, especially between France and Iraq will see major developments in the future. In addition to France's commitment to execute all the contracts it had previously signed with Iraq, new contracts in all fields will be signed, and these will help Iraq implement its economic and development projects and strengthen its defense means and capabilities.

But in addition to the bilateral relations for whose development and increased strength all bridges seem to have been cleared, there is a significant side to the outcome of Mr Tariq 'Aziz's visit to France that pertains to the Arab situation and the Arabian Gulf area. In this regard the visit realized a significant step in Arab-French relations, a matter that was referred to in an editorial in LE MONDE. It is expected that mutual suspicions and fears will disappear and that these relations will emerge from the waiting period and achieve progress beyond their former state. It is worth noting here that the French administration, which is still in the process of drawing up a coordinated foreign policy, was significantly affected by what relations with the Khomeyni regime in Tehran have come to. The French administration has finally abandoned the hopes that the French Socialist party entertained when it was in the opposition regarding the development of the situation in Iran. It seems that the new French point of view regarding the Arabian Gulf area will rely in a principal way on Iraq's role in the area. The French will rely on Iraq not only to guarantee peace and stability, but also to build a polarizing center that would play an active part in the movement of non-aligned countries. The discussion between Mr Tariq 'Aziz and Claude Cheysson in particular focused on Iraq's leadership role in the Third World and in the movement of non-aligned countries. The French administration was assured in the end that Iraq's ability to become a center for polarizing the Arabian Gulf area and the countries of the Third World will be a fundamental guarantee for peace in one of the most strategically important areas in the world: the Middle East area, an area that is full of turbulence and disturbances.

8592
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LATEST DEVELOPMENTS, DEBATES IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY REVIEWED

Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 1 Nov 81 pp 14, 15

/Article by Hisham al-Diwan: "In the National Assembly's Exceptional Meeting, the Domestic and Defense Committee's Report Is Submitted to the Government"/

/Text/ The issue of security and crime in Kuwait filled the assembly's discussions yesterday. After proceedings that lasted about 2 hours, the assembly agreed to hand the Domestic and Defense Committee's report that it had prepared on the subject in the first session over to the government.

The report stipulates the recommendation that it is necessary to strengthen and bolster the media with well educated young people, increase guard patrols and rapid mobile aid units, intensify surveillance over the borders, seek the aid of the National Guard and specialized experts in criminal affairs in order to conduct studies and research, and strive to limit immigration, while intensifying surveillance over the possession of arms and explosives and raising the level and competence of investigators.

The report, on which a long debate took place among the deputies, meeting with strong resistance on the part of some of them and leading to a discussion of the possibility of forming a government or parliamentary committee or committee composed of both powers jointly to discuss the phenomenon of security and the causes of crime, also contained 22 other recommendations calling for coordination between the Ministry of the Interior and four other ministries in this sphere.

During the discussions, the minister of the interior, Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad, informed the deputies that his ministry was intending to study the status of existing police posts in some areas preparatory to turning them again into guard posts.

In addition, the National Assembly held an exceptional meeting yesterday morning under the chairmanship of Mr Muhammad Yusuf al-'Adasani in which it approved a number of decrees of laws that were issued during the parliamentary review period.

Details of the Meeting

The meeting opened at 0900 hours in the morning and as usual the assembly's secretary general, 'Abd-al-Latif al-Fulayj, read out the names of the people absent and the deputies for whose absence an excuse was provided. Then the deputies started to express their observations on the minutes. The deputy Jasim al-Khurafi directed the

assembly's attention to the continued delay in printing and publishing the minutes and some deputies seconded him in this; the government's answer to that was as follows:

The minister of state: "The minutes go to the Ministry of Information for publication and we will urge the ministry to speed up their publication."

The chairman: This meeting, as I have indicated, is to be considered an extension of the last one and we will shorten the question section. (The assembly agreed.)

The assembly proceeded with the question section, which began with a followup by the deputy Ilsa al-Shahin on a question he had regarding the nationalities and numbers of people working in the oil installations. However, the delay in the arrival of the member al-Shahin moved the floor to his colleague the deputy Mutlaq al-Shalimi who followed up on the minister of state and his answer on the possibility of moving the furnaces from their current location, stating,

Mutlaq al-Shalimi: "We previously met with the minister on the same subject; at that time we did not have access to this free podium. However, the minister's response today seems colder than ice and we will think about shifting them to another place. The problem, homorable chairman, is that the government does not control its policy, and the pressure from the companies has become more powerful than that of the citizens. I would like the government or the minister of state to meet us after 1800 hours in the evening or 0700 hours in the morning so that it can see that the issue is one of air pollution, one of disease.

"I demand that the assembly form a committee to investigate the crushers and the furnace to ascertain the damage that is being inflicted on the citizens, and I hope that we will not reach the point where we will have to meet with his highness the prince. This would mean a deficiency on the part of the minister of state."

The Officials' Doors Are Open

The minister of state: "The doors of all officials are open to all citizens, and the truth is that starting 1 January I suspended work in some of the crushers." (The minister read out his answer to the question.)

Then came the turn of the deputy Faysal al-Dawish, who commented on the minister of communications regarding telephone services in Julayb al-Shuyukh:

Faysal al-Dawish: "The current minister of communications does not bear responsibility for past shortcomings in service, but he is committed to amend mistakes and make up for all defects. Citizens, whatever their living circumstances or job circumstances might be, spend more than 3 years waiting for telephones. Why? They put a contractor in Subhan right away while the government removed this contractor from Julayb al-Shuyukh and assigned him to build the warehouses in Subhan.

"The citizens of Julayb al-Shuyukh are suffering from the treatment they receive on the part of the employees in the al-Farwaniyah exchange. If this situation is improper, the minister is responsible for correcting it."

The minister of communications: "Thanks, Mr Chairman, and thanks, Brother al-

Dawish. With God's will we will continue telephone service for the other areas of al-Hasa."

A question from the deputy Muhammad Habib to the minister of health regarding the housing codes in effect; however, the deputy requested that the question be postponed because the competent minister was absent.

Then the deputy Muhammad al-Murshid had a question for the minister of the interior on the guard post in the al-Yarmuk area.

Security in al-Yarmuk

Muhammad al-Murshid: "My purpose in my question was to investigate security in the al-Yarmuk and al-Khalidiyah areas. I do not know anything about criminology, and the truth is that al-Khalidiyah is a station where there is a servant who only answers the telephone, and the line between al-Khalidiyah and the Interior /Ministry/ is bad. Although there are two important border post and National Guard departments there, they do not provide any security for the area. I ask the minister of the interior to review the state of the posts in the areas rather than embarrassing people with market investigations, cutting people's hair off, and so forth. Maintaining security is done by concentrating security posts and meeting deficiencies in them.

"His excellency the minister says that when the installations in al-Yarmuk are completed, a police post will be built there. Who can guarantee that?

"It is true that the people in the area consider themselves above acts of violence, but the area is open to criminal elements and it has no security protection around it. The explosions in al-'Udayliyah and elsewhere originated in the area."

Turning Police Posts into Guard Posts

The minister of the interior: "I would like to assure my honored brother that the ministry will restore the posts to guard stations as in the past. His claim that the servant answers the phone in al-Khalidiyah is not true; I can reassure the honored member that what he said might have been transmitted to him.

"As regards the subject of al-Yarmuk, the installations there are still in being and we have not received the guard post; as soon as we do from the ministry, it will embark on its activity."

There was another question from the same member to the member to the minister of justice on the Kuwaitization of the judiciary, which has however been postponed.

Muhammad al-Murshid: "I would like to content myself with what was stated in the answer from the minister of religious endowments, but his excellency has refused to link the interests of the religious endowments to an assembly, although that can be done. In spite of my appreciation of the people working in the ministry, nonetheless ...."

A question from the member 'Ayid 'Allush to the minister of electricity on lighting in certain streets:

'Ayid 'Allush: "The Umm al-Himan area has been there for 10 years but in spite of that there is nothing even resembling one 'pole,' although its inhabitants number about 32,000. This area still has no lighting except in the main street and there is none elsewhere. The ministry's plan so far has not even shown an indication of the region."

The Faculty of Islamic Law -- Soon

Then the deputy Muhammad al-Rashid commented on the minister of education, regarding the establishment of the faculty of Islamic law.

The minister replied by saying:

The minister of state: "The subject deserves attention and it has been given its turn in the construction /schedule/. A special decree has been issued establishing the faculty, a dean will be appointed to it, and an office will be set up first as soon as possible so that studies in it can start soon. I would like to state that its stages of construction have received the same measures that the other faculties have witnessed."

Then there was a question from the member Badr al-Mudif to the minister or works on the process of extending the street in Mina' 'Abdallah. However, the person presenting the question asked that it be postponed.

There was a question from the member Muhammad al-Murshid on the appointment of a village chief for the al-Khalidiyah and al-Yarmuk areas. He said,

Muhammad al-Murshid: "In appointing the village chief, care should be given to ability and competence, not connections. The Ministry of the Interior must take these matters into consideration. Then why should I ignore the issue of the increase in their salaries? I also request that the selection of the village chief be by election, not by appointment."

The minister of the interior: "The brother has requested that a village chief be chosen for the al-Yarmuk area, but he has moved off the subject. The basic issue is under study with the committee on village chiefs."

The time for questions ended and the assembly moved over to another section. However, the deputy Jasim al-Khurafi requested a point of order, stating:

Where Are Al-Khurafi's Questions?

Jasim al-Khurafi: "I presented two questions, nobody has given me an answer to them yet, and I do not know why. Although there is a specific time for answers, I asked about the people who have special passports and the reasons why they were given them, and another question was to the minister of religious endowments. What I would like to state here is that we are trying to benefit from some questions for which we request answers, so that they can round out our work."

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydili: "We wish that our brothers who have observations on the ruler's speech would hand them over to the committee."

Security Conditions

Then came the turn for the Domestic and Defense Committee report on security conditions. However, the chairman requested that the assembly agree to hand the drafts submitted by the government and the members to the assembly over to the competent assembly committees for discussion. They were handed over after agreement was given, and the assembly resumed discussing the security conditions through the report of the Domestic and Defense Committee and began discussing its seventh report. The committee rapporteur, the deputy Sabah Abu Shaybah, mounted the podium, read the report and opened the floor to discussion. Nine deputies from the two assemblies, besides the others, expressed their desire to comment again.

The Discussions

Before the first deputy's turn to talk came, five deputies presented a recommendation calling on the assembly to embrace the committee report and submit it to the government for adoption. However, some deputies protested and requested a discussion.

Salih al-Fadalah: "It must be discussed."

Muhammad al-Barrak: "We want action, not words. It would be better for the report to be handed over to the government and for us to vote if they protest."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "This is a bad initiative, if we vote on everything before it is discussed."

Mushari al-'Anjari: "The issue of the interior has been killed, if it has not been sated with discussion. There are good things in the report and we hope that the government will adopt them."

The Report Is Deficient

Khalid al-Wasmi: "I am against the recommendation. The committee report contains some deficiencies. If the subject of security in this country is studied 365 days /in the year/ that will not be enough because it is the most serious problem Kuwait is facing. Handing the report directly over to the government is unconstitutional."

'Abd-al-Muhsin Jamal: "The role of the committee is constructive, as is stated in its report, and is not practical. There are matters which must be raised, and let those who do not want to discuss them not discuss them."

Khalid Sultan: "The National Assembly's role must be more general and comprehensive. The issue is one of security alone, not the prosecution of crimes. While the committee has studied the issue from all aspects, the report has dwelt on the Ministry of the Interior alone and is confined to that. I believe that it would have been possible for the Ministry of the Interior itself to produce a report of this kind!"

The chairman: "Gentlemen, we now want the assembly's opinion: Shall we adopt the recommendation or debate? There are two views, and the people holding each have expressed them."

'Adnan 'Abd-al-Samad: "Yesterday a crime was committed in Kuwait. Shall we content

ourselves with submitting a report to the government? The report was prepared on a specific incident which Kuwait witnessed and it must be discussed so that whatever is new can be added to it."

'Abd-al-Muhsin Jamal: "Quoting /on hearsay/ is a constitutional violation. We want to know whether the committee summoned experts in canon or Islamic law, for example."

Sabah Abu Shaybah: "Brother Khalid says that the committee laid responsibility for security on the Interior /Ministry/. This is wrong, because the committee has discussed the role of every entity that is concerned with the issue of security in the country."

Seeking the Advice of Experts

The discussion began. The people spoke in the form of advocates and opponents, but nonetheless no one supported this principle. The following discussion took place:

Salih al-Fadalah: "This committee did not summon experts from the university, law professors or psychologists. It is unjust for us to make the Ministry of the Interior bear the responsibility for security in Kuwait. A number of ministries share the responsibility among themselves, and I would like to comment on some of the points contained in the report. Who said that there is a large number of graduates in the Interior Ministry who are engaged in their activities and areas of specialization, and consequently that the ministry has not made the use of graduates that it should have?

"The village elders: if you want to volunteer, order what is possible. There is no agency at the disposal of any chief; there are just empty rooms without qualified persons at the disposal of every chief! How can they produce the fruits of their activity? I demand that they be compensated so that their activity can be facilitated.

Immigration

"Immigration has become something that cannot be tolerated. On whose invitation are the immigrants entering? We do not know who is from where, and they stay in the country without being monitored. Even the immigration and passport departments in the governorates know nothing about them, so how can they be counted? Is this the best method for solving the problems of immigrants?

In order for us to ask the Ministry of the Interior to do its job as well as possible, there must be a joint committee of the ministries of the government that are connected to monitoring the subject."

Sabah Abu Shaybah: "The committee has met with a number of experts and specialists and has discussed the issue with them. It advised a number of ministries to cooperate in the context of maintaining security, and requested the formation of a committee from the government ministries that are concerned with executing the report after it is studied."

Salih al-Fadalah: "The committee refers only to graduates, without seeking the help of the figures or the number of people actually occupying their positions. You should

have seen the nightmares! You wouldn't have just brought in the deputy minister of the interior and the assistant deputy only."

Sabah Abu Shaybah: "Among the people we met were some civilian officials and the figures the brother requested are in the minister's report."

Salah al-Hijrif: "We haven't learned who is in favor and who is opposed."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "I would like to direct a question to the committee on the last paragraph of the report, in which it requests that the assembly be informed of new things that occur. Has anything in regard to that appeared from the Ministry of the Interior?"

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydili: "The committee demands that a committee be formed to study the causes and sources of crime. This is the first assembly meeting in which the issue is being discussed, and if the government adopts this, then the assembly will have an opinion on it."

The Assembly's Opinion and the Government's Opinion

Muhammad al-Rashid: "Who is the assembly! Who is the government! This report reached the competent minister some time ago and there was supposed to be a practical response from him to the assembly within 6 months. I look at things today, they have grown bigger than they were before. Now the door is open for the government to spread about crime. Servants' identity /cards/ facilitate their flight and movement, and the embassies have also further facilitated matters. Citizens complain, employers complain about the flight of workers, their passports are in the possession of their sponsors, but they are with other people, going to their embassies and getting passports! The government drivers have fled and have found employemnt with other people whom the government knows! These things require monitoring, rules, regulation and inspection. People working at the borders go to their jobs and return in their own cars. This is the first country to function in this fashion. If three people who have come in illegally get in a car with an officer, who is going to detain them? I want the government to cooperate with the Ministry of the Interior. We have to know all the foreigners who are working, but where! Kuwait has become the laughing-stock of the immigrants. If you go to the Interior, it will tell you to bring them. If they escape, where will I bring them from? With a punishment of 9 dinars for that, what are we settling?

"We want prevention, and second of all, punishment. We hope that the new deputy minister of the interior will have good will toward others and will give up on the notion of centralization."

The minister of interior: "I do not want to talk on at length; the report is thorough. However, the honored member is saying that things have been hidden from some people in the Interior, and I would like to hear something on that subject from him."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "I am prepared to meet with the Minister of the interior and explain everything to him."

The minister of the interior: "If there is something, I would like it to be recorded

here that I will undertake to bring anyone whose guilt is proved to the office of the public prosecutor for investigation, and we actually have handed some people over."

The chairman: "A statement has appeared against the immigrants which I would like to delete."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "I was not generalizing, I said 'some.' Then, while I am talking to the minister of the interior, as long as he has said that some employees have been brought before the office of the public prosecutor, that is sufficient."

The Interior and Its Security Responsibility

Khalid al-Sultan: "I ask the assembly to bring back the report and I will explain that.

"First, the report is deficient. It concentrated on just one area, which was the Interior /Ministry/. The Interior alone in the government has been responsible for the problems. Our confidence in the minister in general is great, and there are good signs of a move to treat negative aspects. We, as an assembly, have set out a brief report on dealing with the conditions of crime and I believe that it must be scientific and comprehensive. The flood of crime will stop not so much with the correction of deficiencies in the ministry as with a study of the causes of crime in society and employment of the Ministries of Information, Education and so forth.

"Most unfortunately, the newspapers carry advertisements on the Kuwait Towers and other places for dancing, disco and bands, and these are cabarets, and so this is the Projects Company, and its club parties. This puts us in one place and crime in another. There should be a scientific study of the causes of crime.

Kuwait's Students and Islam in America

"Our students in America have started calling for reform among people in prisons in America and they succeeded after their government failed in reforming them and there has been a radical change in their conduct and their morals. Today one of the most important causes of destruction and crime in the country is the infringement of Islamic law. For the past 8 months we have been awaiting a response from the government to the draft amending Article Two of the constitution.

"The report is good only as regards the Interior. If it is in the name of the whole assembly and concerns crime, it is deficient and not at all adequate.

"Therefore I recommend that a committee be formed to study the matter in a scientific, comprehensive manner."

Sabah Abu Shaybah: "I thank our brother Khalid al-Sultan for his statement. The Ministry of the Interior is watching vigilantly over security and the preservation of order from our standpoint, but we stop at the other ministries and have also reiterated the citizens' responsibility for preserving order as well."

Faysal al-Dawish: "I thank the committee for its efforts, I believe that the 26 recommendations are simple, and I request the rapporteur to give the deputies a chance to state their opinions. Mr Chairman, if I wish the impossible I will ask for

the impossible. The current apparatus of the Ministry of Interior does not investigate the hopes and aspirations of the assembly. It plays a significant role along with the Ministries of /Social/ Affairs, Information and Education, and in sight of the negative aspects that we see in our society the Ministry of Labor has the duty of defining Kuwait's requirements for labor, and the companies' requirements, be they individuals or groups. Some companies must not declare illusory residences for people when they just have offices to bring in labor in exchange for bribes.

"The Education /Ministry/ has an obligation, but let us go back to the Interior. It is well known that private servants are arranged for through them, and that a single person can bring in 83 servants! What has happened following the investigation that was made? The guard posts are empty, or almost empty, on the pretext that everyone is out on patrol and they tell people who have complaints, 'Come early.'

After 3 days, by God, the investigator completes the investigation with a trivial bit of work. The governor is responsible.

"There are supposed to be incentives to attract the young people of Kuwait to work in the Interior."

Each of Us Is a Government

Jasim al-Khurafi: "Mr chairman, at the outset I would like to testify that the committee has given much thought and great effort, and if a quarter of the recommendations that have been put forth by the committee members is realized I will be the first person to be delighted with this result. But the problem is that the whole emphasis is on the Interior and the relationship with other ministries, specifically the office of the public prosecutor. The report has not addressed itself to this and there is just a paragraph asking for coordination. This is nice talk, but how can such coordination take place?

"The problem in Kuwait is that each of us considers that his situation is a government and there are various issues. For example, committees are set forth to coordinate excavations, which are the simplest thing. Such coordination does not exist, so how can coordination take place in matters like these?

"The committee has not addressed itself to ways of acquiring the trust of the citizen through the Ministry of the Interior. There is more than one sincere independent-minded official, and the minister is foremost among them, but this does not prevent people from gaining the trust of the citizen. A week ago a citizen took a woman to the guard post because she was pregnant through fornication. After investigation, he was requested to take her back to his house and keep her. How can such a woman go back to his people, and his honor? This is the responsibility of the office of the public prosecutor, not the Interior. Unfortunately this makes us stress the demand that the officials in the public prosecutor's office and the Interior be Kuwaitis, not because others do not have the competence but because they know the customs in the country.

The Computer and Passports

"The Ministry of the Interior is taking a good approach to improve and develop the system in the Ministry of the Interior, but that must be in accordance with the living issues we are raising.

"The committee missed an important subject, which is technology and the computer. How many residents do we have? We are a small country, not exceeding a million, and passports are still done by hand! Errors are committed repeatedly and the probability of losing files is constant!"

'Abd-al-Muhsin Jamal: "At the outset, I have a complaint with the former Domestic and Defense Committee. This report cannot go out in its name to the government since it is not scientific or thorough. We mean to say, first of all, that the report does not know what security is. Is what is meant by security moral crimes or political or social crimes? This is not specified.

"Then it should not be embarrassing for any committee to call in specialists, experts and committee employees. The report shows that it has not sought the aid of experts in Islamic or canon law or sociology. If the report had been written by a university student it would have given more reasons and scientific background than the committee did.

The Notion of Security and Types of Crime

"The assembly's reports must be presented and be of use to this country. We must not throw everything on the government. The assembly's job is to show the government's mistakes, indeed to rectify them, and it is in the committee's power to conduct field studies on the reasons for all the crimes in Kuwait. It would be best for these studies to show and specify the notion of security and crime and refer to its types and causes, then arrive at ways of dealing with it, after learning if the population composition has an effect on that or if the distribution of the population in areas with immigrants has an effect. The blame now is on people who are not Kuwaiti, without reference to Kuwaitis. Some political crimes are committed in broad daylight; are the time periods the crimes are committed in connected or linked with embassies and some of their activities?

"Then what about the reasons young Kuwaitis are averse to joining the police force? Are these reasons financial, social or what? Then what about the role of the media in reflecting the force's effects on the masses?

"In many crimes which immigrants commit, the accused person posses local residence and passports. Therefore there is no point in intensifying surveillance over the borders.

"Some criminals come with an entirely healthy state of mind, but treatment domestically, government measures and small salaries play an important role in the rejection of crime /sic/.

Financial Motives for Crime

Is crime economically affected or are differences in living standard the reason?

"The committee asks the government to seek the aid of experts and prestigious people. Why doesn't the committee itself deal with the issue: Why aren't the conditions, relationships and other matters concerning immigrants and immigration studied?

"More important than all that is fashioning people ideologically and linking them to Islam. Then, people giving the sermons on Friday must be given freedom to express their views, and have printed sermons distributed among them. Then the cultural societies should be supported and should have public influence. People with /undue/ influence should be exposed, especially since poor people do not come into Kuwait today, but rather people with status and influence do. Therefore I demand that the report be withdrawn."

Sabah Abu Shaybah: "The committee made field trips and met with specialists in the Ministry of the Interior. Today it has a report by them on crime, the reasons for it and its origins. As for defining crime and types of crime, we did not include that in the report because the issue which was raised for discussion was specified and all the circumstances surrounding it were known. We requested the ministries of state to form a committee to study the subject."

'Abd-al-Muhsin Jamal: "According to its report, the committee met only with officials, not experts. These were the minister, the deputy minister and the assistant minister. It did not seek the aid of experts and persons with /specialized/ views."

At this point the chairman gave an announcement on the receipt of a new recommendation that called for closing the door to debate, since the Ministry of the Interior and other specific ministries had been assigned to study the issue of security. One of the people presenting the committee report on the Ministry of the Interior alone stated that the security issue concerned the other ministr/ies/ of state, but the committee rapporteur said that in its report it requested the government basically to form a committee to study the subject.

Criticism Is Harsh

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydili: "The committee now has a chairman and I wish him success. The criticism we have heard is harsh. In the first session, the committee strove to carry out the assembly's wishes, visited the site, and other things, and our brother 'Abd-al-Muhsin's request can be met by the committee whose establishment by the ministries of state is indicated in the report.

"Therefore I request that the assembly now pass the report."

Khalifah al-Jarri: "We the people who made the recommendation requested the formation of a committee from the assembly, not the government. We ourselves, the assembly of the people, would form it, and our will is being met."

Faysal al-Dawish: "I request our brothers to wait awhile. That would be better."

Khalid Sultan: "We have not argued with anyone. We can pass the report but the assembly, not the government, should form the committee."

The chairman: "Does the assembly agree to close the door to the debate? Does it agree to form a committee to study immediate conditions which will be temporary and will deal with the other aspects that have a relationship to the subject?"

The Government Welcomes

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad: "In my opinion, the assembly can form any committee it wants and the government does not have the right to refuse that."

Badr al-Mudaf: "A vote must be taken on it."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "The assembly committee is separate from the government committee."

The chairman: "There is a difference in opinions in every assembly. Does that mean we should vote?"

Khalid al-Wasmi: "As far as the recommendation on forming a committee on a committee goes, I am not in agreement with that. If you want to close /the door to/ any subject, form a committee for it. I believe that the issues of security and crime are the area of competence of the Domestic and Defense Committee and we can inform it of our views and observations; there is no cause to form a new committee."

Khalid al-Nazzal: "Forming a new committee means that there is something wrong with the Domestic and Defense Committee. If there are recommendations, let them be presented to the committee."

The chairman: "Brothers, it is time to vote on the committee report. Shall the assembly hand it over to the government first?"

Mutlaq al-Shalimi: "The Ministry of the Interior is not the Ministry of Education; Interior's job is to follow up on criminals and hand them over to the office of the public prosecutor."

The assembly voted on handing the report over to the government. Forty-five deputies raised their hands in declaration of their agreement, and only one deputy was opposed.

The assembly voted once more on the recommendation of forming a new temporary committee, but that did not receive the necessary majority; only nine deputies supported it.

Voting by Name on the Reports

The assembly resumed discussing the second section bearing on the constitutional provision concerning the assembly's dispute with the council on Article 14 of the constitution. However, the deputies requested that the subject be put off to the next meeting, and the chairman returned to the ninth section, which dealt with the vote on the committee reports. The discussion and voting on the Foreign Committee report started after the deputy Badr al-Mudaf began by reading the texts and contents of these reports bearing on foreign agreements, which were just seven in number, including the decree establishing the Committee on the South. As a result of a vote by name, 39 deputies were in agreement and just one deputy abstained. At 1136 hours the assembly recessed for prayer.

After the Prayer

Thirty-two minutes later, that is, at 1218 hours, the assembly resumed its activity

after everyone had performed the noon prayer and it discussed a new group of committee reports, starting with the report by the Health, Social and Labor Committee on a number of decrees of laws issued when the assembly was absent. The deputy Muhammad al-Rashid commented on one of these decrees by saying:

Muhammad al-Rashid: "We would like the Ministry of Health to increase its attention to and concern for sheep and cattle in pastures and increase its oversight over the general sanitation there."

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydili: "I also add my vote to that of my brother al-Rashid on Health's role in overseeing sanitation, since the filth in many areas of Kuwait has increased."

Khalid Sultan: "We have heard the Ministry of Health on discontinuing the anti-rat plan programs, which means that rats will return to Kuwait after a period of time. The ministry says that the Employees' Bureau does not give workers adequate compensation and does not permit them to be paid this compensation."

The chairman: "Gentlemen, it is now the time to vote on the decree on public aid and on another decree on the pursuit of the medical and dental professions and equivalent professions."

A Deficiency in Services

Hadil al-Jallawi: "In spite of my esteem for the committee report, we, as citizens, sense a deficiency in health services. The committee has taken one side and abandoned the other one. Some areas have more than 5,000 houses. Would that the committee had investigated the issue from all aspects."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "The aid system needs review lest it come to seem like a question of begging."

'Abd-al-Muhsin Jamal: "How can the law on the pursuit of the medical profession permit abortion? Did the committee consult experts on Islamic law?"

Mutlaq al-Shalimi: "The committee understood the justifications for this measure and it is the health committees that are responsible."

Fallah al-Hijrif: "The aid law was approved for people who belong to this country and need help, such as old people, orphans, widows and people who are unable to work. There is injustice in the issue of aid for citizens whom the Ministry of /Social/ Affairs deprives of this right, on grounds that they are renting out extra rooms in their homes. Then abortion is prohibited in Islamic Law."

Mutlaq al-Shalimi: "When necessary, forbidden things are to be kept to a minimum."

Jasim al-'Awn: "The issue is not just what is lawful and forbidden, it is also what is humane. It is the simplest humane rule in a Moslem country like Kuwait that rulings in Islamic law should be sought, and we have a minister of religious endowments."

The Legality of Abortion When Necessary

Faysal al-Dawish: "Supposedly one resorts to abortion only in emergency cases that might threaten the wife's life. Has the committee paid attention to this point?"

Mutlaq al-Shalimi: "The law states that after it has made analyses and examinations the committee will determine when there is an emergency situation which requires abortion, following agreement by both parents. However, there are emergency medical cases where the situation does not require that the guardian be summoned for agreement to be given."

Khalid al-Jumay'an: "We hope that the committee will change its report on abortion until it has sought the ruling of Islamic law."

Khalid al-Sultan: "I do not think that the government wants to violate Islamic law, nor does the committee, so why does the committee refuse to withdraw the report and seek a ruling from Islamic law on it?"

The chairman pointed out that the report would be withdrawn if the assembly agreed, then asked about the Aid Law and received the answer that the assembly had agreed to vote on it. The vote was taken by name and the result was 45 deputies in agreement. Thus Decree 16 for 1981 regarding the addition of a new article to the Public Aid Law was passed.

Then it came time /to review/ the Domestic and Defense Committee report on a number of decrees of laws in addition to articles in the Nationality Law, amendments in the statutes on civil defense, compulsory service and passports, and the abrogation of an article in the Law on the Army and the Police Force Statute.

Ahmad al-Sa'dun: /Line missing/.

'Adnan 'Abd-al-Samad: "I would like the subject of bachelors' housing in residential areas densely populated with families to be dealt with."

Jasim al-Khurafi: "With regard to Law 13 for 1976 regulating the performance of compulsory military service, I am in favor of the amendment because it protects the rights of people who volunteer for service. However, it would be fitting to add an article preserving or realizing service benefits because it is said that people leaving service cease to benefit from training courses as soon as their service is ended. The conscript must be convinced that the effort that he made in serving the country was not just for the sake of learning military drills."

Muhammad al-Rashid: "In the previous session, I said that the committees should place the texts of the original articles that are being replaced alongside the new articles that are meant to replace them."

Muhammad Habib Badr: "I add my vote to that of our brother 'Adnan regarding the need to deal with the issue of bachelors' housing in model areas. It is true that the committee the Council of Ministers formed is functioning, but the village chiefs' role is negative, and they are supposed to check up on everyone who lives in these areas to confirm the legality of the residence /permits/ and see whether they have families with them."

Rashid Sayf: "My observation is on the decree bearing on the regulations on the

performance of compulsory service which exempts /people from/ a particular body while drafting /those from/ another similar body."

Conscripts Are Subject to Their Ministries

The minister of defense: "As regards conscripts, they are subject to conscription in their ministry's staffs and are dealt with as government employees in accordance with the statutes in effect. As for exemptions from service, these concern firemen. The law stipulates that people possessing military ranks are to be exempt from service, and firefighting is a military rank."

Rashid Sayf: "The municipality isn't military. The oil companies have firemen and they ought to be dealt the same way municipality firemen are."

The chairman: "There are some observations I would like to present to the deputies on compulsory service and the law on the residence of foreigners. The rest that there is no objection to we should vote on."

'Adnan 'Abd-al-Samad: "There is not even anything wrong with the law on foreigners, or any objection to it. The fault lies in the execution."

Fallah al-Hijrif: "The compulsory conscription decree that we would like from the minister of defense would have the ministry give conscripts all sorts of arrangements so that they would be ready to serve their country in all military fields.

"Then the decree on army and police salaries: in the army here, a soldier reaches the rank of sargeant and stops. This is not proper -- he is supposed to advance gradually up to second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and so forth."

Training Is Continuous

The minister of defense: "I can assure the honored member that training is continuous and will be continuing further. We now have reactivation courses. The fact is that there is nothing to stop military persons from being promoted until they reach the highest rank besides their secret reports, their activity and their competence. The present chief of staff started at the position of private."

Fallah al-Hijrif: "I would like the minister to be certain about the law."

Shaykh Salim: "It seems that the matter has become obscure to our brother al-Hijrif. Military men are of two kinds, Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti. I was not talking about the former, but the non-Kuwaitis stop at a specific rank."

Faysal al-Dawish: "We ask the minister of defense to have the conscripts' service commitments increased and to stop deferments on grounds of marriage. I also underline what our brother Fallah al-Hijrif said to the effect that some persons served the army for 25 years but stopped at a specific rank for a simple reason, which was that they did not have /Kuwaiti/ nationality."

The minister of defense: "The exemptions occurred as a result of thorough social study. I am one of the people who have lived with this problem. I have two brothers who got married, one of them ahead of the other; the first was exempted while the second was conscripted."

Giving Nationality to People in the Army and Police

'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydali: "Let me add my vote to the brothers' and ask the ministers of defense and the interior about the man in the army and the special police. The issue of nationality is at issue, and the discrimination against this group must be eased. How can we give weapons to people who defend us but do not have our nationality? I recommend that attention be given to the men in the army and the police because they are men, and men today are few in number."

Hadil al-Jallawi: "I request the minister of defense that attention be given to draftees who serve 2 years in the army since they are not government employees; will they serve without annual leave?

"We demand that the army and the police be Kuwaitized. There is an obstacle in the nationality committees." (The chairman cut him off for departing from the subject.)

The chairman declared that a recommendation had been received to close the door to debate. The assembly agreed and voting began on the six decrees contained in the report. The result was that 45 deputies gave agreement and four deputies were opposed.

At that point Chairman al-'Adasani declared that the meeting was adjourned and would resume the following Tuesday morning. At that time it was 1342 hours in the afternoon.

11887
CSO: 4404/98

GULF ECONOMICS MINISTERS DELAY RECOMMENDATIONS

Kuwait AL-ANBA' in Arabic 1 Nov 81 p 6

/Article: "An Economic Framework Is More Important Than Issuing a Unified Currency"/

/Text/ The minister of finance and planning, Mr 'Abd-al-Latif Yusuf al Hamad, announced yesterday that a conference that was to have been held among the planning ministers of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council countries in Kuwait next Wednesday had been postponed.

He said that this postponement occurred on the basis of a request from some planning ministers in fraternal countries because the date of the stipulated meeting was close to the date for the Gulf summit in Riyad on 10 November, and that would not give the ministers enough chance to prepare resolutions and recommendations and present them to the Gulf summit.

He said that a new date for holding the conference had not yet been met.

Replying to questions from journalists, Mr al-Hamad added that the issuance of a unified Gulf currency was a matter for which there was no need at present. He said that although that sort of currency was considered a symbol of unity among the countries of the region, it would change nothing in the economic situation; every cooperation council country had its own economy, statutes and laws.

He pointed out, "Had this step been taken 15 years ago, it would perhaps have been positive and feasible, but now I believe there is no call for it and that it is more important to set out a united economic framework for the council countries."

I Did Not Discuss Membership for the Organization with Claussen

In response to a question on the reason why the bills on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had been frozen -- as a result of which the election of the Palestine Liberation Organization as an observer member to meetings of the two bodies was frozen -- the suspension of these bills for a specific period would permit the elimination of all problems and disputes and it would be possible to submit these bills again the coming year and present the issue of electing the organization as an observer member.

The minister denied that the issue of organization membership had been raised in

his discussions with the chairman of the International Monetary Fund, Mr Alden Claussen, in his recent visit to Kuwait, since this issue was not basically in the jurisdiction of the administrative body.

Mr al-Hamad was elected chairman of the general assemblies of the two international organizations during the joint meeting they held last month.

The minister denied that a discussion had taken place on turning the Ministry of Planning into a planning council once again. He said that that would require legal measures, because the former council's transformation into a ministry had taken place through legal measures.

The Ministry of Planning was established about 6 years ago, after it had been a council subordinate to the Office of the Prime Minister.

The Cancún Summit was Necessary

On the Cancún meetings held recently in Mexico, which heads of northern and southern countries attended, and the possibility of producing a new international economic order, Minister al-Hamad said that the Cancún summit was a very necessary step for the exchange of views between both sides and for getting each side to know what the other one wanted.

He pointed out that this summit was held in accordance with a request from the international Brandt committee, of which Minister al-Hamad was a member.

He said that what the developing countries wanted through the establishment of a new economic system in the United Nations General Assembly was not compatible with the goals of establishing such a system, because international economic relations could not be based on United Nations resolutions, especially since international economic interests are now complex and interconnected.

He added that the benefit and importance of the Cancún conference arose from the fact that the rich countries had conveyed their points of view and what they wanted to the developing countries, and vice versa. America was made to understand that the world economy did not consist of America alone, nor the rich countries alone either.

Regarding the next step, the minister said that there would be a number of steps, not just one, and that these steps might be in numerous directions. However, he did not specify the nature of these steps.

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BILL PROPOSES AMENDMENT OF CIVIL SERVICE LAW

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 14 Oct 81 p 4

[Article: "Bill Presented by Five Deputies to Amend Civil Service Law; Amendment Demands Non-Dismissal of Civil Servant Except on Disciplinary Decision and Abolition of Provision Providing for Dismissal on Decision by Council of Ministers for Public Interest; Extension of Service for 5 Years for Civil Servants Reaching Age of 60 Confined to Kuwaiti Civil Servants Only"]

[Text] Ahmad 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Sa'dun, the National Assembly deputy speaker, and deputies Khalifah al-Jari, Khalid al-Wasmi, Faysal al-Duwaysh and Jasim al-'Awn have proposed a bill to amend article 32 of law by decree No 15 of 1979 concerning the civil service.

The said article covers the reasons governing the termination of a civil servant's services. The presented bill demands amendment of the provision in the article providing for the "dismissal of a civil servant on a decision by the Council of Ministers for the public interest. A dismissed civil servant may appeal to the Council of Ministers within 1 month of the announcement of the dismissal decision. The Council's decision on the appeal shall be final. A civil servant dismissed in implementation of this provision may not be appointed to another civil service job or in one of the public organizations and establishments and may not run for election to the membership of the National Assembly or of any other parliamentary authority within the 5 years following the dismissal decision." The amendment demands that dismissal be made only on the force of a disciplinary decision after an investigation is conducted with the civil servant concerned.

The bill presented by the five deputies also demands amendment of paragraph No 8 of the same article concerning termination of a civil servant's service upon reaching the age of 60. The bill demands extension of the service of such a civil servant for a period of no more than 5 years and that such an extension be given to Kuwaiti civil servants exclusively.

Following is the text of the proposed bill presented by the deputies in its final form, along with its explanatory memorandum:

Article One

Article 32 of law by decree No 15 of 1979 concerning the civil service shall be replaced by the following text:

"Article 32: The service shall be terminated for one of the following reasons:

"1. Resignation.

"2. Retirement.

"3. Dismissal on a disciplinary decision.

"4. A sentence restricting freedom or a sentence for a felony or a crime violating honor or a trust. The minister may retain the civil servant concerned in case the sentence is suspended.

"5. Loss or withdrawal of Kuwaiti citizenship.

"6. Physical unfitness for service or exhaustion of sick leave, whichever comes first.

"7. Reaching the age of 60. The Civil Service Board may lay down rules and regulations to extend the service of a Kuwaiti civil servant reaching the age of 60 for a period of no more than 5 years. As for mosque imams and preachers, their service shall be terminated upon reaching the age of 70.

"8. Death."

Article Two

Every provision in a law or decree conflicting with the previous article shall be abolished.

The explanatory memorandum says:

Paragraph 4 of article 32 of law by decree No 15 of 1979 concerning the civil service has followed the example of article 149 of amir's decree No 7 of 1960 concerning public service jobs by empowering the Council of Ministers to dismiss a public servant on a decision it issues for the public interest. This is what is known as non-disciplinary dismissal because it is not preceded by the disciplinary measures stipulated in articles 27-31 of the said civil service law and because the provisions on the guarantees concerning investigation, interrogation, defense hearing, witnesses, confrontation [with the dismissed], enabling [the dismissed] to familiarize himself with the investigation papers, referral and trial are not applied to such non-disciplinary dismissal. These provisions are stipulated in detail in articles 54-70 of the decree issued on 4 April 1979 in connection with the civil service system.

Even though it is true that issuance of the non-disciplinary decision by the Council of Ministers, the agency controlling the state interests in accordance with article 123 of the constitution, constitutes a guarantee for the civil servant--a guarantee engulfed in the confidence and the reassurance that this power will not be misused as long as the ultimate objective is the public interest--even though this is true, the public interest criterion is itself based on a concept that changes with time and place, that broadens at times and narrows at others and that revolves within a flexible framework with no clearcut features. Views and judgement concerning this criterion of public interest vary. Therefore, using

the absolute argument of public interest considerations and reasons without reliance on firm and proven facts to justify the dismissal of a public servant without hearing his statements and without enabling him to defend himself and issuing the decision without the public servant's knowledge may not be correct. The Council of Ministers should be elevated above the possibility of being responsible for such a thing [faulty decision] and such a decision must be removed from the sphere of absolute authority and returned to the power of the general rules governing the dismissal of public servants, guaranteeing such servants justice and reassurance in their performance of the duties of a civil service job and establishing equality in treating those holding legal public positions.

Legally, non-disciplinary dismissal is not exonerated by the fact that the public servant dismissed is given the opportunity to subsequently appeal the dismissal to the Council of Ministers, considering that this council is the source of the dismissal decision and that its decision on the subsequent appeal is final. This may be interpreted to mean closing the door of legal appeal against the decision whereas the means to such appeal are available in other cases. The Council may also find it difficult to back down on such a decision by virtue of the effect of the public interest argument on which the Council relies in issuing its decision.

Such dismissal is not only characterized by taking away the disciplinary guarantees stipulated in order to spread administrative justice among the public servants. What is more, the third paragraph of provision 4 of article 32 of the [current] civil service law builds upon such dismissal strict subsequent penalties that exceed the ordinary within the framework of penal policies concerning civil service because these penalties go as far as stripping the public servant dismissed on a decision by the Council of Ministers of his public and political rights by denying him the right to be appointed to another civil service job or in a public organization or establishment and the right to run for membership of the National Assembly or any other parliamentary organization and for the position of mukhtar for the 5 years following the dismissal decision. This leads to a dual penalty for the same offense, thus causing the penalty to be illegal, to exceed the limits of moderation and to be incompatible with the incriminating act and with the correct punishment even though the cause of dismissal, namely the public interest, is based on assessory considerations that have a relative effect, that lack definiteness and in which criteria and viewpoints vary because these considerations do not rely on a proven and undisputed fact or on decisive controls.

In view of the abovementioned, it is imperative to amend said article 32 by omitting from it provision 4 with all its parts and by leaving the matter of administrative disciplining and appeals and of legal appeals to the general rules. This is what is stipulated by the first article of the bill, with a slight amendment in paragraph 8 of the same article calling for restricting the power of the Civil Service Board to extend the service of a civil servant who has reached the age of 60 so that such extension may apply only to Kuwaiti civil servants and may not exceed 5 years.

In view of the fact that article 71 of the decree issued on 4 April 1979 in regard to the civil service system repeats verbatim the contents of article 32 of the civil service law concerning the termination of a civil servant's service, the second article of the bill stipulates abolition of every provision in a law or decree conflicting with the stipulations of article one of the bill. This is a normal and necessary consequence emanating from the amendment of article 32 of the law which is identical to article 71 of the decree.

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PROBLEMS OF COOPERATIVE SECTOR DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 12 Oct 81 p 9

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid]

[Text] "What Are Reasons Causing Kuwaitis Working in Cooperative Sector to Amount to Only 3 Percent; Wages in Cooperative Sphere Are Still Unable to Realize Kuwaiti's Personal Ambition; Intensive Specialization Courses Conducted in Past 4 Years; Cooperative Studies in All Specializations; Well-Studied Scientific Plan Is Required of Information Media to Develop Effective Cooperative Awareness Among Kuwaitis of Both Sexes; Incentives Are Successful Administrative System That Helps Increase Production and Improve Performance; Ministry of Education Performed Positive Role by Establishing Cooperative Section in Institute of Commerce and by Sending Students for Summer Training."

The local press published three reports in the past 3 days. The first says that the percentage of Kuwaitis working in the cooperative sector has amounted to 3 percent only. The second report says that in the sphere of cooperation between the consumer cooperative associations on the one hand and the Institute of Commerce on the other, the scientific field studies prepared by 12 of the institute's male and female students in the associations during the summer vacation have been discussed. The third report says that preparations are underway for an educational course to be held for members of the boards of directors of the cooperative associations as of the beginning of next January. When these reports are linked to each other, it becomes evident that the Kuwaiti's inclination to work in the cooperative sphere is still weak. It can be even said that this inclination is not as it should be under normal circumstances. On the other hand, we will find that the sectors concerned with cooperation, whether in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor or in the Cooperative Associations Union, are performing their role in full, theoretically and practically, to entrench this concept, to increase this percentage and to create faithful Kuwaiti cadres capable of establishing the foundations of cooperation in the country.

To start with, several questions have to be raised: Why has the percentage of Kuwaitis working in the cooperative field amounted to only 3 percent of the total number of Kuwaitis working in the public sector? Are there basic reasons causing the Kuwaiti to shun selecting this course? What are the efforts of the cooperative leaderships, whether in the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor or in the

Cooperative Associations Union, to attract Kuwaitis to work in this cooperative field with its various specializations? What has the Ministry of Education offered within its own jurisdiction to join its efforts to the other efforts that have been exerted and that are still being exerted? Is there hope to increase the number of Kuwaitis working in the cooperative field in the near or distant future?

Efforts and Work

We have presented these questions and others to Salah al-Mana'i, the vice president of the Cooperative Associations Union, and he said:

"Generally, it can be said that cooperative work in Kuwait is different from what it was in the past. There is cooperation on the part of the state in the form of guidance and control. There is, on the other hand, practical action by the Cooperative Union and by all the country's associations. This in itself is a gain that has realized many results. However, I want to clarify an extremely important point. Cooperative work is not easy. It requires constant effort and exertion. Such demanding work requires the man who believes in cooperative action and who is capable of constantly enriching the accomplishments in this sphere.

Al-Mana'i added:

"For example, a few years ago the Kuwaiti did not want to work in banks and the number of Kuwaitis working in banks was very small. But with the passage of time and when the Kuwaitis started to engage in this work, developed a belief in it and became loyal to it, the results in this sphere have been much greater than expected. It can be even said (and this is a fact) that the Kuwaiti's giving in the field of banking has become boundless. He has mastered this work, has benefited from it materially and morally and has become a pioneer in all the sectors in which he works. What is the result? The result is that there is now an overwhelming majority of Kuwaitis [in the field of banking]."

Al-Mana'i continued:

"In the cooperative sector, we are in dire need of creating more Kuwaiti cadres. Despite the efforts we and the Ministry of Social Affairs are exerting, these cadres need to develop awareness and to be encouraged at the same time. They need the awareness that will make the Kuwaiti develop a stronger faith in the cooperative sector so that he may proceed to work in this sector. They also need to be encouraged in all areas. This doesn't mean that our wages are small. But what is required of the Kuwaiti is to begin at the bottom of the ladder. The question of earning rewarding wages is in the picture and is being currently assessed by the officials.

"Regarding the training courses conducted by the Cooperative Union in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor or with the academic centers, such as the Social Service Center of Kuwait University or the Commerce Institute controlled by the Ministry of Education, al-Mana'i said:

"Generally, these courses are beneficial. Rather, they constitute extremely important scientific approach because training in the cooperative field is important

and necessary to create the cadres capable of working without hindrances. Theoretical lectures and practical application have had a positive impact. The main goal behind this has been to attract Kuwaiti capabilities to work in the cooperative sectors and in the various accounting, storekeeping, management, purchasing and other activities of the cooperative associations."

Concluding his statements, al-Mana'i has said:

"Now that the courses have been completed, that the trainees have enrolled in various activities in the associations and that several months have passed, we can say that we are in the phase of evaluation. We are evaluating all the previous courses with the aim of finding out whether they are adequate or not and whether there has been as much demand for them as we had wanted. Through all this, we will formulate a new plan or a new strategy for cooperative work in Kuwait. One of the main goals of this plan will be to create more national cadres and to solve any problems facing them so that they may assume their desired place in all jobs. Finally, I must laud the role of the Ministry of Education. For the first time, it was decided this year to set up a branch for cooperation in the Commerce Institute. I consider this a magnificent effort that reflects the ministry's understanding of the importance and effectiveness of cooperative activity. The graduation of more classes from the institute in coming years will help to create cadres that combine knowledge with practical experience to meet the market's needs in this regard."

Courses and Studies

We then interviewed 'Adil Fahd al-Mish'al, the chairman of the Information and Public Relations Committee of the General Cooperative Associations Union. His answers provide further explanation. Figures substantiate his perspective of the reasons for the Kuwaiti youth's disinterest in the cooperative field. He also gives his particular view of the method and results of training.

Regarding the small number of Kuwaitis and their disinclination [to work in the cooperative field], al-Mish'al cites these reasons:

"The state agencies and ministries absorb the Kuwaitis. Work in these agencies and ministries is single-shift work, contrary to work in the cooperative sector which, like the private sector, requires two shifts.

"Salaries and wages in the associations do not constitute an incentive for sacrificing work in the governmental sector, i.e. leaving this sector to work in the cooperative sector.

"The instability of the boards of directors of the associations may affect the stability of some jobs in the cooperative associations.

"Work in the cooperative sector is not just a job. It demands trained experience. At present, the Ministry of Social Affairs is covering this aspect effectively.

"There is a group of Kuwaitis whose thinking is grounded in the idea that work in the government provides greater stability which may not be available in the cooperative sector. Breaking this idea requires more enlightenment."

Regarding the quality and importance of the courses conducted so far, he said:

"The goal of the courses held so far has been to attract generations of Kuwaitis to work in the cooperative field. The first course was conducted in 1979 and 11 trainees enrolled in it. The second course was conducted in 1980 and had 15 trainees. All of them are now working in the cooperative associations, meaning in basic jobs in the associations. Some of them had previously been working in the governmental sector but preferred to join the cooperative sector. A course was also conducted to train retired Kuwaitis to work in the cooperative sector. The Commerce Institute took part in this course which had 16 trainees with ages ranging from 35 to 50 years. All these are also engaged at present in basic jobs in the cooperative associations. The aim of the course was to turn these people into a productive force in society. These trainees studied more specialized topics, such as the activities, integration and organization of cooperative associations, purchasing, storekeeping, secretarial work and public relations, in addition to the principles of cooperation, cooperative financing, marketing, accounting, management and numerous behavioral topics.

"An initial observation indicates that these courses and the courses conducted by the Society Service Center have produced positive results and a clear return. But all this is the subject of a comprehensive evaluation by the [cooperative] movement so as to give more to attract the Kuwaiti element to work in the cooperative sector."

Regarding the summer training given this year to male and female students of the Commerce Institute in the cooperative associations, he said:

"The idea in itself is excellent. It is a successful initiative by the Ministry of Education. Training itself is a combination of the theoretical aspect with the practical aspect to reach the desired perfection. One of the goals of this training was to let the trainees conduct studies in the sectors in which they (worked). The studies themselves and the efforts exerted in them were good. But I want to explain an important point. The union had hoped to know the problems resulting from the studies or at least to know the trainee student's visualization of the problems as a result of what he saw and of the difference between what he had studied and practical experience. The Union also hopes that next year a plan on the training method and on the places in which the students are to be trained will precede the students' arrival for training."

In conclusion, al-Mish'al said:

"If the Union's role has been positive and if the role of the Ministry of Education has been positive, then the role and work of the Ministry of Social Affairs in providing guidance, direction and training has been comprehensive."

Increased Wages

The main role will always continue to be that of the human element. What man has, his character and his opinion are always important for the success of any work. Therefore, we had to have a session with a Kuwaiti citizen working in the cooperative sector to find out what he has and to hear his viewpoint so that the picture

may become complete. We sat with Mubarak 'Abd al-Karim Mulla 'Awwad, the man in charge of al-Qadisiyah Cooperative Association's storehouses. He enrolled in the 1979 training course and was one of 11 trainees, several of whom had abandoned government jobs in the hope of more rights and bigger wages through their love of cooperative work. 'Awwad said:

"There is no doubt that the Kuwaiti is more willing than others to sacrifice in the cooperative sphere because he is more capable than others of knowing the environment and its requirements and knowing the art and method of dealing with the citizens. The beginning was an advertisement in the papers announcing the need for national cadres to work in the cooperative field. We were given a test. There were 100 of us. Only 11 were selected. This in itself is an indication of the presence of awareness regarding work in the cooperative field.

"We spent a training period during which we studied numerous subjects connected with work in the cooperative field, such as accounting, cooperatives, storage, management, purchase, sales and psychology studies. I have been working in this field for nearly 24 months. My salary (total) is 424 dinars. My salary in the government was less. But I now work in the morning and in the evening. The problem is that the salary is not commensurate with the effort exerted. I believe that this is the basic problem. According to my information, every Kuwaiti working in a cooperative sector has found positive aspects in his work. If a fair solution is found to increase the wages and the incentives, the union and the authorities concerned will find considerable interest in this sector."

'Awwad added: "I put the responsibility for attracting the Kuwaiti youth to work in the cooperative sector on the shoulders of the information media. Their role and their approach in this regard can be effective and positive."

We now return to the prelude. There are obvious efforts by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, and the General Cooperative Associations Union, as well as cooperation by the Ministry of Education through the establishment of a new cooperation branch in the Commerce Center. The aim of all of this is to attract the Kuwaiti citizen to work in this field. The Kuwaiti citizen has no objection to all this and he likes to work in this field because cooperation has been ingrained in him for hundreds of years in various ways. The Kuwaiti citizen still believes that working in the cooperative field is a sacrifice on his part. This sacrifice requires increased wages. Such an increase will strengthen interest and the percentage will rise from 3 percent to a higher level, perhaps to 50 percent and maybe even 70 percent.... On the other hand, there also remains the effort of the information media.

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QATAR'S PROGRESS ON TENTH INDEPENDENCE ANNIVERSARY DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 pp 57-59

[Interview with Unidentified Qatari Official; date and place not specified: "Qatar's Independence Is [Vital to] the Gulf's Independence; an Independent Gulf Strengthens the Arabs; Inside the Country What Is Produced by Qatar Belongs to Qataris and Arabs; In Politics Qatar Supports Arab Rights First and then World Peace"]

[Text] Qatar had a date with its leader, al-Shaykh Khalifa ibn Hamad Al Thani on 3 September 1971. In his historical address to the people al-Shaykh Khalifa announced, "Qatar has become an independent, sovereign state because it believes that pursuing an independent course is the only means for protecting and strengthening the country and for setting up the general awakening [in it] from a position of strength, honor and noble origin which stem from the teachings of Islamic law, the heritage of Arabism and the deep-seated roots of our nation."

Ten years have gone by since the dawn of that day. They have been marked by the struggles, sweating brows and continuous work of a nation whose people believe that independence is a historical responsibility and not a gift to be given. The people of Qatar have been building the foundations of true independence in all fields and gatherings.

AL-MUSTAQBAL interviewed a Qatari official and asked him to speak about Qatar on this occasion. The Qatari official began by saying, "If it is true that the measure of nations' awakening, welfare and development lies in the number of years, then the young state of Qatar has taken giant, wise and unprecedented steps in firmly establishing the foundations of its national and social independence. Countries that had their independence before Qatar did not take such steps which manifested themselves in numerous features and aspects on the domestic and foreign scene.

"Inside the country the state has been pursuing a policy that is supported by economic independence and is based on a plan whose objective is to achieve economic and social stability, to direct material and human energies to build the state's own power and to champion all just questions in the international community through comprehensive development. Abroad, Qatar has tended to adopt clear positions on various Arab and international questions.

"In its pursuit of modernizing the country and realizing comprehensive development, Qatar has preserved its most ancient political heritage which stems from its national personality and its native heritage. This political heritage lies in the Advisory Council.

"This council was one of the fruits of Qatar's domestic political features during the past 10 years. It was able to affirm its ability and its fruitful cooperation with the government in making the utmost efforts to treat the country's affairs and discuss the state's public policy. When it was established, the council consisted of 20 members who were people of thought and competence in the country. Then the Amir increased the number of members to 30. He also expanded the council's authorities and gave it new responsibilities so that Qatar's national goals can be achieved and the country can enhance its abilities to assume its domestic and foreign responsibilities."

Girls of Qatar

[Question] What about education in your country?

[Answer] One of the most significant social achievements in Qatar was the fact that the slogan, "Education for All" became a concrete reality. Free education is unrestricted in all the stages of education, and the state continues to develop curricula and textbooks and use contemporary means of education, including educational television. It continues to introduce modern methods in vocational training, and it continues to attach importance to practical research and applications.

A look at the figures would give us a realistic picture that would reflect how many significant accomplishments have been achieved in the field of education.

In the academic year 1980-1981 the number of male and female students came to 40,000. Female students made up 48.5 percent of those students.

There were 143 schools, and 71 of them were girls' schools.

There are 3,486 individuals on the educational staff, and 1,882 of them are female teachers. Among 7,548 persons enrolled in literacy schools, there are 2,541 female students. This is in addition to 1,300 male and female students who were sent to Arab, European and American universities to study various specializations which the country needs in the development plan.

The University of Qatar is preparing intellectual leaders, training [the country's] manpower and stimulating the cultural, intellectual, social and scientific activities in the country. This university is supposed to move to its new location in 1982; that location is equipped with the most modern scientific systems and capabilities.

Qatar's interests have not been confined to schools, the university, research centers, development centers and vocational training centers. The

country's interests have gone beyond that to numerous cultural and athletic aspects. Qatar has established libraries throughout the country, and it has set up many fairs. The most recent of them this year was the Third al-Dawhah Fair for Arabic Books. The fair featured more than 11,000 volumes in the various fields of culture and knowledge.

In its interest in sports, the state built the Khalifah Sports Complex, and established athletic associations and an olympic committee. It has also set up athletic, cultural and scouting clubs.

Heavy Industry

[Question] What about industry?

[Answer] Qatar has been using its oil and natural gas revenues, after gaining full control over them, in building heavy and light industries in accordance with a program to diversify the sources of revenues. The oil and gas sector, the country's two principal resources, have had major importance since their discovery in 1949.

In the area of national economic independence the Qatar Oil Organization and the companies that are affiliated with it pump, process, market and store the oil. The organization began operations to develop and expand the industries which are based on both oil and gas. Average oil production in 1980 amounted to about 173 million barrels per year. Qatar's oil policy was expanded, making Qatar play a prominent role in the area of oil industries within OPEC and within the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries [OAPEC]. This role qualifies it to work for the stability of the world economy.

The area of Umm Sa'id is considered a huge industrial arsenal; it includes numerous heavy industries. After the state completes the heavy industrialization plan, it will turn under the present plan to the establishment of a group of light and medium industries to build a firm industrial foundation.

The iron and steel plant in Umm Sa'id, whose costs amount to 1.1 billion Qatari riyals, is considered one of the largest and most modern plants in the Gulf area and in the Middle East. In 1980 it produced approximately 400,000 tons of reinforcement steel rods. There is a plan to increase its production capacity so it can meet the growing demand for its product. In the fertilizer industry the country has seen the construction of a new plant beside the first one that was built in 1973. In 1980 ammonia production from both plants amounted to almost 507,000 tons, and urea production amounted to 628,000 tons.

[Question] What about oil?

[Answer] There are two oil refineries in Qatar. The first is in the city of Umm Sa'id. It was built around 1953, and it produces about 6,000 barrels [of oil] per day. The second operates at a capacity of 10,000 barrels a

day. But because of the continuing increase in local consumption, the industrial plan has included a project to build a third refinery that is to begin operating in 1983. It is expected that production then would cover every expected increase in local consumption until 1995. The capacity of the third refinery will be 50,000 barrels per day. [Construction of that refinery] will be followed by [construction of] a plant for producing asphalt.

Qatar is considered very rich in gypsum, limestone and quicklime. The state has been careful in making the best use of these raw materials. The first cement plant produced a total of 330,000 tons of cement. The state added another plant to produce quicklime, which is now meeting the needs of the iron and steel plant after production amounted to about 19,500 tons.

On 23 February 1981 a petrochemicals complex was inaugurated in the area of Umm Sa'id. Its design capacity amounted to 280,000 tons of ethylene; 140,000 tons of polyethylene; 46,000 tons of sulphur; and 5,000 tons of propylene per year. This project, along with the units attached to it, has cost about 2.5 billion Qatari riyals. It is one of the products of the joint cooperation between Qatar and France. The first complex had been inaugurated in 1979 in the French city of Dunkirk.

In the effort to utilize natural gas, the liquid natural gas project was inaugurated on 23 February 1981. Gas is a tremendous resource for Qatar, and its daily production is estimated at more than 1.2 billion cubic feet of unassociated gas. This is in addition to the production of gas associated with crude oil; production is estimated at 1,000 cubic feet for every barrel produced.

This project has two units for extracting dense gases from associated gases. The first unit is in the oil fields on land, and the second is on the three offshore fields. Total costs for the project amounted to 1.7 billion Qatari riyals.

[When asked] about commercial activity, the official said:

[Answer] Commercial activity made a significant contribution to the economic awakening which Qatar has experienced in the last 10 years. This was the result of the state's sponsorship of this activity by drawing up plans and programs and preparing projects to strengthen the economy.

For that purpose the state established several vital facilities such as the Qatari Monetary Fund, a Commercial Registration Department and the Qatar Chamber of Commerce. It also established a number of national banks and introduced some of the state's industries to exporting. The state prepared annual analytical data about national joint-stock companies, and it also published an annual bulletin which included all the data and the statistics about the insurance market in the country. That bulletin also included numerous other accomplishments that go along with the state's interest in stimulating commercial and economic activity in the country.

As a result of a watchful, agricultural policy, agriculture, which until a short period of time ago was more of a hobby than a national [effort for] production, has become a source of national revenue. [The value of] total agricultural production in Qatar in 1979 amounted to about 107 million riyals. If the trend in water desalinization [continues] and land suitable for agriculture is irrigated--one third of a million donums--we would become self-sufficient.

In animal resources and fish production the state has set up several projects to raise sheep and cows and to produce milk and dairy products, and it has established several poultry farms. Fish production in Qatar meets 92 percent of the needs of Qatar.

The Rights of Workers

[Question] What about the state's interest in its citizens?

[Answer] After independence the citizen of Qatar began practicing the right to work under a Labor and Workers' Law. Due to the importance of providing housing for each citizen of Qatar, the state has tried to provide housing for citizens of limited income. In 1980 the number of homes turned over to citizens amounted to 3,327 homes; this is in addition to thousands of homes in numerous areas of the country.

Health services in Qatar are free. The state is building hospitals and health centers in al-Dawhah and all other cities.

Electricity and Fresh Water

In recent years the state of Qatar has succeeded in increasing electrical power and producing fresh water to meet the needs of the people. One of the most important major accomplishments in the area of electricity is the completion of work on the Abu Fantas station. People are working tirelessly and continuously on laying the networks and the new cables and on building new power transformers to cover the residential areas that are still under construction.

As far as water is concerned, there is a project to build four new units in addition to the Abu Fantas station to distill sea water and produce 20 million gallons of [fresh] water a day. There is a plan to utilize water from wells in cities and [other] areas, and there are projects to build underground water storage tanks. The state has allocated in the new budget 285.6 million riyals for water and 1,145,500,000 riyals for electricity.

Political Action

[Question] What about Qatar's goals and aspirations? How do you view the problems of the world?

[Answer] The 10 years that followed independence have been marked inside the country by features of restoration, construction, progress, growth

and the achievement of all the hopes for development, progress and contemporary life.

In the foreign field the primary purpose of Qatar's policy is to cooperate with the Arab countries of the Gulf and achieve integration with them. Qatar is intent on firmly establishing the mainstays of independence in the Gulf and on building its own joint strength in order to spare the area from world-wide rivalries and international struggles.

In the Arab field Qatar's policy has been characterized by its efforts to unify the Arab rank, [to establish] solidarity and to unify positions. This policy has always sought to strengthen understanding among the Arab nations out of concern for their solidarity in the face of their national responsibilities against outside dangers. On the basis of this national position, which is based on principle, Qatar has affirmed its full support for the Saudi peace plan regarding the settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Qatar condemned the recent attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, considering it an attack on all the Arab nation.

On Palestine Qatar's position is firm regarding its firm support for the Palestinian people, for their just cause and for their struggle for freedom and independence under the leadership of the PLO. This support has been conveyed at all Arab, Islamic and international conferences and gatherings. We have insisted on recognition of the Palestinian people's right to determine their destiny freely without any foreign intervention, and we have insisted on their right to establish their independent state on their homeland under the leadership of the PLO, their sole legitimate representative.

On Lebanon Qatar's policy in this regard stems from its concern for Lebanon's Arab character and independence, for strengthening Lebanon's unity and for offering Lebanon the support that would provide it with all the conditions that would enable it to regain its sovereignty on its land and thwart the plan that is seeking to bring about the success of the conspiracies that are being planned for it. Qatar has asked the international community to take all measures that are necessary to stop the brutal Zionist attacks on Lebanese and Palestinian civilians.

On Islam Qatar after independence took part with all the Islamic countries in the effort [to establish] a united position and in the appeal to unify the ranks to confront the challenges that are facing the Islamic world. Qatar played a prominent role in all the Islamic conferences, and it advocated that the resolutions of these conferences be adhered to.

Qatar has also joined the agreement of the Islamic Conference countries for economic, technical and commercial cooperation. Qatar provides much support to the economies of the Islamic countries.

On the political scene Qatar demanded the withdrawal of the invading Soviet troops from Afghanistan, and it asked that the Afghani people be granted the freedom to determine their destiny and their regime themselves.

On Africa Qatar is trying to strengthen Arab-African solidarity and cooperation out of concern for the historical, cultural and geographical ties that tie the Arab nation with the nations of the African continent.

Qatar stands beside the African nations which are still suffering from persecution and backwardness as a result of domination by a white minority, as is the case in Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia.

After the period of independence Qatar offered all [forms of] assistance to the friendly African countries. It also conducted talks to strengthen cooperation with their leaders and to discuss matters with them in order to strengthen ties and help those countries in the areas of development and independence.

Internationally Qatar supports the call for world peace which is based on principles and values. In its international actions Qatar is intent on adhering to the UN Charter, the International Declaration of Human Rights, the [notion of] freedom for people to determine their destiny and the right of people to be free, independent and exercise sovereignty over their natural resources.

Qatar's international policy has been marked by its concern for the security and stability of the world. Qatar called for an end to the vast difference that exists between the standard of living in the industrial countries and the standard of living in the developing countries. It asked that the speed with which countries are arming themselves and spending on military areas be checked and that five percent of all monies spent for armaments be spent to save the millions in the world who are threatened by starvation.

All international agencies and organizations that are affiliated with the United Nations have recognized the fact that Qatar has stuck to its position. Along with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates Qatar is offering the developing countries 15 or 20 times more what any western industrial country is offering.

In its international actions Qatar is careful of supporting the OPEC organization for the purpose of the unity of its members and their agreement on a unified oil policy. Qatar is also playing a positive role in supporting OAPEC.

It thus becomes evident that the policy of this youthful state during the 10 years of independence has been set up internally on [bringing about] prosperity and development in all areas and externally on supporting Arab and Islamic questions, strengthening relations with African and developing countries and taking part in solving common international problems.

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BRIEFS

UAE-OMANI DISCUSS MILITARY LINKS--Abu Dhabi, 29 Nov (WAKH)--Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid al-Nuhayyan, the heir apparent and deputy commander of the UAE Armed Forces, received Omani Information Ministry Under Secretary Yusif al-'Alawi, who arrived in Abu Dhabi earlier today. All fields of bilateral relations, particularly military ties, were discussed during the meeting. [Text] [GF291204 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0930 GMT 29 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/153

BRIEFS

SHARING OIL WEALTH--Lagos, 2 Dec (NAN)--A former secretary-general of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Chief M. O. Feyide, said in Lagos yesterday that the sharing of the financial proceeds from petroleum did not necessarily favour the producing nations. He stated this in a paper titled "The Economics of Oil Politics", which he presented at the oil seminar currently taking place at the Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), Lagos. Chief Feyide disclosed that a recent survey carried out by OPEC showed that for every barrel of oil sold in Western Europe in 1979, the consuming government's tax accounted for 41.8 per cent, oil company profits and costs represented 29.8 per cent and OPEC's share, including production costs, was only 28.4 per cent. He compared these figures with those of 1973, when the corresponding shares were 51 per cent, 33 per cent and 16 per cent respectively. Chief Feyide said that it was therefore not easy to determine what should be the proper and fair shares for the producing and consuming countries. He said that not all countries that produced and exported oil were wealthy, and even those with large surpluses were not happy to rely on a single source of income. Chief Feyide remarked that this was why oil exporting countries were utilizng their oil revenue to diversify their economy to establish new sources of income. [Text] [AB021529 Lagos NAN in English 1453 GMT 2 Dec 81]

CSO: 4400/81

OPPOSITION LEADER CRITICIZES AMERICAN PRESENCE, PEACE WITH ISRAEL

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 244, 24 Oct 81 pp 26, 27

/Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Ibrahim Shukri to AL-MUSTAQBAL: Camp David Split the Arab Ranks and an Alternative to It Will Bring Egypt back to the Arabs"/

/Text/ In September 1978, when the establishment of the Socialist Labor Party as an opposition party in Egypt was announced, many people expected that this would become the "accommodating opposition party" that al-Sadat wanted--a facade confirming that there was democratic life in Egypt. The reasons that caused the Labor Party to be described as an "accommodating" one were many; the most important were:

1. The praise former President Anwar al-Sadat bestowed on this party and its leaders, as represented by Ibrahim Shukri, describing it as a party of the "noble opposition."

2. The fact that political personalities who were proteges of President al-Sadat's, such as Mahmud Abu Wafiyah, President al-Sadat's brother-in-law, assumed leadership positions in the party after President al-Sadat had openly called for people to join this party.

3. The Labor Party's declaration of its support for al-Sadat's visit to occupied Jerusalem and its support of the Camp David agreements.

However, in May 1980, the Labor Party made a great shift in its policy and opposition, declaring, "After reviewing Israel's policy following the signing of the Camp David agreements, it appears that the Israeli enemy has not contented itself with these agreements and has not seemed prepared to give the Palestinian people their rights. As a result, because these agreements have created a rift between Egypt and the Arab countries, the Labor Party declares its opposition to the Camp David agreements and the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel."

Before that, in March 1980, the party had declared that it was opposed to exchanging relations with Israel before Israel committed itself to the provisions of the Camp David agreements and gave the Palestinians the right to autonomy.

After these positions, which were to be considered "historic" ones, were declared by the Labor Party, the party started to play its true role of opposition to the

policies of the former president, Anwar al-Sadat. This reached the point where the Egyptian president devoted a large portion of his speech last 14 May to attacking the Labor Party. The newspaper AL-SHA'B, issued by the party, played a big role in expressing the various tendencies of the nationalist opposition view in Egypt and in attacking the Camp David agreements and the policy of normalizing relations with the Israeli enemy. In addition to this, a sort of coordination between the Labor Party and the remaining Egyptian nationalist opposition forces started in the context of individuals and in the context of parties and political currents. This coordination grew with the position the opposition forces took toward the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear reactor and the position on the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

This role, which the Socialist Labor Party has come to accept in the context of a real opposition, prompted President al-Sadat and his regime to attack the party and its leaders, who had "deviated." Then came 3 September, when President al-Sadat managed to direct a strong blow at the Labor Party, ordering the shutdown of the party newspaper AL-SHA'B, the detention of its editor in chief, Mahmud Zaydan, and the detention of a large number of party leaders, including the party vice chairman Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad and the secretary general of the party, Fu'ad Nushi, on the excuse that they had participated in stirring up factional strife.

Following the assassination of President al-Sadat and the announcement of the nomination of Husni Mubarak as new president, the Socialist Labor Party issued a statement supporting Husni Mubarak's nomination and calling on its members to vote for him, although Husni Mubarak had declared that he was running on the platform of continuing President al-Sadat's policy, which was the policy the Labor Party was opposing.

Therefore, when AL-MUSTAQBAL met the chairman of the Labor Party, Mr Ibrahim Shukri, in his home on the bank of the Nile in al-Jizah, it started out by asking him the following question:

"How was it you declared your support for the nomination of Husni Mubarak as president when he declared that he would continue to carry out the policies of President al-Sadat, which you opposed?"

Ibrahim Shukri replied,

"The circumstances and concomitant factors that accompanied the act of the assassination of President al-Sadat could have led to the outbreak of chaos and disturbances in Egypt, with results no one could predict. Therefore we in the Labor Party felt that it was necessary that all the people in this country stick together, however their political views might differ, in order rapidly to establish stability. This was our basic motive in supporting the nomination of Mr Husni Mubarak as president; in addition, we had confidence that President Husni Mubarak would be prepared to remedy the errors the former regime had succumbed to and review the criticisms that the opposition and the majority of the people directed against this regime. Our support for Mr Husni Mubarak's nomination did not mean that we were retreating from the views on President al-Sadat's policies which we had declared."

/Question/ However, President Mubarak did assert that he would continue to carry out the same policies as President al-Sadat.

/Answer/ His declaration that he would continue President al-Sadat's platform we understand. By that he means that he will strive to achieve the same national goals for Egypt. However, it is not necessary that the attainment of that take place through the former president's methods. We are certain that the policy President Husni Mubarak will follow will bring something new. An inevitable change is imposed by the nature of the circumstances that have arisen and the fact that the personality of the new president differs from that of the former one. My knowledge of what had happened in the days of President al-Sadat's rule makes me say that President al-Sadat had the first and last say on the decisions he adopted.

/Question/ Does that mean that you will continue to support President Mubarak and will abandon your role as an opposition party?

/Answer/ Our support for the nomination of President Mubarak does not mean that we will not oppose any opinions or decrees he might issue that our party sees no benefit in agreeing with. We will continue to record our criticisms and observations on all conditions or decrees which we consider do not agree with the public interest and do not serve national goals, such as the Camp David agreements and the normalization of relations with Israel. On Wednesday 14 October I stood up in the People's Assembly, in the session it held following the conclusion of the ceremonies appointing Husni Mubarak president, and opposed the amendment that had been made to the Emergency Law which was aimed at changing the basis of the Emergency Law, demanding that protests by a person detained or imprisoned in accordance with the procedures of this law be made after 6 months, not after 30 days as was the case previously, and that the protest be presented to the president and not to the head of the court. I protested against this amendment and rejected it in whole and in part in the People's Assembly on the day President Husni Mubarak first assumed the tasks of his office.

/Question/ What in your opinion are the reasons behind the assassination of President al-Sadat?

/Answer/ The results of the investigations on the circumstances of that have not yet been announced and I believe that these investigations have not yet been completed to enable us to express an explicit opinion on the real reasons. All that has been announced is what the minister of defense, Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, said, to the effect that the perpetrators of the incident belong to the extremist religious current. Nonetheless one can say that the climate that the detentions and measures of 5 September created could be the direct cause, although it is well known that direct causes are not always wholly important, and this direct cause might not be the real or only one.

/Question/ However, the official statements declared that the leader of the operation carried it out in reaction to the detention of a brother of his during the detentions made on 5 September.

/Answer/ In my previous answer I suggested that the measures taken last month make it natural to attempt to link them with the assassination act, but I must state that these measures (the detentions) dealt with a number of opposition men from different parties, including ours, whose means of expression always have been to express their opinions in words and articles alone. Since the first day of the measures, in which the party's newspaper was shut down and its editor in chief and a further number of party leaders were detained, we have declared that these measures were aimed at striking out at the voice of the opposition and reducing its effectiveness on the pretext of combatting factional strife. President al-Sadat believed that this pretext would be acceptable to people, and I fully believe that what has happened lately in Egypt shows the extent to which these measures were wrong.

/Question/ What is your outlook on the future of political life in Egypt in the context of the new regime?

/Answer/ I am optimistic from the standpoint of the future of democracy and the future of the exercise of democracy, but there is no doubt that this can be judged only in the context of an ordinary normal climate and atmosphere, in the sense that there must be total stability and also that the causes for the declaration of a state of emergency must have vanished. Every day that passes by proves that democracy and a dialogue among differing opinions are sounder ways to advance the national interest than other ways that ignore sound democratic methods.

/Question/ What is your reply to the speech President Husni Mubarak gave at the People's Assembly the day he was installed as president, especially as regards his statement on the opposition?

/Answer/ As far as we are concerned, we were among the first to show good will toward President Husni Mubarak before his speech at the People's Assembly. When he spoke in this speech and extended his hand to all responsible people whether they were in the opposition or not, we found that our good will had been appropriate. We hope that there will be cooperation between us, through our being objective in our opposition and his being prepared to accept and understand opposition views.

/Question/ However, this statement of yours was followed by a broad detention campaign that included members of Islamic groups and other nationalist opposition groups. How can one explain that?

/Answer/ We cannot separate the circumstances Egypt has been going through now, with the assassination of the head of state and the concomitant incidents in Asyut and elsewhere, from the detention measures that are being carried out nowadays against various elements. However, I consider that the public interest requires that people who have no connection with these events be released. Our position is that expanded detention activities cannot be the proper way to arrive at the best results for determining the causes of the assassination. Therefore our opposition in the People's Assembly was to the Emergency Law amendment that had been approved.

/Question/ Do you believe that there is a possibility that the people who were detained last 5 September will be released?

/Answer/ To correct the errors which might have occurred and to stabilize conditions in the country, one must hasten as soon as possible to release the political persons who were detained on 5 September and did not have any connection with what has been called factional strife.

/Question/ Do you expect Egyptian-Arab relations to resume in the near future, with President al-Sadat's departure?

/Answer/ We must admit that the person now responsible for Egyptian policy is someone else besides President al-Sadat. Although President Mubarak has announced that he would follow the general lines of President al-Sadat's policy, he has a great opportunity to work to bring Arab-Egyptian relations back to their natural state. We consider that one of the most outrageous results the Camp David agreements produced was the rift in Arab ranks and the creation of a great gap between Egypt and its Arab sisters. I believe that in the near future conditions will be different from those in the past. The new circumstances which have emerged will give an opportunity now to strive toward the creation of alternate solutions to the contents of the Camp David agreements on the issue of autonomy. We also consider that ideas and initiatives have been set forth on the rights of the Palestinian people which are much better than those contained in the Camp David agreements. Here I can refer to the peace plan of Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, which we wholly support. Likewise there also is the Soviet recommendation that all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinians, meet. Such ideas as these must be considered far better than contenting oneself with the formulas that the Camp David agreements contain. It is expected that the new president Husni Mubarak will proceed within the framework of these ideas in order to acquire better results with regard to the rights of the Palestinian people.

/Question/ How do you explain the great American interest in what has happened in Egypt? What is your position on Washington's attempts to create a greater strategic alliance between itself and Egypt?

/Answer/ Former president Anwar al-Sadat's view was that the United States holds 99 percent of the cards in the game in the Middle East and that it is a full party to the "peace process." This made the United States try to exploit this viewpoint so that it could benefit from Egypt's location and its resources in order to strengthen its influence and interests in the region. It is natural that Washington felt extreme anxiety over the assassination of President al-Sadat, in the manner in which it took place, and the changes it could lead to in the balances in the area. This explains all the American moves that have been made toward Egypt, starting with the appearance of the American secretary of state, Alexander Haig, the talks he held, and the presentation of a date for the joint maneuvers, and ending with the dispatch of two AWACS aircraft to Egypt. With regard to President Husni Mubarak, I do not believe that his policy is very different from previous Egyptian policy, which considered the United States an ally of Egypt's, although I do not hold him responsible for the manifestations of anxiety and the moves, which have been characterized by a sort of nervousness and haste, that America has made in order

to flex its muscles in the region and indicate that it still is able to control affairs in the region. Our party's position is that it is not possible for us to make alliances with any international camp, because we must preserve the state of nonalignment in Egypt. We always express intense wariness on the growing interconnections with the United States, especially in areas where Egypt can be accused of granting a presence and military facilities to American forces in Egypt.

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CSO: 4504/70

SENIOR WAR COLLEGE IMPROVEMENTS ON ANNIVERSARY OF WAR REVIEWED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 2 Oct 81 pp 21, 22, 73

/Article by Hamdi Lutfi: "A Talk about Men: How Did the New Military Commanders Become Able To Make Sound Decisions?"/

/Text/ Alongside weapons, the issue of men, in particular the issue of new commanders who can make decisions in all circumstances is crucial. Through the immortal experience of October, Egyptian military thinking became deep rooted and crystallized and the results of all this appeared in the Egyptian Command and Staff College that became a great international military beacon graduating new commanders able to make sound military decisions in the years after the October war.

The October war introduced new military thinking into the Egyptian Command and Staff College and furnished it with high level expertise and experience which raised it to the ranks of international military science colleges, receiving military commanders from France, Britain and America in addition to commanders from Africa and some Arab rejection states.

At the start, we can say that the problem of problems as far as we go is that we as a people all turn into "commanders" who understand everything when faced with crisis or catastrophe. The tragedy of June 1967 is the example and proof of this: on the level of the armed forces general staff, most of the people who had been the object of trust and were proponents of the principle of "loyalty before expertise" had become operations commanders, wasting the lives of tens of thousands of officers and soldiers in addition to thousands of tons of equipment and weapons!

An operation can fail, and a patient can die.

The manager of a company can fail and the organization can be afflicted with material losses.

However, errors in military decisions can inflict the most grievous losses on a whole nation!

Here the importance of al-Sadat's decree returning "some people" who had been transferred to retirement by January 1970 to their command positions becomes

significant, when we see their positive contributions to the attainment of the October 1973 victory, most of which are still veiled in secrecy.

In the past years, the armed forces general command gave special attention to the tasks of creating new military commanders at levels which do not accept compromise, and this process was accompanied by the creation of a "100 percent Egyptian combat doctrine."

The Command and Staff College in Egypt has played a great, influential role in this achievement--to the point where France has sent its officers to enroll in this college, followed by England and America, not to mention officers from Arab and African countries.

This college is one of the oldest beacons of military scholarship in our country. It was founded in 1825, that is, 156 years ago; the "first" class of Egyptian officers graduated from it in 1937, taking a war staff course in England. That was the beginning.

Maj Gen A/G Muhammad Tantawi explained the conditions of enrollment in the faculty, saying to me:

"Officers must apply for enrollment in the Command and Staff College. In this transitional stage, they generally are at the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel; in the coming stage they will have to be at the rank of major or captain, and their desire to study will have to be accompanied by a recommendation from their commander and a recommendation from the Officers' Affairs Committee: then they must pass an examination supervised by the Armed Forces Training Authority in order ultimately to join the faculty. They must prepare scientific research in the course of study and this research will go through an evaluation stage after which they will acquire a master's degree in military science. After that they will be given a good raise in pay, continue to carry the designation of war staff up to the rank of major general, and will become qualified to assume all military positions."

Soviet Relations with the College

I asked Mag Gen A/G Muhammad Tantawi: "We heard that during the war of attrition the Soviet Union sent a number of military experts to work as professors in the faculty and teach their military or ideological thinking to our officers. What is the truth in this story?"

/He said/ "That actually did happen. Nineteen experts came to the college from the Soviet Union in 1969. Moscow had to some extent taken control of the country's resources. They taught three sessions then left the country when President al-Sadat expelled the Soviet advisors. Egyptian professors then assumed the tasks of teaching in the college after them."

/Question/ What is the situation as regards the courses of study now? Are they the same courses that the Soviet experts had been teaching in the faculty, or have they developed, come to represent Egyptian military thinking and expertise following the October war, and opened up to similar international military colleges?

Maj Gen A/G Muhammad Tantawi replied,

"Studies in the faculty basically follow Egyptian military thinking and expertise, as well as the study of the curricula of command and staff colleges in Britain, France, Iran, West Germany, India and Pakistan. In the latter two countries, the command and staff colleges have attained the highest academic levels. Field Marshal Montgomery, for example, was a graduate of the Pakistani college and you will find that the Pakistani college has had a substantial number of British military commanders up to this time."

Concerning the curriculum which the commanders in our Command and Staff College study and the philosophy governing the study programs to enable our armed forces to provide new commanders for the Egypt of the nineties, up to 2000, Maj Gen A/G Muhammad Tantawi said:

"The philosophy governing the system of study in the faculty is reliance on the technique of discussion and debate as a basic means of study in which the spirit of innovation and initiative in officer students is developed, their mental and intellectual abilities and abilities properly to express their views by various means are developed, emphasis is laid on applied aspects, and they are provided with a broad range of skills and knowledge, especially in the realm of military art and science connected with the tactical level of the land forces, basically, along with an adequate amount of high-level study in the armed forces morally and strategically.

"Evaluation of the student is based on the daily evaluation system which the members of the faculty carry out and on stage-by-stage and final testing. Principally /faculty/ are military commanders; university professors who represent faculties of economics, commerce, political science and law are joining the college's faculty for the first time, and they have participated in teaching people in the class which with God's will will graduate at the end of December. This course contains a French officer for the second time alongside our Arab brothers.

"As regards the faculty, which consists of military men, you will find that its structure is determined by a special philosophy; that is, we apply our 'educational philosophy' not just to students but also to teachers, who are chosen by the faculty's higher council under the chairmanship of the chief of staff of our armed forces, Lt Gen 'Abd Rabb-al-Nabi Hafiz. The secret reports on the 'professor' officers in the college must contain a consistent excellent rating, and they must have served for a period of their lives in the field combat formations, and be among the top graduates of this college also. Preference is given to people who have taken war staff courses in America, Britain, West Germany, France, India or Pakistan before joining us."

I asked Maj Gen Muhammad Tantawi:

"Is France's choice of the Egyptian Command and Staff College as a place to send its officers a form of academic politesse among friendly countries, or are there other elements?"

/He said/ "France has taken this step for the third time. The first time was in 1977 and three classes graduated from the college in 1978. It participated in its belief in the knowledge and science the Egyptian Command and Staff College offers the Egyptian, Arab and African armed forces. In the previous session we had a student from Ghana and it is planned to send a student from France for the fourth time. Then there is planning for an English and an American student as well and it is probable that some countries in Western Europe will present similar applications.

"It is worth pointing out that I could say something about the curriculum in the college in this regard. This is that in 40 percent of the courses the students are taught 'staff duties,' which include techniques for holding and administering military and civilian conferences, coordination with civilian ministries and organizations closely linked to the forces as regards preparing the country for defense or war, methods of working with maps, a summary of national issues, the use of military research and scientific papers, and the generation of specific recommendations. All these courses aid the commander after graduation in engaging in the best forms of scientific command. All over our country we can find people who have graduated from the faculty here and have been assigned to occupy command positions in the country during or after completion of their military service."

The Errors of the October War

The conversation drew us to an important question which needed a simplified explanation which is not academic or military: how did we create Egyptian combat doctrine? What does this doctrine mean? Why wasn't it previously Egyptian?

The commander of the Command and Staff College replied,

"We, as an army, in the thirties, had to rely on the expertise of the militarily advanced countries, and there was no place we could turn except England, which had the final word in Egypt in that period. It applied Western combat doctrine. After the revolution, the shift toward the East and the arming of our forces through the Soviet Union, we turned toward Eastern doctrine. When preparation was made for the October 1973 war we had a very important obligation, which was to bend the tactical military thinking we were applying, that is, the combat techniques, so that they would be appropriate to the nature of war operations in Sinai, which is mountainous and sandy. We entered the October 1973 war with an excellent level of performance, especially in the forms of joint cooperation among land, air and sea combat forces. It is no secret that we made tactical mistakes in the October war which are now primarily lessons that are being benefited from. It is not wrong to commit an error; the fault is in ignoring or hiding this error.

"It was natural, following the lesson of the war in the Yemen theater, the Sinai theater, then the war of attrition in 1968-70, and finally the October 1973 war, that the Command and Staff College should prepare 'scientific military memoranda' by means of the military professors in the college under my supervision. Most of them took practical part in preparing the war theater before the Ramadan war, then entered the war and came to work here in order to develop combat doctrine and Egyptianize it totally by using the expertise they had acquired while preparing

for war, understanding the country's political and politicoeconomic goals, studying the nature of the forces in terms of training and armament, then entering into combat and showing the weak points, causes of error, and factors of success in specific battles which achieved more advanced capability and levels than had been planned for them in the general war plan!"

What did they find? How did the picture seem to these military men?

"Before 1973 we needed great numbers of qualified military science students in order to provide military commands with commanders who would be able to 'fill the gap' that existed between us and Israel and would be able to plan for war in scientific ways. Modern war does not accept the method of 'improvisation,' extemporaneous action on the nationwide level, or gambling with the country by relying on good spontaneous results with good intentions!

"Planning for war requires a study of the country's political economy first of all and planning for the country's abilities to store up the requirements of the armed forces and the masses of the people, especially fuel, considering its vital importance in continuing the fight.

"Then one should scientifically ascertain the political mission of the Arab Republic of Egypt, indeed of the countries participating with us in combat, and finally of countries that must be neutralized. All these issues and their ramifications are very great and we thought about them through study and research before the decision was taken and the forces opened up at noon on 6 October 1973. These tasks were extremely difficult in the long days preceding 6 October in particular and, as I told you, our forces were not furnished adequate numbers of academically qualified commanders for this sort of level of study preceding the issuance of 'the decision.'

"A surgeon's error can eliminate the patient, but an error in this kind of 'decision' can do away with the country completely. We all know how our situation was up until 6 October 1973, and how the wound of June 1967 was constantly bleeding.

"Some 'idiots' from the upper class say in anger and displeasure, now that President al-Sadat has liberated the rest of Sinai peacefully:

"It would have been possible to liberate it in one or two battles and if we had done that the situation would have changed and the people would have been happy!

"Yes, it would have been possible to liberate it through combat, and we did prepare a major plan for that, in accordance with directives from the supreme commander of the armed forces. In fact we prepared for various eventualities, alternate plans and volumes of requirements and losses. Do these people know what the volume of our 'probable' number of men killed in action would have been?

"Forty thousand, in preliminary figures--to say nothing of losses in men, weapons and materiel.

"Al-Sadat has kept every Egyptian home from further pain and further martyrdom of its sons.

Debate between Ma'mun and Sharon

"After that it was necessary for us, especially the Command and Staff College, to prepare commanders who had been filled with storehouses of learning, had a good grasp of their national causes, then of their Arab nation, and had a deep understanding of the political task their country applied, the country's strategic tasks and the strategic tasks of the armed forces. War in its true meaning has become a comprehensive revolution in all spheres of life, on the military and ordinary levels. Through these concepts, we have developed the curriculum in the college and have drawn up a 100 percent Egyptian combat doctrine, that is, a technique of opening forces, under which heading there are hundreds of delicate serious tasks, then the technique of using these forces and generating fire. These techniques are contingent on total secrecy because they are the high point of our armed forces' secrets. Some study programs here also have a secret character as well.

"Among the forms of development of the curricula, one has not just confined matters to visiting Egyptian territory and regions. Rather, they also include visits to friendly major countries. The minister of defense has approved this plan and a group including the top students and the faculty will make a visit to America or Britain in January 1982 to benefit from the West and its advanced military schools in the academic sense."

What about the use in command and staff colleges in France or /other/ Western countries of computers for programming courses? Have we applied this development here?

"Of course. War games are studied by the use of computers in our college and we have held these games three times since the October 1973 war. The faculty also has a complete department for war operations research and integrated classrooms with illuminated screens, closed circuit television for studies, and a movie hall seating 400 students which is electronically equipped to show war movies, with screens that operate automatically. We hold military and civilian scholarly symposiums."

I have learned that you are studying the World War Two battle of al-'Alamayn in Egypt's Western Desert up to the present. Isn't this a relatively old battle in comparison with the battles and wars of the sixties and seventies?

"We study it as military history. Each time we discover new angles by studying conditions on both sides and defensive and offensive moves and ultimately we produce useful lessons of a positive and negative nature to apply or avoid in the future.

"We also study World War Two and the October war and its mistakes and make 'plays,' in every sense of the word, on the October war commanders' management of the Ramadan war. These are attended and observed by force commanders up to the division command level and are supervised by the commander general and the chief of war staff of the armed forces.

"These 'plays' take place on the college stage and their performance takes a whole day.

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"These 'plays' take place on the college stage and their performance takes a whole day.

"We also conduct academic military debates between two opposing commanders in order to produce useful lessons. We thought of holding such a debate between the Egyptian commander Maj Gen Sa'd Ma'mun, commander of the Second Army in the October war and now governor of the capital, or Lt Gen 'Abd Rabb-al-Nabi Hafiz in his capacity as commander of the 16th infantry division--a Second Army division which played a pioneering role in confronting the enemy forces--and the Israeli minister Ariel Sharon, who led his forces in what has been called 'the gap.' Each commander would be in charge of explaining his view on what he did and what ought to have happened. We have postponed this debate to a date to be set later on."

The commander of the most senior high Egyptian military academy, the Command and Staff College, which has been called the Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi Men's School, told me:

"With God's will we will hold a new scientific symposium starting before 6 October 1981 and ending on the immortal national holiday. We will discuss the effects of the war and the development of training and the most modern organization and armament techniques. Military commanders from Egypt and some friendly countries will attend this, along with a number of ministers and some Egyptian university professors. The October 1981 symposium will absolutely not be the last, because military science, like the waters of the sea, can never be exhausted."

Commander of the Egyptian Command and Staff College

Maj Gen A/G Muhammad al-Tantawi is a professor of war operations planning in our armed forces. He was born in 1929 in Quwaysina, Minufiyah.

He graduated from the War College in 1950 as an infantry officer and in 1955 assumed responsibility for training guerrillas and bringing them out into combat with the British and French forces in the canal zone.

He worked as an instructor, then a senior War College instructor, up to 1966, then began his service in war operations, assuming the management of the operations section in the central area, then in 1968 head of the eastern command axis which included Syria, Iraq, Jordan and of course Egypt.

He took part in the planning for the 1973 war and headed the armed forces command group in the main operations center during the management of the war. President al-Sadat assumed the command of this sector as supreme commander.

In 1976 he completed the third course in the Higher War College at the Nasir Military Academy.

He was appointed director of the Command and Staff College in 1977.

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ANTI-REGIME MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS DISSIDENT POET

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 244, 24 Oct 81 pp 71-76

[Interview with Ahmad Fu'ad Najm; Reported by 'Ali ibn 'Ashur: "AL-MUSTAQBAL Meets the Egyptian Poet Ahmad Fu'ad Najm in Prison"]

/Text/ The Egyptian poet Ahmad Fu'ad Najm is too famous to need introduction. Since he started his creative artistic life as a poet and singer with the splendid blind Shaykh Imam, he has been considered the voice of the "con men," the poor, the quarters and the narrow alleys of the various crowded sections of Cairo. It is a "cry of hunger," as Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal said once, in the era of Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. However, our Najm did not fall silent as Haykal wished. Rather, it was fate that drove Haykal into prison in Sadatist Egypt alongside Ahmad Fu'ad Najm!

After al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, Ahmad Fu'ad Najm called himself "the poet of the occupied territories," starting with his famous qasida-poem "An Important Statement" which brought him before a military court that issued a verdict that he be imprisoned a whole year. However, Najm refused to bow down to this oppression and decided to hide in a "voluntary prison," which, in my opinion, is more of a torture for the spirit than the "prisons of the Egyptian regime." However, "voluntary prison," when it takes the form of a great challenge, becomes more important than a million freedoms in the prison whose boundaries are the geographical borders of Egypt. Indeed, Najm succeeded in challenging and deceiving numerous eyes of the Egyptian security authorities, with their extensive equipment, for more than 3 years.

The security authorities did manage to arrest Ahmad Fu'ad Najm finally, but they did not manage to extinguish the flame of defiance within him: rather, he became more determined. Today, in prison, more than at any time in the past, he is resolved to continue the defiance and made the voice of the Egyptian people heard by everyone who is concerned throughout the Arab world.

Two mutual friends, one French and one Arab, met Ahmad Fu'ad Najm in his hiding place and in prison, and the fruit of these meetings was this long conversation, which is an exclusive with the magazine AL-MUSTAQBAL.

/Question/ A few weeks ago, and for 3 years, you were living in a fugitive state, refusing to carry out the sentence issued against you by the military court, which stipulated that you were to be imprisoned for a whole year. Why? What exactly happened?

/Answer/ I have gone to prison more than once in my life, but this was the first time a verdict was issued against me by a military court in my character as a poet! I believe that it was the first time in the history of Egypt, and perhaps in the history of the Arab world, that a poet was brought to military court on the charge of "writing poetry."

That happened in 1978. I had left the Abu Za'bal concentration camp and the Federation of Students of the Engineering Faculty at the University of 'Ayn Shams sent me and my comrade Shaykh Imam an invitation to attend the annual symposium which we attended--I, Shaykh Imam and all the progressive writers and artists. It was an official invitation from the Federation of Students. As I said, I had come out of prison in the 18-19 January case, received the invitation and went. In that period it so happened that President al-Sadat was preparing to go to Jerusalem. The air in Egypt was tense. They tried to prevent us from going to the university and taking part in the festival. Shaykh Imam went ahead of me and the students let him in, in spite of the presence of security forces. I went after him, and we took part in the symposium. I spent the night outside our home in Hawsh Qadam. On the morning of the following day, when I was going back to our house, I found a group of security officers and informants waiting for me, and they attacked me in the street. I asked them, "What do you want from me?" They told me that I was wanted and they took me with them. I stayed in prison 28 days during which I went on a hunger strike for 15 days.

After that, I was handed over to the military judiciary in absentia and was sentenced to a year in prison. This was the first verdict issued against me, as I said before, although I spent 13 years in prisons without trial. It was very routine that they would take me and I would remain in prison without being handed over to the judiciary or going to trial. They had little sense of shame--they could not admit that they were trying a poet because he was writing poetry but this time it was expressed in the text of the charge--"and the poet's poetry was seized in his possession," just like a charge of possessing "opium" or "hashish!"

Escape from Prison

When the verdict was issued against me I decided not to carry it out, not to hand myself over and not to go to prison through a military judiciary sentence for the poem "An Important Statement," on grounds that it contained "material defamatory to the person of President al-Sadat," although I did not mention al-Sadat's name at all. When the deputy public prosecutor told me that this poem infringed on the dignity and feelings of the president, I told him "That's your opinion." For these reasons, I decided to flee and chose to live in hiding. That ended when they discovered my hiding place last May. Of course this directly affected my work, and it also affected Shaykh Imam, because when we are together we attend symposia or prepare for symposia, and we even sang in the streets the past 2 years, which

represents a step forward. I believe that they felt threatened by this. For this reason we were taken to military court, which ruled not to hear the case with respect to Shaykh Imam and 'Azzah, and I was sentenced to a year in prison.

A group of students was with me in the same case before the military court, including one who was sentenced for 3 years, Muhammad Fathi, and there is another case of students called Case 900; they were handed over to military court and verdicts were issued against them.

To this remark, I would like to add that I give thanks to the judge who sentenced me to a year in prison, because pressure was put on him to the extent that al-Jamasi, the war minister at that time, demanded to meet him. After the sentence was handed down he was distressed and after that went to a mental institution. He performed a very great deed. Had another judge been in his place, the sentence would have been at least 10 years. He also declared that Imam and 'Azzah were innocent. He told my lawyer, Nabil al-Hilali, that it was not possible for him to do more, because the pressure on him was intense and in his view, since the intelligence service previously used to put me in prison for a period ranging from 1 to 3 years without trial, when I was taken to military court I would have been sentenced to 10 years at least.

/Question/ You mentioned that you did not enjoy freedom of expression. Is that the case with everyone, or are there people who exercise it in Egypt?

/Answer/ As far as I am concerned, I am deprived of freedom of expression and there are other voices that are deprived of this freedom as I am. These voices are far removed from the media. As regards my opinion about the democratic nature and "freedoms" of the regime, I challenge anyone to find any democracy in the world where a poet is taken to court on the charge of writing poetry. The people running the media express the regime's view, in particular the view of Begin and the American administration. If you turn on the television set you will see, between an American serial and an American serial, an American serial. Then the news on Egyptian television is first news about the regime, then news about Menachem Begin; this is the freedom of expression that is guaranteed and permitted in Egypt.

Noble voices are muzzled and are totally removed from the media. I challenge the "democratic" Egyptian regime to give me a loudspeaker for 5 minutes only, any loudspeaker, outside the radio and television, and let me just go to the university. I am certain it will not allow that at all. This is the democracy of the Egyptian regime.

I am certain that arts, letters and ideas in Egypt today are in a state of degeneration, vapidity and insipidity which dominate television, the movies the stage and the press. Who has a golden voice today? Songs of decadence talk of neurotic love. My opinion today is that any 5-year-old child who looks at Egyptian television will be ready for marriage.

In the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir there was Umm Kalthum, and today there is Yasin al-Khayyam. A little before 'Abd-al-Nasir there was Taha Husayn and he was the director of the university. Today there is Sufi Abu Talib; compare them.

In the press there was Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, whom I differ with, and he was the supervisor over AL-AHRAM. Who is in his place today? Ibrahim Nafi'. In the newspaper AL-AKHBAR there is Ibrahim Sa'dah, who is well known as an official American Central Intelligence agent. They are controlling the media today. There is a general degeneration on all levels. There is the relentless alienation of all honorable people, even those who are in favor of the peace agreement and speak seriously. If you listen to what is broadcast on the radio you will be gripped by amazement and you will be shocked, because there isn't one serious or meaningful minute. The press and media now are the press and media of provocation.

In order to know the state of culture today in Egypt, you must know who Mansur Hasan, the minister of culture, is. He is a man who contracts to sell perfume and cosmetics. We call him Mansur Le Cotale because it is he who brought Le Cotale hair oil into the country.

Egyptian "Liberalization"

/Question/ The international media praise the Egyptian regime's liberalism and openness. If there is liberalism in the economic context, why in your opinion is that not the case in regard to freedoms?

/Answer/ We call it liberalism. In reality, there is a liberalism and openness that does not exist in any other country in the world--for Mrs Jihan al-Sadat to make deals. This woman's wealth can now be counted in the billions. If there is freedom, who is it for? You have been in Cairo Airport and seen the inspection procedures. That means that they are justified--there is liberalization and there is a class which is now enjoying the revenues from this liberalization. Before 1952 we had three millionaires, and the richest of them was Ahmad 'Abbud Pasha, who had 6 million pounds. Today the person with the least in that "crowd" has 500 million pounds. You must compare and you will know the meaning of the opening up. Of course liberalism exists--the liberalism to steal and plunder to the point where one person, Ahmad Sultan, confessed that he embezzled 60 million pounds. That is very normal. He now enjoys all his rights. There is another man called 'Uwaydah who worked with Anwar al-Sadat on the Islamic Conference in the days of 'Abd-al-Nasir, and they would steal together. This 'Uwaydah stole 80 million pounds from the Ministry of Religious Endowments and said, in a loud voice, that he admitted that and was ready to return the sum, on condition that others returned the amounts they had taken. He is now responsible for religious activity in the National Party. Is that person going to teach children religion?

/Question/ If that liberalism has changed nothing in the status of freedoms, has it created an improvement in the level and conditions of life of the Egyptian people?

/Answer/ It is true that liberalism has changed something in the condition of the Egyptian people. It has turned the Egyptians into philosophers--into vegetarians who have nothing to do with meat or even with eggs.

This is the effect of economic liberalization. Today "ta'miyah"--falafel--is sold by the kilogram, and "al-kushari" as well, but bread, which is sold in ordinary areas, is like shoes, full of dirt.

/Question/ Could you mention to us the successive times you went to prison and the charges that were brought against you?

/Answer/ The charge in each case was the same: "seizing the poet's poetry in his possession." My periods in prison were as follows: from 1959 to 1962, from 1965 to mid-1966, from 1968 to 1972, from 1972 to 1973, from 1974 to 1975, 1975 and 1978.

The last three times I was a few months in prison each time then escaped.

When our dear Nixon did us the honor of coming to Egypt, we gave him a good reception, worthy of a thief, and they arrested us. When we were transferred to prison the counsellor asked the deputy prosecutor why he had signed our summons, and his answer was that we had insulted President Nixon. He answered him first by saying, "President Nixon is finished and the American people have said he is a thief and expelled him, and you do not know that?" President Nixon was removed from office and we ourselves remain in prison? After that we were released.

Why Poetry?

/Question/ When did you start to write poetry?

/Answer/ In 1962.

/Question/ You chose poetry and song as an instrument of expression; why didn't you choose stories, novels or the press for example?

/Answer/ Songs are an artistic form it is easy to grasp. When you are taking a bath, you sing; when you are at a party you sing. When you are at work, you sing, and when you are on the street you sing. Even when you are eating you sing. However, you cannot contemplate a painting, look at a movie or read a book in any of these instances. Therefore songs are easier, and their effect is quicker and greater. The Egyptian people in general are very full of song and their heritage of songs is very deep rooted and rich. They love tunes as much as they are known for the spirit of joking. It is clear that we managed to choose the art form by which we could address the people, because of the success we have achieved since 1962.

As far as I go, poetry is a necessity in the sense that it is a religious duty I must perform. Why did I choose this type of poetry? At the beginning I was oriented toward radio signing, and I actually did reach an agreement with 'Abd-al-Halim Hafiz to write poems for him. We had known each other for a long time, because he came from my village and was my neighbor. The day I was with him in al-Manyal, before he became a millionaire, I went down to go to the movies and on my way went to buy something and the vendor gave me a piece of paper. It is a custom with me that I read every piece of paper I find. I started to read the piece of paper, and there was a poem by a poet I did not know. I went back to the vendor and bought the book from him, for half a piaster. This book was the first part of the collection of the great poet Bayram al-Tunisi. When I read it I started to understand that poetry had a function other than that of "Darling I feel foreboding over the night" and the nonsense that is broadcast over the radio. I ceased writing for a long period while looking for poetry of Bayram's to read. Thanks go to

Bayram, who made me understand the function of poetry. My opinion is that words are a weapon; sometimes they are a symbol you pin on the chest of a friend or give him as a gift, and sometimes they are a knife with which you stab an enemy. Words, as far as I am concerned, are the most sacred thing. I respect and guard them and do not look down on them. I pay the price for this from my special account, and cannot haggle over words. This is my view on poetry.

/Question/ Why did you choose colloquial Egyptian as a means of expression?

/Answer/ I chose the colloquial language because it is rich and also because Egyptian movies and songs have become widespread throughout the Arab world and people have come to feel at ease with them since we are better known in Arab countries and among Arabs in Europe than in Egypt. Colloquial Egyptian is the dialect closest to classical Arabic; we could call it modified classical Arabic. In my opinion, when an artist has a mission and has an idea he wants to convey to the public, he must address the public in its language so that the listener will not get tired interpreting what he is saying. I find no difficulty expressing my ideas in colloquial Egyptian.

Meeting Imam

/Question/ When you met Shaykh Imam, what was the extent of his influence on your poetic output?

/Answer/ I met Shaykh Imam in 1962. At that time the Council of Arts had printed a collection of mine in a contest called the first writers' project. Naturally I was very happy with this book, and the first person I wanted to give it to was my cousin, whom I loved though we didn't get married because I was poor. I gave her husband the book to give to her. There I met Sa'd al-Muji, who informed me that there was an artist in Hawsh Qadam who was said to have been an old player. I went with him on a Friday in March and met Imam. He was singing for Shaykh Zakariya Ahmad and Shaykh Sayyid Darwish, and I noted that he was making the additions that he had. I told him he was really innovative and asked him why he didn't sing. He told me that he had no poems and that he refused to get into the radio and into trivia. I liked him because I was like him. As a result, I gave him a poem, which he sang, and that was the beginning of our collaboration. The poem was "I repent loving you," which is the last classical work.

/Question/ Have you written for other singers or performers?

/Answer/ Yes, but nothing worth mentioning. I wrote for Hilmi Amin on the Algerian revolution; the rest was nonsense of the type that gets broadcast. However, after that I took the position that I would refuse to be broadcast.

/Question/ Did Umm Kalthum ask you to write some poems for her?

/Answer/ Yes. It happened that Umm Kalthum in 1968 invited me to her house, but we did not get along. She threw me out of her house, because she was very arrogant and considered herself the queen of Egypt, and I do not like arrogant people.

/Question/ In your poetry you are basically interested in struggles inside Egypt. Have you written about the struggles of other peoples?

/Answer/ Of course. I am on the side of revolution everywhere and at all times. When revolutionaries anywhere have a victory, I sing about it. When a revolution is attacked, I must express my opinion. I wrote a book of poems that I called "Tehran" on the subject of the Iranian revolution. I was on the side of the Vietnamese, on the side of Cuba and on the side of Angola, and I am on the side of the Chilean people, the Palestinian people, and all people who are fighting to liberate themselves. It got to the point where I suggested to a Palestinian leader (there is no need to mention his name) that he send me to the front to take part in the armed conflict. He replied that the Palestinian revolution did not need fourth-rate fighting men so much as it needed first-rate poets, and I would serve the revolution better with my poetry than with weapons.

/Question/ You have written poems about some poets. Who are the poets who have stirred your admiration?

/Answer/ Pablo Neruda, Nazim Hikmet, Aragon, Lorca the great Spanish poet, and (Iloir). I like Pablo Neruda's memoirs more than his poetry. I read Aragon's "Springs of the (Sa)" but did not understand it and got nothing out of it. That could be explained by the fact that the translation was bad. My opinion is that poetry cannot be translated and that if it is translated it loses much of its special character and essence.

The Issue of Exploitation

/Question/ You are now with Shaykh Imam and Muhammad 'Ali, and who else?

/Answer/ As you know, I was in flight and would get help from people. Imam and Muhammad 'Ali are living the normal lives we used to live in Hawsh Qadam, and my separation from them exhausts me emotionally, but we will go on. We will not stop working inside prison or out.

/Question/ Your output is published inside and outside the Arab nation. How come you can't live off that? And why not?

/Answer/ Let us take as an example an Arab radio station which is constantly broadcasting our output. It would send the four of us 100 pounds a month. Suddenly it stopped sending this wretched sum because its government did not like some of our positions. Nonetheless this station continued to broadcast our poems and songs. If we belonged to the Society of Authors and Singers, our rights would be protected. We are exploited from every angle; that is, everyone is nipping at us from his own angle. There are also people who pirate at our expense and sell tapes of our songs without our knowing anything about it.

I also myself read an announcement about a group selling our entire works "to support the struggle of Ahmad Fu'ad Najm and Shaykh Imam." Does "our struggle" live abroad? Is there anyone by name of "our struggle" to whom they should give support? I do not understand that. The Officers Fathi of Egyptian intelligence also share

in exploiting us. They also sell the tapes they confiscate from us on the sly, and they have even gone so far as to sell books they have confiscated from my home. I have found them selling in the al-Izbikiyah market and bought them back. I will never forget when I was in the defendants' box with some other people and the judge Anwar Marzuq left me to the last. When my turn came he took me to the proceedings room and told me that he was missing such-and-such of our works, so I learned that the man in the judiciary exchange and listen to our songs. In the 15 May case, there was a man named Amin al-Huwaydi, who was the director of intelligence, among the accused. They seized tapes of ours in his possession and the judge asked him how he had the songs of Shaykh Imam when he was an intelligence officer. He answered that even President Anwar al-Sadat had such recordings.

/Question/ A final question: what do you hope from educated people and democrats in France and Europe?

/Answer/ If these intellectuals and democrats raise our cause in France, that will have an effect here in Egypt. For example, if democratic public opinion in America had made a campaign on behalf of democratic freedoms in Egypt at the time of the peace agreements with Carter and Begin, that would have had an effect on the course of events in Egypt. But that did not happen.

So I am directing an appeal to all noble persons in France and Europe and am asking what they think when a poet is brought to military court after he has been prosecuted because he writes poetry. If their answer is in my favor, I ask them to help me in my tribulations, not just through declarations but also through active movement. The Egyptian regime wants to play the phoney democratic card; that is the last one it has left. It is claiming to solve all the problems the Egyptian people have, in the form of war, the food problem and so forth. If all this is exposed, whether by individuals or human rights groups, the regime will draw back from putting me in military prison.

Here I would like to add an appeal for all the democratic and progressive forces in the world to stand alongside us because they will thus be defending the cause of freedom in general.

Right after my sentence was issued, hundreds of telegrams poured in protesting against the Information Department. In spite of my thanks to the people who sent the telegrams, I wonder why this noble effort of theirs did not continue.

I am loyal to my vow. I will not betray my words, be afraid, retreat or sell myself. I will go on to the last breath. Everyone who agrees with my position must raise his voice and say that there is a poet in Egypt who was brought before military court on the charge of writing poetry.

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GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INCREASED TECHNICAL TRAINING DECLARED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 2 Nov 81 p 4

/Article: "Minister of Education Tells AL-'UMMAL: Admission of Workers to Technical Schools To Acquire Accreditation"/

/Text/ Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, the minister of education, talked to AL-'UMMAL's correspondent about technical education policy. He said that the goal of technical instruction is not theoretical instruction but rather the productive aspect, being based on regard for manual labor in order to link teaching to productive activity and provide an incentive for our people to feel the value of work and the returns from that work. To this end, in 1 year industrial and agricultural education schools have been established in productive projects worth 5 million pounds whose profits total about 1 million pounds. Twenty-five percent of this profit is distributed to support the equipment in these schools, an additional 25 percent is for the capital project, and 50 percent is given to the students, the faculty and the workers. Some students' income comes to 25 to 30 pounds per month.

The minister said that the ministry is taking the approach of allotting some technical education schools to performing productive projects and is opening its doors to train workers from various organizations in training courses, as well as allowing workers in various productive and service sectors to come forward for their various examinations.

In his statement to AL-'UMMAL, the minister added "There are more than 640,000 students in technical education in Egypt, as compared with 460,000 students in the general secondary. Thus we have reached a ratio of almost 60 percent in technical secondary schooling.

"The number of specializations comes to 120 and the ministry is establishing joint technical schools, that is, an industrial school in agreement with the Ministry of Industry or the Ministry of Transport and Communications, an agricultural school in agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture, an insurance school and a nursing school. We have about 170 schools of that type of joint Ministry of Education and production and service sector school."

The minister said that an agreement had been signed for $60 million for technical education equipment and that the ministry had gradually started the transition to the 5-year school format in place of the 3-year school, in addition to schools which were established with friendly countries such as the one established in Alexandria.

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PROBLEM OF HIGH DROPOUT RATE IN TECHNICAL STUDIES REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 2 Nov 81 pp 32, 33

/Article by Labib al-Siba'i: "The Phenomenon of Attrition in Technical Institutes: Who Is Responsible for It--the Pricing of Diplomas or the Social View?"/

/Text/ Studies began last week in the technical institutes, which contain about 50,000 male and female students in 32 institutes; 15 of these are commercial technical institutes containing about 40,000 male and female students and 17 are industrial technical and contain about 10,000. With the start of studies in these institutes, which are supposed to help prepare specialized technicians that modern technology can rely on, considering then the link between specialized experts and skilled laborers, one sees the phenomenon of a high rate of evasion or attrition in a great percentage of the students enrolled in these institutes as a result of their preference to resume studies in the general secondary level in the hope of attaining a better grade average which will gain them acceptance in the faculties of universities. These institutes remain deficient in performing their role, and studies and statistical surveys underline that the government and its various sectors have a need for graduates from them.

Dr 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim, the general supervisor of the specialized national councils, says that evaluating the existing state of affairs in these institutes reveals, in addition to that, a low level of enrollment in industrial education in general and a failure to establish institutes to prepare technicians in the agricultural sector, as well as a failure to develop or diversify these institutes in a manner serving newly created requirements in order to meet the demands of modern economic and social development, then an almost total reliance on appointments to cover the requirements of scientific training or, to a high degree, instruction from private institutes and in technical institutes.

Dr Hatim adds that at the beginning there were higher institutes parallelling university instruction; the basic goal in establishing them was to graduate groups of applied specialists to help university graduates in scientific activity. However, after a period of time, they turned into higher institutes parallelling universities and now contain more than 40,000 students. Out of conviction in the special bodies' role in establishing private institutes to alleviate the financial and educational burden on the government, it has been decided to form a special council for them under the chairmanship or the minister of education which will take charge of drawing up a general policy for these institutes and setting forth plans to

guarantee that the necessary resources are provided to achieve their goals and set forth a financial system for them. It will also be engaged in regulating the admission of students to these institutes, determining their numbers and granting diplomas or educational degrees, on condition that the establishment of new higher institutes be linked to development needs and not be a repetition of the existing types.

Dr Hatim adds that in spite of the government's clear need for abundant numbers of institute graduates in order to meet development plan needs for intermediate technical labor, the number of students enrolled in these institutes does not exceed 50,000, of whom about 40,000 are in commercial technical institutes and only about 10,000 are in industrial institutes. In addition, the total number of students enrolled in technical schools of various industrial, commercial and agricultural kinds covering the 5 years after preparatory school do not exceed 9,000.

The fact, as Dr 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim says, is that these numbers of students, whether enrolled in technical industrial institutes or technical schools, are to be considered very low in comparison with the composition of the middle technical labor class. This requires the establishment of a general authority that will be responsible for developing and advancing technical education, one of whose responsibilities will be to set out technical institutes in the context of the general structure of education in Egypt, define their mission and function, and evaluate their position in the light of its performance, while providing them with adequate financing and setting out a special policy for preparing technicians, following up on execution of their plans, coordinating their systems, defining their responsibilities and preparing a long range plan aimed at graduating the necessary numbers and types of technicians to meet the country's need for technicians--taking into account the Arab and African countries' requirements in the various industrial, commercial, agricultural and medical fields and preparing a plan to establish specific new model institutes, especially ones that are compatible with the needs of economic liberalization. One should note the development of worldwide technology and anticipated developments in Egypt in the coming stages; strive to distribute technical institutes geographically to achieve development goals in the various authorities; devote attention to establishing institutes to prepare agricultural technicians to cope with the pressing need for them in the agricultural sector; set forth rules and statutes that will guarantee that these institutes' and schools' requirements for human and material resources are provided: encourage the various production and service sectors to establish instruction and training centers there, in view of the success this approach has achieved and in light of the human and material resources and suitable status these sectors provide; determine the beginning of appropriate studies to prepare technicians in accordance with the areas of work and diverse special fields while deepening their programs along with human studies; set out a plan to prepare the necessary faculties for institutes and schools; send people who actually perform instruction on short- and long-term fellowships in order to keep abreast of the developments that occur in the world in this field; and set forth systems of incentives for the faculties in order to attract personnel who are capable of working in this field.

Dr Hatim added that the development of conditions in these institutes will require that the status of technicians and technical education be raised in the opinions of citizens, by reviewing the pricing of diplomas so that wages will be in keeping

with skills and productivity; by increasing technical wages and as a result increasing receptivity to industrial education; by spreading the industrial specializations which stages of progress in the various areas of life require; by giving attention to media and technical guidance; by discovering the inclinations and capabilities of students, and means of changing their approaches; by guiding them, by orienting them, and appreciating work as a value in the early stages of education and training; by retraining in specific periods following graduation in the course of real work; by obtaining expertise; by supporting the faculties with personnel that have a high level, are qualified and have acquired suitable training and previous practical expertise; by providing them with training programs before and during instruction, in order to confirm that the instructors are aware of all developments; and by sending graduates of institutes on domestic and foreign fellowship to obtain higher studies to meet the severe deficit in faculty members in the institutes. The general education plan of study should contain suitable scientific and technical courses so that students who join the technical institutes and schools will have the necessary background to help them absorb the study, and there should be a review in the supplying of books and memoranda and the manner in which they are prepared and existing buildings should be completed and proper new ones established.

Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, the minister of education, states that the ministry has finished setting out a plan to develop the curricula and expand the branches included in the commercial institutions in order to respond to labor requirements and develop the expertise and capability of the people performing instruction in these institutes. In fact, 14 instructors have been trained this year and agreement has been reached with the British Council to carry out a 5-year technical agreement to train new instructors in these institutes in modern teaching approaches. The International Bank of Reconstruction and Development has also allocated $7.5 million to equip some commercial and technical institutes.

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IRAQI DISMISSES VENEZUELAN CHARGES

JN282055 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2020 GMT 28 Nov 81

[Text] Baghdad, 28 Nov (INA)--Iraq has dismissed the accusations which some Venezuelan circles recently fabricated against two Iraqi diplomats in the Iraqi Embassy in Caracas, stressing that these accusations are baseless.

A Foreign Ministry official spokesman tonight said that the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry has asked the Iraqi Embassy in Caracas to recall two of its diplomats because some Venezuelan circles have raised absolutely baseless accusations against them. He said that the Iraqi Foreign Ministry dismisses the accusations in part and parcel.

The spokesman stressed that stemming from Iraq's policy of establishing and maintaining close relations between Iraq and the Third World countries, including Venezuela, which is an OPEC member-state, the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Iraq has decided to recall these two diplomats out of concern for relations with Venezuela despite the fact that the ministry is certain that these allegations, which were attributed to the two Iraqi diplomats by those circles, are false.

The spokesman said that it is regretful that those circles did not only raise such false accusations and allegations but had also exploited the news media to defame Iraq which enjoys the respect and appreciation of the world states in general and the Third World states in particular.

The spokesman asserted that Venezuela's relations with the states in its region is not Iraq's concern and therefore it is inadmissible to involve Iraq in such matters. It is regrettable that such contentions were fabricated.

The spokesman also asserted that Iraq will nevertheless maintain good relations with Venezuela out of its faith in the existing relations of friendship between the two countries and their two peoples' common interests within the framework of their cooperation in OPEC and as Third World countries.

CSO: 4404/153

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO CANADA--Shaykh Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah presented his credentials yesterday to Canada's governor general as Kuwaiti ambassador to Canada. [GF141816 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 13 Nov 81 p 2]

CSO: 4404/153

U.S., ISRAELI POSITIONS ON LEBANON DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 239, 19 Sep 81 pp 32-33

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "The Americans Asked Israel To Keep Its Hands Off of Lebanon, and the Israelis Said: 'Which Lebanon Are You Talking About?'"]

[Text] Two Trends Inside the U.S. Administration Are Fighting With Each Other Over Lebanon's Future: One Trend Calls for a Strong Democratic Regime, and the Other One Favors Military Rule.

Israel Considers Itself a Participant in the Process of Choosing the New Regime for Lebanon, and Begin Said in Washington: "Israel Has Direct Security Interests in Lebanon."

What Does an Extension of the President's Term of Office Mean, and Why Is Sarkis Refusing to Accept the Extension?

Beirut--During the most recent meeting which Philip Habib, the U.S. President's envoy to the Middle East, held with Menachem Begin, Israel's prime minister, and which concluded with a cease-fire agreement in the south of Lebanon, the veteran U.S. diplomat said to the Israeli prime minister--according to well-informed sources--that Washington had come to believe in the necessity of maintaining the status quo in Lebanon and arriving at transitional solutions to this crisis which has lasted so long and has come to threaten the security of the region and has also perhaps become a danger to world peace.

According to these sources, Mr Habib told Prime Minister Begin during this meeting: "It has become necessary for you to disassociate yourselves from the Christians in Lebanon in order to make it more possible that the efforts made in order to achieve this [cease-fire agreement] will result in success. Would it be possible for you to do this?" These sources say that the Israeli prime minister gave the following reply to this question on the part of the U.S. envoy: "Of course it is possible. But we would like to have you define for us which Lebanon it is that you want us to disassociate ourselves from. Are you talking about Lebanon as it is at present or about the Lebanon which will exist according to a new formula? And what is it?" Mr Habib then conveyed the basic elements of this dialogue, which had taken place between him and the Israeli prime minister,

to the higher officials in the Lebanese government. He did this within the framework of the shuttle diplomacy mission which he was engaging in in order to prevent further outbreak of tensions and explosions in connection with the Lebanese crisis and in order to attempt to firmly establish the cease-fire on political foundations and bases which would provide for a long-term truce. Up till that time the U.S. President's envoy to the Middle East did not have an answer to this Israeli question concerning the Lebanon where Washington wanted the Israelis to disassociate themselves from the Christians. The reason for this was that Mr Habib was not authorized to speak and negotiate concerning a final and permanent solution for the Lebanese problem, nor was he authorized to speak and negotiate concerning a future formula for Lebanon and the type of regime which it would have. His mission was restricted to that of arriving at transitional settlements which would maintain the status quo in the whole situation and not allow the situation to suffer large-scale breakdowns in public security and not allow the cease-fire to be violated.

The Lebanese authorities did not need to pause very long before realizing the following two essential facts:

1. In spite of the many U.S. reassurances to the Lebanese government, the "sympathy" which Washington has shown toward Lebanon recently, and Washington's acknowledgement that the survival of Lebanon is a necessity, both politically and in terms of security, for the Middle East, the U.S. administration is still in the stage of studying the matter and still has not decided what the formula should be for the regime which will govern Lebanon in the future.

2. If the Israeli prime minister's question to Mr Habib concerning "which Lebanon it is where you want us to disassociate ourselves from the Christians" indicates anything at all, it indicates that Israel is still insisting that it has a role to play which should be taken into consideration and which it should be permitted to play in the process of determining the formula concerning the Lebanon of the future--in fact even in determining the role which this country would play in the future and consequently in determining its political identity. These are matters which already have been conveyed to the Lebanese authorities as basic Israeli conditions for permitting the Lebanese problem to be solved.

Even before the Israeli prime minister's departure for the U.S., all of the information which the Lebanese authorities had said that the U.S. President and Secretary of State [Haig] would be discussing the Lebanese situation with the Israeli prime minister. The information also said that they would discuss with him the compromises which Washington felt it necessary to arrive at in order to maintain the status quo in Lebanon and which Israel should help to achieve. However, this information said nothing at all about any definite concept which the U.S. administration could be said to have concerning a formula for a regime of government for the Lebanon of the future.

This fact was actually confirmed when initial items of information began to arrive, one by one, from Washington to Beirut concerning the framework within which President Reagan and Alexander Haig, his secretary of state, discussed the Lebanese situation with the Israeli prime minister. The framework included only discussing means of maintaining the cease-fire in Lebanon, reinforcing the position

of the legitimate Lebanese government, and enabling the legitimate government to gradually assume its responsibilities and extend its authority to the various areas of Lebanon, including the south of Lebanon.

U.S. Plan Presented to Begin

A correspondent for Radio Israel who accompanied Mr Begin during his visit to the U.S. acknowledged that the Americans had presented to the Israeli prime minister a plan for achieving a transitional or temporary settlement for the Lebanese crisis. He said that the plan, among other things, stipulated that Israel should, in practice, begin to minimize its intervention in Lebanon's internal affairs. He said that the plan stipulated that Israel, during the first stage, break off relations with the Christians inside Lebanon (meaning the Lebanese Front and the Phalangist Party) and then, during the next stage, sever its special relations with Maj Sa'd Haddad, the leader of the militia which controls the border area in southern Lebanon.

The Israeli correspondent also said that the U.S. administration appears to believe that this beginning for a solution to the Lebanese problem, under the circumstances of a continuation of the cease-fire, will enable the U.S. to design and apply the principles of this plan to other fronts.

The correspondent also mentioned that Mr Begin, before departing for the U.S., expressed his intention to inform the U.S. administration of his total rejection of the ideas contained in this U.S. plan which have the objective of putting an end to Israeli intervention in Lebanon because this, as he put it, would increase the influence of Syria and the PLO in Lebanon.

In spite of the fact that the Lebanese government seemed totally preoccupied with pursuing and following up on the efforts made to implement the decisions of the Arab Follow-Up Committee, the president of Lebanon and his higher aides were also concerned with another basic matter. They wanted to know what was said during the talks between Reagan and Begin--especially with regard to the Lebanese crisis. Up till the beginning of this week, information which has reached Beirut concerning this matter has been very sparse. However, some political information has arrived and has said that the question which Mr Begin posed to Mr Habib was asked once again in Washington. This information also said that Mr Begin assured President Reagan and Secretary of State Haig that Israel has direct security interests in Lebanon and that any change in the status quo would affect Israel's security! While waiting for Washington to inform the president of Lebanon concerning what the U.S. answer was to these Israeli reservations and inquiries concerning the future of the situation in Lebanon, Lebanese political circles will continue to act according to political information, some of which has been brought to Lebanon by Lebanese political personalities who have recently visited Washington and some of which has been conveyed by Cardinal Cook, the respresentative of the U.S. Council of Catholic Bishops, who recently visited Lebanon.

Two Lebanons Presented to Reagan

What does this information say concerning the position of the U.S. administration with regard to Lebanon's future?

It says that there are two trends of thought within the U.S. administration.

The first of the two trends supports the position that a solution for the Lebanese crisis should be achieved by developing the existing regime and establishing a type of hard-line rule in which the legitimate military and security establishments would play a leading role in order to impose upon Lebanon a tough regime which would be able to eliminate all the phenomena brought on by the Lebanese war and consequently eliminate all the dissolution and neglect which has been predominant in the country during this crisis.

The proponents of this trend of thought feel that a regime of this type would be able to adapt to the conditions of the area of the Middle East which surrounds Lebanon. They believe that iron rule such as this can quickly restore security and stability to this country.

The second trend of thought within the U.S. administration rejects this approach and does not consider that it will provide a permanent solution to the Lebanese crisis. Proponents of this second trend feel that a formula such as this will leave Lebanon open to political unrest and crises in view of the nature of Lebanon's political and sectarian composition--and past experience has shown that this political and sectarian composition is unable to accept a radical military regime no matter how eagerly this regime might maintain political institutions as symbols of a democratic regime. The formula for a solution or settlement which was utilized after the events of 1958 in Lebanon did not last long and we know what its fate was on both the political and national levels.

The proponents of this point of view feel that a fairly ideal solution to the Lebanese crisis requires the establishment of a strong democratic regime in which the role of the constitutional and political establishments is strengthened. They feel that this should be done so that this regime would be able to develop both itself and its institutions on new foundations which would take into consideration Lebanon's real situation and the shortcomings which have been shown by past experience and have been fearfully revealed by events which have taken place.

The obvious question which preoccupies the people in Lebanon who hold positions in the government and occupy positions of political power is: Which of these two trends of thought will emerge victorious in the U.S. administration and will represent its final decision with regard to the future of Lebanon and the type of regime which Lebanon will have?

There is only one answer to this question, and the answer says that one must wait and discover the nature of the trends which will prevail in the Lebanese presidentail election campaign next year. There are candidates who are in favor of the formula of having a strong democratic regime, we know who these candidates are, and their names are being circulated among political circles. Brig Gen Raymond

Iddih is one such person. Those in favor of the other type of regime also have their candidate who is known and whose candidacy for the presidency of Lebanon is being slowly and carefully "hatched."

Has The Decision Been Made?

Narrowing down the struggle for the future of Lebanon to these two trends assumes that the question of Lebanon's existence has already been resolved and that a decision in principle has already been made to have Lebanon remain as it was after it was no longer threatened by the danger of partition. However, President Elias Sarkis, one of the fundamental parties concerned, has been unable to resolve this matter even though he has been counting totally on having Lebanon once again become a country which is united in terms of its territory and people.

Furthermore, none of these fundamental parties concerned are able to decide the question with regard to any of the possibilities, whether they be positive or negative, in view of the lack of clarity in the situation and lack of a clear perspective which would determine the contours of the future of the situation in the area as a whole and in Lebanon in particular.

Well-informed sources are becoming more and more convinced every day that, as the initial pattern of the Lebanese presidential campaign becomes crystallized concerning the direction which it will be taking, it will become more and more possible to decide which of the two trends competing for acceptance inside the U.S. administration will be victorious in the end as one sees which candidate to succeed President Sarkis gains the upper hand.

It is just as true that the lack of clarity which still characterizes the situation, due to the fact that the basic forces have not succeeded in arriving at a determination of their options, is what arouses the fear that still another possibility will emerge. This possibility is that Lebanon will fail to elect a new president who will put into practice one of the two trends previously referred to. What this would do would be to confront everyone with having to choose between one of two things: Either President Sarkis's term of office would have to be extended for a period of 2 years or a neutral president would have to be elected who would have to be a good administrator in order to deal with the Lebanese crisis. This means that there would be no temporary or permanent solution to the Lebanese crisis and that this crisis would be likely to continue. Everyone acknowledges that this is what is being counted on by Israel--the party which is most interested in having the Lebanese situation remain as it is at present. The reason for this is that if the situation remains as it is, this will guarantee that Lebanon will collapse in the end after all of its elements and justifications for existence and continued life have crumbled away.

Perhaps this is why President Sarkis is one of those who is most eager to reject and oppose an extension of his term of office under present circumstances, and perhaps this is why he has become so noticeably eager to guarantee the emergence of a strong president who would succeed him and whose arrival would constitute the beginning of a solution to the Lebanese crisis on the basis of the survival of Lebanon. The Lebanese president, as well as Lebanon's political leaders and political activists, have come to believe that Lebanon is no longer

able to survive under the conditions of its present crisis. They believe that the foundations which support the survival of Lebanon have been greatly weakened and that they are no longer able to stand up under the pressure--particularly Lebanon's economic foundations and its system of economic and political freedom.

The situation has been summed up by Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, a Phalangist deputy. He said that an extension of President Sarkis's term of office, or the election of a president who would serve as a crisis manager for the country, merely because of the pressure of certain given circumstances, would mean that the Lebanese crisis would continue until Lebanon collapses.

9468
CSO: 4404/24

BANKING ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 pp 32-33

[Article by Nasim Sulayba: "Stagnation in Credit, Accompanying Liquidity and Pressures on the Pound"]

[Text] The policy of controlling liquidity and retaining high interest rates is so far still "the first line of defense" for the monetary situation in Lebanon because of the security complications, the rising interest rates of the dollar, the state's financial deficit load, and the pressure of local liquidity.

This is an article by financial expert Mr Nasim Sulayba, in which he reviews the results of the banking situation during the first half of 1981, and the expected trends for the rest of the current year.

Despite the lack of available statistics for banking activity through the first half of 1981, there are indicators that the first quarter of the year saw some movement in credit operations, which did record a tangible increase in percentage during the first 3 months of the year. However, this increase does not reflect a basic change in the general tendency that prevailed in 1980.

Stability of the Banking Situation Before April

The banking situation continued in the same self-constrained state that prevailed in 1980, despite the lifting of the credit ceiling at the beginning of this year. There were several important reasons for this:

1. The Bank of Lebanon's continued control of the size of the banks' liquidity, within the policy that it has been following since 1979.

2. The weakening of demand for credit, basically as a result of diminished economic activity.

3. Caution by the banks against expanding credit for non-productive operations, such as financing land and currency speculation, which was in compliance with the Bank of Lebanon's directives.

Despite that, the Lebanese pound's exchange rate vis a vis the dollar continued to be subject to increasing pressures, as a result of rising interest rates on the dollar, and the accompanying great improvement in its exchange rate against all

currencies. The pound's exchange rate, between the end of 1980 and the end of March 1981, declined 8.8 percent with respect to the dollar. This decline, to a considerable extent, was in line with the decline rate of other major currencies against the American currency, since the German mark fell about 7 percent, the Swiss franc 8 percent and the French franc 10 percent.

Relapse

The deterioration of the security stuation in early April resulted in a serious relapse of the economic situation in Lebanon. Economic activity which had begun--albeit timidly--in 1980, and which had continued with a major thrust in the first part of 1981, nearly stagnated in the beginning of April. Bank credit operations equally stagnated, as pressures on the pound's exchange rate increased.

Lebanese banks saw a relatively widespread trend in withdrawals at the beginning of the April incidents. That was due to citizens' precautions against the possibility of prolonged and deteriorating events, and their fear of being unable to get to the banks for some time, as was the case in the period 1975-76.

Liquidity Constraints and the Development of Interest Rates

These precautionary withdrawals came in a situation marked by a relative drop in the banks' liquidity, which created a semi-crisis in liquidity, forcing some of the banks to resort to the Bank of Lebanon. One of the reasons leading to the weakening onf the banks' liquidity at that time was the monetary and financial policy of the Bank of Lebanon and the Ministry of Finance, and the continual absorption of surplus liquidity by means of issuing treasury notes. The Bank of Lebanon then intervened sometimes in the discount market, selling dollars for the purpose of curbing speculation against the Lebanese pound. Finally, there was the preference of many banks, during the recent incidents, to maintain their liquidity over the normal amount, which had reprecussions on the supply of cash, especially among the banks.

Paralleling this increased shortfall of liquidity was intensified demand for local currency, with increased interest rates, espcially among the banks. The interest rate for the pound among the banks (for 3 months) jumped from 11.5 percent at the end of 1980 to about 13 percent at the beginning of April 1981, and then to 17 percent during the first part of May.

In concert with these developments in the interest market, the Bank of Lebanon, on 7 March 1981, raised the rediscount rate from 10 to 13 percent. It also raised the interest rates on treasury bonds from 9 percent on 19 November 1980 to 11.5 percent on 14 April 1981, and then to 14 percent on 18 May 1981. On the other hand, it raised the interest rates on deposits reaching a record of 12 to 13 percent per month at times.

With the rising costs of bank revenues, interest on credit rose to an average of 15 percent, and the state continued to issue its semi-monthly issue of treasury notes at high interest rates. However, the banks' rates were not at a corresponding level during April and May. That was due to the fact that interest rates among the banks exceeded that payed on treasury bonds and, in circumstances of a security relapse and an obscure future, the banks wished to maintain a higher cash liquidity than normal.

The failure of banks to subscribe to treasury notes in amounts equal to or exceeding those falling due, the continuation by the state to finance the deficit by borrowing from the Bank of Lebanon, the reinstallment of a portion of the financial paper, which was withdrawn for the reverse, coupled with the improved security situation, have all led to a tangible improvement in banking liquidity. Banks that borrowed from the Bank of Lebanon were able to repay their loans. Along with this liquidity improvement, a decline in interest rates among the banks suddenly occurred, and to some extent on deposits. However, these rates did not cause the interest rates on treasury notes to decline, which form a floor in determining interest rates in the market.

The fact is that retention of high interest rates on treasury bonds in circumstances of improved bank liquidity, and the improvement of security, have encouraged the banks to subscribe to treasury bonds in greater quantities than before. The value of subscriptions to the latest issue on 13 June 1981 was LL 421.8 million, thereby exceeding the value of due notes which amounted to LL 260 million.

Bank of Labanon Actions

With the continuing rise in interest rates on the dollar, and the uncertain security situation, along with poor remittances from abroad and improved liquidity, pressure on the Lebanese pound intensified, especially on 12 May 1981, when the pound fell compared to all currencies. It registered 440 piasters to the dollar. As a result of this development, the central board of the Bank of Lebanon met and adopted a measure enjoining the banks not to maintain more than half of the capital in discount centers (eliminating their right to keep double their capital in discount centers), especially since a large number of banks had increased their capital in recent years, in addition to the increased capital for new banks. If this measure had an immediate and positive effect with regard to improving the pound's rate of exchange, as a result of the banks' liquidation of a part of their centers, the basic and long-range goal of the Bank of Lebanon's action was to put an end to the banks' ability to speculate against the pound by means of their maintaining tight discount centers. This is aside from causing the central bank's intervening in the discount market to be less costly and more effective. Indeed, the banks' implementation of the measure and the increasing liquidation of centers resulted in the dollar's exchange rate falling from 440 piasters on 12 May to 416 piasters the next day. That was even before it was followed by an equivalent rise abroad, to finally stabilize at a rate that fluctuated between 325 and 330 piasters. Note that that improvement was achieved without any significant intervention by the Bank of Lebanon in the discount market.

Figures up to the end of June 1981 indicate that, with the exception of the Swiss franc, the decline of main European currencies vis a vis the dollar has been more than that recorded by the Lebanese pound between the end of 1980 and the end of June 1981, in that the pound fell by 17.9 percent, while the pound sterling, the German mark and the French franc fell 24.6, 21.5 and 27.4 percent respectively.

This result seems satisfactory if one takes into consideration foreign pressures on the pound and the deterioration of the domestic security situation, along with the accompanying stagnation in economic activity, and most likely a fall in the growth of surplus balance of payments due to poor remittances from Lebanese working abroad. There might be a weakness in the method of governmental expenditures, due to the

Trends for the Second Half of 1981

The recent security relapse, as mentioned previously, had a deeper influence than previous relapses on all economic activity. Evidently, its effects will not be quickly erased, which characterized previous experience. The Lebanese individual has lost confidence in the possibility of stabilizing any temporary relaxation, and consequently, has no incentive to take any action beyond preserving what he already has, and does his business with a minimum of costs and risks. The return of this confidence has beome tied to the fact no radical and final solution has been found for the problem, or at the least, a stabilization of the security relaxation and the beginning of movement by all parties concerned to seriously deal with the issue. Certainly, it is in the nature of the situation for the economic preoccupation to be reflected in banking activities, especially on credit operations. This situation, especially with the weakness of the state's financial position, might lead to a continuation of pressures on the pound, but it would not be difficult to contain these pressures, along with maintaining the prevailing interest rates, in view of the Bank of Lebanon's continuation of its current monetary policy. The central bank's job might be made easier by strengthening the pound/s exchange rate, speeding up payment of Arab assistance installments, as required by the resolutions of the Tunis summit, and the expected decline of the dollar's interest rate.

7005
CSO: 4404/27

FINNISH FIRMS INCREASE ACTIVITY

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT 2 Nov 81 p 30

[Text] On his return from Libya, Deputy Finance Minister Mauno Forsman (Social Democrat) reported that Finnish enterprises will be getting major contracts from Libya which wants to escalate economic cooperation with Finland.

Forsman participated in a joint commission meeting in Tripoli to discuss economic, industrial and technological cooperation between Finland and Libya.

According to Forsman, the most significant projects, in addition to those in construction, are connected with providing electricity and maps for urban areas in Libya. Libya also indicated that it would be especially interested in increasing agricultural cooperation.

In the electric sector, Nokia stands to get a Fmk 200 million contract if its offer is accepted. Finnmap, which already is involved in projects in Libya, will expand its activities this year by sending additional equipment to Libya.

60 Million Contract for the OMP Concern

Already during the meeting, the OMP [expansion unknown] concern signed a contract for the construction of 15 collection containers for rain water in Libya. The value of the contract is about Fmk 60 million. The firm has previously built similar containers in Libya.

According to Forsman, the Libyans wish the Finns to participate in more agricultural development projects, ranging from foresting to plant improvement and soil studies. The Libyans also need fertilizers, grain silos, and grain products in general. The commission also discussed nuclear power cooperation.

The Libyan negotiators noted that Finland is politically a good trading partner for Libya, and that they are hoping Finland will actively seek contact specifically in the electric sector.

According to Forsman, it is difficult to balance the trade between these two countries. The Libyans offered oil, but found it hard to come up with other import articles.

Finnish export to Libya has grown steadily in recent years. Its value in 1980 was about Fmk 200 million. During the first 8 months of the year, the exports rose to Fmk 147.5 million. Among other things, wooden houses, telegraph poles, furniture, printing paper and different machines have been exported to Libya.

9571
CSO: 3107/17

'MUSCAT RADIO' SAYS PDRY PEOPLE LEADING 'TRAGIC LIFE'

EA012200 Muscat Domestic Service in Arabic 1300 GMT 1 Dec 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The international movement for freedom, which is concerned with human rights, has sent a cable appealing to the government of the Sultanate to use its influence to free the South Yemeni people from the yoke of Soviet occupation so that they may regain their freedom and practise the rites of their faith.

[Words indistinct] the 14th anniversary of South Yemen's independence reminds every Arab [word indistinct] the people of South Yemen, who liberated their will, achieved their national independence and became an addition to Arab strength.

But today those people are leading a tragic life [word indistinct] under veiled Soviet colonialism, a colonialism welcomed by the successive rulers of Aden for its sham friendship. This colonialism's objectives soon became clear, namely, to rely on South Yemen for the implementation of Soviet strategy which covets the Gulf region and the Arabian peninsula--the same strategy which covets the oil wealth.

The Aden rulers were not satisfied with giving the Soviets a foothold in the Arabian peninsual [word indistinct]. They also agreed to humiliate their people [words indistinct] and introduce atheistic ideas in the country and stood (?uncritical) when the Soviets replaced the religious education syllabus with another on Marxist-Leninist ideology.

The Soviets, through the client Aden regime, deliberately introduced a permanent atmosphere of terror so as to strike fear into the hearts of the South Yemeni people. As is the case with communist systems, the basic rights of the citizen have been done away with. The citizen is no longer allowed to express or declare his views [words indistinct] for communism is against all religions and not just Islam. Such advocates of communism as Marx and Engels described religion, falsely, as the opium of the people and do not recognize the existence of Almighty God. [passage indistinct]

The leadership, government and people of Oman have always been sympathetic to the people of South Yemen. The Sultanate for all these years has not tried [words indistinct] with the rulers of Aden or to exploit the suffering of that people.

On many occasions and on the basis of principles governing Arab relations in particular and international relations in general Oman has stressed the need for peaceful coexistence with its neighbors and on every occasion the Marxist government in Aden rejected the offer.

The Sultanate has also accepted all Arab and Islamic mediation efforts on the basis of correct and realistic [word indistinct] that conflict does not serve the Arabs higher interests. The Sultanate desires to give full attention to the march of progress which has already covered a considerable distance.

CSO: 4404/153

BRIEFS

NEW AMBASSADOR TO JAPAN--Mr Muhammad 'Ali al-Ansari, the new Qatari ambassador to Japan, has presented his credentials to Hirohito, the emperor of Japan. Emperor Hirohito expressed the hope that Qatari-Japanese relations would further develop in the future. [GF261342 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1235 GMT 26 Nov 81]

NEW ENVOY TO IRELAND--Irish President Patrick Hillery received the credentials of Sharidah Jabir al-Ka'bi as the nonresident Qatari ambassador to Ireland. [GF011747 Doha Domestic Service in Arabic 1530 GMT 1 Dec 81]

CSO: 4404/153

COMMERCIAL BANK'S DEPOSITS INCREASE

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 105

[Article by Sami Ahmad: "Commercial Bank of Syria for 1980: 40 Percent Increase in Deposits and 45 Percent in Credit; Actions Taken to Encourage Savings by High Interest Rates"]

[Text] The Commercial Bank of Syria is Syria's commercial banking organization, and played a major role before its nationalization in the 1960's. It now plays an even bigger role in financing export, import and other activities. The following is a report about it:

The Commercial Bank of Syria is the largest Syrian bank, since it specializes in financing commercial activities in Syria, both domestic and foreign. Along with its branches, it is the only bank that has the right to finance trade, in addition to the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade, and was assigned the task of carrying out the paralled market activities this year. The total activities of this bank and all its branches, during 1979-1980 amounted to the following:

Millions of Syrian pounds	1979	1980
1. Deposits under demand	4,262,088	6,207,723
2. Time deposits	921,583	1,099,484
Total deposits	5,183,671	7,307,207
Investments	9,497,163	13,783,543

It can be seen from the table that demand deposits have increased by 1945,635 million pounds, or some 31.3 percent. Time deposits have also increased by 177,901 million Syrian pounds, or 19.3 percent. The total increase of all deposits was 2123,536 million pounds, i.e., 40.9 percent. Investments increased by 4286,38 million pounds, or 45.13 percent.

The bank has 34 branches, distributed throughout the provinces and districts, and 33 exchange centers in various cities and facilities, such as airports, ports and at the border posts of neighboring countries.

The bank works directly with a number of foreign banks, including the Syrian-Lebanese Bank of Commerce, the Federation of Arab-French Banks, YUBAF-Paris and YUBAF-New York, and indirectly with several banks in London, Brussels and Japan.

The bank has no designated foreign branches, except for five in the Syrian free zones.

The director of planning and statistics of the bank's general directorate answered the following questions:

[Question] How do you assess the role of specialized banks in the national economy?

[Answer] The role of these banks is delineated in the effective laws and regulations. They constantly strive to expand their activities to ensure that the services required by the national economy are rendered. The Commercial Bank of Syria is charged with financing Syrian foreign and domestic trade and the parallel discount market recently established.

[Question] What sort of developments in terms of techniques and personnel has the bank directorate undertaken?

[Answer] The bank has excellent banking expertise and strives to develop intelligent techniques by means of computers and microcomputers tht link our operating branches together. It also has training courses to qualify its staff on banking operations.

[Question] What are the trends of the domestic interest market, both for the people and among banks?

[Interest is all the same in Syrian banks. The state has adopted measures to encourage savings, especially through postal savings banks, since the interest rate has risen from 5 to 8 percent. It has also encouraged investment certificates.

[Question] How do you view the development of Arab banks abroad, and what are their advantages to Arab countries?

[Answer] Arab banks abroad help to solve the Arab countries' problems, and for the most part, grant them favorable conditions in comparison with foreign banks.

[Question] In your view, what is the Arab investment situation abroad and its trends, particularly in the Arab countries?

[Answer] Excellent, if there is economic integration. At that time, the Arab banks and funds should concentrate their financing in those Arab countries that require such financing.

7005
CSO: 4404/27

ZAKUM NATURAL GAS TO BE HARNESSED SOON

GF041036 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 4 Dec 81 p 1

[Article by Raman Kapoor]

[Text] Flaring of associated gas from the giant Zakum field will be stopped by the end of this month, when the multi-million-dollar gas gathering scheme II of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) begins.

Ever since the Zakum field was activated in 1967, the associated gas has been flared, mainly because it was uneconomical to harness the gas in view of low oil prices. The gas gathering now will lead to a massive saving in terms of energy resources for the national economy.

Zakum oil production is at present pegged at 215,000 barrels per day (BPD) and that of associated gas at 125 million cubic feet per day. About 20 to 25 million cubic feet of gas is being used for power generation, etc. and the remaining quantity is being flared.

A gas treatment plant has been installed close the Zakum west supercomplex. Its trial runs have been completed and now work is going on for commissioning it. "In 4 weeks' time, the flaring will gradually stop," said Mr George Latawiec, gas coordinator of the ADMA-OPCO, which will manage and operate the facilities built by ADNOC.

Mr Latawiec said the gas would be channelled through the new plant to Umm Shaif from where it would be piped to Das Island for processing at the LNG plant.

The design capacity of Phase I of the scheme is to treat and compress 280 million cubic feet of gas per day. When the plant begins operations the gas supply would be around 100 to 160 million cubic feet in view of the controlled rate of oil production from the Zakum field.

Mr Latawiec said the gas treatment plan consisted of a cooling facility, a condensate stabilization unit and gas turbine-driven compressors. According to the original plans, the associated gas from the Zakum central, Zakum west and the ZADCO fields are to be carried in pipeline networks to the new compressor plant. Since ZADCO's facilities are not yet ready, ZADCO gas will not be available for the new plant.

A gas drying plant has been installed at the Zakum central supercomplex, and from this a maximum of 148 million cubic feet of gas can be supplied to the new compressor plant through a 24-inch pipe. ZADCO's central collector platform is also to be linked to the new plant with a 16-inch subsea pipeline which can carry a maximum of 65 million cubic feet of gas per day.

From Zakum west, a maximum of 70 million cubic feet of associated gas can be transferred to the new plant.

Mr Latawiec said once the new plant began operations, gas would be moved from there by an 18-inch pipeline to the Umm Shaif supercomplex gas treatment platform. Condensates would be pumped to ZADCO's central collector platform through a 6-inch pipeline.

A gas relief line from the new plant is being connected to the two new flare lines which will be lighted in emergencies or during possible shutdowns of the LNG plant at Das Island.

Zakum gas will be piped from Umm Shaif supercomplex to the Das plant. At the Umm Shaif complex the gas will be passed through the existing treatment plant where a small extension will accommodate the pig-receiving and slug-catching facilities.

At present the Das LNG plant is utilizing about 530 million cubic feet of gas per day mainly from the Umm Shaif field, but with the opening of the Zakum plant it will be able to supplement the supply to Das. ADGAS has a long-term contract to supply LNG to Japan.

CSO: 4400/81

BRIEFS

SCHOOL STATISTICS--The number of UAE students has increased from 40,193 in 1972-73 to 108,842 in 1980-81. In a report published today, AL-WAHDAH said that the number of school teachers and administrative staff has increased from 1,386 in 1972-73 to 8,893 in 1980-81. Schools increased from 129 in 1972-73 to 2,883 in 1980-81 and the number of classes increased from 1,290 to 3,966. [GF290837 Abu Dhabi WAM in Arabic 1305 GMT 28 Nov 81]

OIL EXPLORATION AGREEMENT WITH TEXACO--Shaykh Rasid ibn Ahmad al-Mu'alla, member of the Supreme Council and ruler of Umm al-Qaywayn, signed an agreement at the Amiri Court this afternoon with the U.S. company Texaco. The agreement involves establishing an oil and gas industry and exploring for oil in the offshore area of Umm al-Qaywayn, which is about 650 square km in size. On the company's behalf, the agreement was signed by its vice president, (Elion). In the first stage of the agreement, the company will make a geographical survey and will drill two oil wells at a cost of $5 million within 24 months of signing the agreement. The signing ceremony was attended by Dr Man'i Sa'id al-Utaybah, petroleum and natural resources minister; Shaykh Sultan ibn Ahmad al-Mu'alla, head of the petroleum and mineral department in Umm al-Qaywayn; shaykhs; and senior officials. [Excerpt] [GF071655 Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 1530 GMT 7 Dec 81]

CSO: 4404/153

DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE in French 18 Nov 81 p 7

[Article by Jean Gueyras: "The Forgotten Civil War"]

[Text] San'a--Is there a civil war going on in North Yemen? The foreign journalist trying to find an answer to that question rapidly runs into a wall of silence. Officials being questioned suddenly become evasive and fume about the attention being given to "a few minor and isolated confrontations between the regular army and some of our misguided brothers" in the eastern part of the governorate of Ebb, which borders on South Yemen. "Do not listen to the malevolent rumors being spread by our enemies," people tell you, emphasizing that the calm prevailing in the capital city and its environs indicates that the country is actually in a state of "civil peace."

Yet on balance one notes that security has been much tighter in San'a for nearly 3 months. Searching of vehicles is more and more frequent, once night has fallen, and stricter controls on leaving the city are in effect. The slightest movement of President Ali Abdallah Saleh is accompanied by an impressive deployment of military protection measures.

Indeed, despite the silence observed by the news organs and the discretion of officials, everyone here talks about the "forgotten civil war" which has continued intermittently for almost a year now in the southern part of the country, pitting government forces against the guerrillas of the Democratic National Front (FND), which is composed of the leftist parties along with former soldiers and tribal chiefs who remain faithful to the memory of President Hamdi, assassinated in October 1977. The FND is for all practical purposes in control of an entire area in the eastern part of the governorate of Ebb, in a mountainous, almost inaccessible region linked to South Yemen through the town of Kaataba.

Relations with Aden, however, are good and the two brother countries are imperturbably continuing their interminable negotiations over a possible merger, as if they were not engaged in a conflict. All the same, a quick look at the map is enough to realize that the Front's guerrillas could not keep going without political, military and logistical support from South Yemen. Following the Kuwait accords which in March 1979 put an end to the "little border war" between two Yemens, Aden had reduced its support for the FND in order not to jeopardize the reconciliation with San'a. Everything seems to indicate now that its aid has been resumed on a large scale.

A Precarious Truce

The accord reached 31 January 1980 between President Ali Abdallah Saleh and the secretary general of the Front (Mr Sultan Omar, who has taken asylum in Aden) with the intent of normalizing relations between the government and the Leftist opposition, has remained a dead letter. Despite their initial promise, the talks finally reached an impasse over the thorny problem of FND participation in the government. The North Yemeni president is willing to accept representatives of the Front "in their personal capacity" as members of his cabinet, but he is not at all disposed to grant the FND official status or important ministerial portfolios. The Front, on the other hand, has reportedly expressed the desire to control at least three of the main ministerial positions--including the interior and information ministries--and intends to make its entry into the government the start of a process of creating a "really democratic regime."

The ministerial shake-up of 15 October 1980, which saw the removal of several "progressive" personalities who enjoyed the confidence of the FND, ignited the powder-keg. An increasing number of military engagements took place, especially in the quadrilateral marked by Ebb-Nadira-Damt-Kaataba, which had become the stronghold of the rebellion. They were followed in April by discreet though futile negotiations to reactivate the accord of January 1980. At the end of June the fighting resumed on an even larger scale and with increased violence, when the authorities realized that the Front had made use of the truce to strengthen its positions. The engagements which continued throughout the whole month of July and resumed in August sometimes had the look of a war for position, during the course of which heavy armaments, for the first time, were used by both sides. Government reinforcements were dispatched from San'a to the site of the fighting with the aim of "breaking" the rebel forces once and for all. Since September a precarious truce has once again settled over the combat zones, interrupted occasionally by token government air strikes against FND positions.

The general staff in San'a claims it is pleased with the way operations have been going and claims to have recaptured control of several key positions held by the rebels. The political leaders, who are more realistic, are less inclined to optimism. They know that nothing has really been resolved and that the Front, whose forces have not been dismantled, can with help from Aden build back its numbers with little difficulty. Moreover, the war against the FND troops is not popular in the army. Twenty-four officers were arrested in July for "refusal to fight," and four of them were shot. The severe losses sustained by certain government units have dangerously impaired the soldiers' morale.

President Ali Abdallah Saleh, who is also the commander in chief of the army, does not share the euphoria of some of his officers. He believes a military victory is impossible. Above all, he knows that he does not have sufficient seasoned forces, at least for the time being, to dislodge the guerrillas form their mountainous redoubt, and fears that any attempt made in that direction could degenerate into an open war with South Yemen, a situation he wants to avoid at all costs. On 15 September he met his South Yemeni counterpart, President Ali Nasser, at Taez, to warn him of the "incalculable consequences" continuation of the border fighting poses for the two countries. The official communique, which was made public at the conclusion of the meeting, mentions as always the "brotherhood" and "unity" between the two countries and the necessity of avoiding regional involvement with the policies of "foreign blocs." In reality, according to information from excellent sources in

San'a, the obligatory optimism of the soothing language in the communique was completely contrary to the atmosphere of the talks themselves, which, it is said, were quite heated.

A New Dialogue of the Deaf

The meeting quickly turned into a new dialogue of the deaf. President Ali Nasser once again demanded a political solution, maintaining that the Front's entry into the government was the only way to defuse the crisis. President Ali Abdallah Saleh answered drily that negotiations leading toward a political solution were under way and that Aden could contribute to their success by putting an end to the many forms of aid it is providing to the FND. He also expressed his "serious concern" about the tripartite pact concluded in early August between South Yemen, Ethiopia and Libya, which included a "military clause" that in his view constituted a permanent threat against North Yemen.

The Taez meeting resolved nothing. President Ali Nasser promised to pass on to the party political bureau the North Yemeni desiderata. But no one here has excessive illusions. The changes in Aden's collegial leadership that were made in June, and the naming of Saleh Mousleh--reputedly more "hardline" than President Ali Nasser--to head the defense ministry, have strengthened the faction that favors a more vigorous policy toward the San'a regime, which is accused of being "soft" on Saudi Arabia.

It is true that the "Saudi clan," which here is commonly known under the vague appellation of the Islamic Front, is in the majority in the government. But decision-making power lies solely with the president of the republic, who proved last March that he was capable on occasion of defying his powerful neighbor to the north the more effectively to assert his autonomy. He showed this last March when he went ahead with the arrest of Mr Abdallah Asnag, ex-minister of foreign affairs, who was considered to be Riyadh's liegeman. Asnag had not only cast doubt on President Ali Abdallah Saleh's abilities as chief of state, but he had also informed Saudi Arabia--in a letter which "chanced" to fall into the hands of the authorities--about the president's proposed trip to Moscow, with the apparent intent of nipping in the bud an initiative which would have profoundly displeased the Saudi leaders. But all the pressure the latter have exerted for close to 2 years to convince President Saleh to abandon his policy of military cooperation with the USSR has been in vain. On this particular point, the North Yemeni head of state appears intractable. He believes that without the military aid supplied unstintingly by the Soviet Union--"on a strictly commercial basis," people here insist--he would be unable to maintain a powerful army and preserve enough freedom of action to remain independent both of Saudi Arabia and of his burdensome "brothers" to the south.

An Able Man But a Weak Regime

President Abdallah Saleh is facing a dilemma which is common to all nationalist leaders who rule in San'a: he cannot afford the luxury of appearing to be too pro-Saudi, without risking a rapid crumbling of his popularity in a traditionally anti-Saudi country. But, at the same time, he cannot survive without Riyadh's economic aid: this explains the political concessions he has been led to make. The visit he finally made to Moscow last October, presumably against the wishes of the Saudis, shows that he is unwilling to go too far down the road of concessions when he believes the vital interests of the nation are at stake.

What was he looking for in Moscow? Probably increased financial and economic aid and a rescheduling of his country's debts to the USSR--about $600 million, according to some estimates. And also, above all, he probably wanted to get the Soviets to agree to approach the South Yemenis discreetly to convince them to put an end to the military aid they are supplying the Front. It is still too soon to tell how successful that initiative will be in contributing to a return of civil peace to the country. What is clear, however, is that President Abdallah Saleh's policy of balancing between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen--a policy which he pursues with surprising skill--could in the long run be fatal. The North Yemeni head of state will celebrate in July the fourth anniversary of his accession to power--a not insignificant achievement in a country notorious for the chronic instability of its institutions. But his regime still rests on a fragile base.

Little by little, the man who only a few years ago was only an obscure soldier with no political experience has shown himself to be a credible head of state who has been able to impose his will on a country which is deeply divided into hostile clans. But he has made many enemies: first of all, within the army, which he purged, thereby creating numerous and deeply rooted enmities among certain highly-placed officers who were offended by his lightning-fast political ascent; and also among the politicians and feudal clan leaders whom he divided to better assure his continuance in power. His great weakness, however, remains the failure of the policy of national reconciliation he launched in 1979 with the creation of a Committee for National Dialogue, whose activities were in principle supposed to lead to the election of a national assembly by universal suffrage in 1981.

The Committee for National Dialogue still continues its work, which is greeted with general indifference, but its activities have been drained of any substance by the persistence of the civil war, which hangs heavily over everyone. No one is at this time prepared to hazard fixing a date for the "free and democratic" elections which were to open up a new era in the history of North Yemen.

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END

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22 December 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2457

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22 December 1981

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2457

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FREEDOM OF PRESS SEEN IN DANGER

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 246, 7 Nov 81 p 5

[Editorial: "From 'AL-MUSTAQBAL'"]

[Text] Let us imagine the Arab world without the press. Many people would like that, because the press, to them, is a source of annoyance (if not worse), rather than a means of disseminating news and opinion.

This world, without the press, would have no forum to present the point of view of any group, and consequently the positions of parties to any issue would be subject to fabrications and rumors. No matter how harsh the truth may be, it is still in most cases kinder than fabrication and rumor.

So if these people reflected a bit, they would want newspapers and magazines to continue being published more than we ourselves do. For in the end it is their only means of communicating what they have to say to the people. The official media will never take the place of the press, because the people usually treat them with caution, suspicion, and doubt, even when they tell the truth. Every day there are a thousand instances bearing the truth of this statement.

The official media are necessary, because they reflect the official point of view. However, the private media are an even greater necessity, for the Arab reader wants to breathe with two lungs, not one. The facts prove that the life of people who live on one lung is an endangered life, and is shorter by far than that of people who have two lungs.

In spite of that, there are those who are determined that this [Arab] reader should breathe with one lung, or with half a lung when necessary, even though the number of "fatalities" among them has reached record proportions.

We cannot imagine the Arab world, or any other world, without a press, specifically a free press. We hope that the "infection" stays away from us, for that is the logic of history.

CSO: 4504/119

WEST BANK PALESTINIANS REPORTEDLY NOT INTIMIDATED BY LEAGUES

NC301247 (Clandestine) Voice of Palestine in Arabic 1110 GMT 30 Nov 81

[Text] Our people in the occupied territories, Mustafa Dudin and Bisharah Qumsiyah, received the green light today from [Israeli Defense Minister] General Sharon. They can now carry Israeli uzi submachineguns and set up armed groups, each consisting of a number of mercenaries, to protect them against the pronouncement of condemnation passed against them by the people, to save them from the fate to which they are doomed--the same fate as Yusuf al-Khatib's and every traitor who has reneged against his homeland, people and nation.

These two agents have gone to the end of the road in their treason. However, they are wrong if they believe that the uzi submachineguns will save them from the black fate. They are also wrong if they believe that their mean game will intimidate the Palestinian masses and make them tremble before an Israeli weapon held by the mercenaries of Dudin and Qumsiyah.

The agents, who have been disavowed even by their children and kinsmen, will not find a military Palestinian who would take it upon himself, honor and dignity to carry a Zionist weapon to confront his kinsmen and people with it.

The Palestinians have been taking up arms for the past 17 years to confront the enemy, and their weapons will not be intimidated by the weapons of Dudin and Qumsiyah. The mercenaries who have put themselves in the service of the enemies of their people are too small to create a state of sedition in the arena of the occupied homeland. The blood of the traitors and agents is demanded by all the people. Whoever enlists to serve occupation is a mercenary who is disavowed by his kinsmen, the people and the homeland.

CSO: 4404/165

BRIEFS

KUWAITI-LEBANESE BANKING DEAL--A new group of Kuwaiti and Lebanese interests has entered the Lebanese banking market by purchasing shares of the Izdihar Bank owned by the Al-Wahbah group. The bank operates with a capital of 5 million Lebanese pounds and specializes almost exclusively in loans collateralized with public vehicle titles. The owners of the aforementioned bank entered a stage of inactivity prior to the sale of the bank which resulted in a budget limited to approximately 11 million Lebanese pounds. The bank's purchasing interests are not new to the Lebanese banking sector since they had previously been granted a license to set up a new bank in Lebanon with a capital of 50 million Lebanese pounds. However, they backed out of that preferring to purchase an existing bank, so that they would enjoy the freedom of determining the capital amount without being restricted to a 50 million Lebanese pound limit. They would also benefit from owning bearer shares which they could register and sell whenever they desired to do so without having to adhere to the conditions imposed on the "nominal shares" in the license of any new bank. The new group has not specified when the bank would begin operations under new ownership but it is expected to take place at the beginning of the new year after preparations are completed and capital is increased. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 248, 21 Nov 81 p 65]

LIBYAN WEAPONS CONDUIT TO PLO--Because the Palestinians do not have "an internationally recognized territory," the Soviet Union cannot supply the PLO with weapons directly. This, according to the Lebanese London-based weekly AL HAWADESS was the reply the Soviet leaders gave to PLO chairman Yasser Arafat when he visited Moscow last month. An agreement was, however, reached for supplying the PLO with weapons through Libya and, according to the report, this is the reason why Mr Arafat went straight to Tripoli after Moscow. The PLO chairman had submitted to the Soviet leaders a "shopping list" including heavy weapons. The consequences of such a deal concluded through Libya would mean, observers believe, that some kind of control could be exerted by the Libyans on the Palestinian resistance in Lebanon. One of the main questions raised was why was Libya, and not Syria, chosen as the country through which the weapons would be supplied, and some observers saw in this the sign of a strain between Moscow and Damascus, in addition to the strain which already exists between Syria and the PLO. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 7 Nov 81 p 2]

CSO: 4500/65

FEASIBILITY STUDY UNDERWAY FOR IRAQ-OMAN RAIL LINK

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 pp 7, 8

[Text]

Plans for the biggest development in railway engineering on the Arabian peninsula since construction of the Hejaz railway 73 years ago are to be presented to Gulf rulers in December. K F Smith, Managing Director of Transmark, British Rail's design division, is to visit the Gulf next month with the first detailed feasibility studies for a railway to run the entire length of the peninsula's Gulf coast.

The line was originally suggested in 1978, when Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE signed a provisional agreement to investigate the project. Since then, Oman has expressed interest and the Transmark report is understood to recommend that the the line should end in Oman rather than in the UAE. Transmark's report outlining the various ideas for the line should be ready for distribution to the Gulf governments by the end of November and Mr Smith will then tour the Gulf states to go over details with the authorities there. In particular, Transmark hopes that the Gulf Cooperation Council which brings together Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman, will take an interest in the project.

Transmark believes the Gulf railway would provide a much-needed link which would serve not only the economic interests of the Arab states but would also ease their fears over their security. In particular, it would provide an alternative route for traffic should there be any threat of closure of the Straits of Hormuz, the entrance to the Gulf.

In addition to its plans for the Gulf line, Transmark has undertaken feasibility studies for Kuwait for a rail network which were completed in 1979 and for a 40-kilometres railway to link Iraq's existing rail system with Kuwait's North–South line. The Iraqi extension and the Kuwaiti line would form the first elements of the proposed Gulf line. In all probability, it would also incorporate the 80-kilometres line Saudi Arabia has planned between Dammam and Jubail.

Transmark bases its economic arguments in favour of the line on the diversification of industry in the Gulf and on changing infrastructural requirements. It believes the line will constitute a unifying and strengthening force for the area and provide transport options where none exist at present.

Transmark's plans have all been drawn up with a view to full compatibility between one line and another and with lines under consideration elsewhere in the region. The British firm has paid special attention to Saudi Arabia's plans for an eventual East–West railway line and for the reconstruction at some unspecified date of the old Hejaz railway.

Italy's Technital are the chief consultants for railway development in Saudi Arabia. At present, its main concern is the current upgrading of the Dammam–Riyadh line. This single-track line is being shortened in distance and relaid as a twin-track line. When completed, it will form the eastern section of the proposed trans-peninsula railway.

Saudi Arabia has not however, taken any firm decisions on the exact route for a line from Riyadh to the Red Sea coast. Nor has a decision been taken on whether the proposed line would link up with the Hejaz railway when, as appears probable, the old line is rebuilt and possibly extended. Final decisions on these major projects are unlikely until 1983, with commitments to build them in whole or in parts being contained in the next Saudi Arabian five-year plan which will run from 1986 to 1990.

One section of the Hejaz railway will be rebuilt by 1985. This is the section in Syria which runs from Damascus to Deraa, close to the Jordanian border. Syria allocated $ 90 million towards the project eight months ago and another British firm, Henderson Busby has just been put in charge of preparing design studies. Henderson Busby will also carry out design studies for a standard gauge line from Damascus to Zarghaya, on the Lebanese border, and for reconstruction of the main Hejaz railway station in the Syrian capital. Henderson Busby will be carrying out these studies with three other firms with which it is acting in partnership.

CSO: 4400/80

GUERRILLAS KILL DEFENSE MINISTRY GENERAL

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 30Nov 81 p 2

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 29--Stepped-up terrorist activity by anti-Government guerillas in Kabul recently has claimed the lives of a senior Defence Ministry official and his wife and several party functionaries, a report from the Afghan capital said.

Brigadier Mohammad Azam and his wife were assassinated one night between Nov 24-26 at their home in the Khoshalkhan Meean area of Kabul near the Qargha military barracks said the report from a source who has been accurate in the past.

The anti-Government guerillas escaped safely even though the home was protected by armed guards, the unconfirmed report said. It was not known if any of the guards were killed or wounded.

No information about Azam was immediately available except that he reportedly had been educated in the Soviet Union.

On last Tuesday night insurgents killed three members of the National Fatherland Front and other party members while they attended a meeting at the Karte Char section of Kabul, the source said. The guerillas set fire to the home where the meeting was held before they withdrew.

The National Fatherland Front is a council set up by an effort to broaden support for his unpopular regime. It reportedly has been largely ineffective.

Kabul's Denial

Meanwhile the Kabul source disagreed strongly with Western diplomatic reports here last week which said the Afghan capital's best hotel, the Intercontinental, had been hit by insurgent-fired rockets.

The diplomatic report said the blasts occurred the previous week and apparently were aimed at scaring delegates to an Afro-Asian Solidarity congress staying at the hotel.

The hotel actually was hit by three bomb blasts which slightly damaged it and nearby buildings, the source said. Some of the guests were frightened but there were no injuries.

Elsewhere outside the capital, insurgents ambushed a Soviet supply convoy last week at Poli Matak, about 80 kilometres (50 miles) north of Kabul in Parwan province.

The guerillas and local villagers looted more than 20 trucks carrying food, ammunition and winter uniforms and fled before Government reinforcements arrived, the source quoted a witness as saying.

Soviet helicopter gunships bombarded the surrounding villages for several hours before Afghan troops from the provincial capital of Charikar arrived and scoured the area for the fleeing insurgents, the source said.

There was no immediate report of casualties on either side.

Several of the supply trucks were said to have been destroyed in the attack.--APA

CSO: 4600/145

QANDAHAR SAID TO BE REDUCED TO RUBBLE

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 30 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Nov 29--After three months of continuous fighting between Afghan insurgents and Government forces, the provincial capital of Kandahar resembles a bombed-out European city at the end of World War II, a report from Afghanistan says.

Many hundreds of homes have been destroyed in Kandahar, 300 miles south-west of Kabul and a sizeable part of the once 200 000-strong population has fled to the safety of the countryside, said the report reaching here on Friday from a source who has been accurate in the past.

The report could not immediately be verified. However, a western diplomatic report earlier this month also spoke of heavy damage to the city of Kandahar and the widespread flight of its residents.

Food shortages were beginning to be a problem with few supplies reaching the city from surrounding villages because of the fighting.

Markets and bazaars have closed and only a few food shops remained enough food for present, said the report quoting travellers from Kandahar reaching Kabul.

The insurgents also have been attacking Government supply columns and last week destroyed 42 heavily loaded trucks in the nearby towns of Ar Puza said.--APA

CSO: 4600/145

WATER SHORTAGE EFFECT ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OUTLINED

Algeria Al-SHA'B in Arabic 13 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Jamal Salihi: "The Problem of Agricultural Irrigation in Eastern Algeria; Competition Between the Industrial Sector and Household Consumption"]

[Text] The water shortage problem has become one of the stumbling blocks on the road to development and improvement of the standard of living of the citizens. The problem remains unsolved with regard to both drinking water and water allocated for agricultural irrigation and industrial plant consumption.

The lack of water in our country is not due to a lack of rainfall or insufficient supplies of ground water. It is due primarily to the failure to achieve rational use of rainwater including storage of sufficient quantities of water behind dams, the exploitation of groundwater through the drilling of wells, and the construction of pumping stations, not to mention the water lost by runoff into the ocean, evaporation, leakage through ground fissures, or waste from faucets.

This problem is most severe in the areas of the country where competition for this basic ingredient of life is fiercest among the following three uses: household consumption, consumption by the industrial sector, and irrigation in the agricultural sector.

Perhaps this situation applies most clearly to the eastern part of Algeria. A third of the country's population is concentrated in this area and industrial development is experiencing a strong boom there. Moreover, the area is a prime agricultural region.

This area receives a substantial share of the country's rainfall. The department of Annaba led the country in the number of rainfall days in 1979 with 122 days for a total of 881 mm of rain. This is more than all other departments in eastern Algeria combined. Perhaps this fact is what has placed Annaba in the forefront of the departments that are waging the battle of industrial development. Annaba possesses 48 economic units including 22 plants in the heavy industry sector.

In general, this area is experiencing a comparatively strong industrial boom. Industries centered in this region include numerous plants and installations of

the iron and steel industry (el-Hadjar, Annaba), the petrochemical and refining industries (Skikda), the mechanical implements and tractor industry (Constantine), the bicycle and motorcycle industry (Guelma), the plastics industries (Setif), and the textile industries (Batna), as well as building material plants and conversion industries. All of these industries require large quantities of water in the course of their processing operations. As an example of this, while the Algerian citizen uses an average of 75 liters of water per day--a figure that is below international standard of water consumption, which is 300 liters per day--the production of 1 kilogram of steel requires 270 liters and the production of 1 kilogram of rayon requires 1,000 liters. However, the high concentration of large industrial projects which have won priority in past development plans has had a far-reaching impact on the agricultural sector both from the standpoint of the industrial projects' encroachment on arable lands and from the standpoint of the diversion of irrigation water to operate industrial plants. This has created an imbalance between the two sectors and has complicated their growth, which was to have been balanced and integrated. This situation has been aggravated by the sprawl of construction into fertile lands without proper attention to development preparation.

The fact is that the water shortage problem has not been brought on by the industrial sector so much as by the sector responsible for the completion of the dams scheduled in the development plans as well as the small and medium-sized irrigation projects. These projects could have stored significant quantities of both rainwater and groundwater. While it was inevitable that industry should ask to obtain the lion's share of the water at the expense of agriculture and household consumption, it should have been obligatory before every industrial project was set down in past plans--and this should be a lesson for us in the planning of industrial projects in the future--that hydraulic studies be conducted to pinpoint the water resources required by the project without recourse to competition with agriculture or household consumption for the same resource. Of course, we are not speaking here of the precedence which the project should obtain.

The area that we are discussing is a suitable area for the construction of dams because of its undulating terrain and the quantities of rainfall it receives in the winter. However, this matter does not depend solely on the suitability of natural and climatic conditions or on planning and the allocation of financial resources. The insurmountable obstacle lies in the weakness of the means of implementation. The level at which the large dams are being completed is very low and does not conform to the prescribed goals--especially in view of the competition for building materials and means of transport this sector is experiencing with the construction sector.

For these reasons, the least we can do is to encourage small and medium-sized irrigation units such as small dams, artesian wells, and pumping stations. The key advantage of these units is that their installation and operation can be controlled at the local level without exhorbitant costs, the use of high technologies, and with a considerable saving of time.

8591
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INSECURITY REPORTED GROWING AMONG REGIME OFFICIALS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 pp 1-2

[Text] Signs of growing insecurity among the rulers of Iran's Islamic Republic multiplied during the past week. Ayatollah Khomeini himself warned the president, premier and the cabinet that they must not forget that their power was derived from the people and the clergy; while a whole battery of top officials took part in a campaign against the Saudi Prince Fahd's Mideast peace plan, and the first overt signs of a split between the regime and the PLO were to be seen.

Observers looked back at remarks about the need to call back Iran's experts and to appease the business community by Majlis Speaker and Tehran Friday prayers leader Hashemi Rafsanjani the previous week, to find some reason for Khomeini's hint of divisions among the ruling group in his remarks to the country's top officials.

President Ali Khamenei had criticised Rafsanjani's remarks afterwards. And when Rafsanjani's place was taken at Friday prayers last weekend by chief justice Mussavi-Ardabili tongues began to wag. They said Rafsanjani had been pushed aside or had deliberately stayed away. Khomeini's warning to Khamenei and his henchmen made it clear he was warning them against moving too fast in their plans to institute radical change if sections of the people and the clergy were against them.

He said they must not forget that it was thanks to the "people on the scene" that they were now occupying positions like the presidency, premiership and other top posts. "Were it not for the people you would have been either in prison, in exile, or living an isolated life," he declared. They must not choose a policy which did not conform with the people's or clergy's wishes.

A split, as suggested in last week's IPS newsletter, between Khamenei and his radical hardliners and Rafsanjani and former premier Mahdavi-Kavi and their supporters on the other, seemed to be confirmed by Khomeini's remarks the following day. He gave a strong warning that if the regime's officials did not unite their ranks "then you will be finished."

Observers felt that the pressure on the regime from the moderate clergy was growing as unease among the business community over nationalisation of trade and rumours of more "sovietisation" swelled. With severe food shortages and

a monthly kerosene ration of a meagre 20 litres a month announced, they said, there was a growing tendency, too, among ordinary people to blame the mullahs' government for their bad management.

Reports suggesting resentment and frustration in the armed forces, among even the ordinary soldiers, was much more widespread than had been suspected were other elements in a situation that was obviously seriously perturbing Khomeini and his advisers. The ayatollah did not hesitate to warn that the supporters of the Shah would return if the regime did not close its ranks.

"There is no doubt some big row had broken out," one Tehran observer contacted by IPS said. "Khomeini sounded very concerned. His warnings were explicit this time. There is obviously strong pressure for moderation before it's too late."

Some confirmation of this was also reflected in warnings that a new coup threatened the regime, and in growing attacks on "monarchist grouplets" as well as the Mojahedin and its leftist allies. Indeed, Khamenei said in a speech early in the week that "supporters of the former regime, Savakis and others have had a hand in the sabotage," as well as the Mojahedin. The often ritualistic attacks on the late Shah and his father by Khomeini and other officials seemed to be intensified.

Khamenei admitted that security was now one of the country's major preoccupations. "It's our duty to keep peace and security, law and order, in this country--that's why we cannot have any leniency for the terrorists and for those who want to impose the rule of terror on our people," he said. "We will deal with them mercilessly. Helped and supported by foreign powers and international so-called human rights organisations, the terrorists think they can induce leniency in us, reducing the strength of our determination. They are all wrong. We shall not fail, we shall not bend to their desire."

At Friday prayers in Tehran Musavi-Ardabili made a startling admission of the toll being taken of regime officials by the continuing violence throughout the country. He told the congregation that in the past month alone "we have lost 500 of our best revolutionary colleagues." He was emphasising the gravity of the situation for the government. Though the Tehran press reports killings of revolutionary officials on most days Mussavi-Ardabili's figures were the first public admission of their extent.

Another feature which struck Iran watchers was the clear moderation of public utterances by most top officials. Although firm about terrorism and the war with Iraq Khamenei himself was fairly pragmatic and realistic in his speech, as he had been on the only previous occasion when he had made a public speech since his election as president. He abjured the usual Islamic slogans.

He conceded the economic situation was not bright, blaming as usual the economic set-up under the Shah's regime for this. He asked for control of consumption to help the situation.

"We are not asking you to fast, but to economise," he said. "Why buy a freezer if you don't absolutely need it? Why change a small refrigerator for a bigger one? Why not manage with your old sewing machine? Why not use public transport instead of private cars? Why not eat just enough for your needs, instead of overeating and throwing away waste food?"

On the war Khamenei said Iraq must withdraw without conditions, though he did not mention compensation, as his prime minister Hossain Mussavi had done.

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REGIME BREAK WITH 'ARAFAT, PLO SEEN NEAR

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] The chorus of attacks by prominent Iranian officials on the eight-point Middle East peace plan put forward by Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd reached a crescendo early in the week, with Ayatollah Khomeini himself adding his pungent condemnation of it.

But observers of the Iranian scene were most intrigued by the thinly-veiled attacks on PLO leader Yaser Arafat by more than one official, and then the publication of a personal attack on him by name in the semi-official organ of the revolutionary guards.

The paper accused Arafat of collaboration with the West and the Zionists in his welcome of Fahd's plan. It urged the authorities to check more carefully on the activities of the Palestinians in Iran. "The government must order a close investigation into the activities of the PLO and its embassy in Tehran," the paper said.

Observers in Europe saw these attacks as a response to Palestinian support for the Mojahedin, which is now out in the open. The government became even more sensitive to this when it was realised that the Mojahedin had managed to infiltrate the revolutionary guards to a very considerable degree. Ayatollah Montazeri, whose son died in the IRP headquarters bomb attack blamed on the Mojahedin, was deputed to purge the suspect elements from the guards.

Some observers point also to steadily growing tension in the relations between the Tehran regime and the Palestinians since the war with Iraq broke out. Tehran has suspected the PLO of at least indirectly supporting the Iraqis in the war, and the guards' paper criticised arafat's latest meeting with Saddam Husain.

There was also little doubt whom Khomeini had in mind when he emphasised, in a powerful attack on the Fahd plan on Monday, that "every dutiful Muslim must condemn this shameful project which is inspired by the Great Satan with the ultimate aim of imposing on Muslims recognition of the oppressor state of Israel." He implied Muslims accepting the plan, which he labelled as "heretical, anti-Islamic and thus unlawful," were traitors.

Ayatollah Montazeri has called for a protest march this weekend against the Saudi plan.

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ARMED FORCES VIEWED AS FRUSTRATED, RESENTFUL

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] Military commanders, especially those on the western front, are reported increasingly angry over the regime's failure to replenish their stocks of arms and ammunition as well as widespread inefficiency at the joint staff command headquarters in Tehran. Socio-political commissars, planted by the mullahs to spy on officers and other ranks, have also spread anger and frustration among all ranks, including conscripts.

Frustration has mounted rapidly because of the rising number of casualties in recent weeks. Reports from Iran suggest that the ground forces are now losing around 50 to 60 men every day, compared with less than 10 a day on average during the summer. The officer corps puts the blame for the rising casualty list on the regime's failure to provide much-needed arms and equipment.

The military are also said to be angry at the inconclusive course of the war. They feel they are being deliberately kept at the front line to serve the mullahs' political purposes. Resentment against the clerics is becoming so intense that the turbanned political commissars no longer dare go among the other ranks in the front line areas for fear of their lives.

There is also resentment at the way the Ideological and Information Service of the army, located in Tehran and run entirely by the mullahs, puts out war communiques and manages the army's propaganda. Professional soldiers are ashamed to see the mullahs put out blatant lies in their name. Officers say that often true accounts of their bravery and successes at the front line are omitted from war dispatches while amateurish lies are broadcast. This makes them feel ridiculed.

Reports add that there is spreading contempt for all the mullahs, especially Khomeini. Officers and men refer to Arabs as Tazis, which is often used to call dogs. Ironically, there is still lingering admiration for the Israelis; General Dayan's death recently was the occasion for acknowledging respect for him in private.

Conscripts returning home have reported that soldiers and officers spoke well of Dayan and praised his capability when they heard news of his death. They also said that there is fierce resentment against the Russians and the British, who are believed to supply Iraqis with weapons.

Although the officers and men are afraid of the mullahs' spies, they often speak with respect of the late Shah and have sympathy for the young Shah. They believe that the late Shah, and consequently the army, were betrayed by the Americans.

The conscripts are, in particular, angry with the mullahs because they have exempted students of theological schools from doing national service. They also resent the way the regime favours the revolutionary guards.

Sources say there are growing signs that the professional cadres in the army are resisting involvement in political squabbles or in combat missions against domestic opponents of the regime. Army units did not take part in operations against the Kurdish rebels recently in Bukan, although Tehran radio claimed they did.

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CBI GOVERNOR CLAIMS ECONOMY IS STRONG

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 pp 4-5

[Text] The governor of the Central Bank, Mohsen Noorbakhsh, says that Iran has sufficient foreign exchange reserves to pay for her imports, including arms.

He also said last week that oil exports were up to the intended levels, but did not mention any figures. His statement on the economy was intended to contradict a claim by his immediate predecessor, Alireza Nobari, that Iran is bankrupt. Nobari now lives in exile in Austria.

Sources in Iran say that oil exports are now around 400,000 barrels a day, sold mainly to the East Europeans at a posted price of 35 dollars a barrel. However, the sources said that through bookkeeping adjustments, the actual price paid by buyers was only $27. They also said a dealer in Zurich, believed to be a Jewish American, sells Iranian crude to unidentified buyers, possibly the South Africans. But Iran's income from oil is now less than one billion dollars a month.

The same sources said the regime has drastically cut down on imports, especially of industrial raw materials. Consumption is about 60 percent of what it was in 1979. Despite mobilisation of manpower for the war, unemployment is said to be around five million, or more than half the working population.

It is interesting to note, an Iranian economist pointed out, that those Central Bank officials who have retained their jobs despite widespread purges speak well of the new governor, although he is the mullah's appointee. The staff generally regarded Nobari as too inexperienced and lacking in principles. He was made governor by Bani-Sadr in November 1979 and held on to his job until he was sacked by the mullahs last June, when he left Iran to join his Austrian wife in Vienna.

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PARTY CHIEF SENTENCED TO LIFE IMPRISONMENT

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 pp 5-6

[Text] Abolfazl Qasemi, secretary-general of the Iran party long opposed to the Pahlavi regime, was sentenced to life imprisonment by a military tribunal in Tehran. A former member of his party and an activist in the National Front in the years prior to 1961 has contributed this brief account of events leading up to Qasemi's trial and the background to his organisation:

The Khomeini regime's military tribunal last week sentenced one of its most prominent liberal critics to life imprisonment. Abolfazl Qasemi, secretary-general of the nationalist Iran party, has formally protested against his life sentence, but in Khomeini's judicial system there is no provision for an appeal and protests are thus ignored.

Qasemi was arrested in July 1980, officially accused of collaboration with the former regime's security service, the SAVAK. At the time of his arrest, the propaganda arm of the regime published a document to the effect that Qasemi had received 500,000 rials from the SAVAK for "services rendered." Few had any doubt that the document was forged.

At that time, a special office at the Komiteh Markazi (Central Committee) operating under direct supervision of the assassinated leader Mohammad Beheshti, and personally managed by the present president Ali Khamenei and his premier Hoseyn Musavi, was known to use blank stationery from SAVAK and Majlis press facilities to forge documents to implicate the regime's opponents, either as SAVAK agents or American spies.

At the time of his arrest, Qasemi had won a landslide victory to the mullah's Majlis from his native town of Daragaz in northeast Iran. His unauthorised triumph at the polls angered Beheshti, who had formed an alliance with Mehdi Bazargan and Abolhasan Bani-Sadr to bring out of the ballot box a list of candidates known as the Great Coalition. Because Beheshti's agents were unable to find any other pretext to annul the election in Dargaz (the Qasemi clan dominate the town) they resorted to a forgery to disqualify him. In other towns, such as Kerman where Admiral Madani was elected, and Kermanshah, where Karim Sanjabi was elected, Beheshti ordered annulment of the elections.

Before Qasemi's arrest, a group of hezbollahis, wielding clubs and iron bars and protected by revolutionary guards, occupied the offices of the Iran party on Navab Street in Tehran, and looted the furniture. The mob went on a rampage for one hour and then a young turbanned official, claiming to be a personal aide to the Revolutionary Prosecutor-General, arrived on the scene and officially locked up the party's offices. Thus, Qasemi's arrest was thought to have the added motive of silencing the Iran party, which was then the only affiliate of the National Front which could boast of an organised set-up. Without the Iran party, the National Front could be reduced to a group of politicians with no grass roots organisation.

Qasemi's continued confinement, meanwhile, led to anxiety among his supporters. Outside Iran, liberal and socialist groups made representations to the regime in Tehran to secure his release. The mullahs thought, however, that they would lose face if they released him. So they organised a trial, so their newspapers reported. Nothing was heard until late last month, when suddenly the mullahs announced the military tribunal would take up the case because Qasemi had participated in the alleged coup attempt by Shapour Bakhtiar's supporters in July 1980. The announcement came as a shock because the military tribunal of Khomeini is, in effect, a small outfit, manned by a small group of Palestinian and Lebanese interrogators-cum-torturers and headed by one Mohammad Reyshahri, who is notorious for his ruthlessness and ignorance or distortion of Islamic law (Shariat). Perhaps because of international concern for Qasemi's life, the so-called military tribunal did not pass the death sentence. Yet Qasemi's life cannot be safe, because on several occasions the regime has sent to the firing squad those sentenced to life imprisonment. One such victim was former National Bank chief Yussef Khoshkish, who was sentenced to life in jail, but 10 months after the verdict the mullahs suddenly announced his execution.

Meanwhile, the Khomeini gang tried to use Qasemi's case to deal the coup de grace to the Iran party. The remainder of the party leaders, including Bazargan's former foreign minister, Karim Sanjabi, are said to be in danger. Sanjabi failed to answer a summons to give evidence at Qasemi's trial and a search is on for him.

The Iran party was set up in 1945, when several small political groups, including the Mihan party, united to form a middle-of-the-road social democratic organisation. In 1946, it agreed to a tactical coalition with the pro-Moscow communist Tudeh, when the prime minister, Ahmad Qavam, offered three cabinet seats to his leftist rivals. One of the three cabinet posts went to the Iran party's Allahyar Saleh, and the other two to Tudeh leaders. After a short while Qavam's coalition cabinet broke up and so did the Tudeh-Iran party alliance.

In 1950, the Iran party supported nationalist premier Mohammad Mossadegh and quickly captured cabinet seats and positions of influence. Ahmad Zirakzadeh, Hoseyn Hasibi and Karim Sanjabi served in the Mossadegh cabinets and later formed the backbone of the National Front's parliamentary whip. Hassibi was Mossadegh's chief expert in negotiations to find a working arrangement with the West to buy Iran's not nationalised oil. But he was inflexible in his methods and failed to solve the oil problem. At that time the party's main theoreticians were the present National Iranian Resistance Movement leader Shahpour Bakhtiar and Gholam Ali Bayani.

In late 1952, a group of activists defected from the party to form the Association of Islamic Socialists, but they later joined Mehdi Bazargan's Nehzat group. After the 1953 coup d'etat which brought back the Shah from brief exile the party ceased overt activity and its leaders, including Bakhtiar and Qasemi, spent time in prison. The party had a brief revival in 1961, when Ali Amini came to office. But later it became dormant, remaining so until the summer of 1978 and the beginning of the widespread revolt against the Shah. Then, differences between Sanjabi and Bakhtiar weakened the party. Qasemi was chosen secretary-general in 1979 to hold the rank and file together, and ostensibly weed out Bakhtiar's supporters, but his term was aborted by his arrest.

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REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS REPORTED FIGHTING KURDS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 pp 7-8

[Text] A pilot who deserted from the Iranian air force to join the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (DPIK) forces of Abdolrahman Ghassemloo told IPS' Paris correspondent this week that reinforced and far better trained revolutionary guard units are now battling with Kurdish forces in the west of Iran.

Iraj Soltani, who is now in the French capital, said Palestinian and Libyan mercenaries had both trained and were helping the guards in their campaign against the Kurds. Units of up to 1700 guards were now centred at some gendarmerie posts and were operating much more widely and freely than hitherto.

Unlike in the early days of the war in the area, the guards now attack the Kurdish strongholds during the night instead of regularly withdrawing inside city perimeters when the evening came on. In spite of this, Soltani asserted that the forces of Massoud and Idris Barzani, sons of the famed Kurdish leader who are now supported by Khomeini, who were the worst enemies of the DPIK and other Iranian Kurds opposed to the regime.

Soltani claimed that at least 95 pilots had been executed in Iran since the beginning of the revolution to his knowledge, and there were no doubt others about whom he did not know. He said Syrian pilots, specially retrained on American aircraft, were sent as co-pilots with Iranian crews on missions against the Kurds. This was because Iranians could not be trusted to bomb their compatriots.

That was why he had deserted. He had been denounced as failing to bomb targets. "Actually I just couldn't," he said. "How could one bomb people who came out of their houses and were waving to you?" Warned he was likely to be charged with disobeying orders, he escaped to Tehran and joined the Kurds after contacting them. He claims he is the only non-Kurd member of the DPIK. Other officers were ready to join the DPIK, he said, but the Tudeh (pro-Moscow) wing of the party blocked them.

Wounded four times in operations against the revolutionary guards, Soltani was scathing about the attitude of the opposition groups in Paris to the situation in their country. He said they were sitting around in cafes while people were

dying at home. The longer they feuded the stronger the regime would become, and the more sophisticated and competent the revolutionary guards would also become as they were transformed into regular army units.

He claimed that the late armed forces chief General Falahi and a General Zakiani had sent army personnel marked for purging into action against Kurds when they knew they were likely to be ambushed and killed. Soltani said he had taken part in actions against a 600-strong unit of such men in the Ghassemloo valley, when the men had been massacred.

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PARIS SPEAKERS' CORNER TERMED MORE DRAMATIC THAN LONDON'S

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 pp 9-10

[Text] London's Speakers Corner has long seen weekly exchanges between left and right wing Iranians, which the London bobbies on duty control with the minimum of fuss. It's only rarely that protagonists come to blows--and the worst rows these days are, in fact, between different factions of the Left.

Khomeini supporters are conspicuous by their absence. In fact, his viewpoint is usually put in the safety of the early evening, when most of the militants have gone home, by Malaysians and other sundry Muslim fanatics believed sent by the hardline Muslim groups in the capital.

Paris, too, has its own arena for Iranian differences. Every Saturday, out at the student dormitories of the Cite Universitaire, pro and anti-Khomeini groups try to shout each other down and to tell passers-by of the violent crimes of their opponents back in Iran.

But here everything is conducted in more Gallic fashion. Not only are flags and effigies burned, and the slogans shouted more extreme, but the special French security guards who are there to keep order--from the crack CRS--bristle with bullet-proof waistcoats, guns and anti-riot gear. It is altogether a much more theatrical, dramatic scene.

Action begins at noon, when the pro-Khomeini group, usually around 20 or 30 bearded young men and a handful of veiled girls, start their prayers on the sidewalk beneath posters depicting Mojahedin leader Massoud Rajavi as a terrorist and killer of children, and others showing Khomeini as the supreme leader of the revolution.

On the other side of the street the supporters of the Mojahedin, Paykar, Kar and other leftist organisations, chant at the same time "Death to Khomeini" and "Stop the massacre of children."

Finished with their prayers the Khomeini group sets fire to an American flag, all the time shouting slogans against America, imperialism, Rajavi, Bani-Sadr and Oveissi. "Our revolution is like the struggle of Hossain, our leader is Khomeini. God is Great, Khomeini is our leader," they chant.

On the other side of the road it's an effigy of Khomeini which goes up in flames. "Death to America," the leftists shout, echoing their rivals. "Death to imperialism, reaction, to Oveissi, Bakhtiar and Khomeini."

The Khomeini group explain to passers-by how the counter-revolutionaries in Iran are killing children, setting fire to buses and killing revolutionary leaders, too. They claim there is complete freedom inside Iran and that they won't be intimidated by gangsters.

In turn, a Paykar supporter tells people that Khomeini's hordes take out their members from hospitals to shoot them and "throw their bodies to starving dogs."

"Death to Rajavi, to Bani-Sadr, to America" comes the cry from the Khomeini group. "Down with world imperialism, revisionism..." comes the reply. It is death and destruction to everyone and everything for revolutionaries, nobody shouts long live anybody.

There are occasional shouts in support of the Kurds, but none for other ethnic minorities in Iran. "This is discrimination against other Iranian nationalities," says one Iranian bystander, arguing a secondary point.

It's when the session is over that the security forces have to jump to it. A human wall then surrounds each group as the leftists make for the underground station near where their rivals are gathered. The closer the groups come to each other it is difficult to make out which group is shouting what. Fists are raised on each side, "Death to Khomeini, Khomeini is the leader, Death to Reaction, God is Great, Death to Rajavi"--and then a chorus that seems to be in unison, "Death to America," comes from both sides.

Seeing the hatred, the viciousness in the expressions of both sides it is easy to conjecture on the blood that might flow if the groups got their hands on each other. It would be like inside Iran.

"Can they ever forget this hatred?" asked a watching Iranian, his voice low with emotion, tears in his eyes. "When the blood starts to flow, it is hard to stop it. That's what Khomeini has done to us and we can't forgive him."

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DELEGATE CLAIMS IRANIAN WOMEN HAVE NEW RIGHTS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 47, 19 Nov 81 pp 11-12

[Text] An Iranian woman delegate to the recent international conference on population in Peking complained that Arab Muslim delegates "expounded dictated issues and their views were neither human nor Islamic" when she was interviewed by the Tehran daily Ettelaat on her return.

Mrs Maryam Behruzi added, "In a discussion I had with the first secretary of the communist party I asked him about the role of women in China, and from his explanation I gathered that Chinese women have no political or cultural role in society and they are a tool for economic development.

"After hearing this, I described the role of Iranian women before the revolution, and I told him that now, relatively speaking, the rights of men and women in Iran are equal. And recently the custody of children had been given to mothers. In fact, our women now play an active role in raising the level of the political, economic and moral culture of our society.

"I also explained that our women have achieved their identity through the Islamic view expressed in the Qoran. By shouting "Allahu Akbar" we have already come far in our revolution, and we will move further forward in the future."

Mrs. Behruzi said Iran's delegation was the only one that looked at the problem in an Islamic dimension.

"We believe that human beings are sacred and must have all material aids at their disposal," she said they told the other delegates. "Others disagreed with us and said that human beings must be at the service of money and economy. The others held economic views. The Iranian delegation said that man is sacred and he must be in possession of material benefits and moral conditions. We also mentioned that the position of women must be improved and women must give their consent about having a child. This is a religious law."

At the end of the conference Iran had proposed two resolutions which were approved. These were:

1. Men and women must be equal, at least at a minimum level.
2. The educational and cultural level of women must be improved. Women must have the custody of their children and any success or failure must be the responsibility of women.

The paper said that the Iranian delegation refused to participate in any of the receptions given because alcoholic drinks were served. At the final reception hosted by the Chinese prime minister they did accept an invitation if alcoholic drinks were not served, which the Chinese agreed to. During dinner, a separate table was set for the Iranians "in such a way as to give a good and positive impression and put certain reactionary Islamic countries in the region like Jordan and Iraq to shame," according to the leader of the delegation, Hojatoleslam Yazdi.

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PAPER CLAIMS 'ARAFAT HAS BETRAYED PALESTINIAN PEOPLE

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 21 Nov 81 pp 1, 4

[Text]

THE HISTORICAL speech of Imam Khomeini on November 16, 1981 clarifies the position of anti Islamic personalities, as well as their policies. This had become necessary because the criminal actions of the Superpowers in the Middle East, the cradle of Islam, has reached a point endangering Islam. Imam Khomeini has warned of the imminent danger.

Those who are aware of Imam Khomeini's method of struggle will be aware that he first gives his advise on the issues that are being deviated and if this is not heeded he makes a pointed reference to the divergences and if it still proves to be of no avail he warns on the issue and if this last does not have effect then he begins the struggle against it. Any deviated current that is considered dangerous by Imam Khomeini, will not be correctable by the Moslems anymore and should be eradicated.

In our daily message a few days ago titled 'Middle East Erupts' we made an analysis on the preperation of the Superpowers for the eradication of the Islamic and Moslems uprisings. In that comment we analyzed the reasons behind the and roots for such actions.

Here we do not intend to discuss the hostility of the U.S. and Russia with Islam and the Moslems, which is clear to all. Rather is it our intention today to direct the spotlight at those elements responsible for the execution of the corrupt plots of the Superpowers in the region.

The most important issue in the Middle East at present is the Fahd Plan which if approved will mean the recognition of Israel and in the words of the Imam 'Islam will be enslaved.'

It is about 40 years since Israel this quintessence in crime, enjoying the support of the U.S. and the Soviet Union with its savage invasion, usurped the Holy land of Islam, Palestine. During all these years, the corrupt Israel took within its

bosom millions of innocent Moslems but also made many more of them homeless. After this dreadful Hitlerian invasion, the Moslems in every country stood ranged in the struggle against the fascistic occupation of Palestine.

Leaders such as Jamal Adbel Naser proved sincere in struggling against Zionism. Among the Moslem movements that raised themselves in struggle Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was the first to be formed. With the Moslems of Palestine they started their struggle against Zionism. As it was the first organization of its kind for the people's struggle, soon it became the leader of the movements in Palestine.

For years, this movement continued its armed struggle against the fascistic regime of Israel and was highly esteemed by the Moslem masses in the world. It came soon to be very well accepted by all Moslems and financial aid and volunteer personnel flooded this movement. Aside from governments, no nation helped the PLO as much as the Moslem nation of Iran did. And all the aid provided to the PLO by the Moslem nation of Iran was because they felt the need to identify with the nation of Palestine. A number of governments no doubt accepted the organization as the representative of the Palestinians.

The U.S. as well as Zionism tried for a number of years to prevent the recognition of the PLO, but they failed. Since then Zionism has entered the scene under three guises:

A: Intensification of its vicious military invasion over the southern side of Lebanon, which was the center of the refugee camps of the Palestinians.

B: The enforcement of the toughest forms of dictatorship in those pockets where the Palestinians lived while jailing and torturing the dwellers in these sectors.

C: In addition to all this, Zionism tried to convert the strategy of armed struggle of the Palestinian leaders into a strategy of political and diplomatic struggle.

In the first two cases, Zionism was desperately defeated, because they failed to force the Palestinians to give up their struggle despite the mass slaughter of tens of thousands of their numbers in Tel-Zaatar and other places. By resorting to such inhumanistic actions, Israel drove the Palestinians to become even more sturdily resistant and angrier at the injustices perpetrated against them.

But what of the third case? First the globe exploiters eradicated Imam Mousa Sadr who was an uncompromising clergyman and a descendant of the Prophet (SAW), who was to take over the divine and popular leadership of the people!!!

But later from the time the leaders of Palestinians began to pace through the palaces of Riyadh and walk the corridors of the political citadels of the Kremlin, Baghdad, Germany, France, Japan and others and asked for military and financial aid form every Western and Eastern enemy, the bells began to herald success for Zionism in converting the Holy armed struggle for Palestinians into an ineffectual diplomatic struggle.

The change in tactics portended a lack of reliance of the Palestinians leaders in their strong Moslem peoples and the separation of the movement from the people became obvious to all.

We accept that the early goals of the Moslem Palestinian leaders in begging at the palace doors was in the cause of struggle with Zionism. Yet this policy though far from true Islamic principles did not merit our sustained objection, since the struggle with Zionism was not yet a forgotten issue.

But one thing we were sure of and that was the final objectives of the superpowers and their hireling countries in proferring or encouraging such aid was to divert the Palestinian leaders into a policy of compromise.

And today while this despicable plot of Imperialism and Zionism takes its final steps through the Fahd plan, far from considering silence lawful, we regard it as Haram (a sin according to religion). Here we need to note that the PLO is made up of different political shadings form Islam to communism and socialism.

But we are most concerned here with its strongest wing which is led by Yasser Arafat and is also the decision-maker of the PLO. Yasser Arafat after 30 years leading the PLO and displaying utter lack of success in driving out the Israelis even from one square meter of the occupied lands has proved his deficiency, and now after the victory of the great Islamic Revolution in Iran under the divine leadership of Imam Khomeini, Yasser Arafat has lost his popularity among the masses. Now by approving the Fahd plan and by official recognition of Israel he stabs the Moslem nation of Palestine in the back by acting so hypocritically.

The uncompromising stand of Imam Khomeini during his 20 years of leadership of the Islamic Revolution of Iran and his success in driving out the most powerful puppet of the U.S. from the most powerful country in the Middle East has provided the ground for struggle as well as the Islamic leadership to all the nations including Palestine. There is no more room for the coquettish claims of dancing puppets to leadership. Imam Khomeini has not only nested in the heart of the Palestinian people as their religious leader but more as their absolute political leader as well.

Now that the lier leadership seekers lose their stand and their faces have become known to everybody, they are seeking refuge in the US and Zionism. Arafat first recognized this Plan as having some positive points and finally announced that he agreed on this Plan from the beginning and has said that there is no Plan better than this . . . . . .!!!

Imam Khomeini, the echo of centuries of suppression and cruelty imposed on the Moslems has said about this plan that:

"Those who have given this Plan or find any positive point in it, are either ignorant or have been influenced by the US and Zionism." And also said, "whoever does not oppose the Fahd Plan is a traitor to Islam."

It is quite clear that Arafat who has approved this Plan and has found positive points in it, is either ignorant or under the influence of the US and Zionism and is surely traitor to Islam. Thus we consider the recent historical lecture of the Imam as the ousting of Yasser Arafat from the leadership of Palestine and believe that the Moslem nation no more considers him an official representative and from now no more the man who decides the destiny of the Palestinian.

He can only be restored to his former status if he renounce his anti-Islamic and treacherous stands and repents and follows Imam Khomeini's path in the struggle against Israel.

It appears that they have forgotten their slogans which said, "The only solution to the Qods problem comes through the barrel of the gun." And today they claim that there is no other Plan better than Fahd's !!!??

Yes, the only Plan for the Liberation of dear Palestine is the complete eradication of Israel from the scene of history. And this is possible only through reliance on Islam and the objective of Palestine as well as the divine armed struggle which is in fact the Imam Khomeini's plan and the Moslem nations of the world.

Whoever, either Palestinian, Arab, Persian and else seeks anything but this is not from the Palestinian nation and will be under the influence of the US and Zionism. Because the Palestinian's objective is the goal and not the Palestinian leader.

Hoping that all the Moslem nations of the world read the reviving and destiny making speech of Imam Khomeini delievered on November 16, 1981 and answer his call based on revolt and self sacrifice to prevent the execution of this corrupt and seditionist Plan. We have published the Imam's recent speech in a separate page in our today's issue for publication and distribution everywhere in the world.

By MUSAVIAN

CSO: 4600/142

'ARAFAT CRITICIZED INDIRECTLY BY PRIME MINISTER MUSAVI

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] Tehran (Pars)--"We will oppose the stands of the compromising Palestinian leaders" said Prime Minister Musavi in a press conference held for local reporters here yesterday.

On internal economic problems, Musavi said that the question of soaring prices had been brought under control and inflation was not an insoluble problem, adding that through the cooperation of the nation, the government found it possible to bring high prices under control. He added that constant efforts were directed to stem this trend through the Economic Mobilization Headquarters.

In regard to the Fez Conference, the Premier said that many moves were being made to ensure that the Fahd plan was approved at this the meeting by Arab governments.

Musavi further said "a glance at the tours by the European political leaders to the Middle East and the exchange of views with reactionary heads of state reveal how deeply rooted the plan has been.

"Even in our very first analysis, announced by the Foreign Ministry, we stated that even discussion of the plan was a victory for the Zionist regime.

Secret documents found in the Foreign Ministry following the Revolution reveals Egal Alon as explicitly saying that Israeli politicians had come to the conclusion that the return of any part of the Jordan River and West Bank to the Palestinians could only result in the destruction of Israel.

The Prime Minister said "Israel will not yield any privileges to the Palestinians. But the result of the plan will be the recognition of Israel." He added that the Imam's lecture on the Fahd plan will be hundred percent effective in deciding the future destiny of Israel and struggle of the Moslems with Zionism. And Imam Khomeini has played a vital role which every country accepts in this opposition to the plan which is against their own nations!

On the strategy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the Palestinian, said "we have repeatedly announced our stand and issue of an Islamic Front in our foreign policy will be as strong as ever. We emphasize this issue everyday, because we know that after the recent events this suggestion will have still more support among the Moslem nations."

The Prime Minister continuing, said "We have also announced that the issue of Zionism is not separable from the issue of the U.S. and struggle with the U.S. and Zionism cannot be limited within boundaries, rather it is a global issue. Therefore, the issue of struggle against the Zionism should be spread to all the Islamic countries in the world. We also mentioned in our plan that the call to demonstrations by Ayatollah Montazeri which was participated in by twenty million people can be a guide for us.

"In the future, when this slogan comes to reality, Zionism will be overthrown completely. If you observe the Fahd plan precisely, you find that the Palestinian leaders have taken different stands against this plan. We oppose the stands taken by the compromiser leaders of Palestine.

"Those who consider this plan as acceptable as well as those who think that compromising with Israel is in beneficial to them, are far from the reality and it is they who will be destroyed before anybody else."

On the relations of the liberation movements with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Musavi said that this issue is being discussed in one of the

commissions of the Majlis and will be propounded from a political angle in our country.

The prime minister was asked if the Iranian officials do not think that the diplomatic relations of Saudi Arabia with Russia will result in the inclination of the East bloc countries, particularly those of the Resistance Front to participate in the coming Fez conference. he replied, "I feel that this establishment of Saudi -Soviet relations is for exerting pressures on the members of the Resistance Front throughout Arab countries rather than for participation of the members of the said Front in the Fez conference and so that Saudi Arabia can exert pressure on Yemen, Syria, Algeria and Libya for establishment of relations with the Soviet.

Concerning the Iranian plan on Afghanistan, the premier declared, "We have not provided this plan for the regime of Babrak Karmal. It was crystal clear that he was determined to reject this plan. The plan has been set out for the independence of Afghanistan over a long-round period.

"Not only has this plan been rejected by the existing regime of Afghanistan but it is natural that it is not a plan which is agreeable to the East and West Superpowers.

"However though, the words of the people of Afghanistan is important to us, we think that they will show a suitable reaction towards this plan.

Referring to the volume of money in circulation and the private sector, the prime minister said: "we have a specified system in the Islamic Republic. The state sector will be developed according to the constitution and the private sector will continue their activities.

"None of responsible officials have spoken concerning the dissolution of private sector."

Commenting on a rumor spread by the Time magazine concerning the arrival of some 42 Russian experts for forming a security network in Iran, the prime minister strongly denied it, the prime minister said: "I think they wanted to give the impression to the reactionary regimes of the Persian Gulf region of the existence of American forces and AWAC's because of a Communist line followed in Iran.

"To strengthen the basis of this rumor, Reuter announced that during a contact with a spokesman for the Prime Ministry, this rumor was contradicted.

"As far as we are concerned no contact was established with the Prime Ministry and the Prime Ministry has no spokesman."

He continued "there is another rumor concerning the dispatch of 15,000 information and security personnel of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to Iran in order to provide security measures for top-ranking Iranian officials and to fortify the security network of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"They have plotted such conspiracies to weaken the performance of the 36-million member information network (people of Iran) but I should say that our people are familiar with these lies which have failed to affect the spirit of our people."

In regards to the Iranian proposal of the Afghanistan issue, the prime minister said that if Iran's suggestion would materialize the 30 clerics who would form a Council to supervise affairs, would have full knowledge of the Moslem world and thus it would be a very strong guarantee to preserve peace in that country.

"Secondly," Musavi further stated, "the existence of such a council will attract the support of committed clergymen around the world to this proposal and the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

"We hope that this suggestion will convince Russia that she cannot stay in Afghanistan and Moslems throughout the world will never consent to the Red Army trampling underfoot Islamic territory.

"THE MOSLEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WILL NEVER CONSENT TO THE RED ARMY TRAMPLING UNDERFOOT ISLAMIC TERRITORY.

In connection with the participation of the Islamic Republic in the Summit of the Steadfastness Front, Musavi said that Iran had attended the Summit as a observer and that our participation will not be permanent," adding that Iran would only take part on a permanent basis where it could play a role in determining policies and principles.

"We have repeatedly announced," he continued, "that since the Steadfastness Front resists Zionism and Imperialism we will back it up and this support of ours will continue until they keep on with resistance against Zionists and Imperialists.

Referring to the political relations between Iran and Turkey, the prime minister said that Iran would like to rely on the common interests and not the controversies.

He continued by saying that "though our values differ from theirs, since we have common borders it is to our mutual interest to establish trade relations with the small countries of the region instead of the Superpowers and that the Islamic Republic of Iran would try to avoid any sort of turmoil in this regard.

At the end of his press conference, the premier expressed his hopes that a spokesman for the Cabinet as well as the Foreign Ministry would soon be named.

CSO: 4600/144

COMMANDER CLAIMS KURDS ARE 'MOST LOYAL' TO REVOLUTION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 1 Nov 81 p 4

[Text] Mehabad--ETTELA'AT Dispatched Reporter--Following the return of stability and relative calm to the roads leading to Mehabad, and at the invitation of the commander of the Third Brigade of this city, our reporter left Urmia for Mehabad, in order to prepare a report pertaining to the conditions of this area and the circumstances of the operations of a revolutionary and governmental nature in Mehabad.

The dispatched ETTELA'AT reporter writes: "When I first entered the Mehabad brigade, I noticed something interesting. An order was given by the commander of the Mehabad brigade to each soldier, to say "Takbir" [God is great] upon leaving the base. In a corner of the garrison, I saw a large group of Mehabad students, as well as lovable children and Kurdish brothers, busy learning from brother soldiers the use of different military equipment. When it was time to learn about tanks, everybody rode on one and shouted "Takbir" which was an indication the influence and export of the Islamic Revolution to the liberated areas. The students, after learning about military equipment, left for the garrison's mosque. In the mosque, the commander of the brigade first in simple language, talked about the revolution and the situation of the illegal armed groups in the area, and asked the students religious questions and they answered. Then one came forward and recited the "Hand and Sureh" [a passage from the Koran], and was met with the enthusiasm of the students and soldiers. Following that, all the students shouted the slogan, "Death to America" so loudly that their voices shook the Mosque. Finally, the students left the garrison singing revolutionary songs."

Protecting the Results of the Revolution

Then I took the opportunity and talked to Colonel Mohammad Ali Sharifolnasb, the commander of the Mehabad Brigade, and asked him about the condition of the garrison. He said, "The Revolution is being plundered by American mercenaries, in a manner, that at this time, the weapons must be aimed at the heart of the enemy in the war front, because the hands of these filthy elements are aimed at the hearts of our guards corps and soldiers.

The Mehabad garrison was occupied by the plunderers for quite a long time until the brave warriers of Islam, after many confrontations, became victorious.

Since then, the self-sacrificing guards-corps brothers are struggling day and night to protect the gains of the revolution and many people have become martyrs in this way."

People of Mehabad Are the Most Loyal People to the Revolution

Colonel Sharifolnasb, after mentioning that he has come to Mehabad voluntarily, said: "Since I had a deep knowledge of the frustration and oppression caused by the shah's fallen regime and small groups of political parties, I prepared myself for serving the most noble and at the same time the most deprived of this region of my country. In the most splendorous gathering of the people of Mehabad in the Jame' Mosque, I announced that this army, in the name of Islam, is proud to be the army of mercy and blessing for the oppressed and indigent and will cause wrath for the oppressor and arrogant. I promised right there that with the efforts of loyal personnel, and unity and solidarity with guards corps brothers, that peace would be established in minimum time in the area. It is worthy to say that in this area, out of 24 hours, more than 12 were under the hail of bullets of the internal and foreign enemies. But as a result of providing stability and security, the Bank Melli and other banks were established, communication with the help of the brothers of the Islamic Council of Central Communication was started, the problems of the city's television was solved, and construction of the Mehabad road to Mian Dow-Ab, which is a big help to the economic progress of the region, was resolved. The Gendarmerie regiment, with excellent spirit, have started working, and the construction projects are being rapidly completed one after another. Most importantly, to secure the people's health, the garrison has established a clinic with the cooperation and efforts of the loyal military physicians. They treat the sick free of charge, and in some areas, scarce powdered milk is given to the dear Kurdish mothers free of charge. My impression about the brave people of Mehabad is that they are revolutionary and Islamic fundamentalists. I know the beloved nature of this city. They are among the most faithful people to the revolution and the country. If it was not so, if only 10 percent of these people were identified with the other group, due to the political and military situation of the region, you and I would not have a place in the mainstream of this society and Kordestan would never find stability within this region. During these 3 years, the anti-revolutionary elements, meaning the few number of American mercenaries, in order to protect themselves from the eye of the law and the revenge of the people, dexteriously introduced people as anti-revolutionary, and they themselves in the context of governing the oppressed, became sovereign. But we succeeded with the help of the people and created self-confidence in them, and broke the false government of this group, in a way that gradually the people's fear was placated and one of these days, their cries of "God is great," without fear from small groups, will echo in the skys of Mehabad.

Commander Sharifolnasb added: "It is necessary to be reminded that the affiliated mini-groups, named Democrat and Kumoleh, are much meaner and more despotic than the shah's regime. I am happy with the progress of activities since confrontations have almost totally ceased, and the people are used to the stability and they are even cooperating to create stability in the city. I have learned during this time that under the protection of sincere "God is great" and faith in God, we will achieve everything."

The Situation of Armed Groups

The commander of the Mehabad Brigade, in regard to the situation of the armed groups in the area, said: "Anti-revolutionary activities in the area from the political and administrative point of view, as a whole, have disintegrated and most of the traitorous leaders have been captured or are fugitives. They have observed the capture of the barracks and the unity of the fighters and guards corps in operation, and the deadly and surprised blows. The interesting thing is that every day, many letters have been received from the areas dissolved parties applying for asylum and separation from these groups and asking the army for refuge. They have reached the conclusion that faced with an army which within the distance of 1,400 kilometers, is fighting superpowers and especially world-devouring America, there is no other way except to surrender, and it is 100 percent definite that the army of Mercy and Abundance will give them refuge. Thus, in fact right now, a number of them have started honorable lives in the bosom of Islam.

He added: "We have told the honorable people of Mehabad that stability must be restored in the area as soon as possible so that we will be on our way to the southern front to crush the aggressor enemy. They must not permit the foreign mercenaries to overtake us in the area, and cause a few days of happiness to Saddam's supporters.

We Welcome Arming Loyal Kurds

The commander of the Mehabad Brigade added: "If the Kurdish people like arms, we accept that as a fact, and we welcome arming the true believers and dispatching them to the warfront of truth against futileness, in order to be able to establish a front in the west of the country named the Mehabad front, and to rapidly secure the war in the west of the country and enter Iraqi soil. Of course, the people welcomed this plan and were even ready to send their children to the war fronts. They themselves also devoted a few months of the year to defending the Islamic land and protect the gains of the revolution. Thus, in addition to preparing the preliminary mobilization of Mehabad, a great number of Mehabad's girl and boy students, in order to get acquainted with light and heavy armor military equipment, and to have contact with brother soldiers, came to the garrison and were greatly impressed by the military programs."

He also said: "The Mehabad garrison has started a great revolution through the blessing of the blood of Martyr's and the third revolution and by making use of tactics of the beloved Imam, has selected the Mosque as the starting point and launching platform and expanded this great movement in all dimensions. In a manner, it has been placed at a distinguished level from the point of political, military and religious knowledge, and the military base has become like an Islamic and military university.

The emphasis on Islamic motives has caused the soldier to know why and with whom he is fighting, and with knowledge of this fact, and abstention from blind obedience, he shows a power several times more than the ordinary soldier. This matter has been proven to the people of Mehabad many times. It has been shown that under the protection of the Koran and shouting "Allah Akbar" in addition to victory and securing the stability of the city, rapidly all the dissension ending in Mehabad

has been purged. It is interesting that the Mehabad garrison is turning to a productive center in agriculture and industry, in a way that in this connection, all the land in the garrison is ploughed and is ready for cultivation and brother soldiers have it in mind to cultivate the finest type of wheat in the coming summer in the uncultivated lands of the garrison and the foothills of the heights. Thus, to help the self-supporting economy of the country and also to acquaint the people with revolutionary methods utilizing unknown and clandestine powers.

The progress of projects which have been done with careful and immaculate planning have been such that the results have been perceived in a much wider area than Mehabad. We are sure as we have asked the allied people to continue their cooperation with the military and disciplinary forces in order to enable us to tell the fighting nation of Iran that: "The brothers and sisters of Mehabad are on your side, and are behind the leader, and that the mainstream of the revolution, and the path of holiness is passing through this holy land."

Colonel Sharifolnasb concluded his talk: "In my view Kordestan is like a small child that filthy hands have been trying to part from its mother. When we cut off these hands, this faithful child, in the bosom of its mother, which is the blessed Islamic revolution of Iran, will be freed and both will embrace each other heartily."

9815
CSO: 4640/45

SADDAM HYSAYN ADDRESSES SPECIAL FORCES

JN061856 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1815 GMT 6 Dec 81

[Text] Baghdad, 6 Dec (INA)--President Saddam Husayn has said that the Iraqi Army's 15 months of fighting marks a new phenomenon in the Arab homeland. Addressing a batch of the special forces who were preparing to wage a new battle against the Iranian enemy in the southern sector of the battlefront, President Saddam Husayn said that the sons of the Arab nation envy you for carrying out the trust of defending great Iraq. He added: You will be fighting armed with your principles and valor, which will leave a mark of honor in Iraq's history.

President Saddam Husayn said that the special forces are fighting the enemy as men whose responsibility is to defend the homeland and whose principal task is to fight when the country is exposed to dangers. The special forces, he added, are the Fedayeen division of the Iraqi Army.

President Saddam Husayn stressed the need for preventing the Iranian enemy from occupying any Iraqi position and for dealing further blows to its forces. This, the president added, would force the enemy to stop the war and recognize Iraq's rights in its land and waters.

The text of President Saddam Husayn's speech was broadcast over Baghdad television tonight while airing a film on his excellency's weeklong tour of the battlefront that ended last night.

During the tour, the president decorated the officers and other ranks of an Iraqi military brigade and other military formations. The president decorated them with medals of valor for their brave fighting against, and dealing painful blows to, the enemy personnel in one of the battles which recently raged in the Khafajiyah [Susangerd] area.

CSO: 4404/163

KURDISTAN PARTY ISSUES STATEMENT ON EVENTS

JN061938 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1900 GMT 6 Dec 81

[Text] Baghdad, 6 Dec (INA)--The Kurdistan Revolutionary Party, an offshoot of the Progressive National and Patriotic Front in Iraq, has asserted that the Iraqi people are standing proud, armed with a high and steadfast spirit to deter the aggressors and regain their legitimate rights on their land and waters, which were usurped by the racist Persians.

This came in a statement issued by the party following the 2-day ordinary meeting of the Central Committee. The committee discussed the party's internal situation and international, Arab and local events and developments.

The party said that the war, which is imposed by the Iranian regime on Iraq, is aimed at achieving the designs of imperialism and Zionism in the area, imposing a humiliating settlement on the Palestinian people and liquidating the Arabs' central issue in accordance with the U.S., Zionist and reactionary scheme.

The statement condemned the U.S. military maneuvers in the area, asserting that the threats which are being made these days by imperialist and Zionist circles, particularly U.S. imperialism, are a link in the chain of the treasonous Camp David accords and are a provocation aimed at intimidating the Arab masses and forcing them to accept the U.S.-Zionist solution of the Palestinian issue.

The party reiterated its support and backing for the Palestinian people's struggle, led by the PLO, for the sake of determining their own future and setting up a free and independent state on their own national soil. The party expressed full confidence that this just struggle would be crowned with victory so long as they choose the armed struggle as their road.

CSO: 4404/163

BRIEFS

RADIO ON UPROOTING OF KURDS, TURKOMEN--Honorable Iraqi citizens, freemen of the world: The dictatorial regime, which indulges in treasonous crimes against our people and homeland, continues its racist crimes in Kurdistan to liquidate the Kurdish people and fraternal ethnic groups, especially the Turkomen, and to change the historical and national characteristics of Kurdistan. Tyrant Saddam Husayn, chairman of the so-called Revolution Command Council, has published his decision No 1391 in Issue No 2856 of the Iraqi official GAZETTE dated 2 November 1981. The decision provides for the deportation of thousands of Kurdish and Turkomen families from Kurdistan to central and southern Iraq. The first batch of 20,000 families will be transferred to the provinces of al-Qadisiyah, al-Muthanna, Dhi Qar and al-Anbar. Priority will be given Turkomen and then Kurdish families from the provinces of al-Ta'mim and Kirkuk. [Text] [JN071433 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1550 GMT 6 Dec 81]

COOPERATION WITH SOVIET MINISTER--Baghdad, 8 Dec (INA)--Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council member and first deputy prime minister, met here today with Soviet Machine Building Minister Bakhriev. They discussed developing relations between the two friendly countries and ways to strengthen them. Ramadan and Bakhirev expressed satisfaction with the progress of bilateral relations, stressing the importance of expanding cooperation in various fields to serve their mutual interests. The Soviet minister arrived here yesterday on a weeklong visit. [Text] [JN081039 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1030 GMT 8 Dec 81]

SUPPORT URGED FOR KURDISH CAUSE--To every honest compatriot, to the world peace council, to the Committee in Defense of Human Rights, to all liberation movements in the region and the world, to all liberation, progressive and socialist forces in the world, to all political and judicial organizations and figures and righteous democratic forces in the world, to all friends of the Iraqi and Kurdish peoples throughout the world: Freemen and strugglers, raise your righteous voices in defense of Kurds, Turkomen and all Iraqis. Raise your voices against the racist and fascist measures by the dictatorial regime in Baghdad. Declare your solidarity with the struggle of our people--Arabs, Kurds and ethnic groups--against the regime's terrorism and fascist activities. Support the Kurdish people who are defending their own existence and dignity. Support all Iraqis who are fighting for democracy, liberation and social progress. Our people, with all its opposition patriotic [wataniyah] and Islamic revolutionary forces, ethnic groups and religions, look for your fraternal support and solidarity. Raise your voices in protest against the rule of the tyrant Saddam al-Tikriti and his terrorist clique. [Text] [JN071446 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1550 GMT 6 Dec 81]

'POPULAR ARMY' BENEFITS--Based on the provisions of paragraph (A) of article 42 of the provisional constitution the Revolutionary Command Council, at its session held on 18 November 1981, decided the following: The tour of Popular Army and other civilian volunteer fighters in the pan-Arab battle against the racist Persian enemy outside the territorial borders of the country will be considered double duty for the purposes of retirement. The commander in chief of the Popular Army and the ministers concerned will be charged with implementing this resolution retroactive to 4 September 1980. [Excerpt] [Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 20 Nov 81 p 6]

CSO: 4404/158

RAFI'AH WITHDRAWAL SAID DIFFICULT PROBLEM

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Oct 81 p 7

[Article by Dan Margolit: "Toward Withdrawal"]

[Text] The reacton of Gershon Shaked, professor of Hebrew literature, to the radio interview with Ge'ula Kohen demonstrated the high emotional level characterizing the struggle surrounding withdrawal from Rafi'ah. When speaking about the possibility of deterring continued withdrawal, MK Kohen explained the challenges she would present to the soldiers opposing the settlers. Shaked interpreted her remarks to mean intended agitation, inciting mutiny, and he alerted Yosef Lapid, general manager of the broadcasting network, to the content of Kohen's statements.

Within 2 days, MK Kohen was interviewed on one of the networks. She repeated that her intention was merely to speak with the soldiers, who would discuss the issue with their sargeants, who in turn would pass the information on to their officers, the chief of the general staff and finally to the prime minister, until everyone was convinced that the retreat should be halted. In light of Professor Shaked's reaction, the interviewer asked MK Kohen if she was calling upon the soldiers to mutiny, to refuse to obey orders. Kohen from Tehiya was aware from the start that her statements would create problems. She responded that this was by no means the intention. Everything would be based on persuasion, free will and understanding.

There is perhaps no other subject which currently elicits such a high emotional response as the question of withdrawal from Rafi'ah. The fear is multi-faceted and should be seen against the background of the Gush Emunim settlers who have occupied abandoned homes in the area to be cleared and against the background of Sadat's murder. There is increased apprehension that Yamit and similar settlements will become a battleground, physically and emotionally, such as Israel has never known, not even in the emotional struggle which threatened the government and the constitution during the negotiations with Germany concerning reparations.

Even prior to Sadat's murder, there were already many signs that the struggle was becoming more fierce and that positions were becoming less flexible as the April 1982 deadline drew near. Kohen's friends had known for about a month about her intent to relocate to Yamit. It was only a technical delay in the publication date of the notice that created the wrong impression, namely that

her action was a response to the dramatic events in Egypt. The decision and the notice of the move to Yamit had been set up well in advance of that.

The settlers expressed their intent to fortify their position in the territory and to constitute a threat to the administration. The Gush Emunim group that penetrated Talmei Yosef has refused to evacuate of its own accord. If the existence of these intruders in Rafi'ah was known a month ago, the government passed up the perfect opportunity to remove them immediately and with due haste from the abandoned homes. Sadat's murder further decreases the chances of removing them in the near future. From a realistic point of view the problem is how to prevent the continuation of the phenomenon, when the possible solutions, namely closing off the area or destroying the homes, are not desirable for the government.

As part of the continuing phenomenon there is worried talk in government and political circles of weapons being stockpiled in Yamit and nearby settlements. Even those who refuse to acknowledge the extremist threats attributed to M'eir Kahane's group, know that violent confrontation is the compelling test of reality. The main question is what form the confrontation will take, and what dimensions.

In the event that actions on both sides are well thought out and strategically planned, the settlers will be able to estimate the limits of their own strength and define their own goals. From the settlers' point of view the situation during the decisive month will be influenced by several factors:

- the numbers of those living in Rafi'ah and refusing to withdraw at the beginning of the decisive phase of the struggle.

- the image they build during these next few months. The settlers are trying to create the image of upholders of the law, which is desirable for their propaganda as they seek to expand the circle of support for their position to include groups further removed from Gush Emunim and Tehiya. Toward this end, the possibility of armed conflict must remain vague, since this factor might well alienate them from supporters and excite the government. The prevailing uncertainty on this issue particularly worries the government and has already caused the government to refrain from making the decision to keep new settlers out.

- The settlers know they can depend on reinforcements trying to reach them, but they are taking into consideration the possibility that the roads will be blocked.

- Those pitted against withdrawal know that a certain degree of support for the settlers can be expected from groups whose ideologies are different from theirs. Feelers have indicated the emotional tension which exists as the evacuation of the settlements approaches. The character of the struggle to oust the settlers will determine the extent of public support they receive. The more extreme the physical encounters, the smaller the peripheral support.

- One important unknown is the stability of Husni Mubarak's government. The settlers have no influence however on the events in Egypt and cannot take these into account when making their determinations.

From the government's point of view, the main difficulty is to determine what stand the settlers will take on withdrawal. Until now they have been unanimously single-minded--to prevent withdrawal. If this is their sole, adamant goal, the government will have no choice but to confront them head on, a possibility which is not desirable, especially for the minister of defense, Ari'el Sharon. Despite Prime Minister Menachem Begin's promises, in the end Sharon will be the one to do the job.

This fear has caused alarm in political circles. The growing idea that armed conflict is unavoidable indirectly aids the settlers. In some circles, shocking scenarios have been envisioned, depicting the settlers opening fire on the army and treating Rafi'ah as their Massada.

This fear is a fallacy. The main group of settlers are Gush Emunim members, products of the Central Rabbinical Yeshiva who would not choose a solution of this kind. They do not feel that Yamit is their Massada, because Rafi'ah is not the last stronghold but the first, whose future they are fighting for, now. But the fact remains that this fear has settled in among government ministers and affects current decision-making processes.

On the government's side of the chess board, where the struggle against the settlers is taking place, additional considerations come into play. Menachem Begin may want a smooth, rapid transfer of the territory to Egypt, but there are government forces hoping that the settlers will not be subdued too quickly. They want to exploit the rebellion to convince the United States that the government cannot continue to make territorial concessions. A limited struggle, one which would not surpass the bounds of control by the security forces, could serve the government's interests. It is consistent with Begin's concept of sovereign interests as perceived during the struggle with Henry Kissinger, at the time of signing the interim agreement. The unstable situation in Egypt reinforces this approach.

The settlers are not making it any easier for the government. The ministers do not know what is going on in the enemy camp. The government receives information from accidental conversations, the validity of which cannot be determined. Further, a firm policy has yet to be formulated. The government has to consider the possibility that in the course of events all restraint may be abandoned by the leaders of the settlers. The feeling which prevails among the ministers comes out of self-interest. They feel that Gush Emunim and its supporters may weaken, or worse yet, that Jewish blood might be spilled in Rafi'ah before it is evacuated.

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POLITICS OF SINAI WITHDRAWAL ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Oct 81 Weekend Supplement pp 8, 9

[Article by David Oren: "Withdrawal and Persuasion"]

[Text] Five months before the return of the Rafi'ah area to Egypt, as per the Camp David accords, the conclusion to be reached following a long, open conversation with Yitzhak Regev, chairman of a board of 13 settlements in the region, is that in April 1982 blood will be shed in Yamit. The meeting which took place between Regev, his friends and Prime Minister Menachem Begin last Friday, did not change the feeling that has surrounded the issue for several weeks now. "This whole affair has become a trap. There is a momentum building up that cannot be stopped. Even if solutions can be found and arrangements made for all the settlers, an invisible hand will still light the terrible fire of civil war."

This somber prediction by Yitzhak Regev must be seen with some reservation. One must not forget that this 33-year old man represents a vested interest in the forces still active in the Sinai gateway on the eve of withdrawal. Presenting the situation in somber terms and sounding the alarm about the radical events likely to take place may well be part of the war on public opinion being waged by area settlers in their struggle to get the fattest compensation possible. However, one must not ignore these statements, coming from the man who is best informed as to what is happening, especially regarding the dynamic activities of the "Committee to Stop the Retreat in Sinai" (SRS) and the "Gush Emunim" group in 'Atzmona, Talmei Yosef and the town of Yamit. He is also privy to the statements made by the Knesset members from Tehiya, Hanan Porat and Ge'ula Kohen.

[Question] Who does the "invisible hand" belong to, the hand that will "light the terrible fire of civil war?"

[Answer] Look, in this area it's not a big secret. The fact is that an underground exists. Some call it the "suicidal underground." It's a group of people whose goal is to do everything to prevent withdrawal from the settlements. They work under ground and no one has seen them yet. But this underground exists. It has some supporters from the area, but most are on the outside. Its members state clearly and candidly that in April 1982 they will be here and they will have a go at it, meaning that the pullback will not be accomplished. If they can prevent withdrawal, one or two deaths will not be considered a major tragedy. In the past, they have tried to join in the activities of the settlers' committee,

to draw the settlers into more radical action. But when we realized this trend, we quickly broke all ties with them.

[Question] So you've met them. You've spoken with them. Who are the members of this underground? Are they "Gush Emunim" people?

[Answer] I never met them face to face, and that's the truth. If I were to meet them, I would probably pass the information on to the security forces. I want to emphasize that no one from the settlements in this area that I represent wants bloodshed. Civil war is not an option for the fulfillment of our goals. But I've spoken with the members of the underground on several occasions, by telephone. They suggested actions which led me to understand what their real intentions are. Their struggle is not our struggle. I don't know who these people are. Are they from "Gush Emunim?" They may well be, I don't ignore that possibility. But if so, they are a small, marginal group within the "Gush," a radical group whose existence may even be unknown to the "Gush" itself.

[Question] You said that these anonymous people raised issues and suggested ideas for action during your telephone conversations. Can you be specific?

[Answer] To kidnap a number of Egyptian officers from the peace station at Ne'ot Sinai, and in so doing, awaken world opinion and perhaps destroy the trust between Israel and Egypt. Another suggestion was to sabotage the peace station at Ne'ot Sinai. There were other ideas and suggestions, all in the same vein. Of course, I rejected them from the outset. I explained to these people, by telephone, that this was not our way, that we had no intention of cooperating with them. When they realized that we would stand firm on this position, they stopped calling.

[Question] Did you bring these incidents to the attention of the security forces? Is this situation known to the appropriate government agencies?

[Answer] Naturally. I spoke to many people about it, among them the prime minister and other select ministers. But to tell you the truth, they didn't need my report. Over the past few months there have been serious accidents in the region, such as the electric lines that blew up on one moshav. These incidents forced the security people to open their eyes. Those of us who live here all know each other. It's not likely that any of the residents would endanger himself by perpetrating such an action.

[Question] I understand that these activities have now ceased. Why?

[Answer] I have no idea. But it is my understanding that the government is nonetheless working to identify the underground. It's no secret in the area that numerous telephones are bugged.

Unlike most others, Yitzhak Regev (a declared rightwinger from "the real Herut," in his own words) is not convinced that the "Gush Emunim" people who have penetrated the area over the past few weeks are the ones pushing for a civil war. He is convinced and certain that Ge'ula Kohen would not be part of a civil war, nor would Hanan Porat. Regev's attitude toward Porat is "respect him but

suspect him." In the not so distant past he worked arm in arm with the forces attempting to halt the withdrawal from Sinai. He was among those who tried to persuade Knesset members to vote against the Camp David agreements and he took part in the famous and bitter struggle at Gan Yarok in Ne'ot Sinai. During these activities, he came to understand the people who are now in the territory. He asks us to believe that when the evacuation begins on 26 April, these people will only try to "persuade and explain."

Despite this, against the background of the fanatic, rebellious declarations and actions emanating from the Rafi'ah area, Regev's statements sound almost like the epitome of compromise! He does not believe in the peace treaty with Egypt, an opinion which he shares with most residents in the region, ("I would be happy if time were to prove me wrong"), and if it was up to him, he would prevent the withdrawal and the return of the territory to Egypt. But, during the violent struggle in Gan Yarok between the settlers and IDF soldiers, he understood--as did the other residents, when so few citizens came to support their struggle--that "the battle over Yamit is lost." It was then that the famous saying was born: "Yamit was murdered and died in Camp David. We must bury it as quickly as possible."

[Answer] We understood then that we must get up and go. The awareness that Israel would not hold on to the territory for years to come finally penetrated us. Even if we could halt withdrawal, the area has already been "sold" to Egypt as part of the terrible mistake made at Camp David. If the pullback is not made today, it will be next year, the year after, or even 10 years from now. Let's not play dumb. Husni Mubarak, Egypt's new president, will continue to move things along uneventfully until April 1982. Anyone who thought something might happen in Egypt which might make it possible to break the Camp David accords is naive. Healthy logic tells us to get out and take what's coming to us. We may go with a heavy heart and much pain, but there's nothing to do about that.

[Question] Because of your stand, the head of the Yeshiva in Yamit, Rabbi Israel Ari'el, has called you the country's fifth column.

[Answer] The fifth column in this country is made up of those preaching civil war--whatever the justification may be--people like Rabbi Ari'el. Anyone preaching civil war, in God's name or in the name of any other cause, is a criminal. Rabbi Ari'el doesn't have to tell me about Yamit. He doesn't love the area more than any of the other settlers. He doesn't represent anyone in the region and he's not entitled to anything from anyone. I've heard his statements. I've heard them well. He says: "Nothing will happen if a woman hits a soldier over the head with a carpet beater, or if a few shots are fired." Anyone who says such things is a criminal. He is the fifth column. I'd rather be labelled an opportunist than be called blood thirsty, because I'm not, nor are any of the other settlers. If Rabbi Ari'el wants to drag the area into radical action, we won't get involved. We'll do everything to prevent a tragic step like that. The settlers' committee is a-political. We have no intentions of abetting the political activities of any group whatsoever.

[Question] But today the situation is such that you, Rabbi Israel Ari'el, the SRS people and the "Gush Emunim" people are all in one pot. Directly or indirectly their actions serve your interests, namely to put pressure on the government.

[Answer] In the current situation, due to the government's weak response to the needs of the settlements, this is unfortunately the case. We saw Rabbi Ari'el in Gan Yarok. We also saw all the other heroes from "Gush Emunim." But we were the ones who were really fighting there, because we really had what to lose: our homes, our land. However, we knew our limits. Everyone in this area carries a weapon, as instructed by security. Before we entered Gan Yarok, everyone's weapons were dismantled. General Dan Shomron was there, and the guys from the officers training, and we stood up to the challenge. To say that we left there with uplifted spirits as one might have following a victory is totally false. We walked around in a state of semi-shock for 3 months afterwards. It was a terrible trauma and I'm sorry we got involved.

Rabbi Ari'el can talk about high ideals, about a struggle in God's name. I can't. I can only talk about garbage, about money, about the rights of every settler. It may sound ugly and sad but that's what I have to do, represent those who turn to me, in hundreds of phone calls, and ask: What's going to happen? Civil war? No way. We won't go that far. No house is so beautiful and no piece of land is so good as to be worth the price of a civil war. I deeply regret that all the groups active in the area are so bound up with each other.

[Question] In the situation that is likely to arise, will you, the settlers, fight with the "Gush Emunim" people and the rest of the anti-withdrawal groups against the IDF soldiers or any other force brought in to evacuate you?

[Answer] I've had a feeling for a few months now that the government forces, like the population at large, do not understand just what will happen here in April 1982. We are not "Gush Emunim" people who will start a struggle. They'll get a good picture on television and in that fashion they will have expressed their protest. We're talking about a group of 400 families, working people, who have no place to go after the evacuation. And if they have no place to go, they'll stay here, despite everything. Someone has to realize this. I know the dynamics created by this kind of confrontation. I witnesses it first hand at Gan Yarok. It was a miracle that the confrontation there ended with no deaths. It was a miracle that a tragedy was prevented. This time, when some of the people taking part in the confrontation are people who have nothing to lose, it will be much worse, much more dangerous. Already I hear friends saying: Let's fortify the area. They're bitter, they hurt, they feel cheated. They feel that they're being manipulated, that they're being treated like garbage. They're likely to do things I wouldn't even want to think about. And what's more, you mustn't forget the underground we spoke of, which openly declares its intention to sabotage the withdrawal at any cost.

[Question] From what you're saying it sounds like the confrontation in Yamit in April 1982 is inevitable, whether your financial demands are met or not.

[Answer] Given the current situation, you're absolutely right. I'll go still further and say something that's been brewing inside me for a long time: I have a feeling that certain forces in the region clearly intend to create a civil war. This kind of war would serve their interests. It's possible that "Gush Emunim" or the people from a "United Israel" would have such interests.

The national trauma of a civil war in Yamit would serve as a warning to any future government sitting down to discuss any agreement related to withdrawal from settlements in Judea and Samaria.

The national trauma of a civil war would also serve those political forces seeking to change the government in Israel. I also have a feeling that at certain levels within the government there is a desire to create this kind of trauma. And no, I'm not referring to the upper echelons. I talked with the prime minister and he spoke with pain and sorrow about his efforts to prevent internal wars in the past. I believe his intentions are pure. I'm referring to lower level officials. Maybe they are intentionally encouraging the settlers and Gush Emunim to fight, in the hope that after a civil war breaks out, the political rule in Israel will be shaken. Maybe, I have no proof, but I also have no other explanation for the apathy and lack of caring within their ranks insofar as anything related to the region.

The War on Public Opinion

Yitzhak Regev is a pleasant conversationalist. He's quick to respond and his words need no clarification. He shoots from the hip. The young man from Haifa (married and the father of two children) uses Ne'ot Sinai as the working center and financial office for the agricultural settlement. During his tenure as director of the settlers committee, he has learned the ins and outs of the media. He has learned to use it and to "read between the lines." In the many hours spent with government representatives, who had come in an effort to solve the residents' problems, he also learned to distinguish what he calls the "undercurrents of regional dynamics." This explains, for example, why he's not overly concerned about the fact that for now no action is being taken to remove about 50 Gush Emunim infiltrators from Talmei Yosef, 'Atzmona and Yamit. He believes that refraining from any action at this time is the wisest move the government could make. According to Regev's reading of the "underground currents" the government would prefer to handle the situation on the day of the evacuation and avoid a long drawn out incident lasting 5 months.

But he is disturbed--even angered--by the uneasiness recently expressed by some of his friends-colleagues, fellow residents in the area. Even today--a week after the meeting with Prime Minister Begin who declared his intention to arrive at a quick and logical solution to the problems of area residents--there is strong doubt among the residents regarding the future. Regev is sensitive to the the stirrings of the people he represents--in their struggle against the government and their demands for monetary compensation. He does not deny the fact that many people in the region are interested in forceful action. For the last 3 months the settlers have refrained from taking any action such as they had in the past--closing roads, burning tires and the like--because of their verbal agreement with the prime minister. "Begin broke his promise," says Regev. "How long can I keep the people in check? If the valve bursts, God forbid..."

As a first step, Regev and his colleagues on the steering committee plan to take moderate action, so as not to exacerbate the relations between the settlers and the government. Regev talks about turning to the court of justice, demanding from the government's legal counsel that an independent investigating committee be established ("Maybe this committee can prevent the impending tragedy come April 1982") and calling upon public opinion in Israel to gain support for their struggle.

[Question] What reason do you have to believe that you'll be able to promote widespread understanding within the Israeli public? The criticism against you has been harsh. In the eyes of many--and with some justification--you look like opportunists. It's no secret that you've been called "merchants," "extortionists" and "profiteers" dealing in peace, as well as a few other epithets of the same variety.

[Answer] True. I don't even get excited about the names we've been called. I know the people here. I know what kind of people we're talking about. I'd be willing to conduct a study and publish the results afterward. These are guys who served in combat units. There is a higher percentage of ranking officers here than anywhere else in Israel, and that's a valid criterion in Israeli society. These are good people, some of the best. There's something about moshavniks--they're just a little better than most. We didn't get carried away and excited when they called us "pioneers." We didn't make a big deal about it when they brought representatives from the Fund and from the Bundes and introduced us as the pioneers making the desert bloom. We didn't complain when we lived 5 years in caravans. We didn't ask for anything when times were bad, and I remember those times. At the time, I was secretary of the agricultural settlement and I was integrally involved in all its activities. We did not see ourselves as heroes. Anyone who thinks we are extortionists or profiteers in peace--may he enjoy the thought. It hurts us because the truth is anything but. I would refer the enlightened public to the words of peace judge Asher. Asher, in his judgement on our case, clearly determined that the settlers were being treated in an inhuman fashion, that they were being cheated and duped--those were his exact words.

[Question] This week it was publicized that the settlers' portfolio would receive 50 million shekels, and that each resident had already received an advance ranging from 1.9 to 2.6 million shekels. It's impossible to ignore the fact that we're talking about large sums which have been placed at your disposal to start a new life in a fair and respectable manner. Don't you think your demands are really exaggerated?

[Answer] That's really the problem, all those numbers! All the lies that the government is promulgating via the mass media! Where are those figures coming from? The government is throwing sand in the people's eyes. It's a war of attrition against us, a war on public opinion. How much did they say we'd receive? Fifty million shekels? If someone with the necessary authority came here right now, I'd strike a deal for a far lower sum! In order to make us appear contemptible and in order to give us a bad reputation in the eyes of the public, they're throwing numbers into the air. Where are these figures about advances coming from? The truth is that we have to date received sums

ranging from 900,000 to 1.5 million shekels, that's all. How did these higher figures come into play? Very simply, someone calculated them based on today's index. Now really, does that sound reasonable?

It's very easy to turn public opinion against us. It's even easier perhaps to imbue the public with the idea that we're profiteers. I'm sorry, but we have a different message to relay. We must negotiate for money because if we don't insist on it, we'll leave the area with the feeling that we've been thrown out of the most beautiful region in the country and what's more, that we were cheated and manipulated. Do we deserve that? Dear God, we do have laws in the State of Israel! All we want is what's coming to us, that which the law allows for. Why are they fooling around with us? Why are they making entire families miserable?

[Question] The government claims that you are undermining the negotiations for compensation to area residents, that negotiations have already been completed with 20 percent of the residents.

[Answer] That's another dirty lie! Whoever said that negotiations have been completed with 20 percent of the settlers is either lying (and he knows it) or he doesn't know what he's talking about. I know the facts, and I say it's not true. With the exception of a few individual families who gave up at the beginning of the struggle, those for whom the decision to withdraw only hastened their own decision to leave. The majority of the families are still hanging on and waiting for the negotiations to be completed. What do we want after all? We want someone official, someone with the authority to make a decision, to come and sit with us. We want him to tell us where we stand, how much we'll get, when we'll get it. These people here have other debts. They want to know if they'll be able to meet their financial obligations. I myself signed a $50,000 note in December, to buy a house in Haifa where I'll live after the evacuation. People have purchased homes or farms. They want to know how it's going to work out.

We're undermining the negotiations? How? Emissary after emissary from the government has reached us. They came, they listened, they left. Each one had his reason for coming. Judge Berenzon was here, having been sent by the government. He sat, he listened, he asked questions, he arrived at conclusions. We accepted his conclusions even though we knew he was sent by the government. But Arik Sharon decided that Berenzon wasn't needed, that the situation could be handled without his help. The general manager of the Ministry of Agriculture comes and goes. He accepts our position. But he has no authority. There is no point in talking with people like that.

It's no secret that the negotiations on the amount of compensation to Yamit area residents (The residents of the town of Yamit are a separate group when it comes to demands for compensation. There, 150 families have already been evacuated.) are being conducted slowly. Even when the details had already been agreed upon, someone managed to "blow up" the negotiations. Today the situation is static. The two sides are not in contact, although there is talk of a second advance against compensation. No one, however, knows when this might take place. Regev is convinced that in a week's time "the whole deal"

could be arranged. He solemnly declares that the settlers are willing to accept the decision of any senior government agent with authority, whatever the decision might be. He talks about the deep, troubled feeling settling over the area residents due to the confrontation. He talks about automobile accidents that have occurred in the region, about the increased divorce rate and even one suicide. "People don't understand what it means to be so uncertain about one's future."

In the course of our conversation Regev was careful not to mention the amounts which, in his opinion, the settlers in the Rafi'ah area should receive. Perhaps he didn't want to flaunt the issue and perhaps he didn't want another negative point added to his score in the war on public opinion. In any event, he naturally preferred to turn the conversation to another subject--the danger of the civil war expected to erupt during the fast approaching withdrawal. As to the future of the settlers, he was willing to say that it was already clear that little would come of all the grandiose plans they had made in the not so distant past. There are those planning to emigrate from Israel. Two or three families--who had originally come to the area from the United States--have already left the country ("frustrated and bitter, steeped in disappointment"). But there are others, a nucleus of three settlements in the area, who are weaving a plan to establish a tourist spot in the northeastern area around the Sea of Galilee. Yitzhak Regev hopes to be among those to work on that goal. "We told the government not to give us the money directly but to put the money into the tourist area we've proposed, to lay a foundation and to start building. That's alright with us," he says, eyes glowing.

Yitzhak Regev clearly feels hurt by the upheavals within the settlements, by the confrontation from which there is no recourse in his mind, and of course, by the critical public opinion directed against him and his friends: "The whole issue has really hurt the people here. It hurts them a lot, because it's not how much we'll get out of the situation, but how we'll make out emotionally and whether we'll have the strength, after all the hardship, to go on and do something for the country. I hope I will, but I'm not sure about everyone else. Because what has happened here with respect to the way the government has treated the people is a social oversight of the highest order. But if it is an oversight and no more, so be it. I pray that it will not amount to much more."

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KOHEN INTERVIEWED ON SINAI WITHDRAWAL

[Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 19 Oct 81 p 9]

[Interview with Ge'ula Kohen by Rafa'el Bashan; date and place not specified]

[Text] Ge'ula Kohen, the Knesset member who had moved to Yamit, returned from there for this interview with me.

Question: Why were you summoned to Yamit?

Kohen: I was not summoned to Yamit on the spur of the moment, nor was I called as a result of the death of President Sadat. It was rather from the moment that the peace plan was presented before the Knesset, the plan which relinquished the Sinai and autonomy. If I was silent at the time, it was only because the Knesset was deafened by the announcement of and excitement over President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, (sarcastically) as if it was the Messiah himself! Today, we're not the only ones who are alarmed. People are opening their eyes more and more each day. In fact, former foreign minister Moshe Dayan, may he rest in peace, declared that he thinks the Egyptians will break the agreement after they get the last third of the Sinai back on 28 April 1982. I must point out that this date has a special significance because it is Israel's independence day. The flag lowering ceremony will take place, according to the agreement, on 27 April 1982, which is the day commemorating fallen IDF soldiers. Further, the citizens of Sinai are scheduled to be evacuated on 7 April 1982, which is the eve of Passover, the holiday commemorating our exodus from Egypt...

Question: Aren't your demands and those of "Tehiya" sabotaging peace and normalization with Egypt? Won't they, in the end, cause us serious difficulties, especially at the international level?

Kohen: Our intent is to at least stop the retreat from the rest of Sinai, although many of us will continue to mourn those sections already returned to Egypt. We in "Tehiya" don't see the accords as the basis for a lasting peace, but as a one-sided concession. Even those who see the withdrawal as necessary for the peace accords know that the agreement was sabotaged by Egypt on more than one occasion. Actually, this was the case when they prevented the continuation of talks concerning autonomy in conjunction with the withdrawal from Sinai, ignoring the stipulations of the Camp David accords. Further, the Egyptians voted in the UN, along with those countries which rejected total withdrawal, for the establishment of a Palestinian State, which is contrary to the

plan for autonomy as outlined in the agreement. They called for the establishment of Palestinian government in exile, not to mention their clear statement of intent to support other Arab nations as soon as Israel showed signs of hostility toward any of them. I should remind anyone who has forgotten that we signed the peace treaty with Egypt under circumstances that were quite different than those prevailing in the world today, with all the accompanying repercussions.

Rigid Policy

Question: What exactly do you mean?

Kohen: I mean that we agreed to return the entire Sinai Peninsula at a time when Afghanistan was being invaded, and on our southern border Saudi Arabia wasn't armed as well or as sophisticatedly as today. The whole Middle East was in turmoil. Under international law, when circumstances change, such as those I've outlined, agreements can be revised. Only a country that wants to lose power indulges in a rigid policy which could, God forbid, lead to annihilation. There are many today who know this, but only a few have the ability to draw conclusions from reality and even fewer would fight to change it.

Question: Why do you consider it such a tragedy that the Israeli Government decided to return the entire Sinai Peninsula over a six-month period--is it the time table they've set up?

Kohen: You don't have to be a professional politician to know what the scenario will be after we've returned the Sinai to them. The fact is that Cairo does not see the agreement with Israel in a vacuum, but in a broader perspective. The famous "there is no linkage" is only in the imagination of Prime Minister Begin. From their point of view, the linkage--the tie between the withdrawal from Sinai and the establishment of a Palestinian State in Judea and Samaria and in Gaza--is close and decisive. This means that after we return the Sinai to the Egyptians, they will launch a serious diplomatic campaign to establish a Palestinian base in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Of course, this will be with the help of American pressure which is already being brought to bear on us today. It's entirely possible that they will immediately demand a solution to the question of the final status of Judea, Samaria and Gaza, without waiting for the three years of autonomy to end. Given the current U.S. attitude it's clear to me, without a shadow of doubt, that the pressures on us will be far greater after the final withdrawal from Sinai. And we're already talking about the far-reaching compromises Israel has made to Egypt--in the areas of land, water and internal security during the proposed autonomy. One might fear that the Egyptians will back out of their "no more war" statement and switch to "no more peace."

I'm not saying that Egypt will start a war against us right at this juncture. War and peace are not decided based on the existence or non-existence of a peace treaty. Wars are waged when one side thinks that his opponent is weak and that he himself is strong. At that point he launches a war. That's how it was between Iraq and Iran, despite the peace treaty they had signed. When we withdraw, the very fact that Israel will then have borders which are more difficult to defend, a weakened morale due to the land we've returned and a depressed economic situation, will open the way for war.

Question: Your demands may be justified, but it appears that they don't lend themselves to implementation. Don't you think your opponents are more realistic?

Kohen: I think, I fully believe that we in "Tehiya" have been proven more realistic. Just as it proved that we were realistic with respect to the enemy's intentions, we will be proven realistic also with respect to the internal forces at work among the Israeli people, encouraging them to stand up to pressure and to a confrontation with those bringing this pressure to bear. Realism is not just a question of recognizing forces abroad but also an evaluation of internal forces, spiritual forces. I believe that retaining Sinai is not only necessary and essential, but also possible. If the government does not want this, then the will of the people must force the government to change its position. We must demonstrate that this is a decision that the people won't stand for.

In the State of Israel today a movement is at work. It is large and growing daily. Its goal is to stop the retreat from the Sinai. Its members are not only people from Tehiya and Gush Emunim but people from the settlements, the moshavim and the various political parties. If the government does not agree to act in a rational and responsible manner, if it uses its power to uproot settlements, then we will have to pit our power against theirs. If we really want to, we can.

Question: Don't you, as a Knesset member, have any problem with the definition you're outlining? If the government enforces its right to remove the settlers, will you use your right to oppose the government?

Kohen (with a thin smile): I will have the same problem faced by the prime minister when he became involved in the experiment to settle Sebastia in Samaria, which was declared illegal by the government at the time. Force was used against the settlers in order to remove them. Begin (who was the head of the opposition at the time) was asked, in my presence, how he could explain the fact that he had visited "an illegal settlement." He answered: "Every settlement in the land of Israel is legal. Only the government's decision on this issue is illegal!"

I will give the prime minister--who at the time asked to go along to Ne'ot Sinai in the Yamit area, since he also considered that area a part of Israel--the same answer: settlement is not illegal! Your decision is! For us, the struggle in Yamit is a battle over Israeli territory. Our struggle is over the principle of settlement. It is also a struggle for the need to struggle! The root of the problem in Israel today is that the State of Israel in effect stopped struggling for those true and essential goals whose absence could mean an end to Zionism.

Lack of Sensitivity and Denial

Question: Is there a meaningful difference between the approach and position of the minister of defense, Arik Sharon, and that of the deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture, Simha Erlich, regarding withdrawal from Sinai?

Kohen: First of all, all the members of the government are equally guilty of having voted for the Camp David accords, and for the fact that we've come to a situation wherein settlements are being uprooted from their land. I was shocked

to hear that ministers Erlich and Nisim had brazenly dared to call the families who went down to Talmei Yosef "intruders," when they are the real pioneers of today! This stand on the part of these ministers is proof not just of a lack of sensitivity toward and understanding of the importance of the Zionist settlement and the political act, but also a denial of the explicit obligation taken on by the government to encourage settlement in the area until the moment of withdrawal, God forbid! The government was obligated to aid these families moving and settling in the area, so that it wouldn't be empty, and to pay down to the last cent whoever would stay until the last minute, God forbid it should come. In an area with upheavals such as ours, isn't it irrational to rush the withdrawal from Sinia, even from a realistic reading of the situation.

As for Arik Sharon, I feel that although he was a partner to the Camp David accords and although he is largely responsible for Yamit, I really hope that today he would not be part of the evacuation. To the contrary, in my opinion he should use the full extent of his authority to prevent this terrible decision!

Question: Are you living in Yamit?

Kohen: I divide my time between the Knesset and Yamit. It's true that my soul has not found peace in these times, with this decree hanging over the area. Yamit and Ofira today are like limbs of our bodies, wounded limbs. In my opinion, especially as a Knesset member, it is up to me to be in the place that hurts the most, the place most in need of assistance. My friends and I in the Knesset will conduct our political struggle from the podium of the Knesset. But the real struggle in the area will be conducted by the settlers themselves, among them a group of unusual idealists. Withdrawal is a tense issue with supporters from all parties.

Even if we don't succeed, God forbid, to save Yamit and Ofira, even then our struggle will not have been for naught. Our struggle will strengthen the power of settlers all over Israel, in Judea, Samaria and the Golan Heights. I do believe, however, that our struggle will be successful, that reason will triumph and the withdrawal will be halted. Our struggle is in Yamit, but not for Yamit. We are, rather, struggling for every home in the State of Israel: every home already in existence and all the homes that will be built in the land of Israel. Our struggle is not only against folding in the territories, but against folding the Zionist flag.

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CSO: 4423/38

GOLAN DRUZE CRITICIZE GOVERNMENT POLICY

TA030833 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 3 Dec 81

[Text] The pro-Syrian groups in the Golan Heights are complaining that the Israeli authorities have recently hardened their attitude to the Druze sect members there. They claim that the latest moves are intended to punish them for their refusal to accept Israeli citizenship. The Israeli authorities, however, say that there has been no change in the approach to the Druze. Here are additional details from our correspondent, Yo'el Dar:

The change in the approach to us, the pro-Syrian groups are saying, is taking the form of the 3 week closure of the regional high school in Mas'adah Village, the arrest of six boys on suspicion of incitement against a Hebrew teacher and the positioning of roadblocks on all roads leading to our village. Soldiers supplied with lists, the speakers add, are stopping vehicles and subjecting us to thorough examinations. The reason given is for routine security. But it is no coincidence that those who are being forced to wait for more than an hour at the roadblocks are the leaders of the fight against acceptance of the Israeli identification cards. Moreover, some inhabitants have been interrogated concerning their public activity. In contrast, those who cooperate with Israel meet with a generous and very liberal attitude. This, as I said, is the version of the nationalist groups.

The representatives of the authorities are saying unofficially and uncommitedly that no decision has been made about the change in policy on the Golan Heights Druze, but the truth is that they have ceased to be the spoiled children and they are no longer being treated as being above the law. Israel's friends in the Golan Heights are saying that the latest moves are not significant and have come too late. For example, the Zionist Druze group in Majdal Shams is demanding a halt to all the widescale benefits given to the Druze in the Golan Heights and, in particular, the cancellation of children's allowances. But the latest proposal has not been discussed by any official body and it is doubtful if it will ever be put forward for discussion.

CSO: 4423/56

'HA'ARETZ' ON NEW WEST BANK VILLAGE LEAGUE POLICY

TA301159 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Nov 81 p 9

[Commentary by Yehuda Litani: "Appointed Leaders"]

[Excerpts] A few months after the municipal elections in the West Bank in 1976, from which emerged in most West Bank towns mayors supportive of the PLO, the military government's then Arab affairs adviser Col (Prof) Amnon Kohen was replaced by Col (Prof) Menahem Milson, who currently heads the civilian administration in the West Bank. Colonel Milson's assistant at that time, Yig'al Karmon (today Arab affairs adviser in the military government), knew a resident of the village of Dura in the Hebron subdistrict, Mustafa Dudin, who in 1975 returned from Jordan after having served in numerous venerable posts in the Jordanian regime and, before that, in the government of Egypt.

Mustafa Dudin then started to become a desirable figure to the military government. In his village of Dura he is not regarded as a local leader or clan leader, it being his cousin who represents the Dudin clan at the town's municipal council (Dura has a municipality which is headed by a PLO sympathizer). Military government officers began persuading village mukhtars to join the area village leagues of Mustafa Dudin and of his brothers. The military administration and particularly Milson and Karmon believed that succor would come to the military government in the form of the Dudin brothers.

The military government's attempt to set up area village leagues in the regions of Ramallah and Bethlehem have failed at this stage. Clan relations are much stronger on Mt Hebron than north of it. Moreover, the figures chosen by the administration, Bishara Qimsiyah in Bethlehem and Yusuf al-Khatib (murdered this month by a PLO ambush), were almost unknown to those areas' residents, and they failed to make their leagues work despite massive assistance from the military government.

This is an attempt to circumvent the known urban leadership, and it seems that now, with the appointment of Professor Milson as head of the civilian administration, that attempt will receive a stronger momentum. Professor Milson is known as an ardent opponent of the policy which led to the 1976 municipal elections that resulted in the emergence mayors supportive of the PLO. It is reasonable to assume that during his term in office he will not only seek to reduce the power of the municipalities, but will also try for a flat cancellation of the aforementioned election's inheritance--by invalidating the appointments of several town mayors, as well as of numerous councillors.

Menahem Milson and Yig'al Karmon's reckoning is quite simple: Some 70 percent of the West Bank population is rural, whereas only 30 percent is urban, but the urbanites rule the villagers nevertheless. The attempt now being made is meant to provide the villagers with more independence, so that they can "shed" the urban rule. But Messrs Milson and Karmon seem to be ignoring a few simple facts: the reality of life in the West Bank during the last 2 decades and, particularly since 1967, has in no small measure minimized the difference between the urbanites and villagers. Myriads of villagers have been working since the Israeli occupation in cities in Israel and in the West Bank. The villager of the eighties is much more independent than his fathers were in the thirties and the forties. There is money in his pocket, he is better educated, and his mind works on lines quite similar to those of an urbanite.

It should be noted that among the West Bank security detainees, the percent of villagers resembles their percentage in the general population, which is only one proof refuting Milson and Karmon's oversimplistic theory.

CSO: 4423/56

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURE FREE TRADE ZONE--Israel proposes to set up in Europe a free trade zone for agricultural produce. Israel believes such a step might solve economic problems caused by Spain's and Portugal's joining of the EEC. Our correspondent, Avraham Ben-Melekh, reports that Israel's proposal was raised in Jerusalem today, in the first talk between the deputy preisdent of the EEC Commission, Lorenzo (Natali) and Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and representatives of the economic affairs ministries. It was agreed at the meeting to continue the dialogue between Israel and the EEC institutions. At the beginning of next month, a delegation of experts from the Agriculture Ministry will depart for discussions in Brussels. [Text] [TA011507 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 1 Dec 81]

PUMPING TESTS AT GAS WELL--Pumping tests have begun at the 3 km-deep (Notera III) gas well in the Hula Valley. Our correspondent has learned that experts from the United States and Japan will come to the site within a few days to help produce the gas, which is mixed with water. Our correspondent also notes that gas was discovered in two of the previous wells in the (Notera) series and gas is already being produced for commercial purposes from one of them. It is hoped that there is a larger quantity in the new well. [Text] [TA020731 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 2 Dec 81]

LIST OF BANNED BOOKS PUBLISHED--The military censors have published the names of another 11 books that are not to be distributed in the territories, bringing the total number of banned books to about 800. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reports that the new list includes books on communist issues written by the leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash, and South Yemen President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani; a novel by the Palestinian writer, (Rasan Qanafani), as well as political books about the Palestinian problem, against the self-administration and the autonomy and anti-Zionist articles. [Text] [TA010855 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 1 Dec 81]

IDF CENTRAL COMMAND--There has been a change of commanders in the IDF central command. Today Maj Gen Ori Or became commander of the central command. Or is replacing Maj Gen Moshe Levi after the latter was appointed to another senior IDF post. [TA031639 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 3 Nov 81]

LABOR PARTY COUNCILS--The Labor Party Bureau today elected Ra'anan Kohen as chairman of the minority branch. The Labor Party will soon set up two public councils:

one a Jewish-Arab council and the other, a Jewish-Druze council. It was similarly decided to establish branches in the larger Arab settlements and grant appropriate representation to the 13,000 Arab members of the Labor Party. [TA052010 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 5 Nov 81]

NEW NORTH JERUSALEM NEIGHBORHOOD--The Housing and Construction Ministry has begun building the first houses in the new urban neighborhood called Giv'at Ze'ev, located between Jerusalem and Ramallah. Some 5,000 residential apartments, intended to house 20,000 people, are planned for Giv'at Ze'ev. Initial work was also begun on the new highway that will connect Jerusalem with the coastal plain, along the Jerusalem-Bet Horon axis. [Excerpt] [TA301950 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 30 Nov 81]

EDUCATIONAL TIES WITH SWAZILAND--Jerusalem, 30 Nov--Education and Culture Minister Mr Zvulun Hammer and Swaziland Education Minister Siphethe D. Dlamini have decided to develop educational ties between the two countries. The Swaziland minister recently visited Israel and had held a working talk with Minister Hammer. The guest showed special interest in three spheres developed by the Israeli educational system: vocational training, agricultural education and the literacy program. The minister, accompanied by members of the Education Ministry, toured educational institutions in the country. [Text] [TA301521 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1515 GMT 30 Nov 81]

VILLAGES FORBIDDEN TO REPAIR GENERATORS--The military government will not allow villages in Samaria to repair their electricity-producing generators or to replace old generators with a view to connecting Arab villages to the national electricity network. Orders to this effect were recently issued to the mukhtars of the villages in Samaria. Our correspondent notes that last summer the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee decided to support the rural electricity associations to prevent the connection of the villages to the Israeli network. In response, the military government ordered the villages which had formed electricity associations to dismantle their new generators. [Text] [TA010850 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 1 Dec 81]

AGREEMENT WITH PERU--Deputy Prime Minister and Agriculture Minister Simha Ehrlich and Peruvian Agriculture Minister Don Niels Correa Ericson today signed a letter of intention to expand agricultural cooperation between Israel and Peru. The full agreement states that cooperation, mainly on large-scale irrigation, would be expanded by selling Israeli know-how to Peru. Israel presently sells millions of dollars' worth of irrigation equipment to Peru. The new agreement will further expand sales by extending professional advise and giving credit to exporters selling their produce to Peru. The signing ceremony took place at the Dan Hotel in Tel Aviv. [Text] [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2240 GMT 24 Nov 81]

ARMING OF VILLAGE LEAGUES--The head of the Hebron area Village League, Mustafa Dudin, has welcomed the defense minister's decision to supply arms to the Village Leagues, although he notes that he has heard no official information on this yet. Speaking to our correspondent in Judaea and Samaria, Arye Gus, Dudin wanted to make clear that these arms are intended for defense and not for aggression, adding that he and his people are opposed to terrorism and will never use these weapons for purposes other than defense. Dudin declared that the moment those responsible

for the assassination of Yusuf al-Khatib [the head of the Ramallah area Village League] announce that they are stopping the acts of terrorism, the village leagues will be prepared to return the arms to the authorities. He added that people who use nationalistic slogans for the purpose of killing innocent people cannot be listened to. Our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari, notes that the heads of the village leagues and their supporters in Judaea and Samaria in fact have had arms for some time now. The bodyguards of the village leagues heads have been armed for at least 4 months now, since the joint Jordanian-PLO committee decided to act against the village leagues their leaders have been under IDF guard as well. The leagues' members demand that they not only get the arms but be allowed to use them against their attackers. [Text] [TA301135 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 30 Nov 81]

APPEAL AT TEMPLE MOUNT REJECTED--This morning the high court of justice rejected an appeal to compel the government to allow Jewish prayers on Temple Mount [in Jerusalem]. Our correspondent, Moshe Negbi, notes that the court unanimously ruled that the issue of prayers on Temple Mount is essentially a political one and a decision about it should not be made by a judicial forum. The president of the high court of justice, Moshe Landau, and judges Yehuda Kohen and Yitzhaq Shilo noted that prayers by Jews on Temple Mount might stir up emotions and cause public disorder and, under such circumstances, it is conceivable that the police would be called to intervene and prevent the prayers. The justices also rejected the claim of the appellant--a religious jurist from Ramat Gan--that the basic law on Jerusalem in any way compels the government to allow Jews free access to Temple Mount to worship. [Text] [TA300829 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 30 Nov 81]

CSO: 4423/56

GOVERNMENT, DISSIDENTS DEBATE PRESS FREEDOM IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 4 Nov 81 pp 12-16

/Article: "Comment on the Discussion on Eliminating Restrictions on Freedom of the Press"/

/Text/ The second meeting of the current session of the National Assembly, held on Tuesday morning, 27 October 1981, witnessed a heated extensive discussion of Article 35 (bis) of the Press Law.

The discussion assumed two dimensions. The first one centered on the demand by a number of deputies that the article be put on the agenda for debate. The deputy prime minister and acting minister of information protested against this, demanding that the discussion of the subject be postponed for a period of 2 weeks on grounds that sudden new developments had occurred that needed clarification. The deputies who demanded the debate on Article 35 (bis) rejected the postponement on grounds that the discussion had been postponed for 4 months and that there was no justification for postponing it further.

The discussion of the second dimension concentrated on the unlawfulness and unconstitutionality of the continued application of this article and the demand that it be abrogated, while another group of deputies, including the acting minister of information, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad, concentrated on the need to have this article continue in effect.

The deputies succeeded in arriving at a discussion of Article 35 (bis), but they did not succeed in acquiring the necessary votes to abrogate it. The result of the voting was 29 deputies demanding its abrogation, 24 deputies demanding that it be retained and 15 abstaining. Thus the voting on Article 35 (bis) of the Press Law was suspended, and it is to be put up for the vote at next Saturday's meeting.

Details of the Meeting

The question and answer section:

The assembly began its meeting as usual with the approval of the minutes of the previous meeting. The secretary general of the assembly then read out the cables that had been received and moved on to discuss the question and answer section.

In this section, the deputies usually take up a discussion of service problems, and

in this meeting the discussion did not go beyond the normal scope of previous ones. As regards the heated debate on Article 35 (bis) of the Press Law, the discussion in this section did not possess the weight it usually does when meetings are restricted to a discussion of service issues and this section takes the main share of the time and the agenda of the meeting.

In this section, the deputies addressed themsevles to a criticism of the municipal council's position calling for the removal of a number of coupons from citizens who had been allocated coupons in 1977. The deputy Muhammad al-Barrak said that the Council of Ministers' decree calling for the nonallocation of coupons had made the citizens the target of land merchants.

Deputy Fayiz al-Bughayli also took up a criticism of the backward level of services in the 'Ayn Baghzi area. The deputies Hadil al-Jallawi and 'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydili dealt with the issue of aid presented by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and pointed out that there were citizens who were losing their rights. Al-Juhaydili demanded that an investigation and inspection be made into these citizens' conditions and a view was presented which demanded that the activity of village chiefs be reviewed and that the conditions for their nomination to the National Assembly be reviewed. The deputy Dr Khalid al-Wasmi stated that it was necessary that village chiefs present their resignations when they venture to nominate themselves for membership in the National Assembly.

In the answer section, the deputy Faysal al-Qudaybi followed up on the minister of electricity's answer on the reasons for the al-Shu'aybah fire, stating that there was a lack of coordination between the station and the fire department. He demanded that there be coordination between the ministry and Kuwait University to graduate engineers and technicians to work in this sector.

The deputy Faysal al-Dawish also made a followup on the minister of electricity's response on bringing electricity to the al-'Aridiyah area, saying, "The minister's reply is disappointing. A citizen must wait for a year to receive agreement to have electricity hooked up to his home. The al-"Aridiyah area will remain without electricity until the middle of 1983. This means that the Ministry of Electricity is failing to keep abreast of construction development."

Discussion of Article 35 (Bis)

After the discussion on the question and answer section ended, the assembly moved on to discuss the request by the deputies Ahmad al-Sa'dun, Muhammad al-Rashid, Muhammad al-Murshid, Jasim al-'Awn and Mubarak Ra'i al-Fahma' requesting that the education committee report on the Law on the Press and Publications placed on the agenda before other sections. At this point the course of the discussion turned to proceedings in which contradictory positions regarding Article 35 (bis) manifested themselves. Two positions on the issue at discussion and the investigation into the matter were crystallized in this discussion. The government requested that discussion on this subject be postponed a week on the grounds that there were sudden new variables that had to be studied before discussion of this issue. The deputy prime minister and acting minister of information expressed this position by saying "I demanded that it be postponed only a week since there have been some developments, and it is my right to request that."

This position on the minister's part provoked various reactions among the deputies; among them, some supported the postponement with justifications which these deputies supported only by brief statements marked mostly by a character of nonchalance and support for the government's right to demand a postponement.

However, among other deputies, the demand for postponement raised heated opposition, and they stressed the importance of the discussion and refused to have further procrastination and delay.

The deputy Hamad al-Rumi spoke, saying "Everyone knows that the abrogation of this article is a popular demand, the deputies have promised their constituents that the article would be abrogated, the committee has written its report, the government has asked for a grace period of 1 week, the period was increased to 3 weeks, then the committee met with the deputy prime minister and we heard his opinion, then it presented a report representing the citizens' desire, then the minister promised us he would present an alternative, weeks and months went by, and we were given two orders from the citizens on the postponement of the matter. I demand that the report be assigned an urgent character and be discussed in this session."

As the discussion continued, the assembly chairman settled the matter by a vote on the request for postponement, which received 23 votes and did not pass. When the deputies' demand was voted on, the members fell silent. Then the door to discussion was opened and the deputy prime minister objected, saying "Why didn't the chair vote another time on the basic recommendation, and just vote on the government's demand for a postponement?"

Thus the discussion moved over to the issue of voting on the original recommendation and the interpretation of the question of silence. This stirred up broad argument. The deputy Khalid al-Wasmi was compelled to comment, stating, "The government demanded that its urgent discussion be postponed and the assembly did not agree. Naturally, I request the chair to start the discussion only if we want to lose more time."

The discussions continued to the point where the assembly lost its self-control, up to the moment when the voice vote was taken; the results were:

31 in favor of a discussion;

Three not in favor;

20 abstaining.

After conclusion of the prayer and a break, the meeting reconvened at 1215 hours, and the report by the education, culture and guidance committee on Article 35 (bis) of the Press Law was read out. It was reviewed by the rapporteur, Khalid Jumay'an, and contained the view of the deputy prime minister, minister of foreign affairs and acting minister of information stating that the circumstances of Kuwait and conditions in the Arab world demanded concern about specific matters and that in addition the article was in keeping with the constitution and did not contradict it, and its existence was in the interests of Kuwait.

As for the committee, that was of the unanimous opinion that it should not have

agreed to the ruler's order that that article be added following a resumption of parliamentary activity.

Since there were 28 members who had signed up to discuss the article, a recommendation was made that one content oneself with hearing three supporters and a similar number of opponents.

The discussion began with a statement by the deputy Jasim al-Saqr, who said,

"Regarding Article 35 (bis), we have the following facts in front of us: [words missing/ constitutional provisions; each of us has sworne to commit himself to the constitution and to defend public freedoms and the stipulations bearing on freedom of the press, namely Article 37 of the constitution and Article 36, which stresses freedom of opinion, scientific research and so forth. There are constitutional provisions which bind us to allegiance and commitment to the oath we swore, which was that we should not violate this line.

"In another area, human thought has been in conflict on freedom of opinion throughout the centuries and generations, and since the French revolution thought has all been linked to freedom of opinion. Stripping democracy of freedom of opinion and publication means fundamentally disparaging the notion of democracy. These basic premises cause me to disagree with the amendment proposed by the government. Then making the judiciary the body which is competent to review issues of the press is the natural, correct state of affairs, adopting the principle of the separation of powers, since the judiciary power is supposed to be neutral and independent. This is a premise of principle. There are factors I am very familiar with and in my view many colleagues know the motives that caused the government to think of making the amendment. Perhaps there have been some serious justifications on the government's part, but we are faced with constitutional stipulations to which we have committed ourselves, we are faced with principles related to the people's freedoms, and we do not have the option of dealing lightly with them. We must distinguish between two points, the issue of the constitutional provisions and the judiciary's competence to review the issues of publication, and the organizational aspect. In my view, on the organizational aspects, it is in the capacity of the government to offer a draft regulating the journalistic profession. To be more frank, I hear that one of the precautions motivating the government amendment is that some papers have discussed the heads of some countries and Kuwait's foreign relations, and this involves great embarrassment to the government, or as regards the profession, anyone engaged in the profession of journalism; that is an organizational point which differs from freedom of opinion and thought, and one must not confuse the two.

"We will be the most fervent advocates for supporting a well-studied organizational draft which does not conflict with the provisions of the constitution."

The deputy Ahmad al-Sa'dun, in presenting his support for the rejection of Article 35 (bis), said: "It is necessary to go back a little, to the Press Law issued in 1956, in order to see that this stipulation concerning restrictions on the freedom of the press is not new but existed prior to democracy in Kuwait. It was confirmed by the law issued in 1961 and confirmed again in 1965 in somewhat amended form. By way of bringing the assembly around, the government produced an explanatory memorandum stating that the amendment was tantamount to a temporary measure until a new law was issued. This talk was in 1965. The stipulation continued in the assembly

of 1963 and the assembly of 1967; in the 1973 assembly, some brothers came and presented a modification to Article 35, and it was amended to the form it had taken before. Evaluation was left up to the judiciary and not to the person of the minister of information, who is a human being like us. In 1972 they presented an amendment, the law was amended, and it continued in effect.

Between 1972 and 1976, what happened? Nothing happened regarding the abrogation of that article. The argument which holds that the amendment was made for a reason was unconvincing. Following the passage of the ruler's order, the law was issued not by a decree but by a ruler's order directly after the dissolution of the assembly, which was in violation of the constitution. The explanatory memorandum to the constitution raises a question: were matters so bad that one could not wait for the formation of a cabinet but rather that a ruler's decree had to be issued on Article 10? It was stated that foreign motives were the reason for the attack on some Arab leaders. However, the law was issued directly after the dissolution of the National Assembly, and it was not desirable to discuss the reasons for that dissolution. When some newspapers tried to take a poll of some citizens' opinions, and I stated my opinion -- 'Sabah al-Ahmad has removed us from the issue' -- this was not a departure from the subject. The issuance of the law, and the time it was issued, were primarily for domestic reasons, not foreign ones, and no violations were committed by the press from 1972 to 1976. It is true that there were shutdowns for a day or two, that papers would feel embarrassment in discussing some subjects, and that people would hold themselves back out of fear that the newspaper would be shut down by decree of the minister of information. A few days ago, advertisements were published that were paid for by the account of al-Sadat's regime, and when a cartoon of al-Numayri was published, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM was shut down -- al-Numayri, who imprisoned tens of thousands before he went back to Khartoum from Cairo. /Words missing/ the shutdown of AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM was because of this law "(interruptions) --"it appears there is no desire to continue the discussion."

The deputy Khalid al-Sultan, confirming the positions his colleagues al-Sa'dun and al-Saqr took rejecting the article, said:

"The person who proposed the law is a man of independent judgment. It is irrelevant whether he is right or wrong. Since it is a matter of independent judgment, let us exercise our judgement, since we are able to understand what this country's interests are, and it would be honest for us to pause in deliberation before the laws which obstruct people's freedoms and realize that the people of Kuwait are looking closely at these drafts and that our constituents are also watching closely over us." He then said, "We are dealing with the first section of the law, which demands the most extreme punishment against any newspaper harming Kuwait's interests. However, to state the truth in this matter means to give evidence and it has been the custom that evidence is given before the court. The criminality of any accused person is generally proved before the judiciary. The stipulations of all constitutions include the separation of powers. As stated in Articles 50 through 53 of the constitution, how can we permit ourselves to give the executive power the authorities of the judiciary power? How can we agree to have the Council of Ministers be the plaintiff and give the verdict? On this subject, the case must be presented to the judiciary when any paper commits a violation."

He then said, "Complaints in Kuwait about a media blackout have been widespread. In America, the people know and observe what is going on here before we see it or know

of it. In my opinion, this state of affairs is a result of this law, which also influences the powers of the assembly and of each one of us, because anyone following up on what the press publishes on the minutes of the assembly will note that it is restricted in what it publishes and does not publish some things to the exclusion of others.

"This means that the assembly, as our colleague Faysal al-Dawish said, will become a Hyde Park. People's experiences have shown that unless the word of truth reaches people who bear the responsibility of governing, without restrictions, then someday they will awaken to a surprise." He then said, "Let us be concerned and honest."

Then three of the people opposed to the withdrawal of the article spoke. The first speaker was the deputy Khalaf al-'Anzi, who said, "We are in favor of freedom of the press and freedom of thought and opinion, and everyone strives to be free and express his opinion as much as possible, but there are matters where we must be aware of our weight among the peoples and countries of the world and know who we are. It is true that we cherish ourselves but we measure ourselves by others and take matters step by step. I do not see any restrictions on the press but rather security matters which are necessary for the sake of the country and for the sake of us all. Through the history of the application of this article we find that shutdowns of papers have been very few and on specific matters that involved harm to the country.

"The important point is that our papers -- unfortunately, some editors in chief do not know anything about their papers, and, in spite of our respect for our Arab brothers who are concerned with the country, there are infiltrators and we must take precautions. This area is the object of people's designs and everyone is lying in wait for us. One must understand a point like this and later one can make amendments, when the press becomes Kuwaitized. In spite of our respect for our brother Arabs, I am afraid of infiltrators. The reason why Lebanon was lost lies in the press. Ours is a small territory and we must be worried about our territory and our society."

The deputy 'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydili said:

"Our brothers have been addressing themselves to the issue since 1959, and in 1972 all the members, and not just some of them as was said, reached agreement, because the presence of this article was not necessary at that time. However, are the current conditions, when the flames of war are blazing around us, the same as our conditions in 1972, when the assembly abrogated this article, which, in my own opinion, was just a weak check on the press, which publishes news about people who had it not been for their other preoccupations would have overrun Kuwait?"

He said, "God has brought a curse upon us because we do not know our true weight. We want to deal with conditions in the Arab world and our press is not disciplined or connected to Article 35." He said, "I am not accusing any editors in chief or editors. They are all our brothers. What we are demanding now from the people opposed to the article is that they offer an alternative. It is not just the government which is worried about Kuwait -- we are all worried about our country, and major countries have been lost because of the press and assemblies. Is there any newspaper which has been shut down for a year? We are not in favor of going back to what the papers were writing before the dissolution of the assembly. Everyone was drumming and chanting and I am not spreading my beliefs around -- if the

article were presented to the people of Kuwait, [abrogation of] it would not receive 10 percent, and it is not our fault if two or three people were linked to some body."

The deputy Mutlaq al-Mas'ud spoke, stressing the need to have Article 35 continue in effect. He demanded a popular referendum:

"The committee chairman, in his report, mentioned that abrogation of Article 35 was a popular demand. I consider that our people demand security and stability, and demand that they be provided housing and a dignified life, and that does not depend on whether Article 35 remains or not. In my opinion, the demand that it be abrogated is just a demand by editors in chief of newspapers aimed at increasing their personal incomes at the expense of this nation." He then said, "We are living in a world charged with an atmosphere of wars. We are a stable country and we must not be influenced by the demands of editors in chief in order to sell our country for the sake of five or six persons in Kuwait.

"We want a census of the number of Kuwaitis who work in the press, and let us then look at each newspaper in isolation. Are there Kuwaitis? Kuwaitis are concerned with the interests of their country and if they see something that is harmful to these interests they will realize it."

He then said, "I demand a public referendum of all the people of Kuwait so that we can see if the abrogation of Article 35 concerns them or not."

Then he said, "I believe that freedom exists, although every citizen can speak freely in Kuwait through the deputies in the assembly or through themselves, because they can get to the ruler of the country anytime they want." He then said,

"Kuwait and the interests of Kuwait are a trust upon my colleagues."

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad concluded the discussion by saying,

"I would like to say that the issue is not one of wanting to have a sword hanging over the necks of the press so much as my desire to protect this country." He stated, "If we look at what has happened in Lebanon, that basically resulted from the press, since there it is almost as if the press had become a group of shops. When we set out Article 35 (bis), that was so that the Kuwaiti press would not become 'a group of shops.' There is no one among us who is against the newspapers or even freedom of speech, and we have not prevented any newspaper from writing about any subject that is of concern to the country on the domestic level and domestic issues."

He then said, "I challenge our brother Khalid (he meant Khalid al-Sultan) [to show] any official directive that the press must quote the statements of one deputy but not the statements of another one."

He went on, "lest we get bogged down in this subject, I do not believe there is anyone among us who would agree to have his country destroyed for the sake of the press."

Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad said,

"The editors in chief do not know everything that is written in the press. Let us be extremely explicit: anyone following the daily press will find that there is a specific policy for every page, and this shows that the editor in chief is unable to follow up on everything that is written for publication in the paper." He then stated, "I once met with the editors in chief and raised with them the opinion of opening a press institute to prepare the necessary staffs to man the press. I asserted to them that the government would defray increases in salaries after that."

He said, "We are now in a great state of tension and Kuwait is perhaps the only country that understands what freedom of the press means, but do the neighbors understand freedom of the press? Will they agree to have us say that we have freedom of the press? Then do you want us to isolate Kuwait from others because of the press?"

He went on, "I stress that Article 35 (bis) was set out just because of foreign affairs. In the domestic context, let it be recorded, with regard to us, that we have not prevented any writer from writing on any subject at any time."

He then stated,

"I say that Article 35 must remain, so that something will be present to prevent certain people from infiltrating and destroying relations between us and neighboring countries."

After conclusion of the discussion, a vote was taken and the result was that 29 deputies, including the chairman, supported the committee's report to abrogate Article 35 (bis) of the Press Law, and 24 members, including members of the government, abstained from voting.

Thus the report of the education and culture committee calling for the abrogation of Article 35 (bis) of the Press Law was not passed, and that resulted in postponement of discussion of it to next Saturday's meeting.

The Text of Article 35 (Bis)

"Without prejudice to the penalties stipulated in this or any other law, it is permissible, by decree of the Council of Ministers, to shut down a newspaper for a period not to exceed 2 years or to abrogate its permit if it is proved that it is serving the interests of a foreign country or authority or that its policy is in conflict with the national interest, or if it appears that it has acquired aid, assistance or benefit in any form whatever for any reason under any pretext or designation from any foreign country or body without permission from the Ministry of Information.

"It is also permissible, in cases of utmost need, for issuance of a paper to be suspended by decree of the minister of information for a period not to exceed 3 months.

"No newspaper may publish any advertisement or statement by a foreign government or body before the Ministry of Information has given its agreement.

"It is permissible to protest the abrogation, shutdown or suspension decree before

the Council of Ministers within 2 weeks of notification of the owner of the paper of the decree, and the council's decree on the protest will be final."

The People Supporting Freedom of the Press and Supporting Article 35

In the Tuesday 27 October meeting, the council was divided into people supporting and opposing the retention of Article 35 (bis) of the Press and Publication Law and the legitimacy or unconstitutionality of this article.

Twenty-nine deputies voted in favor of the move to end it and free the press. Among them were Ahmad al-Sa'dun, Badr al-Mudif, Jasim al-Khurafi, Jasim al-'Awn, Falih al-Mayyi', Hammud al-Rumi, Khalid Jumay'an, Khalid Sultan, Khalid al-'Ajran, Khalid al-Wasmi, Khali'fah al-Jarri, Rashid Sayf, Salim al-Hammad, Salih al-Fadalah, 'Abd-al-Muhsin Jamal, 'Adnan 'Abd-al-Samad, 'Isa al-Shahin, Faysal al-Dawish, Mubarak Ra'i al-Fahma', Mubarak al-Dabbus, Muhammad al-Rashid, Marikhan Sa'd, Mutlaq al-Shalimi, Mushari al-'Anjari, Dr Nasir Sarkhuh, Hadi Hayif al-Huwaylah, and the chairman, Muhammad al-'Adasani.

Deputies in favor of retaining Article 35 (bis), numbering 24, were:

The government plus Jasir al-Jasir, Khalaf Dumaythir al-'Anzi, 'Ayid 'Allush, 'Abd-al-Raziq al-Sani', 'Abd-al-Karim al-Juhaydali, Fayiz al-Bughayli, Hayf al-Hajraf, Muhammad Habib Badr, Muhammad al-Barrak, Murdi al-Adhinah, Mutlaq al-Mas'ud, Nayif Abu Ramiyah, Hadil al-Jallawi and Yusuf al-Shahin al-Ghanim.

In the voting, the deputy Faysal al-Qudaybi was outside the hall and was considered also to have abstained.

11887
CSO: 4404/99

BRIEFS

DAILY ON KREISKY'S STATEMENTS--Doha, 7 Dec (QNA)--The newspaper AL-RAYAH calls on the Arab states to press the European states to adopt specific stands that support the Palestinian question, put an end to the anguish of the struggling Palestinian people, and impose real and effective pressure on Israel to confine its aggressive nature and reduce its arrogance. In its editorial today, the paper notes Austrian Chancellor Kreisky's statement in Kuwait yesterday in which he said that the Israeli Government at present is not interested in reaching a radical solution to the Palestinian problem. The paper expresses satisfaction over the issuance of such a telling statement by one of Europe's most prominent leaders and one of the leaders of international socialism, which is linked to Israel by close historical and traditional bonds. The paper adds that this feeling of satisfaction is not sufficient as far as this type of decisive political stance is concerned. More action is required to crystallize, develop and implement these opinions in practical stands. The paper notes the seriousness of the current situation in which we live. It necessitates a carefully studied move toward the achievement of our goals with the utmost amount of activity and effectiveness, and by utilizing every possible opportunity that contains even a single ray of hope. [Text] [GF071205 Doha QNA in Arabic 0900 GMT 7 Dec 81]

CSO: 4404/163

POPULAR UNREST BLAMED ON ECONOMIC MEASURES

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 21 Nov 81 pp 7-9

[Text] The recent measures imposed by Sudanese President Jaafar Numeiry to improve Sudan's faltering economy has triggered a wave of riots and demonstrations throughout the country.

Troubles erupted at the University of Khartoum on Monday, while the Sudanese Vice President General Abdel Hamid Khalil was delivering a speech on the occasion of the University's 25th anniversary. More than 300 students partook in the demonstrations, hurling rocks, bottles and chairs outside the campus before being dispersed by the police.

Meanwhile, the Federation of Trade Union called for a purge of the country's government machinery and public sector firms. The federation whose approximately 250,000 worker-members are mostly low-paid and hard hit by inflation, said indiscipline and inefficiency should be eradicated from government departments.

The wave of protests started last Friday in Khartoum, when workers belonging to the various fields of the economy took to the streets to demonstrate against the tightened measures adopted by the Sudanese President. Observers have underlined that the prevailing situation is dangerous for the country's domestic stability.

Tightened Measures

Describing the present conjuncture as "gravely deteriorating economic situation," President Jaafar Numeiry announced on November 9th a 19-point plan to redress the country's ills. The plan which includes a 12.5 percent devaluation of the Sudanese currency, was formulated at the same time when the president fired his cabinet. The president accused his ministers of inefficiency, but said the present government will remain in power to expedite current affairs until a new one is formed.

Many difficulties face Sudan; the major ones are:

--Inflation estimated at 50 percent.
--A 700-million-dollar gap between imports and exports. Imports cost almost three times as much as Sudan earns from exports.

--A 1.5 billion dollar debt to Western banks and nations.
--A drop in the production of cotton, Sudan's main cash crop, from 747,000 bales in 1978-79 to 460,000 last season.
--The burden of more than 500,000 refugees from neighboring countries, mainly Uganda, Ethiopia and Chad.

President Numeiry reacted to these difficulties by imposing an immediate end on government subsidies on oil imports. He also ordered a gradual lifting of subsidies on basic commodities such as sugar and wheat flour. In fact, the removal of subsidies was called for by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order for Sudan to qualify for IMF financial help.

In the meantime, the Sudanese president has accused Libya of attempting to overthrow his regime by sending saboteurs to buy up food staples, hoping that the resulting shortage will lead to anti-government riots. It should be recalled that that on September 30th, General Kamal Hassan, Deputy Chief of the Sudanese State Security Apparatus, made a statement to the effect that more than 17,000 individuals belonging to the opposition had been arrested earlier that month. The Sudanese Vice President later revealed that a number of the detainees had confessed to be waiting for instructions to move against the government.

More recently, Sudanese authorities have arrested in Khartoum more than 10,000 "vagrant and illegal aliens"; 3,000 were jailed on charges of working to destabilize the regime. Sudanese authorities added that they seized, as a result of these arrests, about 2,000 unlicensed guns, most of them believed to have been supplied by Libya.

Security Threatened From Within and From Libya

In many of his declarations focusing on his country's faltering stability, President Numeiry denied the existence of an opposition, claiming instead that this was a body of saboteurs sent by Libya to foment disorder in Sudan.

Throughout the month of October, press reports carried information indicating that Libyan forces were staging raids on Sudanese border billages. The Sudanese authorities reacted by massing troops at borders with Libya. On October 1st, the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat dispatched then-Vice President Hosni Mubarak and Defense Minister General Abdelhalim Abu Ghazaleh to Washington for talks with American officials on the situation between Libya and Sudan. The Egyptian delegation accused Libya of reinforcing troops in Chad and of training Sudanese mercenaries of the Kordoufan region (western Sudan).

The Egyptian concern over Sudan was loudly denounced by Syria. In a speech delivered on October 1st, Syrian President Hafez Assad said, "Syrian air and ground forces are ready to fight in Libya, if Libya is the target of an attack." The Syrian statement was meant to intimidate any Egyptian attempt in taking an active role in the Libyan-Sudanese crisis.

Developments followed with the US Congress pledging $130 million in military equipment to Sudan, and President Numeiry launching an all-out campaign saying that his country was in a position of "self-defence" which may move the battle inside Libyan territory. October 13th, the US government made public a decision to send unspecified number of military advisers to train Sudanese soldiers in the handling of US-made military equipment. Dean Fisher, the State Department spokesman who made the announcement said, however, "The US is willing to do all it can to help Sudan defend its territory by supplying it with economic and military aid. The US, however, has no proof of any imminent invasion of Sudan by Libya, but we remain concerned by the recent incidents occurring on the borders." Meanwhile, Egypt sent anti-aircraft units to Sudan.

The Libyan government explained its position in a statement made by its Justice Minister on October 18th. Minister Muhammad el Zawi said his government wishes no war with Sudan and attributed the present crisis to the Chadian conflict. He said, "the Sudanese government is backing up the butcher Hissen Hibri (the former Chadian Minister of Defence who was defeated in the civil war) and we interpret this as an aggressive act."

While the news media probed whether an all-out confrontation would take place between Egypt, Sudan and Libya informed diplomatic sources in Beirut indicated that as a result of many diplomatic efforts, some attributed to France, a compromise agreement would have been reached between all three countries. According to this agreement, Egypt would put an end to its campaign against the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front States, while Libya and its allies would stop escalating the conflict with Egypt and Sudan.

In fact, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak announced on October 21st his decision to stop media warfare against his Arab critics. This decision was followed by a Libyan "goodwill" gesture to pull back its troops from the Sudanese borders. However, Sudanese Army troops continued being deployed on the borders with Chad.

Sudan Still in Danger

Observers believed after the main conflicting sides showed sign of goodwill, that domestic problems inside Sudan will rise. Recent days have proven this to be true. President Numeiry is now working to remediate this problem. His efforts have taken him to Washington where he held talks with Vice President George Bush, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Secretary of State Alexander Haig. Agency reports have underlined that the Vice President and the Secretary of State promised the Sudanese President that their government will help Sudan to achieve its economic program. Meanwhile, the Egyptian authorities have dismissed reports of a merger with Sudan, stressing that only coordination will resume.

CSO: 4500/65

PROGRESS ON COMMUNITY AND MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION DISCUSSED

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 9 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Abdelmajid Sahnoun: "The Place of the Municipality in the Development Cycle"]
[Text] Municipalities or tempest in a teapot?

The national conference of municipalities in Tozeur strongly recommended the need to continue the work on training cadres of local collectivities and municipalities in general. Efforts are presently under way in this connection since a substantial training program is provided for within the framework of the second urban development project.

This project is being financed by the UN Development Program and is made up of several sections:

--a "training" section of cadres of local collectivities;

--a "seminar" section on problems of local development;

--"technical assistance" section.

The "training" section consists in providing specific training to benefit cadres of local collectivities in various fields of endeavor, such as traffic, improvement of open spaces, information, organization... in various countries and in such organizations as the World Bank and the Communal Credit Bank of Belgium.

The "seminar" section consists in the organization and financing of a series of seminars on various local development issues to provide know-how to all municipal cadres in various fields of local affairs.

The beneficiaries of the training courses become teachers during the seminars, at the same time as the experts furnished within the framework of the third "technical assistance" section.

Therefore, thanks to the second urban development project, progress is being made toward the restructuring of the municipalities and the continual training of their cadres. When the first urban projects have been defined on how to improve living conditions in unplanned housing quarters through the installation of such infrastructure as drinking water supply, sewage systems, roads and electricity, as well as collective forms of infrastructure such as schools, dispensaries and kindergartens, the planners of the project must take the following two factors into consideration:

a. These projects are indispensable for improving the sanitary conditions of housing for those inhabitants not in a position to have access to housing found on the official market. These projects would contribute to improving safety in general.

b. The needs in projects of this type are great and relate to all municipalities, particularly those which are chief towns of the governorate. More than 50 percent of the real estate property of the country must be renovated and rehabilitated. As far as implementation is concerned, the planners of the project have been confronted with the following alternative: should these projects be entrusted to the municipalities, in which case the latter will have to be formed and organized differently, or should these projects be entrusted to one specialized national company as was done in the past to solve the housing problem through the establishment of the SNIT [Tunisian National Real Estate Company], the AFH [Real Estate Housing Agency], the CNEL [expansion unknown], as well as the sanitation problem through the establishment of the ONAS [National Public Sanitation Office]?

These organizations were undoubtedly means for achieving the development plans. However, they achieved an unbalanced form of development because of their concern for maintaining a balanced financial record. The question raised is consequently one of organization and distribution of economic power between the public sector, government and municipalities on the one hand, the quasi-national sector, national companies and mixed-economy companies on the other hand, and finally the private sector. The objective is very clear: provide a more specific content for unity and national solidarity, as well as for balanced development, which should inevitably result in greater tax equity.

The above organizations also achieved a costly form of development. Some national companies, because of their monopoly strength, did not cut back on expenditures, including personnel expenditures, thus creating spiraling inflation across the board resulting from the need for realignment and because productivity did not tend to increase at the same rate as expenditures. As far as the second urban project is concerned, the option was clear: the planners of the project succeeded in adjusting the municipal structures and procedures to the new objectives which made of the municipality a real development nucleus. Besides their conventional attributes (garbage collection, cultural and sports activities), the municipalities of Tunis and Sfax are now practicing integrated development (housing, VRD [expansion unknown], traffic. .).

These two municipalities are doing what the national companies rightly or wrongly did not do. They are preparing the groundwork for social integration, for a better distribution of revenue among the inhabitants of the collectivity in order to decrease inter-regional imbalance, a factor of insecurity.

In this way, these two municipalities only strengthen the results of social benefits and transfer of revenues implemented at the state level but only through public institutions and rarely through quasi-public ones.

From a progressive standpoint, based on decentralization, effective solidarity and participation and interest of citizens in management of collective issues, and a new division of economic power to the benefit of the municipalities and not to the benefit of national companies, are needed.

The best organized countries in the world are not those which have developed national companies to the detriment of municipalities, as is the case of France where power is centralized and where, whenever decentralization is spoken of to the benefit of municipalities, an endless argument ensues. The Guichard reform in France was proposed precisely to achieve a new division of tasks between the various levels of organization, while attempting to give more responsibility to municipalities.

Also, the best organized countries in the world are not those which have divided the country partly into [urban] municipalities and partly into rural municipalities. The latter, despite certain developmental programs, were not able to overcome the migratory situation and could not get a handle on development without too many errors, leading to an intolerable situation which pitted cities against the countryside.

The countries best adapted to cultural, social and economic evolution are those which have given real power to their collectivities and more responsibilities to the grassroots level. Therefore, they have encouraged the spirit of initiative and developed the taste for individual and collective effort. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland have a municipal government organization permitting these countries to control urban growth almost entirely. In this connection, after a major revamping of the country's inhabited areas, German municipalities are seeking to control urban growth through the rational implementation of the present space planning system.

On the other hand, the Swiss municipalities combine the use of two means: the use of the free market as far as lands are concerned and secondly the right to determine the local tax rate to an extent determined by the canton.

The goal of the Sfax seminar is to study the situation of the present organization of municipalities. Of course, the latter have developed over the last 2 decades as far as the number and qualifications of their cadres are concerned, but they are far from being at the level of development of the state, national companies and citizens in general. To be major representatives, the municipalities and their cadres, with some exceptions, are powerless financially and technically speaking vis-a-vis their representatives. Nevertheless, it is certain that they constitute the most obvious framework to develop the sense of collectivelife and mutual respect and to take steps to bring about social equilibrium in order to avoid the great social inequalities revealed through the coexistence of unplanned housing quarters with no facilities whatsoever and of those housing quarters which have every kind of facility.

They constitute the most obvious framework since they are democratic nuclei, born of the people's will, and the central government must normally grant them an increase of power and means in order to extend the roots of progress to the lowest and farthest corners of housing quarters and minds.

The Sfax seminar should not normally study the municipality in a purely passive frame. It is evident that the municipalities are weak. The conferences on municipalities have already proved that on many occasions in the past, but the essential point is to make a study on what the place of the municipality is before going on to a proliferation of organizations which do nothing but consume public resources.

This is why the line of thought and research of the seminar are: the place of the municipality within the general administrative organization: the municipality and its representatives; and the internal organization of a municipality.

5671
CSO: 4519/45

DEFENSE MINISTER OBSERVES MILITARY MANEUVERS

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 1 Dec 81 p 4

[Article by Naji al-Hayik: "Muhammad ibn-Rashid Observes Maneuvers Using Live Ammunition. Storming Operation by Elite Strike Forces Using Armor, Artillery, Fighter Planes, Missiles, Paratroopers"]

[Text] Yesterday morning the Minister of Defense Shaykh Muhammad ibn-Rashid al-Maktum observed extensive maneuvers using live ammunition. The maneuvers were carried out by groups of the central region military command forces and included paratroop operations, penetration and freeing of hostages, firing on land and air targets and maneuvers with armor and artillery.

The maneuvers began with a storming operation in which groups of the elite strike forces penetrated a building to free hostages trapped inside. The units of the force were divided into three groups. The first group, the "sharpshooters", provided protection and cover. The second group threw hand grenades and opened machinegun fire just before penetration was executed and the third group was charged with carrying out the penetration operation and freeing the hostages.

The entire operation was carried out with complete success after a violent battle with grenades and machinegun fire during which the hostages were rescued.

After this the armored "scorpion" division proceeded in an arrowhead formation and marched toward an elevated area to protect it from occupation by the "enemy". The armored force carried out pursuit and elimination of the "enemy's" resistance in that region. A number of groups participated in this battle including an armored company, a company of infantry guards and an artillery division. There was air support from two fighter planes. The front lines of the armor penetrated enemy lines and began striking their targets. Then they engaged the enemy force to give the division commander the opportunity to send a contact report to the remaining members of the company. After this the planes struck enemy positions with missiles in preparation of penetration of these positions. Under the cover of air fire and artillery barrages, combat platoons proceeded from the concentration area to the rendezvous area and then fell into formation. Platoons from the first group approached the target while the second group battled the entrenched enemy with hand grenades and machineguns and the third group continued its march on the position. After gaining control of all enemy positions the armor moved forward in attack formation to take their designated positions according to the commander's battle

plan. As for the armored reserve, they subsequently proceeded to join the remaining groups which controlled enemy positions. After reorganizing and filling out the battle units, the officer in charge sent his report of the results of the battle and the losses which the enemy suffered. When this was all over, helicopters circled carrying the artillery commander and the battle commander so they could view the position and choose a place to drop the artillery being carried by helicopter. After this the helicopters arrived at the battlefield carrying 105 mm cannons, each one weighing 3,500 pounds, with a maximum firing range of 17 kilometers and capable of firing six rounds per minute. The cannons were dropped to the ground position and paratroopers, fully equipped with weapons, descended from an altitute of 1,000 feet and occupied their designated positions.

The maneuvers were observed by Shaykh Ahmad ibn-Rashid al-Maktum, commander of the central military region, Shaykh Ahmad al-Maktum, deputy commander for operations, Shaykh Butti al-Maktum, deputy commander for administration, Shaykh Marwan al-Maktum, commander of the Royal Guard and a number of senior officers, soldiers and members of the armed forces.

CSO: 4404/162

FIVE-YEAR WATER PLAN CALLS FOR 22 DESALINATION PLANTS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 46, 16 Nov 81 p 5

[Text]

The UAE's national five-year plan calls for installation of 22 water desalination plants by 1985, the *Emirates News* reported last week. The combined capacity of these plants will be 96.5 million gallons per day (MGD). Out of the 22, six will be installed in Abu Dhabi in 1984, each with a daily capacity of 1 MGD, and in 1985 four more will be added, each with a 11 MGD capacity.

Six units are scheduled to be installed at Dubai in 1984, each with a capacity of 4.5 MGD. One unit is to be installed in Umm al-Qaiwain by 1983 with a capacity of 3.5 MGD, one in Ras al-Khaimah by 1983 with a 4 MGD capacity, and two units in the western area by 1984, each with a capacity of 4 MGD. The eastern coast region will be supplied with two units with a capacity of 2 MGD.

The five-year water plan also includes several projects for the preservation of ground water, an official of the Ministry for Water and Electricity was quoted as saying. Dams will be built in several parts of the country which will direct rainwater to a network of aquifers, checking runoff of water into the Gulf. Furthermore, there are plans being drawn up to tap the al-Waria spring, following a directive of UAE President Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan al-Nahyan.

CSO: 4400/80

BRIEFS

NEW OIL COMPANY--It was announced in Umm al-Qaywayn today that an oil and gas company has been established. The representatives of the new company held a meeting today which resulted in the appointment of the company's board of directors and its founding systems. His Highness Shaykh Rashid ibn Ahmad al-Mu'alla, member of the Supreme Council and ruler of Umm al-Qaywayn, issued an Amiri decree establishing this company with a capital of 200 million dirhams. [GF080515 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1850 GMT 7 Dec 81]

CSO: 4404/163 END

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UAE, FRG PLAN EXTRADITION TREATY

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 18 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

ABU DHABI (EN): The Fatwa and legislation Department is revising the final text of a draft extradition treaty between the UAE and West Germany, according to Al Bayan.

The department received the draft treaty from the Interior Ministry after Minister of State for Interior Affairs Hamouda bin Ali had approved it.

According to the draft the two countries agree to extradite persons wanted by law in either country, Assistant Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs Al Aqroubi said.

It however makes the extradition of citizens of either country non-obligatory with certain exceptions.

Individuals charged with crimes that carry jail terms of one year or more in either country will be extradited.

The draft rules out extradition in cases involving political offences. The following offences will not be considered political:

- Assaulting the head of state of any of the two countries, or a member of his family.
- Assaulting or attempting to assault any of the members of the UAE Supreme Council or their family members.
- Murder and robbery.
- Terrorism.
- If the crime for which the extradition is demanded is committed in the country demanding extradition.
- If the person sought to be extradited has already been tried for the same offence for which the extradition has been sought and a judgement passed.

CSO: 4700/79

BRIEFS

SYRIAN, SOVIET NEWS AGENCIES SIGN AGREEMENT--Moscow, (SANA)--The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) delegation headed by Dr Saber Falhout and the Soviet news agency (NOVOSTI) signed here on Tuesday an agreement of joint cooperation. The agreement included the exchange of news, information, documents and photographs. It also included the exchange of delegations, training of technicians and the coordination of the political stands in international conferences and in the Arab-European dialogue which will be held between Arab and European news agencies. Speaking at the ceremony held for signing the agreement, the chairman of the Soviet news agency praised Syria's national and progressive role under the leadership of President Hafez Assad. He said that the Syrian role is lauded and respected by the peoples of the socialist countries. Syria is one of the most solid fronts struggling against American imperialism and international Zionism in order to defend the rights of the Palestinian people and to achieve progress, socialism and a just peace, he added. [Text] [Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 21 Oct 81 p 2]

CSO: 4400/78

SYRIAN-LIBYAN JOINT AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS

Damascus SYRIA TIMES in English 20 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Pat McDonnell]

[Text]

"Our goal isn't to reap profits, our chief aim is to help Syria develop", said Ahmad Mounir al-Homosh, general director of the Syrian-Libyan Company for Industrial and Agricultural Investments (SYLICO).

An agreement was signed between Syria and Libya on Jan. 21, 1978, for a joint company to invest in industrial and agricultural projects in Syria for a duration of 50 years. Initial priorities were placed on stock breeding, grain production and a textile factory. The six-member board of directors is composed of three representatives from each country and the chairman of the board is Libyan, the vice chairman is Syrian. Bylaws state the board will appoint a general director of Syrian nationality and a vice director of Libyan nationality.

The biggest venture launched by the company is a project for wheat cultivation in the Ras al-Ein region around Hassake. Sylico initially rented 18,000 hectares of marginal land from the government in 1980.

"Since this is land where rainfall is around 200 to 250 mm annually, we took parcels of land and experimented with drilling artesian wells", Mr al-Homosh explained. "Later, we rented drilling equipment and struck water 180 to 265m. below the earth's surface".

More than 22 artesian wells have been drilled so far and Sylico has purchased two water drilling rigs with a capacity of 550m depth that arrived in Syria in early September.

During 1980, a total of 10,000 hectares was seeded — 75 per cent with wheat, 25 per cent with barley. "We feel that mechanized agricultural techniques must be introduced and we purchased the very best equipment", Mr al-Homosh continued. "This equipment was put to work as soon as it landed at Lattakia.

"Ww had a bumper crop during 1981 and we owe this to four factors: scientific seeding methods, good rainfall, irrigation from the artesian wells and time saved with up-to-date threshing machines".

"The land that produced this year must be left fallow for one season and a new block of 8,000 hectares is to be seeded in December. If production

keeps up as it has, we can once more become a wheat exporting nation on the scale that earned us the name of being the bread basket for the Roman Empire 2,000 years ago. We have fertile soil, the challenge is to find new means of irrigating it — and then sowing and reaping under mechanized means".

Mr al-Homosh, who holds a degree in business administration from Cairo University and was an economic consultant to the Syrian Prime Minister before his appointment to Sylico, states:

"We differ from other companies operating in Syria because our feasibility studies seek out various locations in the country and we're able to select from these choices for the optimum location for each project. Size is not important to us, we're initially working on an experimental basis; if our techniques prove correct, we shall proceed to expand".

Mr al-Homosh commented that one of Syria's foremost needs is to increase dairy production. A feasibility report and technical study were made for the construction of an agricultural-milk producing complex and dairy in Dera'a.

The location of Dera'a in southern Syria was selected because it can readily supply dairy products to Damascus and all Syria as well as later to Jordan and as far south as Saudi Arabia. The project will not only include production of fodder, but accommodations for 1,200 to 1,600 milk cows and a nearby dairy. Actual construction is scheduled to begin in early 1982 with production slated for 18 months thereafter.

A feasibility study also is near completion for a sheep breeding project in Hassake in northeastern Syria. "We plan to breed al-Wahas sheep, a breed that not only Syrians, but consumers in Saudi and the Gulfprefer", Mr al-Homosh noted. As to the size of the project, he commented that this will be determined by the feasibility study.

Yet another feasibility report is due for completion at the end of this year. In this case, it is for a textile factory near Homs, the midlands of Syria. The factory is projected to produce 14 million metres of 100 per cent Syrian cotton fabric and some textiles of cotton mixed with synthetic threads.

Last month, Sylico announced plans to launch an agricultural project on 4,000 dunums of land in Quneitra. Some of the best agricultural land of Syria is located here, under the shadow of Israeli guns atop the Golan Heights.

"As yet, we don't know if this project will be for cultivation or merely for grazing herds", Mr al-Homosh said, "but I feel it will be the former".

When asked if his company had considered the prospect of Israelis shooting down on workmen, he replied: "Why should we leave some of our best land unfarmed for fear of unjust reprisals from the Israelis? It is our duty to put a stop to this fear and to begin to rebuild the city of Quneitra and make use of this choice fertile land".

In closing, he noted that Syria is in the centre of the Middle East, the perfect spot for distributing the foodstuffs and technological goods soon to be produced by Sylico Company.

CSO: 4400/78

ARAB LEAGUE TO PROMOTE ARAB, ISLAMIC CULTURE ABROAD

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 21 Nov 81 p 2

[Text] TUNIS—A meeting called by the Arab League Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Alesco) ended here after calling for a national body to promote Islamic and Arab cultures abroad.

The three-day meeting explored the dimensions of a massive plan to spread those cultures on a global level after studying previous experiments of Britain, the Soviet Union, France and Germany.

The meeting was attended by delegations from Jordan, Tunisia, Algeria, Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Morocco.

In the course of its three-day session, the meeting reviewed problems confronting the penetration of Islamic and Arab cultures in other regions, including those of finance.

The meeting was also attended by representatives from Unesco, the Arab Universities' Association, the Islamic Centre of Argentine, the Middle East University of Chicago, the Austrian National Library, the Arab-American Society of New York, the University of Indiana and the Islamic Cultural Centre of Brussels.

A study presented to the conference outlined the important role of the Arabic language and its close association with socio-political and economic strategies of most of the world's nations.

In the face of a prevailing Israeli cultural invasion, the meeting called for adequate "cultural security" and protection of Muslims and Arab cultures and civilisations.

A draft plan presented to the conference by Alesco called for intensified efforts to spread Arabic in Afro-Asian countries with high Muslim populations.

The plan called for the provision of educational facilities to Arab communities abroad, particularly in European countries and North and South America.

The panel endorsed proposals to realise inter-Arab cooperation for publication of books and the establishment of international Arab cultural centres.

The meeting also called on Arab states and development funds to provide an annual budget to fund the project in addition to current resources of Alesco.—Kuna

CSO: 4400/79

COUNTRY'S RULERS SEEK CONTROL OF MECCA, MEDINA SHRINES

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 pp 8-9

[By special correspondent]

[Text] Ayatollah Khomeini and his militant supporters believe that their dream of the creation of an Islamic Empire may never come to reality if they do not succeed in converting Saudi Arabia into the heartland of that empire.

"As true Muslims how can we tolerate leaving our most sacred shrines in the custody of a group of heretics who are stooges of our sworn enemies, the Americans?" was how a speaker on radio in the now heavily-angled children's programmes in Iran put it before the Haj pilgrimage two months ago.

The speaker, another of the turbanned revolutionaries, went on to say that a true Islamic homeland would have Mecca as its real and spiritual capital where the paramount Faghih (religious authority) would have his seat to guide the entire Islamic world. In plain language he meant that Khomeini, who is hailed as the paramount spiritual and political leader of the Islamic peoples, (not the Iranian nation) must by right live in Mecca and be the custodian of the holy shrines.

In another commentary several weeks later, a political analyst argued that the Saudi regime was the weakest link in the chain of American surrogates in the region. "The Saudi realm is the heart of the American set-up," he said. "Any good soldier knows that by aiming at the heart he can knock down the body."

The extremist mullahs appear to believe that if they bring Saudi Arabia under their domination the entire southern coast of the Persian Gulf, including Oman, will fall to them, and the epicentre of the Islamic world will shift from Cairo to Mecca. The era of the prophet's own time will thus be reincarnated.

It is no secret that the Khomeini camp is not fanatically concerned with its Iranian identity, nor, any longer, with Shi-ite sectarianism. If need be they are ready to call for unity among all branches of Islam provided the principle of "Velayat-e-Faghih"--the authority of the religious head--is accepted universally by all Muslims.

These considerations are at the heard of the mullahs' current campaign against the Saudis. Moreover, the mullahs have a deep down fear that unless they internationalise

their cause, their theocracy might not survive in Iran. They are aware of the fact that their success in establishing a theocracy in Iran was a historical accident. Khomeini has repeatedly said that he, too, is sometimes unable to understand how his forces triumphed against the Shah's modern army. That is why he calls his revolution a divine creation.

There are signs, too, that Khomeini may also have appreciated that his failure in spreading his revolution almost instantaneously to other parts of the Muslim world may have been due to the fact that he stressed its Shia nature rather than the general Muslim one. Many experienced observers in the Arab world believe that the governments of smaller Arab states like Kuwait and other emirates would have been swept away in the wave of Islamic fanaticism which could have been aroused by the success of a revolution with universal appeal to all Muslims.

Once installed in Mecca the Shi'ite extremists could impose a great deal of their will on the Muslim world, some sources believe. They believe the most fervent Sunni Muslims have been so affected by the romantic notions of an Islamic world raised by Khomeini and his revolutionaries that they would go along with a full scale campaign against the more moderate Muslim leadership. They point to the big number of subversive Muslim students and agents who issue forth from mosques and Islamic associations, even in non-Muslim countries, spreading praise for Khomeini and his revolution notwithstanding its bloody reputation with the public in those places.

"While really devout Sunni Muslim leaders and scholars would never accept the Shia heresy there is a big mass of fervent, but less educated, or very radically inclined people who would exult in a Muslim victory over the Western world with greater intensity than they can feel about the pure tenets of their religion," one analyst warned. "Don't forget that it is revolutionary, anti-Western, anti-imperialist feeling that is now the real resource of the Khomeini regime in Iran--not a simple religious fervour.

"Young people all over the Muslim world are captured by this desire to see the West's influence eradicated in their countries. They see the general philosophy of Islam as providing the greatest weapon to do this. That is the chord which Khomeini and his fellows can still strike repeatedly, with serious effects for the rest of the world."

CSO: 4600/146

NATIONAL FRONT PLANNING TO OVERTHROW KHOMEYNI REGIME

Paris PEYAM-E JABHE-YE MELLI in Persian No 3, 12 Nov 81 pp 1, 2, 3

[Editorial by Hushang Kordestani]

[Text] Without a doubt, the major burden of political struggle in the years before the establishment of the Khomeyni regime was on the shoulders of the National Front. Now, too, the main political faction of opponents of the present regime is the National Front. In other words, the National Front has been a faction of political struggle during the previous regime and is now against the present ruling regime. It will continue to fight along this path of struggle. Unfortunately, the recent full scale political actions of the National Front--which, fortunately, reveal its success in Iran and demonstrate its deep influence among a people who have not forgotten the fighting tradition of the National Front and the method of leadership of Mosaddeq--have been recounted far less than they deserve by the world news agencies and news broadcasts, for obvious reasons with which we deal in the following:

First, the intentional or unintentional lack of attention of the mass media in the world to the nationalist struggle in Iran.

Second, the attention of the same news agencies and mass media to merely armed operations of political struggle in Iran.

As mentioned, the National Front has recently, through several political actions, achieved great successes, proving its superiority in political struggle over any other form of struggle. World propaganda has intentionally tried to simply dismiss them or has untruthfully considered them dependent and has used them to support individuals of their choice. For instance, we mention the following cases:

1. The gathering of the people of Tehran, which was to take place at the invitation of the National Front on 15 Jun 81 in Ferdowsi Square to challeoge the legitimacy of the clerical regime, which the regime knew of before hand and tried with all its might, aided by leftist elements, to prevent from happening or stop from being widely reported and which the mass media tried, without a shred of evidence, to show as the people's support for the president of the time, even though he did not consent to even print the announcement for the march in his newspaper as an advertisement.

The resolution issued by the combatants of the National Front on the day of the march clearly showed that the National Front of Iran had begun a fundamental struggle to overthrow the Khomeyni regime and nothing else.

The regime and the leftist dependent elements were so terrified of this great march, and of widespread demonstrations, that they hastily and miserably banned it and condemned it as heretical, then broadcast Khomeyni's speech over the regime's radio just before the hour the march was to take place, in essence, to prevent the issuance of the resolution which was to be read at the end of this gathering. From its first article, it had declared the present regime absolutely illegitimate because of its anti-human actions, its violations of individual and group rights, its killing of innocent people, its dependence on and loyalty to foreigners, and its obvious anti-national nature, demanding a struggle to overthrow this regime until the ultimate victory.

2. The denouncement of the handpicked president on 24 Jul 81, which resulted in the appointment of Raja'i and the request of the National Front for the people not to leave their houses that day until the polls were closed as a sign of protest for any sort of staged election was greatly welcomed by the people of the cities, especially the combative people of Tehran.

3. The repeated denunciation of the elections and requests for the people to stay at home on 2 Oct, the day of the appointment of the third president of the clerics, which was welcomed by the people throughout Iran even more than the first denunciation. Here is our opportunity to sincerely thank, once again, all the Iranian people, especially the great majority who gave their united response to this call of the National Front for public protest.

Also, we declare once more that the power of the people when they are united is so forceful that neither the bloodthirsty ruling regime nor its foreign supporters can ignore it. As mentioned, these political actions demonstrate that they are the right way to overthrow the present regime. They also demonstrate the fact that if, with continual political actions, we inform the masses of people of the power of their unity in attaining the goal of overthrowing the Khomeyni

regime, the struggle will soon break the weak and hollow foundations of the theocratic government and its structure will crumble down over its head and those of its masters who made the green cloth.

The National Front of Iran, without expressing the slightest opposition to or having a specific position concerning the methods and forms of the struggle of groups who are fighting in opposition to the regime--since it would have negative effects on the total power of the opposing forces--declares that it will continue its struggle against the present governing regime, mostly through political means, since political struggle is the basis for any other sort of national struggle. That is, the National Front of Iran, without negating the other methods of opposing groups, has chosen political struggle as its own road and relies, along this road, on the eternal power of the nation. It believes that no dominant ruling power can equal or confront the power of the whole nation and that the people of Iran, through unity, are capable of putting an end to the present dying regime through united political action, because, in the final analysis, the means and tools for the preservation and stability of any autocratic power--that is, the armed men who have been brainwashed into protecting and supporting it--are not separate from the whole nation but are part of these people. Certainly, in the final sensitive moments, they will join the nation, the great family of the Iranian people, and will return to the nation rather than to the community [ommat]. They will join the people as they have done in the past struggles throughout the world and in our own Iran.

Although the recently armed struggle against the regime has taken place and is taking place by numerous, scattered groups, we believe that no armed or guerrilla action to overthrow the regime, which is limited to a special interest group or groups and is not politically supported by the masses of Iranian people, will, by itself, achieve a desired result. Even given the slight possibility that one day in the future an armed movement could play a role in the overthrow of the present regime, if the public does not welcome it, it would certainly have no choice but to protect its acquired power through dependence and foreign support, even if it is independent today, and by imposing a regime of force and terrorism. It would be nothing but an autocratic government and a transient, dependent dictatorship.

Given the fact that the solution to the present problems and difficulties of Iran--noting the bitter experiences of the past and the particular strategic position of Iran--cannot, without doubt, be a dictatorship, as the fate of the past and present regimes in Iran have historically clarified; all evidence points to the fact that the only regime that has a chance of creating a stable, strong government which is internationally acceptable is surely a democratic government which relies on the support of the people, in other words, a national government. This means that any government dependent on any foreign power will have no political future in Iran. Hence, the importance

of the establishment of a democratic regime and the importance of the people's political movements to attain such a government are already apparent.

Today, the people of Iran, aware that they were greatly deceived in the name of revolution, will be careful to employ all their efforts from now on to support a national force. Through regained political and combative wisdom and insight, they have come to a common intellectual conclusion that the only way to free Iran from the claws of the bloodthirsty monster, Khomeyni, and to attain a national rule which would bring about a government of law and freedom is a government, a national political current, which relies on the support of the masses of the people and not an armed, factional movement, which is is likely to bring with it another dictatorship.

The only armed movement which can be tolerated is one formed alongside the people's political movement and for the purpose of attaining the goals of independence, freedom, and national rule. Only such an armed movement can have a chance for victory that conforms to the social, strategic, and political needs of today's Iran and to the historical wish of our people, that is, one which stands beside the national combative forces of the country.

The National Front of Iran has never supported an armed movement of revenge against the regime--in other words, responding to wrong with wrong--because revenge will naturally bring about more revenge; its continuation will cause the present quarrels to change into overall civil war and fratricide and will benefit only our foreign enemies.

Since the National Front, as a representative of the patriotic people of Iran, has issued a verdict of condemnation and called for the overthrow of the Khomeyni regime by its members in exile who have the opportunity and resources for activities to inform the people of Iran, it will soon announce its program in the three parallel directions mentioned below and hereby declares the beginning of its ultimate movement.

1. A united political people's movement throughout Iran, which is the true field for the final destiny-making battle to attain national victory.

2. A plan to end the destructive war between Iran and Iraq based on the preservation of national autonomy and integrity on land and sea in Iran in order to enable our military brothers to stand side by side with the nation to overthrow Khomeyni and attain our national goals.

3. The mobilization of Iranians abroad--who number about 2 million, consisting mostly of intellectuals and administrators--who must play

their historic role in the country after the overthrow of the regime and at the beginning of the period of construction in Iran.

Finally, an attempt will be made to create a force of national unity, making the liberated people of the world aware of the nature of the clerical regime and calling for assistance from all humanitarian people to overthrow this anti-human regime. They should, at last, realize the truth that Iran is not only governed by an anti-Iranian regime, but an anti-human regime, in whose overthrow all free thinkers and humanitarians should participate.

Once again, we remind the patriots and lovers of Iran of the importance of these times and the heavy burden of our national duty, so that they know that any kind of disunity, for any reason, among the national forces in the sacred, patriotic battle is condemned by us and will not be forgotten in the history of Iran.

Hushang Kordestani

9593
CSO: 4640/77

REOPENING OF UNIVERSITIES DISCUSSED BY MINISTER

Tehran ERRELA'AT in Persian 10 Nov 81 p 14

[Text] Dr Mohammad 'Ali Najafi, the minister of culture and higher education, took part in an interview with the university correspondent of ETTELA'AT, responding to questions on various university-related issues. The major issues discussed in this interview were: the re-opening and new opening of universities, graduating the students of the old system, new processes for sending students abroad, the revision of the system for sending currency to students abroad, the formation of a commission to evaluate the degrees of graduates from abroad, the timetable for the admission of new students to the nation's universities, the fate of the fields of the arts, the new names for universities, etc.

What you read below is a detailed text of the interview.

Re-Opening of Universities

In the beginning, responding to a question concerning the re-opening of the universities and especially the plan for the graduation of students of the old university system who have up to 25 credit hours to complete, Dr Najafi said: Concerning the re-opening of the universities and the graduation of students of the previous university system, certain steps have already been taken. In the field of medicine and related fields, the universities have already begun their educational programs for those students who have four semesters remaining of their education. In veterenary medicine and pharmacology, the program will soon begin for those students who have three semesters left of their education. For the students of other fields who have no more than four semesters to finish, a special council has been formed in the headquarters of the cultural revolution, which is making plans. I hope that within the next 3 months, students who have about 25 credit hours left of their education will go to the universities during the present academic year and begin their programs of study. In any case, as regards the re-opening of the universities, we are trying to expedite this matter in light of the directives of the Imam. Naturally, in the process, we are not

prepared to sacrifice our goals and ideals. We will Islamicize the atmosphere of the universities and we will try to make use of committed professors and students in the re-opening process; but, we will also try to inject an acceptable amount of Islamic culture into the present program, so that those students who graduate during this transitional period will have at least an elementary familiarity with Islamic issues.

Graduation Plan

[Question] Do you mean that within a maximum period of the next three months, the graduation plan for all students, not exclusively those in the medical fields, who have up to 25 credit hours remaining will be implemented?

Dr Najafi: Yes, since the medical fields have already begun. I mean, all the other fields except the field of humanities. It has not been decided whether this field will be included or not.

25 Credit Hours

[Question] Is there a paln for students who need more than 25 credit hours, for instance, up to 40 credit hours?

Dr Najafi: No precise plan has been devised. However, in the next stage, they would certainly be considered.

The Timetable for the Implementation of the Plan

[Question] Do you think that this time, the above plan will be implemented in this time period, in contrast to the previous times, when dates were announced but the plans were never implemented?

Dr Najafi: I hope that by mid-winter of this year, classes will begin, unless particular difficulties are encountered in the planning or the implementational stages which would force us to move this date foreward. Otherwise, at the present time, we foresee no difficulties which would prevent the implementation of this plan. Only the exact number of credit hours needs to be determined.

Coordination with the Headquarters for the Cultural Revolution

[Question] In regards to the relationship between the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and the headquarters for the cultural revolution, it seems that they lack the necessary coordination. What is the reason and, consequently, which one would be more effective in determining the future direction of the universities?

Dr Najafi: I think, under present circumstances, the necessary coordination does exist and it would be unlikely that what you hear

from the authorities of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education would be in contradiction with that from the authorities of the headquarters for the cultural revolution, unless you count the unauthorized statements, for instance, of members of one of the committees of the headquarters or what is said at the lower levels in the ministries. In any case, they are relatively coordinated. In reference to which one would play a more effective role concerning the universities, it must be said that in planning and determining the management of the universities, the educational system, and the content of the courses, the headquarters for the cultural revolution and its planning groups would be more effective; in the areas of implementation, determining the operational charters, and the supervision over the operations, the Ministry of Higher Education would be effective. In other words, the duties have, in fact, been divided between them and, as a result, they do not interfere with each other.

[Question] The reason the question was asked is that earlier the members of the headquarters for the cultural revolution had announced in a press conference that the graduation plan for students of the previous system who needed up to 25 credit hours would begin in early fall of this year.

Dr Najafi: Yes, but since then, there has been complete coordination and fewer contradictory statements have been made.

[Question] Then, at the present time, does the graduation plan for students with 25 credit hours remaining concern the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education in terms of implementation?

Dr Najafi: Yes, in fact, an organization has been formed in the Ministry, called the operational headquarters for the cultural revolution. All plans for the re-opening of the universities are supervised by this headquarters, which will also be responsible for their implementation. This headquarters has a central council in which the minister of culture and higher education, one of his deputies, and the members of the headquarters for the cultural revolution are members. Therefore, we will coordinate our work from the operational standpoint as well.

New Opening of Universities

[Question] What has been discussed thusfar concerns re-opening the universities, which essentially concerns those students who need relatively few credit hours. Now, could you explain what decisions and new steps have been taken concerning the new opening of universities, which would concern most of the students of the old system as well as new students?

Dr Najafi: In regards to the new opening, at the present time, preliminary steps have been taken in the area of teacher training and

medical colleges. That is, two legislative bills have been drafted and presented to the government which must, upon their approval by the Cabinet, be sent to the Majlis. Before the ratification of this plan by the Majlis, the new opening will be practically impossible. As regards agricultural, technical, and engineering fields, final steps are being taken. In regards to other fields, such as the sciences and humanities, plans have been made, but a comprehensive final plan has not yet been completed.

[Question] Could you explain more about the two bills which have been sent to the Majlis for ratification?

Dr Najafi: Concerning teacher training, it has been proposed that a teacher training university system be established which would combine all the institutions affiliated with the Ministry of Education and universities affiliated with the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education which are responsible for teacher training, then all would operate within a single organization.

In regards to medical colleges, the plan proposes to combine them all along with all the resources of the Ministry of Health to form a new ministry called the Ministry of Health and Medical Education. In which case, treatment and medical education resources would be combined.

Date for Admission of New Students

[Question] When will the new opening of universities and the admission of new students be, given your recent trip to Ahvaz when, during your visit to the University of Ahvaz, you expressed hope that the opening of the universities would coincide with the end of the war?

Dr. Najafi: The re-opening of the universities and the issue of the war which I spoke of in Ahvaz only concerned the niversity of Ahvaz. Of course, as for the medical college, the University of Ahvaz is scheduled to begin its educational activities for students who are included in the transitional plan within the next one or two weeks. Concerning fields other than medicine, we hope, God-willing, to prepare the plan affecting those students with 25 credit hours remaining by the end of the war, to be implemented in Ahvaz. Therefore, this issue has nothing to do with the admission of new students.

In connection with the admission of new students, the related plans must be ratified by the Majlis. Meanwhile, before they are ratified, we are making plans to facilitate their implementation so that new students can be admitted as soon as these plans are ratified. But, as to the exact date, that is not yet certain. However, I am certain that we will need time, at least until Mar or Apr of next year to plan the implementation of student admissions. Hence, the admission of new students will be postponed, if possible, until next Mar or Apr.

New Names for Universities

[Question] What decisions have been made concerning new names for the universities?

Dr Najafi: In this connection, in the future, we will determine certain regions for higher education throughout Iran. Each region might include several provinces. In every region, there will be a parent university and several colleges affiliated with that university. At the same time, with the plan for regionalizing higher education, determining the number of regions and the location for each one of the universities, naturally, many universities will either be moved, closed, or combined. Therefore, I believe that the re-naming of the universities must be postponed until after we determine these regions and their universities. After they have been determined and their locations have been set, we will name them. This was discussed earlier and it was decided that after the higher education regions are determined, a council will study all the name proposals and will choose a name for each university appropriate to its function and geographical location.

Sending Foreign Currency for Students

[Question] The new government decision announced some time ago concerning sending foreign currency for students states that those students whose fields of study are not needed by the country will not receive foreign currency while those studying needed fields will be given an increase. What can you tell us in this regard?

Dr Najafi: About the situation of these students, quite some time ago this was studied by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. They had announced certain fields which were not needed and had given the students the opportunity to change their fields. The reason is that when we are sure that a particular field is not needed, naturally, we do not want our students to waste their time in this field or to waste the country's foreign currency to get a degree or specialization which we do not need. The Cabinet emphasized this issue and decided that it should be reexamined to determine, given our monetary difficulties and restrictions, if there are other fields which are not needed by the country, which would, in the future, be included in the previous list and we would then avoid sending foreign currency for them. In any case, when the fields which are needed are determined, we will give an opportunity to students who have been studying other fields to change them and only in this case will they receive foreign currency. This will enable the country to make use of the knowledge of these individuals for its own needs.

[Question] At what stage is this plan at the present time?
Dr Najafi: The plan is presently being studied and nothing has been announced. Before any announcement, it will be sent to the Cabinet.

Sending Students Abroad

[Question] What programs lie ahead of us in regards to sending students abroad?

Dr Najafi: On the whole, we do not consider sending students abroad in the best interests of the country. If students are sent abroad in the future, it will be on a much smaller scale than in the past. Sending students abroad in the uncontrolled manner of before the revolution and one or two years after the revolution had unpleasant cultural and educational effects for us. Culturally, our youth, without having established the necessary roots and depth and without the sufficient familiarity with Islamic culture and tradition, were sent to Western and some Eastern countries and in many cases, they were influenced by atheistic cultures. As a result, those traditional roots which were not yet fully formed in them were weakened. From an educational standpoint, as well, from the studies that we have made, we have seen that in many cases students studied in fields which are not needed or studied at universities which are very low in scientific standing, are very weak in academic standards, or generally are engaged in non-academic activities. Therefore, we believe that sending students abroad should take place under new, strict guidelines and conditions. The monetary difficulties of the country will also force us to send fewer students abroad. Presently, a committee in the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education is devising new guidelines. As I said earlier, we are sure that, at least for the future months, sending high school graduates will absolutely not take place and at the higher levels, it will be very, very difficult.

Evaluation of Educational Degrees

[Question] In our previous interview, I asked you about students who have graduated from abroad and whose degrees have not been evaluated. You said that a commission would soon be formed for this purpose. I would like to ask now whether this has been done?

Dr Najafi: Yes, this commission has been formed. The major problem concerned students who had graduated in the Philippines, which we solved somehow. This commission is presently examining these degrees.

[Question] Do you mean that now, all students whose degrees have not been evaluated can go somewhere for this evaluation?

Dr Najafi: Yes, to the Organization for Student Affairs.

The Combining of Culture, Art, and Guidance

[Question] Certain sections of [the Ministry of] Culture and Arts were supposed to be included under the Ministry of Guidance. While this has not taken place, which of these two ministries is now

supervising culture and the arts, in particular, in the area of film making?

Dr Najafi: Presently, the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education is supervising these areas, as before. Before the issue of the combining of related units to be separated from [the Ministry of] Higher Education is ratified by the Cabinet, this supervision will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education. Of course, in this area also, certain proposals have been offered which are now being studied. The combining issue has also reached its final stages. God willing, it will be offered to the Cabinet shortly to be ratified and implemented.

Abolition of the Field of Music

[Question] My last question is: What decision has been made about the fields of the arts and what fields are to be abolished?

Dr Najafi: Concerning the fields of the arts, music has certainly been ommitted. As for other fields, the art group of the headquarters for the cultural revolution is making studies and plans. After the plans have been prepared and approved by the headquarters for the cultural revolution, they will be implemented. Of course, music has been abolished as an official educational field and other fields, such as theater, cinema, and sculpture, remain, but no decisive plans have been made in this regard.

9593
CSO: 4640/56

PROVINCES DRAFTING DEVELOPMENT, BUDGET PLANS

East Azarbaijan

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 81 p 3

[Interview with chief of Plan and Budget Organization]

[Text] Tabriz - During an interview the chief of the East Azarbaijan Plan and Budget Organization announced: 700 developmental and production projects throughout the province will be ready for operation by the end of the current year. Furthermore a thousand other developmental and production projects are already being implemented.

A total of 12 billion rials credit has been allocated to implement the aforementioned plans.

While making this announcement, he added: The aforementioned plans include construction of educational units, rural roads and postal offices, provision of drinking water in the villages, creation of health clinics, construction of exercise facilities and field recultivation. Twelve billion rials credit has been allocated for these plans during the current year, 4 billion rials of which has been absorbed so far.

Concerning East Azarbaijan's budget and the level of its absorption during the current year, the chief of the province's Plan and Budget Organization said: In the current year, of the total of 54 billion rials credit allocated to this province, 25 billion rials have so far been absorbed by current affairs and developmental plans. We hope that by the end of the current year we can absorb 80 percent of it. At the end of this interview he pointed to the changes in the kinds of programs in the coming year, and said: Next year we will strive to attain industrial and agricultural self-sufficiency, and thus priority will be given to agricultural production plans, such as building deep and shallow wells, construction of canals and dams, and the provision of water for agriculture.

Esfahan Province

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 81 p 7

[Interview with Governor-General Gholam 'Abbas Zare']

[Text] Esfahan - KYEHAN correspondent - A meeting of the Administrative council of

Esfahan Province was convened with the presence of Gholam 'Abbas Zare', the governor-general, and other provincial administrative officials. In this session Sa'id Tehrani, chief of the Plan and Budget Organization of Esfahan Province, pointed to the country's current and developmental budgets, and said: The government intends to submit to the Majles a supplementary bill to this year's budget. The most important point in this bill is economizing in the expenditures of organizations, where a reduction between 10 and 13 percent is anticipated. Due to the imposed war, the economic blocade, a lack of petroleum sales, a lack of export of goods such as pistachios and rugs, and a reduction in the domestic income, the government is faced with a budget deficit. Therefore provincial budgets also have deficits. The budget of Esfahan Province will drop from 40 billion to 27 billion rials. Thus expenditures of the departments must be reduced in every way possible. In this connection, we can use solutions such as tax increases, increased non-petroleum exports, carrying out works by direct administration, preventing hiring, impelling commercial bank credits into developmental and production plans, and cutting off payment for employees's special sssignments and overtime. During another portion of his speech the chief of the Budget and Plan Organization of Esfahan Province pointed to the problem of primary materials, and said: During the year 21 March 1981-20 March 1982, such foreign primary materials as we have will be consumed, and in the coming year we will face the problem of a shortage of primary materials. Because we cannot import primary materials, we must plan and make projects on the basis of domestic production. He added: The present budget of the government of the Islamic republic differs completely from that of the past, and the administrative apparatuses are free in their own planning and budget. Therefore these organizations must send their plans to the plan and budget organization as soon as possible so that after examining them decisions can be made quickly. It should not be left unsaid that development plans should comprise mostly productive and employment-creating work.

Then Ebrahimi, general director of the Treasury of Esfahan Province, turned in his speech to problems of the tax plan, and said: We cannot collect taxes as we should due to a lack of personnel and implementing pesources. The people of Esfahan, the class of bazaar merchants in particular, are not willing to pay taxes. This is true in circumstances where a merchant will do 30 million tumans of business with a factory during the course of one year, but is not willing to pay 13,000 tumans of tax.

Then Moqbali, general director of the Education Department, concerning the budget increase and greater economizing in departmental expenditures, said: Housing loans should not be given to employees, and employee special assignment and overtime pay should be cut off throughout the departments. He added: In some departments employee inflation meets the eye. The Esfahan Steel Mill is an example, while the Education Departmnnt is facing a personnel shortage. If the reconstruction bill is implemented, a number of the government's financial problems will be solved.

In this session a representative from the Health Department also made a short speech in which he criticized the departments, and said: Some of our departments are absolutely useless, such as the Red Crescent which has a 2.5 billion rial budget and accomplished nothing. He pointed to the situation of government employees, and said: There are employees in the Health Department who do not do a lick of work from dawn to dusk, and yet each one receives a salary of about 8,000 tumans. Now that their retirement has been requested, the Ministry of Health has paid no attention.

Dadkhah, general director of the Labor Department, pointed to the country's self-sufficiency, and said; Each province's planning must be done by that province's own officials, and no one should wait for orders from Tehran. In this connection, we must give the underground reserves our attention. Unfortunately however, we are witnessing them being closed one after another. He pointed to the Mutah gold and lead mine, and concluded: Esfahan possesses such enormous mines, but no use is made of them.

Operations of Gilan's Departments

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 10 Nov 81 p 9

[Interview with Governor-Genreal Nosratollah Shadnush]

[Excerpts] Rasht - Nosratollah Shadnush, Gilan governor-general took part in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN's correspondent, and spoke about the operations of Gilan's departments, agricultural and rice problems, fishing, loans to employees, creation of a slaughterhouse, closure of the Sasat fruit and vegetable market in Rasht, fuel supply, construction materials, and physical recreation in the province.

In reply to the first question concerning the grave responsibility which the martyrs and self-sacrificers of the revolution have placed on the shoulders of officials, actions taken towards lifting the burden of problems from the shoulders of the oppressed. That is to say that today arrogant persons do not exist in the ruling apparatus. Instead, from the president on down to the other officials who were put in charge of affairs after the revolution, all are oppressed types, and are certainly striving for the sake of God to liberate the oppressed and to eliminate disorganization. Of course you are aware that in this province we face greater and more extraordinary difficulties than those in other provinces. That which the U.S. and anti-people groups have been doing in this province could be a very effective factor preventing us from accomplishing much of our ordinary or developmental work. Nevertheless we have even accomplished our work in this area. But I wish that we had fewer problems like those of the U.S. groups so that we could deal more with the development ond welfare problems of the region. However, by God's will there have been activities in this area. The statistics of the activities carried out are noteworthy. Even in this area authority has been delegated to the governors so that they can carry out any developmental job of public benefit throughout the villages. They take the budget for it without any restrictions or conditions. We are even expecting that the Islamic Societies in the villages will cooperate with governor's offices so that work can be accomplished more quickly.

The Gilan governor-general continued his talk, adding: Another problem was that of concluding contracts, which was done by the Technical Office, the Technical Deputy's Office and the Development Deputy's Office by means of inquiry and direct administration. This occurred in the field of developmental works such as road-building, health centers, schools and buildings connected with other institutions, water-piping and agricultural matters, more than 150 projects in all. We quickly concluded contracts for them with the concerned departments in a direct administration form, and delegated authority to these departments.

Dissemination of Islamic Culture in Gilan

The Gilan governor-general, concerning cultural work in the region, stated: As far as cultural work is concerned, the portion placed on our shoulders was that of enlightening the people concerning the issues and those lying claims made by the groups. The province's media observed that even I have accepted the major part of this mission, in the form of speech-making. I attended various places and various city-regions throughout the province on special and ordinary occasions, and enlightened and informed the people concerning these issues. From another point of view, what sort of people have these groups placed in front of their traitorous bullets? But the "always-awake" people became acquainted with the actions of the counterrevolution's mini-groups. In fact, the people at the present time have changed a great deal from the way they were in the past. They have the complete acquaintance with these issues that they should have. At the same time a critical part of this mission is on the shoulders of the media. In this context, radio-television, which is an effective agent this area from the standpoint of both vision and sound, can accomplish a lot. We hope that this apparatus can carry out this task in a more desirable fashion.

Solution to the Rice and Fishing Problems

A question was asked about the region's problems: You know that Gilan's two most important problems are rice and fishing, and that these two problems have always created difficulties for the farmers and fishermen, both of whom are from the laboring stratum of this region. Is any decisive solution to eliminate these two problems being considered? The governor-general replied:

Decisions have been made in the area of fishing in order to prevent illegal fishing. This is because fishing has one condition, which must be explicit: the fish stocks should not be destroyed. In this way this God-given resource will remain in the future for the region's toiling people. This is because the fish resource should be a livelihood for the people. However, one group has come in excess, and they are attacking the fishery. In general they catch so much that the danger of a non-existent fishery in the future threatens the region's people. Naturally one of the people's means of livelihood would thus be closed off. Therefore we expect the fishermen and the people to aid the government in order to preserve this life, this livelihood and income. They must not permit persons to undertake fishing without observing fishing standards and regulations. A reminder is necessary that the government has made investments in this area and has worked so that, God willing, the fish protein reserves will have a rich yield in the future. The benefits resulting from this work are in the pockets of the fishermen brothers. That is to say, if the government sets forth the fishermen's benefit. We hope that they will cooperate with us and never permit a profiteering and unjust group to disregard the results of their labor. On the same subject, he added: The government has also made necessary provisions in this area. With respect to fishing equipment for this oppressed and toiling class, it is preparing facilities. However, if persons do not wish to observe standards and regulations, we will certainly deal with them decisively.

However, with respect to farmers, just as you have observed, the government's whole effort was to prevent anyone from being overcharged. In this area we promised our farmer brothers that in return for offering their goods to the government, we would try our best to put those resources we had at their disposal as quickly as possible. The policy of the government and the nation did not call for the price of rice

rising higher than this. If it had gone higher, it certainly would have had a hand in the inflation of the prices of other goods, and would have created an unfavorable situation. Our farming brothers have made sacrifices up to now and have always, everywhere, stepped in to defend the Islamic republic. This class and the worker class have sacrificed all they have in order to preserve their honor. Once again we expect them to cooperate just as they have in the past. We also believe in and are committed to placing the maximum amount of facilities we have at the disposal of the worker, farmer and rural brothers. At the same time we have planned a budget such that the government will purchase rice from the farmers fairly. Barley and threshed unmilled rice will also be purchased from the farmers by the government, so that they will not suffer any hardship. As to supplying necessities, it has been decided that we will supply farmers with that equipment which we can concentrate throughout the villages, without wasting time and under suitable conditions.

9557
CSO: 4640/53

FOLLOWERS REPORTED LEAVING AYATOLLAHS WHO BACKED KHOMEYNI VOTE CALL

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 p 10

[Text] Reliable sources inside Iran report that two of the most prominent Shi'ite theologians, Ayatollahs Golpayegani and Marashi-Najafi, continue to receive protest letters over their advice to their followers to vote in the presidential elections.

The two ayatollahs have lost many of their followers and their donations. Last month, on orders from Ayatollah Khomeini himself, 20 million rials was paid from the treasury to Ayatollah Marashi to meet the expenses of his madrasseh (theological school). This shows how much his receipts from the faithful have fallen as a result of his decision to side with the regime.

One protesting letter writer wrote also to a contact of IPS, "I was greatly shocked when Marashi's announcement on taking part in elections was broadcast by Khomeini's radio. At first I thought the radio was faking the announcement, as the mullahs' radio often does. But after making enquiries I learned that Agha (the ayatollah) had indeed told us to vote. That was the last straw. I no longer imitate (follow) him. I said so in my letter. Many of my relatives in Rasht have also written to him. We believe by participating in the elections Agha endorsed a basically corrupt and un-Islamic government. I argued that long before the election day it was brighter than the sun (clear) that Khamenei was to be brought out from the (ballot) box. Agha's call to vote was in effect advice to us to give credibility to a corrupt election. Marashi also supports claims that what Ayatollah Khomeini has created for us is a real Islamic government. We cannot accept it because even with our limited knowledge of Islam we can understand that Khomeini is a shameless liar who has gathered around himself other liars. We are not fooled by turbans. We listen carefully to all the speeches which Khomeini and his accomplices make. They tell us lies, very clear lies. We have eyes and we see their deeds, and compare them with the holy texts. The result is horrible."

He went on to say: "There is nothing new in abusing religion to further one's personal and political ends. Our own literature is full of vivid examples of how corrupt mullahs exploited people's religious sentiments to satisfy their own personal greed and lust. No doubt Khomeini originally pretended to be a man of God. But we read his hand very soon. What makes us angry is how ulema like Ayatollah Marashi were trapped. How can anybody like him not know that Khomeini is a liar and a bloodthirsty maniac who so blatantly uses the weapon of blasphemy (chomagh-e-takfir) against true Moslems?"

He concluded by saying: "As practicing Moslems we believe that there could never be an Islamic government in the absence of an infallible (ma'ssum) being. Khomeini says that the clergy can deputise for the infallible. Well, he is wrong and countless theologians have written texts that prove him wrong. But Khomeini does not want to admit he is wrong. On the contrary he uses the sword to have his say. What he does is against Islam. Many faithful are forced to doubt the holiness of Islam. If Khomeini continues his rule, Islam will be hurt because people are bound to react against him and in the process damage will be done to Islam unless other ulema come forward to say clearly that Khomeini is a heathen. In the meshrutiyat (constitutional uprising) the ulema realised the essence of changing times, and supported secularism and disowned the mullah who was like Khomeini (Shaikh Fazlollah Noori). We expected Ayatollah Marashi to come forward and disown Khomeini. Many theologians have done so but not him."

CSO: 4600/146

PAPER CLAIMS FAHD PLAN WAS 'BUTCHERED' IN IRAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 28 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Text]

--FINALLY the 28th Conference of the Arab Heads which was held for the approval of Fahd's American-designed plot in Fez concluded amidst notorious defeat.

Perhaps, such a defeat was unexpected by most of the political observers as the plans brought up by each Superpower in different regions, could be defeated only through the opposition of the other. And the Fahd plan was one of those rare plans which both Superpowers (U.S. and USSR) had reached mutual agreement on and yet it failed!

In the past, besides the Superpower opposition, another factor which could also have brought defeat to a plan centered on the Middle East crisis was the opposition of PLO Head, Yasser Arafat, and the Al-Fateh Organization.

Why, then did the Fez Conference end in defeat despite the open support of the U.S. and USSR and the majority of the Arabic countries and above all the approval of the plan by the sold-off Yasser Arafat?

When all the grounds had been prepared for a corrupt agreement through a carefully designed program, when the illegitimate child of America and Zionism was going to gain political recognition after tens of years of massacre, when all were either supporting the plan or were silent and did not have the guts to express their views, the storming call of the great leader of the world's Moslems was heard from Tehran who clarified the aims of this treacherous plot in one of his most historical lectures in which he said that those who had designed, or supported the plan were betraying Islam.

Following the Imam's speech, with his special talent, Ayatollah Montazeri invited the Iranian nation to a massive demonstration against Fahd plan and the great unique Iranian people responded to his invitation en masse.

The Fahd plan suddenly faced 30 million clenched fists raised against it in Iran. Such massive

opposition was followed up by demonstrations of the noble Palestinian nation and organizations along with South Lebanon Moslems who also voiced their opposition.

Afterwards the heads of the Steadfastness Front finding the grounds suitable declared their opposition to the plan as well.

We never wish to undermine the opposition of the Steadfastness Heads and such an opposition was duly significant and precious. But, the fact is that the determining role (in annuling the plot) has to be ascribed to the prophet-like speech of Imam Khomeini who is now ruling the hearts of the world's Moslems and to the 36-million demonstrations of the Iranian nation.

By the way, the defeat of this plot will have great impact on the future events in the region. The Americans lackeys who had shown up in the political and decision-making scenes recently, had to retreat to their hide-outs once again. The U.S. "Bright Star" military maneuvers could not bear any fruit with regards to the Iron-like volition of the Moslem nations.

Millions or even billions of dollars spent for propagation on the Fez Conference went with the wind. The mercenary and sold out Arab heads were unmasked before their nations. The U.S' new gendarme in the region, Fahd, failed in his first role and left the U.S. without any gendarme in the region. Israel which was trying to smear the real (not the fake) opposers of the plan through its ostencible opposition was severely humiliated and most important of all, the determining role of the Islamic Republic and its great leader as the strongest political factor in regards to the Middle East affairs and the Islamic world was revealed to the Superpowers and their mercenaries. Furthermore, the victory of the Moslem nations in a great experience (thwarting the Fahd plan) took forward the tide of the presence of Moslem people in the arena of a serious and long struggle against the Superpowers and the Zionists.

CSO: 4600/147

MULLAHS SHAPE UP FOR NEW POWER STRUGGLE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] Signs of a power struggle between two groups of the clergy, the one led by President Ali Khamenei and the other by the influential former premier Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, proliferated in Tehran during the past week. It centered around the allocation of powers and the government's bid to break up the business interests which support the rival group of mullahs.

Ayatollah Khomeini, meanwhile, embarked on yet another balancing act as the two sides showed their hands. He favoured one side and then the other in approving various legislation or changes, and then warned clerical visitors that the divisions in the clergy were very deep and constituted a great deal of potential danger.

Signs that Mahdavi-Kani's standard was still flying high came with the professions of attachment to Islamic principles in regard to the private sector by radical government leaders after Khamenei had had talks with Khomeini last week. Mahdavi-Kani and other leading cleric in his camp, Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, had made it clear they felt the business interests which are their main support should be given proper consideration.

Then at the beginning of this week came the announcement that Mahdavi-Kani and the Militant Clergy Association which he heads were to have their control of revolutionary committees and guards formalised. Mahdavi-Kani was instrumental in setting up these revolutionary situations at the outset of the uprising, and has retained his influence over them since. This gave him and the "power mullahs" who have control of the Majlis the basic power of the administrative system, since they also included the Minister of Interior in their orbit, and the new announcement seemed to show that Khomeini supported the institutionalising of this status quo.

Under the set-up announced this week the committees become official organs of the government and will coordinate their activities with other government departments; those in Tehran will come under the central committee; and the provincial committees will have independence, in which only the clergy can interfere. The Militant Clergy group which Mahdavi chairs will control the choice of mullahs who must head each committee. Importantly, too, control of all mosques in the country is also given to the Militant Clergygroup, giving them control of two key sections.

Although the revolutionary guards corps was recognised under the Islamic constitution, the committees had hitherto not the same status. The guards will now be more formally integrated into the system through the committees and will have full recognition alongside the armed forces. Sources suggested they would take over policing duties in Tehran, for example, thus doing away with a force which has been widely criticised for its failure to live up to the demands of the revolution. Many leading police officials have been replaced recently.

Control of the judiciary was also formally handed over to revolutionary justice chiefs Mussavi-Ardabili and Rabbani-Amlashi, but Iranian observers said the judiciary had always been a separate arm, and was relatively unimportant in comparison with the executive controlled by Khamanei and the administrative sector under Mahdavi-Kani.

But the publication of the bill to nationalise foreign trade, even though it provided for internal distribution to remain in the hands of the private sector, reflected the fact that Khamenei and his IRP hardliners were still pressing on with their policy to undermine the other mullahs' power.

The rejection of plans for new privately-run factories, hitherto seemingly viewed with favour by officials, together with a campaign against leading businessmen, also reflected the government's bid to press on undaunted with its aims. When the foreign trade nationalisation bill was announced as ready for approval on Tehran radio on Tuesday it was immediately followed by a virulent commentary questioning the morality of leaving domestic distribution in the hands of "economic terrorists." The radio and television are in the hands of Khamenei hardliners.

Reports from Iran also spoke of widespread arrests of wealthy businessmen. True to form, many of these were Jewish, but prominent Muslims were also picked up on charges of profiteering. Reuter reported from Tehran that one Jew, whose name was given as Pakeyzegi, had been publicly lashed and fined the equivalent of 1.2 million dollars.

It was clear that there was an all-out blitz on the remaining private sector by Khamenei and other activists committed to what is in effect the communisation of the country. Since there is not yet any network of cooperatives that can take on the job of running or setting up new businesses, the government rejection of efforts by private interests who want to resume or extend their activities on the grounds these must be run by local cooperatives, can be seen as a blow aimed at their rivals.

If Tehran reports are true that Khomeini allowed it to be known he had approved the foreign trade nationalisation bill so the Majlis could be encouraged to approve it, in spite of the fact that many members were known to be opposed to much of it, observers say it can be surmised he is behind the radicals in their efforts to rid the private sector of its influence.

But nobody seemed sure of where the ayatollah really stands. It was all a big guessing game again, as the public waited to see which way the struggle between the two factions would go in the weeks ahead.

CSO: 4600/146

YOUNG SHAH SAID BEHIND COALITION PLAN

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] Talks between exile opposition leaders on the possibility of forming a coalition to work together against the Khomeini regime received an unexpected fillip this week when sources close to the negotiations said the new Shah Reza the Second had given his support to the idea.

The sources told IPS that the young monarch had assured the negotiators that he would accept their propositions, which include a national vote on the system under which the people of Iran wish to be governed in the future "in the framework of the 1907 constitution."

The first aim of the coalition would be to get rid of the present regime in Iran and form a council which would prepare the way for a referendum once law and order had been properly restored. While the 1907 constitution provides for the monarchy, it contains conditions for a change in the system if the people wish, sources close to the Paris negotiations point out.

The reported agreement of the Shah to the proposals is important, since Admiral Ahmad Madani, in a recent statement which has stimulated considerable interest among exile communities and has given the discussions on cooperation a more solid basis, became the first confessed republican opposition leader to concede a willingness to accept the monarchy if the people in Iran vote for it. The coalition council would guarantee the right of every group to have a platform to put their case to the people after the return to Iran.

The negotiations seemed to have become stalemated two weeks ago, though sources close to veteran statesman Ali Amini and Ayatollah Mehdi Rouhani, a Paris-based religious leader, who have been the go-betweens, said then that the plan had not been dropped.

Talks have continued since, with Madani having paid a visit to London to talk to a former head of the late Shah's armed forces in General Fereidoun Jam, who is said to have considerable following with officers both inside and outside Iran but who until now has remained aloof from politics. It was hoped to add Jam's name to the impressive list of military men ready to support the coalition, who include another of the Shah's top military men in Gholam Ali Oveissi and Jan's predecessor, General Bahram Aryana. Madani was reported hopeful after talking to Jam, but sources close to Jam have not confirmed that he will come in.

Shahpour Bakhtiar, who heads the best known of the opposition groups, the National Resistance Movement, and other "centrist" figures like Hassan Nazih, Ahmad Bani-Ahmad, and Moghadam Maraghei are said to have taken part in the talks or to have offered support to the coalition idea.

A number of people considered of standing inside Iran have also been canvassed about the project and are said to have given it approval.

Some discussion has also apparently taken place on possible approaches to the Mojahedin-e-Khalq to join the coalition, Paris sources said. Mojahedin sources have not commented on the project. Their propaganda has tended to make even the centrists the target of their abuse in the past. While the Mojahedin's association with former president Bani-Sadr presents the biggest obstacle to most of the exiles talking to them.

CSO: 4600/146

'HONEYMOON' BETWEEN TEHRAN, PALESTINIANS SEEN ENDING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 pp 3-6

[Text] Some Tehran sources say the cries of "Execute Arafat" by crowds taking part in the rally called by the regime in Tehran last week were not premeditated by the organisers. Part of the mob insisted on marching on the Palestinian embassy, and someobservers say rally stewards tried to stop them shouting against Arafat personally.

But the honeymoon between the Tehran regime and the Palestinians had been showing signs of approaching its end for a long time. The support given by many sections of the Palestinians' organisation to the Mojahedin and other leftists who have been opposing the mullahs was obviously one of the final straws. But the continued interference of the Palestinians in the internal affairs of the Islamic republic had built up a resentment against them that was sure to explode some time, Iran watchers point out.

The regime showed its ability to recognise the building up of feeling of this kind when it turned the rally into an outpouring of traditional Iranian anti-Arab feeling that helped give public support for the mullahs' regime a boost.

Even some senior Iranian officials had begun to openly criticise the Palestinians by this time, however. Khomeini himself had implied criticism of Arafat's preliminary welcome for parts of the Saudi Prince Fahd's Mideast peace plan when he raged, "Anyone who does not oppose the plan is a traitor to Islam." And Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani described Arafat as "our ignorant friend" in a sermon at Friday prayers.

Radio and newspapers had also carried some attacks on the Palestinians the previous week.

The divisions between the Palestinians themselves had also begun to be reflected in the attitudes taken by their Iranian proteges. Those Palestinians now closest to the regime are those of the left, like marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine leader George Habbash, whose organisation has links with the Fedayeen-e-Khalq majority section which is supporting the Khomeini regime. The PFLP also is close to the pro-Moscow Tudeh party which is one of the regime's main pillars of support. All these groups are interlinked with other communist movements in the Arab world.

The Syrian-backed As-Saiqa group, however, played the biggest role among Palestinians in organising the uprising in Iran. In this respect it became the main agent of the Syrian regime, which is dominated by a Shi'ite president in Hafez Assad and by a Shi'ite ruling class and which has been the mullahs' regime's leading foreign supporter. Some Palestinians also served with the mainly Lebanese Al Amal Shi'ite organisation with which the late Mostafa Chamran was so long associated, and which trained so many of the young Iranian leftists who returned to their country late in 1978.

Arafat had on several occasions been tempted by the late Shah to abandon his anti-Tehran position and open relations with his regime. In 1972 Jafar Raed, the Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, approached the Palestinian leader. The Shah also raised the matter at the Morocco Islamic summit. Arafat was reported to have been in Tehran on at least two occasions in the early 70s, and in 1975 plans were finalised for the PLO to open an office in Tehran.

But the office was never set up and Mansour Ghadar, the Shah's ambassador in Beirut and reportedly a top security official of the regime, is thought to have been responsible for persuading the Shah that giving a shop window to those who were training his opponents to fight against him was imprudent. Relations between Moussa Sadr, the Iranian leader of Lebanon's Shi'ites also deteriorated at this time, with further serious implications for the Tehran regime. With hindsight it is easy to see this as a crucial failure of Iranian diplomacy; and its consequences can now be clearly seen.

Immediately after Khomeini took over in Iran Arafat arrived in Tehran with a vast entourage, to be given a hero's welcome. He spoke to a big crowd from the balcony of the former Israeli embassy, which has handed over to the PLO as the centre for their own diplomatic mission, with Khomeini's son Ahmad at his side. An estimated 10,000 Palestinians poured into Iran, and the appearance of some of these in administrative offices pointed to the key role the Palestinians had played in helping organise the revolutionary system which executed and then consolidated the takeover.

As a reward Arafat was reported to have been paid 60 million dollars in cash and given permission to open an office in the southern city of Ahvaz. After introducing one of his most efficient aides, Hani al-Hassan, as "ambassador" to Tehran Arafat went on a trip to Ahvaz, where he made thundering speeches in Arabic to excited ethnic Arabs who make up much of the population of Iran's southeastern province of Khuzestan.

This was Arafat's first error in the eyes of the regime, for Khuzestan had long been the home of Arab secessionists. On his return to Tehran he was told the regime had changed its mind about letting him open an office in Ahvaz. Arafat soon afterwards ended his first triumphant tour and went back to Beirut.

Hani al-Hassan set up office in the former de facto Israeli embassy building, streets were named after Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians, and they became involved in the running of the revolution.

The first signs of tension between the PLO and Khomeini's regime appeared in Nov, 1979, when Abdul Walid was dispatched by Arafat to mediate for the release of the American hostages. Khomeini, then in Qom, refused to receive the PLO representative, and an embarrassed Walid left Iran. It seems certain that Arafat had hoped to gain recognition from the Americans in return for his services as mediator for the release of the hostages. Khomeini robbed him of this chance, and this didn't go down well with the PLO chief.

Soon the economic crisis prevented Iran from paying the PLO further, and when Arafat's offer of mediation to end the Iran-Iraq war was turned down by the Iranian leaders relations began to show serious signs of strain. The Palestinians attitude to the war between Iran and Iraq also proved unsatisfactory to Tehran.

Regarding the Palestinian Movement as revolutionary, Khomeini was expecting it to adopt a "revolutionary stand" in the war, meaning a break with the traditional way of looking at things in the Middle East on Arab-versus-Iranian lines, in the same way he regards himself as being above "this pettiness, left in heritage by Satanic Western imperialism to divide good Muslims." Since Iran was in the right, Arafat, as a Muslim, was bound to support her. But Arafat failed his former allies.

Ordinary Iranians had also begun to be bitterly resentful of the Palestinians' interfering role, especially in leading and training the often-violent revolutionary guards. Naive people also blamed the Palestinians for the executions of many prominent people of the former regime. Some senior mullahs were also fearful of the Palestinians' true intentions. Ayatollah Monatazeri is known for his dislike of Arafat and his entourage, whom he has accused of having sold themselves out to the Americans.

IPS has previously reported attacks on individual Palestinians in Iranian cities, a number having been killed by unidentified assailants. IPS also reported some months ago that two Palestinian members of Khomeini's bodyguard had been executed for plotting to assassinate him.

The latest steps down the ladder towards an open rift between the Palestinians and Tehran have been the disclosure that the Iranians have been buying arms from Israel, and the qualified support given by Arafat to the Saudi peace plan. Perhaps there is an element of tit-for-tat in Tehran seizing on Arafat's attitude to the Fahd plan as part of its campaign against it. And having deflected attention from its own faux pas with Israel, it may yet not press enough to force a final break.

Last weekend the Saudi radio broadcasted a remarkably abusive riposte to attacks from Tehran, using language rarely used between two nations. It called the Iranian leadership "insane" and said it had surpassed all records, ancient and contemporary, in killing off its own people, including women and children.

That should have been a sign to Tehran that it had already gone much too far for Riyadh. And if other Arab states react similarly to abuse from Tehran there could be a general closing of Arab ranks against Tehran, with endless effect, some observers point out. One could be an early disillusionment for Khomeini over his dream of spreading Islamic revolution.

CSO: 4600/146

DOMESTIC GOALS SEEN BEHIND ANTI-FAHD-PLAN RALLY

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 pp 6-7

[Text] Iranian observers saw the need to try to whip up popular feeling to boost the image of the regime as the prime motive behind last week's rally in Tehran which demanded the heads of Saudi King Khaled and Palestinian Liberation Organisation leader Yasser Arafat.

Anti-Arab sentiment has always been a ready lure to Iranians' feelings of nationalism and bundled up with conventional anti-American, anti-imperialistic ingredients it provided the right blend for a rousing public "tone-up" which would help take people's minds off their problems, experienced Iran watchers felt.

The authorities in Tehran decided there was a need to hold a rally as long ago as in the first week of November. At one time they planned one to protest against the presence of U.S. forces on exercises in the Mideast region.

On another occasion they decided to have a rally "to prove to the Americans that the people are still on the scene and that counter-revolutionaries have no chance to overthrow the Islamic theocracy," as a Tehran radio commentator put it. Hanging judge Khalkhali was in favour of a rally against the West Germans; while, finally, Ayatollah Montazeri came up with his plan to organise a march to denounce the Fahd plan.

The loss of face involved in the failure to rouse anti-Saudi feeling at Mecca and Medina during the pilgrimage, as well as displeasure over Saudi Arabia's continued foreign policy successes in relation to peace initiatives and oil agreements, were obvious factors in making Riyadh the target for attacks.

But the continuing history of splits between factions in the regime--the latest between president Khamenei and the resigned premier Mahdavi-Kani--and the need to show the Islamic republic is impregnable were other important reasons for display of public solidarity. One could add the heavy toll of leading rally organisers among the many assassinations in recent weeks, and the failure of the revolutionary committees to get the promised millions to religious gatherings and passion plays in the important Moharram mourning period, as other incentives to put on a show. And there is always the need to answer the continuing rumours of opposition forces abroad coming together to try to topple the regime.

The disappointing response to the call for massive observance of the Moharram ceremonial was of considerable importance. For the first time since the beginning of the revolution the mullahs had decided to hold not purely political but more traditional ceremonies for Moharram. Khomeini had told the faithful: "Go to religious gatherings this month and weep a lot--the more weep the higher your reward in the world hereafter."

Despite Khomeini's express wish, turn-out at religious gatherings during Moharram (which for Shias is more important than any other religious occasion) was so low that all the mullahs were embarrassed.

Anyway, by Nov 13, plans were laid to bring factory workers, employees of nationalised firms and civil servants with members of their families to march in Tehran. The route was either to be from the centre of the city to the main cemetery, or from Tehran University to the Azadi Square; at that stage that had not been decided, as were several other details.

On the following day the rally organisers were not quite sure what the theme would be so they could not tell their painters and calligraphers what to write on placards.

Speech writers and those who coin slogans were also still waiting for orders. On November 15 Khomeini delivered his second speech after his three weeks in seclusion. He devoted half of his speech to warning clerics against divisions within their ranks and the other half to denouncing the Fahd plan. Rally organisers now had some clues as to the best theme. Then Montazeri came up with the suggestion for the march to condemn the Fahd plan.

Reports from Tehran said that the turn-out was unimpressive despite efforts by the authorities to transport large numbers of Afghan and war refugees into central Tehran. Officials tried to save face by blaming unexpectedly bad weather for the small number of marchers.

An interesting news item broadcast by Tehran radio on Nov 17 was, however, encouragement for rally organisers. The Majlis has approved a bill allocating 50 million rials to shopkeepers and other tradesmen whose business premises have been damaged by the emenies of the regime. Shops belonging to zealots who organise the rallies have been prime targets for counter-revolutionaries in recent months.

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FAILURE OF SOME EXILES TO JOIN ANTI-KHOMEYNI STRUGGLE CRITICIZED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 26 Nov 81 pp 10-11

[Article by Teezbin]

[Text] Iranians certainly seem to have retained their tribal mentality. That is if reports are true that Admiral Ahmad Madani, the exile opposition leader who is actively involved in trying to get a coalition of groups together to give a big new move to get rid of Khomeini and his regime, has been to London to try to persuade former military chief Fereidoun Jam to add his name to the bid.

For Jan, as well as having lived away from Iran several years before the revolution, has certainly risked being considered something less than a patriot by his continued refusal over nearly three years to try to help save his country from the fate that has beset it.

Time after time people have asked him to join their organisations or lend his name to their efforts on the grounds that he still has a big following among the officer corps in and outside Iran. This, they said, would help give people the maximum confidence in the opposition groupings.

And it seems extraordinary that after all this time Iranians can look up, as tribal people do to their khans, at someone who has made no effort to live up to the duties that his previous responsibilities under the Shah demand of him. "Honest, clean," as Iranians keep reiterating about their political and business figures as if that is the most rare quality to be found among their compatriots, Jam may be. But does that really matter if he prefers to be buried among Pakistani labourers in a London Muslim cemetery rather than spill his blood on his native soil in the greatest cause of all-his country?

It may be a little invidious to single out Jam among so many generals and others who have ignored the call to go to the succour of their countrymen, even if only to an office where they could help to organise or influence events. But he does seem to reflect a disturbing inability among Iranians to face up to the truth about themsleves and their situation.

There must be at least 100,000--at a conservative estimate--of able-bodied, fighting-age Iranians in exile in the West, some of them well-trained military men. There is plenty of money among the exiles, too, to pay for the organisation of a pretty sizable armed force. If they marched into northeast Iran who would stop them? They are Iranians, after all, not an invasion force of a foreign power.

Isn't it extraordinary that such a meagre force of often untrained, badly armed and even unintelligent young Iranians has managed to deal effectively with every attempt inside Iran to produce some change in the oppressive system that has been installed? Yet the Shah's great apparatus collapsed like a house of cards and those who made up much of its foundations are still around in the West. Surely this must give them food for thought. And must provide for those who are setting themselves up as opposition leaders a real incentive for them to forget petty ideological differences and to unite in a sacred cause.

Listening to Iranians in exile it is often difficult to understand whom they regard as their worst enemy--Khomeini, Saddam Hossain, the Arabs in general, Yasser Arafat, Bani-Sadr, the British or the Americans? If only they can get that straight perhaps they can get to work to destroy the culprit and go home again. Only then, one would think, are those they blame for not supporting them likely to take an intelligent interest in the future of the Iranian nation, and to try to help ensure it accords with the genuine desires of the people.

CSO: 4600/146

POSSIBILITY THAT U.S. WILL RECOGNIZE PLO VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Oct 81 p 11

[Editorial: "Washington Feels Out the PLO"]

[Text] "The U.S. will continue to adhere to its present policy regarding the Palestinian Liberation Organization, according to which it will not recognize and will not negotiate with the PLO as long as the PLO does not recognize the right of Israel to exist, and does not accept resolutions 242 and 338 of the Security Council of the UN." This was written in the memorandum of understanding between the U.S. and Israel, which was signed as an annex to the interim agreement between Egypt and Israel on 4 September 1975. This section was formulated on the assumption which was then prevalent, that the Geneva peace conference would reconvene, and in anticipation of this, it was said in continuation that "the government of the U.S. will fully consult and will try to coordinate its position and strategy at the Geneva conference on this matter with the government of Israel."

This two-fold promise has been held by Washington officially already for more than 6 years as a permit for negotiations and recognition of the PLO if that organization would accept these two conditions. Yet, the American leadership has not waited for the PLO to properly accept them, but has initiated unofficial contacts with representatives of the PLO, the purpose of which was to motivate that hostile organization to recognize Israel's right to exist and to adopt the resolutions of the Security Council. But in all these contacts the American diplomats have come away emptyhanded. The PLO was not ready to enable the U.S. to get out of the obligations which it took upon itself in 1975.

The constant refusal did not deter the men of the State Department; many of them consider the obligation a nuisance and a stumbling block, and they are trying to exert pressure on the White House to persuade it that the PLO must be brought into the political process.

It is not necessary to conclude from what President Ronald Reagan said, in an interview published in Beirut, that he has already been persuaded of the correctness of their claims. But one gets the impression that he tends to believe that the Saudis will be able to play a role in the campaign to persuade the PLO that it should cease its opposition to accepting conditions which the memorandum of understanding set as requirements for recognition. At the same time, Reagan has decided not to settle the Palestinian problem until it does recognize Israel's right to exist, and from what he said to the interviewer, it sounds as though he does not recognize the PLO as the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people.

Pronouncements by the president of the U.S. have not always been notable for their clarity, especially on international matters. It is clear from them that he is not as expert in these matters as he is on domestic economic policy. This time, and in a matter which particularly affects us, it seems that he was reminded of Washington's campaign only after it was made clear to him that he had gone too far in the beginning of the interview.

There is no doubt that many American diplomats--those who are serving now as well as those who have left the foreign service--are making great efforts to communicate to the White House that it must seek a way of dialogue with the PLO, and the interview of Mr Talcott Selye proves this. The prediction of the man who served as American ambassador to Syria, that the White House would seek, within a year or sooner, a solution outside of the Camp David framework, was intended to pave the road to this end.

Israel is not exaggerating if it expresses concern over this trend. But we will not take lightly the campaign against American recognition of a terrorist organization. Let us not grant it approval for the takeover of Jordan.

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FINANCE COMMITTEE SAID LIKUD'S WEAK POINT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Oct 81 p 5

[Article by Yovel Elitsur: "The 'Soft Belly' Of Likud"]

[Text] What happened on the new moon after New Year, as the session of the Finance Committee of the Knesset, proved that the Alignment, with relative ease, can bring about the fall of the Likud government.

All it has to do is concentrate a relatively small force on a narrow front which can easily be breached: the Finance Committee.

In recent weeks it has been repeatedly shown that this committee is the 'soft underbelly' of the present government. It is not only a committee having consultative authority, but is almost an executive body, which each year must issue approval for 450 laws and amendments, without which no government could legally fulfill its role.

The Israeli legislator has become enamored of the formula: "The Finance Minister, with the agreement of the Knesset Finance Committee, is authorized...." This means that without the approval of the Finance Committee, the hands of the finance minister tied in most areas.

Likud people immediately feared that the Finance Committee could become the weak point of their regime, and so they tried to repair the situation during the days of the "battle over committees" at the beginning of the tenth Knesset. Ultimately, the coalition was forced to accept a committee structure which for it was undesireable: it has 11 members on the committee, including Chairman Shlomo Lornay, opposed to 10 members of the Alignment.

Not only is its shaky majority on the Finance Committee of concern to Likud: not only is the opposition faction on the committee composed of members of the Alignment, but Likud has been forced "at its own expense" to allocate three positions to its partners in the coalition; in addition to the chairman, a member of Agudat Yisrael, a second member of Agudat Yisrael (Avraham Shapira) and two members of the NRP (Aharon Avtavi and Avraham Melamed), the last of whom has more than once proven that he will not dance to their tune.

Also, the Likud representation on the committee has not been a team on which the government can depend: at the four sessions which were held since the vacation, no more than four or five Likud people have appeared.

An additional weakness, more fundamental than the others, stems from the differing interests within the coalition party. One gets the impression that Agudat Yisrael, and to a lesser degree the NRP, view their interest as different than that of the rest of Israel. Even during the last Knesset, the chairman of the committee, MK Shlomo Lorentz, knew how to include resolutions in which the government was interested in various allocations to institutions in which his party was interested. The majority of the committee was often forced, with clenched teeth, to vote for the whole package.

NRP members have shown a sensitivity to issues connected to the education budget. It is easy to understand the hard feelings of the NRP in the Knesset when the Education Ministry budget is cut by 1.5 billion shekels at the same time the MK Lorentz, with package deals, raises the allocations to "independent" educational institutions of the Agudah which are not subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Education.

Against this background it is possible to understand the vote of MK Avraham Melamed with the opposition last week. In that vote the request for an allocation of 8.5 million shekels (and the authorization of an allocation of an addition 11 million) was postponed for Kiryat Hayeled, an Agudah institution closest to the heart of MK Lorentz. This failure is not accidental, and is the unavoidable result of the position of the coalition in the Knesset Finance Committee. There are lessons to be learned from it.

The first lesson that the coalition must heed in all seriousness is that the Finance Committee is a most important arena of struggle, and if the representatives of the coalition parties do not participate in all sessions--then the government will have no prospect of serving out its full term.

The second lesson is that the coalition must formulate a single economic program, a program whose one goal is the good of the economy, the will to overcome inflation, and to achieve economic productivity and growth. If the parties see in the coalition agreement only an agreement to "divide the spoils" in which every group gets what is "coming to it" even if the economy is falling apart--the government will not hot be able to stand, at least not in the present structure of the Finance Committee.

The third lesson is for the opposition. If it really wants to return to power at some time, it must exploit the weakness of its opponent. MK Adi Amorai, coordinator of the Alignment faction on the Finance Committee, has been investing great effort to teach his colleagues this lesson. His success until now has been only partial, and the Alignment has yet to appoint a tenth member to its faction on the Finance Committee. MK Amorai has appointed a group of substitutes who regularly come to committee sessions when members are abroad. Yet, it occasionally happens that a member does not come to a committee session without getting himself a substitute. It even happens that a member will decide to leave in the middle of a session and go to the library to read a book. This happened at the last session, where the coalition succeeded in passing a resolution regarding the allocation of 4 million shekels for the Beth Ya'aqov Schools of the Agudah, because an Alignment member became bored and left to rest a bit.

In any case, it may be assumed that the opposition is not lying in ambush for the government in the Finance Committee on every issue. On issues important for the management of the country, it is certainly ready to lend support.

The vote of the opposition against the allocation for Kiryat Hayeled came only after it seemed to it that the government had breached an agreement and tied up in red tape allocations for secular educational and cultural institutions.

The turning of the Finance Committee into an arena of challenge between the opposition and the coalition is not to the detriment of the citizen. It is worth it that the tax payer feel that there is one body in the Knesset which takes seriously its parliamentary responsibility and even struggles to prevent excessive public expenditures.

The lesson is that to the extent that we closely follow the actions of the Finance Committee, and to the extent that its members feel the responsibility which is upon them, Israeli democracy will benefit.

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LIKUD MK ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH PLO

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "MK Zeigerman: Negotiations With PLO If It Recognizes Right of Israel To Exist In Peace and Security"]

[Text] MK Dror Zeigerman (Likud-Liberals) says that he believes that Israel must now invest a number of months in an effort to encourage Palestinian elements to take part in peace negotiations. If it becomes clear that this is not possible--and he suspects that this will be the case--then Israel must announce that if the PLO recognizes its right to exist in security and peace then it will conduct negotiations with the PLO. In fact, Zeigerman adopts the Yariv-Shem Tov formula in the matter of the Palestinians.

MK Zeigerman returned from a tour of the U.S. where he met persons from both political parties, leaders of the Jewish community, and heads of the pro-Jewish lobby. He was struck by the fact that Washington is presently in the throes of formulating a process to bring the PLO into negotiations. MK Zeigerman found that the U.S. is trying to use Saudi Arabia to achieve recognition of the PLO in Israel and the readiness of Israel to conduct negotiations with it. In his estimation, the visit of past president Richard Nixon in Saudi Arabia, and expressions by Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter on the need for negotiations with the PLO are a part of this effort.

MK Zeigerman is--as is well known--the first elected official of Likud who does not exclude the possibility of negotiations with the PLO. Zeigerman, who is a member of the Committee on Foreign and Security Affairs in the Knesset, proposes to discuss options of deployment in the face of developments in the U.S. He is also preparing a memorandum in this spirit with prime minister Menahem Begin.

Zeigerman believes that the prime minister's trip to the U.S. was a success, especially in the Senate, but difficulties were discovered in explaining current Israeli policy by means of the mass media. In choosing the next ambassador to the U.S., he said that it should be certain that he has the ability to make a good appearance on television in America.

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MILITARY SITUATION IN NORTH ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Oct 81 p 13

[Article by A. Shweitzer: "Partly Concerned Look to the North"]

[Text] The political eyes of Israe are turned to the south. That is the impression one gets in view of the activity surrounding the autonomy talks, and the Israeli effort to develop a maximum thrust towards normalization. But there is a certain momentary attraction to the south. Senior government officials in Israel are alert to the potential for trouble in the north, and to judge from a few indicators, they are ready to move in two alternative directions.

The first one is the military. Politically, the peace treaty with Egypt is built on negotiation, give and take: take Sinai, give Judea, Samaria and Gaza. If not, give some rest now in regard to what is involved. The military view has a different point: transfer of Sinai has to give Israel the possibility of actually avoiding the southern front so that the IDF can concentrate in the north (and perhaps the north-east). Indeed, on the northern front there have been some changes, some of them for the better.

The principal change is the exit of Iraq from Arab ranks. As long as the war in Iran persists, and as long as Iraq does not despair of military and political annexations resulting from this war, it is doubtful whether Syria--which is the axis for the organization of war against Israel in the North--will be able to take into account active Iraqi support. Likewise, it is doubtful whether Jordan would be more than a weak reed, from Damascus' point of view. It is true that in the Arab world, they play in anger and are pacified in an instant. But the danger of war against Israel is great, and Jordan is still not considered by the Syrian Ba'ath party to be an ally with Arab interests and loyalties.

In the matter of the deployment of forces, there has been no improvement on the Syrian side. Lebanon is still not properly under control. And as for the forces which are at the disposal of the PLO, even though they may be depended upon as cannon fodder in any war against Israel, Damascus knows that they would be lacking in weight in any full confrontation with Israel. The only area in which there has been a perceptible improvement is in relations with the USSR: Syria is the principal Soviet arm in the eastern Mediterranean basin. And Moscow appreciates this fact. But one may reasonably doubt Moscos'w desire to get involved in the wars initiated by its allies. They are operating in Syria apparently on the American model: They arm it in order to tie its hands and to keep it from acts of despair.

The beginning of wisdom--and Israel learned it anew and by force during the Yom Kippur War--is that in evaluating the future steps of the enemy, one must take into account his ability; intentions are a secondary view filled with doubt. Anyone who weighs what comes out of Damascus, or is impressed by what it publishes regarding Syrian army maneuvers, cannot doubt its hostile intentions regarding Israel. But ability, which is expressed not only in the number of armored forces and squadrons of modern planes, but in particular in strategic political deployment, cannot attribute too much to the rulers in Damascus. In other words, according to the strategic situation, for the present there is no danger to Israel from the north.

On its part, Israel did two things--an act and an omission--which signal to Syria that there is no need for war. One is the Israeli agreement to a cease fire in the north, which saved the Syrian ally from a smashing military defeat and prevented potential hostilities between the IDF and the Syrian army in Lebanon. The oversight was expressed in the failure to take a stand on the distribution of Israeli identity cards to the Druse in Golan, including the agreement to accept the return of them by those who had received them in the past. In this it is possible to perceive a signal--not for the first--that there is something to talk about regarding the Israeli holding of the Golan.

But there is basis to the belief that the Israeli moves will only achieve a nervous stalemate in the north. Syria is tied to the Soviet system--and although Moscow certainly does not want an outbreak of hostilities, it will also energetically oppose Syria's being cut off from it. And that would be the significance of Syria's coming to terms with Israel, which in the political notebook of the Kremlin is considered a satellite of the U.S. which does its bidding. It also seems that Israel does not have to be interested in the drawing of Syria to the American side--and therefore, it seems that a coming to terms between Israel and Syria, which would remove the shadow of war from the northern border, would be subordinate to American and Soviet influence to a regional settlement.

According to what has been said, it seems that for the present there is no danger of war in the north, but there is also no prospect of tranquility, as happened between Israel and Egypt. But there is a factor which could cause an outbreak, and that is the PLO. The organization is supposed to be controlled by Damascus, but it is doubtful if the obedience is complete. It is possible, without forcing the imagination, to suppose that Arafat would give the signal, either willingly or because of pressure from his colleagues, to renew firing on northern settlements from Lebanon, and if Israel would react as expected, the border could flare up--and if fighting broke out no one knows how and where it would end.

But the ignored factor is the U.S. According to reports published in the media, it is working very hard in Lebanon, with the limited goal of stabilizing the land of the cedars by strengthening the government there. But this effort will be expanded to include Syria and the PLO without reference to the Lebanese connection. To the extent that the goals of American policy will be more ambitious, so will the danger increase of shaking of the already shaky stability in the territory between Israel, Syria and Lebanon. But as in the case of PLO policy, Israel has only an indirect influence on American policy. Therefore, even though the constellation of basic givens is relatively comfortable, tension is also there.

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SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS OF MIDEASTERN JEWS ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14, 18, 20, 23 Sep 81

[Articles by 'Akiv'a 'Eldar]

[14 Sep 81 pp 9, 10]

[Excerpts] The largest waves of immigration to Israel came from North Africa, mainly from Morocco. The gap between North Africans and European or American immigrants is far deeper and wider than the gap between Mideastern Jews as a whole and European Jews as a whole. Professor Eizenstadt and other sociologists claim that you cannot generalize about Mideastern Jews. They point to the Moroccans as one of the principal sources of ethnic agitation directed against the "European establishment." The leaders of the Wadi Salib incidents, the black panther movements, the "Ohalim" and more recently Tami, were and are almost solely of Moroccan extraction. In order to understand their situation and therefore appreciate the tremendous progress they have made since their arrival in Israel, it is important to examine the roots of the Jewish settlement in North Africa, especially Morocco, in recent times.

The process of modernization, or frenchification in the language of the historian, reached Morocco 77 years after France withdrew support from Algeria and 38 years after the French brought their western influence with them to Tunis. Only in 1919 were the Moroccan Jews able to free themselves from the strict Muslim tenets and enjoy the conveniences of modern living brought by the French. At the time, their brothers in Algeria and, to a lesser degree in Tunis, were already "frenchified," educated and free from the symbols of traditional society which Moroccan Jews still adhere to.

Rich and Poor

Professor Emanuel Sivan of the Hebrew University, who specializes in the history of Islamic nations, explains that the French created a deep schism between the small Jewish elite (1/5 to 1/4 of the community) whose children studied in French schools and even assimilated, and the large majority who did not receive physical protection against the Muslims.

Yaron Tzur of the open university, a researcher studying the North African Jewish community, describes the relations between the poor masses and the wealthy minority: "The rich controlled the community. On the eve of the colonial period there was no

Rabbinical-spiritual leadership to balance this control. In Morocco, this ruling class began to draw away, alienate itself from, even exploit the poor. The rich held all the positions on the community council. They lived a European life style, involved in their businesses but charitable if only to satisfy social norms. There was an enormous gap between the two classes. There was almost no dialogue between them, no marriage vows." One could say there was real prejudice.

"With the setbacks of the French government in 1952," says Professor Sivan, "the Jews were faced with a decision. The frenchified minority left immediately. The independent professionals went to France. Until 1967 the bourgeois businessmen chose to remain in Morocco, thinking: We can work toward a new Morocco, bound by the agreement with France, if we can only free ourselves of the "Jewish Arab" image. There is documentation which indicates explicitly that the bourgeois Jews in Morocco said that emigration to Israel was good for the lower classes. Thus, the situation was such that one-third to 40 percent of the immigrants were a group which had been in transit from the villages to the outskirts of the cities and the ghettos. A third of these were Jews from the Atlas Mountains, i.e., more than two-thirds of the Moroccan immigrants during the 1950's came from the lowest strata of the Jewish community."

The elite break away

Of course, there were exceptions, intellectuals and bourgeois zionists, many of whom strank from the difficulties of absorbtion and subsequently left Israel. However, this was actually a form of internal selection among the North African Jews when the State of Israel had decided (not without serious apprehensions) to accept any Jew--the sick, the old, the handicapped--and share with each the meager offerings as well as the hard labor pains of the new country.

The psychologist Dr Kalman Benyamini who during the 1950's dealt with the absorbtion of North African children arriving in France, tells how: "The children were afraid to sleep on beds. They had slept on the floor their whole life and had never seen a bed. Many were suffering from trachoma and we had to explain the use of silverware and toothbrushes." Professor Moshe Lisk does not mince words when he declares that, "The Moroccan immigrants of the 1950's arrived without their elite which had cruelly abandoned them. The leaders wanted to be rid of them and had moved to France. All the energy of the Zionist enterprise was directed toward the North African immigration, in a supreme effort to get most of the Jews out. The older residents of Israel were uneasy about the customs and manners which sprang up during the Mandate period. Although they may have mistaken the shadows of the mountains for the mountains themselves, their fears were not completely unrealistic. There was a need to teach these immigrants to read and write, to treat chronic illnesses and to instruct them in basic hygiene."

Further, in the span of one generation the Moroccan community experienced a double crisis, the result of the modernization process which was part of the move from village to big city--westernization and urbanization. Later, when they immigrated to Israel and were dispersed among various development towns, it was as if they were thrust back to the periphery.

Yemen and Bulgaria Compared With Morocco

Professor Eizenstadt tells about meeting Moroccan leaders who had emigrated to France and Canada at a conference on the social situation in Israel. "These absentee leaders asked me why there was ethnic prejudice in Israel. I told them, 'Because you didn't come. If you had come, things would have been different, even in the eyes of those for whom you speak.' From this we can learn," says Professor Eizenstadt, "about one of the important problems in the absorbtion of Moroccan immigrants." He points out some of the similarities between the Yemenite and Bulgarian immigrants, who showed more promise for success at the outset. Within both groups, the community and the family were better established prior to their immigration to Israel. Further, 90 percent or more immigrated to Israel along with their leaders and their intelligensia. The community supported its weaker members. The Bulgarians were educated and in Yemen there was a strong tradition which encouraged traditional learning, achievement, the desire to survive and emotional self-confidence. These combined with community and family roots were excellent incentives for success. The Yemenite Jews were a closed, persecuted minority on the eve of their emigration. The Bulgarians, on the other hand, had been accepted in the Ottoman society. But the common denominator between both groups was that they had no problem of identity. To be a Jew was not a problem which bothered the Bulgarian or the Yemenite Jews.

Of course, these communities had their problems. As in any community there were weak elements. While the Bulgarian immigrants' European education won them preference over the Yemenite immigrants with respect to professional placements, both groups had a strong ability to deal with the new realities which they confronted in Israel.

The situation for the Morrocan Jews was different: Upheavals had affected their identity as Jews in Morocco and their leaders had fled to France or Canada, leaving the community in a state of deterioration. "The Rabbinical leadership that arrived in Israel was traditional and had insisted on settling in Israel from the beginning of the emigration. The emphasis on education had already been weakened in the Moroccan ghetto. They were a transient society, riddled with crises, arriving with a great burden," said Eizenstadt.

Differing environmental conditions, traditions, leadership and most important, political-historical developments gave the Iraqi, Bulgarian and Algerian immigrants a significant objective advantage over their Moroccan brothers--from the time they arrived at the port. Immigration from the Asian countries had preceded the Moroccan immigration by a few years, but it was enough to give the former a certain advantage in terms of having acquired positions and political offices which the more established Europeans had not yet grabbed up (or positions they saw fit to set aside for Mideastern Jews).

The last to arrive, however, did benefit from the lessons learned by mistakes made in the absorbtion of the first waves of immigrants. We cannot, therefore, generalize about the problems of Mideastern Jews, although we may speak of "the Moroccan problem," this being the largest ethnic community in Israel and the one with the most serious and traumatic problems, far greater than those of Yemenite, Iraqi, Tunisian or Algerian immigrants.

[18 Sep 81 pp 15, 18]

[Excerpts] A young kibbutznik in dusty shorts led me to the huge asphalt plant. A Lebanese worker whom we had disturbed during lunch called out to Rafi Peretz, a member of the salaried workers committee at the Kfar-Gil'adi quarries. Rafi was very angry that day. He didn't even hear the bothersome calls emanating from his walkie-talkie as he spoke at length about a supervisor who had conspired against him. Someone had falsely accused him of stealing a crate of grapes from the kibbutz vineyard. The police were called in and Rafi was insulted. The complaint was dropped and apologies were made.

This time, I thought to myself, I've come to the right place. Rafi from Qiriyat Shemona is of Moroccan descent. The kibbutzniks are of European extraction. He is a salaried worker, they are his employers. Put it all together and you have a promising environment for feelings of ethnic and class prejudice. Rafi has lived close to such feelings almost since his arrival in Israel in 1961, as a youth of 14. He worked first in the fields of this kibbutz and after 5 years moved into the quarry. Why didn't he join the kibbutz? "They've suggested it, but I'm an only son, religious parents, it's hard." He adds, "Actually, I'm not sure if they accept Moroccans." The following day, Sylvie, a Moroccan immigrant from a family of 12 and a graduate of the university, said: "I have no complaints about the kibbutzes, although they have the best. If I wanted I could be accepted with open arms on any kibbutz." Even when it comes to feelings, one must beware of stereotyping.

Rafi's father was a cloth vendor in Morocco. When he arrived here Rafi was advised to continue his studies to be a tinsmith which he had begun in an ORT school in Casablanca. But it didn't work out. "I had to help my father out, so I went to work."

After I had cooled off a little in the airconditioned control room of the asphalt plant, Rafi took me out into the heat and dust of the quarry. He wanted to show me the pitiful storage rooms used as a lunch room by the day laborers. On the way, I heard his monologue on the European kibbutz/Mideastern workers relations. "You won't find any of them working in the quarry. They wouldn't work in this dust. I don't know if it's coincidence, but it's a fact. It's true what they say about the kibbutzes giving blacks a raw deal. Look, to study in the school at Kfar-Blum you have to pay a high fee. Why shouldn't their children study with our children in Qiriyat Shemona? I have friends on the kibbutz, but I don't visit them. Even when they invite us to a kibbutz party, they don't bother to find out if we have transportation. Maybe they're just being polite when they invite us. A month before the elections, the Kibbutzniks started coming to Qiriyat Shemona. All of a sudden they began to take an interest in us. Since the elections, we haven't seen them. It's true that they were insulted by the caricature of the monster we portrayed them as. I don't blame them for that."

Meanwhile, we had arrived at the storage room. Rafi opened the door and pointed to a small, dark room with a formica table and a few office chairs. He said that for several months now the committee had been asking for a "human" dining room, but the kibbutz refused to allocate funds for that purpose. "Kfar-Gil'adi has developed at the expense of workers from Qiriyat Shemona. How do you think they

bought all their trucks?" Rafi continues without anger but with bitterness, "During the elections the kibbutzes employed people with cars who were known Likud supporters. I have always been and will always be an Alignment man, so I refused to work during the elections. That makes them angry and they want to get back at me."

Group Humiliation

Rafi explained that the supervisors at the quarry fired drivers from Qiriyat Shemona and hired Arab drivers in their stead. Before we parted, Rafi added a few words that echoed in my ears on the way back to Qiriyat Shemona--"It's not like it used to be. Today every kibbutznik has a color TV, and they don't wear khaki anymore. And if they don't have a car, they don't go to work."

It reminded me of what I had heard one Friday evening on Kibbutz Nahal-Oz, from one of the woman members who had worked for the Alignment during the campaign, in a development town in the south. "We never succeeded to develop a feeling of trust. The people of Ofakim told me that we (the kibbutzniks) just splashed around in the pool all day. Believe me, my husband works 12 hours every day and we're lucky if we get to the pool on Saturdays. All week it's deserted." That same evening, I saw Knesset member Abraham Katz-Oz sweating in the kitchen. Rafi Peretz has a color TV (if that means anything). He bought it at a special sale conducted by the kibbutz for workers from Qiriyat Shemona. My friend from Nahal-Oz (where they have family sleeping arrangements) doesn't have a color television in the kibbutz living quarters, which is smaller than any apartment designated for young couples in Qiriyat Shemona.

Rafi Peretz and many other workers in Kibbutz industries will continue to complain about prejudice. They'll talk about it even when the listener is not a journalist whose ears they're filling with what they think he expects to hear. When they're talking about feelings the decisive facts related to me by Ehud Becker (son of German parents, former officer in the IDF), quarry supervisor at Kfar-Gil'adi, are of little importance: 40 percent of the day laborers in Qiriyat Shemona are employed by regional industries on kibbutzes in the Gaililee. Neither can survive without the other, without this give and take relationship. More salaried workers are to be found in management positions at the quarry than kibbutz members. A dining room had been set up at great expense for the day laborers, but was eliminated when they indicated they would rather receive monetary compensation for meals. Now, there are plans to rebuild it, due to renewed demands.

Ehud Becker ended our conversation by saying: I visit these workers in Qiriyat Shemona, and I wish I could reach their standard of living, at least as far as material goods. Each of our kibbutz members receives 8,000 shekels annually to buy furniture, books, records and the rest of his personal needs.

This feeling of ethnic discrimination does not prevail among those who feel deprived for other reasons, none of which have anything to do with ethnicity. Shortly before I left for the Kfar-Gil'adi quarry, I heard Amnon Shamosh, the author from kibbutz Ma'ayan-Baruch, use the phrase "group humiliation." He admits that for years he paid no attention to the ethnic problem. He didn't feel prejudice on the kibbutz and he wasn't hurt except when one critic or another ignored his works.

Now he is contrite. "I alienated myself out of the naive belief that a generation would pass and the matter would be resolved. As it turns out, time does not heal all wounds and the state does not mend all tears. Everyone is nonetheless progressing nicely, although the weak progress more slowly and the gap is becoming ever wider."

Shamosh denies the divisive process which occurred among Moroccan Jews and left, in its aftermath, the majority of the rich and educated in France and the large majority of the poor and weak in Israel. "If North African Jews really felt they were immigrating to Israel to stay, they would have better assimilated here. France gave them more in terms of recognition and self-esteem. In France they felt taller. These Jews are lovers of Zion, not lovers of Zionists." Perhaps this explains the harsh comments of a Zionist kibbutznik who often speaks at meetings in homes in Qiriyat Shemona, urging the Moroccan immigrants to vote for that party which in their opinion has been more responsible for discrimination than anything else.

He Who Gives Shall Receive

When speaking of the hostile relations between Mideastern Jews from Qiriyat Shemona and kibbutz members, who fall into the "Ashkenazi" category, Shamosh takes an unusual stand. He considers this problem to be within the realm of the emotional-cultural. "It's one of the ironies of fate, because if there's anywhere that European Jews perform 'dirty work' it's here on the kibbutz. As far as the standard of living, they don't lack anything in Qiriyat Shemona.

Their standard of living is no lower than ours. When they were in transit camps, on Kibbutz Ma'ayan-Baruch two families shared one room with no flooring, just sand on the ground. A masonite board separated them and each couple received a chair, a bed and a small table. Since then things have improved on the kibbutz, and in Qiriyat Shemona, too. Don't let them tell you otherwise."

Shamosh is ready to accuse the kibbutz of ideological fanaticism, of a "holier than thou" attitude and denial of the need of the Mideastern immigrants to preserve their patriarchal tradition, which prevented them from assimilating on the kibbutz. He adds, "They claim that in Qiriyat Shemona there are no properly equipped shelters while on the kibbutzes in the region the shelters are luxurious. You should know that on Ma'ayan-Baruch we don't have a single shelter with running water or plumbing. In a 10-day period more shells fell on Kfar-Gil'adi than have fallen on Qiriyat Shemona since it was built. The problem is psychological, it's the difference between someone who settled of his own will and someone who had no choice and feels like no one cares. Philanthropy won't help. They need to work on getting good teachers out here." I was reminded of the teacher, Sylvie, from Qiriyat Shemona, who told me, "Our high school is known throughout the country for its achievements."

Shamosh angrily attacks the politicians, including Ra'anan Nayim from his own party ("We know that type well"), who exploit the natural feelings of antagonism between the urban settlements and the rural ones in the district, blowing them up for their own political purposes. He blames the kibbutzes for being too attached to the old historical ideals of Mapai with their membership cards. The kibbutzes expected the day laborers to support the Alignment. They felt the workers owed it to them.

The Kibbutznik from Halb criticizes the Israeli society for now knowing how to integrate the Mideastern Jews. But when there is mention of the ugly label "dealers in black men, moshavniks and laborers," which has recently been used in reference to the kibbutzes, he gets his back up "like an Ashkenazi": "the kibbutz gave for many years, and he who gives shall receive. When the nation needed agriculture, the kibbutz invested everything in the agricultural sector. When the country wanted to develop industry, the kibbutz gave its all to industry. Who would dare to ignore the sweat and toil of these settlers or the volunteers who helped in the transit camps, despite all the difficulties they had to confront. I want no man's thanks, but let them not cast stones. The kibbutzniks did not run from enemy fire. Now, they're being accused of everything. The kibbutz movement is struggling for its existence and for the right--in order to continue to exist--to teach its children according to the values and ideologies it chooses to maintain. If they force us to send our children to schools in Qiriyat Shemona, the children will leave the kibbutz and the entire nation will be damaged."

Our conversation was coming to a close and Shamosh from Halb, author, educator, kibbutz member, went on to perform his daily tour of duty in the modest dining room at Ma'ayan-Baruch. It's a tragic story of a man caught in the middle, I thought as I walked with him across the kibbutz grounds. What must be going on in the soul of a man who lives with the image of "prejudice against Mideastern immigrants" but opposes the label of "dealers in black men" as it has been applied to the last vestiges of the pioneer movement.

[20 Sep 81 pp 9, 13]

[Excerpts] From the steps of Sylvie Partok's home in the two story development, I could see the sweaty soldiers taking down the wood stage just outside the cultural center in Qiriyat Shemona. That week, various artists had performed there, having volunteered to soothe somewhat the bitterness, frustration and alienation which had intensified with the fear of the Katyusha shells. They told me Sylvie was a good person to speak with. Her son was weaned to the sound of shrieking shells. There is no shelter in her building and she is from a Moroccan family with many children. All this would combine to tell a good story about prejudice.

"Ethnic prejudice? I never thought of it that way, not at the uni ersity and not in the school where I'm assistant-principal." This young, well-groomed woman surprised me with her answer as she laid a cup of coffee down on the table saying: "Drink. It's good Moroccan coffee."

"The Israeli stereotypes make me angry. Why do they raise their eyebrows when they hear I'm a university graduate and I don't speak with a foreign accent? They always say things like, What, really? You can't be Moroccan! Now that hurts."

Sylvie was 3 when she immigrated with her parents and eight brothers and sisters to Israel in 1956. The tenth daughter, today an art student at Haifa Uniersity, was born in Qiriyat Shemona. Three sisters serve in the army as first lieutenants. "The rest also received an education, thank God, and we are all well established."

Sylvie didn't need the encouragement of experts from Tel Aviv, nor did she need the services of the social worker or other representatives of the patron establishment who were rushed to Qiriyat Shemona after the bombings. "Why me?" asked Sylvie

during the course of our conversation. "There are dozens of others like me. And anyway, what are they talking about these last few years? I'm invited to more weddings between Ashkenazis and Moroccans than weddings where the bride and groom are both from the same ethnic background. My sister married an Ashkenazi. His parents, from Karmel, were in a state of depression at first. Now they love her."

Qiriyat Shemona and 'Alma

I remembered Sylvie's words that night when I was speaking with a community worker who interacts with immigrant families on the Har-Meiron settlements. We wondered why the people of Moshav 'Alma are so tied to the way of life they brought with them from Kfar Nidah in Libya (by the way, as was true for the Moroccan community, the leaders of the Libyan Jewish community advised "the people" to emigrate to Israel, while they themselves chose Italy).

The community worker, who chose to remain anonymous, explained that the social workers were slowly being accepted into peoples' homes, and were succeeding to teach the mothers the importance of hygiene, toys and attention to infants. Then comes the next baby and the "big brother" becomes the charge of the eldest. The mother can't get away from Hebrew lessons or for any basic training organized by the local council. She contents herself with television programs, which she doesn't always understand (there are 250,000 adults in Israel who have difficulty understanding the Hebrew spoken on radio and television). The children come home from school and there's no one to answer the questions which come up while they're doing their homework. A child gets to the eighth grade and finds himself among the 80 out of a total of 300 elementary school graduates in the area who have great difficulty reading and writing Hebrew (this based on a study conducted 2 years ago). Then come the statisticians who count these children in order to demonstrate the educational, income and professional status gaps between Asian/African immigrants and European/American immigrants.

The story of Moshav 'Alma, like the story of Sylvie from Qiriyat Shemona, can tell us little about the problem of ethnic prejudice in general terms. The large majority of those considered "targets of discrimination" lie midway on the road between the educated young woman from Qiriyat Shemona and the woman in traditional Libyan dress from Moshav 'Alma who can't read or write. It reminds me of the saying: You can lead a horse to water but you can't make him drink. Both Sylvie and the woman from 'Alma ostensibly walked the same long road in order to drink the same water. It took courage but Sylvie got there and drank her share. Most of the Moroccan immigrants, however, are blocked somewhere along the way. They were told that everyone is equal ("the integration of exiles") but they were weaker and their strength did not suffice to make it the whole way. When the older residents offered to help and advise them, they said: "We are trying to find our own solution. Who wants to live off charity? We want to be strong and established, too."

All the significant studies conducted in Israel on the advancement of the underprivileged point out (and rightfully so) that discrimination in favor of the Mid-eastern Jews lies in the allocation of resources within the educational system. This is a marginal factor, however, compared with the tremendous importance of motivation, incentives for achievement and educational level (similar studies in the United States have arrived at similar conclusions). With all this, Moroccan Jews were lucky to have gotten to Israel, although for historical and sociological

reasons they seem to recognize this less than European Jews and even less than their brothers from Algeria, Iraq and Yemen, Most of those who were rich and educated in Morocco chose to go to France and, of course, were more successful there than their brothers in Israel.

Moroccan Immigrants Versus Iraqi Immigrants

I thought it would be interesting to compare the achievements of the Iraqi immigrants with those of Moroccans. Since I could not find these statistics broken down, I compared their achievements with statistics for the total population of Asian/African immigrants. The Iraqis and their children, it appears, are the second largest group of immigrants from a Mideastern country (266,000), are constantly improving their situation and have basically made a place for themselves in most areas of Israeli life. If someone were to claim that the Iraqis benefited from reverse discrimination, he should look at the table presented below which was published in pamphlets by the Central Bureau for Social Statistics under the title Israel Society--1980.

Indicators of Educational Differences--a comparison between sectors of select population groups, according to academic year (including those with minimal writing ability)

	1961	1978
Jews versus non-Jews	43	35
Children born in Israel to parents of Asian/African descent compared with children born in Asia and Africa	33	34
Children born in Israel to parents of European/American descent compared with children born in Europe and America	33	29

The indicator expresses, for example, a scale differentiating Jews from Arabs. If both groups had absolutely identical educational levels, the measurement of difference would be 0. If both groups were completely unequal, the indicator would be 100. The scale includes all members of the group with sufficient education to write a simple sentence. Upon examining the table it becomes clear that Israeli Arabs are closing the educational gap which exists between them and the Jewish population, i.e., the level of education improved significantly. On the other hand, there was almost no positive change in the educational level of Israeli-born children with parents of Mideastern descent. The most surprising statistic is the educational level of Israeli-born children of Asian and African descent. Here the level did not improve even when compared with the level of those educated in their countries of origin. And these are countries whose educational systems are considered inferior to the Israeli system. Will someone dare to say that Israeli Arabs benefit from reverse discrimination insofar as the allocation of national resources? An examination of data on housing conditions in Israel reveals that there was discrimination toward the Arab population, but not in a positive direction. The conclusion is that resources are not the decisive factor.

However, one might assume that some Mideastern Jews from lower educational and economic sectors would improve their situations if they were not so far removed from major population centers. Poor planning of settlements arranged in haste during the 1950's caused no small degree of tension in the Israeli society. The "Ashkenazi" pioneer waves had ceased and the administration could only send the less advantaged groups from North Africa to the development towns and border settlements (including Jerusalem). Sociological studies point to the fact that distance from a big city significantly decreases the chances of social mobility. The mistake was, according to Professor Lisk, "The establishment of small towns which do not allow for the evolution of a proper educational, professional or economic foundation. They put up one large textile factory in the town and when that collapeses, the whole town is plunged into a crisis."

This distance fosters alienation. The traumatic transition into a modern, achievement-oriented society broke down the patriarchal framework. The boys earned and learned more than their fathers. Women went to work (Professor Lisk: "And what should we have done? Should we have cultivated the idea that women belong in the kitchen, that the young son should join the father in relief work, and especially that the son should not earn more than his father? It is true that uprooting people is a terrible thing, but everything had to be done so quickly.").

The volunteer spirit of the older settlements had all but disappeared. The depression and the military tension left the work of absorbtion in the hands of the bureaucrats who tend to look down upon those in need of their services--and this is true not just in Israel. True, if there had been a few more idealists like Luba Eli'av, everything might have been a little different.

The concept of Hevel Lachish--a federation of homogeneous communities--is the fruit of devoted thought and effort on the part of a man who opened his heart and mind to the immigrants. Political appointees do not act that way. Administrators prefer to use foolish slogans like "One hundred lira for the tenth child," which only encourages poor families to have too many children, even if they cannot provide them with the tools they need to make a place for themselves in modern society. From here it's a short step to solutions like making a Yemenite the Chief of Staff, which only emphasizes the feeling of discrimination.

The older immigrants are beginning to better understand "What's good for them," and have learned to exploit the gap between them and the "old horses" in more areas. The majority, I gather from numerous conversations with Mideastern Jews, do not want to shoot the old horses and break their common helplessness.

[23 Sep 81 p 9]

[Excerpts] I wanted to begin this final installment of the series with a list of suggestions--lessons learned from positive experiences and from mistakes. I wanted to write that despite everything, the Mideastern Jews have come a long way in Israel and should not look back in anger. I wanted to say in summation that the gaps in the standard of living and education are continuing to close up, that time and inter-ethnic marriage will do their own.

That's what I thought last Saturday night, a long night spent with Dudu Elharar. First Dudu wrote a letter to the editor. Then he asked a common friend to meet us

in order to talk about the series. We sat in the home of Alex Anski in Jerusalem. Dudu sipped 'ar'ak, I sipped wine. We dipped pita bread in sesame paste and hot peppers. For 6 hours we discussed theater, music, people, and of course, ethnicity. Dudu told how he rebelled against his father who told him: "Son, we were made to serve them. We have to do everything we can to make them happy, and that's that." We agreed that it is wrong for educators, although they have good intentions, to decide what culture to bring to the development towns. We agreed, too, that the special Mimuna celebrations are just part of the syndrome of businessmen exploiting their ethnicity and using their customs for personal gain.

Dudu Elharar, who was born to a middle class family in Morocco, is not the kind of person who classifies people according to where they came from. The actor-singer-producer, one of the more prominent in Israel, spoke candidly, but lovingly, about his father who refused to send him to Hertzelia high school. He told how his father had slammed the door in the face of the principal who had come to talk to him about it, and how he had given Dudu a threatening look when he had asked for a guitar. Dudu does not try to blame anyone. Instead he gets into his air-conditioned American car and visits the jails--where he found Shoshi (who sings the song "Her Faults")--and looks for new directions. He is not always successful. Dudu does not see the world in black and white. He tells with disappointment about a released prisoner whom he gave some money and who went right to buy drugs. But Dudu's visits--"one of ours"--to the cells are immensely more beneficial than the efforts of the social workers or the protests of the various "black panther" type groups.

Dudu is a success story. He doesn't have a stand on line at the bank. But he refuses to fill out forms on which you must list your country of birth, or that of your father. Late at night, as he dropped us back at our homes, he said quietly, "Despite everything, I feel small." We tried to understand why. Dudu Elharar, a talented artist and a successful impresario, who hasn't felt discrimination for years, feels inferior. Why? Dudu didn't have an answer.

Where did we go wrong? It's true that our Ashkenazi parents looked down on Dudu's parents and talked about them in stereotypes. It's true that the older residents were the first to get the better places. But what other country in the world took in so many people in such a short, hard time? We didn't turn away the sick, the old or the young. We gave homes and land to whole communities whose leaders had abandoned them. The little that we had, we shared. Everyone fought together and the newer immigrants finished the work of the early pioneer waves--although they may not have liked it--when that immigration had been cut off. It's true that the lower classes are still overflowing with Moroccans, but one should not forget that less than 30 years ago most of the Mideastern immigrants did not realize the importance of an education in an achievement-oriented society, and where there was no awareness, resources were of no help. Even today, their countries of origin have not caught up with the progress of western culture.

This week, an educated reader of Iraqi descent who had grown up in Musrara, called up to say: "Tell the Ashkenazis to stop apologizing already. I'm from a poor family with eight children and we all studied and became successful, with the help of our own will power and, of all things, the help given us by Ashkenazis. Someone has to stop Dr Shimon Shetrit. He has to stop preaching reverse discrimination. We don't need it. It's insulting. For a long time now it's been easier for a Mideastern student at the university."

The solution for this feeling of inferiority or discrimination does not lie in a more equal but mechanical distribution of resources and power. Would Dudu Elharar feel better if another three top officers in the police department or another ten knesset members were from Morocco? Did the addition of Ra'anan Nayim, Yakov Gil and Rafi 'Edri to the Alignment's list and the advancement of Shoshana Arbeli-Almozalino draw support from the Mideastern Jews for the party? Did the appointment of Yitzhak Navon to the presidency reduce the feeling of deprivation?

It seems as though the Jewish people were not graced with a full measure of tolerance and patience. The Spanish who were the old settlers in Israel, fought the new Ashkenazis and refused to share authority with them or give them their daughters in marriage. The first waves of immigrants from Russia looked down upon their brothers from Poland who arrived shortly afterward. The Poles depreciated the German immigrants who held the Yemenites in contempt. And he has not heard a Moroccan immigrant talk about an immigrant from Gruzia who doesn't know what stereotyping is.

As long as there are separate Mideastern and Hassidic song festivals, instead of one Israeli song festival, people will continue to feel inferior. And we shouldn't be surprised if even "successful" men, according to the criteria of modern society, feel that way. We can't justify ourselves by quoting statistics which attest to the closing gap between ethnic groups. As Professor Eizenstadt told me, he who is not aware of the importance of a higher education in modern society will not claim that his children were ruined by the entrance exams for the university. These kinds of claims, which have been heard for the last few years from Mideastern Jews, only prove the country's success in assimilating large groups of immigrants from what is generally called "traditional societies" into the framework of the modern era. We've been trapped in a strange bind--the more advanced the Mideastern Jews become, the more we'll hear about deprivation and discrimination, from a broader population.

It's important to explain, however, that if discrimination exists against one group or another, there was no malice aforethought. It is also important to point out the objective factors contributing to such gaps, still largely due to the "imported gap." However, as long as institutions provide forms with a square for "country of father's birth," and as long as people still raise their eyebrows in surprise when they meet a successful Moroccan, inter-ethnic tensions will continue to exist.

This week a Moroccan friend who had never before spoken about ethnic prejudice asked me, "Why should Nola Chelton produce a play about a home for battered women wherein all the women spoke with Moroccan accents?" She added angrily, "Do only Moroccan men beat their Moroccan wives?"

We need an educational system that promotes tolerance and refraint from stereotyping, not the hypocrisy written in history books. We need to exploit the opportunities we have for cross-fertilization of the best of all those cultures which have gathered here, as opposed to creating a mystique surrounding certain arcane cultures. And we should have political representation based on ability, not ethnic parties. Perhaps all this would make you feel taller, dear Dudu.

9811
CSO: 4423/14

NEW MEDICAL CHEMICALS DEVELOPED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 18 Oct 81 p 18

[Article: "Universtiy of Tel Aviv Develops Substitute Materials for Radioactive Trace Elements"]

[Text] At an Israeli-German scientific symposium on organic chemistry, held recently at the University of Tel Aviv, reports were made on a new method for synthesizing chemical materials. Participating in the symposium were scientists from the University of Heidelberg in Germany and from institutions of higher learning in Israel. Reports were also made on materials which can replace radioactive trace elements used today in medical diagnosis. This was reported in the last issue of UNIVERSITY, the monthly journal of the University of Tel Aviv.

A new method of synthesizing chemical materials used as components in medicines and cosmetics was presented by Dr Shimon Schmelzer of the Department of Chemistry of the University of Tel Aviv. He is currently spending a sabbatical year at the University of Heidelberg. The lecturer explained that the new method of synthesis is much more rapid than older methods, and is also cheaper. It is possible that this new method of synthesis will be effective in the production of a certain type of ketones (a group of organic compositions) which serve as important components in anti-cancer medicines.

The work of Prof Edward Kosover of the Department of Chemistry of the University of Tel Aviv, who was one of the symposium organizers, and Dr Annette Radkovski of the University of Tel Aviv demonstrated the new method of synthesizing materials having a fluorescent quality. These materials emit light when they are illuminated, and they can serve as a substitute for radioactive trace elements in medical diagnosis: after being injected into the body, they are absorbed into the blood, and by tracking their movement throughout the body one can discover possible blockages in blood vessels, and the like. The placement of fluorescent materials is much simpler and cheaper than the placement of radioactive elements. In addition, there is no danger to the body, in contrast to the danger caused by radioactive trace elements.

Prof Yoel Kashman of the University of Tel Aviv lectured on sea metabolites in the Red Sea. The metabolites are materials which are produced in the process of material exchange in living creatures. There are certain metabolites which have a use in the production of medicines, and in industry. The research of Dr Kashman deals with the metabolites of coral, sponges, and other creatures of the Red Sea. In the past, metabolites have been discovered in these creatures which are similar in composition to prostoglands, which are used in medicine to accelerate childbirth.

7075
CSO: 4423/40

BRIEFS

ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY STATISTICS--The total output of the electormics industry in Israel amounts to $800 million per year. This was reported by the chairman of the Union of Electromics Industries in Israel, Elisha Shakhmon, in an interview which was published in TAGLIT, the supplement on research and technology appearing today in MA'ARIV. Mr Shakhmon notes that electronics is an industry rich in knowhow, in which a third of the work force employed is professional. Close to half of its production is earmarked for export, and its added value is high, reaching 65 percent. In recent years, the electronics industry in Israel has developed a wide variety of products, including wireless and line communication devices, medical electronics, computers, industrial control, and electromic components. Surveys of the electronic branch presented in the last issue of TAGLIT include the development of a chip at Intel in Haifa. The chip (a piece of silicon one-third of a millimeter thick) contains 70,000 transistors. This computer unit is able to execute 50,000 actions squared, or 10,000 log second. This chip serves as the electronic "brain"in advanced computers. Work is currently being done to develop the next generation of chips which will contain 250,000 transistors. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Oct 81 p 1] 7075

IDF APPOINTMENT--Col Uri Or is about to be appointed Chief of Central Command, in place of Brig Gen Moshe Levi who is going on leave before being appointed as deputy Chief of Staff and head on Intelligence Branch. Col Or will be promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Col Or is 42 years old, and is considered among the best and most talented of officers in armor of the IDF. He has proven his ability in war as a combat officer. During the Six-Day War he was commander of a patrol unit of Unit 7, which breached the Egyptian lines in the region of Rafiah and Haji-Radi, and which became famous for its daring. Later he was an officer in the intelligence branch of the unit; a bridage commander during the War of Attrition; participated in many clashes; commanded an officers course in armor for the IDF; and spent a year of advanced study at Fort Knox in the U.S. During the Yom Kippur War he was the commander of a reserve armored unit which fought in the Golan Heights, and he distinguished himself in severe combat. After the war, he was appointed commander of Unit 7, during the days of the War of Attrition in the salient. Later he was promoted to colonel and commanded an armored force in the north. During the Litani Campaign he commanded a multi-force unit. Two years ago he was appointed chief of staff of the Central Command, with the intention of later appointing him chief of the command. Col Or was born at Moshav Kfar Haim in the Hefer Valley, is married, and is the father of three children. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Oct 81 p 1] 7075

HOUSING CONSTRUCTION--The government will build 10,000 rental units each year. This was reported last night by Minister of Economy Ya'aqov Meridor, at the dedication of Eliahu House in Tel Aviv. Minister Meridor called upon banks and insurance companies to invest in rental housing. Minister Meridor said that within the next 5 years most of the industrial equipment of factories in Israel would be replaced with more modern equipment. Deputy Finance Minister Haim Kaufman said that the possibility should be studied of enabling insurance companies to release additional parts of their reserves for free investment. Today, insurance companies are required to invest 90 percent of their reserves in government notes. Each year they are permitted to invest only 15 percent of their accumulation in other investments, but in general they are prevented from doing this. The deputy minister believes that companies should be permitted to invest larger amounts in investments determined by the government. Attending the dedication of Eliahu House were ministers, members of Knesset, the mayor of Tel Aviv Mr Shlomo Lahat, and leaders of the financial community. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Oct 81 p 2] 7075

STATISTICS ON IRAQI JEWS--Among students of Iraqi descent, 55 percent of those who took matriculation exams in 1966 passed. Three years later, the percentage fell to 46. During the same period the success rate on matriculation exams among Asian/African candidates as a whole fell from 60 to 58 percent. Those of Iraqi extraction were on a par with their European/American counterparts insofar as their improvement rate on the exams. Despite their positive contribution to the group statistics, the curve for the entire Asian/African population showed a negative direction. In 1961, 57 percent of the Iraqis in Israel spoke Hebrew, compared with 54 percent for the total population of African extraction. This was even higher than the percentage of Hebrew speakers among residents of Europe[illegible]American descent (55.1). In 1973, Iraqis held 5.9 percent of the senior ci[illegible]rvice positions, although senior positions constitute only 4.4 percent of [illegible] civil service jobs. In 1969, 15 percent of the certified bookkeepers in the nation were Iraqis, while Asian/Africans as a whole accounted for only 7 percent (excluding Iraqis). Of those Iraqis on the executive board of the Histadrut, 61.8 percent hold senior positions, compared with 40.6 percent for the total population of Asians and Africans (including Iraqis). Among all members on the executive board, 54 percent held positions at this level. Iraqis have also succeeded to gain upper echelon positions in the IDF (mainly in the intelligence branch and the police). There are eight judges of Iraqi extraction, most in the High Court of Justice. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Sep 81 p 9] 9811

CSO: 4423/14

U.S.-ISRAELI COOPERATION AGREEMENT SEEN AS THREAT

JN020725 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 0515 GMT 2 Dec 81

[Text] Under the headline "The Strategic Cooperation Between Washington and Tel Aviv," today's AL-DUSTUR writes: The strategic cooperation agreement signed by the United States and Israel is a serious development which will have negative dimensions and grave consequences on the region's future. It will also crumble hopes of the possibility of achieving peace and stability in this turbid part of the world.

The strategic cooperation document signed by the U.S. and Israeli defense ministers makes Tel Aviv a partner in drawing up the U.S. political and military strategy in the Middle East region, which will give Israel every chance and right to interfere in the Arab world affairs, something which is rejected by all the Arabs.

Despite Washington's bias in favour of Israel and its commitment to protect and supply Israel with funds and weapons, the strategic cooperation agreement gives Israel a written document which forces the United States to continue its imbalanced policy and obliges it to support Israel's aggressive policy against the Palestinian people and the Arab countries. What doubles the dangers of this agreement is that the storing of sophisticated weapons and military equipment in Israel under the pretext of confronting the Soviet danger leads the region to the hotbed of international conflict and provides the Zionist entity with further military power, in addition to Israel's seeking protection under the U.S. umbrella in implementation of the strategic cooperation agreement.

Washington's attempt to reassure the Arab countries that this agreement is not directed against them, but against the Soviet danger in the region arouses concern rather than reassurance because to focus attention on an imaginary danger aims at distracting attention from the real danger threatening the entire region, that is, the standing Israeli danger as is daily materialized in the establishment of further settlements, confiscation of Arab lands and provocation of this or that state.

What calls for concern and requires further precaution and alertness is that the signing of the strategic cooperation agreement between Washington and Tel Aviv comes at a time when the Arab ranks are split, which makes the Arabs less capable of confronting these grave developments, which Israel is playing down by trying to create a political crisis over the strategic cooperation agreement.

It goes without saying that the Arabs' only option is to quickly unite their ranks and rebuild solidarity on sound and solid bases so that they can confront all developments and repulse all challenges and plots.

CSO: 4404/166

BRIEFS

STEADFASTNESS FUND--Amman, A knowledgeable source in Amman yesterday said that Jordan and the PLO will jointly request the Fes summit conference to increase the capital of the fund in support of the steadfastness in the occupied Arab territories. [Text] [JN250835 Amman AR-RA'Y in Arabic 25 Nov 81 p 1]

W. BANK VILLAGE LEAGUES--Under the headline "The Village Leagues' Armed Militias," today's AR-RA-Y writes: The tasks of the village leagues, which have been formed by the Israeli authorities in some West Bank areas, have been revealed to go beyond previously-conceived dimensions. These dimensions are not confined to politically opposing the PLO and luring our steadfast kinfolk into collaborating with the occupation authorities, but have developed into forming armed militias to terrorize people, exercise armed pressures on them and disrupt their ranks with bullets under the auspices and in the interest of the occupiers. This new development indicates that the Israeli authorities have decided to entrust their aggressive practices against our kinfolk to those few people collaborating with the enemy so that what is happening in the occupied territories will look like armed dispute among the Palestinians themselves, in which Israel has no hand at all. Thus, Israel will appear quite innocent before the world. The village leagues' militias indicate that the occupation authorities have prepared for a bloody scheme in the occupied territories. The steadfast kinfolk should be more vigilant and united so as to resist that scheme and turn it against its perpetrators. Concluding, AR-RA-Y says: There is no doubt that the Palestinian people's strength, solidity and bravery will crush those few people of the village leagues and will also turn these leagues into a lesson showing that our kinfolk's steadfastness and preservation of their identity, land and heritage are more durable and stronger than all evil practices. [Text] [JN010730 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 0515 GMT 1 Dec 81]

CSO: 4404/166

LEBANESE SHI'ITE LEADER INTERVIEWED

PM081255 Beirut AL-BAYRAQ in Arabic 27 Nov 81 p 4

[Interview with Shi'ite Islamic Higher Council Deputy Chairman Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams ad-Din to REVUE DE LIBAN's Nadim Shuqayr: "Intensive Palestinian Presence Upsets Situation in South"--date and place of interview not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Do you still hope that [Shi'ite Islamic Higher Council chairman] Imam Musa al-Sadr will be found?

[Answer] Most certainly we hope to see the imam back in his country. We are making every effort to bring about his return and to see him resume his activities in the service of the homeland and all the Lebanese people without exception.

[Question] Whom do you accuse in the case of the imam's disappearance?

[Answer] There is no doubt that Libya is responsible for the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr and his colleagues Shaykh Muhammad Ya'qub and 'Abbas Badr al-Din. This has been confirmed by the big powers, the Arab states and the Lebanese authorities. All the Arab and Iranian leaders with whom I have discussed this subject have confirmed this. Foreign countries we have contacted on this matter also gave us the same answer. The same conclusion was drawn from the investigation carried out in Lebanon and Italy.

[Question] In the event of a continued long absence of the imam, until when will the election of a new chairman for the Shi'ite Islamic Higher Council be delayed?

[Answer] Elections might be held if the fate of the imam is still unknown when he reaches the age of 65.

[Question] How do you explain the clashes which break out every now and then between the Amal movement and some Palestinians and their allies?

[Answer] Given the absence of the state from the Lebanese arena, the Amal movement epitomizes the hopes of the masses and their aspiration to justice and equality for all the people, who have endured all kinds of suffering and pain. Amal is the threshold to salvation. How can it be otherwise when southern Lebanon is so endangered by intervention and bestial aggression and

the state remains the main element absent from the border area? Life there is impeded by the intensive armed Palestinian presence, which disturbs the natural order of values, by the permanent threat of Israeli aggression, which inflicts pain on all southern Lebanon, and by another kind of Israeli presence, represented all along the border strip by Sa'd Haddad's men. All these factors have led to a rallying around Amal, whose only objective is the defense of Lebanese territory. This leads to complications and misinterpretations, which develop into armed clashes on the ground. When that happens we quickly move to stop or contain them. Let me affirm here that if certain parties imagine that by fighting Amal they can belittle its role or reduce its influence on the masses they are grossly mistaken and would do well to discard those illusions. All sides should agree on common denominators to solve the various problems of the country and avert the specter of mass evacuation as a result of aggression and attack operations.

[Question] Taking all factors into consideration, is the south in danger?

[Answer] We expect a large-scale Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon. We have already sounded a warning about the dangers threatening the area. Today we repeat our warning: southern Lebanon is in more danger now than at any time in the past. This is due to the conflicts on the international scene and the ineffective Arab attitude toward the crisis.

The Arabs have two options: either they declare war on the Zionist enemy on all fronts or they promote calm in the area in accordance with the security council resolutions and the resolutions adopted by the various summit conference.

[Question] Has the Iranian revolution been successful in achieving its aims?

[Answer] Yes, it has been successful, at least in preserving the Islamic Republic. We expect it to score many more successes. Of course, it is facing considerable difficulties because it has its own ideology and rejects all foreign ideologies.

[Question] An Islamic revolution upholding the principles of Islam, and yet so much bloodshed?

[Answer] We believe that the Islamic revolution is the victim of the world news media, which have been fighting the revolution desperately. Violence only affects terrorist groups that have deviated from the national course.

CSO: 4404/166

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP ACCUSED OF NUCLEAR WARMONGERING

London AL-ZAHF AL-AKHDAR in English 13 Nov 81 p 2

[Text]

IT HAS always been difficult, if not impossible, to claim high intelligence for the American leadership. Nobody could really describe any of the recent US Presidents and the majority of their lieutenants as highly intellectual, well-informed, thoughtful people. But even a relatively stupid person is usually able to learn from his mistakes and politicians, even the most callous, have traditionally been sensitive to such learning. Not so Reagan's fearless brigade, who seem always ready to rush in where only fools dare to tread.

Not two weeks after Reagan's blunder concerning the possibility of 'limited' nuclear warfare in Europe and the furious reactions this aroused among European countries, the President's trusted sidekick put his general's foot into his large politician's mouth, by announcing that his boss had spoken the truth and nothing but the truth and that there were contingency plans for firing a nuclear warning-shot. He added that these plans had always been a part of general NATO strategy. Haig should know, as ex-commander of NATO forces. Anyway the said revelation has been an open secret for a long time – anybody interested enough could have found it out for himself.

But one may wonder why Haig, or the American leadership as a whole, insist on the possibility of a nuclear attack? One may reasonably conclude that it is a way of preparing the people of the world for the inevitable: a US pre-emptive strike against the Soviet Union. When dealing with people such as Reagan and Haig, no conclusion, no matter how far fetched or

irrational it may sound, may be excluded. Even the conclusion that these repeated gaffes, that so irritate America's European allies and all progressive people the world over, are not really gaffes, but thought through tactical statements.

We in the South might be forgiven for shrugging off Reaganite nuclear rhetoric, in that it deals, on the surface at least, mainly with Europe. But beyond the inescapable fact that any nuclear 'warning shot' is most likely to degenerate into all-out nuclear warfare, there is another worrying factor. Europe is America's objective ally and the two continents are bound together by deep historical, social and ideological ties. In that sense it is certain that the USA would prefer not to use Europe as its major battlefield in its war against the Soviet Union. The reaction of European governments following the American statements on limited nuclear war in Europe, might go a bit further towards restraining the United States, which is unwilling to lose valuable allies.

However, that does not mean that the Presidency and the Pentagon will give up their warmongering or shelve their plans for a confrontation with the Soviets. But if Europe proves to be an impractical test range for theatre nuclear weapons, where else can the generals scratch their nuclear itch? In the South, of course. What better test battle field than one of the developing countries, especially if such a country has a clearly anti-imperialist stance and opposes American policy. Like killing two flies with one stone, reflect the Pentagon generals. The mood in America now is that Vietnam could have been won had Johnson or Nixon used the Atom bomb: Reagan, Haig and Weinberger subscribe to that belief. A nuclear attack is therefore highly likely should a similar conflict arise somewhere in the Third World, preferably far away from America's shores, say, somewhere like Africa.

CSO: 4500/71

CULTURAL CENTER OPENED IN KUALA LUMPUR

Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 21 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

•A new Libyan cultural centre has been opened in Kuala Lumpur. The ceremony held for the occasion was attended by Muhiddin Mohammed Yassin, Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Malaysia, party leaders, members of the People's Bureau in Malaysia, university chancellors and academic dignitaries, publishers and members of the diplomatic corps in Malaysia.

The secretary of the People's Bureau delivered a speech on the occasion in which he said the opening of a number of cultural centres is part of the Jamahiriya's belief in promoting relations with friendly nations. He said the centre will provide the Malaysian people and others with an opportunity to learn Arabic, the language of the Koran, and to use various other books.

He added that the most important service the centre will be performing will be to introduce the right interpretations of the concept of the Koran which form the basic legislature of the Jamahiriya society. He said: "The Islamic world is facing various challenges to its beliefs and we are called upon to deal with this threat and revise our political, economic and social concepts in accordance with the Green Book."

The Malaysian Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Muhiddin Yassin, praised the Jamahiriya's pioneering role in promoting Islamic teaching and supporting Islamic causes and Muslims. He affirmed that the Islamic countries cannot face the present ideological, political and economic challenges without solidarity and the concerted efforts of all Muslim countries. He said this is the practical and constructive answer to all threats.

Mr. Yassin expressed appreciation for the opening of the centre saying: "This center will certainly advocate the cause of Islam and spread Islamic culture and held to make Islamic values and traditions deeply felt. I heartily congratulate the Malaysian youth on the opening of this centre which will give them the opportunity to learn everything necessary about Islam and Islamic traditions in addition to strengthening relations between the Libyan and Malaysian people."

The centre has four parts inlcuding a library with 20,000 volumes in the fields of science and the humanities, exhibition and lecture halls, a department for teaching Arabic and a special children library.

CSO: 4500/71

BRIEFS

AIR AGREEMENT WITH RWANDA--An agreement on air transport between the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Rwanda was signed at the headquarters of the General Administration of Civil Aviation. The agreement allows airlines in both countries to have regular flights and organize modes of operation and tariff lifting. This agreement was signed by the Director General of the Civil Aviation Board in the Jamahiriya and his counterpart in the republic of Rwanda. [Text] [Valetta THE JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 21 Nov 81 p 6]

CSO: 4500/71

NEW FOOD COOPERATIVE SEEKS TO SOLVE RURAL PROBLEMS

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 29, 30-31 Oct 81

[Article by Abba O. Mohamed]

[29 Oct 81 p 3]

[Text] Legdeim, a small village in Assaba region, 15 km from Boumdeid, had 200 to 250 families a few years ago. Today, there are only half that number. The effects of years of drought, and primarily rural exodus, have seriously affected the people of this area.

Legdeim Combats Hunger

The few remaining families--most of them old people, women, and children--wage a constant and usually futile struggle against hunger, thirst and sickness. These are, of course, the afflictions of our entire rural community and call for urgent and effective measures to save this element of our people. However, these efforts cannot and must not be carried out only by the state and administrative authorities; only joint and sustained action of the victim population can halt the danger. The state's role will thus be to help and to guide the people's efforts in their struggle against the drought and its consequences.

It is in this context that a promising experiment is underway in the Legdeim area, the small village in Boumdeid Region already mentioned. The village young people have decided to establish an agricultural cooperative to achieve food self-sufficiency and breathe new life into this endangered community.

CHAAB newspaper interviewed the president of this cooperative, Cherif Ould Bouna, who discussed the cooperative and its capabilities, prospects, and activities. He also reviewed a number of problems and obstacles which faced the cooperative from the outset. He explained: "It is named Legdeim Cooperative. It has 400,000 Mauritanian ouguiya in capital, up to 40 members, and the purpose--agriculture." The idea of the cooperative came from an organized group of young people in the area who became aware of the problems facing the community.

Food Self-Sufficiency

Their goal in this experiment is both to achieve food self-sufficiency for the people and to persuade people to return to their land. The president of the

cooperative said: "We have the benefit of several factors in undertaking this agricultural activity. The first is that Legdeim's land is cultivable, and also that 85 percent of the rain water which the Tagant receives in a year flows in the Legdeim Oued." He explained that they had benefited from this situation by channeling the water in systems of ditches to the cultivable areas. The cooperative also decided to resume construction of the "Lematt" dam, which had stopped because of the rural exodus and nature's harshness. The dam will make it possible to retain the water brought by ditches to irrigate and make the land usable for traditional agriculture. The cooperative also plans to exploit the inexhaustible Mendjoura underground water (known as Gueltet Mendjoura) to irrigate during rainless periods. The cooperative's president said that this will enable use of modern agricultural methods. The water deposit is located 1,500 meters from the agricultural cooperative. Cherif O. Bouna added that exploitation of the deposit will require some equipment which they do not yet have, and that in the meantime they have been digging wells about 8 meters deep at another dam.

Cherif O. Bouna said that anyone from the area can join the cooperative. However, the cooperative officers reserve the right to reject the application of anyone they consider irresponsible or wrongly motivated. He added that the cooperative has in fact refused participation by certain persons in accordance with the established criteria. These individuals had, unfortunately, tried to cause our effort to fail.

Problem Understood

On the pretext of prohibiting disputed land to be used, these individuals brought a complaint to the regional authorities against the cooperative, using the argument that the cooperative was using land that belonged to them. The president of the cooperative said there was no truth to this. This fabrication impeded our efforts a little, but the new administrative authorities seem to have understood the problems and grasped all the ramifications. We sincerely hope that they will come up with a good solution, the cooperative president said, the one which will give us the right to use the land already irrigated and made productive for the benefit of all residents of the area.

[30-31 Oct 81 p 3]

> [Text] Yesterday we published the first part of our interview with the president of the Legdeim Cooperative in the Assaba region. In yesterday's first part he talked about a group of aspects relating to the idea of creating this cooperative, its means and its work potential in addition to its main goal. In this second and last part, M. Cherif O. Bouna will talk about the cooperative's organization and its problems.

The cooperative president had previously expressed his confidence in the regional officials and his optimism regarding their understanding.

Hope and Confidence

He added: "We hope that matters will be settled very soon and that the cooperative can continue its beneficial and strengthening work."

In addition to this land problem, there are many other obstacles and handicaps. He said: "There are very many problems; but it would have been surprising if there were not."

Marketing of Products, Transportation

First of all, the cooperative has a marketing problem caused by transport difficulties. Since the cultivation is being carried out on areas formerly crossed by roads, this cultivation now impedes transport of the products outside the area. This inevitably has had negative effects on the result of our work, the president said.

In addition, there have been a number of problems specific to the area. The main one is resupplying it with basic necessity foodstuffs. This resupply is of major importance to the Legdeim inhabitants, and the cooperative thus took on the task of achieving it by its own methods. It will bring in all the products and foodstuffs necessary for the people's daily life and make them available in an open store for this purpose.

Cherif O. Bouna said, however: "We have been running into difficulties in this supply to the area of necessary products." The prices at which we are buying the products are too high, far above the initially standardized prices. We hope that the region will help us buy the products at reasonable prices, especially since they are destined for people with little, or nonexistent, income, the president of the cooperative added.

Among the problems specific to the area are certainly health, education, and the effects of the rural exodus, Cherif O. Bouna said: We are drawing attention to the seriousness of the difficulties in the life of the Legdeim people and also their daily struggle to survive. "We appeal, in this connection, to the regional authorities to appreciate at true value the praiseworthy efforts of the Legdeim cooperative's members to help the unfortunate people." We hope that the assistance and understanding which these officials have already given will even grow.

On our part, the president concluded, we will persevere in our efforts. Our cooperative, composed of farmers, employees, students and cattle raisers, all from this area, will do all it can to counter the effects of several years of drought and the consequences of a hostile natural environment.

9920
CSO: 4519/39

DROUGHT CAUSING GRAVE CRISIS IN DAIRY INDUSTRY

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 30 Oct 81 pp 6, 10

[Text] Like all other sectors which depend on the land, stock-raising and the dairy industry have been gravely affected by the drought and the general decline in purchasing power. Although milk production has fallen considerably, it is still quite sufficient to meet the plunging demand. The director of one of large dairies in Morocco explained: "The lowered demand is mainly the result of a decline in purchasing power due to price increases." An initial setback was the price increase per liter of milk from 1.62 to 1.82 in September 1980. The trend was accelerated by an additional increase in June to 2.22.

Although production did fall considerably, mainly as a result of the drought, the decline in consumption was even more marked. During the period of high milk yield in March, April and May it is estimated that the lack of rain caused a 30 percent drop in value of production. On the other hand, the decline in consumption was even greater, since, despite the production decrease, milk stock on hand was larger than in the preceding year at the same time. The excess was thus sent to processing plants (powdered milk) to be used later to meet shortages during low milk yield periods.

The decline in consumption is undoubtedly the result of price increases but also of the bad harvest, also caused by the drought. Shortage of grass has affected cattle feeding. This shortage has caused speculation in supplementary feeds. Thus, fodder has increased from 80 to 150 dirhams per quintal, hay from 80 centimes to 1 durham per kg. Forage is sold at 1.30 per kg, and barley at 1.50. Prices of the various feed products for animals have increased so much that farmers reckon it is now more expensive to feed a cow than a family of 10 children. Unfortunately, you cannot be sure that this is only a joke. You have to figure on 15 to 20 dirhams of feed per cow, whereas only a few months ago this cost was certainly less than half. On this basis, therefore, a farmer has to sell 10 liters of milk per cow just to pay for its feed, which is already a high production for the animals of a small "fellah."

An initial consequence of this catastrophic situation is that a considerable number of farmers, unable to hang on, have sold part of their livestock. Obviously they could not sell to their competitors. All were in the same boat in respect to the current problems. Thus, the milk cows have gone to the slaughterhouse. There also they have sold under very unfavorable conditions: 7.50 dirhams per kg of meat. Prices have dropped so far that many families have stopped eating

poultry for the moment and are eating mainly beef. By chain reaction, the farmers who produce the poultry have seen a decline in their prices as a result both of the drop in beef prices and the rise in the price of chicken caused by increased cost of feed. It is said that some poultry farmers have suffered a 50-percent drop in turnover. This very disturbing situation has not only immediate but future implications. The decimated livestock will be difficult to restore when the time comes to renew production. This will be equally difficult for cattle and sheep.

Importation of Animal Feed

The government has fully understood the situation and has tried to remedy it by appropriate though very burdensome measures. Thus, 70,000 tons of beets and lucerne meal have been imported from France. The state paid 30 percent of the cost and the cooperatives distributed the feed among their farmers. It was thus possible to sell lucerne meal for 1.05 dirhams, which may seem expensive but it has much higher protein nutritive value than hay or forage. These imports were much appreciated but the quantities were unfortunately inadequate. Those involved said "it would have been necessary to import two or three times as much."

The milk industry, at the cattle-raising level, is thus not flourishing, but neither is the processing industries, i.e. in the dairies, the cooperatives, in processing and packaging. Supervisors in that sector say that production costs have risen to a degree that profit margins are smaller and smaller. The cost of energy, which is a large factor in processing, has gone up, and the rebates previously granted to industry in general were cancelled as of July 1980. Salaries have increased. There has been a considerable increase in fuels cost: fuel for the various factory machines has gone from 757 dirhams per ton on 1 July 1980 to 1,358 dirhams on 1 July 1981. Gasoline used to pick up the milk in the countryside and deliver it throughout the country has increased from 1.35 to 2.10 dirhams per liter during the same period. Another result of the petroleum price increase is a considerable increase in cost of plastics and consequently milk containers. Caustic soda, which is used extensively in dairies, was initially imported from Spain and sold to consumers for 1 dirham per kg. It is now produced in Morocco but sold for 2.70 dirhams and last July a further increase brought the price to 3.80. The price of bleaching water has followed a similar progression of price increases. The Compensation Fund is no longer involved in processing except to the extent of 3 centimes. Thus, the margins granted, extremely restrictive, require those in processing to reduce costs as far as possible. An experts' study established last July that the cost of processing and packaging milk was 75 centimes. However, the state allows only 61 centimes, this despite the cost increase in all directions. Currently, it is considered that dairies can only survive by making up for losses on milk through profit on derivatives such as yogurt, cheese or butter. But if this balance makes it possible to "stay afloat," it certainly does not enable new investments. Equipment deteriorates and ages, and professionals in the sector regard the future as hardly promising.

Crisis in the Dairies; Two Powdered Milk Factories

Currently, two plants are processing surplus milk during high-yield periods for transformation into powder. One is at Kenitra and the other at Marrakech. These

installations are able to handle the surplus, and during low-yield periods are used to process yogurt. For example, Yoplait is produced from 85 percent or more powdered milk and 15 percent cream. In effect, cream has been removed from the powder for better conservation and the cream used to make butter. But those in the business say that "we are victims of illogic. The state, to keep butter prices low, gives a 9-dirham subsidy on imported butter. However, this subsidy is withheld from butter made in Morocco. Local butter does have free sale, it is true, but the competition of imported products forces the producers to impose prices which do not promote effective production."

Although milk marketing currently perfectly matches demand, importation of some products continues. There is some importation of condensed milk, which is not produced locally, sold mainly in remote areas far from the distribution centers for fresh milk. But there is also importation of powdered milk for the sole purpose, apparently, of giving the consumer a broader choice.

Production Potential

The current difficult situation that we are experiencing has thus caused a significant reduction in consumption of a product which must be regarded as a basic necessity. In 1979, national production was 730 million liters, and the level remained about the same in 1980. However, a drop of 20 to 30 percent is expected in 1981. Of this 730 million, 226 million will go to plants for pasteurization and packaging. The remainder went to subsistence farming. The plants use mainly milk from imported or cross-bred cows. The typical Moroccan cows supply for home consumption.

The sector's industrial inventory consists of 13 plants at Oujda, Tetouan, Kenitra, El Jadida, Marrakech, Agadir, Kasba Tadla, Fes, and two in Casablanca. However, the Meknes plant has been closed. Two plants produce cheese at Tangier and Casablanca, and a third is now under construction at Sale. Moroccan consumption is still far below that of European countries. The following table of annual consumption (in kg) per person of milk and derivatives illustrates this fact:

Per capita consumption	1970	1980
Morocco	48.5	51.8
Spain	107	131
EEC	326	337
Finland	613	385

Imports	1977	1979
Powdered milk	3,109 tons	4,097 tons
Infant milk	1,225	1,093
Condensed milk	10,506	10.566
Cheese	2,254	512
Butter	10,518	21,506

Those in the industry conclude: "Not a very good situation, and unfortunately we do not see any solution in the near future, unless we get a normal agricultural year."

9920
CSO: 4519/39

LEBANESE PAPER INTERVIEWS FOREIGN MINISTER

PM091527 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 5 Dec 81 p 1

[AL-SAFIR correspondent report: "PDRY Foreign Minister Tells AL-SAFIR: Unity of Two Yemens Is Not Contrary to Aden Treaty"]

[Excerpts] Paris--PDRY Foreign Minister Salim Salih Muhammad, who is currently visiting Paris, yesterday had talks with French minister of external relations Claude Cheysson. During the 2-hour meeting the Yemeni minister handed over a message from PDRY President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad to French President Francois Mitterrand.

Speaking to AL-SAFIR about the agreement signed the day before yesterday between the two Yemeni states, Salim Salih Muhammad said that the agreement raises the standard of coordination between the two countries. It provides for formation of a supreme council consisting of the two presidents or their two vice presidents together with a ministerial committee including the ministers of foreign affairs, internal affairs, planning and education. It also provides for the setting up of a general staff command and a permanent secretariat that will seek to activate the work of the presidential council or the ministerial committee.

Minister Salih Muhammad said that it has been agreed to develop cooperation and coordination in the economic, educational and health fields as well as in the field of foreign policy.

Salih Muhammad praised the Soviet Union's support for the Yemeni people's national and progressive objectives and aspiration for unity. He said: As for the U.S. stand toward unity, it has been well known since the 26 September revolution [in North Yemen] and 14 October [leftist takeover in South Yemen]. U.S. attitudes have been conspiratorial and have tended toward sabotage against both the [YAR] Republic, which was set up on 26 September, and against us in the DPRY. U.S. imperialism has continuously been launching direct attacks against our regime.

Asked about the effect of the treaty signed between Libya, Ethiopia, and the PDRY on unity between the two Yemens, Salih Muhammad said: this unity is not contrary to the principles in the light of which the alliance was approved. In our view unity will strengthen the treaty of friendship recently concluded between the three countries.

He added: We, therefore, believe that the treaty is not contrary to the work for unity which we will carry out as long as such agreements and treaties serve the interest, development and progress of the Yemeni people.

Asked whether he expects San'a' to join the treaty after unity, he said: I believe that this matter will be discussed at the appropriate time and in my view it is premature to bring it up.

Speaking about the Omani aggression against PDRY territories, Salih Muhammad said: In fact, since the U.S. maneuvers on our borders the Sultanate of Oman has been launching frequent attacks on us with the blessing of the Americans. In the past 2 days some forces were landed on certain Yemeni territories and some citizens were detained. This is part of the campaign of provocations that has started since facilities and military bases were granted [to the United States] in Oman.

He added: We have observed all these violations and so did the Arab countries, particularly Kuwait, the UAE, and the Arab League. We reserve the right to respond at the right time.

Asked about the nature of the response, Salih Muhammad said: We are studying the matter and we have not yet defined the requisite practical response. But so far we are showing self-restraint, particularly since efforts are being made by certain Arab countries to stand against the U.S. military presence in the Sultanate of Oman and against such provocative actions, which are actually seeking to inflame and heighten tension in the area.

Salih Muhammad expressed the belief that if sincere Arab efforts are made and the higher interests of our Arab people are taken into consideration "another Arab summit will be held in the near future. We hope so."

CSO: 4404/167

REAGAN'S JERUSALEM POLICY CRITICIZED

PM260923 Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic 24 Nov 81 p 2

[Article by Jasir al-Jasir: "The Jewish Wrong the American Master Wants To Perpetuate"]

[Text] The history of the U.S. presidency shows a constant phenomenon common to all presidents. All past presidents have gone back on the promises they made during their election campaign, promises made under the pressure of the campaigns. Such campaigns often make the candidate lose his political balance and, therefore, give promises by which he hopes to win votes. But once in office he finds that he cannot honor such promises because they are impossible to honor and he is incapable of carrying them out. This phenomenon has been and still is common to all the U.S. presidents.

Therefore, it was surprising and strange that Mr Reagan should depart from this U.S. presidential custom and create a new one, namely sticking to his promises and adding new ones to them. And since the promise given was in favor of the Jews at the expense of the Arabs, Mr Reagan has showed an extraordinary ability to carry out the promise he made as a candidate and to add a new one to it when he became president. And since that which the president promised is at the expense of another people, he has given more than the Jews asked for.

The U.S. president's generosity is puzzling and strange. He has handed over the best and holiest city after Holy Mecca and Medina to the worst and most degraded people by endorsing the Jews' seizure of the city of Jerusalem. Indeed Mr Reagan believes that the city should not be divided after the Jews have united it. Thus he is rewarding the thief by giving him the other half of the loot.

The master of the White House has forgotten that the Arab sector of the holy city includes more than 115,000 Arabs and that this city enshrines holy places for the biggest religions, Islam and Christianity. He has also forgotten that the city, after the Zionist completed its occupation, is being subjected to deliberate sabotage the target of which is both the Islamic and Christian holy places. The citizens, both Christians and Muslims, are also daily the target of harassment and provocations that considerably restrict their performance of religious rites.

The master of the White House has ignored all these established facts in order to please a bunch of Jews who have imposed an injustice which they call a "fait accompli" and which the U.S. master, as usual, is trying to perpetuate.

CSO: 4404/167

IRAN ADMITS BUYING ARMS FROM ISRAEL

LD301226 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 29 Nov 81

[Commentary prepared by Salih al-Duwati and presented by 'Abdullah Rajih]

[Excerpts] However much misleading people and impostors in Tehran try to throw the truth behind the high walls of darkness, the latter is bound to appear because it cannot live except in light. And no matter how much the masters of deception and perfidy in Tehran attempt to deny the military relationship existing between them and Israel in the war which has now been fought between Iraq and Iran for 14 months, the wrong is bound to be removed, and everybody will know the reality of the Iranian ruling regime.

On the eve of the celebrations of the day of solidarity with the Palestinian people Iran offered its present to this struggling people in the form of a statement that has brought the collapse of the false deceptive claims made by the Iranian ruling regime to the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds and more precisely to the Palestinian people.

Iranian parliament speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani said after last night's meeting of the Supreme Defense Council, which deals with the affairs of the war with Iraq, in a statement broadcast by Iranian radio that his country had been supplied with arms from Israel for use in its war with Iraq. In a statement broadcast by Iranian radio that his country had been supplied with arms from Israel for use in its war with Iraq. This is what they have persistently denied since the crash near the Soviet border of the Argentine aircraft coming from Israel and carrying arms to Iran.

It is regrettable that the Iranian politicians should be so naive as to justify the purchase of arms from Israel as the repayment of an old debt of Iran to the Zionist entity. Principles and ideals cannot be shaken by a few million dollars, but in Iran they are unable to justify this dubious cooperation.

The most serious thing contained in the Hashemi-Rafsanjani statement was maybe the fact that he said that the decision to purchase arms from Israel was made by the Iranian Supreme Defense Council in one of its meetings, a matter which exposes the nature of the link between the two sides in the Iraqi-Iranian war, and which confirms repeated reports on the participation of Israeli military aircraft on Iran's side at the beginning of the war. This was ruled

out by all the Arabs under the effect of the tears shed by the new rulers of Iran over the Islamic sanctities in Palestine desecrated by the Zionists.

The rulers of Iran who brag about Islam and friendship to the Palestinian people have now confirmed that they have come an undeniable threat to the Palestinian cause; and we do not rule out the possibility of seeing a day when the Iranian UN delegate stands up in defense of the Israeli's right to liquidate the Palestinian question and to evacuate the Arab occupied territories of their inhabitants.

CSO: 4404/167

BRIEFS

AWACS FOR GULF--An AL-YAWM newspaper correspondent has reported: Answering a question raised by AL-YAWM newspaper on the presence of the AWACS planes in Saudi Arabia and their benefit to the brother of the Gulf, His Royal Highness Prince Sultan Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, the Saudi defense and aviation minister, said: "Any force in the kingdom is a force for the Gulf." Regarding the Gulf states defense ministers conference, the Saudi minister said that he hopes that the conference will be held on 18 January, the set date. His Highness expressed the desire that everyone [the Gulf states defense ministers] live up to the expectations of their people. His Highness was accompanied by his Belgian counterpart who concluded his visit to the kingdom yesterday. On the other hand, Prince Sultan said the visit of the Belgian defense minister to Saudi Arabia was a visit of friendship, exchange of information and furtherance of relations with Belgium, because it is a friendly country. His Highness toured a number of military sectors at King 'Abd al-'Aziz Military Base in Dhahran yesterday morning. [Excerpts] [GF261812 Al-Dammam AL-YAWM in Arabic 26 Nov 81 pp 1, 6]

IRAN ARMS FROM ISRAEL--Riyadh, 29 Nov (WAKH)--In a commentary today Riyadh Radio said that "The rulers of Iran who brag about Islam and their friendship for the Palestinian people are now definitely a threat to the Palestinian cause." The radio was commenting on the statement made by Iranian Majlis speaker Hashemi-Rafsanjani last night in which he said that Iran has received arms from Israel to use them in its war against Iraq. The radio said: "Perhaps the most serious thing in Hashemi-Rafsanjani's statement in his disclosure that the decision to purchase arms from Israel was made at a meeting of Iran's Supreme Defense Council. This reveals the link between the Iranian and Israeli sides in the Iraqi-Iranian war and confirms the reports on the participation of Israeli warplanes on the side of Iran in the early days of the war." Referring to Iranian justifications of this matter the radio said: "It is regrettable that Iranian politicians should be so naive as to justify the purchase of arms from Israel as the payment of an old debt owed to Iran by the Zionist entity." The radio asserted: "Principles and values are not shaken by a few million dollars. But they are unable to justify this suspicious cooperation." The radio added: "All the Iranian regime's falsehood and deception of the Arab muslim peoples, and particularly the Palestinian people, have been exposed on the eve of the day of solidarity with the Palestinian people which coincided with the day in which Iran presented its [word indistinct] to the Palestinian people." [Text] [GF291657 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1455 GMT 29 Nov 81]

PEACE PLAN--Riyadh, 26 Nov (WAKH)--Saudi newspapers have emphasized that the Saudi peace plan will remain a practical and implementable initiative through which the Arab nation can restore its occupied territories and through which Palestinian people can regain their usurped rights. The newspapers have said our hope and the hope of all Arab masses throughout the Arab homeland was that all Arab leaders will personally participate in the Fes summit conference and that the conference will resume its sessions so that the leaders might put forward their final attitudes toward the issue of Arab solidarity and joint Arab action to resolve the Palestinian problem despite all differences. Referring to the effusive Arab and international support for the Saudi peace plan, the newspapers have said that despite all this support, Saudi leaders tried their best to show that the plan is not imposed on any one and that it is only a set of clear and viable views that can be discussed objectively and sincerely during the Arab summit. The newspapers have asserted that Saudi Arabia wants an Arab plan on which all energies and capabilities of the Arab nation can be rallied for joint action because the Saudis are sharing the responsibility of the Arab nation's existence and destiny. [Text] [GF261058 Manama WAKH in Arabic 0955 GMT 26 Nov 81]

USSR RELATIONS--The Soviet Union is willing to restore diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, said the Soviet magazine CONTEMPORARY TIMES in its latest edition. The magazine was replying to a reader's question and recalled that the Saudi kingdom was the first Arab state with which Moscow established diplomatic relations in 1926. It also recalled that Prince Feisal--who was later to become king--paid an official visit to the Soviet Union in 1932. [Text] [Beirut ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 643, 21 Nov 81 p 1]

SECRET VISIT TO CHINA--Diplomatic sources in Peking said that a Saudi member of the royal family recently paid a "secret" visit to Peking which fell within the framework of efforts conducted by China and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations, the Beirut independent daily AL NAHAR reported today. The report did not disclose the name of the Saudi Prince, nor the nature of the talks conducted in Peking. [Text] [Beirut ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English No 643, 21 Nov 81 p 1]

INDIA TO OPEN SUPERMARKET--The Indian Government is to set up a supermarket in Jeddah as part of its drive to increase trade with Saudi Arabia. An official team, which will include trade and industry representatives, will shortly visit Saudi Arabia. According to Khurshid Alam Khan, India's junior minister of commerce who returned recently from a visit to Saudi Arabia, the suggestion to set up the supermarket was made by the Saudi Arabian minister of trade. After studying various aspects of the proposal, it was agreed that India could step up exports of spices, textiles, steel items, superior quality basmati rice, and hand-knotted woolen carpets. Khan said that apart from engineering goods, there was great scope for selling consumer items such as tea in Saudi Arabia. India is also planning to send more Indian handicrafts to that country. Khan said that with Saudi Arabia spending over $90bn in 1981-1982 on development programmes, India could increase foreign exchange earnings by setting up joint ventures in the kingdom. Currently, India is importing crude oil, petroleum products and fertilisers from Saudi Arabia, to the tune of Indian rupees 3.7 bn ($550m) annually, while Indian exports to Saudi Arabia are less than IRI.6bn ($238m). According to Indian government sources, the prospects of getting more loans for development projects from the Saudi Fund for Development are good. The fund has given a loan of $100m to finance two power projects in south India. Recently, it agreed to provide another loan of $32m for a hydroelectric project in the north Indian state of Bihar. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 47, 28 Nov 81 p 43]

CSO: 4400/84

GOVERNMENT GRANTS INDUSTRIAL BANK 1 BILLION DIRHAM LOAN

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 18 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

DUBAI (Al Khaleej): The government has pledged to grant a long-term one-billion-dirham loan to the Industrial Bank, Assistant Under-Secretary in the Finance and Industry Ministry Ahmed Humaid Al Tayer said.

The loan, he said, will help the bank in financing its loans to industrial firms.

He asserted that the bank will contribute in the development of the state's economy and the diversification of its production structure through the establishment of new industries and boosting the existing ones.

He said that the bank's board of directors is the authority which determines the rate of interest on loans. This will not exceed 6 per cent, however.

Regarding the guarantees for loans, Al Tayer said, the board of directors will determine credit policy and guarantees in this regard will either be material or personal depending on each case.

The proposed bank's shareholders are the UAE government, sixteen national banks, insurance companies and one investment company. The government will hold 51 per cent of the capital.

The bank's capital will total Dh. 500 million, to be divided into 500,000 shares of Dh. 100 each.

CSO: 4700/79

INDUSTRIAL BANK POLICY DISCUSSED, SHAREHOLDERS LISTED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 21 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

ABU DHABI (Al Khaleej): The rationale for the establishment of the Industrial Bank has been spelled out by Assistant Under-Secretary in the Finance and Industry Ministry Ahmed Al Tayer.

According to Al Tayer, the need to strengthen the country's economy in the industrial sector has stemmed from the state's reliance on oil as its main source of income. The proposed bank is expected to contribute to the growth of industry, besides diversifying the economy by advancing loans to entrepreneurs.

The bank has an authorised capital of Dh. 500 million and a paid-up capital of Dh. 200 million. As this capital was deemed inadequate, the government has agreed to give a long-term loan of one billion dirhams to the bank at three per cent interest.

Private firms and corporations and industrial institutions in which 70 per cent of shares are owned by the state or citizens will benefit from the bank's services. It will help establishment of industrial projects and expand existing ones by granting them credit. But the bank's aid for any project will not exceed 20 per cent of its paid-up capital or 60 per cent of the project's cost.

The Industrial Bank will also guarantee, on certain terms, loans granted by financial and commercial institutions to industrial firms. It will carry out feasibility studies on projects which it assists and oversee the progress of work on them.

Al Tayer confirmed that the Ministry of Finance would have no say in the day-to-day operations of the bank. Half the number of the bank's directors will be nominees of the government.

Short, medium and long term loans granted by the bank will carry interest at rates to be fixed by the board of directors but will not, in any case, exceed six per cent, according to Al Tayer.

The board will soon draw up credit policies and the guarantees for the loans which may be granted by the bank. But Al Tayer is of the view that they will be similar to those adopted by financial and commercial institutions.

According to him, the public sector's participation in the bank, is, in the final analysis, in the interests of the country. The move is also aimed at enabling the private sector to shoulder a part of the responsibility in boosting industry.

Al Tayer said that commercial banks had in the past extended loans for several projects in a haphazard manner and without making any in-depth study as to the feasibility of projects. This had resulted in heavy losses to investors and banks.

Al Tayer was also of the view that the private sector's participation was also aimed at strengthening local banks to withstand competition from foreign banks in the limited financial market in the country. Further, mixed

economic institutions were capable of taking quick decisions and in shouldering their responsibility. The plus factor in the private sector was its rich experience in the field of management.

According to the bank's articles of association, the government subscribes 51 per cent of the capital but will be represented only by 50 per cent of the number of directors, the private sector sharing the rest. But the government is the prime shareholder to ensure control over the bank's operations.

The bank's 10-man board of directors will draw up the general policy of the bank, supervise its implementation, frame rules for loans and contributions to industrial projects and decide on allocations. It is also responsible for issuing internal rules and regulations on the bank's financial and administrative affairs, evolve rules for acceptance of deposits from shareholders, banks and financial institutions and draw up the annual report of the bank.

The general body of the bank will meet annually and within six months from the date of the bank's fiscal year. Shareholders will have a vote for every share.

The bank's shareholders

	No. of shares (in thousands)	Dirhams (in millions)
UAE government Ministry of Finance	102	102
National Bank of Abu Dhabi	8.2	8.2
National Bank of Dubai	8.2	8.2
National Bank of Sharjah	5	5
Oman Bank Ltd.	16.5	16.5
Federal Commercial Bank	4	4
Union Bank of the Middle East	9.9	9.9
Emirates Commercial Bank	5	5
Gulf Commercial Bank Ltd	8.2	8.2
Dubai Bank Ltd	5	5
Middle East Bank Ltd.	5	5
Abu Dhabi National Insurance Co.	16.5	16.5
Al Ain Ahlia Insurance Co.	2	2
Dubai Insurance Co.	1	1
Dhafra Insurance Co.	0.5	0.5
Oman Insurance Co.	2	2
Emirates Investments Co.	0.5	0.5

CSO: 4700/79

STEPS TAKEN TO CURB TRADE FRAUD

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 18 Nov 81 p 1

[Article by Maruf Khwaja: "Sense of Urgency Marks Dubai Meeting Today To Tackle Trade Fraud"]

[Text]

The question of spurious goods and trade fraud is once again engaging the attention of authorities amid strident calls for preventive and punitive action. Today's meeting in Dubai of ministerial municipal and customs officials is seen as part of the swift response that followed last week's closure of four supermarkets for selling time-expired food.

It was almost one year ago this month that the spurious goods issue had last arisen, and on that occasion with such vehemence that at least one authority was obliged to take unilateral action banning the import of any article whose origin or make was suspect. While this measure may have touched more than one raw nerve, the uproar that followed died down upon the placating formation of a spurious goods committee that was to take a closer and longer look at the matter.

Drawn from bodies regulating commerce, the committee appeared to have had federal blessings in its task to separate the genuine from the spurious, apportion blame or function and come up with solutions that tackled the problem while leaving delicate balances undisturbed. But if the controversy over the occasional withholding of suspect goods subsequently subsided, so did the hopes generated early on by the committee which appeared in course of time to become progressively redundant and defunct. After some initial sessions it stopped meeting altogether

The spurious goods committee may have been defeated by contradictions inherent in the management of commerce here or it was considered superceded by higher bodies charged with attaining still higher objectives. But according to knowledgeable circles, the fact is that forming a committee to identify the problem of spurious goods and suggest solution is a highly academic exercise. It is academic because it is unnecessary and it is unnecessary because law No. 4 of 1979 clearly defines trade frauds including spurious goods and prescribes measures for their prevention and punishment.

In the latter context, therefore, the purpose of the meeting convened in Dubai today would seem at best aimed at securing ad hoc measures to serve the aims of Law No. 4 of 1979 until regulations for its implementation are approved.

A draft of these regulations is presently under circulation with the country's chambers of commerce and industry. Emanating from the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the draft regulations amplify and elucidate provisions of Law No. 4 of 1979 which is entitled the Prevention of Fraudulent Practice in Commerce. The regulations would detail procedures to be adopted in enforcing the law and submitting violations to the process of justice.

The draft regulations were passed to individual chambers by the UAE Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry on a priority basis "for urgent consideration" in view of the critical need for implementation of the legislation. The chambers are under-

stood to be "seized of the matter" and the Federation is expected to receive replies which will be consolidated for submission to the ministry, hopefully by the end of this year. It is possible that a law originally drafted four years ago, legislated two years later will come to be enforced five years from the date of its origin – a long-time indeed to wait for a most elementary statute of commerce in a country which very largely lives by it.

A cursory study of Law No. 4 of 1979 would calm the fears of many traders who seem to believe on the basis of last week's events that the definition of trade fraud is limited only to foodstuffs. Far-sighted legislators had foreseen where a need might arise for defining not only certain terms but also modes of commerce. Thus, one provision takes into account the possibility of circumventing agency agreements and the introduction of goods into national commerce by those who do not have the authority to do so. Importers who introduce goods into the country through unauthorised channels i.e. by smuggling, stand in violation of the law, as indeed do traders who sell goods under false pretences.

The enforcement several months hence of Law No. 4 of 1979 notwithstanding, what traders in Dubai are hoping for now is that the committee drawn from officialdom in four emirates will make the widest possible interpretation of the term "trade fraud." They are hoping a broadbased program of action will result. Their expectations are based on the belief that while bad food may spoil the individual's health, "bad trade" all over will ruin the health of the nation's economy, a prospect grimmer by far. And a lot of this "bad trade", they say, is due to callous violation of basic business ethics by people who import and sell spurious goods, who bring merchandise into the country by unconventional means and exercise unfair advantage over traders bound by adherence to the law.

Traders here generally feel there has never been a greater urgency for measures, even if they are ad hoc, for the control of a phenomenon that amounts to "stabbing them in the back" while they struggle to find an alternative to the Iranian market.

CSO: 4700/79

DUBAI'S CUSTOMS TARIFF SYSTEM DISCUSSED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 9 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

DUBAI (EN): Customs duties in Dubai are still based on the fixed charges system. It is the oldest system in the Gulf and yet it retains plenty of merits which have kept it in use.

As Colonel Abdalla Abu Al Hoal, Director of Dubai Ports and Customs Department, describes it, it is a simple, easy to follow and just system and its procedures are well-known to traders who frequently deal with customs regulations.

The system consists of fixed customs duties listed in a customs charges book which covers all imported items. However, without reference to the book almost every businessmen engaged in imports knows that the duties on cement and explosives used in quarries are two per cent of their cost value, while duties payable on other items are three per cent. Customs duties are calculated according to the bills accompanying the shipments. As for items arriving by air, the duties are 1.25 per cent on watches and precious stones and two per cent on other items. Usually, the procedure does not take more than an hour to complete and the importer walks out with his goods.

In such a system there are no customs experts employed as 'evaluators' but simply inspectors who have to evaluate the shipment only if they suspect the authenticity of the accompanying bills.

Qassem Blay, an official at Dubai customs said that the system was adopted at a time when Dubai used to be the only port in the country but it was still proving successful and inspectors worked as evaluators when the need arises. "The main worry for the inspectors is not customs duties but the speedy delivery of shipments, safe storage of goods and uncomplicated procedures."

Colonel Abu Al Hoal explained that most traders who deal in imports were well-known to customs officials and were more keen to safeguard their reputation than with reduced customs charges. He added however, that defaults did take place and when they were discovered the defaulter was referred to the court. On the whole, he pointed out, a feeling of trust prevailed and defaults were usually the exceptions than the rule.

Although Colonel Abu Al Hoal has expressed his satisfaction over the present system, he also points out that it should be reviewed as every system does from time to time. He said that certain developments had taken place such as the world-wide inflation which has affected the prices of goods everywhere and should be accounted for in a new set of customs regulations formulating a more uptodate system.

CSO: 4700/79

SHODDY BANKING PRACTICES CITED

Dubai KHALEEJ TIMES in English 23 Nov 81 p 1

[Text]

MOST of the banks operating in the UAE have adopted certain procedures that can be called unhealty trend in banking.

This was stated by Mr Abdul Malik Hamar, Governor of the Central Bank, while addressing a banking seminar in Abu Dhabi yesterday. In this context he specifically mentioned deposit liabilities and the lending deposit ratio.

Mr Hamar said that the responsibilities for the situation lie with the top management of the banks. He indicated that the four parties involved in the process of ractification—board of directors, ex-management of the banks, external auditors and the supervision department—should coordinate their efforts to achieve a qualitative banking.

The two-day seminar on banking supervision, sponsored by the UAE Central Bank in coordination with its auditors 'Arthur Andersen and Company, is being attended by the representatives from the central banks of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and Iraq.

Mr Hamar pointed out that in the evaluation of banking four distinct measures would be adopted. They are: capital plus reserve, credit quality, profitability and liquidity. As far as the UAE was concerned, special attention would be paid to the individual bank's funds and the risk element involved in the loans. He indicated that a risk bureau, in accordance with the law of the Central Bank, might be set up in the near future.

Although a number of banks in the country are improving their internal control procedures, the Central Bank's supervision department intends to substantiate the financial reliability of these banks, Mr Hamar said. He called the role of the central bank as that of the voice of conscience in human life.' He said the executive character of the central bank was not only to provide banking facilities but to promote a system wherein the training aspect would be developed. In coordination with the foreign expertise, the Central Bank would work for establishing and maintaining a stable financial situation as well as for the smooth implementation of financial laws and regulations, Mr Hamar added.

Later, an official of Arthur Andresen and Company told Khaleej Times that the primary aim of the seminar was to exchange information among the participants.

'Arthur Andersen' was set up by a professor of the North-Western University in Chicago. The company has 160 branches throughout the world, including in Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Riyadh, Bahrain and Amman.

Mr Ahmed Abdulla bin Mohammad heads the Abu Dhabi office, which trains people as experts in finance, banking and taxes.

Asked about the current fiscal problems faced by many countries, Mr Ahmed Mohammad said that the drop in the lending rates of the banks, accompanied by the fluctuations in gold price and a general recession, had a telling impact on the world economy

CSO: 4700/79

CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL APPROVES DRAFT LAWS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 9 Nov 81 p 3

[Text]

ABU DHABI (WAM): The National Consultative Council (NCC) approved during its fifth legislative term (which concludes on November 10) a number of draft laws and public projects relating to citizens' welfare and public services in Abu Dhabi emirate.

Among the draft laws approved by the NCC was a draft law on the nationalisation of Abu Dhabi Helicopters Company Ltd. The Abu Dhabi government has 30 per cent of shares in this company, while the rest are held by nationals.

Other draft laws included one on regulating trade agencies and another on the setting up of the Commercial Buildings Department. This department will finance commercial building in Abu Dhabi emirate.

A draft law on pensions and service indemnity for nationals employed in oil companies operating in Abu Dhabi emirate was also approved.

The NCC also approved a draft law on reorganising the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, a draft law reorganising the National Drilling Company and a draft law on Abu Dhabi emirate's general budget.

The major public issues discussed by the NCC and on which memoranda were submitted to the Executive Council included foreign manpower and public services in Beda Zayed in Beda Zayed region.

The NCC also submitted memoranda on raising the age for grant of driving licences from 18 to 21, cancellation of conditions for expatriates' departure, setting up of a driving licence department in Tarif area, expansion of postal and telephone services at Suwaihan and Al Ain areas and the setting up of a national company to ply taxis in the emirate.

The NCC also submitted memoranda on opening of civil defence and fire-fighting offices in Suwaihan and other remote areas in the emirate, installation of traffic lights and issuance of laws for development of livestock.

CSO: 4700/79

BRIEFS

IRANIAN DIPLOMAT FLEES--Beirut, 6 Dec (INA)--An Iranian diplomat has managed to escape from his confinement inside the Iranian Embassy in San'a' a few days ago. He left for an unknown destination, perhaps Britain. Informed diplomatic sources have said that ('Abdallah Jahan), Iranian charge d'affaires in San'a', was detained inside the embassy for 1 week by an investigation committee sent from Tehran and led by Mahdavi, who later assumed the post of a new charge d'affaires in San'a'. The committee accused the Iranian diplomat of opposing the regime and carrying out acts against the Iranian Government. The diplomatic sources said that the committee had withdrawn (Jahan's) passport, interrogated and tortured him and prevented him from contacting his family. The sources added that the committee was planning to transfer the Iranian diplomat to Tehran just before he managed to escape from the embassy and leave YAR for an unknown destination. It is to be recalled that many Iranian diplomats in the Iranian embassies in India, FRG, Jamaica, France and Italy fled their embassies and asked for political asylum. [Text] [JN061110 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1000 GMT 6 Dec 81]

SUPPORT FOR IRAQ--Baghdad, 4 Dec (INA)--YAR Prime Minister 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani tonight telephones Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council member and first deputy prime minister. During the telephone conversation, al-Iryani conveyed the greetings of YAR President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, his government and the Yemeni people to President Saddam Husayn and the Iraqi people. He also conveyed their hope that Iraq would continue to achieve victory over the Iranian aggressors. Al-Iryani reaffirmed the YAR's strong support for Iraq in the just war it is waging in defense of its national and pan-Arab rights. [Text] [JN042048 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2015 GMT 4 Dec 81]

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END

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24 December 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2459

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No. 2459

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BRIEFS

IRAQ, LEBANON REOPEN OIL TERMINAL--An agreement to reopen the export terminal in the Lebanese port of Tripoli was signed last week by Lebanese Oil Minister Mohammed Beydoun and his Iraqi counterpart, Tayeh Abdel-Karim as this newsletter had forecast in its November 16 issue. The agreement will also provide the refinery at Tripoli with Iraqi crude and Beirut newspapers quoted Mr Beydoun as saying he hoped pumping would resume in December. But Syrian Oil Minister Abdel-Jabbar al-Dahhak said in an interview with REUTERS, that talks over opening Tripoli's link with the Iraqi pipeline to the Syrian port of Banias "are still going on," with difficulties over transit fees still to be resolved. This is despite an earlier Iraqi-Syrian agreement under which Syria earns 31.89 cents per barrel of Iraqi oil transported from the Kirkuk oil fields through Syrian territory to the Mediterranean. Iraq and Lebanon, on the other hand, have agreed that Lebanese transit fees will be 3.11 cents per barrel, according to Lebanese oil ministry sources. While the Lebanese transit and loading fee is much less than expected, Lebanon still stands to benefit from a supply of crude oil pumped to Tripoli at least $1 cheaper per barrel than that currently shipped there by tanker from Tapline's terminal at Zahrani in southern Lebanon. Furthermore, oil supplies from Iraq will help Lebanon ease the pressure of growing demand. The tripoli refinery is expected to meet 60 per cent of total Lebanese demand. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 47, 23 Nov 81 p 7]

CSO: 4400/82

SOVIET ROLE IN AFGHAN AVIATION REVIEWED

Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 11 Oct 81 p 4

[Article by Ye. Sorkin: "'Dobrolet' Originated the Air Route to Afghanistan"]

[Text] In June of 1930, regular air transportation was introduced on the routing Moscow - Tashkent. The third international air route, Tashkent - Kabul, had come into service even earlier (the first was Moscow - Konigsberg, and the second Verkhne-Udinsk - Ulan-Bator). This was at the end of 1927. "Dobrolet" was the pioneer that sponsored commissioning of this air service. Documents preserved in the Central State Archives of the USSR National Economy attest to this. The question of air transport between the USSR and Afghanistan was specifically discussed at conferences of its administration in June and October of 1927. L. N. Stark, USSR plenipotentiary in Afghanistan, wrote from Kabul: "The practical implementation of service on this air route--which has in fact been operational since mid-September--has convinced everyone in the most obvious way of its potential, expediency and convenience."

Soviet pilots flew trial runs to Afghanistan and back and made thorough studies of the complicated air route over the Hindu Kush mountain range (over 5000 meters high) and of airplane operating conditions in both Soviet and Afghan territory. Detailed pilots' reports were drawn up in which their observations were expounded and different variants proposed.

This resulted in a technical agreement being concluded between the administration of "Dobrolet" and the Afghanistan airline directorate with respect to the Tashkent - Kabul air route.

The population of Afghanistan has maintained a friendly relationship with Soviet pilots. Pilot Ya. Paul' relates in his report that he once had to make a forced landing in Afghanistan as a result of thick cloud cover over Hindu Kush. Afghan well-wishers came running to where the airplane had set down "and advised the pilot, through an interpreter, to get over the mountain range by heading towards Tash-Kurgan. They assured him that the mountain sky was clear in that direction." The pilot flew his airplane as advised and, indeed, after breaking through the clouds, he soon came out into clear sky. Leaving the mountains behind, the airplane landed in Termez 40 minutes later.

It must be stated that there was no meteorological service on the route at this time. Pilots frequently had to overcome significant difficulties in fighting the elements. Airplanes of the "Yunkers" variety--formerly in the "Dobrolet" inventory--were not always able to endure the low temperatures and high altitude. However, there was not a single accident. The most experienced pilots flew this route--M. S. Semenov, F. D. Ivanov, E. I. Shvarts, N. I. Baranov. They regularly flew passengers and freight--chiefly mail. Hero of the Soviet Union M. T. Slepnev later flew this route.

Ministers plenipotentiary of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan rendered "Dobrolet" full assistance in setting up uninterrupted air liaison between the USSR and Afghanistan.

It is interesting now to recall these events of the far distant past--now that the people of Afghanistan have achieved a revolution, winning genuine freedom and independence, and considering that our country came to the aid of its neighbor to the south. Today the air route of friendship is serviced by Aeroflot and its Afghan partners.

9768
CSO: 1829/39

REASONS WHY MUBARAK SHOULD BE NDP LEADER:

PM091123 Cairo MAY in Arabic 7 Dec 81

[Unattributed article: "Why Did President Mubarak Decide To Continue in the Party"]

[Text] When some people asked President Husni Mubarak to give up the National Democratic Party [NDP] leadership so that the president of the republic would stay out of party politics, the president replied that discussion of the matter was premature. The answer was taken as a sign that President Mubarak was likely to leave NDP.

The day before yesterday, Saturday, the president announced to the NDP parliamentary faction that after deep thought he had decided to stay in the party. President Mubarak gave the following justifications for his decision:

If the president leaves the NDP, conflicts will probably break out and affect the unity of the party, which has the majority and is responsible for developing democratic practice to the level we desire. In the event of conflict and division the strong party might become divided into several parties at a time when this cannot be allowed.

In the past few weeks President Mubarak has received the opposition party leaders and agreed with them on putting national interests above party interests. The Socialist Labor Party and the Socialist Liberal Party committed themselves to this principle, and the president hopes that the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party will also commit itself to this principle, which aims at serving Egypt's higher interest.

The president stressed that he would welcome constructive opposition. Objective criticism is required so that we can expose and do away with deviation. Although doing away with deviation is the NDP's primary duty because it is the majority party, nevertheless constructive opposition will be the illuminating light for the party and its government in this action.

The president declared that he will seek advice and consultation from all the opposition parties on every national issue and national action and that their constructive views will be taken into consideration on the grounds that they are part of the regime under whose umbrella we all work.

For these reasons President Mubarak decided to stay in the NDF. The parties have pledged fair play. Accepting that Egypt's national interest is above party ideology and that it is in no one's interest for the president to leave the party when, economic development being his main interest, he needs the majority party and the opposition parties as well.

CSO: 4504/121

EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL AFFIRMS ARAB COMMITMENT

GF121625 Manama WAKH in Arabic 1245 GMT 13 Dec 81

[Text] Doha, 13 Dec (WAKH)--Egyptian Foreign Under Secretary Dr Usamah al-Baz has affirmed his country's commitment to confront any aggression Israel or any other foreign party might carry out against any Arab country. In a statement to the Qatari newspaper AL-'ARAB published today, Dr al-Baz said: When signing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Egypt tried to reaffirm its commitment to the joint Arab defense treaty which provides for confronting any Israeli aggression against the Arab countries, including Syria.

He pointed out that despite the current temporary differences between Egypt and other Arab countries, Egypt is ready to provide urgent military aid to the Gulf countries if these countries are subjected to aggression. He also pointed out that Egypt is anxious to improve its armed forces in order to be able to meet demands by any Arab country subjected to threats or aggression.

Dr al-Baz asserted that the main issue in Egyptian policy is the insurance of an Arab presence, the protection of this presence now and in the future, the protection of the Arab nation's strategic security, and confrontation of any foreign threat by any superpower.

He called for an end to Arab differences and for "reshaping the house from inside" so that Arab nation can firmly confront interference by foreign countries which are interested only in fulfulling their ambitions and in threatening security and peace in the region.

Dr al-Baz said many people in many Arab countries are convinced that the situation now, more than ever, requires closing ranks, uniting and paying attention to the main strategic issues. He said he believed Arab solidarity will improve by the end of the year.

Dr al-Baz warned against continuation of the spread of the Israeli cancer in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which is an abandonment of Palestinian and Arab rights. He said the preservation of Lebanese unity is an issue that has to take first priority in all Arab countries.

On the Iraqi-Iranian war. He said Arab countries must not sit idly and watch this war [but must act] in order to preserve their cohesion, unity and interests.

Asked about the security situation in the Strait of Hormuz, Dr Usamah al-Baz affirmed that should a crisis threaten the security of the strait, Egypt "can go to Oman in a few hours in order to side with the fraternal people there against any attempt to undermine their sovereignty."

He also asserted that the normalization of relations between Egypt and Israel does not mean Israel will have a special status with Egypt. Rather relations are to make the situation between them normal, as in the case of Egyptian-Cypriot or Egyptian-Greek relations, for example.

Dr al-Baz said he cannot see normalization as a threat to the Egyptian and Arab economy or culture, "because this belittles the importance of the Egyptian and Arab economy, culture and civilization."

CSO: 4504/121

TWO-PART SERIES ON CONFESSIONS OF AL-SADAT'S KILLERS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic Nos 2978, 2979, 6, 13 Nov 81

[Article: "Amazing Confessions of the Leaders of the Terrorist Organization"]

[No 2978, 6 Nov 81 pp 6,7, 84 Part I]

> [Text] Terrorists planned to set fire to mosques of al-Sayyidah Zaynab and al-Husayn and to blow up a number of churches to incite sectarian sedition in the midst of the attempt to take over the government.
> Why did the attempt to assassinate al-Sadat in al-Qanatir fail?
> The complete details of the structure of the terrorist organization, beginning with the leaders all the way to the executive echelons.

The correspondent of AL-MUSAWWAR has learned that 30 deputy public prosecutors are now investigating the members of the terrorist organization most of whose members and leaders have been apprehended. In the light of the full confessions provided by these people, a full view of the structure of the terrorist organization throughout the republic has been defined. This view includes all the organizational levels of the organization, their responsibilities, the members of the organization and all the missions it carried out and was planning to execute.

According to statements made by a high level source in the Ministry of the Interior, all the members of the organizational structure throughout the country have been apprehended, even the officials of administrative districts and regions. All the organization's central committees have also been apprehended. These used to constitute the organization's specialized center which was charged with specific responsibilities that had to do with carrying out assassination operations, the outbreak of chaos in the streets and the seizure of vital, important institutions or the acquisition of weapons and explosives.

Relying on this high-level source AL-MUSAWWAR can affirm that the total for all levels of the terrorist organizational structure will not exceed 750 persons. Most of those have been apprehended; the few who escaped are being

picked up every day by security agencies, especially since all their communications have been broken. It has become impossible for them to move about freely, and all their thoughts are confined to hiding and escaping.

AL-MUSAWWAR can also affirm that all the accountable and dangerous leaders of this organization have been apprehended, and that the few who are still at large are no more than 3 or at most 5 persons. Those are mid-level leaders, and they are under constant surveillance. They are being pursued constantly, especially with the abundant information that was provided by those who confessed. This information defined the scope and the possibilities of action for those people.

The correspondent of AL-MUSAWWAR has learned that the facts revealed by the terrorist conspiracy will be the subject of two law suits which are currently being investigated.

1. The case of the assassination of President al-Sadat which is being investigated by the military prosecution, since the assassination took place on the platform for a military parade. The primary defendant in this case is Khalid al-Islambuli.

2. The case of the establishment of an armed, terrorist civilian organization whose purpose is to overthrow the government and to plan the assassination of Egypt's political and military leaders and create a state of chaos in the country that would enable them to seize control of the institutions of government.

It may be said that a number of those who were apprehended and are now being questioned by the state security prosecution and who are accused of establishing this organization are also being questioned at the same time by the military prosecution because they took part in planning the assassination of the late leader, Anwar al-Sadat.

The Members of the Organization's Central Committees and Their Functions inside the Organization

According to the information of AL-MUSAWWAR all the members of the central organization's central committees were apprehended. The most important of these committees are:

1. The preparedness committee. Among its functions were:

--Obtaining money and weapons.

--Planning the break-ins of some jewelry stores to steal quantities of gold and sell the gold to raise money for the organization's expenditures.

--Renting the hideouts that were utilized by the members of the organization.

--Stealing means of transportation, such as cars and motorcycles, a short time before carrying out the plan.

2. The economic committee: Its function was to determine the financial capabilities of the organization, how the money would be spent and the expenses that would be turned over to its members and staff. Its function was also to announce imaginary plans for the construction of a number of mosques and to seize the funds [raised for building those mosques]. The members of this committee] appropriated 5,000 pounds from the contributions that had been collected to build the Fajr al-Islam [Dawn of Islam] Mosque in the area of Nahiya, and they also organized an imaginary campaign to raise contributions for the freedom fighters of Aghanistan. They ultimately appropriated all these funds.

3. The appeals committee: Among its functions was that of stirring up chaos in the Egyptian mainstream if plans to seize the institutions of government succeeded after al-Sadat's assassination. Also among its functions was that of arousing sectarian sedition in the country.

They Made Plans To Set Fire to the Mosques of al-Sayyidah Zaynab and al-Husayn

The organization played a serious role in the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and Asyut. Some of the defendants confessed that they had printed the leaflets that were distributed during the events. [They confessed that] they also recorded the voices of Muslims and Christians who were wounded in these incidents on cassettes and they distributed these casettes to promote sedition.

The confessions of a number of these people revealed amazing facts whose execution was being planned so that sectarian sedition would break out once again amidst the confusion of the assassination incident and the beginning of the execution of the organization's plans to seize the institutions of government. They thought that the spread of sectarian sedition in the midst of these fearful events would give them a climate favorable for the success of their action, particularly since they expected this climate to make all citizens stay in their homes out of fear and [a desire for] safety. The streets would then be occupied only by a rabble-rousing and a destructive mob that can be misled and manipulated in the fearful sequence of events.

In this regard the organization made plans, as was indicated in the confessions of a number of its members, to set fire to the mosques of al-Sayyidah Zaynab and al-Husayn. They also made plans to set fire to a number of churches or to throw some explosives on them as was the case in the incident of Masarah Church.

The confessions of some of the organization's leaders also revealed that if their plans succeeded, the following step would have been to accept nominations for the position of General Prince of the Faithful. This person would have been the one to represent the terrorist state they intended to establish after those who are in charge would have eliminated all the rejectionists or the hesitant Egyptian intellectuals. These would have been eliminated by committees of terror in the streets which can be formed from the rabble in the street, provided that a responsible member of the organization preside over each committee.

According to the confessions of defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, an engineer who used to work for the administration of Cairo University and who was one of the dangerous and principal leaders in the organization, the terrorist organization formed an advisory council throughout the organization in the end of 1980, and that council was chaired by the defendant 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman. He is a blind man from al-Fayyum who used to provide formal legal opinions to these groups. He was employed as an assistant professor in the College of the Principles of Religion.

The organizational structure was formed as follows:

1. The advisory council was chaired by 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, who undertook the task of providing formal legal opinions to the organization. This council included [the following]:

--'Abbud al-Zumur, for Cairo and north Egypt.

--Karam Zuhdi for the south of Egypt.

--Fu'ad al-Dawalibi, 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid and Muhammad 'Isam Darbalah for al-Minya.

--'Ali al-Sharif and Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim for Qina.

--Najih Ibrahim for Asyut.

--Hamdi 'Abd-al-Rahman for Sawhaj.

2. There were three committees that grew out of the advisory council. They are:

--The Preparedness Committee: It consisted of 'Abbud al-Zumur, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, Karam Zuhdi and 'Ali al-Sharif. The function of this committee was to make preparations for arming and training the organization's members in the use of weapons.

--The Appeal Committee: It consisted of Muhammad 'Isam Darbalah, 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid and Najih Ibrahim. This committee undertook the responsibility of choosing new members in the organization by frequenting the mosques and local prayer halls.

3. The Economic Committee.

The Organizational Structure of the Leaders of the Governorates

Karam Muhammad Zuhdi also confessed. He is one of the most dangerous principal leaders of the organization. He was apprehended outside the area of al-Ghanayim while he was trying to flee from the governorate of Asyut after the attempt to seize the city had failed. His colleague, Muhammad 'Isam Hasan Darbalah was with him. The latter had been wounded during the clash that took place with the security forces.

Karam Zuhdi confessed about the organizational structure of the leaderships of the governorates of al-Minya and Asyut. He had presided over that structure which included [the following]:

1. Najih Ibrahim 'Abdallah: he was in command in the south.

2. 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid.

3. 'Ali al-Sharif.

4. Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, from Naja' Hamadi. He is a student in [the College of] Engineering in al-Minya, and he was one of those included in the precautionary order. He was apprehended, and he is the official for Naja' Hamadi.

5. Muhammad 'Isam al-Din Darbalah.

6. Fu'ad Muhammad al-Dawalibi.

7. Hamdi 'Abd-al-Rahman. He is a student in [the College of] Engineering in Asyut, and he is originally from Sawhaj.

8. Muhammad Yasin Muhammad Hammam. He was in charge of military training and of dismantling and assembling weapons in apartments. He took part in the attack in Asyut.

9. Badr, a student at Asyut University.

10. Rifa'i, a student at Asyut University and the official for the area of Aramant.

11. Abu Bakr is the official for the area of al-Balina.

12. Isma'il al-Baql, employed at the Institute of Motor Vehicles.

13. Muhi, one of the organization's members in the governorate of al-Minya.

14. Abu al-'Ila, one of the organization's members in the governorate of al-Minya. He assumed the responsibility for Naja' Hamadi.

15. Ahmad al-Banna assumed the responsibility for Naja' Hamadi after Fu'ad Qasim, the Naja' Hamadi official, was arrested.

16. Sha'ban 'Abd-al-Latif, a 24-year old student at the College of Antiquities.

Karam also confessed that it was al-Shaykh 'Umar Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman who issued the formal legal opinions for the organization. He is a blind man, originally from al-Fayyum, and he is employed as an assistant professor at the College of the Principles of Religion in Asyut. [Karam] had met him in al-Fayyum with Usamah Ibrahim Hafiz and 'Isam.

Karam also confessed that he had purchased for the organization's operations a private white 304 Peugeot car and that he had then painted the car light blue. He purchased the car with Cairo license plate number 163131. The car was seized.

The most serious confession by Karam Zuhdi, however, was the fact that the purpose of the organization ever since it was established was to try to overthrow the government by seizing a few sensitive locations in the state: radio, television, the telephone exchanges and others. The organization was to consider seizing the operations room of the armed forces, the leaders of central security and the Ministry of the Interior and attacking the al-Qanatir rest house as one of the ways of assassinating President al-Sadat.

The execution plan was the responsibility of each of [the following]:

1. 'Abbud al-Zumur.

2. Nabil al-Maghrabi.

3. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam.

The timing of the execution was to be determined upon completion of the organization's ranks and after the organization's members complete their training in the use of weapons.

Some of the members of the organization had functions regarding military arming and training. These were:

--Purchasing weapons:

1. 'Ali al-Sharif, a member of the organization in the south. He was responsible for purchasing weapons from the people of Upper Egypt.

2. 'Abbud al-Zumur was responsible for purchasing weapons from Greater Cairo and the northern part of Egypt.

--Military training: Nabil al-Maghrabi, a member of the organization was in charge of training and was assisted by each of [the following]:

1. 'Ali al-Sharif, member of the organization in the southern part of Egypt.

2. Karam Muhammad Zuhdi.

Nabil al-Maghrabi also trained groups in breaking in and raiding.

--The organization's communications officials were:

1. Karam Zuhdi.

2. Fu'ad al-Dawalibi, communications official for the southern part of Egypt.

3. Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam.

4. Yahya Gharib who lives near the home of Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam located on the second floor of [a building] on Tir'ah al-Zumur Street. He was the communications official for the northern section of Egypt.

Final Meeting To Make Plans for al-Sadat's Assassination

In his confessions Karam Zuhdi also related that for some time the organization had been discussing a former plan to assassinate President al-Sadat at the al-Qanatir resthouse and to assassinate the responsible political and military leaders at their places of residence. However, they refrained from carrying out that plan.

Then at a meeting that was held a short time before the military parade they went back again to discuss a plan to assassinate President al-Sadat.

Karam Zuhdi said that that meeting was attended by each of [the following]:

1. Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam.

2. Fu'ad Mahmud Ahmad al-Dawalibi, who works in trade but used to work for the Central Agency for Organization and Management in al-Minya.

3. Samawi Ibrahim Hafiz, a student at the [College of] Engineering in Asyut and the chief of the Islamic Group there. He is originally from the governorate of al-Minya.

4. Khalid Shawqi al-Islambuli.

The meeting took place in the home of Khalid al-Islambuli's brother-in-law in the area of al-Alf Maskin [the thousand homes]. Khalid had indicated to Karam Zuhdi that he was going to take part in the 6 October military parade and that he would execute the plan to assassinate the late president, Anwar al-Sadat by shooting him and throwing hand grenades at the platform. Al-Islambuli assured [his colleagues] that the plan had an 80 percent chance of success.

The Secrets of the Terrorist Operation in Asyut

In his confessions Karam said that after the assassination plan turned out to be successful, the leadership of the organization thought of carrying out actions in the governorate of Asyut whose purpose would be to realize full control over the governorate and to isolate it from the remaining governorates by [the following] means:

1. Seizing a large quantity of weapons from the security administration and from the police stations.

2. Arousing fear among the central security forces there.

3. Imposing a siege around the administration of the governorate of Asyut by closing all entrances and exits to the city and all the entrances and exits to the administration of the governorate.

4. Seizing the telephone exchange and interrupting communications between Asyut and the remaining governorates.

It was thought that the operation of breaking into the administration of the governorate and the first and second police stations be carried out so that weapons can be seized and quick assassinations of the central security forces carried out. If the operation turned out to be successful, they were to go to the governorate of al-Minya and other governorates. Among the organization's leaders who approved of this were:

1. 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid Muhammad, a student at the [College of] Engineering in Asyut. He is originally from al-Minya. He has been arrested, and he is wounded.

2. 'Ali al-Sharif, a suspended student from the College of Business in Asyut. He is originally from Naja' Hamadi in the governorate of Qina. He was apprehended, and he is wounded.

3. Najih Ibrahim 'Abdallah, a physician at the health unit in Farshut, in the administrative district of Asyut.

4. Muhammad 'Isam al-Din Hasan Darbalah, a student at the [College of] Engineering in Asyut. He was apprehended in the incidents in which the security administration was attacked.

5. Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim, a student in [the College of] Engineering in al-Minya.

6. Fu'ad Mahmud Ahmad al-Dawalibi.

7. Hamdi 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-'Azim, a student at [the College of] Engineering in Asyut.

The fact is that everyone except Tal'at Fu'ad Qasim was included in the precautionary order. They were fugitives in al-Jabal.

Karam said that five groups had been formed, and each group had 8 to 10 members. They were to carry out the plan, and zero hour was scheduled for the early morning during the Bairam prayer. They were to use the weapons they had in their possession. The five groups were charged with the following tasks:

The first group was to storm into and control the security administration; and it was to seize the largest quantity of weapons and ammunition.

The second group was to storm into the second police station in Asyut and to seize the weapons and ammunition there.

The third group was to storm into the first police station in Asyut and to attack the central security force that was stationed in front of the supply investigations [office] near the station.

The fourth and fifth groups were to arouse fear among the members of the central security forces on the roads and streets during the Bairam prayer service. They were then to occupy the Asyut telephone exchange building and then occupy the governorate building after seizing weapons. They were then to cut the navigational route between Asyut and the other governorates.

After the successful execution of the plan, after weapons are seized and control established, the members of the groups were to call upon the worshipers to join them and to carry out the revolution. However, the fact that security forces killed and wounded some and arrested others led to the organization's failure to seize the administration of Asyut governorate. The defendant finally confessed that his name in the movement was Mansur and that the name 'Abbud al-Zumur used in the movement was 'Abd-al-Rahman.

Other Confessions

The defendant 'Arafah 'Abdallah al-Abyad, who is a worker at the radio relay station in Abu Za'bal, confessed that the defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj 'Atiyyah asked [to borrow] his radio identification badge which was issued to him by the broadcasting services. He was going to make badges like it and to use the forgeries in the operation of storming into the Radio and Television Building to broadcast the revolution's declaration. He added that he actually gave him the badge.

He confessed that he was preparing a group of 50 terrorists to occupy the Radio and Television Building after the assassination incident. However, when they failed to eliminate the political and military leaders on the platform, 'Abbud al-Zumur called a meeting at his hideout in al-Haram and made plans to attack the central security patrols and seize their weapons. Those plans were modeled after those that had been made for the Asyut incidents.

[No 2979, 13 Nov 81 p 72 Part II]

[Text] AL-MUSAWWAR has learned from a source closely related to the investigations that are underway with the terrorist organization that planned the assassination of the late President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat and planned the attempt to seize power by force that the most dangerous leader of that organization is the defendant 'Abbud al-Zumur. [AL-MUSAWWAR has also learned that] 'Abbud al-Zumur has made several serious confessions in the course of the investigation and that he said that the numerous crimes he had committed were enough to qualify him for the death sentence and that therefore he saw no need to confess to further details.

'Abbud al-Zumur had stated in his serious confessions that his religious inclinations had begun in 1979 and then developed through his family relationship with the defendant Tariq 'Abd-al-Mawjud al-Zumur. He said that

he had come to an agreement with Nabil al-Maghrabi, Tariq al-Zumur, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Farraj and other members of Islamic groups that it was necessary to seize power by force.

The Development of the Movement and the Purchase of Weapons

The defendant 'Abbud al-Zumur also stated that their movement had later developed [and turned to] the purchase of weapons to implement their plans; to form groups to win over people and train them to use weapons and defend themselves; and to collect contributions to finance the organization's activities.

'Abbud al-Zumur also confessed that Nabil al-Maghrabi and Muhammad 'Abd al-Salam Faraj used to introduce to him those people whom they were able to attract so he can look into the possibility and the method of utilizing them in the organization.

He said that the organization's plan focused on seizing the government by assassinating President al-Sadat and the leaders who assisted him and then carrying out a popular revolution during which the Ministry of Defense, the State Security building at the Ministry of the Interior, the Radio and Television Building, the Central Security Command and the public telephone exchanges would be occupied. imaginary statements of support would then be issued through the media to show support for the revolution, and the masses would be encouraged by means of bullhorns attached to cars to support their movement. In addition, statements would be broadcast by their members at all locations [asking people] to oppose the enemies of the revolution.

On 11 October 'Abbud al-Zumur charged a group from the organization with the task of finding out where central security vehicles are stationed in streets and squares in Cairo and also at the state security investigations building in al-Jizah for the purpose of making plans to seize the weapons of these forces and spread an atmosphere of fear amidst the citizens on the day of the presidential referendum. Al-Zumur had charged another group with the execution of these operations. This group was apprehended.

Al-Sadat's Assassination Was a Natural Matter

The defendant 'Abbud al-Zumur also stated that the assassination of President al-Sadat was a natural matter and that it was required for the achievement of their objective.

He also stated that the fact that the government arrested large numbers of the organization's members after the events of al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and after the precautionary orders were issued constituted the reason why they expedited the implementation of President al-Sadat's assassination. He stated that when the organization carried out this plan, it was still in the process of making preparations for seizing power.

The Terrorists Implicate Each Other in Their Confessions

The confessions of the organization's leaders followed each other after that, and the organization's members who are under arrest began implicating each other in their confessions. The defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salihin stated that the leading defendant Najih 'Abdallah used to urge the organization's plans against the state, which was considered heretical.

The defendant 'Atif Hasan Ziyadah also stated that the leading defendant Nabil al-Maghrabi explained to him that the organization was based on the principle of repudiating the ruler and that the organization's method manifested itself in the use of force against the ruler.

The defendant Karam Zuhdi stated that the organization was seeking the overthrow of the regime and the establishment of a new state. He said that the leading defendant Nabil al-Maghrabi had defined for them the method of the organization's action which is manifested in the use of force to achieve their goals. The organization had made preparations for the Asyut events to spread chaos and to complete the overthrow of the government by seizing a few vital and sensitive locations in the state.

The defendant Nabil al-Maghrabi acknowledged that he and the defendant 'Abbud al-Zumur had agreed that an armed struggle against the regime was necessary so they can impose their authority by force.

The Organization's Organizational Principles

The results of following up the investigations affirm the likelihood that the principal bloc in the structure of the organization which has been apprehended is an extension of the organizational circles of al-Jihad which had begun with the organization at the Military Technical [College]. The most recent of these was the al-Jihad organization which was apprehended late in 1979.

The leading defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj confessed that thoughts about forming the organization began in 1980 after it split from the al-Jihad organization in 1979.

He also stated that three groups that espouse the same ideas as those espoused by the apprehended organization also split from the latter organization. These groups are:

--A group in Alexandria led by Ibrahim Salamah who died in the recent events in al-Ma'adi.

--A group in Shubra led by 'Abd-al-Ra'uf. He was taken into custody in the sectarian sedition events.

--A group led by the Jordanian citizen, Muhammad Salim Ramal. He was deported from the country this year.

The leading defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj indicated that the apprehended organization thought that it should not merge with the aforementioned groups because most of their members were known to security agencies. The organization thought that it would be sufficient to notify them of the zero hour for seizing power, as determined by the organization, a few days earlier so they can help and support their action.

A number of leading defendants, especially the defendant Karam Zuhdi, confessed that the defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj took into the organization some members of the al-Jihad Organization which is affiliated with the Jordanian Muhammad Salim Ramal and others who are members of the group of 'Abd-al-Ra'uf, the chief of the army.

The defendant 'Abd-al-Ra'uf, the chief of the army, also confessed that he had given the defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam two suitcases containing a number of bombs and explosives for his use in his organizational activities. He did so despite his concern that there be a single organizational relationship between them.

The defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj himself confessed that he coordinated activities with Ibrahim Salamah, the chief of the al-Jihad group in Alexandria, to take action in the interests of the organization there.

The Organization's Relationship with Other Organizations inside the Country and Abroad

AL-MUSAWWAR has also learned that the confessions of the leading defendants revealed that the organization had established closer ties with some extremist religious organizations that have been active recently inside the country. The organization set out to establish with these extremist religious organizations something between what resembles a full merger or a description of the alliances and procurement of aid or expenses for supporting the organization and helping it seize power.

The defendant Kamal al-Sa'id Habib al-Disuqi also confessed that he was a member of the group that was led by the Jordanian Muhammad Salim Ramal and that the defendant Ahmad Hani Mustafa al-Hinnawi was also a member of that group. He said that after the aformentioned Jordanian was deported in 1981 and the precautionary orders regarding sectarian sedition were issued, they were joined by the defendant Muhammad Tariq Ibrahim. He was asked to lead the group and he was given the responsibility of financing it. The two defendants Ahmad Hani al-Hinnawi and Salah Bayyumi (Abu Basir) assumed the responsibility for communications, and he assumed the responsibility of winning people over into the organization. The defendant Usamah (Abu al-Harith) assumed the responsibility for al-Jihad, and Nabil Na'im assumed the responsibility for the miltary faction. The structure of the organization was expanded to include most of the governorates of north Egypt, Cairo, al-Jizah and Alexandria.

Subordinate Groups within the Principal Group

Numerous confessions revealed that that this group comprised within it other subordinate groups, such as the group of 'Ali Farraj in al-Zaqaziq, which is originally linked with the extremist group of Taha al-Samawi.

This group was also able to add to its roster of members a few individuals who have ties with other groups.

It is noteworthy that despite the apparent ignorance of the subordinate groups' rank and file of their groups' affiliation with the organization, these subordinate organizations took part in the organization's actions in a manner that leaves no room for doubt about their organic incorporation in the parent organization. It is evident that this is no more than one of the strict security measures pursued by the organization in its action.

The confessions of the defendants in the organization of 'Ali Farraj in al-Zaqaziq stated that after the precautionary orders regarding sectarian sedition were issued, the chief had asked them to go to Cairo to take part in a demonstration which the organization had organized. The demonstration was to start from the al-Nur mosque, and it was to proceed to the People's Assembly where it would ask for the release of all those who were in custody.

Fifty Terrorists To Occupy Broadcasting Building

The confessions of some members of the former group also stated that they had been charged by 'Ali Farraj and Usamah Qasim (Abu al-Harith) with going to Cairo to take part in the plan to seize the weapons in one of the establishments he had specified to them. They were then to storm into the Radio and Television building and to broadcast the revolution's declaration. This group consisted of 50 persons, and they actually went to Cairo on 5 October. After the operation to eliminate the military and political leaders on the platform failed, the defendant Muhammad Tariq Ibrahim took [those 50 persons] to the apartment in al-Haram where the defendant 'Abbud al-Zumur had been hiding. There 'Abbud al-Zumur met with them and made plans for attacking the central security patrols and seizing their weapons.

It is to be noted that the organization's membership in the governorates became confused and broke up when they did not hear the declaration of revolution on the radio after the late president was assassinated because this group had failed to carry out the operation to seize the broadcasting building.

Their Relationship with the Association of Muslim Students in Europe

Follow-up revealed the existence of a close relationship between the apprehended organization and another extremist religious organization that espouses the same ideas and is led by the defendant Ayman al-Zawahiri. 'Isam al-Qamari is one of its members, and the pharmacist, the defendant Amin al-Damiri was the liaison officer between the two organizations. Many of the members of the latter organization were apprehended, and so were large quantities of weapons and explosives that they were hiding in their hideouts. The processes of developing the follow-up [activities] regarding

this organization are underway so as to reveal its proportions and the reality of relations between it and the first apprehended organization, especially in the light of what was revealed regarding the fact that the same people were members of both organizations at the same time, such as the defendant 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Zayni.

The preliminary results of the [investigation into the] true relationship between the two organizations indicate that the organization of Iman al-Zawahiri was providing financial and material aid to the first organization. The confessions of Iman [sic] al-Zawahiri, 'Abbud al-Zumur and Amin al-Damiri indicated that the defendant, Ayman al-Zawahiri gave the defendant 'Abbud al-Zumur the sum of 800 pounds to shore up the organization and that he also disposed of the yield of the gold which the organization had stolen in the Naja' Hamadi incident after preparations for that were made by the defendant Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahim al-Sharqawi.

The confessions of the defendants Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj and 'Abd-al-Majid 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Fiqi affirmed that the apprehended organization had ties with the alliance of Muslim students in Europe which is controlled by a Syrian member of the Muslim Brothers, 'Isam al-'Attar.

Interim Planning for the Realization of Ultimate Goals

AL-MUSAWWAR has also learned that the apprehended organization made an interim plan to achieve its ultimate goals of seizing power and establishing its state. This plan was as follows:

--The first stage involved spreading out among the various sectors of the public by frequenting mosques and religious societies and selecting [illegible] persons who are suitable for recruitment, regardless of their ideological inclinations, and making them join the organization.

--Preparing the necessary weapons for the organization.

--Training the organization's members in the theoretical and practical use of weapons.

The second stage [involved the following]:

--Carrying out political assassinations against the political, executive and popular leaders in the country.

--This would be followed by setting off separate disturbances that would create a kind of over-all chaos and affect the government's ability to control the situation.

--This would be accompanied by action to arouse the popular masses against the regime in preparation for seizing power.

The third stage [involved the following]:

--Seizing the vital locations in the state--radio, television, the general means of communications and some of the control centers in the various agencies of the state--and announcing the creation of their state.

--On that basis the organization had purchased weapons and turned to the formation of groups among its members. It formed committees to win people and recruit them; other committees for communications; and still others for training.

8592
CSO: 4504/107

'ELDERLY' DETAINEES REPORTEDLY TO BE RELEASED

PM141025 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 9 Dec 81 p 1

[AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT bureau and agencies report: "Cairo: Decision To Release al-Talmasani, Kishk, al-'Ashmawi and 74 Other Detainees Within a Week"]

[Excerpt] Cairo--An official source at the public prosecutor's office has stated that it has been decided to release the elderly Muslim and Christian religious figures detained in the 5 September campaign and to allow them to return home as of next week because their health does not allow them to remain in Turrah jail.

The decision involves 74 persons, including 'Umat al-Talmasani, chairman of the board of directors of AL-DA'WAH magazine, ahd Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid Kishk, imam and preacher of Kubri al-Qubbah mosque.

The spokesman said that each of the detainees will be released after his case has been studied, as with those released in November.

On the other hand 'Abd al-Hamid Ramadan, a lawyer and a member of the former Wafd Party, has objected to the decision of the Egyptian People's Assembly to grant the widow of President al-Sadat certain privileges. The lawyer has filed a case with the State Council requesting the abrogation of a decision by parliament giving Mrs Jihan al-Sadat and her children the lifetime right to live in two of the late president's residences, the first in Cairo and the second in Alexandria.

The lawyer pointed out to the "unconstitutionality" of the decision, which is in violation of the principles of equality contained in article 40 of the constitution.

The Egyptian lawyer said in his suit that parliament's decision to grant the heirs of late President al-Sadat a pension equalling the total remuneration which President al-Sadat received constitutes a violation of the rights of the Egyptian taxpayer.

CSO: 4504/121

BRIEFS

MUBARAK FAVORS DIRECT ARAB CONTACT--Cairo, 6 Dec (MENA)--The newspaper MAY, to be published tomorrow, Monday, says that President Husni Mubarak will not use any intermediary in his relations with any Arab or foreign country. The paper affirms that President Mubarak prefers direct contacts with the governments of these countries without intercession by a third party. [Text] [NC062241 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2223 GMT 6 Dec 81]

ASWAN EARTHQUAKES--The danger of earthquakes, which hit Aswan last week, continues. Scientists have discovered that Nasir Lake is the cause of the earthquakes. Hulwan Observatory seismographs have recorded 33 earth tremors since the latest Aswan earthquake. It has transpired that the Hulwan and Abu Sunbul Observatory equipment is inadequate and that there is a shortage of meteorological experts. The education and scientific research minister has confirmed to the People's Assembly that the high dam's Nasir Lake is the cause of the earthquakes. The minister, Dr Mustafa Kamal Hilmi, answering a briefing request from five assembly members, said that any artificial lake like Nasir Lake, which is 350 km long with a different water level than the Nile, is bound to create new geological conditions resulting in earth tremors. The minister said that several tremors of varying degrees occur daily and are not felt by anyone. He added: We have had 53 tremors since the latest Aswan earthquake. They were recorded by the Hulwan Observatory. [Excerpt] [PM070917 Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 30 Nov 81 p 1]

MILITARY EDUCATION INTRODUCTION IN SCHOOLS--The application of military education has begun in 243 secondary schools and technical institutes in 6 provinces in the current scholastic year preparatory to applying it gradually in all secondary schools in all provinces. This was announced by Maj Gen (Fahim Shadid), commander of military education and popular defense, on the occasion of the military education parade which he witnessed today in al-Sa'idiyah secondary school in Al-Jizah. He said that a committee has been formed by the education and defense ministries to consider the development of military education in schools and eliminate all the negative aspects precluding the application of military education in the best manner so as to achieve the aim of discipline and create in the students an integrated personality--educationally, physically and ethically. [Text] [NC061507 Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 6 Dec 81]

CONSTITUTION OF TERRORIST GROUP SEIZED--Cairo, 12 Dec (MENA)--The state security investigation department seized a few days ago the constitution of the terrorist organization in a hide-out set up by the organisation's leadership for concealing weapons, explosives and documents, reports AKHBAR AL-YAWM in its top billing and leaing front-page story. The constitution sets forth the organisation's method of seeking to create a bloody regime, it provides for creating three branches for spying, agitation and fighting and stipulates that whoever took part in the Jihan (holy war) would have a share in the spoils, the amir or leader of the organisation would have the right to retain for himself whatever pleases him of the spoils before they are divided among the other members, the paper said. Jihad is the means the constitution chose for changing the regime of government and included physical liquidation of whoever stood in the way of the achievement of this purpose, anyone who opposed the ideology of the organisation would be an unbeliever and his wealth and women would be fair spoils of the terrorists, the paper added. [From the press review] [Text] [NC120806 Cairo MENA in English 0705 GMT 12 Dec 81]

CSO: 4500/72

OPPOSITION PAPER WARNS 'SOVIETS COMING HASTILY'

Paris IRAN-E AZAD in Persian 31 Oct 81 pp 1, 8

[Text] The travels of high-ranking delegations from the illegitimate Islamic Republic regime to communist countries (particularly those headed by Hashemi-Rafsanjani to North Korea and that of the large delegation of the Islamic Republic to Cuba headed by the "praying" mulla) and the extensive domestic propaganda put out by the Khomeyni regime concerning these travels, made it clear that Soviet influence in Iran has entered a new stage. It can be considered a final stage in the establishment of Kremlin agents and plans designed effectively to tie Iran with the communist bloc and even lead to the actual occupation of the country. Until now Soviet activities in Iran have gone through the following stages: help in the overthrow of the Shah's regime, aid to the illegitimate revolutionary regime in the murder of the supporters of the royal regime and the army, the expansion of the influence of the Tudeh Party and other Iranian, Palestinian, Afghan and Lebanese Marxist parties and organizations in the country; carrying out plans to separate Iran from Western countries and place it in diplomatic, economic and social isolation (such as the taking of American diplomats hostage in Tehran); prevention of involvement in the Islamic Republic establishment of moderate elements and those favoring relations with the West; linking the country with the Eastern bloc through the sale of food products, arms, industrial goods and other consumer items; bringing closer together the policies of the "mulla" regime with those of Kremlin stooge regimes such as Syria, Libya, South Yemen and Cuba; the control of all communication and propaganda facilities, and finally the creation of conditions and atmosphere similar to those in communist countries in the daily life of the country and people such as rationing of food, government control over propaganda, education and art, establishment of an intelligence and security organization similar to those of the Eastern bloc, prevention of people wanting to leave the country, confiscation of citizens' properties, and government control over housing and commerce.

Thus all factors have been readied for the coming into power of a regime in Tehran that would be totally affiliated with the Soviet Union--possibly after the death or murder of Khomeyni. If Khomeyni should be removed from the scene (his life also being totally in the hands of Soviet agents), the transfer of power to a Kremlin-controlled regime would become possible without the need for important changes or any serious difficulty because all devotees are in place at high levels and regulations and forces have been readied to run the country and crack down on any possible resistance.

The new stage of expanding Soviet influence in Iran is designed to obliterate from the Iranian public's mind the bitter and harsh life behind the Iron Curtain. It is for this reason that as a result of the visit of delegations from the illegitimate regime to communist countries and by means of propaganda put out concerning such trips, the news and information organs of the Islamic Republic of Iran are trying to present tampered information in various parts of the country concerning the way of life and government in such countries and to show that the people there fully enjoy freedom, comfort and happiness and that their life and lot are very much better than those presently faced by the Iranian people. Thus the "bestowed gifts" being enjoyed by the people of Cuba and North Korea would spark the envy of the wretched people of Iran and cause them to long for those types of governments and way of life.

In coming against the rapid direct and indirect expansion of Soviet influence in Iran, nationalist fighters and opponents of the regime of the Islamic Republic do not show much awareness of the serious situation the country is in, and continue their simple-minded propaganda concerning a few insignificant political figures and a few leftover and egotistical leaders. At the same time, even though the West and the free countries have become aware of the danger of Soviet influence and the rapid expansion of communism in the world, under present conditions free countries do not appear to have the will and decision to prevent such influence and expansion. In these conditions it is the duty of nationalist fighters and all Iranian patriots to increase the anticommunist and anti-Soviet front of their forces and to clean their ranks of suspect and "leftist" elements who are always affiliated with the Eastern bloc. At the international level, nationalist Iranians must as soon as possible place their ranks at the side of anticommunist forces of free countries and actively join the anticommunist struggle throughout the world. As we have always said, our enemy is not the regime of the Islamic Republic since it does not have an independent life and force of its own. Our true enemy is international communism which today has imposed the Khomeyni regime on our country and tomorrow will create something similar or even worse. Freedom loving, patriotic and anticommunist forces of the world unite!

5854
CSO: 4640/69

TEHRAN'S RIFT WITH SAUDI ARABIA DISCUSSED

Brussels SPECIAL L'EVENTAIL in French No 94, 23-29 Oct 81 pp 14-17

[Article by Jacques Tarron: "The Logic of Fanatics"]

[Text] Incidents with Saudi Arabia, mass executions, the West still considered the "Great Satan": all that could seem inconsistent in the leader of Iranian government officials. But never since the fall of the monarchy have they been as logical with themselves and with their convictions. For the horrified surprise of some foreigners over the actions of the current Tehran government shows a total misunderstanding of the goals which Ayatollah Khomeyni set for himself when he returned to his country.

These goals were extremely simple: to restore Islam to its full extent and, at the same time, to proclaim a "jihad" (holy war) against his enemies, the first of which was the United States, guilty of having supported the imperial regime, a regime which had not applied Koranic (Shi'ite) law in its full sense. For we should make no mistake: If the shah or SAVAK (which has been far surpassed by the current leaders' actions) had maintained law and order in the name of God, neither Khomeyni nor his loyal followers would have reproached it on humanitarian or other grounds. Tehran is presently hurling such reproaches more and more frequently at Saudi Arabia, which is accused of not joining the "holy war" being waged by the imam (according to the Shi'ite faith, a spiritual and religious leader appointed by God) named Ruhollah Khomeyni ....

Even in Mecca

Radio Tehran broadcast a scathing message from "Imam" Khomeyni, accusing the Saudi Government of having harassed Iranian pilgrims visiting the holy city of Mecca. Such a pilgrimage is part of the sacred duties of every Moslem and the local chief of state (King Khaled) cannot bar access to the faithful who come to venerate the "Kaaba" and its black stone, given to Abraham by the archangel Gabriel, according to Koranic tradition. In Khomeyni's view, the assaults on Iranian pilgrims are due only to the "services owed to the United States and Israel" by Saudi leaders. And the old man of Qom also told King Khaled that "prohibiting pilgrims from taking an interest in politics during the pilgrimage (to Mecca) serves the interests of the United States, Israel and other enemies of Islam." Of course, this view overlooks the necessary neutrality imposed by the Saudis in sacred places to prevent friction between nationals--all Moslem--of countries which are sometimes in conflict and also to prevent the recurrence of incidents such as the takeover of the Great

Mosque, slightly more than a year ago, by a commando group probably sent by the "Moslem Brotherhood," the same organization just discovered to be at the root of President Sadat's assassination in Egypt. But to get back to Ayatollah Khomeyni's message to King Khaled, the latter had previously sent the Iranian leader a telegram protesting the conduct of a group of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. And he had good reason to complain! There have been regular clashes between Saudi police and Iranian pilgrims this year, with the latter trying to turn the "haj," the sacred pilgrimage, into a revolutionary platform to convince their fellow Moslems to rally behind the banner of the Islamic Republic of Iran, representing the will of God on earth. At the noon prayer, Mecca police had to surround and take away a group shouting: "Revolution!" "Long live the Koranic revolution" "Khomeyni is the only leader!" "Death to the United States!" and other slogans plainly in violation of the neutral character which the holy places of Islam must retain. The clergymen accompanying the Iranian pilgrims said that King Khaled had been poorly informed by his police and that their flock had been satisfied with "chanting anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans." But the first version of the story is still the most likely, since the messianism of the Shi'ite sect (which has almost no followers in Saudi Arabia) obliges them to try to convince all Islam to enter the holy war--even if this means that chiefs of state must be overthrown if they appear too "lukewarm" concerning Koranic law, which was devised 1,300 years ago and which, according to the Shi'ites, must always be strictly applied. As part of this vast campaign to awaken Islam, Khomeyni has gone so far as to implore the king of Saudi Arabia to join the Iranian Revolution, "treating the people compassionately and the thieving superpowers sternly." Treating the people with compassion: That is a suggestion which may seem absurd in view of what is taking place every day in Iran. But it is extremely logical, inasmuch as compassion must be reserved for loyal followers of the prophet, and especially Shi'ite followers .... The Sunnite nations (comprising almost all Islam throughout the world) are justifiably suspicious of the powder keg which Iran represents. For in Moslem tradition, a "jihad" is always possible. And sometimes a "charismatic leader" (like the Mahdi in Sudan long ago) is all that is needed to inflame entire regions.

The Logic of Government

There is nothing more normal than the fact that Banisadr was driven from power and had to flee. His positions, extremely ambiguous, were able to make Islamic revolutionary authorities believe for a time that he totally espoused their views. In contrast, President Rajai is a "pure" reactionary. And now the new president-elect, Hojatoleslam Ali Khameneini, represents, in Khomeyni's eyes, exactly what was needed as head of state; he will be considered the successor of the old man of Qom and his only political platform will be to carry out the orders and wishes of the "imam." With a thorough knowledge of the Koran and fascinated by its legal details and their possible interpretations, Khomeyni's former student of theology in Qom has remained very close to his former teacher. It is also revealing, if we wish to judge the differences in government, to learn that Khameneini was imprisoned 6 times by the imperial police between 1964 and 1978 for political disturbances. At the present time, no one would have the opportunity to be imprisoned more than once .... In the absolute view of Shi'ite messianism and in the blind obedience to God's decrees as proclaimed by the "imam," the government no longer needs the artificial separation between political and religious power. But above all, Westerners should not imagine that the Iranian masses are outraged over the country's inconsistencies or violence. The reality is just the opposite and the "mojahedin" or so-called "people's soldiers" represent the people's feelings much less than the "guardians of the revolution" do.

Everything indicates that at the present time, carried away with the enthusiasm for the "jihad" and convinced of having a God-given leader, the vast majority of Iranians are still in favor of the Islamic Revolution and will be as long as the "imam" lives. The explanation which the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, Mr Mir Hussein Moussavi, gave of his country's situation can be found in that blind faith.

"A Kind of Stability"

Asked about his country's internal situation while visiting New York, Mr Moussavi said that the Iranian revolution had attained "a kind of stability" and that this stability "has a different political significance from what may be found in the West." In the context of the Islamic Revolution, he is entirely right: Stability is not the result of a consensus calmly expressed by votes or referendums, but rather of conditioning of the people, who are kept under religious "pressure." Observers were also amazed at the high percentage of voters who turned out to vote for the latest president of the republic. Supporting such observations, Mr Moussavi also said that "the people recognize religious law and their awareness has increased." According to him, any evaluation of the revolution's success or failure must at least be based on these two criteria. An Iranian trait, both national and religious, is also a factor: a persecution complex, resulting in fanatical patriotism. The contributions of American technicians during the shah's reign was considered an admission of the inability of Iranians to manage by themselves; Shi'ite doctrine, with the deaths of Hassan and Hussein, who were martyred by the Sunnites, has left the faithful with a feeling of bitterness and injustice to be avenged. The worldwide censure of the revolution's excesses will at least have had the advantage of causing Iran to be respected: "If someone is feared, he is respected." It is from this principle that the Iranian leaders are apparently proceeding. As Mr Moussavi also reportedly stated in New York: "Afterwards (following the revolution and the taking of the American hostages), we finally felt we were able to look Western policy in the eye and to judge it as it had judged us before that." This remark--or acknowledgment--says a lot about the scores which Iran felt it had to settle with the rest of the world. Currently rising among the Khomeyni government's opponents is the lower and average, urban and rural middle class, which was wholly created by the imperial regime and which failed to support the shah when he was overthrown, as well as the small leftist groups of "mojahedin" undeniably being manipulated by the neighboring USSR (whose official party, the Tudeh, is apparently tolerated by the authorities, who point to it as proof of pluralism!), some members of the army, which has been deprived of its elite by purges (God will provide!) and, finally, the ethnic minorities, Kurds, Baluchis or Azerbadijanis, who are pursued by what remains of the Iranian Army. Tehran relies more on the preaching of the mullahs than on arms to mobilize the people under the banner of a holy war. Contrary to what it may look like to the outside world, the Khomeyni government is basically not being challenged by Iran itself. But if Iran's interests do not coincide with those of the West, it is the latter's duty to be aware of this and to draw conclusions. The appalling blindness which free countries have displayed concerning Iran, from the initial unrest during the shah's reign to the present time, should at least have the advantage of providing a broader knowledge and experience of Iranian, and especially Shi'ite, reality.

Shi'ism: Religion of the Persecuted

Representing about 8.80 percent of the world's Moslems, the Shi'ites actually constitute a schism in Islam. Descendants of the followers of Ali, the husband of Fatima and thus the prophet's brother in law, opposed to the caliphs who succeeded the prophet, their great religious feast, the "Moharram," recalls the "martyrdom" of Hussein and Hassan, Ali's two sons, whom the Shi'ites also consider "imams," religious (and indirectly political) leaders against the "caliphs," political and thus religious leaders.

In 873, Muhammad al Mahdi, the 12th "imam," announced that he "would conceal himself," i.e., that he was going to disappear. The majority of Shi'ites say that he is not dead and that he will return himself to announce the "jihad" to win back the world forever. The Shi'ites, who were always in the minority in countries with a Sunnite majority (except in Iran and Iraq), were often persecuted for centuries by the Sunnites.

Thus they have a messianic tendency and awareness of having been a persecuted, although legitimate minority (if we accept Ali's heritage from Mohammed). In addition, the bloody deaths of Hussein and Hassan, who were killed in Kerbela in Iraq in 640, gave them martyrs to be avenged.

Shi'ism believes that the Koran is and must remain the complete code of conduct for all Moslems: nothing can be added or subtracted from it, except for interpretations such as those of the Qom school of theology. Its opposition to the rest of Islam, which it has often considered too "secular" or "accommodating," is well known and is being demonstrated every day ....

11915
CSO: 4619/20

STATUS OF POLITICAL PRISONERS DISCUSSED BY PROSECUTOR GENERAL

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 12 Nov 81 p 3

[Interview with Ayatollah Rabbani Amlashi]

[Excerpts] Prosecutor general Ayatollah Rabbani Amlashi answered questions on various issues during a special interview with our correspondent the day before yesterday. We herewith bring you that interview.

Procedure for Visiting Political Prisoners

Commenting on procedures governing visits to political prisoners the prosecutor general said: As far as I know and can guarantee this matter will take place in that the visitors' section at Evin prison was inadequate and deficient. The Tehran revolutionary prosecutor decided to expand the section and eliminate deficiencies so that we can have a decent and proper place for visits to prisoners. You must remember that those in Evin are usually political prisoners. During meetings with visitors, political prisoners must observe certain conditions, otherwise things can be smuggled into or out of prison or contacts established so that prisoners can continue plots and treasonous activities they had been engaged in on the outside. The basis for such plots and treacheries within the prison must be eliminated. Therefore, we must also keep an eye on visits so that prisoners cannot do in prison what they were doing on the outside, cannot plot or act treacherously, and make certain that harmful materials are not smuggled in from the outside. Of course they can listen to news on television and radio. The issue concerns only harmful materials. It is important that they do not transfer the nucleus of a plot from the outside to the prison. To prevent sedition, there should be no direct communication with the outside world. There are no other restrictions on visits. It was decided to expand the visiting area and eliminate deficiencies. Our revolutionary brother, Mr Lajevardi, had been handling the matter for some time and was about to put it into effect. He hired many workers to speed construction so that prisoners can have visitors. I do not know at this time how far the work has progressed to be able to give an accurate comment. In the near future I will go to Evin prison and God willing make an on-the-spot inspection of matters. I would then be better able to answer questions on such matters. I will tell them that so far as possible there should be no unnecessary restrictions. I will recommend that as far as possible consideration should be extended to prisoners and, God forbid, no one should be subjected to restrictions without reason. I must add that the real cause of imposed restrictions are due to the activities of certain

mini-groups. As God is witness, we do not have the slightest inclination to cause any discomfort to any of these dear young people who are in fact our children and brothers, our family members and relatives and who are of this nation. However, when we see them suddenly descend from every side, kill people, children, the elderly, and set fire to vehicles and buildings, we cannot sit idle and have no choice but to arrest them.

The prosecutor general added: At one time the wave of arrests had reached a very high level. When arrests are on a large scale it follows that adequate attention cannot be given to their living conditions, visits and clothing. This is a period of crisis. You can be sure, God willing, this difficult period will end after a while and things will become normal. Rest assured that if we cannot provide better comfort for political prisoners, we shall not give them anything less than the others. If you noticed, a television broadcast showed that some individuals expressed remorse and recanted. This indicates they were well treated. Otherwise I would consider it improbable that these emotion charged youth would recant unless they were well treated. They have said in interviews that before their arrest they thought revolution guards were executioners and devils but now find they are in reality our brothers who have affection for us! One of them described it well: Some say there is mistreatment and others say the treatment is good. The comment was made by a young woman who added: That depends on the attitude of the prisoners themselves. Bear in mind if prisoners behave, are not obstinate and rude, show remorse for unpleasant acts which they have committed, you can be sure they are well treated. If God forbid I should become aware that a well behaved person has been wronged, I will follow up the matter myself and even take legal action against the guilty person, whoever that person may be.

Fast Handling of Cases

The prosecutor general made this comment concerning the assignment of more interrogators and religious magistrates in order to speed up the cases of political prisoners: Thank God the work is being done. We have brought in new help but they cannot start to work the first day without going through training. They will soon start their work. We agree that a number of innocent people may be in prison. We are always pained by such a possibility and are honestly concerned. But what can we do? Of course if we become aware of irregularities you can be sure we will pursue the matter. The Supreme Legal Council decided recently that we should look into these issues and take legal action without regard to any factor. You yourself read in newspapers that we have abolished the war-time tribunal because of irregularities that had occurred.

Release of Prisoners

In answer to a question as to why some Evin prisoners who were ordered released some time ago are still in jail, Ayatollah Rabbani Amlashi said: I am not aware of this. If there is a specific case, I shall make inquiries and I will investigate. It is possible that after the cases of such persons are completed other reasons, testimonies and accusations are put forward concerning them. In such cases the public prosecutor's office might decide to hold them for further questioning about new matters that have come up. Otherwise I do not believe the public prosecutor's office would invite a headache by continuing to detain those who

have been acquitted and found to be in the clear. However, if you can give a specific instance in this regard, we will investigate and you can rest assured we shall follow up the matter if a wrong has really been done.

Judicial Police

The prosecutor general then commented on the work of the judicial police: The judicial police has begun its work, one of its first acts has been the abolition of the war-time tribunal. We benefited from the judicial police to resolve this matter. We have full trust and confidence in the judicial police whose members are specially chosen for the job.

Reason for the Abolition

Asked why the war-time tribunal was abolished, Ayatollah Rabbani Amlashi said: The tribunal was abolished after we received reports of its very many activities that were contrary to civic and religious laws. The inspector general's office was called in by us to look into the reports and they did so. It became clear to us that irregularities had taken place there. Unauthorized persons had meddled and others with some authority had overstepped their prerogatives. In appearance it was a war-time tribunal but we found for example that it interfered in narcotics matters, in counterrevolutionary issues, and in the work of the tribunal dealing with sinful acts. God willing, after we get better, deeper and more precise information in this connection we will report to the people.

5854
CSO: 4640/68

GOVERNMENT TO PROMOTE LOCAL DRUG INDUSTRY

London 8 DAYS in English No 47, 28 Nov 81 p 43

[Text]

IRAQ'S GENERAL Establishment for Drugs is about to put out international tenders for the construction of a pharmaceuticals factory at Al Yousafiya, 20km outside Baghdad. Feasibility studies for the project have been completed by the West German consultant Weber Consult, who envisage a total cost of around Iraqi dinars 70m ($233m).

When complete, the plant will boost Iraq's domestic drug production by more than 100 per cent, to meet about 80 per cent of the country's total needs according to Salman al Jouhari, director-general of the General Establishment for Drugs. 'The new factory will complete the requirements for our drug needs,' he said, and added that Iraq will probably continue to import drugs to make up the 20 per cent shortfall.

Iraq's centre of drug production is currently Samarra, more than 100km north of Baghdad. The Soviet-built plant produces over 200 items, many of them western drugs made under licence in Iraq. 'The new plant will produce drugs, like antibiotics, and also vitamin pills, not made at Samarra,' said al Jouhari.

In addition to the factory at Al Yousafiya, there are plans to build two or three plants for the manufacture of intravenous solutions (IV) in the north and south, within the next two years. The organisation also decided recently to set up a factory to produce syringes, al Jouhari said.

He also hinted that the government may encourage smaller, private sector drug firms to carve out a share of the market. 'The private sector may be developed in the future in cooperation with the state organisations.'

It is also likely that Iraq will increase its cooperation with neighbouring Gulf states interested in developing an indigenous pharmaceuticals industry. The country already contributes, along with Saudi Arabia and Syria, to the Jordan-based Arab Company for Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, started two years ago. The firm has announced plans to set up a joint venture to manufacture pharmaceutical raw materials in Ras al Khaymah, in the UAE.

CSO: 4400/82

IRAQI, IRANIAN ECONOMIC CONDITIONS COMPARED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 6 Sep 81 p 7

[Article: "In a Statement by Hasan Tawfiq al-Najafi, governor of Iraqi Central Bank: 'Country's Economic Development Is Taking Its Normal Course Despite War Conditions; Nineteen Percent Increase in Appropriations for This Year's Development Plan Over Last Year's Plan'"]

[Text] Hasan Tawfiq al-Najafi, the governor of the Iraqi Central Bank, has emphasized that the country's economic development is taking its normal course, that the appropriations for this year's development plan have been increased 19 percent over last year's plan and that the appropriations for the same period's ordinary budget have also been increased by 9 percent.

In a statement on the occasion of the passage of 1 year over our holy war against the racist Persian enemy, the governor of the Central Bank has pointed out that measures have been taken to create the right atmosphere to boost the activities of foreign firms with which contracts have been concluded, to implement the national development plans and programs and to enable the firms to speed up implementation of the projects entrusted to them.

The governor of the Iraqi Central Bank has also noted that the banking sector's activity has not been affected by the war despite the passage of 1 year over this war and that the various kinds of banking operations have continued to keep up with the basic requirements of the economic and social development at the level of both the socialist [public] and private sectors.

The governor has also stressed that the volume of the loans and other credit facilities advanced by the banks to the various economic sectors has grown significantly, that the balances of the socialist and private sectors' current, set-term and saving accounts have registered high and unprecedented levels and that drawing from and depositing in these accounts is proceeding normally.

He has added that the agencies concerned have been able to secure the needs of the fighting front and of the production sectors without having to focus on one of these aspects [to the exclusion of the others].

The state has undertaken the task of completing the development and construction operation under the war conditions which add a positive dimension to the implementation of this policy through intensified efforts, sacrifices and discipline

to bolster the strength of the Iraqi economy, and through the efforts of millions of workers in the various branches of the economy to realize a high productivity that serves the central primary task and the battle tasks and that preserves the spirit of victory.

The governor of the Iraqi Central Bank has also referred to the deterioration in Iran's economic conditions and to the stifling crisis experienced by Iran and embodied in the drop in production, in the decline of production quality, in rising prices, in increasing unemployment and in a 13 percent drop in the Iranian national production last year, according to information revealed by the Iranian Central Bank.

The Iraqi Central Bank has issued a statement noting that it was officially announced in Tehran that the 1980 inflation rate there amounted to 40 percent. This is a very high rate when compared with inflation rates in developing countries with conditions similar to those of Iran.

The prices of essential goods in Iran have risen by 27 percent and the number of the unemployed there has reached 6 million.

The reports also indicate a drop in the economic growth rates as a result of a drop in the activities of the industrial production, services, insurance and trade sectors.

The Iranian financial situation has worsened further as a result of the war, of the heavy financial burdens entailed by the war and of a drop in the state's general revenues. The Iranian budget experienced a deficit of more than $5 billion in 1980 and this deficit is expected to exceed $7 billion this year. Defense spending represents a large part of the budget appropriations and it is expected that this spending will amount to $14 billion this year. This figure represents nearly one-third of Iran's general budget appropriations, keeping in mind that Iran's budget relies mainly this year on its oil revenues which constitute 80 percent of the total revenues. This will result in serious consequences to the Iranian economy, especially if Iran persists in its unjust war of aggression against Iraq and if the glut in the world oil market continues to exist.

Published information indicates that Iran's rulers have been compelled to sell 40 tons of Iran's gold reserves in the free market and at prices below the prevalent international prices in order to make up for the deficit in Iran's revenues and to repay the country's due debts, amounting to more than $34 billion in the first quarter of this year.

Moreover, the value of the Iranian riyal has dropped to the lowest expected level and a US dollar is now worth more than 170 Iranian riyals whereas it was equal to 70 riyals before the Iraq-Iran war.

8494
CSO: 4404/20

WARTIME AGRICULTURAL PLANNING DISCUSSED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 8 Sep 81 p 4

[Article by Sabah Khalil: "Agricultural Sector and Tasks of Bolstering Our Victories in Saddam's Qadisiyah"]

[Text] For a full year, Iraq has been distinguished by being engaged triumphantly in both the battle of honor and the battle of reconstruction. While the brave men of the 20th century are recording with determination and capability crushing defeats on the racist Persian enemy, the Iraqis are realizing with great determination the highest production rates in the reconstruction and development process being witnessed by our struggling country where the war conditions have not obstructed the ceaseless progress toward bolstering the national development procession.

President and Commander Saddam Husayn is thus giving a new proof of the determination of the Iraqis to wage the battles of war and reconstruction simultaneously when he says: "This time, the fighting will continue and the development projects will continue because only then can we preserve an impregnable and strong Iraq that is capable of serving the Arab nation."

Agricultural Sector and Investment Plan

The agricultural sector's share of the general budget approved for 1981 has been generous due to this sector's importance and vitality, considering that it is the basis in securing food for the citizens and that it is a fundamental mainstay of the comprehensive national development. Appropriations in the investment plan of the 1981 budget have amounted to 6,743,000,000 dinars, with an increase of 1,503,000,000 dinars over last year's appropriations which totalled 5.24 billion dinars, i.e. an increase of 28.7 percent. This is an extremely positive percentage. However, the ordinary budget has also realized a considerable increase. This year's appropriations in the general budget have amounted to 5,025,000,000 dinars compared to 4,627,000,000 dinars last year, i.e. with an increase of 9 percent. A total of 681 million dinars, or 10.1 percent, of these appropriations has been allocated for the agricultural sector. This figure represents an increase of 34.9 percent over last year's agricultural allocations. This is in addition to the allocation of 158 million dinars in the investment plan in order to narrow the gap appearing between city, countryside and the agricultural sector. These appropriations have been distributed among the various aspects of the social, health and cultural life in the countryside and in the rural sector.

Agricultural Sector and Annual Plan

One of the revolutionary and democratic traditions established firmly by the revolution in the agricultural sector is the tradition of holding annual agricultural conferences. The 10th annual agricultural conference, held in the first quarter of 1981, was extremely significant due to the war conditions under which it was convened and due to the nature of its agenda. The conference was held while our brave army has been waging the noblest and most sacred national battle against the racist Persian enemy. The battle did certainly contribute positive results to the discussions held during convocation of the agricultural conference. The conference's resolutions and recommendations constituted a major gain in realizing the party and revolution leadership's aspirations to have agriculture in our country reach advanced stages. The 10th agricultural conference resolutions also derived their significance from the outstanding efforts exerted by the various agricultural organizations and departments throughout the months prior to the conference. Moreover, the conference resolutions reflected loyalty by the peasant and agricultural cadres to every drop of blood that was spilled generously on the battlefield and that achieved victory over the enemies.

The outcome of the conference responded positively to the dictates of the conditions of our national battle. Firm foundations were laid down for the procession of a full year of ceaseless and extraordinary efforts compatible with the efforts of our heroes in the battle to preserve the spirit of victory and to support the battle in every way possible.

The months following the convocation of the 10th annual agricultural conference witnessed continuous successes in the sphere of precise and comprehensive implementation of the agricultural plan approved by the conference. The implementation acts have been largely characterized by a spirit of responsibility and have contributed to bolstering the capabilities of our armed forces in the Saddam's Qadisiyah.

The agricultural work and production map indicates good implementation rates in all junctures of the agricultural process--rates that realize the slogan of "agriculture is endless oil" and that embody the slogan raised by the agricultural sector, saying: "We build with one hand and carry the weapon in the other."

Battle and Task of Securing Food

The task of securing food for citizens is an important and vital matter not only for achieving victory but also for the perpetuation of this victory. Food is a fundamental element in enabling a nation to gain its honor and dignity and here is where the magnitude of struggler and leader Saddam Husayn's words that "there is no good in a nation that eats more than it produces and that harvests less than what it plants" becomes apparent. Therefore, the emergence of an imbalance or a flaw in securing food leads to complications in the economic situation and reflects negatively on the military situation. So proceeding on the basis of the need to secure food both qualitatively and quantitatively in an uninterrupted manner and to insure that no bottlenecks develop in the production processes, thus affecting the food supply and the flow of food supplies to the local markets.

The agricultural sector has formulated a program capable of securing all the daily food supply needs and of insuring their normal flow to the markets, along with securing the food requirement of our valiant armed forces and with storing a large reserve of these foods.

This program has required the agencies concerned with the production, marketing and importation operations to exert exhausting and ceaseless efforts for the careful implementation of the program and to insure that agricultural development is not affected by the war conditions and that the domestic market remains stable. This matter has drawn the attention of all those working in the agricultural sector who have exerted efforts to put agriculture in the desired direction so that it may support the national economy with new components and may preserve the spirit of victory realized in Saddam's Qadisiyah.

National Battle and Pan-Arab Experiment at Agricultural Level

Our struggling country has witnessed in war time a pan-Arab experiment embodied in the immigration of Moroccan peasant families to the country. This step has embodied the pan-Arab principles advocated by the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party--principles that have become a tangible reality in the great Iraq. The agricultural agencies concerned and the General Federation of Peasant Associations have provided this experiment with all the requirements needed to insure its continuation and success in a manner similar to the success of the immigration of Egyptian peasants to Iraq several years ago. This experiment has also coincided with the national battle waged by the brave men of the 20th century in defense of the eastern gate of the Arab homeland on behalf of the Arab nation. This battle will certainly bolster our struggling country's determination to wage the future pan-Arab battles with strength and capability.

The success realized throughout a full year's march of the agricultural sector is an inevitable result of the guarantees provided by the revolution to develop our country's agriculture and of the revolution's determination to secure the requirements of the holy battle and to continue at the same time to implement the development and reconstruction plans and programs with high efficiency. This is shown by the realistic indicators concluded from the production figures in the fields. The signs indicate an abundant crop of the main food staples, especially wheat and barley, for this year. This is in addition to the major projects completed in the agricultural sector and spread over all branches of agricultural production and in addition to securing monetary liquidity for the agricultural projects so that they may continue their work and their tasks despite the battle conditions. The revolution has exerted efforts to increase the capital of the Cooperative Agricultural Bank two times in succession, the first last year and the second this year, from 150 million dinars to 250 million dinars and then to 300 million dinars. This underlines the revolution's determination to score victory in the reconstruction battle as it has scored victory in Saddam's Qadisiyah.

After the passage of one full year over our just war with the racist Persians, we are now proceeding from victory to victory because we rely on faith in what is right and on our ability to secure the requirements of victory whereas they [Iranians] are proceeding from one defeat to another afflicting them with shame and disgrace.

8494
CSO: 4404/20

HOUSING, CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS SAID INCREASING DESPITE WAR CONDITIONS

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 8 Sep 81 p 7

[Article by Mustafa Kamal: "In Statement by Minister of Housing and Reconstruction: One Billion Dinars Allocated for Housing and Reconstruction Sector During Year of Holy Battle; Cost of Projects Undertaken by Housing and Reconstruction Sector Is 7 Billion Dinars"]

[Text] Muhammad Fadl Husayn, the minister of housing and reconstruction, has asserted that the implementation rate of the service projects throughout a year of our just war against the Persian enemy has amounted to threefold the rate of what was implemented in the year preceding the war.

In a statement to the INA [Iraqi News Agency] on occasion of the passage of one year over the glorious Qadisiyah Saddam battle, the minister has said that the appropriations for the housing and reconstruction sector amounted in the said year to one billion dinars, compared to 830 million dinars for the year preceding the battle. The minister has also said that the implementation rate and the increase in the appropriations underline the strength of our economy and the fact that it is based on firm, strong and unshakable foundations, regardless of the ferocity of the challenges and plots faced by our struggling country.

The minister has pointed out that the value of the projects undertaken by the sector amounts to 7 billion dinars, of which 2 billion were added during the war period and 1.2 billion are allocated for construction of the express highway which will link Iraq with the Arab and friendly countries--a highway consisting of four lanes and meeting the latest technical standards. The Public Roads and Bridges Organization has had the honor of taking part in the Saddam's Qadisiyah by opening and paving during 7 months of the battle a total of 2,410 kilometers of roads constituting [words dropped] of the total length of roads paved in the country before the glorious 71-30 July revolution.

Road and Bridge Projects

The minister added that the cost of the projects implemented by the Public Roads and Bridges Organization at all levels has amounted to 3.78 billion dinars. The implementation of two-thirds of these projects was started during the year of victory over the racist Persian enemy. A number of these roads will be completed in the next few years at a cost of 2.7 billion dinars, the express highway will be completed at a cost of 1.2 billion dinars and 106 big and small bridges will

be completed at a cost of 329,545,000 dinars, including al-Dawrah bridge at a cost of 33 million dinars, al-Jadiriyah bridge at a cost of 30 million dinars, al-A'zamiyah bridge at a cost of 13 million dinars, al-Sanak bridge at a cost of 15 million dinars, the second al-'Amarah bridge at a cost of 6.8 million dinars, the fourth Mosul bridge at a cost of 13.9 million dinars and the Samarra' bridge at a cost of 24 million dinars. The other bridges are spread throughout the country.

The minister has also pointed out that the war year has witnessed the construction of other projects, such as airports and road intersections, including 12 intersections at a cost of 80 million dinars. The projects further include the construction of suspended [overhead] bridges in Qanat al-Jaysh, al-Khalidiyah, al-Habbaniyah lake, al-Haswah, Baghdad-al-Hillah road and Damascus square. The projects also call for continued maintenance operations to speed up transportation traffic and to reduce internal and external road accidents.

Progress in Providing Housing Units

The minister has also said that the organization's appropriations amounted last year to 400 million dinars and that they have risen to 550 million dinars in 1981. The ministry's other accomplishments indicate a major qualitative leap in providing housing units through the construction of 7,700 units in 16 governorates at a cost of 33.5 million dinars. Work is also underway to complete the construction of 9,907 units at a cost of 26,963,000 dinars. We have adopted a large-scale program for the construction of tens of thousands of units for the citizens and for the construction of numbers of other units through the employment of advanced modern methods to insure rapid implementation and quality control and to reduce the shortages in the construction materials used in the construction operation.

Muhammad Fadl Husayn has also pointed out that the Public Housing Organization has also started the construction of three plants for prefabricated housing, in addition to the already existing plants, as well as the construction of other plants for latticed iron work, insulation materials, procelain, tiles, concrete blocks and stone and sand quarries.

With this inclination, the organization has made long strides on the path of using mechanization and modern technology and of entrenching the activities of the country's cooperative movement, considering that the Cooperative Union will begin transferring 2,000 units according to the vertical system [as published].

Service and Health Projects

The minister has also said: In the sphere of implementing service and health projects and specialized institutes, projects costing 63 million dinars have been constructed in the country's various governorates during the year of the glorious battle, in addition to a number of institutes, boarding sections, offices for popular organizations, youth centers and party schools in a number of the country's governorates at a cost of 35 million dinars. In compliance with the instructions of the party and revolution leadership, the ministry is also currently constructing 12 hospitals with a capacity of 400 beds in the country's various governorates at a cost of hundreds of millions of dollars.

Moreover, work continues in order to implement the biggest health project in the country, namely the second phase of the medical city and the Ministry of Health complex which constitute one of the most prominent features of modern civilization and health in our struggling country.

The minister has also said that the Public Buildings Organization has begun, as part of its tasks for the current year, constructing projects costing more than one billion dinars. The organization will initiate more than 356 new projects at a cost of 540 million dinars, 91 other projects, currently in the stage of blueprinting, at a cost of 135 million dinars and 12 development projects that are currently under study. The organization is also implementing 783 projects as part of its plan for last year at a cost of 1.5 billion dinars. The number of these projects has risen this year to 841 projects with an estimated cost of more than 2 billion dianrs.

Water and Sewerage Projects

The minister has also pointed out that the value of the projects entrusted for implementation to the Public Contracting Company for Water and Sewerage Projects since the start of the national battle against the Persian enemy has amounted to 504 million dinars. The Contracting Company for School Buildings is currently building in Baghdad Governorate alone a total of 216 prefabricated schools. The company has also started the construction of a plant for the production of iron [house] frames and metal sheets. When completed, this plant will be one of the country's biggest plants in its field of specialization.

The National Center for Construction Laboratories is now engaged in quality control work in more than 1,500 projects. The center has 50 laboratores to insure quick laboratory testing of all kinds of soil and concrete. Moreover, the center is engaged in preparing research and studies to find alternatives to the conventional construction materials, including a study to use sulfur as a partial substitute to asphalt in paving roads. The minister has also noted that the National Engineering and Architectural Consultation Center has played an important role in preparing complete engineering blueprints for the public sector's projects and has complete numerous and precise engineering blueprints.

Concluding his statement, the minister has pointed out that the progress realized in the field of housing and reconstruction come as a result of the ceaseless aid which the housing and reconstruction sector receives from the party and revolution leadership, headed by leader of the victory President and Commander Saddam Husayn, to crystallize the aspiration of building the lofty and strong Iraqi edifice capable of bolstering the victorious march and of entrenching the spirit of victory in order to realize all of our people's and nation's goals of unity, freedom and socialism.

8494
CSO: 4404/20

BRIEFS

IAEA INSPECTION--The International Atomic Energy Agency last week refuted Israeli charges that Iraq was trying to manufacture atomic weapons at the Osirak reactor near Baghdad which was bombed by Israeli warplanes on June 7. Two IAEA inspectors who visited the site said they detected "no non-compliance" with the agency's safety regulations and that they had established an inventory of 39 fuel assemblies of French origin containing about 12.5 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, the same amount recorded by inspectors when the fuel was shipped from France to Iraq. IAEA Spokesman Hans Gruemm said the amount of nuclear fuel found at the site was half of the minimum required for an atomic bomb and that none of the uranium had been diverted from its stated purpose. He added that it would be "several years" before the reactor would be able to begin operations because of the damage inflicted by the Israeli bombers. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 47, 23 Nov 81 p 8]

CSO: 4400/82

SHIM'ON PERES DISCUSSES MIDEAST PEACE EFFORTS

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Summer 81 pp 9-16

[Article by Shim'on Peres: "The Art of Peace"]

[Text] For the rest of the world, the Middle East basically represents the source of its oil supply. But in my opinion, it would be more appropriate to give greater consideration to the region's political future. In this analysis, oil is just one of the factors to be considered; it is not the only one. And if it is true that oil and politics are closely connected in this case, the preponderant influence of the latter over the former cannot be denied.

Today, the Middle East is going through an unprecedented process of deterioration. It offers the distressing spectacle of a juxtaposition of more or less active conflicts with a very uncertain outcome: sporadic confrontation between north and south Yemen; a devastating war between Iran and Iraq; the occupation--not so disinterested as it appears--of Lebanon by the Syrians; conflicts between Morocco and the POLISARIO [Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagui el Hamra and Rio de Oro] Front and between Libya and Chad--whether Colonel Qadhafi is acting in this case in his own interest or for that of the USSR.

But outside the battlefield, a number of political and social issues must also be resolved. The Saudi Government thus is not really stable yet: persistent tensions between the monarchy and clergy and the imbalance of civilian and military investment continue to jeopardize its survival. Jordan, in turn, has pulled away from Syria to form an alliance--for how long?--with Iraq. In Sudan, Arab and African peoples cannot manage to reach an understanding. Relations between Somalia and Ethiopia are far from calm. In Ethiopia, a blood bath followed the fall of the negus and the present government continues to rule only through violence and Soviet-Cuban aid.

Iran must cope with social unrest and many other problems. Unlike its Moslem neighbors, only Turkey seems to be presently managing well since the army took over the government: the economic recovery policy and the campaign against terrorism have clearly borne fruit in that country.

Far from diminishing, the causes of these conflicts (social divisions, religious and ethnic antagonism, etc.) and unrest take on increasing significance every day.

Moreover, in most cases, the superpowers are indirectly involved in these conflicts. There is no doubt that the occupation of part of Lebanon by Syria would not have been possible without--at least--Moscow's tacit encouragement. Iraq would not have ventured into Iran is the USSR had forbidden it to do so, although that invasion has apparently caused it to forfeit the open support which it previously enjoyed (for geopolitical reasons, the Kremlin has slightly modified its position in an attempt to obtain Tehran's favor).

Unfortunately, the United States has intervened only very little to prevent, or resolve a posteriori, these local confrontations.

In response to the withdrawal of conventional U.S. forces in the Middle East, and more specifically in the Persian Gulf area, the USSR has yielded even more readily to the imperialistic temptation, recruiting Cuban mercenaries or massively supplying sophisticated arms to a few reckless strongmen such as Assad of Syria, Saddam Hussein of Iraq or Qadhafi of Libya, the self-proclaimed "protector of Islamic Africa."

Against such a background, the arsenals of the Middle East are growing tremendously. A study conducted by some Israeli university professors concludes that four countries --Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia--have weapons and troops equivalent to those of NATO: 790,000 soldiers, as opposed to 626,000 for NATO; 9.3 armored divisions, as opposed to 10 for NATO; 17 infantry divisions, compared with 17 for NATO; 6,150 tanks, in comparison to 7,000 for NATO; 1,210 fighter planes, as opposed to 1,900 for NATO. Adding to that the arms of other Middle East nations, the range--both technical and financial--of forces is startling.

These arms, which were brought into the region because of political unrest, are only further stirring up such restlessness.

And yet that is only the tip of the iceberg, for some countries are now moving toward nuclear weapons. And there is no doubt that some of them will manage to obtain them in the near future. In this connection, Iraq is working in close cooperation with France, which has supplied it with nuclear reactors and enriched uranium for possible military purposes. Similarly, an Italian company has sold Baghdad a reprocessing plant. Iraq is clearly doing everything possible to quickly attain the rank of a nuclear power. There also seems to be some kind of agreement between Libya and Pakistan concerning the so-called "Islamic bomb"--apparently Qadhafi is supplying uranium and capital, hoping to be paid in return with nuclear weapons.

President Anwar El-Sadat is aware of these many dangers and, in particular, of the Soviet threat. Egypt has been a model of internal and external stability, especially since it began the regional peace process. It would be able to resist Soviet pressures and subversion better than other countries.

But would the case be the same for Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, Iran or Turkey?

The European leaders with whom I recently spoke believe that the Soviet Union should begin to run short of oil in about 5 years. Its interest in oil-rich regions and the Persian Gulf area will then increase considerably. The prospects of this are certain and time is passing at an alarmingly fast rate.

In my opinion, remedies for the ills from which the Middle East suffers must not all be sought outside the region. The internal weaknesses of some nations--politically, economically and socially--play a major role in the future of the region's security and development.

In many Middle East countries, a new intelligentsia is emerging, who understand perfectly the regressive nature of religious fanaticism and realize that only political changes will put an end to the region's present difficulties, while relieving it of the burden of military spending in favor of economic and social investment.

None of the countries in question can handle alone the combination of the nuclear threat, Soviet penetration and social backwardness. Moreover, fighting the first two dangers requires a radical modification of the political infrastructure. A structure for peace must quickly be created to cope with these dangers and to restore calm in the region in the next 5 to 10 years.

All of these considerations lead me to believe that Israel must concentrate a good part of its political activity in the Middle East itself.

Since its birth in 1948 to the early 1960's, Israel has oriented its efforts toward Europe. Deprived of stable sources of arms, it had to turn to Europe, and particularly to France, to offset the imbalance created by the heavy weaponry of Arab countries. Our "special relations" with France were--as everyone knows--suddenly broken off in 1967 and since De Gaulle's about-face, the United States has supported us politically, financially and militarily. Despite the tragic historic ties uniting us and beyond our rather unsatisfactory relations with the Common Market, Europe is moving farther and farther away from Israel. The old continent is today ridden with energy problems. It is no longer strong enough to overlook economic considerations. Seen from the Middle East, Europe has more an image of opportunism than of hope. Europeans sometimes act with more enthusiasm than Egypt, without realizing that they are thus alienating Israel from its neighbors instead of trying to bring them together. Israel will no doubt have a lot of trouble convincing Europe to adopt a more balanced policy, but dialogue continues to be necessary, however.

Assuming that the United States, during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, will work to strengthen Israel and for its properity, the inevitable pressures and constraints which will induce America to develop ties with other Middle East countries must not be underestimated, however. This is why, while maintaining our relations with the United States, we should seek to develop trust and cooperation with our neighbors. To prepare for the future, Israel should, as I have said, orient its diplomacy toward the Middle East itself.

Neither Israel nor the Arabs are doing anyone a favor by seeking peace. Future dangers are not the only reasons for joint action: The time has come to take a new departure. For the barrier of hostility has been broken for the first time, with the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian treaty. A formal precedent now exists for Arabs and Jews to live in peace. The conflicts draining the region today are no longer related to Israel's existence or policy. The confrontations between Iran and Iraq or between Morocco and the POLISARIO Front are in no way related to the Israeli-Arab conflict. Thus this dual observation: 1) Peace is a vital necessity,

perhaps even more for Arab countries than for Israel; 2) A vast strategy for peace must be based on a certain number of priorities.

The most important aspect will continue to be relations between Israel and Egypt. We must do everything possible to prove to other countries in the region that the peace process is a permanent and productive undertaking. To achieve this goal, we must strive to reach an agreement concerning the autonomy provision, which constitutes the second stage of the Camp David process and is not beyond the means of any country involved. Once signed, this agreement should be implemented in the Gaza Strip and then in other territories. The policy of "measures for trust," desired by Egypt, should be accepted by both sides so that Jerusalem and Cairo can coordinate their efforts to guarantee the dynamics of the peace process. In plain language: We recognize the essential role played by Egypt in the Arab world and intend to act accordingly.

Our second priority should be a joint effort to resolve the Palestinian problem. The Israelis have no interest in forever taking responsibility for the fate of 1.3 million Palestinians residing on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. This would be in contradiction to the deep-rooted nature of the Hebrew nation. It is a question of finding the best solution, one that is capable of assuring stability and peace on a permanent basis.

Half of the Palestinians now live in Jordan and half in occupied territories. The PLO and its "moderate" supporters contend that an independent Palestinian state should be established in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, beside an existing Palestinian state: Jordan. I am very much afraid that this proposal is not a solution but rather a source of future conflict. This new Palestinian state could only endanger Jordan and would appear to be a second South Yemen--or even a second Libya--threatening the peace and stability of the entire region.

Moreover, such a sovereign state located between Jordan and Israel could find it difficult to receive all Palestinians (refugees and others) scattered throughout the Middle East. This would lead only to perpetuating the "Palestinian question," while inevitably putting pressure on Israel. Then there is also the problem of demilitarization. Under a Jordanian-Israeli agreement, the West Bank could actually be demilitarized. But in contrast, a separate state would mean the establishment of a separate army, present at the gates of Jerusalem and near the Israeli coastline. This is why a second Palestinian state of radical sympathies is unacceptable to Israel.

Israel thinks that it can convince the international community that the solution to the problem lies in the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian structure with its own government and assuring Israel of permanent and defensible borders. In this regard, we are prepared to negotiate with the Jordanians and Palestinians, together or separately, providing of course that they accept this working hypothesis beforehand.

The south of Israel was considered a desert, a wasteland, for years. But the area has gradually returned to life, taking on growing strategic importance. Israel has developed the port of Eilat and Jordan is actively improving the port of Aqaba. The two cites are only kilometers apart. Aqaba has also become an important supply base for Iraq, particularly since Iraqi-Syrian relations have "cooled." The

resumption of shipping in the narrow straits of the Red Sea is no less vital for Jordan than for Israel. Israel has built a highway in the Arava Desert, from Eilat to Bersheva. Jordan is presently doing the same, from Aqaba to Amman (and from there to Baghdad). Israel has built an airport near Eilat and Jordan is also building one near Aqaba. Israel has developed its potash mines at the southern end of the Dead Sea, followed again in this instance by Jordan. The level of the Dead Sea has begun to drop since the Jordan River was diverted for irrigation purposes, both to Israel and to Jordan.

Thus the only way of keeping the Dead Sea a source of minerals is to allow the Mediterranean Sea to flow into it. The Dead Sea's level will be determined by this flow of water through a canal crossing Israel. If the Dead Sea's level is too high or too low, Jordanian potash mines will be jeopardized.

A symmetrical situation of mutual dependence has thus been created. Either freedom of shipping is assured for both countries or it does not exist for either. Either the air space is open or else both Israeli and Jordanian planes will be in danger. Either highway traffic is unhindered or both countries experience transportation problems. Either the Dead Sea's mineral wealth is exploited jointly or that unique sea's enormous resources constitute a barrier between us. Will this desert be one of confrontation or cooperation? Obviously, Jordan will not be able to continue to threaten us and to refuse to cooperate with us.

But this time the problem also involves Iraq. Jordan is well aware, in fact, that remaining troops between Jordan and Shatt-al-Arab have been substantially reduced. Nine or 10 of the 12 Iraqi divisions are now engaged in the war against Iran. Jordan, with its 4 or 5 divisions, could hardly be a great help to Iraq, particularly since the Syrians are watching for the least sign of weakness on its part. Under these conditions, Jordan must draw its own conclusions; and in this regard, nothing is ever simple. King Hussein cannot continue to turn his back on Israel, believing that we will forever accept such an unconcerned attitude. It is Jordan--and not just Israel--which must, in the final analysis, choose between war and peace. Thus Jerusalem--together with Cairo--must necessarily put Jordanian-Israeli cooperation on the agenda.

Then the final and decisive obstacle could be cleared: the establishment of a joint untertaking, on Egypt's initiative and with the participation of Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, supported by the United States and Europe at the same time.

This joint undertaking must strive to avert the four basic dangers threatening the region: internal conflicts, nuclear dangers, Soviet penetration and social underdevelopment.

Such a project does not require the establishment of a rigid, monolithic structure. Any solution of compromise can be planned so that it can be implemented in stages: what counts is not so much its form as its content. In any case, it is only at this price that we will manage to face future challenges with a broad outlook and determination; it is only under these conditions that we will be able to say goodbye to war and poverty.

11915
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MAYOR KHALAF DISCUSSES CURRENT STANCE

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 4, 1 Aug 81 pp 20-21

[Article by Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah: "The Seriousness of This Stage, and the Duties of the Nations of the Steadfastness Front"]

[Text] The fact that U.S. imperialism has lost its ability to control the reins of historical initiative does not mean that imperialism has losts its capability of aggression and its capabilities of utilizing barbarous means, together with elements which are allied with it, to attempt to fragment the Arab world and to dominate it. The truth of this fact is being confirmed by what the Arab world is witnessing and by what the Arab nations are being subjected to.

The Arab nations have thwarted these attempts which aimed at inducing them to surrender by means of imposing upon them a solution which eliminates their basic cause. These Arab nations have rejected Sadat's policy, which the U.S. fancies that it has the ability to promote and expand. This failure which has been the lot of hostile forces, led by the U.S., and their loss of important strategic positions due to the revolutionary transformation which took place in Afghanistan, Iran, and Ethiopia, is what has impelled these forces to intensify their onslaught against the Arab world.

We are not here concerned with enumerating or drawing up a list of everything that the U.S. has done against the Arab nations. The ugly criminal history of these actions if full of terrorism and aggression. Every Arab child, throughout the Arab world, has suffered, and continues to suffer, from the long list of vicious crimes committed by the U.S.

These hostile forces realize that patriotic regimes and Arab liberation movements, led by the Palestinian Resistance, are the barrier which stands in the path of successfully carrying out the U.S. conspiracy. Consequently they are the target of the implementation of this conspiracy, the chapters of which we have witnessed in many locations in the Arab world. Perhaps the chapter which has been most clearly shown is that concerning what the Palestinian Resistance has been subjected to in Lebanon, what our masses of people have been subjected to in the occupied territories, and the conspiracies which have been witnessed by Libya, Syria, Democratic Yemen, and Algeria. All of this has been an attempt to distract them from the basic objective, which is that of supporting the PLO in order that it attain its lofty goals and realize its just aspirations.

Isolation of the Palestinian Resistance

The U.S. realizes that if these patriotic regimes can be crushed then it will be easy for it to isolate the Palestinian Resistance. This is the thing which has top priority in the program being pursued by reactionary Zionist and imperialist forces. Washington also realizes that, in the steady growth of the Arab liberation movement and in the anchoring of Arab patriotic regimes, there is danger to the reactionary regimes in the region which maintain close ties to the U.S. government. This explains the viciousness of this hostile onslaught and the participation of reactionary forces in attacking the patriotic regimes and Palestinian organizations which, for many long years, have continually waged war and have opposed the U.S. war machine--before the very eyes and ears of those regimes which are calling for the "neutralization" of the U.S.

A few years ago there occurred the formation of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, the members of which are Syria, Libya, Democratic Yemen, Algeria and the PLO. This was done in a serious attempt to oppose U.S. plans and Sadat's capitulation policy which took Egypt out of the battle areas. This front took it upon itself to oppose the hostile plans which have mainly been drawn up in Washington. The front consequently became the object of attacks made by the reactionary imperialist and Zionist forces. The nations in this front have witnessed vicious attacks and sabotage operations which were mounted in an attempt to persuade them to renounce their objectives, their independence, and their role which is hostile to imperialism in all of its forms. However, the earnest stance taken by the members of the Steadfastness Front has thwarted the aims of these hostile forces and has prevented other Arab regimes from jumping on the Camp David bandwagon, in spite of their acts of provocation against the nations of the Steadfastness Front and in spite of the criminal elements which they had sent to these nations to commit abuse and sabotage.

Democratic Yemen has been subjected to impudent shameful provocations on the part of Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman in an attempt to bring down this patriotic regime in Aden. In Algeria hostile forces have tried to stir up sectarian discord. In Rabat the Moroccan reactionary regime is still continuing to conspire against the gains and revolution achieved by the Algerian people.

As for the Libyan Jamahiriyah, it has been subjected to a campaign of violent threats to mount a large-scale attack against it, and the two regimes in Cairo and Khartoum are the most important participants in this action together with Israel and the U.S. Syria, which has succeeded in eliminating the criminal elements which caused havoc and committeed sabotage inside the country, continues to oppose the separatist bands and their allies in Lebanon--a country which our enemies still fancy will be a graveyard for the men in our Palestinian organizations and a dagger in the back of Syria.

The nations of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, including the PLO, are the target of the vicious conspiracy which our region is currently being subjected to. Weakening this front is the first step toward dominating the Arab world with all of its potential and all of its wealth. This is the only means by which hostile forces can keep the Israeli occupation alive and protect the reactionary regimes and elements from the anger of the Arab massess--reactionary regimes and elements which are witnessing a gradual increase in opposition to their domination and to the terrorism waged by them.

The U.S. has forced the Arab people to take part in a vicious battle. It is a challenge to their civilization, and it requires a decisive Arab response which can put a stop to U.S. aggression against the Arab nations and their achievements. The conspiracy is aimed not only at the Palestinian people, but at the entire Arab world. The entire Arab world must be kept secure, and its security cannot be fragmented. However, we need to be alert to the fact that the Zionists and imperialists are attempting to involve the Arabs in marginal causes which are far removed from our fundamental cause.

Summit Meetings

The hostile actions committed by the U.S. so far have not been met with a decisive Arab response. Quite the contrary, many Arab regimes continue to draw closer to Washington the more intense and vicious this onslaught against the Arab world becomes. The latest summit meetings did not succeed in coming up with effective decisions which committed those at the meetings to oppose the plans of the U.S. The nations of the Steadfastness Front have remained the only ones which are combatting the hostile forces. The "solidarity," which usually is prominent in the recommendations made at these summit meetings, is to be interpreted as more attacks and more conspiracy against the Palestinian people and the Arab patriotic regimes, and more promotion and support for the hostile U.S. policy.

Perhaps the positions taken by the Arab regimes which are outside the framework of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and which refuse to respond to actions taken by the U.S. in spite of the means and potential which they have available are the thing which impels us to demand that the members of the Steadfastness Front take quick action and set up a practical plan which is appropriate in view of the danger of the present stage of affairs which is witnessing an intensification in attacks against the members of this front--especially the Palestinian Resistance, which has been continuously waging the war for years.

The PLO has undertaken gigantic efforts to attempt to gather together the forces and potential of the nations of the Steadfastness Front, and has proclaimed the necessity of going over from the defense to the attack. Recently actions have been undertaken by the leaders of the member states [of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front] in the direction of cooperation and mutual consultation. We hope that this will result in real action being taken immediately, because the responsibility is a great one and the trusteeship is a weighty and noble one. What is needed now more than ever, and is needed urgently, is for a meeting to take place which would result in a practical formula which would thwart the actions engaged in by hostile forces and ward off the vicious attacks which the region is being subjected to. At the same time, it is necessary to remember to stay on one's guard and be cautious concerning the reactionary regimes which are closely linked to Washington. It is not possible for two groups to join forces when one of the two groups is hostile to U.S. policy and the other group promotes it and endeavors to further it.

The latest actions which have been engaged in by the leaders of the nations of the Steadfastness Front, and their belief in the necessity to consolidate their alliance with the Soviet Union, have caused a great deal of apprehension and alarm among hostile circles. This means that the setting up of a clear and practical program for the members of this front, and supporting the alliance with Moscow, will serve to disconcert these circles and to thwart their conspiracies. At the

same time this will contribute toward the steady growth of the revolutionary tide in the region which is against the conspiratorial elements.

With the escalation of the vicious hostile attacks against the Arab world, the masses are increasingly putting their hopes in the nations of the Steadfastness Front--the protective armor for their aspirations and achievements. This hope should constitute an impetus for the members of this front to proceed to lead these masses toward the stage of achieving their accomplishments, reaping the harvest of their gains, and winning the battle, which was imposed upon them, so that they can attain their objectives. As for the occupied territories, the seriousness of the present stage of affairs makes it imperative for our masses to achieve more solidarity and more national unity in a quiet atmosphere of democracy which will furnish this unity with real and sound significance. Such unity will then enable us to achieve the results hoped for. National unity is one of the most important factors which contribute toward the thwarting of hostile plans and is one of the most important duties which we have assumed in order to lend our support to the activities, program, and positions of the nations of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front.

9468
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WEST BANK PERSONALITY ANALYZES ELECTIONS

Jerusalem AL-BAYADIR AL-SIYASI in Arabic No 4, 1 Aug 81 pp 22-26

[Article by Ibrahim al-Daqqaq, president of the Engineers' Union in the West Bank: "The 1981 Israeli Election Campaign--Its Framework and Its Significance"]

[Text] When Menachem Begin made his sacred oath that he would not permit any Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories if the Israeli voters would keep him as leader of the Israeli government, he was in fact presenting the voters in Israel with a platform of Zionist monopolistic capitalism.

When Shimon Peres stood up and asserted, time after time, that the blue line represented by the Jordan River, in fact, constituted Israel's actual boundary, he was not opposing Menachem Begin's election campaign platform, nor was he opposing his political orientation.

These two positions represent two sides of the same coin--a coin which has been afflicted with inflation just as the Israeli pound has been afflicted with inflation since the founding of the nation until the present.

Thus is was clear that whoever won--whether it be Begin, the more aggressive person, or Peres, the more diplomatic person--this would not change the nature of Israel's policy which denies the rights of the Palestinian people and is in keeping with the nature of profound social changes which have taken place inside Israel society.

There remains one question which suggests itself: Are Israeli election campaigns, given these circumstances and factors, merely ordinary [Israeli] election campaigns which concern neither Palestinians nor Arabs, wherever they might be?

As a response to this question we would like to say that the election campaign, and not the results of the elections, clearly revealed that it did involve matters which are of utmost importance to both Palestinians and Arabs.

Before presenting these matters to our readers we first need to make a study of the social structure in Israel.

Change in Israel's Social Structure

It is impossible to ignore the internal developments which have taken place in Israel since the stage when it was built as a nation (1948-1967) up till the present

stage of extension and expansion. This historical delimitation does not mean that there has been a lack of intermeshing of all of the stages of Zionist history in the territory of Palestine as a response to the nature of the organic relationship which has linked this Zionist entity to the world imperialist and settlement movement and the continuation of this relationship between the state [of Israel] and the world capitalist market. For this reason, the growth of Israeli capital and its penetration into agriculture and industry as well as its subordination to the Zionist establishments which were set up by the Zionist movement in the Yishuv period in order to serve its interests or to commit them to reconciling their situation with its nature, in addition to the linkage of this capital to the world production market and labor distribution market, have resulted in a social situation which is favorable to it inside Israel.

In spite of the fact that the reconciliation process went on all during the three previous decades, it did not always take place in a quiet and peaceful manner. Sometimes it was frustrated. The tool for achieving this reconciliation was the military establishment, with its administration, armed forces, and other institutions. Perhaps we remember the role which was played by the Lavon affair (1953-1955), the 1956 War, and the fall of Ben-Gurion in 1963 and in 1967. It is no longer a secret that a silent revolution took place just a few days before the June War when Moshe Dayan was brought into the Ministry of Defense in spite of opposition to this at that time by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol.

The role of the military establishment grew under exaggerated Israeli considerations of security. This establishment then exceeded the boundaries of its security responsibilities and was transformed into a factor of social and economic pressure after the expansion of Israel's war industry after 1967, especially after the economic conference which was held in Jerusalem. This conference was tantamount to an open declaration of the fact that the battle had been decided in favor of an alliance of local and international capital at the expense of the Zionist establishments which had been established on the shoulders of the pioneering Zionist movement and the process of building the nation in its initial stages.

We are not here concerned with tracing the growth of the military establishment and its armament industry, which by 1980 had become the seventh-largest exporter of arms to the world. But highlighting its role, and at the same time pointing out the Israeli security phobia which has become a form of national mental exercise guided by the Israeli media, will explain many of the phenomena which we are observing at the present time.

Zionist Parties and the Ma'arakh As Opposed to the Likud

If we compare the platforms of the various Zionist parties, both rightist and leftist, which were presented during the election campaign, we find that they are clearly in agreement concerning their hostility to the Palestinian people and concerning expansion of the role of the military in the life of Israel.

Thus one finds "justification" for the apprehension which Bruno Kreisky, the chancellor of Austria, recently expressed to some visitors of his concerning the probably occurrence of a new silent revolution in Israel.

The fact that Israeli political leaders have come to be at the mercy of the military establishment and dominated by its financial and industrial capital, along with everything which this involves in terms of integration with the international production market in the capitalist world, has created a situation of profound polarization in Israel. This tends to confirm the fact that the election campaign was decided in a way which was aginst the interests of the Jewish masses and against the rights of the Palestinian people even before it began, since victory in the elections would belong to only one of two racehorses--the Liku or the Ma'arakh.

In spite of this polarization in Israeli society and the appearance of the Likud and Ma'arakh as the only two racehorses in the contest, the difference in the two positions taken by the two parties was not necessarily only a difference in form, even though it was a difference among groups from the same position in the class structure.

It is possible to shed some light on the nature of this difference if we recall how the Zionist parties were formed and the nature of their commitments among Jewish circles in all parts of the world. The large parties have their own kibbutzim, moshavim, local and international organizations, and even their own athletic teams. This means that the democratic process plays a restricted role in determining the nature of Israeli policy.

What this means is that the voice of the individual, although important, is not the decisive vote. The decisive factor is how the party economic and social organizations influence the formation of Israeli policy. For this reason, the historical role of the kibbutzim in Israeli policy during the stage of building the nation is no longer a role which possesses the same importance since the kibbutz, histadrut, moshav, and other institutions have entered into the process of reconciliation which has been led by the military establishment. In this manner, these institutions lost the previous independence which they had enjoyed. The chief criterion became the degree of loyalty to the Zionist consensus which is led by the alliance of Zionist and international capital.

This is why we understand the role of the Mapam Party, its renunciation of its previous slogans (such as Marxism and Borochovism), and its renunciation of its objective of establishing Arab-Jewish brotherhood within the framework of a binational state.

We thus also understand the failure of the DASH movement, which appeared as a response to disappointment felt concerning the policy of the Ma'arakh as well as the emaciation of the role of the minor election candidates.

Let us return to the differences between the Ma'arakh and the Likud. The Likud, which represents the most aggressive elements in Zionist monopolistic circles, is behind the latest step of organizing an extremely serious revolution in the life of Israel--which is that of deciding matters, once and for all, in favor of these monopolies and in favor of international capital, and bringing about the dominance of political fascism. Thus we should not find it strange that Begin, several weeks ago, stated that Israel is not begging for aid from the U.S., but rather is a full partner of the U.S. This is something which Reagan later on emphasized when he stated that if Israel had not been established in the region then U.S. forces would have had to occupy the area in order to protect U.S. interests there.

The similarity between both Begin's and Reagan's concept of the U.S.-Israeli relationship means that there is, in fact, complete agreement in the two policies. This was expressed by Reagan's statement after the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and by Begin's request that the U.S. President, as Begin put it, "put a stop to the buffoonery which is going on in the UN Security Council."

Zionist parties have their organizations which have been formed historically, and the Likud, in addition to having such organizations, has also made use of an even more aggressive group called the Gush Emunim. In September 1980 an Israeli journalist told me that this organization is able to mobilize between 50,000 and 100,000 people. He said that it has considerable influence in the Israeli Army and that it has good connections with the chief of staff, senior officers, junior officers, and NCO's. He also said that the Gush Emunim has been transformed into a branch of the Israeli Army which bears the name "Territorial Defense Forces" [IDF].

But how does the Labor Party differ from the Likud Party? The Israeli journalist says that Peres was the outstanding disciple of Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir, who were known for their pragmatism and inflexibility. He claimed that Peres and the Labor Party were against establishing further settlements. But this position is subject to many unstable factors, and consequently Peres is a political phenomenon which is cause for alarm and cannot inspire trust.

To a considerable degree, an observer cannot help but agree with this Israeli journalist's opinion, but agreeing with this opinion does not change the fact that this party is hostile toward the Palestinians. We are not basing this allegation on the history of the party's hostility since the establishment of Israel and up till the assuming of power by the Likud. We are basing the allegation on this party's position taken while it was the opposition party for 4 years and was attempting to outbid the Likud in terms of extremism and then cloak itself in the guise of a national consensus in order to hide the fact that it was in agreement with the disastrous policy of the Likud.

In addition to this, the Ma'arakh has international support which is greater then the support which the Likud has, and this makes its role more important. It has ties with international socialism and some of the international labor organizations. This provides it with an appropriate cover in order to be able to push through its policy of national and social subjugation of the Palestinians after embellishing it with shiny slogans which are democratic in form but vindictive in content. However, the remnants of some liberal Zionist groups are still in the party, and they have not yet accepted the reality of the profound change which has occurred inside Israeli society. These groups still exercise a limited degree of influence in maintaining theis party's liberal appearance.

This is something which the party leaders are anxious to maintain as long as the party's decisive policy and content are in their hands and are shaped by them in a manner which is in keeping with the nature of production relationships inside Israel and in keeping with the fact that these relationships are linked to the policy of imperialism as a whole in the world. Perhaps the differences between the two parties were greater than this, but we believe that the result of the elections confirmed the hostility of the Israeli political establishment generally toward peaceful solutions and that they were not decisive with regard to the two large parties.

The results published also confirmed the decrease in the role played by the minor election candidates in favor of the role played by the two large parties, which means the establishment of a system similar to that of the U.S. two-party system. But the equal number of seats won by the two parties has given some of the other right-wing extremist candidates a power to commit extortion which does not go beyond their actual following among the voters [as published]. In other words, this extortion will float on the surface of Israeli politics as a falsification of the Israeli voters' [government] administration.

There is a lot of talk about the emaciation of democratic institutions in Israel and the appearance of various fascist practices either to decide internal matters or to distract people's attention from everyday problems. All of these phenomena are logical when seen in the light of the polarization which has imposed itself upon Israeli society, in light of splits in the market economy and sectarian schisms, and in light of the economic and social crises.

This policy is the last remaining means in the hands of the Zionist leaders to save their establishment from collapsing, but this policy itself leads to national, political, and human suicide. It is not possible to easily retreat from this policy which is steeped in reaction. This is because such a retreat would mean reconstituting Israeli society, and this is something which is not possible under present circumstances. But insisting on this policy might lead to a military confrontation with neighboring Arab states and might lead to an expansion of the circle of confrontation, which would constitute a danger which would threaten world peace.

The Palestinian Position

The PLO's position, on the other hand, has taken on a new form and clearer content. This position is considered to be something of very important significance in light of the decision by the 15th Palestinian National Council which stipulates conducting a dialogue with non-Zionist Israeli groups and putting a halt to all dialogue with Zionist groups, whether these groups are rightist or leftist groups.

The decision by the PLO's Executive Committee to support and back the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality, and its clear appeal to rally around it and elect its candidates, is tantamount to putting the decision of the Palestinian National Council into effect. This decision indicates, in no uncertain terms, the entry of the PLO as an ally of Arab and Jewish democratic forces and against Zionism and the imperialist alliance in the region which is being led by the U.S. We do not wish to skip over the barriers of the future and decide that it constitutes a strategic step toward consolidating the alliance between all of the forces opposed to imperialism and Zionism, on both sides of the conflict, against the imperialist, reactionary, and Zionist forces in the region. But we can assert that this decision does contain such significance and content, and does truthfully reveal the depth of the Palestinians' vision with regard to the struggle and the realistic and human nature of their visision.

However, as we ponder the future, it is necessary for us to envision things in an integrated framework which accounts for Arabs, Palestinian, and Israeli dimensions. We do not exaggerate when we say that the PLO's latest position accounts for all of these dimensions. By directly entering into the process of polarization and social struggle inside the Arab world, and by giving clear support to democratic

orientations, the PLO is offering itself as a factor assisting in the process of change which is currently taking place in the region. At the same time, the PLO is offering another solution which depends on a confrontation between the democratic alliance, which is striving to form, and the polarization which has been consecrated by the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In other words, having taken this position, the PLO is offering a new concept of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict which is based on doing away with the chauvinistic slogans which reactionary leaders in the Arab world have been profiting from and which Israel has been exploiting in order to kindle hostility agains the Arabs generally and against the Palestinians in particular.

The Position Taken by Jordan and the Arab Countries

Jordan did cherish hopes of arriving at a peaceful solution with Israel within the framework of a united kingdom. But the Camp David agreements, and the [Palestinian] autonomy previously suggested by Begin, dashed these hopes. The only hope then for the solution which Jordan wanted was for a return of the Ma'arakh or an alternative alliance capable of proceeding according to this policy.

Jordan was not the only country which was hoping for this solution. There were other Arab regimes which agreed with this point of view. For this reason, during and after the election campaign the Jordanian position was characterized by violent attacks against the Likud and against its leader, Menachim Begin.

The Likud victory has, if only partially, blocked the path of other Israeli forces which saw in the Jordanian solution and in Jordan the path to a solution. This serves to weaken the Jordanian position vis-a-vis Syria and the PLO. It proves that the other approach being followed by the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front is the result of a more profound understanding of the nature of the confrontation with Israel and is characterized by a more extensive commitment to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

The U.S. tried to encourage Jordan to pursue a policy which was midway between Sadat's policy and the policy of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. This encouragement found support on the part of Saudi Arabia and Morocco. For this reason, since the emergence of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Jordan's policy has enjoyed broad circulation among the Arab regimes. But the failure of Iraq's invasion of Iran, Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, Syria's steadfastness in the face of conspiracies against it, the emergence of the importance of the Syrian-Soviet alliance, and the Likud Party's victory in the elections, have all revealed the social positions of the Arab regimes and the extent to which they pursue a policy which is hostile to the Palestinian people.

This tends to highlight two facts: The first of these is that the only alternative to the present Jordanian and Arab policy is a clear alliance with the Soviet Union. This has to be done in order to confront the Israeli policy which is supported by the U.S.

The second of these facts is that the needs of this present stage conflict with the nature of the social and class structure of these regimes. For this reason, the victory of the Israeli right wing in the last elections will help to further reveal this contradiction and make it more profound.

Prospects for the Future

We do not want to give free rein to our imaginations and fancy things which are not likely to take place. But we can confidently say that there are objective circumstances which are a sign of changes to take place in the social map of the region. There are many indications in Israel, in the occupied territories, and across the borders which confirm this. The position taken by the PLO with regard to the elections if one of the most prominent such indicators. Disappointment inside Israel over the results of the elections, and the demand for change, is also another indicator which is worthy of consideration.

The question is, is there a justification for an internal alliance between the Democratic Front and the Zionist left in Israel?

The fact is that there are many justifications for this. There are quiet a few points of agreement between them. Also, such an alliance would not conflict with the above-mentioned decision of the Palestinian National Council because it is an internal matter and constitutes a temporary alliance. This alliance could be based on a minimum platform which would call for the following:

1. Resistance to fascism and protection of democratic institutions.
2. Putting a stop to social and economic deterioration.
3. Putting a stop to establishing further settlements.
4. Putting a stop to military escalation.

If an alliance such as this between the front and all of the leftist and liberal forces succeeded, even within the limits of the above-mentioned platform, then this success would give people reason to believe that there might be hope for Israeli political life. It would be a sign of the presence of an alternative to the present polarization in Israel. This alternative might restore to political life in Israel a type of sensibility and maturity which it lost under the circumstances of its economic, social, and political development. This is not a simplification of matters which cannot stand up to the facts of life, but rather the only possible alternative which could restrain the zeal for establishing more settlements and keep it from dragging the region into a disastrous war, which would use the Middle East as fuel and the shell fragments of which would scatter and hit the whole world.

The Position Taken in the Occupied Lands

It is not true that the occupied territories have not shown interest in the Israeli elections. The truth is that it is both logical and reasonable for them to show more interest now than they did before.

We have two reasons for reaching this conclusion. First of all, there is the direct relationship between Israel and the occupied territories, and secondly there is the clear and frank position which was taken by the Palestinian leaders.

We also believe that there is [another] dimension which must be assessed when we are dealing with these elections.

We believe that the expected election results were not the most important factor. The most important factor was the effect which these internal changes in Israel have on Palestinian-Israeli relations both domestically and abroad.

We have briefly touched upon the effect which these elections have had abroad. However, we feel that we should show that the domestic effect has perhaps been more important. The reason for this is that the nature of the social changes, which are taking place in the occupied territories due to the effect of the occupation policy, is profoundly affecting the formation of the domestic political position as well as the Palestinian and Arab position abroad.

A continuation of this policy will increase the probability of further social polarization inside the occupied territories and will hasten the screening process which is currently taking place.

These matters which, if they continue to take place at this rapid rate and under the circumstances of a probably increase in establishments of Israeli settlements after the success of the Likud Party in forming the new government, may create a very critical situation, the outcome of which cannot be foreseen. This does not mean that we are talking about the policy of a particular party. Rather we are judging matters by the criteria of social changes inside Israel, their effect on social changes in the occupied territories, and the new role of the PLO in the social screening process which is taking place in the Arab world and inside Israel.

A Final Word

We feel that the labor pains which are going on in the region harbor the prospect of many changes taking place and the prospect of the appearance of new groups and ranks of people which may transcend all of the colored lines which have been drawn on the political map. And the world will find that its ability to accept these changes will be tested.

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DEFENSE SYSTEM CUTS LIKELY TO HURT DEVELOPMENT, EQUIPMENT PROCUREMENT, TRAINING

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Oct 81 p 8

[Article by Tzvi Har'el: "The Cuts in the Defense System are Likely to Hurt Development, Equipment Procurement, and Training"]

[Text] The cuts in the defense system are likely to hurt three areas of the armored corps: development, equipment procurement and training--the commander of the corps, Gen Amnon Reshef, said yesterday at a military press conference on the occasion of armored corps day which will be held this week.

Gen Reshef reported further that in the past year cuts had begun in training, but he did not suppose that an additional cut would be made in this area. In connection with the other two areas--development and equipment procurement--the cuts will oblige the corps to spread its programs over a number of years and to try not to waste them.

The general also said that the Arab states are strengthening themselves with the best equipment from both East and West, and that the IDF is unable to procure on such a large scale. As a solution to the quantitative advantage, Gen Reshef said that the IDF must base its deployment of armor on a number of quality tanks, and these would be the Mercava and, additionally, to develop other tanks that are at its disposal.

In answer to another question, the corps commander replied that the IDF indeeds sees the introduction of attack helicopters as a new threat, but in his opinion one should not view the confrontation in the exclusive arena between the tank and the helicopter but rather in the integrated factual plane in which the advantage of the helicopter over the tank is lessened.

With great satisfaction the commander of the armored troops noted that 95 percent of those in the corps recently had volunteered to serve in it. Gen Reshef explained that the volunteerism means that the recruit chooses one of three corps in which he is interested in serving.

9794
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NEW NAVAL DEFENSE DEVICE EXHIBITED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Sep 81 p 10

[Text] A sophisticated device, the first of its kind in Israel, to search out and warn against threats to navy ships was exhibited yesterday for the first time by its manufacturer, the firm ElOP [Electro-Optics Industries Ltd.] which is located in the industrial park for science-based industries in Rehovot.

The new device is called "Spirateq" and is based on passive (athermal) technology at very large ranges. The device reveals threats such as missile or aircraft strikes and warns the boat, which gives it enough time to destroy the threat or at least to deploy against it.

Details of the new device were reported by the general manager of ElOP, Mr 'Akiva Me'ir, in a tour of the plant by journalists. At the same press conference there were also exhibited for the first time the most sophisticated electro-optical systems which serve the armor and air forces including fire-control, laser, night vision and avionics systems.

The general manager of the company reported that even though the firm suffered losses in years past, it is now extremely successful due to the fact that ElOP's products are among the world's best because of their sophistication and efficiency. As a result of that, new markets have been opened, and the total of production orders has reached about $1 billion of which more than 50 percent are export orders.

Mr 'Akiva Me'ir stressed in particular that these impressive accomplishments in research and development were achieved because of the skilled work force: 750 people work at "ElOP," among whom are 360 academics, researchers, engineers and apprentice engineers. The ElOP company is owned in equal shares by "Tadiran" Israel industries for electronics and the Federman Group.

The company's investment program totals $17 million, of which $10 million has already been authorized for implementation by the managerial council.

The plant represents an integration of electronic and optical technologies, and its products divide into 4 principal categories:

--fire control systems installed on the Mercava tank

--laser systems

--night vision systems

--avionics systems, which are used primarily on Kfir and Skyhawk fighter planes, which enable the pilot to receive flight and armament data and which constitute the plane's fire and bombing intent.

The ElOP company is a merger of two prestigious veteran companies in this branch of industry. One was founded back in 1937 and went through several reincarnations from "Goldberg devices" to ElOP in the industrial park near the Weizmann Institute. The second was founded by Prof Joe Yafeh in 1963. The two companies were purchased in equal shares 3 years ago by "Tadiran" and the Federman group.

Mr Me'ir noted that ElOP products are in demand in the industrialized countries of the West and even the most outstanding of them purchase the plant's products.

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SUCCESSFUL EXPORT OF 105MM SHELL

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 20 Sep 81 pp 9, 35

[Article by Eitan Haber: "The Israeli Shell Which Sells Throughout the World Like Hotcakes"]

[Text] This is a surprise story about a bomb-shell. These are the shells which defense minister Ariel Sharon was selling last week during his secret visit to Switzerland--according to both local and foreign reports. If this was the true reason for Sharon's visit to Switzerland then that country becomes a part of the greatest success story of Israel's military industry (except for the Uzi submachine gun which, if we may exaggerate a little, is almost as widespread in the world as the Bible--though such things should not be mentioned in the same breath). We are talking about the 105mm anti-armor shell. According to what is known thus far, 18 countries have purchased it for almost half a billion dollars, and more orders have been placed.

If I am not mistaken, it was Golda Me'ir who said that she would not forgive the Arabs for turning us from the people of the book to a people of guns and arms manufacturers. Perhaps the only comfort in this matter is that this, too, we do well. Be that as it may, Israel today is among the world leaders, one of the big five. In the case of the anti-armor shell produced by Israel's military industry, there are no competitors.

The problem with tank shells, as it was explained to me, is always how to increase its firing range and penetration. In average shells, the ratio between the shell's length and diameter is small. Therefore both the range and penetration are limited. In 1971, 2 years before the Yom Kippur war, Abraham Maqub came up with the idea of increasing the ratio between length and diameter so that there would be greater weight for a small diameter. The result would be that the range and penetration would increase immeasurably.

Abraham Maqub

This is the place to say a few words about Abraham Maqub. He belongs to a large group of people who were anonymous in both life and death, but to whom Israel owes her life. He was certainly one of those who carried the State of Israel's security on his shoulders. Maqub came to the military industry in 1947 as a graduate of the Technion in Haifa, a certified electrical engineer. Over the years he was recognized

as a real genius in the field of development of modern means of warfare. He was a living incarnation of the saying: "the Jewish mind can invent anything." Within the military industry he was the head of the central laboratory and deputy director, but that hardly says what he did. There was no one in the security industry who contributed as much to weapons development.

He came to fame, for the first time, indirectly, immediately after the Six-Day war. It turned out that the Israeli air force, which destroyed the Arab air forces with such rare success, had used a special bomb for destroying runways. Damage was caused to the take-off and landing strips at the Arab airfields that could not be repaired quickly, and by the time it was repaired, the war was over. The bomb penetrated deep within the runway and exploded underneath it. The runway destruction bomb won Maqub the Israel security prize.

The same security prize was awarded to him years earlier, in 1961, for the "development of new armament products," but at that time the sources in the security office refused to reveal the details. Maqub was not a pleasant person. Just the opposite. But his genius, energy, perseverance and enthusiasm made up for his personal failings. People always treated him as a genius whose idiosyncracies had to be excused. His contribution was rare in both quantity and quality. The general manager of the Israel military industry, Michael Shur, claims that one-half (!) of the self-employed export products of the Israel military industry are the result of Maqub's work and initiative.

He Won the Contest

During the research work on the special shell, it became clear to Maqub that the Americans, Germans and British were also working on the same thing. A blind contest developed between him and them with the final result: a 105 armor shell whose precision and penetration are exceptional. Maqub beat the Americans, British and Germans. Sleepless nights, troubling ideas, hours of doubts and moments of despair resulted in a product which everyone (how terrible to say this about implements of war) ended up praising. Its precision and penetration sent representatives of the armies of the world running to Israel.

Very little was published about the shell. It was known only that it was relatively cheaper than its competitors (and still costs several hundred dollars per), that its manufacture began only in 1978, that not a few countries are waiting in line, that 18 countries have signed multi-year contracts for several thousands or tens of thousands of shells. It was also said in private that its armor penetration was greater than that of the shells which preceded it and, as I already said, that sales thus far have exceeded half a billion dollars.

Maqub himslef only managed to see the beginning. Last winter, following a serious illness, he died after 33 years of work in the Israel arms industry. In any other country he might have been rewarded with a special pension or other benefits which would have provided comfort to him, his children and the generations to come. In Israel there is no such pension or "percentage points," with difficulty you win the Israel security prize and the thanks of a nation that does not know whom to thank.

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IMPROVED DATE CULTIVATION TECHNIQUE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Oct 81 p 4

[Article by Haim Handwerker: "Success In a New Method For Increasing Date Seedlings"]

[Text] Dr 'Oded Re'uveni, director of the institute for plantings in the agricultural research administration in Bet Dagan, succeeded recently, after protracted research work, in increasing date seedlings by means of tissue culture. The seedlings produced by this method still have to be checked to see if they are identical to the mother plant. The success of the method is an important accomplishment, thereby opening up prospects for a significant increase in the date harvests in Israel with the aid of culture material that would be taken from selected trees.

The date is one of the most widespread crops in Israel. The average crop per dunam today is about 2000 kg. The problem of the fertility of the tree is not yet sufficiently clear.

But the experiment has proven that the offspring of a fertile tree will generally produce high harvests, while the offspring of a tree poor in fruit will also be poor in fruit. The tree will sire between 3 and 15 seedlings in its first years, even before it is known whether it is fruit-bearing or not. For these reasons there is no possibility of a large-scale increase in excellent trees, and the growers are accustomed to planting seedlings even from trees with a low yield.

Test-tube planting

In order to solve the problem, Dr Re'uveni began to develop a method for increasing date trees by means of tissue cultures. The system is based on selecting young tissue from a date plant, its introduction into a sterile test-tube containing the essential food required for its development, and the acquisition of plant tissue containing many embryos. These embryos are separated at a certain stage from the mother tissue, are planted in the test-tube and develop there to a size of a few centimeters.

The success of the research increases the prospect for an increase of the date harvest and the profitability of the sector as well as the diversity of foodstuffs in Israel.

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INDUSTRIAL WAGES SAID TOO LOW TO ATTRACT WORKERS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Nov 81 p 12

[Article by 'Aryeh Lavi': "They Do Not Want to Work in Industry"]

[Text] Despite the considerable improvement in the image of industrial workers over the last few years, industry still deters workers. In particular, those plants which need workers at relatively low skill levels are having difficulty finding workers, and all attempts to find such workers have met with complete or partial failure.

The difficulty is especially noticeable in the textile plants in which the salary level, at least in the initial work years, is minimal, as required by the minimum wage level [sic]. There is scant difference between this salary and the unemployment benefits which the worker is entitled to, which acts as a stimulus for the worker to continue to enjoy those benefits.

Occasionally, because of the customary linkage agreements, the unemployment compensation is higher than the minimum wage. This, for example, is the situation now when unemployment benefits for the discharged soldier, which are 40 percent of the average wage, come to 3200 shekels a month while the minimum starting salary is 3085.25 shekels per month. Against this background it is easy to understand the reluctance of discharged soldiers and other unemployed to work in industry.

The attempt that was made in the 'Argaman textile factory in Yavneh can serve as an example of how reluctant workers are of factory work. This plant needed about 10 new workers, and in coordination with the employment office, a plan was worked out to absorb unemployed at the plant. Within this framework it was decided to send workers from the employment offices in Yavneh and 'Ashdod, places where hundreds of unemployed are seeking work, to the plant. In the course of the experiment, which began in June and ended in September, 94 workers were sent to the plant's offices, 49 from the employment office in Yavneh and the rest from 'Ashdod.

To enjoy unemployment compensation

A report which the plant management sent to the employment service describes very well the 'absorption' of the workers at the plant: One-third of the workers--33 people--refused the work that was offered them after an hour or two of work. 'Itamar Zaltz, the director of manpower at the plant, who was in charge of the attempt to absorb the workers, states without hesitation: they do not want to work

in industry. The young prefer to sit by the seashore and enjoy their unemployment benefits. The older ones prefer to work at occasional jobs that pay much more.

Of the 61 workers who started to work, 42 were let go by the end of September--it follows that 19 were absorbed in the plant, or about 20 percent. Two of those who were absorbed were not ready to work in production alongside the machines. But they agreed to take on transport and maintenance jobs, so that the number who were absorbed into production work dropped to 17. Five others were accepted for temporary work, and, therefore, of the total of 94 people who were referred to 'Argaman, 12 were in fact employed, less than 12 percent. The attempts of the 'Argaman managers to recruit workers from the territories were much more successful. Their level of absorption at the plant reaches 75 percent.

In a letter which Mr Zaltz sent to the general manager of the employment office, he notes that there were two principal reasons for the failure of the attempt to absorb workers at the plant:

* the relatively high unemployment benefits as compared to the starting salary in industry

* the lack of a demonstrated desire to be integrated into industry because of the shift work and the image that industry has as a place of work inferior to that of the services.

This week, about a month after the sending of the letter which reported on the level of absorption at the 'Argaman plant, I spoke with 'Itamar Zaltz. It turns out that of the 12 that were absorbed in production, 6 have already left, and the rate of success in absorption now stands at just 6 percent.

'Argaman has terminated the project. Rather than have other plants be disappointed in attempts to absorb workers into industry, it would be proper to examine what can be done to make industrial work more attractive. It seems that decreasing the gap between the minimum wage in industry and the unemployment benefits that the unemployed enjoy is one of the essential keys to achieving the goal.

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BIOGRAPHY OF INFANTRY COMMANDER GIVEN

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Sep 81 p 5

[Text] Brig Gen 'Amos Yaron was appointed yesterday as chief infantry and paratroop officer. Brig Gen 'Amos Yaron replaces Brig Gen Matan Vilan'ai who is going to be appointed to another senior position in the IDF.

Brig Gen Yaron was born in 1940 in Holon. In 1957 he was drafted into the IDF, in a Nahal youth training group. In 1959, he finished the officer's course and between the years 1967-1970 he carried out supervisory tasks in a paratroop brigade. He taught in the officer's school and passed a commando course in the U.S. In the Six-Day war he was operations officer of a paratroop brigade that fought in Jerusalem and completed this mission in 1968. In 1969 he graduated the inter-service command and staff college. Between the years 1970-1973 he was a paratroop battalion and brigade commander. Between the years 1973-1974 he was a trainee at the marines' command and staff school in the U.S.

In the Yom Kippur war he was deputy commander of a paratroop birgade, and between the years 1975-1976 he served as a regular paratroop brigade commander. Between the years 1978-1979 he was a task force commander. In 1979-1980 he was a trainee in the national security college and a student in the history department of the University of Tel Aviv. Beginning in 1980 he has served as the head of the operations branch of the general staff. He is married and the father of a son and of a daughter who is about to be inducted into the IDR.

Photo Caption: Brig Gen 'Amos Yaron

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BRIEFS

MILITARY INDUSTRY SALES--Five hundred planes of different types--fighter and training planes, executive planes and cargo and passenger planes--have been produced and supplied thus far by the aviation industry. The 500th plane, a Westwind 1124, left the production lines a short while ago on its way to its owners. This was reported by the general manager of the aviation industry, Gavri'el Gidur, at the company's board meeting. According to the aviation industry's journal "Skies," the aviation industry has manufactured four types of planes in the last 22 years. The first plane that it produced was the "Fouga Magister" which was turned over to the Israeli air force in July, 1960. These planes fly in air force service to this day and serve as training planes for its pilots. Afterwards the aviation industry began the design and development of the "Arava" plane, of which dozens have been produced up till now in both a civilian and a military version. These planes fly today in the service of many foreign air forces in Latin America and in Asia. With the imposition of the French embargo on Israel, after the Six-Day war, the aviation industry was charged with designing and producing a military fighter from the top down. Today the company maintains regular production of the "Kfir" for the Israeli air force. In addition to these 3 [sic] types of planes, the aviation industry also produces now an executive jet, the "Westwind." Thus far 174 of these planes have been produced. They are sold in many places throughout the world, mainly in the U.S., and earn the aviation industry millions of dollars each year. [Text] [Tel Aviv BAMAHANE in Hebrew 2 Sep 81 p 4] 9794

MILITARY STRENGTH--Prime Minister Menahem Begin, in high spirits, yesterday revealed the extent of the IDF's military strength in a lecture that he delivered to the heads of the "Bunds" in New York. Begin said that Israel would always defend herself alone and would not ask anyone to come to defend her. "If we have to, we can put 700,000 soldiers into service. We have an excellent army. They always ask me if this is the world's best army, and I answer that it is not the best--but I do not know any better. But when they ask me if our air force is the best in the world, I agree that it is, because it has the most battle experience and thus more experience than the air forces of the two superpowers." Begin said that the strategic cooperation to which he agreed in Washington would not remain theoretical. It will be implemented and therefore is a turning point in relations between Israel and the U.S. He sharpened his tone somewhat when discussing the "AWACS." Begin said that, as an Israeli citizen, he would not take part in the debate between the branches of the American government--but as head of the Israeli government, he is obliged to tell the truth that it would endanger Israeli security. "If 10 of the F-15's that will be supplied to Saudi Arabia would come to bomb Tel Aviv, we would down 8 of them. The two that would remain would be able to destroy large parts of the city, and cause great losses"--the prime minister said--"How can I agree to that?" [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Sep 81 p 1] 9794

SCIENTIFIC ENROLLMENT DECLINE--"When we examine what is happening today in the institutions of higher learning in the area of the hard sciences, we find a very small number of students turning to these areas. If this situation does not change, Israel is likely to lose the honored place she holds today among the scientific communities of the world." So said the rector of Ben Gurion University in the Negev, Prof David Wolf, yesterday at the opening of the congress of the Israel society for chemistry which is being held at the university. The president of the Israel society for chemistry, Dr R. Haber, warned of the small number of applicants to the chemical sciences at the universities and claimed that it is necessary to strengthen the awareness of the hard sciences among high school students in Israel. In the opening lecture the former president of Israel, Prof Ephraim Katzir, surveyed the contribution of bio-technology to chemistry, noting the development of new enzymes and the growth of tissues by new chemical means. In the course of the conference, topics to be covered include the geochemical history of the Dead Sea and its implications for the two seas canal project, progress in the use of chemicals in medicine, identification of gunpowder residues, development of an artificial liver, industrial use of photochemistry, the exploitation of industrial wastes for the production of heat collecting materials, air pollution and ecology, and many other topics. Participating in the congress are scientists and chemistry teachers at educational and research institutions throughout Israel. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Oct 81 p 5] 9794

CSO: 4423/47

BRIEFS

BOND CEILING DENIED--Kuwait will not impose an artificial limit on the coupon or amount of dinar bond issues for foreign borrowers, Finance Minister Abdul Latif al-Hamad has told REUTERS in an interview. The minister indicated that market conditions would determine rates in the market, which reopened in August after being closed by a liquidity squeeze. Bankers said they had understood there was a 10 per cent ceiling on coupons and an upper limit of KD 7 million per bond issue (KD 1 = $3.554). All issues but one since the market reopened have had 10 per cent coupons and all but one have been KD 7 million or less. Last month's issue for Eurofima which had an 11 per cent coupon (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, September 28) and this month's KD 30 million issue for the World Bank (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, November 16) were described as exceptions. Mr Hamad commented, "Ten per cent is not a holy figure nor is it a ceiling. It is a guideline." Asked about the widespread market belief about a KD 7 million limit he said: "There is no ceiling on amounts. There are misconceptions. The market has been dormant for a number of years and people are relating the market situation to what it was five years ago." [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 47, 23 Nov 81 p 8]

CSO: 4400/82

ALGERIAN REPORTER DESCRIBES QADHDAFI'S LIBYA

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 21 Sep 81 p 5

[Article by Bashir Hamadi: "The Libyan Jamahiriyah: First September Revolution In Its Twelfth Year; Popular Committees Everywhere"]

[Text] Writing about the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah from the standpoint of the organization of society is delightfully simple, for the experiment upon which the Jamahiriyah embarked (which is represented by its name) as of March 1977 is different from existing experiments in the various Eastern and Western countries. It may be truly said that it is a return to the era of the "city state" in principle, that is, direct democracy and rule of the people and by the people. It is different from the standpoint of methods and particulars, and there is no room here for an academic comparison. We are concerned here not so much with comparison as with learning the facts and through them evaluating the revolution and its slogans. The fact is always the test of each theory and slogan.

However, can one offer a true picture of the situation of a country from a first visit which is limited to the capital, which usually is like an open flower to each visitor when behind it, in most countries, hundreds of wilted blossoms are hidden?!

When our plane landed at Tripoli International Airport after midnight on 2 September, Tripoli seemed to us a radiant pearl or a beautifully dressed bride on its twelfth anniversary.

The road from the airport to the city is like our Jaysh al-Tahrir Street. One side takes you to the city, and the other side carries you from it to the airport, while light-green trees align it, adding beauty and shade.

The first housing complex whose modern buildings greet you is the architecture of a "former hut quarter" whose buildings have risen on the rubble of the huts which represent the belt of misery which surrounds large cities, especially capitals.

The bleary-eyed, one-eyed and even the blind can see the new bracelet of contruction rebirth. The city of Tripoli embraces the sea and meets the sand. New construction predominates. In all of its quarters buildings have risen and are still going up on the rubble of old housing.

Its large major streets, such as Shari' al-Fatih and al-al-Maqrif (on which are located the airlines of the various countries, including Air Algerie), 'Umr al-Mukhtar and others, empty into its Green Square, which is the gathering place of the masses on every holiday and special occasion. This square embraces the popular market, Suq al-Mushir, which in architecture and layout is similar to our casbah, where foreign goods are sold on the sidewalk near the entrance. It is a picture similar to the entrance to the Tariq al-Sahil casbah, with its eastern end differing from the western end. On the end toward Benghazi, sand and dirt mix on the pavement. Both sides are lined with the green of camphor and olive trees, as far as the Tajura' tractor factory which Col Qadhdhafi dedicated on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Fatih, mingling with the blue waters of the sea.

Going west one passes through upper-class neighborhoods with villas in various forms, tree-shaded squares and flowers. Distributed among them are large markets such as the Hay al-Andalus collective market and al-Thalatha' collective market, which are similar to the Algerian bazaars. Here you can find any domestic or foreign commodity, especially the latter, at very reasonable prices.

These markets and small establishments provide stiff competition for the private sector, which no longer can stand up to them and is gradually being ruined so that it is now on the verge of being wiped out in all fields.

Everything Is Green!

We find that everything is green: the Green Book, green signs, the Green Square. All windows and doors of homes and stores or businesses are green. Why the concentration on this color?

Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi said in his first meeting with the revolutionary committees in Benghazi that all of the colors used by traditional revolutionary movements in the world symbolize not life and hope, but destruction and ruin. The color green is the color of life, hope and the future, of which people everywhere dream. Green is the symbol of life everywhere in the world. Even paradise is symbolized by the color green. Green is the color of growing plants, the color of growth and not of growing old. All permanent and temporary slogans are written in this color. Speaking of slogans, the Green Book in its three parts ("Solving the Problem of Democracy," "Solving the Economic Problem," and "Social Support") is about to be transcribed in its entirety over the Arches of Victory and on the tablets and slabs designated for that, and in residential or non-residential buildings.

The most important slogans which you encounter wherever you go are "Partners, Not Competitors," "Power, Wealth and Weapons Among the People," "The Fatih Forever," "Committees Everywhere," and hundreds of other slogans.

Speaking of committees, what is meant? Are these the Popular Committees, which are a basic pillar of the organization of society according to the Green Book, or the revolutionary committees which are not mentioned in the book?

We posed this question to one of the members of the Office of Revolutionary Committees, as it is written on the door. Since the Third Gathering of Revolutionary Committees, in February 1980, it has been called the Office for Liaison with the Revolutionary Committees, headed by Staff Maj 'Abd-al-Salam Ahmad Julud, but the old name is still in use.

This liaison office is located in the middle of a large garden, like the Palace of the People (Qasr al-Sha'b) at home, similar to the shrine of al-Aqsa Mosque. Facing it are fountains which attract tourists, especially after sunset when multicolored lights are lit under the water.

Revolutionary Committees

In the building of the Office of Liaison with Revolutionary Committees I met with Brother 'Umar in a large, grandiose office. We had a long coversation about the revolutionary committees, the need to form them, their place in the organizational pyramid of society, the functions which they handle and other subpoints about the central topics. The gist of the discussion was that the revolutionary committees, which were formed in late 1977, are a tool of the popular revolution and are a stage. The theory of the authority of the people and its application do not require the existence of revolutionary committees, They are not based in theory but are made necessary by the social, political, economic and cultural conditions handed down from a regime opposed to the authority of the people. The presence of these committees is required by the nature of the transition period. The existence of these committees is linked to achieving the authority of the people. Whenever that is achieved there is no need for the revolutionary committees to continue if the goal for which they were formed is achieved.

I asked Brother 'Umar: "Aren't these committees evolving over the years into apparatus exercising authority in lieu of the people? Aren't huge offices like this (referring to the office of my conversation partner) one of the temptations to move away from the masses gradually in body and spirit?"

His facial expression and the tone of his voice changed, and he said, choosing his words carefully: "You know very well that the revolutionary committees have no authority and no right to practice any kind of authority. The revolutionary committees were designed to have no authority so that they would not turn into a party or group setting up a dictatorship over the masses, thus becoming an obstacle to the authority of the people rather than a tool for them."

The revolutionary committees are an evangelistic tool of the new organization of society, spurring the people on to exercise their authority without controlling them or exercising authority for them. One can understand their role in society through the functions which they are performing, represented by:

1. Encouraging the masses to exercise authority, through the presence of these committees at People's Congresses when they meet and as the masses are climbing to the Popular Committees and the leadership committees, for the purpose of making things clear to the masses so that they may reach a sound decision; investigating attempts to dupe or deceive the masses; explaining the true dimensions of subjects being discussed by the masses at their conferences so that they will gain complete knowledge of their responsibilities; and working to have the People's Congresses choose revolutionary leadership elements.

2. Establishing the authority of the people, which is the result to which the support functions of the revolutionary committees are leading.

3. Exercising revolutionary supervision by revealing practices hostile to them and revealing those elements to the masses so that suitable decisions can be made concerning them. The revolutionary committees do not make a decision concerning anyone unless acting in place of the people.

4. Actuating People's Congresses so that the masses will exercise their right to authority. The masses need someone to get them started; they do not change position overnight. They do not change from absolute negativism to absolute positivism quickly. New things are not acceptable easily unless they are proved useful and preferable to the old.

5. Providing guidance to the popular committees and the secretariats of the congress to prevent a relapse in the people's authority because of incorrect practices, especially in the transitional stage, since mistakes of individuals are charged to the people's exercise of authority, and some use that as justification for discrediting the people and their authority.

For fear that the revolutionary committees would enter into a struggle with the leadership and popular committees, it was felt best to have them provide this guidance openly.

6. Protecting, defending and guarding the Fatih Revolution by opposing reactionary groups who hate the revolution; opposing opportunists and hidden power seekers with revolutionary slogans who are more dangerous to the revolution than its conspicuous enemies; and also opposing authoritative practices and attempts to usurp the people's power, at the same time working to communicate the words and theses of the revolution to all of the masses by scientific evidence, effective persuasion and practical pursuits.

Committees Everywhere

"No democracy without People's Congresses and committees everywhere" is a slogan found everywhere, as are such committees. The committees in "committees everywhere" are the Popular Committees, which are considered the basic support of the permanent structure. They are not temporary or part of a stage, as are the revolutionary committees. These committees are chosen by the masses in the basic People's Congresses to take the place of the government administration. Thus the institutions of society operate through these committees. Consequently, administration is by the people and supervision is also performed by the people, embodying the slogan of democracy: the people controlling themselves.

The formation of these committees differs from the formation of the revolutionary committees. They are chosen by the masses and are found on different levels, that is, in every location, from a committee springing from the simplest gathering of citizens in a neighborhood to a committee emanating from the General Congress.

First, there are Popular Committees on the neighborhood or local level; then there are Popular Committees on the level of municipal subdivisions. Next there are specific popular Committees which are chosen on the municipal level during the meeting of the masses of each basic People's Congress to choose their member of each specific committee, such as a member of the Popular Committee on justice, education and health, farming and others. These Popular Committees in education

and other sectors are composed of the group of members chosen by the masses in the basic People's Congresses.

The structure is graduated in this way up to the General People's Congress, which is a general gathering point for the People's Congresses and Popular Committees, trade unions and vocational syndicates to formulate the decisions of the People's Congresses and choose the secretaries of justice, planning, agriculture and industry; that is, corresponding to the ministers.

No Leniency Toward Enemies of Revolution

The question which must occur to any reader is: Is the experiment proceeding without problems, or does it have enemies who are trying to obstruct it and destroy it if they can?

From the beginning we have said that there is no sector or, in other words, organization, which satisfies all members of society, and any organization builds on the debris of the one preceding it if it wants to bring about radical change.

Each organization has those who benefit from it, and the Libyan revolution is now building a new society of the masses on the rubble of the kingdom, which had its basic support from the bourgeoisie and the feudal system. These groups lost their privileges, and although they have seemed content, some of them have been biding their time, waiting for their opportunity to attack the revolution and return to the former system. However, methods of dealing with hostile groups are swift and violent. Thus the supports of the former regime are quickly being destroyed. The revolutionary committees are investigating every trick in the commercial field, and popular trials of several businessmen, contractors and others in this field have been held. They are also investigating incorrect practices such as patronage and bribery, and many examples have been offered to the masses, from high army officers to civilians in various posts. In its dealings with those hostile to it, the Libyan revolution is going beyond this. For example, the declaration of the third gathering of revolutionary committees in February 1980 states: "Bodily elimination of the enemy is the final stage in the agenda of the revolutionary struggle to decide it once and for all, if operations of economic, political and social disarmament have not ended the activities of hostile forces."

The declaration also announced the bodily elimination of the enemies of the revolution abroad, and the fourth conference, which was held in March 1981, approved the decision of the revolutionary committees to continue bodily elimination of the enemies of the authority of the people at home and abroad.

Can there still be a relapse? The possibility is remote, especially since the forces of the revolution are growing every day, and the material supports of the new society are growing every day.

Gleanings From Tripoli

One of the greatest accomplishments of which any revolution can boast is the creation of a new people. The Libyan experiment has begun to bear fruit in this field, and that can be provided by giving examples:

When we arrived at Tripoli International Airport after midnight we found two young men waiting for their family arriving on the same flight. Upon learning why we had come, they left their family members to another and acquainted us with various matters. They did not leave until we had joined the participating delegation, after spending more than 2 hours with us.

An Algerian youth who came with us aboard the same plane as a tourist could not find a vacancy in any hotel. He came to the steamer Toledo, and they, considering him as a guest of the Jamahiriyah (as are all guests) invited him to share their lodgings.

If you asked for directions from one of the young people he would listen carefully to you, give you directions and often would take you there.

The police in Tripoli are few, and traffic signs and lights are scarce. Consequently, the traffic system is subject to the good nature of the motorists more than anything else.

Celebrations in the Jamahiriyah last for days, and a number of Arab and non-Arab troupes of artists participate in them. I noted that at the cockfights the Europeans, perhaps more than the Arabs, favor the Lebanese birds. Speaking of Lebanon, I met the Lebanese troupe of popular artists who accompany "Fayruz" (Turquoise) with a mixture of drums and the electric guitar.

If the masses used to seem as if they "had not risen" to the level of Qadhdhafi's thought, they are gradually approaching it. However, the information media, which are supposed to be in the forward trenches, are more remote, so that one feels that the winds of the revolution have not yet reached broadcasting.

Visual broadcasting, or television, as we call it, not only lags behind the procession of the revolution but also is backward from the standpoint of production techniques and programming. However, the day of progress is approaching, according to the citizens and the workers in the television field.

Children are children, and their behavior is similar no matter how different the governmental structure. One of their favorite hobbies is selling items which they have bought from society at double the price. The day is coming when they announce their union to the world and organize to defend young sidewalk salesmen.

Setting up a meeting with any military body ordinarily is more difficult then setting up a meeting with a civilian body, but in the Jamahiriyah it seems that things are different. Agreement on a meeting with the artists and writers league was more difficult than agreement with a military college.

On the door of a recording studio in the television building this phrase is written: "Announcers and program hosts are forbidden to appear on screen in neckties." We have exactly the opposite!!

7587
CSO: 4504/15

POSSIBLE AFRICAN MEDIATION IN LOCAL POLITICS NOTED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 86, 3-9 Oct 81 pp 30-31

[Article by Talhah Jibril: "Morocco: Possibility of Restoration of Normalcy; African Mediation Between Government and Opposition"]

[Text] Rabat--Since 1957, the Sahara problem has been entwined with the issue of democracy in Morocco and has been linked to it closely because the consensus of all the political currents over the Moroccanism of the Sahara has contributed greatly to enhancing democratic action in the country. However, the emergence of disagreement between the government and the opposition on how to deal politically with the Sahara problem has had a negative impact, it seems, on the democratic action. The signs of the current tension between the government and the opposition, represented in the People's Forces Socialist Union Party, emerged when the unionists expressed their intention to withdraw their deputies from the parliament. Observers have been looking forward to the middle of October, when the Moroccan House of Representatives will begin its fifth year, to find out how the Socialist Union will deal with the dilemma of choosing between continuing in or withdrawing from the parliament. Both options are delicate and difficult. Continuing will put the party leadership in a confrontation with its bases, especially the radical bases, and withdrawal will put this leadership in an open confrontation with the regime. But the surprise lies in the fact that the Socialist Union has circumvented this dilemma to transfer the confrontation into another arena, namely the Sahara problem.

On Monday, 21 September, the Socialist Union leaders stood before the court to face the charge of undermining public security and the constitutional sanctities in the wake of the statement which the party issued and in which it expressed its reservations on the Nairobi conference recommendation for a referendum in the western Sahara.

On 24 September, the court issued its sentence in the case: One-year prison term for 'Abd-al-Rahim Bu 'Ubayd, the party secretary general, and for two members of the Political Bureau, namely Deputy Muhammad al-Yazighi and Professor Muhammad al-Hababi; a suspended 2-year prison term for deputy Muhammad Mansur and a 1-year prison term for Habib al-Furqani, both of whom are also members of the Political Bureau.

Regarding the sentences, it is worth noting that Bu 'Ubayd and al-Yazighi, who is the party's organizer, and al-Hababi are the ones who practically phrased and

prepared the Political Bureau's statement whereas the other two approved the statement afterwards.

The Socialist Union has thus entered an unknown tunnel, especially since the publication of its papers has been banned. The predominant inclination is that the party deputies will withdraw from the parliament. The labor federation controlled by the party, namely the Democratic Confederation of Labor, has been subject to pursuit [persecution] since the Casablanca incidents.

In court, Bu 'Ubayd (61 years old) presented a lengthy explanation of the contents of the party statement. In part, he said that his party accepts the principle of referendum but that its reservations have focused primarily on the point which talks of setting up a temporary administration in the Sahara to be entrusted with the task of implementing the referendum. He said that this administration is considered "parliamentary" [sic] and not temporary and that, consequently, it will freeze the Moroccan administration in the Sahara and make it negative, according to his statements. Bu 'Ubayd also pointed out that this administration could be formed of countries hostile to Morocco's viewpoint and sympathetic to the Polisario. In his explanation before the court, Bu 'Ubayd dwelt at length on this point. When the prosecution pointed out in its statements that the party statement contradicts the explanations on the Nairobi conference resolutions which the Moroccan monarch offered in his speech to the people, Bu 'Ubayd said that the party statement is directed against some Moroccan papers which have misinterpreted the Nairobi resolutions. In this regard, Bu 'Ubayd said: "Morocco, both king and people, has pledged to safeguard the unity of its soil. The party statement is intended to express the fears and the dangers that threaten the unity of our soil." He also said that the Nairobi resolutions are not sacred and can be discussed. Here, Bu 'Ubayd cited the Koranic phrase: "Have you not believed? He said: Yes but I want my heart to rest assured." During the trial, a statement was issued in reply to the observations of the Socialist Union' Political Bureau, saying: "Organization of the referendum can only be done with Morocco's assistance and approval. Morocco will spare no effort to facilitate the conducting of the referendum."

What Is Outcome?

The fact is that Bu 'Ubayd was flexible in his explanations on the party statement. During questioning, he said: "Despite the reservations we have expressed, if the outcome is in the interest of Morocco and in the interest of safeguarding its unity, then we cannot but bless this success." He said this even though he has considered his trial and the trial of his comrades tantamount to a trial of opinions, pointing out that he doesn't need to ask the court to consider mitigating circumstances. Concluding his statements before the court, Bu 'Ubayd said: "God, I prefer to go to jail than to remain silent and not express my opinion on a national issue."

The hall of the Court of First Instance in Rabat was overcrowded with dozens of lawyers who had come to defend the Socialist Union leaders. But the defense counsel, headed by Muhammad al-Siddiqi, chairman of the Rabat Lawyers Union, was content with a brief defense in which it called for summoning the minister of foreign affairs and the secretary general of the Progress and Socialism Party to make explanations on the Nairobi resolutions. But the court rejected the request.

It is worth noting that the Progress and Socialism Party, which is an opposition party, had declared its support for the Nairobi recommendations. The defense counsel expressed its resentment over the details mentioned by the public prosecution in its final statement because the public prosecution had charged the defendants with undermining public security but then proceeded to charge them with undermining the constitutional sanctities.

Now that jail sentences have been issued against the Socialist Union leaders, the question that poses itself is: Have the bridges of dialogue between the government and the opposition been blown up and has estrangement set in between the two sides? A leader of the Socialist Union has told al-Majallah: "We are prepared to work according to the rules of the democratic game if the others agree to do so."

Well-informed sources have assured AL-MAJALLAH that reopening the channels of dialogue between the two sides is not difficult. In this regard, these sources have revealed that ex-President Senghor [of Senegal] will mediate to ease the tension between the government and the opposition. Senghor had hinted at this mediation in a statement he made while attending the meetings of the Political Bureau of the African Socialist in Tunis.

8494
CSO: 4504/33

TEXT OF DECREE ON BYLAWS OF ADVISORY COUNCIL

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 22 Oct 81 pp 3, 8

[Article: "Bylaws for State Advisory Council"]

[Text] H.M. Sultan Qabus Bin Sa'id has issued a royal decree establishing bylaws of the state's advisory council, the text of which follows:

Royal Decree No 86/81 on the bylaws of the state's advisory council.

We, Qabus Bin Sa'id, the Sultan of Oman, in accordance with Royal Decree No 84/81 on the establishment of an advisory council for the state, do hereby decree the following:

Chapter One - General Provisions

Article 1: The council will be a party to the views of the government in the fields of the country's economic and social development in accordance with the decree establishing it and the chairman of the council will submit its recommendations to H.M. the Sultan.

Article 2: In the event government quarters concerned do not see fit to accept recommendations of the council, they are to prepare a report on the reasons for submission to the Sultan.

Article 3: The provisions of these bylaws assure all members of the council the freedom to express views. In its debates and recommendations, the members are to observe the country's laws and capabilities and the provisions of these bylaws.

Chapter Two - The Council's Executive Machinery

Article 3: The executive machinery of the council will comprise:

(1.) The chairman of the council.
(2.) The executive office.
(3.) Permanent and temporary committees.
(4.) The secretariate general.

Section One - The Chairman of the Council

Article 5: The chairman of the council will ensure that the council's activities conform to the laws of the country and these bylaws and in doing so will seek the help of his deputy and the executive office.

Article 6: In general the chairman of the council will oversee the proper functioning of all its business. He will open and chair sessions and announce their adjournment. He will manage the debates during the sessions. He will grant permission to speak, will define the subject of discussion and will instruct the speaker to keep within the bounds of the subject.

It will be he who will announce recommendations issued by the council in conformity with Article 43 of these bylaws.

Article 7: The chairman of the council may summon any of its committees to convene to discuss and important or urgent issue and will chair the committee sessions which he attends.

Any correspondence between any of the council's committees and governmental or other quarters outside the council will be carried on through the chairman of the council.

Article 8: The chairman of the council will oversee the secretariat general and all administrative, financial and technical activities of the council.

Article 9: The chairman of the council will exercise the powers of a minister of the chairman of governmental unity with regard to the council's financial and administrative affairs and staff.

Article 10: The chairman of the council may delegate some of his authority to his deputy and may delegate him to chair some sessions of the council or its committees.

If the chairman is absent, his deputy will chair sessions and will have the authority sanctioned by these regulations for the chairman of the council in managing the session.

Section Two - The Executive Office

Article 11: The executive office will be composed of the chairman of the council as chairman, his deputy and two members from the governmental sector and one from the civil sector selected by a majority vote of the council members present at its first meeting.

Article 12: The executive office will draft a plan for the activities of the council and its committees so as to ensure an orderly process of business. This plan will be presented to the council for approval.

The executive office will oversee the activities of the council and its committees and will assist the council members in performing their responsibilities. It will help the council's committees, draft organized rules for managing their business and coordinate their activities in conformity with the provisions of these bylaws.

Article 13: The executive office may instruct one of the committees to study a given issue and to submit a report on the results of its study and its recommendations. The office may authorize submission of the report to the council.

Article 14: The executive office will work with the secretariat general in drafting the agenda of the sessions in conformity with the approved plan of action, keeping in mind that priority will be given to enscribing questions referred to the council by H.M. the Sultan and the government and those questions which have been dealt with exhuastively.

The secretary general will announce the agenda and notify the members of it at least 2 weeks prior to the convening of the session.

Article 15: In addition to the other powers specified in these regulations, the executive council will supervise organization of all the council's financial and administrative affairs in accordance with the system drafted by the office and approved by the council.

Article 16: The chairman of the council will summon the executive office to periodic meetings and can summon the office to an emergency meeting.

It will be improper for the executive office to meet unless there are at least five members present, including the chairman or his deputy. It will issue its decisions with a majority of those present provided that this number include the chairman, or his deputy in the event the chairman is absent. No nonmember of the office can attend its meetings except the secretary general and whomsoever is given permission to attend by the other members of the council.

The secretary general will record the minutes of the office's meeting and the minutes will be at the disposal of the chairman of the council and his deputy as circumstances dictate.

Section Three - Committees of the Council

Article 17: The council may form permanent or temporary subcommittees from its members which the executive office may instruct to study certain issues which have been raised. These committees will assist the council in exercising its powers in conformity with the decree establishing it and these bylaws.

Article 18: Each committee will comprise a chairman and a number of members representing the governmental and civil sectors in conformity with a proposal from the executive office to ensure the proper establishment of these committees. A member, with the approval of the executive office, may participate in more than one committee so that his knowledge and specialty in the area of the committee's activity may be used.

Article 19: Each committee may, in pursuing its study of issues referred to it, request the council chairman for a meeting with representatives of the appropriate ministries to listen to clarifications or information pertaining to the subject at hand. Council committees may, with council approval, make field visits to investigate an issue referred to them.

Article 20: Sessions of the committees will not be open to the public and can be attended only by the members and council members whose assistance is sought.

A committee can be properly convened only with the presence of at least two-thirds of its members. Decisions of committees will be issued by a majority opinion of members present. In all cases, the committee report will make reference to the affirmative or opposing views of the members present.

Section Four - The Secretariat General

Article 21: The council secretariat general will comprise the secretary general, assistant secretaries and the staffs of the internal departments and sections of the organizational structure of the administrative machinery authorized by the council.

Article 22: The secretariat general will perform the functions necessary to assist the council and all its components to fulfill its powers and responsibilities in conformity with the general organizational guidelines drafted by the executive office and approved by the council.

Article 23: In accordance with the secretariat general's proposal by agreement with the executive office, the council will issue a schedule to regulate staff affairs.

Article 24: The secretary general will attend all council sessions, will supervise all departments and sections of the council's secretariat general and will be responsible to the chairman for the proper functioning. The secretary general will prepare the minutes of council sessions and make them available to the members as directed by the chairman or his deputy, according to circumstances.

In exercising his powers and supervising the financial and administrative departments of the council, the secretary general will have the authority of a ministry undersecretary in the governmental machinery.

Chapter Three - Council Sessions and Recommendations

Section One - Proper Convening of the Council

Article 25: The council will be properly convened only with the presence of at least two-thirds of its members, including the chairman or his deputy. If the council meeting starts properly constituted, it will continue unless some of the members present leave the session chamber.

Article 26: Keeping in mind any special stipulation, the council's decisions will be issued by at least a two-thirds majority of the votes of the members present.

Section Two - Sessions

Article 27: Council sessions will not be open to the public and can be attended only by the council members, the secretary general and government officials who are given permission by the council to attend.

Article 28: The council will hold four sessions a year during the first weeks of January, April, August and October of each year, each session to last no longer than 1 week. The order of business in the council will determine the number and date of meetings during each session.

With council approval, a session can be adjourned sine die. In this event, the chairman will set the date for the next session and notify the council members.

The chairman may summon the council to convene before the date of the session if something arises to warrant this.

Article 29: In conformity with a decision to be issued by the executive council, members will have at their disposal at least 30 minutes before the start of a session lists to sign attesting to their attendance and other lists to be signed after the conclusion of a session.

Article 30: The session cannot begin without a quorum of at least two-thirds of the members present. If it is determined that the legal number is not present when it is time for the session to begin, the chairman will delay it for 30 minutes. If there is still no quorum at the scheduled time, the chairman will announce adjournment of the session and the time and date for the next one.

Article 31: The secretary general will record the minutes of the sessions under the supervision of the chairman. These minutes will be signed by the council chairman and the secretary general and will be retained in the council secretariat general.

No one but council members may have access to minutes of the sessions.

Article 32: No member may speak at a session until he has made a request to do so and has been granted permission by the chairman. Except for requests for speedy completion of reports on subjects referred to council committees, no request can be made to speak on an issue referred to a committee until after its report has been submitted and enscribed on the council's agenda.

Article 33: There can be no debate of subjects not on the agenda except in accordance with a request by the government or the council chairman.

8389
CSO: 4404/89

OIL EXPLORATION AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH TWO JAPANESE COMPANIES

Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 27 Oct 81 p 1

[Article: "Al-Shanfari Signs a New Agreement With Two Japanese Companies For Oil Exploration in the Sultanate"]

[Text] An agreement was signed yesterday morning in the office of Sa'id Ahmad Sa'id al-Shanfari, Minister of Petroleum and Minerals, with the Japanese Nippon and (Taikoku) companies granting a concession to explore for oil in the Sultanate.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the Sultanate by the Minister of Petroleum and Minerals, on behalf of the Nippon Company of Mr (Suki Mitsuno) and on behalf of the (Taikoku) Company by Mr (Tetsuo Kinoshita).

The agreement provides that during its 6-year duration the two companies will explore for oil in the concession area which lies between Bar al-Hikman and the 'Affar area and covers an area of 15,000 square kilometers.

The agreement obliges the two companies to pay $104 million to cover the costs of drilling exploratory wells in the concession area. If oil is discovered, the Sultanate will get a percentage running from 82.5 to 87 percent, depending on the amount of production.

This agreement is consistent with the directives of H.M. the Sultan to promote and intensify efforts to discover more oil fields in the Sultanate by increasing the number of companies operating in this arena. This will help to move the wheels of progress forward and to achieve the desired goals of development to bring prosperity and wellbeing to the people and to enable the Sultanate to maintain its notable standing among nations. The signing ceremony was attended by H.E. Salim Muhammad Sha'ban, undersecretary of the ministry, and senior ministery officials.

8389
CSO: 4404/89

GULF PETROCHEMICAL INDUSTRIES DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English No 47, 28 Nov 81 pp 54,55

[Article by Mike Lyons: "Global Cooperation Takes a Back Seat"]

[Text] ONLY A GLOBAL approach could mitigate the impact of Gulf exports on the world market once production begins later this decade. Unfortunately, the regional attitude of the industry has led it to respond too quickly and too nervously to the construction of new plants in the Gulf. These were the conclusions drawn by Amir Behbehani, deputy manager of Kuwait Petrochemical Industries, in a recently published paper.

The Arab petrochemical industry has only recently emerged as a force to be reckoned with, but it seems that the established producers will have to live with this development. From the development and construction of ammonia and urea plants, it now seeks to apply more sophisticated technology to the production of petrochemicals made from methane and ethane, which would otherwise be flared off. Such expectations may cause concern among West European producers, but they cannot accuse the Arabs of embarking upon impractical schemes.

Recent changes in construction timetables and long study periods reflect the cautiousness and conservatism of the Middle Eastern producer, as well as the thoroughness with which projects are researched. In January, Sabic announced that only one ethylene plant, with a capacity of 500,000 tonnes a year, would be built at Jubail to supply the Sabic Dow and Sabic/Mitsubishi complexes. Originally, two separate complexes, each with its own world-scale ethlyene plant, were planned. Nor is this the only example of Arab caution.

Arab producers have approached the EEC and European Petrochemical Association (EPCA) with a view to working out a mutually acceptable solution on how they can sell their petrochemicals without greatly disrupting already established market patterns. The response from these quarters has been negligible because, Behbehani maintains, the EEC and the EPCA have been swayed by arguments to the effect that Middle Eastern production is uneconomic, thereby relegating the threat to the distant future.

As a result, the time might have passed when developing and established producers could sit down around one table. In the US and Western Europe, the recession has led to overcapacity, with every producer looking to its own survival in a dwindling market. Cooperation has consequently taken a back seat, and feelings of insecurity have increased as the industry becomes global.

Canadian producers are proposing to increase LdPe (low density polyethylene) capacity from 450,000 tonnes a year to 1.3m tonnes, which is alarming US producers who foresee a huge surplus. Similarly, Indonesia and Mexico have ambitious plans to get their own petrochemical industries on stream by the mid 1980s.

The West Europeans plan to construct complexes in Portugal, Greece and the UK, and are bemoaning Arab capacity expansion — this at a time when there are 20 ethylene crackers idle in Europe.

Behbehani's solution to the current fragmentation of the international petrochemical industry is perhaps too simplistic. Technology transfer is considered a 'good step', which would enable the industrial countries to participate in the developing regions. Arrangements of this kind are difficult to negotiate but the results — avoidance of polarisation and joint development of markets — are worth serious consideration.

The Middle East — present, under construction or approved for construction and planned capacities (1,000 MTPY)

Country	Location	Partner(s)	Products	Present	Under or Approved for Construction	Planned
Bahrain	Sitra Island	Banoco/PIC/Sabic	Ammonia	—	330	—
			Methanol	—	330	—
Kuwait (Petrochemical) Industries)	Shuaiba		Ammonia	660	330	—
			Urea	775.5	—	—
			Ethylene	—	—	220-350
			Styrene	—	—	340
			Ethylene Glycol	—	—	135
			Benzene	—	—	280
			p-Xylene	—	—	90
			o-Xylene	—	—	60
Qatar	Umm Said	CdF Chimie	Ammonia	594	—	—
			Urea	660	—	—
			Ethylene	240	—	—
			LDPE	140	—	—
			HDPE	—	—	70,000
		—	Urea	—	—	500
		Shell	Ethylene	—	656	—
			EDC	—	454	—
			Styrene	—	295	—
			Ethanol	—	280	—
		Dow/Mitsubishi	Ethylene	—	—	500
Saudi Arabia (Sabic)	Jubail	Dow	LDPE	—	—	70
			HDPE	—	—	80
		Mitsubishi	LDPE	—	—	130
			Ethylene Glycol (half to Dow/Sabic)	—	—	200
		Exxon	LDPE	—	260	—
		Celanese/Texas Eastern	Methanol	—	650	—
		Japanese Consortium	Methanol	—	650	—
Saudi Arabia (Sabic)	Yanbu	Mobil	Ethylene	—	450	—
			Ethylene Glycol	—	220	—
			HDPE	—	90	—
			LDPE	—	220	—
	Dammam	—	Ammonia	198	—	—
			Urea	330	—	—
U.A.E.	Ruwais	—	Ammonia	—	—	660
			Urea	—	—	494

CSO: 4400/82

BRIEFS

INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL SPENDING DOWN--Qatar announced on QR 8.4 billion ($2.3 billion) budget for 1981-82 last week, showing a drop of 6.6 per cent from the previous year's budget of QR 8.9 billion ($2.6 billion). The largest reduction in spending is in industrial and agricultural projects, down to QR 307 million ($84 million) from QR 3 billion ($811 million) in 1980-81. While no official explanation for the sharp decline was given, it can be attributed to the completion this year of several large industrial projects begun in previous years. No new large turnkey projects are scheduled for the new financial year, which began on October 28, with the new Islamic year. Part of the budget's allocation to the industrial and agricultural sectors will go to the construction of two organic fertilizer plants. Other projects involve the development of crude oil and gas resources by the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation. Allocations to other sectors, however, showed a 41 per cent increase over those of the last budget, with QR 5.2 billion($1.4 billion) going for electricity, water and sewerage works ($641 million), transport, communications and roads ($290.1 million), social services ($160.8 million), education ($212.8 million), and health ($62.7 million). This year's 6.6 per cent reduction in the budget contrasts markedly with the 21.6 per cent increase in 1980-81 when compared to the 1979-80 budget. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 47, 23 Nov 81 p 3]

FERTILIZER PLANTS--Qatar is to build two organic fertiliser plants. The plants will be financed as part of an $84m allocation for development in the industrial and agricultural sectors. The allocation will also be used to finance the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation's projects to develop crude oil and natural gas resources. [Text] [London 8 DAYS in English No 47, 28 Nov 81 p 56]

CSO: 4400/82

NECESSITY OF NATIONAL FRONT OUTLINED

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 20 Oct 81 p 1

[Text] A delegation from our movement has asserted to the head of the state that the various political and intellectual opposition groups in our country--from the Socialist Democrats to the Islamists and from the Popular Unity Movement [MUP] to the communists--have all adopted a clear national position. The delegation also proposed to the head of the state the formation of a national front encompassing the various groups and the Destourian Socialist Party*.

This took place on the morrow of the attack on the city of Qafsah 20 months ago. The national front proposed at the time was intended to combine all the national forces in order to confront any external aggression and to win the battle of development.

Since then, AL-RA'Y has frequently called for formation of the front and has published its frontpage with the bannerline: "National Front With the [Destourian] Party or Popular Front Without It."

Brother Hasib ibn 'Ammar visited the head of the state on 6 August 1981 and expressed to him his opinion on several issues, including the need to create a national front consisting of the various political groups that abide by the national charter.

Finally, on occasion of the legislative elections, we have addressed a message to the secretary general of the Destourian Socialist Party in which we have said: "It is not beneficial to have the declared front confined, especially in this delicate phase through which the country is passing, to the Destourian Socialist Party and the Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT]. The interest lies in a national coalition which includes, in addition to the party and the federation, the national groups that abide by the national charter advocated by President Habib Bourguiba in the party's latest congress."

It thus becomes evident that we have been calling for a national front, a real national front, for a long time. This choice is firm to us and we have worked resolutely to embody it. Whoever believes that our proposal is due to circumstantial motives is wrong.

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*We did not propose the Federation of Workers at the time because of the presence of [word unintelligible] at its head.

Why this clinging to the idea of the national front?

It is because our movement has analyzed the country's procession in the two preceding decades objectively, beginning with the reasons for the failure of the socialist option in the first decade and ending with the consequences of the policy embraced in the second decade and with the incidents of 26 January 1978 and the incidents of Qafsah in January 1980. The movement has also analyzed the conditions of the Tunisian society and the vast gap between the country's resources and the population's aspirations. The movement has further analyzed Tunisia's position in this part of the Mediterranean Sea and all the analyses have led us to the conclusion that our country cannot meet its citizen's needs and realize its goals, and even safeguard its sovereignty and its entity, unless it relies on uniting the capabilities of all its citizens, regardless of how different their views and their theories are.

We believe that there can be no stability as long as the Destourian Socialist Party monopolizes the political power, that there can be no revival as long as we depend on foreign monies more than we rely on our capability and that there can be no impregnability as long as we depend on foreign aircraft more than we depend on the strength of our domestic front.

We have written this and said it frequently to the officials in our country's government apparatus and to some officials in the opposition ranks. How quickly do they forget the lessons of the past and of its crises! They are incapable of surmounting selfishness and subsidiary differences and incapable of clinging to that which unites all and to national unity.

As for us, the path is clear before us. We will continue to struggle in order to embody a real national front, even if in stages, because Tunisia's safety is bound to this front.

8494
CSO: 4504/33

NEGATIVE, POSITIVE ASPECTS OF COMING LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS DISCUSSED

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 20 Oct 81 p 1

[Article: "What Is Use of Elections"]

[Text] Many citizen wonders what benefit can be derived from the premature legislative elections which will be held next month. What is the use of these elections when the competition will be between a front whose members enjoy all the rights and one of whose members, namely the Destourian [Constitutional] Party, runs all of the state's and administration's affairs on the one hand and rising political inclinations that have not yet enjoyed their simplest rights on the other?

From the start, we should not be deceived. The elections will not be truly democratic because they have excluded some tendencies [groups] which are still suffering from oppression and because it is impossible to change overnight the mentality and practices of the officials at the various levels who have monopolized the government throughout a quarter century, regardless of the instructions issued by the higher authority. Therefore, the next National Assembly will not reflect a true image of the Tunisian people.

Despite all this, these elections are not void of positive aspects:

First, for the first time in 18 years, the voter can elect from various lists and numerous political tendencies.

Second, these elections provide an invaluable opportunity which, in principle, will enable a number of the tendencies to establish direct contact with the popular masses and to familiarize these masses with themselves and their programs.

Third, when the lists become numerous in the election campaign, the election process will be tantamount to training on democracy.

Fourth, these elections may make it possible to make a stride on the path of multiplicity if one of the parties running in the elections wins the required number of votes (5 percent).

Fifth, even though the National Assembly will not be a true reflection of the people, it is also expected that it will not be similar to the previous assemblies which have become famous for their unanimous voting. The political tendencies

[groups] running in the elections may be represented, even though not fairly. This representation will be tantamount to a podium which will enable them to familiarize with their positions toward the national issues.

Moreover, inasmuch as the National Assembly represents the people, and is respectable, it will carry some weight in running the country's affairs. This is one of the fundamental conditions which must be secured so that the country's impregnability may be entrenched on sound foundations.

States are made by their lasting constitutional institutions not by their transient men.

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END

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SUCCESS OF GULF COOPERATION VIEWED AS MODEL FOR OTHER REGIONAL AGREEMENTS

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 669, 25 Sep 81 pp 33-35

[Article by Faruq Hasanayn Makhluf: "Gulf Cooperation Council, Experiment and Elements of Success; Success of Gulf Unity Can Constitute Model for Other Regional Unity Experiments in Arab Homeland; Gulf Agreement Is Distinguished by Its Nature, Motives, Components and Historical Background Insofar as Guaranteed Ultimate Results Are Concerned"]

[Text] To start with, it can be said that establishment of the Cooperation Council has crowned many years of organized bilateral or multilateral cooperation among the Gulf states in various spheres, especially the political, economic and cultural. Moreover, all this has a background of interaction among the area's peoples throughout many generations and eras that witnessed actual cooperation, joint interests and a constant exchange among the peoples at various levels. Furthermore, this experiment comes in the wake of tens of experiments and endeavors for regional or semiregional cooperation in the Arab arena or in other parts of the Third World--experiments and endeavors seeking to attain one form or another of cooperation, integration or unity. But all those attempts failed to succeed and fell apart halfway through or were stillborn and did not go beyond the paper they were written on. Thus, the Cooperative Council finds at its disposal a vast stock of experiments from which it can benefit and gain lessons and experience.

The importance and significance of the Gulf experience is not confined to what the resources of these states represent to the states themselves or to others, to the dynamic economic and social development they are undergoing or to the sensitive strategic position they occupy on the world map. The importance and significance of this experiment stems from the fact that this area represents the eastern wing of the Arab nation, that it plays a major role in the common Arab action, represents an important weight in this action and shoulders a heavy responsibility in it. Moreover, the Gulf area plays a vital and essential role in the sphere of Islamic cooperation, third world cooperation and international cooperation. The final communique issued by the first Gulf summit underlines these aspects and also underlines the commitment of the Gulf action to these tasks.

The success of Gulf cooperation and integration will mean a lot to the countries of the Arab and Islamic worlds because it will enable them to have a successful experiment that it is possible to repeat in the future, especially in the Arab area, which possesses real potential for regional integration. Success of the

Gulf experiment will give the Arab area the new momentum it needs. Examples of the semiregional groups likely to engage in similar serious experiments or to repeat previous experiments, but on new bases, are: The countries of North Africa or the Greater Maghreb (Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania) and the Eastern Mediterranean Arab countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine--after a Palestinian state is established). The creation of such major integrated unions within the framework of the broader common Arab action will lay a firm foundation on which a strong and comprehensive Arab integration having the best chances of success can be built in all spheres.

There is, naturally, a strong organic relationship that firmly binds the Gulf action to the common Arab action. This is reflected in the welcome that greeted creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in the Arab arena. It is evident that the Council's policies and steps confirm the presence of full awareness of this fact and indicate the eagerness of the Council member states to have Gulf cooperation proceed in a line parallel to that of Arab cooperation, to constitute one of the strong links of Arab cooperation and to meet with the comprehensive march and the ultimate goals of this Arab cooperation. What is more, the Council's policies and actions are bringing the Arab steps close to these goals. The fact is that there is no need to point this out [that Gulf cooperation complements and serves common Arab cooperation] because it is axiomatic in Gulf action and because it is one of the prominent landmarks of this action. This is made fully clear and is underlined in the final communique on the meeting of the Gulf leaders in Abu Dhabi and in the statements of the top officials of these states. It has also been highlighted in the statements of the Cooperation Council's secretary general.

All this confirms that the Gulf states consider themselves a part of the greater Arab body and that they build their policy and their actions on the basis of their firm faith in the destiny of Arab unity and the unity of the cause of development and progress in the Arab homeland. They also build this policy and this action on their full conviction that completion of the development tasks is a collective Arab responsibility that is realized within the framework of an effective integration of the Arab economic resources in their various shapes and forms.

Distinguishing Features of Common Gulf Action

The common Gulf action is characterized by unique qualities that make it different from all the patterns and forms of existing cooperation and from the forms and patterns that may develop in various other parts of the world, whether between groups of advanced countries or of developing countries. Gulf cooperation has guarantees of success that are not available to other experiments.

These qualities can be summed up as follows:

First, similarity in the economic and social structures and in the elements of scarcity or abundance in the natural resources of the Gulf States, and, consequently, similarity in the problems and challenges of development facing them now and in the future and close similarity in the solutions they adopt to deal with these problems and challenges.

Second, similarity between the political and social systems and between the policies and the plans formulated to organize their economic and social life.

Third, the presence of firm ties founded on the unity of the Islamic faith in its capacity as the basis of their life and their rule of conduct, the identical traditions, customs, values, social heritage and social mores and even intricate relationships of marriage and the presence of branches of the same family in more than one Gulf state at the same time. Moreover, the Gulf peoples have throughout history encountered common experiences that have left their impact and imprint on the relationship between rulers and the citizens in these states.

Fourth, these firm ties among the Gulf states have spread in these states the spirit of a single family abounding with trust. This spirit has been reflected in the course of cooperation between the area's peoples for many generations. This situation has not been affected by the rise of numerous political entities in the area in the form of independent states. The practical translation of this spirit is embodied in the emergence of distinctive characteristics in Gulf relations, such as the characteristics of constant consultations between the area's leaders on various internal and external issues, of the absence of regional clashes and of not allowing any transient differences, such as those that may develop between any two states, to turn into deep conflicts or to affect negatively their existing strong ties and fundamental interests. Moreover, one of the characteristics of this family spirit has been that of not allowing any foreign forces to infiltrate into the area or to impose their domination on it. Consequently, this has made it possible to prevent transformation of the Gulf into a sphere of influence for any major power and to prevent as much as possible transfer of international tension to the area, even though it is an extremely sensitive area in the international strategies and ambitions of the major powers.

Fifth, the Gulf states maintain a firm foreign policy line that adheres to nonalignment with any major power. This doesn't just apply to the area's affiliation with the nonaligned movement, because this movement has lost most of its content and its vitality and perhaps the reason for its existence. What is meant here is that the Gulf states actually exercise a foreign policy that is free to the maximum and is distinguished by eagerness to establish a balance in the area's relations at the international level and to maintain the highest degree of freedom of movement in dealing with international powers, whether the influence of these powers on the international arena is economic, military or political. An indication of this free foreign policy line is the welcome given to the formation of the Cooperation Council by all the international powers and forces and international organizations.

Sixth, one of the traditional features characterizing the formulation of policies and the making of decisions in the Gulf states, and in the sphere of Gulf cooperation, is realism and a practical approach in dealing with various issues, in discussing action plans, in taking practical actions and in not paying much attention to formalities and in being content with just the necessary degree of procedural activity. What draws attention in this regard is the issuance of extremely important resolutions by the first Gulf summit and, before the summit, by the meetings of the ministers of foreign affairs and ministers of finance and economy in preparing for the summit. The resolutions were issued with no time wasted in

the labyrinths of formalities and without waiting for completion of the various procedural regulations. What also draws attention is that the Cooperation Council's secretary general started performing his duties as soon as he was chosen for the post by the first Gulf summit and that he performed an important role in the proceedings of that meeting without waiting for formation of the general secretariat. All this indicates the presence of a positive momentum and of a fiery spirit in Council activities--momentum and spirit that are not tied down by red tape and procedural forms, contrary to what is familiar in similar international or regional organizations. Once again, this special Gulf characteristic in regional cooperation is one of the characteristics of the single family--a characteristic that gives this cooperation distinguishing features.

Seventh, one of the well-known traditions of national or joint Gulf action is the tradition of careful study and the deliberate adoption of any important resolution. As already pointed out, the creation of the Council itself was preceded by long and calm consultations between the six states. This tradition gives these states the chance to see clearly the steps they embark upon and the plans they seek to realize in the future within the framework of the Council. On the other hand, this explains why no tensions, independent positions or reservations emerge on the part of any of the Council member states in the course of the Gulf march. The fact is that this special characteristic is one of the most important guarantees of the success of Gulf cooperation and is a requirement for success in any similar experiments. The absence of this characteristic in other experiments has been the cause of the failure they have encountered. This failure is due to the hasty adoption of ambitious and unstudied resolutions that clash with reality as soon as they confront it and then produce nothing but disappointment and frustration.

Eighth, added to the previous point and tied to it is the presence of another characteristic serving the Gulf action, namely, that the Cooperation Council did not start from scratch but had been preceded and prepared for by years of constant coordination and integration action that laid down firm foundations for Gulf cooperation in the various sectors. The coordination and integration action had taken various applied or institutional forms and bilateral or multilateral formulas. This is because the preceding years had witnessed the firm establishment of the Gulf tradition of mutual consultation on political, defense and other affairs, the conclusion of a large number of bilateral cooperation agreements in all spheres, the creation of numerous coordination committees and the holding of regular high-level ministerial conferences.

A number of collective Gulf organizations had also been set up in more than one sphere and a number of multilateral or bilateral joint companies had been established with government, private or joint funds.

Where Does Gulf Action Begin Within the Framework of the Cooperation Council?

As already made obvious, Gulf cooperation began years before the creation of the Cooperation Council. However, the establishment of the Council represents an important and fundamental turning point in more than one aspect of this cooperation:

First, it means moving the common Gulf action from the phase of cooperation to the phase of integration. This is underlined by the statements and documents establishing the Council--statements and documents saying that the goal behind establishing the Council is to achieve linkage, coordination and integration among the member states.

Second, the integration concept means simply that Gulf action in every sphere will be subject to a strategy with clear-cut features and definite steps. However, this concept doesn't necessarily mean the formulation of a general timetable for the phases and priorities of implementation. But it does necessarily imply the formulation of a clear concept reinforced by specific designs for action in every sphere. The integration plans, steps, activities and priorities are then built on these designs.

Third, the matter will require the formulation of a series of specific collective "framework agreements" in every sphere. In these agreements, the ultimate long-range objectives, the phased goals of Gulf action and the means to achieve these goals, will be defined. At a later phase, detailed agreements dealing with every subsidiary sphere separately will emanate from these framework agreements or will be built on them. Efforts have already been started to formulate a unified economic agreement among the Cooperation Council member states. It is no coincidence that the economic field has been chosen for a start. This choice has been made not only because this field is the most vital and important but also because it is the most strongly prepared to start with due to the background it already has--a background that gives this field its quality as a starting point--and, at the same time, because this field will pave the way to numerous other accomplishments in the Gulf advance.

Fourth, the formula of bilateral action between any two Gulf states will have to disappear automatically to be replaced by the formula of multilateral collective action. This is logical and axiomatic in regional integration projects. Once again, the above-mentioned economic agreement represents the live, applied model and the first accomplishment in the advance on this collective path. This will be the task of the five specialized Gulf committees formed by the first Gulf summit.

Fifth, it is essential to set up a strong general secretariat for the Gulf Council to take care of realizing the major future Gulf tasks and to take initiatives in every sphere of action so as to build the Gulf edifice. It is evident that this important goal [of establishing a strong secretariat] arose when the leaders of the Gulf states at the first meeting of their Supreme Council selected 'Abdallah Ya'qub Bisharah, with all his rich experience in the sphere of international action, to become the first secretary general of the Cooperation Council. It is also obvious that this selection is in itself considered an indication of the resolution and determination of the Gulf governments to set up an effective general secretariat that participates positively in managing and in constantly adding to the common Gulf action.

Sixth, it seems that the power to ratify the Gulf agreements to make them valid will move gradually from the hands of the legislative or constitutional authorities of each Gulf state to the hands of the Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation

Council, considering that it will represent a power higher than that of the governments and that its resolutions will gain the force of binding automatic application in the provinces of the member countries. This development may be the biggest and most far-reaching in the young Gulf experiment because the experiment thus will have overcome major and sensitive obstacles at which many regional cooperation experiments falter. The shift of this power of ratification is tantamount to a ceding by every state of part of its sovereignty to the supreme joint agencies entrusted with managing the collective cooperation or integration. It is worth nothing that the first Gulf initiative in this sound direction is embodied in the phrase in the text of the draft unified economic agreement stating that "this agreement shall go into force within 4 months of its ratification by the Supreme Council." The draft does not tie the validation to any local constitutional measure in any state.

To conclude, there is a lot more to be said about the common Gulf economic action that the Gulf leaders have chosen to be the gate from which the Gulf cooperation passes to the broad spheres of a future that abounds with bright hopes and great accomplishments serving the Gulf family and the Arab and Islamic family.

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RATIONALE BEHIND GULF ECONOMIC COOPERATION AGREEMENT DISCUSSED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 672, 23 Oct 81 pp 44-46

[Article by Faruq Hasanayn Makhluf: "AL-YAMAMAH Publishes Exclusive First Details of Gulf Cooperation Council's Economic Agreement"]

[Text] On 15 Rajab 1401 of the Hegira, the finance and economy ministers of the Gulf states held in the city of Dhahran a quiet meeting far from the media lights in which they drew up a document containing general principles for a draft unified economic agreement among the member states of the Cooperation Council. This document contains the structure or the general framework of the form that such an agreement could take. These principles are the principles presented to the first session of the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council, which was held in Abu Dhabi. The principles gave the leaders a specific idea of the main outline of a Gulf economic agreement. The first Gulf summit approved these principles and considered them a valid starting point and a firm foundation for the new agreement.

Following the summit, the economic officials of the Gulf states began to prepare their perceptions on how to transform the general principles into a detailed and complete agreement in preparation for the next phase--the meeting of ministers of finance and economy of the six states in Riyadh on 6 Sha'ban 1401 of the Hegira. At that meeting, the ministers drew up the first draft unified economic agreement for the Gulf states to replace the existing bilateral economic agreements.

"The Cooperation Council's Ministerial Council approved the draft agreement in its first session, held recently in al-Ta'if, and decided to present the draft to the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council in Riyadh. The statement issued by the Ministerial Council declares that the council approved the agreement "in response to the desires of the area's people to eliminate economic barriers between the Cooperation Council member states in order to guarantee the principle of equality among all the citizens."

The fact is that the Gulf economic agreement deserves to get this degree of attention. It can even be said that it represents a historic event and a turning point in Gulf relations.

The question is: Why does the Gulf economic agreement have such great importance? The answer comes from several aspects, the most important being:

First, the agreement represents a transformation from bilateralism to collectivism with all its implications of proceeding on the path of common economic action and of agreeing to deal on the basis of equality, without any consideration for any difference in the weight of this or that state in terms of wealth, population, area, natural resources, investment opportunities, size of the local market or other aspects.

Second, the agreement contains mutual benefits balanced by mutual sacrifices, regardless of the timing of the benefits and the sacrifices. This means that each state is aware in advance that every benefit it gets is offset by a burden it shoulders, even if the burdens are not immediate, and that every burden it shoulders is offset by a benefit it gets, even if the benefit is not immediate. Thus, the member states are confident that there is ultimately a balance between the benefits and the sacrifices and that this balance is realized for them by the agreement, even if only in the medium or long range. This view simultaneously reflects maturity in dealings among the states and their faith in their common objectives and goals and their determination to achieve them. However, the agreement does not disregard the differences in the standards of growth and the priorities of development in the member states and requires that these differences be taken into consideration in its implementation. Moreover, the agreement permits a temporary exemption from the implementation of some of its provisions in any state whenever such an exemption is necessary to deal with certain conditions or circumstances.

Third, unlike previous bilateral agreements, this agreement does not confine itself to tackling spheres connected with economic dealings among the member states but extends beyond them to cover the major local economic sectors and to bind them with each other firmly within the framework of coordination, linkage and integration. The agreement even goes to the point of unifying major rules and regulations in numerous cases.

Fourth, the agreement establishes for the first time the principle of equal treatment for citizens of the members states in regard to participation in economic activity and in various commercial, financial, industrial, professional and other activities. This equality will be realized in two stages: The first is immediate and is embodied in treating the citizens of each Gulf state the same as the local citizens of each state regardless of the differences in regulation and bases of treatment. The second stage is one in which the citizens of all the Gulf states will be subject to the same treatment, a step that will crystallize gradually with the coordination steps and with the unification of the various rules and laws connected with the economic activity.

Fifth, the ultimate goal of the agreement--a goal into which all the measures contained in the agreement flow--is to reach full economic unity among the member states by eliminating all of the economic barriers obstructing the movement of the various economic elements so as to realize the free movement of people, goods and capital.

Sixth, the agreement leads the Gulf economic advance along a resolute path of unification. Moreover, the agreement contains no date for its termination and no provision for withdrawal from it. In addition, it establishes a priority for its application in case there is conflict between its provisions on the one hand and any local laws or regulations in any member state on the other hand.

Agreement: Contents and Given Facts

The agreement consists of seven sections that deal with trade exchange, the movement of individuals and of monies, participation in economic activity, technical cooperation, transportation and communications, financial and monetary cooperation and final rules.

In the sphere of trade exchange, the agreement stresses the full exemption of the trade of goods of national origin from all fees and restrictions when such goods are exchanged by the member states. It calls on each state to treat the products of the other member states as it treats its national products. The agreement also calls for levying a minimal and uniform external customs tariff to be applied to the outside world, for facilitating the passage of any transit goods belonging to any of the other member states without levying any fees or taxes on them, for coordinating the trade relations of the member states with other states and with the other economic groups, for coordinating import and export policies and regulations, for forming a food reserve, for concluding collective agreements with foreign parties in certain cases and for exerting efforts to create a collective force to bolster the negotiating position of the market states vis-a-vis the outside world in some import and export matters.

These measures will lead to increasing the trade volume among the members, reducing import costs, curtailing imported inflation and increasing the Gulf states' share of world trade.

In the sphere of the movement of monies and individuals and of engaging in economic activity, the agreement realizes for all citizens of the member states on an equal basis and without any differentiation or discrimination freedom of movement, ownership, inheritance and bequest and freedom to engage in economic activity and the free movement of capital. It also urges the member states to encourage their private sectors to set up joint projects, thus leading to a linkage of the economic interests of the citizens in the various spheres.

It is worth noting that releasing the economic activities of 11 million Gulf citizens throughout the area is considered an important beginning for flourishing economic activities in the future, for growing Gulf economic activities, for the emergence of hundreds of joint projects in the various economic sectors of production and services, for increased movement of persons and capital among the area's states and for subsequent changes in the pattern of economic activity. This is in addition to attracting foreign capital and technology to participate with Gulf capital in exploiting the new opportunities that will be generated in the area. This in turn will have its effects on development and growth in the Gulf area--effects that will enhance and speed the pace of this development.

In the sphere of development coordination, the agreement calls for establishing development coordination and for harmonizing the development plans of the member states so as to attain economic integration among them. The agreement includes within this framework coordiantion in all the phases of the oil industry, including production, refining, marketing, processing, pricing, natural gas exploitation, development of energy sources, formulation of unified oil policies and adoption of common positions vis-a-vis the outside world and in international

organizations. The agreement further calls for coordinating the industrial activity and the policies and means leading to industrial development, for diversifying the production base of the member states on an integrated basis, for unifying industrial legislation and regulations, for gearing production toward meeting local needs, for distributing industry among the member states according to relative advantages and economic feasibility, for encouraging the establishment of basic and complementary industries among them and for setting up and subsidizing joint projects in the fields of industry, agriculture and services with public, private or joint capital to achieve economic integration and the meshing of production and common development on sound economic bases.

All this means that the area will enter a new age of development unprecedented elsewhere in the world. It also means that enormous resources will be mobilized to give a major boost to the development process. In its advance, this development will adhere to sound scientific method that does not permit the construction of any new production unit haphazardously and that doesn't permit any squandering of available resources or capabilities. This collective development effort will also necessarily mean the establishment of major production projects that depend on a relatively large market characterized by a real, high demand and moved by the development efforts and the high standard of individual income. Such projects will then proceed with firm steps toward the foreign markets. Finally, one of the most outstanding results emanating from this planned coordination will be a constant increase in the degree of self-sufficiency of the area's states through the gradual replacement of imports. Consequently, the area will become a producer-consumer market instead of its current situation as a consumer market.

We now move to technical cooperation in the agreement to find that the agreement is eager to build a genuine intrinsic base for applied sciences and technology compatible with the nature of the area's needs and with its goals for development and progress. To achieve this, the agreement follows the path of firm cooperation among the member states in innovating spheres of common technical cooperation, in preparing rules, regulations and conditions for the transfer of technology and in selecting the most suitable technology and adapting it to serve their development and progress. This includes the conclusion of unified agreements with foreign governments, scientific institutions or commercial institutions to realize this goal.

On the other hand, the agreement urges the member states to formulate coordinated policies and implement coordinated programs for technical, professional and vocational training at all levels and stages, for developing the educational curricula at all levels to link education and technology with the development needs of the member states, for coordination among the member states in the sphere of manpower and for laying down unified criteria and standards for the various professions and vocations in order to make maximum use of the available human resources.

It is to be noted that the agreement includes extremely advanced arrangements and goals in some of the most important specific aspects regarding the "means" of development--aspects not contained before in similar collective agreements--namely, the aspects of technical and technological progress, of developing the human element capable of undertaking the responsibilities of development and of eagerness to establish technology in the area and to build a Gulf base of

scientific progress, knowledge, production arts and human skills and expertise to nurture the area's development and progress and to be developed locally so as to reduce to a minimum reliance on foreign sources of science and technology.

The agreement also includes a special section on transportation and communications that provides for giving the national transportation means of any member state the same treatment given by all the states to the means of transportation owned by their citizens, including exemption from all taxes and fees. The agreement stresses cooperation among the member states in the sphere of land and maritime transport, communications and coordination in construction of infrastructure projects such as ports, airports, highways and so forth, so as to link their economic activities and serve their common development. The agreement also calls for coordinating aviation and air transport policies. The agreement also decides to give ships and boats owned by the member states the same favorable treatment given to national ships and boats insofar as fees and services of all kinds are concerned.

These transportation and communication arrangements in the agreement are significant because they link the vast territories of the member states, which have a total area of 2,562,270 square kilometers and a population density of four persons per square kilometer and which overlook a long coast stretching across the Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea. Moreover, the arrangements provide for stronger links among the citizens of the Gulf states and offer transportation and communications facilities that are of vital importance to affirm future integration among them.

Finally, the agreement deals with financial and monetary cooperation among the member states. It starts by stipulating that the member states exert efforts to unify investment laws and regulations so that they can formulate a common investment policy that serves to guide the internal and external investments of the member states. The agreement also calls for coordinating financial, monetary and banking policies, for increasing cooperation among the currency institutions and the central banks, including unification of the currency so that it can complement the desired economic integration, and for coordinating foreign policies on advancing international and regional development aid.

It is no secret that this aspect of common economic action among the Gulf states is of maximum significance in light of the fact that the Gulf area lives under and experiences the phenomenon of "outward wealth" reflected falsely in hard figures on the area's oil revenues and reserves. The world never stops counting these revenues and reserves and analyzing their expectations, forgetting or intentionally disregarding the fact that these figures represent a part of the area's sole resource, which is being exhausted when it is turned from its oil form whose value may double in the future into its monetary form whose value deteriorates every morning. These states shoulder a trust and a responsibility toward their future generations, namely, the trust and the responsibility of preserving the future generations' share of this depletable resource and of building a new economy that doesn't rely completely on oil, that provides diverse sources of national income and that is able to continue, grow and prosper. This should not, of course, be done at the expense of the present generations. This means formulating long-range Gulf financial, investment and monetary policies characterized by wisdom, planning and careful organization. It also involves the creation of a

Gulf money market that supplies the area's development requirements and meets a part of the financial needs of the Arab and Islamic worlds and of the third world, all this in addition to continued performance by the Gulf states of the noble role they have undertaken in helping the development of the developing countries.

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OPPOSITION LEADERS EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR PRESIDENT MUBARAK

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 1 Nov 81 p 7

[Article by Muhammad Salamah and Muhammad Sa'd: "After President's Meeting With Opposition Leaderships, What?"]

[Text] The most important event on the Egyptian political scene last week was President Muhammad Husni Mubarak's meeting with the opposition leaders.

The meeting was a magnificent indication of the mutual trust between the government and the opposition as members of a single family: Egypt.

The opposition declared its support and backing for the president and Husni Mubarak opened his heart to the opposition and welcomed its participation in the national responsibility.

What took place at those meetings? What did the opposition tell President Husni Mubarak and what did it hear from him?

Labor Party Chairman: Egypt's National Interest Is Above All Considerations

The Socialist Labor Party has declared its full appreciation of and support for the policy of President Muhammad Husni Mubarak.

Now the question is: Has the Labor Party changed its policy and its position?

Eng Ibrahim Shukri, Labor Party chairman, has said: Egypt's national interest is above everything and above the parties, both the majority and the opposition parties. The issue is not one of disagreement or agreement with policies but primarily the issue of Egypt's safety and supreme interest. This is why we did not hesitate to support the nomination of President Husni Mubarak and his statement in which we find many of the policies that we are demanding.

We are in a new phase and we want to prepare for it all the means of success. We also want to prepare all the components and bases for the realization of policies that, we hope, will be in the interest of the people, especially stability.

Eng Ibrahim Shukri added: "There is no new policy but it is a new political situation or climate."

Answering a question on the effect of the Labor Party's new position on the alliance between the opposition forces, Ibrahim Shukri said: Some people want to completely link the opposition fronts with each other in all matters. This view is far from the facts. We have our position, which may be similar to or different from the positions of others. But we do not consider these limited criteria because the national interest comes first.

Explaining the party's position toward the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Shukri said: Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai next April is, no doubt, considered an accomplishment for the Camp David accords. But at the same time, it is not the sole fundamental accomplishment. This is the point of disagreement that we have made clear because we must make implementation of the accords lead to comprehensive peace, including a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Shukri added that evacuation from the Sinai may form a new beginning for a way to settle the Palestinian problem by including other Arab parties, among them the PLO. This inclination has now become clear on more than one side and in more than one initiative. I believe that after 25 April, the opportunity will be more positive and complete.

Regarding the labor Party's position vis-a-vis the Camp David treaty, Eng Ibrahim Shukri has declared that the party did not reject it but expressed some reservations about the part dealing with Palestinian self-rule. He said: "I see Shamir's statements in which he considers Jordan the homeland of the Palestinians as a reaffirmation of our position and our reservations, which emanated from a lack of seriousness in the Israeli position and understanding of the part concerning Palestinian self-rule. I believe that this strict position of ours is in support of the Egyptian negotiator who talks of both parts [of the treaty]."

As for Sudan, Eng Ibrahim Shukri has stressed that the Labor Party considers Sudan essential to Egypt's security and life and that "we view any aggression against Sudan an agression against Egypt." Shukri added: "We beseech God that Sudan not be subjected to any aggression by its neighbors." The Labor Party chairman also welcomed the endeavors being made by the Arabs and by the OAU to end the differences between Libya and Sudan.

Liberal Party Chairman: Opposition Takes Part in Discussing Important Issues

AL-SIYASI has interviewed the chairman of the Socialist Liberal Party to get his answers to questions that are raised in the Egyptian political arena.

At the outset, Mustafa Kamil Murad talked about what took place during his meeting with President Husni Mubarak, saying: We gave our absolute support to President Husni Mubarak when he was nominated for the presidency of the republic on the basis that he represents the sound democratic national line and that the continuation of this clear and frank line will realize very good results at the local, Arab and international levels. Our meeting with the president has come to confirm the soundness of the line he is following and the clarity of the policy he is adopting.

Murad added: President Husni Mubarak has responded to all the requests made by the opposition leaders during their meeting with his excellency and has promised that the opposition will participate effectively in discussing all the important political affairs and issues. This demand was foremost among the demands presented by the opposition, considering that we demanded that there be responsible participation on the part of the opposition and that the government listen to the opposition's viewpoint and to the alternative solutions and proposals it offers. We also stressed the need for conducting a democratic dialogue among the parties on the various issues and problems and the need to give this dialogue space in the national papers and on radio and television.

On the other hand, the opposition stressed the need for suppott for all the political parties, whether in terms of financing, offices or party papers, so that they can perform their role more effectively among the masses. Let the solution be the establishment of a fixed system to finance the parties in a manner that enables them to carry out their activity in the best manner.

I asked the chairman of the Liberal Party: Have you determined your position vis-a-vis the new government and is there any thought of a coalition with the Democratic National Party?

Mustafa Kamil Murad answered: Our party's support for President Husni Mubarak and the new government is a national support. So far, the opposition's role in the coming phase has not become clear yet and the opposition's final positions have not been defined. We in the Liberal Party await the statement that President Husni Mubarak will deliver before the People's Assembly on the inauguration of the new parliamentary session. We also await the government statement. After studying both statements, we will prepare a detailed memorandum on the party's viewpoint concerning all the domestic and external issues and on our conception of the means to formulate immediate solutions to the problems of the masses. We will send this memorandum to his excellency the president of the republic.

Regarding the position of the leftist party and the reasons that motivated the president not to meet with Khalid Muhyi al-Din, the Liberal Party chairman said:

President Husni Mubarak has not declined to meet with the Grouping Party leaders. I conveyed to his excellency the president the wish of Khalid Muhyi al-Din and of a number of his party's leaders to meet with his excellency and the president has expressed no objection whatsoever.

His excellency the president said: I am prepared to meet them after a time on condition that Khalid Muhyi al-Din stop making endless statements and stop giving endless interviews to foreign journalists and reporters. The president said: There is no call at all for these press conferences, especially at this particular time.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar: We Will Unite Our Opinions for Egypt

All in one.

This has been the position of all people with various political inclinations vis-a-vis the important developments that our beloved Egypt has undergone recently.

The Liberal Party hastened to declare its rejection of the means of violence and radicalism, announcing its support for the leadership of Husni Mubarak and its backing for the statement Mubarak made before the People's Assembly.

Ibrahim Shukri, the opposition leader, declared his party's support for President Husni Mubarak and his strong confidence in Mubarak's political and military experience, expressing his expectations of a bright future under President Mubarak's leadership.

This is what the two major [opposition] parties have said. There remain the independents. What has the representatives of the independents in the People's Assembly said?

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar, People's Assembly member for al-Badari circuit, Asyut, and representative of the independents in the People's Assembly, has met with President Husni Mubarak within the series of meetings his excellency held with all the opposition parties and with the independents to familiarize himself with their viewpoints.

I asked Nassar: After your meeting with President Husni Mubarak, what now?

The truth is that we have found that the president is aware of all the country's issues and problems and understands the opposition's view on the current issues. We had been well aware of this because the president's address before the People's Assembly generated strong satisfaction among us and left us more reassured about our country, both internally and externally.

Therefore, we fully believe in the president's steps to wipe out the devious few and to fight corruption in all its forms and shapes.

But have you brought up with the president the issue of the emergency law, considering that you have objected to the application of this law for 1 year?

Yes.

And what did the president say?

He said that the use of the emergency law will be restricted to the narrowest limits, and he promised to end the state of emergency as soon as the situation stabilizes. He also told me that the emergency law should not be applied for a single day without ajudication.

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar added: I also discussed with the president the situaton concerning the detainees and the president has issued instructions for a speedy completion of the interrogations currently being conducted with the detainees so as to settle the situation and to release those proven innocent and not involved in the incidents experienced by the country.

Counselor Nassar added: Believe me, the discussion with President Husni Mubarak was constructive and he has promised to exchange views with the opposition on the important issues before they are presented to the People's Assembly. We have agreed that opinion should be united for the sake of Egypt's interest.

Are you thinking of formulating a new position for the People's Assembly's independents in light of the president's statements and meetings with you?

Counselr Nassar answered: Our position in the new session will be confined to supporting the national projects on which we reach an understanding before they are presented to the Assembly and to supporting all the investment proposals seeking to raise production.

We will be united inside and outside the People's Assembly for the sake of the citizen's and the country's interest.

President Husni Mubarak has begun a national reconciliation with all the political forces. There is no doubt that our meeting with him has been tantamount to a national initiative to establish a kind of positive participation on the basis of the public interests that concern the masses.

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KHALID MUHYI AL-DIN DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT POLICIES, PRINCE FAHD PEACE PLAN

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 25 Oct 81 p 7

[Interview With Khalid Muhyi al-Din, leader of Egyptian Unionist Grouping Party, by Thamir Muhammad al-Miman: "I Totally Agree With Prince Fahd's Initiative and I Add to It Evacuation of Foreign Bases and Nuclear Weapons From Area; Egyptian Government Burned All Its Winning Cards Before Negotiating; Camp David Embodies Israeli Conditions; Egypt Has Not Benefited From It at All"]

[Text] Under circumstances forecasting numerous surprises, it was very difficult to measure the feelings and the hopes of the Egyptian people prior to al-Sadat's assassination. This is why I wanted to talk to the top opposition leader in Egypt, Khalid Muhyi al-Din, and I have had my wish.

At 1700, I was standing in front of his residence. He came down smiling and apologized for not meeting me in his house because the house was undergoing maintenance, including painting, elevator repairs and so forth. I asked him: Do you prefer to get in my car or to have me get in your car? He said, as if intentionally: You go in your car and I will go in mine. What he wanted to say is: My circumstances harbor a lot of surprises and I fear for you. I followed his Peugeot 504, which headed for al-Jazirah Club. I looked around and we were being watched by more than one. Despite this, we selected an isolated seat in the club. He showed his membership card and paid the admission fee for my ticket. I was behind him. On entering the club grounds, he went looking for parking and the guard motioned to me to enter. Meanwhile, another car entered behind us. Its occupants did not show their membership cards and did not pay for their admission tickets but showed cards of a different kind and were permitted to enter immediately. I still remember them, even though I don't know them. I then had this interview with Khalid Muhyi al-Din.

Two days before the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, AL-MADINAH interviewed Khalid Muhyi al-Din, member of the former Egyptian Revolution Command Council and leader of the opposition Egyptian Unionist Grouping Party.

In the interview, Muhyi al-Din discussed numerous Egyptian and Arab issues, underlining directly or indirectly the reasons for the change taking place in Egypt at present, at least the change involving the assassination of one president and the assumption of power by another.

Khalid Muhyi al-Din dealt with the inadequacy of the Camp David accords, underlining the reasons for his opposition to the accords. He also refuted the accusations levelled against him, especially the accusation of Marxism. He also outlined his viewpoint on solving the Arab issue, stating that this view is identical with the contents of Prince Fahd's initiative. He has further discussed numerous other things, including the reasons for his not assuming any ministerial position. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] It is said that the Camp David treaty has isolated Egypt but united the Arabs. What is your view of this statement and how true is it?

[Answer] Theoretically, this statement is correct. The Camp David treaty has motivated nearly all the Arabs to adopt a semi-united position toward it despite the strong differences among them. This position emerged clearly at the Baghdad summit, then in the Tunis summit and in the measures taken by the Arab countries against the Egyptian Government.

The Egyptian Government's conclusion of the Camp David agreement has isolated it. But this action hasn't isolated Egypt because Egypt is a part of the Arab nation and it cannot be isolated. What has been isolated as a result of the separate agreements is the Egyptian Government's policy. Despite all the Arab differences, there is one thing that unites this nation, namely, a united position vis-a-vis these accords.

As to what the Egyptian Government says about the Arab states' attack against Egypt, it is wrong. Nobody is attacking Egypt or the Egyptian people. What is being attacked is the Egyptian Government and its leadership, unless they consider the Egyptian Government and its leaders to be the representatives of Egypt.

What Is Added and What Is Omitted

[Question] If we were to ask Khalid Muhyi al-Din to add to or to omit from the Camp David accords, what would he add and what would he omit?

[Answer] We object to the method of the solution and not just to the agreement. We reject negotiation with Israel from a position of weakness. The effective instruments of pressure held by the Egyptian Government had been wasted before the Egyptian negotiator reached the negotiating table. It is our opinion that the Jerusalem visit was the straw that broke the camel's back when it portrayed Egypt before the world as if it were incapable of continuing the war and as if the only thing left for the Arabs was peace with Israel. President al-Sadat demonstrated that the issue of relations with Israel is not a very difficult issue and that he accepts such relations, as evidenced by his visit to Jerusalem and his speech before the Knesset there. President al-Sadat thus burned all the winning cards in his hand, weakened his position, isolated himself from the Arab countries and entered the negotiating arena independently.

It is possible that the Arab countries are weaker than Egypt militarily. But their collective economic, political and financial weight forms an international weight and a force that has its importance. Therefore, the agreement will lead to bad consequences. When I asked former Minister of Foreign Affairs Isma'il

Fahmi why he resigned, he said: "As a negotiator, I no longer have anything to use to put pressure on Israel in the negotiations." This doesn't mean that Isma'il Fahmi is against the policy of rapprochement with the United States. The Camp David agreement is synonymous with the Israeli conditions and the implementation of these conditions. Even if Israel withdraws from the Sinai, it will do so in accordance with the Israeli conditions that:

1. The Sinai be demilitarized.

2. U.S. and foreign forces be stationed in it for good.

3. A U.S. guarantee be provided for the agreement in case differences arise.

Required: New Policy

Thus it is evident that all the conditions of the agreement are bad for Egypt militarily. Egypt will have only one division in Sinai and is banned from using any military air fields there. Moreover, there are the two bases that have been built for Israel on the Egyptian borders in the Negev. All this shows that Israel has achieved superiority over Egypt in these conditions.

Any Egyptian politician who wants to amend the treaty or to adopt a position toward it takes into consideration all these military conditions, which constitute an instrument of pressure against the Egyptian decision maker. On the other hand, there is no agreement in the world that stipulates that a state of war be ended [as published]. It is true that termination of the state of war means mutual recognition. Israel is a state and so is Egypt. There is no peace treaty in the world that says that ambassadors must be exchanged as soon as the first phase is completed, unlike the [Egyptian-Israeli] treaty.

It is obvious from all this that there is a transgression against the Egyptian administration because the goal behind establishing embassies and commercial relations is in conflict with the state's sovereignty. The treaty also contains stipulations for ending all anti-Israel propaganda and for abolishing everything hostile to Israel or to Zionism in the academic curricula. Meanwhile, Israel doesn't stop talking of its expansionist plans and doesn't stop saying that it is the state of all the world's Jews. Moreover, Israel is exposing its ambitions in all of Palestine and saying that Palestine is without people [presumably meaning there are no Palestinian citizens]. We have agreed to change the curricula whereas Israel has not changed a single one of its goals. The conditions contained in the treaty are hard. Perhaps they would have been in order before the October war. But after that war, after the victory and under the canopy of fruitful Arab cooperation, an agreement could have been reached that would not have made the Arab side capitulate to whatever Israel wants--a capitulation evident in the present agreement.

Price of Evacuation is Exorbitant

[Question] In your view, what have the Camp David accords realized for the Arabs and what have they realized for Egypt?

[Answer] Insofar as Egypt and the Egyptain people are concerned, these accords have achieved nothing, unless you consider the evacuation and departure of the Israeli army from the Sinai a gain. However, it is my opinion that the price for this evacuation is very exorbitant. The evacuation is superficial and the Egyptian Army cannot enter the Sinai.

When the British negotiated with various governments over evacuation [from the canal area], those governments rejected the British conditions. This doesn't mean that those governments were against evacuation and independence. But they were against the exorbitant price Britain had been demanding, namely, the price of abandoning their will after independence. This is why the price that Egypt has paid in return for evacuation from the Sinai is its sovereignty and its Arab, Islamic, international and African relations.

Sovereignty is an army and a flag. It is true that the Egyptian laws will be applied in the Sinai and that the Sinai will be returned to Egypt. But there are constant pressures because of the military situation. The mistakes are much bigger than the successes and the price is extremely exorbitant.

We Object to Alignment With United States

[Question] The Egyptian Government believes that 99 percent of the cards in this issue are held by the United States. That is why it has wagered completely on the United States and thrown itself into the arms of the United States, as many say. What is your opinion?

[Answer] We object to the method of the solution emanating from a change in the Egyptian policy as embodied in the new political option, namely, that of alignment with the United States. Egypt has thus been made, as President Anwar al-Sadat has said, a partner in U.S. policy. After his latest visit to the United States, President al-Sadat said: "We have become partners with the United States in its strategy in the area." This takes us out of the nonaligned group. It is my view and opinion that the political option adopted by the Egyptian Government is what has brought us so close to U.S. policy. No pro-U.S. country in the area has moved so close to U.S. policy. At the same time, Egypt's ability to exert pressure on the United States or on Israel has been very limited. The only instrument of pressure used by Egypt is the argument that Egypt's regime or government is pro-U.S. and any harm done to this regime poses a danger to the United States. Any danger makes the United States hasten to help Egypt. On the other hand, the United States realizes that Egypt cannot stay away from it.

By the admission of President al-Sadat himself, Carter pressured him to accept the conditions submitted by Israel--conditions that led to the resignation of Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil, a former minister of foreign affairs. This means that the U.S. pressure on Egypt is stronger than Egypt's pressure on the United States. This option is harmful to the Egyptian and Arab interests in the long run. It is my opinion that the Arab area must have balanced relations with the two superpowers. It is not necessary for me to antagonize the Soviets in order to become a friend of the United States.

Impossible for Our Grouping To Be Marxist

[Question] There is a chronic accusation against the Egyptian opposition, namely, that it is always a communist opposition or an opposition that follows the communist course. This accusation is levelled most strongly against your party in particular and the Egyptian Government constantly reiterates the accusation. What is your defense and what is the justification for this accusation?

[Answer] When President al-Sadat permitted the establishment of the platforms and called for a platform for the right, a platform for the center and a platform including all the leftist factions, he was aware that the left consists of numerous factions, and we have said that our party is comprised of numerous factions. But he continued to say that the Grouping Party is a Marxist party. This is impossible because Egyptian law prohibits the foundation of any Marxist party. Should a Marxist or a communist party be discovered, the law punishes [the founders] with a 15- to 20-year prison term. Al-Sadat knows perfectly well that our party, the Grouping Party, is not Marxist because its program was presented to the Central Committee and to the People's Assembly and was approved by the parties law. The Grouping Party is committed to the principles of the Islamic Shari'a, the 23 July revolution and the 15 May revolution. So how can it be communist?

There are active and effective Marxist elements [in the party] and because they are active and effective we curb them. I defy [anybody to prove] the presence of a single statement by the Grouping Party lauding the Soviet Union since the foundation of this party. On the contrary, we have demanded evacuation of the Soviet Army from Afghanistan. But we have opposed Camp David, and the Soviet Union has also opposed Camp David. We called the January 1977 movement a popular uprising and the Soviet Union called it the same thing. So, it is a meeting of opinions only. We have not supported the Soviet Union and have not demanded adoption of communist thought. We cling to "scientific socialism" as defined by the National Charter. We defend the true principles of the 23 July revolution concerning the Arab movement and affiliation, socialism and nonalignment. If the freedom and opportunities were nearly equal [to those given to the Democratic National Party], if the [Grouping] members were not persecuted in universities and in numerous other places, our party now would be representing an effective and influential force in the adoption of any Egyptian decision. This is why the regime persists in its allegations and in describing us as "atheists." It is a campaign launched to scare the citizens away from the party at a time when the party has no paper and no right to defend itself. But despite all these (allegations) and these statements, the party operates in the street and wins supporters. We are confident of our goals. We are not a communist party and if one of our members is proven, by a judiciary sentence, to belong to another party, he is expelled from our party.

True and Untrue in What al-Sadat Has Attributed to Me

[Question] President al-Sadat has said in his latest speech that Khalid Muhyi al-Din has refused to put his hand in the hand of those who say that the 23 July revolution is a reactionary revolution. It is said that this is the reason for your not being arrested with the other leaders that al-Sadat arrested recently. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] What happened is as follows: President al-Sadat said that I agreed with Fu'ad Siraj al-Din on dissolving the new al-Wafd Party. Naturally, this story is untrue because I have no connection with this. But I did meet with Fu'ad Siraj al-Din and ask him about the reasons for dissolving the party. He said: Under the canopy of the new conditions and the new laws, the party cannot continue because it is paralyzed. So, Fu'ad Siraj al-Din is the one who decided to dissolve the party and I agreed with his opinion as an opinion. But personally I am against dissolving parties.

The second point noted by President al-Sadat is that a U.S. professor discussed with me the question of merging the Grouping Party with al-Wafd Party, saying that this would produce good results. I told him that this would be difficult because our starting points are different. We consider the 23 July revolution a national revolution whereas al-Wafd Party believes the contrary. Moreover, the predominant current in our party is a Nasirist current. This is why I objected [to the merger]. Whoever transmitted the conversation [to al-Sadat] did not do so accurately.

We Will Not Merge With Muslim Brotherhood

[Question] So the point of agreement and disagreement between you and al-Wafd Party is that you consider the 23 July revolution as your first national starting point whereas al-Wafd views that revolution as a sort of deviation from the democratic course?

[Answer] I cannot, for example, merge with the Muslim Brotherhood. The Grouping Party cannot merge with the Muslim Brotherhood. But it can cooperate with it. We are a party that considers religion a complementary part of the political system and believe that religion puts emphasis on political positions. But fundamentally, the Muslim Brotherhood begins from a different starting point. We serve the principles of religion, justice and consultation whereas the program of the Brotherhood consists entirely of the Koran and the Sunna. I have no objection to cooperation.

A politician who rejects cooperation is not a politician. For example, I was prepared during the sectarian sedition in Egypt to cooperate with the National Party even though my positions are in fundamental disagreement with its positions. I was prepared to cooperate with the National Party to wipe out sectarian sedition that our party wants to avert. But it [National Party] doesn't want to avert it and wants to exploit the incidents of this sectarian sedition to strike the opposition. If that party wants to deal with the causes of this sedition, then this is not the way to follow. It is normal for the opposition to exploit any mistake committed by the government, else it would not be an opposition. We are not angels or prophets.

Crushed Behind Incidents of al-Zawiyah

[Question] What is your analysis of the Egyptian sectarian struggle that in the government's view, became evident in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' incidents. Is it a fabricated or real struggle or is there another explanation for it?

[Answer] Sectarian conflict has become a recurrent and periodic phenomenon in Egypt since 1972. This confirms that this struggle has struck deep roots. It has also become obvious that its causes are economic, political and external. Israel's and the U.S.'s entry into the area and their tampering in it encourage the sectarian struggle. This is my viewpoint. Class disparity is also another cause. It is noted that those who staged al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' riots are from the crushed class of the people. This emphasizes that these people are ready to listen to any words. Added to this is the absence of real political democracy, enlightened thought and an englightened Islamic-Christian movement.

Meaning of Being Enlightened

[Question] What do you exactly mean by the absence of an enlightened Islamic-Christian movement?

[Answer] I mean by this understanding Islam in a rational and enlightened contemporary way and interpreting Islam without fanaticism and in a manner compatible with the conditions of the age. This applies to the Christian side as well. The absence of such understanding and interpretation and the absence of a real religious reform movement has caused religious fanaticism to prevail. In the absence of mature political thought, fanatic religious concepts always grow. The absence of justice, the presence of a state of constraint among the circles of the Coptic minority and the presence of a belief among the Muslims that the Copts enjoy the economic benefits have nurtured religious fanaticism. The climate is what nurtures such a struggle. Naturally, this is the responsibility of the government and not of the opposition. The government is fully responsible and so is the ruling party.

These radical Islamic groups started in 1972. Who has allowed them to continue to exist until now? Al-Sadat then says: "Those who have exploited the sectarian sedition" and proceeds to strike all the politicians. There is no doubt that this is an opportunity to get rid of the opposition and to shackle it. Such action is tantamount to wiping out political action. Any Egyptian man in the street knows full well how referendums and conducted, how the results are declared and how the elections are prepared. As far as the popular will is concerned, the entire Egyptian people understand that the government doesn't accept opposition. They [government and National Party] said "honorable opposition" and brought out Ibrahim Shukri. But when Shukri disagreed with them he became dishonorable. And now they want to build a strong opposition!

What is required is to say what the majority wants.

God Knows How This Phase Will End

[Question] This leads us to the issue of the political detainees.

[Answer] This latest decree codifies detention and the special measures to bring politicians to account before the judiciary authority (the Court of Shame). This means full control of political investigation by the security agencies because such investigations rely on information and the information is gathered by the security agencies. Therefore, the role of judiciary investigation and of

judiciary trial of the politicians has come to an end and what the regime calls the "supremacy of law" has also come to an end. Regrettably, we have entered a new phase and only God knows how it will end. I do not think that there is democracy, whether in the People's Assembly, in the Consultative Council or among the advisors. They have drawn up a charter and tied everybody to it. A charter must come with the agreement and approval of all. Charters are not imposed. They should, at least, invite us to participate with our opinion and should not impose anything on us. There is no majority party that imposes an opinion on the other parties and binds them to this opinion, else democracy would come to an end in the world.

Government Party

[Question] Recently, new names have appeared in Egypt, such as the law of shame, the Egyptian family and al-Sadat law. There is no longer a clear identity of the real source. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The problem is that the majority party in Egypt is not a strong and popular party. It depends on the government to bolster its power. This is the problem. Whoever wants to travel must get permission from the National Party. If a citizen wants a ration card, he has to get permission from the National Party. The same goes for apartments. This makes the party a part of the government. This is why the party is weak. It uses the government and the police to attract adherents. The issue is one of program and method.

I Am Responsible for My Government Only

[Question apparently missing]

[Answer] We do not interfere in the affairs of the Arab governments. Naturally, we have reservations about some Arab regimes. But this is not our problem. Our problem is with the Egyptian Government. The Arab people of every country are responsible for evaluating their government. We are against the Egyptian Government's positions, against Camp David, against the growing U.S. influence in the area and against the U.S. and Soviet military presence in the area. We support any person whose views, even half his views, agree with ours. We keep silent on any government that agrees with us in these views. This is why I am not free to evaluate the Arab regimes or leaderships. I am responsible for my government. By the way, the Egyptian Government gets angry when somebody gives interviews to foreign papers. But I believe that even if we refrain from giving interviews, it is possible for our views to reach the press through the symposium the party holds. What goes on in this symposium is heard and is transmitted to the press. Therefore, there is no such a thing as "foreign" or "internal."

For example, when Britain attacked in 1956, the British Labor Party staged street demonstrations against its government. The same happened in France, where thousands of Frenchmen staged demonstration in opposition to their government's attack on Egypt in 1956. Millions of Americans also stood against their government during America's war in Vietnam. There is nothing, except prophets, that is not subject to tasking and to discussion.

I Have Not Assumed Ministry

[Question] It is noted that even though you are one of the men of the 23 July revolution, you have not held a ministerial position so far. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] The reason for my not taking part in any cabinet is due to the fact that I resigned from the Revolution Command Council in April 1954. I then worked in the press as chief editor of AL-MASA' and AL-AKHBAR, in the People's Assembly and in the Central Committee of the Socialist Union. This means that I have worked in the general political sphere but have not held any ministerial position.

I Add "Nuclear" Evacuation of Area to al-Fahd's Proposals

[Question] Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz has voiced peace proposals that include eight points. You must have familiarized yourself with these proposals. What is your evaluation of this plan?

[Answer] I fully approve Prince Fahd's peace plan. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state, the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees, evacuation from all the occupied Arab territories and all the other provisions are just demands. But what I want to say is that unless this solution is coupled with another solution, the area will continue to face dangers. This other solution is to keep the area free of foreign bases, nuclear weapons and foreign fleets and to create a real climate of peace.

The Arab area must not be Soviet or American. It must be Arab. Our plan as a Unionist Party accords with Prince Fahd's plan but adds to it freedom of the entire Middle East and West Asia area from foreign alliances and bases and nuclear weapons. This is why the arms race that has been going on since Camp David is unnecessary. The monies spent on weapons must be channeled toward building peace, not only after peace is established between Israel and the Arabs but also after the area is steered clear of international conflict. The realization of this goal is more difficult because the United States wants to solve the Palestinian problem within the framework of the U.S. custodianship over the area. This is our party's view.

Prince Fahd's plan proceeds along the lines of international legitimacy. The plan does not make it a condition that diplomatic relations be established with Israel. This issue is left to the Arab states to decide according to what they deem to be in their interest.

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JUSTIFICATION FOR DECLARATION OF STATE OF EMERGENCY REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Oct 81 p 6

[Article by Bahirah Mukhtar: "Emergency Law To Counter Terrorism; President of Republic Is Entitled To Set Up Special State Security Courts and To Take Measures To Restrict Freedom of Individuals Without Observing Ordinary Law"]

[Text] Declaration of the state of emergency in the country is the most eloquent reply to that terrorist scheme seeking to declare a Khomeyni-style revolution and to create a climate of utter chaos in the country. What is the "state of emergency" from the viewpoint of the law and when and why is it declared? When and why is it abolished?

Dr Ahmad Fathi Surur, head of the criminal law section of the Cairo School of Law, one of the best-known jurists and one who has stressed the role of the law in guaranteeing individual freedom in more than 20 studies he has written, supports the emergency law and explains why it is necessary in this particular phase.

Dr Surur says: The state of emergency is occasioned by the special circumstances being experienced by the country. Special circumstances are governed by special legal rules to meet these circumstances. These special rules are regulated by the emergency law. Under special circumstances, the need arises to adopt special measures to safeguard public order or to insure the uninterrupted work of public utilities. The French State Council has defined the special circumstances on the basis of a state of need to justify going beyond the ordinary law under those circumstances. Egyptian law defines the special circumstances in two ways: First the emergence of a danger posing a threat to the national unity or to the country's security, and this is stipulated in Article 74 of the constitution. The second is the state of emergency that is established by the declaration of a state of emergency [as published]. This is regulated by Article 148 of the Egyptian constitution. Our discussion will be confined, according to Dr Ahmad Fathi Surur, to the second kind of special circumstances, namely the state of emergency.

In Britain and the United States, this state has been defined as martial laws. Egypt has defined it [as a state of emergency] since the British occupation in 1882. Martial law or a state of emergency are divided in turn into two kinds: The first is a military state of emergency, which is restricted to military zones in which a state of defense [presumably meaning alert] is delcared and where

special measures are taken. The second kind is the political state of emergency, which covers all parts of the country if it is exposed to a danger threatening its domestic or external security.

Modern Egypt has known material law since the British invasion of 11 July 1882. The British Government declared this state in Egypt on 2 November 1914 when Turkey joined Germany after the outbreak of World War I. This martial law continued to exist in Egypt and was not terminated until 5 July 1923 when the 1923 constitution was promulgated. Article 95 of that constitution permitted the declaration of martial law. Law No 15 of 1923 governing martial law was issued 26 June 1923. This law permitted a declaration of martial law whenever public security or order in the Egyptian territories or in a part of Egypt were endangered. In accordance with this law, martial law was declared 1 September 1939 when World War II started and was terminated 14 October 1945 when the war ended. Martial law was again declared on 14 May 1948 on the occasion of the Palestine war and was lifted 29 April 1950, except in the governorates of Sinai and the Red Sea. Martial law was declared for a third time on 26 January 1952 on the occasion of the Cairo arson and was abolished in 1956 on the occasion of the referendum on the constitution. However, it was declared again in November 1956 because of the tripartite attack against Egypt in the wake of nationalization of the Suez Canal. This declaration was then called a "state of emergency" for the first time. This state of emergency continued to exist until March 1964. In the wake of the Israeli aggression of 1967, the state of emergency was declared in the country on 5 June 1967 and was then terminated on 14 May 1980 [presumably meaning 1970].

Dr Surur has added: Special circumstances are a kind of [sudden] changes experienced by society's ordinary life--changes that require parallel legal changes to the necessary degree to deal with them, with a minimal observation of the guarantees of individual freedom insured by the constitution. The guarantee of freedom lies in observation of the principle that a person is innocent [until proven guilty]. It is to be noted that the state of emergency imposes special rules that are applied within the framework of the guarantees of personal freedom. The legitimacy of the measures taken in a state of emergency is called the special legitimacy, to distinguish it from the ordinary legitimacy observed under normal circumstances. Here we must point out that "delcaration of a state of emergency" is an act of sovereignty initiated by the president of the republic within the bounds of his political responsibility and approved by the People's Assembly. The measures taken in implementation of the state of emergency are based on the current Egyptian emergency law No 162 of 1958. In accordance with the philosophical basis of the state of emergency based on the said law, a state of emergency may be declared whenever public security or order in the territories of the republic or in part of them are endangered, whether because of the outbreak of war, the development of a situation posing the threat of war, the outbreak of internal riots, the occurrence of general catastrophes or the spread of an epidemic. In accordance with the constitution, the president of the republic declares the state of emergency, then presents this declaration to the People's Assembly within the next 15 days so that the Assembly may decide what it deems fit.

The emergency law guarantees the president of the republic the right to set up special state security courts to try defendants accused of crimes violating

military orders or other crimes referred to them by the president of the republic. In investigating these crimes, the public prosecutor may use all the powers he, the investigating judge and the referral counselor are entitled to.

Moreover, the president of the republic is empowered to adopt all the measures necessary to impose restrictions on the freedom of individuals without observance of the ordinary law.

The state of emergency has been declared to safeguard the country's and the citizens' security. Moreover, there is a saying that "only a thief fears a policeman." The ordinary citizen is protected by the state of emergency measures because these measures are established to protect him and to protect the country's security. As long as this citizen follows the straight path, he need not be worried by the special powers permitted by the emergency law.

As a necessity, the state of emergency is assessed (on its own merits), meaning that the measures permitted by the law are taken when the need dictates such measures.

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SUEZ CANAL TUNNEL SCHEDULED TO BE OPENED BY END OF OCTOBER

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2452, 21 Oct 81 pp 31-32

[Article by Muhammad 'Ali al-Sayyid: "Dream Turned Into Reality: Sinai's Isolation Ended"]

[Text] After the great crossing, his big dream was to end Sinai's isolation and to begin its reconstruction. To realize that dream, the project for the tunnel under the Suez Canal--Martyr Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel--came into existence. From the day the late leader gave the go-ahead for the start of excavation work, he kept up with the implementation of the project step by step. His words to the project workers motivated them to exert greater efforts and sweat. The words were: "Buckle down. You have my wishes for success. Your country will remember you for the magnificent and great effort you are exerting."

The project has been completed and the work in it has ended. The late leader was not destined to inaugurate it this month, October, as had been scheduled.

In this report, AKHIR SA'AH presents the story of the great dream that has been turned into a reality and has materialized to stand as a living testimony to the great accomplishments and building for the future Egypt, the foundations of which have been laid by the martyr leader, Anwar al-Sadat.

"Egypt views your work with pride." These are the words al-Sadat said to the workers in Hamdi Ahmad Tunnel and you see these words in their eyes, in their statements and in the dook of determination showing on their faces while they apply the finishing touches to the tunnel in preparation for its inauguration at full capacity at the end of October 1981

In October, hero Ahmad Hamdi, deputy commander of the engineer corps, was martyred while working on the (pontoon bridge) of the Third Army.

On 28 October 1973, leader al-Sadat entrusted Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman to implement the project as part of the canal's reconstruction and of ending the Sinai's isolation.

In October 1977, leader al-Sadat gave the go-ahead for the start of excavation work when he pressed the button operating the gigantic shield drill at Kilometer 17 north of the city of Suez.

On that day, the leader, according to the workers, asked about the minutest details, visited the ventilation ducts and the exploratory well and lifted the telephone to tell the workers working underground:

"A happy holiday. Work hard. We all wish you success and your country will not forget the magnificant effort you have been exerting."

The voice of the foreman came on the telephone from the depths of the earth to say:

"God willing, we will cross under the canal as the armed forces crossed it over the water."

The president then pushed the button operating the drill to realize his big dream.

Here he was in October 1980 honoring 57 [Egyptian] engineers and 8 foreign engineers working on the tunnel because it was his nature to be loyal and to express his gratitute.

He stood to declare to the world: "Today, the eastern wing of the Arab and Islamic nation is tied to its western wing silently and proudly."

The main goal that the late leader sought from construction of the Hamdi Ahmad Tunnel was to link the Sinai with the canal cities so that the Sinai might become a province integrated with and linked to the valley.

The goal was also to transport the natural raw materials and resources existing in the Sinai to the interior of the republic and to provide the resources for reconstructing and reviving the Sinai and for building roads and railroads to link the Arab countries with each other.

Amid this presence of his pure soul and the determination in his eyes, questions concerning that hope and the dream arose: What is it, why, when was it completed and what are its benefits? We heard the words from the workers in their ceaseless activity to realize this dream and have it opened in October so that it can serve as a symbol of loyalty.

Leader Kept Up With All Steps

Eng Zakariya 'Abd al-Hadi, in charge of the implementing company and one of those who got a medal from the last president, has said:

The leader followed up on the project from the start and kept up with every one of its steps--steps that started in 1977 when his excellency gave the go-ahead for beginning the excavation work.

The main body of the tunnel, opened by the leader in October 1980, is tantamount to a cylindrical bore installed through the use of the shield machine. It is 1.4 kilometers long. This bore is the core of the tunnel and it has precast

concrete walls 600 millimeters thick, designed to withstand high pressures. The bore consists of connected links, each link containing 16 concrete blocks and having a width of 1.2 meters.

This is the part of the tunnel that is underground. The length of the entire tunnel is 6 kilometers. The external part of the tunnel consists of the tunnel entrances and exists, the roads leading to the tunnel and the areas for waiting cars.

The Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel is divided into three sections: The lower section, which has three openings, two for two water pipelines, each with a capacity of 135,000 cubic meters, and the third for a high-tension powerline to supply electricity to the eastern area. The water pipelines supply a water plant built on the Suez Canal.

Next is the central section, which is designated for vehicle crossing and in which vehicles can cross in two opposite lanes. On both sides of the vehicle road, there are elevated sidewalks for maintenance and control workers.

The third section of the tunnel is lined and contains openings for ventilating exhaust fumes in the tunnel.

Eng Zakariya 'Abd al-Hadi adds: The tunnel also has a secondary lining consisting of light-colored Formica sheets that reflect light and make the tunnel lighting more like daylight.

Moreover, the latest equipment is used for tunnel ventilation and control. The tunnel is nearly 51 meters below ground level. It has been built so deep so that it will not be affected even by maximum future Suez Canal expansion.

The tunnel has a main control center located near the western entrance and supplied with various equipment, including television screens linked to television cameras installed inside the tunnel, equipment for air pollution readings in the tunnel and control equipment that operates the ventilation plants and fans and controls lighting inside and outside the tunnel.

Moreover, the tunnel has a total ventilation system whereby fresh air comes into the tunnel from openings found all along the floor of the tunnel and [stale air] escapes through openings in the top of the tunnel, with the help of towers built on both sides of the tunnel.

Shield

The shield machine whose operating button was pushed by the late leader is a drilling machine designed specifically for construction of Martyr Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel. It is suitable for the area's soil. The machine was built in Germany. It contains three drills. It removes the excavated earth and places the concrete links in place by pressure. Its capacity in the first 4 months amounted to installing two links every 24 hours. But this capacity increased later, especially when the Egyptian workers took over, to reach six links daily. This machine cost 5 million pounds.

Engineer Zakariya adds: The late president stayed with us on the site on the day the machine was put into operation until we drilled 1.6 meters into the rock. He then left after congratulating us on our work and wishing us success.

Final Tests

Eng Mahfuz Hanna, the project's resident engineer from the Ministry of Reconstruction and another one of those who got a medal from the late president, has said:

The workers on the site are determined to intensify their efforts to hand over the tunnel very soon so that it can be opened and realize the hope.

We have been carrying out the final tests on the sensitive equipment, such as the cables, the radar and television screens, the pollution measurement equipment and the fire alarms.

The tunnel is now ready to receive vehicles at its maximum capacity of 300 per hour, especially since the tunnel entrances and exits have been supplied with traffic lights, car waiting areas, fire engines and tow trucks.

The maximum speed in the tunnel will be 30 kilometers an hour. Thus, a vehicle can traverse the tunnel in 15 minutes.

Moreover, the tunnel in its entirety has been asphalted and all equipment has been installed. I should note here that the Ahmad Hamdi Tunnel is designed to be 95 percent dry.

The tunnel has been built in accordance with blueprints prepared by a well-known foreign consulting firm. The ministry has followed up every step with the construction company. We had our observations, which have been actually implemented, such as increasing the tunnel's length by 100 meters near the eastern area because extending the tunnel to a low area is less costly than engaging in filling work and extending it to a high area. We also found that the two sides of the tunnel are suitable for building (slopes and footpaths) without the use of reinforced concrete. This has also been done. This is in addition to the modifications proposed by the armed forces to guarantee the tunnel's safety.

It is a great source of pride for the workers that the late leader foldowed up every step of the project, supporting them with hope, with his repeated visits and with his questions about every detail and every person involved.

A residential area has been built for the tunnel workers, and the technicians who will work in the tunnel permanently will occupy it. It should be noted that the area was built in 1977, which means that its price has risen. The project will thus reduce its costs in the long run.

This is in addition to the water plant that has been built and that now serves the area and the other benefits whose role and importance in reconstructing the Sinai and in building the valley's prosperity is a secret to nobody.

Six Degrees of Lighting

Eng Mursi Mahmud Salamah, director of project implementation and also one of those who got a medal from the late leader, has said:

In addition to the efforts they have exerted with the support of the leader, the workers here are determined to finish as quickly as possible and to hand over the tunnel so that it can be opened within days.

Statistics indicate the efforts they have exerted, motivated by their resolution. They have excavated 2.4 million cubic meters of surface soil and the volume of excavation in the body of the tunnel totals 175,000 cubic meters of petrified clay.

Moreover, our electrical engineers have exerted efforts so that the tunnel will have 6 degrees of gradually changing light, so that a driver will not be surprised by sudden strong or weak light. This is in addition to a light reflecter on the western side of the tunnel that functions as an intermediate area between normal light and the tunnel's light.

The tunnel's electricity requirement totals 9,000 kilowatt-hours, which the tunnel gets from the three power plants in the Suez, in addition to an emergency plant with a capacity of 500 kilowatt-hours that goes into operation in case of a power outage.

We leave them with the words of the great leader ringing in our ears: "Buckle down. Your country will not forget your mangnificent effort."

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SYSTEM OF STUDENT ADVISORS INTRODUCED AT AL-AZHAR UNIVERSITY

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic weekly supplement to MAYU No 18, 2 Nov 81 p 6

[Article: "After Start of Studies at al-Azhar: Advisor for Every 30 Students To Be Responsible for Their Actions; 50 Free Copies of Every Book for Needy Students"]

[Text] It has been decided to adopt the system of student advisors at al-Azhar University colleges for the first time this year. This will be done by dividing the students into groups, each comprising 30 students advised by a tutor or an assistant instructor to help solve their problems.

It has also been decided to disburse 110,000 pounds to the Social Solidarity Fund, including 22,000 pounds for the project to produce Islamic uniforms for the students of the women's colleges. This is in addition to subsidizing the budgets of the student unions and allocating 1 million pounds for university textbooks.

This has been stated by Dr 'Abd al-Latif Khulayf, al-Azhar University vice president for student affairs, who has also said: Memorization of the venerable Koran by the students, the teaching of Koranic sciences and other Islamic disciplines, especially in the applied colleges, and the assignment of capable professors to teach these disciplines are the subject of major attention on the part of the university.

The vice president of al-Azhar University has also said that the 87,000 pounds has been allocated for student social welfare in order to realize a kind of social solidarity, to provide disabled students with care and to purchase equipment helpful for them, to pay residence fees at the city towns for students unable to pay and to provide the Islamic uniform free of charge to female students who cannot afford it by producing this uniform at the university. This uniform will be sold to students able to pay at a token price.

Responsibility of Supervisors

Regarding the system of student advisors, Dr 'Abd al-Latif Khulayf said: Each group will include 30 students and will be advised by a tutor or an assistant instructor under the supervision of an assistant professor or professor. The advisor will be responsible for the students' regular attendance at lectures throughout the academic year, for solving their problems, for providing them with full educational care, for helping them in whatever difficulties they encounter and for providing them with university textbooks.

'Abd al-'Aziz Quraysh, secretary general of al-Azhar University, has said: In its latest meeting, the University Council agreed to appoint 4 professors and 16 assistant professors to bolster the teaching staff in the various colleges of the university.

Dr Muhammad Abu Hatab, dean of the College of Languages and Translation, has said: The distribution of students in the various sections of the college will begin as of next week and it will be done in accordance with the total grades of each student and the requirements of the sections.

Islamic Subjects at Start of Day

Dr Badrikan Muhammad Zaki, dean of al-Azhar Women's College of Commerce, has decided to change the time of the lectures on Islamic subjects so that these lectures are given at the beginning of the day. Dr Badrikan has also decided to apply the system of attendance and absence percentages to these lectures so that they can be given exactly the same attention by the female students as that given to accounting, management and economics.

Professors Donate Their Books

Dr Mahmud al-'Ukkazi, dean of Islamic and Arabic Studies at the Alexandria Women's College, has said: All the teaching faculty members have been appointed and the lecture schedules have been distributed to them. Moreover, all the vacant grades for teaching faculty members were filled before the start of the academic year. He added: The results of the acceptance of women students at the university town, which is attached to the college premises, will be announced next week. The town accommodates 600 students. Meals will be offered to all students at a token price of 5 piasters per meal.

Dr Mahmud al-'Ukkazi added: Every professor will donate 50 copies of his textbook to be distributed to needy students. It has also been decided that college female employees, as well as the students, will wear the Islamic uniform.

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CAIRO UNIVERSITY TO SUPPLY BOOKS TO STUDENTS AT COST

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 2 Nov 81 p 7

[Article by Karimah 'Abd al-Razzaq: "University Prints Books and Sells Them to Students at Cost; Generous Reward to Every Faculty Member Who Permits University to Publish His Scientific Work"]

[Text] It has been decided to offer a generous reward to every teaching faculty member who presents the original copy of the books he writes to the university to print them and sell them to students at cost. The deadline for the distribution of lecture mimeograph sheets to university students and for a weekly follow-up on the progress of studies at the colleges is 15 December. The absence of students will be taken into consideration in calculating the percentage of attendance required for sitting for examinations.

Dr Hasan Hamdi, president of Cairo University, has appealed to teaching faculty members to present the original copies of their textbooks adopted for students this year to the university administration for printing by the university printing press in return for generous rewards given to the teaching faculty members. At the same time, Dr Hasan Hamdi has asked the college deans to have the lecture files prepared by the professors so that the colleges may reproduce copies on the machines with which all the university colleges have been supplied. Dr Hamdi has asked that these files be presented no later than 15 December so that they can be ready for distribution to the students. Dr Hamdi has further said: The purpose of this measure is to gurantee that the student acquires university textbooks at a reasonable price and, second, to spare the professor the trouble and the hardship he encounters in having the textbooks printed. This is in addition to the fact that the rising cost of paper has caused outside printing presses to raise the price of book printing. This increase is reflected in the price of the book charged to the student.

Dr Hasan Hamdi has added that a large number of professors offers their books free of charge to students who are incapable of paying and that another large number of professors has already presented the original copies of their books to the university press, which is now printing them at set prices.

Dr Hasan Hamdi, president of Cairo University, has also said: I am following up personally several important matters, espeically the transfer of students in accordance with the regulations established by the University Council.

Dr Hamdi added: As of this week, I will make surprise visits to the university towns and will share with the students their food and listen to their complaints and will, at the same time, punish any student who violates a university town's laws and regulations. I will also visit the university colleges and attend the meetings of their councils to hear the views expressed by the members of these councils regarding educational, academic and research affairs and other issues pertaining to the progress of the educational process in every college.

Yesterday, Dr Hasan Hamdi attended the meeting of the School of Medicine Council, which lasted 5 hours and in which the council reviewed the reports, proposals and opinions submitted by the heads of sections and evaluated studies at the school as of the beginning of the academic year. In its meeting on Wednesday, the day after tomorrow, the Cairo University Council is scheduled to review the reports presented by the college deans on the progress of studies in the past 2 weeks.

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AL-AZHAR TO LAUNCH BROAD RELIGIOUS DIALOGUES WITH YOUTH

Cairo AL-LIWA' AL-ISLAMI in Arabic weekly supplement to MAYU No 17, 26 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Muhammad al-Zarqani: "Al-Azhar Enters Into Direct Dialogue With Students and Youth Groups; New Islamic Concepts Committee in al-Azhar Under Chairmanship of Grand Imam; Selection of Team of Professors and Scholars To Meet With Youth Everywhere"]

[Text] The venerable al-Azhar, in participation with al-Azhar University, has decided to enter into a diredt dialogue with university youth and with the various groups to explain the sound concepts of the Islamic religion and to answer all the questions and queries on the minds of the youth.

A committee named the Islamic Concepts Committee has been formed in al-Azhar under the chairmanship of Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bisar, grand imam and shaykh of al-Azhar, to prepare for and to participate in the dialogue that will take place in a constant and open manner at the broadest level and in all governorates of the rerepublic.

His Eminence Dr al-Husayni Hashim, secretary general of al-Azhar's Islamic Research Academy, has stated that the dialogue seeks to explain the Islamic concepts that concern society and that are prevalent among the youth. It also seeks to guide the youth to the right path, to unite the Muslims and prevent their division, to explain the issues that are the essence of the faith and subsidiary matters that are secondary in the Islamic Shari'a, to explain religious thought accurately, to demonstrate the sound method of interpretation, to outline the points of agreement and points of disagreement and (to show that the arguments of one sect cannot be applied to another sect).

One of the most important goals of the dialogue is also to speak frankly regarding some concepts of the youth.

The academy will publish a series of booklets to provide the youth and the preachers with the sound concepts of Islam and with Islam's opinion on various issues preoccupying the youth. The first booklet will be written by His Eminence Shaykh Mustafa al-Hadidi al-Tayr, academy member and chairman of the Interpretation and Hadith Committees.

The Islamic Concepts Committee is comprised of the grand imam as chairman of His Eminence Dr al-Husayni Hashim; Shaykh Mustafa al-Tayr; Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr, member of the academy; Shaykh 'Abdallah Karim; Shaykh 'Abd al-Hakim Na'na'; Dr Muhammad Kamal Ja'far; Shaykh Muhammad Husam al-Din and Professor Jabir Hamzah Farraj as members.

Al-Azhar University Participation

His Eminence Dr Muhammad al-Tayyib al-Najjar, president of al-Azhar University, has stated that qualified al-Azhar University professors who are well versed in religion will be selected this week to be distributed to the various universities to conduct the dialogue with the students of these universities and to answer their questions and queries on various religious matters. Dr al-Najjar added that coordination will be established with the various information media to participate in this dialogue and to explain religion's opinions on all issues to the broadest youth base. Al-Azhar scholars will take charge of correcting and explaining a number of Hadiths that some people try to exploit in vague interpretations.

Dr al-Najjar has also stated that he is personally ready to receive youth questions and queries on any religious issues and to answer them until the convocation of these meetings is begun.

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SOME WHO CLAIM TO BE OF SALAF CREED MAY NOT BE TRUE MUSLIMS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "Al-Salaf School: Who Are They and How Do They Think"]

[Text] The concerted investigations being conducted by the security agencies of elements of the terrorist organization have revealed that there is a group that follows the al-Salafi creed.

What is the truth of this creed and what is its relationship to Islamic thought?

His Eminence Shaykh Dr 'Abd al-Ghani al-Rajihi, professor of interpretation at the Principles of Religion College, says: To answer this question, a somewhat profound study of the sciences of the Koran, of linguistics and of Islamic philosophy is required.

There are those who are called the Salaf [predecessors], namely, the men of the Hejira [migrants with the prophet from Mecca to Medina] in the first Islamic era, and there are the Khalaf [successors], namely, the men who emerged in the late third century and early fourth century of the Hegira.

The division is based on their concept of the so-called "similar" in the venerable Koran. The similar pertains to God's words and qualities. Let us make things clearer: Many Koran phrases attribute to God "a hand above theirs," an eye or actions similar to man's actions, as when the phrases say: "The compassionate has sat on the throne." The phrases also attribute to God, may He be praised, emotions such as anger, vengeance or compassion.

These phrases were revealed to the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and the prophet's companions and followers read them very simply and clearly, understanding their intent without complication or philosophical exposition.

But it occurred to some people to wade into the issue of the "similar" in the venerable Koran during the time of Imam Malik. A man asked the imam: "The compassionate has sat on the throne--" how did He sit on His throne?

Imam Malik answered: "The sitting is known but the how is unknown. It is a duty to believe in it, asking questions about it is a heresy and you are an evil man."

So the Salaf are the followers of Imam Malik who say: We believe in the "similar" but we do not ask how it happens and we are certain that it is not permissible to describe God with the obvious. They are the ones who have interpreted the "similar" as being known and the "how" as being unknown, saying God knows His purpose best.

The Khalaf are also followers of the Sunna. But in their time, the freethinkers, the atheists and followers of the Greek philosophies, which had been translated into Arabic, emerged. To convince these people to follow Islam, a tangible meaning had to be used because these people used to say: How can we worship God with phrases we do not understand?

So the Khalaf in Islamic thought told those freethinkers and atheists that God's hand means power and that His eye means care.

Dr al-Rajihi adds: But let it be known that the opinions of the early Muslim imams were scientific, accurate and practical Islamic opinions that have nothing to do with the adoption by the modern Salaf of radical political creeds and with the formation of groups that have their paramilitary organizations and their branches throughout the country, that have their own finances and that set up their centers, libraries and publishing houses.

The early Salaf did not form a group because Islam does not at all welcome intellectual fanaticism and because it hates such fanaticism. The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, has prohibited such radicalism, saying: "My nation shall splinter into so many and 70 groups except one." They asked: And what is that one, O messenger of God?

Islamic intellectual 'Abd al-Karim al-Khatib says that the Salaf are the ones in early Islam described by the Koran as the close ones: "The early predecessors are the ones who are close [to God] in paradise."

Thus, the Salaf [predecessors] are the highest ideal of the Muslim. But the problem lies in those who nowadays affiliate themselves with the Salaf, and their claim may be right or may be wrong. However, names are names and have no weight except with faith and action. I may not say I am a Muslim if I do not follow the dictates of Islam. If there emerges a Muslim who claims he is like the pious predecessors and then proceeds to declare the Muslims infidels, then he is certainly not a Salaf and he does not belong with the Salaf. A Muslim is never declared an infidel for any sin except for the sin of setting other gods on equal status with God, may He be praised. The door of repentence and of acceptance is always open to whomever says "there is no god but God." [The Koran says]: "God does not forgive those who set up other gods next to Him and forgives anything else for whomever He wants."

Therefore, whoever calls for the migration of Muslims is not a Salaf. The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, said: "There shall be no migration after the conquest. There shall be (good will) and struggle."

This means that migration is no longer a migration from Mecca to Medina, as it was in the days of the prophet of Islam, but a migration within the soul--i.e., the intention of a man to move from one state of the heart or of sin to a better state,

such as when he is a drinker or a gambler and resolves within himself to repent and to move to the sphere of faith in God. This is what is called the struggle of the soul and this struggle may be with good deeds, with donation of money, with thought and with calling for God.

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MEASURES TO COUNTER RELIGIOUS RADICALISM AMONG YOUTH OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Oct 81 p 3

[Article by Lamis al-Tahawi and Hurriyah Husayn Ahmad: "Egyptian Youth: Where To; Issue as Viewed by Shaykh of al-Azhar and Minister of Religious Trusts; Shaykh of al-Azhar; Religion Can Never Be Source of Deviation; Minister of Religious Trusts: They Are Political and Not at All Religious Groups"]

[Text] The issue is now before the shaykh of al-Azhar and the minister of religious trusts.

His Eminence 'Abd al-Rahman Bisar, shaykh of al-Azhar, has said: The evils now occurring in our society are the result of religious deviation. We hold religion innocent of being the source of deviation and we cannot embroil the word "religion" in this terror. They are terrorist, not religious, groups.

Dr Zakariya al-Barri, minister of religious trusts, has said: The groups that have deviated in the name of religion are political groups and not religious groups at all.

The success of the radicals in infiltrating the minds of Egyptian youth who are thirsty to know more of the teachings of their religion is primarily the responsibility of the agencies for propagating the [Islamic] call, which are in charge of protecting the teachings of Islam from all intrusion.

To start with, His Eminence 'Abd al-Rahman Bisar, skaykh of al-Azhar, says:

It has been said frequently that the evils occurring in society now are the result of religious deviation. We hold religion innocent of being a source of deviation and we hold the principles if Islam above being an incentive for what has happened and what is happening among us.

In 1977, terrorism claimed Shaykh Muhammad al-Dhahabi as a victim. Since then, we have been examining the sources, manifestations and motives of deviation. But we cannot call it religious deviation and we cannot embroil religion in this terrorism.

Religion is security and peace and the deviation comes from terrorist groups founded on a terroristic basis. Religion is innocent of these groups. This is

why these manifestations must be discussed by sociologists, psychologists and economists, because each of these disciplines has something to do with the deviation of youth at an early age, before they become aware of the evils surrounding them.

A committee called the Islamic Concepts Committee has been formed and has met more than once to exert efforts to build and enlighten the minds of the Muslims and to warn them of this terrorism in our country.

His eminence the grand imam adds: We all need to stand united to serve our country and to lead it away from what is directed against it.

Responsibility for the religious protection of our youth from the infiltration of religious radicalism is a responsibility shared by many of the agencies in charge of propagating the Islamic call and of protecting the Islamic heritage. The Islamic Research Academy is one of these agencies shouldering this responsibility. Dr al-Husayni Hashim, secretary general of the Islamic Research Academy, says that "religious deviation is due to a lack of understanding of religion."

The fact is that there is religious knowledge and religious education.

The impact of religious education and religious knowledge is stronger than just teaching and we do have the opportunity to provide this education [as published].

Imam al-Ghazali, an authority on Islam, has said: "A baby is born like a pure blank page and the educators can mold him and implant in him the right teachings at an early age."

The importance of religious education at an early age and in the first stages of education thus becomes evident. When a student moves up gradually through these stages, he grows up with strong religious foundations; the falsifiers of religion cannot deceive such an individual and implant hatred in his heart in the name of religion because religion does not approve of transgression, be it transgression with words or with weapons or transgression in the heart.

The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, has warned of such aggression in his words:

"For a Muslim to transgress against a fellow Muslim, against his blood or against his honor, is unlawful. It is considered a form of oppression for a Muslim to demean a brother Muslim."

The secretary general of the Islamic Research Academy adds that youth guidance is the responsibility of the home first and of the school second. This is why the various curricula taught to students must be reexamined so that they advocate hatred of atheism, of violence and of radicalism. Al-'Aqqad's book on fighting communism and curricula answering the various questions on the minds of the youth must be taught in the secondary schools.

In fact, a committee has been formed in the Islamic Research Academy under the chairmanship of the grand imam and with me as member to write pamphlets and

leaflets that deal with and correct all the misguided thought in the minds of the youth. This committee has been named the Islamic Concepts Committee. Moreover, the academy will redouble its efforts to produce books on the Sunna and the Islamic heritage so as to deal with religious matters and their relationship to secular matters and with the religious vacuum and to offer sound religious education to society, to the family and to the country.

But what arrangements has the Minister of Religious Trusts prepared to exercise its primary responsibility toward our youth?

Dr Zakariya al-Barri, minister of religious trusts, says that efforts to deal with the failure attributed to the state's [religious] call agencies started long ago and that training courses have been organized for the imams to meet with prominent Islamic intellectuals, including professors of al-Azhar, university professors and the ministry's prominent preachers. Annual tests are also held for the imams covering sound Islamic heritage books.

This year, an important subject, namely, that of Islamic religious values stipulated in the current Egyptian constitution, which is founded on many of the sound principles of Islam, has been added [to this training]. The ministry has also printed "Guiding Sermons," a book that contains a number of sound religious concepts from the time of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, to the present time. This book provides the advocates with new armament, in addition to what is already in existence.

The Ministry of Religious Trusts has also begun to deal with the problem of the shortage of imams and with the need of many government and private mosques for vigilant preachers. To deal with this problem, the ministry has initiated a number of measures that serve this aim, including increased recompense for preachers selected from among professors of al-Azhar, university professors, instructors at religious institutes and Arabic language and religion teachers in the Ministry of Education. The recompense has been increased so as to attract such preachers to the Islamic rostrum because attracting them will have a major effect on guiding conduct and on correcting religious concepts.

Dr Zakariya al-Barri adds: I do not believe that the groups that have swerved from religion toward hateful fanaticism and toward intimidation, threats, coercion and misconduct are groups that act on the basis of Islamic concepts. God, may He be praised, says: "Call unto the path of your God with wisdom and with gentle words and debate with them gently." God also says: "The good and the bad cannot be equal. Advocate gently and you shall find that a man who is hostile to you will turn into a warm friend. Only those who are patient and those who are gently fortunate have such gentleness." God has also told His prophet: "Speak to him gently, perhaps he will remember or will have fear [of God.]" [Loose translation of quotes from the Koran.]

All this means that no Muslim has over another Muslim any power other than the power of advocating with wisdom and with gentle words. A Muslim thus will have absolved himself and performed his religious duty within the bounds of good conduct and friendliness. If a Muslim does this, then it does him no harm if

people disagree with him. God, may He be praised, says: "It does you no harm (no matter who accepts or rejects your advocacy) if you follow the right path."

The minister of religious trusts asserts: To root out this kind of deviation, the Ministry of Religious Trusts is preparing a draft law banning any person from preaching or lecturing in its mosques unless permitted by the ministry to do so. This is because the Hanafi sect is one of the major sects accepted by the nation in practice. For the Friday prayers to be correct, it is required that they be led by the supreme head of the state or by whomever he delegates. If the imam is not the head of the state or whomever he deputizes, the Hanafi sect believes that the Friday prayers, which people perform at noon, are not correct. This is an alert action on the part of the Hanafi sect, which understood the issue [of prayer imams] in its own time.

The Hanafi creed emerged in Iraq, which at the time abounded with peaceful Islamic currents and other currents deviating either slightly or greatly from the essence of religion. This creed demanded of the Muslim [everyday] noon prayers that do not require [as published] instead of the Friday prayers that must have a public sermon to be correct. This creed has thus closed the door in the face of confused concepts and falsified facts and has not allowed free access to the rostrum to just any person, especially if the person is fully ignorant of Islam. Such ignorance exists at the highest educational levels that have not studied Islam alertly.

In the past, the Ministry of Religious Trusts, in accordance with the Hanafi creed, used to give its imams permission to lead the Friday prayers and to deliver the sermon to the congregations so that they would not be deprived of correct Friday prayers.

The minister of religious trusts adds: The radical groups started as Islamic groups opposing the communist organizations, which had been trying to dominate the nation's concepts and to falsify the truths of its religion with lies. At the time, the groups posed no danger but were rather serving a good cause. Then atheist and other ignorant fanatic elements were able to lead these groups to these mad actions which, I say, are rejected not only by every Muslim but also by every rational person, regardless of what intellectual creed such a person adopts from among the deluge of intellectual principles existing nowadays throughout the world.

The size of these groups and of their followers is negligible compared with the thousands of other youth and they hardly constitute much of a percentage compared with the thousands of other youth who follow the right path. Not one of those alleged to have formed the Atonement and Migration Group and similar groups is a Muslim scholar. At the same time, these people accept no word of advice or opinion from any specialized Muslim scholar. This means that this movement is a destructive political movement using religion as a mask for its objectives. Such a movement is not unique to Egypt and the press has reported that such organizations have been found in a number of Arab countries. This means that the scheme comes from outside the Islamic world--from the part of the world that is the sole beneficiary of creating intellectual confusion in religion and of sowing inter-Muslim religious sedition, Muslim-Christian sedition and inter-Christian religious sedition.

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NEW ACADEMIC REGULATIONS INTRODUCED FOR COLLEGES OF CAIRO UNIVERSITY

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 22 Oct 81 p 8

[Article by Labib al-Siba'i: "New University Examinations System to Be Applied This Year; Bimonthly Examination for College Students to Account for 30 Percent of Grades; Studies To Continue 30 Weeks, After Subtracting Holidays and Examinations; Experiment of Reinstating University Guard Has Proven Its Success in First Week"]

[Text] It has been decided to hold three examinations for college students during the academic year at the rate of one every 2 months, in addition to the final examinations. Thirty percent of the final grade for each discipline will be accounted for with these examinations.

Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, president of Cairo University, has stated that it has been decided that the colleges next week will set the dates for the periodic examinations and will announce them to the students. Excepted are the medical students, who will be given surprise tests without prior notification by the professors to measure the degree of the student's preparedness.

Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim pointed out that the experiment of the university guard has proven its success as of the first week of studies and that the students have shown great response to the university guards who carry out their duty through the official university agencies. Dr Ibrahim also pointed out that the role of the university guard is restricted to notifying a college dean of a contravening student and that the dean will then take charge of questioning the student. He added that on Saturday, the day after tomorrow, the colleges will begin using attendance records for all students and that a student's guardian will be informed of the student's attendance every month. Dr Ibrahim also said that it has been decided that the student must attend at least 75 percent of the lectures for any subject before he is permitted to sit for the final examination in that subject.

It has also been decided that the student affairs offices will resume their work tomorrow, Friday, to issue to the students university identity cards that will enable them to gain entrance to the university campus.

As for new students accepted by the schools of medicine and to whom the new academic system applies, it has been decided that their studies will be held at the School of Sciences for 4 days and at the School of Medicine for 2 days only

[per week] now that the freshman year has been merged with the other academic years. As for repeating freshmen in the schools of medicine, they will study this year according to the old system so as to give them another chance.

The president of Cairo University also said that it has been decided to set the academic schedules during the year on the basis that the academic year shall not be less than 30 weeks, after subtracting the various holidays and time taken by the examinations.

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CONFESSIONS OF DEFENDANTS IN AL-SADAT ASSASSINATION REPORTED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Oct 81 p 4

[Article: "What Have Plotters Said in Their Confessions?"]

[Text] The plotters said in their confessions, which have been obtained by AL-AHRAM, that they had been planning to spread chaos in the country, to declare a bloody Khomeyni-style revolution and to assassinate all the political, popular, executive, opposition and religious leaders.

'Abbud al-Zummar has said in the interrogations that his religious tendencies began in 1979 and developed through his family relationship with defendant Tariq al-Zummar and that he had agreed with Tariq al-Zummar, Nabil al-Maghribi, 'Abd al-Salam Farraj and other elements of the Islamic groups on the need to set up a Khomeyni-style state: On 11 October, I assigned a team from the organization to survey the positions of the central security vehicles in Cairo's streets and squares and to survey the State Security Investigations building in al-Jizah with the aim of planning to seize the weapons of these forces and to spread an atmosphere of fear among the citizens on the occasion of the referendum on the presidency. He has also said that President al-Sadat's assassination was an ordinary and necessary thing to achieve their goals and that the organization was still in the planning stage but that the government's arrest of a large number of the organization's elements in the wake of al-Zaqiyah al-Hamra' incidents and of issuance of the detention decisions made them hasten execution of the plan to assassinate President al-Sadat.

Nabil Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Maghribi (an employee in the Popular Culture Office) has said in the interrogation conducted with him that he became acquainted with 'Abbud al-Zummar in 1979 while frequenting the mosques and that the latter gave him his address and asked him to visit him. He further said that he visited 'Abbud at the beginning of 1981 and that the two discussed some religious matters and the need to unify the goal of the various Islamic groups. His meetings with 'Abbud al-Zummar then recurred at the rate of one every 3 days and their discussions centered on the need to rally the existing Islamic groups behind the idea of an armed jihad against the current regime and ruler, the need to organize a revolution similar to Khomeyni's revolution, the need to train the right elements in these groups in the use of weapons to fight the government in order to achieve this goal and the need to establish the qualities of piety, obedience and discretion as the basis for selecting these elements. These meetings were attended by Tariq al-Zummar, 'Abbud's brother-in-law and a student at the Cairo School of

Agriculture, who approved the concept of armed jihad and expressed his willingness to help them recruit others to join them.

The three agreed to form an organization, with 'Abbud in charge of planning and armament affairs, Tariq in charge of advocacy and recruitment and Nabil in charge of whatever tasks 'Abbud assigned him to gather information on certain places and installations, in addition to his major role of training organization members and preparing them militarily to confront the existing regime with force.

Nabil has stated that he was able to recruit a number of members, including al-Sayyid Mahmud al-Sayyid and Hasan 'Atif Ziyadah. Tariq al-Zummar was also able to recruit six members. Nabil also confessed that he had studied areas where the organization members could be trained on weapons and had chosen the area between kilometers 9 and 10 on al-Wahat Highway where the training was actually carried out. He also said that he received a Port Said submachinegun and a Czech pistol from 'Abbud al-Zummar, as well as sums of money to spend on the organization members whom he trained to use the submachinegun in the al-Wahat area.

Concluding his confessions, the defendant admitted that his modest religious education and his lack of knowledge and experience with religious affairs prevented him from assuming the leadership of this group and that he is not convinced of 'Abbud's leadership because he lacks the qualifications of a leader.

Hasan 'Atif Ziyadah (a graduate of the School of Arts) has said in his confessions that he joined the organization through Nabil al-Maghribi because of the agreement in their views and beliefs and that he tried, on the instructions of al-Maghribi, to recruit some religious elements and make them join the organization. He also said that he attended the theoretical training on the use of weapons at the house of Nabil al-Maghribi and also attended many of their meetings at various mosques. Ziyadah further confessed that his role was confined to training the organization members in karate. However, he has expressed his regret for what he did, declaring that he was the victim of deception by al-Maghribi and disavowing al-Maghribi and his followers.

Muhammad Muhammad Husayn (a driver) said that he joined the organization by way of Hasan 'Atif with whom he had become acquainted at al-Tawhid mosque in al-Wayli, that he attended the group's shooting training on al-Wahat Road and that he kept firearms belonging to the group at his home several times. He also confessed that he had been previously in possession of the black briefcase seized with his colleague Hasan 'Atif with weapons inside it and that he got rid of the briefcase by giving it to a neighbor when he sensed danger.

Karam Zuhdi, who led the Asyut operation and who was the official in charge of Upper Egypt, admitted that the organization sought to overthrow the regime and to set up a Khomeyni-style state, that leading defendant Nabil al-Maghribi defined for him the organization's method of operation, embodied in the use of force to realize the movement's goals, and that the organization had prepared for the Asyut incidents in order to spread chaos and to urge the citizens to support the so-called Khomeyni-style revolution to overthrow the regime by seizing some sensitive and vital positions in the state.

8494
CSO: 4504/60

DETAILS OF PLOT LEADING TO ASSASSINATION OF AL-SADAT DESCRIBED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Oct 81 p 3

[Article: "Plotters Have Fallen and Their Dens Have Collapsed; Start Was in June and Shaykh Nabil Was First Thread; Where Did Members of Terrorist Organization Meet While Eyes of Security Men Were Watching Them Hour by Hour"]

[Text] The security agencies' decisive confrontation against the first terrorist attack of the radical organization in Asyut had its effect by foiling the terrorist scheme aimed at launching barbarous and bloody attacks in the governorate and proceeding from there to another governorate to arouse terror and fear in all parts of the republic. What is the story of this organization whose dens have collapsed and whose leaders and members--leaders and members who have assassinated al-Sadat and who had planned to create total chaos in the country--have been apprehended?

The security agencies began to move as a result of information concerning the suspicious activities of a person called Shaykh Nabil. The suspicious activity was focused in his attacks on the current regime and in extraordinary moves to purchase weapons and to train numbers of youth in weapons firing in some desert areas. Investigations conducted on Shaykh Nabil and his associates revealed that they had been engaged in illegal activity and in forming an underground organization.

Acting on the principle of the supremacy of law, the matter was presented to the supreme state security prosecution, which permitted a follow-up and kept a full record of the moves of the members. A plan was immediately drawn up to uncover the dimensions of the activity of this organization and to solve the riddle of Shaykh Nabil: Who he was, his moves, his contacts and the places where he met with his organization members.

Thus, it actually became possible to determine his identity and it was discovered that his name was Nabil 'Abd al-Majid al-Maghribi, a graduate of the College of Languages and an employee in the Popular Culture [office] in Bayt al-Sharabiyah.

By this thread, it was possible to discover three sites used by the organization members for their meetings, at which they hatched their plots:

Apartment No 5 in property No 9 on 'Afifi Street in al-Jizah.

Zayn al-Din mosque on Martyr 'Abd al-Mun'im Zayn al-Din Street in al-Haram.

Al-Anwar mosque in 'Arab al-Jisr area in 'Ayn Shams.

From this thread, the security agencies discovered more about the organization's real activities and found out that the meetings were not just for plotting but also for training on weapons and that the training place was located between kilometers 8 and 9 on al-Wahat highway where the security forces found the discarded shells of the ammunition used by the organization members in their training. The agencies also found the target boards in the area.

The security agencies' follow-up and surveillance of the moves of the organization members did not stop at this point. The agencies were able, moreover, to record, in voice and in photographs, three meetings between Shaykh Nabil and other organization members.

The first meeting took place on 21 September 1981 and in this meeting Shaykh Nabil expressed his desire for the speedy purchase of any quantity of weapons and his willingness to pay any sum of money in return. He also stressed the need to provide the members with training in areas other than al-Wahat.

The second meeting took place on 24 September 1981. In this meeting, Shaykh Nabil was seen examining a submachinegun he had obtained, along with some bullets, in a manner that confirmed that he had had experience in this regard, considering that he disassembled and reassembled the submachinegun at the meeting. Shaykh Nabil also expressed his willingness at this meeting to buy eight submachineguns of the Port Said type and thousands of rounds of ammunition and said that the first bullet fired from such a submachinegun would be aimed at al-Sadat's heart.

The third meeting included Shaykh Nabil and another person called al-Sayyid Mahmud al-Sayyid who were seen examining two submachineguns they had purchased.

At this point, the situation was assessed to determine whether it was best to continue the surveillance to discover new dimensions of this organization and its members. But it was decided to speedily arrest the organization elements for urgent considerations made obvious by the recordings, which showed the organization members' eagerness to acquire weapons at any price along with the weapons already in their possession; by the actions of the organization members, which were characterized by violence and rashness, especially their frank statements that the first bullet would be aimed at President al-Sadat; and by the timing of the request for more weapons, which came just prior to President al-Sadat's visit to al-Daqahliyah Governorate on 26 September 1981 and the subsequent convocation of the National Party congress on 28 September 1981.

The security agencies moved immediately, first arresting Nabil al-Maghribi and al-Sayyid Mahmud al-Sayyid while they were walking in a public street and carrying two submachineguns. The two tried to resist the security forces and al-Sayyid Mahmud attacked members of the force with a penknife he was carrying in the pocket of his jallabiyah, wounding some of the security men. The security men were compelled to fire at him to arrest him. A number of organization members were then arrested simultaneously, including Mahammad Husayn Ahmad, a driver; Fathi al-Sayyid Ibrahim, a machinist; and Mustafa 'Abd al-Latif, Khalid Ibrahim Suwaylim, Mustafa Mahrus Ahmad and Ahmad Gharib Mahmud.

A search of their dens, and the weapons and documents seized in them, confirmed the organization's terrorist activity and its scheme to assassinate President al-Sadat.

In the apartment in al-Jizah, a quantity of weapons and munitions, papers listing President al-Sadat's movements until 9 November 1981 and some photographs of a number of top officials were seized. It became known for the first time that this house belonged to 'Abbud al-Zummar.

In Zayn al-Din mosque in al-Haram, some clothes, including a soldier's uniform, were seized. Hasan 'Atif Ziyadah (M.A. in literature) was also arrested in an ambush laid for him at the mosque while he was carrying a suitcase containing a Port Said submachinegun, a pistol and a number of rounds.

Through the interrogation of Nabil al-Maghribi, all the dimensions, goals and schemes of the organization have become known. Al-Maghribi has said that he became acquainted with 'Abbud al-Zummar in 1979 and that they did not meet again until the beginning of this year when he visited 'Abbud at his home and discussed some religious matters with him. The meetings recurred, in the presence of Tariq al-Zummar, at regular intervals and the discussions centered on:

The need to rally the existing Islamic groups behind the idea of an armed jihad against the existing regime and of organizing a revolution similar to Khomeyni's revolution.

The need to train the right elements in these groups in the use of weapons in preparation for fighting the government to achieve this goal of revolution.

The need to establish the qualities of piety, obedience and discretion as the basis for selecting these elements.

Nabil al-Maghribi, 'Abbud al-Zummar and Tariq al-Zummar agreed to form an organization and divided the tasks and the roles among themselves, with 'Abbud taking charge of planning and armaments, Tariq taking charge of advocacy and member recruitment and Nabil carrying out whatever tasks were entrusted to him for gathering information on places and installations.

Nabil was also able to recruit some members, including al-Sayyid Mahmud Husayn and Hasan 'Atif Ziyadah, a graduate of the School of Arts. Tariq was able to recruit six persons and 'Atif was able to bring others into the group, including driver Muhammad Muhammad Husayn, with whom 'Atif had become acquainted while frequenting al-Tawhid mosque in al-Wayli.

President al-Sadat was familiarized at the time with all the details, along with a videotape exposing the dimensions of this organization.

The surprise that the terrorist organization had not expected was the arrest of large numbers of its members in the wave of the incidents in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' and issuance of the detention decisions in the sectarian sedition incidents. The organization members panicked and decided to speed up their plans to assassinate a number of political leaders, especially President al-Sadat, and to move immediately to create riots in various places to incite the masses against the regime. They

rushed the execution of their scheme and committed the biggest crime known to Egypt in assassinating President al-Sadat and then followed this crime with the Asyut incidents.

They had planned more terrorist operations in all parts of Egypt. They had also maintained surveillance of the State Security Investigations building in al-Jizah with the aim of occupying it and had watched the positioning of the central security vehicles in Cairo's streets and squares.

But God's care and the vigilance of the security men exposed their plotting and their moves, decisively destroying their schemes in Asyut and arresting Karam Zuhdi, the operation leader and the organization official in charge of Upper Egypt, and all of the elements participating with him and killing or wounding 22 organization members. The security men also obstructed their terrorist schemes in the other governorates. On the day of the late president's funeral, the security men foiled the feverish efforts of organization members to make preparations for blowing up the State Security Investigations building in al-Jizah, which was to be carried out on the day of the referendum on the presidency. The actions were foiled when 'Abbud al-Zummar and three others were arrested while hiding in one of their dens in al-Jizah with large quantities of weapons and explosives in their possession. It has been proven that 'Abbud has a close relationship with Khalid al-Islambuli who led the operation to assassinate the president. Their dens then began to be exposed and members of the organization began to fall one after the other. The number of terrorists being interrogated at present has reached 256.

8494
CSO: 4504/60

BRIEF

STUDENT LOANS--It has been decided to allocate 1,750,000 pounds this year for loans to 62,000 male and female students of universities and higher institutes. Disbursement will be at the rate of 25 pounds per student at the theoretical colleges and 30 pounds per student at the applied colleges, with a maximum of 100 pounds in emergency cases. Coordination will be established with the Social Solidarity Fund for University Students to prevent dual disbursement, except in cases of utmost necessity requiring such dual disbursement. The Nasir Social Bank held a meeting attended by university vice presidents, university secretaries, the first undersecretary of the Ministry of Social Insurance and officials of Nasir Bank. It was agreed at the meeting to distribute the 1981-82 appropriation for university student loans, amounting to 1.75 million pounds, in the following manner: 200,000 pounds for Cairo University, 170,000 pounds for 'Ayn Shams University, 160,000 pounds for Alexandria University, 127,500 pounds for Asyut University, 220,000 pounds for al-Azhar University, 99,500 pounds for Tanta University, 114,500 for al-Mansurah University, 113,000 pounds for al-Zaqaziq University, 25,000 pounds for the Canal University, 110,500 pounds for Hulwan University, 44,500 pounds for Banha University, 77,000 pounds for al-Minufiyah University, 47,500 pounds for al-Minya University, 64,000 for private higher institutes, 131,535 pounds for the trade and industrial technical institutes, 22,748 pounds for private institutes, 12,686 pounds for the health institutes and 950 pounds for the Academy of Arts. Each university will divide its share among its colleges and will notify the Nasir Social Bank of the divided sums within a maximum of 10 days so that loan disbursement may start by the bank branches closest to the colleges or by a (mobile) bank. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 26 Oct 81 p 8] 8494

ASSISTANT MINISTERS OF INTERIOR--AL-MUSAWWAR has learned that a decree will be issued in the next few days appointing three first assistant ministers of the interior, namely: Mag Gen 'Abd al-Wadud Ayyub, Maj Gen Faruq al-Habashi and Maj Gen Ahmad Rushdi. A decree will also be issued appointing Maj Gen Sami Sa'd, Maj Gen Husayn Kamil Zaki and Maj Gen 'Abd al-Mun'im Jabir as assistant ministers of the interior. [Text] [Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic No 2976, 23 Oct 81 p 11] 8494

STATE SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS CHIEF--Maj Gen Hasan Abu Basha, first assistant minister of the interior, has taken charge of State Security Investigations. Maj Gen 'Ulaywah Zahir, former director of State Security Investigations, has been transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [Text] [Cairo UKTUBAR in Arabic No 261, 25 Oct 81 p 3] 8494

JIHAN AL-SADAT'S LECTURES--Mrs Jihan al-Sadat has asked to be excused from giving her lectures this week to the freshman and sophomore students of the Arab language section of the Cairo School of Arts. Mrs al-Sadat teaches Arabic language and literature to the German section students. [Text] [Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 26 Oct 81 p 7] 8494

CSO: 4504/64

BRIEFS

COMMUNIST CADREMEN APPEAR--A number of Bulgarian pilots have appeared in certain units of the Iranian Army and Iranian Air Force where they are engaged in training their counterparts. Furthermore, some advisers from the German Democratic Republic are now serving as cadremen in certain Iranian artillery units. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 7 Dec 81 p 75]

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END

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Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2461

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2461

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ARABS INVEST IN HONG KONG, SINGAPORE

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 235, 22 Aug 81 p 52

[Article: "Asiadollar Market Promises Large-Scale Operations, Stock Markets Await Funds for a New Take-Off; Hong Kong and Singapore Await Arab Capital"]

[Text] From Europe to America to Japan, and from Japan to Hong Kong and Singapore, observers have begun to talk about Arab capital assuming its full role in the Far Eastern states.

Arab capital has begun pouring into the states of this region, which have been experiencing a phase of new expansion and growth for some time. This new phase started with the liberalization of regulations and opening of markets in the region to foreign organizations and sources of capital, which responded to this liberalization and initiated an influx of capital, offices, and organizations.

The influx of Arab capital and organizations into the states of this region is a response to two factors:

--The first pertains to the region itself, which is among the most promising areas in the world in terms of growth and profits and among the most moderate in terms of inflation rates while investors in the region may operate with complete freedom.

--The second factor pertains to Arab sources of capital, which are investigating all fields that offer investment diversification and allow investments to be spread among many baskets--that is, among a number of sectors and countries.

Up to now, Arab capital and organizations have channeled their activity into the following areas:

1. Banking activity, with the aim of initiating direct participation and profiting from development of the market in "Asiadollar" loans. This market has been a very active one thus far--loans in the market totaled around $60 billion in 1980--and holds much promise for the future.

Arab banks that have obtained licenses to operate in the Asiadollar markets include Abu Dhabi National Bank, the Union of Arab-French Banks [UBAF] and Kuwait National Bank. Abu Dhabi National Bank and UBAF initiated operations in the Far

East in offices and branches of the Asian Kuwaiti Bank (Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore). Kuwait National Bank has established a representative office in advance of the establishment of private branches at the appropriate time.

Other banks are presently waiting to obtain licenses to establish offices and branches. These include the International Afro-Arab Bank, the International Gulf Bank, and the Arab Banking Organization.

2. The second area is activity in the stock exchanges in the countries of the region--particularly the Singapore and Hong Kong exchanges, which have experienced tremendous growth spurts in the last 3 years.

In the Hong Kong exchange, the index of prices quadrupled between 1 January 1978 and June 1981. The index has risen more than 10 times in comparison to 1975 prices.

The Singapore market has achieved increases of three times and six times during the same two periods. This performance is unmatched by any of the stock exchanges among the industrial states which are more firmly entrenched in the sectors of industry, production, and finance.

While these two exchanges have suffered from a certain amount of stagnation (and even some backward movement) for several weeks, both of them possess the potential for a new take-off. According to Pierre Pallas (an official with SICAV [Variable-Capital Investment Co.]-Pacific Saint Honoria, a joint investment fund specializing in this area), this potential is demonstrated by the ability of these two exchanges to overcome all negative reports.

Therefore, the reports about the influx of Arab dollars into these exchanges point to the beginning of a corresponding new boom. This boom will inevitably be an extensive one in view of the relatively limited volume of both exchanges, with stock investment for 1980 amounted to only $20 billion in Singapore and $30 billion in Hong Kong. While these figures exceed stock investment in the Paris exchange, they represent only one-fifteenth in the case of Singapore and one-tenth in the case of Hong Kong of stock investment on the Tokyo exchange, which has benefited from the influx of Arab capital despite its large size.

The stocks awaiting the Arabs in the Hong Kong stock exchange range from shares in banking companies and investment companies to stocks of real estate companies. Industrial companies there are still owned by a small number of individuals who rarely make stock offerings or open their doors to the public. In Singapore, however, the field of choice is wider both with regard to the number of companies whose shares are offered for circulation and with regard to the variety of sectors available. These include the industrial sector with shipbuilding companies, sugar refining companies, and companies involved in minerals processing and exploitation.

3. The third area that attracts Arab capital to these countries is direct participation in the establishment of joint investment companies engaged in diversified activities. Such activities include the petroleum complex construction project being handled by Kuwaiti sources of capital and local governmental and private sources of capital in Singapore.

8591
CSO: 4404/60

ARAB INVESTMENTS INCREASE ON COTE D'AZUR

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 236, 29 Aug 81 p 51

[Article: "Foreigners Back Off on Purchases on Cote d'Azur While the Arabs Advance; Because of the Arabs (Naturally), the Cost of Floorspace on Cote d'Azur Has Risen to $4,000 per Square Meter"]

[Text] "Had it not been for Arab clients and buyers, we would have been unable to maintain the volume of our activities at a reasonable level after 10 May."

This comment was made by one of the officials in charge of a large real estate project on Cote d'Azur on the French coast of the Mediterranean called (Marina Ile Des Anges) in the town of Villeneuve-Loubet. The meaning of this remark is that the willingness of Arab customers to purchase apartments in the real estate projects in the area has been the source that has allowed them to maintain a relatively reasonable scale of activities following the success of the socialists--in the person of Francois Mitterrand--in the presidential elections of 10 May and the ensuing developments within the government in France. These developments led to a decline in the level of purchases by foreigners in general in real estate projects in the area.

Observers of the real estate market in the Cote d'Azur area are in agreement on the clear and definite role that the success of the socialists in the government and the participation of the communists with them have played in the decline in apartment buying by non-French. However, these observers differ somewhat in another area. One group sees the socialist victory as the sole reason for the decline while another group sees additional reasons including rising prices, the scarcity of new projects of first-rate quality, as well as the taxation measures adopted by the former government headed by Raymond Barre. These measures made foreigners as well as Frenchmen subject to taxes on profits resulting from added value and raised taxes on foreign companies that own real estate projects.

Those who cite the last reasons in addition to the first reason based on the change in the identity of the French government as the causes behind the decline in purchases in Cote d'Azur apartment houses by foreigners refer to a specialized magazine called THE COTE D'AZUR REAL ESTATE OBSERVER. This magazine published a study revealing that purchases by foreigners in the "Alps-Maritime" district dropped from 14 percent of all purchases in the district in 1979 to 9 percent in 1980. Thus, according to the study, this decline in activity after May 1981 is

similar to the decline that occurred in the first months of 1981 prior to May and its elections and is an extension of the same trend that began in 1980 when neither d'Estaing's defeat nor Mitterrand's victory were anticipated.

Of course, these observers do not deny the role played by the recent outcome of the French presidential elections in broadening the decline. In fact, while giving this role the natural proportions it deserves without exaggeration, they point to it as a cause not only of the decline in the willingness of foreigners to make real estate purchases in the Cote d'Azur region but also of a trend on the part of some of these foreigners--perhaps for the first time to any substantial degree--toward putting their property up for sale. Perhaps they aim to recover their capital and take their profits, fearing inflation, a new decline in the exchange rate of the French franc, or new taxes that could be imposed on apartment projects by the socialists. Alternately, perhaps they are merely responding to a new trend that has begun to prevail among foreign investors throughout Europe, namely, a move toward investments in the United States, which remains the last bastion of economic liberalism and stable legislation protecting capital and private investments.

The foreigners who are least willing to purchase on Cote d'Azur today are the English and the Germans, two groups which were nearly the largest purchasers there until just recently.

According to a report of the French weekly magazine L'EXPRES concerning a Mr (Zeigenfutter) (a German lawyer registered with the lawyers union in the town of Nice who is one of a group of foreign lawyers who serve foreign investors interested in Cote d'Azur), the telexes he is receiving from clients in Frankfurt, Munich, and Hamburg all repeat a single phrase beginning with the words "please cancel" followed by references to initial purchase agreements or orders that the clients had sent some time before.

As for the English, while their movement away from Cote d'Azur purchases is clear, it is relatively less strong than that of the Germans. The reason for this, according to Robert Floyd, an English broker in the real estate market in the town of Cannes, relates to the free market policy taken by the Thatcher government and the ensuing movements of assets that had been buried in Britain and began moving abroad at an increasing rate because of the rapid rise in the exchange rate of the pound sterling with respect to the French franc.

The English make no secret of another reason for continuing their shift of investments into real estate on Cote d'Azur--or at least not completely backing off from this option as the Germans have done. This reason is that if the socialists in France have come to the threshold of power, the Labor Party is not far from it in England.

Nevertheless, the relative withdrawal of the English from the real estate market on Cote d'Azur is not the main source of concern plaguing some projects which until just yesterday were living--almost flourishing--on the money of foreigners. The major source of concern is that the day will come when the Arabs will leave the ranks of those who continue to buy, as they do today, and join those who are backing off from making purchases--such as the Germans--and those who are putting their current property up for sale, as some of the Germans are doing.

The fear on the part of the French concerned in these projects that the trend away from the projects will ultimately affect the Arabs is not solely attributable to the relative volume of the Arab assets flowing into these projects. Another key factor is the willingness of the Arabs who hold these assets to pay the prices asked for the most expensive apartments, which in Cannes have reached as high as 25,000 francs, or over $4,150, per square meter of floorspace.

The reasons for some of this fear began to be perceived in the absence of deals in excess of 10 million francs. While it is true that this absence is due to the state of saturation that prevails in the market, which has attracted most of the shaykhs, amirs, and super-rich over the past 5 years, still the market has now begun to miss all but rarely the 3-million-franc deals--transactions which are insufficient to give the market the charge it needs for a new boom or the desired growth and expansion.

8591
CSO: 4404/60

UAE EASES SUDANESE LABOR GUIDELINES

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 21 Nov 81 p 7

[Text]

KHARTOUM, Nov. 20 (KUNA): The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Sudanese Republic agreed here last night to set new rules for employment of Sudanese workers in the implementation of UAE development projects and other schemes.

According to an agreement concluded by the two ministers of labour, a system of simplified procedure will be introduced to facilitate the travel of those workers to the UAE.

The agreement also stipulates the exchange of expertise and coordination in planning for manpower needs of the two Arab states.

According to the agreement Sudanese workers in the UAE will be entitled to transfer to Sudan all bonafide earnings and can change employers on amicable terms.

The agreement will run for a period of four years and is automatically renewable for a similar period unless either side demands its termination.

"We have discussed means of strengthening cooperation in fields of manpower resources and reviewed future plans," UAE Labour and Social Affairs Minister Seif Al-Jarwan said following the signing of the agreement with his Sudanese counterpart Hayder Kabsoun.

CSO: 4400/83

THREATS FACING OPEC DISCUSSED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 199, 14 Sep 81 pp 28-29

[Interview with Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, Iraq's oil minister, in Baghdad, by 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi: "OPEC Faces the Danger of Being Torn Apart!"; date of interview not given]

[Text] "If the Arabs' oil were in our hands, the world would be aware of us." This opinion was expressed by Moshe Dayan when he was talking about the effective weapon of the Arabs which was not being used. This expression was also made by Mr Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, Iraq's oil minister, when he was talking about the role of the Arabs' oil. The Iraqi minister asked: "Have the Arabs achieved even their most basic rights by using this strategic weapon? What is OPEC's future? Has the oil market changed from being a buyers' market to being a sellers' market?"

[Question] What has been the respective role of the OPEC countries, large oil companies, and strategic oil reserves of the Western governments in creating the present world oil glut?

[Answer] We are constantly appealing for organization and planning of production. I do not mean programming of production, because the word "programming" scares some countries. Planning is something which is necessary in order to confront the challenges which the International Energy Agency--the strong cartel--is attempting to impose on us. But after OPEC managed to seize the reins of initiative and appropriate for itself the right to set and control the pricing policy, it [the International Energy Agency] has attempted to create, through this bloc and organization, a process of confrontation and hostility. It says that oil is a strategic material which is depletable and not renewable, whereas we are responsible for responding to the actual consumption--"the actual needs"--of the international oil market. This has been a great favor to the consumers.

OPEC is responsible for meeting countries' needs, but some countries are producing more than they need to. This is a sacrifice and means exhaustion of resources. But if I produce more than the world market requires and do damage to myself and exhaust this resource, this is an unreasonable thing to do. We should not permit the industrial countries and large consumers to undertake long-range storage of oil. Such storage of oil is not justified, and it involves very high storage costs. However, this action is based on a political objective which aims at applying as much pressure as possible in order to destroy OPEC.

Faced with this situation of long-range strategic storage of oil reserves, OPEC needs to have an emergency plan available. More than once Iraq has submitted a working paper [dealing with this problem] and many proposals have been made to deal with any storage of oil reserves which would serve to impair the future of OPEC. But OPEC has no emergency plan, planning, programming, or control of production. Naturally the industrial countries aim to diminish the importance of OPEC and consequently are attempting to deal it with the death blow in order to destroy the price structure and go back once again to the situation where they were in control of the future of this important resource.

[Question] What is the reason for the oil glut?

[Answer] It is a result of a decrease in consumption, large-scale storage of oil reserves, and alternative [supplies of oil] from oil-producing nations which are not members of OPEC. These alternative [oil supplies] partially contributed toward the creation of this glut, but they were not the main cause. Another factor is the economic recession. This is characteristic of capitalist systems. Every now and then, in a given space of years, a [capitalist] country goes through a period of recession until that country's economic situation regains its health and vitality. We believe that the present oil glut is temporary, and will last perhaps for 1 year. After that there will be a return to the situation where our influence prevails if we follow an intelligent policy in controlling production and in not giving the large countries the opportunity to undertake the storage of oil reserves. Storage of oil reserves takes place when there is a glut and high production. But when there is production planning, this prevents the large consumer nations from engaging in the process of storing oil reserves and from emerging as a force which influences production.

[Question] Has the present oil glut definitely changed the world oil market from being a sellers' market to being a buyers' market? In other words, have we once again ended up in the situation which we were in before 1972 when the world oil market was a buyers' market?

[Answer] This is a temporary phase. Oil is not a temporary commodity, nor is it a commodity which is created by capital, the labor force, or by anything else. It is a commodity which is different in its nature, influence, and importance. The matter is in our hands since we are the producers, and it is in our hands alone. We could make the market a sellers' market by controlling consumption, exercising influence over the control of production, and adopting a pricing policy which would take into consideration both the interests of the producers and the interests of the consumers. Right now the oil market is considered to be a buyers' market. But the matter is in our hands. We can eliminate the oil glut and have control of oil returned to the hands of those to whom the oil belongs, and we can have the market become a sellers' market rather than a buyers' market.

[Question] In your opinion, how long will OPEC continue to play the supplementary role of responding to the pteroleum needs of the industrial nations?

[Answer] We are depending on oil not remaining a commodity, but rather on being one of the sources of energy, and on oil having a large share in the field of energy. We consider the consumption of oil as energy to be a great squandering of this depletable resource and to be something which is detrimental to future generations as well as to scientific and technical progress in the whole world.

We wish that alternative [sources of energy] would achieve the level that oil has achieved as a source of energy. But we wish to see oil utilized--and set aside only for noble uses--as a raw material in the manufacture of petrochemicals and fertilizers. The world will soon be faced with a food supply problem. Oil is able to play a great role in providing for a secure food supply by means of its being used as a raw material in the manufacture of fertilizers.

The future of OPEC is an extremely serious matter. If we do not take steps to prevent it, OPEC will be confronted by the danger of being torn apart and splitting up. Right now OPEC faces a critical test and historical turning point which might lead to the destruction of the organization--which is considered to be the spearhead in the struggle to achieve a new world economic order which would bring about justice and equality and give the developing countries the opportunity to grow and achieve progress.

[Question] Approximately how much is the OPEC countries' oil production in excess of their financial needs? Is this quantity equal to, more than, or less than the excess of supply over demand in the world oil market?

[Answer] In the market right now there are approximately 3 to 4 million barrels of oil which are in excess of the needs of the world market. There are nations which produce much more than they need to, there are some nations which produce three times as much as they need to, and the majority of nations right now are [being forced] to product less than they need to--because of the present oil glut.

[Question] How much is the aid and assistnace which the OPEC nations give to the other developing nations affected by the continuation of the present oil glut?

[Answer] We bear the responsibility of supporting the poor developing nations which do not have sources of income and which are trying to decrease the rate of inflation which is being exported to them by the industrial nations. But when the majority of producers start producing in accordance with the minimum, which is insufficient to meet actual needs, certainly this will have a negative effect on the amount of aid provided to the developing nations, and the poor developing nations will be harmed by the oil glut, the irrational policy followed, and the unjust gap between the share of each member of OPEC in the oil market.

When I cannot market 1 million barrels [per day] and I need [to market] 2 million [barrels per day], how can I aid others when I myself am undergoing a crisis?

[Question] The continual rise in the rate of inflation and the constant ups-and-downs in currency exchange rates are both becoming more and more a tool in the hands of the large monopolies to redistribute the world's income at the expense of the developing countries. In your opinion, what is the price per barrel ofoil which would maintain, for the OPEC countries, purchasing power for the revenues which they receive for their oil exports?

[Answer] We do not have any problem marketing what we are allowed to produce in excess of the average amount. But for the sake of maintaining the unity of OPEC, Iraq is prepared to lose a dollar or to go down to the price of $35 per barrels. This is why we are suggesting this figure at a time when we are not having any problem. It is not a matter of $34, $36, or $40 per barrel, nor is it a matter of whims. Right now if we wanted to take into consideration the inflation, in general,

which is being exported to us, and the losses which we have been suffering as a result of the decline of the dollar, until the dollar settles at a certain level, we would certainly find that the price of oil [should be] more than $36 per barrel.

But if we also wanted to take into consideration the policy of discrimination which the industrial nations have been following with respect to the OPEC nations, then the price of oil should certainly be much more than $40 per barrel. You know very well that if the normal price of a commodity which we buy from the West is $5, it becomes $10 when the Western countries find out that the buyer is one of the OPEC countries. This is a vicious policy of discrimination. The inflation which is exported to the oil-producing nations is much higher than the inflation exported to the non-oil-producing nations. In any case, we have not yet arrived at the actual value of oil as a source of energy. But if we want to take into consideration the value of oil as a raw material in the manufacture of petrochemicals, [we should realize that] a barrel of oil which has been converted into petrochemicals is worth 50 times it original value.

The revenue received for a barrel of oil which has been converted into petrochemicals is, right now, no less than $2,000.

When I take this barrel of oil out of the ground, I should be compensated in terms of capital accumulation for what has been lost in the ground. So far oil prices have been below the actual value of this resource. If we take into consideration inflation and the decline of the dollar, the losses which have been suffered by the oil-producing nations have been $242 billion alone because of the decline of the dollar. A nation has the right to sell at the price that it wants to. But it does not have the right to go down to the minimum price. If OPEC wants to maintain its international future with regard to supporting the developing nations, then [it should know that] any separatist or individualist position [taken by individual members of OPEC] will lead to the destruction of OPEC. Those members of OPEC who have stood against the majority consensus need to reexamine the matter of prices, bearing in mind the preservation of OPEC's unity and the future of the developing nations. Oil, like blood, flows in the veins and arteries of the world. The Arabs are not the only ones concerned about this important economic circulation system. But if the oil-producing nations' power of influence is snatched away from them, this will represent a golden opportunity for the oil monopolies to pressure the OPEC nations. It also would represent the loss of a golden opportunity, as far as the oil-producing nations are concerned, to achieve the aspirations of the developing nations.

The oil glut which one OPEC nation has forced on the world has been imposed from outside OPEC.

[Quextion] What is Iran's volume of oil production, and what has been the effect of the decrease in oil prices on its [oil] exports and on the manner in which Iran sells its oil?

[Answer] Iran's volume of oil production is 800,000 barrels [per day], and Iran sells its oil by means of bartering. What this means is that they do not know at what price they are selling the oil. This tends to destroy the price structure.

Of course, the greatest achievement which OPEC has accomplished in its struggle has been that of taking the oil pricing policy initiaitve away fro mthe grasp of the oil companies and the consequent elimination of posted prices and reliance upon official prices as the basis of contracts. The elimination of this achievement would be something of tremendous significance to those who are trying to destroy OPEC.

[Question] Does the oil glut tend to play a role in prolonging the war between Iraq and Iran?

[Answer] The fact is that if it were not for the oil glut--the aim of which perhaps is to prolong the war--this war would have already come to an end. This is within the scope of the plan which is attempting to undermine the will power, strngth, and efforts of the Arabs, and is attempting to preoccupy many parties, including Iraq itself--which is the center of power relied upon in the battle against the Zionist enemy. Iraq's resistance to the Iranian enemy--with all of the advanced weapons which Iran has--affirms the fact that Iraq, with its capabilities, is capable of facing Zionist challenges with conventional weapons. The reason I am saying this is that the weapons which Iran has are the same weapons which Israel has. In fact, Iran is better armed than is the Zionist enemy.

Let me emphasize that the oil weapon should be unsheathed in the faces of our enemies and should constitute a guarantee for us to regain our rights and protect ourselves.

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YAMANI EMPHASIZES NEED FOR STRONGER OPEC

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 199, 14 Sep 81 pp 30-31

[Interview with Shaykh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, in Geneva, by Kibah Shaykh al-Ard: "OPEC Was Created in Order To Stay"; date of interview not given]

[Text] The OPEC meeting which was held last May ended in disaster, as some pessimists are saying. It ended with the postponement of [seeking solutions for] deep-seated differences concerning rates of oil production and determination of oil prices till the next conference which will be held in Abu Dhabi. What is the background of this stormy meeting [which was recently held]?

[Question] What are Shaykh Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani's impressions about OPEC's latest meeting in Geneva?

[Answer] I was told, before we came to Geneva, that an agreement was about to be reached and that the member states of OPEC were ready to accept the price of $34 per barrel as a limit--the limit which was accepted here in Geneva last May. It was on the basis of this that we came to this consultative meeting. But, unfortunately, this did not happen. At the meeting haggling went on to raise the benchmark price from $34 a barrel to a higher price. But the average price in the market today is about $34 per barrel. Raising the price higher than that means raising the prices of oil, and this is something which we do not want. Actually we are very content with the price of $32 per barrel, and we think that we should keep this price as the limit. Nevertheless, we accepted the price of $34 a barrel in order to reach a compromise. But, if we have another meeting, I do not believe that we will raise the price to $34 per barrel. We want to maintain a price level of $32 per barrel till the end of 1982.

[Question] How will this sharp decision affect OPEC?

[Answer] I am expressing the feelings of Saudi Arabia when I say that OPEC not only serves the interests of Saudi Arabia and its member states, but also serves the interests of the entire world. It is in the interest of the international community to have a strong OPEC. Saudi Arabia will certainly make the greatest possible effort to strengthen and consolidate OPEC. Even though some difficulties exist, this will not be as harmful to OPEC as some people and some governments would wish it to be. Everyone should realize that OPEC was created in order to stay. In order to show its good will, Saudi Arabia has decided to lower the level of its

production by 1 million barrels [per day] during the current month of September. Our ARAMCO production this month will be 9 million [barrels a day] rather than 10 million or more. Of course, the Neutral Zone will continue with its present production as far as both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are concerned. Saudi production [figures] will be released at the end of each month. This means that October's production will be released at the end of October. But the decision to decrease production is limited to September's production, which will be sold at $32 per barrel. We will decide from month to month concerning our situation.

[Question] After September, will you take still another step in order to demonstrate your good will?

[Answer] No, I am not saying that we will.

[Qeustion] You, then, will not accept an increase in price to $34 per barrel at the end of 1982. But is it possible that production will increase instead of decreasing?

[Answer] Everything is possible.

[Question] What is the benefit in telling people, at the end of the month, what the production of the preceding month has been?

[Answer] This is what we used to do in the past. We are only resuming our former good habits.

[Question] Was the price freeze and decrease in production a type of compromise?

[Answer] We did not reach agreement. There has always been a lack of agreement. We have not enjoyed a uniform price system for more than 2 years. It will not hurt us if this continues for another half year or thereabouts.

[Question] Is it true that the decision which you have made to decrease production by 1 million barrels per day was taken in order to prevent prices from declining between now and September?

[Answer] What I am interested in is $32 per barrel. I will hold to this price. I am not interested in any price which is higher than $32 per barrel.

[Question] During the upcoming meeting in Abu Dhabi, will the price of $32 per barrel be the only minimum [as published] which can be accepted in view of the actual situation?

[Answer] Anything is possible from now on.

[Question] Do you believe that decreasing Saudi production will contribute toward the reaching of an agreement during OPEC's next meeting in Abu Dhabi?

[Answer] No, this was not the intention. The Abu Dhabi meeting is still a long way away. Before that date many things will happen. However, we have taken this step in order to demonstrate our good intentions and feelings and in order to show our colleagues that the problems are actually greater than they have expected.

[Question] Has the news concerning the oil deal made between the U.S. and Mexico had an effect on your deliberations?

[Answer] A deal between one government and another concerning Mexican oil is like a drop in the ocean in comparison with the quantitites of oil which we are talking about. It has no effect on the market.

[Question] Can you also assert that the agreement made between Texaco and (City Services) for the former to supply Saudi oil to the latter for a period of 18 months represents a "drop in the ocean"?

[Answer] I have not heard about this agreement.

[Question] On the basis of what analysis did you decide to decrease production by a million barrels [per day]?

[Answer] I have said that this is a gesture of good will. When a person makes a gesture of good will, he does not analyze or go to a computer.

[Question] Have you informed your colleagues, the other ministers of oil, that you are going to decrease production by 1 million barrels per day?

[Answer] When we failed to reach an agreement, I informed them that I was going to decrease my production. But I did not inform them how much the decrease would be. But they will find out right now because right now I am mentioning the figure for the first time.

[Question] It is said that you have encountered difficulties in selling 10 million barrels per day and that this is the reason why you today have decided to decrease production. Is this true?

[Answer] Difficulties in selling the oil when the price is $32 per barrel? No sir! We could raise production to 11 million barrels a day.

[Question] Could one say that political pressure was put on Saudi Arabia, by means of getting in touch with the king, to have Saudi Arabia take a more flexible position?

[Answer] I do not deny the possibility of this. However, our position has been clear from the beginning. And I believe that political pressure is of no use.

[Question] Will a link be made between the level of your prices or the quantity of your production and whether or not the U.S. sells the AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] No. I have already said that the problem so far is an economic one.

[Question] At the last OPEC meeting the representative of Iran said that the differences [among the members of OPEC] have become of a political rather than an economic nature. Is this true?

[Answer] Yes. A debate took place which was, unfortunately, political--if I may use that expression. But if we speak objectively, not taking any political background into consideration, then I say that the price should be $32 per barrel and no more.

[Question] Could you tell us what the elements of the political problem were?

[Answer] I am not a politician and cannot specify these elements. But it appears that lowering prices is an extremely difficult matter. Take, for example, what happened once in Mexico. I do not know anybody who wants to repeat that experience.

[Question] Have political factors come to the point where they are something which dominate OPEC? Does it not, to some degree, constitute political concessions when the other nations are forced to lower their prices in order to conform to the Saudi price?

[Answer] This is a matter which must be left up to each country to interpret individually. As far as I am concerned, I do not see this as being concessions. I believe that when a person is confronted with economic facts, he has no choice but to deal with them. All important international organizations in the world raise and lower their prices in accordance with changes in economic realities without feeling that this represents some sort of humiliation.

[Question] You have said that you do not wish to blame any delegation for this meeting's failure. However, some of the delegations blame you for this. How do you respond to this?

[Answer] I do not wish to defend myself, nor do I need to do so. It is quite clear that I am not the one who has done this. The truth will be known fully some day, even though only half of it is known today.

[Question] For a long time you have been allied with Venezuela. Were you surprised when Venezuela refused to lower its price below $36 per barrel?

[Answer] Its position does not mean that we are no longer allies. But I really was somewhat surprised. Our figures indicate that the price of oil in Venezuela is actually $35 per barrel. Furthermore, half, or about half, of Venezuela's exports [of oil] are sold at very low price levels. If we take the net figure, I believe that the price of Venezuelan oil is much less than $35 per barrel. This can be confirmed by any economist who specializes in oil affairs. For this reason, it is likely that Venezuela's inability to lower its price is due to political reasons rather than economic reasons. I have said that I do not know very much about Venezuela's internal politics, and for that reason I cannot pass judgment concerning this matter. Venezuela's position did surprise me. But Venezuela, on the other hand, was a founding member of OPEC and has done a lot for the organization in the past. And I believe that Venezuela is still doing a lot today to support OPEC.

[Question] The Iranian oil minister has said that Iran, if it wanted to, could produce 8 million barrels a day during peacetime, but that it would not do this. Do you think that this is a realistic figure? Is it possible?

[Answer] (Mr Yamani smiles and makes no comment.)

[Question] This is what he said, and I am now waiting for your answer!

[Answer] In spite of the little information that I have about Iran and its oil wells, I know that the most that Iran was able to produce during the reign of the shah was 6 million barrels a day. Iran was forced to decrease its production because of technical factors. A dispute arose among technicians concerning the necessity to lower the production to 4 million barrels a day because this was a better production level. But the shah wanted to produce 5 million barrels a day instead of 4 million. Then the Iranian "revolution" occurred, the shah was expelled, and then he died. Today we do not know what the present condition of the oil wells is.

[Question] Was the matter of differences in prices one of the problems brought up for discussion at the recent OPEC meeting?

[Answer] Yes. This was an important problem, especially for North Africa. Nigeria felt that the differences in prices should not be more than $2.5 per barrel. Perhaps it was prepared to increase the price [difference] to about $3 per barrel. (This means $3 above the new index price, if it were agreed upon to take into consideration the difference in type of oil.) But the Algerians felt that the price difference should be at least $4 per barrel and they wanted it to be $4.5 per barrel.

[Question] There is no doubt that the step taken by Saudi Arabia to reduce its production is a moral step in that it is an expression of good intentions. But if Saudi Arabia, for the first time as far as I know, has begun to make a link between quantity of production and level of prices, will Saudi Arabia from now on continue to maintain this link which has been established?

[Answer] What do you mean by establishing a link between amount of production and level of prices?

[Question] You are discussing both production and prices, whereas before you used to take the position that production is a matter which has to do with the sovereignty of each country. But now you are taking this important step of reducing production within the framework of discussing the achievement of uniform prices.

[Answer] No! I merely informed them of what we had decided. I did not reach an agreement with anybody about this.

[Question] People have accused Saudi Arabia of creating the excess of oil production on purpose, or they have said that it was the result of Saudi Arabia taking the position which it did with regard to production last May.

[Answer] I think that we are through with this matter now. We are no longer engaging in a dialogue with our friends. They now know the "realities of the market." I believe that the decline in demand due to the price of oil is a principal cause which we must deal with. The reason is not the level of Saudi production. We could eliminate this oil glut if we greatly lowered our production, but we will not embark upon this step.

[Question] Will the lowering of Saudi production lead to eliminating, or at least to curtailing, the oil glut in the international market?

[Answer] No sir! A million barrels per day will not eliminate the glut. I believe that the oil companies, as long as they do not expect an increase in oil prices, will not resort to storage of oil. Perhaps we will see some decrease in the amount of oil stored (in the world), and this will then constitute additional oil supplies which will come into the market and contribute toward increasing the glut rather than decreasing it.

[Question] If an agreement could be reached between you, would you either right now or this week announce a great decrease in quantity of production?

[Answer] If an agreement were reached, we would not greatly reduce our production level in Saudi Arabia. This would not happen by virtue of Saudi Arabia taking such a decision, but rather by virtue of the forces which influence the marketplace.

[Question] Even [if production went down] to the level of 7 million barrels per day, as some people have quoted you as saying?

[Answer] This, as you know, depends on the level of production in other countries, especially when the Iraqi-Iranian war ends.

[Question] Ideally speaking, in order to eliminate the oil glut, what should be OPEC's production from now till the end of the year?

[Answer] In order to eliminate the oil glut, oil prices should ideally be $28 per barrel. This is true! If I wanted to apply the ideal formula which I have been talking about for a long time, my price in relation to January 1974 should be $28 per barrel today.

[Question] Down to what level will this price help to bring production?

[Answer] It will not bring it down. It will only increase the demand for production.

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FOREIGN BANKS SEEK MERGERS

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 2 Dec 81 p 2

[Text] The tendency to convert the Egyptian branches of foreign banks into joint banks is a mat[illegible] controversy which currently preoccupies both Egyptian and foreign bankers.

Egyptian banking circles consider the tendency as dangerous because it might expose the Egyptian money market to serious loss by depriving it of the advantages secured by foreign banks particularly in view of the fact that eight foreign banks have already submitted requests to convert into joint banks.

The tendency began when the Deputy Prime Minister for Financil and Economic Affairs, Dr Abdul Razzak Abdul Meguid gave the idea the green light late last year. At that time, the Investment Authority approved the convert of three foreign banks into joint banks.

The three banks were the Credit and Trade Bank, which has already converted itself into an Egyptian joint company. The second was Citibank, which voiced its objection to the suggested formula, and the third was the International Arab-African Bank whose Kuwaiti President, Mr Ibrahim al-Ibrahim, said that they wanted a branch of their bank in Egypt to deal in Egyptian and foreign currencies. "We did not ask to merge our bank into an Egyptian corporation" he said.

Mr Al-Ibrahim also said that the International Arab-African Bank has a special status as it had been incorporated by agreement between the governments of Egypt, Kuwait, Iraq Abu Dhabi, Jordan and Algeria. "Accordingly" he continued, "It is only governments of such countries that have the right to change the status of a bank" Mr Al-Ibrahim said.

An easing of this tendency was noted early this year, only to be aroused by the government's decision to reorganise import policy, and Egyptian banks were given the exclusive right to open documentary credits for imports of foodstuffs and intermediary goods while the third category of imports, namely luxury goods, was left for Egyptian, joint and foreign banks to compete in.

When foreign banks complained of the diminishing market, Dr Abdul Meguid advised them to convert themselves into joint banks. Eight of them already submitted requests for this purpose and so the controversy continued.

CSO: 4500/73

ASSEMBLY ALTERS RESTRICTED WORKING HOURS

Cairo THE EGYPTIAN GAZETTE in English 7 Dec 81 p 2

[Text] THE controversial issue of restricted working hours for artisans and shops in Greater Cairo was settled at the People's Assembly yesterday when the First Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Fuad Mohieddin, announced that the Government approved their amendment in compliance with proposals by some members.

Closing time, according to Dr Mohieddin, will be at 7 p.m. instead of 6 p.m. except Thursdays when closing time will be extended to 8 p.m. Opening time will remain as set at 10 a.m. in winter as before.

The new working hours for artisans and shops in Greater Cairo was introduced last November for a test period of 4 years with room for amendments if found necessary. The system originally stipulated opening time as 10 a.m. and closing time 6 p.m. in winter and 7 p.m in summer.

Dr Mohieddin said that the Government approved retention of the present opening time in winter for artisans and commercial shops as proposed by the members of the People's Assembly.

He added that the Greater Cairo Governorates of Cairo Giza and Calubia would have to find another day in the week apart from Thursday to extend working hours for shops to 8 p.m Monday was proposed as a substitute.

Dr Mohieddin said that the new working system had contributed to a surplus of L.E. 18 million in public transport reduced traffic congestion by 25 per cent and saved power consumption by 5 per cent.

Among the advantages of the system was an improvement in family care for children as fathers had more time to stay at home, he added.

He said workshops involved in production could remain open after closing time providing that they did not deal with the public. Shops working in services such as tyre maintenance would benefit from an amenoment allowing one shop in each district to remain open.

CSO: 4500/73

EXILE GROUPS CONTINUE TALKS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 3 Dec 81 pp 1-4

[Text] Rumours of a breakdown in the talks between exiled opposition leaders on the possibility of forming a coalition of the main groups were denied to IPS by one of the chief figures in the discussions, former premier Ali Amini.

The rumours said that Amini was to announce that he had come to an agreement with three former National Front politicians in Ahmad Madani, Hassan Nazih and Ahmad Bani-Ahmad to cooperate without the inclusion of National Iranian Resistance Movement chief Shahpour Bakhtiar and monarchist organisations.

"There is no truth in these stories," Amini told IPS. "Talks continue at a slow pace with the aim of dissipating the differences between the individual groups. There is nothing to despair about...but nothing yet to make us very optimistic, either."

The coalition talks seem to have received their stimulus from a manifesto published by Madani early last month. In it he offered, in the view of experienced Iranian political observers, a "positive platform" for all the political heirs of the late nationalist leader Mohammad Mossadegh to form a united front and subsequently work out a larger coalition with the loyalist groups. Madani and Nazih were all members of the National Front party which Mossadegh led. Bani-Ahmad was close to their line in opposing the Shah's regime. Madani has said that his "political chart" is simply a set of suggestions. "I make absolutely no claim that all of what I suggest should be accepted," he explained. "Our group will neither regard any of its proposals as final, nor lays claim to any position or office. We must lave all that to the people of Iran. Our group will fight alongside others against the insane criminals now wielding power in Iran."

Madani has proposed a three-phase plan of operation. Phase one concerns efforts to overthrow the Khomeini regime, in which all patriots, irrespective of ideology or inclination, must cooperate fully, he says. He does not specify how the regime in Tehran should be overthrown but stresses that this phase should be accomplished in a decisive manner in the shortest possible time, to be quickly followed by phase two.

During this phase he believes that an emergency situation should be declared during which a provisional council would take collective responsibility for administration

of the country, acting in lieu of a head of state. He does not go into any details as to any composition of the provisional council, nor does he suggest any time limit. The council would choose one of its members to head a provisional government.

Madani insists on giving the head of the provisional government clear-cut responsibilities with power to act on them. Having served as defence minister in the post-revolutionary provisional government of Mehdi Bazargan, he knows how a lack of such clear-cut terms of reference emasculated the Bazargan cabinet.

He drew up a nine-point plan of operation for the council during the emergency phase. The nine points would be achieved while the provisional government, ruling by decree, effectively turns conditions to normal, administers the country, restores rule of law and even begins some short-term measures designed to reactivate the economy.

The first point in the plan is the complete ouster of the theocrats. He clearly advocates that the principle of V layat-e-Faghih, which is Khomeini's brand of Islamic theocracy, should be abolished and the Islamic constitution and all other institutions emerging from it should be declared null and void.

Point two provides for drafting of a new constitution. Madani shows a remarkable open-mindedness in his proposals on this. He and his group favour a republican form, but he believes that during the interim period, when work on drafting of the constitution goes on, adherents of various kinds of regime, whether monarchy or republican, could and should have access to all the media to put forward their case. This is a far cry from the April 1979 referendum when Iranians were given a simple choice between Khomeini's Islamic Republic of continuation of monarchy, at a time when a dozen or so monarchists were being sent to firing squads every day.

Madani comes out in favour of separation of religion from politics, which draws him close to the other secularist groups. This is the first time Madani, a devout Muslim himself, had opted unequivocally for secularism. He also calls for a two-chamber parliamentary system, along the lines of the United States Senate and Congress. Other main lines of his policy are along lines advocated by almost all other nationalist groups, although he can be criticised as dogmatic over non-alignment and a mixed economy.

More specifically, he says that the war with Iraq must be ended at once without compromising of Iran's legitimate rights. On the Persian Gulf he stresses that Iran should not act as its sole gendarme; rather she should seek cooperation with all the other states in the region. He says that the legitimate interests of all neighbouring nations, including Iraq, must be respected, but any damaging pact signed by the "present usurpers of power" in Iran would be null and void.

Madani's manifesto came four weeks after the publication of an open letter by three members of the National Front Central Council in which they asked leader of the National Iranian Resistance Movement Shahpour Bakhtiar to unite with other nationalists (naming only Madani) to put an end to the ruinous rule of the mullahs. The three--Mehrdad Arfazadeh, Hamid Zolnour and Hushang Kordestani--praised Bakhtiar's political courage in Dec 1978 in standing up against Khomeini, and they asked him to show the same political and moral courage now by bringing all the nationalists under one umbrella. "Please leave aside any criticism or objections which you may have over the past records of other personalities," they pleaded.

Meanwhile, Ghiame Iran, the organ of Bakhtiar's National Iranian Resistance Movement, said in an editorial on Nov 20 that changes on the political and social scene at home since 1953 (when Mossadegh was overthrown) and a host of other factors had basically changed the position of the National Front in Iranian politics.

The editorial said that the present struggle of the Iranian people was no longer an "organic continuation" of the struggle which the Front had started 30 years ago. It said that the way some Front leaders had capitulated to Khomeini, together with the Front's other failures, had brought about a situation in which it could no longer be the dominant nationalist force.

The editorial said that at this juncture all the nationalist forces must join hands to oust the present usurpers of power in Iran, and that those leaders and organs of the Front who had not capitulated to Khomeini must now join forces with others in the nation's great struggle.

"The unity of purpose among those National Front leaders who remained sincere to the true line of the struggle and who did not fall (to Khomeini) will be valuable only in maintaining a connection between the struggle begun by the National Front (in 1953) and the present struggle of the Iranian people," the editorial concluded.

Independent observers believe that Bakhtiar's group are careful at this juncture not to attach an undue and unrealistic importance to the National Front. They also do not wish to give an unconditional clearance to all those personalities and groups (like Bazargan) who either out of political ignorance or opportunism jumped onto the Khomeini band wagon in Dec 1978, despite Bakhtiar's timely warnings.

What remains to be clarified is Bakhtiar's open reaction to Madani's new move. By all accounts Madani was among those "nationalists," who in late 1978 and early 1979 deviated from the National Front's declared policy of secularism and joined Khomeini. Indeed, Madani acted as defence minister when Khomeini took over. But he was soon forced to resign; then he was made commander of the navy and governor-general of Khuzestan province. His record in both these positions was good; but his services were also helpful in consolidating Khomeini's hold on power. Later Madani stood as a presidential candidate and could have won if Khomeini had not given a signal to the mullahs to bring Bani-Sadr's name out of the ballot box. Finally, Madani was elected to the Islamic Majlis from his native city of Kerman. But he fled the country when the mullahs called for his execution.

Few people doubt Madani's sincerity or his devotion to Iran. Yet collaboration with Khomeini is now regarded such an act of treason that Madani's record is bound to impair his position. That being so, his latest move shows a high degree of political maturity which could go some way to redeem him. That is why independent observers believe that the ground is paved for a move to forge a fusion between all those who claim to be political heirs to Mossadegh; namely, Bakhtiar, Madani, Hassan Nazih, Moghadam Maraghei, Ahmad Bani-Ahmad and some other National Front leaders, but definitely not people like Bazargan, Karim Sanjabi and Bani-Sadr, who are far too closely identified with the mullahs' rule.

There are also reported to be objections by some people to Bani-Ahmad, who has been accused of having been too close to Soviet agents in the past, sources said.

This despite the fact tht evidence of this adduced by opponents cannot be confirmed. Bani-Ahmad has indeed always shown a determined independence.

Once the political heirs to Mossadegh have formed a united front they could then encourage military and civilian groups committed to monarchy to form in turn their own united front and the two could between them create what could be called a nationally representative and credible opposition to Khomeini's theocracy, Iranian observers believe. Front figures still have a sizable following among young people, the professional classe and the bazaar, while the monarchists have strong backing in the army, the civil service and among those big sections of the masses who are traditionally royalist, such as the tribespeople and peasants. Indeed, one secret of Khomeini's success was that he automatically replaced the Shah as the "top man," and so the peasantry switched their unquestioning and traditional allegiance from the "Shah with a crown" to the "Shah with a turban," according to many Iranian observers.

They point out that both "Mossadeghites" and the royalists should be able to agree on choosing an elder statesman like Ali Amini, erstwhile premier and veteran political figure, to act as a chairman or arbiter at the meetings which might be held to negotiate the final terms of a grand coalition. Eventually Amini could be a leading candidate to chair the proposed council for national salvation. He is one of the few surviving politicians in Iran who have proved their skills and prowess.

Indeed Amini like Bakhtiar, has in the past proved that he has the courage of his convictions. In 1952 and 1953, when Mossadegh was desperately looking for a way out of the political deadlock into which he was driven by his popularist stand, Amini advised him to resolve the oil problem according to a World Bank formula. Many observers believe that Mossadegh was in favour of Amini's advice but preferred someone else to do it. Eventually, Mossadegh was overthrown and it was Amini who finally resolved the oil problem by courageously putting his political weight and skills behind the 1954 agreement.

Although followers of Mossadegh condemned that agreement at the time, today specialist opinion is that under the circumstances it was the best deal which until then an oil producing country had received. The agreement paved the way for the establishment of OPEC and other advantages for producers but Amini has never claimed personal credit for this.

As far as Bakhtiar is concerned, other observers point out, other aspirants to political power must remember that it was he and he alone who had the courage to try to save Iran when it stood on the precipice over which it later fell, and that as the country's last prime minister before the degeneration into unconstitutional anarchy he must be seen as a pivotal figure of a united opposition movement. While Amini is now at the end of his career Bakhtiar can still hope to have a crucial role to play for a considerable period ahead in the political future of his country, and his decisions now are harder for him to take with that in mind. It is perhaps with the resolution of the problem relating to their individual status in any coalition of opposition organisations that its success will be achieved.

Independent observers believe that the "Mossadeghites" and all the other centrist and rightist groups must bury the hatchet, forgetting the past and anything which has a divisive influence, to join hands to save the country. Khomeini's emergence has so radically changed the political scene and so gravely endangered the country that discussions of the late Shah's anti-constitutional deeds and the corruption of his aides, or the talk of Mossadegh's mistakes serve no real purpose, they point out. All concerned must forget the past and adopt only one single yardstick to measure a leader's patriotism, and that yardstick is how much he is prepared to sacrifice to save Iran from the most devastating enemy she has encountered since the Mongol invasion, it is contended.

CSO: 4600/148

IRANIAN WARFRONT VICTORY APPEARS CONFIRMED

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 3 Dec 81 pp 4-5

[Text] All the signs by midweek pointed to the fact that the Iranian armed forces had achieved their second significant victory over the Iraqi army near the strategic border town of Bostan in south-western Iran. Three months ago the Iraqis were forced back across the Shatt-al-Arab waterway by the forces defending Abadan.

Unlike its actions after the abortive drive at Susangerd earlier this year, when a much-hailed victory turned into defeat, Tehran radio and the whole of the Tehran media has continued to boost the victory over the past week. After the Susangerd debacle all reference to the battle was dropped within a brief space of time.

Reports from the Bostan area speak of large numbers of bodies littered around the area after the battle. Tehran quickly countered Iraqi denials of their defeat with invitation to foreign correspondents to come to the area and see for themselves.

Reports from foreign correspondents who visited the front in the last few weeks had also suggested that the Iranian forces, in spite of shortages of equipment and arms, were in good fighting order and felt they now had the initiative. Resentment seemed directed at the officials in Tehran who had been unable to obtain for them the same supplies of needed equipment as the Iraqis had been able to get.

Jusy Dubie, of Belgian television, who recently visited the battlefront, was quoted as saying that, as far as he could tell, the Iranians undoubtedly "had the upper hand."

"Morale was very high among the Iranians, especially among the revolutionary guard units who receive all the modern, Soviet-made weapons," he said. "They take on even heavy battle tanks. If there is a lack of coordination between the regular and irregular armies both seem to do their jobs well and appear to have a net superiority over their enemy."

But, Dubié went on, the Iranians were visibly hard-pressed for spare parts, particularly for their sophisticated U.S.-made weapons. Nevertheless, their performance to observers was superior to that of the Iraqis.

Sources in Tehran told IPS that many spare parts for tanks and artillery were now being made in Tehran and, thanks to the newly-found skill in "cannibalisation" of

the big stockpile of arms and equipment built up under the late Shah, the armed forces had been able to keep much of their hardware in action.

The mullahs have so far failed to bring off any sizable purchases of badly-needed parts and equipment, but some Western and Israeli experts believe that the U.S. has given tacit approval to a number of countries, including Israel, Greece, Spain, South Korea and several Western European countries, selling to Iran what it needs, except for some highly sophisticated spares for its air force. It is thought that some sales have now been effected, including ammunition for its heavy battle tanks and long-range artillery.

Some Iranian observers have pointed to the fact that the new offensive by the Iranians followed hints from Iraqi president Saddam Hussain that he was ready to withdraw his forces from Iranian territory if an opposition government in exile approached him and asked him to do so. This was a clear message to people like former president Bani-Sadr and his colleague Massoud Rajavi, or to other opposition groupings. A sharp defeat for Saddam, the Tehran authorities must have appreciated, would show that the Iraqi leader was unable to honour that pledge with any security because he was not in control of events along his border.

None of the opposition groups appears to have reacted to Saddam's hint. "Perhaps that reflects their lack of political sense, for it seems to have provided yet another opportunity that has been missed," commented an Iranian observer in London. "It was in the same way they lost the chance offered by Saddam's attack on Iran--so Khomeini's regime continues to be the main slaughterer of Iranians most of the time, as well as obliterating what is Iranian on a much wider scale than the Iraqi army could."

The Bostan victory has for the moment given the mullah's regime a little more popularity, and there was a good response to a call to the public to go onto their rooftops and cry "God is Great!" for 10 minutes earlier in the week.

But the army, too, must now be getting new confidence and new muscle to bring pressure on the mulllahs in the future. As the country's military chief General Zahir-Nejad put it this week, "It's first Karbala (the Shia holy shrine inside Iraq), then Jerusalem." But once the war is over, say some, the army could change the label given to its offensive, "Towards Jerusalem," to "Towards Tehran" if the mullahs do not show they can offer the support the military people feel they should now get.

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MUSSAVI RIDICULES REPORT ON SOVIET SECURITY ASSISTANCE

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 3 Dec 81 pp 6-7

[Text] Prime Minister Mir Hussain Musavi ridiculed a TIME magazine report that 36 Soviet agents had arrived in Iran to help organise the security services there when he gave an interview to the Tehran daily ETTELAAT.

"You should read the original article," he said. "They say that the lies were so thick that no one could believe it. The article has started with fantastic details about 36 people who are staying in a hotel, where they have eaten, who they have talked to. They have put together the names of the most fantastic places and things and the writer of the article has put this in together with a cartoon.

"I think the aim of this is to give the reactionary regimes of the region, who are always using the danger of communism and Russia as means of explaining the presence of the United States, to explain the recent American manoeuvres. For example, in recent manoeuvres when American soldiers landed within 100 kilometres of Mecca and Medina. Or to explain the presence of the AWACS.

"It is interesting that immediately after the publication of this article, they wanted to make this news very big and REUTERS claimed that upon questioning a spokesman in the Prime Ministry, the spokesman said that this news was not true. They really made an issue of it, whereas the Prime Ministry does not even have a spokesman. Then immediately after this news they announced that the PLO had sent 15,000 security personnel and guards to protect Iranian personalities, and to assist the security and intelligence organisation of Iran.

"This is all because our 36 million people, who all act as intelligence and security agents, have been most successful in routing terrorism. They want to make a failure out of our success. Our people are used to these lies and will not believe them. But it might make a difference to the countries in the region. We have to be alert about this."

CSO: 4600/148

REGIME SAID TO ALLAY PUBLIC FEARS OVER FINANCIAL SITUATION

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 3 Dec 81 pp 7-8

[Text] There were ample signs of the regime's concern over its financial situation over the past week, despite reports of steadily increasing oil exports.

Ayatollah Khomeini himself, in a speech reflecting an unusually conciliatory mood, asked the public to put its money into the banks to support the country. Observers saw this as a new sign that people were withdrawing funds in fear they will lose them if the economic situation worsens and the government faces a severer crisis.

Premier Mussavi in an interview also stressed that the government would protect the public's deposits, both on Islamic and legal grounds. He said assurances given by Majlis Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani at Friday prayers in Tehran had won the trust of the people and they were once more depositing money in the banks to help this economy.

He explained that the government's announcement that it intended to reduce the amount of money in circulation meant that government spending had to be cut and public wastage had to be curbed so that the value of the rial did not drop. If the government injected more money into the sytem it would cause inflation.

"Unfortunately, since the terminology of the announcement was slightly technical," Mussavi said, "counter-revolutionaries have used it against us. They have claimed that the government has bad intentions on the people's deposits in the banks. In the Islamic republic no one has the right to take action against the people's deposits and no one has the intention of confiscating them.

"We are trying to attract people with capital to invest it; they should circulate their capital and they should know that the Islamic republic government will protect their investments. We also protect people's deposits. The government's actions are limited by law--we have all kind of checks, the Majlis, the Council of Guardians, and then there is the velayat-e-faghih. We plan to expand the cooperative sector and the private sector will have its role as well. None of the authorities has talked of getting rid of the private sector. These rumours are spread by counter-revolutionary forces. They have started a vast campaign against us!"

Further signs of the public disquiet were shown by statements on high prices made by the prosecutor of the trade guilds, Javad Sadeqi, and the head of the courts which

investigate charges brought against the various guilds, whose name was given as Nazemzadeh.

After the usual preliminaries blaming the war, the economic boycott and middlemen for the main increases, Sadeqi said another reason was that all the factories taken over by the Foundation for the Deprived (from owners who have fled the country or who could not continue to run them) had lost production because of the failure of management. For example, he said, Iran National (which builds Hillman cars) had to raise the prices of some of its products by 100 per cent. Other companies like Melli Shoe also sold their goods at high prices and this matter had to be dealt with. As had the question of merchants who sold imported goods at a ridiculously high price.

Sadeqi said that cooperatives could play an important part in controlling prices and distribution of goods. "In this connection we must dismiss a number of managing directors of cooperatives and elect new ones. We must also reorganise the factories and appoint managers who can increase production," he said.

Sadeqi went on to promise the purging of middlemen around the fruit and vegetable markets, and that the produce would be available throughout the capital with uniform prices shortly. He said that provocateurs whose aim was to destroy the economic system would be punished; considering they were at war, if their evil intentions were proved their punishment would be execution.

Nazemzadeh also inveighed against the "economic terrorists" who sold goods in Iran and received payment in foreign currency outside, who hoarded goods, or who, "with their friends and connections, get factories closed down," and promised they would suffer severe punishment from the revolutionary courts. He also attacked rumours that shops would be closed or goods rationed to them, which he said were spread to worry the people.

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IMPROVEMENT SEEN IN QUALITY OF PERSIAN-LANGUAGE PRESS IN WEST

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 3 Dec 81 p 9

[Weekly column by Teezbin]

[Text] After a couple of years of simple trading of abuse the Persian language press in the West has raised its standards perceptibly over recent months. And the past week has seen a very promising publication in the monthly RUZEGARE NOW (NEW TIMES), a magazine dealing with a whole range of subjects from political to cultural affairs, whose publisher is Iran's long-serving former ambassador to Saudi Arabia Jafar Raed. Raed is one of his country's best known Arabists.

His editor is Esmail Pourvali, an equally well-known journalist who was editor-in-chief of the influential newsweekly BAMSHAD in Tehran in the later years of the Shah's regime. The new publication shows promise of becoming the most serious, professionally produced of the plethora of Farsi publications put out by the exile community. It says it wants to be a vehicle for helping Iranians to adapt themselves to the "new times," the changes which they must face up to.

As a forerunner to what he hopes will become a series of articles by former ministers, diplomats and others with authoritative stores to tell, Raed has written an absorbing piece about the days when he served the famous religious leader of the '50s, the late Ayatollah Kashani, as a voluntary interpreter. According to Raed, Kashani, following a meeting with Said Ramadan, a prominent Muslim Brotherhood leader, refused to sponsor the Brothers in Iran because he considered their organisation was communist.

Raed also recounts the story of how, on a pilgrimage to Mecca which was made possible by the provision of American warplanes for the hajis, the ayatollah had a row with Kind Saud over the rights of Shia Muslims to observe their own rites at the pilgrimage--and one day later than the Sunnis because the moon did not appear in Iran until it showed in Saudi Arabia.

He described Kashani as a fearless, stubborn but intelligent man with an iron will, very much like Khomeini; but the latter, he adds, has ruthlessness and cruelty as additional characteristics.

Pourvali assures his readers that the journal's columns are open to all contributors, no matter whether their opinions conflict with those of the publisher and editor, provided they are signed by their authors. Others who do not agree with them will get the right to reply.
CSO: 4600/148

BRIEFS

RAJAVI DENIAL ON TEHRAN BOMBING--Massoud Rajavi, exiled leader of the Mohahedin-e-Khalq organisations, has strongly denied charges that the Mojahedin was behind a bomb explosion that killed four people and injured many more in the big Forushgahe Bozorg supermarket in downtown Tehran last week. On the contrary, he said, there was no doubt the Iranian authorities were responsible for the blast, in a way similar to the burning down of the Rex cinema in Abadan three years ago by what he alleged were the Shah's SAVAK agents. Several hundred people, mostly young, died in that incident, which badly damaged the Shah's regime; opinion in Iran now, however, inclines to the idea that it was in fact the mullahs' agents who set fire to the cinema so they could blame the then government. Rajavi said this week that Khomeini was pursuing the same kind of action today to provide a pretext for continuing to hunt down the Mojahedin and discredit them in the eyes of the public. "This kind of action would certainly be against our own interest," Rajavi is quoted as telling a reporter. "Why should we bomb public places and be damned by everyone? This is certainly the work of the authorities to provide reasons for the execution of more Mojahedin and other opponents and also to continue with other arrests and oppression." [Text] [London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English 3 Dec 81 p 8]

CSO: 4600/148

UNION CHIEF DISCUSSES ROLE OF LAND TRANSPORTATION IN WAR EFFORT

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 25 Oct 81 p 5

[Report on Interview with Mr Nuri Latif Sulayman, President of Public Union for Land Transportation by Sa'ib 'Abd-al-Muhsin; date and place of interview not specified: "The President of the Public Union of Land Transportation Workers Discusses Major Contributions of Our Workers in the Battle for Honor and Dignity"]

[Text] Students, workers, farmers, civil servants and soldiers are in their positions fighting the battle of honor and dignity, the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah. They are warding off the evil from our peaceful country which was forced to enter into a war that was imposed on it. But our country was up to [the challenge] and fought to defend its honor, its security and its stability against the enemies of God, Arabism and Islam.

Land transportation workers played a part and made a contribution to the battle. [The correspondent of] the "Organizations" section [in this newspaper] interviewed Mr Nuri Latif Sulayman, the president of the Public Union for Land Transportation and asked him to discuss the union's role in supporting the sacred battle and the role played by land transportation workers in backing the battle and giving it all the requirements for support and for a lasting victory. Mr Sulayman began by saying, "Our union has always been foremost in performing all the functions that are entrusted to it and doing everything that it is asked to do at this significant stage in the history of our glorious Arab nation.

"On the local scene the union convened several expanded meetings for all the branch unions in the country's governorates. The meetings were attended by the president of the General Federation of Labor Unions. At these meetings the functions for which the workers of the Public Union for Land Transportation and the union committees were responsible were discussed so that all energies can be mobilized and maximum efforts can be spent to increase production and preserve the machinery to support the glorious battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah.

"The union also held several debates to explain the dimensions of the battle that was imposed on our struggling country by the racist Persians.

We discussed the repeated attacks that were waged by the ignorant [enemy] against our borders, our villages and our guard posts before 4 September of last year, and we discussed the attacks that were launched since that date. This forced us to enter the battle to defend our land and our water, and we scored admirable victories against the Persians in their own country. Other debates were also held for all the sectors that work in land transportation so that the difficulties that may be encountered in the transportation process may be overcome and useful solutions to them found. The union also held another meeting in which the special tariff for transporting goods was discussed. Officials from the Central Agency for Prices and Traffic and a number of people concerned with those matters took part in that discussion."

Mr Nuri Latif Sulayman added that the union had published several bulletins and posters. One of these bulletins, AL-TARIQ, is written by workers, and about 3,000 copies of it are issued. The bulletin has assumed the character of a periodic newsletter, and it has sections designated to the battle of Saddam's Qadisiyah, to the preservation of the spirit of victory and to other activities that have to do with national development and the distinguished role of land transportation workers in all social, political and cultural areas. The union [organized exhibitions of] oil paintings that depict the heroic battles of our undaunted army. It dedicated an exhibition of political posters by the General Federation of Labor Unions in the al-Zawra' Gardens. That was part of the first festival. The union issued a statement commemorating the 13th anniversary of the glorious revolution of 17-30 July and the anniversary of the birth of the leading party, The Ba'th Arab Socialist party.

In that statement the union also urged workers to increase production so as to strengthen the battle. The union took part in the awareness campaign that was launched among the ranks of workers to eradicate illiteracy, [promote] mandatory education and explain the dimensions of the campaign. The union offered gifts of appreciation to those who excelled.

The union also organizes continuing visits to the front, and it offers gifts of appreciation to our brave fighters who stand like towering mountains in the face of the greedy, aggressive Persians.

On the Arab and international scene the union extended an invitation to the transportation union in fraternal Kuwait [inviting a delegation from the Kuwaiti union] to visit the country and find out about the industrial and construction boom that our country is experiencing as it fights the most honorable battle on the eastern gateway to the Arab homeland.

The union also took part in numerous conferences and meetings that were held for the Federation of World and Arab Transportation. During those meetings union delegations explained the real implications of the repeated attacks that were being carried out against our fighting country by the racist Persians.

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CSO: 4404/170

OBJECTIVES OF 5-YEAR PLAN DISCUSSED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 47, 23 Nov 81 pp 8-12

[Text]

Jordan's Council of Ministers recently approved a new Five-Year Development Plan for the period 1981-85, which was drawn up by the country's National Planning Council (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 12). The plan's contents are now available in detail. The article below summarises the objectives and general framework of the 635-page document as they compare with the aims and achievements of the previous plan, which covered the period 1976-80. In subsequent issues, this newsletter will focus on the plan's approach to three specific aspects of the Jordanian economy: agriculture, industry and social development.

In a section dealing with the aims and strategy of Jordanian development, the new planning document outlines some of the constraints and special conditions which have affected the country's development efforts in the past. Some of these are political, such as the influx of Palestinian refugees in successive waves since 1948, the loss of the West Bank in 1967, Jordan's position on the front-line of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the evolution of its relations with other countries in the region. Others are physical, such as the relative paucity of natural resources.

These factors have had some negative effects, but Jordan has frequently managed to turn ill winds to its own economic advantage. One thinks of the large amounts of foreign aid that Jordan has been able to attract, first from the US and later from Arab countries. Then there is the relationship developed with Iraq since the outbreak of the Gulf war which has benefited Jordan in terms of both trade and aid. There are also the joint ventures with Syria which seem to be able to survive the stormy political relations between the two countries. Finally, there has been the opportunity provided to Jordanians to sell their skills in the lucrative labour markets of the oil-rich Gulf states.

The five-year plan recognises the importance to the economy, in particular to the balance of payments, of the remittances flowing back from the approximately 300,000 Jordanians working abroad. However, it also points out that Jordan suffers from the loss of trained personnel needed for the domestic development effort. Efforts to induce workers to remain at home have forced up labour costs in Jordan. Furthermore, the money sent back by expatriate workers is often spent on consumer goods or on building, thus fuelling inflation which the plan reckons to be running at about per cent a year. Inflation, the drain of skilled manpower and the rising cost of energy are three factors emphasised by the plan as having had a particular effect on the Jordanian economy during the 1970s.

In spite of these general constraints and specific problems, the Jordanian economy achieved an annual growth rate in real terms of 7 per cent in GNP over the period 1973-75 and of 11 per cent over the period 1976-80, the plan says. It adds that although the government's financial resources increased six-fold during the 1970s, external aid still accounted for about 35 per cent of the state budget.

The plan points out that there has been a very high rate of capital formation during the past five years, representing about 48 per cent of GDP and 33 per cent of GNP. It blames the high level of government expenditure and the effects of a consumer boom for the country's apparent inability to reduce the chronic deficit in the balance of trade. During the period from 1976-80, the deficit is estimated at about 75 per cent of GDP or 54 per cent of GNP.

The overall development strategy outlined by the new plan is broadly similar to that of the preceding plan. Objectives include raising GNP, increasing the contribution of domestic revenues to public expenditure and reducing the deficit in the balance of trade. The plan rests on several basic assumptions. First, Jordan will continue its policy of economic freedom and opportunity for private enterprise coupled with an active

governmental role in carrying out large industrial projects and providing incentives and a suitable climate for private investment. Second, the private sector will respond to the government's development efforts by mobilising savings and directing them towards investment development projects. Third, Arab countries, development funds and financial institutions will continue to buttress Jordan's development programme by giving aid to support the budget, helping finance major projects and participating in joint ventures.

The major thrust of the 1976-80 plan was towards heavy investment in industrial and mining projects, notably the production of chemical fertilisers, an oil refinery, a potash extraction complex, phosphates production and a cement plant. Increased industrial production was to play a vital role in achieving the underlying aim of modifying the structure of the Jordanian economy in favour of the commodity-producing sector. The authors of the new plan note that this structural modification has not yet been fully realised and that the economy is still dependent on the services sector.

While the efforts to build up Jordan's industrial base and infrastructure will continue during the next five years, a new emphasis on the satisfaction of basic human needs and the need to spread the benefits of development equitably may be detected in the new plan. The authors draw attention to the fact that Jordan's population is now growing at an estimated 3.8 per cent a year, a high rate by any standards. Its increasingly pyramid-like structure has meant that no more than 21 per cent of Jordan's citizens are actively employed in the work-force. Of particular concern to planners is the relative lack of opportunity for women to join the work-force. Since girls constitute 41 per cent of all secondary students, they clearly represent a considerable pool of untapped labour.

The new plan recommends more balanced regional development and the provision of services and employment opportunities to people in the areas where they live in order to try and stem the flow of people from rural areas to the cities.

Jordan's planners envisage investments amounting to JD 3.3 billion (JD1 = $2.989 at the current exchange rate) over the period 1981-85. This compares with a total of JD 1.22 billion invested over the previous five year period. The last plan called for investments of JD 765 million, well below the figure achieved. However, the JD 1.22 billion invested is equivalent to about JD 843.7 million at 1975 prices. Nonetheless, the new target represents a substantial increase in planned investment over the next five years.

The authors of the plan hope that this level of investment will result in an average annual growth rate in Jordan's GDP of 11 per cent. The country's GDP stood at JD 705 million in 1980 and would thus rise to JD 1.193 billion by 1985. The plan considers that the 1976-80 plan's targets for growth in production came close to being attained. GDP was slated to increase at an annual rate of 11.9 per cent. In real terms, the country actually achieved a growth rate of 8.5 per cent. GNP grew at a rate of 11 per cent a year in real terms, compared to a targeted growth rate of 11.5 per cent.

As noted above, one aim of the plan is to continue the effort to effect a structural change in the Jordanian economy whereby the commodity-producing sector would contribute a greater proportion of GDP compared to the services sector. The 1976-80 plan aimed to raise the commodity-producing sector's share of GDP from 35 per cent in 1976 to 44 per cent in 1980. The productive sector in fact accounted for only 38.8 per cent of GDP in 1980 and this modest rise was one of the disappointments of the last plan. The new plan lays down a target of 46 per cent by 1985, representing a 14.9 per cent annual increase in output from this sector of the economy.

In terms of current prices, capital expenditure in the commodity-producing sector exceeded all investment targets. However, if constant prices are used, the sector received only 80.6 per cent of the investment envisaged by the 1976-80 plan, the new plan admits. It also reveals that no branch of the sector benefited from the expected level of investment in these terms. Conversely, the plan says, expenditure on infrastructure (using constant prices) surpassed the forecast level by 26.2 per cent and that on social services by 58 per cent. Most of this expenditure went on transport, electricity and housing. The fact that investment considered in constant prices was skewed at the expense of the commodity-producing sector, goes a long way towards explaining the continued dominance of the services sector in the Jordanian economy.

Industry and mining are expected to contribute the bulk of the growth in the productive sector. Almost 30 per cent of investment allocated under the 1976-80 plan was channelled into this sector, which was expected to grow at about 26 per cent a year. A growth rate of 24 per cent was actually achieved, but mining and industry provided only 21.8 per cent of GDP in 1980 compared to a targeted share of 28.3 per cent.

The new plan calls for the industrial sector to contribute 29.3 per cent of GDP by 1985, although it is to receive a smaller proportion of total investment. This is planned to be JD 758.8 million, or just under 23 per cent. According to the plan, the mining and industrial sector made substantial progress in establishing several major industrial projects funded under the previous plan. However, several of these have yet to start production. The plan notes that the main reason the sector failed to

Projected evolution of GDP and GNP from 1981-85 (in millions of JD)

Sector	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	Total Average (%)	Average annual growth (%)
Agriculture	65	69	75	80	86	43.6	7.5
Mining and industry	181	214	252	297	350	127.3	17.8
Water and electricity	10	11	13	16	19	137.5	18.9
Construction	59	66	74	84	94	80.8	12.6
Trade	147	163	181	201	222	60.9	10.0
Transport and communications	100	111	125	140	153	69.2	11.1
Public administration and defence	126	131	135	140	145	18.9	3.5
Other services	87	95	104	113	123	53.8	9.0
GDP at factor cost	770	860	959	1,071	1,194	69.2	11.0
Indirect taxation	120	134	148	165	184	68.5	11.0
GDP at market prices	895	994	1,107	1,236	1,377	69.2	11.1
Net factor income from abroad	217	238	262	288	318	61.4	10.0
GNP at market prices	1,112	1,232	1,369	1,524	1,695	67.7	10.9

Source: Jordan's Economic and Social Development Plan 1981-85

meet its production targets was the mediocre performance of the phosphates industry.

Investment allotted to the sector under the 1981-85 plan will be used to complete existing projects, to build chemical industries fed by raw potash and phosphates, to expand the cement industry and to encourage smaller intermediate industries, especially those oriented towards exports.

It is hoped that revenues from mining and industry will climb from JD 154 million in 1980 to JD 350 million by 1985 (at 1980 prices), representing an overall increase of 127.3 per cent, or 18 per cent annually. This compares with a growth rate of 161 per cent envisaged by the 1976-80 plan.

Agriculture is to receive JD 234.5 million over the next five years, a slightly higher share of investment than the previous allocation. Allocations for agriculture represent 6.51 per cent of the total, compared to 5.24 per cent during the previous planning period. But its contribution to GDP is expected to decline further from 8.5 per cent in 1980 to 7.2 per cent in 1985. If things go according to plan, revenues are to rise by 43.6 per cent over the 1980 figure of JD 60 million to JD 86 million by 1985, representing an average annual growth rate of 7.5 per cent.

Over the past five years, agriculture recorded a growth rate of 5.7 per cent a year at constant prices compared to a targeted rate of 7 per cent. The plan recalls that this advance was made against a background of four years of semi-drought, which ended in 1980. While the plan admits that certain basic projects were not executed, it stresses that Jordanian farmers expanded the area of irrigated land and introduced a number of modern agricultural techniques which helped to limit the effects of unfavourable climatic conditions.

Most of the investments for agriculture will be directed towards increasing the area of irrigated land in the Jordan Valley and the southern Ghors, developing agricultural techniques in both irrigated and rainfed areas and expanding the development of animal resources. The plan expresses concern over delays in the construction of the Maqarin Dam across the Yarmouk River to provide water for irrigation and drinking in addition to electrical power. The project is seen as vital in the effort to secure national food supplies and boost agricultural revenues. The plan fears that the benefits of the scheme may not now felt until after 1985.

A much larger slice of investment will be devoted to water and irrigation, which has been allocated 15.81 per cent of the total, compared to the 12.73 per cent it received under the last plan. The JD 521.7 million allocation is to be spent on developing water sources for agriculture, industry and domestic consumption. The Maqarin Dam project will absorb much of the investment in this sector.

Energy and electricity will be given JD 163.4 million, representing 4.95 per cent of total investment, rather less than the 5.6 per cent the sector received under the previous plan. Taken together, revenues from water and electricity are projected to swell from JD 8 million

in 1980 to JD 19 million in 1985, an increase of 137.5 per cent, or 18.9 per cent a year. The two sectors are expected to provide 1.6 per cent of GDP by 1985 as against their actual share of 1.1 per cent in 1980, which was exactly half the proportion projected by the 1976-80 plan.

The new plan calls for a reduction in the contribution of the services sector to GDP from 61.2 per cent in 1980 to 54 per cent in 1985. It envisages an overall growth in the sector's revenues from JD 431 million in 1981 to JD 644 million in 1985, a rise of 49.4 per cent or 8.4 per cent annually. No branch of the services sector is expected to increase its share of GDP, but transport and communications will maintain their contribution of 12.9 per cent each. The share of trade will decline from 19.6 to 18.6 per cent, while that of public administration and defence is to fall from 17.3 to 12.2 per cent. Transport gets the largest allocation of JD 545.5 million, representing 16.53 per cent of total investment. Housing comes second with JD 308 million, but this is a relative drop in its share of total allocations from 11.24 per cent under the last plan to 9.34 per cent under the new one.

General distribution of allocations (in millions of JD)

Sector	Allocation	% of total
Agriculture and cooperatives	234.5	7.11
Water and irrigation	521.7	15.81
Mining and industry	758.8	22.99
Energy and electricity	163.4	4.95
Tourism and antiquities	65.7	1.99
Total for commodity-producing and tourism sectors	1,744.1	52.85
Trade and supply	37.0	1.12
Transport	545.5	16.53
Communications	106.8	3.24
Culture and youth	9.8	0.30
Information	7.9	0.24
Education	226.3	6.86
Health	100.7	3.05
Social development	15.2	0.46
Work-force	9.2	0.28
Housing and government buildings	308.1	9.34
Municipalities and rural and environmental affairs	175.6	0.32
Waqf	6.4	0.19
Science and statistics	7.4	0.22
Total for service sectors	1,555.9	47.15
Overall investment total	**33000**	**100**

Source: Jordan's Economic and Social Development Plan 1981-85.

JD 226.3 million will be spent on education which thus gets 6.86 per cent of total investment.

Of the investment total of JD 3.3 billion, 61 per cent has been allocated to the central government and public corporations and 39 per cent to the private sector and mixed-ownership companies. Under the 1976-80 plan, investment was divided more evenly, with the public sector receiving 50.1 per cent and the private sector 49.9 per cent. To finance this expenditure, the government will rely on a combination of domestic revenues, foreign aid and private investment. Two central goals stressed by the plan are to reduce the chronic deficit in the balance of trade and to increase the contribution of domestic revenues towards public expenditure.

The plan aims to raise domestic revenues to the point where they will cover all the government's current expenditure and even provide a surplus to help finance capital investment. Thus the share of domestic revenues in the government's current expenditure is projected to rise from 68.9 per cent in 1980 to 100.4 per cent in 1985. Given the expected expansion of government expenditure, this will involve an annual increase of at least 20 per cent in domestic revenues. Over the past six years, domestic revenues climbed from JD 82.6 million in 1975 to JD 224.5 million in 1980, an annual rise of 22.1 per cent. Over the period as a whole they constituted 44.1 per cent of total government revenues, which rose from JD 212 million in 1975 to JD 500 million in 1980, an annual increase of 22.1 per cent.

To complement the drive to raise domestic revenues, the plan calls for the growth of public expenditure to be restrained to no more than 12.5 per cent a year from 1981-83 and no more than 10 per cent a year from 1984-85. This should be compared with an annual rise in public expenditure of 20.4 per cent during the last five years. One area in which the plan hopes to cut public expenditure is that of subsidies on fuel products and basic foodstuffs, which last year soaked up 14 per cent of current public spending. Subsidies are to be phased out gradually over the 1981-85 period, although the plan suggests the need for flexibility in this regard.

Public capital expenditure is projected to rise from 38 per cent of total expenditure in 1980 to an average of 49 per cent a year from 1981-85. The government will try to mobilise surplus domestic liquidity to help finance development spending by issuing development bonds worth JD 150 million. The Treasury will continue making loans within legally permitted limits. The plan calls on the municipalities and public utilities to become more self-reliant financially. The municipalities will be asked to increase their revenues by 25 per cent a year and to restrain their expenditure parallel to the central government.

Jordan's planners are determined to bring down the

relative size of the chronic deficit in the balance of trade and services. Although the plan concedes that in absolute terms the deficit is likely to swell from JD 525 million in 1980 to JD 690 million in 1985, it projects a fall from 51.9 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 40.7 per cent in 1985. The previous plan had hoped that the deficit could be eroded in absolute terms from JD 153 million in 1975 to JD 131 million in 1980.

Hopes of trimming the deficit rest on the plan's projection of an annual 17.8 per cent expansion in exports of goods and services. This expansion is to arise thanks to increased national exports as a result of the structural modification of the economy in favour of the commodity-producing sector, increased revenues from tourism and remittances from expatriate workers. Over the last six years, Jordan's exports have risen in value from JD 185.8 million in 1975 to JD 635 million in 1980. Exports of commodities grew from JD 48.9 million in 1975 to JD 160 million in 1980, an annual increase of 26.8 per cent compared with a targeted rise of 24.2 per cent. Moreover, the plan refers to a "radical shift" in the nature of the commodities exported in favour of industrial goods, which constituted 33.7 per cent of the total in 1980 against 24.3 per cent in 1975.

Jordan's creditable export performance has been counter-balanced, however, by a surge in imports, which rose from JD 304.2 million in 1975 to JD 963 million in 1980. Capital and intermediate goods and raw materials constituted 60 per cent of total imports in 1975, rising to 68 per cent in 1980. The proportion of consumer goods imported shrank from 49 per cent in 1975 to 32 per cent in 1980.

The new plan envisages an annual rise in imports of 13.5 per cent over the coming five years. Controlling the growth of imports will be essential if the size of the balance of trade deficit is to be held in check. Until now, the deficit has been covered by external aid in support of the budget, foreign loans and remittances. The 1981-85 plan rests on the assumption that these sources of funds will continue to be available.

The plan projects that foreign loans will total JD 1.162 billion and that the Arab countries will continue to support the budget to the tune of up to JD 244 million a year. Foreign loans will thus provide about 52 per cent of the government's total resources during the next five years.

The apparent ease with which Jordan is able to accommodate a substantial deficit in its trade balance is reflected in the balance of payments situation. The surplus realised over the years 1976-80 pushed the country's foreign currency reserves up from JD 175 million in 1975 to JD 623 million in 1980. The net balance of current operations recorded a slight deficit, but a much smaller one than had been forecast by the 1976-80 plan. This was due, according to the new plan, to higher levels of revenues from services and external aid than had been expected.

CSO: 4400/85

CENTRAL BANK COMPETES WITH EUROMARKETS

London 8 DAYS in English No 48, 5 Dec 81 p 33

[Text] A BURST OF ISSUES of domestic bonds and syndicated loans has combined with radical policy decisions by the Central Bank of Jordan to establish a system of medium-term financing in the country that offers borrowers considerably cheaper funds than do the euromarkets. It also sets a challenge to other developing countries to break the same ground.

In three months, no fewer than eight separate syndicated loans, bonds or forward deals have been completed or initiated in the nascent Jordanian capital market. The deals are worth a total JD58m ($180m). This is slightly more than the value of the 14 bond issues and loan syndications that had previously been consummated in Amman since such instruments were introduced into the market, less than three years ago.

The main impetus to the development of a Jordanian capital market for medium- and long-term loans, of between five and ten years, has been the near 10 percentage point gap between interest rates in Jordan and abroad. Dinar denominated loans have been put together here for between 9 and 11 per cent over the past three years, while bonds carry an interest rate of 8.5 to 9 per cent. These relatively low rates have prompted Jordanian borrowers to put together local dinar syndications to refinance outstanding commercial Eurocredits. The largest was a JD12m ($36m) loan for Alia, the state-owned airline, which was managed by the Arab Bank and had 12 banks in Jordan providing the funds.

This turned out to be a trendsetting loan, and a harbinger of others to come, because for the first time the Central Bank of Jordan agreed to re-discount 50 per cent of the participations in this loan to any of the banks in the syndicate. The present re-discount rate of the Central Bank is 6.5 per cent.

Commercial bankers involved in the Alia and other syndications have called the re-discounting decision by the Central Bank 'a shift in the traditional philosophy of central banking, and one that provides a comforting measure of safety for the commercial bank.' The move, some say, will significantly increase the readiness of Jordanian banks to lend at medium term.

Dr Mohammed Said Nabulsi, governor of the Central Bank of Jordan, says that the re-discounting decision was made because of the favourable fiscal climate in Jordan — only a slight budget deficit is expected this year. He notes that similar commitments in the future would probably be restricted in general to government-guaranteed loans, with exceptions being made only for very strong private sector companies with a high credit rating. He also expects few banks to make use of the re-discounting facility, given the healthy liquidity of the market. The recent brisk growth in the size of the inter-bank market in Amman, which stood at JD86m ($260m) at the end of August, lends support to his argument.

Abdul Majid Shoman, chairman and general manager of the Arab Bank, expects to see a broader base of financial institutions participating in local syndications, in anticipation of local interest rates rising and dollar rates abroad falling. Merchant banking activity makes up ten per cent of the Arab Bank's total income, and is rising.

The new regulations, according to Dr Nabulsi, are based on a formula that allows commercial and investment banks to provide a financing package including typically a syndicated loan and a bond issue.

A commercial bank is seen as leading the

entire package and the syndication, while an investment bank leads the bond issue. This arrangement may also promote the development of a secondary market for bonds, to run parallel to the Amman Stock Exchange's booming activity in company shares.

This kind of loan-bond package is being arranged for Alia's refinancing needs and also for the Jordan Cement Factories Company JD12m-15m ($36m-$45m) loan to finance its sixth kiln expansion project. A similar package to meet the refinancing needs of the country's sole petroleum refinery will probably be discussed in the market soon, given the $50m or so required for repayment of the refinery's outstanding eurocredits. Shoman suggests that the maximum size loan for the Jordanian market is JD10-15m ($30m-$45m).

The net result of the events of the past several months has been virtually to eliminate the need for Jordanian industries to look abroad for their capital. Not only does the lower interest rate in Amman in itself offer savings, but the dinar-denominated loans also preclude a foreign exchange risk. The Central Bank's willingness to rediscount 50 per cent of a commercial bank's share of syndicated loans provides the banks with a safety valve that they have lacked in the past, and one that they need badly to increase their medium-term lending in view of the small capitalisation of most banks operating in Jordan. Other countries are watching closely.

CSO: 4400/85

IMPLICATIONS OF AMIR'S TOUR IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES EXAMINED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 202, 5 Oct 81 p 28

[Article: "Before Convocation of National Assembly Second Session, Kuwait Underlines Its Role as Mediator"]

[Text] Kuwait--AL-DUSTUR--Return of Spirit: The political activity witnessed by Kuwait on the domestic and foreign levels has been followed and commented upon by observers in the Kuwaiti capital who have asserted that this activity was crowned with the recent tour made by the Amir of Kuwait to a number of the socialist bloc countries and by the amir's tidying up of the loose ends of domestic political matters immediately upon his return from this tour.

Observers believe that the most important aspect of the Amir of Kuwait's tour and of his visit to four socialist countries does not so much concern Kuwait as it concerns the mameber states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

The Amir of Kuwait expressed this opinion when he made statements to the effect that rumors and doubts are spreading in the Eastern camp countires regarding Kuwait's neutral role in the wake of Kuwait's accession to the Gulf Cooperation Council. This required a political effort to eliminate these doubts in the countries which thought that the Council was established against them, especially since most of the Gulf states have no diplomatic relations with the socialist countries. Consequently, any alliance among the Gulf states is viewed as an alliance against the socialist countries.

Official Kuwaiti sources also assert that Kuwait diplomacy will endeavor during the Gulf Cooperation Council summit, which will be held next November, to persuade the council's member states of the advantage of establishing relations of cooperation with the socialist countries on the basis of Kuwait's experience in this regard.

In addition to foreign policy and to the role which Kuwait will perform in bolstering the position of the Gulf Cooperation Council, political circles believe that Kuwait has exerted considerable efforts to lessen the tension which developed between Aden and the Sultanate of Oman in the wake of the conclusion of a tripartite treaty between PDRY, the Libyan Jamahiriyah and Ethiopia.

It is well known that Kuwait, represented by Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, had previously exerted

joint efforts with the UAE to lessen the tension arising in the relations between the PDRY and the Sultanate of Oman because of border disputes.

A few days ago, 'Abdallah Bisharah, the Gulf Cooperation Council secretary general, met with 'Abd al-'Aziz Husayn, the Kuwaiti minister of state for cabinet affairs and familiarized him with the mediation effort that he had conducted between the PDRY and Oman. Bisharah said that he realized that in the wake of the conclusion of the treaty between the PDRY, Ethiopia and Libya, questions had arisen which had to be answered and any misunderstanding or worry resulting from the treaty had to be dispelled. This could not have been done without absolute frankness and direct contacts. This what has actually been done.

On the domestic level, at a time when preparations have been started for inauguration of the second session of the Kuwaiti National Assembly, Kuwaiti circles have welcomed a number of laws and regulations which will go into effect when they are approved in the near future. These laws and measures seek to improve the general conditions and to make life easier for the majority of Kuwaitis.

Some of these laws are connected with housing and citizenship.

The Amir of Kuwait has recently said that he cannot imagine that a citizen has to wait 7 years to get a house. He has announced that a committee of Kuwait University professors has completed a new housing study and that the Council of Ministers will familiarize itself with this study and will make the proper decision in this regard.

As for the citizenship issue, the amir has announced that the state is currently examining nearly 60,000 applications for citizenship.

This is in addition to other issues, such as the problem of increased use of manual labor, job violations in the government or government participation sectors and the issue of opening the door for the foundation of Kuwaiti joint-stock companies instead of letting Kuwaiti capital move out of the country.

All these issues and the laws and regulations concerning them have been the subject of instructions issued by the Amir of Kuwait and are being studied by the Council of Ministers. These issues may be included in the agenda of the next session of the National Assembly.

It is worth noting that parliamentary activity in Kuwait had continued during the summer vacation and that a number of representatives questioned a number of ministers on various issues, most of them connected with the needs of the various regions for public utilities and services.

The Kuwaiti National Assembly has also participated in numerous conferences, including the conference of the International Parliamentary Union which was held in Cuba and which focused on discussing the political conditions in the area. The Kuwaiti delegation and Arab and allied delegations explained the problems encountered by the just Arab cause. The Kuwaiti delegation also explained the misconception concerning the role of the Arab oil countries in raising oil prices.

It is well known that inauguration of the second session of the fifth legislative season will take place on 20 October. The first session last year marked the date of the rejuvination of democratic life after a suspension of more than 4 years.
8494
CSO: 4404/76

NEW PARLIAMENTARY SESSION UGED TO BOLSTER DEMOCRATIC LIBERTIES

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 714, 21 Oct 81 pp 11-12

[Article: "National Assembly: New Session and Constant Tasks"]

[Text] The National Assembly has resumed its legislative march by concluding its second session yesterday, Tuesday, after its long annual vacation. While we welcome the assembly's new session, we must pause slightly to consider the previous session, not to evaluate and criticize it, but to refer to its significance in Kuwait's democratic life generally.

There is no doubt that the justification cited by the honorable members of the National Assembly and referred to by the press and by observers, namely that of the brevity of the first parliamentary session, led to limited accomplishment by the honorable Assembly members of the huge tasks that had accumulated during the 4 years in which the country's parliamentary life was suspended. Though there is a place for this justification in a realistic interpretation of the course of events of the parliamentary life of the previous session, what must be focused on at this moment, in which we are at the threshold of the new session, is the importance of democratic liberties and the importance of the availability of the means and instruments of these liberties, not only for the citizens but also for the comprehensive development that we all desire for our country.

From this positive premise in evaluating the previous session--a premise which underlines the need to entrench and strengthen the democratic course and to develop democratic institutions--we appeal to the honorable members of the National Assembly to shoulder their national and pan-Arab responsibilities in the current parliamentary session.

This session will continue until the sixth month of next year, meaning that the honorable representatives have ample time to examine the issues, laws, resolutions and legislation concerning the country's and the citizen's life. This means that time cannot at all be a justification this time for any failure or negligence at the end of the current legislative session, especially if such failure undermines the most sacred goals insofar as the National Assembly members and all the citizens are concerned, namely the democratic liberties of which the parliament constitutes no more than one form.

Consequently, it is your national responsibility, honorable representatives, to respond to the deepest national aspirations of the citizens to entrench the democratic process and to eliminate whatever may shackle the democratic liberties and the exercise of these liberties, especially the gatherings law and the publications law. You must shoulder the responsibility of firmly confronting any endeavors for the passage of these two laws under any pretexts.

Such a position should emanate from faith in the depth of the bond between the National Assembly on the one hand and the citizens and their desires and aspirations on the other. This is what we hope will be achieved in your new session and what will top the enormous tasks placed on your shoulders. The citizens are waiting impatiently for the accomplishment of these tasks.

8494
CSO: 4404/76

TRANSFER OF UNDERSECRETARY OF INTERIOR LAUDED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 714, 21 Oct 81 pp 10-11

[Article" "Transfer of Undersecretary of Ministry of Interior: Change That Has Come 15 Years Late"]

[Text] Amidst the throng of events shaking the area in the wake of al-Sadat's assassination, people in Kuwait have been surprised by a small news report of great significance in Sunday's 1300 newscast from Kuwait Radio.

The report contained news that the Council of Ministers has decided to transfer Maj Gen 'Abd al-Latif al-Thuwayni from his position as undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior to the royal court and to appoint Brig Gen Badr al-Khurafi as undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior. The decision does not say what the former undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior will do in the royal court or what tasks will be entrusted to him. This has been left for the intelligent to conclude and for the soothsayers and insiders to predict.

But why should such a decision have major significance and not be just another ordinary administrative decision like the many decisions made by the Council of Ministers?

The reason is that for a long time the issue of relieving the former undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior has constituted a general demand among numerous popular and official circles. Since the formation of the first National Assembly, i.e. since the early 1960's, criticism has been levelled against the Ministry of Interior as a result of the many shortcomings of those in charge of this agency, led by the former undersecretary. Demands for relieving the former undersecretary have come in succession from all the Kuwaiti National Assemblies, with the exception, of course, of the 1967 assembly. These came so as to provide an opportunity to Kuwaiti youth who have studied in police colleges and academies abroad and who have returned to find the doors closed on them so they could not perform their duties. This is especially critical since the security problems are increasing and intensifying as a result of Kuwait's development, expansion, the change in its pattern of life and increased population and immigration.

But for reasons known only to God and to those who have firm knowledge of the secrets, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior remained like a rock, unshaken and unshakable.

All the endeavors of advisers and critics went to waste and their efforts were like those of someone butting a rock.

There were promises to make the change. A few years ago, a sign of change appeared when well-educated youth in the Ministry of Interior, such as al-Khurafi, the late Muhammad al-Hamad, al-Qabandi and others, were entrusted with tasks indicating a change. But this sign vanished quickly.

Then there was the strong criticism levelled at the beginning of this year by the crown prince and the prime minister against the Ministry of Interior. People thought that the logical outcome of such severe criticism would be fundamental changes in the Ministry of Interior, led by the former permanent undersecretary, that would provide the opportunity for new blood qualified with education and experience to deal with the security problems. But this change did not take place.

This is why the report on the transfer of 'Abd al-Latif al-Thuwayni from the Ministry of Interior has been considered an important report. Many have been pleased with this transfer because the former undersecretary has succeeded in gaining the displeasure of many citizens, including workers of the Ministry of Interior.

The former undersecretary stayed in his post much longer than any official should stay. He was enthroned on the chair of the Security Directorate and the undersecretariat of the Ministry of Interior for more than 30 years. His dismissal has come 15 years late. People had almost come to believe that he would never leave this position, regardless of the country's need for change.

It is said that the asset on which the former undersecretary relied was that of pleasing the prominent people in power. It is reported that he knows all the personal secrets of the country's citizens, especially its prominent citizens. He considered this knowledge his impregnable stronghold to his position.

As for the direct cause for his dismissal, the well-informed say that the ambitions of the former undersecretary expedited the matter. The former undersecretary aspired to a higher position and it is said that he wanted to be the minister of interior. He was a candidate for this position during the latest cabinet formation.

The failure to appoint him minister caused him to adopt an uncooperative attitude toward the present minister. What is more, he used to overstep the minister by directly contacting those in higher positions on issues concerning the ministry, especially since he considered himself older and more experienced than the minister. This attitude provoked the minister to the extreme and the decision was taken with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

What makes the report more significant is the appointment of Brig Gen Yusuf al-Khurafi as undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior at a time when rumors have circulated about the possibility of appointing a member of the ruling family to the post. The appointment of Brig Gen al-Khurafi has sent a wave of relief through popular circles and circles of the Ministry of Interior. Brig Gen al-Khurafi is the opposite of the former undersecretary in everything. He is qualified both in education and in experience. He graduated from the police college and has held several positions in the Ministry of Interior. His integrity and uprightness are

attested to and he is one of the few who has not engaged in commerce or in a contracting business in addition to his official position. Moreover, he is an independent personality and those who know him know that he is not a bootlicker, a flatterer or a hypocrite. He is extremely frank and is stern in his support of right.

Many fear that the new undersecretary will be engulfed in the current of bureaucracy and fear for him concerning the dangers of the position. Many in Kuwait have been changed by positions and interests.

All hope that Yusuf al-Khurafi will be stronger than the negative aspects of the position and the bureaucratic current and that he will work with his collagues to prove that there are sincere people in Kuwait capable of reform if given the opportunity. These people also hope that if al-Khurafi is destined to leave this position, he will leave it with his head high. The people's appreciation and love would be a credit to him, whereas pleasing dignitaries at the expense of the people's interests would be a poor credit that would evaporate quickly.

8494
CSO: 4404/76

CENTRAL BANK REPORT UNDERSCORES ECONOMIC GROWTH

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 24 Nov 81 p 13

[Text] KUWAIT, Nov 23 (KUNA): "During the fiscal year 1980/1981, monetary developments in Kuwait were characterized by relative stability as demonstrated by some major monetary indicators", according to the annual report of the Central Bank, for the year ending June 30, 1981.

These indicators include the rate of monetary expansion measured by the rate of increase in the domestic liquidity available to the private sector, the report released today added.

This rate maintained the high level realized during the past year reaching 29 per cent following a period of decleration which continued for three consecutive fiscal years (1976-77-1978/79).

Monetary expansion in the past fiscal years (1979/80-1980/81) reflects the economic boom which the Kuwaiti economy has been witnessing since last year, the report said.

This has been conspicuously ascertained through some economic indicators the most important of which are domestic government expenditure and banking credit which at the same time constitute the two main sources of domestic liquidity.

As regards public expenditure which is the first major factor effecting domestic liquidity changes and the rate of monetary expansion, this expenditure coninued to have an expansionary effect on liquidity at a rate close to that reached in the past year, the report added.

Effect

Although the monthly follow-up statements of the state budget show that the rate of increase in domestic expenditure during the first eleven months of the fiscal year 1980/81 (14 per cent) is somewhat less than it was during the same period last year (19 per cent), it is however probable that this gap would vanish upon the completion of final statements in the closing accounts for the current fiscal year.

It is noteworthy that figures of government expenditure in the followup statements do not include government loans and shares which constitute an inseparable art of government expenditure as shown in the closing accounts, particularly with regard to their effect on the levels of domestic liquidity.

It seems to be almost certain that these government loans and shares will realize a substantial increase this year in the light of the increase in the capital of a number of public and joint sector companies and institutions as well as the new company established this year with the government subscribing to its capital with a sum of KD 70 million.

As regards banking credit, which is the second factor affecting the rate of monetary credit, the expansionar effect of this factor on domestic liquidity accelerated this year more than it did during the previous year.

It has been noticed that the rate of increase in the claims of commercial banks on the private sector, mostly credit facilities in the form of advances and discounts, reached 30 per cent the fiscal year 1980/81 compated to 27 per cent during the previous fiscal year.

It was further noticed that credit expansion during this year was mainly directed towards financing the productive domestic economic sectors in the light of the expansion witnessed by these sectors and the ensuing increase in bank financing required for such an expansion the report said.

The statements on the distribution of banking credit among various activities show that accelerated growth of banking credit had been prominently realized in the four main productive economic sectors, namely trade, industry construction and agriculture and fisheries.

The increase in the credit facilities granted to the trade sector reached 33.3 per cent in 1980/81 against 22.7 per cent in the previous year.

Similar increase in the facilities granted to the industrial sector reached 52.2 per cent against 43.9 per cent, the construction sector

27.5 per cent against 21.2 per cent and the agriculture sector 24.2 per cent against 12.4 per cent.

The third factor affecting the rate of monetary expansion is the private sector's capital transfers abroad. the report said.

Stability

The moderation in the rate of Kuwaiti capital transfer abroad during the fiscal year 1980/81 can be imputed to several factors of which the most important are: the slackening in the rate of import growth.

Another important factor which led to moderate capital transfers abroad was that Kuwaiti investors were maintaining an increasingportion of their funds in the country for local investment which proved viable particularly under the relative stability of international and domestic interest rates and the relative stability in the gap existing between interest rates on the KD and those on foreign currencies including the US dollar.

Other factors which helped in bringing about moderate capital transfers abroad were the continued contraction of foreign borrowing from the domestic marker whether through the issue of KD bonds or through obtaining syndicated loans in favour of non-residents, the continued decline in the demand for gold following diminishing speculation on this precious metal since the outset of 1980 and the halt in establishing new Gulf companies.

The decline in the rate of capital transfers abroad resulted in a constant growth of private sector deposits expressed in KD to 27 per cent in 1980/81 compared to 19 per cent in 1979/80 while the rate of growth of deposits expressed in foreign currencies declined from 109 per cent to 40 per cent the report added.

CSO: 4400/83

PAPER SCORES SOVIET INTENTIONS IN REGION

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 28 Nov 81 p 6

[Editorial: "Pro-Russian Arabs are Mistaken"]

[Text]

THE statement, "The Arabs have agreed not to agree" accurately sums up the present situation.

Frankly speaking, the Fez summit was a failure. King Hassan II of Morocco satisfied himself by criticising some of the Arab delegations. He said they were at Foreign Ministers' level, and not at Heads of State level. Any future summits at the same level will certainly fail, because summits should be for heads of state.

The Fez Summit failed because the "Arabs agreed not to agree," and because the Middle East is an area of wasted opportunities.

We ask the same question King Hassan II asked PLO leader Yasser Arafat: "Did Arafat talk with the Russians about the 1948 territories, and what was their reply." We ask the same question which was not answered by Yasser Arafat.

We ask the same question to emphasise the fact that pro-Russian Arabs are mistaken if they believe that Russia will regain Palestine for them. What the Russians want is the same thing as the Americans. They both want to promote their interests in the area. Whether it is through Egypt or Israel or Yasser Arafat is not important. What the Russians are concerned about is their existing interests, influence, domination and a market in the region.

Now Saudi Arabia has withdrawn its proposal. It was a simple one and could have been developed into an Arab ideology. This single ideology could have been offered to the international political forum instead of offering more than 20 views. The Arabs have made the world realise that Djibouti has a different view from Somalia, which holds a different view from Libya. Believing that victory is only in prayers and songs, Libya wants to fight the US. In one of the chapters in the Green Book, Libya wants to fight Russia, as if victory can be obtained through the X-65 tank or F-16 aircraft.

This contradiction should be ended through the Arab

Gulf and Peninsula countries. Otherwise these states will be contributing directly to the disturbances created by some Arab regimes. These regimes are distorting Arab demands and proposing weak formulas for Arab issues before the world.

Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries now enjoy a reasonable influence in the world. But this might not continue in the future or might be subject to many changes. The current American Administration is the strongest ally of Israel, but we can negotiate with the present Administration to ensure a minimum, fair level. This Administration may change in the future, to the advantage of Israel which knows what it wants and has worked for its objectives over many years.

Thirty years have passed and the Arabs have not succeeded in deciding how to achieve their goals. The present Arab formula is similar to that of the Comoro Islands which believe they can defeat the Americans or Russians if they want.

The Gulf and Peninsula countries should take a strong, strict stand to stop the disturbances in Arab issues at the international level. There shold be no more delay. Otherwise we will bite our fingers in future in regret.

CSO: 4400/83

ASSEMBLY CONSIDERS NATIONALITY LEGISLATION

Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 22 Nov 81 p 1

[Text] KUWAIT, Nov 21: "In 1980 there were 215,000 employed persons, but only 6,000 were Kuwaitis" National Assembly Speaker Muhammed Yousuf Al Adasani told deputies during yesterday's six-hour session.

The Speaker stepped down from his chair for the first time to sit with other deputies to discuss Law Decree No. 100 for 1980 on amendment of some articles of the Kuwait Nationality Law.

Al Adasani also said that 1980 statistics revealed there were 19,635 non-Kuwaiti businessmen and only 7,113 Kuwaiti ones.

He added "Let us take a figure of 10,000 expatriates as an example. Out of these 4,000 will be working and the remainder will be family members". He said that each 10,000 expatriates would consume 4,723 tons of food items subsidised by the government. They would use 41 million kilowatts of electricity and 603,000 gallons of water. They would require the services of 141 persons for education, 125 for medical attention, 135 security men, 167 home services and cleaning people, and 112 persons for repair work.

No plan

Al Adasani said that there were 23,000 inhabitants in 1961. There was a 9.5 per cent increase between 1960-65, 9.6 per cent between 1965-1970, 6.1 per cent between 1970-75, and 6.3 per cent between 1975-81.

During the 20-year period the population had increased by about 100,000.

"We had not planned for such growth" Al Adasani said. He added that this put a strain on ministries which had to increase their services.

The Speaker said that hospital statistics showed that in 1978 there were 104,429 patients. Out of them 67,197 were non-Kuwaitis and 37,232 were Kuwaitis. He expected the ratio of Kuwaitis to drop this year.

Al Adasani said that only about half the number of pupils in the schools were Kuwaitis.

Al Adasani also said that official statistics showed "the inhabitants policy is in danger" and if no clear policy was decided "the future will be one of instability."

He added "The Nationality Law should be based on the number of inhabitants we want in the coming five-year period. We should discuss the aim before the means, and find out if we have enough economic resources for our purpose."

He then asked "Are they to be from the Gulf and Peninsula, or qualified persons or youths?"

Others

Other deputies also commented on the decree. Some said it was unjust towards the Kuwaiti mother and family and to stateless persons. Others criticised the committees entitled to grant citizenship.

A number of deputies called for giving permanent residence to non-Kuwaitis who had served Kuwait for a long time. "This would give such persons some stability for themselves and their families" the deputies said.

No decision was reached. The debate will be continued at the next session, to be held on Tuesday.

The Assembly meeting ended with approval of ten law decrees issued while the parliament was suspended.

The Assembly also approved a draft law for a department at the Lower Court to look into administrative complaints. It unanimously passed the 14th report by the Interior and Defence Committee on draft laws about salaries.

CSO: 4400/83

BRIEFS

LABOR PACT WITH SOUTH KOREA--Kuwait, Nov. 22--Kuwait and South Korea have reached an agreement which will facilitate the arrival of Korean workers, Social Affairs and Labour Undersecretary Issa Yassin said yesterday. He added that he held talks with officials during his visit to Korea. He visited a number of factories. The Korean Medal of State was bestowed on Yassin. This medal is given to persons who contribute to promoting cooperation between the countries. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 23 Nov 81 p 7]

CSO: 4400/83

CONSTRUCTION COUNCIL'S PROGRESS REPORT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 48, 30 Nov 81 pp 4-6

[Article by Dr Paul Huygelen]

[Text]

Lebanon's Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), set up in January 1977 soon after the first phase of the war here, has just published Council President Muhammad Atallah's report on its activities since then.

From preface to conclusion, the author of the 84-page report feels frustrated by the continued turbulence, by the lack of security in the country that saps the Council's energies and by "the vast task that remains to be done." And that task is defined only in terms of bricks and mortar, whereas minds and souls of a generation are at stake. However this aspect of reconstruction is beyond CDR's terms of reference laid down in Legislative Decree No. 5 of January 31, 1977. In fact, one might argue that it was the resurgence of violence during subsequent phases of turmoil that generated the psychological void that now also needs remedying.

Reference is also made poignantly in the report to financial and technical aid from abroad "in amounts far short of our just requirements." Indeed, Lebanon has little chance to reconstruct except by pulling itself up by its own bootstraps. And, in a country where private enterprise is still paramount, the only quality that is missing is the political will to get organised accordingly.

What Dr Atallah cannot say in his report, but presumably must realise, is that aid, grants, loans from the US or the EEC, or other bilateral economic assistance are being given very clearly by the countries concerned for essentially political reasons, at present in most instances just "to keep a foot in the door."

Lebanon is getting but little economic aid for economic reasons. The process, controversial though it may be, is vitiated from the start. It is a hard blow to take for a country which, ever since its adherence to the United Nations Charter, saw itself in the vanguard of a pluralistic civilisation, therefore counting on generous pluralistic economic aid.

On at least one occasion, not so long ago, the Governor of the Lebanon's Central Bank made it clear that Lebanon does not need American money (and, if he had been addressing a group from Europe instead of a luncheon gathering hosted by the then US Ambassador, he would have said the same about the paltry sums provided from that quarter). What is required, Dr Michel Khoury underlined, in a political situation is political assistance. And this has been forthcoming in even smaller doses than economic aid. The situation in South Lebanon is self-explanatory in this respect. As a result, the CDR is in a situation even more difficult than the report on its four to five years of operation lays before our eyes.

What every political scientist, who studies both international sides of the Middle Eastern coin, realises is that it is premature to predicate Lebanese security on a solution of the Palestinian problem. The problem for Lebanon (and others) is the containment of Israel within its own flexibly designed boundaries.

That is where the CDR's reconstruction objectives, let alone its development hopes, meet the moment of truth. It is the simmering turmoil in Lebanon's South which is the CDR's true ordeal. The occasional insecurity of crossing between East and West Beirut, which inhibits reconstruction in the capital, is but a symptom of what is undermining the body politic from South to North throughout the country. While the difficulty in coping with this now results partly from neglect over several decades in coming to grips with the development of the South, the CDR's efforts will continue to appear academic until the containment of Lebanon's southern neighbour is achieved and internationally guaranteed. In fact, Dr Atallah is himself very outspoken in his report

when he underlines that the past four years were "anguished years in which the rate of reconstruction was often surpassed by new destruction" and well-laid plans had to be put aside. He adds: "Our progress to date does not give us great satisfaction." One could add that one is not going to reconstruct if one does not foresee the possible enjoyment of that reconstruction.

Twelve out of 25 pages devoted to summarising CDR's progress in reconstruction efforts in the public sector cover hospitals and health facilities. This is a significant indicator of the country's requirements, made more striking by the fact that almost as much money is budgeted for this work as for the extension of the Port of Beirut or road rehabilitation and maintenance in the country. In addition, the variety of the grants' contributors in this medical field is noteworthy: they are the Dutch and American governments, UNDP, UNICEF, the EEC, in addition to some LL 127 million ($27 million) reserved from the Tunis pledge.

This pledge was made in November 1979 by Arab League members and covers potential contributions of $2 billion over a five year period, half of the funds to be reserved for South Lebanon: CDR considers it "the cornerstone" in its financing programme but regrets that "some payments are late"; the report acknowledges receipt of $206 million.

In spite of the importance assigned in the report to the "reconstruction" of public sector health care facilities, in several instances one encounters descriptive terminology defining the projects' status as "no studies yet available." It becomes clear from such statements how relevant is the stalemate in CDR's critical assumption to the effect that "the authority of the State will gradually increase throughout the country. This process is necessary for reconstruction, and is in turn aided by reconstruction efforts." Dr Atallah remarks that "the State is gaining authority, but slowly."

The report also reviews steps taken to help the private sector revitalise itself. These include the provision of easy credit to industry, hotels, and private hospitals, for property repair, settling farmers' debts, help for law offices that suffered losses because of the fighting, and many other areas of assistance. Measures regulating relations between pre-war and wartime creditors and debtors encased in various legislative decrees are also listed in the report. The creation of the National Investment Guarantee Corp. in 1977 is covered as a positive step since 1977 towards reconstruction and development in the private sector, as indeed it has proven to be.

The most important contribution to reconstruction in the private sector, though alluded to in the CDR report, cannot be covered there in detail due to the nature itself of the contribution. Remittances from overseas by temporary emigrants which amounted to the equivalent of about $2 billion in 1980 are what have kept the country afloat. The similarity between this figure and that of the Tunis pledge is purely coincidental. It is nevertheless thought-provoking.

The expatriate Lebanese's labour, intellectual or manual, constitutes one of the essential "bootstraps" referred to earlier, the other one being the almost proverbial resilience of the young and old who remained on the home front. One cannot avoid but note this character trait even though it ranges from the construction of illicit ports along the coast to obviate or complement the inadequacy of the damaged port of Beirut right down to the makeshift car reconditioning and repair shops run mostly by teen-agers amid the ruins of the capital's Bab Idriss quarter, where few Beirutis dare set foot these days. Resilience there is.

Hence it is not surprising that CDR's report acknowledges the primacy of the private sector as the "principal generator of productive activity." The day when adequate security is maintained voluntarily, private funds will not be lacking for reconstruction instead of for mere repair, for expansion and development instead of for patchwork change.

That is when CDR's services, built up painstakingly since 1977, will be able to bear fruit if serious planning continues in the meantime. The Council has already set up an Operations Information Room (OIR) which will soon start developing procedures for periodic reporting of progress or the lack thereof. It has also begun to build a Management Services Unit (MSU) designed to assist ministries and agencies to develop management systems for the projects they are planning and implementing, and to work out control procedures including financial schedules and deadlines. A Technical Support Group (TSG) is being set up under UN auspices to relate reconstruction projects to long term objectives and to begin development planning. Long term planning is a difficult concept to master in the Middle East: the lack of security in Lebanon inhabits the process even further.

Whether the CDR's new priorities will turn out to be improved waste disposal and sanitation, or road maintenance work, or port extension, matters little at this stage. Dr Atallah's report states unequivocably that "reconstruction priorities are continually shifting with events, so that no firm listing is appropriate at this time." What does matter is to get something visibly worthwhile started, to regenerate public confidence in the CDR's existence. In this connection the report itself is an achievement, as it presents a useful compendium of the Council's plans and attitudes.

The cost of reconstruction was estimated at some LL 14 billion in 1977. In 1979 the International Monetary Fund found CDR's plans would not cause undue pressures on the country's balance of payments. Similarly the World Bank thought the initial reconstruction prog-

ramme ambitious, but feasible. Worldwide and domestic inflation have had an inevitable impact in the meantime on the estimated costs of the projects. It is understood that, early in 1982, the reconstruction programme will be revised and its cost factors recalculated to reflect the new economic realities and the progress made so far.

The private sector's assessment of the country's future opportunities, including those in South Lebanon, should play an influential role in these revisions. The success of the potential issuance of Government reconstruction bonds to cover the early shortfall of funds will then be a foregone conclusion, thanks to the bootstraps simile.

CSO: 4400/85

BRIEFS

AID TO LEBANON--The Bank of Lebanon announced last week that transfers totalling $89 million had been received from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as part of an Arab aid package agreed to at the 1979 Arab Summit in Tunis. Lebanon had previously received $281 million out of the five-year package of $2,000 million. According to the schedule of transfers, which calls for $400 million per year, Lebanon is due to receive another $430 million by the end of this year. Our sister publication, the daily An-Nahar, expressed optimisim that more transfers would be recieved before the end of 1981, commenting that this would help lower the balance of payments deficit and strengthen the Lebanese Pound (An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO, November 16). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English No 48, 30 Nov 81 p 5]

CSO: 4400/85

GENERAL ECONOMIC, POLITICAL TRENDS SUMMARIZED

London AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL in English No 24, 25 Nov 81 pp 1-3

[Text]

Now that the **United States** Congress has finally approved its foreign aid bill, Sudan is almost assured of getting $100m of military aid (AC Vol 22 No 22) and $100m of other assistance, including USAID subsidies. It now only remains for the House of Representatives to give the final go-ahead. From Khartoum, President **Jaffar Nimeiri**'s lobbying effort in Washington during the week before the Congress vote, is thus seen to have been a success, and in the face of growing internal problems on three broad fronts.

1) A combination of poor economic results, the need to press through an unpopular IMF-inspired economic programme, and the effects of the Moslem fundamentalist revival in the region has pushed Nimeiri to greater reliance on the army (represented at the top by first vice-president Gen. **Abdel Magid Hamad Khalil**) and the security services (whose chief, Gen. **Omer Mohammed al Tayeb**, was promoted one of the two other vice-presidents in October). The regime has as a consequence found its basis of support increasingly restricted. Few members of either the traditional parties, the Umma, the Ansars, or the Unionists, bother to participate in the "National Reconciliation" exercise. A sparring match going on between two of Nimeiri's bastions of support — the moderate wing of the Moslem Brothers and the Marxist inclined wing of the bureaucracy, particularly the SSU — adds to the fray. Until recently Nimeiri has been able to keep these two groups fairly evenly balanced, and apart. But the death of **Anwar Sadat** and the deterioration of the Sudanese economy have revived both wings to alarming proportions.

The moderate Moslem Brother party, whose most prominent member is attorney-general **Hassan al Turabi**, is under pressure from Islamic extremists and from Ansar politicians, such as **Sadiq el Mahdi** (former prime minister and Ansar leader), who have been competing for its Moslem constituency. Nimeiri, acting mainly through Gen. Omer, has had to clamp down on both Moslem Brothers and communist sympathisers. Earlier this month he dissolved the National Assembly (calling for elections in December) and dismissed his entire cabinet (a collection of meritocrats who appeared lost for political initiative). Although the US administration is generally satisfied with Nimeiri (and cannot fail to be aware that the $100m of military sales will bolster the image of the Sudanese army and therefore its support for Nimeiri), there remains a good deal of anxiety about Nimeiri's autocratic approach, an alternative to which, for instance, could be a cabinet led by Sadiq el Mahdi. But the latter believes that the present regime is anyhow doomed. The best Nimeiri can now hope for, is more Ansar and Unionist support in the new assembly and in his future cabinet.

2) The autonomous Southern region has experienced its own variations on the Moslem Brotherhood/communist revival theme, which has sprung up as a rejoinder to the way the Islamic issue is used in the North as a legitimate area for manoeuvring by underground political parties. Southerners remember how this type of vote catching damaged southern interests during the civil war. Now, the North is seen as no less disdainful of southern interests. The turning point was the decision in early summer to site Sudan's new oil refinery at Kosti in the North, despite the Regional Assembly's recommendation that it should be in the South at Bentiu, in Bahr el Ghazal, close to Chevron's oil finds. In the political wheeling and dealing over the Kosti decision it appeared that the North was appealing to tribal interests, thus supporting the regionalisation argument advocated by former High Executive Council President, Gen. **Joseph Lagu** (AC Vol 22 No 20). Lagu, it will be

recalled, has suggested the division of the South into three separate regions as part of an overall decentralisation policy, arguing that it would serve better the interests of the different peoples of the South and break the hegemony of the Dinkas, the largest tribe in the region. But others argue that Lagu is still smarting from his ousting from office in 1979 by a Dinka-dominated coalition headed by **Abel Alier**, the prominent former southern leader. They are particularly concerned that Lagu appears to be playing into the hands of Northern politicians, who, playing the Moslem fundamentalist card, would like to see the South divided and weak.

Although public discussion of the regionalisation issue was banned in March, it continued to be an important talking point throughout the summer. At the same time as dissolving the National and Regional People's Assemblies, Nimeiri appointed a 15-man provisional government in the South headed by a hardline Moslem soldier from Wau, Maj. Gen. **Gasmallah Abdalla Rassas** (Rassas means bullets in Arabic) who is head of the military staff college in Khartoum. His caretaker government appears to be weighted in favour of further regionalisation, with strong regionalisation advocates, such as **Darius Bashir** and **Philip Obang Oyway**, in prominent positions. Ostensibly the people of the South have the final say in a referendum (to coincide with Regional Assembly elections) due to be held by April next year. Former regional finance and industry minister, **Bona Malwal**, for a long time minister of culture and information in Khartoum, and his political mentor Abel Alier, are now leading the opposition to regionalisation. But unfortunately the debate is split along traditional lines, with Dinkas and the rump of the *Southern Front* movement in one camp and people from Bahr el Ghazal and Equatoria — many with SANU connections — in the other.

3) Although there has been resistance to the IMF's programme of radical reform (not least by communist sympathisers) finance minister **Badr el Din Suleiman** has pushed it through fairly methodically — with the spur of increased *World Bank* and multilateral agency support, American assistance and rescheduling of commercial bank debts if all went well. However, in the summer it began to appear that the results of the programme, begun in 1978, had not been as good as expected. Cotton output was still low, luxury goods were coming into the country at an alarming rate, and agriculture and industry continued to perform badly. As a result, signature of the agreement to reschedule $425m of debts, expected to be finalised in August, has been held up until perhaps December. The stumbling block appears to have been Sudan's inability to remove subsidies and further devalue the Sudanese pound. In October the IMF mission arrived in Khartoum and demanded full implementation of its proposals as its price for a new SDR 198m ($220m) standby credit. Nimeiri had to agree to the removal of subsidies on petrol ($53m in 1981/2), sugar, wheat and flour ($97m); a 12½% devaluation of the Sudanese pound (now 90 piastres to the dollar instead of 80); abolition of the dual exchange rate, which allowed certain goods such as pharmaceuticals, wheat-flour, petrol and dried milk to be imported at a cheap favourable rate further cuts in expenditure; and reductions in customs and excise duties and other measures. Nimeiri's cabinet, already tossed to and fro by political controversies, balked at such radical measures. So the President blamed them collectively for Sudan's economic failures and sacked the lot of them on November 9. Clearly such drastic measures have to be explained to allies, particularly ones as interested in Sudan's financial health and future as the US. But the consequences are not clear yet. Already there have been reports of student violence in Khartoum in protest against the 40% rise in fuel prices following removal of subsidies.

Even the White House was a little taken aback by the shrillness of Nimeiri's anti-**Libyan** and anti-**Soviet** diatribet at the time of Sadat's death. But as the passage of the Foreign Aid Bill shows, the US still wants him as an ally. In turn, Nimeiri will have to convince the US that he has a viable policy towards his neighbours. Thus the ubiquitous Gen. Omer was in Paris in mid-November coordinating anti-Gadaffi strategy with France and the various strands of the warring Chadian parties, particularly **Hissein Habré**'s *Forces Armées du Nord* (FAN) and President **Goukkouni Waddeye**'s *Frolinat* party. Sudan is also helping to sponsor the anti-Gadaffi *National Front for the Salvation of Libya*, headed by former Libyan auditor-general, **Mohammed el Mahgaryef** who hopes to stage a show trial of the Libyan leader in Khartoum in February. Among the hundreds of arrests made during the last two months in Sudan, was a former southern MP, **Bel Leyel**, who was reportedly either carrying, or somehow in possession of 1m. Sudanese pounds. Sudanese security services claim that Leyel had been given the money by **Sherrif El Hindi**, the exiled former minister of finance who now has close links with Libya. Leyel says that the money had been donated by **Saudi Arabia** to build mosques in Sudan.

One mystery Nimeiri could have dropped some hints about is his intended date of retirement. For some time he has been talking of stepping down from

the Presidency. The consensus is that if he is to do so, it will be when Sudan's new regional structure (with six to eight regions) is securely in place. But that may be a long time coming

THE EMBATTLED PARTY. The dismissal at the end of October of **Khalifa Khogali**, the assistant secretary (state ministerial status) of the ruling *Sudanese Socialist Union* (SSU) "headquarters affairs and organisation department" appears to be the manifestation of a conflict that has besieged the SSU for a long time. Essentially it has been a battle between the liberals and the conservatives, with Khalifa (who was a history school teacher at Rumbek Senior Secondary School during the civil war) and **Makkawi Awad El Makkawi**, the secretary-general of the *Sudan Youth Association*, seen as representing a liberal wing in the SSU. On the other hand are the conservatives, composed of Islamic fundamentalists, particularly the Muslim Brothers. Though not himself a known member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Gen. Omer (some regard him as more of a Unionist), who is also an assistant secretary in the SSU, leads the conservatives, and is popular with both the Ansar and Brotherhood political religious groups.

The conflict in the SSU started seriously in 1977 when national reconciliation was formally agreed upon. Opposition groups have since then begun to merge with the SSU. Sadig El Mahdi, the leader of the Ansar, became a party politburo member; Hassan Turabi, the secretary-general of the Muslim Brotherhood, became assistant secretary-general for external affairs and information of the party. But the newcomers have not spared the SSU from criticism. Sadig has criticised it for not being democratic enough and of failing to reach the masses; the Muslim Brothers are now accusing the *Sudan Youth Union* and *Sudan Women's Union* (all under the SSU) of being dominated by anti-Muslim Brotherhood elements and of being prone to the old cadre of the regime, which effectively quashed the influence of those parties opposed to the reconciliation. While Sadig resigned from political office and has since kept himself out of any political activity, the Muslim Brothers are on the rise (AC Vol 22, No 20). Turabi, it will be recalled, was appointed attorney-general in 1979. The rise of conservatives in the SSU and government is viewed with great alarm by liberals and the left-wing, who loathe to see conservatives, either who were earlier against the SSU or who are new to the party, now come to the top.

Having lost in 1979 their top man, Mag. **Abul Gasim Mohamed Ibrahim**, then the number two man in the government and party, partly as a result of conservative pressure, the liberals have found politics difficult. Earlier this year, Khalifa had an argument with Omer which ended up in a fist-fight. Both men submitted their resignations to Nimeiri, who promptly ignored the whole incident. The conflict has, however, continued. After the **Chadian** embassy in Khartoum was bombed by some Chadians in June this year, the liberals sharply criticised Omer for lax security. But instead of dismissing Omer, Nimeiri elevated him in October to the post of vice-president. He still retains all his other jobs. Khalifa was, of course, sacked within weeks of Omer's elevation.

While the conservatives have won the day again, the tide may well change against them, not least because Omer has a lot of powerful opponents outside the SSU. Southerners are suspicious of and vehemently dislike the "muslim fanatics" (the conservatives) because of their call for complete Islamisation of the laws. Omer's anti-South feeling, and his conservative and religious beliefs, are well known in the South. He and Hasan Turabi are now the least popular Northerners in Southern eyes.

Recently Omer ordered the arrest of all 15 Southerners[1] on the Solidarity Committee of the defunct Peoples National Assembly, which compiled a pamphlet that has been declared by the SSU to be subversive. Printed in September in the Nile Printing Press (a government department) in Juba, after attempts to have it printed in Khartoum had failed, the pamphlet's contents were written with the unanimous consent of the committee, although the Southerners claim that they themselves wrote the passages critical of the North and opposing the redivision of the South.

Joseph Lagu, believes the pamphlet was actually written by **Abel Alier**, **Bona Malwal**, and Ambrose Ring, a former SSU boss in the regional assembly in Juba. Lagu dismisses the fifteen as "political prostitutes" hired with money. Alier probably lost his job as leader of the South as a result. Omer ordered all six provincial commissioners in the South to arrest the 15 Southerners so that they could be brought to Khartoum by the 19th October, presumably to be investigated and then detained as political prisoners. A number of them had in fact already been arrested in Juba when they had gone to Bona Malwal to complain. Bona then went to see Maj. Gen. Rassas, the new leader of the South, who sent a message to Omer to suspend the arrest warrants. We do not know the contents of Omer's reply, but none of the others have been jailed, and the few who had been arrested were released. Pressure on Nimeiri to remove Omer and some of the conservatives may well become too strong for him to ignore●

Footnote 1: **Michael Jalon Andrew, Andrew Acin Nyin, Peter Samuel Moga, Awad Abdalla Wani, Cirillo Chan, Hussein Ajuong, James Ajing Poth Ater, Benedict Zugumbia Tembura, Gordon Ismail, Musa Fargalla, James Aniceto, Michael Malet, Thompson Thon, Paul Koryom** and **Daniel Thon.**

CSO: 4500/74

GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO IMPROVE FREE ZONES

London 8 DAYS in English No 47, 28 Nov 81 pp 40-41

[Text] SYRIA IS REVIEWING the future of its free trade zones, set up after 1971 to attract foreign capital and build an export-oriented industrial sector. Finance Minister Hamdi Saqqa said that a special study on the zones and their benefit to Syria was being prepared by the ministry of economy and foreign trade, following questions as to whether they were meeting their original objectives.

Arab economic experts have commented that the latest Syrian move is consonant with other economic and fiscal measures taken recently by the republic to curtail the excesses which have obstructed the moves towards an open-door economy taken since President Hafez Assad took power in 1970. Some of those excesses have led to charges of corruption and favouritism being levelled against some traders who had benefited from the open-door policy.

Dr Saqqa said that the ministry of economy report would be considered by Abdel Qader Qaddoura, the deputy prime minister for economic affairs, probably early next year. The committee would include the ministers of economy, finance, oil, industry, agriculture and supply.

The General Authority for Free Zones (GAFZ) was created in 1971, attached to the ministry of economy and foreign trade. At that time, only one free zone existed in Syria, that of Damascus, which covered an area of 88,000 square metres and was administered by the general directorship of customs. Two other free zones operated as port facilities only, in the Mediterranean cities of Latakia and Tartous. After its creation, the GAFZ took over these three zones and began to work on three others: in Adhra (north of the capital), at Damascus International Airport, and in Aleppo. Later, plans for a seventh zone in the southern city of Dera, on the Jordanian border, were added.

Income from the free zones rose to a peak of Syrian £7.119m ($1.8m) in 1977, but has fallen in real and sometimes even in cash terms since then. In 1978, the cumulative total of revenues from the GAFZ totalled only S£4.9m ($1.2m) more than the authority's considerable S£17.18m ($4.5m) expenditure on them up till then. The figures are thought to have deteriorated since.

According to a government statement published recently, Prime Minister Abdul Rauf al Kasn has said he wants to vet all new licences for building or expanding industrial plant in the free zones.

Goods manufactured under licence from western companies in Syria's six operating free zones range from cosmetics and toothpaste to medicines and light industrial products. But the zones, which cover a total of 7,000 sq km, have failed to attract foreign medium or heavy industry.

Dr Saqqa said that the committee would decide whether to expand or reduce the role of the zones and whether to change existing regulations covering them. 'At the moment we get no tax benefit from them and they are a drain on our skilled labour. The profits are mostly going abroad,' he stated.

Economy and Foreign Trade Minister Mohammed Atrash admits that the performance of the free zones has not lived up to expectations: instead of spawning export industries they have become distribution centres for consumer goods destined for local markets. Producing in the zones brings exemption from customs duties, labour and corporate income taxes and many important exchange control regulations. But Atrash thought that the zones still had an

important role to play.

Dr Saqqa said that no decision had been made so far on the future role of the zones, but it was clear that they had to be integrated more into the Syrian economy. Often the zones had been used simply as entrepôts for goods in transit, bringing little real benefit to the economy. Foreign manufacturers have used them to transit products to other Middle East states, as well as the Soviet Union.

Iraq has signed a $250m contract with the Brazilian company Engesa, which manufactures armoured cars and other military vehicles as well as tractors and agricultural machinery.

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END

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REACTIONS OF EGYPTIAN OPPOSITION TO MUBARAK REGIME

Critic Disputes Foreign Involvement

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic No 204, 19 Oct 81 p 22

/Article by Jamal Isma'il/

/Text/ The Cover Story: Some hours after al Sadat's assassination on 6 October, the Egyptian opposition in London distributed a statement declaring that al-Sadat's killing is to be considered the first incident of its kind in the modern history of Egypt and that if this incident proved anything it was that al-Sadat had pursued a path which was not normal as far as the feelings of the Arab people in Egypt and their domestic and national orientations went.

The statement, which the news agencies distributed in London, stressed that violence begets only violence and that al-Sadat reaped the violence he had pursued against the nationalist opposition, in spite of the claims he made about democracy -- which was in reality a disguised dictatorship that increased with the arrest of all the nationalist opposition, in all its creeds and tendencies, regardless of age, sex or religion. Therefore the opposition found recourse only to the method of violence in responding to his methods.

The statement by the Nasirist Egyptian opposition abroad declared that the shots fired at al-Sadat were not so much aimed at him as at his domestic and national policies and his hostility toward his Arabhood and his national identity. It said that al-Sadat's killing constitutes a lesson for everyone following the same path.

After the statement stressed that this event would shake al-Sadat's policies, regardless of who took power after him, it said that al-Sadat imagined that he could fool everyone in Egypt some of the time, or fool some of the people all of the time, but he could not fool all of the people all of the time.

This statement was issued under the signature of 'Abd-al-Majid Farid, former minister for the presidency in the era of 'Abd-al-Nasir and now chairman of the board of the Center of Arab Studies in London. He is well known as the most prominent leadership personality in the Nasirist tendency abroad.

AL-DUSTUR met with 'Abd-al-Majid Farid and a brief conversation took place on the assassination and the statements made about bodies that were responsible for it outside Egypt, as well as what would happen after the killing of al-Sadat.

As regards the assassination act, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid expressed his belief that the group which executed the operation was a domestic military group that acted without any guidance or contact from abroad. He said that when the "windows" of democracy in Egypt are closed and its ruler departs from Arab society and does not accept consultation, explosions and rectifications come from the army, which is part of the very essence of the Egyptian national movement and expresses the nationalism and the feelings of the Egyptian people most truthfully.

'Abd-al-Majid Farid said in this regard that what the Egyptian army did under 'Urabi's command and what it did under the command of 'Abd-al-Nasir were not far from people's memories and he also stated that the men in the army of Egypt today are not the children of a specific class but are the children of all social groups.

Concerning the "organization" that declared its responsibility for the assassination from Beirut, which was said to belong to an organization led by Gen Sa'd al-Shadhili (the armed forces chief of staff in the days of the October war and a leading figure opposed to al-Sadat abroad), 'Abd-al-Majid Farid said that he did not believe that this information was correct and added that the organization al-Shadhili had formed under the title of the National Front basically consisted of the Egyptian Communist Party (Foreign Branch) and some independent elements.

With regard to the religious current inside Egypt and declarations made about the affiliations of the people in the group that carried out the assassination act, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid referred to the fact that al-Sadat had used the religious tendency "in the political sense" when he came to power, with the objective of hitting out with it at the general leftist tendency in the form of Nasirists, communists and socialists. He added that for the sake of this goal the religious tendencies were permitted much greater degrees of movement than were the other political forces, but toward the end of his time al-Sadat suffered from that tendency.

On the assassination itself, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid said that it was difficult for the human mind to imagine or accept that just four or five people were behind this planning.

In response to the question "After al-Sadat, what?" 'Abd-al-Majid Farid replied "Al-Sadat's departure will have a great effect in the international and Arab contexts.

"In the international context, America saw a substitute for the Shah in al-Sadat, especially when we consider Egypt's resources and advantages in terms of geography and people. America also saw in the Egyptian-Israeli alliance an alliance which covered the area and was a base against the Gulf, to compensate for the rapid deployment forces. It is certain that the calculations have been disrupted today, with the death of al-Sadat."

In the Arab context, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid expressed his belief that al-Sadat "as a person" had personal outbursts which blocked the road between Egypt and the Arabs.

Concerning Egyptian policies after the departure of al-Sadat, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid stated that any regime that wanted to rule and continue to rule in Egypt and not end up the way al-Sadat did must take Egypt's interests in the first place, before any other interests or considerations.

When the new ruler begins to review his calculations, he will have to realize that Egypt's interests in the existence of national unity will be realized only by a national reconciliation that joins all political forces around a single goal, and that it is also in Egypt's interests to have its cause resolved within a real Arab context, because what Egypt can obtain alone is certainly not what it can obtain in an Arab context.

Similarly, Egypt's interests lie in liberating Arab and Egyptian soil at the same time, and in returning, in the international context, to the policy of nonalignment and positive neutrality now that the barriers to the isolation which occurred between Egypt and the Arab community in recent years have been broken.

As to whether he believed that the Egyptian regime under the presidency of Husni Mubarak would be different from what it was under al-Sadat's presidency, 'Abd-al-Majid Farid replied by declaring "In general no new regime makes statements as soon as it takes power, to give reassurance to the international community. Following a review of calculations, what has been said in the first weeks could change." In this regard 'Abd-al-Majid Farid emphasized that the first step that must be called for now is the immediate release of all the opposition forces that al-Sadat arrested and the granting of /rights/ to them that opposition forces in all democratic regimes get.

'Abd-al-Majid Farid reasserted that national reconciliation and support for military force, the restoration of the Arab role to Egypt and its return to the Arab community, and the pursuit of a balanced international policy was the way to govern in Egypt.

If the regime continues al-Sadat's platform and policies, what happened on 6 October is not remote from one's mind.

Leftist, Paper Trade Charges

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 40, 9 Nov 81 p 4

/Text/ With reference to what was published on the first page of issue 39 of the newspaper MAYU, /See article following this/ I present you with the following response, in hopes that you will be so kind as to publish it not just in declaration of the truth and not just in execution of the provisions of the law, but also to underline a new spirit which must govern dealings between the opposition parties and the ruling party, whose policies your newspaper expresses.

Proceeding from this premise, I am writing you the following explanations in hopes that you will be kind enough to publish them:

1. As regards our part's request to meet the president, while our party issued a decree to its members to vote "not in agreement" in the referendum to elect the president, the secretary general of the party, prior to the referendum, requested a meeting in which he stated the reasons for this position. These may be summarized by the fact that our party was opposed to the main policies of President al-Sadat, out of a position of principle, and that when President Muhammad Husni Mubarak declared his full commitment to these policies and positions, our party, in harmony with its position in principle, voted, along with its members and friends, that it

was not in agreement. Had it done otherwise its previous opposition would have been based on personal foundations, not on an objective position of principle.

Then again after the referendum our party requested a meeting to state our views on the current policies in general.

2. As regards your remark that the party issued a statement in which it welcomed President Mubarak and that the party said that it was comforted because President Mubarak did not attack the Soviet Union or Libya, which you said provoked indignation because the president does not attack the Soviet Union, Libya or any other country, we would like to point out the following:

A. The party did not happen to issue any statement to that effect.

B. The last statement issued by the secretariat general of the party was the one in which its members and friends called for a vote of "not in agreement" in the referendum to elect the president. No other statement was issued by the party since that.

C. The fact of the matter is that the secretary general of the party gave a number of press interviews in which he underlined a number of the positive aspects contained in the president's statements and speeches, including the fact that President Husni Mubarak did not take a position of hostility to the opposition or persons in it, even those who did not vote for him in the referendum; that the president called for a dialogue with the opposition; and also that he did not attack Arab countries and issued orders to the press not to reply to the attacks issued by Arab countries, mentioning specifically Libya, and would not start a military attack on any Arab country, specifically Libya.

He called for a fight against corruption and laxity and said that he would settle the conditions of the people who had been detained and would release anyone against whom no act that was criminal by law had not been proved. Also he did not attack the Soviet Union in his speeches and statements.

It is no secret that quoting part of the statement not only disrupts the balance of the truth, it also perhaps on some occasions gives an impression contrary to the truth, which is what happened in regard to this incident. In any event, our party does not conceal its position on the need to improve relations with our brother Arabs, among them Libya, and the need to return to a policy of nonalignment and balance in international relations, especially the two superpowers, in a manner that will protect Egypt's interests.

3. As to what you published to the effect that an official source told MAYU "Why does the Grouping Party single out these two countries in particular -- every Egyptian's affiliation must be with Egypt and all his thinking must be on Egypt's behalf!"

That statement provokes indignation because it is not a true democratic tradition for anyone to make himself responsible for determining to what extent Egyptians are loyal to their country. Perhaps the official source needs to have us remind him that improving relations with our brother Arabs, including Libya, is one of the pillars for realizing Egypt's interests and that Egypt cannot attain its real

interests in conflict with its Arab brothers. In addition, the policy of nonalignment and adoption of a balanced position vis-a-vis the two superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, also lie at the heart of Egypt's interests.

How greatly our party wishes that that tune which casts doubts on the loyalty of Egyptians for views they hold or which considers that loyalty to Egypt is the monopoly of people with a specific position or a specific view would vanish. In any event, the people alone are able to issue their verdict on the loyalty of a given party to the cause of the nation and the people.

4. Our party appreciates the difficulty of the present circumstances and appreciates the need to concentrate all efforts on facing terrorism under any uise. Our party expressed its practical position of appreciation of these circumstances, in hopes that other parties would take the same position.

/Signed/ Khalid Muhyi-al-Din

MAYU Follows up:

Khalid Muhyi-al-Din ended his reply to MAYU by saying "Our party appreciates the difficulty of the present circumstances and appreciates the need to concentrate all efforts on facing terrorism under any guise."

We would have hoped that this statement, which was made in the words of Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, had been turned into practical exercise to which his party committed itself, and that the party would really have acted in accordance with an appreciation of the current circumstances and would have forgotten the narrow party view for the sake of the higher national interest for a while.

If the Grouping Party had committed itself to what its secretary general actually says, and placed the national interest ahead of party interests, the party would have adopted the same position, marked by responsibility, that its colleague in opposition, the Labor Party, did.

The Labor Party, the Grouping's colleague in the opposition, rose above all the sensitive feelings and disputes that had blemished its relations with the National Party government in the recent period. The party just mentioned that all Egypt was facing a dark danger, that democratic life, with all its ramifications, was exposed to threats of armed terrorism, and that the terrorist scheme, had it succeeded, would not differentiate between the majority and the minority, or between the party in power and the party in opposition.

For this reason the Labor Party took a wholehearted Egyptian position. It did not look at the referendum on the presidency as a party matter but considered it a national issue linked to the stability and security of Egypt. When the party said "Yes" to Husni Mubarak, it was in reality saying yes to the stability and security of every Egyptian citizen and was participating with the rest of the masses in protect-Egypt from falling into the hands of bloodthirsty terrorist gangs.

The Grouping Party, most unfortunately, could not rise to the level of this historic position and transcend its party view of affairs in delicate circumstances which cannot endure a party viewpoint.

For this reason the party issued a decree to its members to vote "not in agreement" in the referendum. Its excuse in doing so was that it opposed the policies of the late leader and that President Mubarak proclaimed his commitment to those policies.

This means, for instance, that the Grouping Party wanted Husni Mubarak to abandon the policy of peace and consequently abandon the remaining portion of Sinai, which was to be liberated in a few months, so that the party could say "yes" in the referendum.

While the Grouping Party decided to depart from the national consensus on such an issue of destiny, that is its right as guaranteed it by the democratic rules to which we adhere.

However, it would have been more appropriate for the Grouping Party to exercise this democratic right within the boundaries of the nation first of all, and not rush to export its positions to foreign papers, because the issue of constitutional change in Egypt does not concern the readers of papers abroad so much as it concerns the Egyptian masses.

In spite of all that, President Husni Mubarak has announced that he will meet Khalid Muhyi-al-Din as he met Ibrahim Shukri and Mustafa Kamil Murad, because Mubarak's decisions are issued from a nationalist perspective, not a party one, and because the majority chose Mubarak as a president for all the Egyptians.

Mubarak Will Meet Muhyi-al-Din

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 39, 2 Nov 81 p 1

/Text/ Khalid Muhyi-al-Din, chairman of the Grouping Party, was requested a meeting with President Mubarak. The president has agreed to meet him but the date has not yet been set. The president previously met with Ibrahim Shukri, chairman of the Labor Party, and Mustafa Kamil Murad, chairman of the Liberal Party, in accordance with their request.

The Grouping Party issued a statement welcoming President Mubarak and the party said that it was satisfied because President Mubarak did not attack the Soviet Union or Libya. This provoked disapproval because President Mubarak does not attack the Soviet Union, Libya or any other country.

A responsible source told MAYU "Why does the Grouping Party single out these two countries in particular? Every Egyptian's affiliation must be with Egypt and all his thinking must be on Egypt's behalf."

Mubarak Meets Opposition Heads

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 29 Oct 81 p 3

/Article by Ibrahim Shukri/

/Text/ President Husni Mubarak invited us to meet him. The meeting lasted an hour, and could have been confined to expressions of politesse, but the president, on his initiative, turned it into an invitation to a dialogue that might take place among

parties in order to create positive participation based on the general reconciliation that everyone wants.

This is a very positive trend, and it could have good results. While there is a large majority whose numerical superiority enables it to govern and carry out the policies the party seems fit, we can only imagine that this country, and this people's affairs, are the responsibility of everyone living on Egyptian territory.

When there is stability or when there are dangers, the effects of this stability and these dangers are not only reflected on the party of the majority -- they are also reflected on everyone living on the territory of Egypt and clinging to the hope that there may be a way for this people to advance for the sake of attaining its national goals and raise its individuals' standard of living in order to attain welfare.

I do not consider that President Mubarak's call for participation is directed at the opposition parties alone. Rather, it is a call to everyone, including the National Party itself, based on the fact that the stability we all want, setting forth sound bases for our life, is not the responsibility of people who assume power or who are in various places in the agencies of the government but rather is the product of the work or can be the product of the work of all the members of the society -- the majority and the minority.

For the notion of a dialogue to succeed we must set forth bases and guarantees for it.

There must be a "permanent means" for this dialogue and an atmosphere which will make it an objective dialogue that can produce the desired results must be provided.

On this point, I consider that means should be made available to the opposition parties to express and declare their views on all the matters that are taking place; thus we will be able to say that their opinion exists, concerning issues that need to be presented to the people, and that it is reaching all the members of the people.

There might be issues that require specialized study committees in the parties and here these committees must be furnished an opportunity to obtain correct information on those issues which might be of importance for public policies, so that these committees' views might come forth in a manner rounding out all the objective elements and founded on information and facts which might be of use to the government agencies themselves.

When the arena of dialogue is the People's Assembly, it must review the opinions presented by the opposition, on grounds that that constitutes an attempt to offer another view which it would be beneficial to hear and must not be inevitably rejected just because it issued forth from the ranks of the opposition.

This requires generosity of spirit and broadmindedness which will make it possible to understand positions and will create a quiet atmosphere for the discussion of all the various angles presented, even if the dialogue ultimately concludes by settling for the majority view.

That is, giving a complete opportunity and a suitable atmosphere to the issues

discussed in the People's Assembly is the way to create what I am always anxious to call "mutual respect" for opinions presented without trying to depart from objectivity or from the principles of dialogue.

There then comes an important point, which is direct, ongoing meetings between the president and the leaders of the opposition.

In my opinion, this kind of meeting can be wholly beneficial because it will give a full opportunity for an exchange of views at the level of responsibility which everyone senses, namely that there are national interests which can be the subject of the common appreciation of all, apart from any party disputes, tendencies or programs.

Moving over from the notion of dialogue itself to what actually occurred during our meeting with the president, I can say that the president presented us with numerous aspects connected to the policies through which he is aiming at sound progress in the domestic and foreign fields.

The president also presented some examples of ways in which one could benefit from the views of opposition parties in solving the problems of the masses in a manner that can truly be a prelude to the desired dialogue.

While my discussion of the dialogue assumed a theoretical approach based on the presentation of ideas and conceptions, I nonetheless say that many of the ideas that President Husni Mubarak has presented indeed require that we acknowledge their positive points.

The president stresses with full clarity that his Arab policy platform will be based on discontinuing anything that could raise doubts that campaigns exist on the part of the Egyptian media to slander Arab regimes or try to create conflicts or opportunities for conflicts. The president stated most clearly "We will not reply to anyone attacking us and will give them an opportunity to think and review matters."

I consider this a good approach which can lead to a more suitable climate for conceiving future policies and creating points where Egypt and the Arab countries can come together.

When the president spoke about the liberalization policies, although he underlined the fact that there was no turning back from these policies, he also stressed that they just be committed to and emphasize the notion of production and the creation of more job opportunities for Egyptian labor and that the liberalization projects must respond to meeting the basic needs of the people.

The president dealt with this set of aspects which we have long been discussing in the People's Assembly and on many occasions in our papers. He referred here to the production of ordinary clothing as an example of a positive aspect of liberalization and projects to produce sodas as examples of another aspect.

The president stressed his adherence to democracy. I can say that the main burden of the attainment of sound democracy and of giving an opportunity to grow to parties on which democratic life is based lies on the majority party and the leadership of President Husni Mubarak more than on the minority or opposition parties.

The transition on which we have embarked from an authoritarian regime in which official agencies play the basic role in running affairs to a system of a multiplicity of parties and a multiplicity of platforms makes the president's responsibility for arriving at proper results a large one. By proper results I mean ones that the people feel and for which forms, numbers or evidence are not drawn up that strive to make them seem in the media to be greater than what the people actually see has been accomplished.

While the opposition has been accused of having been profligate at times in criticism which seemed unobjective to some people, that may be attributed more to the fact that the opposition lacks direct contact and means for ascertaining the facts than to a deliberate goal in itself. Here I am speaking specifically about the Labor Party.

I believe that direct meetings will offer ongoing opportunities to provide remedies and that President Husni Mubarak will greatly serve democracy by giving an opportunity for the views of the opposition parties to be heard.

This is the democratic method; whatever sufferings might arise in the exercise of it, efforts must be exerted by everyone to exercise it and I believe that the president also considers that they are a better method for arriving at the proper formula for the people's course of action.

In my opinion, sincerely joining forces to achieve democracy by its proper methods will do our country a great service and will block off the approaches for people who want to play with the stability of this country through improper forms of expression, indeed through crime. We consider that constant dialogue, whatever distances there might be among ideas, even to the point of extremism, will show the people of this country and the generation that is to take responsibility in the future the tendencies that some opinions and approaches have turned to.

I predict that this dialogue will have a good future. This is what President Husni Mubarak stressed, stating that he would overcome extremist and wrong ideas on the part of a few young people through constant dialogue through the parties and men of religion who know the true bases of religion. I believe that this is a proper approach which can lead to better results, with God's permission.

Opposition Leader Requests Dialogue

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 5 Nov 81 p 3

/Article by Ibrahim Shukri/

/Text/ President Husni Mubarak has given domestic action prime importance as far as the government is concerned in the present stage and has raised a number of issues which he considers to have priority in his policies.

There is no dispute over the order of these priorities; indeed, there is no dispute either over the president's diagnosis of some negative features that everyone has sensed.

However, the question remains: how can we remedy these negative features in order

to arrive at results in solving problems which are better than the ones we have reached now?

What I mean by that is real results that people perceive and that everyone senses.

When we speak about fighting corruption, about stopping all forms of laxity and about setting examples, people must be aware of the results that have been attained in their daily lives.

Setting the House in Order

The way to do that, in our opinion, is for us to cast a new glance at setting the house in order, by which I mean two specific points:

First, creating the forms through which each citizen can pursue his role.

Second, having every citizen realize this role lest we find ourselves in a regime where citizens look about themselves in bewilderment seeking a role.

How therefore can we prompt people to take part and have faith in the value of what their role achieves and what that provides for the role and for everyone?

How can people really be convinced that the measures taken to combat corruption and laxity, for example, will be applied, and applied to everyone?

The State of Institutions

Here we must penetrate to the heart of the matter:

In one stage we adopted the slogan of a shift from the authoritarian system in which a single person grasps all the threads of decision to the system of party pluralism and the state of institutions.

We understand the state of institutions to be a state in which each institution's role and responsibility is defined and these roles and responsibilities are felt and function in a climate that enables them to act fully without any ambiguities about the effects of one institution on another.

When I brought that up on numerous occasions, the ready answer was that the institutions actually exist and are playing their part without interference from anyone, and further such talk, evidence for which was facilitated by theoretical articles of the constitution and the contents of the various laws and bills which regulate the activity of each institution.

However, practice has revealed something else to us, which I can express as the existence of a sort of "moral," not material influence on these institutions. That is an influence which on some occasions transcends the material influence which could be spelled out in a written stipulation or by clear deterrents.

We know that the authorities here, and in all countries, are three -- the executive authority, represented by the Council of Ministers, the legislative authority, represented by the People's Assembly, and the judiciary authority, whose highest

agency is the Supreme Judiciary Council -- in addition to the press, which is a fourth authority. These are the main institutions of the state.

The Moral Influence

When the head of the state, for example, is at the same time the head of the Council of Ministers, it does not require much thinking for people to sense the possibility of the existence of this type of moral influence on the executive institution which we are talking about.

The gravity of this situation is that on some occasions that could pose an obstacle to other powers and institutions in performing their role. It is the essence of the role of the legislative authority, which is the People's Assembly, that it should hold the prime minister to account when the situation requires such a calling to account. There is no doubt that the People's Assembly faces great embarrassment when the prime minister whom one wishes to hold to account is himself the head of state.

Therefore, our joy was great when President Husni Mubarak declared his determination to relinquish the premiership. Therein lay a correction of the essential situation, and the grant of a real opportunity for the sound exercise of democracy.

Loyalty to the People

When we get to the legislative institution, which is the People's Assembly, the matter also of necessity requires that it be freed from the suspicion that it is succumbing to any type of moral influence.

The assembly is elected; the loyalty of its deputies must be first to the people and to the constitution. We have felt, however, in some situations, that loyalty to the party takes precedence over loyalty to the people.

When 96 percent of the assembly members belong to the ruling party, which is headed by the chief of state -- and this majority feels at all times that a given view or another is that of the head of the party, who is the chief of state, or even that he makes hints to that effect -- the effects of that must result in party commitment overcoming commitments to the people, to the point where there might be a contradiction or lack of congruence between the two commitments. We would very much like the chief of state to remove himself from that situation, since we want him to be the overseer of the entire party experiment.

Therefore what was published in the newspaper MAYU, the paper of the National Party, concerning new appointments this week is an expression of a proper approach which will receive full support and backing from us.

An Honor Which We Are Grateful To Give

We then come to the judiciary institution. There is no argument over the fact that we in Egypt have an independent judiciary whose positions have deserved and always will deserve from us full praise and appreciation. Perhaps as a form of honor to this growing authority, the late leader created a new situation, which was that the head of state was at the same time the chairman of the Supreme Judiciary Council.

However, if we apply the principle of the freedom of institutions, this makes us exempt the lofty authority of the judiciary from any ambiguity concerning moral influence arising from this situation, which it most emphatically can do without, and in our estimation and that of the whole people is too lofty to be exposed to.

A Single Ship

Perhaps the late leader was thinking about some of the points we are raising now, and raised previously, when he decided to go down himself to the man on the political street and the chairmanship of the party, and explicitly announced that there was no decision that took as much thought and hesitation from him as this did.

I personally was a member of the cabinet at that time and I know how this decision in fact was the object of great discussion and debate on the part of the late leader and those who were close to him.

When we come down to setting the house in order, there is no doubt that that will be a new buttress for the course of democracy that can be added to the support that President Husni Mubarak's initiative of opening a new page in the dialogue with the parties has added to it.

At that time the masses will accept public action enthusiastically, because they will feel that we are all passengers on a single ship and that no one is taking more than he is entitled to or more than he is; the people will thereby see a motive to participate and give some of their thought to the public interest.

The President Watches over Everyone

In this manner we will give every citizen a chance to choose in total freedom the program in which he sees the picture of his thinking and aspirations, without being subject to any influence or the possibility of being faced with any vexations if he prefers one program over another.

Thus we will have a true state of institutions with clear features and specific roles, and a stage in which circumstances suggested to the chief of state that his presence in person in all the institutions of the country, directly or indirectly, in a manner governed by the law or the constitution or by a moral situation contained a sort of honor to these institutions, will end.

In my belief, President Husni Mubarak can most confidently begin to set the house in order, take his position as an arbiter among all authorities and devote attention to the interests of the nation and the entire people.

President Husni Mubarak's initiative is what encourages me to write this statement. This week I read his statment that he would assign the ministers concerned to take his place in the celebrations of the professional unions lest it be said that he was watching over those unions or concealing his supervision from them because in his position he watches over everyone.

Husni Mubarak's statement on the people who were detained in early September and his assertion that the investigations would end soon, that people who were not involved in the charges would be released and that the detention period would not be con-

sidered a sentence is occurring in the same context.

The application of all this will certainly be in the interest of democracy and in the interest of the National Democratic Party and the whole party experiment which we are anxious to have continue without error.

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GOVERNMENT PAPER OUTLINES EXTREMISTS' TAKEOVER PLOT

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 38, 26 Oct 81 p 3

/Article by 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Dib: "Details of the Terrorist Plan To Declare a Khomeyni-Style Revolution: The Goal Was To Assassinate All the Leaders on the Reviewing Stand"/

/Text/ What are the details of the terrorist plan the conspirators had prepared to spread chaos and anarchy and surge to power by carrying out what is known as a Khomeyni-style revolution?

How did the terrorists plan to take over the radio station and transmit statements declaring a Khomeyni-style revolution and claiming that it had taken place with the support of the people?

Who are the members of the terrorist government who were given the name of the Council of Learned Men?

Who are the members of the council of consultation and religious rulings?

Who is the "organizing mufti" who issued his rulings that made killing and theft of the citizens' property legal in order to carry out the schemes of the terrorist organization?

The investigating bodies have put their hand on the schemes in full. The confessions of the accused terrorists are unanimous on the details of the vile conspiracy that began with the assassination of the late leader Anwar al-Sadat.

The security agencies in the Ministry of the Interior are still liquidating the remaining terrorist nests and it is expected that the liquidation of the nests of the plot will be entirely finished before the end of this week.

Zero Hour

Zero hour was set as the time for the assassination of the leader Anwar al-Sadat!

The scheme was that the military reviewing stand would be blown up last 6 October and that all the executive and political leaders on it would be killed, along with all the personalities who were sitting there, after which the stages of the Khomeyni-style revolution would begin!

At that time, the plotters had made a plan to occupy the radio station. In the terrorists' organization there was a radio broadcaster and radio engineer whose roles had been spelled out:

The role of the announcer, name of Muhammad al-Beltaji, was to announce the declaration of the Khomeyni-style revolution. The announcer of the Khomeyni-style revolution had been requested by the organization to prepare statements on reel tapes for direct broadcast on the air.

The role of the engineer, whose name was Sayyid Rashad, was to cut the lines and connect all frequencies to the broadcast of the declaration of the revolution.

A plan was drawn up for breaking into the radio and television building.

The announcer and the engineer gave the organization information on the guards that were present inside. Members of the organization observed the guards from outside.

The password for breaking into the radio station was "light."

The announcer and the engineer were arrested and the entire plan for breaking into the radio station was exposed!

The Mufti of the Organization

The investigations revealed other new secrets.

It appeared that the organization's mufti, whose name is 'Umar Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, of the Faculty of Principles of Religion in Asyut, who has been arrested, is the person who ruled that a Khomeyni-style revolution was to break out and ruled in favor of the assassination of executive, political and religious leaders. It has been established that he has a high leadership rank in the organization which had great influence in terms of execution, and that he ruled that it was legitimate for the terrorists who belonged to the organization to steal to have money to spend on the goals and schemes of the organization and that it was legitimate for them to kill anyone opposed to their ideas and schemes. He ruled that the officials' women would be the captives of the members of the organization and they would have the right to possess and dispose of them!

Financing

Among the property of the terrorist mufti, who is blind, the sum of 6,000 pounds and $20,000 was discovered in totally new bills with serial numbers in sequence. It was discovered that the mufti had hidden the money under the waist of his trousers. The investigating bodies are completing the investigations into the source of the financing.

Also as regards financing, the policemen seized the sum of 50,000 pounds in the home of a member of the organization along with papers showing that 40,000 pounds had been deposited in the Islamic Bank. He said that it was to be spent on the organization.

Confessions by members of the terrorist organization also revealed a number of facts, among them:

The democratic climate dominating the country gave the organization the chance to exploit the propaganda aspect of the opposition parties which was directed against the regime or the government, through symposia, publications or newspapers, in order to create a climate that extended to the discussion of political issues under the cover of religion and concentrate on the movement and activity of some proselytizers, deliverers of sermons and religious figures who were opposed to the regime, to attract them to the side of the terrorist organization and its movement, or attract personnel to the organization from among their disciples in the mosques where they spoke.

Assassination of the Leaders

The element of tension that some opposition parties unleashed in the recent period, on the one hand, and elements of deviant and fanatic religious activity on the other, gave a strong push to the members of this terrorist organization.

Consequently, their plan was to assassinate the political leaders and government officials. Their entire expectation was that the people, in their various groups and parties, would support their movement, then the declaration of the Khomeyni-style revolution would start, and their enemies would be eliminated, including all opposition members and politicians outside the Islamid groups.

The foundations of the organization's thinking and the premises of its goals and schemes are in conflict with the system of a party pluralism, the system of democracy, or rule by politicians. These are all the ingredients of an infidel society and regime, while the notions of the organization coincide with the thinking and the system of Khomeyni.

The Peace Treaty

Going by the propaganda stirred up over the peace treaty with Israel and the normalization of relations with it, the leaders and personnel in the organization believed that the treaty had eliminated the accomplishment of the October victory in the political and religious consciousness of the country.

This was a factor which made it mandatory not to shrink from carrying out the assassination plan during the October victory celebrations.

In another area, the confessions of the members of the terrorist organization revealed the specific style and thinking of this organization with the aim of achieving its criminal objectives. Among the most conspicuous characteristics of this style and thinking are:

The fact that the organization aimed, through the integrated plan it had set forth, at assassinating President al-Sadat, then at liquidating all the political and military leaders, to be followed by the occupation of the Ministry of Defense, the radio and television building and the central telephone exchange, then an attack on

and occupation of the centers and institutions of the police and the vital centers of the country, and then an approach to the masses through the broadcast of a declaration announcing "the establishment of a revolution with its Khomeyni-style platform."

Moving the Masses

Moving the masses to support the revolution to take over the Egyptian streets through a technique based on district commanders from the organization staff, which is similar to the mullah system in a Khomeyni-style revolution.

The proliferation of sermon-givers and proselytizers in the mosques who opposed the regime in their sermons, their concurrence with some persons from opposition parties and others in symposiums, and sermons in the mosques were sources by which they could issue "Islamic rulings" on the organization through some of its members, although they had not attained a level of learning or religion which would permit them to do so.

The rulings of the organization's mufti revolved about three areas:

Considering that the ruler and the people who helped him were infidels and that it was legitimate to shed their blood!

Considering that the property of some people in the society could be considered "booty" on behalf of the organization, so that therefore they committed thefts to finance the organization's weapons, materiel and hiding places.

Women As Captives

"Holy war" made it legitimate to take the women of some officials as captives whom it was legal to keep as prisoners and control.

In the event their schemes succeeded, two councils would be formed, one the council of religious scholars resembling the ayatollahs in Iran.

The second council would be the consultative council, ruling the country and the people.

Religious personnel from the organization or religious tendencies that cooperated with them would be appointed to the council, in addition to the religious committees and the militia, which were actually formed within the organization out of personnel who were mostly students and such skilled workers as painters and foundry workers.

The Council of Scholars

The investigations disclosed that included in the council of scholars which was to take power were Hafiz Salamah, the imam of the al-Nur Mosque, al-Mahallawi, imam of the mosque in Alexandria, Mahmud 'Id and 'Abd-al-Rashid Saqr, imam of the Salah-al-Din Mosques, 'Abd-al-Latif Mushtahari, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Sala'm, Faraj and

'Abbud al-Zumr, Fu'ad al-Dawalibi and Tariq al-Zumr. The chairmanship of the council of rulings and consultation would be assumed by 'Umar Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman, who prepared 100 copies of a tape cassette for broadcast in the mosques and shrines dominated by the organization.

The security agencies in the Ministry of the Interior are continuing to liquidate the nests of the terrorist organization. In the last 48 hours, up to dawn yesterday, a number of hiding places in Cairo and al-Jizah were broken into, including:

Weapons and Weapons

Forty rounds, 24 defensive hand grenades, 3 packages of exploding projectiles, 15 rounds of flares, 10 hand grenades, nine oil tins filled with ammunition, 41 cartridges, 16 hand grenades, 5,000 rounds of Russian bullets and seven iron chests of rifles.

These arms and explosives were seized in al-Ma'adi in the home of Nabil Muhammad Muhammad Bar'i, [illegible] is a member of the terrorist organization.

In the last 48 hours, a 9-millimeter Uzi submachine gun was also seized with a 7.65-millimeter pistol and a case which had four rounds and four locally made pistols with two barrels, a 7.62-millimeter gun barrel, a 7.62-millimeter automatic rifle with bayonet, 14 cases of automatic rifles including two loaded ones, with 30 rounds in each, three special cases for loaded Russian automatic rifles, with 30 rounds in one of them, 20 rounds in another and two in the third, in addition to an automatic rifle barrel and 11 boxes of ammunition with 20 7.62 x 39 rounds, two boxes of pistols, with five 22-millimeter rounds in one, a carton with 50 22-millimeter rounds in it, a plastic bag with 423 rounds of the same caliber in it and another one with 54 rounds of the same caliber.

A Ring of Explosives

In another hiding place, the security men managed to discover that the terrorists had made a rig of explosives about their nest, so that if any security officer approached the circle would explode on the policemen while the terrorists escaped through a back door. Within this nest the security officials came upon 238 assault bombs, 14 defensive bombs and 12 incendiary bombs.

Number of Arrested Persons Rises to 397

The number of arrested persons to be investigated in the form of the leaders and personnel in the terrorist organization has risen to 397.

Thus 37 new accused persons have been arrested in the last 48 hours.

An Organization Leader Came out of Prison!

Nabil Na'im 'Abd-al-Fattah, a member of the terrorist organization, had previously spent a sentence period in prison on the charge of killing and stealing. After his release on 6 September 1979 he became a prominent member of the terrorist organization that had hoped to govern Egypt. This is a picture of him when he had been

in prison doing his sentence. He is now a fugitive and the policemen are on his trail.

They Read Mao Zedong's Book "Guerrilla War"

Security men found plot plans of civil and military locations and installations which the terrorist organization leaders had planned to assault and blow up by explosives in most of the terrorists' hiding places.

The security men came upon six documents inside the nests containing a summary of Emam Khomeyn's book "Islamic Rule" and a book titled "Guerrilla War" by Mao Zedong, along with 34 code charts, newspaper clippings with pictures of some senior officials, a handwritten paper on means for using weapons, books on karate training, Islamic books on Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, Abu-al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Sa'id Hawi and others, and a memorandum titled "Security Tasks and Measures during the Occupation."

In addition, 3,545 Egyptian pounds, US $170 and 50 Saudi riyals were discovered.

Nabawi Isma'il Takes Part Personally in Seizing the Terrorists' Nests

Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, moved to the sites of the nests that had been seized yesterday at dawn in the company of Maj Gen Hasan Abu Basha, first assistant minister of the interior for state and public security, and took part personally with the officers and men in assaulting these nests.

The deputy prime minister and minister of the interior ordered that immediate generous bonuses be paid out to the officers and men who had carried out the seizure operations.

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NEW LIGHT SHED ON SUPPRESSION OF ARMED UPRISINGS

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 39, 2 Nov 81 p 3

/Article by 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Dib: "The Downfall of the Terrorists: Their Gangs Tried To Escape with Forged Passports!"/

/Text/ 13 October had been set as the date for the operation!

One week after the assassination of the leader Anwar al-Sadat, they schemed to assassinate Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, in his home, along with his family!

They moved uneasily. Their great scheme, whose zero hour was set at the moment of the assassination of the leader al-Sadat, had not gone into effect as scheduled! Police personnel had come upon an important number of their leaders on 25 September and even after they succeeded in assassinating al-Sadat, Egypt's leaders, whom they had schemed to get rid of at the same moment, were spared by the grace of God, after they threw two grenades which did not explode at the stand.

All the subsequent steps that were planned were spoiled by rapid, alert movement on the part of government agencies and leaders, headed by the Ministry of the Interior. Even in the incidents in Asyut they were surprised by the determination, resolution and violence of the confrontation, as a result of which the incidents were suppressed and kept from spreading to other governorates!

What personnel did they succeed in recruiting? What secret code did they identify one another by?

What is the pyramidal composition of the terrorist organization? Who are its leaders and members?

In recent days, the Ministry of the Interior has revealed a full list of the vilest of terrorist schemes and has spelled out the roles regarding each level in the organization, along with the level of each leader and each of its members, in full.

The terrorists' confessions have been made in full and confirm every word included in the Interior Ministry security agency investigations.

The features of the picture have been filled out!

The ugly face of the vilest plot which the conspirators wove in the dark and began to carry out in order to shed rivers of blood in the safe corners of Egypt, eliminating the national leaders who have exerted and are exerting labor, sweat and lives for Egypt's sake, has been laid bare.

Most of the leaders and the most dangerous elements of the terrorist organization, who recruited in every governorate terrorist elements, and schemed to provoke chaos and anarchy everywhere in order to seize power, conduct wholesale executions, spill blood and exploit religion--a religion of which they knew nothing--have been brought down.

Only a few holdovers from the terrorist gangs remain, and they are being pursued by police agencies with the utmost alertness and attentiveness and extreme knowledge of the danger of this terrorist organization, which tried to cover Egypt in black and bring it to ruin, with crows cackling over it.

How did they plan for their bloody operations?

The organization leaders, who still were out of the grasp of the police, met to prepare an assassination plan! At the end of the meeting a decisive decree was issued: Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, a main commander of the organization, was assigned to supervise the planning of the operation.

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj assigned one of the organization's commanders in the working group in Cairo and Lower Egypt named Salih Ahmad Salih Shahin to command the operation, with the assistance of Mahmud al-Khatib, along with 11 other terrorists who belonged to the organization.

Last 13 October was set for the execution of the operation!

The terrorists passed in front of and examined Nabawi Isma'il's house, drew up a plot plan of it, and determined the number of positions of the guards present. After that the terrorists went to Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj and presented him with the plan. However, he himself made another investigation, then made modifications to the plan and told them "Divide yourselves up into three groups. One group will assault the house from the front, a second group will infiltrate into the house from the rear via the building that lies behind the home of the minister of the interior, through an underground garage by which they will infiltrate, and a third group will break into the house under the cover of the /other/ two groups."

They did not settle only on that in preparing the operation and ensuring its success. One of the organization leaders seized an opportunity to hold a wedding party for one of his acquaintances in a villa on the street behind the interior minister's home, attended the party and went onto the villa balcony to make an examination of the interior minister's home from the rear.

Before the day of the execution of the scheme, the members of the organization who had been assigned to take part in the assassination operation and break into the

interior minister's home fell by the wayside. Salih Ahmad Salih Shahin, the commander of the operation, was arrested, and the weapons they were to use were seized during the attacks launched to liquidate the terrorists' nests before the dimensions of this plan were discovered.

The organization commanders confessed that the plan had been prepared and that the personnel who had been assigned to carry it out had been chosen.

Successive Confessions

The striking confessions on the part of the commanders and personnel of the terrorist organization nest coming one after the other and painted an ugly picture of the most dangerous assassination plot in the history of Egypt.

The organization was formed at various levels: at its apex were the council of scholars, which was to take power, and the consultative council which was to take charge of rulings and proselytization. Three committees branched out from these two, the preparation committee, the economic committee and the proselytization committee.

The preparation committee was concerned with obtaining money and arms for the organization. Among its activities were the planning and execution of burglary operations, theft and the embezzlement of contributions collected for the construction of mosques or for the mojahedin in Afghanistan. The economic committee was concerned with determining the organization's financial resources and different aspects of expenditures and with supervising activities. Among the tasks of the proselytization committee were propagation of the notions and platform of Atonement /and Repentance/, supervision of aspects of proselytization, and preparation of groups which would spread out among the masses to mobilize them behind the leaders of the terrorist organization.

The security agencies in the Ministry of the Interior seized the organization's officials in the provinces and the personnel that they had schemed to rely on in terrorist activities, setting off chaos and anarchy, and assaulting police installations and complexes in all governorates.

It appeared that the terrorist organization's consultative council was headed by 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, the terrorist mufti; among its members were 'Abbud al-Zumr, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj (the official for Cairo and Lower Egypt), Karam Zuhdi, the official for Upper Egypt, Fu'ad al-Dawalibi, 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid, Muhammad 'Isam Darbalah and 'Ali al-Sharif.

A working group was formed in Cairo Governorate and all the governorates of Lower Egypt under the chairmanship of 'Abbud al-Zumr, containing Tariq al-Zumr, Nabil al-Mughrabi, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj, Salih Shahin and 'Abd-al-Majid al-Fiqi. The Upper Egypt working group, under the chairmanship of Karam Zuhdi, had Fu'ad al-Dawalibi, 'Ali al-Sharif, Najih Ibrahim, 'Asim 'Abd-al-Majid and Mihammad Darbalah as its members.

Under these levels, plans were made to form revolutionary committees whose task was to hold demonstrations, sever telephone communications and assassinate the political and executive leaders supporting the national regime they wanted to get rid of.

The leaders of the terrorist organization confessed that they adopted pseudonyms within the organization, such as Abu-al-Harith and Abu-al-Kunyah, and that they held most of the organization meetings to prepare their plans in certain mosques on the excuse of frequenting them to pray. Among these were the 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz mosque in Bulaq al-Dakrur, the al-Anwar mosque in 'Ayn Shams, the al-Tawhid mosque in Sift al-Laban, the al-Gharbi mosque in Nahiya, the Kirdasah mosque, the al-Haqq mosque in the Thousand Dwellings area, and the shrine of the martyred 'Abd-al-Mun'im Zayn-al-Din by the pyramids.

Financing

From the investigations into the terrorists' confessions, it appeared that they used some Koranic verses as codes or symbols among themselves to identify one another and conduct secure communications. Some members of the organization admitted that Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam Faraj assigned them to go out to collect donations on the pretext of building mosques or improving or putting water facilities in mosques, and they did go to collect them and hand them over to him. He confessed that he exploited the receipts from these donations, and donations collected in the name of the mojahedin in Afghanistan, to buy weapons and cars, and he also compelled some affluent members of the organization to pay sums of money to finance the organization.

In the terrorists' confessions it was stated that 'Umar 'Abd-al-Rahman, the organization's mufti and the chairman of the consultative council, sold some gold for 11,000 pounds that organization members had obtained by stealing from jewelry shops in Naj' Hammadi and Shubra al-Khaymah. Of that, the organization's mufti handed only 3,000 pounds over to the organization leaders! With that they bought a second-hand Peugeot car which they used in the incidents in Asyut. When they confronted him with the fact that the sales price was 11,000 pounds, he told them that it had been his intention to hand them over an additional 5,000 pounds as well as the 3,000 he had given them. Of the remaining 3,000 pounds, 1,000 had previously been lent out to the organization and the other 2,000 were his salary for the rulings he had issued for the organization! One should realize that when he was arrested, the sum of 6,000 pounds and $20,000 were found in the mufti's possession.

Policemen seized a large amount of stolen gold in the town of al-Dalinjat in the Governorate of al-Buhayrah in the possession of a flour merchant named Hatim Zaki Nasr.

A tremendous amount of cassettes that the terrorists had prepared for use in the events of factional strife were seized and documents were discovered which revealed their roles in setting off the events in al-Zawiyah al-Hamra'.

Security men in the Ministry of the Interior seized all the members of the group which was to attack the radio and television building following the assassination of the late president. They were 50 in number.

Occupation of Newpapers

Investigations into and confessions by the terrorists revealed that they had prepared a plan to send groups to occupy the press organizations while they occupied the radio and television building. The goal was to put out special issues of the papers listing all government organizations and authorities' support for their movement and to assassinate and liquidate all leaders who had popular, executive or media weight whom they feared would move against them.

The investigations also disclosed that the commanders of the terrorist organization compelled the young people they had succeeded in recruiting to read specific books based on the renunciation of society and the encouragement of violence under the rubric of "holy war," in the book "The Ladder up to Acceptance" by Hafiz ibn Hukmi, "The Date Has Moved Up" by ibn al-Qiyam, interpretations by ibn Kathir, "The Blissful Gardens of the Righteous" by al-Nadwa, "Apposite Statements" by Shaykh al-Sa'di, "Tyrants" and "Life After Death" by Ibn al-A'la al-Mawdudi, and "Platform of Islamic Revolt" by Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi as well.

The terrorists assigned groups to slip in amongst people at prayer to propagate the concept of renouncing the ruler and provoking the masses and instructing them that holy war against the ruler was the only proper way. They appointed a group of terrorists to each mosque which was concerned with these duties.

The whole plan failed!

The organization's leaders and members were thwarted; only fugitive bands remain and they are being pursued and arrested by the security agencies.

Their arrest is inevitable.

Retired Police Officer Applies for Work without Pay

During the visit Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, made to the injured policemen who attacked the terrorists' hiding places and seized them and the arms and ammunition in their places, a lady came forth who was the mother of a wounded officer and told the deputy premier that her husband, a retired police officer, while now retired, wanted to return to service without pay to help pursue and arrest the terrorist murderers.

Nabawi Isma'il told the mother that her husband had made sacrifices all during his service for his country and that her son was now performing the duty of completing his father's mission.

What Did the Policemen Find in 'Abbud al-Zumr's Home?

When the policemen inspected the home of the terrorist 'Abbud al-Zumr last 25 September after receiving a warrent from the office of the public prosecutor, after the investigations had established that he was implicated in the terrorist scheme, they came upon an odd "assortment" of seized objects. However, all the objects that were seized did confirm the investigations and clearly expressed the tendency

of black terrorism and vile scheming aimed at stirring up chaos and terror among the people.

In 'Abbud al-Zumr's home the policemen came upon a group of weapons, an Israeli 9-millimeter machine gun, a barrel, 14 boxes, one filled with bullets, a 7.62 millimeter automatic rifle with bayonet, special boxes for it, a 7.65-millimeter pistol, two boxes, one full, four locally-made pistols, 12 boxes of 7.62 x 39 ammunition, 545 rounds of various calibers in a box and a plastic bag.

Inside 'Abbud al-Zumr's home the policemen found 24 copies of a code, one of which showed the key to the code, along with a handwritten draft containing special organizational assignments on "enlightening" the masses, preparing a secret location for the organization, newspaper clippings, and pictures of senior officials and schedules for observing their movements. Along with these handwritten materials they also found a handwritten memorandum summarizing the book on Khomeyni-style revolution and a notebook containing the names, addresses and telephone numbers of some people.

In addition to that, security men found 11 cassette tapes inside 'Abbud al-Zumr's home on which provocative sermons, meetings with people injured in the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' incidents and popular resistance poems were recorded. There were also 10 publications and declarations issued by the Islamic groups on various occasions containing provocative and inflammatory material against the regime.

They also found a group of AL-DA'WAH and AL-I'TISAM magazines in addition to some books by leaders of extremist religious thinking.

His Sister's Jewelry!

One of the terrorist leaders confessed that he had taken his sister's jewelry, sold it and given her some of the jewelry that had been stolen from jewelers in Shubra al-Khaymah and Naj' Hammadi as a replacement, as a precautionary measure, so that it would be removed from the eyes of policemen.

What Would Have Happened If the House in al-Ma'adi Had Blown up?

Some terrorists turned their homes into storehouses for arms, ammunition and explosives, although these houses were situated in the middle of residential complexes where thousands of citizens lived.

The question is what would have happened if these bombs had exploded; what would have afflicted the peaceful al-Ma'adi section, in which hundreds of thousands of innocent people live, if the bombs the terrorist Nabil Mihammad Muhammad Bar'i stored in his home had gone off?

The quantity of bombs that the security men seized in this terrorist's home, if they had blown up--would God not foreordain such a thing!--could have sufficed to kill and wound dozens, indeed hundreds of innocent citizens. It is enough that he had stored 24 defensive F-10 shrapnel hand grenades, which have powerful effects,

next to three boxes of explosive hand grenade heads and 10 incendiary hand grenades which had been fully prepared!

In the same terrorist home the men of the police came upon nine oil tins filled with 7.62-millimeter ammunition, 40 other rounds, 15 flares, 41 propulsion cartridges, 16 hand grenades, 5,000 Russian 7.62-millimeter rounds and seven iron 7.62-rifle cases.

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MINISTER OF RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS DISCUSSES EXTREMIST GROUPS

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 39, 2 Nov 81 p 5

/Article by Jalal Sirhan and Muhammad al-Zarqani: "Minister of Religious Endowments Tells MAYU: The Terrorist Groups Received Financing from Abroad"/

/Text/ It is difficult for a journalist to start a conversation with a major official with an accusation!

However, when the subject of the conversation is an issue of the utmost seriousness, such as that of the religious extremism which has threatened our society lately, the parties to the conversation find themselves prompted to transcend personal feelings and rise to the level of the issue they are discussing, with the entire goal of arriving at the truth, however harsh it may be.

This is how our conversation with Dr Zakariya al-Barri, minister of religious endowments, began. We started by directing accusations on his ministry's responsibility for the fact that some extremists have controlled the pulpits of mosques. Dr al-Barri replied to the charges with a high degree of frankness and boldness, putting the entire unvarnished truth in front of us, because the goal was not to defend a minister or ministry but to protect all of Egypt, its present, future, security and stability.

Protecting the Mosques from Extremists!

We started the meeting with Dr Zakariya al-Barri, the minister of religious endowments, with this question:

"A charge is made against the Ministry of Religious Endowments to the effect that it has let the pulpits of the mosques be the prey of some extremists and fanatics who have mounted these pulpits and spread about their special political views from them. What is your opinion about that?"

The minister of religious endowments replied,

"In past years, the process of building private mosques has increased in a manner Egypt had not previously witnessed. This was because of the abundance of money in the hands of some people. The Ministry of Religious Endowment's resources failed to keep abreast of this tremendous storm of mosques and to supply these

mosques with qualified imams and givers of sermons. Last year we began to remedy this phenomenon by adding the sum of 2 million pounds to the budget of the Ministry of Religious Endowments, to be allocated to incorporate some private mosques into the ministry. We incorporated 900 mosques into the ministry. However, the Ministry of Religious Endowments failed to supply these mosques with qualified imams because they graduate from the Islamic faculties of al-Azhar, which turn out only very small numbers which do not meet our needs.

"This year we allotted the sum of 1 million pounds to incorporate other mosques. Faced with the lack of imams, we were compelled to rely on givers of sermons for the Friday sermons, paying them compensation. Unfortunately, only a small number of sermonizers accepted this task because the compensation was meager. Therefore we could not supply all the mosques we incorporated with sermonizers. The minister decided to increase the compensation to between 10 and 20 pounds per sermon.

"Because of this tremendous shortage in the number of qualified imams on the one hand and the tremendous increase in the number of mosques on the other, everybody and his brother mounted the pulpits with attacks on the government and promoted their destructive political views. You can imagine that some of these people, a very small minority, tried to propagate marxist ideas from some of the pulpits!

"In order to protect the pulpits from extremists and deviants, the Ministry of Religious Endowments is drawing up a law prohibiting the giving of sermons in mosques subordinate to the ministry or in private mosques except in accordance with written permission from the ministry. In this law we have based ourselves on the Hanafite creed, which stipulates that one condition for Friday prayer to be correct is that its imam be the head of state or whoever he appoints; if the head of state or whoever he appoints is not in attendance, the people can make the noon but not the Friday prayer.

"Until recently, the Ministry of Religious Endowments committed itself to this condition and gave the imams under its jurisdiction official permission to conduct the Friday prayer to avoid the risk of cancelling the prayer.

"The Hanafite creed set forth these rules and conditions for a proper Friday prayer because it emerged in Iraq, in the midst of conflicting, different intellectual currents. It was necessary to protect Moslems from intellectual chaos, so the creed placed restrictions on the Friday sermon and on the imam who gave this sermon to keep the pulpits of Islam from being abandoned to the caprice of conflicting intellectual currents."

Role of the Men of Religion

"Do you believe that the senior scholars and men of religion have played their full part in coping with the extremist thinking on which the terrorist groups relied? Wasn't there a shortcoming on their part?"

Dr al-Barri replied,

"These extremists whom you are talking about accept no dialogue or discussion. Under the force of their ignorance and extremism, they complain about all the

scholars of religion, cast doubts about them and accuse them of all types of things. It is not reasonable for a dialogue to take place between two contradictory groups, a group whose thinking is based on God's Islamic law and literature and the use of Islamic intelligence, and another group that is totally removed from what intelligence and Islamic law require.

"In Islamic history there have been many groups of this type. When this extremist group recently appeared in Egypt, its thinking was made an object of discussion, and it was countered with the argument that it was not founded on any sound Islamic basis. To reply to this group it is sufficient for us to say that its appeal is based on terror, not on persuasion through logic. This is adequate evidence for condemnation, because Islam does not in any way accept the imposition of opinions through terror.

"Islam is decisive and clear on this point and does not leave it up to dispute or individual judgment. Almighty glorious God says in his holy book, addressing his prophet, 'Call for the path of your lord wisely and with good exhortation and argue with them through the best of thoughts.'

He also tells the prophet, 'If you are uncouth and hardhearted they will scatter from your midst.' He tells Moses and Aaron, 'Speak soft words to him.'

"This means that the call to Islam through killing, terror, bloodshed and hardheartedness has no close or remote relationship to Islam. Intellectual discourse is not needed to expose and condemn this type of terrorist appeal."

The Young People and the Sheiks

Dr Zakariya al-Barri asked us,

"Isn't it strange that the young people who belong to the religious groups have not taken the religious scholars and sheiks as their supreme example but rather have launched the harshest of campaigns of assault and slander against them? Is there a reason in your opinion for this profound lack of confidence that divides the generation of the young and the generation of sheiks?

"Egypt is now open to all intellectual currents that exist in our modern world. Any Egyptian youth lying in bed can listen to all sorts of broadcasts, bringing him belief or apostasy, guidance or waywardness, atheism and degeneration, and neither his father nor the society can control these broadcasts or prevent them from propagating their ideas among young people.

"The most serious of these broadcasts are the ones which try to disrupt domestic stability and security in Egypt and beam programs night and day.

"In addition to that, the 'dose of religion' the young people receive in schools does not satisfy their religious needs but leaves them prey to international currents and unarmed with the strong weaponry of faith."

/We asked/ "However, the phenomenon of the attack on men of religion has spread among young people who are truly religious, not young people who are influenced by foreign currents. What is your opinion?"

/He replied/ "I wish you would not consider these deviant youths to be religious. They are a group of people diseased with blindness, no more and no less. Some of these young people receive material and financial encouragement from foreign bodies in order to continue along the path of deviation and extremism. Let us leave the task of revealing the details of this connection between the extremist groups and foreign bodies to the investigation that is being made now."

/We asked/ "Don't you consider that social and economic circumstances have an effect on the growth of these groups?"

/He said/ "Social circumstances may be one cause of the situation that these extremist groups have reached, and it is now our duty to conduct studies on the social circumstances in which the young people who are members of the extremist groups grew up, to determine whether they grew up in stable families or families with anxieties, as well as making studies on many other factors which have been reflected in the formation of extremist youth.

"We must give consideration to the fact that some of these young people have traveled abroad numerous times, although their intrinsic abilities do not qualify them to do so. They receive unlimited material aid from foreign bodies. The foreign element has great relevance in the incitement of extremist groups."

The Sequence of Terror!

/We noted/ "The terrorist groups that recently appeared have not been the first of their kind in our modern history. In less than half a century, such groups have made their appearance and engaged in terrorist activity in the name of religion more than once. What is your explanation of that? What are the causes that help the growth of extremist thinking on Egyptian soil?"

The minister of religious endowments replied,

"The many wars Egypt went through between 1948 and 1973 sowed anxiety and dissension in the spirits of people, especially young people. Some people managed to remedy this anxiety in an intelligent manner, while others were overcome by anxiety which caused them complex psychological ailments. Most of the extremists came from the tanks of anxious young people who were afflicted with psychological tensions. If we conduct deep psychological and social studies on some of the extremist youths who have been arrested, we can produce a truthful picture of the circumstances of these young people and the causes that prompted them to engage in terrorism and insist on repeating the terrorist phenomenon more than once in less than half a century.

"We should not miss an opportunity to refer to the effect of Khomeyni's experiment on extremist youths in Egypt, some of whom have imagined that it would be possible to repeat this experiment in Egypt. They did not realize that there is a vast

difference between the natures of the Iranian and Egyptian people and between the belief and Islamic law of Shiites and Sunnites, of whom we are a part. The most important essential difference between Shiism and Sunnism is that the Shiites believe in the inviolability of their imams, because in their view these imams do not commit sins. Therefore it is easy for the imams to control followers of the Shiite creed, on the basis of this notion. The Sunnites, however, of whom we are a part, believe that no person is safeguarded from sin and that all people face sinful acts and good deeds, no matter how great their fate may be, except for the prophet of God, who is inviolate in regard to what he transmits from his lord. Therefore it is impossible for a new Khomeyni to appear among the Sunnites in Egypt and give them orders which they will obey, because we do not believe in imams who are absolutely free from sin."

Religion and State

/We asked/ "The extremist groups have tried to exploit the slogan 'Islam is religion and state' on their behalf. Could we spell out our position as Moslems on this slogan, and the attempt made by extremists to exploit it?"

"Islam as a religion and a state is a sound principle. It is a religion, on grounds that it is God's Islamic law, and it is a state which sets forth a proper basis for all social systems for Moslems, the small and the great. Nothing happens in an Islamic society on which God does not have a ruling that the scholars know through the holy Koran, the prophet's sayings and doings, analogy, or the search for the public interest.

"We believe that Islam is a religion and a state but we reject trafficking in religion to reach political and party goals--trafficking in politics on the pretext of being concerned for religion on the surface but in reality attaining personal goals. This is what is meant by the phrase 'there is no religion in politics and no politics in religion' which some people have misunderstood."

The Funds of Moslems

"It is said that the donations which flow into mosques and religious societies domestically and abroad have been exploited for non-religious purposes. Is there a plan to carry out surveillance over these contributions?"

"Contributions to mosques are sometimes made in organized form through the issuance of stamps or sealed, authorized receipts, or through boxes that are firmly sealed and opened only in the presence of an official committee in a manner preventing the exploitation or theft of these contributions.

"In addition to that, other groups collect contributions in boxes that are not closed, and people make contributions to them in good faith. This money can be exploited for personal ends or to serve the goals of specific groups.

"The ministry is now preparing a draft to control the process of making contributions to mosques so that these contributions will actually go to serve the mosques and will not be exploited for improper objectives."

"What about contributions that come from abroad?"

"These are prohibited by the provisions of law. They are permitted only by permission of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. However, they are made in illegal fashion in a manner that resembles smuggling. Some people travel abroad and receive large amounts of money from foreign bodies. The goal of course is to exploit these funds for non-religious purposes. As long as this money comes into Egypt illegally, one cannot rule out the possibility that part of it might go into the pockets of people who acquire it from foreign bodies."

Religious Books

"Can young people seeking true religion find it in the religious books that are offered on the Egyptian market now?"

"The Islamic heritage is full of old and modern books. Most of these books offer a proper notion of Islam; few of them offer erroneous notions of religion. Anyone reading these erroneous notions must do so with a critical view and possess a sound idea that will help him investigate them and discover the corrupt points in them. Otherwise, he will believe all these erroneous notions and consider them matters to be taken for granted and not open to discussion. No book is inviolate and not subject to discussion except the holy Koran.

"The holy Koran's platform in calling for Islam is a clear, specific one and if any book comes after it and tries to twist the facts and prove that Islam calls for imposition of religion through terror, killing and violence, how can we believe it when we have the glorious verses of the Koran before us?

"Books that contain wrongful notions on Islam exist in limited form. However, books that present Islam in its proper form are much more numerous and are written in a simpler style. They are available to every young person who wants to learn his religion."

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QUESTION OF GUARDS' ROLE IN ASSASSINATION PONDERED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 90, 31 Oct-6 Nov 81 p 6

/Article: "What Was the Republican Guard's Role in the Assassination of al-Sadat?"/

/Text/ The act of assassination of President al-Sadat began with four persons, under the command of a first lieutenant in the army, Khalid al-Islambuli. Now, following the investigations which the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior has made, it has turned into a major conspiracy to overthrow the Egyptian government and establish a new regime resembling that of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Day by day arrests in Egyptian cities are increasing, among Moslem Brother movements, especially the Atonement and Repentance group, while the liquidation process is going on in the army, dozens of whose officers have been detained while another large number has been transferred to civilian positions.

The operation therefore was not isolated and was not confined, as the Egyptian authorities had believed and as was stated at the beginning. President Husni Mubarak, in an interview with the newspaper AL-AHRAM at the end of last week, pointed out "The extremist Islamic groups organized a bloody terrorist conspiracy to impose a revolution in the form of Khomeyni's revolution on the Egyptian people." They set as a date for the conspiracy the day of the referendum to elect the new president. Mubarak said that the method these groups were going to rely on was to assassinate prominent political, military and religious leaders in order to create a constitutional power vacuum and subsequently take control.

The Ministry of the Interior security agencies put their hands on documents and papers that lay bare the religious groups' schemes in their centers in various Egyptian governorates. From these documents it appears that these groups established revolutionary committees that consisted of organized, trained personnel. Hundreds of persons have been arrested in the form of leaders and members of the armed organizations and in the possession of large amounts of local and foreign currency which have been seized.

The Egyptian authorities discovered the terrorist organization on 25 September, that is, about 2 weeks before the assassination of President al-Sadat. The late Egyptian president viewed a color movie on videotape that dealt with a plan that had been drawn up to assassinate him earlier. The organization was led by a person named 'Abbud al-Zumr, whom policemen arrested. Egyptian sources mention nothing about the nature of his relations with the army, though foreign journalists and

observers in Cairo point out that 'Abbud al-Zumr was an Egyptian intelligence officer of the rank of major and that he was closely involved in smuggling arms and ammunition to the group that carried out the assassination of al-Sadat on 6 October: carrying ammunition in weapons and machine guns used in military parades is forbidden. 'Abbud al-Zumr was the one who organized the disturbances that took place in the city of Asyut in the wake of the assassination of the Egyptian president, and the Egyptian police arrested him during these disturbances.

In their investigations, Egyptian authorities also lay emphasis on the role of the Republican Guard in "facilitating" the success of the assassination act, especially since the members of that guard did not do anything to prevent the assailants from approaching the official stand and continuing to direct fire at President al-Sadat for a period of nearly 2 minutes, although a number of guards were standing near this stand. In this regard official sources close to the army point out that most of the officers who were arrested and are under investigation were from the Republican Guard. The most prominent of them was Maj Gen Hasan al-Misri, who was in charge of the unit assigned to protect President al-Sadat. These sources also point out that the Republican Guard is no longer in charge of protecting the Egyptian president but that a special unit under the command of an air force officer has been assigned to accompany and protect President Husni Mubarak at the present time. Sources close to the army pointed out that the air force and the navy were not the subject of the purge process now going on in the ranks of the armed forces.

The newspaper MAYU, which is the newspaper of the governing National Democratic Party, pointed out that it is members of the extremist Islamic organizations who have been arrested and that most of them are from the Repentance and Atonement Society. In their confessions, they have unanimously stated that they did not expect that the police agencies would deliver a blow of such decisiveness, intensity and violence against them. They did not expect that a large number of them would be arrested after they had fled from Asyut to other governorates with policemen's bullets in their bodies. The investigations have also disclosed that the Islamic groups had agreed in their meetings to put intellectual contradictions among themselves to the side until a later stage and to settle on concentrating on a single goal at this stage, to assassinate some prominent political leaders, strive to spread about an air of chaos, terror and disruption and attack police agency centers, with the goal of paralyzing their movements to control the state of security.

The Egyptian police seized large amounts of arms and ammunition, including machine guns of the Israeli Uzi type, in the possession of the Islamic groups. The groups used their weapons in skirmishes with policemen in a number of sections of Cairo, especially in the al-Ma'adi area where policemen sustained injuries. In a Ministry of the Interior statement, it was noted that the arms that were seized included 17 machine guns, 23 revolvers, 143 bombs, 75 kilograms of incendiaries and explosives, hundreds of bombs of the Molotov cocktail variety, and so forth.

Sources in Cairo point out that the operation of liquidating the Islamic groups in their centers in the Egyptian towns and villages and in the ranks of the army

would continue and that President Husni Mubarak would absolutely not be negligent in this area, because the new era in Egypt must begin its rule from a position of strength, especially since he feels that the Egyptian people stand beside him in confronting these extremist tendencies and which are seeking to strike at the unity of the Egyptian people and threaten Egypt's stability and prestige abroad.

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ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR FOLLOWS UP ON TERRORIST INVESTIGATIONS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 1 Nov 81 p 1

/Article: "The Office To Follow up on Investigations in the Terrorist Cases Is under the Supervision of the Assistant Public Prosecutor"/

/Text/ It has been decided to establish an office to follow up on investigations into the terrorist elements that were arrested recently following the discovery of the true dimensions of their criminal scheme to overthrow the regime.

This decision was taken at a meeting held by Counsellor Ahmad Samir Sami, minister of justice, along with Counsellor Salah al-Rashidi, the public prosecutor, with the objective of supervising the ongoing investigations into all the terrorist elements and coordinating the investigations that are being made by the office of the public prosecutor and the military authorities, preparatory to combining the disposition of both.

Heading the office is Counsellor Safwat 'Abbas, a public lawyer. It is made up of Counsellors Sahib Hafiz and Mahir al-Jindi, Muhammad 'Abdallah Mihran, public lawyers /sic/, Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Mutaliby and Muhammad Hanafi, head of the public prosecutor's office. Supervising the office's activities is Counsellor 'Atif Zaki, assistant public prosecutor.

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TERRORIST HIDEOUT IN VILLAGE EXPOSED, DESCRIBED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 38, 26 Oct 81 p 10

/Article by 'Adil Ibrahim: "Secrets of the 'Nest' the Terrorist Groups Lived In--A Small Village Turned into an Arms Arsenal and Hideaway for Sabotage Activity"/

/Text/ In a small village in the Egyptian countryside, the story of the terror the religious groups engaged in against the Egyptian people began. This secure village turned into a nest for armed terrorist societies, an arsenal for storing weapons, and a stage for training in combat, sabotage and assassination.

The people of the village were not silent about this terrorist activity which ruined their security. They entered into armed battles with machine guns and bombs against the members of the terrorist groups. The families to which the terrorists were related by blood declared that they washed their hands of them and other families helped the security men pursue the terrorists and gave them guidance in arresting them.

After the terrorist groups had committed the latest vile crimes, the al-Zumr family, to which the terrorists 'Abbud and Tariq al-Zumr belong, demanded that these two criminals be executed, and the family said that it would not take delivery of their bodies.

The first outlines of the story of the terrorist groups began inside a small village named Nahiya, in the Imbabah District, and subsequently started to spread in the university faculties. For 2 years this village has been considered an important center for these extremists' activities and appeals for their principles and ideas. There also the training in combat and liquidation began.

More than once, leaders and commanders of terrorist groups from various governorates met in the village of Nahiya and their horrible movements and actions began to provoke doubts among the honest people of the village, changing the course of their tranquil, secure lives and causing them to live in a climate of anxiety, panic and terror. They frequently informed the security authorities and executive agencies in al-Jizah Governorate. Recently the security agencies were compelled to intervene and arrest some extremists who belonged to these groups, especially since they were committing aggressions against the inhabitants and citizens who had given notice of their activities, had refused to join their ranks, or did not keep the activities they were intending to carry out secret.

Belonging to these groups were the terrorists Tariq 'Abd-al-Mawjud al-Zumr and 'Abbud 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zumr, who took part in commanding the recent events of Asyut, and also the doctor 'Isam al-'Aryan, commander of the group in the village of Nahiya and deputy secretary general of the terrorist groups recently formed in the governorates, faculties and university villages.

This village witnessed battles with machine guns and bombs between the members of the terrorist groups and their families, relatives and guardians. Most of the families declared that they washed their hands of them.

A number of the detainees who had stirred up factional strife, old politicians or members of the opposition resistance, were behind instigating and financing the members of the terrorist groups to stir up strife and perpetrate illusory battles.

How Did They Emerge?

Al-Hajj 'Aziz al-Zumr, member of the Consultative Assembly, says that these groups appeared suddenly, without warning and in large numbers. Many of them were not people from the village of Nahiya. They started to meet in village mosques which did not have mausoleums for paramount sheiks (they rejected the principle of establishing mausoleums). They then started to call on everyone around them to alienate themselves from this infidel society and armed everyone who joined them. Among them appeared groups that carried knives and daggers; that was the method by which the people of the village discovered the lies and deviant behavior of these extremists.

After that, some groups of other extremist tendencies also appeared, such as the communists, who were working to aspire to a specific policy in exploiting these groups. Among them for example was the lawyer Ahmad Nasir, former member of the People's Assembly for the district of Imbabah, who resides in the same village. He would hold symposia with them which on many occasions turned into political demonstrations against the regime and Egyptian policy.

On one occasion, they struck and insulted the imam of a mosque, threw him out of the mosque and prevented him from leading prayer because he did not have a beard!

With regard to the accused person 'Abbud 'Abd-al-Latif al-Zumr, al-Hajj 'Aziz al-Zumr says that he did not basically reside in the village of Nahiya because his father had left it more than 40 years ago; they lived in a village in the city of al-Jizah, and most of the young people in the family did not know 'Abbud because the bond with him had been severed a long time ago--they knew nothing about him until the papers published his face, name and link with the most recent events.

He is the first cousin of Tariq 'Abd-al-Mawjud al-Zumr. 'Abbud recently married the sister of Tariq, who is no more than 25 and was always in conflict with his family. His father threw him out of his home a long time ago, after he had smashed the television set and damaged the car of one of his father's guests because he was a Christian.

Al-Hajj 'Aziz al-Zumr emphasizes, "None of the families or the people in them have anything whatever to do with these two young men. We, as a family, most proudly

assert that the most splendid era we have witnessed, and that Egypt has witnessed along with us, was the period of the regime of the late martyr President al-Sadat. We, as a family, had been oppressed by political parties before the revolution, and after the revolution the power centers prevented us from engaging in our political rights, imposing sequestration on us until President al-Sadat removed it and restored all our rights to us. I, as a member of the family, became a member of the People's Assembly for two full terms. President al-Sadat recently did the honor of choosing me to be a member of the Consultative Assembly."

Majdi al-Zumr, secretary general of the National Party in the District of Imbabah, says, "The young people in the family spent more than 18 days chasing 'Abbud and Tariq al-Zumr after we learned that the security authorities wanted to arrest them. We had previously informed the security authorities about them after we had heard about their extremist activity, especially since the groups they worked for had numerous extremist terrorist activities in our village.

"The terrorist groups also hung loudspeakers which broadcast recordings from the Egypt of Arabhood Radio station and sermons stirring up strife among the residents. They then demanded that the citizen 'Abd-al-Shafi Nasr shave his beard and leave his job in the Information Authority to join them; when he refused to meet their request they prevented him from going into the mosque. As a result of that, a battle took place between the terrorist groups that had come to Nahiya from various governorates and 'Abd-al-Shafi's family, in which some of the arches of the mosque were destroyed."

Acts of Aggression against the Citizens

The peasant 'Atiyah 'Abd-al-Shafi adds that he was faced more than once with acts of aggression by the commanders and members of the terrorist groups, which had gathered in houses to demand a holy war for God's sake in order to acquire the land of the mosque.

Muhammad Husayn al-Zumr says, "We were surprised by what happened and did not imagine that these two boys could have reached such a stage of treason, criminality and terrorism." The village chief Ahmad Hasan al-Zumr, the chief of Nahiya, adds "We informed the security authorities more than once that the members of these terrorist groups were using the village mosques to lead young people astray, and we stood up to them because President al-Sadat was the noblest of all the people of Egypt and we suffered severely from the power centers before the May revolution. I was removed from the position of village chief; only al-Sadat was fair with me, reinstalling us in the position of chief after 1971.

Wajih al-Zumr, legal affairs manager in the Governorate of al-Jizah, asserts, "In his last speech to the second national convention of the National Party, President al-Sadat, may God have mercy on him, condemned the members of the extremist groups that had exhausted the people's forbearance. When he referred to the terrorist (I can't say 'al-Zumr'), he said that he would not show mercy on the people who had exhausted the people's forbearance."

Al-Hajj 'Aziz al-Zumr, the patriarch of the al-Zumr family, resumed the conversation, saying "All the members of the family demand that Tariq and 'Abbud al-Zumr

be executed, and we will not take delivery of their bodies because we wash our hands of them. The al-Zumr family has a noble nationalist past. Among them, the regimental commander Tahir al-Zumr died in battle with the leader Ahmad 'Urabi in the 'Urabi revolution against the British occupation, and there was also the martyr Maj Gen Ahmad al-Zumr whom President al-Sadat deeply honored when he decided to name the Diversoir tunnel which is to be erected to link Diversoir with western Sinai after him. He had a story of struggle which he etched out with his blood in the October war, leading the 23rd Infantry Division in the Second Field Army concentrated west of the canal."

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ECONOMICS OF DOMESTIC ILLICIT, LEGAL ARMS TRADE DETAILED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 668, 2 Nov 81 pp 14-18

/Article by Mustafa Imam and Jamal Zayidah: "The Arms Market in Egypt"/

/Text/ The arms trade in Egypt has jumped into the spotlight and has raised a big question mark before the public, provoking its concern and demanding an answer, following the events of violence and the assassinations that have taken place, beginning with the assassination of President al-Sadat and continuing with the bloody events in Asyut.

These events, for the first time, have blatantly exposed a dangerous illegal commerce in arms in Egypt, in which all forbidden arms, rapid-fire arms, automatic weapons, machine guns, automatic rifles, revolvers, bombs and explosives are bought and sold. These are all arms commerce in which among ordinary persons is prohibited and whose disposition is restricted to people in the army and the police only!

While domestic security authorities are exerting all their effort to combat this dangerous trade, there is on the other hand a legitimate arms trade which is conducted under the sight and within the hearing of the police and under its supervision. In this trade, small arms, hunting rifles and pistols that fire single shots, that is, are not rapid-fire and consequently are not offensive but are of use in cases of self defense, are bought and sold. This commerce has also come into the spotlight as a result of the incidents of violence. Questions and worries are being raised about it: has it been afflicted with recession because of these incidents? Has it become active? What are the proposed rules on arms permits? Do shops that sell weapons need intensified security measures to be protected from sudden acts of burglary or theft?

In this report, AL-IQTISADI exposes both the legitimate and illegitimate markets.

The Illegal Market

Let us begin with the illegal market, or the trade in smuggled and prohibited weapons. These weapons constitute a market that is well known to many people, especially people who carry vengeance in their hearts, crooks and violent criminals, and it is also well known to the security authorities.

The prices of arms in this market are highly competitive. For example, the price of a 5-millimeter revolver manufactured locally in the Hilwan war plants is about 150 pounds. The price of imported revolvers is about 200 to 300 pounds, for semi-automatic rifles it comes to about 800 pounds, automatic weapons cost about 1,000 pounds, and the price for rapid-fire rifles is about 1,200 pounds.

This market is active in the governorates of Upper Egypt where considerations of taking revenge against families and of protecting the home and the land are dominant. As Maj Gen Husayn al-Samahi, director of general security, says, the security authorities are constantly conducting intensified campaigns to seize these weapons. Among the most significant of these was the campaign in Asyut in 1978 in which 11,000 items of weaponry were seized, including rapid-fire automatic weapons, semi-automatic weapons, Port Said guns, Lancaster machine guns, single-cartridge weapons and locally manufactured revolvers. The director of general security adds that in his estimation the sample which was seized represents no more than 20 percent of the total arms lacking permits that exist in the Governorate of Asyut alone.

In addition, as Maj Gen Husayn al-Samahi says, 1,515 items of weaponry were seized in campaigns in the Governorate of Qina and notice on the theft of most of these weapons had been by the agencies that deal with these weapons.

Maj Gen Husayn al-Samahi adds that the sources for financing this illegal arms market are numerous, but most of them are arms lost in war, especially in the 1956 war, when arms were distributed among popular defense forces in some governorates, then the 1967 and 1973 wars, when the measures for hauling weapons over were disorganized. In some of its raids the General Security Department discovered Israeli weapons such as the Uzi gun, reaffirming the fact that most of the weapons that leaked out into the hands of the public did so in time of war.

What however is the volume of the arms that leaked out of the armed forces during war? In a comment, Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, declaring a "rough estimate," said "More than 100,000 automatic rifles have been distributed since the 1956 war but not recovered and in addition it was possible to smuggle many of the weapons left in Sinai into the country--and this is not to speak about the possibility for smuggling arms across the western borders"

Police and army sources add the theft of arms from some army and police units, which is considered one of the sources for financing this illegal market. There is a third source for this market which, while of limited influence, consists of people who manufacture what are known as "personals," locally-made revolvers firing Russian-caliber rounds, a primitive attempt to manufacture arms that consist of barrels and stocks and sell for about 30 pounds. That is very low when compared with the prices for imported revolvers, which can come to 200 pounds.

Maj Gen al-Samahi adds that there are about 80 persons throughout the republic who are manufacturing these "personals."

As regards explosives such as bombs, anyone who has a special knowledge of chemistry can make a bomb that can do the job of a Molotov cocktail.

Recession in the Legal Market

This is as far as the illegal market for arms goes. What about the legal market, that which goes through arms stores within the sight, hearing and supervision of the security authorities?

At the outset we must state that the legal market does not sell prohibited or rapid-fire arms; sales are confined to hunting shotguns only and revolvers firing single shots. This market is under the careful surveillance and supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, since it is through that ministry that these weapons are imported. It also supervises arms registration; shops cannot sell a single weapon to anyone who does not possess a permit from the Ministry of the Interior. Therefore it is a market that is intensely supervised!

As Col Nabil Fayid, chairman of the Arms Permits Department in the Ministry of the Interior, says, there are 172 shops that sell weapons in Egypt. The number of weapons permits granted so far comes to 250,000.

In their trade, these shops depend on imported arms. Before the economic liberalization policy, they imported their requirements through a public sector commercial company with limited allocations of foreign currency. After the private sector was permitted to import from its own sources, however, some owners of these shops acquired agencies to distribute the weapons of some American, European and Japanese companies.

Arms importing procedures take place under the supervision of the Ministry of the Interior, through arms and ammunition dealers who are authorized by the ministry.

Imports--How Are They Carried Out?

With regard to import methods, Col Nabil Fayid also states that the merchants present applications to import specific types of arms in specific numbers, as stated by the body from which the arms are imported. Each merchant has a specific amount of arms and ammunition that he is permitted to import and deal in. The merchants are of two groups: first class merchants, who have spent 6 years in the business, and second class merchants who have spent periods of less than 6 years. The imported weapons are examined in customs by the explosives inspector and then permits are received to transport these arms from the port police department to the shops. These weapons are then listed in special registers on the entry and exit of arms, and no merchant can sell a piece of weaponry except to persons who have permits from the police department to buy weapons.

Col Nabil adds that the volume of arms imported in the last 5 years came to 1,060 shotguns used for hunting and guard purposes, 15,000 revolvers, and 13,000 regular (bullet-firing) rifles.

In the market, states Ahmad Mansi, the owner of a weapons shop, there are about four or five big stores which import arms and they have branches in the governorates. They also sell to retail shops. The number of retail shops has increased in the last 8 years because of an increasing interest in obtaining arms permits, and consequently increased sales activity, especially in the provinces.

He adds that the value of what he himself imports annually comes to about 8,000 pounds.

On the types and prices of arms imported into Egypt, Musa Fathallah, a shopowner, says that these are hunting rifles and that their price ranges from 100 to 200 pounds. Public interest in them is increasing.

Sharpshooters' and other pistals are numerous and are imported from Italy, Belgium, Britain, Germany and America. There is a local variety, the Hilwan, produced by the war factories, costing 120 pounds. The most famous imported type is the short Italian 9-millimeter Baretta, costing 275 pounds, and there are American types, of which the most famous are Smith and Wesson and Colt six-shooters costing 300 pounds.

There are Spanish types whose costs range from 100 to 200 pounds. On the volume of sales in the arms stores, sales, as the shopowners say, were active before the al-Zawiyah al-Hamra' incidents, and would range from 20 to 40 pieces per month. Following these incidents, and the Ministry of the Interior's refusal to grant new arms permits so far, because of the recent events, the shops have stopped selling and the business has been hit by a recession.

Ahmad Mansi says that some people view weapons sales shops with fear, but that is not fair because it has not yet been established that anyone possessing arms permits took part in any violent incidents. Indeed, some of these people helped the police forces. He considers that the most recent circumstances are to be considered essential because the Ministry of the Interior permits the issuance of arms permits to people it considers fit to bear arms, especially since the measures of issuing permits are carried out with utmost care.

Indeed, some people recommend that the Ministry of the Interior make an announcement paving the way to grant permits to people who possess arms without permits, because that will without a doubt put them under the scrutiny of the security authorities rather than have the latter not know who these people are.

The arms dealer Musa Fathallah recommends that Interior facilitate measures for issuing permits so that precinct officials be given the right to issue permits; the precinct must ascertain the extent to which persons applying for permits are entitled to obtain arms.

Inadequate Measures

Most arms sales shops display hunting rifles and weapons in their display cases. They display pistols and ammunition in cases or boxes inside the shops. It is possible that these shops can be prey to sudden theft or burglary. Therefore shop owners recommend that special police guards be assigned to each shop, at least at night or during the period of closing, for safety's sake.

Intensification of Punishment

Although the legal arms market is under domestic surveillance and measures for obtaining arms are precise and thorough, nonetheless, after the recent violent incidents, the Ministry of the Interior prepared a draft of a new law amending the

current law bearing on the permits. On the philosophy of the proposed amendments, Maj Gen Hasan al-Samahi states "The rule is that the government is responsible for protecting people and property. The exception is for us to give such a responsibility to individuals. Our rule is that permits should be granted. The old law gives precinct and administrative center officials the right /to grant/ permits for four pieces--two 'polished pieces', that is, rifles used for hunting, and two pieces with ordinary barrels. In the wake of the recent incidents, we have found that it is necessary to review the powers given to everyone who has the right to grant permits and to restrict the security director's jurisdiction in granting permits to two pieces, so that persons with permits will not have more than four pieces. Quantities in excess of that will be presented to the assistant minister of the interior /for review/.

"In addition, the draft of the new law stipulates additional conditions, among them ones related to the type of arms. We have prohibited permits for rapid-fire weapons and have forbidden giving permits for them except to public sector companies. The law stipulates that /owners/ be not less than 21 years of age. Among the conditions related to individuals is that the permit applicants be able to bear arms, and the draft also stipulates that the people bearing arms be physically fit and able to handle them.

"The penalties for violations have also been tightened up, to imprisonment for a period of no less than 1 month and a fine of 50 to 500 pounds for anyone possessing hand-to-hand combat weapons, including fencing swords, bayonets, daggers, double-edged knives, knives with one and a half edges, lances, pocket knives, 'antelope horns,' axes and knives whose possession or ownership is not justified by occupational need. The penalty for the violation is imprisonment for a period of not less than 2 months and a fine of 100 to 1,000 pounds if these arms are in one's possession in areas of population accumulations, means of transport or places of worship.

"An additional period has also been added for possession of firearms. The punishment now is hard labor for a term or for life in the case of people who own or possess arms of these types, ammunition or explosives by themselves or through others without permit in areas of population accumulations, public means of transport or places of worship. The punishment is death if ownership or possession of such arms, ammunition or explosives is with the intent to use them for any activity harmful to public security or infringing on the regime, the principles of the constitution, the basic statutes of the social structure, national unity or social peace."

I asked Maj Gen al-Samahi, "Don't you believe that all these measures will inhibit people who want to get arms permits?"

He said, "I can assert that giving permits to bear arms to people who possess what they want to keep is still in effect and that the process of prohibiting permits was for a temporary period. The intention in that was to hold down the incidents arising from the wrongful use of these weapons, such as the use of weapons during weddings. The legal amendment to this crime has been to a misdemeanor for erroneous injury, and as a result some people deliberately perpetrate crimes of premeditated murder at weddings and evade punishment on the claim that they were erroneous injuries."

Results of the Week's Arms Seizures

Security forces, in the process of pursuing the Renunciation and Atonement Groups, have managed to seize large amounts of arms. These are the yields from the campaign they carried out last week:

170 rapid-fire cannons.
41 rapid fire automatic and semiautomatic rifles.
23 pistols.
116 assault and defensive bombs.
11 locally-made bombs.
Six smoke bombs.
Ten incendiary hand grenades.
75 kilograms of gelignite.
71 gelignite molds.
8.5 kilograms of dynamite.
82 TNT molds.
46 explosives.
34 fuses and timing devices to prepare time bombs and charges.

Bottles filled with gasoline and incendiary materials.

Thousands of rounds and ammunition of various types for weapons and special cases for them.

11887
CSO: 4504/73

YOUTHS SEND MESSAGE ON HUMAN RIGHTS DAY

NC121303 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 11 Dec 81

["Text" of 1 December cable sent by the Executive Committee of the Youths and Students Organization of the National Resistance Movement of Iran from Paris, France, to the chairman of the UN Human Rights Commission]

[Text] Respectable chairman of the Human Rights Commission: (?On that day) when humanitarians gathered from the four corners of the world and approved and declared the human rights declaration, they were speaking of a belief in the basic rights of man, of humanitarian values and position, and of equal rights for men and women, irrespective of race, color, religion, nationality, language and political belief. Where are [words indistinct]? Where are those humanitarians? That declaration has not yet lost its value and remains in force. Although the Human Rights Commission still exists, only a memory remains of [words in distinct] and human rights declaration. Possibly because of the expediency of time, members of the commission have ignored the articles (?resolved by their predecessors) and have preferred expediency to right, and have forgotten the name of the Islamic Republic and saved their humanitarian moves for prisoners and convicts of other countries of the world. If this was not the case, then the humanitarians' rage should have terrified Khomeyni's executioners and forced them to flee. Their shout should have shaken the skies.

On that day (?they decided) [words indistinct] and to create a better life, while today they are showing indifference to the retrogression of the Iranian society. They said that no one can be tortured, harassed, punished or treated in an oppressive way or in a way contrary to humanitarianism and human rights. Yet today the stoning of an Iranian woman and the execution by firing squad of Iranian children does not even affect their (?hearts). As far as the executioners in Islamic garb are concerned, the execution of 9-year-old children on charges of opposing the revolution is something very natural. What would the opinion of the respectable members of the Human Rights Commission be? One wonders....

The Islamic Republic replies to the expression of opinion with bullets, and (?turns) peaceful gatherings to (?scenes of brutality and bloodshed) [words indistinct]. Aren't these acts unconditional violations of the delcaration of human rights? If yes, then why hasn't the name of the Islamic Republic been included in the list of regimes (?violating human rights)?

Ladies and gentlemen, respectable members of the Human Rights Commission: Your silence is very costly for the Iranian nation. The savage acts of Khomeyni's regime are not a secret to anyone. The mass media's (?reporting on confessions by officials) of the Islamic Republic speak of executions and killings by Khomeyni's executioners (?every few minutes). The official published reports are documents, documents proving the pitiless killing of Iranian youths who are being sent every day to the firing squad in groups. Even despite its (?basic laws) and official undertakings vis-a-vis the UN, the Islamic Republic is flagrantly violating all the principles of the human rights declaration and does not consider it necessary to implement that which it itself has called a constitution. Nevertheless you are silent. Why? At a time when an Italian mother who has no commitments and responsibilities toward the Iranian nation and who does not consider silence about Khomeyni's inhumane regime suitable and sets fire to herself in protest, your silence is unforgivable.

We expect nothing but sympathy and protest concerning the savage and inhumane acts committed by Khomeyni's regime, on the basis of the world human rights declaration, so that the Human Rights Commission will continue to remain the loftiest refuge of man and the base of humanitarianism.

With respects, [signed] the Executive Committee of the Organization of Youths and Students of the National Resistance Movement of Iran.

Paris, 9 December 1981, 18 Azar 1360.

CSO: 4640/82

CLANDESTINE RADIO CALLS ON MILITARY TO REVOLT

NC121742 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 11 Dec 81

[Station talk]

[Excerpts] Dear compatriots! Throughout our history we have witnessed how each time foreign enemies and their servants inside the nation have wanted to crush the grandeur, freedom and efforts of the nation to achieve progress and honor they have first aimed their pitiless (?attacks) at the Iranian Army. One of the bitter experiences was in 1941 when our holy country was the target of invading foreign troops and when, at the same time, the servile spies of the north and south implemented a plan to decimate the armed forces and clearly handed over, in one piece, the country's northern (?territory) to the communist forces. We saw how after that the treacherous and flimsy rule of Pishevari and Gholam Yahya was imposed on us and how while what remained of the Iranian Army was in disarray, all (?political efforts) were unable to drive out these red aggressors and their devoted servants from [words indistinct].

But on that glorious day, 12 December 1946--35 years ago--the Iranian Army, even though with limited (?arms and equipment) but with a (?lofty purpose) [words indistinct], (?with the help of God), the support of the brave people of Azarbayjan and with a national command made the liberation of Azarbayjan a turning point in Iran's history. With that victory the Iranian Army was given new life and reached a point where it was one of the 10 largest and most powerful armies in the world.

What does the Iranian nation have today, 3 years after the inception of the rule of Khomeyni and his wicked associates? What does the army of Iran have? Does anything remain of its past grandeur? Is there any sign of security and calm? Has the economic situation improved? Is the Iranian nation still one of the world's 10 big powers? Has democracy spread throughout Iran? Are we respected by Iranians and foreigners? The answers to these questions should be sought from the rulers, who do not know God and who are dominating Iran's destiny.

Iran's armed forces have been directed by the treacherous and destructive rule of Khomeyni and his Tudehi associates to the lowest point of humiliation. In the unwanted war with Iraq, they are playing with the respect of the Iranian soldier and have dominated the armed forces with a bunch of criminal revolution guards and ruffians and hooligans from the country's prisons. In order to dominate our

destiny for a few more days and to transfer abroad what remains of the national wealth and so that no other power will stand before them, the opportunistic and parasitic mullahs have left the Iranian Army without equipment on the western and southern fronts and by disseminating forged reports they are paying great lip-service day and night to the (?victories) of their revolution guards. How impudent and shameless!

Where does the devotion of the Iranian armed forces lie? For the sake of which country were all these armed forces personnel killed?

Oh brave personnel of the Iranian armed forces! The 12th of December is your day. Do you remember how you celebrated this glorious day? Do you remember how the grounds on which you paraded shook under your strong steps and how Iran's blue skies were yours? Do you remember the great respect you enjoyed? Now what have they done to you and us? They have placed the command of our armed forces in the hands of a mentally deranged criminal old man. Is this not what the domestic spies and foreigners want?

The movement for Iran's salvation and freedom should start from the Iranian armed forces. It is the duty of the Iranian armed forces to cleanse the holy land of the presence of these (?avaricious and filthy thieves). If the Iranian armed forces does not act, no force in the world will be able to help the nationalists and patriots of Iran. The initial movement should come from Iran's brave armed forces even under these extremely difficult conditions. The tired and weak Iranian nation has placed its hopes in its armed forces. Is it not opportune, on this historic day, to remind the brave privates, NCO's and officers of Iran of this hope of the nation? Iran's freedom will depend on the steps taken by you, patriotic soldiers, and your national and religious duty deems that you give a positive reply to this desire of the Iranian nation and end the disgrace of the fascist and inhumane regime of Khomeyni and his irreligious clergymen.

Oh personnel of the armed forces, we, the nation, are waiting for your movement. We, the nation, are beside you. Come and add yet another honor in memory of the past grandeur and honors of the Iranian armed forces with your rapid movement.

Long live Iran! May Iran's combatant and (?crushing) army be steadfast!

CSO: 4640/81

CLANDESTINE RADIO CONDEMNS BBC SUPPORT OF IRAN

NC101810 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 9 Dec 81

[Station talk]

[Excerpts] Compatriots! Harsh-sounding murmuring can be heard these days from the ruling clerical machine as well as from the colonialists living on the banks of the Thames River. In other words, we hear from this or that corner, from the mouths of people who pretend to sympathize that struggling against the rule of the executioners is useless and that its only outcome will be the death of the best children of the country by the regime's murderers and that Khomeyni's regime is stable and permanent.

Actually, the undeniable truth is that demons like Sheykh Khalkhali, Rabbani-Amlashi, Musavi-Tabrizi, Reyshahri, Mohammad Gilani, Lajevardi and other such ruffians have taken one step beyond the contrived courts of the shah's era. But the acceptance of this reality should not make us accept that which the sly clergymen want to impress upon us. The thin-bearded [words indistinct] (?Hashemi-Rafsanjani), followed by the butcher of Iran's slaughterhouse, Musavi-Tabrizi, recently said, (?each in his own way), that as a result of steps taken by the Islamic Republic, 90 percent of the opponents have been removed and the remaining 10 percent will either repent or be removed as were the 90 percent. The (?congregation priests in various Iranian cities) [words indistinct] and finally all of them have joined hands to show that struggling with the regime is useless because the rulers of the regime are more bloodthirsty, murderous and pitiless than can be thought. This same remark was made, in another form, on the British television program Panorama and the BBC's Jam-e Jahani program. By (?stressing) that the situation of Khomeyni's Islamic Republic is extremely good, that work continues and that the mosques are doing their job, they want to deceive the people.

Compatriots! Do not be fooled by this deceit. Do not lose hope. BBC is the same program that (?broke) [words indistinct] to bring Khomeyni and is continuing the same program now to preserve him and his regime. This is nothing new. It has been nearly 3 years since Khomeyni and his impostor mullahs (?took possession) of our Iran. But in the life of a country like Iran (?with its thousands of years of history), 3 years is a (?very short time).

The mullahs and their British associates want to inclucate in us that (?this dark night brought on us by them) will last forever. What a baseless thought!

We have been through darker nights and have (?seen brighter tomorrows). Despite (?all the ups and downs), we have (?risen again and are still living). Are you trying to make us afraid of struggling? Do you want us to be scared? (?We, whose history includes names like that of Rostam) [word indistinct], Gudarz, Bizhan, Siavosh, Ya'qub of Leys and Nader. Were they afraid? Should we stop our struggles?

Do not hope in vain! We, the Iranian nation, (?feel) [words indistinct] that (?splendor) will return. With our struggle and by destroying you--the black-clad ravens--and you--their black-hearted supporters--we will give Iran the chance to stand up, to become a respectable, beautiful and happy country and to teach many things to the world as is worthy of its civilization, culture and maturity.

Do you want us to lose our belief in Iran and be absorbed in a stupid (?concept) of an Islamic umma consisting of different countries? How naive you are! Your satanic, mean and sly nature does not mean that you are naive and (?stupid). Truly, you do not know Iran.

Iran is an astonishing country. Iran's history, as far as its versatility is concerned, is rare in the world. The biggest, as well as the (?meanest), men have been brought up in our country. Great things have happened in Iran. It has seen great calamities and numerous successes. It seems that fate tried all its calamities and games in Iran and led it several times to the edge of the precipice but always prevented it from falling. Now you, you unworthy nonentities, want to throw us into the precipice of (?history). [Passage indistinct]

We are correct in being proud of our country. Our back is bent with the weight of history, but this same history gives us strength and prevents us from falling (?into darkness). Today our back, the back of the Iranian nation, is bent under the (?unjust) oppression of you--you (?carcass-eating) mullahs and your British associates--but do not think that we will set our struggles aside. Put aside your crafty propaganda. We will not be deceived.

Compatriots! Those who in their lifetime have not experienced hardship are not worthy of happiness. This is our situation today. That which matures a nation and makes it worthy of respect is not only its victories and haughtiness. We were haughty during the shah's era, but the calamity that was brought on us by fate and at the hands of these same cursed clergymen and with the help of the apparently impartial BBC woke us from our sleep. These calamities, these disappointments, they are all those things which rouse our political wisdom and nurture us like steel.

Do not lose hope. The ignorant, fanatical mullahs cannot conquer our souls. Read the Shahnameh and explain it to your children. The Sassanid Dynasty fell apart, palaces were destroyed and (?wealth lost), but the Iranian soul was not conquered and Iran did not surrender. Khomeyni's sedition is not stronger than the attack by the (?foreigners of that time). Mohammad Reza Shah was overthrown. (?Why fear)? May Iran live a long time. Iran has always been stronger and more deeply rooted than to depend on the life of death of a sultan, khan or shah. Dara was killed, Yazdgerd was killed, Shah Soltan Hoseyn was killed, Ya'qub was killed, but Iran remained stable and will remain stable.

Inflict the last strong blows on the wounded and breathless body of the blood-thirsty mullahs' regime. May the coming spring see the corpse of this wretched regime buried and the BBC [words indistinct].

Long live Iran! May the Iranian nation be everlasting! Death to Khomeyni's criminal regime!

CSO: 4640/80

BANI-SADR REMARKS AGAINST BAKHTIAR

NC101010 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 8 Dec 81

[Unattributed talk]

[Text] Some days ago Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr was interviewed for the Persian-language program of the BBC. He made some remarks that not only (?did not satisfy the Iranian listeners as far as his crimes are concerned), but added with his new lies and his past, recorded and undeniable acts a new disgraceful page to his black record vis-a-vis the Iranian nation.

Mr Bani-Sadr's new demagogies and his self-contradictions in relation to his past acts and remarks were so blatant and shameless and have been sufficiently discussed during the past few days. Perhaps there is no need to spend more valuable time on them, but there was one point in Abolhasan Bani-Sadr's interview which needs a few comments.

In reply to one of BBC's questions on anti-Khomeyni groups, Bani-Sadr said: In my opinion Bakhtiar's group is counterrevolutionary. Actually, in a way, it can be said that probably this was the only true remark throughout the interview heard from Mr Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, because undoubtedly Bakhtiar and his followers oppose the revolution that Bani-Sadr, Khomeyni and other reactionary hirelings handed to our nation. But if Mr Bani-Sadr's motive in expressing this was to mar Shapur Bakhtiar's prestige it should be said that he is extremely wong in his calculations. Shapur Bakhtiar's opposition to the establishment of the reactionary and destructive Bani-Sadr-Khomeyni rule was a great honor and the name of this patriotic man is recorded in Iran's history. If 3 years ago there was only a limited number of people who understood Bakhtiar's opposition to the regime that was being imposed on Iran, today there is no one who does not remember--with praise--the power of discretion which this patriotic politician had and his opposition to that plot that destroyed Iran. If today Bakhtiar's opposition with the establishment of the Khomeyni-Bani-Sadr regime and with any reactionary plot against Iran is considered as a counterrevolutionary act, then Bakhtiar and his followers proudly accept this description. But if one looks at the motive of the revolution and what the Iranian nation wanted, it is easily realized who the counterrevolutionary is. If what the Iranian nation wanted was to return to the era of nomadic life, then Mr Bani-Sadr is correct and he can be called a revolutionary. If what the Iranian nation wanted was clubwielding, suppression, government intervention in all affairs and the probing of people's thoughts even within the four walls of their

homes, then Mr Bani-Sadr is right and he can be called a revolutionary. If the Iranian nation wanted that universities and higher schools be closed, that poverty, (?difficulties) and unemployment reign, the destructive egalitarian economy, war and bloodshed, massacres, the amputation of limbs, the execution of 12-year-old children and pregnant women being stoned, crushing any type of individual or social freedoms and throwing ruffians at the people's throats to aggress their lives, wealth and respect, then Mr Bani-Sadr is correct and he can be called a revolutionary.

If what the Iranian nation wanted was to replace monarchy with theocracy, replacing the countries with turbaned bullies and replacing the monarch with the imam and the deputy imam, then Mr Bani-Sadr is right and he can be called a revolutionary. But if the Iranian nation wants none of the things achieved by the Islamic regime of Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr, then there is no doubt that either Bani-Sadr is alien to the Iranian nation's revolution or, as is said about him, he is a mercenary who came to Iran to fulfill the aims of another government.

In order to acquaint him with what the Iranian nation wants, it is sufficient to remind him of the revolution slogan so that he himself can discern who the revolutionary is. The beautiful slogan that was distorted by Bani-Sadr and his associates and turned into theocracy was nothing but freedom, independence and social justice and this is the same slogan that--even though meaningless and without value for reactionary hirelings like Bani-Sadr--is a motive and style of life for patriotic combatants like Shapur Bakhtiar. Freedom, independence and social justice or real democratic rule is the motive of the revolution started by Shapur Bakhtiar--years before Bani-Sadr, his Syrian and American associates like Qotbzadeh and Yazdi found their way into spying schools, into the school of thought of Iran's national leader Mohammad Mosaddeq, whose memory will always live and who for more than 30 years uttered no other slogan that this. Unlike many of the colluders, demagogues, hirelings and pretenders to the revolution, he never deviated for even a moment from the path of the Iranian nation's needs. Today, too, he has clearly shown everyone that he will continue his struggles for the establishment of freedom and democracy in Iran. The 38 days of Shapur Bakhtiar's democratic rule is the best proof of history in showing the outstanding nature of this combatant and freedom-seeking person.

CSO: 4640/80

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON BAKHTIAR ON AZARBAYJAN DAY

NC111638 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 11 Dec 81

[Excerpts] The leader of the national resistance movement of Iran, Dr Shapur Bakhtiar, has sent a message on the occasion of 21 Azar [12 December], the anniversary of the freedom of Azarbayjan. The text of Dr Shapur Bakhtiar's message is as follows:

Dear sisters and brothers, 21 Azar, the anniversary of the return of Azarbayjan to the homeland, revives the splendid memory of the heroism of a people who did not give in to the disgrace of slavery and the abjectness of captivity and with their brave and devoted insurrection revealed their heartfelt belief in the unity and oneness of Iran. The return of Azarbayjan to the homeland's territory was precisely the reflection of the (?innermost wish) of the Azarbayjanis who (?could not see an identity for themselves) outside the framework of historic solidarity with the outstanding and distinguished nature of the Iranian nature. Undoubtedly, the movement of the armed forces (?and the support by those striving for Iran's oneness) enjoy a worthy place in our contemporary history to achieve the return of this hero-nurturing part to the homeland's territory--but without the efforts of the inner wish of the people of Azarbayjan and without the fulfillment of their united insurrection, that movement and support would not have led anywhere.

I do not doubt that in these days of calamity and bloodshed, when our homeland needs more than ever before the efforts of its children, the raging wave of Sattar Khans will rise from the land that nurtures (?heroes). I do not doubt that Azarbayjan will be the homestead of liberation insurrections and one of the strong positions of (?nationalism and freedom fighting), that it will once again play the role expected of it by Iran, (?and will hoist the banner of bravery) [words indistinct]. I do not doubt that Azarbayjan will be among the forerunners in the all-embracing movement to overthrow the murderous regime--a movement that will take us (?toward freedom and will once again prove that) Iran shall never die.

CSO: 4640/82

TEHRAN BANK OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON KRUPP MEETING

LD131920 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 13 Dec 81

[Excerpts] Following the participation by Mr Mohsen Nurbakhsh, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, as Iran's representative at the annual meeting of Krupp Industries held in Germany, our correspondent interviewed him about Iran's shares in Krupp Industries, about the discussions held between the Central Bank governor and German authorities, the economic status of the country and about people's savings in Iranian banks.

[Begin recording] [Question by unidentified correspondent] Mr Nurbakhsh, during the past few days you held discussions with authorities in Germany and you attended the annual Drupp meeting. Would you tell us what issues were discussed there?

[Answer] In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful. The main aim of my trip was to attend the Krupp meeting which was held as it is every year. During the meeting, the main issue was the general status of Krupp Steel Industries. Decisions are to be made regarding the merger between Krupp and other factories, in such a way that their economic status is improved; (?on the whole), so that it preserves our interests, especially from the point of view of our shares.

[Question] What did you discuss with German authorities?

[Answer] During this trip I had the opportunity to hold a meeting, at the invitation of the Foreign Ministry's economic undersecretary, with the German deputy finance minister. On the whole the outcome of these talks was that, first of all, Germany reached the conclusion that Iran is a stable factor in the Persian Gulf region, and that Iran was successfully able to overcome various events, namely internal terrorism and efforts to disintegrate the country, and the war. During my meetings, the German authorities admitted that they consider Iran a stable factor in the region, that is a country which is able to solve its own problems. In connection with the expansion of economic relations, we held talks in which the German deputy finance minister was particularly interested. Of course, efforts will be made so that the expansion of relations is in the interest of both parties, especially in our interests. [End recording]

CSO: 4640/83

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON DASTGHEYB ASSASSINATION

GF130738 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 13 Dec 81

[Text] The Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that following the demise of Mullah Dastgheyb, Khomeyni's representative in Shiraz, the regime's authorities have become terrified and have intensified their policy of suffocation. According to this report, undeclared martial law has been in effect in Shiraz since Saturday night. The regime's guards have been interrogating citizens for long periods and have been searching all vehicles. According to our reporter, the assassination of Mullah Dastgheyb and 12 other lackeys of the regime--including Dastgheyb's personal bodyguards--is one of the biggest blows against the Islamic Republic of Khomeyni since the explosion in the prime minister's office, which killed Raja'i and Bahonar.

The report also adds that on Saturday afternoon the regime's guards issued a rumor in Shiraz stating that those persons responsible for Mullah Dastgheyb's death had been arrested. However, the rumor was denied a few hours later. There is a strong possibility that the wave of arrests will increase and that persecution of the opposition will intensify. One report also states that several Shirazi youths and Bazaaris have been arrested.

Our correspondent's dispatch also states that Mullah Dastgheyb's demise has dealt a strong mental blow against Khomeyni. In a meeting with a number of government mullahs from Semnan, Khomeyni--looking very sad and disturbed--said that the regime's mullahs are the prime targets in these terrorist actions. He also blamed the United States [for the action] as usual and did not mention the Iranian people's opposition to his regime. In their propaganda uproar the (?propaganda machines) and mullahs of the regime have again attacked the opposition forces. This indicates that the extremist faction of the ruling mullahs now has an excuse to again enforce extreme measures such as groundless arrests.

CSO: 4640/83

CLANDESTINE RADIO COMMENTS ON ARMY UNITY

GF131446 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 0330 GMT 13 Dec 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] Compatriots, the true significance of many historical events and days may come to light only years later. The day of Azarbayjan's liberation, 12 December, is one such day. Recent Iranian history has very few such days. On this day the dream of Iran's enemies for our country did not come true. Our homeland, which would have been torn up following Azarbayjan's separation, remained whole and the Iranian Army was victorious in its first test of defending the nation and its territorial integrity in the current century, aided by complete and selfless support from the people. Of all the political parties in Iran, only one treacherous organization connected to foreigners [Tudeh Party] defended the separation of Azarbayjan.

For 3 years now the Iranians have been prisoners of an antinational and arbitrary regime. For 3 years now anti-Iranian propaganda has been aimed at Iranian thought and spirit. For 3 years now anti-Iranian rulers have tried to destroy all valuable national values such as love of Iran and nationalism in any manner they can and with the aid of the same treacherous political organization that supported the separation of Azarbayjan, they want to replace them with false and valueless ideals. The treacherous ruling regime and its lackeys have done their utmost in the past 3 years to pave the road for the destruction of Iran and its capture by the world-devourerers. The so-called Islamic Republic has not only destroyed nationalist fighters wherever they have been found but has also opposed all nationalist values and tried to obliterate anything about Iran and its culture even in the school books of the children of this country.

The government of the Islamic Republic, seeing the Iranian Army as a thorn in its side, tried all means at its disposal to weaken and destroy it. The regime has now discovered that its plots are changing to deadly rings which are suffocating it. The Iranian Army is escaping the repeated blows of the regime of traitors and defending the homeland. Each day that passes, it is becoming more united under the worried eyes of the antinational rulers.

The anniversary of the liberation of Azarbayjan is a reminder of a glorious event for the Iranian Army, the people and especially the zealous Azarbayjanis. This is a memory which gives them the power to act with more energy and courage when defending their national values and means to accelerate the downfall of the illegal and anti-Iranian regime.

CSO: 4640/83

BOMB KILLS TWO IRANIANS IN LONDON

NC160652 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 15 Dec 81

[Text] A Free Voice of Iran correspondent in London reports that the car that was blown up on 13 December in London killing two terrorist Hezbollahis and wounding another belongs to an Iranian called Mohsen Ghafuri. The Free Voice of Iran correspondent has added that the 19-year-old driver of the car was (Kurosh Puladi) and was [words indistinct] in London and then joined the agents of Savama, the terrifying intelligence organization of the mullahs. He and two other terrorists intended to carry out the explosion at demonstrations by opponents of the regime but became themselves victims of their plot. The London police have not yet been able to identify the two other terrorists who were killed in this incident since they had arrived in London under false names, carrying forged passports given to them by the Khomeyni regime's embassy in Paris. Meanwhile, the GUARDIAN reported that it is highly possible that this bomb was to have been planted among some of the regime's opponents who had planned to demonstrate 25 minutes later near the place of the explosion. These demonstrations had been organized by Iranian monarchists and apparently one of the armed forces commanders was to be among the speakers. The occasion of the monarchists' demonstrations was the 12 December anniversary of the liberation of Azarbayjan. The GUARDIAN added that the 12 December demonstrations had been announced long in advance and all the Iranians living in the United Kingdom knew the exact date and place of the demonstrations. Therefore, there is no doubt that Ayatollah Khomeyni's security organization was also aware of the details. According to the GUARDIAN, an informed Iranian source said that the high-ranking antiregime military figure intended to reveal the mullahs' plot on downing the C-130 plane that carried Fallahi, Fakuri and Namju in September, the incident in which three high-ranking officials of the Islamic Republic's armed forces were killed. The British newspaper wrote that following this air disaster, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr had stated in Paris that Colonel Fakuri was one of the staunch opponents of Khomeyni's regime and intended to leave Iran.

CSO: 4640/83

PARS PROFILES INTERIOR MINISTER NOMINEE

LD151402 Tehran PARS in English 1029 GMT 15 Dec 81

[Text] Tehran, 15 Dec (PARS)--Hojjat ol-Eslam 'Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri was born in 1943 in Nur, Mazandaran Province in the Caspian Sea region, into a religious family. His father was one of the active ulema who strived immensely towards guiding the people. Hojjat ol-Eslam Nateq-Nuri went to Qom at 15 to study Islamic [word indistinct]. He was a student of such prominent ulema as Ayatollah Montazeri, and Ayatollah Meshkini. He then entered the Divinity and Islamic Sciences College and, in 1970, was graduated in Islamic philosophy. He started his political opposition to the despotic regime of the defunct shah in 1963 and 4 years later, was imprisoned with a group of bazaar people in connection with the statement of Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on banning transactions with the Zionists usurping Palestine. After being freed from prison, he was once again arrested in 1971 for delivering a speech at the Tehran's Ark Mosque and was tortured and later was forbidden to speak in mosques and was deprived of working as an Islamic scholar, on the order of the defunct Nasiri, the (?master) of the Savak.

In [date indistinct] he spoke in one of the mosques of Qom on the occasion of the 40th day of the martyrdom of the Tabriz people by the troops of the definct shah. He was again arrested for his role in awakening the people about the martyrs in Yazd, central Iran. However, on the order of the militant clergy, he went to Lebanon and Syria and after the enactment of his mission, returned to Tehran on time for participating in the managing demonstrations of Ashura and Tasu'a. He played an effective role in the committee to welcome Imam Khomeyni to Iran and took part in the sit-in held at Tehran University, along with other ulema to protest (last shah's pm) Bakhtar's closure of the airports. In the beginning of the victory of the Islamic revolution, he played a role in safeguarding the Alnai School, where Imam Khomeyni was staying.

Later he was chosen as imam's repre-entative in Jihad Sazandegi (reconstruction) and was elected as a representative to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis).

CSO: 4600/152

PARS PROFILES FOREIGN MINISTER NOMINEE

LD151200 Tehran PARS in English 1020 GMT 15 Dec 81

[Text] Tehran, 15 Dec (PARS)--Dr 'Ali Akbar Velayati was born in 1945 in Tehran, graduated from the Medical College of Tehran University and 3 years later received his degree of specialisation in children's medicine. Then to complete his education, he went to the U.S. and in 1976, was able to receive his post-graduate degree in the field of infectious diseases. While in the U.S. he became a member of the Muslim Students' Association there. In addition to that, he is a member of the board of trustees of the Physicians' Islamic Association and a member of the Scientific Committee of the College of the Health Sciences and has been active in establishing the relief and treatment centres in cooperation with dedicated religious scholars and physicians in the first round of elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly. He was elected as a deputy from Tehran and became a member of the Health and Welfare Committee of the Majlis.

Dr 'Ali Akbar Velayati went once to Saudi Arabia to perform the Haj rituals and has also been in Greece and Britain. His last trip abroad was to Cuba to participate in the inter-parliamentary union conference recently held in Havana.

He is also a member of the Physicians' Association of the Islamic Republic Party (?and has) written extensively in his field of specialisation: "Infectious Diseases" in two volumes, "Antibiotics" and many articles on medicine and on social affairs. Before the victory of the Islamic revolution, he was an assistant [word indistinct] and the educational manager of the College of Health Sciences. After the triumph of the Islamic revolution he served as the educational manager and undersecretary in treatment affairs of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.

He started his political activities in 1961 and in 1963 and played a principal role in (?raising) the Islamic Association of the Medical College of Tehran University. After joining underground political-ideological activities of Imam Khomeyni, he continued his political activities within the Islamic movement until the victory of the revolution. The nominee has stated his understanding of the line of imam as follows: "It is the line of true Islam which, in my opinion, is the line of true Shi'ism and in our time the leader of this line is the imam and it is binding upon all those who are faithful to the Islamic revolution not to abandon this line."

CSO: 4600/152

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON ARREST OF OFFICER, MONARCHISTS

NC160919 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 15 Dec 81

[Text] A Voice of Iran correspondent reports that another patriotic officer of our country, retired Maj Gen Ruhollah Ertefa'i, has been imprisoned by the clerical regime and that he will possibly be (?tried in the illegal court within the next 20 days and be executed).

Major General Ertefa'i, who is one of our country's most virtuous and respected officers, (?was arrested) on 5 December (?when mercenaries) [words indistinct]. The Voice of Iran correspondent adds that the (?reason) for arresting Major General Ertefa'i (?after about 3 years) is directly linked with the intensification of activities by the armed forces personnel, particularly opposition by the gendarmerie forces. The report also states that the regime's revolutionary prosecutor has condemned retired Maj Gen Ruhollah Ertefa'i (?for having engineered a plan to crush) a group of communists (?in the northern mountains between 1977 and 1978) when he was the commander of the (?operations bureau of the imperial gendarmerie of Iran.)

It should be noted that in 1978 a terrorist and training organization of the communist organization Feda'iyan-e Khalq was discovered in the Alborz Heights. Only four members of this communist organization were arrested and imprisoned, but they were released a few months later when a pardon was issued. Our correspondent ends his report by saying that this is the major accusation against retired Maj Gen Ertefa'i, while another accusation is having served with the imperial Iranian armed forces.

Another report by a Voice of Iran correspondent states that the regime's Revolution Guards Corps has confessed that 236 monarchist combatants as well as members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq were arrested and imprisoned during the past month. Ahmad Ghazanfarpur, one of the closest associates of Bani-Sadr, former president of the regime who is now a fugitive, is among the people arrested. Reports on his imprisonment were broadcast some time ago by the Voice of Iran. Our correspondent's report indicates that 12 combatant monarchist [words indistinct] (?include) one first lieutenant of the air force, one private, [words indistinct], four sergeants, three privates of the ground forces and one former university professor. The Revolution Guards Corps has stated that the monarchist (?prisoners) [words indistinct]. [Passage indistinct]

CSO: 4640/83

CLANDESTINE RADIO ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

NC171617 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian 1500 GMT 16 Dec 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] More than ever before, the mullahs' tempest-struck ship is on a collision course and now after 3 years of playing with the waves, it is nearing the center of the eddy at any moment [words indistinct].

Actually Khomeyni's regime owes its life to difficulties and, apparently, the lack of difficulties threatens the life of the rule even more, and this because throughout the 3 years of the mullahs' rule, the country has not been free from difficulties and problems for even a moment.

In the first year of their usurping rule, they created the problem of the U.S. hostages and kept the people busy for about 1 and 1/2 years with this problem. They closed down industries and plants to draw the workers to the streets and to chant "death to America" to satisfy the wish of the rule. They closed down the universities to arm the youths of the people as revolution guards and to take away public calm and when it became obvious that with the emergence of Reagan in the U.S. policy, Khomeyni's regime would have a losing hand, the war with Iraq was started and meanwhile they did not stop fanning any flame that could start a new fire of problems. They kept the people busy for a while with the idiotic war between Beheshti, Bani-Sadr and their companions and as, with the good offices of the imam of the umma, Beheshti was killed and Bani-Sadr became a carrion. Appointing Raja'i as president, they claimed that "now the rule is wholly Islamic, all its members are doctrinaires and there is nothing but doctrine and doctrinaires." Khomeyni went on to tell his officials that "now is the time of construction." But Raja'i and his prime minister, too, were drowned in the waves of incidents and the country was wholly turned over to the clergymen.

Yes, the regime is after problems and the creation of problems because once there are no problems, the people will have the opportunity to settle accounts with the (?usurping) regime and ask for a record of what has been done during these 3 years of oppression. But when we said that the broken ship of Khomeyni's regime is nearing the eddy and the epicentre of the tempest any moment [we were also referring to] the country's economic problems in addition to the political and social problems, and these economic problems will inevitably prepare the death of Khomeyni's arbitrary rule.

The country's economic problems [words indistinct]. The foreign exchange reserves, with the (?continuation of the Iran-Iraq war) and, as said by the governor of the Bank Markazi, has dropped to less than $1.5 billion. The oil income that has been the)?pillar supporting Khomeyni's rule) and with which the people's food was being furnished is decreasing more and more each day and is now less than $500 million per month, and this can hardly meet one-third of the expenses. Two million war refugees, 1.5 million Afghan refugees and the flood of unemployed and war-stricken people are not small problems that Khomeyni's regime can easily solve. This terrifying eddy will finally destroy the warp and woof of Khomeyni's rule and the lack of experts and the brain drain brought about because of the mullahs' impediments is in itself a weakening factor that will close the doors to solutions more tightly.

However, despite all these (?negative factors we have discussed), the Western world is definitely very well aware [words indistinct], the closeness that the Tehran regime is gaining with the communist (?bloc) will bring to it invaluable assistance that will result in the regime's salvation from the (?tempest in the shortest possible time) and which will also result in the sinking of the country's ship in the ocean of communism. It is clear that the Soviets are not fond of Khomeyni and his associates. But if Khomeyni is able to bring Iran even a step closer to the Eastern bloc--something that he has already done--any type of assistance will be placed at his disposal so that his ignorant [words indistinct]. (?However the Iranian nation, as the best judge, should be the one to discern its enemies) [words indistinct].

Long live Iran! Long live the Iranian nation! Death to Khomeyni's (?arbitrary regime)!

CSO: 4640/83

MOBILIZATION UNIT SUPERVISOR INTERVIEWED

LD171446 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 17 Dec 81

[Text] Thanks to cooperation from the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps and the Islamic Republic of Iran armed forces, more than 2 million people have received mobilization training and are ready to wage battle against the enemies of the Islamic revolution. Hojjat ol-Eslam Saleh, supervisor of the mobilization unit of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, in an exclusive interview given to the correspondent of the Central News Unit in Khorramabad this morning, while announcing this fact, said: Following the guidelines issued by the imam of the Islamic nation, an extensive nationwide mobilization training program is continuing with the utmost speed. So far, 2 million people have received mobilization training and, of course, all the young forces are ready to wage battle against the foes of Islam; this figure includes those people in the mobilization union who have received training.

Analyzing the plots repeatedly hatched by U.S. imperialism in Iran he said: A new force and a new tactic have now emerged in the world by the command of the imam, bearing the Koran in one hand and arms in the other, so much so that this state of affairs has been effective not only on and behind the fronts, but rather has made the enemies of the Islamic revolution tremble with fear.

He added: The mobilization unit of the guards corps has also continued its work in order to prepare to the maximum the multimillion masses, so much so that our brothers who are members of the mobilization unit now constitute an important section of the frontline forces on the side of our brothers from the armed forces and the guards corps.

The supervisor of the country's mobilization, while expressing appreciation for the efforts of Lorestan Province's mobilization, also announced: We need as much help as our Lorestan brothers and sisters can give us, as they have continuously proved that they are the hope of the revolution.

CSO: 4640/83

BRIEFS

COSTS THREATENING PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT--Tehran, 7 Dec (PARS News Agency)--The Energy Minister Dr Ghafuri-Fard who visited the Iranc-Japan petrochemical complex in Bandar Imam Khomeyni, southern Iran, accompanied by a number of other ministers and members of the Industries Committee of the Majlis, said afterwards that because project costs vastly exceed the limit set forth in the agreement, the continuation of the project is not feasible for the Islamic Republic of Iran. He added that so far the project had cost Iran 20 billion tomans or $2.5 billion and in some parts 80 to 90 percent of the work had been finished and 92 percent of the parts of the power plants had been completed. The energy minister said that starting next week, discussions between Iran and Japan would resume to determine whether Iran was going to go ahead with the project, but under the present terms Iran could not continue the work and it had yet to be decided whether Iran was going to complete the project with Japan or with some other partner. [Text] [LD071152 Tehran PARS in English 1018 GMT 7 Dec 81]

ECONOMIC COUNCIL SESSION--Tehran, 11 Dec (PARS)--The Economic Council discussed ways to solve the dispute between the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and the contractor building the Bushehr power station on Thursday's afternoon. The proposal of the Atomic Energy Organization concerning the solution of the dispute was approved. In this session, which was presided over by Prime Minister Musavi, the council also studied financial, economic, and political policies of the 1361 [starting March 1982] budget, the establishment of a Ministry of Heavy Industries, and the continuation of the Esfarayen Foundation, the machine-works project. [Text] [LD112330 Tehran PARS in English 1605 GMT 11 Dec 81]

AZARBAYJAN GOVERNOR INTERVIEWED--Tehran, 15 Dec (PARS News Agency)--Engineer Hussayn Taheri, the governor general of East Azarbayjan, participated in an interview and talked about accomplishments in this province. Mr Taheri talked about the negotiations with the economic delegation of Turkey and stated that these negotiations were aimed at establishing seven new factories, including a lime factory, a galvanised pipe factory, and a cement factory. Contracts for these projects would be signed very soon with the Turkish Government. He added that after the contract for purchasing live sheep from Turkey had been signed so far 30,000,000 sheep had been imported through the Bazargan border. Then the governor general of East Azarbayjan commented on the halt in construction of the power plant of Tabriz saying that after the breakoff in relations between Iran and France following the flight of Bani-Sadr and Rajavi to France the Alsthom Company of France did not

finish its work in the aforementioned powerplant. Measures were being taken to complete the plant he said. About the Tabriz-Jolfa electric railroad project Taheri also said that Soviet experts were working on this. [Text] [LD151952 Tehran PARS in English 1830 GMT 15 Dec 81]

NEW SWISS AMBASSADOR--Tehran, 13 Dec (PARS)--The new ambassador of Switzerland to the Islamic Republic of Iran, Paul Stauffer, submitted his credentials to the Iranian deputy foreign minister, Ahmad 'Azizi, in a meeting on Sunday morning. [Excerpt] [LD140302 Tehran PARS in English 1633 GMT 13 Dec 81]

YUGOSLAV VISITORS--Tehran, 13 Dec (PARS)--Hojjat ol-Eslam Mir Abdulfazl Musavi, the Majlis deputy from Tabriz, East Azerbaijan Province in northeast Iran, met with the ambassador of Yugoslavia to Iran, Edward Kljun, who is also leading a Yugoslav delegation touring Tabriz, in Tabriz tractor manufacturing plant on Saturday afternoon. The Yugoslav delegation is visiting Iran to study the possibilities of transferring the plant from an assembly factory to a producing and self-sufficient unit to manufacture agricultural machinery. [Excertp] [LD140302 Tehran PARS in English 1030 GMT 13 Dec 81]

IRAN-E AZAD LEADER INTERVIEWED--The leader of the Iran-e Azad [Free Iran] group has said that monarchy is the last and only remedy to prevent Iran from downfall. Azadeh Shafiq announced this in an interview with the BBC. This radio has started a series of programs aimed at studying the ideology of opponents of the fascist Tehran regime, the first part of which included interviews with Azadeh Shafiq, leader of the Iran-e Azad group, and Kurosh Aryana, member of the Azadegan group. The leader of the Iran-e Azad group, in reply to a question by the BBC correspondent who had referred to Reza Pahlavi as the former crown prince, (?pointed out) that Reza Pahlavi is the shahanshah of Iran. Meanwhile, she herself spoke about topics that she called wrong propaganda tactics during the shah's period without making any mention (?of the corruption among members of the former regime). In a similar interview, member of the Azadegan organization Kurosh Aryana, by bearing in mind the views and (?wants of the Iranian nation), stressed the salvation of the country by respecting Iran's national history. In our press review section we will speak to you about this series of programs. [Text] [NC031625 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 0315 GMT 11 Dec 81]

WORKERS' PLEDGE TO STRIKE--After a statement was issued yesterday by Mir Hoseyn Musavi-Khamene'i, prime minister of Khomeyni's Islamic regime, regarding the retrenchment of employees from offices, the "strike" councils of employees [as heard] all over the country reviewed the future course of action of their struggle. Our reporter informed us that Iranian employees feel that the government's plan to purge employees is a preventive measure against widespread strikes. Last night the "strike" councils of the employees and workers of Iran issued a circular in Tehran in which they pledged their solidarity and unity for initiating strikes and resistance against the mullahs' Islamic regime. The date of the nationwide strikes has not been announced. [Text] [GF051102 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 4 Dec 81]

ITALIAN ARMS DELIVERY--The Italian Government recently delivered weapons and ammunition to the Khomeyni regime. A well-informed source in Tehran who gave this report to our correspondent said that the Italian Government flew the weapons and ammunition to Iran from an airport [word indistinct] near Milan. [Passage indistinct] [Text] [GF071801 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Dec 81]

BANKNOTES PRINTED IN MALTA--Two Boeing 707 airplanes have transported a large amount of banknotes to Iran from Malta. The Maltese Government is controlled by Great Britain. According to our correspondent's report, a printing press in Malta has printed the new banknotes, which are without any backing by the Khomeyni regime. On several occasions in recent years, Khomeyni's regime has printed banknotes without any backing. [Words indistinct] and has devalued the rial on the (?international market). The same report adds that some wealthy persons have hidden banknotes that were issued during the time of the late shah of Iran in order to use them after the fall of Khomeyni's regime. [Words indistinct] Khomeyni regime's banknotes will be worthless. [Text] [GF071815 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 7 Dec 81]

BAN OF RELIGION TEACHING--An Iranian publication from abroad has reported in its last issue that during the past couple of weeks, the illegal Islamic Republic has added to its pressures on religious minorities and has made life more difficult for our non-Muslim compatriots. Namely, the Islamic Ministry of Education recently warned special schools of religious minorities that they do not have the right to teach (?their language and religion) and that lessons in religions other than Islam should not be included in the curriculum. The first religious minority to oppose (?this decision by the Islamic regime) was the Armenian minority. According to reports received from Tehran, in protest (?to the limitation) of their religious and cultural freedoms Armenian students have not shown up in classrooms and have organized sit-ins in several churches in Tehran. While confirming this report an Armenian compatriot stated that Armenian students are boycotting classes for as long as the regime's officials insist on their decision and they gather in churches in various towns instead of attending classes. [Text] [NC081641 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 7 Dec 81]

TERRORIST TO KILL OPPONENTS--Professional terrorist Mohsen Reza'i met with Khomeyni today. A Free Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that today the occupied Tehran Radio reported that Mohsen Reza'i, commander of the Revolution Guards Corps, submitted a report to the leader of the revolution on fighting counterrevolution. Following clashes between opponents of the fascist clerical regime with terrorists and hezbollahs in Iran and abroad, it is said that the professional terrorist, Mohsen Reza'i, has received several terrorist plans from Russian experts to be used against opponents of the regime. The mass media of the antinational Khomeyni regime always refer to Iran's patriots and freedom-seekers as counterrevolutionaries. On the other hand a reliable report from Tehran indicates that the meeting between the professional terrorist Mohsen Reza'i and Khomeyni is not unrelated to the meeting of the Supreme Defense Council during which Khomeyni's efforts had been directed to removing differences between patriotic officers and members of the defeated Revolution Guards Corps. [Text] [NC101053 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 8 Dec 81]

SOVIET ENVOY MEETS MINISTRY OFFICIAL--According to a Central News Unit report, Vladimir Vinogradov, the Soviet ambassador in the Islamic Republic of Iran, today met and conferred with Mr Kazempur-Ardabili, under secretary for international and economic affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to the report, at this meeting the two sides expressed their interest in the expansion and development of bilateral economic relations and explained the two countries' viewpoints and stands on various world issues discussed at the United Nations and the other international forums. [Text] [LD091780 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 9 Dec 81]

TRIAL OF COUP PARTICIPANTS--According to a PARS report, the Islamic revolution tribunal of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran has announced: This coming Wednesday morning the trial of Eng Reza Marzban will begin at the tribunal's No 1 branch. He has been accused of taking past in the coup d'etat. According to the same report Eng Reza Marzban was one of the main elements in the political branch of the abortive coup d'etat of 1359 [last year]. [Text] [LD051200 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 5 Dec 81]

BANK GOVERNOR VISITS FRG--According to a Central News Unit report, the governor of the Central Bank of Iran left this morning for the Federal Republic of Germany to take part in the annual general meeting of the Krupp Corporation. Before leaving Tehran, the bank governor told a Central News Unit correspondent that because 25 percent of the Krupp Corporation stock belongs to Iran, participation by Iran's representative is compulsory. The Central Bank governor also said that he would meet and hold talks with German economic officials about the two countries' economic relations. He emphasized that the expansion of commercial and economic relations between Iran and Germany will be discussed. [Text] [LD091804 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 9 Dec 81]

REZA PAHLAVI'S UNITY CALL--Reza Pahlavi, the eldest son of the late shah of Iran, has announced that in defending Iran's freedom and independence all opponents of the antinational regime, despite their ideologies and political thoughts, should be supported. Reza Pahlavi, who made this statement in an interview with an Arab weekly, told the Iranian nation that he is (?tired) of commotion and the issuing of (?statements). The eldest son of the late shah of Iran pointed out that he firmly believes in [words indistinct] and that he considers the salvation of Iran to be his most important objective. We draw your attention to the text of Reza Pahlavi's interview with the London-based weekly AL-MAJALLAH in the press review of this program. [Text] [NC101647 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 10 Dec 81]

REGIME TO CLOSE AUTO PLANT--A Voice of Iran correspondent reports that following the intensification of resistance by workers in various parts of the country, authentic documents are now available which show that the clerical government intends to close down the Iran national plant, which builds Peykan cars. According to the report, Ahmad Tavakkoli, the labor minister of the clerical regime, (?has threatened workers at the Iran national plant. He has said that the plant has suffered more than 6 billion rials in losses) and that the government cannot allow the Iran national plant to continue operations. It should be noted that some employees of the Iran national auto industry are on strike, while others have threatened that if a positive reply is not given to the demands of their colleagues, (?all of the plants' workers will go on strike). Meanwhile, the administration of the Iran national plant has been placed under the jurisdiction of the Organization of Rebuilding Iranian Industries affiliated to the Ministry of Industries and Mines and as a (?result it is influenced by reactionary and fundamentalist mullahs). Our correspondent concludes his report by noting that for some time now clashes have been intensifying between workers of various industrial units with members of the Islamic councils that are playing the role of the regime's spies [word indistinct] and the regime is terrified because the strikes are spreading in some factories. [Excerpts] [NC121508 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 11 Dec 81]

RAJAVI 'THREAT' ANGERS MILITARY--According to reports, the remarks made recently by the fugitive leader of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization, Mas'ud Rajavi, threatening Iranian armed forces personnel have prompted an extremely unfavorable reaction among the young cadre of the organization and among the armed forces. On Thursday, Rajavi threatened that if the armed forces attempts anything against the armed men of the Kurdish Democratic Party of 'Abdorrahman Qasemlu, this will be considered tatamount to a clash with the Mojahedin-e Khalq and the military personnel will have to bear heavy consequences. (?Reports indicate) that this threat by Mas'ud Rajavi has met with an extremely unfavorable reaction among the young supporters of his organization and (?has especially greatly enraged) the armed forces. [Text] [NC121506 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 11 Dec 81]

BBC TELEVISION REPORTAGE--The BBC television broadcast a detailed film on the situation in Iran. In this film the extent of Iran's destruction and economic bankruptcy was confirmed and stressed and the extremely difficult living conditions of war refugees was shown. In this television program the voice of a woman tortured by the feet was recorded. On this, the Tehran Islamic revolution prosecutor, Hojjat ol-Eslam Lajevardi, said in a BBC television interview that inflicting bruises on the feet is not considered to be torture but that this actually boosts and strengthens the spirit of women. In another case of Islamic justice, the BBC photographer saw about 300 adolescents, 12 to 18 years of age, who were imprisoned in the new Evin prison building. Finally, the BBC television program showed the trial of a youth who had repented but was condemned to execution and this sentence was immediately implemented. The trial of a youth who was subsequently hanged for not betraying antiregime combatants was also shown. It is worth noting that officials of the Kyomeyni regime claim that they pardon those who repent and do not execute those who have not personally taken up arms against the Islamic Republic. Despite all this, the English producer of the BBC television claimed that the Iranian masses support Khomeyni and that opposition within the country is not noticeable. [Text] [NC100820 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 9 Dec 81]

TUDEH PARTY AIMS--The Commercial Committee of the clerical majlis has approved the bill on nationalizing foreign trade. This is a law implemented only in communist countries and economic experts believe that the bill on nationalizing the foreign trade was compiled by the Tudeh Party, which in turn made the clergymen accept it. An interesting point to note is that the contents of the bill on the nationalization of foreign trade is completely contrary to Islamic jurisprudence. By virtue of Islamic laws trade (?with Muslims or others is permissible for all Muslims). The communists have (?initiated the foreign trade nationalization bill in order to facilitate their work after they gain power and for so that obstacles are removed by the clergymen one by one before the establishment of a communist government in Iran.) [Text] [NC111625 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 11 Dec 81]

KHOMEYNI RECEIVES NEW ENVOY--Mr 'Abbas Zamani who was recently appointed the new charge d'affaires of the Islamic Republic of Iran to Islamabad was received by Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic on the eve of his recent assignment this morning. [LD080222 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 7 Dec 81]

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH ITALY--According to a Central News Unit report, the Italian ambassador in the Islamic Republic of Iran today met with the deputy minister of commerce in charge of foreign trade. During this meeting discussions were held about the expansion of economic and commercial relations between the two countries. According to this report, the Iranian ambassador emphasized that his government is planning to provide its oil needs from the Islamic Republic of Iran. He also expressed his desire to expand the volume of commercial exchanges between the two countries through joint plans and projects. [Text] [LD080222 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 7 Dec 81]

BAKHTIAR HUMAN RIGHTS MESSAGE--The leader of the National Resistance Movement of Iran, Shapur Bakhtiar, has issued a statement on the occasion of human rights day. In his statement, Bakhtiar refers to the "religious" fanaticism of the fascist Tehran regime and points out that nationalism and patriotism are free of these fanaticisms. Condemning [word indistinct] the illegal and usurping regime of Khomeyni for its crimes and antinational acts and the execution without trial of Iranians, Bakhtiar stresses that the "Islamic" regime has carried out its mission on the closing of universities and the killing of Iranian students in the most disgraceful way. [Text] [NC121810 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 12 Dec 81]

ATTACK ON TEHRAN GARRISON--According to a communique published in Paris, the nationalists opposed to the regime of mullahs recently carried out an armed attack against Tehran's Bagh-e Shah garrison. They were able to occupy the garrison for several hours and to take a quantity of arms and ammunition back to their hideouts. Our correspondent's report is based on this communique, which was distributed throughout the student district in Paris. The communique says that the nationalists opposed to the regime did not meet with any opposition from the guards in the garrison. They left it without incident after confiscating arms and ammunition. The armed nationalist strugglers had cut all communications lines to the garrison prior to their attack. Tehran's Bagh-e Shah garrison has been renamed Lahuti. [Text] [GF140718 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 13 Dec 81]

OIL PRICE CUT DENIED--According to a report by the Central News Unit, a spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied an AFP report about the price of Iranian crude exports which had been published in one of the Sunday evening editions of a Tehran newspaper. This spokesman added: It is clear that the new oil prices will be announced officially by the Oil Ministry after they have been confirmed by the responsible officials of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In its incorrect report, AFP said that the price of Iran's crude would be $30. [Text] [LD141920 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 14 Dec 81]

TAHERI TO SUPERVISE GUARDS IDEOLOGY--In the name of God, the compassionate, the merciful To your eminence Hojjat ol-Eslam Haj Seyyed Hasan Taheri, may God extend your shadow: Since his great eminence Hojjat ol-Eslam Val Moslemin Haj Sheykh Hoseyn 'Ali Montazeri, may God extend his shadow, has assigned you to investigate the situation of the guards corps, I hereby appoint you to perform this assignment, to exercise utmost care and to ensure that all the regulations and decisions made by the Council of the Guards Corps accord with the principles of Islam. In addition you are to supervise the path of thoughts and ideology in the corps and

to prevent any corruption of violation of the law. [Signed] Ruhollah Musavi Khomeyni. [Dated] 13 November 1981. [Text] ["Text" of decree issued by Imam Khomeyni, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 13 December] [LD141114 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 14 Dec 81]

ARREST OF ARMY OFFICIAL--Officials of the Islamic regime have announced that on Saturday, 5 December, retired Maj Gen Ruhollah Ertefa'i was arrested in his home in Tehran. Maj Gen Ertefa'i is accused of having discovered in 1977 a training camp of the communist guerrillas of the Feda'iyan-e Khalq in the mountains north of Tehran and for having arrested four of these guerrillas when he was commander of the operations bureau of the gendarmerie. The four arrested guerrillas were later released during Shapur Bakhtiar's premiership and by virtue of a general amnesty to all political prisoners. Maj Gen Ertefa'i's arrest, on the (?one hand), shows the depth of the communists' (?infiltration) and especially of the Tudehis and the Feda'iyan-e Khalq (majority) in the clerical ruling organs and, on the other, speaks of [words indistinct] (?revenge) by communists on past opponents. [Text] [NC171024 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 16 Dec 81]

NEW FRIDAY IMAM FOR SHIRAZ--Imam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, appointed Hojjat ol-Eslam Val-Moslemin Haj Sheykh Mohammad Yazdi as the temporary Friday imam of Shiraz. According to the Central News Unit, the text of the statement on this appointment issued by the imam's office is as follows: In his exalted name. Following the tragic martyrdom of the Friday imam of Shiraz Ayatollah Dastgheyb--may God sanctify his soul--Imam Khomeyni, may his lofty shadow long continue, has appointed the honorable scholar His Excellency Hojjat ol-Eslam Val-Moslemin Haj Sheykh Mohammad Yazdi, may his blessings continue, as the temporary Friday imam of Shiraz. It is hoped that through the cooperation of the great ulema and the esteemed and noble people of Shiraz, the unifying prayers would be held as glorious as possible. We beseech the almighty God to destroy enemies of Islam and grant honor and pride to all Muslims of the world. [Signed] Imam Khomeyni's office 16 Dec 1981 [Text] [LD161910 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1630 GMT 16 Dec 81]

U.S. REFUSES TO SELL F-14 SPARES--The U.S. Defense Department has turned down a request by Khomeyni's Islamic regime on the delivery of spares for F-14 fighters to Iran. According to U.S. laws, the sale of arms and spares to other countries should be approved by the Department of Defense. The Iranian Air Force owns 78 extremely modern F-14 fighter bombers. Because of shortage of spares and the execution of many experienced pilots the planes are grounded and cannot be used in the war. [Text] [NC171034 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 16 Dec 81]

CSO: 4640/82

PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Paris LE FIGARO MAGAZINE in French 28 Nov 81 pp 98-99, 101

[Interview with Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin by Robert Lacontre, in Jerusalem; date not specified]

[Text] Robert Lacontre: Mr Prime Minister, Prince Fahd himself said that his plan was merely a point of departure for trying to find an overall solution. What do you think of it?

Menahem Begin: His plan is not a plan; it is a non-plan, a non-program. I am going to use Gen De Gaulle's words: "I will tell you why!" Why the Fahd plan's eight points mean, quite simply: how to liquidate Israel, not immediately, but little by little. The first stage is for Israel to withdraw from the frontier of 4 June 1967, that is to say at least 30 km from the sea. Well, the PLO now has Soviet 130-mm guns that shoot 27 km, and missiles. That is a direct threat to our country. The second stage consists of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District being under the control of the UN for three months. Next those territories are recovered by the PLO. At that time the enemy's advance positions will be 3 km from Tel Aviv, Jaffa, etc. In a very short time the Palestinian State will become a Soviet base. Because the Fatah, which is the principal component of the PLO, thoroughly defined its intentions at the recent meeting in Damascus. I quote: "Strengthening the strategic alliance with the socialist countries directed by the Soviet Union." This is a euphemism for saying "We are going to serve Moscow." Now, Odessa is two and a half hours from Judea. No problem, therefore, for the Russians to transport weapons and baggage, instructors and soldiers. In addition, behind this Palestinian State are Jordan and Iraq, then those two countries are allied against Iran, with the help of Saudi Arabia. Finally, the Syrians, who for the moment are enemies of Jordan, can change their minds at a single stroke. That makes four Arab countries, armed to the teeth, that have decided to destroy Israel. And then there is the seventh point: "Recognition of the countries of the region, the rights of those countries to live in peace." This was interpreted by the Europeans, but also by the United States, as recognition of Israel. Only the word Israel is not mentioned. Meanwhile, a very significant incident occurred. A diplomat from the Saudi Arabian embassy in Washington stated that it was really a question of recognition of Israel. Seven hours later an official statement from Riyadh corrected the fire: the diplomat had been speaking personally, his words had no basis in fact.

At any rate, what difference does it make whether a state is recognized or not! Germany certainly recognized the French Republic, and it took Alsace and Lorraine.

Poland, too, was recognized, but Germany and Russia destroyed the Polish state. So recognition represents no safeguard for the future. The reality is that we are surrounded by enemies. We have to be very careful. We must not let ourselves be blinded by words. What is the hereditary Saudi prince suggesting? The destruction of the state of Israel in stages. President Reagan said there were promises of negotiations in the Fahd plan. However, the word "negotiations" did not appear. Everything is imposed on Israel, there is no question of negotiations. The hereditary prince, and undoubtedly the PLO, and perhaps someone else, have imagined that Israel could be brought to her knees.

So this plan has no significance for us. It will soon be forgotten, like all the other documents intended to destroy us. If Prince Fahd or King Khaled want to talk peace with us, there is only one way to do it. They can come to Jerusalem and study how a people live in peace, or invite me to go to Riyadh. I will gladly go to Riyadh to talk with them, or else in neutral territory, Switzerland for example. Without documents, without special dossiers, without blah blah blah, then we will talk peace.

[Question] Who do you think murdered al-Sadat?

[Answer] He was assassinated, it seems, by a small group of people who live on another planet. They think al-Sadat deviated from Islam, and that if they should be killed they will go directly to Paradise. They are stupid fanatics who cannot even be talked to. Look at Khomeynism, that horrible fanaticism, the darkest period in the history of humanity, even darker than the Middle Ages, executions, torture, massacres, a horrible regime which, in the name of Islam, overflowed into Syria, into Egypt. The assassination of al-Sadat was a terrible blow for Egypt and for me, because al-Sadat was not only my partner in the peace process, but my personal friend as well. Right here is where the Egyptian president arrived in Jerusalem four years ago. I had told him in my letter of invitation, you will be received by the entire Israeli people with much warmth, with much respect. His coming was an act of courage which I appreciated very much. It was for this reason that I went to his funeral with great sadness in my heart. Al-Sadat and I often said to each other, we are human beings, we can vanish any day, but our nations are eternal, that is why we must make peace for our peoples. We are certain that peace will survive each of us. Now Mubarak has taken over the government. He is in control of the situation. We have had a very warm conversation. We took each other's hands and we said, peace forever. Because such a great event, such an historic event, a peace treaty between two countries that have waged war against each other for 31 years, cannot vanish with its creators. So we must now carry out the second part of the Camp David Accords: autonomy for the Palestinian Arabs living in Judea, in Samaria and in the Gaza District. Friends may have differences, it is true, but we are going to continue our negotiations until we arrive at last at an understanding.

[Question] Was the assassination of the Egyptian president remote-controlled by a foreign power?

[Answer] I cannot supply any proof of that hypothesis.

[Question] What role is Qadhdhafi playing in international terrorism?

[Answer] Al-Sadat asserted that the Libyan colonel was crazy. Can a man who wants to sink the Queen Elizabeth with 2,000 passengers aboard be entirely normal? Above all, he has oil and Russia is behind him.

[Question] Why did he leave Chad so suddenly, at the very moment when Syrian troop movements toward Libya were being talked about?

[Answer] Who can explain the actions of a crazy man? Why would he need Chad, which is immense, when Libya is gigantic and has only 4 million inhabitants? This is totally irrational. Of course, Syria and Libya are linked by a kind of military pact. Those two countries mutually help each other. There are movements of airplanes between Syria and Libya and vice versa. Qadhdhafi undoubtedly asked Damascus to send him aid at the time of the Libyan invasion. Then he had a new whim.

[Question] Why don't we hear anything any more about the missiles in the Lebanese plain of Beka?

[Answer] I am going to have a meeting with the American ambassador and I have asked him where was Mr Philip Habib, who promised me several months ago that he would have those missiles withdrawn from Lebanon. I remind you that we granted a [illegible] to the United States, but that cannot last forever.

[Question] Do you consider Syria a new Soviet bridgehead?

[Answer] Syria has in fact been a Russian base for at least 6 years. What the Americans call "pre-positioning." The Syrians have 2,600 Soviet tanks and 1,000 more are at the disposal of the Russian army in case of intervention in the region. It is the same for missiles and planes. The USSR, in addition to the arms it is furnishing to Syria, has put its own armament in place. That country is totally an instrument of the Russians in the Middle East.

[Question] Al-Sadat told me that if Saudi Arabia suspended giving funds to the Syrians, the latter would be forced to leave Lebanon and peace could be established again.

[Answer] Certainly, but the Saudis never said anything of the kind. So there is in Lebanon a 40,000-man army of occupation which is blindly killing Christians and Muslims. They call it a peace force! A peace force that massacres civilians! In Syria itself, fratricidal war is permanent between Shi'ites and Alaouites. The clique in power in that country is Alaouite, a small Islamic sect that other Muslims do not accept. Assad belongs to this sect, which governs a country divided between Sunnites and Shi'ites, who themselves are continually killing each other.

Syria also supports international terrorism. Directly and indirectly, through Lebanon. An important pro-Syrian faction in the PLO is entirely dependent on the USSR.

[Question] They say that time is on the side of the Palestinians.

[Answer] That depends on which Palestinians you are talking about. Moreover, the word Palestinian is not the right word. I too am a Palestinian. The English called that region Palestine. Historically, it is the country of Israel. We have to speak

of Arabs or Palestinian Ar Some of them are very friendly. The day before yesterday one of them was hit by a PLO bullet. Just because he was a peaceful and moderate man. With such Palestinian Arabs we are ready to discuss peace, but not with armed Palestinians. No country talks about its own destruction with anyone. Look at what we have done in Judea, in Samaria and in Gaza. We built houses for the Arabs to replace the slums they lived in for so long. But there are those who are inciting them to violence.

[Question] In April 1982 you will have evacuated the whole Sinai, so it is not understood why you are implanting Jewish colonies in the "occupied territories."

[Answer] The Europeans know what colonialism is, from their own experience. But this does not apply to us. As far as Judea, Samaria and Gaza are concerned, we are not turning anyone out. Our villages are built on rocky land that has never been cultivated. Our populations carry on agriculture if they can. If they can't, they create industrial enterprises. This is their most basic right. We have been living there for thousands of years.

On the other hand, it is a position of security. Our villages on the heights look over the valleys.

The enemy cannot infiltrate without being spotted. So it is a kind of preventive guard and, I repeat, it is our right to live there without chasing the Arabs out.

[Question] Don't you think that the United States, in delivering weapons and AWACS to Saudi Arabia today, has in mind a new strategy in the Gulf and in the entire Middle East?

[Answer] As far as the Gulf is concerned, the Americans really have a problem there. They are afraid the Russians are seeking to grab it. The situation is all the more dangerous because Iran may become a communist country. There is chaos in Iran, and the Bolsheviks love chaotic situations. Khomeyni is an old man. He may die suddenly. But there exists in that country that no free man should forget, the Tudeh, the Iranian Communist Party, which is the most structured group in the country. If the chaos continues or if Khomeyni disappears, the communists may take control of the country and "invite" the Soviet army to come into Iran. We must not forget that a treaty exists between Iran and the USSR, signed in 1921, which authorizes the Soviet Union to intervene in Iran under certain conditions. If that happens, then the whole problem of oil would arise. So it is not surprising that the Americans are now waking up to face this new danger. They are seeking to put in place a new intervention force, to redeploy their forces. And that is not enough. Because the forces of the USSR are really superior, and these forces are always nearby. Nor should it be forgotten that the Russian army is in Afghanistan. Through Baluchistan, the Soviets can reach the Indian Ocean in no time, and no one will be able to stop them.

[Question] So Saudi Arabia has become America's principal ally in that zone?

[Answer] I should like to state that the Americans are about to commit a huge error there. We are trying to explain it to them, to public opinion as well as to the government or the Congress. Saudi Arabia has no real army. The monarch has only a palace guard of 10,000 men. They are not all good soldiers. Giving such a

completely backward country, which is still living in the Middle Ages, sophisticated weaponry, will serve no one.

Al-Sadat himself called my attention to what was going on in Iran. The shah had sent thousands of young people to study in the United States. They left home illiterate and returned covered with diplomas. After that, they no longer understood why all the country's wealth belonged to a single family. The case of Saudi Arabia is no different. All the country's wealth belongs to 4,000 princes and princesses. I can give you other details reported to me by the Egyptian president. One day, a check for $7 billion was divided among all the princes. If you figure it out, that makes over a million and a half for each of them. Isn't that corruption? Saudi Arabia is a corrupt country to the core, plunged into the night of the Middle Ages. How can one have confidence in such a country? Tomorrow, what happened in Tehran may happen in Riyadh. How can one be proud of such a weak ally, an ally with so little stability, that can easily be smashed? Al-Sadat also assured me that the events in Mecca, you remember two years ago, were a real coup d'etat to overthrow the regime. What saved the royal family was that it arrived late.

President Reagan, Mr Cheysson and Lord Carrington, in trying to gain favor with Saudi Arabia and make it an ally, are thus committing a very serious error.

[Menahem Begin interrupts himself for a moment. A little fine rain is falling on Jerusalem. The sky is rather gloomy. The prime minister resumes in his halting English./

We have paid a heavy price for our existence. Undoubtedly more than any other nation. On the other hand, no one can realize our country's closeness, least of all the Americans. How can a country be a mere 8 miles long, that is to say /shorter than Broadway?/ [in italics]. And the people are not paying attention to the great changes that have taken place in armaments. That is why a Palestinian state would be a key position for the USSR. After Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Libya, Angola, Mozambique and Afghanistan, the Russians would obtain a new base in this way. Consequently we are in mortal danger, surrounded by some 7,000 tanks, 12,000 fighter planes and all sorts of missiles.

Tomorrow, all the sophisticated American weapons supplied to Saudi Arabia are in danger of falling into the hands of potential enemies, and that will be an obstacle to the peace process. A new war may even break out one fine morning, or on a rainy day like today. This is why there are senators and members of the House of Representatives across the Atlantic who are not in agreement with the sale of weapons to Riyadh. Tomorrow the Saudis will obtain supply planes for their F-15's, and will be able, if they decide to, to attack us by surprise. How, under those conditions, would it be possible for the Israeli government and prime minister to disregard such a threat? It must be understood that Israel is a country that is still in a state of war.

[Our interview is finished. Begin goes now to study the reports on the Fez summit. The whole problem will be how Prince Fahd is going to manage to rally to his thesis all the Arab countries, in particular those of the rejection front. With dollars, no doubt. Moreover, he has just offered a gift of $285 million to the Palestinians.]

8946
CSO: 4419/10

ASSEMBLY SAID TO HAVE DIFFICULT TASK RESISTING GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 715, 28 Oct 81 pp 8-9

[Article: "Lest Assembly Turn Into Rubber Stamp Assembly"]

[Text] The citizens have received with satisfaction the inauguration of the National Assembly's new session and the resumption of parliamentary life following the summer vacation.

The source of this satisfaction is the citizens' hopes that this National Assembly will exercise its powers by lifting the shackles restricting democratic liberties, expanding the spheres of these liberties, formulating their bases, entrenching their course and developing their forms in this session, which will have more time than the previous session. Some have cited the lack of time as the reason for the inability of the Assembly's previous session to accomplish a number of issues of significance to the citizens, especially the abolishment of article 35/35 of the publication law and the introduction of democratic amendments to the law on public gatherings.

But statements by some observers in the wake of the initial session to the effect that the outcome of the parliamentary committees' election had been prearranged before convocation of the session has caused disappointment among the citizens.

Some observers have noted that it seems that there is a faction that sought to attain positions of leadership in the parliamentary committees and that this faction has succeeded in doing so, without consideration for the abilities and experience needed by the deputies to hold these positions. This reference is not at all intended to denigrate individuals, but the citizens are motivated by the desire not to have the Assembly's accomplishments characterized by weakness and inadequacy, thus preventing it from carrying out the enormous backlog of tasks awaiting it--tasks that require that maximum use be made of experienced and capable deputies. Failure to have such deputies occupy positions compatible with their capabilities and their experience will lead to paralyzation of their effectiveness to one degree or another.

Commenting on the way the elections were held, some people go so far as to express their lack of confidence in the Assembly's ability to confront its tasks, especially those tasks connected with democratic liberties and with the constitutional amendments that observers consider the most significant tasks entrusted to the current session of the National Assembly.

The source of this lack of confidence lies not only in the faction's attempt to attain the positions of leadership because if that were the case, the matter would call for no concern. Rather, the source of the lack of confidence is that the matter cannot be viewed on its own and cannot be separated from the real objectives that have not been directly exposed by the election process.

These objectives are tied to the Assembly's tasks and goals. The Assembly has two powers, a legislative power represented by the deputies and an executive power represented by the government members, namely the ministers.

In determining the direction of the faction, we cannot disregard the role and weight of the government members in influencing the outcome of the elections. This influence is in line with the position of the government that seeks to insure the legislative authority's approval of the laws and legislation included in the Assembly agenda so that these laws and this legislation can gain constitutionality. Consequently, this goal is compatible with the government's deepest desires to have the laws emanating from its convictions approved. Herein lies the danger of the faction because the goal is not only to attain the positions of leadership but also to realize an effective presence in all the leadership positions so as to pass all the laws and legislation, whether they are compatible with or opposed to the rights and wishes of the citizens.

Should there emerge within the Assembly a trend opposed to these laws and rejecting their passage, it will be immediately accused of obstructing the Assembly's effectiveness and of paralyzing its productivity. The old saying that "Halimah has returned to her old habit" will then apply to the Assembly and the citizen knows what the outcome of this accusation will be.

The historic tasks whose responsibility is shouldered by the National Assembly members and which affect all aspects of life, from democratic liberties, domestic security and external security to organizing and regulating the administrative apparatus and purging it of laxity, bureaucracy and nepotism--all under unstable conditions engulfing the area from every side--are in total conflict with any step to obstruct the Assembly's productivity, a productivity compatible with the citizens' deepest interest. These tasks also put on the shoulders of the deputies a major responsibility and an effective role in formulating laws and in carrying out their national legislative duties.

The performance of this task will be obstructed by the success of the faction in which the government is a party. However, it is most likely that this faction, exposed by the outcome of the [parliamentary committee] elections, will succeed in passing all the laws included on the Assembly agenda, even though some of these laws are totally hostile to the popular aspirations, especially aspirations concerning the proposed constitutional amendments and democratic liberties. Because of the effective place that the government occupies in the Assembly's leadership, many fear that the Assembly will turn into a rubber stamp responsive to the government's wishes.

In the face of this reality, any trend within the Assembly to develop these laws and legislation in a manner compatible with the broadest democratic liberties and the broadest interests of the homeland and of the citizens will face a hard and difficult row.

Thus, the signs indicate that the coming phase of the Assembly's life will be distinguished by nonproductivity. This situation requires that the capable and experienced deputies shoulder their responsibilities with great vigilance. It also demands that these deputies exert extraordinary efforts to confront the passage of the laws and legislation hostile to the citizens' aspirations. Even though we have confidence in the capability of these deputies, what is actually feared is that they will be accused of paralyzing the Assembly's effectiveness and that such an accusation will provide a justification for what nobody wishes to see happen.

8494
CSO: 4404/95

REASONS FOR SUSPENSION OF AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH MAGAZINE EXAMINED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 715, 28 Oct 81 pp 16-19

[Article: Nature of Crisis Between AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH and UAE Government; Constitutional Dilemma One of Main Dilemmas That Will Be Faced by UAE Government in Coming Phase; Editorial Board of AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH Discusses Seriously Question of Republishing Magazine Outside UAE; Arab Ambassadors and Some Circles of Ministry of Information Assert That Decision Will Have 'Arab Dimensions'; Why Did Government Promulgate Publications Law Before Promulgating Constitution"]

[Text] Last Wednesday, 22 October 1981, the UAE Government took a surprise step by shutting down AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH, a widely circulated magazine with a strong influence on local public opinion. In a brief letter to the magazine's chief editor, the Council of Ministers said: "A decision has been taken to suspend issuance of the weekly AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH magazine." No explanation was given for the reasons behind the council's decision. However, some well-informed circles in Abu Dhabi have linked the shutting down of AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH with the constitutional crisis into which the state is about to fall this coming December when the provisional constitution becomes inoperative.

The suspension of the magazine's publication has coincided with a report in the local press on an imminent meeting of the state's Supreme Council, which is comprised of the rulers of the seven emirates, to discuss the country's constitutional conditions and the issues connected with them.

In its issue of 6 October, AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH had warned of the dangers of a second extension of the provisional constitution and the dangers of leaving the country without a constitution, considering that the current constitution will lapse in December 1981. The magazine said: "In less than 2 months, the UAE will come to an end with the end of the first extension of the provisional constitution. With the termination of the constitution, all the laws, legislation and administrative and financial regulations will come to an end. Along with them, bilateral and collective charters, treaties and agreements will automatically end. So will all the employment contracts, emblems and insignia. The political institutions produced by the provisional constitutions, such as the Federal National Council and the judicial authority, will also come to an end. The government, with its ministries, departments, offices and Central Bank, will also end. Moreover, the termination will not stop at this but will also include the UAE Supreme Council. To put it briefly, everything will come to an end unless, of course, we hasten before the ship sinks to prepare a new constitutional formula that will preserve the continuity of the state as a political entity on the international map."

The issue of the constitution is one of the main issues facing the UAE because of the deep differences arising among UAE Supreme Council members over the formula for a permanent constitution that takes into consideration the positive development in the federation's advance that have occurred in recent years.

AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH had launched ceaseless campaigns to pressure the rulers to complete formulation of the permanent constitution and had blamed [the failure to do so] on the reluctant attitudes of some rulers.

Moreover, the well informed and those close to the Ministry of Information and Culture in Abu Dhabi have said that the UAE Government will face more than one dilemma in the next few months, the most important being the "dilemma of the constitution" and the vacuum that will be left by the absence of Shaykh Rashid al-Maktum, prime minister, vice president of the state and rule of Dubai, from political life because of illness.

A lot has been said recently about differences within the ruling family in the Emirate of Dubai over the likely successor to Shaykh Rashid because there are those in the family who are opposed to Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid, the crown prince of Dubai and UAE deputy prime minister.

According to sources in the Ministry of Information in Abu Dhabi, both the UAE Supreme Council and Government need at this tim to silence all the voices "agitating" against the decision to extend the constitution and the National Council for another year.

In November 1980, the Ministry of Information issued a publications law about which AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH said: "Basically, it is a prelude to gagging the mouths and preventing discussion of any vital issue on the grounds that such discussion would confuse both minds and dispositions. Thus, this law, which is considered second in importance to the constitution, as the assistant undersecretary of the Ministry of Information has said, has come before, and not after, the constitution to prevent any discussion of the constitution and to be a sword hanging over the heads of writers."

AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH's stand of "internal" opposition and of support for the Arab and national positions has developed national and democratic tendencies among students, intellectuals, civil servants and the ranks of Al-Azminah Group. This name denotes a large group of UAE university students (in the city of al-'Ayn in Abu Dhabi) who have progressive nationalist tendencies. But the only link between those in the group, about which the official circles talk, is that they support further unionist initiatives to entrench the position of the UAE state, advocate unity among the seven emirates and demand a broader democratic life in the country. These are the issues that AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH has been stressing since its publication in March 1979, in addition to embracing the demands of popular groups of the poor.

In this regard, the magazine has played a role in realizing the demands of drivers, employees and junior clerks [civil servants] who went on strike last April. The strike also included a large number of agencies of the ministries of the federal government, which demanded an improvement in living conditions.

Generally, some of those sympathetic to the magazine say that what has caused its suspension is the fact that it underlines the internal problems facing the UAE and proposes for these problems solutions that displease the government. This is indicated by the editorial in the latest edition of the magazine, which had been distributed before the chief editor was notified of the suspension of publication. Muhammad 'Ubayd Ghabbash, the chief editor, demands in the editorial that "the daily burdens on the citizens be reduced" and calls for "free electricity, water, medicine and food," relying in his demand on figures that he has published and that say that UAE annual oil revenues amount to $70 billions [as published]. Ghabbash also says that a comprehensive program of free water and electricity for all citizens will not cost more than 150 million dirhams "which are a small drop constituting 0.2 percent of the ocean of national income, which exceeds 70 billion dirhams."

Some observers in Abu Dhabi say that the real issue is oil. None of the rulers want wants to discuss this resource or publish any figure on its revenues and on how they are spent. Because of this, and for other reasons, the government has not been able to "deal calmly with AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH," thus adopting its decision, which was opposed by 2 out of the 17 ministers in the cabinet. The Ministry of Information and Culture had issued last year a decision suspending the magazine for 2 weeks without giving reasons, as happened in the decision on indefinite suspension issued by the Council of Ministers.

A person close to the editorial board has said that several Arab ambassadors to the UAE have contacted the magazine and said that the decision has its Arab dimensions because the magazine has been pushing for intensification of the Arab positions, especially positions connected with the U.S. presence in the Gulf, with the Gulf Cooperation Council and with the Arab positions concerning Camp David.

The magazine had taken a stance of opposition to the Gulf Cooperation Council since the Council held its first summit in Abu Dhabi last year. The magazine made no mention of that summit or of the summit convened in the UAE [sic]. It took a negative stance which it reflected in its total disregard of the activities of the council members because it could not declare its position, which casts doubts on the Council's goals due to considerations connected with the publications law and with the restriction of press liberties. This opposition to the council was noted openly in a column written in the vernacular by a member of the editorial board under the pen name "Balluti."

Other state officials have said that many government members expressed their annoyance with the magazine when it condemned, in its latest edition, the state's condemnation of the assassins of former Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat.

In the wake of al-Sadat's execution, an official source made a statement in the name of the state condemning "all kinds of political assassination because they are in conflict with the Arab ethics and with the Islamic Shari'a." The magazine condemned the state's condemnation of the assassination, saying: "Dealing with al-Sadat means dealing with Menachem Begin because the two men have stood together in the face of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and of the Arab nation."

The magazine also noted that "the statement of the official source violates the declared state policy, since the curtailed conference [Baghdad summit] that expelled

al-Sadat from the Arab line officially and condemned his flagrant connection with the Zionist enemy condemned whoever supports al-Sadat."

It is well known that the magazine enthusiastically supports the establishment of balanced relations between East and West and that its editorials have urged the UAE Government to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, following the example of the wise policy of the State of Kuwait in this regard.

Magazine sources say that all these reasons collectively have led to the closure of AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH. Some circles of the Ministry of Information, however, do not exclude the likelihood that external pressure was exerted for the closure of this magazine, which distributes 24,000 copies weekly, especially since the magazine has written things about oil prices, the American AWACS in Saudi Arabia and Prince Fahd's initiative for a Middle East settlement.

The confrontation between AL-AZMINAH AL-'ARABIYAH and the government has not ended. There are those who are trying to persuade the state officials that suspension of the magazine may generate internal complications that will not be in favor of the calm the government wants in the next 2 months. Moreover, the Council of Ministers' suspension decision has been understood as if it were intended to keep the door of negotiations with the magazine officials open so as to pressure them to change the course they have followed since inauguration of the magazine in March 1979.

People close to the magazine's editorial board have said that if the government wanted to permit republication of the magazine, then the magazine would not, on its own decision, publish again if it finds that it will be subjected to unbearable pressures from being gagged.

The same sources have pointed out that the editorial board has discussed seriously the possibility of republishing the magazine outside the UAE if the government persists in its decision to prevent its publication for good.

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No. 2463

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STATUS OF ASIAN LABOR FORCE REVIEWED

Asians Number 2.5 Million

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 28 Sep 81 p 9

[Article: "Special Report to GULF NEWS AGENCY on Asian Labor Situations in the Persian Gulf Area; Size of Asian Labor Force in Gulf Countries Nears 2.5 Million; Number of Immigrant Workers in UAE Nearly Three Times the Native Population"]

[Text] A report to the GULF NEWS AGENCY has clarified the status of the Asian labor force in the Gulf region and the quantitative and qualitative developments that have occurred in this area in recent years. The report also explains the political, economic, and social effects of this phenomenon, which should be studied from a serious perspective. Because of the importance and seriousness of this matter, AL-SIYASAH is publishing this report in a series of articles.

The rapid developments that have taken place in the Persian Gulf region during the second half of this century have played a tremendous role in changing the political, economic, and social aspects of life in the region. During the years immediately following the 1950's, the region experienced a rapid increase in rates of industrial and commercial growth.

This rapid growth was accompanied by a growth in the labor force and an effort on the part of this labor force to come to grips with the new social and economic reality in the region, which came to possess the world's largest reserves of oil. In fact, this area was and is the world's number one region in the production, exportation, and storage of oil.

The problem of employment and labor which pervades all aspects of this development became perhaps the greatest of the challenges and problems that confronted the states of the region. Like all the developing states, the Gulf states suffered initially from a low ratio of labor force to total population.

Foreign manpower poured into this area in awesome numbers. This flood of immigrants, who brought with them cultures, ideas and modes of behaviour that were alien to the states of the area, created a tremendous problem with respect to finding means of regulating this labor force presence.

It must be recognized at this point that the phenomenon of an influx of foreign labor --particularly Asian labor--is not new. During their presence in the region, the colonialists sought to inaugurate and entrench this penenomenon with the aim of obliterating the Arab characteristics of the region and isolating it from the larger Arab nation by creating an imbalance in the demographic composition of these societies and steadily innoculating them with Asian labor.

The problem of Asian labor in the Persian Gulf countries became one of the foremost issues occupying the minds of opinion leaders and officials in the Gulf countries on both the popular and official levels. It also gained the attention and study of numerous political, economic, and labor organizations in the other Arab countries. Moreover, the specialized international organizations have given much attention to this problem for a number of cultural, economic, and humanitarian reasons.

Because of the importance of this issue at the Arab level and in the Gulf region in particular, discussion of Asian labor has taken on an exceptional dimension. This is due to several factors, including the nature of conditions in the area, the size of its population, the resources lying beneath its lands and waters, its strategic position at a crossroads of international communications and transportation, and foreign ambitions with respect to its territory and resources on the part of a number of states and blocs both near to the area and at some distance away from it.

For these reasons individually or collectively, the issue has been put forward vigorously in the political, economic, and legal institutions of the Gulf countries. One view that has developed holds that some agency or agencies are behind a systematic operation to infiltrate Asian races into the Gulf with the aim of altering the demographic character of the area gradually as part of a long-range plan.

This serious situation has materialized as a result of the small population base in the area states and the lack of local labor to meet the needs of the development projects. However, this has in turn created the greatest and most dangerous labor immigration problem in the modern era. An even greater cause for pessimism in this regard is that this phenomenon--Asian immigration--is unprecedented in the history of any past immigrations from the standpoint that the immigrant workers have never before constituted the greatest majority of the labor force and penetrated so deeply into all aspects and areas of economic and commercial activity as in the UAE today. According to a social study conducted by UAE University, immigrants outnumber the original population of the state by almost three to one.

As we have mentioned, the ambitious projects and plans and the varied services that have begun to be offered by the area states undoubtedly require large numbers of workers of all types, both skilled and unskilled. Along with this, the level of dependence on the importation of cheap labor has expanded. In this connection, one study estimated that there were around 362,772 Asian workers in the region in 1975. This represented 42 percent of the existing labor force in the entire area. Assuming that growth rates in the region remain steady, which is the optimistic view of the situation, Asian workers will reach three or four times this number in the early 1980's, according to unofficial estimates.

Other relevant statistics indicate that Asian workers in the area make up over 2.5 million of the immigrant workers currently residing in the Gulf Oil States. A majority of these workers have thus immigrated from the Asian states.

Other statistics indicate that there are now more than 1 million Asian workers in the Gulf area. However, this figure is certainly far short of the actual number. South Korean workers alone now number nearly 300,000.

The rapid growth of the Asian labor force in the Gulf states is attributable to the dominance of the private sector in all the economies of the area states. When this sector controls commercial and economic activities and some light industries and conversion industries, it naturally strives to attain the greatest possible profit and the smallest possible loss. In this connection, we note that Asian laborers--particularly the Indians and Pakistanis--can tolerate any working conditions and any level of wages. This is a result of the deterioration of economic and social conditions in their original homeland. This fact provided an answer to the inadequacy of the local labor market in the area states, which acquired their independence in the early 1970's. The colonialists had worked previously to block opportunities to create any industries that would benefit the area states, and this had diminished the capabilities and skills of local labor and had rendered it incapable of managing the modern projects that would emerge in the area.

Perhaps we should turn our attention at this point to another basic factor, which is reflected by the failure to organize the hiring of Arab labor in a clear and outright manner, not to mention the fact that restrictions were placed on the hiring of Arab labor in several areas. In contrast, we find that there are highly efficient and organized international agencies for the importation of Asian labor. However, we must not forget that despite the commendable standards attained by Arab labor, it has not yet reached the point where it is qualified to provide the desired level of management for social, economic, and industrial development operations in the states of the area. It is only in the last few years that the Arab states have experienced the industrial progress attained by most of the states that export European labor and some Asian states such as Japan and Korea. Aside from this, the special Arab agreements aimed at hiring Arab manpower and arranging for the relocation of Arab workers did not find their way into application for a number of reasons. This encouraged the unrestricted importation of Asian labor.

One of the paradoxes in the labor structure of the Gulf states is the fact that one can find unemployment among the domestic workers in a given Gulf country which at the same time deems it necessary to import foreign workers. This is the result of social factors and prevailing ideas which lead the local workers to refuse certain jobs because they do not guarantee high social status or do not conform to the customs and traditions that prevailed before the beginning of the phase of development and advancement.

It has also been noted that the foreign workers coming into the area are concentrated primarily in the building and construction services sector and are employed in low numbers in the agricultural sector in some Gulf countries. In terms of nationality, they are limited to Indians, Ceylonese, Pakistanis, Bengalis, South Koreans, Filipinos, Thai, Singaporeans, and Japanese. These workers are characterized by a low level of abilities or fall within the least-skilled group and are hired for the purpose of implementing the development process in the field of building and construction and the creation of residential cities. Exceptions to this may include the Japanese and Koreans, who could possess capabilities for administration, organization, and supervision.

Up until the last 10 years, the only Asian labor groups known in the Gulf region were the traditional Indian and Pakistani nationalities. However, employment organizations abroad introduced the region to new Asian labor groups such as those mentioned previously. Another observation in this connection is the growth of a new development in the employment of foreign labor, namely, the hiring of skilled workers from Asian states in large organized work groups to provide all the requirements of the project they are hired to construct, including labor, organization, and all other details of the project. This system has been used in al-Shu'aybah in Kuwait, in the dry dock of the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Company in Bahrain, and in al-Jubayl in Saudi Arabia.

In this report, we will deal with the characteristics of the immigrant labor structure, the role of immigrant labor, and its impact on social conditions and demographic structure in the area. We will also look in some detail at the nature and structure of this labor group in two Gulf countries: the UAE and Bahrain. This is not to imply that these two states are unique in this phenomenon. Rather, they have been chosen to provide an indication of the general existence of the phenomenon, taking into account the differences in the numbers. The UAE was chosen in particular because of the preponderance of immigrant workers over the native population. This situation has made it obligatory to point to the UAE when a problem with labor is encountered, even at the international level.

The relative size of the foreign labor group differs from one Gulf state to another. While the UAE has a high percentage of Asian workers, states such as Iraq have a rather low percentage of this group.

According to official estimates for the last 2 years, there were a minimum of 120,000 foreign workers in the Sultanate of Oman. According to these estimates, foreign labor comprises nearly 80 percent of all workers in the Sultanate of Oman despite the fact that Oman's labor policy gives precedence to Arab labor. It may be seen that the foreign labor force--particularly labor from Asia--is increasing steadily in Oman. Official sources ascribe the predominance of Asian labor over Arab labor in the sultanate to its geographical position as the easternmost Arab country. It is closer to the Asian labor exporting states than it is to the Arab labor exporting states. The Arab nationalities represented among workers currently present in Oman are limited to Yemini, Tunisian, Egyptian, Lebanese, and Jordanian.

In spite of this, the Sultanate of Oman has drawn up an ambitious 5-year plan covering 1980 to 1985, and this plan may require the importation of additional thousands of Asian workers. On the other hand, some Omani experts left their country in the 1950's and 1960's and the sultanate is imploring these experts at every available opportunity to return to their country to help in its reconstruction and lessen its dependence on foreign labor.

A key problem we encountered in trying to estimate the number of workers in Iraq was the lack of official data and statistics pertaining to this field. However, Iraq has initiated vigorous measures to promote the collective immigration of Arab labor into the country, especially workers from Egypt and Morocco. The number of Arab workers in Iraq has increased substantially in recent years. In addition, the strengthening of Iraq's bilateral relations with a number of socialist states in the

area and the signing of bilateral cooperation agreements has contributed to the influx of groups of experts from these states to participate in the reconstruction and development of Iraq, particularly in the industrial and agricultural fields.

Iraq is pursuing a wise policy in the field of agriculture and the hiring of agricultural manpower from the Arab homeland. Iraq began several years ago settling hundreds of thousands of Egyptian farming families in Iraq to farm remote areas of the country. It has recently started bringing in a number of Moroccan families for the same purpose.

Turning to the labor situation in Kuwait, we find a more optimistic picture compared to the other Gulf states. With regard to the presence of Arab workers, official estimates indicate that there were 49,705 new job opportunities available in Kuwait in 1979 and 16,934 Arab workers entered Kuwait during this year. The main nationalities among this group were Egyptian and Palestinian. This does not mean, however, that Kuwait is far from having any Asian workers. Sources in the Kuwaiti Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs have indicated that the demand for new labor is still inclined toward the Asian nationalities, which accounted for 55 percent of all work permits issued during 1980. The labor markets most in demand are those of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Korea, Iran, and Sri Lanka.

Kuwait has seen a rapid increase in the growth of Asian labor only in the last 4 or 5 years. One statistic indicates that there are 80,000 Asian workers in the al-Shu' aybah industrial area in Kuwait.

This situation is in strong contrast to the situation in 1975. Statistics for that year estimated the size of the labor force at 298,000 workers consisting of 29 percent domestic workers, 49 percent other Arab workers, and only 22 percent foreign workers, predomininantly Asian nationals.

Statistics also indiate that citizens accounted for 60 percent of the commercial and economic activity while immigrant workers accounted for 40 percent. The annual statistical report for 1979 published by Kuwait's Ministry of Planning indicated that 17,666 work permits were issued to Arab nationalities according to the following breakdown: 10,851 to Egyptians, 1,516 to Lebanese, 472 to Palestinians, 2,326 to Jordanians, and 827 to all others. Some 28,203 work permits were issued to Asian nationals during the same year, according to the following breakdown: 4,677 to Pakistanis; 991 to Bengalis; 9,056 to Indians; 2,592 to Iranians; 9,871 to Koreans, Filipinos, and Japanese; and 1,138 to all other Asian nationals.

Sources in the Kuwaiti General Planning Administration indicated that the labor force represented 29 percent of the total population for 1980-81. Kuwaiti labor accounted for 29 percent of the labor force with 119,600 workers while non-Kuwaiti labor accounted for 71 percent of the labor force with 292,600 workers.

Kuwaits' 1976-1980 development plan emphasized manpower and labor force development through intensive investment in education and training facilities. This included a reduction in the amount of importance and attention placed on specialized higher education.

Up until recently, conditions in Saudi Arabia were probably similar to conditions in Kuwait from the standpoint of the preponderance of Arab labor over foreign labor.

However, because of the ambitious economic plans it has drawn up for the coming years, Saudi Arabia will require large numbers of workers. For example, the labor requirements for the projects that will be established in the al-Jubayl area have been estimated at around 20,000 workers of various job classifications. Some experts have estimated Saudi Arabia's labor requirements for the next 2 years at around 2.5 million workers.

The second Saudi 5-year plan for 1975-1979 emphasizes the need for development of the labor force through the creation of vocational training programs in various fields.

The Saudi plan seeks to increase Saudi Arabia's labor force from 1.5 million in 1975 to 1.5 million in 1980 while the non-Saudi labor force is slated to increase from 300,000 to 800,000 workers.

Manpower statistics for the second development plan issued by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy indicated that the overall total for the Saudi labor force was 80 percent or 1.286 million workers in 1975 and 65 percent or 1.518 million workers in 1980. Non-Saudi workers accounted for 19 percent or 314,000 workers in 1975 and 34 percent or 812,000 workers in 1980. The increase in the percentage of immigrant labor over the period is evident.

The Saudi Ministry of Interior has issued directives aimed at curbing the growing number of foreigners. The directives ordered that the presence of productive foreign elements required by the country be restricted such that a worker's family members may not follow him except in cases of extreme necessity. The directives also called for regulation of the granting of residency to individuals coming into the country for pilgrimages, minor pilgrimages ['umrah], or visits. Saudi Arabia resorted to these directives after what was described as "great pressure" developed on the public services sector as a result of the growing numbers of immigrants and their family members.

Cases of illegal immigration have risen into the thousands in Saudi Arabia. The kingdom responded to this with an organized campaign led by the Ministry of Interior 2 years ago. This campaign included the deportation of more than 90,000 foreign workers who had entered the country illegally. Large percentages of these workers were Asian nationals and some were Arab nationals.

Social Effects of Immigrants

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 30 Sep 81 p 8

[Article: "Population Concentration of foreigners Makes Arabs Minority in Their Own Homeland; Multiplicity of Nationalities in the Region Causes State of Social and Cultural Conflict and Affects National Cohesiveness"]

[Text] The labor force of Qatar makes up an estimated 45 percent of the total population. Qatari citizens represent about 17 percent of the entire labor force and the remainder consists of non-Qataris.

According to unofficial estimates, Asian workers make up 65 percent of Qatar's total labor force. This percentage is increasing steadily because of the industrial projects that are being established in al-Dawhah. The country's requirements for Asian

labor through 1981 have been estimated at some 93,000 workers. With regard to foreign immigration into the state of Qatar, incoming workers accounted for more than 60 percent. However, the rate of participation of these immigrants in commercial and economic activity was 61 percent according to certain estimates. Although official statistics specifying the size of the Arab labor force in Qatar are lacking, the state hired about 12,000 Egyptian workers in 1974 in accordance with an agreement with the Egyptian Government. Egyptians probably predominate over members of other Arab labor groups in Qatar, who are particularly numerous in the services sector.

We find that Asian workers make up the largest share of the foreign labor force in Qatar, representing 75 percent of all foreign workers. Out of this 75 percent, 65 percent consists of Indians and Pakistanis and 10 percent consists of natives of Southeast Asia. This large percentage of foreigners includes workers in a variety of sectors such as building and construction, trade, public services, transportation, industry, and petroleum products. Around 80,000 Asian workers are employed in the al-Ruways industrial area in Abu Dhabi and some 78,000 Asian workers work in the Jabal 'Ali area in Dubai.

In contrast to these tremendous numbers of Asians, we find that Arab workers make up a relatively small percentage, although this percentage has begun to increase during the past 2 years. Committed individuals in the UAE have begun to call for increased reliance on Arab labor in order to stem the dangers of the Asians.

The existence of Asian labor in such numbers has had negative effects on both the economic and social levels. On the economic level, these effects include the siphoning off of a large portion of the state's revenues since the Asian workers invest their income within their own countries and the state bears the burden of housing, food, and services for 80 percent of the immigrants. On the social level these effects include the disruption of the values, traditions, and customs of society and the spread of crime, illegal gain, and fraud.

The UAE recently placed new conditions on the hiring of foreign workers in an attempt to limit their numbers. These provisions include a stipulation that foreign workers must possess the professional and academic qualifications required by the country and a stipulation that a foreign worker must have entered the country by legal means with a guarantee that his acceptance of a job opportunity will not lead to the unemployment of a citizen possessing the same qualifications or capable of performing the same job. These stipulations gave precedence in hiring to the citizen, then to individuals of Arab nationality, and finally to the foreigner if no citizen or Arab is available.

We also find that the UAE has adopted a series of preventive measures to regulate foreign immigration. These measures provide for the strengthening of the border guard and coast guard to control points of entry into the state, the appointment of labor attache's in the labor exporting states--particularly the Asian states--and the issuing of orders requiring workers who entered the country illegally to leave.

The state of Bahrain was perhaps the first to warn against the threat posed by the growth of the Asian labor force. Official statistics estimate that Asian labor makes up 60 percent of the entire labor force. Statistics of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs indicated that Bahraini labor makes up 27 percent of the labor

force and foreign labor makes up 73 percent. According to these statistics, two-thirds of the labor force consists of Indians and Pakistanis while Arabs make up only 3.5 percent.

Statistics on the size of the Indian and Pakistani labor force issued by the Ministry of Labor reveal the following facts: 57 percent of the workers in the services sector are Indians and Pakistanis, with 47 percent in the first category and 10 percent in the second; 29 percent of the workers in scientific professions are Indians and 6 percent are Pakistanis; 79 percent of the workers in the field of production and trades are Indians and Pakistanis, with 34 percent in the first category and 25 percent in the second.

The situation in Bahrain was much different 10 years ago. Statistics indicate that the relative size of the foreign labor force in 1971 was only 37 percent, with a total of 22,351 workers, while domestic labor made up 63 percent of the total labor force, with 37,950 workers. We note here that domestic labor played a prominent role by virtue of the fact that the country was then implementing medium-sized projects or small construction projects which allowed an opportunity for the domestic labor force --with the addition of some Gulf and Arab nationalities such as Omanis, Yemenis, Lebanese, and Egyptians--to predominate. Bahrain's situation appears more balanced from this standpoint since the statistics indicate that Bahrainis occupied only 10 percent of the clerical jobs.

Bahrain has recently become concerned with creating a vocational training system to undertake the preparation of domestic cadres to run the projects that are being implemented. The state recently established a Higher Council for Vocational Training which will be responsible for coordinating the training process and preparing Bahraini technicians in the projects, organizations, and companies operating in Bahrain. The state has also created a system called the Ten Thousand Trainees Project with the goal of creating a national vocational sector.

According to manpower statistics issued by Bahrain's Ministry of Labor, the ministry issued 200,948 work permits in the 1979-80 time period. Some 51,571 or 27.5 percent of these permits were issued to Bahrainis and 149,377 or 72.5 percent were issued to non-Bahrainis. The year 1978 heads the list in the number of permits issued with 41,626 or 24.5 percent followed by 1977 with 20.6 percent. The lowest year was 1972 when the number of permits issued declined to 7,373.

In November 1978, with the growing awareness of the threat posed by immigrant labor entering Bahrain; the Council of Ministers approved a plan submitted by the Ministry of Labor aimed at confronting the effects caused by immigration. The central objective of the plan is to replace foreign workers with native manpower on a gradual basis. This will apply to strategic jobs and will be accomplished in successive stages. The plan also called for all installations and companies to train at least 5 percent of their Bahraini workers annually to take the place of foreigners.

Khalifah Khalfan, the director of the Labor Department in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, said recently that in the current and upcoming stages, Bahrain will need to continue importing trained manpower from abroad to meet the demands of the rapid pace of development in the country.

He said: "The native labor force consists of only 45,000 productive workers and this is not enough to confront the country's manpower needs at this stage, when the size of the imported foreign labor force is approximately 150,000 workers and technicians. In other words, Bahrain imports several times the number of workers in its own labor force."

The latest manpower survey issued by the Ministry of Labor, which included 3,173 of the establishments in the domestic sector, indicated that only 27 percent of the workers in this sector were Bahrainis. The remaining workers were foreigners. In numbers, there were 18,964 Bahrainis out of a total of 69,114 workers.

The building and construction sector attracts the largest number of the workers, who make up 42 percent of all workers in this sector. Next in importance is the trade, wholesaling, retailing, food, and hotels sector with 15 percent.

The General Census of Population and Housing conducted in Bahrain this year indicated that there were 242,596 Bahrainis as opposed to 116,261 immigrants. Thus, Bahrainis make up 67.6 percent of the total population while immigrants make up 32.4 percent. This is more than twice the percentage indicated by the previous population census taken in 1971.

We have now presented a detailed description of the composition of immigrant Asian labor in the Arab Gulf region and we have examined the size of the Asian labor force in the area states. Based on these facts, we are in a position to issue a message warning of the seriousness of the growth of this labor force, which in some states now predominates--in some cases by several times--over the native population, as we have seen in the UAE.

In the following report, we will identify the dangers of the foreign labor situation along with some of the appeals for earnest and sincere action to limit the size of the foreign labor force as articulated by specialists and officials in the area states. Perhaps the most important dangers posed by immigrant Asian labor are the following:

--The tremendous reliance on this manpower in the current numbers will contribute to a deepening of the phenomenon of demographic and cultural bifurcation. In the long or short term, these immigrants will create a problem because of the fact that they constitute a majority and this will affect the demographic make-up of each state.

Perhaps the greatest threat in this regard lies in the weakening of the Arabic element in the area states as a result of the transformation of the Arabs into a minority in their own country both with respect to population and with respect to their degree of control over economic activity.

The statistics presented thus far have dealt in some detail with the magnitude of this population advance. Estimates for the UAE for 1975 indicated a native population of 157,000 and an immigrant population of 411,000. Estimates for Saudi Arabia place the native population at between 4 million and 6 million. Of course, changes have taken place in these estimates from the time they were made until 1981. These immigrants have formed large communities which, as the years pass, are becoming a cohesive numerical force that is difficult to mobilize or influence.

In the economic sphere, large government financial allocations originally earmarked for services are going to these immigrants while native citizens receive very little of these allocations. Moreover, these workers are siphoning off the financial revenues of the Gulf states through the large remittances they sent to their countries. Certain estimates indicate that in 1977 alone these remittances amounted to nearly $8.6 billion, not to mention the fact that the states of the area lost $4 billion as a result of acts of fraud and deception committed by some foreign companies.

The dangers of the growth of the Asian labor force in the Gulf states in the social sphere should be evident. Such dangers include the spread of alien types of crimes and behavioural and moral deviations brought into the region by these incoming immigrants.

In addition, the problem of rising percentages of single men among the foreign workers is causing difficulties which are reflected in the social and economic behaviour of individuals and is creating a disruption in society due to the impact on many social customs and values.

Moreover, the multiplicity of nationalities in the region--there are 35 nationalities represented at present--with their different cultures, values, traditions, and religions is creating a state of social and cultural conflict and loss of homogeneity, unity, and cohesiveness. This in turn is affecting national unity and the sense of membership in the Arab nation. In addition, some of the poor nationalities such as the Indians and the Pakistanis tend to live in quarters which correspond to their standard of living and this leads to the spread of certain varieties of diseases and social ills such as severe deviance, crimes, stealing, and robbery. Moreover, under any circumstances, some individuals may resort to working in more than one job or specialty, which could deprive native citizens of livelihoods and earnings.

Solutions Proposed To Reduce Dependence On Asian Labor

All that we have said previously will perhaps illuminate the danger inherent in the growth of the Asian labor force. It is certain that the continuation of this growth at the present pace without serious practical labor policies at the Gulf level will expose the region to even more serious threats. At this point we will present solutions that have been proposed to decrease the degree of dependence on this labor.

--The coordination of the importation of Arab labor in accordance with a well researched plan among all the Gulf states, increased reliance on Arab labor, and action to replace foreign labor with Arab labor on a gradual basis. In this connection, statistics indicate that in the past 2 years, unemployment in one Arab country --Tunisia--was 14 percent. This means that nearly 1.5 million workers were without jobs, causing severe labor problems for Tunisia. At the same time, unemployment in Morocco stood at 11 percent. In this regard, appeals were made calling for the Arab homeland to rely on its own people in the field of labor before relying on foreigners. The means to achieve this may lie in the negotiation of bilateral or collective Arab agreements providing for the unconditional free movement of Arab manpower. Secondly, Arab investment companies could be established to enter into competition with other companies in the Gulf region. Such companies, which would rely almost

entirely on Arabs, would be entrusted with implementational operations for development projects in the region. Thirdly, an employment framework could be created at the Arab level through the creation of an executive structure in the form of an Arab employment organization which would endeavor to change the traditional situation characterized by a lack of efficiency in manpower relocation operations in the Arab states.

--Coordination among the Gulf states in labor fields. The Gulf states have similar social and labor conditions, which makes coordination and the achievement of cooperation among these states an easy matter. Such coordination could be achieved through the formulation of a unified labor policy among the area states and the achievement of integration among the projects and labor programs. This would stimulate thought about the establishment of centralized projects in one area state to serve the other states in the same region.

--The establishment of a specialized organization at the Gulf level to undertake the tasks of providing information, data, and statistics concerning the size of the labor force in the region and interpreting the related housing, social, and economic trends. The specification of the composition of the labor force according to nationality and the participation of specific groups in economic and construction activities in the area should facilitate the formulation of plans and solutions to confront any possibilities.

--The establishment of one or more organizations at the level of the Gulf states to plan and formulate policies related to development in general and labor policies in particular.

--The provision of greater opportunities for Gulf women to participate in the labor market. The extremely low level of participation of women in the job market is evident.

--Increased reliance on vocational education and greater numbers of schools and institutes specializing in vocational fields in order to make up for the deficiency in the preparation of vocational graduates in the region.

--Another solution which is related to security consists of the protection of the coasts, ports of entry, and borders of the area states against illegal immigrants. Statistics compiled by the ministries of interior of the area states reveal a tremendous rise in the numbers of illegal entrants into the area.

--Moreover, in order to deal with problems related to the interference of immigrant cultures and their impact on the area states, the states should draft legislation against individuals with different cultures and religions to limit their activities in the areas of preaching their religions and upsetting the social and cultural situation in the region.

Following this report, we can only conclude by issuing a new appeal to merge with all the old appeals urging an earnest awareness of the problem and the implementation of radical solutions and careful scientific planning in order to preserve the status and existence of the area and for the sake of progress and development and our national unity.

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CSO: 4404/68

VARIOUS AFGHAN PEACE PLANS DISCUSSED

London 8 DAYS in English 28 Nov 81 p 28

[Article by John Stokes]

[Text] AFTER a great deal of self-generated publicity and fanfare, Iran has proposed its own Afghan peace plan, which calls for the country to be transformed into an Islamic republic modelled on Iran. It has suggested the replacement of Soviet troops by an Islamic peacekeeping force and an international meeting of Muslim clergymen, who would organise the setting-up of a provisional government. The Iranian deputy foreign minister, Mohammed Lavasani, who returned to Tehran recently from talks in Islamabad with Pakistani officials, said the Pakistanis welcomed the new plan. Privately, however, both Pakistani and western diplomats see it as too far-fetched, and impossible for the Soviet Union to agree to.

The Iranian plan is also at odds with the line taken by most other Muslim countries, who are backing the OIC initiative led by its secretary general, Habib Chatty.

The Afghanistan government was quick to condemn the Iranian plan last week, according to a report by the Soviet news agency Tass. An Afghanistan foreign ministry official was quoted as saying that the plan's political and religious concepts belonged to the past, and that: 'The so-called Iranian plan cannot be a basis for fruitful discussion, and is fully and categorically rejected by the democratic republic of Afghanistan.'

The European Economic Community's own peace plan — headed by Lord Carrington — met with a peremptory rebuttal from the Soviets only two months ago, when Carrington visited Moscow. The OIC plan failed to get off the ground because it could get no response from Iran, and the UN plan has withered for the same reason. Another important element is that no peace plan initiators want to start off by recognising the Karmal regime in Kabul. This obviously makes it impossible to reach any kind of agreement with Moscow.

The Soviets have also been rethinking their military strategy. A number of the most senior officers in the Afghan military are on a six-month training course in Moscow to learn counter-insurgency techniques. These include the controversial defence minister, Colonel Mohammed Rafi, who has been periodically tipped by outside experts as a likely alternative to Babrak Karmal; his deputy; the chief of army logistics; and the Afghan air force chief. Most recently they were joined in Moscow by Prime Minister Sultan Ali Kishtmand, who dropped in on his way back from an official visit to Bulgaria. He is still there, allegedly for medical reasons, but western journalists report he has also joined the training course.

Clearly the Russians are now convinced

that they are in for a long haul and that better tactics are needed to coordinate the Afghan army and Soviet troops against the Mujaheddin. Jonathan Steele of the London newspaper the *Guardian*, who has just returned from Kabul, estimates that 5,000 Afghans are currently undergoing police, army and government courses in the Soviet Union. This long-haul strategy implies that the Russians are concentrating on building up a new generation of cadres and party workers under a secure capable leadership, rather than hoping to win immediate victories on the ground.

The guerrillas are now far more selective and imaginative about the targets they choose, and while the fighting has not intensified, skirmishes are now taking place much closer to Kabul. The guerrillas have set up a semi-permanent base in the Paghman hills just outside the capital. The Russians have periodically made a sweep through the hills and returned to Kabul, only to find the rebels have regained their old positions again.

Afghan guerrillas have also made their presence felt inside Kabul, most recently by rocket and hand grenade attack on the Microyan housing complex in the suburbs which houses hundreds of Soviet families and a special school for their children. Even though casualties were light, such attacks unnerve the already jumpy Russian population.

Inside Afghanistan the Internal Front, made up of fighting forces from the ethnic minorities, is gaining considerable success in keeping areas free of government and Soviet troops. The Hazaras, Tajiks and Nuristanis all have semi-independent regions where the guerrillas run the economic and social administration.

Meanwhile, the Kabul government has reported that there was a 36 per cent rise in the cost of consumer goods during the first half of 1981. The average Kabuli paid 50 per cent more in rent and 100 per cent more for lighting and heating. Food prices have risen by 30 per cent, even though another government report claims that the Afghan wheat crop this year reached an all-time high of 2.9m tonnes. The Soviet Union still takes just over 50 per cent of all Afghanistan's exports, and provides half Afghanistan's imports. Western diplomats have estimated the country's annual revenue at $450m.

● The UN General Assembly last week adopted a resolution calling for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The resolution, carried by 116 votes to 23 with 12 abstentions, reaffirmed the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government without outside interference. It was the third such UN call since the Soviet incursion.

CSO: 4600/155

NEW LIGHT CAST ON MAJOR AL-DANDARAWI LAND CASE

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 668, 2 Nov 81 pp 22-29

/Article: "The Other Side of the al-Dandarawi Case: Where Is the Truth? Who Owns the Land?"/

/Text/ The other side of the al-Dandarawi case continues to raise new observations and reveal conflicts among the numerous bodies trying to acquire a plot of land in the northern coastal area, now that it has become a region attracting investment. AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI has exposed one of these disputes in the Sidi Karir area, between the Egyptian Religious Endowments Authority and the 10 Ramadan Society: the authority rented out about 2,022 feddans to the Oil Services Development Project and the 10 Ramadan Society bought about 193 feddans from the heirs of Hamidah Khallaf on the same land.

As a result, the two parties entered into a confrontation, using all legal and nonlegal means. Each party filed suits against the other, contesting its ownership of the land, and each party tried to obtain legal rulings confirming that the other party was not entitled to the land. /AL-AHRAM/ AL-IQTISADI, in its last issue, reviewed some of the chapters in this struggle and some parties' views. In this issue it is continuing this publication.

In other developments in the confrontation between the two parties, the 10 Ramadan Society filed a misdemeanor suit with the Sidi Karir misdemeanor court to imprison Mr Zaki Abu-al-Nasr, head of the Religious Endowment Authority, basing itself on the decree to eliminate the trespasses against the land that the authority had committed. The Religious Endowment Authority replied to this misdemeanor charge by stating that the 10 Ramadan Society had never owned this land; the authority filed a case with the Alexandria court of first instance to void the conveyance of the contract of sale to the 10 Ramadan Society by Hamidah Khallaf's heirs.

The authority also made a request before the Council of State that a review be made of the verdict the council issued in favor of the General Desert Lands Development Authority; this is a verdict on which the society based itself in claiming that the land did not belong to the Egyptian Religious Endowments Authority.

While the struggle between the two parties has various ramifications, and each party is trying to establish that the other is not entitled to this land, it

appears that the issue of the northern coast will grow in complexity now that the Ministry of Reconstruction's Desert Development Authority has intruded: it claims that it owns the land and is requesting that it be handed over to it, so that the Ministry of Reconstruction can carry out the program to reconstruct the northern coast and that a ministerial committee be formed to discuss this dispute before the dispute between the two government bodies becomes aggravated.

While AL-IQTISADI launched the exposure of this struggle over the northern coast in the presence of public opinion--a struggle which is assuming numerous legal methods of various ramifications, and other methods which are not legal, in order to establish the ownership of the territory--the situation requires a ministerial committee consisting of ministers, experts from the Ministry of Justice, and counsellors from the Council of State in order to resolve this legal dispute and declare a single fact, which is: Who owns this land--the Egyptian Religious Endowment Authority, the heirs of Hamidah Khallaf, or the Desert Redevelopment Authority?

The Religious Endowment Authority's View on the al-Dandarawi Case To the editor in chief of the magazine AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI:

We have read in your honorable magazine, in its issue of 28 September 1981, an article titled "The Other Side of the al-Dandarawi Case."

Since the Egyptian Religious Endowment Authority is concerned to put matters in their proper context, in light of its role as guardian of the properties of Moslems, and from the premise of its concern, at the same time, for citizens' property, the statement of the following facts will eliminate all the obscurity and error which appeared in the article published in the aforementioned issue.

First, under the title "Lost Rights," it was stated that the 10 Ramadan Society bought 250 feddans in the al-'Ajami area in 1975 from the heirs to the private religious endowment of Hamidah Khallaf.

The purchase contracts were registered and they were conveyed through two contracts numbered 1308 and 3463 for 1976. Our answer to this is that the authority, in its concern for the citizens' property, to keep it from falling prey to usurpers of state lands, warned all citizens in the pages of the newspapers, for example the newspapers AL-AHRAM and AL-AKHBAR of 11 August 1974, not to conduct transactions on the plots of land between kilometer 20 and the end of kilometer 47, on grounds that they were the property of the Sidi Karir benevolent religious endowment.

Nonetheless, the abovementioned society did conduct transactions with the heirs of Hamidah Khallaf, buying from them in the confines of the newly created plot of land between kilometer 23 and kilometer 24 an area of 193 feddans within the plot which the authority warned was not to be the subject of transactions.

As regards the conveyance of the two abovementioned contracts on the society's property deed, before the al-Dukhaylah authentification bureau in Alexandria, the Administrative Surveillance /Agency/ followed by the office of the administrative

public prosecutor, decided that there were numerous grievous violations in the violations in the registration of these two contracts, and this prompted the Religious Endowment Authority to file a case voiding these two conveyances before the judiciary.

The claim the society made that it owned the plot sold to it in 1975, around which a fence was erected, is not correct. The area from kilometer 22 to kilometer 26 on the Alexandria-Matruh /Road/ was under the usufruct of bedouins residing in the area up to 5 May 1976, when the bedouins relinquished their usufruct to the Oil Services Development Organization, which took possession of the area in the manner set down in administrative ledger eight of the al-'Amiriyah /personal/ states department, recording that the organization had the usufruct of all the plot from kilometer 22 to kilometer 26.

However, the society made an attempt to usurp some of that plot under the cover of military activities on 21 June 1976, putting barbed wire around a plot approximately half a kilometer in area and a sign stating that it was a military area and that it was forbidden to approach it, as set down in al-'Amiriyah administrative ledger 395.

The Ministry of War, through the military public prosecutor's office and the military police, removed the sign and the barbed wire on grounds that that was a civilian area and military activities had no connection with it.

The authority also executed the administrative decree to eliminate acts of trespass against this part of the plot, removing a brick wall that had been built by some bedouins consisting of blocks of stone 2 meters in width and half a meter high each, with spaces of 100 meters between each block. This all was built by the society in this usurped section.

It is established, by official papers, that the society had been informed of the Religious Endowment Authority's intention to carry out the administrative decree against it, since the society protested before the public prosecutor, who, regarding the society's protest, stated that the administrative body, as with execution of its decree, had to carry out the administrative decree eliminating these blocks of stone within the sight and hearing of representatives of the society.

The society tried by all legal and non-legal means to reacquire the plot that had previously been usurped and was the subject of the execution of the administrative decree. It found no recourse but to file case 176 for 1979 against the Religious Endowment Authority and the Governorate of Alexandria, demanding execution of its contract as issued by the heirs of Hamidah Khallaf and delivery of the plot sold to it in accordance with this contract. At the 8 November 1979 session, the al-'Attarin court ruled against its case.

The causes for the ruling, which became final, stated that this contract merely established a legal relationship between the society making the purchase and the sellers and did not include a commitment to deliver /property/. Therefore the court explicitly rejected the society's request for delivery of the plot.

The society tried to repeat its unsuccessful attempt and filed urgent civil case 3133 for 1977 (Alexandria) on regaining ownership against the Religious Endowment Authority and the Oil Service Development Organization, and a judgment was again made against it confirming these two verdicts by appeal.

Second, as was stated under the title "Violations of the Egyptian Religious Endowment Authority," concerning administrative decree 50 for 1977 issued by the chairman of the Egyptian Religious Endowment Authority eliminating acts of trespass against the Sidi Karir religious endowment lands and protecting them from all persons trying to usurp them:

The society alleged that "the Religious Endowment Authority's deed" was a phrase that appeared in the verdict in the words of the bedouins and an engineering report that appeared in the words of an expert. That allegation is patently false and was made in contradiction to the evidence contained in official papers, whose validity was confirmed by a factfinding committee formed in the People's Assembly in early 1976, in the first legislative period of the fifth ordinary meeting, the session of 30 May 1976, before which various old verdicts to which reference was made in the article were presented. One should bear in mind that these verdicts were not the focal point of the Religious Endowment Authority's ownership of the Sidi Karir Benevolent Endowment.

The 10 Ramadan Society is not allowed to adhere to the ruling of the general assembly of the Council of State because in reality the ruling is against it and not in its favor. On the one hand, it determined that that plot lay within the private property of the state while the 10 Ramadan Society had derived its claim to ownership from the heirs who were entitled to the private religious endowment of Hamidah Khallaf; on the other hand, the Supreme Constitutional Court, in its session of 17 January 1981 (case 12 for 1981), determined that the ruling of the general assembly of the Council of state was not a verdict, did not go beyond a mere opinion and could not be used as a justification for an order calling for judiciary provisions--an order for which the Religious Endowment Authority demanded that the Council of State review this ruling again, since the previous abovementioned ruling was based on erroneous legal documents and was in violation of the principles of Islamic law concerning the provisions of benevolent endowments, in accordance with the conclusions reached by the Department of Rulings in the noble al-Azhar.

It appears that it was absent from the society's mind that the Supreme Administrative Court verdict abrogating Decree 50 for 1977 proved, in the reasons it gave, that the court did not have the competence to discuss ownership or possession because that lay within the jurisdiction of the civilian judiciary alone, and that is one of the obvious points on which the society certainly agrees with us.

As regards the execution of this verdict, which calls for the abrogation of the decree without delivery of the property, the authority actually did execute it, abrogated the contested decree and offered the society a sum of 1,000 Egyptian pounds in compensation. Therefore the property or ownership it is demanding, based on the verdict of the Supreme Administrative Court, has no basis in law. Above and beyond that, and in confirmation of it, the civilian judiciary, as previously stated, rejected the society's demand that it be given the sales price and regain possession

of it, since the contract on that sale was made on the stipulation that the society making the purchase could not demand that the sellers hand the sales price back. There is no argument that the authority, by virtue of the fact that it is a government authority competent to administer and invest benevolent religious endowment properties in order to spread about the call to Islam, is deferring to the judiciary decrees, in exercising the sovereignty of the law and in submission to its authorities, and that in accordance with the constitution one of its first duties is to property of the state from usurpation by residents or people who fall prey to persons plundering this property, whether through ignorance or intentionally and by design. Therefore one cannot say that the authority is above the constitution of this country and its judiciary provisions. The authority observes the sanctity of the rights of the property of Moslems to such a degree that badly wanted the 10 Ramadan Society not to get implicated, as it holds the funds of its officer members in trust, in the activity of plundering the state's property from the benevolent religious endowment, and gave warning and notice to everyone in the mobile /sic/ press. It would have been more fitting for the society, instead of putting its mistakes on the shoulder of the Religious Endowments Authority, to refer to the persons who sold it what they did not own and reclaim its members' money. Nothing provides better proof of the foregoing than the fact that the confines of the newly-created plot of land which the article said was part of the responsibility of the Hamidah Khallaf private religious endowment, and of which the portion registered for the society was sold does in fact not lie within the territory of the private endowment, whose borders end at the end of kilometer 19, as regards the application of the legal argument on that private endowment. In spite of that, those confines of the newly-created plot of land lie within the lands of the Sidi Karir benevolent endowment, according to an examination at the site. Would that the gentleman delegated by the society had taken the trouble to ask specialists in the Religious Endowments Authority before buying it and not contented himself with a letter said to have been issued by the Religious Endowment Authority, whose forgery has been proved by Administrative Surveillance!

Third, as regards the discussion to which the article addressed itself on the authority's contract to rent out an area of 2,022 feddans to al-Dandarawi:

The fact of the matter is that the contract was issued not to the person of Fadl al-Dandarawi but to the Oil Services Development Organization, which presented itself to the authority on 11 August 1974, following the appearance of the authority's notice in the papers on renting out the plot making up the newly-created plot of land, which was bounded by kilometers 22 and 26 on the Alexandria-Matruh Road, in order to establish an oil refinery there. This was issued by the agreement of the General Investment Authority, the Ministry of Tourism, and the Atomic Energy Authority. On 31 January 1976 the General Investment and Free Zones Authority backed up the organization's demand to rent the plot of land to establish a project on it and on 15 May 1976 the organization presented the authority with a contract to buy from the bedouins the usufruct of the plot at issue and it presented an official copy of /personal/ states administrative ledger eight, al-'Amiriyah precinct, in which the organization's ownership of the entire plot was recorded.

On 26 December 1976 the organization presented the authority with Alexandria's agreement issued on 17 December 1976 to the establishment of the project on the

plot on an area of approximately 2,022 feddans, defined by the Technical Anti-Pollution Committee on whose formation a decree was issued by the governor and whose stipulation were agreed to by the utilities council in the governorate.

The Higher Ministry of Religious Endowments Land Appraisal Committee appraised the per-feddan rental value at US $1,500, one thousand five hundred US dollars, per year, on the proviso that a review of the rent be made every 10 years and that the organization be given a grace period of 5 years at a token rent of US $10 per feddan per year, which would rise to US $100 on the sixth year and US $200 for the seventh year, and provided that the top rent be due the first year the refinery went into production. The authority, in assessing the rental value for the years of the grace period, took into account the exorbitant sums which the renting organization would defray in preparing the plot so that it would be in keeping with the rental value, especially since the Higher State Land Pricing Committee had previously appraised the rental value in that plot at 200 pounds per feddan during the rental period.

The General Investment and Free Zones Authority issued Decree 175 for 1977, which was published in AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH, Number 203 for 1977, considering the plot a special free zone for the establishment of a refinery. Finally, the committee composed of the committees of industry, religious endowments and local government of the People's Assembly discussed this project and its economic feasibility for the government alongside a study of the rental contract, and presented its report recommending that the project be constructed and that it was sound.

The society also failed to note that it had previously presented a complaint to the socialist public prosecutor containing the material stated in the published article and that after studying it he ordered that it be retained.

We stress that the Religious Endowment Authority will continue to be the honest guardian of the property of the philanthropic endowment, which is the property of almighty glorious God, that it will not refrain from taking all legal measures for the sake of preserving it, and that there is no other consideration in its mind except to adhere to the retention of God's property, in accordance with its responsibility.

/Signed/ Chairman of the cases of the Religious Endowment Authority, republican counsellor:

Yahya Ra'fat Basyuni.

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CSO: 4504/69

BUILDING SOCIETY REPLIES TO RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENT CHARGES

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 668, 2 Nov 81 pp 30, 31, 34

/Article: "The 10 Ramadan Society Continues Its Accusations: Illegal Measures by the Religious Endowment Authority"/

/Text/ Further Light on Violations by the Religious Endowment Authority

To complete the presentation of the evidence issued against what is called the Karir religious endowment made in issue 663 dated 28 September 1981, we present the motive causes and review the illegal acts that some employees in this authority are committing.

1. Law 124 for 1958 and Law 100 for 1964.

The general principle, according to the provisions of this law, is that desert lands lie within the special realm of the government.

Law 100 states the stipulation that desert lands are to be considered special property of the government and no natural or legal person may in any manner have usufruct of the real properties that lie within the special property of the government.

The same law regulates the method for determining the rights of ownership of desert lands. It stipulates specific cases in which the ownership is to be determined and regulates the means for presenting applications for such determinations by persons who have rights to this property and the means for rendering judgment on these applications.

However, where does the Religious Endowment Authority possess the documents which give proof of the establishemnt of the endowment and ownership present to the Desert Reconstruction Authority in order to provide a determination on this illusory religious endowment?

This is at the same time that the Desert Redevelopment Authority has determined the ownership of the Hamidah Khallaf private endowment, reference to which is made on the margin of its case, including the newly-created plot of land number 16. In addition, a determination was made on the conduct of all the heirs to it.

2. Application of the land reform laws to the Hamidah Khallaf Religious Endowment.

The General Land Reform Authority applied all the land reform laws to the heirs of the Hamidah Khallaf endowment, including the newly-established plot 16, which the Religious Endowment Authority claims is part of its alleged endowment.

The Land Reform Authority took over more than half the land in this endowment, and it became the property of the government.

It is strange that the Religious Endowment Authority is putting its hand on government land on the claim that that is part of an illusory religious endowment for which no official agency has determined that a basis exists. The chairman of the Land Reform Authority issued Decree 3 for 1980 adopting all legal measures against trespasses by the Egyptian Religious Endowment Authority on /Land/ Reform lands in al-'Ajami in order to regain possession of it.

3. The Religious Endowment Authority's contempt for final decrees!

A. The Supreme Administrative Court has issued a number of verdicts ruling that Decree 50 for 1977 issued by the chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority be abrogated, along with all the effects that have arisen from the execution of this decree. The first verdict was issued on 21 June 1980 on behalf of the society against all the following:

The minister of religious endowments, and the chairman of the Religious Endowments Authority, in his /responsible/ capacity, and the director of religious endowments for Alexandria.

The minister of the interior and the director of security of Alexandria (in his /responsible/ capacity).

The minister of justice and the director general of the Real Property Declaration Department, Alexandria (in his /responsible/ capacity).

The governor of Alexandria.

Mr Fadl al-Dandarawi.

B. The society, through the medium of the government judges, presented those against whom the verdict had been issued with an official copy of the ruling, eliminating the executive character as well as submitting copies to some of them in the course of numerous meetings aimed at preparing for the execution of the verdict, in particular with the governor of Alexandria and the security director of Alexandria.

C. The society expected that the Religious Endowment Authority and the Governorate of Alexandria would have the generosity to carry out the verdict, but its expectations became drawn out, to no avail. The former governor of Alexandria promised that the verdict would be carried out and demanded a preparation period so that it would be possible also to reclaim the government lands which the Religious Endowment

Authority had taken over. In spite of the conviction of the rights of the society on the part of all the officials in the governorate, the decree on execution of the verdict has not yet been issued; rather, instructions have been issued to form committee to choose another site for the al-Dandarawi project, and the local council decree was issued refusing to give agreement to the establishment of the project at this site because it was in conflict with tourist projects.

D. As the Governorate of Alexandria sought to find a solution to the problem, we find that the cause of it, the Religious Endowment Authority, was not moving but was still, as if the verdicts issued against it were mere ink on paper. This compelled the society to warn the chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority and the chairman of the office of religious endowments in Alexandria that it would lodge a direct misdemeanor charge against them.

Only at this point was a letter sent to the society's lawyer, on 4 March 1981, notifying him that Decree One for 1981 had been issued abrogating Decree 50 for 1977. This meant that the declaration of the ruling by the government judges was considered null and void--this is the way the Religious Endowment Authority acts. The society's lawyer asked the authority to provide him with a copy of this decree and procrastination occurred, compelling the society to file a direct misdemeanor charge against the chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority and the chairman of the religious endowment office in Alexandria. The Religious Endowment Authority presented its documents on the direct misdmeanor, in which the following tragedy manifested itself:

A. The chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority did not issue one administrative decree after receipt of the warning, but issued two:

B. The first decree: That was Decree 156 for 1980 dated 25 December 1980. In this decree, the chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority decided to abrogate Administrative Decree 50 for 1977 and consider it null and void, in executing the verdict of the administrative court issued on 21 June 1980, which stipulated that the Religious Endowment Authority in Alexandria was charged with paying compensation and costs due the 10 Ramadan Society.

It would have been necessary, had the Religious Endowment Authority actually executed the decree, for it to notify the society of this decree, but that did not happen and the decree was not read until after it had been placed in the case file. This confirms either that the authority issued the decree then hid it or that it did not issue it on the date carried on it but rather issued it upon receipt of the declaration of the direct misdemeanor, especially since it was dated at the end of 1980, that is, approximately 6 months after the issuance of the verdict.

C. The second decree: That was Decree One for 1981. In this strange decree, the true intentions of the chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority became apparent. Through this decree he abrogated his former decree, 150 for 1980, which called for the elimination of the Religious Endowment Authority's trespass and the continuation of conditions as they were, totally rejecting the verdict of the Higher Administrative Court.

What wounds one's spirit is the fact that we see eminent officials who possess a high level of understanding and education being egged on by the conduct of some irresponsible subordinates who have special interests along with the investor in keeping conditions the way they are, or some minor officials who have been transferred to retirement and whose genius did not manifest itself until they had gone into retirement and collected tales of usurped religious endowments in their greed for enormous compensations--which came to 50 percent of the value of the endowments. In the face of this, one cannot neglect the interests of the state or any authority or individual or forget what this group did to the former chairman of the authority, Mr al-Mughrabi, who formed it; it was they who brought him before the felony court.

4. The illegal measures the Religious Endowment Authority is carrying out.

A. Since the beginning of the conflict, the Religious Endowment Authority has worked without letup to advance false charges against others; it even considers official government agencies which do not carry out its instructions to be at fault, as if this authority had turned into an octopus trying to impose its dominance over everyone. Indeed, the authority chairman became so bold as to issue in his administrative decree instructions to the administrative agencies to violate the final provisions issued by the courts. It is strange that we find compliance with its orders in some of these agencies, at a time when the courts are emphasizing that this authority, in its condition, represents the overseers of the religious endowments, that is, that it is considered to consist of people who enjoy a special law.

In spite of its exploitation of its governmental character, in order to protect its actions which are in violation of the law, it must resort to the ordinary courts to solve its problems or acquire all the rights it has, just like any citizen.

B. Indeed, this authority has worked without letup to exploit the governmental character in an illegal manner, for instance by issuing copies of documents for whose issuance other government agencies are responsible, in order to protect its conduct, in violation of the law, for instance through the issuance of administrative decrees to eliminate trespass against properties for which it has no official or unofficial document confirming its claim of ownership.

C. Among the illegal measures which the Religious Endowment Authority has recently committed is the comedy it has tried to act out with regard to real estate taxes. We give thanks to God that this action has been discovered and that the deputy minister /for/ real estate taxes has issued his decree, which was published in the last issue of AL-JARIDAH.

D. One can summarize this comedy as follows:

In view of the fact that the authority lacks documents to prove its allegations, it has decided to resort to strange, devious conduct in proving that there is a religious endowment called Karir that extends from kilometers 19 to 47 on the Alexandria-Matruh Road.

1. The Religious Endowment Authority has presented an application to the real estate tax office in Alexandria requesting that a representative committee be

formed to apply the Karir endowment case secretly. Without the tax department's knowledge, the committee was formed from the Religious Endowment /Authority/ and the tax department. The authority, by devious means, managed to obtain the signature of officials to the effect that the Sidi Karir case had been applied to the land. It is a ridiculous matter that the persons who applied the Sidi Karir religious case to the land were a surveyor from the real estate tax /department/ and a retired Religious Endowment /Authority/ official of unknown qualifications, whose educational qualifications would not permit him to execute such a task.

2. When the society learned what the authority had done, it presented a complaint to the deputy minister of finance for real estate taxes, who issued his orders forming an investigating committee with the department members. The committee did actually make an investigation with the chairman and members of the department, and, through the investigation, proved the forgery which the committee had made in signing the case on the Karir religious endowment regarding other property belonging to the Hamidah Khallaf endowment. The committee abrogated the entire decree of the representative committee and all the measures derived from that, and the deputy minister approved these decrees.

3. However, that did not put an end to the Religious Endowment Authority's attempts. Through devious means, it managed to form a higher committee, to be called a higher committee which, in accordance with the decree forming it, had to discuss the documents of the Karir and Hamidah Khallaf endowments and apply them to the land.

However, the committee admitted that it had been influenced by the endowment members and, instead of studying the documents on the Karir endowment, confined its discussion to the documents on the Hamidah Khallaf endowment alone and did not address itself to its basic task, which was the Karir endowment.

It produced superficial recommendations which were of no value because it failed to study the two documents, and it did not examine any documents on the Karir endowment because it did not come upon any originals on such an endowment anywhere.

The real estate tax department decided, after it had discovered the fraud in the endowments, to retain that committee's report because none of the papers on the Hamidah Khallaf endowment had been blemished by any flaw. The sequence of ownership of the Hamidah Khallaf endowment has also been sound since the first survey lists which were made in 1879; the first operation of setting out land records in the history of Egypt was made in 1898. Its conclusions were set down in the survey registry and in the land budget and costs.

There is no value either to the argument in Islamic law on which the Religious Endowment Authority is basing itself, since the authority did not present it during the process of preparing the survey lists in 1879.

The tax department advised the Religious Endowment Authority to seek recourse within the judiciary in order to establish any rights it has; this was the sound method which the chairman of the Religious Endowment Authority ought to have followed, not the exploitation of powers of administrative abrogation: he has no ownership documents on which to base himself.

It is hoped that the magnificent scholar, the minister of religious endowments, will, after reading these facts, be so generous as to take the necessary measures with regard to holding the officials of the Religious Endowment Authority who have trespassed to account and will look with sympathy on the rights of his sons, the officers of the armed forces who are awaiting a wise decision from him.

11887
CSO: 4504/69

CONCEPT OF COMPREHENSIVE MOSQUES REVIEWED

Cairo MAYU in Arabic No 39, 2 Nov 81 p 9

/Article: "Dr Zakariya al-Barri: A Study on Carrying out the Concept of the Comprehensive Mosque"/

/Text/ Dr Zakariya al-Barri, minister of religious endowments, made a statement to MAYU in which he said that the draft of a law had been prepared making it a felony to trespass against the property of religious endowments.

He stated, "The debts religious endowments owe Agrarian Reform and local government come to 60 million pounds. Approvals have been made on that by the civilian bodies."

The minister said, "The ministry is now studying carrying out the notion of comprehensive mosques which will perform their services for the society lying in their area of influence. They will contain buildings for teaching trades, and tithe committees and will offer social assistance."

The minister of religious endowments requested that funds for the establishment of mosques in the governorates be supported. The number of mosques belonging to the Ministry of Religious Endowments comes to about 6,000, while the number of private mosques is about 40,000.

He said that in the context of upgrading the level of proselytizers, the ministry is printing books on the /Islamic/ legacy for distribution to imams and is setting forth plans to train them by which the imams will meet with senior men of the mission of Islam and senior Islamic thinkers to carry out a dialogue on Islamic concepts. These sessions will be prepared for the governorates.

He said that the Ministry of Religious Endowments' budget had been strengthened by the sum of 2 million pounds which has enabled the ministry to incorporate about 1,000 mosques in all the governorates. The mosques will be subsequently incorporated in a manner where each one will have a qualified proselytizer.

The minister said that the rules which have been observed in the incorporation of the religious endowment mosques are that the number of mosques in each governorate have been allocated in accordance with the ratio of its population to that of the inhabitants of the republic, except in the case of remote governorates.

11887
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SCANDAL OF CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS IN SUEZ REVIEWED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 2 Nov 81 p 3

/Article by Muhammad Husayn 'Abd-al-Mun'im: "An Urgent Investigation Is Requested: In Suez There Are Houses of Sand!"/

/Text/ Suez is one of the cities that is coming back. More specifically, it is one of the cities that bore the sufferings of the June war and contributed a big share to the great October victory. Although its people were happy to do everything for the sake of the glory of Egypt and built it up again, in testimony to the struggle and victory, there have never been problems in their lives like those that still continue to torment their minds--how can all of them find suitable housing for themselves? Housing in Suez has become a tragedy and the subject of everyone's conversation. The homes resemble houses of sand!

There are houses that are in danger of collapsing before anyone lives in them. Balconies and facades in the new towns have been destroyed, and experts recently determined that a village that was built 5 years ago was not fit to live in!

The inhabitants have warned one another against going to the death that awaits them there. Hundreds of housing units were built as models to apply for a loan from the World Bank. Experts also determined that they contained technical flaws. They even forgot that a building to house firemen was for lodging and was built without foundations!

The story began when some officials observed deterioration in some balconies, facades and shops in the new sections. Attention was drawn to the dwellings newly erected when the marks of the tragedy started!

These are the facts, from the mouths of the officials themselves, the members of the local People's Assembly of Suez Governorate:

Ahmad 'Abd-al-Mun'im, assembly member, says "There is a tragedy in the dwellings in the village of 'Amir which was built and completed 5 years ago and was prepared to house inhabitants. Since that time, we have been hearing the experts' opinions, one expert after another. One of them gives an opinion which is unclear, another says that it is unfit, and the matter has ended with the inhabitants warning themselves not to live in them, since death awaits them, now that these have cost /thousands of/ pounds from the government treasury."

Husayn al-'Ashsh, council member, says that the problem of 'Amir village was repeated again, but in worse form, harming the Egyptian economy; 100 housing units were established north of Faysal City between the Technical Aid Office and the housing department in the governorate, costing 200,000 pounds, as models for an application for a loan from a bank, but after it was completed the experts' report said that it had technical flaws, and the loan was lost!

Muhammad Ahmad Ghazzali added a humorous side to the tragedy: it was decided to establish a building to house firemen in the city of Suez and after it was completed it became apparent that it had been built without foundations, reinforced footings or connections among them. Although the job of constructing the building was awarded to a contractor in 1977 at a cost of 8,502 pounds, on condition that it be completed in 3 months, the building was erected in 4 years' time at a cost of 10,064 pounds and it became obvious that it was unfit.

It would have been logical to face up to this farce which everyone is talking about. Ahmad Hilmi Badr, the governor of Suez, decided to hand the matter over to the office of public prosecutor and inform the Engineers' Union.

However, there is a question: in whose interests did all this take place? How did it happen? Buildings of adobe brick have survived for many long years in the Egyptian countryside while others made of iron collapse before anyone lives in them. What will happen after the investigation? Will it be decided to destroy the village of 'Amir and the dwelling, and, if that happens, how will it be possible to regain the lost money?

These are questions that perhaps vex the minds of people who took measures to threaten the lives of others through their neglect and greed. Is it reasonable for the people of Suez to persevere and for its name to be "the city that persevered," while its buildings collapse?

11887
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SCANDAL OF VIOLATION OF WORKERS' RIGHTS IN TEXTILE FIRM EXPOSED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 2 Nov 81 p 2

/Article by Fathi 'Abd-al-Latif: "Strange Happenings in the Wooltex Company"/

/Text/ Strange happenings have taken place and are taking place in the Egyptian Wool Textile Company, "Wooltex," and they are raising many questions. Wrongful practices on the part of the company's management have reached the point of liquidation of productive units in the company and the dispersal of the workers in it. The management is also disbursing production incentives to managers while prohibiting their disbursement to production workers.

There are numerous serious practices that demand that government officials intervene to put an end to them because they threaten the company's economic identity.

'Urabi al-Hamuli, the vice chairman of the trade union committee in the company, says, "Since Eng Ahmad Sami al-Tuhami, the chairman of the board of the company, assumed the board chairmanship 5 years ago, he has been violating the rights the workers attained more than 25 years ago. In addition, in 1979, he liquidated the company's rug factory in which more than 700 male and female employees work, dispersing the workers by transferring them to the firm's various factories without showing attention to the job's need for them, and in addition they were removed from their places of residence. He turned the factory into a storehouse, whereas that factory had realized profits of a quarter of a million pounds a year, manufacturing caps and socks for men in the armed forces and the police.

In 1980 he liquidated the company's Banlon textile weaving plant in which more than 200 employees had been working, and he made the workers in that plant go through an experience similar to that their colleagues the workers in the rug factory had faced, as a result of which some of the workers in that plant left work in the company. They represented long-standing technical expertise which the company needed.

Sabir Muhammad Sabah, member of the union committee, adds that the company's board chairman issued a decree a few days ago that workers living in company-owned housing were not to ride cars and showed no concern for people who were ill with rheumatism or had heart trouble or women taking their children to the nursery for children of people working in the company. The company's board chairman also refused to have the people working in the productive sections of the company receive production bonuses while he disbursed bonuses to people working in the administrative and service sections, contrary to the stipulations of the bills and laws.

The company board chairman also abrogated the decree granting workers 10 minutes before the time their work ended so that they could get to the trains that they rode home. This decree had applied to employees since the company was established.

'Ali Ibrahim al-Ghurab, member of the union committee, says that 'Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz Dawud, chief of the administrative sector of the company, refuses to have the company's management defray the costs of workers' operations. The company has a special medical treatment system which compels the company management to defray the expenses of treatment and operations in full, and he wonders where the workers will find the money to pay for their treatment.

'Urabi al-Hamuli adds that the company's union committee is suffering greatly from a lack of cooperation on the part of company management in solving the workers' problems and a lack of response to workers' demands by management, especially since these demands are not new but are rights that were acquired by the workers many years ago which the company management had committed itself to in the era of the company's former presidents.

In the face of this arbitrary conduct on the part of management, the union committee contacted Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, the first deputy prime minister, Eng Taha Zaki, minister of industry, and 'Umar 'Abd-al-Akhir, governor of al-Qalyubiyah, to put a limit to the irresponsible conduct the company management has been committing against the company's workers, who number 9,000, and the company's economic identity.

11887
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PROPOSALS FOR SOLVING 'AFGHAN PROBLEM' EXAMINED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 15 Nov 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] We have spoken before concerning the problem of Afghanistan and the struggles of the oppressed nation in that land against Soviet political and military domination. We analyzed the roots of the struggle, and the acauses of the creation and growth of the aforementioned movement. We have given sufficiently detailed explanations about the complications of this struggle, its texture and composition, as well as the claims and justifications of the occupiers and the views of some of their stooges and supporters.

Now we wish only to mention a few points concerning Iran's plan, and basically express our understanding and interpretation of it. This is the core of the discussion, and even the marginal comments are connected with it.

Iran's plan to solve the Afghanistan problem contains bright, shining points and characteristics. First of all, the aforementioned plan has moved beyond the state of mere rhetoric and gives attention to issues of practical implementation. Up to now many states with various positions and affiliations have stated their views on this matter. However, most of them, in fact all of them, have delivered nothing more to the struggling and oppressed nation of Afghanistan than verbal rejection or support, a few slogans and an expression of opinion. Even Iran which had a clear, decisive and sincere position on this matter from the beginning, and announced it, nevertheless did not present any plan for implementation. Up to now we have seen no solution, proposal or plan other than this recent implemental plan.

Although the unconditional withdrawal of the Russian occupiers from the Islamic territory of Afghanistan and the acceptance of the right of the people to govern themselves and their political and social destiny are considered the most important and decisive principles contained in Iran's plan, and although they are the basis of the solutions, as they must be, yet in themselves and in general are nothing new. All governments and groups, whether independent, quasi-independent or even affiliated with the west (of course with their own particular motives, goals and positions), have expressed and are expressing exactly the same phrases.

Therefore the special importance of Iran's plan arises at this stage mostly from the text of practical solutions and paths of implementation included in it. Iran has taken the initiative to place the slogans, strategems, principles and

conditions, including the two important and linked principles mentioned above, into the channels of practical implementation. It is for this reason that the western and eastern worlds, despite the show they are putting on, claiming, for example, that they are indifferent to the plan and are ignoring it, and consider it unimportant and unsuitable for discussion and study!, are paying strict attention to it and are making their reckonings based on its implemental solutions. For the first time, the special significance of Iran's plan is linked to precisely this aspect. And if not, Iran's position in relation to the oocupiers and the nation's right of sovereignty was explicit before.

The other extremely important aspect which doubles the import and soundness of the above-mentioned plan is in fact the import and soundness of the position and situation of its proposers. This aspect of the plan has disarmed mainly the easterners headed by the Soviet leaders. This is because they and their stooges always pound each plan on the basis of its proposer's position before even turning to its practical content. They have always said that concern about the issue of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union and talk about plans, solutions, withdrawal, expulsion and the like occurs solely for the purpose of keeping the issue of the United States and the genuineness and immediacy of its dangers hidden from the public's mind. This means in short that each plan and each proposer in this connection is American! However, this time the case differs from past cases from the word go. This time it is not Saudi Arabia which is offering a plan.

It is not Pakistan that is preparing a plan and taking the initiative in acting. It is also not the work of Egypt, Israel or the United States or some other satan. We are not talking about Bani-Sadr or the temporary government or some society or so and so, such that it could be said that the liberals, or as the gentlemen call them, the phonies, are pulling the strings.

This time it is Iran that is preparing a plan and presenting a solution. An Iran which is the heart of the Islamic revolution. An Iran which, as the leaders and members of its own camp admit, has taken aim against the heart and brain of the United States, and that can bring Reagan to power!

A label can be stuck on this country and this revolution except the label of being American! From another point of view, it is the wing of the Followers of the Imam's Line that laid the foundations for the aforementioned plan and announced it with such insight and decisiveness. Thus Iran's proposed plan, based on its country's and government's credibility, is a double-barreled anti-American plan.

This country, this revolution and this so-called dominant wing are this plan's formulators who have with utter strength and bravery now taken positions against the United States, the entire western imperialistic camp and the region's reactionaries, and who are officially warring with them. The aforementioned plan comes from those proposers against whom U.S. imperialism has mobilized all its aggressive forces in one belt. The foreign minister of Afghanistan's occupier was even compelled to admit that the entrance of the U.S. fleet into the Persian Gulf was not to threaten the Soviet Union but rather to apply pressure on Iran.

A country which is now really encircled by U.S. pincers can only cross and expand beyond those encircling, pincerlike borders by extending the borders of faith, Islam and the oppressed Moslem struggling masses. This country has presented a practical solution for the liberation of another nation from the domination of another superpower. This is the strong and bright point which has completely disarmed the Soviet Union and its allies.

9597
CSO: 4640/57

CHIEF JUSTICE DISCUSSES SIGNIFICANT DOMESTIC ISSUES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Nov 81 p 13

[Text] Issues such as the plan for government control of the official documents offices; the aggressions and threats by the United States; the change of names of the country's airports and streets; the conference of the countries of the Persian Gulf region; the coordination between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches; the eight-point plan of Prince Fahd; the training of judges; the activities of the seven-member committees; the revitalization of land and land distribution; the balancing of the salaries of employees; the implementation of Paragraph C; the High Judicial Council's treatment of economic stockpilers; the contradictions between the proclamations of the judges of revolutionary courts and the Justice Department; the eviction of tenants; the regulation to divide the work among the members of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the problem of justice and punishment were among the subjects discussed by Ayatollah Seyyed 'Abdolkarim Musavi-Ardebili, chief justice of the supreme court, in an exclusive interview with the correspondent of PARS NEWS AGENCY.

Theocratic Rule

Asked what he thought about the enforcement of theocratic rule, he said: As the imam said in his communique, sometimes, concerning some issues, opinions are expressed by the first rubrics, sometimes the second rubrics, sometimes no opinions are given, and, finally, sometimes the rule is enforced [as published].

The imam can, within special limitations, permit the enforcement of the rule as he sees appropriate. This is what it has been and nothing else.

The chief justice said, responding to the question of whether the Council of Guardians has the authority to study or reject those bills which the Majlis ratifies on the basis of the authority conferred on it by the imam: If the Council of Guardians believes that the rule cannot be imposed here, no. But if it decides that it has been correct or incorrect on the basis of the guidelines or on the

basis of the primary and secondary rubrics, it can make decisions. Responding to the question of whether all the existing courts throughout the country are without any fault and if they are faulty, whether it would not be better to close them, he said: You cannot say all have faults or all are without fault. Basically, nothing is 100 percent one way or another. But to close them would not be right either. Sometimes a flawed existence is better than non-existence and sometimes the existence of something imperfect is worse than not having it. If it is worse than not having it, that is, if it is better not to be, it must be closed. But if, in its faulty existence, it handles the affairs, even though it has shortcomings, those shortcomings must be eliminated.

Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili added: Presently, there is no division of labor between the five members of the Supreme Judicial Council who have been selected; but, in the beginning stages, there was a division of labor. That early plan cannot be used today as a basis for a division of labor. The Supreme Judicail Council has the authority to determine the precedure for dividing work among its members.

The chief justice of the Supreme Judicial Council said: We have not previously had unsolved problems in the Justice Department and apparently we do not have any now.

The Commission for Pardons and Forgiveness

In response to the question of whether the commission for pardons and forgiveness of the Justice Department has the authority to investigate persons convicted by the revolutionary courts, he said: Yes, the imam has issued instructions. Of course, the commission investigates in a different manner. A list of those who have been pardoned by the revolutionary courts is sent to us; we make our decision and then send it to the imam for his decision. Of course, what some religious magistrates do in the provinces, freeing a number of prisoners on their own, is not right. Basically, prisoners must be freed through the commission for pardons.

Not Issuing Verdicts to Evict Tenants

In response to another question concerning not issuing verdicts to evict tenants, he said: This is within the jurisdiction of the Majlis. Of course, we have expressed our views to the Majlis.

The question was asked: Are execution verdicts approved and ratified by the Supreme Judicial Council before they are carried out?

The chief justice answered: No, and they should not be, since this is not one of the duties of the Supreme Judicial Council.

Contradictory Laws

In response to the question of whether contradictions are found in the work of the revolutionary courts and the Justice Department, he said: There is no contradiction in the work of judges, but there is some sort of contradiction in the laws. In the revolutionary courts, sometimes they act upon religious precepts. These precepts are not codified at times and are confronted with different problems and views. But, in the Justice Department, we act upon national, codified laws.

Change of Names

In response to the question of whether he agrees to changing the names of the airports and streets in the country to those of martyrs, he said: If the people do this, there is no problem, since they have the right to do so. But, if something is done by some group on their own and the combative people do not like it, why should it be done?

Government Control of Official Documents Offices

Concerning the plan for bringing official documents offices under government control, he said that this issue is being studied.

The Fahd Proposal

Concerning the proposal of Prince Fahd and the aggressions and threats of the United States, Ayamollah Musavi-Ardebili said: These American proposals sometimes come from their own mouths and sometimes from the mouths of their functionaries. They want to implement the American plan and we are opposed to the United States and any American proposal because it is to the detrement of the nations of the region. These proposals only protect their own interests.

Fighting the Stockpilers

In response to the question of how they would deal with stockpilers and price hikers who are detremental to our magnificent revolution, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili said: The law concerning stockpilers and price hikers is being studied and the court to handle it will be the court for guild-related affairs. If we need legislative bills to fight price hikers, we will prepare them and send them to the Majlis.

The Activities of the Seven-Member Committees

In response to whether he is satisfied by the work of the seven-member committees for the revitalization of land and land distribution, the chief justice said: These committees have worked well in some places. But we have received complaints from other places that they have not worked well. We have sent inspectors to these regions.

But, concerning the implementation of Paragraph C: Paragraph C has, upon analysis, met with an uncertain fate. Some have agreed with it and some have opposed it. Some have said it is not right. Regardless of what Paragraph C is called, I speak of its content. If we have land in the hands of large landowners and we have the manpower waiting and it is not dead land or waste land that we have for them to cultivate, two things can be done: We can either leave the available manpower idle or employ them as hired hands, or, on the other hand, we can, once again, distribute the land justly among them so that they can work for themselves and reap the rewards of their own labor. If one has 10, 30, or 1,000 hectares of land, the other should have at least 3 [as published].

If we choose the first solution and have one, two, or three large landowners and use others as hired hands, we know that this situation cannot last and would result in disputes. In other words, there would be a constant conflict and this conflict might explode. We can see that it is impossible to keep them side by side. Is it not logical and our religious duty to solve the problem once and for all? If this is what is meant by Paragraph C, there is no religious problem. But if it is interpreted in some other way and if it has been poorly implemented, that is, if cultivated land is in the hands of one person while, at its side, we have idle land with resources, we can attract all the active forces there to work for themselves. One can work there for himself, cultivate as much as he can, and leave what he cannot do. If this is the case, the implementation of Paragraph C is not right. Would we not be mad not to cultivate the land which is available to us?

Adjustment of Salaries

In regard to the adjustment of salary scales, the chief justice said: In accordance with the law ratified by the Revolutionary Council, the highest salary is 200,000 rials per month, which, after taxes, would be 160,000 rials. The lowest salary is 25,000 rials, which is nontaxable and carries some benefits along with it, to the amount of 30,000 rials.

In my opinion, the less the difference, the better. The Revolutionary Council was able to reduae the differences between minimum and maximum salaries, which had been 10,000 and 700,000 rials. This is acceptable, but I do not like what was ratified by the Cabinet or the late martyr Raja'i, which made the maximum salary 70,000 rials, because 70,000 rials is barely sufficient for a family. I know that some of these ministers do not have houses. They pay 50,000 of the 70,000 rials in rent. How can they live on 20,000 rials?

In response to the question of whether there is coordination between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, the chief justice

said: Coordination means that each does its job. And it is right that they be different.

Islamicization of the Justice Department

In response to the question of what difficulties they have faced in Islamicizing the Justice Department, devising Islamic laws, and implementing the laws of the Koran, the chief justice said: There is much discussion in this regard. However, one of our problems is that the honorable people think the more different places they go to the better the work will be done. For instance, they write a letter with 10 or 15 copies, whereas each case is to be investigated in one place. I would like the people to know that this action actually causes a slow down in their affairs. Therefore, people should take the specified channels.

The Operation of the Justice Department

If the authority deviates, complain about the way the deviation took place [as published]. Concerning the operation of the Justice Department, the chief justice said:

The implementation of the national investigation organization; the organization of the court of administrative justice; the office of the organization for research, investigation, and legislative bills; the creation of the Supreme Judicial Council; making public courts and arbitration courts a two-stage process; and the judicial police are among the fundamental concerns of the Supreme Judicial Council.

The chief justice said: To provide the needed personnel in the Justice Department with the judicial cadre, the judicial police, the administrative cadre of prison guards, and the reformatory and training center, we need trained, acceptable, ideologically loyal, committed, and faithful Muslim individuals who must go through the necessary training. For this purpose, the judicial branch will establish a college. This college will function under the supervision of the judicial branch and will provide the individuals needed for the Justice Department.

In response to the final question concerning the war, Chief Justice Ayatollah Seyyed 'Abdolkarim Musavi-Ardebili said:

The War Issue

Our brothers on the fronts are more hopeful than we are. We have set our hopes on God. Our progress on the war fronts is hopeful. The bravery and courage of the dear combatants of Islam in the military, the air force, the army, the navy, Havaniruz, the Islamic revolution guards corps, and the volunteers of the mobilization forces all-in-all show the great role of faith in human life. I hope with this high spirit and overflowing faith which exists in our combatants, we will soon drive the aggressor out of our homeland and achieve a decisive and glorious victory.

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PLIGHT OF KHOMEYNI REGIME DELINEATED

London 8 DAYS in English 28 Nov 81 pp 20-21

[Interview with former Governor of Central Bank 'Ali Reza Nobari by Tim McGirk]

[Text] BEING a central bank governor hardly seems a hazardous job: a few cut fingers from riffling through wads of banknotes, a little political flak as a result of borrowing too much from international moneylenders at exorbitant rates, would appear the main dangers to life and limb.

Or so you would imagine.

But Ali Reza Nobari, the former governor at Iran's Bank Markazi, has a different story to tell. A close aide to former President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, he found himself imprisoned inside his own bank by the same government that appointed him. He later fled the bank and, under threat of death from Ayatollah Khomeini's Revolutionary Guards, spent three months underground in Tehran, constantly shifted from one 'safe house' to another by sympathisers until he was able to escape on foot across the frontier.

In an interview with *8 Days* in Paris, Nobari told how Ayatollah Khomeini himself — and not, as was previously thought to be the case, the fundamentalist politicians — engineered the collapse of Bani Sadr's government. In the clash for power between Bani Sadr and the hardline Islamic Republican Party in revolutionary Iran, said the ex-central bank governor: 'Mr Khomeini was not the impartial referee that he portrayed himself to be.'

'Towards the end,' said Nobari, 'Khomeini even bypassed the Majlis to attack Bani Sadr. When Khomeini's man (chief prosecutor) Lajervardi shut down all the opposition newspapers, even the president's, the action was taken on Khomeini's instructions and without consent from either the interior minister or the Majlis house speaker.'

Islamic Revolution, the daily newspaper published by Bani Sadr and edited by Nobari, was closed by the chief prosecutor's office on 8 June. It was not Nobari's first brush with the chief prosecutor: previously, Lajervardi had arrested the central bank governor when Nobari criticised the Revolutionary Guards for publicly flailing black marketeers in Tehran's bustling bazaar, the largest and most labyrinthine of its kind in the Middle East. 'Whipping speculators is no way to stop inflation,' Nobari complained on Iran television. Shortly afterwards, the chief prosecutor ordered his arrest, and Nobari's release was only secured by Bani Sadr's intervention.

On 8 June, Lajervardi also ordered armed Revolutionary Guards to surround the central bank, scattering the pavement moneylenders on Ferdowsi Avenue. But when Lajervardi's men tried to enter the huge white edifice, Nobari ordered the bank's own security men to bolt all the doors. A standoff between the two security forces then ensued for over a week, with the Revolutionary Guards frisking all the bank employees, even governor Nobari, as they entered and left the building.

Matters were far worse for President Bani Sadr. Stripped of his authority as commander in chief of the armed forces by

Khomeini on 10 June, Bani Sadr returned to Tehran from the war zone in Khuzestan province and installed himself in the presidential office as though he were under siege. And in fact he was, claimed Nobari. Several bombs were hurled into the president's building, on a shady lane off Ferdowsi Avenue. These were reportedly the work of Revolutionary Guards and the Hesbollahi, a club-wielding gang of zealots recruited from the slums of south Tehran.

'Iran was in the final stages of a coup d'etat. We were unable to prevent it,' Nobari told *8 Days*. On 15 June, he and the president slipped into hiding. Bani Sadr was sheltered by the Mujaheddin guerrillas, who also arranged for his escape to France on 29 July aboard a hijacked military Boeing 707, but Nobari was left to his own devices. For three months he eluded the revolutionary authorities, and even managed to publish three issues of *Islamic Revolution* on a clandestine press.

'After a while, there was no place left to hide,' claimed the ex-central bank governor. Nobari refused to give any details of his escape other than: 'I had to walk a long, long time to cross the frontier.' He also said that it was not the Mujaheddin guerrillas who helped him, but rather sympathisers of Bani Sadr who had infiltrated the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard command and the Komiteh police. Both the vigilante Komiteh police force and the Revolutionary Guards were considered bastions of Khomeini support.

Nobari surfaced in Paris five weeks ago, and since then has sharply criticised the current Iranian government's economic policies. Oil exports, said Nobari, have slumped from a pre-revolutionary high of 4.5m barrels a day down to about 500,000 b/d. 'That will bring in no more than $7-8bn this year, about half of what Iran needs to cover its import bill for essential goods, never mind the war,' he told *8 Days*. Iran's foreign currency reserves have also dipped down from about $18bn in September 1980, when war with Iraq broke out, to a current level of $2bn.

In London, some metal dealers believe that Iran has already started selling gold. 'It's certainly not a good time for the Iranians to be offloading. The Russians are selling and so are the South African producers. If Iran starts dumping, gold prices can only go down,' one trader asserted.

A European-based Iranian commercial banker agreed with Nobari's grim assessment of the economy. 'The situation in Iran worsens every day,' said the banker, who asked not to be identified. 'But it doesn't mean that the country will collapse in 24 hours. Three or four months will pass before the currency shortages work through the Iranian economy.'

Nobari's replacement at the central bank,

"Oil exports will bring in no more than $7-8bn this year, about half of what Iran needs to cover its import bill for essential goods, never mind the war. The situation worsens every day, but it doesn't mean that the country will collapse in 24 hours"

Dr. Mohsen Nurbak, is trying to stem the outflow of valuable foreign cash. Virtually all letters of credit, save for food and medicine imports, have been stopped. Instead, Iran is exchanging oil for goods from Eastern bloc countries and India on a barter basis, but still not enough imports are arriving: according to Nobari, Iranians must queue for hours to obtain such rationed staple goods as cooking oil and rice.

Inflation, he claimed, was running over 35 per cent, gross national product growth was below zero, and petroleum sales, the country's main foreign currency earner, were unlikely to rise while the world oil glut persists. 'Iran must sell at least 1.5m b/d to earn the necessary money, but there are no takers in sight,' claimed Nobari.

The tight credit squeeze and the political turmoil inside Iran, predicted Nobari, may lead to a wave of strikes and demonstrations this winter, which could be capable of sweeping the current Islamic government from power.

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U.S. TRIES TO RETRIEVE IN SAUDI ARABIA 'WHAT IT LOST IN IRAN'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 15 Nov 81 pp 16, 13

[Text] Developments in the region must be criticized and examined from the viewpoint of Iran's Islamic revolution because Iran's revolution, as a qualitative transformation in the region, has shattered many standards. For example, if the preservation of Israel's military and technological superiority is one of the United States' goals, Iran's Islamic revolution was not only able to eliminate one of Israel's strong supporters in the region, but also to change Iran at the same time into the most radical enemy of the Zionist regime and world imperialism. To support this statement, it suffices merely to state that Yassar Arafat said in one of his Tehran speeches that after the revolution's victory in Iran, Menachem Begin in the Israeli parliament said: Now the epoch of night and darkness has overtaken Israel. (It should not be left unsaid that it seems as if Arafat intends by his recent positions on regional developments to once again return light to the regime occupying Jerusalem).

From another point of view, the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf and Iran's long border with the throat of world capitalism has caused the Iranian Islamic revolution to clearly put the strategic interests of the United States in real danger of destruction. For this very reason the tip of the arrow of world imperialism's policy is being guided towards the destruction of this revolution by any route possible.

Since Saudi Arabia was one of the most vital petroleum regions for the United States, and furthermore because of its contiguity with the Persian Gulf, the United States was determined to reconstruct in Saudi Arabia what it had lost in Iran. In this fashion Saudi Arabia became a candidate for the exercise of U.S. diplomacy in the Persian Gulf region, so that the United States' unconditional and unrestricted dominance in the Persian Gulf would be secured. However, since the United States had understood that support of puppet regimes by political means was no longer effective, and that it would not be able to prevent the growth, expansion and even victory of liberating revolutions, the resort to a military solution of the situation, and a policy of oppression and direct occupation was placed at the head of the U.S. programs. It was in justification of this policy that Jimmy Carter, former U.S. president, announced on 23 January 1980, after the fall of the Shah's regime in Iran and the Soviet aggression on Afghanistan: "Any kind of attempt by a foreign power towards gaining control of the Persian Gulf region is declared to be open aggression on vital U.S. interests, and such an attack will be answered by any means possible, including military force."

The first U.S. action to implement this diplomacy was organizing the Rapid Deployment Force. These troops, who are from the most elite of the U.S. special forces, were organized in order to intervene quickly to protect vital U.S. interests.

In this regard, Casper Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, says: Protection of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region will bring about the creation of newer and more powerful forces which will have a faster transport capability. He also says: We must prepare ourselves for every kind of war in the region and in every place in the world that we have vital interests.

Thus the United States has entered a new era of political and military life, and has set about arming regimes affiliated with it as quickly as possible, and has prepared a series of actions in order to justify its future operations to world opinion. The imposition of the Iraq war on Iran, and the aid of materiel and weapons to Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan was a good pretext to justify " the crisis in the Persian Gulf." On the one hand the war made the pretense that Iran's!! expansionism was a danger to the "arab world," and additionally gave the United States the opportunity to begin military actions in order to protect the oil resources. It was thus that the AWACS entered Saudi Arabia for the so-called support and preservation of Saudi Arabia's oil facilities. It does not need to be said that this action, in light of the enormous and impressive range of the AWACS, was one of the manifest aims of the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf. It is interesting that when the AWACS were tranferred into the Persian Gulf vicinity, the U.S. plan for the occupation of Iran's oil regions in a few days by means of Iraq's open aggression met with defeat. Later developments show that the mission of the AWACS is other than what Saudi Arabia claims it is, since as was pointed out the AWACS took no action whatsoever during the course of the bombing of the Iraqi atomic facilities. They conveniently ignored the flights of Israeli fighters over Saudi Arabian soil and their penetration of Iraq's territory. Even if this matter were not true and the destruction of Iraq's atomic facilities had taken place some other way, one cannot ignore the existence of Israeli reconnaisance flights over Saudi Arabian soil. This is because just a few days ago, after the latest aggression by the Zionist regime on Saudi Arabian soil and Saudi Arabia's protest (and perhaps confrontation!!) over this action, U.S. authorities admitted that Israeli planes have been making reconnaisance flights over Saudi Arabia for years. (It should not remain unsaid that Israel's recent aggression and Saudi Arabia's huss and fuss could be a joint plan of the United States and Saudi Arabia in order to legitimize the Saudi regime. Saudi Arabia and the United States wished to put the Fahd plan in place through this display of playthings, and to expound Saudi Arabia throughout the world as an enemy of Israel and as a country that is still exposed to Israel's attacks).

In this regard Harold Tryon had written earlier that Israeli warplanes fly over important Saudi Arabian bases and so far have encountered no annoyance whatsoever from the Saudis.

In any case, one of the United States' paths to domination of the Persian Gulf region is the extensive arming of Saudi Arabia. In this regard, the German publication BILD, quoting high governmental sources, writes that West Germany, in the framework of NATO's efforts for the greatest possible armament of Saudi Arabia, will sell weapons to this country. This publication adds that West Germany

will deliver to Saudi Arabia the sale of over 1,000 Leopard-25 tanks, and Tornado anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, which are built with English and Italian cooperation. From another angle, the press affiliated with imperialism writes that the United States intends to equip Saudi Arabia with an air-to-ground Isicl defense system to confront "any sort of probable aggression." General Haig, to justify the sale of 62 F-15 fighter planes says: These planes will aid Saudi Arabia in any face-off with a foreign threat. This is a threat that, in the United States' belief, can come from Iran, Ethiopia or South Yemen. However, who does not know that all these programs for the expansion of the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf are taking place in order to crush Islamic liberation movements? Because General Haig, the proposer of the U.S. military policies in the Persian Gulf, explicitly announced on 17 September 1981 in his speech before the Congress for the AWACS sale that: This deal (the AWACS sale) has a vital aspect for peace in the Middle East, and not only will it not harm Israel, but it will instead be a help to that country. Casper Weinberger, U.S. secretary of defense, announces that the plan for domination of the Persian Gulf is for the military defense of the capitalist world's oil resources in the Middle East.

Saudi Arabia possesses such strategic importance for the United States that General Haig admits that the United States will use any means necessary to prevent Saudi Arabia from suffering the fate of Iran.

Reagan, the U.S. president, reasoning that it is not possible to exercise foreign policy through legislation, states that the interference of the Congress in the AWACS deal could damage the process of peace in the Middle East and obstruct U.S. diplomatic efforts. He furthermore says that in case of such opposition, his decision-making and responsibility will be called into question by the arab countries of the Middle East.

Brief attention to this speech of Reagan shows that he threatens Congress that if this deal does not take place, U.S. credibility in the eyes of servile arab regimes will be destroyed.

Furthermore, it is due to the implementation of the policy of direct oppression that the Al-Sa'ud puppet regime butchered the uprising of Moslems in the Kaaba during November 1979 in order to show its masters that it is obedient to its orders.

Egypt and Sudan, Tunisia, Morocco and Oman are similar tales which we will speak about in the future, God willing.

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MEASURES TAKEN TO WIN LOYALTY OF MILLIONS OF TRIBESMEN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Nov 81 p 5

> [Text] The seasonal migration of tribes and the constant move of migrants between winter and summer regions have been going on for many years. Although tribal life has changed since the beginning of the 20th century, and some of the tribes live in cities and some in villages, engaging in agriculture in addition to animal husbandry, groups of them have continued to migrate and move from pasture to pasture. During the past years, lack of knowledge of correct planning in the tribal locations has created fundamental lodging difficulties. Lack of sufficient understanding of their living conditions, psychology, and culture has resulted in nothing but disturbances and chaos in the lives of the migrants and has changed them from producers to consumers, escalating their suffering and deprivation.

In the previous issue, we dealt with the question of tribes and the implemented policies concerning them in the past. We spoke of some of the pain, suffering, and deprivation of the tribes as well as the descrimination they have endured for long years because they have been stangers in the society and have not been understood. Tribal anthropologists, experts and authorities, who have created the tribal center upon finding such shortcomings, all emphasize the necessity of implementing long-term plans as well as a clear policy towards the tribes. In order to better understand the problem, we will review the political, economic, and cultural plans for tribes of the previous regime and review the history of the implementation of these plans with their various confusing names. Here, we must add that in order to become familiar with the way the center for Iranian tribes was formed, the plans and programs which have been or will be planned for them, the neutralization of those plans that previously drove the migrants to the outskirts of the cities and destroyed their economic base, and the difficulties in implementing

rural and tribal services, we spoke with the authorities. Tribes make up a total of 5 million of the nation's population. They are scattered in the provinces of Kohkiluyeh, Boyer Ahmad, Kerman, Khorasan, Sistan, Baluchestan, Mazandaran, Ilam, Chahar Mahall and Bakhtiari, Fars, Lorestan, and Kermanshahan. The plans for them in the course of the past years have all led towards the destruction of their tribal way of life and the disruption of their independent economy and culture.

Center for Iranian Tribes

Therefore, we spoke with the members of the central council of Iranian tribes concerning the history of the establishment of the center for Iranian tribes, which began its work about five months ago.

One of the members said: "During the period 21 Mar 64-20 Mar 65, a plan known as the plan for the "Lor" and "Nafar" tribes was presented to the Ministry of Development and Housing. The following year, too, a plan for digging deep wells for the tribes was drafted. In the same year, a plan for the settlement of the tribes was, for the first time, prepared in the village of Khansar, Mamasani. Then, in early fall of 1966, three projects for combining the tribes under the plan for tribal development were prepared. During the following year, the central office for the development of tribal regions was established. Some groups were sent to several provinces to create access roads, elementary schools, wells, feed storages, and veterenary services. This office was transformed to the organization of national forests and pastures from 21 Mar 72-20 Mar 73 and was renamed the office of mobile livestock keepers.

"From 21 Mar 75-20 Mar 78, funds were allocated from the plan for the creation of wells and watering tanks to establish centers for tribal services, but they went unused. The following year, the organization no longer had funds for use on a national scale since other plans, under the heading of the social and economic welfare of the tribes, were devised in the provinces. After the revolution, the Revolution Council allocated 15 billion rials for the development of tribal regions; but, since there was no clear planning, this fund was not spent and was divided between 7 provinces due to shortages. This past year, an additional fund was allocated and on 19 Jul, the center for Iranian tribes was created and began its activities."

Hoseyn Motovalian, the supervisor of the Iranian center for tribal services, concerning cultural, cooperative, and developmental planning for the tribes, said: "The plan of this center, in the tribal cooperative section, is to establish funds for interest-free loans within the various tribal branches and for the Islamic societies to supervise these funds. In the developmental section, building tribal access roads to facilitate bringing services to them, providing

facilities to bring tribal products to the market for sale, building bridges to reduce the number of human and livestock casualties during the migration season, building supplementary feed storages, creating watering tanks for livestock, digging deep and semi-deep wells for producing feed, building earthen and concrete dams and dikes for storing drinking water and water for irrigation, and building portable and non-portable bath houses are among the responsibilities of this center.

"In addition to cultural, educational, and propaganda duties, providing tribal education, human and livestock health services, and veterenary services are among our other programs."

Encouraging Handicrafts

About how the tribal handicraft industry can be encouraged and how their products can be put on the market, the supervisor of the center for Iranian tribes said: "Among our programs are: creating mobile and premanent storages for raw materials in conjunction with providing the necessities and primary materials for the handicraft industry of the tribes, creating exhibitions of handicrafts made by them in order to find a market for them, training and sending experts to tribal regions, providing technical training and raising their level of awareness regarding the handicraft industry, developing and improving dairy products, improving quality in terms of packaging and preservation, and, finally, preparing their handicrafts for sale and encouraging them in this industry."

Concerning plans to improve the condition of pastures and provide feed, he said:

"In regards to the pastures, research is being done in terms of collecting data, determining the size of existing pastures, classifying them, understanding pasture vegetation, and improving the seeding of pastures, in cooperation with the research institute for national forests and pastures. Also, solving the problem of the ownership of pastures and studying the surface and underground water supply are among the research plans for pastures. Other areas of concern include the allotment of pastures with regard to the political and social make up of every region in coordination with the related organizations, the revitalization of pastures, the creation of land for planting irrigational and dry farm feed to make up the feed shortages, the development and training as well as creation of demonstration pastures during various seasons to encourage the tribes, in cooperation with the organization of national forests and pastures.

"One of the programs that concerns tribal services is the creation of centers for rural, agricultural, and tribal services, which the Ministry of Agriculture and the construction crusade are working on.

However, since rural and tribal lifestyles differ, more issues should be considered in connection with the tribes."

Centers for Rural and Tribal Services

The member of the executive council of the center for Iranian tribes, concerning centers for rural, agricultural, and tribal services and the difficulties which the Ministry of Agriculture faces in regards to the tribes, said: "The charters, according to which the Ministry of Agriculture must offer rural agricultural and tribal services, did not accurately anticipate tribal problems and difficulties, given their particular way of life. Even those which were not vague in theory could not be implemented, given the structure of tribal life. According to this plan, tribal services are provided in the heart of service centers. However, because of the differences between a rural lifestyle, which is agricultural, and a tribal lifestyle, which involves animal husbandry, we cannot, on the basis of this charter, establish tribal service centers, since bringing services to tribes is quite different from bringing them to villages. The villager needs such things as tractors, seed, and fertilizer; but the tribes need pastures and livestock. On the whole, the tribal make up is particularly spread out and, at times, their migration takes place across several provinces."

In this connection, he added: "The authorities of the Ministry of Agriculture realized this issue last month. Based on the minutes of the meeting, prepared by the council of deputy ministers, the boundaries between the centers for tribal services and centers for rural services were more clearly drawn. The plan creating the centers for rural and tribal services which, in accordance with the ratified bill, is to be supervised by the construction crusade deals, in a section on the tribes, with issues which are not of major importance to the villagers. In a seminar held by the construction crusade of Azarkian with the tribal crusade of Fars Province, the impracticality of implementing a single set of rural plans in the tribal crusade, the differences between rural and tribal lifestyles, the shortcomings of the organization of mobile animal husbandry, and tribal education were discussed. It was pointed out that in the previous regime, more than 60 percent of productive tribes were transformed from mobile to semi-mobile, which resulted in most of these tribes changing to a great extent from producers to consumers.

"The previous regime, in addition to disrupting the tribal economy, insisted on propagating its own culture among them through specific programs."

The cultural supervisor of the central council of Iranian tribes described the educational situation of the tribes before the revolution as follows: "In villages, the teaching of reading and writing was, from old times, handled by school masters. But in the tribes,

because of their particular situation, not even this type of education existed. After the establishment of the central office of tribal education, school masters were used. But the tragedy began with tribal teacher-training, when local literate people were brought to the teacher-training schools to learn new educational techniques. While learning the urban misteachings, they were gradually losing touch with their tribal heritage. The spirit of love for the shah was being propagated among them. In the tribal schools, religious books, the Koran, and art were not taught. Most of the tribal teachers were also encouraged towards irreligion. The goal of tribal education was to interest the tribesmen in positions and jobs, no matter how menial.

"Those in charge of tribal education chose the educational advisors from among the teachers on the basis of their local influence, dependence, and obedience to the establishment. The educational advisors discriminated among the teachers and, therefore, some of the teachers were transferred from the villages and tribes to the cities. Also, in selecting students to be sent to high schools, they discriminated greatly. With so-called examinations, the children of governors-general, SAVAK agents, city governors, etc. entered the tribal boarding schools centered in Shiraz. They were cleverly planning to train loyal individuals. American spies worked in these schools as international Peace Corps volunteers and perhaps for this reason, most of these students, when they entered universities, joined leftist groups." Concerning other misguided educational training, he said: "Every year, a certain budget was allocated for camps which were purely for show and entertainment, where the propaganda films of the regime were shown. All the programs of tribal education consisted of teaching without education." Concerning the ways to make up these shortcomings, the cultural supervisor of the center for Iranian tribes said:

"To reform the teachers and create a cultural revolution, we must first retrain and reform the already employed teachers. To do this, we must make use of summer and new year holidays. Also, the center for tribal teacher training and the tribal high school must be purged of incompetent and irreligious individuals and sympathetic and experienced teachers must be used. The educational advisors should also be replaced with committed individuals who can take the Islamic revolution, like prophets, to the farthest tribal areas." On this subject, he also explained: "The office of tribal education must be purged of Westernized and ignorant SAVAK agents. Steps must be taken to see that a competent, decisive, and revolutionary director-general is appointed. Otherwise, this center will expand more corruptly and will be harmful to the revolution.

The Mobilization of Tribal Warriors

It is appropriate after our examination of tribal issues that we point out their human spirits, their bravery, and their manlihood throughout history. The brave tribesmen, as was stated, were one of the forces that every government in the past centuries tried to use politically. They sometimes armed one tribe against another; sometimes they forced them to settle down or to migrate. But, throughout history, they have made every effort to carry out their mission to protect and preserve the borders. The establishment of the unit of tribal mobilization during the imposed war with Iraq and the extent of their struggle demonstrate this great mission of the tribes. Immediately after the imposed war of Iraq, the tribes of Ilam, Lorestan, and Kermanshahan formed the tribal mobilization unit. Some of the villagers who were under siege by the aggressions of the Iraq forces, even when they were supposed to migrate, resisted and did not migrate. Some even abandoned their livestock and went from Boyer Ahmad, Lorestan, and other places to the borders. Today, the tribes, especially those which were on the borders, because they are aware of the regional situation and know some military techniques, fight the aggressive enemy shoulder to shoulder with the brothers of the military and guards corps. It has been witnessed that in certain cases, some of the tribesmen have crawled 2 km under the most difficult conditions and armed with only ordinary weapons attacked the tanks of the Ba'thists. Now, too, the Ilam tribal mobilization acts under the auspices of the guards corps, so that in more coordination they can pay their share in driving the occupying forces from the borders of our Islamic nation.

Population Statistics on the Number of Tribes, Clans, and Tribal Branches in Provinces

Province of Kohkiluyeh and Boyer Ahmad: 7 tribes, 19 clans, 209 branches

Province of Kerman: 40 tribes, 230 clans, 191 branches

Provinces of Sistan and Baluchestan: No tribes, 77 clans, 252 branches

Province of Khorasan: 8 tribes, 83 clans, 22 branches

Province of Mazandaran: 3 tribes, 28 clans, 93 branches

Province of Ilam: 6 tribes, 78 clans, 16 branches

Province of Chaharmahall and Bakhtiari: 2 tribes, 1,165 clans, 165 branches

Province of Fars: 4 tribes, 18 clans, 402 branches

Province of Lorestan: 9 tribes, 78 clans, no branches

Province of Kermanshahan: 13 tribes, no clans, 114 branches

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BRIEFS

EXPECTED 'DEVELOPMENTS' IN AHVAZ--AL-DUSTUR has learned from sources close to the Arab Front for the Liberation of Ahvaz Tohat, with the Iraqi Armu on Ahvaz territory, the Ahvaz region is expected to witness important developments. The formation of an Arab governmental authority may be announced soon, with the projection that this authority will at a later stage negotiate with the Iranian Government on the political system to be applied there. Furthermore, this authority will contact Arab and foreign governments, work for the recognition of the Ahvaz people's right to self-determination, take the issue of self-determination to the United Nations, prepare the Ahvaz Arab people for a national referendum under UN supervision, and form a popular army to maintain security and run the affairs of the country in the liberated region of Arabistan. [Text] [PM070941 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 7 Dec 81 p 12]

CSO: 4604/8

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH COUNCIL PROJECTS LISTED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH AL-USBU'I in Arabic 24 Oct 81 p 5

[Article: "Twenty-three Projects Sponsored by the Scientific Research Center--Concentrate the Concepts of Science and Scientific Research in All Aspects of Life"]

[Text] Advancing scientific research in all areas and sectors has become the task of the Scientific Research Council through its newly enacted law: It will lead to the strengthening of basic values for scientific growth and the national economy. It will also guide the utilization of science and technology as befitting the political, economic and social circumstances in the nation.

Responsible sources from the council announced this and said that a firm base for the sciences was created through persistent efforts toward achieving an understanding of science and scientific research in all aspects of life and through the deployment of all available human resources with the goal of finding select scientists and capable researchers to bear the burden of this qualitative leap which the party command and the revolution have been seeking regarding science and technology. The council's law has been enacted to achieve these goals.

The sources added that the council has taken several steps to achieve the goals including the reorganization of the council's centers for scientific research and the creation of new research centers commensurate with the scientific growth occurring in various sectors. Also, in-house regulations have been drawn up for the scientific research centers.

They also pointed out the most important projects the council and its research centers sponsor. They are as follows:

1. Discover a new method to separate glucose from date juice.

2. Find alternatives to substances already used for purifying and filtering liquid sugar.

3. Prepare nutrition for children consisting of dates with the cooperation of UNICEF.

4. Start a program for the use of solar energy for agriculture with regard to plastic houses.

5. Complete a drainage model for the Dalmaj reclamation project.

6. Discover a new hybrid of barley suitable for industrial purposes.

7. Begin the implementation of the solar house project which depends on solar energy as the principal energy supplier.

8. Complete a preliminary study on the solar heater and its use in the country.

9. Set up a solar energy observation station in a field outside the center for solar energy research. It will be the first such station to be set up in Iraq.

10. Begin researching the use of solar energy for food manufacturing. Practical application of the research would be conducted at the center for solar energy research.

11. Research for a new kind of inexpensive cement to be used for construction, plastering, flooring, etc.

12. Participate in updating the Iraqi specifications to provide the country with the kinds and quantities of sand it needs.

13. Find alternatives to construction material such as stones and rocks.

14. Set up the equipment for an experimental plant for a project to filter drinking water through the best methods.

15. Set up an experimental station for the study of marine life.

16. Set up a station for drainage pumping and glass houses in al-Fudayliyah.

17. Set up two seismological stations in al-Sulaymaniah and al-Rutba.

18. Set up an experimental plant to extract sugar in al-Fudayliyah.

19. Construct a seismological station in Baghdad.

20. Construct additional buildings to the council's research centers in view of their needs.

21. Construct an experimental soil testing station at the Dalmaj project.

22. Equip the council with an electronic accounting system with a memory of 64,000 words.

23. Begin constructing the new Iraqi astronomical station.

The sources also stated that the council has held several discussion groups and symposia on various science areas and topics aimed at securing an exchange of expertise and continuing meetings among the experts so as to benefit from expert knowledge. The council has also participated, through its research centers, in training university students around the country in various specializations.

Working researchers supervise students in advanced studies at Iraqi universities. The council also permits employees of universities to take advantage of the research centers' laboratories.

The council has agreed to publish periodical scientific reports reflecting the activities of its centers and the progress of scientific research in the areas of agriculture, water resources, biology, oil and construction.

9770
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DIALOGUE WITH USSR URGED

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 3 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by Yossef Shemi: "The De Gaulle Syndrome in the Reagan Policy"]

[Text] The United States is going to make a major shift in its policy towards Israel similar to the one France made at the outbreak of the Six-Day War. Opening channels of communication with the USSR can save Israel from its isolation and make it possible to include an article on arms control in the Middle East in the negotiations on a comprehensive settlement in the region.

The arms deal the Reagan administration made with Saudi Arabia, in which it sold the Saudis sophisticated offensive arms in large quantities, constitutes in itself a violation of the Camp David agreements. The issue becomes even clearer if one looks at the next step of the American administration--adoption, even partial adoption of the Saudi plan for the solution [settlement] of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In the Camp David accords, which apply to the West Bank as well, it was agreed that the fate of these territories will be decided on at the end of the 5 years of the autonomy. It was agreed that in the meantime neither the Egyptians nor the Americans will do anything to change the military status-quo, beyond the changes which will be created by the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. But the Reagan administration not only violated the agreement about the stages for the implementation of the Camp David accords, which stated that the West Bank issue will be postponed for 5 years, but also upset the power balance in the region at the beginning of the process, even before the withdrawal from the Sinai, by signing a giant arms deal with the Saudis. The version that these arms are necessary to protect the oilfields does not convince anybody. The Saudis will not have to face a Soviet invasion alone. The United States will have to join the fight. Their other enemies such as South Yemen, are not so well equipped that Saudi Arabia will need such new arms to protect itself against them. In fact, the main threat to the Saudi royal house is internal. The arms worth $85 billion are no good in case of a revolt or a military coup. Such an arms supply means an increase in the number of army officers and specialists who in time will want to gain control and not to live in the shadows of the corrupt princes.

That might happen in the future, and the Americans will have to face it. At present, it is clear that the arms deal changes the military power balance

against Israel, at the same time the United States is continuing to send arms to other countries in the region. All this is meant to create military pressure on Israel so that it will show more so-called "flexibility" in the negotiations on the controversial issues and especially the issues of the West Bank and the creation of a Palestinian state.

A Shift in Policy

It has to be stated clearly that the Reagan administration, in spite of all the verbal promises, is reshuffling its policy the same way De Gaulle did in 1967. France has a long history of agreement violation when it feels that such a step is convenient. Before De Gaulle there was another French politician named Daladier, and before him another one named Talleyrand who betrayed Poland in the Vienna congress. The United States also went back on its promises, as it did in the case of Vietnam, but for its defense it should be said that it did so because of military defeats and internal turmoil. Most of Israel's spokesmen, including those from the Alignment, like to say that we are a wall against further Soviet expansion. The purpose has been to gain a favorable attitude from the American government and to win leniency from it with regard to the West Bank. There were those who dreamt about full annexation, and those who would have been satisfied with less, like the supporters of the Alon plan, for example. Both groups wanted to postpone the settlement of the conflict as much as possible hoping that in time we will be able to get a more favorable solution to the problem of the West Bank. They cooperated with certain groups in the American administration in trying to push the Soviet Union out of the settlement conflict. The assumption was that it would be easier to postpone a comprehensive settlement if we have to deal only with the United States and not with the two superpowers at the same time. In time, the opinion was formed that the American administration will give a silent approval to annexation if only it will be done the "right" way, but those hopes were not materialized. In 1977, just before Sadat went to Jerusalem, the prime ministers of the United States and the USSR published their famous joint declaration. That attempt to achieve a comprehensive settlement by both superpowers was frustrated by Israel, its friends in the United States and Sadat, who had his own reasons. In Camp David, the Begin government agreed to total withdrawal from the Sinai hoping that this will help to delay or even to abolish the "vicious" demands regarding the other territories.

The Shortcomings of a Partial Settlement

In addition to all the other known shortcomings of the partial settlement with Egypt, it has one serious shortcoming which has been overlooked--it does not include an agreement on arms control. Such an agreement is essential for us, as even with the West Bank and with American aid, in the long run, there is no way we can compete in the arms race. An agreement on arms control could have been reached, if among the signatures on the peace treaty had appeared the signature of the Soviet representative. The Begin government, even more than the previous Alignment governments, strongly objected to any mentioning of Soviet participation, because of its "principles." We became more American than the Americans. At certain times, the Americans were willing to have the USSR join the negotiation table but Israel subverted any such effort, because it feared that a comprehensive settlement will include an almost total withdrawal from the West Bank. Today, nobody doubts that the United States, as well, wants Israeli

withdrawal like the withdrawal from the Sinai. The Begin government has created a situation in which Israel has no room for maneuver; we do not have access to the Soviet Union, and we do not have close contacts with any important West European nation. In his "wisdom" Begin has succeeded in breaking relations with some of their heads of states by his vicious attacks during the election campaign.

Fait Accompli

Now, Begin is trying to win Reagan's favor. Therefore, he is willing to silence the cries about the Saudi arms deal, so that the West Bank issue will not be put on the negotiation table. In the meantime, he is telling his followers that we will create fait accompli, and the other nations will have to take that into consideration. Those are false hopes. Nobody took into consideration the fait accompli in the Sinai, and nobody will do it in the West Bank. The Reagan administration wants to flatter the Saudi princes, to give them prestige in the Arab world, therefore it is willing to adopt the Fahd plan, which by the way, is not so different from what was advertised not so long ago as the Rogers plan. The Saudis are even more "stingy" about what Israel is going to get in return for the withdrawal. The Saudi plan is more extremist than the Russian demands, as the Russians are really interested in the existence of Israel as a permanent component of the Middle East. Therefore, it is not so late to try to make contact with the Soviets, to take away some of the animosity which became part of our relations with them, to get some room for maneuver, and to include the arms race issue in the negotiations for a comprehensive settlement. We do not have to be a wall against communism; the American government does not need us either as servants or as aid in this task. Others will carry out this task, those who get the AWACS and the Sidewinders.

Timing is important in diplomacy. If we had opened channels of communications in past years, the results might have been much better now. Today, we do not know what the other side, the Soviets, will say. It is possible that we are too late. A public declaration might cause a rift between us and most of the Jewish and non-Jewish public which supports us in the United States. This public is mostly conservative and anti-communist. In spite of that, we have to try and find channels of communication with the Soviet Union. Time is almost out. Those who say that after April 1982 things are going to be completely different, are right.

9433
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PLO SEEN GAINING GROUND IN DIPLOMACY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Oct 81 p 9

[Article by Amos Eylon: "Not of Fleeting Importance"]

[Text] The diplomatic achievements of the PLO make it almost impossible to create local representation among the Palestinians in the territories.

Words alone will not create a Palestinian state in Jordan, as Foreign Minister Shamir thinks. It is even harder to prevent the PLO from making more diplomatic gains in the international arena, and even harder to guarantee Palestinian participation in the establishment of full autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

The implementation of the autonomy plan is the most serious task that this government took upon itself, and it has failed and is continuing to fall in it, and not because it is an innocent lamb surrounded by vicious wolves. Without Palestinian participation there will be no autonomy, and with no autonomy which both sides will approve of there will be no peace with Egypt. All the efforts to achieve Israeli-Egyptian agreement on this issue, including the most recent effort made in the talks that took place this week, have failed.

In the meantime, the PLO, headed by Yassir Arafat, is continuing to make impressive diplomatic gains, which contribute to the establishment of its position as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in the international arena. We have to pay attention to the quick pace of developments and their geopolitical location all the way from Moscow to Washington. Arafat's visit to Moscow gave him for the first time full diplomatic recognition from one of the superpowers. Japan did not go as far as granting the PLO full diplomatic recognition, but took care to make Arafat's visit to Tokyo almost official, and after the visit both sides stressed the aura of common understanding between them. Andreas Papandreo, the new Socialist prime minister of Greece, invited Arafat for an official visit to Athens and even promised to recognize the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. And finally, President Reagan, following Presidents Ford and Carter, announced that he is willing to start negotiations with the PLO as soon as the PLO will recognize Israel's right to exist. All this took place in a period of 2 weeks. In reality, it is quite impressive.

It is possible to say that these developments have no real significance. We treat seriously only the bombs the PLO plants, but not its embassies. And in

spite of that, it will not be easy to live with the recent gains of the PLO in the diplomatic arena. It is true that 120 embassies around the world cannot make the PLO into a state, but with more international recognition of the PLO, especially by the superpowers, there are less chances that the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will be willing to take their fate into their own hands. As the position of the PLO is strengthened all over the world, there are less chances that the Palestinians under Israeli control will create their own independent political leadership which will not be dependent on the terrorist organizations, and which will be willing to participate in the autonomy negotiations. As this has been one of the main objectives of the Israeli and Egyptian governments in the 3 years that have gone by since the Camp David accords, what is going to happen to it now? The hope of creating a moderate local leadership is also at the core of the new government policy to replace the military government in the West Bank with a civilian administration.

Nobody wants to be in the shoes of Prof Menahem Milson, who took upon himself to head this new civilian administration. What might have been possible a few years ago, is almost impossible now. A few months ago, in a lecture in the Van Lear institute in Jerusalem, Prof Milson expressed confidence in our ability to break the PLO politically in the West Bank. It will be interesting to see how he will go about achieving this goal. Will the inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip start to turn their backs on the PLO now that the organization is receiving worldwide recognition? After it was accepted in Moscow? On the eve of its recognition by the West Europeans? The opposite is likely. Under the present circumstances, civilian administration in the West Bank is the same as annexation, with no political rights given to the population. That will strengthen the PLO both among other nations and inside the territories themselves.

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MONETARY, BANKING CONDITIONS DISCUSSED

Competition in Expanding Market

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 Special Edition pp 24-25

[Article by Rashid Hasan: "The Banking and Monetary Situation in Saudi Arabia: Expanding Market, Competition, and Liquidity Crisis"]

> [Text] Saudiization of the Banks Has Expanded the Base of Banking Activities and Unleashed the Machinery of Competition.
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> Specialized Banks Played the Principal Role During the Stage of Initial Growth, But Then They Withdrew and Left the Field to the Commercial Banks. The Liquidity Crisis: A Standstill in Deposit Activity, Big Increase in Credit Loans, and Great Decline in Commercial Bank Reserves. The Ratio of Reserves to Demand Deposits Decreased from 73.6 Percent to 24.7 Percent, and the Ratio of Credit Loans to Deposits Increased from 47.9 Percent to 100 Percent.

The flexible policy of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency [SAMA], and in particular the Saudiization of the banks operating in Saudi Arabia, has provided an impetus for growth to the banking sector in Saudi Arabia and has, in a short time, multiplied its rates of growth as well as its deposits, credit loans, and bank branches. The policy has also, through unleashing the mechanism of competition, set the basic foundation for a developing financial market.

Nevertheless developments in the international market, especially the trend of rising interest rates, have had their repercussions on Saudi banks which, with the continual support of SAMA, have tried to absorb the pressures which have been exerted on their liquidity and reserves.

The following is a presentation of the most important developments which took place in the monetary and banking situation in Saudi Arabia during the period 1977-80, with special emphasis on recent and current trends.

During recent years the banking sector in Saudi Arabia has witnessed important developments which have anchored the foundations for the growth of this sector and have paved the way for this sector to increase its role in the financing of the country's economic activity.

There is no doubt that the basic development which took place in this domain was the implementation by the [Saudi] monetary authorities of the policy of Saudiization of the banks--a policy which transformed the foreign banks operating in Saudi Arabia into joint-stock banks with a minimum of 60 percent Saudi ownership. This policy has led to great and rapid expansion of the national base of the commercial banks, whose number thus increased from only two banks (the National Bank and the Riyadh Bank) to nine banks at the present time--after the addition of seven banks which came to have a minimum of 60 percent Saudi ownership. These seven banks are: the Saudi Cairo Bank, the Bank al-Jazirah, the Saudi Holland Bank, the Saudi French Bank, the Saudi British Bank, the Arab National Bank, and Citicorp which recently agreed to Saudiization.

As SAMA had hoped, the process of Saudiization led to an unprecedented expansion of the base of banking activities on numerous levels. One result of this has been that the banks which underwent Saudiization now enjoy rights and privileges which they, as foreign banks, did not enjoy previously--in particular, the right to open branch banks in all areas of Saudi Arabia. These banks have made use of this right and during the last 2 or 3 years they have become very widespread. The number of bank branches operating in Saudi Arabia increased from 110 in 1978 to 140 in 1979, and then to 215 by the end of 1980. Furthermore, the number of seasonal bank offices (which operate during the pilgrimage season) has increased to 28.

The expansion and increase in number of national banks in Saudi Arabia has led to an important phenomenon. This phenomenon has been the emergence of competition between these banks and the gradual development of the machinery and apparatus of the banking market, including the increase in number of bank branches, as these banks strive to attract depositors, provide various types of credit loan services as well as other services, and increase their capital and reserves in keeping with the general expansion of operations and growth in volume of credit. The monthly statistics of the International Monetary Fund [IMF] show that the total capital of the commercial banks increased from 1.29 billion riyals at the end of the first quarter of 1978 to 2.55 billion riyals by the end of 1979, and then to 4.13 billion riyals by August 1980. That is, capital nearly doubled during the first 9 months of last year.

This expansion naturally was accompanied by positive results in terms of the formation of national expertise and the expansion of its scope. This, of course, will pave the way for Saudi personnel to play a greater role in the administration of Saudi banks and to gradually shoulder the basic responsibilities which, in practice, are still in the hands of the previous foreign bank administrations--which have continued to operate on the basis of administration contracts which were concluded with most of the new Saudi bank boards.

These banking developments coincided with the development of economic activity in general, an increase in government expenditures (which, in the oil-producing countries generally, are considered to be the basis for determining the volume of liquidity in the country), and the growth of the dynamic private sector, but they are considered to be factors which support and provide an incentive for the growth of the banking sector and an increase in its activity. Of course, there still are a number of factors which tend to limit this growth. The most important of these are the lack of widespread acceptance of traditional banking practices and the availability of large sums of wealth to a broad sector of corporations and individuals. This enables

such individuals and corporations to finance themselves and means that they feel no need to resort to loans to finance many of their projects. However, the most important reason for the relatively limited role of the Saudi banks (in comparison with the volume of economic activity generally) is the fact that the government engages directly in the financing of the [country's] most important economic activities, either via its budget or via specialized loan institutions which set very easy terms and, in practice, do not charge any interest. This makes it logical for Saudi citizens to seek out these loan institutions in order to finance their housing, industrial, and agricultural projects. Nevertheless, the trend of current developments will, in time, inevitably lead to an increase in the share of commercial banks in the country's credit loan activity. This will occur along with a growth of individuals' awareness of banks and a modification in the behavior of depositors in the direction of more demand for market interest rates above 6 percent, or slightly less sometimes since many Saudis still insist on this [low interest rate] due to religious considerations. Furthermore, there is also increasing competition among banks, their experience and expertise is becoming more well-grounded, and there is a branching out of their credit loan operations.

The Commercial Banks Are Looking Abroad

Commercial banks in Saudi Arabia traditionally restrict their activities to that of financing current and short-term operations. Among the most important of these operations are the providing of financial aid to contractors and importers operating in Saudi Arabia and the financing of the two sectors of trade and services. However, due to the pressure of new requirements and continual developments in the markets both of the region and of the world, the banking apparatus in Saudi Arabia is moving in the direction of more diversification and integration in its types of activities. One of the most important developments in this domain which has taken place has been the fact that the banking apparatus has entered important foreign markets such as those in Bahrain and London. In Bahrain the Riyadh Bank, jointly with the Credit Luni Bank, has established a foreign banking unit which has permitted the Saudi banking apparatus to enter the field of administering consolidated loans and to enter the international finance market. In London, in 1975, SAMA established the Saudi International Bank in which it owns 50 percent of the shares, 2.5 percent of the shares are owned by the National Commercial Bank and the Riyadh Bank, and the rest of the shares are owned by foreigners. This means that this bank is controlled by the Saudis, and within a short period of time the bank has acquired importance as SAMA's commercial arm in international markets and as the most important channel for Saudi public and private investments.

Liquidity Crisis

Since 1979 the liquidity of the Saudi banking apparatus has been experiencing continual pressures due to the enticement of high interest rates paid on foreign currencies, especially the dollar, and due to the fact that individuals have large cash surpluses for which there are no domestic opportunities for investment available which are profitable and are a safe investment.

The monthly statistics of the IMF clearly reflected these pressures, especially during 1979. During that year, reserves in Saudi banks, all at once, decreased from 22.1 billion riyals to 13.6 billion riyals. In contrast to this, deposits increased only 1 billion riyals (from 30 billion to 31 billion). The monetary authorities were

forced to use part of SAMA's foreign assets to provide liquidity to the commercial banks and to enable them to finance the large-scale conversions to U.S. dollars and other currencies. This was reflected in the decrease in Saudi foreign [currency] reserves between the end of 1978 and September 1979, as well as a decrease in SAMA's foreign assets of about 10 billion riyals between the end of 1978 and the middle of 1979.

The volume of conversions which took place during this period of time becomes clear when we see the tremendous increase in credit loans which were made during 1979. They increased from 14.4 billion riyals at the end of 1978 to 26.73 billion riyals by the end of 1979, that is, an increase of 83 percent in 1 year. In contrast to this, deposits increased only 3 percent. At the same time, foreign assets in the commercial banks, during this period, increased from 11.55 million riyals to 18.19 million riyals, that is, an increase of 71 percent.

1980 Trends

Last year the pressure on the banks' liquidity continued, and there was a continuation of the trend of rising interest rates in the world markets. Consequently there was a continuation of the trend to convert money into dollars and other currencies and to make deposits in foreign currencies, both within the Saudi banking apparatus and directly in banks abroad. This trend is especially seen in the continual inflation of the banking apparatus's foreign assets, the value of which has gone up from approximately 16.88 billion riyals at the end of the first quarter of 1980 to about 27.31 billion riyals by the end of September of the same year, that is, an increase of approximately 62 percent within 62 percent within 6 months. Another factor which has increased the pressure on the liquidity of the commercial banks has been the continual large increase in credit loans, even though it is difficult to determine what percentage of them has been used for discount operations, dollar investments, etc. Many of these investments do not show up in bank statistics in view of the fact that they end up outside Saudi Arabia and do not remain in the [Saudi] banking apparatus (as deposits in foreign currencies). During the second and third quarters of 1980, credit loans to the private sector increased from about 28.44 billion riyals to about 33.59 billion riyals, that is, an increase of about 18 percent in 6 months. On the other hand, demand deposits during the same period increased only about 9 percent. In contrast to this, foreign currency deposits increased from 1.9 billion riyals at the end of 1979 to about 4.71 billion riyals by the end of October 1980. This increase was reflected in the total amount of near-money in the banking apparatus, which rose from 11.28 billion riyals at the end of 1979 to 17.32 billion riyals in October 1980.

It is clear that continued conversions into foreign currencies, especially the dollar, have greatly increased the pressure on commercial banks' reserves which have continued to decline--down to a total of 8.57 billion riyals in October 1980 as opposed to 22.12 billion riyals at the end of 1978 and 13.59 billion riyals at the end of 1979 (according to I.F.S. figures). Liquidity in the banks (the ratio of reserves to deposits) thus decreased from 73.6 percent at the end of 1978 to 24.7 percent by the end of October 1980. In contrast to this, the ratio of credit loans to deposits during this same period increased from 47.9 percent to about 100 percent. The indicators just quoted give a clear idea concerning the size of the liquidity crisis experienced by Saudi banks during 1979 and 1980, and they show what tremendous burdens the monetary authorities have had to assume because of this. In fact, Saudi

Arabia, via SAMA and the Ministry of Finance, has continually been forced to pump large sums of cash into the banking apparatus in order to meet the great demand for currencies and absorb the surplus in supply of riyals, and consequently lessen the pressure on the local currency. As has already been indicated, some of the effects of this government support have shown up in the decrease of SAMA's foreign assets, with a growth of 7.5 billion riyals during the second quarter of 1979. And we should bear in mind that these assets are mobile assets, are affected by oil revenue developments, and cannot always be used as a standard.

The burdens of this situation are also shown by another indicator, which is the increase in government deposits in the commercial banks and which reflect part of the process of the government supplying them with liquidity. These deposits increased by about 900 million riyals during the first 9 months of 1980, and we should bear in mind that this increase is only an indicator of a trend and does not represent a definite numerical factor.

Interest Rate Structure: Market Factors and Local Custom

One must acknowledge that the principal reason for such conversions into foreign currencies is not only the increase in interest rates paid on them, but also the decrease in interest rates paid on the riyal and the fact that these latter interest rates may not go beyond a given ceiling. This makes absorption of the pressures on domestic liquidity depend upon this liquidity being available from the monetary authorities directly, rather than via the machinery of interest rates and being influenced by classical monetary devices. If this exception to the rule is possible in Saudi Arabia, because of the enormity of the government's foreign currency reserves and because of the development of procedures for monitoring the banks' utilization of liquidity revenues, nevertheless it remains the basis of a striking phenomenon--which is the lack of homogeneity and multitude of interest rates present in this single [Saudi] market. In particular, there is a great disparity between interest rates between banks, which in some cases have gone up to almost 20 percent, and the interest rates on deposits and credit loans. Due to the pressure and continuation of international circumstances, a unique interest rate structure has emerged which involves three levels. For the banks' "preferred" customers--that is, those who actually deposit their money in the banks, with the interest payments generally being very low--the interest rate on current credit is between 7 and 9 percent. This rate goes up to 12 and sometimes even 14 percent for additional credit and loans. For non-Saudi and new Saudi customers the interest rate is 17 or 18 percent, that is, it approaches that of the interest rates between banks.

The thing which permits this disparity in interest rates on credit loans is the fact that the interest rates on deposits are basically not market-related and differ from depositor to depositor. Most of the Saudi deposits (some sources estimate 75 to 80 percent of them) pay commission interest rates which sometimes are no more than 2 percent. These interest rates, in any case, may not exceed 6 to 8 percent--this being the rate which many Saudis believe is the [highest] acceptable rate of profit or return which can be legitimately paid on capital assets. The availability of this cheap source of deposits greatly lessens the effects of the rise in interest rates between the banks and the cost of short-term loans for financing emergency liquidity requirements. This also permits the banks to maintain some of the favorable credit terms, at relatively low interest rates, which they extend to their preferred customers.

It should also be pointed out that much of the financing of industrial operations and some construction activities and services is accomplished via the specialized banks on long-term bases and without interest payments. One could consider this to be a special type of credit loan which makes it possible to overcome the vicissitudes of the market and which provides investors with a cheap and stable source of financing.

Specialized Loan Institutions

In Saudi Arabia, at the present time, there are six specialized loan institutions which are operating. In terms of the volume of credit loans granted, the most important of these are the General Investment Fund, the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, and the Real Estate Development Fund.

The General Investment Fund is considered to be one of the oldest institutions which specialize in medium-term and long-term loans in Saudi Arabia. It was established in 1971 for the purpose of providing for the financial requirements of large industrial and commercial projects being undertaken by public sector corporations. It does its financing by means of loans or joint ownership.

These projects are mostly so large and costly that it is difficult for the private sector to carry them out. We should also bear in mind that one of the basic principles of the Saudi government is to participate as a partner with the private sector in these projects after they are established and developed by means of having most of their shares put up for sale to the public (for example, the SABIC projects).

The Saudi Industrial Development Fund specializes in financing industrial projects established by the private sector and in financing electric utilities projects. The Real Estate Development Fund is concerned with providing financing for housing projects to individuals and corporations. All of these institutions do not charge interest on their loans--which are generally long-term loans.

Statistics from SAMA give a clear idea of the rapid development of these institutions and of the great increase in the role which they play in financing economic and investment activity in the country. According to SAMA's 1979 annual report, the share of these institutions in total loans made by the banking apparatus to the private sector increased from about 41 percent in the 1975/76 fiscal year to about 65 percent in the next fiscal year (1976/77). The absolute value of loans granted by these institutions to the private sector during the aforementioned fiscal year (1976/77) tripled. Specialized loan institutions also kept for themselves the lion's share of domestic loan activity in the fiscal year 1977/78. During that year their share of this activity totalled about 63.6 percent. But in the fiscal year 1978/79 they surrendered their position of leadership to the commercial banks. In that year their share of the total activity went down to 46.7 percent.

This decrease in the relative volume of loans extended by these specialized institutions is attributable to two basic factors: The first factor is that these institutions increased their loan activities to a great and unusual degree during 1975 and 1976 in order to keep pace with the great demand for establishing industrial and housing projects. This was then followed by a type of levelling off in the market, and the result was that demand retreated back to its normal, more moderate levels. One noticed, for example, a great decrease in credit extended by the Real Estate Development Fund during 1978 and 1979, after the peak which was reached in 1977 in an

effort to solve the housing crisis and to provide apartments for both native Saudi citizens and foreign residents. The housing crisis led to a great demand for housing construction in order to benefit from high rents, but this demand quickly created a situation of large supply which resulted in a decrease in demand for construction activity.

Thus a part of the mission of the specialized banks in Saudi Arabia (that of financing initial growth) could be considered to be of a temporary nature. But the second part of their mission--that is, providing long-term loans for both public and private projects--will no doubt essentially remain in existence, although it will assume its normal proportion within the framework of the banking apparatus's activities as a whole.

The second factor responsible for this decrease in volume of activity on the part of the specialized banks--representing activity which is being assumed by the commercial banks--is the rapid development which the commercial banks are undergoing. This has been especially true after the process of Saudiization and the great expansion in branch banks and in various operations which has been a result of Saudiization. This is an expansion which will not reach its limit in the near future in view of the great capacities and potential which are still not being exploited in the Saudi financial market.

Table 1. Development of Most Important Saudi Monetary and Banking Indicators During the Period from the End of 1977 Until the End of the Third Quarter of 1980 (in billions of riyals, unless otherwise indicated)

	1977	1978	1979 (end of second quarter	End of 1979	Percentage change 1978/79	1980 (end of third quarter	Percentage change 1979/80
Monetary reserves							
Foreign reserves minus gold (in millions of dollars)	299.3	19,200[1]	18,099	19,273	+0.3%	23,896	+24%
SAMA's foreign assets	208.27	198.95	187.20	207.46	+4%	266.45	+28%
Commercial banks							
Reserves	13.03	22.12	18.01	13.59	-24.5%	9.28	-31.7%
Foreign assets	11.28	11.55	12.47	18.19	+57.5%	27.31	+50%
Credit loans to private sector	10.68	14.40	20.84	26.73	+85.6%	33.59	+25.6%
Demand deposits	22.16	30.03	28.97	31.00	+3%	33.71	+8.7%
Government deposits in commercial banks	0.39	0.75	1.23	0.84	+12%	1.63	+62%
Foreign currency deposits	1.30	1.20	1.50	1.90	+58%	3.82	+101%
Liquidity							
Cash	38.41	49.21	49.63	54.70	+11%	58.82	+7.5%
Near-money	7.15	8.83	10.25	11.28	+27%	16.41	+45%

1 Beginning April 1978 there occurred a change in the definition of Saudi foreign currency reserves and, because of this, currencies used to cover money in circulation, at that time amounting to about $5.3 billion, were put up for sale. However, Saudi Arabia, according to a special agreement made with the International Monetary Fund, only considers a portion of its liquid assets, and assets which can be readily converted into liquid assets, to be foreign reserves. (Source of information: International Monetary Fund monthly statistics)



Figure 1. Increases in Credit Loans and Foreign Deposits, and Decline in Bank Reserves

Key:

1. In billions of riyals
2. Demand deposits
3. Credit loans to private sector
4. Foreign assets in commercial banks
5. Reserves
6. Time deposits
7. Source: IMF monthly statistics
8. 35
9. 30
10. 25
11. 20
12. 15
13. 10
14. 5
15. 1978
16. 1979
17. 1980

Financing of Small Projects

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 26

[Article: "The Saudi Holland Bank: Emphasis on Financing Small and Medium-Size Projects"]

[Text] Capital Increased from 105 to 210 Million Riyals, and Credit Loans Increased 33 Percent.

Shaykh 'Abd al-Rahman al-Freij Elected Chairman of the Board

In 1930 the Holland Bank was the first foreign bank established in Saudi Arabia. Since that time the bank continued operating until, in 1978, it was transformed into a Saudi bank and renamed the Saudi Holland Bank. The ownership of most of the bank's shares was turned over to Saudi shareholders, within the scope of the plan for "Saudiization" of the foreign banks.

The capital of this bank--which was the second bank in 1978 to be transformed into a Saudi bank--was set at approximately 105 million Saudi riyals.

The bank has been able to occupy a prominent position in the domestic financial market. It has done this by means of its effective participation in the economic development which Saudi Arabia is undergoing. This bank has managed to establish a network of 12 branch banks which cover the principal commercial and industrial centers of Saudi Arabia.

The bank's annual report dealing with its operations in 1980 points out that assets increased 27 percent. The value of these assets increased from 2.8 billion riyals at the end of 1979 to 3.566 billion riyals by 31 December 1980. In the same year, deposits also increased 25 percent. They totalled 2.965 billion riyals [by the end of 1980] as opposed to 2.371 billion riyals at the end of 1979. Total loans and credits increased 33 percent. Last year they totalled 1.929 billion riyals as opposed to 1.45 billion riyals at the end of 1979. This was in addition to the noticeably large increase in terms of credit facilities extended and activities dealing with financing industrial and agricultural projects. This growth impelled the bank board to double its capital--from 105 to 210 million riyals.

At the beginning of this year the bank underwent a change of leadership. Last 5 April the members of the board elected Shaykh Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Freij as chairman of the board.

He succeeds the previous chairman of the board, the late Husayn al-'Attas. Mr Muhammad Husayn al-'Attas had been appointed as a member [of the board] in order to fill the vacant position until the expiration of the present board's term of office.

Foreign Banks' Role

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 27

[Interview with 'Abdallah Abu al-Samh, director general of the Saudi French Bank: "The 'Saudiization' Plan Has Benefited Foreign Banks"]

[Text] The Level of Interest Rates in Saudi Arabia Has Not Been Influenced by the Worldwide Rise in Interest Rates

What is the situation with regard to the foreign banks which, during the last 3 years, have been transformed into Saudi banks in accordance with the plan for "Saudiization" of these banks? Mr 'Abdallah Abu al-Samh, director general and authorized member of the board of the Saudi French Bank--the only bank which has undergone "Saudiization" which has a Saudi director general--answered this question during the following interview which was held with him:

[Question] What was the effect of transferring most of the bank's shares to Saudi shareholders?

[Answer] The "Saudiization" plan was beneficial to the bank and has generally been beneficial to the foreign banks, the majority of shares of which are now owned by Saudis. When we became a Saudi bank, we became able to obtain favorable [credit] terms and consequently we acquired more ability to expand. The bank's capital increased from 100 to 200 million Saudi riyals, and this year, along with our reserves, it will total 400 million riyals. Furthermore, the number of branches of the bank has increased from 2 branches in 1977 to 18 branches--scattered throughout Saudi Arabia--this year. We are also planning to open up new branches next year. Previously, before "Saudiization," it was very difficult for us to open up new branches and we were not even able to obtain appropriate favorable [credit] terms. But after "Saudiization" we have become one of the most active banks in Saudi Arabia.

[Question] What is your assessment of the results of the bank's operations in 1980? What have been the initial results?

[Answer] Assets increased from 5.528 billion Saudi riyals at the end of 1979 to 11.037 billion riyals by 30 June 1980. Also, total deposits during the same period increased from 1.742 billion riyals to 4.789 billion riyals. Credit loans during 1980 increased from 1.610 billion riyals to 2.807 billion riyals. These figures needless to say, show great development.

This year we expect a growth in the banks' assets of between 25 and 30 percent. This is attributable to the big growth in the banks various activities and is a result of economic growth in Saudi Arabia generally.

[Question] What have been the trends in interest rates in Saudi Arabia?

[Answer] Interest rates did not go up in Saudi Arabia as they did in other countries. This is attributable to the fact that the people in Saudi Arabia are not concerned with interest payments since Islamic teachings forbid using them in transactions. This was responsible for the fact that the cost of credit loans was not affected by the hugh increase in interest rates which the world has been experiencing for about the last 2 years.

[Question] What is your opinion concerning the status of Arab investments abroad?

[Answer] Arab investments abroad have both their positive and negative aspects. For the Arabs they create international power by means of effective participation in international investment and financial activities. But investing Arab money abroad decreases participation [by Arab money] in the building of the economies of the Arab countries. In fact, this phenomenon curtails the building of their economies to a great degree. In any case, Arab investors have come to realize that investing in the Arab countries has become something which is profitable. However, Arab investors want political stability and they want the Arab investment climate to be cleansed of all non-commercial dangers before they cast their lot with the Arab countries.

[Question] How developed is your bank administration, both in terms of technology utilized and availability of qualified personnel?

[Answer] During the last fiscal year the bank pursued its policy which had the objective of employing as many Saudis as possible and training them both locally and abroad in banking operations. In this regard, we have achieved good results. Of our bank employees, 131 of them have been trained in Saudi Arabia and 27 of them have been sent to Britain for special training courses lasting between 6 and 9 months. The bank is endeavoring to continue with this plan because it has brought us such tangible success in providing for all of our needs in terms of Saudi technical personnel. By 30 June there were 733 employees working in the bank, whereas in 1979 there were only 547 bank employees.

As for the bank's technological development, we have begun to use computers in our bank branches in the Eastern Province, and we plan to eventually do this in all of our bank branches so that we can bring our plan to completion and carry it out in all of the bank's branches in Saudi Arabia.

Annual Report: Saudi Bank

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic Jun 81 p 28

[Text] During 1980 the Budget Increased 60 Percent and Deposits Increased 61 Percent

The Saudi Bank has issued its annual report for 1980. It includes a presentation by Dr Shafiq al-Akhras, chairman of the board and director general, concerning the bank's activity during the past year and plans for the coming year. The following is a summary of Dr al-Akhras's presentation:

The year 1979 was a year of reinforcement and consolidation of the achievements which the bank has accomplished since it was founded. At the same time, it was a year for making preparations for new growth during 1980. The basic core of this new growth was expansion in the geographical scope of the bank's activities and consequently the development of its effectiveness in the various aspects of banking activity, along with the achievement of a significant increase in the bank's assets and profits. During 1980 the bank was actually able to accomplish its program of expansion and growth. The following indicators are eloquent testimony to this success.

1. The overall budget figure increased from Fr 2.305 billion in 1979 to Fr 3.685 billion by the end of 1980, that is, an increase of 60 percent. This numerical increase was accompanied by appropriate development in the structure of the budget.

The bank's private capital--its capital, reserves, and retained earnings--increased in accordance with the growth of the bank's budget. It totalled Fr 173.4 million [by the end of 1980] as opposed to Fr 136 million at the end of 1979, that is, an increase of 27 percent. Paid-up capital totalled Fr 150 million after payment of the second installment of the capital gains on 1 December 1980. The two remaining installments will be paid during 1981. The third installment will be paid next June and the fourth and last installment will be paid before the end of the year.

Total bank deposits increased 61 percent between the end of 1979 and the end of 1980. During this same period, deposits by individuals doubled and deposits by the Arab central banks increased 63 percent.

Along with this increase in the bank's deposits and private capital, there was an increase in, and diversification of, the bank's investments, particularly in the field of documentary credit and financing operations pertaining to the importation of oil from the Arab countries. The bank was also active in the administration of, as well as in participating in the administration of, a number of international loans. There were 12 such loans during 1980 as opposed to 6 such loans the year before. The effects of this activity were reflected in the bank's resources in terms of interest payments and commissions and, consequently, its profits.

2. The bank reached the end of this fiscal year with a total in earnings which, before taxes and before [transfers to] debt reduction reserves, amounted to Fr 20.1 million as opposed to Fr 16.3 million at the end of 1979, that is, an increase of 85 percent. After the transfer of Fr 9.8 million to debt reduction reserves, total taxable earnings were Fr 20.3 million as opposed to Fr 10.6 million at the end of 1979, that is, an increase of 92 percent. Net earnings after taxes totalled Fr 11.7 million as opposed to Fr 6.1 million at the end of last year, that is, an increase of 93 percent. During the same period of time the size of the budget increased 60 percent, and this indicates tangible progress in the bank's profitability.

The bank's plan for the coming year will be emphasizing the following points:

Reinforcement of the bank's international orientation and development of its relations with international banks and institutions. In doing so the bank will make use of its branch in London.

Consolidation of the bank's activities, expansion of the bank's financing base both in the Arab countries and internationally, with emphasis on short-term investments, and maintenance of harmony between the rates of growth of the bank's deposits, investments, and private capital.

Strengthening the bank's relations with its customers and diversification of the services which it offers to them by means of utilizing its new branches specializing in this field, which are located in London and in the city of Cannes in France, and its branch company in Geneva which specializes in administering private investments --and consequently continuing efforts to increase deposits by individuals and corporations.

Emphasis on participating in operations and transactions which serve to increase financial relations between Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries, on the one hand, and between Saudi Arabia and the European countries, on the other hand, in addition to strengthening the bank's role in these fields.

Completion of the program of geographical expansion within the general guidelines established by the board in terms of priorities and time-frames.

Table 2.1. Balance Sheet (in French francs)

	1979	1980
Assets		
Cash and accounts in banks	1,455,129,000	2,398,500,000
Portfolio of securities	24,387,000	18,752,000
Loans and discounted bonds	730,945,000	1,116,495,000
Various debtors	70,922,000	116,634,000
Investments	18,159,000	27,467,000
Fixed capital and various assets	5,793,000	7,445,000
Total assets	2,305,335,000	3,685,293,000
Stockholders' Equity and Liabilities		
[Liabilities]		
Demand deposits	139,226,000	335,825,000
Time deposits	1,968,644,000	3,057,432,000
Total deposits	2,107,870,000	3,393,357,000
Various creditors	24,328,000	30,445,000
Various claims	36,482,000	88,112,000
Total liabilities	2,168,680,000	3,511,914,000
Stockholders' Equity		
Paid-up capital at a rate of Fr 1,000 per share	125,000,000	150,000,000
Legal reserve	276,000	583,000
Retained earnings	11,379,000	22,796,000
Total stockholders' equity	136,655,000	173,379,000
Total stockholders' equity	2,305,335,000	3,685,393,000
Accounts Receivable		
Documentary credits	350,007,000	1,156,283,000
Sureties	363,033,000	436,912,000
Various accounts	265,296,000	414,373,000
Owned securities	75,805,000	1,022,964,000
Deferred settlement terms	348,618,000	449,206,000

Table 2.2. Profit and Loss Statement

	Year Ended 31 Dec 79	Year Ended 31 Dec 80
Income		
Interest payments	182,487,000	333,788,000
Commissions	16,410,000	24,176,000
Total income	198,897,000	357,964,000
Expenses		
Interest expenses	151,047,000	285,759,000
General and administrative expenses	29,350,000	40,859,000
Amortizations	2,203,000	1,196,000
Supplies	5,736,000	9,842,000
Total expenses and supplies	188,335,000	337,656,000
Earnings before [income] taxes	10,562,000	20,308,000
Income taxes	4,428,000	8,584,000
Net earnings	6,134,000	11,724,000
Earnings retained at beginning of fiscal year	5,440,000	11,379,000
Transferred to legal reserve	(195,000)	(307,000)
Retained earnings	11,379,000	22,796,000

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WIFE OF MUSLIM BROTHER LEADER ASSASSINATED

Oppression by Syrian Regime Alleged

Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No 25, 17 Jun 81 p 28

[Unsigned Editorial]

[Text] There is a real, full-fledged revolution in Syria, with all the cultural implications of that word. On the one hand there is a disintegrating regime that has lost all justifications for life and survival, and on the other hand there are struggling leaders who have all the ingredients for existence and for creativity. An Islamic revolution is being born in Syria from this growing conflict between the ideology and history of Muslims and a reality that is quite different from this ideology and history. This is the reality in which land, history and civilization are being sold; opium and tools of torture are being bought; and oppression and injustice are being freely distributed. There is a growing conflict between Muslims who are striving for unity and the reality that is imposing regionalism and fragmentation on them. [There is a growing conflict between] Muslims who dream of justice and freedom and the reality that is imposing injustice and subjugation on them.

Other than this conflict, it was inevitable that in a stage during which the Islamic tide was regressing, a revolution against a regime that has been trying to stifle our historical experience and to rob our nation of its cultural characteristics would be kindled. This is the sectarian Ba'th regime and the pre-Islamic retrogression. Thus, the revolution goes forward: the revolution is not a mood that befalls faithful and enthusiastic young people; it is a necessity and an inevitability that accompanies the movement of history and works by means of its progress so as to make this religion triumph over all religions.

Today, the Arab homeland--and the Syrian regime is part of it--is the sick man of the world. One looks at the seats of power and finds them occupied only by illiterate men, mad men, conspiring killers, capitulators or . . . . Despite their legendary wealth Arab leaders cannot even protect their borders. Instead, they import policemen and colonialists just as they import alcohol, blondes and perfumes.

In Syria the sectarian Ba'thist regime--like its bitter counterpart in Iraq, the tribal Ba'thist regime, and like other regimes in this free-for-all homeland--represents the most dangerous aberration [of government] that the gloomy age of colonialism produced. These regimes borrow from Nazism and Zionism the most horrible methods of murder and destruction [practiced by these two systems]. The difference is that Nazis killed non-Germans and Zionists killed non-Jews, but these regimes find no other victims but their oppressed and helpless peoples.

Have you heard of a law that prosecutes people merely for their feelings, their sentiments and their emotions and then sentences them to death for having these feelings? In Damascus sympathizing with the Muslim Brothers carries a death sentence. Nevertheless, the fire will not be extinguished, and the wrath will not be abated until those tyrants, who assume the garb of the masses to crush the masses, fall. Today, it is the turn of the masses to speak.

The gap that exists between the regime and the masses is growing. The intra-Ba'th struggle is at its most intense, and the army is being torn by sectarian privileges and excesses. There are breakdowns everywhere. Truthfully, everything is also a reflection of the historic transformation that is being forged and rushed into maturity by the fighting new leaders.

In Damascus and from Damascus a special team set out to go to Aachen in West Germany to kill a woman whose only fault was that she was preparing meals for her activist husband, looking after his children and organizing his papers.

The wife is Binan al-Tantawi, the daughter of the venerable Muslim scholar, 'Ali al-Tantawi. The husband is Mr 'Isam al-'Attar, one of the historical leaders of the Muslim Brothers movement. Ever since the movement's inception in Syria, he has been close to Dr al-Siba'i, the movement's inspector general. In 1954 after Dr al-Siba'i left Syria and went to Europe to study, Mr 'Isam assumed the responsibilities of deputy inspector general. He assumed the same responsibilities in 1957 when Dr al-Siba'i became ill. However, he was officially elected inspector general of the Muslim Brothers in 1961. In the same year he became a representative for Damascus in the last legitimate Syrian parliament. He was barred from entering Syria on his way back from the pilgrimage in 1964.

(For more on 'Isam al-'Attar see the report on "The Islamic Revolution in Syria," AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI No 16).

Today, AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI is going to present to its readers this interview that was conducted with Mr 'Isam by an Arab journalist. This is an interview with a husband and an activist about the wife who lost her life in the fight with the infidels; this is an interview about the struggle and about the survival of the revolution.

Wife's Death Discussed

Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No 25, 17 Jun 81 pp 30-32

[Interview with 'Isam al-'Attar]

[Text] [Question] Did your late wife know that she was in danger?

[Answer] Yes. Previous assassination attempts made no distinction between me and any members of my family who might be with me. News that came to us from various sources affirmed that we were in serious danger, in varying degrees, and that we were all targets for murder by various means and methods.

[Question] Was your late wife afraid and did she wish that you would leave the life of struggle and activism which you have been living for years and lead a more secure, more comfortable and a more tranquil life?

[Answer] My wife, may God have mercy on her soul, used to fear for me and for her two children, Hadiyah and Ayman. But she did not fear for herself. She was fully prepared to give up her life for her religion, her nation, her country, her husband and her family.

We've been married for 22 years and not once while we were settled at home or on a journey, in sickness or in health, in good times or in bad times have I heard her ask me to give up the holy fight for God Almighty and to prefer security, comfort and tranquillity to a life dedicated to pleasing God and the interests of the nation and the country. Instead, she always encouraged me to persevere and to be undaunted. She stood by my side without any hesitation in the harshest and gloomiest days and circumstances.

I remember her telling me after one of the assassination attempts which along with previously obtained information indicated that she and her two children were targeted for death with me by the criminal killers--I remember her [as vividly] as though I could see and hear her now telling me as she held my hand, "Promise me, 'Isam, if the criminal tyrants kill me and kill your children, that you will not allow your grief to weaken your resolve. Promise me that you will continue to fight as you did before with the utmost of power, determination and perseverance. I also promise you, 'Isam--if it is your destiny to die for the cause--that we will follow the course we took together: the course of great Islam. We will follow this course until we obtain one of two good things: dying for the cause or achieving victory and meeting God Almighty and finding Him satisfied with us."

She won God's mercy and favor when she gave up her life for the cause. I am now left to travel this course by myself after losing the companion of my life and my fellow fighter.

[Question] Whom are you accusing of committing this heinous crime?

[Answer] I am not accusing anybody, but the investigation revealed and the public prosecutor announced that the murderers and the criminals came from Syria. They are affiliated with one of the organizations of the sectarian, dictatorship there. It is the criminal, bloody, sectarian dictatorship in Syria that is responsible for this.

[Question] What punishment are you asking for the criminal murderers if they are apprehended?

[Answer] I do not pay much attention to the petty criminals. It is the big criminals who must first pay the price [for their crime].

[Question] What about the petty criminals?

[Answer] The punishment decreed by God Almighty for the big criminals is what I ask for the petty criminals. I do not ask nor do I accept any judgment other than God's just judgment. He protects with His just punishment the lives of thousands of innocent people who would [otherwise] be exposed to brutal murder in Syria and everywhere on the earth. If it weren't for this, I would give up every personal right, and I would have pardoned and forgiven them. Nothing can make up for the life of my dear wife. She was more likely to pardon and forgive others; she had a big heart that never felt hatred or resentment toward a human being regardless of his offense. Notwithstanding different circumstances, her heart harbored nothing but pardon and forgiveness, true affection and good will to all people.

[Question] Do you think the killers and criminals will be apprehended?

[Answer] I don't know. Considerable political pressures are being applied by the sectarian dictatorship in Syria and by those regimes that stand and support it and place no value on truth, justice and human beings. They shed the blood of innocent people and do not fear God Almighty. But I will not stand still to any indifference to the criminals. I will not stand still if escape is made easy for them; if the matter is covered up; and if the real motive that is quite obvious to all people is hidden.

[Question] What if despite that, they are able to escape?

[Answer] I will consider every organization or agency that gives them shelter or protection an accomplice in their crime and accountable for it. That crime involved a degree of brutality and baseness that would make beasts in the jungle cringe. They killed an innocent woman, a mother and a wife; they killed her inside her home; she was wearing a housecoat, and she was unarmed; she did not have the means of defending herself. She had committed no offense, and there was no need to kill her. They killed her not with one, two or three bullets, but five. They shot her twice in the head; once in the neck; once in the shoulder and once in the armpit. With grenades and guns in their hands, they stepped over her bleeding body, searching the rooms of the apartment for the remaining members of the family. Had it not been for the protection of God, they could have disposed of the whole family, for the other members of the family were not at home at that

time. They would have killed them all, and Hafiz al-Asad would have been relieved of the responsibility of breaking into the Golan Heights as long as he was able to break into the home of 'Isam al-'Attar and kill one of the most innocent and most honorable women. He killed an Arab Muslim mother and a true, sincere freedom fighter for the cause of God Almighty.

[Question] Was there no security guarding the house when it was broken into and the dear lady was killed? What happened to the tight security that you had before?

[Answer] When I was positively forbidden before last Christmas from practicing any political activity, the security around my house was simultaneously removed. My family and I were left alone to face death, and we had nothing in our possession or in our home with which we could defend ourselves.

It seems that the Arab and Islamic course which we are pursuing has no appeal in the west or in the east or among the followers of either. Hence stem the difficult conditions from which we have suffered and from which we are still suffering all the time and everywhere.

[Question] A few foreign journalists are wondering if you will continue your active struggle after this horrible crime and this grievous blow that befell you and your family?

[Answer] I confess to you that this blow has cut me to the quick and that it has actually destroyed the mainstay of my family and my home. My suffering and my grief for Umm Ayman is unlimited. May God have mercy on her soul, she was a wife, a friend, a companion and a constant partner in every part of our private and public life. I would like to go on record here and to say for history's sake, in front of God Almighty and in front of Arabs and Muslims that Binan al-Tantawi, Umm Ayman, was largely responsible for every accomplisment I realized since we got married and for every position I assumed for the cause of God Almighty, in the service of great Islam and in the service of Arabs and Muslims.

As far as going on with the struggle is concerned, Let me give you the answer I gave to a few German journalists who asked me a similar question.

[I told them] if they killed all the members of my family one by one in front of me and if they killed me 1,000 times and I were to come back to life, I would fight for the cause of God.

We have all given our lives to God Almighty. Our dearly beloved Binan, whom we have lost for the cause, has gone before us to Paradise. When God wills it, we will meet again and we will be in the company of the prophets, the prophet's friends, those who have died in the cause of God and good people. There can be no better company than that of those. We would be very happy to die for the cause of God, and we long for such a death. Giving up our lives is our way of doing our duty, achieving victory and meeting the loved ones who went before us.

Tell your readers, my brother, wherever they are on the earth, tell them for me and my family that our faith, thank God, is stronger than the pain, the misfortunes and the blows. Tell them that our right and our just cause are stronger than bullets and death. Tell them that we do not fear the criminal murderers who are ruling in Damascus. We defy those murderers in Damascus--from the biggest comrade to the smallest follower. My chest is unprotected, and they can shoot me any time and anywhere. Let them shoot me in the chest or in the head as they shot my wife. Their bullets will carry me to Paradise and hurl them to the lowest depths of hell. These bullets will bring an end to their corrupt, criminal, bloody, dictatorship. It is enough for me that I meet my Almighty Maker after my wife and that I find Him satisfied with me.

[Question] Will your course of action be altered under the influence of this great tragedy?

[Answer] No. My course of action will not be altered under the influence of this great tragedy. My actions are never motivated by emotions, feelings and private influences; nor are they motivated by personal circumstances and considerations regardless what these circumstances and considerations are. My actions are always motivated by objective, disinterested considerations that are gauged by great Islam, by Arab and Muslim interests and by the interests of all human beings everywhere in the world. After that my family and I are sacrificing our lives for the truth and the considered legitimate interests that have and do become evident; we are sacrificing our lives for our solemn course: the independent, distinguished, upright course of Islam.

[Question] Is there anything else you would like to say to conclude this interview?

[Answer] Yes. I am not thinking now nor did I think in the past only of my wife or my family. To me every woman who loses her life in Syria or in any Islamic country is as dear to me as Binan, and every orphan girl or boy are as dear to me as Hadiyah and Ayman are.

Thousands of good men, pure women and innocent children have lost their lives in Syria. To me those people were dearer to me than myself, and they were like my relatives and my family.

There are now in Syria over 10,000 men and women prisoners and detainees about whom the world knows almost nothing. Most of these innocent prisoners and detainees are being liquidated by the lackeys of the sectarian dictatorship in droves, one after the other. They are being massacred in massacres like the Tudmur massacre. These are fearful massacres, unseen by human eyes.

Through the free honorable media I am appealing to the conscience of the whole world; I am appealing to the international amnesty and human rights committees, to all concerned international organizations and to every free person on the face of the earth to take action that would save thousands of innocent people before it is too late.

Arabs and Muslims, I assure you the sectarian dictatorship that exists in Syria today will not last. We will bring down this criminal government, and we will give back the people their freedom and their rights. We will establish, God willing, an Islamic life and an Islamic government that express the people's conviction, their will and their choice. Tell the faithful the good news.

Appeal to World Made

Cairo AL-MUKHTAR AL-ISLAMI in Arabic No 25, 17 Jun 81 pp 33-36

[Article by 'Isam al-'Attar written in Aachen, West Germany, dated 1 April, 1981]

[Text] I am not making this appeal as one of the leaders of my country, as one of the Muslim leaders or as a leader of one of the Islamic movements in the world. I am making this appeal as a human being, a husband, a father and a citizen without any other qualities or titles. If the clear word of truth cannot be heard or accepted unless it is linked with attributes and titles or unless it is backed by armies, tanks and airplanes, then we can say goodbye to truth, justice, humanity and its supreme values as well as to the human race and its future on this earth.

The bloody dictatorship that exists now in Syria has killed my wife, Binan al-Tantawi, the mother of my children, the mainstay of my family and my life. This sinful, dictatorial government has killed her in West Germany, in Aachen, in clear daylight. Through the German investigating authorities and the various media the whole world has found out about this bloodcurdling crime.

My wife, Binan al-Tantawi, is a 37-year old housewife who lived her life with me in exile. Like me, she was forbidden from entering our country and going back to our town, our home and our families since 1964. My wife Binan, as all those who know her in our country and in the West will attest, is a good woman. She never harbored in her heart hatred to any person. She never harmed a friend or an enemy. She wanted people everywhere to be happy, and she made an effort to help everyone she could help without hesitation. She did not boast about helping others; she sought no favors from those she helped; and she sought no reward except that which God Almighty would grant her.

My wife was an affectionate, sensitive person. She would weep profusely for people's suffering. She was, nevertheless, always brave and optimistic. She loved her small, homeless family; her faraway venerable parents and her blood brothers [and sisters] in God Almighty. She loved an honorable, positive, fruitful life. Despite our difficult circumstances, she was always hopeful and smiling.

This wife, mother, dutiful daughter and faithful, good human being who was full of affection, optimism and life was the innocent victim of Hafiz al-Asad and his criminal gang of human beasts who are now ruling Syria.

Three individuals, who are members of this gang, entered the building in which we live in the city of Aachen on 17 March 1981. They got hold of one of our simple neighbors and after threatening to kill her, they forced her to knock on the door of our apartment so that my wife would open the door after seeing that it was our neighbor who was knocking. My wife was alone at home, and we did not have anything at home with which we could have protected or defended ourselves. My wife looked through the peephole and saw her good neighbor. She was reassured, and she opened the door. The beasts killed her immediately. They killed her even though she had committed no offense and there was no need to kill her. They shot her not once, twice or three times; they shot her five times. They shot her twice in the head; once in the neck; once in the shoulder; and once in the armpit. With grenades and guns in their hands they stepped over her bleeding body to search the rooms of the apartment for the remaining members of the family. Had it not been for the protection of God, they could have disposed of the whole family. Had not the other members of the family been away from home at the time, they would all have been killed without exception, and the whole family would have been wiped out. The reason for that is that the head of this household opposes the dictatorship in Syria and everywhere. He is popular, and people in Syria, in the Arab countries and in the other Islamic countries support him and have confidence in him.

This brutal crime, which, as I said, the whole world has found out about, is a very small illustration of the thousands of various brutal crimes that are committed by the sectarian dictatorship in Syria in prisons, detention camps, torture chambers, homes, markets, streets and public squares out of sight of the outside world. The conscience, the spokespeople and the writers of the outside world are not moved by all this when they see it.

What is the reason for this fearful silence? Why is this brutal crime that was committed in the city of Aachen in front of the whole world not being denounced? The world felt this crime; its perpetrators were discovered by western investigators and not by Syrians, Arabs or Muslims.

What is the reason for this fearful silence? Why are these brutal crimes and wholesale massacres which are arranged by the bloody, sectarian dictatorship in Syria being curiously ignored?

Are the silence and indifference due to the fact that the innocent blood that was shed in Aachen--and is still being shed in the various cities of Syria--is mostly Islamic blood? Are the silence and indifference due to the fact that Islamic blood has no value in the western and the free world?

Are the silence and indifference due to the fact that the blood that has been spilled--and is still being spilled--is Arab blood? Are the silence and indifference due to the fact that for the west Arab blood has the same value as Islamic blood?

Are the silence and indifference due to the fact that the blood that has been spilled--and is being spilled--is the blood of "creatures" from the Third World? Are the silence and indifference due to the fact that the

creatures of the Third World--whose raw materials are of interest to the west--are considered less than human?

I wonder [about this], living in exile in the west, threatened with death along with the rest of my family. In the aftermath of the Aachen crime which I cannot describe and after the more horrible crimes that are being perpetrated in my country by the thousands, I wonder [about this] as a human being, as a mere human being, without any other attributes: Where is the conscience of the world?

Where is the conscience of the whole world in general? Where in particular is the conscience of the world that describes itself as the free world, the world which reacts with sensitivity and force to simple, limited incidents of injustice if its special interests call for action and if such incidents befall certain people who espouse a few religions and who are citizens of a few countries. Where is this conscience? Why did it not take action for the horrible crimes that are being committed in our country and that move hearts of stone?

Where are the thinkers, the intellectuals and the free writers who usually articulate the conscience of the world inasmuch as they are truthful, honest and aware? Those people must always be the spokespeople for this articulate conscience, for its expressive pen and for its vital voice which is heard everywhere, demolishing the basic elements of injustice and tyranny wherever they may be?

Where are the authorized international organizations? Where are the international amnesty and human rights committees? Where are the universal and local organizations that are interested in people and in defending people behind any barriers and beyond any considerations?

I am holding the whole world responsible in the case of the brutal crimes and the alarming, wholesale and individual liquidations that are being perpetrated by the Syrian dictatorship inside Syria and abroad. I am holding the whole world responsible, not from a personal, national or ethnic perspective, but from a common human perspective which is linked with every person worthy of that noble and honorable name and attribute.

I deeply believe that the awakening of the world's conscience and a stance by the free people of the world against such horrible crimes--wherever they may occur on the earth--is a necessity for the deliverance of the whole world which can then pursue a course for a secure and a better future. It is for this reason that I am making this appeal to the conscience of the world.

'Isam al-'Attar, husband of the late Binan al-Tantawi

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